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MAY  18  1910 
LAW  .LISRAEY. 


A  TREATISE 


ON  THE 


LAV  OF  EMINENT  DOMAIN 


IN  THE 


UNITED  STATES 


BY 

JOHN  LEWIS 

t  »■ 


THIRD  EDITION 

a^oltjm:e  I 


CHICAGO 
CALLAGE  AN  &  COMPANY 
1909 


COPTEIGHT,   1888 
BY 

JOHN  LEWIS 


COPYBIGHT,    1900 
BY 

JOHN  LEWIS 


Copyright,  1909 

BY 

JOHN  LKWIS 


PEEFACE  TO  THIED  EDITION. 


The  existence  of  between  five  and  six  thousand  new  cases  on 
the  subject  of  Eminent  Domain,  decided  since  the  Second  Edi- 
tion was  published,  affords  sufficient  reason  for  a  New  Edition. 
These  new  cases  deal  with  new  questions,  new  conditions  and 
new  phases  of  old  questions.  The  same  plaji  has  been  followed, 
as  in  the  old  editions,  of  making  the  treatment  thorough  and 
exhaustive.  On  some  questions  the  old  authorities  have  been 
re-examined  and  the  text  rewritten.  On  all  points,  the  cita- 
tions have  been  brought  down  to  date.  Parallel  references  to 
the  Reporter  System,  the  Trinity  and  the  L.K.A.  have  been 
incorporated.  Wo  change  has  been  made  in  the  arrangement. 
The  sections  have  been  renumbered  and  the  old  numbers  placed 
in  parentheses,  so  that  any  section  can  be  readily  found,  whether 
referred  to  by  the  old  or  new  number. 

joH:jir  LEWIS. 

Chicago,  September,  1909. 


PEEFACE  TO  SECOND  EDITION. 


Tu  the  twelve  years  which  have  elapsed  since  the  publication 
of  the  first  edition,  more  decisions  have  been  handed  down  on  the 
subject  of  Eminent  Domain  than  in  all  the  previous  history  of 
the  country.  The  same  plan  has  been  pursued,  as  in  the  former 
edition,  of  making  the  citations  exhaustive.  One  hundred  and 
ninety-two  new  sections  have  been  added  and  the  number  and 
extent  of  the  notes  has,  probably,  been  doubled.  Half  the  in- 
crease in  the  size  of  the  work  will  be  found  in  the  seven  chapters 
which  treat  distinctively  of  constitutional  questions. 

iii 


IV 


PEEPACE. 


In  tlie  preface  to  the  former  edition  a  list  was  given,  showing 
the  number  of  cases  cited  from  each  State.  For  the  sake  of 
comparison  a  similar  list  is  subjoined,  in  which  are  included 
England,  Canada,  the  Territories  and  Federal  courts.  The  total 
number  of  cases  cited  is  12,822. 


ITew  York 1,728 

Pennsylvania     1,34*7 

Illinois   890 

Massachusetts 809 

Indiana    652 

Missouri 532 

i!^ew  Jersey 529 

Iowa 410 

Federal  Courts 380 

Michigan    356 

Minnesota    356 

Maine 327 

Wisconsin     305 

California    295 

Ohio 277 

Kansas   250 

England   245 

"New  Hampshire    228 

Kentucky   213 

Connecticut    208 

Nebraska    207 

Texas    198 

Georgia    196 

IsTorth  Carolina 183 

Louisiana 161 

Alabama     156 


Maryland 156 

Vermont     135 

Canada 108 

"Virginia 102 

Tennessee  . . ; 96 

Mississippi 87 

Colorado 85 

South  Carolina   85 

Arkansas    81 

Oregon   75 

Washington 68 

Ehode  Island 07 

West  Virginia 64 

Delaware    35 

Florida 32 

District  of  Columbia.  .  26 

Montana 22 

Nevada     16 

South  Dakota 15 

Utah 

Idaho    

North  Dakota 

Dakota  Territory    .  . 

Wyoming     

New  Mexico    

Oklahoma     


11 
6 
6 

2 
2 
1 
1 


The  notes  in  the  present  edition  have  been  numbered  in  suc- 
cessive series  of  1  to  99,  instead  of  in  a  separate  series  for  each 
section  as  in  the  old  edition.  This  accomplishes  the  same 
purpose  of  enabling  a  reference  to  be  made  to  any  note  of  any 
section,  and  at  the  same  time  economizes  space. 

JOHN  LEWIS. 


Chicago,  August,  1900. 


PBEFACE. 


PREFACE   TO   FIRST  EDITION. 


The  work,  which  is  now  offered  to  the  Profession  and  the 
Public,  was  commenced  fourteen  years  ago  and  has  been  prose- 
cuted with  as  much  assiduity  as  the  increasing  demands  of 
professional  life  would  permit.  Within  that  time  the  number 
of  reported  cases  upon  the  subject  treated  has  doubled;  and, 
what  is  of  gTcater  moment,  decisions  of  vast  importance  and 
far-reaching  consequence  have  been  rendered,  which  will,  if 
they  have  not  already,  produce  radical  changes  in  many  of  the 
legal  aspects  of  the  subject. 

Great  attention  has  been  paid  to  the  constitutional  side  of 
the  question,  and  nearly  half  the  book  is  occupied  with  a  dis- 
cussion of  the  proper  interpretation  of  the  words  "taken," 
'■public  use"  and  "just  compensation,"  as  used  in  the  consti- 
tutions of  the  several  States.  The  manner  in  which  this  part 
of  the  subject  has  been  treated  will  be  best  ascertained  by  an 
examination  of  the  work  itself,  but  a  few  words  of  explanation 
may  not  be  improper.  Very  early  in  the  preparation  of  the 
work  the  writer  became  convinced  that  the  earlier  cases  as  to 
what  constitutes  a  taking  were  based  upon  a  radically  defective 
interpretation  of  the  constitution,  which  not  only  denied  the 
right  to  compensation  in  many  cases  where  it  ought  to  be  given, 
but  greatly  embarrassed  the  property-owner  in  obtaining  it  in 
those  cases  in  which  it  was  conceded  to  be  due.  These  early 
cases  atacked  the  question  wrong  end  first,  so  to  speak,  through 
the  word  taken  instead  of  through  the  word  property.  It  is 
only  by  having  a  clear  and  correct  conception  of  the  idea  of 
property  that  a  uniform,  consistent  and  just  application  of  the 
constitution  can  be  made  to  the  many  complicated  and  varied 
cases  which  come  up  for  adjudication.  It  seems  to  the  writer 
that  the  principles  elaborated  in  the  third  chaapter,  and  which 
are  supjwrted  by  a  constantly  increasing  weight  of  authority, 
will  enable  such  an  ap)plication  to  be  made. 

The  chapter  on  the  meaaning  of  the  words  "public  use," 
is  written  upon  the  assumption,  which  accords  with  all  the 
authorites,  that  the  words  import  a  limtation  upon  the  power 
of  the  legislature.  Conceding  this  to  be  the  intent  of  the  words, 
whether  the  conclusions  reached  by  the  author  are  correct  must 


VI  PEEFACE. 

be  left  for  the  reader  to  judge.  They  have  been  reached  after 
years  of  consideration  and  the  gradual  resolution  of  many 
doubts  and  questions.  One  doubt  concerning  the  matter,  how- 
ever, remains,  and  that  is,  whether  the  words  in  question  were 
originally  intended  to  operate  as  a  limitation  at  all.  The  lan- 
guage of  the  provision  does  not  indicate  it.  "Private  prop- 
erty shall  not  be  taken  for  public  use  without  just  compensa- 
tion." If  the  intent  had  been  to  make  the  words,  public  use, 
a  limitation,  the  natural  form  of  expression  would  have  been: 
"Private  property  shall  not  be  taken  except  for  public  use,  nor 
without  just  compensation."  It  is  certainly  questionable 
whether  anything  more  was  intended  by  the  provision  in  ques- 
tion than  as  though  it  read,  "Private  property  shall  not  be 
taken  under  the  power  of  eminent  domain  without  just  com- 
pensation." Those  cases  which  virtually  give  this  interpreta- 
tion to  the  provision  and  at  the  same  time  hold  that  the  words, 
pubic  use,  are  a  limitation,  it  seems  to  the  author  are  not  logi- 
cally sound.  In  some  of  the  States  the  form  of  the  provision 
is  such  as  to  leave  no  room  for  doubt  that  a  limitation  was 
intended. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  comment  upon  that  part  of  the  work 
which  treats  of  "just  compensation,"  or  upon  what  has  been 
written  concerning  the  effect  of  the  constitutional  provision 
aas  a  whole. 

The  author  has  endeavored  to  make  the  citation  of  authori- 
ties exhaustive,  and  hence  numerous  cases  are  sometimes 
referred  to  in  support  of  propositions  which  are  not  disputed. 
While  this  may  seem  unnecessary,  it  leols  to  no  confusion  and 
the  advantage  is  gained  of  having  substantially  all  the  authori- 
ties at  hand  upon  a  given  point  when  desired  for  any  purpose. 

Over  six  thousand  cases  are  referred  to,  and  the  comparative 
extent  to  which  each  State  contributes  to  the  number  might 
be  made  the  subject  of  an  interesting  commentaary,  when  it 
is  remembered  that  they  are  an  indication  of  material  progress 
and  of  public  improveements,  but  perhaps  most  can  be  said  in 
the  fewest  words  by  giving  the  list  itself  and  leaving  the  reader 
to  his  awn.  reflections : 

ISTew  York   830  Indiana    366 

Massachusetts    599  New  Jersey 338 

Pennsylvania 534  Iowa 259 

Illinois   377  Missouri 232 


PREFACE. 


VII 


Maine 215 

Wisconsin 208 

ISTew  Hampshire    186 

Ohio 171 

Michigan    169 

Minnesota    159 

Kentucky   139 

California    135 

Connecticut    133 

Louisiana 98 

Vermont 98 

Kansas 88 

Georgia    87 

North  Carolina 83 

Maryland   81 


Tennessee 67 

Virginia 65 

Alabama     63 

Texas    61 

Nebraska    54 

Mississippi 44 

Arkansaas    43 

South  Carolina    43 

West  Virginia 34 

Ehode  Island    29 

Oregon    26 

Delaware    19 

Colorado     14 

Nevada 12 

Florida     6 


The  plan  has  been  adopted  of  numbering  the  notes  of  each 
section  consecutively,  and  in  order  to  prevent  confusion  the 
notes  of  each  section  are  headed  by  the  number  of  the  section 
to  which  they  belong.  This  plan  is  believed  by  the  author  to  be 
the  most  convenient  for  citation  and  reference,  and  advantage 
has  been  taken  of  it  to  refer,  in  the  table  of  cases,  to  the  par- 
ticular note  or  notes  in  which  each  case  appears. 

JOHN  LEWIS. 

Chicago,  June,  1888. 


TABLE   or  CONTENTS. 

VOLUME   I. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  POWER  DEFINED  AND  DISTINGUISHED. 

The  power  defined. 
Definitions  considered. 
Nature  of  the  power. 

Eminent  domain  distinguished  from  taxation. 
Distinguished  from  special  assessments  or  betterments. 
Distingviished  from  the  police  power. 

Distinguished  from  the  damaging  or  destruction  of  property   in 
cases  of  necessity. 
S.     Distinguished  from  the  war  power. 

CHAPTER  II. 
CONSTITUTIONAL  PROVISIONS. 

9.  In  general. 

10.  The  constitutional  provision  a  limitation,  not  a  grant. 

11.  States  having  no  constitutional  provision. 

12.  The  provision  in  the  federal  constitution. 

13.  Effect  of  a  change  in  the  constitution. 

14.  The  provisions  apply  only  to  the  power  of  eminent  domain. 

15.  Provision  in  the  federal  constitution. 

lG-01.     Constitutional  provisions  of  the  different  states  in  the  alpha- 
betical order  of  states. 

CHAPTER  III. 

WHAT  CONSTITUTES  A  TAKING:  GENERAL  PRINCIPLES. 

02.     Statement  of  the  question. 

6.3.  What  is  property? 

04.     Meaning  of  the  word  property  in  the  constitution. 

65.  Principles  which  determine  when  there  has  been  a  taking. 

66.  Changes  which  the  law  has  undergone. 

67.  08     Leading  cases. 

ix 


TABLE    or    CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  IV. 

WHAT  CONSTITUTES  A  TAKING:     WATEES. 

70.  Streams  defined  and  classified. 

71.  Rights  of  riparian  owners  in  the  flow  of  the  stream. 

72.  What  constitutes  a  reasonable  use  of  a  stream  by  an  upper  pro- 

prietor. 

73.  What  riparian  rights  in  the  flow  of  a  stream  attach  to  property 

held  for  public  use. 

74.  Abstracting  or  diverting  the  water  of  a  stream. 

75.  Increasing  the  quantity  of  water. 

76.  Interfering  with  the  regularity  of  the  current. 

77.  Pollution  of  the  water. 

78.  Changing  the  current  by  works  in,  across  or  near  the  channel  to 

the  injury  of  those  below. 

79.  Embankment  on  one  side  of  stream  causing  an  increase  of  flood 

water  upon  the  opposite  side. 

80.  Works  which  set  back  the  water  and  cause  a  flooding  of  the  lands 

above. 

81.  Bridges — Authority    to    construct — ^Damages    thereby — ^Interfering 

with  navigation. 

82.  Slaking  a  private  stream  public,  or  navigable,  by  statute. 

83.  Rights  of  riparian  owners  on  private  navigable  streams. 

84.  An  interference  with  sucli  rights  is  a  taking. 

85.  Damages  by  reason  of  improving  navigation. 

86.  Wliat  streams  are  public. 

87.  Rights  of  riparian  owners  on  public  navigable  streams. 

88.  Interfering  with  the  flow  of  public  streams. 

89.  Damage  to  authorized  works  on  public  streams. 

90.  Title  to  lakes  and  ponds. 

91.  What  constitutes  navigability. 

92.  The  question  of  title  to  the  bed  of  navigable  waters  and  of  the 

rights   of  riparian   owners   upon   such  waters  is   one  of   State 
policy  and  State  law. 

93.  Nature  and  limitations  of  the  title  to  the  bed  of  navigable  waters 

whether  in  the  public  or  riparian  owners. 
04-100     Rights  of  riparian  owners  on  public  waters. 

101.  Injury  to  riparian  rights  upon  public  waters  is  a  taking. 

102.  Interfering  with  access:     Railroads  and  other  works  below  high 

water  mark. 

103.  Establishing  harbor  lines  and  interfering  witli  piers  and  wharves. 

104.  Rights  of  riparian  owners  upon  lakes  and  ponds  and  what  inter- 

ference therewith  is  a  taking. 

105.  Withdrawing,  diverting  or  polluting  public  waters. 

106.  Miscellaneous  cases  in  regard  to  public  waters. 

107.  Riparian  rights  cannot  be  abolished  without  compensation. 

108.  Damages  from  discharge  of  sewer. 

109.  Discharging  water  upon  land;   injury  b}-  seeping;  saturating,  etc. 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  XI 

110.  Rights  respecting  surface  water. 

111.  What  constitutes  surface  water;  flood  waters  of  stream. 

112.  What  interference  with  surface  water  is  a  taking. 

113.  Misellaneous  cases  in  regard  to  surface  water. 

114.  Subterranean  waters. 

115.  Interference  with  natural  barriers  against  water. 

116.  Miscellaneous  cases  as  to  waters. 

CHAPTEE  V. 

WHAT  CONSTITUTES  A  TAKING:  ROADS  AND  STREETS. 
I.  General  Questions — Rights  of  Abutting  Owners. 

117.  Nomenclature  of  public  ways. 

118.  Distinction  between  rural  highways  and  urban  streets  as  to  the 

extent  of  the  public  right  or  easement. 

119.  What  is  meant  by  "abutting  owners." 

120.  Rights  of  abutting  owners:     Light,  air  and  access. 

121.  Origin  and  basis  of  the  rights  or  easements  of  lightj  air  and  access. 

122.  Further  as  to  the  right  to  light  and  air. 

123.  To  how  much  of  the  street  the  easements  of  light,  air  and  access 

extend. 

124.  Has  the  abutter  other  rights  or  easements  than  those  of  light,  air 

and  access? 

125.  Rights  of  abutting  owners  a  matter  of  state  law. 

126.  Rights  of  abutting  owners  as  adjoining  proprietors. 

127.  When  the  fee  of  streets  is  in  the  public  the  title  is  in  trust  for 

street  uses  only. 

128.  Ownersliip  of  the  fee  of  streets  and  distinctions  based  thereon. 

II.  Street  Grade  Cases. 

129.  Early  English  cases. 

130.  Value  of  English  precedent  in  constitutional  questions. 

131.  Leading  cases  in  the  United  States.     Callender  v.  Marsh. 

132.  Other  early  cases. 

133.  The  general  doctrine. 

134.  Ratio  decidendi  of  these  cases. 

135.  The  Ohio  cases. 

136.  The  law  in  Kentucky. 

137.  Interfering  with  access,  light  and  air  by  change  of  grade  not  a 

taking. 

138.  Peculiar   and   extraordinary   changes   of   grade,    and    changes    for 

some    ulterior    purpose    other    than    the    improvement   of   the 
street. 

139.  Lowering  grade:     Interfering  with  support  of  soil. 

140.  Raising  grade:     Encroachment  of  the  filling. 

141.  Damages  from  surface  water. 


11  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

142.  Interfering  with  natural  streams. 

143.  Unlawful  change  of  grade. 

144.  When  the  work  is  negligently  done. 

145.  Power  to  establish  grades  a  continuing  one. 

146.  Power  of  city  to  make  compensation. 

147.  Miscellaneous  cases. 

148.  Right  to   compensation  for   change   of   grade   under   statutes   and 

recent  constitutions. 

III.  Railroads  ijj  Stbeets. 

149.  In  general. 

150.  Classification  of  railroads. 

151.  Is  a  commercial  railroad  a  legitimate  use  of  a  street  or  highway? 

152.  Commercial  railroad  in  street:     Right  to  compensation  generally. 

153.  Right  to  compensation  when  fee  of  street  in  abutter. 

154.  Right  to  compensation  when  fee  of  street  in  the  public. 

155.  Right  to  compensation  when  fee  of  street  in  third  party. 

150.  Commercial  railroad  on  viaduct.     New  York  Park  Avenue  cases. 

157.  Elevated  railroads. 

158.  Horse  railroads. 

159.  Cable  railroads. 

160.  Steam  motor  railroads. 

161.  Electric  trolley  railroads. 

162.  Underground  railroads  in  streets. 

163.  Other  kinds  of  street  railroads. 

164.  Street  railroads.     General  conclusions. 

165.  Interurban  railroads. 

166.  Street  railroads  carrying  freight. 

167.  Railroads  in  streets.     General  conclusions. 

168.  Whether  a  railroad  is  a  proper  or  legitimate  street  use  is  a  ques- 

tion of  law. 

169.  Authority  to  occupy  a  street,  how  granted  and  construed. 

170.  Rights  of  company  as  to  manner  of  constructing  and  operating 

road. 

171.  The  doctrine  of  an  unreasonable  or  excessive  use  of  streets  by  rail- 

roads, as  a  basis  for  compensation. 

172.  Railroads  in  streets  constructed  without  authority  or  used  in  a 

way  not  authorized:     Remedies  of  abutters. 

173.  Switch  tracks  to  private  property  and  railroads  for  private  use. 

174.  Railroad  across  street:     Right  of  abutter  on  street  to  compensa- 

tion. 

175.  Right  of   municipality  having  the  fee  of  street  to  receive  compensa- 

tion. 

176.  When  the  owner  is  estopped  from  claiming  damages. 

177.  Measure  of  damages:     Remedies. 

178.  When  there  is  a  change  of  grade  in  connection  with  a  railroad  in 

a.  street. 

179.  Compensation  for  additional  track  or  change  of  use. 


TABLE    OF    CONTEXTS.  Xlll 

§  180.     Street  railroads  crossing  commercial  railroads. 

181.  Railroads  in  streets:     Miscellaneous  cases. 

IV.  Other  Uses  of  Streets. 

182.  What  are  legitimate  street  uses  generally. 
•    183.     Sewers  and  di'ains. 

184.  Water  pipes. 

185.  Gas  pipes. 

186.  Steam,  electricity,  etc. 

187.  Telegraph  and  telephone  poles. 

188.  Electric  wires  for  lighting  and  other  purposes. 

189.  Markets. 

190.  Destruction  of  or  injury  to  shade  trees  in  streets. 

191.  Interfering  with  access  by  obstructing  street  at  a  distance  from 

the  plaintiff's  property. 

192.  Damage  to  railroads,  water  pipes,  gas  pipes,  etc.,  by  the  grading 

and  improvement  of  streets. 

193.  Damages  to  railroads,  water  and  gas  pipes  by  the  construction  of 

sewers. 

194.  Miscellaneous  eases. 

195.  The  franchise  to  use  streets  and  its  incidents. 

V.  Damages    fkom    the    Vacation,    Discontinuance    and    Closino    of 
Streets  and  Highways. 

196.  The  power  to  vacate  streets  and  highways. 

197.  Right  to  compensation  for  the  vacation  or  closing  of  streets :     Gen- 

eral principles. 

198.  Private  rights  in  streets  and  highways. 

199.  What  is  special  damage  from  the  obstruction  of  a  street. 

200.  Vacating  or  closing  street  in  front  of  property. 

201.  Narrowing  street  in  front. 

202.  Vacating  or  closing  street  so  as  to  cut  off  access  in  one  direction. 

203.  When  the  vacated  part  is  beyond  the  next  cross  street  from  the 

plaintiff's  property. 

204.  Where  the  property  is  cut  off  entirelj',  though  the  street  is  left 

intact  in  front. 

205.  Vacation  and  discontinuance  of  country  highways. 

206.  When  damage  by  the  vacation  or  closing  of  streets  and  highways 

amounts  to  a  taking. 

207.  When  the  depreciation  of  value  from  the  vacation  and  closing  of 

streets  amounts  to  damage  or  injury  within  constitutions  and 
statutes. 

208.  Pennsylvania  decisions  on  the  subject. 

209.  Purpose  and  motives  of  the  vacation. 

210.  Exercise  and  construction  of  the  statutory  authority. 

211.  Effect  of  vacation  upon  private  rights  in  street. 

212.  Remedies. 


XIV  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

CHAPTEE  VI. 

OTHER  CASES  OF  TAKING. 

§  213.  Impairing  franchises. 

214.  When  the  franchise  is  not  exclusive. 

215.  When  the  franchise  is  exclusive. 

216.  What  is  an  interference  with  an  exclusive  franchise?     Bridges  and 

ferries. 

217.  Same:     Other  franchises. 

218.  Electrical  franchises  and  electrical  interference. 

219.  Change  of  use,  or  an  additional  use. 

220.  Change  of  use:     Instances. 

221.  New  burdens  on  railroad  right  of  way. 

222.  Joint  use  of  tracks. 

223.  Interfering  with  an  easement. 

224.  Kestrictive  covenants. 

225.  Possessory  rights  in  public  lands. 

226.  Mapping  territory  into  streets  and  blocks  for  future  improvement. 

227.  Establishing  building  lines. 

228.  Justifiable  entries. 

229.  Injuries  by  blasting. 

230.  Injury  to  business. 

231.  Highways  laid  out  adjacent  to  but  not  taking  one's  land. 

232.  Interfering  with  the  right  of  exclusion. 

233.  Easement  of  levee  in  Louisiana. 

234.  Interfering  with  the  right  of  support. 

235.  Consequential  injuries  to  property  by  operation  of  railroad:    Xoise, 

smoke,  cinders,  jarring,  vibrations,  etc. 

236.  Polluting  the  atmosphere. 

237.  When  the  public  use  of  land  produces  a  physical  or  structural  in- 

jury to  adjacent  land:     Disturbance  of  the  soil  by  pressure, 
vibration,  flooding  or  percolation. 

238.  If  the  use  of  property  for  public  purposes  produces  a  nuisance, 

those  injured  are  entitled  to  compensation. 

239.  Miscellaneous  decisions  as  to  what  constitutes  a  taking. 

240.  Damages  from  negligence. 

241.  Public  property  not  within  the  constitutional  provision. 

242.  Taking  under  the  guise  of  taxation. 

243.  Taking  under  the  guise  of  the  police  power:     Regulating  the  use 

of  property,  the  construction,  repair  and  height  of  buildings 
and  the  like:     Fire  limits. 

244.  Legislative    regulation    and    control    of    railroads    and   other    cor- 

porations:    Imposing  new  liabilities. 

245.  Regulating  or  prohibiting  businesses,   occupations,   contracts   and 

the  like. 

246.  Regvilating  rates  and  charges. 

247.  Taking,  injuring  or  destroying  property  in  the  abatement  of  nui- 

sances, or  when  made,  kept  or  used  in  violation  of  law. 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  XV 

§  248.     Compelling  railroads  and  otliers  to  make  alterations  and  construct 
works  for  the   purpose  of   promoting  the   public   safety,   con- 
venience and  welfare. 
249.    Taking  under  the  guise  of  the  police  power:     Conclusions. 

CHAPTEE  VII. 

MEANING  OF  THE  WORDS  "PUBLIC  USE." 

§  250.     Taking  for  private  use  unauthorized. 

251.  The  question  of  public  use  a  judicial  one. 

252.  State  of  the  authorities  as  to  the  meaning  of  the  words  "public 

use." 

253.  The  question  of  public  use  not  affected  by  the  agency  employed. 

254.  Nor  by  the  fact  that  the  use  or  benefit  is  local  or  limited. 

255.  Nor  by  the  necessity  or  lack  of  necessity  for  the  condemnation. 

256.  The  words  "public  use"  a  limitation. 

257.  Statement  of  doctrines. 

258.  Proper  construction  of  the  words  "public  use." 

259.  Highways :     Questions  of  public  use,  as  affected  by  their  character, 

purpose  or  other  circumstances. 

260.  Private  roads. 

261.  Toll  roads,  bridges  and  ferries. 

262.  Canals. 

263.  Railroads,  their  connections  and  appurtenances. 

264.  Lateral  and  branch  railroads,  switch  and  spur  tracks  to  private 

property. 

265.  Other   means   of   transportation;    the   telegraph,   petroleum   tubes, 

elevated  tramways,  etc. 

266.  Public  grain  elevators. 

267.  Urban  improvements:     Sewers,  water,  gas,  etc. 

268.  Electricity  for  light,  heat  and  power  and  works  for  generating  and 

transmitting  same. 

269.  The  supply  and  distribution  of  water  for  power  purposes. 

270.  Public  buildings:     Schools,  markets,  hospitals,  etc. 

271.  Public  parks  or  pleasure  drives. 

272.  Converting  spots  of  historic  interest  into  public  grounds:     Battle- 

fields. 

273.  Cemeteries. 

274.  Improvement  of  navigation. 

275.  Water  mills  and  water  power. 

276.  The  same:     Leading  cases. 

277.  The  same:     Law  in  the  different  States  at  the  present  time. 

278.  The  same:  Review  of  the  decisions. 

279.  Massachusetts  doctrine  that  the  mill  acts  do  not  fall  under  the 

eminent  domain  power. 

280.  The  mill  acts  fall  under  the  eminent  domain  power. 

281.  Promoting  fish  culture,  cranberry  culture  and  the  like. 

282.  Development  of  mines. 


x\ri 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 


i  283.  Drains,  ditches,  levees,  etc.,  for  improving  wet  and  overilowed  land. 

284.  Decisions   referring  such   improvements   to   the  police   power,   or 

power  to  legislate  for  the  general  welfare. 

285.  These  improvements  referable  to  the  eminent  domain  power, 

286.  The  question  of  public  use. 

287.  Drains,  etc. :     Decisions  of  California, 

288.  Same:     Illinois. 

289.  Same :     Indiana. 

290.  Same :     Iowa. 

291.  Same:     Kansas. 

292.  Same:     Kentucky. 

293.  Same :     Michigan. 

294.  Same :     Minnesota. 

295.  Same :     Missouri. 

296.  Same :     Nebraska. 

297.  Same:     New  Jersey. 

298.  Same:     New  York. 

299.  Same:     North  Carolina. 

300.  Same:     North  Dakota, 

301.  Same :     Ohio. 

302.  Same :     Oregon. 

303.  Same:  Washington. 

304.  Same :     Wisconsin. 

305.  Same:     Other  states. 

306.  Levees,  dikes,  etc. 

307.  The  public  health. 

308.  Irrigation. 

309.  Taking  for  the  United  States. 

310.  Taking  for  a  foreign  state. 

311.  Taking  all  of  the  tract  when  only  a  part  is  required. 

312.  Miscellaneous  cases:  Settling  private  controversies. 

313.  To  constitute  a  public  use  the  public  must  have  a  legal  right  to 

the  use  or  service  for  which  the  property  is  taken. 

314.  Combination  of  public  and  private  use  in  the  same  act  or  pro- 

ceeding. 

315.  Taking  for  other  than  a  public  purpose  violates  the  fourteenth 

amendment  to  the  Federal  constitution. 


CHAPTEE  VIII. 

MEANING  OF  THE  WORDS  "DAMAGED,"  "INJURED,"  OR  "INJURI- 
OUSLY AFFECTED." 

I.  In  Statutes. 


g  316.  Statutes  giving  damages  for  change  of  grade:     Connecticut. 

317.  Same:     Indiana. 

318.  Same:     Iowa. 

319.  Same:     Kansas, 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  XVll 

j  320.  Same:  Maine. 

321.  Same:  Massachusetts. 

322.  Same :  Michigan. 

323.  Same:  Minnesota. 

324.  Same :  Missouri. 

325.  Same:  New  Hampshire, 

326.  Same:  New  Jersey. 

327.  Same:  New  York. 

328.  Same:  Ohio. 

329.  Same:  Pennsylvania. 

330.  Same:  Rhode  Island. 

331.  Same:  South  Carolina. 

332.  Same :  Tennessee. 

333.  Same :  Vermont. 

334.  Same:  Washington. 

335.  Same:  Wisconsin. 

336.  Where  the  statute  refers  merely  to  a  change  of  grade  must  it  be 

from  a  previously  established  grade? 
337'.     What  constitutes  an  established  grade. 

338.  What  constitutes  a  change  of  grade. 

339.  The  right  and  remedy  are  wholly  dependent  upon  the  statute. 

340.  When  action  accrues. 

341.  Whether  the  statute  applies  to  changes  ordered  before  but  made 

after  it  takes  effect. 

342.  Elements  and  measure  of  damages. 
3.     Estdppel  to  claim  damages. 

.44.     Statutes  giving  damages  for  railroads  in  streets. 

345.  Statutes  giving  damages  in  other  cases. 

II.  In  Constitutions. 

346.  Constitutional  provisions. 

347.  The  terms   "damaged,"   "injured"   and   "injuriously   affected"   are 

synonymous. 

348.  Damages  from  change  of  grade. 

349.  Viaducts,  tunnels,  causeways,  bridge  approaches  and  the  like   in 

streets. 

350.  Decisions    in    Alabama    and    Pennsylvania:      What    constitutes    a 

construction  or  enlargement  of  works,  highways   or  improve- 
ments. 

351.  Damages  by  railroads  in  streets. 

352.  Damages  by  other  uses  of  streets. 

353.  Damages  by  tlie  vacation  of  streets. 

354.  Impeding  access  to  premises  by  interfering  with  public  ways  not 

in  front  of  same. 

355.  Competing  ferries,  bridges,  etc. 

356.  Interference  with  water  rights. 

357.  Damage  from  the  operation  of  a  railroad  or  its  appurtenances  on 

the   private  property  of  the   company:      Noise,   smolce,   vibra- 
tions, etc. 


Xviii  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

§  358.     Miscellaneous  cases. 

359.  The  words  in  question  were  intended  to  enlarge  the  right  to  com- 

pensation. 

360.  The  words  in  question  should  be  liberally  ponstrued. 

361.  They  include  any  physical  injury  to  property  not  held  to  be  a 

taking. 

362.  Also  any  interference  with  private  rights  not  held  to  be  a  taking. 

363.  And,  generally,   any  damage  to  property  arising  from   an  inter- 

ference with  a  right,  public  or  private,  which  does  not  amount 
to  a  taking. 

364.  When  claim  based  on  an  interference  with  a  public  right  the  plain- 

tiff's damages  must  be  special  and  peculiar. 

365.  Different  views   regarding  the  proper   construction  of   the  words 

"damaged"  or  "injured." 

366.  Damages  not  embraced  by  the  words  in  question. 

CHAPTER  IX. 

THE  STATUTORY  AUTHORITY. 

§  367.     Power  of  the  legislature  generally. 

368.  People's  charters. 

369.  The  necessity  or  expediency  of  exercising  the  power  is  exclusively 

for  the  legislature. 

370.  When  the  power  of  eminent  domain  has  been  delegated,  the  pro- 

priety of  its  exercise  rests  with  the  grantee. 

371.  The  authority  to  condemn  must  be  expressly  given  or  necessarily 

implied. 

372.  Illustrations. 

373.  How  the  authority  may  be  given. 

374.  To  whom  authority  may  be  given:     Foreign  corporations. 

375.  Direct  appropriation  by  the  legislature. 

376.  Delegation   and  transfer   of   authority:      Contractors   and   agents. 

377.  A  lease  of  the  property  and  franchises  of  a  corporation  does  not 

destroy  its  right  to  condemn. 

378.  The  manner  of  proceeding  may  be  changed  at  the  pleasure  of  the 

legislature. 

379.  The  right  to  impose  additional  liabilities. 

380.  Effect  of  the  repeal,  amendment  or  expiration  of  statutes. 

381.  General  and  special  laws:     Repeal  by  implication. 

382.  Two  acts  conferring  same  power. 

383.  Effect  of  a  change  in  the  form  of  municipal  government. 

384.  Conflict  of  jurisdiction  between  different  authorities  having  power 

in  the  same  territory. 

385.  Statutes  have  no  extra-territorial  effect. 

386.  When  a  naked  or  defective  authority  to  condemn  may  be  exercised 

according  to  previous  statutes,  and  when  not. 

387.  The  authority  must  be  strictly  pursued. 

388.  The  authority  to  condemn  will  be  strictly  construed. 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  XIX 

§  389.     Provisions  as  to  compensation  and  remedy  and  in  favor  of  the 
property  owner  should  be  liberally  construed. 

390.  Construction  of  statutes  as  to  location. 

391.  Construction  of  statutes  as  to  the  purpose  for  whioh  the  power 

may  be  exercised:     Eailroads. 

392.  Same:     Branch  and  lateral  railroads. 

393.  Same:     Street  and  elevated  railroads. 

394.  Same:     Roads  and  streets. 

395.  Same:     Statutes  relating  to  the  taking  of  materials  for  the  re- 

pair of  roads  and  bridges. 

396.  Same:     Drains,  levees,  irrigation. 

397.  Same:     Dams,  water  and  water  power. 

398.  Same:     Telegraphs  and  telephones,  electric  companies. 

399.  Same:     Municipal  purposes. 

400.  Same :     Miscellaneous. 

401.  Meaning  of  the  words  "to,"  "from,"  "at"  or  "near"  a  place,  in 

statutes  describing  termini  and  location. 

402.  Change  of  location. 

403.  Successive  appropriations. 

404.  Where  the  provisions  of  one  statute  are  adopted  by  another,  or 

extended  to  another  jurisdiction. 

405.  Validity  and  effect  of  statutes  legalizing  defective  proceedings. 

406.  The  legislature  cannot  surrender  or  preclude  itself  from  the  exer- 

cise of  the  eminent  domain  power. 

407.  Agreements  not  to  condemn. 

408.  Exercise  of  the  power  by  congress. 

409     Constitutionality  of  eminent  domain  statutes  generally. 
410.     Parties  availing  of  statute  cannot  object  to  its  validity. 


TOLUME  II. 
CHAPTEE  X. 

WHAT  MAY  BE  TAKEN. 

411.  All  property  subject  to  the  right  of  eminent  domain. 

412.  Land  and  rights  and  easements  in  or  appurtenant  thereto. 

413.  Money,  contracts,  choses  in  action  and  other  personal  property. 

414.  Public  lands  and  lands  held  by  grant  from  the  State  or  condemn- 

ing authority. 

415.  Lands  of  Indian  tribes. 

416.  Property  affected  by  contracts,  settlements  or  otherwise,  or  held 

for  particular  uses,  educational,  charitable  or  otherwise. 

417.  Taking  railroad  property  for  highways  and  streets. 

418.  To  what  extent  one  railway  company  may  take  the  property  of 

another. 

419.  Same:     Taking  tracks  or  joint  use  of  same. 


XX  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

§  420.     Same:     Taking  part  of  right  of  way. 

421.  Same:     Taking  land  used  for  depots,  yards,  shops  and  other  ap- 

purtenances. 

422.  Same :     Joint  use  of  depot  and  terminal  facilities. 

423.  Same:     Joint  use  of  tracks. 

424.  Same:     Right  of  crossing. 

425.  Statutes  regulating  the  right  and  manner  of  crossing. 

426.  Power  to  intersect,  join,  connect  or  unite  with  other  railroads. 

427.  Talcing  railroad  property  for  parks. 

427a.  Taking  railroad  property  for  telegraph  and  telephone  lines, 

428.  Taking  railroad  property  for  drains  and  ditches. 

429.  Taking  railroad  property  for  other  public  uses. 

430.  Taking  highways  and  streets. 

431.  Railroads  across  highways  and  streets. 

432.  Bridges,  turnpikes,  ferries,  canals  and  mill  property. 

433.  Property  of  gas  and  water  companies  and  other  public  service  cor- 

porations. 

434.  Parks  and  cemeteries. 

435.  Public  school  property. 

436.  Taking  land  devoted  to  other  public  or  quasi-public  uses. 

437.  Works  upon,  across  or  over  navigable  waters. 

438.  Corporate  property  and  franchises  may  be  taken. 

439.  Exclusive  rights  and  privileges. 

440.  General  principles  deducible  from  the  foregoing  decisions  in  respect 

to  the  taking  of  property  already  devoted  to  public  use. 

441.  The  general   rule  does  not  apply  to  prevent  the  taking  of  ease- 

ments or  joint  use,  when  no  material  injury. 

442.  Property  not  in  use  and  not  necessary. 

443.  Property  acquired  by  contract. 

444.  Property  of  public  service  corporations  not  having  the  power  of 

eminent  domain. 

445.  Property  voluntarily  devoted  to  public  use  by  individuals  and  cor- 

porations. 

446.  Property  to  be  exempt  must  be  used  for  public  purposes  in  good 

faith. 

447.  Statutes  giving  right  to  tal^  property  in  public  use  for  a  more 

necessary  public  use,  or  upon  similar  conditions. 

448.  Extent  of  interest  which  the  legislature  may  authorize  to  be  taken. 

449.  What  estate  vests  when  statute  silent  on  the  subject. 

450.  When  the  statute  provides  for  a  fee;  nature  of  fee  acquired. 

451.  What  estate  acquired  under  particular  statutes;   whether  fee  or 

easement. 

452.  Right   to  take   temporary   use  of   land   or  particular   rights   and 

privileges. 

453.  How  much  may  be  taken. 

454.  Same :     Instances. 

455.  Construction  of  statutes  prohibiting  the  taking  of  certain  build- 

ings and  enclosures:     Dwellings. 

456.  The  same  continued:     Other  buildings  and  structures, 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  XXI 

§  457.     The    same    continued:     Gardens,    orchards,    yards    and    other    en- 
closures or  exceptions. 

458.  Section  92  of  the  English  land  clauses  consolidation  act:     Meaning 

of  "house,"  "building,"  "manufactory." 

459.  What  may  be  taken  under  the  term  "land,"  "ground,"  etc. 

460.  Designating  the  property  to  be  taken. 

461.  What  may  be  taken  under  particular  statutes. 

OHAPTEE  Xl. 

ACQUISITION  OF  PROPERTY  BY  AGREEMENT,  PRESCRIPTION  OR 

DEDICATION. 

§  462.  The  subject  generally. 

463.  The  power  to  obtain  property  by  agreement. 

464.  Who  are  competent  to  agree  or  convey. 

465.  Validity  of  deeds  and  contracts:     Fraud,  public  policy,  considera- 

tion. 

466.  Delivery  and  acceptance. 

467.  Construction  and  sufficiency  of  the  description  in  deeds  and  con- 

tracts. 

468.  The  title  or  estate  conveyed,  or  which  may  be  acquired. 

469.  Conveyances  upon  condition:     Whether  provisions  of  deed  will  be 

construed  as  conditions  or  covenants. 

470.  Construction  of,  and  compliance  with,  conditions:     Forfeitures. 

471.  Same:     Conditions  and  agreements  relating  to  the  establishment 

of  stations. 

472.  Reservations,  exceptions,  restrictions,  etc. 

473.  Forfeiting  benefit  of  grant  or  agreement  by  delay. 

474.  Effect  of  conveyance  as  to  damages  to  property  of  the  grantor. 

475.  Release  of  damages  in  lieu  of  award. 

476.  Oral  agreements  in  connection  with  written  contracts. 

477.  Specific  performance,  and  other  remedies:     Damages. 

478.  By  and  against  whom  the  agreements  may  be  enforced. 

479.  Notice  of  unrecorded  deeds  and  contracts. 

480.  Contracts  with  promotors. 

481.  Oral  agi-eements,  releases  and  licenses. 

482.  Particular  contracts  construed. 

483.  Reserving  right  of  way  for  public  use  in  grants  by  railroads  and 

others. 

484.  Agreement  to  furnish  right  of  way. 

485.  Construction  of  contracts  generally. 

486.  Rights  by  prescription. 

487.  Requisites  of  prescription. 

488.  Possession  and  color  of  title. 

489.  Rights  by  dedication:     To  what  public  uses  it  applies. 

490.  Statutory  dedications. 

491.  Construction  of  map  or  plat  as  to  public  use  intended  or  which 

may  be  made  of  the  land  dedicated. 


XXn  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

§  492.  Common  law  dedications. 

493.  Who  may  make  dedication. 

494.  The  intent  of  the  owner. 

495.  Acceptance  by  the  public. 

496.  Miscellaneous  matters  relating  to  dedication. 

CHAPTEE  XII. 

PRELIMINARY  AND  MISCELLANEOUS  MATTERS  PERTAINING  TO 

PROCEEDINGS. 

§  497.  Necessity  of  an  attempt  to  agree. 

498.  What  is  a  sufficient  attempt  to  agree. 

499.  How  excused  or  waived:     Owners  under  disability. 

500.  How  the  inability  to  agree  should  be  alleged  and  shown. 

501.  An  agreement  precludes  proceedings. 

502.  Priority  of  right  to  appropriate  specific  property:     Mill  cases. 

503.  The  same  continued:     Railroads  and  other  public  works. 

504.  Priority  of  right  to  use  streets. 

505.  The  property  must  be  legally  designated:     Plans,  surveys,  etc. 

506.  When   an   ordinance,   resolution   or  vote   of   a  municipal  body   is 

essential,  and  the  requisites  thereof. 

507.  When  a  previous  refusal  of   some  other  tribunal  is  essential  to 

jurisdiction. 

508.  Other   matters   and   questions   preliminary   to   the   institution   of 

proceedings. 

509.  Of  the  right  to  a  common  law  jury. 

510.  It  is  sufficient,  in  any  event,  if    a  jury  trial  may  be  had  on  appeal. 

511.  What  tribunal  is  sufficient. 

512.  Nature  of  the  proceeding  generally:     Whether  a  "suit,"  "action," 

"special  proceeding,"  etc. 

513.  Jurisdiction  of  the  Federal  Courts:     Removals. 

514.  Proceedings  by  the  United  States. 

515.  Venue. 

CHAPTEE  XIII. 

THE  PARTIES  TO  PROCEEDINGS  AND  THE  VARIOUS  ESTATES  AND 
INTERESTS  TO  BE  CONSIDERED. 

§  516.  General  view. 

■517.  Grantor  and  grantee. 

518.  In  case  of  executory  contracts. 

519.  Heirs,  devisees  and  personal  representatives. 

520.  Trust  estates. 

521.  Husband  and  wife. 

522.  Dower. 

523.  Mortgagees. 

624.     Judgment  creditors  and  other  lien-holders. 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  XXIU 

525.  Life  tenants,  lessees  and  revisionera. 

526.  Tenants  in  common  and  joint  tenants. 

527.  Infants. 

528.  Towns  and  public  authorities  as  parties. 

529.  Persons  in  possession  of  public  lands. 

530.  Other  rights  and  interests  which  must  be  considered. 

631.  Claims  or  interests  for  which  compensation  need  not  be  made. 

532.  The  proper  plaintiff  in  condemnation  proceedings. 

533.  Proper  parties  where  the  initiative  is  in  owner:     Mill  acts. 

534.  Construction  of  statutes  in  regard  to  parties. 

535.  Joinder  of  parties. 

536.  New  parties,  misjoinder,  etc. 

537.  Death  of  a  party,  or  change  of  title  pending  proceedings. 

538.  Effect  of  omitting  a  necessary  party. 

539.  What  constitutes  making  a  person  a  party? 

540.  General  conclusions  and  principles  in  regard  to  parties. 

CHAPTER  XIV. 

OF  THE  PETITION,   COMPLAINT  OR  OTHER   FORM  OF  APPLICA- 
TION. 

§  541.  Scope  of  the  chapter. 

542.  When  a  petition  is  necessary. 

543.  When  not  necessary. 

544.  Addressing,  signing,  verifying  and  iiling. 

545.  When  the  signers  must  include  a  certain  proportion  of  the  prop- 

erty involved,  or  of  the  owners  thereof. 

546.  When  required  to  be  signed  by  a  certain  class  of  persons. 

547.  General  requisites  as  to  form  and  substance. 

548.  Statement  of  parties,  owners  and  persons  interested. 

549.  Description  of  the  property  taken,  or  of  the  location  of  the  im- 

provement. 

550.  Descriptions  held  sufficient. 

551.  Descriptions  held  insufficient. 

552.  Descriptions  in  certain  peculiar  cases  of  condemnation:      Taking 

joint  use  of  land  or  tracks:     The  right  to  occupy  streets,  to 
withdraw  water,  etc. 

553.  Stating  the  purpose  of  the  taking. 

554.  Stating  the  necessity  for  the  taking. 

555.  Statement  of  title. 

550.     Stating  the  nature  of  the  injury  or  damage. 

557.  Must  show  inability  to  agree. 

558.  Showing  neglect  or  refusal  of  some  other  tribunal  to  make  the 

improvement. 

559.  Joinder  of  improvements. 

560.  Cross  petition. 

561.  Amendments. 

562.  Waiver  of  defects  in  the  petition. 

563.  Miscellaneous  questions. 


XXIV  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

OHAPTEE  XV. 

NOTICE  OF  PROCEEDINGS. 
I.  Constitutional  Requieements. 

§  564.  Cases  holding  that  notice  need  not  be  given. 

565.  Cases  holding  that  notice  must  be  given. 

566.  "Due  process  of  law"  requires  notice. 

567.  What  is  sufficient  as  to  the  subject  matter  of  the  notice?    Of  what 

notice  must  be  given. 

568.  What  is  sufficient  as  to  the  manner  of  giving  notice? 

569.  Giving  notice  when  not  required  by  statute  and  validity  of  statutes 

which  do  not  provide  for  notice. 

II.  Statutobt  Requibements. 

570.  The  notice  required  by  statute  is  jurisdictional  and  must  be  given. 

571.  Meaning  of  "reasonable  notice''  in  statutes. 

572.  Form  of  the  notice  and  compliance  with  statute  generally. 

573.  Specifying  time  and  place. 

574.  Signing. 

575.  Describing  the  property  taken. 

576.  Stating  the  nature  or  purpose  of  the  proposed  action. 

577.  Describing  the  location  or  improvement. 

578.  Meaning  of  the  terms,  "owners,"  occupants,"  etc. 

579.  Serving,  publishing,  posting,  etc. 

580.  Waiver  of  notice  by  appearance  or  otherwise. 

581.  Who  is  bound  or  affected  by  a  particular  notice. 

582.  The  proof  of  notice. 

583.  The  record  must  show  a  compliance  with  the  statute  as  to  notice. 

584.  Who  may  take  advantage  of  want  or  defect  of  notice. 

585.  Notice  of  adjournments,  and  of  other  steps  in  the  proceedings. 

586.  One  entitled  to  notice  is  not  bound,  if  not  notified. 

CHAPTEE  XVI. 
OBJECTIONS  TO  THE  APPLICATION. 

§  587.  General  considerations. 

588.  Where  the  application  is  to  a  ministerial  officer  or  board. 

589.  Where  the  application  is  to  a  court. 

590.  Manner  of  raising  objections  apparent  upon  the  face  of  the  papers. 

591.  Manner  of  raising  other  objections.    Propriety  of  a  plea  or  answer. 

592.  Questioning  the  legal  incorporation  of  the  petitioner. 

593.  Proceedings  by  foreign  corporations. 

694.     Controverting  a   compliance  with  the   conditions  imposed  bv  the 
statute. 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  XXV 

i  595.     The  question  of  necessity:     Whether  statute  must  provide  for   a 
hearing  upon  this  question. 

596.  The  necessity  of  exercising  the  power  for  the  purpose  proposed. 

597.  The  necessity  of  malting  the  proposed  worlc  or  improvement. 

598.  Statutes  requiring  the  necessity  to  be  passed  upon  in  a  particular 

manner. 

599.  Statutes  which  expressly  limit  the  taking  to  what  is  necessary  for 

the  purpose. 

600.  The  question  of  necessity  when  the  statute  is  silent  on  the  sub- 

ject:     Whether  the  constitution  impliedly  forbids  the  taking 
of  what  is  not  necessary. 

601.  Meaning  of  necessity  and  the  principles  to  be  applied  in  deter- 

mining the  question. 

602.  Practice  in  determining  the  question  of  necessity. 

603.  Power  of  legislature  to  determine  necessity. 

604.  Objection  that  other  property  available. 

605.  Former  proceeding  for  the  same  purpose. 

606.  Good  faith  of  the  proceedings. 

607.  Other  objections. 

608.  Defences  where  proceedings  are  instituted  by  the  owner. 

609.  Practice  in  hearing  objections. 

610.  Amendments. 

611.  Waiver  of  objections  by  going  to  a  hearing  on  the   question  of 

damages. 

OHAPTEE  XVII. 

SECURING  THE  TRIBUNAIi  TO  ASSESS  DAMAGES. 

612.  The  case  stated. 

613.  The  order  or  warrant. 

614.  The  writ  of  ad  quod  damnum. 

615.  Some   further   points   as   to  the   appointment   and   summoning   of 

commissioners,  etc. 

616.  Mandamus  to  compel  the  appointment  of  commissioners. 

617.  Setting  aside  order  appointing  viewers,  commissioners,  etc. 

618.  The  qualifications  of  commissioners,  jurors,  etc.:     Petitioners. 

619.  Same:     Taxpayers. 

620.  Same:     Relatives  of  parties  or  of  their  counsel. 

621.  Same:     Owners  of  land  affected. 

622.  Same :     Stockholders. 

623.  Same;     Miscellaneous  points. 

624.  Whether  the  record  should  show  that  the  commissioners,  jurors, 

etc.,  possessed  the  qualifications  required  by  law. 

625.  Waiver  of  objections  to  commissioners,  jurors,  etc. 

626.  Vacancies,  efi'ect  of,  and  how  filled. 

627.  Effect  of  the  disagreement  of  special  juries. 

628.  The  presiding  officer  of  special  juries,  his  qualifications,  duties,  etc. 


XXVI  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

CHAPTEK  XVIII. 

PROCEEDINGS  BY  AND  BEFORE  THE   CONSTITUTED  TRIBUNAL. 

§  629.  The  oath  to  be  taken. 

630.  The  form  and  sufficiency  of  the  oath. 

631.  What  the  record  should  show  as  to  the  oath  taken. 

632.  Waiver  of  defective  oath. 

633.  The  time  and  place  of  meeting  and  of  acting. 

634.  Mode  of  procedure  before  the  commissioners:     Evidence,  etc. 

635.  What  questions  may  be  considered. 

636.  Adjournments. 

637.  Whether  a  majority  may  act  or  decide. 

638.  Receiving  ex  parte  communications. 

639.  Receiving  entertainment. 

640.  Other  improprieties. 

641.  Power  of  commissioners  to  reconsider  or  amend  their  report. 

642.  Where  the  proceedings  are  before  a  court. 

643.  View  of  the  premises  by  the  jury. 

644.  Effect  to  be  given  the  view. 

645.  The  right  to  open  and  close. 

646.  The  practice  as  to  consolidation  of  cases  and  separate  trials. 

647.  Instructions. 

648.  Arbitration. 

CHAPTEE  XIX, 

EVIDENCE. 

§  649.  The  general  rules  of  evidence  apply. 

650.  Competency  of  evidence  generally. 

651.  The  burden  of  proof. 

652.  Competency  of  witnesses  generally. 

653.  Limiting  the  number  of  witnesses. 

654.  Opinions  of  witness  as  to  value. 

655.  Opinions  as  to  the  amount  of  damages  or  benefits. 

656.  Who  are  competent  to  give  such  opinions. 

657.  Opinions  of  witnesses  as  to  other  matters. 

658.  Admissions. 

659.  Whether  the  owner  must  prove  his  title. 

660.  Estoppel  to  deny  title. 

661.  What  is  sufficient  proof  of  title. 

662.  Proving  sales  of  similar  property. 

663.  Proving  effect  upon  other  property  in  suits  for  depreciation. 

664.  Proving  the  cost  of  the  property  or  of  improvements  thereon. 

665.  Proving  a  sale  of  property  claimed  to  be  damaged  made  after  the 

damage  has  been  incurred. 

666.  Offers  to  buy  or  sell. 

667.  Purchase  by  the  party  condemning. 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  XXVll 

§  668.     Assessment  for  taxation. 

669.  Reports  of  commissioners,  etc.,  as  evidence. 

670.  Miscellaneous  points. 

CHAPTER  XX. 

JUST  COMPENSATION  AND  DAMAGES. 

§  671.  Eight  to  compensation  when  the  constitution  does  not  require  it 
in  express  terms. 

672.  Right  to  compensation  generally:  Scope  of  the  chapter. 

673.  Statutes  which  authorize  a  taking  must  provide  for  compensation. 

674.  Exceptional  cases  in  New  Jersey  and  Pennsylvania. 

675.  What  constitutes  a,  sufficient  provision  for  compensation. 

676.  Express   constitutional   provisions  with   reference   to  the  time  or 

manner  of  making  compensation. 

677.  Questions  which  arise  when  the  constitution  is  silent  in  these  re- 

spects. 

678.  As  to  the  time  of  making  compensation. 

679.  Distinction  between  a,  taking  by  the  public  and  by  private  parties 
C80.     What  is  suflBoient  security  when  the  taking  is  by  private  parties. 

681.  Summary  as  to  time  of  compensation. 

682.  Compensation  must  be  made  in  money. 

683.  The  legislature  cannot  fix  the  compensation  or  prescribe  the  rules 

for  its  computation. 

684.  Meaning  of  the  phrase  "just  compensation." 

685.  Measure  of  damages  when  an  entire  property  or  tract  is  taken. 

686.  When  part  is  taken,  just  compensation  includes  damages  to  the 

remainder. 

687.  The  question  of  benefits. 

688.  Cases  holding  that  benefits  cannot  be  considered  at  all. 

689.  Cases  holding  that  special  benefits  only  may  be  set  off  against  dam- 

ages to  the  remainder,  but  not  against  the  value  of  the  land 
taken. 

690.  Cases  holding  that  benefits,  both  general  and  special,  may  be  set 

off  against  damages  to  the  remainder,  but  not  against  the  value 
of  the  part  taken. 

691.  Cases  holding  that   special  benefits   only  may  be  set  off  against 

both  the  value  of  the  part  taken  and  damages  to  the  remainder. 

692.  Cases  holding  that  benefits,  both  general  and  special,  may  be  set 

off  against  both  damages  to  the  remainder  and  the  value  of  the 
part  taken. 

693.  Conclusion  as  to  the  question  of  benefits. 

694.  Measure  of  damages  where  part  of  a  tract  is  taken. 

695.  Constitutional  provisions  as  to  benefits. 

696.  Statutory  provisions  as  to  benefits  and  measure  of  damages. 

697.  Benefits  or  damages  to  a  different  tract. 

698.  What  constitutes  an  entire  tract:    Farms  and  acre  property. 

699.  Same:  Tovm  property. 


XXVlll  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

§  700.  Same:     Peculiar  properties — quarries,  mines,  etc 

701.  Same:     Miscellaneous  questions. 

702.  What  are  special  benefits. 

703.  Further  as  to  special  benefits. 

704.  Assessing  or  taxing  the  part  not  taken  to  pay  the  damages  awarded. 

705.  Time  with  reference  to  which  damages  should  be  estimated. 

706.  General  principles  in  estimating  value. 

707.  Value  for  particular  uses. 

708.  Some  particular  elements  of  value  and  value  in  special  cases. 

709.  Speculative  inquiries  as  to  a  possible  use  or  improvement  of  the 

property  are  improper. 

710.  Damage  from  construction,  use  and  operation. 

711.  When  works  have  been  constructed  before  the  assessment  of  dam 

ages. 

712.  When  there  is  a  stipulation  or  agreement  as  to  the  manner  of  con- 

struction. 

713.  When  there  is  no  stipulation  or  agreement  as  to  the  manner  of 

construction. 

714.  Damages  to  be  assessed  on  the  basis  of  a  proper  construction  and 

use.    Damages  from  improper  construction  or  use  to  be  excluded. 

715.  Damages  from  trespass:    Past  damages. 

716.  Where  there  are  different  interests  or  estates.     General  rules. 

717.  Same:    Life  estates. 

718.  Same:    Effect  of  the  taking  on  the  covenant  to  pay  rent. 

719.  Same:    Landlord  and  tenant. 

720.  Same:    Other  estates  and  interests.    Mortgages. 

721.  When  there  are  franchises,  easements,  or  privileges  appurtenant 

to  property.     Gratuitous  or  possible  privileges. 

722.  When  corporate  property  and  franchises  are  taken. 

723.  When  the  title   is   subject   to   restrictions,   conditions,  easements, 

etc.,  or  is  held  for  particular  cases. 

724.  Value  of  trees,  crops,  springs,  wells,  etc. 

725.  Value  of  coal,  oil  and  other  minerals. 

726.  Value  of  buildings  and  other  structures. 

727.  Injury  to  business,  loss  of  profits,  etc. 

728.  Personal  property:    Fixtures:    Cost  of  removal. 

729.  When  one  railroad  crosses  another. 

730.  When  a  street  railroad  is  laid  across  a  commercial  railroad. 

731.  When  one  railroad  takes  the  use  of  another's  tracks. 

732.  Telegraph  or  telephone  lines  on  railroad  right  of  way. 

733.  When  a  highway  is  laid  out  across  a  railroad. 

734.  When  a  railroad  is  laid  across  or  along  a  turnpike. 

735.  Railroads  in  streets:    Measure  of  damages. 

736.  Railroads  in  streets:    Elements  of  damage:    Benefits. 

737.  Change  of  grade. 

738.  In  case  of  viaducts,  causeways,  and  the  like  in  streets. 

739.  Various  elements  of  damages  when  part  of  a  tract  is  taken. 

740.  Danger  from  fire. 

741.  Cost  of  fencing. 

742.  The  question  of  interest. 


.  TABLE    OF    COITTENTS.  XXIX 

§  743.  When  property  is  taken  for  a  street  which  is  subject  to  a  public 
easement  of  way  by  dedication  or  prescription. 

744.  When  a  fee  of  an  existing  street  is  taken. 

745.  Enliancement  caused  by  the  work  or  improvement. 

746.  The  right  or  estate  acquired  for  the  public  use  should  be  considered. 

747.  The  extent  of  the  use  may  be  considered. 

748.  Damages  which  would  be  irremediable  if  no  property  taken. 

749.  Damages  by  retarding  or  preventing  increase  of  value. 

750.  Whether  the  effect  of  the  entire  work  or  improvement  is  to  be  con- 

sidered or  merely  that   portion   thereof  which   is   on   the   part 
taken. 

751.  Measure  of  damages  when  property  is  damaged  or  injured  but  no 

part  taken. 
753.     Where  rights  or  easements  are  impaired  or  destroyed  but  no  land 
taken. 

753.  When  the  taking  produces  damage  which  is  preventable  or  necessi- 

tates a  change,  reconstruction  or  substitution  of  works. 

754.  Miscellaneous  items  of  damage  held  allowable. 

755.  Miscellaneous  items   of   damage  held  not   allowable. 

756.  Reserving  rights  or  easements,  or  requiring  things  to  be  done  in 

lieu  of  money. 

757.  Mill  cases. 

758.  Taking  part  of  a  town  for  federal  purposes. 

759.  Where  entry  is  made  and  worKs  constructed  before  obtaining  title. 

760.  When  the  owner  is  estopped  to  claim  damages. 

CHAPTER  XXI. 
THE  REPORT  OR  VERDICT,  AND  ACTION  THEREON. 

§  761.     Requisites  generally. 

762.  Describing  the  property  to  be  taken,  or  location  of  the  improve- 

ment. 

763.  Description  of  location  in  case  of  highways. 

764.  What  is  a  sufficient  finding  on  the  question  of  damages. 

765.  What  is  a  sufficient  finding  on  the  question  of  necessity,  public 

utility,  etc. 

766.  Of  naming  and  describing  the  owners  of  property  taken  or  aflfected. 

767.  Whether  the  award  of  damages  should  be  joint  or  several, 

768.  Conditional  and  alternative  awards. 

769.  As  to  the  time  of  making  report. 

770.  Filing  and  recording  the  report. 

771.  Action  on  the  report  by  non-judicial  bodies. 

772.  Action  on  the  report  by  a  court:     General  principles. 

773.  Defects  in  the  proceedings  prior  to  the  appointment  of  commission- 

ers. 

774.  Irregularities  on  the  part  of  the  commissioners,  jurors,  etc. 

775.  Accident,  mistake  or  error  of  judgment  on  the  part  of  the  com- 

missioners, 


XXX  TABLE    OF    C0KTENT3. 

§  776.  Inadequate  or  excessive  damages. 

777.  Departure  from  the  petition  in  laying  out  a  highway. 

778.  Miscellaneous  objections. 

779.  The  time  and  manner  of  objecting. 

780.  The  practice  in  hearing  objections. 

781.  Power  of  the  court  to  amend  or  modify  the  report,  or  confirm  it  in 

part. 

782.  Rehearings,  recommitals,  reviews,  etc. 

783.  When  objectors  are  estopped. 

784.  The  order  confirming  the  report  of  commissioners. 

785.  The  judgment  to  be  entered  on  the  verdict  of  a  jury. 

786.  Setting  aside  the  order  of  confirmation. 


CHAPTEE  XXII. 

REVIEW  OF  THE  PROCEEDINGS,  BY  APPEAL  OR  OTHERWISE.. 


787.  The  subject  generally:  Right  of  appeal. 

788.  Statutes  making  the  decision  of  commissioners  or  of  inferior  tribu- 

nals final  and  conclusive. 

789.  Practice  in  taking  appeals. 

790.  Parties,  and  who  may  a:ppeal. 

791.  Notice  in  case  of  appeals. 

792.  Practice  and  power  of  the  appellate  tribunal. 

793.  Effect  of  the  appeal. 

794.  Certiorari:    Its  nature  and  ofiice  generally. 

795.  When  it  lies,  and  when  the  proper  remedy. 

796.  Application  for  the  writ  and  proceedings  thereon. 

797.  When  granted  and  when  refused. 

798.  Form  and  effect  of  the  writ. 

799.  Return  to  the  writ. 

800.  Proceedings  on  the  return. 

801.  What  are  sufficient  grounds  for  quashing  the  proceedings:     The 

judgment  to  be  entered. 

802.  Appeals  to  appellate  or  Supreme  Court. 

803.  What  is  a  final  order  from  which  an  appeal  lies. 

804.  Construction  of  statutes  as  to  when  an  appeal  will  lie  to  a  court 

of  appellate  jurisdiction. 

805.  Practice  in  the  supreme  or  appellate  court. 

806.  Writs  of  error. 

807.  Limitations  as  to  the  time  in  taking  an  appeal  or  certiorari. 

808.  Estoppel  to  prosecute  an  appeal  or  certiorari. 

809.  When  an  appeal  or  certiorari  is  the  proper  remedy. 

810.  Statutes  opening  proceedings  for  review  after  final  judgment. 
8\1.  Review  by  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States:    Federal  questions. 


TABLE    OF    COITTEITTS.  XXXI 

OHAPTEE  XXIII. 

COSTS. 

812.  General  principles  in  regard  to  costs  in  condemnation  cases. 

813.  Costs  in  the  absence  of  special  statutory  provisions  relating  to  emin- 

ent domain  proceedings. 

814.  Costs  under  particular  statutes. 

815.  Costs  in  case  of  appeals,  reviews,  etc. 

816.  Items  of  costs,  attorney's  fees,  expert  witnesses,  etc. 

817.  Miscellaneous  cases. 


OHAPTEE  XXIV. 

DAMAGES  PRESUMED  TO  BE  INCLUDED  IN  THE  AWARD  OR 
JUDGMENT. 

818.  Statement  of  the  question. 

819.  General  doctrine  of  the  decisions. 

820.  The  doctrine  of  the  cases  criticised. 

821.  Damages  arising  from  construction  of  the  works. 

822.  Damages  from  works  on  land  to  which  the  assessment  does  not 

relate. 

823.  Damages  to  a  distinct  tract. 

824.  By  interfering  with  the  support  of  the  adjacent  soil. 

825.  By  grading  and  changing  the  grade  of  streets. 

826.  By  interfering  with  running  streams. 

827.  By  interfering  with  surface  or  subterranean  waters. 

828.  Damages  by  blasting,  trespass  and  the  like. 

829.  The  assessment  does  not  include  damages  resulting  from  the  im- 

proper construction  or  negligent  use  of  the  works. 

830.  Claims  based  upon  changes  in  the  works  or  plan  of  construction  or 

upon  the  increased  use  of  the  property. 

831.  Items  or  claims  omitted  by  mistake  or  otherwise. 

832.  Statutes  giving  a  remedy  for  damages  not  foreseen  and  estimated. 


OHAPTEE  XXV. 

RIGHTS  OF  THE  RESPECTIVE  PARTIES  IN  THE  PROPERTY 
CONDEMNED. 

833.  General  principles  as  to  obtaining  possession. 

834.  Statutes  permitting  possession  upon  a  tender  or  deposit  of  the  dam- 

ages awarded. 

835.  Possession  pending  an  appeal  upon  depositing  the  damages  awarded. 

836.  Right  of  the  owner  to  the  damages  deposited  in  such  cases. 


XXxii  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

§  837.  Possession  upon  giving  security  for  the  compensation. 

838.  What  constitutes  an  entry. 

839.  Remedy  of  condemnor  to  obtain  possession  when  opposed  by  owner. 

840.  Remedy  of  owner  to  prevent  an  unlawful  possession. 

841.  Miscellaneous  cases  as  to  obtaining  or  keeping  possession. 

842.  Deposit  at  whose  risk. 

843.  Judgment  against  owner  when  damages  reduced  on  appeal. 

844.  The  estate  acquired  in  lands  taken  for  public  use. 

845.  Rights  of  company  in  land  taken  for  railroad  right  of  way. 

846.  The  company  an  adjoining  proprietor,  and  limited  by  the  mazioi, 

sic  utere  tuo  ut  alienum,  non  laedas. 

847.  Whether   the   company's   possession   is   exclusive;    Rights   of   fee- 

owner. 

848.  Adverse  possession  of  railroad  right  of  way. 

849.  Right  to  trees,  herbage,  minerals,  materials,  buildings,  etc. 

850.  Property  taken  for  other  railroad  uses. 

851.  Right  of  owner  of  fee  to  cross  right  of  way  of  railroad:    Matter 

of  private  crossings  generally. 

852.  Property  taken  for  highways  and  streets. 

853.  Right  to  trees,  herbage,  materials,  etc. 

854.  Adverse  possession  of  streets  and  highways. 

855.  Property  taken  for  turnpikes. 

856.  Lands  taken  or  dedicated  for  public  parks,  squares  and  the  l^jgi 

857.  Property  taken  for  other  uses. 

858.  When  a  fee  is  taken  for  public  use. 

859.  Transfers  of  the  right  or  estate  acquired  by  condemnati(jj^^ 

860.  Effect  of  forced  sales. 

861.  Reversion  of  lands  taken  for  public  use. 

862.  What  amounts  to  an  abandonment  of  the  public  usei',  ^ 

863.  Right  to  improvements  when  land  reverts.  -f   i 

864.  No  rights  are  acquired  beyond  the  limits  of  the  land  condemned. 


OHAPTEK  XXVI. 


OF  THE  RECORD  AND  PROCEEDINGS  WHEN  CALLED  IN  QUESTION 
COLLATERALLY. 


§  865.     In  general. 

866.  When   jurisdiction   exists,   the   proceedings   are   good   collaterally, 

though  erroneous. 

867.  What  is  essential  to  jurisdiction. 

868.  What  irregularities,  subsequent  to  jurisdiction,  will  vitiate  the  pro- 

ceedings. 

869.  What  the  record  should  show. 

870.  Parol  evidence  to  aid  or  contradict  the  record. 

871.  Estoppel  to  question  proceedings  collaterally. 


TABIJf'oii'    CONTENTS.  XXxiii 

HAPTEE  XXVII. 


dfl 


OF  THE  REMEDIES  AND  PROCEEDINGS  TO  RECOVER  THE  DAM- 
AGES AWARDED,  OR  WHICH  SHOULD  BE  PAID,  FOR  PROPERTY 

T^EN  OR  AFFECTED. 


§  8'V2.     When  the  statutory  remedy  is  exclusive. 

873.  When  not  exclusive. 

874.  Action  on  the  award  or  judgment. 

875.  Defences  thereto. 

876.  When  the  damages  are  payable  from  an  assessment  of  benefits. 

877.  When   there   has   been   no   entry,    or   when   the   taking   has   been 

abandoned. 

878.  Mandamus  to  compel  payment,  or  the  raising  of  a  fund  for  pay- 

ment. 

879.  Mandamus  to  compel  an  assessment  of  damages. 

880.  Bill  in  equity  for  the  same  purpose. 

881.  Proceedings  to  obtain  damages  which  have  been  deposited. 

882.  The  remedy  upon  bonds  given  for  security  of  damages. 

883.  Enjoining  use  and  possession  until  damages  are  paid. 

884.  Suit  to  abate  dam  unless  the  damages  are  paid. 

885.  Enforcing  the  claim  for  damages  as  a  vendor's  lien. 

886.  The  right  to  damages,  as  against  those  claiming  under  the  party 

condemning. 

887.  Of  the  remedies  as  against  those  claiming  under  the  party  con- 

demning. 

888.  Whether  same  rules  apply  to  compensation  for  property  damaged  as 

for  property  taken. 

889.  Common   law   suits   for   the  value   of   land   appropriated  without 

proceedings. 

890.  The  remedy  for  property  damaged,  injured  or  injuriously  affected. 

891.  The  measure  of  damages  in  such  cases. 

892.  Assessment  of  just  compensation  in  an  equitable  proceeding  to  en- 

join the  construction  or  use  of  works. — New  York  elevated  rail- 
road cases. 

893.  When  no  damages  are  awarded,  the  only  remedy  is  by  appeal. 

894.  Conflicting  claims  to  the  damages  awarded. — Following  the  award 

into  the  hands  of  those  not  entitled  thereto. 

895.  Right  to  the  compensation  when  there  has  been  a  transfer  of  title 

pending  proceedings  to  take  the  property. 

896.  Rights  and  remedies  of  mortgages  of  the  lands  taken. 

897.  Rights  and  remedies  of  the  owners  of  other,  liens  and  interests  in 

the  land  taken. 

898.  Remedy  of  condemnor  to  have  award  applied  to  the  payment  of 

claims  of  mortgagees  or  lien-holders,  who  were  not  made  parties. 

899.  Rights  of  an  assignee  of  the  damages  awarded. 

900.  Miscellaneous  cases. — Execution — specific  performance,  etc. 


XXXIV-  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

CHAPTEK  XXVIII. 

THE  REMEDY  FOR  A  WRONGFUL  INTERFERENCE  WITH  PROPER- 
TY UNDER  COLOR  OF  EMINENT  DOMAIN  AND  OTHER  REME- 
DIES. 

§  901.     Injunction  to  prevent  entry  or  construction  of  works  before  com- 
plying with  the  law,  or  without  authority  of  law. 

902.  The  grounds  of  jurisdiction  in  such  cases. 

903.  When  the  relief  will  be  refused. 

904.  Injunction   to   prevent   the   continued   use   of   property   until   the 

damages  are  paid  when  the  condemnor  already  in  possession. 

905.  To   prevent   the  laying   or  operating  of   commercial   railroads   in 

streets. 

906.  To  prevent  the  construction  or  operation  of  elevated  railroads  in 

streets. 

907.  To  prevent  the  laying  or  operating  of  surface  street  railroads. 

908.  To   prevent   construction   and   operation   of   interurban   railroads, 

in  streets. 

909.  Summary  as  to  injunctive  relief  in  case  of  railroads  in  streets. 

910.  Some  questions  of  practice  in  bills  to  enjoin  railroads  in  streets. 

911.  To  prevent  other  uses  of  streets  or  other  interference  with  the  abut- 

ting owner's  rights. 

912.  To  prevent  the  vacation  of  a  street. 

913.  To  prevent  changing  the  grade  of  a  street. 

914.  To  prevent  the  construction  of  works  in  a  particular  manner. 

915.  To  prevent  the  occupation  or  use  of  adjacent  property  not  included 

in  the  condemnation. 

916.  To  prevent  an  interference  with  water  rights. 

917.  To  prevent  the  infringement  of  a  franchise  or  exclusive  right. 

918.  To  prevent  the  taking  of  property  already  devoted  to  public  use. 
91J.     To  prevent  one  railroad  from  crossing  another. 

920.  To  prevent  injury  or  damage  to  property  not  taken. 

921.  Some  questions  of  practice  in  cases  to  enjoin  the  taking  or  damag- 

ing of  property. 

922.  Injunction  to  prevent  misuse  or  diversion  of  public  streets  and 

grounds. 

923.  Bill  to  protect  the  possession  or  rights  of  condemnor. 

924.  Bill  to  protect  franchises  in  public  streets. 

925.  Suit  by  public  authorities  to  prevent  unlawful  use  of  street  or  to 

recover  for  damage  thereto. 

926.  Enjoining  condemnation   proceedings. 

927.  Ejectment  for  land  taken  or  occupied  for  public  use. 

928.  Ejectment  in  cases  of  wrongful  occupation  of  street. 

929.  When  the  owner  is  estopped  to  maintain  ejectment. 

930.  Ejectment  by  condemnor. 

931.  Trpspass. 

932.  Mandamus. 

933.  Remedy  for  damages  arising  from  the  negligent  or  improper  con- 

struction of  works. 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  XXXV 

§  934.  Relief  in  equity  on  account  of  error,  mistalce,  new  evidence,  etc. 

935.  Compelling  a  railroad  company  to  restore  a  highway. 

936.  Remedy  for  failure  to  construct  or  maintain  private  crossings. 

937.  The  question  of  one  action  or  successive  actions.     Statement  and 

general  principles. 

938.  Same:    Interference  with  the  flow  of  streams. 

939.  Same:     Diverting  or  polluting  the  waters  of  a  stream. 

940.  Same:     Interfering  with  the  flow  of  surface  water. 

941.  Same:    Overflow  or  percolation  from  a  reservoir  or  canal. 

942.  Same:     Change  of  grade  causing  surface  water  to  flow  upon  the 

plaintiii's  premises. 

943.  Same:    Change  of  grade  or  viaduct  In  streets. 

944.  Same:    Railroads  in  streets. 

945.  Same:    Where  there  is  an  actual  occupation  of  the  plaintiff's  land. 

946.  Same:     Miscellaneous  cases. 

947.  Same :     Conclusions. 

948.  Same:    Right  of  parties  to  elect  in  favor  of  permanent  damages. 

949.  Who  entitled  to  sue  in  case  of  transfer  of  title  after  construction 

or  use  of  works  causing  the  damage. 

950.  Effect  of  estates  for  life  or  years  on  the  right  to  damages. 

951.  What  constitutes  special  damage. 

952.  Certiorari  to  set  aside  ordinance. 

953.  Other  remedies. 

CHAPTEE  XXIX. 

THE  DISCONTINUANCE  AND  ABANDONMENT  OF  PROCEEDINGS. 

§  954.  The  right  to  discontinue  proceedings  before  completion. 

955.  The  right  to  abandon  after  the  proceedings  are  completed. 

956.  What  constitutes  an  abandonment. 

957.  The  owner's  right  to  recover  for  damages  occasioned  by  proceedings 

which  have  been  abandoned. 

958.  Statutes  giving  a  right  to  recover  for  damages  occasioned  by  pro- 

ceedings. 

959.  Right  to  abandon  under  English  statutes  after  notice  to  treat. 

960.  New  proceedings  for  the  same  purpose  as  former  proceedings  which 

have  been  abandoned. 

961.  When  entry  is  to  be  made  or  possession  taken  in  a  specified  time, 

what  is  sufficient. 

962.  Improvements  pending  proceedings. 

CHAPTEE  XXX. 

LIMITATIONS   TO   ACTIONS    AND    PROCEEDINGS. 

§  963  When  compensation  need  not  be  first  made,  the  ovmer  may  be 
required  to  present  his  claim  for  damages  within  a  time 
limited. — Construction  of  statutes. 


XXXVl  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS, 

§  964.     When  the  statutory  remedy  for  just  compensation  accrues. 

965.  When  there  is  no  special  limitation  of  the  statutory  remedy. — 

Application  of  the  general  statute  of  limitations. 

966.  Limitation  when  compensation  must  be  first  made. 

967.  Limitations    when    property    is    appropriated    without    complying 

with  the  law. 

968.  Common  law  suits  for  damages  to  property. 

969.  When  an  action  acrues  for  consequential  damages^ 

970.  For  change  of  street  grade. 

971.  Miscellaneous. 


TABLE  or  CASES  CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :  Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


A. 

Abbington   Tp.   v.   North  Pa.   R.   R. 

Co.,  12  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  118:  781. 
Abbot  V.  Upham,  13  Met.  172:  1526. 
Abbott  V.  Board  of  Supervisors,   36 

la.  354:   1019. 
V.   Cottage   City,   143   Mass.   521: 

1216. 
V.    County    Comrs.,    6    Kan.    App. 

162:   1360,  1514. 
V.  Duluth,  104  Fed.  833:  362. 
V.  Gatch,  13  Md.  314:  1256. 
V.  Elansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  83 

Mo.  271 :  93,  152. 
V.  Milwaukee  L.  H.  &  T.  Co.,  126 

Wis.  634:  284,  1297. 
V.  New  York  etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   145 

Mass.   450:    684,   688. 
V.    Penobscot    Co.,    52    Me.    584: 

1441. 
V.   Southern   Pac.   R.   R.   Co.,    109 

Cal.  282 :  1304,  1330. 
V.    Stewartstown,    47    N.   H.   228: 

1327. 
Abel  V.   Minneapolis,   68   Minn.   89: 

617,  1525. 
Abendroth  v.  Manhattan  El.  Ry.  Co., 

19  Abb.  N.  C.  247 :  451. 
V.     Manhattan     R.     R.     Co.,     122 

N.  Y.  1:  177,  180,  265,  1296. 
v.   Manhattan   Ry.   Co.,   52   N.   Y. 

Supr.   Ct.   274:    196. 
V.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  54  N.  Y. 

Supr.  Ct.  417:  265. 
Abercrombie   v.    Simmons,    71    Kan. 

538:    834,  838,   1497,   1500. 
Aberdeen  v.   Bradford,  94  Md.   670: 

74,  77,  162,  163,  1654. 
Abney  v.   Clark,   87   la.   726:    1004, 

1009,  1017,  1412. 
V.  Texarkana  etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   105 

La.  446:    1378. 
Abraham  v.  Fremont,  54  Neb.  391 : 

83,  1604. 
V.  Oregon  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  37  Ore. 

495:    1474. 
V.  Oregon  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  41   Ore. 

550:   1474. 


Abrahams  v.  London,   37   L.   J.   Oh. 

732:   1115. 
Acker  v.  Knoxville,   117  Tenn.  224: 
248,  437,  614,  618,  1294. 
V.  New  Castle,  48  Hun  312:    153, 
235. 
Ackerman  v.  Horicon  Iron  Mfg.  Co., 
16  Wis.  150:   1537. 
T.  Huff,  71  Tex.  317:    1033,   1461, 

1517. 
V.  True,  56  App.  Div.  54 :  351,  373. 
T.   True,    71   App.   Div.    143:    197, 

199,  1596. 
V.  True,  175  N.  Y.  353:   197,  199, 
373,   1596. 
Acquackanonk  Water  Co.  v.  Watson, 

29  N.  J.  Eq.  366:  74,  85,  1603. 
Icton  V.  Blundell,  12  M.  &  W.  324: 
161,  165. 
V.  York  County,  77  Me.  128:   981, 
1102. 
Adair  v.  Atlanta,  124  Ga.  288:  1488. 
Adams,   Inhabitants   of.   Petitioners, 

10  Rich.  270:   1418. 
Adams,  In  re,  73  Hun  581 :  878,  1327. 
Adams,  In  re,  141  N.  Y.  297:    366, 

878,  1327. 
Adams,   Matter  of,   141   N.   Y.   297: 

366. 
Adams  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co., 
39    Minn.    286:     180,    181,    188, 
190,  200,  242,  249,  253,  444,  448, 
1295,   1335. 
V.  Clarksburg,  23  W.  Va.  203 :  707, 

1078. 
V.  Durham  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  110  N. 

C.  325:  92,  94,  95,  1651,  1653. 
V.  Emerson,  6  Pick.  57 :  1486,  1489. 
V.  Harrington,   114  lud.   66:    980, 

981,   1010,   1510. 
V.  Hastings  &  Dakota  R.  R.  Co.,  18 
Minn.     260:     247,     1298,     1650, 
1656,  1657. 
V.   London   etc.   Ry.   Co.,    18   L.  J. 

Ch.  N.  S.  357:   1533. 
V.  London  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  2  McN. 
&  G.   118:    1513. 


XXXVll 


XXXVIU 


CASES    CITED 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :  Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Adams  v.  Newfane,  8  Vt.  271:  1423. 
V.  Pearson,  7  Pick.  341:   1137. 
V.  Pease,  2  Conn.  481:   103. 
V.  Roanoke,  102  Va.  53:   1005. 
V.  Rulon,  50  N.  J.  L.  526:    1368, 

1387. 
V.   St.   Johnsbury   &   I^ake   Cham- 
plain  R.  R.  Co.,  57  Vt.  240:  947, 
1188,  1540,  1544,  1564. 
V.  San  Angelo  Water  Works  Co., 

86  Tex.  486:  739. 
V.  Saratoga   &.  Washington   R.   R. 

Co.,  11  Barb.  414:  224,  244. 
V.  Saratoga  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  10  N.  Y. 

328:   893,  895,  1517,  1626. 
s'.    Shelbyville,    154   Ind.   467:    10, 

463. 
V.  Slater,  8  111.  App.  72:  73. 
V.  Toronto,  12  Ontario,  243:  631. 
V.  Walker,  34  Conn.  466:   145,  146. 
Adams     County     v.     Dobschlag,     19 

Wash.  356:   1435. 
Adamson  v.  Nassau  Electric  R.  R.  Co., 
89  Hun  261:   305. 
V.  Nassau  Elec.  R.  R.  Co.,  12  Miscl. 
600:   305. 
Adden  v.  Railroad  Co.,  55  N.  H.  413 : 

1187,  1315. 
Addis   V.    Priest,    3    N.   J.    L.    378: 

1389. 
Adee  v.  Nassau  Elec.  R.  R.  Co.,  65 
App.  Div.  529:  302. 
V.  Nassau  Elec.  R.  R.  Co.,  72  App. 

Div.  404:   683,  744. 
V.  Nassau  Elec.  R.  R.  Co.,  173  N. 

Y.  580:   302. 
V.  Nassau  Elec.  R.  R.  Co.,  177  W. 
Y.  548:  683,  744. 
Adirondack   Ry.    Co.    v.   New   York, 

176  U.  S.  335:  909. 
Adkins  v.  Smith,  94  la.  758:    1476. 
Adler  v.  Met.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  138  N. 
Y.  173:  1585,  1590. 
v:  Met.  El.   R.   R.   Co.,  61   N.  Y. 
Supr.  Ct.  85:   1585,  1590. 
Adolph,    Matter   of,    102   App.    Div. 

371:  1362. 
Adolph,  Matter  of,  186  N.  Y.  547: 

1362. 
Adolph  V.  Minneapolis  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
42  Minn.  170:  1176,  1200,  1201, 
1629. 
Aetna  Mills  v.  Brookline,  127  Mass. 
69:  74,  77. 
V.  Brookline,   178  Mass.  482:   933. 
V.   Waltham,    126   Mass.   422:    74, 
77,  78,  895. 
Afee  V.  Kennedy,  1  Litt.  9  :   544. 
Agne  v.  Seitsinger,  85  la.  305:  850, 
852. 


Agne  V.  Seitsinger,    (la.)    60  N.  W. 

483:   862. 
Ahem  v.  Dubuque  Lead  &  Level  Min- 
ing Co.,  48  la.  140:  563. 
Aitken  v.  Wells  River,  70  Vt.  309: 

460. 
Aken  v.  Parfrey,  35  Wis.  249:  1359, 

1526. 
Akers  v.  Philadelphia,  4  Phila,  56: 
1527,  1528. 
V.  United  New  Jersey  R.  R.  Co.,  43 
N.  J.  L.  110:   711. 
Akin  V.  Commissioners,  36  Ean.  170: 
1028. 
V.    Water   Comrs.,   82    Hun,    265: 
924,    1076. 
Akron  v.  Chamberlain  Company,  34 
Ohio   St.    328:    218. 
V.  Huber,  78  Ohio  St.  372:  219. 
V.  McComb,  18  Ohio  229:   214. 
Alabama    Consol.    C.    &    I.    Co.    v. 
Turner,  14S  Ala.  639:  69. 
V.  Vines,  151  Ala.  398:  81. 
Alabama  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bloom,  71 
Miss.  247:   640. 
V.  Burkett,  42  Ala.  83:  1123,  1204, 

1330. 
V.    Burkett,    46    Ala.    569:     1204, 

1317. 
».  Cumberland  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  88 

Miss.  438 :  682,  1623. 

V.  Kenny,  39  Ala.   307:    743,  747. 

Alabama  G.  S.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Collier, 

112  Ala.  681:  246,  248,  250. 

V.  Gilbert,  71   Ga.   591:   708,  820. 

V.   Prouty,   149   Ala.   7:    145,   151, 

1607. 
V.  Shahan,  116  Ala.  302:   94. 
Alabama   Lumber   Co.   v.   Keel,    125 

Ala.  603:  98. 
Alabama  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Coakry,  92 
Ala.   254:    324,  639. 
V.  Newton,  94  Ala.  443 :  924,  1673, 

1703. 
V.    Williams,    92    Ala.    277:    319, 
1451,    1452,    1453. 
Alameda  v.  Cohen,  133  Cal.  5:   674, 

678,   1434. 
Alameda  County  v.  Crocker,  125  Cal. 

101:   1444. 
Albany,    Bx    parte,   23    Wend.    277: 

1411,   1414,   1415,   1419. 
Albany  v.  Gilbert,  144  Mo.  224 :  1158.  ' 
V.  Sikes,  94  Ga.  30:   154,  653. 
V.   Watervliet   etc.    R.   R.   Co.,   45 

Hun  442 :  492. 
V.  Watervliet  T.  &  P.  Co.,  108  N. 
Y.   14:    746,  749,  1520. 
Albany  etc.  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Dayton,  10 
Abb.  Pr.  N.  S.  182:   1177. 


CASES    CITED. 


XXXIX 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Albany  Northern  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown- 
ell,  24  N.  Y.  345:  490,  750,  820, 

1287. 
V.    Lansing,    16    Barb.    68:     1096, 

1205. 
Albany  St.,  Matter  of,  11  Wend.  149: 

589,  1266. 
Albany  Street,  Matter  of,  11  Wend. 

151:  495,  496. 
Albany  Street  Opening,   6  Abb.   Pr. 

273:    1022,   1031. 
Albany  Water  Works  Co.  v.  Albany 

Mayor's   Court,    12   Wend.   292 

1414. 
Albert  Lea  v.  Nielson,  80  Minn.  101 

137. 
Albertson  v.  Phila.,  185  Pa.  St.  223 

1313. 
T.  State,  95  Ind.  370:  1516. 
Albion  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Heiser,  84  Oal. 

43:   1347. 
Albot  T.  Gibson,  141  Mich.  698 :  975. 
Albright  v.  Cedar  Rapids  etc.  Ry.  & 

Lt.  Co.,  133  la.  644:   153,  1450, 

1454,  1639. 
v.    Sussex    County   Lake    &    Park 

Commission,   68   N.   J.   L.   523: 

498,  501,  503,  540,  807. 
V.    Sussex    County    Lake   &    Park 

Commission,   71   N.   J.   L.    303: 

540,  807. 
V.    Sussex    County   Lake   &   Park 

Commission,   71   N.   J.   L.   309: 

540. 
Albro  V.  Fall  River,  175  Mass.  590: 

605. 
Albuquerque  L.  &  I.  Co.  v.  Gutierrez, 

10  N.  M.  177:  587. 
Alcorn    v.    Hamer,    38    Miss.    652: 

586. 
Aleott  y.  Aeheson,  49  la.  569:   1035, 

1671. 
Alden  v.  Minneapolis,  24  Minn.  254: 

234. 
Alden   Coal   Co.  v.   Challis,   200  111. 

222:   883,  887,  889. 
Aldis  V.  Union  El.  R.   R.   Co.,   203 

111.    567:     266,    304,    639,    642, 

1549,   1551. 
Aldredge  v.  School  District,  10  Okla. 

694:  1005,  1513,  1626. 
Aldrich  v.  Cheshire  R.  R.  Co.,  21  N. 

H.    359:    161,    1523. 
V.  Drury,  8  R.  I.  554:   1480. 
V.  Met.   West  Side  El.  R.  R.  Co., 

195  111.  456:    655,   663,  670. 
V.    Minneapolis,     52    Minn.     164: 

1665. 


Aldrich  v.  Providence,  12  R.  I.  241: 

612,  615,  1532. 
V.   Wetmore,   52   Minn.    164:    372, 

374. 
Aldridge  v.  Board  of  Education,   15 

Old.    354:    1005. 
V.  Spears,  14  S.  W.  118:   1397. 
V.  Stillwater  Board  of  Education, 

15  Okl.  354:   1348. 
V.  Tuscumbia,  C.  &  D.  R.  R.  Co., 

2   Stew.   &   Por.   199:    501,   504, 

524,  674,  926. 
Aldritt  V.  Fleischauer,  74  Neb.   66: 

166. 
Aldworth    v.    Lynn,    153    Mass.    53: 

144,  1639,  1662. 
Alexander  v.   Baltimore,   5   G.   &  J. 

(Md.)    383:    13. 
V.  District  of  Columbia,  3  Mackey 

(D.    C.)     192:    1634. 
V.  Milwaukee,  16  Wis.  247:   167. 
V,  Plattsmouth,  30  Neb.  117:  951. 
V.  West  London  &  Crystal  Pal.  Ry. 

Co.,   30   Beav.   556:    822,    823. 
V.  West  London  &  Crystal  Pal.  Ry. 

Co.,  31  N.  J.  Ch.  N.  S.  500:  822. 
Alexandria  v.  Morgan's  La.  etc.  Co., 

109   La.   50:    303. 
Alexandria   &  Fredericksburg  R.   R. 

Co.  V.  Alexandria  &  Washington 

R.  R.  Co.,  75  Va.  780:   754. 
Alexandria  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Faunce, 

31    Gratt.    761:    428,    744,    952, 

953,  966,  1546,  1547. 
Alexian   Bros.    v.    Oshkosh,   95   Wis. 

221:  1236. 
Alfalfa  Irr.  Dist.  v.  Collins,  46  Nel). 

411:    10. 
Aliso   Water  Co.   v.   Baker,  95    Cal. 

268:   587,  987. 
AUaby    v.    Milwaukee    Elec.    Service 

Co.,  135  Wis.  345:  550. 
Allaire  v.  Woonsocket,  25  R.  I.  414: 

1180,   1202. 
AUard  v.  Loban,  3  Martin  La.  N.  S. 

293:   430,  956. 
Allegheny's  Appeal,  165  Pa.  St.  367 : 

1670. 
Allegheny  v.   Black's   Heirs,   99   Pa. 

St.   152:    1216. 
v.  Millville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  159  Pa. 

St.  411:   302. 
Allegheny  Co.  v.  Gibson,  90  Pa.  St. 

397:    476. 
Allegheny  County  v.   Smith,   11   Pa. 

Dist.  Ct.  704:  989. 


xl 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Allegheny  Valley  K.  E.  Co.  v.  Col- 
well,  2  Monaghan   (Pa.  Supm.) 

300:    1629. 
Allen  V.  Androscoggin  R.  R.  Co.,  60 

Me.  494:   1090. 
V.  Bainbridge,  145  Mich.  366 :  460. 
V.  Boston,  137  Mass.  319:  1266. 
V.  Boston,  159  Mass.  324 :  143. 
v.    Charlestown,    109    Mass.    243: 

1185,  1216. 
V.  Chicago,  176  HI.  113:  958,  1069. 
V.   Chippewa  Falls,   52   Wis.  430: 

234. 
V.    Clausen,    114    Wis.    244:     315, 

1587. 
V.   Colorado   Cent.   R.  R.   Co.,   22 

Colo.  238:   1519- 
7.   Commonwealth,   188  Mass.   59: 

626,  660,  1273. 
V.  Drew,  44  Vt.   174:    14,  462. 
T.  Jersey  City,  53  N.  J.  L.   522: 

309,  778. 
V,  Jones,   47   Ind.   438:    679,   680. 
V.    Levee    Comrs.,    57    Miss.    163: 

1412. 
V.  Michel,  38  111.  App.  313:    154, 

1650,  1655. 
T.  Northville,  39  Hun  240:  918. 
V.  Paris,  1  Tex.  App.  Civil  Cas.  p. 

506:   235. 
V.    Parker    County,    23    Tex.    Civ. 

App.  536:   1029,  1030. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  107  Ga.  838:  936. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,   (Tex.  Civ.  App.) 

25  S.  W.  826:  1329. 
V,  Reinhardt,  90  Ky.  466:  876. 
V.  Thornapple  Elec.  Co.,  144  Mich. 

370:    69. 
V.  Utica,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  Hun 

80:    1511,   1514. 
V.  Wabash,  St.  Louis  &  Pacific  E. 

R.  Co.,  84  Mo.  646:   1546. 
V.  Welch,  125  Mo.  App.  278:  1024, 

1029. 
Allentown  etc.  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Le- 
high Val.  Traction  Co.,  174  Pa. 

St.  273:  1292. 
Allen    To^vnship    Road.    18    Pa.    St. 

463:   1082. 
Allison  r.  Cincinnati,  2  Cinn.  Super. 

Ct.   462:    335. 
V.  Comrs.  of  Highways,  54  111.  170: 

1099,  1370,  1409. 
V.     Delaware    etc.    Canal    Co.,     5 

Wheat.    482:    1378. 
V.  Taylor,  3  T.  B.  Monroe  7 :  1423. 
Alhnon  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  155 

III.    17:    1195,  1202,  1426. 
Alloway  v.  Nashville,  88  Tenn.  510: 

1175,     12-28.     1229,     1232,     1234, 

1237,  1251,  1320. 


Allport  V.  Helena  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  12 

Mont.  279:   1399. 
AUyn  V.  Providence  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  4 

R.  L  457:   1136. 
Almand  v.  Atlanta  Consolidated  St. 

Ry.  Co.,  108  Ga.  417:   298. 
V.  Rockdale  Co.,  78  Ga.  199 :   1081. 
Almy  v.  Church,  18  R.  I.  182 :  869. 
V.  Coggeshall,  19  R.  I.  549:  235. 
Alstad  V.   Sim,   15  N.  D.   629:    580, 

1511. 
Alston's  Petition,  In  re,  I  Penn.  Del. 

359:    672. 
Althen  v.  Kelly,  32  Minn.  280:  1489, 

1594. 
Alton  v.  Fishback,  181  111.  396:  883. 
V.  Hamilton  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  U. 

C.  Q.  B.  595:   158. 
V.  Illinois  Trans.  Co.,  12  111.  38: 

872. 
V.    Meenwenberg,    108   Mich.    629: 

876. 
Alton  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Baugh,  14  IIL 

211:  1316. 
V.    Carpenter,    14    111.    190:    1174, 

1194. 
Altoona  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Tyrone  etc. 

R.  R.  Co.,  160  Pa.  St.  633:  771. 
Amboy  v.  111.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  236 

in.  236:  396,  397. 
Amer  v.  Union  County,  17  Ore.  600: 

981. 
American  Bank  Note  Co.  v.  Met.  El. 

R.  R.  Co.,  63  Hun  506:   1277. 
V.  New  York  El.  E.  R.  Co.,  129  N. 

Y.  252:  265,  448,  866,  869,  1296, 

1297,    1303,    1304,    1333,    1554, 

1555,  1584. 
American  Cannel  Coal  Co.  v.  Hunt- 

ingburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  130  Ind. 

98:  1100,  1365,  1409. 
American  Locomotive  Co.  v.  Hoffman, 

105  Va.  343:  94. 
V.  Hoffman,  108  Va.  363:  1653. 
American    Primitive    Methodist    So- 
ciety V.  Brooklyn  El.  R.  R.  Co., 

46  Hun,  530:   264. 
American  Print  Works  v.  Lawrence, 

21  N.  J.  L.  248:   17. 
V.  Lawrence,  23  N.  J.  L.  590:  17. 
American  Ea,pid  Tel.  Co.  v.  Hess,  125 

N.  Y.  641:    15,  489. 
American  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  Harbor 

Creek  Tp.  23  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  437: 

361,  491. 
v.   Jones,    78    lU.   App.    372,    338, 

1636. 
v.   Mill   Creek,    195   Pa.    St.   643: 

361,  491. 
V.  Morgan  Co.  Tel.  Co.,   138  Ala. 

597:  418. 


OASES    CITED. 


xli 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


American  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  Pearce, 

71  Md.  535:  343. 
V.  St.  Louis  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  202  Mo. 

656:    677,  774,  988,   1247,   1284, 

1286. 
V.  Smith,  71  Md.  535:   425,   1159, 

1473,  1568,  1573. 
American  Trans.  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  New 

York  etc.  K.  R.  Co.,  58  N.  J.  L. 

109:  909. 
V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  59  N. 

J.  L.  156:   909. 
American  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Wilming- 
ton etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  83  N.  C.  420: 

1423. 
American    Unitarian    Ass.    v.    Com- 
monwealth, 193  Mass.  470:  468, 

740. 
American    Woolen    Co.    v.   Kennebec 

Water  Dist.   102  Me.   153:    110, 

138. 
Americus  v.   Mitchell,   79   6a.   807: 

484. 
Ames  V.  Lake  Superior  &  Miss.  R. 

R.  Co.,  21  Minn.  241 :  923,  927. 
T.  San  Diego,  101  Cal.  390:  1491. 
V.  Union  Pae.  R.  R.  Co.,  64  Fed. 

165:   483. 
Amet  V.  Texas  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  117  La. 

454:    1546,   1715. 
Amory  v.   Melrose,    162  Mass.   556: 

1127,  1140,  1141. 
Amos  T.  Norcross,  58  N.  J.  Eq.  256: 

117. 
Amoskeag  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Goodale,  46  N. 

H.  53:  91. 
V.  Goodale,  62  N.  H.  66:  549. 
T.  Head,  56  N.  H.  386 :  549. 
V.  Worcester,  60  N.  H.  522:   549, 

723,  1147. 
Amsterdam  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  In  re,  86 

Hun  578:  920. 
Amsterdam   Knitting   Co.    v.    Dean, 

162  N.  Y.  278:    1603. 
Anaheim  v.   Longenberger,   134   Cal. 

608:   886,  888. 
Anchor  Brewing  Co.  v.  Dobbs  Ferry, 

84  Hun  274:  157,  235. 
Anders  v.  Anders,  4  Jones  Law  243: 

1410. 
Anderson,  Matter   of,   91   App.   Div. 

563:  610,  611. 
Anderson,  Matter  of,  178  N.  Y.  416: 

610,  611. 
Anderson  v.  Atchison  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  71 

Kan.  453:   1714. 
V.  Atlantic  Coast  Line  R.  R.  Co., 

59  S.  C.  350:  838,  1497. 
V.  Bain,    120   Ind.   254:    602,   616, 

918 
V.  Baker.  98  Ind.  587 :  575. 


Anderson   v.    Bement,    13   Ind.   App. 

248:   1490. 
V.  Board  of  Co.  Comrs.,  46  Minn. 

237:  1400. 
V.    Burlington    etc.    Ry.    Co.,    82 

Minn.  293:   450. 
V.  Caldwell,  91  Ind.  451 :  922,  929. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  85  Minn. 

337:   450. 
V.  Cincinnati  So.  R.  R.  Co.,  86  Ky. 

44:   69,  72,  75. 
T.  Comrs.,  12  Ohio  St.  635:   1516, 

1517,  1571. 
V.  Decoria,  74  Minn.  339 :  1028. 
V.  Endicutt,  101  Ind.  539:  700. 
V.  Ft.  Worth,  83  Tex.  107:   1116. 
V.  Kerns  Draining  Co.,  14  Ind.  199  : 

571,  574. 
V.    McKinney,    24    Ohio    St.    467: 

1707,  1709. 
V.  Messenger,  158  Fed.  250:  1005. 
V.  Milwaukee,  82  Wis.  279:  615. 
V.  New  York  Cent.  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

58  Misc.  72 :  1562. 
T.  Pemberton,  89  Mo.  61 :  957,  1096, 

1360,  1371. 
V.  Rochester  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  9  How. 

Pr.  553 :  420,  1494. 
V.  St.  Louis,  47  Mo.  479:  893,  894, 

1035,  1674. 
V.    San    Francisco,   92   Minn.    57: 

1028. 
V.  Turbeville,  6  Coldw.   150:    178, 

369,  388,  498,  503,  675,  923,  1005, 

1008,  1165. 
V.  Wharton  Co.,  27  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

115:  1317. 
V.  Word,  80  111.  15:  993. 
Anderson  etc.  R.  K.  Co.  v.  Kemhole, 

54  Ind.  314:   1634. 
Andover  v.  Board  of  Comrs.  86  Me. 

185:    1083. 
V.    County    Comrs.    5    Gray,   393: 

1361. 
V.  Sutton,  12  Met.  182:   1623. 
Andrew  v.   Nantasket   Beach  R.   R. 

Co.,  152  Ma^s.  506 :  957. 
Andrews  t.  Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust 

Co.,  22  Wis.  288:   1579. 
V.   Johnson,   1  Law  Repoa  N.   C. 

272:   1408. 
V.  King,  77  Me.  239 :  1415. 
V.  Marion,  23  Minn.  372:  1405. 
v.  Steel  City,  2  Neb.   (Unof.)   676: 

155,  1606. 
Andrus  v.  Bay  Creek  Ry.  Co.,  60  N. 

J.  L.  10,  1670. 
Angell  V.  Hornbeck,  31  Ind.  xVpp.  59: 

1058. 
Anheuser-Busch  Brewing  Ass.  v.  Pe- 
terson. 41  Neb.  893:   166. 


xlii 


CASES    CITED, 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Anketell  v.  Hayward,  119  Mich.  525: 

1361. 
Anness  v.  Providence,   13  K.  I.   17: 

612:  618. 
Anniston  etc.  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Jackson- 
ville etc.  K.  R.  Co.,  82  Ala.  297 : 
758,  794. 
Anthony  v.  Adams,  1  Met.  284:  722. 
V.   County  Comrs.,   14  Pick.    189: 

1386. 
V.  lawhorne,  1  Leigh  1:   1098. 
V.  South  Kingstown,  13  E.  I.  129: 
1081. 
Anthony   St.,   Matter   of,   20   Wend. 

618:   1669,  1670. 
Antoinette  Street,  8  Phila.  461 :  1341. 
A.  0.  Hine  v.  Trevor,  4  Wall.  455: 

103. 
Apex  Transportation  Co.  v.  Garbade, 
32  Ore.  582:  498,  535,  675,  1042, 
1043. 
Appleby  Manor  Road,  1  Grant,  443: 

1371. 
Applegate  v.  Franklin,  109  111.  App. 

293:   109,  151. 
Appleton  v.  County  Comrs.,  80  Me. 
284:    1399. 
V.  Newton,  178  Mass.  276 :  675,  733, 
1001,    1003,    1008,    1157,    1164, 
1707,  1708,  1709,  1712. 
Application  for  Drainage,  Matter  of, 
35  N.  J.  L.  497:  577,  1044,  1187. 
Appointment  of  Viewers,  In  re,  6  Lu 
zerne  Leg.  Eeg.  Eep.  13:   1081. 
Appropriation,   Matter    of,   23   App. 

Div.  N.  Y.  7:  1705. 
App's  Tavern,  Road  from,  17  S.  &  R. 

388:   1003,  1086. 
Aqua  Pura  Co.  v.  Las  Vegas,  10  N. 

M.  6:  481. 
Arbegust  v.  Louisville,  2  Bush.  271: 

465. 
Arbenz  v.  Wheeling  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  33 
W.  Va.    1:    256,   297,  306,   324, 
640,  1581. 
Arbrush   v.   Oakdale,   28   Minn.   61: 

1186,  1206. 
Areata  v.  Areata  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  92 

Cal.  639:  303,  426. 
Areata  &  Mad   River  R.   R.   Co.   T. 

Murphy,  71  Cal.  122:   1223. 
Archer  v.  Salinas  City,  93  Cal.  43: 

871,  877,  887. 
Archibald  v.  New  York  Cent.  etc.  E. 
R.  Co.,  157  N.  Y.  574:   122. 
V.  Thompson,  2  Colo.  388:  996. 
Andrus  v.  Bay  Creek  Ry.  Co.  60  N. 

J.  L.    10:    1698. 
Argentine  v.  Atchison  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

55  Kan.  730:  487. 
Argo  V.  Barthand,  80  Ind.  63:  1510. 


Arimond  v.   Green  Bay  etc.   Co.,  31 

Wis.  316:   63,  66,  90,  100,  144, 

168. 

V.  Green  Bay  etc.  Co.,  35  Wis.  41: 

90,  92,   1074,  1710. 

Arizona  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Denver  etc. 

Ey.  Co.,  13  N.  M.  345:  900,  1619. 

Arkansas  Cent.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith, 

71  Ark.  189:  843,  852,  853,  1545. 

Arkansas  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Kennedy,  84 

Ark.  364:  1470. 
Arkansas  Val.  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Witt,  19 

OkL  262:   1245. 
Armington  v.   Barnett,   15  Vt.  745: 

781,   788. 
Armistead   v.   Vicksburg  etc.   E.  R. 

Co.,  47  La.  An.  1381:  873,  874. 
Armory  Board,  Matter  of,   73  App. 

Div.   152:    1212,   1233,  1240. 
Armstrong  v.  Cincirmati,  5  Ohio  138 : 
1459,  1641. 
V.  County  Court,  54  W.  Va.  503: 

363. 
V.  Moore,   1  K^an.  App.   450,  948, 

1563. 
V.  New  York  Central  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

2  Hun  482:    1469. 
T.  St.  Louis,  69  Mo.  309 :  1626. 
V.  St.  Louis,  3  Mo.  App.  151 :  239. 
V.  St.  Paul,  30  Minn.  299 :  229,  442, 
1453. 
Am  V.  Kansas  City,  4  McCrary,  558: 

156. 
Amd  V.  Cullman,  132  Ala.  540:  143. 
V.  Union  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  120  Fed. 
912:   465. 
Arndt    v.    Thomas,    90    Minn.    355: 

1569. 
Arnold  v.  Buffalo  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  32  Pa. 
Supr.  Ct.  452 :  945. 
V.    Council   Bluffs,   85   Iowa  441: 
698. 

V.  Covington  &  Cincinnati  Bridge 

Co.,  1   Duvall    (Ky.)    372:   522, 

1225,   1461,   1463. 
V.  Decatur,  29  Mich.  77:  893,  1058, 

1367. 
V.  Elmore,  16  Wis.  509:  104. 
V.  Hudson  River  R.  R.  Co.,  55  N. 

Y.  661:  428. 
V.  Klipper,  24  Mo.  273:  1604. 
v.    Stanford,    113    Ky.    852:    456, 

658. 

V.  Weiker,  55  Kan.  510:  384,  390, 
400,  876. 

Arnsperger    v.    Crawford,    101    Md. 

247 :  494,  496,  498,  505,  508,  509, 

517,  520,  1395,  1519. 
Arringtou  v.  Savannah  &  W.  E.  E. 

Co.,  95   Ala.   434:    717. 


OASES    CITED. 


xliii 


[The  references  are   to  the   pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Art  St.,  Matter  of,  20  Wend.   685: 

1533. 
Asburn  v.  Chicago,  105  111.  App.  217  : 

658. 
Ash   V.    Cummings,    50   N.   H.    591: 

549,  684,  685,  1164,  1525. 
Ashby  V.  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.,  5  Met. 

368:   963. 
Asher  v.  Jones  County,  29  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  353:   1512. 
V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  87  Ky.  391 : 
1159,    1160,    1161,    1183,    1200, 
1201,  1468. 
V.  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  118  Ky. 
493:  1471. 
Asheville  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  West  Ashe- 
ville  R.  R.  Co.,  114  N.  C.  725: 
298 
Ashland  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  105 
Wis.  398:  395,  399,  406,  1492. 
V.  No.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  119  Wis.  204: 
395,  399,  406,  1492. 
Ashland  Coal  &  I.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  David- 
son,  (Ky.)   20  S.  W.  270:   1464. 
Ashland  etc.  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Faulkner, 

106  Ky.  332 :  272,  274,  313. 
Ashley  v.  Burt  County,  73  Neb.  159 : 
1354. 
V.  Port  Huron,  35  Mich.  296 :  143, 

233. 
V.  Wolcott,  11  Cush.  192:  147. 
Askam  v.  King  County,  9  Wash.  1: 

492,  564,  568,  581,  1157. 
Aspinwall  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
41    Wis.    474:    947,    949,    1226, 
1329. 
Astor  V.   Hoyt,   5   Wend.   603:    948, 
949. 
V.  New  York,  5  Jones  &  S.  539 :  13. 
V.  New  York,  62  N.  Y.  580:   1087, 
1101,  1102,   1103. 
Aswell  V.  Scranton,  175  Pa.  St.  173: 

1308. 
Atchison  v.  Atlanta,  81  Ga.  625:  653. 
Atchison  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Anderson, 
65  Kan.  202 :  1549. 
V.  Armstrong,  71  Kan.   366:    351, 

447. 
V.  Arnold,  52  Kan.  729:  211,  252, 

319. 
V.  B.  &  0.  R.  R.  Co.,  110  U.  S.  675: 

772. 
V.  Blackshire,  10  Kan.  417:    1203. 
T.  Board  of  Comrs.,  48  Kan.  576: 

1290. 
V.  Boemer,  34  Neb.  240:   190,  646, 

1451,  1452. 
V.  Boerner,  45  Neb.  453 :  646,  1450, 

1451,  1452. 
y.  Davenport,  65  Kan.  206:   1245, 
1457,  1485,  1519,  1646. 


Atchison  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Davidson, 
52  Kans.  739:  179,  252,  311,  324, 
1549,   1048,   1657. 
V.  Forney,  35  Neb.  607:    1450. 
V.  Garside,  10  Kan.  552:  249,  251, 

316. 
V.  General  Elec.  Ry.  Co.,  112  Fed. 

689:  328,  766,  1282,  1611. 
V.  Gough,  29  Kan.  94:   1208,  1311. 
V.  Hammer,  22  Kan.  763:  157. 
V.  Herman,  74  Kan.  77:  91. 
V.    Jones,    110    111.   App.    626.   88, 

1456,  1639,  1653. 
V.   Kansas   City   etc.,   Ry.   Co.,   67 

Kan.    569:    708,    754,   793,   799, 

1041,  1571. 
V.  Lauterback,  8  Kan.  App.  15: 

1714. 
V.  Lenz,  35  111.  App.  330:  654. 
V.  Long,  46  Kan.  701:  75,  1603. 
V.  Luening,  52  Kan.  732:  252,  319. 
V.  Lyon,  24  Kan.  745:  1311,  1438. 
V.  Meyer,  62  Kan.  696:  1615. 
V.  Patch,  28  Kan.  470:  1030,  1409. 
V.  Plant,  24  Neb.  127:  1436,  1440. 
V.  Piatt,  53  111.  App.  263 :  639. 
V.  Schneider,  127  111.  144:  1109, 

1259,  1274,  1277,  1427,  1467. 
V.  Weaver,  10  Kan.  344:  1159, 

1525,  1634. 
V.  Wilson,  66  Kan.  233:  1534,  1673. 
Atchison  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Missouri 

Pao.  R.  R.  Co.,  31  Kan.  660:  299, 

328,  767,  1610. 
v.  Nave,  38  Kan.  744:  303,  314, 

315,  1587,  1589. 
Athens  Mfg.   Co.  v.  Rueker,  80  Ga. 

292:  95,  456. 
Athens  Terminal  Co.  v.  Athens  F.  & 

M.  Works,  129  Ga.  393 :  242,  297, 

1581,  1617. 
Atkins  V.  Boston,  188  Mass.  77:  1186, 

1220. 
Atkinson  v.  Asheville  St.  R.  R.  Co. 

113  N.  C.  581:  305. 
V.  Atlanta,  81  Ga.  625:   154,  629, 

1648,   1656,  1660,  1718. 
V.  Marietta  R.  R.  Co.,  15  Ohio  St. 

21:  687,  729,  1048. 
V.  Newton,  169  Mass.  242:  514. 
V.  Washington  Irr.  Co.,  44  Wash. 

75:  957,  1569. 
Atlanta  v.  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  53  Ga. 

120:   750,  926,  1182. 
V.  Green,  67  Ga.  386:  629,  671. 
V.  Holliday,  96  Ga.  546:  347,  349, 

1487,  1594. 
V.   Hunnicutt,   95   Ga.    138:    1331, 

1496,  1524. 
V.  Schneltzer,  83  Ga.  609:  1353. 


xliv 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Atlanta  v.   Wood,  78  Ga.  276:    629, 

653,  1137. 
Atlanta  Consolidated  St.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Jackson,  108  Ga.  634:  1504. 
Atlanta  etc.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Atlanta  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  124  Ga.  125:  760,  799, 
800. 
V.  Atlanta  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  125  Ga. 

529:  246,  639,  1580. 
V.  Barker,  105  Ga.  534:  1627,  1631. 
V.  Kimberly,  87  Ga.  161 :  159,  454. 
V.    Redwine,    123    Ga.    736:    10^, 

1624. 
T.  St.  Louis,  66  Mo.  228 :  693. 
V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  131  Fed.  657: 

«08. 
V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  153  Fed.  122: 
1504. 
Atlanta   Ry.    &    P.    Co.    t.    Atlanta 
Rapid  Transit  Co.,  113  Ga.  481: 
881,  1620. 
Atlantic  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.,  In  re,  136  N. 

Y.  292 :   922. 
Atlantic  City   v.'  GroflF,  64  N.  J.  L. 
527:   888. 
V.  GrofF,  68  N.  J.  L.  670:  880. 
T.  New  Auditorium  Pier  Co.,  63  N. 

J.  Eq.  644:    117. 
V.  Snee,  68  N.  J.  L.  39:  891. 
Atlantic  City  Gas  &  W.  Co.  v.  Con- 
sumers' Gas  &  Fuel  Co.,  70  N. 
J.  Eq.  5b6:   1608. 
Atlantic  Coast  Line  Elec.  R.  R.  Co. 

V.  Griffin,  64  N.  J.  L.  513:  700. 
Atlantic    Coast   Line    R.    R.    Co.    v. 
Corp.  Commission,  206  U.  S.  1: 
488. 
V.  Florida,  203  U.  S.  256 :  480,  483. 
V.  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  120  Ga. 
268:  733,  773,  1061,  1066,  1231, 
1233,  1266,  1285,  1286,  1407. 
V.  South  Bound  R.  R.  Co.,  57  S.  C, 
317:  740,  927,  1399. 
Atlantic  etc.   R.  R.   Co.,  appellants, 

100  Maine,  430:  752. 
Atlantic  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Campbell, 
4  Ohio  St.  583:  1124,  1125. 
V.  Cordele,  125  Ga.  373:  361,  491. 
V.  Cordele,  128  Ga.  293:  361,  491. 
V.  Cumberland  Co.  Comrs.,  28  Me. 

112:    1444. 
V.     Cumberland     Co.     Comrs.,     51 

Maine  36 :  1004. 
V.  Fuller,  48  Ga.  423 :   1524. 
V.  Kirkland,  129  Ga.  552:  728. 
V.    Koblentz,    21    Ohio    St.    334: 

1323. 
V.  Lesuer,  2  Ariz.  428 :  837. 
V.   MeKnight,    125    Ga.   328:    629, 
634,  639,  1297,  1301,  1302,  1549, 
1552. 


Atlantic  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Montezuma. 

122  Ga.  1:  309,  1622. 
V.   Peake,   87   Va.    130:    92,    1651, 

1653. 
V.  Penny,  119  Ga.  479:   815,  1059, 
1060,    1061,    1063,    1065,    1066, 

1519. 
V.  Prudhomme,   2  Montreal  Supr. 

Ct.  21:  1322. 
V.  Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry.  Co.,  116 

Ga.  412:  1610,  1611. 
V.   Sullivan,  5   Ohio  St.   76:    929, 

1048. 
Atlantic  &  P.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Chicago  etc. 

R.  R.  Co.,  6  Biss.  158 :  425. 
Atlee  V.  Packet  Co.,  21  Wall.  389 :  99, 

136. 
Atley  V.  Clinton  County,  77  Ohio  St. 

285:  1423. 
Atterbury  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

134  111.  App.  330:  152,  846,  847. 
Attorney    General    v.    Abbott,     154 

Mass.  323:  871,  876,  878,  890. 
V.  Boston,  186  Mass.  209:  1487. 
v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  160  Mass. 

62:  476. 
V.  Colney  Hatch  Lunatic  Asylum, 

L.  R.  4  Ch.  App.  146:  81,  1605. 
V.  Conservators  of  the  Thames,  1 

H.  &  M.  1 :  128. 
V.  Delaware  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  27  N. 

J.  Eq.  1:  97,  116. 
V.  Delaware  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  27  N.  J. 

Eq.  631:  97,  116. 
V.   Detroit   Common   Council,   148 

Mich.  1 :  299. 
V.  Eau  Claire,  37  Wis.  400:   523, 

550,  593. 
V.    Goderich,    5    Grant   402:    421, 

1494. 
V.  Hunter,  1  Dev.  Eq.  12 :  484. 
V.  Lake  View  Land  Co.,  143  Ala. 

291:  870. 
V.   Leeds,   5  L.  R.  Ch.  App.  583: 

83. 
V.  Lonsdale,  7  L.  R.  Eq.  Cas.  390: 

649. 
V.   Lunatic  Asylum,   4  L.   R.   Ch. 

App.  146:  81. 
V.  McClear,  146  Mich.  45:  564,  576. 
T.  Metropolitan  R.  R.  Co.,  L.  R. 

(1894)  1  Q.  B.  D.  384:  451,  657. 
V.    Metropolitan    R.    R.    Co.,    125 

Mass.  515:  268. 
V.  Morris  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  19  N.  J. 

Eq.  386:  406,  1583. 
V.  Paterson,  58  N.  J.  Eq.  1:  1604. 
V.  Pingree,  120  Mich.  550:   739. 
V.  Revere   Copper   Co.,   152   Mass. 

444:   109,  110. 
V.  Sherry,  20  R.  I.  43 :  364,  368. 


CASES    CITED. 


xlv 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :  Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Attorney  General  v.  Smith,  109  Wis. 
532:  109,  114,  115,  128. 
V.   Sunderland,   L.   E.   2   Ch.   Div. 

634:  420,  421,  1494. 
V.   Sunderland,   L.   R.   2   Ch.   Div. 

638:   1494. 
V.  Tarr,  148  Mass.  309:   356,  422, 

1496,  1618. 
V.  Tomline,  12  L.  E.  Ch.  Div.  214: 

166. 
V.  Tomline,  14  L.  R.  Ch.  Div.  58: 

166. 
V.   Turpin,   3   Hen.   &  Mun.   548: 

1325,  1683. 
V.  Vineyard  Grove  Co.,  181  Mass. 

507:  872. 
V.  Williams,  174  Mass.  476:  468, 

512,  540. 
V.  Williams,  178  Mass.  330:  468. 
V.  Woods,  108  Mass.  436:  113. 
Atwater    v.    Canandaigua,    56    Hun 
293:    138. 
V.   Canandaigua,    124   N.   Y.   602: 

138 
v.  Mayer,  29  Alb.  L.  J.  483:  1594. 
Attwood  V.  Bangor,  83  Maine,  582: 
142,  1650,  1656. 
V.  Moosehead  Paper  &  Pulp  Co.,  85 

Maine  379 :  948. 
V.  O'Brien,  80  Maine  447 :  879. 
V.  Partree,  56  Conn.  80:  385,  388, 
406. 
Auburn  v.  Union  Water  Power  Co., 

90  Maine  576:  109,  138. 
Auchinloss  v.  Metropolitan  R.  R.  Co., 

69  App.  Div.  63:  315. 
Auditor  v.  Crise,  20  Ark.  540:  1531. 
Auditor  General  v.  Crane,  152  Mich. 

94:   1511,  1637. 
Audubon  v.  Hand,  231  111.  334:  1017, 

1020. 
Augusta  V.  Marks,  50  Ga.  612:  1182. 
V.  Marks,  124  Ga.  365:    142,  453, 

1649,  1654. 
V.    Schrameck,    96   Ga.    426:    629, 

1306,  1307,  1337. 
V.  Tyner,  197  III.  242:  891. 
Augusta  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Augusta, 

100  Ga.  701 :  297. 
Aull  V.  Columbia  etc.  R.  R.  Co,  42  S. 

C.  431:  976,  996. 
Auman  v.  Philadelphia  etc.  R,  R.  Co., 

113  Pa.  St.  93:   1152. 
Aurora  v.   Elgin   etc.   Traction   Co., 
227  III.  485 :  241,  284,  304. 
V.  Fox,  78  Ind.  1:  229,  442,  1453. 
V.  Gillett,  56  III.  132:  233. 
V.  Love,  93  111.  521 :   154. 
V.  Reed.  57  III.  29 :   233. 
V.  West,  9  Ind.  74:   10,  26,  462. 


Aurora   Blec.   Lt.   &   P.    Co.  v.   Me- 
Wethy,   104  111.  App.   479:    344, 
1594. 
Aurora  etc.  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Harvey,  178 
111.  477 :  720,  1045,  1059,  1068. 
V.  Lawrenceburg,  56  Ind.  80:  1047. 
V.  Miller,  56  Ind.  88:   1044,  1047, 
1048. 
Austel  V.  Atlanta,  100  Ga.  182 :  1080, 

1408. 
Austin   V.   Allen,    6   Wis.    134:    974, 
1022,  1518. 
V.  Augusta  Terminal  Ey.  Co.,  108 

Ga.  671:  449,  666,  671. 
V.  Austin  City  Cem.  Assn.,  87  Tex. 

330:  469. 
V.  Belleville  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  19  111. 

310:  734,  1396. 
V.  Detroit  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  134  Mich. 

149:  272,  274,  280,  281,  324. 
v.  Helms,  65  N.  C.  560:  1102. 
V.  Murray,  16  Pick.  121 :  480. 
V.  Eutland  R.  R.  Co.,  45  Vt.  215: 
108,  830. 
Austin  etc.   R.  E.  Co.  v.   Anderson, 
79  Texas  427:    155,  1651,  1655, 
1716. 
Autensieth  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  E.  R.  Co., 
36  Mo.  App.  254:  351,  372,  385, 
1649,  1659. 
Avery  v.  Fox,  1  Abb.  U.  S.  246:  70, 
75,  1163,  1603. 
V.  Groton,  36  Conn.  304:  1103. 
V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  113 

Mo.  561:  1627,  1633. 
V.  Maxwell,  4  N.  H.  38 :  1489. 
V.  Police  Jury,   12  La.  Ann.  554: 

160. 
V.  Vandusen,  5  Pick.  182:  1185. 
V.  Vermont  Elec.  Co.,  75  Vt.  235: 
508,  536,  551,  560,  591. 
Avis  V.  Vineland,  55  N.  J.  L.  285: 

914. 
Avon-by-the-Sea  L.  &  I.  Co.  v.  Nep- 
tune City,  53  N.  J.  Eq.  178 :  300. 
Avondale    v.    McFarland,    101    Ala. 

381:  629,  638,  653. 
Avondale  Land  Co.  v.  Avondale,  111 

Alabama,  523:   877,  1618. 
Axford    V.    Philadelphia,    19    Phila. 

483:   1308. 

Axtell  V.  Coombs,  4  Maine  322 :  1046. 

Aycock  V.  San  Antonio  Brewing  Co., 

26  Tex.  Civ.  App.  341:  291,  640. 

Ayer  v.  Chicago,  149  111.  262:   1387, 

1514. 
Ayres  v.  Gulf  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  39  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  561,  746. 
V.  Penn.sylvania  E.  R.  Co.,  52  N. 
J.  L.  405:   892. 


xlvi 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :  Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Ayres   v.    Richards,    38    Mich.    214: 
520,  990,  1011,  1013,  1014,  1016, 
1419. 
V.  Richards,  41  Mich.  680:  1328. 
V.  Windsor,  14  Ont.  682:  236. 


B. 


Babb  V.  Carver,  7  Wis.  124:  1022. 

V.  Mackey,  10  Wis.  371:  550,  1523. 
Babcock  v.   Buffalo,  66   N.   Y.   268: 
484. 
V.  Buffalo,  1  Sheldon  317:  122,  127, 

132. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  107  Wis. 

280:    1547,   1714. 
V.  Welsh,  71  Cal.  400 :  1602. 
T.  Western  R.  R.  Co.,  9  Met.  553: 
1507. 
Bachelor  v.  Cole,  132  Ind.  143 :  1409. 
V.  New  Hampton,  60  N.  H.  207: 
996,  1381. 
Bachler'a   Appeal,   90   Pa.    St.    207: 

673. 
Bachman's  Road,  1  Watts  400:  1388. 
Bachus  V.  Fort  St.  Union  Depot  Co., 

169  V.  S.  55 :  7. 
Backus  V.  Detroit,  49  Mich.  110:  131. 
V.  Fort  St.  Union  Depot  Co.,  169 

U.  S.  557:  927. 
V.  Lebanon,  11  N.  H.  19:  781,  788, 
923. 
Bacon  v.  Boston,  154  MasS.  100:  166, 
452,  453,  456,  457,  1524. 
V.  Noble,  20  Ohio  C.  C.  281:   993. 
V.  Walker,  77  Ga.  336:   657,  669, 
1613. 
Bacot,  Ex  parte,  36  S.  C.  125:  528, 

534. 
Badgely  v.  Hamilton   Co.,   1  Disney 

Ohio  316:   1524,  1525. 
Badger   v.    Boston,    130   Mass.    170: 
625,  1524,  1525. 
V.  Merry,  139  Ind.  631:  1106,  1409. 
Bagnall  v.  London  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 

1  H.  &  C.   (Exch.)   544:   1639. 
Baier  v.  Hosmer,  107  Wis.  380:  1370, 

1515,  1570,  1571. 
Bailey  v.  Boston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  182 
Mass.  537:  437,  1271. 
V.    Carrollton,    28   La.   Ann.    171: 

1545. 
V.   Culver,  84  Mo.   531:    371,  380, 

388,  398,  644,  1595. 
V.  Culver,  12  Mo.  App.  175 :  371. 
V.  Culver,   12  Mo.  App.  531:   380, 

388,  398. 
V.  Isle  of  Thanet  St.  Ry.  Co.,  (1900) 

1  Q.  B.  722:   1240. 
T.  McCain,  92  III.  277:   1510,  1512. 


Bailey  v.  New  Orleans,  19  La.  Ann. 

271:   1545. 
V.  New  York,  3  Hill  531:  624. 
V.  People,  190  111.  28:  53. 
Bailey  v.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 

4   Harr.    (Del.)    389:    107,    108, 

691,  922. 
V.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  17 

Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  115:  819. 
V.  Sweeney,  64  N.  H.  296 :  1481. 
V.  Woburn,  126  Mass.  416:  74,  77, 

78,  1331,  1332,  1446. 
Bainard  v.  Newton,  154  Mass.  255; 

79,  82. 

Baird  v.  Hunter,  12  Pick.  556 :  1667. 
V.  Monroe,  150  Cal.  560:  697. 
V.  Schuylkill  River  E.  S.  R.  R.  Co., 

154  Pa.  St.  459:  1339. 
V.  Wills,  22  Pick.  312:   899. 
Baker,  Matter  of,  54  App.  Div.  21: 

1410. 
Matter  of,  59  App.  Div.  625 :  1086, 

1087. 
Matter  of,   173  N.   Y.  249:    1088, 

1087. 
Baker  v.  Ashland,  50  N.  H.  27:  992. 
V.  Atchison  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  122  Mo. 

396:    943,   945. 
V.  Boston,  12  Pick.   184:    14,  484, 

557. 
V.  Boston  El.  Ry.  Co.,   183  Mass. 

178:  266,  448,  622,  666,  1303. 
V.  Braman,  6  Hill  47:   1527,  1528. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  57  Mo. 

265:  858,  1631. 
V.  Fall  River,  187  Mass.  53:  1390. 
V.  Hogaboom,   12  S.  D.  405:    1492. 
V.  Holderness,  26  N.  H.  110:  923. 
V.  Johnson,  2  Hill  342:  1496. 
V.  Johnston,  21  Mich.  319:  879. 
V.  Leka,  48  111.  App.  353 :  167,  1652, 

1662. 
V.  Metropolitan  R.  R.  Co.,  31  Beav. 

504:  845,  861. 
V.   New  York,  31  App.  Div.   112: 

1565. 
V.  Norwood,  74  Fed.  997:  1220. 
V.   Pittsburg  etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   219 

Pa.  St.  398:   1129. 
V.  Rochester,  24  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 

383:   744,   1263. 
V.   Runnels,   12   Maine  235:    1411, 

1510. 
V.  Selma  St.  &  Suburban  Ry.  Co., 

130  Ala.  474:  271,  305,  307. 
V.  Selma  St.  &.  Suburban  Ry.  Co. 

135  Ala.  552:  271,  306. 
V.   Shepard,   24  N.   H.   208:    1486, 

1489. 

V.   Shoals,   6   Ind.  App.   319:    211, 
601. 


CASES    CITED. 


xlvii 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.1 


Baker  v.   Tjuunton,    119   Mass.   392: 
1717. 
V.  Thayer,  3  Met.  312:  1444. 
V.  Vanderburg,  99  Mo.  378:  875. 
V.  Windham,  25  Conn.  597:    1404, 
1510,  1516. 
Balch  V.  County  Comrs.  of  Essex,  103 
Mass.   106:   542,  785,  897. 
V.  Detroit,  109  Mich.  253:  1531. 
Baldwin  v.   Bangor,   36  Maine   518: 
678,  1625. 
V.    Buffalo,    29    Barb.    396:    1459, 

1572. 
V.   Buffalo,   35    N.   Y.   375:    1326, 

1412,  1571. 
V.   Calkins,    10   Wend.    167:    1086, 

1087. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  35  Minn. 

354:  1551,  1648,  1657. 
V.  Newark,  38  N.  J.  L.  158:   1168, 

1187,  1529. 
V.  Ohio  Tp.  70  Kan.  102:  147,  154. 
V.  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  78  S.  C. 
.    419:  685. 
Baldwin  etc.  Tps.  Eoad,  36  Pa.  St.  9: 

1371. 
Baldwin  &  Snowden  Eoad,  3  Grant's 

Cases  62:   1371. 
Bales  V.  Pidgeon,  129  Ind.  548:  865, 

870. 
Balfour  v.  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

62  Miss.  508:  1179. 
Ball  V.  Herbert,  3  T.  R.  253 :  433. 
V.   Humphrey,   4   G.   Greene   204 

1409. 
V.  Keokuk  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  71  Iowa 

306:  996,  1425. 
y.  Keokuk  eac.  R.  R.  Co.,  74  Iowa 

132:   1123,  1125,  1128,  1204. 
V.  Maysville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  102  Ky. 
486:     179.    249,    253,    448,    639, 
1544. 
V.  Slack,  2  Whart.  Pa.  538:    127. 
V.  Tacoma,  9  Wash.  592:  1356. 
Ballance  v.  Peoria,  180  HI.  29:   102. 
Ballard  v.  Ballard  Vale  Co.,  5  Gray 
468:   948. 
V.  Struckman,   123   111.   636:    866, 

869. 
V.   Tomlinson,   26   L.-  R.   Ch.   Div. 

194:  165. 
V.  Tomlinson,   L.   R.   29   Ch.   Div. 
115:   165. 
Bailie  v.  Larson,  138  Fed.  177 :   564. 
Balliet  v.  Commonwealth,  17  Pa.  St. 

509:    1489. 
Ballou  V.  Elder,  95  Iowa  693:   821. 
Baltimore  v.  Appbold,  42  Md.   442: 
70,  79,  1604. 
\f.   Baltimore   etc.    Steamboat   Co., 
104  Md.  485:   1231,  1313. 


Baltimore  v.  Baltimore  T.  &  G.  Co.. 
166  U.  S.  673:  309. 
V.  Bouldin,  23  Md.  328:  917. 
V.  Brick  Co.,  80  Md.  458:   1119. 
V.  Brownel,  86  Md.  153:  886,  888. 
V.  Clunet,  23  Md.  449:  589. 
V.  Coates,  85  Md.  531:   1614. 
V.  Cowen,  88  Md.  447 :  355,  966. 
V.  Fairfield  Imp.  Co.,  87  Md.  352: 

452. 
V.  Fear,  82  Md.  246:  879. 
V.  Frick,  82  Md.  77:  190,  367,  889. 
V.  Grand  Lodge,  44  Md.  436:  914. 
V.    Greenmount    Cemetery,    7    Md. 

517:   13. 
V.  Hook,  62  Md.  371:  431,  1159. 
V.  Latrobe,  101  Md.  621 :  743,  957, 

958,  1253,  1255,  1257. 
V.  Little  Sisters,  56  Md.  400:  917. 
V.  Merryman,  86  Md.  584:  91. 
V.   Musgrave,   48   Md.   272:    1673, 

1690,  1691. 
V.  Northern  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  88 

Md,  427:  879. 
V.  Porter,  18  Md.  284 :  237. 
V.  Rice,  73  Md,307:   1257. 
V.  St.  Agnes'  Hospital,  48  Md.  419 : 

431. 
V.  Smith  &  S.  Brick  Co.,  80  Md. 

458:   1138,  1143. 
V.   Warren   Mfg.   Co.   59   Md.   96: 
86,   1604. 
Baltimore  Belt  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Baltzell, 
75  Md.  94:  922,  1000,  1004,  1013, 
1014,  1019. 
V.   Lee,   75   Md.   596:    1569,    1574, 

1576. 
V.  Sattler,  100  Md.  306:  447. 
V.  Sattler,  102  Md.  595:  1119,  1120, 

1124,  1125. 
V.  Sattler,  105  Md.  264:  447,  1659. 
Baltimore  County  W.  &  Elec.  Co.  v. 
Baltimore  Co.,  105  Md.  154:  172, 
359. 
V.    Dubreuil,    105    Md.    424:    172, 
173,  176,  177,  337. 
Baltimore  etc.  Extension  Co.  v.  Duke, 
129  Pa.  St.  422:   324,  640. 
V.  Seipel,  129  Pa.  St.  425:  1708. 
Baltimore  etc.  R.  R.   Co.  v.  Algire, 
63  Md.  319:  857,  859,  1636. 
V.  Baltimore,  98  Md.  535 :  1290. 
V.  Board  of  Comrs.  156  Ind.  260: 

776,  799,  1510. 
V.  Bouvier,  70  N.  J.  Eq.  158:  1226, 

1347. 
V.  Boyd,  63  Md.  325:  1159,  1634. 
V.  Butler  Pass.   Ry.   Co.,  207   Pa. 
St.  406:  770. 


xlviii 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references   are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Baltimore  etc.   R.   R.   Co.  v.  B.  W. 

&    Ky.     R.  R.  Co.,    17  W.  Va. 

812'  687 
V.  Chase,  43  Md.  23:  127,  128,  129, 

130. 
V.  Duke,  129  Pa.  St.  422:  324. 
V.  Fifth  Baptist  Church,  108  U.  S. 

317:  450,  451. 
V.  Fifth  Baptist  Church,  137  U.  S. 

568:    450. 
V.   Fitzgerald,   2  App.   Cas.  D.   C. 

501:  309,  316. 
V.  Flower,  132  Pa.  St.  524:  1110. 
V.  Hackett,  87  Md.  224:  152,  1664. 
V.Johnson,     84     Ind.     420:     1429, 

1463. 
V.  Ketring,  122  Ind.  5:  929. 
V.  Lansing,  52  Ind.  229:  1310,  1311, 

1316. 
V.  Lersch,  58  Ohio  St.  639 :  1294. 
V.  Magruder,  34  Md.  79:  87,  1454, 

1476. 
V.  Nesbitt,  10  How.  U.  S.  395:  690, 

1431,  1674. 
V.  North,  103  Ind.  486:   776,  786, 

798,  1010,  1609. 

V.  Parrette,  55  Fed.  50:   952,  966, 

1629. 
V.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  17 

Phlia.  396:   770. 
V.  Pittsburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  W. 

Va.   812:    9,   21,   672,   675,   754, 

799,  1005,  1008,  1009,  1010,  1011, 
1013,  1014,  1043,  1045,  1061, 
1074,  1075,  1077,  1424. 

V.  Quillen,  34  Ind.  App.  330:  152, 

154,  1450,  1454,  1639,  1654. 
V.  Reaney,  42  Md.  117:  440. 
V.  Seymour,  154  Ind.  17 :  864. 
V.  Sloan,  131  Pa.  St.  568:  1208. 
V.  State,  159  Ind.  510:  928,  1010, 

1288,  1642,  1644. 
V.  Stewart,  128  111.  App.  270:  91. 
V.  Strauss,  37  Md.  237:  1583. 
V.  Taylor,  6  App.  D.  C.  259 :  315. 
V.  Thompson,  10  Md.  76 :  952,  961, 

1132,  1635. 
V.  Union  R.  R.  Co.,  35  Md.  224: 

410. 
V.  Van  Ness,  4  Cranch  595:  524. 
V.  Waters,  105  Md.  396:  717,  718. 
V.   Winslow,    18   App.    Cas.   D.    C. 

438:1620. 
Baltimore  Extension  R.  E.  Co.,  In  re 

(1895)    1  I.  R.  169:   1326. 
Baltimore   &    F.    Turnpike    Road    v. 

Baltimore  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  81  Md. 

247:  789,  798. 
Baltimore    &    Havre-de-Grace    Turn- 
pike Co.  V.  Northern  Central  R. 

R.  Co.,  15  Md.  193:   1422. 


Baltimore    &    Havre-de-Graee    Turn- 
pike Co.  V.  Union  R.  R.  Co.,  35 
Md.  224:  409,  782,  1610. 
Baltimore  &  Ohio  Tel.  Co.  v.  Mor- 
gan's La.  &  Tex.  R.  R.  Co.,  37  La. 
Ann.  883:  775,  791. 
v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  24  Fed. 
318:   412,  832. 
Baltimore  T.  &  G.  Co.  v.  Baltimore, 

64  Fed.  153:  303. 
Baltimore  Traction  Co.  v.  Baltimore 
Belt  R.  R.  Co.,  151  U.  S.  137: 
1005,  1433. 
Baltzeger  v.  Carolina  Midland  R.  R. 

Co.,  54  S.  C.  242:  148,  159. 
Bancroft  v.  Boston,  115  Mass.  377: 
1185. 
V.  Cambridge,  126  Mass.  438:  484, 

569,  586,  948,  1320. 
V.  San  Diego,  120  Cal.  432:   629, 
1309,  1567. 
Bangor  v.  County  Comrs.,  30  Maine 
270:   1415,  1419. 
v.  Lansil,  51  Me.  521:   147. 

r   etc.  R.   R.   Co.  v.  McComb, 
60  Maine  290:   494,  1174,  1175, 
1177,  1185,  1315,  1319. 
V.  Smith,  47  Maine  34:  321. 
Banigan  v.  Worcester,  30  Fed.  392: 

702,  929,  931. 
Bankhead  v.   Brown,  25   Iowa  540: 
494,  495,  498,  516,  517,  520,  675. 
Bank  of  Auburn  v.  Roberts,  44  N.  Y. 

192:  948,  949,  1563. 
Bank  of  Hopkinsville  v.  Western  Ky. 
Asylum,  108  Ky.  357:  76,  1654. 
Banks    et   al.    appellants,   29   Maine 

288:  1412. 
Banks  v.  Ogden,  2  Wall.  57 :  130. 
V.   School  Directors,   194  111.  247 
960. 
Bannister  v.  Mclntire,  112  Iowa  600 

1534. 
Bannon  v.  Angier,  2  Allen  128:  835, 
V.  Rohmeiser,  90  Ky.  48 :  369,  373, 
382,  389,  391,  405,  1596. 
Banse  v.   Clark,   69  Minn.   53:   974, 

992,  1157,  1365,  1707. 
Barbadoes  St.,  In  re,  8  Phila.  498 

1109,  1274. 
Barber   v.    Andover,    8    N.   H.    398 
782. 
V.  East  Dallas,  83  Tex.  147:   1546, 
Barbian  v.  Chicago,  80  111.  482:  1392. 
Barbour  v.  Barbour,  46  Maine  9:  943 

V.  Lyddy,  49  Fed.  896:  183,  879. 
Barclay  v.  Abraham,  121  Iowa  619 
162. 
V.  Howell,  6  Pet.  498:   1486. 
V.  Lebanon,   11  N.  H.  19:   422. 
V.  Pickles,  38  Mo.  143:   1255. 


CASES    CITED. 


xlix 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-Jfl9.] 


Barclay  R.  E.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Ingham, 

36  Pa.  St.  194:  92,  95,  104. 
Barden  v.  Portage,  79  Wis.  126:   89. 
Bardstown  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Metcalfe, 

4  Met.   (Ky.)   199:  1497. 
Bardstown  etc.  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Nel- 
son Co.,  109  Kv.  800:  1672. 
Barfield  v.  Gleason,  111  Ky.  491:  11, 

463,  1548. 
V.  Macon   Co.,   109   Ga.   386:    156, 

629,  634. 
Barker  v.  Clark,  4  N.  H.  380;  865. 
V.  Hartman  Steel  Co.,  6  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

183:   301,  688,  1582. 
V.  Hartman  Steel  Co.,  129  Pa.  St. 

551:   317. 
V.   Milwaukee   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   60 

Wis.  480:  929. 
V.  Southern  Ey.  Co.,  137  N.  C.  214: 

165,  1157,  1707,  1708. 
V.  Taunton,  119  Mass.  392:  1353. 
Barlow  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  29 

Iowa  276:  834,  854,  1497,  1503. 
V.  Highway  Comrs.,  59  Mich.  443: 

1095. 
Barnard  v.  Comrs.,  172  111.  391:  1614. 
v.  Fitch,  7  Met.  605:  976. 
V.  Haworth,  9  Ind.  103 :  1362. 
V.  Shirley,  135  Ind.  547:  71,  82. 
Barnes  v.   Fox.   61    Iowa   18:    1018, 

1571. 
V.  Grafton,  61  W.  Va.  408:  631. 
r.  Hannibal,  71  Mo.  449:  91,  95. 
V.   Michigan  Air  Line  R.   R.   Co., 

65  Mich.  251:   1245,  1450,  1451. 
v.  Midland.R.  R.  Terminal  Co.,  193 

N.  y.  378:  1603,  1607. 
T.  New  York,  27  Hun  236 :  1325. 
V.  Springfield,  4  Allen  488:    703. 
■V.  Suddard,  117  111.  237:  837. 
V.  Tidewater  Ry.  Co.,  107  Va.  263 : 

1379. 
Bamet  v.  Paasumpsic  Turnpike  Co., 

15  Vt.  757 :  423. 
Bamett  v.  Johnson,  15  N.  J.  Eq.  481 : 

188. 
V.  Matagorda  R.  &  I.  Co.,  98  Tex. 

365:   148. 
T.  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  79  S.  C. 

462:  685. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  68  Mo.  56:  475. 
V.  St.  Anthony  etc.  Co.,  33  Minn. 

265:    1119,  1121,  1127. 
T.  St.  Francis  Levee  Dist.  125  Mo. 

App.  61:  93,  1639,  1653,  1716. 
V.  State,  15  Ala.  829:   1017,  1032, 

1033,  1412. 
Barney  v.  Keokuk,  4  Dill.  593:  308, 

1593. 
V.  Keokuk,  94  U.  S.  324:   104,  105, 

110,  114,  201,  308. 


Barnaley  Canal  Co.  v.  Twibell,  13  L. 

J.  Ch.  434:  952. 
Barnstable  Savings  Bank  v.  Boston, 

127  Mass.  254:  948,  1638. 

Barnum  v.   Minnesota  Transfer  Ry. 

Co.,  33  Minn.  365:  320,  302,  370, 

384. 

Barr  v.  Flynn,  20  Mo.  App.  383:  990. 

V.  Omaha,  42  Neb.  342:  994,  1170, 

1216,  1308. 
V.   Oskaloosa,   45   Iowa   275:    199, 

366,  376,  388,  395. 
V.  Stevens,  1  Bibb.  292:  1403. 
Barrall  v.  Quicli,  HI  Ky.  22:   1113, 

1316,   1332,    1439. 
Barre  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Montpelier  R.  R. 
Co.,  61  Vt.  1:  754,  759,  793,  798, 
901,  908. 
Barrett   v.   Bangor,   70   Maine   335: 
91. 
V.  Kemp,  91  Iowa  296:  677,  1056. 
V.  Metcalf,  12  Tex.  Civ.  App.  247: 

141. 
V.  Mt.  Greenwood   Cem.  Assn.,  57 

m.  App.  401:  79,  453,  1613. 
V.  Mt.  Greenwood  Cem.  Assn.,  159 
111.  385:   83,  1004. 
Barre   Turnpike   Co.   v.   Appleton,   2 

Pick.  430:   1028,  1079. 
Barre  Water  Co.  In  re,  62  Vt.  27: 

551,  595,  710,  723. 
Barre  Water  Co.,  In  re,  72  Vt.  413: 

1332. 
Barrickman  v.  Commissioners,  11  6. 

&  J.  50:  1343. 
Barrington  v.  Meyer,    103  111.  App. 

124:   630,   1306. 
Barron  v.  Mayor  etc.  of  Baltimore,  7 
Peters  243:  23. 
V.  Memphis,  113  Tenn.  89:  57,  87. 
Barrow  v.  Page,  5  Haywood  (Tenn.) 

97:   19. 
Barrows  v.  Guest,  5  Utah  91:  867. 
V.  Sycamore,  150  111.  588:  179,  197, 

355,  643,  657,  1488,  1497. 
v.  Sycamore,  49  111.  App.  590:  355. 
Barry  v.  Delaughery,  47  Neb.   354: 
970,  992,  1004. 
v.  Lowell,  8  Allen  127:   143. 
V.  Smith,  191  Mass.  78:  455. 
Barstow  Irr.   Co.  v.   Black,  39  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  80:   152. 
Bartels  v.  Houston,  32  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

389:   226,  848. 
Barter  v.  Commonwealth,  3  Penn.  & 

Watts  253:   355. 
Bartleson  v.   Minneapolis,   33  Minn. 

468:   1626,  1629. 
Bartlett  v.   Bangor,   67   Maine   460: 
880,  1326. 
V.  Beardmore,  77  Wis.  356:  882. 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Bartlett  v.  Bristol,   66   N.  H.   420: 
1525. 
V.   Tarrytown,   52   Hun  380:    609, 

619,  1356. 
V.   Tarrytown,   55   Hun   492:    610, 
615. 
Bartley  v.  Cincinnati,  8  Ohio  C.  C. 

226:    1219. 
Bartram  v.  Central  Turnpike  Co.,  25 

Cal.  283:   409. 
Bashfield  v.  Empire  State  Tel.  Co.,  71 

Hun  532:  339. 
Bass  V.   Elliott,   105   lud.   517:    929, 
1367. 
V.  Ft.  Wayne,  121  Ind.  389:   677, 
713,  822,  928,  1431,  1510,  1512, 
1602. 
V.  Metropolitan  W.   S.   El.  R.   E. 
Co.,  82  Fed.  857:  438,  953,  1570, 
1575. 
V.  Roanoke  etc.  Co.,  Ill  N.  C.  439: 

1497,  150ii. 
V.  State,  34  La.  Ann.  494 :  440. 
Bassett  v.  Clement,  17  N.  J.  L.  166: 
1102. 
V.  Denn,  17  N.  J.  L.  432:   1092. 
V.  Harwiclt,   180  Mass.   585:    865, 

870. 
V.Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  201  Pa. 
St.  226:   1479. 
Bastable   v.    Syracuse,    8   Hvin   587: 

233. 
Bastain  v.  Pliiladelphia,  180  Pa.  St. 

227:  1252. 
Bate  V.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
1  Mont.  Co.  L.  R.  47:  918,  1466, 
1561,  1670. 
Bateman  v.  Covington,  90  Ky.  390: 

197,  1496. 
Bates  V.  Boston  El.  Ry.  Co.,  187  Mass. 
328:  948,  1261,  1564,  1717. 
V.  Cooper,  5  Ohio  115:  725,  1165. 
V.  Ray,  102  Mass.  458:   1310. 
V.    Westborough,    151    Mass.    174: 

143. 
V.    Weymouth    Iron    Co.,    8    Cush. 
548:  554,  557. 
Bathgate    v.   Irvine,    126    Cal.    135: 

70. 
Battle  Creek  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Tiffany, 

99  Mich.  471:  751. 
Battles  V.  Baintree,  14  Vt.  348:  1527. 
Baubie  v.  Ossman,  142  Mo.  499:  1511. 
Baudistel  v.  Jackson,  110  Mich.  357: 
384,  390,  406,  1416. 
v.  Michigan  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  113 
Mich.  687:  400,  384. 
Baugh  V.  Gulf  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  44  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  443:   152. 
V.   Texas  etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   80   Tex. 
56:  309,  316,  1651,  16.59. 
Eaugher  v.  Kudd.  53  Ark.  417:   1399. 


Baughman   v.    Heinzelman,    180    111. 

251:  675,  1056. 
Bauman  v.  Boeckeler,  119  Mo.   189: 
881,  882. 
V.  New  Castle,  12  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  22: 

1649. 
V.  Ross,  167  U.  S.  548:  923,  1188. 
Baxter  v.  Turnpike  Co.,  22  Vt.  119: 

1489. 
Bayo  V.  Lake  City,  44  Fla.  491:  1568. 
Bayard  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  38  Ore. 

438:  865,  867,  871. 
Baychester  Ave.,  Matter  of,  120  App. 

Div.  393:   1270,  1271. 
Bay    City    Belt   Line   R.    R.    Co.    v. 
Hitchcock,    90    Mich.    533:    972. 
Bayou  Cook  Nav.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Doullut, 

111  La.  517:   1050. 
Beach  v.  Elmira.  22  Hun  158:   141, 
1612. 
V.  Scranton,  25  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  430: 

1450,  1457. 
V.  Sterling  Iron  &  Z.  Co.,  54  N.  J. 

Eq.  65:   65,  81,  82,   1604. 
V.  Wilmington  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  120 
N.  C.  498 :  1649,  1655. 
Beacon  v.  Pittsburgh  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
1  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  618:   1331,  1481. 
Beal  v.  Durham  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  136 
N.  C.  298:  936,  1360,  1559,  1560. 
Beale,  Matter  of,  39  Cal.  495:   1550. 
V.  Boston,  166  Mass.  53:   1327. 
V.    New   York   Central   &   Hudson 
River  R.  R.   Co.,  41   Hun   172: 
1501. 
V.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  86  Pa. 
St.  509:   1682. 
Beale   St.,   Matter   of,   39   Cal.  495: 

617,  1717. 
Bean  v.  Hinman,  33  Maine  48:  960. 
V.  Kulp,  7  Phila.  650:   949. 
V.  Warner,  38  N.  H.  247 :  966. 
Bean's  Road,  35  Pa.  St.  280:    1364. 
Beard  v.   Henniker,   69   N.   H.  279: 
994. 
V.  Henniker,  70  N.  H.  197:  1683. 
V.  Murphy,  37   Vt.   99:    145,  440, 
441. 

Beardslee  v.   Dolge,   143  N.  Y.   160: 
1418. 

V.  French,  7  Conn.  125:  1362,  1492, 
1504. 
Beardsley  v.  Lehigh  Valley  R.  R.  Co., 
65  Hun  502:   1483,  1645,  1646. 
V.   Lehigh   Valley  R.   R.   Co.,   142 

N.  Y.   173:    1645,   1646. 
V.  New  York  etc.  R.   R.   Co.,   162 

N.  Y.  230:  484. 
V.  Washington,  39  Conn.  265:  1105. 
Bearse  v.  Perry,  117  Mass.  211:  560. 
V.  Bristol,  66  N.  H.  420:   1525. 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references   ere   to  the   pages :    Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Beasley  v.  Aberdeen  etc.  E.  R.  Co., 

147  N.  C.  362:   1523,  1524,  1546, 

1631. 
V.  Mountain   Lake  Water  Co.,   13 

Cal.  306:  706. 
Beatrice  v.  Leary,  45  Neb.  149 :   143, 

149,  153. 
Beatrice  Gas  Co.  v.  Thomas,  41  Neb. 

662:   166. 
Beattie  v.  Carolina  Central  E.  R.  Co., 

108  N.  C.  425:   845. 
Beatty  v.  Beethe,  23  Neb.  210:  1018, 

1020,  1569,  1571. 
V.  Kuntz,  2  Pet.  566 :  872. 
V.  Kuntz,  6  Pet.  430:   872. 
V.  Kinnear  Mfg.  Co.,  21  Ohio  C.  C. 

384:  191,  363,  371,  389,  392,  398, 

405,  1596. 
V.   St.   Joseph,   57   Mo.  App.  251: 

237. 
Beaudrot  v.  Murphy,  53  S.  C.   118: 

516. 
Beaver  v.  Beaver  Valley  R.  R.  Co., 

217  Pa.  St.  280:   304. 
V.   Harrisburg,    156    Pa.    St.    547: 

226,  635,  1356,  1452. 
Bechnel  v.  New  Orleans  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

28  La.  Ann.  522:  862. 
Beck  V.  Biggers,  66  Ark.  292.   1029, 

1082,  1363. 
V.  Brooklyn  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  87  Hun 

30:   1296,   1299,  1302. 
V.  Erie  Terminal  E.  R.  Co.,  11  Pa. 

Co.  Ct.  363:  248,  641. 
V.  Ingram,  1  Bush    (Ky.)    355:   18. 
V.   Louisville    etc.    E.    E.    Co.,    65 

Miss.  172:  857,  1627,  1633. 
V.  Pennsylvania  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  148 

Pa.  St.  271:    1123. 
V.  United  N.  J.  E.  E.  Co.,  39  N.  J. 

L.  45:    708,   710. 
Becker  v.  Chicago  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  126 

111.  436:   1426. 
V.  Lebanon  etc.  St.  Ey.  Co.,  30  Pa. 

Supr.  Ct.   546:    1297. 
V.  Lebanon  etc.  St.  R.  E.  Co.,  188 

Pa.  St.  484:  1588. 
V.  Lebanon   etc.   St.   Ey.   Co.,   195 

Pa.  St.  502:  1630. 
V.  Metropolitan  El.  E.  E.  Co.,  131 

N.  Y.  509:  1196,  1296,  1301, 

1302. 
V.  Philadelphia  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  177 

Pa.  St.  252:  1140,  1277. 
Beckerle  v.  Danbury,  80  Conn.  124: 

858. 
Beckett  v.  Midland  Ey.  Co.,  1  L.  E. 

C.  P.  241:  635,  640,  1377. 
v.  Midland  Ey.  Co.,  3  L.  R.  C.  P. 

82:  636.  640. 


Beckman  v.  Lincoln  etc.   R.  R.   Co., 

79  Neb.  89 :  689,  690. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  3  Paige  73 :  495. 
Beckwith  v.   Beckwith,   22   Ohio   St. 

180:   721. 
Bedell  v.  Sea  Cliff,  18  App.  Div.  261 : 

155. 
Bedenbaugh  v.  Southern  Ey.  Co.,  69 

S.  C.  1 :  306. 
Bedford  v.  United  States,  192  U.  S. 

217:   86,  100. 
Bedford   etc.   E.   E.    Co.   v.    Stanley, 

32  L.  J.  Ch.  60:  856. 
Bedlow  V.   New  York  Floating  Dry 

Dock  Co.,  112  N.  Y.  263:  115. 
Beebe   v.   Little  Eoek,   68   Ark.    39: 

199. 
V.  Magoun,  122  Iowa  94:  1007. 
V.  Scheidt,  13  Ohio  St.  406:   1011, 

1511. 
Beech  Creek  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Olanta  Coal 

Min.  Co.,  158  Fed.  36:   1218. 
Beecher  v.  Newark,  64  N.  J.  L.  475 : 

199    373. 
V.  Newark,  65  N.  J.  L.  307:   197, 

373. 
Beech  &  Page  Streets,  In  re,  91  Pa. 

St.  354:   b92. 
Beekman  v.  Brooklyn  &  B.  R.  E.  Co., 

89  Hun  84:  719. 
V.  Flint  Ave.  E.  E.  Co.,  153  N.  Y- 

144:  358. 
V.   Jackson   County.   18   Ore.   283: 

1100,    1101,    1177,    1187,     1200, 

1215,  1366. 
V.  Saratoga  and  Schenectady  R.  E. 

Co.,  3  Paige  45 :  6,  504,  524,  675, 

746,  923. 
V.  Third  Ave.  E.  E.  Co.,  13  App. 

Div.  279:   180,  279,  297,  300. 
Beekman  Street,  20  Johns  269:  1671. 
Beer  Co.  v.  Massachusetts,  97  U.  S. 

25:   15,  469,  478,  485,  736. 
Beers  v.   Chicago   etc.   Ey.   Co.,    141 

Fed.  957:   1616. 
Beeson's  Case,  3  Leigh  820:  1508. 
Beeson  v.  Chicago,  75  Fed.  880:  302, 

1587. 
Behrens   v.    Commissioners,    169    111. 

558:   976,   1035. 
V.  Maofarland,  30  App.  Cas.  D.  C. 

538:    1424. 
Beideman  v.  Atlantic  City  E.  E.  Co. 

(N.  J.)   19  Atl.  731:  446. 
Beidler's  Appeal,    1   Monaghan    (Pa. 

Supm.  Ct.)   336:   431. 
Beidler  v.  Sanitary  District,  211  111. 

628:   74,  97,  99,  102,  1337. 
Belcher    Sugar    Refining   Co.    v.    St. 

Louis  Grain  Elevator  Co.,  82  Mo. 

121:  708. 


lii 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references   are  to  the  pages :  Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Belcher  v.  St.  Louis  Grain  Elevator 

Co.,  10  Mo.  App.  401:  543. 
Belchertown   v.    County   Comrs.,    11 

Cush.  189:  916. 
Belfast,    Appellant,    53   Maine    431: 

703,  1370. 
Belfast    Academy    v.     Salmund,     11 

Maine  109:   1019. 
Belk  V.  Hamilton,  130  Mo.  292:  520, 

521,  976. 
Belknap    v.    Belknap,   2    Johns.    Ch. 

463:  709. 
Bell  V.  Atlantic  &  P.  R.  E.  Co.,  63 
Fed.  417:  957. 
V.  Boston,  101  Mass.  506:  856. 
V.  0.  B.  &  Q.  K.  K.  Co.,  74  Iowa 

343:   1252,  1311,  1312. 
V.  County  Court,  61  Mo.  App.  173: 

928 
v.  Cox,  122  Ind.  153 :  1046. 
V.  Dayton  &  I.  R.  E.  Co.,  3  Ohio 

C.  C.  31:  851,  855. 
V.  Hull  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  6  M.  &  W. 

699:   652. 
V.  Louisville  &  Nashville  R.  R.  Co., 

1  Bush  (Ky.)  404:  18. 

V.  Mattoon  W.  W.  &  E.  Co.,  235 

111.  218:   412. 
V.  Norfolk  So.  R.  R.  Co.,  101  N.  C. 

21:    160. 
V.  Ohio  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  1  Grant  105: 

707,  957,  1494,  1618. 
V.   Southern   Pac.   R.   R.   Co.,   144 
Cal.  560:  832,  833,  841. 
Bellair  v.  B.  &  0.  R.  E.  Co.,  146  U. 

S.  117:  931. 
Bellenot  v.  Eichmond,  108  Va.  314: 

1492. 
Belleville  v.  Citizens'  Horse  E.  E.  Co., 

152  111.  171:  303,  426. 
Bellevue  v.  Bellevue  Imp.  Co.,  65  Neb. 

52:   396. 
Bellinger  v.  New  York  Central  R.  R. 

Co.,  23  N.  Y.  42:  88,  94,  461. 
Bellingham  Bay  R.  &  N.  Co.  v.  Loose, 

2  Wash.  500:  434,  1526. 
Bellingham   Bay   etc.   E.   R.    Co.   v. 

Strand,  4  Wash.  311:  1113,  1242. 
V.    Strand,    14   Wash.    144:    1320, 

1348. 
Bellona  Company  Case,  3  Bland  Chy. 

442:  501,  504,  524,  710,  789. 
Bell   Telephone    Co.   v.    Parker,    115 

App.  Div.  920:  1042,  1044. 
V.  Parker,  187  N.  Y.  299 :  986,  1042, 

1044. 
Belmont  v.  New  Bng.  Brick  Co.,  190 

Mass.  442:  467. 
Belmont  St.  Opening,  128  App.  Div. 

636:   1324. 


Belsborrow  v.  Pierce,  101  Minn.  271 : 

1603. 
Belt  Line  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Crabtree,  2 

Tex.  App.  Civ.  Cas.  p.  579 :  640, 

1294. 
Bemis  v.  Springfield,  122  Mass.  110: 

605. 
Bench  v.  Otis,  25  Mich.  29:  1421. 
V.  Wilmington  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  120 

N.  C.  498:  155. 
Bendickson   v.    Great   Northern   Ry. 

Co.,  80  Minn.  332 :  332,  834. 
Benedict  v.  Goit,  3  Barb.  459:   422, 

423. 
V.   Heineberg,   43   Vt.   231:    1499, 

1500. 
V.  New  York,  98  Fed.  789:  1221. 
V.  State,  120  N.  Y.  228:  91,  1707, 

1708. 
Benham  v.  Dunbar,   103  Mass.  365: 

1138,  1141. 
v.  Potter,  52  Conn.  248 :  1499. 
Benjamin  v.   Wheeler,   8  Gray  409: 

239. 
Bennett,  ex  parte,  26  S.  C.  317 :  982, 

1417. 
Bennett  v.  Atlantic  Coast  Line  R.  R. 

Co.,  126  Ga.  411:  864,  867. 
V.  Boyle,  40  Barb.  5S1:   495,  589, 
T.  Camden  &  Amboy  E.  R.  Co.,  14 

N.  J.  L.  145 :  1374,  1375. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  73  Fed. 

696 :  183,  875. 
V.    Clemence,    6    Allen    10:    1119, 

1120. 
v.    County    Comrs.,   4    Gray    359: 

1428. 
V.  Cutler,  44  N.  H.  69:  969,  1381, 

1514. 
V.   Drain   Comrs.,   56   Mich.    634: 

984,  1032,  1419. 
V.  Fisher,  26  Iowa  497 :  734. 
V.  Hall,  184  Mo.  407:  1186,  1406. 
V.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.,  181  N. 

Y.  431:  326,  1457,  1473. 
V.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.,  89  App. 

Div.  379:  326,  1457,  1473. 
V.  Marion,  106  Iowa  628:  675,  815, 

817,  1044,  1046,  1056,  1060,  1062, 

1063,  1066. 
V.  Marion,  119  Iowa  473:  84,  1650, 

1654. 
V.  Minneapolis  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  42 

Minn.  245:  947,  1261,  1629. 
V.  Woody,  137  Mo.  377:  1176,  1186, 

1200. 
Bennett  Water  Co.  v.  Millvale,  202 

Pa.  St.  616:  410,  417. 
Bennington   v.    Smith,   29   Vt.   254: 

700. 


CASES    CITED. 


liii 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Bensinger  Tp.  Public  Road,  In  re,  115 

Pa.  St.  436:  1386. 
Bensley  v.  Mountain  Lake  Water  Co., 
13   Cal.   306:    1136,   1162,   1673, 
1684. 
Benson  v.  Chicago  &  Alton  K.  R.  Co., 
78  Mo.  504:  153,  846,  1650,  1655. 
V.  Morrow,  61  Mo.  345:  104. 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  62  Minn. 

198:  881. 
V.  Soule,  32  Maine  39:  1135. 
V.    Wilmington,    9    Houston    359: 
235. 
Bent   V.    Brigham,    117    Mass.    307: 
1042. 
V.  Emery,  173  Mass.  495:   1158. 
V.  Trimboli,  61  W.  Va.  509:  1596. 
Bentinck  v.  Norfolk  Estuary  Co.,  8 
Deg.  McN.  &  G.  714:   715,  813, 
1624. 
Bentley  v.  Atlanta,  92  Ga.  623:  226, 
635,  1664. 
V.  Wabash  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  61  Iowa 
229:   1537. 
Benton  v.  Brookline,  151  Mass.  250: 
1131,  1150. 
V.  Milwaukee,  50  Wis.  368:   1137, 
1551. 
Benton  Harbor  Terminal  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Hall,  131  Mich.  384:  1087. 
v.'King,  131  Mich.  377:  1087,  1097. 
Bentonville  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Baker,  45 
Ark.   252:    151,  830,   952,   1310, 
1524,  1545. 
V.  Stroud,  45  Ark.  278:  958,  1045, 
1136. 

Benzenhoefer's  Appeal,   154  Pa.   St. 

547:  1419. 
Bequette  v.  Patterson,  104  Cal.  282: 

865. 
Bergman  v.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  129 

N.  Y.  637:  924. 
V.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  59  N.  Y. 

Supr.  566:   924. 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  Minn. 

533:   1693. 
Berggren  v.  Fremont  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

23  Neb.  620:  1408. 
Berger  v.  Tracy,  135  Iowa  597 :  1010. 
Bergen    Neck    R.    R.    Co.,    v.    Point 

Breeze  F.  &  I.  Co.,  57  N.  J.  L. 

163:  1131. 
Berks  Co.  v.  Reading  City  Pass.  R. 

R.  Co.,  167  Pa.  St.  102:  304. 
Berks  &  Dauphin  Turnpike  Road  v. 

Lebanon  Steam  Co.,  5  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

354:  338. 
Berks  &  D.  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Lebanon 

&  M.  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Pa.  Dist. 

Ct.  55:  306,  307. 


Berks  St.  Opening,  In  re,  15  Phila. 

381:  1327. 
Berlew  v.  Electric  Illuminating  Co., 

1  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  651:   345. 
Berlin  Road,  3  Yates  263:   1388. 
Bern   v.   Pennsylvania   Tp.   Road,   2 

Monaghan  (Pa.)   105:  514. 
Bernard  v.  Brewer,  2  Wash.  ( Va. )  76 : 

1018,   1029,   1032. 
V.   Calloway   County   Co.,   28   Mo. 

37:  1384. 
Bernhard  v.  Rochester,  127  App.  Div. 

875:   1524. 
Berrien  Springs  Water  Power  Co.  v. 

Berrien   Circ.  Judge,   113  Mich. 

48:  494,  508,  591,  592,  593. 
Berry  v.  Carle,  3  Greenl.  269:    103. 

T.  Hebron,  38  N.  H.  196 :  1383. 
Berryman  v.  Little,  49  N.  J.  L.  182 : 

1414. 
Bertsch  v.  Lehigh  Coal  &  Nav.  Co., 

4  Rawle,  130 :  845. 
Beseman  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co., 

50  N.  J.  L.  235 :  445,  457,  1446, 

1476. 
V.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  52  N.  J. 

L.  221 :  445,  1440,  1476. 
Besuden  v.  Comrs.,  7  Ohio  C.  C.  237 : 

1109. 
Bethel  v.  Bruett,  215  111.   162:   868, 

884,  885,  886. 
V.  County  Comrs.,  42  Maine  478: 

992. 
Bethlehem  South  Gas  &  Water  Co.  v. 

Yoder,    112  Pa.    St.    136:    1352, 

1353,  1667. 

Bethlehem    Toll-Bridge,    12    Pa.    Co. 

Ct.  311:  781,782. 
Bethum  v.  Turner,  1  Maine  111:  672, 
Betjeman  v.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co., 

1  Miscl.  138:   1427. 
Bettis  V.  Geddes,  54  Mich.  608 :  1017, 

1036,  1420. 
Betts    V.    Williamsburgh,    16    Barb. 

255:  1025,  1195. 
Beutel  V.  West  Bay  City  Sugar  Co., 

132  Mich.  587 :  384,  390. 
Beveridge  v.  South  Park  Comrs.,  100 

111.  75:  1325. 
V.  West  Park  Comrs.,  7  111.  App. 

460:    1325. 
Bevier  v.  Dillingham,   18  Wis.  529: 

928,  1206. 
Bewley  v.  Graves,  17  Ore.  274:  974, 

1021,  1511. 
Bexar  County  v.  Terrell    (Tex.)    14 

S.  W.  62:   1138. 
Beyer  v.  Tanner,  29  111.  135:  1636. 
Beynon  v.  Brandywine  etc.  Turnpike 

Co.,  30  Ind.  129  :  1100. 


liv 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the   pages:   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Bez   V.   Chicago   etc.    R.   R.    Co.,    23 

111.  App.   137:    1581. 
Bibb   V.   Mountjoy,   2    Bibb    1:    544, 

1089,  1358. 
Bibb  County  v.  Reese,  115  Ga.  346: 

634. 
Bibb   Co.   Comrs.   v.   Harris,  71   Ga. 

250;  721. 
Bibber-White  Co.  v.  White  River  Val. 

Elec.   R.   R.   Co.,    Ill    Fed.    36: 

1547,  1631. 
Bickford   v.   Hyde   Park,    173   Mass. 

552:   623. 
Biddeford  v.  County  Comrs.,  78  Maine 

105:  701,  917. 
Biddle  v.  Dancer,  20  N.  J.  L.  633: 

981. 
V.  Hussman,  23  Mo.  579 :  1255. 
V.  Hussman,  23  Mo.  602 :  1255. 
Bidell  V.  Sea  Clifif,  18  App.  Div.  N. 

Y.  261:    149. 
Bielman  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  50 

Mo.  App.  152:  449,  1650,  1659. 
Bigaouette  v.  North  Shore  R.  R.  Co. 

17    Duvall   363:    102,    127,    128, 

129,  131. 
Bigelow  V.  Ballerino,  111  Cal.  559: 

179,  375,  390,  405,  406,  644. 
V.  Cambridge  Turnpike  Co.,  7  Mass. 

202:    1526. 
V.  Draper,  6.  N.  D.  152:  715,  744, 

959,  995,  1059,  1060,  1061,  1064, 

1066,  1427. 
V.  Mississippi  Central  &,  Tenn.  R. 

R.  Co.,  2  Head.  624:  895. 
V.  Newell,  10  Pick.  348 :  898. 
V.  West  Wisconsin  Ry.  Co.,  27  Wis. 

478:   1175,  1180,  1205. 
V.  Whitcomb,  72  N.  H.  473 :  57,  67, 

349,  473,   1490,   1491. 
Bigg  V.  Corporation  of  London,  L.  R. 

15  Eq.  Cas.  376:   1272. 
Biggert's  Appeal,   1  Monaghan    (Pa. 

Supr.  Ct.)   365:   1419. 
Bigham    v.    Pitts    Construction    Co., 

29  Pa.  Supr.   Ct.  86:   439,   1507. 
Bigham  Bros.  v.  Port  Arthur  C.  & 

D.  Co.,  100  Tex.  192:  103. 
Big   Hollow   Road,    In   re.    111    Mo. 

326:  364,  400,  1397. 
Bigler's  Exrs.  v.  Penn.  Canal  Co.,  177 

Pa.  St.  28:  1617. 
Biglow  V.  Ritter,  131  Iowa  213:  1510, 

1516. 
Big   Rapids   v.    Comstock,    65   Mich. 

78:   1492. 
Big  Sandy  Ky.  Co.  v.  Boyd  Co.,  125 

Ky.  345 :  322,  400,  1623. 
V.  Dils,   120  Ky.  563:   1183. 
Biles   V.   Tacoma   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   5 

Wash.  509:   863. 


Bill  V.  Quebec.  L.  R.  5  H.  L.  84:  127, 

128. 
Billingham    Bay   etc.    R.    R.   Co.    v. 

Stroud,  14  Wash.  144:   1392. 
Bill  Posting  Sign  Co.  v.  Atlantic  City, 

71  N.  J.  L.  72:  471. 
Bills  V.  Belknap,  36  Iowa  583:   349, 

1487,  1594. 
Bingham  v.  Doane,  9  Ohio  165:  356, 

1667. 
Binghampton    Bridge,    3    Wall.    51: 

407,  412,  413. 
Binney's  Case,  2  Bland.   Ch.    (Md.) 

99:   708,  709. 
Birch  V.  Metropolitan  E.  R.  R.  Co., 

15  Daly  453:  1664. 
Bird  V.  Great  Eastern  Ry.  Co.,  34  L. 

J.  C.  P.  366:  429,  958. 
V.  Hannibal  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  30  Mo. 

App.  365 :  91,  93,  95,  1649,  1653. 
V.  W.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  8  Rich.  Eq. 

S.  C.  46:  711. 
Birdsall  v.  Cary,  66  How.  Pr.  358: 

1500. 
V.  Cary,  66  How.  Pr.  627  :  808. 
Birge  v.  Centralia,  218  Hi.  503:  873, 

874,  875,  876,  884,  886. 
V.   Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  65  Iowa 

440:    1023,  1525,  1634. 
Birmingham  v.  Land,  137  Ala.  538: 

83,  866,  1654. 
Birmingham  Belt  R.  Co.  v.  Lockwood, 

150   Ala.    610:    328,    1612,    1657, 

1663. 
Birmingham  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Birm- 
ingham  St.  R.  R.   Co.,  79  Ala. 

465:   301. 
V.   Louisville  etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   152 

Ala.  422:   760,  802,  941,  1623. 
V.  Queen,  20  L.  J.  Q.  B.  304:  1533. 
V.  Parsons,  100  Ala.  662:  475,  487. 
V.  Smith,  89  Ala.  305:  1149. 
Birmingham  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Queen,  15 

Q.  B.  647 :  005. 
Birmingham  Ry.  &  Elec.  Co.  v.  Birm- 
ingham  Traction   Co.,   122   Ala 

349:  329,  765. 
V.   Birmingham  Tr.  Co.,   128  Ala. 

110:    1397. 
Birmingham    Ry.    Lt.    &    P.    Co.    v, 

Moran,   151   Ala.   187:    314.  372, 

383,  1592. 
V.  Oden,   146  Ala.  495:    639,  642, 

1297. 
Birmingham    Traction   Co.   v.   Birm 

ingham  R.  R.   &  Elec.  Co.,   119 

Ala.  137:  271,  1572. 
V.  Birmingham  Ry.  &  Elec.  Co.,  119 

Ala.  129:  328,  1611. 
V.  Southern  Bell  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co., 

119  Ala.  144:  418,  1621. 


CASES    CITED. 


Iv 


[The  references  are   to  the   pages :   Vol.   1,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Birmingham  Union  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Ely- 
ton  Land  Co.,  114  Ala.  70:  720. 
Birrell  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
41   N.   Y.   App.   Div.    506:    305, 
1472. 
V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.   Co.,   198 
U.  S.  390:   258. 
Bischof  V.  Merchants'  Nat.  Bank,  75 

Neb.  838:  373. 

Bischoff  v.New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co., 

138   N.   Y.  257:    180,    193,   265, 

448,  1196,  1296,  1300,  1305,  1333. 

Bisher  v.  Richards,  9  Ohio  St.  495: 

778,  779. 
Bishop  V.  Bagley,  104  Va.  29:   1101. 
V.  Macon,  7  Ga.  200:  17. 
V.  Medway,  12  Met.  125 :  1683. 
V.  Merchants'  Nat.  Bank,  75  Neb. 

838:    1596. 
V.   North   Adams    Fire   Dist.,    167 

Mass.  364:  336,  814. 
V.  Rouney,  59  Vt.  316:  753. 
V.    Superior   Judge,    87   Cal.   226: 
893,  894. 
Bissell  V.  Collins,  28  Mich.  277:  1489. 
V.   Larehmont,    57   App.    Div.   61: 
609,  616. 
Bittenhaus  v.  Johnston,  92  Wis.  477 : 

486. 
Bixby  V.  Goss,   54  Mich.   551:    941, 

1017,  1036,  1412,  1420. 
Bizer  v.   Ottumwa  Hydraulic  Power 

Co.,  70  Iowa  145:  1553. 
Black  V.  Baltimore,  50  Md.-235:  1673, 
1691. 
V.  Baltimore,  56  Md.  333:  1691. 
V.  Brooklyn  Heights  R.  R.  Co.,  32 

App.  Div.  N.  Y.  468:  1581. 
V.  Campbell,   112  Ind.  122:   973. 
V.  Delaware  etc.  Canal  Co.,  24  N. 

J.  Eq.  455:   529. 
V.  Delaware  etc.  Co.,  22  N.  J.  Eq. 

130:   1479. 
V.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  58 

St.  249:  255. 

V.  Pittsburg  etc.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  34  Pa. 

Supr.  Ct.  416:  382,  391,  394,  404, 

405,  1596. 

V.  Thompson,  107  Ind.   162:    1095. 

Black  Hills  etc.  Ry.   Co.  v.  Tacoma 

Mill  Co.,  129  Fed.  312:   1624. 
Blackman   v.   Halves,   72    Ind.    515: 

514. 
Black  River  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Barnard, 

9  Hun  104:  1200,  1201. 
Black  River  Imp.  Co.  v.  LaCrosse 
Booming  &  Tram  Co.,  54  Wis. 
659:  76,  100. 
Blackshire  v.  Atchison,  Topeka  & 
Sante  Fe  R.  R.  Co.,  13  Kan.  514: 
1626,  1628. 


Blaekwell   v.   Lynchburg   etc.   R.    R. 
Co.,   Ill   N.   0.    151:    435,    1455, 
1476. 
v.  Old  Colony  R.  R.  Co.,  122  Mass. 

1:  133. 
v.   Phinney,    126   Mass.   458:    560, 
1074. 
Blaekwell  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bebout,  19 
Okl.  63:   1324,  1546. 
V.  Gist,  18  Okla.  516:   201,  364. 
Blackwell's  Island  Bridge,  Matter  of, 

118  App.  Div.  272:  1241,  1270. 
Blackwell's  Island  Bridge,  Matter  of, 

189  N.  Y.  512:   1241,  1270. 
Blackwood   v.  Tanner,  112  Ky.  672 

414. 
Blaine  Co.  v.  Brewster,  32  Neb.  264 

781,  1270. 
Blair  v.  Charleston,  43  W.  Va.  62 
615,  631,  633. 
V.  Claxton,  18  N.  Y.  529:   1256. 
V.  Coakley,   136  N.  C.  405:    1400. 
V.  Milwaukee  etc.  Co.,  110  Wis.  64: 

1364. 
V.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  24  Fed. 
539:    864. 
Blaisdell   v.   Briggs,   23  Maine   123: 
1517. 
v.  Portsmouth,  Great  Falls  &  Con- 
way  R.  R.   Co.,   51   N.   H.   483: 
857 
V,  Winthrop,  118  Mass.  138:  1373. 
Blake  v.  Co.  Comrs.,  114  Mass.  583: 
514,  1104,  1105. 
V.  Dubuque,  13  la.  66:   1545,  1675. 
V.   McCarthy,   56   Miss.    654:    439, 

1154. 
V.  People,  109  111.  504 :  574. 
V.    Quincy,    113    Ind.    124:     1371, 

1385. 

V.  Rich,  34  N.  H.  282:  1480,  1481. 

Blakeley  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

25  Neb.  207:  1129,  1176,  1200, 

1201,  1243,  1251. 

V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  34  Neb. 

284:   425,   1473,  1628. 
v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  46  Neb. 

272:  837,  839,  1473,  1628. 
V.  Devine,  36  Minn.  53 :  154. 
Blakely  Road,  8  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  498 :  993. 
Blakely    Road,    8   Pa.    Co.    Ct.    592: 

1105. 
Blakeslee  v.  Missouri  Pae.  R.  R.  Co., 

43  Neb.  61 :  1577. 
Blanchard  v.  Abraham,  115  La.  989: 
413. 
V.  Kansas  City,  5   McCrary,  217: 

631,   1160,   1549. 
V.  Maysville  etc.  Turnpike  Co.,   1 
Dana  86:   1526. 


Ivi 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Bland   v.   Hixenbaugh,   39    la.    532: 

1204. 
Blanden  v.  Ft.  Dodge,   102  la.  441: 

236. 
Blane  v.  Khimpke,  29  Cal.  156 :  649. 
Blauey    v.    Salem.    160    Mass.    303: 

1130,  1133. 
Blanton  v.  Richmond  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

86  Va.  618:  717. 
Bleck  V.  Keller,  73  Neb.  826 :  868. 
Blennerhassett  v.  Forest  City,  117  la. 

680:   1492. 
Blesch    V.    Chicago    &   Northwestern 

Ry.  Co.,  43  Wis.  183:  1298,  1299, 

1636. 
V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  48  Wis.  168: 

247,  323,  1298,  1299,  1334,  1335. 
Blincoe  v.  Choctaw  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  16 

Old.  286:  1109,  1146,  1228,  1278. 
Bliss  V.  Ball,  99  Mass.  597 :  349. 

V.  Hosmer,  15  Ohio  44:  688. 
Blize  V.  Costlio,  8  Mo.  App.  290 :  973, 

974,   1406. 
Blizzard  v.  Danville,  175  Pa.  St.  479: 

80. 
Block  V.  Gt.  Northern  Ry.  Co.,   101 

Minn.  183:   156. 
Blocki  V.  People,  220  III.  444:  304. 
Blodgett  V.  N.  W.  El.  111.  R.  R.  Co., 

80  Fed.  601 :   1585. 
V.  Utica  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  64  Barb. 

580:    1353. 
V.    Whaley,    47   Mich.    469:    1032, 

1364. 

Blood  V.  Nashua  &  Lowell  R.  R.  Co., 
2  Gray,   137:   461. 
V.  Woods,  95  Cal.  78 :  892. 

Bloodgood  V.  Mohawk  &  Hudson  R. 

R.  Co.,  14  Wend.  51:   524,  1164. 

V.  Mohawk  &  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  18 

Wend.  9:   8,  495,  496,  500,  509, 

524,  684,  1154,  1164,  1171. 

Bloomfield  v.  Calkins,  1  N.  Y.  Su- 
preme Ct.  Rep.  549:    1310. 

Bloomfield  etc.  Gas  Co.  v.  Calkins,  62 
N.  Y.  386:  172,  176,  337. 

Bloomfield  etc.  Gas  Lt.  Co.  v.  Cal- 
kins,  1  Thomp.  etc.  541:   337. 

Bloomfield  etc.  Natural  Gas  Lt.  Co. 
v.  Richardson,  63  Barb.  437: 
501,  503,  536. 

Bloomfield  R.  R.   Co.  v.  Grace,   112 
Ind.  128:   1545. 
V.  Van  Slike,  107  Ind.  480:  1628. 
Bloomington    v.    Bloomington    Cem. 
Ass.  126  111.  221:  881,  884,  885. 
V.  Brokaw,  77  111.   194:   629. 
V.   Costello,  65  111.  App.  407:    84. 

453. 
V.  Latham,  142  111.  462:   1220. 


Bloomington  v.  Miller,  84  lU.  621: 
994,  1195,  1366,  1392. 
V.  Murnin,  36  111.  App.  647 :  142. 
V.  Pollock,   141   111.  346:   25,  616, 

618,  629,  632,  633,  1718. 
V.  Pollock  38  111.  App.  133:  25,  618, 
1306,  1308. 
Blount  V.  Great  Southern  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  2  Irish  Ch.  40:   1566,  1700. 
Blue  Earth  Co.  v.  St.  Paul  &  Sioux 
City  R.  R.  Co.,  28  Minn.   503: 
1119,  1120,  1186,  1225,  1312. 
Bluefield  v.  Bailey,  62  W.  Va.  302: 

1424,  1427. 
Blum   V.    Manhattan   R.    R.    Co.,    1 

Miscl.  119:  1124. 
Blumenthal  v.  New  York  El.  R.  R. 
Co.,  60  N.  Y.  Supr.  Ct.  95:  1124, 
1584. 
Blumfield  v.  Brown,  130  Mich.  504: 

1429. 
Blunt  V.  Aiken,  15  Wend.  522:  960. 
Ely  V.  Edison  Elec.  lU.  Co.,  Ill  App. 
Div.  170:  454. 
V.  Edison  Elec.  111.  Co.,  172  N.  Y. 

1:  454. 
V.  Edison  Elec.  HI.  Co.,  188  N.  Y. 
82:    454. 
Board  of  Comrs.  v.  Beekwith,  10  Kan. 
603:    808. 
V.  Bisby,  37  Kan.  253:   1137. 
V.  Bronne,  49  Kan.  291:   1353. 
V.  Fahlor,  132  Ind.  426:  735,  1004. 
V.  Hogan,  39  Kan.  606 :  1200,  1310, 

1316. 
V.  Indianapolis  Nat.  Gas  Co.,  134 

Ind.  209,  337. 
V.  Lahore,  37  Kan.  480 :  961,  1209. 
V.  Miller,  82  Ind.  .572:   1634. 
V.  Reeves,  148  Ind.  467:    10. 
V.  Small,  61  Ind.  318:   1409. 
V.  State,  38  Ind.  193:  1431,  1638. 
V.  State,  147  Ind.  476:  461. 
V.  State,  156  Ind.  550:   1531. 
V.  Trees,  12  Ind.  App.  479:  1547. 
V.   Young,   59   Fed.   96:    872,  892, 
1500,  1504. 
Board  of  County  Comrs.  v.  Ingram, 
31   Colo.  319:   1515. 
V.  Mann,  43  Kan.  676:  964. 
Board    of   Directors   v.    Redditt,    79 

Ark.  154:   733. 
Board  of  Education,   Matter   of,  59 

App.  Div.  258:    1565. 
Board  of  Education,  Matter  of,  169 

N.  Y.  456:   1565. 
Board  of  Education  v.  Bakewell,  122 
111.  339:  459,  494,  496. 
V.  Martin,  92  Cal.  209:   1491. 
V.  Prior,  11  S.  D.  292:  1047. 


CASES    CITED. 


Ivii 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Board  of  Health  v.  Lederer,  52  N.  J. 

L.  675:  453,  866. 
V.  Van  Hoesen,  87  Mich.  533:  494, 

496,  507,  543,  1043. 
Board  of  Levee  Comrs.  v.  Brinkley, 

(Miss.)    19  So.  296:   1343. 
V.  Harkelroads,  62  Miss.  807:  1179. 
v.  Jackson,  113  La.  124:  113,  1061, 

1063,  1149. 
V.  Johnson,  66  Miss.  248 :  952,  1255, 
Board  of  Levee  Inspectors  v.  Critten- 
den, 94  Fed.  613:  1547. 
Board  of   Park  Comrs.  v.   Diamond 

Ice  Co.,  130  la.  603 :  473. 
V.  Du  Pont,  110  Ky.  743:   7,  704, 

708,  734. 
Board    of    Police    Commissioners    v. 

Wagner,  93  Md.  182:  483. 
Board  of  Public  Improvements,  Mat- 
ter of,  99  App.  Div.  576:    1177, 

1244,  1379. 
Board  of  R.  E,.  Comrs.  v.  Symms  Gro- 
cer Co.  53  Kan.  207:  481. 
Board  of  Rapid  Transit  Comrs.,  In  re, 

147  N.  Y.  260:  922. 
Board  of  Rapid  Transit  R.  R.  Comrs., 

Matter  of,   104  App.   Div.  468: 

277. 
Board  of  Rapid  Transit  R.  R.  Comrs., 

Matter  of,   117   App.  Div.   160: 

277. 
Board  of  Regents  v.  Painter,  102  Mo. 

464:    459,    1495. 
Board  of  Street  Opening,  In  re,  82 

Hun  580:    1669,  1670. 
Board  of  Street  Opening,  In  re,  89 

Hun  525:    1558. 
Board  of   Street  Opening,  In  re,  91 

Hun  477:  976. 
Board  of  Street  Opening,  In  re,   12 

Miac.   535:    1098. 
Board  of  Street  Opening,  In  re,  133 

N.  Y.  436:   1669,  1670. 
Board  of  Street  Opening,  Matter  of, 

21  App.  Div.  357:   1324. 
Board  of  Street  Opening,  Matter  of, 

27  App.  Div.  265:  961. 
Board  of  Street  Opening,  Matter  of, 

68  Hun  562:  939,  1560. 
Boar4  of  Street  Opening,  Matter  of, 

111  N.  Y.  581:   1395. 
Board  of  Street  Opening,  Matter  of, 

35   N.  Y.   App.   Div.   406:    1326. 
Board  of  Street  Openings,  In  re,  62 

Hun   499:   785. 
Board  of  Street  Openings,  In  re,  133 

N.  Y.  329:  785. 
Board  of  Supervisors  v.  Magoon,  109 

111.   142:    1028,   1099,   1413,  1413. 
V.  McFadden,   57   Miss.   618:    782, 

1609. 


Board  of  Supervisors  v.  Winchester, 

84  Va.  467:   421,   1494,   1618. 
Board  of  Trade  Tel.  Co.  v.  Barnett, 

107  111.  507:  173,  175,  338,  1636. 
V.  Blume,  176  111.  247:   1426. 
V.  Darst,  192  111.  47 :    1341. 
Board   of   Trustees   v.   Gill,   94  Ky. 

138:   465. 
V.  Jones,  2  Ohio  C.  C.  482:   1409. 
Board  of  Water  Comrs.  v.   Dwight, 

101  N.  Y.  9  :  734. 
V.  Lansing,  45  N.  Y.  19:   1100. 
V.  Perry,  69  Conn.  461:  73. 
V.  Shutts,  25  App.  Div.  N.  Y.  22: 

1387. 
Bockoven  v.  Board  of  Supvrs.,  13  S. 

D.  317:  966,  974,  1188,  1317. 
Bodine  v.  Trenton,  36  N.  J.  L.  198: 

1491. 
Body  V.  Negley,  40  Pa.  St.  377:  1389. 
Boecker  v.  Naperville,  166  111.   151: 

1426. 
Boehler  v.  Des  Moines,  111  la.  417: 

876. 
Boener   v.   McKillip,    52    Kan.   508: 

881,  882. 
Boester  v.  Kuhlengel,   136  111.  App. 

17:    1506. 
Bogard  v.  O'Brien    (Ky.)    20  S.  W. 

1097:   616. 
Bogart  v.   New   York,   7   Covir.    158: 

1414,  1417. 
Bogart's  Admr.,  Matter  of,  1  Wend. 

41:  1533. 
Bogert   V.   United    States,   2    Ct.   of 

Claims,  159:   459. 
Bogue   V.   De   Long,    147    Mich.   63: 

1082,  1087. 
Bohan  v.  Avoca,  154  Pa.  St.  404:  155. 
V.  Port  Jervis  Gas  Light  Co.,  122 

N.  Y.  18:   451,  453. 
Bohannan  v.  Stamford,  80  Conn.  107 : 

1530,  1682. 
Bohlen  v.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co., 

133  N.  Y.  677:  1121. 
V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  59 

N.  Y.  Supr.  Ct.  565:   1121. 
Bohlm^n  v.  Green  Bay  &  Lake  Pepin 

Ry.  Co.,  30  Wis.  105:   1570. 
V.  Green  Bay  &  Minn.  Ry.  Co.,  40 

Wis.    157:    690,   696,   707,   1091, 

1093,  1570. 
Bohm  V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co., 

129   N.  Y.   576:    180,  265,   1216, 

1296,  1302,  1554,  1584,  1591. 
Bohr   V.   Neuenschwander,    120    Ind. 

449:    1370. 
Boise  City  v.  Hon,  14  Ida.  272 :  877, 

879,  889. 
Boise  City  etc.  Water  Co.  v.   Boise 

City,  123  Fed.  232,  362. 


Iviii 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.1 


Boise  City  Irr.  &  L.  Co.  v.  Clark,  131 

Fed.  41:  481. 
Boland    v.    St.    Johns    Schools,    163 

Mass.  229:   878. 
Boles  V.  Boston,  136  Mass.  398:  1176, 

1200,   1202,  1342. 
Bolger  V.  Met.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  61  N.  Y. 

Supr.  Ct.  459:   1584. 
Bolivar  v.  Pittsburgh  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

88  App.  Div.  387:  778,  1622. 
V.  Pittsburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  179  N. 

Y.  523:  778,  1622. 
Boiling  V.  Petersburg,  3  Rand.  563: 

1486. 
Bollinger  v.  Southern  Pipe  Line  Co. 

2  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  604:  57. 
Bolton  V.  McShane,  67  la.  207 :  1568, 

1574,  1575. 
V.  McShane,  79  la.  26 :  870. 
Bonaparte  v.  Camden  &  Amboy  R.  R. 

Co.,   1   Bald.  205:   434,  524,  922, 

1155,  1163,  1570.  1571,  1574. 
Bond  V.  MuUins,  3  Met.  282:    1360. 
V.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  171  111. 

508:  246,  1580. 
V.  Philadelphia,  218  Pa.  St.  475: 

630,  636,  1307. 
V.  Wool,  107  N.  C.  139:  127,  129. 
Bondurant  v.  North  Carolina  etc.  R. 

R.  Co.,  5  Ky.  L.  R.  101 :  253. 
Bonner  v.  Rio  Grande  So.  R.  R.  Co., 

31  Colo.  446:   957. 
V.  Worth,   5  Tex.  Civ.  App.   560: 

152,  1716. 
Booker  v.  Venice  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  101 

111.   333:    816,   897,    1066. 
Bookman  v.  N.  Y.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  137 

N.  Y.  302:   1152,  1301. 
V.   New  York   El.  R.   R.   Co.,   147 

N.  Y.  298:    1296,   1299. 
Boom  Co.  V.  Patterson,  3  Dillon  465: 

931. 
V.  Patterson,  98  U.   S.   403:    676, 

684,  687,  931,  1234,  1329. 
Boonville  v.  Ormrod's  Admr.,  26  Mo. 

193 :  940,  1004,  1006,  1013,  1014. 
Booraem  v.  North  Hudson  Co.,R.  K. 

Co.,  40  N.  J.  Eq.  557:   1582. 

V.  Wood,  27  N.  J.  Eq.  371:  947. 

Boorman  v.  Sunnuchs,  42  Wis.  233 : 

109,  125,  128. 
Booth  V.  Rome  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  140  N. 

Y.  267:   436,  1455,  1476. 
V.  Woodbury,  32  Conn.   118:   462. 
Boothby  v.  Androscoggin  &  Kennebec 

R.  R.  Co.,  51  Me.  318:   440,  442, 

1452. 
Borchaenius  v.  Chic-xj^'o  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 

96  Wis.  448:    159. 


Borden  v.  Trespalaeios  R.  &  I.  Co.,  98 

Tex.  494:  499,  508,  510,  587,  591, 

592,  739. 
v.  Vincent,  24  Pick.  301 :  866. 
Bordentown    etc.    Turnpike    Co.    v. 

Camden  &  Amboy  R.  R.  Co.,  17 

N.  J.  L.  314:  414. 
Borer  v.  Lange,  44  Minn.  281:  S78. 
Borghart  v.   Cedar  Rapids,    126   la. 

313:   376,  388,  404,  1548. 
Borgman  v.  Detroit,  102  Mich.  261: 
*        924. 
Bork  V.  United  N.  J.  R."  R.  &  C.  Co., 

70  N.  J.  L.  268:  247,  254,  1629. 
Boro  V.  Phillips,  4  Dill.  216:  586. 
Borup,  Matter  of,  89  App.  Div.  183: 

611,  1042,  1046. 
Borup,  Matter  of,  102  App.  Div.  262 : 

610. 
Borup,   Matter   of,    182   N.  Y.   222: 

610. 
Bostock  V.  Bridgeport,  95  Md.  400: 

540. 
V.  Sams,  95  Md.  400:  473. 
Boston  V.  Brookline,  156  Mass.  172: 

786,  797,  798,  799. 
V.  Richardson,  13  Allen,  146:  335, 

337. 
V.  Robbins,  121  Mass.  453:   1254. 
V.  Robbins,  126  Mass.  384:  1567. 
Boston   Belting   Co.   v.   Boston,    149 

Mass.  44:   1523,  1525. 
V.  Boston,  152  Mass.  307:  80,  625. 
v.   Boston,    183   Mass.   254:    1271, 

1443. 
Boston  Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  Bos- 
ton, 195  Mass.  338:  1327. 
Boston  Elec.  Lt.  Co.  v.  Boston  Ter- 
minal CO./-184  Mass.  566:  360. 
Boston  El.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Presho,  174 

Mass.  99:  733. 
Boston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter  of,  10 

Abb.  N.  C.   104:   912. 
Boston  etc.  R.  R.  Co..  Matter  of,  22 

Hun  176:  1231,  1235. 
Boston,  Hoosac  Tunnel  and  Western 

Ry.  Co.,  Matter  of,  31  Hun  461 : 

1208,   1310,   1311. 
Boston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter  of,  53 

N.  Y.  574:  784.  793,  798,  800. 
Boston  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  Matter  of,  79  N. 

Y.   64:    971. 
Boston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Boston,  140 

Mass.  87:  512,  721. 
V.  Cambridge,  159  Mass.  283 :  1289, 

1290. 
V.  Cambridge,  166  Mass.  224:  773. 
V.  Charlton,  161  Mass.  32:   1443. 
V.  Cilley,  44  N.  H.  578:  696. 
V.    County    Comrs.    79    Me.    386, 

1287,  1288,  1290. 


CASES    CITED. 


lix 


[The  references  are   to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Boston  etc.  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Doherty,  154 
Mass.  314:   1647. 
V.  Folsom,  46  N.  H.  64 :  1029,  1412, 

1415,  1416. 
V.  Greenbush,  52  N.  Y.  510:   490, 

128". 
V.  Lawrence,  2  Allen,  107:  752. 
V.   Lowell  &  Lawrence  R.  R.  Co., 
124   Mass.    368:    753,   793,   798, 
800,  1609. 
V.   Middlesex    Co.,    1    Allen,    324: 

1290,  1292. 
V.  Midland  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Gray,  340: 

729.  ? 

V.    Montgomery,    119    Mass.    114: 

1132,  1340. 
V.  Old  Colony  &  Fall  River  R.  R. 

Co.,  3  Allen,   142:    1127,   1273. 
V.  Old  Colony  R.  R.  Co.,  12  Cush. 

605:   117,  131. 
V.  Salem,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Gray,  1 : 

411,  412,  415,   1608. 
V.  State,  32  N.  H.  215:  475. 
V.  Western  R.  R.  Co.,  14  Gray,  253 : 
476. 
Boston  Gas  Lt.  Co.  v.  Old  Colony  & 
Newport  Ry.  Co.,  14  Allen,  444 : 
429,   1474,  1478. 
Boston  H.  T.  &  W.  Co.,  Matter  of,  79 

N.  Y.  64:   765. 
Boston  H.  T.  &  W.  Co.,  Matter  of, 

79  N.  Y.  69:   765. 
Boston  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Burgin,  114  Mass. 

340:    558. 
Boston  Road,  Matter  of,  27  Hun  409 : 

1378. 
Boston  Rolling  Mills  v.   Cambridge, 

117  Mass.  396:  142. 
Boston  &  Roxbury  Mill  Corporation 
V.  Gardner,  2  Pick.  33:   624. 
V.  Newman,  12  Pick.  467:   2,  544, 
547,  549,  552,  555,  1495. 
Boston  Water  Power   Co.  v.   Boston 
&  Worcester  R.  R.  Co.,  16  Pick. 
512:   139. 
V.  Boston  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  Pick 
360:  408,  411,  524,  783,  788,  793, 
824. 
Bostwick    V.    Isbell,    41    Conn.    305: 

1014. 
Bosworth  V.  Pittsburgh,  Cincinnati  & 
St.  Louis  Ry.  Co.,  1  Ohio  Cir.  Ct. 
69:  855. 
V.  Providence,  17  R.  I.  58:   1409. 
Boteler  v.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

164  Pa.  St.  397:    1131. 
Bothe  V.   Railway   Co.,   37   Ohio  St. 

147:   1626. 
Bothwell  V.  Denver  Union  Stockyards 
Co.,  39  Colo.  221:  887. 


Bottamly  v.  Chism,  102  Mass.  463: 

899. 
Botto   \.  Mo.   Pacific  R.   R.   Co.,   11 

■  Mo.  App.  589 :  253. 
Bottoms  V.  Brewer,  54  Ala.  288:  69, 

90,  551,  988. 
Boughner  v.  Clarksburg,   15  W.  Va. 

394:    1569. 
Boughton  V.   Atlanta,   113  Ga.  948: 

1306. 
Bouke  V.  American  Tel.  Co.,  41  N.  J. 

Eq.  35:   1593. 
Boulat  V.  Municipality  No.  1,  5  La. 

An.  363:  589. 
Boulo  V.  New  Orleans  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

55  Ala.  480:  1573. 
Boulton  V.  Crowther,  2  B.  &  C.  703: 

206. 
Bounds  V.  Kirven,  63  Tex.  159:  424. 
Bourdier  v.  Morgan's  R.  R.  Co.,  35 

La.  Ann.  947  :  858,   1639. 
Bourgeois  v.  Mills,  60  Tex.  76:  1194, 

1377. 
Bourne  v.  Liverpool,  32  L.  J.  Q.  B. 

15:   1257. 
Boutelle    v.    Minneapolis,    59    Minn. 

493:   948,  949,  1563,  1564. 
Bouvier  v.  Baltimore  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

65  N.  J.  L.  313:    840,  842,  843, 

853,  1627. 

V.  Baltimore  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  67  N. 
J.    L.   281:    840,    842,    843,    853, 

854,  1627. 

V.  Baltimore  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  69  N.  J. 
L.  149:  748. 
Bowden  v.   Burnham,   70   Fed.   209: 
.996. 
V.  Jacksonville,  52  Fla.  216:    179, 
181,  210,   226. 
Bowditch  V.  Boston,  4  Clifford,  323: 
17. 
V.    Boston,    164  Mass.    107:    1141, 

1330. 
V.  Boston,  101  U.  S.  16:  17. 
Bowen  v.  Atlantic  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  17 
S.  C.  574:    1206. 
V.  Hester,  143  Ind.  511:    1510. 
V.  Snyder,  66  Ind.  340:   1384. 
Bowers  v.  Bears,   12  Wis.  213,  221, 
550. 
V.  Braddock,  172  Pa.  St.  596:  138, 

1402,   1428. 
v.  Citizens'  Water  Co.,  162  Pa.  St. 

9:  74. 
V.  Miss.  &  Rum  Riv.  Boom  Co.,  78 
Minn.  398:  86,  1639,  1652,  1661. 
Bowlby  >'.  Shively,  22  Or.  410:   118, 

136. 
Bowler    v.    Drain    Comr.,    47    Mich. 
154:    1091,  1094,  1420. 


k 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   1,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Bowling  Green  v.  Hobsen,  3  B.  Mon. 

478:    365. 
Bowman  v.  Carondelet  Ey.  Co.,  102 
111.  459:   U15. 
V.  Jobs,  123  Ind.  44:  1397. 
V.  New  Orleans,  27  La.  Ann.  501: 

153. 
V.  Venice  v.  Caraidelet  Ry.  Co.,  102 
111.  459:   816,  897,  1066. 
Boyoe  v.  Mo.  Pac.  E.  E.  Co.,  168  Mo. 

583:    808. 
Boyd  V.  Alabama,  94  U.  S.  645 :  469. 
V.    Liogansport    etc.    Traction    Co., 

162  Ind.  587:  1042,  1624. 
V.  Negley,  40  Pa.  St.  377 :  530,  978, 
V.  Negley,  53  Pa.  St.  387:  1602. 
V.  United  States,  116  U.  S.  616: 

660. 
V.  Wilkinsburg,   183  Pa.   St.   199: 

1309. 

V.  Winnsboro  Granite  Co.,  66  S.  C. 

433:   495. 

Boyer  v.   St.  Louis  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  97 

Tex.  107 :  1234,  1238,  1297,  1300. 

Boyer's  Petition,  15  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  531 : 

695,    1718. 
Boyer's  Eoad,  37  Pa.  St.  257:   778, 

1032,  1382. 
Boyertown  Water  Co.  v.  Boyertown, 

200  Pa.  St.  394:  408,  409. 
Boyfield  v.  Porter,  13  East  200 :  1524. 
Boyne  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ander- 
son,   146  Mich.   328:    621,    1152, 
1443. 
Boynton  v.  Hall,  100  Me.  131 :   1604. 
V.  Langley,  19  Nev.  169:  145. 
V.  Peterborough   &   Shirley   E.   R. 
Co.,  4  Cush.  467:   940. 
Brace   &   H.    Mill    Co.   v.    State,   49 

Wash.  326:   109. 
Braceville  Coal  Co.  v.  People,  147  111. 

66:  477,  479. 
Bracey  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  79 

Ark.   124:    1304,   1445. 
Bradbury  v.  Cumberland  Co.,  52  Me. 
27:    1527,    1528. 
V.  Vandalia  Levee  &  Dr.  Dist.,  236 

111.  36:    90,  653,  1548. 
V.  Walton,  94  Ky.   163:   386,  387, 
400. 
Braddock     Ferry     Co's     Appeal,     3 

Penny.  32:   130. 
Bradford  v.   Cole,  8   Fla.   263:    516, 
973. 
V.  Pickle,   (1895)  A.  C.  587:  161. 
Bradley,  Ex  parte,  5  Dow.  &  L.  575: 

1079. 
Bradley,  In  re,  108  la.  476:   922. 
Bradley  v.   Fallbrook  Irr.   Dist.,  68 
Fed.  948:   587. 
V.   Frankfort,   99   Ind.   417:    1082, 
1086. 


Bradley  v.  McAtee,  7  Bush.  667:  13. 
V.  Missouri   Pacific  E.  R.  Co.,  91 

Mo.  493:   830,   1628. 
V.   No.   Pac.   R.  E.   Co..   38  Minn. 

234:   964. 
V.  New  York  &  New  Haven  R.  R. 

Co.,  21  Conn.  294:   022. 
V.   Northern    Pac.   R.    R.    Co.,    38 

Minn.   234:    1684. 
V.   Pharr,   45   La.    Ann.   426:    300, 

316,  494. 
V.  Rice,  13  Me.  198 :  109. 
V.  Southern  New  Eng.  Tel.  Co.,  66 

Conn.  559:  342,  350,  1488. 
Bradshaw  v.   Duluth   Imperial   Mill 

Co.,  52  Minn.  59:   125. 
V.  Omaha,  1  Neb.  16:  465. 
V.  Rodgers,  20  Johns.  103:  22. 
V.  Rodgers,  20  Johns.  735:   22. 
Bradstreet  v.   Erskine,  50  Me.  407: 

1091. 
Bradwell  v.  Kansas  City,  75  Mo.  213 : 

231. 
Brady  v.  Atlantic  City,  53  N.  J.  Eq. 

440:   783,  1670. 
V.    Blackington,    174    Mass.    559: 

1523. 
V.  Fall  River,  121  Mass.  262:  605. 
v.  Kansas  City  Cable  Ry.  Co.,  Ill 

Mo.    329:    269,    324,    642,    1294, 

1299. 
V.  Northwestern  Insurance  Co.,  11 

Mich.   425:    468. 
v.  Shinkle,  40  la.  576:   364,  380, 

387,  388. 
V.   Wilkesbarre,   161   Pa.   St.   246: 

630,  636. 

Brainard  v.  Boston  &  N.  Y.  Cent.  E. 
E.  Co.,  12  Gray  407:   1135. 
V.  Clapp,  10  Cush.  6:   1472,  1476, 

1480. 
V.    Connecticut    E.    E.    E.    Co.,    7 

Cush.  506:    1643. 
V.   Missisiquoi   E.   B.   Co.,   48  Vt. 
107 :  407,  423,  782,  1503. 
Braine  v.  Northern  Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  218 

Pa.  St.  43:   87,  93. 
Brakebill  v.  Leonard,  40  Ga.  60:  19. 
Brakken   v.   Minneapolis   etc.   R.  E. 
Co.,  29  Minn.  41:  320,  351,  372, 
385,  1298,   1650,  1659. 
V.  Minneapolis  &  St.  Louis  Ry.  Co., 

31  Minn.     45:     320,    351,    385, 
1298. 

V.  Minneapolis  &  St.  Louis  Ey.  Co., 

32  Minn.    425:     320,    351,    385, 
1298,  1650,   1659. 

Bramlett   v.   Laurens,   58   S.   C.   60: 
212. 

Bramlette  v.  Louisville  etc.  R.  E.  Co., 
113  Ky.  300:   655,  664. 


CASES    CITED. 


Ixi 


[The  references   are   to   the   pages :   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Branard  v.  Cincinnati  etc.  E.  R.  Co., 

115   Ind.    1:    856. 
Branch  v.  Lewerenz,  75  Conn.  319: 

588,   1519. 
V.  United  States,   100  U.  S.  673: 

19. 
Brand  v.  Hammersmith  City  Ey.  Co., 

(House  of  Lords)   L.  E.  4  Eng. 

&  Irish  App.  171:   656. 
V.  Hammersmith  City  Ry.  Co.,  L. 

R.  1  Q.  B.  130:  656. 
V.    Hammersmith    City     Ey.     Co. 

(Exch.   Cham.)    L.   R.   2   Q.   B. 

223:  656. 
V.  Multnomah  Co.  38  Ore.  79:  211, 

224. 
Brandenberg  v.  Zeigler,  62  S.  C.  18: 

166. 
V.  District  of  Columbia,   26  App. 

Cas.  D.  C.  140:   1413. 
V.  Hittel  (Ind.)  37  N.  E.  329:  400, 

625. 
Brandenstein  v.  Hoke,  101  Cal.  131 : 

572. 
Brandon's  Estate,  34  L.  J.  Eq.  333: 

1098. 
Bradt  v.  Albany,  5  Hun  591:   141. 

V.  Olson,  79  Neb.  612:  890. 
Brannan  v.  St.  Paul,  44  Minn.  464: 

1365. 
Branson  v.   Gee,  25   Ore.   462:    722, 

1008,  1010,  1157,  1623. 
V.  New  York  Cent.  etc.  E.  R.  Co., 

Ill  App.  Div.  737:   155. 
Brass   v.   North   Dakota,    153   U.   S. 

391:   482. 
Bratton  v.  Catawba  Power  Co.,  80  S. 

C.  260:   1135,  1604. 
Brauer    v.    Baltimore    Refrigerating 

etc.  Co.,  99  Md.   367,   199,  372, 

1596. 
Braun  v.  Metropolitan  W.  S.  El.  R. 

R.  Co.,  166  111.  434:    1271,  1426. 
Bravard  v.  Cincinnati  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

115  Ind.  1:  1631. 
Braxton  v.  Bressler,  64  111.  488:  103. 
Bray  v.  Ocean  City  R.  R.  Co.,  60  N. 

J.  L.  91:   1078,  1081. 
Brayton   v.    Fall    River,    113    Mass. 

218:   142. 
Brazee  v.  Raymond,   59  Mich.   548: 

1017,   1032,   1033. 
Breaux  v.  Bienvenue,  51  La.  An.  687: 

522,  708. 
Breckenridge  v.  Ward,  1  T.  B.  Mon. 

57:   1091,  1094. 
Bredin  v.  Pittsburgh  etc.  E.  E.  Co., 

165  Pa.  St.  262:  1073. 
Breed  v.  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.,  5  Gray, 

470:  948. 
V.  Lynn,  126  Mass.  367:  142,  1606. 


Breen  v.  Pittsburg  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  220 

Pa.  St.  612:  307,  1588. 
Breese  v.   Poole,    16   111.   App.   551: 

1370,  1568,  1572,  1684. 
Breitweiser  v.  Fuhrman,  88  Ind.  28: 

1385,  1407. 
Bremer  v.  Manhattan  Ey.  Co.,  191  N. 

Y.  333 :  265,  305,  866,  870,  1584, 

1585. 
V.  New  York  Central  etc.  E.  R.  Co., 

118  App.  Div.  139:  257. 
Brenchnock  Tp.  Road,  2  Woodward's 

Dec.    (Pa.)   437:  522. 
Brennan  v.  Mecklenberg,  49  Cal.  672 : 

1380. 
Brenner's    Appeal,    2    Walker's    Pa. 

Supm.   92:   948. 
Bresler  v.  Ellis,  46  Mich.  335:   1416. 
Brewer  v.  Boston  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  113 

Mass.  52:  316,  1639. 

V.  Bowman.  9  Ga.  37:  515,  519, 

1155. 
V.  Grow,  83  Mich.  250:  959. 
V.  Pine  Bluflf,  80  Ark.  489:  877. 
Brewster   v.  Hough,   10   N.  H.   138: 

683,  736. 
V.  J.  &  J.  Eogers  Co.,  42  App.  Div. 

343:  79,  97,  544,  1164,  1170. 
V.  J.  &  J.  Eogers  Co.,   169  N.  Y. 

73:  79,  544,  1164,  1170. 
Brice    v.    Thompson,    48    Mo.    361: 

1618. 
Brickett  v.  Haverhill  Aqueduct  Co., 

142  Mass.  394:  702,  1170,  1523. 
Brickies  v.  Milwaukee  Lt.  H.  &  T. 

Co.,  134  Wis.  358:   284,  1560. 
Bridal  Veil  Lumbering  Co.  v.  John- 
son, 30  Ore.  205:  205,  498,  673, 

675,  1046,  1071. 
Briden  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  27 

E.  I.  569:   321,  329,   1645. 
Bridge  v.  New  Hampton,  47   N.  H. 

151:  1396. 
Bridge  Co.  v.  Hoboken  Land  &  Imp. 

Co.,  13  N.  J.  Eq.  81:  413. 
V.  Hoboken  Laud  &  Imp.  Co.,   13 

N.  J.  Eq.  503:   113. 
V.   Hoboken   Land   &   Imp.   Co.,    1 

Wall.  116:  413. 
Bridgeman  v.  Hardwick,  67  Vt.  653: 

1319,  1340,  1358. 
V.  St.  Johnsbury  etc.  E.  R.  Co.,  58 

Vt.   198:    1540,  1541. 
Bridgeport  v.  Eisenman,  47  Conn.  34 : 

1116. 
V.   Giddings,  43   Conn.  304:    1082, 

1086. 
V.  Hubbell,  5  Conn.  237:  696. 
V.  New   York   etc.   E.   R.   Co.,   36 

Conn.  255:  750. 


Ixii 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references   are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Bridgers  v.  Dill,  97  N.  C.  222 :  1252, 

1455,  1524,  1636. 

V.  Purcell,  1  Dev.  &  B.  492 :  858. 

V.  Purcell,  1  Ired.  Law  232 :  1345. 

Bridges  v.  Wyckoflf,   67   N.  Y.   130: 

878. 
Bridgewater  v.  Beaver  Val.  Traction 

Co.,  214  Pa.  St.  343:   305. 
Bridgewater    Ferry    Co.    v.    Sharon 
Bridge  Co.,  145  Pa.  St.  404 :  409. 
Bridport,  Matter  of,  24  Vt.  176:  713, 

917. 
Bridwell  v.  Gate  City  Terminal  Co., 
127  Ga.  520:  498,  501,  527,  716, 
912,  1017,  1051,  1070,  1623. 
Briesen  v.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.,  31 

Hun  112:   451. 

Brigham  v.  Agricultural  Branch  R. 

R.  Co.,  1  Allen  316:   1636,  1506. 

V.  Edmonds,  7  Gray,  359:  438. 

V.  Holmes,  14  Allen  184:  1073. 

V.  Wheeler,  12  Allen  89:    1524. 

Brigham  City  v.  Chase,  30  Utah  410: 

957,  961,  962,  966. 
Briggs  V.  Board  of  Comrs.  39  Kan. 
90:   1238,  1407. 
V.  Cape  Cod  Ship  Canal  Co.,  137 

Mass.  71:  1047,  1164,  1683. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  56  Kan. 

526:  947,  1352. 
V.  Lewiston  &  Auburn  Horse  R.  R. 
Co.,  79  Me.  363:   211,  268,  270, 
279,   324. 
V.   Union  Drainage  Dist.    140   HI. 
53:   13. 
Briggs  Ave.,  Matter  of,  84  App.  Div. 

312:   611. 
Briggs  Ave.,  Matter  of,  118  App.  Div. 

224:    1270,   1271. 
Brimberry  v.  Savannah  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

78   Ga.  641:    159. 
Brimmer  v.   Boston,   102  Mass.    19: 

736,  746,  747,  1510. 
Brine  v.  Great  Western  R.  R.  Co.,  31 

L.  J.   Q.  B.   101:    1457. 
Brink  v.  Dunmore,  174  Pa.  St.  395: 
1569. 
V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  17 
Mo.  App.  177:   88. 
Brinkerhoff  v.  Newark  etc.  Traction 
Co.,  66  N.  J.  L.  478:  681. 
V.  Wemple,  1  Wend.  470:   1556. 
Brinkley  v.  Southern  R.  R.  Co.,  135 

N.  C.  654:   1457,  1472,  1473. 
Brisbine  v.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  23 
Minn.   114:    127,    128,   129,   131, 
991. 
Briscoe  v.  Great  Wester^  Ry.  Co.,  L. 
R.  16  Eq.  Cas.  636:  1601. 
V.  Parker,  145  N.  C.  14:   145. 
V.  Young,  131  N.  C.  386:  89. 


Bristol  V.  Bradford,  42   Conn.  321: 
1096. 
V.  Bristol  etc.  Water  Co.,  23  R.  I. 

274:  1266. 
V.  New  Chester,  3  N.  H.  533:  459. 
Bristol  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Somerset  R. 

R.  Co.,  22  W.  R.  601:  908. 
British  Cast  Plate  Manufacturers  v. 

Meredith,  4  T.  R.  794 :  206. 
Britton  v.  Des  Moines  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

59  la.   540:    1204. 
v.  Dubuque  &  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  II  la. 

15:    1480,    1481. 
Broadbent   v.    Imperial   Gas    Co.,    7 

DeG.  McM.  &  G.  436:  457,  733. 

V.  Ramsbotham,  11  Exch.  602:  146. 

Broadmoor   Land    Co.    v.    Curr,    133 

Fed.  37:  932. 
Broadmoor   Land    Co.   v.   Curr,    142 

Fed.  421:  932. 
Broad  Street  Road's  Case,  7  S.  &  R. 

444:   1091,  1092. 
Broadway  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  73  Hun  7: 

990,   1048,   1076. 
Broadway  &  Seventh  Ave.  R.  R.  Co., 

Matter  of,  69  Hun  275:   1020. 
Broadway  Surface  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter 

of,  34  Hun  414:  921. 
Broadway  Underground  Ry.  Co.,  Mat- 
ter of,  23  Hun  693:  921. 
Broadway  Widening,   Matter  of,   61 

Barb.  483:  458,  1393,  1431,  1678. 
Broadway   Widening,   Matter  of,  63 

Barb.  572:   1035,  1370. 
Broadway   Widening,   Matter  of,  42 

How.  Pr.  220:  1393,  1678. 
Broadway   Widening,  Matter   of,  49 

N.  Y.  150:  1393,  1431,  1678. 
Broadwell   v.   Kansas   City,    75   Mo. 

213:  67. 
Broadwell  Dr.  Dist.  v.  Lawrence,  231 

111.  86:  147. 
Brock  V.  Barnett,  57  Vt.   172:   515, 

1029. 
V.  Chase,  39  Me.  300 :  865. 
V.  Dore,  166  Mass.  161:  726. 
V.  Hishen,  40  Wis.  674:  1167,  1531. 
V.  Old  Colony  R.  R.  Co.,  146  Mass. 

194:  928,  1003,  1011,  1157,  1164, 

1626,  1707. 
Brockelbank  v.  Whitehaven  Junction 

Ry.  Co.,  15  Sim.  632:  695. 
Brocket  v.  Ohio  &  Pennsylvania  R.  R. 

Co.,  14  Pa.  St.  241:  823. 
Brokaw  v.   Comrs.  of  Highways,  99 

III.  App.  415:  1206. 
V.  Terre  Haute,  97  Ind.  451 :  1672, 

1675. 
Bromley   y.   Philadelphia,   20   Phila. 

302:   1160,  1167. 


OASES    CITED. 


Ixiii 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.1 


Bronnenburg  v.   O'Bryant,   139   Ind. 

17:  975,  995,  1094. 
Bronson,  In  re,  1  Ontario,  415:  726, 

793. 
Bronson  v.  Albion  Telephone  Co.,  67 

Neb.  Ill:  201,  338,  1594,  1612. 
V.  Gee,   25  Ore.   462:    1005,    1160, 

1167. 
V.  Wallingford,  54  Conn.  513:  234. 
Brookfield,  Matter  of,  78  App.  Div. 

520:   839. 
Brookfield,  Matter  of,  176  N.  Y.  138: 

839. 
Brookhaven  v.   Smith,  98  App.  Div. 

212*   127    129 
V.  Smith,  188  N.Y.  74:  127,  129. 
Brookline    v.    County    Comrs.,     114 

Mass.  548:   1711. 
Brooklyn,  In  re,  73  Hun  499:  408. 
Brooklyn,  In  re,  143  2Sr.  Y.  596 :  407, 

408,  498,  783. 
Brooklyn,  Matter  of,  73  N.  Y.  179: 

1327. 
Brooklyn  v.  Copeland,  106  N.  Y.  496 : 

1494,  1500. 
T.  Franz,  87  Hun  54 :  485. 
V.  Mackey,  13  App.  Div.  105:   129. 
V.  Messerole,  26  Wend.  132:   1570. 
V.  Long  Island  Water  Supply  Co., 

88  Hun  176:  1437. 
V.  Long  Island  Water  Supply  Co., 

148  N.  Y.  107:   1437. 
V.    Seaman,    30    Misc.    507:     935, 

1561. 
Brooklyn  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Brook- 
lyn City  R.  R.  Co.,  32  Barb.  358: 

426,  427,  728,  762,  763. 
Brooklyn  Central  etc.  R.   R.  Co.  v. 

Brooklyn    City    R.    R.   Co.,    33 

Barb.  420:  765. 
Brooklyn  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Con- 
ey Island  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  35  Barb. 

364:  410. 
Brooklyn  El.  R.  R.  Co..  In  re,  76  Hun 

79:   1584. 
Brooklyn  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  In  re,  80  Hun 

355:  1101. 
Brooklyn  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter  of,  6 

App.  Div.  53:   1305,  1315. 
Brooklyn  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter  of,  32 

App.  Div.  N.  Y.  221 :  1083. 
Brooklyn  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter  of,  95 

App.  Div.   108:    1295. 
Brooklyn  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter  of,  105 

App.  Div.  Ill:   991,  1225,  1304. 
Brooklyn  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter  of,  05 

Hun   165:    1295. 
Brooklyn  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter  of,  55 

Misc.  N.  Y.  120:   1034. 
Brooklyn  El.  R.  R.   Co.,  Matter  of, 

125  N.  Y.  434:  695. 


Brooklyn  El.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Brooklyn, 

2  App.  Div.  98:   354. 
V.  Flynn,  87  Hun  104:   1305. 
V.  Flynn,  147  N.  Y.  344:   1213. 
V.  Nagel,  75  Hun  590:  986. 
Brooklyn  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter  of,  55 

How  Pr.  14:   694,  1049. 
Brooklyn  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter  of, 

72  N.  Y.  245:   694,   1047,   1048, 

1049. 
Brooklyn     Heights,    Matter    of,     48 

Barb.  288:   1327. 
Brooklyn  Heights  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Brook- 
lyn, 152  N.  Y.  244:  309. 
Brooklyn  Park  Co.  v.  Armstrong,  45 

N.  Y.  234:  539,  1520. 
Brooklyn  Rapid  Transit  Co.,  Matter 

of,  62  How.  Pr.  404:   260. 
Brooklyn     Steam     Transit     Co.     v. 

Brooklyn,    78    N.    Y.    524:    694, 

1583,  1622. 
Brooklyn  St.,  Opening  of,  118  Pa.  St. 

640:  879,  1327. 
Brooklyn  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter  of,  82 

App.  Div.  567 :  1437. 
Brooklyn  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter  of, 

176  N.  Y.  213:  1437. 
Brooklyn  Union  El.  JR.  R.  Co.,  Matter 

of,    113    App.    Div.    817:     1096, 

1297,  1303,  1304. 
Brooklyn  Union  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter 

of,    188  N.   Y.   553:    1096,    1297, 

1303,  1304. 
Brook's  Appeal,   32   Cal.  558:    1384. 
Brooks  V.  Boston,  19  Pick.  174:  437, 

1259,  1260,  1274. 
V.   Cedar  Brook  Imp.  Co.,  82  Me. 

17:  100,  625. 
V.  Davenport  &  St.  Paul  R.  R.  Co., 

37  la.  99:  1204,  1310. 
V.  Hubbard,  73  Vt.  122:  1563. 
V.  Kirby,  19  Ala.  72:   1413,  1421. 
Brook  Ave,  Matter  of,  8  App.  Div. 

294:  1397. 
Broome  v.  New  York  &  N.  J.  Tel.  Co., 

42  N.  J.  Eq.  141 :  340,  1593. 
V.  N.  Y.  &  N.  J.  Tel.  Co.,  49  N.  J. 

L.  624:    340. 
Broumel  v.  White,  87  Md.  521;  878. 
Broussard  v.  Sabine  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

80  Tex.  329:  158,  1639. 
Brower  v.  Chester  County,  1  Pa.  Co. 

Ct.  1:  635,  638. 
Brown  v.  Ark.  Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  72  Ark. 

456:  963,  1559. 
V.  Asheville  Elec.   Co.,    138   N.   C. 

533:   350. 
V.  Atlanta,  66  Ga.  71:   79,  80,  81. 
V.  Atlanta  Ry.  &  P.  Co.,  113  Ga. 

462:   308. 


Ixiv 


CASES    CITED. 


[Tlie  references  are   to  the   pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.  1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Brown  v.  Atlanta  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  126 

Ga.  248:  728,  730. 
V.  Beatty,  34  Miss.  227:  495,  500, 

524,   1178,   1431,   1523. 
V.  Board  of  Supervisors,  124  Oal. 

274:  665. 
V.  Bowman,  9  Ga.  37:  1154. 
V.  Bridges,  31  la.  138:  1506. 
V.  Brown,  50  N.  H.  538:  1511,  1514. 
V.  Buffalo  etc.  E.  R.  Co.,  22  N.  Y. 

191:  475. 
V.  Calumet  Riv.  E.  E.  Co.,  125  111. 

600:   1047,  1176,  1227,  1228. 
V.  Carthage,  128  Mo.  10:  873,  874, 

892. 
V.   Cayuga   &   Susquehanna  E.   E. 

Co.,  12  N.  Y.  486:   167. 
V.  Chadbourne,  31  Me.  9:  97,  103, 

113. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  137  Mo. 

529:   311,  527. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  64  Neb. 

62:  1162,  1172,  1465,  1470,  1526, 

1527,  1534. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  66  Neb. 

106:     1172,     1465,     1470,    1471, 

1526,  1527,  1534. 
V.  Cincinnati,  14  Ohio  541:    1192. 
V.  Commissioners,  L.  R.   15,  I.  L. 

240:    1268. 
V.  Corey,  43  Pa.  St.  495:  530,  811, 

1187,  1410. 
V.  Co.  Comrs.,   12  Met.  208:   938, 

1354. 
V.  Duplessis,  14  La.  Ann.  842 :  268. 
V.  Ellis,  26  la.  85:   1115. 
V.  Forest  Water  Co.,  213  Pa.   St. 

440:  1229,  1232,  1237. 
V.    Gardner,    Harr.    Ch.     (Mich.) 

291:   1572,  1574. 
V.   Gerald,   100  Me.   351:    21,  494, 

496,  498,  501,  503,  537,  538,  593, 

675,  684,  743,  1071,  1568,  1572. 
V.  Gold  Coin  Min.  Co.  48  Ore.  277 : 

69. 
V.  Grant,  116  U.  S.  207:  854. 
V.  Illinois  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  209  111.  402 : 

1121. 
V.  Illinois,  25  Conn.  583:  165,  166. 
T.  Kennedy,  5  H.  &  J.  195,  103. 
v.  Lowell,  8  Met.   172:    606,  618, 

955,  1010,  1718. 
V.  Macfarland,  19  App.  Cas.  D.  0. 

525:   706,  1394. 
V.  Merrill,  3  Chand.  46:   1180. 
V.  Ontario  Talc  Co.,  81  App.  Div. 

273:   1604. 
r.  Philadelphia,  W.  &  B.  R.  R.  Co., 

58  Md.  539:  731. 
V.  Pierce  County,  28  Wash.   345: 

460. 


Brown  v.  Pittsburg  etc.   R.   R.   Co., 

29  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  131:  853,  1646. 
V.  Powell,  25  Pa.  St.  229:  952,  961, 

1635. 
V.  Preston,  38  Conn.  219 :  788. 
V.  Providence  &  Springfield  E.  E. 

Co.,  12  R.  I.  238:   1124,  1129. 
V.  Providence,  Warren  &  Bristol  R. 

R.  Co.,  5  Gray  35:  435,  1149. 
V.  Radnor  Tp.   Elec.  Lt.  Co.,  208 

Pa.  St.  453:  682. 
V.  Rea,  150  Cal.   171:   250,  1613. 
V.  Roberts,  23  111.  App.  461:  993, 

1418,  1419. 
V.  Robertson,  123  111.  631:  1395. 
V.  Rome  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  86  Ala.  206: 

897,  979,  084,  1558. 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  38  Minn. 

506:   1026. 
V.  Sams,  119  Ga.  22:  1364. 
V.    San   Francisco,    124   Cal.   274: 

378,  391,  399,  406,  666. 
V.  Seattle,  5  Wash.  35:   212,  629, 

631,    647,    659,    664,    670,    1601, 

1612. 
V.  So.  Pac.  Co.,  36  Ore.  128:  856. 
T.  Starks,  83  Cal.  636:  877. 
V.  Stein,  38  Neb.  596:  884. 
V.  Township  Board,  92  Mich.  294: 

1397. 
V.  Township  Board,  109  Mich.  557: 

1397. 
V.  United  States,  81  Fed.  55:  140. 
V.  Watrous,  47  Me.  161:  649. 
V.   Weaver  Power  Co.,   140  N.  C. 

333:  536,  537,  1228,  1234,  1546, 

1548. 
V.  Webster  City,  115  la.  511:  236. 
V.  Winona  etc.  E.  R.  Co.,  53  Minn. 

259:    148,    157. 
V.  Worcester,  13  Gray  31:  1343. 
V.  Wyandotte  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  68  Ark. 

134:   1049,  1254. 
V.  Young,  69  la.  625:   837. 
Brown's  Petition,  57  N.  H.  367 :  1421. 
Brown   Co.   v.   Burkhalter,   75  Kan. 

321:  1316,  1404. 
Brown  &  Dickenson  v.  Fitchburg,  13 

Gray  546:  1121. 
Browne  v.  McCord,  20  Ind.  270:  974. 
Browning  v.  Camden  etc.  R.  E.  Co., 

4  N.  J.  Eq.  47:   1464,  1574. 
V.  CoUis,  21  N.  Y.  Misc.  155:  710, 

1167. 
Bruce  v.   Canal  Co.,   19   Barb.   371: 

1616. 
V.  Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry.  Co.,  52 

Fla.  461:   882,  883. 
Brudy  v.  Bronson,  45  Cal.  640:  1162, 

1636. 


CASES    CITED. 


Ixv 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Bruggerman  v.  True,  25  Minn.  123: 

922,  927. 
Brumit  v.   Bailroad   Co.,   106   Tenn. 

124:    255,  313. 
Brmnley  v.  State,  83  Ark.  236 :'  1033, 

1517. 
Brvuies  v.  Cote  St.  Louis,  2  Montreal 

L.  Q.  B.  103:  828. 
Brunswick,    Inhabitants    of.   Appell- 
ants, 37  Me.  446:   1386. 
Brunswick  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hardy, 
112  Ga.  604:   351. 
v.  McLaren,  47  Ga.  546,  1123,  1149, 

1310. 
V.  Waycross,  88  Ga.  68:   322,  639, 

1622. 
V.  Waycross,  91  Ga.  573:  883. 
V.  Waycross,  94  Ga.  102:  738,  1154, 
1156,  1568,  1572. 
Brunswick    etc.    Water    District    v. 
Maine  Water  Co.,  99  Me.   371: 
1263. 
Brunswick  Gas  Light  Co.  v.  Bruns- 
wick, 92  Me.  493 :   354. 
Brush  V.  Detroit,  32  Mich.  43:  1025, 

1420. 
Brushy   Mound   v.   McClintock,    150 

111.  129:   868,  870. 
Bryan   v.   Branford,   50   Conn.   246: 
540. 
V.  Burnett,  2  Jones  L.  305:   1525. 
V.  Moore,  81  Ind.  9 :  979. 
Bryant    v.    County   Comra.,    79   Me. 
128:  981,  1381. 
T.   Glidden,   36  Me.  36:    929,   976, 

1358. 
V.  Knox  &  Lincoln  R.  R.  Co.,  61 

Me.  300:   1383. 
V.  Merritt,  71  Kan.  272:  147. 
V.  New  Castle  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  6  Pa. 

Co.  Ct.  53:  918. 
V.  Pottsville  Water  Co.,  190  Pa.  St. 

366:  1232,  1237. 
v.  Bobbins,  74  Wis.  608 :  1427. 
Bryn    Mawr    Water    Co.    v.    Lower 
Marion  Tp.,  15  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  527: 
354. 
Bryson'a  Road,  2  P.  &  W.  207:  1091. 
Bubenzer  v.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,     (Del.    Ch.)    57    Atl.    242: 
1646. 
Buchanan  v.  Beavor,  171  Pa.  St.  567: 
1596. 
V.  James,  130  Ga.  546:  1155,  1568. 
T.  Kansas  City,  208  Mo.  674:  1534, 
1557,  1565. 
Buchanan    Co.   v.    Bledsoe,   200   Mo. 

630:   1086. 
Buchanan  Co.  Bank  v.  Cedar  Rapids 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  62  la.  494:   1558. 


Buchner  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  56 
Wis.  403:  247,  319,  1616. 
V.  Chicago    etc.    Ry.   Co.    60    Wis. 
264:   182,  319. 
Buck  V.  Connecticut  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  42 
Vt.  370:   320,  1643. 
V.  Met.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  73  Hun  251 : 
1296,  1299,  1300. 
Buckholtz  V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
71  App.  Div.  452:  321,  380,  383, 
388,  398. 
V.   New   York   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   60 
Hun  377:  753. 
Buckholz  V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
148    N.   Y.    640:    320,    321,    351, 
372,  380,  383,  781. 
V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  177  N. 
Y.  550:  321,  380,  383,  388,  398. 
Buckhout  V.  New  York,  82  App.  Div. 
218:   1565. 
V.  New  York,  176  N.  Y.  363:  1565. 
Bucki  V.  Cone,  25  Fla.  1:   112. 
Buckingham  v.  Smith,  10  Ohio  288: 

522,  523. 
Buckles  v.  Northern   Bank  of  Ken- 
tucky, 63  111.  268:   1206. 
Buckley  v.  Drake,  41  Hun  384:  1081, 
1431. 
V.  New  Bedford,  155  Mass.  64 :  142. 
Buckman  v.  Oskaloosa,  130  la.  600: 

889. 
Bucks  Co.  Road,  3  Whart.  105:  1461. 
Buckwalter  v.   Atchison   etc.   R.    R. 
Co.,  64  Kan.  403:   1631. 
V.  Black  Rock  Bridge  Co.,  38  Pa. 

St.  281:   624. 
T.   School  District,   65   Kan.   603: 
1004,  1008,  1163. 
Buckwalter's  Road,  3   S.  &  R.  236: 

1388. 

Budd  V.   Camden,  69  N.  J.  L.  193: 

1416. 

V.  Camden  Horse  R.  R.  Co.,  61  N. 

J.  Eq.  543:  272,  274,  1586,  1587. 

V.  Camden  Horse  R.  R.  Co.,  70  N. 

J.  L.  782:  272,  274. 
V.  New  Jersey  R.  R.  Co.,  14  N.  J. 

L.  467:  1417,  1533. 
V.  New  York,  143  U.  S.  517:  482. 
V.  Reidelbach,  128  Ind.  145:   1407. 
Buel,  Matter  of,  57  App.  Div.  629: 

977. 
Buel,  Matter  of,  168  N.  Y.  423:  977. 
Buel  V.  Lockport,  3  N.  Y.  197,  1528. 
Buell  V.  Ball,  20  la.  282:  465. 

V.  Worcester,  119  Mass.  372:  1307. 
Buffalo,   Matter    of,    116   App.    Div. 

555:  743,  1057,  1328. 
Buffalo,  Matter  of,  72  Hun  422 :  773. 
Buffalo,   Matter    of,    52    Misc.    313: 
1026. 


Ixvi 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.  1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Buffalo,  Matter  of,  64  N.  Y.  547:  776. 
Buffalo,   Matter   of,   68   N.  Y.    167: 

754,  776,  794,  795, 
Buffalo,  Matter  of,   189  N.  Y.   163: 

743,  1057,   1328. 
Buffalo  V.  Delaware  etc.  E,.  K.  Co.,  68 

App.  Div.  488:   888. 
V.  Delaware  etc.  R.  R  .Co.,  178  N. 

Y.  561:  888. 
V.  Hoffeld,  6  Miscl.  197:   1505. 
V.  Pratt,  131  N.  Y.  293:  200,  1328. 
V.  Strait,  20  Colo.  13:  659. 
Buffalo  Bayou  etc.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Fer- 
ris, 26  Tex.  588:   524,  923,  1163, 

1169,  1170,  1183,  1635. 
Buffalo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter  of,  32 

Hun  289:   1105,  1106,  1374. 
Buffalo  etc.  R.  R.   Co.  v.  Brainard, 

9.  N.  Y.  100:  503,  524,  675,  683, 

684. 
V.  Du  Bois  Traction  Pass.  R.  R. 

Co.,  149  Pa.  St.  1,  328,  765,  771. 
V.  Harvey,  107  Pa.  St.  319:   1540, 

1541,  1543. 
V.   New  York   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   72 

Hun  587 :  328,  765,  773,  1282. 
V.  Overton,  35  Hun,  157 :  743. 
V.  Reynolds,  6  How.  Pr.  96:   1074. 
Buffalo  Grade  Crossing  Comrs.  Mat- 
ter of,  116  App.  Div.  549:   1208, 

1309. 
Buffalo  Stone  &  Uement  Co.  v.  Dela- 
ware etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  130  N.  Y. 

152:   1484,  1645,  1647. 
Buffum  V.  Harris,  5  R.  I.  243:   146. 
V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  4  R.  I. 

221:   1129.      ■ 
Buhl  V.  Fort  St.  Union  Depot  Co., 

98  Mich.  596:  364,  371,  384,  388, 

391,  398. 
Bullard  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

178  Mass.  570:  862. 
Bumpus  V.  Miller,  4  Mich.  159:  865. 
Bunderson  v.  Burlington  etc.  R.  R. 

Co.  43  Neb.  545:   149,  150,  155. 
Bundy  v.   Catto,   61   111.   App.   209: 

1489. 
Bungenstock     v.     Nishnabotna     Dr. 

Dist.    163   Mo.    198:    461,    1456, 

1639,  1652. 
Bunker  v.  Hudson,  122  Wis.  43 :  231, 

232,  439. 
Bunten  v.  Danville,  93  Va.  200 :  876, 

884. 
Burbank  v.  Conrad,  96  U.  S.  291 :  19. 

V.   Fay,   65   N.   Y.   57:    78. 
Burbridge  v.  New  Albany  &  Salem  R. 

R.  Co.,  9  Ind.  546:    1259. 
Burch  V.  Augusta  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  80 

Ga.  296:   850. 
v.  McKeesport,  166  Pa.  St.  57:  432. 


Burchard   v.    State,    128    App.    Div. 

750:  1097,  1435,  1443. 
Burchardt  v.  Wausau  Boom  Co.,  54 

Wis.  107:  94. 
Burchmann   v.    St.    Louis,    121    Mo. 

523:  873,  878,  885,  886,  887. 
Burde  v.   St.  Joseph,   130  Mo.  App. 

453:  648,  1210,  1212. 
Burden  v.  Nashua,  17  N.  H.  477:  211. 
v.  Stein,  24  Ala.  130:  1028. 
V.  Stein,  27  Ala.   104:   73,  536. 
Burdick,  Matter  of,  27  N.  Y.  Misc. 

298:  513. 
Burgess  v.  Clark,  13  Ired.  Law  109: 
1347. 
V.  Georgia,  11  Vt.  134:  976. 
V.  Grafton,  10  Vt.  321 :  1385. 
Burgett  V.  Norris,  25  Ohio  St.  308: 

734. 
Burgwyn  v.  Lockhart,  Winston  Law 

269:   516. 
Burk  V.  Ayers,  19  Hun  17:  564. 
V.  Baltimore,  77  Md.  469:  912,  914. 
V.   Simonson,   104  Ind.   173:   78. 
Burkard  v.  Brooklyn,  6  Miscl.  431: 

1561,  1564. 
Burke  v.   Cumberland  Traction  Co., 
15  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  159 :  302. 
V.  Kansas  City,  118  Mo.  309:  928, 

1511,   1512. 
V.   Manhattan  Ry.   Co.,   120   App. 

Div.  684:  866. 
V.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  29  Mo.  App. 

370:    147,  159. 
y.  Sanitary  District,  152  III.  125: 
1066,  1243. 
Burkham  v.  Ohio  &  M.  E.  R.  Co.,  122 

Ind.  344:  322,  601,  619,  1582. 
Burkleo    v.    Washington,    38    Minn. 

441:  914. 
Burky  v.  Lake,  30  111.  App.  23:  646, 

1335. 
Burlington  v.  Burlington  St.  R.  R. 
Co.,  49  la.  144:  309. 
V.  Gilbert,  31  la.  356:   211,  1550. 
V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  56  N.  J.  Eq. 
259:     197,    243,    297,    298,    778, 
1618. 
Burlington  •       R.  R.  Co.  v.  Beebe,  14 
Neb.  46 J:    1124,   1137. 
V.  Billings,  38  Kan.  243 :  965. 
V.  Colo.  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.,  38  Colo. 

95:  829. 
V.  Columbus  Junction,  104  la.  11,0: 

865. 
V.  Dobson,  17  Neb.  450:   1384. 
V.  Johnson,  38  Kan.  142:  956. 
V.  Reinhackle,    15   Neb.   279:    178, 

254,   1548,   1550. 
V.  Sater,  1  la.  421:   1669. 


CASES    CITED. 


Ixvii 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742;   Vol.  II,   pp.    743-1719.] 


Burlington  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Schluntz, 

14  Neb.   421:    1124,   1129. 
V.  Schweikert,  10  Colo.  178:   1172, 

1344. 
V.  Spere,  24  Neb.  125:   1436,  1440. 
V.  White,  28  Neb.  166:   1124,  1232. 
Burlington  Gas  Lt.  Co.  v.  Burling- 
ton etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  91  la.  470: 

378. 
V.  Burlington  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  165 

U.  S.  370:  378,  422,  1581. 
Burnet  v.  Knowles,  3  Dow.  280 :  1524. 
Burnett  v.  Commonwealtli,  169  Mass. 

417:   806,  825. 
V.  Gt.  Northern  Ry.  Co.,  76  Minn. 

461:  88. 
V.  Meehan,  83  Ind.  566:   1132. 
V.  Nicholson,  86  N.  C.  99:    1339, 

1345. 
V.  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  71  S.  0. 

146:   832. 
V.  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  79  S.  C. 

462:   1634. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  4  Sued,  528 :  1478, 

1496. 
V.  Sacramento,  12  Cal.  76 :  13,  745, 

1162. 
V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  62  S.  C.  281 : 

1668. 
Burnham  v.  Goflfstown,  50  N.  H.  560: 

1086. 
V.  Story,  3  Allen,  378 :  1523. 

V.   Thompson,   35  la.   421:    549, 

1035. 
Burnish  St.  Widening,  In  re,  140  Pa. 

St.  531:  738,  1154. 
Burns  v.  Annas,  60  Me.  288:  865. 
V.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  102  la. 

7:   1430. 
V.  Chicago   etc.   Ry.   Co.,   110   la. 

385:  1470. 
V.  Columbus  Citizens'  Tel.  Co.,  10 

Ohio   C.   C.    (N.   S.)    307:    343, 

1594. 
V.  Dodge,  9  Wis.  458:  1520. 
V.  Liberty,  131  Mo.  372:  881. 
V.  Milwaukee  &  Mississippi  R.  R. 

Co.,  9  Wis.  450:    1520. 
V.   Multnomah  Ry.   Co.,  8  Sawyer 

543:  734,  1005,  1372. 
T.    School   District,   61    Neb.    351 

1347. 
V.    Spring    Green,    56    Wis.    239 

1405. 
Burr  V.  Leichester,   121  Mass.  241 

605. 
Burrage  v.   Boston,    198  Mass.   580 

1320. 
Burrall  v.  Am.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  224 

111.  266:   338,  1593. 
Burrill  v.  Martin,  12  Me.  345:   1439. 


Burritt  v.  New  Haven,  42  Conn.  174: 

210,  623. 
Burroughs  v.  Cherokee,  134  la.  429: 

887,  888,  889,  890,  891,  1492. 
Burrow  v.  Terre  Haute  &  Logansport 
R.  R.  Co.  107  Ind.  432 :  834,  856. 
Burrows  v.  Gray's  Harbor  Boom  Co., 
44    Wash.    630:    118,    128,    132, 
1607. 
V.  Vandevier,  3  Ohio  383;  696. 
Burrus    v.    Columbus,    105    Ga.    42: 

1581. 
Burt  V.  Brigham,  117  Mass.  307:  895. 
V.  Commissioners  of  Highways,  32 

Mich.  190:  1417. 
T,  Merchants'  Ins.  Co.,  106  Mass. 

356:  539,  588,  685. 
V.  Merchants'  Ins.  Co.,   115  Mass. 

1:    1222,  1224,  1253. 
v.   Wigglesworth,   117   Mass.   302: 
1112,     1114,     1115,     1120,     1222, 
1227,  1241. 
Burtiss  V.  Parks,  65  Me.  559 :  1033. 
Burton  Lumber  Co.  v.   Houston,  45 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  363:  635. 
Burwell  v.  Commissioners,  93  N.  C. 
73:  58. 
V.  Sneed,  104  N.  C.  118:  516,  522. 
Buschman  v.  St.  Louis,  121  Mo.  523 : 

881. 
Busenbark  v.  Crawfordsville,  9  Ind. 

App.  578:   1527. 
Buser  v.  Cedar  Rapids,  115  Iowa  683: 

603. 
Bush  V.  Dubuque,  69  Iowa  233:  484. 
V.  Peru  Bridge  Co.,  3  Ind.  21 :  409, 

414. 
V.  Portland,  19  Or.  45:  235. 
V.  Trowbridge  Water  Co.,  44  L.  J. 

Ch.  645:   652. 
V.  Trowbridge  Water  Co.,  L.  R.  10 
Ch.  App.  459 :  652,  1612. 
Buskirk   v.   Harrod,   48   Mich.    258: 

1017. 
Bushwick  Avenue,  Matter  of,  48  Barb. 

9:   539. 
Butchers'  Ice  &  Coal  Co.  v.  Philadel- 
phia, 156  Pa.  St.  54:  132,  142. 
Butchers'  Slaughtering  &  M.  Assn.  v. 
Commonwealth,   169  Mass.   103: 
1186,  1216. 
Butchers'  Union  Co.  v.  Crescent  City 
Co.,  Ill  U.  S.  746:  469,  492,  736. 
v.  Crescent  City  Co.,  4  Wood  96: 
469. 
Butis  V.  Geddes,  54  Mich.  608:   941. 
Butler  V.  Barr,  18  Mo.  357 :  1634. 
V.    County    Comrs.,    42    Kan.    416: 

1356. 
V.  Frontier  Telephone  Co.,  109  App. 
Div.  217:  438,  1627. 


Ixviii 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :  Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Butler    V.    Frontier    Telephone    Co., 
186  N.  Y.  486:  438,  1627. 
V.  Parker,  9  Ind.  534:    1428. 
V.  Peek,  16  Ohio  St.  334:  145. 
V.  Sewer  Comrs.,  39  N.  J.  L.  665: 

1172. 
V.    Thomasville,   74   Ga.   570:    83, 

679,  1572. 

V.  White  Plains,  59  App.  Div.  30: 

83,  85. 

Butler  Hard  Rubber  Co.  v.  Newark, 

61  N.  J.  L.  32:   74,  1263.  ^ 

Butler  Street,  25  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  357 : 

1713. 
Butler  Tp.  Road,  6  Luzerne  Leg.  Reg. 

Rep.  443:  1091. 
Butman  v.  Fowler,  17  Ohio  101 :  1098, 
1106. 
V.  Vermont  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  27 
Vt.  500:   1458,  1459. 
Butte  Co.  V.  Boydston,  64  Cal.  110: 
515,  1316,  1317. 
V.  Boydstun,  68  Cal.  189:   1404. 
Butte  Elec.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mathews,  34 

Mont.  487:   1319,  1324,  1378. 
Butte  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Montana  U. 
R.   R.    Co.,   16   Mont.    504:    528, 
534,  563,  758,  793,  796.  797,  798, 
805. 
V.  Montana  U.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  Mon. 
550*  769   771 
Butterfield  v.'  Poliock,  45  Iowa  257 : 

983,  1380. 
Butterworth  v.  Bartlett,  50  Ind.  537 : 

363,  385,  387,  390,  402. 
Butts  V.  Geary  County,  7  Kan.  App. 

302:  514. 
Byberry  Road,   6  Phila.   384:    1371, 

1381. 
Byer   v.   New   Castle,    124   Ind.    86: 
1517. 
V.  Tanner,  29  111.  135:  1506. 
Byles,  In  re,  25  L.  J.  Ex.  53 :  1098. 
Byrne  v.  Cambria  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  219 
Pa.  St.  277:  1122. 
V.  Chicago  General  R.  R.  Co.,  169 

111.  75:  302. 
V.  Chicago  General  R.  R.  Co.,  63 

111.  App.  438 :  302. 
V.  Drain,  127  Cal.  663 :  697. 
V.  Farmington,  64  Conn.  367:   157. 
V.  Keokuk  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  47  Mo. 

App.  383:  160. 
V.  Minn.  &  St.  Louis  R.  R.  Co.,  38 
Minn.    212:    91,   94,    150,    1454, 
1650,  1653. 
Byrnes  v.  Cohoes,  5  Hun  602:  141. 
V.  Cohoes,  67  N.  Y.  204:  233. 
V.  Riverton,  64  N.  J.  L.  210:  433. 
Byron  v.  Blount,  97  111.  62 :  976,  1043, 
1040. 


Byron  v.  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  22 
Ky.  L.  R.  1007:  1615. 


C. 


Cabbell  v.  Williams,   127   Ala.  320: 

372. 
Cabot  V.   Kingman,   166  Mass.  403: 

335,  443. 
Caceia   v.   Brooklyn  El.  R.   R.   Co., 

98  App.  Div.  294:  829,  856. 
Cadiz  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Roach,  114  Ky. 

934:  833. 
Cadle  V.  Muscatine  Western  R.  R.  Co., 
44  Iowa  11:  251,  316,  1648,  1657. 
Cage  V.  Tragar,  60  Miss.  563:  1086, 

1516. 
Cahill  V.  Baltimore,  93  Md.  233:  154, 
157. 
V.  Norwood  Park,  149  111.  156:  895, 
1092,  1378. 
Cain  V.  Hays,  4  Dana  Ky.  338:  1345. 
V.   Omaha,   42   Neb.    120:    13,   26, 

463,  464. 
V.  South  Bound  R.  R.  Co.,  62  S.  C. 
25:  155. 
Cairo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Brevoort,  62 
Fed.  129:  89,  151,  1478. 
V.  People,  92  111.  97:   475. 
V.  Stevens,  73  Ind.  278:  157. 
V.  Trout,  32  Ark.  17 :  25,  922. 
V.   Turner,   31    Ark.   494:    22,   23, 

524,  1155,  1163,  1169. 
V.  Woodvard,  226  111.  331:   728, 
1042,  1043,  1044. 
Cake  V.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  K.  Co., 

87  Pa.  St;  307:  777. 
Calais  v.  Dyer,  7  Maine  155:  956. 
Calcasien  Lumber  Co.  v.  Harris,  77 

Tex.  18:  1497. 
Calder  v.  Police  Jury,  44  La.  Ann. 

173:  706,  1154,  1155,  1568. 
Caldwell   v.    Carthage,   49    Ohio   St. 
334:  919. 
V.  East  Broad  Top  R.  R.  Co.,  169 

Pa.  St.  99:   168,  844. 
V.  Gale,  11  Mich.  77:  1639. 
V.  Nashua,  122  Iowa  179:  237. 
V.  New  York  ete.  R.  R.  Co.,  Ill 
App.  Div.  164:  257. 
Caledonia  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Colt,  3  Mac- 
queen  833:  1524. 
V.  Lockhart,  3  Macqueen  808 :  1244, 

1450. 
V.  Ogiivy,  2  Maeq.  So.  App.  229: 

645. 
V.  Walker's  Trustees,  L.  R.  7  App. 
Cas.  259 :  372,  645,  646,  662,  671. 
Calhoun  v.  Colfax,  105  La.  416:  877. 

V.  Palmer,  8  Gratt.  88:   1459. 
Calhoun's  Road,  8  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  222: 
721. 


CASES    CITED. 


IXIX 


[The  references   are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.    743-1719.] 


Callendar  v.  Marsh,  1  Pick.  418 :  208, 

211,  212,  213,  229,  1452. 
V.   Painesville   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,    11 

Ohio  St.  516:   1045. 
California  v.  Central  Pac.  R.  R.  Co., 

127  U.  S.  1:  687. 
California  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hooper, 

76  Cal.  404:   964,  980,  984. 
V.  State,  1  Cal.  App.  142:  746. 
California  Nav.  &  Imp.  Co.  v.  Union 

Transp.  Co.,   126  Cal.  433:   873, 

883. 
California    Northern    R.    R.    Co.    v. 

Gould,  21  Cal.  254:  430,  956. 
California  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Arm- 
strong, 46  Cal.  85:  1192,  1347. 
V.  Central  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  47  Cal. 

528:   434,  1102. 
V.  Central  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  47  Cal. 

549:  754. 
V.  Frisbie,  41  Cal.  356:   1366. 
California  Reduction  Co.  v.  Sanitary 

Reduction  Works,  199  U.  S.  306 : 

474. 
California  Southern  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kim- 
ball, 61  Cal.  90:   1071,  1223. 
V.  Southern  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  65 

Cal.  295:   1424. 
V.  Southern  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  67 

Cal.   59:    1346. 
Calking  v.   Baldwin,   4  Wend.    667: 

543,  1523. 
Calkins  v.  Bloomfield  Gas  Lt.  Co.,  1 

N.  y.  Supm.  541:  176,  337. 
V.  Postal  Tel.  Co.,  11  Pa.  Dist.  Ct. 

305:  936,  1560. 
Call  V.  County  Comrs.,  2  Gray  232: 

1711. 

V.  Wilkesboro,  115  N.  C.  337:  675. 

Callaghan  v.  Dunn,  78  Cal.  366:  1673. 

Callahan  v.  Dunn,  78  Cal.  366:  1675. 

Callaman  v.  Port  Huron  &  N.  W.  Ry. 

Co.,  61  Mich.  15:   1353. 
Callen  v.  Columbus  Edison  Elec.  Lt. 

Co.,  66  Ohio  St.  166:  53,  54,  57, 

175,  197,  198,  344,  345,  1593. 
Callison  v.  Hedrick,  15  Gratt.  244: 

1710. 
Gallon  V.  Jacksonville,  147  111.  113: 

912,  914. 
Callowhill  St.,  Matter  of,  32  Pa.  St. 

361:  700. 
Calumet  Riv.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown,  136 

111.  322:  947,  949,  1558,  1566. 
V.  Brown,   37  111.  App.   113:    947, 

949,  1558,  1566. 
V.  Moore,  124  111.  329:  1231,  1236, 

1426. 
Calvert  v.  State,  34  Neb.  616:   765, 

767,  1611. 


Cambria  Street,  75  Pa.  St.  357 :  1029, 

1091,  1092,  1103,  1388. 
Cambridge  v.  Cook  (Iowa)  66  N.  W. 
884:  886. 
v.    County   Comrs.,   6   Allen    134: 

1428. 
V.  County  Comrs.,  117  Mass.  79: 

1366. 
V.  County  Comrs.,  125  Mass.  529: 
605,  615. 
Cambridge  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Charles  Riv. 
St.   R.   R.  Co.,   139   Mass.   454: 
762,  1284. 
Camden  etc.  Land  Co.  v.  Lippincott, 
45  N.  J.  L.  405:  130. 
V.   United   States   Cast   Iron   Pipe 
&  F.  Co.,  68  N.  J.  Eq.  279:  272. 
Camden  Horse  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Citizens' 
Coach  Co.,  28  N.  J.  Eq.  145 :  416, 
^27. 
V.  Citizens'  Coach  Co.,  29  N.  J.  Eq. 

299:  427. 
V.  West  Jersey  Traction  Co.,  58  N. 
J.  L.  102:  300. 
Camden  &  R.  Water  Co.  v.  Ingrham, 

85  Maine  179:  948. 
Cameron  v.  Board  of  Supervisors  of 
Washington   Co.,  47  Miss.   264: 
1570. 
V.  Charing  Cross  Ry.,  16  C.  B.  N. 

S.  430:  645. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  42  Minn. 

75:  444,  1208. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  51  Minn. 

153:   1232. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  6;>  Minn. 

384:  475. 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  38  App. 

Div.  N.  Y.  16:   1664. 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  Misc. 

N.  y.  590 :  1664. 
V.  Pittsburgh  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  157 

Pa.  St.  617:   1208. 
V.    Wasco    County,    27    Ore.    318: 

1034,  1422. 
V.  Wellington  R.  R.  Co.,  28  Grant 
Ch.  327:  841. 
Camp,   Matter   of,    126   N.   Y.    377: 

1254. 
Campau   v.    Charbeneau,    105    Mich. 
422:  1018. 
V.  Detroit,  104  Mich.  560 :  865. 
V.  LeBlanc,  127  Mich.  179:    1511,. 
1512. 
Campbell's  Appeal,  4  Mont.  Co.  L.  R. 

47:    1602. 
Campbell  v.  Cincinnati,  49  Ohio  St. 
463:   914. 
V.  Detroit,  14  Mich.  276 :  696. 
V.    Dwiggins,    83    Ind.   473:    1004, 
1006. 


Ixx 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Campbell  v.  Fogg,  132  Ind.  1 :   1383. 
V.  Indianapolis  &  Vincennes  K.  R. 

Co.,  110  Ind.  490:  858. 
V.  Kansas  City,  102  Mo.  326:  872, 

876,  892,  1499,  1504. 
V.  Metropolitan  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  82 
Ga.  320:  639,  642,  659,  664,  666, 
671,  1294,  1302,  1337,  1338. 
V.  Pennsylvania   S.  V.  R.  R.   Co., 

2  Mont.  Co.  L.  R.  139:  1601. 
V.  Philadelphia,   108  Pa.  St.  300: 

612,  618,  1718. 
V.  Point  Pleasant  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  23 

W.  Va.  448:  1.577,  1615. 
V.  Race,  7  Cush.  408. 
V.    Railroad    Co.,    110    Ind.    490: 

1616. 
V.  Windham,  63  N.  H.  465:  1409. 
Campbell  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Dye,  18  B. 

Mon.  761:   377,  385,  387,  388. 
Canada  So.  Ry.  Co.,  In  re,  20  Am. 

&  Eng.  R.  R.  Cas.  196 :  1479. 
Canada  Southern  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Nor- 
vall,  41  U.   C.  Q.  B.   195:    1427. 
Canadian  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Western 
Union   Tel.   Co.,   17   Can.   S.   C. 
151:  412,  832. 
Canal  Appraisers   v.   Kempshall,   26 
Wend.  404:  105. 
V.  People,  17  Wend.  603 :  95. 
Canal  Bank  v.  Albany,  9  Wend.  244: 

1341,    1385. 
Canal  &  Charles  Sts.,  18  R.  I.  129: 

917. 
Canal  &  C.  Nav.  Co.  v.  Comrs.,  26 

La.  Ann.  740 :  1547. 
Canal  Comrs.  v.  Kempshall,  26  Wend. 
404 :  98,  99. 
V.  People,  5  Wend.  423:   105,  106, 

108,  117,  1533. 
V.  People,  13  Wend.  355:  105,  106, 
117. 
Canal  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Crescent  City 
R.  R.  Co.,  44  La.  Ann.  485 :  427, 
762,  763,  764,  1283. 
V.  Orleans  R.  R.  Co.,  44  La.  Ann. 

54:   426,  427,  762,  763,  1283. 
V.   St.   Charles   St.   R.   R.  Co.,   44 
La.   Ann.    1069:    427,   762,   763, 
1283. 
Canal  &  C.  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Crescent 
City  R.  R.  Co.,  41  La.  Ann.  561 : 
426,  427,  761,  762,  763. 
Canal  Place,  Matter  of,  64  App.  Div. 

605:  804. 
Canal   Street,   Matter   of,   11   Wend. 

154:   1670. 
Canal    Trustees   v.   Chicago,    12    111. 

406:   12. 
Canal  &  Walker  Sts.,  Matter  of,  12 
N.  Y.  406  :  1397. 


Canandaigua  v.  Benedict,  8  App.  Div. 

475:  1465. 
V.    Benedict,    13    App.    Div.    600: 

1404. 
V.   Benedict,   24   N.   Y.  App.   Div. 

348:  710,  780. 
Canandaigua  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Payne, 

16  Barb.  273 :  1244. 
Canastota   Knife    Co.    v.   Newington 

Tramway  Co.,  69  Conn.  146:  272, 

281,  282,  295,  316. 
Canaway  v.  Archerman,  94  Ind.  187: 

973 
Candia  v.  Chandler,  58  N.  H.   127: 

1029. 
Candler  v.   Asheville   Elee.   Co.,   135 

N.  C.  12:  1546,  1653. 
Cane  Belt  R.  R.   Co.  v.  Hughes,  31 

Tex.   Civ.   App.   565:    824,   1065, 

1068,  1228,  1230. 
V.  Ridgeway,  38  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

108:  153,  316,  846,  847,  1639, 

1658. 
Canepa  v.  Birmingham,  92  Ala.  358: 

468. 
Canman  v.  St.  Louis,  97  Mo.  92:  648. 
Canniif  v.  San  Francisco,  67  Cal.  45 : 

1454. 
Cannon  v.  St.  Joseph,  67  Mo.  App. 

367:   149,  155. 
Canton  v.  Canton  Cotton  Warehouse 

Co.,  84  Miss.  268 :  299,  309,  321, 

1472,  1473. 
V.  Shock,  66  Ohio  St.  19:  73. 
Canton  County  v.  Baltimore  etc.  R. 

R.  Co.,  99  Md.  202:    1503,  1504. 
V.  Baltimore,  104  Md.  582:   865. 
V.  Baltimore,  106  Md.  69 :  367,  878, 

879,  880,  884,  886,  1630. 
Canton  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  French,  68 

Miss.  22 :  1456,  1634. 
V.  Paine   (Miss.)    19  So.  199:   149, 

152,  1454. 
Cantwell  v.  Knoxville  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

90  Tenn.  638 :  96. 
Canty  v.   Latterner,   31   Minn.   239: 

942. 
Canyon  Co.  v.  Toole,  8  Idaho  501: 

976. 
V.  Toole,  9  Idaho  561:  996. 
Canyonville  etc.  Road  Co.  v.  Douglass 

Co.,  5  Ore.  280:   983,  1403. 
Cape  Elizabeth  v.  County  Comrs.,  64 

Maine  456:  788. 
Cape   Girardeau  v.  Houck,   129  Mo. 

607:    498,  675,  914,   1044. 
Cape    Girardeau   etc.    R.    R.    Co.   v. 

Wingerter,    124   Mo.   App.   426: 

834,  852,  859. 
Cape  Girardeau  etc.  Road  Co.  v.  Den- 
nis, 67  Mo.  438:  730,  1385. 


CASES    CITED. 


Ixxi 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   7?3-1719.] 


Cape  Girardeau  etc.  Road  Co.  v.  Ken- 

fre,  58  Mo.  265:  304,  422,  858. 
Capers  v.  Augusta  G.  4  S.  E.  R.  Co., 

76Ga.  90:  1634. 
Capps  V.  Texas  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  21  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  84:  859,  1633. 
Carbon  Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v.  Drake, 

26  Kan.  345:   1155,  1571. 
Caretta  Ry.  Co.  v.  Virginia-Poeahoii- 

tas   Coal   Co.,   62   W.  Va.    185: 

527,  528,  591,  1051,  1070. 
Carey  v.  Dewey,  127  App.  Div.  478: 

495,  1634. 
Carl  V.  Sheboygan  &  Fond  du  Lac  R. 

R.  Co.,  46  Wis.  625:  243,  247, 

1137,  1298,  1552,  1651,  1658. 
Carleton  St.  Widening,  16  Hun  497: 

914,  1026. 
Carley   v.    Sylvester,    49    Wis.    429: 

1635. 
Carli  V.  Stillwater  &  St.  Paul  R.  R. 

Co.,    16    Minn.    260:    966,    1186, 

1225. 
V.   Stillwater  Street  R.  &  T.   Co., 

28  Minn.  373:  127,  128,  129,  131, 

338. 
V.     Union    Depot,    Street    Ry.    & 

Transfer  Co.,  32  Minn.  101 :  1298. 
Carlile  v.  Des  Moines  etc.  E.  R.  Co., 

99  Iowa  345 :  1510. 
Carlisle  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Philadelphia 

etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  199  Pa.  St.  532: 

771. 
Carll  V.  Northport,  11  App.  Div.  120: 

231,  234. 
Carlson  v.  County  Comrs.,  38  Wash. 

616:  1354. 
V.  Duluth   Short  Line  R.   R.   Co., 

38  Minn.  305 :  863. 
v.  St.  Louis  etc.  Co.,  73  Minn.  128: 

80,  1604. 
Carlton  v.  State,  8  Blaekf .  208 :  1362. 
Carlton  St.  Widening,  16  Hun  497: 

914,  1026. 
Carlton  St.  Widening,  78  N.  Y.  362: 

914. 
Carman  v.  Indiana  R.  R.  Co.,  4  Ohio 

St.  399 :  435,  436. 
V.  St.  Louis,  97  Mo.  92:  665. 
V.  Steubenville  &  Indiana  R.  R.  Co., 

4  Ohio  St.  399:  1455. 
Carmel  v.  Shaw,  155  111.  37 :  378. 
V.  Shaw,  52  111.  App.  429 :  378. 
Carmody  v.  Chicago  &  Alton  R.  R. 

Co.,  Ill  111.  69:  815. 
Camochan  v.  Norwich  &  Spalding  Ry. 

Co.,  26  Beav.  169:  1537,  1578. 
Caro  V.  Manhattan  El.  Ry.   Co.,  46 

N.  Y.  Supr.  Ct.  138:  53,451. 
Carolina   Cent.  Ry.   Co.  v.   Love,  81 

N.  C.  434:  1058,  1061. 


Carolina  Cent.  Ry.  Co.  v.  MeCaskill, 
94  N.  C.  746:   1475,   1503,  1523, 
1707,   1708. 
V.  Wilmington  St.  R.  Co.,  120  N. 
C.  520:  331. 
Carolina  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Pennearden 
L.  &  M.  Co.,  132  N.  C.  644 :  709, 
1005. 
Carondelet  Canal  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  New 

Orleans,  38  La.  Ann.  308 :  239. 
Carothers    v.    Philadelphia    Co.,    118 

Pa.  St.  468:  704. 
Carpenter,  In  re,  11  Miacl.  690:  1427. 
Carpenter's  Petition,  67  N.  H.  574: 

1075. 
Carpenter   v.    Board   of    Comrs.,    56 
Minn.  513:   100,  105,  110. 
V.   Capital  Elec.  Co.,   178  111.  29: 

344,  1593. 
V.   County   Comrs.,   21   Pick.    258: 

1040,  1080,  1638. 
V.  Easton  &  Amboy  R.  R.  Co.,  24 
N.  J.  Eq.  249:   1246,  1248,  1602. 
V.  Easton  &.  Amboy  R.  R.  Co.,  24 

N.  J.  Eq.  408:   1246,  1602. 
V.  Easton  &  Amboy  R.  R.  Co.,  26 
N.  J.  Eq.  168:  1246,  1248,  1602. 
V.  Gold,  88  Va.  551:  69,  76. 
V.  Grisham,  59  Missouri  247:  1571, 

1573. 
V.  Highway  Comrs.,  64  Mich.  476: 

1416. 
V.  Jennings,  77  111.  250:  1194. 
V.  LandafF,  42  N.  H.  218:  1187. 
V.   New   York,   44   App.   Div.   230: 

1565. 
V.  New  York,   51  App.   Div.   584: 

1565. 
V.  New  York,  27  Misc.  272:   1565. 
V.  Oswego  &  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  24  N,  Y. 

655:  247,315,  1630. 
V.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  195  Pa. 

St.  160:  394. 
V.  Sims,  3  Leigh.  674:   989,  1075. 
V.  Spencer,  2  Gray  407:  1116. 
Carpenter  St.,  3  Walker's  Pa.  Supm. 

Ct.  286:    1011,  1327. 
Carr  V.  Berkley,  145  Mass.  539:  1371. 
V.  Boone,  108  Ind.  241:   1028,  1031, 

1675. 
V.  Payette  Co.,  37  Iowa  608:  1032. 
V.  Northern  Liberties,   35   Pa.   St. 

324:   142. 
V.   State,    103   Ind.   548:    941,   978, 
1010,  1033. 
Carraher  v.  Revere,  182  Mass.  427: 

1314. 
Carrico  v.  Colvin,  92  Ky.  342:    1159, 

1161,  1460. 
Carriger   v.   R.   R.   Co.,   7   Lea   388: 
158,  1455. 


Ixxii 


CASES    CITED, 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :  Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.  11,   pp.   748-1710.] 


Carxis  v.  Commissioners  of  Waterloo, 

2  Hill  443:  820. 
Carroll  v.  Asbury,  28  Pa.  Supr.  Ct. 
354:  183,  394,  404,  405,  1596. 
V.  Atlanta,  74  Ga.  386 :  81. 
V.  Campbell,  108  Mo.  550:  414. 
V.  Campbell,  110  Mo.  557:  411. 
V.    Griffith,    117    Tenn.    500:    710, 

1154. 
V.  Marshall,  99  Mo.  App.  464 :  1308. 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  App. 

Div.  278:    1426. 
V.  Rye  Tp.,  13  N.  D.  458:  153. 
V.   Wisconsin   Central   R.   R.    Co., 
40  Minn.  168:   444. 
Carron  v.  Great  Western  R.  R.  Co., 
14  U.  C.  Q.  B.  192:   159. 
V.  Western  R.  R.  Co.,  8  Gray  423 : 
456. 
Carson  v.  Blazer,  2  Binn.  475:   104. 
V.  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  35  Cal.  325: 

246,  250,  268,  307. 
V.  Coleman,  11  N.  J.  Eq.  106:  1155, 

1187. 
V.   Hartford,   48   Conn.   68:    1673, 

1685. 
V.   Springfield,  53  Mo.  App.   289: 
155,  630,  653,  1306,  1309,  1650, 
1656. 
V.  Western  R.  R.  Co.,  8  Gray  423: 
1472. 
Carter   v.    Barkley,    137    Iowa    510: 
886. 
V.  Chicago.  57  111.  283 :  197,  357. 
V.  Moulton,  58  N.  H.  64:  818. 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  134  N. 

Y.  168:    1124. 
Y.  Ridge  Turnpike  Co.,  208  Pa.  St. 

515:    866,   1626,   1713,   1714. 
V.  Ridge  Turnpike  Co.,  22  Pa.  Supr. 
Ct.  162:  866. 
Cartersville    v.    Lyon,    69    Ga.    577: 

1506,  1664. 
Carthage  v.  Central  N.  Y.  Tel.  &  Tel. 
Co.,  110  App.  Dlv.  625:  361,  489. 
V.  Central  N.  Y.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co., 

185  X.  Y.  448:  361,  489. 
V.  Frederick,  122  N.  Y.  268 :  492. 
V.  Garner,  209  Mo.  688:   361. 
Cartwright  t.  Liberty  Telephone  Co., 

205  Mo.  126:   348,  350. 
Carvalho  v.   Brooklyn  etc.  Turnpike 
Co.,  56  App.  Div.  522:   133. 
V.  Brooklvn  etc.  Turnpike  Co.,  173 
N.  Y.  586:  133. 
Carville  v.  Commonwealth,  189  Mass. 
273:   1409. 
T.  Commonwealth,   192  ilass.  570: 
1157,  1164,  1707. 
Carv    V.    Daniels,    8    Met.    466 :    554, 
556. 


Cary  Library  v.  Bliss,  151  Mass.  364: 

494,  496,  676,  792. 
Cascades  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Sohns,  1  Wash. 

Ter.  N.  S.  558 :  698. 
Case   V.   Cayuga    County,   34   N.   Y. 
Supp.  595 :  254. 
V.  Meyers,  6  Dana  330:  1017. 
V.   Pennsylvania  Co.,   159   Pa.   6t. 

273:   635. 
V.  Thompson,  6  Wend.  634:   1164, 
1167. 
^Casey  v.  Kilgore,  14  Kan.  478:  933, 

981,  982. 
Cash    V.    Kruschke,    134    Wis.    130 
975,  1671,  1674. 
V.  Union  Depot  etc.  Co.,  32  Minn. 

101:   253. 
V.  Whitworth,    13  La.   Ann.   401 
440. 
Caskey  v.  Greensburg,  78  Ind.  233 

1576. 
Cason   V.    Harrison,    135    Ind.    330 

1410,  1510,  1512. 
Cass  V.  Dicks,  14  Wash.  75:  148,  151 
V.  Pennsylvania   Co.,   159   Pa.   St. 
273:   226,  641,  1649,  1656,  1660, 
1718. 
Cass  Farm  Co.  v.  Detroit,  124  Mich. 
433:   11,  464. 
V.  Detroit,  181  U.  S.  396:   11,  464. 
Cassidy  v.  Kennebec  &  Portland  R. 
R.  Co.,  45  Maine  263 :  1078. 
V.  Old  Colony  R.  R.  Co.,  141  Mass. 

174:  157,  1457,  1473. 
V.   Smith,  13  Minn.   129:    1517. 
V.  Sullivan,  75  Neb.  847:  890. 
Castle  V.  Bell  Telephone  Co.,  49  App. 
Div.  437 :  343. 
V.  Berkshire,  11  Gray  26:  371,  379, 
391. 
Castlebury  v.  Atlanta,  74  Ga.  164: 

348,  629. 
Castle  Rock  Irr.  &  W.  P.  Co.  v.  Jxt- 

risch,  67  Neb.  377:  921,  1624. 
Catawba  Toll  Bridge  Co.  v.  Flowers, 

HON.  C.  381:  414. 
Catawissa    R.    R.    Co.'s    Appeal,    2 
Walker's  Pa.  Supm.  Ct.  175:  771, 
772. 
Catharine  Tp.  Road,  76  Pa.  St.  189: 

1077. 
Cater  v.   North  Western  Tel.  Exeh. 

Co.,  60  Minn.  539:  333,  341. 
Gates  V.  Waddington,  1  McCord  580: 

104. 
Cathedral    of    the    Holy    Trinity    v. 
West   Ont.   Pac.   R.    R.    Co.,   14 
Ont.   246:    823. 
Cathedral  Parkway  Opening,  Matter 
of,  20  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  404:  1391. 


CASES    CITED. 


Ixxiii 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Cator  V.  Board  of  Works  etc.,  34  L. 

J.  Q.  B.  74:  1524. 
Cauble  v.  Hultz,  118  Ind.  13:  1573. 
Cauldwell   v.    Curry,    93    Ind.    363: 

1510. 
Cavanagh   v.   Bayonne,   63   N.  J.   L. 

176:   1374.  1415. 
Cavanaugh  v.  Boston,  139  Mass.  426: 

485. 
Cave's  Executor  v.  Colmes,  3  A.  K. 

Marsh.  36:   1673,  1675. 
Cedar  Co.  v.  Iiamniers,  73  Neb.  744: 

941. 
Cedar  Lake  Hotel  Co.  v.  Cedar  Lake 
Hydraulic  Co.,  79  Wis.  297 :  125, 
128,  137,  1607. 
Cedar   Rapids,   In   re,   85   Iowa  39: 

698,  1056,  1072,  1167,  1168. 
Cedar  Rapids  v.  Marion  City  Ry.  Co., 
125  Iowa  430:  280. 
V.  Young,  119  Iowa  552:  865. 
Cedar  Rapids  Canning  Co.  v.  Burling- 
ton etc.  Ry.  Co.,  120  Iowa  724: 
1480. 
Cedar  Rapids  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Chica- 
go   etc.   Ry.    Co.,    60   Iowa    35: 
1403. 
V.  Raymond,  37  Minn.  204:   1315, 

1331,  1477,  1483. 
V.  Ryan,  37  Minn.  38:   1132,  1186, 

1208. 
V.  Whelan,  64  Iowa  694:   1412. 
Cedar   Rapids   Water   Co.   v.   Cedar 

Rapids,  118  Iowa  234:  481. 
Cella  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  217 

111.  326:   1409. 
Cemetery  Assn.  v.  Meninger,  14  Kan. 
312:  512,  513,  865,  880,  881,  884, 
885,  886,  890. 
Central  Branch  U,  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Andrews,     26    Kan.    702:     251, 
1227,  1229,  1551,  1662. 
V.    Andrews,    30    Kan.    590:    251, 

1295. 
V.  Andrews,  34  Kan.   565:    251. 
V.    Andrews,    37    Kan.    162:    251, 

1119,  1127,  1133,  1134. 
V.  Andrews,  37  Kan.  641:   251. 
V.    Andrews,    41    Kan.    370:    251, 

311,  1294. 
v.  Atchison  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  26  Kan. 

669:   731. 
V.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  28 

Kan.  453:  673,  922,  1463,  1465. 
V.  Twine,  23  Kan.  585:  249,  251. 
Central  Bridge  Corporation  v.  Lowell, 

4  Gray  474:  781,  788,  790,  791. 
Central  Bridge  Co.  v.  Lowell,  15  Gray 
106:   1261. 


Central  City  Horse  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Fort 

Clark  Horse  R.  R.  Co.,  81   111. 

523:   755,  763,  1624. 
Central  Crosstown  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Met- 
ropolitan St.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  App. 

Div.  N.  Y.  229:  331,  1621. 
Central  Crosstown  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Met- 
ropolitan St.  Ry.  Co.,   17  Misc. 

716:  1621. 
Central  Land  Co.  v.  Providence,   15 

R.  1.  246:   879,  986,  1267. 
Centralia   v.   Wright,    156    111.    561: 

1545,  1547. 
v.   Wright,    58    lU.   App.    51:    91, 

93,  1652,  1653. 
Centralia   etc.   R.   R.   Co.   v.   Brake, 

125  111.  393:   1314,  1318. 
V.  Brake,  31  111.  App.  459:   1535. 
v.  Henry,  31  111.  App.  456:    1535. 
V.  Rixman,  121  111.  214:  1318. 
Central  Mills  Co.  v.  New  York  &  iNew 

England   R.   R.   Co.,    127   Mass. 

537:   831. 
Central  New  York  Tel.  Co.,  Matter 

of,  36  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  553:  1386. 
Central  of  Ga.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Alabama 

etc.    R.   R.    Co.,    130   Ala.   559: 

1428. 
V.  Union  Springs  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  144 

Ala.  639:  726,  1047. 
V.  Windham,  126  Ala.  552:   156. 
V.  Wright,   207   U.   S.    127:    1005, 

1007. 
Central  Ohio  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Holler,  7 

Ohio  St.  220:  1343. 
Central  Pass.  Ry  Co.  v.  Philadelphia 

etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  95  Md.  428:  328, 

329,  769,   1282,   1611. 
Central  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Feldman,  152 

Cal.   303:    524,   714,   917,    1060, 

1063,  1119,  1132,  1231. 
V.  Pearson,  35  Cal.  247:  1097,  1119, 

1120,  1145,  1240,  1271,  1277. 
Central  Park   Comrs.  Matter  of,  51 

Barb.  277:  1023,  1377. 
Central  Park  Comrs.,  Matter  of,  61 

Barb.  40:   1388. 
Central  Park  Comrs.,  Matter  of,  63 

Barb.  282:   539,  773. 
Central  Park  Comrs.,  Matter  of,  54 

How.  Pr.   313:    1327. 
Central  Park  Comrs.,  Matter  of,  4 

Lans.  467:  1388. 
Central  Park  Comrs.,  Matter  of,  50 

N.  Y.  493:    1397. 
Central  Park  Extension,  Matter  of, 

16  Abb.  Pr.  56:  943. 
Central    Pa.    Tel.    &    Supply    Co.    v. 

Wilkes-Barre  etc.  R.  R.   Co.,  11 

Pa.  Co.  Ct.  417:  272,  418,  1615. 
Central  R.  R.  Co.'s  Appeal,  102  Pa. 

St.  38:   1017,  1031,  1034. 


Ixxiv 


CASES    CITED. 


[Tlie  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,  pp.  1-742;   Vol.  11,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Central  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Bayonne,  51  N, 
J.  L.  428:   1292. 
V.  Bayonne,  52  N.  J.  L.  503:  883, 
V.  English,  73  Ga.  366:  453. 
V.  Hatfield,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  323:  247, 
V.  Hatfield,  29  N.  J.  L.  206:   22, 

1634. 

V.  Hatfield,  29  N.  J.  L.  571 :  1634. 
V.  Hudson  Terminal  Co.,  46  N.  J. 

L.  289:  708,  1064. 
V.  Merkel,  32  Tex.  723 :  936. 
V.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  59  Fed. 

192:  96. 
V.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  31  N. 
J.  Eq.  475:   683,  726,  748,  1047. 
V.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  33  N.  J.  Eq. 
127:  777. 
Central  Trust  Co.  v.  Bridges,  57  Fed. 
753:   1540,  1541,  1542. 
V.  Valley  R.  R.  Co.,  79  Fed.  195: 
1541. 
Central     Turnpike     Corporation,     7 

Pick.   13:    1010. 
Central  Union  Telephone  Co.'  v.  Co- 
lumbus   Grove,    8    Ohio    C.    C. 
(N.  S.)  81:  685,  709. 
Central  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  State,  118 
Ind.  194:   481. 
v.  tSate,  123  Ind.  113 :  481. 
Central  Vt.  R.   R.  Co.  v.  Royalton, 
58  Vt.  234:   752. 
V.   Woodstock   R.   R.   Co.,   50   Vt. 
452:    1610. 
Centreville  &  Abington  Turnpike  Co. 

V.  Jarrett,  4  Ind.  213:   1086. 
Cereghino   v.   Oregon   Short-Line  R. 
R.  Co.,  26  Utah  467:    197,   199, 
317. 
Cerf  V.  Pfleging,  94  Cal.  131:  879. 
Certain  Land  in  Lawrence,  In  re,  119 

Fed.  453:  784. 
C.  6.  Lamed  etc.  Co.  v.  Omaha  etc. 
R.   R.   Co.,   56  Kan.   174:    1360. 
C.  &  6.  R.  R.  Co.  v;  Stephenson,  8 

Ore.  263 :  782. 
Chaee  v.   Fall   River,   2  Allen   533: 

1366. 
Chadbourne  v.  Zilsdorf,  34  Minn.  43: 

1569,  1572. 
Chad's  Ford,  5  Binney  481:  1419. 
Chaffee's  Appeal,  56  Mich.  244:  680, 

706. 

Chaffee  v.  Aiken,  57  S.  C.  507 :   1492. 

Chagrin    Falls    &    Cleveland    Plank 

Road   Co.   V.    Cane,    2   Ohio   St. 

419:  422. 

Chalcraft  v.  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

113  111.  86:   1483,  1484,  1647. 
Challis  \.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  R. 
Co.,   16  Kan.   117:   21,   503,  675, 
80G,  1519. 


Chamberlain  v.  Elizabethport  Steam 
Cordage   Co.,  41  N.  J.  Eq.  43: 
243,  247,  298,  680. 
V.  Iowa  Tel.  Co.,   119  Iowa  619: 

342,  358,  362. 
V.  Missouri  Elec.  Lt.  &  P.  Co.,  158 

Mo.  1:  454. 
V.   Morgan,   68   Pa.   St.    168:    538, 

1167. 
V.  Northeastern  R.  R.  Co.,  41  S.  C. 
399 :  1497,  1500. 
'  V.  West   End   of  London  etc.  Ry. 
Co.,  2  Best  &  Smith  605:  645. 
V.  West  End  of  London  etc.  Ry.  Co., 
2  Best  &  Smith  617:  645. 
Chambers  v.  Carteret,  54  N.  J.  L.  85 : 
1419. 
V.  Cincinnati  &  Ga.  R.  E.  Co.,  69 

Ga.  320:   1159,  1570. 

V.   Cleveland  ete.   Traction  Co.,   5 

Ohio  C.  C.  (N.  S.)  298:  281,  285, 

1589. 

V.  Farry,  1  Yates  167:   423,  1491. 

V.  Great  Northern  Power  Co.,  100 

Minn.  214:    808,  1499,   1504. 
V.  Lewis,  9  Iowa  583 :  1414. 
V.  Saterlee,  40  Cal.  497:  13. 
V.  South  Chester,  140  Pa.  St.  510: 

1306,  1307,  1308,  1337. 
V.  Talladega  Real  Est.  &  L.  Assn., 
126  Ala.  296:  365,  877. 
Chambersburg  etc.  Turnpike  Road,  20 
Pa.   Supr.  Ct.   173:    1177,   1264, 
1266. 
Chamley  v.  Shewano  W.  P.  ete.  Co., 

109  Wis.  563:   1074. 
Champaign  v.  Forrester,  29  111.  App. 

117:   142,  453. 
Champion  v.  County  Comrs.,  1  Nev. 
478:  1159,  1570,  1574. 
V.    County    Comrs.,    2    Nev.    271: 

1159,  1570,  1579. 
V.  Crandon,  84  Wis.  405:   148. 
Champlain  v.  McCrea,  33  App.  Div. 
N.  Y.  259:  918. 
V.  McCrea,  165  N.  Y.  264:  695,  988. 
Champlin   v.    Morgan,    18    111.    293: 
1572. 
V.  New  York,  3  Paige  573:  1571. 
Chandler  v.  Austin,  4  Ariz.  347:  70. 
V.  Beale,  132  Ind.  596:  1442. 
V.  Heisler,  153  Mich.  1:  1514,  1569, 

1571. 
V.  Jamiea     Pond     Aqueduct     Co., 
114     Mass.     575:     1003,     1707, 
1708,   1709,  1712. 
V.  Jamiea  Pond  Aqueduct  Co.,  122 

Mass.  305:    1138,   1140,  1143. 
V.  Jamaica  Pond  Aqueduct  Co.,  125 
Mass.     544:     1130,     1132,     12U6, 
1319,  1320. 


CASES    CITED. 


Ixxv 


[The  references   are  to  the   pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Chandler  >•.  Morey,  195  111.  596:  965, 
1561,  1673. 
V.  Morey,  96  111.  App.  278:    1561. 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  34  App. 

Div.  N.  Y.  305 :  1664. 
V.  Reading,  129  Mo.  App.  63:  521, 
708. 
Change  of  Grade,  In  re,  2  Pa.  Dist. 

Ct.  179:  1718. 
Chapel  V.  Smith,  80  Mich.  100:   146. 
Chapin,  In  re,  32  N.  Y.  Supp.  361: 

1376. 
Chapin  v.  Boston  &  Providence  R.  K. 
Co.,  6  Cush.  442:    1147,  1150. 
V.  Brown,  15  R.  I.  579:  880. 
V.   Sullivan   R.   R.   Co.,   39   N.   H. 
564:    1480. 
Chaplin  v.  Highway  Comra.,  129  111. 
651:  893,  895,  1056,  1158,  1173, 
1516,  1571. 
V.   Highway   Comrs.,   27   111.   App. 
643:   1571. 
Chapman   v.   Albany  &   Schenectady 
R.   R.    Co.    10   Barb.    360:    243, 
244. 
v.  Clark,  49  Mich.  305 :   1093. 
V.  Gates,  54  N.  Y.  132:  1164,  1168, 

1171. 
V.  Gates,  63  N.  Y.  136:   1168. 
V.    Graves,    8    Blackf.    308:    1374, 

1377. 
V.  Kimball,  9  Conn.  38 :   103. 
V.   Monmouthshire   Ry.   &   C.    Co., 

2  H.  &  N.  267:  1529. 
V.  Monmouthshire  Ry.  &  Canal  Co., 

27  L.  J.  N.  S.  Ex.  97:  1529. 
v.Oshkosh  &  Miss.   R.   R.   Co.,   33 

Wis.  629:  107,  247. 
V.  Rochester,   110  N.  Y.  273:    86, 

1605,  1617. 
V.  Sault  Ste.  Marie,  146  Mich.  23: 

890. 
V.  Swan,  65  Barb.  210:  1100,  1102, 
1518. 
Chappell  V.  Edmondson  Ave^,  83  Md. 
512:   1395. 
V.   New  York   etc.   R.   R.    Co.,   62 

Conn.  195:  855. 
V.  United  States,  81  Fed.  764 :  932, 
Charles  v.  Monson  &  Brimfield  Mfg. 

Co.,  17  Pick.  70:  960. 
Charles  River  Branch  R.   R.   Co.   v. 
County    Comrs.,    7     Gray     389: 
1710. 
Charles     River     Bridge     v.     Warren 

Bridge,  11  Pet.  420:  409. 
Charles    River    Bridge    Co.    v.    War- 
ren Bridge,  6  Pick.  376:  1608. 
Charles     River     Bridge     v.     Warren 
Bridge,  7  Pick.  344:  409. 


Charless  v.  Rankin,  22  Mo.  566:  440. 
Charles  Street  Avenue  Co.  v.  Merry- 
man,  10  Md.  536:  712. 
Charleston  v.  Newman,  130  111.  App. 
6:   630,  1137,  1306. 
V.  Werner,  38  S.  C.  488 :  15,  484. 
V.  Werner,  46  S.  C.  323 :  484. 
Charleston  etc.   Bridge   Co.   v.   Com- 
stock,  36  W.  Va.  263:    701,  955, 
991,  1115,  1213. 
Charleston   etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.   Blake, 
12  Rich.  S.  C.  634:   809,  1112. 
V.  Fleming,  118  Ga.  699:   1483. 
V.  Fleming,  119  Ga.  995:  521,  522. 
V.  Garlington,  74  S.  C.  161:   1625. 
V.  Hughes,  105  Ga.  1:  966. 
V.  Leech,  39  S.  C.  446:  830. 
V.   Reynolds,    69    S.    C.   481:    830, 
1226,  1227,  1320,  1715. 
Charleston  Road,  2  Grant's  Cas.  467 : 

1089. 
Charlestown  v.  County  Comrs.,  3  Met. 

202:  112,  788. 
Charlestown    Branch    R.    R.    Co.    v. 
County  Comrs.,  7  Met.  78:  1712. 
Charlestown  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hughes, 

105  Ga.   1:   1347. 
Charlestown  Tp.  Road,  2  Phila.  126: 

1089. 
Charlotte  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Gibbs,  27 
S.  C.  385:  475. 
V.  Gibbs,  142  U.  S.  386:   475. 
Charlotte  Street,  23  Pa.  St.  286 :  982. 
Charlottesville  v.  Maury,  96  Va.  383: 
709,  813. 
v.  Southern  Ry.   Co.  97  Va.  428: 
361,  487,  781,   1643,   1644,   1645. 
Charlton  v.  Allegheny  City,  1  Grant's 

Cases  208:   145. 
Charnley  v.  Sawano  W.  P.  &  C.  Co., 

109  Wis.  563 :  866. 
Charnock  v.  Levee  Co.,  38  La.  Ann. 

323:   12. 
Chartier's    Township    Road,    34    Pa. 

St.  276:   1083. 
Chartier's    Township    Road,    48    Pa. 

St.  314:  400,  985,  1371. 
Chase   v.   Cochran,    102   Maine   431 : 
787. 
V.  Hatheway,  14  Mass.  222:    1007, 

1014. 
V.  Lowell,  149  Mass.  85 :  349. 
V.  New  York  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  24 

Barb.  273:  155. 
V.  Oskosh,  81  Wis.  313:  348,  1488. 
V.  Portland,  86  Maine  367:  604, 
618,  619,  1185,  1215,  1308,  1337. 
V.  Rutland,  47  Vt.  393 :  1082. 
V.  School  District,  8  Utah  231: 
1348. 


Ixxvi 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:  Vol.   I,  pp.  1-742;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Chase  v.  Sioux  City,  86  lawa  603: 
619. 
V.  Sullivan  E.  R.  Co.,  20  N.  H.  195 : 

1404. 
V.    Sutton    Manufacturing    Co.,    4 

Cush.  152:  424,  1497. 
V.  Worcester,  108  Mass.  60:   1134, 
1185. 
Chase  Co.  Comrs.  v.  Carter,  24  Kan. 
511:   1404. 
V.  Carter,  30  Kan.  581:    1024. 
Chaster  v.  PhiladelpMa  etc.  E.  E.  Co., 
3   Walker    (Pa.   Supreme)    368: 
1291. 
Chasemore  v.  Richards,  7  H.  L.  Cas. 

349:  161. 
Chatham  St.,  16  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  103: 

643. 
Chatham  St.,  In  re,  191  Pa.  St.  604: 

630,  634,  636,  653. 
Chattanooga  v.  Geiler,   13  Lea  611: 
613,  616,  1180,  1308. 
V.  Terminal  R.  E.  Co.,  67  Fed.  Rep. 
273:   1165. 

Chattanooga  etc.  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Brown, 
84  Ga.  256:   831,  952,  1259. 

V.  Davis  89  Ga.  708 :  833. 

V.  East  Rome  Tovra  Co.,  89  Ga. 
732:  1545. 

V.  Felton,  69  Fed.  273:  754. 

V.  Jones,  80  Ga.  264:  1615. 

V.  Philpot,  112  Ga.  153:   521. 

Chattanooga  Terminal  R.  E.  Co.  v. 
Felton,  69  Fed.  273 :  768. 

Chatterton  v.  Parrott,  46  Mich.  432 : 

1519. 
Cheaney  v.  Hooser,  9  B.  Mon.  330: 

26,  465. 
Cheesbrough,  Matter  of,  17  Hun  561 : 

1155. 
Cheesbrough's  Petition,  78  N.  Y.  232 : 

15. 
Cheever   v.    Shedd,    13   Blateh.    258: 

229,  1452. 
Chelalis  Co.  v.  Ellington,  21   Wash. 

638:   942. 
Chelan    Co.    v.    Navarre,    38    Wash. 

684:    690,   696,   979. 
Chelsea  Dye-House  and  Laundry  Co. 

v.     Commonwealth,     164     Mass. 

350:  335. 
Cheltenham  Road,  3  Mont.  Co.  L.  R. 

37:  1360,  1364. 
Chenango  Bridge  Co.  v.  Paige,  83  N. 

Y.  178 :  98,  99. 
Cheney  v.   Boston  Consolidated   Gas 

Co.,    198   Mass.    356:    191,    334, 

337,  358. 


Cherokee  v.  S.  C.  &  I.  F.  Town  Lot 

&  Land  Co.,  52  Iowa  279:   675, 

1128,  1139,  1436,  1437. 
Cherokee  etc.  R.  R.   Co.  v.  Kenken, 

77  Iowa  316:   859. 
Cherokee  Nation  v.  South  Kansas  R. 

R.  Co.,  33  Fed.  900:   2,  9,  524, 

747. 
V.  Southern  Kansas  R.  R.  Co.,  135 

U.  S.  641:  747,  1165,  1170,  1460. 
pherry  v.  Board  of  Comrs.,  52  N.  J. 

L.    544:    700,    738,    1154,    1157, 

1158. 
V.  Board  of  Comrs.,   51   N.  J.  L. 

417:  700,  1154,  1157,  1158. 
V.  Lake  Drummond  C.  &  W.  Co., 

140  N.  C.  422:   439,   1546,   1649, 

1659,  1716. 
V.  Lane  County,  25  Ore.  487:  722, 

1160,  1167,  1523. 
V.    Matthews,    25    Ore.    484:    722, 

1602. 
V.  Rock  Hill,  48  S.  C.  553:  384,  389, 

399,  1666. 
V.  Williams,  147  N.  C.  452:  454. 
Cherry  St.,  1  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  41:   1088. 
Cherry  tree  Tp.  Road,  10  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

389:  1017,  1384. 
Chesapeake    &    Ohio    Canal    Co.    v. 

Baltimore  &  Ohio  R.  E.  Co.,  4 

G.  &  J.  1:  900. 
V.    Binney,   4    Cranch,    C.    C.    68: 

1083,  1360. 
V.  Grove,  11  G.  &  J.  398:  1445. 
V.  Hoye,  2  Gratt.  511:   1369. 
V.  Key.  3  Cranch,  C.  C.  599:  522, 

711,  1078,  1175,  1194. 
V.  Mason,  4  Cranch  123:  815,  1385. 
V.  Tyree,  7  W.  Va.  693:  1225. 
V.  Union  Bank,  4  Cranch,  C.  C.  75 : 

1005,  lOiO,  1013,  1360. 
V.   Union   Bank,   5   Cranch,   C.   C. 

509:  131. 
V.  Western  Md.  R.  R.  Co.,  99  Md. 

570:  748. 
V.  Young,  3  Md.  480:  1576. 
Chesapeake  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bradford, 

6  W.  Va.  220:   1392,  1670,  1674. 
V.  Chambers,  95  Va.  503 :  1457. 
V.  Deepwater  Ry.  Co.,  57  W.  Va. 

641:   901,  904,  905. 
V.  Dyer  County,  87  Tenn.  712:  321. 
V.  Halstead,  7  W.  Va.  301 :  1343. 
V.  Kobs    (Ky.)    30  S.  W.  6:   252, 

310,  1294. 
V.  Pack,  6  W.  Va.  397:  819,  1389. 
V.  Patton,  5  W.  Va.  234:   1574. 
V.   Patton,    6   W.   Va.    147:    1172, 

1343. 
v.    Patton,    9    W.    Va.    648:    690, 

1086. 


CASES    CITED. 


Ixxvii 


[The  references  are   to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-T42 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Chesapeake   etc.   R.   R.   Co.  v.  Rice, 
20  Ky.  L.  R.  1930:  639. 
V.  Walker,   100  Va.  69:    128,   130, 

812. 
V.  Washington  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  99  Va. 
715:    895,   1033,  1043,   1517. 
Chesapeake  etc.  Tel.  Co.  v.  B.  &  0. 
Tel.  Co.,  66  Md.  399:   481,  682. 
Chesapeake  &  P.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Macken- 
zie,  74  Md.   36:    172,   175,    180, 
200,  338,  340,  625,  1152. 
Chesbrough  v.   Comrs.,   37   Ohio   St. 

508:  580. 
Cheseldine  v.  Comrs.,  6  Ohio  C.  C. 

450:  220. 
Cheshire  v.  Adams  etc.  Reservoir  Co., 

119  Mass.  356:  956. 
Cheshire  Turnpike  v.  Stevens,  10  N. 

H.  133:  401. 
Chess  V.  Manown,  3  Watts  219 :  423. 
Chessbrough,    Matter    of,     17     Hun 

561:    485. 
Chessbrough,   Matter   of,    78   N.   Y. 

232:    485. 
Chestates   Pyrites    Co.   v.   Cavenders 
Creek   Gold  Min.   Co.,    118   Ga. 
255:  1603. 
V.  Cavenders  Creek  Gold  Min.  Co., 
119   Ga.  354:    7,  683,  685,   708, 
1041. 
Chester  v.  Baltimore  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
140  Pa.   St.  275:    780. 
V.  Baltimore  &  0.  R.  R.  Co.,  217 

Pa.  St.  402:   309. 
V.  Wabash  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  182  111. 
382:  302,  1630. 
Chester  County  v.  Brewer,   117   Pa. 
St.  647:  324,  635,  636,  638,  659, 
660,  1549,  1550,  1551. 
Chester  County  Road,  4  Yeates  433: 

1418. 
Chesterfield  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  John- 
son, 58  S.  C.  560 :  923. 
Chester  Road,  2  Rawle  421 :  778. 
Chester  Traction  Co.  v.  Phila.  etc.  R. 

R.  Co.,  188  Pa.  St.  105:  771. 
Chestnut  St.,  8  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  55:  698. 
Chestnut  St.,  In  re,  118  Pa.  St.  593: 

1357,  1712. 
Chestnut  St.,  In  re,  128  Pa.  St.  214: 

1410. 
Chestnut    St.    Widening,    In    re,    18 

Phila.  511:  1712. 
Chewett  v.  Great  Western  R.  R.  Co., 

26  U.  C.  C.  P.  118:  945. 

Cheyney  v.  Atlantic  City  W.  W.  Co., 

55  N.  J.  L.  235:  723,  814,  816, 

1060,  1063,  1066. 

Chicago  V.  Allcock,  36  111.  384:  1323. 

V.  Altgeld,   33   111.  App.  23:    937, 

1648,  1656. 
V.  Anglum,  104  111.  App.  188 :   635, 
1306. 


Chicago  V.  Baker,  86  Fed.  753:  373, 
382     391 
V.  Baker,  98   Fed.  830:    373,   391, 

398. 
V.  Barbian,  80  111.  482:  1673,  1675, 

1680,  1684. 
V.  Bowman  Dairy  Co.,  234  111.  294 : 

473. 
V.  Brennan,  61  111.  App.  247:  1150. 
V.  Burcky,  158  111.  103:   372,  382, 

391,  398,  1665. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  152  111. 

561:  881,  883. 
V.  Chicago  League  Ball  Club,  97  111. 

App.  637:   460,  1547. 
V.   Chicago  Terminal   Transfer  R. 
R.  Co.,  121  111.  App.   197:   303, 
304. 
V.  Colby,  20  111.  614:  12. 
V.  Crosby,  111  111.  538:  492. 
V.   Drexel,    141    111.   89:    873,  877, 

886,  888,  890,  891. 
V.  Gait,  224  111.  421 :  869. 
V.  Garrity,  7  111.  App.  474:  1255. 
V.  Gunning  System,  214  111.   628: 

471. 
V.    Hayward,    176    111.    130:    828, 

1673,  1675. 
V.  Hayward,  60  111.  App.  582:  1527. 
V.  Hill,  124  111.  646:  884,  1137. 
V.  Jackson,  196  111.  496:  467,  629. 
V.  Laflin,  49  111.  172:  15,  123,  470. 
V.  Lamed,  34  111.  203 :  12. 
V.    LeMoyne,    119   Fed.    662:    635, 

1309,  1313. 
V.  Lonergan,  196  111.  518 :  226,  629, 

1313. 
V.  McDonough,  112  111.  85:    1122, 

1309. 
V.  McGinn,  51  111.  266:  96. 
V.    McShane,    102    111.    App.    239: 

635. 
V.  McCartney,  216  111.  377:    1219. 
V.  Messier,  38  Fed.  308 :  965,  1556, 

1561. 
V.  Murdock,  212  111.  9:   435,  456. 
V.  O'Brien,  111  111.  532:  492. 
V.  Palmer,  93  111.  125:   1325. 
V.  Pooley,   112  III.  App.   343:    199. 
V.  Pulcyn,  129  111.  App.  179:  320, 

372,  383,  646. 
V.    Rogers    Park   Water    Co.,    214 

111.  212:   481,  483. 
V.  Rogers  Park  Water  Co.,  116  111. 

App.  200:  481,483. 
V.  Rothschild,  212  111.  590:  1422. 
V.   Rumsey,   87   111.   348:   25,   224, 

633,  635. 
V.  Rust,  117  111.  App.  427:  443. 
V.  Seben,  165  111.  371 :  142. 
V.  Bhepard,  S  111.  App.  602:   1673. 


Ixxviii 


OASES    CITED. 


[The  references   are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   74S-1719.) 


Chicago  V.  Smythe,  33  111.  App.  28: 

1319,  1545. 
T.  Spoor,  190  111.  340:  1212,  1309. 
V.  Stinson,  124  111.  510:  884,  886. 
V.  Taylor,  125  U.  S.  161:  631,  635, 

660,  663. 
V.  Union  Bldg.  Assn.,  102  111.  379: 

178,  370,  371,  383,  392,  398. 
V.   Union   Stock  Yards  &  Transit 

Co.,  164  111.  224:  484,  1620. 
V.  Verdon,  119  111.  App.  494:   197, 

199. 
V.  Van  Ingen,  152  111.  624:   129. 
V.  Ward,  169  111.  392:  876.  1618. 
V.  Webb,   102   111.  App.  232:   373, 

375,  391. 
V.  Wells,  236  111.  129:  53,  57,  461. 
V.  Wheeler,  25  111.  478 :  1325,  1527, 

1528,  1530. 
T.  Wright,   69   111.  318:    197,  357, 

1579. 
Chicago  City  R.  R.  Co.  v.  People,  73 

111.  541:  299,  407. 
Chicago  Cold  Storage  Warehouse  Co. 

V.  People,  127  111.  App.  179 :  199. 
Chicago  County  v.  Nelson,  81  Minn. 

443:  1137. 
Chicago    etc.    Bridge   Co.    v.    Pacific 

Mut.  Tel.  Co.,  36  Kan.  113:  917, 

1568. 
Chicago  etc.  Elec.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Chi- 
cago etc.  Ry.   Co.,  211   111.   352: 

731,  757,  759,  1043,  1044,  1409. 
V.  Mailman,  206  111.   182:    1312. 
Chicago    etc.    R.   R.    Co.   v.   Abbott, 

215    111.    416:     864,    999,    1004, 

1513. 
V.  Abbott,  44  Kan.  170:  913. 
V.  Aclsiley,  94  U.  S.  179 :  480. 
V.  Aldrieh,  134  111.  9:   1195,  1312, 

1442. 
V.  Alexander,  47  Wash.  131:  1146, 

1152,  1242. 
V.  Anderson,  42  Kan.  297:  942. 
V.  Andreesen,  62  Neb.  456:  92,  93, 

1454,  1456,  1639,  1653,  1716. 
V.  Atterbury,  156  111.  281:  1314. 
V.  Ayres,  106  111.  511:  639,,  671. 
V.  Baker,  102  Mo.  553:  1208,  1318, 

1365. 
V.  Bastin,  97  111.  App.  38:   1602. 
V.  Bates,  109  Mo.  53:  926. 
V.  Bean,  69  Iowa  257:   1505,  1510. 
V.  Beatrice  Rapid  Transit  &  P.  Co., 

47  Neb.  741 :  328. 
v.  Berg,  10  111.  App.  607 :  639,  1294. 
V.  Blake,  116  111.  163:   1119,  1129, 

1195,  1241,  1379. 
V.  Blume,  137  111.  448:  1243,  1310, 

1312,  1314. 


Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Board  of 

Comrs.,  49  Kan.  763:  1290. 
V.  Bowman,  122  111.  595 :  1109, 1202, 

1243,  1311,  1312,  1314,  1426, 

1437. 
V.  Brink,  16  S.  D.  644:  1244. 
V.  Brinkman,  47  111.  App.  287 :  1246, 

1249. 
V.  Broquet,  47  Kan.  571:  1098, 

1150,  1200,  1201. 
,v.  Brunson,  43  Kan.  371:  1208, 

1213. 
V.  Buel,  56  Neb.  205:  1128,  1179, 

1200,  1323. 
V.  Buel,  76  Neb.  420:  91,  94. 
V.  Bull,  20  111.  218:  1438. 
V.  Butts,  55  Kan.  660:  964. 
V.  Carpenter,  125  111.  App.  306:  91. 
V.  Casey,  90  111.  514:  151. 
V.  Casper,  42  Kan.  561:  1128. 
V.  Catholic  Bishop,  119  111.  525: 

1134,  1146,  1222,  1258,  1266. 
V.  Cedar  Rapids  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  86 

Iowa  500:  I'iSl. 
V.  Chamber'   .  84  111.  333:  897, 

1033,  1086,  1516. 
V.  Chappell,  124  Mich.  72:  489, 

1154. 
V.  Chicago,  121  111.  176:  297,  778, 

780. 
V.  Chicago,  132  111.  372:  1382. 
V.  Chicago,  140  111.  309 :  753,  1287. 
V.  Chicago,  143  111.  641 :  1046,  1070, 

1074,  1624,  1701. 
V.  Chicago,  148  111.  141 :  895,  1469. 
V.  Chicago,  148  111.  479 :  1675,  1701. 
v.  Chicago,  149  111.  457 :  750,  1267, 

1287,  1288,  1497. 

V.  Chicago,  149  111.  495 :  895,  1287. 
V.  Chicago,  150  111.  597 :  895,  1287. 
v.  Chicago,  151  111.  348:  751,  1624. 
V.  Chicago,  166  U.  S.  226:  1267, 

1288,  1432. 

V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  112  111. 

589:  726,  761,  797,  1043,  1047, 

1246. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  60  Iowa 

35:  966. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  91  Iowa 

16:  767. 
V.  Chicago  Mechanics  Inst.,  239  111. 

197:  708,  729,  1115,  1260. 
V.  Cicero,  154  111.  656:  749,  752, 

1115,  1120,  1287,  1292. 
V.  Cicero,  155  111.  51:  749,  1287. 
V.  Cicero,  157  111.  48:  1287. 
V.  Cicero,  157  111.  89 :  1287. 
v.  Clapp,  201  111.  418:  1503,  1504, 

1627. 
V.  Coggeswell,  44  111.  App.  388: 

654,  656,  663,  1245,  1246. 


CASES    CITED. 


Ixxix 


[The  references   are  to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742;   "Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Chicago  etc.  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Cogswell,  94 
111.  App.  127:  1457,  1472. 
V.  Connors,  25  111.  App.  561:  154. 
V.  Cook,  43  Kan.  83:  1409. 
V.  Cooper,  42  Kan.  561 :  1247,  1249. 
V.  Curless,  27  Ind.  App.  306:  1378. 
V.  Darke,   148  111.  226:   448,  654, 

671,  1544. 
V.  Davidson,  49   Kan.   589:    1151, 

1236. 
V.  Dill,  41  Kan.  736:   1124,  1151. 
V.  Diver,  213  111.  26:    1195,   1247, 

1249,  1314,  1318,  1332,  1379. 
V.  Donelson,  45  Kan.  189:  1132. 
v.  Douglass,  33  Tex.  Civ.  App.  262 : 

862,  1130. 
y.  Douglass  County,  1  Neb.  (Unof.) 

247:  1162,  1569. 
V.  Drainage  Comrs.,  212  111.  103: 

492. 
T.  Drainage  Comrs.,  200  U.  S.  561: 

493. 
V.  Drake,  46  Kan.  568:  1121. 
V.  Dressel,  110  111.  89:  1210,  1271. 
V.  Dunbar,  100  111.  110:  1071. 
V.  Durant,  44  Minn.  361:   851. 
V.  Easley,  46  Kan.  337:  1130. 
V.   Eaton,    136   111.   9:    1085,    1195, 

1246,  1249,  1270,  1318,  1442. 
V.  Eisert,  127  Ind.  166:   324,  328, 

1582,  1591. 
V.  Elgin,  91  111.  251:  330. 
V.  Elliott,  108  Mo.  321 :  926. 
V.  Elliott,  117  Mo.  549.  1440. 
V.  Ellis,  52  Kan.  41 :  952,  1404. 
V.  Ellis,  52  Kan.  48:  952. 
V.  Ellithorpe,  78  Iowa  415:    1018, 

1513,  1571. 
V.  Elmhurst,  165  111.  148:  12. 
V.  Ely,  77  Neb.  809:  91,  1456. 
V.  Emery,  51  Kan.  16:   1139,  1203. 
V.  Emmert,  53  Neb.  237:   94,  151, 

1650,  1653. 
V.   Englehart,   57    Neb.   444:    858, 

1631. 
V.  Englewood  Connecting  Ey.  Co., 

115  111.  375:   53,  1280. 
V.  Englewood  Connecting  E.  E.  Co., 

17  111.  App.  141 :  1610. 
V.   Eubanks,    130   Mo.   270:    1322, 

1466. 
V.  Franeia,  70  HI.  238:  639,  1195, 

1581. 
V.  Galey,  141  Ind.  360:  1540,  1541, 

1543,  1544,  1545. 
V.  Gait,  133  III.  657:  715,  1626. 
V.  Garrett,  239  111.  397:   1557. 
V.   Gates,   120  111.   86:    964,   1162, 

1627,  1669. 
V.  General  Electric  E.  E.  Co.,  79 

111.  App.  569:  272,328,  1611. 


Chicago  etc.  E.  E.  Co.  v.  George,  10 

111.  App.  646:  639,  1294. 
V.  George,  145  Mo.  38:  1202,  1426, 

1477. 
V.  Glenney,  117  111.  487:  153. 
V.  Glenney,  28  111.  App.  364:   154. 
V.  Glos,  239  111.  24:   1136. 
T.  Goodwin,  111  111.  273:  830,  1346, 

1347. 
V.  Grand  Eapids  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  163 

Mich.  686:  977. 
V.  Graney,  137  111.  628:  1310. 
V.  Grantham,  165  Ind.  279:    1545. 
V.    Greimey,     137    111.     628:     134, 

1202,  1243,  1311,  1318.1 
V.   Griesser,    48    Kan.    663":    1035, 

1510,  1636. 
V.  Griffith,  44  Neb.  690:  1140. 
V.    Grovier,    41    Kan.    685:    1138, 

1404,  1409. 
V.  Guthrie,  192  III.  679:  690,  696, 

740,  1700. 
V.  Hall,  90  111.  42:  639. 
V.  Hall,  8  111.  App.  621 :  639. 
V.  Hall,   135  Ind.  91:    1540,  1541, 

1543,  1545. 
V.  Hazels,  26  Neb.  364:   448,  654, 

664,  668,  1334,  1337. 
V.  Henneberry,  153  111.  354:  151. 
V.  Henneberry,  28   111.   App.   110: 

151,  1648,  1655. 

V.  Henneberry,  42   111.  App.    126: 

152,  1639. 

V.  Hildebrand,  136  111.  467:    1243. 

V.  Hoag,  90  111.  339 :  145. 

V.  Hock,   118  III.  587:   924,  1274, 

1277. 
v.  Hogan,  105  111.  App.  136:  849. 
V.  Hopkins,  90  111.  316:  994,  1045, 

1108,  1310. 
V.  Hough,  61  Mich.  507 :  1290. 
V.  Huncheon,   130  Ind.  529:    1208, 

1213. 
V.    Hunter,    128    Ind.    213:     1247, 

1251. 
V.  Hurst,  30  Iowa  73 :  1404. 
v.  Hurst,  41  Kan.  740:  956,  1253. 
V.  Illinois  Central  E.  E.  Co.,  113 

111.  156:  689,  731,  737,  749,  766. 
v.  Indianapolis  etc.  Traction  Co., 

165  Ind.  453:  764,  766. 
V.  Iowa,  94  U.  S.  155 :  15,  480. 
Y.  Jacobs,  110  111.  414:  1108,  1234, 

1236. 
v.  Joliet,  79  111.  25:  875,  1494. 
V.  Joliet,  L.  &  A.  Ey.  Co.,  105  111. 

388:   1280,  1281,  1344. 
V.  Jones,  149  111.  361:  481,  483. 
v.  Jones,  103  Ind.  386:   913,  1075, 

1391. 


Ixxx 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are   to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-14:2 ;  Vol.  11,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Chicago   etc.   R.   E,.    Co.   v.   Kansas 

City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  38  Fed.  58: 

764. 
V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  110 

Mo.  510:  769. 
V.   Keith,   67   Ohio   St.   279:    489, 

1005. 
V.  Kelly,  221  111.  498:   1152,  1195, 

1202    1231. 
V.  Kline,  220  111.  334:   1138,  1142, 

1143,  1250,  1332. 
V.  Knox  College,  34  111.  195:  1631. 
V.  Knuppke,  36  Kan.  367:  1481. 
V.  Lake,  71  111.  333:  674,  750,  1609. 
V.    Leah,    152  111.    249:    448,    654, 

1243    1302. 
V.   Leah,   41    111.   App.    584:    639, 

1294,    1302. 
V.  Lemonweir  Riv.   Dr.   Dist.   135 

Wis.  228:  1515. 
V.  Liebel,  27  Ky.  L.  R.  716:   1385. 
V.    Loeb,    118    11.    203:    937,    1551, 

1553,    1648,    1657,    1662,    1663, 

1717. 
V.  Loeb,  8  111.  App.  627:  639,  937, 

1551. 
V.   Maher,   91   111.   312:    652,   937, 

1551,    1553,    1648,    1658,    1662, 

1663. 
V.  Mason,  26  Ind.  App.  395:   1192, 

1201,  1313. 
V.  McAuley,  121  111..  160:  639, 1648. 
V.  McCarthy,  20  111.  385 :  1636. 
V.  McCutchen,  80  Ark.  235:    158, 

1649,  1654. 
V.  McGinnis,  79  111.  269 :  251. 
V.   McGrew,    104   Mo.    282:    1172, 

1175,    1186,    1217,    1274,    1314, 

1339,  1344,  1477. 
V.  McGrew,  113  Mo.  390:  926. 
V.  Melville,  66  111.  329:   1343. 
V.  Miller,  233  111.  508:  1045,  1046, 

1136. 
V.  Miller,  106  Mo.  458:  926,  1340. 
T.  Milwaukee,  97  Wis.  418:   1288, 

1289. 
V.  Milwaiikee   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   95 

Wis.  561 :  243,  247,  285,  1610. 
V.  Mines,  221  111.  448:  1109,  1138, 

1143,  1222. 
V.  Minnesota,   134  U.  S.  418:   95, 

480,  483. 
v.  Mitchell,  159  111.  406:  1119. 
V.  Mitchell,  74  Neb.  563:  93,  1639, 

1716. 
V.  Moffit,  75  III.  524:  87. 
V.  Moggridge,  116  Tenn.  445:  1127, 

1226,  1323. 
V.  Moore,  60  Kan.  107:  1485. 
T.  Moore,  63  111.  App.   163:    1243, 

1294,  1302,  1314. 
V.  Morehouse,  112  Wis.  1:  533. 


Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Morrison, 

195  111.  271 :  503,  749,  751,  1056, 

1291. 
V.  Mouriquand,  45  Kan.  170:  1128. 
V.  Muller,  45  Kan.  85:  1124,  1146. 
V.  Naperville,  166  111.  87:  1287. 
V.    Naperville,    169    111.    25:    514, 

1464. 
V.  Nashua  Savings  Bank,  52  Kan. 

467:  948. 
V.  Nebraska,  170  U.  S.  57 :  487. 
V.  Need,  2  ELan.  App.  492:  948. 
V.  Neiman,  45  Kan.  533:   1124. 
V.  Newton,  36  Iowa  299:  251,  321. 
V.  Nix,   137  111.   141:    1122,   1128, 

1176,  1243,  1310,  1312,  1314. 
V.  Noblesville,  159  Ind.  237:   1288. 
V.  Nolin,  221  111.  367:  1312,  1314. 
V.  O'Conner,  42  Neb.  90:  640,  643, 

655,     1294,     1303,     1314,     1337, 

1472. 
V.  O'Neill,  58  Neb.  239:  646,  1337, 

1548,  1552,  1649,  1660. 
V.  Oshkosh  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  107  Wis. 

192:  1050. 
V.  Palmer,  44  Kan.  110:  1312. 
V.    Parsons,    51    Kan.    408:    1109, 

1176,  1227,  1231. 
V.   Patterson,    26    Ind.   App.    295: 

1314,  1545. 
V.  Patchin,  16  111.  198:  1496. 
V.  People,  212  111.  103:  487,  1644. 
V.  People,  222  111.  396:  729. 
V.  People,  222  111.  427:    197,  305, 

1618,  1622. 
V.  People,  120  111.  App.  306:   305, 

1622. 
V.  People,  200  U.  S.  561 :  487. 
V.  Phelps,  125  111.  482:  1118,  1430, 

1467. 
V.  Phillips,  10  111.  App.  648:  639, 

1294. 
V.  Pigg,  63  111.  App.  163:  1425. 
y.  Pontiac,  169  111.  155:  675,  678, 

751,  1287,  1426. 
V.  Porter,  72  Iowa  426:   106,  131, 

132. 
V.  Porter,  43  Minn.  527 :  1045. 
V.  Quincy.  136  111.  563:  352. 
V.  Quincy,  139  111.  355:   306. 
V.  Randolph    Town-Site    Co.,    103 

Mo.  451:   898,  1226,  1361. 
V.  Reed,  2  Kan.  App.  492:  825. 
V.  Reeder,  6  Ohio  C.  C.  354:  327. 
V.  Reuter,  223  111.  387:    146,  158, 

1650,  1654. 
V.  Richardson,  86  Wis.   154:    977, 

1060. 
V.  Riley,  25  111.  App.  569 :  154. 
V.  Ritter,  1  Tex.  App.  Civil  Cases  p. 

107:  1206. 


CASES    CITED. 


Lxxxi 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,    pp.   743-1719.] 


Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis 

etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  111.  App.  587: 

1610. 
V.  Sanford,  23  Mich.  418:  924. 
V.  SchaflFer,  124  111.  112:  90,  1651. 
V.  Schaffer,  26  111.  App.  280:   90, 

1651,  1653. 
V.  Scott,  225  111.  352:   1109,  1147, 

1377. 
V.  Scott,  232  111.  419:  1342. 
V.  Scott,  71  Kan.  874:   91. 
V.  Selders,  4  Kan.  App.  497 :  1010, 

1461. 
V.  Shafer,  49  Neb.  25:   1129,  1243, 

1312. 
V.   Shaw,   63  Neb.   380:    152,   158, 

1716. 
V.  Sheldon,  53  Kan.  169:  948,  949, 

1558,  1560. 
V.  Shepard,  39  Neb.  523:  937. 
V.  Smith,  78  111.  96:  706,  999,  1023, 

1030. 
V.  Smith,  111  111.  363:  846. 
V.  Snyder,  120  la.  532:  1248,  1478, 

1517,  1519. 
V.  Springfield  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  67  111. 

142:   1279. 
V.  Springfield  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  96  111. 

274:    1279. 
V.  Staley,  221  111.  405:  1229,  1233, 

1234,   1312,  1314. 
V.  Starkweather.  97  Xa.  159:   750. 
V.  State,  158  Ind.  180:    1288. 
V.  State,  47  Neb.  550:  487. 
V.   State,   50   Neb.   399:    472,   495, 

1474. 
V.  Steek,  51   Kan.   737:    147,   150, 

157. 
V.  Stein,  75  111.  41 :  652. 
V.    Stewart,    47    Kan.    704:     1121, 

1139. 
V.  Stewart,  50  Kan.  33:  1130,  1545. 
T.  Stroud,  129  111.  App.  348:   152. 
V.  Sturey,  55  Neb.  137:  254,  1294. 
V.  Sutton,  130  Ind.  405:   1518. 
V.  Swan,  120  Mo.  30:  984,  1035. 
V.  Swinney,  38  la.  182:   830,  853, 

1625. 
V.  Titerington,  84  Tex.  218:    830, 

840. 
V.  Tompkins,   176  U.  S.  167:   480, 

483. 
V.    Tounsdin,    45   Kan.    771:    929, 

1437,  1439. 
V.  Union  Inv.  Co.,  51  Kan.  600: 

252,  311,  1294,  1304,  1652. 
V.  Van  Cleave,  52  Kan.  665:  956, 

1336. 
V.  Vaughn,  206  111.  234:  830,  1346, 

1347. 
V.  Vivian,  33  Mo.  App.  583:  1187, 

1200. 


Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ward,  128 

111.  349:   807,  1262. 
V.    Watkins,    43    Kan.    50:     1460, 

1636. 
V.  Wedel,  144  111.  9 :  639,  1545. 
V.  Wellman,  143  U.  S.  339 :  480. 
V.  West  Chicago  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  156 

111.  255:  765,  767,  1610. 
V.  West  Chicago  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  156 

111.  270:  272,  328,  657,  1282. 
V,  White,  36  Mont.  437 :  1556. 
V.  Whiting  etc.  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  139 

Ind.  297  :  272,  282,  328,  657,  765, 

767,  1282,  1611. 
V.  Wiebe,  26  Neb.  545:  1179,  1199, 

1200,  1243. 
V.    Willets,    45    Kan.    110:     1455, 

1507. 
V.  Willi,  53  111.  App.  603:   92,  94, 

1454,  1639. 
V.   Williams,    148   Fed.   442:    750, 

1609. 
V.  Wilson,   17   111.   123:    526,   731, 

1040,  1080. 
V.  Wiltse,   116  111.  449:    532,   676, 

677,    708. 
V.    Winslow,    27    Ind.    App.    316: 

1192. 
V.  Wolf,   137  III.   360:    1339,   1426. 
V.  Woodward,  47  Kan.  191:    1203. 
V.  Wright,  153  111.  307:   856. 
V.  Wynkoop,  73   Kan.   590:    1248, 

1249,    1485,    1519,    1646. 
V.  Wysor  Land  Co.,  163  Ind.  288: 

1120,  1123,  1205,  1378. 
v.    Young,    96    Mo.    39:    706,    973, 

1017,   1031,  1032,  1419,   1420. 
Chicago  etc.  Traction  Co.  v.  Flaherty, 

222  111.  67:   1700. 
Chicago  Dock   &   Canal   Co.  v.  Gar- 

rity,  115  111.   155:   318,  526,  532. 
Chicago  General  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Chicago 

City  R.  R.  Co.,  62  111.  App.  502: 

197,  408,  762. 
V.  Chicago  City  R.  R.  Co.,  10  Nat. 

Corp.  651:    426,  763. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  181  111. 

605:    329. 
V.  West  Chicago  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  63 

111.   App.   464:    331,    1620. 
Chicago  Gt.  Western  Ry.  Co.  v.  First 

M.  E.  Church,  102  Fed.  85:   308, 

450,  458. 
Chicago  League  Ball  Club  v.  Chicago, 

77  111.  App.  124:    1545. 
Chicago  Municipal  Gas  L.  Co.  v.  Lake, 

130  111.   42:    412. 
Chicago  North  Shore  St.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Payne,    192    III.    239:     454,    655, 

1337,  1648,  1659,  1716. 
Chicago  Office  Bldg.  v.  Lake  St.  Ry. 

Co.,   87  111.  App.   594:    266. 


Ixxxii 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :  Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Chicago  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Chicago  etc.  R. 

R.  Co.  91  Iowa  16:   1281. 
Chicago  Tel.  Co.  v.  N.  W.  Tel.  Co., 

199  111.  324:    197,  342,  360,  410, 

418,  1621. 
T.   North   W.    Telephone   Co.,    100 

111.  App.  57:  1621. 
Chicago  Terminal  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chicago, 

217  111.  343:  1328. 
Chicago  Terminal  Transf.  R.  R.  Co. 

V.    Bugbee,    184    111.    353:     1150, 

1309    1379 
V.  Chicago,  203  111.  576:  304,  362. 
V.  Chicago,  217  111.  343:  1150. 
V.  Chicago,  220  111.  310:   297,  303. 
V.  Prencil,  236  111.  491:   1423. 
Chicago-Virden   Coal   Co.   v.   Wilson, 

67  111.  App.  443:   1650,  1659. 
Chicago  West  Division  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Metropolitan  W.  S.  El.  R.  R.  Co., 

152  111.  519:  761,  800,  1260. 
Child  v.  Boston,  4  Allen  41:  142,  143. 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  89  App. 

Div.  598:  1562. 
Childs  V.  Central  R.  R.  Co.  of  N.  J., 

33  N.  J.  L.  323:  732. 
V.  Franklin  Co.,  128  Mass.  97:  1366. 
V.  Kansas   City  etc.   R.  R.   Co.,   117 

Mo.  414:   1546,  1547. 
V.  Nelson,  69  Wis.  125:   348. 
V.  New  Haven  &  Northampton  R.  R. 

Co.,  133  Mass.  253:   1217. 
V.  New  Haven  &  Northampton  Co., 

135   Mass.  570:    1439. 
V.  Newport,  70  Vt.  62:   988,  1353. 
Chisman  v.  Deck,  84  Iowa  344:   349. 
Chisohn  v.  Caines,  67  Fed.  285:  113, 

114,   115. 
Choate  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  143  Ala. 

316:    1519. 
Choctaw  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  True,  35  Tex. 

av.  App.  309:   1635. 
Chope    v.    Detroit    &   Howell    Plank 

Road  Co.,  37  Mich.  195:   727. 
Chorman  v.  Queen  Anne's  R.  R.  Co., 

3  Penn.  Del.  407:   146,  154. 
Chouteau  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  R.  Co., 

122  Mo.  375:    837,  943,  945,  962. 
V.  St.  Louis,  8  Mo.  App.  48:   631, 

1309. 
Chowan  &  S.  R.   R.   Co.  v.   Parker, 

105   N.   C.   246:    923,   924. 
Chrisman   v.   Omaha   etc.    Ry.   &   B. 

Co.,  125  Iowa  133:  373,  404. 
Christ  Church  Wardens  v.  Woodward, 

26  Maine  172:   1373. 
Christian  v.  St.  Louis,  127  Mo.  109: 

1595.  I 


Christian   County   Court   v.   Rankin, 

2  Duv.  Ky.  502:   18. 
Christy    v.    Newton,    60    Barb.    332: 

1100,  1102. 
Chronic  v.  Pugh,  136  111.  539:  574. 
Church's   Application,    92    N.    Y.    1: 

1164,  1167. 
Church  V.  Grand  Rapids   etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  70  Ind.  161:   940. 
V.   Joint   School  District,   55  Wis. 

399:    1165,   1569,   1574. 
V.   Milwaukee,    31   Wis.   512:    615, 

619,  1307,  1308. 
V.  Milwaukee,  34  Wis.  66:  615,  619. 
V.   Northern   Central   Ry.    Co.,   45 
Pa.    St.   339:    1419. 
Churchill  v.  Beethe,  48  Neb.  87:  147, 
1176,  1243,  1446. 
V.  Burlington  Water  Co.,  94  Iowa 
89:   452,  454. 
Churchman  v.  Martin,   54  Ind.  380: 

23. 
Church  of  the  Holy  Apostles,  21  App. 

Div.  N.  Y.  47:    1305. 
Church  of  Holy  Communion  v.  Pat- 
terson etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  63  N.  J.  L. 
470:  441. 
V.  Patterson  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.,  66  N. 

J.  L.  218:  441. 
V.  Patterson  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  68  N. 
J.  L.  399:  441. 
Church  Road,  5  W.  &  S.  200:   976. 
Church  Street,  Matter  of,  49  Barb. 

455:   956. 
Chute   V.  Washburn,   44   Minn.   312: 

840,  841,  864. 
Cicero  Lumber  Co.  v.  Cicero,  176  HI. 

9:   357. 
Cincinnati  v.  Cincinnati  So.  Ry.  Co., 
1  Ohio  N.  P.  (N.  S.)  361:  731. 
v.  Combs,  16  Ohio  181:   1546. 
V.  Evans,  5  Ohio  St.  594:  1492. 
v.  First    Presbyterian     Church,    8 

Ohio  298:  1492. 
V.  Hamilton  Co.,  1  Disney,  5:  402. 
V.  Hosea,  19  Ohio  C.  C.  744:  1520. 
V.  Morton,   10  Ohio  C.  C.   (N.  S.) 

416:  1107. 
V.   Penny,   21    Ohio   St.   499:    218, 

335. 
V.  Roth,  20  Ohio  C.  C.   317:    220, 

611,  616. 
V.   Sherike,  47  Ohio   St.  217:    709, 

1017,  1710. 
V.  Whetstone,  47  Ohio  St.  196:  220, 

1323. 
V.  White,  6  Pet.  431 :  872,  882,  885. 
Cincinnati  Con.  Belt  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bur- 
ski,  4  Ohio  C.  C.  (N.  S.)  98:  447. 


CASES    CITED. 


Ixxxiii 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Cincinnati  etc.   Elec.   St.  Ey.  Co.   v. 

Cincinnati  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  Ohio 

C.   C.  391:    281,  328. 

V.  Lohe,  68  Ohio  St.  101:  281. 
Cincinnati  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  In  re,  19 

Ohio  C.  C.  308:    390. 
Cincinnati  etc.  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Anderson, 

139    Ind.    490:     750,    793,    796, 

797,  798,   1609. 
V.  Barcelow,  4  Ohio  C.  C.  49:  1427. 
V.   Bay    City   etc.   R.   E.   Co.,    106 

Mich.  473:   897,  982. 
v.  Belle  Centre,  48  Ohio  St.  273: 

538,  776,  793,  796,  800,  802,  1518. 
v.  Campbell,  51  Ohio  St.  328:  1549, 

1651,  1658. 
V.  Cincinnati,  62  Ohio  St.  465:  464, 

1219. 
V.  Clifford,  113  Ind.  460:  1625,  1631. 
V.  Danville  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  75  111. 

113:   759,  985,  1047. 
V.  Mims,  71  Ga.  240:  1119. 
v.  Miller,  36  Ind.  App.  26:   1657. 
V.  Troy,  68  Ohio  St.  510:  491,  1290. 
V.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  162  Ind.  303: 

764,  1461,  1463. 
V.  Wachter,  70  Ohio  St.  113:   837, 

1483,   1646. 
V.  Ward,  120  111.  App.  212;   152. 
V.  Zinn,  18  Ohio  St.  417 :  1292. 
Cincinnati  etc.  St.  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Cum- 

minsville,  14  Ohio  St.  523:   247, 

1586. 
Cincinnati  etc.  Traction  Co.  v.  Felix, 

5  Ohio  C.  C.    (N.   S.)   270:    740, 

1438. 
Cincinnati  Inclined  Plane  E.  R.  Co.  v. 

City  &  Suburban  Tel.  Asso.,  48 

Ohio  St.  390:  272,  332,  343,  417, 

911,  1622. 
Cincinnati  International  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Murray',  10  Ohio  N.  P.   (N.  S.) 

301:  716,  747,  896. 
Cincinnati  Iron  Stove  Co.  v.  Cincin- 
nati  So.  Ry.   Co.,  9  Ohio   C.  C. 

103:  1147,  1272. 
Cincinnati  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Geisel,  119  Ind. 

77:   837,  1475,  1481. 
V.    Longworth,    30    Ohio    St.    108: 

1203,  1236. 
Cincinnati    Southern    R.    R.    Co.    v. 

Chattanooga  etc.  R.  R.   Co.,   44 

Fed.   470:    1570. 
V.  Haas,  42  Ohio  St.  239:   1703. 
C.  I.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  M.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co., 

57  Iowa  249:  1502. 
Citizens  Coach  Co.  v.  Camden  Horse 

R.  R.  Co.,  28  N.  J.  Eq.  145:  1621. 
V.  Camden  H.  R.  E.  Co.,  29  N.  J. 

Eq.  299:   416. 


Citizens  Coach  Co.  v.  Camden  H.  E. 

E.  Co.,  31  N.  J.  Eq.  525:   416, 

1621. 
V.  Camden  Horse  E.  E.  Co.,  33  N. 

J.  Eq.  267:  278,  415,  1621. 
Citizens'  Gas  etc.  Co.  v.  Elwood,  114 

Ind.  332:   338,  411. 
Citizens'  Horse  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Belleville, 

47  111.  App.  388:  302,  426,  763. 
Citizens'  Nat.  Bank  v.  Graham,  147 

Mo.  250:  594. 
Citizens'  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  East  Har- 

risburg  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  164  Pa. 

St.  274:  778. 
Citizens'  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Africa,  100 

Tenn.  26:  297. 
V.  Memphis,  53  Fed.  715:  299. 
Citizens'  Water  Co.  v.  Bridgeport  Hy- 
draulic Co.,  55  Conn.  1 :  416. 
Citizens'  W.  W.   Co.,  Matter  of,  32 

App.  Div.  N.  Y.  54:  918. 
Citizens'  W.  W.  Co.  v.  Parry,  59  Hun. 

202:  920,  1044. 
V.  Parry,  128  N.  Y.  669 :  920,  1044. 
City  Council  v.  Georgia  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

98  Ga.  161:  750. 
City  etc.  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Savannah,  77 

Ga.  731:   476. 
V.  Smith,  72  Miss.  677:   151. 
City  Store  v.  San  Jose  etc.  Ey.  Co., 

150  Cal.  277:  250,  1614. 
Clack   V.   White,  2   Swan,   540:    495, 

516. 
Claflin  V.  Boston  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  157 

Mass.  489:  844. 
Clairborne  St.,  Matter  of,  4  La.  An. 

7:   1386. 
Clapp  V.  Boston,  133  Mass.  367:  1341. 
V.  Macfarland,  20  App.  Gas.  D.  C. 

224:   1385. 
V.  Manter,  78  Maine  358:   1524. 
V.  Minn.  Grass  Twine  Co.,  81  Minn. 

511:  577. 
V.  Spokane,  53  Fed.  515:  354,  1620. 
Clapper,  Ex  parte,  3  Hill  458:  817. 
Claremont  Ry.  &  Lt.  Co.  v.  Putney, 

73  N.  H.  431:  672,  679,  683,  708, 

720. 
Clarendon  v.  Medina  Quarry  Co.,  102 

App.  Div.  217:   1491. 
V.  Rutland  R.  R.  Co.,  75  Vt.  6:  491, 

1288. 
Clarion    Turnpike    &    Bridge    Co.    v. 

Clarion    Co.,    172    Pa.    St.    243: 

1264,  1266. 
Clark,  In  re,  74  Hun  294:  1715. 
Clark  v.  AUaman,  71  Kan.  206:   69, 

71. 
V.  Birmingham  etc.  Co.  41  Pa.  St. 

147:  96. 
V.  Board  of  County  Comrs.,  69  Kan. 

542:    494,    516. 


Ixxxiv 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Clark  V.  Boston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  24  K. 

H.  118:  515. 
V.  Brooklyn  City  R.  R.  Co.,  30  Hun 

409:   247,  1635. 
V.  Cambridge  etc.  Improv.  Co.,  45 

Neb.  799:  69,  70,  113,  1607,  1615, 

1616. 
V.  Close,  43  Iowa  92:  939. 
V.  Dasso,  34  Mich.  86:   1481,  1491. 
V.  Drain  Comr.  50  Mich.  618:  1511. 
V.  Dyer,   81   Tex.   339:    160,   1651, 

1655,  1716. 
V.  Elizabeth,  37  N.  J.  L.  120:  432, 

878,  879,  1326,  1327. 

V.  Elizabeth,  40  N.  J.  L.  172:  878, 

879,  1327. 

V.  Elizabeth,  61  N.  J.  L.  565:  608. 
V.  Hampstead,  19  N.  H.  365:  1683. 
V.  Hannibal  &  St.  Joe  R.  R.  Co., 

36  Mo.  202:  157,  1450,  1455. 
V.  Irrigation  Co.,  45  Neb.  799:  116, 

140. 
V.  Lawrence,  6  Jones  Eq.  83:  165. 
v.  McCormick,  174  111.  164:  874. 
V.  Meyerdirck,  107  Md.  63:  1557. 
v.  Middletown-Goshen  Traction  Co., 

10  App.  Div.  354:   273. 
V.  Miller,  54  N.  Y.  528:    925. 
v.  Mitchell,  64  Mo.  564:   18. 
T.  Nash,  198  U.  S.  361:   587,  595, 

596,  597. 
V.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  145  Pa. 

St.  438:  69,  72,  75,  1342. 
V.  Phelps,  4  Cow.  190:   821. 
T.    Philadelphia,    171    Pa.    St.    30: 

1356. 
V.   Providence,   10  R.  I.   437:    183, 

878,  880,  889,  1618. 
V.   Providence,   16  R.  I.   337:    420, 

1493. 
V.  Rochester,  43  Hun  367:  149,  153, 

155,  235. 
V.  Rockland  Water  Co.  52  Maine 

68:    137,   1131,   1524. 
r.  Saybrook,  21  Conn.  313:   133. 
V.  Second  etc.  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Phil. 

259:   307. 
V.  Syracuse,  13  Barb.  32:  492. 
V.  Utica,  18  Barb.  451:   924. 
v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  132  Iowa  11: 

1226. 
V.  Washington,  11  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  433 : 

1251. 
V.    Water    Comrs.,    148   N.    Y.    1: 

1424,  1713,  1715. 
V.  Wilmington,  5  Harr.  (Del.)  243: 

235. 
V.  Worcester,  125  Mass.  226:   808, 

1186. 
Clarke  v,  Birmingham  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

41  Pa.  St.  147:  96. 


Clarke  v.  Blackmar,  47  N.  Y.  150: 
318,  526,  533,  712. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  Neb. 

613:   1378. 
V.  Gilmanton,  12  N.  H.  515:  955. 
V.  Long  Island  Realty  Co.,  126  App. 

Div.  282:   1559. 
V.  Manchester.  56  N.  H.  502:  1669, 

1671,  1683,  1685. 
V.  Newport,  5  R.  I.  333:  1373. 
V.  Ohio  Riv.  R.  R.  Co.,  39  W.  Va. 

732:    1646. 
V.  Patapsco  Guano  Co.,  144  N.  C. 

64:    151. 
V.  Rochester,  24  Barb.  446:  462. 
V.  Rochester  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  Barb. 

350:   1484. 
V.   South  Kingston,  18  R.  I.  283: 

913,  921. 
V.  White,  5  Bush  353:  423. 
Clarke  Co.  v.  Mississippi  Lumber  Co., 

80  Miss.  535:   164. 
Clarksburg  Elec.   Lt.  Co.  v.   Clarks- 
burg, 47  W.  Va.  739:   361,  408, 
409. 
Clarkson  v.  Wood,  168  Ind.  582:  1384. 
Clarksville  etc.  Turnpike  Co.  v.  At- 
kinson, 1  Sneed,  426:  1097,  1377, 
1385. 
Clarren  v.  Jefferson  School,  169  Ind. 

140:  995. 
Clary  v.  Woodbury  County,  135  Iowa 

488:   933. 
Classen  v.   Guano   Co.,  81   Md.   258: 

137. 
Clauson  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  106 

Wis.  308:  153. 
Clay  V.  Pennoyer  Creek  Imp.  Co.,  34 
Mich.  204:  976,  1403. 
V.  Pittsburg  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  164  Ind. 

439:   147,  157. 
V.  Postal  Tel.  Co.,   70  Miss.  406: 

1636. 
V.  St.  Albans,  43  W.  Va.  539:  155. 
Claybaugh  v.  Baltimore  &  Ohio  R.  R. 

Co.,  108  Ind.  262:   1371. 
Clayton  v.    Chicago    etc.   R.   R.    Co., 
67  Iowa  238:  1108. 
V.  County  Court,  58  W.  Va.  253: 
425,  958,  1569. 
Clear  Creek  Land  &  Ditch  Co.  v.  Kil- 
kenny, 5  Wyo.  38:  425. 
Clear  Creek  Water  Co.  v.  Gladeville 

Imp.  Co.,  107  Va.  278:  744. 
Clear  Lake  Water  Co.,  Matter  of,  48 

Cal.   586:    1383. 
Cleckler   v.    Morrow,    150   Ala.    524: 
1407. 


OASES    CITED. 


Ixxxv 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Clelland  v.  McCumber,  15  Colo.  355: 

1462,  1470,  1534. 
Clemans  v.  Hatch,  168  Ind.  291:  695. 
Clemens  v.  Conn.  Jlut.  Life  Ins.  Co., 

184  Mo.  46:    1161.  1601,  1012. 
T.  Speed,  93  Ky.  284:   440. 
Clement  v.  Burns,  43  N.  H.  609:    969, 

983. 
V.  Durgin,  5  Me.  9:  860,  1354. 
V.  Wichita  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  53  Kan. 

682:   1020,  1517. 
Clements   v.   Watkins   Land   Co.,   36 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  339 :    72. 
Cleneghau  v.  Omaha  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

25  Neb.  531:    93. 
Clercq  v.  Gallipolis,  7   Ohio    (pt.   1) 

217:    420,  1494,  1618. 
Cleveland  v.  Augusta,  102  Ga.  233: 

488. 
V.  Cleveland  City  Ry.  Co.  194  U.  S. 

517:  482. 
V.  Cleveland  Elec.  Ry.  Co.,  194  U. 

S.  538:    482. 
V.  Standard  Bag  &  Paper  Co.,  72 

Ohio  St.  324:    83,  866,  870. 

V.  Wick,  18  Ohio  St.  303:    1204. 

Cleveland  Burial  Case  Co.,  4  Ohio  C. 

C.   (N.  S.)   365:    1581. 
Cleveland  Elec.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cleveland 

etc.  Ry.  Co.,  204  U.  S.  116:    304, 

305,  407. 
Cleveland  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Akron,  1 

Ohio  C.  C.  (N.  S.)  174:    1624. 
V.  Akron,  6  Ohio  N.  P.  (N.  S.)  81: 

750,  752,  1609. 
V.  Ball,  5  Ohio  St.  568:    1119,  1124, 

1207,  1244. 
V.  Coburn,  91  Ind.  557:  839. 
V.  Feight,  41   Ind.  App.  416:     281, 

329,  1611. 
V.  Gorash,  8  Ohio  C.  0.    (N.  S.) 

297:     1140,    1270. 
V.  Hayes,  35  Ind.  App.  539:    1430. 
V.  Hobbie,  61  111.  App.  396:    851. 
V.  Huddleston,  21   Ind.   App.   621: 

159. 
V.  Kennedy,  20  Ind.  App.  315:  1545. 
V.  Kline,    29    Ind.    App.    390:     92, 

1639,  1654. 
V.  Munsell,  192  111.  430:    1457,  1472. 
V.  Nowlin,   163  Ind.  497:    1430. 
V.  Ohio  Postal   Tel.   Cable  Co.,  68 

Ohio    St.    306:     774,    1042,    1045, 

1046,  1284,  1285. 
V.  Patterson,  67  HI.  App.  351 :  449, 

1650,   1659. 
V.  Polecat   Dr.   Dist.,   213   111.   83: 

501,  507,  574,  704,  1047. 


Cleveland   etc.   R.   R.   Co.   v.   Porter, 

210  U.  S.  177:  11,  464. 
V.  South,  78  Ohio  St.  10:  709,  715. 
V.  Speer,  56  Pa.  St.  325:    255. 
V.  Stackhouse,    10    Ohio    St.    567: 

1547. 
V.  Urbana  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  5  Ohio  C. 

C.    (N.  S.)    583:   328,  765. 
V.  Wisehart,    162    Ind.    208:      92, 

1445.  1454. 
Click  V.  Lamar  Co.,  79  Tex.  121 :  865. 
Clifford  V.  Eagle,  35  111.  444:     1366. 
Cliflford  et  al.  Appellants,  59  Me.  262: 

1082. 
Clift  V.  Brown,  95  Ind.  53:    980. 
Clifton   Heights    v.   Kent    Mfg.    Co., 

220  Pa.  St.  585:    297. 
Cline  V.  Cornwall,  21  Grant  Ch.  129: 

356. 
V.  Stock,  71  Neb.  70:  1523,  1603. 
Clinical  Instruction  Co.  v.  New  York 

El.  R.  R.  Co.,  81  Hun  608:    1302. 
Clinkingbeard  v.  St.  Joseph,  122  Mo. 

641:   630,  633,  1308. 
Clinton  v.  Cedar  Rapids  &  Mo.  River 

R.  R.   Co.  24  la.  455:     251,  321. 
V.  Clinton  &  Lyons  Horse  Ry.  Co., 

.37  la.  61:    268,  321. 
V.  Walliker,  98  la.  655:    734. 
Clinton  Ave.,  Matter  of,  57  App.  Div. 

166:     515,   539,   739,   806,   807. 
Clinton  Ave.,  Matter  of,   KS?   N.  Y. 

624:     515,   539,    739,   806,   807. 
ainton  Tp.  Road,  3  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  170: 

1091,  1100,  1101,  1384. 
Close  V.  Samm,  27  la.  503:    1109. 
Qothier  v.  Webster,  12  C.  B.  N.  S. 

790:    1457. 
V.  Webster,   104  E.  C.  L.  R.  789: 

1457. 
aough  v.  Unity,  18  N.  H.  75:    1683. 
Cloure  V.   Canada   So.  R.   R.   Co.,   4 

Ont.  28:    850. 
aoverdale   v.   Smith,    128   Cal.   230 

154. 
Clowes  Private  Road,  31  Pa.  St.  12 

1165. 
Clowe's  Road,  2  Grant's  Cases,  129 

1390. 
Cloyes   V.   Middlebury   Elec.   Co.,   80 

Vt.  109:    92,  1604,  1612,  1617. 
Clute  V.  Carr,  20  Wis.  531 :    858. 

V.  Fisher,  65  Mich.  48:    109. 
Clymer  v.  Roberts,  220  Pa.  St.  162: 

368. 
C.  N.  0.  &  S.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  In  re,  19 

Ohio  C.  C.  308:    384. 
Coalville  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wilkes- 

Barre  Southside  R.  R.  Co.  5  Lu- 
zerne Leg.  Reg.  Rep.  340:    197. 


Ixxxvi 


CASES    CITED, 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Coates   V.   Campbell,   37   Minn.   498: 
550. 
V.  Dubuque,  68  Iowa  550 :  603. 
V.  Iowa,  68  la.  550:  616. 
V.  New  York,  7  Cow.  585 :    14. 
Coats  V.  Atchison  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  1  Cal. 
App.    441:     179,    250,    304,    1298. 
V.  Clarence    Ry.    Co.,    1    Kuss.    & 
Mylne,  181:    1601. 
Coatsville  etc.  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Uwchlan 
St.  Ry.   Co.,    18   Pa.   Super.   Ct. 
'524:     910. 
Coatsworth  v.  Lehigh  Val.  Ry.  Co., 
115  App.  Div.  7:    1596. 
V.  Lehigh  Val.   R.   R.  Co.,   156  N. 
Y.  451:    247,  255,  260,  324,  1580. 
Cobb  V.  Boston,  112  Mass.  181:    1147, 
1148,  1221. 
V.  Boston,    109    Mass.    438:     1121, 

1221,  1271,  1276. 
V.  Davenport,  32  N.  J.  L.  369:    109. 
V.  Davenport,  33  N.  J.  L.  223:    109. 
V.  Illinois  etc.  Co.,  68  111.  233:  1570, 

1574. 
V.  Smith,    16    Wis.    661:     1537. 
V.  Warren  St.  Ry.  Co.,  218  Pa.  St. 
366:    248,  635,  1585. 
Coberly  v.  Butler,  63  Mo.  App.  656: 

872   885 
Cobia  V.' Ellis,  149  Ala.  108:    1603. 
Coburn  v.  Ames,  52  Cal.  385:    1460. 
V.  New  Telephone  Co.,  156  Ind.  90: 

341,  343. 
V.  Pacific  Lumber   &  Mill  Co.,  46 

Cal.  31:    1461,  1627. 
V.  Sands,  150  Ind.  141:    1541. 
V.  San  Mater  Co.,  75  Fed.  520:  869, 

876. 
V.  Townsend,  103  Cal.  233:    1467. 
Cochran  v.  Missouri  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  94 

Mo.  App.  469:    1347. 
Cochrane     v.     Commonwealth,      175 
Mass.  299:   1229. 
v.  Maiden,   152   Mass.   365:     169. 
Cockroft's     Appeal,     60     Conn.     161: 

1397. 
Codman  v.  Evans,  5  Allen,  308:   191, 

192 
Coe  V.  Aiken,  61  Fed.  24:    814,  912, 
1061,  1064,  1572. 
V.  Columbus    etc.    R.    R.    Co.,    10 

Ohio  St.  372:     1579. 
V.  New  Jersey  M.  Ry.  Co.,  30  N. 

J.  Eq.  21:  854. 
V.  New    Jersey    Midland   Ry.    Co., 
31  N.  J.  Eq.  105:    908. 
Coe    College    v.    Cedar    Rapids,    120 

la.  541:    876. 
Coffey    County   v.   Venard,    10   Kan. 
95:     363,   387,   388. 


Coffeyville  M.  &  Gas  Co.  v.  Citizens' 
Nat.  Gas  Co.,  55  Kan.  179:   338, 
1621. 
Coffin    V.    Left    Hand    Ditch    Co.,    6 

Colo.  443:    70. 
Coffman    v.    St.    Francis    Dr.    Dist., 

83  Ark.  54:     11,  464. 
Cogshill   V.   Mobile    etc.,   R.   R.    Co., 

92   Ala.   252:     870,   1468. 
Cogswell  V.  Essex  Mill  Corp.,  6  Pick. 
94:    544,   1155,   1524. 
V.  New   York,  N.   H.   &  H.  R.  E. 
Co.,  103  N.  Y.  10:    67,  210,  451. 
Cohen  v.  Alameda,  124  Cal.  504:  911. 
V.  Cleveland,  43  Ohio  St.  190:  226. 
V.  Gray,  70  Cal.  85:     695. 
V.  La   Canada   L.    &   W.   Co.,    142 

Cal.  437:    78. 
V.  Railroad     Co.,     34     Kan.     158: 

1329. 

V.  St.    Louis    etc.    R.    R.    Co.,    34 

Kan.  158:    1235,  1320,  1346,  1347. 

V.  United    States,    162    Fed.    364: 

76,  1342. 

Cohn  V.  Wausau  Boom  Co.,  47  Wis. 

314:     101. 
Cohoes  V.  Del.  &  H.  Canal  Co.,  134 

N.  Y.  397:    878. 
Coker  v.   Atlanta  etc.   Ry.   Co.,   123 
Ga.  483:   363,  372,  384,  392,  399, 
405. 
Colbert  v.  Shepard,  89  Va.  401:    872, 

882. 
Colburn  v.  Kittridge,  131  Mass.  470: 

1343. 
Colby   V.   La   Grange,   65   Fed.   554: 

141,    724. 
Colby    University    v.    Canandaigua, 

69  Fed.  671:    783. 
Colclough    v.    Milwaukee,    92    Wis. 

182:  226. 

Colcough  V.  Nashville  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

2  Head,  171:  952,  961,  963,  1523. 

Golden  v.  Botts,  12  Wend.  234:  1414. 

Cole  V.  Boston,   181  Mass.  374:   468 

1122,   1186. 

V.  County    Comrs.,    78    Me.    532: 

1069,   1070. 
V.  Canaan,  29  N.  H.   88:     1381. 
V.  Drew,  44  Vt.  49:    357.   1489. 
V.  Eastham,    133    Mass.    65:      138. 
V.  Ellwood  Power  Co.,  216  Pa.  St. 

283:    1269. 
V.  Hadley,    162    Mass.    579:     183, 

878. 
V.  La   Grange,   113   U.   S.   1:     552, 

554. 
V.  Muscatine,  14  la.  296:    211,  603. 

617,   1550. 
V.  Peoria,    18  111.   301:     1385. 


CASES    CITED. 


Ixxxvii 


[The  references   are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719. 1 


Cole  V.  St.  Louis,  132  Mo.  633 :  1308, 
1334. 
V.  Shannon,    1    J.    J.    Marsh.   218: 

377,   384,    387,   390,    1427. 
V.  West    London    &    Crystal    Pal. 
Ey.  Co.,  27  Beav.  242:   822. 
Colegrove   Water   Co.   v.  Hollywood, 

1.51   Cal.   425:     1488. 
Coleman    v.    Andrews,    48   Me.    562: 
1017,  1032,  1387. 
V.  Holden,  88  Miss.  798;   363,  406, 

9.'52,    1596. 
V.  Moody,  4  Hen.  &  Munf .  1 :  1029, 

1105. 
T.  State,   134  N.  Y.   564:    866. 
Coles  V.  Midland  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  67 
N.  J.  L.   490:     896,   971. 
V.  Williamsburg,    10    Wend.    659: 
1164.  1167,  1168,  1373. 
College    Point   v.   Dennett,   5   N.   Y. 

Supreme  Ct.  217:    1234. 
Collier  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co,  48 
Mo.  App.  398:     147,   157. 
v.  Union   Ry.   Co.,   113   Tenn.    96: 
527,  716. 
Collins  V.  Asheville  Land  Co.,  128  N. 
C.  563:   190,  366,  880. 
V.  Buffalo    Furnace    Co.,    73    App. 

Div.   22:     366,  878,   888. 
V.  Chartiers   Valley    Gas    Co.,    130 

Pa.   St.    Ill:    162. 
V.  Chartiers    Valley   Gas    Co.,    131 

Pa.    St.    143:     162. 
V.  Crecy,  8  Jones  L.  333:  722. 
V.  Houghton,  4  Ired.  L.  420:    1397, 

1412. 
V.  Philadelphia,    93    Pa.    St.    272: 

236. 
V.  Rupe,   109  Ind.   340:    981,   982. 
V.  Saratoga  Springs,  70  Hun  583: 

1029. 
V.  Savannah,  77  Ga.  745:   432. 
V.  South  Staffordshire  Ry.  Co.,  21 
L.  J.  Ex.  N.  S.  247:    1116. 
Collis,  Matter  of,  76  App.  Div.  368: 

1379. 
Colon  V.   Lisk,   153  N.  Y.   188:    486. 
Colonial  City  Traction  Co.  v.  Kings- 
ton  City  R.  R.   Co.,   153  N.   Y. 
540:    917,  1053. 
V.  Kingston    City   R.   R.    Co.,    154 
N.   Y.   493:     920. 
Colony  V.  Dublin,  32  N.  H.  432:  696. 
Colorado   Cent.   R.   R.   Co.   v.   Allen, 
13  Cal.  229:   831,  942. 
V.  Humphreys,   16   Colo.  34:    1085, 
1217. 
Colorado  Consol  L.   &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Morris,   1  Colo.  App.  401:    1638. 


Colorado  Eastern  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Chi- 
cago etc.  Ry.  Co.,  141  Fed.  898: 
1570,   1624. 
V.  Union  Pae.  R.  R.   Co.,   41   Fed. 
293:     527,    534,    679,    714,    754, 
800.  1068. 
V.  Union  Pac.  R.   R.  Co.,   94  Fed. 
312:    930. 
Colorado   Fuel   &   Iron   Co.   v.   Four 
Mile  Ry.  Co.,  29  Colo.  90:    706, 
897,  1042,  1046,  1085,  1108,  1461. 
Colorado  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown,  15 
Colo.    193:    1176.   1200. 
V.  Croman,    16   Colo.   381:    1137. 
V.  Jones,   29   Fed.    193:    929,   931. 
V.  Trevarthen,    1    Colo.   App.    152: 
639. 
Colorado  So.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Boagni, 

118  La.  268:   1068,  1378. 
Colorado    Springs    v.    Colorado    etc. 

Ry.   Co.,   38   Colo.   107:    331. 
Colston  V.  St.  Joseph,  106  Mo.  App. 

714:  348. 
Colton  V.  Rossi,  9  Cal.  595:  1162. 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  7  Misc. 
626:     1120,    1121. 
Columbia   v.   Melton,   81   S.   C.   356: 

1624. 
Columbia    Delaware    Bridge    Co.    v. 
Geisse,  35  N.  J.  L.  474:   1097. 
V.  Geisse,  35  N.  J.  L.  558:  628. 
V.  Geisse,  36  N.  J.  L.  537:  1097. 
V.  Geisse,  38  N.  J.  L.  39 :  964. 
Columbia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Seattle,  6 
Wash.  332:   118. 
V.  Seattle,  33  Wash.  513:  882,  885. 
Columbia  Heights  Realty  Co.  v.  Mac- 
farland,  31  App.  Cas.  D.  C.  112: 
691,  1378 
Columbia  Val.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Portland 
etc.  Ry.  Co.,  49  Wash.  88:  901. 
Columbia  W.  P.  Co.  v.  Nunamaker, 

73  S.  C.  550:   1625. 
Columbus    V.    Bidlingmeier,    7    Ohio 
C.  C.  136:   1109. 
V.  Columbus  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  37  Ind. 

294:  303,  1503,  1620. 
V.  Columbus  Gas  Co.,  76  Ohio  St. 

309:  361,  408,  410. 
V.  Hydraulic  Woolen  Mills  Co.  33 

Ind.  435:   1597. 
V.  McDaniel,  117  Ga.  823:  629. 
V.  Storey,  33  Ind.   195:   210,  1.597. 
V.  Union  Pac.  E.  R.  Co.,  137  Fed. 

869:  399. 
V.  Willard,  7  Ohio  0.  C.  113:  229, 
442. 
Columbia  etc.  Bridge  Co.  v.  Geise,  34 

N.  .J.  L.  268:   954. 
Columbus  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Baker,  34 
Pa.  Co.  Ct.  28:   816. 


Ixxxviii 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:  Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Columbus  etc.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Braden, 
110  Ind.  558:   1502. 
V.  Richardson,  7  Ind.  543 :  1017. 
V.  Simpson,  5  Ohio  St.  251:   1192. 
V.  Williams,  53  Ohio  St.  268:  835. 
Columbus  Gas  Lt.  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Co- 
lumbus, 50  Ohio  St.  65 :  238,  352. 
Columbus  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis 
etc.  Ry.  Co.,  117  La.  199:  1052. 
Columbus  &  Western  Ry.  Co.  v.  With- 
erow,    82    Ala.     190:    638,    966, 
1579. 
Columbus   W.  W.   Co.  v.  Long,    121 
Ala.    245:    588,    684,    988,    989, 
1043,  1044. 
Colusa  Co.  V.  Hudson,  85  Cal.  633: 

1238,  1319. 
Colvill  V.  St.  Paul  &  Chicago  Ry.  Co., 
19  Minn.  283:   1119,  1122,  1186, 
1205,  1314,  1378. 
Colville  V.  Judy,  73  Mo.  651:  990. 

V.  Langdon,  22  Minn.  565:    1464. 
Combs  V.  Smith,  78  Mo.  32:  1186. 
Comesky.v.  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  41 
App.  Div.  N.  Y.  245:  339,  1651. 
V.  Suflfem,  179  N.  Y.  393:  609,  616, 

1073. 
V.  Suflfem,  83  App.  Div.  137:  609, 
616,  1073. 
Coming   v.    Bradbury,    10   Me.   447: 

1155. 
Commett   v.    Pearson,    18   Me.    344: 

1101. 
Commissioner  of  Public  Works,  Mat- 
ter of.  111  App.  Div.  285:   690, 
690,  1396. 
Commissioner  of  Public  Works,  Mat- 
ter of,  185  N.  Y.  391:  690,  696, 
1396. 
Commissioners  v.  Allen,  25  Kan.  616 : 
1710. 
V.  Barry,  66  111.  496 :  1095. 
V.  Baumgarten,  41  111.  254:   1100, 

1101. 
V.  Carthage,  27  111.  140:  1411,  1421. 
V.  Cook,  86  N.  C.  18 :   1423. 
V.  Durham,  43  111.  86:  1366. 
V.  Espen,  12  Kan.  531 :  1510,  1512, 

1576. 
V.  Green,  156  111.  504:   1572,  1602. 
V.  Harper,  38  111.  103:   1017,  1032, 

1095,   1413. 
V.  Heed,  33  Kan.  34:  1028. 
V.  Hoblit,   19  111.  App.  259:    1020. 
V.  Jacksonville,  36  Fla.  196:   171. 
V.  Johnston,  71  N.  C.  398:   1187. 
V.  Judge,  13  Wend.  432:   1409. 
V.  Judges,  7  Wend.  264 :  1058. 
V.  Judges,  10  Wend.  434:   1415. 
V.  Judges,  17  Wend.  9:  683,  726. 
V.  Judges,  25  Wend.  453 :  1407. 


Commissioners    v.    Mallory,    21    111. 

App.  184:   982,  984. 
V.  Moesta,  91  Mich.  149:  738,  1058, 

1274. 
V.  Murray,  1  Rich.  L.  335:    1018, 

1029. 
V.   Quinn,   38  111.  App.   192:    1403. 
V.    Supervisors,   53  111.   320:    1401, 

1402. 
V.  Tarver,  25  Ala.  480:  933. 
V.  Thompson,  18  Ala.  694:  933. 
V.  Whitsett,  15  111.  App.  318:  233. 
Commissioners'   Court   v.   Bowie,   34 

Ala.  461:  678,  1087,  1163. 
V.  Street,  116  Ala.  28:  710,  1158, 

1317,  1318,  1392. 
V.  Thompson  18  Ala.  694:  1516. 
V.  Traber,  25  Ala.  480:  1419. 
Comrs.  etc.  on  Pequest  River,  Mat- 
ter of,  39  N.  J.  L.  433 :  564,  578. 
Comrs.  etc.  on  Pequest  River,  Matter 

of,   41   N.   J.  L.    175:    564,   566, 

578,  584. 
Comrs.  etc.  on  Pequest  River,  Matter 

of,  42  N.  J.  L.  553:  578. 
Comrs.   of   Canal  Fund  v.  Perry,   5 

Ohio  58:  514. 
Commissioners  of  Highways  v.  Baer, 

224  111.  259 :  975. 
V.  Barnes,  195  HI.  43:  1398,  1412, 

1416. 
V.  Claw,  15  Johns.  537 :  1013,  1014, 

1405. 
V.  Ellwood,  193  111.  304:  973. 
V.  Green,  156  111.  504:  1574. 
V.  Harrison,  108  111.  398 :  1573. 
V.  Husker,  133  111.  App.  252:  1409. 
V.  Jackson,  165  IlL  17:  1531. 
V.   Ludwick,   151   Mich.  498:    787. 
V.  Meserole,  10  Wend.  122:  975. 
V.  Newby,  31  111.  App.  78:  1421. 
V.  People,  38  111.  347:  1637. 
V.  People,  2  111.  App.  24:  1032. 
V.  People,  4  111.  App.  391:   1637. 
V.  People,  61  111.  App.  634:   1371, 

1372. 
V.  Quinn,   136  111.  604:    383,  400, 

,1402. 
V.  Riker,  79  Mich.  551:  869. 
V.  Smith,  217  HI.  250:  1017,  1033, 

1034,  1099,  1418. 
V.  Snyder  15  111.  App.  645:  1531. 
V.  Sperling,  120  Mich.  493:  322. 
V.  Sweet,  77  HI.  App.  641 :  154. 
V.  Young,  34  111.  App.  178:   1614. 
Comrs.  of  Homochitto  River  v.  With- 
ers, 29  Miss.  21 :  76,  100. 
Comrs.   of   Inland   Fisheries  v.  Hol- 

yoke  Water  Power  Co.,  104  Mass. 

446:  486. 


CASES    CITED. 


Ixxxix 


[Tile  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.1 


Comrs.   of   Kensington  v.  Wood,    10 

Pa.  St.  93:  235. 
Commissioners  of  Parks  v.  Michigan 

Cent.  R.  E.  Co.,  90  Mich.  385: 

749. 
V.  Mich.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  90  ilich. 

385:    1290. 
V.  Moesta,  91  Mich.  149:   738. 
V.  Detroit  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  91  Mich. 

291:   1290. 
V.  Detroit  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  93  Mich. 

58:   751. 
Comrs.  of  State  Reservation  at  Niag- 
ara, Matter  of,   15  Abb.   N.   C. 

159:   106,  1168. 
Comrs.  of  State  Reservation  at  Niag- 
ara,  Matter  of,    15  Abb.  N.   C. 

395:  106,  1168. 
Comrs.  of  State  Reservation,  Matter 

of,  16  Abb.  N.  C.  159 :  1397. 
Commissioners  of  State  Reservation 

at  Niagara,   37   Hun   537:    106, 

923. 
Commissioners  of  State  Reservation 

at  Niagara,  102  N.  Y.  734:  106, 

923,  1168,  1397. 
Comrs.  of  Washington  Park,  Matter 

of,  52  N.  Y.  131:  978. 
Commonwealth  v.  Abbott;,  160  Mass. 

282:  912,  914,  1057. 
V.  Alger,  7  Cush.  53 :  136,  467,  470, 

480,  557. 
V.  Alger,  7  Cush.  84:  14. 
V.  Allegheny  Val.  Ry.  Co.,  14  Pa. 

Supr.  Ct.  336:  1643,  1644,  1645. 
V.  Atlantic  Coast  Line  Ey.  Co.,  106 

Va.  61 :  483. 
V.  Bacon,  13  Bush  (Ky.)   210:  15, 

472. 
V.  Bainbridge,  6  J.  J.  Marsh.  436: 

1427. 
V.  Barker,   140  Pa.  St.   189:    882, 

885. 
V.  Beatty,  1  Watts,  382 :  695. 
V.  Beaver,  171  Pa.  St.  542:  357. 
V.  Blue  Hill  Turnpike,  5  Mass.  420: 

1392,  1422. 
V.  Bond,  214  Pa.  St.  307 :  427,  763. 
V.  Boston,  12  Cush.  254:  1510. 
T.  Boston  Advertiser  Co.,  188  Mass. 

348:  57,  67,  471,  540,  738,  1154. 
v.  Boston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Cush. 

25:   107,  1439. 
v.  Boston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  134  Mass. 

211:  475. 
V.  Boston  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  150  Mass. 

174:   401. 
V.  Boston  Terminal  Co.,  185  Mass. 

281:  746. 
V.   Bowman,   3   Pa.    St.   202:    420, 

1494. 


Commonwealth  v.  Breed,  4  Pick.  460 : 

96. 
V.  Broad  St.  Ry.  Co.,  219  Pa.  St. 

11:  362,  736,  791. 
V.   Cambridge,  4  Mass.  627:    955, 

1004. 
V.  Cambridge,  7  Mass.  158:  1035. 
V.  Carpenter,  3  Mass.  268 :  1436. 
V.  Chapin,  5  Pick.  199 :  103. 
V.  Chase,  2  Mass.  170:   955,  1004, 

1017. 
V.  Comrs.,  2  Mass.  489:  1316. 
V.  Coombs,  2  Mass.  489:  955,  969, 

1185,  1368. 
T.  County  Commissioners,  8  Pick. 

343:  979,  1034. 
V.   Covington  &   Cinn.   Bridge  Co. 

(Ky.)   21  S.  W.  1042:  481,  483. 
v.  Covington  &  Cinn.  Bridge  Co., 

154  U.  S.  204:   481. 
v.  Cutter,  156  Mass.  52:  492. 
V.  Dudley,  5  T.  B.  Mon.  22:  1427. 
V.   Eastern   R.   R.   Co.,   103   Mass. 

254:   486. 
V.    Bgremont,    6   Mass.    491:    955, 

1058. 
V.  Ellis,  11  Mass.  462:  981. 
V.  Emmers,   221  Pa.   St.  298:    86, 

473. 
V.  Emmers,  33  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  151: 

84. 
V.  Erie  &  North  East  R.  R.  Co.,  27 

Pa.  St.  339:  727. 
V.  Favis,  5  Rand.  691:   1459. 
V.  Fisher,   1  P.  &  W.    (Pa.)   462: 

1156,  1157,  1360. 
V.   Fitchburg  R.   R.   Co.,  8   Cush. 

240:  711. 

V.  FoUett,  164  Mass.  477:  471. 
V.  Frankfort,  92  Ky.  149 :  252,  300, 

310,  314,  316,  1582. 
V.  Great  Barrington,  6  Mass.  492: 

1368. 
V.  Hall,  8  Pick.  440:   1430. 
V.  Hauck,   103  Pa.  St.  536:    1487, 

1488. 
V.  Hartford  &  New  Haven  R.  E. 

Co.,  14  Gray  379:    319. 
V.  Haverhill,  7  Allen  523:  1472. 
V.  Interstate  Consolidated  St.  Ey. 

187  Mass.  436:  484. 
V.  Ipswich,  2  Pick.  70:  1100. 
v.  Kevin,  202  Pa.  St.  23:  479. 
V.  Logan,  5  Litt.  286:   865. 
V.  Low,  3  Pick.  413 :  872. 
V.  McAllister,  2  Watts,  190:   1156, 

1157. 
V.    Merrick,    2    Mass.    529:     1372, 

1373. 
V.  Metcalf,  2  Mass.   118:    1017. 
V.    Moorehead,    118    Pa.    St     344: 

887,  890. 


xc 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the   pages :  Vol.  1,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Commonwealth  v.  Newberry,  2  Pick. 

57:  872. 
V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  138  Pa. 

St.  58:  1643. 
V.    Norfolk,    5    Mass.    435:     1533, 

1638. 
V.  Northeastern  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  161 

Pa.  St.  409:  268,  719. 
V.  Noxon,  121  Mass.  42:  1343. 
V.  Parks,  155  Mas.  531:  457. 
V.  Pennsylvania  Canal  Co.,  66  Pa. 

St.  41:   15,  486. 
V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  117  Pa.  St.  637 

1643,  1645. 
V.  Peters,  2  Mass.  125:  1343. 
V.  Peters,  3  Mass.  229:   969,  1004, 

1013. 
V.    Philadelphia,    2    Whart.    286: 

1532. 
T.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.   Co.,   135 

Pa.  St.  256:   883. 
V.  Pittsburgh  &  Connellsville  R.  R. 

Co.,  58  Pa.  St.  26:   1173. 
V.  Royce,  152  Pa.  St.  88:  890,  891. 
V.    Russell,    172    Pa.    St.    506:    85, 

1605. 
V.  Sawin,  2  Pick.  547:  514. 
V.  Sessions  of  Middlesex,  9  Mass. 

388:    1185. 
V.  Sheldon,  3  Mass.  188 :  1017. 
T.    Shoemaker,    14   Pa.    Supr.    Ct. 

194:  366. 
V.  Sisson,  178  Mass.  578:  479. 
V.  Sisson,  189  Mass.  247:  866. 
V.  Snyder,  2  Watts,  418:  625. 
V.  Stevens,  10  Pick.  247:  779. 
V.  Tewksbury,  11  Met.  55:  14,  470. 
V.  Trent,  117  Ky.  35:  471. 
V.  Uwchlan  St.  Ry.  Co.,  203  Pa.  St. 

608 :  427,  763. 
V.  Vrooman,  164  Pa.  St.  306:  479. 
V.  Weimer,  3  Met.  445 :  1034. 
V.  Westborough,  3  Mass.  406:  1028, 

1093. 
V.  West  Boston  Bridge,   13   Pick. 

195:   1422. 
V.  West  Chester,  9  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  542 : 

272,  642. 
V.   Young  Men's   Christian   Asso., 

169  Pa.  St.  24:  105. 
Como  V.  Worcester,   177  Mass.  543: 

1245. 
Compton  V.  Seattle,  38  Wash.  514: 

230,  631,  1511,  1577. 
V.  Susquehanna  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Bland 
Ch.  386:   1163,  1165. 
Comstock  V.  Clearfield  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

169  Pa.  St.  582:  1244. 
Conabeer  v.   New  York  Central  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  84  Hun  34 :  1354. 
V.  New  York  Cent.  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
156  N.  Y.  474:  846,  849. 


Conan  v.  Ely,  91  Minn.  127:    1229, 

1268. 
Conant,  In  re,  83  Me.  42 :  1425. 
Conant's  Appeal,  102  Me.  477 :   1081. 
Conant  v.  Deep  Creek  etc.  Irr.  Co.,  23 

Utah  627 :  934. 
Conboy  v.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

42  Kan.  658 :  830. 
Concord,  Petition  of,  50  N.  H.  530: 

364,  383,  387. 
Concord  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Boston  etc. 

R.  R.  Co.,  68  N.  H.  519:  762. 
Concordia  v.  Natchez  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

44  La.  Ann.  613:  157. 
Concordia   Cem.  Assn.  v.  Minnesota 

etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  121  111.  199:  1138, 

1267. 
Concord  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Robertson,  66  N. 

H.    1:    109,   110,   111,   113,   115, 

120,  128,  129,  137. 
Concord  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Greeley  17  N.  H. 

47:   23,  495,  496,  498,  500,  506, 

524,  534,  684,   1029. 
V.  Greely,  20  N.  H.  157 :   1428. 
V.  Greely  23  N.  H.  237:  1138,  1146. 
Concord  Tp's  Appeal,  1  Walker's  Pa. 

Supm.  Ct.  195:   780,  1643. 
Condemnation  of  Land  at  Nahaut,  In 

re,  128  Fed.  185:   780,  1346. 
Condemnation     of     Land     for    New 

State  House,  In  re,  19  R.  I.  382 : 

1221,  1329. 
Condict  V.  Ramsey,  65  N.  J.  L.  503: 

1102. 
Condon   v.    County   Comrs.,   89    Me. 

409:    1028. 
Cone  v.  Hartford,  28  Conn.  363 :  176, 

335. 
Coney  Island  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter 

of,  12  Hun  451:  913. 
Conger  v.  Burlington  &  S.  W.  R.  R. 

Co.,  41  la.  419:  1625,  1629. 
V.  Hudson  Riv.  R.  R.  Co.,  12  N.  Y. 

190:    1102. 
V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  120 

N.  Y.  29 :  843,  852. 
Conklin  v.  Keokuk,  73  la.  343:  602, 

604,  619,  965,  1405. 
V.  Mackinaw  City,  120  Mich.  67: 

878,  887,  890. 
V.  New  York  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  102  N.  Y. 

107:   211,   226,  319. 
V.  Old  Colony  R.  R.  Co.,  154  Mass. 

155:  809. 
Conkling  v.  Zerga,  72  Hun  134:  1649, 

1659. 

Connable  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  60 

la.  27:  966,  1403. 
Connecticut  &  Passumpsic  Rivers  R. 

R.    Co.    V.    Holton,    32    Vt.    43: 

1477,  1481. 


CASES    CITED. 


XCl 


[The  references  are  to  the   pages:   Vol.   1,   pp.   1-742;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Connecticut  Riv.  Lumber  Co.  v.  01- 

cott   Falls   Co.,   65   N.   H.    290: 

1607. 
Connecticut  River  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Clapp, 

1  Cush.  559:  1112,  1114,  1359. 
y.  County  Comrs.,   127   Mass.   50; 

1168. 
Connellsville  Gas  Coal  Co.  v.  Balti- 
more etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  216  Pa.  St. 

309:    1626,  1713,  1714. 
Conner  v.  Covington  Transfer  R.  R. 

Co.,   (Ky.)    19  S.  W.  597:   1624. 
Conners  v.  Yazoo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  86 

Miss.  356:  848. 
Conness  v.  Indiana  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  193 

111.  464:  952,  1315,  1379. 
Conniflf  v.  San  Francisco,  67  Cal.  45: 

60,  153. 
Connolly   v.   Griswold,   7   Iowa  416: 

1555 
V.  \Yoods,  13  Ida.  591:   1047,  1050, 

1071. 
Conrad  v.  County  of  Lewis,  10  W.  Va. 

784:   993    1022 
V.  Smith,  32  Mich.  429 :  336,  1487, 

1594. 
V.  Waples,  96  U.  S.  279:   19. 
V.  West  End  Hotel  &  Land  Co.,  126 

N.  C.  776:  420,  878. 
Conshohocken  Ave.,    1   Walker's   Pa. 

Supm.  Ct.  424:    1098. 
Conshohocen   R.   R.   Co.   v.   Pennsyl- 
vania R.  R.  Co.,  15  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

445:  780. 
Consolidated  Channel  Co.  v.  Central 

Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  51  Cal.  269: 

497,  563. 
Consolidated  El.  Lt.  Co.  v.  People's 

El.  Lt.  &  G.  Co.,  94  Ala.  372: 

911. 
Consolidated  Gas,  Elec.  Lt.  &  P.  Co. 

V.  Northern   Cent.  Ry.  Co.,   107 

Md.  671:  1667. 
Consumers  Gas  &  El.  Lt.  Co.  v.  Con- 
gress Spring  Co.,  69  Hun   133: 

345. 
Consolidated  Home  Supply  Ditch  & 

R.  R.  Co.  V.  Hamlin,  6  Colo.  App. 

341:  144,  1455. 
Consolidated  Rendering   Co.  v.  Ver- 
mont, 207  U.  S.  541:  460. 
Consolidated  Traction  Co.  v.  Jordan, 

36   Ind.    App.    1.56:    1128,    1192, 

1250. 
V.  South  Orange  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  56 

N.  J.  Eq.  569:  329,  1611. 
Constitution   Wharf    Co.   v.    Boston, 

156  Mass.  397  :  142. 
Consumers    Gas    Trust    Co.    v.    Am. 

Plate  Glass  Co.,   162   Ind.   393: 

864,  867,  1481,  1573. 


Consumers  Gas  Trust  Co.  v.  Harless 

131    Ind.    446:    2,   23,    672,    673 

675,    1461,    1463,    1465. 
V.  Huntsinger   12   Ind.  App.  285 

1112,  1409. 
V.  Huntsinger,  14  Ind.  App.   156 

337. 
Conter  v.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  22 

Minn.  342:  1225. 
V.  St,  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  24  Minn. 

313:    1425. 
Continental  Ins.  Go.  v.  Rhoads,   119 

U.  S.  237:  996. 
Contra  Costa  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Moss,  23 

Cal.  323:  991. 
Contra  Costa  Water  Co.  v.  Van  Rens- 
selaer, 155  Fed.  140:  965. 
Convers  v.  Atchison  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

142  U.  S.  671:   1115,  1392. 
V.  Grand  Rapids  &  Indiana  R.  R. 

Co.,  18  Mich.  459:   912,  930. 
Converse   v.    Calumet  Riv.   Ry.    Co., 

195  111.  204,  871. 
Conway  v.  Ascherman,  94  Ind.  187: 

973. 
Conwell  V.  Emrie,  2  Ind.  35:  16. 
V.  Emrie,  4  Ind.  209:   234. 
V.   Hagerstown   Canal   Co.,   2  Ind. 

588:    1522. 
V.  Springfield  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  81  111. 

232:    834,  1354. 
V.  Tate,  107  Ind.  171 :  1385. 
Cook  V.  Ansonia,  66  Conn.  413:  600, 

601,  617,  619,  1308,  1549. 
V.  Bath,  L.  R.  6  Eq.  Gas.  177 :  372, 

382,  391. 
V.  Boone  Subn.  Elec.  Ry.  Co.,  122 

la.  437:   1208. 
V.  Burlington,  36  la.  357:   243. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.   Co.,  83  la. 

278:  1293,  1304. 
V.    Covert,    71    Mich.    249:     1017, 

1520. 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Miscl. 

248:   1151,  1301,  1302. 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  144  N. 

Y.  115:   1150,  1151,  1302. 
V.  Quick,  127  Ind.  477:   385,  386, 

390,  402. 
V.  Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry.  Co.   107 

Va.  32:    151. 
V.  South  Park  Comrs.,  61  111.  115: 

539,  1115,  1162,  1222,  1324,  1392. 
V.  Sudden,  94  Cal.  443:  879. 
V.  Totten,  49  W.  Va.  177 :  183,  191, 

366,  404. 
V.  Vickers,  141  N.  C.  101:  515, 

1396,   1400. 
Cook  &  R.  Co.  V.  Sanitary  District, 

177  111.  599:   1271,  1313. 


XCll 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-742  ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1T19.] 


Cool  V.  Crommet,  13  Me.  250:   938, 

948,  1032. 
Coolidge  V.  Dexter,  129  Mass.   167: 

879. 
Cooling  V.  Great  Northern  R.  E.  Co., 

19  L.  J.  Q.  B.  25:  651. 
Coolman  v.   Fleming,   82   Ind.    117: 

995,  996,  1028. 
Coolville  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wilkes- 
Barre  South  Side  R.  R.  Co.,  5 
Luzerne    Leg.    Reg.    Rep.    340: 
299. 
Coombs   V.    County   Comrs.,    68   Me. 
484:   514. 
V.    County    Comrs.,    71    Me.    239: 

1505. 
V.  Salt  Lake  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  9  Utah 
322:   1581,  1617. 
Coon  V.  Mason  Co.,  22  111.  666 :  1398. 
Cooper's  Application,   28   Hun   515: 

539. 
Cooper   V.    Alden,   Harr.    Mich.    72: 
297,  308,  315. 
V.  Anniston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  85  Ala. 

106:  731,  1624. 
V.  Board  of  Works,  108  Eng.  Com. 

Law  181 :   1014. 
V.  Chester  R.  R.  Co.,  19  N.  J.  Eq. 

199:    1463. 
V.  Dallas,  83  Tex.  239:   153,  1309, 

1339. 
v.  Hall,  5  Ohio  320:  94. 
V.  Manhattan  E.  R.  Co.,  85  Hun 

217:  1305. 
V.  Monterey  Co.,  104  Cal.  437 :  881, 

886. 
V.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  123  Mo. 

App.  141:   160. 
V.  Scranton  City,  21  Pa.  Supr.  Ct. 

17:   631,  1251,  1523,  1525. 
V.  Williams,  4  Ohio  253 :  78,  523. 
V.  Williams,  5  Ohio  391 :  522. 
Cooper  etc.  Application  of,  93  N.  Y. 

507:  1389. 
Coosa   Eiv.   Steamboat   Co.   v.    Bar- 
clay, 30  Ala.  130:  475. 
Copcutt  V.  Yonkers,  83  Hun  178:  912, 

914. 
Copeland  v.  Packard,   16  Pick.  217: 

514,  1028. 
Coquard  v.  Boehmer,  81  Mich.  445: 

1027. 
Corbin  v.  Cedar  Rapids  etc.  Ry.  Co., 
66  la.  73:  1669,  1700. 
V.    Marsh,    2    Duv.    Ky.    463:    18, 

807,  1154. 
V.  Wisconsin  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  66  la. 
269:   1046,  1073. 


Corby  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  150 

Mo.  457:  180,  311,  1582. 
Corcoran  v.  Benicia,  96  Cal.  1 :  235. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  149  111. 

291:   1581. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  E.  R.  Co.,  37  111. 
App.  417:  1581. 
Cord  V.  High,  24  la.  336:  236. 
Core  V.  Norfolk,  99  Va.  190:  894. 
Coreghino  v.  Ore.  Short  Line  R.  R. 

Co.,  26  Utah  467  :  1590. 
Corey  v.  Buffalo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  23 
Barb.  482:   246,  248.  324. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  100  Mo. 
282:    893,    898,    959,    980,    982, 
1091. 
V.   Probate  Judge,   56  Mich.   524: 

1017,  1036,  1420. 
V.  Swagger,  74  Ind.  211:  990,  1406. 
V.  Swagger,  74  Ind.  481 :  979,  1150. 
V.  Wrentham,  164  Mass.  18 :  1683. 
Cork  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  v.  Harnett,  16 
Ir.  Ch.  Rep.  268:  1566. 
v.  Harnett,  5  Irish  Rep.  Eq.  308: 
1566. 
Corley  v.  Kennedy,  28  111.  143:  1017. 
Cornelius  v.  Glen,  7  Jones  L.  512:  15, 

486. 
Cornell  v.  Crawford  Co.,  11  Ark.  604: 

1412. 
Coming   v.   Woolner,    206    111.    190: 

182,   888. 
Cornish  v.  Milwaukee  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

60  Wis.  476:  929. 
Cornplanter  Tp.  Road,  No.  1:  26  Pa. 

Super.  Ct.  20:  982. 
Cornplanter  Tp.  Road,  26  Pa.  Supr. 

Ct.  29:   1029. 
Comville  v.  Co.  Comrs.,  33  Me.  237: 

1370. 
Cornwall  v.  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
87  Ky.  72:  737,  745,  749,  1262, 
1492. 
V.  Louisville  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  104  Ky. 
29:   1671. 
Corporation    v.    Manhattan    Co.,    1 
Caines    Eep.    507:     1020,    1081, 
1377. 
Corporation  Commission  v.  Atl.  Coast 
Line  R.  E.  Co.,  137  N.  C.  1 :  488. 
V.  Atl.  Coast  Line  E.  R.  Co.,  139 

N.  C.  126:  488. 
V.   Seaboard  Air  Line  R.  E.   Co., 

127  N.  C.  283:  481. 
V.  Seaboard  Air  Line  E.  E.  Co.,  140 
N.  C.  239:  488,  489,  533. 
Corr  V.  Philadelphia,  14  Pa.  Dist.  Ct. 
35:    1504. 
V.  Philadelphia,  212  Pa.  St.  123: 
I  1503:  1504. 


OASES    CITED. 


XClll 


[The  references   are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Corrigal  v.  London  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  44 

E.  C.  L.  R.  123:   1029. 
V.  London  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  5  M.  &  G. 

219:    1029. 
Corrigan   v.    Chicago,    144   111.   537: 

1255,  1257,  1258. 
Corse  V.  Norfolk,  99  Va.  190:   1044, 

1053. 
Corsicana  v.  Zorn,  97  Tex.  317:  366, 

878,  879,  889. 
Cortelyou  v.  Van  Brundt,  2  Johns. 

357:  1486. 
Cortland  &  Homer  Horse  R.  R.  Co., 

Matter  of,  98  N.  Y.  336:   1281, 

1438. 
Corwin  v.  Cowan,  12  Ohio  St.  629: 

808,  1506. 
V.   Erie   R.   R.   Co.,   84  App.   Div. 

555:   93,   1607. 
V.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  178  N.  Y.  590: 

93,  1607. 
V.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  51  Kan. 

451:   1519. 
Corwith  V.  Hyde  Park,  14  HI.  App. 

635 :   1526,  1528,  1675. 
Cosard  v.   Kanawha   Hardwood  Co., 

139  N.  C.  283:  22. 
Cosby  V.  Lynn,  4  Bibb  249 :  1403. 
Cosens  v.  Bogner  Ry.  Co.,  36  L.  J. 

Eq.  104:   1536. 
Cosgriff  V.  Tri-State  Telephone  Co., 

15  N.  D.  210:   339. 
Costa  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Moss,  23  Cal.  323 : 

754. 
Costello  V.  Burke,  63  la.  361:    928, 

1135,  1137. 
Coster  V.  Albany,  52  Barb.  276 :  624. 
V.  Albany,  43  N.  Y.  399 :  363,  370, 

371,  380,  388,  625,  666. 
V.  New  Jersey  R.  R.  Co.,  23  N.  J. 

L.  227:  893,  1021,  1033. 
V.  New  Jersey  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  24  N. 

J.  L.  730:  748,  1097.  1347. 
T.  Tide  Water  Co.,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  54: 

14,  497,  498,  501,  565,  566,  577, 

578,  584,  675. 
V.  Tide  Water  Co.,   18  N.  J.   Eq. 

518:  14,  675. 
Costigan  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co., 

54  N.  J.  L.   233:    446,  455,  456, 

847,  856,  1476. 
Cotauch  V.  Grover,  57  Hun  272:  1490. 
Cotes  V.  Davenport,  9  la.  227:   235, 

604,  618. 
Cother  v.  Midland  Ry.  Co.,  2  Phillips 

469:  714. 
Cott  V.  Lewiston  R.  R.  Co.,  36  N.  Y. 

214:   76,  146. 
Cottle  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

27  App.  Div.  N.  Y.  604:   1526. 


Cotton  V.   Boston   El.   Ry.   Co.,    191 
Mass.  103:  1134,  1151,  1304. 
V.  Miss.  &  R.  Riv.  Boom  Co.,   19 

Minn.  497:   100. 
v.  Mississippi  &  Rum  River  Boom 
Co.,  22  Minn.  372:  101,  543,  677. 
Cottrill  V.  Myrick,  12  Me.  222:  501. 
Cotts  V.  Wheeling  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  63 
W.    Va.    39:     1446,    1547,    1548, 
1649,  1657,  1717. 
Couch,  Ex  parte,  14  Ark.  337:  1412. 
Coulter  V.  Hunter,  4  Rand.  58:   723. 
Council  Bluffs  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bent- 
ley,  62  la.  446:   898. 
County  Comrs.  v.  Hoag,  48  Kan.  413 : 
1353. 
V.  Humphrey,  47  Ga.  565 :  1568. 
V.  McGee,  20  Ohio  C.  C.  201:  1674. 
County   Court   v.   Griswold,   58   Mo. 

175:  539,  676,  814,  1043. 
Coutaut    V.    Catlin,    2    Sandf.    485: 

1253. 
Covert    V.    Brooklyn,    13    App.    Div. 
188:  74. 
V.  Cranford,  141  N.  Y.  521 :  77. 
V.  O'Connor,  8  Watts  470:  104. 
V.  Pittsburg  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  204  Pa. 
St.  341:    864,  869. 
Covey  V.  Buffalo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  23 
Barb.  482:   244. 
i.  Edgewood,  18  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  216 

1620. 
V.   Probate   Judge,   56  Mich.   524 
941. 
Covington   v.    Berry,    120    Ky.    582 
141,  1335. 
V.  McDonald,  94  Ky.  1,  879. 
v.  Southgate,  15  B.  Mon.  491 :  465. 
V.  TaflFee,  24  Ky.  L.  R.  373:   630, 

1306,  1307. 
V.  Worthington,   88  Ky.   206:    13, 
464,  1220. 
Covington    &    Cinn.    Bridge    Co.    v. 
Kentucky,  154  U.  S.  204:  482. 
V.  Magruder,  63  Ohio  St.  455:   7, 
748. 
Covington  etc.  R.  R.  &  Bridge  Co.  v. 
Kleymeier,    105    Ky.    609:    253, 
310,  448,  654,  661,  1648,  1657. 
Covington  &  L.  Turnpike  R.  Co.  v. 
Sandford   (Ky.)   20  S.  W.  1031: 
481,  483. 
Covington  &  L.  T.  Road  Co.  v.  Sand- 
ford,  164  U.  S.  578 :  483. 
Covington  Short  Route  Transfer  Co. 
V.  Piel,  87  Ky.  267:    1159,  1166, 
1274,    1467. 
V.  Piel,  9  Ky.  L.  R.  665:   1467. 
Covington  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Covington, 
9  Bush.  127:  298. 


XCIV 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp. 

Covington  St.  Ev.  Co.  v.  Covington  & 

Cinn.   St.   R.   R.   Co.    (Ky.)    19 

Am.  L.  Reg.    (N.  S.)    765:   426, 

427,  761,  762,  1615. 

V.  Covington  &  Cinn.  St.  E.  R.  Co., 

1  Ky.  L.  R.  341 :  426,  762,  807. 
V.  Covington  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  1  Ky. 
L.  E.  318:  301. 
Cowan's  Case,  1  Overton  310:  700. 
Cowan  V.  Glover,  3  A.  K.  Marsh.  356: 
1083. 
V.   Penobscott  E.   E.   Co.,   44  Me. 

140:   690. 
V.   Southern   R.   R.    Co.,    118   Ala. 
354:   830,  942,  1541,  1542,  1630. 
Coward  v.  Llewellyn,  209  Pa.  St.  582 : 
884. 
V.  North  Plainfield,  63  N.  J.  L.  61: 
739. 
Cowdrey  v.  Wobum,  136  Mass.  409: 

77. 
Cowell  V.  Springs  Co.,  100  U.  S.  55: 
837. 
V.  Thayer,  5  Met.  253 :  95. 
Cowley  Co.  v.  Hooker,  70  Kan.  372: 

1328. 
Cox  v.  Buie,  12  Iredel  L.  139:   1019. 
V.   Commissioner  of  Highways,  83 

Mich.  193:  993,  1027. 
V.    Comrs.    of   Highways,    194    111. 

355:   865,  1363,  1515. 
V.  Cummings,  33  Ga.  549:   19. 
V.  Easter,  1  Porter  130:  909. 
V.    Hannibal    etc.   R.    R.    Co.,    174 

Mo.  588:    147,   160. 
V.  Howell,  108  Tenn.  130 :  69,  72. 
V.  Little  Rock  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  55 

Ark.  454:  933. 
V.  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  48  Ind. 
■     178:     200,    242,    246,    251,    279, 

315,  1580. 
V.  Mason  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  77  la. 

20:   1210. 
V.  Phila.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  215  Pa.  St. 
506:     1189,     1201,     1229,     1233, 
1234,   1241. 
V.  State,  3  Blackf.  193 :  103. 
V.  Tifton.   18  Mo.  App.  450:   708. 
Coyne   v.  Memphis,    118  Tenn.   651: 
224,  227,  324,  492,  635. 
V.  Warrior  So.  Ry.  Co.,  137  Ala. 
553:   1473,  1497. 
Coyner  v.  Boyd,  55  Ind.   166:    1108, 

1149:    1406. 
Cozard   v.   Kanawha   Hardwood  Co., 

139  X.  C.  283:  508,  533. 
C.  P.  &  V.  R.  R.   Co.  V.  Davis.   19 
Ohio  C.  C.  589:   936,  1546,  1559. 
Craft  V.  DeSoto  Co.,  79  Miss.   618: 
974. 
V.  Norfolk  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  136  N.  C. 
49:  79,  167. 


ao.] 


Craigie  v.  Mellen,  6  Mass.  7:  701. 
Craig  V.  Allegheny,  53  Pa.  St.  477: 
1500. 
V.  Lewis,  110  Mass.  377:  858. 
V.  North,  3  Met.   (Ky.)   187:  1364. 
V.  Eochester  City  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  39 

Barb.  494:  269,  273,  1586. 
V.  Eochester  City  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  39 

N.  Y.  404:  200,  1586. 
V.  Supervisors,  10  Wend.  585:  733. 
Cram  v.  Laconia,  71  N.  H.  41:   371, 

380,  388,  392,  403. 
Crandall  v.  Des  Moines  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
103  la.  684:  732,  815,  919. 
V.  McElheney,  146  Mich.  191 :  1577. 
V.  Taunton,  110  Mass.  421:  1411. 
Crane  v.  Camp,  12  Conn.  463 :  1019. 
V.  Roselle,  236  111.  97:  82,  1606. 
Cranson   v.   Snyder,   137  Mich.  340: 

146. 
Crater   v.    Frittz,   44   N.   J.   L.   374: 

1206,  1377. 
Craugh  v.  Harrisburg,  1  Pa.  St.  132: 

1254. 
Crawford   v.    Delaware,    7    Ohio   St. 
4.59:   178,  207,  213,  215,  220. 
V.  Comrs.  of  Elk  Co.,  32  Kan.  555 : 

1017,  1033. 
V.  iletropolitan  El.  R.  E.  Co.,  120 

N.  Y.  624:    1121. 
V.  Rutland,  52  Vt.  412 :  1042,  1045. 
V.  Topeka,  53  Kan.  756:  471. 
V.  St.  Francis  Levee  Dist.  79  Ark. 

606:    830,  952. 
V.   Snowden,  3  Littell,  288:    1017, 

1030. 
V.  Valley  R.  E.  Co.,  25  Gratt.  467: 
1385. 
Crawford  Co.  v.  Hathaway,  60  Neb. 
754:  69. 
V.  Hathaway,  61  Neb.  317 :  69. 
V.  Hathaway,  67  Neb.  325 :  69,  70, 
71,  72,  587. 
Crawford  Paving  Co.  v.  Baum,  97  Va. 

501:    1379. 
Crawfordsville  v.  Bond,  96  Ind.  236: 

154,  233. 
Crawfordsville  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Wright, 

5  Ind.  252:   1634. 
Crawson  v.  Grand  Trunk  E.  E.  Co., 

27  U.  C.  Q.  B.  68:    148. 
Creal  v.  Keokuk,  4  G.  Greene   (la.) 

47:   211,  238. 
Crear  v.   Crossly,   40   111.   175:    516, 

520. 
Creek  v.  Bozeman  W.  W.  Co.,  15  Moii. 

121:   71,  74. 
Creighton  v.  Manson,  27  Cal.  613:  13. 
v.   Water  Comrs.,   143  N.  C.  171: 
1267. 


CASES    OITEB. 


xcv 


[The  references   are  to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Crenshaw  v.  Slate  River  Co.,  6  Rand. 

Va.  245:   108,  544. 
V.  Snyder,   117   Mo.   167:    1511. 
Crescent    Ave.    Opening,    Matter    of, 

107  App.  Div.  616:  1557. 
Crescent    Ave.    Opening,    Matter    of, 

183  N.  Y.  14:    1557. 
Crescent   City   etc.    Co.   v.    Butchers 

Union  etc.  Co.,  4  Wood  C.  C.  96, 

15. 
Crescent  City  R.  R.  Co.  v.  New  Or- 
leans etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  48  La.  An. 

856:   427. 
Crescent  Pipe  Line  Co.,  2  Pa.  Dist. 

Ct.  93:  918. 
Crescent  Tp.  v.  Pittsburg  etc.  R.  R. 

Co.,  210  Pa.  St.  334:   1511. 
Creston  W.  W.  Co.  v.  McGrath,  89 

la.  502:  1060,  1064,  1074,  1075. 
Creswell  v.  Comrs.,  24  Ala.  282 :  958. 
Crewson  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  R.  Co., 

27  U.  C.  Q.  B.  68:  158. 
Cribbs  v.  Benedict,  64  Ark.  555:  13, 

979,  1018,  1155. 
C'rill  V.  Rome,  47  How.  Pr.  398 :  106, 

138. 
Crimmins  v.  Met.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  87 

Hun  187:   1665. 
Crimson  v.  Deck,  84  la.  344:    1487, 

1594. 
Crippen  v.  White,  28  Colo.  298:   70. 
Crise  v.  Auditor,  17  Ark.  572:   1510, 

1531,  1532. 
Crittenden   v.   Wilson,   5   Cow.   165 : 

91,  1523. 
Crocker  v.  Boston  Elee.  Lt.  Co.,  180 

Mass.  516:  361,  491. 
V.  New  York,  15  Fed.  405 :  136. 
Crocliett  v.  Boston,  5  Cush.  182:  860, 

1073. 

V.  Millett,  65  Me.  191:  1524. 
Croft  V.  Bennington  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  64 

Vt.  1:    1029,  1571. 
V.  London  &  North  W.  Ry.  Co.,  3 

B.  &  S.  436:  846. 
Crolley  v.   Minneapolis   &   St.  Louis 

Ry.    Co.,    30    Minn.    541:    1497, 

1498,  1503. 
Cromer  v.  Logansport,  38  Ind.  App. 

661:  154. 
Cromie  v.  Board  of  Trustees,  71  Ind. 

208:   808. 
Crompton  Carpet   Co.   v.   Worcester, 

119   Mass.   375:    1423. 
V.  Worcester,  123  Mass.  498:   938. 
Cromwell  v.   Brown,   50  Conn.   470: 

303. 
Cromwell   Ave.   Matter   of,   96   App. 

Div.  424:    1.325. 
Crooke  v.  Flatbush  Water  Works  Co., 

27  Hun  72:   336. 


Crooke  v.  Flatbush  Water  Works  Co., 

29  Hun  245:   336. 
Crosbie  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  62  la. 

189:  840,  841. 
Crosby   v.    Dracut,    109   Mass.    206: 

1632. 
V.  Hanover,  36  N.  H.  404:  513,  701, 

781,  788. 
V.   Owensboro    etc.   R.   R.   Co.,    10 

Bush  288:   249,  252. 
V.  Smith,  19  Wis.  449:   1537. 
Cross   V.   Kansas    City,   90   Mo.    13 

1353. 
V.  Morristown,   18  N.  J.  Eq.  305 

,349,   1266,  1491,  1594. 
V.  Morristown,   18  N.  J.  Eq.  313 

1487. 
V.  Plymouth,  125  Mass.  557:   1115, 

1186,  1216. 
V.  St.  Louis  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  77  Mo. 

318:  254,  307,  311. 
Crossett  v.  Janesville,  28  Wis.  420: 

236. 
V.  Owens,  110  111.  378:   1091,  1094. 
Crossly  v.  O'Brien,  24  Ind.  325:   788. 
Crossman  v.   Furman,  57  App.  Div. 

393:   479. 
v.  Lurman,  171  N.  Y.  329:   479. 
Crosstown  St.  R.  R.  Co.  Matter  of, 

68  Hun  236:  305. 
Crouse  v.  Whitlock,  46  111.  App.  260 : 

1028,  1520. 
Crow  V.  Judy,  139  Ind.  562 :  698. 
Crowder  v.   Sullivan,   128  Ind.   486: 

346,  408,  411. 
Crowe  V.  Charlestown,  62  W.  Va.  91 : 

631. 
Crowell  V.  Londonderry,  63  N.  H.  42 : 

713,  818,  1087. 
Crowley  v.  Board  of  Comrs.,  14  Mon. 

292:    1086,   1362,   1511. 
Crowner  v.  Watertown  &  Rome  R.  R. 

Co.,  9  How.  Pr.  457:    1671. 
Cruger  v.  Hudson  River  R.  R.  Co.,  12 

N.  Y.  190:  925,  1018,  1029,  1101. 
Crum  V.  Hargrove,  119  Ga.  471:  510. 
Crume  v.  Wilson,  104  Ind.  583:  1671. 
C.  Scheerer  &  Co.  v.  Hutton.  7  Cal. 

App.   524:    1393,   1431,   1510. 
C.  Street,  118  Pa.  St.  171:  734,  1396. 
Cubit  V.  O'Dett,  51  Mich.  347:   154, 

233. 
Cuckfield  Burial  Board,  In  re,  24  L. 

J.  Ch.  N.  S.  585 :  747. 
Culbertson    v.    Culbertson,    17    Okla. 

370:   1486. 
Culbertson  &  Blair  Provision  Co.  v. 

Chicago,  111  111.  651:  1108,1138, 

1553. 


XCVl 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references   are  to  the  pages:  Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742;   Vol.  II,   pp.   74a-1719.] 


CuUen  V.  New  York  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  66 

Conn.  211:  487. 
Culley  V.  Cunningham,  96  Ala.  583: 

1408. 
Cullough  V.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

52   Minn.    12:    440. 
Culpepper    County     v.     Gorrell,     20 
Gratt.  484:   681,  703,  824,  1024. 
Culver  V.  Chicago  etc.  E.  R.  Co.,  38 
Mo.  App.  130:  93,  1639. 
V.  Fair  Haven,  67  Vt.  163:  721. 
Cumberland  v.  Willison,  50  Md.  138 : 

234. 
Cumberland  etc.  Canal  Co.  v.  Hitch- 

ings,  65  Me.  140:  1650,  1658. 
Cumberland  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Penn. 

R.  R.  Co.,  57  Md.  267:   1610. 
Cumberland  Telephone  Co.  v.  United 

Elec.  Co.,  17  Fed.  825:  682. 
Cumberland  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  Avritt, 
120  Ky.  34:  333,  334,  341. 
V.  Cassedy,  78  Miss.  666 :  350. 
v.  Foster,  117  Ky.  389:  443. 
v.   Louisville  Home  Tel.   Co.,   110 

Fed.  593:   418. 
V.  Louisville  Home  Tel.   Co.,   110 

Fed.  596:  418. 
V.  Morgan's  etc.  Co.,  112  La.  287: 

1048,  1052. 
v.  United  Elec.  R.  R.  Co.,  42  Fed. 

272:    417,    1622. 
V.  United  Electric  R.  R.   Co.,  93 

Tenn.  492:   272,  418,  911. 
V.  Yazoo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  90  Miss. 
686:   685,  724. 
Cumberland  Valley  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mar- 
tin,   100  Md.    165:    1086. 
V.  McLanahan,  59  Pa.  St.  23:  524, 

1523. 
V.  Rhoadarmer,   107  Pa.   St.  214: 
625. 
Cuming    v.    Prang,    24    Mich.    514: 

1489. 
Cumming  v.  St.  Louis,  90  Mo.  259: 

1618. 
Cummings  v.  Dixon,  139  Mich.  269: 
211,  606. 
v.  Huse  etc.  Co.,  156  Mo.  28:  1618. 
V.  Hyatt,  54  Neb.  35 :  587. 
V.  Noble  Co.  Comrs.,  13  Okla.  21: 

1407. 
V.  Peters,  56  Cal.  593 :  536,  587. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  70  Mo.  570:  475. 
V.  St.  Louis,  90  Mo.  259:  1493. 
V.    Union    El.    R.   R.    Co.,    169    111. 

33:    1585. 
V.   Williamsport,   84   Pa.    St.   472: 
1187,  1228,  1404. 
Cummings  Realty  &  Inv.  Co.  v.  Deere 
&  Co.,  208  Mo.  60:  378,  384.  392. 


Cummins  v.  Des  Moines  &  St.  Louis 

Ry.  Co.,  63  la.  397:  1139,  1210, 

1245,  1330,  1332. 
V.  Seymour,  79  Ind.  491:  234,  336. 
V.  Shields,  34  Ind.  154:  821,  1407. 
V.    Summunduwot   Lodge,    9    Kan. 

App.  153:   309. 
Cunard  v.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,   1 

Miscl.   151:   1296,  1301." 
Cunningham    v.    Campbell,    33    Ga. 

625:    19. 
v.  Fitzgerald,  138  N.  Y.  165:  878. 
V.   Hendricks,   89   Wis.   632:    876, 

882,  883,  884,  885. 
v.  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  61  Mo.  33: 

893,  894. 
V.  Rome  R.  R.  Co.,  27   Ga.  499: 

1478,   1618. 
V.  San  Saba  Co.,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

480:  867,  870. 
Cupp   V.    Comrs.   of   Seneca   Co.,    19 

Ohio  St.  173:    1011,  1101,  1709. 
Cureton  v.  South  Bound  R.  R.  Co., 

59  S.  C.  371:  830,  953,  1546. 
Curran,  Matter  of,  38  App.  Div.  N. 

Y.  82:   817. 
Curran   v.    East   Pittsburg,    20    Pa. 

Supr.  Ct.  590:   1523,  1525,  1639. 
V.  Louisville,  83  Ky.  628:  1503. 
V.  Shattuck,  24  Cal.  427 :  706,  966, 

1018,   1155,  1162,   1570,   1579. 
V.   Sibley  County,  47   Minn.   313: 

576,  735,  1018. 
V.  Sibley  Co.,  56  Minn.  432:   576, 

735,   1018. 
Curren   Matter   of,   25   N.   Y.   Misc. 

432:   1034. 
Currie  v.  Atlantic  City,  66  N.  J.  L. 

140:   302. 
V.  Atlantic  City,  66  N.  J.  L.  671: 

302. 
V.  Jersey  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,   (N. 

J.)    1462. 
V.  Natchez  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  61  Miss. 

725:  858,  1634,  1636. 
V.  Natchez  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  62  Miss. 

506,  858,   1636. 
V.  New  York  Transit  Co.,  66  N.  J. 

Eq.  313:   806,  807,  812,  1497. 
V.  Waverly  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  52  N.  J. 

L.   381:    1132,   1210,   1235,   1243, 

1329. 
Currier    v.    Grafton,    28   N.   H.   73: 

1437. 
V.  Marietta  &  Cincinnati  R.  R.  Co., 

11  Ohio  St.  228:  813. 
Curry  v.  Jones,  4  Del.  Ch.  559:  1100, 

1571. 
V.  Jit.    Sterling,    15    111.    320:    678, 

1194. 
V.  Rosell,  99  Mich.  524:  400,  1004, 


CASES    CITED. 


XCVll 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Curtin  v.  Nittany  Valley  R.  R.  Co., 
135  Pa.  St.  20:   1317. 
V.   Rochester   R.    R.    Co.,    78   Huri 

555:  330. 
V.  Columbus  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  34  Pa. 
Co.   Ct.   52:    816. 
Curtis   V.   Columbus   etc.   R.  R.   Co., 
34  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  52:  816. 
V.  Columbus  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  Pa. 

Dist.  Ct.  1017:  716. 
V.  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.,  14  Allen,  55: 

153. 
V.  Pocahontas  County,  72  la.  151 : 

989. 

T.  Portland,  60  Me.  55:   1409,  1672. 

V.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  Minn. 

28:    1119,  1120,  1122,  1128,  1312, 

1314,  1472. 

V.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  Minn. 

497:    1392. 
V.  Water  Co.,  20  Or.  34:    1617. 
Curtiss  V.  Ayrault,  47  N.  Y.  73 :  146. 

V.  Smith,  35  Conn.  156:    899. 
Curtiss  St.,  Matter  of,  1  Sheldon  (N. 

Y.)  425:  1097,  1393. 
Curwensville,  Appeal  of,  129  Pa.  St. 

74:  707,  1569. 
Gushing   v.   Boston,   144   Mass.   317: 
1341. 
V.  Gay,  23  Me.  9:  1058,  1367,  1368. 
V.  Nantucket  Beach  R.  R.  Co.,  143 

Mass.  77:    1152. 
V.  Webb,    102    Me.    157:    969,    980, 
1510. 
Cushing-Wetmore    Co.    v.    Gray,    152 

Cal.  118:   179,  190,  351,  385. 
Cushman  v.   Smith,   34  Me.   247:    59, 
434,  1163,   1635. 
V.  Wood,  6  Hun  520:   1558. 
Cuthbert    v.    Kuhn,    3    Whart.    357: 

1255. 
Cutler  V.  New  York,  92  N.  Y.  166: 
1326. 
V.  Sours,  80  111.  App.  618:   1673. 
Cuyler  v.  Rochester,  12  Wend.  165: 

817. 
C.  W.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Clinton  Coun- 
ty, 1  Ohio  St.  101-2:  462. 
V.  Comrs.,  1  Ohio  St.  77:  10. 
Cypress  Pond  Dr.  Co.   v.  Hooper,  2 
Met.    (Ky.)    350:    467,  494,   570, 
575,  583. 
Cyr  V.  Dufour,  68  Me.  492:   975. 

D. 

Daggy  V.  Coats,   19  Ind.  259:    1407. 

V.  Green,   12   Ind.   303:    976,   1082. 

Dahlman    v.    Milwaukee,    131    Wis. 

427:    230,  442. 
Daiber  v.   Scott,   3  Ohio  C.  C.   313: 

878,  890. 


Daigneault  v.  Woonsocket,   18  R.  I. 

378:   1150. 
Dailey  v.  State,  51  Ohio  St.  348:  332, 

339,  1487,  1488,  1667. 
Daily  v.   Swope,  47  Miss.   367:    580 
Dairy  v.  Iowa  Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  113  la 

716:   320,  351,  372,  383. 
Dakota  Co.  v.  Cheney,  22  Neb.  437 

577. 
Dale  v.  St.  Joseph,  59  Mo.  App.  566 

616,  618,  1306,  1337. 
V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  132  N.  C.  705 

152,   1549. 
Daley  v.  St.  Paul,  7  Minn.  390:  1681. 
V.  Watertown,  192  Mass.  116:  154, 

157. 
Dallas    V.    Barksdale,    83    Tex.    117: 

1546. 
V.  Halloek,  44  Ore.  246:   990,  1056, 

1060,  1068,  1072. 
Dallas  County  v.  Plowman,  99  Tex. 

509:   697,  739,  1569,  1571. 
Dallas  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Chenault,  4 

Tex.  a.  of  App.  p.  171,  §  HI: 

1112,   1123. 
V.  Day,  3  Tex.  Civ.  App.  353:  1094, 

1112. 
V.  Kinnard     (Tex.    Supm.)     18    S. 

W.  1062:    92. 
Dalles   Lumbering   Co.   v.   Urquhart, 

16   Ore.  67:    495,  496,  522,  675. 
Dalrymple   v.   Whittingham,   26   Vt. 

345:    1116,  1177,   1202,   1529. 
Dalton    V.    Northampton,    19   N.    H. 

362:    923. 
V.  Water  Comrs.  49  Cal.  222:  700. 
Daly,  In  re,  139  Cal.  216:  469. 
Daly,  In  re,  88  Hun,  188:   1369. 
Daly,  Matter  of,  29  App.  Div.  286: 

1255. 
Daly,  Matter  of,  116  App.  Div.  798: 

1398. 
Daly,  Matter  of,  23  App.  Div.  N.  Y. 

232:    1369. 
Daly,  Matter  of,  189  N.  Y.  34:  1398. 
Daly  V.  Elton,  195  U.  S.  242:  469. 
V.  Georgia  Southern  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

80  Ga.  793:  297,  298,  314. 
V.  Smith,  18  App.  Div.   194:    1229. 
Dalzell  V.  Davenport,  12  la.  437:  603, 

1123,    1125. 
Damkoehler  v.  Milwaukee,  124  Wis. 

144:   230,  441,  442. 
Damon  v.   Baldvrin,   101   Minn.  414: 

1024. 
V.  Baltimore  R.  R.  Co.,  119  Pa.  St. 

287:  817,  818. 
Damour  v.  Lyons  City,  44  la.   276: 

235. 
Damp  v.  Dane,  29  Wis.  419:  973,  975. 


XCVlll 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are   to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Damrell  v.  Board  of  Supervisors  etc., 

40  Cal.  154:  706,  933,  1358. 
Dana  v.  Boston,  176  Mass.  97:   606. 

V.  Craddock,  66  N.  H.  593:  1238. 
Danforth  v.  Bangor,  85  Me.  423 :  877, 

1326. 
V.  Groton    Water    Co.,    176    Mass. 

118:    733. 
V.  Suydam,  4  N.  Y.  66:   949. 
Daniel  v.  Ft.  Worth  etc.  Ky.  Co.,  96 

Tex.  327:  449,  655,  661. 
Daniels  v.  Almy,  18  R.  I.  244:   880, 

882. 
V.  Chicago   etc.   R.  R.   Co.,  41   la. 

52:    1347,   1352. 
V.  Chicago  &  North  Western  R.  R. 

Co.,  35  Iowa,  129:    1625. 
V.  Citizens      Savings      Institution, 

127  Mass.  534:   95. 
V.  Smith,  38  Mich.  660:  1033. 
Dantzer  v.  Indianapolis  Union  R.  R. 

Co.,  141  Ind.  604:    179,  190,  191, 

370,  371,  383,  388,  398. 
Danube,  Comrs.  of,  Ex  parte,  1  Cow. 

142:   1409. 
Danvers   v.   County   Comrs.,   2   Met. 

185;    1082. 
Danville  v.  McAdams,   153  HI.   216: 

895. 
V.  Sehultz,  99  111.  App.  287:   629. 
Dansville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hammond, 

77  Hun  39:  1437. 
V.  Tidrick,  137  111.  App.  553:   372, 

646,  1131,  1297,  1304. 
Danville  etc.  Road  Co.  v.  Campbell, 

87  Ind.  57:   422. 
Danville,  H.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Com- 
monwealth.  73   Pa.   St.  29:    255. 
Dargan  v.  Carolina  Central  R.  R.  Co., 

113  N.  C.  596:    1710. 
Darling  v.  Newport  Elec.  Lt.  Co.,  74 

N.  H.  515:  350. 
Darling's  Admr.  v.  Blackstone  Mfg. 

Co.,  16  Gray  187:  965,  1073. 
Darlington  v.  Allegheny  City,  189  Pa. 

St.  202:    1128. 
V.  Cloud  Co.,  75  Kan.   810:    153. 
V.  New  York,  31  N.  Y.  164:   476. 
V.  United  States,  82  Pa.  St.  382: 

672,  911,  991. 
Darrow   v.    Chicago   etc.   R.   R.   Co., 

169  Ind.  99:   707,  942,  971,  980, 

995. 
Darst   V.    Griffin,    31    Neb.    668:    577, 

918,   969,   1018,   1511,   1512,   1513. 
Dartmouth    v.    County    Comrs.,    153 

Mass.  12:   988,  996. 
Dartmouth   College   v.   Woodward,   4 

Wheat.   625:    412. 
Daubert  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  155  Pa. 

St.  178:   1627,  1633. 


Daugey  v.  London,  38  L.  J.  C.  P.  298: 

733. 
Daugherty    v.    Brown,    91    Mo.    26: 

1186. 
Daughters  of  Am.  Rev.  v.  Schenley, 

204  Pa.  St.  572:   394. 
Davenport  v.  Buffington,  97  Fed.  234: 

420. 
V.  Dedham,    178    Mass.    382:    351, 

370,  384,  647. 
V.  Hyde  Park,  178  Mass.  385:  351, 

370,   384,   647. 
V.  Stevenson,   34  la.  225:    251. 
Davenport    etc.    Ry.    Co.   v.    Sinnet, 

111   111.  App.   75:    448,   654,  661, 

1337. 
Davenport  etc.  Terminal  Co.  v.  John- 
son,   188    111.    472:     639,    1580, 

1591. 
David  Bradley   Mfg.  Co.  v.  Chicago 

etc.   Traction   Co.,   229  111.   170: 

683,  1210. 
Davidheiser  v.   Rhodes,   133   Pa.   St. 

226:    145,  146. 
Davidson  v.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  R. 

Co.,  3  Cush.  91:  936. 
V.  New  Orleans,  98  U.  S.  97:   14, 

1007. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  3  Tex.  Ct.  of  App. 

p.  473,   §  400:    1348. 
V.  Texas  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  29  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  54:  958,  1511,  1557. 
V.  Wight,  16  App.  Cases,  D.  C.  371: 

464. 
Davies  v.  Epstein,  77  Ark.  221:  372, 

876,  877. 
V.  Los  Angeles,  86   Cal.  37:    1004, 

1010. 
V.  St.   Joseph,   98   Mo.   App.   611: 

180. 
Daviess  v.  County  Court,  1  Bibb  453 : 

1091. 
v.  Co.  Court,  1  Bibb  514:  1367. 
Davis   V.    Appleton,    109    Wis.    580: 

355,  1594. 
V.  Baltimore  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  102  Md. 

371:  447,  1614. 
V.  Board  of  Supervisors,  89  Mich. 

295:   400. 
V.    Bonaparte,    137    la.    197:    882, 

885. 
v.  Boone  Co.,  28  Neb.  837:    1075, 

1407. 
V.  Brigham,  29  Me.  391 :  960. 
v.  Charles  River  Branch  R.  R.  Co., 

11  Cush.   506:    941,   1146. 
V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  46  la.  389: 

251,  307. 
V.    Cleveland   etc.   R.   R.    Co.,    140 

Ind.  468:   864,   1485. 
V.  Comrs.,  143  111.  9:    1488. 


CASES    CITED. 


XCIX 


[The  references  are  to  the   pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol,   II,   pp.    743-1719.] 


Davis  V.   County  Comrs.,   153  Mass. 

218;  371,  379,  380,  391,  398. 
V.  Covington  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  77  Ga. 

322:    1614. 
V.  Crawfordsville,  119  Ind.  1:  234. 
V.   East  Tenn.   etc.   R.  E.   Co.,  87 

Ga.  605:   777,  1298,   1649,  1657. 
V.  East  Tenn.  &  Ga.  R.  R.  Co.,   1 

Sneed  94:   431. 
v.  Fry,  14  Okla.  340:   166. 
V.  Hill,  11  Ired.  L.  9:   1444. 
V.    LaCrosse   &   Mississippi   R.    R. 

Co.,    12    Wis.    16:     1523,    1536, 

1579. 
V.  Lake  Shore  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  114 

Ind.  364:   1004. 
V.  Londgreen,  8  Neb.  43:  145. 
V.  Memphis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  87  Ala. 

633:    839,   1330,   1501. 
V.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  119  Mo.  180: 

616,  630,  632,  633,   1308. 
V.  Morris,  132  N.  C.  435:   368. 
V.  Newark,  54  N.  J.  L.  595:   608, 

1219.  . 
V.   New   Bedford,    133   Mass.   649: 

1712. 
c  New  York,  14  N.  Y.  506:   268, 

297,  298,  301,  315,  1588. 
T.  Nichols,  39  111.  App.  610:  786. 
V.  North  Penn.  R.  E.  Co.  2  Phila. 

146:   1325,  1391. 
V.  Northwestern  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  170 

111.   595:    897,   1109,    1243,   1420, 

1467. 
V.  Pa.  R.  R.  Co.,  215  Pa.  St.  581 : 

1132,  1145. 
T.  Russell,  47  Me.  443:   1163,  1522, 

1635. 
V.  Sacramento,  59  Cal.  596:  90. 
V.  San  Lorenzo  R.  E.  Co.,  47  Cal. 

517:  434,  1162,  1467. 
V.  Saratoga  Springs,  17  App.  Div. 

623:  84. 
V.    Saratoga    Springs,    163    N.    Y. 

581:   84. 
V.  Sawyer,  133  Mass.  239 :  457. 
V.  Silverton,  47  Ore.  171:  231,  439. 

V.  Smith,  130  Mass.  113:  515. 
V.  S.  W.  Pa.  Pipe  Line  Co.,  34  Pa. 

Supr.  Ct.  438:    1578. 
V.  Stevens,  57  Me.  593:  954,  963. 
V.  T.  C.  &  D.  R.  R.  Co.,  4  Stew.  & 

Por.  421 :  524. 
T.  Titusville  &  Oil  City  Ey.   Co., 

114  Pa.  St.  308:   900,  937,  1560. 
V.  Wheeling  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  12  Pa. 

Dist.  Ct.  93:   1523. 
V.  Wheeling  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  26  Pa. 

Supr.  Ct.  364:   1458,  1473. 
v.  Winslow,  51  Me.  264:   71. 


Davison  v.  Otis,  24  Mich.  23:    1421. 
Dawson  v.  Katter,  48  Ga.  133:  17. 
V.  Moores,  4  Mumf.  535:    1360. 
V.    Pittsburgh,    159    Pa,    St,    317: 
1123,    1126,     1306,    1307,    1337, 
1338,  1409. 
Day  V.  Board  of  Aldermen  of  Spring- 
field,  102  Mass.  310:    733. 
V.  Forest  City  Ry.  Co.,  5  Ohio  C. 

C,    (N,   S,)    393:    302. 
V.  Hulburt,  11  Met.  321:  1523. 
V.    Louisville   etc.   R,    R.    Co.,    Q9 

Miss.  589:   1507. 
v.  New  Orleans  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  37 

La.  Ann.   131:    1553. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  41  Ohio  St.  392: 

856. 
V.  Eailroad  Co.,  44  Ohio  St,  406: 

1499. 

V.  Springfield,  102  Mass,  310:  1572. 

V.  Stetson,  8  Maine  365:  409,  522. 

Dayton  v.  Bauman,  66  Ohio  St.  379: 

464,  1219. 

V.  Drainage  Comrs.,  128  111.  271: 

145. 
V.  Lincoln,  39  Neb.  74:  630,  1179, 
1199. 
Dayton  etc.  Ry.   Co.  v.  Dayton  etc. 
Traction  Co.,  4  Ohio  C.  C.    (N. 
S.)  329:  765,  772. 
V.    Dayton    etc.    Traction    Co.,    72 

Ohio  St.  429 :  1409. 
V.  Lewton,  20  Ohio  St.  401:   1538, 

1540,  1541. 

V.  Marshall,  11  Ohio  St.  497 :  1670. 

Dayton   Mining   Co.    v.    Sea  well,    11 

Nev.    394:    495,    498,    500,    502, 

511,  561. 

D.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  C.  &  G.  R.  R.  Co., 

8  Ore.  102:  782. 
Deaconess  Home  &  Hospital  v.  Bont- 

jes,   207   111.   553:    454,   658. 
Deadwood  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Barker, 

14  S.  D.  558:    161,  162. 
Dean   v.  Ann  Arbor   St.  R.   R.   Co., 
93  Mich.  330:   272. 
V.  Ann  Arbor  R.  E.  Co.,  137  Mich. 

459:   373,  382,  390,  398,   1596, 
V.  Colt,  99  Mass.  486:    1523,   1524. 
V.  Millard,  151  Mich.  582:  356. 
Deansville  Cemetery  Assn.,  Matter  of, 

5  Hun  482:   675,  683. 
Deansville      Cemetery      Association, 
Matter  of,   66   N.  Y.   569:    498, 
543. 
Deaton  v.  Polk  Co.,  9  Iowa  594 ;  1404. 

1490. 
Dearborn  v.  Boston  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  24 
N.    II.    179:     1118,    1177,    1446, 
1447,  1451. 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:  Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Deavitt  v.   Washington   County,   75 

Vt.  156:   156,  744. 
De  Baker  v.  Southern  California  R. 

R.  Co.,  106  Cal.  257:  89. 
DeBen  v.  Gerard,  4  La.  Ann.  30 :  1489 
DeBuol  V.  Freeport  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  Ill 

111.   499:    1098,   1271. 
De  Camp  v.  Dix.  159  N.  Y.  436:  97. 
V.    Hibemia    Underground    R.    R. 

Co.,  47   N.   J.  L.  43:   532,   748, 

811,  813,  823. 
V.  Hibemia  Underground  R.  R.  Co., 

47  N.  J.  L.  518:   532,  811,  813, 

823. 
V.  Robbing,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  36 :  837. 
V.  Robbins,  31  N.  J.  Eq.  671:  837. 
V.   Thompson,    16   App.   Div.   528: 

97. 
Decatur    v.    Vaughan,    233    111.    50: 

1230,   1231. 
Decker  v.   Evansville   Suburban   etc. 

R.  R.  Co.,  133  Ind.  493:  179,  251, 

256,  447,   1582. 
V.    Washburn,    8    Ind.   App.    673: 

1703. 
Deenier  v.  Bells  Run  R.  R.  Co.,  212 

Pa.  St.  491:  1071',  1572. 
Deems  v.  Baltimore,  80  Md.  164:  485. 
Deepvvater  Ry.  Co.  v.  Western  P.  C.  & 

L.  Co.,  152  Fed.  824:  931,  932. 
Deer  v.  Commissioners  of  Highways, 

109  111.  379:    1382. 
V.  Sheroden,  220  Pa.  St.  307:  237. 
Deere  v.  Cole,  118  111.  165:   1602. 
V.   Guest,   1  Mylne   &   Craig  516: 

1537. 
Deering,  Matter   of,   93   N.  Y.   361: 

352. 
Deering  v.  County  Comrs.,  87  Maine 

151:  701,  976,  1387. 
V.  New  York,   51  App.  Div.   402: 

1565. 
V.  York  &  Cumberland  R.  R.  Co., 

31  Maine  172:   1570. 
Deesher  v.  Reading  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  2 

Pa.  Co.  Ct.  606 :   1399. 
Defer  v.  Detroit,  67  Mich.  346:   143. 
DeForest  v.  Wheeler,  7  Ohio  St.  286 : 

400. 
DeGeofroy  v.  Merchants  Bridge  Ter- 
minal Ry.  Co.,  179  Mo.  698:  180, 

254,  259,  641,  642,  1649,  1717. 
DeGeorge   v.    Goosby,    33    Tex.    Civ. 

App.  187:  888. 
DeGraffensied  v.  Savage,  9  Col.  App. 

131:    858. 
DeGrauw  v.   Long   Island  Elec.  Ry. 

Co..  43  App.  Div.  502:   290. 
V.   Long  Island  Elec.   Ry.   Co.,   163 

N.   Y.    597:    289. 
DeGrilleau  v.   Frawley,  48  La.  Ann. 
■    184:    884. 


DeGroat  v.  Jersey  City,  55  N.  J.  L. 

120:    886. 
Deiman  v.  Ft.  Madison,  30  Iowa  542 : 

465. 
Deisner  v.  Simpson,  72  Ind.  435 :  947. 
Deitrichs  v.  Lincoln  &  North  Western 

R.  R.  Co.,  12  Neb.  225:  1391. 
V.  Lincoln  &  North  Western  R.  R. 

Co.,  13  Neb.  361:  731. 
Deitrick  v.   Highway  Comrs.,   6  111. 

App.  70:    1194. 
DeKalb  v.  Luney,  193  111.  185:  1491. 
DeKalb  Co.  Telephone  Co.  v.  Dutton, 

228  111.  178:  175,  338,  341,  348. 
Delafleld,  In  re,  109  Fed.  577:  932. 
Delaneey  Street,  Matter  of,  120  App. 

Div.  700:   1253,  1256,  1258. 
DeLand  v.  Dixon  Power  &  Lt.  Co., 

225  111.  212:   395,  398,  405. 
DeLander  v.  Baltimore  Co.,  94  Md. 

1:    53,    211,   428. 
Delaney  v.  Georgia  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  58 

S.   C.   357:    1668. 
V.   Metropolitan  Board  of  Works, 

L.  R.  2  C.  P.  532:  1710. 
Delap  V.  Brooklyn,  3  Misel.  22:  687, 

1558,  1561. 
V.  Brooklyn,  144  N.  Y.  265:   1561. 
Delaplaine  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co., 

42  Wis.  214:   109,  110,  124,  128, 

129,    131. 
DeLappe  v.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R. 

Co.,  69  Mo.  App.  572:  147,  157. 
Delaware  Ave.,   Matter  of,   62  App. 

Div.  492:   750. 
Delaware  Ave.,  Matter  of,  167  N.  Y. 

256:   750. 
Delaware    County's   Appeal,    119   Pa. 

St.    159:    638,   653,    1160,    1167, 

1550,  1613. 
Delaware  Division  Canal  Co.  v.  Mc- 

Keen,  52  Pa.  St.  117:  624. 
Delaware  etc.  Canal  Co.  v.  Lee,  22 

N.   J.   L.   243:    87,   88,   91,   461, 

848,  1451,  1650,  1653,  1715. 
V.  Whitehall,  90  N.  Y.  21:   1287. 

Delaware  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Buffalo, 
158  N.  Y.  266:  354,  487. 
V.   BuflFalo,    158   N.   Y.   478:    354, 

487. 
V.    Burson,    61    Pa.    St.    369:    831, 

849,  1187,  1317,  1319,  1713. 

V.   Danville   etc.   St.   Ry.   Co.,   211 

Pa.  St.  591:   771. 
V.   Danville  etc.   St.  Ry.   Co.,   221 

Pa.  St.  149:   771. 
v.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  21  N.  J.  Eq.  299 : 

768. 
v.  Mehrhof  Bros.  Mfg.  Co.,  53  N. 

J.  L.  205:  96. 
V.  Newton  Coal  ilin.  Co.,  6  Luzerne 

Leg.  Reg.  Rep.  21 :  835,  1618. 


CASES    CITED. 


CI 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,   pp.   l-'742 ;   Vol.  11,   pp.   743-17191 


Delaware  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Oswego,  92 

App.  Div.  551:  302. 
V.   Syracuse,   165   Fed.  631    (C.  C. 

A.)    308. 
V.  Wilkes-Barre  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  11 

Pa.  Co.  Ct.  165:  771. 
V.  Wilkes-Barre  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,   6 

Luzerne  L.  R.  Rep.  342:   1282. 
V.  Wilkes-Barre  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,   1 

Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  627 :  328,  765. 
Delaware  St.,  in  re,  3  Luzerne  Leg. 

Reg.  Rep.  353:   1385. 
Dell  Rapids  v.  Irving,  7  S.  D.  310: 

927. 
Delmar  Tp.  Road,  13  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  505: 

1081. 
DeLong   v.    Schimmel,    58    Ind.    64: 

1364. 
V.  Spring  Lake  etc.  Co.,  65  N.  J. 

L.  1:   881. 
V.    Warren    (Cal.)    36    Pac.    1009: 

629. 
Delphi  V.  Evans,  36  Ind.  90:   229. 
Delsol    V.    Spokane    etc.   Ry.    Co.,   4 

Ida.  456:   1270,  1472. 
DeLucca  v.  North  Little  Rock,   142 

Fed.   597:    1601. 
Demartine  v.  San  Francisco,  107  Cal. 

402:   881. 
Demby    v.    Kingston,    60    Hun    294: 

84. 
V.  Kingston,  133  N.  Y.  538:   84. 
Deming  v.  Cleveland,  22  Ohio  C.  C.  1 : 

70,  97. 
Demopolis  v.  Webb,  87  Ala.  659:  877, 

879. 
Dempsey  v.  Burlington,  66  la.  387: 

199,  377,   380,   388,  395,   1502. 
V.  Donnelly,  58  111.  40:   1517. 
Demules  v.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

44   Minn.   436:    1295,   1335. 
Den    V.    Jersey    Co.,    15    How.    426: 

115. 
V.  Morris  Canal  Co.,  24  N.  J.  L. 

587:    22,  26,   1164. 
Deneen  v.   Unverzagt,   225  111.   378: 

1700. 
Denham    v.    Co.    Comrs.    of    Bristol, 

108   Mass.  202:    515,  516. 
Deninger    v.    Recorder's    Court,    145 

Cal.  629:   481. 
V.  Recorder's  Court,  145  Cal.  638: 

481,  482. 
Dennis  v.   Mobile   etc.   Ry.   Co.,   137 

Ala.    649:     383,    392,    398,    406, 

1595,  1612. 
V.  Osborn,  75  Kan.  557:  154. 
Dennison  v.  Somerset  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

21  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  248:   156. 
V.   Taylor,   15  Abb.    (N.   C.)    439: 

939. 


Denniston  v.  Clark,   125  Mass.  216: 

1489. 
V.    Philadelphia    Co.,    161    Pa.    St. 

41:   1251,  14.50,  1457. 
V.    Philadelphia    Co.,    1    Pa.    Supr. 

Ct.  599:    1245,   1251,   1448. 
Denny  v.  Bush,  95  Ind.  315:  1407. 
Denslow   v.    New   Haven    &    North- 
ampton   Co.,    16    Conn.    98:    66, 

74. 
Densmore  v.  Central  la.  R.  R.   Co., 

72  la.   182:   447. 
Dent  v.  Smith,  76  Kan.  381:   516. 
Denton  v.  Nanny,  8  Barb.  618:   946. 
V.  Thompson,  136  Ind.  446:    1400. 
Denver  v.   Bayer,   7   Colo.    113:    53, 

178,  250,  639,  642,  659,  671,  1294. 
V.  Cincinnati,  161  Fed.  633:  1145. 
V.  Denver   Cable   City   R.   R.   Co., 

22  Colo.  565:   491. 
V.  Denver  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,   17   Col. 

583:   330,  886,  887,  888,  890. 
V.  Jacobson,  17  Colo.  497:  876,  881, 

883    885 
V.  Mullen,  7  Col.  345:  484. 
V.  Rhodes,  9  Colo.  554:    143. 
V.  Vernia,  8  Colo.  399:  633. 
Denver  City  Irr.  &  W.  Co.  v.  Mid- 

daugh,   12   Colo.  434,  1445,   1519. 
Denver  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Barsalou.x, 

15  Colo.  290:  308,  1581. 
V.  Bourne,  11   Colo.  59:   639,  1302. 
V.   Costes,   1  Colo.  App.  336:    327, 

639,  643,  1299. 
V.    Davidson,    2    Colo.    App.    443: 

475. 
V.  Denver  City  Ry.  Co.,  2  Colo.  673 : 

415,  1608. 
V.  Denver,  S.  P.   &  P.  R.  R.   Co., 

17  Fed.  867:   794. 
v.  Domke,  11  Colo.  247:   242,  250, 

639,  643,  1161,  1581. 
v.  Griffith,  17  Colo.  598:  1046,  1119, 

1225. 
V.  Jackson,  6  Colo.  340:  1424. 
V.    Lamborn,    8    Colo.    380:     1673, 

1675. 
V.  Lamborn,  9  Colo.  119:  1673,  1675, 

1685. 
v.  Lockwood,  54  Kan.  586:   836. 
V.   Otis,   7   Colo.    198:    1443. 
V.  Outcalt,  2  Colo.  App.  395:   475. 
V.  Schmitt,  11  Colo.  56:  639,  1145, 

1302. 
V.    School   District,    14   Colo.   327: 

1627,  1631. 
V.  Stark,  16  Colo.  291:   1358. 
V.  Stancliff,  4  Utah  117:  1348. 
V.  Toohey,  15  Colo.  297:  308,  1581. 
V.  Union  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,   34  Fed. 

386:   527,  534. 


Cll 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Denver  etc.  E.  K.  Co.  v.  Wilson,  28 
Colo.  6:   431,  956,   1625,   1629. 

Denver  Power  &  Irr.  Co.  v.  Denver 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  30  Colo.  204: 
564,  684,  777,  797,  798,  799,  804, 
1042,  1045. 

Department  of  Parka,  Matter  of,  73 
2Sr.  Y.  560:   1534. 

Department  of  Public  Parks,  Matter 
of,  53  Hun  280:  687,  1227,  1232, 
1272,  1277,  1323. 

Department  of  Public  Works,  In  re, 
35  N.  Y.  Supp.  332:    1558. 

Department  of  Public  Works,  Mat- 
ter of,  2  Hun  374:  1670. 

Department  of  Public  Works,  Mat- 
ter of,  6  Hun  486:    1327. 

Department  of  Public  Works,  Mat- 
ter of,  53  Hun  556:  887,  888, 
889,  1327. 

Depew  &  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  In  re, 
92   Hun  406:    909. 

DePeyster  v.  Mali,  27  Hun  439:  1555. 

Depriest  v.  Jones,  2  Va.  Dec.  109: 
1492. 

Derby  v.  Framingham  etc.  E.  R.  Co., 
119   Mass.    516:    706,    919,    1053. 
V.  Gage,  60  Mich.  1:   1392,  1683. 

Derry  Tp.  Road,  11  Pa.  Supr.  Ct. 
232:    985. 

Derry  Tp.  Road,  30  Pa.  Supr.  Ct. 
538:    414. 

DeRuttan  v.  Canadian  No.  Ry.  Co., 
12   Ont.    187:    1348,    1352. 

Derwell  v.  Bauer,  41  N.  Y.  App. 
Div.  53:   1490. 

Deshong  v.  New  York,  74  App.  Div. 
234:    1488. 
v.  New  York,  176  N.  Y.  475:  1488. 

Des  Moines  v.  Laymon,  21  la.  153: 
1409. 

Des  Moines  City  R.  Co.  v.  Des 
Moines,  90  la.  770:   354,  1620. 

Des  Moines  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Des 
Moines  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  73  Iowa 
513:   301. 

Dethample  v.   Lake  Keon   Nav.   etc. 

Co.,  73  Kan.  54:   1330. 
Detloe   v.    Grand   Trunk   R.   R.   Co., 

15  U.  C.  Q.  B.  595:   1523. 
Detmold    v.    Drake,   46    N.   Y.    318: 

1260. 
Detroit  v.  Beecher,  75  Mich.  454:  895, 
971,  1319,  1341. 
V.  Brennan,  93  Mich.  338:    1274. 
V.    Bruder,    104    Mich.    221:     1426. 
V.  C.  H.  Little  Co.,  141  Mich.  637: 

647,  952.  1309. 
V.  C.  H.  Little  Co.,  146  Mich.  373: 

647,  952,  1309. 
V.  Co.  Comrs.,  35  Me.  373:   1415. 


Detroit  v.  Daly,  68  Mich.  503:   693, 

1220. 
V.  Detroit  City  R.  R.  Co.,  56  Fed. 

867:    301,    1587,    1590. 
V.  Detroit  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  112  Mich. 

304:    1290. 
V.  Detroit   &  Howell   Plank  Road 

Co.,  43  Mich.  140:  417. 
V.   Ft.   Wayne   etc.   R.  R.   Co.,   90 

Mich.   646:    352. 
V.  Myers,  152  Mich.  666:  875. 
V.  Parker,  181  U.  S.  399:   11,  464. 
V.  Robinson,  93  Mich.  426:   993. 
V.    Schilling,    93    Mich.    429:    940, 

1558. 
V.  Wabash  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  63  Mich. 

712:   708,  726,  1027. 
Detroit  Board  of  Education  v.  Mo- 

ross,   151   Mich.   625:    916. 
Detroit  Citizens  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Board 

of  Public  Works,  126  Mich.  554: 

308. 
V.    Board    of    Public    Works,    126 

Mich.  554:    732. 
V.  Detroit,  64  Fed.  628:   298,  301, 

1502. 
V.    Detroit,    110    Mich.    384:    297, 

301. 
V.  Detroit,  171  U.  S.  48:  301. 
Detroit  City  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mills,   85 

Mich.  634:   272,  1586,  1590. 
Detroit  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  In  re,  2  Doug. 

(Mich.)  367:  1088. 
Detroit  etc.  R.  R.   Co.  v.  Campbell, 

140  Mich.  384:   893,  1042,  1045, 

1049,   1105. 
v.  Detroit,  49  Mich.  47:   966. 
V.  Detroit,  91  Mich.  444:    1624. 
V.    Detroit    Suburban    R.    R.    Co., 

103  Mich.  585:   779. 
V.   Ferguson,    140   Mich.   400:    893, 

1042,  1045,   1049,  1105. 
V.    Gartner,    95    Mich.    318:     986, 

1040. 
V.  Graham,  46  Mich.  642:  1421. 
V.  Hall,  133  Mich.  302:   1378,  1395. 
Detroit     Leather     Specialty    Co.     v. 

Mich.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  149  Mich. 

588:    428,   958,   1569. 
Detroit  Sharpshooters'  Assn.  v.  High- 
way Comrs.,  34  Mich.  36:    706, 

1033,  1420. 
Detroit   So.   R.   R.   Co.   v.   Lawrence 

County  Comrs.,  71  Ohio  St.  454: 

1438. 
Detroit  Western  Tr.  Co.  v.  Backus, 

48  Mich.  582:  1413. 
Detroit  Western   Transit  etc.  R.  R. 

Co.  V.  Crane,  50  Mich.  182 :   1358, 

1360. 
Dettor  V.  Grand  Trunk  R.  R.  Co.,  15 

U.  C.  Q.  B.  595:  1708. 


OASES    CITED. 


cm 


[Th«  references   are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


DeVaraigue    v.    Fox,    2    Blatch.    95: 

806,  1500. 
Devaux  v.  Detroit,  Harr.  Ch.  (Mich.) 

98:    1569,   1572. 
Devine   v.   Olney,   68   N.   J.  L.   284: 

1389 
Devlin  v.  New  York,  131  N.  Y.  123: 
948,  1261,  1324,  1563. 
V.   Philadelphia,   206  Pa.   St.  518: 
634,  1718. 
Devoe  v.  Smeltser,  86  la.   385:   400, 

890. 
Devon   v.   Cincinnati,   161   Fed.   633: 

1176,  1270. 
Detwiler   v.   Citizens  Water   Co.,   25 

Pa.   Co.   Ct.   481:    724. 
Dewey  v.  Atlantic  Coast  Line  R.  R. 
Co.,  142  N.  C.  392:  488. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  Elec.  Ry.  Co.,  184 
111.  426:    720. 
DeWint,  Matter  of,  2  Cow.  498:  1534. 
DeWitt  V.  Duncan,  46  Cal.  342:   683, 
824. 
V.  Ithaca,  15  Hun  568:   880. 
Dexter    v.    Boston,    176    Mass.    247: 
463. 
V.  Broat,  16  Barb.  337:   239. 
Diamond  Jo  Line  Steamers  v.  Daven- 
port,   114    la.    432:    801,    804. 
V.  Davenport  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  115  la. 
480:    1201,  1229. 
Diamond    Match    Co.    v.   Ontonagon, 
72  Mich.  249 :  366,  369,  878,  880, 
886,  888. 
Diamond  Mills  Emery  Co.  v.  Phila- 
delphia, 22  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  9:    1277. 
Dibsell  V.  Morris,  89  Tenn.  497:   53. 
Dice  V.  Sherman,  107  Va.  424:   508, 

551. 
Dickenson    v.    Fitchburg,    13    Gray, 

546:   1121,  1130,  1145,  1231. 
Dickerman  v.  Duluth,  88  Minn.  288: 
630,    634. 
V.  Marion,  122  111.  App.   154:    881. 
V.   New   York   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   72 
Conn.  271:   1718. 
Dickerson  v.  Comrs.  of  Highways,  18 
111.    App.    88:    1624. 
V.  Detroit,  99  Mich.  498:  876. 
Dickey  v.  Chicago,  152  111.  468:  1018, 
1025,  1513. 
V.  Maysville  Road  Co.,  7  Dana  113: 

414. 

v.  Tennison,  27  Mo.  373:  495,  498, 

516,   517,  675,    1004,   1013,   1014, 

Dickinson  v.  Amherst  Water  Co.,  139 

Mass.  210:   1436. 

V.  Ark.  City  Imp.  Co.,  77  Ark.  570: 

881,  888. 
V.    Grand    Junction    Canal    Co.,    7 
Exch.  282:    165. 


Dickinson    v.    Highway    Comrs.,    41 

Mich.   638:    1017. 
V.  New  Haven  etc.  Co.,  155  Mass. 

16,  780. 
V.  Pere  Marquette  R.  R.  Co.,   148 

Mich.   461:    441. 
V.  Van  Wormer,  39  Mich.  141 :  893, 

894,  1017,  1420. 
V.  Worcester,  7  Allen  19:  234. 
Dickinson  Tp.  Road,  23  Pa.  Supr.  Ct. 

34:  519. 
Dickson  v.  Baltimore  &  Philadelphia 

R.  R.  Co.,  3  McArthur  D.  C.  362 : 

1550. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  71   Mo. 

575:    87,   1552,  1650,  1652. 
Diebold  v.  Ky.  Traction  Co.,  117  Ky. 

146:  241. 
Diedrioh  v.  N.  W.  U.  R.  R.  Co.,  42 

Wis.  248:   105,  108,  124,  128,  130, 

131. 
Diedricks  v.  Northwestern  Union  Co., 

33  Wis.  219:    1570. 
Diehl  V.  Met.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  11  Misc. 

14:  448,  1303,  1304. 
Dierks  v.  Comrs.  of  Highways,   142 

in.    197:    142,    167,    453,    1044, 

1624. 
Dietrich   v.   Murdock,   42    Mo.    279: 

530,  1348. 
Dietrichs  v.   Lincoln  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

12  Neb.  225:   1145. 
V.  Lincoln  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  Neb. 

355:  1136. 
Dietrick  v.  Highway   Comrs.,   6   111. 

App.  70:  1412. 
Diets  V.  Frazier,  50  Mich.  227:   1412. 
Diffendal  v.  Virginia  M.  R.  Co.,   86 

Va.  459:    855. 
Dill  V.  School   Board,   47   N.   J.  Eq. 

421:   180,  183,  191,  878. 
Dillard  v.  Webb,  55  Ala.  468:   485. 
Dillenbach  v.  Xenia,  41  Ohio  St.  207 : 

1553. 
Dilley   v.   Wilkes-Barre  Pass.   R.   R. 

Co.,  12  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  270:  327,  642, 

643,  1586. 
Dillman  v.  Crooks,  91  Ind.  158:  1132. 
Dillon  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  58 

Neb.  472:   1393. 
V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  67 

Kan.  687:   524,  1519. 
Dills  v.  Hatcher,  6  Bush   (Ky.)  606: 

18. 
Dilworth  v.   State    (Tex.  Civ.  App.) 

36  S.  W.  274:  473. 
Dimmett  v.  Eskridge,  6  Munp.  308: 

1506. 
Dimmick   v.   Broadhead,    75   Pa.    St. 

464:    1467,    1634. 


CIV 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Dimmick  v.  Council  Bluffs  etc.  R.  E. 

Co.,  58  la.  637:   1468. 
Dinger  v.  New  York,  101  App.  Div. 
202*    1338 
V.  New  York,  182  N.  Y.  542:  1338. 
Dingley   v.   Boston,   100   Mass.   544: 
569,  586,  806. 
V.  Gardiner,  73  Me.  63:  1522. 
Dinsmore  v.  Auburn,  26  N.  H.  356: 

992. 
Diuwiddie   v.   Roberts,    1   G.   Greene 

363:  1570. 
Directors  of  Poor  v.  Railroad  Co.,  7 

W.  &  S.  236:   697,  1135. 
Disosway  v.  Winaut,  34  Barb.  538: 

1441. 
District    of    Columbia    v.    Armes,    8 
App.  Cas.  D.  C.  393:  432. 
V,   Atchison,   31    App.   Cas.   D.   C. 

'250:  210,  237. 
V.  Gray,  6  App.  D.  C.  314:  143. 
V.  Hutchinson,   1  App.  Cas.  D.  C. 

403:   1545,  1648,  1658,  1662. 
V.  Prospect  Hill  Cemetery,  5  App. 
Cas.  D.  C.  497:   1198,  1229,  1422, 
1625. 
V.   Robinson,    14   App.   Cas.   D.   C. 
512:   865,  1490. 
District  of  Oakland  v.   Hewitt,   105 

la.   663:    816. 
Dix  V.  Shaver,  14  Hun  392:  833,  861. 
Dixon  T.  Allemand,  136  111.  App.  449: 
1506. 
V.  Baker,  65  HI.  518:   233,  1309. 
V.    Baltimore    etc.    R.    R.    Co.,    1 

Mackey   (D.  C.)   78:   938. 
V.  Eaton,  68  Me.  542:   723. 
V.  Highway  Comrs.,  75  Mich.  225: 

1017,  1027,  1099. 
V.   Louisville   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   115 

Tenn.  362:   1250. 
V.  Rockwell  etc.  E.  R.  Co.,  75  la. 
367:   1404. 
Doane   v.    Chicago    City   R.   R.    Co., 
160  111.  22:   302. 
V.  Lake  St.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  165  HI. 
510:    266,   302,   1585,   1648,   1657. 
Dobbins  v.  Los  Angeles,  139  Cal.  179: 
469. 
V.  Los  Angeles,  195  U.  S.  223:  469. 
Dobson   V.    Hohenadel,    148    Pa.    St. 
367:   183,  878. 
V.  Penn.  S.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  6  Mont. 

Co.  L.  R.  109:   1071. 
V.  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  79  S.  C. 
429:    1635. 
Doctor    V.    Hartman,    74    Ind.    221: 

1058. 
Dodd   V.   Consolidated   Traction   Co., 
57  N.  J.  L.  482:  349. 


Dodd  V.  St.  ]>)uis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  108 

Mo.  581:  858,  1627,  1631. 
Doddridge    Co.    Suprs.    v.    Stout,    9 

W.   Va.   703:    1087,   1379. 
Dodge    V.    Acworth,   32   N.   H.   474: 
1428. 
V.  Boston  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  154  Mass. 

299:  842,  855. 
V.  Burns,  6  Wis.  514:   1520. 
V.  Council  Bluffs,  57  la.  560:   684. 
V.  County  Comrs.  of  Essex,  3  Met. 

380:    435,  436,   623. 
V.  Omaha  &  South  Western  R.  R. 

Co.,  20  Neb.  276:  961,  1564. 
V.  Pennsylvania  R    R.  Co.,  43  N. 
J.   Eq.   351:    366,   368,   384,  390, 
398,  1595. 
V.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  45  N. 
J.   Eq.   366:    366,   368,   384,   390, 
398,   1595. 
V.  Rockport,  199  Mass.  274:   1174, 
1320. 
Dodge  Co.  V.  Acom,  61  Neb.  376:  577, 

707,  982. 
Dodson    V.    Cincinnati,    34    Ohio   St. 

276:   231,  1331. 
Doe  V.  Georgia  R.  R.  &  B.  Co.,  1  Ga. 
524:    22,    24,    1154,    1163,    1169, 
1524. 
V.  Leeds  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  L.  J. 
Q.  B.  486:  860,  1627,  1631. 
Dolan   V.   Chicago  etc.  Ry.   Co.,   118 
Wis.  362:   449. 
V.  Mayor  etc.,  62  N.  Y.  472:   1393. 
V.   New   York   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   74 

App.  Div.  434:   257,  258. 
V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.   Co.,  175 
N.  Y.  367:  257,  258,  488. 
Dolbeer   v.    Suneook   N.   W.   Co.,   72 

N.  H.  562:  110,  138. 
Dole  V.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  70  Hun 

374:   1437. 
Dolfield  V.  Western  Md.  R.  R.   Co., 

107  Md.  584:  731. 
DoUarhide    v.    Muscatine    County,    1 

G.  Greene  158:   1094. 
Dolores  No.  2  L.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Hart- 
man,  17  Colo.  138:   1435,  1436. 
Dolphin  V.  Pedley,  27  Wis.  469:  1365. 
Domestic  Tel.  Co.  v.  Newark,  49  N. 

J.  L.  344:  358. 
Dominick  v.  Delaware  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

180  Pa.  St.  468:    1645. 
Domschke  v.  Met.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  74 
Hun  442:  1663. 
V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  148 
N.  Y.  337:   1143. 
Donahue    v.    Keystone    Gas    Co.,    90 
App.  Div.  380:  201,  347. 
V.   Keystone   Gas   Co..    181    N.   Y. 
313:    192,  193,  201,  347. 


OASES    CITED. 


CV 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  IT,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Donald  v.  Judge,  78  Mich.  182:  1443. 
V.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  li,.  Co.,  52  la. 

411:  936,  1545. 
Donalson  v.   Lawson,   126  Ind.   169: 

1410. 
Donnaker  v.  State,  8  S.  &  M.  649: 

253,  321. 
Donnell  v.  Comrs.  of  York  County, 

87  Me.  223:  917,  1419. 
Donnelly    v.    Decker,    58    Wis.    461: 

565,  566,  567,  568,  582. 
Donnington  Street,  In  re,  3  Pa.  Co. 

Ct.  455:  700. 
Donnisthorpe  v.  Fremont  etc.  E.  R. 

Co.,  30  Neb.  142:   425,  850,  1458. 
Donora   Southern   R.   R.   Co.   v.   Pa. 

R.  R.  Co.,  213  Pa.  St.  119:  1619. 
Donovan    v.    Allert,    11    N.   D.    289: 

332,  339,   1593. 
V.  Royal,  26   Tex.  Civ.  App.  248: 

83,  85,  1605. 
V.  Springfield,  125  Mass.  371:  1147. 
Doody   V.   Vaughn,   7   Neb.  28:    973, 

974,  1018,  1032,  1513,  1516. 
Dooley  v.  Kansas  City,  82  Mo.  444: 

1634. 
Dooley    Block    v.    Salt    Lake    Rapid 

Transit  Co.,  9  Utah  31:  181,  201, 

273,  313,   314,  315,   1587,  1591. 
Doolittle  V.  Branford,  59  Conn.  402; 

487. 
V.   East   Tenn.   etc.   R.  E.  Co.,   80 

Ga.  658:   1614. 
Doon  V.  Natick,  171  Mass.  228:  806. 
Dooner   v.    Pennsylvania   R.   R.   Co., 

142  Pa.  St.  36:   449,  655. 
Doorman    v.    Ames,    12    Minn.    451: 

71,  88,  91,  94. 
Dorau  v.   Central   Pacific  R.  R.  Co., 

24  Cal.  245:  430,  956. 
Dorchester  v.  Wentworth,  31  N.  H. 

451:    1427. 
Dore  v.  Milwaukee,  42  Wis.  108:  236, 

614,  617,  631. 
Doremus  v.   Paterson,  63  N.  J.   Eq. 

605:    1569. 
V.  Paterson,  69  N.  J.  Eq.   188:   83, 

1005,   1606,   1615. 
V.    Paterson,    69    N.    J.    Eq.    775: 

83,  1605,  1606,  1615. 
Dorgan  v.  Boston,  12  Allen  223:  1185, 

1330. 
V.   Railroad   Co.,    131    N.   C.    623: 

1523. 
Dorian  v.  East  Brandywine   etc.   R. 

R.   Co.,    46    Pa.    St.    520:     1118, 

1241. 
Dorman  v.  Bates   Mfg.   Co.,   82   Me. 

438:    182,  877. 
V.  Jacksonville,   13   Fla.  538:    210. 


Dorman   v.    Lewiston,    81    Me.    411: 
1019,   1367. 
V.  State,  24  Ala.  216:  478. 
Dorr  V.  Sharon,  198  Mass.  240:   920. 
Dorrence   Street,  Matter  of,  4  R.  I. 

230:    13,  1220. 
Dorsett,  Matter  of,  92  App.  Div.  523: 

1319    1326 
Dorsett,  'Matter  of,  179  N.  Y.  496 : 

1319,  1326. 
Dotson  v.  Sibert,  4  Bibb.  464:  933. 
Doubet  V.  Independent  Dist.,  135  la. 

95:  728. 
Doucette  v.  Little  Falls  L  &  N.  Co., 

71  Minn.  206:  99. 
Doud  V.  Mason  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

76  la.  438:   1268,  1455,  1507. 
Dougherty  v.  Brown,  91  Mo.  26:  975, 
1020. 
v.   Wabash   etc.   Ry.   Co.,   19   Mo. 
App.  419:   1472. 
Doughty  V.  Atlantic  City  etc.  Trac- 
tion Co.,  71  N.  J.  L.  131:   1078. 
V.  Hope,  3  Denio  249:    1100,  1101. 
V.    Somerville    etc.    R.    R.    Co.,    7 

N.  J.  Eq.  51:   913,  1159,  1625. 
V.  Somerville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  N. 
J.   L.    442:    893,    898,   913,    1021, 
1159,  1463. 
Douglas    V.    Indianapolis    etc.    Trac- 
tion Co.,  37  Ind.  App.  332:  1471. 
V.  N.  Y.   El.   R.  R.   Co.,   14   App. 

Div.   471:    1144. 
V.    New    York    El.    R.   R.    Co.,   45 
App.  Div.  596:    1122,  1144. 
Douglas  Co.  V.  Clark,  15  Ore.  3:  515. 
v.  Taylor,  50  Neb.  535:  630,  1546, 
15G7. 
Douglass  V.  Boonesborough  Turnpike 
Co.,  22  Md.  219:   422,  423. 
V.   Byrnes,   59   Fed.   29:    562,   679, 

714,   1071. 
V.  Byrnes,  63  Fed.  16:   1105,  1376. 
V.  Leavenworth,  6  Kan.  App.  96: 

305. 
V.  Montgomery,  118  Ala.  599:  420, 

1493,   1618. 
V.  Ohio  Riv.  R.  R.  Co.,  51  W.  Va. 

523,  852. 
V.  Rawlins,  4  Hayward,  Tenn.  Ill: 
1091,  1094. 
Dover  v.  Bruckenridge,  75  N.  J.  L. 
204:   885. 
V.   Portsmouth   Bridge,    17   N.    H. 
200:   96,  133,  1622. 
Dover  St.,  Matter  of,  18  Johns.  506: 

1670. 
Dow   V.    Beidelman,    125   U.    S.    680: 
480,  482. 
V.  Electric  Co.,  68  N.  H.  59:   695, 
740,  741. 


CVl 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Dowd  V.  Mason  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

76  la.  438:   1252. 
Dowell  V.   Blue   Ridge   etc.  Ry.  Co., 

144  N.  C.  721:    841. 
Dowie   V.   Chicago   etc.  Ry.  Co.,  214 

111.   49:    920,   963,   1071. 
Downing  v.  Corcoran,  112  Mo.  App. 
645:    515,   1596. 
V.   Des   Moines   Northwestern   Ry. 

Co.,  63  la.  177:  1463,  1464. 
V.  More,  12  Colo.   316:    564. 
Downs  V.  Ansonia,  73  Conn.  33:  159, 
234. 
V.  Huntington,  35  Conn.  588:   695. 
V.   Seattle   &   M.   &  R.   R.   Co.,   5 
Wash.  778:  1526. 
Dows    V.    Johnson,    110    U.    S.    223: 

1114. 
Doyle  V.  Kansas  City  &  S.  R.  R.  Co., 
113    Mo.    280;    1176,   1200,    1202, 
1226,  1426,   1546,  1548. 
V.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  15  Daly 

473:   1304. 
V.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  128  N.  Y. 

488:    1121,  1133. 
V.  Sycamore,  193  111.  501:  355. 
Drady  v.  Des  Moines  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
57  la.  393:  620,  691,  1298,  1550, 
1552. 
Drainage   Comrs   v.   Griflm,    134   111. 
330:   1412. 
V.  Harms,  238  HI.  414:    1397. 
V.  Knox,  237  111.  148:  56,  57,  438, 

1105,  1331. 
V.  People,  26  111.  App.  276 :  1024. 
V.  Volke,  163  111.  243:   1415,  1416, 

1418. 
V.  Volke,  59  111.  App.  283:    1195, 
1416,  1421. 
Drainage  District  v.  Dowd,   132  111. 

App.  440:   1548. 
Drain   Commissioners   v. .  Baxter,   57 

Mich.  127:  681. 
Draining  Certain  Swamp  Lands,  Mat- 
ter of,  5  Hun  116:   579. 
Drake  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  70 
Iowa   59:    147. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.   Co.,   63  Iowa 
302:   152,  1454,  1551,  1054,  1716. 
V.  Clay,  Sneed,  139:  522. 
V.  Hamilton  Woolen  Co.,  99  Mass. 

574:    81. 
V.  Hudson  River  R.  R.  Co.,  7  Barb. 

508:  244. 
V.  Lady  Ensley  Coal  etc.  Co.,   102 

Ala.  501:   71,  81. 
v.  Rogers,  3  Hill  604:   1410. 
Draper  v.  Bnwn,  115  Wis.  361:   128, 
137,  1607. 
V.    Maekey,    35    Ark.    497:     1157, 
1510,    1512. 


Draper   v.    Williams,   2    Mich.    536: 

828. 
Drath  v.  Burlington  etc.  R.  R.  Co.. 

15  Neb.  367.   1391,  1676. 
Drebert  v.  Trier,  106  Ind.  510:  786. 
Dreber  v.   Iowa   etc.   R.  R.   Co.,   59 

Iowa  599:   1310. 
Drehman  v.  Stifel,  41  Mo.  184:    19. 
Dresden   v.    Comrs.,   62   Maine   365: 

1415. 
Dressen  v.  Board  of  Comrs.,  76  Minn. 

,   290:    109,   115,   577. 
Dries  v.  St.  Joseph,  98  Mo.  App.  611: 

351,  372,  382. 
Driggs   V.   Phillips,    103    N.  Y.    77: 

1492. 
Drinkhouse  v.  Spring  Valley  Water 

Works,  87  Cal.  253:   965. 
Driscoll  V.  New  Haven,  75  Conn.  92: 

806,  811. 
V.   Taunton,    160  Mass.   486:    698, 

1200. 
Drisncr   v.    Simpson,    72    Ind.    435: 

990. 
Driver  v.  St.  Francis  Levee  Dist.,  70 

Ark.  358:  880. 
V.   Western   Union  R.   R.   Co.,   32 

Wis.  569:  1180,  1225,  1273,  I'Ofi. 
Drouberger    v.    Reed,    11    Ind.    420: 

922,  1160,  1167. 
Drouin  v.  Boston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  74 

Vt.   343:    1479,   1520. 
Drucker  v.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  51 

N.  Y.  Supr.  Ct.  429:    1295. 
V.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,   106  N.  Y. 

157:    1296. 
V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  73 

Hun   102:    1301. 
Druley  v.  Adams,  102  111.  177 :  80. 
Drummond   v.   Eau   Claire,  85   Wis. 

556:   236. 
Drury    v.    Boston,    101    Mass.    439: 

1099. 
V.  Midland  R.  R.   Co.,   127   Mass. 

571:    131,   936,   991,   1146,   1263, 

1319,  1320,  1540. 
Dryades  St.,  11  La.  Ann.  458:   1389. 
Dryden  v.  Pittsburg  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  208 

Pa.  St.  316:  815,  819! 
Dubach  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  Joseph  R. 

R.    Co.,    89    Mo.    483:    308,    312, 

1581. 
Dubbs  V.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

148  Pa.  St.  66:    1483,  1646. 
Dubenzer   v.   Philadelphia  etc.  R.   K. 

Co.,    (Del.    Ch.)    61    Atl.    270: 

1472. 
Dublin  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  In  re,  27  L.  R. 

Ireland,  79:    1322. 
Dublin  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Navan  etc. 

R.  R.  Co.,  5  Irish  Eq.  Rep.  393: 

754. 


CASES    CITED. 


evil 


[The  references  are  to  the   pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Dubois  Cem.  Co.  v.  Griffin,   165  Pa. 

St.  81:  878,  882. 
DuBois  Traction  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Buffalo  etc.   R.   R.   Co.,    10   Pa. 
Co.  Ct.  401'k328,  765,  771. 
Dubose  V.  Levee  Comrs.,  11  La.  Ann. 

165:    440. 
Dubuque   v.   Benson,    23   Iowa   248 : 
1490. 
V.  Maloney,  9  Iowa  450:   182,  355. 
Dubuque  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Crittenden, 
5  Iowa  514:   1400. 
V.  Diehl,  64  Iowa  635:  1505,  1556. 
V.  Shinn,  5  Iowa  516:   1400. 
Duckworth  v.  Watsonville  W.  &  L. 

Co.,   150  Cal.  520:   69. 
Dudley  v.  Butler,  10  N.  H.  281:  1370. 
V.  Cilley,  5  N.  H.  558:  514. 
V.  Frankfort,  12  B.  Mon.  610:  1492. 
Duesler  v.  Johnstown,  24  App.  Div. 

N.  Y.  608:  74,  1603. 
Duff  Private  Road,  66  Pa.  St.  459: 

1419. 
Duke  V.   Central  N.  J.  Tel.   Co.,  53 
N.  J.  L.  341:   980. 
V.  CBryan,  100  Ky.  710:  569,  575. 
V.  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  71  S.  C. 
95:    685. 
Duke    of    Beaufort    v.    Pattrick,    17 

Beav.  60:   860,  1226. 
Duke  of  Bedford  v.  Dawson,  20  L.  E. 

Eq.  Cas.  353:   1524. 
Duke   of   Buccleuch   v.   Metropolitan 
Bd.  of  Works,  5  L.  R.  Ex.  221 : 
651. 
V.  Metropolitan   Board  of   Works, 
L.  R.  5  H.  L.  418:  128,  651. 
Duke  of  Norfolk  v.  Tennant,  9  Hare 

744:    1611. 
Dukes  V.  Working,  93  Ind.  501 :  929. 
Dulaney  v.  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
100  Ky.  628:  253,  1582. 
V.  2Srolan  Co.,  85  Tex.  225:   1183. 
V.   United   Rys.  &   Elec.   Co.,   104 
Md.  423:   292,  318. 
Duluth  V.  Duluth  Tel.  Co.,  84  Minn. 
486:   342,  360,  362,  695. 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  49  Minn. 
201:   876. 
Duluth  Transfer  Ry.  Co.  v.  Duluth 
Terminal  Ry.  Co.,  81  Minn.  62: 
1423. 
Duluth  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  West,  51 

Minn.  163:   1176,  1238. 
Dumass  v.  Francis,  15  111.  543:  1516. 
Dumraer  \.  Jersey  City,  Spencer,  86: 

365. 
Dunbar  v.  Augusta,  90  Ga.  390 :  484, 
485. 
V.  San  Francisco,  1  Cal.  355:  17. 
V.  Wightman,  51  Mo.  432:  1460. 


Duncan  v.  Ferguson,  Wright   (Ohio) 
740:    1397. 
V.    Levee    Comrs.,    74    Miss.    125: 

1176. 
V.    Louisville,   8    Bush.    98:     1531, 

1681. 
V.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  94  Pa. 

St.  435:   26,  640,  692. 
v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  13  Phil. 

68.   640. 
V.  Ramish,  142  Cal.  686:  1567. 
Dunham  v.  Hyde  Park,  75  111.  371: 
678,  1625. 
V.    New    Britain,    55    Conn.    378: 

472. 
V.   Williams,   36   Barb.    136:    810, 
1499. 
Dunlap   v.    Mount    Sterling,    14    111. 
251:   678,  1406. 
V.  Pulley,  28  Iowa  469:  U57,  1431, 

1510,  1512. 
V.   Toledo   etc.   Ry.   Co.,   46   Mich. 
190:   1030,  1412,  1420. 
Dunlop  V.  York,  16  Grant  216:  948, 

1563. 
Dunmore  v.  Scranton  Ry.  Co.,  34  Pa. 

Supr.  Ct.  294:  308,  732. 
Dunn   V.   Birmingham   Canal   Co.,   8 
L.  R.  Q.  B.  42:   1524. 
V.  Charleston,  Harper  (S.  C.)   189: 

495,  589. 
V.  Pownal,  65  Vt.  116:  916,  930. 
V.   Tarentum,    23    Pa.    Supr.   332: 
1353. 
Dunning   v.   Mathews,    16    111.    308: 
1162. 
V.  Township  Drain  Comr.,  44  Mich. 
518:   1028,  1420. 
Dunsmore  v.  Central  Iowa  R.  R.  Co., 

72  Iowa  182:  449. 
Dunston  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  R.  Co., 

2  N.  D.  46 :  863. 
Dupont  V.  Highway  Comrs.,  28  Mich. 
362:   1033,  1420. 
V.  Sanitary  District,  203  111.  170: 
994,  996,  1042,  1075,  1109,  1247, 
1248,    1249. 
Dupuis  V.  Chicago  &  North  Wiscon- 
sin Ry.   Co.,    115   111.   97:    1115, 
1195,  1222,  1241,  1274. 
Durand    v.    Ansonia,    57    Conn.    70: 

210. 
Durango  v.  Davis,  13  Colo.  App.  285: 

890. 
Durant  v.   Lawrence,    1   Allen    125: 

699. 
Durfee  v.  Peoria  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  140 

111.  435:   1503,  1504. 
Durham  v.  Eno  Cotton  Mills,  141  N. 
C.  615:  81. 


CVIU 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:  Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1710.] 


Durham  v.  Lisbon  Falls  Fibre   Co., 

100  Maine  238 :  86. 
V.  Rigsbee,  140  N.  C.  128:  894,  897, 

991,  1042,  1053,  1057. 
Durham  &  N.  R.  R.  Co,  v.  Richmond 

&  D.  R.  R.  Co.,  106  N.  0.   16: 

698,  912. 
Durkee  v.   Union,   38   N.   J.   L.   21: 

234. 
Duryea  v.  New  York,  26  Hun  120: 

141. 
Dusenbury  v.  Mutual  Union  Tel.  Co., 

11  Abb.  New  Cases,  440:  339. 
V.  Mutual  Union  Telegraph  Co.,  64 

How.  Pr.  206:  1164. 
V.  New  York  etc.  Traction  Co.,  46 

App.  Div.  267 :  302. 
Dussau  V.  Municipality  No.  1,  6  La. 

Ann.  575:   1545,  1636. 
Dutton   V.    Stoughton,    79   Vt.    361: 

866,   870. 
V.  Strong,  1  Black  23 :  128,  129. 
Duyekinck  v.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co., 

3  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  744: 

180,  181,  187,  199,  240. 
V.   New   York   El.   R.   R.    Co.,    15 

Daly  294:    265. 
Duyne  v.  Knox  Hat  Mfg.  Co.,  71  N. 

J.  Eq.  375:   197,  887.. 
Dwenger  v.  Chicago  &  Grand  Trunk 

R.  R.  Co.,  98  Ind.  153:  251. 
Dwiggins  v.  Denver,  24  Ohio  St.  629 : 

514,   942. 

Dwight  V.   County   Comrs.,   7   Cush. 
533:   955. 
V.   County  Comrs.,   11   Cush.   201: 

1122. 
T.  Hays,  150  111.  273:  71,  83,  858, 

1604,  1605,  1614,  1617. 
V.  Springfield,  4  Gray  107:    1411. 
Dwight  Printing  Co.  v.  Boston,  122 

Mass.  583:  86. 
Dwinel  v.  Veazie,  44  Maine  167:  97. 
Dyche  v.  Weichselbaum,  9  Kan.  App. 

360:  351,  372. 
Dychman  v.  New  York,  5  N.  Y.  434: 

954,  1029,  1520. 
Dye  V.  Midland  Val.  R.  R.  Co.,  77 

Kan.   488:    1557. 
Dyer   v.    Baltimore,    140   Fed.    880: 
710,  927,  1011. 
V.    Belfast,    88    Maine    140:     710, 

1425. 
V.  Philadelphia,  4  Phila.  328:  1325. 
V.  St.  Louis,  11  Mo.  App.  590:  607. 
V.    St.   Paul,   27   Minn.    457:    229, 

442,  1453. 
V.  Tuskaloosa  Bridge  Co.,  2  Porter 

(Ala.)   296.  3,  407,  409.  1522. 
V.  Wightman,  66  Pa.  St.  425 :  1255. 


E. 

Eachus  V.  Los  Angeles  Consol.  El.  R. 

R.  Co.,   103  Cal.  614:    179,  616, 

629,  631,  632,  633,  635,  639,  664, 

669,  671,  1122,  1309,  1548,'1549, 

1552,  1656.   1660,  1718. 
Eagle  V.   Charing  Cross   Ry.   Co.,   2 

L.  R.  Ch.  638:   656. 
Eagle  White  Lead  Company  v.  Cin- 
cinnati, 1  Cinn.  Supr.  Ct.   154: 
•  220. 
Eames'  Petition,  16  N.  H.  443:  1396. 
Eames  v.  New  England  Worsted  Co., 

11  Met.  570:    1345. 
V.   Northumberland,  44  N.   H.   67 : 

969,   1381. 
Earhart   v.    Cowles,    122    Iowa    194: 

846. 
Earl  V.  Chicago,  136  111.  277 :  365. 
Earle  v.   Commonwealth,   180   Mass. 

579:    626,   1273. 
V.  DeHart,  12  N.  J.  L.  280 :  145. 
V.  Poat,  63  S.  C.  439 :  865. 
Earll  V.  Chicago,  136  111.  539:   873, 

874,  877. 
Earl  of  Sandwich  v.  Great  Northern 

Ry.  Co.,  L.  R.  10  Ch.  Div.  707: 

75,  77. 
Earl  St.  Germans  v.  Crystal  Palace 

Ry.  Co.,  L.  R.  11  Eq.  Cas.  568: 

1537. 
Earlywine  v.  Topeka  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

43  Kan.  746:   1480. 
Eason   v.    Perkins,   2    Dev.   Eq.    38: 

484. 
Eastebrooks  v.  Peterborough  &  Shir- 
ley   R.    R.    Co.,    12    Cush.    224: 

1639. 
East  Ala.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Doe,  114  U. 

S.   340:    1479,   1499. 
East  Branch  etc.  Imp.  Co.  v.  Lumber 

Co.,  69  ilich.  207:   725. 
East  Brandywine  etc.   R.   R.   Co.  v. 

Ranck,    78    Pa.    St.    454:    1133, 

1187. 
East  Canada  Creek  Elec.  L.  &  P.  Co., 

Matter  of,  49  Misc.  99:  536. 
East  Deer  Road,  In  re,  155  Pa.  53: 

1381. 
East  Donegal  Tp.  Road,  In  re,  90  Pa. 

St.  190:   1094. 
East  End  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Doyle,  88 

Tenn.  747 :  200,  240,  270. 
Eastern  Cen.  Co.  v.  Louisville  (Ky.) 

15  S.  W.  1117:  881. 
Eastern     Counties     R.     R.     Co.     v. 

Hawkes,  24  L.  J.  Ch.  601:   851. 
Eastern  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Boston  &  Jlaine 

R.  R.   Co.,   Ill   Mass.    125:    088, 

743,  754,   1263. 
Eastern  Tex.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Eddings,  30 

Tex.  Civ.  App.   170:    1140. 


CASES    CITED. 


CIX 


[The  references  are   to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Eastern  Tex.  E,.  R.  Co.  v.  Scurbock, 

97   Tex.   305:    1127,   1297,   1300. 

Eastern  Wis.  Ry.  &  Lt.  Co.,  In  re, 

127  Wis.  641:  769. 
Eastern  Wis.  Ry.  &  Lt.  Co.  v.  Hack- 
ett,  135  Wis.  464:   304. 
V.    Winnebago    Traction    Co.,    126 
Wis.    179:    303. 
East  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  East  Tenn.  etc. 
R.   R.    Co.,   75   Ala.    275:    1576, 
1609. 
East  Georgia  &  F.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  King, 

91  Ga.  519:   933,  1545. 
East  Grand  St.,  In  re,   121   Pa.   St. 

596:     1376. 
Easthampton  v.  County  Comrs.,  154 

Mass.  424:   786,  797,  798. 
East    Hartford    v.    Hartford    Bridge 
Co.,  16  Conn.   149:   412. 
V.  Hartford  Bridge  Co.,  17   Conn. 

79:  412. 
V.   Hartford  Bridge   Co.,   10   How. 
511:  412. 
East  Haven  v.  Hemingway,  7  Conn. 

186:   103. 
East  Hoquaim  B.  &  L.  Co.  v.  Neeson, 

20  Wash.  142:  113. 
East  Jersey  Water  Co.   v.   Bigelow, 

60  N.  J.  L.  201 :  74. 
East  Line  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Garrett,  52 

Tex.    133:    850. 
East  Louisiana  R.  R.  Co.  v.  New  Or- 
leans, 46  La.  Ann.  526:   303. 
Eastman  v.  Amoskeag  Mfg.  Co.,  44 
N.  H.   143:    22,  91. 
V.   St.   Anthony   Falls  W.   P.   Co., 

43  Minn.  60:   837. 
V.  Stowe,  37  Maine  86:  1116. 
East  Montpelier  v.  Wheelock,  70  Vt. 

391:    460. 
Easton,  Appeal  of,  47  Pa.  St.  255: 

1540,  1541. 
Easton  Borough  v.  Rinek,  116  Pa.  St. 

1:  1354. 
East  161st  Street,  Matter  of,  52  Misc. 

596:    750. 
East  187th  St.,  Matter  of,  78  App. 

Div.    355:    610. 
Easton  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter  of,  37 

N.  J.  L.  222:   1322. 
Easton  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Central  R.  E. 

Co.,  52  N.  J.  L.  267:  119. 
Easton    Road    Case,    3    Rawie    195: 

700. 
East  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hiester,  40 
Pa.  St.  53:   1134,  1139,  1310. 
V.  Holtenstine,  47  Pa.  St.  28:  1187. 
V.  Schollenberger,  54  Pa.  St.  144: 
860. 
East  Penn.  Tp.  Road,  2  Pa.  Co.  453 : 
1093,   1094. 


East  River  Bridge  etc..  Matter  of,  26 

Hun  490 :  254,  260. 
East  River  Bridge  &  Rapid  Transit 
Co.,    Matter    of,    10    Abb.    New 
Cases,    245:    260. 
East  River  Gas  Co.,  Matter  of,   119 

App.  Div.  350:    1231. 
East  River  Gas  Co.,  Matter  of,  190 

N.  Y.  528:    1231. 
East  Rome  v.   Lloyd,   124  Ga.   852: 

629,  634,  1306,  1718. 
East  Saginaw  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ben- 
ham,  28  Mich.   459:    1028,   1369. 
East   St.   Louis   v.   Lockhead,   7    111. 
App.   83:    646. 
V.  Murphy,  89  111.  App.  22:   629. 
V.  O'Flvnn,  119  HI.  200:   363,  371, 

383,  390,  392,  398. 
v.    O'Flvnn,    19   111.   App.   64:    53, 

646,    1122. 
V.  St.  .John,  47  111.  463 :  725. 
V.  Wiggins  Ferry  Co.,  11  111.  App. 
254:    1309. 
East  St.  Louis  Connecting  Ry.  Co.  v. 
East  St.   Louis   Union   Ry.   Co., 
108  111.  265:  409, '764,  1610. 
East   St.   Louis    R.   R.    Co.   v.   Bell- 
ville  City  R.  R.  Co.,  159  HI.  544: 
1047. 
V.  Eisentraut,  134  111.  96:  88,  144. 
V.  Nugent,  147  111.  254:  864. 
East  St.  Louis  Ry.  Co.  v.  Louisville 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  149  Fed.  159 :  328, 
766. 
East  St.  Louis  Union  R.   R.   Co.  v. 
East  St.  Louis,  39  111.  App.  398 : 
303. 
East    Tennessee    etc.    R.    R.    Co.    v. 
Boardman,   96   Ga.   356. 
v.  Davis,  91  Ala.  615:  859. 
V.  Love,  3  Head  63:  942,  1180. 
v.  Sellers,  85  Ga.  853:  1478,  1619. 
V.  Telford's  Exrs.,   89   Tenn.   293 : 
425,  1157,  1472,  1477,  1478,  1479, 
1707,  1708. 
East  Tenn.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Anderson  Co. 
Tel  Co.,   115  Ky.  488:    342,  359, 
418. 
V.  Russellville,  106  Ky.  667 :  342. 
East  &  West  R.  R.  Co.  v.  East  Tenn 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  75  Ala.  275 :   758. 
East  and  West  111.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mil- 
ler, 201   111.  413:    1379. 
East  &  West  India  Docks  and  Birm- 
ingham Junction  Ry.  Co.  v.  Gatt- 
ke,  20  L.  J.  N.  S.  Ch.  217:  656. 
East  &  West  India  Docks  etc.  Co.  v. 
V.  Gattke,  3  McN.  &  G.  155 :  628, 
1611. 
East    Whiteland    Tp.   Road,    30    Pa. 
Supr.   Qt.  211:   514. 


ex 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references   are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Eaton  V.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  R.  Co., 

51  N.  H.  504:   53,  60,,  166,  436, 

502,  848,   849,   1356,   1451,   1452. 

V.  European  &  North  American  Ry. 

Co.,  59  Me.  520:  435,  1455,  1506, 

1636. 

V.  Framingham,  6  Gush.  245:  1401. 

iSberhart  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

70  111.  347:  655,  1195. 
Ebert  v.  Schuylkill  Riv.  E.  S.  R.  R. 

Co.,    151:    952. 
E.  B.  W.  &  M.  Co.,  Matter  of,  96  N. 

Y.  42:  590. 
Eckart  v.  Irons,  128  III.  568:  884. 
Eckerson  v.  Haverstraw,  6  App.  Div. 

102:    888. 
Economic  P.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Buffalo,  59 

Misc.  571:  358,  361. 
Ecorse  Tp.  v.  Jackson  etc.  Ry.  Co., 

153  Mich.  393:  242,  277,  1622. 
Eddings  v.   Seabrook,   12  Rich.  504: 

1272,  1317. 
Eddleman  v.  Union  Co.  Traction  &  P. 
Co.,  217  111.  409 :  525,  896,  1061, 
1066,   1115. 
Eddy  V.  Hinnant,  82  Tex.  354:  855. 

V.  People,  15  111.  386:  1007,  1014. 
Eden  v.  Comrs.,  84  Maine  52:  1409. 
Edenville  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

77  Iowa  69 :  1643. 
Edgecumbe  v.  Burlington,  46  Vt.  218 : 

543. 
Edgerton  v.  Green  Cove  Springs,   19 
Fla.  140:    13. 
V.  HuflF,  26  Ind.  35:  806,  1495. 
Edgewood  R.  R.  Co.'s  Appeal,  79  Pa. 

St.  257:   529,  563. 
Edgewood  Water  Co.  v.  Troy  Water 
Co.,  7  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  476:  731,  783, 
918,  1625. 
Edinborough  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Leven, 

1  McQueen  284:   1566,  1700. 
Edison  Elec.   111.   Co.  v.  Hooper,   85 

Md.  110:   346. 
Edmison  v.  Lowry,  3  S.  D.  77:   181. 
Edmonds  v.  Boston,   108  Mass.  535: 

1276,  1277,   1319,  1683. 
Edmondson  v.  Moberly,  98  Mo.  523: 
84,  85,  453. 
V.   Pittsburgh  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,   Ill 
Pa.  St.  316:   671. 
Ednia  v.  Short,  129  Mo.  354:    1405. 
Edsall  V.  Jersey  Shore,  220  Pa.  St. 

591:    1307. 
Edwards  v.  Bruorton,  184  Mass.  529: 
10,   463. 
V.  Charlotte  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  39  S. 

C.  472:    148,   158. 
V.  Harger,  180  111.  99:   161. 
V.   Missouri   etc.   Ry.   Co.,   82   Mo. 
App.  96:  846,  847,  1451,  1456. 


Edwards  v.  Pittsburg  Junction  R.  R. 
Co.,  215  Pa.  St.  597:  302,  1583. 
V.    Stonington    Cemetery    Associa- 
tion, 20  Conn.  466:   542. 
Edwards   House   Co.   v.   Jackson,   91 

Miss.  429:  464. 
Edwardsville    v.    Barnsback,    66    111. 

App.  381:   882,  886. 
Edwardsville  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Sawyer,  92 

111.  377:  315,  1630. 
Eel   River   &   Eureka   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Field,  67  Cal.  429 :  730. 
Eels  V.  American  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  65 
Hun  516:    1626. 
V.  Am.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  143  N.  Y. 
133:  172,  174,  175,  204,  331,  339, 
1630. 
V.  Chesapeake  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  49  W. 
Va.  65:  87,  1639,  1651,  1652. 
Effingham   v.    Surrels,    77    111.   App. 

460:    154. 
Egan  V.  Hart,  45  La.  Ann.  1358 :  132, 

135,   440. 
Egbert  v.  Lake  Shore  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
6  Ind.  App.  350:  319,  847,  1451, 
1452,   1453. 
Egerer  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
3  App.  Div.  157:   148. 
V.  New  York  Central  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
130   N.    Y.    108:    180,   255,   259, 
324,  378. 
Eggleston  v.  New  York  &  Harlem  R. 

R.  Co.,  35  Barb.  162:  857. 
Egyptian  Levee  Co.  v.  Hardin,  27  Mo. 

495:   583,  584,  586. 
Egypt  Street,  2  Grant's  Cases,  455: 

784. 
Ehmen  v.  Gothenburg,  50  Neb.  715: 

875. 
Ehret  v.  Camden  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  60  N. 
J.  Eq.   246:    274. 
V.  Camden  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  61  N.  J. 

Eq.  171 :  272,  274,  282. 
V.  Schuylkill  Bridge  E.  S.  R.  R.  Co., 
151  Pa.  St.  158:  964,  1257,  1259, 
1274,  1339,  1546,  1547. 
Ehrsam,  Matter   of,  37   N.  Y.  App. 

Div.  272:  609,  610. 
Eichels  v.  Evansville  St.  Ry.  Co.,  78 

Ind.  261:   268. 
Eidemiller  v.  Wyandotte  City,  2  Dil- 
lon 376:   1160,  1571,  1574. 
Eighth  School  District  v.  Copeland, 

2  Gray  414:   1495,  1634. 
Eisenbach  v.  Hatfield,  2  Wash.  236: 

117,   119,   136. 
Eisendrath  v.  Chicago,  192  111.  320: 

366,   881. 
Elam,  Ex  parte,  6   Colo.  App.  233: 
162,  471. 


CASES    CITED. 


CXI 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :  Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   7i3-lV19.] 


Elbe  V.   State,   77  Kan.   179:    1491, 

1623. 
Elbert  Co.  v.  Swift,  2  Ga.  App.  47: 

G58,  670. 
Elberton    v.    Adams,    130    Ga.    501: 
1080,  1623. 
V.  Hobbs,  121  Ga.  749:  70,  73,  893, 

1603,  1623. 
V.  Pearle  Cotton  Mills,  123  Ga.  1 : 
73,   1603. 
Elder  v.  Bemis,  2  Met.  599 :   1490. 
Eldert  v.  Long  Island  Elec.  R.  R.  Co., 
28    App.    Div.    N.    Y.    451:    305, 
1587. 
El  Dorado  v.  Ritchie  Grocery  Co.,  84 

Ark.  52 :  1492. 
Eldorado  etc.   R.  R.  Co.  v.  Everett, 
225  111.  529:   1147,  1195,  1215. 
V.    Sims,    228    111.    9:     1268,    1269, 
1331,  1481. 
Eldredge  v.  County  Comrs.,  185  Mass. 

186:  793,  798,  799. 
Eldridge  v.  Binghamton,  42  Hun  202 : 
1196,  1500. 
V.  Binghamton,  120  N.  Y.  309:  806, 
807,  864,  867,  1196,  1497,  1500. 
V.  Collins,  75  Neb.  65:  865. 
V.  Rochester  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  54 
Hun  194:   830,  1355,  1580,  1592. 
V.    Smith,    34    Vt.    484:    524,    525, 

526. 
V.  Trezevant,  160  U.  S.  452:  440. 
Electric  Co.  v.  Dow,  166  U.  S.  489: 

740,  741,  695,  1433. 
Electric  Construction   Co.  v.  Heffer- 

man,  12  N.  Y.  Supp.  336 :  345. 
Elevated  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter  of,  18  Hun 

378:   921. 
Eleventh  Ave.  Opening,  Matter  of,  81 

N.  Y.   436:    368. 
Elfelt  V.  Stillwater  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  53 

Minn.  68:   277. 
Elgin  V.  Eaton,  83  111.  535:  629,  632. 
V.  Hoag,   25  111.  App.  650:    144. 
V.  Kimball,  90  111.  356:  154,  233. 
V.  McCallum,  23  111.  App.  186 :  629, 

1306,  1308. 
V.  Welch,  16  111.  App.  483:   233. 
V.  Welch,  23  111.  App.  185:   233. 
Elgin  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Fletcher,  128 

111.  619:    1246,  1249. 
Elgin  Hydraulic  Co.  v.  Elgin,  74  111. 

433:    142. 
Eliot  V.  Fitchburg  R.  R.  Co.,  10  Gush. 

191:   74. 
Elizabethtown  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ash- 
land &  C.  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  96  Ky. 
347:   328,  765,  769. 
V.  Cattlesburg  Water  Co.,  110  Ky. 
175:  996,  1176,  1243,  1409,  1519. 


Eliabethtown     etc.     R.     R.     Co.     v. 

Coombs,  10  Bush.  382;   178,  249, 

252,  448,  1295,  1302,  1445,  1551, 

1648,  1657. 
V-.  Helm's  Heirs,  8  Bush  681 :  935, 

1182,   1231. 
v.  Thompson,  79  Ky.  52:  245,  252, 

1392 
v.  Tierney,  11  Ky.  L.  R.  526:  310. 
v.  Walton,  9  Ky.  L.  R.  243:   1294. 
Elkhart   v.    Simonton,   69    Ind.    126: 

1570. 
V.  Simonton,  71  Ind.  7:  1373,  1669. 
Elkins  Elec.  Co.  v.  Western  Md.  R. 

R.  Co.,  163  Fed.  724:  772. 
Elk  Road,  2  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  45:   1383. 
Ellicottville  etc.  Plank  Road  Co.  v. 

Buffalo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  Barb, 

644:    423. 
EUinger  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  R.  Co., 

112  Mo.  525:  131,  132. 
EUinghouse  v.  Taylor,  19  Mont.  462: 

587. 
Ellington  v.  Bennett,  59  Ga.  286:  144, 

1229. 
Elliot  V.  Lewis,  1  A.  K.  Marsh.  514: 

1091,  1094. 
V.  Fair  Haven  &  Westville  R.  R. 

Co.,  32  Conn.  579:  268. 
v.  Ferguson,  37  Tex.  Civ.  App.  40: 

454,  1613,  1614. 
V.  Oil  City,  129  Pa.  St.  570:   155. 
Elliott's   Appeal,    154   Pa.   St.    541: 

1387. 
Ellis  v.  Carpenter,  89  Iowa  521 :  1405, 

1406. 
V.   Iowa  City,  29  Iowa  229:    211, 

235. 
V.   St.   Louis  R.   R.   Co.,    131   Mo. 

App.  395:  351,  372. 
Ells  V.  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  51  Mo.  200: 

893,  894,  1516,  1626. 
Ellsworth  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

91   Iowa   386:    1030,   1224,   1247. 
V.  Chickasaw  County,  40  Iowa  571 : 

377,  380,  387,  388. 
V.  Lord,  40  Minn.  389:  881,  892. 
Elmendorf  v.   New  York,   25   Wend. 

693:   1416. 
El  Paso  V.  Coffin,  40  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

54:   1176,  1225,  1229,  1330. 
Elser  v.   Gross  Point,  223  111.  230 

156,  1606. 
Elsom  v.  Seaburg,  11  Ohio  St.  265 

1541. 
Elster  V.  Springfield,  49  Ohio  St.  82 

161,  335,  354. 
Elting  Woolen   Co.   v.   Williams,   36 

Conn.  310:   899. 
Ehvell  V.  Eastfrn  R.  R.  Co.,  124  Mass. 

160:    1535. 


CXll 


OASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  11,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Elwood  V.   Rochester,  43   Hun    102: 

915. 
Ely  V.  Board  of  Comra.,  112  Ind.  361 : 

973. 
V.  Parsons,  55  Conn.  83:  865,  867. 
V.   Rochester,   26   Barb.   133:    236, 

1602. 
Elyton  Land  Co.  v.  South  &  North 

Ala.    R.    R.    Co.,    95    Ala.    631: 

1472 
Embury  v.  Conner,  3  N.  Y.  511:  495, 

496,  589,  816,  1520. 
V.  Conner,  2  Sandf.  89:   495,  589, 

1520. 
Emerson  v.  Commonwealth,  108  Pa. 

St.  Ill:   413,  416. 
V.  Reading,  14  Vt.  279 :   1073. 
V.  Western  Union  R.  R.  Co.,  75  111. 

176:  696,  1206,  1346. 
Emery  v.  Boston  Terminal  Co.,   178 

Mass.     172:     1073,    1135,    1257, 

1260. 
V.  San  Francisco  Gas  Co.,  28  Cal. 

345:    13. 
Emigrant  Ditch  Co.  v.  Webber,   108 

Cal.  88:    1053. 
Emigrant  Mission  Com.  v.  Brooklyn 

R.  R.  Co.,  20  App.  Div.  596:  447. 
V.  Brooklyn  R.  R.  Co.,  165  N.  Y. 

604:   447. 
Emmons  v.  Minneapolis  &  St.  Louis 

Ry.  Co.,  35  Minn.  503:  487. 
V.  Minneapolis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  40 

Minn.   133:   1122. 
Empire  City  Bank,  Matter  of,  18  N. 

Y.  199:  1013. 
Empire  City  Subway  Co.  v.  Broadway 

&  S.  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  87  Hun  279: 

338,  409. 
Emporia  v.  Soden,  25  Kan.  588:  70, 

74,  77,  1603. 
Emry  v.  Raleigh  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  102 

N.   C.   209:   91,   866,  870,   1454, 

1651,  1653,  1716. 
Enders  v.  Friday,  78  Neb.  510:   370. 
Bndicott,   Petitioner,   24   Pick.   339: 

1430. 
Enfield  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Ward,  190  Mass. 

314:    838,   1504. 
Enfield  Toll  Bridge  Co.  v.  Connecticut 

River  Co.,  7  Conn.  28:  1173. 
V.  Hartford  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  Conn. 

63:  407,  413,  524,  682,  1608. 
V.  Hartford  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  Conn. 

454:    682,  781,  788. 
Engle  V.  Hunt,  50  Neb.  358 :  868. 
Bnglehardt  v.  Brooklyn,  3  Miscl.  30: 

1558,  1561. 
Englewood  Connecting  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chi- 
cago  &  Eastern  111.  R.  R.   Co., 

117  111.  611:  954. 


Englewood    Connecting    Ry.    Co.    v. 
Chicago  &  Eastern  111.  R.  R.  Co., 
17  111.  App.  141 :   954. 
English  V.  Danville,  170  111.  131 :  357, 
678. 
V.  Danville,  69  111.  App.  288 :  357. 
V.  New  Haven  &  Northampton  Co., 
32  Conn.  240:  487. 
Ennis  v.  Gilder,   32  Tex.   Civ.  App. 

351:   92. 
Eno  V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co., 
56  N.  Y.  Supr.  Ct.  95 :    1526. 
V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  56 
N.    Y.    Supr.    313:     1555,    1584, 
1615. 
Enoch  V.  Spokane  Falls  &  N.  R.  R. 

Co.,  6  Wash.  393 :  957. 
Enochs  V.  Philadelphia,  2  Pa.  Dist. 

Ct.   83:   647. 
Enos  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  78 

Iowa   28:    620. 
Enterprise  v.   Smith,  62   Kan.   815: 

739. 
Epler  V.  Niman,  5  Ind.  459:   1081. 
Epling  V.  Dickson,  170  111.  329 :  1324, 

1435. 
Epps  V.  Cralle,  1  Mimiford  258 :  1078, 

1359. 
Erickson  v.  Cass  Co.,  11  N.  D.  494: 
579. 
V.  Crookston  W.  W.  P.  &  L.  Co., 

100  Minn.  481 :   162,  163. 
V.  Crookston  W.  W.  P.  &  L.  Co., 
105  Minn.  182:   162,  163. 
Erie  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown,  57  Misc. 
164:   895,  1053. 
V.   Casey,   26   Pa.   St.   287:    1499, 

1502. 
V.  Johnson,  101  Pa.  St.  555:  852. 
V.  Welch,  1  App.  Div.  140:  976. 
Erie  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Delaware  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  21  N.  J.  Eq.  283:  1579,  1616. 
V.  Paterson,  74  N.  J.  L.  738:  914. 
V.  Steward,  59  App.  Div.  187 :  1395. 
V.  Steward,  61  App.  Div.  480:  709, 

718,  728,  920,  1042,  1046. 
v.   Steward,   170   N.  Y.    172:    679, 

709,  718,  728,  920,  1042,  1046. 
V.  Welsh,  1  App.  Div.  140 :  1043. 
V.  Youngstown,  5  Ohio  0.  C.  332: 
914. 
Erkenbrecher  v.   Cincinnati,  2  Cinn. 

Sup.  Ct.  412:   78. 
Erlich  v.  Mason  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

75  Iowa  443:   1315. 
Ermentrout   v.   Stitzel,    170   Pa.   St. 

540:   366. 
Erskine    v.    Boston,    14    Gray    216: 

1717. 
Erwin  v.   Fulk,   94  Ind.   235:    1362, 
1571,  1573. 


CASES    CITED. 


CXlll 


[The  references   are  to   the   pages:   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Esch  V.   Chicago  etc.   R.  R.  Co.,   72 

Wis.  229:  1143,  1228,  1231,  1272. 

Eshleman  v.  Martie  Tp.,  152  Pa.  St. 

liS:   866,  1651,  1656. 
Eslich  V.  Mason  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

73  Iowa  443:   307,  324,  1293. 
Esaery  v.   Grand   Trunk  R.   R.   Co., 

21  Ontario  224:  937,  1560. 
Essex  V.  Local  Board,  L.  R.  14  H.  L. 
153:    447,  451,   453,   1244,    1252, 
1333. 
V.  Local  Board,  14  Q.  B.  D.  753 

447,  451,  453. 
V.  Local  Board,   17  Q.  B.  D.  447 
447. 
Essex   Avenue,   In   re,    121   Mo.   98 

1380. 
Essex  Co.  V.  County  Comrs.,  7  Gray 

450:   1711. 
Essexville  v.  Emery,  90  Mich.   183: 

1492. 
Estabrooks  v.  Peterborough  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,    12    Cush.    224:    87,    88,   91, 
461. 
Estes  V,  Macon,  103  Ga.  780:  1309. 
Ethel   St.,  Matter   of,   3  Miscl.   403: 

183.    1098. 
Etter  V.  Edwards,  4  Watts  63:  1350. 
Ettlinger   v.   Weil,    184   N.   Y.   179: 

1151. 
Eubank  v.  Pence,  5  Litt.  338:   1358, 

1359. 
Eufaula   v.    Simmons,   86   Ala.   515: 

154,  1638. 
Eureka  v.   Armstrong,   83   Cal.  623: 
877,  890. 
V.  Croghan,  81  Cal.  524:   877,  888. 
V.  Eay,  107  Cal.  166:  879. 
V.  Gates,  137  Cal.  89:  877,  887. 
Eureka  Basin  Warehouse  &  Mfg.  Co., 
Matter  of,  96  N.  Y.  42 :  495,  505. 
Eustis   V.   Milton    St.    Ry.   Co.,    183 

Mass.  586:  272,  334. 
Evans  v.  Atlantic  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  6 
Mon.  Supr.  Ct.  493:   1456. 
V.    Boston,    190    Mass.    525:     1029, 

1519. 
V.   Blankenship,  4  Ariz.   307:    871, 

875,  877,  891. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  86  Wis. 

597:   247,  306,  316. 
V.  Foss,  194  Mass.  523:  429. 
V.  Gulf  etc.  R.  R.   Co.    (Tex.   Civ. 

App.)   28  S.  W.  903:  858. 
V.  Haefner,  29  Mo.  141:  1480. 
V.  James,  4  Wis.  408:  1674. 
v.  Letitz,  162  Pa.  St.  561:  882. 
V.  McLueas,  15  S.  C.  67 :  1475. 
V.  Missouri,  Iowa  &  Neb.  Ry.  Co., 
64  Mo.  453:   1535,   1536,  1578. 


Evans  v.  New  Auditorium  Pier  Co., 
63  N.  J.  Eq.   674:    117. 
V.   New   Auditorium   Pier   Co.,   67 

N.  J.  Eq.  315:  117. 
V.  Santana  Live  Stock  &  Land  Co., 

81  Tex.  622:  1027,  1577. 
V.  Savannah  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  90  Ala. 

54:    1663. 
V.  Sharkey  Co.,  89  Miss.  302 :  1399. 
V.  Shields,  3  Head  70:    1407,  1423. 
V.  Welch,  29  Colo.  355:  884. 
V.  West,  138  Ind.  621:   1510. 
Evanston  v.  Clark,  77  111.  App.  234; 
1675. 
V.  O'Leary,  70  111.  App.  124:  1468. 
Evansville  v.   Decker,   84   Ind.    325: 

233. 
Evansville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Charlton, 
6  Ind.  App.  56:    1305,  1355. 
V.  Cochran,  10  Ind.  560:  1109,  1119. 
V.  Dick,  9  Ind.  433:  66,  86,  88. 
v.  Evansville,  15  Ind.  395:   1518. 
V.  Fitzpatrick,   10  Ind.   120:    1123, 

1128,  1205,  1316,  1391. 
V.  Grady,  6  Bush  144:   1159,  1160, 

1636. 
V.  Miller,   30   Ind.   209:    922,  927, 

1112,   1392. 
V.   Nye,    113   Ind.   223:    858,    1560. 
V.  State,  149  Ind.  276:    1288. 
V.    Stringer,    10    Ind.    551:     1123, 

1205,    1316,    1391. 
V.  Swift,   128  Ind.  34:   931. 
V.  Terre  Haute,  161  Ind.  26:   1395, 
1396. 
Evansville  etc.  Traction  Co.  v.  Hen- 
derson Bridge  Co.,  141  Fed.  51: 
685,  686. 
Evansville   Traction   Co.   v.   Hender- 
son  Bridge   Co.,    134   Fed.   973: 
701. 
Everett  v.  Cedar  Rapids  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,    28    Iowa   417:    1032,    1033, 
1420. 
v.  Council  Bluffs,  46  Iowa  66 :  349, 

1487,  1594. 

v.  Fall  River,  189  Mass.  513:  1073. 

V.   Union   Pac.   Ry.   Co.,   59    Iowa 

243:  1118,  1139,  1142,  1227, 

1236. 

Everett    Water    Co.    v.    Powers,    34 

Wash.   143:    1619. 

Evergreen    Cemetery    Association    v. 

New  Haven,  43  Conn.  234:   542. 

V.  Beecher,  53  Conn.  551:  543,  963, 

989. 

Evers  v.  Vreeland,  50  N.  J.  L.  380: 

1387. 
Everse  v.   North-West  R.  R.   Co.,  2 
Montreal  Supr.  Ct.  290:   1570. 


CXLV 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the   pages :   Vol.  1,  pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.  II,  pp.   743-1719.) 


Eversfleld  v.  Mid-Sussex  Ry.  Co.,   3 

DeG.  &  J.  286:  715,  813,  1624. 
Eward  v.  Lawrenceburgh  etc.  R.  R. 

Co.,  7  Ind.  711:  708,  1524. 
Ewell  V.  Daggs,  108  U.  S.  148:  694. 
Ewing  V.  Alabama  &  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  68 

Miss.  551:  524,  714,  731. 
V.  St.  Louis,  5  Wall.  413:  1412. 
Ewings  Mill  Road,  32  Pa.  St.  282: 

1384. 
Exchange    Alley,   Matter    of,    4    La. 

Ann.  4:   1035. 

F. 

Fagan  v.  Chicago,  84  111.  227:   424, 

956. 
Fairbanks     v.     Commonwealth,     183 

Mass.  373:  626,  922,  1273. 
V.  Fitchburg,  110  Mass.  224:   1240. 
V.   Rockingham,    73   Vt.    124:    614, 

1641. 
V.   Rockingham,   75   Vt.   221:    614, 

618,    1641. 
Fairbault   v.   Hulett,    10   Minn.   30: 

976. 
Fairbury  Brick   Co.  v.   Chicago  etc. 

Ry.  Co.,  79  Neb.  854:  91. 
Fairbury  Union  Agricultural  Board 

V.  Holly,  169  111.  9:  890. 
Fairchild  v.   St.   Louis,  97  Mo.   85: 

648,  665. 
v.  St.  Paul,  46  Minn.  540:  673,  675, 

806,  809,  814,  1021,  1027,  1057, 

1067,  1489. 
Faires  v.  San  Antonio  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

80  Tex.  43:   846,  848,  1335. 
Fairfield's  Appeal,  57  Conn.  167:  487. 
Fair  Haven  etc.   R.  R.   Co.  v.   New 

Haven,  203  U.  S.  379:  491. 
Fairmonut  Park,  In  re,  9  Phila.  553: 

1187. 
Faler    v.    Easthampton,    162    Mass. 

422:    1236,  1263. 
Falker  v.  New  York,  West  Shore  & 

Buffalo   Ry.   Co.,    17   Abb.   New 

Cas.  279:    1295,  1581. 
Falter  v.  Packard,  219  111.  356:  865, 

868. 
Fallbrook  Irr.  Dist.  v.  Bradley,   164 

U.  S.  112:  587,  595,  1432. 
Fall  River   Iron   Works   Co.   v.   Old 

Colony  &  Fall  River  R.  R.  Co., 

5  Allen  221:  712,  727. 
Fall  River  Print  Works  v.  Fall  River, 

110  Mass.  428:   1147,  1148. 
Fall   River   R.   R.   Co.   v.   Chase,    125 

Mass.  483:    1408,   1410. 
Falls  V.  Belfast  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  12  I. 

C.  L.  R.  233:  652. 
Fallsburg  P.  &  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Alexander, 

101  Va.  98:   495,  508,  536,   591, 

592,   593. 


Falls  Mfg.  Co.  V.  Oconto  Riv.  Imp. 

Co.,  87  Wis.  134:  81,  99,  113. 
Falmouth   v.   Falmouth    Water    Co., 

180  Mass.  325 :   1266. 
rancher  v.  Coffin,  41  Ind.  App.  489: 

980. 
Fanning  v.   Gilliland,   37   Ore.   369: 
498,  513,  678,  1057. 
V.  Gregoire,  16  How.  524:  411. 
V.    Osborne    &   Co.,    34   Hun    121: 

243,  301,  317,  1580,  1581. 
y.  Osborne,  102  N.  Y.  441:  317. 
Fargo  V.  Browning,  45  App.  Div.  507 : 

1556. 
Farlow,   Re,   2   Barn.   &   Adol.   341: 

1257. 
Farist    Steel    Co.   v.    Bridgeport,    60 
Conn.   278:    115,   136,   540,   543, 
732,  1070. 
Fanner   v.   Cedar   Rapids,   116  Iowa 
322:  602,  603,  616. 
V.  Hooksett,  28  N.  H.  244 :  1382. 
V.  Lewis,  1  Bush  (Ky.)  66:  18. 
V.  McDonald,  59  Ga.  509:  858. 
V.  Myles,  106  La.  333 :  172. 
V.  Pauley,  50  Ind.  583:  983. 
V.  Stillwater  Water  Co.,  9S  Minn. 

119:    1237,   1240,   1339. 
V.  Waterloo  &  City  R.  R.  Co.,  L.  R. 
(1895)    1  Ch.  D.  527:   438. 
Farmers'    Co-Op.   Mfg.    Co.   v.   Albe- 
marle etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  117  N.  C. 
579:   96,  133. 
Farmers'  Market  Co.  v.  Philadelphia 
R.  R.  Co.,  10  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  25 :  507. 
Farmer's   Turnpike   v.    Coventry,    10 

Johns.  389:   726. 
Farm  Investment  Co.  v.  Carpenter,  9 

Wyo.  110:   70. 
Farnandis  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co., 

41  Wash.  486:   436,  443,  456. 
Farneman  v.  Mt.  Pleasant  Cem.  Ass., 

135  Ind.  344:  989,  1056,  1176. 

Parnham    v.     Delaware    &    Hudson 

Canal  Co.,  61  Pa.  St.  265:  1523. 

Farnsworth  v.  Boston,  126  Mass.  1: 

484,  948,  949. 

v.  Lime  Rock  R.  R.  Co..  83  Maine 

440:  500,  533,  894,  991. 
V.  Rockland,  83  Maine  508:   1486, 
1489. 
Farnum   v.  Blackstone   Canal  Co.,  1 
Sumner  46:  702. 
V.  Haverhill  etc.   St.  Ry.  Co.,  178 
Mass.    300:    720. 
Farnum's    Petition,    51    N.    H.    376: 

690. 
Farrand   v.    Clarke,    63    Minn.    181: 
1534. 
V.    Marshall,    19    Barb.    380:    440, 
441. 


CASES    CITED. 


exv 


[The  references   are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742;   Vol.   II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Farrant  v.  First  Division  of  St.  Paul 
&  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,   13  Minn.   311: 
319. 
Farrar  v.  Midland  Elec.  Ry.  Co.,  101 
Mo.   App.    140:    307,   323,   325. 
V.  Midland  Elec.  Ry.  Co.,  162  Mo. 
469:   630,  634. 
Farrell  v.  Manhattan  El.  R.  R.  Co., 
43  App.  Div.  N.  Y.  143:   1664. 
V.    St.    Paul,    62   Minn.    271:    229, 
236. 
Farrell  Road,  35  Pa.   Supr.   Ct.   86: 

1101. 
Farrington  v.  Blish,  14  Me.  423:  976. 
V.  Mt.  Veraon,  51  App.  Dlv.  250: 

609,  616. 
V.  Mt.  Vernon,  166  N.  Y.  233:  609, 

616. 
V.  New  York,  83  Hun  124:    1511, 
1512. 
Farwell   v.   Boston,    180   Mass.   433: 
1218,  1219. 
V.  Boston,  192  Mass.  15:  1219. 
V.  Cambridge,  11  Gray  413:   1185, 

1216. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  52  Neb. 
614:   1117,  1232. 
Faulkner  v.  Somerset  &  Dorset  Ry. 

Co.,  42  L.  J.  Ch.  851:   823. 
Faulkner,   Town   of,   56  N.   H.  255: 

1711. 
Faust    V.    Huntsville,    83    Ala.    279: 
1411. 
V.  Passenger  Ry.  Co.,  3  Phil.  164: 
243,  245,  255. 
Faville  v.  Greene,   12   Wis.   11:   990. 
Fay   V.    Salem   &   Danvers   Aqueduct 
Co.,  Ill  Mass.  27:   109,  117,  138. 
Fayetteville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Combs, 
51    Ark.    324:    1122,    1125,    1200, 
1201,    1243,    1311,    1378,    1476. 
Fayetteville  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Aberdeen 
etc.  R.   R.  Co.,   142  N.  C.  423: 
900,  904,  906,  1619. 
V.  Hunt,  51  Ark.  330:   1208,  1213. 
Fazendel  v.  Morgan,  31  La.  Ann.  549: 

860,  861. 
Fearing  v.  Irwin,  55  N.  Y.  486:   363, 

384,  388. 
Fehr  v.  Schuylkill  Navigation  Co.,  69 

Pa.  St.  161:  1523. 
Feiber  v.  Coyle,  3  Watts  407:   1493. 
Feiten   v.   Milwaukee,   47   Wis.   494: 

1697,   1698. 
Felch  v.  Gilman,  22  Vt.  38:  1520. 
Fellows  V.  New  Haven,  44  Conn.  240: 

212,  213,  229,  231. 
Felt  V.  Vicksburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  46 

La.  Ann.  549:  159,  160. 
Fenelon's    Petition,    7    Pa.    St.    173: 


Fenn,  Matter  of,  128  N.  Y.  10:  1397. 
Fenter  v.  Toledo   etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  29 

111.  App.  250:   90,  1638. 
Ferebee  v.  Lake  Drummond  C.  &  W. 

Co.,  130  N.  C.  745:    1454,  1653. 
Fereday   v.   Mankedick,   172   Pa.    St. 

535:    366. 
Feree   v.  Meily,  3  Yeats   153:    1359. 
Ferguson's  Appeal,  117  Pa.  St.  426: 

183,  878,  1595. 
Ferguson    v.    Covington    etc.    Bridge 

Co.,  108  Ky.  662:   179,  253,  310, 

1657,  1717. 
V.  Firmenlch  Mfg.  Co.,  77  la.  576: 

69,    81,    1454,    1650,    1654. 
V.  Loar,  5  Bush   (Ky.)   689:    19. 
V.  London,  Brighton  &  South  Coast 

Ry.  Co.,  33  Beav.  103:  823. 
V.  London,  Brighton  &  South  Coast 

Ry.   Co.,   3   DeG.   J.   &   S.   653: 

823. 
Fernald  v.  Boston,  12  Cush.  574:  605, 

619,  1356. 
V.  Palmer,   83  Me.  244:    520,  1528. 
Fernold  v.  Knox  Woolen  Co.,  82  Me. 

48:  109,  137. 
Ferrand  v.  Bradford,  21  Beav.  412: 

1603. 
v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  Wis. 

435:    1123. 
Ferrar  v.  Comrs.,  4  L.  R.  Exch.  227: 

733. 
Ferree   v.    Sixth   Ward    School   Dis- 
trict, 76  Pa.   St.   376:    824. 
Ferrenbach   v.   Turner,   86   Mo.   410: 

1488. 
Ferris   v.  Bramble,   5  Ohio   St.   109: 

515,  1033,  1165,  1170. 
V.  Ward,  9  111.  499:    1357,  1521. 
Ferrus    v.    Stafford    etc.    R.    R.    Co., 

41  L.  J.  Eq.  362:    1443. 
Fertilizing  Co.  v.  Hyde  Park,  97  U. 

S.  659:    14,  736. 
Fesser    v.    Achenbach,    29    111.    App. 

373:   377,  387,  390. 
Fessler  v.  Union,   67   N.   J.   Eq.   14: 

420,    872,    875,    878,    1494,    1618. 
Feuerstein  v.  Jackson,  8  Ohio  C.  C. 

396:    236. 
Fevee  v.  Meily,  3  Yates  153:  1156. 
Fick  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  157 

Pa.  St.  622:    152,  159. 
Ficken  v.  Atlanta,  114  Ga.  970:  629. 
Fidelity  Trust  etc.  Co.  v.  Mobile  St. 

R.  R.  Co.,  53  Fed.  687:  416,  1621. 
Field   v.   Barling,   149   111.   556:    190, 

197,  366,  369,  373,  877. 
V.   Carnarvon   etc.   Ry.   Co.,   L.  R. 

5  Eq.  Cas.  190:   1570. 
V.   Carnarvon   etc.   Ry.   Co.,   37    L. 

J.  Ch.  176:   1.570. 


CXVl 


CASES    CITED. 


[The   references   are  to   the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.  1-742 ;   Vol.   II,  pp.   743-1T19.) 


Field  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  21 

Mo.  App.  600:    147,   160. 
V.  Des  Moines,  39  la.  575:  17. 
V.  Field,  38  N.  J.  L.  290:    1100. 
V.    Vermont    &    Mass.   R.    R.    Co., 

4  Cush.  150:   1075. 
V.  West  Orange,  36  N.  J.  Eq.  118: 

233,  1606. 
V.  West  Orange,  46  N.  J.  Eq.  183: 

146,    155. 
Fields  V.  Colby,  102  Mich.  450:   513. 
Fifer   v.    Ritter,    159    Ind.    8:     1192, 

1310,  1316. 
Fifth  &  Sixth  Sts.  Change  of  Grade 

of,  12  Phila.  587:  612,  618,  1718. 
Fifteenth  St.  Opening,  10  Phila.  214: 

1317. 
I'ilth  Nat'l  Bank  v.  New  York  El. 

R.  R.  Co.,  24  Fed.  114:  267. 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  28  Fed. 

231:    1295. 
Fifty-Second  Street  Opening,  Matter 

of,  18  Phil.  497:   1341. 
Filbert  v.  Dechert,  22  Pa.  Supr.  Ct. 

362:   73. 
Fillebrown  v.  Hoar,  124  Mass.  580: 

1256. 
Finch  V.  Riverside  &  A.  R.  R.  Co., 

87  Cal.  597:  277,  306. 
Fingal  v.  Millvale,  162  Pa.  St.  313: 

417. 
Fink    V.    Newark,    40    N.    J.    L.    11: 

1325. 
Finke  v.  Zeigemiller,  77  la.  253:  706, 

1404. 
Finn   v.   Providence   Gas   &   W.   Co., 

99   Pa.   St.   631:    1270,   1495. 
Finnell's  Admr.  v.  Louisville  South- 
ern R.  R.  Co.,  99  Ky.  570:   1564. 
Finney   v.    Sommerville,   80   Pa.    St. 

59:   684,  1524. 
Firman  Street,  Matter  of,  17  Wend. 

649:   8,  659,   1229. 
First  Baptist  Society  v.  Fall  River, 

119   Mass.   95:    1438,    1439. 
First    Church   in   Boston   v.   Boston, 

14    Gray   214:    1185,    1213. 
First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Sarlls,   129  Ind. 

201:    468. 
V.  Thompson,  116  Ala.  166:    1564. 
v.   Tyson,   133   Ala.  459:    190,   191, 

192,  373,  1596. 
V.  Tyson,  144  Ala.  457:    191,  1596. 
V.   West   River  R.   R.  Co.,  49  Vt. 

167:    1531,   1557. 
V.   West  River   R.  R.   Co.,  46   Vt. 

633:    1531,  1675. 
First  Parish  v.  County  of  Plymouth, 

8   Cush.   475:    1316,   1317. 
V.  Middlesex  Co..  7  Gray  106:   1266. 


First    St.    Opening,    Matter    of,    66 
Mich.  42:  736,  745,  747,  749,  1290. 
Fischer  v.  Laack,  76  Wis.  313:   882. 
V.    Catawissa   R.   R.   Co.,    175   Pa. 
St.  554:    1670,   1682. 
Fish  V.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  84  Minn. 
179:    1226. 
V.  Rochester,  6  Paige  268:   211. 
Fisher  v.  Allen,  8  N.  J.  L.  301 :  1091. 
V.  Baden  Gas  Co.,  138  Pa.  St.  301: 

1175,  1187. 
V.    Bountiful    City,    21    Utah    29: 

57,  70. 
V.  Chicago  &  Springfield  R.  R.  Co., 

104  111.  323:   526,  731. 
V.  Coyle,  3  Watts  407:  1630. 
V.  Feige,  137  Cal.  39:  69. 
V.  Hobbs,  42  Ind.  276:    996,   1028. 
V.  Horicon   Iron  &  Manf.   Co.,   10 

Wis.  351:   550,  1523. 
V.  Naysmith,  106  Mich.  71:  236. 
V.  New  York,  3  Hun  648:    1529. 
V.  New  York,  4  Lans.  451:  1527. 
V.  New  York,  57  N.  Y.  344:   1526, 

1527. 
V.  Rochester,  6  Lans.  225:   1491. 
V.  Smith,  5  Leigh  611:   1091,  1094. 
V.   Warwick   R.   R.   Co.,    12   R.   I. 
287:   1526,  1527. 
Fisher,   Ex   parte,   72   Cal.   125:    468. 
Fisher,  In  re,  178  Pa.  St.  325:   928. 
Fisk  V.  Hartford,  70  Conn.  720:   73, 
1615. 
V.   Springfield,   116   Mass.   88:    239. 
Fiske  V.  Chesterfield,  14  N.  H.  240: 
1325. 
V.    Framingham    Manuf.    Co.,     12 
Pick.  68:   544,  554,  557,   1667. 
Fitch  V.  Seymour,  9  Met.  462:  858. 
V.  Stevens,  2  Met.  505:   964,  1438. 
V.   Stevens,   4   Met.   426:    1524. 
V.  Taft,  126  Mass.  503:    1116. 
Fitchburg,   Bradford   &   Buflfalo   Ry. 
Co.    V.   McCloskey,    110   Pa.    St. 
436:    1150. 
Fitchburg   R.    R.    Co.    v.    Boston    & 
Maine   R.   R.    Co.,    3   Cush.   58: 
107,  1079,  1089. 
V.  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.,  6  Allen  98: 

1377. 
V.  Fitchburg,  121  Mass.  132:   1022. 
Fitch,  In  re,  147  N.  Y.   334:    1412. 
Fitzer  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  105 

Minn.  221:   351,  372. 
Fitzell   V.   Philadelphia,   211   Pa.   St. 

1:    1327. 
Fitzgerald  v.  Baltimore   &  0.  R.  R. 
Co.,  19  D.  C.  513:  309,  316. 
V.  Barbour,  55  Fed.  440:    183,  879. 
V.   Sa.xton,  58  Ark.  494:    877,  889. 
Fitzpatrick  v.  Boston  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
84  Me.  33:    1485,  1647. 


CASES    CITED. 


CX\'ll 


[The  references   are  to   the  pages:   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-3719.] 


Fitzpatriek   v.    Penn.   R.   R.   Co.,    10 

Phila.    107:    1365,    1366. 
FitzSimons  &  Coimell  Co.  v.  Braun, 

199  111.  390:   435,  443,  456. 
Fitzmaurice  v.  Turney,  214  Mo.  610: 

1391. 
Five  Tracts  of  Land  v.  United  States, 

101    Fed.   661:    1142,    1147,    1228, 

1230,   1243. 
Flag  V.  Worcester,  8  Cush.  69:   1084. 
Flagg    V.    Worcester,    13    Gray    601: 

147,  234,  605. 
Flammer  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  56 

App.  Div.  183:   1562. 
Flanders  v.  Colebrook,  51  N.  H.  300: 

1381. 
V.    Franklin,   70    N.   H.    168:    159, 

235. 
V.  Wood,  24  Wis.  572:  821,  1572. 
Flannagan  v.  Philadelphia,  42  Pa.  St. 

219:    104. 
Flatbush   Ave.,    Matter    of,    1    Barb. 

286:  408,  410,  978. 
Flaten  v.   Moorhead,   51   Minn.   518: 

420,   1494,   1618. 
Flat   Swamp  etc.  Co.   v.   McAllister, 

74  N.  C.  159:  928. 
Fleener    v.    Claman,    126    Ind.    166: 

1410. 
Fleetwood  Streets,  8  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  210: 

992. 
Fleming  v.  Baltimore  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

51  W.  Va.  54:   1485. 
V.   Chicago   etc.   R.  R.  Co.,   34   la. 

353:    1211,  1315. 
V.  Hight,  95  Ind.  78:   1403,  1406. 
V.  Hull,  73  la.  598:   494,  549,   553, 

564,  570,  571,  575. 
V.   Lockwood,   36   Mont.    384:    144. 
V.  Rome,   130  Ga.  383:    1601,   1612. 
V.   Wilmington    &   W.    R.   R.    Co., 

115    N.    C.    676:    88,    157,    1449, 

1454,  1459,   1476,  1512. 
Flersheim  v.  Baltimore,  85  Md.  489: 

879. 
Fletcher  v.  The  Auburn  &  Syracuse 

E.   R.    Co.,    25   Wend.    462:    152, 

244. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  67  Minn. 

339:   813,  989. 
V.    Great    Western   R.   R.    Co.,   29 

L.  .J.   Exch.   253:    837,   1475. 
V.  Seattle,  43  Wash.  627:  631,  632, 

634. 
Fletcher's   Heirs   v.   Fugate,   3   J.   .T. 

Marsh.  Ky.  631:  513,  1004,  1017, 

1077,   1367. 
Flinn   v.  New  York  Central   etc.  R. 

R.  Co.,  58  Hun  230:   1472. 


Flint  etc.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Detroit   etc. 
R.   R.    Co.,   64    Mich.    350:    990, 
1281. 
V.  Norton,  64  Mich.  248:    1412. 
Flock  V.  Green  Island,  122  N.  Y.  107 : 

880. 
Flood    V.    Brooklyn    El.    R.    R.    Co., 

75  Hun  601:   1298,  1303. 
Florence    etc.    R.    R.    Co.    v.    Lilley, 
3   Kan.   App.   588:    825. 
v.  Pember,  45  Kan.  625:  1119,  1312. 
V.   Shepherd,  50  Kan.  438:    1203. 
Florida  Cent.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bear, 
43  Fla.  319:  706.  708,  1392,  1427, 
1673. 
V.  Bell,  43  Fla.  359:  911,  977,  979. 
V.    Ocala    St.    R.    R.    Co.,    39    Fla. 
306:   301. 
Florida    East    Coast    R.    R.    Co.    v. 
Worley,  49   Fla.  297:    871,  875, 
876,  877. 
Florida  So.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown,   23 
Fla.    104:     200,    250,    315,    1294. 
V.  Hill,  40  Fla.  1:   1535,  1537,  1031. 
Flower   v.   London   etc;   R.   R.   Co.,   2 

D.  &  S.  330:    815,   1061,  1572. 
Floyd  V.  Turner,  23  Tex.  292:    1571. 
Floyd   Co.   V.   Rome    St.    R.    R.    Co., 

77   Ga.   614:    321,   424,   1489. 
Flynn  v.  Detroit,  93  Mich.  590:   1492. 
V.    Kings    Co.    El.    R.    R.    Co.,    3 

App.  Div.  254:   1133. 
V.  Taylor,   127  N.  Y.   596:    1665. 
V.  Woolman,  133  Mich.  508:    1511. 
Fobes   V.   Rome   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   121 
N.    Y.    505:    200,    202,    243,    254. 
1328,    1584. 
Fogg  V.  Nevada  etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   20 

Neb.  429:    1592. 
Fohl    v.    Chicago    etc.    Ry.    Co.,    84 
Minn.   314:    997. 
V.  Sleepy  Eye  Lake,  80  Minn.  67: 
749,  751,  752. 
Foley  V.  Cedar  Rapids,   130  la.  453: 
603. 
V.   County   Court,   54   W.  Va.    16: 
1569,   1574. 
enson    v.    I 
Pa.  St.  523:   633. 
Folley  V.  Passaic,  26  N.  J.  Eq.  216: 

952,   1570,   1574. 
Follman    v.     City    of    Mankato,    45 

Minn.  457:   148,  149,  154. 
Folmar  v.  Folmar,  68  Ala.  120:   1083. 
V.  Folmar,  71  Ala.   136:    981,  1438. 
Folmsbee   v.  Amsterdam,   142  N.    V. 
118:   236,  610,  616,   1549,  1.550. 
V.   Amsterdam,    66   Hun   214:    236, 
610,   1549,   1550. 


rixviii 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to   the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II.   pp.   743-1719.] 


Folsom  V.  Apple  River  Log  Driving 

Co.,  41  Wis.  602:  80. 
V.  New   Orleans,  28  La.  An.   936: 

476. 
Folts   St.,   Matter   of,   18  App.  Dlv. 

N.  Y.  568:  678,  750. 
Foltz  V.  Huntley,  7  Wend.  210:  1255. 
V.    St.    Louis    etc.    R.    R.    Co.,    60 

Fed.  316:   1511,  1512,  1619. 
Foot  V.  Stiles,  57  N.  Y.  399:  1511. 
Foote    V.    Cincinnati,    11    Ohio    408: 

1255,   1524. 
V.   Loraine   etc.   Ry.   Co.,   21    Ohio 

C.  C.   319:    1232,   1254,   1268. 
V.   Manhattan  R.  R.   Co.,   58  Hun 

478:    1663,  1664. 
V.  Met.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  147  N.  Y. 

367:  1663,  1664. 
V.  New  Haven  &  Northampton  Co., 

23  Conn.  214:  857. 
Forbell  v.  New  York,  164  N.  Y.  522: 

163,  1637. 
V.  New  York,  27  N.  Y.  Misc.  12: 

163. 
Forbes  v.  Commonwealth,  172  Mass. 

289:    1267. 
V.    Cannon,    35    Mont.    424:    941, 

1556. 
V.  Delashmutt,  68  Iowa  164:  1098, 

1572. 
Forbes  St.,  70  Pa.  St.  125:  432,  1385, 

1705. 
Ford  V.  Chartiers,  4  Penny.  62:  1399. 
V.   Chicago   &  N.   W.   Ry.  Co.,    14 

Wis.  609:    243,  247,  315,   1580. 
V.    Chicago    Milk    Shippers'    Asso., 

11  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  433: 

410. 
V.    County    Comrs.,    64    Me.    408: 

1365. 
V.   Danbury,   44   N.    H.   388:    1382. 
V.   Ford,   110   Ind.   89:    1028. 
V.  Harris,  95  Ga.  97:  877. 
V.  Metropolitan  R.  R.   Co.,  L.  R. 

17  Q.  B.  D.  12:   645. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  14  Wis.  609:  1651, 

1658. 
V.   Santa  Cruz  R.  R.  Co.,  59  Cal. 

290:    249,   250,   1298,    1552,   1649, 

1657. 
V.  Surget,  46  Miss.   130:    18. 
V.  Whitaker,  1  Nott  &  McCord  5: 

1373. 
Fordyce   v.   Kansas   City   etc.   R.  R. 

Co.,  145  Fed.  566:   1544. 
V.   Wolfe.   82   Tex.   145:    966,   1559, 

1560. 
Fore  V.  Hoke,  48  Mo.  App.  254:  726, 

893,    894,    1084,    lOSO. 
V.   Western   N.   C.   R.  R.   Co.,   101 

N.  C.  526:   817,  1634. 


Foreman's    Heirs    v.    Allen,    2    Bibb 

581:    1368. 
Forest  Cemetery  Assn.  v.   Constans, 

70  Minn.  436:  1423. 
Forest  City   etc.  R.   R.   Co.   v.  Day, 

73  Ohio  St.  83:   302. 
Forge    V.    Highland,    109    Wis.    292: 

885. 
Fork   Ridge   Baptist   Cem.   Assn.   v. 

Redd,  33  W.  Va.  262:    507,   543, 

707,  988,  989,  990,  1043,  1064. 
Forney  v.  Fremont  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  23 

Neb.  465:  2,  495,  496,  542,  1270, 

1481,    1482. 
Forster   v.   Bridge    Co.,   Harris   393: 

1350. 
V.   Cumberland   Valley  R.   R.   Co., 

23  Pa.  St.  371:  1713. 
v.   Scott,   136  N.   Y.   577:    57,   67, 

431,  432,   1154. 

v.  Scott,  60  N.  Y.  Supr.  313:  431, 

432,  1154. 

Forsyth   v.   Baltimore    &    Ohio    Tel. 

Co.,  12  Mo.  App.  494:    341,  342. 

V.  Kreuter,  100  Ind.  27:   973,  975, 

996,  1075,  1406. 
V.  Wheeling,  19  W.  Va.  318:   1569, 
1574. 
Forsyth   Boulevard   v.    Forsyth,    127 

Mo.  417:    1138,   1225,  1384. 
Forsythe   v.   Dunagan,   94   Cal.   438: 
889. 
V.  Hammond,  68  Fed.  774:  23,  466. 
V.    Wilcox,    143    Ind.    144:     1086, 
1192,  1426. 
Fort  V.  Goodwin,  36  S.  C.  445:  467, 
495,  589. 
V.  New  Haven  &  N.  Co.,  23  Conn. 
214:    144. 
Fort  Collins  Dev.  Ry.  Co.  v.  France, 
41    Colo.    512:    646,    1119,    1120, 
1127,   1149. 
v.  Hoyt,  35  Colo.  480:  1424. 
Fort   Dodge   v.   Minneapolis    etc.    R. 
R.    Co.,    87    la.    389:    748,    753, 
1643,    1644,    1645. 
Fort  Plain  Bridge  Co.  v.  Smith,  30 

N.   Y.   44:    409,  410. 
Fort   Scott   W.   &   W.   R.   R.   Co.  v. 
Fox,  42  Kan.  490:  249,  252,  1545, 
1549. 
Fort  Smith  v.  McKibbin,  41  Ark.  45: 

1492. 
Fort  St.  Union  Depot  Co.  v.  Backus, 
92    Mich.    33:    1068,    1316,    1339, 
1374. 
V.  Jones,  83  Mich.  415:   1383. 
V.  Morton,  83  Mich.  265:   527,  684 

1092. 
V.  Peninsular  Stove  Co.,  103  Mich 
637:    1430. 


CASES    CITED. 


CXIX 


{The   references   are  to   the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Fort    St.    Union    Depot   Co.  v.  State 

R.  E.  Crossing  Board,  81  Mich. 

248:   771. 

Fort  Wayne  v.  Ft.  Wayne  etc.  R.  R. 

Co.,   149   Ind.  25:    1004,    1571. 

V.   Hamilton,   132   Ind.   487:    1545, 

1547. 
V.  Lake  Shore  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  132 
Ind.   ,558:    749,   1609. 
Fort  Wayne  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Sherry, 

126   Ind.   334:    835,   836. 
Fort  Wayne  L.  &  I.  Co.  v.  Maumee 
Ave.  Gravel  R.  R.  Co.,  132  Ind. 
80:    407,    414. 
Fort  Worth  v.  Howard,  3  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  537:   616,  631,  632,  1306. 
Fort  Worth  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Downie, 
82  Tex.  383:   449,  654,  655,  664, 
1334,  1337. 
V.  Hogsett,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  Cas. 

200:    984,   1135. 
V.    Jennings,    76    Tex.    373:     425, 

1473. 
V.   Lamphear,    1    Tex.    App.    Civil 

Cases  p.   127:    1390. 
V.    Scott,    2    Tex.   App.    Civ.    Cas. 

137:  155,  1267. 
V.   State,   100  Tex.  425:    489. 
V.  Sweatt,  20  Tex.  Civ.  App.  543: 

858,  1503. 
V.  S.  W.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  96  Tex. 
160:  724,  774. 
Fort  Worth  Ice  Co.  v.  Chicago  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  11  Tex.  Civ.  App.  600: 
1389. 
Fort  Worth  St.  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Queen 
City    R.    R.    Co.,    71    Tex.    165: 
1483. 
Forty-fourth  St.,  In  re,  7  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

69:    431. 
Forty-fourth  St.  Opening,  In  re,   19 

Phil.    563:    1327. 
Forward  v.  Hampshire   &   Hampden 

Canal  Co.,  22  Pick.  462,  1537. 
Fosgate  v.  Hudson,   178  Mass.  225: 

1221,  1338. 
Fossion   V.   Landrey,    123   Ind.    136: 

877. 

Fossum  V.   Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  80 

Minn,  9:    153,   1127,   1648,   1655. 

Foster  v.  Boston,  22  Pick.  33:   1354. 

V.  Boston  Park  Comrs.,  131  Mass. 

225:   539. 
V.  Buffalo,  64  How.  Pr.  127:   420, 

1498,  1618. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  10  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  476:  989. 
V.  Dunklin,  44  Mo.  216:    1403. 
V.  Foster,  81   S.  C.  307:   831. 
V.  Kansas,  112  U.  S.  201:  478. 
V.   London   etc.    R.   R.    Co.,    L.   R. 
(1895)    1  Q.  B.  711:    1475. 


Foster  v.  Paxton,  90  Ind.  122:   1510. 
V.   St.   Louis,   71    Mo.   157:    234. 
V.  St.  Louis,  4  Mo.  App.  564:   234. 
V.  Sebago  Imp.  Co.,  100  Me.   196: 

866,  808,  870. 
V.  Stafford  National  Bank,  57  Vt. 

128:    67,    128,    1163,    1165. 
V.  Winona  County,  84  Minn.  308: 

1011. 
V.  Worcester,  164  Mass.  419:  1494. 
Foster  Ave.,  Matter  of,  89  App.  Div. 

490:  1328. 
Foster  Tp.  Road,  1  Luzerne  Leg.  Reg. 

■    Rep.    100:    1091. 
Fostoria  v.  Fox,  60  Ohio  St.  340:  932. 
Fotterby  v.  Metropolitan  Ry.  Co.,  2 

L.  R.  C.  P.   188:    1533. 
Fouche  V.  Rome  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  84  Ga. 

233:  639,  642,  1588,  1615. 
Foudry  v.  St.  Louis   etc.  R.  E.  Co., 

130  Mo.  App.  104:   1582. 
Fountain  v.  Keen,  116  la.  406:   881. 
Fourth  Ave.,  11  Abb.  Pr.  189:    1100, 

1101. 
Fourth  St.   Opening,  In  re,   158  Pa. 

St.  469:   1393. 
Foust  V.  Pa.  R.  R.  Co.,  212  Pa.  St. 
213:   373,  382,  391,  394,  398,  647, 
664. 
Fowie   V.   New   Haven   etc.   Co.,    107 
Mass.  352:   1652. 
V.  N.  H.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  112  Mass. 
334:    88,   108,   1446,   1551,   1652, 
1662. 
Fowler    v.    County    Comrs.,   6    Allen 
92:    1145. 
V.  Des   Moines   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,  91 

la.    533:    1648,    1657. 
V.  Holbrook,  17  Pick.  188:  1526. 
Fox  V.  Baltimore  &  0.  R.  R.  Co.,  34 
W.    Va.    466:     640,    1302,    1550, 
1551. 
V.  Cincinnati,  104  U.  S.  783:   523, 

1496. 
V.    Holcomb,    34    Mich.    298:    976, 

1419. 
V.  New  York  City  Interborough  R. 
R.  Co.,   112   App.  Div.  832:    302. 
V.  Union  Sugar  Co.,  109  Mass.  292: 

366. 
V.  Virgin,  11  111.  App.  513:   867. 
V.   Western   Pacific   R.   R.   Co.,   31 
Cal.    538:    1102,    1171,    1487. 
Fox  Street,  Matter  of,  54  App.  Div. 

479:   884,  887,  889,  1327. 
Frame    v.    Boyd,    35   N.    J.    L.    457: 

1372. 
Framingham  Water  Co.  v.  Old  Col- 
ony R.   R.   Co.,   176   Mass.   404: 
73,  814. 
Frank  v.  Atlanta,  72   Ga.  428:   484. 


cxx 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to   the  pages:   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742;  Vol.   II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Frank  v.   Evansville  &  Indianapolis 

R.  R.  Co.,   Ill  Ind.   132:    1500. 
Francis  v.  Schoelkoff,  53  N.  Y.  152: 

649. 
Franconia  Tp.  Road,  78  Pa.  St.  316: 

1069. 
Frankel  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 

70  la.  424:    1443. 
Frankle    v.    Jackson,    30    Fed.    Rep. 

398:    640,   1717. 
Franklin   v.   Durgee,  71   N.  H.   186: 

153. 
V.  Fisk,   13  Allen,  211:    147. 
Franklin  County  Road,  2  Yeates  53: 

1388. 
Franklin   &   Columbia   Turnpil^e  Co. 
V.     County    Court    of    Maury,    8 

Humph.  342:   410,  414,  1608. 
Franklin   etc.   R.  R.   Co.  v.   Monnat, 

52   La.    Ann.    1026:    836. 
Franklin  Road,  16  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  276: 

1360,  1364. 
Franklin   St.,   14  Pa.   St.  403:    1670, 

1671. 
Franklin  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Long  Dis- 
tance Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  118  Tenn. 

88:    739. 
F\-anklin    Trust    Co.    v.    Peninsular 

Pure  Water  Co.,   161   Fed.   855: 

409,  1622. 
Frankfort   etc.   R.   R.   Co.   v.   Phila- 
delphia, 175  Pa.  St.  120:   885. 
Frankstown   Road,   26   Pa.   St.   472: 

1370. 
Frank  Warr  &  Co.  v.  London  County 

Council,    (1904)     1    K.   B.   713: 

958. 
Franz  v.  Sioux  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

55   la.    107:    319. 
Frassr  v.  Mulany,  129  Wis.  377:  707, 

1018,   1571. 
Frater    v.    Hamilton    Co.,    90    Tenn. 

661:    181,  224,   1546. 
Fravert  v.  Finfrock,  31  Ohio  St.  621 : 

1431,   1555. 
V.    Frinfrock,    43    Ohio    St.    335: 

1017,   1032,   1033. 
Frazee    v.    Manufacturers    L.    &    H. 

Co.,  20  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  420:    1107. 
Frazer   v.    Bigelow    Carpet    Co.,    141 

Mass.  126:  1320. 
V.  Chicago,  186  111.  480:   658. 
V.    Mulany,    129    Wis.    377:    1513, 

1570. 
Frazier  v.  East  Tenn.   Tel.  Co.,   115 

Tenn.  416:   333,  342. 
Fred    v.    Kansas    City    Cable    R.    R. 

Co..  65   Mo.  App.   121:   227,  324, 

1355. 


Frederick   v.   Groshon,   30   Md.   436: 
1568,  1574. 
V.  Shane,  32  la.  254:   1204. 
Fredericks   v.  Hoffmeister,   62   N.  J. 
L.  565:   817,  1419. 
V.   New   York,  44  App.  Div.   274 

1326. 
V.  New  York,  27  Misc.  588:    1326 
V.  New  York,  165  N.  Y.  656:  1326 
V.  Pennsylvania  Canal  Co.,  148  Pa, 
St.  317:   653. 
Frederick    St.,   11    Pa.   Co.    Ct.    114 

*     915 
Frederick    St.,    12   Pa.    Co.   Ct.   577 

514. 
Frederick  St.,  In  re,  155  Pa.  St.  623 

914,  1376,  1409. 
Freedle  v.  North  Carolina  R.  R.  Co 

4  Jones  Law  89:    1206. 
Freedom    v.    Norris,    128    Ind.    377 

1504. 
Freeland  v.  Muscatine,  9  la.  461:  211, 
236. 
V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  66  Pa.  St.  91: 

108. 
V.  Pa.  R.  R.  Co.,  197  Pa.  St.  529: 
87,  116. 
Freeman  v.  Cook,  113  Ky.  461:  1400. 
v.  Cornish,  52  N.  H.  141:    1428. 
V.  Hunter,  7  Ohio  C.  C.  117:  1219. 
V.   Price,    63    N.    J.    L.    151:    700, 

1381. 
V.  Weeks,  45  Mich.  335:  1520. 
Freeport  Water  Co.  v.  Freeport,  186 
111.  179:   481. 
V.  Freeport,  180  U.  S.  587:   481. 
Freetown  v.  County  Comrs.,  9  Pick. 

46:    1019. 
Freiberg  v.  S.  S.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  221 

111.  508:   1176,  1229,  1239. 
Freiday  v.  Sioux  City  Rapid  Transit 

Co.,   92   la.   191:    267. 

Freight  Tax  Case,  15  Wall.  232:  594. 

Fremont  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bates,  40 

Neb.  381:   1200,  1223,  1243,  1312. 

V.  Harlin,  50  Neb.  698:    149,   155, 

846,  847,  1456. 
V.  Mattheis,  35  Neb.  48:   980,  982, 

995,    1523. 
V.  Meeker,  28  Neb.  94:   1310,  1312, 

1409. 
V.  Morley,  25  Neb.  138:   155,  1124. 
V.  Setright,  34  Neb.  253:   630,  635, 

939,  1548. 
V.  Whalen,  11  Neb.  585:  1124,  1179, 
1251. 
French  v.  Barber  Asphalt  Pav.  Co., 
181  U.  S.  324:    11,  463. 
1 .   Braintree    Manf.   Co.,   23   Pick. 
216:    544,   554,    899. 


CASES    CITED. 


CXXl 


[The   references  are  to   the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.  J-742  ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Trench  v.   Comra.,  of  Highways,    12 

Mich.   267:    1417. 
V.  Inhabitants  of  Quincy,  3  Allen 

9:    523. 
V.    Lowell,    117    Mas,s.    363:     1185, 

1217. 
V.    Jlilwaukee,   49    Wis.    584:    615, 

618,   619,   1307. 
V.    Owen,    5    Wis.    112:    695,    1524. 
V.    Robb,    67    N.    J.    L.    260:     344, 

1630. 
V.  White,  24  Conn.  170:  570. 
French     Livestock     Co.     v.     Harvey 

County,  38  Ore.  315:  1381. 
Frend   v.   Detroit    etc.   Ry.    Co.,    133 

Mich.  413:   1569. 
Frency,    Matter    of,    20    Misc.    272: 

1362. 
Freshour  v.  Logansport  &  Northern 

Turnpike  Co.,  104  Ind.  463 :  1423. 
Fresno  v.   Fresno  Canal   &  Irr.   Co., 

98  Cal.  179:  356. 
Fresno    St.    R.    R.    Co.    v.    So.    Pac. 

R.  R.  Co.,  135  Cal.  202:    1633. 
Fretz'a  Appeal,  15  Pa.  St.  397:  1397. 
Frey  v.  Duluth  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  91  Wis. 

309:   247. 
V.    Ft.    Worth    etc.    R.    R.    Co.,    5 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  29:    861. 
Freyburg  v.  Davenport,  63  la.   119: 

234. 
Friday    v.    Pa.    R.   R.    Co.,    204    Pa. 

St.   405:    1120.   1127,    1131,   1140. 
Friedenwald    v.    Baltimore,    74    Md. 

116:    1115,   1179,   1216,   1408. 
V.  Shipley,  74  Md.  220:    918. 
Friedman   v.   New   York   etc.   R.   R. 

Co.,  89  App.  Div.  38:   450. 
v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,   180 

N.  y.  550:   450. 
Friedrich    v.    Milwaukee,    114    Wis. 

304:   236,  615,  617. 
Friel   v.   People,   4   Colo.   App.   259: 

868,  870. 
Friend  v.  Abbott,  56  Me.  262:    1088, 

1409. 
Friend,  Appellant,  53  Me.  387:  1083. 
Friendsville  Road,  16  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  172^: 

1034,  1383. 
Fries  v.  New  York   etc.  R.   R.   Co., 

57   App.  Div.   577:    257,   358. 
V.  New  York   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   169 

N.  Y.  270:   257,  258,  358. 
V.  Southern  Penn.  Ry.  Co.,  85  Pa. 

St.  73:   1538,  1682. 
v.  Wheeling  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  56  Ohio 

St.   135:    1547,   1631. 
Frink    v.    Lawrence,    20    Conn.    117: 

649. 
Frisbin  v.  Cowen,  18  App.  Cas.  D.  C. 

381:    154. 


Frith    V.    Dubuque,   45   la.   406:    251, 
316,  1650,  1657. 
V.  Justices   of  the  Inferior   Court, 
30  Ga.  723:  1091. 
Fritz,    Ex   parte,   86   Miss.   210:    52, 

471. 
Fritzell  v.  Rogers,  82  111.  109:   1571. 
Frohmann  v.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co., 

86  Hun  262:   1304. 
Front  &  Union  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  In  re, 

1  Penn.  Del.  370:    1040. 
Frost  V.  Earnest,  4  Whart.  86:   1260. 
v.  I^atherman,   55   Mich.   33:    973, 

983,  1419,  1513,  1516. 
V.  People,   193  111.  635:   485. 
V.  Worthington  Co.  R.  R.  Co.,  96 
Me.  76:   128,  134. 
Frostburg  v.  Dufty,  70  Md.  47:   143, 
154,    1650,    1656. 
V.  Hitchins,  70  Md.   56:    143,   154, 

1650. 
V.    Wineland,    98    Md.    239:     349, 
1594. 
Frovert  v.  Finfrock,  31  Ohio  St.  621: 
1431. 
V.  Finfrock,  43  Ohio  St.  335:  1017. 
Frudle  v.  North  Carolina  R.  R.  Co., 

4   Jones   Law   89:    1187. 
Fryer  v.  McRae,  8  Porter  (Ala.)  187: 

19. 
Fuess  V.  Kansas  City  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  191 

Mo.  692:   1306. 
Fuller   V.   Atlanta,    66   Ga.   80:    210. 
V.  Belleville,  67  N.  J.  Eq.  468:  155, 

1606. 
V.    Chicago    Manf.    Co.,    16    Gray 

46:    1345. 
V.  County  Comrs.  of  Plymouth,  15 

Pick.  81 :  860,  1073. 
V.  Detroit,   97   Mich.  597:    1511. 
V.  Edings,  11  Rich.  239:  1272,  1523. 
V.  French,  10  Met.  359:  1526,  1530. 
V.   Grand  Rapids,   105   Mich.   529: 

231. 
V.  Mt.  Vernon,  64  App.  Div.  621: 

236. 
V.    Mt.    Vernon,    171    N.    Y.    247: 

236. 
V.  Shedd,  161  111.  462:   109. 
Fuller  Co.  v.  Amorous,  89  Ga.  614: 

1033. 
Fulmer  v.  Williams,  122  Pa.  St.  191: 
104,  106,  108,  119,  128,  129,  138. 
Fulton   V.    Cummins,    132    Ind.    453: 
1082. 
V.    Davenport,    17    la.    404:    465. 
V.  Dover    (Del.)    31   Atl.   974:    879. 
V.   Dover,  6   Del.   Ch.    1:    672,   928. 
V.  Dover,  8  Houston  (Del.)  78:  672, 
928,   1192. 


CXXll 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Pulton   v.   Metlow   Trading   Co.,   45 

Wash.   136:    895,   1389. 
V.  Monahan,  4  Ohio,  426:    1059. 
V.   Short  Route  R.   R.  Trans.  Co., 

85  Ky.   640:    179,  200,  243,   245, 

248,  252,  267,  310,  448,  1243,  1294, 

1302. 
Fulton  County  v.  Amorous,  89  Ga. 

614:    939. 
V.  Phillips,  91  Ga.  66:    1545. 
Funderburk  v.  Spengler,  234  111.  574: 

706,  708,  721. 
Funke  v.  St.  Louis,  122  Mo.  132:  433, 

438. 
Furbish  v.  Co.  Comrs.,  93  Me.   117: 

1674,  1680. 
Furman   v.   Furman,   86   Mich.    391: 

1058,  1358,  1420,  1516. 
Furman  Street,  Matter  of,  17  Wend. 

649:    238,  432,   1326. 
Furniss  v.  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  5  Sandf. 

551:    1446,   1451. 
V.  Midland  Ry.   Co.,  L.  R.   6  Eq. 

Cas.  473:  822. 
Furth  V.  State,  72  Ark.  161:  485. 
Fusilier  v.  Great  Southern  Tel.  Co., 

50  La.  An.  799:  1356,  1615. 
V.    Police    Jury,    6    La.    An.    670: 

1425. 
Fyfe  V.  Turtle  Creek,  22  Pa.   Supr. 

292:   443. 

G. 

Gaedeke    v.    Staten    Island    Midland 
R.   R.    Co.,   46    App.    Div.    219: 
302. 
Gage  V.  Chicago,  141  111.  642:   1386, 
1387. 
V.  Chicago,  146  111.  499:  1364. 
V.  Judson,   111   Fed.  350:    1241. 
Gagnon  t.  French  Lick  Springs  Ho- 
tel  Co.,    163   Ind.   687:    162. 
Gaines  v.  Linn  County,  21  Ore.  425: 
1031. 
V.  Linn  Co.,  21  Ore.  430:   1403. 
V.  Lunaford,  120  Ga.  370:  521,  1058. 
V.   Merryman,   95   Va.   660:    887. 
Gainesville   etc.   R.   R.   Co.   v.    Hall, 
78  Tex.  169:   449,  654,  659,  664, 
666,  671,  1334,  1337. 
V.  Waples,  3  Tex.  Ct.  of  App.  p. 
482,    §    409:    1112,    1310,    1315. 
Galbraith    t.    Littiech,    73    111.    209: 
1100.  1103,  1516,  1517. 
V.    Philadelphia    Co.,    2   Pa.    Supr. 

Ct.  359:    1129,   1201. 
V.    Prentice,    109    Mo.    App.    498: 

1392. 
V.  Yates,  79  Minn.  436:   163. 
Galeano  v.  Boston,  195  Mass.  64:  606. 
Galen  v.  Clyde  etc.  Plank  R.  R.  Co., 
27  Barb.  543:   956,  1622. 


Galena  etc.   R.   R.   Co.   v.   Birkbeck, 
70  111.  208:   994,  1310. 
V.  Haslam,  73  111.  494:   938,  1107, 

1122. 
V.   Pound,   22   111.   399:    1517. 
Gales  V.  Anderson,  13  111.  413:   413. 
Galesburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.   Milroy, 

181  111.  243:    1202,  1229. 
Galgay  v.  Great  Southern  R.  R.  Co., 

4  L  C.  L.  R.  456:   161. 
Gallagher  v.  Head,  72  la.   173,   700. 
V.   Kingston   Water   Co.,   25   App. 

Div.  82:  74,  1603. 
V.  Montecito  Val.  Water  Co.,  101 
Cal.  242:   866. 
Gallatin  Canal  Co.  v.  Lay,  10  Mont. 

528:    1366. 
Gallup   V.    Woodstock,   29   Vt.    347: 

678. 
Gait  V.  Erie  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  Grant 

Ch.  637:  1537. 
Galveston  v.   Menard,  23   Tex.  349: 

118. 
Galveston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bock,  63 
Tex.  245:   640,  1294. 
V.  Donahoo,  59  Tex.  128:  155,  830, 

1310,    1546,    1548. 
V.  Eddins,  29  Alb.  L.  J.  518:  249, 

255. 
V.  Eddins,  60  Tex.  656:  1294,  1303. 
V.   Fuller,   63   Tex.  467:    640,   659, 

671,  1294. 
V.  Galveston,  91  Tex.  17:   302. 
V.   Graves,   I   Tex.  App.   Civ.  Cas. 

301:    640. 
v.  Henning,  90  Tex.  656:   640. 
V.  Lyons,  2  Tex.  App.  Civ.  Cases, 

133:    1225. 
V.  Mud  Creek  etc.  Co.,  1  Tex.  App. 

Civ.  Cas.  169:   984,  1135. 
V.  Perry,  81  Tex.  466:   862. 
V.  Pfeuffer,  56  Tex.  66:   936. 
V.   Ryan,   2   Tex.   Civ.   App.    545: 
158. 
Galveston  Wharf  Co.  v.  Gulf  etc.  R. 
R.   Co.,  72   Tex.  454,  707,   1667. 
V.    Gulf    etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   81    Tex. 
494:    314. 
Galway  v.  Met.   El.  R.  R.   Co.,   128 
N.  Y.  132:  1553,  1554,  1651,  1658. 
Gamble  v.   McCradv,   75  N.   C.  509: 
927,   1005,   1010.   1013. 
V.   Pettyjohn,   116  Mo.  375:   881. 
V.  Philadelphia,  2  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  560: 

1327. 
V.  Philadelphia,   162  Pa.   St.  413: 
1327. 
Gammage  v.  Georgia  Southern  R.  R. 
Co.,  65  Ga.  614:  1535,  1570,  16lr.. 
Gammell  v.  Potter,  2  la.   562:    971, 
1027. 


OASES    CITED. 


CXXlll 


(The  references  are  to   the  pages:   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Gammell  v.  Potter,  6  Ta.  548 :  549. 
Gannett    v.    Independent    Telephone 

Co.,  55  Misc.  555:   339. 
Gannon  v.  Hargadon,  10  Allen  106: 

147. 
Gano  V.  Minneapolis  etc.  E.  R.  Co., 

114   la.    713:    1,   679,   706,   740, 

928,   1395,   1434,   1435,   1443. 
Ganson  v.  Buffalo,  1  Keyes  454:  1526. 
Ganz  V.  Ohio  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co., 

140  Fed.  692:   361,  491. 
Garbutt  Lumber  Co.  v.  Ga.  etc.  Ry. 

Co.,  Ill  Ga.  714:  534,  738,  1154, 

1155,   1623. 
Gardiner  v.  Baltimore,  96  Md.   361: 

1519,  1559. 
V.  Boston  &  Warcester  R.  R.  Co., 

9  Cush.   1:    623. 
V.  Camden,  86  Me.  377:   157. 
V.   Tisdale,   2  Wis.   153:    872. 
Gardner  v.  Brookline,  127  Mass.  358: 

1138,  1141,  1176,  1234,  1236,  1241. 
V.  Charing  Cross  Ry.  Co.,  2  J.  & 

H.  248:  823. 
V.  Chester,  13  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  4:   1397. 
V.  Ga.  R.  R.  &  B.  Co.,  117  Ga.  522: 

697,  714,  730,  731. 
V.  Michigan,   199  U.   S.   325:    474. 
V.  Newburg,  2  Johns.  Ch.  161:  74, 

1603. 
V.   St.   Joseph,   96   Mo.   App.   657: 

237,  634. 
V.  Town  Council  of  Johnstown,  16 

E.  I.  94:   612,  616. 
Gardner's  Petition,  Matter  of,  41  Mo. 

App.   589:   895,  982,   1033. 
Gardner  Water   Co.  v.  Gardner,   185 

Mass.  190:   1262,  1265. 
Gargan  v.  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

89  Ky.  212:    369,  373,  382,  389, 

391. 
Garit«e   v.   Baltimore,   52   Md.   422: 

127,  128,  129,  132. 
Garland    v.    Aurin,    103    Tenn.    555: 

146. 
Garland  Novelty  Co.  v.  State,  71  Ark. 

138:   485. 
Garlick    v.    Pittsburg    etc.    Ry.    Co., 

67  Ohio  St.  223:   1497,  1502. 
V.  Strong,  3  Paige  440:  945. 
Garmoe  v.  Sturgeon,  65  la.  147:  966. 
Garnett    v.    Jacksonville    etc.    R.    R. 

Co.,  20  Fla.  889:  243,  315,  1580. 
Garroux  v.  Greenville,  53  S.  C.  575; 

212,  613,  618,  1525. 
Garretson  v.  Baker,  65  N.  J.  L.  184: 

1419. 
Garrett  v.  Lake  Roland  El.  R.  R.  Co., 

79  Md.  277:  265,  324.  325,  1582, 

1584,  1592. 
V.  St.  Louis,  25  Mo.  505:  13. 


Garrison  v.  New  York,  21  Wall.  196: 

1163,  1431,  1674,  1678,  1681. 
Garrity   v.    Boston,    161    Mass.    530: 

605,  617. 
Garth  L.   &   S.  Co.  v.  Johnson,   151 

Mich.  205:  97. 
Gartner  v.   Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  71 

Neb.  444:   1649,  1661. 
Garvey   v.   Harbison-Walker  Refrac- 
tories Co.,  213  Pa.  St.  177:   183, 

366,   606,   878,  879,   889,   1596. 
V.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.,  9  App. 

Div.   254:   449,   1613. 
V.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.,  159  N. 

Y,  323:   449,  825,   1613. 
Garvin   v.    Dausman,    114   Ind.   429: 

1004,  1007. 
Garwood   v.  New  York   Central  etc. 

R.  R.  Co.,  17  Hun  356:  75,  1603. 
V.  New  York  Central  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

83  N.  Y.  400:   71,  73,  75,  77. 
Gascho  V.  Sohl,  155  Ind.  417:  700. 
Gashweller's  Heirs  v.  Mcllroy,  1   A. 

K.  Marsh.  84:   1160,  1167,  1368. 
Gas  Lt.  &  Coke  Co.  v.  New  Albany, 

158  Ind.  268:   1192,  1220. 
Gas  Light  Co.  v.  Hart,  40  La.  An. 

474:    485. 
V.  Richardson,  63  Barb.  437:    172, 

176. 
Gastner  v.  Chicago   etc.  Ry.  Co.,  71 

Neb.  444:   1655. 
Gaston  v.  Portland,  41  Ore.  373:  1462. 
Gate  City  v.  Richmond,  97  Va.  337: 

883,  885. 
Gately  v.  Old  Colony  R.  R.  Co.,  171 

Mass.  494:   1011,  1707. 
Gates   V.   Boston   etc.  R.  R.   Co.,   53 

Conn.  333:  679. 
V.   Chicago  etc.  R.  R.   Co.,   82  la. 

518:   620. 
V.   De   La   Mare,    142   N.   Y.    307: 

1558,  1561. 
V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  Ill 

Mo.  28:   330,  642,  648,  665,  667. 
V.  McDaniel,  2  Stew.  211:    414. 
Gaus  &  Sons  Manuf.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis 

etc.  Ry.  Co.,  113  Mo.  308:  311. 
Gauster  v.   Met.   Elec.   Co.,   214   Pa. 

St.  628:   454. 
Gavin   v.   Commonwealth,   182  Mass. 

190:    626,   1273. 
Gavit  V.  Chambers,  3  Ohio  495:   104. 
Gaw  V.   Bristol   etc.   R.  R.   Co.,   196 

Pa.   St.  442:    714. 
Gay  V.  Bradstreet,  49  Me.  580:   1510. 
V.  Caldwell,  Hardin  (Ky.)  68:  1078, 

1086. 
V.   Gardiner,   54   Me.   477:    1319. 
V.  Mutual  Union  Tel.  Co.,  12  Mo. 

App.  485:   341,  342. 


exxiv 


CASES    CITED, 


[The   references  are  to   the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Gay  V.  New  Orleans  Pacific  Ry.  Co., 

32  La.  An.  277:   1578. 
V.  Welles,  7  Pick.  217:   1526,  1528. 
Gaylord  v.  Sanitary  District,  204  II). 

576:  90,  551,  595. 
Gay  St.,  6  Pa.  Co.  Gt.  187:   1505. 
Gay  &  West  Sts..  7  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  217: 

400,  914,  1017. 
G.  B.   &   L.   Ry.   Co.    v.   Haggart,   9 

Colo.  346:  1136. 
Gear  v.  C.  C.  &  D.  R.  R.  Co.,  43  la. 

83:    1252. 
V.  Dubuque  &  Sioux  City  R.  R.  Co., 

20  la.  523:  1673,  1685. 
Gearhart  v.  Clear  Spring  W.  Co.,  202 

Pa.  St.  292:    1229,   1234,   1237. 
Geary  v.  Board  of  Supervisors,   107 

Cal.  530:   918. 
Geauyeau  v.  Gt.  Western  R.  R.  Co., 

3  U.  C.  App.  412:  841. 
Gebhardt  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

122  Mo.  App.  503:    160. 
V.  Reeves,  75  Ills.  301 :  198,  1500. 
Gebling  v.   St.  Joseph,  49  Mo.  App. 

430:     237. 
Geddes  v.  Rice,  24  Ohio  St.  60:   993. 
Gedney  v.  Tewksbury,  3  Mass.  307: 

1522. 
Geer  v.  Durham  Water  Co.,  127  N.  C. 

349:   74,  1549,   1552. 
Gehrig   v.    Fuhrman,    68    Neb.    325: 

868. 
Geissinger    v.   Hellertown,     133    Pa. 

St.   522:    1188,   1200,   1319. 
Geizy  v.   C.   W.  &  Z.   R.  R.   Co.,  4 

Ohio  St.  308 :  2,  20,  524,  676. 
General  Electric  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Chica- 
go City  R.  R.  Co.,  66  111.  App. 

362:    309,  409. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  184  111. 

588:   328,  765,  1586,  1612. 
Genesee  Chief,  12  How.  43:   103. 
Genesee  Fork  Imp.  Co.  v.  Ives,   144 

Pa.  St.  114:   918. 
Genesee  River  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Boying- 

ton,  60  Misc.  416:   1341. 
Genet    v.    Brooklyn,    99    N.    Y.    296: 

687,  824,  1196. 
Geneva    v.    Patterson,    21    111.    App. 

454:   1308. 
Geneva  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  Cent. 

etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  24  App.  Div.  N. 

Y.  335:   297. 
V  New  York  Cent.  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

90  Hun  9 :  765,  772. 
V.  N.  Y.  Cent.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  163 

N.  Y.  228:  329,  695,  772. 
Genois    v.    St.    Paul,    35    Minn.   330: 

211. 
Gentry  v.  Richmond  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

38  S.  C.  284:  158,  1649,  1655. 


G«orge  V.  Chester,  59  Misc.  533:  141, 
470. 
V.  Wabash  Western  R.  R.  Co.,  40 
ilo.  App.  433:   88,   144,  1639. 
George's  Creek  Coal  Co.  v.  New  Cen- 
tral Coal  Co.,  40  Md.  425:    999, 
1000,   1389. 
Georgetown  etc.  Traction  Co.  v.  Mul- 
holland,  25  Ky.  L.  R.  578:  272, 
281. 
Georgia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Archer,  87 
«        Ga.   237:    1.570. 

V.  Berry,  78  Ga.  744:  90,  1664. 
V.  Harvey,  84  Ga.  372:   314,  1596. 
V.  Jernigan,  128  Ga.  501:   153. 
V.  Ray,  84  Ga.  376:  639,  1581,  1592. 
V.  Scott,  38  S.  C.  34:   831,  961. 
V.  Small,  87  Ga.  355:   1225. 
Ga.   Granite   R.   R.   Co.   v.   Venable, 
129    Ga.    341:     806.    808,    1429, 
1519. 
Georgia  Midland  &  G.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Columbus  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  89  Ga. 
205:    1154,  1155,   1281,   1610. 
Georgia  Northern  Rv.  Co.  v.  Tifton 

etc.  Ry.  Co.,  lOg'Ga.  762:  412. 
Georgia  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Strick- 
land, 80  Ga.  776:   1354,  1469. 
Georgia  R.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Bohler,  98  Ga. 
184:    92,   93,   1454. 
V.  Smith,  128  U.  S.  174:  480,  482, 
V.  Atlanta,  118  Ga.  486:  884,  886, 

1568. 
V.  Baker,  88  Ga.  28:  154. 
V.  Decatur,  129  Ga.  502:  681,  1288. 
V.  Gardner,  115  Ga.  945:   1634. 
V.  Haas,  127  Ga.  187:   1506. 
V.  Maddox,  116  Ga.  64:   450,  656, 

666,  1613. 
V.  Union  Point,  119  Ga.  809:   679, 
680,  1288,  1568. 
Georgia  Southern  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Jones,  90  Ga.  292:    1426. 
Geraghty  v.  Boston,  120  Mass.  416: 

605. 
Gerber  v.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co., 

3  Miscl.  427:   1151,  1302. 
Gerdon  v.  Tucker,  6  Maine  247:  1116. 
Gerhard  v.  Seekonk  Riv.  Bridge,  15 

R.  I.  334:   212,  389. 
German-American    Real    Est.    Co.    v. 
Myers,  32  App.  Div.  N.  Y.  41: 
431. 
German  Bank  v.  Brose,  32  Ind.  App. 

77:    884,  889. 
German  Sav.  &  Loan  Soc.  v.  Ramish, 

138  Cal.  120:   13,  1567. 
German  Theological  School  v.  Dubu- 
que, 64  Iowa  736 :  158. 
Germantovvn  Ave.,   Change  of  Grade 
of,  15  Phila.  413:  612. 


CASES    CITED. 


CXXV 


[The  references   are  to   the   pages ;   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Germantown  Ave.,  In  re,  99  Pa.  St. 

479:    1419. 
Germantown   Ave.,   In   re,    14   Phila. 

351:   612,  631. 
Germantown  etc.  Turnpike  Road  Co., 

4  Eawle  191 :   1370. 
Germantown  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Citi- 
zens   Pass.    R.    R.    Co.,    48    Leg. 

Intel.  220:   1621. 
Gerow  v.  Liberty,  106  App.  Div.  357 : 

453,  1613. 
Gerrard  v.  Omaha  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  14 

Neb.  270:  961,  1557. 
Gerst  V.  St.  Louis,  185  Mo.  191:  443, 

643. 
Getty  \r.  Hudson  River  R.  R.  Co.,  21 

Barb.  617:  117,  131. 
Gettysburg  Memorial  Assn.  v.  Sherry, 

117  Pa.  St.  256:  1399. 
Getz  V.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

I  Walker's  Pa.  Supm.  Ct.  427: 

918. 
V.   Philadelphia   &  Reading  R.   R. 

Co.,    105   Pa.   St.   547:    952,  953, 

96.3,    12.59. 
V.   Philadelphia  &  Reading  R.   R. 

Co,.  113  Pa.  St.  214:  1259. 
Getzenhauer  v.  Trinity  etc.  Ry.  Co., 

43  Tex.  Civ.  App.  66:   1642. 
Geurkink  v.  Petaluma,  112  Cal.  306: 

1607. 
Gherkey   v.   Haines,   4   Blackf.    159: 

1359. 
G.  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Seymour, 

63  Tex.  345:    1552. 
Gibbons  v.  Jlobile  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  36 

Ala.  410:    10,  462. 
V.  Railway  Co.,  40  Mo.  App.  146: 

1443,    1695. 
Giboney  v.  Cape  Girardeau,  58  Mo. 

141:    466. 
Gibson   v.    Bridge    Co.,    192   Pa.    St. 

55:    1211. 
V.  Cann,  28  Colo.  499 :   1058,  1060, 

1062,  1065. 
V.  Fisher,  68  Iowa  29:  95. 
V.  Greenville,  64  S.   C.  455:    1080, 

1532,   1637. 
V.  Hammersmith  &  City  Ry.  Co.,  2 

Drewry  &  Smale,  60.3:  1276. 
V.  Kelley,  15  Mont.  417:  104. 
V.  Mason,  5  Nev.  283:   10,  462. 
V.   Norwalk,    13   Ohio   C.    C.   428: 

1231,  1237,   1330. 
V.  United  States,   166  U.   S.  269: 

99,  102,   116. 
V.   Zimmerman,   27   Mo.   App.   90: 

607,  616. 
Gibson  &  Guy's  Mill  Road,  37  Pa.  St. 

255:    1384. 
Gidnev  v.  Karl,  12  \\em\.  98:  1486. 


Giesy  v.  Cincinnati  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  4 

Ohio   St.   308:    1055,   1067,   1115, 

1204. 
Giffin  V.   Olathe,  44  Kan.   342:    874, 

877. 
Gifford  V.  Dartmouth,  129  Mass.  135: 

1436. 
».  New  Jersey  R.  R.  Co.,  10  N.  J. 

Eq.    171:    1608. 
V.  Norwich,  30  Conn.  35:   955. 
V.  Republican  Valley  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

20  Neb.  538:   1401. 
Gifford  Dr  Dist  v.  Shroer,   145  Ind. 

572:  571,  575. 
Gilbert  v.   Columbia  Trnpike   Co.,   3 

Johns.  Cas.  107:   893,  894,  1516. 
V.  Greeley  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  Colo. 

501:    647. 
v.  Hall,  115  Ind.  549:   1046. 
V.  New  Haven,  39  Conn.  467:   678. 
V.  Savannah,  Griffin  &  North  Ala. 

R.  R.  Co.,  69  Ga.  396:  846. 
Gilbert  Elevated  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ander- 
son, 3  Abb.  New  Cases  434:  260. 
Gilbert  Elevated  Ry.  Co.,  Matter  of, 

38  Hun  437:    196,  1295. 
Gilbert  Elevated  Ry.  Co.,  Matter  of, 

70  N.  Y.  361:  260,  1071. 
Gilchrist  Co.  v.  Des  Moines,  128  Iowa 

49:   197,  309,  1583,  1666. 
Gildersleeve  v.  Hammond,  109  Mich. 

431:   440. 
Gile,  Admr.  v.  Stevens,  13  Gray  146: 

1185,  1267. 
Giles   V.   London   etc.   R.    R.    Co.,    1 

Drewry  &  Smale,  406:  1460. 
V.  London  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  30  L.  J. 

Ch.  603:   822. 
Gilfeather  v.  Council  Bluffs,  69  Iowa 

310:  234. 
Gilford  v.    Winnipiseogee   Lake   Co., 

52  N.  H.  202:  866. 
Gilford's    Petition,    25    N.    H.    124: 

1095. 
Gilkerson  v.  Scott,  76  111.  509:   1088. 
Gilkey  v.  Watertown,  141  Mass.  317: 

1361,  1510,  1704. 
Gill  V.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  117  Iowa 

278:    1.504. 
V.  Lake  Charles,  119  La.  17:  1592. 
V.   Milwaukee   etc.   R.   R.    Co.,    76 

Wis.  293:  929. 
Gillan  v.   Hutchinson,   16  Cal.    153: 

431,  494,  496,  563,  9.56,  1162. 
Gillender  v.  New  York,  127  App.  Div. 

612:   351,  372,  1592,  1615. 
Gillespie  v.  Buffalo  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  33 

Pa.  Co.  Ct.  513:   1458,  1473. 
V.  Duling,  41   Ind.  App.  217:    885. 
V.    Thomas,    15    Wend.    464:    1255, 

1260,  1678. 


CXXVl 


CASJ5S    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to   the  pages:   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Gillet  V.  Jones,  1  Dev.  &  B.  (N.  C.) 

339:    1345. 
Gillette  v.  Aurora  Eys.  Co.,  228  111. 

261:  241,  675,  679,  687,  716,  719, 

780,  1047,  1050,  1056. 
Gillham  v.  Madison  County  R.  R.  Co., 

49  111.  484:   151. 
Gilliam  v.  Canaday,  11  Ired.  L.  106: 

1523. 
Gilligan  v.  Providence,  11  R.  I.  258: 

612,  952,  953,  961,  1532. 
Gillinwater  v.  Mississippi  etc.  R.  R. 

Co.,  13  III.  1:  920,  1040. 
Gillison   v.    Charleston,    16    W.    Va. 

282:    233. 
V.   Savannah  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,   7   S. 

C.   173:    1537,  1540,  1541. 
Gilluly  V.  Madison,  63  Wis.  518 :  234. 
GiUnan  v.  Laconia,  55  N.  H.  130 :  143. 
V.   Milwaulcee,   55  Wis.   328:    420, 

1494,  1618. 
V.  Philadelphia,   3  Wall.   713:   96, 

133. 
V.  Sheboygan,  2  Black.  510:  462. 
V.    Sheboygan   etc.   R.   R.    Co.,   37 

Wis.  317:   1170,  1540,  1543. 
V.  Sheboygan  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  40  Wis. 

653:    1536,   1540,   1541. 
V.  Westfield,  47  Vt.  20:   513. 
Gilmer  v.  Hunnicutt,  57   S.  C.  166: 

923,   1165,   1167. 
V.  Lime  Point,   18  Cal.   229:   501; 

588,  674,  685. 
V.   Lime   Point,    19   Cal.   47:    8f)3, 

894,  898,  1053. 
Gilmore  v.  DriseoU,   122  Mass.   199: 

440,   441. 
v.  Pittsburgh,  Va.  &  C.  R.  R.  Co., 

104  Pa.  St.  275:    1267,   1316. 
V.  Sapp,  100  111.  297 :  1004. 
Gilpin  V.  Ansonia,  68  Conn.  72:  601. 
Gilroy,  In  re,  78  Hun  260 :  1379. 
Gilroy,  In  re,  85  Hun  424:  1092,  1237' 

1329. 
Gilroy,  Matter  of,  26  App.  Div.  N. 

Y.   314:    1272. 
Gilroy,  Matter  of,  60  Misc.  125 :  1254. 
Gilroy,    Matter    of,    32    N.    Y.   App. 

i)iv.   216:    817,   1061. 
Gilson  V.  State,  5  Lea  161 :   1511. 
Gilzinger    v.    Saugerties    Water   Co., 

66  Hun   173:   69,  74,   1603. 
Gimbel   v.   Stolte,   59   Ind.   446:    949, 

1565. 
Ginn  v.  Moultrie  etc.  Dr.  Dist.,  188 

111.  305:  1195. 
Girard   Ave.,   In   re,    18    Phil.    499: 

1357,  1626,  1714. 
Girard  Ave.,  Matter  of,  11  Phil.  449: 

1098. 


Girard's  Lessee  v.  Hughes,  1  G.  &  J. 

249:    130. 
Gish  V.  Drainage  Dist.,  136  Iowa  155 : 

1204. 
V.  Drainage  Dist.,   137   Iowa  711': 

1204. 
Gist   V.    Owings,   95   Md.    302:    786, 

1395. 
Given  v.  Des  Moines,  70  Iowa  637: 

307. 
V.  State,  160  Ind.  552:  471. 
Givens  v.  Van  Studdiford,  4  Mo.  App. 

498:   649. 
Gladfelter  v.  Walker,  40  Md.  1 :   81 
Glaessner   v.   Anheuser-Busch   Brew 

ing  Assn.,  100  Mo.  508:  301,  314 

317,  320,  351,  372,  383,  533,  649 

665,  1582  1589. 
Glasby  v.  Morris   18  N.  J.  Eq.   72 

335,   336. 
Glaser  v.   Glenwood  R.  R.   Co.,   208 

Pa.  St.  328:  689,  819. 
Glasgow  V.  Altoona,  27  Pa.  Supr.  55 : 

84. 
V.  Fazie,  14  Sess.  Cas.  (4th  Series) 

346:   821. 
V.  Mathews,  106  Va.  14:  887,  888. 
V.  St.  Louis,  87  Mo.  678 :  384,  401, 

406. 
V.    St.   Louis,    107   Mo.    198:    367, 

371,  384,  392,  395,  396,  398,  644, 

1595. 
V.  St.  Louis,  15  Mo.  App.  112:  384, 

401,  406. 
Glass  V.  Basin  Min.  etc.  Co.,  22  Mon. 

151:    706,  897,  992. 
Glassburn    v.    Deer,    143    Ind.    174: 

1400. 
Glazier  v.  New  Jersey  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

60  N.  J.  L.  353:   1081. 
Gleasou   v.   Assabet   Manf.   Co.,    101 

Mass.  72:  899. 
V  Jefferson,  78  111.  399:  1576. 
V.  Tuttle,  46  Maine  288 :  866. 
Glencoe  v.  Reed,  93  Minn.  518:   1486, 

1490. 
Glenn  County  v.  Johnston,  129  Cal. 

404:    1566. 
Glennon  v.   Chicago   etc.  R.  R.   Co., 

79  111.  501:   1274. 
Glick  V.   Baltimore  &  0.  R.  R.  Co., 

19  D.  C.  412:  246,  248,  250,  309, 

316. 
Globe  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lexington,  173 

Mass.  6:  626. 
Gloe  V.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  65  Neb. 

680:    842,  851. 
Gloucester  v.  County  Comrs.,  3  Met. 

375:  721. 


CASES    CITED. 


CXXVll 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.) 


Gloucester     Water     Supply     Co.     v. 

Gloucester,  179  Mass.  365:   740, 

1265,   1546. 

Glover  v.  Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  72 

S.  C.  381:  830,  953,  1546. 

V.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  66  How.  Pr. 

77:  203,  l.'i81. 
V.  Manhattan   Ry.   Co.,   51   N.   Y. 

Supr.  Ct.  1:  1581. 
V.  North  Staffordshire  Ry.  Co.,  5 

Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  335:    1611. 
V.  North  Staffordshire  Ry.  Co.,  20 

L.  J.  N.  S.  Q.  B.  376 :  645. 
v.  Powell,   10  N.   J.  Eq.   211:    108, 

460,   1154,  1607. 
y.  Reraley,  62  S.  C.  52:  1523. 
Gloversville,  Matter  of,  42  Misc.  559 : 

776. 
Gluck  V.  Baltimore,  81  Md.  315:  952, 

1255,  1256,  1258. 
Godbey  v.  Bluefield,  61  W.  Va.  604: 

1307,  1308. 
Godcharles  v.  Wigeman,  113  Pa.  St. 

431:    479. 
Godchaux  v.  Carpenter,  19  Nev.  415 : 

972,  978,  1358,  1419. 
Goddard,    Petitioner,    16   Pick.   504: 

492,  557. 
Goddard  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  202 
111     362:    298 
V.  Boston,  20  Pick.  407:  1707,  1708. 
V.  Worcester,  9  Gray  88:   1373. 
Godfrey  v.  Alton,  12  111.  29:  131,  872. 
V.   District   Court,   44   Minn.    299: 
1154. 
Goehring  v.  Rankin,  17  Pa.  Supr.  Ct. 

186:   1370. 
Goelet  V.  Metropolitan   Transit  Co., 

48  Hun  520:   717,  1589. 
Golahar  v.  Gates.  20  Mo.  23fi:   1514. 
Golconda  v.  Field,  108  111.  419:  408, 

1608. 
Gold  V,  Pittsburgh  etc.  R.  R.  Co ,  153 
Ind.  232:   1042,  1510. 
V.  Vermont  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  19 
Vt.  478 :  923,  1408. 
Golden  v.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co., 

1  Misc    142:  448,  1303. 
Goldie  V.  Oswald,  2  Dow.  534:   1635. 
Golding  V.  Attleborough,   172  Mass. 

223:   617,   1523. 
Goldman   v.   Justices,   3   Head    107: 

1403. 
Goldsmid  v.  Tunbridge  Wells  Impr. 
Comrs.,  L.  R.   1   Ch.  App.  349: 
83,   1605. 
V.  Tunbridge  Wells  Impr.  Comrs., 
L.  R.  1  Eq.  161 :   83. 
Good  V.   Altoona,    162   Pa.   St.   493: 
84. 


Good  V.  Droste,  8  Ohio  C.  C.  {N.  S.) 

452:     1255,    1257. 
Goodale  v.  Sowell,  62  S.  C.  516:  460, 

589. 
Goodall   V.   Milwaukee,   5   Wis.    32: 

196,  197,  213,  239. 
Goode  V.  St.  Louis,  113  Mo.  257:  875, 

892,  1496,  1504,  1505. 
Goodell  V.  Kalamazoo,  63  Mich.  416: 

893,  1422. 

Goodfellow  V.   Riggs,  88   Iowa   540: 

881,  884,  885. 
Goodford  v.  Stonehouse  etc.  Ry.  Co., 

38  L.  J.  Eq.  307 :    1537. 
Goodin   v.    Canal   Co.,    18    Ohio    St. 

169:    1234,   1537,  1617. 
Goodloe  r.   Cincinnati,   4  Ohio   500: 

213. 
Goodnan   T.    Bradley,    2   Wis.    257: 
722. 
V.  Ft.'  Collins,  164  Fed.  470:   976, 
996. 
Goodrich  v.  Comrs.  of  Highways,   1 
Mich.  385:   1417. 
V.    County   Comrs.,   47   Kan.    355: 

948,  962. 
V.  Detroit,  123  Mich.  559:   11,  464. 
T.  Milwaukee,  24  Wis.  422:  614. 
V.  Omaha,  10  Neb.  98:   1219. 
Goodwin  v.  County  Comrs.,  60  Maine 
328:    992. 
V.  Gibbs,  70  Maine  243:  963. 
V.  Merrill,  48  Maine  282 ;  1402. 
V.  Milton,  25  N.  H.  458:  940,  1377. 
V.  Wethersfield,  43  Conn.  437:  513, 
1098,  1099. 
Goodwine   v.    Evans,    134   Ind.   262: 
1192. 
V.  Leak,  127  Ind.  569:   1383,  1510. 
Goodyear  Shoe  Machinery  Co.  v.  Bos- 
ton Terminal  Co.,  176  Mass.  115: 
953,  1259. 
Googins  V.   Boston  &  A.  R.  E.  Co., 

155  Mass.  505:   823. 
Gordon  v.  Comrs.,  169  111.  510:  1195. 
V.  Kings  County  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  23 

N.  Y.  App.  Div.  51:  1133. 
V.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.   (Pa.)   6 

Rep.   727:    155,   1455. 
V.  Tucker,  6  Maine  247 :    1445. 
V.  Winston,  181  111.  338:   130. 
Gordon  Co.  v.  Calhoun,  128  Ga.  781: 

420,  1493.  1618. 
Gorges  v.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
144  Pa.  St.  1:    1130,  1262,  1342. 
V.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  215 
Pa.    St.   501:    1140,    1189,    1201, 
1236. 
Gorham  v.  New  Haven,  79  Conn.  670 : 
83. 


CXXVIU 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references   are   to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,  pp.   743-1719.1 


Gorman    v.    Supervisors,    20    Minn. 

392:   1402. 
Gorrill   v.   Toledo  etc.  R.  R.   Co.,   4 

Ohio  C.  C.  398:   830,  953,  1569, 

1664. 
Gosa  V.  Milwaukee  Lt.  H.  &  T.  Co., 

134    Wis.    369:    284,   987,    1501, 

1664. 
Goss   V.   Highway   Comrs.,   63  Mich. 

608:   382,  387,  400,  406,  1031. 
Gossett    V.    Southern    Ry.    Co.,    115 

Tenn.  376 :  436,  456,  661. 
Goszler    v.     Georgetown,     6    Wheat. 

593:  212,  238. 
Gottschalk  v.  C.  &  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co., 

14  Neb.  550:   640,  642,  659,  664, 

671. 
V.  Lincoln  etc  R.  R.  Co.,   14  Neb. 

389:    959. 
Goudy   V.    Lake   View,   33   111.   App. 

245:    1426. 
Gough  V.  Bell,  2  Zab.  441 :   127,  129, 

189. 
Gould  V.  Booth,  66  N.  Y.  62 :  235. 
V.  Boston  Dock  Co.,  13  Gray  442: 

554,  556. 
V.  Eaton,  111  Cal.  639:   161. 
V.  Glass,  19  Barb.  179:   1156. 
V.    Hudson    River    R.    R.    Co.,    12 

Barb.  616:    117,  131. 
V.  Hudson  River  R.  R.  Co.,  6  N.  Y. 

522:    117,   121,   128,  130,  131. 
V.  Rochester,  105  N.  Y.  46 :  453. 
Gouverneur  v.  National  Ice  Co.   134 

N.  Y.  355:   109. 
Gowen  v.  Penobscot  R.  R.  Co.,  44  Me. 

140:    1163,  1710. 
Grab,  Matter  of,  157  N.  Y.  69 :  1423. 
Grade    Crossing    Comrs.,    In    re,    64 

App.  Div.  71:  937,  1564. 
Grade   Crossing   Comrs.,    In   re,    169 

N.  Y.  605:   937,  1564. 
Grade   Crossing   Comrs.,   Matter    of, 

6  App.  Div.  327;   1077,  1244. 
Grade   Crossing    Comrs.,    Matter    of, 

17    App.    Div.    N.    Y.    54:    952, 

1272. 
Grade  Crossing  Comrs.,  Matter  of,  52 

App.  Div.  122:   1377. 
Grade    Crossing   Comrs.,   Matter   of, 

59    App.    Div.    498:     660,     710, 

1210. 
Grade    Crossing   Comrs.,    Matter   of, 

116  App.  Div.  549:   1211. 
Grade    Crossing    Comrs.,    Matter   of, 

154   N.   Y.    550:    610,   616. 
Grade    Crossing   Comrs.,   Matter    of, 

154  N.  Y.  561 :   1080. 
Grade    Crossing    Comrs.,    ilatter    of, 

164  N.  Y.  575:    1377. 


Grade    Crossing   Comrs.,   Matter   of, 
166  N.  Y.  69 :  320,  384,  388,  398, 
647. 
Grade    Crossing   Comrs.,   Matter   of, 

168  N.  Y.   659:   660,  710. 
Graden  v.   Parkville,   114   Mo.   App. 

527:    1594. 
Grading  Bledsoe  Hill,  In  re,  200  Mo, 

630:    706. 
Grady  v.    Case,   51   N.   J.   Eq.   426: 
947. 
v.  Dunden,  30  Ore.  333:  928,  1005, 

1018,   1571. 
v.  N.  W.  Loan  &  Inv.  Co.,  93  Wis. 
229:    1534. 
Graf  V.  St.  Louis,  8  Mo.  App.  562: 

893,  895. 
Graff    V.    Baltimore,    10    Md.    544: 
1669,  1673,  1685. 
V.  Evergreen  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Pa.  Co. 
Ct.  502:   717. 
Grafton  v.  Baltimore  &  Ohio  R.  R. 
Co.,    21    Fed.    309:     622,    1294, 
1549. 
v.  St.  Paul  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  16  N.  D. 
313:    1057,  1288,  1289. 
Grafton   Dolomite   Stone   Co.   v.   St. 
Louis  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  199  111.  458: 
851,  1620. 
Graham  v.   Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  39 
Ind.   App.   294:    91,   1639,    1653, 
1668. 
v.   Columbus  &  Indianapolis   Cen- 
tral   R.    R.    Co.,    27    Ind.    260: 
1625. 
V.  Connersville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  36 

Ind.  463:   1222,  1348. 
V.  Flynn,  21  Neb.  229:  865,  1034. 
V.  Keene,  143  111.  425:    154,  167. 
V.  Northern  R.  R.  Co.,   10  Grant 

Ch.   259:    75. 
V.  Pittsburgh  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,   145 

Pa.  St.  504:   1188,  1200,  1226. 
V.  St.  Louis  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  69  Ark. 

562:   837,  1476,   1633. 
V.  United  States,  2  Ct.  of  Claims 

327:   459. 
V.  Virgin,  78  Me.  338:    1522. 
Grand  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Citizens'  R. 
R.   Co.,   148  Mo.   665:   427,  764, 
1282,   1284. 
V.  Lindell  R.  R.  Co.,  148  Mo.  637: 

427,  764,  1284. 
V.  People's  R.  R.  Co.,  12  Am.  R.  R. 

&  Corp.  Rep.  594:   427. 
V.  People's  R.  R.  Co.,  132  Mo.  34: 
1282,   1284. 
Grand  Boulevard,  Matter  of,  33  App. 
Div.  N.  Y.  210:   1044. 


CASES    CITED. 


CXXIX 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719. ]■ 


Grandchamp     v.     McCormack,     150 

Mich.  232:   1511,  1576. 
Grande  Ronde  Elec.  Co.  v.  Drake,  46 
Ore.  243:  151,  495,  496,  498,  536, 
707,  921. 
Grand  Junction  R.  R.  Co.  v.  County 
Comrs.,  14  Gray  553:  994,  1278. 
Grand  Rapids  v.  Bennett,  106  Mich. 
528:   1132,  1290. 
V.  Coit,  149  Mich.  668:  1058,  1132, 

1387. 
V.  Grand  Rapids  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  58 
Mich.  641:   751,  895,  948,  1290. 
V.  Grand  Rapids  Hydraulic  Co.,  66 

Mich.  606:  476. 
V.  Luce,  92  Mich.  92:    1058,  1146. 
V.  Perldns,  78  Mich.  93:   1109. 
V.  Powers,  89  Mich.  94:   116,  129, 
136. 
Grand  Rapids  Booming  Co.  v.  Jarvis, 
30  Mich.   308:    60,  67,  90,   100, 
101,  680. 
Grand    Rapids    E.    L.    &   P.    Co.    v. 
Grand  Rapids   E.   L.  &   G.   Co., 

33  Fed.   659:    346,  411. 

Grand  Rapids  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Alley, 

34  Mich.  16:  954. 

V.  Alley,  34  Mich.  18:   954. 

V.    Chesebro,    74   Mich.    466:    897, 

1089,  1174,  1176,  1310,  1456. 
T.  Grand  Rapids  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  35 

Mich.  265:  765,  788,  1610. 
V.  Heisel,   38  Mich.  62:    247,  253, 

279,  309. 
V.  Heisel,  47  Mich.  393:   242,  247, 

253,  309,  622,  1294. 
V.  Horn,  41  Ind.  479:  1112,  1205. 
V.  Van  Driels,  24  Mich.  409:  990, 

1058. 
V.  Weiden,  69  Mich.  572 :  894,  992, 

1419,   1421. 
v.  Weiden,  70  Mich.  390 :  893,  894, 

895,  896,  991,  1274,  1377. 
Grand  Tower  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wal- 
ton, 150  HI.  428:  832. 
Grand  Trunk  Ry.   Co.  v.  Berlin,  68 

N.   H.    168:    1005,    1017,    1415, 

1420. 
v.  Richardson,  91  U.  S.  454:  1475. 
Granger  v.  Avery,  64  Me.  292 :  103. 
V.  Postal  Tel.  Co.,  70  S.  C.  528: 

830,   1635. 
V.    Syracuse,    38    How.    Pr.    308: 

1196. 
Grannis  v.  St.  Paul  &  Chicago  Ry. 

Co.,  18  Minn.  194,  1186. 
Grant  v.  Courier,  24  Barb.  232 :  462. 
V.  Davenport,  18  la.  179:  129,  136, 

875. 
V.   Hyde  Park,   67   Ohio   St.    166: 

238,  707,  1246,  1250,  1314,  1446. 


Grant  v.  Kugler,  81  Ga.  637 :  79,  88. 
V.  United  States,  1  Ct.  of  CI.  41: 

18. 
Grant   Park  v.   Trah,   218   III.   516: 

629,  631,  634. 
V.    Irah,    115   HI.   App.    291:    630, 

631,  634. 
Grant  Street,  7  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  84:  1397. 
Granville    v.    Co.    Comrs.,   97    Mass. 

193:    1415. 
Grape  St.,  In  re,   103  Pa.   St.    121: 

1708. 
Graves  v.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

69  Mo.  App.  574:   147,  157. 
V.  Middletown,  137  Ind.  400:  1029, 

1514,  1518. 
V.  Otis,  2  Hill,  466:  2il,  972. 
Gray  v.  Bartlett,  20  Pick.  186:   103. 
V.  Baynard,  5  Del.  Ch.  499:   1489. 
V.  Burlington  ex,^   R.  R.  Co.  37  la. 

119:  843,  844,  851. 
V.  Case,  51  N.  J.  Eq.  426:  1564. 
V.    Chicago  etc.   Ry.   Co.,    189   III. 

400,  843. 
V.   Chicago   etc.   Ry.   Co.,   189   III. 

400:   748. 
T.  Dundas,  11  Out.  317:  84. 
V.    First   Division   of    St.   Paul   & 

Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  13  Minn.  315: 

247. 
V.  Fort  Plain,  105  App.  Div.  215: 

1338,  1554. 
V.  Greenville  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  59  N.  J. 

Eq.  372:  370,  384,  718. 
V.  Haas,  98  la.  502:  869. 
V.  Iowa  Land  Co.,  26   Iowa   387 : 

284,  390. 
V.  Iowa   Cent.   Ry.   Co.,   129   Iowa 

68:   980. 
V.  Jones,  178  III.  169:  1402. 
V.  Knoxville,  85  Tenn.  99:   145. 
V.    Liverpool   &   Bury   Ry.    Co.,    9 

Veas.  391:   709. 
V.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  128  N.  Y. 

499:   1121,  1554,  1615. 
V.  Middletown,  56  Vt.  53:  1081. 
V.  New  York  etc.  T.  Co.,  56  N.  J. 

Eq.  463:   297. 
v.  New  York  etc.  Telephone  Co.,  68 

N.  J.  L.  454:   1116. 
V.  New  York  &  Phila.  Traction  Co., 

56  N.  J.  Eq.  463:  1618. 
V.  No.  Versailles  Tp.,  208  Pa.  St. 

77:    1508. 
V.  St.  Louis  &  San  Francisco  Ry. 

Co.,  81  Mo.  126:  684,  1033,  1683. 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  Minn. 

315:    304. 
v.   York    State   Telephone   Co.,   92 

App.  Div.   89:    339,   1593. 


cxxx 


CASES    CITKJJ. 


[The  references   are   to  the  pages:  Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Gray  v.  York  State  Telephone  Co.,  41 

Misc.   109:    339,   1593. 
Grayvllle   &   Mattoon   R.   R.    Co.   v. 

Christy,  92  111.  337:  1115. 
Great  Bend  Road,  2  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  335 : 

1504. 
Great  Falls  Manf.  Co.  v.  Attorney- 
General,  124  U.  S.  581:   1029. 
V.  Fernald,  47  N.  H.  444:  544,  549. 
V.  Garland,  25  Fed.  521 :  923,  1165, 

1167,  1576. 
Great  Falls  Power  Co.  v.  Great  Falls 

etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  104  Va.  416:  528, 

540,  806. 
Great  Northern  R.  R.  Co.  v.  St.  Paul, 

61  Minn.  1:  878. 
Great  Western  Nat.  Gas  &  Oil  Co.,  v. 

Hawkins,  30  Ind.  App.  557:  21, 

494,  498,  499,  507,  549,  929,  988, 

1042,  1044. 
Gredney  v.  Tewksbury,  3  Mass.  307: 

1527. 
Greeley  v.  Maine  Central  R.  R.  Co., 

53  Me.  200:  147,  157. 
V.  Quimby,  22  N.  H.  335 :  865. 
Greeley  etc.   R.  R.  Co.  v.  Yount,   7 

Colo.     App.     189:     1176,     1320, 

1547. 
Green  v.  Bethen,  30  Ga.  896:  1328. 
V.  Chicago,  97  111.  370:  1108,  1121, 

1195. 
V.  City  &  Suburban  R.  R.  Co.,  78 

Md.  294:  280,  281,  324. 
V.  Bales,  2  A.  &  E.  N.  S.  225 :  1260. 
V.    East   Haddam,    51    Conn.    547 : 

1105,  1387. 
V.  Elliott,  86  Ind.  53 :   1407. 
V.  Fall  River,  113  Mass.  262:  1142, 

1185. 
V.  Green,  34  111.  320:  1703. 
V.  Ivey,  45  Fla.  338 :  408,  409,  414, 

1608. 
V.  Londenslager,  54  N.  J.  L.  478; 

993. 
V.  Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  82  Mo. 

653:    1628. 
V.   New   York   Central   R.   R.   Co., 

65  How.  Pr.  154:  316. 
V.  Portland,  32  Me.  431:  291,  304, 

316,  533,  1667. 
V.  Reading,  9  Watts  382:  209,  211. 
V.  Road  Board,  126  Ga.  693:  1363, 

1515. 
V.  St.  Louis,  106  Mo.  454:  1444. 
V.   Savannah,  6  Ga.   1:    469. 
V.  South  Bound  R.  R.  Co.,  112  Ga. 

849:    9.36,   1559. 
V.  State,  56  Wis.  583:   1024. 
V.  Swift,  47  Cal.  536:   89. 
V.  Tacoma,  51  Fed.  622:  1626. 


Green  v.  Taylor  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,   79 

Tex.  604:   158,  1639. 
Green   Bay   etc.   Canal   Co.   v.   Kau- 
kauna  Water  Power  Co.,  90  Wis. 
370:    71,  76. 
Greenburg   v.    Western    Turf    Asso., 
148  Cal.  126:  467. 
V.   Western   Turf.   Asso.,   140   Cal. 
357:    467. 
Greencastle  v.  Hazelett,  23  Ind.  186: 

165. 
Greene  v.  Aurora  Rys.  Co.,  157  Fed. 
85:  1570,  1624. 
,v.   East   Haddam,   51    Conn.   547: 

1381. 
V.  O'Connor,   18  R.  I.  25:    513. 
V.  O'Connor,  18  R.  I.  56:  887. 
V.  Portland,  32  Me.  431:  300. 
Green   &   K.    Tp.   Road,  In   re,    129 

Pa.  St.  527:  1081. 
Greenland  v.  Co.  Comrs.,  68  Md.  59: 

1397,  1428. 
Greenleaf  v.   Francis,   18  Pick.   117: 

161. 
Greenleaf  Court's   Case,   4   Wharton 

514:    1094. 
Green  St.,  In  re,  1  Mont.  Co.  L.  R. 

37:   778. 
Greenup  Co.  v.  Maysville  etc.  R.  R. 

Co.,  88  Ky.  659:    1643. 
Greenville  v.  AUand  (Tex.  Civ.  App.) 
27  S.  W.  292:  454. 
V.  Earle,  80  S.  C.  321:   613,  1353. 
v.    Mouldin,    64    S.    C.    438:    613, 
1625. 
Greenville  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  Matter  of,  75 

App.  Div.  220:   730. 
Greenville  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  Matter  of,  172 

N.  Y.  462:    730. 
Greenville   etc.  Ry.   Co.  v.  Grey,  62 
N.  J.  Eq.  768:   760,  1473. 
V.   Nunnamaker,   4   Rich.   L.   107: 

1386. 
V.  Partlow,  5  Rich.  428:  1192,  1194, 

1317. 
V.  Parlow,  6  Rich.  286:  1436,  1484. 
Greenwood  v.  Freight  Co.,  105  U.  S. 
13:  407. 
V.   School  District,   126   Mich.  81: 

859. 
V.  Wilton  R.  R.  Co.,  23  N.  H.  261: 
1331. 
Greer,  Matter  of,  39  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 

22:  610,  615. 
Greesemer  v.  Oley  Val.  R.  R.  Co.,  13 

Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  225:   1332. 
Gregg  V.  Baltimore,  58  Md.  256:  589, 
624,   1309,   1550. 
V.   Northern  R.  R.   Co.,   67  N.   H. 
452:    1143,    1228,    1243. 


CASES    CITED. 


cxxxi 


[The  references  are  to  the   pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1710.] 


Gregory    v.    Ann    Arbor,    127    Mich. 
454:   886. 
V.  Bush,  64  Mich.  37 :  146,  147,  150, 

154. 
V.  Forbes,  96  N.  C.  77 :  127,  129. 
Gregsten  v.  Chicago,  40  111.  App.  607 : 

197. 
Greist  v.  Amrhyn,  80  Conn.  280:  400. 
Gresinger  v.  Hellertown,  133  Pa.  St. 

522:    1402. 
Greve   v.   First   Division   of   the   St. 
Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  26  Minn.  66: 
1347. 
Grey  v.  Greenville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  60 
N.  J.  Eq.   153:    760. 
V.  Greenville  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  59  N.  J. 

Eq.  372:   320,  351. 
V.  Paterson,  58  N.  J.  Eq.  1:  83. 
V.  Paterson,  60  N.  J.  Eq.  385:   82, 
83,  84,  1604,  1606,  1615. 
Gridley  v.  Bloomington,  88  111.  554: 

492. 
Griffin's  Petition,  27  N.  H.  343:  701. 
Griffin   v.   Augusta   &   Knoxville   R. 
R.  Co.,  70  Ga.  164:   1536. 
V.  Dogan,  48  Miss.  11:    10. 
V.  Foster,  8  Jones  L.  337 :  866. 
v.  House,   18  Johns.  397:    726. 
T.  Jacksonville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  33 

Fla.  606:  1630. 
V.  Lawrence,   135  Mass.  365:    144. 
V.  Martin,  7  Barb.  297:   357,  1489. 
V.  Penn.  S.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Mont. 

Co.  L.  R.   169:    1189,  1317. 
V.    Shreveport   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   41 
La.  Ann.  808:  640,  1294,  1337. 
Griffith   V.   Holman,   23   Wash.    347: 
113. 
V.  Pence,  9  Kan.  App.  253:  575. 
Griffiths  V.  Galindo,  86  Cal.  192:  877. 
Grigg  V.  Northern  R.  R.  Co.,  67  N. 

H.  452:    745. 
Griggs  V.   Foote,   4   Allen   195:    829, 

1551. 
Grigsby    v.    Burtnett,    31    Cal.    406: 

1570,   1573. 
Grimes   v.   Doyle,   Sneed    (Ky.)    58: 
1091,  1367. 
V.  Eddy,  126  Mo.  168:  594. 
Grimshaw   v.   Fall   River,   160  Mass. 

483:    1403. 
Grimwood   v.    Macke,    79    Ind.    100: 

1406. 
Grindley   v.   Barker,   1   Bos.   &   Pul. 

229:    1100. 
Grinnel  v.  Adams,  34   Ohio  St.   44: 

975. 
Grinnell  v.  Portage  Co.  Comr.,  6  Ohio 
C.  C.  (N.  S.)  180:  375,  386,  388, 
405,  1596. 


Griscom  v.  Gilmore,  15  N.  J.  L.  475: 

707,  1102,  1358. 
V.  Gilmore,  16  N.  J.  L.  105:   1101, 

1364. 
Griswold  v.  Guilford,  73  Conn.   192: 

600. 
V.  McGee,  102  Minn.  114:  943. 
•  V.   Met.   El.  R.  R.  Co.,   122  N.  Y. 

640:    1663. 
V.  Minneapolis  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  12  N. 

D.  435:  840,  842,  843,  854,  1627, 

1629. 
Griveau  v.   South  Chicago  City  Ry. 

Co.,  130  111.  App.  519: 
Groce  v.  Zumwalt,  4  Mo.  567:   1004, 

1385. 
Groff  V.  Bird-in-Hand  Turnpike  Co., 

128  Pa.  St.  621:  2,  779,  793,  798, 

1595. 
V.  Bird-in-Hand  Turnpike  Co.,  144 

Pa.  St.  150:   779,  793,  798,  1595. 

V.  Frederick  City,  44  Md.  67:  466. 

Gross   V.    Lampsacus,    74   Tex.    196: 

143. 
V.  McNutt,  4  Ida.  286:    865. 
Grosser   v.   Rochester,   60  Hun   379: 

942. 
V.  Rochester,  148  N.  Y.  235:   942, 

1569. 
Grossman   v.  Houston   etc.   Ry.   Co., 

99  Tex.  641:   328. 
V.  Patton,  186  Mo.  661:   710,  1085. 
Grosvenor  v.  Hempstead  Junction  R. 

R.  Co.,  1  DeG.  &  J.  446:  822. 
Grote   V.   New   York,   117   App.  Div. 

768:    1325. 
V.  New  York,  190  N.  Y.  235:  1325. 
Groton's  Petition,  43  N.  H.  91:  1385. 
Groton   v.    Hurlbut,    22    Conn.    178; 

788. 
Grove  v.  Allen,  92  la.  519:  387,  388. 
Grover  v.  Comet,  135  Mo.  21:    1306. 
Groves  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Herman,  206 

m.   34:    1109,   1379. 
Grove  St.,  In  re,  61   Cal.  438:    977, 

1518. 
Grugan  v.  Philadelphia,  158  Pa.  St, 

337:   1711. 
Grundy  v.  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

98  Ky.  117:   862. 
Gruner  v.  Hartman,  66  N.  J.  L.  189: 

1362. 
Gudger  v.  Richmond  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

106  N.  C.  481:   1707,  1708. 
Gue    v.    Tide   Water    Canal    Co.,    24 

How.  257:    1499. 
Guerkink  v.  Petaluma,  112  Cal.  306: 

169,    1617. 
Guess  v.  South  Bound  R.  R.  Co.,  40 

S.  C.  450:  832. 


CXXXll 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  me  to  the  pages :  Vol.   I,   pp.   1-T42 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Guess  V.  Stone  Mountain  Granite  etc. 

Co.,  72  Ga.  320:    1294. 
Guest  V.   Church  Hill,   90   Md.   689: 

154,  211,  233. 
V.  Reynolds,  69  111.  478:   440. 
Guild  V.  Shedd,  150  Mass.  255:  873. 
Guilford's   Petition,   25    N.   H.    124: 

1029. 
Guilford   v.   County   Comrs.,   40   Me. 

296:    992. 
V.  Minneapolis  etc.  E.  R.  Co.,  94 

Minn.  108:   1595. 
Guilford  Town,  Matter  of,  85  App. 

Div.  207:  1386,  1402. 
Guillotte  V.  New  Orleans,  12  La.  An. 

432:    485. 
Guinn  v.  Iowa  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  125  la. 

301:   1245,  1311. 
V.  Iowa  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  131  la.  680: 

1109,   1245,  1311,  1320,   1450. 
V.  Ohio  Eiv.  R.  R.  Co.,  46  W.  Va. 

151:  256,  640,  1297,  1552. 
Gulf  Coast  Ice  &  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Bowers, 

80  Miss.  570 :  344. 
Gulf  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Abney,  3  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  p.  485:    1149. 
V.  Brugger,  24  Tex.  Civ.  App.  367: 

1112,  1221,  1329. 
V.  Dunman,  85  Tex.  176:  853. 
V.  Ellis,  70  Tex.  307:   844,  1311. 
V.  Fink  (Tex.)  18  S.  W.  492:  1305. 
V.   Ft.   Worth   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   86 

Tex.  537:  772,  894,  1511,  1512. 
v.   Frederickson    (Tex.)    19   S.   W. 

124:   158,  1651,  1655. 
v.    Hartley,    88    Miss.    674:     1455. 

1506. 
V.  Haskell,  4  Tex.  Civ.  App.  550: 

1651,  1653. 
V.  Hefflry,  158  U.  S.  98:  482. 
v.  Helsley,  62  Tex.  593:   152,  1552, 

1651,   1655. 
V.  Hepner,  83  Tex.  136:   92,  1651, 

1653. 
V.  HoUiday,  65  Tex.  512:   152. 
V.  Jones,  63  Tex.  524:  167. 
V.   Jones,   82   Tex.   156:    831,   850. 
V.   Jones,   3   Tex.   Ct.   of   App.   p. 

41:    152. 
v.  Kerfoot,  85  Tex.  267:   1409. 
V.  Locker,  78  Tex.  279:   86,  92. 
V.  Martin,  38  Tex.  Civ.  App.  379: 

843,   844,  852. 
V.  Milam  Co.,  90  Tex.  355:  1288. 
v.  Mud  Creek,  I.  A.  &  M.  Co.,  1 

Tex.  App.  avil  Cas.  p.  169:  707, 

984. 
V.   Necco    (Tex.)    15    S.    W.    Rep. 

1102;   449,  654,  1244. 
V.  Poindexter,    70    Tex.    98:     707, 

831,  1526. 
V.  Pomeroy,  67  Tex.  498:  94. 


Gulf  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Pool,  70  Tex. 
713:   88,  1457. 
V.  Richards,   83   Tex.   203:    862. 
V.  Rowland,  70  Tex.  298:  844,  1311. 
V.  Singleterry,  78  Miss.  772:    830. 
V.  S.  W.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  18  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  500:  682,  724,  988. 
V.  S.  W.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  25  Tex. 
Civ.    App.    488:    682,    684,    690, 
696,  724. 
V.  Steele,  29  Tex.  C5v.  App.  328: 

152. 
V.  Tacquard,  3  Tex.  Ct.  App.  179: 

715. 
V.    Tait,   63   Tex.   223:    155,   1552, 
1651,  1655. 
Gunn  V.  Ohio  Riv.  R.  R.  Co.,  46  W. 

Va.  151:   1550. 
Gunnerus  v.  Spring  Prairie,  91  Minn. 

473:  57,  155. 
Gunning  v.  Pittsburg  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  2 

Ohio  N.  P.  (N.  S.)  411:  1588. 
Gunning  System  v.  Buffalo,  62  App. 
Div.  497:  471. 
V.  BuflFalo,  75  App.  Div.  31:   471 
Gunter  v.  Geary,  1  Cal.  462:  139. 
Guptail   V.   Teft,   16   111.   365:    1517, 

1634. 
Gumee  v.  Chicago,  40  111.  165:  1093. 
Gurney  v.  Minneapolis  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
41  Minn.  223:    1105,   1108. 
V.  Minneapolis  Union  Elevator  Co., 
63   Minn.   70:    809,   1474. 
Gumsey  v.  Edwards,  26  N.  H.  224: 
1518,  1520. 
v.  Northern  Cal.  Power  Co.,  7  Cal. 
App.  534:  344. 
Gustafson  v.  Hamm,  56  Minn.  334: 
180,  181,  190,  300,  317,  533,  1582, 
1589. 
Guthrie  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Faulkner,  12 

Okla.  532:  1330,  1332,  1477. 
Gutsehow  V.  Washington  Co.,  74  Neb. 

794:    1180,    1220. 
Guttery  v.  Glenn,  201  El.  275:   351, 

370,  383,  871,  875. 
Guyandot  Valley  Ry.  Co.  v.  Buskirk, 
57  W.  Va.  417:  1129,  1145,  1228. 
Gwinner  v.  Lehigh  R.  R.  Co.,  55  Pa. 

St.  126:   698. 
Gwynne  v.  Cincinnati,  3  Ohio  24:  943, 
945. 


Haan  v.  Meester,  132  la.  709:  870. 
Haas  V.  Evansville,  20  Ind.  App.  482 

1489. 
Hab   V.   Georgetown,  46  Wash.   642 

1353. 
Hackett   v.   Brown,    128    Mich.    141 

1419. 
V.  State,  113  Ind.  532:   1034,  1514. 


CASES    CITED. 


CXXXlll 


[The  references  arc   to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.1 


Hackstaok  v.  Keshena  Improvement 

Co.,  66  Wis.  439:  81,  1524. 
Hadeock  v.  Gloversville,  96  App.  Div. 

130:   1605. 
Hadden   v.    Metropolitan    EI.    R.    R. 
Co.,  75  Hun  63:  1139,  1143,  1296. 
Hadley  v.  Citizens'  Savings  Institu- 
tion, 123  Mass.  301:   1042,  1045, 
1073. 
V.   Passaic   Co.,   73   N.   J.   L.    197: 
1138,    1148,   1250. 
Hafey  v.  Commonwealth,  189  Mass. 

540:    1366. 
Hagaman    v.    Moore,    84    Ind.    496: 

1123,  1125,  1192,  1310,   1316. 
Hagar  v.  Brainard,  44  Vt.  294:   947, 
966,  1024,  1036. 
V.   Board   of   Supervisors   of   Yolo 
Co.,  47  Cal.  222:   13,  564,  572. 
Hagemeyer  v.  St.  Michael,  70  Minn. 

482:    1614. 
Hagerstown  v.   Groh,   101   Md.    560: 

947,  949,  961,   1563. 
Haggard  v.   Algona   School  Dt.,   113 

la.  486:  1134,  1210,  1392,  1673. 
Haggerty  v.  Seranton,  23  Pa.  Supr. 

279:  373,  382,  394,  647. 
Hagner  v.  Pennsylvania  S.  V.  R.  R. 

Co.,   154  Pa.   St.  475:    819. 
Haiglit  V.  Keokuk,  4  la.  199:  104. 

V.  Littlefield,  147  N.  Y.  338:    878. 
Haines  v.  Hall,  17  Or.  165:   113. 
V.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  65  la. 

216:   1208. 
V.  Twenty-second  St.  etc.  Pass.  R. 
R.  Co.,  1  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  506:  297, 
315,   316,    1587,    1590. 
Haislip  V.  Wilmington  &  W.  R.  R. 
Co.,   102  N.  C.   376:    1187,  1252. 
Haldeman  v.  Bruckhart,  45  Pa.  St. 
514:   165. 
V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  50  Pa.  St.  425: 
809,  1500. 
Hale  V.  Burwell,  2  Patten  &  Heath, 
608:    929,   931,   965. 
V.  Lawrence,  21  N.  J.  L.  714:   19. 
V.  McLea,  53  Cal.   578:    165. 
V.  McLeod,  2  Met.  Ky.  98:   872. 
V.   Point  Pleasant   &   Ohio  E.   R. 
Co.,  23  W.  Va.  454:    1160,  1294, 
1580. 
Haley  v.  Philadelphia,  68  Pa.  St.  45: 

1324. 
Hall  V.  Baird,  73  la.  528:  1515. 
V.  Boyd,  14  Ga.  1:   1163. 
V.    Breyfogle,    162    Ind.    494:    366, 

877,   880,  882,   1491. 
V.  Bristol,  L.  R.  2  C.  P.  322:    628. 
V.  Carter,  33  Tex.  Civ.  App.  230: 

866. 
V.  Ionia,   38   Mieh.   493:    74. 


Hall  V.  Kaufman,  106  Cal.  451:  889. 
V.  Lebanon,  31  Ind.  App.  265:  384, 

390. 
V.  Manchester,  39  N.  H.  295:  1361. 
V.  Manchester,  40  N.  H.  410:  1100. 
V.   Meriden,   48   Conn.   416:    891. 
V.   Palmer,   54   Mich.   270:    1444. 
V.  Pa.  R.  R.  Co.,  215  Pa.  St.  172: 

315,  1590. 
V.  People,  57  HI.  307:    1162,   1637, 

1638. 
V.  Pettit,  88  Mich.   158:   516,  522, 

976,  1419. 
V.  Pickering,  40  Me.  548:  834,  1522. 
V.  Ragsdale,  4  S.   &  P.  252:    410, 

414. 
V.  St.  Paul,  56  Minn.  428:  865. 
V.   Smith,  2   Bing.    156:    206. 
V.   State,   72   App.   Div.   360:    866, 

1262. 
V.    State,    92   App.    Div.    96:    866, 

869. 
V.  Thayer,  105  Mass.  219:  1082. 
V.  Trenton,  86  Mo.  App.  326:  237. 
Halleran   v.   Bell   Telephone   Co.,    64 
App.  Div.  47:  1594. 
V.  Bell   Telephone   Co.,   177  N.  Y. 
573:    1594. 
Hallock  V.  Franklin  Co.,  2  Met.  558: 
1087,   1682. 
V.   Woolsey,  23  Wend.  328:    1527, 
1528. 
Halse  Tp.  Road,  4  Luzerne  Leg.  Reg. 

Rep.  423:    1059. 
Balse  Tp.  Road,  6  Luzerne  Leg.  Reg. 

Rep.    463:     778. 
Halsey  v.  Lehigh  Valley  R.  R.   Co., 
45  N.  J.  L.  26:   1524. 
V.    Rapid    Transit    R.    R.    Co.,    47 
N.    J.    Eq.    380:     181,    201,    279, 
333,  1586,  1590. 
Halstead   v.    Manhattan   R.   R.    Co., 

58  N.  Y.  Supr.  Ct.  270:  1085. 
Halsted   v.   Buster,    119   U.    S.    341: 

996. 
Halter  v.   Nebraska,  205   U.   S.   34: 
468. 
V.  State,  74  Neb.  757:  473. 
Halverson  v.  Bell,  39  Minn.  240:  1381, 

1514,   1634. 
Ham  V.  Levee  Comrs.  83  Miss.  534: 
153,  584,  679,  1057,  1063,  1070. 
V.    Salem,     100    Mass.    350:     352, 

1142,    1144. 
V.  Wisconsin  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  61   la. 
716:  1138,  1204,  1208. 
Hamblin  v.  Co.  Comrs.,  16  Gray  256: 

1639. 
Hamel  v.  Minneapolis  etc.  Ry.  Co..  97 
Minn.   334:    842,    843,    844,    853, 
1627. 


CXXXIV 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Hamilton,  Matter  of,  14  Barb.  405: 

410. 
Hamilton  v.  Adams,  7  J.  J.  Marsh. 
248:   1073. 
V.  Annapolis   &  Elk   Ridge  R.  R. 
Co.,  1  Md.  553:   730.  1172,  1483. 
V.  Annapolis   &   Elk  Ridge  R.   R. 
Co.,   1   Md.   Ch.   107:    730,   1162, 
1163,   1172,  1483. 
V.  Ashbrook,  62  Ohio  St.  571:   79. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  124  111. 

235:   886. 
V.   Comrs.    of   Highways,    203    HI. 

269:  1017,  1412,  1420. 
v.   Fort  Wayne,   73  Ind.   1:    1397. 
V.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  57  N.  Y. 

Supr.  Ct.  491:   1444. 
V.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  58  N.  Y. 

Supr.  Ct.  17:  1121,  1305,  1665. 
V.  New  York  &  Harlem  R.  R.  Co., 

9  Paige,  171:  1582. 
V.    Pittsburg   etc.   R.   R.    Co.,    190 

Pa.  St.  51:  1272,  1315. 
V.  Spokane  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Ida- 
ho,   898:    431. 
V.   Vicksburg   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   119 
U.   S.  280:    133. 
Hamilton  Ave.,  Matter  of,  14  Barb. 

405:   408,  1107. 
Hamilton  County  v.  Garrett,  62  Tex. 
602:   1382,   1546. 
V.  Rape,   101   Tenn.  222:    181,  222. 
Hamilton  etc.  Traction  Co.  v.  Hamil- 
ton  etc.  Elec.   Traction   Co.,   69 
Ohio  St.   402:    416,   910. 
V.  Parrot,  67  Ohio  St.  181:  302. 
Hamilton  G.   &  C.  Co.  v.  Hamilton, 

146  U.   S.   258:   409. 
Hamilton  St.  Opening,  In  re,  6  Mont. 

Co.  L.  Rep.  207:   878. 
Hamlin  v.  Kansas  Ry.  Co.,  73  Kan. 
565:    1503. 
V.    New   Bedford,    143   Mass.    192: 

703,   1434. 
V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,   160 

Mass.  459:  845. 
V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.   Co.,   166 
Mass.  462:   1485. 
Hamman     v.     County     Comrs.,     154 

Mass.  509:    387. 
Hammel  v.  Cumberland  Valley  R.  R. 

Co.,  175  Pa.  St.  537:   1458. 
Hammersley  v.  New  York,  67  Barb. 
35:    1325 
V.  New  York,  56  N.  Y.  533:   1168, 
1325,  1326. 
Hammerslough    v.   Kansas    City,    57 

Mo.  219:    1576. 
Hammersmith     etc.     R.    R.     Co.     v. 
Brand,  L.  R.  4  Eng.  &  Ir.  App. 
171:    654. 


Hammett  v.  Phila.,  65  Pa.  St.  146: 

14,  744. 
Hammon   v.    Commissioners,    38   111. 

App.  237:  1020. 
Hammond    v.    County    Comrs.,    154 
Mass.   509:    371,  379,   388,   1415. 
V.  Harvard,  31  Neb.  635:   630. 
V.  Port  Royal  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  15 

S.  C.   10:    854. 
V.   Port  Royal   &   Augusta  R.   R. 

Co.,  16  S.  C.  567:   854. 
V.  Rose,  11  Colo.  524:   70. 
V.  Shepard,  186  111.  235:   109. 
Hamor  v.  Bar  Harbor  Water  Co.,  78 
Me.  127:  70,  74,  912,  1522,  1525. 
V.  Bar  Harbor  Water  Co.,  92  Me. 
364:     1445. 
Hampden  P.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Springfield 
etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   124  Mass.   118: 
1222,  1320. 
Hampstead  v.  Junction  R.  R.  Co.,  1 

DeG.  &  J.  446:  823. 
Hampton  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  125 
111.    App.    412:    352. 
v.  Clinton  Water  etc.  Co.,  65  N.  J. 

L.  158:  707,  708,  917,  1050. 
V.  Coffin,  4  N.  H.  517:  1683. 
V.  Commonwealth,  19  Pa.  St.  329: 

695,   1674. 
V.  Kansas  City,  74  Mo.  App.  129: 

630    1323. 
V.   Poland.   50  N.  J.  L.   367:   514, 
1057,    1419. 
Hancock  v.  Boston,  1  Met.  122:  1028, 
1415,  1416. 
V.    Philadelphia,    4    Pa.    Dist.    Ct. 

345:    1327. 
V.  Philadelphia,   175  Pa.  St.   124: 

1426. 
V.  Worcester,  62  Vt.  106:    1415. 
Hancock  Stock  &  Fence  Law  Co.  v. 
Adams,   87   Fed.   417:    467,   494, 
589. 
Hancock   Street,   18  Pa.   St.  26:    13, 

14. 
Hand    Gold    Mining    Co.    v.    Parker, 
59  Ga.  419:   494,  504,  562,  684. 
Handler  v.  Lehigh  Valley  R.  R.  Co., 

209  Pa.  St.  256:   838. 
Hanes  v.  North  Carolina  R.  R.  Co., 

109  N.   C.  490:    1359,  1360. 
Haney  v.  G.  C.  &   S.  F.  R.  R.  Co., 
3  Tex.  Ct.  of  App.  336:    666. 
V.  Kansas   City,   94   Mo.   334:    143, 
235. 
Hanford  v.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

43  Minn.  104:  105,  132. 
Hanger  v.  Des  Moines,  109  la.  480: 

865.    891. 
Hankins  v.  Lawrence,  8  Blackf.  266: 
549,  553,  1163.   1165. 


CASES    CITED. 


CXXXV 


[The  references   are  to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Hanley  v.   Toronto  etc.  Ry.  Co.,   11 

Ont.    91:    1635. 
Hanlin  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 

61  Wis.  515:  247. 
Hanlon  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  40 

Neb.  52:  837,  864,  867,  868,  869. 
V.  Westchester,  57  Barb.  383;   828, 

923. 
Hannah  v.  Met.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  81  Mo. 

App.  78:   285. 
Hannaker  v.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

5  Dak.  1:   157. 
Hannibal  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  Joseph 

R.  R.  Co.,  49  Mo.  480:    750. 
Hannibal  Bridge  Co.  v.  Schaubacker, 

49  Mo.  555:   1386. 
V.  Schaubacker,  57  Mo.  582:   1211, 

1339. 
Hannibal  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Morton, 

20  Mo.  70:   1427. 
V.  Morton,  27  Mo.  317:   959,  1094. 
V.  Muder,  49  Mo.  165:  524,  526,  897, 

991. 
V.  Rowland,  29  Mo.  337:   1389. 
Hannum  v.  Media  etc.  Elec.  Ry.  Co., 

200  Pa.  St.  44:  315,  1587. 
V.  Media  etc.  Elec.  Ry.  Co.,  221  Pa. 

St.  454:   763. 
V.  West   Chester,  63  Pa.  St.  475: 

1714. 
Hanover's  Appeal,   150  Pa.  St.  202: 

698. 
Haurahan  v.  Fox,  47  la.  102:    1317. 
Hansen  v.   Hammer,   15  Wash.  315: 

584,  1008. 
Hanson  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  61 

Iowa,  588:  300. 
V.  Effingham,  20  N.  H.  460:    1437. 
V.  La  Fayette,  18  La.  295:  440. 
Happy  V.  Mosher,  48  N.  Y.  313:  1007. 
Harbach  v.  Des  Moines  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

80  la.  593:  620,  1544,  1580,  1591, 

1592. 

Harbaugh  Ave.,  10  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  440: 

976,  1005. 
Harbaugh's  Road,  8  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  671: 

707. 
Harbeck  v.  Boston,  10  Gush.  295:  808. 
V.  Toledo,    11    Ohio    St.   219:    707, 

978,  1032,  1033,  1516. 

Hardenburg  v.  Lockwood,  25  Barb.  9: 

357,   1489. 
Harder  v.   Kansas   etc.  Ry.   Co.,   74 

Kan.  615:    1408. 
Hardesty  v.  Ball,  43  Kan.  151:  1710, 

1711. 
Hardin   v.    Jordan,    140   U.    S.    382: 

108,  109,  110,  114. 
Harding  v.   Funk,  8  Kan.  315:   494, 

549,  1185.  1310. 


Harding  v.    Goodlet,   3   Yerg.   Tenn. 
41:   6,  548,  551,  595. 
V.  Medway,  10  Met.  465 :  1683. 
v.  Stamford  Water  Co.,  41   Conn. 
87:  70,  73. 
Hardinsburg  v.  Cravens,  148  Ind.  1: 

1568. 
Hardman  v.  Cabot,  60  W.  Va.  664: 

337,  361. 
Hardy  v.  Ala.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  73  Miss. 
719:   1485. 
V.  Houston,  2  N.  H.  309:  1372. 
V.  Keene,  54  N.  H.  449:  993. 
V.  McKinney,    107    Ind.    364:    786, 
1406. 
Hare  v.  Rice,  142  Pa.  St.  608:   644, 

1396. 

Hargis  v.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

100  Mo.  210:   864,  867,  869,  871. 

Hargo  V.  Hodgden,  89  Cal.  623:  1665. 

Hargreaves  v.  Kimberly,  26  W.  Va. 

787'   1123 
Harkins  v.  Aaheville,  123  N.  C.  636: 

948. 
Harkness   v.   Waldo   Co.   Comrs.,   26 

Me.  353:  701. 
Harlan  v.  Logansport  Nat.  Gas  Co., 

133  Ind.  323:   833. 
Harlan  Co.  v.  Hogsett,  60  Neb.  362: 

936,  1319,  1561. 
Harlan  &  H.  Co.  v.  Parchall,  5  Del. 

Ch.  435:  104,  127,  136. 
Harlem  Riv.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Rey- 
nolds,  50   App.   Div.   575:    1379. 
Harley  v.  Jones,  165  Pa.  St.  34:  231. 
V.    Meshoppen  Water  Co.,  174  Pa. 
St.  416:    1614. 
Harlot  Paper  Co.  v.  State,  47  App. 

Div.  196:   1496. 
Harlow  v.  Marquette,  H.  &  O.  R.  R. 
Co.,  41  Mich.  336:   1347. 
V.  Pike,  3  Me.  438:  1004,  1013. 
1014,  1411,  1516,  1634. 
Harman  v.  Caretta  Ry.  Co.,   61   W. 
Va.  356:  1569,  1574. 
V.  So.  Ry.  Co.,  72  S.  C.  228:   838, 
856,  1479. 
Harmon  v.  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
87    Tenn.    614:    247,    316,    1549, 
1649,  1657,  1662. 
Harness  v.  The  Chesapeake  &  Ohio 
Canal  Co.,  1  Md.  Ch.  248:  22,  23, 
923,  927,  1162,  1163,  1165,   1535, 
1675. 
Harp  v.  Glenolden,  28  Pa.  Supr.  Ct. 

116:   631. 
Harper    v.   Detroit,    110    Mich.    427: 
1306. 
V.  Lexington  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Dana 

227:    1010,  1091,   1094. 
V.  Miller,    4   Ired.    Law    34:    1075, 
1076. 


CXXXVl 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to   the   pages :   vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Harper  v.  Morse,  46   Mo.   App.   470 : 
856. 
V.  Richardson,   22   Cal.   251:    1707, 

1710. 
V.  State,  109  Ala.  66:  869. 
Harper   H.    &    D.    Co.    v.    Mountain 
Water   Co.,   65   N.   J.   Eq.   479: 
76,  1603. 
Harper's  Ferry  v.  Kaplon,  58  W.  Va. 

482:  878,  890. 
Harrelson  v.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R. 

Co.,  151  Mo.  482:    159,  1446. 
Harrimau  v.  Moore,  74  N.  H.  277:^ 
865. 
V.  Southern    Ry.    Co.,    Ill    Tenn. 
538:  487,  1288. 
Harriman  Imp.  Co.  v.  Keel,  25  Utah 

96:  161,  162. 
Harrington   v.   Co.   Comra.,  22   Pick. 
263:    1682. 
V.  Harrington,   1   Met.   404:    1373. 
V.  la.  Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  126  la.  388: 
199,  351,  377,  380,  388,  395,  1502. 
V.  People,  6  Barb.  607:    1518. 
V.  Probate  Judge,   153  Mich.  660: 

1105. 
V.  St.  Paul  &  Sioux  City  R.  R.  Co., 
17  Minn.  215:  242,  247,  315,  936, 
1314,  1580,  1650,  1657. 
Harris  v.   Board   of  Supervisors,   88 
Iowa  219:  400,  993,  1419. 
V.  Brewster,   154  Pa.   St.  22:   966, 

1558. 
V.  Coltraine,  3  Hawks,  N.  C.  312: 

1444. 
V.  Curtis,   34  Ind.  App.   438:    993. 
V.  Howes,  75  Me.  436:   1258,  1369, 

1556. 
V.  Kingston  Realty  Co.,  116  App. 

Div.  704:    936,   1561. 
V.  Marblehead,   10  Gray,  40:    687, 

706,   1626. 
V.  Philadelphia,    155    Pa.    St.    76: 

141,   1651,  1656. 
V.  Ross,  112  Ind.  314:    1514. 
V.  Sohuylldll  Riv.  E   S  R.  R.  Co., 
141  Pa.  St.  242:  1187,  1215,  1232, 
1236. 
V.  Schuylkill  Riv.  E.  S.  R.  R.  Co., 

159  Pa.  St.  468:   1535. 
V.  Thompson,    9    Barb.    350:    498, 

675. 

V.  Woodstock,  27  Conn.  567:  1103. 

Harrisburg   v.   Crangle,   3   W.   &   S. 

460:    952,    953,    961,    1159,    1349. 

V.  McPherson,  200  Pa.  St.  343:  11, 

464. 
V.  Roller,  97  Va.  582:  212,  237. 
Harrisburg  City  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.   v. 
Harrisburg,   7  Pa.   Co.  Ct.   584: 
331. 


Harrisburg  City  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Harrisburg,  7  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  593: 
331. 
V.  Harrisburg,    149    Pa.    St.    465: 
299,  1620. 
Harrisburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Harris- 
burg etc.  Turnpike   Co.,   15  Pa. 
Co.  Ct.  389:   920,  1053. 
V.  Peflfer,  84  Pa.  St.  295:   1566. 
Harrisburg  etc.  Road  Co.  v.  Harris- 
burg etc.  Elec.  Ry.  Co.,  177  Pa. 
St.   585:    1160,   1170,   1462,   1464, 
1466. 
Harrisburg's    Park,    34    Pa.    Co.   Ct. 

219:    1167. 
Harrison  v.  Iowa  Midland  R.  R.  Co., 
36  la.  323:  1109,  1123,  1125,  1204, 
1231. 
V.  Lexington   etc.   Co.,   9  B.   Mon. 

470:    1497. 
v.  Mt.  Auburn  Cable  R.  R.  Co.,  17 

Weekly  Bull.  265:    269. 
V.  Myer,  92  U.  S.  Ill:  19. 
V.  Newman,  71  Kan.  324:  1026. 
V.  New  Orleans  Pacific  R.  R.  Co., 
34  La.  Ann.  462:  248,  253,  1582. 
V.  Thompson,  9  Barb.  350:  495. 
V.  Young,  9  Ga.  359:  1112,  1329. 
Harrisonburg  v.  Roller,  97  Va.  582: 

1597. 
Harrison   County   v.   Seal,   66   Miss. 

129:   886,  890. 
Harrocks  v.  Met.  R.  R.  Co.,  4  B.  & 

S.  357:  640. 
Harsh  v.  First  Dlv.  of  the  St.  Paul 
&   Pacific   R.   R.   Co.,   17   Minn. 
439:   1159. 
Harshbarger  v.   Midland  R.  R.   Co., 
131   Ind.    177:    937,   1497,   1502, 
15C0,  1714. 
Hart  V.  Atlanta,  100  Ga.  274:  59,  226. 
V.  Baraboo,  101  Wis.  368:  234. 
V.  Baton  Rouge,  10  La.  Ann.  171: 

129,  137. 
V.  Board  of  Levee  Comrs.,  54  Fed. 

559:  440. 
V.  Buckuer,  54  Fed.  925:   181,  297, 

315,  1587,  1590. 
V.  Piedmont  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  52  W. 

Va.  396:  640,  883. 
V.  Seattle,  42  Wash.  113:  631,  1601, 

1612. 
V.  Seattle,    45    Wash.    300:     1601, 
1612. 
Hartford  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

59  Conn.  250:  880,  881. 
Hartford  Bridge  Co.  v.  Union  Ferry 

Co.,  29   Conn.   210:    413,   414. 
Hartford   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   In   re,   74 
Conn.  662:   693,  1719. 


CASES    CITED. 


CXXXVll 


[The  references  are  to   the  pages:   Vol.  1,   pp.   1-742;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Hartford  &  Connecticut  Western  R. 
R.  Co.,  Matter  of,  65  How.  Pr. 
133:   811. 
Hartford  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Montague, 
72  Conn.  687:  693,  1719. 
V.  Wagner,     73     Conn.     506:     693, 
1719. 
Hartley  v.  Keokuk  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  85 

la.  455:   991,  1046. 
Hartman  v.  Pittsburg  Inclined  Plane 
R.  R.  Co.,  159  Pa.  St.  442:   145. 
V.  Pittsburg    Inclined    Plane    Co., 

11  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  438:   1651. 
V.  Pittsburgh   Inclined    Plane    Co., 

23  Pa.   Supr.  Ct.  360:    1651. 
V.  Tresise,  36  Colo.  146:   494.  591. 
Hartman   Steel   Co.'s   Appeal,   6   Pa. 

Co.  Ct.  183:  1589,  1590. 
Hartman  Steel  Go's  Appeal,  129  Pa 
St.  551 :  301,  314,  533,  1582,  1589. 
Ilarton  v.   Avondale,    147   Ala.   458: 

464. 
Hartshorn  v.  B.  C.  R.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 
52  la.  613:   1310,  1426. 
v.  Chaddock,  135  N.  Y.  116,  89. 
V.  Chicago   etc.  R.  R.   Co.,   52   la. 

613:    1208. 
V.  111.   Val.   Traction   Co.,   210   III. 

609:  682,  720. 
V.  HI.  Val.  Ry.  Co.,  216  HI.   392: 

1233,  1234. 
V.  Pottroff,  89  111.  509:  1519,  1520. 
V.    South   Reading,    3   Allen    501: 

379,  391. 

V.  Worcester,  113  Mass.  Ill:  1307. 

Hartsman  v.  Covington  &  Lexington 

R.  R.  Co.,  18  B.  Mon.  218:   1452. 

Hartwell  Matter,  2  Nisi  Prius  Rep. 

(Mich.)  97:  3,  8. 
Hartwell's  Petition,  2  Nisi  Prius  Rep. 

97:  551. 
Hartwell  v.  Armstrong,  19  Barb.  166: 

501,  564,  578. 
Hartz  V.  St.  Paul  &  Sioux  City  R.  R. 

Co.,  21  Minn.  358:   247,  1208. 
Harvard  v.  Crouch,  47  Neb.  133:  630. 
V.  St.  Clair  etc.  Drainage  Co.,  51 
111.  130:  927. 
Harvard  Branch  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Rand,  8 

Cush.  218:    1439. 
Harvey  v.  Aurora  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  174 
Hi.  295:  241,  708,  720,  1042,  1044. 
V.  Aurora  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  186  111.  283: 

300,  303,  304,  720,  1071. 
V.  Dewoody,  18  Ark.  252:  485. 
V.  G.  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Tex. 

Ct.  of  App.   336:    647. 
V.  Georgia  Southern  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
90  Ga.  66:  179,  190,  320,  351,  372, 
639,  646,  1593,  1596. 
V.  Kansas  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  54  Kan. 
228:   842. 


Harvey   v.    Lackawanna   etc.    R.    R. 
Co.,  47  Pa.   St.  428:    1341. 
v.  Lloyd,    3    Pa.    331:     530,    971, 

1187. 

V.  Mason  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  129 

la.    465:     158,    1454,    1548,    1552, 

1639,  1650,  1655,  1662. 

V.  Parkdale,  16  Ontario  372:  1239. 

V.  Parkdale,  17  Ontario  App.  468: 

1239 
V.  Thomas,  10  Watts,  63:  21,  530, 
1349. 
Harward  v.  St.  Clair  etc.  Dr.  Co.,  51 

111.  130:    10. 
Harwell    v.    Bennett,    1    Rand.    282: 

1383. 
Harwinton  v.  Catlin,  19  Conn.  520: 

678. 
Harwood  v.  Bloomington,  124  111.  48: 
1195. 
V.  West  Randolph,  64  Vt.  41:  1229, 
1268. 
Haskell  v.   County  Comrs.,  9   Gray, 
341:   1711. 
v.  Denver  Tramway   Co.,  23  Colo. 

60:   196,  277,  1586. 
V.  New    Bedford,    108    Mass.   208: 
142,  787,  1354,  1606. 
Haslam  v.  Galena  etc  R.  R.  Co.,  64 

111.  353:  1084,  1229,  1241. 
Haslett   V.   New   Albany   Belt   &   T. 

Co.,  7  Ind.  App.  603:  1524. 
Hasson  v.  Oil  Creek  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

8  Phil.  556:  1478. 
Hastings  v.  Burlington  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

38  la.  316:    1463,  1669. 
Hastings  &  Grand  Island  R.  R.  Co., 
v.  Ingalls,  15  Neb.  123 :  243,  939, 
1378. 
Hastings  Water  Co.  v.  Hastings,  216 

Pa.  St.  178:  408,  409. 
Haswell   v.   Vermont   Central   R.   R. 
Co.,  23  Vt.  228:  1403,  1533,  1534. 
Hatch   V.   Arnault,   3   La.   An.    482: 
1499. 
V.  Barnes,  124  la.  251:   735,  1492. 
V.  Qncinnati  &  Indiana  R.  R.  Co., 
18  Ohio  St.  92:   424,  1310,  1314. 
V.  Dwight,  17  Mass.  289:  556. 
V.  Hawkes,  126  Mass.  177:    1519. 
V.  New  York,  82  N.  Y.  436:   1557. 
V.  Pottawattamie  Co.,  43  la.  442 : 

575. 
V.  Tacoma  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  6  Wash. 

1:   256,  304,  324,  1667. 
V.  Vermont  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  25 

Vt.  49:   256. 
V.  Vermont  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  28 
Vt.  142:   256. 
Hatchett  v.  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
1  Miss.  Dec.  38:   1473. 


CXXXVUl 


CASES    CITED. 


£The  references  are  to   the  pages  :   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.   II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Hatfield  v.  Central  R.  E.  Co.,  29  N. 

J.  L.  571:  857. 
V.  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  33  N.  J.  L. 

251:   1650,  1657. 
V.  Straus,  117  App.  Div.  671:  291, 

294,  317,  1588. 
V.  Straus,  189  N.  Y.  208:  291,  294, 

317,  1588. 
Hatfield   Tp.    Road,   4   Yeates    392: 

695. 
Hathaway  v.  Osborne,  25  R.  I.  249: 

1635. 
V.  Yakima    W.    L.    &    P.    Co.,    14 

Wash.  469:   858. 
Hathorn  v.  Kelley,  86  Me.  487:   928, 

1503. 
V.  Strong's    S.    S.   Sanitarium,   55 

Misc.  445:  163. 
Hathorne  v.  Stenson,  12  Me.  183:  866. 
Hatry  v.  Painsville  etc.  Ry.   Co.,   1 

Ohio  C.  C.  426:   1540,  1541. 
Hatt    V.   Napoleon,    144    Mich.    266: 

400,  1017,  1036. 
Hatten  v.  Furman,  123  Ky.  844:  412. 
Hattermehl    v.    Dickinson,    8    Phila. 

282:   1165,  1167. 
Hauck  V.  Tide  Water  Pipe  Line  Co., 

153  Pa.  St.  366:  455,  457. 
Haupt's  Appeal,  125  Pa.  St.  211:  72, 

73,  74,  1603. 
Haus  V.  Jeffersonville  etc.  E.  R.  Co., 

138  Ind.  307:  1298,  1457. 
Hause's     Appeal,     3     Walker's     Pa. 

Super.  Ct.  54:    1388. 
Hanser  v.  Burbank,  117  Mich.  642: 

1390. 
Haven  v.  Orton,  37  Minn.  445:  1406. 
Haverford  Elee.  Lt.  Co.  v.  Hart,  13 

Pa.  Co.  Ct.  369:  345. 
Haverhill   Bridge   Props,   v.    County 

Comrs.  of  Essex,  103  Mass.  120: 

675,  824,  1164,  1167. 
Haverstraw  v.   Eckerman,   124  App. 

Div.  18:   1623. 
Hawes    v.    Louisville,    5   Bush,   667: 

1562. 
Hawesville  v.  Howes'  Heirs,  6  Bush 

(Ky.)   232:   1490. 
Hawkins   v.    Calloway,   88   El.    155: 

1092. 
V.  County    Comrs.,   2   Allen,    254: 

941. 
V.  Fall  River,  119  Mass.  94:   1119, 

1120. 
V.  Justices  of  Truesdale  County,  12 

Lea  351:   970. 
V.  Nelson,  40  Ala.  553:  19. 
V.  Pittsburg,    220   Pa.    St.    7:    433, 

708,  728. 
V.  Randolph    County,    1    Murphy, 

118:  1425. 


Hawkins  v.  Robinson,  5- J.  J.  Marsh. 

9:  1436. 

V.  Rochester,  1  Wend.  53:  1678. 

V.  Stanford,  138  Ind.  267:   1576. 

Hawkins  Point  Light  House  Case,  39 

Fed.  77:  102. 
Hawley   v.   Baltimore,   33   Md.   270: 

190,  367. 
V.  Central   Valley  R.   R.   Co.,  213 

Pa.  St.  36:   1458,  1473. 
V.  Harrall,  19  Conn.   142:    1163. 
»Hay  V.  Cohoes  Co.,  3  Barb.  42:  435, 

551,  1455. 
V.  Cohoes   Co.,  2  N.  Y.   159:    435, 

1455. 
T.  Commonwealth,  183  Mass.  294: 

1221,  1319. 
V.  Lexington,    114    Ky.    665:    630, 

634. 
V.  Springfield  Water  Co.,  207  Pa. 

St   38:  1577 
Haydeii  v.  Skilliiigs,  78  Me.  413:  1478. 
V.  State,  132  N.  Y.  533:  912,  987. 
V.  Stewart,  71  Kan.  11:   373,  382, 

404. 
Hayes   v.   Atlanta,   1   Ga.   App.   25: 

1260,  1309. 
V.  Board  of  Comrs.,  59  Ind.   552: 

1673. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.  64  la.  753: 

1322,  1324. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  46  Minn. 

349:   320,  351,  372,  385. 
v.  Shackford,   3   N.   H.    10:    1362, 

1634. 
V.  Toledo  etc.  Ry.  &  T.  Co.,  6  Ohio 

C.  C.   (N.  S.)   281:   1315. 
V.  Tyler,  85  la.  126:  400. 
V.  Waverly  &  P.  E.  R.  Co.,  51  N. 

J.   Eq.   345:    267. 
Hayford    v.    Bangor,    102    Me.    340: 

1418. 
V.  Bangor,  103  Me.  434:  930,  1395. 
v.  County  Comrs.,  78  Me.  153 :  984, 

1414. 
Haynes  v.  Buffalo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  38 

Hun,  17:  851. 
T.  Duluth,    47    Minn.    458:     1186, 

1201. 
V.  Thomas,  7  Ind.  38:  178,  363,  377, 

378,  387,  404. 
V.  Wells,  26  Ark.  464:   413. 
Hays  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Penny. 

52:    1325. 
V.  Bowman,  1  Rand.  417:  104. 
V.  Briggs,  74  Pa.  St.  373:  1139. 
V.  Briggs,   24  P.  F.  S.  373:    1140. 
V.  Campbell,  17  Ind.  430:  977. 
V.  Columbia   Tel.   Co.,   21    Ohio   C. 

C.  480:    341. 
V.  Hinkleman,  68  Pa.  St.  324 :  146. 


CASES    CITED. 


CXXXIX 


[The  references  are  to   the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Hays  V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
108  Mo.  544 :  859. 
V.  Lewis,  28  Ohio  St.  326:   816. 
V.  Ottawa   etc.   R.   E.   Co.,   54   III. 

373:    1122,  1206,  1216,   1245. 
V.  Parish,  52  Ind.   132:    1094,  1102. 
V.  Risher,  32  Pa.  169:  530. 
V.  Shackford,    3    N.   H.    10:    1362, 

1634. 
V.  South  Easton  Borough,   10  Pa. 

Super.  Ct.  390:  1546. 
V.  State,  8  Ind.  425 :  1363. 
V.  T.  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  62  Tex.  397: 

714,  857,  864,  1626. 
V.  Waldron,  44  N.  H.  580:  71. 
Hayward  v.  Bath,  40  N.  H.  100:  1106. 
V.  Charlestown,  34  N.  H.  23:   969. 
V.  Davidson,  41  Ind.  212:  837. 
V.  New    York,    8   Barb.   486:    539, 

1500. 
V.  New  York,  7  N.  Y.  314:  1500. 
V.  Snohomish  Co.,   11  Wash.  429: 
564,  581,  1157. 
Haywood  v.  Bath,  35  N.  H.  514:  1421. 
T.  Charlestown,  43  N.  H.  61:  1372. 
Hazelhurst  v.  Baltimore,  37  Md.  199: 
1510,  1512. 
V.  Freeman,  52  Ga.  244:  726. 
T.  Mayes,  84  Miss.  7 :  180,  344,  350. 
Hazen  v.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  R.  Co., 
2  Gray,  574:  1636. 
V.  Essex   Co.,    12   Cush.   475:    543, 
549,  555,   783,   1164,   1165,   1170, 
1522. 
H.    B.   Anthony    Shoe   Co.    v.    West 
Jersey  R.  R.   Co.,  57  N.  J.  Eq. 
607:    254,   1581. 
H.  C.  Frick  Coke  Co.  v.  Painter,  198 
Pa.    St.    468:    1058,    1062,    1064, 
1188,  1201,  1209. 
Heacock   v.   Sullivan,   70   Kan.   750: 

735,  1154,  1514. 
Head  v.  Amoskeag  Manuf.  Co.,   113 

U.  S.  9:   549,  554,  578,  596. 
Headrick  v.  Larson,  152  Fed.  93:  755. 
Heady  v.   Vevay  etc.  Turnpike   Co., 

52  Ind.   117:   703,  1109,   1406. 
Heagy  v.  Black,  90  Ind.  534:    1518. 
Healey  v.  Atlanta,  125  Ga.  736:  884, 
886. 
V.  Babbitt,  14  R.  I.  533:  1499. 
V.  New  Haven,  49  Conn.  394:  601, 

1524,  1550,  1718. 
v.  New  Haven,  47  N.  H.  305:  211. 
V.  Newton,    119    Mass.   480:    1010. 
Health  Dept  v.  Trinity  Church,  146 

N.  Y.  32:   490. 
Healy    Lumber    Co.    v.    Morris,    33 

Wash.  490:   505,  508,  510,  516. 
Heard  v.  Brooklyn.  60  N.  Y.  242:  424. 


Heard  v.  Middlesex  Canal,  5  Met.  81 : 

1185. 
v.  Proprietors  of  Middlesex  Canal, 

5  Met.  81:   1711. 
v.  Talbot,  7  Gray  113:  1504. 
Heath  v.  Barman,  49  Barb.  496:  422. 
V.  Barmore,  50  N.  Y.  302:  422,  837, 

838. 
V.  Des  Moines  &  St.  Louis  Ry.  Co., 

61  la.  11:  300,  316,  712,  1583. 
V.  Sheetz,  164  Ind.  665:  1058,  1192, 

1378. 
V.  Texas   &   Pae.  Ry.  Co.,  37  La. 

An.  728:  846. 
V.  Williams,  25   Me.   209:    69,   95, 

900. 
Heaton  v.  Chester,  59  Misc.  558:  141, 

470. 
Hebron  Gravel  Road  Co.  v.  Harvey, 

90  Ind.  192:  91,  95,  137,  1607. 
Hector    Tp.   Road    (No.    1),    19   Pa. 

Super.  Ct.  120:   1363. 
Hector    Tp.    Road    (No.    2),    19    Pa. 

Super,  a.  124:  1363. 
Hedeen  v.  State,  47  Kan.  402:  1028, 

1520. 
Hedges  v.  Metropolitan  Ry.  Co.,  28 

Beav.  109:   1533. 
V.  West  Shore  R.  R.  Co.,  80  Hun, 

310:    102,    122,   127,   131. 
Hedrick  v.  Hedrick,  55  Ind.  78:  995, 

1075. 
V.  Olathe,  30  Kan.  348:   1553. 
Heermans    v.    Jacksonville    etc.    Ry. 

Co.,   40   Fla.   85:    1389. 
Heffner  v.  Cass  &  Morgan  Cos.  193 

111.  439:   321,  439,  574. 
Heffron   v.   Galveston,   33    Tex.   Civ. 

App.  52:   872. 
Hegar  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 

26  Wis.  624:  247,  1293. 
Hegemeyer  v.   Board  of  Co.  Comrs., 

71  Minn.  42:  1404. 
Hegenbaumer    v.    Heckenkamp,    202 

111.  621:    1411,  1414. 
Heick  V.  Voight,  110  Ind.  279:   566 

575,  976,  1069. 
Heidelberg  Tp.  Road,   1  Pa.  Co.  Ct, 

7:   1105. 
Heidelberg  Tp.  Road,  47  Pa.  St.  536 

1370. 
Heilbron  v.  Canal  Co.,  75  Cal.  426 

74,  1603,  1614. 
V.  Land  &  Water  Co.,  80  Cal.  189 

71,  72,  76. 
V.   Superior   Court,   151   Cal.   271 

1461,  1463,  1464. 
Heilman  v.  Lebanon  &  A.  St.  R.  R, 

Co.,    10    Pa.    Co.    Ct.    241:    272, 

642,  1586,  1590. 


cxl 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742  ;  Vol.   II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Heilman   v.   Lebanon   &  Anville   St. 
Ey.  Co.,  145  Pa.  St.  23:  282. 
V.  Lebanon  etc.  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  175 

Pa.   St.   188:    1587. 

V.  Lebanon  etc.  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  180 

Pa.  St.  627:  306,  307,  1587,  1616. 

V.    Union    Canal    Co.,    50    Pa.    St. 

268:  74,  78,  937. 

Heilscher   v.   Minneapolis,   46  Minn. 

529:   404. 
Heimburg  v.  Manhattan  R.  E.  Co.,  19 
App.  Div.  179:   1355. 
V.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  162  N.  Y. 
352:  323,  1355. 
Heine  v.  Columbia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  16 

Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  840:  677,  714. 
Heinl  v.  Terre  Haute,   161  Ind.  44: 

690,  696. 
Heinrich  v.  St.  Louis,  125  Mo.  424: 

364,  369,  375,  376,  391,  1337. 
Heinz  v.  Buckham,  104  Minn.  389: 

1035,  1412,  1420. 
Heinzman  v.  Winona  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

75  Minn.  253 :  859. 
Heinle  v.  Cloekamas  County,  20  Ore. 
147:  721. 
V.  East  Portland,  13  Or.  97:   173. 
Heise  v.  Penn.  R.  E.  Co.,  62  Pa.  St. 

67:    1077. 
Heiser  v.   New  York,  29   Hun  446: 
609,  617. 
V.  New  York,  104  N.  Y.  68:   609, 
617. 
Heiss  V.  Milwaukee  &  Lake  Winne- 
bago  R.   R.   Co.,    69   Wis.   555: 
248. 
Heitz  V.  St.  Louis,  110  Mo.  618: 
878,  891. 
Helena  v.  Harvey,  6  Mont.  114:  990. 
V.  Helena  W.  W.  Co.,  122  Fed.  1: 

409,  410. 
V.  Hornor,  58  Ark.    151:    1492. 
V.  Rogan,  26  Mont.  452:   707,  804, 

805,  934,  987. 

V.  Rogan,  27  Mont.  135:  805,  934, 

987. 
V.  Thompson,  29  Ark.  569:   236. 
Helena  etc.  Reduction  Co.  v.  Lynch, 

25  Mont.  497:   564,  1378. 
Helena    Power   Transmission   Co.   v. 

Spratt,  146  Fed.  310:  931. 
V.  Spratt,  35  Mont.  108:  495,  536, 

537,  587,  592,  672,  684,  685,  686, 

1045,  1046. 
Helena  W.  W.  Co.  v.  Helena  195  U. 

S.  383:  410. 
Helfrich    v.    Catonsville    Water   Co., 

74  Md.  267:   71,  81. 
Hellen    v.    Medford,    188   Mass.    42: 

806,  807,  1172. 


Helm  V.  Grayville,  224  111.  274:  682, 
725,  980. 
V.  McClure,  107  Cal.  199:  877,  880, 

881. 
V.  Webster,  85  HI.  116:  198,  1502. 
Helme  v.  Kingston,  191  Pa.  St.  191: 

1427. 
Helmer  v.  Colo.  Southern  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  (La.)  47  So.  443:  640,  1297, 
1303. 
Helm  etc.  R.  R.   Co.  v.   Turner,   89 

Miss.  334:   1430. 
Helms  V.  Bell,  155  Ind.  502:   1516. 
Hembling  v.  Big  Rapids,  89  Mich.  1 : 

1353. 
Hempstead  v.  Cargill,  46  Minn.  118: 
1400. 
V.  Cargill,  46  Minn.   141:   1716. 
V.   Des   Moines,   52   la.   303:    603, 

1306,  1550. 
V.  Des  Moines,  63  la.  36 :  603,  618, 

619,  1551,  1656,  1718. 
V.  Salt  Lake  City,  32  Utah  261: 
631. 
Hench  v.  Pritt,  62  W.  Va.  270:  499, 

505,  531,  591. 
Hendershott  v.  Ottumwa,  46  la.  658: 

230. 
Henderson  v.  Adams,   5   Cush.   610: 
930,  1116. 
V.   Chicago  etc.  E.   E.   Co.   83   la. 

221:  1634. 
V.  Davis,  106  N.  C.  88:  1018,  1032, 

1513. 
V.  McClain,  102  Ky.  402 :  630,  659, 

661. 
V.  Minneapolis,  32  Minn.  319:  211. 
V.  New  York  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  17 

Hun  344 :   1580. 
V.  N.  Y.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  78  N.  Y.  423: 

247,  315,  323,  1293,  1580. 
V.  Ogden  City  R.  R.  Co.,  7  Utah 

199:   298,  301,  763. 
V.   Winstead,    109  Ky.   328:    1306. 
Henderson    Belt    R.    R.    Co.    v.    De- 
champ,    95    Ky.    219:    252,    620, 
666. 
V.  DeChamp,  14  Ky.  L.  R.  44:  620. 
Henderson  Co.  Water  Co.  v.  McCar- 

ter,  209  U.  S.  349:  170. 
Henderson  v.  Nashville  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Dickerson,  17  B.  Mon.  173:  922, 
1182,  1184,  1230,  1431. 
Henderson  Real   Est.   Co.  v.  Carroll 

etc.  Co.,  113  A.  D.  775:  71. 
Henderson  Real  Est.   Co.  v.  Carroll 

etc.  Co.,  189  N.  Y.  531:  71. 

Hendler   v.   Lehigh   Val.   R.    R.   Co., 

209  Pa.  St.  256:   845,  1480. 


OASES    CITED. 


cxli 


[The  references   are  to   the  pages ;   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Hendler  v.  Lehigh  Val.  E.  "R.  Co.,  209 

Pa.  St.  263:   845,   1480. 
Hendrick's  Appeal,  103  Pa.  St.  358: 

632,  636. 
Heiidrick  v.   Carolina  Central  E.  E. 
Co.,   101  N.   C.   617:    939,   1177, 
1540,  1541,  1543,  1559. 
Hendricks  v.  Johnson,  5  Porter  208 : 
1673. 
V.    Johnson,    6    Porter    Ala.    472: 
745,   899,   900,    1673. 
Hendrickson  v.  Point  Pleasant,  65  N. 
J.  L.  535:  914,  1081,  1091,  1358. 
Hendrie  v.  Toronto  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  26 

Ont.  667:   325,  1582,  1591. 
Hendrix   v.    Southern   Ry.    Co.,    130 

Ala.  205:   1620. 
Henkel    v.    Detroit,    49    Mich.    249: 
347. 
V.  Wabash  Pittsburg  Terminal  E. 
E.  Co.,  213  Pa.  St.  485:  1143. 
Henline  v.  People,  81  111.  269:   1516. 
Henney  v.   Brooklyn  El.   E.  E.   Co., 

75  Hun  543 :   1584. 
Henry  v.  Centralia  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  121 
111.  264:    1045,  10/4. 
V.  Dubuque  &  Pacific  R.  E.  Co.,  2 

la.  288:  808,  1204. 
V.  Dubuque  &  Pacific  E.  E.  Co.,  10 

la.  540:   1634. 
V.   Newburyport,    149    Mass.    582: 

119    132 
V.  Ohio  Eiv.  E.  R.  Co.,  40  W.  Va. 

234:   149,  152,  1651,  1658. 
V.    Perry    Tp.    48    Ohio    St.    172: 

1572. 
V.  Pittsburgh  &  Allegheny  Bridge 

Co.,  8  W.  &  S.  85:  211. 
V.  Thomas,  119  Mass.  583:  972. 
V.  Trustees,  48  Ohio  St.  172:  818. 
V.  Vermont  Central  E.  R.  Co.,  30 

Vt.   638:    87. 
V.  Wabash  Western  E.  E.  Co.,  44 

Mo.  App.  100:  321,  1643. 
V.  Ward,  49  Neb.  392:  1569. 
Henry  Gauss  &  Sons  Mfg.  Co.  v.  St. 
Louis   etc.   E.   E.    Co.,    113   Mo. 
308:    181,  254,  641,  1582. 
Henry  Street,  Matter  of,  7  Cow.  400: 

1388. 
Henry  Street,  Vacation  of,   123  Pa. 

St.    346:    400,   402. 
Hennessey  v.  Andrews,  6  Cush.  170: 
961. 
V.  Carmony,  50  N.  J.  Eq.  616:  446, 

455. 
V.  St.  Paul,  44  Minn.  306:    1460, 
1466. 
Henning  v.  Hudson  Val.  E.  E.  Co., 

90  App.  Div.  492:  1587. 
Hensen  v.  Moore,   104  111.  403:    943. 


Henshaw   v.   Hunting,    1    Gray   203 : 

825. 
Hants  V.  Mt.  Vernon,  78  App.  Div. 

515:   80. 
Hentz  V.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.,  13 

Barb.   646:    244,   1537. 
Hentzler  v.   Bradbury,  5  Kan.  App. 

1:   969,   1018,  1571. 
Hepburn's  Case,  3  Bland   (Md.)   95: 

494,  496. 
Hepburn  v.  Jersey  City,  67  N.  J.  L. 

114:  813. 
Hepting  v.  New  Orleans  Pac.  R.  R. 

Co.,  36  La.  Ann.  898:    180,  200, 

243,  245,  248,  253,  306,  314,  316, 

640,    1582,    1591. 
Herbein  •  v.    Railroad    Co.,    9    Watts 

272:    1436. 
Herbert  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  43  N.  J. 

Bq.    21:     380,    390,    456,     1476, 

1582. 
V.  Rainey,  54  Fed.  248:  879. 
Hercules  Water  Co.  v.  Fernandez,  5 

Cal.  App.  726:  593. 
Herman   v.    County   Comrs.,   39   Me. 

583:   701. 
V.    Manhattan    Ry.    Co.,    58    App. 

Div.  369:   1554. 
V.  East  St.  Louis,  58  111.  App.  166 : 

629,  635,  1294,  1302. 
Herman's  Heirs  v.  Municipality  No. 

Two,  15  La.  597 :  1084. 
Herndon  v.  Kansas,  N.  &  D.  E.  E. 

Co.,  46  Kan.  560:   252,  311. 
Herold  v.  Manhattan  E.  E.  Co.,  129 

N.  Y.  636:   1302. 
V.  Manhattan  E.  E.  Co.,  59  N.  Y. 

Supr.  Ct.  564:    1301. 
Herr  v.  Altoona,   31   Pa.   Supr.   Ct. 

375:   1523,  1525. 
Herrick  v.   Cleveland,  7  Ohio  0.   C. 

470:   199,  346,  868,  1618. 
V.  Stover,  5  Wend.  580:  1362. 
V.  Ararat  Tp.  Eoad,  16  Pa.  Supm. 

Ct.   579:    1365. 
Herring  v.   District  of   Columbia,  3 

Mackey,  572:   157,  234. 
Herring  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  5  Ont.  349: 

1116. 
Herron  v.  Improvem't  Comrs.,  L.  R. 

(1892)   A.  C.  498:  707. 
Herr's  Mill  Road,   14  S.  &  R.   204: 

1386. 
Herser  v.  Milwaukee,  39  Wis.   108: 

619. 
Hersey  v.  Packard,  56  Me.  395:  1137. 
Hershfield  v.  Rocky  Mt.  Bell  Co.,  12 

Mont.  102:   342,  1594.. 
Herzer  v.  Milwaukee,   39  Wis.   108: 

614. 


cxlii 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-742 ;   Vol.   II,  pp.   743-1719.) 


Herzog  v.  New  York  El.  E.  R.  Co.,  76 

Hun   486:    1355. 
Heselton   v.   Harmon,    80    Me.    326: 

877. 
Hespenheide's  Appeal,  4  Penny.  71: 

688,  715. 
Hessing  v.   District  of  Columbia,   3 

Maokey  572:  234. 
Hessler  v.  Drainage  Comrs.,  53  111. 

105:   12. 
Hess's  Mill   Road,  21   Pa.   St.   217: 

778. 
Hester  v.   Chambers,  84  Mich.   562, 

1083. 
Heston  v.  Canal  Comrs.,  Brightley's 

N.  P.  183:   1571. 
V.   Canal   Comrs.,   1  Pa.   Rep.   25: 

1577. 
Hetfield  v.  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  29  N. 

J.  L.  571:   936. 
y.  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  29  N.  J.  L. 

206:   936. 
Heth  V.  Fond  du  Lac.  63  Wis.  228: 

148,  234. 
Hetzel  V.  B.  &  0.  R.  R.  Co.,  169  U.  S. 

26:   315. 
Hewes  v.  Andover,  16  Vt.  510:   973, 

974. 
V.  Crete,  175  111.  348:  888. 
Hewett   V.   Canton,    182   Mass.   220: 

157,  326,  606,  1667. 
V.  Co.  Comrs.,  85  Me.  308:    1343, 

1414. 
Hewin  v.  Atlanta,  121  Ga.  723:  479. 
Hewitt's  Appeal,  88  Pa.  St.  55 :  466. 
V.    County    Comra.,    85    Me.    308: 

1345,  1415. 
V.  Pittsburgh  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  Pa. 

Supr.  Ct.  304:   1140,  1189,  1201. 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  35  Minn. 

226:    729. 
V.  Western  U.  Teleg.  Co.,  4  Mack. 

424:   1593. 
Heyl  V.  Philadelphia,  12  Phila.  291: 

1115. 
Heyneman  v.  Blake,  19  Cal:  579 :  808, 

810. 
Heyward  v.  Farmers'  Min.  Co.,  42  S. 

C.  138:   113,  115. 
Heyward  v.  New  York,  8  Barb.  480: 

807,  1600. 
V.  New  York,  7  N.  Y.  314:  8,  806, 

807,  932,  1500. 
Hibbard  v.  Chicago,  173  111.  91:  199. 
V.  Chicago,  59  111.  App.  470:   197, 

199. 
V.  Delaware  Co.,  1  Pa.  Supr.  Ct. 

204:   1531. 
Hibben  v.  Smith,  191  U.  S.  310:  11, 

464. 


Hibberd  v.  Melvillee    (Cal.)    33  Pac. 

201:  881. 
Hibbs  V.  Chicago  &  Southwestern  Ry. 
Co.,    39    la.     340:     1535,     1536, 
1578. 
Hick   V.    School    District,    49    Mich. 

551:  911. 
Hickerson    v.    Mexico,    58    Mo.    61 : 

1546,  1548. 
Hickey  v.  Mich.  Central  R.  R.  Co., 

96  Mich.  498:    1507. 
Hickman's  Case,  4  Harr.  (Del.)  580: 

515,  518. 
Hickman   v.   Kansas    City,    120   Mo. 
110:   619,  630,  632,   1186,  1337, 
1525,  1546. 
Hickok  V.  Chicago  etc.  K  R.  Co.,  78 
Mich.  615:  842,  1503. 
V.  Hina,  23  Ohio  St.  523:  97,  788. 
Hickory  Tree  Road,  43  Pa.  St.  139: 

696. 
Hickox  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  94 
Mich.  237:  841. 
v.  Cleveland,  8  Ohio  543:  214. 
Hicks  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  84 
la.  27:   1300. 
V.  Foster,  32  6a.  414:   1089. 
V.  Ward,  69  Me.  436 :  364. 
Hidden  v.  Davison,  51  Cal.  138:  941. 
Higbee  v.   Camden  &  Amboy  R.  R. 
Co.,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  276:  308,  1593. 
V.  Camden  &  Amboy  R.  R.  Co.,  20 

N.  J.  Bq.  435:   297,  1593. 
V.  Peed,  98  Ind.  420:  1384. 
Higgins  V.  Chicago,  18  111.  276:  1531, 
1532,  1680. 
V.  Curtis,  39  Kan.  283 :  1374,  1393. 
V.  Flemington  Water  Co.,  36  N.  J. 

Eq.  538:   74,  1603. 
T.  Hamor,  88  Me.  25 :  1510. 
V.   New  York   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   78 

Hun  567 :  93,  94. 
V.  Reynolds,  31  N.  Y.  151:  1491. 
V.   Sharon,   5   Pa.   Super.   Ct.   92: 
366. 
Higginson  v.  Nahant,  11  Allen  530: 

514,  539. 
High   V.   Big  Creek  Ditching  Assn., 

44  Ind.  356:    1082. 
Highbarger  v.  Milford,  71  Kan.  331: 
182,    190,    366,    382,    389,    404, 
1596. 
High  Bridge  Lumber  Co.  v.  United 
States,    69    Fed.   Rep.    320:    92, 
457,  932,  933,  1316,   1451. 
Highland  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Birming- 
ham Union   R.  R.  Co.,  93  Ala. 
505:    328,   705,   767,   1611. 
Highland  Ave.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bir- 
mingham Union  R.  R.  Co.,  117 
Ala.  511:   764. 


CASES    CITED. 


cxliii 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-741,,    vol.   II,  pp.   743-1719.) 


Highland   Ave.    &   B.    R.    R.    Co.   v. 

Matthews,  99  Ala.  24 :  639,  1549, 

1552,   1648,   1657. 
Highland    Boy    Gold    Min.     Co.    v. 

Strickley,   116  Fed.  852:    1627. 
V.    Strickley,    28    Utah    215:    504, 

563,  596,  599. 
Highland  Park  v.  Detroit  etc.  Road 

Co.,  95  Mich.  489:   414. 
Hightower    v.    Jones,    85    Ga.    697 

1522. 
Highway,  Matter  of,  3  N.  J.  L.  242 

973,  974,  1009. 
Highway,  Matter,   3   N.   J.   L.   244 

1370. 
Highway,  Matter  of,  3  N.  J.  L.  272 

1389. 
Highway,  Matter  of,  3  N.  J.  L.  504 

1084. 
Highway,  Matter  of,  3  N.  J.  L.  590 

1069. 
Highway,  Matter  of,  7  N.  J.  L.  37 

992. 
Highway,  Matter  of,  15  N.  J.  L.  39 

1031. 
Highway,  Matter  of,  16  N.  J.  L.  345 

1409. 
Highway,  Matter  of,  16  N.  J.  L.  391 

979,  1022,  1093,  1099. 
Highway,  Matter  of,  18  N.  J.  L.  291 

1376. 
Highway,  Matter  of,  22  N.  J.  L.  293 

22,   1156,   1157. 
Highway    Comrs.    v.    Ely,    54-  Mich 

173:   336,  1487. 
Hilbourne  v.  Suffolk  Co.,   120  Mass, 

393:  1186,  1216. 
Hilcoat  V.  Archbishop,  19  L.  J.  C.  P. 

376:    1267. 
Hildreth   v.    Lowell,    11    Gray   345 

535,  1010,  1024,  1366. 
Hileman  v.  Chicago  Gt.  Western  Ry. 

Co.,  113  la.  591:  836,  838,  846, 

1445,  1457. 
Hill  V.  Baker,  28  Me.  9:  963. 

V.   Board   of  Supervisors,   95   Cal. 

239:   918,  982. 
V.  Bridges,  6  Porter  197:  1427. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  38  La. 

Ann.  599,  253. 
V.   Cincinnati  etc.  R.  R.   Co.,   109 

Ind.  511:  157 
V.  Co.  Comrs.,  4  Gray,  414:   1638. 
V.  Glendon  etc.  Mfg.  Co.,  113  N.  C. 

259"  830. 
V.  Higdon,  5  Ohio  St.  243 :   14. 
T.  McGinniss,  64  Neb.  187 :  865. 
V.  Mohawk  &  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  5 

Denio  206:   1343. 
V.  Mohawk  &  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  7 

N.  y.   152:    1246,  1343,  1344. 


Hill  V.  St.  Louis,  59  Mo.  412:  236. 
V.  Sayles,  4  Gush.  549:   1667. 
V.  Sayles,  12  Cush.  454:   1607. 
V.  Sayles,  12  Met.  142:  1667. 
V.  Sedalia,  64  Mo.  App.  494:   881, 

886. 
V.    Sewald,    3    P.    F.    Smith    271: 

1350. 
V.  Southern  Ry.  Go.,  67  S.  C.  548: 

727,  1479. 
V.  Wadley  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  128 

Ga.  705:  481,  483. 
V.  Ward,  2  Gil.   (111.)   285:  90. 
V.  Western  Vt.  R.  R.  Co.,  32  Vt. 

68:   827,  834,  837,  1499. 
V.  Wine,  35  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  520: 
948,  1563. 
Hiller  v.  Atchison  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  28 
Kan.  625:    384,  390. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  28  Kan.  628:  369. 
Hilltown  Road,  18  Pa.  St.  233 :  1082, 

1087. 
Hilltown     Road,     2     Walker's     Pa. 

Supm.  Ct.  78:  778,  1094. 
Hilton   V.    St.    Louia,    99    Mo.    199: 
1557. 
V.  Thirty-fourth  Street  R.  R.  Co., 
1  How.  Pr.  N.  S.  453:  922. 
Hiues  V.  Pittsburgh,  213  Pa.  St.  362: 

1189. 
Himmelmann  v.  Hoadley,  44  Cal.  213 : 

237,  734. 
Hinchman  v.  Patterson  H.  R.  R.  Co., 

17  N.  J.  Eq.  75:  268,  279,  1586. 
Hinckley,  Ex  parte,  8  Me.  146:  1081, 

1420. 
Hinckley  et  al.  Petitioners,  15  Pick. 
447:  955,  1004,  1010,  1013,  1014, 
1029. 
Hinckley  v.  Franklin,  69  N.  H.  614: 
608,  617. 
V.  Nickerson,  117  Mass.  213:  560. 
v.  Manhattan   Ry.   Co.,    103   App. 
Div.  504:  866. 
Hindley  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  185  N. 

Y.  335:  866. 
Hiude  V.  Wabash  Navigation  Co.,  15 

111.  72:  688. 
Hine  v.  K.  &  D.  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  42  la. 
636:  251. 
V.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  132  N.  Y. 

477:   1145. 
V.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  58  N.  Y. 

Supr.  377:  1146. 
V.  New  Haven,  40  Conn.  478:    14, 

485. 
v.  New    York    El.    R.    R.    Co.,    36 

Hun,  293:  1124. 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  54  Hun, 
425:    180,  204. 


cxliv 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;  Vol.   II,  pp.   743-1719.; 


Hine  v.  New  York  El.  R.  E.  Co.,  8 

Misel.  18:   1665. 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  128  N. 

Y.  571:   1665. 
Hines  v.  Darling,  99  Mich.  47:   1519. 
Hingham  v.  United  States,  161  Fed. 

295:   1127,  1221,  1320.     ^ 
Hingham  &  Quincy  Bridge  Co.  v.  Nor- 
folk Co.  6  Allen  353:   422,  687, 

814,  1067,  1374. 
Hinkley   v.   Hastings,   2   Pick.    162: 

1363. 
Hinman  v.  Warren,  6  Ore.  408:  118. 
Hiuners  v.  Edgewater  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

75  N.J.  L.  514:  1109. 
Hinnershitz  v.  United  Traction  Co., 

206  Pa.  St.  91:  1588. 
Hire  v.  Knisley,  130  Ind.  295:   1119, 

1192,  1318,  1339. 
Hirsh  V.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  84  App. 

Div.  374:   1562,  1584. 
Hirth  V.  Indianapolis,   18  Ind.  App. 

673:  234. 
Hiss  V.  Baltimore  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  52  Md. 

242:   268,  281. 
Hitchcock  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

88  la.  242:   319,  620. 
V.  Co.  Comrs.,  131  Mass.  519:  1638. 
V.  Danbury  &  Newark  R.  R.  Co., 

25  Conn.  516:  1519. 
Hitchings  v.  Brooklyn  El.  E.  R.  Co., 

6  Miscl.  430:   1151,  1302. 
Hitehins  v.  Frostburg,  68  Md.   100: 

154,  1650,  1656. 
V.  Frostburg,  70  Md.  56:  1656. 
Hoadley   v.    San   Francisco,   50   Cal. 

265:  237,  734,  1491. 
Hoag  v.  Denton,  20  la.  118:  1027. 

V.  Switzer,  61  111.  294:  437. 
Hoagland  v.  Culvert,  20  N.  J.  L.  387: 

1093. 
V.  Sacramento,  52  Cal.  142:  89. 
Hoard  v.  Des  Moines,  62  la.  326:  90. 
Hobart  v.  Ford,  6  Nev.  77:  430. 
T.  Plymouth  Co.,   100  Mass.   159: 

1133. 
V.  Milwaukee  City  Ry.  Co.,  27  Wis. 

194:   268,  284,  329. 
Hobbs  V.  Board  of  Comrs.,  103  Ind. 

575:   1095. 
V.  Long  Distance  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co., 

147  Ala.  393:  341. 
V.  Nashville  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  122  Ala. 

602:   1382,  1641. 
V.  State   Trust  Co.,  68  Fed.   618: 

1537,  1538,  1540,  1542. 
Hoboken  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co., 

124  U.  S.  656:   117. 
Hobson  V.  Philadelphia,  150  Pa.  St. 

595:   183. 


Hobson  V.  Philadelphia,  155  Pa.  St. 

131:   356. 
Hobsou's  Trusts,  In  re,  7  L.  R.  Ch. 

D.  708:   1534. 
Hockett  V.  State,  105  Ind.  250:  481. 
Hocutt  V.  Wilmington  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

124  N.  C.  214:  167. 
Hodge  V.   Lehigh  Valley  R.  R.  Co., 
39  Fed.  449:  846,  1450,  1458. 
V.  Lehigh  Val.  R.  R.  Co.,  56  Fed. 

195:  93. 
V.  Sloan,  107  N.  Y.  244:  429. 
Hodgerson  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

160  111.  430:  1070. 
Hodges  V.  Baltimore  Pass.  Ry.  Co., 
58  Md.  603:  268,  279. 
V.  Board   of   Suprs.  49  Neb.   666: 

1569. 
V.  Hodges,  5  Met.  205:    1524. 
V.  Milligan,  42  Kan.  396:    927. 
V.  Seaboard  etc.  R.  Co.,  88  Va.  653: 

243,  247,  622,  1580,  1591. 
V.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  72  Miss. 

910:  463. 
V.  Western    Union    Tel.    Co.,    133 
N.  C.  225:  425,  837,  1473. 
Hodgkinson  v.  Ennor,  4  B.  &  S.  229: 
165. 
V.  Long  Island  R.   R.   Co.,  4  Ed- 
wards Ch.  411:  224. 
Hodgman  v.  Concord,  69  N.  H.  349: 

608,  618. 

Hoey  V.  Gilroy,  129  N.  Y.  132:  485. 

Hoffeditz  v.  Southern  Pa.  R.  R.  Co., 

129  Pa.  St.  264:   848,  849,  1450, 

1451. 

Hoffer  V.  Penn.  Canal  Co.,  87  Pa.  St. 

221:  1187. 
Hoffman's  Appeal,  118  Pa.  St.  512: 

1466,  1535,  1682. 
Hoffman  v.  Bloomsburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
143  Pa.  St.  503:  862,  1200,  1201, 
1244. 
V.  Connor,  76  N.  Y.  121:  1144. 
V.  Flint  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  114  Mieh. 

316:   247,  253,  1650,  1657. 
V.  Manhattan    El.    E.    R.    Co.,    1 

Miscl.  155:   1296,  1302. 
v.  Muscatine,  113  la.  332:   156. 
V.  Port  Huron,  102  Mich.  417:  836. 
V.  Rodman,  39  N.  J.  L.  252:  1363. 
V.  St.  Louis,  15  Mo.  651 :  211,  234, 
238. 
Hogan  V.  Central  Pacific  R.  R.  Co., 
71  Cal.  83:   250,  1583. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  208  111. 
161:   327,  643. 
Hoge  V.  Eaton,  135  Fed.  441 :  169,  934. 
Hogencamp  v.  Paterson  H.  R.  R.  Co., 
17  N.  J.  Eq.  83:   268,  1586. 


CASES    CITED. 


cxlv 


[The  references  are  to   the  pages:   Vol.  I,   pp.  1-742;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Hogenson  v.  St.  Paul,  Minneapolis  & 

Manitoba  Ey.  Co.,  31  Minn.  224: 

153. 
Hogg  V.  Connellsville  Water  Co.,  168 

Pa.  St.  456:  74,76,  1637. 
Hoggatt  V.  Vicksburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

34  La.  Ann.  624:  1482. 
Hogsett  V.  Harlan  Co.,  4  Neb.  (Unof.) 

309:   1526,  1546. 
Hogue  V.  Albina,  20  Ore.   182:    876, 

882,  883,  884,  885. 
V.  Penn.  3  Bush  (Ky.)   663:   19. 
Hohman  v.  Chicago.  140  HI.  226:  629, 

635,  1274. 
V.  Chicago,  41  HI.  App.  41:   1274. 
Hohokus  V.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  65  N.  J. 

L.  353:  888. 
Hoke  T.  Georgia  R.  &  B.  Co.,  89  Ga. 

215:    753,  759,  1609. 
Holbert  v.  St.  Louis,  K.  C.  &  N.  R. 

R.  Co.,  45  Iowa  23:   685. 
Holbrook  v.  Norcross,  121   Ga.   319: 

159,  1648,  1656. 
Holcomb  V.  Moore,  4  Allen,  529:  438. 
Holcraft  v.  King,  25  Ind.  352:   1487. 
Holdane  v.  Cold  Spring,  23  Barb.  103: 

513. 
V.  Cold  Spring,  21  N.  Y.  474:   513, 

878,  885,  887,  888,  890. 
Holden  v.  Cole,  1  Pa.  St.  303:   438. 

V.  Lake  Co.,  53  N.  H.  552:  71. 
Holland  House  Co.  v.  Baird,  49  App. 

Div.   180:   436. 
V.  Baird,  169  N.  Y.  136:  436. 
Hollenbeck  v.  Marion,  116  la.  69:  84. 
Holleran  v.   Bell   Telephone   Co.,   64 

App.  Div.  41:   341. 
V.  Bell   Telephone   Co.,   177   N.  Y. 

573:   341. 
Holley  V.  Torrington,  63  Conn.  426: 

600,  601,  617,  619.  1525. 
Holliday  v.  Atlanta,  96  Ga.  377:  735, 

1348. 
Hollingsworth  v.  Des  Moines  &  St. 

Louis  Ry.  Co.,  63  la.  443:   1139, 

1143,  1176,  1322. 
Hollingsworth  &  V.   Co.  v.   Foxbor- 

ough   Water   Supply   Dist.,    165 

Mass.  186:  77,  163. 
HoUins  V.  Patterson,  6  Leigh,  457: 

917. 
HoUister  v.  Oark,  9  Ida.   672:    536, 

537,  746. 
V.  State,  9  Ida.  8:  7,  536,  537,  746, 

956. 
V.  Union  Co.,  7  Conn.  436:   100. 
Holloway  v.  Delano,  64  Hun  27:  368, 

375,  388,  403,  404. 
V.  Delano,   64    Hun    34:    368,    375, 

388,  403,  404. 


Holloway  v.  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

92  Ky.  244:  1633. 
V.  Southmayd,  139  N.  Y.  390:  180, 

368,  375,  388,  403,  404,  878. 
V.  University  R.  R.  Co.,  85  N.  C. 

452:    1523. 
Holly  Grove  v.  Smith,  63  Ark.  5:  886. 
Holly  Shelter  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Newton, 

133  N.  C.  132:   1047,  1049. 
V.  Newton,  133  N.  C.  136:  1422. 
Holm  V.  Windsor,  38  HI.  App.  650: 

1595. 
Holmes  v.  Atlanta,  113  Ga.  961:  159, 

233. 
V.  Bell,  155  Ind.  502:  1510. 
V.  Calhoun  County,  97  la.  360:  149, 

154,  1606. 
V.  Drew,  7  Pick.  141 :  960. 
V.  Jersey  City,  12  N.  J.  Eq.  299: 

886,  891. 
V.  Kansas  City,  209  Mo.  513:  942, 

1569,  1571. 
V.  Wilson,  10  A.   &  E.   503:    1651, 

1658. 
Holsman  v.  Boiling  Spring  Bleaching 

Co.  14  N.  J.  Eq.  335:  81. 
Holt  V.  Gas  Light  &  Coke  Co.,  7  L.  R. 

Q.  B.  728:  657. 
V.  Somerville,  127  Mass.  408:   539, 

675,  810,  837,  1008,  1057,  1067. 
Holton   V.   Milwaukee,   31    Wis.    27: 

1180,  1341. 
Holyoke  Co.  v.  Lyman,  15  Wall.  500: 

486. 
Holyoke   Water   Power    Co.   v.    Con- 
necticut  River    Co.,    22    Blatch. 

131 :   100,  702,  1604. 
V.   Conn.  Riv.   Co.,  52   Conn.   570: 

100. 
Home  V.   Rochester,   62   N.  H.   346: 

1518. 
Home  Bldg.  Co.  v.  Roanoke,  91  Va. 

52:   212,  226. 
Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Smith,  28  Hun,  296 : 

948. 
Homestead  St.  R.   R.    Co.    v.   Pitts- 
burgh etc.,  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  166  Pa. 

St.  162:  305,  910. 
Home  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  Los  Angeles, 

211  U.  S.  265:  481. 
Honenstein  v.  Vaughn,  7  Blackf .  520 : 

978,  1368. 
Hood  V.  Finch,  8  Wis.  381 :  923. 
V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  133  Ala.  374: 

936,  1561,  1620. 
Hood  Riv.  L.  Co.  v.  Wasco  Co.,  35  Ore. 

498:  1005,  1016,  1030. 
Hooe  V.   Chicago  etc.,  R.  R.   Co.   98 

Wis.  302:   1523,  1708,  1714. 
Hook  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  133 

Mo.  313:  1399. 


cxlvi 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:  Vol.  I,   pp.  1-742;  Vol.   II,  pp.  743-1719.] 


Hook  V.  Los  Angeles  Ey.  Co.,  129  Cal. 

180:  762,  1284. 
V.  Smith,  6  Mo.  225:  900. 
Hooker  v.  Cummiugs,  20  Johns.  90: 

98. 
V.  Martin,   10  Hun  302:   948,  949, 

1563. 
V.  Montpelier  R.  R.  Co.,  62  Vt.  47: 

1229,  1236,  1425. 
V.  New  Haven  &  Northampton  Co., 

14  Conn.  146:  66,144. 

V.  New  Haven  &  Northampton  Co., 

15  Conn.  312:  66,  144,  437. 

V.    Rochester,    57    App.   Div.    530: 

1042,  1624. 
V.  Rochester,  37  Hun  181:  84. 
V.  Rochester,  172  N.  Y.  665:   1042, 

1624. 
V.  Utiea  etc.  Road  Co.,  12  Wend. 

371:   1499,  1500. 
Hooksett  V.  Amoskeag  Mfg.  Co.,  44 

N.  H.  105:   169,  956,  1623. 
Hooper    v.    Bridgewater,    102    Mass. 

512:   1028,  1631. 
V.   Columbus   &  Western  Ry.  Co., 

78  Ala.  213:  1627,  1632. 
V.  Savannah  &  Memphis  R.  R.  Co., 

69  Ala.  529:  840,  854,  1202. 
Hope  V.  Barnett,  78  Cal.  9:  885. 
V.  Norfolk  &  Western  R.  R.  Co.,  79 

Va.  283 :  830. 
V.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  211 

Pa.  St.  401:  1128,  1129,  1188, 

1201. 
V.  Shiver,  77  Ark.  177:  877. 
Hopewell  v.  Flemington,  69  N.  J.  L. 

597:  1416. 
V.  Welling,  24  N.  J.  L.  127:  1035. 
Hopkins  v.  Calasauqua  Mfg.  Co.,  180 

Pa.  St.  199:  315,  1580. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  76  Minn. 

70:  1477. 
V.  Contra  Costa  County,  106  Cal. 

566:    918. 
y.  Cravey,  85  Tex.  189:  1462,  1511, 

1512,  1576. 
V.  Crombie,  4  N.  H.  520:  890,  1030, 

1034,  1521. 
V.  Fla.  Cent.  etc.  E.  R.  Co.,  97  Ga. 

107:  524,  708. 
V.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.,  L.  R.  2 

Q.  B.  D.  224:  651. 
V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  79 

Mo.  98:  1048. 
v.  Keller,  16  Neb.  569:  1431,  1511, 

1512,  1576. 
V.  Ottawa,  59  111.  App.  288:    629, 

1306. 
V.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  94 

Md.  257:  731. 


Hopkins  v.  Western  Pac.  R.  R.  Co., 

50  Cal.  190:  1649,  1657. 
Hopkinton  v.  Winship,  35  N.  H.  209: 

701,  1071. 
Hopper  v.  Douglas  Co.,  75  Neb.  329 : 

159. 
Hoppikus  V.  State  Capitol  Comrs.,  16 

Cal.  248:  922. 
Hopson  V.  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

71  Miss.  503:  1352,  1456. 
Hord  V.  Nashville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  2 

Swan  497 :  1407. 
Homaday  v.  State,  63  Kan.  499:  828. 
Hornback  v.  Cincinnati  etc.  R.  E.  Co., 

20   Ohio   St.    81:    840,   851,    852, 

1631. 
Horne  v.  BuflFalo,  49  Hun  76 :  933. 
Hornellsville    Electric   R.   R.    Co.   v. 

New  York  etc.  E.  E.  Co..  83  Hun 

407:  765,  772. 
Horney   v.    Coldbrook,   65   111.   App. 

477:  1559. 
Horn  Silver  Min.  Co.  v.  New  York, 

143  U.  S.  305:  462. 
Hornstein  v.  Atlantic  etc.  R.  E.  Co., 

51  Pa.  St.  87:  1187. 

Horrell   v.    Ellsworth,   17   Ala.   576: 

413. 
Horton  v.   Andrus,   191   N.  Y.   231: 
535 
v.  Coiwyn   etc.,    (1908)    1    K.   B. 

327:    1313 
V.  Fulton,  130  Ga.  466:  81. 
V.    Grand   Haven,    24    Mich.    465: 

1058. 
V.  Hoyt,  11  la.  496:  1570. 
V.  Norwalk,  45  Conn.  237:  1075. 
V.   Williams,   99   Mich.   423:    366, 
373,  382,  389,  395,  398,  404,  406. 
Hortsman  v.  Covington  etc.  E.  R.  Co. 

18  B.  Mon.  218:  442,  847. 
Hosher  v.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
60  Mo.  303:   1119,  1120,  1186. 
V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  60 
Mo.  329:   152,  157,  858. 
Hoskin  v.  Toronto  General  Trust  Co., 

12  Ontario  480:  1558,  1561. 
Hosmer  v.  Gloversville,  27  Misc.  669: 
211. 
V.  Warner,  7  Gray  177:  1074. 
V.  Warner,  15  Gray  46:  929,  1079, 
1119,  1185. 
Hoster  v.  Philadelphia,  12  Pa.  Super. 

Ct.  224:  1555. 
Hotard  v.  Texas  &  P.  E.  E.  Co.,  36 

La.  Ann.  450:  168. 
Hotchkiss  V.  Auburn  &  Rochester,  36 

Barb.  600:    955. 
Hot  Springs  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Tyler,  36 
Ark.  205:  963. 


OASES    CITED. 


cxlvii 


[The  references   are  to   the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.   II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Hot  Springs  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Williamson, 
45  Ark.  429:    639,  659,  671. 
V.  Williamson,  136  U.  S.  121:  640, 
642. 
Hotz  V.  Highway  Comrs.,  135  111.  388: 
1614. 
v.  Hoyt,  34  111.  App.  488:  167,  1606. 
Hougan  v.  Milwaukee  &  St.  Paul  Ky. 

Co.,  35  la.  558:   161. 
Hough  V.  Doylestown,  4  Brews.  333: 

74. 
Houghtaling  v.  Chicago  Gt.  Western 

Ry.  Co.,  117  la.  540:  91. 
Houghton's  Appeal,  42  Cal.  35:   930. 
Houghton  T.  C.  D.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  47 
la.  370:  104. 
V.  Huron  Copper  Co.,  57  Mich.  547 : 

681,  1084. 
V.  Milwaukee  &  St.  Paul  Ry.  Co., 
35  la.  558:  1473. 
Housatonie  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Lee  & 
Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  118  Mass.  391: 
753,  754,  793,  798,  1609. 
House   V.   Greensburg,   93   Ind.   533: 
400. 
V.  Rochester,  15  Barb.  517:  928. 
House  Ave.  Opening,  67  Barb.  350: 

893. 
House  Ave.  Opening,  3  N.  Y.  Supm. 

Ct.  770:    893,  895,  898. 
Householder  v.  Kansas  City,  83  Mo. 

488:   24,  630. 
Houston  V.  Bartels,  36  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
498:   634,  848. 
V.  Bryan,   2   Tex.   fflv.  App.   553: 

155. 
T.  Houston  City  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  83 

Tex.  548:  301,  409,427. 
T.  Hutcheson,   39   Tex.   Civ.   App. 

337:   155,  233. 
V.  Paterson  etc.   Traction  Co.,   69 

N.  J.  L.  168:  920,965. 
V.  Western  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  204  Pa. 
St.  321:  1133. 
Houston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Adams,  58 
Tex.  476  i  846. 
V.  Adams,  63  Tex.  200:  1507. 
V.  Barr,  44  Tex.  Civ.  App.  57: 
V.  Chaffin,  60  Tex.  553:  1716. 
V.  Dallas,  98  Tex.  396:  488. 
V.  Davis,  45  Tex.  Civ.  App.  212: 

654. 
V.  East,  98  Tex.  148:   162,  164. 
V.  Meador,  50  Tex.  77:   861. 
V.  Kansas  City  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  109  La. 

.581:  764,  766. 
V.  McKinney,  55  Tex.  176 :  850. 
V.  Milbum,  34  Tex.  224:  923,  1380. 
V.  Odum,  53  Tex.  343:  255. 
V.  Postal   Tel.  Cable  Co.,  18  Tex. 
Civ.  App.   502:    934,  938,   1212. 


Houston  St.,  Matter  of,  7  Hill  175: 

1085. 
Hovey  v.  Haverstraw,  124  N.  Y.  273 : 
1505. 
V.  Mayo,  43  Me.  322:    147,  1489. 
V.  Perkins,  63  N.  H.  516:  981. 
How  V.   Chesapeake   &  Delaware   C. 

Co.,  5  Harr.  Del.  245 :   144. 
Howard's  Appeal,   162  Pa.   St.   374: 

417. 
Howard's   Petition,    28   N.   H.    157: 

1070. 
Howard  v.  Board  of  Co.  Comrs.,  25 
Neb.  229:  973. 
V.  Board  of  Supervisors,  54  Neb. 

443:   675,   1427. 
V.  Crouch,  47  Neb.  133:   1306. 
T.   Hutchinson,   10  Me.   335:    970, 

1004,   1013,   1372. 
V.  Proprietors  of  Locks  &  Canals, 

12  Cush.  259:  929,  1073. 
V.  Providence,  6  R.  I.  514:    1127, 

1147. 
V.   St.  Clair  Dr.  Co.,  51   111.   130: 

12. 
V.    Schmidt,    70   Kan.    640:    1028, 

1510,  1517. 
V.  State,  47  Ark.  431 :  1007,  1018. 
Howard  Co.  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
130    Mo.    652:     86,    1650,    1652, 
1716. 
Howard  Mills  Co.  v.  Schwartz  L.  & 
C.  Co.,  77  Kan.  599:   509,   551, 
591,  710,  724. 
Howard  St.,  Vacation  of.  In  re,  142 

Pa.  St.  601:   644. 
Howcott  V.   Coffield,   7   Ired.   L.   24: 
940. 
V.  Warren,  7  Ired.  L.  20:  940. 
Howe    V.    Callaway,    119    Mo.    App. 
251:    1395. 
V.  Harding,  76  Tex.  17 :  1537. 
V.  Howard,  158  Mass.  278:  1150. 
V.  Jamaica,  19  Vt.  607:   973,  974, 

994. 
V.  Ray,  110  Mass.  298:  952. 
V.  Ray,  113  Mass.  88:    1185. 
V.   West  End   St.   R.   R.   Co.,   167 

Mass.   46:    272,   281. 
V.     Weymouth,     148    Mass.     605 
1331. 
Howell   V.    Buffalo,    15   N.    Y.    512 
1358. 
V.    Morrisville,    212    Pa.    St.    349 

391,  394,  647. 
V.  Redlon,  44  Kan.  558:  973,  974 
V.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  4  Mack 
ey   424:    340. 
Howell's  Mills  State  Road,  6  Whart- 
on 352:    1079. 
Howes  V.  Belfast,  72  Me.  46:  698. 


cxlviii 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to   the  pages:   Vol.  I,   pp.  1-742;   Vol.   II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Howes  y.  Gruah,  131  Mass.  207:  560 
Howland  v.  Co.  Comrs.,  49  Me.  143 
1366. 
V.   School  District,   15  R.  I.   184 

921. 
V.   School  District,   16  E.  I.   257 
894. 
Howley  v.  Central  Valley  R.  E.  Co., 
213   Pa.    St.    36:    426. 
V.  Pittsburg,  204  Pa.  St.  428:  938, 
1649,   1718. 
Hoy   V.    Cohoes   Co.,   2   N.    Y.    159: 
1507. 
V.  Hubbell,  125  App.  Div.  60:  1521. 
V.    Salamanca,   57   Misc.   81:    609, 
617. 
Hoye   V.    Diehls,    78    Neb.    77:    981, 
1511,   1520. 
V.  Swan's  Lessee,  5  Md.  237:  494, 
590. 
Hoyt  V.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  117  la. 
296:    1116,  1208,   1209,   1213. 
V.  Cirleason,  65  Fed.  685:  875. 
V.  Hudson,  27  Wis.  656:   148,  234, 

235. 
V.  Southern  New  Eng.  Tel.  Co.,  60 
Conn.  385:  350,  1487,  1488. 
Hubbard  v.  Bell,  54  111.  112:  103. 
V.  Kansas  City,  St.  Joseph  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  63  Mo.  68:  840,  843,  851, 
852 
V.  Great  Falls  Mfg.  Co.,  80  Me.  39 : 

706,  1042,  1383. 
V.  Hartford,  74  Conn.  452:   1427. 
V.  Medford,  20  Ore.  315:   468. 
V.  Toledo,   21    Ohio   St.   379:    523, 

625. 
V.  Webster,   118  Mass.  599:    1309. 
V.  Wickliffe,  2  A.  K.  Marsh.  503: 

1077. 
V.  Wickliflfe,  1  Litt.  80:  1077. 
Huber  v.  Gazley,  18  Ohio  18:  365. 
V.  Merkel,  117  Wis.  355:  162,  164, 
471,  495. 
Hubert  v.  Missouri  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  80 

Mo.  App.  87:    1545. 
Hiuckenstein   v.   Allegheny,    165    Pa. 

St.  367 :  634. 
Huddleston  v.  Eugene,  34  Ore.  343: 
175. 
V.  West  Bellevue,  111  Pa.  St.  110: 
155,  233. 
Hudson  V.  Cuero  Land  &  Emigration 
Co.,  47  Tex.  56:  424. 
V.    Voreis,    134    Ind.    642:     1362, 
1571. 
Hudson  &  Delaware  Canal  Co.  v.  N. 
Y.   &  Erie  R.   E.   Co.,   9   Paige, 
323:  410,  416,  728,  1608. 
Hudson   etc.   R.   E.   Co.   v.   Wendell, 
112  App.  Div.  822:  826. 


Hudson  etc.  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Wendel,  122 
App.  Div.  917:  808,  898. 
V.  Wendell,  186  N.  Y.  535:  826. 
v.  Wendel,  193  N.  Y.  166:  808,  898. 
Hudson  Eiver  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Cutwater, 

3  Sand.  689:   697,  1670,  1685. 
Hudson  Eiver  E.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Day,  54 

Fed.  545:   931. 
Hudson  Eiv.   Telephone  Co.  v.  For- 
restal,  56  Misc.  133:  339. 
V.  Watervliet  T.  &  E.  E.  Co.,  61 

Hun  140;  417,  1621,  1622. 
V.  Watervliet  T.  &.  E.  E.  Co.,  135 
N.  Y.  393:    343,  417,  911,   1621. 
Hueston  v.  Eaton  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  4 
Ohio  St.  685:   1165,  1547. 
V.  Miss.  &  Rum  Riv.  Boom  Co.,  76 
Minn.  251:  91. 
HuflF  V.  Donehoo,  109  Ga.  638:   459, 

658,  670. 
Huffman  v.  State,  21  lud.  App.  449: 

337. 
Huffmire  v.  Brooklyn,  22  App.  Div. 
N.  Y.  406 :   142. 
V.  Brooklyn,  162  N.  Y.  584:  57,  67. 
Huggins  V.  Hurt,  23  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
404:   975,   1512,  1576. 
V.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Miscl. 
110:    1196. 
Hughes   V.   Anderson,   68   Ala.    280: 
145. 
V.  Arkansas  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  74  Ark. 

194:  490,  1288,  1643. 
V.  Bingham,  135  N.  Y.  347:  873. 
V.  Clark,  134  N.  C.  457:  878,  879, 

889. 
V.  Mermod,  121  Mo.  98 :  924,  1409. 
V.  Metropolitan  El.  E.  E.  Co.,  130 
N.   Y.    14:    177,    180,    183,    187, 
265,  1137,  1261,  1555,  1584. 
V.  Metropolitan  El.  E.  R.  Co.,  57 
N.  Y.  Supr.  Ct.  378:  1261,  1555, 
1584. 
V.    Milligan,    42    Kan.    396:    927, 

1004,  1167,  1568. 
V.  Miss.  &  Mo.  R.  R.  Co.,   12  la. 

261:   245,  251. 
V.  Sellers,  34  Ind.  337:   941,  978, 

996,  1390. 
V.  Todd,  2  Duv.  Ky.  188:   18,  807. 
V.  Trustees  of  Morden   College,   1 
Ves.  Sr.   188:   821,   1572. 
Hulburt  V.  Harris,  3  App.  Div.  30: 

570. 
Hulett  V.  Missouri  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  80 

Mo.  App.  87  :  325. 
Huling  V.  Kaw  Valley  R.  E.  Co.,  130 

U.    S.   559:    1011,    1515,    1517. 
Hull  V.  Baird,  73  la.  528:  569,  570, 
575. 


CASES    CITED. 


cxlix 


[The  references  are  to   tlie  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.  1-742  ;  Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Hull  V.  Chicago  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  65  la. 
713:   851,  852. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  Neb. 

371:   1018,  1026,  1626. 
V.  Decker,  48  Me.  255 :  930. 
V.   Kansas    City   etc.   Ry.   Co.,   70 

Neb.  756:  838. 
V.    Phillips,    128    Mo.    App.    247: 

1561. 

V.  Westfield,  133  Mass.  433:   1523. 

Hullin    V.    Second    Municipality    of 

New   Orleans,    11    Rob.   La.   97: 

1669,  1685. 

Hulse  V.  Powell,  21  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

471:   1618. 
Humboldt  Co.  v.  Dinsmore,   75   Cal. 

604:  974,  1361,  1365. 
Humer    v.    Mayer,    1    Humph.    403: 

197. 
Humes  v.  Knoxville,  1  Humph.  403: 
209,  212,  213. 
V.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  115  U.  S. 

512:   475. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  82  Mo.  221:  475. 
V.  Shugart,  10  Leigh,  332:  899. 
Humeston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Chicago 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  74  Iowa  554 :  767, 
1610. 
Hummett  v.  Phila.  65  Pa.  St.   146: 

10. 
Humphreys  v.  Ft.  Smith  Traction  L. 
&  P.  Co.,  71  Ark.  152:  297,  298, 
1354. 
V.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  E.  Co.,  88  Va. 

431 :   833. 
V.  Woodstown,   48  N.   J.   L.   588: 
1516. 
Hunt  V.   Ambruster,    17   N.   J.   Eq. 
208:   459. 
V.   Boston,    152  Mass.    168:    1120, 

1138. 
V.  Card,  94  Me.  386 :  698. 
T.  Chicago  Horse  &  D.  R.  R.  Co., 

121  111.  638:   302. 
V.  Iowa  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  86  la. 

15:  158,  1456,  1650,  1655. 
V.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  76  Mo. 

115:  1507. 
V.  New  York,  Chicago,  &  St.  Louis 

Ry.  Co.,  99  Ind.  593:  913. 
V.  Smith,  9  Kan.   137:   913,   1023, 

1203,  1360. 
V.  Whitney,  4  Met  603 :  557,  1673. 
Hunter,  Matter  of,  47  App.  Div.  102 : 

890. 
Hunter,  Matter  of,   163  N.  Y.  542: 

890. 
Hunter  v.  Burlington  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
76   la.  490:    855. 
V.  Burlington  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  84  la. 
605:  855,  1715. 


Hunter  v.   Chesapeake   etc.  Ry.   Co., 

107   Va.    158:    1176,   1228,    1238, 

1272     1385 
V.  Jones,  13  Minn.  307:   1519,  1520. 
V.  Matthews,  12  Leigh,  228:    1083. 
V.   Matthews,    1   Rob.    (Va.)    468: 

1010. 
V.  Newport,  5  R.  I.  325 :  1367. 
v.   Sandy  Hill,   6   Hill,   407:    871, 

872. 
Hunting  v.  Curtis,  10  la.  152:   1669. 
Huntington  v.  Amiss,  167  Ind.  375: 

535,  575,  1086. 
T.  Attrill,  118  N.  Y.  365:    1139. 
V.  Birch,  12  Conn.  142:   1033. 
V.  Griffith,  142  Ind.  280:   602,  616, 

1597. 
V.    Kenowen,    12    Ind.    App.    456: 

1545,  1548. 
Huntington  County  v.  Kaufman,  126 

Pa.  St.  305:   1434. 
Huntington  etc.  R.  R.  Co's.  Appeal, 

149  Pa.  St.  133:   698. 
Huntington,  Road  in,  11  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

119:  700. 
Huntress  v.  Effingham,  17  N.  H.  584: 

1389. 
Huntsville  v.  Ewing,   116  Ala.  576: 

159,  1648,  1659. 
Huntting  v.  Hartford  St.  Ry.  Co.,  73 

Conn.   179:   349. 
Hupevt    V.    Anderson,    35    la.    578: 

1701. 
Hurd   V.   Atchison   etc.   Ry.   Co.,   73 

Kan.  83:  .533,  731,  1577,  1614. 
Hurdman    v.    North    Eastern    R.    R. 

Co.,  L.  R.  3  C.  P.  D.  168:  145. 
Hurford  v.  Omaha,  4  Neb.  336:  1597. 
Hurley   v.    Jones,    165    Pa.    St.    34: 

1634. 
V.  South  Thomaston,  101  Me.  538: 

604. 
V.  West  St.  Paul,  83  Minn.  401: 

884. 
Hurniker  v.  Contooeook  Valley  R.  R. 

Co.,  29  N.  H.  146:  1523. 
Hursh  V.  First  Division  of  St.  Paul 

etc.   R.   R.   Co.,    17   Minr.   439: 

1634. 
Hurst  V.  Martinsburg,  80  Minn.  40: 

705:   1025. 
Hussey  v.  Bryant,  95  Me.  49:   1519. 
Hussner  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  R.  Co., 

30  Hun  409:   247,   1635. 
V.  Brooklyn  City  R.  R.  Co.,  114  N. 

Y.    433:    271,    314,    1298,    1553, 

1651,  1658. 
Husted  V.  Greenwich,  11  Conn.  383: 

995. 
Huston  V.  Cincinnati  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

21  Ohio  St.  235 :   1247,  1484. 


cl 


OASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.  1-742 ;   Vol.   II,  pp.  743-1719.] 


Huston  V.  Clark,  112  111.  344:   1028. 
V.    Fort   Atkinson,    56   Wis.    350: 
1489. 
Hutchins  v.  Vandalia  L.  &  D.  Dist., 

217  111.  561 :  924. 
Hutchinson  v.  Delano,  46  Kan.  345: 
84,  1605. 
V.   Parkersburg,   25   W.   Va.   226: 

631,  942. 
V.   Storrie,  92  Tex.  685:    10,   463, 
464,  1005. 
Hutchinson  W.  L.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Hut- 
chinson, 144  Fed.  256:  3?1,  411. 
Hutlacher  v.  Harris,  2  Wright  491 : 

1350. 
Hutt  V.  Chicago,  187  111.  145:  981. 
Hutton  V.  Indiana  Cent.  R.  K.  Co., 
7  Ind.  522:  251,  307. 
V.  London  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L. 
J.  Ch.  N.  S.  345:   1612. 
Hyde  v.  Boston  etc.  St.  Ey.  Co.,  194 
Mass.  80:   211,  226,  319,  606. 
V.    Fall    River,     189    Mass.    439: 

379,  391,  454,  627. 
V.   Fall  River,   197  Mass.   4:    370, 

378,  391. 
V.    Middlesex    Co.,    2    Gray    267: 
1343. 
Hyde  Park  v.  Cemetery  Ass.,  119  111. 
141:  736,  737,  785. 
V.  Dyer,  7  Ohio  N.  P.  (N.  S.)  244: 

1561. 
V.  Dunham,  85  111.  569:   1195. 
V.  Spencer,  118  111.  446:  828,  912, 

914. 
V.    Washington   Ice    Co.,    117    111. 

233:   1231. 
V.    Wiggin,    157    Mass.    94:     930, 
1075. 
Hyde  Park  T.  H.  Light  Co.  v.  Porter, 

167  111.  276:   454,   1648,   1659. 
Hydes  Ferry  Turnpike  Co.  v.  David- 
son Co.,  91  Tenn.  291 :  409,  414. 
Hyland  v.   Ossining,    127   App.   Div. 

291:   1592. 
Hyman  v.  Ann  Arbor  E.  R.  Co.,  141 

Mich.  84:  428. 
Hymes  v.  Aydelott,  26  Ind.  431 :  922. 
Hyneman    v.    Blake,    19    Cal.    579: 

1042. 
Hynes  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  54  App. 

Div.  256 :  1296. 
Hyslop  V.   Finch,   99   111.    171:    696, 
706,  1195,  1416. 
I. 
Idaho  Springs  v.  Woodward,  10  Colo. 

104:    144. 
Ihmsen  v.  Momngahela  Nav.  Co.,  32 

Pa.    St.    153;    625. 
I.   &  G.  N.   Ev.   Co.  V.   Benitos,  59 1 
Tex.   326:    1546. 


I.  &  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Bost,  2  Tex. 

Civ.  Cas.  334:  846,  1473. 
V.  Klausj  64  Tex.  293:  88. 
V.  Pape,  62  Tex.  313:  1451. 
Illinois  &  Mich.   Canal  Co.  v.   C.  & 

R.  I.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  111.  314:  410, 

416. 
Illinois   &   St.   Louis   R.   R.    Co.   v. 

Febringer,  82  111.   129:   151. 
Illinois  &  St.  Louis  R.  R.  &  Coal  Co. 

V.  Switzer,  117  111.  399:   1246. 
Illinois    &   Wis.   R.   E.    Co.   v.   Van 

Horn,   18   111.   257:    1119,   1120, 

1378. 
Illinois  Central  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Allen, 

39  111.  205:  937. 
V.  Anderson,  73  111.  App.  64:  846. 
V.  Anderson,  73  111.  App.  621 :  849, 

1472. 
V.  Bloomington,  76  111.  447 :  490. 
V.  Bloomington,  167  111.  9:  891. 
V.  Champaign,  163  111.  524,  1701. 
V.  Chicago,  138  111.  453:  749,  985. 
V.  Chicago,  141  111.  586:  751,  1287. 
V.  Chicago,  156  111.  98:   751,  1292. 
V.  Chicago,  169  111.  329:  1122,  1131 

1243,  1287. 
V.  Chicago,  173  111.  471:   115,  712. 
V.  CJiicago,  176  XJ.  S.  646:   712. 
V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  121  HI. 

483:  772. 
V.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  122  111. 

473:  753,  757,  793,  796,  798,  931. 
V.   Comrs.,   161   111.  247:    1288. 
V.  Copiah  Co.,  81  Miss.  685:  491, 

1288,  1644. 
V.  Davis,  71  111.  App.  99:   327. 
V.   Ferrell,   108  HI.  App.  659:   91, 

1548,    1553,   1653. 
V.  Grabill,  50  III.  242:  649,  1662. 
V.  Hasenwinkle,  232  III.  224 :  1028, 

1478. 
V.  Heisner,  45  111.  App.   143:    154, 

159. 
V.  Heisner,  93  III.  App.  469:   152. 
V.  Heisner,  192  111.  571:   152,  153, 

154. 
V.  Hodge,  21  Ky.  L.  R.  1479:  1474. 
V.   Hoskins,    80    Miss.    730:    1347, 

1625. 
V.    Illinois,    146   U.    S.    387:    105, 

108,  110,  111,  112,  114,  119,  123, 

128,  129. 
V.  Interstate  Com.  Com.  203  U.  S. 

441:    480. 
V.  Kreeble,  95  III.  App.  185:   639. 
V.   Le   Blanc,   74  Miss.   650:    1352. 

1626,  1629. 
V.  Lockwood,  112  III.  App.  423:  91, 

144,  1653,   1663. 
V.  Lostant,   167  HI.  85:   980,  1343. 


CASES    CITED. 


cli 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742;  Vol.   II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Illinois  Central  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Miller, 

68  Mias.  760:   147,  149,  155. 
V.  Normal,  175  111.  562:  751,  1426. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  85  111.  211:  1578. 
V.  Rucker,  14  111.  153:   1038,  1040, 

1080,   1638. 
T.  Schmidgall,  91  111.  App.  23:  639, 

1297    1302. 
V.  Smith,   lib  Ky.  203:   89,  1124, 

1639,  1648,  1652. 
V.  Swalm,  83  Miss.  631 :  491,  1288, 

1511,  1642,  1644. 
V.  Thomas,  75  Miss.  54:    1580. 
V.  Trustees  of  Schools,  212  111.  406: 

448,   654,   661,   663,   1243,   1338. 
V.    Trustees    of    Schools,    128    111. 

App.  Ill:  448,  654. 
V.  Turner,  194  111.  575:   304,  639, 

1297   1302. 
T.  Turner,  97  111.  App.  219:    304, 

639,   1297,  1302; 
V.  Walthen,  17  111.  App.  582:  1474, 

1482. 
V.    Wilboum,    74    Miss.    284:    93, 

1452. 
V.  Willenberg,  117  111.  203:    1485, 

1645. 
Illinois  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Easterbrook, 

211  111.  624:   1195. 
V.    Freeman,    210    III.    270:    1080, 

1208,  1312. 
V.  Humiston,   208   111.    100:    1138, 

1310   1379. 
V.  Ring,  219  111.  91 :   1314,  1379, 
V.  Mayrand,  93  111.  591:  994.  1^36. 
V.  McCIintock,  63  111.  514:   1380. 
V.   McCIintock,    68   111.   296:    1325. 
V.  St.  Louis,  2  Dill.  70:  422,  1496. 
Ulinoia  Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Borders, 

201  111.  459:   859. 
Illinois  Steel  Co.  v.  Beloit,  109  Wis. 

418:    115. 
Illinois  State  Trust  Co.  v.  St.  Louis 

etc.  Ry.  Co.  208  111.  419:  7,  917, 

1053. 
lUsley  V.  Portland   &  Rochester  R. 

R.  Co.,  56  Me.  531 :   1536. 
Imber   v.    Springfield,    30   Mo.   App. 

669:    630,   634,   1029. 
Imbescheid  v.  Old  Colony  R.  R.  Co., 

171  Mass.  209:  1164,  1319,  1320, 

1323. 
Imlay  v.  Railroad  Co.,  26  Conn.  256 : 

196. 
V.  Union  Branch  R.  R.  Co.  26  Conn. 

249:     242,    246,    279,    315,    323, 

1293 
Imler  v.  Springfield,  55  Mo.  119:  234. 
Imperial  Gas  Co.  v.  Broadbout,  7  H. 

L.  600:   457,  1524. 
V.  Broadbout,  7  DeG.  McN.   &  G. 

436:   1524. 


Improvement  Co.  v.  Hoboken,  36  N. 

J.  L.  540:  201. 
Independence  Ave.  Boulevard,  In  Re, 

128  Mo.  272:  895,  926,  1409. 
Independent  Nat.  Gas  Co.  v.  Butler 
Water  Co.,  210  Pa.  St.  177:  784, 
1577,  1615,  1624. 
Indiana  Central  R.   R.   Co.  v.  Hun- 
ter, 8  Ind.  74:  1192,  1205. 
V.  Oakes,  20  Ind.  9 :  897. 
V.    Boden,    10   Ind.    96:    246,    251, 
1550. 
Indiana  County,  51  Pa.  St.  296:  1388. 
Indiana  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Allen,  100 
Ind.  409:   831,  936,  1028,   1177, 
1346. 
V.   Allen,    113   Ind.   308:    1545. 
V.  Allen,  113  Ind.  581:  1631. 
V.  Brittingham,  98  Ind.  294:   831. 
V.  Connera,  184  111.  178:   1254. 
V.  Eberle,   110  Ind.  542:    152,   178. 
V.  Finnell,   116  Ind.  414:   850. 
V.  McBroom,  114  Ind.  198 :  1631. 
V.  Patehett,  59  111.  App.  251 :   188, 

1639. 
V.  Rinehart,  14  Ind.  App.  588 :  995, 

1247. 
V.  Stauber,  185  111.  9:   1314,  1379. 
Indiana   Natural    Gas    &   O.    Co.    v. 

Jones,  14  Ind.  App.  55:   1343. 
Indiana    Oolithic    Limeatone    Co.    v. 
Louisville    etc.    R.    R.    Co.,    107 
Ind.  301 :   1576. 
Indiana  Power  Co.  v.  St.  Joseph  & 
Elkhart  Power  Co.,  159  Ind.  42: 
801,  900,  907. 
Indiana  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hoffman,  162  Ind. 

593:  304. 
Indianapolis  v.  Board  of  Church  Ex- 
tension,  28  Ind.  App.   319:    891. 
V.  Consumers'  Gas  Trust  Co.,  144 

Fed.  640:   725. 
V.  Consumers'  Gas  Trust  Co.,  140 

Ind.  107:   476. 
V.  Croas,  7  Ind.  9 :  182,  366,  877. 
V.    Cumberland   Gravel   Road   Co., 

93  Ind.  360:  927. 
V.  Huffer,  30  Ind.  235:  143. 
v.  Kingsbury,   101   Ind.  200:    182, 

366,  425,  877. 
V.  Lawyer,  38  Ind.  348 :  233. 
Indianapolis  Cable  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Citizens'  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  127  Ind. 
369:  268,  910. 
Indianapolis    &    Cumberland    Gravel 
Road   Co.  V.   Belt  Ry.   Co.,    110 
Ind.  5:  428. 
V.  Christian,  93  Ind.  360:  922,  927. 
Indianapolis  etc.  Gravel  Road  Co.  v. 
State,  105  Ind.  37:    1010,  1012, 
1499. 


clii 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to   the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.  1-742  ;  Vol.   II,  pp.   T43-1719.] 


Indianapolis  etc.  R.  R.  C!o.  v.  Brower, 
12  Ind.  374:  1430. 
V.    Calvert,     110    Ind.    555:     307, 

1583. 
V.  Christian,  93  Ind.  360:  976. 
V.  Cook,  102  Ind.  133:   1112. 
V.  Hartley,  67   111.  439:    172,  200, 

242,  246,  251,  279,  726,  1635. 
V.  Hood,  130  Ind.  594:  1407. 
V.  Indianapolis  etc.  Rapid  Transit 
Co.,  33  Ind.  App.  337 :  743,  759, 
793. 
V.    Lawrenceburg,     37     Ind.    489: 

1642. 
V.  Lewis,  119  Ind.  218 :  835. 
V.  Newsom,  54  Ind.  121:  976,  983. 
V.  Price,  153  Ind.  31 :  940,  1560. 
V.  Pugh,  85  Ind.  279:   1119,  1120. 
V.   Reed,   52  Ind.   357:    912. 
V.  Reynolds,  116  Ind.  356:  835,  836. 
V.  Smith,  52  Ind.  428:   246,  319. 
V.    Smythe,   45   Ind.   322;    1390. 
Indianapolis   Northern  Traction   Co. 
V.  Dunn,  37  Ind.  App.  248:  1146. 
Indianapolis  etc.  Traction  Co.  v.  Lar- 
rabee,  168  Ind.  237:  1310,  1312. 
V.    Shepherd,    35    Ind.    App.    601: 
1112,  1145. 
Indianapolis  Water  Co.  v.  Am.  Straw- 
board  Co.,  53  Fed.  970:   71,  82, 
84. 
V.  Multe,  126  Ind.  373 :   855. 
Indianola  L.  I.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Montgom- 
ery, 85  Miss.  304:  878,  889. 
Ingalls  V.   Byer's   Administrator,   94 

Ind.  134:  854,  1557. 
Inge  V.   Birmingham   etc.  Ry.  Co.  3 
DeG.  McN.  &  G.  658:  1533. 
V.  Police  Jury,  14  La.  Ann.   117: 
936. 
Ingleside  Mfg.  Co.  v.   Charleston  L. 

&  W.  Co.,  76  S.  C.  95:   1624. 
Ingraham   v.    Camden    &    R.    Water 
Co.,  82  Me.  335:    987,  1522. 
V.  C.  T>.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  34  la.  249 : 
251. 
Ingram  v.  C.  D.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  38 
la.   669:    251. 
V.  Me.  Water  Co.,  98  Me.  566:  91, 

550,  558,  930. 
V.   State,  39   Ala.  247:   478. 
V.  Wilson,  4  Humph.  424:   1077. 
Inhabitants    of    Hamilton   v.    Wain- 

wright,  52  N.  J.  Eq.  419:  160. 
Inland  Empire  Ry.  Co.  v.  McKinley, 

48  Wash.  675:   1427. 
Inmann  v.  Tripp,   11  R.  I.  520:   233. 
Innes  v.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.  3  App. 

Div.  541:    1144. 
Inskeep  v.  Leeony,   1  N.  J.  L.   112: 
694. 


Interlaken   Land   Co.   v.    Seattle,  47 

Wash.    603:    1233,    1239. 
International    Bridge    &    T.    Co.    v. 

McLane,  8  Tex.  Civ.  App.  665: 

1348. 
International  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Capers, 

33  Tex.  Civ.  App.  283:   1639. 
v.  Slusher,  42  Tex.  Civ.  App.  631: 

152. 
Interstate  Consol.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Early, 

46  Kan.  197:  211,  323,  604,  617. 
Iowa  College  v.  Davenport,  7  la.  213: 

1159,  1570. 
Iowa  St.,  12  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  611:  918. 
Ipswich  V.  Co.   Comrs.  of  Essex,   10 

Pick.  519:    1087,  1417. 
Ipswich  Mills  v.  County  Comrs.  108 

Mass.    363:    1712. 
Ireland  v.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co., 

52  N.  Y.  Supr.  Ct.  450 :  1295. 
Irish  V.  Burlington  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  44 

la.  380:  1535,  1578. 
Iron  Mt.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bingham,  87 

Tenn.   522:    200,   243,   255,  309, 

313,  316,  325. 
Iron  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ironton,  19  Ohio 

St.   299:    678,  800,  802. 
Irrigation  v.  De  Lappe,  79  Cal.  351 : 

587. 
Irrigation  Dist.  v.  Williams,  76  Cal. 

360:   587. 
Irving  V.   Ford,  65  Mich.  241:   884, 

886. 
V.   Media   Borough,    10   Pa.   Supr. 

Ct.  132:  73,  74,  77,  870,  1637. 
V.  Media  Borough,  194  Pa.  St.  648: 

73,  74,  870. 
Irwin    V.    Armuth,    129    Ind.    340: 

1422. 
V.  Great  Southern  Tel.  Co.,  37  La. 

Ann.  63:   341. 
V.    Seobee,    3    T.    B.    Monroe    50: 

1078. 
V.  Yeager,   74  la.   174:    16,   1507. 
Iselin  V.  Starin,  144  N.  Y.  453 :  881, 

890. 
Isham  V.  Smith,  21  Wis.  32 :  1364. 
Isom  V.  Low  Fare  Ry.  Co.  10  Ohio 

C.  C.    (N.  S.)   89:   302. 
V.  Mississippi   Central  R.  R.   Co., 

36  Miss.  300:    1173,  1179. 
Israel  v.  Jewett,  29  la.  475:  1204. 
V.   Met.   El.   R.   R.   Co.    10   Miscl. 

722:    1296,  1299,  1437. 
Issenhuth   v.    Baum,    11    S.   D.   222: 

1029,  1098. 
Ives  V.  East  Haven,  48   Conn.  272: 

1027,  1028,  1034,  1387. 
Ivey   V.    Georgia   etc.   R.    R.    Co.,   84 

Ga.   536:    639,  1588,  1615. 


OASES    CITED. 


cliii 


[The  references  are  to   the  pages:   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742;   Vol.   II,  pp.   743-1719.1 

Jacob    V.    Louisville,    9    Dana,    114: 

1182. 
Jacobs   V.    Clearview   Water    Supply 

Co.,  220  Pa.  St.  388:   1,  6,  499, 

501,  505,  508,  538,  591,  673. 
Jacobs,  Matter  of,  33  Hun  374 :  492. 
Jacobs,  Matter  of,  98  N.  Y.  98 :  479, 

480,  492. 
Jacobs's  Petition,  Matter  of,  3  Harr. 

Del.   321:    993. 
Jacquelin  v.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  9 

Miscl.  329:    1584. 
Jager  v.  Dey,  80  la.  23:   715. 

V.  New  York,   75  App.  Div.   258: 

1338,   1554. 
•Jamaica  v  .Board  of  Comrs.,  56  Ind. 

466:   1408. 
Jamaica  etc.  Plank  Road  Co.  v.  New 

York  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  25  Hun  585: 

1164,  1610. 
Jamaica  Pond  Aqueduct  Co.  v.  Brook- 
line,  121  Mass.  5:  352. 
James  v.  Darlington,   71   Wis.   173: 

375,  400,  406,  1596. 
V.  Ontario  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  12  Ont. 

624:   1319. 
V.  Sammis,  132  N.  Y.  239:   865. 
V.  West  Chester,  220  Pa.  St.  490: 

1226,  1332. 
James  Kinney,  Petition  of,  5  Harr. 

18:    1023. 
James    River    &    Kanawha    Co.    v. 

Thompson,  3  Gratt.  270:   788. 
V.  Turner,  9  Leigh  313:  1180. 
Jamestown  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Jones, 

7  N.  D.  619:  431,  957. 
Jamieson  v.  Board  of  Comrs.,  56  Ind. 

466:    1441. 
V.  Burlington  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  87  la. 

265:  1326. 
V.  Ind.  Nat.  Gas  &  O.  Co.,  128  Ind. 

555:    14,  470. 
V.   Kings   County   Elevated   R.   R. 

Co.,   147  N.  Y.  322:    1143,  1151, 

1304. 
Jamison  v.  Bell  Tel.  Co.,  186  N.  Y. 

493:  1630. 
v.  Burlington  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  69  la. 

670:    1401,   1406. 
V.   Springfield,  53  Mo.  224:    1004, 

1546,  1548. 
Jane  Evans,  In  re,  42  L.  J.  Ch.  357: 

957. 
Janesville  v.  Carpenter,  77  Wis.  288 : 

57,  99,  125,  128,   129,   136,   139, 

141. 
Janesville  Bridge  Co.  v.  Stoughton,  1 

Pinney    667:    409. 
Janssen    v.    Lammers,    29    Wis.    88: 
1708. 


Jabb  V.  Hull  Dock  Co.,  9  A.  &  E. 

N.  S.  443:   625,  1274. 
Jackman  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  R.  Co., 

15  Neb.  524:  847,  1454. 
Jackson  v.  Big  Sandy  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

63  W.  Va.   18:   419,  1569. 
V.   Centerville    etc.    R.    R.   Co.,   64 

Iowa,    292:    829,    947,    1629. 
v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  41  Fed. 

656:   313,  325,  040,   1298. 
v.  Edwards,  7  Paige,  386:   946. 
V.   Edwards,   22   Wend.   498:    943, 

946. 
V.  Edwards,  22  Wend.  519:  943. 
V.   Harrington,    2    Allen,   242:    95. 
V.  Hatheway,  15  Johns.  447:  1486, 

1491. 
v.  Housel,   17  Johns.   281:    53. 
V.  Jackson,  16  Ohio  St.  163:    178, 

217. 
V.    Pittsburgh,    36    Pa.    Supr.    Ct. 

274:  948,  1564. 
V.  Portland,  63  Me.  55:   1251. 
V.  Rankin,  67  Wis.  285:   722,  980, 

1363. 
V.  Rutland  &  Burlington  R.  R.  Co., 

25  Vt.  150:   1477. 
V.  State,  104  Ind.  516:   1518. 
V.  Stevenson,  156  Mass.  496:   429. 
V.   Winn's    Heirs,   4   Littell,    322 

746,   1160. 
Jackson  etc.  Traction  Co.  v.  Comrs 

of    Railroads,    128    Mich.    164 

329,  769,  770. 
Jackson  Co.  v.  Waldo,  85  Mo.  637 

1186. 
Jackson  Co.  H.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Inter 

state  R.  T.  Ry.  Co.,  24  Fed.  306 

411. 
Jackson  St.,  In  re,  47  Wash.  243 

1108. 
Jacksonville   v.    Dean,    145    111.    23 

84,  453. 
V.  Doan,  48  111.  App.  247 :  84,  453. 
V.  Lambert,  62  111.  519:  141. 
V.  Loar,  65  111.  App.  218:   1337. 
Jacksonville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Adams, 

27  Fla.  443:  1018,  1513,  1626. 
V.  Adams,  28  Fla.  631 :  748,  1347. 
V.  Adams,  29  Fla.  260:  1422,  1424. 
V.  Adams,   33   Fla.   608:    924,   925, 

1422,  1424. 
V.  Caldwell,  21  111.  75:   1129. 
V.  Cox,  91   111.  500:    154. 
V.  Kidder,  21  111.  131 :   1246. 
V.    Lockwood,    33    Fla.    573:    315, 

1293,  1549,   1552,   1648,   1657. 
V.    Thompson,    34    Fla.    346:    315, 

325,  351,  647. 
V.  Walsh,    106   111.   253:    1271. 


cliv 


OASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Janvrin    v.    Poole,    181    Masa.    463: 

1418. 
Jarboe  v.   Carrollton,   73   Mo.   App. 

347:    325. 
Jarden  v.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

3  Whart.  502:  1569. 

Jarvis  v.   Grafton,  44  W.  Va.  453: 

890. 
Jasper  Ck).  Elee.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Curtis, 

154  Mo.  10:  834,  842,  850. 
Jaynes  v.  Omaha  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  53 

Neb.    631:    180,    191,    197,    274, 

295,   333,  640. 
Jeffers  v.  Annapolis,   107  Md.   268: 

297,  281,  282,  1589. 
Jefferson  v.  Delaehaise,  22  La.  Ann. 

26:  706,  1106,  1358. 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.  132  N. 

y.  483:   1121. 
Jefferson  Co.  v.  Cowan,  54  Mo.  234: 

973,  974. 
Jefferson  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hazeur,  7 

La.  Ann.  182:  1061. 
V.  New  Orleans,  31  La.  Ann.  478: 

1571. 
Jeffersonville  v.  Myers,  2  Ind.  App. 

532:  224,  1356. 
Jeffersonville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bowen, 

40  Ind.  545:  1109. 
V.   Dougherty,   40   Ind.   33:    1160, 

1167. 
V.  Esterle,  13  Bush.  667 :  249,  252, 

1293,  1551,  1648,  1657,  1662. 
Jeffrey  v.  Blue  Hill  Turnpike  Co.,  10 

Mass.  368:   1526. 
Jeffries  v.  Jeffries,   117  Mass.   184: 

429. 
V.  Maceown,  30  Ind.  226:  1464. 
V.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.   Co.,  3 

Houst.  Del.  447:    1343. 
V.    Swampscott,    105    Mass.    535: 

1361,  1371,  1373,  1571. 
Jemison  v.   Bell  Telephone  Co.,   186 

N.  Y.  493:  339. 
Jenal   v.   Green   Island   Dr.   Co.,    12 

Neb.    163:    495,   505,    564,    570, 

577. 
Jenkins  v.  Central  Ontario  R.  R.  Co., 

4  Ont.  593:  712,  1068,  1071. 

V.  Riggs,  100  Md.  427 :  1362,  1510. 
V.  Stetler,  118  Ind.  275:  1489. 
V.  Wilmington  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  110 
N.  C.  438:  157. 
Jenks  V.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
17  Phila.  65:   1189,  1200,  1201. 
V.  Stump,  41  Colo.  281 :  1004,  1007. 
Jennings   v.   Le   Roy,  '  63    Cal.   397 : 

1718. 
Jennings,  Ex  parte,  6  Cow.  518:  97, 

99. 
Jerabek   v.   Kennedy,   61   Neb.   340: 
1129,  1180,  1201. 


Jeremy  Imp.   Co.  v.   Commonwealth, 

106  Va.  482 :  484. 
Jerome  v.   Ross,  7   Johns.  Ch.  315: 

813,  825,   1602. 
Jerome  Ave.,  Matter  of,  120  App.  Div. 

201:   1196. 
Jerome   Ave.,   Matter   of,    120   App. 

Div.  297:  1328. 
Jersey  City  v.  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  40 
N.  J.  Eq.  417:  708. 
V.  Gardner,  32  N.  J.  Eq.  586 :  1578. 
V.  Gardner,  33  N.  J.  Eq.  622 :  1526, 

1578. 
V.   Fitzpatrick,   30   N.   J.  Eq.  97: 

1631. 
T.  Hamilton,  70  N.  J.  L.  48:  1430. 
V.  Morris  Canal  &  B.  Co.,   12  N. 

J.  Eq.  547:  1491. 
V.   National  Docks   R.  R.  Co.,  55 

N.  J.  L.  194:   898. 
V.  Sackett,  44  N.  J.  L.  428:   1528. 
Jersey  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Central 
R.  R.  Co.,  48  N.  J.  Ch.  379:  766, 
767,  1410. 
V.  Jersey  City  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  20 
N.    J.    Eq.    61:    268,    427,    762, 
1283,  1610. 
Jersey  City  &  Hoboken  Horse  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Jersey  City  &  Bergen  R. 
R.  Co.,  21  N.  J.  Eq.  550:   427, 
762,  763,  764,  1283,  1610. 
Jersey    City   Water   Comrs.,   Matter 
of,  31  N.  J.  L.  72:    1669,  1671, 
1685. 
Jessup  V.   Grand   Trunk  R.   R.  Co., 
28  Grant  Ch.  583:  841. 
V.  Grand  Trunk  R.  R.  Co.,  7  V.  C. 

App.  128:  841. 
V.  Loucks,  55  Pa.  St.  350:  1499. 
Jessup   &  M.   Paper  Co.  v.  Ford,  6 

Del.  Ch.  52:  69,  81. 
Jessup  etc.  Co.  v.  Ford,  6  Del.  Ch. 

52:   1604. 
Jeter  v.  Board,  27  Gratt.  910:   1075. 
Jewell   V.    Gardiner,    12   Mass.   311: 

1345. 
Jewett  V.  Somerset  Co.,  1  Me.  125: 
1444. 
V.   Swett,   178   111.   96:    154,   1606. 
V.  Swett,  71  111.  App.  641:   154. 
J.  G.  Brill  Co.  V.  Philadelphia,  167 

Pa.  St.  1:    1309. 
Jockbeck  v.  Board  of  Comrs.,  53  Kan. 

780:    538,   824,  896. 
John  &  Cherry  Streets,  Matter  of,  19 
Wend.  659:  495,  589. 

John  Monat  Lumber  Co.  v.  Denver, 
21  Colo.  1:  889. 

Johns  V.  Marion  County,  4  Ore.  46: 
983. 


OASES    CITED. 


clv 


[The  references  are  to   the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Johnson  v.  Alameda  County,  14  Cal. 

106:   1162. 
V.  Atlantic  &  St.  Lawrence  R.  E. 

Co.,  35  N.  H.   569:   158,  461. 
T.  Atlantic  City  R.  R.  Co.,  73  N. 

J.  L.  767:  857,  1559,  1630,  1633. 
V.  Baltimore  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  45  N. 

J.    Eq.    454:     1261,    1460,    1461, 

1462,^1463,   1569. 
V.  Boorman,  63  Wis.  268 :  866. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  37  Minn. 

519,  1314. 
v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  80  Wis. 

641:    148,  158. 
V.  Chicago,  Milwaukee  &  St.  Paul 

Ey.  Co.,  58  la.  537:  816. 
V.  Clayton  County,  61  la.  89:  1421. 
V.  Clontarf,    98    Minn.    281:    973, 

1512,  1513,  1569,  1571. 
V.  Cox,  42  Misc.  301 :  404. 
T.  Crow,  87  Pa.  St.  184:   408,  412. 
V.  Dadeville,  127  Ala.  244:  882. 
V.  Freeport  &  Miss.  Riv.  Ry.  Co., 

Ill    111.    413:    994,    1045,    1119, 

1128,  1131,  1134,  1135. 
V.  Freeport  &  Miss.  River  Ry.  Co., 

116  111.  521:  994,  1423. 
V.  Grays  Point  Terminal  Ry.   Co. 

Ill  Mo.  App.  378:  151. 
T.  Joliet  &  Chicago  R.  R.  Co.,  23 

111.    202:    922,    998,    999,    1015, 

1162. 
T.  Met.  W.  S.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  160 

111.  477:  1467. 
V.   New   York    El.   R.   R.   Co.,    10 

Miscl.  136:   1151,  1302. 
V.  New  York  etc.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co., 

76  App.  Div.  564:   339. 
V.  Old  Colony  R.  R.  Co.,  18  R.  I. 

642:     181,    183,    191,    320,    351: 

366,  382,  391,  404,  744,  1338. 
v.  Ontario  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  11  U.  C. 

203:    952. 
T.  Ontario  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  11  U.  C. 

Q.  B.  246:   1635. 
V.   Parkersburg,    16   W.   Va.   402: 

631,  659,  671,  1549. 
V.    Pettit,     120    App.    Div.    774: 

1559 
V.  Rankin,  70  N.  C.  550:  1170. 
V.   St.   Louis,    137   Fed.   439:    643, 

1549. 
V.  St.  Louis  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  32  Ark. 

758:    1522. 
V.   School  Trustees,  26  Grant  Ch. 

204:  821. 
V.  Shelter  Is.  Grove  &  Camp-Meet- 
ing Ass.,  47  Hun  374 :  880. 
V.  Shelter  Island  Grove  &  Camp- 
Meeting   Ass.,    122    N.    Y.   330: 

880. 


Johnson  v.  Sherman  Co.  I.  W.  P.  &  I. 

Co.,  71  Neb.  452:   850. 
V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  71  S.  C.  241: 

1523. 
V.  State,  I  Ga.  App.  196:  365,  876. 
V.  Stephenson,     39    111.    App.    88: 

1033,  1420. 
V.  Supervisors  of  Clayton  Co.,  61 

la.  89:   512. 
V.  Sutliff,  17  Neb.  423 :  1440,  1436, 

1437. 
V.  Thompson-Houston  Electric  Co., 

54  Hun  469:    345. 
V.    Utica    Water    Works    Co.,    67 

Barb.  415:  731. 
V.  White,  26  R.   I.  207:    149,   155, 

156,  233,  1455. 
Johnson   City   v.    Wolfe,    103   Tenn. 

277:   882,  884. 
Johnson    Co.    v.    Minnear,    72    Kan. 

326:   515. 
Johnson,  In  re,  49  N.  J.  L.  381 :  1020, 

1095. 
Johnston  v.  Callery,  173  Pa.  St.  129 : 

936. 
v.  Callery,  184  Pa.  St.  146:  1705. 
V.  District  of  Columbia,  118  U.  S. 

19:  142. 
V.  Lonstorf,  128  Wis.  17 :  375,  388, 

400,  405,  513,  1596. 
V.  Rankin,  70  N.  C.  550:   22,  23, 

1082,  1164,  1571. 
V.    Supervisors,     19    Johns.    272: 

1531. 
V.  Vandyke,  6  McLean,  422:  943. 
Johnstown    v.    Frederick,    36    N.    Y. 

App.  Div.  44:   1437. 
Johnsville   v.    Smith,    90   App.    Div. 

618:    1348. 
V.  Smith,  184  N.  Y.  341 :  1348. 
Joliet  V.  Blower,  155  111.  414:    629, 

1245,  1254. 
V.  Blower,  49  111.  App.  464:   629, 

1249. 
V.  Spring  Creek  Dr.  Dist.,  222  111. 

441:  924. 
Joliet  &  Chicago  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bar- 
rows, 24  111.  562:    1413,  1669. 
Jolly  V.  Pittsburgh  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  16 

Pa.  Co.  Ct.   1:   300,  1587,  1590. 
V.  Wimbledon  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  1  B. 

&  S.  807:   1626. 
Jones  V.  Adams,  19  Nev.  78:  71. 
V.  Asheville,   116  N.   C.  817:    953. 
V.  Bangor,   144  Pa.  St.   638:    618, 

632,  1353,  1718. 
V.  Bird,  5  B.  &  Aid.  837 :  206. 
V.  Bright,  140  Ala.  268 :  870. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  68  111. 

380:    994,    1138,   1251. 
V.  Clark,  7  Jones  Law  418:  1073. 


clvi 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to   the  pages;   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742;   Vol.   II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Jones  V.  Conn,  39  Ore.  30:  71,  72. 
V.   Commonwealth,   1   Bush    (Ky.) 

34:    19. 
V.  Erie  &  W.  E.  K.  Co.,  151  Pa.  St. 

30:    449. 
V.  Erie  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  169  Pa.  St. 

333:   306,  327. 
V.  Florida  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  41  Fed. 

70:  957,  1570,  1576. 
V.  Franklin  Co.  Comrs.  130  N.  C. 

451:  1523. 
V.  GoflFstown,  39  N.  H.  254:  1096. 
V.  Houston,  45  Tex.  Civ.  App.   1 : 

1307. 
Y.  Met.   El.   R.  R.   Co.,  59   N.  Y. 

Supr.  Ct.  437:   1427. 
V.  Miller,  2  Va.  Dec.  232:   1565. 
V.  New  Orleans  etc.   Co.,  70  Ala. 

227:   1202,  1347,  1351. 
V.   North   Ga.   Elec.   Co.,   125   Ga. 

618:  7,  536,  537,  672. 
V.  Oxford,  45  Me.  419:  1527. 
V.  Pettibone,  2  Wis.  308 :  104. 
V.  Phillips,  30  Me.  455:   1345, 
V.  Pa.  R.  R.  Co.,  143  Pa.  St.  374: 

859. 
V.  Pittsburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  11  Pa. 

Supr.  Ct.  202:  749. 
V.  Portland,  57  Me.  42 :   1019. 
V.   Railroad   Co.,   151   Pa.   St.   30: 

267. 
v.  St.  Louis  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  84  Mo. 

151:   152. 
V.  Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry.  Co.,  67 

S.  C.  181:  847,  1451,  1457,  1639. 
V.    Seattle,    23    Wash.    753:    229, 

1307,  1566. 
V.  Seligman,  81  N.  Y.  190:    1645, 

1646,  1647. 
V.  Skinner,  61  Me.  25 :  976. 
V.  Stafford  Justices,  1  Leigh  584: 

1638. 
V.  Theiss,  30  Ind.  311 :  1399. 
V.  United  States,  48  Wis.  385:  92, 

738. 
V.    Van    Bochove,    103    Mich.    98: 

837,  1504. 
V.  Venable,  120  Ga.  1 :  521,  534. 
V.  Wabash  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  18  Mo. 

App.  251:  157. 
V.  Walker,  2  Paine  C.  C.  688:   6, 

672,  745. 
V.  Wills  Valley  E.  E.  Co.,  30  Ga. 

43,  1182. 
V.    Zink,   65   Mo.   App.   409:    707, 

1086. 
Jones'    Heirs    v.    Barclay,    2    J.    J. 

Marsh.  73:   516,  519,  955,  1017, 

1135. 


Joplin  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kansas  City 
etc.    R.    R.    Co.,    135    Mo.   549: 
908. 
Joplin  Con.  Min.  Co.  v.  Joplin,  124 

Mo.  129:   84,  653,  981,  1008. 
Jordan  v.  Benwood,  42  W.  Va.  312: 
148,   156,  233. 
V.  Chenoa,  166  111.  530:  886. 
V.  Greig,  33  Colo.  360:  996. 
V.  Haskell,  63  Me.  189 :  1503. 
V.  Hyatt,  3  Barb.  275:  12. 
V.  Met.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  60  N.  Y.  S. 

385:    448,    1303,   1555. 
V.    School   District,    60   Me.    540: 

1409. 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  42  Minn. 

172:   148,  157. 
V.   Woodward,    40   Me.    317:    502, 
550,   1495. 
Jordan    et   al..    Petitioners,    32   Me. 

472:    1417. 
Jorgenson  v.  Superior,  111  Wis.  561: 

615,  617,  619,  1356,  1550. 
Joseph  V.  Truckenmiller,  183  Mo.  9: 
1107. 
V.  Zimmerman,  142  Mo.  155:  1186. 
Joy  V.   Grindstone  Neck  Water  Co., 

85  Me.  109:  1247,  1445. 

Joyce  V.  East  St.  Louis  El.  St.  E.  R. 

Co.,  43  111.  App.  157:  322,  1355. 

Judd  V.  Hartford,  72  Conn.  350 :  143. 

Judge  V.  New  York  Central  etc.  R.  R. 

Co.,  56  Hun  60:  1630. 
Judson  V.  Bridgeport,  25  Conn.  426: 

1086,  1515. 
Julia  Building  Ass'n  v.  Bell  Tel.  Co., 

88  Mo.  258:   341,  643. 
Juliatta  V.  Smith,  12  Ida.  288:  865. 
Junction  Pass.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Williams- 
port  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  154  Pa.  St. 
116:  304. 
Jungblum  v.  Minneapolis  etc.  E.  E. 
Co.,    70   Minn.    153:    152,    1650, 
1655. 
Jurries   v.   Virgens,    104   Minn.   71: 

1515. 
Justice   V.   Nesquehoning   Valley   E. 
E.  Co.,  87  Pa.  St.  28 :  1348,  1351, 
1626,  1629. 
V.  Philadelphia,   169  Pa.  St.  297: 

953. 
T.  Philadelphia,  169  Pa.  St.  503: 
952,  1560. 
Justices  etc.  v.  Griffin  etc.  Eoad  Co., 
15  Ga.  39:  779,  1057. 
V.  Plank  Road  Co.,  9  Ga.  475:  706, 
779. 
Justices  of  Williamson  v.  Jefferson, 

1  Coldw.  419:    1531. 
Juvinall  v.  .Jamesburg  Dr.  Dist.,  204 
111.  106:  924. 


OASES    CITED. 


clvii 


[Tlie  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.   II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


K. 

Kaiser  v.  St.  Paul  S.  &  T.  F.  E.  E. 

Co.,  22  Minn.  149:  319. 
Kaje  V.   Chicago  etc.  R.   R.  Co.,  57 
Minn.   422:    320,   351,   382,   388, 
399,  444. 
Kal-celdy  v.  Columbia  E.  R.  Co.,  37 
Wash.   675:    327,  377,  399,  406, 
1560,  1583. 
Kakkie  v.  St.  Paul  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  44 

Minn.  438:   352. 
Kalamazoo  v.  Kalamazoo  H.  L.  &  P. 
Co.,  124  Mich.  74:  360,  361,  410. 
Kales  V.  Spokane  Val.  L.  &  W.  Co., 

42  Wash.  43:  137. 
Kamer  v.  Clatsop  Co.,  6  Ore.   238: 

975,  1069. 
Kamm  v.  Nonnand,  50  Ore.  9:    81, 

1604. 
Kanaga  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  E.  E.  Co., 

76  Mo.  207:  858,  1627,  1631. 
Kanawha  etc.  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Glen  Jean 
etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  45  W.  Va.   119: 
901. 
Kane  v.  Baltimore,  15  Md.  240 :  536, 
1495. 
V.  New  York  El.   E.  R.   Co.,   125 
N.   Y.   164:    180,   181,    183,    187, 
197,  198,  199,  202,  240,  255,  264, 
265,  1296. 
Kankakee  etc.  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Chester, 
62  111.  235:   1369. 
V.    Horan,    131    III.    288:     90,    95, 

1638,  1648,  1653. 
V.   Horan,   22   111.   App.   145:    151, 

156,  1648,  1655. 
V.  Horan,  23  111.   App.  259:    151. 
V.  Horan,  30  111.  App.  552 :  90,  95, 

1648,   1653. 
V.  Straut,  102  111.  666:   1107. 
Kankakee   Water   Co.  v.   Eeeves,   45 

111.  App.  285 :  145. 
Kanne   v.   Minneapolis   &   St.   Louis 
Ey.    Co.,    30    Minn.    423:    1461, 
1626,  1628. 
V.  Minneapolis  &  St.  Louis  Ey.  Co., 
33  Minn.  419:    1626. 
Kansas  v.  Colorado,  185  U.  S.   125: 
170. 
V.  Colorado,  206  U.  S.  46:   170. 
Kansas  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Allen,  22 
Kan.  285:   1477. 
V.  Allen,  24  Kan.  33:    1119,  1120, 

1125,  1128. 
V.  Board  of  Co.   Comrs.,  45  Kan. 
716:   1290. 
Kansas   City  v.  Baird,  98  Mo.  215: 
678,  1057. 
V.  Brady,  52  Kan.  297:   169. 
V.  Butterfield,  89  Mo.  646:   1109. 
V.  Campbell,  62  Mo.  585:  894. 
V.  Duncan,  135  Mo.  571:   1011. 


Kansas  City  v.  Hennegan,  152  Fed. 

249:   931,  932. 
V.  Hill,  80  Mo.  523 :  923. 
V.  Hyde,  196  Mo.  498:   1071. 
V.  Hyde,  196  Mo.  515:   1071. 
V.  Kansas  City  Belt  R.  R.  Co.,  102 

Mo.  633:   354,  487. 
V.  Kansas  City  Belt  Ry.  Co.,   187 

Mo.  146:  490,  1422. 
V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  84 

Mo.  410:   1378. 
V.  Kansas  City  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  189 

Mo.  245:   1403. 
V.  Kansas  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,   18  Kan. 

331:   1410,  1673. 
V.  Marsh  Oil  Co.,  140  Mo.  458:  9, 

674. 
V.  Mastin,  169  Mo.  80:   1011. 
V.  Met.  Water  Co.,  164  Fed.  728: 

931. 
V.  Morse,  105  Mo.  510:  1270. 
V.  Mulkey,  176  Mo.  229:   1703. 
V.   Napiecek,   76   Kan.   693:    1270, 

1344. 

V.    No.   Am.    Trust    Co.,    110    Mo. 

App.  647:   1563. 
V.  Scarritt,  169  Mo.  471:  872,  892. 
V.    Slangstrom,   53    Kan.    431:    88, 

92,  93. 
V.  Street,  36  Mo.  App.  666:   1109. 
V.  Vineyard,  128  Mo.  75:  926. 
V.  Ward,  134  Mo.  172:  1011,  1186. 
Kansas  City  etc.  E.  Co.  v.  Baird,  41 

Kan.  69:   1128,  1311. 
V.  Baker,  183  Mo.  312:  873. 
V.  Baker,  196  Mo.  593:  1557. 
V.    Campbell,    62    Mo.     585:     893, 

1029,  1377. 
V.   Cook,  57  Ark.   387:    158,   1638. 
V.  Cox,  41  Mo.  App.  499:  926. 
V.  Dawley,  50  Mo.  App.  480:  1119, 

1130,  1310,  1312. 
V.  Fisher,  49  Kan.  17:   1228. 
V.  Fisher,  53  Kan.  512:  1018,  1513, 

1540,  1541,  1543,  1545. 
V.  Hurst,  42  Kan.  462 :   1428. 
V.  Kansas  City  etc.  E.  E.  Co.  118 

Mo.  599:    1281. 
v.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  129 

Mo.  62:    1619. 
V.  Kennedy,  49  Kan.  19:  1391. 
V.    Kregelo,    32    Kan.    608:     1246, 

1314,  1330,  1342,  1477. 
V.  Lackey,  72  Miss.  881 :  87,  88,  89, 

1456. 
V.  Littler,  70  Kan.  556:   1208. 
V.  La.  Western  E.  E.  Co.,  116  La. 

178:  533,  714,  764,  769. 
V.  Merrill,  25  Kan.  421 :  1208,  1392. 
V.  Morley,  45  Mo.  App.  304:  354. 


elviii 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to   the  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-742;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Kansas  City  etc.  E,.  R.  Co.  v.  Riley, 

33  Kan.  374:  147. 
V.  St.  Joseph  Terminal  R.  R.  Co., 

97  Mo.  457:   312,  328,  657,  765, 

769,  1282. 
V.  Schwake,  70  Kan.  141:  252,  260, 

1297. 
V.  Shoemaker,  160  Mo.  425:   1310, 

1315. 
V.  Smith,  51  La.  Ann.  1079:  1426. 
V.  Smith,  72  Miss.  677:  89. 
V.  Spencer,  72  Miss.  491 :  487. 
V.  Splitlog,  45  Kan.  68:  1150,  1241, 

1545. 
V.  State,  74  Neb.  868:  868. 
V.  Story,  96  Mo.  611:  926.  1176. 
V.  Turley,  71  Kan.  256:  1387. 
V.  Vickroy,  46  Kan.  248:  1120,  1231, 

1236,  1241. 
V.  View,  156  Mo.  608:  1557. 
V.  Weaver,  86  Mo.  473:  1254,  1557. 
V.  Weidenmann,  77  Kan.  300:  1128, 

1139,  1225. 
V.  Wiggal,  82  Miss.  223:  96. 
Kansas   Citj  Interurban  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Davis,    197    Mo.    669:    708,   715, 

997,  1043,  1044. 
Kansas  City  M.  Co.  v.  Riley,  133  Mo. 

574:  882. 
Kansas  City  Suburban  Belt  R.  R.  Co. 

V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  118 

Mo.  599:  771. 
V.   McElroy,    161    Mo.    584:    1150, 

1186,  1217. 
V.    Noreross,    137    Mo.    415:    1137, 

1210. 
Kansas  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Burns,  70 

Kan.  627:   1477,  1633. 
V.  Cuykendall,  42  Kan.  234:    251, 

311,  325. 
V.  LeFlora,  49  Fed.  119:  426,  1474, 

1608,  1615. 
V.  Mahler,  45  Kan.  565:  252,  311, 
V.  McAfee,  42  Kan.  239:  252,  311, 

316. 
V.  N.  W.  Coal  &  M.  Co.,  161  Mo. 

288:    528,    530,    592,    824,    1042, 

1045,  1050,  1052,  1068,  1070. 
V.  Payne,  49  Fed.   114:    410,   413, 

426,  1474,  1608,  1615. 
V.  Phipps,  4  Kan.  App.  252:   1010, 

1461. 
Kansas  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hopkins,  18 

Kan.  494:    840. 
v.   Mihlman,    17   Kan.   224:    1551, 

1648,  1658,  1715. 
V.  Streeter,  8  Kan.  133:  1004.  1626. 
Karber  v.  Pfeil,  56  Wis.  429:  1520. 
Karnes  v.  Drake,  103  Ky.  134:   711, 

1077. 


Karst  V.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  22 

Minn.  118:  237,  1306,  1648,  1657. 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  Minn. 

401:  237,  1306. 
Katharine  Water  Co.,   32  Pa.  Supr. 

Ct.  94:  918. 
Katz  V.  Walkinshaw,   141   Cal.   116: 

162,  163. 
Kauflfman  v.  Greismer,  26  Pa.  St.  407: 

146. 
ICaufman   v.    Pittsburgh   etc.   R.    R. 

Co.,  210  Pa.  St.  440:  1134. 
v.  Tacoma  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  11  Wash. 

632:    256,    304,    324,    640,    1294, 

1300,  1549,  1649,  1657. 
Kaukauna  Water  Power  Co.  v.  Green 

Bay  &  M.  Canal  Co.,  142  U.  S. 

254:  495,  522,  523,  1432. 
Kavanagh  v.  Mobile  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

78  Ga.  271:    296,  308,  314,  315, 

1581,  1591. 
KSivanaugh   v.    Brooklyn,   32   N.   Y. 

489:   234. 
Kay  V.  Glade  Creek  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  47 

W.   Va.    467:    1123,    1315,    1316, 

1379. 
V.  Kirk,  76  Md.  41:  79,  88. 
Kean  v.  Elizabeth,  54  N.  J.  L.  462: 

370,  371,  384,  390,  406. 

V.  Elizabeth,  55  N.  J.  L.  337:  370, 

371,  384,  390,  406. 

V.  Stetson,  5  Pick.  492:  1634. 
Kearney  v.   Metropolitan   El.  R.  R. 

Co.,   129  N.  Y.   76:    1296,   1554, 

1584,  1665. 
v.   Themanson,   48   Neb.    74:    147, 

149,  158. 
Kearney  Tp.  V.  Ballentine,  54  N.  J.  L. 

194:   698. 
Kearns  v.  Thomas,  37  Wis.  118:  1400. 
Kearsley  v.  Gibbs,  44  N.  J.  L.  169: 

1368. 
Keasy   v.  Louisville,  4  Dana    (Ky.) 

154:  209,  211,  238. 
Keating  v.   Cincinnati,   38   Ohio   St. 

141:  229,  230,442,  1453. 
Keck  V.  Vanghause,  127  la.  529 :  89. 
Keech  v.  People,  22  111.  478:  1106. 
Keefer  v.  Bridgeport,  68  Conn.  401: 

706. 
Keehn  v.  McGillicudy,  15  Ind.  App. 

580:   602. 
Keeler,  Ex  parte,  45  S.  C.  537:  485. 
Keeley  v.  New  York,  6  Miscl.  516: 

1167. 
Keeling  v.  Pittsburg  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  205 

Pa.  St.  31:   1616. 
Keeling's  Road,  59  Pa.  St.  358:  519. 
Keenan,  Ex  parte,  21  Ala.  558:  1415, 

1638. 


CASES    CITED. 


clix 


[The  references  are  to   tbe  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.  1-742;   Vol.   II,  pp.   74S-1719.1 


Keenan    v.    Comrs.'    Court,    26    Ala. 

568:    1091,    1094,    1420. 
Keene  v.  Bristol,  26  Pa.  St.  46:  1168, 
1570. 
V.  Chapman,  25  Me.  126:  1522. 
V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  79 
Hun  451 :  1305. 
Kehoe  v.  Philadelphia,  199  Pa.  St.  45: 

1251,  1457. 
Kehrer    v.    Richmond   City,    81    Va. 

745:   212. 
Kiefer  v.  Bridgeport,  68  Conn.  401: 

1634. 
Keigwin  v.  Drainage  Comrs.,  115  III. 

347:    1431,   1510,   1576. 
Keim  v.  Philadelphia,  2  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

149:  883. 
Keine  v.  Cass  County,  71  Neb.  677: 

1435. 
Keith  V.  Bingham,  100  Mo.  300:  13. 

V.  Brockton,  147  Mass.  618:   1717. 

Keithsburg    &    East    R.    R.    Co.,    v. 

Henry,   79   m.   290:    1122,   1128, 

1194,  1309,  1311,  1314. 

Kelenke  v.  West  Homestead,  216  Pa. 

St.  476:   630. 
Kellar  v.  Earl,  98  Wis.  488:  1636. 
V.    Riverton    Consolidated    Water 
Co.,  34  Pa.  Supr.  a.  301:  731. 
Keller  v.  Bading,  64  111.  App.   198: 
1559. 
V.  Corpus  Christi,  50  Tex.  614:  17. 
V.  Harrisburg  etc.  R.  R.   Co.,   151 

Pa.  St.  67:  1713. 
V.  Harrisburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  161  Pa. 

St.  594:  1535. 
V.  Pittsburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  151  Pa. 

St.  67:  1708. 
V.  Riverton  Water  Co.,  161  Pa.  St. 
422:    1068. 
Kelley  v.  Green  Bay  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
80  Wis.  328:  1578. 
V.  Horton,  2  Cow.  424:  1634,  1636. 
V.  Kennard,  60  N.  H.  1:  514. 
V.  New  York,  6  Misc.  516:  85,  1184. 
V.  Pittsburg,  85  Pa.  St.  170:  466. 
Kelliner  v.  Miller,  97  Mass.  71:  1147. 
Kellinger  v.  Forty-second  Street  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  50  N.  Y.  206:  178,  269, 
307. 
Kellogg  V.  Kirksville,   132  Mo.  App. 
519:  84,  1654. 
V.  Malin,  50  Mo.  App.  496:  1500. 
V.  New  Britain,  62  Conn.  232:  84. 
V.   Thompson,   66   N.   Y.   88:    168, 
866,  1491. 
Kellor's     Appeal,     2     Walker's     Pa. 
Supm.  32:  948. 


Kelly  V.  Danby,  46  Vt.  504:  701. 
V.    Donahoe,    2    Met.     (Ky.)     482: 

1489. 
V.  Dunning,  39  N.  J.  Eq.  482:  146. 
V.  Harrison,  2  Johns.  Cas.  29;  943. 
V.  Minneapolis,  57  Minn.  294:  226. 
V.  Pennsylvania  S.  V.  R.  R.  Co.  5 

Mont.  Co.  L.  R.  175:  819. 
V.  Pittsburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  28  Ind. 
App.  457:  91,  1639,  1716. 
Kelsay  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  41 

Ind.  App.  128:  1644. 
Kelsey  v.  King,  32  Barb.  410:    335, 

678. 
Kelso,  In  re,  147  Cal.  609:  467. 
Kelsoe  v.  Oglethorpe,   120   Ga.  951: 

886,  890,  1492,  1568. 
Kemp  v.  Penn.   R.   R.   Co.,   156  Pa. 
St.  430:  847. 
V.  Polk  County,  46  Ore.  546 :  978. 
V.   Smith,  7   Ind.  471:    995,   1021, 

1406. 
V.  Southeastern  R.  R.  Co.,  7  L.  R. 
Ch.  364:  1061. 
Kemper  v.  Collins,  97  Mo.  644:   872, 
886. 
V.  Louisville,  14  Bush.  87:  66,  234. 
Kemper's   Lessee    v.    Cincinnati   etc. 
Turnpike  Co.,  11  Ohio  392:  815. 
Kenan,  In  re,  109  Ga.  819:  726. 
Kendall  v.  Columbia,  74  S.  C.  539: 
212,  613,  618,  1525. 
V.  Post,  8  Or.  141 :  923. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  55  Vt.  438:   1536, 
1537,  1538,  1539,  1540. 
Kendriek   v.    Towle,    60    Mich.    368 

1323. 
Kenedy    v.    Erwin,   Busbee   L.    387 

495. 
Kenesin  v.  Arlington,  144  Mass.  456 

912. 
Kenkele  v.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  55 

Hun  398:  1295. 
Kennebec  Water  District  v.  Water- 
ville,  96  Me.  234:    21,  498,  503, 
675,    733,    788,    789,    930,    1263, 
1265. 
V.    Waterville,    97    Me.    185:    788, 
1263,  1265. 
Kennedy   v.   Detroit   R.  R.   Co.,   108 
Mich.  390:  307,  1588. 
V.  Dubuque  &  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  2 

Iowa  521:   1204. 

V.  Indianapolis,  103  U.  S.  599:  1194. 

V.  Milwaukee  &  St.  Paul  Ry.  Co., 

22    Wis.    581:     947,    949,    1226, 

1.564. 

V.  Minneola  etc.  Traction  Co.,  77 

App.  Div.  484:  273. 
V.  Minneola  etc.  Traction  Co.,  178 
N.  Y.  508:  273. 


clx 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to   the  pages:   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-14:2 ;  Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Kennedy  v.  State,  109  Ind.  236:  1514. 
Kennett's  Petition,  24  N.  H.  139:  437, 

917,  1118,  1362. 
Kenney  v.  Kansas  City  etc.  E.  R.  Co., 

69  Mo.  App.  569:  147,  157. 
V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  74 

Mo.  App.  301 :  94. 
V.  Pittsburg  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  208  Pa. 

St.  30:  748. 
Kenniaon  v.  Beverly,  146  Mass.  467: 

145. 
Kensington's  Case,  2  Rawle,  445:  781, 

788. 
Kensington  v.  Wood,  10  Pa.  St.  93: 

1137. 
Kensington  &  Oxford  Turnpike,  In  re, 

97  Pa.  St.  260 :  1383. 
Kent  V.  Board  of  County  Comrs.,  42 

Kan.  534:  1395,  1568. 
V.  Pratt,  73  Conn.  573:  881. 
V.    St.    Joseph,   72   Mo.   App.    42: 

1306. 
v.  Wallingford,  42  Vt.  651:    1530, 

1683. 
Kent  Co.  v.  Goodwin,  98  Md.  84:  153. 
Kenton  Co.  Ct.  v.  Bank  Lick  Turn- 
pike Co.,  10  Bush.  529:   782. 
Kentucky  Cent.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Clark, 

5  Ky.  L.  R.  184:  180,  253. 
V.  Paris,  95  Ky.  627:  865. 
Kentucky  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Harrison, 

4  Ky.  L.  R.  448:   1358. 
Kentucky  &  Ind.  Bridge  Co.  v.  Held, 

16  Ky.  L.  R.  160:   1144. 
V.  Kreiger,  93  Ky.  243:  310,  314. 
Kenyou  v.  New  York  Cent.  etc.  R.  R. 

Co.,  29  App.  Div.  N.  Y.  80:  1651, 

1658. 
Keokuk  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Donnell,  77  la. 

221 :  1046,  1073,  1624. 
Kepley    v.    Taylor,    1    Blackf.    492: 

549,  553,  1519. 
Kepple  V.  Keokuk,  61  Iowa  653 :  603, 

616. 
Kern    v.    Isgrig,    132    Ind.    4:    1568, 

1574,  1576. 
Kern  Island  Irr.  Co.  v.  Bakersfield, 

151  Cal.  403:  835. 
Kemochan  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  161 

N.  Y.  339:   1554,  1562. 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  128  N. 

Y.  559:   182,  1298,  1663,  1665. 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  130  N. 

Y.  651:   1121. 
Kerr  v.  South  Park  Comrs.,  117  U.  S. 

379:  539,  1143. 
V.  West  Shore  R.  R.  Co.,  127  N.  Y. 
269:  788. 
Kerrigan  v.  Backus,  69  App.  Div.  329 : 


Kerr's  Petition,  Matter  of,  42  Barb. 

119:   684,  788. 
Kersey  v.  Schuylkill  Riv.  E.  S.  R.  R. 

Co.,  133  Pa.  St.  234:  1188,  1201, 

1274,  1339. 
Kershaw  v.  Philadelphia,  10  Pa.  Co. 

Ct.   153:    1550,  1718. 
V.    Philadelphia,    20    Pbila.    318: 

618,  1551,  1649,  1656. 
Kersley  v.  Gibbs,  44  N.  J.  L.   169: 

1386. 
Kester   v.    Western   Union   Tel.   Co., 

108  Fed.  926:   339. 
Ketcham  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

76  App.  Div.  619:  258. 
V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,   177 

N.  Y.  247 :  258. 
Kettle  River  R.   R.   Co.  v.   Eastern 

R.  R.   Co.,   41   Minn.  461:   533, 

832 
Kewanee  v.  Otley,  204  111.  402:   82, 

83,  1604,  1650,  1654. 
Keyes  v.  Minneapolis,  42  Minn.  467: 

1382,  1514. 
V.  Tait,  19  la.  123:  974,  1516. 
Keyport  v.  Freehold  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

74  N.  J.  L.  480:  878,  890. 
Keyes   v.   Morin   Co.,   42    Cal.   252: 

1415,  1416. 
V.   Williamson,   31   Ohio   St.   561: 

1033. 
Keyser  v.  Lake  Shore  etc.  Ry.  Co., 

142  Mich.  143 :  1294,  1304,  1550, 

1648,   1657. 
Keysport  v.  Cherry,  51  N.  J.  L.  417: 

710. 
Keystone  Bridge  Co.  v.  Summers,  13 

W.  Va.   476:   948. 
Keystone    State   Tel.   &   Tel.    Co.   v. 

Ridley  Park,  28  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

635:    362. 

Kidd  v.  Pearson,  128  U.  S.   1:  478. 

Kidder  v.  Jennison,  21  Vt.  108:  1018. 

V.  Oxford,  116  Mass.  165:    1319. 

V.  Peoria,  29  111.  77:    1018,  1513. 

Kidder    Tp.    Road,    1    Luzerne    Leg. 

Reg.  Rep.  10:    1091. 
Kiebler  v.  Holmes,  58  Mo.  App.  119: 

935,  1558,  1560. 
Kiecher    v.    Killbuck    Turnpike    Co., 

33  Ind.  333:  1628. 
Kiekenapp  v.  Supers.,  64  Minn.  547: 

1082. 
Kiernan  v.   Chicago  etc.   R.  R.   Co., 

123   111.   188:    1109,   1150,   1176, 

1200,   1202,  1312,   1313,  1506. 
Kiesel  v.  Ogden  City,   8  Utah  237: 

143. 
Killbuck   Private   Road,    77   Pa.   St. 

39:    707,  721,  1362. 


CASES    CITED. 


clxi 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742;   Vol.   II,  pp.   743-1719. J 


Kimball  v.  Board  of  Supervisors,  46 

Cal.  19:  922. 
V.  Homan,  74  Mich.  699:  364,  367, 

384,  388,  400,  406,  1004. 
V.  Kenosha,  4  Wis.  321:   196,  197, 

366,  384. 
>.  Salt  Lake  City,  32  Utah,  253: 

631,  634,  1307,  1308,  1323. 
V.  Yates,  14  111.  464:    1096. 
Kimball  Admx.  v.  Rockland,  71  Me. 

137:    1526,   1530,   1683. 
Kimble  v.  White  Water  Valley  Canal 

Co.,  1  Ind.  285:  1445,  1522. 
Kime  v.  Cass  County,  71  Neb.  677: 

1162,  1172,  1569,  1571,  1713. 
Kimel  v.  Kimel,  4  Jones  Law  121: 

923,   1345. 
Kincaid    v.    Indianapolis    Nat'l    Gas 

Co.,    124    Ind.    577:     172,     176, 

200,  337,  1594,  1615. 
Kine  v.  Defenbaugh,  64  111.  291:  24. 
King,  Matter  of,  42  Misc.  480 :   1362, 

1381. 
King  V.  Bristol  Dock  Co.,  6  B.  &  C. 

181:  206. 
V.  Bristol  Dock  Co.,  12  East  429: 

83. 
T.   Brown,   31   Pa.    Supr.    Ct.    50: 

1325. 
V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  71  la.  696: 

160. 
V.  Danville,  32  Ky.  L.  R.  1188:  74, 

1654. 
V.  Davenport,  98  111.  305 :   14,  485. 
V.  Granger,  21  R.  I.  93:  143. 
V.  Greenwood  Cem.  Assn.,  67  Ohio 

St.  240:   924,  927,  1397. 
V.  Hayes,  80  Me.  206:   486. 
V.  Hungerford  Market  Co.,  4  Barn. 

&  Adol.  596:    1257. 
V.  Iowa  Midland  R.  R.  Co.,  34  la. 

458:    1139,  1147. 
V.   Kent,    10    Barn.    &   Ores.   477: 

1358. 
V.  Minneapolis  Union  Ry.  Co.,  32 

Minn.  224:   1276. 
V.  New  York,  36  N.  Y.  182:   929, 

1397. 
V.  New  York,  102  N.  Y.  171:  938. 
V.  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  90  Va. 

210:   836,  1504. 
V.  Nottingham  Waterworks,   6  A. 

&  E.  355:    1533. 
V.   Philadelphia    Co.,    154    Pa.    St. 

160:  337. 
V.  Portland,  38  Ore.  402:    10,  463. 
V.    Southern    Ry.    Co.,     119    Fed. 

1017:    1560,   1631. 
V.  Tarlton,  2  Harris  &  McH.  (Md.) 

473:   1135. 
v.  United  States,  59  Fed.  Rep.  9: 

92,  1716. 


King  V.  Vicksburg  Ry.  &  Lt.  Co.,  88 

Miss.    456:    453,    454,    655,    661, 

664,  1175,  1337,  1668. 
V.  Wycombe  Ry.  Co.,  28  Beav.  104 : 

822. 
v.  Wycombe  Ry.  Co.,  29  L.  J.  Ch. 

N.  S.  462:   822. 
Kingman     County     Comrs.     v.     Ply- 
mouth, 6  Cush.  306:   1416. 
Kingman     et    al..    Petitioners,     153 

Mass.  566:   535. 
Kings  Co.  v.  Sea  View  Ry.   Co.,  23 

Hun  180:   1583,  1622. 
Kings  County  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter 

of,  20  Hun  217 :  921. 
Kings  County  Elevated  Ry.  Co.,  Mat- 
ter of,   82  N.  Y.  95:   260. 
Kings  Co.  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.   Stevens, 

101    N.    Y.    411:    368,    380,    388. 
King's  Lake  L.  &  -D.  Dist.  v.  Jami- 
son, 176  Mo.  557  :   1082. 
Kingsland  v.  Clark,  24  Mo.  24:  1255. 
V.  New  York,  35  Hun  458:    130. 
V.  New  York,  110  N.  Y.  509:   428, 

1262,  1342. 
King's   Leasehold  Estates,  L.  R.    16 

Eq.  Cas.  521:   1260. 
King's  Prerogative  etc'.,  12  Coke  12 : 

16. 
King's  Road,  1  Dall.  11:  1388. 
Kingston  Road,   In  re,   134   Pa.    St. 

409:   1366,  1376. 
Kingston  Tp.  Road,  5  Luzerne  Leg. 

Reg.  Rep.  43:   1387. 
Kinion  v.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

118  Mo.  577:   956. 
Kinnealy  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

69  Mo.  658:  459. 
Kinnear  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Beatty,  21  Ohio 

C.  C.  384:   380. 
v.   Beatty,   65   Ohio   St.   264:    371, 

380,  388,  392,  398,  1595. 
Kinney  v.  Pittsburg  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  208 

Pa.  St.  30:  743. 
Kinnie  v.  Bare,  68  Mich.  625:   564, 

569,  570,  576,  979,  980,  1088. 
Y.  Bare,  80  Mich.  345:  1034,  1380. 
Kinsey  v.  New  York,  75  App.  Div. 

262:    1338,   1554. 
V.  New  York,  177  N.  Y.  568:  1338, 

1554. 
v.    Union   Traction    Co.,    169    Ind. 

563:  280,  286,  289,  292,  313,  334, 

1589,  1591. 
Kinsman  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Broadway 

&  N.  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  36  Ohio  St. 

239:    426,    427,    762,    763,    764, 

1283. 
Kinston  etc.  B^  R.  Co.  v.  Stroud,  132 

N.  C.  413:  919,  1050. 


clxii 


JASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.   II,  pp.   743-l'719.] 


Kip  V.  New  York  &  Harlem  E.  E. 

Co.,  6  Hun  24:  748,  1624. 
V.  New  York  &  Harlem  R.  R.  Co., 

67  N.  Y.  227:   689. 
Klrby  v.  Boylston  Market  Assn.,  14 

Gray  252:  492. 
V.  Chicago  ete.  Ry.  Co.,   106  Fed. 

551:  931. 
V.   Citizens'   R.   Co.,   48  Md.    168: 

354. 
V.  Citizens'  Telephone  Co.,  17  S.  D. 

362:    342. 
V.  Panhandle  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  39  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  252:  1216,  1219,  1251. 
Kirchman  v.  West  &  So.  Towns  St. 

R.  R.  Co.,  58  111.  App.  515:  1587. 
Kirk's  Appeal,  28  Pa.  St.  185:  1419. 
Kirk  V.  Kansas  City  ete.  R.  R.  Co., 

51  La.  Ann.  664:  846,  847,  1485. 
V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  51 

La.  An.  667:   846,  847. 
V.  Lynd,  106  U.  S.  315:   19. 
Kirkendall    v.    Hunt,    4    Kan.    514: 

1570. 
V.  Omaha,  39  Neb.  1:   1179,  1215, 

1308. 
Kirkhart   v.    Roberts,    123   la.    137: 

1070,  1623. 
Kirkland   v.    Atlantic   etc.    Ry.   Co., 

126  Ga.  246 :  728. 
V.  State,  72  Ark.  171 :  484. 
Kirn  v.   Cape  Girardeau  etc.   E.  R. 

Co.  124  Mo.  App.  271:   1696. 
Kirtland  v.  Meriden,  39  Conn.  107: 

1683. 
Kishler  v.   So.   Pac.   R.  R.   Co.,   134 

Gal.  636:   1227,  1233. 
Kiskiminitas  Tp.  Road,  32  Pa.  St.  9: 

1423. 
Kissam  v.  Brooklyn  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  86 

Hun  598:   1555. 
Kissinger  v.  Hanselman,  33  Ind.  80: 

512,  517,  1033. 
Kitsap  County  v.  Melker,  50  Wash. 

29:    1020. 
Kittell  V.  Missisquoi  R.   R.   Co.,  56 

Vt.  96:   1536,  1538,  1540,  1541. 
Kivett  V.  McKeitham,  90  N.  C.  106: 

857. 
Klages  V.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  E.  Co., 

160  Pa.  St.  386:   1324. 
Klaus   V.   Jersey  City,   69   N.  J.   L. 

127,  608,  619,  1532,  1718. 
Klein   v.   St.   Paul  etc.   Ey.   Co.,   30 

Minn.  451:   1404,  1405. 
Klenk  v.  Walnut  Lake,  51  Minn.  381: 

881,  885. 
Klenke  v.  West  Homestead,  '216  Pa. 

St.  476:  632,  636. 
Klicker  v.  Guilbaud,  47  N.  J.  L.  277 : 

721. 


Klinger  v.  Bickal,  117  Pa.  St.  326: 

468. 
Klipstein  v.  New  York  El.  E.  E.  Co., 

8  Miscl.  457:  924. 
Klopp  V.  Chicago  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  (la.) 

119  N.  W.  373:    1332. 
Klosterman    v.    Chespeake    etc.    Ey. 

Co.,  114  Ky.  426:  1299,  1657. 
Klous  V.   Commonwealth,   188  Mass. 

149:    1127. 
Klug  V.  Jeflers,   88  App.  Div.  246: 

882,  884. 
Knapp  v.  MeAuley,  39  Vt.  275:  1631. 
V.  New  York  El.  E.  E.  Co.,  4  Miscl. 
408:   1379. 
Knapp  &  C.  Mfg.  Co.  v.  New  York 
etc.   E.   E.    Co.,   76   Conn.    311: 
246,  1549,  1635. 
Knapp  Stout  &  Co.  v.  St.  Louis,  153 
Mo.  560:  384,  392,  398,  1595. 
V.    St.   Louis,   156   Mo.    343:    384, 

392,  398,  1595. 
V.  St.  Louis  Transfer  R.  R.  Co.  126 
Mo.    26:     254,    311,    314,    1582, 
1591,  1592. 
Knauft  V.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  22 

Minn.  173:  1225,  1321. 
Knickerbocker  Ice  Co.  v.  Forty-sec- 
ond Street  E.  R.  Co.,  85  App. 
Div.  530:    115. 
V.  Forty-second  Street  R.  E.   Co., 

176  N.  Y.  408:   115. 
V.  Philadelphia  &  Reading  R.  E 
Co.,  15  Phila.  48:  315. 
Knight  V.  Ala.   Midland  E.  R.  Co, 
101  Ala.  407:  841. 
V.  Albemarle  etc.  Jl.  R.  Co.,   110 

N.  C.  58:  93. 
V.  Albemarle  etc.   R.  R.  Co.,   Ill 

N.  C.  80:  92,  1454. 
V.  Aroostook  Riv.  R.  R.  Co.,  67  Me. 

291:    698. 
V.  CarroUton  R.  E.  Co.,  9  La.  Ann. 

284:  304. 
V.  Heaton,  22  Vt.  480:  1402. 
Knoblauch  v.  Minneapolis,  56  Minn. 

321:  678,  1011,  1057,  1085. 
Knock  V.  Metropolitan  Ey.  Co.,  38  L. 
J.  C.  P.  78:  625. 
V.  Metropolitan  Ry.  Co.,  4  L.  R.  C. 
P.  131 :  625. 
Knorr  v.  Germantown  R.  R.  Co.,  5 

Whart.  256 :  1523. 
Knoth  V.  Barclay,  8  Colo.  300:   929, 
956. 
V.   Manhattan   Ry.    Co.,    109   App. 

Div.  802:    1588. 
V.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  187  N.  Y. 
243:   1588. 


CASES    CITED. 


clxiii 


[The  references  are  to   the  pages:   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742;   Vol.   II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Knowles'  Petition,  22  N.  H.  361 :  513, 

1365. 
Knowles'    Petition,    23    N.    H.    193: 

1437. 
Knowles  v.  Knowles,  25  R.   I.   325: 
887,  1492. 
V.  Muscatine,  20  la.  248:  721,  1362. 
V.  Norfolk.  &  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  102  N. 
C.  381 :  132,  1456,  1523. 
Knox  V.  Chalomer,  42  Me.  150:   103. 
V.  Epsom,  56  N.  H.  14:  1034. 
T.  Met.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  58  Hun  517 : 

1584,  1591. 
T.  Met.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  128  N.  Y. 

625:  1584,  1591. 
V.  New  York,  55  Barb.  404:  356. 
Knoxville  v.  Africa,  77  Fed.  501 :  297, 
298,  305. 
V.  Bird,  12  Lea,  121:  468. 
V.  Harth,  105  Tenn.  436:   613. 
Knoxville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Beeler,  90 

Tenn.  548 :  836. 
Knoxville  W.  Co.  v.  Knoxville,  200  U. 

S.  22:  410,  411,  417. 
Kobbe  V.  New  Brighton,  23  App.  Div. 

243:  453,  1613. 
Kobs  V.  Minneapolis,  22  Minn.  159: 

233. 
Koeb  V.  Del.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  53 
N.  J.  L.  256:   167,  470,  1475. 
V.  Del.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  54  N.  J. 

L.  401:  88,  144. 
V.  Ky.  &  Ind.  Bridge  Co.,  26  Ky.  L. 

R.  216:  640,  1356. 
V.  North  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.,  75  Md. 

222:  267. 
V.    Sackman-Phillips    Inv.    Co.,    9 

Wash.  405:  231,  1309,  1339. 
V.  Williamsport  Water  Co.,  65  Pa. 
St.  288:   1523. 
Koeffler  v.  Milwaukee,  85  Wis.  397: 

237,  1597. 
Koehler  v.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co., 
9  App.  Div.  449:   1355. 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  159  N. 
Y.  218:    1355,   1562. 
Koehmel  v.  New  Orleans  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  27  La.  Ann.  442:  253,  307. 
Koelle  V.  Kuecht,  99  111.  396 :  532. 
Koenig  v.  Winona  Co.,  10  Minn.  238 : 
1424. 
V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  27  Neb. 
699:  686,  1578. 
Koeppen  v.  Sedalia,  89  Mo.  App.  648 : 

237. 
Koerper'  v.  St.  Paul  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 

42  Minn.  340;  1211. 
Kohl  V.  United  States,  91  U.  S.  367: 

672,  931,  932. 
Kohlhepp  V.  West  Roxbury,  120  Mass. 
596:  1518. 


Kokomo  V.  Mahan,  100  Ind.  242 :  210, 

238,  602,  617,  1597. 
Koopman  v.  Blodgett,  70  Mich.  610 : 

80,  1604. 
Kopetzky  v.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R. 

Co.,  14  Miscl.  311:  1304. 
Kopp  V.  Northern  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  41 

Minn.  310:  441,  1338,  1453. 
Koppikus  V.  State  Capitol  Comrs.,  16 

Cal.  248:  927,  1004. 
Kornder  v.  Kings  County  El.  R.  R. 

Co.,  61  App.  Div.  439:  1555. 
Kossler   v.   Pittsburgh   etc.   Ry.   Co., 

208  Pa.  St.  50,  1188,  1201,  1213, 

1241,  1273. 
Kothe  V.  Board  of  Suprs.,  19  S.  D. 

427  :  942,  972,  1029. 
Kotz  V.  111.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  188  111. 

578:  658,  1457,  1472. 
Kough  V.  Darcey,  11  N.  J.  L.  237: 

1636. 
Kownslar  v.  Ward,  Gilmer,  Va.  127 : 

1359. 
Kraeer  v.  Pa.  R.  R.  Co.,  218  Pa.  St. 

569:   842,  864,  1485,  1646. 
Kramer  v.  Cleveland  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

5  Ohio  St.  140:   923,  927,  1013, 

1192. 
V.   Cleveland   &   Pittsburgh  R.   R. 

Co.,  5  Ohio  St.  p.  165:   1016. 
V.  Los  Angeles,  147  Cal.  668:  501. 
Krause  v.  Oregon  Steel  Co.,  45  Or. 

378:  92,  1604. 
Kreigh  v.  Chicago,  86  111.  407:   197, 

357. 
Kremer  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  51 

Minn.  15:  857,  1176,  1627,  1632. 
v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  54  Minn. 

157:  1626. 
Krenick  v.  Cordova,  95  Minn.   372: 

1031. 
Kreuger  v.  Wis.  Telephone  Co.,   106 

Wis.  96:  339,  1593. 
Kroffe  V.    Springfield,   86   Mo.   App. 

530:  237. 
Krone  v.  Kings  County  El.  R.  R.  Co., 

50  Hun  431 :  1614. 
Kronenwetter's  Appeal,   135  Pa.   St. 

176:   1386. 
Kroop  V.  Forman,  31  Mich.  144:  706, 

969,  1361,  1420. 
Krug  V.  St.  Mary's  Borough,  152  Pa. 

St.  37:  93. 
Kruger  v.  Le  Blanc,  70  Mich.  76 :  865, 

867,  1358,  1516. 
Krumweide  v.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co., 

9  Miscl.  552:  1196,  1296,  1300. 
Kucheman  v.  C.  C.  &  D.  Ry.  Co.,  46 

la.  306:  200,  242,  247,  251,  323, 

1293,  1299,  1335. 


clxiv 


CASES    CITED. 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Kuh  V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co., 

58  N.  Y.  Supr.  138:    1145,  1150. 

Kuhl  V.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  E.  R.  Co., 

101  Wis.  42:  248,  621,  858,  1719. 

Kuhn   V.   111.    Cent.   R.   R.    Co.,   Ill 

111.  App.  323:  450,  655,  661. 

V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  7  Misel. 

53:   1301. 
V.  Truman,  15  Kan.  423 :  939. 
Kundinger  v.  Saginaw,  59  Mich.  355 : 

1013,  1084,  1395,  1402. 
Kuschke  v.  St.  Paul,  45  Minn.  225: 

229,  987,  1011,  1021,  1504. 

Kushequa   R.   R.   Co.   v.   Pittsburgh 

etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  200  Pa.  St.  526: 

900. 

Kyle   V.   Auburn   etc.   R.   R.    Co.,    2 

Barb.  Ch.  489:  1386,  1446,  1483. 

V.  Board  of  Comrs.,  94  Ind.  115: 

1393 
V.  Logan,  87  111.  67:  867. 
V.  Malin,  8  Ind.  34:  919. 
V.  Miller,  108  Ind.  90:  1378. 
V.  Texas  &  N.  0.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  p.  518:   533. 
Kyne  v.  Wilmington  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
8  Houst.   185:   780. 

L. 

Labry  v.  Gilmour,  121  Ky.  367:   197, 

199. 
Lacey,  Ex  parte,  108  Cal.  326:   469. 
Lachlan  v.  Gray,  105  la.  259 :  387. 
Lackawanna  Ave.  Viaduct,  14  Pa.  Co. 

Ct.  603:   1081. 
Lackawanna  Tp.  Road,   112   Pa.   St. 

212:    1390. 
Lackland  v.  North  Mo.  R.  R.  Co.,  31 
Mo.  180:  178,  253,  254,  307,  309. 
V.  North  Missouri  R.  R.  Co.  34  Mo. 

259:  253,  307. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  31  Mo.  183:  311. 
Lacroix    v.    Medway,    12    Met.    123: 

1527. 
La  Crosse  City  Ry.  Co.  v.  Higbee,  107 

Wis.  389 :  273,  274,  275. 
La  Crosse  &  Milwaukee  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Seeger,  4  Wis.  268:  1116,  1527. 
Ladd  V.  Boston,  151  Mass.  585:  430, 
957. 
V.  French,  6  N.  Y.  Supp.  56 :  1490. 
V.  Philadelphia,   171  Pa.   St.   485 
643. 
La   Farrier   v.   Hardy,   66   Vt.    200 

1009,  1018,  1513. 
La   Fayette   v.   Bush,    19   Ind.    326 
1160,  1570. 
V.  Nagle,   113   Ind.   425:    236,   601, 
617,  1119.  1128,  1550.  1648,  1656, 
1718. 
V.  Spencer,  14  Ind.  399:   210. 
V.  Snencer,  19  Ind.  326:   210. 


La   Fayette  v.   Shultz,  44   Ind.   97: 
1681. 
V.  Wortman,  107  Ind.  404:  601,  617, 
1135,  1137,  1550. 
Lafayette  etc.  R.  R.   Co.  v.  Butner, 
162  Ind.  400:   7,  672,  673,  927, 
929,  1042,  1045,  1046,  1395. 
V.  Murdock,  68  Ind.  137:  424,  1221, 

1353; 
V.  Smith,  6  Ind.  249:  1522. 
V.  Winslow,  66  111.  219:    1270. 
La  Fayette  Plank  Road  Co.  v.  New 
Albany  &   Salem  R.  R.   Co.,   13 
Ind.  90:  407,  409,  410,  411,  782, 
788. 
Lefeau  v.  York  County,,  20  Pa.  Supr, 

Ct.  573:  635. 
Lafiferty  v.  Girardville,   I  Monaghan 
(Pa.  Supm.)   513:  235. 
V.   Schuylkill  Riv.  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
124  Pa.  St.  297 :  952,  1259,  1635. 
Laflin  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  33 
Fed.  415:  1110,  1139,  1177,  1217. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  34  Fed. 
859:    1150. 
Lager  v.   Sibley  County,   100  Minn. 

85:   713. 
Laguna  Dr.  Dist.  v.  Charles  Martin 
Co.,  144  Cal.  209 :  497,  501,  564, 
572,  573. 
V.  Charles  Martin  Co.,  5  Cal.  App. 
166:   1067,  1070,  1378. 
La  Harpe  v.  Elm  Tp^  Gas  etc.  Co., 
69  Kan.  97:   322,  338,  358,  536, 
1622. 
Lahr  v.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co., 
104  N.  Y.  268:  67,  178,  184.  197, 
199,  202,  263,  264,  1296. 
Laing  v.  Americus,  86  Ga.  758:   199. 
V.  United  N.  J.   R.   &  C.   Co.,  54 
N.  J.  L.  576:    1147,   1293,  1303. 
1314. 
Laird   v.   Pittsburg,   205  Pa.   St.   1: 

421,   539,    1494. 
Lake  v.  Bok,  31  111.  App.  45:   153. 
V.  Burcky,  57  111.  App.  547:   382, 

391,  398,  644. 
V.  Loysen,  66  Wis.  424:  981,  991. 
V.  Va.  &  Truckee  R.  R.  Co.,  7  Nev. 
294:  408,  413. 
Lake  City  v.  Fulkerson,  122  la.  569 : 

377,  395,   1502. 
Lake  Erie  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Board  oi 
Comrs.,  57  Fed.  945:  776,  797. 
V.  Boswell,  137  Ind.  336:  881,  883. 
V.  Comrs.,  63  Ohio  St.  23:   569. 
V.  Griffin,  92  Ind.  487 :   1540,  1543. 
V.  Griffin,  107  Ind.  464:   1540. 
T.    Hancock    Co.,   63    Ohio   St.   23: 

495,   ,580,   581.   776,    1341. 
V.  Heath,  9  Ind.  558:   923,  929. 
V.  Hilfiker,  12  Ind.  App.  280:  154. 


CASES    CITED. 


clxv 


[The  references   are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Lake  Erie  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kennedy, 

132  Ind.  274:   858. 
V.  Kinaey,  87  Ind.  514:  1463,  1464. 

1628. 
v.    Kokomo,    130    Ind.    224:    749, 

1409. 
V.  Lauter,  47  111.  App.  339:    1504. 
T.  Lee,  14  Ind.  App.  328:   1646. 
V.  Michener,   117   Ind.   465:    1568, 

1602. 
V.  Priest,  131  Ind.  413:   840,  854, 

947. 
V.   Pureell,   75   111.   App.   573:    87, 

1648,  1652. 
V.   Scott,    132   111.   429:    448,   655, 

671. 
V.  Scott,  32  111.  App.  292:  655. 
V.  Shelby,  163  Ind.  36:   1192,  1288. 
V.  Whitham,  155  111.  514:  872. 
V.  Young,  135  Ind.  426:   93,  1601, 

1604. 
V.  Ziebarth,  6  Ind.  App.  228:   835, 

836,  845. 
Lake   Keon  Nav.   etc.   Co.   v.   Klein, 

63  Kan.  484:  498,  503,  587,  591, 

592,  593,  672,  675,   1496. 
T.  McLain  etc.  Co.,  69  Kan.  334: 

1224,     1236,     1270,    1316,     1321, 

1400. 
Lake  Merced  Water   Co.   v.   Cowles, 

31   Cal.  215:   2,  908. 
Lake  Pleasant  Water  Co.  v.  Contra 

Costa   Water  Co.,   67   Cal.   659: 

799,    1043. 
Lake  Roland  El.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Balti- 
more, 77  Md.  352:  303,  427. 
V.  Frick,  86  Md.  259:    1144,  1293, 

1334. 
V.  Hibernian  Society,  83  Md.  420: 

1355. 
V.  Webster,  81  Md.  529:  621,  1293, 
1549,  1552,  1650.  1657. 

V.  Weir,  86  Md.  273:   1149. 
Lakeside  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Worcester,  186 

Mass.  552:   1127,  1240. 
Lakeside  Paper  Co.  v.  State,  15  App. 

Div.  N.  Y.  169:  80,  169. 
Lake  Shore  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter  of, 

65  Hun  538:  1437. 
Lake  Shore  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Balti- 
more &   C.   R.   R.   Co.,   149   111. 

272:   764,  769,  976,  1135. 
V.  Brown,  16  Ohio  C.  C.  269:  226. 
V.  Chicago,  148  111.  509:   749,  895, 

1287. 
V.  Chicago,  151  111.  359:    749,  895, 

l^RT.   1292. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  100  111. 

21:  1280. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  96  111. 

125:   1624. 


Lake  Shore  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Chi- 
cago etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  97  111.  506: 
1610. 

V.   Cincinnati   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   116 
Ind.  578:  760,  893,  894,  991. 

V.    Cincinnati,    30    Ohio    St.    604: 
476. 

V.  Elyria,  14  Ohio  C.  C.  48 :  197. 

V.   Elyria,   69   Ohio   St.   414:    197, 
309,   1489,    1642. 

V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  8  Fed. 
858:   754,  759,   1061,  1609. 

V.  Smith,  173  U.  S.  684:  484. 

V.  Whiting,  161  Ind.  76:  175,  1445, 
1457,  1487. 
Lake  St.  El.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Brooks,  90 

111.  App.  173:   639,   1302. 
Lake  Superior  &  Miss.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Greve,  17  Minn.  322:   1332,  1477. 
Lake   View  v.   Rose    Hill   Cem.   Co., 

70  111.  192:   15,  469. 

Lake  Whateomb   L.   Co.    v.   Callvert, 

33  Wash.  126:   1348. 
Lakkie  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  44 

Minn.  438:   320. 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  44  Minn. 

438:   370,  384,  1295,  1335. 
Lally  V.  Central  Valley  R.  R.  Co..  215 

Pa.  St.  436:   1129. 
Lamar  v.  Browne,  92  U.  S.  187:   18, 

19. 
V.  Comrs.  Court,  21  Ala.  772:  1411. 
Lamar  Co.  v.  Clements,  49  Tex.  348: 

421,  1494. 
Lamb  v.  Lane,  4  Ohio  St.   167:    24, 

924. 
V.  North  London  R.  R.  Co.,  4  L. 

R.  Ch.  522:    709. 
V.  Pontiac  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  150  Mich. 

340:   1484,  1646. 
V.  Rickets,  11  Ohio,  311:   104. 
Lambar  v.   St.   Louis,   15   Mo.    610: 

239. 
Lambe  v.  Love,  109  N.  C.  305:    1402. 
Lambert   v.    Howe,    14    Johns.    383: 

1496. 
Lamborn  v.  Bell,   18  Col.   346:    560, 

564,  1225. 
Lamm  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  45 

Minn.    71:    200,    202,    253,    304, 

330,  1355,  1356,  1451. 
Lamming  v.  Galusha,  135  N.  Y.  239: 

1580,  1617. 
La  Mont  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

62  la.  193:   1150,  1243. 
Lamphrey   v.    State,    52    Minn.    181: 

109,  110,  111,  112,  113,  115,  119, 

125,  127,  130,  137. 
Lampley  v.  Atlantic   Coast  Line   R. 

R.  Co.,  63   S.   C.  462:   92. 
V.  Atlantic:   Coast  Line  R.   R.   Co., 

71  S.  C.  156:   693. 


clxvi 


CASES    CITED. 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.  II,   pp.   733-1719.) 


Lampson   v.   Drain  Comr.   45   Mich. 

150:  1017,  1032. 
Lancashire  &  Yorkshire  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Evans,  15  Beav.  322:  1611. 
Lancaster  v.   Kennebec  Log  Driving 
Co.,  62  Me.  272:  912. 
V.  Leaman,  107  Ky.  35:    1376. 
V.  Leaman,  110  Ky.  251:  1407. 
V.  Pope,  1  Mass.  86:  1033. 
V.  Richardson,   4  Lans.   136:    347, 

1491. 
V.  Richmond,  83  Me.  534:   1527. 
Lancaster  City  Road,  68  Pa.  St.  396 : 

962,  1017,  1036. 
Lancaster  County  v.  Lancaster,   170 

Pa.  St.  108:  1511,  1512. 

Lance  v.  Chicago,  Mil.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 

Co.,  57  la.  636;  1267,  1316,  1404. 

Lance's  Appeal,  55  Pa.  St.  16:  1475. 

Lancey  v.  King  County,  15  Wash.  9: 

501. 
Lancy  v.  Boston,  185  Mass.  219 :  1003 

1523,  1707,  1708,  1709. 
Land  v.  Smith,  44  La.  Ann.  931 :  877. 
V.  Wilmington  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  107 
N.  C.  72:  1713. 
Landaff'a   Petition,   34   N.    H.    163: 

1097,  1415,  1421. 
Landerbrun  v.  Duffv,  2  Pa.  St.  398: 

434,  1455. 
Lander  v.  Bath,  85  Me.  141 :  235. 
Landers  v.  Whitefield,  154  111.  630: 

865,  870. 
Lane  v.  Boston,  125  Mass.  519:  605, 
615. 
V.    Burnap,    39    Mich.    736:    1033, 

1420. 
V.  Harbor  Comra.,   70   Conn.   685: 

139. 
V.  Lamke,  53  App.  Div.  395:   347. 
V.  Met.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  69  App.  Div. 

231:   1245,  1332. 
V.   Mich.   Traction  Co.,   135   Mich. 

70:   851,  1615. 
V.  Miller,  17  Ind.  58:  858,  966. 
V.  Miller,  22  Ind.  104 :  858,  1522. 
V.  Saginaw,  53  Mich.  442:   896. 
V.  Smith,  71  Conn.  65:   139. 
V.  Smith  Bros.,  80  Conn.  185:  129. 
Lanesborough  v.  County  Comrs.,  22 

Pick.  278:  955,  1425. 
Laney  v.  Jasper,  39  111.  46:  145. 
Langdon  v.  New  York,  59  Hun  434; 
1229,  1147. 
V.  New  York,  93  N.  Y.  129:    108, 

127    132. 
V.  New  York,  133  N.  Y.  628:  1139, 
1147. 
Lange  v.  La  Crosse  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  118 

Wis.  558:  248,  1589. 
Langford   v.    Co.    Comrs.,    16    Minn. 
375:   922,  927,  1004,  1010. 


Langley   v.   Augusta,    118   Ga.    590: 

141,  1660. 
Lanquist    v.    Chicago,    200    IH.    69: 

1143,  1144,  1145,  1222,  1379. 
Lansing  v.  Caswell,  4  Paige,  519:  817. 
V.  Smith,  8  Cow.  146:  133. 
V.  Smith,  4  Wend.  9:  133. 
Lanterman  v.  Blairstown  R.  R.  Co., 

28  N.  J.  Eq.   1:    1570. 
Lantis,  Matter  of,  9  Mich.  324:  1416, 

1417. 
Lapan  v.  Comrs.,  65  Me.  160:   1415. 
Lapish  V.  Bangor  Bank,  8  Greenl.  85 

103. 
La  Plaisance  Bay  Harbor  Co.  v.  Mon 

roe.  Walk.  Ch.   155:   104. 
Laplant    v.    Marshalltown,    134    la. 

261:    1624. 
Large  v.  Philadelphia,  3  Phila.  382 

1036,  1570. 
Larimer  etc.  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Larimer, 

St.   Ry.    Co.,    137   Pa.    St.   533 

300,  910. 
Larkin  v.  Scranton,  162  Pa.  St.  289 

1029,  1330. 
Lamed  v.  Briscoe,  62  Mich.  393 :  237. 
Larney  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co, 

62  App.  Div.  311:   257,  1299 
Laroe  v.  Northampton  St.   Ry.   Co, 

189  Mass.  254:  307,  606. 
Laroz  v.   Northampton  St.  Ry.   Co, 

189  Mass.  254:  324. 
Larrabee  v.  Cloverdale,  131  Cal.  96 

90,  236. 
Larsh  v.  Test,  48  Ind.  130:   898. 
Larsen  v.  Oregon  R.  R.  Co.,  19  Or. 

240:  957. 
Larson  v.   Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  19 

S.  D.  284:  883. 
V.  Superior  Short  Line  Ry.  Co.,  64 

Wis.  59:  1400,  1405. 
Lasala  v.  Holbrook,  4  Paige  169 :  440, 

441. 
Lasher  v.  Saratoga  Springs,  17  App. 

Div.  624:  84. 
V.  Saratoga  Springs,  163  N.  Y.  582 : 

84. 
La  Societa  Italiana  v.  San  Francisco, 

131  Cal.  169:  1498. 
Lassiter  v.  Norfolk  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  126 

N.  C.  509:  156,  1549,  1552,  1655, 

1716. 
Latah  Co.  v.  Hasfurther,  12  Ida.  797 : 

515,  1091,  1092,  1406. 
V.   Peterson,   2   Idaho,    1118:    515, 

521. 
Lathrop    v.    Racine,    119    Wis.    461: 

463. 
Lathrop  Tp.  Road,  In  re,  84  Pa.  St. 

126:  1390. 
Latimer  v.  Tillamook  County,  22  Or. 

291:  400,  1384. 


CASES    CITED. 


clxvii 


tThe   references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.r 


Launstein   v.    Launstein,    150   Mich. 

524:    146. 
Laure  v.  Oil  City  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  170 

Pa.  St.  249 :  304. 
Laurel  v.  Rowell,  84  Miss.  435:  375, 

388,  395,  406. 
Laurel  Hill   Cemetery  v.   San  Fran- 
cisco, 152  Cal.  464:  473. 
Laverty  v.  State,  109  Ind.  217:  1514. 
Laviosa  v.   Chicago  St.  L.   &  N.  O. 
R.  R.   Co.,  1  McGloin  La.  299: 
253,  ,307. 
Law  V.  Galena  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  IS  111. 
324:    1419. 
V.  Railroad,  63  N.  H.  557:  1231. 
V.  Sanitary  District,  197  111.  523: 
1361. 
Lawlor  v.  Baring  Boom  Co.,  56  Me. 

443 :  87,  94. 
Lawless  v.  Reese,  4  Bibh  309:   678, 

1004,  1032.  1403. 

Lawondoski  v.  Wilkes-Barre  etc.  Ry. 

Co.,  35   Pa.  Supr.   Ct.   10:    1130. 

Lawrence  v.  Boston,  119  Mass.  126: 

1129,  1134,  1228. 

V.  Fairhaven,  5  Gray  110:  91,  236. 

V.  Great  Northern  R.  R.   Co.,   16 

Q.  B.  642:  89. 
V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  15 

Daly,  502:  1146. 
V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  126 

N.  Y.  483:  1304. 
V.Miller,  2  N.  Y.  245:  943. 
T.  Miller,  1  Sandf.  516:  943. 
V.   Morgan's   R.    &    S.    S.    Co.,    39 

La.  Ann.  427:   1631. 
V.  Nahant,    136  Mass.   477:    1030, 

1641. 
T.  Newark,  38  N.  J.  L.  151:  1168. 
T.  New   York,   2   Barb.   577:    197, 

378,  388,  406,  1596. 
V.   Philadelphia,    154   Pa.   St.   20: 

392,  394,  630,  647. 
V.  Saratoga  Lake  Ry.  Co.,  36  Hun 

467:  843,  844,  851,  852. 
V.  Second  Municipality,  2  La.  An. 

651:  1319. 
V.    Second    Municipality,    12    Rob. 
La.    453:    1546,    1548. 
Lawrenceburg    etc.     R.     R.     Co.     v. 

Smith,  3  Ind.  253:  1398. 
Lawrence   County  v.   Deadwood   etc. 

Co.,  11  S.  D.  74:   961. 
Lawrence   &  Others   Appeal,   78   Pa. 

St.  365:   856,  1258. 
Lawrence   Railroad   Co.   v.   Cobb,   35 
Ohio  St.  94:  1137,  1710. 
v.  O'Hara,  48  Ohio  St.  343:   243, 

247,  924,  1136. 
V.  O'Hara,  50  Ohio  St.  667:   940, 
996,  1546,  1559. 
Lawrie  v.  Silsby,  76  V.t.  240:  71. 


Lawton,  Matter  of,  24  N.  Y.  Misc. 
426:  513. 
V.    New    Rochelle,    123    App.    Div. 

832:  610. 
V.  Seaboard  Air  Line  R.  R.  Co.,  75 

S.  C.  82:   92,  94,  1651,  1653. 
V.  South  Bound  R.  R.  Co.,  61  S.  C. 

548:   148,  158. 
V.  Steele,  119  N.  Y.  226;   480. 
V.   Steele,    152   U.   S.    133:    14,    15, 
486. 
Layman  v.  Beeler,  113  Ky.  221 :  630, 

1549. 
Lazarus  v.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co., 
5  App.  Div.  398:   1302. 
V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  14 

App.  Div.  438:  1305. 
V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  69 

Hun  190:  1301. 
V.  Morris,  29  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  505 ;  812, 

1499. 
V.  Morris,  212  Pa.  St.  128:   7,  21, 
709,  806,  812,  1499. 
L.   C.   &   C.   R.  R.   Co.   V.   Chappell, 

Rice  (S.  C.)  383:  684. 
Lea  V.  Johnson,  9  Iredell  Law,   15: 

709. 
Leach  v.  Day,  27  Cal.  643:   516. 
Leader  v.  Moxon,  3  Wils.  461:  205. 
Leadville  v.  Bohn  Min.  Co.,  37  Colo. 
248:   196,  1497. 
V.  Coronado  Min.  Co.,  29  Colo.  17 : 

198,  1497. 
V.  Coronado  Min.  Co.,  37  Colo.  234 : 

1497. 
V.  St.  Louis  S.  &  M.  Co.,  29  Colo. 
40:  198,  1497. 
League  Island,  In  re,   1   Brews.  Pa. 

524:  588. 
Leak  v.  Selma,  Rome  &  Dalton  R.  R. 

Co.,  47  Ga.  345:  1438,  1439. 
Leale  v.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co., 

61  Hun  613:  1146,  1304. 
Leary  v.  Hannibal  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  38 

Mo.  485:   1523. 
Leath   v.   Summers,    3    Iredell   Law, 

108:    990. 
Leavenworth   v.    Douglass,    59    Kan. 
416:  363,  384,  390,  398. 
V.  Duffy,   10  Kan.  App.  124:   604. 
Leavenworth    County   Comrs.  v.   Es- 

pen,  12  Kan.  531:  1018. 
Leavenworth  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Atchi- 
son, 137  Mo.  218:  923,  995,  1011. 
v.  Curtan,  51  Kan.  432:    179,  252. 
320,     351,    373,    382,    388,    398 
1294,   1549,  1648,  1657,   1662. 
V.  Herley,  45  Kan.  535:  1124,  1251 

1252. 
V.  Meyer,  50  Kan.  25:   1034,  1098 
1099,  1360. 


clxviii 


CASES    CITED. 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.  II,   pp.   74S-1719.] 


Leavenworth  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Meyer, 
58  Kan.  308:  1100,  1106,  1515. 
V.  Paul,  28  Kan.  816:   1124,  1126, 

1316. 
V.  Usher,  42  Kan.  637:  1252,  1455. 
V.    Wilkins,    45    Kan.    674:     1208, 
1212,   1545. 
Leavitt  v.  Cambridge,  120  Mass.  157 : 
484. 
V.    Eastman,    77    Me.    117:     1018, 
1033. 
Lebanon   v.    Olcott,   I   N.     H.    339: 

1523,  1526. 
Lebanon    Min.    Co.    v.    Consolidated 

Co.,  6  Colo.  371:  996. 
Lebanon   Water   Co.,   9   Pa.   Co.   Ct. 

S89:   783,  918. 
Leber  v.  Minneapolis  &  N.  W.  Ey. 
Co.,   29   Minn.   256:    1159,   1352. 
Lebya  v.  Armijo,  11  N.  M.  437:  976, 

1412. 
Lecoul  V.   Police  Jury,  20  La.  Ann. 

308:   678. 
Ledyard  v.  TenEyck,  36  Barb.  102: 

109. 
Lee  V.  Harris,  206  111.  428:  891,  1630. 
V.  Minneapolis,  22  Minn.   13:   211. 
V.  Northwestern  Union  Ry.  Co.,  33 

Wis.  222:    1402. 
V.  Pembroke  Iron  Co.,  57  Me.  481 : 

67,  90,  95,  108. 
V.  Springfield  Water  Co.,  176  Pa. 

St.  223:  74,  1123. 
V.  Tebo  &  Neosho  R.  R.  Co.,  53  Mo. 
178:    1186. 
Ijeeds  V.  Camden  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  53 
N.  J.  L.  229:   1227,  1407. 
V.   Richmond,    102   Ind.   372:    335, 
672,  680. 
Leep  V.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  58 

Ark.  407:  479. 
Leet  Tp.  Road,  159  Pa.  St.  72:  1363, 

1389. 
Lefevre's  Appeal,  32  Cal.  565:  1135. 
Lefel  V.  Overchain,  90  Ind.  5u:  1400. 
Leffmann  v.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co., 
120  App.  Div.  528:  259,  1457. 
1473. 
Lefkovitz    v.    Chicago,   238    111.    23: 

358. 
Leflore  v.  Cannon,  81  Miss.  334:  91, 

1604. 
Lefrois  v.  Monroe  County,  24  App. 

Div.  421:   83,  1605. 
Legg  V.  Legg,  34  Wash.   126:    1556. 
Leggett  V.   Detroit,    137   Mich.   247: 

736. 
Lehigh  Coal  Co.  v.  WilkesBarre  etc. 
R.    R.    Co.,    187    Pa.    St.    145: 
1228,  1231. 


Lehigh    Coal   &   Nav.    Co.    v.   Inter- 
County  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  167  Pa.  St. 
75:  300. 
Lehigh   County  State  Road,   60  Pa. 

St.  330:   1101. 
Lehigh  Valley  Coal  Co.  v.  Chicago, 
26    Fed.    415:    415,    631,    1120, 
1131. 
V.  U.  S.  Pipe  Line  Co.,  7  Luzerne 
Leg.  Reg.  Rep.  77:  728. 
Lehigh  Valley  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dover  & 
Rockaway  R.  R.  Co.,  43  N.  J.  L. 
528:  1105,  1106,  1701. 
v.  Lazarus,  28  Pa.  St.  203:    1315. 
V.    McFarlan,    43    N.    J.    L.    605: 

1540,  1543,  1713,  1714. 
V.  Phillipsburg,  73  N.  J.  L.  138: 

698. 
T.  Trone,  28  Pa.  St.  206:   1311. 
Lehigh  Water  Go's  Appeal,   102  Pa. 

St.  515:   416. 
Lehmann   v.    Rinehart,   90   la.   346: 

976. 

Lehmieke  v.  St.  Paul,  Stillwater  etc. 

R.  R.  Co.,  19  Minn.  464:   1119, 

1122,  1128,  1139,  1146. 

Leiber  v.  People  33  Colo.  493:   1515. 

Leiby  v.  Clear  Spring  W^ater  Co.,  205 

Pa.  St.  634:   1129,  1268. 
Leigh  v.  Garysburg  Mfg.  Co.,  132  N. 

C.  167:  533. 
Leighton  v.  Concord  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
72  N.  H.  224:  363,  377,  388,  401, 
.405,  1412. 
Leiper  v.  B.  &  0.  R.  R.  Co.,  5  Pa. 
Co.  Ct.  60:    1325,  1444. 
V.  Denver,  36  Colo.  110:   633. 
Leisse  et  al.  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  2  Mo.  App.  105 :  1693,  1694. 
V.  St.  Louis  R.  E.  Co.,  6  Mo.  App. 
585:    1693,  1694. 
Leitzsey  v.   Columbia  Water  Power 

Co.,  47  S.  C.  464:  681,  823. 
Leland  v.   Woodbury,   4  Gush.   245: 

1522. 
Leman  v.  New  York,  5  Bos.  414:  236. 
Lembeck  v.   Nye,   47   Ohio   St.  336: 

109. 
Lenhart  v.  State,  75  App.  Div.  162: 

1196. 
Lenox  v.  Knox  &  Lincoln  R.  R.  Co., 

62  Me.  322:   1104. 
Lent,  Matter  of,  47  App.  Div.  349: 

1005,  1080. 
Lent  V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  55 
Hun  180:   1526. 
V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,   130 

N.  Y.  504:  1526. 
V.  Tillson,  72  Cal.  404:   674,  1008, 
1010. 


CASES    CITED. 


clxix 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Lent  V.  Tilyou,  106  App.  Div.   189: 

880,  887. 
Lentell  v.   Boston  etc.    St.   Ry.   Co., 

187  Mass.  445:   1158,  1173. 
Lenz  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  Ill 

Wis.   198:    621,  710,   733,   1719. 
Leonard  v.  Cassidy,  8  Ohio  C.  C.  529: 
226. 
V.  Detroit,  108  Mich.  599:   865. 
V.  Rutland,  66  Vt.  105:  1331. 
V.    Sparks,    117    Mo.     103:     1018, 

1027,  1086,  1515,  1516,  1518. 
^.  Wading  Riv.  Res.  Co.,  113  Mass. 
235:   1524. 
Leopold  V.  Chesapeake  etc.  Canal  Co., 
1  Gill  222 :  780. 
V.  Chicago,  150  111.  568:  1219. 
LeRoy  v.  Leonard,  (Tenn.  Ch.  App.) 

35  S.  W.  884:  882. 
Leroy  etc.   R.   R.   Co.  v.   Hawk,   49 
Kan.  638:  1128. 
V.  Ross,  40  Kan.  598:   1124,  1125, 

1203    1312. 
V.  Small,  46  Kan.  300:   862,   1547. 
Lesher  v.  Wabash  Navigation  Co.,  14 

in.  85:  688. 
Lesley  v.  Klamath  Co.,  44  Ore.  491: 

970. 
Leslie  v.  St.  Louis,  47  Mo.  474:  893, 

894. 
L'Esperanee  v.  Great  Western  R.  R. 
Co.,  14  U.  C.  Q.  B.  187 :  158,  847. 
Less  V.  Butte,  28  Mont.  27 :  630,  632, 

1549. 
Lessieur  v.  Custer  Co.  61  Neb.  612: 

1135. 
Lester  v.  Lobley,  7  A.  &  E.  124:  961. 

V.  Lobley,  34  E.  C.  L.  R.  86:  961. 
Lester  Real  Estate  Co.  v.  St.  Louis, 
169  Mo.  227:    1601. 
V.  St.  Louis,  170  Mo.  31 :  1695. 
Letherman  v.  Hauser,  77  Neb.  731 : 

400,  406,  973,  1513,  1596. 
Levant  v.  Comrs  67  Me.  429:    1414. 
Levee  Comrs.  v.  Allen,  60  Miss.  93: 
1086. 
V.  Daney,  65  Miss.  335:  1157,  1426, 

1713. 
V.     Harkleroads,     62     Miss.     807: 

1310. 
V.  Hendricks,  77  Miss.  483:   1119, 

1176,  1227. 
V.  Lee,  85  Miss.  508:  1229,  1378. 
V.  Nelms  82  Miss.  416:  1119,  1128, 
1138,  1143. 
Levee   District  v.   Farmer,    101    Cal. 

178:  363.  377,  386,  388,  390. 
Levenson  v.  Boston  El.  Ry.  Co.  191 

Mass.   75:    1144,    1151. 
Leverett  v.  Middle  Georgia  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  96  Ga,  385:  728. 


Levering  v.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.   R. 

Co.,  8  W.  &  S.  459:  1464,  1628. 
Levering   St.   In   re,    14   Phila.   349: 

612,  631,  636. 
Levisay  v.  Delp,  9  Baxt.  415:   1608. 
Levi   V.    Worcester    Consol.    St.    Ry. 

Co.,  193  Mass.  116:  428. 
Levin  v.   Goodwin,    191    Mass.    341: 
457. 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  165  N. 
Y.  572:   1137. 
Levis  V.  Newton,  75  Fed.  884 :  337. 
Leviston   v.    Junction   R.   R.    Co.,   7 

Ind.,  597:   1522. 
Levitt  V.  Eastman,  77  Me.  117:  1517. 
Lewis  V.  Baker,  39  Neb.  636:  1492. 
V.   Darby,    166   Pa.    St.   613:    630, 

636,   1353. 
V.  Englewood  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  223  111. 

223:   1130,  1149. 
V.  Germantown  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  16 

Phila.,  608:   688,  778. 
V.  Germantown  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  16 
Phila.  621:    754,   759,  788,  793, 
796. 
V.    Homestead,    194    Pa.    St.    199: 

612,  634. 
V.  Johnson,  76  Fed.  476:  129. 
V.  Jones,  1  Pa.  St.  336:    1486. 
V.   McGuire,    3   Bush    (Ky.)    202: 

19. 
V.    New    Britain,    32    Conn.    568: 

1341. 
V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,' 162  N. 

Y.  202:   257,  866. 
V.  Portland,  25  Ore.  133:  118,  137. 
V.  Rough,  26  Ind.  398 :   1574. 
V.    Seattle,    5    Wash.    741:     1160, 
1161,    1188,    1203,    1207,    1216, 
1546. 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  5  S.  D. 

148:  707,  1517. 
V.  Springfield  Water  Co.,  176  Pa. 

St.  230:    1129. 
V.     Washington,     5     Gratt.     265: 

513,  520. 
V.  Wilmington  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,   11 
Mich.  Law  91:   937. 
Lewis   County  v.   Gordon,  20   Wash. 
80:  501,  570,  581. 
V.  McGeorge,  47   Wash.  414:    735, 

1348. 
V.  Schobey,  31  Wash.  357:   895. 
Lewis    Street,    Matter    of,    2    Wend. 

472:    183,  1326. 
Lewiston  v.  Co.  Comrs.,  30  Me.   19: 

917,  1363. 
Lewiston   etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ayer,  27 
App.  Div.  571:  1217. 


cLxx 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Lewiston  Road,  8  Pa.  St.  109 :  1707, 

1708. 
Lewiston  Road,  84  Pa.  St.  410:  1388. 
Lewis  Tp.  Imp.  Co.  v.  Royer,  38  Ind. 

App.  151:  91. 
Lexington  v.  Long,  31  Mo.  369 :  1089, 

1207. 
Lexington  Ave.,  Matter  of,  29  Hun 

303:  738. 
Lexington  Ave.  Opening,  Matter  of, 

50  How.  Pr.  113:  1393. 
Lexington   etc.   R.  R.   Co.  v.  Apple- 
gate,  8  Dana,  289 :  178,  369,  388, 

524. 
V.   Fitchburg  R.  R.   Co.,   14  Gray 

266:  476. 
Lexington  etc.  Turnpike  Co.  v.  MC' 

Murtry,  3  B.  Mon.  516:  423,  957. 
Lexington    Print   Works   v.    Canton, 

167  Mass.  341:  912,  1571. 
v.  Canton,  171  Mass.  414:   1617. 
Lex  or  Mica  St.,  In  re,  12  Phila.  622 : 

1682. 
Leyba  v.  Armijo,  11  N.  M.  437:  707, 

1004,  1420. 
L'Hote  V.  New  Orleans,  51  La.  Ann. 

93:  473. 
V.   New   Orleans,   177   U.   S.   587: 

473. 
Liber  v.  Minneapolis  &  North  West- 
ern Ry.  Co.,  29  Minn.  256 :  1353. 
Liberty  Alley,  In  re,  8  Pa.  St.  381: 

721. 
Libmann  v.  Manhattan  E.  R.  Co.,  59 

Hun  428 :  923. 
Liekly  v.   Bishopp,   150   Mich.   256: 

1083. 
Lidgerwood   v.   Miekalek,    12   N.   D. 

348:   977,  1673. 
Lieber  v.  People,  33  Colo.  493:   868. 
Lieberman  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

141  111.  140:  268,  718,  898,  1042, 

1075,  1222,  1246,  1247,  1426. 
Liebole  v.  Traster,  41  Ind.  App.  278: 

1571. 
Liedel  v.  Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  89 

Minn.  284:   533,   1457,   1473. 
Lien   v.   Norman   County,   80   Minn. 

68:  501,  565,  567,  576,  739. 
Ligare  v.  Chicago,  139  111.  46:    132, 

135,  788. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  166  111. 

249 :   748,  920,  1228,  1236. 
Ligat  V.   Commonwealth,   19  Pa.  St. 

456:  729,  923. 
Lightcap  V.  North  Judson,  154  Ind. 

43:   886. 
Lile  V.  Gibson,  91  Mo.  App.  480:  577. 
Liles  V.  Cawthorn,  78  Mias.  558:  69. 
Lilley  v.  Pa.  R.  R.  Co.,  219  Pa.  St. 

447:  1129. 


Lilley  v.  Pittsburg  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  213 

Pa.  St.  247:   748. 
Limerick  etc.  Turnpike  Co.'s  Appeal, 

80  Pa.  St.  425 :  233. 
Limerick,  Inhabitants  of,  18  Me.  183: 

1408. 
Limerick  Tp.  Road,   16  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

567:  1087. 
Lime  Rock  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Farnsworth, 

86  Me.  127 :  982,  1482. 
Linblom    v.    Ramsey,    75    111.    246 

1461. 
Lincoln  v.  Colusa  Co.,  28  Cal.  662 
706,  893,  894,  1707,  1710. 
V.    Commonwealth,    164    Mass.    1 

335. 

V.  Commonwealth,  164  Mass.  368, 

447,  453,  1130,  1208,  1244,  1334. 

V.  Grant,  38  Neb.  369:  1523,  1526. 

Lincoln  County  v.  Brock,  37  Wash. 

14:    1188,  1204. 
Lincoln  etc.  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Sutherland, 

44  Neb.  526:  149,  158. 
Lincoln  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Adams,  41 

Neb.  737:   149,  155. 
Lind  V.   Clemens,  44  Mo.  540:    893, 
894. 
V.  San  Luis  Obispo,  109  Cal.  340: 
84,  453,   1604. 
Lindell  v.  Hannibal  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  25 

Mo.  550:   722. 
Lindell's   Admr.   v.   Hannibal  &   St. 
Joseph  R.  R.  Co.,  36  Mo.  543: 
1523. 
Linden  Land  Co.  v.  Milwaukee  Elec. 
Ry.   &   Lt.   Co.,    107    Wis.   493: 
273,  292. 
Linderwood   v.    Michalek,    12   N.   D. 

348.  977. 
Lindner  v.  Yazoo  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  116 

La.  262:   1546. 
Lindsay    v.    Commissioners    etc.,    2 
Bay  (S.  C.)  38:  22. 
V.  Hubbard,  44  Conn.  109 :  458. 
V.  Lindley,  20  Ark.  573:  413. 
V.  Omaha,  30  Neb.  512:   364,  375, 

406. 
V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  149  Ala.  349 : 
90. 
Lindsay  Irrigation  Co.  v.  Mehi;ten3, 

97  Cal.  676:  587. 
Line  v.  Phila.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  218  Pa. 

St.  604:  1245. 
Lingo  V.  Burford,  112  Mo.  149:  1033, 

1186,  1518. 
Linhart  v.  Buiff,  11  Cal.  280:   996. 
Link   v.  Brooks,  Phillips  Law  499: 

1516. 
Linning   v.   Barnett,    134   Ind.    332: 

400. 
Lins  V.  Seefield,  126  Wis.  610:  878. 


CASES    CITED. 


clxxi 


[The  references   are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Linton  v.  Armstrong  Water  Co.,  29 
Pa.  Supr.  Co.  172:  1546,  1560. 
V.  Sharpsburg  Bridge  Co.,  1  Grant's 
Cases  414:  680. 
Linton    Pharmacy   v.   McDonald,    48 

Misc.  125:  437. 
Lionberger  v.   Pelton,   62   Neb.   252: 

1461,  1463. 
Lipes  V.  Hand,    104   Ind.   503:    566, 

575,  922,  1371. 
Lipfeld  V.  Charlotte  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

41  S.  C.  285:   475. 
Lippincott  v.  Harvey,  72  Md.  572: 

874,  877. 
Lisbon  v.  Merrill,  12  Me.  210:   1415, 

1417. 
Lister  v.  Lobley,  7  A.  &  E.  124:  952. 

V.  New  York,  79  Hun  479 :  456. 
Litchfield    v.    Pond,    105    App.    Div. 
229:  434,  738,  1154,  1634,  1635. 
V.  Pond,   186  N.  Y.  66:   434,  738, 

1154,  1634,  1635. 
v.  Vernon  41  N.  Y.  123:  14. 
V.    Wilman,    2    Root,    Conn.    288: 
1492. 
Little  V.  Am.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  96  App. 
Div.  559:  1630. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  65  Minn. 

48:  934. 
.V.  May,  3  Hawks  N.  C.  599 :  1029. 
V.    Stanbank,    63   N.    C.   285:    95, 

1345. 
V.   Thompson,    24   Ind.    146:    975, 
1017. 
Little  Britain  Road,  27  Pa.  St.  69: 

1088,  1103. 
Littlefield  v.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  R. 

Co.,  65  Me.  248:   1528~ 
Littlejohn  v.   Chicago   etc.   Ry.   Co., 
219  HI.  584:   584,  841,  842,  855. 
V.  Cox,  15  La.  Ann.  67:  516. 
Little  Miami  Elevator  Co.  v.  Cincin- 
nati, 30  Ohio  St.   629:   523. 
Little  Miami  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Day- 
ton, 23  Ohio  St.  510:  750. 
Little  Miami  L.  H.  &  P.  Co.  v.  White, 

5  OhioN.  P.  (N.  S.)  201:  536. 
Little  Miami  R.  R.  Co.  v.  CoUett,  6 
Ohio  St.  182:   1203. 
V.  Comrs.,  31   Ohio   St.   338:    780, 

1643. 
V.  Perrin,  16  Ohio  479:  1406. 
V.   Naylor,   2   Ohio   St.   235:    308, 

729. 
V.  Wliitaere,  8  Ohio  St.  590:  1523. 
Little   Nestucca   Road   Co.   v.   Tilla- 
mook Co.,  31  Ore.   1:    782,  792, 
1261,  1266,   1572. 
Little  Rock  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Allen, 
41   Ark.   431:    1176,    1200,   1201, 
1243,  1311,  1312.  1314. 


Little  Rock  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Allister, 
62  Ark    1 :  952. 
V.    Allister,    68    Ark.    600:     1206, 

1217,  1561. 
V.  Bimie,  59  Ark.  66:  843. 
V.   Chapman,   39   Ark.   463:    1648, 

1655. 
V.  Greer,  77  Ark.  387:  639,  1716. 
V.   McGehee,    41    Ark.    202:    1236, 

1545. 
V.  Newman,  73  Ark.  1:   320,  383, 

392. 
V.  Payne,  33  Ark.  816:  475. 
V.  Wallis,  82  Ark.  447:    151. 
Little    Rock    Junction    Ry.    Co.    v. 
Woodruff,    49    Ark.    381:     1119, 
1228,  1229,  1263,  1378. 
Littleton  v.  Berlin  Mills  Co.,  73  N. 
H.    11:     710,    738,    1154,    1158, 
1164,  1634. 
Ldtz  V.  West  Hammond,  230  111.  310: 

828,   829. 
Litzell  V.  Philadelphia,  211  Pa.  St. 

1:  882. 
Liverman  v.  Roanoke  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

114  N.  C.  692:  935,  936,  1177. 
Livermon  v.  Roanoke  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
109   N.   C.   52:    829,   936,    1559, 
1564. 
Livermore  v.   Jamaica,  23  Vt.   361: 
1188. 
V.  Norfolk  County,  186  Mass.  133: 
964. 
Livermore,    Inhabitants   of,    11    Me. 

275:   1381. 
Livingston   v.   Board   of   Comrs.,   42 
Neb.  277  :  1159,  1162. 
V.  Ellis  Co.,  30  Tex.  Civ.  App.  19: 

485. 
V.  McDonald,  21  la.  160:  145,  146. 
V.  New  York,  8  Wend.  85 :  23,  183, 

923,  1175,  1196. 
V.  Paducah,  80  Ky.  656 :  463. 
V.  Sulzer,  19  Hun  375 :  1257. 
V.  Van  Ingen,  9  Johns.  507:   410. 
Floyd  V.   Fair   Haven,   67   Vt.    167: 
1271,   1342. 
V.  Philadelphia,  17  Phlla.  202:  631, 
636,  1550. 
Loan  Ass'n  v.  Topeka,  20  Wall.  655 : 

595. 
Loble   v.   Philadelphia,    174   Pa.    St. 

Ill:    1431. 
Loeber  v.  Butte  General  Elec.  Co.,  16 

Mont.   1:    1594. 
Lobman  v.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.   Co., 

18  Minn.  174:   1018. 
Lockhart  v.  Craig  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  8  Pa. 
Co.   Ct.   470:    272,   642,   1586. 


clxxii 


CASES    CITED. 


LThe  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Lockhart  v.  Craig  St.  K.  E.  Co.,  139 
Pa.  St.  319:   172,  175,  177,  272, 
335,   642,   1586,   1590. 
Loeke  v.  Highway  Comr.,  107  Mich. 

631:    1082. 
Lockett  V.  Fort  Worth  etc.  E.  R.  Co., 

78  Tex.  211 :  159,  454. 

Lock  Haven  Bridge  Co.  v.  Clinton  Co., 

157  Pa.  St.  379:   736,  781,  782. 

Loekie  v.  Mutual  Union  Tel.  Co.,  103 

111.  401:    814,   1317,   1319,   1495. 

Lockland  v.  Smiley,  26  Ohio  St.  94: 

887. 
Lockman  v.  Morgan  County,  32  111. 

App.  414:  1395. 
Lockport  &  Buffalo  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter 
of,  77  N.  Y.  557:  897,  991,  1045, 
1053. 
Lockwood  V.  Charlestown,  114  Mass. 
416:  733. 
V.  Gregory,  4  Day,  407:  989,  1384. 
V.   New   York   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   37 

Conn.   387:   130. 
V.  Ohio  River  R.  R.  Co.,  103  Fed. 

243:  838. 
V.  St.  Louis,  24  Mo.  20 :   10. 
V.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  122  Mo.  86: 
254,  311,  314,  1582,  1591. 
Lodge  V.  Martin,  31  App.  Div.  N.  Y. 
13:    1255. 
v.  Phila.  Wilmington  &  Baltimore 

R.  R.  Co.,  8  Phila.  345:   815 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  9  Phila.  543 :  1366. 
Loeber  v.  Butte  General  Electric  Co., 

16  Mont.   1:   344,  345. 
Logan   V.    Boston   EI.   Ry.    Co.,    188 
Mass.  414:  1304. 
V.  Kiser,  25  Ind.  393:  1399. 
V.  Rose,  88  Cal.  263:   889. 
V.  Stogdale,  123  Ind.  372 :  498,  499, 

516. 
V.  Vernon  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  90  Ind. 
552:    1519. 
Logan  Nat.  Gas  &  Fuel  Co.  v.  Chilli- 
cothe,  65  Ohio  St.   186:   483. 
V.  Wiler,  72  Ohio  St.  628:  1700. 
Logansport  v.  McMillan,  49  Ind.  493: 
1119. 
V.  Pollard,  50  Ind.  151:   1020. 
V.    Seybold,    59    Ind.    225:    23,    26, 

466. 
V.   Shirk,   88   Ind.   563:    808,   1501. 
V.  Shirk,  129  Ind.  352:  1409. 
V.  Wright,  25  Ind.  512:   143. 
Logansport  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Buchanan, 

52  Ind.   163:   913,  1220. 
Logansport   Ry.    Co.    v.    Logansport, 

114  Fed.   688:    303. 
Lohman  v.  St.  Paul,   Stillwater  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  18  Minn.   174:    1535, 
1571,  1615. 


Lohr  V.   Somerset  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.  2 
Monaghan     (Pa.     Supm.)     507: 
859. 
Lohse  V.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  44  Mo. 

App.  645:   1695. 
Loker  v.  Damon,  17  Pick.  284:  1469. 
Loloff  V.  Sterling,  31  Colo.  102;  1122, 

1138,   1146,  1243,  1251,  1456. 
Lombard  v.  Stearns,  4  Cush.  60 :  536. 
Lonaconing  etc.  Ry.   Co.  v.   Consoli- 
dated Coal  Co.,  95  Md.  630 :  272, 
281,  295. 
Lone  Tree  Ditch  Co.  v.  Rapid  City  E. 
&  G.  Lt.  Co.,  16  S.  D.  451:   80, 
1604. 
London  v.  Coffey,  178  Mass.  489:  10. 
V.    Sample    Lumber    Co.,    91    Ala. 
606:    984,   1390. 
Londonderry  Tp.  Road,  6  Pa,  Co.  Ct. 

391:    1105. 
London   etc.   Ry.    Co.   v.    Bradley,   3 
McN.  &  G.  336:    1611. 
V.  Smith,  1  McN.  &  G.  216:   1012. 
V.  Trustees  of  Gower  Walk  School, 

L.  R.  24  Q.  B.  D.  40 :  657. 
V.    Truman,   L.   R.    11    H.   L.   45: 
450,  451,  714,  1068. 
London  Mills  v.  White,  208  111.  289: 

361. 
Long's  Appeal,  87  Pa.  St.  114:  690. 
Long  V.  Billings,  7  Wash.  267,  520, 
521,   673. 
V.  Galley,  91  Mo.  305:  1387. 
V.  Comrs.'  Court,  18  Ala.  482:  1094. 

1421. 
V.  Duluth,  49  Minn.  280:  409,  411, 

413. 
V.  Elberton,  109  Ga.  28:  657,  669. 
V.  Emporia,  59  Kan.  46;   84,  825, 

1035. 
V.    Fuller,    68    Pa.    St.    170:    538, 

1167. 
V.  Harrisburg  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  126 

Pa.  St.  143:   1187,  1206,  1215. 
V.  Louisville   &  N.  R.  R.   Co.,   89 

Ky.  544:  862. 
V.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  (Ky.) 

14  S.  W.  78:   862. 
V.  State,  74  Md.  565:  479. 
V.  Tulley,  91  Mo.  305:   1410. 
V.  Wilson,   119  la.  267:    172,  179, 
181,  183,  369,  375,  376,  388,  404. 
Long  Branch  Comrs.  v.  West  End  R. 

R.  Co.,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  566:  716. 
Long  Eaton  Recreation  Groimds  Co. 
V.  Midland  Ry.  Co.,    (1902)    2  K. 
B.  574:   430,  957,  1338. 
Longfellow  v.  Quimby,  29  Me.   196: 

1510. 
Long  Island  R.  E.  Co.,  In  re,  143  N. 
Y.  67:  714. 


OASES    CITED. 


clxxiii 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742  ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Long  Island  E.  R.  Co.,  Matter  of,  6 

N.  Y.  Supreme  Ct.  298:   1348. 
Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter  ol,  189 

N.  Y.  428:   308. 
Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bennett,  10 

Hun  91:  1010,  1196. 
V.  Eeilly,  89  App.  Div.  166:   1379. 
long    Island    Water    Supply    Co.    v. 

Brooklyn,    166   U.   S.   685:    745, 

1432. 
Longmont  v.   Parker,   14  Colo.   386: 

628,  643,  665,  666. 
Long  Point  Road,  5  Harr.  Del.  152 : 

1402. 
Longworth  v.  Cincinnati,  48  Ohio  St. 

637:    881,   1320,  1546,   1547. 
V.   Meriden    &   W.   R.   E.    Co.,    61 

Conn.  451:  319,  1356,  1451,  1452. 
V.  Sedevic,  165  Mo.  221:  366,  383, 

404,  882,  1596. 
Longvvorthy  v.  Dubuque,  13  la.  86: 

465. 

428:  73,  1603. 
Looby  V.  Austin,   19   111.  App.   325: 

1517. 
Loomis    V.    Andrews,    49    Cal.    239 : 

1461. 
loop  V.  Chamberlain,   17  Wis.  504: 
1636. 
v.  Chamberlain,  20  Wis.  135:  1635, 

1636. 
Lorain  v.  Rolling,  3  Ohio  C.  C.    (N. 

S.)    660:    455. 
Lorain  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Sinning,  17 

Ohio  C.  C.  649:   1202. 
Lord  V.  Atkins,  138  N.  Y.  184:  366, 

878. 
Lonsdale  Co.  v.  Woonsocket,  25  R.  I. 
V.   Meadville   Water   Co.,    135   Pa. 

St.  122:  72,  73,  74. 
Lorden    v.    Coffey,    178    Mass.    489: 

463. 
Loree  v.  Smith,  100  Mich.  252:  1417. 
Lorenz  v.  Jacob,  63  Cal.  73:  494. 
Lorie  v.   North   Chicago   City  R.  R. 

Co.,  32  Fed.  270 :  269. 
Loring  v.  Boston,  12  Gray  209:  1683, 

1711. 
Lorman  v.  Benson,  8  Mich.  18:   104. 
Los  Angeles  v.  Dehail,   97   Cal.   13: 

913 
V.  Kysor,  125  Cal.  463:  888. 
V.  Leaves,   119   Cal.   164:    698. 
T.  Poraeroy,  124  Cal.  597:  164,  743, 

815,  817,  979,  1107,  1176,   1222, 

1229,  1233. 
V.  Pomeroy,  132  Cal.  340:    1410. 
Los  Angeles  Cam.  Assn.  v.  lios  An- 
geles, 95   Cal.   420:   842. 


V.  Los  Angeles,  103  Cal.  461:   153, 

235. 
V.  Los  Angeles,  32  Pae.  240:   881, 
889. 
Los  Angeles  Co.  v.  Reyes    (Cal.)    32 
Pac.  233:   515. 
V.    San   Jose   Land   &  W.   Co.,   96 
Cal.  93:   920,   1041. 
Los  Angeles  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Rump, 

104  Cal.  20:   1316,  1317,  1436. 
Los  Angeles  Ry.  Co.  v.  Los  Angeles, 

152  Cal.  242:    302,  303. 
Losch's  Appeal,  109  Pa.  St.  72:  966, 

1403. 
Loshbaugh  v.  Birdsell,  90  Ind.  466: 

1132. 
Lostutter   v.   Aurora,    126   Ind.   436: 

172,  175,  355. 
Lotzee  v.  Cincinnati,  61  Ohio  St.  272: 

220. 
Lough  V.  Minneapolis  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
116    la.    31:     1201,    1204,    1208, 
1311,  1320,  1443. 
Loughbridge  v.  Harris,  42  Ga.  501 : 

22,  498,  551,  562. 
Loughram  v.  Des  Moines,  72  la.  382 : 

84,  453,  1650,  1054. 
Louis  V.  Lanigan,  97  Mo.  175:   942. 
Louisiana  v.  New  Orleans,  109  U.  S. 

285:   476. 
Louisiana   etc.   Ry.    Co.   v.    Moseley, 
115  La.  757:   1084. 
V.    Moseley,    117    La.    313:     1045, 

1075. 
V.  Vicksburg  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  112  La. 
915:  760. 
Louisiana  &  Frankford  Plank  Road 
Co.  V.  Pickett,  25  Mo.  535:   923, 
1186. 
Louisiana  Ice  Mfg.   Co.  v.  New  Or- 
leans, 43  La.  Ann.  217:   1491. 
Louisiana   Nav.    &    Fisheries    Co.   v. 
Doullut,  114  La.  906:  593,  1071. 
Louisiana  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  Jones, 
113  La.  29:   1227,  1230. 
V.  Kohn,  116  La.  159:    1365,  1378, 

1386. 
V.  Morere,  116  La.  997:  1082,  1128, 

1145,  1149,  1150. 
V.  Sarpy,  117  La.  156:  1128,  1130. 
V.  Xavier  Realty  Co.,  115  La.  328: 
1061,    1063,    1065,    1066,    1212, 
1222,  1329. 
Louisiana  Western  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cross- 
man,  111  La.  611:   1386. 
V.  La.  Cent.  L.  &  I.  Co.,   119  La. 
927:   1377. 
Louisville  v.  Bannon,  99  Ky.  74:  363, 
382,  389,  391,  395,  398,  405. 
V.  Bitzer,  115  Ky.  359:  10,  463. 


clxxiv 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol, 

Louisville  v.  Coleburne,  108  Ky.  420: 
1656. 
V.  Hegan,  20  Ky.  L.  R.  1532:  630. 
V.  Kaye,  122  Ky.  599 :  1306. 
V.  Norris,  111  Ky.  903:   141,  142, 

1660,    1716. 
V.   Louisville  Rolling  Mill   Co.,   3 

Buish  416:  221,  1597. 
V.   Snow,   107   Ky.   536:    877,   886, 
890. 
Louisville  Bagging  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Cen- 
tral Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  95  Ky.  50: 
272,  329. 
Louisville  City  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Central 
Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  87  Ky.  223:  427, 
762,  763,  1282,  1283. 
Louisville     etc.     Elec.     Ry.     Co.     v. 
Whipps,  118  Ky.  121:  843,  844, 
852,  1138. 
Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Asher,  12 
Ky.  L.  R.  815:  1183,  1202,  1225. 
V.  Asher,  15  S.  W.  517:  1183,  1201, 

1251. 
V.  Barrett,  91  Ky.  487:  1202. 
v.  Beck,  119  Ind.  124:  1545,  1547, 

1631. 
V.  Berkey,  136  Ind.  591:   1631. 
V.  Brinton,  109  Ky.  180:  154,  831, 

846,  1455. 
V.   Brown,   17  B.   Mon.   763:    245, 

252. 
V.  Bowling  Green  Ry.  Co.,  110  Ky. 

788:   303,  328,  1611. 
V.  Chapell,  Rice    (18  S.  C.)    383: 

524. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  97  III. 

506:  764. 
V.  Cincinnati  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  3  Ohio 

N.  P.  (N.  S.)   109:  314. 
V.    Cincinnati,    76    Ohio    St.    481: 

422,  1495. 
V.    Commonwealth,    104    Ky.    35: 

865. 
V.    Cornelius,    111    Ky.    752:    154, 

1650,  1655,  1716. 
V.  Covington,  2  Bush  526:  841. 
V.   Cumnock,  25  Ky.   L.  R.   1330: 

328,  635. 
V.  Day,  67  Miss.  227:  939. 
V.    Dickson,    63   Miss.    380:    1347, 

1353. 
V.  Dryden,  39  Ind.  393 :  923. 
V.  Faulkner,  2  Head  65:  1667. 
V.  Finlay,  86   Ky.  294:    319,  382, 
389,  454. 
V.  Finlay,  7  Ky.  L.  R.  129:  253, 
1297. 
V.  Geibel,  9  Ky.  L.  R.  813 :  448. 
V.  Glazebrook,   1  Bush  325:    1182, 

1316. 
V.  Hennin,  14  Ky.  L.  R.  526:  368, 

375,  388,  404. 
V.  Hodge,  6  Bush  141:  319. 


I,   pp.    1-742;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 

Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hopson, 
73  Miss.  773:    1226. 
V.  Ingram,  12  Ky.  L.  R.  456:  1176, 

1183. 
V.   Ingram,    14   S.   W.   534:    1182, 

1183,  1201,  1378. 
V.   Interstate  R.   R.    Co.,   107  Va. 

225:  772. 
V.   Interstate  R.   R.   Co.,    108   Va. 

502:  722,  762,  1155,  1569. 
V.  Leibfreid,  92  Ky.  407 :  297,  1486, 

1629,  1632. 
V.  Louisville  City  Ry.  Co.,  2  Du- 

vall  175:  415. 
V.  McAfee,  30  Ind.  291 :  160. 
V.  McVean    (Ky.)    34  S.  W.  525: 

1081. 
V.  Mississippi,  133  U.  S.  587:  488. 
V.    Mississippi    T.    R.   R.    Co.,    92 

Tenn.  681:  764. 
V.  Mobile  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  124  Ala. 

162:    297,   298,   1589. 
V.  Mossman,  90  Tenn.  157:  866. 
v.   Neafus,   93   Ky.   53:    850,   852, 

853. 
v.    N.    O.   Terminal    Co.,    120   La. 

978 •  329 
V.  Orr,  91  Ky.  109:  252,  310,  448, 

1303,  1545,  1549. 
V.  Orr,  10  Ky.  L.  R.  677:  1545. 
V.  O.  V.  B.  &  T.  Co.,  105  Ky.  600: 

863. 
V.  People's  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  101  Ala. 

331:   1425. 
V.  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  68  Miss. 

806:   896,  1086,  1426. 
V.  Power,  119  Ind.  269:   852,  853. 
V.  Quinn,   14  Lea  65:   1165,   1635. 
V.    Rudd    (Ky.)    30    8.    W.    604: 

1625. 
V.  Ryan,  64  Miss.  399 :  1145,  1232, 

1392    1672. 
V.  Scomp,  124  Ky.  330:  1314,  1445, 

1457,  1459,  1472,  1639,  1660. 
V.  Scott,  132  111.  429:  663. 
V.  Smith,   128  Fed.   1:    864,   1619. 
V.  Smith,  125  Ky.  336:   1478,  1479. 
V.  Smith,  31  Ky.  L.  R.  1:   1479. 
V.  Sparks,  12  Ind.  App.  410:   158, 

1648,  1655. 
V.  State,  3  Head  523:   1643. 
V.  Stephens,  96  Ky.  401:  829,  873. 
V.  Taylor,  96  Ky.  241:   833. 
V.    Thompson,    18    B.    Mon.    735: 

1182. 
V.  Whitley  County  Court,  95  Ky. 
215:    306,    314,    322,    777,    793, 
956,  1623. 
V.  Whitsell,  125  Ky.  433:  76,  1654, 

1661. 
V.    Zachritz,    13   Ky.   L.    R.    141: 
1657. 


OASES    CITED. 


clxxv 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.) 


Louisville  etc.  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Whitsell, 

31  Ky.  L.  K.  76:  77,  1639,  1716. 
Louisville  etc.  Terminal  Co.  v.  Jacobs, 

109    Tenn.    727:    450,   453,    655, 

661,  1668. 
V.    Lellyett,    114    Tenn.    368:    450, 

655,  661,  1459,  1474,  1639,  1659. 
Louisville   Gas  Co.  v.   Citizens'   Gas 

Co.,    115    U.    S.    683:    410,    492, 

736. 
Louisville  Ry.  Co.  v.  Poster,  108  Ky. 

743:   272,  274. 
Louisville   So.   R.   R.   Co.   v.    Cogar, 

15    Ky.    L.    R.    444:    253,    310, 

639. 
T.  Hooe,   18  Ky.  L.  R.  521:    253, 

310,   448,   639. 
Louisville  Steam  Forge  Co.  v.  Meh- 

ler,   112   Ky.   438:    224. 
Louisville    Trust    Co.    v.    Cincinnati, 

75  Fed.  716:  30L 
Louk   V.   Woods,    15    111.    256:    1100, 

1103,  1516. 
Loveland  v.  Berlin,  27  Vt.  713:  516. 
Low,  Matter  of,  103  App.  Div.  530: 

1437. 
Low  V.  Galena  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  111. 

324:   526,   1094. 
Lowe  V.   Aroma,   21    111.   App.   598: 

1516. 
V.  Brannan,  105  Ind.  247:   1381. 
V.  Conroy,  120  Wis.  151:   485. 
V.   Lawrenceburg   R.   M.    Co.,    161 

Ind.    495:    401. 
y.  Omaha,  33  Neb.  587:  630,  1179, 

1199,    1201,    1216,    1228,    1306, 

1308. 
T.  Ryan,  94  Ind.  450:   1407. 
Lowell   V.    Boston,    111    Mass.    454: 

549,  554,  558,  565,  566. 
T.  Shaw,  15  Me.  242:    1540,  1543. 
T.  Washington  County  R.  R.  Co., 

90  Me.  80:  714. 
Lowenthal    v.    New    York,    5    Lans. 

532:  143. 
Lower  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  59 

la.  563:  685,  904,  1361. 
Loweree  v.  Newark,  38  N.  J.  L.  151 

1187,  1529. 
Lower  Merian  Road,  58  Pa.  St.  66 

1364. 
Lower  Salford  Road,  25  Pa.  St.  524 

1069. 
Lower  Windsor  Road,  29  Pa.  St.  18 

1082. 
Lowery  v.  Pekin,  186  111.  387 :   1568 
Lowndes   County   v.   Bowie,   34   Ala, 

461:   1167. 
Lownsdale   v.    Gray's   Harbor   Boom 

Co.,  36  Wash.  198:  98. 
Lowther   v.    Bridgeman,   57   W.   Va. 

306:  342,  361. 


Lucas  V.  Sawyer,  17  la.  517:  943. 
V.  Wattles,  49  Mich.  380:    1323. 
Lucas   &   Chesterfield   Gas   &   Water 

Board,   In   re,    (1908)    1   K.   B. 

571:   1238. 
Ludlam  v.  Swain,  73  N.  J.  L.   162: 

1381. 
Ludlow    V.   Detwiler,   20   Ky.   L.   R. 

894:  231,  630,  664. 
V.  Froste,  20  Ky.  L.  R.  216:  231. 
V.  Hudson  River  R.  R.  Co.,  6  Lans. 

128:    441,  442,  443. 

V.  Norfolk,  87  Va.  349:   1423. 
Ludlow   Street,  Matter   of,   59   App. 

Div.  180:   690,  696,  918. 
Ludlow  Street,  Matter  of,  172  N.  Y. 

542:  690,  696,  917. 
Lull  V.  Curry,   10  Mich.  397:   1461. 
V.  Fox  &  Wisconsin  Improvement 

Co.,  19  Wis.  100:   963. 
Lullamire   v.   Kaufman   Co.,   3   Tex. 

Ct.  of  App.  p.  392:   1018. 
Lumberman's    Ins.    Co.   v.    St.   Paul, 

77  Minn.  410:  1563. 
V.   St.   Paul,   82   Minn.   497:    929, 

1564. 
V.  St.  Paul,  85  Minn.  234:  1361. 
Lummery  v.  Braddy,  8  la.  33:   899. 
Lumsden  v.  Milwaukee,  8  Wis.  485: 

1091,  1571. 
Lund   V.   Idaho   etc.   R.   R.    Co.,    50 

Wash.  574:  181,  640,  1580,  1615. 
V.  Midland  Ry.  Co.,  34  L.  J.  Eq. 

276:   1067. 
V.  New  Bedford,  121  Mass.  286 :  74, 

952,  1514. 
Lusby  V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

73  Miss.  360:  728. 
Luscombe  v.  Milwaukee,  36  Wis.  511: 

614,  619. 
Lutgen    V.    Stearns    County    Comrs., 

99  Minn.  499:    1025. 
Luther  v.  Winnisimmet  Co.,  9  Cusb. 

171:  147. 
Lutterloh  v.  Cedar  Keys,  15  Fla.  306: 

346,  356,  1594. 
Lux  V.  Haggin,  69  Cal.  255:  70,  141, 

587,  1603. 
Luxton  V.  North  River   Bridge  Co., 

147  U.  S.  337 :  932,  1423. 
V.  North  River  Bridge  Co.,  153  U. 

S.  525:  96,  513,  522,  737. 
Lybe's  Appeal,  106  Pa.  St.  626:   161, 

165. 
Lycett  V.   Stafford  &  Uttoxeter  Ry. 

Co.,    13    Eq.    Cas.    L.    R.    261: 

1537. 
V.   Stafford  v.   Uttoxeter   Ry.   Co., 

41  L.  J.  Eq.  474:    1537. 
Lycoming  Gas  &   W.   Co.   v.   Meyer, 

99  Pa.  St.  615:  53,  623,  652. 


clxxvi 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references   are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Lykens  Tp.  Road,  19  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  145 : 

1105. 
Lyle  V.   Chicago  etc.  E.  E..   Co.,   55 

Minn.  223:  1018,  1020,  1513. 
Lyles  V.  Texas  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  73  Tex. 

95:   640. 
Lyman  v.  Boston,  164  Mass.  99:  1131, 
1141. 
V.   Burlington,   22  Vt.   131:    1091, 

1093,  1097. 
V.  Gedney,  114  111.  388:   1500. 
V.  Suburban  R.  R.  Co.,  190  111.  320 : 
842,  843. 
Lynch  v.  Forbes,  161  Mass.  302:  678, 
1057,  1060,  1067. 
V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  129 
N.  Y.  274:  923,  1554,  1555,  1584, 
1617. 
V.  New  York,  76  N.  Y.  60:  234. 
V.    RutlAid,    66    Vt.    570:     1009, 

1018,  1513,  1626. 
V.    Stone,   4  Denio,   356:    1523. 
Lynn  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Boston  etc.  R. 

R.  Co.,  114  Mass.  88:  765. 
Lyon  V.    Fishmongers    Co.,   L.   R.    1 
App.  Cases  662:   125,  128. 
V.  Gormley,  53  Pa.  St.  261 :  1480. 
V.  Green  Bay  &  Minn.  Ry.  Co.,  42 
Wis.  538:  1094,  1225,  1226,  1348. 
V.   Hammond  etc.   R.  R.   Co.,    167 

111.  527:  1149,  1247,  1426, 
V.  Hamor,  73  Me.  56:  516,  721. 
V.  Jerome,  15  Wend.  569:   687. 
V.  Jerome,  26  Wend.  485 :  687,  688. 
V.  McDonald,  78  Tex.  71:   1475. 
Lyon  Co.  Comrs.  v.  Kiser,  26  Kan. 

279:   1115. 
Lyons  v.  N.  Y.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  26  App. 
Div.  N.  Y.   57:    1144. 
V.   Philadelphia   etc.   Ry.   Co.,   209 
Pa.  St.  550:   953,   1258. 
Lyons  Cem.  Assn.,  Matter  of,  93  App. 

Div.  19:  542. 
Lytle  V.  Breckenridge,  3  J.  J.  Marsh. 
663:  407. 

M. 

Mahler   v.    Brumder,    92   Wis.   477: 

513. 
Mabon  v.  Halsted,  39  N.  J.  L.  640: 

1673,  1684. 
MacArthur  v.  The  King,  8  Can.  Exch. 

245:  372,  382,  647. 
MacDonnell      v.      Caledonia      Canal 

Comrs.,  8  S.  &  D.  881:  97. 
Macey  v.  Indianapolis,  17  Ind.  267: 

238. 
V.  Metropolitan   Board  of   Works, 

33  L.  J.  Oh.  377:   1612. 
▼.  Met.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  69  Hun  365 : 

1584,  1664. 


Macey  v.  Met.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  128  N. 

Y.  624:    1584,  1664. 
Macfarland  v.  Saunders,  25  App.  Cas. 

D.  C.  438:   1394. 
MacGinnitie  v.  Silvers,  167  Ind.  321 : 

385. 
Macintosh  v.  Nome,   1  Alaska,  492: 

363. 
Mack  V.  Commissioners  of  Highways, 
41  111.  378:   713. 
V.  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.,  10  Pa.  Dist. 
Ct.   102:   948. 
Macon   v.    Daley,   2    Ga.   App.   355: 
629,  1306,  1307. 
V.  Dannenberg,  113  6a.  1111:  158. 
V.  Harris,  73  Ga.  42:   316. 
V.  Harris,   75   Ga.   761:    300,   316, 

1581. 
V.    Hill,    58    Ga.    595:    210,    224, 

237. 
V.  Owen,  3  Ala.  116:  899,  1361. 
V.  Patty,   57  Miss.   378:    14,  26. 
V.   Wing,   113  Ga.   90:    179,   181. 
Macon  Consol.  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ma- 
con, 112  Ga.  782:   491. 
Macon  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bowen,  45 
Ga.   531:    834,   860,   1354. 
V.  Macon  &  D.  R.  R.  Co.,  86  Ga. 

83:   712. 
V.   Riggs,   87   Ga.    158:    787,   789, 
831. 
Macungie  Tp.  Road,  26  Pa.  St.  221: 

1093,  1419. 
Macy  V.   Indianapolis,   17   Ind.  267: 

210,  213. 
Madden  v.  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
66   Miss.   258:    965,    1086,    1520, 
1629,  1633. 
V.   Pa.   R.   R.   Co.,   21   Ohio  C.   0. 
73:   190,  351,  366,  377,  384,  388, 
404,  405,  1596. 
Maddox  v.  Ware,  2  Bailey  314:  1000. 
Madera  Co.  v.  Raymond  Granite  Co., 
138  Cal.  244:  1410. 
V.  Raymond  Granite  Co.,  139  Cal. 
128:  515,  980,  1434. 
Madera   Irrigation   Dist.,   In  re,   92 

Cal.  296:  587. 
Madera  Ry.   Co.   v.  Raymond  Gran- 
ite  Co.,   3   Cal.   App.   668:    497, 
501,   527,  528,  533. 
Madison  v.  Daley,  58  Fed.  751:  709, 
912,  915. 
V.  Gallagher,  159  111.   105:   869. 
v.  Ross,  3  Ind.  236:  91,  94. 
Madison  Road,  37  Pa.  St.  417:   402. 
Madisonville  Traction  Co.  v.  St.  Ber- 
nard Min.   Co.,    196   U.    S.   239: 
931,  932. 
Madson  v.  Spokane  Val.  L.  &  W.  Co., 
40  Wash.  414:    137,   1607,   1612, 
1615. 


OASES    CITED. 


clxxvii 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1T19.] 


Maffet  V.  Quine,  93  Fed.  Rep.  347: 

551,  1663. 
Magee  v.  Brooklyn,  144  N.  Y.  265: 

935,  948,   1561,   1564. 
V.  London  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  6  Grant 

U.  C.  170:  177,  1609. 
V.  Overshiner,  150  Ind.   127:   333, 

341. 
<!.  Penn.  S.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  Pa. 

Super.  Ct.  187:    155. 
Magee     Furnace     Co.     v.     Common- 
wealth,  166  Mass.   480:    1455. 
Magnolia   Ave.,   In   re,    117    Pa.   St. 

50:   1098. 
Magnolia  Ave.,  In  re,  20  Phila.  387: 

1371. 
Magnolia,  Steam  Boat,  v.  Marshall, 

39  Miss.   109:    104. 
Magnolia  St.,  8  Phil.  468:   1105. 
Magnolia,  The,  20  How.  296:   103. 
Maguire  v.   Centerville,   76   Ga.   84: 

153. 
Mahady  v.  Brunswick  R.  R.  Co.,  91 

N.   Y.    148:    254,   269,   309,   316. 
Mahaffey  v.  Beech  Creek  R.  R.  Co., 

163    Pa.    St.    158:     1215,    1262, 

1342. 
Mahler    v.    Brunder,    92    Wis.    477: 

888. 
Mahon  v.  New  York  Central  R.  R. 

Co.,   24    N.   Y.    658:    423,    1635. 
V.  Utica  &  Schenectady  R.  R.  Co., 

Hill  &  Denio's  Supplement,  156: 

244,  248. 
Mahoney  v.  Beaver  Meadow  etc.  R. 

R.  Co.,  13  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  344:   642, 

1587. 
V.  Spring  Valley  Water  Works,  52 

Cal.  159:  688. 
Mahoney  Tp.  v.  Comry,  103  Pa.  St. 

362:   687,  824. 
Maine  &  Hamburgh  St.  Canal,  Mat- 
ter, 50  How.  Pr.  70 :  776. 
Main   St.,  Altering   etc..   Matter   of, 

30  Hun  424:   696. 
Main   St.,  Altering  etc..   Matter   of, 

98  N.  Y.  454:  696. 
Mairs  v..  Gallahue,  9  Gratt.  94:  1358, 

1360. 
Maise  v.  Kruse,  85  Wis.  302:    1505. 
Maitland  v.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  9 

Miscl.  616:  327. 
Major   V.    Taylor,    1    A.    K.    Marsh. 

552:   1359. 
Makepiece  v.  Worden,   1   N.  H.   16: 

1490. 
Mak-Saw-Ba    Club    v.    Construction 

Comr.,   169   Ind.   204:    1395. 
Malcolm  v.  New  York  Bl.  R.  R.  Co., 

147  N.  Y.  308:   1296,  1299. 
Mallard   v.    LaFayette,    5    La.    Ann. 

112:   1688. 


Mallory  v.  Bradford,  1  Pa.  Dist.  Ct. 
670:    337,  1594. 
V.  Huntington,  64  Conn.  88:  1116. 
Mallott   V.   Johnston,    106    111.   App. 

545:  1639,  1653,  1663. 
Malone  v.  Toledo,  28  Ohio  St.  643: 
808,  1500. 
V.  Toledo,   34   Ohio   St.  541:    807, 

808,  1500,  1707,  1708. 
V.    Waukesha    Elee.    Lt.    Co.,    120 

Wis.  485:  345,  1594. 
V.  Williams,  18  Tenn.  390:  470. 
Malott  V.  Mersea,  9  Ontario  611:  79, 

1604. 
Malthers  v.   Shields,   2  Met.    (Ky.) 

553:  465. 
Maltman  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
41  111.  App.  229:   327,  639,  643, 
880,  1717. 
Manchester    Road,    15    Pa.    Co.    Ct. 

623:   1383. 
Manda  v.  Orange,  75  N.  J.  L.  251: 

707,  709,  976. 
Manderson,  In  re,  51  Fed.  501:  680, 

1154. 
Mangam    v.    Sing    Sing,    26    N.    Y. 

App.  Div.  464:    1504. 
Manhattan  Co.,  Ex  parte,  22  Wend. 

653:  779. 
Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Astor,   126 
App.  Div.  907:   305,  679. 
V.    Comstock,   74   App.   Div.   341: 

1379. 
V.  Kent,  80  Hun  557 :  1437. 
v.  McKee,  1  App.  Div.  488:   1444. 
V.   New  York,   89   Hun  429:    229, 

750. 
V.   O'Sullivan,   6   App.   Div.   571: 

1397. 
V.    O'Sullivan,    8    App.    Div.    320: 

1465. 
V.  O'Sullivan,  150  N.  Y.  569:  1397. 
V.  Stroub,  68  Hun  90:   1078. 
v.  Stroub,  70  Hun  363:   1410. 
V.  Stuyvesant,  126  App.  Div.  848: 

1139. 
V.  Taber,  78  Hun  434:  1437,  1467. 
V.   Tompkins,    59   App.   Div.   572: 
1393. 
Manheim   Tp.   Road,    12    Pa.    Supr. 

279:    401. 
Manigault  v.  Springs,  199  U.  S.  473 : 

86,  1612,  1613,  1614.- 
Manion  v.  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

90  Ky.  491 :  1673,  1674. 
Maniqunet      v.      Commissioners      of 
Roads,  4  McCord    (S.  C.)    541: 
22. 
Manistee   etc.   R.   R.   Co.  v.   Fowler, 

73  Mich.  217;   980,  984,  1419. 
Manitowoc  Clay  Product  Co.  v.  Mani- 
towoc etc.  R.   R.  Co.,  135  Wis. 
94:   1247,  1484. 


clxxviii 


CASES    CITED. 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Mankin  v.  State,  2  Swan  206:   1373. 
Mann  v.  Bergman,  203  111.  406:  877, 

879,   889. 
V.  Marston,  12  Maine  32:  1372. 
V.  Willey,  51  App.  Div.  169:  1605. 
V.  Willey,  168  N.  Y.  664:  1605. 
Mannel  v.  Detroit  etc.  Ry.  Co.,   139 

Mich.  106:   272. 
Manning  v.   Bruce,   186  Mass.   282: 

455,  1519,  1613. 
V.  Lowell,  130  Mass.  21:   233. 
V.   Lowell,    173   Mass.    100:    1127, 

1147,  1149,  1232,  1268. 
V.  Port  Reading  R.  R.  Co.,  54  N. 

J.  Eq.  46:   1616. 
V.  Shreveport,  119  La.  1044:   630, 

632,  633,  1183,   1308. 
Mansfield's  Appeal,  158  Pa.  St.  314: 

1402. 
Mansfield  v.  Balliet,  65  Ohio  St.  451 : 

70,  82,  84. 
V.  Hunt,   19  Ohio  C.   C.  488:    84, 

1654. 
Mansfield  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Clark,  23 

Mich.  519:  980,  1058,  1088. 
Manson  v.   Boston,    163   Mass.   479: 

1339. 
V.  South  Bound  R.  R.  Co.,  64  S.  C. 

120:  420,  1618. 
Mantel!  v.  Buevrus  Tel.  Co.,  20  Ohio 

C.  C.  345:  "339,  1593. 
Manteufel  v.  Wetzel,  133  Wis.  619: 

146. 
Manton  v.  South  Shore  Traction  Co., 

121  App.  Div.  410:  1587. 
Mantorville  Ry.  &  Tr.  Co.  v.  Sllnger- 

land,  101  Minn.  488:  1186,  1217, 

1219. 
Manufacturer's  Land  &  Imp.  Co.  v. 

Camden,  71  N.  J.  L.  490:   608. 
V.  Camden,  73  N.  J.  L.  263:  608. 
Manufacturers'  Nat.  Gas.  Co.  v.  Les- 
lie, 22  Ind.  App.  677:  1176,  1251, 

1456. 
Manufacturing  Co.  v.  Green,  39  La. 

Ann.  455:   12. 
Manville  Co.  v.  Worcester,  138  Mass. 

89 •  702 
Marble  v.   Whitney,   28  N.   Y.   297: 

860,  1100,  1101. 
Marblehead  v.  County  Comrs.  of  Es- 
sex, 5  Gray  451:  787. 
Marcey  v.  Fries,  18  Kan.  353:   1185, 

1345. 
March  v.   New   York,   69   App.   Div. 

1:   276. 
V.  Portsmouth  &  Concord  R.  R.  Co., 

19  N.  H.  372:   1138,  1142,  1247, 

1251,  1322. 
Marchant  v.  Maple  Grove,  48  Minn. 

271:  865,  867. 
V.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  153  U. 

S.  380:   656.  1432. 


Marietta  Chair  Co.  v.  Henderson,  121 

Ga.  399:  362,  363,  377,  398,  406. 
Marion  Co.  v.  Harper,  44  111.   482: 

1398. 
Marin  Co.  Water  Co.  v.  Marin  Co., 

145  Cal.  586 :  804,  805. 
Mariner    v.    Shulte,    13    Wis.    692: 

104. 
Marino  v.  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  69  N. 

J.  L.  628:   1484,  1646. 
Marion  Co.  Lumber  Co.  v.  Tilghman 

L.  Co.,  75  S.  C.  220:  901. 
Marion  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ward,  9  Ind. 

123:    1073. 
Mariposa  Co.   v.   Knowles,    146   Cal. 

1:  515. 
Mark  v.  State,  97  N.  Y.  572:   1707, 

1708. 
Market  v.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  87 

Hun  213:  1299. 
Market  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Central  R.  R. 

Co.,  51  Cal.  583:   268,  765. 
Market  St.  Widening,  Matter  of,  11 

Phila.  409:   1380. 
Markham  v.  Anaraosa,  122  Iowa  689 : 

237. 
f.  Atlanta,  23  Ga.  402:  210,  1597. 
V.  Brown,  37  Ga.  277:  438,  472. 
Markowitz  v.  Kansas  City,  125  Mo. 

485:     1138,     1306,     1337,     1648, 

1656,  1660. 
V.  Pittsburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  216  Pa. 

St.  535:   1120,   1129. 
Marks  v.   Bradshaw  Mt.  R.  R.  Co., 

8  Ariz.  379:   1233. 
Markwardt  v.  Guthrie,  18  Okla.  32: 

84. 
Marling  v.  Burlington  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

67  Iowa  331:  1519. 
Marlor  v.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

166  Pa.  St.  524:  697. 
Marquette  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Harlow, 

37  Mich.  554:  861. 
V.    Longyear,    133   Mich.   94:    966, 

997,  1071,  1378. 
V.   Probate   Judge,  53   Mich.   217: 

1385,  1389. 
Marsden    v.    Cambridge,    114   Mass. 

490:   1263. 
Marsh,   Matter  of,   10  Hun  49:   976. 
Marsh,  Matter  of,  71  N.  Y.  315:  893, 

894,  898,  1044. 
Marsh  v.  Fairbury,  163  111.  401:  874, 

877,  887. 
v.  Lehigh  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  215  Pa. 

St.  141:   1485,  1645. 
V.  Milwaukee  Lt.  H.  &  T.  Co.,  134 

Wis.  384:   284. 
V.  Oregon  City,  105  Mo.  226 :   1008. 
V.  Portsmouth  &  Concord  R.  R.  Co., 

19  N.  H.  372:  1311. 


CASES    CITED. 


clxxix 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Marshall  v.  Am.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  16 

Pa.    Supr.    Ct.    615:    350,    1338, 

1639. 
V.  Chicago,  77  111.  App.  351:  1271. 
Marshall  Fishing  Co.  v.  Hadley  Falls 

Co.,  5  Cush.  602:   1439,  1442. 
Marshalltown    v.    Forney,    61    Iowa 

578:   199,  395,  398,  1502. 
Marsh    et   al.,   Petitioners,    2    Aiken 

239:    1393. 
Marson  v.  London,  Chatham  &  Dover 

Ey.  Co.,  37  L.  J.  Ch.  483:  822. 
V.  London,  Chatham  &  Dover  Ey. 

Co.,  L.  E.  6  Eq.  Cas.  101:   822. 
Martin,  Ex  parte,   13  Ark.   198:   22, 

23,  90,  1155. 
Martin  v.  Benoist,  20  Mo.  App.  262: 

147. 
V.  Beverley,  5  Call  444 :  976. 
V.    Brooklyn,    1    Hill    545:     1670, 

1678,  1696. 
V.  Burns,  155  N.  Y.  23:  498,  501, 

544. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  220  111. 

97:  994,  1115. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  47  Mo. 

App.  452:  180,  224,  1549,  1552, 

1649,  1656,  1660. 
V.  District  of  Columbia,  205  U.  S. 

135:    10,  464. 
V.  Dix,  52  Miss.  53:  23,  466. 
V.  Fillmore  County,  44  Neb.  719: 

1176,  1179,  1205. 
v.  Franklin  Co.,  62  Maine  455 :  978. 
V.  Gainesville  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  78  Ga. 

307:   141. 
T.  Gleason,  139  Mass.  183:   823. 
V.  London  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  1  L.  E.  Eq. 

Cas.  145:  948. 
V.  Louisville,  97  Ky.  30:  382,  400, 

1522. 
v.  Marks,  154  Ind.  549:  372,  1596. 
V.  New  York  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  62  N. 

Y.  331 :  475. 
V.  Eiddle,  26  Pa.  St.  415:  145,  146. 
V.  Eushton,  42  Ala.  289:  708,  1358, 

1516. 
V.  St.  Louis,  139  Mo.  246:   1324. 
V.  Stillwell,  50  N.  J.  L.  530:   1370. 
V.  Tyler,  4  N.  D.  270:    580,   923, 

1154,   1159,  1160. 
V.  Waddell,  16  Pet.  367:  115. 
Martini  v.  Gzonski,   13  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

298:    1455. 
Martinsville  etc.  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Bridges, 

6  Ind.  400:  978. 
Maryland  etc.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Hiller,  8 

App.  Cas.  D.  C.  289:    1188. 
Maryland  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  Ruth,  106 

Md.  644:  338,  1667. 


Marylebone  Imp.   Act,   In   re,  L.   E. 

12  Eq.  Cas.  389:  953. 
Marylebone  Improvement  Act,  In  I'e, 

40  L.  J.  Eq.  697 :  953. 
Marysville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ingram 

(Ky.)   30  S.  W.  8:   1294. 
Marysville  Water  Co.  v.  West  Fair- 
view   etc.    St.   Ry.    Co.,    13    Pa. 
Dist.  Ct.  365:   739. 
Mason  v.   Brooklyn   City  etc.  R.   R. 
Co.,  35  Barb.  373:  268,  726,  728. 
v.  Chicago,  163  111.  351:   874,  880. 
V.  Harper's  Ferry  Bridge  Co.,   17 
W.  Va.  396:  411,  414,  651,  1570. 
v.   Iowa   Cent.  Ey.  Co.,   131   Iowa 

468:   1047,  1069. 
v.  Kennebec  &  Portland  E.  E.  Co., 

31  Maine  215:   1311,  1522. 
V.  Lake  Erie  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  9  Biss. 

239:    809,   1500. 
V.  Mattoon,  95   HI.   App.   525:    83, 

1604. 
V.  Ohio  Eiver  E.  E.  Co.,  51  W.  Va. 

183:    313,   1C22. 
v.  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  71  S.  C. 

150*  832 
V.  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  74  S.  C. 

557:   832,   1123. 
V.  Stokes  Bay  Pier  &  Ey.  Co.,  32 
L.  J.  Ch.  110:  1533. 
Mason  City  etc.  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Boynton, 
158  Fed.  599:    1392,  1674. 
V.   Boynton,   204   U.   S.   570:    931, 

932. 
V.   Wolf,    148   Fed.   961:    382,   391, 
647,  654,  664,  1337. 
Mason    City    Salt   &   Mining    Co.   v. 

Mason,  23  W.  Va.  211 :  1570. 

Massachusetts  Central  R.  R.   Co.  v. 

Boston,  Clinton  &  Fitchburg  E. 

E.  Co.,  121  Mass.  124:   1278. 

Masters  v.  McHolland,  12  Kan.   17: 

513,  1034,  1555. 
Masters  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  In  re,  (1901)  2 

K.  B.  84:   958,  1260. 
Masters  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  In  re,  (1900)  2 

Q.  B.  677:  958,  1260. 
Matheny  v.  Aiken,  68  S.  C.  163:  84, 

1523. 
Mathews    v.    Droud,    114    Ind.    268: 
1028,  1407. 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  E.  R.  Co.,  18  Minn. 
434:    857,    1164,   1634. 
Mathewson  v.  Supervisors,  8  Pa.  Co. 

Ct.  204:  1011. 
Mathias  v.  Drainage  Comrs.,  49  Mich. 

465:   984. 
Matson  v.  Port  Townsend  etc  R.  R. 

Co.,  9  Wash.  449:    840. 
Matteson  v.  New  York  Cent.  etc.  E. 
R.  Co.,  218  Pa.  St.  527:  87. 


clxxx 


CASES    CITED. 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Matthews    v.    Belfast    Mfg.    Co.,    35 
Wash.  662:  81,  1604. 
V.  Duryee,  4  Keys  525 :  946. 
V.   Stillwater   G.   &  E.  L.  Co.,   63 
Minn.  493:   452,  454. 
Mattingly   v.   District   of   Columbia, 
97  U.  S.  687:  734,  735. 
V.   Plymouth,    100   Ind.   545:    602, 
616. 
Mattison  v.  Alton  etc.  Traction  Co., 

235  111.  346 :  303. 

Mattlage  v.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co., 

14  Daly  1:   305,  1585. 

V.  New  York  El.  Ey.  Co.,  67  How. 

Pr.  232:  305,  308,  314,  712,  1590. 

V.  New  York  El.  E.  E.  Co.,  1  Miscl. 

339:   1296,  1302. 
V.   New   York   El.   R.   E.    Co.,    14 
Miscl.  291:   1614. 
Mattuson  v.  Lehigh  Val.  E.  R.  Co.,  36 

Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  66:   144. 

Mauldin  v.  Greenville,  53  S.  C.  285: 

613. 

V.   Greenville,   64   S.   C.  444:    613, 

618,  619,  1306,  1307,  1308,  1391. 

Mauser  v.  Northern  etc.  E.  R.  Co.,  2 

Eng.  E.  R.  Cases  380:  1601. 
Maust  V.   Pennsylvania  etc.   St.  Ry. 

Co.,  219  Pa.  St.  568:  1588. 
Maxwell  v.  Bay  City  Bridge  Co.,  41 
Mich.  453:  858,  977,  1354. 
V.  Central  D.  &  P.  Tel.  Co.,  51  W. 

Va.  121 :  342,  343,  643,  1594. 
V.  La  Brune,  68  Iowa  689 :   1404. 
May  v.  Boston,   158  Mass.  21:   840, 
1141,  1330. 
V.    Carbondale    Traction    Co.,    167 

Pa.  St.  343:  642,  1294. 
v.  Kornhaus,  9  W.  &  S.  121:  1547. 
Mayer  v.  New  York,  127  App.  Div. 
926:   611. 
V.  New  York,  193  N.  Y.  535:  611, 
1524. 
Maynard  v.  Northampton,  157  Mass. 

218:   1231. 
Mayo  V.   Springfield,   136  Mass.   10: 
231. 
V.  Springfield,  138  Mass.  70:  231. 
V.  Turner,   1  Mumford  405:    1374. 
Mayor,  Matter  of,  20  Misc.  520:  1084, 

1085. 
Mayor  v.  Brown,  9  Heisk.  1:   197. 

V.  Hopkins,  13  La.  Ann.  326:  1496. 
Mays  V.  Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry.  Co., 

75  S.  C.  455:  489. 
Maysville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ball,  108 
Ky.  241 :  1357. 
V.   Conner    (Ky.)    29    S.   W.   344: 
310. 


Maysville  etc.  R.  R.   Co.  v.  Ingram 

(Ky.)  30  S.  W.  8:  253,  310,  448, 

1303,  1549,  1552,  1648,  1657. 

V.  Pelham    (Ky.)    20   S.   W.   384 

1520. 

May  Town  Road,  4  Yeats  470:  1081, 

Mayville  v.  Wilcox,  61  Hun  223:  140. 

McAfee's  Heirs  v.  Kennedy,   1  Litt. 

Ky.  92:   1358. 
McAlister  v.  Reed,  59  Mo.  App.  70 

1259 
McAlUlly   V.    Horton,    75   Ala.    491 

1411. 
McAllister  v.  Pickup,   84   Iowa   65 
869. 
V.   Reed,   53   Mo.   App.   81:    1258, 
1556. 
McAntire  v.  Joplin  Tel.  Co.,  75  Mo. 

App.  535:  349. 
McArthur  v.  Kelly,  5  Ohio  139 :  523. 
v.  McEachin,  64  N.  C.  454:    1640. 
V.  Morgan,  49  Conn.  347 :  899,  1387. 
McAuley  v.  C.  C.  &  I.  0.  Ry.  Co.,  83 
111.  348:   1047. 
V.  Western  Vermont  R.  R.  Co.,  33 
Vt.  311:   860,  1631,  1632 
McBride  v.  Akron,  11  Ohio  C.  C.  610: 
84. 
V.  Chicago,  22  111.  576 :  12.- 
V.  State,  130  Ind.  525:   955,  1510. 
McCaffrey   v.    Smith,    41    Hun    117: 

357. 
McCall   V.   Marion   County,   43   Ore. 

536:   1392,  1407,  1439. 
McCallister  v.  Shney,  24  Iowa  362: 

976,  1032,  1033. 
McCandless  v.  Richmond  etc.  R.  E. 

Co.,  38  S.  C.  103:   15. 
McCandless'  Appeal,  70  Pa.  St.  210: 

495,  520,  529. 
McCandless  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  R. 

Co.,  38  S.  C.  103:  475. 
McCandless  Road,   110  Pa.  St.  605: 

1419. 
McCann  v.  Johnson  Co.  TeL  Co.,  69 
Kan.  210:   341. 
V.  Mt.  Gilead  Cemetery,  166  Ind. 

573:    784,  822. 
V.  Oregon  R.  R.  Co.,  13  Ore.  455: 

118. 
V.  Otoe  Co.,  9  Neb.  324:  828,  1116. 
V.   Sierra   Co.,    7    Cal.    121:    1162, 
1570. 
McCarter  v.  Hudson  Co.  Water  Co., 
70  N.  J.  Eq.  525:   170. 
V.   Hudson  Co.  Water   Co.,   70   N. 
J.  Eq.  595:   169. 
McCarthy  v.  Far  Rockaway,  3  App. 
Div.  379:  149,  155,  211,  233. 
V.  Met.  Board  of  Works,  L.  R.  7 
C.  P.  508:  372,  644. 


CASES    CITED. 


clxxxi 


tThe  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;  Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


McCarthy  v.  Met.  Board  of  Works,  L. 

E.  8  C.  P.  191 :  372,  644,  650. 

V.  Met.  Board  of  Works,  L.  R.  7 

Bng.   &   I.  App.   243:    372,   644, 

662,  671. 

V.  Murphy,  119  Wis.  159:   128,  129. 

V.  St.  Paul,  22  Minn.  527:  606,  615, 

617,  618,  1307,  1718. 
V.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  144  Cal.  677: 

1496. 
V.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  148  Cal.  211 : 

679,  969,   1496. 
V.  Syracuse,  46  N.  Y.  194:   1488. 
V.  Whalen,  19  Hun  503:  970. 
McCartney  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

112  111.  611:  726. 
McCarty  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  34 
111.  App.  273:  327,  643,  1378. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  34  111. 

App.  273:  639. 
V.    Clark    County,    101    Mo.    179: 

1626. 
V.  St.  Paul,  22  Minn.  527 :  1550. 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  31  Minn. 
278:  846. 
McCaah  v.  Burlington,  72  Iowa  26: 

603,  1306. 

McCauley  v.  Brooks,  16  Cal.  11 :  458, 

952. 

V.  Dunlap,  4  B.  Mod.  57 :  516,  519. 

V.  ^Valle^,   12  Cal.  500:   458,  1162. 

McChesney  v.  Chicago,  161  111.  110: 

1701. 
llcClain  v.   Chicago  etc.   R.  R.  Co., 
90  Iowa  646:   1504. 
V.  People,  9  Colo.  190:   1466. 
MeClane    v.    McClane,    207     Pa.    St. 

465:  831,  1569. 
McClarren   v.   Jefferson   School,    169 

Ind.  140:  695,  1347. 
MeClary  v.  Hartwell,  25  Mich.   139: 

1058,  1367. 
MeCloskey  v.  McDaniel,  37  Ind.  App. 

59 :  884,  886,  890. 
McCIaysburg  Road,  4  S.  &  R.  200: 

1081. 
McClean  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  67 

Iowa  568:   1120,  1293. 
McClellan  v.   Fisher,    16   Gray   185: 

939 
McClelland   v.   Miller,    28    Ohio    St. 

488:  1516,  1521. 
McClenachan  v.  Curwin,  6  Binn.  509 : 
1156,  1157. 
V.  Curwin,  3  Yeats  362:  1156,  1157. 
McCleneghan  v.  Omaha  R.  E.  Co.,  25 

Neb.  523:  93,  153. 
McClinton  v.  Pittsburg  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  66  Pa.  St.  404:  1160,  1546, 
1625,  1629,  1713. 
V.  Pittsburgh,  Fort  Wayne  &  Chi- 
cago R.  R.  Co.,  68  Pa.  St.  408: 
1626. 


McClinton  v.  Railroad  Co.,  16  P.  F. 

Smith  409:    1349. 
MeCloskey  v.  Pacific  Coast  Co.,   160 
Fed.  794:    129,  131. 
V.  Atlantic  City  E.  R.  Co.,  70  N. 
J.  L.  20:  159,  326. 
McClure's  Appeal,  137  Pa.  St.  590: 

1081. 

McClure  v.  Ala.  Midland  Ry.  Co.,  130 

Ala.  436:   1159,  1161,  1620. 

v.  Groton,  50  N.  H.  49 :   1025. 

V.  Red  Wing,  28  Minn.  186:  234. 

McColgan   v.    Baltimore   Belt   E.   E. 

Co.,  85  Md.  519:  1566. 
McComb  V.  Akron,  15  Ohio  474:  214, 
215. 
V.  Bell,  2  Minn.  295 :  13. 
McCombs  V.  Pittsburgh,  194  Pa.  St. 
348:    1201. 
V.  Stewart,  40  Ohio  St.  647:   808, 
1499. 
McConnell    v.    Am.    Bronze    Powder 
Mfg.  Co.,  41  N.  J.  Eq.  447:  1505. 
V.  Lexington,  12  Wheat.  582:   872. 
MeConnell's   Mill   Eoad,   32   Pa.    St. 

285:   1364. 
McCook  Irr.  &  W.  P.  Co.  v.  Crews,  70 

Neb.  109 :  70,  71,  76. 
McCord  V.  Doniphan  Branch  Ey.  Co., 
21  Mo.  App.  92:   860. 
V.  High,  24  Iowa  336 :  75. 
V.    Sylvester,    32    Wis.    451:    550, 
1343. 
McCord's  Road  Case,  13  S.  &  R.  83: 

1363. 
McCormack  v.  Brooklyn,   108  N.  Y. 

49:   687,  1526,  1530. 
McCormick,  Appeal  of,   165   Pa.   St. 
386:    237. 
V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  57 

Mo.  433:   1446,  1451,  1455. 
V.  Kansas  City,  St.  Joe  &  C.  B.  E. 

E.  Co.,  70  Mo.  359:   155. 
V.  LaFayette,  1  Ind.  48:  1163,  1165, 

1170. 
V.  Terre  Haute  &  Eichmond  E.  E. 

Co.,  9  Ind.  283:   1522. 
V.  West  Chicago  Park  Comrs.,  118 
111.  655:    1392. 
McCosh  V.  Burlington,  72  Iowa  26: 

618. 
McCotter  v.  New  Shoreham,  21  R.  I. 

43:  707,  894,  895,  957,  961. 

McCoy  V.  Cincinnati  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  13 

Fed.  3:   476. 

V.  Graudy.  3  Ohio  St.  463 :  459. 

McCray  v.  Fairmont,  46  W.  Va.  442 : 

155,  233. 
McCrea  v.  Champlain,  35  App.  Div. 
N.  Y.  89:  697. 
V.  Port  Royal  R.  R.  Co.,  3   S.  C. 
.381:  090,  697. 


clxxxii 


CASES    CITED. 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.  II,   pp.  743-1719.] 


McCready  v.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  E. 
Co.,  76  Hun  531:  1299,  1300. 
V.   Rio   Grande   Western   Ry.    Co., 
30  Utah  1 :  1698. 
McCrory  v.   Griswold,   7   Iowa   248: 

1421. 
McCruden  v.  Rochester  R.  R.  Co.,  5 

Misc.  59:   350,  1486. 
McCue  V.  Bellingham  Bay  Water  Co., 

5  Wash.   156:   1505. 
MoCulIey    v.    Cunningham,    96    Ala. 

583:  551,  595,  988. 
McCullom  V.  Uhl,  128  Ind.  304:  1510. 
McCullough   V.   Brooklyn,   23   Weud. 
458:  1527,  1530,  1531. 
V.    Campbellsport,    123    Wis.    334: 

212,  229,  231,  439. 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  52  Minn. 

12:  441,  1453. 
V.  State,  41  S.  C.  220:   478. 
V.  Virginia,  172  U.  S.  102:  594. 
McCune   v.    SwaflFord,    5   Iowa    552: 

,  1396. 
McCunley   v.    Weller,    12    Cal.    500: 

1155. 
McCutchen  v.  Texas  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  118 

La.  436:  864,  1714. 
McDaniel  v.  Columbus,  87  Ga.  440: 
1576. 
V.  Columbus,  91  Ga.  462:  535,  1070. 
McDermott   v.   New    Castle,    13    Pa. 
Co.  Ct.  474:   1018,  1359,  1365. 
V.  Warren  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  172  Mass. 
197:  621,  1529. 
McDevitt  V.  People's  Nat'l  Gas  Co., 
160  Pa.  St.  367:    172,  175,  337, 
367,  644,  1524. 
McDonald    v.    Payne,    114   Ind.    359: 
980,  982,  1576. 
V.  Red  Wing,  13  Minn.  38:   17. 
V.   Southern   Cal.    R.   R.    Co.,    101 

Cal.  206:    848. 
V.  Stark,  176  111.  456:   877,  890. 
V.  Western  N.  C.  Insane  Asylum, 

101  N.  C.  656:   1406. 
V.  Wilson,  59  Ind.  54:   980,  983. 
McDough  V.  Clark,  7  B.  Men.  448: 

899,  1311. 
McDowell  V.  Asheville,  112  N.  C.  747: 
1532. 
V.  Blue  Ridge  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  144  N. 
C.  721:   853. 
McElheny  v.  McKeesport  etc.  Bridge 

Co.,  153  Pa.  St.   108:    1128. 
McElroth     V.     Lakeville,    92     Minn. 

248:   1399. 
McElroy  v.  Kansas  City,  21  Fed.  R. 
257:   26,  631,  1160,  1597. 
V.  Kansas  City  etc.  Air  Line,  172 
Mo.  576:    1186. 


McElroy  v.  Manhattan  R.  E,  Co.,  6 

App.  Div.  367:   1302. 
McEwan  v.  Pennsylvania  etc.  R.  R. 

Co.,  72  N.  J.  L.  419:  806,  977. 
McEwen   v.   Preece,   45   Wash.    612: 

866. 
McFadden    v.    Johnson,    72    Pa.    St. 

335:  937,  1560. 
V.  Missouri  etc.  Ry.   Co.,  41  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  350:   153. 
McFarlan  v.  Morris  Canal  &  B.  Co., 

44    N.    J.    L.    471:     1650,    1653, 

1713,  1714. 
McFarland  v.   Lindekugel,   107   Wis. 

474:  366,  889,  1596. 
V.   Orange   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   13   N. 

J.  Eq.  17:  712. 
McGann  v.  People,  194  111.  526:  302, 

532. 
V.  People,  97  111.  App.  587 :  302. 
McGar  v.  Bristol,  71  Conn.  652:  601, 

617,  620. 
McGavock   v.    Omaha,    40    Neb.    64: 

1004,  1009,  1550. 
McGean  v.  Manhattan  R.  E.  Co.,  117 

N.  Y.  219:   1121,  1124. 
McGee's    Appeal,    114   Pa.    St.    470: 

363,  384,  392,  394,  647. 
McGee  v.  Hennepin  County,  84  Minn. 

472:   739. 
McGee  Irrigation  Ditch  Co.  v.  Hud- 
son, 85  Tex.  587:  141,  587. 
McGehee  v.   Tidewater  Ry.  Co.,   108 

Va.  508:   152,  1667. 
V.  Mathis,  21  Ark.  40:  586. 
McGillis  V.  Willis,  19  111.  App.  311 

1450. 
McGinnis  v.  St.  Louis,  157  Mo.  191 

878. 
McGinnitie  v.  Silvers,  167  Ind.  321 

388. 
McGourin   v.   DeFuniak   Springs,   51 

Fla.  502:   884. 
McGram  v.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co., 

67  App.  Div.  37 :  1555. 
McGrath   v.    ^Vatertown,    181    Mass. 

380:  1074,  1707,  1708. 
McGregor  v.  Equitable  Gas  Co.,  139 

Pa.  St.  230:   813,  1251. 
McGrew    v.    Kansas    City,    64    Kan. 

61;  357. 
V.  Kansas  City,  69  Kan.  606:  357. 
McGuire  v.  Grant,  25  N.  J.  L.  356: 

440. 
V.  Wilkes-Barre,  36  Pa.  Supr.  Ct. 

418:   1492. 
McHale  v.  Easton  &  B.  Transit  Co., 

169  Pa.  St.  416:   352. 
McIIhenny  v.  Trenton,  148  Mich.  381: 

356. 
Mcllvoy  V.  Speed,  4  Bibb  85 :  1370. 


CASES    CITED. 


clxxxiii 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;  Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Mclntire    v.    State,    5    Blackf.    384: 

1174,  1175,  1192. 

V.  Western  N.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  67  N. 

C.   278:    1164,   1165,   1170,   1523. 

Mclntyre  v.   Easton  &  Amboy  R.  R. 

Co.,  26  N.  J.  Eq.  425:   941,  962, 

1024. 

V.  El  Paso  Co.,  15  Colo.  App.  78: 

420,  1494,  1618. 
V.  Lukes,  77  Tex.  259:   1018,  1029, 

1513. 
V.  Marine,  93  Ind.  193:  1010,  1012. 
McKay  v.   Pennsylvania   Water  Co., 

6  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  364:   728. 
McKean  v.  New  England  R.  R.  Co., 
199  Mass.  292 :  454. 
V.   New   York   etc.   R.   R.    Co.,    75 
Conn.  343 :  246,  1549. 
McKee  v.  Delaware  &  H.  Canal  Co., 
52  Hun  52:  79,  1637. 
V.  Delaware  &  H.  Canal  Co.,  125 

N.  Y.  353:  79,  80,  1637. 
V.  Grand  Rapids,   137  Mich.  200: 

1615. 
V.  Hull,  69  Wis.  657 :  860. 
V.  St.  Louis,  17  Mo.  184:  963. 
v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  49  Mo. 
App.  174:  91,  1650,  1653. 
McKean  v.  Delaware  Canal  Co.,   49 
Pa.  St.  424:   108,  117. 
V.  Porter,  134  Ind.  483:   996. 
McKeesport  v.  Citizens'  Pass.  R.  R. 

Co.,  2  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  249:  299. 
McKenna  v.  Brooklyn  Union  El.  R. 
R.   Co.,   95   App.   Div.   226:    182, 
1562. 
V.  Brooklyn  Union  El.  R.  R.  Co., 

184  N.  Y.  391:   182,  1562. 
T.  St.  Louis  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  69  Ark. 
104:   1628. 
McKenney  v.  County  Comrs.,  40  Me. 

136:    1089. 
McKennon  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  Ry.  Co., 

69  Ark.   104:    814,   1522. 
McKenny  v.  Monongahela  Navigation 

Co.,  14  Pa.  St.  65:   1523. 
McKenzie  v.   Gilmore,   33  Pac.  262: 
881. 
V.  Haines,  123  Wis.  557:  887. 
V.  Miss.  &  Rum  River  Boom  Co., 
29   Minn.   288:    67,   90,   94. 
McKeon  v.  New  England  R.  R.  Co., 

199   Mass.    292:    1252,    1636. 
McKernan   v.    Indianapolis,    38    Ind. 

223:    1514. 
McKevin  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  R.  Co., 

45  Fed.'  464:   1526. 
McKey  v.  Hyde  Park,  134  U.  S.  84: 

882,  885. 
McKinney    v.    Nashville,    102    Tenn. 
131:  1229,  1230,  1233,  1240. 


McKinnon  v.  Cedar  Rapids  etc.  Ry. 

&  Lt.  Co.,   126  la.  426:    1409. 
McKinsey  v.   Bowman,    58   Ind.   88 : 

1150. 
McKusick    V.    Stillwater,    44    Minn. 

372:   993,   1085,  1186. 
McLachlan    v.    Gray,    105    la.    259: 

363,   384,   388,   395,   406. 
McLaman  v.  McMeley,  56  Mo.  App. 

556:  878. 
McLauchlin  v.  Railroad  Co.,  5  Rich. 

583:   248,  255. 
McLaughlin   v.   Dorsey,    1   Harris   & 

McHenry,    224:    940. 
V.  Municipality  No.  2,  5  La.  Ann. 

504:    1688. 
V.    Sandusky,    17    Neb.    110:    722, 

1574. 
V.  State,  8  Ind.  281:   1522. 
McLean    v.    Brush   Electric   Lt.    Co., 

9  Cinn.  Law  Bull.  65:  344. 
V.   Great   Western    R.    R.    Co.,    33 

U.  C.  Q.  B.   198:    1031. 
V.   Llewellyn   Iron   W^orks,   2   Cal. 

App.  346:   182,  366. 
McLellan  v.  County  Comrs.,  21  Me. 

390:   1100,  1103. 
v.   Crofton,   6  Greenl.    (Me.)    307: 

996. 
McLemon  v.  McNeley,   56  Mo.  App. 

556:   183. 
McLendon    v.    Railroad   Co.,    54   Ga. 

293:  936. 
McLeod  V.  Savannah,  Albany  etc.  R. 

R.  Co.,  25  Ga.  445:  413. 
V.  So.  Deerfield  Water  Supply  Dist. 

193   Mass.   6:    710. 
McLucas  V.  St.  Joseph  etc.  Ry.  Co.. 

67  Neb.  603:  1478,  1479,  1633. 
McMahon    v.    Cincinnati    &    Chicago 

Short    Line    R.    R.    Co.,    5    Ind. 

413:   698,   1205,  1376. 
V.  Council  Bluffs,  12  la.  268:  236, 

335,  336. 
V.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  41  La. 

Ann.  827:   640,  666,  1161,  1294, 

1303,   1334,  1337,   1582,  1615. 
McMamara  v.  Taft,  196  Mass.  597: 

81. 
McManus    v.    Carmichael,    3    la.    1 : 

104. 
V.   McDonough,    107   111.    95:    925, 

1028. 
McMasters      v.      Commonwealth,      3 

Watts  292:    1187. 
McMeekin  v.  Central  Carolina  Power 

Co.,   80  S.   C.   512:    536,   1624. 
McMicken  v.  Cincinnati,  4  Ohio  St. 

394:   1011,  1012. 
McMillan    v.    Baker,    20    Kan.    50: 

1571,  1573. 


clxxxiv 


OASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


McMillan  v.  Board  of  Co.  Comrs.,  92 
Minn.   16:    576. 
V.   Butte,  30  Mont.  220:    11,  464. 
V.  Klaw  &  Erlanger  Con.  Co.,  107 
App.  Div.  407:    199,  373. 
McMillin   Printing  Co.   v.   Pittsburg 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  216  Pa.  St.  504: 
1233,  1257,  1277. 
McMinn  v.  Pittsburg    etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

147  Pa.  St.  5:  849,  1457. 
McMullen   v.    State,    105    Ind.    334: 

1088,  1371,  1510. 
McMuIlin   V.    Leitich,   83    Cal.   239: 

892. 
McMurray-Judge  Architectural  Iron 
Works    V.    St.    Louis,    138    Mo. 
608:    1601. 
McMurtrie    v.   Stewart,    21    Pa.    St. 

322 :  728. 
McNally   v.    Smith,    12   Allen,    455: 

1523. 
McNamara    v.    Commonwealth,    184 
Mass.  304:   623,  1268. 
V.  Minn.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  12  Minn. 
388:   1407,  1425. 
McNeil  V.  Hicks,  34  La.  Ann.  1090: 

422,  1494,  1496. 
McNichols   v.    Wilson,    42    la.    385: 

1429. 
McNulta   V.   Rolston,   5   Ohio   C.   C. 

330:    180,   319. 
McOsker    v.    Burrell,    55    Ind.    425: 

722. 
McPherson  v.  Holdridge,  24  111.  38: 
1099,  1571. 
V.  Leathers,  29  Ind.  65:   1406. 
McPike  V.  West,  71  Mo.   199:    1569, 

1574. 
McQuade  v.  The  King,  7  Can.  Exch. 

318:   372,  382,  391,  647. 
McQuaid   v.    Portland    &   V.    R.    R. 
Co.,  18  Ore.  237:    180,  201,  282, 
313,   316. 
McQuigg  V.  Cullins,  56  Ohio  St.  649 : 
190,    385,    386,    387,    388,    404, 
405,  1596. 
McQuillen    v.    Hatton,    42    Ohio    St. 

202:   495,  501,  580. 
McRae  v.  Wilmington  R.   R.  Co.,  2 

Jones  Law  186:   413. 
McReynolds    v.    Baltimore    etc.    Ry. 
Co.,  106  111.   152:    1379. 
V.  Burlington  &  Ohio  Ry.  Co.,  106 

III.  152:  1195. 
V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  110 

Mo.  484:    1546,   1547. 
V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  34 
Mo.  App.  581 :  1209. 
McRoberts    v.    Wagliburn,    10    Minn. 
23:   130,  407,  413,  781,  1008. 


McSweeny    v.     Commonwealth,     185 

Mass.  371:  429,  626,  733. 
McVey  v.  Heavenridge,  30  Ind.  100: 

1400. 
McWethy  v.  Aurora  Elec.  Lt.  &  P. 

Co.,  202  111.  218:  344,  1594. 
McWhirter  v.    Cockrell,   2   Head   9: 

1061. 
McWilliams  v.  Jewett,  14  Miscl.  491 : 

922. 
Meacham  v.  Fitchburg  R.  R.  Co.,  4 
Cush.  291:   1185,   1207. 
V.  Seattle,  45  Wash.  380 :  878,  882, 
891. 
Mead  v.  Ballard,  7  Wall.  290:  841. 
V.  Haynes,  3  Rand.  33:    104,  969. 
V.  Haynes,  3  Rand.  417:   104. 
V.  Hein,  28  Wis.  533:   937. 
V.   Mellette,    18    S.    D.    523:    164, 

1604. 
V.  Portland,  45  Ore.  1:   360. 
V.  Portland,  200  U.  S.   148:   238. 
Meade  v.  Topeka,  75  Kan.  61:   865, 
867. 
V.  United  States,  2  Ct.  of  Claims 
224:  745. 
Meadville  Nat.  Gas  Co.  v.  Meadville 
Fuel  Gas  Co.,  1  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  448: 
411. 
Meagher,   Matter  of,   35   Misc.   601 : 
976,  989,  990,  1044,  1060,  1067. 
Mears  v.  Wilmington,  9  Ired.  L.  73: 

229,  237. 
Meehan  v.  Wiles,  93  Ind.  52:    1396, 

1400,   1407,   1409. 
Meek  v.  Meade  County,  12  S.  D.  163: 

828. 
Meeker'  v.  Chicago,  23  111.  App.  23: 
1527,  1625,  1673. 
V.  Puyallup,  5  Wash.  759:  892. 
Meginnis  v.  Nunamaker,  64  Pa.  St. 

374:   1555. 
Megrath  v.  Nickerson,  24  Wash.  235: 

869. 
Mehrhof    Bros.    Brick    Mfg.    Co.    v. 
Delaware  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  51  N. 
J.  L.  56:   119,  131,  133. 
Meier  v.   Portland  Cable  R.  R.  Co., 

16  Ore.  500:  878. 
Meigs'  Appeal,   12  P.  F.  Smith  28: 

1350. 
Meigs  V.  Milligan,   177   Pa.   St.   66: 

429. 
Meilly  v.  Zurmehly,  23  Ohio  St.  627: 

1465. 

Meinzer  v.  Racine,  68  Wis.  241 :  236. 
Melandy  v.   Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
132    111.    App.    431:    91,    93,    94, 
1639,  1653,   1662. 
Melenbacker  v.  Salamanca,  116  App. 
Div.  691:  609,  617,  1525. 
V.  Salamanca,  188  N.  Y.  370:  609, 
617,  1525. 


CASES    CITED. 


clxxxv 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Melendy  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  132 

III.  App.  431:  91,  94,  1653,  1662, 
Melizet's    Appeal,    17    Pa.    St.    449: 

943. 
Mellen  v.  Western  R.  R.  Co.,  4  Gray 

301:  1639. 
Mellichar  v.  Iowa  City,  116  la.  390: 

1671,  1700. 
Mellor  V.  Philadelphia,   160   Pa.   St. 

614:  372,  382,  385,  391,  394,  630, 

636,  646,  647,  671. 
Melon  St.,   In  re,   182  Pa.   St.   397: 

181,    187,    191,    364,    368,    3/4, 

382,  391,  894,  403,  404,  646,  651, 

1666. 
Melon  St.,   In  re,   1   Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

63:    382,  394,  644. 
Melrose   v.    Cutter,   157   Mass.   461: 

1496. 
Memphis   v.    Bolton,   9    Heisk.    508: 

1180. 
V.  Hastings,   113  Tenn.    142:    733, 

1158,  1169. 
V.  Wright,  6  Yerg.  497:  422,  1495, 

1496. 
Memphis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Birming- 
ham etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  96  Ala.  571: 

738,  769,  1281,  1396. 
T.    Hopkins    (Ala.)     18    So.    845: 

1425. 
v.  Organ,   67   Ark.   84:    864,   869, 

1545,  1714. 
V.  Parsons  Town  Co.,  26  Kan.  503 : 

1031,  1034,  1626. 
V.  Payne,  37  Miss.  700:   1634. 
V.  Union  Ry.  Co.,  116  Tenn.  500: 

677,  739,  760,  761,  768,  1068. 
Memphis  Freight  Co.  v.  Memphis,  6 

Coldw.  419:  505,  544,  591. 
Memphis   State   Line   R.   R.    Co.   v. 

Forest  Hill  Cem.  Co.,  116  Tenn. 

400:    543,   784. 
Memphis   Tel.    Co.  v.   Hun,   16   Lea. 

456:   343,  350,   1488. 
Menage   v.   Minneapolis,    104   Minn. 

195:   875. 
Menard  Co.  v.  Kincaid,  71  111.  587: 

6,  695. 
Mendenhall  v.  Clugish,  84  Ind.   94: 

993. 
Mendez  v.  Dugart,  17  La.  Ann.  171: 

1499. 
Mendocino  Co.  v.  Peters,  2  Cal.  App. 

24:  514,  913. 
Mendon  v.   County   Comrs.,   2  Allen 

463:   1417. 
V.    County    Comrs.)    5    Allen    13: 

1418. 
V.   Worcester   Co.,    10   Pick.    235: 

1089. 


Meng   V.    Coffee,    67    Neb.    500:    69, 

71. 
Menges   v.   Albany,    56    N.    Y.    374: 

925. 
Meranda  v.   Spurlin,    100  Ind.   380: 

786,  934,   1384. 
Mercantile  Trust   Co.  v.   Atlantic   & 

P.  R.  R.  Co.,  63  Fed.  513:   425. 
V.  Atlantic  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  63  Fed. 

910:  412,  832. 
V.  Texas  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  51  Fed. 

529:    483. 
Mercantile  Trust  etc.  Co.  v.  Collins 

Park   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,    101    Fed. 

347:  764. 
Merced  Falls  Gas  &  Elec.  Co.  v.  Tur- 
ner, 2  Col.  App.  720:   361,  491. 
Mercer      v.      McWilliams,      Wright 

(Ohio)    132:    1165. 
V.  Pittsburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  36  Pa. 

St.  99:  255,  368. 
V.  Williams,  Walker  Ch.    (Mich.) 

85:  1574. 
Mercer  County  v.  Wolff,  237  111.  74: 

683,  704,  896,   1072,   1548. 
Mercer   Co.   Traction  Co.  v.  United 

N.  J.  R.  R.  &  C.  Co.,  64  N.  J. 

Eq.  588:    302. 
V.  United  N.  J.  R.  R.  &  C.  Co.,  65 

N.  J.  Eq.  574:  302. 
V.  United  N.  J.  R.  R.  &  C.  Co.,  68 

N.  J.  Eq.  714:  302,  771. 
Mercer   etc.   R.   R.   Co.  v.   Delaware 

etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  26  N.  J.  Eq.  464: 

1463,  1464. 
Mercer,   Road  in,   14   S.   &  E.   447: 

700. 
Merchants  P.  &  D.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Citi- 
zens Tel.  Co.,  123  Ky.  90:   419, 

1622. 
Merchant  St.,  In  re,   9  Phila.   590: 

976. 
Merchants'  Union.  Barb  Wire  Co.  \. 

Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  70 

la.  105:   298,  620,  1553. 
V.   Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,   79  la. 

614:   1354. 
Meredith  v.  Sayre,  32  N.  J.  Eq.  557 : 

1595. 
Meriam   v.   Brown,    128   Mass.   391 : 

1348. 
Meridian  v.   Farmers'   L.   4;  T.   Co,, 

143  Fed.  67:  410. 
V.  Higgins,  81  Miss.  376:  1179. 
V.  Poole,  88  Miss.   108:   891. 
Merom  Gravel  Co.  v.  Pearson,  33  Ind. 

App.  174:   1365. 
Merrick  v.   Baltimore,   43  Md.   219: 

1673. 
V.   Intramontaine   R.   R.    Co.,    118 

N.  C.   1081:   277. 


clxxxvi 


CASES    CITED. 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Merrick  Water  Co.  v.  Brooklyn,  32 

App.  Div.  454:  163. 
Merrifield   v.    Worcester,    110    Mass. 

216:  82. 
Merrill   v.  Berkshire,   11   Pick.  269: 

954,  1089. 
V.  Calkins,  74  N.  Y.  1 :  1580. 
Messenger  v.   Manhattan  K.  R.   Co., 
129  N.  Y.  502:  193,  265,  448,  1290, 

1303,  1304. 
V.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  129  N.  Y. 

648:   1333. 
Messer  v.   Wildman,   53   Conn.   494: 

1410. 
Messerole  v.  Brooklyn,  8  Paige  198: 

1571. 
Messner  v.  Lykens  etc.  St.  Ry.  Co., 

13  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  429:   1592. 
Metcalf  V.   Bingham,   3   N.   H.   459: 

515. 
V.  Nelson,  8  S.  D.  87:  161. 
Methodist    Church    v.    Baltimore,    6 

Md.   391:    678,    1010. 
Methodist  Episcopal  Church  v.  Wy- 
andotte, 31  Kan.  721:   211,  238. 
Metlar  v.  Middlesex  etc.  Traction  Co., 

72  N.  J.  L.  524:  708,  717. 
Metier  v.  Easton  &  Ambry  R.  R.  Co., 

25  N.  J.  Eq.  214:   1325,  1569. 
T.  Easton  &  Ambry  R.  R.  Co.,  37 

N.  J.  L.  222:   1225,  1227,  1321, 

1323,  1438,  1439. 
Metropolitan   Bd.   of   Works  v.   Mc- 
Carthy, L.  R.  7  Eng.  &  I.  App. 

243:   214,  651. 
V.  Metropolitan  Ry.  Co.,  37  L.  J. 

C.  P.  281 :   1453. 
V.  Metropolitan  Ry.  Co.,  38  L.  J. 

C.  P.  172:  1453. 
V.  Saut,  38  L.  J.  Eq.  7:  1557. 
Metropolitan  City  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chicago 

West  Div.  Rv.  Co.,  87  111.  317: 

743,    744,    747,    789,    920,    1036, 

1044,  1071. 
Metropolitan   El.   R.   R.    Co.,   In   r^ 

76  Hun  375:   1109,  1377. 
Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.   Co.,  Matter 

of,  128  N.  Y.  600:   1425. 
Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dom- 

inick,    55    Hun    198:    743,    897, 

977,  987,  1043. 
Metropolitan  Gas  Co.  v.  Hyde  Park, 

27  111.  App.  361 :  416,  1621. 
Metropolitan  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Broadway 

R.  R.   Co.,   99  Mass.   238:    761, 

1284. 
V.    Chicago    West    Div.    Ry.    Co., 

87  HI.  317:  791. 
V.  Highland  R.  R.  Co.,  118  Mass. 
290:   761,  1282,  1283,  1284. 


Metropolitan   R.   R.   Ca   v.   Macfar- 

land,  20  App.   Cas.  D.  C.   421: 

488. 
V.  Quincy  R.  R.  Co.,  12  Allen  262: 

761,  1283,  1284. 
Metropolitan  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Toledo 

EI.  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  9  Ohio  C.  C. 

664:   765,  768. 
V.  Walsh,  197  Mo.  392:  525,  1119, 

1129,    1138,    1146,    1147,    1148, 

1228,  1229. 
Metropolitan  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  Col- 
well  Lead  Co.,  67  How.  Pr.  365: 

1593. 
V.    Colwell    Lead    Co.,    50    N.    Y. 

Supr.  Ct.  488 :  339,  1593. 
Metropolitan  Tr.  Co.,  Matter  of.  111 

N.  Y.  588 :  1072. 
Metropolitan    Water    Co.   v.   Kansas 

City,  164  Fed.  738:  931,  1167. 
Metropolitan   West   Side   El.   R.    R. 

Co.  V.  Clancy,  153  111.  270:  1195, 

1215. 
V.    Dickinson,    161    111.    22:     1130, 

1426. 
V.  Esehner,  233  111.  210:  991,  1136. 
V.  Goll,   100  III.  App.  323:   53,  57, 

323,  448,  654,  663,  1337. 
V.  Siegel,  161  III.  638:    1274,  1422. 
V.    Springer,    159    111.    434:    1211, 

1378. 
V.  Springer,  171  111.  170:  190,  266, 

438,  1195,  1243,  1335,  1426. 
V.    Stickney,    150    111.    362:    1195, 

1215,  1313,  1665. 
V.  White,  166  111.  375:  1133. 
Metty  V.  Marsh,   124   Ind.   18:    982, 

1407. 
Metuchen  v.  Pa.  R.  R.  Co.,  71  N.  J. 

Eq.   404:    1643. 
Metzler  &  Hugus's  Road,  62  Pa.  St. 

151:   1096,  1371. 
Mewes  v.  Crescent  Pipe  Line  Co.,  170 

Pa.  St.  364:  1128,  1130,  1131. 
Meyer    v.    Burlington,    52    la.    560: 

1306. 
V.  Covington,  103  Ky.  546:    1057. 
V.  Lincoln,  33  Neb.  566:   1492. 
V.  Tacoma  etc.  Co.,  8  Wash.  144: 

69,  161,  164. 
V.   Teutopolis,    131    HI.    552:    363, 

396,  399. 
Meyers  v.  Brown,  55  Ind.  596:   978. 
V.    Hudson    Co.    Elec.    Co.,    63    N. 

J.  L.  573:  361. 
V.    St.    Louis,    8    Mo.    App.    266: 

107. 
V.  Schuylkill  Riv.  E.  S.  R.  R.  Co., 

5  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  634:  1128. 
V.  Vermillion,  7  Ohio  N.  P.  (N.  S.) 

90:  155,  1606. 


OASES    CITED. 


clxxxvii 


[The  references   are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Miami  Coal  Co.  v.  Wighton,  19  Ohio 

St.  560:  679,  709. 
Michael  v.   St.   Louis,   112  Mo.  610: 

1512. 
Michigan  Air  Line  Ry.  Co.  v.  Barnes, 
40    Mich.    383:     947,    949,    962, 
1084. 
V.    Barnes,    44    Mich.    222:     1097, 
1365. 
Mich.   Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bay  City, 
129  Mich.  264:  890. 
V.  Bullard,  120  Mich.  416:   1474. 
V.    Probate   Judge,    48    Mich.    638: 

1384. 
V.  Spring  Creek  Dr.  Dist.,  215  111. 
501:  924,  1195. 
Michigan  etc.   R.   R.   Co.  v.  Monroe 
Circ.  Judge,  144  Mich.  44:   929. 
Mich.    Tel.    Co.    v.    Benton    Harbor, 
121  Mich.  512:  342,  362. 
V.  St.  Joseph,  121  Mich.  502:   342, 
362. 
Micon  V.  Tallahassee  Bridge  Co.,  47 

Ala.  652:   1608. 
Middleborough  v.  New  York  etc.  R. 

R.  Co.,  179  Mass.  520:  1158. 
Middle  Creek  Elec.  Co.  v.  Hughes,  34 

Pa.  Co.  Ct.  270:  679. 
Middle   Creek   Road,   9   Pa.   St.    69: 

1358. 
Middlesex  Co.  v.  Lowell,   149  Mass. 
509:  82,  83,  453,  1604. 
V.  McCue,  149  Mass.  103 :  168. 
Middlesex  etc.  Traction  Co.  v.  Met- 

lar,  70  N.  J.  L.  98:  709,  717. 
Middleton  v.  Flat  River  Booming  Co., 
27  Mich.  533:   80,  1604. 
V.  Mason  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  127 

la.  433:    620. 
V.  Sage,  8  Conn.  221:    103. 
Middletown,  Matter  of,  82  N.  Y.  196: 

896,  963,  1009. 
Middletown    v.    Pritchard,    3    Scam. 

510:  103. 
Middletown  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Middle- 
town  Electric  R.  R.   Co.,  4  Pa. 
Dist.  Ct.  32:   910. 
Midland  Counties  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Oswin, 

1   Collyer  74:   831,  1558. 
Midland  R.   R.   Co.  v.   Checkley,   36 
L.  J.  Ch.  380:  825. 
V.  Checkley,  4  L.  R.  Eq.  Cas.   19: 

1496. 
V.  Galey,  141  Ind.  483:    1425. 
V.  Smith,   109  Ind.   488:    984,  996. 
V.  Smith,  113  Ind.  233:   1568,  1578. 
V.  Smith,  125  Ind.  509:   1712. 
V.  Smith,   135  Ind.  348:    1578. 
Mifflin  V.  Comrs.,  5  S.  &  R.  69:  1528. 
V.   Railroad   Co.,    16   Pa.   St.    182: 
248,  423,  624. 


Mifflin    Bridge    Co.    v.    Juniata    Co., 

144    Pa.    St.    365:     1135,    1145, 

1264,  1265. 
Mifflinville  Bridge,  206  Pa.  St.  420: 

753. 
Mifflinville  Bridge,  209  Pa.  St.  587: 

753. 
Mihollin  v.  Thomas,  7  Ind.  165:  978, 

1028. 
Mikesell    v.    Durkee,    34    Kan.    509: 

300,  316,  1593. 

Milan  v.   Sproul,  36  Ga.  393:    1028, 

1414. 
Milbridge   etc.   Elec.   R.   R.   Co.   Ap- 
pellants,  96   Me.    110:    272,   299, 

321,  358. 
Milburn   v.    Cedar   Rapids,    12   Iowa 

246:  200,  243,  251. 
Miles  v.  Benton  Tp.,  11  S.  D.  450: 

587. 
V.  Worcester,  154  Mass.  511:  439, 

1508. 
Milhau    V.     Sharp,     15    Barb.  .193: 

244,   268. 
V.  Sharp,  27  N.  Y.  611:   297,  298, 

301,  1586. 

Military  Parade  Ground,  Matter  of, 

60   N.   Y.   319:    1670. 
Mill   V.   White   Water   Valley    Canal 

Co.,  4  Ind.  431:   1711. 
Millard  v.  Roberts,   202  U.   S.  429: 

586. 
V.  Webster  City,  113  la.  220:  603, 

618,  1123,  1126. 
Millbury  v.  Blackstone  Canal  Co.,  8 

Pick.  473 :  956. 
Millcreek  Road,  29  Pa.  St.  195 :  722, 

1003. 
Miller  v.  Asheville,   112  N.   C.  759: 

1152,  1254,   1319,  1323. 
V.  Auburn  &  Syracuse  R.  R.  Co.,  6 

Hill   61:    857. 
V.    Bank   of    Belleville,    148   Mich. 

339:     9,    1604. 
V.  Banks,  146  Ind.  219:   1381. 
V.  Beaver  &  LeRoy,  37  Minn.  203: 

1186,  1215. 
V.    Black    Rock    Spring   Imp.    Co., 

99  Va.  747:   161,  163. 
V.  Board  of  Comrs.,  3  Ohio  C.  C. 

617:  786,  1429. 
V.  Brown,  56  N.  Y.  383:  707. 
V.  Buffalo,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  29  Pa. 

Supr.  Ct.  515:   92. 
V.  Chicago  &  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  60  111. 

App.  51:    152,  1251,  1454. 
V.  Colonial  Forestry  Co.,  73  Conn. 

500:  512. 
V.  Corinna,  42  Minn.  391 :  363,  400, 

865. 


elx: 


XXVlll 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742 ;  Vo'.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Miller  v.  Cornwell,  71  Mich.  270:  91, 

93,  1615. 
V.  Craig,  11  N.  J.  Eq.  175:  586. 
V.   Edison  Elee.   111.   Co.,   97   App. 

Div.   638':    454. 
V.  Edison  Elec.  111.  Co.,  184  N.  Y. 

17:  454. 
V.  Graham,   17   Ohio  St.   1:    1012, 

1022. 
V.   Green  Bay  etc.   R.   R.   Co.,  59 

Minn.  169:  425,  1473. 
V.  Indianapolis,  123  Ind.  196:  876. 
V.    Jensen,    102    Minn.    391:    567, 

576. 
V.   Junction  Canal   Co.,   41  N.  Y. 

98:  1443. 
V.  Keokuk  &  Pes  Moines  Ry.  Co., 

63    la.    680:     1251,    1454,    1551, 

1650,  1653,  1716. 
V.  Mobile,  47  Ala.  163:    1571. 
V.  Morristown,  47   N.   J.  Eq.   62: 

156,  1606. 
V.  Newark,  35  N.  J.  L.  462:   1267, 

1409. 
V.   Newport   News,    101    Va.   432: 

80. 
V.  New  York,  21  Barb.  513 :  490. 
V.  New  York  etc.  E.  R.  Co.,   125 

N.  Y.  118:   168. 
V.  Porter,  71   Ind.  521:   978,  980, 

1023,  1510. 
V.   Prairie   du   Chien  &  McGregor 

Ry.  Co.,  34  Wis.  533:  1047,  1406. 
V.  Railroad  Co.  6  Hill  61 :  322. 
V.  St.  Louis  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  162  Mo. 

424:  1226,  1320,  1546. 
V.  Schenck,  78  la.  372:   1665. 
V.  Sterling,  198  111.  523 :  1309. 
V.  St»wman,  26  Ind.  143:  866. 
V.  Township  Committee,  24  N.  J. 

L.  54:   1531. 
V.  Troost,  14  Minn.  365:  550,  898. 
V.    Union    County,    48    Ore.    266: 

1390,  1424. 
V.   Weber,   1   Ohio   Circ.   Ct.    130: 

1124. 
V.  Webster  City,   94  la.   162:   347. 
V.    Windsor    Water    Co.,    148    Pa. 

St.  429:  1149. 
V.  Wisenberger,  61  Ohio  St.   561: 

79. 
v.  Ypsilanti  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  125  Mich. 

171:  349. 
Millerd  v.  Reeves,  1  Mich.  107:   858. 
Millett    V.    County    Comrs.,    80    Me. 

427:    401,   1683. 
Millick    V.    Philadelphia,    11    Phila. 

354:    1325. 
Milligan  v.  State,  60  Ind.  206 :  912. 
Milliken  v.   Denny,   141   N.   C.  224: 

881. 


Milliser   v.   Wagner,    133   Ind.   400: 

1409. 
Mills  V.   Board  of  Comrs.,   50   Kan. 
635 :  400,  401,  969. 
V.  Brooklyn,   32  N.   Y.   489:    142, 

234. 
V.    County    Comrs.,    3    Scam.    53: 

1261. 
V.  East  Syracuse,  20  Miscl.  N.  Y. 

651:   1529. 
V.  Evans,   100  la.  712:    865. 
V.  Nashua,  63  N.  H.  42 :  142. 
V.   Parlin,    106   111.    60:    318,   532, 

1581. 
V.  St.  Clair  Co.,  8  How.  569:  409, 

709,  1637. 
V.  Seattle  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  10  Wash. 

520:  840. 
V.    United    States,    46    Fed.    738: 

139. 
V.   Van  Voorhies,   20   N.  Y.   412: 
946. 
Millvale,  Borough  of.  Appeal  of,  131 

Pa.   St.    1:    299,   308. 
Milton    V.    Wacker,    40    Mich.    229: 

1032,  1361,  1420. 
Milwaukee  v.  Gimbel  Bros.,  130  Wis. 
31:    1623. 
V.  Milwaukee  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  7  Wis. 
85:  321,  1583,  1622. 
Milwaukee   Boiler   Co.   v.    Wadhams 
etc.  Co.,  126  Wis.  32:  372,  1596. 
Milwaukee  El.  R.  &  L.  Co.  v.  Mil- 
waukee, 95  Wis.  39:   1506. 
Milwaukee   etc.    R.   R.    Co.   v.   Eble, 
4  Chand.  72:   1180,  1225,  1317. 
V.  Faribault,  23  Minn.   167:    750, 

798,  1609. 
V.  Milwaukee,   34  Wis.   271:    524, 

1059. 
V.  Stolze,  101  Wis.  91 :  1670,  1671. 
V.  Strange,  63  Wis.  178:  860,  1560. 
Milwaukee  etc.  Traction  Co.  v.  Mil- 
waukee Northern   Ry.   Co.,   132 
Wis.  313:  901,  904,  912. 
V.   Milwaukee   Northern   Ry.   Co., 
132  Wis.  342 :  901. 
Milwaukee  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  In  re, 
124    Wis.    490:    778,    784,    793, 
997,  1049. 
Milwaukee  St.  R.  R.   Co.  v.  Adlam, 

85  Wis.  142:  353,  1620. 
Mims  v.  Macon  &  Western  R.  R.  Co., 
3  Ga.  333:  684,  687,  1537,  1540, 
1541. 
Mine  Hill  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  v.  Zerbe,  2 
Walker's   Pa.    Supm.    409:    952, 
961,  1523. 
Mine  Mill  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Lippin- 
cott,  86  Pa.  St.  468:   861. 


CASES    CITED. 


clxxxix 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Miner  v.  Buffalo  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  9  TJ. 

C.  C.  P.  280:    156. 
V.  Gilmour,   12  Moort  P.  C.  131: 

128. 
V.  New  York  Cent.  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

123  N.  Y.  242:    864,   1330,  1501. 
V.   New   York   etc.   E.   R.   Co.,   40 

Hun  612:    1501. 
Mineral  Range  Ry.  Co.  v.  Detroit  & 

Lake    Superior    Copper    Co.,    25 

Fed.   515:    931. 
Minersville   v.    Schuylkill   Elec.   Ry. 

Co.,  205  Pa.  St.  394:  302. 
Minhinnah   v.   Haines,   29   N.   J.   L. 

388:   700,  1531. 
Mining  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania,  125  U. 

S.  181:  687. 
Minneapolis  v.  Wilkin,  30  Minn.  140: 

922. 
V.    Wilkin,    30    Minn.    145:    1321, 

1322,  1324. 
Minneapolis    Eastern    R.    E.    Co.    v. 

Minnesota,  134  U.  S.  467:   480, 

483. 
Minneapolis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  In  re,  39 

Minn.  162:   767,  769. 
Minneapolis  etc.   R.  R.   Co.,  Matter 

of,  36  Minn.  481 :  769. 
Minneapolis  etc.  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Britt, 

105  la.  198:  888. 
V.  Brown,  99  Minn.  384:  863. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  116  la. 

681:    893,   908,   1035. 
V.  Emmons,  40  Minn.  133:  475. 
V.   Emmons,    149    U.    S.    364:    475, 

487. 
V.    Hartland,    85    Minn.    76:    675, 

749,  751,  1057,  1058. 
V.  Kanne,  32  Minn.  174 :   1020. 
V.  Manitou  Forest  Syndicate,   101 

Minn.  132:  765,  766. 
V.  Marble,  112  Mich.  4:   857,  873. 
V.   Minneapolis   &   W.   E.   E.    Co., 

61    Minn.    502:    426,    755,    756, 

959. 
V.  Minnesota,  193  U.  S.  53 :  488. 
V.  Nester,   3  N.  D.  480:    25,  924, 

1076. 
V.  Nestor,  50  Fed.  1 :  931. 
V.  Nicolin,  76  Minn.  302:  533. 
V.  Olson,  81  Minn.  265:  1043,  1044. 
V.  Woodworth,  32  Minn.  452 :  1410, 

1699. 
Minneapolis    Mill    Co.    v.    Board    of 

Water    Comrs.,    56    Minn.    485: 

106,  138. 
V.  Minneapolis   etc.  E.  E.   Co.,  51 

Minn.  304:   857,  1627,  1632. 
Minneapolis  Terminal  Co.,  In  re,  38 

Minn.     157:     1061,     1076,     1081, 

1431. 


Minneapolis  W.  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Minneap- 
olis etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  58  Minn.  128: 

857,  1627,  1632. 
Minnesota    Belt   Line   E.    E.    Co.   v. 

Gluok,  45  Minn.  463:  1122,  1145. 
Minnesota    Canal    &    Power    Co.,    v. 

Koochiching  Co.,  97  Minn.  429: 

494,  496,  498,  499,  501,  508,  536, 

538,  593,  988. 
V.  Pratt,  101  Minn.  197:  536,  787, 

920. 
Minnesota  Central  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Mc- 

Namara,    13    Minn.    508:     1217, 

1418. 
V.   Patterson,  31   Minn.   42:    1424. 
Minnesota  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  In  re,  103 

Wis.  191:   1423. 
Minnesota  L.   &   T.   Co.  v.   St.  An- 
thony Falls  W.  P.  Co.,  82  Minn. 

505:  71,  72. 
Minnesota  Valley  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Doran, 

15  Minn.  230:   1208,  1213. 
V.  Doran,  17  Minn.  188:  1112,  1114, 

1318. 
Minot  V.  Cumberland  Co.  Comrs.,  28 

Maine  121:  1135. 
Minton  v.  New  York  El.  E.  E.  Co., 

130  N.  Y.  332:  1554,  1584,  1664. 
Miocene  Ditch  Co.  v.  Jacobson,   146 

Fed.  680:  563,  1616. 
V.  Lyng,  138  Fed.  544:  684,  686. 
Miskey  v.   Philadelphia,   68   Pa.   St. 

48:   1324. 
Missionary  Society  v.  New  York  El. 

R.  E.  Co.,   12  Miscl.   359:    1207, 

1300. 
Mississippi  Central  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Ca- 

ruth,  51  Miss.  77:  158. 
V.  Mason,   51   Miss.    234:    87,   91, 

158. 
Mississippi  etc.  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Bying- 

ton,  14  Iowa  572 :  1429. 
V.  Devaney,  42  Miss.  555:  729. 
V.  Eosseau,  8  Iowa  373:   1406. 
V.  Texas  etc.   E.   E.   Co.,   4  Wood 

360:    768,   1610. 
V.  Wooten,  36  La.  Ann.  441 :  1478, 

1483. 
Mississippi  Levee  Comrs.  v.  Johnson, 

66  Miss.  248:  927,  953. 
Mississippi  E.  E.   Co.  v.  McDonald, 

12  Heisk.  54:   690,  1180. 
Mississippi  Eiver  Bridge  Co.  v.  Lon- 

ergan,  91  111.  508:  107. 
V.  Eing,  58  Mo.  491:    1186,   1227, 

1229,     1230,     1324,     1385,     1386. 
Mississippi   River  etc.   E.   E.    Co.   v. 

Jones,   54   Mo.   App.   529:    1035. 
Missouri  v.  Illinois,   180  U.  S.  208: 

170. 
V.  Illinois,  200  U.  S.  496:   170. 


cxc 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references   are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Missouri-Edison  Elec.  Co.  v.  Weber, 

102  Mo.  App.  95 :  360. 
Missouri   etc.   Ry.   Co.   v.   Anderson, 

36  Tex.  Civ.  App.  121:  837,  1459, 

1474. 
V.  Chenault,  24  Tex.  Civ.  App.  481 : 

1483. 
V.   Crow,  43   Tex.   Civ.  App.   280: 

152. 
V.  Graham,  12  Tex.  Civ.  App.  54: 

1719. 
V.  Green,  44  Tex.  Civ.  App.  247:' 

152,  1137,  1552,  1655. 
V.  Haines,  10  Kan.  439 :  1243,  1244, 

1245,  1312. 
V.   Mott,   98   Tex.    91:    837,    1459, 

1474. 
V.    Murphy,    75    Kan.    707:     1526, 

1540. 
V.  Roe,  77  Kan.  224:   1211. 
V.    Schmuck,   69   Kan.    272:    1176, 

1185,  1201,  1268,  1481. 
V.  State,  100  Tex.  420 :  489. 
V.  State,  100  Tex.  426:  489. 
V.  Texas   &   St.  Louis  Ey.  Co.,  4 

Wood  360:  931,  1610. 
V.  Ward,  10  Kan.  325:    1353. 
V.  Wetz,  97  Tex.  581:  1485. 
Missouri  Pac.  K.  K.  Co.  v.  Cambern, 

66  Kan.  365:    584. 
V.  Cambern,  10  Kan.  App.  581:  584. 
V.   Carter,   85  Mo.   448:    933,   955, 

964,  1360. 
V.  Cass  Co.,  76  Neb.  396:  491,  1288, 

1289. 
V.  Coon,  15  Neb.  232:   1127. 
V.    Dulaney,    38   Kan.    246:    1120, 

1310. 
V.  Duncan,  87  Minn.  91 :  1150. 
V.  Gano,  47  Kan.  457 :  859,  1627. 
V.  Hays,  15  Neb.  224:   1310. 
V.  Houseman,  41   Kan.   300:    1018, 

1020,   1513,   1626. 
V.  Humes,  115  U.  S.  512:  487,  923. 
V.  Keys,  55  Kan.  205:   151. 
V.  Lee,  70  Tex.  496:    883. 
V.  Nebraska,  29  Neb.  550 :  472. 
V.  Nebraska,   164  U.  S.  403:   472, 

1474. 
V.  Porter,  112  Mo.  361:   1277. 
V.  Eenfro,  52  Kan.  237:   147,  157. 
V.  Roberts,  187  Mo.  309:   1150. 
V.  Smith,  60  Ark.  221 :   483. 
V.  Webster,  3  Kan.  App.  166:  92, 
V.    Wernway,    35    Mo.    App.    449: 

1222. 
V.  Wilson,  45  Mo.  App.  1:   964. 
Missouri  Ry.  Co.  v.  Murphy,  75  Kan. 

707:   1543. 


Missouri    River    etc.    R.    R.    Co.    v. 

Owen,  8  Kan.   409:    1120,  1125, 

1319. 
V.  Shepard,  9  Kan.  647 :  913,  1010. 
Mitchell  V.  Bass,  33  Tex.  259:   1502. 
V.  Bond,  11  Bush.  614:  917. 
V.  Bourbon  County,  25  Ky.  L.  R. 

512:    1503. 
V.  Bridgewater,  10  Cush.  411 :  1078, 

1354. 
V.  Denver,  33  Colo.  37 :  876,  884. 
V.  Franklin  &  Columbia  Turnpike 

Co.,  3  Humph.  456:   1523. 
V.   Great   Western   R.   R.    Co.,   35 

U.  C.  Q.  B.  148:   1680. 
V.  Harmony,  13  How.  115:  18. 
V.  Holderness,  29  N.  H.  523:  1081. 
V.  Illinois  etc.  Co.,  68  111.  286:  24. 
V.   Illinois    etc.    Co.,    69    111.    280: 

1667. 
V.  Illinois  &  St.  Louis  R.  R.  &  Coal 

Co.,   85   111.   566:    1109. 
V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  138 

Mo.  326:    1511. 
V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  56 

Hun  543:    965,   1584. 
V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  132 

N.  Y.  552:    1425. 
V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  134 

N.  Y.  11:  965,  1584,  1663. 
V.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  82  Mo. 

100:    996. 
V.  New  Orleans  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  41 

La.  Ann.  363:    1546. 
V.  New  York,  Lake  Erie  &  Western 

E.  R.  Co.,  36  Hun  177:  153. 
V.  Rome,  49  Ga.  19 :  229,  1452. 
V.    St.    Louis,    14    Mo.    App.    600: 

607. 
V.   Smale,   140  U.   S.   406:    109. 
V.  Thornton,  21  Gratt.  164:    1075, 

1180. 
V.  White  Plains,  62  Hun  231:  941, 

1154,   1168,   1572. 
Mithoff   V.   CarroUton,   12   La.  Ann. 

185:    440. 
Mix  V.  Lafayette  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  67 

111.    319:    448,    639,    994,    1295, 

1303. 
Mizell  V.  McGowan,  120  N.  C.  134: 

146. 
V.  McGowan,  125  N.  C.  439 :  146. 
V.  McGowan,  129  N.  C.  93 :  80,  147. 
Moale  V.  Baltimore,  5  Md.  314:  431, 

1690. 
Mobile  V.  Fowler,  147  Ala.  403 :  886. 
V.    Louisville    etc.    E.    E.    Co.,    84 

Ala.   115:   303,  472,  1620. 
V.  Louisville  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  124  Ala. 

132:    297,    304. 


CASES    CITED. 


cxei 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;  Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Mobile  V.  Richardson,  1  Stew.  &  For. 

(Ala.)    12:   829,  861. 
Mobile  County  v.  Kimball,  102  U.  S. 

691:    10,   462. 
Mobile  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ala.  Midland 
R.  R.  Co.,  87  Ala.  501 :  706,  70S, 
753,  754,  758,  759,  788,  793,  796, 
798. 
V.  Alabama  Mid.  R.  R.  Co.,  87  Ala. 
520:    758,   759,  793,   796,   798,   1464, 
1609. 
V.  Alabama  Midland  R.  R.  Co.,  116 

Ala.  51:  246,  250,  1595. 
V.  Ala.  Midland  Ry.  Co.,  123  Ala. 

145:    1568,   1574. 
V.  Bynum   (Miss.)   15  So.  795:  87. 
V.  Cogshill,  85  Ala.  456:   870. 
V.  Fowle  Lumber  Co.,  152  Ala.  320 : 

1535,    1578,    1615. 
V.  Hester,  122  Ala.  249:  1200,  1202, 

1392. 

V.  Hoye,  87  Miss.   571:   941,   1642. 

V.  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  120  Ala. 

21:    534,    773,   988,    1048,    1284, 

1392,  1673. 

V.  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  76  Miss. 

731:    1285,    1286. 
V.  Riley,  119  Ala.  260:   1118,  1202. 
Mobley  v.  Breed,  48  Ga.  44 :   1625. 
Moellering  v.   Evans,   121   Ind.   195: 

440,   441. 
Moeschen  v.  Tenement  House  Dept., 

203   U.   S.   583:    490. 
Moetter  v.  Comrs.   of  Highways,  39 

Mich.    726:    1032,    1420. 
Moffett  V.  Brewer,  1  G.  Greene  348: 

70. 
Moffitt   V.    South   Park    Comrs.,    138 

HI.  620:   881. 
Mohawk  Bridge  Co.  v.  Utica  &  Schen- 
ectady R.  R.  Co.,  6  Paige,  554: 
413,   726. 
Mohawk  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Artcher,  6 

Paige   83:    516,   819,   1609. 
Moison  V.  Great  Western  R.  R.  Co., 

14  U.  C.  Q.  B.   109:    93. 
Mold   T.    Wheatcroft,   27   Beav.   510: 

1537. 

Molett  V.  Keenan,  22  Ala.  484:   1033. 

Moll  V.  Benekler,  30  Wis.  584:   1384. 

V.  Sanitary  District,  228  HI.  633: 

1322,    1324. 

Mollandin  v.  Union  Pacific  R.  R.  Co., 

4  McCrary  290:   640. 
Molton   V.   Newburyport   Water   Co., 

137  Mass.  163:  1231. 
Monaghan  v.  Memphis  Fair  etc.  Co., 

95  Tenn.   108:   880. 
Monagle   v.  County  Comrs.,  8  Gush. 
360:    1707. 


Monarch  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Omaha  etc.  Ry. 

Co.,  127  Iowa,  511:    157,  326. 
Monqhet  v.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.,  1 

Ry.  Cas.  567:   1611. 
Monmouth    v.    Gardiner,    35    Maine 

247:    956. 
Monmouth  County  v.  Red  Bank  etc. 
Turnpike  Co.,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  91: 
423,  1536. 
Monongahela  Bridge  Co.  v.  Kirk,  46 

Pa.  St  112:   96. 
Monongahela  Nav.   Co.  v.   Blair,   20 
Pa.    St.    71:    691. 
V.  Coon,  6  Pa.  St.  379:  691. 
V.  Coons,  6  W.  &  S.  101 :  108,  117. 
V.  United   States,   148  U.  S.  312: 
108,  789,  790,   1158,  1173,  1174, 
1199,   1261,  1264,  1266,  1272. 
Monroe   v.    Crawford    163    Mo.    178 : 
1004,   1513,   1569,   1571. 
V.  Danbury,  24  Conn.   199:   700. 
V.  Detroit  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  143  Mich. 
315:    303. 
Monroe  Mill  Co.  v.  Mensel,  35  Wash. 

487:   81,  1604. 
Monson  v.  County  Comrs.,  84  Maine 

99:   1416. 
Montana  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Helena 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  6  Mont.  416:  794. 
Montana   R.    R.   Co.    v.   Freerer,   29 
Mont.  210:   1223,  1245,  1456. 
V.  Warren,  6  Mon.  275:   1129,  1236. 
V.   Warren,    137    U.    S.   348:    1127, 
1129. 
Montclaire  Military  Academy  v.  N. 
J.    St.    Ry.    Co.,    65    N.    J.    L. 
328:   272,  302. 
V.  N.  J.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  70  N.  J.  L. 
229:   272,  302. 
Montolair  R.   R.   Co.   v.   Benson,   36 

N.  J.  L.  557:    1146:    1225. 
Montecito  Val.  Water  Co.  v.   Santa 
Barbara,   144  Cal.  578:    77,  864, 
1603. 
V.   Santa   Barbara,    151   Cal.   377: 
72. 
Montello,  The,  20  Wall.  430:  103. 
Monterey  v.  County  Comrs.,  7  Cush. 
394:  701. 
V.  Molasin,  99  Cal.  290 :  864. 
Monterey  Co.  v.  Gushing,  83  Cal.  507 : 

515,   959. 
Montgomery,  In  re,  48  Fed.  896 :  680, 

894,  976,  991,  1154. 
Montgomery  v.  Baltimore  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  29  Ind.  App.  692:    1390. 
V.  Kelly,  142  Ala.  552:   479. 
V.  Lemle,  121  Ala.  609:   629,  1161, 

1601,  1612. 
v.  Maddox,  89  Ala.   181:   629,  631, 
636,  637,  659,  670,  1306,  1337. 


cxcu 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.  II,   pp.  743-1719.] 


Montgomery  v.  Moore,  140  Ala.  638 : 
11,  463. 
V.  Parker,  114  Ala.  118:    193. 
V.  Santa  Ana  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  104 
Cal.    186:     172,    173,    175,    242, 
243,  245,  248,  250,  270,  287,  289, 
639,  642,  1630. 
V.  Shaver,  40  Ore.  244:    118,  127, 

129. 
V.  Somera,  50  Ore.  259:  1124. 
V.  Townseud,  80  Ala.  489 :  629,  636, 

659,  671,  1306. 
V.  Townsend,  84  Ala.  478 :  636. 
Montgomery  Co.  v.  Schuylkill  Bridge 
Co.,  110  Pa.  St.  54:   781,  1231, 
1233,   1261,   1264,   1275. 
Montgomery  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Sayre,  72 
Ala.  443:    1112. 
V.  Varner,  19  Ala.  185:  1123. 
V.  Waltan,  14  Ala.  N.  S.  207 :  1461, 
1469,  1619. 
Montgomery    Gas    Lt.    Co.    v.    City 

Council,  87  Ala.  245:  411. 
Montgomery  Lt.  &  W.  P.  Co.  v.  Citi- 
zens' Lt.  H.  &  P.  Co.,  142  Ala. 
462:  360,  408,  418. 
Montgomery    Southern    Ry.    Co.    v. 

Sayre,  72  Ala.  443:  1159. 
Montgomery  Township  Road,  15  Pa. 

Co.  Ct.   384:    983. 
Montgomery  Gravel  R.  Co.  v.  Rock, 

41  Ind.  263:   1316. 
■  V.    Stockton,    43    Ind.    328:     1205, 

1310,  1311,  1445. 
Montour  K.   Co.   v.   Scott,    1   Penny 

503:   1317. 
Montreal  v.  Drummond,  L.  R.   1  H. 

L.  384:  371,  380,  392. 
Montrose  Canal  Co.  v.  Loutsenhiser 

Ditch  Co.,  23  Colo.  223 :  73. 
Moody  V.  Jacksonville,  Tampa  &  Key 
West   R.   R.    Co.,   20   Fla.   597: 
1163,  1170,  1467. 
V.  Saratoga  Springs,  17  App.  Div. 

N.  Y.  207:   83,  84,  85,  1605. 

V.  Saratoga  Springs,  163  N.  Y.  581 : 

84,  85. 

Mooers  v.  Kennebec  &  Portland  R.  R. 

Co.,  58  Maine  279:    1537,  1579. 

Moon  V.  Sandown,  19  N.  H.  93:  1081. 

Mooney  v.  Clark,  69  Conn.  241 :  487. 

V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  App. 

Div.    380:.    1562. 
V.    New   York   El.    R.   R.    Co.,    16 

Daly  145:  1305. 
V.   New  York  El.   R.   R.   Co.,    163 
N.   Y.   242:    1554,   1S62. 
Moore's  Appeal,  68  Maine  405 :   1399. 
Moore  v.  Albany,  98  N.  Y.  396:  230, 
231,   442. 
V.  Ange,  125  Ind.  562:   513. 


Moore  v.  Atlanta,  70  Ga.  611:   629, 
1306,   1601,   1612. 
V.  Bailey,  8  Mo.  App.  156:  1412. 
V.  Boston,  8  Cush.  274:  940,  1683, 

1712. 
V.  Camden  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  73  N.  J. 

L.  599:    275,   1630. 
V.   Cape  Girardeau,   103  Mo.  470: 

890. 
V.  Clear  Lake  W.  W.,  68  Cal.  146: 

73. 
V.  Great  Southern  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

10  Irish  C.  L.  46:  631,  1550. 
V.  Hancock,  11  Ala.  245:   1403. 
V.  Mclntyre,  110  Mich.  237:  1416. 
V.  New  York,  8  N.  Y.   110:   943, 

944,   945,   946. 
V.  New  York,  4  Sandf.  456:   943, 

944. 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  130  N. 
Y.  523:   1296,  1298,  1333,  1652. 
V.  Roberts,  64  Wis.  538:  1520. 
V.    Sanford,    151   Mass.    285:    543, 

1572,  1577. 
V.   Street  Passenger  R.   R.   Co.,  3 

Phila.  417:  1101. 
V.  Superior  &  St.  Croix  R.  R.  Co., 
34  Wis.  173:   698. 
Moore  Tp.  Road,  17  Pa.  St.  116:  1081. 
Moorehead  v.  Little  Miami  R.  R.  Co., 

17  Ohio  340:   729,  1572. 
Moores  v.  Bel  Air  W.  &  L.  Co.,  79 

Md.  391:    1429. 
Moorman  v.   Seattle  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

8  Wash.  98:   852. 
Moose  V.  Carson,  104  N.  C.  431 :  183, 

366,  377,  378,  388. 
Moran  v.   Lydecker,    11   Abb.  N.   C. 
298:    1583. 
V.  McClarus,  63  Barb.  185:  155. 
V.  Ross,  79  Cal.  159:  9,  524,  674, 

683,  684. 
V.  Ross,  79  Cal.  549:  1192,  1200. 
V.  Troy,  9  Hun  540:  13. 
Moravian  Seminary  v.  Bethlehem,  153 

Pa.  St.  583:    1671,  1685. 
Mordhurst  v.  Ft.  Wayne  etc.  Traction 
Co.,  163  Ind.  268:  285,  289,  313, 
334. 
Morean  v.  Ditchernendy,  18  Mo.  522 : 

943. 
Morehouse  v.  Burgot,  22  Ohio  C.  C. 

174:   1491. 
Morey  v.  Fitzgerald,  56  Vt.  487 :  433. 
Morford  v.  Unger,  8  Iowa  82 :  465. 
Morgan's  Appeal,  39  Mich.  675 :  1058, 

1346,    1378. 
Morgan  v.  Banta,  1  Bibb.   579:    779. 
v.    Binghamton,   32   Hun   602:    83, 
453,   1606. 


CASES    CITED. 


CXClll 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Morgan  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.   Co.,  36 

Mich.   428:    1025,   1420. 
V.  Des  Moines  &  St.  Louia  Ry.  Co., 

64   Iowa  589:    620. 
V.  King,  18  Barb.  277:  97. 
V.  King,  35  N.  Y.  454:  97. 
V.  Lake  Shore  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  130 

Ind.    101:     1631. 
V.  Metropolitan  Ry.   Co.,  4   L.  R. 

C    P    97 ■   1533 
V.  Miller,  59  Iowa  481 :   1568. 
V.  Monmouth  Plank  Road  Co.,  26 

N.  J.  L.  99:   422. 
V.  New  York  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  130 

N.  Y.  692:  1528 
V.  Oliver,  98  Tex.  218:   1005,  1008, 

1013,  1014,  1513. 
V.  Reading,  3  S.  &  M.  366 :   104. 
Morgan    Civil    Township     v.    Hunt, 

104  Ind.  590:   1383. 
Morgan  R.  R.  etc.  Co.,  Matter  of,  32 

La.  Ann.  371:    1257. 
Morgan's  La.  etc.  Co.  v.  Bui'guieres 

Co.,  110  La.  9:   1397,  1422. 
Morgan's  La.  &  Tex.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bar- 
ton, 51  La.  Ann.  1338:    1426. 
V.  Bourdier,    1   McGloin  La.   232: 

807,  954,  1017. 
Morin  v.  Railroad  Co.,  30  Minn.  100: 

1329. 
v.  St.  Paul  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  30  Minn. 

100:   1225. 
Moritz  v.   St.   Paul,   52   Minn.   409: 

1564. 
Morley  v.  Buchanan,  124  Mich.  128: 

159,  233. 
Morrell  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  49 

Minn.   526:    315,  1635. 
Morrill  V.  Mackman,  24  Mich.  279: 

858. 
V.  Wabash  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  96  Mo. 

174:   841,   1502. 
Morris    v.   Baltimore,    44   Md.    598: 

1324. 
V.  Chicago,  11  111.  650:   1423. 
V.   Council   Blufifs,    67   Iowa    343: 

234. 
V.  Edwards,  132  Wis.  91:  400,  1018, 

1098,  1513. 
.      V.   Healy   Lumber   Co.,    33    Wash. 

451:   1667. 
v.  Heppenheimer,  54  N.  J.  L.  268 : 

923,  927,  928. 
v.  Montgomery  Traction   Co.,   143 

Ala.  246:  272 
V.  New  York,  55  Hun  476:    1087, 

1391,  1511,  1576. 
V.    Philadelphia,    70   Pa.    St.   333: 

1325. 
V.  Philadelphia,   199  Pa.  St.   357: 

378,  406,   1595. 


Morris  v.  Pueblo,  12  Colo.  App.  290: 

1358. 
V.  Salle   (Ky.)   19  S.  W.  527:  990, 

1004,    1407. 
v.  Sault  Ste  Marie,  143  Mich.  672: 

226,  1650,  1656. 
V.  Schallsville  Branch  etc.,  4  Bush. 

448:   818. 
V.   Turnpike   Road,    6   Bush.    671: 

1496. 
V.    Washington    County,    72    Neb. 

174:  710,  738,  1154,  1158. 
V.  Wisconsin  Midland  R.  R.  Co.,  82 

Wis.   541:    330. 
Morris  Aqueduct  v.  Jones,  36  N.  J. 

L.   206:    1404. 
Morris  Ave.,  Matter  of,  56  App.  Div. 

122:  364. 
Morris  Ave.,  Matter  of,  118  App.  Div. 

117:    1564. 
Morris  Canal  &  Banking  Co.  v.  Town- 
send,  24  Barb.  658:    684,  745. 
Morris  Canal  Co.  v.  Jersey,  12  N.  J. 

Eq.   547:    432. 
V.  Jersey  City,  12  N.  J.  Eq.  252: 

432. 
v.  State,  24  N.  J.  L.  62 :  782. 
Morris  Canal  etc.  Co.  v.  Central  R. 

R.  Co.,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  419:  1576. 
v.  Ryerson,  27  N.  J.  L.  457:   847, 

848,   1456. 
V.  Seward,  23  N.  J.  L.  219:    1459, 

1667. 
v.   State,   14  N.  J.  L.   411:    1414, 

1417. 
Morris  &  C.  Dredging  Co.  v.  Jersey 
^    City,  64  N.  J.  L.  587:  351,  372. 
Morris  etc.  Co.  v.  Delaware  etc.  R. 

R.  Co.,  190  Pa.  St.  448:  1232. 
Morris  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Blair,  9  N. 

J.  Eq.  635:  900,  901,  904,  906. 
V.  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  31  N.  J.  L. 

205:  693,  728,  765. 
V.   Green,   15   N.   J.   Eq.   469:    833, 

856. 
V.  Hoboken  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  68  N. 

J.  Eq.  328:   737. 
V.   Hudson   Tunnel  R.   R.    Co.,   25 

N.  J.  Eq.  384:  434,  1159,  1570. 
V.  Newark,  10  N.  J.  Eq.  352:   243, 

254,  297,  315,  322. 
V.  Newark  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  51  N. 

J.  Eq.  379:   328,  765,  708. 
V.  Orange,  63  N.  J.  L.  252:   1291. 
V.  Prudden,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  386:  1588. 
V.  Prudden,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  530:  297, 

406,   1588. 
Morrison  v.  Bucksport  &  Bangor  R. 

R.  Co.,  67  Maine  353:    147,   157. 
V.   Fairmont  etc.   Traction   Co.,   60 

W.  Va.  441:   1129,  1180,  1202. 


CXCIV 


CASES    CITED. 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Morrison   v.   Fonnan,    177   111.   427: 

689,  1049. 
V.  Hinkaon,  87  111.  587:   197,  355, 

643,  654,  1137. 
V.   Indianapolis  etc.   Ry.   Co.,   166 

Ind.  511:   893,  894,  1042,   1047 
V.  Morey,  146  Mo.  543:  13,  586. 
V.  Rice,  35  Minn.  436:  943. 
V.  Semple,  6  Binn.  (Pa.)  94:  53. 
V.  Thistle  Coal  Co.,  119  Iowa  705: 

513,   532. 
Morrissey  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  38 

Neb.  406:    150,  151,  157. 
Morristown  v.  East  Tenn.  Telephone 

Co.,  115  Fed.  304:  343,  360,  361. 
V.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Mont. 

Co.  L.  Rep.  5:    304. 
Morrow    v.    Commonwealth,    48    Pa. 

St.  305:    728. 
V.    Highland   Grove   Traction   Co., 

219  Pa.   St.  619:    420,   872,  875, 

1618. 
V.    St.   Louis    etc.    R.    R.    Co.,    81 

Tex.  405:  256,  640,  1294,  1337. 
Morse  v.  Stockee,   1  Allen  150:   439, 

1571. 
V.  Wheeler,  69  N.  H.  292:   1410. 
Morseman    v.    Ionia,   32    Mich.    283: 

893,   894. 
Morss  V.  Boston  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  2 

Cush.   536:    1345. 
Morss,  Petitioner,  18  Pick.  443:  1343, 

1345,   1438,   1439. 
Mortimer  v.   Manhattan   R.   R.   Co., 

129  N.  Y.  81:  941,' 1664. 
V.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  57  N.  Y. 

Supr.  509:  1665. 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  5mJ. 

Y.  Supr.  Ct.  244:   180,  264. 
V.  Southwestern  Ry.  Co.,  102  E.  C. 

L.  R.  374:    1529. 
V.  Southwestern  Ry.  Co.,  1  Ellis  & 

Ellis  375:   1529. 
V.  Southwestern  Ry.  Co.,  38  L.  J. 

Q.  B.  129:   1529. 
Morton  v.  Burlington,  106  Iowa  50: 

603,  617. 
V.  Franklin  Co.,  62  Maine  455 :  976. 
v.  New  York,  65  Hun  32:  456. 
V.  New  York,  140  N.  Y.  207:   92, 

456,  714. 
Moseley  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  54 

Neb.   636:    850. 
V.  York  Shore  Water  Co.,  94  Maine 

83:   675,  733,  1060. 
Moses  V.  Pittsburgh  etc.  R.  R.   Co., 

21  111.  516:  200,  243,  251,  726. 
V.    St.    Louis    Sectional    Dock    Co., 

84  Mo.  242:  893,  894,  1036,  1520, 

1626. 
V.  Sandford,  11  Lea  731:  410,  1261. 


Mosier  v.  Ore.  Nav.  Co.,  39  Ore.  256: 

440,  441,   1453. 
Moss  V.  St.  Louis,  Iron  Mt.  etc.  Ry. 

Co.,  85  Mo.  86:   153,  1457,  1473. 
Mossman   v.    Forrest,   27    Ind.   233: 

1365. 
Molitor  v.  First  Division  of  St.  Paul 

etc.   R.   R.   Co.,    14  Minn.   285: 

247. 
Mott  V.   Consumers  Water  Co.,   188 

Pa.  St.  521:  74. 
V.   Eno,   97   App.    Div.    580:    687, 

806,  813. 
V.  Eno,   181  N.  Y.   346:    687,   806, 

813. 
V.  New  York,  2  Hilton  358:  236. 
Mottman  v.  Olympia,  45  Wash.  361 : 

371,  384,  392,  399,  647. 
Moulton  V.  Newburyport  W.  Co.,  137 

Mass.   167:    1237,   1263. 
Mound  City  Land  &  Stock  Co.  v.  Mil- 
ler, 170  Mo.  240 :  577. 
Moundsville  v.   Ohio   R.   R.   Co.,   37 

W.  Va.  92:  306,  315,  1643,  1644. 
Mt.  Adams  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Winslow, 

3    Ohio    C.    C.    425:    272,    1587, 

1590. 
Mountain  Park  Terminal  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Field,    76   Ark.    239:    494,    497, 

1041,  1044,  1568,  1572. 
Mt.  Auburn  Cable  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Neare, 

54  Ohio  St.  153:  302,  316,  1587. 
Mt.  Carmel  v.  Bell,  52  111.  App.  427 : 

349,  378,  1487,  1594. 
V.  Shaw,  155  111.  37:  399. 
V.  Shaw,  52  111.  App.  429:  349,  399, 

1487,  1594. 
Mt.  Clemens  v.  Macomb  Circ.  Judge, 

119  Mich.  293:  739,  1085. 
V.  Mt.  Clemens  Sanitarium  Co.,  127 

Mich.   115:    873. 
Mt.   Hope   Cemetery  v.   Boston,    158 

Mass.  509:  459. 
Mountjoy  v.  Oldham,  1  A.  K.  Marsh. 

535:    1359. 
Mount  Morris  Square,  Matter  of,  2 

Hill  14:   1393,   1417. 
Mt.  Olive  V.  Hunt,  51  N.  J.  L.  274: 

1363,  1365,  1368,  1421. 
Mount  Pleasant  Ave.,  Matter  of,  10' 

R.  L  320:  1019. 
Mt.   Pleasant  Coal  Co.  v.   Delaware 

etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  200  Pa.  St.  434: 

864,  1485,  1646. 
Mount    Sterling   v.    Givens,    17    111. 

255:   1136. 
V.  Jephson,  21  Ky.  L.  R.  1028:  630, 

634. 
lit.  Vernon  v.  Young,  124  Iowa  517: 

877. 


CASES    CITED. 


CXCT 


(The   references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719,] 


Mt.  Washington  R.  R.  Co.,  Petition 

of,  35  N.  H.  146:    1198. 
Mt.   Washington  R.   R.   Co.   v.   Coe, 

50  Fed.  637:   931. 
Mt.  Washington  Road  Co.,  Petition 

of,  35  N.  H.   134:    22,  514,  540, 

923,  1177,  1272. 
Mountz   V.    Philadelphia   etc.    R.    R. 

Co.,  203  Pa.  St.  128:  936,  1560. 
Mouser's  Case,  12  Coke  62:  16,  17. 
Mowrey   v.   Boston,   173   Mass.   425: 

1330. 
Mowry  v.  Providence,  16  R.  I.  422: 

420,  1493,  1618. 
Moyer  v.  New  York  Cent.  etc.  R.  R. 

Co.,  88  N.  Y.  351 :  89. 
V.  Preston,  6  Wyo.  308:   70. 
Moyer    Street,    In   re,    6   Phila.    81 : 

1341. 
Moynahan    v.     Superior    Court,     42 

Wash.   172:    1025. 
Mueller  v.  St.  Louis  &  Iron  Mt.  R. 

R.  Co.,  31   Mo.  262:    1634. 
Mugler  V.   Kansas,    123   U.   S.   623: 

477,  568. 
Muhle  V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

86  Tex.  459:    1502. 
Muhlker  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 

60  App.  Div.  621:  257. 
V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.   Co.,   173 

N.  Y.   549:    256,   257,   258,   358. 
V.  New  York  etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   197 

U.  S.  544:    181,  258,  259. 
Muir  V.  Johnson,  49  Wash.  66:   1607. 
Muire    v.    Falconer,     10    Gratt.    12: 

1027,  1029,  1407. 
Mulholland    v.    Des   Moines    etc.    R. 

R.   Co.,   60   la.   740:    691,   1550, 

1718. 
Mull    V.    Indianapolis    etc.    Traction 

Co.,  169  Ind.  214:  498,  503,  525, 

675,  688,  739. 
Mullen  V.  Lake  Drummond  C.  &  W. 

Co.,   130  N.  C.  496:    1454,  1456, 

1649,  1653. 
Muller  V.  Earle,  35  N.  Y.  Supr.  Ct. 

461:    1257. 
V.    Southern    Pao.    R.    R.    Co.,    83 

Cal.  240:    639,  1146,  1231,  1242, 

1293. 
Mulligan  v.  Smith,  59  Cal.  206 :  972, 

1004,  1007,  1011,  1013. 
MuUiner  v.  Midland  R.  R.  Co.,  L.  R. 

11  Ch.  Div.  611:    1475. 
Mullins  V.  Met  St.  Ry.  Co.,  126  Mo. 

App.  507:   862,  1507. 
Mumford  v.  Terry,  2  N.  C.  L.  R.  425 : 

1523. 
V.   Whitney,   15   Wend.    380:    857. 
Mumpower  v.   Bristol,   90   Va.    151: 

71,  76. 


Mums  V.   Isle   of  Wight  R.   R.   Co., 

17  W.  R.  1081:  851. 
Muncy  Elec.  L.  H.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Peo- 
ple's Elec.  L.  H.  &  P.  Co.,  218 

Pa.  St.  636:  410,  412. 
Muncey  v.  Joest,  74  Ind.  409:   1033, 

1518. 
Muncie  Nat.  Gas  Co.  v.  Allison,  31 

Ind.  App.  50:    1221,   1251,   1456. 
Vluncie    Pulp    Co.    v.    Keesling,    166 

Ind.  479:  81. 
V.  Martin,  164  Ind.  30:  81. 
Mundorf  v.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co., 

62  Hun  465:    1252. 
Mundy  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

75  Hun  479:  92,  93,  94,  456. 
v.  Water  Comrs.,  75  N.  J.  L.  25: 

828. 
Hunger   v.    St.    Paul,    57    Minn.    9: 

194,  224. 
Municipality  No.  1,  8  La.  Ann.  377: 

1020. 
Municipality  No.  1  v.  Millanden,  12 

La.  Ann.  769:   1566. 
V.  Young,  5  La.  Ann.  362:  701. 
Municipality  No.  2  v.  White,  9  La. 

Ann.  446 :  12. 
Municipality  No.  2  for  opening  Em- 

phrosine    St.,    7    La.    Ann.    72: 

1159. 
Munkers  v.  Kansas   City  etc.  R.  R. 

Co.  60  Mo.  334:   152,  157. 
V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  72 

Mo.  514:   152,  157. 
Munkwitz  v.   Chicago,  Milwaukee  & 

St.  Paul  R.  R.  Co.,  64  Wis.  402: 

nil,  1150,  1242. 
Munn  v.  Boston,  183  Mass.  421,  239, 

376,   391,   402,   428,   1338. 
V.  Corbin,  8  Colo.  App.   113:   486. 
v.  Illinois,  94  U.  S.  113:  480,  482, 

483. 
V.  People,  69  111.  80 :   14. 
V.  People,  94  U.  S.  113:   14. 
Munro  v.   Newry   etc.   R.   E.   Co.,   2 

Irish  Ch.  260:    1566. 
Munson,    Matter    of,    29    Hun    325: 

1670. 
Munson  v.  Blake,  101  Ind.  78:  1371, 

1383,  1404. 
V.  Board  of  Comrs.,  43  La.  Ann. 

15:   12. 
V.    Brimfield   Manf.    Co.,   15   Pick. 

554:   1345. 
V.  Mallory,  36  Conn.  165:  357. 
Murdock  v.  Prospect  Park  &  Conev 

Island  R.  R.  Co.,   10  Hun   598": 

322. 
v.   Prospect  Park  &  Coney  Island 

R.  R.  Co.,  73  N.  Y.  579 :  857. 


CXCVl 


CASES    CITED. 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.  743-1719.1 


Murdock  v.   Stickney,  8   Cush.   113: 

112,  544,  549,  554,  557,  559. 
Murhard  Estate  Co.  v.  Portland  etc. 
Ry.  Co.,  163  Fed.  194:   928,  931, 
1108. 
Murphy  v.  Beard,  138  Ind.  560 :  459, 
1010. 
V.  Boston,  120  Mass.  419:  605. 
V.   Chicago,   29   111.  279:    200,  210, 

243. 
V.   Groot,  44   Cal.   51:    1461,    1570. 
V.  Indianapolis,  158  Ind.  238:  143. 
V.  King  Co.,  45  Wash.  587:  1493. 
V.  Kingston  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  11  Ont- 

tario  302 :  729. 
V.  Kingston  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  11  On- 
tario 582:    729. 
V.  Southern  Ey.  Co.,  99  6a.  207: 
1614. 
Murray  v.  Allegheny,   136  Fed.   57: 
420. 
V.   Comrs.,   of   Berkshire,   12  Met. 

455 :    422. 
V.  Gibson,  21   111.  App.  488:    172, 

336. 
V.  Grass  Lake,  125  Mich.  2 :  138. 
V.  Mefee,  20  Ark.  561:  411. 
V.    Norfolk    Co.,    149    Mass.    328: 

807. 
V.  Pannaci,  64  N.  J.  Eq.  147:  166. 
V.  Preston,  106  Ky.  561:   97,  113. 
V.  Sharp,  1  Bos.  539 :   139. 
V.  Thompson,  35  U.  C.  Q.  B.  28: 
1535. 
Murray  Hill  Land  Co.  v.  Milwaukee 
Lt.  H.  &  T.  Co.,  110  Wis.  555: 
325,  1597. 
V.  Milwaukee  L.  H.  &  T.  Co.,  126 
Wis.   14:    1135,  1136. 
Murtha  v.  Lovewell,  166  Mass.  391: 

457. 
Murtry   v.    Metropolitan    El.    E.    E. 

Co.,   14  Miscl.  284:    1152. 
Musgrove   St.,    10   Pa.   Co.   Ct.    180: 

1357. 
Music  V.  Kansas  City  etc.  E.  E.  Co., 

124  Mo.  544:    1517. 
Musick  V.  Kansas  City  etc.  E.  E.  Co., 

114  Mo.  309:   927,  1369,  1511. 
Muskego  V.  Drainage  Comrs.,  78  Wis. 

40:  1020. 
Musser  v.  Hershey,  42  la.  356:    104, 

129. 
Mussey  v.  Cahoon,  34  Me.  74:    1343. 
Mutual  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Katkamp, 

103   111.  420:    1380. 
Mver's    Appeal,    153    Pa.    St.    276: 

1358. 
Jryor  V.  Schuylkill  Eiv.  E.  E.  Co.,  17 

Phila.  468:   1236. 
Myers  v.  Bell  Tel.  Co.,  83  App.  Div. 
G23;    1630. 


Myers  v.  Charlotte,   146  N.  C.  246: 

1133. 
V.    Chicago    etc.    IJv.    Co.,    118   la. 

312:  931. 
V.    Daubeuliss,     84     Cal.     1:     1505, 

1572. 
V.  Delaware  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  3  Lu- 
zerne Leg.   Eeg.  Eep.  347:   918. 
V.  Kenyon,  7  Cal.  App.  112:   877. 
V.  McGavock,  39  Neb.  843:  686. 
T.  Oceanside,  7  Cal.  App.  87:  875, 

886,  888. 
V.  Old  Mission  &  Whitbeek  Eoad, 

7  la.  315:  1404. 
V.  Pownal,   16  Vt.   415:    1428. 
V.  St.  Louis,  82  Mo.  367 :   127. 
V.  Schuylkill  Eiv.  E.  S.  E.  E.  Co., 

5  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  634:   1151. 
V.  Schuylkill  Eiv.  E.  S.  R.  E.  Co., 

19  Phil.  468:   1319. 
V.  Simms,  4  la.   500:    1396. 
V.   South   Bethlehem,   149   Pa.   St. 

85:  1682. 

N. 

Nadin,  Ex  parte,   17  L.  J.  Ch.  421: 

1258. 
Nagel  V.  Lindell  Ey.  Co.,  167  Mo.  89: 

272,  622,  642. 
Nahant  v.   United   States,    136   Fed.- 

273:  56,  462,  737,  779,  1346. 
Nally  V.  Pennsylvania  R.  E.  Co.,  177 

111.  117:  881. 
Names   v.    Comrs.   of   Highways,    30 

Mich.  490:   1032,  1412. 
Nankin  v.  State,  2  Swan  206:   1511. 
Nanticoke,  Street  in,  4  Luzerne  Leg. 

Eeg.   Rep.   464:    1083. 
Nanticoke,  Street  in,  4  Luzerne  Leg. 

Reg.  Rep.  513:   1087. 
Napa  V.  Howland,  87  Cal.  84:  883. 
Napier  v.  Brooklyn,  41  N.  Y.  App. 

Div.  274:  966. 
Narehold  v.  Westport,  71  Mo.  App. 

508:  357. 
Nash  V.  Clark,   198  U.  S.  361:   504. 
V.  Clark,  27  Utah  158:   495,  504, 

587,  596,  597. 
V.  Lowry,  37  Minn.  261:  297,  299. 
Nashua's    Petition,    12    N.   H.    425: 

1081. 
Nashua    River    Paper    Co.    v.    Com- 
monwealth, 184  Mass.  279:  1271. 
Nashville    v.    Comr.,    88    Tenn.    415: 

1651,  1656,  1661,  1662. 
V.  Nichols,  3  Bax.  338:   613,  710. 
Nashville  etc.  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Coward- 

ine,   11  Humph.  348:   714. 
V.    Hammond,    104   Ala.    191:    835, 

836. 
V.  Hobbs,  120  Ala.  600:  979,  1382, 

1520,  1626. 
V.  Karthaus,  150  Ala.  633:   1480. 
Nasmith,  In  re,  2  Ontario  192 :  485. 


OASES    CITED. 


CXCVll 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,  pp-   1-742;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-171!!.] 


Nason   v.   Woonsoeket  Union   R.   R. 

Co.,  4  R.  I.  377:    1251,  1455. 
Nassau  Cable  Co.,  Matter  of,  2  How. 

Pr.  N.  S.  124:  922. 
Nassau  Cable  Co.,  Matter  of,  36  Hun 

272:  921. 
Nassau    Electric    R.    R.    Co.,    In   re, 

85  Hun  446:    922. 
Nasson  v.  Railroad,  122  N.  C.  856: 

864. 
Natick   Gas   Lt.   Co.   v.   Natick,    175 

Mass.  246:   352. 
Natchez  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Currie,  62 

Miss.  506:   1634. 
Natchitoches  Ry.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Henry, 

109  La.  669:   1379. 
National   Bank  v.  Matthews,   98   U. 

S.  621:   837. 
National  Docks  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Central 
R.  R.  Co.,  32  N.  J.  Eq.  755:  676, 
683,  712,  716,  748,  768,  1047. 
V.   Penn.   R.   R.   Co.,   54  N.   J.   Eq. 

10:  1611. 
V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  54  N.  J.  Eq. 

142:    1281. 
V.   Penn.   R.  R.   Co.,   57  N.   J.  L. 

265:    1281. 
V.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  57  N. 

J.  L.  637:    1281. 
v.  State,  52  N.  J.  L.  90:   765. 
V.  State,  53  N.  J.  L.  217:  765. 
V.  United  N.  J.  R.  etc.  Co.,  52  N. 

J.  Eq.  366:  1462. 
V.  United  N.  J.  R.  R.  Co.,  52  N. 

J.  L.  90:  767,  768,  769,  1281. 
V.  United  N.  J.  R.  R.  Co.,  53  N. 
J.   L.   217:    716,   766,   767,   768, 
769,  985,   1250,   1281. 
National  Fibre  Board  Co.  v.  Lewis- 
ton   etc.    Lt.    Co.,    95    Me.    318: 
898,  899. 
National    Tel.    Co.   v.    Baker,   L.   R. 

(1893)   2  Ch.  D.  186:  417. 
National  Water  Works  Co.  v.  Kansas 
City,  65  Fed.  Rep.  691 :  858. 
V.  Kansas  City,  20  Mo.  App.  237: 
352 
Natoma  W.  &  M.  Co.  v.  Catkin,  14 

Cal.  544:  837. 
Navan  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  In  re,  10  Irish 

Rep.  Eq.  113:  1323. 
Neal  V.  Knox  &  Lincoln  R.  R.  Co., 
61  Me.  298:  940,  1368. 
V.  Neal,  122  Ga.  804:   521,  990. 
V.  Ohio  Riv.  R.  R.  Co.,  47  W.  Va. 

316:   92,  148,  1.50,  1.58. 
V.  Pittsburgh  &  Connelsville  R.  R. 
Co.,  2  Grant's  Cases,  137:   1391, 
1681. 
V.  Pittsburgh  &  Connelsville  R.  R. 
Co.,   31   Pa.   St.   19:    1566,   1681. 


Neal  V.  Portland,  85  Me.  62:  919. 
V.   Rochester,  88   Hun   614:    78. 
V.  Rochester,   156  N.  Y.   213:    78, 
1603. 
Neale  v.  Cogar,  1  A.  K.  Marsh.  589: 
1358. 
V.    Superior    Court,    77    Cal.    28: 
1469. 
Nealy    v.    Brown,    6    111.    10:     928, 

1517. 
Nebraska   City  v.   Lampkin,   C   Neb. 
27:   211. 
V.   Northcutt,  45   Neb.   456:    1549, 
[  1664. 

Nebraska  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Scott,  31 
Neb.  571:   324,  640,  1427. 
V.  Storer,  22  Neb.  90:   1401. 
Nebraska   R.  R.   Co.  v.   Van   Dusen, 

6  Neb.  160:    1395,  1399,  1400. 
Nebraska  Tel.   Co.  v.  Western  Inde- 
pendent L.   D.   T.   Co.,   68   Neb. 
772-  342   359. 
V.   Yoik  Gas  &'e1.   Light  Co.,  27 
Neb.   284:    346,   418,   911. 
Nedow    V.    Porter,    122    Mich.    456: 

957. 
Ned's  Point  Battery,  In  re    (1903), 
2    L   R.    192:    1244,    1252,    1313, 
1341. 
Needham  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

152  Mass.  61:   1643. 
Neeld's   Road,    1    Pa.    St.    353:    955, 

1005. 

Neely    v.    Western    Allegheny   R.   R. 

Co.,  219  Pa.  St.  349:   1120,  1140. 

Neff  V.  Cincinnati,  32  Ohio  St.  215: 

1113. 

V.   Penn.   R.   R.    Co.,   202    Pa.    St. 

371:    428,  1263,  1338. 
V.   Reed,    98    Ind.    341:    50;!,    575, 

723    1115 
V.  Smith,  91   la.  87:    1505. 
Neff's   Road,    3    S.    &   R.    210:    1091, 

1094. 
Nehall  v.  Galena  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,   14 

111.  273:  717. 
Neilson  v.  Chicago,  Mil.  N.  W.  Ry. 
Co.,    58   Wis.    516:    1123,    1180, 
1251. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  91  Wis. 
557:   1323. 
Neis  V.  Franzen,  18  Wis.  537:   1513. 
Neitsey  v.  Baltimore  &  0.  R.  R.  Co., 
5  Mackey  34 :  245,  248,  250,  309, 
316,  1298. 
Nelson   v.   Butterfield,    21   Me.    220: 
960,  990,  1135. 
V.  Fehd,  203  111.  120:   1488. 
V.   Fehd,   104  111.   App.   114:    1488. 
V.  Fleming,  56  Ind.  310:  808,  1500, 
1707,  1708. 


CXCVlll 


CASES    CITED. 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Nelson  v.   Goodykoontz,   47   la.    32: 

1673. 
v.  Harlan  Co.,  2  Neb.  (Unof.)  537: 

707,  1514,  1569,  1571. 
V.  Jenkins,  42  Neb.  133:  865,  869. 
V.  Minneapolis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,   40 

Minn.  131:  475,  1317. 
V.  Miss.  &  Rum  Riv.  Boom  Co.,  99 

Minn.  484:  86. 
V.  Randolph,  222  111.  531:  877,  886, 

892. 
V.  Sneed,  76  Neb.  201:  868. 
V.   Vermont  &  Canada  R.   R.   Co., 

26  Vt.  717:   487. 
V.    West   Duluth,    55    Minn.    497: 

231,  1306,  1307. 

V.  Yamhill  County,   41   Ore.   560: 

980. 
Nemasket    Mills     v.     Taunton,     166 

Mass.  540:  74. 
Neponset  Meadow  Co.  v.  Tileson,  133 

Mass.   189:    458. 
Nesbitt  V.  Trumbo,  39  111.  110:  494, 

496,  516,  517. 
Nescopeck  Road,  1  Luzerne  Leg.  Reg. 

Rep.   316:    1094. 
Neselhous  v.  Walker,  45  Wash.  621: 

69. 
Nette  V.   New  York  El.   R.   R.   Co., 

1  Miscl.  342:   1196,  1300. 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Miscl. 

62:    1196,    1216,    1300. 
Newbert  v.  Toledo,  9  Ohio  C.  C.  462 : 

220,  616. 
Nevada  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  De  Lissa, 

103   Mo.   125:    1119,   1123,   1672, 

1675. 
Nevins   v.   Peoria,   41    111.   502:    66, 

232,  235. 

New  V.  Ewing,  1  A.  K.  Marshall  55: 

1017. 
Newago  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Chicago  etc.  R. 

R.  Co.,  64  Mich.  114:    1602. 
New  Albany  v.  Ray,  3  Ind.  App.  321 : 
160. 
V.  White,   100  Ind.  206:    1570. 
V.  Williams,  126  Ind.  1:   873,  882. 
New  Albany   &   Salem  R.   R.    Co.   v. 
Connelly,  7  Ind.  32:   1163,  1165, 
1571. 
V.  Higman,  18  Ind.  77:   157. 
V.  Huff,   19  Ind.  315:    1123. 
V.  O'Dailey,  12  Ind.  551:   246,  251, 

1582. 
V.  O'Dailey,  13  Ind.  353:  251,  1550. 
Newark  v.  Watson,  56  N.  J.  L.  667: 
469. 
V.   Weeks,   71   N.  J.  L.   448:    608, 
619,  1308. 
Newark  Aqueduct  Board  v.  Passaic, 
45  N.  J.  Eq.  393:  85,  1607. 
T.    Passaic,    46    N.    J.    Eq.       552: 
1614. 


New  Bedford  v.  Co.  Comrs.,  9  Gray 

346:  1683. 
New  Bedford  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Aeushnet 

R.  R.  Co.,  143  Mass.  200:  762. 
New  Boston's  Petition,  49  N.  H.  328: 

1081. 
New  Brighton  v.  Peirsol,  107  Pa.  St. 
280:   630,  636. 
V.  United  Presbyterian  Church,  96 
Pa.   St.   331:    630,  632,  636. 
New    Brighton    etc.    R.    R.    Co.    v. 
Pittsburgh  etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   105 
Pa.  St.  13:  900,901. 
New    Britain    v.    Sargent,   42    Conn. 

137:  1342. 
Newburyport  Water  Co.  v.  Newbury- 
port,    85    Fed.    723:    1173,    1261, 
1265. 
V.   Newburyport,    168   Mass.    541: 

740,  1261,  1265. 
V.   Newburyport,    193   U.    S.   561: 
740,  788. 
Newburg  Turnpike   Co.   v.   Miller,  5 

Johns.  Ch.  101:  410. 
Newby  v.  Platte  County,  25  Mo.  258 : 

13,  1186. 
New  Castle's  Petition,  In  re,  16  Pa. 

Co.  Ct.  478:   1309. 
New  Castle  v.  Central  D.  &  P.  Tel. 
Co.,  207  Pa.  St.  371:   343,  361. 
491. 
V.  Commissioners,  87  Me.  227 :  973, 

984,  995. 
V.  Lake  Erie  etc.  R.   R.  Co.,   155 

Ind.  18:   260,  866. 
V.  Raney,  6  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  87:   484. 
New    Castle    etc.    R.   R.   Co.   v.   Mc- 
Chesney,  85  Pa.  St.  522:   620. 
V.    Brumback,    5    Ind.    543:    1118, 

1205. 
V.  Peru  &  Indianapolis  R.  R.  Co., 
3  Ind.  464:   764. 
New    Central    Coal    Co.   v.    George's 
Creek  Coal  &  Iron  Co.,' 37  Md. 
537:   494,  498,  530,  1159,   1570. 
Newcomb    v.    Royce,    42    Neb.    323: 
1046. 
V.  Smith,  1  Chandler,  71:  550,  553, 
672,  923,  1164. 
New   Decatur    v.    Seharfenburg,    147 
Ala.   367:    629,   634,   1353,   1601, 
1612. 
Newell  V.  Minneapolis  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
35  Minn.  112:  240,  269,  279,  282, 
296,  313,  335. 
V.    Sass,    142    111.    104:    182,    877, 

1595. 
V.  Smith,  15  Wis.  101:  937,  1170, 

1547. 
V.  Smith,  26  Wis.  582:   1537. 
V.  Wheeler,  48  N.  Y.  486:  707. 


CASES    CITED. 


CXCIX 


[The   references   are  to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


New  England  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Board  of 

Comrs.,  171  Mass.  135:   825. 
New  England  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  Bos- 
ton Terminal  Co.,  182  Mass.  397  : 

334,   358,    360. 
New  England  Trout  &  Salmon  Club 

V.  Mather,  68  Vt.  338:  109,  112, 

561. 
Newgass  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

54  Ark.    140:    1222,   1243,    1251, 

1319,  1320,  1329,  1347,  1516. 
New  Hamburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  In  re, 

76  Hun  76;  919. 
New  Hannover  Road,  18  Pa.  St.  220 ; 

1103. 
New   Haven   v.   Heminway,   7    Conn. 

186:  129. 
v.  New  Haven  &  D.  R.  R.  Co.,  62 

Conn.  252:   833. 
V.   New   York   etc.   R.   R.    Co.,    72 

Conn.  225:    882,   1004. 
V.    Sargent,    38    Conn.    50:    1489, 

1490. 
New  Haven  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  County 

Comrs.,   173  Mass.  12:   825. 
New   Haven   &  Northampton   Co.   v. 

Northampton,    102    Mass.    116: 

1439. 
New  Haven  Steam  Saw  Mill  Co.  v. 

New  Haven,  72  Conn.  276:  1324. 
New  Haven  Water   Co.   v.   Walling- 

ford,    72    Conn.    293:    784,    802, 

908. 
New  Jersey  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Suydam, 

17    N.    J.    L.    25:     1242,     1318, 

1385. 
V.  Tutt,  168  Ind.  205:  1119,  1120, 

1176,  1222,  1245,  1251,  1310, 

1314,  1445. 
New  Jersey  Midland  Ry.  Co.  v.  Van 

Syekle,  37  N.  J.  L.  496;  851, 

854,  859. 
New  Jersey  So.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Chand- 
ler, 65  N.  J.  L.  173:  1419. 
New  Jersey   Southern   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Long  Branch   Comrs.,   39   N.  J. 

L.  28:   750,  793. 
New  Jersey  Zinc  &  I.  Co.  v.  Morris 

C.  &  B.  Co.,  44  N.  J.   Eq.   398: 

119,  132. 
New  London  v.  Davis,  74  N.  H.  56 : 

1515. 
New  Madrid  Co.  v.  Phillip,  125  Mo. 

61:   954,  966,  1556. 
Newman   v.    Chicago,    153    111.    469; 

912,  914. 
V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  118 

N.  Y.  618:  180,  265,  1176,  1196, 

1216,  1296,  1297,  1300. 
New  Marlborough  v.  County  Comrs., 

9  Met.  423;    1028. 


New  Mexican  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hendricks, 

6   N.   M.    611:    254,    1124,    1125, 

1294,  1550. 
New  Milford  Water  Co.  v.  Watson, 

75   Conn.   237:    936,    1043,   1112, 

1242,  1323,   1423,  1434. 
New  Odorless  Sewerage  Co.  v.  Wis- 
dom, 30  Tex.  Civ.  App.  224;   82. 
New  &  Old  Decatur  Belt  etc.  R.  R. 

Co.   V.   Karcher,    112   Ala.   676: 

674,  706,  958. 
New  Orleans,  In  re,  20  La.  An.  394: 

440,  1137. 
New  Orleans  v.  Cotonio,  111  La.  545: 

1397,  1422. 
v.  Elliott,  10  La.  Ann.  59 :  12. 
V.  Manfree,  111  La.  927;   1143. 
V.  Morgan,  111  La.  851:   1378. 
V.  Murat,  119  La.  1093;  467. 
V.  Shroeder,  111  La.  653:  1378. 
V.    Sohr,    16    La.    An.    393;    706, 

972. 
V.    Steinharde,   52   La.   An.    1043: 

514,  678,  1057,  1378. 
V.  United  States,   10  Pet.  p.  723: 

787. 
New  Orleans  City  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cres- 
cent City  R.  R.  Co.,  12  Fed.  308 : 

301. 
New   Orleans   Drainage   Co.,    11   La. 

An.  338:  12,  569,  583. 
New  Orleans  etc.,  20  La.  Ann.  407: 

12. 
New  Orleans  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Barton, 

43  La.  An.  171:  1144,  1334. 
V.  Bougere,  23  La.  An.  803:    1035. 
v.  Brown,  64  Miss.  479:  441,  1506. 
V.   Canal   &  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  47   La. 

An.    1476:    427,    762,    763,    764, 

1283 
V.  Delamore,  114  U.  S.  501:  242. 
V.  Drake,  60  Miss.  621 :  927. 
V.  Frank,  39  La.  An.  707 :   1426. 
V.  Frederick,  46  Miss.  1 :  1036. 
V.  Gay,  32  La.  An.  471 :  807,  808, 

813,  1061,  1075. 
V.    Hemphill,    35    Miss.    17:    929, 

1000,  1084,  1094. 
V.  Jones,  68  Ala.  48;    1161,   1631. 
V.  Lagarde,  10  La.  An.  150:   1183. 
V.    McNeeley,    47    La.    An.    1298: 

1378. 
V.  Morese,  48  La.  An.  1273:   1426. 
V.  Moye,  39  Miss.  374:   253,  1179. 
V.   New  Orleans,   26   La.   An.   517: 

253,  297. 
V.   New   Orleans,   44  La.   An.   728: 

208.  .301. 
V.  New  Orleans,  44  La.  An.  748 : 

197,  298,  301. 


CO 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:  Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


New  Orleans  etc.  K.   R.   Co.  v.  Ra- 

basse,  44  La.  An.  178:  931,  1426. 

V.  Second  Municipality,  1  La.  An. 

128:  304. 
V.  Southern  &  Atlantic  Tel.  Co.,  53 
Ala.   211:    S34,    773,   791,    1043, 
1425. 
V.    Zerringue,    23    La.    Ann.    521: 
1380. 
New  Orleans  Gas.   Co.  v.  Louisiana 
Lt.  Co.,  115  U.  S.  650:  410,  492, 
736. 
New  Orleans  Gas  Lt.  Co.  v.  Drain- 
age  Commission,    111   La.   838: 
354. 
V.  Drainage  Commission,  197  U.  S. 
453:  354. 
New   Orleans   Pac.   Ry.    Co.   v.   Gay, 
31  La.  Ann.  430:   807,  1183. 
V.  Murrell,  36  La.  An.  344:   1183, 
1310,  1343. 
New  Orleans  Steamboat  v.  Pboebus, 

11   Peters,   175:    103. 
New  Orleans   Terminal  Co.  v.   Fire- 
men's  Charitable   Ass.,    115   La. 
441:   1430. 
V.  Teller,  113  La.  733:   980,  1042, 
1045,  1046,  1051,  1070. 
New    Orleans    Water   Works    Co.   v. 
Rivers,  115  U.  S.  674:  410,  492, 
736. 
v.  St.  Tammany  Water  Works  Co., 
4  Wood.  134:   15. 
Newport's  Petition,  39  N.  H.  67 :  701, 

1383. 
Newport  v.   Newport   Light   Co.,   84 
Ky.   166:   411,  416,  1608. 
V.  Newport  Light  Co.,  89  Ky.  454: 

346. 
V.   Temescal   Water   Co.,    149   Cal. 
531:   1614. 
Newport  &  Cincinnati  Bridge  Co.  v. 
Foote,  9  Bush.    (Ky.)    264:   211, 
224. 
Newport  etc.  Bridge  Co.  v.  Gill,  22 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  325:    1571. 
Newport  Highway,   Petition  for,   48 

N.  H.  433:    1105. 
Newport  News  etc.  Ry.  &  Elec.  Co. 
V.  Hampton  Roads  Ry.   &  Elec. 
Co.,  102  Va.  795:   301,  408,  409, 
418. 
V.  Lake,  101  Va.  334:  883. 
V.  Lake,  105  Va.  311:  1348. 
New   Reservoir,   Matter   of,    1    Shel- 
don  (N.  Y.)   408:   1253,  1378. 
New  River  Co.  v.  Johnson,  105  E.  C 
L.  R.  434:   628. 
V.  Johnson,  2  E  &  E.  435:   628. 


New  Rochclle  Water  Co.,  Matter  of, 

46  Hun  525;   536. 
New  Salem's  Petition,  6  Pick.  470: 

1034. 
Newton  v.  Agricultural  Branch  R.  R. 
Co.,   15  Gray  27:    1506. 
V.  Ala.  Midland  R.  R.  Co.,  99  Ala. 

468:    996,   1406,   1408. 
V.  Manufacturers  Ry.  Co.,  115  Fed. 

781:    421,  811. 
V.    Newton,    188   Mass.    226:    808, 

823. 
y.   New   York   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   72 
Conn.   420:    320,    351,   371,   380, 
388,  398. 
V.   New   York   etc.   R.   R.    Co.,    72 

Conn.  421:   191. 
V.  Perry,  163  Mass.  319:  808,  1495. 
Newton    Rubber    Works    v.    De   Las 

Cassas,  198  Mass.  156:   748. 
New   Union   Tel.    Co.    v.   Marsh,   96 

App.  Div.  122:  744,  956,  1071. 
Newville  Road  Case,   8  Watts   172: 

1353. 
New  Vineyard  v.   Somerset,   15  Me. 

21:  713. 
New  Washington  Road,   23   Pa.   St. 

485:  1365. 
New   Westminster   v.   Brighouse,   20 
Duvall,  520:    194,  230,  442,  443, 
1453. 
New    Whatcom    v.    Fairhaven    Land 
Co.,  24  Wash.  493:  69,  109,  118, 
128,  137,  1603. 
New  York  Case,  16  Johns.  231 :  1383. 
New  York,  Matter  of,  28  App.  Div. 
143:   364,  399,  403,  591. 
Mptter  of,  34  App.  Div.  468:  696. 
Matter  of,  39  App.  Div.  589:  1210, 

1276. 
Matter  of,  40  App.  Div.  281:   1221, 

1227,   1319,   1323,   1565. 
Matter  of,  42  App.  Div.  198:  1556. 
Matter  of,  73  App.  Div.  394:  1493. 
Matter  of,  74  App.  Div.  197:  197, 

809,  1497. 
Matter  of,  74  App.  Div.  343:  787, 

1232. 
Matter    of,    101    App.    Div.    527: 

1253,  1256,  1276. 
Matter  of,  104  App.  Div.  445 :  920, 

1053. 
Matter  of,  113  App.  Div.  84:  1253. 
Matter  of,  114  App.  Div.  904:  956. 
Matter    of,    117    App.    Div.    553: 

1262. 
Matter    of,    118    App.    Div.    272: 

U45,    1151,   1229. 
Matter  of,  120  App.  Div.  819:  806, 
1174,    1183,    1195,     1202,    1205. 
1218,  1220. 


CASES    CITED. 


CCl 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;  Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


New  York,  Matter  of,  121  App.  Div. 

702:    429. 
Matter    of,    122    App.    Div.    890: 

1260,  1276. 
Matter    of,    124    App.    Div.    465: 

1259. 
Matter    of,     125    App.    Div.    393: 

1211,  1257. 
Matter    of,    128    App.    Div.    150: 

1559. 
Matter  of,  6  Cow.  571:    1393. 
Matter  of,  34  Hun  441:   687,  824, 

1100,  1101,  1167,  1260. 
Matter  of,  51  Hun  416:   773,  900. 
Matter  of,  56  Misc.  306:    1151. 
Matter    of,    56    Misc.    311:    1145, 

1270. 
Matter  of,  99  N.  Y.  569:  687,  1100, 

1101,  1167,  1260. 

Matter    of,    135    N.    Y.    253:    422, 

776. 
Matter  of,  157  N.  Y.  409:  591. 
ilatter   of,    168   N.    Y.    134:    115, 

127,  132. 
Matter  of,  174  N.  Y.  26 :  197,  809, 

1497. 
Matter  of,   182  N.  Y.   281?    1253, 

1256,  1276. 
Matter  of,  186  N.  Y.  237:  956. 
Matter   of,    190   N.   Y.    350:    806, 

1174,     1183,    1195,    1202,    1205, 

1218,  1220. 
Matter  of,   192  N.   Y.   295:    1260, 

1276. 
Matter   of,   193   N.   Y.   117:    liSU, 

1257. 
Matter  of,  193  N.  Y.  503:  429. 
New  York  v.   Bailey,  2  Denio  433: 

1456. 
V.  Bailey,  3  Hill  531:   1456. 
V.  Dover  Street,  1  Cow.  74:   1383. 
V.  Furze,  3  Hill   612:   143. 
V.  Hesterberg,  211  U.  S.  31:  471. 
V.    Knickerbocker   Trust    Co.,    104 

App.  Div.  223:   1623. 
V.  Lord,  17  Wend.  285:  17. 
V.  Lord,  18  Wend.   126:   17. 
V.  Mapes,  6  Johns.  Ch.  46:    1670, 

1705. 
V.  Pents,  24  Wend.  668:   17. 
V.   Pine,    185   U.   S.   93:    74:    169, 

1603,  1616,  1617. 
V.  Starin,  106  N.  Y.  1 :  407,  413, 

1608. 
V.  Stone,  20  Wend.  139:   17. 
V.  Twenty- third  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  113 

N.  Y.  311:   476. 
New  York  Bridge  Co.,  Matter  of,  67 

Barb.  295:    1117. 
New   York   Bridge   Co.'a   Petition,   4 

Hun   635:    1074.   1075. 


New   York   &   B.   Bridge,   In   re,    75 

Hun  558:  943,  945,  947,  1558. 
New   York   &   B.    Bridge,   In   re,   89 

Hun  219:  943,  945,  947. 
New  York  &  B.   Bridge,  Matter  of, 

18  App.  Div.  N.  Y.  8:   1341. 
New  York  Cable  Co.,  Matter,  of,  36 

Hun  355:   922. 
New  York   Cable   Co.   v.  New  York, 

104  N.  Y.   1 :   1048. 
New  York  Cement  Co.  v.  Consolidated 
R.  Cement  Co.,  84  App.  Div.  635 : 
1496. 
V.  Consolidated  R.  Cement  Co.,  178 
N.  Y.  167:   1496. 
New   York   Central    etc.   R.    R.    Co., 
Matter  of,  67  Barb.  426:  731. 
Matter  of,  5  Hun  86:   988. 
Matter  of,  15  Hun  63 :  1293. 
Matter  of,  33  Hun  274 :  896. 
Matter  of,  35  Hun  306:    1277. 
Matter   of,   59   Hun   7:    524,   816, 

1061,  1065. 
Matter  of,  60  N.  Y.  116:   1463. 
Matter   of,    66   N.   Y.   407:    1045, 

1061,  1066,  1074. 
Matter  of,  70  N.  Y.  191:  979. 
Matter  of,  77  N.  Y.  248 :  524,  823. 
New  York  Cent.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Al- 
dridge,  135  N.  Y.  83:   122,  131, 
133. 
V.   Auburn   Interurban   R.  R.   Co., 

178  N.  Y.  75:  282. 
V.  Dailey,  57  Misc.  311:   713,  799, 

802. 
V.  Haflfen,  90  Hun  260:  432. 
V.   Marshall,    120   App.    Div.   742: 

1338. 
V.  Marshall,    127   App.   Div.    534: 

1670,  1672. 
V.  Metropolitan  Gas  Light  Co.,  5 

Hun  201:   524. 
V.  Metropolitan  Gas  Lt.  Co.,  63  N. 

Y.  326:  783,  789,  798,  802. 
V.  New  York,  22  App.  Div.  N.  Y. 

124:    1041,  1045. 
V.  Rochester.  127  N.  Y.  591:    141, 

1606. 
V.   State,  37  App.  Div.  N.  Y.  57: 

1716. 
V.  Warren  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  188  Pa. 
St.  85:   771. 
New  York  City  and  Northern  R.  R. 
Co.   V.   Central   Union   Tel.    Co., 
21  Hun  261  :  775. 
New  York  Dist.  Ry.  Co.,  Matter  of, 

107  N.  Y.  42:  275. 
New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  In  re,  76 
Hun  384:  .327,  1300. 


ceil 


CASES    CITED. 


[The   references   are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1710.1 


New  York  Elevated  R.  R.  Co.,  Mat- 
ter of,  3  Abb.  New  Cases  401: 

260. 
Matter  of,  36  Hun  414:    1296. 
Matter  of,  36  Hun  427 :  1295,  1296, 

1303. 
Matter  of,  4  Hun  502 :  1295. 
Matter    of,    70    N.    Y.    327:    260, 

304. 
New  York  Elevated  K.  R.  Co.  v.  Fifth 

Nat'l  Bank,  135  U.  S.  432:  267, 

432,  1652,  1662. 
New  York  etc.   R.  R.   Co.'s  Appeal, 

58    Conn.    532:    487. 
New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter  of, 

62  Barb.  85:   893,  912,  1017. 
Matter  of,  21  How.  Pr.  434:   1360. 
Matter  of,  63  How.  Pr.  265 :   1377. 
Matter  of,  1  How.  Pr.  N.  S.  190: 

1670. 
Matter  of,  2  How.  Pr.  N.  S.  225: 

1377. 
Matter  of,  4  Hun  381 :  977. 
Matter  of,  6  Hun  149 :   1211. 
Matter  of,  20  Hun  201:  784. 
Matter  of,  21  Hun  250:   1380. 
Matter  of,  26  Hun   194:   964. 
Matter  of,  26  Hun  592:    1437. 
Matter  of,  27  Hun  116:  1235,  1329. 
Matter  of,  27  Hun  151:   1236. 
Matter  of,  28  Hun  426:   1172. 
Matter  of,  29  Hun  1 :    1339. 
Matter  of,  29   Hun  269:    117. 
Matter  of,  29  Hun  602:   1377. 
Matter    of,    29    Hun,    609:     1124, 

1126. 
Matter  of,  29  Hun  646:    1339. 
Matter  of,  33  Hun  148:   714,  971, 

1097,  1112,  1114. 
Matter  of,  33  Hun  231:   1134. 
Matter  of,  33   Hun   270:    772. 
Matter  of,  33  Hun  293:    1359. 
Matter  of,  33  Hun  639:  1242,  1377. 
Matter  of,  35  Hun  220:  689,  1045, 

1061,  1064. 

Matter  of,  35  Hun  232:   1359. 
Matter  of,  35  Hun  260:    1377. 
Matter  of,  35  Hun  306:    1387. 
Matter  of,  35  Hun  575:    1087. 
Matter  of,  35  Hun  633:  1276,  1277. 
Matter  of,  39  Hun  338 :  1430,  1463. 
Matter  of,  40  Hun  130:    1081. 
Matter  of,  44  Hun  194:   745,  748. 
Matter  of,  51  Misc.  333:   1463. 
Matter  of,  60  N.  Y.  116:  1430. 
Matter  of,  64  N.  Y.  60:  1376,  1377, 

1393. 
Matter   of,    77   N.    Y.    248:    lOCl, 

1062,  1063,  1066. 

Matter  of,  88  N.  Y.  279:  712. 
Matter  of.  89  N.  Y.  453:   996. 


New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  Matter  of,  93 
N.  Y.  385:   1377,  13s8. 
Matter    of,    94    N.    Y.    287:     143C, 

1440. 
Matter  of,  98  N.  Y.  12 :  1430,  1463, 

1465. 
Matter   of,    98    N.   Y.   447:    1242, 

1377. 
Matter  of,  99  N.  Y.  12:  689,  803, 

1045,  1061,  1064. 
Matter    of,    101    N.    Y.    685:    133, 

1451. 
Matter  of,  102  N.  Y.  704:  1377. 
Matter  of,  110  N.  Y.  374:  772. 
New  York  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Arnot,  27 
Hun  151:  1139,  1196. 
V.   Blacker,   178  Mass.   386:    1219, 

1262. 
V.  Boston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  36  Conn. 

196:    9,   693;   743,   761,  908. 
V.     Bridgeport    Traction    Co.,    65 
Conn.   410:    272,   328,  657,   767, 
769,  1282,  1610. 
V.  Bristol,  62  Conn.  527:  487. 
V.  Bristol,  151  U.  S.  556:  487. 
V.  Capner,  49  N.  J.  L.  555:   1095, 

1099. 
V.  Church,  31  Hun  440:   1104. 
V.  Coburn,  6  How.  Pr.  223:    1408. 
V.  Comatock,  60  Conn.  200:    1476, 

1478,  1483,  1647. 
V.   Drummond,   46   N.   J.   L.   644: 

751,  798. 
V.  Drury,  133  Mass.  167:  1320. 
V.  Fair  Haven  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  70 

Conn.  610:   424. 
V.  Forty  Second  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  50 

Barb.  285,  410. 
V.  Forty  Second  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  50 

Barb.   309:    410. 
V.  Forty  Second  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  26 : 

How.  Pr.  68:  410. 
v.    Gennett,    37    Hun    317:     1144, 

1270,  1348. 
V.  Gunnison,  1  Hun  496:  527,  715. 
V.   Gunnison,   3   N.   Y.   Supm.   Ct. 

632:  715. 
V.  Hamlet  Hay  Co.  149  Ind.  344: 

94,  1716. 
V.  Hammond,   132  Ind.  475:    1540, 

1543,   1544,  1545. 
V.   Illy,   79    Conn.   526:    947,   957, 

1004,  1135. 
V  Jones,  94  Md.  24:   154,  156. 
V.   Kip,   46   N.    Y.   546:    524,    525, 

709,  710,  714. 
V.  Le  Fevre,  27  Hun  537:   1208. 
V.  Long,   69   Conn.   424:    498,   684, 

911. 
V.   Long,    72   Conn.    10:    127,    128, 
129. 


CASES    CITED. 


cell] 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


New  York  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Marshall, 

120  App.  Div.  742:   1263. 
V.  McBride,  45  Misc.  510:    1438. 
T.  Miller,  165  Mass.  514:  1485. 
V.    New    Haven     (Conn.)     71    Atl. 

780:    749,    1287. 
V.   New   York   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,    11 

Abb.  N.  G.  386:   912. 
V.  Offield,  77  Conn.  417:  499,  529, 

738,  743,  745,  788. 
V.  Offield,  78  Conn.  1 :  529,  745. 
V.  Paterson,  61  N.  J.  L.  408:  750, 

1666. 
V.  Price,  4  Penny.  200:  1107,  1408. 
V.  Providence,   16  R.   I.  746:    840. 
y.  Railroad  Comrs.,  162  Mass.  81: 

862. 
V.   Rhodes    (Ind.)    86   N.   E.   840: 

749,  1288. 
V.    Speelman,    12    Ind.   App.    372: 

151. 
V.   Stanley's   Heirs,   34  N.   J.   Eq. 

55:  855,  1540,  1543,  1631. 
V.   Stanley's   Heirs,   35   N.   J.   Eq. 

283:  855,  1540,  1543,  1544. 
V.   Stanley's   Heirs,   39   N.   J.   Eq. 

361:   1317. 
V.   Townsend,   36   Hun   630:    1084, 

1105. 
V.  Trimmer,  53  N.  J.  L.  1 :   1469, 

1633. 
V.    Waterbury,    60    Conn.    1:    487, 

753,  1287,  1288. 
V.    Welsh,    143    N.    Y.    411:     684, 

698. 
V.  Wheeler,  72  Conn.  481 :  740. 
V.   Young,    33    Pa.    St.    175:    108, 

684. 
New    York    etc.     Telephone    Co.    v. 

Broome,  49  N.  J.  L.  624:  986. 
New   York    &   L.    I.    Bridge    Co.    v. 

Smith,  90  Hun  312:  1496. 
V.  Smith,  148  N.  Y.  540:  694,  738, 

1049. 
New  York  Min.  Co.  v.  Midland  Min. 

Co.,  99  Md.  506:  530,  1060,  1066, 

1087,  1395. 
New  York   Rubber   Co.    v.   Rothery, 

132  N.  Y.  293:  69,  76. 
New  York   Sanitary  Utilization   Co. 

V.  Dept.  of  Health,  61  App.  Div. 

106:  470. 
Ney   V.   Swinnev,  36   Ind.   454:    895, 

897,  1516,  "1520. 
Niagara  Co.  I.  &  W.  S.  Co.  v.  Col- 
lege Heights  Land  Co.,  Ill  App. 

Div.   170:    739. 
Niagara  Falls  &  Whirlpool  Ry  Co., 

Matter  of,  46  Hun.  94:  919. 
Matter  of,  68  Hun  391 :  1409. 
Matter  of,  108  N.  Y.  375 :  495,  498, 

507,  528,  672,  675,  676. 


Niagara  Falls  &  Whirlpool  Ry.  Co. 

Matter  of,  121  N.  Y.  319:   528, 

1076,  1081. 
Niagara  Falls  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Brund- 

age,  7  App.  Div.  445:   1116. 
Niagara  Falls  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hotchkiss, 

16   Barb.   271:    1469. 
Niagara  L.  &  0.  Power  Co.,  Matter 

of,  111  App.  Div.  680:  530,  538, 

1463. 
Niagara    State    Reservation,    Matter 

of,  16  Abb.  N.  C.  159:   1397. 
Niagara    State    Reservation,    Matter 

of,  102  N.  Y.  734:    1397. 
Niagara  Falls  Suspension  Bridge  Co. 

V.  Buchanan,  4  Lans.  523:   1489. 
Nicetown  Lane,  Matter  of,  11  Phila. 

377:  1094. 
Nieholai    v.    Vernon,    88    Wis.    551: 

1577. 
Nichols  V.  Ann  Arbor  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

87  Mich.  361 :  240,  241,  271,  280, 

282,  324,  1586,  1587,  1591. 
v.  Bridgeport,  23  Conn.  189:   1086, 

1185,  1516,  1517. 
v.  Duluth,  40  Minn.  389 :   194,  195, 

229,  230,  440,  442,  1453,  1488. 
V.  Norfolk  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  120  N. 

C.  495:    152,  1649,   1655. 
V.  Richmond,  162  Mass.  170:   364, 

371,  377,  379,  391,  398,  666. 
V.  Salem,  14  Gray  490 :  1034,  1576. 
V.  Somerset  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  43  Me. 

356:    1163,   1165,    1522. 
V.   Sutton,   22   Ga.   369:    1574. 
Nicholson   v.    Me.    Cent.    R.   R.    Co., 

97  Me.  43:   911. 
v.  New  York  &  N.  H.  R.  R.  Co., 

22  Conn.  74:  246,  319,  623,  1185. 
V.  Stockett,  Walker,  Miss.  67 :  377, 

400. 
Nicholson  Borough,  27  Pa.  Supr.  Ct. 

570:    739. 
Nicherson   v.   Lynch,    135    Mo.   471 : 

707. 
Nickey  v.  Stearns  Ranches  Co.,   126 

Cal.  150:   494,  564,  570,  573. 
Nicks  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  84 

la.  27 :  226,  620,  621,  1293,  1304. 
Nicoll  V.  New  York  etc.  Co.,  62  N.  J. 

L.   156:   339. 
V.  New  York  etc.  Co.,  62  N.  J.  L. 

733:     338. 
V.    New   York   &   Erie   R.   R.   Co., 

12  N.  Y.  121:  827,  837,  838,  839, 

842. 
Nicomen  Boom   Co.   v.   North   Shore 

B.  &  W.  Co.,  40  Wash.  315:  901, 

1504,  1505,  1609. 
Nicon  V.  Tallahassee  Bridge  Co.,  47 

Ala.    652:    413. 


CCIV 


CASES    CITED. 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Niehaus   v.    Cooker,    134    Ala.    223: 

1612. 
Nielson  v.  Wakefield,  43  Mich.  434: 

1033,  1420. 
Nieman  v.  Detroit  Suburban   St.  R. 

E.  Co.,  103  Mich.  256:  272,  279, 

1586,  1590. 
Niemeyer  v.  Little  Rock  Junction  R. 

R.  Co.,  43  Ark.   Ill:    527,  716, 

1048. 
Niles  V.  Los  Angeles,  125  Cal.  572: 

888. 
Ninety-Fourth    St.    Opening,   Matter 

of,  22  Misc.  N.  Y.  32:   1327. 
Ninth  Ave.,  Matter  of,  45  N.  Y.  729 : 

1266. 
Ninth  Ave.  R.  R.   Co.  v.  New  York 

Elevated  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Abb.  New 

Cases,  347:    260. 
Nischen  v.  Hawes    (Ky.),  21   S.  W. 

1049:  821,  973,  1376. 
Nishnabotna  Dr.  Dist.  v.   Campbell, 

154   Mo.    151:    706,    1011,    1017, 

1384. 
Nittany  Val.   R.   R.   Co.   v.   Empire 

Steel  &  I.  Co.,  218  Pa.  St.  224: 

1560,  1563. 
Noble  V.  Aasen,  8  N.  D.  77:  155. 
V.  Des  Moines  &  St.  Louis  Ry.  Co., 

61  la.  637:   1441. 
V.  St.  Albans,  56  Vt.  522 :  144. 
Noble    Street    Case,   5   Whart.    333: 

1383. 
Noble  Street,  Matter  of,  1  Ashmead 

276:    1563. 
Noblesville  v.  Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  R. 

Co.,   130  Ind.  1:   892. 
Noeton  v.   Penn.   R.  R.   Co.,   32  Pa. 

Supr.  Ct.  555:   394. 
Noe  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  76  la. 

360:    91,   150,   1123,   1132. 
Noel  V.  Ewing,  9  Ind.  37:   943. 

V.  Sale,  1  Call  495:   1425. 
Nolan  V.   Brockway  Park  Imp.   Co., 

76  Hun  458 :   122. 
V.  New  Britain,  69  Conn.  668:  83, 

1604. 
Nolensville  v.  Baker,  4  Humph.  315: 

422. 
Noll  \.  Dubuque  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,   32 

la.  66:  8,  1497,  1502,  1505. 
Nolmsville  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Quimby, 

8  Humph.  476:    1511. 
Nolte  V.  Cincinnati,  3  Ohio  C.  C.  503: 

220,  602,  633. 
Noon  V.  Scranton  City,  7  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

123:   438,  1496,  1546,  1548. 
Noonan  v.  Albany,  79  N.  Y.  470 :  233. 
Norfleet  v.  Cromwell,  70  N.  C.  634: 

571,  579,  584. 
Norfolk  v.  Chamberlain,  89  Va.  196: 

14,  1180,  1219. 


Norfolk  V.  Nottingham,   96   Va.   34. 

888. 
Norfolk  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Carter,  91 
Va.    587:     148,    149,    155,    156, 
1455,  1456. 
V.   Davis,    58   W.   Va.    620;    1110, 

1230,  1232,  1241,  1268. 
V.  Lynchburg  Cotton  Mills  Co.,  106 

Va.  376:   709,  718. 
V.  Nighbert,  46  W.  Va.  202:   1377. 
.     V.  Pendleton,   156  U.  S.  667;   480, 
482. 
V.  Pendleton,  88  Va.  350:  481. 
V.  Perdue,  40  W.  Va.  442 :  1547. 
V.  Stephens,  85  Va.  302:   1317. 
V.  Consolidated  Turnpike  Co.,  100 

Va.  243:  297,  298. 
V.  Ely,   101   N.  C.   8:    1042,   1074, 
1076. 
Norfolk  Southern  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ely, 
95   N.    C.   77:    697,    1395,    1397, 
1402. 
Norman  v.  Ince,  8  Okla.  412:   145. 
Normandale  Lumber   Co.  v.  Knight, 

89  Ga.  Ill:  520,  521,  1058. 
Norrell  v.  Augusta  Ry.  &  Elec.  Co., 

116  Ga.  313:  1491. 
Norris    v.    Baltimore,    44   Md.    398 : 
1689. 
v.  Clymer,  2  Pa.  St.  277 :  458. 
V.  Pueblo,  12  Colo.  App.  290:   958. 
V.  Vermont  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  28 

Vt.  99:   87,  846. 
V.  Waco,  57  Tex.  635 :  462,  466. 
Norristown's  Appeal,  3  Walker   (Pa. 
Supr.    Ct.)    146:    616,   630,   632, 
636. 
Norristown  etc.  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Bur- 
kett,  26  Ind.  53:  923,  926,  1135, 
1159. 
Norristown  &  Whitpain  Road,  4  Pa. 

St.  337:  1367. 
North  Alton  v.  Dorsett,  59  111.  App. 

612:  629,  1306,  1307. 
North  Am.  Cold  Storage  Co.  v.  Chi- 
cago, 211  U.  S.  306:   485,  486. 
Northampton  v.  Abell,  127  Mass.  507 : 

1514. 
Northampton  Bridge  Case,  116  Mass. 

442:   781,  824,  1401. 
North  Ark.  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cole,  71 

Ark.  38:   1082,  1314,  1315. 

North  Baltimore  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Baltimore,  75  Md.  247 :  301,  408. 

V.  North  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.,   75  Md. 

233:  427,  762,  763,  764,  1283. 

North  Berwick  v.  Comrs.  of  York,  25 

Me.  69:  516. 
North  Branch  Canal  Co.  v.  Hireen,  44 

Pa.  St.  418:  809. 
North  Carolina  R.  R.  Co:  v.  Carolina 
Central  R.  R.  Co.,  83  N.  C.  489 : 
761. 


OASES    CITED. 


CCV 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


North  Carolina  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Goodwin, 

110  N.  C.   175:    1442,  1443. 
North  Chester  v.  Eckfeldt,  1   Mona- 
ghan   (Pa.  Supm.  Ct.)   732:  618, 
1128,   1130,  1649,  1656,   1718. 
North  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lake 

View,  105  111.  207 :  487. 
North     Chicago    St.    R.    R.    Co.    v. 
Chetham,  58  111.  App.  318:  1586. 
North   Chillicothe   v.   Burr,   185   111. 

322:    892. 
North  Coast  Ry.  Co.  v.  No.  Pac.  Ry. 

Co.  48  Wash.  529 :  758,  759. 
Northeastern  Neb.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Fra- 
zier,  25  Neb.  42:  966,  1208,  1213, 
1426. 
V.  Frazier,  25  Neb.  53:  1129,  1223. 
North  Eastern  R.  R.   Co.  v.   Payne, 
8  Rich.  S.  C.  177:  726. 
V.  Sineath,  8  Rich.  L.  185:  1317. 
Northern  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Balti- 
more, 21  Md.  93:  1583,  1622. 
V.    Baltimore,    46    Md.    425:    752, 

1291. 
V.  Canton  Co.,  104  Md.  682:   1580, 

1589. 
V.   Harrisburg   Elec.   Co.,   177   Pa. 

St.   142:    1611. 
V.  Holland,  117  Pa.  St.  613:   327, 
643,  691,  692. 
Northern  Coal  &  Iron  Co.  v.  Wilkes- 

Barre,  218  Pa.  St.  269:  780. 
Northern  Countries  Invest.  Trust  Co. 
V.  Enyard,  24  Wash.  366:   1480. 
Northern   Ohio   Ry.   Co.   v.   Hancock 
Co.  Comrs.,  63  Ohio  St.  32:  581, 
776. 
Northern  Pac.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cole- 
man, 3  Wash.  228 :  1329,  1425. 
V.    Forbes,    15    Mont.    452:     1233, 
1480,  1481. 
Northern  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  B.  &  M. 
R.  R.  Co.,  4  Fed.  298:  1570. 
V.    Duncan,    87    Minn.    91:    1229, 
1262. 
Northern  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ely,  25 
Wash.  384:   1480. 
V.  Georgetown,  50  Wash.  580:  1701, 

1703. 
V.  Basse,  28  Wash.  353:    1480. 
V.    Jackman     (Dak.)     50    N.    W. 

123:   1533. 
V.  Murray,  87  Fed.  648:  1663. 
V.  St.  Paul,  Minneapolis  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,   1  McCrary  302:   765,  1160, 
1571. 
V.  Smith,  171  U.  S.  260:   1631. 
V.  Spokane,  45  Wash.  229 :  1480. 
V.  Spokane,  56  Fed.  915:  879,  883, 

1479. 
V.  Spokane,  64  Fed.  506:   883. 


Northern  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Townsend, 

190  U.  S.  267:  1479. 
Northern    Pacific    Terminal    Co.    v. 

Lowenberg,   9   Sawyer   348:    931. 

V.  Portland,  14  Ore.  24:  1086,  1517. 

Northern   R.    R.    Co.    v.    Concord    & 

Claremont  R.  R.  Co.,  27  N.  H. 

183:   759,  1364. 
V.  Earhart,  167  Mo.  612:    1213. 
V.    Englewood,    62   N.    J.   L.    188: 

915. 
Northern  Traction  Co.   v.   Dunn,   37 

Ind.  App.  248:   1192. 
V.  Rainer,  37  Ind.  App.  264:  1192. 
Northern  Transportation  Co.  v.  Chi- 
cago, 7  Biss.  45:  437. 
V.  Chicago,  99  U.  S.  635 :  437. 
North  Hempstead  v.  Gregory,  53  App. 

Div.  350:   127,  129,  130. 
North  Hudson  Co.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Boor- 

aem,  28  N.  J.  Eq.  450 :  947,  1227, 

1347,  1352,  1564. 
North   Judson   v.   Lightcap,   41    Ind. 

App.  565 :  234. 
North  Lebanon  Tp.  Road,  3  Pa.  Co. 

Ct.  401 :   1099. 
North  Lebanon  Tp.  Road,  6  Pa.  Co. 

Ct.  598:   1364. 
North  Manheim  v.  Reading  etc.  R.  R. 

Co.,  18  Phil.  650:   781. 
North   Missouri   R.   R.   Co.  v.   Gott, 

25  Mo.  540:  697. 
V.    Lackland,    25    Mo.    515:     1424, 

1669,  1685. 
V.  Reynal,  25  Mo.  534:  1424,  1669, 

1685. 
North  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Reynolds, 

50  Cal.  90:  1309. 
North  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis,  26 

Pa.  St.  238:  952,  961,  1257. 
V.  Inland  Traction  Co.,  205  Pa.  St. 

579:   328. 
North  Reading  v.  Co.  Comrs.,  7  Gray 

109:    1366. 
North  Riv.  Boom  Co.  v.   Smith,   15 

Wash.  138:   958. 
North  River  Water  Front,  Matter  of, 

118  App.  Div.  685:   1257,  1276. 
North  River  Water  Front,  Matter  of, 

120  App.  Div.  849:  1198. 
North  River  Water  Front,  Matter  of, 

189  N.  Y.  508:  1257,  1258,  1276. 
North   Shore  R.   R.   Co.  v.  Pion,   14 

App.    Cas.    612:    127,    128,    129, 

131. 
V.  Pion,   14  Duvall  677:   127,  128, 

131. 
North  Spring  Water  Co.  v.  Tacoma, 

21   Wash.  517:    408,  409. 
North  Thirteenth  Street,  Matter  of, 

5  Hun  175:  1461,  1670. 


CCVl 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references   are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


North  Union  Tp.  Road,   150  Pa.  St. 

512:   1389. 
North  Vernon  v.  Voegler,  89  Ind.  77 : 

233. 
V.  Voegler,  103  Ind.  314:  142,  210, 

237,   1251,   1551,   1648,  1656. 
North    &    West   Branch   Ry.    Co.    v. 

Swank,  105  Pa.  St.  555:  846. 
Northwestern  Fertilizing  Co.  v.  Hyde 

Park,  70  111.  634:   14,  452,  455, 

469. 
V.  Hyde  Park,  97  U.  S.  659:    14, 

452,  455,  469. 
N.  W.  Telephone  Exch.  Go.  v.  Chicago 

etc.  Ry.  Co.,  76  Minn.  334:  682, 

775,  793,  796,  977,  1072. 
V.  Minneapolis,  81  Minn.  140:  360, 

362,  489,  682. 
V.    Twin    City    Telephone    Co.    89 

Minn.  495:   418,  419,   1621. 
Northwood  v.  Raleigh,  3  Ontario  347 : 

156. 
Norton   v.   Hodges,    100   Mass.    241 : 

961. 
V.  London  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  L.  R.  9  Ch. 

623:    1494. 
V.  Peck,  3  Wis.  714:   1165. 
T.  Studley,  17  111.  556:   1162. 
V.  Truitt,  70  N.  J.  L.  611:    1381, 

1382 
V.   Waikill   Valley   R.   R.    Co.,   61 

Barb.  476:  824. 
V.   Waikill   Valley  R.   R.    Co.,   63 

Barb.  77:   1017. 
V.  Waikill  Valley  etc.  R.  R.   Co., 

42  How.  Pr.  228:   679. 
Norvall  v.  Canada  Southern  R.  R.  Co., 

28  U.  C.  C.  P.  309:    1523,  1626. 
Norwalk  v.  Blatz,  9  Ohio  C.  C.  417: 

83,  866. 
Norway  Plains  Co.  v.  Bradley,  52  N. 

H.   86:    104. 
Norwich  v.  Story,  25  Conn.  44:  700. 
Norwich  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wodehouae,  11 

Beav.  282:   1619. 
Norwegian   Street,   81   Pa.   St.   349: 

915. 
Norwood,  In  re,  161  Mass.  259:  487. 
Norwood  T.   Baker,   172   U.   S.   269: 

10,  14,  23,  464,  1203,  1219,  1432. 
V.  Gonzales  Co.,  79  Tex.  218:  700, 

1567. 
Norwood  etc.  R.  R.   Co.,  Matter  o'f, 

47  Hun  489:   1347. 
Nosaer  v.  Seelev,  10  Neb.  460 :  898. 
Nottingham  v."B.  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  3 

McArthur  517  :  250,  319. 
Novich   V.   Trinity   etc.   Ry.   Co.,   45 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  664:  654,  1337. 
Novotney  v.  Danforth,  9  S.  D.  301: 

440,   441. 
Noyes  v.  Chapin,  6  Wend.  461:  829. 


Noyes  v.  Cosselman,  29  Wash.  635: 

1607. 
V.  Mason  City,  53  la.  418:    1550. 

v.  Springfield,  116  Mass.  87:  1416. 
Nugent  v.  New  York,  58  Misc.  453: 

609,   1718. 
Null  V.  White  Water  Valley   Canal 

Co.,  4  Ind.  431:    1522. 
V.  Zierle,  52  Mich.  540:  983,  1419. 
Nunnamaker  v.  Columbia  etc.  R.  R. 

Co.,  47  S.  C.  485:   710,  846. 
Nussbaum  v.   Bell  Co.,  97  Tex.  86: 

153. 
Nutter  V.  Gallagher,  19  Or.  375:  112. 
Nutting  v.  Kings  Co.  El.  R.  R.  Co., 

91   Hun  251:    1425. 
Nye  V.   Taunton   Branch  R.  R.   Co., 

113  Mass.  277:  838. 
Nypano  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wadaworth  Salt 

Co.,    9    Ohio    C.    C.    114:    1109, 

1244,  1273. 


Oak  CliflF  Sewerage  Co.  v.  Marsalis, 

30  Tex.  Civ.  App.  42:  892. 

Oakland  v.  Oakland  Water  Front  Co., 

118  Cal.  160:  118. 

V.  Thompson,  151  Cal.  572:  698. 

O'Bannan    v.    Jackson,    Sneed    201: 

1360. 
Oberfelder  v.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R. 

Co.,  138  N.  Y.  181 :  1372. 
O'Brien  v.  Ball,  119  Mass.  28:   1255. 
V.  Baltimore  Belt  R.  Co.,  74  Md. 

363:   324,  622,  1581,  1592. 
V.  Central  Iron  etc.  Co.,  158  Ind. 

218:   190,  351,  369,  372,  382. 
V.     Commissioners     of     Baltimore 

County,  51  Md.  15:   734. 
V.  Norwich  &  Worcester  Ry.   Co., 

17   Conn.  371:    133. 
V.  Philadelphia,   150  Pa.  St.  589: 

630,  632,  636. 
V.  St.  Paul,  25  Minn.  331 :  67,  233. 
V.  Shenley  Park  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  194 

Pa.   St.   336:    1229. 

V.  Penn.  Schuylkill  Val.  R.  R.  Co., 

4  Mont.  Co.  L.  R.  57:  641,  1649. 

V.  Penn.  S.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  119  Pa, 

St.  184:  618,  630,  636,  646,  1549, 

1550,  1652,  1660. 

Obst  V.  Covell,   93  Minn.   30:    1222, 

1561. 
Occum  Co.  V.  Sprague  Manuf.  Co.,  35 

Conn.  496:   548,  899. 
Ocean   City  R.   R.   Co.   v.   Bray,   57 

N.  J.  Eq.  164:  1577. 
Ocean  City  Land  Co.  v.  Ocean  City, 

73  N.  J.  L.  493:   420. 
Ocean  Grove  Camp  Meeting  Associa- 
tion V.  Ashbury  Park,  40  N.  J. 
Eq.  447:   161. 


OASES    CITED. 


CCVH 


[The   reterences  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Ockerhausen  v.  Tyson,  71  Conn.  31 : 

133. 
Oconee  Elec.  Lt.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Carter, 
111  Ga.  106:  679,  708,  726,  1623. 
O'Connell   v.   Bowman,  45   111.   App. 
654:    869. 
V.   Chicago   Terminal   Transfer   R. 
E.   Co.,   184   111.   308:    242,   868, 
1580. 
V.  East  Tenn.  V.  &  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  87 
Ga.  246:   89,  150. 
O'Connor  v.   Fond  du  -uac,  A.  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  52  Wis.  526 :  158. 
V.  Nova  Scotia  Tel.  Co.,  22  Duvall 

276:   350,  1488. 
V.  Pittsburgh,  18  Pa.  St.  187:  211. 
V.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  56  Iowa 

735:  251,  320,  351. 
V.   Southern   Pac.   R.   R.   Co.,    122 
Cal.   681:    1580. 
Octoraro  Water  Co.'s  Petition,  15  Pa. 

Dist.  Ct.  767:  169,  934. 
Odd  Fellows  Cem.  Assn.  v.  San  Fran- 
cisco, 140  Cal.  226:  473. 
V.  San  Francisco,  140  Cal.  609 :  14. 
Ode  V.  Manhattan  R.  K.  Co.,  56  Hun 

199:   1298,   1651,  1658. 
O'Dea  V.  State,  16  Neb.  241 :  1505. 
Odell  V.  Bretney,  62  App.  Div.  595: 
357. 
V.  DeWitt,  53  N.  Y.  643:  1158. 
V.   Metropolitan  El.   R.   R.   Co.,   3 

Miscl.  335:    1664. 
V.   New  York  El.   R.   R.   Co.,   130 
N.  Y.  690:  1296,  1299,  1300. 
Odneal  v.  City  of  Sherman,  77  Tex. 

182:    355. 
O'Donnell   v.   White,   23   R.   I.   318: 
231    439. 
V.  White,  24  R.  I.  483:   159,  212, 

612,   616. 
V.  Preston,  74  App.  Div.  86 :  357. 
V.  Syracuse,  102  App.  Div.  80:  79. 
V.  Syracuse,  184  N.  Y.  1 :  79. 
Odum  V.  Rutledge  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  94 

Ala.  488:    1116,  1481. 
Oehler  v.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  4 

App.  Div.  152:   1664. 
Ortman  v.   Union   Pac.   Ry.   Co.,   32 

Kan.  419:    1408. 
Oettinger  v.  District  of  Columbia,  18 

App.  Cas.  D.  C.  375:  881. 
Offield  V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

203  U.  S.  372:  745. 
OiTutt  V.   Montgomery   Co.,   94   Md. 

115:    324. 
Oftelie  V.  Hammond,  78  Minn.  275: 

147,  149. 
Ogburn  v.  Conner,  46  Cal.  346:   145. 
Ogden   V.   Philadelphia,    143   Pa.   St. 
430:  25,  618,  630,  633,  636,  1718. 


Ogden  V.  Stokes,  25  Kan.  517:   1520. 
Ogden  City  R.  R.  v.  Ogden  City,  7 

Utah  207:    298,   763. 
Ogden  St.  Opening,  Matter  of,  63  Hun 

188:    1082. 
Ogle  V.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

3  Hous.  Del.  302:   864. 
O'Hara  v.  Lexington  &  Oliio   R.  R. 

Co.,  1  Dana  (Ky.)  232:  524. 
V.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  25  Pa. 

St.  445:  991,  1358. 
O'Hara  Tp.  Road,  In  re,  87  Pa.  St. 

366:    1366. 
O'Hare  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  139 

111.    151:    677,   679,    1074,    1143, 

1426. 
V.  Dubuque,  22  Iowa  144:  465. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  139  111.  151:  1046. 
Ohio  V.  Carman,  Tappan  (Ohio)  162: 

1372. 
Ohio  etc.  R.  R.   Co.  v.   Barker,   134 

111.  470:    1100,  1101. 
V.    Bridgeport,   63   111.   App.    224: 

780,  1645. 
V.  Combs,  43  111.  App.  119:  91,  152, 

159. 
V.  Long,  52  111.  App.  670:  91. 
V.  Neutzel,  43  111.  App.   108:    91, 

152,  1454,  1651,  1653. 
V.  Ramey,  139  111.  9:  90,  94. 
V.  Ramey,  39  111.  App.  409:  151. 
V.  Thillman,   143  111.   127:    90,  93, 

94,   1649,   1653. 
V.  Thillman,  43  111.  App.  78:   90, 

94,  152,  1454,  1635. 
V.  Webb,  142  111.  402:  90. 
V.  Wallace,  14  Pa.  St.  245:  1365. 
V.  Dooley,  32  111.  App.  228:  158. 
V.  Gallagher,  33  Pa.  Ct.  Ct.  489: 

1506. 
V.  Gallagher,  17  Pa.  Dist.  Co.  142 : 

1506. 
V.  Russell,  115  111.  52:  487. 
V.  Wachter,   123   111.   440:   90,  93, 

1548,   1651,   1653,   1662. 
V.  Wachter,  23  111.  App.  415:  1638. 
V.  Webb,  142  111.  402:  94. 
Ohio  Oil  Co.  V.  Indiana,   177  U.   S. 

190:   164,  471. 
V.  Indiana,  177  U.  S.  212:  471. 
V.  Indiana,  177  U.  S.  213:  471. 
V.  State,  150  Ind.  694:   471. 
V.  State,  150  Ind.  698:   471. 
Ohio  Riv.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Blake,  38  W. 

Va.  718:    1086,   1427. 
V.  Harness,  24  W.  Va.  511:    1360. 
V.  Johnson,  50  W.  Va.  499:    1472. 
V.    Ward,    35    W.    Va.    481:     1098, 

1581. 
Ohio  Valley  R.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Kerth,  130 

Ind.  314:   1131. 


covin 


CASES    CITED. 


[The   references   are  to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Ohio  Val.  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Simpson,  11 

Ky.  L.  R.  719:   843,  852. 
Oklahoma  v.  Oldahoma  Gas  &  Blee. 

Co.  13  Okl.  454:  361,  411. 
Oklahoma  City  etc.  Ey.  Co.  v.  Dun- 
ham,   39     Tex.    Civ.   App.    575: 

323,  1458,  1472. 
Old   Colony   etc.   R.   R.    Co.  v.   Ply- 
mouth Co.,  14  Gray  155 :  55,  67, 

1289,  1290,  1292. 
Old  Colony  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Fall  River, 

147  Mass.  455:   749,  1510,  1614. 
V.  F.  P.  Robinson  Co.,   176  Mass. 

387:   1141. 
V.    Framingham    Water    Co.,    153 

Mass.  561:   793,  796,   1169. 
V.  Miller,  125  Mass.  1:  1319,  1320, 

1331. 
Old   Colony   R.   R.    Co.,   In   re,    163 

Mass.  356:   487. 
Old    Town   V.    Dooley,   81    111.    255: 

1487. 
Olean   v.    Steyner,    135    N.    Y.    341: 

366,  1137,  1327,  1328. 
Olean  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Pa.  R.  R.  Co., 

75  App.  Div.  412:  772. 
V.  Pa.  R.  R.  Co.,  175  N.  Y.  468: 

772. 
O'Learv   v.   Pittsburg   Terminal   Ry. 

Co.,  210  Pa.  St.  522:  819,  1569, 

1572. 
Olive  v.  Sabine  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  11  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  208:   835,  1478. 
Oliver  v.  Monona  County,  117  la.  43: 

975,  1016,  1510,  1518. 
V.  Thompson's  Run  Bridge  Co.,  197 

Pa.    St.   344:    1050. 
V.  Union  Point  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  83 

Ga.  257:   922,  1397,  1461,  1463, 

1570. 
Oliver  Schlemmer  Co.  v.  Steinman  & 

M.  Furn.  Co.,  2  Ohio  N.  P.   (N. 

S.)   293:  368,  370,  375,  404,  405, 

1596. 
V.    Steinman    &   M.   Furn.    Co.,    7 

Ohio  C.  C.  (N.  S.)  468:  368,  375, 

404,  405,  1596. 
Oliphant  v.  Atkinson  Co.  Comrs.,  18 

Kan.  386:  969,  1518,  1571. 
Olmstead   v.    Camp,    33    Conn.    532: 

504,  548. 
V.  Proprietors  of  the  Morris  Aque- 
duct Co.,  47  N.  J.  L.  311:   536, 

1044,  1060,  1062,  1063,  1066. 
V.  Proprietors  of  the  Morris  Aque- 
duct Co.,  46  N.  J.  L.  495:  536, 

1044,   1060,   1062,   1063,   1066. 
Olney  v.   Wharf,   115  111.  519:   243, 

1553. 
Olson  V.  Merrill,  42  Wis.  203:    104, 

125. 


Olson  V.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  38 

Minn.    419:    154. 
V.    Seattle,    30    Wash.    687:     939, 

1569. 
Olympia  v.  Mann,  1  Wash.  380 :  468. 
Omaha  v.   Croft,  60  Neb.  57:    1233, 

1234,  1546. 
V.  Clarke,  66  Neb.  33:   1556,  1642. 
v.  Flood,  57  Neb.  124:   1718. 
V.  Hanover,  49  Neb.  1:  879. 
V.    Howell    Lumber    Co.,    30    Neb. 

633:   1179. 
V.  Kramer,  25  Neb.  492:  630,  635, 

659,   660,   664,   667,   1124,   1306, 

1337. 
V.  McGavock,  47  Neb.  313:  227. 
V.  Rediok,  61  Neb.  163 :  1546,  1548. 
V.  Schaller,  26  Neb.  522 :  630,  1216, 

1308. 
V.  Williams,  52  Neb.  40:  619. 
Omaha  Belt  R.  R.  Co.  v.  McDermott, 

25    Neb.    717:    640,    664,    1243, 

1294,   1300. 
Omaha  B.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Reed,  3 

Neb.     (Unof.)     793:     947,    962, 

1399,  1404. 
v.    Reed,   69   Neb.   514:    947,   961, 

1399,  1404. 
V.  Whiting,  68  Neb.  389 :  1347. 
Omaha  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown,  14 

Neb.  170:   88,  94. 
V.  Brown,  16  Neb.   161:   88. 
V.  Brown,  29  Neb.  492:  93,  1664. 
V.  Doney,  3  Kan.  App.  515:  1176, 

1243. 
V.  Gerrard,  17  Neb.  587:  1136. 
V.  Janecek,  30  Neb.  276:  448,  640, 

654,  655,  671,  1294,  1303,  1337. 
V.  Menk,  4  Neb.  21:  1343,  1530. 
V.  Moschel,  38  Neb.  281:  449,  654, 

1715. 
V.  Rediek,  16  Neb.  313:   1631. 
V.  Rickards,  38  Neb.  847 :  864,  867, 

868,  871,  980,  981,  984. 
V.  Rogers,  16  Neb.  117:  640. 
V.  Standen,  22  Neb.  343:  91,  1650, 

1653,  1716. 
V.  Standen,  29  Neb.  622:  93. 
V.   Struden,  22  Neb.   343:   659. 
V.    Walker,    17    Neb.    432:     1109, 

1112,   1329. 
Omaha    Horse    R.    R.    Co.    v.    Cable 

Tramway  Co.,  32  Fed.  727:  667. 
Omaha  L.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Douglass  Co., 

62  Neb.  1:  630,  1127. 
Omaha,  Niobrara  &  Black  Hills  R. 

R.  Co.  V.  Umstead,  17  Neb.  459 : 

1112. 
Omaha  Southern  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Beeson, 

36   Neb.    361:    964,    1152,    1499, 

1502. 


OASES    CITED. 


CCIX 


[!*«  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Omaha  Southern  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Todd, 

39  Neb.  818:    1144,   1176,   1179, 

1200,    1208,    1243,    1244,    1312, 

1313. 
O'Malley     v.      Commonwealth,      182 

Mass.   196:    1138,  1141,  1148. 
O'Neal    V.    Sherman,    77    Tex.    182: 

709,  839,  1488,  1595. 
One  Hundred  &  Seventy-third  Street, 

In  re,  78  Hun  487 :   1328. 
One   Hundreth    &    Sixteenth   Street, 

Opening  of.  Matter   of,    1   App. 

Div.  436:  879. 
One    Hundred    and    Sixty-third    St., 

Matter    of,    61    Hun    365:    929, 

1384. 
One  Hundred  and  Thirty-eighth  St., 

Matter    of,    60    How.    Pr.    290: 

1379. 
One    Hundredth    &    Twenty-seventh 

Street,   Matter  of,  56  How  Pr. 

60:   432. 
Oneida  St.,  Matter  of,  37  App.  Div. 

N.  Y.  266:   1005. 
Oneida  St.  Matter  of,  22  Misc.  N.  Y. 

235:  947,  1005. 
O'Neil  V.  Armstrong,  17  Phila.  273: 

357. 
O'Neill  v.  Hoboken,  72  N.  J.  L.  67: 

577. 
V.  Hudson,  41  N.  J.  L.  161 :   1673, 

1675,  1684. 
Oneonta  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Coopers- 
town  etc.  R.  K.  Co.,  85  App.  Div. 

284:  772. 
Onondaga    Co.    v.    White,    38    Miso. 

587:   1670. 
Onset  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Comity  Comrs., 

154  Mass.   395:    271,   622,   1415. 
Onthank  v.  Lake  Shore  etc.  Ry.  Co., 

71  N.  Y.  194:  835,  864. 
Opelousas  etc.  Ry.   Co.  v.   Bradford, 

118   La.   506:    1222,   1227,   1228, 

1229,   1242. 
V.  St.  Landry  Cotton  Oil  Co.,  118 

La.  290:  1222. 
Opening    First    St.,    Matter    of,    66 

Mich.  42:  683. 
Opening  of   Streets   through   Girard 

College  Grounds,  10  Phila.  145: 

747. 
Opinion   of   the   Justices,   25   N.   H. 

538:  63. 
Opinion   of   the   Justices,   41    N.   H. 

555:   594. 
Opinion  of  Justices,  186  Mass.  603: 

462. 
Opinion  of  Justices,  190  Mass.  611: 

462. 
Opinion  of  the  Justices,  103  Me.  506 : 

14,  474. 


Opinion   of  the   Justices,   66   N.   H. 

629:   20,  22,  789,  1156,  1173. 
Opp  v.  Timmons,  149  Ind.  236:   514 
Oran  Comrs.  v.  Hoblit,  19  111.  App, 

259:    1412. 
Orange  Belt  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Craver,  32 

Fla.  28:   1128,  1176,  1243,  1375 
Orange    Co.    v.    Ellsworth.    98    App 

Div.  275:  704,  1029,  1042,  1055. 
Orange   House   v.   Montgomery    Co 

218  Pa.   St.   204:    1407. 
Orange   Street,   Matter  of,   50  How 

Pr.  244:    1022. 
Ordway  v.  Canisteo,  66  Hun -569:  80 
O'Reiley  v.  Kankakee  Valley  Drain 

ing  Co.,  32  Ind.  169:   501,  564 

565,  566,  571. 
O'Reilly  v.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co. 

76  Hun  283:  1296,  1299. 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  148  N 

Y.  347:  1296,  1299,  1554,  1614. 
Oregon  v.  Memphis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  51 

Ark.  235:    1537. 
Oregon  &  Cal.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Barlow,  3 

Ore.  311:  1112,  1223. 
Oregon  Cascade  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bailey, 

3  Ore.  164:  753. 
Oregon  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wait,  3 

Ore.   91:    1206. 
V.  Wait,  3  Ore.  428:    1206. 
Oregon  City  v.  Oregon  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

44  Ore.  165:   875,  882. 
Oregon  City  Trans.  Co.  v.  Columbia 

St.    Bridge    Co.,    53    Fed.    549: 

96. 
Oregon  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mitchell,  7 

Utah  505:   1223. 
v.  Oregon  Steam  Nav.  Co.,  3  Ore. 

178:  827,  1386. 
V.   Day,   3   Wash.   Ter.   252:    856, 

1712. 
Oregon  R.  R.  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  McCor- 

mick,  46  Wash.  45 :  1080. 
V.  Mosler,  14  Ore.  519:  1348. 
V.  Owsley,  3  Wash.  Ter.  38:  1247, 

1249,  1356. 
Oregon  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bridwell,  11  Ore. 

282:    1392. 
v.  Hill,  9  Ore.  377:    1159. 
Oregon  Ry.  etc.  Co.  v.  Oregon  Real 

Estate    Co.,    10   Ore.    444:    894, 

897. 
Oregon  Short  Line  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Fox, 

28  Utah  311:  1206. 
V.  Jones,  29  Utah  147 :  1322. 
V.  Postal  lei.  Cable  Co.,  104  Fed, 

623:  1284,  1286. 
V.  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  Ill  Fed. 

842:  714,  775,  796,  799,  804, 
1048,  1050,  1066,  1068,  1284, 
1286. 


cex 


CASES    CITED. 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.> 


Oregon  Short  Line  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Quig- 

ley,  10  Ida.  770:  956,  1479,  1620. 
V.  Russell,  27  Utah  457:   1379. 
Organ  v.  Memphis  &  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  51 

Ark.   235:    127,   129,   697,   1159, 

1241,     1540,     1542,     1543,    1544, 

1578,  1617. 
Oritz  V.  Hansen,  35  Colo.   100:   587, 

674,  708,  988. 
Orleans   etc.   R.   R.   Co.  v.   Jefferson 

etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  51  La.  An  1605: 

754,  799,  1229,  1235. 
Ormerod  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

13  Fed.  370:  131. 
Orono  v.  County  Comrs.,  30  Me.  302 : 

1098. 
Oroville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Leggett,  161 

Fed.  571:  932. 
Orr  V.  Quinby,  54  N.  H.  590 :  2,  433, 

434,  588,  1164. 
Orriek   School  Dist.   v.   Dorton,   125 

Mo.  439:   706,   1047,  1048. 
Orrington  v.  County  Comrs.  of  Pen- 
obscot Co.,  51  Me.  570:  1380. 
Orth    V.    Milwaukee,    92    Wis.    230: 

1245. 
Ortman  v.  Union  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  32 

Kan.  419:   1108. 
Orton  V.  Metuchen,  66  N.  J.  L.  572: 

302. 
V.  Tilden,  110  Ind.  131:   1028. 
Ortwine  v.   Baltimore,   16  Md.  387: 

1551. 
Osborn  v.  Hart,  24  Wis.  89:  495,  516, 

517. 
V.  Norwalk,  77  Conn.  663:  73,  866. 
Osborne    v.    Auburn    Telephone    Co., 

189  N.  Y.  393:  339,  1593. 
V.  Auburn  Telephone  Co.,  Ill  App. 

Div.  702:  339,  350,  1593. 
V.  Detroit,  32  Mich.  282:   1017. 
V.  Knife  Falls  Boom  Co.,  32  Minn. 

412:   99. 
V.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  35  Fed.  Rep. 

84:   640,   1582. 
V.  Mo.  Pac.  R  R.  Co.,   147  U.   S. 

248:   640,  641,   1582. 
Osburn  v.  Chicago,  105  111.  App.  217: 

145/,  1472. 
Osgood    V.    Chicago,    154    111.    194: 

1306,  1308,  1309,  1337. 
V.  Chicago,  44  111.  App.  532:  629, 

1306,  1308. 
Oshkosh  V.  Milwaukee  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

74  Wis.  534:    1643. 
Osterheldt  v.   Philadelphia,   195  Pa. 

St.  355:  878,  879,  889,  1327. 
Ostrom    V.    San    Antonio,    77    Tex. 

345:   1492,  1569,  1572. 
V.  Sills,  24  Out.  526:   148. 


Oswego  Falls  Bridge  Co.  v.  Fish,   1 

Barb.  Ch.  547:  409. 
Oswego  V.  Oswego  Canal  Co.,  6  N.  Y. 

257:  887. 
Otis    Co.    V.    Ludlow   Mfg.    Co.,    186 

Mass.   89:    549,    554,   899. 
Otero  Canal  Co.  v.  Fosdick,  20  Colo. 

552*    1459 
Otoe  Co.  V.  Heys,  19  Neb.  289:  1116,, 

1342. 
Ottawa  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  25 

111.  43:  1576. 
V.  Yentzer,  160  111.  509:  868,  88U 
Ottawa  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Adolph,  41 

Kan.  600:   1124. 
V.  Larson,  40  Kan.  301:  252,  311, 

330. 
V.    Peterson,    51    Kan.    604:    252, 

1294,  1652. 
Ottawa  Gas  Light  Co.  v.  Graham,  28 

111.  73:   166,  649. 
Otten  V.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,   150 

N.  Y.  395:    1302. 
V.   Manhattan  R.   R.   Co.,   2  App. 

Div.  396:    1302. 
Ottendorf   v.   Agnew,    13    Daly    16: 

356. 
Ottenot  V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

119  N.  Y.  603:   226,  319,   1553, 

1651,  1658. 
Otto  V.  Conroy,  76  Neb.  517:    1057. 
Ottumwa    etc.    Ry.    Co.    v.    McWil- 

liams,  71  la.  164:  830,  834,  838, 

851. 
Ouimet  v.  Montreal,  7  Ontario  193: 

1259,  1274. 
Ouken  v.  Riley,  65  Tex.  468 :  1029. 
Oury  V.  Goodwin,  3  Ariz.  255:   587, 

672. 
Overman  v.  May,  35  la.  89:  1489. 
V.    St.    Paul,    39    Minn.    120:    231, 

1018,  1032,   1513,  1516,  1634. 
Overman   Silver  Mining  Co.  v.  Cor- 
coran, 15  Nev.  147:  562. 
Owazarzak  v.  Gulf  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  31 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  229:   489,  1483. 
Owen  V.  Brockport,  208  111.  35:  892. 
V.  Jordan,  27  Ala.  608:   1358. 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  12  Wash. 

313:   938,  1354,  1629. 
V.   Springfield,   83   Mo.  App.   557: 

1695. 
Owen  County  v.  Morgan,  22  Ky.  L. 

R.    922:    947,    1564. 
Owens  V.  Crossett,  105  111.  354 :  1572. 
V.  Lancaster,  182  Pa.  St.  257:  79, 

84,  453,  1637. 
V.  Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  67  Tex. 

679:  152. 
Owensboro  v.  Muster,  111  Ky.  856: 

884. 


CASES    CITED. 


cexi 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Owensboro  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Gray,  14 

Ky.  L.  R.  79:   1670,  1698. 
V.  Griffith,  92  Ky.   137  :   842 
Owensborough  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Sut- 
ton,   (Ky.)    13  S.  W.   1086:   309, 

1086. 
Owings   V.   Worthington,   10  G.  &  J. 

283:   516,  989,   1516. 
Orvis  V.   Elmira   etc.   R.  R.   Co.,   17 

App.  Div.  N.  Y.  187:   93. 
Owners    of    Ground    v.    Albany,    15 

Wend.     374:     539,     1005,     1011, 

1438. 
Owners  of  Land  v.  People,   113  111. 

296;    1518. 
Owosso   V.   Richfield,   80   Mich.   324: 

912,  914,  1025,  1085. 
Owston  V.  Grand  Trunk  R.  R.   Co., 

28  Grant  Ch.  431 :   953,  1556. 
Oxford  V.  Brands,  45  N.  J.  L.  332: 

1106,  1368,  1386. 
».  Columbia,  38  Ohio  St.  87:  1492. 
V.    Philadelphia,    19    Phila.    483: 

633. 
V.  Willoughby,  87  App.  Div.  609: 

1623. 
V.    Willoughby,    181    N.    Y.    155: 

1623. 
Oxford   Alley,    8    Pa.    Co.    Ct.    221: 

1384. 
Oyler  v.  Ross,  48  Neb.  211:  970. 

P. 

Pace  V.   Freeman,   10  Ired.   L.   103: 

1135. 
Pacific  Coast  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Porter,  74 

Cal.  261:    1203,   1223. 
Pacific  Gas   Imp.   Co.   v.   Ellert,   64 

Fed.  421:    119. 
Pacific  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.  v.  Ir- 
vine, 49  Fed.   113:    339. 
V.  Oregon  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  163  Fed. 

967:  775,  823. 
V.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co..  50  Fed. 
493:   412,  832,   1476. 
Pacific  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Chrystal,  25  Mo. 
544:    1186. 
V.  Leavenworth  City,  1  Dill.  393: 

306. 
V.  Perkins,  36  Neb.  456:   1024. 
V.  Reed,  41  Cal.  256:   249. 
V.  Seely,  45  Mo.  212:   833. 
V.   Wade,  91   Cal.   449:    426,   427, 
761,  763,  1283. 
Pack  V.  Chesapeake  &  Ohio  R.  R.  Co., 

5  W.  Va.  118:  928. 
Packard  v.  Bergen  Neck  R.  R.  Co., 
48    N.    J.    Eq.    281:    915,    1461, 
1464,  1563. 
V.  Bergen  Neck  R.  R.  Co.,  54  N.  J. 
L.  229:   1187,  1247,  1366. 


Packard  v.  Bergen  Neck  R.  R.   Co., 
54    N.    J.    L.    553:    1132,    1187, 
1200,  1247,  1366. 
V.  County  Comrs.,  80  Me.  43:  979, 
984. 
Packer  v.  Bird,  137  U.  S.  661:    114. 
V.  Sunbury  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  Pa. 
St.  211:  709,  900. 
Packet  Co.  v.  Keokuk,  95  U.  S.  80: 
594. 
V.  Sorrels,  50  Ark.  466:  356,  1488. 
Paducah  v.  Allen,  111  Ky.  361:  658, 

1138,  1337. 
Paducah  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dipple,  16 
Ky.  L.  R.  62:   1549. 
V.  Storall,  12  Heisk.  1:  1100,  1207. 
Page  V.  Baltimore,  34  Md.  558:  745, 
748. 
V.  Belvin,  88  Va.  985:   1457. 
V.  Boston,   106  Mass.  84:    1717. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  70  111. 

324:    1177,   1195. 
V.  Heineberg,  40  Vt.  81:  827,  837, 

838,  1500. 
V.  Huckins,  150  Mich.  103:   154. 
V.  O'Toole,  144  Mass.  303:  809, 
Pagel   V.   County   Comrs.,    17    Mont. 

586:    984,   1363,   1571. 
Pagels  V.  Oaks,  64  la.  198:  513,  1032, 

1033,  1069,  1416. 
Paige    V.    Schenectady    Ry.    Co.,    77 
App.  Div.  571:   1586,  1587. 
V.   Schenectady   Ry.    Co.,   84   App. 

Div.  91:   273. 
V.  Schenectady  Ry.  Co.,  178  N.  Y. 
102:    273. 
Paine  v.  Boston,  4  Allen,  168:   1138, 
1142. 
V.  Delhi,  116  N.  Y.  224:  143. 
V.  Leicester,  22  Vt.  44:   513,  1421. 
V.  Lettsville,   103   la.  481:    236. 
V.    Woods,    108    Mass.    160:     109, 
948,  980,  1133,  1217. 
Paine    Lumber    Co.    v.    Oshkosh,    86 
Wis.  397:  431,  1572. 
V.  Oshkosh,  89  Wis.  449:    1505. 
V.  United  States,  55  Fed.  854:  92, 
128    129    136 
Painter 'v.  St.  Clair,  98  Va.  85:  672, 
673,    675,    687,    707,    709,    1515, 
1569,  1571. 
Painter's  Lateral  R.  R.  Co.,  198  Pa. 

St.  461:    707,  1460. 
Paisier  v.  Board  of  Co.   Comrs.,   68 

Minn.  297:   1407. 
Palairet's   Appeal,   67   Pa.    St.    479: 

590. 
Palatine  v.  Kreuger,  121  111.  72:  173, 
1486,  1487. 
V.  Kreuger,  20  111.  App.  420:  1486, 
1487. 


CCXll 


CASES    CITED. 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742;  Vol.  II,   pp.  743-1719.] 


Palatka  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  State,  23 

Fla.  546:  780. 
Palethorp  v.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  2  Walker's  Pa.  Supm.  487: 
859. 
Palmer  v.  Clinton,  52  111.  App.  67: 
890. 
V.  Conway,  22  N.  H.  144:   1088. 
V.  East  River  Gas   Co.,   115  App. 

Biv.  677:  890. 
V.   Hickory   Grove   Cem.,   84  App. 

Div.  600:    1625. 
V.  Higliway  Comr.,  49  Mich.   45: 

996. 
V.  Harris  Co.,  29  Tex.   Civ.  App. 

340:    1057,   1377. 
V.  Larchmont  Electric  Co.,  6  App. 

Div.   12:    345,   1593. 
V.  Larchmont  Electric  Co.,  158  N. 

Y.  231:    175,  344. 
V.  Logansport  etc.  Gravel  R.  Co., 

108  Ind.   137:   422,  1595. 
V.   Mulligan,   3   Caines  Rep.   307: 

71,  76. 
V.  O'Donnell,  15  lU.  App.  324:  233. 
V.  Rich,  12  Mich.  414:  973. 
v.  State,  Wright  (Ohio),  364:  722. 
V.  Union  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  64  111.  App. 
534:    1585. 
Palmer  Co.  v.  Ferrill,  17  Pick.  58: 

1185,  1215. 
Palmer  etc..  Matter  of,  9  A.  &  E. 

463:   953. 
Palmer  etc..  Matter  of,  36  E.  C.  L.  R. 

253:    953. 
Palmer's  Private  Road,   16   Pa.   Co. 

Ct.  340:   721. 
Palmyra  v.  Morton,  25  Mo.  593:   13. 
Palo   Alto  Road,    160   Pa.   St.    104: 

402. 
Palo  Alto  Road  View,  13  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

537:  701. 
Panhandle  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Kirby,  42 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  340:  1329. 
Panton  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Bishop,   11 

Vt.  198:  422. 
Pape  V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  74 
App.  Div.  175:  257. 
V.  New   York  etc.  R.  R.   Co.   175 
N  Y.  504:   257. 
Papooshek  v.  Winona  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
44  Minn.   195:    247,   1127,   1128, 
1131. 
Pappenheim    v.    Railway    Company, 
128  N.  Y.  436:    182,  1553,  1554, 
1584,  1591,  1663. 
Papworth    v.    Milwaukee,    64    Wis. 

389:    1488. 
Paquet  v.  Mt.  Tabor  St.  R.  R.  Co., 
18  Or.  233:   271,  282,  313.  316. 
Paradise  Road,  29  Pa.  St.  20:   1100, 
1101. 


Paret  v.  Bayonne,  39  N.  J.  L.  559: 

828 
V.  Bayonne,  40  N.  J.  L.  333 :  1548. 
v.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  60  N.  Y. 

Supr.  441:  1664. 
Parham   v.   Decatur    County,   9   Ga. 

341:   22,  23,  24,  672,  674,  1095, 

1163,  1571. 
Paris  V.  AUred,   17   Tex.   Civ.  App. 

125:   84,  1649,  1654. 
V.    Coltraine,    3   Hawks.    (N.   C.) 

312:    1438. 
V.  Current,  15  Ky.  L.  R.  126:  237. 
V.  Mason,  37  Tex.  447 :  1163,  1183, 

1571. 
Parisa  v.  Dallas,  83  Tex.  253 :  882. 
Paris  Elec.  L.  &  R.  R.  Co.  v.  S.  W. 

Tel.  &  Tel.  Co,  (Tex.  Civ.  App.) 

27  S  W.  902:  418. 
Paris  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Greimer,  84 

Tex.  443:   1626. 
Parish  v.  Gilmanton,  11  N.  H.  293: 

948,  962,  1021,   1031. 
Paris  Mountain  Water  Co.  v.  Green- 
ville, 53  S.  C.  82:  354,  613,  660. 
Parke's  Appeal,  64  Pa.  St.  137:  727. 
Park  V.  C.  &  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  43  la. 

636:     320,    351,    372,    374,    383, 

651. 
Parke  v.   Seattle,   5   Wash.    1:    229, 

1309. 
V.  Seattle,  8  Wash.  78:  942,  1145. 
Parker  v.  Adams,  55  N.  J.  L.  334: 

1069. 
V.  Am.  Woolen  Co.,  195  Mass.  591 : 

81. 
V.  Atchison,  46  Kan.  14:  604,  618, 

1306,  1308,  1337. 
V.  Atkinson,  58  Kan.  29 :  89. 
y.  Boston  Sc  M.  R.  E.  Co.,  3  Cush. 

107:    226,   623. 
V.  Boston,  15  Pick.  198:   1109. 
V.   Catholic  Bishop,   146   111.   158: 

363,  382,  391,  396,  398,  406,  644, 

1595. 
V.  Catholic  Bishop,  41  111.  App.  74 

363,  382,  391,  396,  398,  406. 
V.  Commonwealth,  178  Mass.  199 

468. 
V.  Cutter  Milldam  Co.,  20  Me.  253 

133. 
V.  East  Tenn.  etc.  R.   R.  Co.,  13 

Lea   669:    1165,   1526,   1570. 
V.   Ft.   Worth   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   84 

Tex.  333:   985,  1018,  1513,  1518. 
V.  Framingham,  8  Met.  260:    368. 
V.  Hotchkiss,  25  Conn.  321:  71. 
V.  Metropolitan  Ry.  Co.,  109  Mass. 

506:    691. 
V.  Nashua,  59  N.  H.  402:  235. 
V.    Norfolk   Co.,    150    Mass.    489: 

1468. 


CASES    CITED, 


CCXlll 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742  ;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Parker  v.  Norfolk  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  119 
N.  C.  676:    155. 
V.  Norfolk  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  123  N.  C. 

71:   155,  1449. 
V.  People,  111  111.  581:   486. 
V.  Rogers,  8  Ore.  183,  118. 
V.  St.  Paul,  47  Minn.   317:    1503, 

1504. 
V.  Smith,  17  Mass.  413:  368. 
V.  Superior  Court,  25  Wash.  544: 
1042,     1043,     1044,     1397,     1399, 
1424. 
V.  Taylor,  7  Ore.  435:  118. 
V.  West  Coast  Packing  Co.,  17  Ore. 
510:   118. 
Parker  Co.  v.  Jackson,   5  Tex.   Civ. 

App.  36:   424. 
Parker,  Petitioner,  36  N.  H.  84 :  948. 
Parkersburg  Gas.  Co.  v.  Parkersburg, 

30  W.  Va.  435:  413,  416. 
Parkham  v.  Justices  etc.  9  Ga.  341 : 

498. 
Parkhurst   v.   Salem,    23   Ore.    472: 
301. 
V.  Vanderveer,  48  N.  J.  L.  80 :  981, 
1023. 
Parks  V.  Boston,  8  Pick.  218:  514. 
V.    Boston,    15    Pick.    198:     1221, 

1222,  1255,  1320. 
V.    Dallas    Terminal    etc.    Co.,    34 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  341:   1429. 
V.   Hampden   Co.,   120  Mass.   395: 

395,  1186. 
V.  Newburyport,  10  Gray  28:   147. 
T.    Southern   Ry.    Co.,    143   N.    C. 

289:    156,   1455,   1707,   1708. 
V.  Wisconsin  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  33 
Wis.  413:   1123. 
Parmelee  v.  Oswego  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  7 
Barb.  599:  787. 
V.  Oswego  &  Syracuse  R.  R.  Co.,  6 
N.  Y.  24:  839. 
Parnell    v.    Comra.'    Court,    34   Ala. 

278:  1414. 
Parny  v.  Citizen  Water  Works  Co., 

59  Hun  196:   1603. 
Parriott  v.  Hampton,   134  la.   157: 

889,  1493. 
Parrott  v.  Chicago  Gt.  Western  Ry. 
Co.,  127  la.  419:   1455,  1506. 
V.  Cincinnati  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Ohio 

St.  330:   249,  255. 
V.   Cincinnati   etc.   R.   R.    Co.,    10 
Ohio  St.  624 :  247,  249,  255,  330, 
448,  1295,  1303. 
V.  Lawrence,  2  Dill.  332:   414. 
Parry  v.  Citizens'  Water  Works  Co., 
59  Hun  196:   69,  72,  74. 
V.  New  Orleans  M.  &  C.  R.  R.  Co., 

55  Ala.  413:  250. 
V.  Richmond,  27  Ind.  66:  858,  860. 


Parsell  v.   State,  30   N.   J.   L.   530: 

1082. 
Parsonfield    v.    Lord,    23    Me.    511: 

1371. 
Parsons  v.  Clark,  76  Me.  476:   1489. 
V.  Detroit  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  122  Mich. 

462:   844. 
V.  Howe,  41  Me.  218:  715. 
V.  Hunt,  98  Tex.  420:  859. 
v.  Pettingill,  11  Allen,  507:    17. 
V.   VanWyck,   56   App.   Div.    329: 

421. 
V.  Waterville  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  101  Me. 
173:  272. 
Parsons  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Montgom- 
ery, 46  Kan.   120:   1380. 
Parsons'    Water    Co.    v.    Knapp,    33 

Kan.  752:   1124,  1495. 
Parst  V.  Bayonne,  39  N.  J.  L.  559: 

1116. 
Partridge    v.    Arlington,    193    Mass. 
530:  965,  1525,  1707. 
V.  Ballard,  2  Me.  50 :  1390. 
V.  Great  Western  R.  R.  Co.,  8  U. 
C.  C.  P.  97:  937,  1559. 
Pasadena   v.    Stinson,   91    Cal.   238: 

738    1334. 
Paschall  St.,  81  Pa.  St.   118:    1092, 

1103. 
Passaic  v.  Paterson  Bill  Posting  Co., 
71  N.  J.  L.  75:  471. 
V.   Paterson   Bill  Posting   Co.,   72 
N.  J.  L.  285:  57,  67,  471,  540. 
Passyunk  Ave.,  In  re,  2  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

269:   1189. 
Patch  v.  Boston,  146  Mass.  52:  1133, 

1138,  1151. 
Patchin  v.  Brooklyn,  2  Wend.   377: 
1108. 
V.   Brooklyn,  8  Wend.  47:    1108. 
V.  Brooklyn,  10  Wend.  664:   1418. 
V.  Doolittle,  3  Vt.  457 :  514,  1461. 
V.  Morrison,  3  Vt.  590:   1461. 
Patent  v.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
43  Legal  Intel.  79 :  692. 
V.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  17 

Phil.  291:   692. 
V.  Phil.  &  Reading  R.  R.  Co.,  14 
Weekly  Notes  (Pa.)  545:  643. 
Paterson's  Appeal,   129  Pa.  St.  109: 

1614. 
Paterson  v.  Buffalo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  17 
Grant  U.  C.  521 :   1540. 
V.  Duluth,  21   Minn.  493:    367. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  331 : 
1619. 
Paterson  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kamlah, 
42  N.  J.  Eq.  93:  859,  1320,  1631. 
V.  Kamlah,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  331 :   1320. 
V.  Newark,  61  N.  J.  L.  80:    1250, 
1292. 


CCXIV 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.  II,   pp.  743-1719.] 


Paterson  v.  Nutley,  72  N.  J.  L.  123 : 
1291. 
V.   Paterson,  72  N.  J.  L.  112:  750. 
V.    Paterson,    24   N.    J.    Eq.    158: 
268. 
Paterson  etc.  Traction  Co.  v.  DeGray, 
70  N.  J.  L.  59:   690,  697,  1395, 
1397. 
Patoka  Tp.  v.  Hopkins,  131  Ind.  142: 

154,  1606. 
Patrick  v.  Commissioners,  etc.,  4  Me- 
Cord    (S.  C.)    541:   22,   1153. 
V.   Omaha,    1    Neb.    (Unof.)    250: 

484. 
V.  Young  Men's  C.  Ass.,  120  Mich. 
185:    873,  892. 
Patridge    v.    Arlington,    193    Mass. 

530:   1718. 
Patten's  Petition,  16  N.  H.  277 :  992, 

995,  1103. 

Patten  v.  New  York  Elevated  R.  R. 

Co.,  3  Abb.  New  Cases  306:  260. 

V.  Northern  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  33  Pa.. 

St.  426:   1315. 

Patterson's  Appeal,  129  Pa.  St.  109: 

1576. 
Patterson  v.  Boom  Co.,  3  Dill.  465: 
543,  807. 
V.  Boom  Co.,  98  U.  S.  403:  543. 
T.    Boston,    20    Pick.    159:     l!S55, 

1259,  1274. 
V.    Boston,    23    Pick.    425:     1259, 

1274. 
V.  Chicago,  D.  &  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  75 

111.  588,  639,  1581. 
V.  Duluth,  21  Minn.  493:   384. 
V.  Mead,  148  Mich.  659:  973,  993. 
V.  Munyau,  93  Cal.  128 :  864. 
V.  People's  Nat.  Gas  Co.,  172  Pa. 

St.  554:    882. 
V.  Vail,  43  la.  142:  348. 
V.    Wollman,    5    N.    D.    608:    413, 
1608. 
Patton  V.  Clark,  9  Yerg.  268:   1095, 
1426. 
V.  Olympia  D.  &  L.  Co.,  15  Wash. 

210:   315,  1554. 
V.   Philadelphia,    175   Pa.    St.   88: 

1339. 
V.  Rome,  124  Ga.  52g:  378,  379. 
V.  State,  50  Ark.  53 :  864. 
Paul  V.  Carver,  24  Pa.  St.  207:  376, 
393 
V.    Detroit,    32    Mich.    108:    1058, 
1104. 
Paulsen  v.  Portland,   149  U.  S.  30: 

1013. 
Pause   V.   Atlanta,   98   Ga.   92:    635, 
1271,  1272,  1306. 


Pawcatuck  Val.  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  West- 
erly, 22  R.  I.  307:   491. 
Pawnee  Co.  v.  Storm,  34  Neb.  735: 

1011,  1013,  1709. 
Paxton  v.  Yazoo  R.  R.  Co.,  76  Miss. 

536:  1477. 
Paxton  etc.  Irr.   Canal  &  L.  Co.  v. 
Farmers'  etc.  Irr.  &  L.  Co.,  45 
Neb.  884:  675. 
Payne  v.  English,  79  Cal.  540:   119, 
132,  137,  652,  1607. 
V.  Kansas  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  46  Fed. 

546:   426,  680,  1474. 
v.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  112 

Mo.  6:   157. 
V.  Morgan's  R.  R.  etc.  Co.,  38  La. 

Ann.  164:   152,  1476. 
V.  Morgan's  R.  R.  Co.,  43  La.  Ann. 

981:  160,  1546,  1547. 
V.  Wayland,  131  la.  659:  452,  454. 
Peabody  v.  Boston  El.  Ry.  Co.,  191 
Mass.  513:  1216,  1300. 
V.  Boston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  181  Mass. 

76:  325,  1549. 
V.  New  York  etc.  R.   R.  Co.,   187 
Mass.  489:  325,  1144,  1145,  1151, 
1306,    1323. 
V.  Sweet,  3  Ind.  514:  1017,  1032. 
Peach  Bottum  Road,  In  re,  3  Penny. 

Pa.  541:   1034,  1100,  1383. 
Pearce  v.  Chicago,  176  111.  152:  1534. 
V.  Chicago,  67  111.  App.  671 :  1534. 
V.  Gilmer,  54  111.  25 :  1362. 
V.  Milwaukee,   18  Wis.   428:    614, 
619. 
Pearce's  Heirs  v.  Patton,  7  B.  Mon. 

162:   459,  494,  591. 
Pearl   Street,   Matter   of,    19   Wend. 

651:    1385. 
Pearl  St.  Opening  of,  In  re.  111  Pa. 

St.   565:    880. 
Pearsall  v.  Eaton  Co.,  71  Mich.  438: 
375,  386,  388,  400,  405. 
V.  Eaton  County,  74  Mich.  558 :  56, 
57,  185,  369,  375,  386,  388,  400, 
405,  1004,  1058. 
V.  Post,  20  Wend.  Ill:    726,  867, 
871,  872. 
Pearsoll  v.  Post,  22  Wend.  425 :  872. 
Pearson  v.  Allen,  151  Mass.  79:  183, 
366,  384,  392. 
V.    Island   County,   3    Wash.   497: 

1402. 
V.  Johnson,  54  Miss.  259:  543,  1159, 
1170. 
Peart  v.  Meeker,   45  La.  Ann.  421 : 

440. 
Pease  v.  Paterson  etc.  Traction  Co., 
69  N.  J.  L.  165 :   780,  887. 


CASES    CITED. 


CCXV 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Peavey  v.   Calais  R.  R.  Co.,  30  Me. 
498:  693,  711,  1048. 
V.  Wolfborough,  37  N.  H.  286 :  955, 
1029,  1103,  1368. 
Peay  v.  Salt  Lake  City,  11  Utah,  331 : 

137. 
Peck  V.  Goodberlett,  109  N.  Y.  180: 
147. 
V.  New  Albany  &  Chicago  R.  R.  Co., 

101  Ind.  366:    731. 
V.  Smith,  1  Conn.  103:   1486. 
V.  Schenectady  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  67  App. 

Div.  359 :  273,  1586. 
V.   Schenectady   etc.   Ry.   Co.,    170 

N.  Y.  298:   273,  1586. 
V.  Van  Rensselaer,  8  Blackf.  Ind. 

312:  748. 
V.  Whitney,  6  B.  Mon.  117:  1367. 
Peckham  v.  Dutchess  Co.  R.  R.  Co., 
145  N.  Y.  385:  1484,  1645,  1647. 
V.  Lebanon,  39  Conn.  231:   513. 
V.    School   District,    7   R.   I.    545: 
1106. 
Peden  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  73 
la.    328:    840,    852,    855,    1652, 
1655. 
Peddicord   v.   Baltimore    etc.   H.   R. 
R.    Co.,   34   Md.    463:    211,    238, 
268,  281. 
Pcdrick   v.    Raleisth   etc.   R.   R.   Co., 

143  N.  C.  485:  133. 
Peel  V.  Atlanta.  85  Ga.  138:  438,  629, 

664,  666,  670. 
Pegler  v.  Highway  Comrs.,  34  Mich. 
359:    1034. 
V.  Hyde  Park,  176  Mass.  101 :  1260, 
1271,  1276,  1277,  1319. 
Pegram  v.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  8 
Miscl.  425:   1664. 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  147  N. 

Y.  135:   182,  923,  1663,  1664. 

V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  59  N. 

Y.  Supr.  Ct.  570:  1664. 

Peify  V.  Mountain  Water  Supply  Co., 

214  Pa.  St.  340:  495,  1569,  1572. 

Peik  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  94  U. 

S.  164:  15,  480. 
Pekin  v.  Brereton,  67  111.  477 :  629. 

V.  Winkel,  77  111.  56:  629. 
Pelham  Manor  v.  New  Rochelle  Wat- 
er Co.,  143  N.  Y.  532 :  336. 
Pell  V.  Northampton  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
L.    R.    2    Ch.    App.    100:     1537, 
1578. 
Pembroke   v.   Canadian   Cent.   R.   R. 
Co.,  3  Ont.  503:  297,  299. 
V.   County   Comrs.,    12   Cush.   351 : 
979    1381. 
Pence  v.'  Bryant,  54  W.  Va.  263:  375, 

395,  406,   1596. 
Penfield  v.  New  York,  115  App.  Div. 
502:  79. 


Peninsular  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Howard,  20 

Mich.   18:    1083. 
Penley,  Complt.,  89  Me.  313:   1200. 
Penley  v.  Me.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  92  Me. 

59:   94. 
Pennell  v.   Card,  96  Me.   392:    1135, 

1519,  1535. 
Penn  Gas  Coal  Co.  v.  Versailles  Fuel 

Gas  Co.,    131    Pa.   St.   522:    439, 

1569. 
Penniman  v.   St.  Johnsbury,   54  Vt. 

306:    212. 
Pennock  v.   Crescent  Pipe  Line   Co., 

170  Pa.  St.  372:   1130. 
Pennoyer   v.   Saginaw,   8  Mich.   296 : 

233. 
Pennsburg  Alley,  12  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  213 : 

1034,  1087. 
Pennsylvania  Coal  Co.  v.  Sanderson, 

113  Pa.  St.  126:  71. 
Pennsylvania   Co.'s  Appeal,   115   Pa. 

St.  529:   1665. 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Bond,  202  111.  95 : 

197,  375,  1596. 
V.  Erie  &  Pittsburgh  R.  R.  Co.,  108 

Pa.  St.  621:  855 
V.  Ohio  Riv.  Junction  R.  R.  Co.,  204 

Pa.  St.  356:  900,  1619. 
V.    Piatt,    47    Ohio    St.    336:    425, 

1546,  1578. 
V.  Plotz,   125  Ind.  26:    881,  883. 
V.  Stanley,  10  Ind.  App.  421:   179, 

190,  319,  372,   382. 
Pennsylvania  Company  for  Insurance 

V.  Pennsylvania  S.  V.  R.  R.  Co., 

151  Pa.  St.  334:  449,  655. 
Pennsylvania  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bun- 
nell, 81   Pa.  St.  414:   995,   1120, 

1139    1317 
V.  Root,  53  N.  J.  L.  253:   1131. 
Pennsylvania  Gas  Coal   Co.  v.   Ver- 
sailles Fuel  Gas  Co.,  131  Pa.  St. 

522:    1496. 
Pennsylvania  Hall,  Matter  of,  5  Pa. 

St.  204:  476. 
Pennsylvania  Mut.   Life   Ins.   Co.   v. 

Heiss,    141    111.    35:    639,    1355, 

1540,  1542,  1544. 
Pennsylvania  Nat.  Gas  Co.  v.  Cook, 

123  Pa.   St.   170:   625. 
Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.'s  Appeal,  128 

Pa.  St.  509:  1067. 
Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.'s  Appeal,  115 

Pa.    St.    514:     640,    1574,    1581, 

1583. 
Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.'s  Appeal,  93 

Pa.  St.  150:   679,  680,  711,  753, 

796,  1010. 
Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.'s  Appeal,  80 

Pa.  St.  265:  760,  831. 
Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.'s  Appeal,  33 

Pa.  Co.  Ct.  251:   1682. 


CCXVl 


OASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.  II,   pp.  743-1719.] 


Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.'s  Appeal,  3 

Walker's  Pa.  Supm.  Ct.  454:  754, 

799,  1387. 
Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Angell,  41 

N.  J.  Eq.  316:  57,  309,  446,  447, 

451,  1583,  1592. 
V.  B.  &  0.  R.  R.  Co.,  60  Md.  263: 

772,  1154,  1173. 
V.  Baltimore  &  0.  R.  R.  Co.,  63  Md. 

263:  427,  756,  762,  772. 
V.  Bogert,  209  Pa.  St.  589:  753. 
V.  Braddock  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  11  Pa., 

Co.  Ct.  163:  771. 
V.    Braddock    Electric   R.    R.    Co., 

152  Pa.  St.  116:  770,  771. 
V.  Bruner,  55  Pa.  St.  318:  1359. 
V.  Chicago,  181  111.  289 :  199,  1618. 
V.  Conshohocken  R.  R.  Co.,  15  Pa. 

Co.  Ct.  454:  771. 
V.  Cooper,  58  Pa.  St.  408:  1324. 
V.  Diehm,   128   Pa.    St.   509:    677, 

679,  1057,  1063,  1068. 
V.  Duncan,  111  Pa.  St.  352:   693. 
V.  Ely,  107  Pa.  St.  166:   952,  961, 

1634,  1635. 
V.  Edgewood,  200  Pa.  St.  45 :  1489. 
V.  Freeport,  138  Pa.  St.  91:   1504. 
V.  Friday,  4  Penny.  158:   1457. 
V.  Greensburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,   176 

Pa.  St.  559:  331. 
v.  Heister,  8  Pa.  St.  445:  1187. 
V.    Inland    Traction    Co.,    25    Pa. 

Super.  Ct.  115:  328. 
V.  Keiffer,  22  Pa.   St.  356:    1097, 

1438. 
V.  Lippincott,  116  Pa.  St.  472:  449, 

640,  655. 
V.  Lutheran  Congregation,  53  Pa. 

St.  445:  923,  994. 
V.  Marchant,  119  Pa.  St.  541:  449, 

640,  655,  656,  664,  665,  666,  668, 

671. 
V.  Miller,  112  Pa.  St.  34:  74,  77, 

1476. 
V.  Miller,  132  U.  S.  75:   26,  267, 

475,  640i  693. 
V.  Montgomery  Co.  Pass.  R.  R.  Co., 

14    Pa.    Co.    Ct.    88:    172,    274, 

1586. 
V.  Montgomery  Co.  Pass.  R.  R.  Co., 

167   Pa.   St.   62:    172,   177,   274, 

282,  1589,   1591. 
V.  National  Docks  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

51  Fed.  858:   768. 
V.  National  Docks  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  56 

Fed.  677:   768. 
V.  National  Docks  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

58  Fed.  929:  768. 
V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  N. 

J.  Eq.  157:   117,  131. 
V.  Parkersburg  etc.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  26 

Pa.  Supr.  Ct.   159:   300. 


Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Pearsoll, 

173  Pa.  St.  496:   835. 
V.  Philadelphia  Belt  R.  R.  Co.,  10 

Pa.  Co.  Ct.  625:  298,  778. 
v.   Philadelphia   Co.,   220   Pa.   St. 

100:  483. 
V.  Porter,  29  Pa.  St.  165:  992,  995. 
V.  Reichert,  58  Md.  261 :  1345. 
V.  Stanley,  10  Ind.  App.  421:  320, 

351. 
V.  Suburban  Rapid  Transit  Co.,  11 

Pa.  Co.  Ct.  591:   771. 
V.   Thompson,   45   N.   J.  Eq.   870: 

446,  1583,  1592. 
V.  Turtle  Creek  Val.  R.  R.  Co.,  179 

Pa.  St.  584:  300,  920. 
V.  Warren  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  188  Pa. 

St.  74:  771. 
Pennsylvania  S.  V.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Clary, 

125  Pa.  St.  442:  940,  1151,  1200, 

1232,  1241,  1242,  1561. 
v.   Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.   Co.,  7 

Pa.  Co.  Ct.  490:   771. 
v.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  157 

Pa.  St.  42:  301,  306,  308,  327. 
v.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  160 

Pa.  St.  232:   753,  778. 
V.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  160 

Pa.  St.  277:  771. 
V.  Reading  Paper  Mills,  149  Pa.  St. 

18:  331,  1595. 
V.  Schuylkill  Nav.  Co.,  167  Pa.  St. 

576   759. 
V.  Wa'lsh,  124  Pa.  St.  544:  641,  664, 

665,  666. 
V.  Ziemer,  124  Pa.  St.  560:    640, 

1147,  1324,  1549,  1651,  1717. 
Pennsylvania  Steel  Co.'s  Appeal,  161 

Pa.  St.  561:  1422. 
Pennsylvania  Telephone  Co.  v.  Hoov- 
er, 27  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  61 :  682. 
V.  Hoover,   24   Pa.   Supr.   Ct.   96: 

679,  709. 

V.  Hoover,  209  Pa.  St.  555:   679, 

680,  709. 

Penny,  In  re,  7  Ellis  &  B.  660:  656. 
Peimy  v.  Commonwealth,  173  Mass. 

507:    1313. 
V.   Penny,  L.  R.  5  Eq.  Cas.  227: 

1257,  1260. 
Penobscot  Log  Driving  Co.  v.  West 

Branch    etc.    Co.,    99    Me.    452: 

1135. 
Penrhyn  Slate  Co.  v.  Granville  Elec. 

L.  &  P.   Co.,  84  App.  Div.  92: 

1603,   1616. 
V.  Granville  Elec.  Light  &  P.  Co., 

181  N.  Y.  80:   1603,  1616. 
Penrice  v.  Wallis,  37  Miss.  172:  1179, 

1571. 
Pensacola  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hyer,  32 

Fla.  539:   96. 
V.  State,  25  Fla.  310:   483. 


CASES    CITED. 


CCXVll 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742;  Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Pensacola  Gas  Co.  v.  Pebley,  25  Fla. 

381:    166. 
Pensacola  Tel.  Co.  v.  Western  Union 
Tel.   Co.,  96  U.  S.   1:   687,  775, 
832. 
People  V.  Adam,  74  App.  Div.  604: 
1411,  1412. 
V.  Adam,  79  App.  Div.  306:   1411, 

1412. 
V.  Adam,  83  App.  Div.  620:   1411, 

1412. 
V.  Adirondack  R.  R.  Co.,  39  App. 

Div.  34:  540. 
v.  Adirondack  R.  R.  Co.,  160  N.  Y. 

225:  1,  9,  21,  540,  675,  736,  743, 

900,  909,  927,  1009,  1164,  1624. 
V.  Allen,  37  App.  Div.  N.  Y.  248: 

1018. 
V.  Atchison  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  217  111. 

594:  197,  398,  400,  406. 
V.  Barnard,  48  Hun  57 :  763. 
V.  Barnard,  110  N.  Y.  548:  763. 
V.  B.  &  0.  R.  R.  Co.,  117  N.  Y.  150: 

9,  743,  744,  1496. 
V.  Beaudry,  91  Cal.  213:  890. 
V.   Blake,   19   Cal.   579:    808,   922, 

1061. 
V.  Blocki,  203  111.  363 :  318,  532. 
V.  Board  of  Assessors,  59  Hun  407 : 

928,  1005,  1013. 
V.  Board  of  Health,  140  N.  Y.  1: 

484. 
V.  Board  of  R.  R.  Comrs.,  4  App. 

Div.  259:  909. 
V.    Board   of   R.    R.    Comrs.,    124 

App.  Div.  47:  920,  1411,  1412. 
V.   Board  of   Supervisors,   33   Cal. 

487:    695. 
T.  Board  of  Trustees,  137  N.  Y.  88: 

912. 
v.  Bowen,  30  Barb.  24:  337,  338. 
V.  Bridges,  142  111.  30:  471. 
v.    Brighton,    20    Mich.    57:    930, 

1086,  1413. 
V.    Brooklyn,    6    Barb.    209:     13, 

1195. 
V.  Brooklyn,  9  Barb.  535:   13. 
V.  Brooklyn,  49  Barb.   136:    1106, 

1107,  1417. 
V.  Brooklyn,  4  N.  Y.  419:   10,  13, 

14,  744. 
V.  Brooklyn,  1  Wend.  318:    1670, 

1678. 
V.  Brown,  47  Hun  459:  1005,  1362. 
V.  Budd,  117  N.  Y.  1:  482. 
V.  Buflfalo,  76  N.  Y.  558:  17. 
V.    Burton,    65    N.   Y.   452:    1029, 

1132. 
V.  Calder,  89  App.  Div.  503:   433. 
V.   Calder,  153  Mich.   724:    740. 


People  V.  Canal  Appraisers,  9  Barb, 
496:    1708. 
V.   Canal  Appraisers,   13  Hun  64 

1401. 
V.  Canal  Appraisers,  33  N.  Y.  461 

105,   106,   117. 
V.  Canal  Appraisers,  13  Wend.  355 

94. 
V.  Canal  Board,  7  Lans.  220:  1374, 

1409,  1515. 
V.  Carman,  47  Hun  380:   1409. 
V.  Central  Union  Tel.  Co.,  192  111. 

307:  359,  410. 
V.  Champion,  16  Johns.  61:   1637. 
V.   Cheritree,   4   N.   Y.    Supm.    Ct. 

289:   1417. 
V.  Chicago  Telephone  Co.,  220  111. 

238:    631,   1623. 
V.  Clean  St.  Co.,  225  111.  470:  199. 
V.  Cline,  23  Barb.  197:   1082. 
V.  Coler,  60  App.  Div.  77:   1324. 
V.   Corer,   168   N.  Y.  644:    1324. 
V.    Collins,    19    Wend.    56:     1364, 

1637. 
V.  Colorado  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.,  8 

Colo.  App.  301 :  1049. 
V.    Commissioners,    27    Barb.    94: 
1058,    1100,    1101,    1515,    1517, 
1638. 
V.  Commissioners,  3  Hill  599 :  1396, 

1402. 
V.    Commissioners,    42    Hun    463: 

1638. 
V.    Commissioners,    16    Mich.    63: 

1033. 
V.   Commissioners,  37  N.  Y.   360: 

778. 
V.  Commissioners,  1  N.  Y.  Supm. 

Ct.  193:   1638,  1670. 
V.  Comrs.  of  Greenbush,  24  Wend. 

367:    1078. 
V.  Commissioners  of  Highways,  53 

Barb.  70:   378,  387,  395. 
V.    Comrs.    of   Highways,    103    111. 

640:   1638. 
V.    Comrs.    of   Highways,    188   III. 

150:  1409. 
V.  Comrs.  of  Highways,  57  N.  Y. 

549:   821. 
V.  Comrs.  of  Highways,  13  Wend. 

310:    1637. 
V.  Comrs.  of  Land  Office,  135  N.  Y. 

447:  105,  122. 
V,  Common   Council,  20  How.  Pr. 

491:   1530,  1678. 
V.  Common  Council,  2  Misc.  7 :  697, 

1531. 
V.  Common  Council,  78  N.  Y.  56: 

1671,   1679. 
V.  Common  Council,  140  N.  Y.  300 : 
697,  1531. 


ccxvm 


CASES    CITED. 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol. 

People  V.  Conner,  46  Barb.  333:  1091. 
V.  County  Court,  28  Hun  14:  1047. 
V.  Co.  Court,  152  N.  Y.  214 :  1412. 
V.   Covert,   1   Hill  674:    1417. 
V.  Crayeroft,  111  Cal.  544:   300. 
V.  Crissman,  41  Colo.  450:  460. 
V.  Curyea,  16  111.  547 :  1637. 
V.  Dains,  38  Hun  43:   1079,  1081, 

1418. 
V.  Davidson,  79  Cal.  166:   889. 
V.   Decatur   etc.   Ry.   Co.,   120   111. 

App.  229:   1622. 
V.  Delany,  120  App.  Div.  801 :  1532. 
V.  Delaware  etc.  Co.,  81  App.  Div. 

335:   781,  1642,  1643. 
V.  Delaware  etc.  Co.,  177  N.  Y.  337 : 

781,  1642,  1643. 
V.  Delaware  etc.  K.  R.  Co.,  11  App. 

Div.  280:    1287. 
V.  Detroit  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  79  Mich. 

471:  491,  1290. 
V.    Detroit    United    Ry.  •  Co.,    134 

Mich.  682:   488. 
V.    District   Court,    11    Colo.    147: 

534,  745,  1470. 
V.  Diver,  19  Hun  263:  1364. 
V.  D'Oench,  111  N.  Y.  359:   468. 
V.  Dodge,  45  Hun  310:   1080. 
V.    Drain   Comrs.,    40    Mich.    745: 

1415,   1416,    1417. 
V.  Eaton,  100  Mich.  208 :  341. 
V.    Eel   River   etc.    R.   R.    Co.,    98 

Cal.  665:  881,  883. 
V.    Eggleston,    13    How.    Pr.    123: 

1069. 
V.  Eldredge,  3  Hun  541:  1196. 
V.  Ellison,  115  App.  Div.  254:  361, 

489. 
V.    Ellison,    188    N.   Y.    523:    361, 

489. 
V.  Ferris,  41  Barb.  121:  1107. 
V.  Ferris,  36  N.  Y.  218:    1421. 
V.  First  Judge  of  Columbia,  2  Hill 

398:   1083,  1418. 
V.  Fisher,  116  App.  Div.  677:  806, 

813 
V.  Fisher,  190  N.  Y.  468:   7,  672, 

675,  1061,  1064. 
V.  Fitch,  78  Hun  321:   1531. 
V.  Fitch,  147  N.  Y.  355:  609,  1531, 

1532. 
V.  Ft.  Wayne  &  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  92 

Mich.  522:  272,  277,  313. 
V.  Foss,  80  Mich.  559:   1486,  1489. 
V.  Friend,  233  111.  572:   398. 
V.  Gallagher,  4  Mich.  244:   23. 
V.   Gardner,   24  N.  Y.   583:    1358, 

1515. 
V.  General  Electric  Ry.  Co.,  172  HI. 

129:  1618. 
V.   Geneva   etc.   Traction   Co.,   112 
App.  Div.  581 :  491. 


I,   pp.    1-742;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.1 

People  V.  Geneva  etc.   Traction  Co., 

186  N.  Y.  516:   491. 
V.   Gillson,    109    N.   Y.    389:    479, 

480. 
V.   Gilon,   76  Hun  346:    609,   619, 

1095,  1365. 
V.  Gilon,  121  N.  Y.  551:  609,  1005, 

1013,  1417. 
V.  Gloversville,  128  App.  Div.  44: 

879,  1327. 
V.    Goodwin,    5    N.    Y.    568:    820, 
,  1418. 
V.  Grand  Appraisers,  9  Barb.  496: 

1707. 
V.  Gray,  49  Hun  465:   1005,  1013. 
V.  Green,  85  App.  Div.  400:   471, 

1532    1533. 
V.  Griswold,  67  N.  Y.  59:  1637. 
V.    Griswold,   2   N.   Y.    Supm.   Ct. 

351:  1637. 
V.  Haines,  49  N.  Y.  587:   437. 
V.  Hamburg,   58  Misc.   643:    1532, 

1637. 
V.  Harris,  203  111.  272:    197,  199, 

373. 
V.  Harris,  63  N.  Y.  391:    1406. 
V.  Haverstraw,  80  Hun  385:   927, 

1164,  1167. 
V.  Haverstraw,  137  N.  Y.  88:  911. 
V.  Hawley,  3  Mich.  330:    14,  477. 
V.  Hayden,  6  Hill  359:  1532. 
V.  Hesterberg,  184  N.  Y.  126:  471. 
V.  Hibernia  S.  &  L.  Soc,  84  Cal. 

634:  877. 
V.  Hildreth,  126  N.  Y.  360:   1412, 

1413. 
V.  Hinds,  30  N.  Y.  470:  1100. 
V.   Highway   Comrs.,   88   111.    141 

1532. 
V.  Highway  Comrs.,  14  Mich.  528 

1033. 
V.  Highway  Comrs.,  15  Mich.  347 

701. 
V.  Highway  Comrs.,  16  Mich.  63 

1516. 
V.  Highway  Comrs.,  35  Mich.  15 

376,   386,  388,  391. 
V.  Highway  Comrs.,  38  Mich.  247 

1027. 
V.  Highway  Comrs.,  40  Mich.  165 

1032,   1420. 
V.  Highway  Comrs.,  13  Wend.  310 

1362. 
V.  Horton,  8  Hun  357:  821. 
V.  Hulbert,  131  Mich.  156:  73,  74, 

137. 
V.  Hyde  Park,  117  HI.  462:   1673. 
V.  Hynds,  30  N.  Y.  470:   1102. 
V.  Ingham  Co.,  20  Mich.  95:   384, 

387,  888,  406. 
T.  Jefferds,  2  Hun  149:   1533. 


CASES    CITED. 


CCXIX 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol:   I,   pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


People  V.  Jefferson  Co.  Ct.,  55  N.  Y. 

604:    579. 
V.  Jessup,  28  App.  Div.  524:  96. 
V.  Jessup,   160  N.  Y.  249:   96. 
V.  Johnson,  237  111.  237:  886,  887, 

888. 
V.  Jones,  63  N.  Y.  306:   1069. 
V.  Jones,   2   N.   Y.   Supr.   Ct,   360: 

917,  1058. 
V.   Judge  of  Recorder's   Court,   40 

Mich.  64:  969,  1638. 
V.  Judges  of  Dutchess  County,  23 

Wend.  360:  821,  1419. 
V.  Keating,  62  App.  Div.  348 :  357. 
V.  Keating,  168  N.  Y.  390:  357. 
V.  Kerr,  37  Barb.  357:   268. 
T.  Kerr,  27   N.  Y.   188:    178,   196, 

197,  198,  298,  321. 
V.  Kimball,  4  Mich.  95:   24. 
T.  Kingman,  24  N.  Y.  599:   821. 
V.  Kniskern,  50  Barb.  87:  1517. 
V.  Kniskern,  54  N.  Y.  52 :   1017. 
V.  La  Grange,  2  Mich.   187:    1025, 

1325. 
V.  Lake  County,  33  Cal.  487:  701, 

1370. 
V.    Lake    Shore    etc.    Ry.    Co.,    52 

Mich.  277:  490. 
V.  Lake  St.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  54  111. 

App.   348:    1623. 
V.    Landreth,    1    Hun    544:     1083, 

1416. 
V.  Law,  34  Barb.  494:  268.  1586. 
T.    Law,    22    How.    Pr.    109:    247, 

1580. 
y.  Lawrence,   54  Barb.   589:    1405. 
V.  Lee,  29  Hun  216:  1404. 
V.    Leonard,    87    App.    Div.    269: 

611. 
▼.  Lewis,  26  How.  Pr.  378:    1389. 
V.  Loew,  39  Hun  490:   1155. 
V.  Loew,   102   N.  Y.  471:    1155. 
V.  Lowell,  9  Mich.  144:   1531,  1532. 
V.  Lyon,  114  App.  Div.  583:  1177, 

1229. 
v.    Lyon,    186    N.    Y.    545:     1177, 

1229. 
V.  Marin  Co.,   103  Cal.  223:    889. 
v.  Marshall,  6  111.  672:   23. 
V.  May,  27  Barb.  238 :   1402. 
V.  Marx,  99  N.  Y.  376:   478. 
V.  McCarthy,  102  N.  Y.  630:   1139. 
V.  McGann,  34  Hun  358:  478. 
V.  McDonald,  69  N.  Y.  362 :  734. 
V.  McRoberts,  62  111.  38:    1162. 
V.  Michigan  Southern  R.  R.  Co.,  3 

Mich.  496:  922,  1164,  1166,  1497, 

1707,  1708. 
V.  Miller,  82  Cal.  153:   1018,  1513, 

1571. 
V.  Morgan,  97  App.  Div.  267 :  1531. 


People  v.  Morrison,  54  App.  Div.  262 : 

1360. 
V.  Morrison,   165  N.  Y.  644:    1360. 
V.  Mosier,  56  Hun  64:   1412,  1420. 
V.   Mould,   37    App.   Div.    35:    122, 

1618. 
v.  Mott,  2  Hun  672:   1106. 
V.  Mott,  60  N.  Y.  649:   1106. 
V.  Muh,    101   App.   Div.   423:    610. 
v.  Muh,  183  N.  Y.  540:   610. 
v:  Murray,  5  Hill  468:   1535. 
V.  Mutual  Gas  Lt.  Co.,   38   Mich. 

154:    1623. 
V.  Myers,  73  Hun  43:   1531. 
V.  Nearing,  27  N.  Y.  306 :  564,  568, 

579. 
V.   Newton,    112   N.   Y.    396:    269, 

304. 
V.  New  York  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  45 

Barb.  73:  715,  728. 
V.  New  York  Central  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

61  App.  Div.  494:   1484. 
V.  New  York  Central  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

156  N.  Y.  570:  750. 
V.  New  York  Central  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

168  N.  Y.  187:   1484. 
V.  O'Brien,  111  N.  Y.  1:   302,  426, 

762,  1502. 
V.   Osborn,    32   N.   Y.    Supp.    358: 

867,  870. 
V.    Osborn,   20    Wend.    186:    1404, 

1405. 
V.  Otis,  90  N.  Y.  48:   66. 
V.  Palmer,  52  N.   Y.  83:    1087. 
v.  Park  etc.  R.  R.  Co,  76  Cal.  156: 

421,   1494. 
V.  Parks,  58  Cal.  624 :  572. 
V.  PfeiiTer,  59  Cal.  89:  1423. 
V.  Phillips,  88  App.  Div.  560:  610. 
V.  Pitt,  64  App.  Div.  316:  464. 
V.  Pitt,  169  N.  Y.  521:   II,  464. 
V.   Pittsburgh  R.  R.   Co.,   53   Cal. 

694:   529. 
V.  Piatt,  17  Johns.  195:  486. 
V.  Pope,  53  Cal.  437:  1491. 
V.  Porter,  26  Hun  622:  459. 
V.  Port  Jervis,  100  N.  Y.  283:  972. 
V.  Potter,  36  Hun  181 :    1081. 
V.  Reed,  81  Cal.  70:  877,  884. 
V.  Rierecker,  58  App.  Div.  391 :  479. 
V.  Rierecker,  169  N.  Y.  53 :  479. 
V.    Robertson,    17    How.    Pr.    74: 

1018. 
V.  Robinson,  29  Barb.  77:   941. 
V.  Rochester,  50  N.  Y.  525:  681. 
V.  Rock  Island,  215  111.  488:   1492. 
V.  Ruby,  59  111.  App.  653:   1638. 
V.   Ruthruff,   40  Mich.   175:    1032, 

1420. 
V.  St.  Lawrence,  5  Cow.  292:  1531, 

1532. 


ccxx 


CASES    CITED. 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol 

People  V.  St.  Louis,  5  Gil.  351 :   103. 
V.  Salem,  1  Cow.  23:  1637. 
V.  Salem,  20  Mich.  452:   524,  684. 
v.  Sanitary  District,  210  111.  171: 


San  Luis  Obispo,  116  Cal.  617: 

83,  1604. 

Sass,  171  111.  357:  1532. 

Scio,  3  Mich.  121:  1532. 

Schuyler,  69  N.  Y.  242:    ]531, 

1532. 

Scott,  8  Hun  566:  1084. 

Severance,  125  Mich.  556;   127. 

Silberwood,  110  Mich.  103:   108, 

140. 

Simon,  176  111.  165:  460. 

Smith,  15  111.  326:   1401. 

Smith,  7  Hun   17:    1034,   1420. 

Smith,  21  N.  Y.  595:  503,  675, 

923,  1008. 

South  Park  Comrs.,  221  111.  522: 

297. 

Sperry,  116  Cal.  593:  881. 

Springfield,  12  Mich.  434:   1382. 

Springwells,  13  Mich.  462 :  1069. 
Stedman,    57    Hun   280:    1017, 

1420. 

Stillings,  75  App.  Div.  569 :  735, 
1719. 

Stillings,  76  App.  Div.  143:  735, 

1719. 

Stillings,    124   App.   Div.   195: 

1411,  1412. 

Stuart,  97  111.  123:  862. 

Suburban   R.   R.    Co.,    178    111. 
594:    302. 

Supervisors,  3  Barb.  332:  24. 

Suprs.  of  Westchester,  4  Barb. 
64:  697. 

Supervisors,  12  Barb.  446:   24. 

Supervisors,  32  Barb.  473 :  1358, 
1638. 

Supervisors,  36  How.  Pr.  544: 
1023. 

Supervisors,  26  Mich.  22:  564. 

Supervisors  of  Richmond  Coun- 
ty, 20N.  Y.  252:  829. 

Supervisors,   (N.  Y.  Supm.)   35 
N.  Y.  Supp.  91:  914. 

Supervisors,  7  Wend.  530:  1409, 
1638. 

Supervisors   of  Oneida  County, 
19  Wend.  102 :  437. 
Sutter  St.  Ry.  Co.,  117  Cal.  604: 
1623. 

Syracuse,  63  N.  Y.  291:    1083, 
1087. 

Syracuse,   78   N.   Y.    56:    1671, 
1679. 

Talmage,  46  Hun  603 :   1419. 
Taylor,  34  Barb.  481 :  979,  1087. 
Thayer,  63  N.  Y.  348:   1511. 


I,   pp.    1-742;   Vol.   II,    pp.   743-1719.) 

People   V.    Thompson,    65    How.    Pr. 

407:   344. 
V.   Thompson,    67    How.   Pr.   491: 

779. 
V.  Thompson,  98  N.  Y.  6:  779,  793. 
V.   Thornton,   122   App.   Div.   287: 

952,  961. 
V.   Tallman,   36   Barb.   222:    1004, 

1010,  1013. 
V.  Township  Board,  2  Mich.  187 

1531,  1532. 
V.  Township  Board,  25  Mich.  153 

738. 
V.  Township  Board,  38  Mich.  558 

1033. 
V.  Toynbee,  2  Parker  (N.  Y.)  490; 

23. 
V.  Trustees,  137  N.  Y.  88:  914. 
V.  Underbill,  144  N.  Y.  316:  878, 

890. 
V.  Union  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  Colo. 

186:   487. 
V.    Van    Alstyne,    32    Barb.    131: 

1418. 
V.  Van  Alstyne,  3  Keyes  35:  513. 
V.  Van  Brunt,  99  App.  Div.  564: 

1419. 
V.  Wallace,  4  N.  Y.   Supreme  Ct. 

438:  1412. 
v.  Walsh,  96  111.  232:   357. 
V.   Wasson,   64   N.   Y.    167:    1639, 

1640. 
V.  West  Chicago  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  115 

111.  172:   488. 
V.  Westchester  Suprs.,  4  Barb.  64: 

1681. 
V.  Whitaker,  101  Cal.  597:   1364. 
V.  White,  11  Barb.  26:   808,  1500. 
V.  Whitney's  Point,  32  Hun  508: 

915,  978,   1018,  1381. 
V.  Whitney's  Point,  102  N.  Y.  81: 

1381    1532 
V.    Wieboldt,'  233    111.    572:    396, 

406. 
V.  Williams,  51  111.  63:  1162,  1194. 
V.  Williams,  36  N.  Y.  441:   1100, 

1102. 
V.  Wolverine  Mfg.  Co.,   141  Mich. 

455:    890. 
V.   Zoll,  97  N.   Y.   203:    609,  618, 

1718. 
People's  Elec.  L.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Capital 

Gas  &  Elec.  Lt.  Co.,  116  Ky.  76: 

408,  412. 
People's  Gas  Lt.  Co.  v.  Jersey  City 

Gas  Lt.  Co.,  46  N.  J.  L.  297 :  338, 

1621,  1666. 
People's  Nat.  Gas.  Co.  i-.  Pittsburgh, 

1  Pa.   Co.   Ct.   311:    1621. 
People's  Passenger  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bald- 
win, 14  Phila.  231 :  732. 


OASES    CITED. 


CCXXl 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


People's  Passenger  Ey.  Co.  v.  Market 
St.  Pass.   E.  E.   Co.,   8  Pa.  Co. 
Ct.  273:  717. 
V.  Maschall  St.  E.  E.  Co.,  20  Phila. 

203:  910. 
V.  Union  Pass.  E.  E.  Co.,  15  Pa. 
Co.  Ct.  498:   764. 
People's  E.   E.   Co.,  Matter  of,   112 
N.  Y.  578:  922. 
V.  Grand  Ave.  E.  E.  Co.,  149  Mo. 

245:   1446. 
V.  Memphis   E.   E.   Co.,    10  Wall. 
38:  298,  301. 
People's  Eapid  Transit  Co.  v.  Dash, 

125  N.  Y.  93:  267,  268,  719. 
People's  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  Berks  etc. 
Turnpike  Eoad  Co.,  23  Pa.  Co. 
Ct.  401:   682. 
Peoria  v.  Kidder,  26  111.  351:  12. 
Peoria   Co.  v.   Harvey,   18   111.  364: 

1400. 
Peoria  etc.  Ey.  Co.  v.  Barnum,  107 
111.   160:    1108:    1112. 
V.   Barton,   38   111.  App.   469:    92, 

1639. 
V.  Birhett,  62  111.   332:   24,  1246. 
V.  Black,  58  111.  33:   1409. 
V.  Bryant,  57  111.  473:  1136,  1311. 
V.  Lansie,  63  111.  264:   1136. 
V.  Mitchell,  74  111.  394:  1392. 
V.   Peoria   etc.   E.   E.   Co.,   66  111. 

174:   754,  799,  1392. 
V.  Peoria  &  F.  Ry.   Co.,    105   III. 

110:   1047,  1246. 
T.  Rice,  75  111.  329:   965,   1673. 
V.  Sawyer,  71  111.  361:  994,  1109, 

1310,  1311,  1312. 
V.  Schertz,  84  111.  135:  1581. 
V.   Warner,   61   111.   52:    999,   1004, 
1010,  1013,  1014,  1015. 
Peoria    etc.   Traction   Co.   v.   Vance, 
225  111.  270:   1195. 
V.  Vance,  234  111.  36:    1121,  1122, 
1127,    1131,    1260,    1267,     1268, 
1361. 
Peoria   Gaslight   etc.    Co.   v.   Peoria 
Terminal  R.  E.  Co.,  146  111.  372 : 
1109,  1147,  1148. 
Pepin  V.  Elizabeth,  57  N.  J.  L.  653: 

1324. 
Pepper  v.  Union  Ey.  Co.,  113  Tenn. 

53:   313,  1582,  1591. 
Pere  Marquette  E.  R.   Co.  v.  U.  S. 
Gypsum  Co.,   (Mich.)   117  N.  W. 
733:    533. 
Perkins   v.    Fielding,    119    Mo.    149: 
881,  883,  884. 
V.    Haywood,    132    Ind.    95:     1029, 

1444. 
V.  Jewett,  11  Allen  9:  879. 
T.  Maine  Central  R.  E.  Co.,  72  Me. 
95:   858,  1636. 


Perkins  v.  Morrestown  etc.  Turnpike 

Co.,  48  N.  J.  Eq.  499:  422,  1617. 

V.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  103  Mo. 

54:  475 
V.    St.   Louis   etc  R.   E.   Co.,    143 
Mo.  513:    1435. 
Perkiomen  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bromer,  217 

Pa.  St.  263:   850. 
Perley  v.  B.  G.  &  M.  R.  R  Co.,  57 
N.  H.  212:   1446. 
V.  Chandler,  6  Mass.  454:   1488. 
Perrine   v.   Farr,   22   N.   J.   L.    356: 
515,  1156. 
y.  Pa.  E.  E.  Co.,  72  N.  J.  L.  398: 
319,  351,  847,  1356,  1452. 
Perry  v.  Board  of  Supervisors,   133 
la.  281:   1638. 
V.  Lehigh  Val.  E.  E.  Co.,  9  Miscl. 

515:   1457,  1476. 
V.  New  Orleans  M.  &  C.  E.  E.  Co., 

55  Ala.  413:  248,  298. 
V.  Oregon,  139  111.  App.  606:  485. 
V.  Pennsylvania   S.  V.  E.  R.  Co., 

2  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  59:    1399. 
V.  Sherborn,  11  Cush.  388:  996. 
V.  Webb,  21  La.  An.  247:  516. 
V.  Wilkes-Barre  &  K.  Pass.  R.  R. 
Co.,  4   Luzerne   Leg.   Rep.   519: 
277,  642. 
V.  Wilson,  7  Mass.  393:   100,  679, 

680. 
V.  Worcester,  6  Gray  544:  87,  236. 
Perry  County  R.  R.  Extension  Co.  v. 
Newport  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  150  Pa. 
St.  193:  771. 
Perrysburg  Canal  &  Hydraulic  Co.  v. 
Fitzgerald,  10  Ohio  St.  513:  24. 
Peru  V.  Barrett,   100  Me.  213:   412, 
413. 
V.  Brown,  10  Ind.  App.  597:   143. 
Peters  v.  Fergus  Falls,  35  Minn.  549 : 
67,  153. 
V.  Griffee,  108  Ind.  121:  1030. 
v.  Hastings  &  Dakota  Ry.  Co.,  19 

Minn.  260:   1400. 
V.   Lewis,  28   Wash.   366:    155. 
Petersburg  R.  R.   Co.  v.  Burtons,   1 

Va.  Dec.  397:   247. 
Petersburg  School  Dist.  v.  Peterson, 
14    N.    D.    344:    711,    713,    911, 
1225,    1229,    1236,    1271,    1435, 
1436. 
Peterson,   Matter    of,   94   App.    Div. 

143:    929. 
Peterson  v.  Beha,  161  Mo.  513:  983. 
V.  Brown,  22  Utah  43 :   1635. 
V.  Ferreby,  30  la.  327 :  1463,  1464. 
V.  Fisher,  71  Neb.  238:  973,  1018, 

1513. 
V.  Hopewell,  55  Neb.  670:  1571. 
V.  Navy  Yard  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  5  Phila. 
199:  268. 


CCXXll 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Peterson    v.    Santa    Rosa,    119    Cal. 

387:    83,    1604. 
V.   Smith,   6   Wash.    163:    926. 
V.  Waltham,  150  Mass.  564:   1523. 
Peter  Townsend,  Matter  of,  39  N.  Y. 

171:   496,  522,  684. 
Petrie  v.  Milwaukee  Lt.  H.  &  T.  Co., 

134  Wis.  394:  284. 
Pettengill  v.  County  Comrs.,  21  Me. 

377:  976. 
Pettersou  v.  Waske,  45  Wash.  307: 

868. 
Pettibone  v.  Hamilton,  40  Wis.  402: 

375,  400,  406,  878,  1596. 
V.   LaCroase   &   Milwaukee   R.    R. 

Co.,  14  Wis.  443:   1537. 
Pettigrew  v.  Evausville,  25  Wis.  223: 

233. 
Pettis  V.  Providence,   11  R.  I.  372: 

1036. 
Pettit   T.    Grand   Junction,    119    la. 

352:  356,  1659. 
V.  Macon,  95  Ga.  645:  881. 
Pewaukee  v.   Savoy,    103  Wis.   271: 

131. 
Peyser  v.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co., 

13  N.  Y.  C.  P.  122:    1295. 
V.  New  York  Elevated  R.  R.  Co., 

12  Abb.  New  Cases  276 :  263. 
Peyton  v.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co., 

62  Hun  536:   1304. 
Pfaender  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  86 

Minn.  218:   1382,  1514,  1628. 
Pfeifer  v.  Sheboygan  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

18  Wis.  155 :  1540,  1542. 
Pfeififer  v.  Brown,  165  Pa.  St.  267: 

79,  84. 
Pflegar  v.  Hastings  &  D.  Ry.  Co.,  28 

Minn.  510:   1310. 
Pfleger,  In  re,  L.  R.  6  Eq.  426:  1254, 

1557. 
Pfoutz  V.  Penn.  Telephone  Co.,  24  Pa. 

Supr.  Ct.   105:    679,  709. 
Phelps   V.    Detroit,    120   Mich.    447: 

227,   236,  319,   325,   1650,   1656. 
V.  Lake  St.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  165  111. 

526:   1585. 
V.  Lake  St.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  60  111. 

App.  471:   1585. 
V.  Morehouse,  12  La.  An  649:  409. 
Phifer  v.  Carolina  Central  R.  R.  Co., 

72  N.  C.  433:    1407,  1410,  1431, 

1571. 
V.   Cox,  21  Ohio  St.  248:    1491. 
Philadelphia  v.  Citizens'  Pass  R.  R. 

Co.,  151  Pa.  St.  128:   304. 
V.  Comrs.  of  Fairmount  Park,   16 

Pa.  Co.  Ct.  625:  421. 


Philadelphia  v.  Dickson,  38  Pa.  St. 

247:    1626,  15^0.  1682. 
V.  Dyer,  41  Pa.  be.  463:  949,  1261, 

1323,  1325,  1530. 
V.  Empire  Passenger  R.  R.  Co.,  3 

Brews.  547:  255. 
V.  Fairmount  Park  Comrs.,  16  Pa. 

Co.   Ct.   625:    1494. 
V.  Field,  58  Pa.  St.  320:  23. 
V.  McManes,  175  Pa.  St.  28:  421. 
V.  Penn.  Hospital,  143  Pa.  St.  367 : 

13. 
V.  Phila.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  7  Pa.  Co. 

Ct  390:   322. 
V.  Phila.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  58  Pa.  St. 

253:   1492. 
V.  Phila.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  Phil. 

507:  322,  717,  1622. 
V.  Randolph,  4  W.  &  S.  514:  235, 

236. 
V.  River  Front  R.  R.  Co.,  173  Pa. 

St.  334:   299. 
V.  Rudderow,  166  Pa.  St.  241:  630, 

634,  636,  1187,  1308. 
V.   Scott,  81   Pa.  St.   80:    15,  491, 

492. 
V.   Scott,   9   Phila.    171:    491. 
V.   Slocum,    14   Phil.    141:    347. 
V.    Thirteenth    etc.    R.    R.    Co.,    8 

Phil.    648:    1587. 
V.   Ward,    174   Pa.    St.   45:    1063, 

1486. 
V.  Wiskey,  68  Pa.  St.  49:  1325. 
V.   Wright,    100   Pa.   St.   235:    26, 

612. 
Philadelphia  Ball  Club  v.  Philadel- 
phia, 182  Pa.  St.  362:  1308. 
V.   Phila.,   192   Pa.   St.  632,   1306, 

1308. 
Philadelphia  etc.  Ferry  Co.  v.  Inter 

City  Link  R.  R.  Co.,  73  N.  J.  L. 

86:    527,  782,  994,   1047. 
Philadelphia  &  Gray's  Ferry  Passen- 
ger Ry.  Go's  Appeal,  102  Pa.  St. 

123:  729,  791. 
Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  6  Whart- 
on 25 :  243,  248,  255,  1419. 
Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.'s  Appeal 

1  Montg.  Co.  L.  Rep.   129:   182. 
Philadelphia    etc.    Ry.    Go's   Appeal, 

102  Pa.  St.  123:  411. 
Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.'s  Appeal, 

120  Pa.  St.  90:  781. 
Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.'s  Appeal, 

187  Pa.  St.  123:  755. 
Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.'s  Appeal, 

2  Walker's  Pa.  Supm.  Ct.  243: 
771. 

Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.'s  Appeal, 
2  Walker's  Supm.  Ct.  Rep.  291: 
182,  246,  248. 


CASES    CITED. 


CCXXHl 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.'s  Appli- 
cation, 7  Phila.  461:    1467. 
Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Go's.  Petition, 

32  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  337:  716. 
Phidadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Berks 

County,     2     Woodward's     Decs. 

361:  301,  306,  327. 
T.  Cake,  95  Pa.  St.  139:    1359. 
V.  Cooper,  105  Pa.  St.  239:    1160, 

1627. 
V.   Davis,   68   Md.   281:    145,    152, 

159. 
T.  Getz,  105  Pa.  St.  547:   1277. 
V.  Getz,  113  Pa.  St.  214:   1277. 
V.  Johnson,   2  Whart.   275:    1436, 

1438. 
V.  Lawrence,  10  Phila.  604:    1481. 
V.   Obert,   109  Pa.   St.   193:    1135. 
V.  Patterson,  3  Walker's  Pa.  Sup. 

Ct.   143:    1152. 
V.  Pennsylvania  S.  V.   R.  E.  Co., 

151  Pa.  St.  569:    1565. 
V.  Pennsylvania  etc.  R.  R,  Co.,  16 

Phila.  636:   760. 
V.  Pennsylvania  S.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  7 

Pa.  Co.  Ct.  381:  771. 
V.  Pennsylvania  S.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  7 

Pa.   Co.   Ct.   491:    771. 
T.   Philadelphia,   47   Pa.    St.    325: 

492. 
T.  Philadelphia,  9  Phila.  563:  746, 

750. 
T.   Pottsville  Water   Co.,   182   Pa. 

St.  418:  73. 
T.   Railroad   Co.,    12    Pa.    Co.    Ct. 

513:  982,   1262,  1342. 
T.    Rogers,    2    Walker's    Pa.    Sup. 

275:   1315,  1316,  1339. 
V.  Shipley,  72  Md.  88:  1393. 
V.  Smick,  2  Whart.  273:  1408. 
y.  Smith,  64  Fed.  679:  93. 
T.  Trimble,  4  Wharton,  47:    1311, 

1365. 
V.  Williams,  54  Pa.  St.  103:   731, 

823. 
Philadelphia  etc.  St.  Ry.  Co.'s  Peti- 
tion, 203  Pa.  St.  354:  427,  529, 

763,  788,  1424. 
Philadelphia  Trust  etc.  Co.  v.  Mer- 

chantville,  75  N.  J.  L.  451 :  824, 

898,  1068. 
Philbrick  v.  University  Place,  106  la. 

352:    892. 
Phillips  v.  Am.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  71 

S.  C.  571:   1252,  1457,  1636. 
V.    Council    Bluffs,    63    la.    576 

1597. 
V.    County    Comrs.,    83    Me.    541 

1384,  1415. 
V.  County  Comrs.,  122  Mass.  258 

733. 


Phillips  V.  Dunkirk,  Warren  &  Pitta 
burgh  R.  R.  Co.,  78  Pa.  St.  177 
248. 
V.  Hutchinson,  34  Ind.  App.  486 

1510. 
V.    Marblehead,     148    Mass.     326 

U27. 
V.    New   York   El.    R.    R.    Co.,    14 

App.  Div.  595:    1426. 
V.  Pease,  39  Cal.  582:   1324,  1325, 

1423. 
V.  Phila.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  184  Pa.  St. 

537:    1244. 
V.  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  130  N.  C. 
513:  22,  24,  425,  966,  1473,  1546, 
15.59. 
V.    St.   Claire   Inclined   Plane   Co., 

153  Pa.  St.  230:  880,  1523. 
V.  St.  Clair  Inclined  Plane  Co.,  166 

Pa.   St.  21:    1210. 
V.    Scales    Mound,    195    111.    353: 
679,   706,  708,   989,   1174,   1227, 
1229. 
V.  Sherman,  61  Me.  548:  954. 
V.  Sherman,  64  Me.  171:  80,  81. 
V.  South  Park  Commissioners,  119 

111.  626:   1162,  1320,  1325. 
V.    Thompson,    1    Johns.    Ch.    131: 

827,  829,  858. 
V.  Tucker,  3  Met.   (Ky.)   69:   1082, 

1363. 
V.  Watson,  63  la.  28 :  532. 
Phillip  Trusts,   In   re,  L.   E.   6  Eq. 

250:   1254,  1557. 
Phinizy  v.  City  Council  of  Augusta, 

47  Ga.   260:    144. 
Phipps  V.  Kansas  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  58 
Kan.  142:  959. 
V.    North    Pelham,    61    App.    Div. 

442:    610,  618. 
V.   West  Maryland   R.   R.   Co.,   66 
Md.  319:  200,  242,  247. 
Phoenix   v.    Gannon,    123   App.   Div. 

93:   358,  361. 
Phoenix    Water    Co.    v.    Phoenix,    9 

Ariz.  430:   408,  409. 
Phyfe  V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co., 

11  Miscl.   70:    1301. 
Piatt    V.     Covington     &     Cincinnati 

Bridge  Co.,  8  Bush  31 :  409. 
Pichon  V.  Martin,  35  Ind.  App.  167: 

1192,   1201,   1207. 
Pick  V.   Rubicon  Hydraulic   Co.,   27 

Wis.  433:   937,  1180. 
Pickens  v.  Coal  Riv.  Boom  &  T.  Co., 
58  W.  Va.  11:  92,  94,  1651,  1653, 
1668. 
Pickerill  v.  Louisville,  125  Ky.  213: 

145,  153,  494,  1661. 
Pickering    v.    State,    106    Ind.    228: 

1018,   1514. 
Pickering's  Lessee  v.  Rutty,  1  S.  &  R. 
511:   590. 


CCXXIV 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references   are  to  the  pages:  Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;  Vol.  II,   pp.  743-1719.) 


Pickert  v.  Richfield  Park  R.  R.  Co., 

25  N.  J.  Eq.  316:  1579. 
Pickett  V.  Toledo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  131 

Ind.  562:   1714. 
Pickford  v.  Lynn,  98  Mass.  491:  1030, 

1420. 
Pickles   V.   Ansonia,    76   Conn.   278: 

601,  618,  619,  1307,  1718. 
Pickman  v.  Peabody,  145  Mass.  480: 

723. 
Pickneyville    v.    Hutchinga,    63    111. 
App.  137:  91,  1548,  1653. 
V.    Rhine,    63    111.   App.    139:    91, 
1648,  1653. 
Pickup  V.  Phila.  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  29  Pa. 

Super.  Ct.  631:  309. 
Piedmont  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Speelman, 

67  Md.  260:  712,  1568,  1577. 
Pierce  v.  Boston,  164  Mass.  92:  1121, 
1141. 
V.  Boston  &  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  141  Mass 

481:    1474,   1482. 
V.    Chicago   etc.   Elee.   R.    R.   Co., 

(Wis.)   119  N.  W.  297:  1332. 
V.    County    Comrs.,    63    Me.    252: 

1358. 
T.  Drew,  136  Mass.  75:   337,  341, 

342,  534,  1593. 
V.  Gibson  County,  107  Tenn.  224: 

141,  453,  1605,  1606. 

V.  Roberts,  57  Conn.  31:  877,  1618. 

y.  Somersworth,  10  N.  H.  369 :  422. 

v.  Worcester  &  Nashua  R.  R.  Co., 

105  Mass.  199:  1314. 

Piercy  v.  Morris,  2  Iredell  Law  168: 

1406. 
Pier  No.  15,  Matter  of,  95  App.  Div. 

501:    1262. 
Pier  39,  Matter  of,  62  App.  Div.  271: 

1258. 
Pier  39,  Matter  of,  168  N.  Y.  254: 

1258. 
Pierpont   v.    Harrisville,    9    W.    Va. 

215:    1569,  1574. 
Pierson  v.   Boston  El.  Ry.  Co.,   191 
Mass.    223:     1120,    1146,    1152, 
1297,  1304. 
V.  Speyer,  178  N.  Y.  270:  71. 
Pike  Tp.  Road,  30  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  644 : 

1101. 
Pile  V.  Pile,  3  L.  R.  Ch.  D.  36:  1563. 
Pillsbury  v.  Alexander,  40  Neb.  242 : 
878 
V.  Brown,  82  Me.  450:  867,  870. 
V.  Springiaeld,  16  N.  H.  565:   1374, 
1670. 
Pinchin  v.  London  &  Blackwall  Ry. 
Co.,  5  DeG.  McN.  &  G.  851:  823. 
V.  London  &  Blackwall  Ry.  Co.,  24 
L.  J.  N.  S.  Ch.  417:  813. 
Pine  V.  New  York,  76  Fed.  418:  1603. 


Pine  V.  New  York,  103  Fed.  337 :  74, 

169,   1603,  1617. 
V.  New  York,  112  Fed.  98:  74,  169, 

1603,   1617. 
Pine  Bluflf  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Kelly,  78 

Ark.  83:   1252,  1669,  1671,  1672. 
Pine  Grove  v.  Talcott,  19  Wall.  606 : 

462. 
Pingree  v.  Co.  Comrs.,  30  Me.  351: 

706,   1358,  1420. 
Pingrey  v.  Cherokee  &  D.  R.  R.  Co., 

78   la.    438:     1128,    1252,    1311, 

1314,  1315. 
Pinkerton  v.  Boston  &  Albany  R.  R. 

Co.,  109  Mass.  257 :  939. 
Pinkham   v.    Chelmsford,    109   Mass. 

225:    1119,   1128,   1240,  1633. 
Pinkstaff  v.  Steffy,  216  111.  406:  146. 
Pinney  v.  Winstead,  79  Conn.  606: 

1097,    1098,    1135,    1520,    1568, 

1573. 
Pinnix  v.  Lake  Drummond  Canal  Co., 

132  N.   C.   124:    153,   439. 
PioUet  V.  Simmons,  106  Pa.  St.  95: 

1486,  1487. 
Pion  V.  North  Shore  R.  R.  Co.,  14 

Duvall  677:   129. 
Piper  V.  Connersville  &  Liberty  Turn- 
pike Co.,  12  Ind.  400:  923,  1100. 
V.  Union  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  14  Kan. 

568:   1345. 
Pipkin  V.  Wynns,  2  Dev.  (N.  C.)  402: 

423. 
Pippin  v.  May,  78  Ark.  18:  515,  521. 
Piscataqua    Bridge    Co.    y.    N.    H. 

Bridge  Co.,  7  N.  H.  35:  22,  411, 

412,  413,  791,  1155,  1170,  1608. 
Piscataway  &  B.  Tps.,  In  re,  54  N.  J. 

L.  539:  700. 
Pitcher  v.  United  States,  1  Ct.  of  CI. 

7:   458. 
Pitkin  V.  Springfield,  112  Mass.  509: 

734,  1221. 
Pittock  V.  Central  Dist.  &  Print.  Tel. 

Co.,  31  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  589:   425, 

1636. 
Pitton  V.  Cincinnati,   3  Ohio   C.   C. 

593:   220. 
Pitts  y.  Baltimore,  73  Md.  326 :  884. 
Pittsburg,  District  of,  2  W.  &  S.  320: 

21,  432. 
Pittsburg  y.  Brown,  82  Me.  450 :  865. 
y.   Cluley,   74  Pa.   St.   262:    1517. 
V.   Consolidated   Gas.    Co.,   34   Pa. 

Super.   Ct.  374:   352,  491. 
V.   Epping-Carpenter   Co.,    194  Pa. 

St.  318:    887,  890,   1623. 
y.   Irwin's   Exrs.,   85   Pa.   St.   420: 

1535. 
V.  Pittsburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  205  Pa. 
St.  13:  299,  300. 


CASES    CITED, 


CCXXV 


[The  references   are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Pittsburg  V.    Scott,   1   Pa.    St.   309: 

498,  504,   543,   710,    1165,   1167, 

1521. 
Pittsburgh  etc.   R.  E.   Co.'s  Appeal, 

130  Pa.  St.   190:    1428,   1429. 
Pittsburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co.'s  Appeal,  1 

Penny  449:  297,  299. 
Pittsburgh   etc.   R.    R.   Co.   v.   Beck, 

152  Ind.  421:   1545. 
V.  Bentley,  88  Pa.  St.  178:  1254. 
V.  Benwood  Iron  Worlcs,  31  W.  Va. 

TIO:   317,  495,  499,  531,  533. 
V.  Bruce,  102  Pa.  St.  23:  424,  709, 

808,   1499,   1500,   1629. 
V.  Chicago,  159  111.  369 :  309. 
V.  Commonwealth,  101  Pa.  St.  192: 

1643. 
V.  Commonwealth,  104  Pa.  St.  583: 

422. 
V.  Crothersville,  159  Ind.  330:  449. 
V.  Crown  Point,  150  Ind.  536:  865. 
V.  Garlick,  20  Ohio  C.  C.  561 :  808, 

1474,  1497,  1500,  1503. 
V.  Gilleland,  56  Pa.  St.  445:  1446, 

1451,  1454,  1457. 
V.    Greenville,    69    Ohio    St.    487: 

1041,  1609,  1610,  1624. 
V.  Hall,  25  Pa.  St.  336:  954,  1369. 
V.    Jones,    111    Pa.    St.    204:    410, 

1261. 
V.    Jones,    59    Pa.    St.    433:     1627, 

1629. 
V.  Lyons,  159  111.  576:   1426. 
V.  McClosky,  110  Pa.  St.  436:  1187, 

1315,    131?. 
V.    Noftsger,    148    Ind.    101:    179, 

251,    1315. 
V.    Noftsger,    26    Ind.    App.    614: 

1657. 
V.   Oliver,   131   Pa.    St.   408:    940, 

1627,  1633. 
V.    Patterson,    107    Pa.    St.    461: 

1139,   1140,  1241,   1272,  1274. 
V.  Peet,  152  Pa.  St.  488:  815. 
v.  Perkins,  22  Ohio  C.  C.  630:  784, 

829. 
V.  Perkins,  49  Ohio  St.  326:   936, 

1226,    1559. 
V.  Pittsburgh  etc.  R.   R.  Co.,   159 

Pa.  St.  331:   530,  731,  900,  904, 

912. 
V.  Point  Bridge   Co.,   165   Pa.   St. 

37:    304,   423,   1621. 
V.   Reich,   101   111.    157:    639,   643, 

1211. 
T.  Robinson,  95  Pa.  St.  426:   1120, 

112,3,   1131,  1187,  1216,  1218. 
V.  Rose,  74  Pa.  St.  362:  622. 
V.  Sanitary  District,  218  111.  286: 

675,    776,    977,    988,    989,    1042, 

1045,  1056,  1063,  1066. 


Pittsburgh  etc.   R.   R.  Co.   v.   Swin- 

ney,    97    Ind.    586:    940,    1669, 

1685. 

V.  Tod,  72  Ohio  St.  156:  919,  1422. 

V.  Vance,   115  Pa.   St.   325:    1130, 

1140,    1228,    1232. 
V.  West  Chicago  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  54 
111.    App.    273:    328,    657,    765, 
767,  1611. 
V.    Woloott,    162    Ind.    399:     749, 
1056,  1192,  1288. 
Pittsburgh  Junction  R.  R.  Co.'s  Ap- 
peal, 122  Pa.  St.  511:   753,  700, 
793,  796,  798,  1609. 
Pittsburgh  Junction  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Al- 
legheny  Valley   R.    R.   Co.,    146 
Pa.  St.  297:   760,  798. 
V.  Fort  Pitt  St.  Pass.  R.  R.   Co., 
192  Pa.  St.  44:  771. 
Pittsburgh  Nat'l  Bank  of  Commerce 
V.    Shoenberger,    HI    Pa.    St.    95: 
814. 
Pittsfield  &  North  Adams  R.  R.  Co., 

V.  Foster,  1  Cush.  480:   1089. 
Pittston  Road,  4  Luzerne  Leg.  Reg. 

Rep.    305:    1300. 
Pitt  Tp.  Road,  1  Pa.  St.  356:  1390. 
Pitzer  V.  Williams,  2  Rob.  Va.  241: 

1029. 
Placke  V.  Union  Depot  R.  R.  Co.,  140 

Mo.  634:   272,  1586,   1587. 
Plainfield  v.  Packer,   11   Conn.  576: 

992. 
Plains  Tp.  Road,  7  Luzerne  Leg.  Reg. 

Rep.  233:   1094,  1100,  1101. 
Plan  100,  In  re,  143  Pa.  St.  414:  012, 

633. 
Planet  P.  &  F.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  etc. 

R.  R.  Co.,  115  Mo.  613:  1582. 
Plank  Road  Co.  v.   Ramai^e,  20  Pa. 
St.  95:    1156,   1157,   f310,   1317. 
V.  Rea,  20  Pa.  St.  97:   1187. 
V.    Thomas,   21    Pa.    St.    91:    1118, 
1156,   1157. 
Plant  V.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.,   10 

Barb.   26:    239,   244,   437. 
Plath   V.   Manhattan   R.    R.   Co.,   88 

Hun  263:    1304. 
Piatt  V.   Bright,   22   N.   J.   Eq.    128: 
1564. 
V.  Bright,  29  N.  J.  Eq.   128:   947, 

949,   1563. 
V.  Bright,   31   N.  J.  Eq.   81:    947, 

049,    1563,   1564. 
V.  Bright,  32  N.  J.  Eq.  362:   947, 

949,   1653. 
V.   Chicago  etc.  R.  R.   Co.,  74  la. 

127:  422,  1496,  1618. 
V.    Miltord,    66    Conn.    320:    600, 

618,  1306. 
V.  Oneonta,  88  App.  Div.  192:  358. 


CCXXVl 


CASES    CITED. 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 

Piatt  V.  Oneonta,  183  N.  Y.  516:  358. 
V.  Penn.  Co.,  47  Ohio  St.  366:  1473. 
V.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  43  Ohio 

St.  228:  425,  1192,  1473. 
V.  Root,  15  Johns.  213:   71,  76. 
Piatt  Bros.  &  Co.  v.  Waterbury,  72 
Conn.  531:  57,  66,  453,  725,  1604, 
1606,    1612. 
V.   Waterbury,   80   Conn.   179:    83, 
1654. 
Platter  v.  Seymour,  86  Ind.  323 :  234. 
Plattsmouth  v.  Breck,  32  Neb.  297: 

643,  1337. 
Plattsmouth  Water  Co.  v.  Smith,  57 

Neb.  579:   79,  1604. 
Pleasant  v.  Kost,  29  111.  490:   12. 
Pleasant  Hill  v.  Comrs.,  71  Ohio  St. 

133:    700. 
Pleasant  Water  Co.  v.  Contra  Costa 

Water  Co.,  67  Cal.  659 :  783. 
Plecker   v.   Rhodes,   30   Gratt.    795: 

522. 
Plessy,   Ex  parte,  45   La.  Ann.   80: 

488. 
Plimmons   v.    Frisby,   Winston   Law 

201:    516. 
Plott  V.  Western  North  Carolina  R. 

R.  Co.,  65  N.  C.  74:   1548. 
Plum  V.  Kansas  City,  101  Mo.  525: 
1324,  1326. 
V.  Morris  Canal  Co.,  10  N.  J.  Eq. 
256:   211. 
Plumb   V.    Grand    Rapids,    81    Mich. 

381:    871    881,    890. 
Plum  Creek   Tp.   Road,   110  Pa.   St. 

544:    1034. 
Plumer  v.   Johnston,  63  Mich.   105: 
369,  385,  388,  878,  886,  888. 
V.  Wausau  Boom  Co.,  49  Wis.  449: 
965. 
Plumley  v.  Massachusetts,  155  U.  S. 

461:    478. 
Plummer   v.    Sheldon,    94   Cal.    533: 
881. 
V.  Sturtevant,  32  Me.  325:  438. 
V.   Waterville,   32  Me.   506:    1510, 
1512. 
Plymouth  v.  Chestnut  Hill  &  N.  R. 
R.  Co.,  168  Pa.  St.  181:   302. 
V.  County  Comrs.,   16  Gray,  341: 

1100. 
V.  Pere  Marquette  R.  R.  Co.,  139 

Mich.   347:    1290,   1292. 
V.  Russell  Mills,  7  Allen  438 :   1640. 
Plymouth    Cordage   Co.,   In    re,    135 

Fed.  1000:  996. 
Plymouth   R.   R.   Co.  v.   Colwell,   30 

Pa.  St.  337:   711. 
Plymouth  Road,  5  Rawle  150:   1105. 
Plympton  v.  Woburn,  11  Gray  415: 
1307.  I 


Pocopsen  Road,  16  Pa.  St.  15:   519. 
Pocopson  Road,  7  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  617: 

983. 
Pochila  V.   Calvert  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  31 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  398:   1183,  1201, 

1216,  1297,  1300. 
Pocantioo  W.  W.  Co.  v.  Bird,  130  N. 

Y.  249:   495,  496,  501,  507,  536, 

684,  909,  913,  920,  1061. 
Pohlman  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  131 

Iowa  89:   157. 
Poillon  V.  Brooklyn,  101  N.  Y.  132: 

591,  1546,  1547. 
Point  Pleasant  Elec.  Lt.  &  P.  Co.  v. 

Bayhead,  62  N.  J.  Eq.  296:  362. 
Polack  V.  S.  F.  Orphan  Asylum,  48 

Cal.  490:  362,  363,  383,  390,  399. 
Pollard  V.  Dickinson  County,  71  Iowa 

438:   993,   1409. 
V.    Ferguson,    1    Litt.    196:    1100, 

1107. 
V.  Moore,  51  N.  H.  188:  1671. 
Pollard's   Lessee  v.   Hogan,   3   How. 

212:  2,  110. 
Pollock  V.  Maysville  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

103  Ky.  84:   1479. 
V.  Morris,  105  N.  Y.  676:  1557. 
Polly  V.   Saratoga   etc.  R.   R.  Co.  9 

Barb.  449:  22,  434,  1011,  1098. 
Pomeroy  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  25 

Wis.  641:  937,  1352,  1500. 
V.  Granger,  18  R.  I.  024 :  443. 
V.  Milwaukee  &  Chi.  R.  R.  Co.,  16 

Wis.  640:  247. 
Pomona  Branch  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Camden 

etc.   R.   R.   Co.    (N.  J.)    20  Atl. 

350:   1461,  1402. 
Pond  V.  Metropolitan  El.  Ry.  Co.,  42 

Hun  567:   1295. 
V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  112 

N.    Y.    186:     1553,    1554,    1651, 

1657. 
V.  Milford,  35  Conn.  32 :  1086. 
Ponder  v.  Quitman  Ginnery,  122  Ga. 

29:  451. 

Ponischil  v.  Hoquiam   Sash  &  Door 
Co.,  41  Wash.  303:  303,  371,  380, 
392,  396,  398,  647. 
Pontchartrain  R.  R.   Co.  v.  La  Fa- 
yette &  Pontchartrain  R.  R.  Co., 
10  La.  Ann.  741 :  727. 
Pontiac  v.  Carter,  32  Mich.  164:  211, 
212,  213;  238. 
V.  Lull,  111  Mich.  509:  996. 
Pool  V.  Breese,   114   111.   594:    1410, 
1573. 
V.  Butler,  141  Cal.  46:   1673. 
V.  Simmons,  134  Cal.  621 :   1050. 
V.  Trexler,  76  N.  C.  297:   565,  507, 
571,  579. 


OASES    CITED. 


ccxxvn 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Poole  V.  Falls  Road  Elec.  R.  E.  Co., 

88  Md.  533:  197,  272,  306. 
V.  Lake  Forest,  238  111.  305:   875. 
Poor  V.  Blake,  123  Mass.  543:   1468, 

1704. 
Pope  V.  Sliinhattan  Ey.  Co.,  79  App. 

Div.  583:   1562. 
T.  Union,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  282:  878. 
Port  V.  Huntington   etc.   R.   R.   Co., 

168  Pa.  St.  19:  1310,  1311,  1646. 
Port  Angeles  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cooke, 

38  Wash.  184:  1392,  1674. 
Porter  v.  Allen,  8  Ind.  1:  103. 

V.  Armstrong,  129  N.  C.  101 :  579. 
V.  Armstrong,  132  N.  C.  66:  1607. 
V.  Armstrong,  134  N.  C.  447:  579, 

1397. 
V.  Armstrong,  139  N.  C.  179:  579, 

1106. 
V.  Carpenter,  39  Fla.  14:  3G6. 
V.   County   Comrs.,    13    Met.   479: 

1010. 
V.  Durham,  74  N.  C.  767:  145,  146. 
V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  103 

Mo.  App.  422:    1660. 
T.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  120 

N.  Y.  284:    1652,   1662. 
V.  Midland  R.  R.  Co.,  125  Ind.  476: 

1631,  1648,  1657. 
V.  North  Missouri   R.   R.   Co.,   33 

Mo.  128:   243. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  33  Mo.   128:   311. 
V.  Scranton  City,  36  Pa.  Supr.  Ct. 

218:    1272,   1308. 
v.  Stout,  73  Ind.  3:  962,  1518. 
Porterfield  v.  Bond,  38  Fed.  391:  450, 

1457. 
Port  Huron  etc.  Ey.  Co.  v.  Callanan, 

61  Mich.  12:  926. 
V.  Voorliies,  50  Mich.   506:    1097, 

1210. 
Forth  V.  Manliattan  R.  E.  Co.,   134 

N.  Y.  615:  1585,  1590. 
V.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  58  N.  Y. 

Supr.  Ct.  366:   1585,  1590. 
Portland  v.  Kamm,  10  Ore.  383:  1123, 

1245,  1410,  1453. 
V.  LeeSam,  7  Ore.  397:  1705. 
V.  Midland  E.  R.  Co.,  125  Ind.  476: 

246. 
Portland    etc.    R.    E.    Co.    v.    Clarke 

County,  48  Wash.  509,  1427. 
V.    County    Comrs.,    64    Me.    505: 

1429. 
V.  County  Comrs.  65  Me.  292 :  1390. 
V.  Deering,  78  Me.  61 :  490,  1290. 
v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.   Co.,  46  Me. 

69:  691. 
V.  Ladd,  47  Wash.  88 :  929. 
V.  Portland,  14  Ore.  188:  422,  1490. 


Portland  &  G.  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Bobb, 

88  Ky.  226:  893,  894,  980,  991, 

1044. 
Port  Reading  R.  R.  Co.,  In  re,  75  N. 

J.  h.  430:   1684. 
Port    Richmond    etc.    R.    R.    Co.    v. 

Staten  Island  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  71 

Hun  179:  773. 
v.  Staten  Island  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  144 

N.  Y.  445 :  773. 
Portsmouth  Gas  Light  Co.  v.  Shana- 

han,  65  N.  H.  233 :  354. 
Port   Townsend  v.   Lewis,   34  Wash. 

413:   1630. 
Port  Townsend  Southern  E.  E.   Co. 

V.  Barbare,  46  Wash.  275:  1147, 

1231,  1392. 
Post  V.  Kreischer,  32  Hun  49:  139. 
V.  Logan,   1   N.  Y.   Leg.  Obs.  59: 

1255 
V.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  125  N.  Y. 

697:    1605. 
V.  Rutland  R.  R.  Co.,  80  Vt.  551 : 

707,  013,  1514,  1569,  1573. 
T.  West  Shore  etc.   R.  R.   Co.,  50 

Hun  301 :  855,  1540. 
V.  West  Shore  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  123 

N.  Y.  580:  855,  1540. 
Postar  V.  Henderson,  1  Ind.  62:  1399. 
Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  Ex  parte,  72 

S.  C.  552:  1412. 
Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.  v.  Ala.  etc.  Ry. 

Co.,  68  Miss.  314:   1285,  1426. 
V.  Alabama  G.  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  92  Ala. 

331:  924. 
V.  Baltimore,  79  Md.  502 ;  342,  463. 
V.    Chicago   etc.   Ry.   Co.,   30   Ind. 

App.  654,  733,  775,  799. 
V.  Cleveland  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  94  Fed. 

234:  775. 
V.  Eaton,  170  111.  520:  338,  1630. 
V.  Farmville  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  96  Va. 

OGl:  774. 
V.  Kuhnem,  127  Ga.  20:  1634. 
V.  Louisiana  Western  Ry.  Co.,  49 

La.  An.  1270;  1286. 
V.  Louisville  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  43  La. 

An.  522:   1286,  1426. 
V.  Morgan's  etc.  S.  S.  Co.,  49  La. 

Ann.  58:  775,  799,  1286. 
V.  Norfolk  etc.  E.  R.  Co.,  88  Va. 

920:    774. 
V.  Ore.  Short  Line  R.  E.  Co..  lU 

Fed.  787:    775,  799,   1048,   1050, 

1285. 
V.  Ore.  Short  Line  E.  R.  Co.,   lOt 

Fed.  623:    988,  1050. 
v.  Ore.   Short  Line  R.  R.   Co.,  23 

Utah   474:    534,   775,    799,   934, 

988,  1048,  1050,  1062,  1003,  1064, 

1068. 


CCXXVlll 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.  v.  Peyton,  124 
Ga.   746:    1377. 
V.  Southern  R.  R.  Go.,  89  Fed.  190 

775,  799. 
V.  Southern  R.  R.  Co.,  98  Fed.  190 

734. 
V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  122  Fed.  156 
932. 
Poston  V.  Terry,  5  J.  J.  Marsh.  220 

1077,  1360. 
Potlatch  Lumber  Co.  v.  Peterson,  12 

Ida.  769:   7,  97,  504,  541,  726. 
Potomac   S.   B.   Co.   v.   Upper   S.   B. 

Co.,  109  U.  S.  672:  131. 
Pottawattamie  Go.  Comrs.  v.  O'Sul- 
livan,    17   Kan.   58:    1185,    1203, 
1214. 
Potter   V.   Ames,   43   Cal.   75:    1022, 
1162,  1634,  1710. 
V.  Coltis,  156  N.  Y.  16:  358. 
V.  Indiana  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  95  Mich. 

389:  135. 
V.  McCounack,  127  Ind.  438:  1407 
V.  Putnam,  74  Conn.   189:    1326. 
Potts   V.   Penn.   S.   V.   R.    R.   Co.,   4 
Mont.  Co.  L.  R.  121:  1207. 
V.  Penn.  S.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  119  Pa. 

St.  278:   1212. 
V.    Quaker    Citv    El.    R.    R.    Co., 
12   Pa.   Co.   Ct.   593:    268,   1585, 
1590. 
V.  Quaker  City  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  161 
Pa.  St.  396:   2CS,  297,  719,  1585, 
1590. 
Pott's  Appeal,  15  Pa.  St.  414:  1387. 
Pottsgrove    Road,     2    Walker's    Pa. 

Supm.  Ct.  503:    1094. 
Pottsgrove  Tp.  Road,  4  Mont.  Co.  L. 

Rep.   114:   785. 
Pottstown    Gas    Co.    v.    Murphy,    39 

Pa.  St.  257:    166. 
Pottsville  V.  People's  R.  R.  Co.,  148 

Pa.  St.   175:   425,   1472. 
Poudler    v.    Minneapolis,    103    Minn. 

479:  878. 
Poughkeepsie  Bridge  Co.,  Matter  of, 
108   N.   Y.   483:    672,   673,   675, 
709,   728,   1044. 
Poughkeepsie  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter 

of,  63  Barb.  151:   1212. 

Poulan  V.  Atlantic  Coast  Line  R.  R. 

Co.,  123  Ga.  605:   678,  704,  749. 

751,  752,  939,  1056,  1288,  1568. 

Poundstone  v.  Baldwin,  145  Ind.  139: 

575,  995,  1034. 

Powell  V.  Clelland,  82  Ind.  24:   1555. 

V.   Gilmain,   38  111.  App.   611:    877. 

V.   Greensburg,   150   Ind.   148:    749. 

V.  Hitchner,  32  N.  J.  L.  211:   989, 

1381. 
V.  Lash,  64  N.  C.  456:  95. 


Powell  V.  Macon  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  92  Ga. 
209:   298,  639,  1613. 
V.    Pennsylvania,    127    U.    S.    678: 

15,  478. 
V.  Sammon,  31  Ala.  552:  407,  412, 

491. 
V.  Whitaker,  88  Pa.  St.  445:  1565. 
Powelton  Ave.,  In  re,  11  Phila.  447: 

915. 
Power  V.  Athens,  26  Hun  282:  408, 
412,  1608. 
V.  Athens,  99  N.  Y.  592:  408,  412, 

1608. 
V.  Ridgeway,  149  Pa.  St.  317:  1523. 
Power's  Appeal,  29  Mich.  504:  1026, 

1058. 
Powers   V.   Armstrong,    19   Ga.   427: 
1163. 
V.  Bears,  12  Wis.  213:   928,  1165, 

1169,  1570. 
V.  Bergen,  6  N.  Y.  358 :  459. 
V.  Brooklyn  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  89  Hun 

288:  1301. 
V.  Brooklyn  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  157  N. 

Y.  105:   1334. 
V.  City  Council  of  Springfield,  116 

Mass.  84:   700. 
V.  Council  Bluffs,  45  la.  652:  1551, 

1648,  1659,  1716. 
V.  Council  Bluffs,  50  la.  197:  235. 
V.  Hazleton  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  33  Ohio 

St.  429:    1048. 
V.  Hurmet,  51  Mo.  136:  1520. 
V.   Irish,  23  Mich.  429:   976,  977. 
V.  Railwav  Co.,  33  Ohio  St.  429: 

894,  898",  1242. 
V.  St.  Louis  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  158  Mo. 

87:  89,  1649,  1652. 
V.   State  Line  Telephone  Co.,   116 
App.  Div.  737:  339,  1593. 
Pownal,  Inhabitants  of,  8  Me.  271: 

916. 
Povnder  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co., 

2  Phillips  330:    1570. 
Prahl  V.   Brown   County,   104  Minn. 

227:   1378,  1423. 
Prairie   Co.   v.   Fink,    65   Ark.   492: 

781. 
Prather  v.  Chicago  So.  Ry.  Co.,  221 
111.    190:    815,   1061,    1063,   1060, 
1247,  1249. 
v.  Ellison,  10  Ohio  396:   1491. 
V.    Jeffersonville    etc.    R.    R.    Co., 
52  Ind.  16:  26,  731,  1059,  1060, 
1061,  1062,  1163,  1165. 
V.   Western   U.   Tel.    Co.,   89   Ind. 
501:  807. 
Pratt   v.   Brown,   3   Wis.   603;    550, 
672,  695. 
V.   Buffalo  City  Ry.   Co.,   19   Hun 
30:  183,  1581. 


CASES    CITED. 


CCXXIX 


[The  references   are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Pratt  y.  Des  Moines  etc.  E.  R.  Co., 
72    la.    249:    1648,    1657,    1715, 
1717. 
V.   Holmes  St.   R.  R.   Co.,  49  Mo. 

App.  63:  1353. 
V.   New  York  R.   R.   Co.,   77   Hun 

139:    112»4. 
V.  New  York  Central  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

90  Hun  83:   1582,  1614. 
V.  People,   13  Hun  664:   1514. 
V.   Eoseland   R.   R.   Co.,   50   N.  J. 

Eq.    150:    1569. 
V.  Saline  Valley  Ry.  Co.,  130  Mo. 

App.  175:   1254,  1546. 

V.  Stratford,  14  Ontario  260:  1550. 

V.    Stratford,    16    U.    S.    App.    5: 

631. 

Preble  v.  Portland,  45  Me.  241:  1008. 

Prentice  v.  Weston,  111  N.  Y.  460: 

472. 
Prentis  v.  Atlantic  Coast  Line  R.  R. 

Co.,  211  U.  S.  210:  480,  483. 
Prentiss  v.  Parks,  65  Me.  559:   1018, 

1516. 
Presbrey  v.  Old  Colony  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
103   Mass.   1:    1147,   1148,    1478, 
1483.      , 
Preseott  v.  Beyer,  34  Minn.  493 :  850, 
1514,   1569,   1573. 
V.  Curtes,  42  Me.  04:   980. 
V.    Edwards,    117    Cal.    298:     182, 

879. 
V.  Patterson,  44  Mich.  525:    1018, 
1032,  1634. 
Preseott   Irrigation   Co.   v.   Flathers, 

20  Wash.  454 :  587,  920. 
Preslin  v.  Sabine  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  70 

Tex.  375:    1348. 
President  v.  Trenton  City  Bridge  Co., 

13  N.  J.  Eq.  46:   96. 
President    &    Comrs.    of   Revenue   v. 

State,  45  Ala.  399 :  462. 
President  etc.  v.  Diffebach,   1   Yates 
367:  897. 
V.  Mifflin,  1  Yeats,  430:   1359. 
Preston  v.  Cedar  Rapids,  95  la.  71: 
619,   1118,   1306,    1353. 
V.  Dubuque  &  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  11 

la.  15:   1480. 
V.  Liverpool  etc.  E.  R.   Co.,  5  H. 
L.  Gas.   605:   833,  856. 
Prezinger  v.  Fording,   114  Ind.   599: 
1034,  1518. 
V.   Harness,    114   Ind.    491:    1034, 
1516,  1518. 
Price  v.  Engelldng,  58  111.  App.  547 : 
1558,  1561,   1673,   1675. 
V.  Knott,  8  Oreg.  438:   237,  1597. 


Price  V.  Milwaukee  &  St.  Paul  Rv. 
Co.,    27    Wis.    98:     1245,    1277, 
1312. 
V.  Oregon  R.  R.  Co.,  47  Ore.  350: 

93. 
V.  Pa.  R.  R.  Co.,  209  Pa.  St.  81: 

714. 
V.    Plainfleld,    40    N.    J.    L.    608: 

1491. 
V.    Poynton,    1    Bush    (Ky.)    387: 

19. 
V.  Southbury,  29  Conn.  490;   1367. 
V.  Stagray,  68  Mich.  17 :  400,  1017, 

1032,  1099. 
V.  Stratton,  45  Ela.  535:  366,  877. 
V.  Thompson,  48  Mo.  361 :  1494. 
V.  Weehawken  Ferry  Co.,  31  N.  J. 
Eq.  31:    830,   1347. 
Prichard  v.  Bixby,  71  Wis.  422:  1100, 

1101. 
Pridgen   v.   Bannerman,   8   Jones   L. 

53:   1425. 
Priebe  v.  Ames,  104  Minn.  419:  1707. 
Priest  V.   Maxwell,   127   la.   744:    89. 
Priewe   v.   Wisconsin   State   Land    & 
Imp.  Co.,  93  Wis.  534:   125,  141, 
499. 
Prime  v.  Yonkers,  116  App.  Div.  609: 
79. 
V.  Yonkers,  192  N.  Y.  105:  79. 
Prince  v.  Baintree,  64  Vt.  540:  1238. 
V.    Crocker,    116   Mass.    347:    276, 

299. 
V.  Crocker,  166  Mass.  347:  784. 
Princeton  v.  County  Comrs.,  17  Pick. 
154:    1382. 
V.  Gieske,  93  Ind.  102:  235. 
V.  Terapleton,  71  111.  68:   1328. 
Princeville   v.    Auten,    77    III.    325: 

420,  1494,  1618. 
Prior,  In  re,  55  Kan.  724 :  482. 
Prior  V.   Buehler  etc.   Co.,    170  Mo. 
439:    11,  464. 
v.  Hardwick,  94  Ky.  408:   1625. 
V.  Swartz,  62  Conn.  132:   127,  129, 
137,  494. 
Pritchard   v.    Edison    Elec.    111.    Co., 
92  App.  Div.   178:    454. 
V.  Edison  Elec.  111.  Co.,  179  N.  Y. 
364:  454. 
Private  Road  Case,  1  Ashmead  417: 

1327. 
Private  Road  etc.,  112  Pa.  St.   183: 

1017,   1032,   1034. 
Proctor  V.   Andover,  42   N.  H.   348: 
515. 
v.  Old  Colony  R.  R.  Co.,  154  Mass. 
251:  91. 
Proetz   V.    St.    Paul    Water    Co.,    17 
Minn.  163:  1353. 


ccxxx 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742  ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Proprietors      of      Kennebunk      Toll 
Bridge,  Petitioners,  11  Me.  263: 
1533,  1638. 
Proprietors    of    Locks    &    Canals    v. 
Nashua  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  10  Cush. 
385:    370,    371,    372,    379,    623, 
939   963. 
V.  Lowell,  7  Gray  223:   783,   793. 
V.  Nashua  &  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  104  Mass. 
1:   1475,  1478. 
Proprietors  of  Mills  v.  Braintree  Wa- 
ter Supply  Co.,  149  Mass.  478: 
138,  1603. 
V.  Commonwealth,  164  Mass.  227: 
472. 
Propst  V.  Cass  County,  51  Neb.  736 

1546. 
Prospect  Park  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter 
of,  8  Hun  30:   918. 
Matter  of,  13  Hun  345:  247,  1293. 
Matter  of,  16  Hun  261 :   1293. 
Matter  of,  24  Hun  199:   1380. 
Application  of,  67  N.  Y.  371 :  896. 
Matter  of,  85  N.  Y.  489 :  1397. 
Prospect  Park  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wil- 
liamson, 24  Hun  216:   1609. 
v.  Williamson,  91  N.  Y.  552:  750, 
798,  1609. 
Prosser  v.  Davis,  18  la.  367:  423. 
V.   Northern   Pac.   R.  R.   Co.,    152 

U.  S.  59:    118,  136. 

V.  Wappello,  18  la.  327:  423,  1123. 

Protzman  v.  Indianapolis  &  Cinn.  R. 

R.  Co.,  9  Ind.  467:  246,  251,  307, 

324,  1548. 

Proviijence   v.    Droon,   20    Ind.   238: 

1406. 
Providence  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  In  re,  17 
R.   I.    324:    728,   730,   753,   755, 
800. 
Providence  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Norwich 
&  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  138  Mass.  277: 
754,  756,  793,  798. 
V.  Worcester,  155  Mass.  35:   1147, 
1148,  1212,  1230,  1231,  1263. 
Providence  etc.  Stfeamboat  Co.  v.  Fall 
River,  183  Mass.  535:  740,  1253, 
1319. 
Provolt  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  57 

Mo.  256:  858,  1631. 
v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  69  Mo.  633 : 
1535,     1536,     1538,     1540,    1541, 
1578. 
Provost  V.   Morgan's  R.   R.   Co.,   42 
La.  Ann.  809:   842. 
V.    New    Chester    Water    Co.,    162 
Pa.   St.   275:    336,  337. 
Pruyn    v.    Graham,    1    Wend.    370: 

1069. 
Pry  V.  Mankedick,  172  Pa.  St.  535: 
880. 


Pryor,  In  re,  55  Kan.  724:  481. 
Pryzblowicz  v.  Missouri  Riv.  R.  R. 

Co.,  3  McCrary  586:   858,  1627, 

1631. 
Public  Alley,  In  re,  160  Pa.  St.  89: 

698. 
Public  Road,  5  Harr.  242:    1081. 
Public  Road,  4  N.  J.  L.  290:    1099, 

1363. 
Public  Road,  Matter  of,  4  N.  J.  L. 

31:  979. 
Public  Road,  Matter  of,  4  N.  J.  L. 

396:   1091,  1092. 
Public  Roads,  5  Harr.  174:   1027. 
Public    Road    Vacation,    In    re,    160 

Pa.   St.   104:    400. 
Pueblo  V.  Shutt  Investment  Co.,  28 

Colo.  524:   1096. 
V.   Strait,  20   Colo.   13:    635,   660, 

664,  671. 
Pueblo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Rudd,  5  Colo. 

270:    1358,    1374. 
Pugh,    Matter    of,    22    Misc.    N.    Y. 

43:  1097. 
Pugh  V.  Wheeler,  2  Dev.  &  B.    (N. 

C.)    50:   900. 
Pulaski  Ave.,  33  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  108: 

938. 
Pulling  V.  London,  Chatham  &  Dover 

Ry.  Co.,  33  Beav.  644:  823. 
V.  London,  Chatham  &  Dover  Ry. 

Co.,  3  DeG.  J.  &  S.  661 :  823. 
Pullman  Co.  v.  Chicago,  224  111.  248: 

1151,  1379. 
Pumpelly  v.  Green  Bay  Co.,  13  Wall. 

166:    23,   66,   90,   100,   144,    168, 

554,  558. 
Purdy  V.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  162  N.  Y. 

42:   484. 
V.  Manhattan  R.  R.   Co.,  3  Misc. 

50:   448,   1300,   1303. 
V.    Martin,    31    Mich.    455:    1033, 

1420. 
Purifoy    v.    Richmond    &   D.    R.    R. 

Co.,    108    N.    C.    100:    726,   913, 

1157,  1707,  1708. 
Purinton  v.  Somerset,  174  Mass.  556: 

606. 
Purnell    v.    McLane,    98    Md.    589: 

359. 
Pursell   V.   Edison  Portland   Cement 

Co.,  65  N.  J.  L.  541 :   1382. 
Purviance   v.   Drover,   20   Ind.   278: 

1409. 
Pusey  V.  Allegheny,  98  Pa.  St.  522: 

630,  631,  924,   1115,   1245,   1453. 
V.  Wright,  31  Pa.  St.  387:  852. 
Putnam   v.    Boston   etc.    R.    R.    Co., 

182   Mass.   351:    191,    319,   379, 

384,  385,  390,  402,  647. 


CASES    CITED. 


CCXXXl 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Putnam  v.  Douglas  Co.,  8  Ore.  328: 

1187,    1192. 
Putney   Bros.   Co.  v.  Milwaukee  Lt. 

H.  &  T.  Co.,  134  Wis.  379 :  284, 

1455. 
Puyallup  V.    Lacey,   43   Wash.    110: 

710,  725,  895,  1397. 
Pychlicke  v.  St.  Louis,  98  Mo.  497: 

155. 
Pye  V.  Mankato,  36  Minn.  373 :   154. 

Q. 

Quackenbush  v.  Dist.  of  Columbia,  & 

Mackey  300:  1017,  1021,  1571. 
Quayle  v.  M.  K.   &   T.   Ry.   Co.,   63 

Mo.  465:    1102,  1514. 
Queen  v.   Birmingham   etc.   Ey.   Co., 

4  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  276:   1700. 
V.  Birmingham  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  6  Ey. 

Cas.  628:  1700. 
V.  Bristol  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  2  Eng.  E. 

E.  Cas.  99:    1413. 
V.  Brown,  2  L.  E.  Q.  B.  630 :   1236. 
V.  Cambria  Ey.  Co.,  L.  E.  6  0.  B, 

422:  651. 
T.  Cambrian  Ey.  Co.,  40  L.  J.  Q. 

B.  169:   414. 
V.  Commissioners  of  Woods  &  For- 
ests,   15    A.    &   E.    N.    S.    761: 

1700. 
V.  Clarke,  5  Can.  Exch.  64:   1221, 

1270. 
V.     Darlington     Local     Board     of 

Health,    35    L.    J.    Q.    B.    45: 

1524. 
V.    Eastern    Counties    Ey.    Co.,    2 

A.  &  E.  N.  S.  347:  631,  640. 
V.   Eastern    Counties   Ey.    Co.,    42 

E.  C.  L.  E.  706:   631. 
V.    Harwood,    6    Can.    Exch.    420: 

1231. 
V.   Lancaster   &   Preston    Junction 

Ey.   Co.,   6  A.  &  E.   N.   S.   759: 

1077. 
V.   Lancaster   &   Preston   Junction 

Ey.    Co.,   51    E.    C.   L.   E.   757: 

1077. 
V.  London  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  10  A.  & 

E.  2:  1258. 
V.  London  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  16  A.  &  E. 

N.  S.  864:  1533. 
v.  London  &  Greenwich  Ey.  Co., 

3  A.  &  E.  N.  S.  166:  823. 
V.  London  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  3  E.  &  B. 

443:   1370. 
V.   London  etc.  Ey.   Co.,   77  E.  C. 

L.  E.  443:   1370. 
V.  London  etc.  Ey.   Co.,   23  L.  J. 

Q.  B.  N.   S.   185:    1135. 
V.  Longton   Gas   Co.,   2  El.   &  El. 

651:    338. 
V.    New   York    etc.    Rv-    Co.,    71 

E.  C.  L.  E.  886:    1533. 


Queen  v.  Poulter,  20  L.  E.  Q.  B.  D. 

132-   1259 
V.   Eyiid,   16'  I.   C.  L.  R.   29:    652. 
V.  South  Wales  E.  R.  Co.,   13  A. 

&  E.   N.   S.   988:    1343. 
V.   The   Inns   of  Court  Hotel   Co., 

32  L.  J.  Q.  B.  367:   1098. 
V.    Vaughn,    4   L.   R.    Q.    B.    190: 

1272. 
V.   Vaughan,   38   L.   J.   Q.   B.    71: 

1260. 
V.    Vestry    of    St.    Luke's    etc.    L. 

E.  6  Q.  B.  572:  631. 
V.    Vestry   of    St.    Luke's    etc.,    7 

L.  E.  Q.  B.  148:  631. 
V.  Wallasey  Local  Board  of  Health, 

L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  351 :   631. 
V.    Wismer,   6    U.    C.    Q.   B.    293: 

QQ9 

V.  Yoi-k  etc.  Ry.   Co.,  16  A.  &  E. 
N.  S.  886:  1533. 
Queen  County  Water  Co.  v.  Monroe, 

83  App.  Div.   105:    829. 
Quick  V.  Cotman,  124  la.  102 :  885. 
V.  Taylor,   113  Ind.  540:   806,  808. 
v.  White  Water  Township,  7  Ind. 
570:   23. 
Quieksall    v.    Philadelphia,    177    Pa. 

St.  301:   366,  878. 
Quigley  v.  Montgomery  etc.  Elec.  Ry. 
Co.,  208  Pa.  St.  238:   850. 
V.  Penn.  S.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Mont. 

Co.  L.  R.  109 :  641,  1524. 
V.  Penn.  S.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  4  Mont. 

Co.  L.  Rep.  179:  330. 
V.  Penn.  S.  V.  E.  E.  Co.,  121  Pa. 
St.  35:   330,  1327. 
Quigley's  Case,  3  P.  &  W.  139:  1187. 
Quimby  v.  Consumers'  Gas  Trust  Co., 
144  Fed.  362:   725. 
V.  Vermont  Central  E.  E.  Co.,  23 
Vt.  387:   809. 
Quincy   v.    Jones,    76    111.    231:    210, 

213,  229,  441. 
Quincy  &  Palmyra  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Tay- 
lor, 43  Mo.  35:    1019. 
Quincy  etc.  E.  R.   Co.  v.  Kellog,  54 
Mo.  334:   964,  980. 
V.   Ridge,   57   Mo.   599:    1186. 
Quindaro  Tp.  v.  Squier,  51  Fed.  152: 

865,  869. 
Quinn  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  63 
la.  510:   453. 
V.  Paterson,  27  N.  J.  L.  35:  1506. 
V.    Schnider,    118    Mo.    App.    39: 
1576. 
Quinton  v.  Burton,  61  la.  471:  1487. 
Quirk  V.  Seattle,  38  Wash.  25:  1219. 

R. 
Raab   v.    Roberts,    30    Ind.   App.    6 : 

1058. 
Race  Street,  8  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  95:   1360, 
1363, 


CCXXXll 


CASES    CITED. 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Race   Street,   In   re,   24   Fa.   Co.   Ct. 

433:   1276. 
Race    Street,    Condemnation,    9    Pa. 

Dist.  Ct.  615:    1276. 
Radcliff's   Executors  v.   Brooklyn,   4 
N.   Y.    195:    209,   211,   212,   213, 
215,  229,  245,  1452. 
Radke  v.  Minneapolis  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

41  Minn.  350:  848. 
Radnor  Road,  5  Binn.  612:  1081. 
Radnor  Tp.  Elec.  Lt.  Co.'s  Petition, 

208  Pa.  St.  460:   682. 
Radnor  Tp.  Elec.  Lt.  Co.  v.  Brown, 

208  Pa.  St.  461:   682,  1619. 
Rafferty  v.  Central  Traction  Co.,  147 
Pa.  St.  579:   177,  241,  269,  279, 
642,    1586,    1590,    1592. 
Ragan   v.    Kansas    City   etc.    R.    R. 
Co.,    Ill    Mo.   456:    1127,    1186, 
1226,  1548. 
V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  144 
Mo.  623:   1226,  1320,  1546. 
Ragsdale    v.    Southern    Ry.    Co.,    60 

S.  C.  .381:   1573. 
Rahn  Tp.  v.  Tamaqua  &  L.  St.  R.  R. 
Co.,    4    Pa.    Dist.    Ct.    29:     683, 
719. 
V.   Tamaqua   &  L.   St.   R.   R.   Co., 
167   Pa.   St.  84:    305. 
Railroad  Comrs.,  In  re,  83  Me.  273: 

769. 
Railroad   Comrs.  v.  Pensacola  &  A. 

R.  R.  Co.,  24  Fla.  417:  480. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Ailing,  99  U.  S.  463 : 
901. 
V.  Benson,  36  N.  J.  L.  357:   1138. 
V.  Benson,  36  N.  J.  L.  557:   1139. 
V.  Bohn,  34  Ohio  St.  114:  988. 
V.    Boyer,    13    Pa.    St.    497:    957, 

961,  963. 
v.  Bucher,  7  Watts  33:  954. 
V.  Bunnell,  81   Pa.  St.  414:    1139. 
V.    Burnett's   Exrs.,    11    Lea   525: 

1325. 
v.   Burson,    11   P.   F.    Smith   379: 

1349. 
V.    Calderwood,    15    La.   An.    481 : 

1183. 
V.  Carr,  38  Ohio  St.  448:   89. 
V.    Cobb,    35    Ohio    St.    94:    1323, 

1325. 
V.    County    Comrs.,    79    Me.    386: 

490. 
V.  Crow,  108  Tenn.  17:   834,  1479. 
V.  Donovan,  104  Tenn.  465:    1479. 
V.  Duggan,  109  111.  537:  475. 
V.  Duncan,   111  Pa.  St.  352:   269. 
V.    Ferguson,    105   Tenn.   552:    96, 

113   133 
V.  Foreman,  24  W.  Va.  662:   1123, 
1180,  1463,  1464. 


Railroad   Co.   v.   French,    100   Tenn. 

209:    1474. 
V.  Gardner,  45  Ohio  St.  309:   621, 

1124,   1125,  1244,  1294,  1303. 
V.   Gesner,   20   Pa.  St.   240:    1319, 

1379. 
V.  Gilson,  8  Watts  243:  1187,  1207, 

1313. 
V.  Halstead,  7  W.  Va.  301:   1172. 
V.    Hambleton,    40    Ohio    St.   496: 

255,  1549,  1553. 
v.  Hester,  40  Pa.  St.  53:  1139. 
■V.  Hiester,  4  Wright  53:   1140. 
V.    Higdon,    111    Tenn.    121:     92, 

1651,  1653. 
V.  Keith,  53  Ga.   178:    1139. 
V.  Lawrence,  38  Ohio  St.  41:  1581. 
V.    Longworth,    30    Ohio   St.    108: 

1236. 
V.  Louisville,  8  Bush  415:  354. 
V.  Montgomery  Co.  Pass.  R.  R.  Co., 

14   Pa.    Co.    Ct.    88:    171. 
V.  Pearson,  35  Cal.  247:   1139. 
V.  Renwick,  49  la.  664:   131. 
V.   Renwick,    102  U.   S.   180:    108, 

131. 
V.  Richmond,  96  U.  S.  521 :  487. 
V.  Robbins,  35  Ohio  St.  531 :  1547. 
V.  Rose,  24  P.  F.  S.  362:   1140. 
V.  Roseville,  76  Ohio  St.  108:  882, 

890. 
V.  Schurmier,  7  Wall.  272:   105. 
V.  Shutte,  103  U.  S.  118:   594. 
V.  Smith,   113  Ind.  233:    1616. 
V.  State,  9  Bax.  522:    703. 
V.  Swinney,  97  Ind.  586:  1323. 
V.    Telegraph    Co.,    101    Tenn.   62: 

774,  775,  1284,  1286. 
V.  Tyree,  7  W.  Va.  693:   1180. 
V.   Waterbury,    55   Conn.    19:    487. 
V.  Williams,  35  Ohio  St.  168:  243, 

247. 
V.  Woodruff,  49  Ark.  381 :  1329. 
V.  Yeiser,  8  Pa.  St.  366:   1315. 
V.  Railway,  30  Ohio  St.  604:  765, 

1278. 
Rainey    v.    Herbert,    55    Fed.    443: 

183. 
V.    Hinds    County,    78   Miss.    308: 

630,  631. 
V.  Red  River  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  99  Tex. 

276:  450,  453,  655,  1013. 
Raissier  v.  Grimmer,   130  Ind.  219: 

1512. 
Rait  V.    Furrow,    74   Kan.    101:    68. 
Rakowsky  v.  Duluth,  44  Minn.  188: 

211,  236. 
Raleigh  v.  Peace,  110  N.  C.  32:   .12, 
464. 


OASES    CITED. 


ecxxxiii 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-T42 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1T19.] 


Raleigh   etc.  R.   R.   Co.   v.   Davis,   2 
Bev.  &  B.  Law   (N.  C.)   451:   8, 
23,  806,  923,  927,  1164. 
V.    Glendon    etc.    Co.,    112    N.    C. 

661:   759,  1609. 
V.  Jones,  1  Ired.  L.  25:  1425. 
V.   Sturgeon,   120  N.  C.  225:    808, 

1478. 
V.  Wicker,  74  N.  C.  220:  152,  1187. 
Ralpho  Tp.  Road,  1  Monaghan   (Pa. 

Supm.   Ct.)    427:    1388.     ' 
Ralston  v.  Weston,  46  W.  Va.  544: 

1492. 
Ramey  v.  Baltimore  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

235  111.  502:  90,  1663. 
Ramsden  v.  Manchester  etc.  Ry.  Co., 

1    Bxch.    723:     1635. 
Ramsey  v.  People,  142  111.  380:  479. 
Ramsey   County   v.    Stees,   27   Minn. 
14:  1425. 
V.   Stees,  28  Minn.  326:   814. 
Ranck  v.  Cedar  Rapids,  134  la.  563 : 
1139,     1229,     1231,     1232,     1236, 
1270,  1276,  1329. 
Rand  v.  Boston,  164  Mass.  354:  454. 
V.  Ft.  Scott  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  50  Kan. 

114:  948,  949,  1563. 
V.  Newton,  6  Allen,  38:  1120. 
V.   Townshend,    26    Vt.    670:    937. 
963. 
Randall  v.  Christiansen,  76  la.  169: 
336. 
V.   Jacksonville   St.  R.  R.   Co.,   19 

Fla.  409:    268,   1586,   1590. 
V.   Roselstad,    105   Wis.   410:    882. 
V.  Texas  Central  Ry.  Co.,  63  Tex. 
586:  830,  942. 
Randecker  v.  Commissioners,   61   111. 

App.  426:  1418. 
Randle  v.  Pacific  R.  R.   Co.,  65  Mo. 
325:    249,    253,    309,    448,    1119, 
1120,  1295,  1303. 
Rand  Lumber  Co.  v.  Burlington,  122 

la.  203:  455,  1004. 
Randolf  v.  Bnomfield,  77  la.  50 :  453, 
1650,  1654. 
v.  Comrs.  of  Highways,  8  111.  App. 

128:  988. 
V.  Pennsylvania  S.  V.  R.   R.   Co., 

186   Pa.   St.   541:   81. 
V.  Union,  63  N.  J.  L.  155:    1187, 
1206. 
Rangely   v.   Midland   R.   R.    Co.,    37 

L.  J.  Ch.  313:    695. 
Ranken  v.  East  &  West  India  Docks 
etc.  Co.,  12  Beav.  298:  949,  14G0, 
1570. 
V.  St.  Louis  &  B.  Suburban  Ry.  Co., 
98  Fed.  479:  282. 
Rankin  v.  Great  Western  R.  R.  Co., 
40  U.  C.  C.  P.  463:   860,  1627, 
1631. 


Rankin    v.    Harrisonburg,     104    Va. 

524:  79,  95,  1345. 
V.  Sievern  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  58  S.  U. 

532:    1635. 
Rannow  v.  Hazard,  61  N.  Y.   Supr. 

211:   1150,  1305,  1665. 
Ransom  v.   Citizens'  R.  R.   Co.,   104 

Mo.  375:  277,  308,  327,  732. 
v.  Sault  Ste.  Marie,  143  Mich.  661  : 

226,  1650,  1656. 
Raphael  v.  Thomas  Valley  R.  R.  Co., 

36  L.  J.   Ch.  209:    851. 
Rapid  Transit  R.  R.  Comrs.,  Matter 

of,  128  App.  Div.  103:  276,  1158. 
Rapid   Transit   R.   R.    Co.   v.    Simp- 
son, 45  Kan.  714:  1203. 
Rapp    v.    Stratton,    41    Wash.    263: 

1492. 
Raritan  v.  Port  Reading  R.  R.  Co., 

49  N.  ,L  Eq.  11:  778,  780,  1643. 
Raritan    Canal    Co.,    24    N.    J.    Eq. 

455:  745. 
Raritan  Water  Power  Co.  v.  Veghte, 

21   N.  J.  Eq.  463:   859. 
Raasier  v.   Grimmer,    130   Ind.   219: 

1510. 
Ratcliif    V.     Wichita     Union     Stock 

Yards  Co.,  74  Kan.  1 :   482. 
Rathbun  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

20  R.  I.  61 :    1484. 
Rathke   v.    Gardner,    134   Mass.    14: 

153. 
Rauenstein  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R. 

Co.,  120  N.  Y.  661 :  320. 
V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.   Co.,   136 

N.  Y.  528:   181,  255,  319. 
Raulet  V.  Concord  R.  R.  Co.,  62  N. 

H.  561:    1259,  1262,   1272,   1273, 

1276,  1277,  1342. 
Ravatte  v.  Race,  152  111.  672:   1309. 
Ravenswood  v.  Flemings,  22  W.  Va. 

52:  104,  129,  137. 
Rawlings  v.  Biggs,  85  Ky.  251 :   1409. 
Rawston   v.    Taylor,    11    Exch.    307: 

161. 
Ray  V.  Atchison  &  Nebraska  R.  R. 

Co.,    4    Neb.    439:     1535,    1536, 

1570. 
V.  Fletcher,  12  Cush.  200:   866. 
V.  New  York  Bay  Extension  R.  R 

Co.,   34   App.  Div.  3:    247,   743 
Raymond  v.  Clay  County,  68  la.  130 

1404. 
V.  Commonwealth,  192  Mass.  486 

1157,  1164,  1707. 
V.  County  Comrs.,  63  Maine  110 

1095. 
V.  County  Comrs.,  63  Maine   112 

977. 
V.  Fish,  51  Conn.  80:  485. 
V.  Griffin,  23  N.  H.  340:   1381. 


CCXXXIV 


CASES    CITED. 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Read  v.  Cambridge,  126  Mass.  427: 
948. 
V.  Camden,  53  N.  J.  L.  322:  224, 

226,  914,   1666. 
V.  Camden,  54  N.  J.  L.  347:    224, 

226,   914,   1666. 
V.   Victoria  Station  &  R.  R.   Co., 
32  L.  J.  Ex.  167:  1098. 
Reading  v.  Althouse,  93  Pa.  St.  400: 

652. 
.  V.  Davis,  153  Pa.  St.  360:  1495. 

V.  Keppleman,  61  Pa.  St.  223:  211. 
Reading   Co.   v.   Seip,   30   Pa.   Supr. 

Ct.  330:   1479. 
Reading  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Balthaser, 
119  Pa.  St.  472:  1217. 
V.  Balthaser,  126  Pa.  St.  1:   1324. 
Readington   v.   Dilley,   24   N.    J.   L. 

209:   1097,  1311,  1317,  1421. 
Ready  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  98 

Mo.  App.  467 :  155. 
Reagan  v.  Farmers'  L.  &  T.  Co.,  154 
U.  S.  362:   483. 
V.  Farmers'  L.  &  T.  Co.,  154  U.  S. 

420:    483. 
V.  Mercantile  Trust  Co.,  154  U.  S. 

413:    483. 
V.  Mercantile  Trust  Co.,  154  U.  S. 
418:    483. 
Reardon   v.   San   Francisco,   66   Cal. 

492:   629,  659,  671. 
Reclamation  Dist.  v.  Superior  Court, 

151  Cal.  263. 
Reckner  v.  Warner,  22  Ohio  St.  275: 

927,   1640,   1707,   1708. 
Reddall  v.  Bryan,  14  Md.  444:   536, 

588. 
Reddin    v.    Metropolitan    Board    of 

Works,  31  L.  J.  Ch.  660:  823. 
Redman   v.   Boulevard   Co.,    189   Pa. 
St.  437:   1588. 
V.  Philadelphia  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  33  N. 
J.    Eq.    165:     1159,    1160,    1465, 
1570. 
Redmond  v.  Chacey,  7  N.  D.  231 :  579. 
Red  River  Bridge  Co.  v.  Clarksville, 
1   Sneed.    176:    781,    788,    1533, 
1608. 
Red  River  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hughes,  36 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  472:    1183,  1201, 
1340. 
V.   Sture,   32  Minn.   95:    746,  956, 
1369. 
Reed  v.  Acton,  117  Mass.  384:   1366. 
V.    Aeton,    120    Mass.    130:     1371, 

1373. 
V.  Birmingham,  92  Ala.  339:  1491. 
V.     Board     of    Park    Comrs.,     100 

Minn.  167:   808,  811,  1494. 
V.  Brenneman,  72  Ind.  288 :   1387. 


Reed  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
25  Fed.  886:  931,  1225,  1391. 
V.  Hanover  Branch  R.  R.  Co.,  105 
Mass.  303:  941,  963,  1221,  1227, 
1319,    1320. 
v.  Leeds,  19  Conn.  182:  1486. 
V.   Louisville  Bridge  Co.,  8   Bush. 

69:    1060. 
V.  Ohio  &  Miss.  R.  R.  Co.,  126  111. 
48:     893,    894,    896,    991,    1176, 
1227     1231 
V.  Peek,  163  Mo.  333:  237. 
V.  Pittsburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  210  Pa. 

St.  211:   1120,  1129,  1379. 
V.  State,  108  N.  Y.  407:  144,  1651, 
1655. 
Reelford  Lake  Levee  Dist.  v.  Dawson, 

97   Tenn.    151:    584. 
Rees  V.  Addams,  16  S.  &  R.  40:  1565. 
V.  Chicago,  38  111.  322:  1519,  1520. 
Reeves    v.     Backus-Brooks     Co.,    83 
Minn.  339:    127,  129,   132,   1606. 
v.  Wood  Co.,  8  Ohio  St.  333:   438, 
570,   580. 
Regan   v.    Boston   Gas   Lt.   Co.,    137 
Mass.  37:   190,  366. 
V.   New   York   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   60 

Conn.  124:  475. 
V.  Rochester,  45  N.  Y.  129 :   865. 
Regents  Canal  Co.  v.  Ware,  23  Beav. 
575:    1506. 
V.  Ware,  26  L.  J.  Ch.  566:  851. 
Regina  v.  Buffalo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  23 
U.  C.  Q.  B.  208:   131. 
V.  Comrs.,  2  Jur.  N.  S.  861:  952. 
V.  Metropolitan   Board  of  Works, 

3  B.  &  S.  710:   161. 

V.   Metropolitan   Board  of  Works, 

4  L.  R.  Q.  B.  358:  645,  652. 

V.  Perth,  14  L.  R.  Q.  B.  156:  212. 
V.  Stone,  L.  R.  1  Q.  B.  529:   1260. 
V.  Train,  9  Cox  C.  C.  180:  297. 
V.  Wilts  etc.  Canal  Co.,  8  Dowling 
623:    1533. 
Reiber  v.  Butler  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  201 

Pa.  St.  49:   1229,  1236,  1242, 

Reichenbach  v.  Wash.  Short  Line  R. 

R.  Co.,  10  Wash.  357:   837,  842. 

Reichert  v.  St.  Louis  R.  R.  Co.,  51 

Ark.  491:   242,  246,   1486,   1629, 

1631. 

Reichert  Milling  Co.  v.  Freeburg,  217 

111.   384:    1492. 
Reid  V.  Atlanta,  73  Ga.  523:   143. 
V.  Norfolk  Citv  R.  R.  Co.,  94  Va. 

117:  273. 
V.  Ohio  Miss.  R.  R.  Co.,  126  111.  48: 

706. 
V.  Wall  Tp.,  34  N.  J.  L.  275:   1530. 
Reiff  V.  Conner,  10  Ark.  241:  1393. 


CASES    CITED. 


ccxxxv 


[The   reftirences  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Reilly  v.  Ft.  Dodge,  118  Iowa  633: 

211,  602,  617. 
V.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  43  N.  Y. 

App.  Div.  80:    1210. 
V.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  33  N  Y. 

Supp.  391:    1.301. 
V.  Racine,  51  Wis.  526:  348. 
Reining  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

128    N.   Y.    157:    180,    181,    182, 

223,  255,  259,  324,  325. 
Reis  V.  New  York,  113  App.  Div.  464: 

190,  367,  384,  388,  399. 
V.  New  York,   188  N.  Y.  58:    190, 

367,  384,  388,  399. 
Reisert  v.  New  York,   69  App.  Div. 

302:    163,   1338. 
V.  New  York,   101  App.  Div.  93: 

1338,    1554. 
v.  New  York,  174  N.  Y.  196:   163, 

1338. 
Reisner  v.  Strong,  24  Kan.  410:  1047, 

1537. 
V.   Union  Depot  &  R.  R.   Co.,  27 

Kan.  382:  1203,  1210,  1322. 
Reitenbaugh  v.  Chester  Valley  R.  R. 

Co.,    21    Pa.    St.    100:    894,   897, 

991,  1005,  1017,  1359. 
Remey  v.   Iowa   Cent.   Ry.   Co.,   116 

Iowa  133:   1505. 
V.  Municipality  No.  2,  12  La.  Ann. 

500:   1097. 
Renard  v.  Grande,  29  Ind.  App.  579 : 

1192. 
Rennich  v.  Board  of  County  Comrs., 

45  Kan.  442:  1429. 
Rennsalaer   &   Saratoga   R.    R.    Co., 

Matter  of,  4  Paige  553,:    1318. 
Reno  Smelting  Works  v.  Stevenson, 

20  Nev.   269:    70. 
Rensselaer  v.  Leopold,   106  Ind.  29: 

178,  210,  369,  378,  388,  396,  401, 

402,  404,  743. 
Rensselaer  &  S.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis, 

43  N.  Y.  137 :  524,  525,  526,  1056, 

1061,  1063,  1064,  1066. 
V.  Davis,  55  N.  Y.  145 :  1437. 
Renthorp  v.  Bourg,  4  Martin   0.   S. 

(La.)   97:  23. 
Rentz  v.  Detroit,  48  Mich.  544:  1369, 

1429. 
Renwick  v.  D.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  49 

Iowa  664:   127,  1257. 
V.   D.   &   N.   W.   Ry.    Co.,    102  U. 

S.  180:   127. 
V.   New   York   El.    R.   R.    Co.,    59 

N.  Y.  Supr.  Ct.  591:   1584. 
Reny  v.  Municipality  No.  2,  15  La. 

Ann.  657:   1496. 
Reock  V.  Newark,  33  N.  J.  L.   129: 

1550. 


Respublica  v.  Sparhawk,  1  Dall.  357 : 

18. 
Republican  Valley  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ar- 
nold,  13   Neb.  485:    1119,   1]2<I, 
1128. 
V.  Fellers,  16  Neb.  169:   646,  848, 

]i51,  1550. 
V.  Fink,   18  Neb.   82:    1525,   1526, 
1634. 
-    V.  Hayes,  13  Neb.  489:  1124,  1136. 

V.  Linn,  15  Neb.  234:    1119. 
Rerick  v.  Kern,  14  S.  &  R.  267 :  858. 
Reserve  Tp.  Road,  2  Grant's  Cas.  204 : 

1371. 
Reserve  Tp.   Road,   80  Pa.   St.   165: 

778. 
Ressegien  v.  Sioux  City,  94  Iowa  543 : 

603. 
Restesky  v.  Delmar  Ave.  etc.  R.  R. 

Co.,  106  Mo.  App.  382:  63U. 
Rettinger  v.  Passaic,  45  N.  J.  L.  146 : 

1520. 
Reubel,  Matter  of,  52  Misc.  604 :  936, 

1561. 
Reuben  v.  Ontario  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  5 

Montreal  Supr.  Ct.  211:  1325. 
Reupert  v.  C.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  43  Iowa 

490:   1369. 
Reusch  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  57 

.  Iowa   687 :    527. 
Revell  V.  People,   177   111.  468:    109, 

115,  130. 
Revere  v.  Boston,  14  Gray  218:  1717. 
Revere  Water  Cd.  v.  Winthrop,  192 

Mass.  455:  408,  409. 
Rex  V.  Pease,  4  B.  &  A.  30:  451. 
Rexford  v.  Knight,  15  Barb.  627  :  808, 
1195. 
V.    Knight,    11    N.    Y.    308:     1164, 
1500,  1707,  1708. 
Reyenthaler  v.  PhilAdelphia,  160  Pa. 

St.  195:   1341. 
Reynolds,    Ex    parte,    52    Ark.    330: 

1466. 
Reynolds   v.   Baltimore   &   Ohio   Ry. 
Co.,   106  111.   152:    1113. 
V.  Barre,  63  Vt.  541:    1385. 
V.  Dunkirk  &  State  Line  R.  R.  Co., 

17  Barb.  613:  831. 
V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  110 

Mo.  484:   1186. 
V.  Louisiana  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  59  Ark. 

171:    1567,   1669. 
V.  Presidio  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,   1   Cal. 
App.    229:    314,   315,    639,   042, 
1588. 
V.    Reynolds,    15    Conn.    83:     510, 

519,  1390. 
V.   Shreveport,    13   La.   Ann.   426: 

211,  213,  238. 
V.  Shults,  106  Ind.  291 :  1406. 


ecxxxvi 


CASES    CITED, 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742  ;  Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Reynolds  v.  Spears,  1  Stew.  34 :  708. 
Keynoldsville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Buffa- 
lo etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  134  Pa.  St.  541 : 
771. 
Rhea  v.  Newport  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  50 

Fed.   16:    96. 
Rhelmer  v.  Stillwater  Ry.  &  Trans- 
fer Co.,  29  Minn.  147 :  1378. 
Rhine  v.  McKinney,  53  Tex.  354:  923, 

927,  928,   1572. 
Rhinebeck  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter  of, 

8  Hun  34:   1391,  1566,  1678. 
Rhinebeck  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter  of, 

67  N.  Y.  242 :  1678. 
Rhinehart  v.  Redfield,  93  App.  Div. 

410:    197. 
Rhoades  v.  Toledo,  6  Ohio  C.  C.  9: 

916,  1220. 
Rhode  Island  Hospital  Trust  Co.  v. 

Hayden,  20  R.  I.  544:   1255. 
Rhode  Island  Suburban  Ry.  Co.,  In 
re,  22  R.  I.  455:   498,  499,  525, 
593,  594,  720. 
Rhode  Island  Suburban  Ry.  Co.,  In 
re,  22  R.  I.  457:  498,  594,  508, 
,       525,  720. 

Rhodes  v.  Airedale  Drainage  Comrs., 

L.  R.  1  C.  P.  Div.  380:  652,  1529. 

V.    Airedale    Drainage   Comrs.,    L. 

R.  1  C.  P.  Div.  402:  652. 
V.   Brightwood,   145   Ind.   21:    877, 

887,  891. 
V.  Cissel,  82  Ark.  367:   109. 
V.  Cleveland,  10  Ohio  159:  214,  233. 
V.  Clivesdale  Dr.  Comrs.,  45  L.  J. 

Com.  Pleas  337 :  952. 
V.  Halvorson,  120  Wis.  99:   865. 
Rialto    Irr.    Dist.    v.    Brandon,    103 

Cal.  384:  723,  1068. 
Ricard  Boiler  &  Engine  Co.  v.  Toledo, 

6  Ohio  C.  C.  {N.  S.)  501:  358. 
Rice  v.  Alley,  1  Sneed  51:   516. 
V.  Danville,  Lancaster  etc.  Turnpike 

Co.,  7  Dana  81:   1182,  1423. 
V.  Chicago,  57  111.  App.  558:  1468, 

1558,  1561,  1673,  1675. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  30  III. 

App.  481:    306,  777. 
V.  Evansville,  108  Ind.  7:   142. 
V.   Flint,   67   Mich.   401:    153,   194, 

1489. 
V.  Norfolk  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  130  N. 

C.  375:   75,  79,  156. 
V.  Parkman,  16  Mass.  326:  458. 
V.  Rindge,  53  N.  H.  530:  513. 
V.   Ruddiman.    10   Mich.   125:    104, 

109,  110,  128. 
V.    Waterman,   5   Ohio   C.   C.   334: 

1030.      . 
V.  Wellman,  5  Ohio  C.  C.  334:  1058, 
1307,   1431,  1515. 


Rice  Exr.  v.  Barre  Turnpike  Co.,  4 

Pick.   130:    1558. 
Rich   V.    Chicago,   59   111.   286:    922, 

923    999. 
V.  Gow,  19  111.  App.  81:   1624. 
V.  Minneapolis,  37  Minn.  423 :  1489, 

1490,  1491. 
V.   New   York   El.   R.   R.    Co.,    16 

Daly  518:   1614. 
Richards  v.  Des  Moines  Valley  R.  R. 

Co.,  18  Iowa  259:  1535,  1578. 
V.  Dougherty,  133  Ala.  569:  455. 
V.    Ferguson    Implement   Co.,    125 

Mo.     App.  428:   533. 
V.   New    York   etc.   R.   R.    Co.,   77 

Conn.  501:   127,  129,  135. 
V.  Ohio  Riv.  R.  R.  Co.,  56  W.  Va. 

592:  89,  93,  151,  1639. 
V.  Wolf,  82  Iowa  358:   513. 
Richardson  v.  Centerville,  137  Iowa 

353:     1176,     1251,     1313,     1392, 

1443. 
v.  Curtis,  2  Cush.  341:  1115. 
V.  Davis,  91  Md.  390:   351,  372. 
V.  Eureka,  96  Cal.  443 :  90. 
V.  Levee  Comrs.,  58  Miss.  539:  440. 
V.    Levee    Comrs.,    68    Miss.    539: 

1340. 
V.    Levee    Comrs.,    77    Miss.    518: 

57,  91. 
V.  Lone  Star  Salt  Co.,  20  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  486:  351,  372,  1492. 
v.  Munson,  23  Conn.  94:  458. 
V.  Sioux  City,  136  Iowa  436:  236, 

1119,  1120,  1306,  1307,  1308. 
V.  Vermont  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  25 

Vt.  465:   256,  441. 
V.   Webster   City,    111    Iowa   427: 

236,   603,  618,  1123,   1125,   1306. 
Riche  V.  Bar  Harbor  Water  Co.  (Me.) 

28  Alb.  L.  J.  498:  501. 
V.  Bar  Harbor  Water  Co.,  75  Maine 

91:  536,  1026,  1163. 
Richert  Milling  Co.  v.  Freeburg,  217 

111.  384:    891. 
Richi   V.   Chattanooga   Brewing   Co.. 

105  Tenn.  651:   317,   1582,   1590^ 
Richland   School   Tp.   v.   Overmeyer, 

164  Ind.  382:  672,  673,  677,  678, 

815,   1068,   1070. 
Richman  v.  Board  of  Supervisors,  70 

Iowa  627:    972,   1414,   1419. 
V.  Board  of  Supervisors,  77  Iowa 

10:    513,   734. 
Richmond  v.  Gallego  Mills  Co.,   102 

Va.  165:  872. 
V.  James  River  &  Kanawha  Com- 
pany, 9   Leigh,  313:    1199. 
V.  James  Riv.  &  Kanawha  Co.,  12 

Leigh  278:    779. 
V.  Muire,  2  Rob.   (Va.)  458:  1085. 


CASES    CITED. 


CCXXXVll 


[The  references   are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Richmond  v.  Richmond  Nat.  Oas.  Co., 
108  Ind.  82:  481. 
V.  Smith,  148  Ind.  294:  347,  1595. 
V.  Smith,  101  Va.  161:   356. 
V.  Test,  18  Ind.  App.  482:  82. 
Richmond  etc.  Elec.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Sea- 
board Air  Line  Ry.  Co.,  103  Va. 
399:    1240,  1379. 
Richmond  etc.   R.   R.   Co.  v.   Chamb- 
lin,    100    Va.    401:     1229,    1272, 
1273. 
V.  Durham,  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  104  N. 

C.   658:    759,  857. 
V.  Estill  Co.,  105  Ky.  808:  321. 
>.   Humphreys,   90   Va.   425:    1152, 

1348,  1427. 
V.  Johnson,  103  Va.  456:  750. 
V.  Knopf,  86  Va.  981:   1425. 
V.  Louisa  R.  R.  Co.,  13  How.  71: 

415. 
%.    Thomas,    19    Ky.   L.    R.    1488: 

1545,  1548. 
V.  Wicker,  13  Gratt.  375:   818. 
Richmond  etc.  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Madi- 
son  Co.,    114   Ky.   351:    1263. 
Richmond  &  L.  Tunrpike  Road  Co.  v. 

Rogers,  1  Duvall  135:   1261. 
Richmond  JIanufaeturing  Co.  v.  At- 
lantic DeLaine  Co.,  10  R.  I.  100 : 
81. 
Richmond   Traction   Co.   v.   Murphy, 
98  Va.  104:   273,  296,  622,  1303. 
Rickert  v.  Philadelphia  etc.  Ry.  Co., 

15  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  32:  939. 
Rickett's  Case,  2  Eng.  &  Irish  App. 

193:   628. 
Rickett   V.   Metropolitan   Ry.   Co.,   5 
B.  &  S.  149:   645. 
V.   Metropolitan   Ry.   Co.,  L.  R.  2 
H.  L.  175:   645. 
Ricks  V.   Hall,   4   Porter    178:    1395. 
Riddell  v.  Animas  Canon  Toll  Road 

Co.,   5   Colo.   230:    911. 
Riddle  v.  Del.  Co.  Comrs.,  3  Pa.  Co. 

Ct.  598:   96. 
Riddle's    Exrs.    v.   Delaware   County, 

156  Pa.  St.  643:  95,  457,  1337. 
Ridenour    v.    SaflBn,    1    Handy    464: 

Rider  v.  Stryker,  2  Hun  115:    1108. 
V.  Stryker,  63  N.  Y.  136:   1164. 

Ridge   Ave.,   In  re,   99   Pa.    St.   409: 
612. 

Ridge  Ave.  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Phil- 
adelphia, 181  Pa.  St.  592:  352. 
V.   Philadelphia,   10  Phil.   37:    352. 

Ridge  Street,  In  re,  29  Pa.  St.  391: 
211,   1245,   1453. 

Ridge  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Stoever,  6  W. 
&  S.  378:   1493,  1636. 


Ridgeway   v.   Ludlow,   58   Ind.   248: 

109. 
V.   Osceola    (la.)    117  N.  W.  974: 

375,  377,  389,  391,  406. 
Ridgway  L.  &  H.  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania 

R.  R.  Co.,  18  Phila.  601:  776. 
Ridley  v.    Seaboard   etc.   R.   R.   Co., 

118   N.   C.   990:    92,   1649,   1653, 

1603. 
v.  Seaboard  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  124  N. 

C.  34:   94. 
Rieck  V.   Omaha,  73  Neb.  000:    947, 

1563. 
Riedman   v.  Mt.  Morris  Eleo.  Light 

Co.,  56  App.  Div.  23:  1615. 
Rifenburg  v.  Muskegon,  83  Mich.  279  : 

1027. 
Riggs  V.  St.  Francois  County  Ry.  Co., 

120  Mo.  App.  335:   285. 
V.  Winteroek,  100  Md.  439:    1362. 
Righter  v.   Jersey   City  Water   Sup- 
ply Co.,  73N.  J.  L.  298:  144. 
V.   Philadelphia,    161   Pa.   St.    73: 

846,  848,    1356. 
Rigney  v  Chicago,  102  111.  64:   383, 

645,  659,   663,   671. 
V.  Tacoma  Light  &  W.  Co.,  9  Wash. 

576:   70,  73,  74. 
Riker  v.  New  York,  3  Daly  174:  1343. 
Riley  v.  Buchman,  116  Ky.  025:  890. 
V.   Charleston   Union   Station   Co., 

67    S.    C.    84:    815,    1041,    1004, 

1066,  1067. 
V.   Charleston   Union   Station   Co., 

71    S.    C.    457:    527,    815,    1041, 

1055,     1063,     1064,     1060,     1007, 

1624. 
V.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  32  Pa. 

Supr.  Ct.  579:   .308,  1583. 
Rimback  v.  Essex  Co.  Bank,  62  N.  J. 

L.   494:    1404. 
Rinard  v.  Burlington  &  W.  R.  R.  Co., 

66  Iowa  440:   330. 
Rindge   v.    Sargent,    64   N.   H.   294: 

147. 
Rinehart  v.  Cowell,  44  N.  J.  L.  300: 

1416. 
Rines   v.    Portland,    93   Maine   227 : 

1403. 
Ring   v.   Mississippi   Bridge   Co.,   57 

Mo.  496:  1546. 
Ringle    v.    Board    of    Chosen    Free- 
holders, 56  N.  J.  L.  661:  1406. 
Rio  Grande  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ortiz, 

75   Tex.   602:    1540,    1541,    1542, 

1543,   1544,   1540. 

Rio  Grande  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Brownsville, 

45  Tex.  88:  322,  726. 
Ripley  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.,  L. 

R.  10  Ch.  App.  435:  628. 


CCXXXVlll 


CASES    CITED. 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Rippe  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  20 

Minn.   187:    1407. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  Minn. 

44:    1466. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  Minn. 

18:   125,  127,  129,  1135,  1407. 
Rische  v.  Texas  Trans.  Co.,  27  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  33:   291,  640. 
Rise  V.  Flint,  67  Mich.  401 :  456. 
Rising  Sun  &  Hartford  Turnpike  v. 

Hamilton,  50  Ind.  580:  980. 
Ritchie  v.  Kansas  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  55 

Kan.    38:     840,    841,    844,    864, 

1629. 
V.  People,  155  111.  98:  53,  477,  479. 
Rittenhouse    v.    Creasey,    2    Luzerne 

Leg.  Rep.    (Pa.)   241:   538. 
Riverhead  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter  of, 

36  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  514:  727. 
Riverside  v.  MacLain,,  210  111.  308: 

420,  784,  877,  879,  889,  892,  1494, 

1018. 
V.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  74  N.  J. 

L.  476:    865,   1630. 
Riverside  Cotton  Mills  v.  Lanier,  102 

Va.    148:    146. 
Riverside  Drive,  In  re,  83  Huu  50: 

1101. 
Riverside  Park,  Matter  of,  59  App. 

Div.  603:  687,  1319,  1565. 
Riverside  Park,  95   App.   Div.    552 : 

733. 
Riverside  Park,  Matter  of,  167  N.  Y. 

627:    687,   1319,    1565. 
Riverside  Park  Extension,  Matter  of, 

27  Misc.  373:  1227. 
Riverton    Ferry    Co.    v.    McKeesport 

etc.  Bridge  Co.,  179  Pa.  St.  460: 

1261,   1266. 
V.  McKeesport  &  D.  Bridge  Co.,  1 

Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  587:  413,  1340. 
Road  Case,  1  Brown  210:   1084. 
Road  Case,  6  Phila.  143:  971. 
Road  Case,  2  S.  &  R.  277:  1366,  1370. 
Road  Case,  2  S.  &  R.  419:  1413: 
Road  Case,  4  S.  &  R.  106:   171,  1421. 
Road,  Case  of,  9  S.  &  R.  35 :   982. 
Road  Case,  4  W.  &  S.  39 :  816:   1362. 
-Road  Case,  4  Yates  514:  516,  982. 
Road  Comrs.  v.  Fickinger,  51  Pa.  St. 

48:    1419. 
V.  Morgan,  47  Pa.  St.  276:  1083. 
Road  District  v.  Beebe,  231  111.  147 : 

865. 
Road   etc.,   In   re,   166   Pa.   St.    132: 

1058. 
Road   from   App.'s  Tavern,    17   S.   & 

R.  388:   1101. 
Road  from  Mrs.  Cully's,  13  S.  &  R. 

25:    1103. 
Road  in  Collins,  36  Pa.  St.  85:  1383.  ' 


Road  in  Upper  Darby,  2  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

366:  513. 
Road    Leading   etc.,    1    Brown    210: 

1100,  1101. 
Road  Notices,  4  Harr.  Del.  324 :  1020. 
Roads,  2  T.  B.  Mon.  91:   1030. 
Road   to   Ewing-s   Mill,    32   Pa.    St. 

282*    1103 
Road  to  York  Water  Co.,  24  Pa.  St. 

397:  733. 
Roake   v.   Am.    Tel.   &   Tel.   Co.,   41 

N.  J.  Eq.  35:  340. 
Roanoke    v.    Boiling,    101    Va.    182; 

468. 
Roanoke  City  v.   Berkowitz,  80  Va. 
616:  8,  673,  675,  809,  813,  1087, 
1344. 
Roanoke  Gas  Co.  v.  Roanoke,  88  Va. 

810:    238,   252. 
Roanoke    Investm^int   Co.   v.   Kansas 
City    etc.    R.    R.    Co.,    108    Mo. 
50:  840,  841,  1503,  1504. 
Roaring  Creek  Road,  11  Pa.  St.  356: 

713. 
Roath  V.  Driscoll,  20  Conn.  532:  161, 
165. 
V.  Driscoll,  20  Conn.  533:    161. 
Robb  V.   LaGrange,   158  111.  21:   83, 
1605. 
V.  LaGrange,  57  III.  App.  380:  84, 

453,  1613. 
V.  Maysville  &  Mt.  Sterling  Turn- 
pike   Road   Co.,    3    Met.    (Ky.) 
117:   1230. 
Robbins    v.    Barman,    1    Pick.    122: 
1493. 
V.  Bridgewater,  6  N.  H.  524:  1411, 

1516,    1526,    1528. 
V.  Guflfy,  20  Phila.  400:  439. 
V.  Lexington,  8  Cush.  292:   1411. 
V.   Milwaukee  &  H.  R.   R.   Co.,   6 

Wis.  636:  1135,1137,  1317. 
V.  Omaha  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  27  Neb. 

73:    1408. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  6  Wis.  636:  1165, 

1166. 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  Minn. 

286:    1330. 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  24  Minn. 

191:    1392. 
V.  Scranton,  217  Pa.  St.  577:  372, 

382,  391,  394,  647. 
V.  Willmon,  71  Minn.  403:  154. 
Robert  v.  Sadler,  37  Hun  377 :  1489. 
V.    Sadler,    104   N.   Y.   229:    1489, 
1490,  1491,  1594. 
Roberts  v.   Boston,    149   Mass.   346: 
1127,  1138,  1146. 
V.  Boston  &  Lowell  R.  E.  Co.,  115 
Mass.  57:   1428. 


OASES    CITED, 


ccxxxix 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.1 


Roberts  v.  Brown  Co.  Comrs.,  21  Kan. 

247:    1185. 
V.  Chicago,  26  III.  249:  210,  230. 
V.  Claremont  Ey.  &  Lt.  Co.,  73  N. 

H.   121:    1569. 
V.  Comrs.  of  Brown  Co.,  21  Kan. 

247:    1214. 
V.   Easton,    19    Ohio   St.   78:    973, 

1586. 
V.  Highway  Comrs.,  25  Mich.  23: 

973,  974,  1513,  1516. 
V.  Huntington  R.  R.  Co.,  56  Misc. 

62-    273. 
V.  Mathews,  137  Ala.  523:  366,  877, 

1596. 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  12  Misc. 

345:    941. 
V.  New  York   El.   R.  R.   Co.,   128 

N.  Y.  455:    1121,   1124. 
V.   New  York   El.   R.   R.   Co.,   155 

N.  Y.  31:   1334,  1355. 
V.  Northern   Pae.   R.   R.   Co.,    158 

V.  S.  1:  937,  1560. 
V.  Reed,  16  East  215:    1716. 
V.  Rust,  104  Wis.  619:  95,  1607. 
V.   Sioux  City  etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   73 

Neb.  8:  lOGl,  1478,  1479,  1520. 
v.  Smith,  115  Mich.  5:   13. 
V.  Stark,  47  N.  H.  223:    1029. 
V.    Williams,    13    Ark.    355:     1095, 

1413. 
V.  Williams,  15  Ark.  43:  512,  515, 

517,  706,  966,  1368. 
V.    Wisconsin    Telephone    Co.,    77 

Wis.  589:   682. 
Robertson    v.    Daviess    Gravel    Road 

Co.,  116  Ky.  913:  154. 
V.    Hartenbower,    120    Iowa    410; 

1411,  1412,  1673,  1701. 
Robey  v.  State,  76  Neb.  450:  533. 
Robins  v.  Milwaulcee  &  Horricon  R. 

R.  Co.,  6  Wis.  636:   1180. 
Robinson  v.  Brown,   182   Mass.   266: 

191,  370. 
V.   Great  Northern  R.  R.   Co.,   48 

Minn.  445:   211,  226. 
V.  Logan,   31   Ohio   St.   466:    1382. 
V.   Matherick,    5    Neb.    252:    1032, 

1518. 
V.   New   York   El.    R.   R.    Co.,    73 

App.  Div.  626:   1122,  1144. 
V.   New  York   El.   R.  E.   Co.,   175 

N.  Y.  219:   1122,  1144. 
V.   New   York   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   27 

Barb.  512:  86,  87,  166,  167,  401. 
V.  Norwood,  215  Pa.  St.  375:  1523. 
V.  Norwood,  27  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  481: 

1523,    1663. 
V.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  161  Pa. 

St.  561:  816,  1061,  1067,  1628. 
V.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  174  Pa. 

St.  199:  995. 


Robinson   v.    Ripley,    111    Ind.    112: 
698,  974,   1028. 
v.  Robinson,   1   Duvall   162:    1358, 

1366. 
V.  Southern  Cal.  Ry.  Co.,  129  Cal. 

8:   864,   1625,  1714. 
V.  Swope,   12  Bush.  21:   494,  495, 

519 
V.  West  Penn.  Ry.  Co.,  72  Pa.  St. 

316:   1500. 
V.  White,  42  Maine  209 :   109. 
V.   Winch,   66   Vt.    110:    513,   1020, 
1360,   1364,    1511,   1512. 
Robson  V.  Richey,  159  Ind.  660:  1374, 

1393. 
Roby  V.  New  York  Central  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  65  Hun  532:   1475. 
V.  New  York  Central  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
142  N.  Y.  176:  1476,  1477,  1503, 
1504. 
V.  South  Park  Comrs.,  215  111.  200: 

1397. 
V.  Yates,  70  Hun  35:  1475. 
Rochester,  In  re,  136  N.  Y.  83:  1534. 
Rochester,    In    re,    137    N.    Y.    243: 

1020. 
Rochester,  Matter   of,  97  App.   Div. 

642:  1437. 
Rochester,  Matter  of,  102  App.  Div. 

99:   929,  1396,  1424. 
Rochester,  Matter  of,  102  App.  Liiv. 

181:    938,   1011,   1174,   1556. 
Rochester,  Matter   of,  40  Hun  588: 

1119. 
Rochester,  Matter  of,  181  N.  Y.  322: 

1437. 
Rochester    v.    Sledge,    82    Ky.    344: 
1365. 
V.  West,  29  App.  Div.  125:   471. 
V.  West,   164  N.  Y.  510:   471. 
Rochester  Electric  R.  R.  Co.,  In  re, 
123   N.   Y.    351:    297,   299,   300, 
920,   1053. 
Rochester  Electric  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter 

of,  57  Hun  56:  683,  720,  912. 
Rochester  El.  R.  R.   Co.,   123  N.  \. 

351:   980. 
Rochester  etc.  C.  &  I.  Co.  v.  Berwind- 
White  Min.  Co.,  24  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 
104:    530. 
Rochester    etc.    R.    R.    Co.,    50    Hun 

29:    1357. 
Rochester  etc   Ry.  Co.,  Matter  of,  45 

Hun   126:    994. 

Rochester  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter  of. 

110  N.  Y.  119 :  754,  799,  900,  906. 

Rochester  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Beckwith, 

10  How.  Pr.  168:   1101,  1.385. 

V.  Budlong,  6  How.  Pr.  467:  1097, 

1124. 
V.  Budlong,  10  How.  Pr.  289:  1124, 
1125. 


ccxl 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Rochester  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Monroe 
County  Elec.  Belt  Line  Co.,  78 
App.  Div.  38:  910,  1620. 
V.  New  York  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  44  Hun 

206:   900. 
V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,   110 

N.  Y.  128:  900,  906,  908,  1019. 
V.  Rochester,   17   App.  Div.  N.  Y. 

257:  750,  1609. 
V.  Tolan,  116  App.  Div.  676:  1085. 
Rochester  etc.  Water  Co.  v.  Roches- 
ter, 84  App.  Div.  71:   358,  360, 
695. 
V.   Rochester,   176  N.  Y.  36:    358, 
360,  695. 
Rochester  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Robinson,  133 

N.  Y.  242:  977,  1074. 
Rochester  Water  Comrs.,  Matter  of, 
66  N.  Y.  413:  783,  799,  800,  959. 
Rochester  Water  Works  Co.  v.  Wood, 
60  Barb.  137:   1386. 
V.  Wood,  41  How.  Pr.  53:  1386. 
Rochester  White  Lead  Co.  v.  Roches- 
ter, 3  N.  Y.  463:  91. 
Rochette  v.  Chicago,  Mil.  &  St.  Paul 
Ry.  Co.,  32  Minn.  201 :  320,  351, 
370,  384. 
Rockafeller  v.  Northern  Central  Ry. 

Co.,  212  Pa.  St.  485:  392,  394. 
Rockford  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Coppinger, 
66  HI.  510. 
V.    Keyt,    117    111.   App.    32:    284, 

1233. 
V.  McKinley,  64  111.  338 :  1095. 
V.  Shuniek,  65  111.  223:  849. 
Rockford  Gas   etc.   Co.  v.   Ernst,   68 

III.  App.  300:   350. 

Rockingham  Co.  L.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Hobbs, 

72  N.  H.  531:  495,  496,  498,  501, 

508,  536,  537,  549,  591,  592,  6S2. 

Rock  Island  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dimiek, 

144  111.  628:  853,  8S4. 

V.  Gordon,  184  111.  456,  1229,  1236, 

1314,  1379. 
V.  Johnson,  204  111.  488:  246,  327. 

873. 
V.  Krapp,  74  111.  App.  158:   87. 
V.  Leisy  Brewing  Co.,  174  111.  547: 

1222,  1426,  1480. 
V.  Lynch,  23  III.   645:    1083,   1318. 
Rockland  Water  Co.  v.  Rockland,  83 
Me.  267:  352. 
V.  Tillson,  69  Me.  255:  849.  860. 
V.  Tillson,  75  Me.  170:  1496. 
Rockport  V.  Webster,  174  Mass.  385: 

808,  1495. 
Rockwell    V.    Bowers,    88    Iowa    88: 

1046,  1510,  1512,  1576. 
Rodemacher  v.  Milwaukee  &  St.  Paul 
R.   R.   Co.,  41  Iowa  297:    1456,  j 
1459. 


Rodgers  v.  Freemansburg,  2  Pa.  Co. 
Ct.  518:  991. 
V.  Parker,  9  Gray  445:  366,  392, 

406. 
V.  Philadelphia,   181  Pa.   St.  243: 
1453. 
Roe,  Matter  of,  59  Misc.  535 :  959. 
Roe  V.  Howard  Co.  75  Neb.  448:  155, 

1456. 
Roebling  v.  Trenton  Pass.  R.  R.  Co., 

58  N.  J.  L.  666:  272,  274. 
Roeck  V.  Newark,  33  N.  J.  L.   129: 

1525. 
Roehrborn  v.  Schmidt,  16  Wis.  519: 

1517,  1520. 
Roelker  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

50  Ind.  127:   1582. 
RofBngnac   Street  Widening,   4  Rob. 

La.  357:    1386,  1669. 
Rogers,  Ek  parte,  7  Cow.  526:   1101, 

1531. 
Rogers  v.   Coal  River  Boom  Co.,  39 
W.  Va.  272:  89,  1651,  1652. 
V.  Dock  Co.,  34  L.  J.  E(}.  105 :  952. 
V.    Freemansburg,    2    Pa.    Co.    Ct. 

518:   1029. 
V.  Kennebec  &  Portland  R.  R.  Co., 

35  Me.  319:   1639. 
V.  Omaha,  75  Neb.  318:  1527. 
V.    St.    Charles,    3    Mo.    App.    41: 

1701. 
V.  Venis,  137  Ind.  221 :  786.  976. 
Rogers  Place,  Matter  of,  65  App.  Div. 

1:  611. 
Rohn  Tp.  V.  Tamaqua  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

4  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  29:  920. 
Rohrer  v.  Harrisburg,  20  Pa.  Supr. 

Ct.  543:   155. 
Roll    V.   Augusta,    34   Ga.    326:    234, 

250. 
Rollins  V.  Atlantic   City  R.  R.  Co., 

70  N.  J.  L.  664:  1135. 
Roman  Catholic  Church  v.  Texas  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  41  Fed.  564:  841,  842. 
Romano  v.  Yazoo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  87 

Miss.  721:   1299,  1717. 
Rome   V.    Omberg,   28   Ga.    46:    229, 
1452. 
V.  Perkins,  30  Ga.  154:   1545. 
V.  Whitestown  W.  W.  Co.,  113  App. 
Div.   547:    536,   909,   1060,   1061, 
1066. 
V.  Whitestown  W.  W.  Co..  187  N. 
Y.    542:    536,    909,    1060,    1061, 
1066. 
Rome  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Gleason,  42 
N.  Y.  App.  Div.  530:  1245. 
V.  Jennings,  85  Ga.  444:   1259. 
V.  Ontario  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  Hun 
445:  772. 


OASES    CITED. 


ccxli 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages;   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;   Vol.  U,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Eominger  v.  Simmons,  88  Ind.  453: 

786,  1385,  1407. 

Rondout  etc.   R.   R.   Co.  v.   Dego,   5 

Lans.  298:    1097,   1359. 

v.  Field,  38  How.  Pr.  187:  1385. 

Rooker  v.  Perkins,  14  Wis.  79:  1345. 

Rooney  v.  Sacramento  Vallev  E.  R. 

Co.,  6  Cal.  638:   1557. 
Roosa  V.   Henderson  County,  59  III. 
446:    1424. 
V.  St.  Joseph  &  I.  R.  R.  Co.,  114 
'      Mo.  508:  926,  1511. 
Roosevelt  v.  Godard,  52  Barb.  533: 
15,  470. 
V.  New  York  EI.  R.  R.  Co.,  57  N. 
Y.  Supr.  Ct.  438:    1121. 
Roper  V.  New  Britain,  70  Conn.  459: 

1529. 
Rosa   V.   Missouri,   Kansas   etc.    Ry. 
Co.,  18  Kan.  124:  430,  431,  95G. 
V.  St.  Joseph  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,   114 
Mo.  309:  1626. 
Rose  V.  Farmington,  196  111.  226:  846. 
1379. 
V.  Groves,  5  M.  &  G.  613:   128. 
V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  128 

Mo.  135:   1098,  1360,  1370. 
V.  New  York  etc.  E.   R.   Co.,   108 

App.  Div.  206:  1379. 
V.  St.  Charles,  49  Mo.  509:  91,  157, 

234. 
V.  Taunton,  119  Mass.  99:   1143. 
V.  Washington  Co.,  42  Neb.  1 :  970. 
Eosenberger  v.  Miller,  61  Mo.  App. 

422:   884,  890. 
Eosenthal  v.  Taylor  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  79 
Tex.  325:  1294,  1649,  1657,  1662. 
Rosentiel  v.  Miller,  96  Mich.  99 :  996. 
Ross  V.  Adams,  28  N.  J.  L.  160:  1534. 
V.  Board  of  Supervisors,  128  Iowa, 
427:   690,  696,  1004,   1009,  1011, 
1034,  1036,  1395,  1398. 
V.  Chicago,  Burlington  &  Quincy  R. 
R.  Co.,  77  111.  127:  835,  851,  852, 
861. 
V.  Cincinnati  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  5  Ohio 

C.  C.   (N.  S.)    565:  450. 
V.  Clinton,  46  Iowa  606 :  235. 
V.  Davis,  97  Ind.  79:  501,  566,  575, 

1192. 
V.  Elizabethtown  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  2 

N.  J.  Eq.  422:   1537,  1570. 
V.  Elizabethtown  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  20 

N.  J.  L.  230:  952,  1025,  1369. 
V.  Faust,  54  Ind.  471:   103. 
V.  Georgia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  33  S.  C. 

477:  1523. 
V.  Grand  Trunk  E.  R.  Co..  10  Ont. 

447:  864,  1713. 
V.  Long  Branch,  73  N.  J.  L.  292: 
421,  913,  1494. 


Rosa  V.  Metropolitan  R.  R.  Co.,  57  N. 

Y.  Supr.  412:   1145,  1357. 
V.  Pennsylvania  E.  E.  Co.,  17  Phil. 

339:  1505. 
Ross  Tp.  Road,  4  Luzerne  Leg.  Reg. 

Rep.  67:  1105. 
Eoss  Township  Road,  36  Pa.  St.  87: 

400,  985,  1100,  1384. 
Rosser  v.  Randolph,  7  Porter  238 :  95, 

1614. 
Eossiter   v.    Russell,    18    N.   H.    73: 

1462. 
Rossmiller  v.   State,    114   Wis.   169: 

109,  115,  128,  140. 
Rostraver  Tp.  Eoad,  34  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

176:  1100,  1101. 
Rothan  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  E.  E.  Co., 

113  Mo.  132:  927,  1160,  1463. 
Rothschild  v.  Chicago,  227  HI.  205: 

199. 
Roughton  v.  Atlanta,   113  Ga.   948: 

629. 
Rounds  V.  Mumford,  2  R.  I.  154:  212, 

238. 
Rourke  v.   Central  Mass.   Elec.   Co., 

177  Mass.  46:   1122. 
V.    Central    Mass.    Elec.    Co.,    177 

Mass.  48:  1122. 
V.  Kings  County  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  22 

App.  Div.  511:   1145. 
Rousey  v.  Wood,  47  Mo.  App.  471: 

1511. 
v.  Wood,  57   Mo.   App.   650:    706, 

1514,  1516. 
V.  Wood,   63  Mo.  App.  460:    1511, 

1516. 
Roushlange  v.   Chicago  &  A.   E.   R. 

Co.,  115  Ind.  106:  456,  837,  846, 

847,  1476. 
Eout  V.  Mountjoy,  3  B.  Mon.   300: 

51G,  519,  1017,  1027,  1359. 
Eovvan  v.  Portland,  8  B.  Mon.  232: 

131,  305,  366,  880. 
Rowe  V.  Addison,  34  N.  H.  306:  235. 
V.  East  Orange,  69  N.  J.  L.  600: 

1029,  1085. 
V.  Granite  Bridge  Corp.,  21  Pick. 

344:   86,  112. 
V.Rochester,  22  U.  C.   C.  P.   319: 

156. 
V.  Rochester,    29  U.  C.  Q.  B.  590: 

156,  233. 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  41  Minn. 

384:  148,  157. 
Rowland  V.  Miller,  139  N.  Y.  93:  429. 
Rowzee  v.  Pierce,  75  Miss.  846:  420, 

1494. 
Eoxedale  v.  Seip,  32  La.  Ann.  435: 

400,  401. 
Eoyce  v.  Carpenter,  80  Vt.  37:    92, 

1604. 


ccxlii 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Royston  v.  Royston,  21  Ga.  161:  943. 
Rozell  V.  Anderson,  91  Ind.  591 :  142. 
Rube  V.  Sullivan,  23  Neb.  779:  884. 
Rubel  V.  Title  Guarantee  &  Trust  Co., 

199  111.  110:   1260. 
Rubottom  V.  MeClure,  4  Blackf .  505 : 

1163,  1165. 
Ruch  V.  New  Orleans,  43  La.  Ann. 

275:  433,  440. 
Ruckert  v.  Grand  Ave.  Rv.  Co.,  163 

Mo.  260:  272,  296,  622,  642. 
Rudd  V.  Farmville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  2 

Va.  Dec.  346:  1461. 
Ruddick  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  E.  R.  Co., 

116  Mo.  25:  855. 
Ruddiman  v.  Taylor,  95  Mich.  547: 

874,  878. 
Rude  V.  St.  Louis,  93  Mo.  408:  312, 

648. 
V.  St.  Marie,  121  Wis.  634:  583. 
Rudel  V.  Los  Angeles  Co.,   118   Cal. 

281:  79. 
Rudisill  V.  State,  40  Ind.  485:   1100. 
Rudolph  V.  Penn.  S.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  6 

Mont.  Co.  L.  R.  114:   1071. 
V.  Pennsylvania  S.  V.  R.  R.  Co., 

160  Pa.  St.  430:   530,  818. 
V.  Pennsylvania  S.  V.   R.   R.   Co., 

186  Pa.  St.  541:  1211,  1313. 
Ruduyai  v.  Harwinton,  79  Conn.  91 : 

154. 
Ruehl  V.  Voight,  28  Wis.  153:    1708. 
Rugby  Portland  Cement  Co.  v.  Lon- 
don etc.  Ry.  Co.,  (1908)   1  K.  B. 

925:   12G9. 
V.  London  etc.  Ry.  Co.,    (1908)    2 

K.  B.  006:   1269. 
Rugg  V.  Commercial  Union  Tel.  Co., 

66  Vt.  208:  343. 
Ruggles  V.  Illinois,   108  U.   S.  526: 

480,  482. 
V.  Lesun,  24  Pick.  187 :  858. 
Rugheimer,  In  re,  36  Fed.  369:   969, 

1199,  1230. 
Rugsdale  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  60  S. 

C.  381:  1475. 
Ruhland  v.  Supervisors,  55  Wis.  664 : 

1099. 
Rumsey  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  E.  Co., 

63  Hun  200:    1651,  1658. 
V.  New  York  &  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co., 

114  N.  Y.  423:   122. 
V.  New  York  &  N.  E.  R.  R.   Co., 

125  N.  Y.  681:   122,  131,  133. 
V.  New  York  &  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co. 

130  N.  Y.  88,  28  N.  E.  763 :'  122. 
V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.   Co.,   133 

N.  Y.  79:  102,  122,  123,  127,  128, 

129,  131,  1338. 
V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  136  N. 

Y.  543:   122,  131,  1338. 


Rundell  \.  Blakeslee,  47  Mich.  575: 

1058,  1366. 
Eundle  v.  Delaware  &,  Raritan  Canal 

Co.,  14  How.  80 :   108. 
Runner    \.    Keokuk,    11    Iowa    543: 

1406. 
Runshart   v.    Railroad    Co.,    54    Ga. 

579:  1536. 
Runyon  v.  Altan,  78  Minn.  31 :  1399, 

1405. 
Ruppert  V.  West  Side  Belt  R..R.  Co., 

25  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  013:   441. 
Eusch  V.  Milwaukee,  L.  &  W.  Ry.  Co., 

54  Wis.  136;  1369. 
Ruscomb   Street,   30   Pa.   Super.   Ct. 

476:   364,  392,  394,  403. 
Ruscomb  St.,  33  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  148: 

382,  392,  394,  403. 
Rush  V.  McDermctt,  50  Cal.  471:  831. 
Huston  V.   Grimwood,   30   Ind.   364: 

1360. 
Rushton    V.    Martin,    43    Ala.    555: 

1094,  1367. 
Rushville  v.  RushviUe  Nat.  Gas  Co., 

132  Ind.  575:  408,  481. 
Rusk  V.  Berlin,  173  111.  634:  874. 
Russ  V.  Pennsylvania  Tel.  Co.,  15  Pa. 

Co.  Ct.  226:   343,  1594. 
Russell  V.  Burlington,  30  Iowa  262: 

211,  235,  238. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  Elee.  Ry.  Co.,  205 

111.  155 :  305,  366,  874,  886,  888, 

891,  1588. 
V.  Lincoln,  200  111.  511:  366,  873, 

874,  879,  889,  1491. 
V.  New  Bedford,  5  Gray  31 :  1707, 

1708. 
V.  New  York,  2  Denio,  461:  16,  17. 
V.  St.  Louis  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  71  Ark. 

451:  684,  1243,  1339. 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  33  Minn. 

210:   1230. 
V.  Turner,  62  Me.  496:  978,  995. 
Russell  Mills  v.  Co.  Comrs.,  16  Gray 

347:  1526. 
Rutherford's    Case,    72   Pa.    St.    82: 

1005,  1013,  1014. 
Rutherford  v.   Davis,   95    Ind.    245: 

1510,  1512. 
V.  Holley,  105  N.  Y.  632 :  235. 
V.  Hudson  Riv.  Traction  Co.,  73  N. 

J.  L.  227:   302. 
Rutherford's  Road,  10  S.  &  R.  120: 

1359. 
Rutland  v.  County  Comrs.,  20  Pick. 

71:   1030. 
V.  Supervisors,  55  Wis.  664:   1096. 
Rutland-Canadian  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cent. 

Vt.   Ry.    Co.,   72   Vt.    128:    760, 

793,  794,  797,  798. 


OASES    CITEB. 


ccxliii 


7The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Rutland  El.  Lt.  Co.  v.  Marble  City 

El.  Lt.  Co.,  65  Vt.  377:  911. 
Rutland  K.  R.  Co.  v.  Chaffee.  71  Vt. 
84:   953,  1477,  1631,  1633. 
V.  Chaffee,  72  Vt.  404:  953,  1477, 
1631,  1633. 
Rutledge  v.  Drainage  Comrs.,  16  111. 

App.  655:   1506,  1602. 
Ryan  t.  Boston,  118  Mass.  248:  605, 
1309. 
V.  Brown,  18  Mich.  196:  470. 
V.  Hoffman,  26  Ohio  St.  109 :  1531, 

1683. 
V.  Mississippi  Val.  etc.  R.  E.  Co., 

62  Miss.  162:  864. 
V.  Pennsylvania  S.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  2 

Mont.  Co.  L.  R.  31:  641,  1524. 
V.  Preston,  59  App.  Div.  97:  357. 
V.  Preston,  32  Misc.  92:  357. 
V.   Terminal   Co.,    102   Tenn.    Ill: 
498,  500,  503,  508,  527,  591,  675, 
739,  1056,  1060. 
Rvan  Tp.  Road,  3  Luzerne  Leg.  Reg. 
Rep.  76:   1091,  1094,  1100,  1101. 
Ryckman  v.  Gillis,  6  Lans.  79:  442. 
Ryder  v.  Brooklyn  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  89 
Hun  29:   1301. 
V.    Horsting,    130    Ind.    104:    962, 
1004,  1510,  1513. 
Ryers,  Matter  of,  72  N.  Y.   1:    564, 

569,  570,  578,  584. 
Ryerson  v.  Brown,  35  Mich.  333 :  502, 

551. 
Eyker  v.  McElroy,  28  Ind.  179:  516. 


Sabetto  v.  New  York  Cent.  etc.  R.  R. 

Co.,  127  App.  Div.  832:   153. 
Sabin  v.  Vermont  Central  R.  R.  Co., 

25  Vt.  363:  435,  436,  1455,  1450. 
Sabine  v.  Johnson,  35  Wis.  185:  937, 

960. 
Sabine   etc.   R.   R.   Co.   v.   Brousard, 

69  Tex.  617:   158,  159. 
V.  Brousard,  75  Tex.  597:  93. 
V.  Gulf  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  92  Tex.  1G2: 

760,  768. 
V.  Johnson,  65  Tex.  389 :  152. 
Sacks  V.  Minneapolis,  75  Minn.  30: 

784. 
Sacramento  etc.  R.  R.  Co,  v.  Harlan, 

24  Cal.  334:  930,  1425. 
Sacramento  Val.  E.   R.   Co.  v.  Mof- 

fatt,  6  Cal.  74:   1316. 
V.  Moffatt,  7  Cal.  577 :  1557. 
Sadd   V.   Maddon   Ry.    Co.,    6    Exch. 

143:  814. 
Sadler  v.  Langham,  34  Ala.  311 :  404, 

497,  499,  516,  517,  551,  552,  593, 

674,  1163. 
Sadlier  v.  New  York,  104  App.  Div. 

82:  454. 


Sadlier  v.   New  York,  40  Misc.  78: 
454. 
V.  New  York,  185  N.  Y.  408:  454. 
Sadorus  v.   Black,   65   111.  App.   72: 

1488. 
Sadsbury  Tp.  Roads,  In  re,  147  Pa. 

St.  471:  992. 
Sage  V.  Brooklyn,  89  N.  Y.  189:  1158, 
1164,  1168,  1171,  1526,  1530. 
V.  New  York,   10  App.   Div.  294: 

129. 
V.  Ne\v  York,  154  N.  Y.  61:   122, 
132. 
Saginaw  v.  Campau,  102  Mich.  594: 

1085. 
Saginaw  etc.  R.  R.   Co.  v.  Bordner, 
108  Mich.  236:  524,  1027,  1061. 
Sahr  V.  Scholle,  89  Hun  42:  486. 
St.  Albans  v.  Seymour,  41  Vt.  579: 

940. 
St.  Anthony  etc.  Co.  v.  King  Bridge 

Co.,  23  Minn.  186:  1489. 
St.  Anthony  Falls  Water  Power  Co. 
V.   St.  Paul  Water  Comrs.,   168 
U.    S.    349:    106,    110,    114,    138, 
1432. 
St.   Charles  v.  Rogers,  49  Mo.  530: 
1412. 
\.  Stuart,  49  Mo.  132:   1412. 
St.   Clair  v.   San  Francisco  etc.  Ry. 

Co.,  142  Cal.  647:   639. 
St.  Francis  Levee  Dist.  v.  Redditt,  79 

Ark.  154:  928,  1570. 
St.   Francois   Co.   v.   Marks,   14  Mo. 
539:   1531. 
V.  Peers,  14  Mo.  ,537:   1531. 
St.  Helena  Water  Co.  v.  Forbes,  62 

Cal.  182:  69,  73,  536. 
St.  Johnsbury  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wil- 

lard,  61  Vt.  134:  1347. 
St.  Johnsville  v.  Smith,  61  App.  Div. 
.380:  1395. 
V.  Smith,  90  App.  Div.  618:   1352. 
v.    Smith,    184    N.    Y.    341:     1144, 
1352,  1634. 
St.  Joseph  V.  Geiwetz,  148  Mo.  210: 
923,  1034,  1186,  1387. 
V.   Hamilton,    43    Mo.    282:    1669, 

1673. 
V.  Zimmerman,  142  Mo.  155:   710, 
1158. 
St.  Joseph  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Baldwin, 
7  Neb.  247:  956. 
V.   Callender,   13   Kan.   496:    1626, 

1628,  1632. 
V.  Cudmore,  103  Mo.  634:   24,  920. 
V.  McCarty,  3  Neb.    (Unof.)    626: 

158. 
V.   Orr,   8   Kan.   419:    1145,    1203, 
1224. 


ccxliv 


CASES    CITED. 


JThe  references   are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


St. 

St. 

St. 

St. 
St. 
St. 

St. 

V. 
V. 

V, 


Joseph  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Sham- 
baugh,  106  Mo.  557:  926,  1010, 
1047,  1318. 

Joseph  Hydraulic  Co.  v.  Cincin- 
nati etc.  k  R.  Co.,  109  Ind.  172: 
1510,  1512,  1520,  1631. 
Joseph  Terminal  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Han- 
nibal etc.  R.  R.  Co.  94  Mo.  535: 
1045. 

Julien  \i.  Morgan's  La.  &  Tex.  R. 
R.  Co.,  35  La.  An.  924:  1631. 
Lawrence  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  In  re, 
133  N.  Y.  270:  971,  1469. 
Lawrence  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter 
of,  66  Hun  306:  1164,  1170, 
1467. 

Louis  v.  Annex  Realty  Co.,   175 
Mo.  63:   1719. 
.  Bell  Tel.  Co.,  96  Mo.  623:   341. 

Bissell,   46  Mo.   157:    852. 

Brown,   155  Mo.   545:   498,  503, 
710,  1085,  1271. 

Conn.  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.,  90 
Mo.  135:  807,  1331. 

Conn.  Mut.   Life  Ins.   Co.,    107 
Mo.  92:  492. 

.  Cruikshank,  16  Mo.  App.  495: 
915. 

Frank,   9   Mo.   App.   579:    976, 
1074. 

Franks,   78   Mo.   41:    706,   913, 
915. 

Gait,  179  Mo.  8:  468,  473. 
Gleason,  89  Mo.  67:   918. 

Gleason,  15  Mo.  App.  25:   918, 
972    1035 
Gurno,  12  Mo.  414:  211,  234. 

Hill,   116  Mo.   527:    53,   54,   56, 
67,  433. 

Lang,    131   Mo.   412:    25,    1381. 
Lanigan,  97  Mo.  175:  1425,  1426. 
Lawton,  189  Mo.  474:   1380. 
Meintz,  107  Mo.  611:    1442. 
Missouri  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  114  Mo. 
13:    130,   131,  322,  1629. 
Nelson,  169  Mo.  461:    1399. 

Roe,    184    Mo.    324:    926. 
Speck,  67  Mo.  403:   13. 
Stern,  3  Mo.  App.  48:  484. 

Stern,   3  Mo.  Ap.   694:    14. 

Stoddard,    15    Mo.    App.    173: 
699. 

Terminal  R.   R.  Ass.,   211    Mo. 
364:  180. 

Thomas,  100  Mo.  223:    1422. 
Weber,  140  Mo.  515:    1381. 

Western    Union    Tel.    Co.,    148 
U.  S.  92:  463. 

Western    Union    Tel.    Co.,    149 
U.   S.  465:    343,  463. 
Wetzel,   110  Mo.  260:    1378. 


St. 


St. 


Louis  Belt  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cartan 

Real    Est.    Co.,    204    Mo.    565: 

1106,  1187,  1201,  1269. 
.  Mendonza,  193  Mo.  518:  1314. 

Louis  Brewing  Ass.  v.  St.  Louis, 

168  Mo.  37:  1669,  1695. 

Louis  County,  58  Mo.  175:   1067. 

Louis    Co.    Ct.    V.    Griswold,    58 

Mo.  175:  498. 

Louis  etc.  Elec.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Van 

Hoorebeke,  191  111.  633:  846,  851, 

1445. 

Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Almeroth, 

62   Mo.   343:    1385. 
V.   Anderson,   39   Ark.    167:    1118, 

1127,    1128,    1203,    1309,    1314, 

1316. 
V.    Anderson,    62    Ark.    360:    149, 

151,  1716. 
T.  Aubuchon,   199  Mo.  352:    1118, 

1210,  1430. 
V.  Barnsback,  234  111.   344:    1122, 

1315,  1377. 
V.  Belleville,   122  111.  376:   886. 
v.  Belleville,  20  111.  App.  580:  301. 
V.   Belleville   City  R.   R.   Co.,   158 

111.   390:    754,   799,  1047. 
V.  Biggs,  52  Ark.  240:  1654,  1655. 
V.  Bradley,  4  C.   C.  A.  528:    1129. 
V.    Bradley,    54    Fed.    630:     1127, 

1132. 

Brady,  83  Ark.  489:    846. 

Brooksher,  86  Ark.  91:  87,  849, 

1124,  1125,  1456. 

Brown,  58  111.  61:   1209. 
Brown,   34   111.   App.   552:    92, 

94,  1639. 

Capps,  67  111.  607:   021. 

Capps,  72  111.  188:   621. 
Chapman,   38   Kan.   307:    1128, 

1233. 

Clark,  119  Mo.  357:  1461,  1463, 

1465,  1466,  1471. 

Clark,  121  Mo.  169:  1138,  1247, 

1342,  1477,  1483. 

Continental  Brick  Co.,  198  Mo. 

698:  1128,  1239,  1243,  1271, 

1314. 

Craigo,  10  Tex.  Civ.  App.  238: 

87. 

Crandall,  75  Ark.  89:  843,  850, 

851,  853. 

Davenport,  80  Ark.  244:  846. 

Davis,  75  Ark.  283:  867. 
Donovan,  149  Mo.  93:  1114, 

1408,  1430. 

Drennan,  26  111.  App.  263:  1636. 

Drummond  R.  &  I.  Co.,  205  Mo. 

167:   1389. 


OASES    CITED. 


ccxlv 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dudgeon, 

64  Ark.   108:   1517. 
V.   Eby,    152   Mo.   606:    1354. 
V.  Evans  &  Howard  Fire  Brick  Co., 

85  Mo.  307:    1423,  1430,  1403. 
V.  Evans  &  Howard  Fire  Brick  Co., 

15    Mo.    App.    152:     1430,    1463. 
V.  Fayetteville,  75  Ark.  532:   677, 

678,  749,  1288. 
V.  Foltz,  52  Fed.  627 :  086,  1631. 
V.  Fowler,   113  Mo.  458:   980,  982, 

1031,  1225,  1322. 
V.  Fowler,  142  Mo.  670:  1149,  H86, 

1202,  1217,  1245. 
V.   Gill,    156   U.    S.   649:    480,   483. 
V.  Gordon,   157  Mo.  71:   881,  883. 
v.  Grayson  Co.,  31  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

611:  956. 
V.   Guswelle,    236    111.    214:    1140, 

1314. 
V.   Haller,   82   111.   208:    621,   778, 

780,  1138. 
V.   Hammers,   51    Kan.    127:    1312. 
V.  Hanks,  80  Ark.  417:   84G. 
V.  Hannibal  Union  Depot  Co.,  125 

Mo.  82:  726,  754,  760,  797,  798. 
V.  Harris,  47   Ark.   340:    87,   848. 
V.  Henderson,  86  Tex.  307 ;  853. 
V.  Hoshall,  82  Ark.  387:  92,  1038, 

1653. 
V.    Hurst.    14   111.   App.   419:    154, 

846,  847,  1455. 

V.    Hurst,    25    111.    App.    98:    154, 

847,  1455. 

V.  Jacobs,  44  La.  Ann.  922:    1456. 
V.  Karnes,  101   111.  402:    1519. 
V.  Kirby,  104  111.  345:   1195,  1318. 
V.    Kirkwood,    159   Mo.    239:    303. 
V.  Knapp,   Stout   &   Co.,   160   Mo. 

396:  995,  1186,  1202,  1230,  1247, 

1271,  1277,  1311,  1471. 
V.    Lewriabt,    113    Mo.    660:     684, 

921,  982,  1435. 
V.  Lindell  Ry.   Co.,   190  Mo.   246: 

328,  881. 
V.  Lux,  63  111.  523:   1398. 
V.  Lvman,   57   Ark.   512:  ,90,   1120, 

1131,  1649,  1653. 
T.    Martin,    29    Kan.     750:     1441, 

1443. 
V.    McAuliff,    43    Kan.    185:    1310, 

1314. 
V.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  114  Mo.  13: 

132. 
V.  Mitchell,  47  111.  165:  1246,  1318. 
V.  Moldenhauer,  130  Mo.  App.  243; 

1461.  1471. 
V.  Mollett,  59   111.   235:    1267. 
r.   Morris,    35    Ark.    622:    90,    93, 

95,   158.   847,    1199.   1200,   1456, 

1648,  1653,  1715,  1716. 


St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Morse,  50 

Kan.   99:    1400. 
V.  Neely,  63  Ark.  630:   306. 
V.  North,  31  Mo.  App.  345:   1112, 

1311,  1315. 
V.  Nyce,  61  Kan.  394:   1346,  1347, 

1564. 
V.  Oliver,  17  Okla.  589:  1225,  1312, 

1321,  1324,  1515. 
V.   Petty,   57   Ark.   359;    524,   534, 

731,  816,  1068. 
V.   Petty,   63   Ark.   94:    1072. 
V.  Pfau,  212  Mo.  398:   1150,  1271, 

1314. 
V.  P.  0.  &  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  42  Ark. 

249:  909,  1281. 
v.    Postal    Tel.    Co.,    173    El.    508: 

895,  934,  994,  1176,  1247,  1285, 

1286. 
V.  Quinn,  24  Kan.  370:   1399. 
V.  Ramsey,  53  Ark.  314:   104,  lOfa, 

107. 
V.  Richardson,  45  Mo.  466:    1186. 
V.  Royall,  75  Ark.  530:    1288. 
V.  Ruddell,  53  Ark.  32;   833. 
V.    Russell,    150    Mo.    453:     1408, 

1430. 
V.  St.  Louis  Union  Stock  Yard  Co., 

120   Mo.   541:    1120,   1123,   1186, 

1217. 
V.  Saunders,  78  Ark.  589:  90. 
V.  Saunders,  84  Ark.  Ill:  90. 
V.    Schneider,    30    Mo.    App.    620: 

135.  147,  157. 
V.    Sliaw,    99    Tox.    559:    450,    655, 

661. 
V.  Smith,  42  Ark.  265:    1144. 
V.  Smith,  216  111.  339:   1318,  1332, 

1339. 
V.  S.  W.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  121  Fed. 

276;    701,    773.    894,    931,    932, 

1048.  1286,  1624. 
V.    Springfield    etc.    R.    R.    Co.,    96 

111.  274;  764. 
V.  State,  85  Ark.  561;  1643. 
V.  Stewart,  201  Mo.  491;   1216. 
V.    Sullivan,    7    Kan.    App.    527; 

94. 
V.  Teters,  68  111.  144:    1312,  1392, 

1673,  1675. 
V.  Thomas.  34  Fed.  774;  673,  675. 
V.  Tropp,  64  Ark.  357 ;  859. 
V.  Trustees.  43  111.  303:   786. 
V.  Union  Trust  &  S.  Co.,  209  111. 

457:  1379. 
V.  Wabash  Ry.  Co.,  152  Fed.  849: 

762. 
V.    Wallrink,    47    Ark.    330;     847, 

1319. 
V.  Wilder,  17  Kan.  239;  939,  1392, 

1673. 


ccxlvi 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1710.] 


St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Winkle- 
man,  47  111.  App.  276:  91. 
V.  Yarborough,  56  Ark.  612:    158, 

1132,  1649,  1654. 
V.  Yount,  67  Kan.  396:  853,  1545. 
St.  Louis  Gas  Lt.   Co.  v.   St.  Louis 
Gas  F.  &  P.  Co.,   16  Mo.  App. 
52:  411. 
St.  Louis  Merchant's  Bridge  Terminal 
Ry.  Ass.  V.  Schultz,  226  111.  409 : 
151,  1654. 
St.  Louis  Merchants'  Bridge  Terminal* 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Schulz,  126  111.  App. 
552:   91. 
St.  Louis  Nat.  Stock  Yards  v.  Wig- 
gins   Ferry    Co.,    112    111.    384: 
857,  859. 
St.  Louis  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Northwestern 
R.  R.   Co.,  2  Mo.  App.  69:   719. 
V.  Northwestern  St.  Louis  Ry.  Co., 

69  Mo.  65:  412,  1608. 
V.  Postal  Tel.   Cable  Co.,   173  111. 

508:  773. 
V.  Southern  R.  R.  Co.,  138  Mo.  591 : 

1695. 
V.  Thomas,  34  Fed.  774:  673. 
St.  Louis  Transfer  R.  R.  Co.  v.  St. 
Louis   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,    100   Mo. 
419:  771. 
V.   St.  Louis  Merchants'   B.  &  T. 
R.    R.    Co.,    Ill   Mo.    066:    765, 
769. 
St.  Michael's  P.  E.  Church  v.  Forty- 
second    St.    etc.    R.    R.    Co.,    26 
Misc.   601:   277. 
St.  Nicholas  Terrace,  In  re,  76  Hun 

209:    1253. 
St.  Nicholas  Terrace,   In   re,   143  N. 

Y.  621:    183,  878,   1253. 
St.  Paul  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  Co.,  45 
Minn.  387:    1492. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  63  Minn. 

330:   197,  199. 
V.  Nickl,  42  Minn.  262:    679,  927, 

928,  1009,  1057. 

St.    Paul    etc.    Ry.    Co.,    In    re,    34 
Minn.  227:  498,  747,  1045,  1061, 
1423. 
St.   Paul   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   In  re,   37 

Minn.  164:   767,  769. 
St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Covell,  2 
Dak.  483:    1097. 
V.  Duluth,  56  Minn.  494:    142. 
V.  Matthews,  16  Minn.  341:   1137, 

1364. 
V.  Minneapolis,  35  Minn.  141:  749, 

929,  1011. 

V.  Minneapolis,  44  Minn.  149:  881, 

883. 
V.  Minneapolis,  45  Minn.  400 :  1492. 


St.  Paul  etc.  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Murphy, 

19  Minn.  500:   1112,  1186,  1209, 

1213,  1310,  1311. 
V.  St.  Paul  U.  D.   R.  R.   Co.,  44 

Minn.  325:   862. 
St.    Paul    Union    Depot    Co.    v.    St. 

Paul,  30  Minn.  359 :  750,  755. 
St.  Peter  v.  Denison,  58  N.  Y.  416: 

435,  436,  688,  1507. 
St.  Tammany  Water  Works  v.  New 

Orleans  Water  Works,  120  U.  S. 

64:  410,  736. 
St.  Thomas  Hospital  v.  Charing  Cross 

Ry.  Co.,  1  J.  &  H.  400 :  823. 
St.  Vincent  V.  Greenfield,  12  Ontario 

297:  913. 
St.  Vincent  Orphan  Asylum  v.  Troy, 

76  N.  Y.  108:  1492. 
Salazar  v.  Smart,  12  Mont.  395:  587, 

1603. 
Salem  v.  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.,  98  Mass. 

431:  557. 
V.  Maynes,  123  Mass.  372:  468. 
Salem    etc.    R.    R.    Co.    v.    County 

Comrs.,  9  Allen  563:  1201,  1265. 
Salem  &  Hamburg  Turnpike  Co.  v. 

Lyme,    18   Conn.   451:    409,   411, 

791. 
Salem  Mills  Co.  v.  Lord,  42  Ore.  82: 

73. 
Salem  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Alderman  &  Sons 

Co.,  78  S.  C.  1:  533,  1062. 
Salem    Road,    7    Luzerne    Leg.    Reg. 

Rep.  105:    1031. 
Salem  Tp.  Road,  In  re,  103  Pa.  St. 

250:  1371. 
Salem  Turnpike  etc.   Corporation  v. 

County  of  Essex,  100  Mass.  282: 

923. 
Salisbury  v.   Great  Northern   R.   R. 

Co.,  17  Q.  B.  840:   695,  1700. 
V.   Western   N.    C.   R.   R.   Co.,   91 

N.  C.  490:  168. 
Salisbury   Mills   v.   Forsaith,   57   N. 

H.   124:   702. 
Sallden   v.   Little   Falls,    102    Minn. 

358:    630,  632,   1306,   1307. 
Sallicotte   v.   King   Bridge   Co.,   122 

Fed.  378:   89. 
Salsbury  v.  Gaskin,  66  N.  J.  L.  Ill: 

700. 
Salsbury  v.  Western  N.  C.  R.  R.  Co., 

91   N.   C.   490:    1664. 
Salt  Co.  V.   Brown,  7   W.  Va.   191: 

500,  502,  506,  531. 
Salt    Creek    Val.    Turnpike    Co.    v. 

Parks,  50  Ohio  St.  568:   1007. 
Salter   v.  Metropolitan  District  Ry. 

Co.,  39  L.  J.  Eq.  567:  822. 
Salt  Lake  City  v.  Salt  Lake  City  W. 

&  E.  P.  Co.,  24  Utah  249:   798, 

799. 


CASES    CITED. 


ccxlvii 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   7^3-1719.] 


Salt  Lake   City  W.   &  E.  P.  Co.  v. 
Salt  Lake   City,   24   Utah   282: 
1165,   1169,   1413,   1467. 
V.  Salt  Lake  City,  25  Utah  441: 
798,  799. 
Samish    Kiver    Boom    Co.    v.    Union 
Boom    Co.,    32    Wash.    586:    21, 
543,    673,    677,    714,    901,    1060, 
1062. 
Sammons    v.    Gloversville,    67    App. 
Div.    628:    83,    85,    1605,    1612, 
1615. 
V.  Gloversville,  81  App.  Div.  332: 

83,  1605. 
V.  Gloversville,  175  N.  Y.  346:  83, 
85,  1605,  1612,   1615. 
Samon  v.  Trenton,  47  N.  J.  L.  489 

1033. 
Sampf's    Appeal,    116    Pa.    St.    33 

172. 
Sample    v.    Carroll,    132    Ind.    496 

713. 
Sampson  v.  Bradford,  6  Cush.   303 

960. 
Sams  V.  Port  Royal  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

15  S.  C.  484:   858. 
Samuels  v.   County  of  Dubuque,   13 

la.  536:    458. 
San  Antonio  v.  Grandjean,   91   Tex. 
430:   1.520. 
V.  MuUaly,  11  Tex.  Civ.  App.  596: 

631. 
V.  San  Antonio  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  15 

Tex.   Civ.  App.   1:    354. 
V.  Sullivan,  23  Tex.  Civ.  App.  658: 
1642. 
San  Antonio  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Gurley, 
37   Tex.   Civ.  App.   283:    152. 
V.  Gwvnn,   4  Tex.   Ct.  of  App.   p. 

338:  152. 
v.   Hunnicutt,    18   Tex.    Civ.   Ann. 
310:    1226,   1229,    1356. 
V.  Knoepfli,  82  Tex.  270:    1626. 
V.  Kiersey,  98  Tex.  590:    88. 
V.   Ruby,   80   Tex.    172:    936,   1144, 

1226. 
V.  S.  W.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  93  Tex. 

313:    682,    686. 
V.  State,  79  Tex.  204:   488. 
San   Antonio   Rapid   Transit    St.   R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Li"  burger,  88  Tex.  79: 
272,  274,  0!\ 
San  Bernardino  &   E.   R.   R.   Co.  v. 
Haven,  94  Cal.  489:   1203,  1310. 
Sanborn  v.  Belden,  51  Cal.  266:  1162, 
1170,  1467. 
V.  Meredith,  58  N.  H.  150:  1025. 
V.  Rice,  129  Mass.  387:   429. 
V.  Van  Duyne,  90  Minn.  215:   197, 
838,  1495,  1618. 


Sand  Creek  Lateral  Irr.  Co.  v.  Davis, 

17  Colo.  326:  587,  1058. 
Sander  v.  State,  90  App.  Div.  618: 
259 
V.  State,  182  N.  Y.  400 :  259. 
Sanders,  Ex  parte,  4  Cow.  544:  1637. 
V.  McCracken,  Hardin   (Ky.)   260: 
966. 
Sanderson   v.   Haverstick,   8   Pa.   St. 
294:    1491. 
V.    Herman,    108    Wis.    662:    615, 
616. 
Sandford  v.  Martin,  31  la.  67:   725. 
San  Diego  Land  &  Town  Co.  v.  Neale, 
78    Cal.    63:    1128,    1176,    1227, 
1233,  1237,   1329. 
V.  Neale,  78  Cal.  80:    1460,   1469. 
v.  Neale,   88  Cal.  50:    1130,   1131, 
1435. 
San  Diego  Water  Co.  v.  San  Diego, 

118  Cal.  556,  483. 
Sandpoint    v.    Doyle,    14    Ida.    749: 

226. 
Sandy  Lick  Creek  Road,  51   Pa.  St. 

94:  519. 
Sanford  v.  Tucson,  8  Ariz.  247:  497, 
672,  990,  1042,  1043,  1044,  1061, 
1062,  1066,  1067. 
V.  Webster  County,  5  Neb.  (Unof.) 
364:   1511,  1516. 
San  Francisco  v.  Burr,  108  Cal.  460: 

362,  401. 
■    V.  Burr   (Cal.)    36  Pac.  771:   877. 
V.  Collins,  98  Cal.  259:  1435,  1436. 
V.  Itsett,   80  Cal.  57:    1493. 
V.  Kieman,  98  Cal.  614:    696,  698. 
V.    Scott,   4   Cal.    114:    1162,    1435. 
San  Francisco  &  Alameda  Water  Co. 
V.   Alameda  Water  Co.,   30   Cal. 
639:  908. 
San  Francisco  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cald- 
well,   31    Cal.    367:    524,    1174, 
1176,  1192. 
V.  Gould,  122  Cal.  601:   982. 
V.   Lewiston,    134   Cal.   412:    1325, 

1434. 
V.    Mahoney,    29    Cal.    112:     1098, 

1223    1423 
V.  Taylor,  86  Cal.  246:   1347. 
San  Francisco  Savings  Union  v.   G. 
R.   Petroleum   &   Min.    Co.,    144 
Cal.  134:   114,  127,  1600. 
Sangamon  Co.  v.  Brown,  13  111.  207: 

1113,  1407,  1673. 
Sanger  v.  County  Comrs.,  25  Me.  291 : 
1637. 
V.  Township  Board,  118  Mich.  19: 
1404. 
Sanguinette  v.  Pock,   136   Cal.  468: 
68,  145. 


ccxlviii 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742  ;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Sanitary  District  v.   Alderman,   113 
111.  App.  23 :   144,  846,  1456. 
V.  Bernstein,  175  111.  215:   1700. 
V.  Chapin,  226  111.  499:  930,  1072, 

1222. 
V.  Conroy,  109  111.  App.  367:   144. 
V.    Cullerton,    147   111.   385:    1106, 

1426. 
V.  Lee,  79  111.  App.  159 :  829. 
V.   Loughran,   160   111.   362:    1222, 

1262,  1329. 
V.  Martin,  227  111.  260:   851,  854. 
V.  McGuirl,  81  111.  App.  392:  1271. 
V.  Pittsburg  etc.  Rv.  Co.,  216  111. 
575:  777,  991,  1042,  1136,  1174, 
1233,   1239,  1266. 
V.  Ray,  85  111.  App.  115:  1458. 
V.   Ray,    199   111.    63:    1456,    1649, 
1653. 
San  Jose  v.  Freyschlog,  56   Cal.  8: 
1328. 
V.  Reed,  65  Cal.  241:   1136,   1137. 
San  Jose  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mayne, 

83  Cal.  566:   1149,  1223. 
San   Jose  Ranch   Co.   v.   Brooks,   74 

Cal.  463:  351. 
San   Luis    Land   etc.    Co.    v.    Kenil- 
worth  Canal   Co.,   3   Colo.  App. 
244:    587,   1466. 
San  Luis  Obispo  v.  Brizzolara,   100 

Cal.  434:    1150. 
San  Luis  Obispo  Co.  v.  Simas,  1  Cal. 
App.  175:   917,  997,  1247,  1461. 
San   Mateo    County   v.    Coburn,    130 
Cal.  631:   7,  497,  499,  503,  512, 
514,  674,  1203. 
San  Mateo  Water  Co.  v.  Sharpstein, 
50    Cal.   284:    1162,   1171,    1461, 
1467. 
San  Pedro   etc.  R.  R.   Co.  v.   Board 
of  Education,  32  Utah  305 :  1244. 
Santa  Ana  v.  Brunner,  132  Cal.  234: 
678,  1046,  1063,  1070,  1228. 
V.  Gildmaeher,  133  Cal.  395:  1060, 

1062,  1063,  1064. 
V.  Harlin,  99  Cal.  538:   514,  678, 
1056,    1128,    1176,    1227,    1231, 
1240. 
Santa   Barbara   v.    Gould,    143    Cal. 

421:  783. 
Santa  Cruz  v.  Enright,  95  Cal.  105: 

697,  1060,  1063. 
Santry  v.  Penn.  S.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  4 

Mont.  Co.  L.  R.  144:  647. 
Sappington    v.    Little    Rock    etc.   R. 

R.  Co.,  37  Ark.  23:  855. 
Saratoga  &  Schenectady  R.  R.   Co., 
Matter  of,  66  How.  Pr.  43:  1461. 
Saratoga  Springs  v.  Saratoga  G.  E. 
L.  &  P.  Co.,  191  N.  y.  123:  481.' 


Sargeant   v.    Ohio   &   Mississippi   R. 

R.    Co.,    1    Handy    (Ohio)     52: 

620. 

Sargent    v.    Machias,    65    Me.    591: 

938. 

V.  Merrimac,  196  Mass.  171:  1228, 

1231,  1234,  1237. 
V.  Tacoma,  10  Wash.  212:  614,  616, 
1718. 
Sarle  v.   Lead,    10   S.   D.   312:    659. 
Sarvis  v.  Carter,  116  la.  707:  889. 
Sater  v.  Burlington  &  Mount  Pleas- 
ant Plank  Road  Co.,  1  la.  386: 
1174. 
Satterfield  Admx.  v.  Crow,  8  B.  Mon. 

553 :  965 
Satterly'v.  Winne,   101   N.  Y.  218: 

981,  1365. 
Sauer  v.   New  York,   44  App.   Div. 
305:  1273. 
V.   New   York,    90   App.   Div.   36: 

181,  211,  228. 
V.  New  York,  40  Misc.  585:   228. 
V.  New  York,  180  N.  Y.  27:   181, 

211    227    228 
V.  New  York,  206  U.  S.  536:   194, 
228. 
Saunders  v.  Bluefield  W.  W.  &  Imp. 
Co.,    58    Fed.    133:    72,    73,    74, 
701,  1603. 
V.  Lowell,  131  Mass.  387:   1074. 
V.  New  York  Cent.  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

71  Hun  153:  122,  131. 
V.  New  York  Cent.  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
144  N.  Y.  75:  115,  122,  127,  129, 
131,  132,  133. 
V.   New   York   El.   R.   R.   Co.,    16 

Daly  261:    924. 
V.    Railroad   Co.,    101    Tenn.    206: 
1165,  1629. 
Sautter  v.  Utica  City  Nat.  Bank,  45 

Misc.   15:    373. 
Savage  v.   Board  of   Corars.,   10  111. 
App.  204:   1411,  1419. 
V.  Salem,  23  Or.  381 :  355. 
Savanna  v.  Loop,  47  111.  App.  214: 

629,  1306,  1308,  1309,  1336. 
Savannah    v.   Hancock,    91   Mo.    54: 
498,  512. 
V.  Hartridge,  37  Ga.  113:   1182. 
V.  Vernon  Shell  Road  Co.,  88  Ga. 
342:  413,  779. 
Savannah  etc.  Canal  v.  Bourquim,  51 
Ga.   378:    1649,   1656. 
V.  Suburban  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  93  Ga. 
240:    783. 
Savannah  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Atkinson, 
94  Ga.  780:   839,  841. 
v.  Buford,  106  Ala.  303:  151,  1149, 

1716. 
V.  Davis,  25  Fla.  917:   1634. 


CASES    CITED. 


ccxlix 


[Tbe  references  arc  to   the  pages :   Vol.  I,   pp.   1-742  ;   Vol.   II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Savannah  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Fort,  84 

Ga.  300:  1581. 
V.  Gill,  118  Ga.  737:  351,  372,  865. 
V.  Parish,  117  Ga.  893:   169,  1638. 
V.  Postal  Tel.   Cable  Co.,   112  Ga. 

941:   773,   1068,   1285. 
V.  Postal  Tel.  Cable   Co.,   113   Ga. 

916:   773,   1285. 
V.  Postal  Tel.   Cable  Co.,  115  Ga. 

554:    503,   773,   1285,   1619. 
V.    Savannah,    45    Ga.    602:     268, 

321. 
V.    Savannah,    96    Ga.    680:     1004, 

1016,  1571. 
V.   Shiels,   33   Ga.   601:    250,    307, 

1581. 
V.  Woodruff,  86  Ga.  94:  732,  1581, 

1592. 
Saver    v.    Philadelphia,    35    Pa.    St. 

231:  1570. 
Savings     Fund     &     Loan     Assn.     v. 

Schmidt,  15  la.  213:   1510,  1576. 
Sawyer   v.   Boston,    144   Mass.   470: 

1120,  1138,  1320. 
V.  Commonwealth,  182  Mass.  245: 

626,  922,  1273. 
V.  Commonwealth,  185  Mass.  356: 

626,  1273. 
V.  Hamilton,  1  Murphy  N.  C.  253 ; 

1005. 
V.  Keene,  47  N.  H.  173:   GOB. 
V.   Landers,   56   la.   422:    947,  949, 

1563,  1564. 
V.   Met.   Water   Board,    178   Mass. 

267:   733,   1271,   1273. 
Saxton  V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co., 

12  App.  Div.  263:  1562. 
V.   New   York   EI.    R.    R.    Co.,    60 

N.  Y.  Supr.   Ct.   421:    1305. 
V.   New  York   El.   R.  R.   Co.,   139 

N.  Y.  320:  1196,  1296,  1300, 

1301. 
Sayre  v.  Newark,  58  N.  J.  Eq.  136: 

85,  117,  139,  142. 
V.  Newark,  60  N.  J.  Eq.  361:  84, 

85,  117,  138,  142,  1606. 
V.  State,   123  N.  Y.  291 :    144. 
Scace  V.   Wayne   Co.,   72  Neb.    162: 

659,  1176,  1208,  1209. 
Scallon  V.   Manhattan   Ry.   Co.,   112 

Anp.   Div.   262:    866. 
V.  Manhattan  Ry.   Co.,   185  N.  Y. 

359:  866. 
Scammon    v.    Chicaijo,    40    111.    146: 

1018,   1027,    1513. 
Scanlon  v.  Ix)ndon  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  23 

Grant  Ch.  559:   1533. 
Scarborough    v.    Commissioners,    41 

Me.  604;   916,  992. 
Scarritt  v.   Kansas   City   etc.   R.   R. 

Co.,    127    Mo.    298:'   1027,    1031. 
v.    Kansas    City    etc.    R.    R.    Co., 

148  Mo.  676:    1503. 


Schaaf    v.    Cleveland    etc.    Ry.    Co., 

66  Ohio  St.  215:   285,  1589. 
Schade  v.  Theel,  45  Kan.  628:   973, 

974. 
Schaeffer  v.  Werling,  188  U.  S.  510: 

464. 
Schafer  v.  Brooklyn   &  L.   I.  R.   R. 

Co.,  124  N.  Y.  630:   268,  719. 
Schaller    v.    Omaha,    23    Neb.    325: 

630,  659,  660,  664,  1334. 
Schattner   v.    Kansas   City,    53    Mo. 

162:  238    239. 
Schatz  V.   Pf'eil,   56   Wis.  429:    513, 

1520. 
Scliaufele  v.  Doyle,  86  Cal.  107 :  237, 

1597. 
Scheer  v.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.,  127 

App.   Div.   267:    864,   964,    1520. 
Scheff  V.  Upper  Conn.  River  &  Lalce 

Imp.  Co.,  57  N.  H.  110:  981. 
Seheh  v.  Detroit,  45  Mich.  626:  520. 
Schenectady  v.  Furman,  61  Hun  171 : 

168. 
V.  Furman,  145  N.  Y.  482:   491. 
Schenectady    Ry.    Co.    v.    Lyon,    41 

Misc.   506:    894,   895. 
V.  Lyon,  44  Misc.  275:    1438. 
V.    Peck,    88    App.    Div.    201:    683, 

744. 
Schepman  v.   Buhner,   32   Ind.   App. 

562:  1095. 
Schermeely  v.  Stillwater  &  St.  Paul 

R.  R.   Co.,   16  Minn.   506:    1407. 
Schermerhorn  v.  Peck,  43  Kan.  667: 

948,  1564. 
Scheurich  v.  S.  W.  Mo.  Lt.  Co.,  109 

Mo.  App.  406:   724. 
Scheutter   v.   Lynch,   23    Utah   305: 

882. 
Schier  v.  Cane  Belt  Ry.  Co.,  45  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  295:    640, 
Schliehauf  v.  Canada  So.  R.  R.  Co., 

28  Grant  Ch.  236:   843. 
Schlosser  v.  Comrs.  of  Highways,  235 

111.  214:   1106,  1416. 
Schmeckpepper  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R. 

Co.,  116  Wis.  592:  92. 
Schmidt   v.  Densmore,   42   Mo.   225: 

672,   679,   688,   1634. 
V.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  11  Miscl. 

18:  1302. 
V.  Minneapolis  etc.  R.  R.   Co.,  38 

Minn.  491:   1311. 
V.  N.  Y.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  2  App.  Div. 

481:   1124. 
Schmied    v.    Keeney,    72    Ind.    309: 

1406. 
Schmitt  V.   San  Francisco,   100   Cal. 

302:   888. 
Schmitz  V.  Brooklyn  Union  El.  R..  R. 

Co.,    Ill    App.    Div.    308:     180, 

1334. 


ccl 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Schmitz  V.  Germantown,  31  111.  App. 

284:  886. 
Schneider  v.  Brown,   142  Mich.   45: 
231,  439. 
V.  Detroit,     72  Mich.      240:   211, 

226,  227,  236. 
V.  Jacob,  86  Ky.  101 :  182,  877. 
V.  Knickerbocker  Ice  Co.,  119  Wis. 

171:  864. 
V.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  29  Mo.  App. 

68:   151. 
V.   Rochester,   33   App.   Div.   458: 

707. 
V.  Rochester,  160  N.  Y.  165:   707, 

968,  1374,  1624. 
V.    Schneider,   36   Colo.    518:    920, 
1058,  1442. 
Schock  V.  Falls  City,  31  Neb.  599: 

1569. 
Schoen  v.  Kansas  City,  65  Mo.  App. 

134:  84,  1650,  1654. 
Schofield    V.    Cooper,    126    la.    334: 
154. 
V.  Penn.   S.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,   12  Pa. 
Co.  Ct.  122:  530,  717. 
Schoff  V.    Cleveland   etc.  R.   R.   Co., 
16  Ohio  C.  C.  252:  272. 
V.  Upper  Conn.  River  etc.  Co.,  57 
N.  H.  110:  990. 
Scholl  V.  Emerich,  36  Pa.  Supr.  Ct. 
404:  1499. 
V.  German  Coal  Co.   118  111.  427: 
8. 
Scholle   V.    Met.   El.    R.    R.    Co.,    60 

App.  Div.  368:   1562. 
Schomacker    v.    Michaels,    117    App. 
Div.  125:   1562. 
V.   Michaels,    189   N.   Y.   61:    182, 
1562. 
Schonhardt  v.  Pa.  R.  R.  Co.,  216  Pa. 

St.  224:   1272. 
School  District  v.  Copeland,  2  Gray 
414:    1018. 
V.  Hart,  3  Wyo.  563:   1500. 
V.  Hodgin,  180  Mo.  70:  1047,  1049. 
V.  Oellien,  209  Mo.  464:   921,  976. 
V.  Searl,  38  Fed.   18:   1348. 
Schopp  V.   St.  Louis,   117  Mo.   131: 

199,  346. 
Schreiber,   Matter   of,    53    How.   Pr. 

359:   707. 
Schreiber  v.  Chicago  &  Evanston  R. 

R.  Co.,   115  111.  340:   953. 
Schriver  v.  Johnstown,  71  Hun  232: 

83,  1605. 
Schrodt  v.  St.  Joseph,  109  Mo.  App. 

627:  1137. 
Schroeder  v.  De  Graff,  28  Minn.  299 : 
1634. 
V.  Detroit  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  44  Mich. 

387:    1047,  1098,  1419. 
V.   Joliet,   189   111.  48:    629,   1306, 
1308. 


Schroeder  v.   Klipp,   120  Wis.   245: 
400. 
V.  Lancaster  City,  15  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

466:  1399. 
V.  Onekama.     95  Mich.  25:     1512, 
1516,  1517. 
Schrope  v.  Pioneer  Tp.  Ill  la.  113: 

156. 
Schuchardt  v.   New  York,   59   Barb. 
295:   1343. 
V.  New  York,  53  N.  Y.  202:    1459. 
Schuett  V.  Stillwater,  80  Minn.  287: 

159,  235. 
Schulenberg  &  B.  L.  Co.  v.'  St.  Louis 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  129  Mo.  455 :   254, 
311,   314,   1582,   1591. 
Schuler  v.   Board  of  Supvrs.,   12  S. 

D.  460:    1123,  1313,  1317. 
Schuller    v.    Northern    Liberties    etc. 

R.  R.  Co.,  3  Whart.  555:   1403. 
Schulte  V.  North  Pacific  Transporta- 
tion Co.,  50  Cal.  592:   250. 
Schumacher  v.  St.  Louis,  3  Mo.  App. 
297:  607. 
v.  Toberman,  56  Cal.  508:   735. 
Schurmeier  v.   St.  Paul  &  Pacific  R. 
R.  Co.,  8  Minn.  113:  1582. 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  10  Minn. 
82:   104,  197,  200,  247,  249,  253, 
1580. 
Schuster  v.  Lemond,  27  Minn.  253: 
384,  400,   1402,   1403. 
V.  Sanitary  District,  177  111.  626: 
677,  815,  1061,   1066,  12.32. 
Schuylkill  Falls  Road,  2  Binn.  250: 

1086. 
Schuylkill    etc.    Navigation    Co.    v. 
Decker,  2  Watts  343:  1670,  1674. 
Schuylkill   Navigation    Co.   v.    Farr, 
4  W.  &  S.  362:   963,  1144,  1270, 
1272,  1273,  1706. 
V.  Freedley,  6  Whart.  109:   1267. 
V.  Kittera,  2  Rawie  438:    1440. 
V.  Loose,  19  Pa.  St.  15:  710. 
V.  McDonough,  33  Pa.  St.  73 :  1456, 

1639. 
V.  Pottsville  &  M.  R.   R.  Co.,   17 

Phil.  648:   783. 
V.   Thoburn,  7   S.   &  R.  411:   948, 
1187,  1227,  1272. 
Schuylkill  Riv.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.'s  Peti- 
tion, 17  Phila.  11:   918. 
Schuvlkill  River  E.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Har- 
ris,  124  Pa.   St.   215:    1410. 
v.  Kersey,  133  Pa.  St.  234:  1339. 
V.  Rees,  '135  Pa.  St.  629 :  1227. 
v.  Stocker,  128  Pa.  St.  233:   1150, 
1178. 
Schwarzenbach    v.     Electric     Water 
Power  Co.,  101  App.  Div.  345: 
144,  1607. 
V.  Electric  Water  Power  Co.,  184 
N.  Y.  546:   144,  1607. 


CASES    CITED. 


ccli 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Schwede  v.  Burnstown,  35  Minn.  468 : 

1402. 

V.  Hemrich  Bros.  Brewing  Co.,  29 

Wash.  21:   298,  300,  1582,  1590. 

Schwerdtle    v.    Placer    Co.    108    Cal. 

589:    865,   1504. 
Scott  V.  Bruckett,  89  Ind.  413:  1032. 
V.  Central  Val.  R.  R.  Co.,  33  Pa. 

Supr.   Ct.   574:    1523. 
v.  Donald,  165  U.  S.  58:  485. 
V.  Lasell,  71  la.  180:  930,  1401. 
V.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  60  N.  Y. 

Supr.  Ct.   233:    1229. 
V.  Metropolitan   El.   R.  R.   Co.,   2 

Miscl.   150:    1152. 
V.  Nevada,  56  Mo.  App.  189:   142, 

1652,  1654,  1662. 
V.  St.  Paul  &  Chicago  Ry.  Co.,  21 

Minn.  322:  806. 
V.  Toledo,  36  Fed.  385:  1005,  1220. 
V.  Wilson,  3  N.  H.  321 :   104. 
Scott  Lumber  Co.  v.  Wolford,  02  W. 

Va.  555:    531,  591. 
Scottish  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Stewart, 

3  Maeq.  382:  833,  856. 
Scovel  V.  Detroit,  146  Mich.  93 :   357. 
Scovell  V.  St.  Louis  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  117 

La.  459:  873,  1546,  1715. 
Scovil   V.    Geddings,    7    Ohio,   pt.   2, 

211:  213. 
Scoville    V.    Cleveland,    1    Ohio    St. 

126:  14. 
Seranton's  Appeal,   121   Pa.   St.   97: 
1606. 

Scranton  v.  Barnes,  147  Pa.  St.  461 : 

914. 
V.  Del.  &  H.  Canal  Co.,  12  Pa.  Co. 

Ct.  283:  1622. 
V.  Minneapolis,  58  Minn.  437:  879. 
V.  Thomas,  141  Pa.  St.  1 :  880. 
V.  Wheeler,  57  Fed.  803:   99,  115, 

116,  132. 
V.  Wheeler,  113  Mich.  565:  99. 
V.    Wheeler,    179    U.    S.    141:    99, 

102. 
Scranton  etc.  Traction  Co.  v.  Del.  & 

H.   Canal   Co.,    1   Pa.   Supr.   Ct. 

409:  277,  766,  771. 
V.  Del.  &  H.  Canal  Co.,  180  Pa.  St. 

636:  770. 
Scranton  Gas  &  W.  Co.  v.  Coal  &  I. 

Co.,  145  Pa.  St.  21 :  783,  802. 
V.  Northern  Coal  &  Iron  Co.,   192 

Pa.  St.  80:   784,  802,  1044,  1609. 
V.  Scranton,  11  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  671: 

354. 
V.  Scranton  City,  214  Pa.  St.  586: 

352. 
Scraper  v.  Piper,  59  Ind.  158:   983, 

1407. 


Scrivner  v.  Paris,  26  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

196:  453. 
Scruggs  V.  Reese,  128  Ind.  399:  723. 
Scrutchfield   v.    Choctaw   etc.   R.   R. 

Co.,  18  Okla.  308:  191,  320,  380, 

389. 
Scudder  v.   Trenton   Del.   Falls.   Co., 

1  N.  J.  Eq.  694:   495,  498,  547, 

549,  552,  923. 
Scuffletown  Fence  Co.  v.  McAllister, 

12  Bush.    (Ky.)    312:   589. 
Scully  V.    Cincinnati,   9   Ohio   C.   C. 

63:    1565. 
Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cham- 

berlin,  108  Va.  42:  1147. 

V.  Florida,  203  U.   S.  261:   480, 

483. 
V.  Olive,  142  N.  C.  257:  1061,  1477, 

1480,  1619. 
V.    Southern   Invest.    Co.,    53    Fla. 

832:    246,   1580. 
Seaboard  &  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ambrose,  122 

Ga.  47:   1638. 
Seabright  v.  Allgor,  69  N.  J.  L.  641 : 

1630. 
V.  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  72  N.  J.  L. 

8:   1511,  1519. 
V.  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  73  N.  J.  L. 

625:   1511,  1519. 
Seafield  v.  Bohne,  169  Mo.  537:  514, 

1511. 
Seale  v.  Lead,  10  S.  D.  312:  631. 
Seaman  v.  Smith,  24  111.  523:    103, 

108. 
V.   Washington,   172   Pa.   St.   467: 

630,  636,  698,  894,  1308. 
Searcy   v.    Clay   Co.,    176    Mo.   493: 

1035,  1511. 
Searing  v.  Saratoga  Springs,  39  Hun 

307:  142. 
Searl   v.   School   District,   133  U.   S. 

553:  1175,  134a,  1352. 
V.   School   District  No.   2,   124  U. 

S.  197:  931. 
Searle  v.  Lackawanna  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

33  Pa.  St.  57:  1268. 
v.  Lackawanna  R.  R.  Co.,  9  Casey 

57:  1140. 
V.  Lead,  10  S.  D.  312:   1601. 
Sears    v.    Crocker,    184    Mass.    586: 

276,  334. 
V.   Marshalltown    St.   Ry.   Co.,    65 

la.  742:   620. 
V.  Street  Comrs.,   173  Mass.   350: 

10,  463. 
V.   Tuolumne    Co.,    132   Cal.    167: 

1493. 
Seaside  &  B.  B.  El.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  South 

Reformed  Dutch  Church,  83  Hun 

143:  193,  1303. 


cclii 


CASES    CITED. 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Seaside  Realty  &  Imp.  Co.  v.  Atlan- 
tic City,  74  N.  J.  L.  178:  739. 
Seasongood  v.  Cincinnati,  5  Ohio  C. 

C.  225:  603,  CU. 
Seattle,  In  re,  26  Wash.  602:    1564. 
Seattle  v.  Board  of  Home  Missions, 
138  Fed.  307:   1307,  1308. 
V.  Columbia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  6  Wash. 

379:   118,  353. 
V.    Fidelity   Trust   Co.,   22    Wash. 

154:    709,   1370. 
V.  Hill,  23  Wash.  92:  876,  887. 
V.  Park,  42  Wash.  151:   1136. 
V.  Smith,  37  Wash.  119:  865. 
V.  Williams,  41  Wash.  366:   1110, 
1379. 
Seattle  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bellingham 
Bay   etc.   R.    R.    Co.,   29    Wash. 
491 :    759    1413. 
V.  Corbett,  22  Wash.  189:  1348. 
V.   Gilchrist,   4   Wash.   509:    1113, 

1130,  1138,  1310,  1315. 
V.  Murphine,   4   Wash.   448:    1113, 

1229,  1311,  1317. 
V.    Roeder,    30    Wash.    244:    1110, 
1132,    1188,    1202,    1203,    1269, 
1273. 
V.  Scheike,  3  Wash.  625:   1257. 
V.  State,  52  Fed.  594:  931. 
V.  State,  7   Wash.   150:    118,  746, 
825. 
Seattle  Land  &  Imp.  Co.  v.  Seattle, 
37  Wash.  274:   1494,  1496,  1500. 
Seattle   Transfer    Co.   v.   Seattle,   27 
Wash.  520:  229,  640,  1357,  1601. 
Seavey    v.    Seattle,    17    Wash.    361: 

1674. 
Secomb  v.  Milwaukee  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
49  How.  Pr.  75:   524,  673,  748, 
1634. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  23  Wall.  108 :  673, 
1516,  1626. 
Second  St.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Green  & 
Coats   Sts.   Pass.   R.   R.    Co.,    3 
Phila.  430:   1621. 
Second  Street  Extension,  23  Pa.  St. 

346:   819. 
Second  Street,  Harrisburg,  66  Pa.  St. 

132:    1325. 

Second  &  Third  Sts.  Pass.  R.  R.  Co. 

V.  Green  &  Coats  Sts.  Pass.  R. 

R.  Co.,  3  Phila.  430:  764,  1283. 

Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  In  re,  45 

Fed.    396:    738. 
Sedalia  v.  Missouri  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  17 

Mo.  App.  105:   1344,  1378. 
Sedalia  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Abell,  18  Mo. 

App.  632:   1242,  1318. 
Sedgeley  Ave.,  In  re,  88  Pa.  St.  509 : 

432,  1682,  1705. 
Sedgeley  Ave.,  In  re,  217  Pa.  St.  313: 
631. 


Sedgwick  v.  Watford  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

36  L.  J.  Ch.  379:   1537. 
Seefeld  v.  Chicago,  Milwaukee  &  St. 

Paul  Ry.  Co.,  67  Wis.  96:   1111 

1138,   1150,   1321. 
Seeger  v.  Mueller,  133  111.  86:  880. 
Seeley  v.  Amsterdam,  54  App.  Div.  9 : 

1524. 
Seely  v.  Sebastian,  4  Oregon  25 :  504, 

564,  571,  581. 
Seibert  v.  Linton,  5  W.  Va.  57 :  734. 
Seidel's  Road,  In  re,  2   Woodward's 

Decs.   275:    1381. 
Seidensparger    v.    Spear,    17    Maine 

123:    858. 
Seidschlag  v.  Antioch,  207  111.  280: 

876,  883,  885. 
Seifert  v.  Brooks,  34  Wis.  443 :  1005, 

1009,  1013,  1016. 
V.  Brooklyn,  101  N.  Y.   136:    155, 

233. 
Seipel    V.    Baltimore    etc.    Extension 

Co.,  129  Pa.  St.  425:  1713. 
Seitz  V.  Lafayette  Traction  Co.,  5  Pa. 

Co.   Ct.   469:    1589. 
Selden  v.  Delaware  &  H.  Canal  Co., 

24  Barb.  362 :  144. 
V.  Delaware  &  Hudson  Canal  Co., 

29  N.  Y.  634:  858. 
V.  Jacksonville,  28  Fla.  558 :  53,  54, 

57,  179,  181,  210,  222,  226. 
Self    v.    Gowin,    80   Mo.    App.    398: 

1018. 
Sellards  v.  Zomes,  5  Bush.  (Ky.)  90: 

19. 
Selma  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Camp,  45  Ga. 

180:    1207. 
v.    Gt.mmage,    63    Ga.    604:     1322, 

1378. 
V.  Keith,  53  Ga.   178:   1146,  1182, 

1231,    1454,    1476. 
V.  Redewine,  51  Ga.  470:    1309. 
Semon  v.  Trenton,  47  N.  J.  L.  489: 

1370. 
Senaker   v.   Justices   of    Sullivan,    4 

Sneed.   116:    1436,   1444. 
Seneca  Road  Co.  v.  Auburn  &  Roch- 
ester R.  R.  Co.,  5  Hill  170:  408, 

410,  1155,  1635. 
Senior  v.  Metropolitan  Rv.  Co.,  2  H. 

&  C.    (Ech.)    258:   64*5. 
Sennott  v.  St.  Johnsbury  etc.  R.  R. 

Co.,  59  Vt.  226:    1539,  1540. 
Senor  v.  Board  of  Comrs.,  13  Wash. 

48:   739. 
Sensenig  v.   Lancaster   Co.,   130  Pa. 

Supr.   Ct.  224:    1671. 
Sentman  v.   B.   &  0.  R.   R.   Co.,  78 

Md.  222:   159. 
Sequin  v.  Ireland,  57  Tex.  183:  420, 

1494,  1618. 


OASES    CITED. 


ccliii 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Serrell  v.  Probate  Judge,   107  Mich. 

234:   1100. 
Sessions  v.  Crunkelton,  20  Ohio  St. 

349:   564,  580,  1018. 
Setzler  v.  Pennsylvania  S.  V.  R.  K. 

Co.,  112  Pa.  St.  56:   1150,  1187, 

1251. 
Seufferle  v.  Macfarland,  28  App.  Gas. 

D.  C.  94:  453,  1242. 
Seuter  v.  Pugh,  9  Gratt.  260:  401. 
Seventeenth     Street,     Matter    of,     1 

Wend.  262:   1326. 
Seventh  Ave.,  Matter  of,  59  App.  Div. 

175:    1561. 
Severin  v.   Cole,   38   lovi-a  463:    947, 

948,  961,  1564. 
Sewell   v.    Chicago   Terminal   Trans. 

R.  R.  Co.,  177  111.  93:  1128. 
Sewer  St.,  In  re,  20  Phil.  367:   698. 
Sewickley   Borough   v.    Jennings,    12 

Pa.  Co.  Ct.  75:  698. 
Sewickley  Tp.  Road,  26  Pa.  Supr.  Ct. 

572:    1370. 
Sexton    V.    North    Bridgewater,    116 

Mass.    200:     1119,    1120,    1130, 

1216. 
V.  Union  Stock  Yards  &  T.  Co.,  200 

111.  244:    1042,  1229,  1240,  1330, 

1379. 
Seymour  v.  Carter,  2  Met.  520 :  858, 

1073. 
V.    Cummins,    119    Ind.    148:    142, 

937,  941,  1652,  1659,  1663. 
V.  JefTersonville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  126 

Ind.  466:  750,  1609. 
V.  Salamanca,  137  N.  Y.  364:  915, 

1518. 
V.  State,  19  Wis.  240:  821. 
Shaaber  v.  Reading,  133  Pa.  St.  643 : 

700. 
Shackleford  v.   Bailey,   35   111.   491: 

834. 
Shackleford's   Heirs   v.   CoflFey,   4   J. 

J.   Marsh.   40:    544,    1017,    1932, 

1078,  1358. 
Shaeffer  v.  Werling,  188  U.  S.  510: 

11. 
Shafer  v.  Brodener,  19  Ind.  294 :  1407. 
Shaffer  v.  Weech,  34  Kan.  505:  973. 
Shafferstown    Road,    3    Watts    475: 

971. 
Shaffner   v.    Fogleman,   Busbee   Law 

280:    1406. 
V.  St.  Louis,  31  Mo.  264:    1035. 
Shake  v.  Frazer,   94  Ky.   143:    516, 

519. 
Shamberg  v.  N.  J.  Shore  Line  R.  R. 

Co.,  72  N.  J.  L.  140:  746. 
V.  N.  J.  Shore  Line  R.  R.  Co.,  73 

N.  J.  L.  572 :  746. 
Shamleffer  v.   Peerless  Mill   Co.,   18 

Kan.  24:  69,  70. 


Shamokin  Road,  6  Binn.  36:  1390. 
Shand   v.    Henderson,    2    Dow    519: 

1602. 
Shane  v.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

71  Mo.  237:   152. 
Shanline   v.   Wiltsie,   70   Kan.    177: 

870,  1028. 
Shanahan    v.    Waterbury,    63    Conn. 

420:   1221,  1410,  1072,  1675. 
Sliano    V.    Bridge    Co.,    189    Pa.    St. 

245:    635,  641,  656. 
Sharett's  Road,  8   Pa.   St.   89:    703, 

971. 
Sharon  R.  R.  Co.'s  Appeal,  122  Pa. 
St.  533:  753,  760,  793,  796,  798, 
1609. 
Sharp   V.    Cincinnati,   4   Ohio   C.    C. 
(N.  S.)    19:    159,  234. 
V.  Dunavan,  17  B.  Mon.  223:   465. 
Johnson,  4  Hill  92:   972,   1513, 
1516. 
Sharpe  v.  Hasey,  134  Wis.  618 :  820. 
V.   United    States,    112    Fed.    893: 

1146,  1207,  1209,  1313. 
V.  United  States,   191   U.  S.  341: 
1146,  1207,  1209. 
Sharpless  v.  West  Chester,  1  Grant's 
Cases  257:    1159. 
v.  West  Chester,  2  Phila.  130:  1100. 
Shasta    Power    Co.    v.    Walker,    149 

Fed.  568:  508,  536,  537,  592. 
Shattner  v.  Kansas,  53  Mo.  162:  211. 
Shattuck  v.  Stoneham  Branch  R.  R. 
Co.,    6    Allen    115:    1119,    1122, 
1138,  1142,  1216,  1263 
V.  Waterville,  27  Vt.  600:  1376. 
V.  Wilton  R.  R.  Co.,  23  N.  H.  269 : 
1322. 
Shaubert  v.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
21  Minn.  502:  320,  351,  367,  370, 
384. 
Shaufelter  v.  Baltimore,  80  Md.  483 : 

1693,   1695,   1699. 
Shaver   v.   Eldred,    114   N.   Y.    236: 
1523. 
V.   Starrett,  4  Ohio  St.  494:   515, 
924. 
Shaw  V.  Boston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,   159 
Mass.  597:   370. 
V.  Charleston,  2   Gray  107:    1119, 

1122. 
v.  Charlestown,  3  Allen  538:  1683. 
V.  Crocker,  42  Cal.  435:  231. 
V.  Mills,  9  Cush.  503:   1358. 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  78  App. 

Div.   290:    323,   1562. 
V.  New  York   El.   R.   R.   Co.,   110 

App.  Div.  892:    1121. 
V.   New   York   El.   R.   R.   Co.,   187 

N.  Y.  186:   1121. 
V.  Philadelphia,   169  Pa.   St.  506: 
952,  1277. 


ccliv 


CASES    CITED. 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742  ;  Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Shaw  V.  Ward,  131  Wis.  646:  166. 

V.  Wells,  5  Gush.  537:   1522. 
Shawnee  Co.  Comrs.  v.  Beckwith,  10 

Kan.  603:    1318. 
Shawneetown  v.  Mason,  82  111.  337: 

181,  224,  631,  635,  1309. 
Shea  V.  Ottumwa,  67  Iowa  39:   889. 
V.  Potrero  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  44  Cal. 

414:    306. 
Sheaff  V.   People,   87   111.    189:    513, 

1519. 
Shealy  v.  Chicago  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  72 

Wis.  471:   319. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  77  Wis. 

653:   319,   1336. 
Shearer  v.  Comrs.,  13  Kan.  145:  1640, 

1709. 
Sheedy  v.  Union  Press  Brick  Works, 

25  Mo.  App.  527:   1665. 
Sheehy  v.  Kansas  City  Cable  R.  E. 

Co.,  94  Mo.  574:  616,  642. 
Sheehan  v.  Board  of  Supervisors,  80 

Minn.  355:  980,  993. 
V.  Fall  River,  187  Mass.  356:  320, 

321,  1260. 
V.  Flynn.  59  Minn.  436:  148,  157. 
Sheer  v.  Erie  E.  E.  Co.,  64  N.  J.  Eq. 

601:  851. 
V.  Erie  E.  E.  Co.,  68  N.  J.  Eq.  615: 

851. 
V.  Erie  R.  E.  Co.,  70  N.  J.  Eq.  318: 

851. 
Shehan  v.  Fall  River,  187  Mass.  356 : 

191. 
Shelbyville     etc.     Turnpike     Co.     v. 

Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  Ky. 

L.  R.  548:   1385. 
Sheldon  v.  Boston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  172 

Mass.  180:  162,  627. 
v.  Kalamazoo,  24  Mich.  383:   1636. 
V.  Minneapolis  &  St.  Louis  Ry.  Co., 

29  Minn.  318:   1118,  1145,  1210. 
V.  Rockwell,  9  Wis.  166:   1607. 
Shelfer  v.  London  Electric  Lighting 

Co.,  L.  E.   (1895)    1  Ch.  D.  287: 

456,  1612. 
Shell  V.  Poulson,  23  Wash.  535:  980. 
Shelley  v.   St.   Charles  Co.,   17   Fed. 

909:    565,   583. 
Shelton  v.  Derby,  27  Conn.  414 :  1004. 
Shelton  Co.  v.  Birmingham,  61  Conn. 

518:    600. 
V.  Birmingham,  62  Conn.  456 :  600, 

619,  1307. 
Shenandoah  Valley  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Rob- 
inson, 82  Va.  542:   1247,  1249. 
Shenango  &  Allegheny  E.  E.  Co.  v. 

Braham,   79  Pa.   St.  447:    1187, 

1228. 
Shepard  v.  East  Orange,  69  N.  J.  L. 

133:  302. 


Shepard  v.  East  Orange,  70  N.  J.  L. 

203:    302. 
V.  Manhattan  Ey.  Co.,  48  App.  Div. 

452:    182,   1122,   1554,   1562. 
V.  Manhattan  E.  R.  Co.,  117  N.  Y. 

442:   940,  1553,  1584,  1591. 
V.  Manhattan  E.  E.  Co.,  131  N.  Y. 

215:    923. 
v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  169  N.  Y. 

160:   182,  1122,  1554,  15G2. 
V.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  57  N.  Y. 

Supr.  Ct.  5:  1584,  1617. 
V.  Metropolitan  El.  E.  E.  Co.,  82 

Hun  527:  1663,  1664. 
V.  Suffolk  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  140  N.  C. 

391:    837,   838. 
V.  Third  Municipality  of  New  Or- 
leans, 6  Rob.  La.  349:  958. 
Shepardson   v.   Milwaukee  &   Beloit 

R.  R.  Co.,  6  Wis.  605:  696,  1165, 

1570. 
Shepherd  v.  Baltimore  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

130  U.  S.  426:  321. 
V.  New  Orleans,  6  Rob.  La.   349: 

137. 
V.  Turner,  129  Cal.  530:  706. 
Shepp  V.  Reading  Belt  R.  R.  Co.,  211 

Pa.  St.  425:   1311,  1483. 
Sherer  v.  Jasper,  93  Ala.  530:   877, 

1326. 
Sherlock  v.  Bainbridge,  41  Ind.  35: 

103. 
V.  Kansas  City  Belt  R.  R.  Co.,  142 

Mo.  172:   180,  254,  311,  1582. 
V.   Louisville   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,    115 

Ind.    22:    864,    870,    936,    1648, 

1658,  1716. 
Sherman  v.  Buick,  32  Cal.  241:  515, 

518,  674. 
V.  Butcher,  72  N.  J.  L.  53:  348. 
v.  Fall  River   Iron   Works  Co.,  5 

Allen  213:    165. 
V.  Kane,  46  N.  Y.  Supr.  Ct.  310: 

589. 
V.  Milwaukee  Lake  Shore  &  West- 
ern R.  R.  Co.,  40  Wis.  045 :  247, 

1636. 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  30  Minn, 

227:    1119,   1122,  1236. 
V.  Sherman,  18  R.  I.  504:  128,  129, 

136. 
V.  Tobey,  3  Allen  7 :  722. 
Sherman  Line  Co.  v.  Glens  Falls,  101 

App.  Div.  269:   881. 
Sherry  v.  Gettysburg  Battlefield  Me- 
morial Assn.,  2  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  58 : 

1399. 
Sherwiu  v.  Wigglesworth,  129  Haas. 

64:    1320. 
Sherwood  v.  Lafayette,  109  Ind.  411: 

947. 


OASES    CITED. 


cclr 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Sherwood  v.  St.  Paul  &  Chicago  Ey. 

Co.,  21   Minn.   122:    1210,   1344, 

1369,  1706. 

V.  St.  Paul  &  Chicago  Ky.  Co.,  21 

Minn.    127:     1119,    1120,    1122, 

1137,  1369. 

Shettler  v.  Lynch,  23  Utah  305 :  870. 

Shevalier  v.  Postal  Tel.  Co.,  22  Pa. 

Supr.  Ct.  506:  936,  1500,  1635. 
Shiel  v.  Walker,  114  Mo.  App.  521: 

785,  935. 
Shields  v.  Highway  Comrs.,  158  111. 
214:   700. 
V.  Justices  of  Green  Co.,  2  Coldw. 

60:    1413. 
V.  McMahan,  101  Ind.  591:  976. 
V.  Norfolk  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,   129  N. 

C.  1:   807,  1270,  1481. 
V.  Ohio,  95  U.  S.  319:   691. 
V.  Pittsburg,  201  Pa.  St.  328:  930. 
V.  Titus,  46  Ohio  St.  528:  183,  878, 
1595. 
Shimer  v.  Eastern  Ry.  Co.,  205  Pa. 

St.  648:   1130.  1188,  1308. 
Shinkle  v.  Magill,  58  111.  422:   1033, 

1381. 
Shinzel  v.  Bell  Tel.  Co.,  31  Pa.  Supr. 

Ct.  221 :  342,  343. 
Shipley  v.  Baltimore  etc.  R.  E.  Co., 
34  Md.  336:   1179. 
V.  Continental  R.  R.  Co.,  13  Phil. 

128:    1587,  1590. 
V.   Pittsburg   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,    216 

Pa.   St.   512:    1257. 
V.  Western   Md.   Tidewater  R.   R. 
Co.,    99    Md.    115:     1506,    1507, 
1602. 
Shippin  V.  Paul,  31  N.  J.  Eq.  439: 

863. 
Shireley  v.  Cedar  Rapids  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,    74    Iowa    169:    449,    1650, 
1659. 
Shirk  V.  Board  of  Comrs.,   106  Ind. 
573:    1496. 
V.  Chicago,  195  111.  298:   1491. 
Shirlev  v.  Bishop,  67  Cal.  543:   128, 
1606. 
V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  121  Ky.  187 : 
1268,  1407. 
Shively  v.  Bowlby,  152  U.  S.  1:  114, 
115,  118,  123,   128,   136. 
V.  Lankford,  174  Mo.  535:  710,  739, 

1085,  1462. 
V.  Parker,  9  Ore.  500:   118. 
V.  Welch,  10  Sawyer  136:  118. 
Shoals  T.  State,  2  Chand.  Wis.  182: 

458. 
Shoemaker  v.  Cedar  Rapids  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  45  Minn.  366:   839,  1626. 
V.  United  States,   147  U.   S.  282: 
499,  539,   738,   814,   1068,   1093, 
1243,  1323,  1330,  1379. 


Shoenberger  v.  Mulholland,  8  Pa.  134: 

530,  1137. 
Shohan  v.  Alabama  Great  Southern 

Ry.  Co.,  115  Ala.  181:   151. 
Sholl  V.   German   Coal   Co.,   118  111. 

427:  9,  505,  532,  672,  683. 
V.    Stump,   24   Pa.    Supr.    Ct.    48: 

808. 
Sholty  V.   Comrs.   of  Highways,   134 

111.  App.  541:  972,  1571. 
V.    Dale    Township,    63    111.    209: 

1069. 
Sholtz  V.   Comrs.  of  Highways,    134 

111.  App.  541:   1513,  1568. 
Shoolbred  v.  Charleston,  2  Bay  63: 

1531. 
Shoppert   v.   Martin,    137   Mo.    455: 

1075,  1577. 
Shores  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  72  S.  C. 

244:    88,   1639,   1651,   1668. 
Shorter  v.  Smith,  9  Ga.  517:  413. 
Shortle  v.  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

130   Ind.    505:    1713. 
Shortle  v.   Terre  Haute  &  I.   R.  E. 

Co.,  131  Ind.  338:  833,  1713. 
Short  Route  Transfer  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ful- 
ton, 12  Ky.  L.  R.  232:   249,  253, 

1303. 
Shough,  Ex  parte,  16  N.  J.  L.  264: 

1102. 
Showalter  v.  Southern  Kan.  R.  R.  Co., 

49  Kan.  421:   198,  1502. 
Shreck  v.   Coeur  D'Alene,   12   Idaho 

708:    453,   1613. 
Shreveport    v.    Noel,    114    La.    187: 

1378,  1386. 
V.  St.  Louis  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  115  La. 

885:    306. 
V.  Yousee,  114  La.  182:  1109,  1377. 
Shreveport  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hollings- 

worth,   42    La.    Ann.    729:    524, 

1320. 
Shreveport  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hinds, 

50  La.    Ann.    781:     1202,    1228, 
1499. 

V.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  51  La. 

Ann.  814:  757. 
Shreveport   Traction    Co.   v.   Kansas 

City  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  119  La.  759: 

683,   720. 
Shroder    v.    Lancaster,    170    Pa.    St. 

136:    697,   698,    1524. 
Shrunk  v.  Schuylkill  Navigation  Co., 

14  S.  &  R.  71:   104,  024. 
Shue  V.   Highway  Comrs.,   41   Mich. 

638:    1032. 
Shull  V.  Brown,  25  Neb.  234:  973. 
Shumate  v.  Heman,   181  U.  S.  402: 

11,  464. 
Shurtleff  v.  Board  of  Co.  Comrs.,  63 

Kan.  645 :  1404. 


cclvi 


CASES    CITED. 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Shuster  v.  Central  Dist.  P.  Tel.  Co., 

34  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  513:  1313,  154G. 
Shute  V.  Barnes,  2  Allen  598:   1558, 

1560. 
V.  Boston,  99  Mass.  236 :  1429. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  26  111. 

436:   1162,  1570.- 
V.  Decker,  51  Ind.  241:  983. 
Sidener  v.  Essex,  22  Ind.  201:   1192, 

1362. 
V.  Morristown  etc.  Turnpike  Co.,  23 

Ind.  623:   1506,  1602. 
Sidwell  V.  Jett,  213  Mo.  601:    1428. 
Siedler  v.  Seeley,  8  Colo.  App.  499: 

1075. 
Sieferer  v.   St.  Louis,  141  Mo.  586: 

978,  1018. 
Siegel  V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

62  App.  Div.  290:   257,  1299. 
V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.   Co.,   173 

N.   Y.   644:    257,    1299. 
Siegfried  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co., 

16  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  614:  1682. 
Sievers   v.   San   Francisco,    115   Cal. 

648:   237. 
Sigafoos  V.  Minneapolis  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

39  Minn.  8:   1186,  1200,  1201. 
V.  Talbot,  25  Iowa  214:  1407. 
Sillcocks  V.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  10 

Miscl.  259 :  1296,  1299. 
Silsby  Mfg.  Co.  v.  State,  104  N.  Y. 

562:    1456. 
Silver  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  101 

Mo.  79:  96. 
Silver  Creek  Nav.  &  Imp.  Co.  v.  Man- 
gum,  64  Miss.  682:   91,  1311. 
V.  Yazoo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  90  Miss. 

345:    97. 
Silver  Spring  etc.   Co.  v.  Wanskuck 

Co.,   13   R.   I.   611:    69,   70,   81, 

1605. 
Silvester  v.  St.  Louis,  164  Mo.  601 : 

1530,  1673. 
Sim  V.  Rosholt,  16  N.  D.  77 :  580. 
Siman  v.  Rhodes,  24  Minn.  25:  947. 
Simar  v.  Canaday,  53  N.  Y.  298 :  943, 

945. 
Sime  v.   Spencer,   30  Ore.   340:   983, 

985,  1516,  1571. 
Simmons,  Matter  of,  58  Miss.   581: 

626,  1096,  1221,  1229,  1231,  1238, 

1273. 
Simmons,  Matter  of.  Misc.  607:  1145, 

1270. 
Simmons  v.   Camden,   26   Ark.   276: 

210     213 
V.  Mu'mford,  2  R.  I.  172:   1373. 
V.  Passaic,  42  N.  J.  L.  619:   1156. 
V.  St.  Paul  &  Chicago  Ry.  Co.,  18 

Minn.  184:  1122,  1186. 
V.  Toledo,  5  Ohio  C.  C.  124:  272. 
V.  Toledo,  8  Ohio  C.  C.  535:   272, 

302. 


Simms  v.  Brooklyn,  33  N.  Y.  Supp. 
859:    1561. 
V.  Memphis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  12  Heisk 
621:    1707,    1708. 
Simon  v.  Northrop,  27  Ore.  488 :  357. 

V.  Rhodes,  24  Minn.  25:  1017. 
Simons  v.  Mason  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
128  Iowa  139:    1129,  1147,  1260, 
1404. 
Simplot  V.   Chicago,  M.  &  St.  Paul 
Ry.  Co.,  5  McCrary  158:   251. 
v.  Worcester,  5  McCrary,  158 :  931. 
Simpson  v.  Berkowitz,  59  Misc.  160: 
1670. 
V.  Kansas  City,  111  Mo.  237:  673, 

675,  1669,  1695. 
V.  Keokuk,  34  Iowa  568:   143. 
V.  Lancaster  &  Carlisle  Ry.  Co.,  15 

Sim.   580:    731. 
V.    Mikkelsen,    196    111.    575:    429, 

875. 
V.  Oxford,  41  N.  H.  228:  917. 
V.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.   R.   Co.,  4 

Mont.  Co.  L.  Rep.  102:  308. 
V.  Seavy,  8  Maine  138:   103. 
V.      South      Staffordshire      Water 
Works   Co.,   34  L.   J.   Eq.   380  ^ 
708. 
Sims  v.  Ohio  Riv.  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  56  S. 

C.  30:  439. 
Sinai  v.  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  71 

Miss.  547:    152. 
Singer  v.   New  York,   47   App.  Div. 
42:    432. 
V.  New  York,  165  N.  Y.  658:  432. 
Singleton  v.   Atchison  etc.   Ry.   Co., 
67  Kan.  284:   169. 
V.  Comrs.,  2  Nott  &  McC.  526:  516. 
Sings   V.   Joliet,    237    111.   300:    485, 

486. 
Siniekson  v.   Johnson,   17   N.   J.   L. 

129:   21,  22,  91. 
Sioux  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown, 
13  Neb.  317:  1323. 
V.   Chicago   etc.   Ry.   Co.,   27   Fed. 

770:   906,  907. 
V.  Weimer,  16  Neb.  272:  1129,  1340, 
1426,   1451,   1453. 
Sisson  V.  Board  of  Supervisors,   128 
Iowa  442:   7,  494,  499,  501,  507, 
569,  575,  672,  675,  739,  926, 1158, 
1169. 
V.    Carithers,    35    Ind.    App.    161: 

995. 
V.   New   Bedford,    137   Mass.   255: 

604,    1366. 
v.  Stonington,  73  Conn.  348:   1525. 
Sistersville  Ferry  Co.  v.  RusseH  52 
W.  Va.  356:   408,  411,  413,  982. 
Sites  V.  Miller,  120  Ind.  19:   1017. 
Sixteenth  St.  Opening,  4  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 
124:    978. 


OASES    CITED. 


cclvii 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Sixth  Ave.  R.  R.  v.  Gilbert  Elevated 

E.  R.  Co.  3  Abb.  New  Cas.  372: 

260. 
V.  Gilbert  Elevated  Ry.,  41  N.  Y. 

Sup.  Ct.  489:   260. 
V.  Gilbert  Elevated  Ry.,  43  N.  Y. 

Supr.  Ct.  292 :  2C0. 
v.   Kerr,  45   Barb.   138:   427,   756, 

762. 
,'.  Kerr,  72  N.  Y.  330:   427,  756, 

762. 
V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  56 

Hun    182:    1151,    1304. 
V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  138 

N.  Y.  548:  1118,  1296,  1301, 

1303. 

Sixth  St.,  Matter  of,  11  Philadelphia 

414:   683. 
Sixty-Second   St.,   214  Pa.   St.    137: 

1306. 
Sixty- Seventh  St.  Opening,  Matter  of, 

60  How.  Pr.  264:   1327. 
Skagit  Co.  V.  McLean,  20  Wash.  92: 

501,  570,  581,  1393. 
V.  Stiles,  10  Wash.  388:  581. 
Skaneateles  W.  W.  Co.  v.  Skaneate- 

les,  161   N.  Y.   154:   408,  409. 
V.  Skaneateles,  184  U.  S.  354:  409. 
Skelly  V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  7 

Miscl.  88:    1133,   1302. 
Skillman  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

78  Iowa  404:    1505. 
Skinner  v.  Chicago,  42  111.  52:   1093. 
V.  Hartford  Bridge  Co.j  29   Conn. 

523:  212. 
V.  Lake  View  Ave.  Co.,  57  111.  151 : 

971,  1028. 

Slack  V.  Maysville  &  Lexington  R.  E. 

Co.,   13  B.  Mon.   1:   23. 
Slaght  V.  Northern  Pao.  Ry.  Co.,  39 

Wash.   576:   431,   1626,   1629. 
Slatten  v.  Des  Moines  Valley  R.  R. 

Co.,  29  Iowa  148:  251. 
Slater  v.  Canada  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  25 

Grant  Ch.  363:   1537. 
Slattery  v.  Harley,  58  Neb.  575:  69. 

V.  St.  Louis,  120  Mo.  183:   1309. 
Slaughter  v.  Meridian  St.  &  Ry.  Co. 

(Miss.)   48  So.  6:  273,  295. 
Slaughter  House  Cases,  16  Wall.  66: 

410. 
Slayton  v.  Hulings,  7  Ind.  144:  1402. 
Sleeper,  In  re,  62  N.  J.  Eq.  67 :  952, 

1565. 
Sleight   V.   Kingston,    11   Hun    594: 

■142. 


Sligh    v.    Grand    Rapids,    84    Mich. 

497:  1004. 
Slingerland  v.   International  C.  Co., 
43  App.  Div.  215:  99. 
v.  International  C.  Co.,  169  N.  Y. 
60:  99. 
Slingluff    V.    Wissahickon    Turnpike 

Co.,  1  Phila.  379:  1467. 

Slipper  v.   Totterham  &  Hampstead 

Junction  Ry.   Co.,  36  L.  J.  Eq. 

841:    1260. 

Sloan  v.  N.  Y.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  63  Hun 

300:  448,  1216,  1300,  1302,  1303. 

Sloane  v.   People's   Elec.   R.  R.   Co., 

7  Ohio  C.  C.  84:  297,  302. 
Slocum  v.  Neptune,  68  N.  J.  L.  595: 

416,  739,  1101. 
Slocumb  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  57 

Iowa  675:  75. 
Sly,   Matter  of,   78   App.   Div.   630: 

1386. 
Sly,  Matter  of,  177  N.  Y.  465:  1386. 
Smafield   v.   Smith,    153   Mich.   270: 

79,  1606. 
Small  V.  Binford,  41  Ind.  App.  440: 
400. 
V.  Georgia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  87  Ga. 

602:    524,  941. 
V.    Pennell,    31    Maine    267:    916, 
1510. 
Smart  v.  Aroostook  Lumber  Co.,  103 
Maine  37:   133,  1639. 
V.  Hart,  75  Wis.  471:  819. 
V.  Johnston,  17  R.  I.  778:   1577. 
V.   Portsmouth    &,    Concord    R.    E. 
Co.,  20  N.  H.  233:    1527,   1530, 
1681. 
Smeaton  v.  Austin,  82  Wis.  76:  1396, 
1409. 
V.  Martin,  57  Wis.  364:   514,  675, 
1165,   1166. 
Smeberg    v.    Cunningham,    96   Mich. 

379:   1629. 
Smedley  v.   Erwin,  51   Pa.   St.  445: 

687,  703. 
Smith,  In  re,  143  Cal.  368:  470. 
Smith  V.  Adams,  6  Paige  435:    165. 
V.  Agawam  Canal  Co.,  2  Allen  355 : 

71. 
V.  Alexander,  24  Ind.  454:  1028. 
V.  Alexandria,  33  Gratt.  208;  237. 
V.    Applegate,    23    N.    J.    L.    352: 

1385. 
V.  Atlanta,  75  Ga.  110:  141. 
V.  Atlanta,  92  Ga.  119:  438,  1182, 

1545. 
V.  Atlantic  &  Gt.   Western  R.  R. 
Co.,   25   Ohio  St.  91:    570,   581, 
584,  924. 
V.   Barre  Water  Co.,  73  Vt.  310: 
538,  595,  723. 


cclviii 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Smith  V.  Beloit,  122  Wis.  396:   874, 

878,  890. 
V.  Bivens,  56  Fed.  352 :  472. 
V.   Board  of   Comrs.,  50  Ohio   St. 

628:   220,  616. 
V.  Boston,  7  Cush.  254:   364,  371, 

379,  391. 
V.  Boston,  1  Gray  72 :  1366. 
V.  Boston  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  99  App. 

Div.  94:   211. 
V.  Boston  etc.  K.  R.  Co.,  181  N.  Y. 

132:  211. 
V.  Brooklyn,   18  App.  Div.  N.  Y. 

340:    77,    163. 
V.   Brooklyn,   32  App.  Div.  N.   Y. 

257:  77,  163. 
V.   Brooklyn,   160  N.  Y.   357:    74, 

77,  163. 
V.  Central  District  P.  &  Tel.  Co.,  2 

Ohio  C.  C.  259:   337,  339,  1593. 
V.  Chicago,  107  III.  App.  270:  876, 

890,  892. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  67  111. 

191 :  935,  966,  1035,  1626. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  105  111. 

511:     1055,     1061,     1063,     1065, 

1066,  1115. 
V.   Chiltenham,   35   Pa.    Supr.    Ct. 

507:   211. 
V.  Cincinnati,  4  Ohio  515:  213. 
V.  City  Council  of  Alexandria,  33 

Gratt.  208:  212. 
V.  Claussen  Park  D.  &  L.  Dist.  229 

111.    155:    683,    704,    980,    124G, 

1247,  1457. 
V.  Cochrane,  9  Wash.  85 :  738,  926, 

927,  1005,  1013. 
V.    Commissioners,    150    111.    385: 

1069,   1418. 
V.  Comrs.  of  Cumberland,  42  Maine 

395:    1421. 
V.  Connelly's  Heirs,  1  T.  B.  Mon. 

58:    544,    1360. 
V.  Conway,  17  N.  H.  586:  514,  781, 

981,  1382. 
V.  Corporation  of  Washington,  20 

How.  135:   212,  213. 
V.   Crete  etc.   R.   R.   Co.,  29  Neb. 

142:  1176,  1179,  1200,  1202. 
V.  Detroit,  120  Mich.  572 :  948. 
V.  Dublin  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Irish 

Ch.   225:    1566. 
V.  Dubuque  Co.,  1  Iowa  492 :  1409. 
V.  East  End  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  87  Tenn 

626:  277,  313,  316. 
V.  Eau  Claire,  78  Wis.  487:   212, 

615,  618. 
V.  Ferris,  6  Hun  553:  939,  962. 
V.  Floyd  Co.,  85  Ga.  422 :  629,  635, 

1306,    1337,    1550,    1552,    1648, 

1656,    1660. 


Smith  V.  Goldsboro,  121  N.  C.  350: 

173,  336,  346. 
V.  Goldsborough,  80  Md.  49:   971, 

996. 
V.  Gorrell,  81  Iowa  218:  1505. 
V.  Gould,  59  Wis.  631:    76,   1523. 
V.  Gould,  61  Wis.  31:   76. 
V.  Goulding,  6  Cush.  154:  858,  860. 
V.  Hall,   103  Iowa  95:   806,  838. 
V.  Helraer,  7  Barb.  416:  1164. 
V.  Holloway,  124  Ind.  329:   837. 
V.  Inge,  80  Ala.  283:  1156,  1625. 
V.  Jackson  &  Battle  Creek  Traction 

Co.,  137  Mich.  20 :  282. 
V.  Kansas  City,  128  Mo.  23:   630, 

1306,  1307,  1330. 
V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  98 

Mo.  20:  254,  260,  307,  323,  324, 

325,  616,  642,  1549,  1650,  1657. 
V.  Los  Angeles,  136  Cal.  156:  629. 
V.  Los  Angeles  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  98 

Cal.  210:  85.3. 
V.  Leavenworth,  15  Kan.  81 :   1497. 
V.  Lincoln,  170  Mass.  488:  868. 
V.  Macon,  129  Ga.  227 :  363. 
V.    McAdams,    3   Mich.    506:    922, 

1164,  1166,  1497,  1707,  1708. 
V.  McDowell,  148  111.  51:  197,  199, 

369,  395,  398,  406.  877. 
V.  Milwaukee,  18  Wis.  63:  235. 
V.   Mitchell,   21    Wash.    536:    385, 

390,  405. 
V.  Montgomery,  2  Idaho  1187:  881. 
V.  Montgomery,  3  Idaho  472:   881. 
V.    Nashville    etc.    R.    R.    Co.,    88 

Tenn.  611:  936. 
V.  New  Haven,  59  Conn.  203:  753, 

1100,  1101. 
V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,   165 

Mass.  569 :  1504. 
V.  Olmstead,  5  Blackf.  37:  1537. 
V.  Osage,  80  Iowa  84:  874. 
V.  Peterson,  123  Iowa  672:  1007. 
V.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  205  Pa. 

St.  645:   1129. 
V.  Pennsylvania  S.  V.  R.  R.   Co., 

141  Pa.  St.  68:   1149. 
V.  Point  Pleasant  &  Ohio  R.  R.  Co., 

23  W.  Va.  451:  1160,  1294,  1580. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  98  Mo.  24:  311. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  87  Tenn.  626 :  197, 

200. 
V.  Rochester,  38  Hun  612:  78,  1603. 
V.  Rochester,  92  N.  Y.  463:  74,  78, 

98,  99,  105,  108,  109. 
V.  Rogers,  Litt.  Select  Cas.   (Ky.) 

117:  1369. 
V.  Rome,  19  Ga.  89 :  1489,  1594. 
V.   St.   Joseph,   122   Mo.   643:    630, 

632,  1186,  1199,  1308. 


CASES    CITED. 


cclix 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Smith  V.   St.   Louis   Public   Schools, 

30  Mo.  290:   131. 
V.  St.  Paul,  65  Minn.  295:  1559. 
V.  St.  Paul,  69  Minn.  276:   1529. 
V.  St.  Paul,  72  Minn.  472:  874. 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  39  Wash. 

355:  384,  392,  449,  647,  054,  659, 

661,  666,  671. 
V.  San  Luis  Obispo,  95  Cal.  463: 

881. 
V.  Scearce,  34  Ind.  285:   1424. 
V.  School  District  No.  2,  40  Mich. 

143:  1087. 
V.  Sedalia,  152  Mo.  283:   84,  653, 

866. 
V.    Sedalia,    182   Mo.    1:    84,    870, 

1338,  1054. 
V.  Sherry,  50  Wis.  210:  466. 
V.  Simmons,  103  Pa.  St.  32 :  336. 
V.  Smith,  120  App.  Div.  278:  366, 

404. 
V.  Smith,  96  Ind.  273:   1383. 
T.   Southern   Pac.   R.   R.   Co.,    146 

Cal.  164:  250,  639. 
V.  State,  59  Ohio  St.  278:  867,  809. 
V.  Street  R.  R.  Co.,  87  Tenn.  626: 

270. 
V.  Taylor,  34  Tex.  589:  929. 
V.  Trenton  Delaware  Falls  Co.,  17 

N.    J.    L.    5:    1077,    1100,    1102, 

1369. 
V.  Union  S.  &  T.  Co.,  17  Pa.  Supr. 

Ct.  444:  183,  366,  878. 
V.  Weldon,  73  Ind.  454:   983,  1574. 
V.  White  Plains,  67  Hun  81:   211, 

609,  610,  618,  1550. 
Smith   Canal   &   Ditch   Co.   v.    Colo. 

Ice  &  Storage  Co.,  34  Colo.  485: 

808,  812,  1496. 
Smith  Jr.  v.  Chicago  &  Western  In- 
diana  R.   R.    Co.,    105   111.    511: 

1045. 
Smithko  v.  Pittsburgh  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

5  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  543:  715. 
Smoot  V.  Schooler,  87  Ky.  157:  1078. 
Smythe  v.  Ames,  169  U.  S.  466:  483. 
v.  Brooklyn  EI.  R.  R.  Co.,  121  App. 

Div.  282:  323,  1355. 
V.  Brooklyn  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  193  N. 

Y.  335:   323,  1355. 
Snee  v.  West  Side  Belt  R.  R.  Co.,  210 

Pa.  St.  480:  679,  709,  716. 
Sneed  v.  Falls  Co.,  91  Tex.  168:  1086, 

1518. 
Snively  v.  Washington  Tp.  218  Pa. 

St.  249:   1487. 
Snoddy  v.   Bolen    (Mo.),   24   S.   W. 

142:  874. 
V.    Pettis    Co.,   45   Mo.    361:    974, 

1369,  1390. 


Snodgrass  v.  Chicago,   152  111.  600: 

1128,  1202,  1313,  1426. 
Snodley  v.  Asheville,  110  N.  C.  84: 

1402. 
Snouffeur  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

105  Iowa  681:   1329. 
Snow  V.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  R.  Co., 
65  Me.  230:    1108,  1119,   1122. 
V.  Moses,  53  Me.  546 :  860. 
V.    Provincetown,    109   Mass.    123: 

605,  615. 
V.  Sandgate,  66  Vt.  461;  513. 
V.   Whitehead,  27   L.   R.   Ch.  Div. 
588:   165. 
Snowden    v.    Shelby    Co.,    118   Tenn. 
725:   1323 
V.  Wilas,  19  Ind.  10:  1522. 
Snydacker   v.    West   Hammond,    225 

111.   154:   828,  829. 
Snyder  v.  Baltimore  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
210  Pa.  St.  500:  689,  819. 
v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  112  Mo. 

527:  948,  1627. 
V.  Cowan,  120  Mo.  389:  1463,  1465. 
V.  Cowan,  50  Mo.  App.  430:    1534. 
V.  Ft.  Madison  St.  E.  R.  Co.,  105 

Iowa  284:   272,  275,   1588. 
V.  Mt.  Pulaski,  176  111.  397:  199. 
V.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  55  Pa. 

St.  340:  248,  255,  308. 
V.  Plass,  28  N.  Y.  465:  821. 
V.  Rockport,  6  Ind.  237:  210. 
V.  Trumpbour,  38  N.  Y.  355:  821, 

1021. 
V.  Warford,  11  Mo.  513:  520. 
V.   Western   Union   R.   R.    Co.,   25 
Wis.  60:   1123,  1310. 
Snyder  Avenue,  Matter  of,  14  Phil. 

346:  432. 
Sohier  v.  Mass.  General  Hospital,  3 

Cush.  483 :  458. 
S.  0.  Houghton's  Appeal,  42  Cal.  35 : 

1397,  1398. 
Soller  V.  Brown  Tp.   67  Mich.   422: 

1028,  1415. 
Somerset  Coal  Canal  Co.  v.  Harcourt, 

24  Beav.  571:   1071. 
Somerset  etc.  Road,  74  Pa.   St.  61: 

700. 
Somerton  Turnpike,  16  Pa.  Supr.  Ct. 

400:   1264. 
Somerville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Doughtv, 
22    N.    J.    L.    495:     1312,    '1314, 
1378,  1380. 
Sommerville  v.  Waltham,  170  Mass. 
160:  591. 
V.  Wimbush,  7  Gratt.  205 :  409. 
Sonnek  v.  Minnesota  Lake,  50  Minn. 

558:   1360,  1364. 
Sorenson  v.    Greeley,    10   Colo.   369: 
303,  1667. 


cclx 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;  Vol.  II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Soule  V.  Passaic,  47  N.  J.  Eq.   28; 

155,  1606. 
South   V.   East  London  Ey.   Co.,   42 

L.  J.  477:  635. 
South   Abington   Road,    109   Pa.   St. 

118:   1005,  1013,  1032,  1376. 
South  Amboy  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R. 

Co.,  66  N.  J.  L.  623:   878,  879, 

889. 

Southampton  Road,  21  Pa.  St.  356: 

778. 
Southard  v.   Brooklyn,   1   App.   Div. 

N.  Y.  175 :  144,  1651,  1655. 
V.  Eicker,  43  Me.  575:   1017,  1032, 

1033. 
South  Bait.  Harbor  etc.  Co.  v.  Smith, 

85  Md.  537:   882. 

South  Beach  R.   R.   Co.,  Matter  of, 

53  Hun  131:   720,  814,  1061. 
South   Beach  E.  E.   Co.,  Matter  of, 

119  N.  Y.    141:    720,   814,   1061. 
South  Berwick  v.  County  Comrs.,  98 

Me.  108:  882. 
South  Bound  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Burton,  63 

S.  C.  348:   1625. 
V.  Burton,  67  S.  C.  515:    181,  201, 

202,    243,    249,    255,    304,    1297, 

1303,  1625. 
South  Brooklyn  R.  &  T.  Co.,  Matter 

of,  50  Hun  405:  731. 
South  Buffalo  Ey.   Co.  v.  Kirkover, 

86  App.  Div.  55:  1195,  1200, 
1202,  1243. 

V.  Kirkover,  176  N.  Y.  301:  1195, 

1200,  1202,  1243. 

th  Cai 

4:  76 
South  Carolina  etc.  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Am. 

Tel.  &   Tel.   Co.,   63   S.  C.    199: 

1624. 
V.  American  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  65  S. 

C.    459:    733,    988,    1247,    1286, 

1624. 
South  Carolina  E.  E.  Co.,  Ex  parte, 

2  Eich.  L.  S.  C.  434:  728. 
South  Carolina  E.  E.   Co.  v.  Blake, 

9   Rich.    S.    C.   228:    1042,    1045, 

1061,  1066,  1074,  1075. 
V.  Columbia  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  13  Eich. 

Eq.  S.  C.  339:  765. 
V.  Steiner,  44  Ga.  546:    242,  249, 

250,    279,   323,    448,    1155,    1295, 

1302. 

South  Chester  Road,  80  Pa.  St.  370: 
700. 

South  Chicago  City  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Calu- 
met etc.  St.  R.  E.  Co.,  70  111. 
App.  254:  737,  768,  1611. 


South  Chicago  City  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Chi- 
cago,  196  HI.  490:    1509,   1510. 
V.   Dix,    109   HI.   237:    532,    1043, 
1061,  1063. 
South   Covington   etc.   E.   E.   Co.  v. 

Berry,  93  Ky.  43:   476. 
South  Dak.  Cent.  Ey.  Co.  v.  Chicago 
etc.  Ey.  Co.,  141  Fed.  578:   759, 
931,  932. 
Southeast  etc.  Ey.  Co.  v.  Evansville 
etc.  E.  R.  Co.,  169  Ind.  339:  329, 
76.5,  766,  768,  1611. 
Southern  Bell  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  Fran- 
cis, 109  Ala.  224:  342,  349. 
V.  Mobile,  162  Fed.  523:  359,  1619, 

1622. 
V.  Nalley,  165  Fed.  263:  342. 
V.  Richmond,  103  Fed.  33:  343,  362. 
Southern  Boulevard,  Matter  of,  3  Abb. 

Pr.  N.  S.  447  :  1083. 
Southern  Boulevard  R.  E.  Co.,  In  re, 

58  Hun  497:  330,  1154. 
Southern  Boulevard  E.  E.  Co.,  In  re, 

128  N.  Y.  93:  330,  1154. 
Southern  Boulevard  E.  E.  Co.,  In  re, 

141  N.  Y.  532:   1397. 
Southern  Boulevard  E.  E.  Co.,  In  re, 

143  N.  Y.  253:   736,  1397. 
Southern  Boulevard  E.  E.  Co.,  In  re, 

140  N.  Y.  352:   736. 
Southern  Cal.  Mt.  Water  Co.  v.  Cam- 
eron, 141  Cal.  283:   1669. 
Southern  Cal.  Rv.  Co.  v.  Slanson,  138 

Cal.  342:   1630. 
Southern  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  Bull,  116 

Ga.  776:  315,  351,  372,  1596. 
Southern  Cotton  Press  &  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
Galveston  Wharf  Co.,  3  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  p.  309:  747,  749,  1183. 
Southern   111.   &   Mo.   Bridge   Co.   v. 
Stone,   174  Mo.   1:    7,  503,  675, 
684,  686,  701. 
V.  Stone,  194  Mo.  175:  686,  1186. 
Southern  Ind.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Indianapolis 
etc.  Ry.  Co.,  108  Ind.  360:   801, 
900,  907,  919. 
V.  Brown,  30  Ind.  App.  684:   1717. 
Southern  Kansas  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Board 
of  Comrs.,  52  Kan.  138:   1290. 
V.  Oklahoma  City,  12  Okl.  82 :  360, 

750,  1291. 
V.  State,  100  Tex.  437:  480. 
Southern  Minn.   R.  R.   Co.  v.   Stod- 
dard, 6  Minn.  150:  824. 
Southern  Mo.  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wood- 

ard,  193  Mo.  656:  1123. 
Southern  Pac.  Co.  v.  Hyatt,  132  Cal. 
240:    1479. 
V.  Pomoma,  144  Cal.  339:  8S3. 
Southern  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dufour. 
95  Cal.  615:  161. 
V.  Ferris,  93  Cal.  263:  881,  1619. 


CASES    CITED. 


cclxi 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742  ;   Vol.  II,  pp.   743-1T19.] 


Southern  Pac.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Hart,  3 
Cal.    App.    11:    1211,    1243. 
V.  Oakland,  58  Fed.  .50:  1570,  1619. 
V.  Reed,  41  Cal.  256:  242,  246,  250, 

307. 
.V.    San   Francisco   Savings   Union, 

146  Cal.  290:   1477. 
V.    Southern    Cal.    R.   R.   Co.,    Ill 

Cal.  221,  754,  799. 
V.  Wilson,  49  Cal.  396:  1385. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Atlanta  Ry.  &  P. 
Co.,  Ill  Ga.  679:  272,  328. 
V.  Atlantic  Stove  Works,   128  Ga. 

207:   481,  483. 
V.  Birmingham   etc.   Ry.    Co.,    131 

Ala.  663:   1159,  1410,  1568. 
V.  Cook,  106  Ga.  450:   151. 
V.   Cook,   117   Ga.   286:    151,    1649, 

1G54. 
V.  Ferguson,  105  Tenn.  552:  97. 
V.  Gossett,  79  S.  C.  372:  1477. 
V.  Gregg,  101  Va.  308:  1537,  1540, 

1541. 
V.  Hardeman,  130  Ga.  222:   153. 
V.  Hays,  150  Ala.  212:   1568,  1574. 
V.  Hood,  126  Ala.  312:   1540,  1620. 
V.  Leard,  146  Ala.  349 :  92. 
V.  Piatt,  131  Ala.  312:  92,  1638. 
V.  Sehna  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  130  Ala.  660: 
926,  1159,  1160,  1435,  1464,  1465. 
V.  Southern  &  Atlantic  Tel  Co.,  46 

Ga.  43:   1159. 
V.  Stantiford,  21  Ky.  L.  R.  1023: 
830,  873,  882,  1628. 
South  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ala.  Gt.  So. 
R.   R.   Co.,    102   Ala.   236:    1619, 
1620. 
V.  Highland  Ave.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  119 

Ala.  105:   720,  757. 
V.   Highland  Ave.   R.  R.   Co.,   117 

Ala.  395:  845. 
V.  Virginia  etc.   Ry.   Co.,   104  Va. 
323:   1042,  1619,  1624. 
Southgate  v.  Covington,  15  B.  Mon. 

291  :  465. 
South  Haven  v.  Probate  Judge,  140 

Mich.  117:  725. 
Southington  v.  Clark,  13  Conn.  370: 

917,  992. 
South    London    Ry.    Co.    v.    United 
Parishes    (1905)   A.  C.  1:   1267. 
v.  United  Parishes  etc.    (1903)    2 
K.  B.  728:  1267. 
South  Market  St.,  In  re,  67  Hun  594 

1168. 
South  Market  St.,  In  re,  76  Hun  85 

914,  1370. 
South  Market  St.,  In  re,  80  Hun  246 

929,  1437. 
South  Omaha  v.  Omaha  B.  &  T.  Ry, 
Co.,  76  Neb.  718:  322. 


South  Park  Comrs.  v.  Ayer,  237  lU. 
211:   1109,  1115,  1263. 
,r.  Dunlevy,  91  111.  49:   1222,  1224, 

1236,  1325. 
V.  Todd,  112  111.  379:  947. 
V.  Trustees  of  Schools,  107  111.  489: 
1113,  1379. 
Southport   etc.    R.    R.    Co.   v.    Piatt 

Land,  133  N.  C.  206:  22,  1187. 
South   St.   Paul  St.,  In  re,  85  Hun 

473:    1374. 
South    Seventh    St.,    Matter    of,    48 

Barb.  12:   1083. 
South  Side  El.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Nesvig, 

214  111.  463:   1507. 
South  Side  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Second 
Ave.   Pass.    R.   R.   Co.,   191   Pa. 
St.  492 :  764. 
Southside   R.    R.    Co.   v.   Daniel,   20 

Gratt.    344:    1459. 
South  Staffordshire  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hall, 

1  Sim.  N.  S.  373:  1611. 
South    Twelfth    Street,   217    Pa.    St. 

362:  432. 
South  Wales  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Richards, 

6  Eng.  R.  R.  Cas.  197 :   1413. 
Southwark    Water    Co.    v.    District 
Board,  L.  R.   (1898)   2  Ch.  603: 
352. 
Southwestern   Land   Co.   v.   Hickory 
Jackson  Ditch  Co.,  18  Colo.  489: 
995,  996,  1075,  1435,  1436,  1437. 
Southwestern  Mineral  Ry.  Co.  v.  Har- 
vey, 8  Kan.  App.  489:  1312. 
Southwestern  Mo.  Lt.  Co.  v.  Scheu- 
rich,  174  Mo.  235:  551,  679,  724. 
Southwestern  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Paulk,  24 
Ga.  356:  475. 
v.  Southern  &  Atlantic  Tel.  Co.,  46 
Ga.  43:   923,  1609. 
Southwestern  Telephone  Co.  v.  Kan- 
sas City  Ry.  Co.,  109  La.  892: 
724,  774,  1286. 
Southwestern   State   Normal   School, 

26  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  9!) :  709. 
Southwestern    State    Normal    School 
Case,  213  Pa.  St.  244:   183,  366, 
779,  800,  878. 
Southwest  Penn.   Pipe   Lines   v.   Di- 
rectors of  the  Poor,  1  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 
460:   786. 
Sower  V.  Philadelphia,  35  Pa.  St.  231 : 

915. 
Sowers  v.  Cincinnati  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

162  Ind.   676:    1671,   1672. 
Sowle  V.  Cisner,  56  Ind.  276:  996. 
Spackman   v.   Great   Western   R.   R. 

Co.,  1  Jur.  N.  S.  790:   822. 
Spader  v.  New  York  Elevated  R.  R. 
Co.,  3  Abb.  New  Cases  467 :  260. 


cclxii 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;  Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Spalding  v.  Macomb  etc.  Ev.  Co.,  225 

111.  585:  242,  246,  558,'639,  1580, 

1588,  1591. 

V.    Omaha,   4   Neb.    (Uuof.)    447: 

1526,  1719. 

Spangler's  Appeal,   64 'Pa.   St.   387: 

1603. 
Spangler  v.   Saa  Francisco,  84   Cal. 

12:    143. 
Sparhawk  v.  Walpole,  20  N.  H.  317: 

1528. 
Sparks  v.  Philadelphia  etc.  K.  R.  Co., 

212  Pa.  St.  105:  716. 
Sparks  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Newton,  57  N.  J. 
Eq.  367:  74,  151,  1263,  1554. 
V.  Newton,  60  N.  J.  Eq.  399:   73, 
74,  1201,  1263,  1554. 
Sparling  v.  Dwenger,  60  Ind.  72:  701. 
Sparrow  v.  Oxford,  Worcester  &  Wol- 
verhampton Ry.  Co.,  2  DeG.  Mc- 
N.  &  G.  94:   438,  822. 
Spaulding   v.    Arlington,    126   Mass. 
492:    1459. 
V.  Groton,  68  N.  H.  77:  1362,  1380, 

1381. 
V.  Lowell,  23  Pick.  71 :  523. 
V.  Milwaukee  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  57  Wis. 

304:   1403. 
v.  Nourse,  143  Mass.  490:  734. 
V.    Wesson    (Cal.)     45    Pac.    807: 
881. 
Spealman   v.    Railroad   Co.,    71    Mo. 

434:    475. 
Spear   v.   Allison,    20    Pa.    St.   200: 
1499. 
V.  Drainage  Comrs.,   113  111.  632: 
1122. 
Spears  v.  New  York,  87  N.  Y.  359: 

1566. 
Spear's  Road  Case,  4  Binn.  174:  1360. 
Specht  V.  Detroit,  20  Mich.  168 :  1022. 
Speck  V.  Kenoyer,  164  Ind.  431:  503, 
512,  514,  1056,  1058,  1192,  1208, 
1209. 
Speer  v.  Athens,  85  Ga.  49:  13. 
V.   Erie   R.   R.   Co.,   64  N.  J.   Eq. 

601:  855,  1646,  1647. 
V.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  68  N.  J.  Eq.  615: 

855,  1646. 
V.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  70  N.  J.  Eq.  318: 
855,  1646. 
Speese  v.  Schuylkill  Riv.  E.  S.  R.  R. 
Co.,  8  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  584:   1483. 
V.  Schuylkill  Riv.  E.  S.  R.  R.  Co., 

10  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  515:   1477. 
V.  Schuykill  Riv.  E.  S.  R.  R.  Co., 
201  Pa.  St.  568:   1485. 
Spencer  v.  Andrew,  82  la.  14:  356. 
V.  Hartford,   Providence,   &  T.   R. 
R.   Co.,   10  R.   I.    14:    88,   1251, 
1451,  1454.  ' 


Spencer  v.  Merchant,  100  N.  Y.  585: 
735. 
V.  Merchant,  125  U.  S.  345:  735. 
V.  Metropolitan  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  120 
Mo.    154:     180,    630,    635,    642, 
1123,  1186. 
V.  Met.  St.  E.  R.  Co.,  58  Mo.  App. 

513:    324,  642. 
V.   New   York   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   62 

Conn.   242:    428. 
V.  Peterson,  41  Ore.  257 :  878,  879, 

889. 
V.  Point  Pleasant  &  Ohio  .E  E.  Co., 
23  W.  Va.  406:  256,  1160,  1294, 
1299,   1335,   1580. 
V.  Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry.  Co.,  137 
N.  C.  107:  7,  529,  745. 
Spencer  Co.  Ct.  v.  Commonwealth,  84 

Ky.  36:   1531. 
Spencer  Creek  Water  Co.  v.  Vallejo, 

48   Cal.  70:    930. 
Sperb  V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  E.  Co., 
61    Hun    539:    448,    1303,    1663, 
1664. 
V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  137 

N.   Y.    155:   448,   1296,   1303. 
V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  137 
N.    Y.    596:     1196,    1296,    1300, 
1301. 
Sperry  v.  Flygare,  80  Minn.  325 :  12, 

464. 
Spetzer  v.  Runyan,  113  la.  619:  398. 
Spierling  v.   Ohl,   232   111.   581:    838, 

1497. 
Spilman  v.  Roanoke  Navigation  Co., 
74   N.   C.   675:    144,   1651,   1656. 
Spires  v.  Los  Angeles,   150  Cal.  64: 

421,  1494. 
Spitzer  v.  Runyan,  113  la.  619:   199, 
395,  398,  406,  1411,  1412,  1.502. 
Split  Rock  Cable  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter 

of,  58  Hun  351:   495. 
Split  Rock  Cable  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter 
of,  128  N.  Y.  408:  495,  507,  528, 
535,  1044. 
Spofford  V.   B.   &  B.   R.  R.   Co.,   66 
Me.    26:    708,    976,    980,    1058, 
1414,  1416. 
V.    Southern   Boul.   R.   R.    Co.,    15 
Daly    162:    1586,    1591. 
Spohr  V.  Chicago,  206  111.  441:   1120, 
1313. 
V.  Sehofleld,  66  Ind.  168:  1363. 
Spokane   v.    Colby,    16    Wash.    610: 

422. 
Spokane  etc.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Lieuallen, 
2  Idaho,  1101:  1147,  1226. 
V.   Lieuallen,  3   Idaho   381:    1147, 

1222. 
V.  Ziegler,  61  Fed.  392:   1206. 


CASES    CITED. 


cclxiii 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Spokane  Interurban  Ry.  Co.  v.  Con- 
nelly, 48  Wash.  515:    1031. 
Spokane  St.  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Spokane,  5 
Wash.   634:   354,   1620. 
V.    Spokane   Falls,    6   Wash.    521: 
299. 
Sporato  V.  New  York,  75  App.  Div. 

304:   1338,  1562. 
V.  New  York,  178  N.  Y.  583:    1338, 

1562. 
Spouenberg  v.  Gloversvilla,  96  App. 

Div.  157:   1605,  1615. 
Sprague  v.  Dorr,  185  Mass.   10:   86. 
T.  No.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  122  Wis.  509 : 

1671,  1674. 
V.  Worcester,    13   Gray   193:    147, 
234. 
Spratt  V.  Helena  Power  Transmission 
Co.,  37  Mont.  60:  500,  536,  739, 
748,  1071. 
Spring  V.  Delaware  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  88 
Hun  385:    449,   1613. 
V.  Lowell,  1  Mass.  422:  1091,  1094. 
V.  Park,  89  Md.  406:   469. 
V.  Russell,  7  Me.  273:  99,  103. 
Springboro  School  Dist.,  21  Pa.  Co. 

Ct.  23:  726. 
Springbrook  Road,   64   Pa.   St.   451: 

1107,  1387. 
Spring  City  Gas  Lt.  Co.  v.  Penn.  S. 
V.    R.    R.    Co.,    167    Pa.    St.    6: 
672,  684,  783,  802,  1175. 
Springer    v.    Chicago,    135    HI.    552: 
629,  635,  1108,  1146,  1195,  1549, 
1648,  1656,  1660. 
v.  Chicago,  37  HI.  App.  206:   1145, 

1336. 
V.  Russell,  7  Me.  273:  99,  103. 
Springfield  v.  Conn.  Riv.  R.  R.  Co., 
4  Cush.  63:   242,  297,  756,  777, 
793,  795,  796. 
V.  Dalbey,   139  111.  34:    1383. 
V.  Griffith,  21   HI.  App.  93:    1307. 
V.  Griffith,  46  HI.  App.  246:   629, 

1306,  1307,  1337. 
V.   Robertson   Ave.   R.   R.   Co.,   69 

Mo.  App.  544:  1618. 
V.    Schmook,    68    Mo.    394:     1146, 

1147,  1186,   1215. 
V.  Sleeper,  115  Mass.  587:   1115. 
V.    Whitlock,    34    Mo.    App.    642: 
893,  991. 
Springfield  etc.  Ry.   Co.  v.   Calkins, 
90  Mo.  538:  1119,  1129,  1213. 
V.  Hall,  67  HI.  99:   690. 
V.  Henry,  44  Ark.  360:   154,  1252. 
V.  Rhea,  44  Ark.  258:   1112,  1149, 

1203,  1309,  1310,  1378. 
V.  Turner,  68  HI.  187:   1392. 
Springfield   Road,    73    Pa.    St.    127: 
1364. 


Springfield  Tp.  Road,  In  re,  91  Pa. 

St.  260:  778. 
Springfield  W.  W.  Co.  v.  Jenkins,  62 

Mo.  App.  74:   163. 
Spring  Garden  Road,  43  Pa.  St.  144 : 

1419. 
Spring  Garden  Street's  Case,  4  Rawle 

192:   1097. 
Spring  St.  Opening,  112  Pa.  St.  258: 
.      1531. 
Spring  Valley  Water  Works,  Matter 

of,  17  Cal.  132:  1047. 
Spring  Valley  Water  Works  v.  Drink- 
house,   92   Cal.   528:    1060,   1062, 

1063,  1066,  1231. 
V.  Drinkhouse,  95  Cal.  220:   1425, 

1463. 
V.    San    Francisco,    22    Cal.    434 

1047,  1135. 
V.    San    Francisco,    82    Cal.    286 

481. 
V.  San  Mateo  W.  W.,  64  Cal.  123 

1060,  1062. 
V.  Shottler,  110  U.  S.  347:  481. 
Springville  v.  Fullmer,  7  Utah  450: 

683. 
Sproule  V.  Ala.  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  78  Miss. 

88:  1477. 
Spurgeon  v.   Bartlett,   56  Mo.   App. 

349:  706. 
Spurlock   V.   Dornan,   182   Mo.   242: 

941,  1514,  1516. 
Spurrier    v.    Wirtner,    48    la.    486 : 

1406. 
Spuyten    Duyvil    Parkway,    Opening 

of.  Matter  of,  67  How.  Pr.  341 : 

1075,  1076. 
Squire,  In  re,  125  N.  Y.  131:   1524. 
Squire  v.  Somerville,  120  Mass.  579 : 

1144. 
Squires    v.    Neenah,    24    Wis.    588 : 

1058. 
Stacev  V.  Glen  Ellyn  Hotel  Co.,  223 

ill.  546:  884. 
V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  Co.,  15  App. 

Div.   534:    1302. 
V.  Vermont  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  27 

Vt.  39:    1674. 
Stack,  Matter  of,  50  Hun  385:   610, 

617. 
V.  East  St.  Louis,  85  111.  377 :  635, 

656,  1553. 
V.   Seaboard   Air  Line   R.   R.   Co., 

139   N.   C.   366:    1716. 
Stackpole    v.    Healy,    16    Mass.    33: 

1489. 
Stadler  v.   Milwaukee,   34  Wis.   98: 

615,  619. 
Stafford  v.  Albany,  6  Johns.  1:  1681. 
V.  Albany,  7  Johns.  541:   1681. 


cclxiv 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Staflford  V.  Providence,  10  E.  I.  567: 

1221,   1329. 
Stafford  Springs  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mid- 
dle Rlv.  Mfg.  Co.,  80  Conn.  37: 

896,  898. 
Staggs  V.  Martinsville,  140  Ind.  476: 

472. 
Stahl  V.  Pennsylvania  Co.,   155  Pa. 

St.  309:  818. 
Stanton  v.  Met.  Board  of  Works,  26 

L.  J.  Ch.  300:   643,  1612. 
Stalker   v.    Dunwick,    15    Ont.    342: 

156. 
Stamford  v.  Stamford  H.  R.  Co.,  56 

Conn.  381:   322,  1622. 
Stamford  Water  Co.  v.   Stanley,   39 

Hun  424:  70,  74,  536,  933. 
Stamnes  v.  Milwaukee  etc.  Ry.  Co., 

131  Wis.  85:   829,  947. 
Stamps  V.  Birmingham  &  Stone  Val- 
ley   Ry.    Co.,    2    Pliillips    673: 

731. 
Standen  v.  New  Rochelle  Water  Co., 

91  Hun  272:  71,  72,  74. 
Standish  v.  Liverpool,   1  Drewry  1 : 

1468. 
V.  Washburn,  21  Pick.  237:   1150. 
Standley   v.   Atchison    etc.    Ry.    Co., 

121  Mo.  App.  537:  91. 
Stanford  v.  San  Francisco,  111  Cal. 

198:  233. 
v.  Worn,  27  Cal.  171:   960,   1017, 

1027. 
Stange  v.  Dubuque,  62  la.  303 :   1298. 
v.   Hill  &  West  Dubuque  St.  Ry. 

Co.,  54  la.  669:   268,  271. 
Stanislaus   Co.   v.   San   Joaquin   etc. 

Irr.  Co.,  192  U.  S.  201:  481. 
Stanley  v.    Davenport,   54   la.    463: 

197,  268,  271. 
Stannard  v.  Aurora  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

220  111.  469:   832,  1504. 
Stannards  Corners  Rural  Cem.  Asso. 

V.  Brandes,  35  N.  Y.  Supp.  1015: 

542,  976,  995. 
Stanton  v.  Chicago,  154  111.  23:  912, 

914. 
v.  Metropolitan  Bd.  of  Works,  26 

L.  J.  Ch.  300:   161. 
Stanwood  v.  Maiden,   157  Mass.  17: 

370,  371,  377,  379,  380,  392,  393, 

402,  660,  666. 
Staple  V.  Spring,  10  Mass.  72:  1069. 
Star  &  Crescent  Milling  Co.  v.  San- 
itary District,  120  111.  App.  555 : 

635,  1716. 


Stark  V.  Sioux  City  &  Pacific  R.  R. 

Co.,  43  la.  501:   816. 

V.  Mansfield,  178  Mass.  76:   1254. 

V.  McGown,  1  Nott  &  McCord  (S. 

C.)    387:    22. 

Starling   v.    Grand   Junction   R.    R. 

Co.,  30  U.  C.  C.  P.  247:    1540. 

Starnes  v.  Molson,  1  Montreal  L.  Q. 

B.  425:   131. 

Starr  v.  Camden  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  24 

N.  J.  L.  592:   247,  318,  1635. 
V.  London,  7  L.  R.  Eq.  Cas.  236: 

1115. 
V.  People,  17  Colo.  458:   876,  881, 

883,  884,  885. 
V.  Rochester,  6  Wend.  564:  820. 
Starry  v.  Treat,   102  la.  449:    1024. 
Starr  Burying  Ground  Asso.  v.  North 

Lane  Cem.  Asso.,  77  Conn.  83: 

542,  785,  792. 
State  V.   Adams,   54   N.   J.  L.   506: 

1418. 
V.  Adkins,  42  Kan.  203:  884. 
V.  Aiken,  42  S.  C.  222 :  478. 
V.  Allen,  58  N.  J.  L.  315:   817. 
V.  Anchard,  22  Mont.  14:  1018. 
V.  Anderson,  39  la.  274:  1018. 
V.  Anderson,  130  Wis.  227:    1414, 

1415. 
V.  Anthoine,  40  Me.  435:   787. 
V.  Armwel,  8  Kan.  288:    1507. 
V.   Ashtabula   Co.   Comrs.,   7   Ohio 

C.  C.    (N.   S.)    469:   488. 

V.   Ashtabula   Co.   Comrs.,   8   Ohio 

C.  C.    (N.  S.)    169:  488. 
V.   Atkinson        27   N.   J.   L.   420: 

1081,  1381. 
V.  Atlantic  Coast  Air  Line,  48  Fla. 

114:  481. 
V.  Atlantic  Coast  Air  Line,  48  Fla. 

146:  481. 
V.  Atlantic  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  141  N. 

C.  736:   309. 
V.  Ayres,   15  N.  J.  L.  479:    1091, 

1092. 
V.  Bailey,  6  Wis.  291:   1098. 
V.  Bangor,  98  Me.  114:  781,  789. 
V.  Barlow,  61  la.  572:  970. 
V.  Barnes,  13  N.  J.  L.  268:  1091. 
V.  Barton,  36  Minn.  145 :  384,  400, 

1402. 
V.    Bayonne,    35    N.    J.    L.    332: 

917. 
V.    Bayonne,    35    N.    J.    L.    476: 

1086,  1091,  1093. 
V.  Bayonne,  54  N.  J.  L.  293:  236, 

972. 
V.  Bayonne,  59  N.  J.  L.  101:  342, 

1666. 
V.  Beackmo,  8  Blaekf.  246:    1172. 
V.  Beardsley,  108  la.  396:  486. 


CASES    CITED. 


cclxv 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


State  V.  Beeman,  35  Me.  242:   1010. 
V.  Bennett,  25  N.  J.  L.  329:    1366. 
V.    Berditta,    73    Ind.    185:    199. 
V.  Bergen,  21  N.  J.  L.  342:    1099. 
v.  Bergen,  33  N.  J.  L.  39:   914. 
V.   Bergen,   33   N.  J.   L.   72:    707, 

914. 
V.  Bergen,  34  N.  J.  L.  438 :  734. 
V.  Bergen,  35  N.  J.  L.  332:  918. 
T.  Bergen  Neck  R.  E.  Co.,  53  N.  J. 

L.  108:   693. 
V.  Bergers,  21  N.  J.  L.  342:   993. 
V.    Berry,    12    la.    58:    969,    1032, 

1510,  1512. 
V.   Birmingham,   74  la.   407:    881, 

884,  885,  886. 
V.  Bishop,  39  N.  J.  L.  226:    513, 

678. 
V.   Black   Riv.   Phosphate   Co.,    32 

Fla.  82:    115,  127. 
V.    Blalve,    35    N.   J.    L.    208:    14, 

577. 
V.  Blake,  36  N.  J.  L.  442:  14,  565, 

566,  568,  577,  1441. 

V.  Blauvelt,  33  N.  J.  L.  36:  1368. 
V.  Blauvelt,  34  N.  J.  L.  261 :  1421. 
V.    Board    of    Chosen    Freeholders, 

51  N.  J.  L.  454:  918. 
V.  Board  of  Chosen  Freeholders,  52 

N.  J.  L.  398:  919. 
V.  Board  of  Chosen  Freeholders,  56 

N.  J.  L.  416:   297,  304. 
V.  Board  of  Park  Comrs.,  33  Minn. 

524:   1673,  1683. 
V.    Board    of    Park    Comrs.,    100 

Minn.  150:   363. 
V.    Board    of    Public    Works,    42 

Ohio  St.  607:   829. 
V.  Board  of  Suprs.,  102  Minn.  442: 

567,  570,  576. 

V.  Board  of   Supervisors,  66  Wis. 

199:   75. 
V.   Bo^ardus,   63   Kan.   259:    1018, 

1513. 
V.    Boone    County,    78    Neb.    271: 

746. 
V.  Boston,  11  N.  H.  407:   1502. 
V.  Bradley,  31  Mo.  308:   865. 
v.  Brown,  27  N.  J.  L.  13:  837. 
V.  Brown,  53  N.  J.  L.  181:    1383. 
V.  BrugiTerman,  31  Minn.  493:  734. 
V.   Burlington   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   99 

la.  565:   1646. 
V.  Burlington  &  Mt.  PI.  Plank  Road 

Co.,  1  la.  386:    1204. 
V.  Burgeson,   108  Wis.   174:    1363. 
V.    Burnell,    104    Wis.    246:     765, 

1638. 
V.  Burnett,  14  N.  J.  L.  385:   1102, 

1381. 
V.  Cake,  24  N.  J.  L.  516:   1363. 


State  V.  Calais,  48  Me.  456:   1373. 
V.  Camden,  53  N.  J.  L.  322:   487. 
V.  Canterbury,  28  N.  li.  195:   104, 

781,   788,   1511. 
V.  Canterbury,  40  N.  H.  307:  1381. 
V.  Cape  May,  58  N.  J.  L.  565 :  299, 

1666. 
V.  Capital  City  Dairy  Co.,  62  Ohio 

St.  350:  479. 
V.  Carragan,  36  N.  J.  L.  52:  431. 
V.  Centralia  etc.  Ry.  &  P.  Co.,  42 

Wash.   632:    536,  537,  594,  921, 

1064,  1071. 
V.  Chapman,  69  N.  J.  L.  464:  477, 

479. 
V.  Charleston  Lt.  &  W.  Co.,  68  S. 

C.  540:   133. 
V.   Chicago  etc.   R.  R.  Co.,  80   la. 

586:    1010. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  86  la. 

304:   1485. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  36  Minn. 

402:   472,  1173. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  29  Neb. 

412:    1642. 
V.    Cincinnati   etc.    R.   R.    Co.,    17 

Ohio   St.   103:    1390,   1673,  1684. 
V.  Cincinnati  Gas  Lt.  &  C.  Co.,  18 

Ohio  St.  262:   411,  1623. 
V.    City    Council,    40    Minn.    483: 

1673,  1701. 
V.    City    Council,    12    Rich.    S.    C. 

702:  13. 
V.  Clark,  1  N.  J.  L.  226:    1363. 
V.  Clark,  38  N.  J.  L.  102:   1416. 
V.  Clark,  25  N.  J.  L.  54 :  700. 
V.    Clyde,    130    Wis.    159:     1069: 

1381. 
V.    Colfax    County,    51    Neb.    28: 

1515. 
V.  Collins,  6  Ohio  126:  514. 
V.   CoUis,  20  App.  Div.  341:    687, 

1227. 
v.  Commissioners,  23  N.  J.  L.  510: 

525. 
V.  Comrs.,  30  Ohio  St.  58:  831. 
V.  Commissioners,  54  Ohio  St.  333 : 

739. 
V.  Connover,  7  N.  J.  L.  203:   1374. 
V.  Convery,  53  N.  J.  L.  588:    1020. 
v.  Cooper,  23  N.  J.  L.  381 :  1366. 
V.    County    Comrs.,    23    Fla.    632: 

701. 
V.  Cowles,  64  Ohio  St.  162:  738. 
V.    Cozzens,    42    La.    Ann.    1069: 

476. 
V.   Crane,   36  N.  J.  L.  394:    1083, 

1085. 
V.  Crosby,  92  Minn.  176:  739. 
V.  Cruser,  14  N.  J.  L.  401:    1389 


cclxvi 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


State  V.   Curtis,   86  Wis.   140:    916, 

1367,  1516,  1517. 
V.  Dalton,  22  R.I.  77:  479. 
V.   Davis,    13   N.   J.   L.    10:    1091, 

1092. 
V.  Dawson,  3  Hill  (S.  C.)  101:  22, 

1153. 
V.   Dayton   Traction   Co.,   64   Ohio 

St.  272:   281,  291. 
V.  Bearing,  173  Mo.  492:  771. 
V.  Delesdernier,  11  Me.  473:   1081, 

1083. 
V.    Demarest,    32    N.    J.    L.    528: 

462. 
V.  Des  Moines   City  Ey.   Co.,   135 

la.  694:   1623. 
V.  Dickson,  3  Mo.  App.  464:   1463. 
V.  Digby,  5  Blackf.  543:    1207. 
V.   District  Court,  42  Minn.   247 

1289. 
V.   District  Court,  44  Minn.   244 

1413. 
V.    District   Court,    50   Minn.    14 

1383. 
V.   District   Court,   52  Minn.   283 

954,  966. 
V.   District  Court,  77  Minn.  248 

787. 
V.  District  Court,  83   Minn.   464 

1419,  1421. 
V.  District  Court,   87  Minn.    146 

7,  21,  674. 
V.  District  Court,  87   Minn.   268 

1085,  1438. 
V.  District  Court,   14  Mont.   476 

520,  521. 
V.   District  Court,   28  Mont.  528 

439. 

V.  District  Court,  34  Mont.  535 

715. 
V.    Dobard,    45    La.    Apn.    1412 

479. 
V.  Dover,  10  N".  H.  394:  1390. 
V.  Driggs,  45  N.  J.  L.  91 :  578. 
V.  Dubuque  etc.  E.  R.  Co.,  88  la. 

508:   876. 
V.  Dunlap,  49  Wasli.  385:  322. 
V.   Dupaquier,    46   La.   Ann.    577: 

479. 
V.  East  Fifth  St.  E.  R.  Co.,   140 

Mo.  539:  297,  1623. 
V.  Easton  &  Amboy  R.  E.  Co.,  36 

N.  J.  L.   181:   941,  962,  966. 
V.  Eau  Claire,  40  Wis.  533:   523, 

536,   593. 
V.  Edwards,  86  Me.  102:  551. 
V.   Elizabeth,    37    N.   J.   Eq.   432: 

878. 
V.  Elizabeth,  32  N.  J.  L.  357:  914, 

1023,  1084. 
V.  Elizabeth,  54  N.  J.  L.  462:  185, 

396. 


State  V.  Elizabeth,  55  N.  J.  L.  337: 

185,  397. 
V.  Elkinton,  30  N.  J.  L.  335:  1637. 
V.    Elk   Island   Boom   Co.,   41    W. 

Va.  796:   115. 
V.  Ellis,  113  La.  555:    1061. 
V.  Emmons,  24  N.  J.  L.  45:  1364. 
V.   Engleman,    106   Mo.   628:    673, 

678,  1057,  1399. 
V.  English,  22  N.  J.  L.  291 :  1359. 
V.  English,  22  N.  J.  L.  713:  1359. 
V.   Essex   Public   Road  Board,   37 

N.  J.  L.  273:    1358. 
V.  Evans,  2  Scam.  208:   1194. 
V.  Everett,  23  N.  J.  L.  378:  1365, 

1419,  1420. 
V.  Tackier,  91  Wis.  418:  594. 
V.  Fillmore  Co.,  32  Neb.  870:   155, 

1606. 
V.  Findley,  67  Wis.  86:  1100. 
V.  Fire  Creek  C.  &  C.  Co.,  33  W. 

Va.   188:   479. 
V.  Fisher,  117  N.  C.  733:  887,  888, 

890. 
V.  Fischer,  26  N.  J.  L.  129:  954, 

1369. 
V.  Fisk,  15  N.  D.  219 :  580. 
V.  Fond  du  Lac,  42  Wis.  287 :  1005, 

1010,  1011,  1013,  1016. 
V.  Ford,  6  Wis.  291:    1638. 
V.  Fort,  180  Mo.  97 :  1676. 
V.    Franklin   Falls   Co.,   49   N.  H. 

240:  22. 
V.  French,  24  N.  J.  L.  736:   1381. 
V.  French,  71   Ohio  St.  186:   486. 
V.    Frorhlick,    115    Wis.    32:    739. 
V.  Garch,  9  Wash.  226:  1444. 
V.  Garretson,  23  N.  J.  L.  388 :  1369. 
V.  Geneva,  107  Wis.  1:   514,  1403. 
V.  Gill,  84  Mo.  248:    1410. 
V.  Gilmanton,  9  N.  H.  461:    104, 

109. 
V.  Glen,  7  Jones  L.  321:   15,  108, 

486. 
V.  Goodwill,  33  W.  Va.  179:  477, 

479. 
V.    Graeme,    130    Mo.    App.    138: 

350. 
V.    Graflfam,    74    Wis.    643:     970, 

1638. 
V.  Grand  Island  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  31 

Neb.  209:   1531. 
V.  Graves,  19  Md.  351 :  1673,  1685. 
V.  Graves,  120  Wis.  607:   1370. 
V.  Green,  15  N.  J.  L.  88:  1364. 
V.  Green,   18  N.  J.  L.   179:    1022, 

1416. 
V.  Griftner,  61  Ohio  St.  201 :  1500. 
V.  Guilbert,  56  Ohio  St.  575:  460. 
V.  Haines,  58  Minn.  96:   1409. 
V.   Hall,  8  Pick.   440:    1017. 
V.  Hall,  17  N.  J.  L.  374:  1102. 


CASES    CITED. 


cclxvii 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol. 

State   V.   Hamilton,   109   Tenn.   276: 

191,  366. 
V.  Hamilton,  47  Ohio  St.  52:  409, 

413. 
V.  Hampton,  2  N.  H.  22 :  779. 
V.  Hanna,  97  Ind.  469:   1431. 
V.  Harland,  74  Wis.   11:   1517. 
V.  Hart,    17   N.   J.  L.    185:    1091, 

1092,  1364. 
V.  Hemsley,  59  N.  J.  L.  149 :  1086. 
V.    Hendriekson,    80    Minn.    352 

1363,  1515. 
V.  Heppenheimer,  54  N.  J.  L.  268 

1010,  1160. 
V.    Hernsley,    59    N.    J.    L.    149 

707. 
V.  Hoboken,  35  N.  J.  L.  205 :  297. 
V.  Hoetz,  67  Wis.  84:    1093. 
V.  Hogue,  71  Wis.  384:   687,  1013, 

1014,   1091,   1165,   1167,   1511. 
V.    Holman,    40    Minn.    369:     384, 

400,  1402. 
V.  Hopping,  18  N.  J.  L.  423:  1363. 
V.  Horn,  34  Kan.  556:   1095,  1515. 
V.   Hudson   Co.,   55   N.   J.   L.   88: 

1187. 
V.    Hudson    County    Ave.    Comrs., 

37  N.  J.  L.   12:    432. 
V.  Hudson  County  Board,  55  N.  J. 

L.  88:   807,   1199,  1312. 
V.  Hudson  River  R.   R.   &   T.   Co. 

(N.  J.)    25  Atl.  Rep.  853:   1027. 
V.  Hudson  Tunnel  R.  R.  Co.,  38  N. 

J.  L.  17:    1040,  1048. 
V.  Hudson  Tunnel  R.  R.  Co.,  38  N. 

J.  L.  548:  726,  1040,  1048. 
V.   Hug,   44   Mo.    116:    1392,    1673, 

1701,  1702. 
V.  Hulick,  3  N.  J.  L.  70:  1363. 
V.  Hulick,  33  N.   J.  L.   307:    942, 

1363,  1381. 
V.   Humes,    34    Wash.    347:    1325, 

1326. 
V.  Hutchinson,    10   N.   J.   L.   242: 

1091. 
V.  Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  116 

U.  S.  347:   480. 
V.  Indiana  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  133  Ind. 

69:    488. 
V.   Indianapolis   Un.   Ry.   Co.,   160 

Ind.    45:    488. 
V.   Iowa   Cent.   R.   R.    Co.,   91    la. 

275:    1017. 
V.  Isanti  Co.  Comrs.,  98  Minn.  89: 

144,  1414. 
V.  Jacksonville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  20 

Fla.  616:  1163,  1467. 
V.  Jacksonville  St.  R.  R.   Co.,   29 

Fla.  590:  268,  298,  299. 


I,  pp.   1-742;   Vol.   II,   pp.    T43-1Y19.] 

State  V.  Jacksonville  Terminal   Co., 

41  Fla.  377:  426,  428,  761. 
V.    Janesville    St.    R.    R.    Co.,    87 

Wis.  72:  330. 
V.   Jersey  City,  24  N.  J.  L.   662 

1014. 
V.  Jersey  City,  25  N.  J.  L.   309 

707,  914,  1029,  1080,  1358. 
V.  Jersey  City,   29  N.  J.  L.  441 

921,    1071. 
V.   Jersey   City,   34   N.   J.   L.   31 

485. 
V.   Jersey   City,   54   N.   J.   L.   49 

698,    707,    708,    734. 
V.   Jersey  City,  55  N.  J.  L.   117 

141. 
V.   Jersey  City,  56  N.  J.  L.  216 

980. 
V.  Jersey  City,   57  N.  J.  L.   293 

272,  1666. 
V.  Jersey  City,  58  N.  J.  L.  262 

783 
V.  Johnson,  114  N.  C.  846:  468. 
V.  Jones,  139  N.  C.  613:  923,  1005, 

1008,  1082. 
V.  Joyce,  121  N.  C.  610:   1511. 
V.  Judges,  69  Ohio  St.  372:    1409, 

1422. 
V.  Justice,   24  N.   J.  L.   413:    514, 

1033,  1105. 
V.  Kansas  City,  89  Mo.  34:   1186, 

1418. 
V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  54 

Ark.  608:  780,  1718. 
V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  32 

Fed.   722:    488. 
V.  Kansas  Natural  Gas  Co.,  71  Kan. 

508:   359. 
V.  Kinne,  41   N.  H.  238:    1434. 
V.  Kinney,  39  la.  226:   1510,  1514. 
V.  Klein,  140  Mo.  502:  1471. 
V.  Laclede  Gas  &  L.  Co.,  102  Mo. 

472:  481,482. 
V.  Langer,  29  Wis.  68:   1029. 
V.  Larabee,  59  N.  J.  L.  259:   707, 

1387. 
V.  Larrabee,  58  N.  J.  L.  314:  1418. 
V.  Latrobe,  81  Md.  222:  303. 
V.  Laverack,  34  N.  J.  L.  201 :  346, 

419,  422. 
v.  Lawrence,  5  N.  J.  L.  850:   1091. 
v.  Leaver,  62  Wis.  387:  348. 
V.  Leighton,  83  Me.  419:   96. 
V.  Leslie,  30  Min.  533:  1366. 
V.  Lewis,  22  N.  J.  L.  564:    1033, 

1511,  1516. 
V.  Lindell  R.  R.  Co.,  151  Mo.  162: 

299. 
V.    Lindig,    96    Minn.    419:     1361, 

1362. 


cclxviil 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol 

State  V.  Lippinoott,  25  N.  J.  L.  434: 

1363. 
V.  Lloyd,  133  Wis.  468:  865. 
V.  Logue,  73  Wis.  598:  1517,  1018. 
V.  Long  Branch  Comrs.,  54  N.  J. 

L.  484:   916,  1666. 
V.  Longfellow,   169  Mo.   109:    104, 

105,  114,  115. 
V.   Longstreet,    38    N.   J.   L.    312: 

1431. 
V.  Loomis,  115  Mo.  307:  479. 
V.   Lord,   26   N.   J.   L.   140:    1358, 

1421. 
V.  Lubke,  85  Mo.  307:  1465. 
V.  Lubke,  15  Mo.  App.  152:   1465. 
V.  Luce,  9  Houst.  396:   451. 
V.  Lyle,   100   N.   C.  497:   22,  495, 

496,  923,  1164. 
V.    Maealester    College,    87    Minn. 

165:   11,  464. 
V.  Madison,  59  Me.  538:   1505. 
V.   Madison   St.  Ry.   Co.,   72   Wis. 

612:    1623. 
v.  Maine,  27  Conn.  641:  422,  .522. 
V.  Mallard,  143  N.   C.  666:    1462, 

1634. 
V.  Martin,  51  Kan.  462:  716. 
V.  Mason  City  etc.  E.  R.   Co.,  85 

la.  516:   1645. 
V.  McDonald,  28  Minn.  445:   974, 

1374. 
V.  McGowan,  138  Mo.  187  :  594. 
V.  McHatton,  15  Mont.  159:   1463, 

1465. 
V.    Mclver,    88   N.    C.    686:    1164, 

1165,    1167. 
V.  McNay,  90  Wis.  104:   565,  567, 

568,   582. 
V.  Meiley,  22  Ohio  St.  534:   1534. 
V.  Messenger,  27  Minn.  119:   1160, 

1167. 
V.  Miller,  23  N.  J.  L.  383:    1106, 

1187,   1379. 
V.  Mills,  29  Wis.  322:   1391,  1392, 

1674. 
V.  Milwaukee  etc.  R.  R.   Co.,   116 

Wis.    142:    306. 
V.  Mines,  38  W.  Va.  125:  594. 
V.  Minneapolis  etc.  R.  R.   Co.,  88 

la.  689:' 1517. 
V.  Minneapolis  etc.  R.  R.   Co.,   39 

Minn.  219:  487,  1642,  1643,  1644 
V.  Mo.  etc.  Telephone  Co.,  189  Mo, 

83:    481. 
V.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  98  Minn.  429 

490,   1288. 
V.   Mo.  Pac.   Ey.   Co.,   75   Neb.   4 

951. 
V.   Mobile,   5   Porter    (Ala.)    279 

346,  1488,  1594. 
V.  Molly,  18  Iowa  525:  1381,  1514. 


I,   pp.    1-742;   Vol.   11,   pp.    743-1719.] 

State  V.  Monongahela  Riv.  R.  R.  Co., 

37  W.  Va.  108.  1643. 
V.  Monroe,  40  Wash.  545:  358. 
V.  Montclair  R.  R.  Co.,  35  N.  J.  L. 

328:   787. 
V.  Morse,  51  N.  H.  98:   969. 
V.  Muncie  Pulp  Co.,  119  Tenn.  47: 

104. 
V.  Murphy,  130  Mo.  10:   346,  476. 
V.   Murphy    (Mo.)    34   S.   W.    51: 

346. 
V.  National  Docks  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  54 

N.  J.  L.  180:    1088. 
V.  National  Docks  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

57  N.  J.  L.  183:   1063. 
V.  Nelson,  52  Ohio  St.  88:  476. 
V.  Nelson,  57  Wis.  147:  974,  1087. 
V.  Neptune  City,  57  N.  J.  L.  302: 

300. 
V.  Neville,  110  Mo.  345:  928,  1638. 
V.  Newark,  25  N.  J.  L.  411:   1014. 
V.  Newark,  27  N.  J.  L.  185:   734, 

735. 
V.  Newark,  28  N.  J.  L.  491:  700. 
V.  Newark,  28  N.  J.  L.  529 :  782. 
V.  Newark,  35  N.  J.  L.  168:   14. 
V.  Newark,   54  N.  J.  L.  62:    683, 

724,  1068. 
V.  Newark,  54  N.  J.  L.  102:   304, 

014,  1666. 
V.  Newark,  57  N.  J.  L.  309 :  300. 
V.  New  Brunswick,  58  N.  J.  L.  225 : 

514,  917. 
V.  New  Boston,  11  N.  H.  407:  423. 
V.  New  Haven  etc.  R.  R.   Co.,  43 

Conn.  351:    476. 
V.  New  Haven  etc.  Co.,  45  Conn. 

331;    728. 
V.  Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  98  Minn. 

429:   1289,  1644. 
V.  Northrup,  18  N.  J.  L.  271:  979, 

981. 
V.  Noyes,  47  Maine  189:  407,  409, 

487. 
V.  O'Connor,  78  Wis.  282 :  980,  983, 

1021,  1381. 
V.  Officer,  4  Ore.  180:   1034,  1516. 
V.  Ohio  Oil  Co.,  150  Ind.  21:   164, 

470. 
V.  Ohio  Riv.  R.  R.  Co.,  38  W.  Va. 

242:   1643. 
V.   Oliver,   24  N.   J.   L.   129:    992, 

1368. 
V.  Olynipia  L.  &  P.  Co.,  46  Wash. 

511:    536,   537,   594. 
V.   Orange,   32   N.   J.   L.   49:    941, 

972,  1017,  1032. 
V.  Orange,  54  N.  J.  L.  Ill:  514, 

675,  738,  1057,  1666. 
V.  Oshkosh,  84  Wis.  548:  1005, 

1021,  1395,  1397. 


OASES    CITED. 


cdxix 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


State  V.  Oshkosh  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  100 

Wis.  538:   1412,  1423. 
V.  Otis,  53  Minn.  318:   1164,  1167. 
V.  Otoe  Co.,  6  Neb.  129:  969,  1017, 

1018,    1021,    1031,    1032,    1033. 
V.  Paine  Lumber  Co.,  84  Wis.  205: 

887. 
V.    Park    Comrs.,    33    Minn.    524: 

1531. 
V.  Passaic,  36  N.  J.  L.  382:   695, 

734,  1017,  1396. 
V.  Passaic,  37  N.  J.  L.   65:   734. 
V.  Pendergrass,  106  N.  C.  664:  469. 
V.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  133  Ind.  700 

488. 
V.  Perth  Amboy,  52  N.  J.  L.  132 

927,  1154,  1155,  1156. 
V.  Perth  Amboy,  57  N.  J.  L.  482 

1086. 
V.  Philadelphia,   195  Pa.  St.   101 

1523,  1525. 
V.  Phipps,  4  Ind.  515:   779. 
V.  Pierson,  37  N.  J.  L.  363:  1381. 
V.  Pilsbury,  82  Minn.  359 :  463. 
V.  Pitman,  88  Iowa  252:   976. 
V.  Plainfield,  41  N.  J.  L.  138 :   893, 

894,  1021,  1023,  1035. 
V.  Polk  Co.  Comrs.,  87  Minn.  325: 

494,  567,  576,  710,  979,  1395. 
V.  Potts,  4  N.  J.  L.  347:   1156. 
V.  Pownal,  10  Maine  24:  916. 
V.  Price,  21  Md.  448:   513. 
V.  Prine,  25  Iowa  231:  1033,  1516. 
V.  Proprietors  of  Morris  Aqueduct 

Co.,  58  N.  J.  L.  303:   912. 
V.  Prosser,  2  Wash.  530:    118,  136. 
V.  Prosser,  4  Wash.  816:    118. 
V.  Putnam  Co.,  23  Fla.  632:  171. 
V.  Railway  Co.,  40  Ohio  St.  504: 

528,  529,  534. 
V.  Railroad  Comrs.,  56  Conn.  308: 

524,  714,   1638. 
v.  Ramseyer,  73  N.  H.  31:  479. 
V.  Rapp,   39   Minn.   65:    675,   683, 

684,  927,  930,  982,  1637. 
V.  Reckless,  38  N.  J.  L.  393:  1105. 
V.  Red  Lodge,  30  Mont.  338:    342, 

362,  685. 
V.  Red  Lodge,  33  Mont.  345:   342, 

362. 
V.  Redmond,  134  Wis.  89:  470. 
V.  Reed,  38  N.  H.  59 :   823,  1004. 
V.  Richereek,  167  Ind.  217:  479. 
V.  Richmond,  26  N.  H.  232:    1511. 
V.  Rivers,  5  Ired.  L.  297 :   1499. 
V.  Rixie,  50  Wash.  676 :  865. 
V.  Robb,  100  Maine  180:  474. 
V.  Robert  P.  Lewis  Co.,  72  Minn. 

87:   11,  464. 
V.  Robert  P.  Lewis  Co.,  82  Minn. 

390:   11,  464. 


State  V.   Runyan,  24  N.  J.  L.  256: 

1366. 
V.  Rutherford,  55  N.  J.  L.  540:  236. 
V.  Ryan,  127  Wis.  599:  514,  1515, 

1638. 
V.  Rve,  35  N.  H.  368:   1376,  1381, 

1511. 
V.  St.  Louis,  62  Mo.  244:  1186. 
v.    St.    Louis,   67   Mo.    113:    1031, 

1032. 
V.  St.  Louis,  145  Mo.  551:  534. 
V.   St.  Louis,   161  Mo.   371:    199. 
V.  St.  Louis,  1  Mo.  App.  503:  1031, 

1086,    1358. 
V.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  78  Minn. 

331:   309,  361,  467. 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  35  Minn. 

131:  487,  714,  1642,  1644. 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  38  Minn. 

246:    487,    1642,   1644. 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  62  Minn. 

450:  874. 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  98  Minn. 

380:  490,  1288,  1289,  1642,  1644. 
V.  Salem  Water  Co.,  5  Ohio  C.  C. 

58:  679,  683,  689. 
V.  Sargent,  45  Conn.  358:  129,  136, 

470. 
V.  Sayer,  41  N.  J.  L.  158:  608. 
V.  Schanck,  9  N.  J.  L.  107 :  1365. 
V.  Schilb,  47  Iowa  611:   1361. 
V.    School    District,    79    Mo.    App. 

103:  893,  921,  1532. 
V.  Scott,  22  Neb.  628:   686. 
V.  Scott,  9  N.  J.  L.  17:  1095,  1358. 
V.  Scott  County  Road  Co.,  207  Mo. 

54:    460. 
V.  Scougal,  3  S.  D.  55 :  479. 
V.  Seaboard  Air  Line  R.  R.  Co.,  48 

Fla.   150:   481. 
V.  Seaboard  Air  Line  R.  R.  Co.,  139 

N.  C.  366:   1655. 
V.  Several  Parcels  of  Land,  79  Neb. 

638:    1164,  1167. 
V.  Seymour,  35  N.  J.  L.  47:   432, 

434,   1155,  1156. 
V.  Shardlow,  43  Minn.  524:  1289. 
V.   Sheboygan,    111   Wis.   23:    343, 

358,  362,  682. 
V.    Shelton,    154    Mo.    670:     1412, 

1424. 
V.  Shivers,  58  N.  J.  L.  124:  300. 
V.  Shreeve,  15  N.  J.  L.  57 :   1420. 
V.   Shreve,   4   N.   J.   L.   297:    979, 

1022,  1102. 
V.   Sioux   City  etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   43 

Iowa  501:    1472. 
V.   Sioux   City  etc.   R.  R.   Co.,   40 

Neb.  682:  483. 
V.  Simons,  145  Ala.  95:  434. 
V.  Smiley,  65  Kan.  240:  594. 


cclxx 


CASES    CITED. 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


State  V.  Smith,  58  Minn.  35:  476. 
V.  Smith,  100  N.  C.  550:  970,  1509, 

1511. 
V.  Smith,  21  N.  J.  L.  91:  1363. 
V.  Snedecker,  30  N.  J.  L.  80:  363, 

400. 
V.  Snook,  53  Ohio  St.  521 :  809. 
V.  Snow,  3  E.  I.  64:  485. 
V.  South  Amboy,  57  N.  J.  L.  252: 

878,  887. 
V.  Spencer,  53  Kan.  655:  687,  927. 
V.  Sewart,  74  Wis.  620:   565,  567, 

568,  570,  582,  675. 
V.  Stiles,  13  N.  J.  L.  172:  1382. 
V.  Stockhouse,  14  S.  C.  417:   520, 

721. 
V.  Stoke,  80  Iowa  68 :  1469. 
V.  Stoner,  39  Ind.  App.  104:   199, 

356. 
V.  Summerville,  104  La.  74:   1159, 

1568. 
V.  Sunapee  Dam  Co.,  70  N".  H.  458 : 

117,   138. 
V.    Superior,    81   Wis.    649:    1167, 

1168. 
V.  Superior,  108  Wis.  16:  615,  1356, 

1637. 
V.  Superior  Court  (Wash.)  99  Pac. 

3:   538. 
V.  Superior  Court,  26  Wash.  278: 

53,   56,   1161,   1581,   1586,   1591, 

1612,  1615. 
V.  Superior  Court,  28  Wash.  317 

739. 
V.    Superior    Court,   29    Wash.    1 

512,  1057. 

V.  Superior  Court,  30  Wash.  219 

181,  1412. 
V.  Superior  Ct.,  31  Wash.  32:  1412 
V.  Superior  Court,  31  Wash.  445 

746,  1034,  1036. 
V.    Superior    Ct.,    33    Wash.    542 

563,  1072. 
V.  Superior  Ct.,  35  Wash.  303 :  725 
V.  Superior  Court,  36  Wash.  381 

709,  746. 
V.  Superior  Court,  40  Wash.  389 

759,   760. 
V.  Superior  Court,  41  Wash.  450 

1429. 
V.  Superior  Court,  42  Wash.  521 

513,  1027,  1072. 

V.  Superior  Court,  42  Wash.  660 

508,  537,  591,  594. 
V.  Superior  Court,  42  Wash.  675 

528,  533,  1046. 
V.  Superior  Court,  42  Wash.  684 

1416,   1429. 
V.  Superior  Ct.,  43  Wash.  34:  1413 
V.  Superior  Ct.,  43  Wash.  91:  1407 


State  V.   Superior   Court,   44  Wash, 

108:  912,  917,  1073,  1208. 
V.  Superior  Court,  44  Wash.  476 

721,  739,  895,  1058,  1062. 
V.  Superior  Court,  44  Wash.  554 

1412. 
V.  Superior  Court,  45  Wash.  270 

760. 
V.  Superior  Court,  45  Wash.  316 

1073. 
V.  Superior  Court,  45  Wash.  316 

754,  799,   1073. 
V.  Superior  Court,  45  Wash.  321 

980. 
V.   Superior   Court,  46  Wash.   35 

1412. 
V.  Superior  Court,  46  Wash.  303 

1412. 
V.  Superior  Court,  46  Wash.  500 

73,  908. 
V.  Superior  Court,  46  Wash.  516 

533,  1060,  1062,  1064,  1068. 
V.   Superior  Court,  47   Wash.   11 

512,  1511,  1516. 
V.  Superior  Court,  47  Wash.  166 

787,  792,  796,  798,  894,  897. 
V.  Superior  Court,  47  Wash.  310 

976,  989. 
V.  Superior  Court,  47  Wash.  397 

501,  544,  1051,  1071. 
V.  Superior  Court,  48  Wash.  277 

54,  502,  897,  988,  1051,  1073. 
V.  Superior  Court,  49  Wash.  390 

1073. 
V.  Superior  Court,  49  Wash.  392 

1068. 
V.   Superior  Court,  50  Wash.   13 

537,    591,   1043. 
V.  Supervisors,  66  Wis.  199:   1532 
V.  Supervisoi-s,  68  Wis.  502:   976 
V.  Taff,  37  Conn.  392:   1372. 
V.  Tarrelly,  36  Mo.  App.  282:  700. 
V.  Taylor,  54  S.  C.  294:  868. 
V.  Taylor,  107  Tenn.  455 :  197,  384, 

390,  404,   1596. 
V.  Taylor,  36  Wash.  607:  408,  40P. 
V.  Ten  Eyck,  18  N.  J.  L.  373:  1416. 
V.  Tenny,  58  S.  C.  215:  697. 
V.  Theriault,  70  Vt.  617:  471. 
V.  Thompson,  46  Minn.  302:   1380. 
V.  Toledo,  48  Ohio  St.  112:  536. 
V.  Toledo  Ry.  &  T.  Co.,  1  Ohio  C. 

C.  (N.  S.)  513:  533. 
V.  Tower,  84  Maine  444:  411. 
V.  Towers,  71  Conn.  657:  338. 
V.  Trask,  6  Vt.  355 :  872. 
V.   Travis   Co.,   85  Tex.   435:    872, 

892,  1496. 
V.  Trenton,  35  N.  J.  L.  485 :   1092. 
V.  Trenton,  36  N.  J.  L.  79:    301, 

317. 


CASES    CITED. 


cclxxi 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-712;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


State  V.  Trenton,   36  N.  J.  L.   198: 

697,  700,  1511. 
V.  Trenton,  36  N.  J.  L.  499:   893, 

894,  1004,  1011,  1011,  1013,  1014. 
V.  Trenton,  53  N.  J.  L.  178:  1017, 

1024. 
V.  Trenton,  54  N.  J.  L.  92:    304, 

914,  1666. 
V.  Trenton  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  58  N. 

J.  L.  666:   313,  316. 
V.  Troth,  34  N.  J.  L.  377:  700,  817, 

818    819 
V,  Troth,  36  N.  J.  L.  422:  817. 
V.  Twiford,  136  N.  C.  603:  113. 
V.  Union,   33   N.   J.   L.   350:    734, 

735. 
V.  Union,  37  N.  J.  L.  268 :  1083. 
T.  Union  Terminal  R.  R.  Co.,  72 

Ohio  St.  455:  716. 
V.   Vanbuskirlc,   21   N.    J.    L.    86: 

1099,  1381. 
V.   Vandevere,   25    N.    J.    L.    233: 

1419. 
V.  VanGeison,  15  N.  J.  L.  339:  707, 

1095,  1102,   1358. 
V.    Varnum,    81    Wis.    593:    1018, 

1637. 
V.  Vineland,  56  N.  J.  L.  474:  349, 

1487,  1666. 
V.  Wabash  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  83  Mo. 

144:   488. 
V.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  206  Mo.  251: 

1642. 
V.  Waite,  2  Ohio  C.  C.  (N.  S.)  49: 

1410. 
T.  Waite,  70  Ohio  St.  149:  1410. 
V.  Waldron,  17  N.  J.  L.  369 :   1706. 
V.  Wallman,   110  Wis.  312:    1396, 

1412. 
V.  Walters,  69  Mo.  463 :  865. 
v.  Warner,  51  Mo.  App.  174:  865. 
V.  Waterman,  79  la.  360:  865,  870, 

1020,  1031. 
V.  Weare,  38  N.  H.  314:  1100,  1101, 

1511,  1518. 
V.  Weimer,  64  la.  243 :  1032. 
V.  Welch,  66  N.  H.   178:   109,  115. 
V.  Wellman,  83  Me.  282:  1637. 
V.   Wells,    142    N.    C.    590:    1460, 

1462. 
V.    Wertzel,    62    Wis.    184:     1368, 

1520. 
V.  West  Hoboken,  37  N.  J.  L.  77 : 

992,   1154. 
V.  West  Hoboken,  54  N.  J.  L.  508 : 

698. 
V.  Wheeler,  97  Wis.  96:   1403. 
V.  Wheeling  &  B.  Bridge   Co.,   18 

How.  421 :  98. 
V.  White,  151  Ind.  364:    1529. 


State  V.  White  River  Power  Co.,  30 
Wash.  648:    505,  508,  537,  538, 
591 
V.  Williams,  125  Ala.  115:  1428. 
V.  Willingborough  Road,  1  N.  J.  h. 

128:    1088. 
V.  Wilson,  17  Wis.  687 :  1087,  1532. 
V.  Wilton  R.  R.  Co.,  19  N.  H.  521: 

712. 
V.   Wis.   Cent.   Ry.   Co.,    123   Wis. 

551:    1483,  1645,  1646. 
V.    Witherspoon,    75    N.    C.    222: 

1511. 
V.  Withrow,   (Mo.)   24  S.  W.  638: 

1566. 
V.  Woodmanse,  1  N.  D.  246:   478. 
V.  Woodruff,  36  N.  J.  L.  204:  1364, 

1368,  1416. 
V.  Woodward,  9  N.  J.  L.  21 :  1417. 
V.  Wright,   54  N.   J.  L.   130:    119, 

1021,  1082. 
V.  Youger,  29  N.  J.  L.  384:  1358. 
State  Bank  v.  State,  1  Blackf.  267: 

417. 
State  Board  v.  People,  229  111.  430: 

731. 
State  Historical  Assn.  v.  Lincoln,  14 

Neb.  336:  420. 
Staten  Island  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Staten 
Island  Elec.  R.  R.  Co.,  34  N.  Y. 
App.  Div.  181:  764. 
Staten  Island   Rapid  Transit  R.   R. 
Co.,    Matter   of.,    38    Hun   381: 
1047. 
Staten    Island    Rapid    Transit    Co., 

Matter  of,  41   Hun  392:    1106. 

Staten    Island    Rapid    Transit    Co., 

Matter  of,   47    Hun   396:    1096, 

1379. 

Staten    Island    Rapid    Transit    Co., 

Matter  of,   103   N.  Y.   251:    815. 

State  Line  Telephone  Co.  v.  Ellison, 

121  App.  Div.  499:  322. 
State  Lunatic  Asylum  v.  Worcester 

Co.,   1  Met.  437:    1135. 
State    Park    Comrs.    v.    Henry,    38 
Minn.     266:     675,     1227,     1324, 
1669,  1673. 
State  St.,  In  re,  8  Pa.  St.  485:  1381. 
State  Water   Supply  Commission  v. 
Curtis,  125  App.  Div.  117:   710, 
1008. 
V.  Curtis,  192  N.  Y.  319:  710,  1008. 
Staton  V.  Atl.  Coast  Line  R.  R.  Co., 
147    N.    C.    428:    180,    255,    304, 
1581,  1583,  1717. 
V.  Norfolk,  R.  R.   Co.,   Ill   N.   C. 
278:     23,     146,    155,    156,    1449, 
1455. 


ccLxxii 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Stauffer  v.  Cincinnati  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

33    Ind.    App.    356:    807,    1270, 

1481,  1517,  1519. 

V.  East  Stroudsburg,  215  Pa.   St. 

143:  1129,  1226,  1713,  1714. 

Staunchfeld    v.    Newton,    142    Mass. 

110:   143. 
Stearns  v.  Barre,  73  Vt.  281:  7,  21, 
502,   677,   814,   815,   1055,   1061, 
1067. 
V.  Deerfield,  51  N.  H.  372:   1382. 
Stearns'  County  v.  St.  Cloud  etc.  K. 

R.  Co.,  36  Minn.  425:   1622. 
Steam's  Exrs.  v.  Richmond,  88  Va. 
992:     194,    196,    229,    441,    442, 
1453,  1488. 
Stebbins   v.   Evanston,    136   111.    37: 

1255. 
Steele's  Petition,  44  N.  H.  220 :  1087. 
Steel  V.  Portland,  23  Or.   176:   872, 
878. 
V.     Tanana     Mines     Ry.     Co.,     2 
Alaska,  451 :  1568. 
Steele  v.  County  Comrs.,  83  Ala.  304: 
9,  21,  520,  1421. 
V.    Empson,    142    Ind.    397:    1086, 

1383. 
V.  Midland  R.  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  1  Ch. 

App.  275:  822. 
V.  Sanchez,  72  la.  65 :  106. 
V.  Western  Inland  Lock  Nav.  Co.,  2 
Johns.  283:  1310,  1456. 
Steelton    Borough    v.    East    Harris- 
burgh  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  11  Pa.  Co. 
Ct.  161:  297,  299,  1622. 
Steers  v.  Brooklyn,  101  N.  Y.  51 :  122, 

127. 
Steets  V.  isew  York  EI.  R.  R.  Co.,  79 

Hun  288:    1152. 
Stehr   V.   Mason   City   etc.    Ry.   Co., 
77  Neb.  641:  378,  391,  664,  1297, 
1303. 
Steigerwald   v.   Manhattan   Ry.    Co., 

50  App.  Div.  487:  1122,  1144. 
Steinaur  v.  Tell  City,  146  Ind.  490: 

884,  888. 
Stein  V.  Ashby,  24  Ala.  521 :  73. 
V.  Ashby,  30  Ala.  363,  73. 
V.  Bienville  Water  Supply  Co.,  34 

Fed.  145:  414,  416. 
V.  Burden,  24  Ala.  130:  73,  77. 
V.  Burden,  29  Ala.  127:  73. 
V.   La  Fayette,   6   Ind.  App.   414: 

937,  1648,  1656. 
V.  Mobile,  24  Ala.  591 :  10,  462. 
Steinert   v.   Metropolitan   El.   R.   R. 

Co.,  12  Miscl.  370.  1304. 
Steinhart  v.  Superior  Court,  137  Cal. 

575:    1159,   1160,   1461,   1467. 
Steinmeyer  v.  St.  Louis,  3  Mo.  App. 
256:  234. 


Stenson  v.  Mt.  Vernon,  104  App.  Div. 

17:  609,  610,  616,  617. 
Stephen  v.   Commissioners,  36  Kan. 

664:   1028. 
Stephens  v.  Marshall,  3  Chand.  Wis. 
222:    695. 
V.   New   York   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   61 

App.  Div.  612:  323,  836. 
V.  New  lork  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  175  N. 
Y.  72:  323,  327,  836. 
Stephenson  v.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  68 

Mo.  App.  642:   180. 
Stephenville  v.  Brown,  29  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  384:   453. 
Stephensville  v.  Overby,  3  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  173:  982. 
Sterling's   Appeal,    111   Pa.   St.   35: 

172,  176,  337,  1594. 
Sterling    v.    Pawnee    Ditcn    Co.,    42 

Colo.  421 :   1603. 
Sterling  I.  &  Z.  Co.  v.  Sparks  Mfg. 
Co.,  55  N.  J.  Eq.  824:   82,  824, 
1604. 
Sternberger  v.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R. 

Co.,  2  Miscl.  113:   1150. 
Sterrett  v.  Delmar  Ave.  Ry.  Co.,  108 

Mo.  App.  650:    1695. 
Sterrett  Township  Road,  In  re,  114 

Pa.  St.  627:  981,  1011,  1364. 
Sterrett  Tp.  Road,  123  Pa.  St.  231: 

700. 
Sterritt  v.  Bangor,  60  Me.  313:  1326. 
v.  Bangor,  73  Me.  357 :  1326. 
V.  Chicago  &  Evanston  R.  R.  Co., 

75  111.  74:   639,  1581. 
T.  Faxon,  19  Pick.  147:  649. 
V.    Young,    14    Wyo.    146:     1005, 
1016,   1040,  1570,  1572. 
Stettegast  v.  Houston,  38  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  623:  328. 
Steubenville  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cleveland 
etc.  Ry.  Co.,  2  Ohio  N.  P.    (N. 
S.)    45:   759. 
V.  Patrick,  7  Ohio  St.  170:   1422, 
1464. 
Steubing  v.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co., 

138  N.  Y.  658:   1301. 
Stevens  v.  Board  of  Supvrs.,  41  la. 
341:  976. 
V.  Cedar  Rapids,  128  la.  227 :  602. 
V.    County    Comrs.,    97    Me.    121: 

1417,  1418. 
V.    Danbury,    53    Conn.    9:     1673, 

1688. 
V.   Duck  River  Navigation   Co.,   1 
Sneed    237:     1078,    1670,    1671, 
1685. 
V.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  21  N.  J.  Eq.  259 : 
788,  160/. 
Stevens  v.  Goffstown,  21  N.  H.  454: 
1389. 


OASES    CITED. 


cclxxiii 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:  Vol.   I,  pp.   1-743;   Vol.   II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Stevens  v.  King,  76  Me.  197:  1524. 
V.  Manchester,  63  N.  H.  390:  818. 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  130  N. 

Y.  95:   1305. 
V.  New   lork  El.  R.  R.  Co.  57  N. 

Y.  Supr.  Ct.  416:   1305. 
V.  Patterson  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  34  N. 

J.   L.   532:    117,   121,   128,   131. 
V.    Proprietors    of    the    Middlesex 

Canal,   12  Mass.  466:    1522. 
V.  St.  Louis  Merchants  Bridge  T. 

Ry.  Co.,  152  Mo.  212:  425:  1483. 
V.  Stevens,  11  Met.  251:  857. 
V.    Worcester,    196   Mass.   45:    74, 

1637. 
Stevenson  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  R.  Co. 

(Mo.)    31  S.  W.  793:   314,  316, 

1294. 
V.  New  York,  3  N.  Y.  Supr.  133: 

695. 
Stevens  Point  Boom  Co.  v.  Reilly,  44 

Wis.  295:  99,  680. 
V.  Reilly,  46  Wis.  237 :  99. 
Stewart's   Appeal,   56   Pa.    St.    413: 

687. 
Stewart   v.   Baltimore,    7    Md.    500: 

431,  917,  927. 
V.  Board  of  Police,  25  Miss.  479: 

929,  1000. 
V.   Chicago   General   Street   R.   R. 

Co.,  166  111.  61:   1586. 
V.  Chicago  General  St.  R.  R.  Co., 

58  111.  App.  446:  1586. 
V.  Clinton,  79  Mo.  603 :  234. 
V.  Conley,  122  Ala.  179:  890. 
V.  Council  Bluffs,  84  la.  61:   603, 

618,  1306,  1308,  1339. 
V.   County,   2   Pa.   St.    340:    1325, 

1704. 
V.   Great  Northern  R.  R.   Co.,   65 

Minn.  515:   535,  675,  776. 
V.  Hartman,  46  Ind.  331:  516,  517. 
V.  Ohio  Riv.  R.  B.  Co.,  38  W.  Va. 

438:  201,  248,  249,  256,  640,  642, 

1294,     1299,     1550,     1552,     1649, 

1657. 
V.  Palmer,  74  N.  Y.   183:    1005. 
V.  Raymond  R.  R.  Co.,  7  S.  &  M. 

568:  947,  1535,  1570. 
V.  Rutland,  58  Vt.  12:   142,  1251, 

1457. 
V.  Supervisors  of  Polk  County,  30 

la.  9:    462. 
T.  Wallis,  30  Barb.  344:  707,  1102, 

1517,  1638. 
Stewart  Wire  Co.  v.  Lehigh  C.  &  N. 

Co.,  203  Pa.  St.  474:  1603,  1615, 

1616. 
Stickford  v.  St.  Louis,  75  Mo.  ao9: 

607,  617. 

v.   St.   Louis,   7   Mo.  App.  217: 

607,  617,  631. 


Stillman  v.  Northern  Pac.  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  34  Minn.  420:   1314. 
v.   Pendleton,  26   R.   I.   585:    155. 
1651,   1655,   1656. 
Stillwater  v.  Lowry,  83  Minn.  275: 

298. 
Stillwater  Board  of  Education  v.  Al- 
dridge,  13  Okla.  205:  1005,  1016 
Stillwater  etc.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  Matter  of, 

72  App.  Div.  294:  291,  773. 
Stillwater   etc.    St.   Ry.   Co.,   Matter 

of,  171  N.  Y.  589:  291,  772. 
Stillwater  etc.   R.  R.  Co.  v.  Boston 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  67  App.  Div.  367 : 
1423. 
V.  Slade,  36  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  587: 

897 
V.  Stillwater,  66  Minn.  176:   1719. 
Stillwater  Water  Co.  v.  Farmer,  89 
Minn  58:    162. 
V.  Stillwater,  50  Minn.  498:    352. 
Stillwell   V.   Kenedy,   36   Misc.   359: 
1562. 
V.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  39  Mo. 
App.   221:    840,  852,  853,   1646. 
Stiltz  V.  Indianapolis,  55  Ind.  515: 

466. 
Stimmel   v.    Brown,    1    Houst.    219 : 

440. 
Stinson  v.  Brookline,  197  Mass.  568: 
91. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  27  Minn. 

284:   1139,  1235. 

V.  Dunbarton,  46  N.  H.  385:   1388. 

Stinson  Mill  Co.  v.  Board  of  Harbor 

Line   Comrs.,    (Wash.)    29   Pac. 

938:   118. 

Stith  V.  Louisville  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  109 

Ky.  168:   152. 
Stockdale  v.  Rio  Grande  Western  R. 
R.   Co.,  28   Utah   201:    57,   318, 
449,    533,    640,    654,    661,    1580, 
1590,  1612. 
Stock  V.  Boston,  149  Mass.  410:   142. 
V.  Jefferson   Township,   114  Mich. 
357:    78,   1603. 
Stocker  v.  Nemaha  County,  72  Neb. 
255:    1446,    1450,   1456. 
V.    Nemaha    Co.,    4    Neb.    (Unof.) 
230:   1606. 
Stockett  V.  Nicholson,  Walker,  Miss. 

75:  706,  1517. 
Stockley  \.  Robbstown  Bridge  Co.,  5 

Watts  546:   1489. 
Stockport  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  In  re,  33  L. 

J.  Q.  B.  251:   1315. 
Stockton  V.  Baltimore  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
32  Fed.  9:  96. 
V.  Chicago,  136  111.  434:    1426. 
V.  North  Jersey  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  (N. 
J.  Ch.)  34  Atl.  688:  300. 


cclxxiv 


CASES    CITED. 


IThe  references  are  to  the  pages:  Vol.  I,  pp.   1-743;  Vol.  II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Stockton   etc.   Ry.   Co.   v.   Brown,   9 
H.  L.  246:   1067. 
V.    Galgiani,    49    Cal.    139:     1275, 

1386. 
V.  Stockton,  41  Cal.  147 :  497. 
Stockton    &    Linden    Gravel    Co.    v. 
Stodden    &    Copperopolis   R.    E. 
Co.,  53  Cal.  11:  1292. 
Stoddard  v.    Saratoga   Springs,    127 

N.  Y.  261:   141. 

Stodghill  V.  Chicago  etc.  E..  R.  Co., 

43  la.  26:  846,  847,  1454,  1476.^ 

V.   Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  53  la. 

341:    1551,  1648,  1654. 

Stofflet  V.  Estes,  104  Mich.  208:   96, 

97,  133. 
Stokes    V.    Manhattan    Ry.    Co.,    47 
App.  Div.  58:  1562. 
V.  Parker,  53  N.  J.  L.  183:  939. 
Stolze   V.   Manitowoc   Terminal   Co., 
100  Wis.  208:   1128,  1138,  1245, 
1441. 
V.  Milwaukee  etc.  R.  R.   Co.,   104 
Wis.  47:   1441,  1464,  1536,  1578. 
V.  Milwaukee  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,   113 
Wis.  44:   1435,  1442,  1462,  1464, 
1536,  1578. 
Stone  V.  Augusta,   46  Me.   127:    87, 
195,  236,  456,  1454,  1548. 
V.  Boston,  2  Met.  220:  1017,  1420, 
V.  Cambridge,  6  Cush.  270:   1361. 
V.  Commercial  Ry.  Co.,  9  Sim.  621 : 

823 
V.  Fairbury  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  68  111. 

394:  639,  654. 
V.  Farmers  L.  &  T.  Co.,  116  U.  S. 

307:  480,  482. 
V.  Heath,  135  Mass.  561:  1317. 
V.  Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  116  U. 

S.  347:   482. 
V.  Mississippi,  101  U.  S.  814:  469, 

736. 
v.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  75  Kan.  600: 
1248,    1249,    1457,    1485,    1519, 
1646,  1647. 
V.  New  Orleans  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  116 

U.  S.  352:  480. 
V.  New  York,  25  Wend.  157 :  1277. 

1411. 
V.  So.  111.  &  Mo.  Bridge  Co.,  206 

U.  S.  267:   684. 
V.  State,   138  N.  Y.   124:   89,  144. 
Stoneham  v.  London  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  7 

L.  R.  Q.  B.  1:   957. 
Stoner  v.  Rice,  121  Ind.  51 :   109. 
Stonington  v.  States,  31  Conn.  213: 

678. 
Stopf  V.  Wolt,  177  111.  620:  1561. 
Storch  V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co., 
131  N.  Y.  514:  1301. 


Storck  V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co., 

131  N.  Y.  514:  1196,  1296. 
Store  V.  San  Jose  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  150 

CaL  277:  314. 
Storer  v.  Hobbs,  52  Me.  144:   1634. 
Stork  V.   Philadelphia,    195   Pa.    St. 

101:    1251,   1639. 
Storm   V.   Manehaug   Co.,    13   Allen, 

10:   554,  557,  559. 
Storm  Lake  v.  Iowa  Falls  &  Sioux 

City  Ry.  Co.,  62  la.  218:  952. 
Storms  v.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  77 

App.  Div.  94:    1562. 
V.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  178  N.  Y. 

493:   1562. 
Storrs  V.  Pensacola  &  A.  R.  R.  Co., 

29  Fla.  617:  480. 
Story  V.   New  York  Elevated  R.  E. 

Co.,  3  Abb.  New  Cases  478:  260. 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  90  N.  Y. 

122:   67,  178,  183,  186,  187,  197, 

199,   202,   249,   254,   260. 
V.  N.  Y.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  90  N.  Y. 

149:   428. 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  90  N.  Y. 

161:    337. 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  90  N. 

Y.  177:   333. 
T.  Ullmaii,  88  Md.  244:  888. 
Story  St.,  In  re,  11  Phila.  456:  1327. 
Stoudinger  v.  Newark,  28  N.  J.  Eq. 

187:   335. 
V.  Newark,  28  N.  J.  Eq.  446:  335. 
Stough  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  71 

la.  641:   1549. 
Stoughton  V.  Paul,   173  Mass.   148: 

1071. 
Stout  V.  Freeholders,  25  N.  J.  L.  202: 

678. 
V.  Hopping,  17  N.  J.  L.  471:  1638. 
Stowe  V.  Newborn,  127  Ga.  421 :  679, 

704. 
Stowell  V.   Board   of  Public   Works, 

184  Mass.  416:  1511,  1523. 
V.  Flagg,  11  Mass.  364:  544,  1522. 
V.  Johnson,  7  Utah  215:   70. 
V.  Milwaukee,   31   Wis.   523:    615, 

619,   1123,   1307. 
Stowers  v.  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  68 

Miss.   559:    338,   1593. 
Stoy  V.  Indiana  Hydraulic  Power  Co., 

166  Ind.   316:    536. 
Strachen   v.    Brown,    39    Mich.    168: 

1004,  1010,  1013,  1420. 
Strack  v.  Miller,  134  Mich.  311:  1624. 
Strader  v.  Cincinnati,  1  Handy  446: 

197,   369,    385,    388,    404,    405, 

1497. 
Strafford's   Petition,    X4   N.   H.   30; 

1069, 


OASES    CITED. 


cclxxv 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :  Vol.   I,  pp.   1-743  ;   Vol.  II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Strang  v.  Braddoek,  172  Pa.  St.  600 : 
1402. 
V.  New  York  Rubber  Co.,  1  Sween- 
ey  78:    1260. 
Slrahan  v.  Attala  County,  91  Miss. 
529 •   1057. 
V.  Malvern,  77  la.  454:   1071. 
Strahlem    v.    Shelby    Co.    Comrs.,    1 
Ohio  N.  P.    (N.  S.)    249:    1569, 
1571. 
Strattan  v.  Co.  Court,  65  Mo.  644: 
1638. 
V.   Gt.   Western   &   Brentford   Ry. 
Co.,  40  N.  J.  Eq.  50:  1536,  1578, 
1632. 
Stratton's  Petition,  21  N.  H.  44:  917. 
Stratton  v.  Elliott,  83  Ind.  425 :  422. 
V.  Omaha  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  37  Neb. 
477:  856,  1633. 
Strauss  v.  AUentown,  215  Pa.  St.  96: 

79. 
Streets.  Leete,  79  Conn.  352:  887. 
V.  New  Orleans  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  43 
La.  An.  116:   1316,  1546,  1547. 
Street  Ry.   Co.   of  Grand  Rapids  v. 
West  Side  St.  Ry.  Co.,  48  Mich. 
433:   307,  415,  791. 
Stretch  v.  Cassopolis,  125  Mich.  167: 

349. 
Streyer  v.  Georgia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  90 
Ga.   56:    639,    1112,    1147,    1294, 
1301,  1337. 
Stribley  v.  Cincinnati,  9  Ohio  C.  C. 

122:  1225. 
Strickford  v.  Boston  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

73  N.  H.  81 :  296,  622. 
Strickland  v.  Penn.   R.   R.   Co.,   154 

Pa.  St.  348:   460,  953. 
Strickler  v.  Colorado  Springs,  16  Col. 
61:   428. 
V.    Midland    R.    R.    Co.,    125    Ind. 
412:  246,  1631. 
Stricklev  v.  Chesapeake  &  0.  R.  R. 
Co.,' 93  Ky.  323:   252,  310,  1545, 
1648,   1657. 
V.   Highland  Boy   Gold  Min.    Co., 
200   U.   S.   527:    504,   563,   595, 
596,  599. 
Striker  v.  Kelley,  2  Denio,  323:   12. 

V.  Kelley,  7  Hill  9 :  12. 
Stritesky   v.    Cedar    Rapids,    98    la. 

373:   324. 
Strobel  v.  Ephrota,  178  Pa.  St.  50: 
169. 
V.  Kerr  Salt  Co.,  164  N.  Y.  303: 
69,  71. 
Strocker  v.  St.  Joseph,  117  Mo,  App. 
350;   1300,   1307, 


Strohecker  v.  Ala.  R.  R.  Co.,  42  Ga. 

509:    1568. 
Strong  V.  Beloit  &  Madison  R.  R.  Co., 
16  Wis.  635,  1083. 
V.  Brooklyn,  12  Hun  453 :  1629. 
V.  Brooklyn,  68  N.  Y.  1:  424,  808, 

1500,  1628. 
V.  Clem,  12  Ind.  37 :  943. 
V.  Co.  Comrs.,  31  Me.  578:  1414. 
V.  Makeever,  102  Ind.  578:   1362. 
V.  N.  W.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  64  111.  App. 
533:   1585. 
Stroub  V.  Manhattan  R.  R.   Co.,  59 

N.  Y.  Supr.  Ct.  505:  1584. 
Stroudsburg  Borough  v.  Stroudsburg 
Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  12  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 
124:  25,  300,  306. 
V.  Wilkes-Barre  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  12 
Pa.  Co.  Ct.  395:  306. 
Strousky  v.  Hickman,   116  la.   651: 

820,  1510. 
Strout  V.  Millbridge  Co.,  45  Me.  76: 

1525. 
Strunk    v.    Pritchell,    27    Ind.    App. 

582:    889. 
Struthers  v.  Dunkirk  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  87 
Pa.  St.  282:  255. 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  5  Misel. 

239:    1296,   1302. 
V.  Phila.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  174  Pa.  St. 
288:   1201. 
Stuart  V.  Baltimore,  7  Md.  500 :  434. 

V.  Palmer,  74  N.  Y.  183:   1007. 
Stubbings  v.  Evanston,   136  111.  37: 

1255. 
Stuber's  Road,  28  Pa.  St.  199:  519. 
Studebaker  v.  New  Castle  Gas  Co.,  7 

Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  641:   1634. 
Studler  v.  Milwaukee,   34   Wis.   98: 

1272. 
Stufflebeam   v.    Montgomery,    3    Ida. 

20:  351. 
Stump's  Appeal,  116  Pa.  St.  33:  176. 
Stumpe  V.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  R.  Co., 

61  Mo.  App.  357:   1484. 
Stumer  v.  County  Court,  42  W.  Va. 

724:   420. 

Sturs  V.  Brooklyn,  101  N.  Y.  51:  129. 

Sturtevant  v.  Milwaukee  etc.   R.  R. 

Co.,  11  Wis.  63:  1536,  1578. 

V.  Plymouth  Co.,  12  Met.  7:   849. 

Stuttgart  V.  John,  85  Ark.  Ill:  877, 

1493. 
Stuyvesant  v.  N.  Y.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  4 

App.   Div.    159:    1144. 
Suburban  Lt.  &  Power  Co.  v.  Board 
of    Aldermen,    153    Mass.    200: 
345, 


cclxxvi 


OASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:  Vol.   I,  pp.   1-743;  Vol.  II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Suburban  R.  E.  Co.,  v.  Met.  W.  S.  El. 

R.  R.  Co.,  193  111.  217 :  759,  792, 

1071. 

Suburban  Rapid  Transit  Co.,  Matter 

of,  16  Abb.  N.  C.  152:  991,  1071. 

Suburban  Rapid  Transit  Co.,  Matter 

of,  38  Hun  553:  991,  1071,  1075. 

Suburban  Rapid  Transit  Co.  v.  New 

York,  128  N.  Y.  510:  773,  909. 
Sudberry  v.  Graves,  83  Ark.  344:  735, 

1018,   1513. 
Sudd  V.  Maiden  R.  E.  Co.,  6  Exeh. 

143:   1064. 
Suffield  V.  Hatheway,  44  Conn.  521: 
1487. 
V.  Northampton  Co.,  53  Conn.  367 : 
487. 
Suffolk  V.  Parker,  79  Va.  660:  453. 
Suffolk   Co.   Telephone   Co.   v.   Gam- 
mon, 113  App.  Div.  764:  986. 
Suffolk   etc.    Ry.    Co.   v.    West   End 
Land  &  Imp.  Co.,  137  N.  C.  330: 
1149,    1187,    1232. 
Sugarloaf  Tp.  Road,  6  Luzerne  Leg. 

Reg.  Rep.  469:  1105. 
Sugar  Refining  Co.  v.  Jersey  City,  26 

N.  J.  Eq.  247:   117,  133. 
Suisun  City  v.  De  Feritas,  142  Cal. 

350: 
Suits  V.  Murdock,  63  Ind.  73:   1365, 

1514. 
Sullens  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  74 
la.  659:    150,   1639,   1650,   1653, 
1716. 
Sullivan  v.  Board  of  Suprs.,  58  Miss. 
790:  781,  782,  1346. 
V.  Browning,  67  N.  J.  Eq.  391 :  149. 
V.  Fall  River,  144  Mass.  579:  605. 
V.  Johnson,  30  Wash.  72:   1607. 
V.  Kline,  33  Ore.  260:  515,  1008. 
V.  La  Fayette  Co.,  61  Miss.  271: 

1236,  1385. 
V.  Missouri  etc.   Ry.  Co.,  29  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  429:   1145,  1146,  1228, 
1229     1313. 
V.  North  Hudson  Co.  R.  R.  Co.,  51 
N.   J.   L.   518:    266,    1199,   1201, 
1215,  1243. 
V.  Phillips,  110  Ind.  320:  233,  1606. 
V.  Robbins,  109  la.  235:  1510. 
1-.  Tichenor,  179  111.  97:  890. 
V.  Webster,  16  R.  *[.  33:  212,  224. 
V.  Wilson,  101  Ky.  427:  955. 
V.  Yazoo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  85  Miss. 
649:   1040,  1041,  1638. 
Sullivan  Timber   Co.  v.  Mobile,   124 

Fed.  644:   128,   129. 
Sultan  W.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Weyerhauser 
Timber  Co.,  31  Wash.  558:  1207, 
1208,  1210. 


Summerfield  v.  Chicago,  197  111.  270 : 

357,  586. 
Summerville  v.  Pressley,  33  S.  C.  56: 

15,  472. 
V.  Wimbish,  7  Gratt.  205:    1085. 
Summit   Ave.,    Matter    of,    84   App. 

Div.   455:    611. 
Summit  St.,  Matter  of,  3  How.  Pr. 

26:   1102. 
Sumner  v.  County  Comrs.,  37  Maine 

112:    979,    1030,    1420. 
Summy  v.  Mulford,  5   Blackf.  202: 

1524. 
Sunbury  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hummell, 

27  Pa.  St.  99,  1315. 
Sunderland  v.  Martin,  113  Ind.  411: 

1578. 
Sunderland   Bridge   Case,   122  Mass. 

459:   1382. 
Sunier  v.  Miller,  105  Ind.  393 :  1028, 

1510. 
Supervisors  v.  Buffalo,  63  Hun  565: 

1325,  1526. 
v.  Sea  View  R.  R.  Co.,  23  Hun  180: 

322. 
V.  Stanley,  105  U.  S.  305:  594. 
V.  Stout,  9  V^  Va.  703:   25. 
Surgi    V.    Snetehman,    11    La.    Ann. 

387:    12. 
Surocco  V.  Geary,  3  Cal.  69:  16. 
Susanna  Root's  Case,  77  Pa.  St.  276 : 

1187,  1206. 
Susquehanna  Canal  Co.  v.  Wright,  9 

W.  &  S.  9:   108. 
Susquehanna  Depot  v.  Simmons,  112 

Pa.  St.  384:  336. 
Susquehanna  Fertilizer  Co.  v.  Malone, 

73  Md.  268:  451,  455. 
v.  Spangler,  86  Md.  562:  455. 
Sussex  and  Morris  Road,  13  N.  J.  L. 

157:  973,  1031,  1032,  1033. 
Sussman  v.  San  Luis  Obispo,  126  Cal. 

536:  881,  883. 
Sutherland  v.  Holmes,  78  Mo.  399: 

933,  981,  982,  1019,  1086,  1407. 
Sutliff  V.  Johnson,  17  Neb.  575 :  960. 
Sutro  V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co., 

137  N.  Y.  592:  1196,  1296,  1300, 

1302. 
Sutter   County  v.   Tisdale,   136   Cal. 

474:   977,  993,  1058. 
Sutton  V.  Catavpba  Power  Co.,  76  S. 

C.  320:  86. 
V.  Clark,  6  Taunton  28 :  206. 
V.  Pa.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  Pa.  Dist.  Ct. 

474:   731. 
V.  Pa.  R.  R.  Co.,  211  Pa.  St.  554: 

731. 
V.  Pa.  E.  R.  Co.,  214  Pa.  St.  274: 

1129,  1244. 


CASES    CITED. 


cclxxvii 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :  Vol.   I,  pp.   1-743  ;   Vol.  II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Sutton   Harbor  Improvement  Co.  v. 

Hitchens,  1  DeG.  McN.  &  G.  161 : 

1611. 

V.  Hitchens,  21  L.  J.  Ch.  N.  S.  73: 

1611. 

Sutton's  Heirs  v.  Louisville,  5  Dana 

28:   13,  1182,  1183. 

Suver  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  123 

111.   293:    980,    1246,   1249,    1369. 

Svanson  v.  Omaha,  38  Neb.  550 :  630. 

Svennes    v.    West    Salem,    114    Wis. 

650:  915,  1514,  1570,  1571. 
Swain    v.    Boston    El.    Ry.    Co.,    188 

Mass.  405 :   1304. 
Swan  V.  Davidson  County  Comrs.,  18 
Minn.  482:   524. 
V.  Middlesex  Co.,   101   Mass.   173: 

1122,  1127. 
V.  Williams,  2  Mich.  427 :  673,  675, 
1004,  1013,  1014. 
Swann  v.  Washington  Southern  Ry. 

Co.,  108  Va.  282:  744,  1343. 
Swanson  v.  Hallock,  95  Minn.   161: 
1186. 
V,  Miss.  &  Rum  River  Boom  Co.,  42 
Minn.  532:    133. 
Swanson  Street,  In  re,   163  Pa.   St. 

323:  399,  400,  974. 
Swart  V.  Saratoga  Springs,  25  App. 
Div.  622:  84. 
V.    Saratoga    Springs,    164    N.    Y. 
609:    84. 
Swayze  v.  New  Jersey  Midland  R.  R. 
Co.,  36  N.  J.  L.  295:   1187,  1377. 
Sweaney   v.   United   States,   62   Wis. 

390:   937. 
Sweatman  v.  Bathrick,  17  S.  D.  138: 

882. 
Swedish  Evangelist  Church  v.  Jack- 
son, 229  111.  506:    887,   1493. 
Sweek   v.   Jorgensen,    33    Ore.    270: 

1033,  1511. 
Sweenev   v.    Chicago   Telephone    Co., 
212  111.   475:    930,   1427. 
V.  Mont.  Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  19  Mont. 

163:   847. 
V.  Mont.  Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  25  Mont. 

543:   847. 
V.  Shakespeare,  42  La.  Ann.  614: 
105,  1496. 
Sweet  V.  Boston,  186  Mass.  79:   928, 
1003,  1707,  1708,  1709. 
V.   Buffalo   etc.   Ry.    Co.,    13    Hun 

643:   1.500. 
V.  Buffalo  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  79  N.  Y. 

293:    806,   1500. 
V.  Conley,  20  R.  I.  381:   236. 
V.  Rechel,   37  Fed.  323:   485. 
V.  Rechel,  159  U.  S.  380:  586,  807, 

1157,    1165,    1167. 
V.  Syracuse,  128  N.  Y.  680:  739. 


Swenson  v.  Hallock,   95  Minn.   161 : 

1218. 
V.    Lexington,    69    Mo.    157:    253, 

307,  1137. 
Swett  V.  Cutts,  50  N.  H.  439:   147. 
Swift  V.  Broyles,  115  Ga.  885:  455. 
V.  Delaware  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  66  N. 

J.  Eq.  34:   199,  317. 
V.   Newport   News,    105   Va.    108: 

631,  633,  1123,  1307,  1524,  1549, 

1550,  1552. 
Swift  &  Given's  Appeal,  111  Pa.  St. 

516:  817. 
Swikehard  v.  Michels,   8  Misc.  568: 

738. 
Swindon  Water  Works  Co.  v.  Wilts 

&  Berks   Canal   Navigation  Co., 

L.  R.  7  E.  &  L  App.  Cas.  697: 

74,  77. 
Swinhart  v.   St.  Louis  etc.   Ry.  Co., 

207  Mo.  423:  315,  1587. 
Swope  V.  Seattle,  35  Wash.  69:   631, 

1601,  1612. 
V.    Seattle,    36    Wash.    113:    1001, 

1612. 
Symonds  v.  Cincinnati,  14  Ohio  147: 

1175,  1192. 
Symons  v.   San   Francisco,    115   Cal. 

555:   383,  392,  678,  1668. 
Snyder  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  112 

Mo.  527:    1161. 
Syracuse  v.   Benedict,   86  Hun  343: 

726,  1437. 
V.  Stacey,  45  App.  Div.  249:  744, 

1196,  1229.  1263,  1338. 
v.  Stacey,  86  Hun  441:   698,  994. 
V.  Stacey,  169  N.  Y.  231:  744,  1196, 

1229,   1263,   1338. 
V.  Weyrick,  37  Ind.  App.  50:   1568. 
Syracuse  etc.   R.  R.   Co.,  Matter  of, 

4  Hun   311:    1443,   1670. 
Syracuse  Solar  Salt  Co.  v.  Rome  etc. 

R.  R.  Co.,  67  Hun  153:  243,  247, 

1580,  1591,  1651,  1658. 
Syracuse  Water  Co.  v.  Syracuse,  116 

N.  Y.  167 :  408,  409. 


Taber  v.  Boston,  190  Mass.  101 :  948, 

949,   1563. 
V.   New   Bedford,    135   Mass.    162: 

1510. 
V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  28  R. 

L   269:    308,    1177,    1180,    1293, 

1300. 
Tabor  v.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  8 

Miscl.  17:   1305. 
Tabor  Street,  25  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  355: 

1713. 
Tacoma  v.  State,  4  Wash.   64:    673, 

679,  681. 


cclxxviii 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :  Vol.   I,  pp.   1-743  ;  Vol.  II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Tacoma  v.  Wm.  Birmingham  Co.,  50 

Wash.  683:    1428. 
Taeger  v.  Rieppe,  90  la.  484:  1577. 
Taft   V.    Commomvealth,    158    Mass. 

526:  865,  1132,  1334. 
Taggart  v.  Newport  St.  E.  R.  Co.,  16 
R.  I.  326:   279. 
V.  Newport  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  R.  I. 
668:   272,  273. 
Taintor  v.  Cambridge,  192  Mass.  522 : 
733. 
V.  Cambridge,  197  Mass.  412:  1366. 
V.   Morristown,   19  N.   J.  Eq.  46: 
104,  349,  1266,  1487,  1491,  1594. 
V.    Morristown,    33    N.   J.   L.    57: 
1491. 
Tait  V.  Hall,  71  Cal.  149:  1568. 
V.    Matthews,    33    Tex.    112:    524, 

1163,  1170,  1183,  1635. 

Tait's  Executor  v.  Central  Lunatic 
Asylum,  84  Va.  271:  9,  675,  747. 
748,  1158,  1173,  1177. 

Talbot  V.  Hudson,  16  Gray,  417 :  496, 
498,  501,  504,  555,  557,  586,  675, 

1164,  1166. 

V.    Richmond    etc.    R.    R.    Co.,    31 

Gratt.   685:    331. 
Talcott  Bros.  v.  Des  Moines,  134  la. 

113:    230,  443. 
Taliaferro  v.  Roach   (Ky.)    12  S.  W. 

1039:  1368. 
Talladega   Co.   Comrs.  v.   Thompson, 

15   Ala.    134:    1017,   1032,    1033, 

1412. 
Tallahassee  Falls  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Jones, 

128  Ala.  424:  965. 
Tallman  v.  Metropolitan   El.   R.   R. 

Co.,   121  N.  Y.   119:   1298,   1553, 

1554,  1651,  1658. 
Tallon  V.  Hoboken,  59  N.  J.  L.  383: 

892. 
V.  Hoboken,  60  N.  J.  L.  212-  297, 

298,  778. 

Tamaqua  etc.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Inter-Coun- 
ty St.  R.  R.  Co.,  4  Pa.  Dist.  Ct. 
20:   1621. 

Tamaqua  &  L.  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Inter- 
County  St.  R.  E.  Co.,  167  Pa.  St. 
91:    300,  910. 

Tamasco  City  v.  Brinkmeyer,  12  Ind. 
349:    1576. 

Tamon  v.  Kellogg,  49  Mo.  118:  1555. 

Tampa  Water  Works  Co.  v.  Cline,  37 
Fla.  586:  69,  161,  165. 

Tanner  v.  Treasury  T.  M.  &  R.  Co., 
35  Colo.  593 :  498,  499,  564,  593, 
674. 

Tanninan  v.  City  &  Suburban  Tel. 
Ass.,  1  Ohio'N.  P.  (N.  S.)  81: 
339,  1593. 


Tappan's    Petition,    24    N.    H.    43: 

1376. 
Taraldron   v.   Lime   Springs,   92   la. 

187*    889 
Tarkio  v.  Clark,   186  Mo.  285:   917, 

1032,  1086,  1424. 
Tarrytown  v.  Cobb,  14  Abb.   (N.  C.) 

493:   1412. 
Tate    V.    Greensborough,    114   N.    C. 

392:  348,  1057,  1488. 
V.  M.  K.  &  T.  R.  E.  Co.,  64  Mo. 

149:  246,  248,  253,  324,  1119. 
V.  Ohio  &  Miss.  E.  E.  Co.,  7  Ind. 

479:   178,  251,  307. 
V.  Eailway  Co.,  64  Mo.  149:  1545. 
V.  Sacramento,  50  Cal.  242:   1572. 
Taussig  V.   St.   Louis  Val.   Transfer 

Ry.  Co.,  133  Fed.  220:  715. 
Taylor  v.  Armstrong,  24   Ark.   102: 

1486. 
V.  Austin,  32  Minn.  247:  143. 
V.  Baltimore,  45  Md.  576 :  807,  809, 

1331. 
V.  B.  &  0.  R.  E.  Co.,  38  W.  Va.  39: 

93,  94. 
V.  Bay  City  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  80  Mich. 

77:  622,  691,  1586,  1592. 
V.  Bay  City  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  101  Mich. 

140:  277,  324,  329,  1133,  1323. 
V.  Black,  3  Bibb  78 :  1427. 
v.  Burnap,  39  Mich.  739:  1033. 
V.  Cedar  Rapids  &  St.  Paul  R.  E. 

Co.,  25  la.  371 :  840. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  63  Wis. 

327:  1631. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  81  Wis. 

82:  1444. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  83  Wis. 

636:  247,  356,  424. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  83  Wis. 

645:   1442. 
V.   Clemson,   11    Clark  &  Finnelly 

610:    897,   1029. 
V.  Comrs.  of  Highways,  88  111.  526 

383,  1402. 
V.    Commonwealth,    102    Va.    759 

130,  140. 
V.  County  Comrs.,  105  Mass.  225 

1082. 
V.   County  Comrs.,    18   Pick.   309 

965. 
V.  Erie  City  Pass.  Ey.  Co.,  212  Pa. 

St.  487:    1588. 
V.   Fla.  East  Coast  E.  E.  Co.,  54 

Fla.  635:   843,  851. 
V.  Hopper,  62  N.  Y.  649:  366. 
V.  Marcy,  25  111.  518:   1460,  1634. 
V.    Metropolitan    El.    Ry.    Co.,    50 

N.  Y.  Supr.  Ct.  311:  1298,  1548, 

1552. 
V.  Metropolitan  El.  E.  R.  Co.,  55 

N.  Y.  Supr.  Ct.  555 :  1298,  1303. 


CASES    CITED. 


cclxxix 


[The  references   are  to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.1 


Taylor  v.  Nashville  &  Chattanooga  E. 
E.  Co.,  6  Cold.  646:   19. 
V.  New  York  etc.  E.  R.  Co.,  38  N. 

J.  L.   28:    1480. 
V.  Norfolk  etc.  Ey.  Co.,   162  Fed. 

452:  747. 
V.  Norfolk  etc.  Ey.  Co.,   162  Fed. 

462:     744. 
V.  Pettijohn,  24  111.  312:  733. 
V.  Philippi,  35  W.  Va.  554:    878, 

887   890 
V.  Plymouth,  8  Met.  462;  17. 
V.   Porter.   4  Hill    140:    495,   496, 

516.   517. 
V.  Portsmouth  etc.  E.   E.   Co.,   91 

Me.  193:  272,  281,  333. 
V.  Eailroad  Co..   38  N.  J.  L.  28: 

807. 
V.  St.  Louis,  14  Mo.  20:  211,  229, 

234,  235. 
V.  St.  Paul,  25  Minn.  129:  607,  617, 

1524. 
V.    San   Antonio   etc.   Ey.   Co.,   36 

Tex.  Civ.  App.   658:    158. 
V.   Seaboard  Air  Line   E.   E.   Co., 

145  N.  C.  400:  450. 
V.    Strayer,    167    Ind.   23:    695. 
V.    Todd,    48    Mo.    App.    550:    706, 

1025,  1513,  1516,  1517,  1576. 
V.  Turley,  33  Md.  500:   1256. 
V.  Waverly,  94  la.  661 :  465. 
Taylor    Ave.    Opening,    146    Pa.    St. 

638:   1017. 
Teachout  v.  Des  Moines  Broad  Gauge 
St.  R.  E.  Co.,  75  La.  722:   415. 
Tearney  v.   Smith,  86  111.   391:    233, 

1455. 
Teaslev    v.    Stanton,    136    Ala.    641: 

368. 
Tedens  v.  Sanitary  District,  149  111. 
87:   814,   1061,   1063,  1005,  1066, 
1107,    1121,    1227. 
Teele  v.  Boston,  165  Mass.  88:   1232. 
Teese,  Ex  parte,  4  Pa.  St.  69:    1370. 
Tegeler  v.  Kansas  City,  95  Mo.  App. 
162:   231,  439,   1300,  1307,  1549, 
1552,  1658. 
Tehama   Co.   v.   Bryan,   68   Cal.   57: 

1223. 
Telegraph  &  Telephone  Co.  v.  Forke, 
2  Tex.  App.  Civ.  Cas.  318:   952, 
1123,    1267. 
Temple  v.  Hamilton  County,  134  la. 

706:   1056,  1058. 
Templeton  v.  Milwaukee  L.  H.  &  T. 

Co.,  134  Wis.  377:  284. 
Templin   v.    Iowa    City,    14   la.    59: 

235 
Ten  Bro'eck  v.  Sherrill,  71  N.  Y.  276: 

689. 
Tenbrooke  v.  Jahke.  77  Pa.  St.  392: 
936,  1561. 


Tenement  House  Dept.  v.  Moeschen, 
89  App.  Div.  526:   14,  490. 
v.  Moeschen,  90  App.  Div.  603 :  14, 

490. 
v.  Moeschen,  179  N.  Y.  325:  14,  15, 

467,   490. 
v.  Moeschen,  203  U.  S.  583 :  14,  15. 
Ten    Eyck    v.    Delaware    &    Raritan 
Canal  Co.,  18  N.  J.  L.  200:  70, 
86. 
Tennessee  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Camp- 
bell, 109  Tenn.  640:   1042,  1413, 
1423,  1424. 
V.  Campbell,   109  Tenn.  655:    714, 
912,  1042,  1413,  1423,  1424. 
Tennessee  Coal,  Iron  &  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Birmingham    So.    Ry.    Co.,    128 
Ala.   526:    697,   1072. 
Tennessee  etc.  R.  R.   Co.  v.  Adams, 
3  Head  596:   726. 
V.  Taylor,  102  Ala.  224:    1502. 
Terminal   R.   E.   Co.,  Matter  of,    16 
App.  Div.  N.  Y.  515:   1086,  1390. 
Terminal    Ey.    Co.    v.    Gebereux,    55 

Misc.  1:   1085. 
Terpening  v.   Smith,   46   Barb.   208: 

1018,  1634. 
Terre  Haute  v.  Blake,   9   Ind.  App. 
403:    1680. 
V.   Evansville  etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   149 

Ind.  174:  733,  926. 
V.  Turner,  36  Ind.  522:  210. 
Terre  Haute  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bissell, 
108  Ind.  113:  246,  248. 
V.  Crawford,  100  Ind.  550:   1390. 
V.  Flora,  29  Ind.  App.  442:  1192. 
V.  Harris,  126  Ind.  7 :   1547. 
V.   Indianapolis   etc.   Traction   Co., 

167  Ind.  193:   1400. 
V.  McCoy,  113  Ind.  498:  143. 
V.    McKinley,    33    Ind.    274:     87, 

461. 
V.  Scott,  74  Ind.  29:   1710. 
V.  Zehner,  166  Ind.  149:  91,  1486. 
Terrell    v.    Paducah,    122    Ky.    331: 

104. 
Terrell   Co.   v.   York,    127    Ga.    166: 

1545. 
Terrill  v.  Bloomfield  (Ky.)   21  S.  W. 
1041:    431. 
V.  Rankin,  2  Bush.  453:   19. 
Terry    v.    Hartford,    39    Conn.    286: 
1219. 
v.  McClung,  104  Va.  599 :  695,  722. 
v.    New   York   Central    &   Hudson 
River   R.   R.   Co.,   67   How.   Pr. 
439:    1501. 
V.    Richmond,    94    Va.    537:    260, 

275,  304,   1667. 
V.  Waterbury,  35  Conn.  526:  1044, 
1069. 


cclxxx 


CASES    CITED. 


[Tlie  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Teter  v.  W.  Va.  Cent.  etc.  E.  R.  Co., 

35  W.  Va.,  433:  51,  1154,  1156. 
Tetherington  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  K.  R. 

Co.,  226  111.  129:   151. 
V.   St.  Louis  etc.  R.   E.   Co.,   128 

111.  App.   139:    152,   1630. 
Texarkana  v.  Leach,  66  Ark.  40 :  363, 

372,  383,  399,  405,  646,  1596. 
V.  Talbot,   7   Tex.  Civ.  App.   202: 

631,  1353. 
Texarkana  etc.  Ry.   Co.   v.   Spencer, 

28  Tex.  Civ.  App.  251:   152. 
Texas  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bowman, 

97  Tex.  417:   746. 
V.  Brown,  38  Tex.  Civ.  App.  610: 

152,  1655. 
V.  Clifton,  2  Tex.  App.  Civil  Cases 

p.   433:    152,   1455,    1552. 
Texas    etc.   R.   R.   Co.   v.    Cella,    42 

Ark.  528:  1314,  1316,  1329,  1378. 
V.   Dunn    (Tex.)     17    S.    W.    822: 

155 
V.  Du'rrett,  57  Tex.  48:   830,  1310. 
V.  Eddy,  42  Ark.  527:   1149,  1378. 
V.  Edringtou,   100  Tex.   496:    450, 

655,  661,  1716. 
V.  Goldberg,  68  Tex.  685:   640. 
V.  Hays,  3  Tex.  Civ.  App.  p.  79,  § 

57:    1348. 
V.  Jarrell,  60  Tex.  267:  858,  1627, 

1631. 
V.  Kirby,  44  Ark.  103:  1119,  1122, 

1127. 
V.  Long,  1  Tex.  App.  Civ.  Caa.  p. 

281:    1552. 
v.  Maddox,  26  Tex.  Civ.  App.  297: 

152. 
v.  Marshall,   136  U.   S.  393:    833, 

841,  852. 
v.   Matthews,   60   Tex.   215:    1183, 

1267. 
v.  O'Mahoney,  24  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

631:    144. 
v.    Orange   etc.    Ry.    Co.,   29    Tex. 

Civ.  App.  38:    1467. 
V.  Rosedale  Ry.  Co.,  64  Tex.   80: 

268,   1586. 
V.  Scott,  77  Fed.  726:   843. 
V.  Snyder,  18  S.  W.  559:  152. 
V.  So.  Development  Co.,  52  La.  An. 

535:    1377. 
V.  Sutor,  56  Tex.  496:  859,  1347. 
v.  Sutor,  59  Tex.  29:    859. 
V.  Whitaker,  36  Tex.  Civ.  App.  571 : 

158. 
V.  Wilson,  108  La.  1 :  1378,  1379. 
Texas  Midland  R.  R.   Co.  v.   S.   W. 

Tel.    &   Tel.    Co.,    24    Tex.    Civ. 

App.  198:   690,  696,  1467. 
Texas   Pac.   R.   R.    Co.   v.    Saunders 

(Tex.)    18  S.  W.  792:   1664. 


Texas  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Eddings,  30  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  170:   1297. 
Texas  Trunk   R.   R.   Co.  v.  Elan,   1 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  201:  92,  158. 
Texas   Western   R.   R.   Co.   v.   Cave, 

80  Tex.  137:   1226. 
V.  Wilson,  83  Tex.  153:   864,  869. 
Textor  v.  Baltimore  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

107  Md.  221:    1395,   1397,   1398. 
Thames  Conservators  v.  Victoria  etc. 

R.   R.    Co.,   4   L.   R.   C.   P.   59: 

1353. 
Tharp  v.  Witham,  65  la.  566:   1576. 
Thatcher  v.   Crisman,   6   Colo.  App. 

49:    973. 
V.  Dartmouth  Bridge  Co.,  18  Pick. 

501:    6LJ,   1634. 
Thaxter  v.  Turner,  17  R.  I.  799 :  183. 

877,  880. 
Thayer  v.  Brooks,  17  Ohio  489:  161, 

934. 
V.  Burger,  100  Ind.  262:  977,  1383, 

1407. 
V.  Co.  Comrs.,  10  Cush.  151:   996. 
V.    New    Bedford    R.    R.    Co.,    125 

Mass.  253:  117,  131. 
V.  Rochester  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  15 

Abb.  N.  C.  52:   269,  1586. 
Thebodereaux  v.  Maggioli,  4  La.  An. 

73:    1341. 
Theilan  v.  Porter,  14  Lea  622 :  485. 
Themanson  v.  Kearney,  35  Neb.  881: 

236. 
Theobold   v.   Louisville,   N.   0.   &  T. 

R.   R.   Co.,    66   Miss.   279:    180, 

188,  197,  201,  243,  247,  249,  253, 

295. 
Theresa  Dr.  Dist.,  In  re,  90  Wis.  301 : 

495,    565,    567,    568,    570,    582, 

738 
Thetford  v.  Kilburn,  36  Vt.  179 :  955, 

1005. 
Thibodaux  v.  Thibodaux,  46  La.  An. 

1528:    169. 
Thicknesse  v.  Lancaster  Canal  Co.,  4 

M.  &  W.  471:  693,  1524. 
Thien    v.    Voegtlande,    3    Wis.    461: 

550. 
Third  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.,  In  re,  56  Hun 

537:    302. 
Third   Ave.    R.    R.    Co.,   In   re,    121 

N.  Y.  536:    269,  302. 
Third  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  New  York 

El.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  Abb.  N.  C.  261: 

1581. 
Third,  Fourth  &  Fifth  Avenues,  In  re, 

49    Wash.    109: -828,    916,    993, 

1509,  1511. 
Thirteenth  Street  etc.  R.  R.   Co.  v. 

Southern  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  Pa. 

Co.  Ct.  145:  1621. 


OASES    OITEB, 


cclxxxi 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;  Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Thirteenth    Street    Opening,    In    re, 

147  Pa.  St.  245:   1376. 
Thirtv-fourth    St.,    81    Pa.    St.    27: 

1419. 
Thirty-fourth  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter 

of,  37  Hun  442:    1040,   1080. 
Thirty-fourth  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter 
of,   102  N.  Y.  343:    1040,   1080. 
Thirty-fourth    St.,   Widening   of,    10 

Phila.  197:  721. 
Thirty-second   Street,  Matter  of,   19 

Wend.  128:    1326. 
Thom  V.  Ga.  Mfg.  &  Public  Service 
Co.,  128  Ga.  187:  594,  674,  731, 
1070,  1623. 
Thoman  v.  Covington,  23  Ky.  L.  R. 

117:  154. 
Thomas  v.  Ashland  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  122 
Wis.  519:   128,  135. 
V.  Boyd,  108  Va.  584:  1642. 
V.  Ford,  63  Md.  346:    1486. 
V.   Grand   View  Beach  R.   R.  Co., 

76  Hun  601:  1578. 
V.  Hunt,  134  Mo.  392:   1629. 
V.  Inter-County  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  167 
Pa.     St.     120:     314,    315,     1587, 
1590,   1665. 
V.  .Tunction  City  Irr.  Co.,  80  Tex. 

550:  1652. 
1.  Milledgeville  R.  R.  Co.,  99  Ga. 

714:   674. 
V.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  164  111. 

6.S4:   896,  939,  1047. 
V.  South  Side  El.  R.  R.   Co.,  218 

111.  571,  1049. 
V.  Wade,  48  Fla.  311:   96,  133. 
Thomas    Jefferson,    The,    10    Wheat. 

428:    103. 
Thomason  v.   Seaboard  Air  Line  R. 
R.  Co.,  142  N.  C.  300 :  449. 
v.  Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry.  Co.,  142 
N.  C.  318:  1459,  1472. 
Thompkins  v.  Augusta  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
37  S.  C.  382:   1460. 
V.  Hodgson,  2  Hun  146 :  356. 
Thompson,  In  re,  85  Hun  438:  1379 
Thompson,  In  re,  86  Hun  405:   724 

726. 
Thompson,  In  re,  89  Hun  32:   1561 
Thompson,  Matter  of,  43  Hun  416 

437. 
Thompson,  Matter  of,  45  Hun  261 

1379. 
Thompson,  Matter  of,  57  Hun  419 

684,  806,  810,   C.3,  1331. 
Thompson,  Matter  of,  121  N.  Y.  277 

1425. 
Thompson,  Matter  of,  127  N.  Y.  463 
1139,   1147. 


Thompson  v.  Androscoggin  River  Im- 
provement  Co.,   54   N.   H.    545: 

62,  80,  436,  437. 
V.  Androscoggin  Riv.  Imp.  Co.,  58 

N.  H.  108:   100. 
V.  Berlin,  87  Minn.  7:   1020,  1023, 

1033,  1518. 
V.  Board  of  Supervisors,  111  Cal. 

553,   300. 
V.  Booneville,  61  Mo.  282:  237. 
V.    Canada    Central   R.    R.    Co.,    3 

Ontario,  136:    860. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  110  Mo. 

147:  948,  949,  1027,  1261,  1511. 
V.  Citizens'  Traction  Co.,  181  Pa. 

St.  131:   1549,  1657. 
V.  Citizens'  Traction  Co.   (Mo.)   31 

S.  W.  793:   1294. 
V.  Conway,  53  N.  H.  622 :  1377. 
V.  Crabb,  6  J.  J.  Marsh.  222:  1091, 

1094. 
V.  Deprez,  96  Ind.  67:  1132. 
V.  De  Weese-Dye  Ditch  &  Res.  Co., 

25  Colo.  243:    1066,  1378. 
V.  Goldthwait,  132  Ind.  20:   1083. 
V.  Grand  Gulf  R.  R.  Co.,  3  How. 

(Miss.)    240:    1159,  1170. 
V.  Keokuk,  61  la.  187 :  1306,  1307. 
V.  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  110  Ky. 

973:   1478. 
v.  Macon  City,  106  Mo.  App.  84: 

324,  631. 
V.   Major,   58   N.    H.   242:    1504. 
V.  Maloney,  199  111.  276:  366,  873, 

874,  875,  877. 
V.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,   16  Daly 

64:  1664. 
V.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  130  N.  Y. 

360:   1554,  1584,  1664. 
V.  McElarney,  82  Pa.  St.  174:  858. 
V.  Milwaukee  &  St.  Paul  Ry.  Co., 

27  Wis.  93:  1245,  1307. 
V.  Multnomah  Co.,  2  Ore.  34:  1017, 

1032,  1034,  1081,  1358,  1411. 
V.  New  York  &  Harlem  R.  R.  Co., 

3  Sandf.  Ch.  625:   413. 
V.   Ocean   City   R.   R.    Co.,    60   N. 

J.  L.  74:  297,  778. 
V.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  51  N. 

J.  L.  42:    314,  316,   1124. 
V.  Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry.  Co.,  142 

N.  C.  318:  447. 
V.  Southern  Cal.  Motor  Road  Co., 

82  Cal.  497  :  836. 
V.  State,  20  Ala.  54:  821,  1069. 
V.  Treasurer  of  Wood  Co.,  11  Ohio 

St.  678:  580. 
V.  Trowe,  82  Minn.  471:  982,  1186. 
V.  Trustees  of  Schools,  218  111.  540: 

911. 


cclxxxii 


CASES    CITEB. 


[The   references   are  to  the  pages:   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Thompson-Houston    Electric    Co.    v. 
Newton,  42  Fed.  723:  409,  410. 
V.  Simon,  20  Ore.  60:   719. 
Thomsen  v.  McCormick,  136  111.  135: 

873,  874,  877. 
Thomson  v.  Sebasticook  &  M.  R.  R. 

Co.,  81  Me.  40:  1232. 
Thorington   v.   Montgomery,    147   U. 

S.  490:   23. 
Thorn  v.  Sweeney,  12  Nev.  251:  536, 

1578. 
Thorndike    v.    County    Comrs.,     117 

Mass.  566:    1035. 
Thornton  v.  North  Providence,  6  R. 
I.  433:   1369. 
V.  Roll,  118  111.  350:  1602. 
V.  Sheffield  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  84  Ala. 
109:    842,    1535,   1579. 
Thorp  V.  Rutland  &  Burlington  R.  R. 
Co.,  27  Vt.  140:  487. 
V.  Witham,  65  la.  566:   926,  927, 
1431. 
Thorpe  v.   Co.  Comrs.,   9   Gray,   57: 

1382,  1415. 
Thrall  v.  Gosnell,  28  Ind.  App.  174: 

973,  994,  1035. 
Threat  v.  Middletown,  8  Conn.  243: 

992. 
Thunder  Bay  Booming  Co.  v.  Speedi- 
ly, 31  Mich.  336:  80. 
Thurman  v.   Emerson,   4   Bibb   279 : 

1370. 
Thurston  v.  Alstead,  26  N.  H.  259: 
1083. 
V.  Hancock,  12  Mass.  220:   440. 
V.   Portland,   63   Me.    149:    1135. 
V.  St.  Joseph,  51  Mo.  510:  67,  178, 
183,  187,  233,  234. 
Thurston  County  v.  Walker,  27  Wash. 

500:  882. 
Tibbetts   v.   Knox   &  Lincoln   R.   R. 
Co.,    62    Me.    437:    435,    1455. 
V.  West  &  So.  Towns  St.  R.  R.  Co., 

54  111.  App.  180:   1586. 
V.  West  &  South  Towns  St.  Ry.  Co., 
153  111.  147:  302,  1587.      , 
Tide    Water    Canal    Co.    v.    Archer, 
9  Gil.  &  J.  (Md.)  479:  684,  1092, 
1179,  1241,  1369,  1690. 
Tide  Water  Co.  v.  Coster,   18  N.  J. 

Eq.  518:  577,  584,  586. 
Tidewater  Rv.  Co.  v.  Cowan,  106  Va. 
817:   1341,  1379. 
V.  Shartzer,  107  Va.  562:  629,  651, 
654,  659,  660,  661,  668. 
Tieck  V.  Board  of  Comrs.,   11  Minn. 

292:  1523. 
Tiedt  V.  Carstensen,  61  la.  334:  1419. 
Tietze  v.  International  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  | 
35  Tex.  Civ.  App.  136:    1657. 


Tiffany  v.  United  States  Illuminat- 
ing Co.,   67   How.   Pr.   73:    339, 

1593. 
V.  United  States  Illuminating  Co., 

51  N.  Y.  Supr.  Ct.  280:  339.  345, 

1593. 
Tiffany  St.,  Matter  of,  84  App.  Div. 

525:  611. 
Tifft  V.  Buffalo,  82  N.  Y.  204 :   1499, 

1500. 
Tift  V.  Dougherty  Co.,  74  Ga.  340: 

1625. 
Tileston    v.     Brookline,     134    Mass. 

438:   1712. 
Tillamook   Water    Co.    v.    Tillamook 

City,  150  Fed.  117:  409,  410. 
Tilley  v.  Mitchell  &  L.  Co.,  121  Wis. 

1:    191,  372,  373,   .374,  382,   384, 

389,    391,    396,    397,    398,    406, 

651. 
Tillman  v.  Kireher,  64  Ind.  104:  574. 

V.  People,  12  Mich.  401:  886. 
Tilzie  V.   Hage,   8    Wash.    187:    873, 

874. 
Tingley  v.  Providence,  8  R.  I.  493: 

1120,  1124,  1125. 
V.  Providence,  9  R.  I.  388:    1029. 
Tingle  v.  Tingle,  12  Bush  160:   1365. 
Tinieum   Fishing   Co.   v.    Carter,   61 

Pa.  St.  21:   139. 
V.  Carter,  90  Pa.  St.  85:  139. 
Tinker  v.  Rockford    (111.)    28  N.  E. 

573 ■    629    635. 
V.  Rockford!  137  111.  123:  629,  635, 

1356,  1451,  1452,  1453. 
V.  Rockford,  36  111.  App.  460:  840, 

847,  1451. 
Tinkham  v.  Arnold,  3  Me.  120:  866. 
Tinsman  v.  Belvidere  Del.  R.  R.  Co., 

26  N.  J.  L.  148 :  95. 
V.  Monroe  Probate  Judge,  82  Mich. 

562:    993. 
Tintsman  v.  National  Bank,  100  U. 

S.   6:    1114. 
Tioga   St.,  In   re,   213   Pa.   St.   345: 

1029. 
Tipton  V.  Miller,  3  Yerg.  423:   1079, 

1358. 
Tisbury   v.   Vineyard    Haven   Water 

Co.,  193  Mass.  196:   1266. 
Tise  V.  Whitaker-Harvey  Co.,  144  N. 

C.  507:    351,  372,   1596. 
V.  Whitaker-Harvey  Co.,  146  N.  C. 

374*    883 
Tisso  V.   Great  So.   Tel.   &  Tel.   Co., 

39  La.  An.  996:  350. 
Titus  V.  Boston,  149  Mass.  164:  810, 

1450,  1491,  1496. 
V.  Boston,  161  Mass.  209:  453. 
Titusville  Elec.  Lt.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Titus- 

ville,  196  Pa.  St.  3:  408. 


CASES    CITED. 


cclxxxiii 


[The   references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Titusville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Warren 

etc.   R.    R.    Co.,    12    Phila.    642: 

906. 
Tobey  v.  Moore,  130  Mass.  448:  429. 
Tobie  V.  Brown  Co.  Comrs.,  20  Kan. 

14:    1185. 
Todd  V.  Austin,  34  Conn.  78:   2,  6, 

20.  504,  548. 
V.  Kankakee  &  Illinois  River  R.  R. 

Co.,  78  111.  530:   1206. 
V.  Macfarland,  20  App.  Cas.  D.  C. 

176:   1394. 
V.  Rome,  2  Me.  55:   1372. 
V.  York,  3  Neb.    (Unof.)    763:   84. 
V.  York  Co.,  72  Neb.  207:  149,  157. 
Todernier  v.  Aspinwall,  43  111.  401 : 

943,  1363,  1368. 
Toledo   V.    Converse,   21    Ohio    C.    C. 

239:  876,  884,  887,  890. 
V.    Sanwald,    13   Ohio   C.   C.    496: 

1526. 
Toledo  Consol.  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Toledo 

Elec.  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  6  Ohio  C.  C. 

362:    427,    756,    762,    764,    985, 

1282,  1283. 
V.   Toledo  Electric   St.   R.  R.   Co., 

50  Ohio  St.  603:   427,  756,  762, 

764,  986,  1283. 
Toledo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Campau,  83 

Mich.  33:   1098,  1359. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  155  111. 

9:     1601.    1607. 
V.  Cosand,  6  Ind.  App.  222 :  855. 
V.  Daniels,  16  Ohio  St.  390:  731. 
V.  Darst,  61  111.  231:  869,  1426. 
V.  Detroit  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  62  Mich. 

564:     770,    893,    894,    991,    985, 

1281. 
V.  Detroit  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  63  Mich. 

645:  770. 
V.  Dunlap,  47  Mich.  456 :  685,  896, 

1347,  1434. 
V.  East  Saginaw  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  72 

Mich.   206:    494,   533,   976,   990. 
V.  Fostoria,  7  Ohio  C.  C.  293:  1291. 
V.  Green,  67  111.  199 :  1480. 
V.  Jacksonville,  67  111.  37:   476. 
V.  Loop,  139  Ind.  542:  1507. 
V.  Morgan,  72  111.  155:  937. 
V.  Munson,  57  Mich.  42:  706,  984, 

1343. 
V.  Pence,  68  111.  524:  25. 
V.  Toledo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  6  Ohio  C. 

C    521 :    1422. 
Toledo  etc.  Ry.  &  t.  Co.  v.  Hayes,  70 

Ohio  St.  425:    1315. 
Toledo  etc.  Traction  Co.  v.  Indiana 

etc.  Interurban  Ry.  Co.,    (Ind.) 

86  N.  E.  54:  900,  907. 
Toluca  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Haws,  194  111. 

92:  934,  1246,  1247,  1249,  1457. 


Tomlin  v.  Dubuque,  B.  &  M.  R.  R. 
Co.,   32  la.   106:    104,   117,  130, 
131. 
Tomlinson  v.  Wallace,  16  Wis.  224: 

1517. 
Tompkins  v.  Augusta  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
21  S.  C.  420:  831,  1631. 
v.  Augusta  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  33  S.  C. 

216:    1626 
V.  Augusta  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  37  S.  C. 

382:    1626. 
V.  Hodgson,  2  Hun  146:  337. 
Tonawanda  v.  Lyon,  181  U.  S.  389: 

II,  464. 

Toney  v.  Johnson,  26  Ind.  382 :  1522. 
Tonica  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cooper,  22 

III.  224:    1217. 

V.  Unsicker,  22  111.  221 :  1309,  1316. 
Tonnes  v.  Augusta,  52  S.  C.  396 :  94. 
Toole  V.  Delaware  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  27 

Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  577:  155,  157. 
Toops  V.  State,  92  Ind.  13:  1518. 
Toote  V.   Clifton,   22   Ohio   St.  247: 

145. 
Topeka  v.  Cower,  48  Kan.  345:   864, 
868. 
V.   Martineau,   42   Kan.    387:    604, 

619,  1109,  1124,  1307,  1339. 
V.    Sells,   48    Kan.    520:    236,    604, 
617,  1525. 
Topliff  V.  Chicago,  196  111.  215:  357. 
Toppan's  Petition,  24  N.  H.  43 :  1022. 
Torge   V.    Salamanca,    86   App.    Div. 
211:   610. 
V.  Salamanca,  176  N.  Y.  324:  610. 
Toronto  Belt  Line  R.  R.  Co.,  In  re, 
26  Ont.  413:  947,  948,  949,  1564. 
Torrey  v.  Scranton,  133  Pa.  St.  173: 

155,  233. 
Torrington   v.    Messenger,    74   Conn. 
321*   159    710 
v.  Nash,  17' Conn.  197:  916,  992. 
Tosper  v.  Saline  Co.  Comrs.,  27  Kan. 

391:    1185. 
Totel  V.  Bonnefoy,  123  111.  653 :   145. 
Towamencin  Road,   10  Pa.   St.   195 : 

1069. 
Towanda  Bridge   Co.,  In  re,  91  Pa. 

St.  216:   687,  781,  788. 
Tower  v.  Boston,  10  Cush.  235 :   624, 
1522. 
V.  Pittstick,  55  111.   115:   1514. 
Towle  V.  Eastern  Railroad,  17  N.  H. 
519*   319. 
V.  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.,  18  N.  H.  547: 
691. 
Town    V.    Blackberry,    29    111.    137: 
1519. 
V.  Foulkner,  56  N.  H.  255:    1551. 
V.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  50  Neb. 
768:   148,  149,  157. 


eclxxxiv 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742 ;  Vol.   II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Town  V.  Stoddard,  30  N.  H.  23 :  1082, 

1095. 
Townes  v.  City  Council,  46  S.  C.  15: 
144. 
V.  Klamath  County,  33  Ore.  225: 
515,  676,  982,  1008,  1029,  10G8. 
Townsend,  Matter  of,  39  N.  Y.  171: 
500. 
V.   Blewett,   5  How.    (Miss.)    503: 

413. 
V.   Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  91  111. 

545;    976,   1510. 
V.  Epstein,  93  Md.  537:   180,  181, 

190,  197,  199,  373,  1596. 
V.  Hoyle,  20  Conn.  1:  514. 
V.  Mich.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  101  Fed. 

757:    1570. 
V.  New  York  Cent.  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

56  Misc  253:   1457,  1473. 
V.  Norfolk  Ry.  &  Lt.  Co.,  105  Va. 

22:    453,   454. 
V.  State,  147  Ind.  624:   164. 
Township  Board  v.  Haekman,  48  Mo. 

243:    502,   538,   1075. 
Tracewell  v.   Wood   Co.,   58  W.  Va. 

283'    156 
Traeey  v.  Corse,  58  N.  Y.  143 :  1008. 
V.  Bittle,  213  Mo.  302:   542,  872. 
V.    Elizabethtown   etc.   R.    R.   Co., 

78  Ky.  309:    1423. 
V.  Elizabethtown  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  80 
Ky.  259:   1004,  1010,  1013,  1014, 
1045,    1056,    1061,    1062,    1063, 
1066,  1067,  1074. 
V.  Troy  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  54  Hun  550 : 
273,   1586,   1614. 
Trade    Dollar    Consol.    Min.    Co.    v. 

Fraser,  148  Fed.  585:   1603. 
Trahern  v.  San  Joaquin  Co.,  59  Cal. 

320:    24. 
Trainer  v.  Lawrence,  36  111.  App.  90: 

1078,  1420. 
Transportation  Co.  v.  Chicago,  99  U. 

S.   635:    212,  658. 
Transylvania   University   v.   Lexing- 
ton, 3  B.  Mon.  25:  178,  369,  388. 
Traphagen  v.  Jersey  City,  29  N.  J. 

Eq.    206:    335,    1616. 
Trant  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  1 
Monaghan  (Pa.  Supm.  Ct.)  394: 
1342. 
Travers  v.  Merrick  County,  14  Neb. 

327:   550. 
Traverse  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Sey- 
mour, 81  Mich.  378:   1418. 
Travis   County  v.   Trogden,   88  Tex. 

302:    1160,    1183,    1570. 
Treacy  v.   Elizabethtown  etc.  R.   R. 
Co.,  80  Ky.  266:   696,  697,  698. 
V.  Elizabethtown  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  85 
Ky.  270:   696,  697. 


Treadway    v.    Railroad    Co.,    43    la. 

527:  475. 
Treat  v.  Bates,  27  Mich.  390:  91. 
V.  Lord,  42  Me.  552:   97. 
V.  Middletown,  8  Conn.  243:   916. 
Trelford  v.  Coney  Island  etc.  R.  R. 

Co.,  5  App.  Div.  464:    1587. 
V.  Coney  Island  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  6 

App.  Div.  204:   1587. 
Tremain  v.  Cohoes  Co.,  2  N.  Y.  163 : 

435,  1455. 
Tjenton  v.  McQuade,   52   N.   J.   Eq. 

669:    238. 
Trenton  Horse  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Trenton, 

53  N.  J.  L.   132:    476. 
Trenton  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R. 

Co.,  63  N.  J.  Eq.  276 :  297. 
V.  United  N.  J.  R.  R.  &  C.  Co.,  60 

N.  J.  Eq.   500:    329,   771. 
Trenton  Water  Power  Co.  v.  Cham- 
bers, 9  N.  J.  Eq.  471:  859,  1631. 
V.    Chambers,   13   N.   J.   Eq.    199: 

1446. 
v.  Raff,  36  N.  J.  L.  335:  67,  90,  95, 

1155. 
Trepenning  v.  Smith,  46  Barb.  208: 

1513. 
Trester  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  23 

Neb.  242 :  686. 
V.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  33  Neb. 

171:    685,   971,   976,   978,    1017, 

1409. 
V.  Sheboygan,  87  Wis,  496:  828. 
Trevitt  v.  Prison  Ass.,  98  Va.  332: 

84. 
Trickey  v.  Sehlader,  52  111.  78 :  1520. 
Triest  v.  New  York,   126  App.  Div. 

934:  611. 
V.  New  York,  55  Misc.  459:  236. 
V.  New  York,  193  N.  Y.  525:  611. 
Trimmer  v.  Pennsylvania  etc.  R.  R. 

Co.,  55  ]N.  J.  L.  46:  1227,  1238. 
Trine  v.  Pueblo,  21  Colo.  102:  886. 
Trinity  Ave.,  Matter  of,  81  App.  Div. 

215:   611,   1327. 
Trinity   Ave.,   Matter   of,    116   App. 

Div.  252:   936,  1561. 
Trinity  Church  v.  Higgins,  4  Robt. 

1:   915. 
Trinity  College  v.  Hartford,  32  Conn. 

452:    1185,   1190. 
Trinity  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Meadows,  73 

Tex.  32:  168,  653,  664,  665,  666, 

670. 
Tripp    V.    County    Comrs.,    2    Allen 

556:     1078,    1105. 
V.  Overocker,  7  Colo.  72:  53,  1550. 
Troe  V.  Larson,  84  la.  649:  95,  137. 

1607. 
Trogden  v.  Winona  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  22 

Minn.  198:  948,  1261. 


OASES    CITEB. 


cclxxxv 


[The   references  are   to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.J 


Trombley    v.    Humphrey,    23    Mich. 

471:   588. 
Trook  V.  B.  &  P.  E.  R.  Co.,  3  Mc- 

Arthur,  D.  C.  392:  309. 
Trosper  v.  Comrs.  of  Saline  Co.,  27 

Kan.   391:    121G. 
Trotier  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

180  111.  471:   897,  931. 
Troutman  v.  Barnes,  4  Met.    (Ky. ) 

337:  519,  1078. 
Trowbridge  v.   Brookline,   144  Mass. 
139:    164,   623. 
V.  Detroit,  99  Mich.  443:   698. 
Troy  V.  Cheshire  R.  R.  Co.,  23  N.  H. 
83:   322,  1551,  1649,  1658,  1060. 
V.  Coleman,  58  Ala.  570:   154,  233, 
1649,  1654. 
Troy  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cleveland,  6 
How.  Pr.  238:   963,  1079. 
V.  Lee,   13  Barb.  169:    1195,  1378. 
V.  Northern  Turnpike  Co.,  16  Barb. 

100:  437,  1119,  1292,  1375. 
V.  Potter,  41  Vt.  265:    1477,  1481. 
Truax    v.    Sterling,    74    Mich.    160: 

1027,  1058,  1358,  1513,  1515. 
Trudeau  v.  Sheldon,  62  Vt.  198:  912. 
True  V.  Freeman,  64  Me.  573:   992, 

1510. 
Truesdale  v.  Peoria  Grape  Sugar  Co., 

101   III.  561:   318,  532,  1581. 
Trustees    v.    Atlanta,    93    Ga.    408: 
744,  789,  824,  986. 
V.  Hoboken,  33  N.  J.  L.  13:   872, 

874,  876,  892,  1494. 
V.  Johnson,  2  Ind.  219:   1638. 
V.  Leary,  89  Hun  219:  1558. 
V.  Metropolitan  District  R.  R.  Co., 

19  L.  T.  N.  S.  692:  1417. 
V.   Milwaukee   etc.   R.   R.    Co.,   77 
Wis.    158:    247,    248,    325,    330, 
622. 
V.  Walsh,  57  III.  363:  1572. 
Trustees    Common    School    Dist.    v. 
Nashville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  Ky. 
L.  R.  243:    1716. 
Trustees  etc..  Matter  of,  1  Barb.  34: 

1533. 
Trustees  etc.  v.  Auburn  &  Rochester 
R.  R.  Co.,  3  Hill  567:  244,  318, 
1635. 
V.  Clark,  137  N.  Y.  95:  1425. 
Trustees  of  Belfast  Academy  v.  Sal- 

mond,  11  Me.  109:  747. 
Trustees  of  College  Point  v.  Dennett, 
5    N.   Y.    Supreme    Court,    217: 
1237. 
Trustees     of     Columbia     College     v. 
Lynch,  70  N.  Y.  440:  429. 
V.  Thatcher,  87  N.  Y.  311:  429. 
Trustees  of  P.  E.  Church  v.  Anamosa, 
76  la.  538:  237. 


Trustees   of   Schools   v.   Schroll,   120 

111.    509:   109,  114. 
Trustees  of  Southampton  v.  Jeasup, 

162  N.  Y.  122:  133. 
Tuckahoe  Canal  Co.  v.  Tuokahoe  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  11  Leigh.    (Va.)    42: 
407,  410,  416,  1155,  1165. 
Tucker's    Petition,    27    N.    H.    405: 

1416. 
Tucker  v.  Campbell,  36  Me.  346 :  954. 
v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  66  Mo. 

App.  141:   152. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  91  Wis. 

576:   1714 
V.  Eden,  68  Vt.  168:  970. 
V.  Eldred,  6  R.  I.  404:  1489. 
V.  Erie  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  27  Pa.  St. 

281:   971,   1446. 
V.    Mass.   Central   R.   R.   Co.,    116 

Mass.  124:   1423. 
V,  Parker,  50  Mich.  5:   1412. 
V.  Rankin,  15  Barb.  471:   1102. 
V.  Russell,   14  Pick.  279:    356. 
V.  Tower,  9  Pick.  109:   1493. 
Tudor  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  164 
111.  73:    1320. 
V.   Chicago   etc.  R.   R.   Co.,    (111.) 
27  N.  E.   915:    825. 
Tufts  V.   Charlestown,   2   Gray  271: 
1267,   1327. 
V.  Charlestown,  4  Gray,  537:  1185, 

1327. 
V.    Charlestown,    117    MasH.    401 : 
1135. 
Tulley  V.  Northfield,  6  111.  App.  356 : 

1372. 
Tunbridge   v.    Tarbell,    19    Vt.    453: 

1073. 
Tuohey  v.  Great  Southern  etc.  R.  R. 

Co.,  10  Irish.  C.  L.  98:   1550. 
Turlev  V.  Oldham,  68  Ind.  114:   1406. 
Turlow  V.  Ross,   144  Mo.   234:    927, 

1100. 
Turner's    Appeal,    2     Walker's     Pa. 

Supm.  Ct.  229:  1073. 
Turner  v.   Althaus,   6   Neb.   54:    10, 
465,  466. 
V.  Dartmouth,   13  Allen  291:    234. 
V.  Detroit,  104  Mich.  320:   464. 
V.  Holleran,  11  Minn.  253:   1423. 
V.  Nye,   154  Mass.  579:    494,   549, 

554,  559,  560. 
V.  Rising  Sun  etc.  Turnpike  Co.,  71 

Ind.  547:  422. 
V.  Robbins,  133  Mass.  207:  1254. 
V.  Sheffield  &  Rotherham  R.  R.  Co., 

10  M.  &  N.  425:   656,  657. 
V.    Stanton,    42    Mich.    506:    860, 

13S3,  1354. 
V.  State,  67  App.  Div.  393:   1228, 
1233. 


cclxxxvi 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.  I,  pp.   1-742 ;   Vol.  II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Turner  v.  Whitehouse,  68  Me.  221: 
996. 
V.  Williams,  10  Wend.  140:   1259, 
1556. 
Turney  v.  So.  Pac.  Co.  44  Ore.  280: 

301. 
Turnpike  Co.  v.  American  etc.  News 
Co.,  43  N.  J.  L.  381:   534,  782, 
980. 
V.  Davidson  County,   3  Tenn.  Ch. 

396:   15,  491. 
V.   Davidson   Co.,    106   Tenn.   258: 

412,  414,  1608. 
V.  News  Co.,  43  N.  J.  L.  381:  340, 

986. 
V.  State,  3  Wall.  210 :  410. 
Turnpike  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  E. 
Co.,  6  Mont.  Co.  L.  R.  121:  782. 
Turnpike  Road,  Matter  of,   18  Phil. 

444:    1396. 
Turnpike   Road   by   Chad's   Ford,   5 

Binney,  481;    1100,  1101,   1103. 
Turnpike  Road  Co.  v.  Brosi,  22  Pa. 
St.  29:   952,  961. 
V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  6  Mont.  Co.  L. 
R.    105:    782. 
Turnquist  v.  Cass  County,  11  N.  D. 

514:  580. 
Turpen  v.  Turlock  Irr.  Dist.  141  Cal. 

1:    144,   1251,   1456. 
Turrell   v.   Norman,    19    Barb.   262: 

1635. 
Tuthill,  Matter  of,  36  App.  Div.  49 : 

508,  570. 
Tuthill,  Matter  of,  163  N.  Y.  133:  22, 
495,  496,  508,  564,  570,  579,  595, 
598. 
Tutt  v.  Port  Royal  &  Augusta  Ry. 
.Co.,  16  S.  C.  365:   831. 
v.  Port  RoyaJ  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  28 
S.   C.   388:   941,   1707,   1708. 
Tuttle  V.   Brush   Electric  Illuminat- 
ing  Co.,    50   N.    Y.    Super.    Ct. 
464:    344. 
V.    Justice,    89    Tenn.    157:    1154, 

1158. 
V.  Knox  Co.,  89   Tenn.   157:    698, 

738. 
V.  Moore,  3  Ind.  Ter.  712:  504,  590. 
Tutwiler  C.  &  I.  Co.  v.  Nichols,  146 

Ala.  364:   69. 
Twelfth  St.  Market  Co.  v.  Philadel- 
phia etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  142  Pa.  St. 
580:   539,  787,  789,   1397,  1399. 
Twenty-eighth    St.,    In   re,    15    Phil. 

350:   700. 
Twenty-eighth   Street  Opening,  Mat- 
ter of,  11  Phila.  436:   1359. 
Twenty-eighth  St.  Sewer,  In  re,   158 

Pa.  St.  464:    1383. 
Twenty-fifth  Street  Opening,  Matter 
pf,  18  Phil,  461;   1466. 


Twenty-fifth  Street  Opening,  Matter 

of,  18  Phil.  488:  1253,  1255. 
Twenty-fifth   St.   Opening,   79   Mich. 

584:    1378. 
Twenty-ninth  St.,  Matter  of,  1  Hill 

189;   190,  367,  1326. 
Twenty-second  Street,  In  re,  102  Pa. 

St.  108:   736,  737,  785. 
Twenty-second  Street,  In  re,  15  Phil. 

409:  736,  737,  785,  789. 
Twenty-second    Street    Extension    in 
*       Columbia,  23  Pa.  St.  346:  817. 
Twenty-sixth  St.  Matter  of,  12  Wend. 

203:    1084. 

Twin  Lakes  H.  G.  M.  S.  v.  Colorado 

M.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  Colo.  1:   1225. 

Twin  Village  Water  Co.  v.  Damaris- 

cotta  Gas  Lt.  Co.,  98  Me.  325: 

359 

Twombly  v.  Madbury,  27  N.  H.  433 : 

1400. 
T.  W.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Morrison,  71 

111.   616:    153,   156. 
Tyler  v.   Beacher,  44  Vt.   648:    495, 
499,  551,  675. 
V.  Bowen,  1  Pitts.  Pa.  225:    1026. 
V.  Columbus,  6  Ohio  C.  C.  224:  916. 
V.  Hudson,  147  Mass.  609:  810. 
V.  Revere,  183  Mass.  98:    157. 
V.  St.  Louis,  56  Mo.  60:   1220. 
V.  State,  83  Ind.  563:   1004,  1006. 
V.  Tehama  County,   109  Cal.  618: 

653. 
V.  Texas  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  73  Tex.  95 : 
1717. 
Tyron  v.  Baltimore  County,  28  Md. 

510:    89. 
Tyrone    v.    Burns,    102    Minn.    318: 

1034,  1036. 
Tyrone  Tp.  School  District's  Appeal, 
1    Monaghan    (Pa.    Supm.    Ct.) 
20:  591,  786. 
Tyrus  v.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
114  Tenn.   579:    155,   156,   1649, 
1655. 
Tyson  v.  Milwaukee,  50  Wis.  78:  615, 
618,  619,  1307,  1308,  1325,  1718. 
v.   Rogers,   33   Ga.    473:    19,   672, 

744. 
V.    Washington    County,    78    Neb. 
211;  739. 

U. 
Uhl  V.  Ohio  Riv.  R.  R.  Co.,  47  W. 
Va.   59:    845,    1485. 
V.  Ohio  River  R.  R.  Co.,  51  W.  Va. 

106:  838,  1481. 
V.  Ohio  Riv.  R.  R.  Co.,  56  W.  Va. 
494:    89,   93,    151,    1639. 
Uhland  Club  v.  Schupback,  168  Mass, 

430;  1556. 
Uhler  v.    Cowen,   192   Pa.   St.   443 1 
1255, 


CASES    CITED. 


cclxxxvii 


tThe  references   are  to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


UWer   V.   Cowen,    199   Pa.    St.    316: 

1255. 
Uhrig  V.  St.  Louis,  44  Mo.  458 :  927. 
Ulbricht  v.   Eufaula   Water   Co.,   86 

Ala.  587:  72,  73,  1603. 
Uline  V.  New  York  Cent.  E.  R.  Co., 

101  N.  Y.  98:    319,   1298,   1552, 

1650,  1656. 
Ullman   v.   Baltimore,   72  Md.   587: 

1004. 
Ulmer  v.  Line  Rock  R.  R.  Co.,  98  Me. 

579:     494,    498,    499,    501,    507, 

533,  1049,  1071. 
Ulster  &  Delaware  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Gross, 

31  Hun  83:   1434,  1437. 
Umatilla    Irr.    Co.    v.    Barnhart,    22 

Ore.  389:  587. 
Unangst's   Appeal,   55   Pa.   St.    128: 

860. 
Uncanoonnuck  Road   Co.  v.  Orr,   67 

N.  H.  541:   849,  858. 
Underhill  v.  Saratoga  &  Washington 

R.  R.  Co.,  20  Barb.  455:   8d9. 
Underwood  v.  Bailey,  56  N.  H.  187: 

1358. 
V.  Bailey,  59  N.  H.  480:  513. 
V.    North   Wayne    Scythe    Co.,    38 

Me.  75:   1345. 
V.  North  Wayne  Scythe  Co.,  41  Me. 

291:   1522. 
V.  Worcester,  177  Mass.  173:   211, 

324,  606. 
Uniacke  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  67 

Wis.  108:  1225,  1321. 
Union  Barb  Wire  Co.  v.  Chicago  etc. 

R.   R.   Co.,   79    la.   614:    322. 
Union  Bridge  Co.  v.  United  States, 

204  U.  S.  364:    488. 
Union  Canal  Co.  v.  Keiser,  19  Pa.  St. 

134:   1419,  1711. 
V.  Landis,  9  Watts  228:    104,  108. 
V.  LaSalle,   136  111.   119:    1496. 
V.  O'Brien,  4  Rawle,  358:   991. 
V.  Woodside,  11  Pa.  St.  176:  928. 
Union  Co.  v.  Peckham,  16  R.  I.  64: 

878. 
Union  Depot  etc.  Co.  v.  Brunswick, 

31  Minn.  297:  125,  127,  128,  129, 

131,  1231,  1235,  1329. 
Union  Depot   Co.   v.   Frederick,    117 

Mo.    138:    928,   964,    1029,    1115, 

1511,   1512. 
Union  Depot  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Southern  R. 

R.   Co.,   105   Mo.   562:    426,   761, 

764,  1283. 
Union  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter  of,  112 

N.  Y.  61:  1005,  1011,  1048. 
Union  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter  of,  113 

N.  Y.   275:    672,  677,   679,   684, 

709,   1061,   1062,  1063,   1066. 
Union  Elec.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  Apple- 
quest,    JP4   111.   App.   517;    338, 

1593, 


Union  Elevator  Co.  v.  K.  C.  Subur- 
ban   R.    R.    Co.,    135    Mo.    353: 
1123,  1211. 
Union  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  Matter  of,  53 

Barb.  457:    1315. 
Union  Ferry   Co.,  Matter  of,   98  N. 

Y.  139:   687,  814,  824,  1068. 
Union    Institution    for    Savings    v. 
Boston,  129  Mass.  82:   948,  949. 
Union  Mut  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Slee,  123 

111.   57:  .928. 
Union  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Benson,  19 
Colo.  285:   639,  647,  1294,  1295, 
1335. 
v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  1  McCrary 

452:   765. 
v.  Burlington  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Mc- 
Crary 452:   1102. 
V.  Burlington  &  Missouri  Riv.  R. 

R.  Co.,  19  Neb.  386:  1079. 
V.  Colo.  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  30 
Colo.    133:    534,   713,    773,    799, 
1285. 
V.  Dyche,  31  Kan.  120:  87,  1476. 
V.  Foley,   19  Colo.  280:    639,  647, 

1294,  1295,  1335. 
V.  Hall,  91  U.  S.  343:  727. 
V.  Harris,  76  Kan.  255:   431. 
V.    Kindred,    43    Kan.    134:     750, 

1078,   1479,   1513,   1571,   1609. 
V.    Leavenworth    etc.    Ry.    Co.,   29 

Fed.  728:  765,  1005,  1046. 
V.  Mason  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  128 
Fed.  230:   761. 
Union  Passenger  Ry.  Co.  v.  Continen- 
tal Ry.   Co.,   11   Phil.   321:    416, 
427,  755,   762,   764. 
Union    Railroad    Transfer    &    Stock 
Yard  Co.  v.  More,  80  Ind.  458: 
1245. 
Union  R.   R.   Co.   v.   Cambridge,    11 

Allen  287 :  492. 
'  v.  Canton  R.  R.  Co.,  105  Md.  12  r 
717. 
V.  Phila.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  188  Pa.  St. 

115:  771. 
V.    Chicasaw  Cooperage    Co.,     116 

Tenn.  594:  422,  1495. 
v.    Hunton,   114   Tenn.   609:    1138, 

1151,    1260. 
V.    Raine,    114    Tenn.    569:     1244, 

12,50,  1314,  1332,  1446. 
V.   Standard   Wheel   Co..   149   Fed. 
698:    1391,  1674,   1680. 
Union  R.  R.  T.  &  S.  Y.  Co.  v.  Moore, 

80  Ind.  458:  1118,  1331. 
Union  Springs  v.  Jones,  58  Ala.  654: 

233,    1251. 
Union  Steamboat  Co.,  39  Fed.  723: 

1272,  1613. 
Union  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hazelton  etc. 
K.  R,  Co,,  134  Pa,  St.  423:  1631. 


cclxxxviii 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references   are  to  the  pages:   toI.   I,   pp.   1-742;   vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719] 


Union   Street  Vacation,   In  re,   140 

Pa.   St.   525:    400,   402. 
Union  Terminal  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Board  of 

E.  E.  Comrs.  54  Kan.  352:  1106. 
V.   Peet   Bros.  Mfg.    Co.,   58   Kan. 

197:  1211,  1241. 
Union  Township  Eoad,  10  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

433:  399,  400. 
Union    Traction    Co.    v.    Basey,    164 

Ind.  249:    1430. 
V.   Pfeil,   39   Ind.   App.   51:    1192, 

1445. 
Union  Trust  Co.  v.  Atchison  etc.  Ey. 

Co.,  8  N.  M.  327:  775. 
Union   Tp.   Eoad,   29  Pa.   Siipr.   Ct. 

573:  970,  1101,  1381. 
Union  Tp.  Private  Eoad,  14  Pa.  Co. 

Ct.   436:    1018. 
United  Eailroad  &  Canal  Co.  v.  Wel- 

don,  47  N.  J.  L.  59: 
V.  Jersey  City,  71  N.  J.  L.  80:  358. 
United  N.  J.  E.  E.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Lewis, 

68  N.  J.  Eq.  437:    1549. 
V.   MeCuIley,   68    N.   J.   Eq.   442: 

1549. 
V.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  33  N.  J.  Eq. 

1£3:  777. 
V.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  35  N.  J.  Eq. 

123:    1609. 
United  States  v.  Alexander,   148  U. 

S.    186:    164. 
v.  Ames,  1  W.  &  M.  76:  702,  746. 
V.  Baltimore  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  27  App. 

Cas  D.   C.   105:    677,  814. 
V.  Bloclc  121,  3  Biss.  208:   931. 
V.  Central  Pac.  E.  E.  Co.,  118  U. 

S.  235:  594. 
V.   Certain   Lands,    112   Fed.   622: 

430. 
V.   Certain   Lands,   140   Fed.   463: 

183. 
V.   Certain  Lands,    145   Fed.   654: 

677. 
V.    Certain   Land,    165    Fed.    783: 

780,   933. 
V.  Chicago,  7  How.  185:  746. 
V.  Choctaw  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  3  Oltla. 

404:   957. 
V.   Cooper,   9  Mackey,  D.   C.   104: 

8,  539,  738,  1673. 
V.  Cooper,  21  Supm.  Ct.  D.  C.  491 : 

1442. 
V.  Cooper,  21  Supm.  Ct.  D.  C.  605 : 

1673. 
V.  Diekelman,  92  U.  S.  520:   19. 
V.    Dumplin   Island,    1    Barb.    24: 

959,  1358. 
V.  Engeman,  45  Fed.  546:   933. 
V.  Engeman,  46  Fed.  176:  926. 
V.    Engeman,   46   Fed.   898:    1325, 

1444. 


United  States  t.  Freemen,  113  Fed. 
370:   1147. 

V.  Fox,  94  U.  S.  315 :  672. 

V.  Gettysburg  Electric  E.  E.  Co., 

67  Fed.  869:   541. 
V.   Gettysburg  Electric  E.  R.   Co., 

160  U.   S.   688:    499,   541,   543, 

814. 
V.  Harris,  1  Sumner  21:   198,  687, 

1502. 
V.    Honolulu   Plantation    Co.,    122 

Fed.  581:  1228,  1230,  1231. 
V.  Illinois  Cent.  E.  E.  Co.,  2  Biss. 

174:  420,  1494,  1618. 
V.  111.  Central  E.  E.  Co.,  154  U.  S. 

225:  873,  892,  1618. 
V.  Jones,  109  U.  S.  513:  21,  927, 

932,   1005,   1010. 
V.   Land  in  Monterey  County,   47 

Cal.   515:    1348. 
V.  Lynch,  188  U.  S.  445:  92,  100, 

144,  743,   1547. 
V.  Merriam,  161  Fed.  303:  1637. 
V.    Monongahela    Bridge    Co.,    160 

Fed.  712:  491. 
V.  Nahant,  136  Fed.  273:   1340. 
V.    Nahant,    153    Fed.    520:     462, 

1175,  1340,  1346. 
V.  Oregon  Ey.  &  Nav.  Co.,  9  Saw- 
yer 61:  931,  991. 
V.  Parkersburg  Branch  E.  E.  Co., 

143  Fed.  224:   488. 
V.  Eailroad  Bridge  Co.,  6  McLean 

517:    745. 
V.  Eauers,  70  Fed.  748:  673,  680. 
V.  Eeid,  56  Mo.  565:  897,  1384. 
V.  Eio  Grande  Dam  &  Irr.  Co.,  174 

U.  S.   690:    69,   169. 
V.  Eoss,  92  U.  S.  281 :  19. 
V.  Sargent,  162  Fed.  81:   1321. 
V.  Seufert  Bros.  Co.,  78  Fed.  520: 

1237. 
V.  Seufert  Bros.  Co.,  87  Fed.  35: 

1379. 
V.  Smith,  110  Fed.  338:    ]347. 
V.    Suprs.    of    Summit,    1    Pinney, 

566:   1086,  1515. 
V.  Taffee,  78  Fed.  524:  1237. 
V.  Taffee,  86  Fed.  830:   1243. 
v.  Tennant,  93  Fed.  613:  933,  1386. 
V.  Tract  of  Land,  70  Fed.  940 :  542. 
V.  Union  Bridge  Co.,  143  Fed.  377 : 

488. 
V.  Union  Pac.  Ey.  Co.  160  U.  S.  1 : 
,     775. 
United  States  Freehold  L.  &  E.  Co. 

V.  Gallegos,  89  Fed.  769:   1603. 
United  States     Gypsnm   Co.  v.  Oir 

cuit  Judge,  150  Mich.  668:  1395. 
United  States'  Petition,  67  How.  Pr 

121:  543. 


CASES    CITED. 


cclxxxix 


[The  references  are   to  the  pages:  Vol.   I,  pp.   1-743;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


United    States,    Petition,    96    N.    Y. 

227:   543. 
United  States  Pipe  Line  Co.  v.  Dela- 
ware etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  62  N.  J.  L. 

254:  838. 
United  Traction  Co.  v.  Ferguson  Con- 
struction Co.,  117  App.  Div.  305: 

1569. 
University  of  Minnesota  v.  St.  Paul 

&  Northern  Pacific  Ry.   Co.,   36 

Minn.  447:  747. 
Updegrafl"  v.  Palmer,   107  Ind.  181: 

934,  971,  1028,  1384. 
Updegrave  v.  Penn.  S.  V.  R.  R.  Co., 

132  Pa.  St.  540:  846. 
V.  Schuylkill  Val.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Pa. 

Co.  Ct.  74:   1073. 
Updike  V.  Wright,  81  111.  49:  722. 
Upham   V.    Marsh,    128    Mass.    546: 

1491. 
V.  Worcester,  113  Mass.  97:   1185. 
Upper  Appomattox  Co.  v.  Hardings, 

11  Gratt.  1:  965. 
Upper  Cons  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Parsons,  66 

N.  H.  181:  1408. 
Upper  Derby  Tp.  Road,  15  Pa.  Supr. 

Ct.   652:    1363,   1407. 
Upper  Fairfield  Tp.  Road,  11  Pa.  Co. 

Ct.  396:   1017. 
Upper  Hanover  Road,  2  Luzerne  Leg. 

Reg.  Rep.  179:  1105. 
Upper  Hanover  Road,  44  Pa.  St.  277: 

1026. 
Upper  Ten-Mile  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Braden, 

172  Pa.  St.  460:    1493. 
Uppington  v.  New  York,  165  N.  Y. 

222:   443. 
Uptagraff    v.    Smith,    106    la.    385: 

1492. 
Upton  V.  South  Branch  Reading  R.  R. 

Co.,  8  Cush.  600:   1146,  1185. 
Uren  v.   Walsh,   57   Wis.   98:    1570, 

1574. 
Utah  V.    Daniels,    6   Utah   288:    24, 

465. 
Utica  etc.  R.   R.  Co.  Matter  of,  56 

Barb.    456:     1119,     1124,     1126, 

1196. 
Utica,  In  re,   (Hun)   26  N.  Y.  Supp. 

564:   786. 
Utley  V.  Wilmington  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

119  N.  C.  720:    1713. 
Utter  V.   Richmond,    112   N.  Y.   610: 

948,   949,   1563. 
Uwchlan  Tp.  Road,  30  Pa.  St.  156: 

696. 

V. 
Vacation  of  Certain  Streets,  Matter 

of,  17  Phil.  660 :  400. 
Vail  V.  Fall  Creek  Turnpike  Co.,  32 

Ind.   198:    1410. 
T.  Mix,  74  111.  127 :  866. 


Vail  V.  Morris  &  Essex  R.  R.  Co.,  21 

N.  J.  L.   189:   969,  1360. 
Vaile  V.  Independence,  116  Mo.  333 

634,  1353. 
Vale  Mills  v.  Nashua,  63  N.  H.  42 

83,  84. 
Valentine  v.   Boston,   20  Pick.   201 

930,  1425. 
V.  Boston,  22  Pick.  75:  1326. 
Valley  City  Salt  Co.  v.  Brown,  7  W. 

Va.   191:    495,  563. 
Valley  Ry.   Co.  v.  Bohm,  Admr.,  29 

Ohio    St.    633:    965. 
v.  Franz,  43   Ohio   St.  623:    1552, 

1651,  1652,  1715,  1716. 
Valparaiso  v.  Adams,  123  Ind.  250: 

602,  616. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  E.  R.  Co.,  123  Ind. 

467:    750. 
V.  Hazen,  153  Ind.  337:   82,  1605. 
v.  Keyes,  30  Ind.  App.  447 :  141. 
V.  Parker,   148  Ind.  379:    1384. 
v.   Spaeth,    166  Ind.    14:    154,   210, 

233,  234. 
Valparaiso  City  Water  Co.  v.  Dick- 
over,    17    ind.    App.    233:     137, 

1650. 
Van  Allen  v.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co., 

144  N.  Y.   174:    1663. 
Van    Auken    v.    Commissioners,    27 

Mich.  414:    1033. 
Van  Benthan  v.  Board  of  Comrs.,  49 

Kan.   30:    1316. 
Vanblaricum  v.  State,  7  Blackf .  209 : 

1192,  1245. 
Van  Bokelen   v.   Brooklyn   City   Ry. 

Co.,  5  Blatch.  379:  268. 
Van  Brunt  v.  Flatbush,  59  Hun  192 : 

172,   176,  333,  336. 
V.   Flatbush,    128   N.   Y.   50:    172, 

176,    336. 
Van  Buren  v.  Fishkill  W.  W.  Co.,  50 

Hun  448:   74,  1272. 
Van    Buskirk   v.    Harrod,    48   Mich. 

258:    1032. 
Vance  v.  Martin,  21  W.  Va.  534:  505. 
Van  Cleve  v.  Passaic  Val.  Sewerage 

Comrs.,  71  N.  J.  L.  183:  739. 
Vandalia  Coal  Co.  v.  Indianapolis  etc. 

Ry.  Co.,  168  Ind.  144:  977,  1046. 
Vanderbilt  v.  Adams,  7  Cow.  349:  14. 
Vanderbilt  Ave.,  Matter  of,  95  App. 

Div.  533:   364,  403. 
Vanderbright  v.  Delaware  R.  R.  Co., 

2  Houst.  Del.  287:    1343. 
Vanderburgh     v.     Minneapolis,      93 

Minn.   81:    399,   406,    1595. 
V.  Minneapolis,  98  Minn.  329:  373, 

382,  383,  388,  391,  399,  406. 
Vanderhurst    v.    Tholcke,    113    Cal. 

147:   348. 


ccxo 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :  Vol.   I,  pp.   1-743  ;  Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Vanderlip  v.  Grand  Rapids,  73  Mich. 
522:   67,  231,  1569,   1574,   1576, 
1602. 
Vandermulen    v.    Vandermulen,    108 

N.   Y.   195:    1259. 
Vandersllce  v.   Philadelphia,   7   Out. 
102:    1140. 
V.  Philadelphia,  103  Pa.  St.   102: 
143. 
Vanderstolph  v.  Highway  Conir.,  50 

Mich.  330:    1414. 
Van  de  Vere  v.  Kansas  City,  107  Mo. 
83:  657,  659,  664,  665,  666,  669, 
670. 
Vanduser  v.  Comstock,  3  Mass.  184: 

976,  1073. 
Van    Egmond    v.    Seaforth,    6    Ont. 

599:   69,  81,  83,   1605. 
Van  Emburgh  v.  Paterson  etc.  Trac- 
tion Co.,   70  N.  J.  L.  668:    690, 
696,  697,  1395,  1397. 
Van  Hoozier  v.  Hannibal  etc.  R.  R. 

Co.,  70  Mo.  145:    1650,  1652. 
Vanhorn  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  R.  Co., 

18  U.  C.  Q.  B.  356:   158. 
Van  Home  v.   Newark   Pass.   R.   R. 
Co.,  48  N.  J.  Eq.  332:   201,  268, 
297,   314,   315,   332,   1586,   1587, 
1589. 
Van  Home's  Lessee  v.   Dorranee,   2 

Dall.   304:    590. 
Van  Husan  v.  Heames,  91  Mich.  519: 

874. 
Van  Husen  v.  Omaha  Bridge  etc.  Co., 

.     118  la.  366:   1226. 
Van  Orsdol  v.  B.  C.  R.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 

56  la.  470:  1551. 
Van  Rennselaer  v.  Albany,  2  How. 
Pr.  N.  S.  42:   1606. 
V.  Albany,  15  Abb.  N.  C.  457 :  1606. 
Van  Riper  v.  Essex  Road  Board,  38 

N.  J.  L.  23:   608,  1246,  1453. 
Van  Schoick  v.  Delaware  &  Hudson 
Canal  Co.,  20  N.  J.  L.  249 :  1446, 
1451. 
Van  Siclen  v.  Jamaica  Elec.  Lt.  Co., 
45   App.   Div.    1:    350. 
V.  Jamaica  Elec.  Lt.  Co.,  168  N.  Y 
650:   350. 
Van  Steenburgh  v.  Bigelow,  3  Wend. 

43:    1103,    1516. 
Vantilburgh  v.   Shann,   24  N.  J.   L. 

740:   1004,  1013. 
Van  Valkenburgh  v.  Milwaukee,  43 

Wis.   574:    1685,   1896. 
Van  Veghten  v.  Hudson  Riv.  Power 
Transmission  Co.,  103  App.  Div. 
133:    1653. 
Van  Vorst,  Heirs  of.  Ex  parte,  2  N. ' 
J.  Eq.  292:   1534. 


Van  Wagner  v.  Central  N.  E.  &  W.  R. 

R.  Co.,  80  Hun  278:  1459. 
Van  Wanning  v.  Deeter,  78  Neb.  284: 

867,   1569. 
Vanwickle  v.  Camden  &  Ambry  R.  R. 

Co.,  14  N.  J.  L.  162:  1097,  1377. 
Van  Witsen  v.  Gutman,  79  Md.  405: 

368,  373,  382,  389,  395,  398, 494, 

498,  673,  877. 
Van  Wycklen  v.  Brooklyn,  118  N.  Y. 

424:    77. 
Varick  v.  Smith,  5  Paige,  137:   522 
Varner  v.  Martin,  21   W.  Va.  534: 

495,  499,  502,  505,  516,  517,  551. 
V.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  55  la. 

677:   851,  855,   1539. 
Vartie  v.  Underwood,  18  Barb.  561: 

946. 
Varwig  v.  Cleveland  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

6  Ohio  C.  C.  439:  308,  327,  732. 
Vasselborough,  Inhabitants  of,  19  Me. 

338:    514,    1100,    1417. 
Vaugh  V.  Wetherell,  116  Mass.  138: 

948. 
Vaughn  v.  Lewis,  89  Va.  187:  879. 
Vauneman  v.  Young,  3  Am.  R.  R.  & 

Corp.  Rep.  662:    1048. 
Vausandt    v.    Weir,    109    Ala.    224: 

883. 
Vawter   v.    Gilliland,    55    Ind.    278: 

1368. 
Veamans  v.  County  Comrs.,  16  Gray 

36:   1367. 
Veazie  v.  Dwinel,  50  Me.  479 :  1495. 
Veazie    v.    Mayo,    45    Me.    560:    487, 

780. 
Vedder   v.   Marion    County,   22   Ore. 

264:    982,   1025. 
T.  Marion  County,  28  Ore.  77:  993, 

1057. 
V.  Marion  Co.,  (Ore.)  36  Pac.  535: 

1374. 
Velte  V.  United  States,  76  Wis.  278 : 

92,    1319. 
Venable   v.   Wabash  Western   R.   R. 

Co.,  112  Mo.  103:  943,  945. 
Venard  v.   Cross,   8  Kan.  248:    549. 

779,  1033. 
Venice  v.  Madison  Co.  Ferry  Co.,  216 

111.   345:    888,   891. 
Venner  v.  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.,  236 

111.   349:   361. 
Ventura   Co.   v.    Thompson,   51    Cal. 

577:    1206. 
Verdier  v.  Port  Royal  R.  R.  Co.,  15 

S.  C.  477:   858. 
Verdugo   Cafion   Water   Co.   v.   Ver- 

dugo,  152  Cal.  655:   162. 
Verga   v.   Miller,   45   N.   J.   Eq.   93, 
1577. 


OASES    CITED. 


CCXCl 


[The  references  are  to  the   pages :  Vol.   I,  pp.   1-743  ;   Vol.  II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Veimilyn   v.    Chicago,   Milwuakee  & 

St.  Paul  Ry.  Co.,  66  la.  606:  861, 

1481. 
Vermont  v.  Miller,  161  111.  210:  874. 
Vermont  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bax- 
ter,  22   Vt.   365:    688. 
Vermont  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Co.  Comrs., 

10  Cush.   12:    1643. 
Vernon  Irr.  Co.  v.  Los  Angeles,  106 

Cal    237  •   76 
Vernon  Park",   163  Pa.  St.   70:   734, 

1397. 
Vernon  Shell  Road  Co.  v.  Savannah, 

95  Ga.  387:    1149. 
Verona  v.  Allegheny  Valley  R.  R.  Co., 

152   Pa.    St.    368:    869. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  187  Pa.  St.  358: 

698. 
Verona's    Appeal,    108    Pa.    St.    83: 

1570,  1579. 
Versailles  Tp.  Road,  4  Brews.  Pa.  57 : 

1058,   1367. 
Vice  V.  Eden,  113  Ky.  255:  519,  521, 

1058,    1059. 
Viek  V.  Rochester,  46  Hun  607:  1612. 
Vickers  v.  Durham,  132  N.  C.  880: 

1614. 
Vieksburg  v.  Herman,  72  Miss.  211: 

630,  659,  664,  670,  1306,  1307. 
V.  Marshall,  59  Miss.  563:    1491. 
V.  Vieksburg  W.  W.  Co.,  202  U.  S. 

453:  412,  416. 
V.  Vieksburg  Water  Co.,  206  XJ.  S. 

496:    481,    482. 
Vieksburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Barrett, 

67  Miss.  579:    835. 
V.    Calderwood,    15    La.    An.    481 : 

1206. 
T.  Dillard,  35  La.  An.  1045:   1183, 

1310. 
Viebahn  v.  Crow  Wing  Co.,  96  Minn. 

276:    133. 
Viele  V.  Troy  &  Boston  R.  R.  Co.,  20 

N.  Y.   184:   1116. 
Viers    et    al..    Petitioners,    Tappan 

Ohio  56:   1707,  1709. 
Vigeant  v.   Marlborough,    175  Mass. 

459:  606. 
Vilas  V.  Milwaukee  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  15 

Wis.   233:    1579. 
V.    Milwaukee    etc.    Ev.     Co.,     17 

Wis.  497:    1544. 
Vilhac  V.  Stockton  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  53 

Cal.  208:   1162,  1170,  1472. 
Viliski  V.  Minneapolis,  40  Minn.  304 : 

1489,   1490,  1491. 
Vincennes  v.  Richards,  23  Ind.  381: 

234. 
Vinegar  Bend  L.   Co.  v.   Oak  Grove 

etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  89  Miss.  84 :  1040, 

1041,  1624. 


Vinegar  Bend  L.   Co.  v.  Oak  Grove 

etc.    R.    R.    Co.,    89   Missi.    117: 

1040,  1041,  1624. 
Virginia-Carolina  Ry.  Co.  v.  Booker, 

99  Va.  633:  936,  965,  1561. 
Virginia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Elliott,  5 

Nev.  358:   923,  927,  1228,  1231, 

1378. 
V.  Henry,  8  Nev.  165:   1174,  1177, 

1379. 
V.  Lovejoy,  8  Nev.  100:  731,  1329. 
V.  Lynch,  13  Nev.  92:  255. 
Visscher  v.  Hudson  River  R.  R.  Co., 

15  Barb.  37:    1393. 
Voegtly  V.  Pittsburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  2 

Grant's    Cas.    243:    1255. 
Vogle   V.    Bridges,    15   Ky.   L.    R.    6: 

1365. 
V.    Bridges    (Ky.)     22    S.    W.    82: 

1095,  1364. 
Vogt  V.  Bexor  Co.,  5  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

272:     1005,     1018,     1032,     1158, 

1513. 
V.  Grinnell,  123  la.  332:  84,  1650, 

1654,   1661. 
V.  Grinnell,  133  la.  363:   84,  1650, 

1654. 
Voight   V.   Detroit,    123   Mich.    547: 

463. 
Volmer  v.   Schuylkill  Riv.   E.   S.  R. 

R.   Co.,   18  iPhil.  248:    717. 
Vorhes  v.  Ackley,  127  la.  658:   891. 
Voris  V.  Pittsburg  PI.  Glass  Co.,  163 

Ind.  599:    11. 
Vorrath  v.  Hoboken,  49  N.  J.  L.  285 : 

608. 
Vose  V.  Newport  St.  R.  R.   Co.,   17 

R.    L    134:    621. 
Vossen  v.  Dantel,  116  Mo.  379:   881. 
Vought  V.   Columbus  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

58  Ohio  St.  123:  424,  808,  1503. 
Vreeland  v.  Bayonne,  54  N.  J.  L.  488 : 

1086. 
Vyner  v.  Hoglake  R.  R.  Co.,  17  W. 

R.   92:    851. 
Vyse  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  126 

la.  90:   92,  169. 

W. 

Wabash  v.  Alber,  88  Ind.  428:   602. 

V.  Defiance,   52  Ohio  St.  262:   238. 

Wabash  &  Erie  Canal  v.  Spears,  16' 

Ind.  441:  91. 
Wabash    etc.   R.   R.    Co.    v.    Illinois, 
118  U.  S.  557:  480,  482. 
V.   McDougall,    118   111.   229:    937, 

1246. 
V.  McDougall,   126   III.    Ill:    1195, 

1201,  1243,  1246,  1249. 
V.  Sanders,  47  111.  App.  436:    152, 
1639. 


ccxcn 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-743  ;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Wabash  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cincinnati  etc. 
R.    R.    Co.,    29    Ind.    App.    546: 
1399. 
V.  Coon  Run  D.  &  L.  Dist.,  194  111. 

310:    924. 
V.    Ft.    Wayne    etc.    Traction    Co., 
161  Ind.  295:   1619. 
Wabaunsee    Co.    Comrs.    v.    Muhlen- 

baeker,  18  Kan.  129:  973,  974. 
Waddell's  Appeal,  84  Pa.  St.  90 :  495, 

519,  520,  534,  563. 
Waddell  v.  New  York,  8  Barb.   95: 

211,  213,  238. 
WaddyV.  Johnson,  5  Ired.  L.  333: 

1277. 
Wade  V.  Carolina  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  147 
N.  C.  219:  339,  1119,  1122,  1123, 
1546. 
V.  Hennessey,  55  Vt.  207 :  829,  947, 
962,  1564. 
Wadham    v.    Northeastern    Ry.    Co., 
14  L.  R.   Q.  B.  747:   645. 
V.  Northeastern  R.  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  16 
Q.  B.  D.  227:    1232. 
Wadhams  v.  Lackawanna  etc.  R.  R. 

Co.,  42  Pa.  St.  303:   1467. 
Wadleigh    v.    Oilman,    12    Me.    403: 

468. 
Wadsworth    v.    Smith,    11    Me.    278: 
103. 
V.  Tillotson,  15  Conn.  365:   70. 
V.  Union  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  Colo. 
600:    475. 
Waffle   V.   New  York   Central   R.   R. 
Co.,  58  Barb.  413:  101. 
V.  New  York  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  53 
N.  Y.  11:   161,  1472. 
Wager  v.  Troy  Union  R.  R.  Co.,  25 

N.  Y.  526:  247,  315,  1630. 
Waggeman  v.  North  Peoria,  155  111. 
545:  879,  1195,  1216. 
V.  North  Peoria,  160  111.  277:   881. 
V.  North  Peoria,  41  111.  App.  132: 
881,  884,  885. 
Waggoner  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  185 

111.    154:    842,   843,   855,   1627. 
Wagner  v.   Cleveland  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
22  Ohio  St.  5e.3 :   1506. 
V.  Gage  County,  3  Neb.  237:   1179. 
V.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Hun 

633:   157. 
V.    Milwaukee    County,    112    Wis. 

601:    738. 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  79  Hun 

445:    1296. 
T.   Railway    Co.,    38    Ohio   St.    32: 
1461,  1569. 
Wainwright  v.  Ramsden,  5  M.  &  W. 

602:     1260. 
Waite  V.  Drainage  District,  226  111. 
207:   1019.  ' 


Waite   V.    Port   Reading   R.   R.    Co., 

48  N.  J.'Eq.  346:    1462. 
Wakefield  v.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  R. 

Co.,  63  Me.  385:   1107. 
V.  Newell,  12  R.  I.  75:  234. 
Wakeman   v.   New   York   etc.   R.   R. 

Co.,  35  N.  J.  Eq.  496 :  844. 
Walbridge  v.  Cabot,  67  Vt.  114:  1009, 

1018,  1360. 
V.  Russell  Co.,  74  Kan.  341 :  1328. 
Waldmuller   v.    Brooklyn   El.   R.   R. 

Co.,   40   App.   Div.   N.   Y.   242: 

1585. 
Waldron  v.  Haverhill,  143  Mass.  582 : 

454. 
Waldrop  v.  Greenwood  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

28  S.  C.  157:  158. 
Walker  v.   Board  of   Public   Works, 

16  Ohio  540:  74,  97,  104. 
V.   Boston,   8   Cush,   279:    1128. 
V.   Boston   &  Maine   R.   R.   Co.,   3 

Cush.    1:    1087. 
V.  Caywood,  31  N.  Y.  51:  422. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  57  Mo. 

275:    1626. 
V.  City  Council,  1  Bailey  Ch.    (S. 

C.)    443:    1640. 
V.    Corn,    3    A.    K.   Marshall    167: 

1004,  1017. 
V.    Eastern    Counties    Ry.    Co.,    6 

Harr.  594:  1700. 
V.    Ga.    Pac.    R.    R.    Co.,    1    Miss. 

Dec.    1:    748,   1071. 
V.  Lickens,   24  Mo.   298:    1636. 
V.    London   &    Blackwall   Rv.   Co., 

3  A.  &  E.  N.  S.  744:   823. 
V.   Mad   River   etc.    R.    R.    Co.,   8 

Ohio,   38:    824,   1576. 
V.  Manchester,  58  N.  H.  438:   1326. 
V.   Old   Colony  &   Newport   R.   R. 

Co.,  103  Mass.  10:  61,  158,  1310. 
V.    Oxford    Woolen    Mfg.    Co.,    10 

Met.   203:    937. 
V.  Sedalia,  74  Mo.  App.  70:   630, 

1308,   1549. 
V.   Shasta    Power    Co.,     160    Fed. 

856:    499,   536,   594. 
v.  So.  Chester  R.  R.  Co.,  174  Pa. 

St.  291:   1201. 
V.  United  States,   106  U.  S.  413: 

19. 
V.  Ware,  H.  &  B.  Ry.  Co.,  35  L.  J. 

Eq.  94:    1537,  1540,   1541. 
V.  Winkler,  60  N.  J.  L.   105:   973, 

1420. 
Wallace   v.  Alvord,   39  Ga.   609:    19. 
V.    Ann   Arbor    etc.    Ry.    Co.,    121 

Mich.   588:    855. 


CASES    CITED. 


CCXClll 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:  Vol.   I,  pp.   1-743;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Wallace  v.  (Columbia  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
34  S.  C.  62:   93. 
V.  Columbia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  37  S. 

C.   335:    92. 
V.  Grand  Trunk  R.  R.  Co.,  16  U. 

C.  Q.  B.  551:   158. 
V.  Jefferson  Gas   Co.,   147   Pa.   St. 

205:    1331. 
V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  47 
Mo.    App.    491:    180,    224,    1549, 
1649,   1656,  1660. 
V.    Karlenowefski,    19    Barb.    118: 

1156. 
V.    New    Castle    Northern    R.    Co., 

138  Pa.  St.  168:    1466. 
V.    Richmond,    94    Va.    204:     485, 

673. 
V.  Shellton,  14  La.  Ann.  503:   12. 
Wallach  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

Ill    App.   Div.   273:    257. 
Waller   v.  Martin,   17    B.   Mon.    181: 
1159,    1160,    1636. 
V.  McConnell,  19  Wis.  417 :  976. 
Walley  v.  Platte  &  D.  Ditch  Co.,  15 

Colo.  579:  356,  643. 
Wallman  v.  R.  Connor  Co.,  115  Wis. 

617:    5^3,    516. 
Wall  Street,  Matter  of,  17  Barb.  617: 

1705. 
Walnut   St.   Bridge,   In  re,    191    Pa.. 

St.   153:    635. 
Walnut  St.  Opening,  7  Luzerne  Leg. 

Reg.   Rep.   502:    1029. 
Walpole  V.  Mass.  Chemical  Co.,  192 

Mass.   66:    1003,   1619. 
Walrath  v.  Redfleld,  18  N.  Y.  457: 

1323. 
Walsh  V.  Board  of  Education,  73  N. 
J.  L.  643:  1119,  1130,  1676,  1684. 
V.  Brooklyn  Union  El.  R.  R.  Co., 

69   App.   Div.   380:    1584. 
V.    Milwaukee,    95    Wis.    16:    212, 

224. 
V.    Scranton,    23    Pa.    Super.    Ct. 

276:   373,  382,  394,  647. 
V.  Wallace,  26  Nev.  299:   70. 
Walston   V.   Nevin,    128   U.    S.    578: 

14. 
Waltemeyer    v.    Wisconsin    etc.    Ry. 

Co.,  71  la.  026:   1135. 
Walter    v.    County    Comrs.,    35    Md. 

385:    234. 
Walters   v.   Houck,   7   la.   72:    1091, 
1094,   1377. 
V.   St.   Louis,    132   Mo.    1:    227. 
Walther  v.   Chicago  etc.   R.  R.   Co., 
215   111.   456:    655,   1613. 
V.  Warner,  25  Mo.  277:   434,  1166, 
1169,   1171. 
Waltmeyer  v.  Wisconsin,  la.  &  Neb. 
Ry.    Co.,    64    la.    688:     1405. 


Walton    V.    Norman,    102    Ky.    114: 

1407. 
Wamesit    Power    Co.    v.    Allen,    120 

Mass.    352:    706,    1514,    1634. 
Ward  V.   Albemarle   etc.   R.   R.   Co., 

112   N.   C.    168:    1454. 
V.   Folly,  5  N.  J.  L.  482:    865. 
V.  Marietta  etc.  Co.,  6  Ohio  St.  15: 

1493. 
V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  82 

Hun  545:    849,  856. 
V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  152 

N.  Y.  39:   1354. 
V.    Minnesota   &   Northwestern   R. 

R.  Co.,   119  111.  287:   898,  1047, 

1048. 
V.   Newton,    181    Mass.    432:    1414, 

1415,   1418. 
V.    Peck,    49    N.    J.    L.    42:    438, 

1156. 
V.  State,   12  Lea  469:    1506. 
V.  Triple  State  Nat.  Gas  &  Oil  Co., 

115   Ky.    723:    337,   837,   838. 
Warden   v.    Madisonville   etc.    R.   R. 

Co.,    31    Ky.    L.    R.    234:     990, 

1047,     1049,    1059,     1060,     1066. 
V.  Philadelphia,   167   Pa.  St.  523: 

1236,  1270. 
Ware  v.  County  Comrs.,  38  Me.  492: 

1017. 
V.   Regents   Canal    Co.,   3   DeG.    & 

J.  212:   653. 
Warfel  v.  Cochran,  34  Pa.  St.  381: 

89,    1603. 
Waring  v.   Cherew  &  Darlington   R. 

R.  Co.,  16  S.  C.  416:   1707,  1708. 

V.  Little  Rock,   02  Ark.   408:    864. 

Warlick  v.  Lowman,   101  N.  C.  548: 

1406. 
V.    Lowman,   103   N.    C.    122,   516, 

522,   976,    1076. 
V.    Lowman,    104   N.   C.    403:    516, 

522. 
V.   Lowman,   111   N.  C.   532:    1070. 
Warne   v.   Baker,   24   111.   351:    973, 

1400. 
V.   Baker,    35    111.    382:    973,    975, 

1513,   1516. 
Warner  v.  Doran,  30  la.  521:   1710. 
V.  Ford  L.  &  M.  Co.,  123  Ky.  103 

99,   1262. 
V.  Franklin  County,  131  Mass.  348 

992. 
V.  Gloversville,  81  App.  Div.  291 

83. 
V.    Gunnison,    2    Colo.    App.    430 

681,  1056,   1112. 
V.  Hennepin  Co.,  9  Minn.  139:  703, 

1156,   1638. 
V.  Maxwell,  124  Ga.  518:  90,  1604. 


CCXCIV 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the   pages :  Vol.   I,  pp.   1-743  ;   Vol.  II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Warner  v.  Eailroad  Co.,  39  Ohio  St. 

70:   835,  836,  864,  1569,  1573. 
Warrell,  Appeal  of,  130  Pa.  St.  600 : 

1561. 
Warren  v.   Brown,  31   Neb.   8:    882, 
886,    1514. 
V.  Bunnell,  11  Vt.  600:  431. 
V.  First  Division  of  the  St.  Paul 

6  Pacific  K.   R.   Co.,    18   Minn. 
384:    824,    930,    1159,    1424. 

V.  First  Division  St.  Paul  &  Pacific 
E.   R.   Co.,   21   Minn.   424:    1225, 
1227,  1321,  1322,  1323,  1326. 
V.  Gloversville,  81  App.  Div.  291: 

1605. 
V.  Grand  Haven,  30  Mich.  24 :  335. 
V.  Henry,  31   la.   31:    603,  616. 
V.  Parkhurst,   105  App.  Div.  239: 

1605. 
V.  Parkhurst,  186  N.  Y.  45:   1605. 
V.   Spencer  Water  Co.,   143   Mass. 

9:    912,    1634. 
V.   Spencer   Water    Co.,   143   Mess. 

155:   1127,  1131. 
V.  Wisconsin  Valley  R.  R.  Co.,  6 
Biss.  425:   931. 
Warren  Academy  of  Sciences,  29  Pa. 

Co.  Ct.  30:   709. 
Warren    County   v.    Rand,    88    Miss. 

395:    1306,   1308. 
Warren  etc.   R.  R.   Co.  v.   Garrison, 

74  Ark.   136:    1631. 
Warrior  Run  Road,  3  Binn  3:   1359. 
Warwick    Institute    for    Savings    v. 
Providence,    12  R.   I.    144:    947, 
1023. 
Washburn   v.  Milwaukee   etc.   R.   R. 
Co.,    59    Wis.    364:     1110,    1111, 
1120,     1123,     1138,     1180,    1216, 
1408,    1439. 
V.   Milwaukee   &  Lake  Winnebago 
R.  R.  Co.,  59  Wis.  379:  1402. 
Washburn   &   M.   Mfg.    Co.   v.   Wor- 
cester, 153  Mass.  494:   84,  1337. 
Washington  v.  Barnes,  2  N.  Y.  Supm. 
Ct.   637:    1670. 
v.   Fisher,   43   N.  J.  L.   377:    700, 

1368. 
V.   Gibbs,  44  N.  J.  L.   169:    1366. 
Washington   Ave.,    69    Pa.    St.    352: 

10. 
Washington  &  Bait.  Turnpil<e  Road 
V.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  E.  Co.,  10 
G.   &  J.   392:    409. 
Washington  Bridge  Co.  v.  State,   18 

Conn.   53:    491. 
Washington   Cemetery    Co.    v.    Pros- 
pect  Park   &   C.    I.   R.   E.    Co., 

7  Hun  655:  247,  1580. 

V.   Prospect  Park   etc.   E.   R.   Co., 
68   N.   Y.    591:    304,    808,    1580. 


Washington   Co.   Water   Co.   v.   Gar- 

ver,  91  Md.  398:    165. 
Washington   etc.    R.   R.    Co.,   In   re, 

115  N.  Y.  442:  719. 
Washington  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Alexan- 
dria, 98  Va.   344:    361,  491. 
V.    Coeur    D'Alene    E.    &   N.    Co., 

60  Fed.  981 :   728,  905. 
V.  Coeur  D'Alene  Ey.  &  Nav.  Co., 

3   Ida.  263:    1107. 
V.   Switzer,   26   Gratt.   661:    1097, 

1384. 
Washington  Ice  Co.  v.  Chicago,  147 

111.    327:     1195,    1215,    1248. 
V.   Lay,    103    Ind.   48:    974,    1028, 

1069. 
V.  White,  166  111.  375:   1215. 
Washington    Park,     1     Sandf.    283: 

1383. 
Washington  Park  Comrs.,  Matter  of, 

56  N.  Y.  144:   1670. 
Washington  Park  Comrs.,  Matter  of, 

2  N.  Y.  Supr.  Ct.  637:    1670. 
Washington  St.,  12  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  288: 

1386. 
Washington  St.,  In  re,  19  E.  I.  156: 

1107,  1387. 
Waterbury's   Appeal,    57    Conn.    84: 

1395. 
Waterbury  v.  Darien,  8  Conn.  161 : 

992. 
V.  Darien,  19  Conn.  252:   1387. 
V.    Dry   Dock   etc.   E.    R.    Co.,    54 

Barb.   388:    909. 
V.  Piatt  Bros.  &  Co.,  75  Conn.  387 : 

453,  708,  724,  813,   1606. 
V.  Piatt  Bros.  &  Co.,  75  Conn.  435: 

1163. 
V.  Piatt  Bros.  &  Co.,  76  Conn.  435: 

453,  674,  725,  1158,  1253,  1606. 
Waterbury    River    Turnpike    Co.    v. 

Litchfield,  26  Conn.  209:   423. 
Water   Comrs.,   Matter   of,   55   App. 

Div.  77:   1263. 
Water   Comrs.,   Matter   of,   71    App. 

Div.   544:    1266. 
Water  Comrs.,  Matter  of,  3  Edwards 

Ch.  290:  117,  133. 
Water  Comrs.,  Matter  of,  3  Edwards 

Ch.   552:    732,   879,   1267,   1330. 
Water  Comrs.,  Matter  of,  4  Edw.  Ch. 

545:    1253. 
Water  Comrs.,  Matter  of,  176  N.  Y. 

239:   1266. 
Water  Comrs.  v.  Lawrence,  3   Edw. 

Ch.  552:    731,   810,  813,  893. 
Water  Comrs.  of  Amsterdam,  Matter 

of,   96  N.  Y.   351:    809,   813. 
Waterford  v.  County  Comrs.,  59  Me. 

450:    1069. 


CASES    CITED. 


CCXCV 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,  pp.   1-743;   Vol.  11,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Waterford  Elee.  Lt.  H.  &  P.  Co.  v. 

Reed,  47  Misc.  406:   1263,  1338. 

Waterhouse   t.    County   Comrs.   etc., 

44  Me.   368:    1079. 
Waterloo  Woolen  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Shana- 

han,  128  N.  Y.  345:  495. 
Waterman    v.    Buck,    58    Vt.    519: 
84,  1605. 
V.   Connecticut  etc.  R.  R.   Co.,   30 
Vt.   610:    158,  461. 
Waters  v.   Bay  View,  61  Wis.  642: 
148,   234. 
V.  Greenleaf  Johnson  Lumber  Co., 

115  N.  C.  648:   158. 
v.  Philadelphia,  208  Pa.  St.   189: 
882,  884,  885. 
Waters  Pierce  Oil  Co.  v.  New  Iberia, 

47  La.  An.   863:   469. 
Watertown    v.    County    Comrs.,    176 
Mass.  22:    1416. 
V.  Cowen,  4  Paige  510:  872. 
v.  Mayo,  109  Mass.  315;    14,  469. 
Waterville,   Petitioner,   31   Me.   506: 

1415. 
Water  Works  v.  Sharpstein,  50  Cal. 

284:    57. 
Water   Works    Co.   v.    Burkhart,    41 
Ind.  364:  21,  503,  675,  743,  806, 
808,  1496. 
Watkin  v.  W.  Phila.  Pass.  R.  R.  Co., 
11  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  648:    1587. 
V.  W.  Phila.  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Pa. 
Dist.    Ct.    463:     297,    314,    316 
1590. 
Watkins   v.   Dorris,   24   Wash.   636: 
98. 
v.  la.  Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  123  la.  390: 

837,  838,   1500. 
V.  Pickering,   92   Ind.   332:    978. 
v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  137  la.  441 : 

1139,    1204. 
V.   Walker   County,    18    Tex.   585: 

1155,  1546,  1547. 
V.  Welch  Grape  Juice  Co.,  96  App. 
Div.    114:    881. 
Watkins   Land   Co.   v.    Clements,   98 

Tex.  578 :  69,  72. 
Watkinson  v.  McCoy,  23  Wash.  372: 

92. 
Watson  V.  Acquaekanouck  Water  Co., 
36  N.  J.  L.   195:    708,  814,  823. 
V.  Carver,  27  App.  Cas.  D.  C.  535: 

886. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  46  Minn. 

321:   871,  873,   1626. 
V.    Crowsore,    93    Ind.    220:     980, 

1119,  1121. 
V.   Fairmont  etc.   Ry.   Co.,   49   W. 

Va.    528:    1587,    1612. 
V.  Grand  Rapids  &  I.  R.  R.   Co., 
91  Mich.  198:   947,  1564. 


Watson   V.   Kingston,   43   Hun   367: 
235 
V.   Kingston,    114  N.  Y.   88:    235. 
V.  Manhattan  R.  R.   Co.,   17  Abb. 

N.  C.  289:   924. 
V.   Met.   El.   R.   R.   Co.,   57   N.  Y. 

Supr.  Ct.  364:    1584,   1664. 

V.  Milwaukee  &  Madison  Ry.  Co., 

57    Wis.    332:    954,    1115,    1138, 

1145,  1146,  1236,  1241,  1404. 

V.  New  Milford,  72  Conn.  561:  83. 

V.    New    Milford    Water    Co.,    71 

Conn.  442:  73. 
V.  New  York  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  47 

N.  Y.  157:   949,  951,  961. 
V.   New  York   Cent.  R.   R.   Co.,   1 

Sheldon   159:    949. 
V.    Pittsburgh    &    Connellsville    R. 

R.  Co.,  37  Pa.  St.  469:   624. 
V.   Robertson   Ave.   R.   R.    Co.,   69 

Mo.  App.  548:  311,  1587. 
V.  Sewickley,  91  Pa.  St.  330:  941, 

1030. 
V.   South  Kingston,   5   R.   I.   562: 

513. 
V.  Trustee,  21   Ohio  St.  667:   438, 

1155. 
V.  VanMeter,  43  la.  76:  1459. 
Watson  Exr.  v.  Trustees  etc.,  21  Ohio 

St.  667:   1154,  1572. 
Watterson   v.   Allegheny   etc.    R.   R. 
Co.,    74   Pa.    St.    208:    850,    852, 
853. 
Watts  V.  Derry,  22  N.  H.  498:   1118. 
V.  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  39  W. 
Va.  196:   846,  1263,  1455,  1662. 
Watuppa  Reservoir  Co.  v.  Fall  River, 
134  Mass.  267:   74,  78,  961. 
v.  Fall  River,  147  Mass.  548:  109, 

119,   138. 
V.  Fall  River,  154  Mass.  305 :   138. 
Wavikegan   v.    Weale,    118    111.   App. 

460:  156. 
Wautauga  Water  Co.  v.   Scott,   111 
Tenn.   321:    706,   724,   738,   744, 
1154. 
Waverly  v.  Waverly  Water  Co.,  127 

App.  Div.  440 :  898. 
Waverly   Water    Works,   Matter    of, 

16  Hun  57:   1670. 
Waverly   Water   Works,    Matter    of, 

85  N.  Y.  478:   1670,  1685. 
Waycross  v.  Houk,  113  Ga.  963:  83, 

1604. 
Waycross    Air    Line    R.    R.    Co.    v. 
Southern  Pine  Co.,  Ill  Ga.  233: 
862,  1568. 
Wayland   v.    County   Commissioners, 

4  Gray  500:   536. 
Wayne  v.  Caldwell,  1  S.  D.  483:  707, 
1360,  1511. 


CCXCVl 


CASES    CITED. 


[Tlie  references  are  to  the  pages:  Vol.   I,  pp.   1-743;   Vol.   II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Wayne  v.  County  Comrs.  37  Me.  558: 

1421. 
Wayne  Ave.,  Opening  of,  124  Pa.  St. 

135:    879,    1327. 
Wayne  County  Sav.  Bank  v.  Stock- 
well,  84  Mich.  586:   865,  867. 
Waynesborough    School    District,     1 

Pa.  Co.  Ct.  422 :  1670. 
Wayne  Tp.  Road,  34  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  576 : 

1095. 
Wayzata   v.    Great   Northern   R.    R. 
Co.,  46  Minn.  505:   876,  1578. 
V.  Great  Northern   R.   R.   Co.,  50 
Minn.  438:   308,  314,  322,  1492, 
1643. 
V.  Gt.  Northern  R.  R.  Co.,  67  Minn. 
385:    305. 
Wead  V.  St.  Johnsbury  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

64  Vt.  52:    319,  620,  622. 
Weage  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  227 

111.  421:   197,  395,  401. 
Weatherby  Water   Co's  Petition,   21 

Pa.  Co.  Ct.  330:   1682. 
Weathersfield  v.  Humphry,  20  Conn. 

218:    788. 
Weaver  v.   Gregg,   6  Ohio    St.   547: 
943,  945. 
V.   Miss.   &   Rum   Riv.  B.   Co.,   28 

Minn.  534:  67,  90,  94,  100. 
V.  Miss.   etc.   Boom  Co.   30  Minn. 
477:   90. 
Weaver's  Road,  45  Pa.  St.  405:   1417. 
Webb   v.    Co.    Comrs.,    77    Me.    180: 
1371. 
V.    Demopolis,   95   Ala.    116:    104, 

114,  1491. 
V.  Fuel  Co.,  16  Wkly.  L.  B.  121: 

176. 
V.   Manchester   etc.    R.    R.    Co.,   4 
Mylne  &  Craig  116:   815,   1061, 
1572. 
V.    New   York,    64    How.    Pr.    10: 

459. 
V.  Rocky  Hill,  21   Conn.  468:   401. 
Webber  v.  Pere  Marquette  Boom  Co., 

62  Mich.   626:    104,   114,   115. 
Weber  v.  Berlin,  8  Ont.   302:   84. 
V.  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Met.  147: 

1314. 
V.   Harbor   Comrs.,    18   Wall.    57: 

136. 
V.   Iowa   City,    119   la.   633:    1492. 
V.  Ryers,  82  Mich.  177:  1412. 
V.    Santa    Clara    County,    59    Cal. 

265:   24. 
V.    Stagray,    75    Mich.    32:     1182, 

1512,  1516,  1634. 
V.  Toledo,   3   Ohio   C.   C.    (N.   S.) 
319:   882,  940,  1561. 
Webster   v.    Bridgewater,    63   N.    H. 
296:    996. 


Webster  v.  Fargo,  9  N.  D.  208:    11, 
464. 
V.  Fargo,  181  U.  S.  394:  11,  464. 
V.  Harris,  111  Tenn.  668:   113. 
V.  Holland,  58  Me.  168:  954,  963. 
V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  116 
Mo.  114:  1146,  1229,  1232,  1235, 
1320,  1546,  1547. 
V.  Lowell,  142  Mass.  324:  376,  391, 

402,  1492. 
V.  Pittsburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  78  Ohio 

St.    87:     1715. 
V.  Washington  Co.,  26  Minn.  220: 
1083. 
Weckler  v.  Chicago,  61  111.  142 :  992. 
Weed  V.  Boston,  172  Mass.  28:    10, 
463. 
V.    Goodwin,    36    Wash.    31:     739, 
1177. 
Weel<s  V.  Grace,  194  Mass.  296:  9. 
V.  Milwaukee,  10  Wis.  242 :  235. 
V.  N.  Y.  &  N.  J.  Tel.  Co.,  86  App. 
Div.  257:   343,  1594. 
Wegmann  v.   Jefferson,   61   Mo.   55: 

237. 
Wehn  V.  Commissioners  of  Gage  Co.. 

5  Neb.  494:  58. 
Wehrenberg  v.  Seiferd,  56  Misc.  356: 

1562. 

Weide  v.  St.  Paul,  62  Minn.  67:  1324, 

Weidenfeld  v.  Sugar  Run  R.  R.  Co.. 

48  Fed.  615:  528,  529,  534,  1574. 

Weigold  V.  Pittsburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

208  Pa.  St.  81:    1356. 
Weiland   v.    Ashton,    18    S.    D.    331: 

1372,  1514. 
Weimer  v.  Bumbury,  30  Mich.  201 : 

1007. 
Weir  V.  Borough  of  Plymouth,   148 
Pa.  St.  566:   155. 
V.  Claude,  i6  Devall  575:  866. 
V.  Owensboro  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  (Ky.) 

21   S.  W.   643:    324. 
V.    St.    Paul,    etc.    R.    R.    Co.,    18 
Minn.  155:  673,  683,  1010,  1186, 
1206,  1400,   1466. 
Weirston  v.  Waggoner,  5  J.  J.  Marsh. 

41:    1077. 
Weis  V.  Madison,  75  Ind.  241 :  233. 
Weiss  V.  Oregon  etc.  Co.,  13  Or.  496: 
70. 
V.   South   Bethlehem,    136   Pa.   St. 
294:   882,  885,   1319,   1324. 
Welch  V.  Boston,  126  Mass.  442:  484, 
948. 
V.  Hodge,  94  Mich.  493:  952,  966, 

1017. 
V.  Milwaukee  &  St.  Paul  Ry.  Co., 

27   Wis.    108:    1208,   1210. 
V.  Piercey,  7  Ired.  L.  365:   1636. 
V.  Swasey,  193  Mass.  364:  468. 


CASES    CITED. 


ecxcvii 


[The  references  are  to  the   pages:  Vol.   I,  pp.   1-743;   Vol.   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Welch  V.  Tippery,  66  Neb.  604:   1354, 

1577. 
Weld  V.  Brooks,  152  Mass.  297 :   865. 
Welde  V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  28 

App.  Div.  379:   326. 
Welland  v.  Buflalo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  30 

U.  C.  Q.  B.  147:    1631. 
Welles  V.  Cowles,  4  Conn.  182:   1558, 

1683. 
Wellington  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  R.  Co. 
158  Mass.  185:   1135,  1207. 
V.    Boston   &   M.    R.    R.    Co.,    164 
Mass.  380:    1207. 
Wellington    et    al.     Petitioners,     16 

Pick.   87:    784. 
Wellington  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cashie 
etc.  Co.,  114  N.  C.  690:    1047. 
V.  Cashie  etc.  Co.,  116  N.  C.  924: 
1165,  1169,  1467,  1577. 
Welliver   v.   Pa.    Canal   Co.,   23   Pa. 

Super.   Ct.   79:    144. 
Wellman  v.   Chicago  &  G.  T.  R.  R. 

Co.,  83  Mich.  592:  481,  483. 
Wells   V.   Bridgeport   Hydraulic    Co., 
30  Conn.  316:   1459,  1640. 
V.    Chicago   etc.    Ry.    Co.,    19   Mo. 

App.   127:    1187. 
V.  County  Comrs.  79  Me.  522:  778. 
V.  Harris,  137  Mo.  512:  438. 
V.  Hic'cs,  27  111.  343:    1095. 
V.  McLaughlin,  17  Ohio  97 :  701. 
V.  New  Haven  etc.  Co.,  1  Am.  R.  R. 

&  Corp.   Rep.   708:    1647,   1662. 
V.  New  Haven  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  151 
Mass.  46:   144,  1650,  1652,  1715. 
V.  Northern  R.  R.  Co.,  14  Ontario 

594:    1485,    1646. 
V.  Rhodes,  114  Ind.  467:  996,  1028, 

1046,   1407. 
V.  Somerset  &  Kennebec  R.  R.  Co., 
47  Me.   345:    818. 
Wells'  Ave.     Sewer,    Matter    of,    46 

Hun  534:   1670. 
Wellsburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Pan  Han- 
dle Traction  Co.,  56  W.  Va.   18: 
772. 
Wells   Co.  Road,   Matter  of,  7   Ohio 

St.  16:   975,  1100,  1406. 
Welsh  V.    Chicago   etc.   Ry.    Co.,    19 
Mo.  App.  127:   1546. 
V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  57 

N.  y.  Supr.  Ct.  408:   1427. 
V.  New  Castle  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  6  Pa. 

Co.  Ct.  56:   918. 
V.   New   York   El.    R.   R.    Co.,    16 

Daly  515:   1300,  1664. 
V.  Taylor,  134  N.  Y.  450:   1504. 
V.  Tippery,   66  Neb.  604:   859. 
Welton  V.  Dickson,  38  Neb.  767  :  495, 
496,    498,   499,    516,    675,    1154, 
1572,   1574,   1576. 


Wendel  v.   Board  of  Education    (N. 

.T.  L.)   70  Atl.  152:  083.919,976. 

V.  Spokane  County,  27  Wash.  121: 

144,   167,  957. 

Wendt  V.  Board  of  Suprs.  87  Minn. 

403:   375,  386,  390. 
Wenger   v.    Fisher,    55   W.    Va.    13: 

1569. 
Wentworth  v.  Farmington,  48  N.  H. 
207:    696. 
v.  Farmington,  49  N.  H.  119:  1088. 
V.  Farmington,  51  N.  H.  128:  1095. 
V.  Milton,  46  N.  H.  448:  981. 
V.     Portsmouth,    68     N.     H.    392: 
1320,    1324. 
Werges  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  35 
La.  An.  641 :  243,  245,  248,  447, 
448,  1303. 
Werlev    v.    Huntington    Waterworks 

Co.,    138   Ind.    148:    1376. 
Werner  v.  Papf,  94  Minn.  118:    148,. 
Wirth   V.    Postal   Tel.    Cable   Co.,   7 
Ohio  C.  C.  290:    1593. 
V.   Springfield,   78    Mo.    107:    237, 

630. 
V.    Springfield,    22    Mo.    App.    12: 
634. 
Werthman  v.  Mason  City  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,    128    la.    135:     1129,    1147, 
1260,  1404. 
Westcott  V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

152  Mass.  465:  1502,  1504. 
Wesson   v.    Washburn    Iron    Co.,    13 

Allen  95:  649. 
West  V.   Bancroft,   32  Vt.   371:    337, 
355 
V.  McGurn,  43  Barb.   198:    1400. 
V.  Milwaukee  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  56  Wis. 
318:      1138,     1225,     1227,     1321, 
1323. 
V.   Octoraro   Water   Co.,    159   Fed. 

528:    934,    1616. 
V.  Parkdale,  7  Ont.  270:  319. 
V.   Parkdale,   8   Ont.  59:    319,   709, 

710. 
V.    Parkdale,     15    Ont.    310:     236, 

1307,  1309. 
V.  Parkdale,    12  U.   C.   App.   393: 

236. 
V.  West  &  East  R.  R.  Co.,  61  Miss. 
536:    1634. 
West  Arlington   Imp.   Co.   v.  Mount 
Hope  Retreat,  97  Md.    191:    81, 
1604. 
West  Bellevue  Bor.  v.  Huddleston,  1 
Monaghan     (Pa.     Supm.)     129: 
159. 
West   Boston   Bridge   Co.   v.  County 
Comrs.    of   Middlesex,    10    Pick. 
270:   782. 


CCXCVlll 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :  Vol.   I,  pp.   1-743  ;   Vol.  II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


West  Branch  &  Susquehanna  Canal 

Co.  V.  Mulliner,  68  Pa.  St.  357: 

144. 
Westbrook's   Appeal,    57    Conn.    96: 

487. 
Westbrook  v.  Baldwin  Co.,   121   Ga. 

442:    90,    95. 
V.   Muscatine  etc.   R.  E.   Co.,   115 

la.   106:    1209. 
Westbrooke    v.    North,    1    Me.    179: 

1683. 
West  Chester  &  W.  Plank  Road  Co. 
V.  Chester  County,  182  Pa.  St.  40: 

1149,  1261,  1264. 
West  Chicago  Masonic  Ass.  v.  Chi- 
cago,  215   111.   278:    1271:    1340. 
West  Chicago  Park  Comrs.  v.  Boal, 

232  111.  248:   1230,  1378. 
V.  McMullen,  134  111.  170:  732. 
West  Chicago  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Chi- 
cago, 172  111.  198:   1222,  1426. 
V.  People,  214  111.  9:  97,  102,  488, 

1644. 
V.  People,  201  U.   S.   506:   488. 
West  Covington  v.   Schultz,   16  Ky. 

L.   R.   831:    230. 
West  End  Narrow  Gauge  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Almeroth,  13  Mo.  App.  91:  924, 

1046,  1074. 
Western  Am.  Co.  v.  St.  Ann  Co.,  22 

Wash.  158:  1395,  UOJ. 
Western  Ave.,  7  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  233 :  938, 

1098. 
Western  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Richards, 

137  Pa.  St.  524:  858. 
Western  Md.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Patterson, 

37  Md.  125 :  1624. 
Western  N.  Y.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Buf- 
falo etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  193  Pa.  St. 

127:  771.      . 
Western  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kerr,  41 

Cal.  489:  431. 
v.  Reed,  35  Cal.   621:    1097,   1379. 
V.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  151  Fed.  376: 

128,    130. 
V.  Tevis,  41  Cal.  489:  956. 
Western  Paper  Co.  v.  Pope,  155  Ind. 

394:   81,  1604. 
Western   Penn.   R.   R.   Co.'s  Appeal, 

99  Pa.  St.  155:  726. 
Western   Penn.   R.   R.   Co.'s  Appeal, 

152  Pa.  St.  319:    1364,   1384. 
Western  Pennsylvania  R.  R.   Co.  v. 

Hill,  56  Pa.  St.  460:  1340. 
v.  Johnston,  59  Pa.  St.  290:   1540, 

1541,  1543. 
Western  R.  R.  of  Ala.  v.  Ala.  G.  T. 

R.  R.  Co.,  96  Ala.  272:  172,  175, 

242,  246,  249,  250,  877,  1582. 
Western   R.    R.    Co.    v.   Dickson,   30 

Wis.  389:   1040,  1080. 
V.  Owinga,  15  Md.  199:  1570,  1574. 


Western  Turf  Ass.  v.  Greenburg,  204 

U.  S.  359:  468. 
Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Atlantic 

&  Pacific  Tel.  Co.,  7  Biss.  367: 

412,  748,  832. 
V.  Am.  Tel.  Co.,  9  Biss.  72:   412, 

832 
V.    Am.    Union    Tel.    Co.,    65    Ga. 

160:  412,  775,  791,  832. 
V.  B.  &  0.  Tel.  Co.   19  Fed.  060: 

412    832 
V.  B.  &  0.  Tel.  Co.,  23  Fed.  12:  412, 

832 
V.  Builard,  67  Vt.  272:  343,  1357, 

1489. 
V.   Burlington   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,    11 

Fed.   I:   832. 
I'.  Burlington  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Mc- 

Crary  130:   412,  832. 
V.   Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  86  111. 

246:    412. 
V.   Electric   Lt.  Co.,   46   Mo.   App. 

120:   418. 
V.  Elec.  Lt.  &  P.  Co.,  81  App.  Div. 

655:    418. 
V.   Elec.  Lt.  &  P.  Co.,   178  N.  Y. 

325:   418. 
V.  Guernsey  etc.  Lt.  Co.,  46  Mo. 

App.  120:   1621. 
V.  Los  Angeles  Elec.  Co.,  76  Fed. 

178:  418. 
V.  Moyle,  51  Kan.  185:  438. 
V.  New  York,  38  Fed.  552:  489. 
V.   Pa.  R.   R.   Co.,   195  U.   S.   540: 

679,  682,  688. 
V.  Rich,  19  Kan.  517:  425,  1473. 
V.    Shepard,    49    App.    Div.    345: 

182,   1562. 
V.  Shepard,  72  App.  Div.  108:  321. 
V.   Shepard,   169  N.  Y.   170:    182, 

1562. 
V.    Smith,    64   Ohio    St.    106:    349, 

350. 
v.  Williams,  86  Va.  696 :  200,  332, 

339,  710,   738,   1154,   1155,   1158. 
West  Fallowfield  Road,  7  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

645:    1095. 
Westfleld    Cem.   Assn.   v.   Danielson, 

62  Conn.  319:  542,  896. 
Westfleld  Gas  &  M.  Co.  v.  Menden- 

hall,  142  Ind.  538:  481. 
West  Goshen  Roads,   7   Pa.  Co.   Ct. 

250:   993. 
West  Hefler  v.  Lebanon  &  A.  St.  R. 

R.    Co.,    163    Pa.    St.    54:    280, 

324,  1587,  1588,  1591. 
West  Jersey  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ocean 

City  R.  R.  Co.,  61  N.  J.  L.  506: 

1040. 
v.  Cape  May  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  34  N. 

J.  Eq.  164:  268. 


OASES    CITED. 


CCXCIX 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :  Vol.   I,  pp.   1-743  ;   Vol.  II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


West  Jersey  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Camden  etc. 

Ry.  Co.,  52  N.  J.  Eq.  31:   295, 

1611. 
V.  Camden,  Gloucester  &  Woodbury 

Ry.  Co.,  52  N.  J.  Eq.  31:  282. 
West  Jersey  Traction  Co.,  In  re,  59 

N.  J.  Eq.  63:   771. 
West  Jersey  Traction  Co.  v.  Camden 

Horse   R.   R.   Co.,   53   N.   J.   Eq. 

163:  289,  911. 
West  Manchester  Road,   10  Pa.   Co. 

Ct.  429:  1069,  1387. 
West     Muncie     Strawboard     Co.     v. 

Slaelv,  164  Ind.  21:  81  . 
West  Newbury  v.  Chase,  5  Gray  421 : 

1119,  1120,  1128. 
Weston  V.  Ralston,  48  W.  Va.   170: 

1492. 
West  Orange  v.  Field,  37  N.  J.  Eq. 

600:    155,  233,  1606. 
Westphal  v.  New  York,  75  App.  Div. 

252:   1554,  1607. 
v.  New  York,  177  N.  Y.   140:    163, 

1554,   16u7. 
West    Pikeland    Road,    63    Pa.    St. 

471:   512. 
West  Point  v.   Bland,   106  Va.  792: 

883. 
West  Point  W.  &  P.  &  L.  I.  Co.  v. 

State,  49  Neb.  218:  486. 
Westport  V.  County  Comrs.,  9  Allen 

204:   979,  982,  1422. 
V.    Mulholland,    159    Mo.   86:    467. 
West    River    Bridge    Co.    v.    Dix,    6 

How.    507:    407,    525,    539,    781, 

788,  790,  792. 
V.  Dix,  16  Vt.  446:   678,  781,  788. 
West  Roxbury  v.  Stoddard,  7  Allen 

158:    109,  113. 
West  Seattle  v.  West  Seattle  L.  &  1. 

Co.,   38   Wash.  359:    1492,    1623. 
West  Two  Hundred  and  Fourteenth 

St.,    Matter   of,    109   App.    Div. 

575:   1493. 
West  Virginia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Gib- 
son,   94    Ky.    234:     1183,    1201, 

1231. 
West  Virginia  Short  Line  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Belington  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  56  W. 

Va.   360:    901,   908. 
West  Virginia  Transportation  Co.  v. 

Ohio  River  Pipe  Line  Co.,  22  W. 

Va.  600:  413,  832. 
V.  Volcanic  Coal  &  Oil  Co.,  5  W. 

Va.  382:   534,  896. 
West    Whiteland    Road,    4    Pa.    Co. 

Ct.  511:   698. 
Wetherill  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  195  Pa. 

St.    156:    394. 
Wetherspoon  v.  State,  Mar.  &  Yerg. 

118:  1165. 


Wetmore  v.  Story,  22  Barb.  414:  268, 

297,  1586. 

Weyer  v.  Chicago,  Wis.  &  N.  W.  R. 

R.  Co.,  68  Wis.  180:   1232,  1312. 

V.   Milwaukee   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   57 

Wis.   329:    1400. 

Weyl  V.   Sonoma  Valley  R.   R.   Co., 

69  Cal.  202:   246,  1629. 
Weymouth  v.  Commissioners,  86  Me. 
391:   976,  1004,  1098,  1099. 
V.  Port  Townsend  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  6 
Wash.  575:   778,  1623. 
Whalen  v.  Bates,  19  R.  I.  274:  1567. 

V.  Gordon,  95  Fed.  305:  996. 
Whaley  v.  New  York,  83  App.  Div. 

6:    1617. 
Whalley  v.  Lancashire  &   Yorkshire 
Ry.    Co..    13   L.   R.   Q.    B.    131: 
156. 
V.  Lancashire  &  Yorkshire  Ry.  Co 
16  L.  R.  Q.  B.   227:    156. 
Wharton  v.  Stevens,  84  la.  107 :   149. 
V.    United    States,    153    Fed.    876: 
430. 
Wharton  St.,  48  Pa.  St.  487:    1390. 
Whatcom    County    v.    Yellowkanuni, 

48  Wash.  90:   1396. 
Wheat  V.  Van  Line,  149  Mich.  314: 

606,  619. 
Wheatley  v.  Baugh,  25  Pa.  St.  528: 

165. 
Wheeler  v.  Aberdeen,  45   Wash.   63 : 
468. 
v.  Bloomington,  105  111.  App.  97: 

630,  1306. 
V.  Clark,  58  N.  Y.  267:   368,  380, 

388. 
V.   Essex  Public   Road   Board,    39 

N.  J.  L.  29:    1344. 
V.  Fitchburg,  150  Mass.  350 :   1468, 

1704. 
V.  Kirtland,  27  N.  J.  Eq.  534:  943, 

945,   1565. 
V.  Rochester  &  Syracuse  R.  R.  Co., 

12  Barb.  227:  'l251. 
V.  Spinola,  54  N.  Y.  377 :   109. 
V.  Young,  4  Wend.  647:    1106. 
Wheeling  &  B.  Bridge  Co.  v.  Wheel- 
ing &  B.  Bridge  Co.,  138  U.  S. 
287:  412,  782,  797,  800. 
Wheeling  Bridge  Co.  v.  Wheeling  & 
B.   Bridge   Co.,   34   W.  Va.   153: 
412,  782,  797,  799. 
Wheeling  Bridge  &  T.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Camden  Consol.  Oil  Co.,  35  W. 
Va.  205:    717,  913. 
v.  Wheeling  S.  &  I.  Co.,  41  W.  Va. 
747:    1424. 
Wheeling  etc.  R.  R.  Co.'s  Appeal,   1 
Penny  360:   855. 


cce 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages;  Vol.   I,  pp.   1-743;   Vol.  II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Wheeling  etc.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Laughlin, 

15  Ohio  C.  C.  1 :  621. 
V.  Toledo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  72  Ohio 

St.  368:   1,  690,  696,  1042,  1061, 

1066,  1624. 
V.  Triadelphia,  58  W.  Va.  487 :  303, 

360. 
V.  Warrell,  122  Pa.  St.  613:   1460, 

1626. 
V.  Wheeling  S.  &  I.  Co.,  41  W.  Va. 

747:  1423. 
Wheeloek   v.   Young,   4   Wend.    647: 

813,   1155,  1164. 
Wheelwright    v.    Boston,    188    Mass. 

521:  512,  1154. 
Whipple  V.  Fair  Haven,  63  Vt.  221: 

141,   1606,   1617. 
Whistler  v.  Drain  Comrs.,  40  Mich. 

591:   893,  894. 
Whitacre  v.   St.  Paul  &  Sioux  City 

R.  R.  Co.,  24  Minn.  311:    1225, 

1321. 
Whitaker    v.    Phoenixville,    141    Pa. 

St.  327:  1207. 
V.  State,  109  Ind.  600:  1514. 
Whitcher  v.   Benton,  48  N.   H.   157: 

a41,  954,   1030. 
V.  Landaff,  48  N.  H.  153 :  1070. 
White's   Case,   2   Overton   109:    678, 

1421. 
White   V.   Blanchard   Bros.   etc.    Co., 

178   Mass.    363;    291,   301,   318, 

334. 
V.  Boston  &  Providence  R.  R.  Co., 

6  Cush.  420:  1150,  1344. 
V.    Bridge   Co.,    189   Pa.    St.    500: 

1210. 
V.   Charleston,   2   Hill  S.   C.   571: 

17. 
V.     Charlotte    etc.    R.    R.     Co.,  6 

Rich.  47:    1192. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  122  Ind. 

317:    326,  425,   1457,   1472. 
V.    Cincinnati    etc.    R.    R.    Co.,    34 

Ind.  App.  287:   807,   1192,   1201, 

1270,  1276,  1331. 
V.  Codd,  39  Wash.  14:  92. 
V.    Coleman,   6   Gratt.    138;    1081. 
V.   Co.  Comrs.,  2  Cush.  361:    1409. 
V.    Co.    Comrs.,    70    Me.    317:    969, 

1414,   1415. 
V.    East    Lake    Land    Co.    96    Ga. 

415:  71,  72,  77. 
V.   Fitchburg  R.   R.   Co.,   4   Cush. 

440:   1147. 
V.  Flannigan,  1  Md.  542:  183,  877, 

1595. 
V.  Foxborough,  151  Mass.  z6:  1317. 
V.  Godfrey,  97  Ma!3s.  472:  349. 
V.  Ivey,  34  Ga.   186:    19. 
V.   Landaff,   35   N.   H.    128:    1376, 

1511. 


White  V.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  139 

N.  Y.   19:   302,  1354,  1355. 
V.  McKeesport,   101   Pa.    St.   394: 

1550. 
V.  Meadville,  177  Pa.  St.  643:  416, 

417. 
V.  Medford,  163  Mass.   164:    1252, 

1340,  1639. 
V.  Memphis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  64  Miss. 

566:  840,  1086,  1516. 
V.  Metropolitan  West  Side  El.  R. 

R.  Co.,  154  111.  620:   1207. 
V.  Nashville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  7  Heisk. 

518:    8,    1536,   1540,   1541,    1015. 
V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,   156 

Mass.   181:   844. 
V.  Northwestern  N.  C.  R.  R.  Co., 

113    N    0.    610:     180,    188,    190, 

201,    203,    243,    247,    249,    255, 

1548,     1549,     1552,     1649,     1657, 

1662. 
V.  People,  94  111.  604:   12. 
V.  Smith,  37  Mich.  291:   874,  878, 

886,  889. 
V.  South  Shore  R.  R.  Co.,  6  Cush. 

412:    783. 
V.  Tide  Water  Oil  Co.,  50  N.  J.  Eq. 

1:  368:   377. 
V.  Wabash  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  64  la.  281 : 

1464,  1470,  1534,  1626,  1628. 
V.  Whitney  Mfg.  Co..  60  S.  C.  254: 

71. 
V.  Yazoo  City,  27  Miss.  357:   335, 

336. 
White    Bear    v.    Stewart,    40    Minn. 

284:    884. 
White  Deer  Creek  Improvement  Co. 
V.   Sassaman,  67   Pa.   St.  415:    97 

1123. 
Whitefleld  v.  United  States,  92  U.  S. 

165:     19. 
Whiteford  v.  Probate  Judge,  53  Mich. 

130:  973,  1004,  1013.  1014,1016, 

1420. 
Whitehead  v.  Arkansas  Central  R.  R. 

Co.,  28  Ark.  460:   24,  924,  1634. 
V.  Denver,  13  Colo.  App.  134:  914, 

1046. 
V.   Manor,   23   Pa.   Supr.    Ct.   314: 

1307. 
Whitehouse   v.    Androscoggin    R.    R. 

Co.,  52  Me.  208:   435,  1252. 
V.   Fellows,   100  E.   C.  L.  R.  765: 

1651,  1655. 
Whiteley    Road,    2    Monaghan     (Pa. 

Supreme  Ct.)    194:   1361,  1364. 
Whitely    v.    Miss.    Water    Power    & 

Boom  Co.,  38  Minn.  523:    1186, 

1199. 
V.  Platte  Co.,  73  Mo.  30:  973,  974, 

1025,  1032,  1033. 


CASES    CITED. 


CCCl 


[The  references  are   to  the  pages:  Vol.   I,  pp.   1-743;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Whiteman  v.  W.   &  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  2 

Harr.    (Del.)     514: 
Whiteman's  Executrix  v.  Wilmington 

&    Susquehanna    R.    R.     Co.,    2 

Harr.    Del.    514:    674,    922,    926, 

1192. 
Whitemarsh    Road,    3    Luzerne    Leg. 

Reg.   Rep.   474:    1105. 
White  Oak  Ry.  Co.  v.  Gordan,  61  W. 

Va.   519:    1423. 
White   Plains,    Matter    of,    65    App. 

Div.  417:    1670. 
White  Plains,   Matter   of,   124  App. 

Div.  1:   858,  1145,  1347,  1348. 
White  River  Ry.  Co.  v.  Batesville  & 

W.   Tel.   Co.    81   Ark.    195:    900, 

1634. 
White    River   Turnpike    Co.    v.   Ver- 
mont Central  R.  R.  Co.,  21  Vt. 

590:    407,    410,    782,   788. 
White's   Bank   v.  Nichols,   64  N.   Y. 

65:    368. 
Whitesides  v.  Green,   13  Utah,  341: 

867. 
Whitestown,    Matter    of,    24    N.    Y. 

Misc.   150:   513. 
White    Water   Valley    Canal    Co.    v. 

Ferris,  2  Ind.  331:  1707,  1708. 
V.  Henderson,  8  Blackf.  528:  1399. 
V.  Henderson,  3  Ind.  3:  1101,  1510, 

1512,  1526,  1528. 
White   Water   Valley   R.   R.    Co.,   v. 

McClure,     29     Ind.     536:      1203, 

1310,   1311. 
Whiting      V.      Commonwealth,      196 

Mass.   468:    626,  1273. 
V.  New  Haven,  45  Conn.  303:   948. 
Whitingham  v.  Bowen,  22  Vt.  317: 

515. 
Whitlock   V.   Hankins,   105   Va.   242: 

735. 
Whitman  v.  Boston  &  Maine  R.   R. 

Co.,  3  Allen  133:  940,  1116,  1137, 

1241,   1271. 
V.   Boston   &  Maine   R.   R.   Co.,   7 

Allen    313:     1128,     1130,     1145, 

1185,    1319. 
\.  Boston  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  Gray, 

530:   996. 
V.   Comrs.    of    Highways,    96    111. 

292:   383,  1403. 
V.  Nantucket,  169  Mass.  147:  1157, 

1707. 
Whitmark   v.  N.   Y.   El.   R.   R.   Co., 

149  N.  Y.  393:   1143. 
Whitmier   &  F.   Co.  v.   BufiFalo,   118 

Fed.  773:   471. 
Whitmore  v.  Smith,  29  L.  J.  Ex.  402 : 

1116. 
V.  Tarrvtown,  137  N.  Y.  409 :   609, 

617.  " 


Whitney   v.    Boston,   98   Mass.    312: 
1130,  1185,  1210. 
V.   Commonwealth,   190  Mass.  531: 

626. 
V.  Fitchburg  R.  R.  Co.,  178  Mass. 

559:    75,    1603. 
V.  Gilman,  33  Me.  273:   976. 
V.  Lynn,   122  Mass.  338:    1699. 
V.  Milwaukee,  57  Wis.  630:   1557. 
V.  New  York,  28  Barb.  233:    1583. 
V.  New   York,   96   N.   Y.   240:    424. 
V.   Toledo,   8   Ohio   C.   C.    (N.   S.) 

577:   336,  1605. 
V.    Willamette    Bridge   R.    R.    Co., 
23  Or.   188:    160. 
Whitsett  V.  Union  Depot  &  R.  R.  Co., 
10    Colo.    243:     362,    371,    383, 
392,  .398. 
Whittaker    v.    Deadwood,    12    S.    D. 
523:    882. 
v.    Gutheridge,    52    111.    App.    460: 
973,  996,  1403,  1576. 
Whittier    v.    North    Providence,    10 
R.    I.   266:    1532. 
v.  Portland  &  Kennebec  R.  R.  Co., 
38  Me.  26:   319. 
Whittingham   v.   Hopkins,   69   N.   J. 
L.  189:   1025,  1381. 
V.  Hopkins,  70  N.  J.  L.  322:   707, 
1096,    1100,    1381. 
Whittlesev    v.    Hartford,    Providence 
&  Fishkill  R.   R.   Co.,  23  Conn. 
421:    1519. 
Whittredge  v.  Concord,  36  N.  H.  530 : 

1030. 
Whitworth  v.  Berry,  69  Miss.  882: 
879. 
V.  Puckett,  2  Gratt.  531 :  386,  970, 
1459. 
Whoriskey  v.  Old  Colony  R.  R.  Co., 

173    Mass.    432:    1157,    1707. 
Whyte  V.  Kansas  City,  22  Mo.  App. 
409:   1669,  1695. 
v.  St.  Louis,  153  Mo.  80:  872,  884. 
Wichita  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Fechheimer, 
36  Kan.  45:   1545,  1548. 
V.  Fechheimer,   49  Kan.   643:    439, 

1105,   1336,   1545,   1547. 
V.  Kuhn,  38  Kan.  104:   1124,  1203, 
1245,     1251,     1322,     1391,     1444, 
1673. 
V.  Kuhn,  38  Kan.  675:   1124,  1203. 
V.  Smith,  45  Kan.  264:  252,  311. 
V.   Thayer,   54   Kan.   259:    948. 
Wickham  v.  Lehigh  Val.  R.  R.  Co., 
.85    App.    Div.     182:     155,     150, 
1455. 
Wickliflfe   v.   Lexington,    11   B.   Mon. 

163:   365. 
Widder  v.  Buffalo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  20 
U.  C.  Q.   B.  638:    la'l. 


cccn 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :  Vol.   I,  pp.   1-743 ;  Vol.  II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Widder  v.  Buffalo  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  24 

U.  C.  Q.  B.  222:    131. 
Widening    Chestnut    St.    In    re,    18 

Phil.  511:    1243. 
Widman   Invest.   Co.   v.   St.   Joseph, 

191  Mo.  459:    1306,  1308,  1378. 
Wieland  v.   Ashton,   18   S.   D.   331: 

1511. 
Wier  V.  St.  Louis  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  40 

Kan.    130:    1220. 
Wiggin  V.  Exeter,  13  N.  H.  304:  969, 

979. 
V.  New  York,  9  Paige  16:   1253. 
Wiggins  Ferry  Co.  v.  East  St.  Louis 

etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  107  111.  450:  302, 

716. 
Wight  V.  Davidson,  181  U.  S.  371: 

11.  464. 
V.   Packer,    114   Mass.   473:    1535, 

1536. 
Wilbert's  Appeal,   137   Pa.   St.  494: 

738. 
Wilbraham    v.    County    Comrs.,    11 

Pick.  322:    1082. 
Wilbur  V.   Ft.  Dodge,   120  la.   555: 

211,  233,  002. 
V.  Taunton,   123  Mass.  522:   605. 
Wilbur  Lumber  Co.  v.  Milwaukee  Lt. 

H.  &  T.  Co.,  134  Wis.  352:   284, 

1455,  1560,  1664. 
Wilcox  V.  Am.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  73 

App.  Div.  614:  832,  1630. 
V.  Am.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  176  N.  Y. 

115:    832,    1630. 
V.  Meriden,   67   Conn.    120:    1339, 

1388. 
V.   New   Bedford,    140   Mass.   570: 

1704. 
V.  Oaldand,  49  Cal.  29:  1098. 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  35  Minn. 

439:    1136,   1211,  1672. 
Wild  V.  Deig,  43  Ind.  455:  516,  517, 

520,   1517,   1571. 
Wilde  V.  New  York  etc.  E.  E.   Co., 

168  N.  Y.  597:   257. 
Wilder  Matter  of,  90  App.  Div.  262 : 

97. 
Wilder  v.  Aurora   etc.  Elec.  T.   Co., 

216  111.  493:  240,  284,  300,  1589. 
V.  Boston  &  A.  R.  E.  Co.,  161  Mass. 

387:   919,   1053. 
V.    Hubbell,   43    Mich.    487:    1033, 

1416,    1420. 
V.  Buffalo  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  24  U.  C. 

Q.  B.  222:    1526. 
V.  Buffalo  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  24  U.  C. 

Q.  B.  520:    1528. 
Wiler  V.  Logan  Nat.  Gas  &  Fuel  Co., 

6  Ohio  C.  C.    (N.  S.)    206:   740, 

1700. 


Wiler  V.  Logan  Nat.  Gas  &  Fuel  Co., 

72  Ohio  St.  628:  740. 
Wiley  V.  Brimfield,  59  111.  300:  1505, 

1517. 
V.  Elwood,  134  111.  281:   449,  655, 

671,  1334. 
Wilgus  V.  Board  of  Comrs.,  54  Kan. 

605:   872,  886,  887,  889. 
Wilkerson  v.  Buchanan  Co.,  12  Mo. 

328:    1681. 
V.   St.   Louis   Sectional  Dock   Co., 

102   Mo.    130:    867. 
Wilkes-Barre  v.  Wyoming  Historical 

&  G.  Soc,  134  Pa.  St.  616:  495. 
Wilkes-Barre     Paper     Mfg.     Co.     v. 

Wilkes-Barre,    5    Luzerne    Leg. 

Eeg.    Eep.    333:    631,   632,   636, 

1167. 
Wilkey  v.  Philadelphia,  180  Pa.  St. 

146:   1310. 
Wilkin  V.  First  Div.  of  St.  Paul  etc. 

E.   E.   Co.,   16   Minn.  271:    673, 

980,    1021. 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  22  Minn. 

177:  1402. 
V.   St.   Paul,   33   Minn.    181:    607, 

617,  1597. 
Wilkins   v.   Chicago  etc.   E.   E.   Co., 

110  Tenn.  442:    191,   1495. 
v.  Gaffney  Citv  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  54 

S.   C.    199:    255,   1580. 
V.  Manchester,  74  N.  H.  275:   1327. 
Wilkinson   v.   Bixler,    88   Ind.    574: 

1673. 
V.   District  of  Columbia,   22  App. 

Cas.  D.  C.  289:  965. 
V.   Mayo,    3   Hen.    &   Mumf.   565: 

1390. 
Wilks  V.  Georgia  Pac.  E.  E.  Co.,  79 

Ala.   180:   814. 
Willamet  Falls  Canal  &  Lock  Co.  v. 

Kelly,   3   Ore.   99:    1206. 
Willamette  Iron  Bridge  Co.  v.  Hatch, 

125  U.  S.  1:  96. 
Willamette   Iron    Works   v.    Oregon 

E.   &  N.   Co.,  26  Ore.  224:    ISO, 

182,  190,  201,  225,  1580,  1592. 
Willard   v.   Boston,   149   Mass.   176: 

1045. 
V.   Cambridge,   3   Allen,  574:    370, 

379. 
Willcheck  v.  Edwards,  42  Mich.  105: 

1033,    1416,    1420. 
WiDett  V.  Woodhaus,  1  111.  App.  411: 

1568. 
Willetts  V.  Jeffries,  5  Kan.  470:  5. 
Willets  Mfg.   Co.  V.  Mercer  Co.,  62 

N.   J.   L.   95:    224. 
Willey  V.  Effing,  16  N.  H.  58 :  1683. 
V.  Hunter,  59  Vt.  479 :  92. 


CASES    CITED. 


CCClll 


[The  references  are  to  the   pages:  Vol.   I,  pp.   1-743;   Vol.  II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Willey  V.  Norfolk  Southern  Ry.  Co., 

96  N.  C.  408:   428. 
V.  Norfolk  So.  R.  E.  Co.,  98  N.  C. 

263:   157,  160. 
V.   People,   36  111.  App.   609:    884, 

886. 
V.  Southeastern  Ry.  Co.,  1  MeN.  & 

G.  58:    1570. 
William  A.  Fowler,  Matter  of,  53  N. 

Y.  60:   675. 
Willliam  &  Anthony  Sts.,  Matter  of, 

19  Wend.  678:    943,   1257,   1368. 

1378. 
William  H.  Moudy  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Pa. 

R.  R.  Co.,  212  Pa.  St.  156:  1189, 

1201. 
V.  Pa.  E.  R.  Co.,  215  Pa.  St.  110: 

1189,  1201,  1229. 
Williams  v.  Boston,  190  Mass.  541 : 

4G8. 
V.  Brooklyn  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  126  N. 

Y.     96:     265,    296,     1298,    1553, 

1651,  1658. 
V.  Camden  v.  Rockland  Water  Co., 

79  Me.  543:   1522,  1524. 
V.  Cammack,  27  Miss.  209:  13,  464, 

586. 
V,  Carey,  73  Iowa   194:    199,  390, 

395,  677,  679,  721,  1595. 
v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  110  Tenn. 

442:  422. 
V.  City  Electric  Street  R.  R.  Co., 

41  Fed.  Rep.  556:   240,  241,  271, 

279,  1586,  1587. 
V.  Commonwealth,  168  Mass.  364: 

1277. 
V.  County  Comrs.  of  Lincoln   Co., 

35  Me.  345:  695. 
V.  Courtenev,  77  Mo.  587:  943. 
V.  Detroit,  2  Mich.  561 :   13. 
V.    Etting   AVoolen    Co.,    33    Conn. 

353:   1624. 
V.    First    Presbyterian    Church,    1 

Ohio  St.  478:   1492. 
V.  Fulmer,   151   Pa.  St.  405:    106, 

108,  119,  128,  138. 
V.  Galveston  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  1  Tex. 

App.  Civil  Cas.  131 :  640. 
V.  Giblin,  86  Wis.  147:  1517. 
V.   Hartford  &  New  Haven  E.  R. 

Co.,  13  Conn.  110:  1423. 
V.  Hartford  &  New  Haven  R.   R. 

Co.,  13  Conn.  397:  893,  894,  898, 

911. 
V.  Holmes,  2  Wis.  129:   973,  1513, 

1518. 
V.  Hudson,  130  Wis.  297 :  232,  439, 

872,  1354. 
V.  Hutchinson  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  62  Kan. 

412:  949,  962. 
V.   Jackman,  2   J.  J.  Marsh.   352: 

1436. 


Williams  v.  Judge  of  Eighteenth  Ju- 
dicial Dist.,  45  La.  Ann.   1295: 

494,  498,   1415. 
V.  Kirby,   169  Mo.  622:   706,  976, 

984,  1017. 
V.  Lake  Drummond  C.  &  W.  Co., 

130  N.  C.  746:   1454,  1653. 
V.    Lockoman,    46    Ohio    St.    416: 

1109. 
V.   Los  Angeles  Ey.  Co.,   150  Cal. 

592:   179,  191,  308. 
V.  Macon  &  B.  E.  E.  Co.,  94  Ga. 

709:   1113. 
V.    Mitchell,    49    Wis.    284:    1020, 

1081. 
V.  Monroe,  125  Mo.  574:  1019. 
V.  Natural  Bridge  Plank  Eoad,  21 

Mo.  580:  422,  423. 
V.  Nelson,  23  Pick.  141:   554,  557, 

559,  866,  1073. 
V.  New  Orleans  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  60 

Miss.  689:    1540,  1673. 
V.  New  York,  105  N.  Y.  419:   122, 

127,  128. 
V.   New   York   Central   E.   E.    Co., 

18  Barb.  222:  244. 
V.  New  York  Cent.  E.  E.   Co.,  16 

N.   Y.    97:    200,   243,   245,   279, 

1580. 
V.    Parker,    188    U.    S.    491:    1160, 

1167. 
V.  Eailroad  Co.,  2  Mich.  259 :  1478. 
V.  Eead,  106  Va.  453:  1180. 
V.  Eiley,  79  Neb.  554:  1623. 
V.   Eoutt    Co.,    37    Colo.   55:    1025, 

1033,  1510,  1513,  1517. 
V.  St.  Louis,  120  Mo.  403:  1491. 
V.  School  District,  33  Vt.  271:  502, 

538. 
V.  Stevenson,  103  Ind.  243:  1032. 
V.  Stonington,  49  Conn.  229:   1105. 
v.  Taunton,  125  Mass.  34:   1263. 
V.  Taunton,  126  Mass.  287 :   1434. 
V.  Turner  Tp.,  15  S.  D.  182:   1406. 
V.  Wingo,  177  U.  S.  601:  411. 
Williamsburg  Boom  Co.  v.  Smith,  84 

Ky.  372:  102,  103,  116. 
Williams  et  al..  Petitioners,  59  Me. 

517:  955,  1004,  1013,  1014. 
William's    Executors    v.    Pittsburgh, 

83  Pa.  St.  71:  924,  1115. 
Williamson  v.   Canal   Co.,   78  N.   C. 

156:  579,  1155. 
V.  Carlton,  51  Maine,  449:   1137. 
V.  Cass  County,  84  111.  361:    1426. 
V.  East  Amwell,  28  N.  J.  L.  270- 

1377. 
V.  Houser,  169  Ind.  397:  734,  1383, 

1397. 
V.  Missouri  etc.  Ey.  Co.,   115  Mo. 
App.  72:   160. 


CCCIV 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are   to  the  pages:   Vol.   I,   pp.   1-742;   Vol.  II,   pp.   74"    :719.] 


Williamson   v.    Read,   106   Va.   453: 

1213,  1214,  1377. 
Williamsport  v.   Williamsport   Pass. 
R.  R.  Co.,  3  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  39 :  322, 
1622. 
Williamsport  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Phila- 
delphia etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  8  Pa.  Co. 
Ct.  10:  753,  759,  793,  796.  900. 
V.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  141 

Pa.  St.  407:  904,  905,  912. 
V.  Supervisors,  4  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  588 : 
750. 
Williams  St.  In  re,  191  Pa.  St.  472: 

1399. 
Williamston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Battle, 

66  N.  C.  540:  840,  851,  854. 
Willing   V.    Baltimore   R.   R.    Co.,   5 

Whart.  460:   1378. 
Willis  V.  Erie  T.  &  T.  Co.,  37  Minn. 
347:   340,  341,  1593. 
V.  Erie  City  Pass.  Ry.  Co.,  188  Pa. 

St.  56:  305. 
V.  Erie  Pass.  Ry.  Co.,  188  Pa.  St. 

71:  303. 
V.  Kentucky  &  Ind.  Bridge  Co.,  104 
Ky.  186:  249,  448,  639,  654,  061. 
V.  Perry,  92  Iowa  297:   165. 
V.  Sproule,  13  Kan.  257 :  974,  1516, 

1518. 
V.  Winona,  59  Minn.  27 :  224,  607. 
Willits  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  80 
Iowa  531:   158. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  88  Iowa 
281:    158,  1650,  1655. 
Willoughbv  V.  Shipman,  28  Mo.  50: 

819. 
Willow  Creek  Irr.  Co.  v.  Micliaelson, 

21  Utah  248:   161. 
Willson   V.    Blackbird    Creek   Marsh 

Co.,  2  Pet.  245:  96,  133. 
Willyard  v.  Hamilton,  7  Ohio  (pt.  2) 

111:  501,  522,  923,  1165,  1170. 
Wilmarth   v.   Knight,    7    Gray   294: 

1073,  1078. 
Wilmes  v.  Minneapolis  &  Northwest- 
ern Ry.  Co.,  29  Minn.  242:   1208. 
Wilmington   Ave.,    213   Pa.   St.   238: 

993. 
Wilmington  Canal  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Dominquez,    50    Cal.    505:    1060, 
1062,  1367. 
Wilmington  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Condon, 
8  G.  &  J.  443:   1389,  1425. 
v.  Smith,  99  N.  C.  131:  1187,  1215. 
V.  Stauflfer,  60  Pa.  St.  374,  1315. 
V.  Walker,   15   Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  373: 
1479. 
Wilmington  Star  Min.  Co.  v.  Fulton, 
205  U.  S.  60 :  468. 


Wilmington     Water    Power     Co.    v. 

Evans,    166   111.   548:    407,   857, 

858,  1537. 
Wilmot  v.  Yazoo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  76 

Miss.  374:  1477. 
Wilshire,  In  re,  103  Fed.  620:  471. 
Wilson  V.  Acree,  97  Tenn.  378:   878. 
V.  Alderman,  69  S.  C.  176:   1569. 
V.  Atkin,  80  Mich.  247 :  1099. 
V.  Baltimore  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  5  Del. 

Ch.  524:  23,  1004. 
V.  Beaver  Borough,  13  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

75:    1309. 
V.  Beaver  Val.  R.  R.  Co.,  33  Pa. 

Co.  Ct.  604:   1244,  1480. 
V.  Beaver  Val.  R.  R.   Co.,  17  Pa. 

Dist.  Ct.  151 :   1480. 
v.  Bondurant,  142  111.  645:  1573. 
V.  Campbell,  76  Me.  94:   1524. 
V.  Carpenter,  17  Wis.  512:  1635. 
V.  Cochran,  4  Harr.  88:   1558. 
V.    Commissioners,    18    Kan.    575: 

1399. 
V.  Des  Moines  etc.  R.  R.   Co.,  67 

Iowa  509:  448,  1298,  1303,  1550. 
V.  Duncan,  74  Iowa  491:  336. 
V.  Equitable  Gas  Co.,  152  Pa.  St. 

566:    1236. 
V.  European  &  North  Am.  Ry.  Co., 

67  Me.  358 :  947,  949,  962,"  1636. 
V.  Harvey,  3  Harr.  500:   1558. 
V.   Hathewav,   42   Iowa    173:    928, 

1010. 
V.  Hull,  7  Utah  90:  882. 
v.  Lynn,  119  Mass.  174:  1514,  1634. 
V.  McClain,  131  Ind.  335:  1399. 
V.    Mineral    Point,    39    Wis.    160: 

1569,  1574. 

V.  Muskegon   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   132 

Mich.  469:    1625. 
V.   New   Bedford,    108   Mass.   261: 

144. 
V.   New  York,   1   Denio   595:    213, 

234. 
V.    New    York    El.    R.    R.    Co.,    9 

Miscl.  657:  190. 
V.  Northampton  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  L.  R. 

9   Ch.  279:    852. 
V.    Pittsburgh   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   34 

Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  575:   976,  989. 
v.  Port  Hope,  2  Grant  U.  C.  370: 

1570,  1574. 

V.  Rockford  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  59  111. 

273:   1206,  1377. 
V.  Scranton,  141  Pa.  St.  621 :  1409. 
'v.   Talley,    144    Ind.    74:    1409. 
V.  Township  Board,  87  Mich.  240: 

973,  1017,  1412. 
V.  Trenton,  53  N.  J.  L.  645:   1024. 
T.  Welch,   12  Ore.   353:    118,  127. 


CASES    CITED. 


cccv 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:  Vol.   I,  pp.   1-743;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 


Wilson    V.    Wlieeler,    125    Ind.    173: 

1402. 
V.  Whitsell,  24  Ind.  306:   1370. 
V.  Woolman,  133  Mich.  350:   1615. 
Wilson   Bros.   v.   Trenton,   53   N.   J. 

L.   178:    897,  898. 
Wilzinski  v.  Greenville,  85  Miss.  393 : 

11,  464. 
V.    Louisville    etc.    R.    R.    Cki.,    60 

Miss.  595:   1475. 
W^inchell  v.  Waukesha,  110  Wis.  101: 

82,   83,  84,   85,   453,   1605,   1612. 
Winchester  v.  Capron,  63  N.  H.  605: 

356,  1488. 
V.  Hinsdale,  12  Conn.  88:  1386. 
v.  Stevens  Point,  58  Wis.  350 :  182, 

224,  1135,  1137,  1309,  1552,  1651, 

1656. 
Winchester     etc.     Turnpike     Co.     v. 

Evans,    110    Ky.    463:    1402. 
Winchester  &  Potomac  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Washington,     1     Rob.     Va.     67: 

1343,   1370. 
Winder,  Ex  parte,  L.  R.  6  Ch.  Div. 

696:   957. 
Windfall   Nat.   Gas   Co.  v.   Terwilh- 

ger,   152  Ind.  364:   337. 
Windham  v.  Cumberland  Co.  Comrs., 

26  Me.  406:   700,  1382. 
V.  Litchfield,  22  Conn.  226:  994. 
Windham  Inhabitants  of.  Petitioners, 

32  Me.  452:    1096,   1370. 
Windle  v.  Crescent  Pipe  Line  Co.,  186 

Pa.   St.   224:    832. 
Windsor  v.  Del.  &  H.  Canal  Co.,  92 

Hun  127:    1718. 
V.  Field,   1   Conn.  279:   990,  1358, 

1.383. 
V.  McVeirrh.   93   U.  S.  274:    1008. 
V.  State,   103  Md.  611:   473. 
Winebiddle    v.    Pennsylvania    R.    R. 

Co.,   2   Grant's   Cases    32:    1098. 
Wing  v.  Tottenham  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  37 

L.   J.   Ch.    654:    1537. 
Wingfield  v.   Crenshaw,   3  H.   &  M. 

245:    1403. 
Winkelman  v.  Chicago,  213  111.  3G0: 

658,  1673,  1698. 
V.  Drainage  District,  24  111.  App. 

242:    1195. 
Winklemans   v.   Des   Moines   North- 
western Ry.  Co.,  62  la.  11:  1119, 

1139,  1150. 
Winkler    v.    Winkler,    40    111.    179: 

1624. 
Winkley   v.    Salisbury  Mfg.    Co.,    14 

Gray  443:    1524. 
Winn  V.  Board  of  Park  Comrs.  (Ky.) 

14  S.  W.  Rep.  421 :  539. 
V.    Rutland,    52   Vt.    481:    141. 


Winnebago   Furn.   Mfg.   Co.   v.  Wis- 
consin M.  R.  Co.,  81  Wis.  389: 
976,  996,  1011. 
Winner  v.  Grauer,   173  Pa.  St.  43: 

632,  1356.    ' 
Winnetka  v.  Chicago  etc.  Elec.  Ry. 
Co.,  204  111.  297:  272. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  Elec.  Ry.  Co.,  107 

HI.  App.  117:  272. 
V.  Clifford,  201  111.  475:   351,  383, 
391,  402,   1337. 
Winnisimmet    Co.    v.    Grueby,    111 

Mass.  543:   1112,  1146. 
Winona   etc.   R.   R.    Co.   v.    Chicago 
etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   50   Minn.   300: 
771. 
V.   Denman,    10  Minn.   267:    1175, 

1186,  1225,  1317,  1318. 
V.    Waldron,    11    Minn.    515:    21, 

1119,  1186,  1198,  1318. 
V.    Watertown,    4    S.    D.    323:    9, 
672,  673,  675,  684,  750,  752. 
Winslow  V.  Baltimore  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
28   App.   Cas.   D.    C.    126:    814, 
1399. 
V.   Baltimore   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,    188 

U.  S.  646:   1620. 
V.  Co.  Comrs.,  31  Me.  444:    1406, 

1409. 
V.    Gifford,    6   Cush.    327:    434. 
V.  Winslow,  95  N.  C.  24:  565,  567, 
579. 
Winston  v.  Waggoner,  5  J.  J.  Marsh. 

41:  1367. 
Winter  v.  City  Council,  83  Ala.  589 : 
629,   643. 
V.  N.  Y.  &  N.  J.  Tel.  Co.,  51  N.  J. 

Eq.   83:    340,  976,  986,   1053. 
V.   Payne,   33   Fla.   470:    366,  877. 
V.  Petersen,  24  N.  J.  L.  524 :   1490. 
Winter  Ave.,  23  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  353: 

993. 
Winterbottom    v.    Wright,    10   Mees. 

&  W.  115:   1256. 
Wirth  V.  Jersey  City,  56  N.  J.  L.  216: 

985. 
Wirth    V.   Postal   Tel.    Cable    Co.,    7 

Ohio    C.    C.    290:    343. 
Wisconsin  v.  Duluth,  96  U.  S.  379: 

76. 
Wisconsin  Central  R.  R.  v.  Cornell 
University,    49    Wis.    102:    814, 
929,   1061,  1424. 
V.  Cornell  University,  52  Wis.  537 : 

1060,  1064,  1067,  1074. 
V.  Kneale,  79  Wis.   89:    930,   10.59, 
1060,    1064,    1066,    1068,    1075, 
1434. 
V.    Wieezorck,    51    111.    App.    498: 
448,  1337. 


CCCYl 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages:  Vol.   I,   pp.   1-743;   Vol.  II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Wis.  Eiv.  Imp.  Co.  v.  Lyons,  30  Wis. 
01:  99. 
V.    Pier     (Wis.)     118    N.    W.    857: 
500,  5.'36,   538,  592. 
Wis.   Telephone   Co.   v.   Oshkosh,   62 

Wis.  32:   6S2. 
Wisconsin  Water  Co.  v.  Winans.  85 
Wis.  26:  405,  499,  675,  083,  920, 
1043. 
Wiseman  v.  Beckwith,  90  Ind.  185: 

943. 
Wislimier  v.  State,  97  Ind.  100:  575. 
Wisiier    v.   Barber   County,   73   Kan. 

324:    980. 
Wistar    v.    Philadelphia,    8    Pa.    St. 
505:    14. 
V.    Philadelphia,    71    Pa.    St.    44: 
1400. 
Witelier   v.    Holland   W.    W.    Co.,    66 
Hun   010:    172,   175,   336,   536. 
V.  Holland  W.  W.  Co.,  142  N.  Y 
626:    330. 
Witham  v.  Osbiirn,  4  Ore.  318:   495, 

510,  517,  520. 
Withers,  Ex  parte,  3  Brevard  {S.  C.) 

83:    23,   1153. 
Withers    v.    Buckley,    20    How.    84: 

23,  100. 
Witherspoon    v.    Meridan,    69    Miss. 

288:    878. 
Witman  v.  Reading,  191  Pa.  St.  134: 
1211. 
V.    Smeltzer,    16    Pa.    Supr.    285: 
366. 
Witt  V.  St.  Paul  &  No.  Pac.  11.  E. 
Co.,  35  Minn.  404:  1072. 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  38  Minn. 
122:    247,   325,    1635. 
Witter  V.  Damitz,  81  Wis.  385:  882. 
Witterding    v.    Green,    4    Ida.    473 : 

587 
Wittkowsky's  Land,  In  re,  143  N.  C. 

247:    1005. 
Witty  v.  Board  of  Comrs.,  76  Minn. 

280:    109,   115,  576. 
Witzinsky   v.    Louisville    etc.    R.    R. 

Co.,  66  Miss.  595:   845. 
Wixora    V.    Bixby,     127    Mich.    439: 

924. 
Wofferd    v.    McKinna,    23    Tex.    36 1 

834. 
Wolcott  V.  Pond,  19  Conn.  597:  917 
V.   Whitcomb,   40   Vt.   40:    515. 
V.  Woolen  Manf.  Co.,  5  Pick.  292: 
544. 
Wolf    V.    Brass,    72    Tex.    133:    183, 
878. 
V.  Coffey,  4  J.  J.  Marsh.  41 :   1667. 
V.    Covington    &    Lexington    R.    R. 
Co.,   15  B.  Mon.  404:   322. 


Wolfe   V.   Pearson,    114   N.    C:   021: 

211,  237. 

V.  Sullivan,   133  Ind.  331:   S77. 

Wolff   V.    Georgia    Southern   etc.    R. 

R.  Co.,  94  Ga.  5.55:    1113,   1293. 

Wolford  V.  Fisher,  48  Ore.  479:   323, 

533. 
Wolfskin  V.  Los  Angeles  County,  86 

Cal.  405:  881. 
Womelsdorf  Alley,  8  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  207 : 

1011. 
Womersley  v.  Church,   17  L.  T.  Rep. 

N.   S.  190:    165. 
Wood,  flatter  of,  111  App.  Div.  781: 

1029. 
Wood  v.  Campbell,   14  B.  Mon.  330; 
1077,  1094,  1359,  1303,  1368. 
V.  Charing  Cross  Ry.  Co.,  33  Beav. 

290:   1537. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,   60  la. 

456:    105,   131. 
V.    Comrs.   of    Bridges,    122   Mass 

394:    930,    964. 
V.    Comrs.    of    Highways,    62    HI. 

391:    1095,  1099. 
V.    Hamilton    etc.    R.    R.    Co.,    25 

Grant  Ch.   135:    1249. 
V.   Hudson,    114   ilass.    513:    118.5. 
V.    Hurd,    34    N.    J.    L.    87:    881, 

886. 
V.   Hustis,   17   Wis.   410:    1523. 
V.    Kelley,    30    Me.    47:    559,    866, 

869. 
V.  Macon  &  Brunswick  R.  R.  Co., 

68  Ga.  539:  785. 
V.  McGrith,  150  Pa.  Ct.  451:   172, 

175,  330. 
V.  Mears,   12  Ind.  515:    1487. 
V.  Michigan  Air  Line  R.  R.  Co.,  90 

Mich.   212:    1714. 
V.   Michigan  Air  Line  R.  R.   Co.. 

90  Mich.  3.34:   850. 
V.  Mobile,   107   Fed.  846:   813. 
V.  Moulton,   146  Cal.  317:   146. 
V.   Quinc}',    11    Cush.   487:    1428. 
V.   .S-attle,   23   Wash.   1:   408,  409. 
V.  P^rte  Hospital,  164  Pa.  St.  159: 

1682. 
V.   Stourbridge  Ey.   Co.,   16  Q.  B. 

N.   S.  222:   645. 
V.   Truckee  Turnpike  Co.,  24  Cal. 

474:    1499. 
V.  Trustees,  164  Pa.  St.  159:   1675. 
V.    Westborough,    140    Mass.    403: 

1563. 
V.  Wilson,   12  Ind.  657:    1030. 
Woodhridge  v.  Cambridge,  114  Mass. 
483:    1710. 
V.  Detroit,  8  Mich.  274:    12,   13. 
V.  Eastland  Co.,  70  Tex.  680:  424. 


CASES    CITE  1 1. 


CCCVll 


[The  references  are  to  the   pages ;  Vol.   I,  pp.   1-743 ;   Vol,   II,   pp.   743-1719.] 

V.  Nasliville,   108   Tenn.   353:    709, 


Woodburn   v.   Sterling,   184   111.  208: 

884,  890. 

Woodbury  v.  Beverlv.  153  Mass.  245: 
e05,   618,  019,   008. 
v.     Marbleliead     Water     Co.,     145 

Mass.  509:    912. 
V.  Parshley,  7  N.  H.  237:   857. 
Woodcliff   L.    1.   Co.   V.    N.   J.    Shore 
Line  R.  R.  Co..  72  N.  J.  L,  137: 
74G,  980,  995. 
Woodcock   V.    Wabash   Ey.    Co.,    135 

la.  559:    1443. 
Woodfolk  V.  Nashville  &  Chattanooga 
E.    R.    Co.,    2    Swan   422:    1180, 
1182,  1228. 
Woodhouse    v.    Burlington,    47    Vt. 

300:   14. 
Woodman  v.  County  Comrs.,  24  Me. 

151:    1443. 
Woodmere  Cemetery    v.    Roulo,    104 

Mich.    595:    78.5. 
Woodring  v.  Forks  Township,  28  Pa. 

St.    355:    1488. 
Woodruff  T.   Catlin,   54   Conn.   277: 
487. 
V.  Douglass  Co.,  17  Ore.  314:  707, 

976,  983. 
V.  Fisher,  17  Barb.  224:   579,  580. 
V.  Glendale,  23  Minn.  537:   15B9. 
V.  Glendale.  26  Minn.  78 :   14G6. 
V.  Mining  Co.,   18   Fed.  Rep.  753: 

92. 
V.  Neal,  28   Conn.   165:    357,   1489, 

1629. 
V.   New   York   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   59 

Conn.   63:    487. 
V.    North    Bloonificld   Gravel   Min. 

Co.,   18   Fed.   753:    7-15. 
V.  Taylor,- 20  Vt.  05:   1008. 
Woodruff  Place  v.  Raschig,  147  Ind. 

517:    877. 
Woods  V.   Greensboro   N.at.  Gas.   Co., 
204  Pa.  St.   GOO:    679,   709,   726, 
1509,    1572. 
V.  Nashua  Mfg.  Co.,  4  N.  H.  527: 
1523. 
Woodstock    V.    Gallup,    28    Vt.    587: 

540,  1G38. 
Woodward    v.    Central    ^^'t.    Rv.    Co., 
180    J  lass.    SnO:    404. 
V.  Kilhnurn  :\lf-.  Co.   1   AI^j,  V.  S. 

C.  158:   99. 

V.  Scelv,  11  111.   157:   8.^8. 

V.   Webb.   65   Pa.    l-^t.   254:    (i-24. 
Woodward   Iron   Co.   v.   Cahaniss,   87 

Ala.  328:    926. 
Vj'oodworth    v.    Spirit   Mound,    10    S. 

D.  504:    99G. 

\'\'ool  V.  Edonton,  115  N.  C.   10:   127 

Woolard     v.     f'lvnif-r,      {'lenn.     Ch 

App.)   35  S.'W.  1086:   886. 


918.  100.5,  1013,  1014,  1165,  1523, 
1635. 
Woolcott  Woolen  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Upham, 

5  Pick.  292:   1522. 
Woolever    v.    Stewart,    30    Ohio    St. 

146:   486. 
Woollacott  V.  Chicago,  187  111.  504: 

884,   880. 
Woolscv's  Application,  95  N.  Y.  135: 

1389. 
Woolsey  v.  Board  of  Suprvs.,  32  la. 
130:    10:;2,   1033,   1093. 
v.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co..  134  N. 
Y.   323:    1261,   1554,    1555,   1584. 
v.  Tompkins,  23  Wend.  324:   1101, 
1363. 
Worcester  v.  Great  Falls  Manf.  Co.. 
41  Me.   159:    1345. 
V.  KeHh,  5  Allen  17:  970. 
V.    Lakeside   Mfg.    Co.,    174   Mass. 

299:    1024. 
T.  Norwich  &.  Worcester  R.  R.  Co., 

109   :Mass.   103:   688,   091. 
V.  \^'cstern  R.  R.  Co.,  4  Met.  564: 
1474. 
Worcester  Gas  Light  Co.  v.  County 
Comrs.,   138  Mass.   289:   84,  85, 
1712. 
Worcester    &   Nashua   R.   R.    Co.   v. 
Railroad  Comrs.,  118  Mass.  561: 
753,  1609. 
Workman  v.  Jfifflin,  30  Pa.  St.  362: 
954,  962,   12.15. 
V.  So.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  129  Cal.  536: 
307,   308,   732. 
World's     Columbian     Exposition     v. 
Brennan,  51   111.  App.   128:    369, 
1595. 
Wormlev  v.  Dist.  of  Columbia,  181  U. 
S.  402:    11,  404. 
V.    Mason    City    etc.    Ry.    Co.,    120 

la.   684:    1443. 
V.  'Wormley.  207  111.  411  :   S72. 
Wormscr  v.  Brown,  72  Hun  93:    180. 

185,  370,  495. 
Worsham  v.  G.  H.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  3 
Te>;.   Civ.  App.  496:    1183,    1207, 
Worth   V.    Postal   Tel.   Cable   Co.,    7 

Ohio  C.  C.  290:   343. 
Worthington    v.    Bicknell,    1    Bland 
186:   819,  1570. 
v.  Coward,  114  N.  V.  289:   1409. 
Wooster  v.  Great  Falls  Mfg.  Co.,  39 
Me.  240:   702,  933,  1524. 
v.  Sugar  River  Valley  R.  R.  Co., 
57    Wis.   311:    947,  'll23,    1565. 


CCCVlll 


CASES    CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :  Vol.   I,  pp.   1-743  ;   Vol.   II,  pp.   743-1719.] 


Wovessey  v.  Board  of  Supervisors,  32 

la.  130:  1019. 

Wragg  V.  Penn  Tp.  94  111.  11:   1703. 

Wray  v.  Knoxville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  113 

Tenn.    544:     1123,    1149,    1177, 

1180,  1201,  1206,  1229. 

Wrenthara  v.  Corey,   159  Mass.  93: 

1402. 
Wright  V.  Austin,  143  Cal.  236 :  1486, 
1487. 
V.  Baker,  94  Ky.  343:  928,  1080. 
V.  Butler,  64  Mo.  165:   1136. 
V.  Carter,  27  N.  J.  L.  76:  422. 
V.  Chicago,  46  111.  44:  12. 
V.    Comrs.    of   Highways,    145    111. 

48:    1099. 
V.  Doniphan,   169   Mo.   601:    1491. 
V.     Georgetown,     4    Cranch    534: 

1550. 
V.  Highway  Comrs.,  150  111.  138: 

1411. 
V.  Milwaukee  El.  R.  &  L.  Co.,  95 

Wis.  29:   1506. 
V.    New   York   EI.   R.   R.   Co.,    78 

Hun  450:  1299. 
V.    Rowley,    44   Mich.    557:     1033, 

1416,  1420. 
V.  Stowe,  4  Jones  L.  516:  1345. 
V.  Syracuse  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  92  Hun 

32:    315,   1580,   1589. 
V.  Syracuse  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  49  Hun 

445:   88,  144. 
V.  Syracuse  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  124  N. 

Y.  668:   88,   144. 
V.  Wells,  29  Ind.  354:   1020,  1031, 

1033. 
T.  Wilmington,  92   jST.  C.  156:  142, 
234. 
V.   Wilson,  95   Ind.   408:    979,    1017, 
1373. 
V.  Wisconsin  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  29 

Wis.    341:    1408,    1410. 
V.  Woodcock,  86  Me.  113:   1495. 
Wright  &  Cromford  Co.,  In  re,  1  A. 

&  E.  N.  S.  98:   1370. 
Wright  &  Cromford  Co.,  In  re,  41  E. 

C.  L.  R.  454:  1370. 
Wrightsel  v.  Fee,  76  Ohio  St.  529: 

87. 
Wrightsville    &    T.    R.    R.     Co.    v. 
Holmes,  85  Ga.  668:   941,  1151, 
1242,  1357. 
Wroe  V.  Harris,  2  Wash.   126:    1078. 
Wulzen  V.  Board  of  Supervisors,  101 
Cal.    15:    674,    678,    913,    1010, 
1411,  1666. 
Wurts  V.  Hoagland,  114  U.  S.  606: 
565,    567,    578,    596,    923,    927, 
1005. 
Wutchuma  Water  Co.  v.  Pogue,  151 
Cal.  105:  72. 


Wyandotte  and  Central  Sts.,  In  re, 
117  Mo.  446:   1186,  1199,  1308. 

Wyandotte   Elec.  Lt.   Co.  v.  Wyan- 
dotte, 124  Mich.  43:  362. 

Wyandotte  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Waldo,  70 
Mo.  629:   1186.  1208,  1213. 

Wyant  v.  Central  Telephone  Co.,  123 
Mich.  51:   350. 

Wyatt  V.  Thomas,  29  Mo.  23:   1511. 

Wylie  V.  Elwood,  134  III.  281:   1665. 

Wyman  v.  Lexington  &  West  Cam- 
bridge R.  R.   Co.,   13  Met.  316: 
1084,  1120,  1148. 
V.  New  York,  11  Wend.  486:  1326. 

Wynn  v.  Beardsley,  126  N.  C.  116: 
970,  1005. 

Wynehamer  v.  People,  13  N.  Y.  378: 
53,  61,  485. 

Wyoming  Coal  &  Trans.  Co.  v.  Price, 
81  Pa.  St.  156:  809,  1500. 

Wysor  v.  Lake  Erie  etc.  R.  R.  Co.. 
143  Ind.  6:   1475. 
X. 

Xavier  Realty  Co.  v.  La.   Ry.  Nav. 
Co.,  114  La.  484:  748. 

Xavier  Realty  Co.   v.  La.  Ry.  Nav. 

Co.,  115  La.  343:  748,  1071. 

Y. 

Yager  v.  Fairmount,  43  W.  Va.  259 : 

234. 
Yakima  Co.  v.  Fuller,  3  Wash.  Ter. 

393:    957. 
Yakima  Water  etc.  Co.  v.  Hathaway, 

18  Wash.  377:  1558,  1559. 
Yankton  County  v.  Klemisch,  11  S. 

D.   170:    1511. 
Yanish  v.   St.  Paul,  50  Minn.   518: 

211,  224. 
Yates  V.  Milwaukee,   10  Wall.  497: 

123,  128,  129,  136,  470. 
Yaw  V.  State,  127  N.  Y.  190:   1707, 

1708,  1712. 
Yates   V.  Van  De  Bogert,  56  N.  Y. 
526:    837,   838. 
V.  Warrenton,  84  Va.  337 :  1492. 
T.  West  Grafton,  33  W.  Va.  507: 

400,  406,  1513,  1569. 
V.  West  Grafton,  34  W.  Va.  783: 
246,  248,  1581. 
Yazoo  etc.  Levee  Board  v.  Daney,  65 

Miss.  335:   1159. 
Yazoo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Baldwin,  78 
Miss.  57:   843,  852. 
v.  Clarke,  120  La.  1044:  966. 
V.  Davis,  73  Miss.  678:   151. 
V.  Harrington,  85  Miss.  366:   487. 
T.  Jennings,  90  Miss.  93:   1313. 
V.  Lefoldt,  87  Miss.  317:  630,  634. 
Yeaser   v.   Carpenter,   8   Leigh  454:. 
'1511. 


CASES    CITED. 


CCCIX 


[The  references  are  to  the  pages :  Vol. 

Yeatman   v.   Crandall,    11   La.   Ann. 

220:    12. 
Yellow  River  Imp.  Co.  v.  Wood  Co., 

81  Wis.  554:  1479. 
Yellowstone     Park     E.     R.     Co.     v. 

Bridger  Coal  Co.,  34  Mont.  545 : 

1045,     1040,     1123,     1140,     1150, 

1176,  1213,  1232,  1378. 
Yeomans  v.  County  Comrs.,  16  Gray 

30:   1390. 
T.  Kiddle,  84  Iowa  147:   13,  lOOG. 
Y.  Wellington,  4  U.   C.  App.   301: 

631. 
Yesler   v.    Washington   Harbor   Line 

Comrs.,  146  U.  S.  640:   118,  136, 

1432. 
Yolo  County  v.  Barney,  79  Cal.  375 : 

1491. 
Yonkers  v.  New  York  Cent.  etc.  R.  R. 

Co.,  165  N.  Y.  142:  491,  1287. 
Yonkers,  In  re,  117  N.  Y.  504:   333, 

335,  1137. 
York  V.  Cedar  Rapids,  130  Iowa  453: 

019. 
York  Borough  v.  Welsh,  117  Pa.  St. 

174*  951    1540 
York   Co.  V.   Fewell,   21   S.   C.   106: 

1406. 
York  Tel.  Co.  v.  Kersey,  5  Pa.  Dist. 
~       Ct.  366:  343. 
Yost  V.   Conroy,   92   Ind.   464:    1119, 

1120,   1123,   1125,   1132. 
V.  Schuylkill  Nav.  Co.,  125  Pa.  St. 

152:   840. 
Ycst's  Report,  17  Pa.  St.  424:   083, 

1160,  1165,  1167. 
^'oughiogheny    Bridge   Co.   v.    Pitts- 
burg etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  201  Pa.  St. 

457:  782. 
Youghiogheny  Riv.  Coal  Co.  v.  Rob- 
ertson, 12  Pa.  Co.  Cfc.   1:    1577, 

1024. 

Young  T.  Buckingham,  5  Ohio  485: 

522,  1100,  1101. 
V.   Chicago  etc.   Ry.   Co.,   28   Wis. 

171:   1643. 
V.  Comrs.  134  111.  569:    154,   1006. 
V.    Commonwealth,    101    Va.    853: 

479. 
V.  Extension  Ditch  Co.,   13  Idaho 

174:  144. 
V.  Harrison,  6  Ga.  130:  498,  1103, 

1166,  1535,  1570,  1615. 
V.  Harrison,  17  Ga.  30:  1182,  1192, 

1194,  1236. 
T.    Harrison,    21    Ga.    584:     1119, 

1120. 
V.  Kansas  City,  27  Mo.  App.  101: 

91. 


I,  pp.   1-743;   Vol.  II,   pp.   743-1719.] 

Young  V.  Laconia,  59  N.  H.  534 :  995. 
V.  McKenzie,  3  Ga.  31:   22,  24,  522, 
706,  746. 
V.  Oskaloosa,  88  Iowa  681:   875. 
V.   Rothrock,    121   Iowa   588:    351, 

372. 
V.  Sellers,  106  Ind.  101:   1510. 
V.   Stoddard,   27   App.   Div.  N.  Y. 

162:   1557,  1559. 
V.  York  Haven  Elec.  T.  Co..  15  Pa. 
Dist.  Ct.  843:   346,  423,  1593. 
YoungstoAvn   v.   Moore,   30   Ohio   St. 

133:  218. 
Younkin  v.   Milwaukee   L.   H.   &   T. 
Co.,  112  Wis.  15:  273,  284,  1587, 
1590,  1592. 
V.  Milwaukee  L.  H.  &  T.  Co.,  120 
Wis.  477:  273,  284,  1590. 
Youree  v.  Vicksburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

110  La.  791:   1500,  1507. 
Ystalyfera  Iron  Co.  v.  Neath  R.  R. 
Co.,  17  L.  R.  Eq.  142:  095. 


Zabel  V.   Harshman,   08   Mich.   273: 

780,  1609. 
Zabriskie  v.   Jersey  City  etc.  R.   R. 

Co.,  13  N.  J.  Eq.  314:   1582. 
Zack  V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  25  Pa.  St. 

394:  1010. 
Zanesville   v.    Fannan,    53    Oliio    St. 
605:    1526. 
v.   Zanesville   Tel.   &  Tel.   Co.,   64 
Ohio  St.  67:    322. 
Zearfoss  v.  Lansdale,  1  Mont.  Co.  L. 

R.  R.  157:  616. 
Zearing  v.  Raber,  74  111.  409 :  365. 
Zehren  v.  Milwaukee  Elec.  Rv.  &  Lt. 
Co.,  99  Wis.   83:    172,  281,  283, 
324,  325,  1587. 
Ziebold  v.  Foster,  118  Mo.  349:  979, 

980,  982,  1033. 
Zigler  v.  Menges,  121  Ind.  99:   504, 

565,  567,  569,  575. 
Zimmerman  v.  Am.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co., 
71  S.  C.  528:   836. 
V.  Canfield,  42  Ohio  St.  463:   927, 

1005,  1008,  1009,  1101. 
v.  Kansas  City  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co., 
144  Fed.  622:    1540,  1541,   1544. 
V.  Kearney  County,  33  Neb.  020: 

1162. 
V.  Snowden,  88  Mo.  218:  973,  974, 

1004,  1018,  1510. 
V.  Union  Canal  Co.,  1  W.  &  S.  340 : 
139,   937,    1227. 


cccx 


CASES    CITED. 


fTlie  references  are  to  the  pages :  Vol.   I 
La  Salle,  117  111.  411 


Zinc  Co. 

1496. 
Zinser  v.  Board  of  Supervisors,  137 

Iowa  660 :  979. 
Zireh  v.  Southern  Ey.  Co.,  102  Va. 

17:   533. 
Zoeller  v.  Kellogg,  4  Mo.  App.  1C3: 

13. 


pp.    1-743;   Vol.   II,   pp.    743-1710.] 

Zoltowski  V.  Judge,   112  Mich.  349: 

1384. 
Zumbro  v.  Parnin,  141  Ind.  430:  904. 
Zweig  V.  Horicon  Mfg  Co.,   17  Wis. 

362:   1537. 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


CHAPTEK  I. 


THE  POWER  DEFINED  AND  DISTINGUISHED. 

§  1.  The  power  defined.  Eminent  domain  is  the  right 
or  power  of  a  sovereign  State  to  appropriate  private  property 
to  particular  uses,  for  the  purpose  of  promoting  the  general 
welfare.-^  It  embraces  all  cases  Avhere,  by  authority  of  the  State 
and  for  the  public  good,  the  property  of  the  individual  is  taken, 
without  his  consent,  for  the  purpose  of  being  devoted  to  some 
particular  use,  either  by  the  State  itself  or  by  a  corporation. 


iDefinition  adopted  in  Gano  v. 
Minneapolis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  114  la. 
713,  721,  87  N.  W.  714,  89  Am.  St. 
Rep.  393,  55  L.R.A.  263.  The  phrase 
emineiit  domain  has  received  a  great 
variety  of  definitions.  "It  is  de- 
fined to  be  that  dominium  eminens, 
or  superior  right,  which  of  necessity 
resides  in  the  sovereign  power,  in 
all  governments,  to  apply  private 
property  to  public  use  in  those  great 
public  emergencies  which  can  rea- 
sonably be  met  in  no  other  way.''  1 
Eedfield  on  Railroads,  p.  228.  "The 
right  of  every  government  to  appro- 
priate, otherwise  than  by  taxation 
and  its  police  authority  (which  are 
distinct  powers),  private  property 
for  public  use."  Dillon  on  Munici- 
pal Corporations,  §  584  (453).  "It 
is  the  rightful  authority,  which  ex- 
ists in  every  sovereignty,  to  control 
and  regulate  those  rights  of  a  pub- 
lic nature  which  pertain  to  its  citi- 
Em.  D.— 1. 


zens  in  common,  and  to  appropriate 
and  control  individual  property  for 
the  public  benefit,  as  the  public  safe- 
ty, necessity,  convenience,  or  welfare 
may  demand."  Cooley,  Const.  Lims. 
p.  624.  "The  power  of  the  sovereign 
to  condemn  private  property  for  pub- 
lic use."  Mills  on  Em.  Dom.  §  1. 
"The  power  of  eminent  domain  is 
the  right  of  the  state,  as  sovereign, 
to  take  private  property  for  public 
use  upon  making  just  compensa- 
tion." People  V.  Adirondack  R.  R. 
Co.,  160  N.  Y.  225,  237.  "The  right 
of  eminent  domain  is  the  right  to 
take  private  property  for  a,  public 
use."  Wheeling  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Toledo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  72  Ohio  St. 
368,  74  N.  E.  209,  106  Am.  St.  Rep. 
622.  To  same  effect,  Jacobs  v.  Clear- 
view  Water  Supply  Co.,  220  Pa.  St. 
388,  69  Atl.  870.  "The  right  which 
belongs  to  the  society,  or  to  the  sov- 
ereign, of  disposing,  in  case  of  ne- 


3  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    1 

public  or  private,  or  by  a  private  citizen.^  This  definition 
relates  to  the  power  of  eminent  domain  as  it  exists  unrestricted 
in  the  sovereign  state.  Apart  from  constitutional  considera- 
tions, it  is  not  essential,  in  order  to  constitute  an  act  of  eminent 
domain,  that  the  use  for  vfhich  the  property  is  taken  should  be 
of  a  public  nature,  that  is,  a  use  in  which  the  public  participates, 
directly  or  indirectly,  as  in  case  of  highways,  railroads,  public 
service  plants  and  the  like.  It  is  sufficient  that  the  use  of  the 
particular  property  for  the  purpose  proposed,  is  necessary  to 
enable  individual  proprietors  to  utilize  and  develop  the  natural 
resources  of  their  land,  as  by  reclaiming  wet  -or  arid  tracts, 
improving  a  water  power  or  vcorking  a  mine.  In  such  cases 
the  public  welfare  is  promoted  by  the  increased  prosperity  which 
necessarily  results  from  developing  the  natural  resources  of  the 
country.  Such  exercises  of  the  power  of  eminent  domain  have 
been  upheld  by  many  courts,  including  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States^  and,  we  think,  must  be  regarded  as  legitimate 
exercises  of  the  power,  in  the  absence  of  constitutional  restric- 
tions which  limit  the  taking  to  public  uses.  Doubtless  the 
definitions  which  restrict  eminent  domain  to  a  taking  for  public 
use  have  been  inspired  by  these  constitutional  provisions  which 
prevail  in  the  United  States  and  impose  this  limitation  on  the 
exercise  of  the  power.  Some  courts  hold  that  the  words  public 
use  in  the  constitution  are  equivalent  to  public  welfare  and  are 
broad  enough  to  include  the  cases  referred  to  in  which  property 
is  taken  for  private  use  when  necessary  to  promote  the  public 
welfare.*  But  other  courts  hold  that  the  words  public  use  are 
to  be  taken  more  strictly  and  as  precluding  a  taking  for  private 
use  in  any  case,  even  though  such  taking  may  promote  the  public 
welfare  and  though  the  public  good  in  question  could  not  rea- 

oessity,  and  for  the  public  safety,  of  Austin,  34  Conn.  78;  Forney  v.  Fre- 
all  the  wealth  contained  in  the  State,  mont  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  Neb.  465,  36 
is  called  the  eminent  domain."  Vat-  N.  W.  806 ;  Grofl  t.  Turnpilce  Co., 
tel,  b.  1,  c.  20,  §  244.  The  last  128  Pa.  St.  621,  18  Atl.  431;  Cher- 
definition  is  adopted  by  the  court  in  okee  Nation  v.  So.  Kans.  R.  R.  Co., 
Pollard's  Lessee  v.  Hogan,  3  How.  33  Fed.  900. 

223.    And  see  Geizy  v.  C.  &  W.  R.  R.  2Adopted  by  the  court  in  Consmn- 

Co.,  4  Ohio  St.  308;    Orr  v.  Quim-  ers'  Gas  Trust  Co.  v.  Harless,   131 

by,  54  N.  H.  590,  611;  Lake  Merced  Ind.  446,  29  N.  E.  1062,  15  L.R.A. 

Water  Co.  v.  Cowles,  31   Cal.   215;  505. 

The   Boston  and  Roxbury  Mill  Co.  sPost,  §§  275-308. 

V.   Newman,   12  Pick.  467;   Todd  v.  iPost,  257. 


§    2  THE    POWEE    DEFINED    AND    DISTINGUISHED.  3 

sonably  be  attained  in  any  other  way.®  In  view  of  the  different 
constructions  thus  put  upon  the  words  public  use  and  in  view 
of  the  widely  held  opinion  that  such  words  were  intended  as  a 
restriction  upon  the  power,  it  seems  objectionable  to  define  emi- 
nent domain  as  the  power  to  take  private  property  for  public  use. 
If  the  eminent  domain  provision  of  the  constitution  was  elimi- 
nated altogether,  doubtless  a  broader  scope  would  be  given  to  the 
power  than  is  now  permitted  with  the  constitutional  provision  in 
force.  Just  what  this  broader  scope  includes  cannot  be  laid  down 
in  advance  and  will  vary  with  the  customs  and  opinions  of  the 
people  and  the  economic  conditions  which  surround  them.  But 
in  a  general  way  it  includes  any  purpose  which  is  calculated  to 
promote  the  public  welfare  and  which  cannot  reasonably  and 
practically  be  attained  without  an  exercise  of  the  power.  Hence, 
in  its  broad  and  unrestricted  sense  eminent  domain  is  the  power 
to  take  private  property  for  the  purpose  of  promoting  the  public 
welfare.® 

§  2.  Definitions  considered.  From  the  definitions  cited 
in  the  foregoing  section,  it  will  be  seen  that  some  writers  and 
jurists  have  given  to  the  phrase  eminent  domain  a  more  extended 
signification  than  the  one  above  laid  down.  Thus  Judge  Oooley 
defines  it  as  "the  rightful  authority,  which  exists  in  every  sov- 
ereignty, to  control  and  regulate  those  rights  of  a  public  nature 
which  pertain  to  its  citizens  in  common,  and  to  appropriate  and 
control  individual  property  for  the  public  benefit,  as  the  public 
safety,  necessity,  convenience,  or  welfare  may  demand."^  No 
court  has  ever  referred  either  the  control  and  regulation  of  rights 
of  a  public  nature  or  of  individual  property  to  the  power  of 
eminent  domain,  and  Judge  Cooley  himself  treats  of  these  mat- 
ters, not  under  the  head  of  eminent  domain,  but  under  the  head 
of  the  police  power.  This  enlarged  definition  finds  sanction 
in  the  works  of  many  theoretical  writers  and  in  the  dicta  of 
various  judicial  opinions,  but,  however,  well  sanctioned,  it  is 
certainly  objectionable;  first,  because  it  does  not  correspond  to 
the  practical  application  of  the  term,  and,  second,  because  it 
invests  the  term  with  a  certain  vagueness  and  elasticity,  that 

BPost,  258.  'Cooley,    Const.    Lims.    524;    and 

6The  purpof?es  for  which   private  see  Dyer  v.  Tuskaloosa  Bridge  Co., 

property   may   be   taken   under    the  2  Porter    (Ala.)    296,   27   Am.   Dec. 

power  of  eminent  domain   are  con-  655;  Hartwell  Matter,  2  Nisi  Prius 

sidered  at  length  in  Chapter  7.  Rep.   (Mich.)   97. 


4  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    2 

preclude  the  formation  of  any  definite  conception.  All  exercises 
of  sovereign  power  over  private  property,  which  have  been  judi- 
cially determined  to  fall  under  the  right  of  eminent  domain,  have 
been  cases  in  which  there  has  been  an  appropriation  of  such 
property  to  particular  uses. 

The  rights  and  powers  which  the  State  has  in,  or  over,  public 
property  may  be  classified  under  a  few  heads,  as  follows : 

First.  The  State  may  possess  property  in  its  individual  or 
organic  capacity  which  it  holds  for  sale  or  profit,  and  in  which 
the  people  distributively  have  no  right  whatsoever.  In  respect 
to  property  of  this  sort,  the  State  stands  in  the  same  relation  as 
any  citizen  to  the  property  he  possesses,  and  may  use,  enjoy, 
control  and  dispose  of  it  in  the  same  manner. 

Second.  The  State  possesses  property  of  a  public  nature,  such 
as  forts,  arsenals,  public  buildings  and  the  like,  which  is  em- 
ployed for  defense,  or  the  transaction  of  the  public  business  and 
affairs.  In  this  class  of  property,  also,  individual  citizens  have 
no  rights,  and  are  only  entitled  to  use  it  as  they  have  dealings 
with  the  government,  and  then  only  subject  to  such  regulations 
as  the  government  may  see  fit  to  establish.  The  State  can  dis- 
pose of  this  property  at  pleasure,  subject  to  such  limitations  as 
attached  to  its  rights  in  the  property  at  the  time  of  its  acquisi- 
tion. 

Third.  The  State  possesses  property  which  it  holds  as  trus- 
tee for  the  public,  such  as  navigable  waters,  highways,  and  the 
like.  This  class  of  property  is  exclusively  for  the  public  use, 
and  the  State,  as  the  only  representative  of  the  public,  may  be 
said  to  be  invested  with  the  title  thereto.  The  State  may  con- 
trol and  regulate  the  use  of  such  property  as  the  public  welfare 
may  demand,  but  cannot  rightfully  deprive  any  part  of  the 
public  of  the  privilege  of  such  use. 

All  property  under  the  control  of  the  State  will  be  found  to 
fall  into  one  of  these  classes,  and  all  acts  of  the  State  in  respect 
to  these  classes  of  property  may  be  referred,  either  to  the  right 
of  proprietorship,  the  right  of  police  regulation,  or  the  general 
power  of  a  State  to  do  all  such  acts  as  are  necessary  for  the 
public  safety  or  conducive  to  the  public  good;  none  of  such 
acts  can  properly  be  referred  to  the  power  of  eminent  domain. 

If  we  turn  now  to  the  power  of  the  State  over  private  prop- 
erty, we  shall  see  that  all  legitimate  acts  of  power  may  be  clas- 
sified as  follows: 


§    2  THE    POWEE    DEFINED    AND    DISTINGUISHED.  5 

First.  The  State  may  regulate  the  making  of  contracts 
between  citizens  in  respect  to  property  and  prescribe  generally 
as  to  their  validity  and  effect,  and  may  make  such  enactments 
as  to  the  acquisition  and  disposition  of  property  as  the  public 
welfare  requires.  Instances  of  this  right  are  seen  in  the  statute 
of  frauds,  statute  of  wills,  recording  acts,  conveyancing  acts, 
and  the  like. 

Second.  The  State  may  deprive  an  individual  of  his  prop- 
erty and  vest  it  in  another  in  order  to  compel  the  former  to 
fulfill  a  moral  or  legal  obligation  which  he  owes  the  latter. 
Upon  this  right  are  founded  the  laws  for  the  attachment  and  sale 
of  property  on  civil  process,  the  bastardy  laws,  laws  making 
the  support  of  wife  and  children  compulsory,  and  so  forth.* 

Third.  The  State  may  deprive  an  individual  of  his  prop- 
erty, as  a  punishment  for  the  violation  of  law.  All  laws 
imposing  fines  and  forfeitures  are  examples  of  this  power. 

Fourth.  The  State  may  regulate  the  use  of  property  in  such 
manner  as  the  public  health,  safety,  convenience  and  welfare 
may  require.  The  establishment  of  fire  limits  and  building 
regulations  in  cities,  and  the  prohibiting  of  certain  noxious 
trades  and  manufactures  within  certain  localities,  are  familiar 
illustrations  of  this  power.  It  is  known  as  the  Police  Power, 
or  the  Eight  of  Police  Eegulation. 

Fifth.  The  State  may  exact  of  the  individual  a  contribu- 
tion of  a  portion  of  his  property  based  upon  some  rule  of  apipor- 
tionment,  or  the  possession  of  some  privilege  or  franchise,  or 
the  exercise  of  some  trade  or  calling,  in  order  to  provide  a  fund 
for  defraying  the  necessary  expenses  of  the  government.  This 
is  known  as  the  Eight  of  Taxation. 

Sixth.  The  State  may  deprive  a  person  of  his  property,  or 
of  some  right  or  interest  therein,  for  the  purpose  of  appropri- 

8  "Beside  the  right  of  the  State  fulfill  some  moral  obligation  rest- 
to  take  private  property  for  pub-  ing  upon  such  individual  which 
lie  use  under  the  right  of  eminent  he  refuses  to  fulfill.  Thus  the 
domain,  the  right  of  taxation  and  State  may  take  the  private  prop- 
the  right  to  assess  fines  and  for-  erty  of  an  individual  to  fulfill  his 
feitures  for  crimes,  the  State  may  contract,  to  pay  his  debts,  or  to 
also  take  the  private  property  of  make  compensation  for  injuries  to 
one  individual,  and  transfer  it  to  person,  reputation  or  property, 
another  vy^henever  in  equity  and  which  he  has  caused;  or  to  support 
good  conscience  the  former  has  his  wife  or  children  when  he  refuses 
no  right  to  withhold  it  from  the  to  do  so."  Willetts  v.  Jeffries,  5 
latter,    or   to   enable    the    State    to  Kan.  470,  475.      (Bastardy  Case.) 


EMINEITT    DOMAIN.  §    3 


I 


ating  the  same,  or  making  it  subservient,  to  particular  uses. 
Thus  private  property  is  taken  and  held  by  the  State,  or  vested 
in  public  corporations,  for  the  public  use,  as  in  the  case  of  high- 
ways, canals,  parks,  public  buildings  and  the  like;  or  private 
corporations,  or  individuals,  are  authorized  to  institute  proceed- 
ings for  the  purpose  of  compelling  a  transfer  of  property  to 
themselves,  to  be  devoted  to  some  particular  use,  either  of  a 
public  nature,  such  as  railroads,  turnpikes,  etc.,  or  of  a  private 
nature,  such  as  private  ways,  mills  and  the  like. 

The  acts  which  are  described  and  included  under  this  last 
division  are  universally  spoken  of  as  pertaining  to  the  eminent 
domain.  All  other  exercises  of  power  over  private  property 
and  every  species  of  right  in,  and  control  and  regulation  over, 
property  of  a  public  nature,  may  properly  be  referred,  as  we 
have  shown,  to  some  other  of  the  sovereign  powers  of  the  State. 
Therefore  eminent  domain  is  properly  limited  in  its  application 
to  the  appropriation  by  a  sovereign  State  of  private  property  to 
particular  uses,  as  the  public  welfare  demands.  This  definition 
strips  the  term  of  all  ambiguity  and  uncertainty,  without  robbing 
it  of  any  significance  or  application  which  it  properly  embraces, 
or  has  acquired  by  common  usage. 

§  3.  Nature  of  the  power.  There  has  existed,  and  still 
exists,  among  jurists  a  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  nature 
of  the  power  of  eminent  domain.  Some  maintain  that  it  is 
a  kind  of  reserved  right,  or  supereminent  estate  or  interest  in 
all  property,  vested  in  the  sovereign  power.  Thus  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Connecticut  says :  "The  right  to  take  private  property 
for  public  use,  or  of  eminent  domain,  is  a  reserved  right  attached 
to  every  man's  land,  and  paramount  to  his  right  of  ownership. 
He  holds  his  land  subject  to  that  right,  and  cannot  complain  of 
injustice  when  it  is  lawfully  exercised."  And  again :  "The  true 
theory  and  principle  of  the  matter  is,  that  the  legislature  resume 
dominion  over  the  property,  and,  having  resumed  it,  instead  of 
using  it  by  their  agents,  to  effect  the  intended  public  good,  and 
to  avoid  entanglement  in  the  common  business  of  life,  they  revest 
it  in  other  individuals  or  corporations,  to  be  used  by  them,  in 
such  manner  as  to  effect,  directly  or  indirectly,  or  incidentally 
as  the  case  may  be,  the  public  good  intended."  *     This  view  is 

oTodd  T.  Austin,  34  Conn.  78.    See  R.  Co.,  3  Paige,  45;  Jacobs  v.  Clear- 

also   Harding   v.   Goodlett,   3   Yerg.  view  Water  Supply  Co.,  220  Pa.  St. 

(Tenn.)   41,  24  Am.  Dee.  546;  Beek-  388,  69  Atl.  870. 
man  v.  Saratoga  and  Schnectady  E. 


§  3 


THE    POWEE    DEFINED    AND    DISTINGUISHED. 


favored  by  the  etymology  of  the  name,  and  was  doubtless  the 
view  entertained  by  those  who  brought  the  name  into  use.  But 
the  name  is  of  comparatively  recent  origin,^"  and  was  applied 
to  a  power  already  existing  and  recognized,  and  we  must  look 
to  the  power,  and  not  to  the  name,  to  determine  its  true  signifi- 
cance. The  implication  which  the  name  imports  was  perceived 
by  writers  contemporary  with  its  introduction,  who  protested 
against  the  implication  of  its  etymology,  but  accepted  it  as  a 
convenient  name  for  a  power  which  was  well  defined.^' 

The  correct  view  is  that  the  power  of  eminent  domain  is  not 
a  reversed,  but  an  inherent  right,^^  a  right  which  pertains  to 
sovereignty  as  a  necessary,  constant  and  inextinguishable  attri- 
bute. ^^ 


loThe  name  appears  to  have  been 
brought  into  use  by  Grotius  and  oth- 
er continental  writers  in  the  early 
part  of  the  seventeenth  century. 

iiThus  Puflfendorf,  writing  in  the 
seventeenth  century,  says :  "The 
eminent  domain  (dominium  emi- 
nens)  is  what  some  are  afraid  of, 
more  upon  account  of  the  name  than 
the  thing.  The  sovereign  power,  say 
they,  was  erected  for  the  common  se- 
curity, and  that  alone  will  give  a 
Prince  »  sufficient  right  and  title 
to  make  use  of  the  goods  and  for- 
tunes of  his  subjects  whenever  ne- 
cessity requires;  because  he  must 
be  supposed  to  have  a  right  to  every- 
thing without  which  the  public  good 
cannot  be  obtained.  And  the  emi- 
nent domain  is  too  arrogant  and  am- 
bitious a  word  and  which  ill  princes 
may  sometimes  abuse  to  the  damage 
and  ruin  of  their  subjects.  But,  as 
it  is  trifling  to  dispute  about  words, 
so  I  think  there  can  be  no  absurdity 
or  danger  in  giving  a  particular 
name  to  a  particular  branch  of  the 
sovereign  power  as  it  exerts  itself 
in  a  certain  way  upon  certain 
things."  Puff.  b.  8,  c.  5,  §  7,  Eng. 
Translation  1703. 

i2The  power  of  eminent  domain 
is  an  inherent  attribute  of  sovereign- 


ty. San  Mateo  County  v.  Coburn, 
130  Cal.  631,  63  Pae.  78;  Chestates 
Pyrites  Co.  v.  Cavenders  Creek  Gold 
Min.  Co.,  119  Ga.  354,  46  S.  E.  422, 
100  Am.  St.  Rep.  174;  Jones  v.  No. 
Ga.  Elee.  Co.,  125  Ga.  618,  54  S.  E. 
85,  6  L.R.A.(N.S.)  122;  Hollister  v. 
State,  9  Ida.  8,  71  Pac.  541 ;  Potlatch 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Peterson,  12  Ida.  769, 
88  Pac.  426,  118  Am.  St.  Eep.  233; 
111.  Steel  Trust  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  etc. 
Ry.  Co.,  208  111.  419,  70  N.  E.  357; 
Lafayette  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Butner, 
162  Ind.  460,  70  N.  E.  529;  Sisson 
v.  Board  of  Supervisors,  128  la.  442, 
104  N.  W.  454,  70  L.R.A.  440;  Board 
of  Park  Comrs.  v.  DuPont,  110  Ky. 
743,  62  S.  W.  891 ;  State  v.  District 
Court,  87  Minn.  146,  91  N.  W.  300; 
Southern  III.  &  Mo.  Bridge  Co.  v. 
Stone,  174  Mo.  1,  73  S.  W.  453,  63 
L.R.A.  301;  People  v.  Fisher,  190 
N.  Y.  468,  83  N.  E.  482 ;  Spencer  v. 
Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry.  Co.,  137  N.  C. 
107,  49  S.  E.  96;  Covington  &  Cin. 
Bridge  Co.  v.  Magruder,  63  Ohio  St. 
455,  59  N.  E.  216;  Lazarus  v.  Morris, 
212  Pa.  St.  128,  61  Atl.  815;  Stearns 
V.  Barre,  73  Vt.  281,  50  Atl.  108G, 
87  Am.  St.  Rep.  721,  58  L.R.A.  240; 
Painter  v.  St.  Clair,  98  Va.  85,  34 
S.   E.   989. 

I3"lt  is  a  necessary  attribute  of 


8 


EMINENT    DOMAIH, 


§4 


§  4.     Eminent    domain    distinguished    from    taxation. 

Besides  the  power  of  eminent  domain,  the  State  is  clothed,  by 
virtue  of  its  sovereignty,  with  other  powers  over  private  prop- 
erty, with  which  it  is  closely  allied  and  sometimes  confounded. 


sovereignty  in  the  State  rather  than 
any  reserved  right  in  the  grant  of 
property  to  the  citizen."  Noll  v. 
Dubuque,  B.  &  M.  R.  E.  Co.,  32  la. 
66;  Hartwell  Matter,  2  Nisi  Prius 
Eep.  (Mich.)  97;  2  Redfield  on  E. 
E.,  p.  229.  "But,  practically,  it  is 
immaterial  whether  the  right  be  sup- 
posed to  have  been  impliedly  re- 
served because  it  ought  not  to  be 
granted,  or  because  it  is  a  portion 
of  the  national  sovereignty  which  is 
inalienable  by  the  government,  or 
whether  the  right  is  created  by  the 
public  necessity,  which  at  the  time 
calls  for  its  exercise, — its  existence 
in  every  State  is  indispensable  and 
incontestible."  Ealeigh  &  Gaston 
E.  E.  Co.  V.  Davis,  2  Bev.  &  B.  Law 
(N.  C.)  451.  "Whether  this  prin- 
ciple be  denominated  the  right  of 
transcendental  propriety,  or  of  emi- 
nent domain,  or  as  is  more  properly 
by  Grotius,  the  force  of  superemi- 
nent  dominion,  it  means  nothing 
more  or  less  than  an  inherent  polit- 
ical right,  founded  on  a  common  ne- 
cessity and  interest,  of  appropriating 
the  property  of  individual  members 
of  the  community  to  the  great  ne- 
cessities of  the  whole  community. 
This  principle  or  right  does  not  rest, 
as  supposed  by  some,  upon  the  no- 
tion that  the  State  had  an  original 
and  absolute  ownership  of  the  whole 
property  possessed  by  the  individual 
members  of  it,  antecedent  to  their 
possession  of  it,  and  that  their  pos- 
session and  enjoyment  of  it  being 
subsequently  derived  from  a  grant 
by  the  sovereign,  it  is  held  subject 
to  a  tacit  agreement  or  implied  res- 
ervation that  it  may  be  resumed, 
and  all  individual   rights  to  it  ex- 


tinguished by  a  rightful  exertion  of 
sovereign  power.  Such  a  doctrine  is 
bringing  the  principles  of  the  social 
system  hack  to  the  slavish  theory 
of  Hobbes,  which  however  plausible 
it  may  be  in  regard  to  lands  once 
held  in  absolute  ownership  by  the 
sovereignty,  and  directly  granted  by 
it  to  individuals,  it  is  inconsistent 
with  the  fact  that  the  security  of 
pre-existing  rights  to  their  own 
property  is  the  great  motive  and 
object  of  individuals  for  associating 
into  governments.  Besides,  it  will 
not  apply  at  all  to  personal  proper- 
ty, which  in  many  cases  is  entirely 
the  creation  of  its  individual  own- 
ers; and  yet  the  principle  of  appro- 
priating private  property  to  public 
use,  is  full  as  extensive  in  regard 
to  personal  as  to  real  property." 
Bloodgood  V.  M.  &  H.  E.  R.  Co.,  18 
Wend.  9,  57.  "The  exercise  of  the 
right  of  eminent  domain  by  a  sov- 
ereign cannot  be  the  creation  of 
grant  or  compact.  It  inheres  in  the 
existence  of  an  independent  govern- 
ment, and  comes  into  being  eo  in- 
stanti  with  its  establishment,  and 
continues  as  long  as  the  government 
endures.  The  United  States  did  not 
derive  the  right  to  exercise  it  in  Lou- 
isiana from  France,  or  in  Florida  from 
Spain,  or  in  California  from  Mexi- 
co, or  in  Alaska  from  Eussia;  the 
right  was  coeval  with  its  proprie- 
torship as  sovereign."  United  States 
V.  Cooper,  9  Mackey,  D.  C.  104,  117. 
See  also  Seholl  v.  German  Coal  Co.. 
118  111.  427;  Matter  of  Firman 
Street,  17  Wend.  649,  659;  Heyvvard 
V.  Mayor  etc.  of  New  York,  7  N.  Y. 
314;  White  v.  Nashville  etc.  E.  R. 
Co.,  7  Heisk.  518;   Eoanoke  City  v. 


§    4  THE    POWER    DEFINED   AND    DISTINGUISHED.  9 

These  are  the  power  of  taxation  and  the  power  of  police  regula- 
tion. A  tax  is  a  contribution  exacted  by  the  government  from 
all  the  individuals  of  the  State,  or  from  those  of  a  particular 
class  or  locality,  for  the  purpose  of  defraying  the  public  ex- 
penses.-'* The  contribution  may  be  of  money  or  of  property.'^ 
But  when  property  is  exacted  instead  of  money,  it  is  not  because 
the  State  needs  the  particular  property,  but  because  that  form 
of  exaction,  owing  to  the  scarcity  of  money,  will  be  more 
promptly  and  certainly  complied  with.  Taxation  is  also  based 
upon  some  rule  of  apportionment,  as  when  made  upon  persons 
according  to  number,  or  upon  property  according  to  value  or 
quantity  or  benefits.  In  all  these  respects  a  tax  differs  from  an 
exercise  of  the  power  of  eminent  domain.  "Taxation  exacts 
money,  or  services,  from  individuals,  as  and  for  their  respective 
shares  of  contribution  to  any  public  burthen.  Private  property 
taken  for  public  use  by  right  of  eminent  domain,  is  taken  not 
as  the  owner's  share  of  contribution  to  a  public  burthen,  but 
as  so  much  beyond  his  share.  Special  compensation  is  therefore 
to  be  made^in  the  latter  case,  because  the  government  is  a  debtor 
for  the  property  so  taken;  but  not  in  the  former,  because  the 
payment  of  taxes  is  a  duty  and  creates  no  obligation  to  repay, 
otherwise  than  in  the  proper  application  of  the  tax.  Taxation 
operates  upon  a  community  or  upon  a  class  of  persons  in  a  com- 
munity and  by  some  rule  of  apportionment.  The  exercise  of 
the  right  of  eminent  domain  operates  upon  an  individual  and 

Berkowitz,  80  Va.  616;  Baltimore  &  The  right  cannot  be  bargained 
Ohio  E.  K.  Co.  V.  Pittsburg  etc.  E,.  away  or  extinguished.  Puff.  b.  8,  c. 
R.  Co.,  17  W.  Va.  812,  841;  Steele  5,  §  7;  New  York,  H.  &  N.  E.  E.  Co. 
V.  County  Comrs.,  83  Ala.  304;  Mo-  v.  Boston,  H.  &  E.  E.  E.  Co.,  36 
ran  v.  Ex)ss,  79  Cal.  159,  21  Pac.  Conn.  196 ;  Sholl  v.  German  Coal  Co., 
Eep.  547 ;  People  v.  B.  &  0.  E.  E.  118  111.  427 ;  Tait's  Executor  v.  Ceu- 
Co.,  117  N.  Y.  150,  22  N.  E.  1026;  tral  Lunatic  Asylum,  84  Va.  271,  4 
Winona  &  St.  P.  E.  E.  Co.  v.  City  S.  E.  297;  post,  §  406. 
of  Watertown,  4  S.  D.  323,  56  N.  i4"Taxes  are  defined  as  being  the 
W.  1077 ;  Jones  v.  Walker,  2  Paine  enforced  proportional  contribution  of 
C.  C.  688;  Cherokee  Nation  v.  So.  persons  and  property,  levied  by  the 
Kans.  R.  E.  Co.,  33  Fed.  900;  Kan-  authority  of  the  State  for  the  sup- 
sas  City  v.  Marsh  Oil  Co.,  140  Mo.  port  of  the  government,  and  for  all 
458,  464;  Bridal  Veil  Lumbering  Co.  public  needs."  Cooley  on  Taxation, 
V.  Johnson,  30  Ore.  205,  46  Pac.  790,  p.  1.  See  also  Burroughs  on  Taxa- 
60  Am.  St.  Eep.  818,  34  L.E.A.  368;  tion,  chap.  I.;  Hilliard,  id.,  Intro- 
People  V.  Adirondack  R.  E.  Co.,  160  duction. 

N.  Y.  225.  237;  Weeks  v.  Grace,  194  iBSee  Dowell's  Hist.  Taxation  in 

Mass.  298,  80  N.  E.  220.  -  England. 


10  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    5 

without  reference  to  the  amount,  or  value  exacted  from  any  other 
individual,  or  class  of  individuals."  ^® 

§  5.  Distinguished  from  special  assessments  or  better- 
ments. There  is  a  peculiar  species  of  taxation,  known  as 
special  assessments  or  betterments,  which  is  often  confounded 
with  the  power  of  eminent  domain.  The  system  prevails  in  all 
the  States,  of  assessing  a  part,  or  the  whole,  of  the  cost  of  local 
improvements  upon  the  property  specially  benefited.  These 
local  improvements  are  usually  made  to  accommodate  a  partic- 
ular locality,  generally  at  the  instance  of  property  owners  in  that 
locality,  who  urge  the  improvement  for  the  express  purpose  of 
enhancing  the  value  of  their  property.  It  seems  but  just  that 
those  whose  property  is  thus  enhanced,  and  who  thus  receive 
peculiar  benefits  from  the  improvement,  should  contribute  spe- 
cially to  defray  its  cost.^'^  Special  benefits  being  thus  the  foun- 
dation, or  principle,  upon  which  the  special  contribution  is 
based,  it  should  not  exceed  the  benefits  conferred.^*  But  this 
is  a  question  of  policy  and  not  of  power  and,  in  the  absence  of 
some  special  constitutional  provision  on  the  subject,  it  is  held 
that  the  legislative  power  may  fix  the  district  to  be  taxed  for 
the  local  improvement,  which  may  consist  of  the  abutting 
property  only,  and  may  assess  a  part  or  the  whole  of  the  cost 

loPeople  V.  Mayor  etc.  of  Brook-  ifLockwood  v.  St.  Louis,  24  Mo. 

lyn,  4  N.  Y.  419,  55  Am.  Dec.  266,  20,  22. 

1851.    Approved  in 'Kiimm.ettv.'Phil-  isLouiaville    v.    Bitzer,    115    Ky. 

adelphia,  65  Pa.  St.  146,  1870.     See  369,  73  S.  W.  1115;  Weed  v.  Boston, 

also  C.  W.  etc.  R.  R.  C!o.  v.  Corns,  of  172  Mass.  28,  51  N.  E.  204,  42  L.R.A. 

Clinton  County,  1  Ohio  St.  77,  101,  642;    Sears    v.    Street    Comrs.,    173 

102;    Washington   Ave.,   69   Pa.    St.  Mass.  350,  53  N.  E.  138;  Dexter  v. 

352;   Gibson  v.  Mason,  5  Nev.  283,  Boston,  176  Mass.  247,  57  N.  E.  379, 

303;   Griffin  v.  Dogan,  48  Miss.  11;  79  L.R.A.  306;  London  v.  ColToy,  178 

Turner  v.  Althaus,  6  Neb.  54;   City  Mass.  489,  60  N.  E.  124;  Edwards  r. 

of  Aurora  v.  West,  9  Ind.  74;  Gib-  Bruorton,   184  Mass.  529,  69  N.  E. 

bona   v.   Mobile   etc.   R.   R.    Co.,   36  328;  Hutchinson  v.  Storrie,  92  Tex. 

Ala.    410;    Stein   v.    Mayor   etc.    of  685,  51   S.   W.  848,  45  L.R.A.  280; 

Mobile,  24  Ala.  591 ;  Harward  v.  St.  Norwood   v.   Baker,   172   U.   S.   269. 

Clair  etc.  Drainage  Co.,  51  111.  130;  And  see  Adams  v.   Shelbyville,   154 

Richman  v.  Board  of  Supervisors,  77  Ind.  467,  57  N.  E.  114,  77  Am.  St. 

la.  513,  42  N.  W.  422;   Alfalfa  Ir-  Rep.   484,   49   L.R.A.   797;   King   v. 

rigation   Dist.    v.    Collins,    46    Neb.  Portland,  38  Ore.  402,  63  Pac.  2,  55 

411,  64  N.  W.  1086;  County  of  Mo-  L.R.A.    812;    Martin   v.   District   of 

bile  V.  Kimball,  102  U.  S.  691,  703;  Columbia,  205  U.   S.   135,  27   S.   C. 

Board   of   Commissioners   v.    Reeves,  440. 
148  Ind.  467.    And  see  post  §§  5  and 
242. 


§    6  THE    POWER    DEFINED    AND    DISTINGUISHED.  11 

of  the  improvement  upon  such  district,  without  regard  to  bene- 
fits.^® But  the  courts  will  intervene  to  prevent  an  abuse  of  this 
power,  as  when  the  special  tax  or  assessment  amounts  to  a  con- 
fiscation or  spoliation  of  property,  because  there  is  no  benefit 
or  presumption  of  benefit  to  support  it.^"  A  special  assessment 
is  thus  seen  to  be  a  contribution  levied  upon  a  particular  class 
of  individuals,  and  apportioned  among  them  according  to  the 
quantity  or  value  of  property  possessed  by  each  in  the  locality 
of  the  improvement,  or  in  proportion  to  benefits  received.  Here 
is  every  element  of  a  tax  and  not  one  element  of  the  exercise  of 
eminent  domain.  Under  the  latter  power  it  is  always  sought 
to  appropriate  specific  property,  without  regard  to  any  ratio  or 
apportionment.  A  special  assessment  is  a  contribution  of 
money  the  same  as  a  general  tax.  The  compensation  received 
in  benefits  does  not  differ  in  principle  from  the  compensation 
received,  or  supposed  to  be  received,  for  general  taxes,  and  is 
often  a  myth  in  fact  in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other.  All  this 
seems  so  evident  that  the  wonder  is  that  any  court  should  have 
come  to  a  contrary  conclusion.  The  only  State  in  which  the 
doctrine  has  been  unequivocally  announced  that  special  assess- 
ments fall  under  the  power  of  eminent  domain,  is  Illinois,  and 

I'Montgomery  v.  Moore,  140  Ala.  645;  Wormley  v.  District  of  Colum- 

638,  37  So.  291;  Voris  v.  Pittsburg  bia,   181   U.   S.   402,   21    S.   C.   609; 

Plate   Glass   C!o.,   163    Ind.   599,    70  Shumate  v.  Heman,  181  U.  S.  402,  21 

N.  E.  249;  Cass  Farm  Co.  v.  Detroit,  S.  C.  645;   ShaeflFer  v.  Werling,  188 

124  Mich.  433,  83  N.  W.  108 ;  Good-  U.  S.  516,  23  S.  C.  449 ;  Hibben  v. 

rich   V.   Detroit,    123  Mich.   559,   82  Smith,  191  U.  S.  310,  24  S.  C.  88; 

N.  W.  255;  Wilzinski  v.  Greenville,  Cleveland  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Porter,  210 

85  Miss.  393,  37   So.   807 ;   Prior  v.  U.  S.  177,  28  S.  C.  647 ;  Cleveland  etc. 

Buehler  etc.  Co.,  170  Mo.  439,  71  S.  Ry.    Co.   v.   Porter,   210   U.   S.    177. 

W.  205 ;  McMillan  v.  Butte,  30  Mont.  See  State  v.  Robert  P.  Lewis  Co.,  72 

220,  76  Pac.  203;  People  v.  Pitt,  169  Minn.  87,  75  N.  W.   108,  42  L.R.A. 

N.  Y.  521,  62  N.  E.  662,  58  L.R.A.  639;   State  v.  Robert  P.  Lewis  Co., 

372;  Webster  v.  Fargo,  9  N.  D.  208,  82  Minn.  390,  402,  85  N.  W.  207,  86 

82  N.  W.  732,  .56  L.R.A.  156;  Har-  N.  W.  611,  53  L.R.A.  421;  State  v. 

risburg  v.  McPherson,   200   Pa.   St.  Macalester    College,    87    Minn.    165, 

343,  49  Atl.  988 ;  French  v.  Barber  91  N.  W.  484. 

Asphalt   Pav.    Co.,    181    U.    S.    324,  aoQoffman  v.  St.  Francis  Dr.  Dis- 

21  S.  C.  625;  Wight  V.  Davidson,  181  trict,   83  Ark.   54,   103   S.   W.    179; 

U.  S.  371,  21  S.  C.  610;  Tonawanda  Barfield  v.  Gleason,  111  Ky.  491,  63 

V.  Lyon,  181  U.  S.  389,  21  S.  C.  609;  S.  W.  964;   Wight  v.  Davidson,  181 

Webster  v.  Fargo,  181  U.  S.  394,  21  U.  S.  371,  385,  21   S.  C.  616;   Cass 

S.  C.  645;  Cass  Farm  Co.  v.  Detroit,  Farm  Co.  v.  Detroit,  181  U.  S.  396, 

181  U.  S.  396,  21  S.  C.  644;  Detroit  21  S.  C.  644. 
V.  Parker,  181   U.   S.  399,  21   S.  C. 


12 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§   !"' 


in  that  State  the  courts  seem  to  have  been  driven  to  that  con- 
clusion in  order  to  sustain  such  assessments  at  all,  owing  to  the 
peculiar  provisions  as  to  taxation  in  the  constitution  of  that 
State  then  in  force.^^  Since  this  difficulty  was  removed  by  the 
adoption  of  the  present  constitution,  the  Supreme  Court  of  that 
State  has  concluded  that  a  special  assessment  is  a  tax  and  not  an 
exercise  of  the  power  of  eminent  domain.^^  Other  courts  have 
exhibited  some  vacillation  on  this  subject.**     But  we  believe 


2iThe  provision  requiring  Tiniform- 
ity.  Chicago  v.  Lamed,  34  111.  203; 
Canal  Trustees  v.  Chicago,  12  111. 
406;  Chicago  v.  Colby,  20  111.  614; 
McBride  v.  Chicago,  22  111.  576; 
Peoria  v.  Kidder,  26  111.  351 ;  Town 
of  Pleasant  v.  Kost,  29  111.  490; 
Howard  v.  St  Clair  Drain  Co.,  51 
111.  130;  Hessler  v.  Drainage  Corns., 
53  111.  105;  Wright  v.  Chicago,  46 
111.  44.  The  Supreme  Court  of  Mich- 
igan encountered  the  same  obstacle 
in  the  constitution  of  that  State,  but 
overcame  it  by  holding  that  the  con- 
stitutional provisions  applied  only 
to  taxes  of  the  ordinary  kind  for 
State,  county  and  municipal  ex- 
penses, and  that  therefore  the  legis- 
lature had  plenary  power  over  this 
other  kind  of  taxation,  and  so  sus- 
tained special  assessments  as  a  tax. 
Woodbridge  v.  Detroit,  8  Mich.  274. 
In  City  of  Raleigh  v.  Peace,  110  N. 
C.  32,  14  S.  E.  521,  17  L.R.A.  330, 
a  special  assessment  was  sustained 
as  an  exercise  of  the  taxing  power, 
notwithstanding  a  similar  provision 
in  the  constitution  of  that  State. 
And  see  Munson  v.  Board  of  Com- 
missioners, 43  La.  Ann.  15,  8  So. 
906;  Sperry  v.  Flygare,  80  Minn. 
325,  83  N.  W.  177,  81  Am.  St.  Rep. 
261,  49  L.R.A.  757. 

2  2 White  V.  People,  94  111.  604, 
1880;  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Elm- 
hurst,  165  111.  148,  46  N.  E.  43. 

2  3In  Louisiana  the  court  first  held 
special  assessments  to  be  an  exer- 
cise of  the  taxing  power  in  Munici- 
pality, No.  2  v.  White,  9  La.  Ann. 


446,    1854,    and    afterwards    in    the 
New  Orleans  Drainage  Co.  etc.,   11 
La.   Ann.   338,    1856,   and   Surgi   v. 
Snetchman,    11    id.    387,    1856,   held 
them  to  be  an  exercise  of  the  pow- 
er  of  eminent   domain,   but   finally 
leave  the  question  in  uncertainty  in 
Wallace  v.  Shelton,  14  id.  503,  1859, 
and  City  of  New  Orleans  etc.,  20  id. 
407,  1868;  and  see  further  New  Or- 
leans V.  Elliott,  10  La.  An.  59,  1855; 
Yeatman    v.    Crandall,    11    id.    220, 
1856.    Recent  eases  have  settled  that 
a  special  assessment  is  a  tax  in  its 
essential  nature,  though  not  a  tax 
within  the  meaning  of  the  constitu- 
tional provisions  on  the  subject  of 
taxation.       Munson     v.     Board     of 
Comrs.,  43  La.  An.  15,  8  So.  906; 
Charnock  v.  Levee  Co.,  38  La.  An. 
323 ;  Manufacturing  Co.  v.  Green,  39 
La.  An.  455,  1  So.  873.    In  the  first 
of   these    cases    it    is    said:      "The 
levy  of  a  local  assessment  is  an  ex- 
ercise  of   the   taxing   power   in   its 
broadest    and    most    comprehensive 
sense;  yet  it  is  not  a  tax,  eo  nomine, 
and  is  not  governed  by  the  provisions 
of  the  constitution  on   the  general 
subject  of   taxation;    but  it  is   ex- 
erted entirely   independently  of  all 
its  provisions  on  the  subject  of  tax- 
ation."    In  New  York  the  Court  of 
Errors  in  1844-5  held  assessments  to 
be  an  exercise  of  the  taxing  power. 
Striker  v.  Kelley,  7  Hill,  9,  1844;  S. 
C.   2  Denio,   323,   1845.     Afterwards 
there    were    three    decisions    to    the 
contrary  in  the  Supreme  Court.    Jor- 
dan   V.    Hyatt,    3    Barb.    275,    1S48; 


§  6 


THE    POWEE    DEFINED   AND    DISTINGUISHED. 


13 


that  the  doctrine  is  now  universal  to  the  effect  that  special  assess- 
ments are  to  be  referred  to  the  power  of  taxation.^* 

§  6.  Distinguished  from  the  police  power.  Every  one 
is  bound  so  to  use  his  own  property  as  not  to  interfere  with  the 
reasonable  use  and  enjoyment  by  others  of  their  property.  For 
a  violation  of  this  duty  the  law  provides  a  civil  remedy.  Besides 
this  obligation,  which  every  property  owner  is  under  to  the 
owners  of  neighboring  property,  he  is  also  bound  so  to  use  and 
enjoy  his  ovyn  as  not  to  interfere  with  the  general  welfare  of  the 


People  ex  rel.  etc.  v.  Mayor  etc.  of 
Brooklyn,  6  id.  209,  1849;  People  ex 
rel.  etc.  v.  Mayor  etc.  of  Brooklyn, 
9  id.  535,  1850.  But  the  doctrine 
was  finally  settled  in  favor  of  the 
text  in  the  case  of  People  ex  rel. 
etc.  V.  Mayor  etc.  of  Brooklyn,  4 
N.  Y.  419,  55  Am.  Dec.  266,  1851, 
where  the  court  discusses  at  length 
the  distinguishing  characteristics  of 
a.  tax  and  of  an  exercise  of  the  em- 
inent domain  power.  To  same  ef- 
fect, Astor  V.  Mayor  etc.  of  New 
York,  5  Jones  &  S.  539;  Moran  v. 
City  of  Troy,  9  Hun  540.  Other 
cases  holding  or  intimating  that  spe- 
cial assessments  fall  under  the  pow- 
er of  eminent  domain  are  the  fol- 
lowing: Extension  of  Hancock 
Street,  18  Pa.  St.  26 ;  Zoeller  v.  Kel- 
logg, 4  Mo.  Ap.  163;  State  v.  City 
Council,  12  Rich.  S.  C.  702;  Sutton's 
Heirs  v.  City  of  Louisville,  5  Dana 
28.  See  Cribbs  v.  Benedict,  64  Ark. 
555.  In  Philadelphia  v.  Penn  Hos- 
pital, 143  Pa.  St.  367,  22  Atl.  744, 
an  ordinance  that  the  footways  of 
all  streets  and  highways  should  be 
graded,  curbed,  paved  and  kept  in 
repair  at  the  expense  of  the  abutting 
owner,  was  held  to  be  an  exercise 
of  the  police  power  and  not  of  the 
power  of  taxation. 

24"The  form  and  manner,  spirit 
and  bearing  of  an  act  of  State,  de- 
cide whether  it  be  an  exercise  of  the 
right  of  eminent  domain,  or  the  right 
of  taxation,  and  not  the  mere  phys- 
ical nature  of  the  thing  ultimately 


obtained  by  it  for  the  public  use." 
In  the  Matter  of  Dorrence  Street,  4 
R.  I.  230,  246.  In  support  of  the 
text,  see:  Burnett  v.  Mayor  etc.  of 
Sacramento,  12  Cal.  76;  Creighton 
V.  Manson,  27  Cal.  613;  Emery  v. 
San  Francisco  Gas  Co.,  28  Cal.  345, 
350;  Chambers  v.  Saterlee,  40  Cal. 
497;  Hagar  v.  Board  of  Supervisors 
of  Yolo  Co.,  47  Cal.,  222;  German 
Sav.  &  Loan  Soc.  v.  Ramish.  138  Cal. 
120,  70  Pac.  1067;  Nichols  v.  Bridge- 
port, 23  Conn.  189;  Edgerton  v. 
Green  Cove  Springs,  19  Fla.  140; 
Speer  v.  Athens,  85  Ga.  49,  9  L.R.A. 
402,  11  S  E.  802;  Briggs  v.  Union 
Drainage  Dist.,  140  111.  53,  29  N.  E. 
721;  Yeomans  v.  Riddle,  84  la.  147, 
50  N.  W.  886;  Bradley  v.  McAtee,  7 
Bush,  667,  3  Am.  Rep.  309;  City  of 
Covington  v.  Worthington,  88  Ky. 
206,  10  S.  W.  790,  11  S.  W.  1038; 
Alexander  v.  Mayor  etc.  of  Balti- 
more, 5  G.  &  J.  (Md.)  383;  Mayor 
etc.  of  Baltimore  v.  Greenmount 
Cemetery,  7  Md.  517;  Williams  v. 
Mayor  etc.  of  Detroit,  2  Mich.  561 ; 
Woodbridge  v.  Detroit,  8  Mich.  274; 
Roberts  v.  Smith,  115  Mich.  5,  72 
N.  W.  1091;  McComb  v.  Bell,  2 
Minn.  295;  Williams  v.  Cammack, 
27  Miss.  209;  Garrett  v.  St.  Louis, 
25  Mo.  505;  Newby  v.  Piatt  Co.,  25 
Mo.  258;  Palmyra  v.  Morton,  25  Mo. 
593 ;  St.  Louis  v.  Speck,  67  Mo.  403 ; 
Keith  V.  Bingham,  100  Mo.  300,  13 
S.  W.  683;  Morrison  v.  Morey,  146 
Mo.  543,  43  S.  W.  629;  Cain  v. 
Omaha,  42  Neb.  120,  60  N.  W.  368; 


14 


iEMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  6 


community  in  which  he  lives.^^  It  is  the  enforcement  of  this 
last  duty  which  pertains  to  the  police  power  of  the  State  so 
far  as  the  exercise  of  that  power  affects  private  property.  What- 
ever restraints  the  legislature  imposes  upon  the  use  and  enjoy- 
ment of  property  within  the  reason  and  principle  of  this  duty, 
the  owner  must  submit  to,  and  for  any  inconvenience  or  loss 
which  he  sustains  thereby,  he  is  without  remedy.  It  is  a  reg- 
ulation, and  not  a  taking,  au  exercise  of  police  power,  and  not  of 
eminent   domain.^*     But  the   moment   the   legislature   passes 


State  V.  Mayor  etc.  of  Newark,  35 
N.  J.  L.  168;  State  v.  Blake,  36  N. 
J.  L.  442;  S.  C.  35  N.  J.  L.  208; 
Coster  V.  Tide  Water  Co.,  18  N.  J. 
Eq.  54;  S.  C.  on  appeal,  18  N.  J. 
Eq.  518;  People  v.  Brooklyn,  4  N. 
Y.  419,  55  Am.  Dec.  266;  Litchfield 
V.  Vernon,  41  N.  Y.  123;  Scoville  v. 
City  of  Cleveland,  1  Ohio  St.  126; 
Hill  V.  Higdon,  5  Ohio  St.  243,  67 
Am.  Dec.  289;  Ridenour  v.  Saffin,  1 
Handy,  464;  Allen  v.  Drew,  44  Vt. 
174;  Woodhouse  v.  Burlington,  47 
Vt.  300;  City  of  Norfolk  v.  Cham- 
berlain, 89  Va.  196,  16  S.  E.  730; 
Walston  V.  Nevin,  128  U.  S.  578, 
9  S.  C.  192;  Norwood  v.  Baker,  172 
U.  S.  269.  The  nature  of  special  as- 
sessments will  be  found  to  be  ex- 
haustively discussed  and  the  author- 
ities reviewed  in  Town  of  Macon  v. 
Patty,  57  Miss.  378,  34  Am.  Rep. 
451 ;  Hammett  v.  Philadelphia,  65 
Pa.  St.  146;  Hancock  Street,  18  Pa. 
St.  26;  Davidson  v.  New  Orleans,  96 
U.  S.  97.  Where  a  city  assessed 
land  for  repairing  and  curbing  a 
street  which  had  just  been  paved 
and  curbed  by  the  city  and  was  in 
good  condition,  the  object  being  to 
make  the  street  conform  to  a  new 
und  different  plan,  it  was  held  that 
the  assessment  would  be  in  deroga- 
tion of  the  rights  of  private  prop- 
erty. Wistar  v.  Philadelphia,  8  Pa. 
St.  505. 

2  6  "Every  right,  from  an  absolute 
ownership  in  property,  dowp  to  a 
mere    easement,    is    purchased    and 


holden  subject  to  the  restriction, 
that  it  shall  be  so  exercised  as  not 
to  injure  others."  Coates  v.  Mayor 
etc.  of  New  York,  7  Cow.  585,  605. 
See  also  Jamieson  v.  Ind.  Nat.  Gas 
&  Oil  Co.,  128  Ind.  555,  28  N.  E.  76, 
12  L.R.A.  652;  Opinion  of  the  Jus- 
tices, 103  Me.  506,  69  Atl.  627;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Alger,  7  Cush.  84; 
Fertilizing  Co.  v.  Hyde  Park,  97  U. 
S.  659;  Lawton  v.  Steele,  152  U.  S. 
133;  Tenement  House  Dept.  v.  Moe- 
scher,  89  A.  D.  526,  85  N.  Y.  S.  704; 
Same  v.  Same,  90  A.  D.  603,  85  N. 
Y.  S.  1148;  same  cases  affirmed,  179 
N.  Y.  325,  72  N.  E.  231,  103  Am.  St. 
Rep.  910,  7  L.R.A.  704;  latter  case 
affirmed  without  opinion,  203  U.  S. 
583;  and  see  post,  §§  243-249. 

260dd  Fellows  Cem.  Asso.  v.  San 
Francisco,  140  Cal.  226,  73  Pac.  987; 
In  re  Kelso,  147  Cal.  609,  82  Pac. 
241,  109  Am.  St.  Rep.  178,  2  L.R.A. 
(N.S.)  796;  Hine  v.  New  Haven,  40 
Conn.  478;  King  v.  Davenport,  98 
111.  305,  38  Am.  Rep.  89;  Munn  v. 
People,  69  lU.  80;  S.  C.  affirmed, 
94  U.  S.  113;  N.  W.  Fertilizing  Co. 
V.  Hyde  Park,  70  111.  634;  S.  C.  af- 
firmed, 97  U.  S.  659;  Jamieson  v. 
Ind.  Nat.  Gas  &  Oil  Co.,  128  Ind. 
555,  28  N.  E.  76,  12  L.R.A.  652; 
People  V.  Hawley,  3  Mich.  330 ;  Bak- 
er V.  Boston,  12  Pick.  184,  22  Am. 
Dec.  421 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Tewks- 
bury,  11  Met.  55:  Watertovvn  v. 
Mayo,  109  Mass.  315,  12  Am.  Rep. 
694;  St.  Louis  V.  Stern,  3  Mo.  App. 
48;    Vanderbilt   v.   Adams,    7    Cow. 


§  6 


THE    POWEE    DEFINED    AND    DISTINGUISHED. 


15 


beyond  mere  regulation,  and  attempts  to  deprive  the  individual 
of  his  property,  or  of  some  substantial  interest  therein,  under 
pretense  of  regulation,  then  the  act  becomes  one  of  eminent 
domain,  and  is  subject  to  the  obligations  and  limitations  which 
attend  an  exercise  of  that  power.^^  We  shall  defer  until  a  sub- 
sequent chapter  a  discussion  of  the  limits  of  the  police  regula- 
tion of  private  property  and  of  the  acts  which,  though  under 
the  guise  of  police  regulation,  amount  to  a  taking  of  property 
for   public  use,  and  which,  therefore,  can  only  be  accomplished 


349;   Roosevelt  v.  Godard,  52  Barb, 
533;    Am.  Rapid   Tel.   Co.   v.   Hess, 
125  N.  Y.  641,  26  N.  E.  919,  4  Am 
E.  E.  &  Corp.  Rep.  199,  13  L.E.A 
454;  Tenement  House  Dept.  v.  Moe 
scher,  179  N.  Y.  325,  72  N.  E.  231 
103  Am.  St.  Eep.  910,  70  L.E.A.  704 
S.  C.  affirmed,  203  U.  S.  583;   Me- 
Candlass  v.  Eiehmond  &  D.  R.  Co 
38  S.  C.  103,  16  S.  E.  429,  7  Am.  E 
R.  &  Corp.  Eep.  366,  18  L.E.A.  440 
City  of  Charleston  v.  Werner,  38  S. 
C.  488,  17  S.  E.  33,  8  Am.  E.  R.  & 
Corp.  Eep.  73;  Town  of  Summerville 
V.  Presby,  33  S.  C.  56,  11  S.  E.  545, 
3  Am.   E.   E.   &   Corp.  Eep.   101,   8 
L.E.A.  854;   Beer  Co.  v.  Massachu- 
setts, 97   U.   S.  25;   C.  B.  &  Q.  R. 
E.    Co.    V.    Iowa,    94    U.    S.   155; 
Peik   V.    C.    &   N.    W.    R.   R.    Co., 
94   U.    S.    164;    Powell   v.   Pennsyl- 
vania, 127  U.   S.  678,  8   S.   C.   992, 
1257;   Lawton  v.   Steele,   152  U.   S. 
133;  S.  C.  119  N.  Y.  326,  23  N,  E. 
878,  16  Am.  St.  Rep.  813,  7  L.R.A. 
134.     In   Philadelphia   v.    Scott,   81 
Pa.   St.   80,   22   Am.   Rep.   738,   the 
court,  speaking  of  the  powers  of  emi- 
nent domain  and  police,  says:     "In 
their  leading  features,  these  powers 
are    plainly     different,     the     latter 
reaching  even  to  destruction  of  prop- 
erty, as  in  tearing  down  a  house  to 
prevent  the   spread  of   a  conflagra- 
tion, or  to  removal  at  the  expense  of 
the  owner,  as  in  case  of  a  nuisance 
tending    to    breed    disease.      In    the 
first   instance,   the    community   pro- 


ceeds on  the  ground  of  overwhelming 
calamity;  and  in  the  second,  be- 
cause of  the  fault  of  the  owner  of 
the  thing;  and  in  either  case  com- 
pensation is  not  a  condition  of  the 
exercise  of  the  power.  The  same 
general  principles  attend  its  exercise 
in  other  directions,  and  it  is  general- 
ly based  upon  disaster,  fault,  or  in- 
evitable necessity.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  power  of  eminent  domain 
is  conditioned  generally  upon  com- 
pensation to  the  owner,  and  for  the 
most  part  is  founded,  not  in  calam- 
itj'  or  fault,  but  in  public  utility. 
These  distinctions  clearly  mark  the 
cases  distant  from  the  border  line 
between  the  two  powers,  but  in  or 
near  to  it  they  begin  to  fade  into 
each  other,  and  it  is  difficult  to  say 
when  compensation  becomes  a  duty 
and  when  not." 

2'Lake  View  v.  Rose  Hill  Ceme- 
tery Co.,  70  111.  192,  22  Am.  Rep.  71; 
Chicago  V.  Laflin,  49  111.  172;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Bacon,  13  Bush.  210, 
26  Am.  Rep.  189;  Matter  of  Petition 
of  Cheesbrough,  78  N.  Y.  232;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Penn.  Canal  Co.,  66 
Pa.  St.  41,  5  Am.  Eep.  329;  State  v. 
Glenn,  7  Jones  L.  321 ;  Cornelius  v. 
Glenn,  7  Jones  L.  512;  Turnpike  Co. 
V.  Davidson  Co.,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  396; 
New  Orleans  Water  Works  Co.  v. 
St.  Tammany  Water  Works  Co.,  4 
Wood  C.  0.  134;  Crescent  City  etc. 
Co.  V.  Butchers'  Union  etc.  Co.,  4 
Wood  C.  C.  96. 


1-6  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    7 

under  the  power  of  eminent  domain.^*  It  is  sufficient  for  the 
present  purpose  to  point  out  the  distinction  between  the  two 
powers.  Under  the  one,  the  public  welfare  is  prompted  by 
regulating  and  restricting  the  use  and  enjoyment  of  property 
by  the  owner ;  under  the  other,  the  public  welfare  is  promoted 
by  taking  the  property  from  the  owner  and  appropriating  it  to 
some  particular  use. 

§  7.  Distinguished  from  the  damaging  or  destruction 
of  property  in  cases  of  necessity.  At  common  law  the  right 
exists  in  individuals,  in  cases  of  emergency  where  the  danger  is 
imminent  and  admits  of  no  delay,  to  control  and  destroy  prop- 
erty in  order  to  avert  a  public  calamity.^®  The  most  common 
example  of  the  exercise  of  this  right,  is  the  demolition  of  build- 
ings to  prevent  the  spreading  of  a  conflagration.^"  In  all  such 
cases,  if  the  judgment  of  the  individual  was  a  reasonable  one 
under  the  circumstances  in  which  he  was  placed,  he  is  not  liable, 
even  though  it  should  finally  turn  out  that  the  destruction  was, 
in  fact,  unnecessary.^^  Though  the  right  is  regulated  by  statute 
and  officers  designated  to  determine  upon  the  necessity  and  order 
the  destruction,  the  nature  of  the  act  remains  unchanged.  In 
such  cases  no  remedy  exists  except  such  as  was  previously  given 

2sPost,  §§  243-249.  soThe  right  of  a  traveler  to  go 

292     Kent's     Com.     338;     Dillon  upon  adjacent  property  when  a  high- 

Munic.  Corp.  §  955  (756)  ;  Mouser's  way  is  impassable  is  referred  to  the 

Case,  12  Coke,  62;   King's  Preroga-  same    law    of    necessity.      Irwin   v. 

tive  in  Saltpeter,  12  Coke,  12;  Bow-  Yeager,  74  la.  174,  37  N.  W.  136. 

ditch  V.  Boston,  101  U.  S.  16;   and  This  was  trespass  for  such  a  use  of 

cases   cited  in  subsequent  notes  to  private  property  when  the  highway 

this  section.     "The  best  elementary  was  blockaded  by  snow.     The  court 


writers  lay  down  the  principle,  and 

adjudications     upon     adjudications  "This  right  is  based  on  the  groimd 

have  for  centuries   sustained,   sane-  of    inevitable    necessity;    and    also 

tioned  and  upheld  it,  that  in  a  case  when  the  public  convenience  and  ne- 

of  actual  necessity,   to  prevent  the  cessity  come  in  conflict  with  private 

spreading  of  a  fire,  the  ravages  of  a  right,  the  latter  must  yield  to  the 

pestilence,  or  any  other  great  public  former.    Such  fact,  therefore,  may  be 

calamity,  the  private  property  of  any  pleaded  and  shown  as  an  excuse  for 

individual  may  be  lawfully  destroyed  the  alleged  trespass.     Such  tempo- 

for  the  relief,   protection  or  safety  rary  and  unavoidable  use  of  private 

of  the  many,  without  subjecting  the  property  must  be  regarded  as  one  of 

actors  to  personal  responsibility  for  those  incidental  burdens  to  which  all 

the   damages  which   the  owner  has  property  in  a  civilized  community  is 

sustained."      Senator    Sherman     in  subject."  p.  177. 

Russell  V.  Mayor  etc.  of  New  York,  siConwell   v.    Emrie,   2   Ind.   35; 

2  Denio  461,  474.  Suroeco  v.  Geary,  3  Cal.  69,  58  Am. 


§  7 


THE    POWER    DEFIlirED    AND    DISTINGUISHED. 


17 


by  the  common  law,  or  is  conferred  by  the  statute.*'^  The  reg- 
ulation of  the  right  by  statute  does  not  bring  its  exercise  under 
the  power  of  eminent  domain.^^  This  right  is  plainly  dis- 
tinguishable from  the  right  of  eminent  domain.  It  is  a  right 
which  exists  in  the  individual,  and  not  in  the  State ;  by  nature, 
and  not  as  the  result  of  political  organization.^* 


Dec.  385 ;  Dunbar  v.  The  Alcalde  etc. 
of  San  Francisco,  1  Cal.  355;  Mc- 
Donald V.  City  of  Red  Wing,  13 
Minn.  38;  Field  v.  Des  Moines,  39 
la.  575,  18  Am.  Rep.  46;  Hale  v. 
Lawrence,  21  N.  J.  L.  714;  Bowditch 
V.  Boston,  101  U.  S.  16;  Mouser's 
Case,  12  Coke,  62.  In  Bishop  v. 
Macon,  7  Ga.  200,  50  Am.  Dec.  400, 
a  contrary  doctrine  appears  to  be 
held. 

3  2People  ex  rel.  v.  Common  Coun- 
cil of  Buffalo,  76  N.  Y.  558,  32  Am. 
Rep.  337;  Bowditch  v.  City  of  Bos- 
ton, 4  Clifford,  323;  Keller  v.  Cor- 
pus Christi,  50  Tex.  614,  32  Am. 
Rep.  613;  Mayor  etc.  of  New  York 
V.  Lord,  17  Wend.  285;  S.  C. 
18  Wend.  126;  Mayor  etc.  of 
New  York  v.  Pentz,  24  Wend.  668; 
Russell  V.  Mayor  etc.  of  New  York, 
2  Denio  461 ;  American  Print  Works 
V.  Lawrence,  21  N.  J.  L.  248,  57  Am. 
Dec.  420;  S.  C.  21  N.  J.  L.  714; 
23  N.  J.  L.  590;  Parsons  v.  Pettin- 
gill,  11  Allen  507;  Taylor  v.  Ply- 
mouth, 8  Met.  462;  White  v.  City 
Council  of  Charleston,  2  Hill  S.  C. 
571 ;  Field  v.  Des  Moines,  39  la.  575, 
18  Am.  Rep.  46;  Bowditch  v.  Bos- 
ton, 101  U.  S.  16;  Town  of  Dawson 
V.  Katter,  48  Ga.  133.  For  a  con- 
struction of  the  New  York  statute 
as  to  goods  in  buildings  destroyed, 
see  Mayor  etc.  of  New  York  v.  Stone, 
20  Wend.  139. 

3  3In  American  Print  Works  v. 
Lawrence,  21  N.  J.  L.  248,  258,  57 
Am.  Dec.  420,  Green,  C.  J.,  says:  "I 
am  of  opinion,  therefore,  that  the 
destruction  of  buildings  to  prevent 
the  spread  of  a  conflagration,  is  not 
Em.  D.— 2. 


the  taking  of  property  for  public 
use  within  the  meaning  of  the  con- 
stitution. Nor  is  the  principle  al- 
tered by  the  fact  that  the  destruc- 
tion in  the  present  instance  was 
committed  under  legislative  sanc- 
tion. The  right  of  destruction  ex- 
isted prior  to  the  enactment.  The 
statute  created  no  new  power.  It 
conferred  no  new  right.  It  merely 
converted  a  right  of  necessity  into  a 
legal  right.  It  regulated  the  mode  in 
which  a  previously  existing  power 
should  be  exercised."  See  also  S.  C. 
23  N.  J.  L.  590;  Russell  v.  Mayor 
etc.  of  New  York,  2  Denio  461; 
Field  V.  Des  Moines,  39  la.  576; 
Keller  v.  Corpus  Christi,  50  Tex. 
614;  Bowditch  v.  City  of  Boston,  4 
Cliflford  323.  Compare  Hale  v.  Law- 
rence, 21  N.  J.  L.  714. 

3  4"The  right  of  eminent  domain 
is  a  public  right,  it  arises  from  the 
laws  of  society,  and  is  vested  in  the 
State  or  its  grantee,  acting  under 
the  right  and  power  of  the  State, 
and  is  the  right  to  take  or  destroy 
private  property  for  the  use  or  bene- 
fit of  the  State,  or  of  those  acting 
under  and  for  it.  The  right  of  ne- 
cessity arises  under  the  law  of  na- 
ture; it  is  older  than  the  laws  of 
society  or  society  itself.  It  is  the 
right  of  self-defense,  of  self-preser- 
vation, whether  applied  to  persons 
or  to  property.  It  is  a  private  right 
vested  in  every  individual,  and  with 
which  the  rights  of  the  State  or 
State  necessity  has  nothing  to  do." 
Per  Randolph,  J.,  in  American  Print 
Works  V.  Lawrence,  23  N.  J.  L.  at 
615;  S.  C.  21  N.  J.  L.  at  p.  257. 


18 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  8.  Distinguished  from  the  war  power.  The  taking, 
injuring  and  destruction  of  property  in  time  of  war,  is  clearly 
allied  to  the  injury  and  destruction  of  property  referred  to  in 
the  last  section.  The  war  power  is  founded  on  necessity.  It 
is  exercised  by  the  State  and  its  authorized  agents,  not  by 
individuals  acting  independently  and  upon  their  own  author- 
ity.*® According  to  the  laws  of  war,  private  property  in  the 
enemy's  country,  whether  belonging  to  friend  or  foe,  useful  to 
the  enemy  for  attack,  or  defense,  or  subsistence,  may  be  right- 
fully taken  or  destroyed.*^  The  owners  of  property  injured, 
or  destroyed,  in  the  actual  operations  of  war,  in  battle,  in  the 
movement  of  troops,  in  the  construction  of  works  of  attack  or 
defense,  are  without  remedy.* '^  So  of  property  wantonly  de- 
stroyed by  troops.  The  destruction  of  property  to  prevent  its 
falling  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy  falls  under  the  same  power.** 
In  such  cases  the  officer  acts  at  his  peril  and  upon  his  own  respon- 
sibility. If  his  judgment  was  a  reasonable  one,  in  view  of  the 
circumstances  as  they  appeared  to  him  at  the  time,  and  the  in- 
formation he  had  a  right  to  rely  upon,  the  act  is  justifiable,  and 
the  loss  is  the  owner's  misfortune.  If  the  ofiicer's  action  was 
not  justified  as  above  explained,  he  is  personally  responsible.*^ 
It  is  in  no  event  an  exercise  of  the  power  of  eminent  domain. 
There  is  not  wanting,  however,  some  authority  for  a  contrary 
view.*"     Where  the  property  of  a  citizen  is  impressed  into  the 


Beck   V.    Ingram,    1    Bush  er,    6    Bush    (Ky.)    606;    Christian 

(Ky.)    355.  County  Court  V.  Rankin,  2  Duv.  Ky. 

3  6  Bell   V.   Louisville   &   Nashville  502,  87  Am.  Dec.  505.    And  see  Clark 

R.  R.  Co.,  1  Bush  (Ky.)  404;  see  13  v.  Mitchell,   64  Mo.   564;    S.   C.   69 

Am.  Law  Reg.  N.  S.  275.     "For  the  Mo.  627. 

purposes  of  capture,  property  found  *cGrant  v.   United   States,   1   Ct. 

in  enemy  territory  is  enemy  proper-  of  CI.  41 ;  Mitchell  v.  Harmony,  13 

ty,  without  regard  to  the  status  of  How.    115.      But   see    comments    on 

the  owner.     In  war,  all  residents  of  these  cases  in  13  Am.  Law  Reg.  415, 

enemy   country   are   enemies."     La-  note.     In  Corbin  v.  Marsh,  2  Duv. 

mar  v.  Browne,  92  U.  S.  187,  194.  Ky.  463,  and  Hughes  v.  Todd,  2  Duv. 

3  7Bell  V.  Louisville  &  Nashville  R.  Ky.  188  the  act  of  Congress  provid- 

R.  R.  Co.,   1   Bush    (Ky. )    404;   see  ing  for  the  enlistment  or  drafting 

article  in  13  Am.   Law  Reg.  N.   S.  of  colored  persons  or  slaves,  author- 

337.  izing  a,  compensation  of  not  exceed- 

ssRespublica  v.  Sparhawk,  1  Dall.  ing  $300  to  the  loyal  owner  of  any 

357;   Ford  v.  Surget,  46  Miss.  130^  such  slave  and  that  such  slave  should 

Article  13  Am.  Law  Reg.  N.  S.  401.  be  free,  and  also  providing  that  the 

sojiitchell  V.  Harmony,   13   How.  mother,    wife    and    children    of   the 

115;  Farmer  v.  Lewis,  1  Bush  (Ky.)  soldier  should  be  free,  was  held  to 

66,  89  Am.  Dec.  610;  Dills  v.  Hatch-  be  unconstitutional,  as  in  violation 


§  8 


THE    POWER    DEFINED    AND    DISTINGUISHED. 


19 


service  of  the  State  in  time  of  war,  which  would  ordinarily  be 
procured  by  contract,  except  for  the  emergency,  there  is  a  taking 
within  the  meaning  of  the  constitution,  and  the  owner  is  entitled 
to  compensation.*^  But  if  there  is  a  lack  of  good  faith,  or  of 
a  sufficient  emergency,  or  of  proper  authority,  the  person  taking 
the  property  will  be  liable.*^  In  case  of  such  impressment  of 
property,  the  compensation  must  be  fixed  by  an  impartial  tri- 
bunal, and  not  arbitrarily  by  the  government.**  Personal  prop- 
erty once  rightly  impressed  vests  absolutely  in  the  government, 
and  does  not  revert  when  the  emergency  ceases.**  It  has  been 
held  that  money  and  real  estate  cannot  be  lawfully  impressed.*^ 


of  the  eminent  domain  clause  of  the 
Constitution. 

"Drehman  v.  Stifel,  41  Mo.  184, 
97  Am.  Dec.  268;  Wallace  v.  Al- 
vord,  39  Ga.  609;  Price  v.  Poynton, 
1  Bush  (Ky.)  387. 

4  2Barrow    v.    Page,    5    Haywood 
(Tenn.)  97;  Tyson  v.  Rogers,  33  Ga. 
473;     Jones     v.     Commonwealth,     1 
Bush    (Ky.)    34,  89  Am.  Dec.   771 
Sellards  v.  Zomes,  5  Bush  (Ky.)  90 
Brakebill    v.    Leonard,    40    Ga.    60 
Lewis   V.   McGuire,    3    Bush    (Ky. ) 
202;  Hogue  v.  Penn.  3  Bush    (Ky.) 
663;     Ferguson    v.    Loar,     5    Bush 
(Ky.)   689. 

<3Cox  V.  Cummings,  33  Ga.  549; 
Cunningham  v.  Campbell,  33  Ga. 
625. 

"Taylor  v.  Nashville  &  Chatta- 
nooga R.  R.  Co.,  6  Cold.  646.    Contra, 


Fryer  v.  McRae,  8  Porter  (Ala.) 
187.  And  see  Hawkins  v.  Nelson,  40 
Ala.  553,  91  Am.  Dec.  492. 

"White  V.  Ivey,  34  Ga.  186;  Ter- 
rill  V.  Rankin,  2  Bush  453.  On  the 
general  subject  of  the  section  the 
following  cases,  arising  under  the 
federal  captured  and  abandoned 
property  act,  will  be  found  of  inter- 
est. Harrison  v.  Myer,  92  U.  S.  Ill; 
Whitefield  v.  United  States,  92  U. 
S.  165;  Lamar  v.  Brown,  92  U.  S. 
187;  United  States  v.  Ross,  92  U.  S. 
281 ;  United  States  v.  Diekelman,  92 
U.  S.  520;  Conrad  v.  Waples,  90 
U.  S.  279;  Burbank  v.  Conrad,  90 
U.  S.  291 ;  Branch  v.  United  States, 
100  U.  S.  673;  Walker  v.  United 
States,  106  U.  S.  413;  Kirk  v.  Lynd, 
106  U.  S.  315. 


CHAPTEE  II. 

CONSTITUTIONAL  PROVISIONS. 

§  9.  In  general.  The  eminent  domain,  as  we  have  al- 
ready seen,  is  a  sovereign  power  and  devolves  upon  those  persons 
in  a  State  who  are  clothed  with  the  supreme  authority.  In  the 
States  of  the  American  Union  these  persons  are  the  people,  or, 
more  strictly,  that  portion  of  the  people  invested  with  the  elective 
franchise.  The  power  of  eminent  domain  has  been  delegated 
by  the  people  to  the  legislative  department  of  the  government  in 
the  general  grant  of  legislative  power.-^  In  nearly  all  the  States 
this  grant  has  been  accompanied  by  an  express  limitation  upon 
the  legislature  in  the  exercise  of  the  power.  The  ordinary  and 
typical  form  of  this  limitation  is,  that  private  property  shall 
not  be  taken  for  public  use  without  just  compensation.  The 
later  constitutions,  however,  display  a  tendency  to  amplify  and 
complicate  this  simple  prohibition  with  special  reference  to 
the  taking  of  property  by  municipal  and  private  corporations, 
and  also  with  reference  to  the  time  and  manner  of  compensation. 
As  these  constitutional  provisions  form  the  basis  of  a  great  mul- 
titude of  decisions,  they  have,  for  convenience  of  reference  and 
the  better  understanding  of  the  decided  cases,  been  collated  at 
the  end  of  this  chapter.  It  will  be  observed  that  but  one  State, 
North  Carolina,  now  remains  without  a  provision  on  this  sub- 
ject in  its  organic  law.^  Other  States  have  been  without  such 
a  provision,  as  follows:  ~Sew  York,  until  1822;  New  Jersey, 
until  1844;  Louisiana,  until  1845;  Maryland,  until  1851,  and 
Arkansas,  Georgia  and  South  Carolina,  until  1868.     The  pro- 

i"The   power   itself   is   an    iusep-  zThe  Constitution  of  New  Hamp- 

arable  incident  of  sovereignty,  and  shire    does    not    expressly    require 

its    exercise   was    delegated   by    the  compensation    to    be    made    and    is 

sovereign  power  to  the  general  as-  virtually  without  any  provision  on 

sembly,  in  the  general  grant  of  leg-  the  subject.  See  post,  §  41,  and  Opin- 

islative    authority."      Geizey    v.    C.  ion  of  the  Justices,  6fi  N.  H.   629, 

W.  &  Z.  R.  E.  Co.,  4  Ohio  St.  308,  33  Atl.  1076.    -See  also  the  Constitu- 

323;  also  Todd  v.  Austin,  34  Conn.  tion  of  Virginia,  post,  §  57. 
78;  ante,  §  3. 

20 


§  10 


CONSTITUTIONAL    PEOVISIONS. 


21 


vision  in  the  constitution  of  Kansas  relates  only  to  the  taking 
of  rights  of  way  by  corporations.  The  provision  first  appears  in 
the  constitution  of  Vermont,  adopted  in  177Y.  Massachusetts 
and  Pennsylvania  follow  in  1780  and  1790  respectively.  The 
principal  questions  which  have  arisen  in  construing  these  con- 
stitutional provisions  are,  first,  what  constitutes  a  taking;  sec- 
ond, what  is  a  public  use,  and,  third,  what  is  just  compensation ; 
and  these  questions  are  discussed  in  the  succeeding  chapters. 

§  10.  The  constitutional  provision  a  limitation,  not  a 
grant.  The  constitutional  provisions  in  regard  to  the  eminent 
domain  are  limitations  upon  the  power  as  vested  in  the  legisla- 
tive department  of  the  State.  They  are  neither  to  be  regarded 
as  declaratory  of  what  the  law  would  be  without  them,  nor  as 
grants  of  the  power  in  question  to  the  legislature.^  "This  power 
to  take  private  property  reaches  back  of  all  constitutional  pro- 
visions ;  and  it  seems  to  have  been  considered  a  settled  principle 
of  universal  law,  that  the  right  to  compensation,  is  an  incident 
to  the  exercise  of  that  power ;  that  the  one  is  so  inseparably  con- 
nected with  the  other,  that  they  may  be  said  to  exist  not  as  sep- 
arate and  distinct  principles,  but  as  parts  of  one  and  the  same 
principle."  * 


sUnited  States  v.  Jones,  100  U.  S. 
513,  518;  B.  &  0.  E.  E.  Co.  v.  P. 
W.  &  Ky.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  W.  Va. 
812,  841;  Challiss  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
R.  R.  Co.,  16  Kan.  117;  District  of 
City  of  Pittsburg,  2  W.  &  S.  320; 
Steele  v.  County  Comrs.,  83  Ala. 
304 ;  People  v.  Adirondack  R.  R.  Co., 
160  N.  y.  2L5,  237;  The  Water 
Works  Co.  of  Indianapolis  v.  Burk- 
hart,  41  Ind.  364;  Kennebec  Water 
District  v.  Waterville,  96  Me.  234, 
52  Atl.  774;  Brown  v.  Gerald,  100 
Me.  351,  360,  61  Atl.  785,  109  Am. 
St.  Rep.  526,  70  L.R.A.  472;  State 
V.  District  Court,  87  Minn.  146,  91 
N.  W.  300;  Samish  Riv.  Boom  Co. 
V.  Union  Boom  Co.,  32  Wash.  580, 
595,  73  Pac.  670;  Winona  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Waldron,  11  Minn.  515,  539, 
88  Am.  Dec.  100.  In  the  latter  case 
the  court  says:  "The  right  of  em- 
inent domain  is  hot  conferred  by  the 
constitution;  but,  if  affected  at  all. 


is  limited  thereby,  and  only  to  the 
extent  of  the  limitation  can  the 
citizen  obtain  any  redress."  Again, 
in  Harvey  v.  Thomas,  10  Watts  63, 
"Tlie  clause  by  which  it  is  declared 
that  no  man's  property  shall  be  talc- 
en  or  applied  to  public  use  A^■ithout 
the  consent  of  his  representatives 
and  without  just  compensation  is  a 
disabling,  not  an  enabling,  one,  and 
the  right  would  have  existed  in  full 
force  without  it.'' 

iSinniclcson  v.  Johnson,  17  N.  J. 
L.  129,  145.  "The  right  of  eminent 
domain  is  limited,  not  conferred  by 
the  Constitution."  Gt.  Western 
Nat.  Gas  &  Oil  Co.  v.  Hawkins,  30 
Ind.  App.  557,  565,  66  N.  E.  765,  "It 
exists  Independent  of  constitutional 
mandate,  and  it  existed  prior  to  con- 
stitutions." Lazarus  v.  Morris,  212 
Pa.  St.  128,  130,  61  Atl.  815;  Stearns 
v.  Barre,  73  Vt.  281,  50  Atl.  1086, 
87  Am.  St.  Rep.  721,  58  L.R.A.  240. 


22 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§    11 


§  11   (10).     States  having  no  constitutional  provision. 

It  is  an  interesting  question,  whether,  in  those  States  whose  con- 
stitutions contain  no  provision  in  regard  to  taking  private  prop- 
erty for  public  use,  the  legislature  is  under  any  restraint  what- 
ever in  the  exercise  of  the  power.  But  this  question  has  lost  most 
of  its  practical  interest,  from  the  fact  that  all  States  except  one" 
now  have  an  express  limitation  in  their  organic  law  touching  the 
exercise  of  this  power.  The  courts  of  nearly  all  the  States  which 
are,  or  have  been,  without  such  a  limitation,  have  held  that  the 
limitation  itself  was  simply  declaratory  of  certain  great  and 
fundamental  principles  of  natural  justice  and  equity  which  were 
as  binding  and  obligatory  upon  the  legislature  as  though  ex- 
pressly incorporated  into  the  written  constitution.*     The  idea. 


SNorth  Carolina.    See  ante,  §  9. 

eSpencer,  J.,  in  Bradshaw  v.  Kod- 
gers,  20  Johns.  103,  1822,  speaking 
of  these  constitutional  provisions, 
says :  "They  are  declaratory  of  a 
great  and  fundamental  principle  of 
government;  and  any  law  violating 
that  principle  must  he  deemed  a 
nullity,  as  it  is  against  natural  right 
and  justice."  S.  C.  20  Johns.  735, 
1823.  In  Harness  v.  The  Chesa- 
peake &  Ohio  Canal  Co.,  1  Md. 
Ch.  248,  1848,  it  was  said  that,  in- 
dependent of  constitutions,  "there 
was  a  principle  of  right  and  justice 
inherent  in  the  nature  and  spirit  of 
the  social  compact,  which  restrained 
and  set  bounds  to  the  authority  of 
the  legislature,  and  beyond  which  it 
could  not  be  allowed  to  pass — that 
principle  which  protects  the  life, 
liberty  and  property  of  the  citizen 
from  violation  in  the  unjust  exercise 
of  legislative  power."  And  see  Mar- 
tin et  al.  ex  parte,  13  Ark.  198; 
Cairo  &  Fulton  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Turner, 
31  Ark.  494;  Doe  v.  Georgia  R.  R. 
&  B.  Co.,  1  Ga.  524;  Young  v.  Me- 
Kenzie,  3  Ga.  31;  Parham  v.  Jus- 
tices etc.  of  Decatur  County,  9  Ora. 
341 ;  Loughbridge  v.  Harris,  42  Ga. 
501 ;  Sinniekson  v.  Johnson,  17  N.  J. 
L.  129;  Matter  of  Highway,  22  N.  J. 


L.  293;  The  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hetfield,  29  N.  J.  L.  206,  1861 ;  Den 
V.  Morris  Canal  Co.,  24  N.  J.  L.  587, 
1854;  Petition  of  Mt.  Washington 
Road  Co.,  35  N.  H.  134,  141,  142; 
Eastman  v.  Amoskeag  Mfg.  Co.,  44 
N.  H.  143,  160,  82  Am.  Dec.  201; 
State  V.  Franklin  Falls  Co.,  49  N.  H. 
240,  251,  6  Am.  Rep.  513;  Piscata- 
qua  Bridge  Co.  v.  N.  H.  Bridge  Co., 
7  N.  H.  35,  66,  70;  Opinion  of  the 
Justices,  66  N.  H.  629,  33  Atl.  Rep. 
1076;  Polly  v.  Saratoga  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  9  Barb.  449;  Matter  of  Tut- 
hill,  163  N.  Y.  133,  57  N.  E.  303,  79 
Am.  St.  Rep.  574,  49  L.R.A.  781; 
Johnston  v.  Ranlcin,  70  N.  C.  550; 
State  V.  Lyle,  100  N.  C.  497,  6  S. 
E.  379 ;  Phillips  v.  Postal  Tel.  Cable 
Co.,  130  N.  C.  513,  41  S.  E.  1022,  89 
Am.  St.  Rep.  868;  Southport  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Piatt  Land,  133  N.  C. 
266,  45  S.  E.  589;  Cosard  v.  Kana- 
wha Hardwood  Co.,  139  N.  C.  283, 
51  S.  E.  932,  111  Am.  St.  Rep.  779, 
1  L.R.A.(N.S.)  969.  Contra,  Lind- 
say V.  Commissioners  etc.  2  Bay 
(S.  C.)  38,  1796;  Stark  v.  Mc- 
Gown,  1  Nott  &  McCord  ( S.  C. )  387, 
1818;  Patrick  v.  Commissioners  etc. 
4  McCord  (S.  C.)  541,  1828;  Mani- 
qunet  v.  Commissioners  of  Roads,  4 
McCord  (S.  C.)  541,  1828;  State  v. 


§  12 


CONSTITUTIONAL    PEOVISIONS. 


23 


however,  that  the  legislature  of  a  State  is  restrained  by  limita- 
tions which  are  not  to  be  found  in  the  written  constitution,  is  not 
founded  upon  any  sound  legal  or  philosophical  principles.  The 
later  authorities  and  the  better  reasoning  are  against  such  a 
view.  The  subject  has  been  fully  treated  by  Mr.  Sedgwick  and 
Mr.  Cooley  in  their  admirable  treatises  on  constitutional  law.' 
In  some  of  the  States,  which  have  or  have  had,  no  provision  on 
the  subject,  the  right  to  compensation  has  been  worked  out 
through  other  provisions  of  the  constitution,  such  as  the  one 
that  no  person  shall  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty  or  property  with- 
out due  process  of  law.*  The  latter  is  undoubtedly  the  correct 
view  of  the  matter,  for  a  law  which  authorizes  the  taking  of  pri- 
vate property  without  compensation  or  for  other  than  a  public 
purpose,  cannot  be  considered  as  due  process  of  law  in  a  free 
government.® 

§  12  (11).  The  provision  in  the  federal  Constitution. 
The  provision  in  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  that 
private  property  shall  not  be  taken  for  public  use  without  just 
compensation,  applies  only  to  the  operations  of  the  federal  gov- 
ernment and  is  not  a  limitation  upon  the  power  of  the  States.  ■'*' 


Dawson,  3  Hill  (S.  C.)  101,  1836; 
Ex  parte  Withers,  3  Brevard  (S.  C.) 
83;  Raleigh  &  Gaston  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Davis,  2  Dev.  &  B.  L.  (N.  C.) 
451,  1837. 

'Sedgwick  on  Const.  &  Stat.  Law, 
pp.  123-132,  150-159;  Cooley,  Const. 
Lira.  pp.  85,  86,  172,  173.  See  also 
Slack  V.  Maysville  &  Lexington  R. 
R.  Co.,  13  B.  Mon.  1,  22;  City  of 
Logansport  v.  Seybold,  59  Ind.  225; 
Churchman  v.  Martin,  54  Ind.  380; 
Quick  V.  ^Vhite  Water  Township,  7 
Ind.  570;  Consumers'  Gas  Trust  Co. 
V.  Harless,  131  Ind.  446,  29  N.  E. 
1062,  15  L.R.A.  505;  Philadelphia 
V.  Field,  58  Pa.  St.  320;  People  v. 
Toynbee,  2  Parker  (N.  Y.)  490; 
People  V.  Gallagher,  4  Mich.  244; 
People  V.  Marshall,  6  111.  672 ;  For- 
sythe  V.  City  of  Hammond,  68  Fed. 
774. 

8Martin  ex  parte,  13  Ark.  198; 
Harness  v.  Chesapeake  &  Ohio  Can- 
al Co.,   1   Md.   Ch.  248;    Parham  v. 


Justices  etc.  of  Decatur  County,  9 
Ga.  341;  Norwood  v.  Baker,  172  U. 
S.  269.  See  especially  Staton  v. 
Norfolk,  R.  R.  Co.,  Ill  N.  C.  278, 
16  S.  E.  181,  17  L.R.A.  838.  But  a 
different  conclusion  is  reached  in 
the  South  Carolina  cases  cited  ante, 
n  46. 

sSee  post,  §  315. 

10  Barron  v.  Mayor  etc.  of  Balti- 
more, 7  Peters,  243 ;  Withers  v. 
Buckley,  20  How.  84;  Pumpelly  v. 
Green  Bay  Co.,  13  Wall.  166,  176; 
Thorington  v.  Montgomery,  147  U. 
S.  490,  13  S.  C.  394;  Livingston  v. 
Mayor  etc.  of  New  York,  8  Wend. 
85;  Cairo  and  Fulton  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Turner,  31  Ark.  494 ;  Raleigh  &  Gas- 
ton R.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis,  2  Dev.  &  B. 
Law  (N.  C. )  451;  Johnston  v.  Ran- 
kin, 70  N.  C.  550;  Concord  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Greeley,  17  N.  H.  47;  Martin 
V.  Dix,  52  Miss.  53,  24  Am.  Rep. 
661 ;  Renthorp  v.  Bourg,  4  Martin, 
0.   S.    (La.)    97;    Wilson   v.   Balti- 


24  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    13 

The  only  dissent  from  this  proposition  is  found  in  an  early 
case  in  Georgia;  ^^  but  the  Supreme  Court  of  that  State  after- 
wards modified  its  views  and  held  in  accordance  with  the 
text.^^    The  provision  applies  to  the  territories.^^ 

§  13  (12).  Effect  of  a  change  in  the  constitution.  A 
constitution  may  be  revised  or  amended  so  as  to  introduce  im- 
portant changes  regarding  the  power  of  eminent  domain.  The 
question  may  arise  as  to  the  effect  of  such  changes  upon  existing 
laws,  pending  proceedings  or  works  in  progress.  The  solution 
of  such  questions  pertains  more  properly  to  works  on  constitu- 
tional law;^*  but  a  brief  discussion  of  them  will  not  be  out  of 
place  in  this  connection.  Much  must  depend  upon  the  facts  of 
each  case,  but  in  general  it  may  be  said  that  provisions  intended 
to  secure  the  citizen  additional  rights  and  safeguards  against  the 
exercise  of  the  power  in  question,  or  affecting  the  remedy  or  pro- 
cedure only,  will  be  deemed  to  go  into  operation  immediately 
and  without  the  aid  of  legislation,  unless  the  operation  of  such 
provisions  is  expressly  made  dependent  upon  laws  to  be  after- 
wards enacted.  Thus  where,  by  a  change  in  the  constitution,  the 
compensation  or  damages  for  property  taken  is  required  to  be 
ascertained  in  a  particular  mode,  all  laws  inconsistent  therewith 
are  at  once  abrogated ;  -^^  and  proceedings  under  such  laws  there- 
after are  void  and  of  no  effect  even  collaterally.^^  But  a  party 
by  participating  in  proceedings  under  such  a  statute  and  invok- 
ing the  benefit  thereof  will  thereafter  be  estopped  to  assert  its 

more  &  P.  K.  E.  Co.,  5  Del.  Ch.  524;  Barb.  446;  Lamb  v.  Lane,  4  Ohio  St. 

Phillips  V.  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  130  167.    But  see  as  to  proceedings  pend- 

N.  C.  513,  521,  41  S.  E.  1022,  89  Am.  ing    on    appeal,    People    v.    Super- 

St.  Eep.  868.  visors,  3  Barb.  332.     In  the  foUow- 

iiDoe  V.  Georgia  E.  E.  &  B.  Co.,  ing  case   the   right  to  go   on   with 

1  Ga.  524.  pending  proceedings  was  held  to  be 

izYoung  V.  McKenzie,  3  Ga.  31;  secured  by  a  saving  clause.     Peoria 

Parham  v.  Justices  of  Decatur  Coun-  etc.   E.   E.    Co.   v.    Birhett,   62   111. 

ty,  9  Ga.  341.  332. 

isTerritory   of   Utah   v.   Daniels,  isMitchell  v.  Illinois  etc.  Co.,  68 

6  Utah,  288,  22  Pac.  159.  111.  286 ;  People  v.  Kimball,  4  Mich. 

K/Sfee  Cooley,  Const.  Lim.  chap.  4.  95;  Perrysburg  Canal  and  Hydraulic 

iBKine  v.  Defenbaugh,  64  111.  291;  Co.  v.  Fitzgerald,  10  Ohio  St.  513; 

Mitchell  V.  Illinois  etc.  Co.,  68  111.  Whitehead  v.  The  Arkansas  Central 

286;  Householder  v.  City  of  Kansas,  E.   E.   Co.,   28  Ark.   460;    Weber  v. 

83  Mo.  488;    St  Joseph  &  I.  E.  R.  County  of  Santa  Clara,  59  Cal.  265; 

Co.  V.  Cudmore,  103  Mo.  634,  15  S.  Trahern  v.  San  Joaquin  Co.,  59  Cal. 

W.   535;    People  v.    Supervisors,   12  320. 


§    13  CONSTITUTIONAL    PEO VISIONS.  25 

invalidity.^''    A  constitution  will  not  be  so  construed  as  to  have 
a  retroactive  effect.^* 

The  constitution  of  Arkansas  of  1868  provided  that  the  com- 
pensation for  a  right  of  way  appropriated  by  a  corporation 
should  be  ascertained  by  a  jury  of  twelve  men  in  a  court  of 
record  as  should  be  prescribed  by  law.^®  The  Cairo  &  Fulton 
R.  E.  Co.  was  organized  under  an  act  of  1855  which  provided 
for  the  assessment  of  damages  by  five  commissioners  on  the  appli- 
cation of  either  party.  In  ISli  Trout  filed  his  petition  against 
the  said  company  under  the  act  of  1855  for  an  assessment  of 
damages.  An  act  was  passed  in  1873  applicable  to  all  railroads, 
which  provided  a  mode  of  assessing  damages  in  accordance  with 
the  constitution,  but  it  gave  the  initiative  to  the  railroad  com- 
pany alone.  The  petitioners'  land  was  entered  upon  before  the 
passage  of  this  act.  The  court  held  that  the  constitution  did 
not  execute  itself,  but  plainly  indicated  that  it  was  to  be  carried 
into  effect  only  by  legislation.  It  was  further  held  that  as  the 
petitioner's  right  accrued  before  the  act  of  1873  was  passed,  he 
could  proceed  under  the  act  in  force  at  the  time  his  right  ac- 
crued.^" Where  by  the  adoption  of  a  new  constitution  compen- 
sation is  required  to  be  made  for  property  injured  or  damaged 
as  well  as  for  property  taken,  it  has  been  held  that  it  did  not 
apply  to  damages  occasioned  by  works  which  had  been  ordered 
and  contracted  for  before  the  new  constitution  went  into  effect.^  ^ 
But  where  an  ordinance  was  passed  for  a  change  of  grade  before 
the  new  constitution  went  into  effect,  and  the  change  was  not 
made  until  afterwards,  it  was  held  that  the  new  constitution  ap- 
plied and  that  the  municipality  would  be  liable  for  damages 
to  abutting  property  thereby  occasioned.^-     The  right  to  impose 

1 'Minneapolis   etc.   E..   R.    Co.   v.  that   either   party   should  have   the 

Neater,  3  N.  D.  480,  57  N.  W.  510.  right  to  a  jury  of  twelve  freeliolders, 

is'loledo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Pence,  the  existing  laws  remained  in  force 

68  111.  524.  until  a  general  law  was  passed  as 

isArt.  V,  Sec.  48.     See  post,  §  17.  contemplated  by  the  constitution. 

20Cairo    &    Fulton   R.    R.    Co.   v.  2iChicago  v.  Rumsey,  87  111.  348. 

Trout,  ,32  Ark.   17.     In  Supervisors  2  2City  of  Bloomington  v.  Pollock, 

of  Dodridge  County  v.  Stout,  9  W.  141    111.   346,   31   N.   E.    146;    S.   C. 

Va.    703,    it   was   held   that   where,  38  111.  App.  133.     Compare  Strouds- 

pending  proceedings  to   condemn,   a  bourg  Borough  v.  Stroudsbourg  Pass, 

new  constitution  went  into  effect  re-  R.  R.  Co.,  12  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  124 ;    St. 

quiring   compensation    to   be   ascer-  Louis  v.  Lang,  131  Mo.  412,  33  S.  W. 

tained  in  such  manner  as  should  be  54;   Ogden  v.  Philadelphia,  143  Pa. 

prescribed  by  general  law,  provided,  St.  430,  22  Atl.  Rep.  694. 


26 


EMINENT    DOMAIIT. 


§  14 


upon  existing  corporations,  by  an  amendment  to  the  constitution 
or  othenvise,  a  liability  for  consequential  damages,  where  none 
existed  before,  is  considered  in  a  future  section.^^ 

§  14  (13).  The  provisions  apply  only  to  the  power  of 
eminent  domain.  As  we  have  already  seen,  private  property 
may  be  taken  or  affected  for  public  use,  not  only  under  the  power 
of  eminent  domain,  but  also  under  other  powers  vested  in  the 
State,  as  the  power  of  taxation,  the  police  power  and  the  war 
power. ^*  Some  courts  have  held  that  the  constitutional  provi- 
sion in  question  is  a  limitation  upon  the  exercise  of  all  these 
powers.^^  But  the  better  view  undoubtedly  is  that  it  applies  only 
to  the  power  of  eminent  domain.^^     The  just  compensation  re- 


2  3Po«<,  §  379.  See  Pennsylvania 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Miller,  132  U.  S.  75, 
10  S.  C.  Rep.  34,  1  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp. 
Rep.  15;  Prather  v.  Jeffersonville 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  52  Ind.  16;  Den  v. 
Morris  Canal  etc.  Co.,  24  N.  J.  L. 
587;  Duncan  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R. 
Co.,  94  Pa.  St.  435 ;  Philadelphia  v. 
Wright,  100  Pa.  St.  235;  McElroy 
v.  Kansas  City,  21  Fed.  R.  257. 

a  Ante,  Chap.  1. 

26In  Macon  v.  Patty,  57  Miss.  37S, 
399,  34  Am.  Rep.  451,  the  court  says : 
"We  must  apply  this  provision  in 
all  cases,  notwithstanding  it  has  been 
said  that  it  is  only  applicable  to 
property  taken  under  the  right  of 
eminent  domain,  which  right  does 
not  extend  to  the  taking  of  money. 
We  agree  that  the  most  important 
use  of  this  provision  is  to  restrain 
the  right  of  eminent  domain;  but 
that  is  not  its  whole  force.  For  the 
prohibition  is  general  and  absolute: 
'Private  property  shall  not  be  taken 
for  public  use,  except  upon  due 
compensation,'  is  the  language  of 
the  constitution.  The  prohibition  is 
not  as  to  the  methods  in  which  the 
appropriation  may  be  made,  but  is 
a  denial  of  the  power  to  make  it  at 
all  by  any  method,  under  any  cir- 
cumstances, and  under  any  pretence 
whatever,    unless    compensation    is 


first  made.  It  was  intended  to  se- 
cure the  absolute  inviolability  of 
private  property  of  all  kinds  against 
any  and  all  invasions  under  public 
authority.  If  the  right  of  eminent 
domain  does  not  extend  to  the  tak- 
ing of  money,  this  is  no  reason  why 
that  kind  of  property  should  not 
come  within  the  protection  of  this 
clause  of  the  constitution;  but,  on 
the  contrary,  the  absence  of  the 
right  is  but  an  additional  safeguard 
for  its  protection.  It  is  true  that 
money  exacted  from  the  citizen,  in 
the  way  of  lawful  and  constitutional 
taxation,  is  not  within  the  meaning 
of  this  clause,  because  it  is  taken 
in  discharge  of  a  debt  to  the  State 
or  public.  But  if,  imder  the  guise 
of  taxation,  money  is  attempted  to 
be  exacted  beyond  the  limits  of  the 
taxing  power,  it  is  a  violation  of  the 
security  afforded  by  this  clause  of 
the  constitution."  See  also  Cheaney 
V.  Hooser,  9  B.  Mon.  330,  341;  Cain 
V.  City  of  Omaha,  42  Neb.  120,  60 
N.  W.  Rep.  368. 

2  6  "It  is  only  the  taking  of  specific 
pieces  of  property  of  an  individual 
that  is  prohibited  by  the  constitu- 
tional provision  mentioned."  City 
of  Logansport  v.  Seybold,  59  Ind. 
225,  228;  City  of  Aurora  v.  West,  9 
Ind.  74,  83. 


§    15  CONSTITUTIONAL    PKOVISIONS.  27 

quired  to  be  made  is  an  equivalent,  either  in  money,  or  in 
special  benefits  to  particular  proporty.^^  In  no  case  is  the  indi- 
vidual compensated  in  this  manner  for  money  exacted  for  taxa- 
tion or  loss  occasioned  by  an  exercise  of  police  power.  In  short, 
these  powers  would  be  rendered  nugatory,  if  such  compensation 
was  obligatory  in  case  of  their  exercise.  It  is  enough  that  a 
tax  or  police  regulation  promotes,  or  is  calculated  or  intended  to 
promote,  the  general  welfare.  The  individual  receives  his  only 
compensation  by  sharing  in  the  common  beneiit.  But,  if  the 
constitutional  provision  for  just  compensation  is  satisfied  by  a 
participation  in  the  general  welfare,  then  its  efficacy  to  protect 
the  individual  against  the  power  of  eminent  domain  is  entirely 
gone.  As  the  provision  must  have  a  uniform  interpretation 
and  cannot  be  made  to  mean  one  thing  at  one  time  and  another 
thing  at  another  time,  one  thing  when  applied  to  the  power  of 
eminent  domain  and  another  when  applied  to  taxation  or  police 
regulation,  we  think  it  is  clear  that  its  application  must  be  con- 
fined to  the  former  power.  It  does  serve  to  keep  the  other  powers 
within  their  legitimate  bounds,  but  within  those  bounds  it  has 
no  application.^^  These  conclusions  are  enforced  by  considering 
those  provisions  which  require  the  "just  compensation"  to  be 
first  made.  It  can  hardly  be  contended  that  this  modification 
changes  entirely  the  scope  and  purposes  of  the  provision.  But 
it  is  evident  that  it  would  absolutely  preclude  the  exercise  of  the 
power  of  taxation  or  police  regulation,  if  applied  thereto;  for 
it  is  impossible  to  receive  the  benefit  of  a  tax  until  it  has  been 
collected  and  expended,  or  of  a  police  regulation  until  it  has 
been  made  and  enforced. 

§  15  (14).  Constitutional  provisions. — United  States. 
Art.  5.  Amendments  of  1Y91.  *  *  *  "nor  shall  private 
property  be  taken  for  public  use,  without  just  compensation." 

Ordinance  of  1787.  Sec.  9,  Art.  2.  "No  man  shall  be  de- 
prived of  his  liberty  or' property,  but  by  the  judgment  of  his. 
peers,  or  the  law  of  the  land;  and  should  the  public  exigencies 
make  it  necessary,  for  the  common  preservation,  to  take  any 
person's  property,  or  to  demand  his  particular  services,  full 
compensation  shall  be  made  for  the  same." 

27We  do  not  mean  at  this  point  tion"  required  to  be  made  may  con- 
to  give  a  construction  of  the  words  sist   of    special   benefits.      See   post 
in  question.    All  we  mean  is  that  the  §§  687,  693. 
least  effect  courts  have   ever  given  a^See  post,  §§  242-249. 
to  them,  is  that  the  "just  compensa- 


28  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    16 

§  16  (15).     Alabama. 

1819.  Art.  1,  §  13.  *  *  *  "nor  shall  any  person's 
property  be  taken  or  applied  to  public  use,  unless  just  compen- 
sation be  made  therefor." 

1865.  Art.  1,  §  25.  "That  private  property  shall  not  be 
taken  or  applied  for  public  use,  unless  just  compensation  be 
made  therefor;  nor  shall  private  property  be  taken  for  private 
use,  or  for  the  use  of  corporations  other  than  municipal,  without 
the  consent  of  the  owner ;  provided,  however,  that  laws  may  be 
made  securing  to  persons  or  corporations  the  right  of  way  over 
the  lands  of  other  persons  or  corporations,  and  for  works  of 
internal  improvement,  the  right  to  establish  depots,  stations  and 
turn-outs ;  but  just  compensation  shall,  in  such  cases  be  first 
made  to  the  owner." 

1868.  Art.  1,  §  25.  The  same  provision  is  continued,  except 
for  "other  persons  or  corporations"  read  "either  persons  or  cor- 
porations," and  in  the  last  line  in  place  of  "such  cases"  read 
"all  cases." 

Art.  13,  §  5.  "!N"o  right  of  way  shall  be  appropriated  to 
the  use  of  any  corporation,  until  full  compensation  therefor 
be  first  made  in  money,  or  secured  by  a  deposit  of  money  to  the 
owner,  irrespective  of  any  benefit  from  any  improvements  pro- 
posed by  such  corporation;  which  compensation  shall  be  ascer- 
tained by  a  jury  of  twelve  men  in  a  court  of  record,  as  shall  be 
prescribed  by  law." 

1875.  Art.  1,  §  24.  "The  exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent 
domain  shall  never  be  abridged  or  so  construed  as  to  prevent  the 
general  assembly  from  taking  the  property  and  franchises  of 
incorporated  companies  and  subjecting  them  to  public  use  the 
same  as  individuals.  But  private  property  shall  not  be  taken  for 
or  applied  to  public  use,  unless  just  compensation  be  made 
therefor ;  nor  shall  private  property  be  taken  for  private  use,  or 
for  the  use  of  corporations,  other  than"  municipal,  without  the 
consent  of  the  owner ;  provided,  however,  that  the  general  assem- 
bly may,  by  law,  secure  to  persons  or  corporations  the  right  of 
way  over  the  lands  of  other  persons  or  corporations,  and  by  gen- 
eral laws  provide  for  and  regulate  the  exercise  by  persons  and 
corporations  of  the  rights  herein  reserved ;  but  just  compensation 
shall,  in  all  cases,  be  first  made  to  the  owner ;  and  provided,  that 
the  right  of  eminent  domain  shall  not  be  so  construed  as  to  allow 
taxation  or  forced  subscription  for  the  benefit  of  railroads  or 


§    16  CONSTITUTIONAL    PEOVISIONS.  29 

any  other  kind  of  corporations  other  than  municipal,  or  for  the 
benefit  of  any  individual  or  association." 

Art.  14,  §  7.  "Municipal  and  other  corporations  and  indi- 
viduals invested  with  the  privilege  of  taking  private  property 
for  public  use  shall  make  just  compensation  for  the  property 
taken,  injured,  or  destroyed  by  the  construction  or  enlargement 
of  its  works,  highways  or  improvements,  which  compensation 
shall  be  paid  before  such  taking,  injury  or  destruction.  The  gen- 
eral assembly  is  hereby  prohibited  from  depriving  any  person 
from  an  appeal  from  any  preliminary  assessment  of  damages 
against  any  such  corporation  or  individuals,  made  by  viewers  or 
otherwise ;  and  the  amount  of  such  damages  in  all  cases  of  appeal 
shall,  on  the  demand  of  either  party,  be  determined  by  a  jury 
according  to  law." 

1901.  §  23.  That  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent  do- 
main shall  never  be  abridged  or  so  construed  as  to  prevent  the 
legislature  from  taking  the  property  and  franchises  of  incorpo- 
rated companies,  and  subjecting  them  to  public  use  in  the  same 
manner  in  which  the  property  and  franchises  of  individuals  are 
taken  and  subjected ;  but  private  property  shall  not  be  taken  for, 
nor  applied  to,  public  use,  unless  just  compensation  be  first 
made  therefor;  nor  shall  private  property  be  taken  for  private 
use,  or  for  the  use  of  corporations,  other  than  municipal,  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  owner ;  provided,  however,  the  legislature 
may  by  land  secure  to  persons  or  corporations  the  right  of  way 
over  land  of  other  persons  or  corporations,  and  by  general  laws 
provide  for  and  regulate  the  exercise  by  persons  and  corpora- 
tions of  the  rights  herein  reserved ;  but  just  compensation  shall 
in  all  cases,  be  first  made  to  the  owner ;  and,  provided,  that  the 
right  of  eminent  domain  shall  not  be  so  construed  as  to  allow 
taxation  or  forced  subscription  for  the  benefit  of  railroads  or  any 
other  kind  of  corporations,  other  than  municipal,  or  for  the 
benefit  of  any  individual  or  association." 

§  227.  "Any  person,  firm,  association  or  corporation,  who 
may  construct  or  operate  any  public  iitility  along  or  across  the 
public  streets  of  any  city,  town  or  village,  under  any  privilege 
or  franchise  permitting  such  construction  or  operation,  shall  be 
liable  to  abutting  proprietors  for  the  actual  damage  done  to  the 
abutting  property  on  account  of  such  construction  or  operation." 

§  235.  "Municipal  and  other  corporations  and  associations 
invested  with  its  privilege  of  taking  property  for  public  use, 


30  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    17 

shall  make  just  compensation,  to  be  ascertained  as  may  be  pro- 
vided by  law,  for  the  property  taken,  injured  or  destroyed  by  the 
construction  or  enlargement  of  its  works,  highways  or  improve- 
ments, which  compensation  shall  be  paid  before  such  taking, 
injury  or  destruction.  The  legislature  is  hereby  prohibited  from 
denying  the  right  of  appeal  from  any  preliminary  assessment  of 
damages  against  any  such  corporations  or  individuals  made  by 
viewers  or  otherwise,  but  such  appeal  shall  not  deprive  those 
who  have  obtained  the  judgment  of  condemnation  from  a  right 
of  entry,  provided  the  amount  of  damages  assessed  shall  have 
been  paid  into  court  in  money,  and  a  bond  shall  have  been 
given  in  not  less  than  double  the  amount  of  the  damages  as- 
sessed, with  good  and  sufficient  sureties,  to  pay  such  damages  as 
the  property  owner  may  sustain ;  and  the  amount  of  damages  in 
all  cases  of  appeals  shall  on  the  demand,  of  either  party,  be 
determined  by  a  jury  according  to  law." 

§  17   (16).     Arkansas. 

1836.     No  provision. 

1864.     No  provision. 

1868.  Art.  1,  §  15.  "Private  property  shall  not  be  taken 
for  public  use  without  just  compensation  therefor." 

Art.  5,  §  48.  *  *  *  "~So  right  of  way  shall  be  appropri- 
ated to  the  use  of  any  corporation  until  full  compensation  there- 
for shall  be  first  made  in  money,  or  first  secured  by  a  deposit  of 
money,  to  the  owner,  irrespective  of  any  benefit  from  any  im- 
provement proposed  by  such  corporation;  which  compensation 
shall  be  ascertained  by  a  jury  of  twelve  men  in  a  court  of  record, 
as  shall  be  prescribed  by  law." 

1874.  Art.  2,  §  22.  "The  right  of  property  is  before  and 
higher  than  any  constitutional  sanction;  and  private  property 
shall  not  be  taken,  appropriated,  or  damaged  for  public  use  with- 
out just  compensation  therefor." 

Art.  12,  §  9.  "No  property  nor  right  of  way  shall  be  appro- 
priated to  the  use  of  any  corporations  until  full  compensation 
therefor  shall  be  first  made  to  the  owner  in  money,  or  first  se- 
cured to  him  by  a  deposit  of  money ;  which  compensation,  ir- 
respective of  any  benefit  from  any  improvement  proposed  by 
such  corporation,  shall  be  ascertained  by  a  jury  of  twelve  men, 
in  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction,  as  shall  be  prescribed  by 
law." 

§  11.  "Foreign  corporations  *  *  *  shall  not  have 
power  to  condemn  or  appropriate  private  property," 


§    19  CONSTITUTIOITAl,    PEOVISIONS.  31 

Art.  17,  §  9.  "The  exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent  domain 
shall  never  be  abridged  or  so  construed  as  to  prevent  the  gen- 
eral assembly  from  taking  the  property  and  franchises  of  incor- 
porated companies  and  subjecting  them  to  public  use,  the  same 
as  the  property  of  individuals." 

§  12.  "All  railroads,  which  are  now  or  may  be  hereafter 
built  and  operated  cither  in  whole  or  in  part,  in  this  State,  shall 
be  responsible  for  all  damages  to  persons  and  property,  under 
such  regulations  as  may  be  prescribed  by  the  general  assembly." 

§  18  (17).     California. 

1849.  Art.  1,  §  8.  *  *  *  "nor  shall  private  property 
be  taken  for  public  use  without  just  compensation." 

1879.  Art.  1,  §  14.  "Private  property  shall  not  be  taken 
or  damaged  for  public  use  without  just  compensation  having 
been  first  made  to,  or  paid  into  court  for,  the  owner,  and  no 
right  of  way  shall  be  appropriated  to  the  use  of  any  corporation 
other  than  municipal  until  full  compensation  therefor  be  first 
made  in  money  or  ascertained  or  paid  into  court  for  the  owner, 
irrespective  of  any  benefit  from  any  improvement  proposed  by 
such  corporation,  which  compensation  shall  be  ascertained  by  a 
jury,  unless  a  jury  be  waived,  as  in  other  civil  cases  in  a  court 
of  record,  as  shall  be  prescribed  by  law." 

Art.  12,  §  8.  "The  exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent  domain 
shall  never  be  so  abridged  or  construed  as  to  prevent  the  legis- 
lature from  taking  the  property  and  franchises  of  incorporated 
companies,  and  subjecting  them  to  public  use  the  same  as  the 
property  of  individuals." 

Art.  14,  §  1.  "The  use  of  all  water  now  appropriated,  or 
that  may  hereafter  be  appropriated,  for  sale,  rental,  or  distri- 
bution, is  hereby  declared  to  be  a  public  use,  and  subject  to 
the  regulation  and  control  of  the  State,  in  the  manner  to  be  pre- 
scribed by  law." 

§  19  (18).     Colorado. 

1876.  Art.  2,  §  14.  "That  private  property  shall  not  be 
taken  for  private  use  luiless  by  consent  of  the  owner,  except 
for  private  ways  of  necessity,  and  except  for  reservoirs,  drains, 
flumes,  or  ditches  on  or  across  the  land  of  others,  for  agricultural, 
mining,  milling,  domestic,  or  sanitary  purposes." 

§  15.  "That  private  property  shall  not  bo  taken  or  damaged, 
for  public  or  private  use,  without  just  compensation.  Such 
compensation  shall  be  ascertained  by  a  board  of  commissioners, 
of  not  less  than  three  freeholders,  or  by  a  jury,  when  required 


33  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    20 

by  the  owner  of  the  property,  in  such  manner  as  may  be  pre- 
scribed by  law,  and  until  the  same  shall  be  paid  to  the  owner, 
or  into  court  for  the  owner,  the  property  shall  not  be  needlessly 
disturbed,  or  the  proprietary  rights  of  the  owner  therein  di- 
vested; and  whenever  an  attempt  is  made  to  take  private  prop- 
erty for  a  use  alleged  to  be  public,  the  question  whether  the 
contemplated  use  be  really  public  shall  be  a  judicial  question, 
and  determined  as  such  without  regard  to  any  legislative  asser- 
tion that  the  use  is  public." 

Art.  15,  §  8.  "The  right  of  eminent  domain  shall  never  be 
abridged,  nor  so  construed  as  to  prevent  the  general  assembly 
from  taking  the  property  and  franchises  of  incorporated  com- 
panies and  subjecting  them  to  public  use,  the  same  as  the  proper- 
ty of  individuals." 

§  20  (19).     Connecticut. 

1818.  Art.  1,  §  11.  "The  property  of  no  person  shall  be 
taken  for  public  use  without  just  compensation  therefor." 

§  21   (20).     Delaware. 

1776.     No  provision. 

1792.  Art.  1,  §  8  *  *  *  "nor  shall  any  man's  prop- 
erty be  taken  or  applied  to  public  use  without  the  consent  of 
his  representatives,  and  without  compensation  being  made." 

1831.     Art.  1,  §  8.     Same. 

1897.     Art.  1,  §  8.     Same. 

§  22  (21).     Florida. 

1838.  Art.  1,  §  14.  "That  private  property  shall  not  be 
taken  or  applied  to  public  use  unless  just  compensation  be  made 
therefor." 

1865.  Art.  1,  §  14.  "That  private  property  shall  not  be 
taken  or  applied  to  public  use,  unless  just  compensation  be  first 
made  therefor." 

1868.  Art.  1,  §  9.  *  *  *  "nor  shall  private  property 
be  taken  without  just  compensation." 

1886.  Declaration  of  rights,  §  12.  *  *  *  "nor  shall 
private  property  be  taken  without  just  compensation." 

Art.  16,  §  29.  "No  private  property  nor  right  of  way  shall 
be  appropriated  to  the  use  of  any  corporation  or  individual 
until  full  compensation  therefor  shall  be  first  made  to  the  owner, 
or  first  secured  to  him  by  deposit  of  money ;  which  compensation, 
irrespective  of  any  benefit  from  any  improvement  proposed  by 
any  such  corporation  or  individual,  shall  be  ascertained  by  a 


§    24  CONSTITUTIONAL    PEOVISIOWS.  33 

jury  of  twelve  men  in  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction,  as  shall 
be  prescribed  by  law." 

§  23  (22).     Georgia. 

1777.     No  provision. 

1789.     No  provision. 

1798.     No  provision. 

1865.  Art.  1,  §  17.  "In  cases  of  necessity,  private  ways 
may  be  granted  upon  just  compensation  being  first  paid;  and 
with  this  exception  private  property  shall  not  be  taken,  save  for 
public  use,  and  then  only  on  just  compensation,  to  be  first  pro- 
vided and  paid,  unless  there  be  a  pressing,  unforeseen  necessity ; 
in  which  event  the  general  assembly  shall  make  early  provision 
for  such  compensation." 

1868.  Art.  1,  §  20.  "Private  ways  may  be  granted  upon 
just  compensation  being  paid  by  the  applicant." 

1877.  Art.  1,  Sec.  Ill,  T[  1.  "In  cases  of  necessity,  private 
ways  may  be  granted  upon  just  compensation  being  first  paid 
by  the  applicant.  Private  property  shall  not  be  taken  or  dam- 
aged for  public  purposes,  without  just  and  adequate  compensa- 
tion being  first  paid." 

Art.  Ill,  Sec.  VII,  f  20.  "The  General  Assembly  shall  not 
authorize  the  construction  of  any  street  passenger  railway  with- 
in the  limits  of  any  incorporated  town  or  city,  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  corporate  authorities." 

Art.  IV,  Sec.  II,  fi  2.  "The  exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent 
domain  shall  never  be  abridged,  nor  so  construed  as  to  prevent 
the  General  Assembly  from  taking  the  property  and  franchises 
of  incorporated  companies  and  subjecting  them  to  public  use, 
the  same  as  property  of  individuals."     *     *     * 

§  24  (22a).     Idaho. 

1889.  Art.  1,  §  14.  "The  necessary  use  of  lands  for  the 
construction  of  reservoirs  or  storage  basins,  for  the  purpose  of 
irrigation,  or  for  rights  of  way  for  the  construction  of  canals, 
ditches,  flumes  or  pipes,  to  convey  water  to  the  place  of  use,  for 
any  useful,  beneficial  or  necessary  purpose,  or  for  drainage ;  or 
for  the  drainage  of  mines,  or  the  working  thereof,  by  means  of 
roads,  railroads,  tramways,  cuts,  tunnels,  shafts,  hoisting  works, 
dumps,  or  other  necessary  means  to  their  complete  development, 
or  any  other  use  necessary  to  the  complete  development  of  the 
material  resources  of  the  State,  or  the  preservation  of  the  health 
of  its  inhabitants,  is  hereby  declared  to  be  a  public  use,  and 
subject  to  the  regulation  and  control  of  the  State. 
Em.  D.— 3. 


34  EMIlTETfT    DOMAIN.  §    25 

"Private  property  may  be  taken  for  public  use,  but  not  until 
a  just  compensation,  to  be  ascertained  in  a  manner  prescribed  by 
law,  shall  be  paid  therefor." 

Art.  11,  §  8.  "The  right  of  eminent  domain  shall  never  be 
abridged,  or  so  construed  as  to  prevent  the  legislature  from  tak- 
ing the  property  and  franchise  of  incorporated  companies  and 
subjecting  them  to  public  use,  the  same  as  property  of  individ- 
uals." 

See  also  the  whole  of  article  15  as  to  water  rights. 

§  25  (23).     Illinois. 

1818.  Art.  8,  §  11.  *  *  *  "nor  shall  any  man's  prop- 
erty be  taken  or  applied  to  public  use,  without  the  consent  of 
his  representatives  in  the  general  assembly,  nor  without  just 
compensation  being  made  to  him." 

1848.     Art.  13,  §  11.     Same. 

18Y0.  Art.  2,  §  13.  "Private  property  shall  not  be  taken 
or  damaged  for  public  use  without  just  compensation.  Such 
compensation,  when  not  made  by  the  State,  shall  be  ascertained 
by  a  jury,  as  shall  be  prescribed  by  law.  The  fee  of  land  taken 
for  railroad  tracks,  without  consent  of  the  owners  thereof,  shall 
remain  in  such  owners,  subject  to  the  use  for  which  it  was 
taken." 

Art.  4,  §  30.  "The  general  assembly  may  provide  for  es- 
tablishing and  opening  roads  and  cartways,  connected  with  a 
public  road,  for  private  or  public  use." 

Art.  11,  §  14.  "The  exercise  of  the  power  and  the  right  of 
eminent  domain  shall  never  be  so  construed  or  abridged  as  to 
prevent  the  taking,  by  the  general  assembly,  of  the  property  and 
franchises  of  incorporated  companies  already  organized,  and 
subjecting  them  to  the  public  necessity  the  same  as  of  individ- 
uals. The  right  of  trial  by  jury  shall  be  held  inviolate  in  all 
trials  of  claims  for  compensation,  when,  in  the  exercise  of  the 
said  right  of  eminent  domain,  any  incorporated  company  shall 
be  interested  either  for  or  against  the  exercise  of  said  right." 

Art.  4,  §  31,  as  amended  in  1878.  "The  General  Assembly 
may  pass  laws  permitting  the  owners  of  lands  to  construct  drains, 
ditches  and  levees  for  agricultural,  sanitary  or  mining  purposes, 
across  the  lands  of  others,  and  provide  for  the  organization  of 
drainage  districts  and  vest  the  corporate  authorities  thereof, 
with  power  to  construct  and  maintain  levees,  drains  and  ditches, 
and  to  keep  in  repair  all  drains,  ditches  and  levees  heretofore 


§    29  CONSTITUTIONAL    PEO VISIONS.  35 

constructed  under  the  laws  of  this  State,  by  special  assessments 
upon  the  property  benefited  thereby." 

§  26  (24).     Indiana. 

1816.  Art.  1,  §  7.  "That  no  man's  particular  services  shall 
be  demanded,  or  property  taken  or  applied  to  public  use,  without 
the  consent  of  his  representatives,  or  without  a  just  compensa- 
tion being  made  therefor." 

1851.  Art.  1,  §  21.  "jSTo  man's  particular  services  shall  be 
demanded  without  just  compensation.  No  man's  property  shall 
be  taken  by  law  without  just  compensation ;  nor,  except  in  case 
of  the  State,  without  such  compensation  first  assessed  and  ten- 
dered." 

§  27  (25).     Iowa. 

1846.  Art.  1,  §  18.  "Private  property  shall  not  be  taken 
for  public  use  without  just  compensation  first  being  made,  or 
secured,  to  be  paid  to  the  owner  thereof,  as  soon  as  the  damages 
shall  be  assessed  by  a  jury,  who  shall  not  take  into  consideration 
any  advantages  that  may  result  to  said  owner  on  account  of  the 
improvement  for  which  it  is  taken." 

1857.    Art.  1,  §  18.    Same. 

§  28  (26).     Kansas. 

1859.  Art.  12,  §  4.  "ISTo  right  of  way  shall  be  appropri- 
ated to  the  use  of  any  corporation  until  full  coriipensation  there- 
for be  first  made  in  money,  or  secured  by  a  deposit  of  money  to 
the  owner,  irrespective  of  any  benefit  from  any  improvement 
proposed  by  such  corporation." 

§  29  (27).     Kentucky. 

1792.  Art.  12,  §  12.  *  *  *  "nor  shall  any  man's  prop- 
erty be  taken  or  applied  to  public  use  without  the  consent 
of  his  representatives,  and  without  just  compensation  being  pre- 
viously made  to  him." 

1799.     Art.  10,  §  12.     Same. 

1850.     Art.  13,  §  14.     Same. 

1891.  §  195.  "The  Commonwealth,  in  the  exercise  of  the 
right  of  eminent  domain,  shall  have  and  retain  the  same  powers 
to  take  the  property  and  franchises  of  incorporated  companies 
for  public  use  which  it  has  and  retains  to  take  the  property  of 
individuals." 

§  242.  Municipal  and  other  corporations  and  individuals, 
invested  with  the  privilege  of  taking  private  property  for  public 
use,  shall  make  just  compensation  for  property  taken,  injured 


36  EMINENT    DOMAIN-.  §    30 

or  destroyed  by  them ;  which  compensation  shall  be  paid  before 
such  taking,  or  paid  or  secured,  at  the  election  of  such  corpora- 
tion or  individual,  before  such  injury  or  destruction.  The  gen- 
eral assembly  shall  not  deprive  any  person  of  an  appeal  from  any 
preliminary  assessment  of  damages  against  any  other  corpora- 
tion or  individual  made  by  commissioners  or  otherwise;  and 
upon  appeal  from  such  preliminary  assessment  the  amount  of 
such  damages  shall,  in  all  cases,  be  determined  by  a  jury,  accord- 
ing to  the  course  of  the  common  law." 

§  30  (28).     Louisiana. 

Civil  Code,  Art.  489.  "ISTo  one  can  be  divested  of  his  prop- 
erty, unless  for  some  purpose  of  public  utility  and  on  considera- 
tion of  an  equitable  and  previous  indemnity  and  in  a  manner 
previously  prescribed  by  law.  By  an  equitable  indemnity  in  this 
case  is  understood,  not  only  a  payment  for  the  value  of  the  thing 
of  which  the  owner  is  deprived,  but  a  remuneration  for  the  dam- 
ages which  may  be  caused  thereby." 

1812.     ~Sq  provision. 

1845.  Title  6,  Art.  109.  "Vested  rights  shall  not  be  di- 
vested unless  for  purposes  of  public  utility,  and  for  adequate 
compensation  previously  made." 

1852.     Title  6,  Art.  105.     Same. 

1864.     Title  6,  Art.  109.     Same. 

1868.  Title  6,  Art.  110.  Same,  omitting  the  word  previ- 
ously. 

1879.  Art.  156.  "Private  property  shall  not  be  taken  or 
damaged  for  public  purposes  without  just  and  adequate  com- 
pensation being  first  paid." 

1898.  Art.  167.  Private  property  shall  not  be  taken  nor 
damaged  for  public  purposes  without  just  and  adequate  com- 
pensation being  first  paid. 

§  31   (29).     Maine. 

1819.  Art.  1,  §  21.  "Private  property  shall  not  be  taken 
for  public  use  without  just  compensation,  nor  unless  the  public 
exigencies  require  it." 

§  32  (30).     Maryland, 

1776.    No  provision. 

1851.  Art.  3,  §  46.  "The  legislature  shall  enact  no  law  au- 
thorizing private  property  to  be  taken  for  public  use,  without 
just  compensation,  as  agreed  upon  between  the  parties  or  award- 


§    34  CONSTITUTIONAL    PEOVISIONS.  37 

ed  by  a  jury,  being  first  paid  or  tendered  to  the  party  entitled 
to  such  compensation." 

1864.     Art.  3,  §  39.     Same. 

1867.     Art.  3,  §  40.     Same. 

§  33  (31).     Massachusetts. 

1780.  Part  1st,  Art.  10.  "Each  individual  of  the  society 
has  a  right  to  be  protected  by  it  in  the  enjoyment  of  his  life, 
liberty,  and  property,  according  to  standing  laws.  He  is  obliged, 
consequently,  to  contribute  his  share  to  the  expense  of  this 
protection;  to  give  his  personal  services  or  an  equivalent  when 
necessary;  but  no  part  of  the  property  of  any  individual 
can,  with  justice,  be  taken  from  him,  or  applied  to  public  uses, 
without  his  own  consent,  or  that  of  the  representative  body  of 
the  people.  In  fine,  the  public  of  this  commonwealth  are  not 
controllable  by  any  other  laws  than  those  to  which  their  con- 
stitutional representative  body  have  given  their  consent.  And 
whenever  the  public  exigencies  require  that  the  property  of  any 
individual  should  be  appropriated  to  public  uses,  he  shall  re- 
ceive a  reasonable  compensation  therefor." 

§  34  (32).     Michigan. 

1835.  Art.  1,  §  19.  "The  property  of  no  person  shall  be 
taken  for  public  use  without  just  compensation  therefor." 

1850.  Art.  10,  §  11.  "The  board  of  supervisors  of  each 
organized  county  may  provide  for  laying  out  highways,  con- 
structing bridges,  and  organizing  townships,  under  such  restric- 
tions and  limitations  as  shall  be  prescribed  by  law." 

Art.  15,  §  9.  "The  property  of  no  person  shall  be  taken  by 
any  corporation  for  public  use  without  compensation  being  first 
made  or  secured,  in  such  manner  as  may  be  prescribed  by  law." 

Art.  15,  §  15.  "Private  property  shall  not  be  taken  for 
public  improvements  in  cities  and  villages  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  owner,  unless  the  compensation  therefor  shall  first 
be  determined  by  a  jury  of  freeholders,  and  actually  paid  or 
secured  in  the  manner  provided  by  law." 

Art.  18,  §  2.  "When  private  property  is  taken  for  the  use 
or  benefit  cl  the  public,  the  necessity  for  using  such  property, 
and  the  just  compensation  to  be  made  therefor,  except  when  to 
be  made  by  the  State,  shall  be  ascertained  by  a  jury  of  twelve 
freeholders,  residing  in  the  vicinity  of  such  property,  or  by  not 
less  than  three  commissioners,  appointed  by  a  court  of  record, 


38  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    35 

as  shall  be  prescribed  by  law.  Provided,  The  foregoing  provi- 
sions shall  in  no  case  be  construed  to  apply  to  the  action  of 
commissioners  of  highways  in  the  official  discharge  of  their 
duties  as  highway  commissioners."     (Proviso  added  in  1860.) 

Art.  18,  §  14.  "The  property  of  no  person  shall  be  taken 
for  public  use  without  just  compensation  therefor.  Private 
roads  may  be  opened  in  the  manner  to  be  prescribed  by  law; 
but  in  every  ease  the  necessities  of  the  road  and  the  amount 
of  all  damages  to  be  sustained  by  the  opening  thereof  shall  be 
first  determined  by  a  jury  of  freeholders,  and  such  amount,  to- 
gether with  the  expenses  of  proceedings,  shall  be  paid  by  the 
person  or  persons  to  be  benefited." 

§  35  (33).     Minnesota. 

1857.  Art.  1,  §  13.  "Private  property  shall  not  be  taken 
for  public  use  without  just  compensation  therefor,  first  paid  or 
secured." 

Art.  10,  §  4.  "Lands  may  be  taken  for  public  way,  for  the 
purpose  of  granting  to  any  corporation  the  franchise  of  way 
for  public  use.  In  all  cases,  however,  a  fair  and  equitable  com- 
pensation shall  be  paid  for  such  land  and  the  damages  arising 
from  the  taking  of  the  same ;  but  all  corporations  being  common 
carriers,  enjoying  the  right  of  way  in  pursuance  to  the  provi- 
sions of  this  section,  shall  be  bound  to  carry  the  mineral,  agri- 
cultural and  other  productions  or  manufactures  on  equal  and 
reasonable  terms." 

1896,  Art.  1,  §  13,  (as  amended).  Private  property  shall 
not  be  taken,  destroyed  or  damaged  for  public  use,  without  just 
compensation  therefor  first  paid  or  secured. 

§  36  (34).     Mississippi. 

1817.  Art.  1,  §  13.  *  *  *  "nor  shall  any  person's 
property  be  taken  or  applied  to  public  use,  without  the  consent 
of  his  representatives,  and  without  just  compensation  being  made 
therefor." 

1832.  Art.  1,  §  13.  *  *  *  "nor  shall  any  person's 
property  be  taken  or  applied  to  public  use  without  the  consent 
of  the  legislature,  and  without  just  compensation  being  first 
made  therefor." 

1868.  Art.  1,  §  10.  "Private  property  shall  not  be  taken 
for  public  use  except  upon  due  compensation  first  being  made 
to  the  owner  or  owners  thereof  in  a  manner  to  be  provided  by 
law." 

1890.     Art.  3,  §  17.     "Private  property  shall  not  be  taken  or 


§    37  CONSTITUTIONAL    PBOVISIONS.  39 

damaged  for  public  use  except  upon  due  compensation  being  first 
made  to  the  owner  or  owners  thereof,  in  a  manner  to  be  pre- 
scribed by  law ;  and  whenever  an  attempt  is  made  to  take  private 
property  for  a  use  alleged  to  be  public,  the  question  whether  the 
contemplated  use  be  public  shall  be  a  judicial  question,  and  as 
such  determined  without  regard  to  legislative  assertion  that  the 
use  is  public." 

Art.  7,  §  190.  "The  exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent  do- 
main shall  never  be  abridged  or  so  construed  as  to  prevent  the 
legislature  from  taking  the  property  and  franchises  of  incorpo- 
rated companies  and  subjecting  them  to  public  use." 

Art.  11,  §  233.  "The  levee  boards  shall  have  and  are  hereby 
granted  authority  and  full  power  to  appropriate  private  proper- 
ty in  their  respective  districts  for  the  purpose  of  constructing, 
maintaining  and  repairing  levees  therein ;  and  when  any  owner 
of  land,  or  any  other  person  interested  therein,  shall  object  to 
the  location  or  building  of  the  levee  thereon,  or  shall  claim 
compensation  for  any  land  that  may  be  taken,  or  for  any  dam- 
ages he  may  sustain  in  consequence  thereof,  the  president,  or 
other  proper  officer  or  agent  of  such  levee  board,  or  owner  of  such 
land,  or  other  person  interested  therein,  may  forthwith  apply  for 
an  assessment  of  damages,  to  which  said  person  claiming  the 
same  may  be  entitled." 

§  37   (35).     Missouri. 

1820.  Art.  13,  §  7.  *  *  *  "and  that  no  private  prop- 
erty ought  to  be  taken  or  applied  to  public  use  without  just  com- 
pensation." 

1865.     Art.   1,  §    16.     Same. 

1875.  Art.  2,  §  20.  "That  no  private  property  can  be 
taken  for  private  use  with  or  without  compensation,  unless  by 
the  consent  of  the  owner,  except  for  private  ways  of  necessity, 
and  except  for  drains  and  ditches  across  the  lands  of  others  for 
agricultural  and  sanitary  purposes,  in  such  manner  as  may  be 
prescribed  by  law ;  and  that  whenever  an  attempt  is  made  to  take 
private  property  for  a  use  alleged  to  be  public,  the  question 
whether  the  contemplated  use  be  really  public  shall  be  a  judicial 
question,  and  as  such  judicially  determined,  without  regard  to 
any  legislative  assertion  that  the  use  is  public." 

Art.  2,  §  21.  "That  private  property  shall  not  be  taken 
or  damaged  for  public  use  without  just  compensation.  Such 
compensation  shall  be  ascertained  by  a  jiiry  or  board  of  commis- 
sioners of  not  less  than  three  freeholders,  in  such  manner  as 


40  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    38 

may  be  prescribed  by  law ;  and  until  the  same  shall  be  paid  to 
the  owner,  or  into  court  for  the  owner,  the  property  shall  not 
be  disturbed  or  the  proprietary  rights  of  the  owner  therein  di- 
vested. The  fee  of  land  taken  for  railroad  tracks  without  the 
consent  of  the  owner  thereof  shall  remain  in  such  owner,  subject 
to  the  use  for  which  it  is  taken." 

Art.  12,  §  4.  "The  exercise  of  the  power  and  right  of  emi- 
nent domain  shall  never  be  so  construed  or  abridged  as  to  prevent 
the  taking,  by  the  general  assembly,  of  the  property  and  fran- 
chises of  incorporated  companies  already  organized,  or  that  may 
be  hereafter  organized,  and  subjecting  them  to  the  public  use, 
the  same  as  that  of  individuals.  The  right  of  trial  by  jury  shall 
be  held  inviolate  in  all  trials  of  claims  for  compensation,  when  in 
the  exercise  of  said  right  of  eminent  domain,  any  incorporated 
company  shall  be  interested  either  for  or  against  the  exercise  of 
said  right." 

§  38  (35a),     Montana. 

1889.  Art.  3,  §  14.  "Private  property  shall  not  be  taken 
or  damaged  for  public  use  without  just  compensation  having 
been  first  made  to,  or  paid  into  court  for,  the  owner." 

Art.  3,  §  15.  "The  use  of  all  water  now  appropriated,  or 
that  may  hereafter  be  appropriated,  for  sale,  rental,  distribution 
or  other  beneficial  use  and  the  right  of  way  over  the  lands  of 
others,  for  all  ditches,  drains,  flumes,  canals  and  aqueducts, 
necessarily  used  in  connection  therewith,  as  well  as  the  sites  for 
reservoirs  necessary  for  collecting  and  storing  the  same,  shall  be 
a  public  use.  Private  roads  may  be  opened  in  the  manner  to  be 
prescribed  by  law,  but  in  every  case  the  necessity  of  the  road, 
and  the  amount  of  all  damages  to  be  sustained  by  the  opening 
thereof,  shall  be  first  determined  by  a  jury,  and  such  amount, 
together  with  the  expenses  of  the  proceeding,  shall  be  paid  by 
the  person  to  be  benefited." 

Art.  15,  §  9.  "The  right  of  eminent  domain  shall  never  be 
abridged,  nor  so  construed  as  to  prevent  the  legislative  assem- 
bly from  taking  the  property  and  franchises  of  incorporated  com- 
panies, and  subjecting  them  to  public  use  the  same  as  the  prop- 
erty of  individuals." 

§  39   (36).     Nebraska. 

1867.  Art.  1,  §  13.  "The  property  of  no  person  shall  be 
taken  for  public  use  without  just  compensation  therefor." 

Art.  2,  §  3.     "The  people  of  the  State,  in  their  right  of 


§    42  CONSTITUTIONAL    PEOVISIONS.  41 

sovereignty,  are  declared  to  possess  the  ultimate  property  in  and 
to  all  lands  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  State." 

1875.  Art.  1,  §  21.  "The  property  of  no  person  shall  be 
taken  or  damaged  for  public  use  without  just  compensation  there- 
for." 

Art.  11,  §  6.  "The  exercise  of  the  power  and  right  of  emi- 
nent domain  shall  never  be  so  construed  or  abridged  as  to  pre- 
vent the  taking  by  the  legislature  of  the  property  and  franchises 
of  incorporated  companies  already  organized  or  hereafter  to  be 
organized,  and  subjecting  them  to  the  public  necessity,  the  same 
as  of  individuals." 

Art.  11,  §  8.  "No  railroad  corporation  organized  under  the 
laws  of  any  other  State,  or  of  the  United  States,  and  doing  busi- 
ness in  this  State,  shall  be  entitled  to  exercise  the  right  of  emi- 
nent domain,  or  have  power  to  acquire  the  right  of  way  or  real 
estate  for  depot  or  other  uses,  until  it  shall  have  become  a  body 
corporate  pursuant  to  and  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  this 
State." 

§  40  (37).     Nevada. 

1864.  Art.  1,  §  8.  *  *  *  "nor  shall  private  property  be 
taken  for  public  use  without  just  compensation  having  been 
first  made  or  secured,  except  in  cases  of  war,  riot,  fire,  or  great 
public  peril,  in  which  case  compensation  shall  afterwards  be 
made." 

Art.  8,  §  7.  "ISTo  right  of  way  shall  be  appropriated  to  the 
use  of  any  corporation  until  full  compensation  be  first  made  or 
secured  therefor." 

§  41   (38).     New  Hampshire. 

1776.     No  provision. 

1784.  Part  I,  Art.  12.  *  *  *  "but  no  part  of  a  man's 
property  shall  be  taken  from  him,  or  applied  to  public  uses, 
without  his  own  consent,  or  that  of  the  representative  body  of 
the  people." 

1792.     Part  I,  Art.  12.     Same. 

§  42  (39).     New  Jersey. 

1776.     'No  provision. 

1844.  Art.  1,  §  16.  "Private  property  shall  not  be  taken 
for  public  use,  without  just  compensation ;  but  land  may  be  taken 
for  public  highways,  as  heretofore,  until  the  Legislature  shall 
direct  compensation  to  be  made." 

Art.  4,  §  7,  cl.  9.     "Individuals  or  private  corporations  shall 


4-2  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    43 

not  be  authorized  to  take  private  property  for  public  use  -with- 
out just  compensation  first  made  to  the  owner." 

§  43   (40).     New  York. 

1777.     No  provision. 

1821.  Art.  7,  §  7.  *  *  *  "nor  shall  private  property 
be  taken  for  public  use  without  just  compensation." 

1846.     Art.  1,  §  6.     Same. 

Art.  1,  §  7.  "When  private  property  shall  be  taken  for  any 
public  use,  the  compensation  to  be  made  therefor,' when  such 
compensation  is  not  made  by  the  State,  shall  be  ascertained  by  a 
jury,  or  by  not  less  than  three  commissioners  appointed  by  a 
court  of  record,  as  shall  be  prescribed  by  law.  Private  roads  may 
be  opened  in  the  manner  to  be  prescribed  by  law;  but  in  every 
case  the  necessity  for  the  road,  and  the  amount  of  all  damages 
to  be  sustained  by  the  opening  thereof,  shall  be  first  determined 
by  a  jury  of  freeholders,  and  such  amount,  together  with  the 
expenses  of  the  proceeding,  shall  be  paid  by  the  person  to  be 
benefited." 

Art.  1,  §  11.  "The  people  of  this  State,  in  their  right  of 
sovereignty,  are  deemed  to  possess  the  original  and  ultimate 
property  in  and  to  all  lands  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
State." 

1894.  Same,  with  the  following  added  to  Section  7:  Gen- 
eral laws  may  be  passed  permitting  the  owners  or  occupants  of 
agricultural  lands  to  construct  and  maintain  for  the  drainage 
thereof,  necessary  drains,  ditches  and  dykes  upon  the  lands  of 
others,  under  proper  restrictions  and  with  just  compensation, 
but  no  special  laws  shall  be  enacted  for  such  purposes. 

§  44  (41)       North  Carolina. 

1776.     No  provision. 

1868.     No  provision. 

1876.     No  provision. 

§  45   (41a).     North  Dakota. 

1889.  Art.  1,  §  14.  "Private  property  shall  not  be  taken 
or  damaged  for  public  use  without  just  compensation  having 
been  first  made  to,  or  paid  into  court  for  the  owner,  and  no 
right  of  way  shall  be  appropriated  to  the  use  of  any  corpora- 
tion, other  than  municipal,  until  full  compensation  therefor 
be  first  made  in  money  or  ascertained  and  paid  into  court  for 
the  owner,  irrespective  of  any  benefit  from  any  improvement 
proposed  by  such  corporation,  which  compensation  shall  be  as- 
certained by  a  jury,  unless  a  jury  be  waived." 


§    47  CONSTITUTIONAL    PEOVISIONS.  43 

Art.  Y,  §  134.  "The  exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent  domain 
shall  never  be  abridged,  or  so  construed  as  to  prevent  the  legis- 
lative assembly  from  taking  the  property  and  franchises  of  in- 
corporated companies  and  subjecting  them  to  public  use,  the 
same  as  the  property  of  individuals." 

§  46  (42).     Ohio. 

1802.  Art.  8,  §  4.  "Private  property  ought  and  shall  ever 
be  held  inviolate,  but  always  subservient  to  the  public  welfare, 
provided  a  compensation  in  money  be  made  to  the  owner." 

1851.  Art.  1,  §  19.  "Private  property  shall  ever  be  held 
inviolate,  but  subservient  to  the  public  welfare.  When  taken  in 
time  of  war  or  other  public  exigency,  imperatively  requiring  its 
immediate  seizure,  or  for  the  purpose  of  making  or  repairing 
roads,  which  shall  be  open  to  the  public  without  charge,  a  com- 
pensation shall  be  made  to  the  owner  in  money,  and  in  all  other 
cases  where  private  property  shall  be  taken  for  public  use  a 
compensation  therefor  shall  be  first  made  in  money,  or  first  se- 
cured by  a  deposit  of  money ;  and  such  compensation  shall  be  as- 
sessed by  a  jury,  without  deduction  for  benefits  to  any  property 
of  the  owner." 

Art.  13,  §  5.  "No  right  of  way  shall  be  appropriated  to  the 
use  of  any  corporation,  until  full  compensation  therefor  shall  be 
first  made  in  money,  or  first  secured  by  a  deposit  of  money  to  the 
owner,  irrespective  of  any  benefit  from  any  improvement  pro- 
posed by  such  corporation ;  which  compensation  shall  be  ascer- 
tained by  a  jury  of  twelve  men,  in  a  court  of  record,  as  shall 
be  prescribed  by  law." 

§  47.     Oklahoma. 

1907.  Sec.  32.  ISTo  private  property  shall  be  taken  or  dam- 
aged for  private  use,  with  or  without  compensation,  unless  by 
consent  of  the  owner,  except  for  private  ways  of  necessity,  or 
for  drains  and  ditches  across  the  lands  of  others  for  agricultural, 
mining,  or  sanitary  purpose,-  in  such  manner  as  may  be  pre- 
scribed by  law. 

Sec.  33.  Private  property  shall  not  be  taken  or  damaged 
for  public  use  without  just  compensation.  Such  compensation, 
irrespective  of  any  benefit  from  any  improvement  proposed,  shall 
be  ascertained  by  a  board  of  commissioners  of  not  less  than  three 
freeholders,  in  such  manner  as  may  be  prescribed  by  law.  The 
commissioners  shall  not  be  appointed  by  any  judge  or  court  with- 
out reasonable  notice  having  been  served  upon  all  parties  inter- 
ested.    The  commissioners  shall  be  selected  from  the  regular 


44  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    48 

jury  list  of  names  prepared  and  made  as  the  legislature  shall 
provide.  Any  party  aggrieved  shall  have  the  right  of  appeal, 
without  bond,  and  trial  by  jury  in  a  court  of  record.  Until  the 
compensation  shall  be  paid  to  the  owner,  or  into  court  for  the 
owner,  the  property  shall  not  be  disturbed,  or  the  proprietary 
rights  of  the  owner  divested.  When  possession  is  taken  of  prop- 
erty condemned  for  any  public  use,  the  owner  shall  be  entitled 
to  the  immediate  receipt  of  the  compensation  awarded,  without 
prejudice  to  the  right  of  either  party  to  further  proceedings  for 
the  judicial  determination  of  the  sufficiency  or  insufficiency  of 
such  compensation.  The  fee  of  the  land  taken  by  common  car- 
riers for  right  of  way,  without  the  consent  of  the  owner,  shall 
remain  in  such  owner  subject  only  to  the  use  for  which  it  is 
taken.  In  all  cases  of  condemnation  of  private  property  for 
public  or  private  use,  the  determination  of  the  character  of  the 
use  shall  be  a  judicial  question." 

§  48  (43).     Oregon. 

1857.  Art.  1,  §  19.  "Private  property  shall  not  be  taken 
for  public  use,  nor  the  particular  services  of  any  man  be  demand- 
ed without  just  compensation,  nor  except  in  case  of  the  State, 
without  such  compensation  first  assessed  and  tendered." 

Art.  11,  §  4.  "No  person's  property  shall  be  taken  by  any 
corporation  under  authority  of  law,  without  compensation  being 
first  made  or  secured,  in  such  manner  as  may  be  prescribed  by 
law." 

§  49  (44).     Pennsylvania. 

1776.  Art.  8.  *  *  *  "but  no  part  of  a  man's  property 
can  be  justly  taken  from  him,  or  applied  to  public  uses,  without 
his  own  consent,  or  that  of  his  legal  representatives." 

1790.  Art.  9,  §  10.  *  *  *  "nor  shall  any  man's  prop- 
erty be  taken  or  applied  to  public  use  without  the  consent  of  his 
representatives,  and  without  just  compensation  being  made." 

1838.  Art.  7,  §  4.  "The  legislature  shall  not  invest  any 
corporate  body  or  individual  with  the  privilege  of  taking  private 
property  for  public  use,  without  requiring  such  corporation  or 
individual  to  make  compensation  to  the  owners  of  said  property, 
or  give  adequate  security  therefor,  before  such  property  shall  be 
taken." 

Art.  9,  §  10.     Same  as  in  1790. 

1874.  Art.  1,  §  10.  *  *  *  "nor  shall  private  property 
be  taken  or  applied  to  public  use  without  authority  of  law,  and 
without  just  compensation  being  first  made  or  secured." 


§    51  CONSTITUTIONAL    PEOVISIONS.  45 

Art.  16,  §  3.  "The  exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent  domain 
shall  never  be  abridged  or  so  construed  as  to  prevent  the  general 
assembly  from  taking  the  property  and  franchises  of  incorpo- 
rated companies  and  subjecting  them  to  public  use,  the  same  as 
the  property  of  individuals." 

§  8.  "Municipal  and  other  corporations  and  individuals  in- 
vested vyith  the  privilege  of  taking  private  property  for  public 
use  shall  make  just  compensation  for  property  taken,  injured, 
or  destroyed,  by  the  construction  or  enlargement  of  their  v^orks, 
highways,  or  improvements,  which  compensation  shall  be  paid 
or  secured  before  such  taking,  injury,  or  destruction.  The  gen- 
eral assembly  is  hereby  prohibited  from  depriving  any  person 
from  an  appeal  from  any  preliminary  assessment  of  damages 
against  any  such  corporations  or  individuals  made  by  viewers  or 
otherwise ;  and  the  amount  of  such  damages  in  all  cases  of  appeal 
shall,  on  the  demand  of  either  party,  be  determined  by  a  jury 
according  to  the  course  of  the  common  law." 

§  SO  (45).     Rhode  Island. 

1842.  Art.  1,  §  16.  "Private  property  shall  not  be  taken 
for  public  uses,  without  just  compensation," 


§  51 

(46).     South  Carolina, 

1776. 

No  provision. 

1778. 

No  provision. 

1790. 

No  provision. 

1865. 

No  provision. 

1868. 

Art.  1,  §  23.     "Priva 

"Private  property  shall  not  be  taken 
or  applied  for  public  use,  or  for  the  use  of  corporations,  or 
for  private  use,  without  the  consent  of  the  owner  or  a  just  com- 
pensation being  made  therefor:  Provided,  however,  that  laws 
may  be  made  securing  to  persons  or  corporations  the  right  of 
way  over  the  lands  of  either  persons  or  corporations,  and  for 
works  of  internal  improvement,  the  right  to  establish  depots, 
stations,  turnouts,  etc. ;  but  a  just  compensation  shall,  in  all 
cases,  be  first  made  to  the  owner." 

Art.  6,  §  3.  "The  people  of  the  State  are  declared  to  pos- 
sess the  ultimate  property  in  and  to  all  lands  within  the  juris- 
diction of  the  State." 

Art.  12,  §  3.  "No  right  of  way  shall  be  appropriated  to 
the  use  of  any  corporation  until  full  compensation  therefor  shall 
be  first  made,  or  secured  by  a  deposit  of  money,  to  the  owner, 
irrespective  of  any  benefit  from  any  improvement  proposed  by 
such  corporation,  which  compensation  shall  be  ascertained  by  a 


46  EMHiTENT    DOMAIIT.  §    52 

jury  of  twelve  men,  in  a  court  of  record,  as  shall  be  prescribed 
by  law." 

1895.  Art.  1,  §  17.  "Private  property  stall  not  be  taken 
for  private  use  without  the  consent  of  the  owner,  nor  for  public 
use  without  just  compensation  being  made  therefor." 

Art.  9,  §  20.  ISTo  right  of  way  shall  be  appropriated  to  the 
use  of  any  corporation  until  full  compensation  therefor  shall  be 
first  made  to  the  owner  or  secured  by  a  deposit  of  money,  irre- 
spective of  any  benefit  from  any»improvement  proposed  by  such 
corporation,  which  compensation  shall  be  ascertained  by  a  jury 
of  twelve  men,  in  a  court  of  record,  as  shall  be  prescribed  by 
law. 

Art.  14,  §  3.  The  people  of  the  State  are  declared  to  possess 
the  ultimate  property  in  and  to  all  lands  within  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  state. 

§  52  (46a).     South  Dakota. 

1889.  Art.  6,  §  13.  "Private  property  shall  not  be  taken 
for  public  use,  or  damaged,  without  just  compensation  as  deter- 
mined by  a  jury,  which  shall  be  paid  as  soon  as  it  can  be  ascer- 
tained and  before  possession  is  taken.  No  benefit  which  may 
accrue  to  the  owner  as  the  result  of  an  improvement  made  by 
any  private  corporation  shall  be  considered  in  fixing  the  com- 
pensation for  property  taken  or  damaged.  The  fee  of  land 
taken  for  railroad  tracks  or  other  highways  shall  remain  in  such 
owners,  subject  to  the  use  for  which  it  is  taken." 

Art.  17,  §  4.  "The  exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent  do- 
main shall  never  be  abridged  or  so  construed  as  to  prevent  the 
legislature  from  taking  the  property  and  franchises  of  incor- 
porated companies  and  subjecting  them  to  public  use,  the  same 
as  the  property  of  individuals." 

Art.  17,  §  18.  "Municipal  and  other  corporations  and  in- 
dividuals invested  with  the  privilege  of  taking  private  property 
for  public  use  shall  make  just  compensation  for  property  taken, 
injured  or  destroyed  by  the  construction  or  enlargement  of  their 
works  or  improvements,  which  compensation  shall  be  paid  or 
secured  before  such  taking,  injury  or  destruction.  The  legis- 
lature is  hereby  prohibited  from  depriving  any  person  of  an 
appeal  from  any  preliminary  assessment  of  damages  against 
any  such  corporation  or  individuals  made  by  viewers  or  other- 
wise, and  the  amount  of  such  damages  in  all  cases  of  appeal 
shall,  on  the  demand  of  either  party,  be  determined  by  a  jury 
as  in  other  civil  cases." 


§    56  CONSTITUTIONAL    PKO VISIONS.  47 

§  53   (47).     Tennessee. 

179G.  Art.  11,  §  21.  "That  no  man's  particular  services 
shall  be  demanded  or  property  taken,  or  applied  to  public  use, 
without  the  consent  of  his  representatives,  or  without  just  com- 
pensation being  made  therefor." 

1834.     Art.  1,  §  21.     Same. 

1870.     Art.  1,  §  21.     Same. 

§  54  (48).     Texas. 

1836.  Eepublic  of  Texas,  Declaration  of  Eights,  13th.  "Ko 
person's  particular  services  shall  be  demanded,  nor  property 
taken  or  applied  to  public  use,  unless  by  the  consent  of  himself 
or  his  representatives,  without  just  compensation  being  made 
therefor  according  to  law." 

1845.  State  of  Texas,  Art.  1,  §  14.  "JSTo  person's  property 
shall  be  taken  or  applied  to  public  use,  without  adequate  com- 
pensation being  made,  unless  by  the  consent  of  such  person." 

1866.     Art.   1,  §  14.     Same. 

1868.     Art.  1,  §  14.     Same. 

1876.  Art.  1,  §  17.  "ISTo  person's  property  shall  be  taken, 
damaged,  or  destroyed  for  or  applied  to  public  use  without  ade- 
quate compensation  being  made,  unless  by  consent  of  such  per- 
son ;  and,  when  taken,  except  for  the  use  of  the  State,  such  com- 
pensation shall  be  first  made,  or  secured,  by  a  deposit  of  money  ; 
and  no  irrevocable  or  uncontrollable  grant  of  special  privileges 
or  immunities  shall  be  made;  but  all  privileges  and  franchises 
granted  by  the  legislature  or  created  under  its  authority  shall 
be  subject  to  the  control  thereof." 

§  55   (50a).     Utah. 

1895.  Art.  1,  §  22.  "Private  property  shall  not  be  taken 
or  damaged  for  public  use  without  just  compensation." 

Art.  12,  §  11.  "The  exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent  do- 
main shall  never  be  so  abridged  or  construed,  as  to  prevent  the 
legislature  from  taking  the  property  and  franchises  of  incor- 
porated companies,  and  subjecting  them  to  public  use  the  same 
as  the  property  of  individuals. 

§  56   (49).     Vermont. 

1777.  Chap.  1,  §  2.  "That  private  property  ought  to  be 
subservient  to  public  uses,  when  necessity  requires  it ;  neverthe- 
less, whenever  any  particular  man's  property  is  taken  for  the 
use  of  the  public,  th€  owner  ought  to  receive  an  equivalent  in 
money." 

1786.     Chap.  1,  §  2.     Same. 


48  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    57 

1793.  Chap.  1,  §  2.  Same,  except  for  "any  particular 
man's  property"  read  "any  person's  property." 

§  57  (SO).     Virginia. 

1776.  Bill  of  Eights,  §  6.  *  *  *  "that  all  men,  hav- 
ing sufficient  evidence  of  permanent  common  interest  with, 
and  attachment  to,  the  community,  have  the  right  of  suffrage, 
and  cannot  be  taxed  or  deprived  of  their  property  for  public 
uses,  -without  their  own  consent,  or  that  of  their  representatives 
so  elected." 

1850.     Bill  of  Eights,  §  6.     Same. 

1870.     Art.  1,  §  8.     Same. 

1902.  Art.  1,  §  6.  That  all  elections  ought  to  be  free;  and 
that  all  men,  having  sufficient  evidence  of  permanent  common 
interest  with,  and  attachment  to,  the  community,  have  the  right 
of  suffrage,  and  cannot  he  taxed,  or  deprived  of,  or  damaged  in, 
their  property  for  public  uses,  without  their  own  consent,  or 
that  of  their  representatives  duly  elected,  or  bound  by  any  law  to 
which  they  have  not,  in  like  manner,  assented  for  the  public 
good. 

Art.  4,  §  58.  It  (the  general  assembly)  shall  not  enact  any 
law  whereby  private  property  shall  be  taken  or  damaged  for 
public  uses,  without  just  compensation. 

Art.  12,  §  159.  The  exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent  do- 
main shall  never  be  abridged,  nor  so  construed  as  to  prevent  the 
general  assembly  from  taking  the  property  and  franchises  of 
corporations  and  subjecting  them  to  public  use,  the  same  as  the 
property  of  individuals. 

§  58  (50a).     Washington. 

Art.  1,  §  16.  "Private  property  shall  not  be  taken  for 
private  use,  except  for  private  ways  of  necessity,  and  for  drains, 
flumes  or  ditches  on  or  across  the  lands  of  others  for  agricul- 
tural, domestic  or  sanitary  purposes.  No  private  property  shall 
be  taken  or  damaged  for  public  or  private  use,  without  just 
compensation  having  been  first  made,  or  paid  into  court  for  the 
owner,  and  no  right  of  way  shall  be  appropriated  to  the  use  of 
any  corporation,  other  than  municipal,  until  full  compensation 
therefor  be  first  made  in  money,  or  ascertained  and  paid  into 
court  for  the  owner,  irrespective  of  any  benefit  from  any  im- 
provement proposed  by  such  corporation,  which  compensation 
shall  be  ascertained  by  a  jury,  unless  a  jury  be  waived,  as  in 
other  civil  cases,  in  courts  of  record,  in  the  manner  prescribed 
by  law.     Whenever  an  attempt  is  made  to  take  private  property 


§    60  CONSTITUTIOIfAL    PEOVISIONS.  49 

for  a  use  alleged  to  be  public,  the  question  ■whether  the  con- 
templated use  be  really  public,  shall  be  a  judicial  question,  and 
determined  as  such  without  regard  to  any  legislative  assertion 
that  the  use  is  public." 

Art.  12,  §  10.  "The  exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent  do- 
main shall  never  be  so  abridged  or  construed  as  to  prevent  the 
legislature  from  taking  the  property  and  franchises  of  incor- 
porated companies,  and  subjecting  them  to  public  use  the  same 
as  the  property  of  individuals." 

Art.  22,  §  1.  "The  use  of  the  waters  of  this  State  for  irri- 
gation, mining  and  manufacturing  purposes  shall  be  deemed 
a  public  use." 

§  59  (51).     West  Virginia. 

1861-3.  Art.  2,  §  6.  "Private  property  shall  not  be  taken 
for  public  use  without  just  compensation." 

1872.  Art.  3,  §  9.  "Private  property  shall  not  be  taken 
or  damaged  for  public  use  without  just  compensation ;  nor  shall 
the  same  be  taken  by  any  company  incorporated  for  the  pur- 
poses of  internal  improvement  until  just  compensation  shall 
have  been  paid,  or  secured  to  be  paid,  to  the  owner ;  and  when 
private  property  shall  be  taken,  or  damaged,  for  public  use,  or 
for  the  use  of  such  corporations,  the  compensation  to  the  owner 
shall  be  ascertained  in  such  manner  as  may  be  prescribed  by 
general  law:  Provided,  that  when  required  by  either  of  the 
parties  such  compensation  shall  be  ascertained  by  an  impartial 
jury  of  twelve  freeholders." 

Art.  11,  §  12.  "The  exercise  of  the  power  and  the  right  of 
eminent  domain  shall  never  be  so  construed  or  abridged  as  to 
prevent  the  taking,  by  the  legislature,  of  the  property  and 
franchises  of  incorporated  companies  already  organized,  and 
subjecting  them  to  the  public  use,  the  same  as  of  individuals." 

§  60  (52).     Wisconsin. 

1848.  Art.  1,  §  13.  "The  property  of  no  person  shall  be 
taken  for  public  use  without  just  compensation  therefor." 

Art.  9,  §  3.  "The  people  of  this  State,  in  their  right  of  sov- 
ereignty, are  declared  to  possess  the  ultimate  property  in  and 
to  all  lands  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  State." 

Art.  11,  §  2.  "No  municipal  corporation  shall  take  private 
property  for  public  use  against  the  consent  of  the  owner,  with- 
out the  necessity  thereof  being  first  established  by  the  verdict 

of  a  jury." 

Em.  D. — 4. 


50  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    61 

§  61   (S2a).     Wyoming, 

Art.  1,  §  32.  "Private  property  shall  not  be  taken,  for  private 
use  unless  by  consent  of  the  owner,  except  for  private  ways  of 
necessity,  and  for  reservoirs,  drains,  flumes,  or  ditches  on  or 
across  the  lands  of  others  for  agricultural,  mining,  milling, 
domestic  or  sanitary  purposes,  nor  in  any  case  without  due 
compensation." 

Art.  1,  §  32.  "Private  property  shall  not  be  taken  or  dam- 
aged for  public  or  private  use  without  just  compensation." 

Art.  8,  §  1.  "The  water  of  all  natural  streams,  springs, 
lakes,  or  other  collections  of  still  water,  within  the  boundaries 
of  the  State,  are  hereby  declared  to  be  the  property  of  the  State." 

§§  2  to  5  of  the  same  article  provide  for  the  control  and 
utilization  of  such  waters. 

Art.  10,  §  9.  "The  right  of  eminent  domain  shall  never  be 
so  abridged  or  construed  as  to  prevent  the  legislature  from  tak- 
ing the  property  and  franchises  of  incorporated  companies  and 
subjecting  them  to  the  public  use  the  same  as  the  property  of 
individuals." 


CHAPTER  III. 

WHAT  CONSTITUTES  A  T,4KING;    GENERAL.  PRINCIPLES, 

§  62  (53).  Statement  of  the  question.  The  constitu- 
tional limitations  upon  the  powey  of  eminent  domain,  which 
have  been  considered  in  the  last  chapter,  though  seemingly  plain 
and  definite,  nevertheless  contain  three  important  ambiguities. 
These  are  found  in  the  word  "taken"  and  in  the  phrases  "public 
use"  and  "just  compensation."  The  first  of  these,  or  what,  con- 
stitutes a  talcing  of  proper1;y,  within- the  meaning  of  the  con- 
stitution, will  form  the  subject  of  inquiry  in  the  present  aiid  suc- 
ceeding chapters.  In  regard  to  personal  property,  no  question 
can  ordinarily  arise.  It  is  seldom  necessary  to  appropriate  it, 
but  if  appropriated,  it  is  taken;  ii  not  appropriated,  it  can  be 
removed  beyond  the  influence  of  any  particular  inlprovement 
and  so  escape  the  deterioration  or  injury  it  might  otherwise' Stife- 
tain.^  jSTor  does  any  question  arise  in  regard  to  real  property 
when  some  legal  estate  or  interest  therein  is  acquired,  or  a  physi- 
cal appropriation  made.  But  it  frequently  happens  whfeniland 
has  been  taken  for  some  public  purpose,  that  the  use  of-  the  land 
for  that  purpose,  or  the  adaptation  of  the  land  for  such' use, 
may  occasion  damage  to  adjacent  property,  the  title/ and  pos- 
session of  which  remain  wholly  unaffected.  Such  damage  may 
consist  of  a  real  structural  or  physical  injury  to  the  property, 
of  an  interference  with  certain  rights  appurtenant  thereto',  or 
enjoyed  in  connection  therewith,  or  of  a  mere  deterioratiori  in 
value.  Do  such  damages,  whether  structural  or  otherwise,  come 
"Within  the  purview  of  the  constitution  ?  Are  they,  in  any  case, 
a  talcing  for  which  compensation  must  be  made  ? 

§  63  (54).  What  is  property?  In  determining  the  qiieis- 
tion  of  what  constitutes  a  taking  of  property,  it  is  important  to 
■  have  at  the  outset,  a  clear  understanding  of  what  property,  rea,lly 
is. 

iThe  constitution  protects  person-  W.  Va.  Cent.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  35  W.  Va. 
alty  as  fully  as  real  estate.    Teter  v.      433,  14  S.  E.  146. 

51 


52 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  63 


The  term  is  applied  with  many  different  meanings.^  "Some- 
times," says  Austin,  "it  is  taken  in  a  loose  and  vulgar  accep- 
tation to  denote  not  the  right  of  property  or  dominium, 
but  the  subject  of  such  a  right ;  as  where  a  horse  or  piece 
of  land  is  called  my  property."  *  A  little  reflection,  however, 
vdll  suffice  to  convince  any  one  that  property  is  not  the 
corporeal  thing  itself  of  which  it  is  predicated,  but  certain  rights 
in  or  over  the  thing.  Land  undergoes  no  corporeal  change  by 
the  mere  fact  of  being  reduced  to  the  dominion  and  ownership 
of  man.  An  animal  fercB  naturw  tuslj  be  precisely  the  same 
before  and  after  capture,  but  in  his  former  state  no  one  would 
speak  of  him  as  property.*  We  must,  therefore,  look  beyond  the 
thing  itself,  beyond  the  mere  corporeal  object,  for  the  true  idea 
of  property.  Property  may  be  defined  as  certain  rights  in  things 
which  pertain  to  persons  and  which  are  created  and  sanctioned 
by  law.'  These  rights  are  the  right  of  user,  the  right  of  exclu- 
sion and  the  right  of  disposition.^     These  rights  are  not  pos- 


2At  the  close  of  his  forty-seventh 
lecture,  Mr.  Austin  enumerates  some 
of  the  "various  meanings  of  the  very 
ambiguous  word  property."  2  Aus- 
tin's Jurisprudence,  §  1051. 

sAustin's  Jur.,  §  1051. 

^Animals  ferce  natures  are  not 
property  until  reduced  to  possession. 
Ex  parte  Fritz,  86  Miss.  210,  38  So. 
722,  109  Am.  St.  Rep.  700. 

6We  do  not  mean  to  be  understood 
as  announcing  the  doctrine  that 
property  was  originally  created  by 
law.  Property  and  the  laws  of  prop- 
erty grew  up  together  out  of  a  prim- 
itive condition  of  things  in  which 
neither  existed.  See  Laveleye's  Prim- 
itive Property,  Morgan's  Ancient 
Society,  and  Works  of  Sir  Henry 
Maine.  What  we  mean  to  assert  is 
that  now  property  is  exactly  what 
the  law  makes  it. 

6"The  integral  or  entire  right  of 
property,"  says  Benthan,  "includes 
four  particulars:  1.  Right  of  oc- 
cupation. 2.  Right  of  excluding  oth- 
ers. 3.  Right  of  disposition,  or  the 
right  of  transferring  the  integral 
right  to  other  persons.     4.  Right  of 


transmission,  in  virtue  of  which  the 
integral  right  is  often  transmitted 
after  the  death  of  the  proprietor, 
without  any  disposition  on  his  part 
to  those  in  whose  possession  he 
would  have  wished  to  place  it."  3 
Benthan's  Works,  ed.  1843,  Edin- 
burgh, p.  182.  The  same  author 
also  says :  "Property  is  entirely  the 
creature  of  the  law.  *  »  •  There 
is  no  form,  or  color,  or  visible  trace, 
by  which  it  is  possible  to  express  the 
relation  which  constitutes  property. 
It  belongs  not  to  physics,  but  to 
metaphysics;  it  is  altogether  a  crea- 
ture of  the  mind.  •  •  »  i  can 
reckon  upon  the  enjoyment  of  that 
which  I  regard  as  my  own,  only  ac- 
cording to  the  promise  of  the  law, 
which  guarantees  it  to  me.  It  is  the 
law  alone  which  allows  me  to  forget 
my  natural  weakness;  it  is  from  the 
law  alone  that  I  can  enclose  a,  field 
and  give  myself  to  its  cultivation,  in 
the  distant  hope  of  the  harvest." 
Principles  of  the  Civil  Code,  chap, 
viii.  Works,  vol.  1,  p.  308.  "Prop- 
erty signifies  the  right  or  interest 
which  one  has  in  land  or  chattels. 


§  63 


WHAT    CONSTITUTES    A    TAKIKG. 


53 


sessed  in  an  absolute  degree,  but  are  limited.  The  right  of  user 
is  limited  by  those  regulations  which  are  enacted  for  the  general 
good  and  by  those  restraints  which  are  imposed  by  the  common 
law  under  the  maxim  sic  uiere  tuo  id  alienum  non  Icedas.  It 
may  also  be  limited  in  various  ways  by  contract  and  testamen- 
tary dispositions.  The  right  of  exclusion  must  yield  to  the  re- 
quirements of  legal  process  and  to  the  law  of  necessity.  The 
right  of  disposition  may  be  limited  and  regulated  in  the  same 


In  this  sense  it  is  used  l)y  the  learn- 
ed and  unlearned,  by  men  of  all 
ranks  and  conditions.  We  find  it  so 
defined  in  dictionaries,  and  so  under- 
stood by  the  best  authors."  Tilgh- 
man,  C.  J.,  in  Morrison  v.  Semple, 
6  Binn.  (Pa.)  94,  98,  1813.  This 
definition  is  approved  by  the  court 
in  Jackson  v.  Housel,  17  Johns.  281, 
283,  1820,  and  Spencer,  C.  J.,  in 
that  case  adds  the  following:  "Prop- 
erty is  defined  to  be  the  highest  right 
a  man  can  have  to  a  thing ;  being  used 
for  that  right  which  one  hath  to 
lands  or  tenements,  goods  or  chat- 
tels, which  no  way  depend  on  an- 
other man's  courtesy."  "Property 
itself  in  a  legal  sense  is  nothing 
njore  than  the  exclusive  right  'of 
possessing,  enjoying  and  disposing 
of  a  thing,'  which,  of  course,  includes 
the  use  of  a  thing."  Chicago  & 
Western  Indiana  E.  R.  Co.  v.  En- 
glewcod  Connecting  Ry.  Co.,  115 
111.  375,  385,  56  Am.  Hep.  173. 
"Property,  in  its  broader  and  more 
appropriate  sense,  is  not  alone  the 
chattel  or  land  itself,  but  the  right 
to  freely  possess,  use  and  alienate 
the  same;  and  many  things  are  con- 
sidered property  which  have  no  tan- 
gible existence^  but  which  are  neces- 
sary to  the  satisfactory  use  and 
enjoyment  of  that  which  is  tangible." 
City  of  Denver  v.  Bayer,  7  Colo. 
113.  "Sometimes  the  term  is  ap- 
plied to  the  thing  itself,  as  to  a 
horse  or  tract  of  land.  These  things, 
however,  though  the  subjects  of  prop- 
erty, are,  when  coupled  with  posses- 


sion, but  the  indicia,  the  visible 
manifestations  of  invisible  rights, 
'the  evidence  of  things  not  seen.' 
Property,  then,  in  a  determinate  ob- 
ject, is  composed  of  certain  constitu- 
ent elements,  to  wit.,  the  unrestrict- 
ed right  of  use,  enjoyment  and  dis- 
posal, of  that  object."  City  of  St. 
Louis  V.  Hill,  116  Mo.  527,  22  S.  W. 
861,  8  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  422. 
"The  term  'property'  includes  every 
interest  any  one  may  have  in  any 
and  everything  that  is  the  subject 
of  ownership  by  man,  together  with 
the  right  to  freely  possess,  use,  en- 
joy and  dispose  of  the  same."  Bailey 
V.  People,  190  111.  28,  33,  60  N.  E. 
98,  83  Am.  St.  Rep.  116,  54  L.R.A. 
838.  See  also  Tripp  v.  Ovorocker,  7 
Colo.  72;  Selden  v.  Jacksonville,  28 
Fla.  558,  10  So.  457;  Ritchie  v.  Peo- 
ple, 155  111.  98,  40  N.  E.  454,  46  Am. 
St.  Rep.  315,  29  L.R.A.  79;  Chicago 
v.  Wells,  236  111.  129;  Drainage 
Comrs.  V.  Knox,  237  111.  148;  East 
St.  Louis  V.  O'Flynn,  19  111.  App. 
64;  Metropolitan  W.  S.  El.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Goll,  100  111.  App.  325;  De  Land- 
er V.  Baltimore  Co.,  94  Md.  1,  50 
Atl.  427 ;  Eaton  v.  B.  C.  &  M.  R.  R. 
Co.,  51  N.  H.  504,  511;  Wynehamer 
v.  People,  13  N.  Y.  378,  433,  12 
Am.  Rep.  ,147;  Caro  v.  Met.  El.  R. 
R.  Co.  46  N.  Y.  Supr.  Ct.  138;  Callen 
V.  Columbus  Edison  Elec.  Lt.  Co., 
66  Ohio  St.  166,  64  N.  E.  141,  58 
L.R.A.  72;  Lycoming  Gas  &  W.  Co. 
V.  Moyer,  99  Pa.  St.  615;  Dibsell  v. 
Morris,  89  Tenn.  497,  15  S.  w!  87; 
State  V.   Superior   Court,  26  Wasli. 


54  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  .  §    04 

v/ay  as  the  right  of  useJ  A  person's  right  of  property  in  things, 
therefore,  consists  of  the  right  to  possess,  use  and  dispose  thereof 
in  such  manner  as  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  law  of  the  land. 

As  regards  real  property,  in  addition  to  the  rights  already' 
enumerated,  which  pertain  to  the  use  and  disposition  of  that 
limited  area  which  a  man  calls  his  own,  there  are  others  which 
pertain  to  the  use  which  may  lawfully  be  made  of  contiguous 
and  surrounding  areas  and  which  form  an  important  part  of 
that  aggregate  of  rights  constituting  property  in  land.  Such  are 
the  rights  to  the  support  of  soil,  to  light  and  air,  the  right  to  be 
imdisturbed  by  nuisances  or  the  unreasonable  use  of  neighboring 
property,  the  right, to  the  protection,  atforded  by  natural  barriers 
against  tide  and  flood,  waves  and  currents,  rights  in  tide  waters 
aiid  running  streams  and  various  rights  respecting  waters  flow- 
ing lipon  the  surface  ot  percolating  through  the  soil  in  no  deflned 
channel.  .  These  rights,  wherever  they  exist,  and  to  the  extent 
to  which  they  are  secured  by  law,  are  part  and  parcel  of  the 
owner's  property  in  land.* 

§  64  (55).  Meaning  of  the  word  property  in  the  con- 
stittition.  Having  indicated  the  true  meaning  of  the  word; 
property,  it  remains  to  inquire  what  meaning  it  has  in  the  con- 
stitution. Undoubtedly,  in  such  an  instrument,  it  should  be 
given  a  meaning  that  accords  with  the  ordinary  usage  and  under-: 
standing  of  the  people  who  made  the  instrument.  We  do  not' 
refer  to  the  small  body  of  persons  who  actually  formulated  the 
instrument,  but  the  large  body  of  citizens  who  gave  it  vitality 
by  their  votes.  The  sovereign  people  say  to  their  agents  and. 
servants,  the  executive  and  legislative  oiEcers  of  the  State :  We 
delegate  to  you  all  of  our  sovereign  powers,  but  you  must  not 

278,  66  Pac.  385;  State  v.  Superior  which    he    considers    the    diflferent 

Court,  48  Wash.  277,  93  Pac.  423;  meanings  of  the  word  property  will 

1  Bl.Com.  138;  Austin's  Jurispru-  be  found  in  the  North  American  Ee- 

dence,  §§  47  and  48;  Rutherford,  b.  view  for  September,  1882.    Vol.  135, 

1,  c.  iv,  §   1.     "Full  property  in  a  p.  253. 

thing,"  says   the  author  last  cited.  The  views  of  this  section  are  very 

"is  a;  perpetual  right  to  use  it  to  fully  adopted  in  the  following  eases: 

any  purpose  and  to  dispose  of  it  at  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Hill,  116  Mo. 

pleasure."  527,  22  S.  W.  861;    Selden  v.  City 

72  Austin's  Jurisp.  825,  826,  sec.  of  Jacksonville,  28  Fla..  558,  It)  So.' 

48;   3  Bentham's  Works,  p.   182  et  Rep.  457^  29  Am.   St.  Rep.  278,  14 

■seq.-  Rutherford,  b.  1,  c.  iv.  L.R.A.  370;  Callen  v.  Columbus  Ed- 

sAn    interesting    and    instructive  ison  Elec.  Lt.  Co.,  66  Ohio  St.  166, 

article  by  Mr.   A.   G.   Sedgwick   in  64  N.  E.  141,  58  L.R.A.  782. 


§    64  WHAT    CONSTITUTES    A    TAKING.  55 

take  our  private  property  for  public  use  without  making  us  a 
just  compensation  therefor.  What  did  they  mean  by  property  ? 
The  dullest  individual  among  the  people  knows  and  understands 
that  his  property  in  anything  is  a  bundle  of  rights.  It  is  no 
more  common  for  ordinary  people  to  speak  of  things  as  property 
than  it  is  for  them  to  speak  of  their  rights  in  things,  as  the  right 
to  dispose  of  a  thing  in  this  way  or  that,  the  right  to  use  a  thing 
in  this  way  or  that,  the  right  to  compel  a  neighbor  to  desist  from 
doing  this  or  that,  etc.  Although,  as  Austin  says,  all  men  speak 
loosely  of  things  as  property,  yet  practically  all  men  understand 
that  property  consists  of  certain  rights  in  things  which  are 
secured  by  law.  They  constantly  act  upon  this  understanding, 
although  they  may  never  have  formulated  a  definition  of  the 
word  and  would  be  at  a  loss  to  do  so.  However  unable  a  man 
may  be  to  formulate  his  ideas,  yet  if  you  turn  a  stream  of  water 
on  his  land,  or  defile  his  atmosphere  with  gas  or  smoke,  or  create 
other  like  disturbance,  you  will  soon  find  that  he  has  a  very  clear , 
idea  of  his  right  to  be  exempt  from  such  intrusion.  Now  it 
seems  to  us  that  the  word  property  in  the  constitution  should  be 
given  a  meaning  which,  while  in  accord  with  the  sense  in  which 
it  is  practically  used  and  understood  by  the  people,  will  also 
secure  to  the  individual  the  largest  degree  of  protection  against 
the  exercise  of  the  power  intended  to  be  restricted.  The  mean- 
ing which,  in  our  opinion,  fulfills  both  of  these  conditions,  is  the 
one  set  forth  in  the  preceding  section.®  Chief  Justice  Shaw,  of 
Massachusetts,  in  speaking  on  this  subject  says:  "The  word 
'property,'  in  the  tenth  article  of  the  Bill  of  Rights,  which  pro- 
vides that  'whenever  the  public  exigencies  require  that  the  prop- 
erty of  any  individual  should  be  appropriated  to  public  uses,  he 
shall  receive  a  reasonable  compensation  therefor,'  should  have 
such  a  liberal  construction  as  to  include  every  valuable  interest 
which  can  be  enjoyed  as  property  and  recognized  as  such."  ^'^ 

9/8ee  the  article  referred  to  In  the  confounded  with  the  property  itself, 

last  note.    In  that  article  Mr.  Sedg-  That  the  second  of  these  two  views 

wick  says:     "If  the  views  here  sug-  must  in  the  end  prevail  and  render 

gested  are  sound,  the  process  of  in-  the  first  obsolete,   no  one  who  has 

terpretation  through  which  the  con-  paid  much  attention  to  the  develop- 

stitutional    provision    as    to    taking  ment  of  the  law  on  the  subject  in 

■property'  is  passing,  is   one  under  this    country    can    for    a    moment 

which  what  Austin  calls  the  true  or  doubt." 

strict  sense  of  the  word  is  being  sub-  lOQld  Colony  &  Fall  River  E.  E. 

stituted  for  the  vulgar  acceptation  Co.  v.  County  of  Plymouth,  14  Gray, 

in  which  the  subject  of  property  is  155,   161.     "The  constitutional  pro- 


56  EMIJTEIv'T    DOMAIIT.  §    65 

And  the  supreme  court  of  Washington  speaking  of  the  -word 
property,  says:  "It  is  used  in  the  constitution  in  a  comprehen- 
sive and  unlimited  sense,  and  so  it  must  be  construed.  It  is 
not  any  particular  kind  of  property  that  is  mentioned,  but  the 
"wording  is,  'no  private  property.'  It  need  not  be  any  physical 
or  tangible  property  which  is  subjected  to  a  tangible  invasion. 
The  right  to  the  use  and  possession  of  a  lot  abutting  on  a  public 
street  is  property.  The  right  to  light  and  air  and  access  is 
equally  property.  *  *  *  And  the  modern  authorities  are 
uniform  that  these  are  rights  which  are  guaranteed  by  constitu- 
tional provisions  similar  to  ours."  ^^ 

§  65  (56).  Principles  which  determine  when  there  has 
been  a  taking.  If  property,  then,  consists, .  not  in  tangible 
things  themselves,  but  in  certain  rights  in  and  appurtenant  to 
those  things,  it  follows  that,  when  a  person  is  deprived  of  any 
of  those  rights,  he  is  to  that  extent  deprived  of  his  property, 
and  hence,  that  his  property  may  be  taken,  in  the  constitutional 
sense,  though  his  title  and  possession  remain  undisturbed;  and 
it  may  be  laid  down  as  a  general  proposition,  based  upon  the 
nature  of  property  itself,  that,  whenever  the  lawful  rights  of  an 
individual  to  the  possession,  use  or  enjoyment  of  his  land  are  in 
any  degree  abridged  or  destroyed  by  reason  of  the  exercise  of  the 
power  of  eminent  domain,  his  property  is,  pro  tanto,  taken,  and 
he  is  entitled  to  compensation.-'^     "Any  substantial  interference 

vision  is  adopted  for  the  protection  States,  136  Fed.  273,  70  C.  C.  A.  641, 
of  and  security  to  the  rights  of  the  69  L.R.A.  723.  "Property,  then,  in 
individual  as  against  the  govern-  a  determinate  object,  is  composed  of 
ment,  and  the  word  'taking'  should  certain  constituent  elements,  to  wit., 
not  be  used  in  an  unreasonable  or  the  unrestricted  right  of  use,  en- 
narrow  sense."  Pearsall  v.  Board  joyment,  and  disposal,  of  that  ob- 
of  Supervisors,  74  Mich.  558,  42  N.  ject.  It  follows  from  this  premise 
W.  77.  that  anything  which  destroys  or  sub- 

11  State    V.     Superior    Court,    26  verts  any  of  the  essential  elements 

Wash.    278,    286,    66    Pac.    385.     In  aforesaid  is  a  taking  or  destruction 

Drainage   Comrs.  v.  Knox,  237   III.  pro   tanto   of  property,  though   the 

148,  151,  the  court  says:     "Property  possession  and  power  of  disposal  of 

in  land  is  the  right  of  user  and  dis-  the    land    remain    undisturbed,   and 

position  and  dominion  to  the  exclu-  though  there  be  no  actual  or  phy- 

sion  of  all  others,  and  that  is  the  sical  invasion  of  the  lomis  in  quo." 

sense  in  which  it  is  used  in  the  con-  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Hill,  110  Mo. 

stitution."  527,  22  S.  W.  861,  8  Am.  R.  R.   & 

^Quoted  and  approved.     State  v.  Corp.  Rep.  422.    Similar  rulings  and 

Superior  Court,  26  Wash.  278,  287,  expressions  of  opinion  will  be  found 

06    Pac.    385;     Nahant    v.    United  in  the  following  cases:     San  Mateo 


§    65  WHAT    COK^STITUTES    A    TAKING.  57 

with  private  property  -which  destroys  or  lessens  its  value,  or  by 
v?hich  the  owner's  right  to  its  use  and  enjoyment  is  in  any  sub- 
stantial degree  abridged  or  destroyed,  is,  in  fact,  and  in  law,  a 
taking,  in  the  constitutional  sense,  to,  the  extent  of  the  damages 
suffered,  even  though  the  title  and  possession  of  the  owner  re- 
main undisturbed."  ^* 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that,  in  order  that  there  may  be  a  recovery 
of  compensation  for  damages  to  property  no  part  of  which  is 
taken,  such  damages  must  be  the  result  of  a  violation  of  some  one 
or  more  of  the  rights  which  constitute  property.  In  other  words, 
the  damage  must  be  actionable  damage,  that  is,  damage  which 
would  be  remediable  if  done  by  an  individual  without  any  pre- 
tense of  statutory  authority.  If,  for  damage  caused  to  my  land 
by  certain  acts  of  my  neighbor  done  upon  his  own  land  for  his 
own  use,  I  may  have  compensation,  and  if,  for  the  same  damage 
caused  by  the  same  acts  done  upon  the  same  land  by  the  public 
or  its  agents  for  public  use  I  can  have  no  compensation,  it  is 
plain  that  the  right  upon  which  the  former  action  was  founded 
has  been  taken  from  me,  that  so  much  has  been  subtracted  from 
my  property  in  the  land.  Every  such  taking  we  hold  to  be 
within  the  constitutional  prohibition  requiring  compensation  to 
be  made.     In  any  given  case,  therefore,  where  the  land  of  an 

Water  Works  v.  Sharpstein,  50  Cal.  Rep.    1;    Passaic   v.   Patterson   Bill 

284 ;  Piatt  Bros.  &  Co.  v.  Waterbury,  Posting  Co.,  72  N.  J.  L.  285,  62  Atl. 

72  Conn.  531,  45  Atl.  154,  77  Am.  267,  111  Am.  St.  Rep.  676;  Forster 

St.   Rep.   335,   48   L.R.A.   691;    Sel-  v.  Scott,  136  N.  Y.  577,  32  N.  E.  Rep. 

den    V.    Jacksonville,    28    Fla.    558,  976,  18  L.R.A.  543,  8  Am.  R.  R.  & 

10  So.  457,  29  Am.  St.  Rep.  278,  14  Corp.   Rep.   428   note;    Huffmire   v. 

L.R.A.   370;    Chicago  v.   Wells,  236  Brooklyn,  162  N.  Y.  584,  57  N.  E. 

111.  129;  Drainage  Comrs.  v.  Knox,  176,  48  L.R.A.  421;  Callen  v.  Colum- 

237  111.  148;  Metropolitan  W.  S.  El.  bus  Edison  Elec.  Lt.   Co.,  66   Ohio 

R.  R.  Co.  V.  Goll,  100  111.  App.  323;  St.  166,  64  N.  E.  141,  58  L.R.A.  782; 

Commonwealth  v.  Boston  Advertiser  Bollinger  v.  Southern  Pipe  Line  Co., 

Co.,   188   Mass.   348,  74  N.   E.   601,  2  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  604;  Barron  v.  Mem- 

108   Am.    St.    Rep.    494,    69   L.R.A.  phis,   113  Tenn.   89,   80  S.  W.   832, 

817;  Pearsall  v.  Board  of  Supes.,  74  106  Am.  St.  Rep.  810;  Janesville  v. 

Mich.  558,  42  N.  W.  77 ;  Gunnerus  v.  Carpenter,   77   Wis.   288,  46   N.  W. 

Spring  Prairie,  91  Minn.  473,  98  N.  128.     See   also    the    succeeding    sec- 

W.   340,   974;    Richardson  v.   Levee  tions. 

Comrs.,   77   Miss.   518,   26   So.   963;  isStockdale  v.  Rio  Grande  West- 

Bigelow  V.  Whitcomb,  72  N.  H.  473,  ern   Ry.   Co.   28   Utah  201,   211,   77 

57  Atl.  680,  65  L.R.A.  676 ;  Pennsyl-  Pae.  849.     To  same  effect,  Fisher  v. 

vania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Angell,  41  N.  J.  Bountiful  City,  21  Utah  29,  36,  59 

Eq.  318,  329,  7  Atl.  432,  56  Am.  St.  Pac.  520. 


58  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    CG 

indiyidual  has  been  damaged  or  diminished  in  value  by  the  con- 
struction or  operation  of  works  for  public  use,  whether  he  is 
entitled  to  compensation  or  not  will  depend  upon  whether  the 
damage  or  deterioration  is  due  to  an  interference  with  any  right 
appurtenant  to  the  land  or  parcel  of  his  property  in  it.  If  this 
question  can  be  answered  in  the  affirmative,  there  is  a  right  to 
compensation;  otherwise,  not.  Thus,  if  a  city  takes  a  lot  ad- 
jacent to  my  own  and,  under  proper  authority,  erects  thereon 
works,  the  operation  of  which  necessarily  fills  my  premises  with 
noxious  gases,  whereby  my  property  is  depreciated  in  value,  I 
am  entitled  to  compensation,  because  my  right  not  to  be  damaged 
by  an  unreasonable  use  of  the  adjacent  lot  has  been  violated. 
But  if  the  city  erects  upon  the  same  lot  a  school-house  and  uses 
it  for  school  purposes  and  thereby  my  premises  are  lessened  in 
value,  I  am  remediless,  because  no  right  whatever  which  I  had, 
as  owner  of  my  lot,  respecting  the  use  which  could  be  made  of 
the  adjoining  lot,  has  been  violated.  A  school  is  not  a  nuisance 
in  a  legal  sense,  and  the  city,  in  the  case  supposed,  has  done  no 
more  than  any  individual  could  have  done  upon  the  same  prem- 
ises.^* 

§  66  (57).  Changes  which  the  law  has  undergone. 
The  law  as  to  what  constitutes  a  taking  has  been  undergoing 
radical  changes  in  the  last  few  years.  Mr.  Sedgwick,  writing 
in  1857,  in  speaking  of  this  subject,  says :  "It  seems  to  be  settled 
that,  to  entitle  the  owner  to  protection  under  this  clause,  the 
property  must  be  actually  taken,  in  the  physical  sense  of  the 
word,  and  that  the  proprietor  is  not  entitled  to  claim  remunera- 
tion for  indirect  or  consequential  damage,  no  matter  how  serious 
or  how  clearly  and  unquestionably  resulting  from  the  exercise  of 
the  power  of  eminent  domain."  ^'  The  Supreme  Court  of 
Maine,  in  interpreting  the  constitutional  provision  in  question, 
in  1852,  said:  "The  design  appears  to  have  been  simply  to  de- 
clare, that  private  property  shall  not  be  changed  to  public  prop- 
erty, or  transferred  from  the  owner  to  others,  for  public  use, 

nWe  do  not  remember  any  deci-  Wehn  v.  Commissioners  of  Gage  Co., 

sion  which  exactly  covers  the  illus-  5  Neb.  494,  25  Am.  Ecp.  497;  Bur- 

tration    used,    but    there   are    cases  well  v.  Commissioners,  93  N.  C.  73, 

which    involve    the    same    principle.  53  Am.  Rep.  454.     See  post,  §§  234r- 

Thus  it  has  been  decided  that  a  suit  236,  363-366. 

will  not  lie  either  to  prevent,  or  to  isSedgwick  Const.  Law,  2d  ed.  pp. 

recover  damages  for,  the  erection  of  456-458. 
a,     jail     upon     adjoining     property. 


§'■66'  WHAT    CONSTITUTES    A    TAKING.  59 

without  just  compensation."  *"  These  quotations  present  a  fair 
stateanent  of  the  condition  of  the  law  in  the  middle  of  the  nine- 
teenth century. ^^  The  learned  author  just  quoted,  after  review- 
ing: the  decisions  which  he  has  summed  up  in  the  above  quotation, 
ventures  his  own  opinion  upon  the  subject  as  follows :  "To  differ 
from  the  voice  of  so  many  learned  and  sagacious  magistrates 
may  almost  wear  the  aspect  of  presumption;  but  I  can  not 
refrain  from  the  expression  of  the  opinion,  that  this  limitation 
of  the  term  taking  to  the  actual  physical  appropriation  of  the 
property  or  a  divesting  of  title  is,  it  seems  to  me,  far  too  nari'ow 
a  construction  to  answer  the  purposes  of  justice,  or  to  meet  the 
demands  of  an  equal  administration  of  the  great  powers  of  gov- 
ernment. The  tendency  under  our  system  is  too  often  to  sacri- 
fice the  individual  to  the  community ;  and  it  seems  very  difficult 
in  reaspn  to  show  why  the  State  should  not  pay  for  property 
which  it  destroys  or  impairs  the  value,  as  well  as  for  what  it 
physically  takes.  If  by  reason  of  a  consequential  damage  the 
value  of  real  estate  is  postively  diminished,  it  does  not  appear 
arduous  to  prove  that,  in  point  of  fact,  the  owner  is  deprived  of 
property,  though  a  particular  piece  of  property  may  not  be  ac- 
tually, taken."  ^« 

Numerous  cases  decided  since  Mr.  Sedgwick  wrote  have  vin- 
dicated his  view  of  what  the  law  should  be.  In  stating,  in  the 
last  section,  the  conclusions  at  which  we  have  arrived  after  a 
cateful  examination  of  all  the  decided  cases,  and  in  discussing 
the  principles  upon  which  those  conclusions  are  based,  we  have 
not  referred  to  the  decisions,  because  they  must  be  referred  to 
under  the  different  divisions  of  the  subject  to  which  they  respec- 
tively pertain,  and  because  the  soundness  of  the  conclusions  we 
have  announced  must  be  tested,  not  by  the  few  cases  which 
discuss  general  principles,  but  by  the  points  actually  adjudicated 
in  all  the  cases.  But,  in  view  of  the  great  importance  of  the 
question,  the  numeroiis  cases  which  call  for  its  solution,  and  the 
magnitude  of  the  interests  involved,  we  shall,  at  the  risk  of  some 
repetition,  refer  to  some  of  the  leading  cases  in  support  of  the 
views  we  have  expressed. 

I6(^ushman  v.  Smith,  34  Me.  247,  appropriation  of  the  property  of  an- 

258.  other." 

I'ln  the  recent  case  of  Hart  v.  At-  isSedgwick  Const.  Law,  2d  ed.  pp. 

lanta,  100  Ga.  274,  it  is  said  that  a  462-463. 
"taking"  "means  a  physical,  tangible 


60  EMINENT   DOMAIN.  §    67 

§  67  (58).  Leading  cases.  The  leading  case  upon  the 
subject,  and  the  one  which  has  contributed  more  than  any  other 
towards  bringing  about  the  change  referred  to  in  the  last  section, 
is  Eaton  v.  B.  0.  &  M.  E.  E.  Co.,'^®  decided  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  !N"ew  Hampshire  in  1872.  In  referring  to  this  case. 
Judge  Christiancy,  of  Michigan,  says :  "But  the  most  satisfac- 
tory and  best  considered  case  which  can  be  found  in  the  books 
upon  this  subject,  which  examines,  classifies  and  analyzes  nearly 
all  the  cases,  and  in  the  conclusions  of  which  I  wholly  agree, 
is  that  of  Eaton  v.  B.  C.  &  M.  E".  E.  Co.,  51  N.  H.  504."  ^o 

The  defendant,  a  railroad  company,  laid  out  its  road  through 
the  plaintiff's  farm,  whose  damages  were  duly  assessed,  paid  and 
released.  But  in  constructing  their  road  the  company  cut 
through  a  ridge  north  of  plaintiff's  farm,  through  which  in  times 
of  freshet  the  waters  of  an  adjacent  river  found  their  way,  flood- 
ing the  plaintiff's  land  and  bringing  down  and  lodging  upon  it 
quantities  of  earth  and  stones,  thereby  rendering  the  land  unfit 
for  cultivation  or  use.  The  plaintiff  brought  suit  to  recover  for 
this  damage,  and  the  court  held  in  an  elaborately  considered  opin- 
ion that  he  was  entitled  to  succeed.  It  was  conceded  in  the  case 
"that,  if  the  cut  through  the  ridge  had  been  made  by  a  private 
landowner,  who  had  acquired  no  rights  from  the  plaintiff  or 
from  the  legislature,  he  would  be  liable  for  the  damages  sought 
to  be  recovered  in  this  action."  "The  vital  issue  then  is,"  says 
the  court,  "whether  the  injuries  complained  of  amount  to  a  tak- 
ing of  the  plaintiff's  property,  within  the  constitutional  mean- 
ing of  those  terms.  To  constitute  'a  taking  of  property,'  it  seems 
to  have  sometimes  been  held  necessary  that  there  should  be  'an 
exclusive  appropriation,'  'a  total  assumption  of  possession,'  'a 
complete  ouster,'  an  absolute  or  total  conversion  of  the  entire 
property,  'a  taking  the  property  altogether.'  These  views  seem 
to  us  to  be  founded  upon  a  misconception  of  the  meaning  of 
the  term  'property,'  as  used  in  the  various  State  constitutions. 
In  a  strict  legal  sense,  land  is  not  'property,'  but  the  subject  of 
property.  The  term  property,  although  in  common  parlance  fre- 
quently applied  to  a  tract  of  land  or  a  chattel,  in  its  legal  signi- 
fication 'means  only  the  right  of  the  owner  in  relation  to  it.'  'It 
denotes  a  right  over  a  determinate  thing.'    'Property  is  the  right 

1951  N.  H.  504. 

2  0Grand  Rapids   Booming   Co.  v. 
Jarvis,  30  Mieh.  308,  321. 


§    67  WHAT    CONSTITUTES    A    TAKING.  61 

,  of  any  person  to  possess,  use,  enjoy,  and  dispose  of  a  thing.'  *^ 
If  property  in  land  consists  in  certain  essential  rights,  and  a 
physical  interference  with  the  land  substantially  subverts  one 
of  those  rights,  such  interference  'takes,'  pro  tanto,  the  owner's 
'property.'  The  right  of  indefinite  user  (or  of  using  indefi- 
nitely) is  an  essential  quality  or  attribute  of  absolute  property, 
without  which  absolute  property  can  have  no  legal  existence. 
'Use  is  the  real  side  of  property.'  This  right  of  user  necessarily 
includes  the  right  and  power  of  excluding  others  from  using 
the  land.^^  From  the  very  nature  of  these  rights  of  user  and  of 
exclusion,  it  is  evident  that  they  cannot  be  materially  abridged 
without,  ipso  facto,  taking  the  owner's  'property.'  If  the  right 
of  indefinite  user  is  an  essential  element  of  absolute  property  or 
complete  ownership,  whatever  physical  interference  annuls  this 
right  takes  'property,' — although  the  owner  may  still  have  left 
to  him  valuable  rights  (in  the  article)  of  a  more  limited  and 
circumscribed  nature.  He  has  not  the  same  property  that  he 
formerly  had.  Then,  he  had  an  unlimited  right;  now,  he  has 
only  a  limited  right.  His  absolute  ownership  has  been  reduced 
to  a  qualified  ownership.  Restricting  A's  unlimited  right  of 
using  one  hundred  acres  of  land  to  a  limited  right  of  using  the 
same  land,  may  work  a  far  greater  injury  to  A  than  to  take  from 
him  the  title  in  fee  simple  to  one  acre,  leaving  him  the  unre- 
stricted right  of  using  the  remaining  ninety-nine  acres.  Nobody 
doubts  that  the  latter  transaction  would  constitute  a  taking  of 
'property.'  Why  not  the  former?  *  *  '^  The  principle 
must  be  the  same  whether  the  oAvner  is  wholly  deprived  of  the 
use  of  his  land,  or  only  partially  deprived  of  it;  although  the 
amount  or  value  of  the  property  taken  in  the  two  instances  may 
widely  differ.  If  the  railroad  corporation  takes  a  strip  four  rods 
wide  out  of  a  farm  to  build  their  track  upon,  they  cannot  escape 
paying  for  the  strip  by  the  plea  that  they  have  not  taken  the 
whole  farm.  So  a  partial,  but  substantial,  restriction  of  the  right 
of  user  may  not  annihilate  all  the  owner's  rights  of  property  in 
the  land,  but  it  is  none  the  less  true  that  a  part  of  his  property 
is  taken.  *  *  *  The  injury  complained  of  in  this  case  is 
not  a  mere  personal  inconvenience  or  annoyance  to  the  occupant. 
Two  marked  characteristics  distinguish  this  injury  from  that 

2iSelden,  J.,  in  Wynehamer  v.  Peo-  ^^Citing,   2   Austin   on   Jurispru- 

ple,  13  N.  Y.  378,  433;   1  Bl.  Com.  dence,  3d  ed.  830;  Wells,  J.,  in  Wallc- 

138;    2   Austin's   Jurisprudence,   3d  er  v.  0.  C.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  103  Mass. 

ed.  817,  818.  10,  p.  14. 


62  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    68 

described  in  many  other  cases.  First,  it  is  a  physical  injui:y  to 
the  land  itself,  a  physical  interference  with  the  rights  of  prop- 
erty, an  actual  disturbance  of  the  plaintiff's  possession.  Second, 
it  would  clearly  be  actionable  if  done  by  a  private  person  with- 
out legislative  authority.  *  *  *  WTg  think  there  ha^  been 
a  taking  of  the  plaintiff's  property ;  that,  as  the  statutes  uride'r 
which  the  defendants  acted  make  no  provision  for  the  plkintiff's 
compensation,  they  afford  no  justification;  that  the  defeiidarits 
are  liable  in  this  action  as  wrong-doers;  and  that  the  ruling  of 
the  court  was  correct."  The  true  ^ound  of  this  decision  is  that 
the  plaintiff  as  owner  of  this  farm  had  a  right  to  the  protection 
of  the  natural  barrier  against  the  overflow  upon  his  land  of  the 
river  in  question,  that  this  right  was  a  part  of  the  property  in 
his  land,  and  that  the  acts  of  the  defendant  company  amounted 
to  a  taking  of  this  right  and  consequently  to  a  taking  of  his 
property  in  the  land  pro  tanto,  for  which  he  was  entitled  to  com- 
pensation under  the  constitution. 

§  68  (59).  Leading  cases,  continued.  The  decision  in 
the  Eaton  case  was  reviewed  two  years  later  by  the  same  court, 
in  the  case  of  Thompson  v.  The  Androscoggin  River  linprove- 
ment  Company,*^  and  the  true  principles  of  the  decision  set 
forth  with  great  clearness  and  ability.  As  the  Eaton  case  has 
exerted  so  large  an  influence  upon  this  branch  of  the  law  of 
eminent  domain  since  its  rendition,  we  shall  give  the  views  of 
the  court  at  length  from  the  case  last  cited : 

"Property  in  land  must  be  considered,  for  many  purposes,  not 
as  an  absolute,  unrestricted  dominion,  but  as  an  aggregation  of 
qualified  privileges,  the  limits  of  which  are  prescribed  by  the 
equality  of  rights,  and  the  correlation  of  rights  and  obligations 
necessary  for  the  highest  enjoyment  of  land  by  the  entire  com- 
munity of  proprietors.  Two  of  Eaton's  proprietary  rights  in  the 
tract  of  land  described  as  his  farm — his  right  of  exclusive  pos- 
session and  his  right  of  reasonable  use  of  the  soil — included  the 
right  that  the  soil  should  not  be  injured  by  E  either  appropriat- 
ing it  to  his  own  use,  or  committing  a  trespass  upon  it,  or  mak- 
ing an  unreasonable  use  of  his  own  land.  When  Eaton's  right 
of  not  being  injured  by  an  unreasonable  use  of  R's  land  was  in- 
vaded, his  property  was  taken,  in  the  same  legal  sense  in  which 
it  would  have  been  taken  if  his  right  of  not  being  injured  by  a 
trespass  or  appropriation  had  been  infringed.    If  Eaton's  farm 

2  354  N.  H.  545,  1874. 


§    68  WHAT    CONSTITUTES    A    TAKING.  63 

had  been  damaged  by  R's  reasonable  use  of  his  own  land,  Eaton 
would  have  had  no  cause  of  action ;  his  rights  would  not  have 
been  invaded  by  E,  exercising  his  right  of  reasonably  using  his 
own.  The  proprietary  rights  of  each  were  limited  in  that  man- 
ner. They  were  not  absolute  in  respect  to  each  one's  use  of 
his  own ;  they  included  a  right  in  respect  to  the  use  of  the  other's. 
The  soil  is  often  called  property ;  and  this  use  of  language  is  suf- 
ficiently accurate  for  some  purposes.  But  the  proposition  that 
the  soil  is  property  conveys  a  very  imperfect  idea  of  the  numer- 
ous and  variously  limited  rights  comprised  in  landed  estate ;  and 
it  is  sometimes  necessary  to  remember  that  the  name  of  property 
belongs  to  some  of  the  essential  proprietary  rights  vested  in  the 
person  called  the  owner  of  the  soil.  A  refusal  to  pay  a  debt  is  an 
injury  to  the  property  of  the  creditor.^*  A  patent  right,  a  copy 
right,  a  right  of  action,  an  easement,  an  incorporeal  heredita- 
ment, may  be  property  as  valuable  as  a  granite  quarry ;  and  the 
owner  of  such  property  may  be  practically  deprived  of  it, — 
such  property  may  be  practically  taken  from  its  owner, — al- 
though it  is  not  corporeal.  So  those  proprietary  rights,  which 
are  the  only  valuable  attributes  or  ingredients  of  a  land-owner's 
property,  may  be  taken  from  him,  without  an  asportation  or 
adverse  personal  occupation  of  that  portion  of  the  earth  which 
is  his,  in  the  limited  sense  of  being  the  subject  of  certain  legally 
recognized  proprietary  rights  which  he  may  exercise  for  a  short 
time.  Property  is  taken,  when  any  one  of  those  proprietary 
rights  is  taken,  of  which  property  consists.^'  Eaton's  right  of 
not  being  injured  in  his  real  estate  by  an  unreasonable  use  of 
R's  land  was  one  of  the  proprietary  rights  of  which  his  general 
and  comprehensive  right  of  property  was  composed.  And  that 
particular  right  of  being  uninjured  by  an  unreasonable  use  of 
R's  land  was  equally  an  element  of  his  property,  whether  such 
a  use  were  made  of  R's  land  by  R  or  by  the  defendants. 

"The  right  of  R  to  make  a  reasonable  use  of  his  own  (al- 
though such  a  use  might  cause  damage  to  Eaton's  farm),  like 
other  rights  included  in  R's  property,  could  be  transferred  to 
the  defendants  (the  B.  C.  &  M.  R.  R.)  by  R  himself,  or  by  the 
legislature  exercising  the  public  power  of  compulsory  purchase, 
commonly  called  eminent  domain.  But  the  right,  by  an  unrea- 
sonable use  of  R's  land,  to  cause  a  damage  to  Eaton's  farm,  not 

^iCiting,  Opinion  of  the  Justices,  ^^Citing,   Arimond  v.   Green  Bay 

23  N.  H.  538,  540.  etc.  Co.,  31   Wis.  316,  335. 


64  EMIITENT    DOMAIK.  §    68 

being  E's  right,  could  not  be  transferred  from  K  to  the  defend- 
ants by  E,  or  by  eminent  domain,  or  by  any  other  person  or 
power.  Eaton's  right  of  not  suffering  the  damage  done  his  farm 
by  the  imreasonable  use  of  E.'s  land  could  be  legally  taken 
from  him;  he  could  voluntarily  divest  himself  of  it;  he  could 
be  compulsorily  deprived  of  it  by  the  legislature  wielding  that 
power  of  eminent  domain  which  requires  compensation. 
*  *  *  In  Eaton  v.  Eailroad,  the  public  (by  their  agents, 
the  defendants)  took  from  E,^  and  converted  to  its  own  use, 
E's  right  to  make  a  reasonable  use  of  his  own  land — that  is, 
a  right  to  make  such  a  use  of  his  land  as  it  would  be  reasonable 
for  him  to  make  without  compensating  Eaton  or  any  one  else 
for  any  damage  resulting  therefrom.  In  making  such  a  use 
of  E's  land,  the  defendants  would  not  transcend  the  authority 
conferred  upon  them.  But  in  making  an  unreasonable  use  of  E's 
land  as  against  Eaton,  and  thereby  causing  Eaton's  land  to  be 
injured,  they  took  Eaton's  property  without  compensation,  and 
transcended  their  authority.  The  power  of  eminent  domain 
could  neither  take  from  E  a  right  (to  make  such  a  use  of  his 
land)  which  he  never  possessed,  nor  take  from  Eaton,  without 
compensation,  his  proprietary  right  to  be  unharmed  by  such  a 
use  of  E's  land.  Thus  interpreted  and  applied,  the  rule,  fairly 
stated  by  Sedgwick  as  the  result  of  the  adjudicated  cases,  is 
intelligible  and  sound.  It  is  generally  called  a  rule  of  conse- 
quential damages;  and  it  may  safely  be  called  so,  if  sufficient 
pains  be  taken  to  give  such  an  explanation  of  its  operation  and 
effect  as  will  show  how  unmeaning  and  inappropriate  the  name 
is. 

"If  the  railroad  company,  by  changing  the  course  of  traffic 
and  travel  and  causing  a  village  to  be  built  on  E's  land,  had 
reduced  the  value  of  Eaton's  property  in  a  neighboring  village 
more  than  the  entire  worth  of  his  farm,  they  would  not  have  been 
liable  to  him  for  that  damage.  They  would  have  been  justified, 
not  on  the  ground  that  the  damage  was  remote  and  consequential, 
in  the  sense  of  being  a  remote  consequence,  but  on  the  ground 
that  a  railroad  changing  the  channels  of  commerce  and  causing 
a  rival  village  to  spring  up,  would  be  a  reasonable  use  for 
others  to  make  of  their  land,  an  exercise  of  their  rights  of  j)rop- 
erty  in  land,  and  not  a  violation  of  Eaton's  right.  The  idea 
sometimes  conveyed,  in  such  a  case,  by  the  supposed  doctrine 
of  remote  and  consequential  damage  is,  that,  although  the  suf- 
ferer's legal  right  is  violated,  the  damage  is  too  remotely  conse- 


§    68  WHAT    CONSTITUTES    A    TAKING.  65 

quential,  too  remote  in  degree,  to  be  actionable;  as  if  the  law 
would  not  give  redress  for  the  violation  of  a  legal  right,  when 
the  space  between  cause  and  effect  exceeds  a  certain  prescribed 
legal  distance.  A  proprietor's  right  may  be  more  seriously  in- 
fringed by  a  cut  through  the  bank  of  a  river  at  a  great  distance 
from  his  land,  than  by  a  railway  built  across  his  hearth-stone. 
*  *  ,  *  Suppose,  in  Eaton's  case,  E — 'the  former  owner  of 
the  land  where  the  cut  was  made — had  owned  not  only  that, 
but  also  all  the  rest  of  the  strip  on  which  the  railroad  was  built, 
from  Concord  to  the  northern  end  of  the  road,  or  had,  by  con- 
tract, acquired  from  the  owners  the  right  to  build  and  use  a 
railroad  upon  it;  and  suppose  he  could  have  built  and  used  it 
without  infringing  any  public  right  of  way  on  land  or  water, 
or  any  other  public  right ;  he  could,  without  legislative  authority, 
have  lawfully  built  and  used  a  railroad  there  for  his  exclusive 
private  purposes,  or  for  carrying  the  passengers  and  freight 
now  carried  by  the  railroad  corporation;  he  could  have  built  it 
over  the  spot  where  the  cut  was  made,  without  violating  Eaton's 
right.  Such  a  use  of  his  own  land  would  have  been  reasonable ; 
but  if  he  had  made  such  a  cut  there  as  the  corporation  made, 
without  taking  the  precautions  necessary  to  prevent  the  natural, 
apparent,  and  expected  consequence  of  the  river  being  poured 
upon  Eaton's  farm,  he  would  have  been  liable,  because  such  a 
cut,  causing  such  an  injury,  would  have  been  an  unreasonable 
use  of  his  own  land.  His  liability,  under  such  circumstances, 
was  understood  to  be  admitted,  and  would  seem  to  be  too  clear 
to  be  contested. 

"Then  modify  the  supposed  case,  by  inserting  the  fact  that 
he  could  not  have  built  the  road,  on  the  route  on  which  it  was 
built,  without  infringing  public  rights  of  way  on  land  and 
water ;  and  suppose  that  difficulty  obviated  by  an  act  of  the  leg- 
islature, authorizing  him  to  encroach  upon  public  rights  of 
way  to  an  extent  necessary  for  the  building  of  a  railroad,  to  be 
used  by  him  in  the  business  of  a  common  carrier ;  such  a  modi- 
fication of  public  rights  would  not  affect  Eaton's  private  right 
of  not  being  injured  in  his  property  by  E.  pouring  Baker's  river 
upon  his  farm.  Modify  the  supposed  case  further,  by  insert- 
ing the  fact  that  E,  obtains  a  charter,  making  him  a  corporation 
by  the  name  of  E;  Eaton's  right  of  property  would  not  be 
affected  by  the  circumstance  that  the  river  was  poured  upon  his 
farm  by  E,  acting,  not  in  his  natural  capacity,  but  as  an  arti- 
ficial being— invisible,  intangible,  and  existing  only  in  contem- 
Em.  D.— 5. 


66 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  68 


plation  of  law.  How,  then,  could  E.  acquire  the  right  to  pour 
the  river  upon  Eaton's  farm  through  a  cut  which  it  would  be 
an  unreasonable  use  of  his  own  land  for  him  to  make?  By 
a  purchase,  voluntary  or  compulsory.  The  public,  exercising 
the  public  power  of  compulsory  purchase,  otherwise  called  emi- 
nent domain,  whereof  compensation  is  an  essential  element, 
could  authorize  him  as  a  public  agent,  in  his  natural  or  in  his 
artificial  capacity,  to  take  as  many  of  Eaton's  rights  of  prop- 
erty as  were  necessary  for  a  public  use.  In  that  way  E,  as  an 
agent  of  the  public,  could  obtain  Eaton's  right  of  not  being  in- 
jured by  an  unreasonable  use  of  K's  land.  That  right  was 
property  before  the  B.  C.  &  M.  Railroad  acquired  any  of  E's 
rights ;  and  it  continued  to  be  property  afterwards.  It  was  prop- 
erty that  the  railroad  corporation  could  not  acquire  from  R ;  and 
it  could  not  be  transferred  to  them  from  Eaton  by  a  compulsory 
purchase  without  compensation."  ^^ 


2  6  We  shall  not  take  the  space  to 
quote  to  any  extent  from  the  opin- 
ions of  other  courts.  The  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  in  a  case 
which  is  often  cited  on  this  ques- 
tion says :  "It  would  be  a  very  cu- 
rious and  unsatisfactory  result,  if, 
in  construing  a  provision  of  consti- 
tutional law,  always  understood  to 
have  been  adopted  for  protection  and 
security  to  the  rights  of  the  individ- 
ual as  against  the  government,  and 
which  has  received  the  commen- 
dation of  jurists,  statesmen  and 
commentators  as  placing  the  just 
principles  of  the  common  law  on 
that  subject  beyond  the  power  of  or- 
dinary legislation  to  change  or  con- 
trol them,  it  shall  be  held  that  if 
the  government  refrains  from  the  ab- 
solute conversion  of  real  property  to 
the  uses  of  the  public  it  can  destroy 
its  value  entirely,  can  inflict  irrep- 
arable and  permanent  injury  to 
any  extent,  can,  in  effect,  subject 
it  to  total  destruction  without  mak- 
ing any  compensation,  because,  in 
the  narrowest  sense  of  that  word, 
it  is  not  taken  for  the  public  use. 
Such  a  construction  would  pervert. 


the  constitutional  provision  into  a 
restriction  upon  the  rights  of  the 
citizen,  as  these  rights  stood  at  the 
common  law,  instead  of  the  govern- 
ment, and  make  it  an  authority  for 
the  invasion  of  private  right  under 
the  pretext  of  the  public  good,  which 
had  no  warrant  in  the  laws  or  prac- 
tices of  our  ancestors."  Pumpelly 
v.  Green  Bay  Co.,  13  Wall.  166,  177, 
1871.  Approved  and  followed  in  Ari- 
mond  V.  The  Green  Bay  and  Miss. 
Canal  Co.,  31  Wis.  316,  1872. 

"Depriving  an  owner  of  property 
of  one  of  its  essential  attributes,  is 
depriving  him  of  his  property."  Peo- 
ple v.  Otis,  90  N.  Y.  48,  52. 

The  following  are  also  leading  cases 
on  the  question:  Conniff  v.  San 
Francisco,  67  Cal.  45;  Hooker  v. 
New  Haven  &  Northampton  Co.,  14 
Conn.  146,  36  Am.  Dec.  477 ;  Same  v. 
Same,  15  Conn.  312;  Denslow  v. 
Same,  16  Conn.  98;  Piatt  Bros.  Co. 
v.  Waterbury,  72  Conn.  531,  45  Atl. 
154,  77  Am.  St.  Rep.  335,  48  L.R.A. 
691 ;  Nevins  v.  Peoria,  41  111.  502, 
89  Am.  Dec.  392 ;  Evansville  &  Craw- 
fordsville  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dick,  9  Ind. 
433;  Kemper  v.  Louisville,  14  Bush. 


"WHAT    CONSTITUTES    A    TAKING. 


67 


87;  Lee  v.  Pembroke  Iron  Co.,  57 
Me.  481,  2  Am.  Rep.  59 ;  Old  Colony 
&  Fall  River  R.  R.  Co.  v.  County  of 
Plymouth,  14  Gray  155;  Common- 
wealth V.  Boston  Advertising  Co., 
188  Mass.  348,  74  N.  E.  601,  108  Am. 
St.  Rep.  494,  69  L.R.A.  817;  Grand 
Rapids  Booming  Co.  v.  Jarvis,  30 
Mich.  308 ;  Vanderlip  v.  Grand  Rap- 
ids, 73  Mich.  522,  41  N.  W.  677 
O'Brien  v.  St.  Paul,  25  Minn.  331 
Weaver  v.  Boom  Co.,  28  Minn.  534 
McKenzie  v.  Miss.  &  Rum  River 
Boom  Co.,  29  Minn.  288;  Peters  v. 
Fergus  Falls,  35  Minn.  549;  Thurs- 
ton V.  St.  Joseph,  51  Mo.  510 ;  Broad- 
well  V.  City  of  Kansas,  75  Mo.  213, 
42  Am.  Rep.  406;  St.  Louis  v.  Hill, 
116  Mo.  527,  22  S.  W.  861;  Bigelow 


V.  Whitcomb,  72  N.  H.  473,  57  Atl. 
680,  65  L.R.A.  676;  Trenton  Water 
Power  Co.  v.  Rafif,  36  N.  J.  L.  335; 
Passaic  v.  Patterson  Bill  Posting 
Co.,  72  N.  J.  L.  285,  62  Atl.  267,  111 
Am.  St.  Rep.  076;  Story  v.  N.  Y. 
El.  R.  R.  Co.,  90  N.  Y.  122,  43  Am. 
Rep.  146;  Seifert  v.  Brooklyn,  101 
N.  Y.  136,  54  Am.  Rep.  664;  Cogs- 
well V.  New  York,  New  Haven  & 
Hartford  R.  R.  Co.,  103  N.  Y.  10, 
67  Am.  Rep.  701 ;  Lahr  v.  Metropoli- 
tan El.  R.  R.  Co.,  104  N.  Y.  208; 
Forster  v.  Scott,  136  N.  Y.  577,  32 
N.  E.  Rep.  976,  18  L.R.A.  543;  Huff- 
mire  V.  Brooklyn,  162  N.  Y.  584,  57 
N.  E.  176,  48  L.R.A.  421 ;  Foster  v. 
Stafford  National  Bank,  57  Vt.  128. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

WHAT  CONSTITUTES  A  TAKING:  WATEES. 

§  70  (60).  Streams  defined  and  classified.  Ruiming 
streams  consist  of  a  well  defined  channel  with  sides  or  banks,  in 
which  water  habitually  flows,  though  it  need  not  flow  continu- 
ously.-^  Some  streams  are  small  and  inacapable  of  navigation 
for  any  purpose.  All  the  authorities  agree  that  such  streams  are 
wholly  private  property  and  that  the  title  of  the  riparian  owner 
extends  to  the  middle  of  the  stream.^  In  regard  to  navigable 
streams,  there  is  much  conflict  of  authority,  both  as  to  the  title 
of  the  riparian  owner  to  the  bed  of  the  stream  and  as  to 
his  rights  in  the  stream  itself.  As  to  what  constitutes  navi- 
gability is  a  question  which  does  not  fall  within  the  province  of 
this  treatise,  and  for  a  solution  of  it  the  reader  is  referred  to 
other  works.^  So  also  as  to  title  to  the  bed  of  navigable 
streams.*  The  decisions  of  the  different  States  vary  upon  these 
questions,  and  especially  upon  the  latter.  For  thfe  purposes  of 
this  treatise  it  is  necessary  to  ascertain  and  define  the  rights  of 
riparian  owners;  and,  as  respects  such  rights,  streams  may  be 
divided  into  three  classes :  First,  private  non-navigable  streams ; 
second,  private  navigable  streams ;  third,  public  navigable 
streams.®  The  second  and  third  classes  are  public  highways 
by  water,  the  only  difference  being  that  in  the  second  class  the 
title  to  the  bed  of  the  stream  is  in  the  riparian  proprietors,  while 
in  the  third  class  it  is  in  the  public.  Important  distinctions 
are,  by  some  courts,  based  upon  this  circumstance  which  will 
be  noticed  hereafter. 

lAngell  on  Watercourses,  §§  1-4;  xiii;    Gould  on  Waters,   §§   19,   41, 

Gould  on  Waters,  §  41;  2  Farnham  et  seq.;  1  Farnham  on  Waters,  §  23; 

on  Waters,  §§  455-460;  Sanguinette*  post,  §  91. 

V.  Pock,  136  Cal.  466,  69  Pac.  98,  89  4Angell    on   Waterc,    chap,    xiii; 

Am.  St.  Rep.  169;  Rait  v.  Furrow,  Gould  on  Waters,  §§  19,  41,  e*  seg.;  1 

74  Kan.  101,  85  Pac.  934,  6  L.R.A.  Farnham  on  Waters,  §§  36-50;  post, 

(N.S.)    157.  §§  87,  94^100. 

sAngell  on  Waterc,  §§  10  &  11;  BAngell    on   Waterc,    chap,    xiii; 

Gould  on  Waters,  §§  46,  et  seq.;  1  Gould  on  Waters,  chap,  iii;  Wood  on 

Farnham  on  Waters,  §  29b.  Nuisances  (1st  ed.),  §  586. 


sAngell    on    Watercourses,    chap. 


68 


i  71 


WATEES. 


69 


§  71  (61).  Rights  of  riparian  owners  in  the  flow  of  the 
stream.  It  may  be  laid  down  as  a  well-settled  principle  that 
every  proprietor  over  or  past  whose  land  a  stream  of  water  flows 
has  a  right  that  it  shall  continue  to  flow  to  and  from  his  prem- 
ises in  the  quantity,  quality  and  manner  in  which  it  is  accus- 
tomed to  flow  by  nature,  subject  to  the  right  of  the  upper  pro- 
prietors to  make  a  reasonable  use  of  the  stream  as  it  flows  past 
their  land.^  This  right  is  a  part  of  his  property  in  the  land 
and  in  many  cases  constitutes  its  most  valuable  element.''     It 


sAngell  on  Watercourses,  §§  90- 
96;  Gould  on  Waters,  §  204;  Ala. 
Consol.  C.  &  I.  Co.  V.  Turner,  145 
Ala.  639,  39  So.  603,  117  Am.  St.  Rep. 
Gl;  Tutwiler  C.  &  I.  Co.  v.  Nichols, 
146  Ala.  364,  39  So.  762,  119  Am. 
St.  Rep.  34;  Fisher  v.  Feige,  137  Cal. 
39,  69  Pac.  618,  92  Am.  St.  Rep.  77, 

59  L.R.A.  333;  Duckworth  v.  Wat- 
sonville  W.  &  L.  Co.,  150  Cal.  520, 
89  Pac.  338;  Jessup  &  M.  I'aper  Co. 
V.  Ford,  6  Del.  Ch.  52;  Tampa  Water 
Works  Co.  V.  Cline,  37  Fla.  586,  20 
So.  780,  53  Am.  St.  Rep.  262,  33 
L.R.A.  370;  Ferguson  v.  Firmenich 
Mfg.  Co.,  77  la.  576,  42  N.  W.  448, 
14  Am.  St.  Rep.  319;  Shamleffer  v. 
Peerless  Mill  Co.,  18  Kan.  24;  Clark 
V.  Allaman,  71  Kan.  206,  80  Pac. 
571,  70  L.R.A.  971;  Anderson  v. 
Cinn.  So.  R.  R.  Co.,  86  Ky.  44,  5  S. 
W.  49;  Heath  v.  Williams,  25  Me. 
209,  43  Am.  Dec.  265;  Allen  v. 
Thornapple  Elec.  Co.,  144  Mich.  370, 
108  N.  W.  79,  115  Am.  St.  Rep.  453; 
Liles  v.  Cawthorn,  78  Miss.  558,  29 
So.  834;  Clark  v.  Cambridge  etc. 
Impv.  Co.,  45  Neb.  799,  64  N.  W. 
239;  Slattery  v.  Harley,  58  Neb. 
575,  79  N.  W.  151 ;  Crawford  Co.  v. 
Hathaway,  60  Neb.  754,  84  N.  W. 
271;  Crawford  Co.  v.  Hathaway,  61 
Neb.  317,  85  N.  W.  303;  Crawford 
Co.  V.  Hathaway,  67  Neb.  325,  93 
N.  W.  781,  108  N.  W.  647,  60  L.R.A. 
889;  Meng  v.  Coffee,  67  Neb.  500, 
93  N.  W.  713,  108  Am.  St.  Rep.  697, 

60  L.R.A.    910;    New  York   Rubber 


Co.  V.  Rothery,  132  N.  Y.  293,  30 
N.  E.  841 ;  Strobel  v.  Kerr  Salt  Co., 
164  N.  Y.  303,  58  N.  E.  142,  79  Am. 
St.  Rep.  643,  51  L.R.A.  687;  Parry 
V.  Citizens'  Water  Works  Co.,  59 
Hun  196,  37  N.  Y.  St.  715,  14  N.  Y. 
Supp.  471;  Gilzinger  v.  Saugerties 
Water  Co.,  66  Hun  173,  21  N.  Y. 
Supp.  121;  Brown  v.  Gold  Coin  Min. 
Co.,  48  Ore.  277,  86  Pac.  361 ;  Clark 
V.  Pa.  R.  R.  Co.,  145  Pa.  St.  438,  22 
Atl.  989,  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  710;  Sil- 
ver Spring  Co.  v.  Wanskuck  Co.,  13 
R.  I.  611 ;  Cox  V.  Howell,  108  Tenn. 
130,  65  S.  W.  868,  58  L.R.A.  487; 
Watkins  Land  Co.  v.  Clements,  98 
Tex.  578,  86  S.  W.  733,  107  Am.  St. 
Rep.  653,  70  L.R.A.  964;  Carpenter 
V.  Gold,  88  Va.  551,  14  S.  E.  329; 
Neselhous  v.  Walker,  45  Wash.  621, 
88  Pac.  1032 ;  New  Whatcom  v.  Fair- 
haven  Land  Co.,  24  Wash.  493,  64 
Pac.  735,  54  L.R.A.  190;  Van  Eg- 
mond  V.  Seaforth,  6  Ont.  599;  Unit- 
ed States  V.  Rio  Grande  Dam  &  Irr. 
Co.,  174  U.  S.  690;  also  numerous 
cases  cited  in  the  following  sections. 
Where  the  waters  of  a  stream  grad- 
ually sink  into  the  sand  and  disap- 
pear, finding  their  way  by  percola- 
tion along  the  valley  of  the  stream 
to  a  lake,  they  no  longer  constitute 
a  natural  water  course,  and  may  be 
treated  as  percolating  water.  Meyer 
V.  Tacoma  L.  &  P.  Co.,  8  Wash.  144, 
35  Pac.  601.    Aiid  see  post,  §  114. 

'Bottoms  V.  Brewer,  54  Ala.  288; 
St.  Helena  Water  Co.  v.  Forbes,  62 


70 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  71 


necessarily  follows,  therefore,  that  any  violation  of  this  right 
in  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  eminent  domain  is  a  taking  of 
private  property  for  which  compensation  must  be  made.*  Such 
a  violation  must  occur  in  one  of  three  ways:  (1)  By  abstract- 
ing or  diverting  water  above,  (2)  by  changing  or  corrupting 
the  current,  or  (3)  by  works  below  which  prevent  the  water  flow- 
ing off  in  its  accustomed  manner.  As  respects  the  rights  of  the 
riparian  owner  in  the  flow  of  the  water,  we  apprehend  it  makes 
no  difference  whether  the  stream  is  public  or  private,  navigable. 


Cal.  182,  45  Am.  Rep.  659;  Lux  v. 
Haggin,  69  Cal.  255;  Wadsworth 
V.  Tillotson,  15  Conn.  365,  373,  39 
Am.  Dec.  391 ;  Harding  v.  Stamford 
Water  Co.,  41  Conn.  87;  Blberton 
V.  Hobbs,  121  Ga.  749,  49  S.  E.  779; 
Mofifett  V.  Brewer,  1  G.  Greene,  348; 
Shamleffer  v.  Peerless  Mill  Co.,  18 
Kan.  24;  Emporia  v.  Soden,  25  Kan. 
588,  37  Am.  Rep.  265;  Clark  v.  Cam- 
bridge etc.  Impv.  Co.,  45  Neb.  799, 
64  N.  W.  239;  Crawford  Co.  v. 
Hathaway,  67  Neb.  325,  93  N.  W. 
781,  108  Am.  St.  Rep.  647,  60  L.R.A. 
889;  Ten  Eyck  v.  Delaware  &  Rari- 
tan  Canal  Co.,  18  N.  J.  L.  200,  37 
Am.  Dec.  233;  Stamford  Water  Co. 
V.  Stanley,  39  Hun  424;  Mansfield 
V.  Balliet,  65  Ohio  St.  451,  63  N.  E. 
86,  58  L.R.A.  528;  Deming  v.  Cleve- 
land, 22  Ohio  C.  C.  1;  Weiss  v. 
Oregon  etc.  Co.,  13  Ore.  496;  Sil- 
ver Spring  etc.  Co.  v.  Wanskuek 
Co.,  13  R.  L  611;  Fisher  v.  Bounti- 
ful City,  21  Utah  29,  59  Pac.  520; 
Rigney  v.  Tacoma  L.  &  T.  Co.,  9 
Wash.  576,  38  Pac.  147;  Avery  v. 
Fox,  1  Abb.  U.  S.  246;  Gould  on 
Waters,  §  204.  "The  right  of  a  ri- 
parian proprietor,  as  such,  is  prop- 
erty, and,  when  vested,  can  be  de- 
stroyed or  impaired  only  in  the  in- 
terest of  the  general  public,  upon 
full  compensation,  and  in  accordance 
with  established  law."  Clark  v. 
Cambridge  etc.  Impv.  Co.,  45  Neb. 
799,  64  N.  W.  239. 

In   some   of   the   arid   States   the 
common  law  rules  as  to  the  rights 


of  riparian  owners  upon  streams  are 
held  to  be  inapplicable  to  the  condi- 
tions there  existing,  and  therefore 
not  in  force,  and  in  several  the  com- 
mon law  rules  are  modified  by  con- 
stitutions or  statutes.  See  Chandler 
V.  Austin,  4  Ariz.  347,  42  Pac.  483; 
Lux  V.  Haggin,  69  Cal.  255,  10  Pac. 
674;  Bathgate  v.  Irvine,  126  Cal. 
135,  58  Pac.  442,  77  Am.  St.  Rep. 
158;  Coffin  v.  Left  Hand  Ditch  Co., 
6  Colo.  443;  Hammond  v.  Rose,  11 
Colo.  524,  7  Am.  St.  Rep.  258;  Crip- 
pen  V.  White,  28  Colo.  298,  64  Pac. 
184;  Reno  Smelting  Works  v.  Stev- 
enson, 20  Nev.  269,  21  Pac.  317,  19 
Am.  St.  Rep.  364,  4  L.R.A.  160; 
Walsh  V.  Wallace,  26  Nev.  299,  67 
Pac.  914,  99  Am.  St.  Rep.  692;  Sto- 
well  V.  Johnson,  7  Utah,  215,  26 
Pac.  290 ;  Moyer  v.  Preston,  6  Wyo. 
308,  44  Pac,  845;  Farm  Investment 
Co.  V.  Carpenter,  9  Wyo.  110,  61 
Pac.  258,  87  Am.  St.  Rep.  918,  50 
L.R.A.  747. 

SLux  V.  Haggin,  69  Cal.  255;  El- 
berton  v.  Hobbs,  121  Ga.  749,  49  S. 
E.  779 ;  Hamor  v.  Bar  Harbor  Water 
Co.,  78  Me.  127;  Mayor  etc.  of  Balti- 
more V.  Apphold,  42  Md.  442;  Craw- 
ford Co.  V.  Hathaway,  67  Neb.  325, 
93  N.  W.  781,  108  Am.  St.  Rep.  647, 
60  L.R.A.  89 ;  McCook,  Irr.  &  W.  P. 
Co.  V.  Crews,  70  Neb.  109,  96  N.  W. 
996;  Mansfield  v.  Balliet,  65  Ohio 
St.  451,  63  N.  W.  86,  58  L.R.A.  628; 
Fisher  v.  Bountiful  City,  21  Utah 
29,  59  Pac.  520.  And  see  cases  cited 
in  the  succeeding  sections. 


§  72 


WATEES. 


71 


or  not  navigable  f  but  we  shall  recur  to  the  rights  of  riparian 
owners  upon  public  and  navigable  streams  hereafter.^" 

§  72  (61a).  What  constitutes  a  reasonable  use  of  a 
stream  by  an  upper  proprietor.  Although  this  question  does 
not  fall  strictly  within  the  scope  of  this  work,  some  reference 
to  authorities  on  the  question  may  be  found  convenient.  ^^  The 
principal  uses  to  which  the  water  of  a  stream  may  be  put  are 
for  domestic  purposes,  for  watering  stock,  for  irrigation  and 
for  manufacturing.  The  right  to  take  water  for  domestic  pur- 
poses and  for  watering  stock  is  an  absolute  right,  and  each  pro- 
prietor may  take  what  is  necessary  for  these  purposes,  without 
regard  to  the  effect  upon  lower  proprietors.-'^     But  the  right 


9  Gould  on  Waters,  §  204. 

loPosf,  §§   87,  94-100. 

iiThe  following  are  some  of  the 
leading  cases  in  wliieh  the  question 
of  reasonable  use  is  discussed: 
Drake  v.  Lady  Ensley  Coal  etc.  Co., 
102  Ala.  501,  14  So.  749,  48  Am. 
St.  Eep.  77,  24  L.R.A.  64;  Heilbron 
V.  Land  &  Water  Co.,  80  Cal.  189,  22 
Pae.  62;  Parker  v.  Hotchkiss,  25 
Conn.  321 ;  White  v.  East  Lake  Land 
Co.,  96  Ga.  415,  23  S.  E.  393,  51  Am. 
St.  Rep.  141;  Bwight  v.  Hays,  150 
111.  273,  37  N.  E.  218,  41  Am.  St. 
Rep.  367;  Barnard  v.  Shirley,  135 
Ind.  547,  34  N.  E.  Rep.  600,  35  N. 
E.  117;  Clark  v.  Allaman,  71  Kan. 
206,  80  Pac.  571,  70  L.R.A.  971 ;  Dav- 
is V.  Winslow,  51  Me.  264,  81  Am. 
Dec.  573;  Helfrich  v.  Catonsville 
Water  Co.,  74  Md.  269,  22  Atl.  72, 
28  Am.  St.  Rep.  245;  Smith  v.  Aga- 
wam  Canal  Co.,  2  Allen  355;  Door- 
man V.  Ames,  12  Minn.  451 ;  Minn. 
L.  &  T.  Co.  V.  St.  Anthony  Falls 
W.  P.  Co.,  82  Minn.  503,  85  N.  W. 
520 ;  Creek  v.  Bozeman  Water  Works 
Co.,  15  Mont.  121,  38  Pac.  459;  Craw- 
ford Co.  V.  Hathaway,  67  Neb.  325, 
93  N.  W.  781,  108  Am.  St.  Rep.  647, 
60  L.R.A.  889;  Meng  v.  Coffee,  67 
Neb.  500,  93  N.  W.  713,  108  Am. 
St.  Rep.  697,  60  L.R.A.  910;  McCook 
Irr.  &  W.  P.  Co.  V.  Crews,  70  Neb. 
109,  96  N.  W.    996 ;  Jones  v.  Adams, 


19  Nev.  78,  6  Pac.  442,  3  Am.  St. 
Rep.  788;  Hays  v.  Waldron,  44  N. 
H.  580,  84  Am.  Dec.  105;  Holden  v. 
Lake  Co.  53  N.  H.  552;  Garwood 
V.  N.  Y.  Cent.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  83 
N.  Y.  400;  Strobel  v.  Kerr  Salt  Co., 
164  N.  Y.  303,  58  N.  E.  1242,  79  Am. 
St.  Rep.  643,  51  L.R.A.  687;  Pier- 
son  V.  Speyer,  178  N.  Y.  270,  70  N. 
E.  799,  102  Am.  St.  Rep.  499;  Hen- 
derson Real  Est.  Co.  v.  Carroll  etc. 
Co.,  189  N.  Y.  531,  affirming,  113 
A.  D.  775,  99  N.  Y.  S.  365;  Piatt  v. 
Root,  15  Johns.  213 ;  Palmer  v.  Mul- 
ligan, 3  Caines  Rep.  307,  2  Am.  Deo. 
270 ;  Standen  v.  New  Rochelle  Water 
Co.,  91  Hun  272,  36  N.  Y.  Supp.  92; 
Jones  V.  Conn,  39  Ore.  30,  64  Pac. 
855,  65  Pac.  1068,  87  Am.  St.  Rep. 
634,  54  L.R.A.  630;  Pennsylvania 
Coal  Co.  V.  Sanderson,  113  Pa.  St. 
126,  6  Atl.  453;  White  v.  Whitney 
Mfg.  Co.,  60  S.  C.  254,  38  S.  E.  456 ; 
Lawrie  v.  Silsby,  76  Vt.  240,  56 
Atl.  1106,  104  Am.  St.  Rep.  927; 
Mumpower  v.  City  of  Bristol,  90 
Va.  151,  17  S.  E.  853,  44  Am.  St. 
Rep.  902;  Green  Bay  etc.  Canal 
Co.  V.  Kaukauna  Water  Power 
Co.,  90  Wis.  370,  61  N.  W.  1121, 
48  Am.  St.  Rep.  937;  Indianapolis 
Water  Co.  v.  Am.  Straw  Board  Co., 
53  Fed.  Rep.  970,  57  Fed.  Rep.  100; 
Gould  on  Waters,  §§  205  et  seq. 
i2Garwood  v.  New  York  Central 


72 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  73 


to  take  the  water  for  irrigation  or  manufacturing  purposes  is 
qualified  and  limited  by  the  existence  of  like  rights  in  the 
lower  owners,  and  must  be  exercised  with  a  due  regard  to  such 
rights.-'^  The  rights  of  a  riparian  owner  have  no  dependence 
upon  the  extent  of  the  watershed  which  he  owns,  except  perhaps 
as  respects  irrigation.-^*  A  riparian  owner  has  no  right,  as 
against  lower  proprietors,  to  take  and  divert  water  for  the  use 
of  non-riparian  owners,  or  for  the  use  of  his  own  non-riparian 
lands.  ^® 

§  73  (61b).  What  riparian  rights  in  the  flow  of  a, 
stream  attach  to  property  held  for  public  use.  Eiparian 
rights  in  a  stream  pertain  to  the  land  abutting  on  the  stream. 
They  pass  with  the  title  to  the  property  and  are  the  same,  wheth- 
er the  property  is  owned  by  a  natural  or  an  artificial  person. 
The  rights  are  not  dependent  upon  the  uses  made  of  the  prop- 
erty or  the  purposes  for  which  it  is  held.  The  fact  that  the 
property  is  held  for  public  use,  therefore,  would  not  seem  to 


etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  8a  N.  Y.  400;  An- 
derson V.  Cinn.  So.  R.  R.  Co.,  86 
Ky.  44,  5  S.  W.  49;  White  v.  East 
Lake  Land  Co.,  96  Ga.  415,  23  S.  E. 
393,  51  Am.  St.  Rep.  141;  Cox  v. 
Howell,  108  Tenn.  130,  65  S.  W.  868, 
58  L.RA.  487;  Watkins  Land  Co. 
V.  Clements,  90  Tex.  578,  86  S.  W. 
733,  107  Am.  St.  Rep.  653,  70  L.R.A. 
964. 

isSame;  Minnesota  L.  &  T.  Co.  v. 
St.  Anthony  Falls  W.  P.  Co.,  82 
Minn.  505,  85  N.  W.  520;  Crawford 
Co.  V.  Hathaway,  67  Neb.  325,  93 
N.  W.  781,  108  Am.  St.  Rep.  647, 
60  L.R.A.  889. 

i4Standen  v.  New  Rochelle  Water 
Co.,  91  Hun  272,  36  N.  Y.  Supp. 
92.  As  to  what  are  to  be  deemed  ri- 
parian lands  see  2  Farnham  on 
Waters,  §  463;  Crawford  Co.  v. 
Hathaway,  67  Neb.  325,  93  N.  W. 
781,  108  Am.  St.  Rep.  647,  60  L.R.A. 
889;  Jones  v.  Conn,  39  Ore.  30,  64 
Pac.  855,  65  Pae.  1068,  87  Am.  St. 
Rep.  634,  54  L.R.A.  630;  Watkins 
Land  Co.  v.  Clements,  98  Tex.  578, 
86  S.  W.  733,  107  Am.  St.  Rep.  653, 
70  L.R.A.  964. 


"Ulbrecht  v.  Eufaula  Water  Co., 
86  Ala.  587,  4  L.R.A.  572;  Heilbron 
V.  Land  &  Water  Co.,  80  Cal.  189,  22 
Pac.  62;  Wutchuma  Water  Co.  v. 
Pogue,  151  Cal.  105;  Montecito  Val. 
Water  Co.  v.  Santa  Barbara,  151 
Cal.  377,  90  Pac.  935;  Anderson  v. 
Cinn.  So.  R.  R.  Co.,  86  Ky.  44,  5 
S.  W.  49;  Crawford  Co.  v.  Hatha- 
way, 67  Neb.  325,  93  N.  W.  781,  108 
Am.  St.  Rep.  047,  60  L.R.A.  889; 
Parry  v.  Citizens'  Water  Works  Co. 
59  Hun  196,  37  N.  Y.  St.  715,  14 
N.  Y.  Supp.  471 ;  Standen  v.  New 
Rochelle  Water  Co.,  91  Hun  272, 
38  N.  Y.  Supp.  92;  Appeal  of  Haupt, 
125  Pa.  St.  211,  17  Atl.  436,  3 
L.RA.  536 ;  Clark  v.  Pennsylvania 
R.  R.  Co.,  145  Pa.  St.  438,  32  Atl. 
089,  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  710;  Lord  v. 
Meadville  Water  Co.  135  Pa.  St.  122, 
19  Atl.  1007,  20  Am.  St.  Rep.  864, 
8  L.R.A.  202;  Watkins  Land  Co.  v. 
Clement,  98  Tex.  578,  86  S.  W.  733, 
107  Am.  St.  Rep.  653,  70  L.R.A.  964; 
Clements  v.  Watkins  Land  Co.,  36 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  339,  82  S.  W.  665; 
Saunders  v.  Bluefield  W.  W.  Co., 
58  Fed.  133. 


§  74 


WATEES. 


73 


affect  the  question  of  riparian  rights.^"  But  as  the  right  to  use 
the  water  pertains  to  the  property,  the  use  must  be  upon  the 
property  for  the  benefit  of  the  same  or  its  occupants.-^''  As  a 
natural  person  may  not  take  and  sell  the  water  to  non-riparian 
owners,  so  the  same  may  not  be  done  by  a  city  or  water  company 
owning  land  upon  a  stream.^*  As  a  natural  person  may  not 
use  the  water  in  his  business  upon  non-riparian  property,  so  a 
railroad  company  or  other  corporation  of  a  public  nature  is 
restricted  in  like  manner.^®  It  has  been  held  in  Oregon  that 
the  State,  as  a  riparian  proprietor  on  a  stream  may  not  divert 
water  for  the  supply  of  a  penitentiary  and  insane  asylum  sit- 
uated on  the  riparian  lands.^"  But  the  contrary  has  been  held 
in  Pennsylvania.^^ 

§  74  (62).  Abstracting  or  diverting  the  water  of  a 
stream.  Where  the  waters  of  a  stream  or  any  part  thereof  are 
taken  or  diverted  to  supply  a  city  or  village  with  water,^*  or  for 


iBSaunders  v.  Bluefield  etc.  Co, 
58  Fed.  13.3;  Lord  v.  Meadville  Wa 
ter  Co.,  135  Pa.  St.  122,  19  Atl 
1007,  20  Am.  St.  Eep.  834,  8  L.R.A, 
202;  Appeal  of  Haupt,  125  Pa.  St, 
211,  17  Atl.  436,  3  L.R.A.  536;  Rig- 
ney  v.  Tacoma  Light  &,  W.  Co.,  9 
Wash.  576,  38  Pac.  147;  People  v. 
Hulbert,  131  Mich.  156,  91  N.  W. 
211,  100  Am.  St.  Rep.  588,  64 
L.R.A.  265. 

17  Garwood  v.  New  York  Cent.  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  83  N.  Y.  400. 

isMontroae  Canal  Co.  v.  Loutsen- 
hiser  Ditch  Co.,  23  Colo.  223,  48  Pac. 
532;  Osborn  v.  Norwalk,  77  Conn. 
663,  60  Atl.  645;  Elberton  v.  Pearle 
Cotton  Mills,  123  Ga.  1,  50  S.  E.  977 ; 
People  V.  Hulbert,  131  Mich.  156, 
91  N.  W.  211,  100  Am.  St.  Rep.  588, 
64  L.R.A.  265;  Sparks  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
Newton,  60  N.  J.  Eq.  399,  45  Atl. 
596;  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Pottsville  Water  Co.,  182  Pa.  St.  418, 
38  Atl.  404;  Irving  v.  Media,  194  Pa. 
St.  648,  45  Atl.  482,  affirming  10  Pa. 
Supr.  Ct.  132;  Lonsdale  Co.  v.  Woon- 
socket,  25  R.  I.  428,  56  Atl.  448; 
State  V.  Superior  Court,  46  Wash. 
eOO,  90  Pac.  650 ;  post,  §  74.    Contra, 


Canton  v.  Shock,  66  Ohio  St.  19,  63 
N.  E.  600,  90  Am.  St.  Rep.  557,  58 
L.R.A.  637.  See  Framingham  Water 
Co.  V.  Old  Colony  R.  R.  Co.,  176 
Mass.  404,  57  N.  E.  680. 

19  Same. 

2  0  Salem  Mills  Co.  v.  Lord,  42  Ore. 
82,  69  Pac.  1033^  70  Pac.  832. 

21  Filbert  v.  Dechert,  22  Pa.  Supr. 
Ct.  362. 

2  2  Stein  V.  Burden,  24  Ala.  130,  55 
Am.  Dec.  453;  Stein  v.  Ashby,  24 
Ala.  521;  Burden  v.  Stein,  27  Ala. 
104,  62  Am.  Dee.  758 ;  Stein  v.  Bur- 
den, 29  Ala.  127;  Stein  v.  Ashby,  30 
Ala.  363 ;  Ulbricht  v.  Eufaula  Water 
Co.,  86  Ala.  587;  St.  Helena  Water 
Co.  V.  Forbes,  62  Cal.  182,  45  Am. 
Rep.  659;  Moore  v.  Clear  Lake  W. 
W.,  68  Cal.  146;  Harding  v.  Stam- 
ford Water  Co.,  41  Conn.  87 ;  Board 
of  Water  Comrs.  v.  Perry,  69  Conn. 
461,  37  Atl.  1059 ;  Fisk  v.  Hartford, 
70  Conn.  720,  40  Atl.  906,  66  Am.  St. 
Rep.  147;  Watson  v.  New  Milford 
Water  Co.,  71  Conn.  442,  42  Atl.  265; 
Osborn  v.  Norwalk,  77  Conn.  663, 
60  Atl.  645;  Elberton  v.  Hobba,  121 
Ga.  749,  49  S.  E.  779;  Elberton  v. 
Pearle  Cotton  Mills,  123  Ga.  1,  50  S. 


u 


EMINENT   DOMAIN. 


§  u 


the  use  of  a  canal  ^^  or  railroad  company,^*  or  to  improve  a 


E.  977;  Emporia  v.  Soden,  25  Kan. 
588,  37  Am.  Rep.  265;  King  v.  Dan- 
ville, 32  Ky.  L.  E.  1188;  Hamor  v. 
Bar  Harbor  Water  Co.,  78  Me.  127; 
Aberdeen  v.  Bradford,  94  Md.  G70, 
51  Atl.  614;  Lund  v.  New  Bedford, 
121  Mass.  286;  Aetna  Mills  v.  Wal- 
tham,  126  Mass.  422;  Bailey  v.  AVo- 
burn,  126  Mass.  416;  Aetna  Mills  v. 
Brookline,  127  Mass.  69;  Watuppa 
Reservoir  Co.  v.  Fall  River,  134 
Mass.  267;  Nemasket  Mills  v.  Taun- 
ton, 166  Mass.  540,  44  N.  E.  Rep. 
609;  Stevens  v.  Worcester,  196  Mass. 
45 ;  Hall  v.  Ionia,  38  Midi.  493 ;  Peo- 
ple V.  Hulbert,  131  Mich.  156,  91  N. 
W.  211,  100  Am.  St.  Rep.  588,  64 
L.R.A.  265 ;  Creek  v.  Bozeman  W.  W. 
Co.,  15  Mon.  121,  38  Pac.  439;  Hig- 
gins  V.  Flemington  Water  Co.,  36  N. 
J.  Eq.  538 ;  Acquackanonk  Water  Co. 
V.  Watson,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  366;  East 
Jersey  Water  Co.  v.  Bigelow,  60  N. 
J.  L.  201;  Butler  Hard  Rubber  Co. 
V.  Newark,  61  N.  J.  L.  32,  40  Atl. 
224;  Sparks  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Newton,  60 
N.  J.  Eq.  399,  45  Atl.  596,  reversing 
S.  C.  57  N.  J.  Eq.  367,  41  Atl.  385; 
Gardner  v.  Village  of  Newburgh,  2 
Johns.  Ch.  161,  7  Am.  Dec.  526; 
Smith  T.  City  of  Rochester,  92  N. 
Y.  463,  44  Am.  Rep.  393;  Smith  v. 
Brooklyn,  160  N.  Y.  357,  45  L.R.A. 
664;  Stamford  Water  Co.  v.  Stanley, 
39  Hun  424;  Van  Buren  v.  Fishkill 
W.  W.  Co.,  50  Hun  448,  21  N.  Y. 
St.  448,  3  N.  Y.  Supp.  336;  Parry  v. 
Citizens'  W.  W.  Co.,  59  Hun  196,  37 
N.  Y.  St.  715,  14  N.  Y.  Supp.  471 ; 
Gilzinger  v.  Saugerties  W.  Co.,  68 
Hun  173,  21  N.  Y.  Supp.  121 ;  Stan- 
den  V.  New  Roehelle  Water  Co.,  91 
Hun  272,  36  N.  Y.  Supp.  92;  Covert 
V.  Brooklyn,  13  App  Div.  188,  42  N. 
Y.  S.  310 ;  Duesler  v.  Johnstown,  24 
A.  D.  608;  Gallagher  v.  Kingston 
Water  Co.,  25  App.  Div.  82 ;  Geer  v. 
Durham  Water  Co.,  127  N.  C.  349, 


37  S.  E.  474;  Hough  v.  Doylejtown, 
4  Brews.,  333;  Appeal  of  Haupt,  125 
Pa.  St.  211,  17  Atl.  436,  3  L.R.A. 
536;  Lord  v.  Meadville  Water  Co., 
135  Pa.  St.  122,  19  Atl.  1007,  20  Am. 
St.  Rep.  864,  8  L.R.A.  202;  Bowers 
V.  Citizens'  Water  Co.,  162  Pa.  St. 
9,  29  Atl.  98;  Hogg  v.  Connellsville 
Water  Co.,  168  Pa.  St.  456,  31  Atl. 
1010;  Lee  v.  Springfield  Water  Co., 
170  Pa.  St.  223,  35  Atl.  184;  Irving 
V.  Media  Borough,  194  Pa.  St.  048,  45 
Atl.  482,  affirming  S.  C.  10  Pa.  Supr. 
Ct.  132;  Lonsdale  v.  Woonsocket,  25 
R.  I.  428,  56  Atl.  448;  Rigney  v. 
Taeoma  L.  &  Water  Co.,  9  Wash. 
576,  38  Pac.  147,  26  L.R.A.  425; 
New  York  v.  Pine,  185  V.  S.  93,  22 
S.  C.  592;  Pine  v.  New  York,  112 
Fed.  98,  50  C.  C.  A.  145,  affirming 
S.  C.  103  Fed.  337 ;  Saunders  v.  Blue- 
field  W.  W.  etc.  Co.,  58  Fed.  Rep. 
133;  Swindon  Water  Works  Co.  v. 
Wilts  &  Berks  Canal  Navigation  Co., 
L.  R.  7  E.  &  I.  App.  Cas.  697.  A 
temporary  diversion  by  a  water  com- 
pany for  the  purpose  of  repairing 
its  dam  was  held  not  actionable. 
Mott  V.  Consumers  Water  Co.,  188 
Pa.   St.  521,  41  Atl.  611. 

2  3Denslow  v.  New  Haven  &  North- 
ampton Canal  Co.,  16  Conn.  98; 
Heilman  v.  Union  Canal  Co.,  50  Pa. 
St.  268;  Walker  v.  Board  of  Public 
Works,  16  Ohio  540;  Heilbron  v. 
Canal  Co.,  75  Cal.  426,  7  Am.  St. 
Rep.  183;  Beidler  v.  Sanitary  Dist., 
211  111.  628,  71  N.  E.  1118,  67 
L.R.A.  820. 

24It  has  been  held  that  a  railroad 
company,  being  a  riparian  proprie- 
tor, either  by  virtue  of  its  right  of 
way  crossing  a  stream  or  otherwise, 
may  take  therefrom  a  reasonable 
amount  of  water  for  the  purpose  of 
supplying  its  locomotives  or  for 
other  use.  Eliot  v.  Fitchburg  R.  R. 
Co.,  10  Cush.  191;  Pennsylvania  R. 


§  74 


WATEES. 


75 


highway  by  land,^'  or  to  make  a  new  channel  either  for  the 
improvement  of  navigation,^*'  or  for  the  protection  of  a  public 


E.  Co.  V.  Miller,  112  Pa.  St.  34;  Earl 
of  Sandwich  v.  Great  Northern  Ky. 
Co.,  L.  R.  10  Ch.  Div.  707;  Graham 
V.  Northern  R.  R.  Co.,  10  Grant  Ch. 
259.  But  this  right  is  denied  in  An- 
derson V.  Cinn.  So.  R.  R.  Co.,  86 
Ky.  44,  5  S.  W.  49,  and  a  railroad 
company  was  held  liable  to  the  lower 
proprietor  for  withholding  water  for 
railroad  uses.  To  the  same  effect  is 
Garwood  v.  New  York  Central  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  83  N.  Y.  400,  S.  C.  17  Hun 
356.  This  case  also  denies  the  right 
of  a  railroad  company  to  withdraw 
water  for  its  locomotives  to  the  in- 
jury of  a  lower  proprietor.  After 
stating  that  a  riparian  proprietor 
has  an  absolute  right  to  withdraw 
sufficient  water  for  domestic  pur- 
poses and  for  cattle  and  a  qualified 
right  to  use  the  water  for  irrigation 
and  manufacturing,  provided  the  use 
is  upon  the  land  to  which  the  right 
is  incident,  the  court  says:  "Now 
in  the  case  before  us  the  defendant 
has  done  something  more ;  it  has  not 
been  content  with  exercising  this 
privilege;  it  has  diverted  a  consid- 
erable portion  of  the  stream  not  for 
any  use  upon  the  land  past  which  it 
flows,  but  for  the  transaction  of  its 
business  in  other  places,  and  for 
purposes  in  no  respect  pertaining  to 
the  laud  itself.  *  *  *  So  far  as 
the  plaintiff  is  concerned,  it  has  car- 
ried away  from  his  premises  the 
water,  as  effectually  as  if  it  had 
been  turned  into  another  channel 
and  discharged  at  Albany  or  Buffa- 
lo; and  from  this,  as  the  jury  has 
found,  he  has  sustained  damages." 
In  Clark  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  145  Pa. 
St.  438,  22  Atl.  989,  27  Am.  St.  Rep. 
710,  it  is  held  that,  no  matter  what 
the  necessities  of  the  defendant's 
business,   it   had  no   right   to   take 


water  from  a  stream  for  its  locomo- 
tives, without  compensation  to  those 
damaged  hereby.  And  this  would 
seem  to  be  the  correct  rule.  See  § 
72;  Whitney  v.  Fitchburg  R.  R. 
Co.,  178  Mass.  559,  60  N.  E.  384; 
Rice  V.  Norfolk  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  130 
N.  C.  375,  41  S.  E.  1031. 

Where  a  railroad  company,  in 
constructing  its  road  totally  diverted 
a  stream  from  a  lower  proprietor, 
the  latter  was  held  entitled  to  a 
mandatory  injunction  for  its  restor- 
ation. Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Long,  46  Kan.  701,  27  Pac. 
182,  26  Am.  St.  Rep.  165.  But  an 
owner  may  lose  his  right  to  equit- 
able relief  by  keeping  silent  while 
he  sees  the  company  expend  large 
sums  in  diverting  a  small  stream. 
Slocumb  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  57 
la.  675. 

2  6McCord  v.  High,  24  la.  336. 

2  6Avery  v.  Fox,  1  Abb.  U.  S.  246, 
253.  In  this  case  the  court  says :  "To 
divert  a,  stream  from  its  natural 
channel  into  an  artificial  one,  for 
the  purpose  of  affording  improved 
navigation  and  benefiting  commerce, 
may  be  a  work  of  great  public  con- 
cernment and  advantage,  but  if 
thereby  a  riparian  owner  is  wholly 
or  injuriously  deprived  of  the  use 
of  its  waters,  which  he  is  employ- 
ing advantageously  as  an  incident  to 
his  land,  it  is  taking  the  private 
property  of  such  owner  in  and  to 
the  use  of  that  water  for  public  use, 
and,  unless  just  compensation  is 
made,  is  against  both  the  principles 
of  the  common  law  and  the  provi- 
sions of  the  Constitution  of  the  Unit- 
ed States,  and  courts  have  no  alter- 
native but  to  so  administer  the  law  as 
to  secure  and  protect  such  rights  in 
a  proper  case."    The  improvement  in 


76 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  74 


road,^''  or  for  any  other  public  use,  compensation  must  be  made 
to  the  inferior  proprietors  on  the  banks  of  the  stream  who 
are  injured  thereby.^*  The  only  dissenting  case  which  has 
come  to  our  notice  is  that  of  the  Commissioners  of  Homochitto 
River  v.  Withers,  in  which  the  Supreme  Court  of  Mississippi 
held  that  it  was  not  a  taking,  to  divert  a  stream  of  water  from 
the  plaintiff's  property  into  a  new  channel  for  the  purpose  of 
improving  navigation.^®  This  decision  is  so  palpably  wrong  that 
we  do  not  think  it  requires  discussion.  Where  a  railroad  com- 
pany divert  a  stream  into  a  new  channel  for  a  short  distance, 
it  is  bound  to  restore  it  unimpaired  to  its  natural  channel,  and 
where  in  such  case  the  stream  escaped  from  the  new  channel  by 
percolation  the  company  was  held  liable.^" 


this  case  was  being  made  by  the 
United  States  and  so  the  federal 
Constitution  applied  to  the  case. 

To  same  effect,  Cohen  v.  United 
States,  162  Fed.  364. 

27Smith  V.  Gould,  59  Wis.  631,  18 
N.  W.  457;  S.  C.  61  Wis.  31,  20  N. 
W.  369;  State  ex  rel.  Smith  v. 
Board  of  Supervisors,  66  Wis.  199, 
28  N.  W.  140.  So  where  a  stream  was 
diverted  into  a  new  channel  by  a 
railroad  company.  Louisville  etc. 
E.  E.  Co.  V.  Whitsell,  125  Ky.  433. 

2  8See  also  the  following  cases,  in 
most  of  which,  however,  the  diver- 
sion was  not  for  public  use.  Heil- 
bron  V.  Land  &  Water  Co.,  80  Cal. 
189,  22  Pae.  62;  Vernon  Irr.  Co.  v. 
Los  Angeles,  106  Cal.  237,  39  Pae. 
762;  Bank  of  Hopkinsville  v.  \^'est- 
ern  Ky.  Asylum,  108  Ky.  357,  56  S. 
W.  525;  McCook  Irr.  &  W.  P.  Co.  v. 
Crews,  70  Neb.  109,  96  N.  W.  996; 
Harper  H.  &  D.  Co.  v.  Mountain 
Water  Co.,  65  N.  J.  Eq.  479,  56  Atl. 
297;  Piatt  v.  Boot,  15  Johns.  213; 
Palmer  v.  Mulligan,  3  Caines  Eep. 
307,  2  Am.  Dec.  270;  New  York 
Rubber  Co.  v.  Eothery,  132  N.  Y. 
293,  30  N.  E.  841 ;  Hogg  v.  Connells- 
ville  Water  Co.,  168  Pa.  St.  456,  31 
Atl.  1010 ;  Carpenter  v.  Gold,  88  Va. 
551,  14  S.  E.  329;  Mumpower  v. 
City  of  Bristol,  90  Va.  151,   17   S. 


E.  853;  Green  Bay  etc.  Cajial  Co.  v. 
Kaukauna  W.  P.  Co.,  90  Wis.  370,  61 
N.  W.  1121,  48  Am.  St.  Rep.  937. 

2929  Miss.  21,  32,  64  Am.  Dec.  126. 
The  court  says:  "It  appears  to  us 
that  it  (the  constitution)  applies  to 
such  property  as  belongs  absolutely 
to  the  individual,  and  of  which  he 
has  the  exclusive  right  of  disposi- 
tion; property  of  a  specific,  fixed, 
and  tangible  nature,  capable  of  be- 
ing had  in  possession  and  transmit- 
ted to  another,  as  houses,  lands,  and 
chattels.  But  it  is  not  easy  to  un- 
derstand how  a  man  can  be  said  to 
have,  a,  property  in  water,  light,  or 
air  of  so  fixed  and  positive  a  char- 
acter as  to  deprive  the  sovereign 
power  of  the  right  to  control  it  for 
the  public  good  and  general  conven- 
ience." In  South  Carolina  v.  Geor- 
gia, 93  U.  S.  4,  it  was  held  that 
Congress  might  close  one  of  two  nav- 
igable channels  of  a  river.  No  ques- 
tion of  private  right  was  involved  in 
this  case  and,  besides,  causing  the 
water  of  a  stream  to  flow  in  one  of 
two  natural  channels  is  quite  differ- 
ent from  diverting  it  wholly  into 
an  artificial  channel.  See  also  Black 
Eiv.  Imp.  Co.  V.  La  Crosse  Booming 
&  Tram.  Co.,  54  Wis.  659 ;  Wisconsin 
V.  Duluth,  96  U.  S.  379. 

aoCott  V.  Lewiston  E.  R.  Co.,  36 


§    74  WATEES.  77 

The  manner  in  whicli  the  diversion  is  accomplished  is  im- 
material, whether  by  an  artificial  channel,  by  pumping,  by 
percolation  into  a  well  or  gallery,  or  by  other  means.  The  injury 
consists  in  taking  the  water.  Under  a  general  authority  to  take 
water  for  the  purpose  of  supplying  its  inhabitants  with  water 
for  domestic  use,  for  extinguishing  fires  and  for  manufacturing, 
a  city  purchased  land  on  a  stream  bordering  a  mill  pond  and 
dug  a  well  about  seventy-five  feet  from  the  water's  edge,  from 
which  it  pumped  a  supply.  The  water  came  to  the  well  by  per- 
colation from  the  pond.  The  city  also  extended  a  pipe  directly 
into  the  pond,  to  be  used  only  in  case  of  fire.  The  owner  of  the 
pond  and  of  the  mill  which  the  pond  supplied  brought  suit  for 
the  damages.  It  was  held  that  he  was  entitled  to  recover,  that 
the  city  had  no  more  right  to  draw  the  water  from  the  pond  in- 
directly, by  percolation,  than  directly,  by  a  pipe  or  other  means, 
and  that  the  distance  of  the  well  from  the  pond  was  immaterial, 
provided  its  supply  came  from  the  pond.^^  Similar  decisions 
have  been  made  in  Massachusetts  and  other  States.*^  The  fact 
that  the  city  is  the  owner  in  fee  of  land  on  the  stream  where 
such  works  are  constructed  does  not  alter  the  case.^*  The  right 
of  a  riparian  owner  to  take  sufficient  water  for  domestic  use  does 
not  apply  to  a  city.  It  is  not  an  individual  and  has  no  natural 
wants.^*    Where  a  city  under  a  special  act  has  voted  to  take  a 

N.  Y.  214.     See  also  White  v.  East  Rep.    826;    Smith   v.    Brooklyn,    18 

Lake  Land  Co.,  96  Ga.  415,  23  S.  E.  App.    Div.    N.    Y.    340;     Smith    v. 

393,  51  Am.  St.  Eep.  141 ;  Louisville  Brooklyn,  160  N.  Y.  357,  45  L.R.A. 

etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Whitsell,  31  Ky.  L.  664,   affirming   S.   C.   32   App.   Div. 

R.  76,  101  S.  W.  834.  N.  Y.  257;  Irving  v.  Media  Borough, 

siCity   of   Emporia  v.   Soden,   25  10  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  132. 

Kan.  588,  37  Am.  Rep.  265.  3 3 Same;  also  Stein  v.  Burden,  24 

32Bailey    v.    Woburn,    126    Mass.  Ala.  130,  55  Am.  Dec.  453;   and  as 

416;   Aetna  Mills  v.  Waltham,   126  respects    other     corporations    with- 

Mass.   422;    Aetna  Mills  v.   Brook-  drawing  water  for  a  public  use  as 

line,  127  Mass.  69;  Cowdrey  v.  Wo-  riparian  proprietors,  see  Garwood  v. 

bum,  136  Mass.  409;  Hollingsworth  N.  Y.  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.  83 

&  V.  Co.  V.  Foxborough  Water  Sup-  N.  Y.  400 ;  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

ply  Dist.,  165  Mass.  186,  42  N.  E.  Miller,  112  Pa.  St.  34;  Swindon  Wa- 

574;    Montecito  Val.   Water   Co.   v.  ter   Works    Co.    v.    Welts   &    Berks 

Santa  Barbara,  144  Cal.  578,  77  Pac.  Canal  Co.,  L.  R.  7  E.  &  I.  App.  Cas. 

1113;  Aberdeen  V.  Bradford, '94  Md.  697;    Earl    of    Sandwich    v.    Great 

670,   51  Atl.   614;   Van  Wycklen  v.  Northern  Ry.  Co.,  L.  R.  10  Ch.  Div. 

City  of  Brooklyn,  118  N.  Y.  424,  24  707;  ante,  note  18. 

N.  E.  179;   Covert  v.  Cranford,  141  s^City   of   Emporia   v.   Soden,   25 

N.  Y.  521,  36  N.  E.  597,  38  Am.  St.  Kan.    588,    607.      The    court    says: 


78  EMINENT   DOMAIN.  §    75 

million  gallons  a  day  from  a  river,  and  has  constructed  a  filter- 
ing gallery  on  land  adjacent  to  the  river  into  which  water  comes 
by  percolation  both  from  the  river  and  from  other  sources,  a  ri- 
parian owner  on  the  stream  is  entitled  to  have  his  damages  as- 
sessed on  the  basis  of  the  taking  of  the  maximum  amount  daily.^® 

The  riparian  owners  upon  a  stream  which  flows  through  or 
from  a  pond  or  lake,  are  entitled  to  compensation  for  water 
taken  from  the  lake.^®  Where  a  canal  company  used  a  stream 
of  water  for  a  period  of  years,  in  pursuance  of  a  contract,  and 
continued  the  use  after  the  contract  expired,  it  was  held  to  be 
an  appropriation  under  the  eminent  domain  powers  conferred 
upon  the  company  and  that  the  owner  at  the  time  of  the  appro- 
priation was  entitled  to  compensation.^''  But,  where  a  canal 
company  constructs  an  artificial  feeder  over  an  individual's  land, 
he  acquires  no  right  to  the  use  of  the  water  as  against  the  com- 
pany, and  the  latter  may  divert  it  at  pleasure.^^  Where  a 
canal  company  has  the  right  to  take  water  from  a  stream  for 
navigation  purposes  only,  it  cannot  take  a  surplus  for  the  pur- 
pose of  leasing  it  to  mill  owners.^®  The  same  rules  apply  to 
springs  which  fiow  in  a  surface  stream,  as  to  the  stream  itself.*" 

§  75  (63).  Increasing  the  quantity  of  water.  ITot  only 
is  it  a  violation  of  the  right  of  a  riparian  owner  to  obstruct 
or  divert  the  water  of  a  stream  before  it  reaches  his  land,  but  it 
is  equally  a  violation  of  his  rights  to  increase  the  quantity  of 

"The    city,    as   a    corporation,    may  156   N.   Y.   213,   affirming   8.   C.   88 

own  land  on  the  banks,  and  thus  in  Hun  614. 

one  sense  be  a  riparian  owner.     But  STHeilman  v.  Union  Canal  Co.,  50 

this  does   not  make  each  citizen   a  Pa.  St.  268. 

riparian  owner.     And  the  corpora-  3  8  Cooper  v.  Williams,  4  Ohio  253; 

tion  is  not  taking  the  water  for  its  Erkenbrecher  v.  Cincinnati,  2  Cinn. 

own  domestic  purposes;  it  is  not  an  Sup.   Ct.   412;   Burbanlc  v.   Fay,  65 

individual;  it  has  no  natural  wants,  N.  Y.  57.    But  where  a  natural  water 

it  is  not  taking  for  its  own  use,  but  course  was  changed  into  a  canal,  and 

to   supply   a   multitude  of   Individ-  used  as   such   for   twenty  years,   it 

uals;  it  takes  to  sell."  was    held    the   riparian   proprietors 

ssAetna   Mills   v.    Waltham,    126  had  the   same   rights   as   though  it 

Mass.  422.  had  continued  a  natural  water  course. 

3  6Bailey  v.  Town  of  Woburn,  126  Burk  v.  Siuionson,  104  Ind.  173,  54 

Mass.   416;  Watuppa  Reservoir   Co.  Am.  Rep.  304. 

V.     Fall     River,     134     Mass.     267;  3  9 Adams  v.  Slater,  8  Ills.  App.  72. 

Smith  V.   City  of  Rochester,  92  N.  ^oSuisun   City  v.   DeFeritas,   142 

Y.  463,  44  Am.  Rep.  393;   S.  C.  38  Cal.  350,  75  Pac.  1092;  Cohen  v.  La 

Hun  612;  Stock  v.  Township  of  Jef-  Canada  L.  &  W.  Co.,  142  CaL  437, 

ferson,  114  Mich.  357,  72  N.  W.  132,  76  Pac.  47. 
38   L.R.A.   355;    Neal  v.   Rochester, 


§  75 


■WATERS. 


79 


•water  flowing  past  his  land  by  artificial  means  not  connected 
Avith  the  reasonable  use  of  the  land  above. *^  Thus  plaintiff 
owned  land  on  both  sides  of  Roland's  Run,  which  was  a  natural 
stream.  The  City  of  Baltimore  proposed  to  introduce  into  the 
stream,  above  plaintiff,  an  artificial  supply  of  ten  million  gal- 
lons a  day,  for  the  purpose  of  increasing  the  supply  in  a  reser- 
voir situated  in  the  run  below  plaintiff's  land,  from  which  the 
city  was  supplied.  It  appeared  that  this  increase  would  cause 
the  stream  to  overflow  some  of  plaintiff's  land  and  saturate 
and  injure  other  parts.  The  court  held  that  the  plaintiff  was 
entitled  to  have  the  stream  "continue  to  flow  through  his  land 
in  its  usual  quantity,  at  its  natural  place  and  at  its  usual 
height,"  and  that  the  city  should  be  enjoined  from  doing  the 
damage  until  it  had  acquired  the  right  by  condemnation.*^  No 
action  lies  for  raising  the  water  in  a  stream  by  drains  and 
sewers  which  conduct  surface  water  only,  and  which  only  in- 
crease the  flow  by  draining  the  watershed  more  quickly.*^  But 
where  a  city  collected  the  water  from  the  watershed  of  a  small 


<iWood  on  Nuisances,  §  365. 

<2Mayor  of  Baltimore  v.  Apphold, 
42  Md.  442.  To  same  effect,  Rudel 
V.  County  of  Los  Angeles,  118  Cal. 
281;  Smafield  v.  Smith,  153  Mich. 
270;  McKee  v.  Del.  &  H.  Canal  Co., 
125  N.  Y.  353,  26  N.  E.  305,  21  Am. 
St.  Rep.  740;  S.  C.  52  Hun  52,  22 
N.  Y.  St.  222,  4  N.  Y.  Supp.  753; 
Brewster  v.  J.  &  J.  Rogers  Co.  169 
N.  Y.  73,  62  N.  E.  264,  58  L.R.A. 
495,  affirming  S.  C.  42  App.  Div.  343, 
59  ISr.  Y.  S.  32;  Craft  v.  Norfolk 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  136  N.  C.  49,  48  S. 
E.  519;  Pfeiffer  v.  Brown,  165  Pa. 
St.  267,  30  Atl.  844,  44  Am  St.  Rep. 
660;  Owens  v.  Lancaster,  182  Pa.  St. 
257;  Rankin  v.  Harrisburg,  104  Va. 
524,  52  S.  E.  555,  113  Am.  St.  Rep. 
1050,  3  L.R.A.(N.S.)  919;  Malott  v. 
Mersea,  9  Ontario  611 ;  aiid  see  Grant 
V.  Kugler,  81  Ga  637;  Kay  v.  Kirk, 
76  Md.  41,  24  Atl.  326;  Barrett  v. 
Mt.  Greenwood  Cem.  Ass.,  57  111. 
App.  401;  Plattsmouth  Water  Co.  v. 
Smith,  57  Neb.  579,  78  N.  W.  275; 
Rice  V.  Norfolk  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  130 


N.  C.  375,  41  S.  E.  1031 ;  Miller  v. 
Wisenberger,  61  Ohio  St.  561,  56  N. 
E.  454.  In  Brown  v.  Atlanta,  66  Ga. 
71,  the  defendant  city  had  a  reser- 
voir above  plaintiff  and  let  off  the 
water  in  -a,  way  to  damage  plaintiff 
by  the  increased  flow.  It  was  held 
that  the  city  had  a  right  to  do  so, 
provided  it  exercised  that  care  which 
a  prudent  person  would  do  who  had 
lands  below,  and  provided  it  did  no 
more  harm  than  nature's  floods 
would  do  had  there  been  no  reser- 
voir, and  provided  the  flow  would 
not,  in  the  absence  of  other  causes, 
more  than  fill  the  bed  of  the 
stream. 

■*3Bainard  v.  City  of  Newton,  154 
Mass.  255,  27  N.  E.  995;  O'Donnell 
v.  Syracuse,  184  N.  Y.  1,  76  N.  E. 
738,  reversing  S.  C.  102  App.  Div.  80, 
92  N.  Y.  S.  55;  Prime  v.  Yonkers, 
192  N.  Y.  105,  reversing  S.  C.  116 
App.  Div.  699;  Penfield  v.  New 
York,  115  App.  Div.  502,  101  N.  Y. 
S.  442;  Hamilton  v.  Ashbrook,  62 
Ohio  St.  571,  57  N.  E.  239;  Strauss 


80  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    '?^6 

stream  in  its  sewers  whicli  drained  the  watershed  with  such 
rapidity  as  to  cause  the  stream  to  overflow,  it  was  held  liahle.** 
Water  turned  into  a  running  stream  by  a  riparian  proprietor,  be- 
comes, after  leaving  his  land,  identified  with  the  natural  stream 
as  to  any  benefit  to  the  lower  proprietors,  and  one  such  lower 
proprietor  cannot  abstract  an  amount  equal  to  that  artificially 
added,  to  the  injury  of  another.*® 

§  76  (64).  Interfering  with  the  regularity  of  the  cur- 
rent. The  upper  proprietor  may  always  make  a  reasonable  use 
of  the  water  as  it  passes  over  his  land,  although  such  use  may 
to  a  certain  extent  change  the  natural  current  of  the  stream  or 
affect  its  volume  or  quality.  What  constitutes  a  reasonable  use 
in  any  given  case  is  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury.*"  Beyond 
this  neither  individuals  nor  the  public  can  go  without  com- 
pensation to  the  inferior  proprietor  who  suffers  damage.  Any 
interference  with  the  regularity  of  the  current  for  public  use, 
so  as  to  make  the  flow  fitful,  uncertain  and  intermittent,  is  a 
violation  of  the  common  law  right  to  have  the  stream  flow  as  it 
is  wont  by  nature,  and  a  recovery  may  be  had  for  any  damages 
so  occasioned.*'^  Where  a  booming  company  erects  dams  across 
a  stream  and  lets  off  the  water  from  time  to  time  in  floods  for 
the  purpose  of  floating  logs,  and  in  the  intervals  retains  the 
water  for  such  purpose,  a  lower  proprietor  whose  mill  is  inter- 
fered with  or  whose  lands  are  flooded  may  recover  compensa- 
tion.*® But  a  boom  company  was  held  not  liable  for  damages 
caused  by  an  unusual  accumulation  of  logs  and  an  unusual  rise 

V.  Allentown,  215  Pa.  St.  96,  63  Atl.  N.  Y.  353,  26  N.  E.  305,  21  Am.  St. 

1073;   Miller  v.  Newport  News,  101  Eep.  740;  Ordway  v.  Village  of  Can- 

Va.    432,   44    S.    E.    712.      And   see  isteo,  66  Hun  569,  21   N.  Y.  Supp. 

Mizell  V.  McGowan,   129  N.   C.   93,  835;  Lakeside  Paper  Ck).  v.  State,  15 

39  S.  E.  729,  85  Am.  St.  Rep.  705.  App.   Div.   N.   Y.    169;    Blizzard   v. 

4  4Hents  V.  Mt.  Vernon,  78  App.  Danville,   175   Pa.   St.   479,   34  Atl. 

Div.  515,  79  N.  Y.  S.  774.  846;   Lone  Tree  Ditch  Co.  v.  Rapid 

4  5Druley  v.  Adams,  102  111.  177.  City  E.  &  G.  Lt.  Co.,  16  S.  D.  451, 

4  6Thompson  v.  The  Androscoggin  93  N.  W.  650;    Compare  Brov?n   v. 

River   Improvement   Co.,   54   N.    H.  Atlanta,  66  Ga.  71.     See  ante,  §  72. 

545;    Phillips   v.    Sherman,   64   Me.  ^sThunder    Bay    Booming    Co.    v. 

171.    See  ante,  §  72.  Speechly,  31  Mich.  336;  Middleton  v. 

4  70sbom    V.    Norwalk,    77    Conn.  Flat  River  Booming  Co.,   27   Mich. 

663,  60  Atl.  645;  Boston  Belting  Co.  533;  Koopman  v.  Blodgett,  70  Mich. 

V.  City  of  Boston,  152  Mass.  307,  25  610,  38  N.  W.  649,  14  Am.  St.  Rep. 

N.  E.  613 ;  Carlson  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  527 ;  Folsom  v.  The  Apple  River  Log 

Co.,  73  Minn.  128,  75  N.  W.   1044 ;  Driving  Co.,  41  Wis.  602 ;  Thompson 

McKee  v.  Del.  &  H.  Canal  Co.,  125  v.  Androscoggin  River  Improvement 


§  77 


■TATEES. 


81 


of  water.**  And  a  recent  case  in  Wisconsin  holds  that  a  riyer 
improvement  company,  authorized  to  construct  dams  and  other 
works,  to  aid  in  the  iioating  of  logs,  was  not  liable  to  a  mill 
owner  below  for  damages  resulting  from  alternately  retaining 
and  letting  off  the  water.^" 

§  77  (65).  Pollution  of  the  water.  The  general  right 
to  the  flow  of  a  stream  in  its  natural  purity  is  fully  established 
by  the  decisions.^  ^  The  upper  proprietor  may,  of  course,  make 
a  reasonable  use  of  the  stream  or  of  his  land,  though  the  stream 
is  to  some  extent  pointed  thereby.^^     This  right  to  pure  water 


Co.,  54  N.  H.  545;  Phillips  v.  Sher- 
man, 64  Me.  171 ;  Carroll  v.  Atlanta, 
74  Ga.  386 ;  Brown  v.  Atlanta,  66  Ga. 
71 ;  Kamm  v.  Normand,  50  Ore.  9,  91 
Pac.  448,  11  L.R.A.(N.S.)  290;  Mon- 
roe Mill  Co.  V.  Mensel,  35  Wash. 
487,  77  Pac.  813,  102  Am.  St.  Rep. 
905,  70  L.E.A.  272;  Matthews  v.  Bel- 
fast Mfg.  Co.,  35  Wash.  662,  77  Pac. 
1046;  Hackstack  v.  Keshena  Im- 
provement Co.,  66  Wis.  439.  In  the 
last  case  the  plaintiff's  property  was 
situated  twenty  miles  below  the  im- 
provements. It  was  flooded  by  water 
detained  and  let  off  in  large  volumes 
for  the  purpose  of  floating  logs.  In 
Massachusetts  it  is  held  that  under 
the  Mill  act  a  mill  owner  is  not  li- 
able for  any  injury  done  to  interven- 
ing land  by  letting  down  water  from 
his  reservoir  dam  for  the  use  of  his 
mill,  for  which  he  would  not  be  li- 
able at  common  law.  Drake  v.  Ham- 
ilton Woolen  Co.,  99  Mass.  574. 

isLawler  v.  Baring  Boom  Co.,  56 
Me.  443. 

sopalls  Mfg.  Co.  V.  Oconto  Eiv. 
Imp.  Co.,  87  Wis.  134,  58  N.  W. 
Rep.  257.  As  to  damages  by  worKs 
for  the  improvement  of  navigation 
see  post,  §  85. 

siDrake  v.  Lady  Ensley  Coal  etc. 
Co.,  102  Ala.  501,  14  So.  749,  48  Am. 
St.  Rep.  77,  24  L.R.A.  64;  Alabama 
C.  C.  &  I.  Co.  v.  Vines,  151  Ala. 
398,  44  So.  377;  Horton  v.  Fulton, 
130  Ga.  466;  Jessup  &  Moore  Paper 
Em.D. — 6. 


Co.  V.  Ford,  6  Del.  Ch.  52;  Western 
Paper  Co.  v.  Pope,  155  Ind.  394,  57 
N.  E.  719,  56  L.R.A.  899;  West 
Munoie  Strawboard  Co.  v.  Slack, 
164  Ind.  21,  72  N.  E.  879; 
Muncie  Pulp  Co.  v.  Martin,  164 
Ind.  30,  72  N".  E.  882;  Muncie 
Pulp  Co.  V.  Keesling,  166  Ind. 
479,  76  N.  E.  1002;  Ferguson  v. 
Firmenich  Mfg.  Co.,  77  la.  576, 
42  N.  W.  448,  14  Am.  St.  Rep.  319; 
Gladfelter  v.  Walker,  40  Md.  1;  West 
Arlington  Imp.  Co.  v.  Mount  Hope 
Retreat,  97  Md.  191,  54  Atl.  982; 
Parker  v.  Am.  Woolen  Co.,  195  Mass. 
591;  MacNamara  v.  Taft,  196  Mass. 
597;  Holsman  v.  Boiling  Spring 
Bleaching  Co.,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  335; 
Beach  v.  Sterling  Iron  &,  Z.  Co.,  54 
N.  J.  Eq.  65,  33  Atl.  286;  Sterling 
Iron  &  Z.  Co.  v.  Sparks  Mfg.  Co., 
55  N.  J.  Eq.  824,  41  Atl.  1117;  Dur- 
ham V.  Eno  Cotton  Mills,  141  N.  C. 
615,  54  S.  E.  453,  7  L.R.A.  (N.S.) 
321;  Richmond  Manufacturing  Co. 
V.  Atlantic  DeLaine  Co.,  10  R.  I. 
106;  Randolph  v.  Pennsylvania  S. 
V.  R.  R.  Co.,  186  Pa.  St.  541 ;  Silver 
Spring  etc.  Co.  v.  Waunskuck  Co., 
13  R.  I.  611;  Van  Egmond  v.  Sea- 
forth,  6  Ontario  599;  Attorney  Gen- 
eral V.  Lunatic  Asylum,  4  L.  R.  Ch. 
App.  146;  Angell  on  Waters., 
§  136;  Wood  on  Nuisances,  §  697; 
ante,  §  71. 

B2Helfrich    v.    Catonsville    Water 
Co.,  74  Md.  269,  22  Atl.  72,  28  Am. 


82  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    TY 

is  property''^  and  any  interference  with  the  right  is  a  taking,  to 
the  extent  of  such  interference.^*  It  necessarily  follows  that 
a  stream  may  not  he  polluted  for  private  purposes  against 
the  will  of  the  riparian  owner,  with  or  without  compensation  f^ 
also  that  it  cannot  be  polluted  for  public  purposes,  except  under 
authority  of  law,  and  upon  compensation  made.''*'  In  Indiana 
and  Massachusetts  ^'^  it  has  been  held  that  it  is  a  reasonable  use 
of  a  stream  running  through  a  city,  to  empty  into  it  the  public 
sewers  of  the  town,  and  that  for  such  pollution  as  arises  there- 
from the  lower  proprietor  has  no  remedy.  This  is  contrary  to 
the  principle  just  enunciated  and  seems  to  us  a  wrong  conclu- 
sion. Undoubtedly  the  lower  proprietor  must  endure  without 
remedy  such  impurities  as  find  their  way  into  a  stream  from 
the  natural  wash  and  drainage  of  a  city  situated  on  its  banks. 
Drains  and  sewers  may  be  constructed  for  the  purpose  of  fa- 
cilitating the  drainage  into  the  stream  of  the  water  which  falls 
upon  the  surface  or  percolates  beneath.^*  This  is  no  more  than 
a  reasonable  use  of  the  stream.  But  it  is  a  different  thing  to 
conduct  directly  into  the  stream,  by  means  of  sewers  and  arti- 
ficial supplies  of  water,  the  waste  and  filth  which  come  from  a 
dense  population.  There  is  no  principle  upon  which  this  can 
be  justified.    A  city  is  not  a  riparian  proprietor  simply  because 

St.  Kep.  245;   Grey  v.  Paterson,  60  J.  Eq.  385,  45  Atl.  995,  83  Am.  St. 

N.  J.  Eq.  385,  45  Atl.  995,  83  Am.  St.  Eep.  642,  48  L.R.A.  717;  New  Odor- 

Kep.  642,  48  L.R.A.  717.     The  ques-  less    Sewerage    Co.   v.    Wisdom,    30 

tion  of   reasonable  use,  as  respects  Tex.  Civ.  App.  224,  70  S.  W.  354. 

pollution,  is  mueli  considered  in  In-  ssBeacli  v.  Sterling  Iron  &  Z.  Co., 

dianapolis  Water  Co.  v.  Am.  Straw-  54  N.  J.  Eq.  65,  33  Atl.  286;  S.  C. 

board  Co.,  53  Fed.  970,  57  Fed.  Rep.  affirmed  on  opinion  below.  Sterling 

1000,   and   Barnard  v.   Shirley,   135  Iron  &  Z.  Co.  v.  Sparks  Mfg.  Co.,  55 

Ind.   547,   34   N.   E.    600.     And  see  N.  J.  Eq.  824,  41  Atl.  1117. 

ante,  §  72.  i^Post,  §§  367,  671,  672,  673. 

ssKewanee  v.  Otley,  204  111.  402,  BTMerrifield     v.     Worcester,     110 

08  N.  E.  388;  Beach  v.  Sterling  Iron  Mass.  216,   14  Am.  Rep.  592;    com- 

&  Z.  Co.,  54  N.  J.  Eq.  65,  33  Atl.  pare  Middlesex  Co.  v.  City  of  Low- 

286;  S.  C.  affirmed  Sub  Nom.     Ster-  ell,    149   Mass.   509,   21    N.   E.   872. 

ling  Iron  &  Z.  Co.  v.   Sparks  Mfg.  So  in  Indiana,  Valparaiso  w  Hagen, 

Co.,  55  N.  J.  Eq.  824,  41  Atl.  1117;  153  Ind.  337,  54  N.  E.  1082,  74  Am. 

Mansfield  v.  Balliet,  65  Ohio  St.  451,  St.  Eep.  305,  48  L.R.A.  707;  Rich- 

63  N.  E.  86,  58  L.R.A.  628;  Winchell  mond  v.  Test,  18  Ind.  App.  482. 

V.   Waukesha,   110  Wis.   101,  85   N.  ssCrane   v.   Roselle,   236   111.   97; 

W.  668,  84  Am.  St.  Rep.  902;  ante,  Bainard    v.    City    of    Newton,    154 

§  64.  Mass.  255,  27  N.  B.  995. 

p 4 Same;  Grey  v.  Paterson,  60  N, 


§  77 


■WATEES. 


83 


a  stream  runs  tlirougli  or  past  its  limits.'*  Those  who  own  the 
banks  of  the  stream  are  the  riparian  proprietors.  And  even  if 
the  city  could  be  regarded  as  a  riparian  owner,  either  because 
the  stream  was  within  its  corporate  limits  or  because  its  streets 
or  public  grounds  intersected  or  bounded  on  it,  there  is  no  ri- 
parian right  to  cast  filth  directly  into  the  stream.  A  single 
proprietor  upon  a  very  small  stream  would  not  be  allowed  to 
place  his  privy  over  the  stream  and  turn  directly  into  it  the 
refuse  from  his  kitchen  and  stable.  No  more  can  a  hundred 
proprietors  on  a  larger  stream  or  the  corporate  authorities  of 
a  city  through  which  it  runs.  Accordingly  it  has  been  held 
in  numerous  cases  that  an  action  will  lie  against  a  municipality 
to  enjoin  the  polution  of  a  stream  with  sewerage,®"  or  to  rcjover 
damages  for  such  pollution.®^  The  terms  and  conditions  upon 
which  injunctive  relief  will  be  granted  are  considered  in  a  sub- 


B  9 Vale  Mills  v.  Nashua,  63  N.  H. 
42;  ante,  §  73. 

sopeople  V.  San  Luis  Obispo,  116 
Cal.  617,  48  Pac.  723;  Nolan  v.  New 
Britain,  69  Conn.  668;  Butler  v. 
Thomasville,  74  Ga.  570;  Waycross 
V.  Houk,  113  Ga.  963,  39  S.  E.  577; 
Village  of  Dwight  v.  Hayes,  150  111. 
273,  37  N.  E.  218,  41  Am.  St.  Rep. 
367;  Kewanee  v.  Otley,  204  111.  402, 
08  N.  E.  388;  Mason  v.  Mattoon, 
95  111.  App.  525;  Middlesex  Co.  v. 
Lowell,  149  Mass.  509,  21  N.  E.  872; 
Grey  v.  Paterson,  58  N.  J.  Eq.  1, 
42  Atl.  749;  Grey  v.  Paterson,  60 
N.  J.  Eq.  385,  45  Atl.  995,  83  Am. 
St.  Rep.  642,  48  L.R.A.  717;  Dorem- 
us  V.  Paterson,  69  N.  J.  Eq.  188,  57 
Atl.  548;  S.  C.  affirmed,  69  N.  J. 
Eq.  775,  61  Atl.  396;  Sammons  v. 
Gloversville,  175  N.  Y.  346,  67  N.  E. 
622,  affirming  67  App.  Div.  628; 
Morgan  v.  Bingham,  32  Hun  602; 
Schriver  v.  Village  of  Johnstown,  71 
Hun  232,  24  N.  Y.  Supp.  1083; 
Moody  V.  Saratoga  Springs,  17  App. 
Div.  N.  Y.  207;  Butler  v.  White 
Plains,  59  App.  Div.  30,  69  N.  Y.  S. 
193;  Warner  v.  Gloversville,  81  App. 
Div.  291,  80  N.  Y.  S.  912;  Sammons 
>'.  Gloversville,  81  App.  Div.  332,  81 


N.  Y.  S.  466;  Donovan  v.  Royal,  26 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  248,  63  S.  W.  1054; 
Winchell  v.  Waukeska,  110  Wis. 
101,  85  N.  W.  668,  84  Am.  St.  Rep. 
902;  Goldsmid  v.  Tunbridge  Wells 
Impr.  Comrs.,  L.  R.  1  Ch.  App.  349, 
affirming  S.  C.  L.  R.  1  Eq.  161 ;  Van 
Egmond  v.  Seaforth,  6  Ontario  599; 
Attorney  General  v.  Leeds,  5  L.  R. 
Ch.  App.  583,  589.  And  see  Robb 
v.  La  Grange,  158  HI.  1,  42  N.  E. 
77;  Barrett  v.  Mt.  Greenwood  Cem. 
Ass.  159  111.  385,  42  N.  E.  891,  31 
L.R.A.  109;  Lefrois  v.  Monroe  Coun- 
ty, 24  App.  Div.  421 ;  Abraham  v. 
Fremont,  54  Neb.  391,  74  N.  W.  834; 
Peterson  v.  Santa  Rosa,  119  Cal. 
387.  In  Cleveland  v.  Standard  Bag 
&  Paper  Co.,  72  Ohio  St.  324,  74  N. 
E.  206,  100  Am.  St.  Rep.  613,  a 
city  was  held  to  liave  a  prescriptive 
right  to  pollute  a  stream  with  sew- 
erage after  twenty  years  user  and 
an  injunction  was  refused.  See 
Norwalk  v.  Blatz,  9  Ohio  C.  C.  417. 
oiBirmingham  v.  Land,  137  Ala. 
538,  34  So.  61 3 ;  Watson  v.  New  Mil- 
ford,  72  Conn.  561,  45  Atl.  167,  77 
Am.  St.  Rep.  345;  Gorham  v.  New 
Haven,  79  Conn.  070,  66  Atl.  505; 
Piatt  Bros.  &  Co.  v.  Waterbury,  80 


84 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  77 


sequent  chapter.^^  The  legislature  may  doubtless  authorize  the 
pollution  of  streams  with  sewerage,  upon  providing  for  compen- 
sation to  riparian  owners  and  this  has  been  done  in  some  States.®* 


Conn.  179 ;  Jacksonville  v.  Doan,  145 
111.  23,  33  N.  E.  878,  affirming  8.  C.  48 
111.  App.  247;  Bloomington  v.  Cos- 
tello,  65  111.  App.  407;  Loughram  v. 
Des  Moines,  72  la.  382;  Hollenbeok 
V.  Marion,  116  la.  69,  89  N.  W.  210; 
Bennett  v.  Marion,  119  la.  473,  93 
N.  W.  558;  Vog-fc  v.  Grinnell,  123 
la.  332,  98  N.  W.  782;  Vogt  v.  Grin- 
nell, 133  la.  363,  110  N.  W.  603; 
Long  V.  Emporia,  59  Kan.  46;  Ed- 
mondson  v.  Moberly,  98  Mo.  523,  11 
S.  W.  990;  Sohoen  v.  Kansas  City, 
65  Mo.  App.  134;  Smith  v.  Sedalia, 
152  Mo.  283,  53  S.  W.  907,  48  L.K.A. 
711;  S.  C.  182  Mo.  1,  81  S.  W.  165; 
Kellogg  V.  Kirksville,  132  Mo.  App. 
519;  Todd  v.  York,  3  Neb.  (Unof.) 
763,  92  N.  W.  1040;  Vale  Mills  v. 
Nashua,  63  N.  H.  42;  Hooker  v. 
Rochester,  37  Hun  181;  Demby  v. 
City  of  Kingston,  60  Hun  294,  38 
N.  Y.  St.  42,  14  N.  Y.  Supp. 
601 ;  S.  C.  affirmed  without  opin- 
ion 133  N.  Y.  538;  Moody  v. 
Saratoga  Springs,  17  App.  Div.  207, 
45  N.  Y.  S.  365;  S.  C.  affirmed,  163 
N.  Y.  581,  57  N.  E.  1118;  Davis  v. 
Same,  17  App.  Div.  623;  S.  C.  af- 
firmed, 163  N.  Y.  581,  57  N.  E. 
1108;  Lasher  v.  Same,  17  App.  Div. 
624;  S.  C.  affirmed,  163  N.  Y.  582, 
57  N.  E.  1115;  Swart  v.  Same,  25 
App.  Div.  622;  S.  C.  affirmed,  164 
N.  Y.  609,  58  N.  E.  1092;  Mansfield 
V.  Balliet,  65  Ohio  St.  451,  63  N.  E. 
86,  58  L.R.A.  628;  McBride  v. 
Akron,  11  Ohio  C.  0.  610;  Mans- 
field V.  Hunt,  It)  Ohio  G.  C. 
488;  Markwardt  v.  Guthrie,  18 
Okla.  32,  90  Pac.  26,  9  L.K.A(N.S.) 
1150;  Good  V.  City  of  Altoona,  102 
Pa.  St.  493,  29  Atl.  741,  42  Am.  St. 
Rep.  840;  Owens  v.  Lancaster,  182 
Pa.  St.  257;  Glasgow  v.  Altoona,  27 


Pa.  Supr.  55;  Matheny  v.  Aiken,  68 
S.  C.  163,  47  S.  E.  56;  Paris  v.  All- 
red,  17  Tex.  Civ.  App.  125,  43  S. 
W.  62;  Trevitt  v.  Prison  Ass.,  98 
Va.  332,  36  S.  E.  373,  81  Am.  St. 
Rep.  727,  50  L.R.A.  564;  Weber  v. 
Berlin,  8  Ont.  302.  See  also  Lind 
V.  City  of  San  Luis  Obispo,  109 
Cal.  340,  42  Pac.  437;  Ilobb  v.  L,a- 
Grange,  57  111.  App.  386;  Pfeififer 
V.  Brown,  165  Pa.  St.  267,  30  Atl. 
844,  44  Am.  St.  Rep.  660;  Gray  v. 
Dundas,  11  Ontario  317;  City  of 
Hutchinson  v.  Delano,  46  Kan.  345, 
26  Pac.  740.  A  mill  owner  may  be 
enjoined  from  depositing  sawdust  in 
a.  stream  to  the  damage  of  a  lower 
proprietor.  Waterman  v.  Buck,  58 
Vt.  519.  See  also  Indianapolis  Wa- 
ter Co.  V.  Am.  Strawboard  Co.,  53 
Fed.   970,  57   Fed.   1000. 

6  2Post,  §  916.  See  especially. 
Grey  V.  Paterson,  60  N.  J.  Eq.  385, 
45  Atl.  995,  83  Am.  St.  Rep.  642, 
48  L.R.A.  717;  Winehell  v.  Wau- 
kesha, 110  Wis.  101,  85  N.  W.  668, 
84  Am.  St.  Rep.  902. 

ssKellogg  V.  New  Britain,  62 
Conn.  232,  24  Atl.  996;  Washburn  & 
M.  Mfg.  Co.  V.  City  of  Worcester, 
153  Mass.  494,  27  N.  E.  Rep.  664; 
Worcester  Gas  Light  Co.  v.  County 
Comrs.,  138  Mass.  289;  Joplin  Con. 
Min.  Co.  v.  Joplin,  124  Mo.  129,  27 
S.  W.  406.  And  see  Sayre  v.  New- 
ark, 60  N.  J.  Eq.  361,  45  Atl.  985, 
83  Am.  St.  Rep.  629,  48  L.R.A.  722; 
Matheny  v.  Aiken,  68  S.  C.  163, 
47  S.  B.  56.  In  Pennsylvania  an 
act  of  1905  prohibits  the  discharge 
of  sewerage  into  the  streams  and 
waters  of  the  State,  except  ,by  sew- 
erage systems  already  constructed. 
Commonwealth  v.  Emmers,  33  Pa. 
Supr.  Ct.  151. 


§    17  WATEES.  85 

But  a  general  authority  to  construct  sewers,  or  even  to  discharge 
them  into  a  stream,  will  not  be  construed  as  authorizing  the  pol- 
lution of  the  stream  or  the  creation  of  a  nuisance.^*  In  a  New 
York  case  the  charter  of  the  defendant  city  empowered  its  com- 
mon council  to  construct  sewers  and  discharge  them  into  the 
stream  in  question.  Of  this  authority  the  court  says:  "Thia 
is  a  permission  and  not  a  direction,  and  a  legislative  permission 
neither  implies  a  right  to  appropriate  property,  without  com- 
pensation; nor  confers  a  license  to  commit  a  nuisance."'^'' 
In  New  Jersey  it  has  been  held  that  in  case  of  a  stream  where 
the  tide  ebbs  and  flows,  the  title  to  the  water  and  bed  of  the 
stream  is  absolutely  in  the  public  and  that  the  legislature  may 
authorize  its  use  for  sewerage  disposal  without  compensation 
to  the  riparian  owners.""  It  has  been  held  that  a  company 
to  supply  a  village  with  water  could  not  take  the  water  of  a 
stream  and  return  to  it  an  equal  amount  of  inferior  quality  to 
the  damage  of  a  lower  proprietor .  "''  Under  authority  to  takc- 
the  waters  of  a  stream  for  sewer  purposes,  a  section  was  taken, 
the  sewer  constructed  and  the  waters  of  the  stream  conducted 
through  it,  but  the  same  were  restored  to  their  natural  channel 
before  reaching  plaintiff's  land.  It  was  held  a  taking  of  the 
waters  as  to  plaintiff  and  that  his  right  to  compensation  ac- 
crued at  the  time  of  such  appropriation."*  Where  a  river  is 
public,  that  is  where  the  title  to  the  bed  is  in  the  State,  it  has 
been  held  that  the  remedy  for  pollution  must  be  sought  through 
the  attorney-general."^  One  who  has  been  accustomed  to  foul 
a  stream  by  using  the  water  for  manufacturing  purposes,  but 

64Edmondson  v.  Moberly,  98  Mo.  361,   45  Atl.   985,   83  Am.   St.   Kep. 

523,  11  S.  W.  990;  Moody  v.  Sara-  629,  48  L.E.A.  722,  reversing  S.  C. 

toga  Springs,  17  App.  Div.  207,  45  58  N.  J.  Eq.  136,  42  Atl.  106S. 
N.  y.  S.  365;  S.  C.  affirmed,  163  N.  « VAcquackanonk     Water     Co.     v. 

Y.   581,   57   N.   E.   1118;    Butler   v.  Watson,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  366. 
White  Plains,  59  App.  Div.  30,  69  ssWorcester     Gas     Light     Co.    v. 

N.  Y.  S.  193;  Donovan  v.  Royal,  26  County  Comrs.,  138  Mass.  289. 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  248,  63  S.  W.  1054;  6  9Newark  Aqueduct  Board  v.  City 

Winchell  v.  Waukesha,  110  Wis.  101,  of  Passaic,  45  N.  J.  Eq.  393,  18  Atl. 

85  N.  W.  668,  84  Am.  St.  Eep.  902.  106.     See  also  King  v.  Bristol  Dock 

65Sammon3    v.    Gloversville,    175  Co.,  12  East,  429.    As  to  the  protec- 

N.  Y.  346,  352,  67  N.  E.  622,  affirm-  tion  of  a  public  water  supply  from 

ing   S.   C.   67   App.   Div.   628.     The  pollution  see  Kelley  v.   New  York, 

point  is  elaborately  discussed  in  the  6  Misc.   516,   27   N.  Y.    Supp.   164; 

Wisconsin  case  last  cited.  Commonwealth  v.   Russell,    172   Pa. 

6  6Sayre  v.  Newark,  60  N.  J.  Eq.  St.  508,  33  Atl.  709. 


86  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    78 

has  acquired  no  riglit  to  do  so  by  grant  or  prescription,  cannot 
recover  damages  when  compelled  to  relinquish  such  use  of  the 
water  by  reason  of  the  stream  being  taken  at  a  point  below  his 
mill  under  the  power  of  eminent  domain  to  supply  a  city  with 
water.''"  But  if  the  mill-owner  has  acquired  such  riglit  by  pre- 
scription or  otherwise,  then  the  right  must  be  condemned.  As 
the  riparian  owner  has  no  right  to  pollute  a  stream,  the  legisla- 
ture may  prohibit  such  pollution  without  compensation.''^ 

§  78  (66).  Changing  the  current  by  works  in,  across 
or  near  the  channel  to  the  injury  of  those  below.  Works  of 
public  utility  must  be  so  constructed  us  not  to  interfere  with 
the  accustomed  flow  of  the  stream,  otherwise  there  is  a  right  to 
recover  for  any  consequent  damage  to  private  property.''^  Au- 
thority to  bridge  or  cross  a  stream  does  not  imply  authority  to 
interfere  with  its  current.''^  Where  a  railroad  company,  in 
carrying  its  road  across  a  stream,  erected  a  bridge  and  embank- 
ment in  such  a  way  as  to  change  and  increase  the  current  of 
the  stream  in  times  of  high  water,  thereby  causing  damage  to 
the  lands  of  a  proprietor  some  distance  below,  none  of  whose  land 
was  taken,  it  was  held  he  could  recover  compensation  for  the 
loss.^*     And,  generally,  if  a  railroad  company  in  bridging  a 

7  0Baltimore  v.  Warren  Manufac-  56  S.  E.  966;  Gulf  etc.  E.  R.  Co.  v. 

turing    Co.,    59    Md.    96;     Dwight  Locker,  78  Tex.  279,  14  S.  W.  611. 

Printing  Co.   v.   Boston,   122  Mass.  See  Bedford  v.   United   States,   192 

583.  U.  S.  217,  24  S.  C.  238;  Manigault 

7iSprague  v.  Dorr,  185  Mass.  10,  v.  Springs,  199  U.  S.  473,  26  S.  C. 

69    N.    E.    344;    Commonwealth    v.  127. 

Emmers,  221  Pa.  St.  298.  7  3Rowe    v.    Granite    Bridge    Cor- 

7  2Durham  v.   Lisbon   Falls   Fibre  poration,  21  Pick.  344;  Robinson  v. 

Co.,  100  Me.  238,  61  Atl.  177;  Eowe  N.  Y.  &  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  27  Barb.  512. 

V.    Granite   Bridge   Corp.,    21    Pick.  7  4EvansvilIe  &  Crawfordsville  E. 

344;    Nelson  v.  Miss.   &  Rum   Riv.  R.  Co.  v.  Dick,  9  Ind.  433,  436.     "A 

Boom  Co.,  99  Minn.  484,  109  N.  W.  proper  construction  of  the  word  tak- 

1118;  Bowers  v.  Miss.  &  Rum  Riv.  en,"  says  the  court,  "makes  it  syn- 

Boom  Co.,  78  Minn.  398,  81  K.  W.  onymous    with    seized,    injured,    de- 

208,  79  Am.  St  Rep.  395;  Ten  Eyck  stroyed,   deprived  of.     It   is,   tliere- 

V.  Delaware  &  Raritan  Canal  Co.,  18  fore,    evident    that    the    legislature 

N.  J.  L.  200,  37  Am.  Dec.  233;  Rob-  have  no  power  to  authorize,  in  any 

inson  v.  N.  Y.  &  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  27  case,   either  a,  direct  or   conseqiien- 

Barb.  512;  Chapman  v.  City  of  Roch-  tial  injury  to  private  property,  with- 

ester,  110  N.  Y.  273,  18  N.  E.  88,  6  out    compensation    to    the    owner." 

Am.    St.   Rep.    366,    1    L.R.A.    296;  But  where  the  road  crossed  on  the 

Howard  Co.  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  land    of   the    plaintiff    it   was   held 

130  Mo.  652,  32  S.  W.  651 ;  Sutton  v.  that  it  must  be  presumed  that  he 

Catawba  Power   Co.,  76   S.   C.   320,  had  been  compensated  for  all  such 


§  78 


WATEKS. 


87 


stream  changes  in  any  way  the  natural  current  of  the  stream 
to  the  damage  of  private  property,  there  is  a  right  to 
compensation.'^'*  So  where  a  railroad  crossed  a  small  stream 
obliquely  and  a  culvert  was  put  in  at  right  angles  to  the  road, 
thereby  changing  the  course  of  the  stream  and  causing  it  to 
flow  upon  the  plaintiff's  land  to  his  damage.'''^  The  same  rule 
applies  to  a  bridge  built  by  a  tovm  or  city  as  part  of  a  highway.'' '^ 
It  is  held  that  one  over  whose  land  such  crossing  is  made  is  en- 
titled to  receive  compensation  for  all  such  damages  as  will  result 
from  constructing  the  bridge  or  other  crossing  in  a  reasonable 
and  proper  manner.''*  If  no  part  of  one's  land  is  taken,  he 
may  always  recover  for  damages  occasioned  by  such  interfer- 
ence with  the  current  of  a  stream,  either  by  an  assessment  under 


damages  as  would  resylt  from  con- 
structing the  bridge  in  a  reasonable 
and  proper  manner  with  a  view  both 
to  the  safety  of  passengers  and  the 
protection  of  the  property-holder, 
and  that  he  could  only  recover  for 
damages  resulting  from  improper 
construction  as  thus  explained.  See 
also  Terre  Haute  &  Indianapolis  E. 
E.  Co.  V.  McKinley,  33  Ind.  274. 

"Chicago,  Rock  Island  &  P.  Ky. 
Co.  V.  MofFitt,  75  111.  524;  Rock  Is- 
land etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Krapp,  74 
111.  App.  158;  Lake  Erie  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Purcell,  75  111.  App.  573;  Union 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Dyche,  31  Kan.  120; 
Estabrooka  v.  Peterborough  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  12  Cush.  224;  Kansas  City 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Lackey,  72  Miss.  881, 
16  So.  909;  Mobile  &  0.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Bynura  (Miss),  15  So.  795;  Dick- 
son V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  71 
Mo.  575 ;  Delaware  etc..  Canal  Co. 
^.  Lee,  22  N.  J.  L.  243;  Robinson 
V.  N.  Y.  &  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  27  Barb. 
512;  Freeland  v.  Pa.  R.  R.  Co.,  197 
Pa.  St.  529,  47  Atl.  745,  80  Am.  St. 
Rep.  850,  58  L.R.A.  206;  Braine  v. 
Northern  Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  218  Pa.  St. 
43,  00  Atl.  985;  Matteson  v.  New 
York  Cent.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  218  Pa. 
St.  527,  67  Atl.  817;  St.  Louis  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Craigo,  10  Tex.  Civ. 
App.   238,   31    S.   W.   207;    Eells  v. 


Chesapeake  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  49  W.  Va. 
65,  38  S.  E.  479,  87  Am.  St.  Rep. 
787.  Contra:  Norris  v.  Vermont 
Central  R.  R.  Co.,  28  Vt.  99;  Henry 
V.  Same,  30  Vt.  638. 

7  6  St.  Louis  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Brook- 
sher,  86  Ark.  91. 

"Perry  v.  Worcester,  6  Gray  544; 
Stone  V.  Augusta,  46  Me.  127;  Bar- 
ron V.  Memphis,  113  Tenn.  89,  80 
S.  W.  832,  106  Am.  St.  Rep.  810. 
Where  road  officers  diverted  a  stream 
of  water  on  to  plaintiff  they  were 
held  personally  liable  for  the  conse- 
quences. Wrightsel  v.  FeR,  70  Ohio 
St.  529. 

'STerre  Haute  &  Indianapolis  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  McKinley,  33  Ind.  274; 
Mississippi  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Mason,  51  Miss.  234;  Baltimore  & 
Potomac  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Magruder,  34 
Md.  79.  As  to  the  correctness  of 
this  position,  see  post,  chap.  xxiv. 
AVhere  an  owner  grants  a  right  of 
way  over  his  land  to  a  railroad, 
with  the  right  to  change  water- 
courses, this  only  authorizes  changes 
on  his  own  land,  and  he  may  recover 
damages  caused  to  his  land  by  a 
change  made  by  the  company  on  the 
land  of  another.  St  Louis  etc.  E.  E. 
Co.  V.  Harris,  47  Ark.  340.  To  the 
same  effect,  Eaton's  Case,  54  N.  H. 
502. 


88  EMI]S-ENT    DOMAIJSr.  §    78 

the  statute/^  or  by  a  common  law  action.^"  Damages  which 
result  from  negligent  or  improper  construction  may  always  be 
recovered,  whether  there  has  been  an  assessment  of  damages  or 
not.®^  In  bridging  a  stream,  by  legislative  authority,  a  rail- 
road company  is  only  required  to  exercise  reasonable  diligence 
and  foresight  to  avoid  damages  by  reason  of  extraordinary  floods 
and  ice  gorges.^  ^  Such  floods  are  deemed  an  act  of  God,  for 
the  consequences  of  which  no  one  is  liable.®*  A  railroad  com- 
pany, in  crossing  a  small  stream,  diverted  it  into  a  ditch  along 
its  track  for  about  300  feet  and  then  discharged  it  through  a 
culvert  upon  the  plaintiff's  land,  whence  it  sought  the  regular 
channel.  In  times  of  flood,  stones  and  gravel  were  deposited 
upon  the  plaintiff's  land.  It  was  held  that  this  amounted  to 
a  taking  of  the  plaintiff's  property,  which  could  not  be  accom- 
plished without  a  condemnation,  and  that,  in  the  absence  of 
such  condemnation,  a  bill  would  lie  to  compel  a  restoration  of 
the  stream  to  its  original  channel.**  Changing  the  channel  or 
direction  of  the  current,  so  that  the  stream  is  cast  upon  the 
lower  proprietor  in  a  different  place,  or  so  that  the  current  strikes 
his  land  from  a  different  direction,  to  his  injury,  is  a  taking  or 
actionable  injury.*^     The  channel  of  the  American  Eiver,  a 

'SEstabrooks   v.    Peterborough    &  8  S.  W.  535;  and  see  post,  §  80  note 

Shirley  R.  E.  Co.,  12  Cush.  224.  3. 

soDelaware  &  Raritan  Canal  Co.  ssDoorman  v.  Ames,  12  Minn.  451. 

V.  Lee,  22  N.  J.  L.  243;   Evansville  8  4 Wright  v.  Syracuse  etc.  R.  R. 

&  Crawfordsville  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dick,  Co.,  49  Hun  445,  23  N.  Y.  St.  78, 

9  Ind.  433.  3  N.  Y.   Supp.  480;   S.  C.  affirmed 

siSpencer  v.  Hartford,  Providence  without  opinion,  124  N.  Y.  668.     To 

&  T.  R.  R.  Co.,  10  R.  I.  14;  Fowle  the  same  effect.  East  St.  Louis  etc. 

V.  N.  H.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  112  Mass.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Eisentraut,  134  HI.  96, 

334,  17  Am.  Rep.  108;  Kansas  City  24  N.  E.  760;  Atchison  etc.  Ry.  Co. 

etc.  R.  R.   Co.  V.  Lackey,  72  Miss.  v.  Jones,  110  111.  App.  626;  Burnett 

881,  16  So.  Rep.  909;  Brink  v.  Kan-  v.  Gt.  Northern  Ry.   Co.,  76  Minn, 

sas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  Mo.  App.  461,  79  N.  W.  523 ;  George  v.  Wabash 

177;   I.  &  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Klaus,  Western  R.  R.  Co.,  40  Mo.  App.  433; 

64  Tex.  293 ;  Shores  v.  Southern  Ry.  Koch  v.  Del.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  54 

Co.,  72  S.  C.  244,  51  S.  E.  699;  San  N.  J.  L.  401,  24  Atl.  442;   Fleming 

Antonio  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Klersey,  98  v.  Wilmington  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  115 

Tex.  590,  86  S.  W.  744;  post,  §§  829,  N.  C.  076,  20  S.  E.  Rep.  714.     Gom- 

933.  pare  City  of  Kansas  City  v.  Slang- 

8  2Bellinger  v.  New  York  Central  strom,   53  Kan.   431,   36  Pae.   Rep. 

R.  R.  Co.,  23  N.  Y.  42;   Omaha  &  706. 

R.  V.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Brown,  14  Neb.  ssSame;  also  Grant  v.  Kugler,  81 

170;  S.  C.  16  Neb.  161;  Gulf  C.  &  S.  Ga.    637,    12   Am.    St.    Rep.    348,    3 

F.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Pool,  70  Tex.  713,  L.R.A.  606;  Kay  v.  Kirk,  76  Md.  41, 


§  79 


WATEES. 


tributary  of  the  Sacramento,  was  changed  so  as  to  enter  the 
latter  river  opposite  the  plaintiff's  jjremises.  During  a  high 
flood,  the  force  of  the  current  was  such  as  to  wash  away  the 
plaintiff's  land  and  buildings,  causing  damage  to  the  amount 
of  $28,000.  It  Avas  held  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  California 
that  the  damage  was  not  a  taking  and  that  there  was  no  liability 
on  the  part  of  the  commissioners  engaged  in  the  work  or  of  the 
city  for  whose  benefit  it  was  done.*" 

§  79  (66a).  Embankment  on  one  side  of  stream  caus- 
ing an  increase  of  flood  water  upon  the  opposite  side. 
Where  a  railroad  company  builds  an  embankment  on  one  side 
of  a  stream,  which  causes  an  increased  flow  of  flood  waters 
upon  the  lands  situated  along  the  opposite  bank,  to  their  dam- 
age, the  company  will  be  liable.*^  Some  cases,  however,  hold 
the  contrary.**  A  city  was  held  not  liable  because  a  levee  which 
it  had  built  caused  the  flood  water  to  accumulate  to  a  greater 
depth  upon  the  plaintiff's  lots  which  were  situated  between  the 


24  Atl.  326;  Parker  v.  Atkinson,  58 
Kan.  29;  111.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Smith,  110  Ky.  203,  61  S.  W.  2; 
Powers  V.  St.  Louis  etc.  Ry.  Co., 
158  Mo.  87,  57  S.  W.  1090.  And  see 
Briscoe  v.  Young,  131  N.  C.  386,  42 
S.  E.  893;  Stone  v.  State,  138  K.  Y. 
124,  33  N.  E.  733;  Rogers  v.  Coal 
River  B.  &  D.  Co.,  39  W.  Va.  272, 
19  S.  E.  401.  Contra:  Warfel  v. 
Cochran,  34  Pa.  St.  381;  Sallicotte 
V.  King  Bridge  Co.,  122  Fed.  378, 
58  C.  C.  A.  466,  65  L.R.A.  620. 

ssGreen  v.  Swift,  47  Cal.  536; 
Hoagland  v.  Sacramento,  52  Cal. 
142;  see  also  a  similar  case  in  Ohio: 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Carr,  38  Ohio  St. 
448,  43  Am.  Rep.  428;  see  §  115. 

8  70'ConneIl  v.  East  Tenn.  V.  & 
G.  R.  R.  Co.,  87  Ga.  246,  13' S.  E. 
489,  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  246,  13  L.R.A. 
394,  which  contains  a  valuable  re- 
view of  cases;  Barden  v.  City  of 
Portage,  79  Wis.  126,  48  N.  W.  210; 
Cairo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Brevoort,  62 
Ffd.  129;  Hartshorn  v.  Chaddoclc, 
135  N.  Y.  116,  31  N.  E.  997,  17  L.R.A. 
426;  Lawrence  v.  Great  Northern  K. 


R.  Co.,  16  Q.  B.  642.  See  Uhl  v. 
Ohio  Riv.  R.  R.  Co.,  56  W.  Va.  494, 
49  S.  E.  378,  107  Am.  St.  Rep.  968, 
68  L.R.A.  138;  Richards  v.  Ohio 
Riv.  R.  R.  Co.,  56  W.  Va.  592,  49 
S.  E.  385;  Keck  v.  Vanghause,  127 
la.  529,  103  N.  W.  773;  Priest  v. 
Maxwell,  127  la.  744,  104  N.  W. 
344. 

8  8Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Smith,  72  Miss.  677,  17  So.  78,  48 
Am.  St.  Rep.  579,  27  L.R.A.  762; 
Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Lackey, 
72  Miss.  881,  16  So.  909;  Meyer  v. 
New  York  Cent.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  88 
N.  Y.  351.  In  Tyron  v.  Baltimore 
County,  28  Md.  510,  it  was  held 
there  was  no  liability  for  similar 
injuries  caused  by  a  wall  erected  by 
county  authorities  to  protect  a  piib- 
lic  road.  And  see  De  Baker  v. 
Southern  California  R.  R.  Co.,  106 
Cal.  257,  39  Pac.  610,  46  Am.  St. 
Rep.  237.  As  to  whether  flood  wa- 
ters, overflowing  the  banks  of  a 
stream,  are  to  be  regarded  as  sur- 
face water  or  as  a,  part  of  the 
stream,  see  post,  §  111. 


90 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  80 


levee  and  the  river.^"  But  where  a  levee  built  by  a  drainage  dis- 
trict on  one  side  of  a  stream  caused  a  flooding  and  washing 
of  plaintiff's  lands  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  stream,  which 
would  not  otherwise  have  occurred,  the  district  was  held  liable 
as  for  a  taking  or  damaging  of  the  plaintiff's  property  within  the. 
constitution.^" 

§  80  (67).  Works  which  set  back  the  water  and  cause 
a  flooding  of  the  lands  above.  The  right  to  have  a  stream 
flow  as  it  is  wont  by  nature,®-^  includes  the  right  to  have  the 
water  flow  off  from  one's  premises  as  it  is  accustomed  to  do, 
and  this  right  is  property.^^  Where  works  are  constructed  be- 
low the  lands  of  a  proprietor,  such  as  a  bridge,  or  culvert,  or 
dam,  or  alteration  of  the  channel,  which  cause  the  water  to  set 
back  and  overflow  the  land  of  such  proprietor,  there  is  a  viola- 
tion of  such  right  and,  if  the  works  are  authorized  by  law,  there 
is  a  taking  for  which  compensation  must  be  made."^     Works 


8  8 Hoard  v.  Des  Moines,  G2  la. 
326. 

soBradbury  v.  Vandalia  Levee  & 
Dr.  Dist.,  236  111.  36. 
siAnte,  §  71. 

9  2Trenton  Water  Power  Co.  v. 
Eafif,  36  N.  J.  L.  335. 

9  3The  cases  which  support  this 
proposition  are  very  numerous.  Tlie 
leading  cas,es  are  the  following: 
Pumpelly  v.  Green  Bay  Co.,  13  Wall. 
166;  Lee  v.  Pembroke  Iron  Co.,  57 
Me.  481,  2  Am.  Eep.  59;  Grand 
Rapids  Boom  Co.  v.  Jarvis,  30  Mich. 
308;  Weaver  v.  Miss.  etc.  Boom  Co., 
28  Minn.  534;  S.  C.  30  Minn.  477; 
McKenzie  v.  Miss.  etc.  Boom  Co.,  29 
Minn.  288 ;  Trenton  Water  Power  Co. 
v.  KaflF,  36  N.  J.  L.  335;  Arimond 
V.  Green  Bay  etc.  Co.,  31  Wis.  316; 
Same  v.  Same,'35  Wis.  41. 

Of  numerous  other  eases  in  sup- 
port of  the  text  we  cite  the  follow- 
ing: Bottoms  V.  Brewer,  54  Ala. 
288;  Lindsay  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co., 
149  Ala.  349,  43  So.  139;  Martin  ex 
parte,  13  Ark.  198;  St.  Louis  etc.  E. 
R.  Co.  V.  Lyman,  57  Ark.  512,  22  S. 
W.  Rep.  170;  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Morris,  35  Ark.  622;  St.  Louis, 


etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Saunders,  78  Ark. 
589,  94  S.  W.  709 ;  St.  Louis,  etc.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Saunders,  84  Ark.  Ill;  Davis 
V.  Sacramento,  59  Cal.  590;  Richard- 
son V.  Eureka,  96  Cal.  443,  31  Pac. 
458;  Larrabee  v.  Cloverdale,  131  Cal. 
96,  63  Pac.  143;  Georgia  etc.  R.  E. 
Co.  V.  Berry,  78  Ga.  744;  West- 
brook  v.  Baldwin  Co.,  121  Ga.  442, 
49  S.  E.  286;  Warner  v.  Maxwell, 
124  Ga.  518,  52  S.  E.  809;  Hill  v. 
Ward,  2  Gil.  (111.)  285;  Ohio  etc. 
R.  E.  Co.  V.  Wachter,  123  111.  440, 

5  Am.  St.  Eep.  532;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q. 
E.  R.  Co.  v.  Schaffer,  124  111.  112, 
affirming  26  111.  App.  280 ;  Kankakee 

6  S.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  I-Ioran,  131  111.  288, 
23  N.  E.  621;  S.  C.  30  III.  App.  552; 
Ohio  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Eamey,  139 
111.  9,  28  N.  E.  1087,  32  Am.  St.  Rep. 
176;  Ohio  &  M.  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Webb, 
142  111.  402,  32  N.  E.  527;  Ohio  & 
M.  R.  E.  Co.  V.  Thillman,  143  111. 
127,  32  N.  E.  529,  36  Am.  St.  Eep. 
359;  S.  C.  43  111.  App.  78;  Gaylord 
v.  Sanitary  District,  204  111.  576, 
68  N.  E.  522,  98  Am.  St.  Eep.  235, 
63  L.R.A.  582;  Ramey  v.  Baltimore 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  235  111.  502;  Fenter 
V.  Toledo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  29  111.  App. 


§  80 


WATEUS. 


91 


which  obstruct  the  flow  of  a  stream  are  not  authorized  by  law, 
unless  the  authority  \inder  which  they  are  constructed,  is  prac- 
tically incapable  of  execution  without  causing  such  obstruc- 


250;  Ohio  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Combs, 
43  111.  App.  119;  Ohio  &  M.  R.  Co. 
V.  Neutzel,  43  111.  App.  108;  St. 
Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Winkleman, 
47  111.  App.  276;  Ohio  &  M.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Long,  52  111.  App.  670;  City 
of  Centralla  v.  Wright,  58  111.  App. 
51;  City  of  Piclcneyville  v.  Huteh- 
ings,  63  111.  App.  137 ;  City  of  Pick- 
neyville  v.  Rhine,  63  111.  App.  139; 
Illinois  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Fcrrell, 
108  111.  App.  659;  Illinois  Cent.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Lockwood,  112  111.  App. 
423;  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Carpenter,  125  111.  App.  306;  St. 
Louis  Merchants  Bridge  Terminal 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Schulz,  126  111.  App.  552; 
Baltimore  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Stew- 
art, 128  111.  App.  270;  Mel- 
endy  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  132 
111.  App.  431 ;  Madison  v.  Ross,  3 
Ind.  236;  Trustees  of  Wabash  & 
Erie  Canal  v.  Spears,  16  Ind.  441 ; 
Hebron  Gravel  Road  Co.  v.  Harvey, 
90  Ind.  192,  46  Am.  Rep.  199;  Terre 
Haute  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Zahner,  1C6 
Ind.  149,  76  N.  E.  169,  3  L.R.A. 
(N.S.)  277;  Kelly  v.  Pittsburg  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  28  Ind.  App.  457,  63  N.  E. 
233,  91  Am.  St.  Rep.  134;  Lewis  Tp. 
Imp.  Co.  V.  Royer,  38  Ind.  App.  151, 
76  N.  E.  1068;  Graham  v.  Chicago 
etc.  Ry.  Co.,  39  Ind.  App.  294,  77  N 
E.  57;  Noe  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R 
Co.,  76  la.  300,  41  N.  W.  42;  Hough- 
taling  v.  Chicago  Gt.  Western  Ry 
Co.,  117  la.  540,  91  N.  W.  811;  Chi 
cago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Scott,  71  Kan 
874,  81  Pae.  1131;  Atchison  etc.  Ry 
Co.  '.  Herman,  74  Kan.  77,  85  Pae 
817 ;  Barrett  v.  Bangor,  70  Me.  335 
Ingram  v.  Me.  Water  Co.,  98  Me 
56B,  57  Atl.  893 ;  Baltimore  v.  Merry 
man,  86  Md.  584;  Estabrooks  v.  Pet 
erborough  &  Shirley  R.  R.   Co.,   12 


Cush.  224;  Lawrence  v.  Fairhaven,  5 
Gray  110;  Proctor  v.  Old  Colony  R. 
R.  Co.,  154  Mass.  251,  28  N.  E.  13; 
Stinson  V.  Brookline,  197  Mass.  568 ; 
Treat  v.  Bates,  27  Mich.  390;  Mil- 
ler V.  Cornwell,  71  Mich.  270,  38  N. 
W.  912;  Miller  v.  Bank  of  Belleville, 
148  Mich.  339,  111  N.  W.  1002; 
Doorman  v.  Ames,  12  Minn.  451 ; 
Byrne  v.  Minn.  &  St.  Louis  R.  R.  Co., 
38  Minn.  212,  36  N.  W.  339,  8  Am. 
St.  Rep.  668;  Hueston  v.  Miss.  & 
Rum  Riv.  Boom  Co.,  76  Minn.  251, 
79  N.  W.  92;  Mississippi  Central  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Mason,  51  Miss.  234;  Sil- 
ver Creek  Nav.  and  Imp.  Co.  v. 
Mangum,  64  Miss.  682;  Richardson 
v.  Levee  Comrs.  77  Miss.  518,  20 
So.  963;  Leflore  Co.  v.  Cannon,  81 
Miss.  334,  33  So.  81;  Rose  v.  St. 
Charles,  49  Mo.  509;  Barnes  v.  City 
of  Hannibal,  71  Mo.  449;  Young  v. 
City  of  Kansas,  27  Mo.  App.  101; 
Bird  V.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R.  R.  Co., 
30  Mo.  App.  365 ;  McKee  v.  St.  Louis 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  49  Mo.  App.  174; 
Standley  v.  Atchison  etc.  Ry.  Co., 
121  Mo.  App.  537,  97  S.  W.  244; 
Omaha  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Standen,  22 
Neb.  343;  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Buel,  76  Neb.  420,  107  N.  W.  590; 
Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ely,  77  Neb. 
809,  110  N.  W.  539;  Fairbury  Brick 
Co.  V.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  79  Neb. 
854;  Eastman  v.  Amoskeag  Mfg.  Co., 
44  N.  H.  143,  82  Am.  Dec.  201; 
Amoskeag  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Goodale,  46 
N.  H.  53;  Siniekson  v.  Johnson,  17 
N.  J.  L.  129,  34  Am.  Dec.  184;  Dela- 
ware etc.  Canal  Co.  v.  Lee,  22  N.  J. 
L.  243 ;  Crittenden  v.  Wilson,  5  Cow. 
165,  15  Am.  Dec.  462;  Rochester 
White  Lead  Co.  v.  Rochester,  3  N. 
Y.  463;  Benedict  v.  State,  120  N.  Y. 
228,  24  N.  E.  314;  Emry  y.  Raleigh 


92 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  80 


tion.®*  In  that  case  the  damages  caused  by  the  interference 
with  the  natural  flow  of  the  stream  are  a  taking,  and  compensa- 
tion must  be  made  according  to  the  constitution.®^  But  if  such 
interference  can  be  avoided  by  the  exercise  of  reasonable  care 
and  skill,  then  the  interference  is  not  authorized,  and  the  works 
which  cause  it  are  a  nuisance.  Many  of  the  cases  already  re- 
ferred to  in  this  section  go  upon  this  ground,  and  there  are 
many  more  of  the  same  purport.®^    Some  of  the  cases  imply  that 


etc.  E.  R.  Co.,  102  N.  C.  209,  9  S. 
B.  139;  Ridley  v.  Seaboard  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  118  N.  C.  996,  24  S.  E.  730,  32 
L.R.A.  857;  Adams  v.  Durham  &  N. 
R.  R.  Co.,  110  N.  C.  325, 14  S.  E.  857; 
Knight  V.  Albermarle  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
Ill  N.  C.  80,  15  S.  E.  929;  Krause  v. 
Oregon  Steel  Co.,  45  Ore.  378,  7  Pac. 
883 ;  Barclay  R.  R.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Ingham, 
36  Pa.  St.  194;  Wallace  v.  Colum- 
bia &  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  37  S.  C.  335,  16 
S.  E.  35;  Lampley  v.  Atlantic  Coast 
Line  R.  R.  Co.,  63  S.  C.  462,  41  S. 
E.  517;  Lawton  v.  Seaboard  Air 
Line  R.  R.  Co.,  75  S.  C.  82,  55  S.  E. 
128;  Railway  Co.  v.  Higdon,  111 
Tenn.  121,  76  S.  W.  895;  Gulf  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Locker,  78  Tex.  279,  14 
S.  W.  611;  Gulf  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hepner,  83  Tex.  136,  18  S.  W.  441; 
Dallas  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kinnard 
(Tex.  Supm.),  18  S.  W.  1062;  Texas 
Trunk  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Elan,  1  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  201;  Ennis  v.  Gilder,  32  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  351,  74  S.  W.  585;  Willey 
V.  Hunter,  59  Vt.  479 ;  Royce  v.  Car- 
penter, 80  Vt.  37,  66  Atl.  888;  Cloyes 
V.  Middlebury  Elec.  Co.,  80  Vt.  109, 
66  Atl.  1039;  Atlantic  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Peake,  87  Va.  130,  12  S.  E.  348; 
Watkinson  v.  McCoy,  23  Wash.  372, 
63  Pac.  245;  White  v.  Codd,  39 
Wash.  14,  80  Pac.  836;  Neal  v.  Ohio 
Riv.  R.  R.  Co.,  47  W.  Va.  316,  34 
S.  E.  914;  Pickens  v.  Coal  Riv.  Boom 
&  T.  Co.,  58  W.  Va.  11,  50  S.  E.  872; 
Arimond  v.  Green  Bay  etc.  Co.,  35 
Wis.  41 ;  Jones  v.  United  States, 
48  Wis.  385;  Velte  v.  United  States, 
76  Wis.  278,  45  N.  W.  119;  Schmeok- 


pepper  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  116 
Wis.  592,  93  N.  W.  533;  United 
States  V.  Lynch,  188  U.  S.  445,  23 
S.  C.  349;  Woodruff  v.  Mining  Co., 
18  Fed.  Rep.  753;  King  v.  United 
States,  59  Fed.  Rep.  9;  Paine  Lum- 
ber Co.  V.  United  States,  55  Fed. 
Rep.  854;  High  Bridge  Lumber  Co. 
V.  United  States,  69  Fed.  Rep.  320, 
16  C.  C.  A.  460. 

9  4  Chicago,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  An- 
derson, 62  Neb.  456,  87  N.  W.  167; 
Morton  v.  New  York,  140  N.  Y. 
207,  35  N.  E.  490,  22  L.R.A.  241; 
Mundy  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
75  Hun,  479,  27  N.  Y.  Supp.  469; 
and  many  of  the  cases  cited  in  last 
note. 

9  6  Cases  cited  in  note  88. 

9  6In  addition  to  the  cases  cited 
in  the  last  section,  the  following  are 
more  especially  based  upon  negli- 
gence: Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Plott, 
131  Ala.  312,  31  So.  33;  Southern 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Leard,  146  Ala.  349,  39 
So.  449;  St.  Louis  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Hoshall,  82  Ark.  387,  102  S.  W.  207 ; 
Georgia  R.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Bohler,  98 
Ga.  184;  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Brown,  34  III.  App.  552;  Peoria  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Barton,  38  111.  App.  469; 
Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Willi,  53 
HI.  App.  603 ;  Cleveland  etc.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Wisehart,  162  Ind.  208,  67  N.  E. 
993;  Cleveland  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Kline,  29  Ind.  App.  390,  63  N.  E. 
483;  Vyse  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
126  la.  90,  101  N.  W.  736;  Kansas 
City  V.  Slangstran,  53  Kan.  431,  36 
Pac.  706;  Missouri  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 


§  80 


WATEES. 


93 


if  reasonable  care  and  skill  have  been  exercised  to  avoid  injury 
to  neighboring  proprietors,  there  is  no  liability,  although  the 
flow  of  the  stream  is  obstructed  to  their  damage."^  But  we 
apprehend  that  the  question  of  care  and  skill  is  one  which 
affects  the  remedy  only  and  not  the  liability.  If  the  works  are 
constructed  with  due  care  and  skill  they  are  not  a  nuisance, 
and  the  only  remedy  is  one  for  compensation,  and  the  damages 
must  be  recovered  once  for  all.^^  If  otherwise,  then  the  works 
may  be  prevented  by  injunction,®®  or  abated  as  a  nuisance,-^  and 
successive  actions  may  be  brought  as  damages  are  sustained.^ 


Webster,  3  Kan.  App.  166,  42  Pac. 
Rep.  845;  Illinois  Cent.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Wilbourn,  74  Miss.  284;  Abbott 
V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  83 
Mo.  271,  53  Am.  Rep.  581;  Culver  v. 
Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  38  Mo.  App. 
130;  Barnett  v.  St.  Francis  Levee 
Dist.,  125  Mo.  App.  61,  102  S.  W. 
583;  McCleneghan  v.  Omaha  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  25  Neb.  523,  41  N.  W.  350, 
13  Am.  St.  Rep.  508 ;  Omaha  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Brown,  29  Neb.  492,  46  N. 
W.  39;  Omaha  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Standen,  29  Neb.  622,  46  N.  W.  46; 
Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Anderson, 
62  Neb.  456,  87  N.  W.  167;  Chicago 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Mitchell,  74  Neb. 
563,  104  N.  W.  1144;  Orvis  v.  El- 
mira  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  App.  JJiv. 
N.  Y.  187;  Mundy  v.  Newf  York  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  75  Hun  479,  27  N.  Y. 
Supp.  469;  Higgins  v.  New  Yorlc 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  78  Hun  567,  29  N.  Y. 
Supp.  563 ;  Corwin  v.  Erie  R.  R.  Co., 
84  App.  Div.  556,  82  N.  Y.  S.  753; 
S.  C.  affirmed,  178  N.  Y.  590,  70  N. 
E.  1097 ;  Knight  v.  Albemarle  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  110  N.  C.  58,  14  S.  E.  650; 
Price  V.  Oregon  R.  R.  Co.,  47  Ore. 
350,  83  Pac.  843;  Krug  v.  Borough 
of  St.  Mary's,  152  Pa.  St.  37,  25 
Atl.  161,  34  Am.  St.  Rep.  616;  Mil- 
ler V.  Buffalo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  29 
Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  515;  Wallace  v.  Co- 
lumbia etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  34  S.  C.  62, 
12  S.  E.  815;  Sabine  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Broussard,  75  Tex.  597,  12  S.  W. 


1126;  Taylor  v.  B.  &  0.  R.  R.  Co., 
33  W.  Va.  39,  10  S.  E.  29;  Uhl  v. 
Ohio  Riv.  R.  R.  Co.,  56  W.  Va.  494, 
49  S.  E.  378,  107  Am.  St.  Rep.  968, 
68  L.R.A.  138;  Richards  v.  Ohio 
Riv.  R.  R.  Co.,  56  W.  Va.  592,  49 
S.  E.  385;  Hodge  v.  Lehigh  Val.  R. 
R.  Co.,  58  Fed.  195;  Philadelphia 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Smith,  64  Fed.  679, 
12  C.  C.  A.  384,  27  L.R.A.  131; 
Moison  V.  Great  Western  R.  R.  Co., 
14  U.  C.  Q.  B.  109. 

9 '/See  especially  St.  Louis  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Morris,  35  Ark.  622;  Geor- 
gia R.  &  B.  Co.  V.  Bohler,  98  Ga. 
184;  Kansas  City  v.  Slangatrom,  53 
Kan.  431,  36  Pac.  706;  Illinois  Cen- 
tral R.  R.  Co.  V.  Wilbourn,  74  Miss. 
284;  Cleneghan  v.  Omaha  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  25  Neb.  531,  41  N.  W.  350; 
Braine  v.  Northern  Cent.  Ry.  Co., 
218  Pa.  St.  43,  66  Atl.  985;  Wallace 
V.  Columbia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  34  S.  C. 
62,  12  S.  E.  815. 

ssOhio  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wach- 
ter,  123  111.  440,  5  Am.  St.  Rep.  532 ; 
City  of  Centralia  v.  Wright,  58  111. 
App.  51 ;  Melandy  v.  Chicago  etc. 
Ry.  Co.,  132  111.  App.  431;  Bird  v. 
Hannibal  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  30  Mo.  App. 
365. 

9  9Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Young,  135  Ind.  426,  35  N.  E.  177,  41 
Am.  St.  Rep.  430. 

iMiller  v.  Cornwell,  71  Mich.  270, 
38  N.  W.  912. 

20hio  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Thillman, 


94 


EMINEITT    DOMAIN. 


§  80 


The  practical  outcome  of  the  cases  is  that  a  work  which  inter- 
feres with  the  flow  of  a  stream,  either  at  its  ordinary  height  or 
in  case  of  such  floods  as  are  to  be  anticipated,  is  negligently  con- 
structed, and  the  only  exemption  from  liability  is  in  those 
cases  where  the  damage  is  caused  by  a  flood  of  such  an  extra- 
ordinary and  unprecedented  character  as  to  amount  to  an  act 
of  God.* 

In  the  case  of  damages  by  flooding,  it  is  immaterial  whether 
the  flooding  is  continuous  and  .permanent  or  only  occasional. 
Where  the  works  of  a  boom  company  cause  lands  to  be  occa- 
sionally flooded  and  obstructed  by  stranded  logs,  there  is  a  tak- 
ing to  the  extent  of  the  injury.*  It  has  been  held  in  New  York 
and  Ohio  that  merely  raising  the  water  in  the  channel  of  a 
stream  without  producing  any  actual  injury  affords  no  ground 
of  action,*  but  a  contrary  view  is  taken  by  the  Supreme  Court 


143  111.  127,  32  N.  E.  529,  36  Am.  St. 
Eep.  359;  St.  Louis  etc.  E.  R.  Co.  v. 
Brown,  34  111.  App.  552;  Chicago 
&  A.  K.  E.  Co.  V.  Willi,  53  111.  App. 
603;  Melendy  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  E. 
Co.,  132  111.  App.  431;  Byrne  v. 
Minn.  &  St.  L.  R.  E.  Co.,  38  Minn. 
212,  36  N.  W.  339,  8  Am.  St.  Eep. 
668;  Adams  v.  Durham  etc.  E.  E. 
Co.,  110  N.  C.  325,  14  S.  E.  857; 
Lawton  v.  Seaboard  Air  Line  E.  E. 
Co.,  75  S.  C.  82,  55  S.  E.  128;  Pick- 
ens V.  Coal  Eiv.  Boom  &  T.  Co.,  58 
W.  Va.  11,  50  S.  E.  872;  and  see  post, 
§§  938-948. 

^Alabama  Great  Southern  E.  E. 
Co.  V.  Shahan,  116  Ala.  302,  22  So. 
509;  Ohio  etc.  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Ramey, 
139  111.  9,  28  N.  E.  1087;  Ohio  etc. 
E.  E.  Co.  V.  Webb,  142  111.  402,  32 
N.  E.  527,  32  Am.  St.  Rep.  176 ;  Ohio 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Thillman,  143  111. 
127,  32  N.  B.  529;  S.  C.  43  111.  App. 
78 ;  Madison  v  Ross,  3  Ind  236 ;  New 
York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hamlet  Hay 
Co.,  149  Ind.  344;  St.  Louis  etc.  R. 
E.  Co.  V.  Sullivan,  7  Kan.  App.  527 ; 
Lawler  v.  Baring  Boom  Co.,  50  Me. 
443;  PenlQy  v.  Me.  Cent.  E.  E.  Co., 
92  Me.  59,  42  Atl.  233;  Doorman  v. 
Ames,  12  Minn.  451;  Kenney  v.  Kan- 


sas City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  74  Mo.  App. 
301;  Omaha  &  R.  V.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Brown,  14  Neb.  170;  Chicago  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.  T.  Emmert,  53  Neb.  237,  73 
N.  W.  540,  68  Am.  St.  Eep.  602; 
Chicago  etc.  Ey.  Co.  v.  Buel,  76 
Neb.  420,  107  N.  W.  590;  Bellinger 
V.  New  York  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  23 
N.  Y.  42;  Higgins  v.  New  York  etc. 
R.  E.  Co.,  78  Hun  567,  29  N.  Y. 
Supp.  563 ;  Mundy  v.  New  York  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  75  Hun  479,  27  N.  Y. 
Supp.  469 ;  Ridley  v.  Seaboard  etc. 
R.  E.  Co.,  124  N.  C.  34;  Tonnes  v. 
Augusta,  52  S.  C.  396,  29  S.  E.  851 ; 
Gulf  etc.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Pomeroy,  67 
Tex.  498;  Am.  Locomotive  Co.  v. 
Hoffman,  105  Va.  343,  54  S.  E.  25, 
6  L.R.A.(N.S.)  252;  Taylor  v.  B.  & 
O.  R.  R.  Co.,  33  W.  Va.  39,  10 
S.  E.  29 ;  Burehardt  v.  Wausau  Boom 
Co.,  54  Wis.  107. 

^Weaver  v.  Mississippi  &  Rum 
River  Boom  Co.,  28  Minn.  534;  S.  C. 
30  Minn.  477;  McKenzie  v.  Same, 
29  Minn.  288. 

6  Cooper  V.  Hall,  5  Ohio  320;  Peo- 
ple V.  Canal  Appraisers,  13  Wend. 
355.  But  this  is  certainly  the  vio- 
lation of  a  right  and  should  entitle 
the    upper    proprietor    to    nominal 


§  81 


"WATEES. 


95 


of  North  Carolina,®  and  "Virginia ; '  but  if  damage  results,  as 
by  rendering  abxitting  land  wet  and  soggy,  an  action  will  lie ;  ® 
so  if  the  water  is  set  back  upon  a  mill.*  Where  a  city  or  rail- 
road company  undertakes  to  make  a  new  channel  for  a  creek, 
it  interferes  with  the  stream  at  its  peril,  and  if,  by  reason  of  the 
insufficiency  of  the  new  channel,  lands  are  flooded,  it  will  be 
liable.-"  A  lake  had  its  outlet  through  a  bed  of  porous  gravel, 
which  outlet  was  obstructed  by  a  gravel-road  company,  causing 
the  lake  to  rise  and  flood  the  plaintiff's  land.  The  company 
was  held  liable.  ^^  Where  one  has  a  right  to  maintain  a  dam 
at  a  certain  height,  he  will  not  be  liable  for  additional  flooding 
caused  by  repairing  the  dam  and  making  it  tight.  ^^ 

§  81  (67a).  Bridges — authority  to  construct — dam- 
ages thereby — interfering  with  navigation.  Congress  has 
paramount  authority  over  interstate  commerce  and  over  the 
ways  and  means  of  transportation  for  such  commerce.-'^  It 
may,  therefore,  control  rivers  navigable  for  such  commerce  and 


damages.  Canal  Appraisers  v.  Peo- 
ple, 17  Wend.  603. 

6Little  V.  Stanbank,  63  N.  C.  285. 
See  ante,  §  75. 

'Rankin  v.  Harrisburg,  104  Va. 
524,  52  S.  E.  555,  113  Am.  St.  Rep. 
1050,   3  L.R.A.(lSr.S.)    919. 

sAthens  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Rucker,  80 
Ga.  292;  Westbrook  v.  Baldwin  Co., 
121  Ga.  442,  49  S.  E.  286. 

9  Gibson  v.  Fisher,  68  la.  29;  Tren- 
ton Water  Power  Co.  v.  Raff,  36  N. 
J.  L.  335 ;  Barclay  R.  R.  &  Coal  Co. 
V.  Ingham,  36  Pa.  St.  194;  Tinsman 
V.  Belvidere  Del.  R.  R.  Co.,  26  N.  J. 
L.  148;  Lee  v.  Pembroke  Iron  Co., 
57  Me.  481,  2  Am.  Rep.  59;  Heath 
V.  Williams,  25  Me.  209,  43  Am. 
Dec.  265;  Riddle's  Exrs.  v.  Dela- 
ware County,  156  Pa.  St.  643,  27 
Atl.  569;  Rosser  v.  Randolph,  7  Por- 
ter 238,  31  Am.  Dec.  712. 

lost.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mor- 
ris, 35  Ark.  622;  Kankakee  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Horan,  30  111.  App.  552; 
affirmed  131  111.  288,  23  N.  E.  621; 
Barnes  v.  Hannibal,  71  Mo.  449; 
Bird  V.  Hannibal  etc.  R.  R,  Co.,  30 


Mo.  App.  365;  Adams  v.  Durham 
&  R.  Co.,  110  N.  C.  325,  14  S.  E. 
857. 

11  Hebron  Gravel  Road  Co.  v.  Har- 
vey, 90  Ind.  192,  46  Am.  Rep.  199. 
To  same  effect,  Troe  v.  Larson,  84 
la.  649,  51  N.  W.  179,  35  Am.  St. 
Rep.  336;  Roberts  v.  Rust,  104  Wis. 
619,  80  N.  W.  914. 

i2Cowell  V.  Thayer,  5  Met.  253,  38 
Am.  Dec.  400 ;  Jackson  v.  Harring- 
ton, 2  Allen,  242.  But  where  there 
is  a,  prescriptive  right  to  flood  cer- 
tain land,  and  a  new  dam,  tighter 
but  not  higher,  causes  additional 
flooding  and  saturating,  there  is  a 
liability.  Powell  v.  Lash,  64  N.  C. 
456.  Where  a  person  has  a  right  to 
maintain  a  dam  at  u,  certain  height, 
it  is  no  ground  of  complaint  tliat, 
because  of  non  use  of  mill,  the  water 
stands  higher  than  it  otherwise 
would.  Daniels  v.  Citizens  Savings 
Institution,  127  Mass.  534. 

13  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Min- 
.  nesota,  134  U.  S.  418,  10  S.  C.  Rep. 
462,  2  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  564 
and  note. 


96 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§    81 


authorize  bridges  in  aid  thereof.-^*  The  States  may  authorize 
bridges  over  navigable  streams  wholly  within  their  limits,  sub- 
ject to  the  power  of  congress  to  regulate  and  control  the  same.^*^ 
A  bridge  between  two  States  can  only  be  authorized  by  congress 
or  by  the  concurrence  of  both  States. -^^  The  subject  of  damages 
to  private  property  by  bridges  has  been  considered  in  the  pre- 
ceding sections.  The  question  of  authority  does  not  fall  with- 
in the  province  of  this  treatise,  but  in  case  of  damage  to  prop- 
erty would  be  important  as  affecting  the  remedy. -^^  The  inter- 
ference with  navigation  by  an  authorized  bridge  affords  no  cause 
of  action  to  those  who  are  merely  inconvenienced  thereby.-'* 
If  the  bridge  is  unauthorized,  or  if  the  interference  is  due  to 
the  bridge  being  negligently  or  improperly  constructed  or  man- 
aged, it  is  otherwise.  •'^*  But  where  the  bridge  interferes  with 
access  to  property  there  is  a  remedy.^"  And  in  Michigan  it 
has  been  held  that  a  riparian  owner  may  enjoin  the  erection  of 


KLuxton  V.  North  River  Bridge 
Co.,  153  U.  S.  525,  14  S.  C.  Rep. 
891;  Stockton  v.  Baltimore  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  32  Fed.  Rep.  9. 

isWillson  V.  Blackbird  Creek 
Marsh  Co.,  2  Pet.  245;  Oilman  v. 
Philadelphia,  3  Wall.  713;  Willam- 
ette Iron  Bridge  Co.  v.  Hatch,  125 
U.  S.  1,  8  S.  C.  811;  Chicago  v. 
McGinn,  51  111.  266,  2  Am.  Rep.  295 ; 
State  V.  Leighton,  83  Me.  419,  22 
Atl.  380;  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Wiggal,  82  Miss.  223,  32  So. 
965,  61  L.R.A.  578;  Dover  v.  Ports- 
mouth Bridge,  17  N.  H.  200;  People 
V.  Jessup,  160  N.  Y.  249;  reversing 
28  App.  Div.  524;  Clark  v.  Birming- 
ham etc.  Co.,  41  Pa.  St.  147;  Mo- 
nongahela  Bridge  Co.  v.  Kirk,  46  Pa. 
St.  112,  84  Am.  Dec.  527;  Railroad 
Co.  V.  Ferguson,  105  Tenn.  552,  59 
S.  W.  343,  80  Am.  St.  Rep.  908; 
Rhea  v.  Newport  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  50 
Fed.  16;  Oregon  City  Trans.  Co.  v. 
Columbia  St.  Bridge  Co.,  53  Fed. 
549. 

IS  President  v.  Trenton  City 
Bridge  Co.,  13  N.  J.  Eq.  46. 

i^One  whose  property  will  be  dam- 
aged  thereby  may  enjoin  the  erec- 


tion of  an  unauthorized  bridge.  Rid- 
dle V.  Del.  Co.  Comrs.,  3  Pa.  Co.  Ct., 
598,  600,  605;  and  see  Stofflet  v.  Es- 
tes,  104  Mich.  208,  62  N.  W.  347. 

isPeusacola  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hy- 
er,  32  Fla.  539,  14  So.  381,  22  L.R.A. 
368;  Thomas  v.  Wade,  48  Fla.  311, 
37  So.  743;  State  v.  Leighton,  83 
Me.  419,  22  Atl.  380;  Commonwealth 
v.  Breed,  4  Pick.  460;  Silver  v.  Mo. 
Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  101  Mo.  79,  13  S.  W. 
410;  Clarke  v.  Birmingham  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  41  Pa.  St.  147 ;  Monongahela 
Bridge  Co.  v.  Kirk,  46  Pa.  St.  112, 
84  Am.  Dec.  527 ;  Cantwell  v.  Knox- 
ville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  90  Tenn.  638,  18 
S.  W.  271;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Fergu- 
son, 105  Tenn.  552,  59  S.  W.  343,  80 
Am.  St.  Rep.  908. 

isOregon  City  Trans.  Co.  v.  Co- 
lumbia St.  Bridge  Co.,  53  Fed.  549; 
Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania 
R.  R.  Co.,  59  Fed.  192,  8  C.  C.  A.  86; 
Farmers'  Co-op.  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Albe- 
marle etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  117  N.  C.  579, 
23  S.  E.  43,  29  L.R.A.  700;  Delaware 
etc.  R.  Co.  V.  Mehrhof  Bros.  Mfg. 
Co.,  53  N.  J.  L.  205,  23  Atl.  170. 

20Post,  §  102. 


§    83  WATERS.  97 

a  bridge  without  a  draw,  which  will  prevent  navigation  between 
his  mill  and  a  railroad  station,  although  the  bridge  would  not 
interfere  with  access  to  his  property  from  the  navigable  water.^^ 
It  has  been  held  that  authority  to  bridge  a  navigable  stream,  is 
not  authority  to  construct  a  bridge  without  a  draw  or  so  as 
to  obstruct  navigation.^^ 

§  82  (68).  Making  a  private  stream  public,  or  navi- 
gable, by  statute.  As  we  have  already  stated,  streams  which 
are  not  navigable  are  wholly  private  property.  The  riparian 
owner,  by  means  of  dams,  or  otherwise,  may  make  a  reasonable 
use  of  the  water  as  it  flows  over  his  land.  An  act  of  the  legis- 
lature declaring  such  a  river  public,  or  navigable,  will  not  affect 
such  rights,^^  and  the  riparian  owner  cannot  be  deprived  of  the 
use  of  the  water,^*  or  his  private  rights  or  works  on  the  stream 
interfered  with  without  compensation.^^  Compensation  must 
be  made  for  all  damages  occasioned  to  private  rights  by  improve- 
ments making  such  a  stream  navigable  in  f  act.^^ 

§  83  (69).  Rights  of  riparian  owners  on  private  navi- 
gable streams.  Private  atreams  which  are  navigable  are  pub- 
lic highways  by  water,  and  the  rights  of  riparian  proprietors 
thereon  are  subject  to  the  paramount  right  of  the  public  to  use 
and  improve  the  stream  as  such  highway.^^  In  all  other  respects 
riparian  owners  have  the  same  rights  as  upon  private,  non- 
21  stofflet  V.  Estes,  104  Mich.  208,  De  Camp  v.  Thompson,  16  App.  Div. 
62  N.  W.  347.  N.  Y.  528. 

22tMlver  Creek  Nav.  &  Imp.  Co.  v.  26Macdonnell  v.  Caledonia  Canal 

Yazoo  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  90  Miss.  345,  Commisaioners,  8  Shaw  &  Dunl.  881 ; 
43  So.  478;  Hiekok  v.  Hine,  23  Ohio  White  Deer  Creek  Improvement  Co. 
St.  523,  13  Am.  Rep.  255;  Southern  v.  Sassaman,  67  Pa.  St.  415;  De 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Ferguson,  105  Tenn.  552,  Camp  v.  Dix,  159  N.  Y.  436,  54  N.  E. 
59  S.  W.  343,  80  Am.  St.  Rep.  908.      63;  Brewster  v.  Rogers  Co.,  42  N.  Y. 

23PotIatch   Lumber  Co.  v.  Peter-      App.  Div.  343.    See  post,  §  107. 
son,  12  Ida.  769,  88  Pao.  426,  118  Am.  27Attorney    General   v.    Delaware 

St.  Rep.  233 ;  Murray  v.  Preston,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  27  N.  J.  Eq.  1 ;  S.  C. 
106  Ky.  561,  50  S.  W.  1095,  90  Am.  affirmed,  27  N.  J.  Eq.  631 ;  Brown  v. 
St.  Rep.  232.  See  Darning  v.  Cleve-  Chadbourne,  31  Me.  9,  50  Am.  Dec. 
land,  22  Ohio  C.  C.  1.  An  act  de-  641;  Treat  v.  Lord,  42  Me.  552,  66 
daring  a  stream  navigable  and  pro-  Am.  Dec.  447;  Dwinel  v.  Veazie,  44 
viding  for  compensation  to  riparian  Me.  167,  69  Am.  Dec.  94;  Beidler 
owners  is  valid.     Matter  of  Wilder,      v.    Sanitary   District,    211    111.    028, 

90  App.  Div.  262,  85  N.  Y.  S.  741.      71  N.  E.  1118,  67  L.R.A.  820;  West 
2  4Walker     v.     Board     of     Public      Chicago  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  People,  214 

Works,  16  Ohio  540.  111.  9,  73  N.  E.  393.     The  right  of 

2  5Morgan  v.  King,  35  N.  Y.  454,      navigation  confers  no  right  to  use 

91  Am.  Dec.  58;  S.  C.  18  Barb.  277;       the  banks  of  the  stream.     Garth  L. 

Em.  D.— 7. 


98  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    83 

navigable  streams,  and  the  further  right  of  making  use  of  the 
navigable  vsraters  in  connection  with  their  property,  including 
the  right  to  build  piers,  booms  and  the  like.^"  "The  public 
right  is  one  of  passage,  and  nothing  more ;  as  in  a  common  high- 
way. It  is  called  by  the  cases  an  easement  and  the  proprietor 
of  the  adjoining  land  has  a  right  to  use  the  land  and  water 
of  the  river  in  any  way  not  inconsistent  with  this  easement."  ^^ 
The  Court  of  Appeals  of  New  York,  in  a  recent  opinion,  speak- 
ing of  this  easement,  says :  "It  is  an  elementary  principle  that 
all  easements  are  limited  to  the  very  purpose  for  which  they 
were  created,  and  their  enjoyment  cannot  be  extended  by  impli- 
cation. This  right,  being  founded  upon  the  public  benefit  sup- 
posed to  be  derived  from  their  use  as  a  highway,  cannot  be 
extended  to  a  different  purpose  inconsistent  with  its  original 
use."  ^"  And  again  in  another  case :  "The  legislature,  except 
under  the  power  of  eminent  domain,  upon  making  compensa- 
tion, can  interfere  with  such  streams  only  for  the  purpose  of 
regulating,  preserving  and  protecting  the  public  easement.  Fur- 
ther than  that,  it  has  no  more  power  over  these  fresh-water 
streams  than  over  other  private  property.  It  may  make  laws 
for  regulating  booms,  dams,  ferries  and  bridges,  only  so  far  as 
is  necessary  to  protect  and  preserve  the  public  easement ;  and 
when  it  goes  further,  it  invades  private  rights  protected  under 
the  constitution."  ^^  These  conclusions,  so  -well  put  by  the  'Sew 
York  court,  state  fully  and  correctly  the  rights  of  riparian  own- 
ers upon  private  navigable  streams,  and  the  limitations  to  which 
they  are  subject,  and  are  fully  sustained  by  the  authorities.^^ 
These  limitations  necessarily  prevent  any  structure  on  the  bed 
or  banks  of  the  stream  which  interferes  with  navigation,  such 

&  S.  Co.  V.  Johnson,  151  Mieh.  205,  3  0  Smith   v.    Rochester,    92   N.   Y. 

115  N.  W.  52;  Watkins  t.  Dorris,  24  463,  483,  44  Am.  Rep.  393. 

Wash.   636,  64  Pac.  840,  54  L.R.A.  31  Chenango   Bridge  Co.  v.  Paige, 

199;     Lownsdale    v.    Grays    Harbor  83  N.  Y.  178,  185,  38  Am.  Rep.  407. 

Boom   Co.,   36   Wash.   198,   78   Pac.  3  2Hool{er  v.  Cummings,  20  Johns. 

904.     See  Ala.  Lumber  Co.  v.  Keel,  90,   99,   11   Am.  Dec.  249;   State  of 

125  Ala.  603,  28  So.  204,  82  Am.  St.  Pennsylvania  v.  Wheeling  &  Belmont 

Rep.  265.  Bridge  Co.,  18  How.  421;  Canal  Cora- 

^sPost,  §§  94-100.  missioners  v.  Kempshall,  26  Wend. 

29Ex  parte  Jennings,  6  Cow.  518,  404. 
527,  16  Am.  Dec.  447. 


§    85  WATERS.  99 

as  a  dam,^*  or  boom,^^  and  all  such  structures  are  nuisances  and 
may  be  abated. ^^ 

§  84  (70).     An  interference  with  such  rights  is  a  taking. 

Such  being  the  rights  of  the  riparian  owner  upon  a  private  navi- 
gable stream,  it  follows  that  any  interference  with  these  rights, 
under  legislative  sanction,  for  any  purpose  not  connected  with 
the  navigation  of  the  stream,  is  a  taking.^^  The  water  cannot 
be  taken  as  a  feeder  for  a  canal,^^  or  to  supply  a  town  with 
water,^^  or  for  any  public  purpose  without  compensation.  Any 
interference  with  the  accustomed  flow  of  the  stream,  in  its  quan- 
tity, quality  or  uniformity,  to  the  damage  of  a  riparian  proprie- 
tor, except  for  the  improvement  of  navigation,  will  be  action- 
able, and  the  authorities  heretofore  referred  to  in  treating  of 
non-navigable  streams  apply  with  full  force.  A  statute  making 
it  unlawful  to  drive  piles,  or  build  piers,  cribs  or  other  structures 
in  the  bed  of  a  private  navigable  river,  without  regard  to  whether 
the  same  obstruct  navigation,  was  held  invalid,  as  depriving 
the  riparian  owners  of  their  property  without  compensation  and 
without  due  process  of  law.^^ 

§  85  (71).  Damages  by  reason  of  improving  naviga- 
tion. The  public  easement  in  a  private  navigable  stream  in- 
cludes not  only  the  right  to  use,  but  also  the  right  to  improve. 
The  public  may  make  such  changes  and  construct  such  works 
in  the  bed  of  the  stream,  as  may  be  deemed  necessary  to  promote 
its  usefulness  and  efficiency  as  a  highway.*"     If  such  improve- 

ssWisconsin    River    Improvement  39City    of    Janesville    v.    Carpen- 

Co.  V.  Lyons,  30  Wis.  61;  Woodward  ter,  77  Wis.  288,  46  N.  W.  128. 
..  Kilbourn  Mfg.  Co.,  1  Abb.  U.  S.  ^oSpring  v.   Russell,   7   Me.   273 

C.  158.  Scranton  v.  Wheeler,  113  Mich.  565, 

34Warner  v.  Ford  L.  &  M.  Co.,  123  71  N.  W.  1091,  67  Am.  St.  Rep.  484 

Ky.  103,  93  S.  W.  650;  Stevens  Point  Osborne  v.  Knife  Falls  Boom  Corp 

Boom   Co.   V.   Reilly,   44   Wis.   295;  32    Minn.    412,    50    Am.    Rep.    500 

S.  C.  46  Wis.  237.  Doucette  v.  Little  Falls  Imp.  &  Nav, 

35Atlee   V.   Packet   Co.,   21    Wall.  Co.,   71   Minn.   206,   73  N.  W.   847 

389.  Slingerland    v.    International    Con 

ssBeidler  v.  Sanitary  District,  211  tracting  Co.,  169  N.  Y.  60,  62  N.  E 

111.  628,   71   N.   E.   1118,   67   L.R.A.  1097,  56  L.R.A.  494,  affirming  S.  C 

820;   Chenango  Bridge  Co.  v.  Paige,  43   App.   Div.   215,   60  N.  Y.   S.   12 

83  N.  Y.  178,  185,  44  Am.  Hep.  393.  Falls  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Oconto  Riv.  Imp 

3  7Ex  parte  Jennings,  6  Cow.  518;  Co.,  87  Wis.  134,  58  N.  W.  Rep.  257 

Canal  Commissioners  v.  Kempshall,  Scranton  v.   Wheeler,   57   Fed.  Rep 

26  Wend.  404.  803,  6  C.  C.  A.  585 ;  Gibson  v.  Unit 

ssSmith  V.   Rochester,   92   N.   Y.  ed  States,  166  U.   S.   269,   17   S.   C. 

463,  38  Am.  Rep.  407.  Rep.  578 ;  Scranton  v.  Wheeler,  179 


100 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§    85 


ments  change  the  current  of  the  stream  so  as  to  wash  away  the 
land  of  a  proprietor,  it  is  damnum  absque  injuria.*^  The  ri- 
parian owner,  in  such  case,  must  protect  his  bank.  But,  if 
such  works  cause  private  property  to  be  overflowed,  compensa- 
tion must  be  made.*^  The  banks  of  the  stream  and  land  adjoin- 
ing, being  private  property,  cannot  be  occupied  without  com- 
pensation.*^ It  has  been  held  in  Wisconsin  that  a  side  chute, 
or  subsidiary  channel,  though  forming  a  navigable  connection 
with  the  main  stream,  may  be  dosed  for  the  purpose  of  turning 
all  the  water  into  the  principal  channel,  and  that  a  proprietor 
upon  the  former,  who  is  thus  cut  off  from  all  access  to  the  river, 
is  not  entitled  to  compensation.**  The  Supreme  Court  of  Mis- 
sissippi has  gone  so  far  as  to  hold  that  a  stream  may  be  turned 
into  an  entirely  new  channel  without  compensation  to  those 
whose  use  of  it  is  thus  destroyed.*^  The  latter  decision  seems 
to  us  erroneous.  The  public  right  is  a  right  of  passage  only,  in- 
cluding the  right  to  improve  the  navigation.  It  is  necessarily 
limited  to  the  bed  of  the  stream.**  So  far  as  the  water  is  con- 
cerned, it  can  only  use  it  for  navigation;  it  cannot  take  it  or 
divert  it.*^     The  public  easement  includes  the  right  to  make 


U.  S.  141,  21  S.  C.  48;  Bedford  v. 
United  States,  192  U.  S.  217,  24  S. 
C.  238 ;  and  cases  cited  in  succeed- 
ing notes.  In  Thompson  v.  Andro- 
scoggin Riv.  Impv.  Co.,  58  N.  H. 
108,  it  is  held  tliat  the  right  of  the 
public  is  one  of  reasonable  use  and  to 
make  reasonable  improvements  in 
aid  of  that  use,  and  that,  for  dam- 
ages resulting  from  unreasonable  im- 
provements, a  recovery  may  be  had. 
^iHolIister  v.  Union  Co.,  9  Conn. 
436,  25  Am.  Dec.  38 ;  Brooks  v.  Cedar 
Brook  Impv.  Co.,  82  Me.  17,  19  Atl. 
87,  17  Am.  St.  Rep.  459,  7  L.R.A. 
460;  Bedford  v.  United  States,  192 
U.  S.  217,  24  S.  C.  238.  But  it  is 
held  that  one  State  cannot  author- 
ize works  for  the  improvement  of 
navigation  which  will  produce  dam- 
age, either  direct  or  consequential,  to 
lands  in  another  State.  Holyoke 
Water  Power  Co.  v.  Connecticut  Riv- 
er Co.,  22  Blatch.  131;  S.  C.  52 
Conn.  570. 


4  2Arimond  v.  Green  Bay  &  Mis- 
sissippi Canal  Co.,  31  Wis.  316;  Pum- 
pelly  V.  Green  Bay  Co.,  13  Wall.  166; 
United  States  v.  Lynch,  188  U.  S. 
445,  23  S.  C.  349;  Grand  Rapids 
Boom  Co.  V.  Jarvis,  30  Mich.  308; 
Carpenter  v.  Board  of  Comrs.,  56 
Minn.  513,  58  N.  W.  295;  see  also 
ante,  §  80. 

4 s Same;  Cotton  v.  Mississippi  & 
Rum  River  Boom  Co.,  19  Minn.  497; 
Perry  v.  Wilson,  7  Mass.  393. 

4  4Black  River  Improvement  Co.  v. 
La  Crosse  Booming  &  Trans.  Co.,  54 
Wis.  659. 

4  6  Commissioners  of  Homochitto 
River  v.  Withers,  29  Miss.  21,  64 
Am.  Dec.  126.  This  case  was  taken 
to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States,  but  there  dismissed  for  want 
of  jurisdiction.  Withers  v.  Buck- 
ley, 20  How.  84. 

•46Weaver  v.  Miss.  &  Rum  River 
Boom  Co.,  28  Minn.  534,  538. 

<  TSee  cases  cited  ante,  §  74. 


§    85  WATERS.  101 

any  use  of  the  water  or  bed  of  the  stream,  for  promoting  the 
navigation  of  the  stream  itself,  which  the  legislature  deems 
expedient.  But  the  public  right  is  one  of  passage  only,  and 
improvements  can  be  made  only  for  that  purpose.  While  these 
general  principles  are  admitted  by  all,  there  is  much  diversity 
in  their  application.  It  has  recently  been  held  in  Wisconsin 
that  it  was  competent  to  confer  upon  a  corporation  the  exclu- 
sive right  of  constructing  and  operating  booms  for  a  certain  dis- 
tance on  the  Wisconsin  River,  where  the  result  was  not  only  to 
deprive  the  riparian  owner  of  the  right  or  privilege  of  con- 
structing a  boom  opposite  his  own  bank,  but  also  to  cut  him 
off  from  the  navigable  part  of  the  river.*^  Plaintiff  had  about 
two  thousand  feet  of  frontage  on  the  river  and  was  owner  of  tim- 
ber lands  above.  The  channel  was  about  two  hundred  feet  from 
shore.  He  had  bought  the  property  for  the  purpose  of  erecting 
saw  mills  thereon  and  with  a  view  to  constructing  in  front 
thereof  booms  for  storing  logs.  The  defendant  company  con- 
structed a  boom  along  the  whole  front  of  his  land,  extending 
from  near  the  shore  to  the  channel.  The  maintenance  of  the 
defendant's  works  would  virtually  ruin  his  property.  The  court 
held  the  defendant's  works  to  be  a  legitimate  exercise  of  the 
public  easement  of  navigation,  that  no  property  of  the  plaintiff's 
was  taken,  and  that  he  was  not  entitled  to  any  relief.  Undoubt- 
edly a  boom  in  such  a  stream  is  a  work  of  public  utility  for  which 
property  may  be  taken.*"  But  the  construction  of  a  boom  for 
the  storing,  sorting  and  handling  of  logs  can  hardly  be  called 
an  improvement  of  the  right  of  passage  in  a  stream.  It  is  a 
legitimate  use  of  highways  to  drive  cattle  along  them,  and  the 
public  may  make  the  ways  safe  and  convenient  for  that  purpose ; 
but  it  would  not  be  contended  that  this  would  justify  the  con- 
struction of  cattle  yards  in  front  of  a  man's  door  to  enable  the 
drover  to  feed,  water,  rest  or  sell  his  stock.^°    The  right  of  access 

<8Cohn  V.  Wausau  Boom  Co.,  47  vessels,  or  floatable  for  logs,  is  but 

Wis.  314.  a.    public    highway    by    water;    the 

4SCotton    V.    Mississippi    &    Rum  right  to   navigate   the  one   or  float 

River  Boom  Co.,  22  Minn.  372;  post,  the  other  is  but  a  right  of  passage, 

§  274.  including  only  such  rights  as  are  in- 

6  0 We  wish  to  credit  this  illustra-  cident  to  that  right  and  necessary  to 

tion,  which  is  a  very  apt  one,  to  its  render  it  reasonably  available.    And 

proper    source.     In    Grand    Rapids  though  the  drover  has  the  right  to 

Booming  Co.  v.  Jarvis,  30  Mich.  308,  drive   his   herds    of    cattle   along   a 

319,    Christiancy,    J.,    says :      "This  public  road,  no  one  will  contend  that 

river,  so  far  as  it  is  navigable  for  he  has  a  right  to  convert  a,  certain 


102  EMINEJN^T    DOMAIN.  §    85 

to  the  navigable  part  of  the  river  ^-^  and  the  right  to  constinact 
booms  for  logs  adjacent  to  one's  premises,®^  which  do  not  inter- 
fere with  the  public  use  of  the  stream,  are  valuable  riparian 
rights  which  cannot  be  taken  or  impaired  without  compensa- 
tion.^^ A  lighthouse,  being  in  aid  of  navigation,  may  be  built 
in  the  bed  of  the  stream  without  compensation  to  the  riparian 
owner.^*  A  dike  built  in  aid  of  navigation  so  changed  the  cur- 
rent as  to  prevent  access  to  the  plaintiff's  wharf  below,  except 
in  high  water.  It  was  held  that  there  was  no  taking  and  no 
liability.^^  Where  the  riparian  owner's  title  extends  to  the 
middle  of  the  stream,  the  appurtenances  of  a  bridge  cannot  be 
placed  in  the  bed  of  the  stream  without  compensation.^*  Where 
the  riparian  owner  has  built  a  tunnel  under  the  Chicago  river 
by  permission  of  the  city,  he  may  be  compelled  to  lower  it  at 
his  own  expense,  when  it  has  become  an  obstruction  to  naviga- 
tion.^'' The  improvement  of  navigation  to  which  riparian  rights 
on  a  stream  are  subject  relates  solely  to  the  improvement  of  the 
stream  itself  as  a  natural  highway  by  water,  and  when  such 
rights  are  impaired  by  the  construction  of  an  artificial  channel, 
connecting  such  stream  with  another  stream  and  designed  to 
reverse  the  current  of  the  former,  there  is  a  right  to  compensa- 
tion.^® Where  the  plaintiff  had  a  rice  plantation  upon  a  fresh 
water  stream  which  had  its  outlet  through  a  lake  and  bayou  to 
the  sea  and  by  the  improvement  of  navigation  in  the  lower 
waters  the  stream  was  made  salt  and  its  value  destroyed  for  the 

length  of  the  highway  into  a  cattle  310,  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  92;  Bigaouetto 

yard,   and  occupy  it  for   that  pur-  r.  North  Shore  K.  R.  Co.,  17  Duvall 

pose  for  months  or  weeks,  or  even  a  363 ;  post,  §§  94^100. 

day,  while  he  is  purchasing,  collect-  B2Wiliamsburg  Boom  Co.  v.  Smith, 

ing  and  bringing  in  his  droves,  as-  84  Ky.  372. 

sorting,    dividing    or    selling    them.  ^^Post,  §  101  et  seq. 

*      *      *     Every   man   sees   at  once  5  4Hawkins     Point     Light     House 

that,  however  convenient  such  right  Case,  39   Fed.  77.     To  same  effect, 

might  be  to  the  drover,  and  however  Scranton  v.  Wheeler,  179  U.  S.  141, 

necessary  to  enable  him  to  make  his  21  S.  C.  48. 

business   profitable,   it  is  a   eonven-  ssQibson  v.  United  States,  166  U. 

ience    and    necessity    for    which    he  S.  2G9,  17  S.  C.  578. 

must  pay."  seBallance  v.  Peoria,  180  111.  29. 

5iRumsey  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  5  7 West  Chicago  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Co.,  133  N.  Y.  79,  30  N.  E.  654,  28  People,  214  111.  9,  73  N.  E.  393. 

Am.  St.  Rep.  600,  15  L.R.A.  618,  6  6 sBeidler  v.  Sanitary  District,  211 

Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  67;  Hedges  v.  111.  628,  71  N.  E.  1118,  67  L.R.A.  820. 
West  Shore  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  80  Hun 


86 


WATEES. 


103 


irrigation  of  rice  lands  it  was  held  that  he  was  entitled  to  com- 
pensation.^^ 

§  86  (72).  What  streams  are  public.  At  common  law 
all  streams  and  waters  where  the  tide  ebbed  and  flowed  were  re- 
garded as  navigable,  and  the  soil  below  high  water  mark  was 
held  to  be  in  the  pnblic.  All  other  waters  were  regarded  as  pri- 
vate property.®"  In  this  country,  with  its  great  inland  lakes  and 
rivers,  there  has  been  some  tendency  to  depart  from  the  com- 
mon law  doctrine,  but  no  definite  rule  has  been  enunciated  by 
any  State  by  which  it  can  be  determined  in  any  given  case 
whether  the  title  to  the  bed  of  a  stream  is  in  the  public  or  the 
riparian  owners.  The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States, 
after  originally  confining  admiralty  jurisdiction  to  tide  waters, 
in  accordance  with  the  common  law  of  England,®^  at  length 
overcame  the  force  of  English  precedent  and  extended  that  juris- 
diction to  all  waters  navigable  in  fact  for  purposes  of  commerce, 
without  regard  to  the  ebbing  and  flowing  of  the  tide ;  ®^  and 
even  where  the  river  was  only  rendered  navigable  for  boats  of 
any  size  by  means  of  locks  and  canals,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Fox 
Eiver,  Wisconsin.®^  Most  of  the  States  have  adhered  to  the 
common  law  rule.  Of  these  are  Connecticut,®*  Illinois,®^  Indi- 
ana,®® Kentucky,®^  Maine,®^  Maryland,®^  Massachusetts,''®  Mich- 


BSBigham  Bros.  v.  Port  Arthur  C 
&  D.  Co.,  100  Tex.  192,  97  S.  W.  680, 

6  0De  Juris  Maris,  Part  I,  C.  2 
Angell  on  Watercourses,  §§  542-551 
Wood  on  Nuisances,  {1st  ed.)  §  575 
Gould  on  Waters,  chap.  iii. ;  1  Fam 
ham  on  Waters,  §§  36-55. 

eiThe  Thomas  Jeflferson,  10  Wheat. 
428;  The  Steamboat  New  Orleans 
V.  Phoebus,  11  Peters,  175. 

6  2The  Propeller  Genesee  Chief,  12 
How.  43;  The  Magnolia,  20  How. 
296;  A.  0.  Hine  v.  Trevor,  4  Wall.  455. 

63The  Montello,  20  Wall.  430. 

6  4 Adams  \.  Pease,  2  Conn.  481; 
Chapman  v.  Kimball,  9  Conn.  38,  21 
Am.  Dec.  707;  East  Haven  v.  Hem- 
ingway, 7  Conn.  188;  Middleton  v. 
Sage,  8  Conn.  221. 

ssMiddletown  v.  Pritehard,  3 
Scam.  510;  People  v.  St.  Louis,  5 
Gil.  351;  Seaman  v.  Smith,  24  111. 
523;    Hubbard  v.   Bell,   54  111.   112, 


5  Am.  Rep.  98;  Braxton  v.  Bressler, 
64  111.  488. 

66Cox  V.  State,  3  Blackf.  193;  Por- 
ter V.  Allen,  8  Ind.  1,  65  Am.  Dec. 
750;  Sherlock  v.  Bainbridge,  41  Ind. 
35,  41,  13  Am.  Rep.  302;  Ross  v. 
Faust,  54  Ind.  471,  23  Am.  Rep.  655. 

6 'Williamsburg  Boom  Co.  v. 
Smith,  84  Ky.  372. 

ssBerry  v.  Carle,  3  Greenl.  269; 
Lapish  V.  Bangor  Bank,  8  Greenl. 
85;  Springer  v.  Russell,  7  Me.  273; 
Simpson  v.  Seavy,  8  Me.  138,  22 
Am.  Dec.  228;  Wadsworth  v.  Smith, 
11  Me.  278,  26  Am.  Dec.  525;  Brown 
V.  Chadbourne,  31  Me.  9,  50  Am. 
Dec.  641;  Knox  v.  Chaloner,  42  Me. 
150;  Granger  v.  Avery,  64  Me.  292. 

6  9  Brown  v.  Kennedy,  5  H.  &  J. 
195. 

TO  Commonwealth  v.  Chapin,  5 
Pick.  199;  Gray  v.  Bartlett,  20  Pick. 
186,  32  Am.  Dec.  208. 


104 


EMINENT    DOMAIN 


86 


igan/^  Mississippi,''^  ISTew  Hampshire,''^  Ohio,''*  Virginia,''^ 
and  Wisconsin,''®  and  perhaps  other  States.''^  On  the  other  hand 
several  of  the  States  have  held  some  of  our  large  inland  rivers 
to-  be  public  streams,  in  the  fullest  sense  of  the  term.  This  has 
always  been  the  doctrine  in  Pennsylvania,  which  holds  the  title 
to  navigable  streams  to  be  in  the  public  from  low  water  mark.''* 
Several  decisions  in  Iowa  in  relation  to  the  Mississippi  Kiver 
have  held  the  title  to  the  bed  of  the  stream  to  be  in  the  public 
from  high  water  mark.''®  Several  other  States  have  held  or  in- 
clined to  similar  views.®"  The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States,  while  holding  that  the  question  is  one  of  State  policy 
and  State  law,®^  yet  inclines  to  approve  the  doctrine  maintained 


'iLa  Plaisance  Ba.y  Harbor  Co. 
V.  Monroe,  Walk.  Ch.  155;  Loi-man 
V.  Benson,  8  Mich.  18,  77  Am.  Dec. 
435;  Rice  v.  Ruddiman,  10  Mich. 
125;  Webber  v.  Pere  Marquette  Boom 
Co.,  62  Mich.  626,  30  N.  W.  469. 

7  2Morgan  v.  Reading,  3  S.  &  M. 
366;  Steamboat  Magnolia  v.  Mar- 
shall, 39  Miss.  109. 

7  3  Scott  V.  Wilson,  3  N.  H.  321 
State  V.   Gilmanton,   9   N.  H.   461 
State  V.  Canterbury,  28  N.  H.  195 
Norway  Plaines  Co.  v.  Bradley,  52 
N.  H.  86. 

7  4Gavit  V.  Chambers,  3  Ohio  495; 
Lamb  v.  Rickets,  11  Ohio  311; 
Walker  v.  Board  of  Public  Works, 
16  Ohio  540. 

76Hays  V.  Bowman,  1  Rand.  417; 
Mead  v.  Haynes,  3  Rand.  33. 

7  6  Jones  V.  Pettibone,  2  Wis.  308; 
Mariner  v.  Shulte,  13  Wis.  692;  Ar- 
nold V.  Elmore,  16  Wis.  509;  Olsen 
v.  Merrill,  42  Wis.  203. 

TTSee  1  Farnham  on  Waters,  §§  48- 
50. 

7  8  Carson  v.  Blazer,  2  Binn.  475; 
Shrunk  v.  Schuylkill  Navigation  Co., 
14  S.  &  R.  71;  Union  Canal  Co.  v. 
Landis,  9  Watts  228;  Covert  v.  O'- 
Connor, 8  Watts  470;  Barclay  Road 
V.  Ingham,  36  Pa.  St.  194,  201 ;  Flan- 
nagan  v.  Philadelphia,  42  Pa.  St. 
219;    Fulmer  v.   Williams,   122  Pa. 


St.  191,  15  Atl.  726,  9  Am.  St.  Rep. 
88,  1  L.R.A.  603. 

7  9McManus  v.  Carmichael,  3  la. 
1;  Haight  v.  Keokuk,  4  la.  199; 
Tomlin  v.  Dubuque,  B.  &  M.  R.  R. 
Co.,  32  la.  106,  7  Am.  Rep.  176;  Mus- 
ser  V.  Hershey,  42  la.  356.  in 
Houghton  V.  C.  D.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  47 
la.  370,  high  water  mark  is  defined 
"as  co-ordinate  with  the  limit  of  the 
river  bed.  What  the  river  does  not 
occupy  long  enough  to  wrest  from 
vegetation,  so  far  as  to  destroy  its 
value  for  agriculture,  is  not  river 
bed." 

8  0 Webb  v.  City  of  Demopolis,  95 
Ala.  116,  13  S.  E.  289,  21  L.R.A. 
62;  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Ramsey,  53  Ark.  314,  13  S.  W.  931, 
22  Am.  St.  Rep.  195,  8  L.R.A.  559; 
Harlan  &  H.  Co.  v.  Parchall,  5  Del. 
Ch.  435 ;  Terrell  v.  Paducah,  122  Ky. 
331,  92  S.  W.  310;  Gibson  v.  Kelly, 
15  Mont.  417,  39  Pac.  517 ;  Benson  v. 
Morrow,  61  Mo.  345;  State  v.  Long- 
fellow, 169  Mo.  109,  69  S.  W.  374; 
State  V.  Muncie  Pulp  Co.,  119  Tenn. 
47;  Ravenswood  v*.  Flemings,  22  W. 
Va.  52,  46  Am.  Rep.  485;  Gates  v. 
Waddington,  1  McCord,  580;  Schur- 
mier  v.  Railroad  Co.,  10  Minn.  82, 
88  Am.  Dee.  59. 

siBarney  v.  Keokuk,  94  U.  S.  324. 


§    86  WATEES.  105 

by  the  Iowa  court.*^  The  decisions  in  JSTew  York  are  seemingly- 
conflicting,  but  the  common  law  doctrine  may  be  said  to  prevail, 
except  as  to  the  Mohawk  and  Hudson.  These  rivers  are  ex- 
ceptional, owing  to  the  fact  that  they  were  originally  under  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Dutch,  and  through  them  were,  so  to  speak, 
impressed  with  the  doctrines  of  the  civil  law.^*  As  we  have 
before  said,  it  is  not  within  the  purview  of  this  treatise  to  ex- 
amine these  decisions  and  work  out  the  true  doctrine  in  respect 
to  the  title  to  navigable  streams.  The  subject  is  fully  treated  in 
works  upon  Waters,  where  the  authorities  are  referred  to  and 
discussed.®*  We  have  referred  to  the  question  here  for  the  pur- 
pose of  showing  how  it  stands.  The  question  which  concerns 
us  is,  what  consequences  follow  from  the  title  to  the  bed  of  the 
stream  being  in  the  public  ? 

The  boundary  line  between  public  and  private  ownership 
where  the  tide  ebbs  and  flows  is  high  water  mark.*^  Where 
the  tide  does  not  ebb  and  flow  the  boundary  "is  to  be  determined 
by  examining  the  bed  and  banks,  and  ascertaining  where  the 
presence  and  action  of  the  water  are  so  common  and  usual  as 
to  mark  upon  the  soil  of  the  bed  a  character  distinct  from  that 
of  the  banks  in  respect  to  vegetation  as  well  as  the  nature  of  the 
soil."  ***  The  owner  cannot  extend  his  ownership  by  filling  in 
below  high  water  mark.®^  The  Des  Moines  Eiver  was  declared 
navigable  by  Congress,  and  afterwards  the  act  was  repealed.  It 
was  held  that  the  title  of  riparian  owners  was  not  thereby  ex- 
tended to  the  thread  of  the  stream.^® 

82Railroad    Co.    v.    Sehurmier,    7  Ark.  314,  13  S.  W.  931,  22  Am.  St. 

Wall.   272;    Barney   v.   Keokuk,   94  Rep.  195,  8  L.R.A.  559. 

U.  S.  324.  It  is  held  to  be  low  water  mark  in 

ssCanal  Commissioners  v.  People,  State   v.   Longfellow,    169   Mo.    109, 

5  Wend.  423;   S.  C.  13  Wend.  355;  69  S.  W.  374. 

17  Wend.  570;   Canal  Appraisers  v.  STDiedrich  v.  N.  W.  U.  R.  R.  Co., 

Kempshall,  26  Wend.  404;  People  v.  42   Wis.   248;    People  v.   Comrs.   of 

Canal    Appraisers,    33    N.    Y.    461;  Land  Office,  135  N.  Y.  447,  32  N.  E. 

Smith  V.  Rochester,  92  N.  Y.  463,  44  139;  Illinois  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Illi- 

Am.   Rep.   393.     In  the  latter   case  nois,   146  U.   S.  387,   13  S.  C.   110; 

prior    decisions    are    reviewed,    ex-  Sweeney  v.  Shakespeare,  42  La.  An. 

plained  and  distinguished.  614,   7    So.   729;    Commonwealth   v. 

84Gould   on  Waters,   §§   46-79;    1  Young  Men's  Christian  Asso.,  169  Pa. 

Farnham  on  Waters,  §§  48-53b.  St.   24,  32  Atl.   121 ;    but  see  Han- 

isSee  ante,  n.  60.  ford  v.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  43 

ssCarpenter  v.   Board  of  Comrs.,  Minn.  104,  44  N.  W.  1144,  7  L.R.A. 

56  Minn.    513,   58   N.   W.   295;    St.  722. 

Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ramsey,  53  8  8 Wood  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 


106  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    87 

§  87  (73).  Rights  of  riparian  owners  on  public  navi- 
gable streams.  So  far  as  these  rights  are  connected  with  the 
navigation  of  the  stream,  we  shall  treat  of  them  under  the  gen- 
eral head  of  "Eights  of  riparian  owners  on  public  waters."  ^^ 
We  shall  only  discuss  here  the  right  to  the  flow  of  the  stream. 
In  New  York  it  has  been  held  that  the  State  has  an  absolute  right 
to  appropriate  the  water  of  public  streams  in  any  way  it  sees 
fit,  as  to  supply  a  city  with  water,*"  or  create  a  feeder  for  a 
canal,"  ^  without  compensation  to  the  riparian  owners.  So  it 
has  been  held  in  Minnesota  that  the  water  of  public  streams  may 
be  taken  for  a  public  water  supply  without  compensation."^ 
The  doctrine  is  not  without  support  in  other  States,  especially 
in  Pennsylvania."^  The  logic  of  these  cases  is,  that  a  public 
river  may  be  entirely  appropriated  by  the  State,  so  as  to  leave 
the  riparian  owners  abutting  on  a  dry  river  bed,  and  yet  violate 
no  right  of  private  property.  It  seems  to  us  that  this  is  a  result 
not  to  be  tolerated,  and  that  the  principles  which  involve  it  are 
erroneous.  As  respects  the  flow  of  the  stream,  we  think  there  is 
no  difference  between  public  and  private  navigable  rivers. 
Though  title  is  declared  to  be  in  the  State,  it  holds  it  as  a  mere 
trustee,  for  the  benefit  of  the  public  and  the  riparian  owners 
alike."*  The  public  are  beneficiaries  to  the  extent  of  having  a 
common  right  of  passage,  and  perhaps  of  fishery;  the  riparian 
owners  are  beneficiaries  to  the  extent  of  having  a  right  to  all 
those  advantages  which  the  stream  affords,  and  which  can  be 
enjoyed  without  interfering  with  the  public  rights.  These  bene- 
ficiary rights  are  property,  and  within  the  protection  of  the 
constitution.      They  are  attached  to  the  riparian  property  by 

60  la.  456 ;   Serrin  v.  Gref e,  67  la.  rights  of  the  public,  and  that  he  was 

196;    Steele  v.   Sanchez,   72  la.    65,  entitled  to  compensation  when  such 

2   Am.    St.   Rep.   233;    Chicago  etc.  right  was  taken.     S.  C.  15  Abb.  N. 

R.  R.  Co.  V.  Porter,  72  la.  426.  C.  159  and  395. 

ssPost,  §§  94^100.  9  2Minneapolis  Mill  Co.  v.  Board  of 

soCrill  V.  Rome,  47  How.  398.  Water    Comrs.,    56    Minn.    485,    58 

9iCanal  Commissioners  v.  People,  N.    W.    33.      And   see    St.   Anthony 

5  Wend.  423;  S.  C.  13  Wend.  355;  17  Falls  Water  Power  Co.  v.  St.  Paul 

Wend.    570;    People    v.    Canal    Ap-  Water  Comrs.,  168  U.  S.  349. 

praisers,  33  N.  Y.  461.    In  matter  of  ss^ee  Fulmer  v.  Williams,  122  Pa. 

Commissioners  of  State  Reservation  St.  191,  15  Atl.  726,  9  Am.  St.  Rep. 

at  Niagara,  37  Hun  537,  affirmed  in  88,  1  L.R.A.  603;   Williams  r.  Ful- 

102  N.  Y.  734,  it  was  held  that  u  ri-  mer,  151  Pa.  St.  405,  25  Atl.  103,  31 

parian  owner  could  acquire  by  pre-  Am.   St.   Rep.   767 ;   post,   %   89  and 

scription  a  right  to  such  use  of  the  cases  cited, 

stream  as  did  not  interfere  with  the  ^*See  post,  §  93. 


§    88  WATEKS.  107 

nature,  are  universally  estimated  as  part  of  its  value  in  all 
the  dealings  between  man  and  man,  and  should  receive  the  pro- 
tection of  the  law.  For  a  justification  of  these  conclusions  we 
refer  to  what  is  said  further  on  in  regard  to  rights  in  public 
waters.®^ 

§  88  (74).  Interfering  with  the  flow  of  public  streams. 
According  to  the  conclusions  announced  in  the  last  section,  any 
damage  to  riparian  owners  on  public  streams  by  works  for  any 
purpose  not  connected  with  the  improvement  of  navigation  is 
a  taking  for  which  compensation  is  to  be  made.  Exactly  the 
same  rules  apply  as  in  case  of  private  navigable  streams.^® 
\Vhere  the  city  of  St.  Louis  extended  a  street  or  pier  seven  hun- 
dred feet  into  the  Mississippi  Eiver,  thereby  destroying  a  chan- 
nel adjacent  to  plaintiff's  property  and  greatly  depreciating  its 
value,  the  city  was  held  liable.*^  But  most  of  the  decisions  on 
this  question  are  of  older  date  and  adverse  to  the  views  we  have 
expressed.  We  referred  in  the  last  section  to  some  cases  in  re- 
lation to  diverting  the  water  of  public  streams,®*  and  will  now 
refer  to  some  additional  cases  holding  the  same  doctrine.  A 
railroad  company,  authorized  to  cross  a  tidal  river,  constructed 
a  bridge,  the  piers  of  which  caused  a  change  in  the  current  of 
the  river,  which  rendered  additional  sea  wall  and  piling  neces- 
sary in  order  to  protect  the  plaintiff's  land.  It  was  held  that 
the  company  was  not  liable.  "It  is  incident  to  the  power  of  the 
legislature,"  says  the  court,  "to  regulate  a  navigable  stream  so 
as  best  to  promote  the  public  convenience,  and  if,  in  doing  so, 
some  damage  is  done  to  riparian  proprietors,  and  some  increased 
expense  thrown  upon  them,  it  is  damnum  absque  injuria."  ^^ 
It  is  difficult  to  reconcile  this  case  with  anotlier  in  the  same  vol- 
ume which  seems  to  hold  that  precisely  the  same  item  of  dam- 
ages is  allowable.^ 

^^Post  §   94  et  seq.    In   St.  Louis  CommonweaPth  v.   Boston   &  Maine 

etc.  R.  R.   Co.  V.  Ramsey,  53  Ark.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Cush.  25. 

314,  13  S.  W.  931,  22  Am.  St.  Rep.  ssSee  cases  cited  in  last  section. 

195,  8  L.R.A.  559,  it  is  held  that  a  ssFitchburg  R.  R.   Co.  v.  Boston 

riparian  owner  cannot  maintain  an  &  Maine  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Cush.  58,  88; 

action  for  gravel  removed  from  the  also  Bailey  v.  Philadelphia  etc.  R. 

bed  of  a  public  stream  by  a  railroad  R.  Co.,  4  Harr.    (Del.)   389,  44  Am. 

company.  Dec.  593 ;  to  the  same  point,  Missis- 

9^ Ante,  §§  71-80.  sippi  River  Bridge  Co.  v.  Lonergan, 

9 'Meyers  v.  St.  Louis,  8  Mo.  Ap.  91  111.  508. 

266;   see  also  Chapman  v.  Oshkosh  i  Commonwealth  v.  Boston  &  Maine 

&  Miss.  R.  R.  Co.,  33  Wis.  629,  and  R.    R.    Co.,    3    Cush.    25;    see    also 


108 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  89 


§  89  (75).  Damage  to  authorized  works  on  public 
streams.  It  lias  been  repeatedly  held,  in  Pennsylvania,  that, 
where  a  dam  has  been  built  on  a  public  navigable  stream,  under 
an  act  of  the  legislature  granting  permission  to  do  so,  the  grant 
is  a  mere  license,  revocable  at  pleasure,  and  that  where  such 
dam  is  injured  or  destroyed  by  reason  of  other  improvements  in 
or  upon  the  stream,  authorized  by  the  legislature,  no  compensa- 
tion need  be  made.^  The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States, 
in  a  case  which  went  up  from  Pennsylvania,  characterize  this 
doctrine  as  "somewhat  peculiar,"  but,  nevertheless,  follow  it  as 
being  a  rule  of  property  in  that  State.*  In  Virginia  and  other 
States  it  has  been  held,  in  such  case,  that,  the  legislature  having 
granted  the  right  to  erect  the  dam,  and  the  grantee  having 
erected  it,  he  had  a  vested  right  to  maintain  it  which  could  not 
be  taken  or  impaired  without  compensation.*  This  would  seem 
to  be  the  better  rule  and  to  be  of  general  application  to  all  works 
erected  in  public  waters  by  legislative  authority.^ 

§  90  (76).  Title  to  lakes  and  ponds.  The  title  to  the 
great  fresh-water  lakes  of  the  United  States  is  universally  held 
to  be  in  the  public  from  low  water  mark.*     As  to  the  smaller 


Fowle  V.  N.  H.  &  N.  Co.,  112  Mass. 
334,  17  Am.  Eep.  106.  The  follow- 
ing cases  from  Pennsylvania  tend  to 
support  the  doctrine  that  the  water 
of  a  public  stream  cannot  be  divert- 
ed from  the  riparian  owner  without 
compensation.  Fulmer  v.  Williams, 
122  Pa.  St.  191,  15  Atl.  726,  9  Am. 
St.  Eep.  88,  1  L.R.A.  603;  Williams 
V.  Fulmer,  151  Pa.  St.  405,  25  Atl. 
103,  31  Am.  St.  Rep.  767. 

2Union  Canal  Co.  v.  Landis,  9 
Watts  228;  Monongahela  Naviga- 
tion Co.  V.  Coons,  6  W.  &  S.  101; 
Susquehanna  Canal  Co.  v.  Wright, 
9  W.  &  S.  9,  42  Am.  Dec.  312;  New 
York  &  Erie  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Youngs,  33 
Pa.  St.  175;  McKeen  v.  Delaware 
Canal  Co.,  49  Pa.  St.  424;  Freeland 
V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  66  Pa.  St.  91; 
see  also  Bailey  v.  Phil.  W.  &  B.  R. 
R.  Co.,  4  Harr.  Del.  389,  44  Am.  Dec. 
593. 

sRundle  v.  Delaware  &  Raritan 
Canal  Co.,  14  How.  80,  93. 


4  Crenshaw  v.  Slate  River  Co.,  6 
Rand.  Va.  245;  Glover  v.  Powell,  10 
N.  J.  Eq.  211;  Lee  v.  Pembroke 
Iron  Co.,  57  Me.  481,  2  Am.  Rep.  59 ; 
State  V.  Glen,  7  Jones  L.,  321 ;  and 
see  Langdon  v.  Mayor  etc.  of  New 
York,  93  N.  Y.  129;  Railroad  Com- 
pany V.  Renwick,  102  U.  S.  180. 

BMonongahela  Nav.  Co.  v.  United 
States,  148  U.  S.  312,  13  S.  C.  Rep. 
622. 

6  Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Illi- 
nois, 146  U.  S.  387,  13  S.  C.  Rep. 
110;  Hardin  v.  Jordan,  140  U.  S.  371, 
382;  Diedrich  v.  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  42 
Wis.  248;  Seaman  v.  Smith,  24  111. 
521.  These  cases  relate  to  Lake 
Michigan,  and,  in  the  latter,  the  pre- 
cise limit  of  private  ownership  in 
that  lake  is  held  to  be  the  line  where 
the  water  usually  stands  when  un- 
affected by  disturbing  causes.  Smith 
V.  Rochester,  92  N.  Y.  at  p.  479,  44 
Am.  Rep.  393;  Canal  Commissioners 
V.  People,  5  Wend.  423,  446;   Aus- 


§  90 


WATEES. 


109 


lakes,  varying  in  size  from  one  or  two  to  many  miles  in  circum- 
ference, the  decisions  are  conflicting,  some  holding  that  the  title 
to  the  bed  of  the  lake  is  in  the  riparian  owners,''  others  that  it 
is  in  the  public  from  low  or  high  water  mark.^  By  colonial 
ordinances  of  1641  and  1647,  all  great  ponds  in  Massachusetts 
containing  more  than  ten  acres  were  made  public  and  common 
forever,  and  in  that  State  it  has  been  held  that  the  title  to  all 
such  ponds  below  low  water  mark  is  in  the  public."     The  same 


tin  V.  Rutland  R.  E.  Co.,  45  Vt.  215 ; 
Revell  V.  People,  177  111.  468,  52  N. 
E.  1052,  69  Am.  St.  Rep.  257 ;  People 
V.  Silberwood,  110  Mich.  103,  32 
L.R.A.  694. 

'Hardin  v.  Jordan,  140  U.  S.  371, 
11  S.  C.  808,  838;  Mitchell  v.  Smale, 
140  U.  S.  406,  U  S.  C.  819;  Rhodes 
V.  Cissel,  82  Ark.  367,  101  S.  W.  758; 
Fuller  V.  Shedd,  161  111.  462,  44  N. 
E.  286,  52  Am.  St.  Rep.  380,  33 
L.R.A.  146;  Applegate  v.  Franklin, 
109  111.  App.  293;  Ridgeway  v.  Lud- 
low, 58  Ind.  248;  Stoner  v.  Rice, 
121  Ind.  51,  22  N.  E.  968,  6  L.R.A. 
387;  Rice  v.  Ruddiman,  10  Mich. 
125;  Glut*  V.  Fisher,  65  Mich.  48; 
Cobb  V.  Davenport,  32  N.  J.  L.  369 ; 
S.  C.  33  N.  J.  L.  223;  Smith  v. 
Rochester,  92  N.  Y.  463,  44  Am. 
Rep.  393;  Gouverneur  v.  National 
Ice  Co.,  134  N.  Y.  355,  31  N.  E.  865, 
30  Am.  St.  Rep.  669,  18  L.R.A.  695; 
Ledyard  v.  Ten  Eyck,  36  Barb.  102; 
Lembeck  v.  Nye,  47  Ohio  St.  336,  24 
N.  E.  686,  21  Am.  St.  Rep.  828,  8 
L.R.A.  578.  Hardin  v.  Jordan,  140 
U.  S.  371,  11  S.  C.  808,  holds  the 
common  law  rule  to  be  that  the  title 
to  small  lakes  and  ponds  is  in  the 
riparian  owners. 

sTrustees  of  Schools  v.  Schroll, 
120  111.  509;  Hammond  v.  Shepard, 
186  111.  235,  57  N.  E.  867,  78  Am. 
St.  Rep.  274;  Bradley  v.  Rice,  13 
Me.  198,  29  Am.  Dec.  501 ;  Robinson 
V.  White,  42  Me.  209;  Fernold  v. 
Knox  Woolen  Co.,  82  Me.  48,  19  Atl. 
Rep.  93;  Paine  v.  Woods,  108  Mass. 


160;  Fay  v.  Salem  &  D.  Aqueduct 
Co.,  Ill  Mass.  27;  Watuppa  Reser- 
voir Co.  V.  Fall  River,  147  Mass.  548, 
1  L.R.A.  466;  Attorney  General  v. 
Revere  Copper  Co.,  152  Mass.  444, 
25  N.  E.  605;  Lamphrey  v.  State, 
52  Minn.  181,  53  N.  W.  1139,  38  Am. 
St.  Rep.  541;  Witty  v.  Board  of 
Comrs.,  76  Minn.  286,  79  N.  W.  112; 
Dressen  v.  Board  of  Comrs.,  76  Minn. 
290,  79  N.  W.  113;  State  v.  Gil- 
manton,  9  N.  H.  461;  Concord  Mfg. 
Co.  V.  Robertson,  66  N.  H.  1,  25  Atl. 
718,  18  L.R.A.  679;  State  v.  Welch, 
66  N.  H.  178,  28  Atl.  21;  Wheeler 
v.  Spinola,  54  N.  Y.  377  (The  last 
case  is  distinguished,  or  overruled, 
in  Gouverneur  v.  National  Ice  Co., 
134  N.  Y.  355,  31  N.  E.  865,  30  Am. 
et.  Rep.  669,  18  L.R.A.  695)  ;  New 
Whatcom  v.  Fairhaven  Land  Co.,  24 
Wash.  493,  64  Pac.  735,  54  L.R.A. 
190;  Brace  &  H.  Mill  Co.  v.  State, 
49  Wash.  326,  95  Pac.  278;  Dela- 
plaine  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  .42 
Wis.  214;  Boorman  v.  Sunnuck,  42 
Wis.  233 ;  Attorney  General  v.  Smith, 
109  Wis.  532,  85  N.  W.  512;  Ross- 
miller  V.  State,  114  Wis.  169,  89 
N.  W.  839,  91  Am.  St.  Rep.  910,  58 
L.R.A.  93.  See  also  Fuller  v.  Shedd, 
161  111.  462,  44  N.  E.  286;  Auburn 
V.  Union  Water  Power  Co.,  90  Me. 
576,  38  Atl.  561,  38  L.R.A.  188;  New 
England  T.  &  S.  Club  v.  Mather,  68 
Vt.  33«,  35  Atl.  323,  33  L.R.A.  569. 

9West  Roxbury  v.  Stoddard,  7 
Allen,  158;  Watuppa  Reservoir  Co. 
V.  Fall  River,  147  Mass.  548,  1  L.R.A. 


110  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    90 

rule  obtains  in  Maine^"  and  ITew  Hampshire.  ■^^  The  rule  in 
Minnesota  is  thus  stated  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  that  State  in 
a  syllabus  of  its  own:  "The  same  rules  govern  the  rights  of  ri- 
parian owners  on  lakes  or  other  still  waters  as  govern  the  rights 
of  riparian  owners  upon  streams.  Hence,  if  a  meandered  lake 
is  'non-navigable,'  in  fact  the  patentee  of  the  riparian  land  takes 
the  fee  to  the  center  of  the  lake;  but  if  the  lake  is  'navigable' 
in  fact,  its  waters  and  bed  belong  to  the  State,  in  its  sovereign  ca- 
pacity, and  the  riparian  patentea  takes  the  fee  only  to  the  water 
line,  but  with  all  the  rights  incident  to  riparian  ownership  on 
navigable  waters,  including  the  right  to  accretions  or  relictions 
formed  in  front  of  his  land  by  the  action  or  recession  of  the 
water.  The  division  of  waters  into  navigable  and  non-navigable 
is  merely  a  method  of  dividing  them,  into  public  and  private, 
which  is  the  more  natural  classification;  and  the  definition  or 
test  of  navigability  to  be  applied  to  our  inland  lakes  must  be 
sufficiently  broad  and  liberal  to  include  all  the  public  uses,  in- 
cluding boating  for  pleasure,  for  which  such  waters  are  adapted. 
So  long  as  they  continue  capable  of  being  put  to  any  beneficial 
public  use,  they  are  public  waters."  ^^  In  Michigan  the  title  to 
small  lakes  and  ponds  is  held  to  be  in  the  riparian  owners,  sub- 
ject to  the  public  right  of  navigation.  ^^  The  question  as  to  the 
ownership  of  the  bed  of  streams  and  lakes  is  one  which  each 
State  is  at  liberty  to  determine  for  itself,  in  accordance  with  its 
own  views  of  public  law  and  public  policy.^* 

The  question  of  title  then  may  be  summarized  as  follows: 
All  agree  that  the  great  lakes  emptying  into  the  St.  Lawrence 
are  public.-''  All  agree  that  there  is  a  class  of  lakes  and  ponds 
so  small  as  to  be  wholly  private.-'®     Between  the  two  extremes 

466 ;  Attorney  General  V.  Kevere  Cop-  "Delaplaine  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ey. 

per   Co.,   152  Mass.,   444,  25   N.   E.  Co.,    42   Wis.   214,   225;    Barney   v. 

605.  Keokuk,  94  U.  S.  324,  338 ;  Pollard's 

10 American  Woolen  Co.  v.  Kenne-  Lessee  v.  Hogan,  3  How.  212;  Har- 

bec   Water   Dist.,    102   Me.    153,    66  din  v.  Jordan,   140  U.   S.  371,  382, 

Atl.  316.  383;  St.  Anthony  Falls  Water  Pow- 

iiDolbeer  v.  Suncook  W.  W.  Co,  er   Co.  v.    St.   Paul   Water   Comrs., 

72  N.  H.  562,  58  Atl.  504.  168  U.  S.  349;  post,  %  92. 

izLamphrey    v.    State,    52    Minn.  i5Coneord  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Robertson, 

181,  53  N.  W.  1139,  38  Am.  St.  Rep.  66  N.  H.  1,  25  Atl.  718,  18  L.R.A. 

541.    See  also  Carpenter  v.  Board  of  679;    Illinois   Central  R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Commissioners,  56  Minn.  513,  58  N.  Illinois,  146  U.  S.  387,  31  S.  C.  110; 

W.  Rep.  295.  ante,  note  6. 

isRice  V.  Ruddiman,  10  Mich.  125.  I6"ln  respect  to  title  the  law  di- 


§  90 


WATEES. 


Ill 


the  cases  are  conflicting.  It  is  not  the  province  of  this  treatise 
to  resolve  this  question  of  title,  or  of  what  waters  are  public 
and  what  private.  But  as  it  is  agreed  on  all  hands  that  the 
test  of  the  ebb  and  flow  of  the  tide  must  be  abandoned  in  this 
country,  it  is  manifest  that  some  other  test  must  be  sought.^'' 
To  say  that  the  five  or  six  great  lakes  are  public  and  all  the 
others  private  is  purely  arbitrary.^*  There  would  seem  to  be 
no  reasonable  criterion  to  be  applied  but  that  of  navigability  in 
faet.^^  This  is  said  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 
to  be  the  real  reason  of  the  common  law  rule  which  makes  the 
ebb  and  flow  of  the  tides  the  test  of  public  ownership.^" 
If  this  test  is  adopted,  then  the  only  question  which  remains 
is  to  define  what  is  meant  by  navigability  and,  upon  this  point, 
the  position  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Minnesota,  that  any  water 
which  is  navigable  for  either  profit  or  pleasure  is  within  the 
rule,  seems  a  reasonable  one.^^     In  the  larger  sense  the  reason 


vides  natural  fresh  water  ponda  in- 
to two  classes, — the  small,  which 
pass  by  an  ordinary  grant  of  land, 
like  brooks  and  rivers,  from  which, 
as  conveyable  property,  they  are 
not  distinguished;  and  the  large, 
which  are  exempt  from  the  operation 
of  such  a  grant,  for  reasons  that 
stop  private  ownership  at  the  wa- 
ter's edge  of  the  sea  and  its  estu- 
aries." Concord  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Robert- 
son, 66  N.  H.  1,  25  Atl.  718,  719, 
18  L.R.A.   679. 

I'ln  the  case  last  cited,  referring 
to  lakes  and  ponds,  it  is  said:  "The 
standard  of  size,  or  other  test,  that 
establishes  their  public  or  private 
title,  is  a  point  left  undecided  by 
our  reported  cases.  But  the  law, 
classing  large  ponds  with  tide  wa- 
ters, and  small  ponds  with  fre.5h 
waters  and  brooks,  necessarily  pro- 
vides a  mode  of  determining  to 
which  class  every  pond  belongs." 
Concord  Mfg.  Co.  %-.  Robertson,  66 
N.  H.  1,  25  Atl.  7 IS,  720,  18  L.R.A. 
679.  But  the  court  does  not  make 
it  clear  what  this  mode  is  and  later 
in  the  opinion  indicates  that  the 
question  may  have  to  be  determined 


arbitrarily.  "The  abandonment  of 
the  arbitrary  tidal  test  makes  it 
necessary  to  choose  another,  and  it 
may  be  impossible  to  find  one  that 
is  not  arbitrary."  Ibid.  25  Atl.  p. 
731. 

i8"Nothing  can  be  more  arbitrary 
than  six  exceptions  to  the  English 
rule"  (meaning  the  exception  of  the 
six  great  lakes).  Concord  Mfg.  Co. 
v.  Robertson,  66  N.  H.  1,  25  Atl.  718, 
731,  18  L.R.A.  679. 

i9Lamphrey  v.  State,  52  Minn. 
181,  53  N.  W.  1139,  38  Am.  St.  Rep. 
541. 

2  0"So,  also,  by  the  common  law, 
tfte  doctrine  of  the  dominion  over 
and  ownership  by  the  crown  of  lands 
within  the  realm  under  tide  waters 
is  not  founded  upon  the  existence  of 
the  tide  over  the  lands,  but  upon 
the  fact  that  the  waters  are  navi- 
gable, tide  waters  and  navigable  wa- 
ters, as  already  said,  being  used  as 
synonomous  terms  in  England."  Il- 
linois Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Illinois, 
146  U.  S.  387,  436,  13  S.  C.  110. 

21  "Most  of  the  definitions  of  'nav- 
igability' in  the  decided  cases,  while 
perhaps  conceding  that  the  size  of 


112  EMINENT    DOMAllT.  §    91 

for  declaring  any  waters  public  is  thereby  the  better  to  preserve 
them  for  the  public  use  and  benefit,  and  if  beneficial  use  by  the 
public  is  taken  as  the  test,  then  any  waters  are  public  which  are 
capable  of  such  beneficial  use,  whether  for  pecuniary  gain  or 
for  health  and  pleasure.^^ 

§  91  (76a).  What  constitutes  navigability.  As  the 
question  of  title  to  land  under  water  depends  largely,  if  not 
wholly,  upon  the  question  of  navigability,  we  refer  briefly  to 
some  authorities  upon  that  question.  Many  of  the  cases  affirm 
or  imply  that  a  stream  or  lake,  in  order  to  be  navigable  in  the 
legal  sense,  must  be  navigable  for  some  useful  purpose  connected 
with  trade  or  agriculture.  Thus  in  a  Florida  case  it  is  said: 
"A  stream  of  sufficient  capacity  and  volume  of  water  to  float 
to  market  the  products  of  the  country  will  answer  the  conditions 
of  navigability,  and  is  a  public  highway,  open  to  all  persons  for 
the  business  of  floatage  to  which  it  is  adapted,  whatever  the 
character  of  the  product,  or  the  kind  of  flotage  suited  to  their 
conditions;  though  it  may  not  be  adapted  to  the  use  of  vessels, 
and  only  fit  for  floating  logs  and  rafts,  yet  if  required  for  such 
use,  and  there  is  sufficient  business,  present  or  prospective,  to 
render  the  easement  a  matter  of  public  concern,  it  will  be  re- 
garded as  a  public  stream  for  that  purpose ;  and  it  is  not  essen- 
tial to  the  easement  that  the  stream  should  be  continuously,  at 
all  seasons  of  the  year,  in  a  state  suited  to  such  floatage."  ^*  So 
in  a  Massachusetts  case  it  is  said  that,  in  order  that  a  stream  may 
have  the  character  of  navigability  in  law,  "it  must  be  navigable 
to  some  purpose,  useful  to  trade  or  agriculture."  ^*     But  more 

the  boats  or  vessels  is  not   impor-  should  not  be  considered  navigation, 

tant,  and,  indeed,  that  it  is  not  nee-  as  well  as  boating  for  mere  pecun- 

essary  that  navigation  should  be  by  iary   profit."      Lamphrey   v.    State, 

boats  at  all,  yet  seem  to  convey  the  52  Minn.  181,  53  N.  W.  1139,  1143, 

idea  that  the  water  must  be  capable  38  Am.  St.  Kep.  541. 

of  some  commerce  of  pecuniary  val-  ^^See  Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

ue,    as    distinguished   from   boating  Illinois,  146  U.  S.  387,  436,  13  S.  C. 

for   mere   pleasure.      But   if,   under  110;   New  England  T.  &  S.  Club  v. 

present  conditions  of  society,  bodies  Mather,  68  Vt.  338,  35  Atl.  323,  32 

of   water   are  used   for  public   uses  L.R.A.  569;  post,  %  91. 

other  than  mere  commercial  naviga-  2  3Bucki  v.  Cone,  25  Fla.  1,  6  So. 

tion,  in  its  ordinary  sense,  we  fail  160. 

to  see  why  they  ought  not  to  be  held  2  4Rowe  v.  Granite  Bridge  Corp., 

to   be   public   waters,    or   navigable  21   Pick.  344.     To  the  same  efect: 

waters,   if  the  old  nomenclature  is  Charlestown   v.    County    Comrs.,    3 

preferred.     Certainly  we  do  not  see  Met.   202;    Murdock  v.   Stickney,   8 

why  boating  or  sailing  for  pleasure  Cush.  113,  115;  Nutter  v.  Gallagher, 


§    92  WATEES.  113 

recent  cases  are  to  the  effect  that  it  is  the  capacity  of  being  navi- 
gated,  and  not  the  purpose  of  the  navigation,  which   deter- 
mines the  question  of  navigability  in  lavy.^^     The  Massachv 
setts  court,  referring  to  the  language  already  quoted  from  th 
State,  says:  "But  this  language  is  applied  to  the  capacity  < 
the  stream,  and  is  not  intended  to  be  a  strict  enumeration  of  th. 
uses  to  which  it  must  be  actually  applied  in  order  to  give  ii 
this  character.     Navigable  streams  are  highways ;  and  a  travelei 
for  pleasure  is  as  fully  entitled  to  protection  in  using  a  publi; 
way,  whether  by  land  or  by  water,  as  a  traveler  for  business. 
Certainly  fishing  and  fowling  are  as  really  regarded,  on  navi- 
gable waters,  as  trade  and  agriculture,  though  not  mentioned 
in  the  case  cited  above;  and  in  West  Roxbury  v.  Stoddard,^ 
it  is  said  that  the  use  of  great  ponds,  which  are  public  property, 
may  as  well  be  for  bathing,  boating,  skating,  fishing  and  fowl- 
ing, as  for  business,  and  is  entitled  to  equal  consideration.     If 
water  is  navigable  for  pleasure  boating,  it  must  be  regarded  as 
navigable  water,  though  no  craft  has  ever  been  upon  it  for  the 
purposes  of  trade  or  agriculture.     The  purpose  of  the  naviga- 
tion is  not  the  subject  of  inquiry,  but  the  fact  of  the  capacity  of 
the  water  for  use  in  navigation."  ^'^     The  question  of  naviga- 
bility is  one  of  fact.^^ 

§  92  (76b).  The  question  of  title  to  the  bed  of  navi- 
gable waters  and  of  the  rights  of  riparian  owners  upon 
such  waters  is  one  of  State  policy  and  State  law.     It    has 

19   Ore.    375,   24   Pac.   250;    Haines  679;    Clark  v.    Cambridge,   45   Neb. 

V.     Hall,     17     Ore.     165,     20     Pac.  799,  64  N.  E.  239;  Chisolm  v.  Caines, 

831;     Brown     v.     Cbadbourne,     31  67  Fed.  285. 

Me.  9,  50  Am.  Dec.  641;   East  Ho-  267  Allen  158,  171. 

quaim  B.  &  L.  Co.  V.  Neeson,  20  Wash.  'iTTo  same  effect  is  Lamphrey  v. 

142,  54  Pac.  1001;   Griffith  v.  Hoi-  State,  52  Minn.  181,  53  N.  W.  1139, 

man,  23  Wash.  347,  63  Pac.  239,  83  38  Am.  St.  Rep.  541.     See  on  ques- 

Am.  St.  Eep.  821,  54  L.K.A.  178.  tion  of  navigability,  Murray  v.  Pres- 

2  5Attomey  General  v.  Woods,  108  ton,  106  Ky.  561,  50  S.  W.  1095.  90 

Mass.   436;    Lamphrey  v.   State,   52  Am.  St.  Rep.  232;  Webster  v.  Harris, 

Minn.  181,  53  N.  W.   1139,  38  Am.  Ill    Tenn.    668,    69    S.    W.    782;    1 

St.    Eep.    541 ;    Falls    Mfg.    Co.    v.  Farnham  on  Waters,  §  23. 

Oconto  Riv.  Imp.  Co.,  87  Wis.  134,  zsRailroad   Co.   v.   Ferguson,    105 

58  N.  W.   257;    Heyward  v.  Farm-  Tenn.  552,  59  S.  W.  343,  80  Am.  St. 

ers'  Min.  Co.,  42  S.  C.  138,  19  S.  E.  Rep.  908;   State  v.  Twiford,  136  N. 

963,  46  Am.  St.  Rep.  702,  28  L.R.A.  C.  603,  48  S.  E.  586;  Griffith  v.  Hol- 

42;  Concord  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Robertson,  man,  23  Wash.  347,  63  Pac.  239,  83 

66  N.  H.  1,  25  Atl.  718,  18  L.R.A.  Am.  St.  Rep.  821,  54  L.R.A.  178;  1 

Em.  D. — 8.  Farnham  on  Waters,  §  26, 


114  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    93 

been  repeatedly  held  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 
that  it  is  for  each  State  to  determine  whether  the  title  to  the 
bed  of  navigable  waters  is  in  the  State  or  in  the  riparian  owner, 
and  to  what  extent  the  prerogative  of  the  State  shall  be  exerted 
over  such  waters  and  the  lands  under  them.^^  And  so  it  is  held, 
by  the  same  high  authority,  that  each  State  may  determine  for 
itself  what  rights,  if  any,  attach  to  the  ownership  of  lands  ad- 
jacent to  such  waters.^**  Upon  these  questions  the  Federal 
Courts  follow  the  decisions  o£  the, State  Court.^^ 

§  93  (76c).  Nature  and  limitations  of  the  title  to  the 
bed  of  navigable  waters,  whether  in  the  public  or  riparian 
owners.  The  nature  of  the  public  title  to  the  bed  of  navigable 
waters  received  very  careful  consideration  at  the  hands  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  in  the  recent  case  of  Illi- 
nois Central  E,.  E.  Co.  v.  Illinois.^^  The  legislature  of  the 
State  had  assumed  to  grant  to  the  railroad  company  a  thousand 
acres  of  the  submerged  lands  of  Lake  Michigan  adjacent  to  the 
shore  in  the  city  of  Chicago.  The  grant  extended  for  a  con- 
siderable distance  along  the  shore  and  embraced  both  shoal  and 
deep  water.  The  court  held  that  the  grant  was  revocable,  if 
not  absolutely  void,  and  discussed  at  length  the  nature  of  the 
State's  title  to  such  lands.  The  title  of  the  State  is  held  to  be 
in  trust  for  the  people  at  large,  for  the  purposes  of  navigation 
and  fishing.^*  In  Wisconsin  it  is  held  that  the  title  to  the  bed 
of  navigable  waters  in  the  State  is  vested  in  the  State  in  trust 
to  preserve  the  same  for  the  enjoyment  of  the  people ;  that  the 
State  has  no  proprietary  rights  in  such  beds,  or  in  the  water 

2  9  St.  Anthony  Falls  Water  Power  the   decisions   of   the    State   courts. 

Co.  V.  St.  Paul  Water  Comrs.,  168  Compare  Hardin  v.  Jordan,  140  U.  S. 

U.  S.  349;  Hardin  v.  Jordan,  140  U.  371,  11   S.  C.  838,  and  Trustees  of 

S.   371,   382,   11    S.   C.  808;    Illinois  Schools  v.  Sehroll,  120  111.  509. 
Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Illinois,  U6  U.  30Same. 

S.  387,  13  S.  C.  110;  Shively  v.  siShively  v.  Bowlby,  152  U.  S.  1, 
Bowlby,  152  U.  S.  1,  40,  14  S.  C.  14  S.  C.  548. 
548;  Packer  v.  Bird,  137  U.  S.  661;  32146  U.  S.  387,  13  S.  C.  110. 
Barney  v.  Keokuk,  94  U.  S.  324.  See  ssgan  Francisco  Savings  Union  v. 
also  Webb  v.  City  of  Demopolis,  95  G.  R.  Petroleum  &  Min.  Co.,  144  Cal. 
Ala.  116,  13  So.  289,  21  L.R.A.  62;  134,  77  Pac.  823,  103  Am.  St.  Rep. 
Webber  v.  Pere  Marquette  Boom  72,  66  L.R.A.  242;  State  v.  Long- 
Co.,  62  Mich.  626,  30  N.  W.  469;  fellow,  169  Mo.  109,  69  S.  W.  374; 
Chisolm  V.  Caines,  67  Fed.  285.  But  Attorney  General  v.  Smith,  109  Wis. 
the  determination  of  this  question  532,  85  N.  W.  512;  Illinois  Cent.  R. 
by  the  federal  courts  does  not  al-  R.  Co.  v.  Illinois,  146  U.  S.  387,  452- 
\vays  appear  to  be  in  harmony  with  454,  455,  456. 


93 


WATEES. 


115 


above  the  same,  nor  in  the  fish  that  inhabit  such  water,  or 
the  fowls  that  resort  thereto,  or  the  ice  which  forms  thereon, 
which  it  can  deal  in  by  sale  or  otherwise;  and  that 
the  power  of  the  State  over  navigable  waters  within  its 
boundaries  is  limited  to  the  enactment  and  enforcement  of  such 
reasonable  police  regulations  as  may  be  deemed  necessary  to 
preserve  the  common  right  of  all  to  enjoy  the  same  for  naviga- 
tion by  boats  or  otherwise,  and  all  incidents  of  navigable  waters, 
including  the  taking  of  ice  therefrom  for  domestic  use  or  sale.^* 
Numerous  other  cases  assert  the  trust  character  of  the  public 
title  to  the  bed  of  navigable  waters,  and  that  the  trust  is  for 
the  benefit  of  the  whole  people  and  to  aid  in  preserving  and  pro- 
moting the  public  rights  of  navigation  and  fishing.^^  All  navi- 
gable streams  and  bodies  of  water  have  more  or  less  shoal  water 
along  the  shores  which  is  not  navigable.  A  distinction  may, 
doubtless,  be  made  between  the  soil  under  shoal  water  and  the 
soil  under  deep  water.  The  former  may  be  reclaimed  and  de- 
voted to  private  uses  without  detriment  to  the  pviblic  interests. 


34E,ossmiller  v.  State,  114  Wis. 
169,  89  N.  W.  839,  91  Am.  St.  Eep. 
910,  58  L.R.A.  93.  The  same  court, 
speaking  of  a  small  navigable  lake 
about  three  miles  in  diameter,  says: 
"The  title  to  its  bed  is  in  the  State 
in  trust  for  legitimate  public  uses, 
such  as  fishing,  navigation,  and  the 
like;  and  the  State  cannot  convey 
it  away  for  private  uses,  nor  can  it 
abdicate  the  trust."  Attorney  Gen- 
eral V.  Smith,  109  Wis.  532,  539, 
85  N.  W.  512. 

ssFarist  Street  Co.  v.  Bridgeport, 
60  Conn.  278,  22  Atl.  561 ;  State  v. 
Black  Riv.  Phosphate  Co.,  32  Kla. 
82,  13  So.  640;  Illinois  Cent.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Chicago,  173  111.  471,  50  N. 
E.  1104;  Revell  v.  People,  177  111. 
468,  52  N.  E.  1052,  69  Am.  St.  Rep. 
257;  Lamphrey  v.  State,  52  Minn. 
181,  53  N.  W.  1139,  38  Am.  St.  Rep. 
541;  Witty  v.  Board  of  Comrs.,  76 
Minn.  286,  79  N.  W.  112;  Dressen  v. 
Board  of  Comrs.,  76  Minn.  290,  79 
N.  W.  113;  State  v.  Longfellow,  169 
Mo.  109,  69  S.  W.  374;  Concord  Mfg. 
Co.  V.  Robertson,  66  N.  H.  1,  25  Atl. 


718,  18  L.R.A.  679;  State  v.  Welch, 

66  N.  H.  178,  28  Atl.  21 ;  Saunders 
V.  New  York  Central  R.  Co.,  144  N. 
Y.  75,  38  N.  E.  992,  43  Am.  St.  Rep. 
729,  26  L.R.A.  378;  Matter  of  New 
York,  168  N.  Y.  134,  61  N.  E.  158, 

56  L.R.A.  500;  Knickerbocker  Ice 
Co.  V.  Forty-Second  Street  R.  R.  Co., 
176  N.  Y.  408,  68  N.  E.  864,  affirming 
S.  C.  85  App.  Div.  530,  83  N.  Y.  S. 
469;  Heyward  v.  Farmers'  Min.  Co., 
42  S.  C.  138,  19  S.  E.  963,  46  Am.  St. 
Rep.  702,  28  L.R.A.  42;  Illinois 
Steel  Co.  V.  Beloit,  109  Wis.  418,  84 
N.  W.  855,  85  N.  W.  402,  83  Am.  St. 
Rep.  905;  Martin  v.  Waddell,  16 
Pet.  367;  Den  v.  Jersey  Co.,  15  How. 
426;  Shively  v.  Bowlby,  152  U.  S.  1, 
14   S.    C.    548;    Chisolm   v.    Caines, 

67  Fed.   285;    Scranton  v.   Wheeler, 

57  Fed.  803,  6  C.  C.  A.  585.  As  to 
the  power  of  the  legislature  over 
the  public  rights  of  navigation  and 
fishing  see  also  Bedlow  v.  New  York 
Floating  Dry  Dock  Co.,  112  N.  Y. 
263,  19  N.  E.  800,  2  L.R.A.  629; 
State  V.  Elk  Island  Boom  Co.,  41  W. 
Va.  796,  24  S.  B.  590, 


116  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    94 

It  may  be  otherwise  with  the  latter.  Just  what  are  the  limita- 
tions upon  the  power  of  the  State  over  lands  under  public  waters, 
is  not  definitely  settled,  beyond  the  fact  that  it  is  subject  to 
the  paramount  authority  of  Congress  to  regulate  interstate  and 
foreign  commerce  and  to  control  navigable  waters  and  the  soil 
thereunder  in  the  interest  of  such  commerce.^^ 

In  those  States  in  which  the  title  to  the  bed  of  non-tidal  navi- 
gable waters  is  held  to  be  in  the  riparian  owners,  the  private 
right  is  subject  to  the  public  i^ights  of  navigation  and  fishing 
and  to  the  control  of  the  State  in  the  interest  of  such  public 
rights.^'^  The  State  may  use  the  submerged  lands  for  the  im- 
provement of  navigation  or  promotion  of  commerce^  Subject 
to  such  use  and  control  the  riparian  owner  may  make  any  use 
of  the  submerged  lands  which  does  not  materially  interfere  with 
the  rights  of  the  public.^* 

According  to  what  seems  to  the  writer  the  better  view,  there 
is  thus  no  practical  difference  in  the  rights  of  riparian  owners 
on  navigable  waters,  whether  the  title  to  the  bed  is  in  the  ripa- 
rian owners  or  the  public.  If  the  former,  the  title  and  riparian 
rights  are  subject  to  the  right  of  the  public  to  use,  improve  and' 
regulate.  If  the  latter,  the  right  of  the  public  is  limited  to  the 
same  purposes ;  the  title  to  the  bed  is  thus  wholly  unimportant. 

§  94  (77).  Rights  of  riparian  owners  on  public  waters. 
There  is  not  more  diversity  of  opinion  among  the  courts  as  to  the 
title  to  the  bed  and  shores  of  navigable  streams  and  waters  than 
there  is  as  to  the  rights  of  riparian  owners  in  such  waters  as 
are  conceded  to  be  entirely  puhlici  juris.  The  older  authorities 
hold  that  such  an  owner  has  no  private  rights  in  the  stream  or 
body  of  water  which  are  appurtenant  to  his  land,  and,  in  short, 
no  rights  beyond  that  of  any  other  member  of  the  public,  and 
that  the  only  difference  is  that  he  is  more  conveniently  situated 
to  enjoy  the  privileges  which  all  the  public  have  in  common,  and 
that  he  has  access  to  the  waters  over  his  own  land,  which  the 

36Gibson  v.  United  States,  166  U.  R.   Co.,  27  N.  J.   Eq.   1;    S.   C.  af- 

S.  269,  17   S.  C.  578.  firmed,  27  N.  J.  Eq.  631;   Scraiiton 

3 'Webber  v.  Pere  Marquette  Boom  v.  Wheeler,  57  Fed.  803,  6  C.  C.  A. 

Co.,   62  Mich.   626,   30   N.  W.   469;  585;  Clark  v.  Irrigation  Co.,  45  Neb. 

Williamsburg  Boom  Co.  v.  Smith,  84  799,  64  N.  W.  239;  Freeland  v.  Pa. 

Ky.  372;   City  of  Grand  Rapids  v.  R.  R.  Co.,  197  Pa.  St.  529,  47  Atl. 

Powers,  89  Mich.  94,  50  N.  W.  661,  745,  80  Am.  St.  Rep.  850,  58  L,R.A, 

28  Am.  St.  Rep.  276,  14  L.R.A.  498,  206. 
5  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  490;  At-  3  8  game, 

torney  General  v.  Delaware  etc.  R. 


§  04 


WATEES. 


117 


public  do  not.  The  stream  is  regarded  as  an  adjoining  freehold, 
the  title  to  which  is  absolutely  in  the  public,  and  which  the 
public  may  use  and  control  in  the  same  manner  as  an  individual 
could  if  the  stream  was  his  private  property.  Access  to  and  use 
of  the  stream  by  the  riparian  owner  is  regarded  as  merely  per- 
missive on  the  part  of  the  public  and  liable  to  be  cut  off  abso- 
lutely if  the  public  sees  fit  to  do  so.^®  Wood,  in  his  work  on 
Nuisances,  states  the  doctrine  as  follows:  "The  State  is  the 
owner,  absolutely,  of  the  alveus  of  the  stream  to  high-water 
mark,  and,  as  such  owner,  may  devote  the  stream,  or  any  part 
thereof,  to  such  purposes  as  it  sees  fit,  so  long  as  it  does  not 
materially  obstruct  navigation.  Riparian  owners,  as  such,  upon 
this  class  of  streams,  have  no  more  rights  than  any  other  member 
of  the  public,  either  in  the  stream,  or  any  of  the  lands  covered 
thereby.     They  cannot  erect  a  wharf  thereon,  or  use  any  portion 


3  9The  leading  cases  in  support  of 
this  doctrine  are  Stevens  v.  Patter- 
son etc.  K.  R.  Co.,  34  N.  J.  L.  532, 
3  Am.  Rep.  269,  1870,  and  Gould  v. 
Hudson  River  R.  R.  Co.,  6  N.  Y. 
522,  1852  {overruled  in  1892,  see  § 
96).  Other  cases  in  which  the  same 
doctrine  is  held  are  the  following: 
Tomlin  v.  Dubuque  B.  &  M.  R. 
R.  Co.  32  la.  106  (Beck,  J., 
dissents),  7  Am.  Rep.  176;  Boa- 
ton  &  Worcester  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Old  Colony  R.  R.  Co.,  12  Cush.  605; 
Fay  V.  Salem  &  Danvers  Aqueduct 
Co.,  Ill  Mass.  27;  Thayer  v.  New 
Bedford  R.  R.  Co.,  125  Mass.  253; 
State  V.  Sunapee  Dam  Co.,  70  N.  H. 
458,  50  Atl.  108,  59  L.R.A.  55;  Penn- 
sylvania R.  R.  Co.  V.  New  York  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  23  N.  J.  Eq.  157  (opinion 
of  Chancellor  only)  ;  Sugar  Refining 
Co.  V.  Jersey  City,  26  N.  J.  Eq.  247 
(opinion  of  Chancellor  only)  ;  Amos 
V.  Norcross,  58  N.  J.  Eq.  256, 
43  Atl.  195  (V.  C.)  ;  Sayre  v. 
Newark,  60  N.  J.  Eq.  361,  45 
Atl.  785,  83  Am.  St.  Rep.  629, 
48  L.R.A.  722,  affirming  S.  C. 
58  N.  J.  Eq.  136,  42  Atl.  1068; 
Atlantic  City  v.  New  Auditorium 
Pier  Co.,  63  N.  J.  Eq.  644,  53  Atl. 


99  (V.  C.)  ;  Evans  v.  S4me,  63  N.  J. 
Eq.  674,  53  Atl.  Ill  (V.  C.)  ;  Same 
V.  Same,  67  N.  J.  Eq.  315,  58  Atl. 
191  (V.  C.)  ;  Canal  Commissioners 
V.  People,  5  Wend.  423;  S.  C.  13 
Wend.  355;  17  Wend.  570;  People  v. 
Canal  Appraisers,  33  N.  Y.  461 ; 
Gould  V.  Hudson  River  R.  R.  Co.,  12 
Barb.  616;  Matter  of  Water  Com- 
missioners, 3  Edwards  Ch.  290;  Get- 
ty v.  Hudson  River  R.  R.  Co.,  21 
Barb.  617;  Matter  of  N.  Y.,  W.  S.  & 
B.  Ry.  Co.,  29  Hun  269;  Mononga- 
hela  Navigation  Co.  v.  Coons,  6  W. 
&  S.  101 ;  McKeen  v.  Delaware  Canal 
Co.,  49  Pa.  St.  424.  See  also  Ho- 
boken  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co., 
124  U.  S.  656,  which  states  and  ap- 
plies the  law  of  New  Jersey.  Since 
the  first  edition  was  published,  this 
view  of  the  law  has  received  its 
chief  support,  from  the  states  of 
Oregon  and  Washington.  In  Eisen- 
bach  V.  Hatfield,  2  Wash.  236,  26 
Pac.  539,  12  L.R.A.  632,  which  is 
the  leading  authority  in  the  latter 
State,  the  court  says:  "The  result 
of  our  investigation  of  the  authori- 
ties leads  us  to  the  conclusion  that 
riparian  proprietors  on  the  shore  of 
the   navigable   waters   of  the   State 


118 


EMINEITT    DOMAIN. 


§    94 


of  the  alveus  of  the  stream  for  any  purpose  whatever,  except  in 
the  exercise  of  the  common  right  of  navigation.  They  may 
cross  and  recross  the  same  for  the  purpose  of  approaching  the 
sea,  and  so  may  any  other  member  of  the  public.  They  may 
use  the  waters  of  the  stream  for  ordinary  domestic  purposes, 
and  so  may  any  one  else.  The  owner  of  the  bank  has  no  jus 
privatum,  or  special  usufructuary  interest,  in  the  water.  He 
does  not,  from  the  mere  circumstance  that  he  is  the  owner  of 
the  bank,  acquire  any  special  or  particular  interest  in  the  stream, 
over  any  other  member  of  the  public,  except  that,  by  his  prox- 
imity thereto,  he  enjoys  greater  conveniences  than  the  public 
generally.     To    him,    riparian    ownership    brings    no   greater 


have  no  special  or  peculiar  rights 
therein  as  an  incident  to  their  es- 
tate. To  hold  otherwise  would  he  to 
deny  the  pojver  of  the  State  to  deal 
with  its  own  property  as  it  may 
deem  best  for  the  public  good.  If 
the  State  cannot  exercise  its  consti- 
tutional right  to  erect  wharves  and 
other  structures  without  the  consent 
of  adjoining  owners,  it  is  obviously 
deficient  in  the  powers  of  self-devel- 
opment, which  every  government  is 
supposed  to  possess, — a  proposition 
to  which  we  cannot  assent.  See  Gal- 
veston V.  Menard,  23  Tex.  349.  Nor 
do  we  think  this  view  in  any  way 
conflicts  with  the  constitution  of  the 
State,  but,  on  the  contrary,  we  be- 
lieve it  is  in  strict  harmony  with  it, 
when  all  its  parts  are  construed  to- 
gether. We  cannot  think  that  the 
building  by  the  State  or  its  grantees 
of  wharves,  upon  shores  of  navi- 
gable waters,  would  constitute  either 
a  taking  or  damaging  of  private 
property  for  public  use,  in  contem- 
plation of  the  constitution."  ( Stiles, 
J.,  dissents.)  See  also  State  ex  rel. 
Yesler  v.  Prosser,  2  Wash.  530,  27 
Pac.  550;  Stinson  Ivlill  Co.  v.  Board 
of  Harbor  Line  Comrs.  (Wash.),  29 
Pac.  938;  State  ex  rel.  v.  Prosser, 
4  Wash.  816,  30  Pac.  734;  Columbia 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  City  of  Seattle,  6 
Wash.  332,  33  Pac.  824,  34  Pac.  725; 


City  of  Seattle  v.  Columbia  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  6  Wash.  379,  33  Pac.  1048; 
Seattle  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  State,  7 
Wash.  150,  34  Pac.  551,  22  L.R.A. 
217;  Yesler  v.  Washington  Harbor 
Line  Comrs.,  146  U.  S.  646,  13  S.  C. 
190;  Prosser  v.  Northern  Pac.  R. 
R.  Co.,  152  U.  S.  59,  14  S.  C.  528. 
Compare  New  Whatcom  v.  Fair- 
haven  Land  Co.,  24  Wash.  493,  64 
Pac.  735,  54  L.R.A.  190;  Burrows  v. 
Grays  Harbor  Boom  Co.,  44  Wash. 
630,  87  Pac.  937.  The  same  rule  is 
held  in  Oregon.  Bowlby  v.  Shively, 
22  Or.  410;  S.  C.  152  U.  S.  1 ;  Hin- 
man  v.  Warren,  6  Ore.  408;  Parker 
V.  Taylor,  7  Ore.  435;  Parker  v. 
Rogers,  8  Ore.  183 ;  Shively  v.  Park- 
er, 9  Ore.  500;  McCann  v.  Oregon 
R.  R.  Co.,  13  Ore.  455;  Shively  v. 
Welch,  10  Sawyer,  136,  140,  141. 
Compare  Parker  v.  West  Coast  Pack- 
ing Co.,  17  Or.  510,  21  Pac.  822; 
Montgomery  v.  Shaver,  40  Ore.  244, 
66  Pac.  923;  Wilson  v.  Welch,  12 
Ore.  353-.  But  it  has  been  held  that 
where  a  wharf  has  been  built  out  to 
navigable  water  by  the  express  or 
implied  license  of  the  State,  it  can- 
not be  appropriated  to  public  use 
without  compensation.  Lewis  v. 
City  of  Portland,  25  Ore.  133,  35 
Pac.  256,  42  Am.  St.  Rep.  772,  22 
L.R.A.  736.  And  see  Oakland  v.  Oak- 
land Water  Front  Co.,  118  Cal.  160. 


§    95  WATERS.  119 

rights  than  those  incident  to  all  the  public,  except  that  he  can 
approach  the  water  more  readily,  and  over  lands  which  the 
general  public  have  no  right  to  use  for  that  purpose.  But  this 
is  a  mere  convenience,  arising  from  his  ownership  of  the  lands 
adjacent  to  the  ordinary  high  water  mark,  and  does  not  prevent 
the  State  from  depriving  him  entirely  of  this  convenience,  by 
itself  making  erections  upon  the  shore,  or  authorizing  the  use 
of  the  shore  by  others,  in  such  a  way  as  to  deprive  him  of  this 
convenience  altogether,  and  the  injury  resulting  to  him  there- 
from, although  greater  than  that  sustained  by  the  rest  of  the 
public,  is  damnum  absque  in-juria."  *° 

§  95  (78).  The  same  continued.  On  the  other  hand, 
there  are  cases  which  hold  that  the  riparian  owners,  upon  waters 
the  bed  of  which  belongs  to  the  public,  have  valuable  rights 
appurtenant  to  their  estates,  of  which  they  cannot  be  deprived 
without  compensation.  This  seems  to  us  the  better  and  sounder 
rule.  The  opposite  conclusion  has  been  reached  by  a  narrow 
and  technical  course  of  reasoning,  based  upon  the  fact  that  the 
title  to  the  soil  is  in  the  State,  or  the  public.  It  is  assumed  that 
this  title  gives  the  State  the  same  absolute  and  exclusive  con- 
trol of  the  waters  and  their  bed,  as  an  individual  possesses  over 
his  private  property.  But  there  is  really  no  analogy  between 
the  relations  of  a  riparian  owner  to  the  waters  upon  which  he 
abuts  and  the  relations  between  the  proprietors  of  adjoining 
lands.  The  State  holds  the  title  to  public  waters  as  a  trustee, 
merely,  for  the  use  of  all  the  public  in  common.  The  very 
object  of  declaring  the  title  in  the  public  is  the  better  to  secure 
this  common  use  and  benefit.*^     The  riparian  owner  is  pecu- 

"Wood  on   Nuisances    (1st  ed.),  44   N.   J.   Eq.   398,    15   Atl.    227,   1 

592.      See    further    on    the    subject,  L.R.A.  133;  Fulmer  v.  Williams,  122 

Payne   y.    English,    79    Cal.    540,   21  Pa.  St.   191,  15  Atl.  726,  9  Am.  St. 

Pac.   952;   Pacific  G.ns   Imp.   Co.  v.  Rep.  88,  1  L.R.A.  603;  Williams  v. 

Ellert,  64  Fed.  421 ;  Watuppa  Reser-  Fulmer,  151  Pa.  St.  405,  25  Atl.  103, 

voir   Co.   V.    Fall   River,    147    Mass.  12  L.R.A.  632;  Wood  on  Nuisances, 

548,   1   L.R.A.   460;    Henry   v.   New-  {1st  ed.),  592.     Stiles,  J.,  in  Eisen- 

buryport,   149  Mass.   582,  22  N.  E.  bach  v.   Hatfield,   2   Wash.   236,   26 

75,    5    L.R.A.    179;    Mehrhof    Bros.  Pac.   539,   551,    12  L.R.A.   632,   says 

Brick    Mfg.     Co.    v.   Delaware   etc.  that  Mr.  Wood  is  the  only  modern 

R.    R.    Co.,    51    N.    J.    L.    56,    16  text    writer     who     maintains     this 

Atl.     12;     Easton     &     A.     R.     R.  ground. 

Co.  V.  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  52  N.  J.  L.  "Illinois    Central    R.    R.    Co.    v. 

267,  19  Atl.  722;  State  v.  Wright,  54  Illinois,  146  U.  S.  387,  452,  453,  455, 

N.  J.  L.  130,  23  Atl.  116;  New  Jer-  456,  457,  13  S.  C.  110;  Lamphrey  v. 

Bey  Zinc  Co.  v.  Morris  C.  &  B.  Co.,  State,  52  Minn.  181,  53  N.  W.  1139, 


120  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    95 

liarly  situated  for  the  enjoyment  of  these  advantages.  He  has 
rights  in  the  waters  upon  which  he  abuts  which  no  private  owner 
has  in  the  land  of  his  neighbor.  No  private  owner  holds  his 
lands  for  the  purpose  of  being  used  by  his  neighbors  and  the 
public.  The  conclusions,  therefore,  which  are  based  upon  the 
artificial  and  purely  metaphysical  notion  of  title,  carried  to  its 
extremest  logical  consequences,  as  in  the  case  of  ordinary  private 
ownership,  are,  it  seems  to  us,  unsound  and  unwarranted.  As 
matter  of  fact,  riparian  owners  have  always  enjoyed,  in  connec- 
tion with  their  estates,  various  privileges  in  the  contiguous 
shore  and  waters,  and,  practically-,  these  privileges  have  been 
regarded  as  annexed  to  their  estates  and  estimated  as  part  of 
the  property  in  business  transactions  touching  the  value  of  the 
same.  When  a  court  is  called  upon  to  say  whether  these  privi- 
leges are  rights  appurtenant  to  the  property  and  part  and  parcel 
of  it,  it  must  establish  a  rule  of  law  and  of  property,  whichever 
way  it  decides  the  question.  To  look  simply  to  the  fact  of  title 
and  then  apply  the  law  relating  to  adjoining  proprietors,  is  to 
ignore  some  of  the  most  important  features  in  the  case.  True, 
the  title  is  in  the  State,  but  it  is  only  in  the  State  by  the  declara- 
tion of  courts,  and  then  only  as  trustee  for  the  benefit  of  all  the 
public  in  common,  including  the  riparian  owners.  And,  looking 
further,  it  is  seen  that  the  riparian  owner,  in  addition  to  rights 
which  he  shares  in  common  with  others,  has  other  rights  or  privi- 
leges which  are  peculiar  to  himself,  such  as  the  right  to  accre- 
tions, the  right  of  wharfage,  the  right  of  access  to  and  from  his 
lot,  and  the  like,  which  destroy  all  analogy  to  the  case  of  adjoin- 
ing proprietors.  It  is  more  reasonable,  more  logical  and  more 
just  to  say  that  these  privileges  are  in  fact  rights,  as  inviolable 
as  the  soil  itself.  The  public  loses  nothing,  for  it  is  conceded 
that  all  these  rights  are  subject  to  the  paramount  right  of  the 
State  to  use  and  improve  the  waters  as  shall  best  subserve  the 
common  rights  of  all.*^ 

38  Am.  St.  Rep.  541 ;  Concord  Mfg.  public  lands  which  are  open  to  pre- 
Co.  V.  Hobertson,  66  N.  H.  1,  25  emption  and  sale.  It  ia  a  title  held 
Atl.  718,  721,  724,  725,  18  L.R.A.  in  trust  for  the  people  of  the  State 
679;  ante,  §  93.  In  the  first  case  that  they  may  enjoy  the  navigation 
cited,  speaking  of  this  title,  the  of  the  waters,  carry  on  commerce 
court  says :  "But  it  is  a  title  dif-  over  them,  and  have  liberty  of  fish- 
ferent  in  character  from  that  which  ing  therein  freed  from  the  obstruc- 
the  State  holds  in  lands  intended  for  tion  or  interference  of  private  par- 
sale.  It  is  different  from  the  title  ties,"  p.  452. 
which  the  United  States  hold  in  the  i^Ante,  §  93. 


§    96  WATEES.  121 

§  96  (79).  The  same  continued.  These  views  are  not 
without  a  strong  support  in  the  earlier  cases  and  cases  already 
cited,  and  have  been  vindicated  by  several  late  decisions  by  courts 
of  the  highest  authority.  In  Gould  v.  Hudson  Eiver  Railroad 
Co.,*^  Judge  Edmonds  filed  an  elaborate  dissenting  opinion, 
in  which  he  combated  the  conclusions  of  the  majority  with  great 
learning  and  ability.  He  enumerates  eight  rights  which  the 
riparian  owner  has,  that  are  peculiar  to  himself  and  appurtenant 
to  his  property:  1.  The  right  of  navigating  the  river  to  and 
from  his  land,  and  landing  upon  his  shore.  2.  The  right, 
under  the  statute,  to  be  preferred  in  the  grant  of  a  ferry  right 
terminating  upon  his  land  and  in  a  grant  of  the  soil  under 
water  opposite  his  land.  3.  The  right  of  fishing  in  the  river 
and  of  using  his  land  in  connection  therewith.  4.  The  right 
to  accretions.  5.  The  right  to  use  the  water  in  his  business, 
whatever  it  may  be,  and  for  domestic  purposes.  6.  The  right 
to  lade  and  unlade  upon  the  bank.  7.  The  right  of  way  from 
his  land  to  the  channel  of  the  river.  8.  The  right  to  be  and 
remain  a  riparian  owner,  and  have  the  water  lave  his  land. 
And  so  in  the  case  of  Stevens  v.  Paterson  &  Newark  E..  R. 
Co.,**  two  of  the  Judges  unite  with  the  Chancellor  in  a  dis- 
senting opinion  in  which  similar  views  are  maintained.  Says 
the  Chancellor:  "The  right,  on  the  principles  of  the  common 
law,  which  I  for  convenience  call  the  right  of  adjacency,  consists 
in  the  right  of  ferriage,  of  landing  boats  alongside  a  wharf,  or 
land  by  the  shore,  and  unloading  goods  upon  or  taking  them 
from  it,  the  right  of  fishing  from  the  shore,  and  drawing  nets 
upon  it,  of  entering  upon  it  from  the  land,  for  bathing  or  pro- 
curing water,  and  such  other  benefits  as  can  be  enjoyed  only  by 
the  adjoining  owner,  peculiar  to  him,  and  not  common  to  the 
rest  of  the  public."  And  he  concludes  as  follows : 
"The  conclusions  to  which  I  have  arrived  are  these : 
"First.  That  the  owner  of  lands  upon  tide  waters  has  a 
right  to  the  natural  advantages  conferred  on  his  land  by  its 
adjacency  to  the  water,  which,  like  the  right  to  have  fresh  water 
streams  flow  unobstructed  and  unpolluted  upon  and  from  his 
land,  and  like  the  right  to  support  for  the  natural  soil  from  the 
adjacent  soil,  is  an  incident  to  the  land,  and  is  property. 

4  36  N.  Y.  522. 

"34  N.  J.  L.  532,  562,  3  Am.  Rep. 
269. 


122 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  96 


"Second.  That,  by  the  law  of  New  Jersey,  being  the  com- 
mon law  as  adopted  here,  altered  to  suit  the  circumstances  and 
necessities  of  the  people  and  the  genius  of  our  government,  the 
right  to  wharf  out  from  the  lands  situate  on  tide  waters  over  the 
shore  in  front,  has  become  an  incident  to  such  lands  and  a  right 
of  property. 

"Third.  That,  by  the  wharf  act  of  1851,  the  right  to  fill 
in  and  appropriate  the  shore  is  conferred  upon  the  shore  owner 
as  an  incident  to  his  property.       , 

"Lastly.  That  alL  these  rights,  being  incidents  to  an  estate 
which  add  to  its  value,  are  property,  and  cannot  be  taken  away 
by  general  or  special  legislation,  except  by  the  power  of  eminent 
domain  for  public  use  and  upon  compensation."  *^ 

Since  the  first  edition  was  published  the  case  of  Gould  v.  Hud- 
son River  R.  R.  Co.  has  been  overruled  and  the  law  of  New  York 
declared  to  be  in  accordance  with  the  dissenting  opinion  of  Judge 
Edmonds." 


<  6  Judge  Cooley,  in  his  work  upon 
Constitutional  Limitations  (p.  544), 
speaking  of  these  cases,  says:  "So 
far  as  these  cases  hold  it  competent 
to  cut  off  a  riparian  proprietor  from 
access  to  the  navigable  water,  they 
seem  to  us  to  justify  an  appropria- 
tion of  his  property  without  com- 
pensation; for,  even  those  courts 
which  hold  the  fee  in  the  soil  under 
navigable  streams  to  be  in  the  State, 
admit  valuable  riparian  rights  in 
the  adjacent  proprietor." 

"Rumsey  v.  New  York  &  N.  E.  R. 
R.  Co.,  133  N.  y.  79,  30  N.  E.  654, 
28  Am.  St.  Rep.  600,  15  L.R.A.  618, 
6  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  67.  For 
other  litigation  between  the  same 
parties  and  growing  out  of  the  same 
facts,  see:  Rumsey  v.  New  York  & 
N.  E.  R.  E.  Co.,  114  N.  Y.  423,  21 
N.  E.  1066;  Rumsey  v.  New  York  & 
N.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  125  N.  Y.  681,  25 
N.  E.  1080;  Rumsey  v.  New  York  & 
N.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  130  N.  Y.  88,  28 
N.  E.  763;  Rumsey  v.  New  York  & 
N.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  136  N.  Y.  543,  32 
N.  E.  979.  The  following  are  other 
New  York  cases  bearing  on  the  ques- 


tion: Steers  v.  City  of  Brooklyn, 
101  N.  Y.  51 ;  Williams  v.  New  York, 
105  N.  Y.  419;  New  York  Cent.  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Aldridge,  135  N.  Y.  83, 
32  N.  E.  50;  People  ex  rel.  etc.  v. 
Comrs.  of  Land  Office,  135  N.  Y.  447, 
32  N.  E.  139;  Saunders  v.  New  York 
Cent.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  144  N.  Y.  75, 
38  N.  E.  992,  43  Am.  St.  Rep.  729, 
26  L.R.A.  378;  Sage  v.  New  York, 
154  N.  Y.  61,  47  N.  E.  1096,  61  Am. 
St.  Rep.  592;  Archibald  v.  New  York 
Central  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  157  N.  Y.  574, 
52  N.  E.  567;  Saunders  v.  New 
York  Cent.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  71  Hun 
153,  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  927;  Nolan  v. 
Brockway  Park  Imp.  Co.,  76  Hun 
458,  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  102;  Hedges  v. 
West  Shore  R.  R.  Co.,  80  Hun  310, 
30  N.  Y.  Supp.  92;  Babcock  v.  City 
of  Buffalo,  1  Sheldon  317;  People 
V.  Mould,  37  App.  Div.  35;  and  see 
New  York  cases  cited  post,  §  99, 
note  56. 

In  Saunders  v.  New  York  Cent, 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  144  N.  Y.  75,  38  N. 
E.  992,  43  Am.  St.  Rep.  729,  26 
L.R.A.  378,  the  court,  in  speaking 
of    the   rights   of   riparian   owners. 


§    98  WATERS.  123 

§  97  (80).  The  same  continued.  The  same  doctrine  is 
affirmed  in  a  recent  case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  which  went  up  from  Wisconsin.  The  plaintiff  had  ex- 
tended a  wharf  into  the  Milwaukee  Eiver.  Afterwards  the  city 
of  Milwaukee,  acting  under  certain  legislative  acts,  established 
dock  lines  upon  the  river,  and  declared  a  part  of  plaintiff's  wharf 
which  projected  beyond  these  lines  a  nuisance  and  ordered  its 
abatement.  The  plaintiff  filed  his  bill  to  enjoin  and  prevailed. 
The  court  says  that,  though  the  title  to  the  bed  of  the  river  is  in 
the  public,  yet  the  abutting  owner  has  riparian  rights,  and 
"among  those  rights  are  access  to  the  navigable  part  of  the  river 
from  the  front  of  his  lot,  the  right  to  make  a  landing,  wharf  or 
pier  for  his  own  use  or  for  the  use  of  the  public,  subject  to  such 
general  rules  and  regulations  as  the  legislature  may  see  proper 
to  impose  for  the  protection  of  the  rights  of  the  public,  whatever 
those  may  be.  *  *  *  This  riparian  right,"  says  the  court, 
"is  property,  and  is  valuable,  and,  though  it  must  be  enjoyed  in 
due  subjection  to  the  rights  of  the  public,  it  cannot  be  arbitrarily 
or  capriciously  destroyed  or  impaired.  It  is  a  right  of  which, 
when  once  vested,  the  owner  can  only  be  deprived  in  accordance 
with  established  law,  and  if  necessary  that  it  be  taken  for  the 
public  good,  upon  due  compensation."  *'  These  views  have  been 
confirmed  by  recent  decisions  of  the  same  court.** 

§  98  (81).  The  same  continued.  Several  well  consid- 
ered cases  upon  this  question  are  to  be  found  in  the  42d  volume 
of  the  Wisconsin  Reports.  In  one  of  these  cases  it  appeared  that 
one  Diedrich  owned  a  lot  on  Lake  Michigan  and  had,  by  artificial 
means,  extended  his  lot  some  eighty-five  feet  into  the  lake.  A 
railroad  company  located  its  road  across  this  new  land,  and  in- 
stituted proceedings  to  condemn  so  much  of  the  land  as  was  re- 
quired for  its  track.     On  appeal  the  court  held  that  Diedrich 

says :    "What  these   rights   are   has  his  own  use  or  for  that  of  the  public, 

been  decided  in  the  Rumsey  case,  133  with   the   right  of   passage  to   and 

N.  Y.  79,  30  N.  E.  654,  and  since  from  the  same  with  reasonable  safe- 

that  decision  reaffirmed  in  the  case  ty  and  convenience." 
of  Illinois  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Illinois,  i^Yates   v.   Milwaukee,    10    Wall. 

146  U.  S.  387,  13  S.  C.  110.     They  497,504.  .To  the  same  effect,  Chicngo 

embrace  the  right  of  access  to  the  v.  Laflin,  49  Ills.  172. 
channel    or    navigable   part    of    the  ^slllinois  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Illi- 

river    for    navigation,    fishing,    and  noia,   146  U.   S.  387,   13  S.  C.   110; 

such   other   uses   as    commonly   be-  Shively  v.  Bowlby,  152  U.  S.  1,  14  S. 

long  to  riparian  ownership,  the  right  C.  548. 
to  make  a  landing,  wharf  or  pier  for 


124r  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    98 

liad  no  title  to  the  made  land  on  which  the  railroad  was  laid, 
and  that,  as  the  damages  awarded  had  been  given  for  the  land 
taken,  and  not  for  injury  to  riparian  rights,  the  case  must  be 
reversed.  The  question  of  riparian  rights  was  discussed  and 
the  opinion  expressed  that,  for  any  injury  thereto,  the  owner 
would  be  entitled  to  compensation.*^ 

In  another  case°°  a  railroad  company  constructed  its  road 
across  a  small  lake  in  the  city  of  Madison  so  as  entirely  to  cut 
off  the  plaintiff  from  access  to  tha  lake  and  leave  a  stagnant  pool 
in  front  of  his  premises.  The  lake  was  navigable  and  about  nine 
miles  in  circumference.  The  plaintiff  sued  for  damages.  The 
title  to  the  bed  of  the  lake  beyond  the  water's  edge  was  held  to  be 
in  the  State,  but  the  court  held  the  plaintiff  had  riparian  rights 
appurtenant  to  his  land  of  which  he  could  not  be  deprived  with- 
out compensation.  The  court  says:  "But,  while  the  riparian 
proprietor  only  takes  to  the  water  line,  it  by  no  means  follows, 
nor  are  we  willing  to  admit,  that  he  can  be  deprived  of  his  ripa- 
rian rights  without  compensation.  As  proprietor  of  the  adjoin- 
ing land,  and  as  connected  with  it,  he  has  the  right  of  exclusive 
access  to  and  from  the  waters  of  the  lake  at  that  particular 
place ;  he  has  the  right  to  build  piers  and  wharves  in  front  of 
his  land,  out  to  navigable  waters,  in  aid  of  navigation,  not  in- 
terfering with  the  public  use.  These  are  private  rights  incident 
to  the  ownershp  of  the  shore,  which  he  possesses  distinct  from 
the  rest  of  the  public.  All  the  facilities  which  the  location  of 
his  land  with  reference  to  the  lake  affords,  he  has  the  right  to 
enjoy  for  purposes  of  gain  or  pleasure ;  and  they  oftentimes  give 
property  thus  situated  its  chief  value.  It  is  evident,  from  the 
nature  of  the  case,  that  these  rights  of  user  and  of  exclusion  are 
connected  with  the  land  itself,  grow  out  of  its  location,  and  can- 
not be  materially  abridged  or  destroyed  without  inflicting  an 
injury  upon  the  owner  which  the  law  should  redress.  It  seems 
unnecessary  to  add  the  remark,  that  these  riparian  rights  are 
not  common  to  the  citizens  at  large,  but  exist  as  incidents  to 
the  right  of  the  soil  itself  adjacent  to  the  water.  In  other  words, 
according  to  the  uniform  doctrine  of  the  best  authorities,  the 
foundation  of  riparian  rights,  ex  vi  iermini,  is  the  ownership 
of  the  bank  or  shore.  In  such  ownership  they  have  their  origin. 
They  may  and  do  exist,  though  the  fee  in  the  bed  of  the  river  or 

49Diedrieh  v.  N.  W.  U.  Ry.  Co.,  BODelaplaine  v.   C.  &  N.  W.  Ky. 

42  Wis.  248.  Co.,  42  Wis.  214,  226. 


§    99  WATERS.  125 

lake  be  in  the  State.  If  the  proprietor  owns  the  bed  of  the 
stream  or  lake,  this  may  possibly  give  him  some  additional  right ; 
but  his  riparian  rights,  strictly  speaking,  do  not  depend  on  that 
fact."" 

The  same  views  are  entertained  by  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Minnesota,  which  in  a  recent  case,  says:  "In  this  State  it  is 
the  settled  doctrine  that  the  riparian  owner  has  the  fee  to  low 
water  mark.  But,  while  he  only  has  the  fee  to  low  water  mark, 
he  has  certain  rights  incident  to  the  ownership  of  real  estate  bor- 
dering upon  a  navigable  stream.  Among  these  are  the  right  to 
enjoy  free  communication  between  his  abutting  premises  and 
the  navigable  channel  of  the  river,  to  build  and  maintain  suitable 
landings,  piers,  and  wharves,  on  and  in  front  of  his  land,  and  to 
extend  the  same  therefrom  into  the  river  to  the  point  of  naviga- 
bility, even  beyond  low  water  mark,  and,  to  this  extent,  exclu- 
sively to  occupy  for  such  and  like  purposes,  the  bed  of  the  stream, 
subordinate  only  to  the  paramount  public  right  of  navigation. 
These  riparian  rights  are  property,  and  cannot  be  taken  away 
without  paying  just  compensation  therefor."  ^^ 

Since  the  first  edition  various  other  States  have  rendered  deci- 
sions in  conformity  with  these  views.^^ 

§  99  (82).  The  same  continued.  These  views  are  fully 
sustained  by  a  decision  of  the  House  of  Lords,  in  the  late  case 
of  Lyon  v.  Fishmongers  Co.^*  The  question  was,  whether  a  ri- 
parian proprietor  on  the  banks  of  a  tidal  navigable  river  had 
any  rights  or  natural  easements  similar  to  those  which  belong  to 
a  riparian  proprietor  upon  a  non-tidal  stream.  This  question 
was  answered  in  the  affirmative.  "I  cannot  entertain  any 
doubt,"  says  the  Lord  Chancellor,  "that  the  riparian  owner  on 
a  navigable  river,  in  addition  to  the  right  connected  with  navi- 

BiThe    same    questions    of    right  Wis.  534,  67  N.  W.  918,  33  L.R.A. 

are  discussed  in  the  following  cases,  643;  and  eases  cited  §  99  note  56. 
which,  however,  do  not  involve  any  6  2Union  Depot  etc.  Co.  v.  Bruns- 

exercise  of  the  eminent  domain  pow-  'W'"'^'  31  Minn.  297,  301.     See  also 

er:     Olson  v.  Merrill,  42  Wis.  203;  Lamphrey  v.  State,  52  Minn.  181,  53 

Boorman  v.  Sunnuchs,  42  Wis.  233.  f  ^^  ^^^S,  38  Am.   St.  Rep.  541; 

„         ,       „  ,       T    1      TT  i.  ,   /-.  Bradshaw  v.  Duluth  Imperial  Mil) 

See   also   Cedar  Lake   Hotel   Co.  v.  .,       ^„  ,^.         ,„     ^„   ^^'  „,    ,„„„ 

^   ,       T    ,      XT    ,       ,■     r,       ^n  -.TT-  Co.,   52   Minn.   59,   53   N.   W.    1066; 

Cedar  Lake  Hydraulic  Co.,  79  Wis.  -„.  _.,  .  i.     t.    t,    /.,       „„ 

•'  Kippe  v.  Chicago  etc  R.  R.  Co.,  23 

297,   48   N.   W.   Rep.    371;    City   of  ^^^   jg 

Janesville  v.  Carpenter,  77  Wis.  288,  535,^^  ^^^^^  ^^^^^^  ^^^^^  g  99^  j^^^g  gg 

46  N.  W.  Rep.  128;  Priewe  v.  Wis-  6  4Law   Reports,   1    Appeal   Cases, 

consin   State  Land  &  Imp.   Co,   93      662,  674,  682;  1876. 


126 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


gation  to  -which  he  is  entitled  as  one  of  the  puhlic,  retains  his 
rights,  as  an  ordinary  riparian  owner,  underlying  and  controlled 
by,  but  not  extinguished  by,  the  public  right  of  navigation." 
And  from  Lord  Selbourne's  opinion  we  take  the  following: 
"The  rights  of  a  riparian  proprietor,  so  far  as  they  relate  to 
any  natural  stream,  exist  jurw  naturae,  because  his  land  has, 
by  nature,  the  advantage  of  being  washed  by  the  stream;  and 
if  the  facts  of  nature  constitute  the  foundation  of  the  right,  I 
am  unable  to  see  why  the  law  should  not  recognize  and  follow 
the  course  of  nature  in  every  part  of  the  same  stream.  Water 
which  is  more  or  less  salt  by  reason  of  the  flow  of  the  tides  may 
still  be  useful  for  many  domestic  and  other  purposes,  though 
there  are  no  doubt  some  purposes  which  fresh  water  only  will 
serve.  The  general  law  as  to  riparian  rights  is  not  stated  by 
any  authorities,  that  I  am  aware  of,  in  terms  which  require 
this  distinction,  and,  if  there  is  any  sound  principle  on  which  it 
ought  to  be  made,  the  burden  of  proof  seems  to  lie  on  those  who 
so  affirm.  As  for  the  public  right  of  navigation,  it  may  well 
co-exist  with  private  riparian  rights,  which  must  of  course  be 
enjoyed  subject  to  it;  just  as  where  there  is  no  navigation,  each 
riparian  proprietor's  right  is  concurrent  with,  and  is  so  far 
limited  by,  the  rights  of  other  proprietors.  With  respect  to  the 
ownership  of  the  bed  of  the  river,  this  cannot  be  the  natural 
foundation  of  riparian  rights,  properly  so  called,  because  the 
word  'riparian'  is  relative  to  the  bank,  and  not  the  bed,  of  the 
stream;  and  the  connection,  when  it  exists,  of  property  on  the 
bank  with  property  in  the  bed  of  the  stream  depends,  not  upon 
nature,  but  on  grant  or  presumption  of  law."  ^^ 


5  Bin  this  case  the  facts  were  as 
follows :  Lyon  owned  a  wharf  which 
fronted  south  on  the  Thames  and 
west  on  an  inlet  extending  north 
about  forty  feet,  known  as  Winck- 
worth's  Hole,  at  the  bottom  of  which 
was  the  defendant  company's  wharf, 
and  west  of  the  inlet  was  Winek- 
worth's  wharf,  thus: — 

Fishmongers 
Company. 


Winck- 
worth's 
Wharf. 


Winckworth's 
Hole. 


Lyon's 
Wharf. 


By  an  act  of  parliament,  a  body 
called  the  Conservators  of  the 
Thames  was  constituted,  with  power 
to  grant  to  the  owner  or  occupier 
of  any  land  fronting  and  immediate- 
ly adjoining  the  Thames  a  license 
to  make  any  dock  or  other  work  im- 
mediately in  front  of  his  land  and 
into  the  body  of  said  river,  but  not 
so  as  to  take  away,  alter  or  abridge 
any  right  to  which  any  owner  or 
occupier  of  lands  on  the  banks  of 
the  river,  including  the  banks  there- 
of, was  by  law  entitled.  The  de- 
fendants obtained  a  license  to  extend 
their  wharf  to  the  main  line  of  the 


WATEES. 


127 


This  case  may  safely  be  regarded  as  settling  the  law  of 
England  in  favor  of  the  conclusions  reached  in  the  text.  Fur- 
ther confirmation  of  the  text  will  be  found  in  the  cases  cited  in 
the  note  and  in  the  following  sections.^* 


river,  so  as  entirely  to  displace  the 
water  in  Winckworth's  Hole,  and 
cut  oflF  the  plaintiff  from  access  to 
his  premises  on  the  west  side  there- 
of. The  plaintiff  applied  for  an  in- 
junction, which  was  granted  by  the 
Vice  Chancellor.  On  appeal,  the  de- 
cision of  the  Vice  Chancellor  was 
reversed,  on  the  ground  that  the 
plaintiff  had  no  right  or  claim  which 
would  be  taken  away,  altered  or 
abridged  by  the  execution  of  the  pro- 
jected improvement.  (Law  Rep.,  10 
Ch.  App.  679.)  The  broad  ground 
was  taken  that  a  riparian  owner  on 
tidal  waters  has  no  private  right 
in  the  waters  appurtenant  to  his 
land.  The  latter  decision '  was  re- 
versed by  the  House  of  Lords  with- 
out a  dissenting  opinion.  See  also 
Bill  V.  Quebec,  L.  R.  5  H.  L.  84; 
North  Shore  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Pion,  14 
App.  tDas.  612,  affirming  S.  C.  14 
Duvall  677;  Bigaouette  v.  North 
Shore  R.  R.  Co.,  17  Duvall  363. 

5  6The  authorities  sustaining  these 
views  are  here  collated,  for  conven- 
ience of  examination  and  compari- 
son with  the  cases  supporting  the 
opposite  view,  to  be  found  in  note  39, 
§  94:  Organ  f.  Memphis  &  L.  R.  R. 
Co.,  51  Ark.  235,  11  S.  W.  96;  San 
Francisco  Savings  Union  v.  Petrol- 
eum &  Min.  Co.,  144  Cal.  134,  77 
Pae.  823,  103  Am.  St.  Rep.  72,  66 
L.R.A.  242;  Prior  v.  Swartz,  62 
Conn.  132,  25  Atl.  398,  36  Am.  St. 
Rep.  333,  18  L.R.A.  668;  New  York 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Long,  72  Conn.  10, 
43  Atl.  559;  Richards  v.  New  York 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  77  Conn.  501,  60  Atl. 
295,  69  L.R.A.  929;  Harlan  &  H. 
Co.  V.  Parchall,  5  Del.  Ch.  435;  State 
V.  Black  Riv.  Phosphate  Co.,  32  Fla. 
82,  13  So.  640,  21  L.R.A.  189;  Ren- 


wick  V.  D.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  49  la. 
664,  affirmed,  102  U.  S.  180;  Balti- 
more etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Chase,  43  Md. 
23;  Gariter  v.  Baltimore,  52  Md. 
422;  People  v.  Severance,  125  Mich. 
556,  84  N.  W.  1089;  Rippe  v.  Chi- 
cago etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  Minn.  18; 
Carli  v.  Stillwater  Street  R.  &  T. 
Co.,  28  Minn.  373,  41  Am.  Rep.  290; 
Brisbine  v.  St.  Paul  &  Sioux  City 
R.  R.  Co.,  23  Mirni:  114;  Union  De- 
pot etc.  Co.  V.  Brunswick,  31  Minn. 
297;  Lamphrey  v.  State,  52  Minn. 
181,  53  N.  W.  1139,  38  Am.  St.  Rep. 
541 ;  Reeves  v.  Backus-Brooks  Co., 
83  Minn.  339,  86  N.  W.  337;  Myers 
V.  St.  Louis,  82  Mo.  367;  Gough  v. 
Bell,  2  Zab.  441 ;  Langdon  v.  New 
York,  93  N.  Y.  129;  Steers  v.  City 
of  Brooklyn,  101  N.  Y.  51 ;  Williams 
V.  New  York,  105  N.  Y.  419;  Rum- 
sey  V.  New  York  &  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co., 
133  N.  Y.  79,  30  N.  E.  654,  28  Am. 
St.  Rep.  600,  15  L.R.A.  618,  6  Am. 
R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  67;  Saunders  v. 
New  York  Central  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  144 
N.  Y.  75,  38  N.  E.  992,  43  Am.  St. 
Rep.  729,  26  L.R.A.  378;  Matter  of 
New  York,  168  N.  Y.  134,  61  N.  E. 
158,  56  L.R.A.  500;  Brookhaven  v. 
Smith,  188  N.  Y.  74,  9  L.R.A.  (N.S.) 
326,  reversing  S.  C.  98  App.  Div. 
212,  90  N.  Y.  S.  646;  Hedges  v. 
West  Shore  R.  R.  Co.,  80  Hun  310, 
30  N.  Y.  Supp.  92 ;  Babcock  v.  City 
of  Buffalo,  1  Sheldon  317;  North 
Hempstead  v.  Gregory,  53  App.  Div. 
350,  65  N.  Y.  S.  867;  Gregory  v. 
Forbes,  96  N.  C.  77;  Bond  v.  Wool, 
107  N.  C.  139,  12  S.  E.  281;  Wool 
V.  Town  of  Edonton,  115  N.  C.  10,  20 
S.  E.  165;  Wilson  v.  Welch,  12  Ore. 
353 ;  Montgomery  v.  Shaver,  40  Ore. 
244,  66  Pac.  923;  Ball  v.  Slack,  2 
Whart.  Pa.  538,  30  Am.  Dec.  278; 


128 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  100 


§  100  (83).  The  same  concluded.  In  conclusion,  the 
following  rights  may  be  enumerated  as  appurtenant  to  property 
upon  public  waters : 

First.  The  right  to  be  and  remain  a  riparian  proprietor  and 
to  enjoy  the  natural  advantages  thereby  conferred  upon  the  land 
by  its  adjacency  to  the  water.^^ 

Second.  The  right  of  access  to  the  water,  including  a  right 
of  way  to  and  from  the  navigable  part.^* 


Sherman  v.  Sherman,  18  E.  I.  504, 
30  Atl.  459;  Chesapeake  etc.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Walker,  100  Va.  69,  40  S.  E. 
633,  914;  New  Whatcom  v.  Fair- 
haven  Land  Co.,  24  Wash.  493,  64 
Pac.  735,  54  L.R.A.  190;  Burrows 
V.  Grays  Harbor  Boom  Co.,  44  Wash. 
630,  87  Pac.  937 ;  Delaplaine  v.  C.  & 
N.  W.  Ky.  Co.,  42  Wis.  214;  Boorman 
V.  Sunnucks,  id.  233;  Diedrich  v.  N. 
W.  Union  Ry.  Co.,  id.  248;  Janesville 
V.  Carpenter,  77  Wis.  288,  46  N.  W. 
128;  Cedar  Lake  Hotel  Co.  v.  Cedar 
Lake  Hydraulic  Co.,  79  Wis.  297,  48 
X.  W.  371;  Attorney  General  v. 
Smith,  109  Wis.  532,  85  N.  W.  512; 
Rossmiller  v.  State,  114  Wis.  169, 
89  N.  W.  839,  91  Am.  St.  Rep.  910, 
58  L.R.A.  93;  Draper  v.  Brown,  115 
Wis.  361,  91  N.  W.  1001 ;  McCarthy 
V.  ilurphy,  119  Wis.  159,  96  N.  W. 
531,  100  Am.  St.  Rep.  163;  Thomas 
T.  Ashland  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  122  Wis.  519, 
100  N.  W.  993,  106  Am.  St.  Rep. 
1000;  Button  v.  Strong,  1  Black 
23;  Yates  v.  Milwaukee,  10  Wall. 
497;  Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co.  t. 
Illinois,  146  U.  S.  387,  13  S.  C.  110; 
Shively  v.  Bowlby,  152  U.  S.  1,  14 
S.  C.  548;  Paine  Lumber  Co.  \. 
United  States,  55  Fed.  854;  Sulli- 
van Timber  Co.  v.  Jlobile,  124  Fed. 
644;  Lyon  v.  Fishmongers'  Com- 
pany, L.  R.  1  App.  Cas.  662;  Duke 
of  Buecleuch  v.  Metropolitan  Board 
of  Works,  L.  R.  5  H.  L.  418;  Bill 
V.  Quebec,  L.  R.  5  H.  L.  84;  North 
Shore  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Pion,  14  App. 
Cas.  612;  S.  C.  14  Duvall  677;  Big- 
aoutte   V.   North    Shore   E.   R,   Co., 


17  Duvall  363;  Miner  v.  Gilmour, 
12  Moore  P.  C.  131 ;  Rose  v.  Groves, 

5  M.  &  G.  613;  Attorney  General  v. 
Conservators   of   the   Thames,   1    H. 

6  M.  1.  See  Frost  v.  Worthington 
Co.  R.  R.  Co.  96  Me.  76,  51  Atl. 
806,  59  L.R.A.  68 ;  Western  Pac.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  151  Fed. 
376,  80  C.  C.  A.  606. 

^T  Dissenting  opinion,  Stevens  v. 
Patterson,  34  N.  J.  L.  532,  3  Am. 
Rep.  269;  opinion  of  Judge  Ed- 
monds, dissenting  in  Gould  v.  Hud- 
son River  R.  R.  Co.  6  N.  Y.  522; 
Lyon  V.  Fishmongers  Co.,  L.  R.  1 
App.  Cas.  662;  Delaplaine  v.  C.  & 
N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  42  Wis.  214;  Rice  v. 
Euddiman,  10  Mich.  125,  142;  Illi- 
nois Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Illinois,  146 
U.  S.  387,  13  S.  C.  110;  Concord 
Mfg.  Co.  V.  Robertson,  66  N.  H.  1,  25 
Atl.  718,  18  L.R.A.  679;  Fulmer  v. 
Williams,  122  Pa.  St.  191,  15  Atl. 
726,  9  Am.  St.  Eep.  88,  1  L.E.A.  603, 
Williams  v.  Fulmer,  151  Pa.  St.  405, 
25  Atl.  103,  31  Am.  St.  Rep.  767. 

5  8  Same,  Shirley  r.  Bishop,  67 
Cal.  543;  New  York  etc.  E.  E.  Co. 
V.  Long,  72  Conn.  10,  43  Atl.  559; 
Baltimore  &  Ohio  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Chase, 
43  Md.  23,  35;  Garitee  v.  Baltimore, 
52  Md.  422;  Brisbine  v.  St.  Paul  etc. 
E.  E.  Co.,  23  Minn.  114;  Carli  v. 
Stillwater  Street  E.  &  T.  Co.,  28 
Minn.  373;  Union  Depot  etc.  Co.  v. 
Brunswick,  31  Minn.  297 ;  Concord 
Mfg.  Co.  \.  Eobertson,  68  N.  H.  1, 
25  Atl.  718,  IS  L.R.A.  679;  Williams 
V.  New  York,  105  N.  Y.  419;  Rum- 
sey  V.  New  York  &  N.  E.  E.  E.  Co., 


§  100 


WATEES. 


129 


Third.     The  right  to  build  a  pier  or  wharf  out  to  navigable 
water,  subject  to  any  regulations  of  the  State.®' 


133  N.  Y.  79,  30  N.  E.  654,  6  Am.  R. 
N.  &  Corp.  Rep.  67,  28  Am.  St.  Rep. 
600,  15  L.R.A.  618;  Saunders  v.  New 
York  Cent.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  144  N.  Y. 
75,  38  N.  E.  992,  43  Am.  St.  Rep. 
729,  26  L.R.A.  378;  North  Hemp- 
stead V.  Gregory,  53  App.  Div.  350, 
65  N.  Y.  S.  867;  Montgomery  v. 
Shaver,  40  Ore.  244,  66  Pac.  923; 
Fulmer  v.  Williams,  122  Pa.  St.  191, 
15  Atl.  726,  9  Am.  St.  Rep.  88,  1 
L.R.A.  603;  Sherman  v.  Sherman,  18 
R.  I.  504,  30  Atl.  459 ;  McCarthy  v. 
Murphy,  119  Wis.  159,  96  N.  W. 
531,  100  Am.  St.  Rep.  163;  Yates  v. 
Milwaukee,  10  Wall.  497;  Illinois 
Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Illinois,  146  U.  S. 
387,  13  S.  C.  110;  Paine  Lumber  Co. 
V.  United  States,  55  Fed.  854 ;  Lewis 
V.  Johnson,  76  Fed.  476;  Sullivan 
Timber  Co.  v.  Mobile,  124  Fed.  644; 
McCloskey  v.  Pacific  Coast  Co.,  160 
Fed.  794  (C.  C.  A.)  ;  North  Shore  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Pion,  14  App.  Caa.  612; 
Pion  V.  North  Shore  R.  R.  Co.,  14 
Duvall  677;  Bigaouette  v.  North 
Shore  R.  R.  Co.,  17  Duvall  363. 
See  Sage  v.  New  York,  10  App.  Div. 
294.  41  N.  Y.  Supp.  938. 

ssOrgan  v.  Memphis  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  51  Ark.  235,  11  S.  W. 
96;  New  Haven  v.  Hemingway, 
7  Conn.  186;  State  v.  Sargent, 
45  Conn,  358;  Prior  v.  Swartz, 
62  Conn.  132,  25  Atl.  398,  36 
Am.  St.  Rep.  333,  18  L.R.A.  668; 
New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Long,  72 
Conn.  10,  43  Atl.  559;  Richards  v. 
New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  77  Conn. 
501,  60  Atl.  295,  69  L.R.A.  929; 
Lane  v.  Smith  Bros.,  80  Conn.  185; 
Chicago  V.  Van  Ingen,  152  111.  624, 
38  N.  E.  894,  43  Am.  St.  Rep.  285; 
Grant  v.  Davenport,  18  la.  179; 
Musser  v.  Hershey,  42  la.  356,  361; 
Baltimore  &  Ohio  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Chase, 
43  Md.  23,  35 ;  Garitee  v.  Mayor  etc. 
Em.  D.— 9. 


of  Baltimore,  52  Md.  422;  Grand 
Rapids  v.  Powers,  89  Mich.  94,  50 
N.  W.  661,  28  Am.  St.  Rep.  276,  14 
L.R.A.  498 ;  Rippe  v.  Chicago  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  23  Minn.  18;  Brisbine  v.  St. 
Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  Minn.  114; 
Carli  V.  Stillwater  Street  R.  &  T. 
Co.,  28  Minn.  373,  380,  41  Am. 
Rep.  290;  Union  Depot  etc.  Co. 
V.  Brunswick,  31  Minn.  297; 
Reeves  v.  Backus-Brooks  Co.,  83 
Minn.  339,  86  N.  W.  337;  Gough  v. 
Bell,  2  Zab.  441;  Concord  Mfg.  Co. 
V.  Robertson,  66  N.  H.  1,  25  Atl. 
718,  18  L.R.A.  679;  Sturs  v.  Brook- 
lyn, 101  N.  Y.  51;  Rumsey  v.  New 
York  &  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  133  N.  Y. 
79,  30  N.  E.  654,  6  Am.  R.  R.  & 
Corp.  Rep.  67,  28  Am.  St.  Rep.  600, 
15  L.R.A.  618;  Saunders  v.  New 
York  Cent.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  144  N.  Y. 
75,  38  N.  E.  992,  43  Am.  St.  Rep. 
729,  26  L.R.A.  378;  Brookhaven  v. 
Smith,  188  N.  Y.  74,  9  L.R.A.  (N.S.) 
326,  reversing  S.  C.  98  App.  Div.  212, 
90  N.  Y.  S.  646;  Brooklyn  v. 
Mackey,  13  App.  Div.  105;  North 
Hempstead  v.  Gregory,  53  App. 
Div.  350,  65  N.  Y.  S.  867;  Greg- 
ory V.  Forbes,  96  N.  C.  77;  Bond  v. 
Wool,  107  N.  C.  139,  12  S.  E.  281; 
Montgomery  v.  Shaver,  40  Ore.  244, 
66  Pac.  923;  Delaplaine  v.  Chicago 
etc.  Ry.  Co.,  42  Wis.  214;  Janesville 
V.  Carpenter,  77  Wis.  288,  46  N.  W. 
128;  McCarthy  v.  Murphy,  119  Wis. 
159,  96  N.  W.  531,  100  Am.  St.  Rep. 
163;  Dutton  V.  Strong,  1  Black  23; 
Yates  V.  Milwaukee,  10  Wall.  497; 
Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Illinois, 
146  U.  S.  387,  13  S.  C.  110;  Paine 
Lumber  Co.  v.  United  States,  55 
Fed.  854;  Sullivan  Timber  Co.  v. 
Mobile,  124  Fed.  644.  See  Hart  v. 
Baton  Rouge,  10  La.  An.  171; 
Gregory  v.  Forbes,  96  N.  C.  77; 
Eavenswood  v.  Flemings,  22  W.  Va. 


130  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    101 

Fourth.     The  right  to  accretions  or  alluvium.*' 

Fifth.  The  right  to  make  a  reasonable  use  of  the  water  as  it 
flows  past  or  laves  the  land.®^ 

In  addition  to  these  rights,  which  are  recognized  by  the  com- 
mon law,  the  riparian  owner  upon  public  waters  is  frequently 
invested  with  rights  by  statute.*^  All  these  rights  are  sub- 
ordinate to  the  regulation  and  use  of  the  waters  by  the  public 
for  navigation  and  fishing. 

§  101  (84).  Injury  to  riparian  rights  upon  public  wa- 
ters is  a  taking.  According  to  principles  heretofore  laid 
down,  it  follows  that  any  injury  to  riparian  rights  for  public 
use  is  a  taking  for  which  compensation  must  be  made.^^ 
"These  riparian  rights  founded  on  the  common  law,  are  prop- 
erty, and  are  valuable,  and  while  they  must  be  enjoyed  in  due 
subjection  to  the  rights  of  the  public,  they  cannot  be  abridged 
or  capriciously  destroyed  or  impaired.  They  are  rights  of 
which,  when  once  vested,  the  owner  can  only  be  deprived  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  law  of  the  land,  and,  if  necessary  that  they 
be  taken  for  public  use,  upon  due  compensation."  "*  The  gen- 
eral proposition  is  sufficiently  illustrated  by  the  cases  reviewed 
in  the  preceding  sections. 

§  102    (84a).     Interfering  with  access;   railroads  and 

52,  46  Am.  Rep.  485;  Western  Pac.  &  Atlantic  Land  Co.  v.  Lippineott, 

Ry.   Co.  V.   Southern  Pac.   Co.,   151  45  N.  J.  L.  405;  Chesapeake  etc.  Ry. 

Fed.  376,  80  C.  C.  A.  606.    But  this  Co.  v.  Wallcer,  100  Va.  69,  40  S.  E. 

does  not  authorize  the  riparian  own-  633,  914;   Banks  v.  Ogden,  2  Wall, 

er  to  build  out  piers  for  the  pur-  57. 

pose  of  making  new  land,  and  such  BiOpinion   of  Judge  Edmonds   in 

piers  may  be  abated  as  a  nuisance  Gould  v.  Hudson  River  R.  R.  Co.,  6 

at  the  suit  of  the  State.     Revell  v.  N.  Y.  522.     The  above  enumeration 

People,  177  111.  468,  52  N.  E.  1052,  of  rights  is  approved  in  Taylor  v. 

69    Am.    St.   Rep.    257;    Gordon   v.  Commonwealth,   102  Va.  759,  47  S 

Winston,  181  111.  338,  54  N.  E.  1095.  E.  875,  102  Am.  St.  Rep.  865. 

See   North   Hempstead  v.   Gregory,  6  2 As  to  the  right  of  the  ripari- 

53  App.  Div.  350,  65  N.  Y.  S.  867.  an  owner  to  maintain  a,  ferry,  see 

6  0Lockwood  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  Braddock    Ferry    Co.'s    Appeal,    3 

R.  Co.,  37  Conn.  387 ;  Tomlin  v.  D.  Penny.  32 ;  McRoberts  v.  Washburn, 

B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  32  la.  106,  109,  10  Minn.  23. 

7  Am.  Rep.  176;  Baltimore  etc.  R.  6  3/Sfee  ante,  §§  63-65,  84. 

R.  Co.  V.  Chase,  43  Md.  23,  35;  Gi-  64Baltimore   &   O.    R.    R.    Co.   v. 

rard's  Lessee  v.  Hughes,  1  G.  &  J.  Chase,  43  Md.  23,  35.     To  same  ef- 

249;    Lamphrey  v.   State,   52   Minn.  feet  Diedrich  v.  N.  W.  Union  R.  R. 

181,  53  N.  W.  1139,  38  Am.  St.  Rep.  Co.,  42  Wis.  248;  Kingsland  v.  New 

541 ;  St.  Louis  v.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  York,  35  Hun  458. 
114  Mo.  13,  21  S.  W.  202;  Camdea 


§  102 


WATEES. 


131 


other  works  below  high-water  mark.  The  legislature  can- 
not authorize  the  construction  of  a  railroad  between  high  and 
low  water  mark,  or  anywhere  below  the  line  of  private  owner- 
ship, without  compensation  to  the  riparian  owner.^^  It  is  im- 
material that  a  public  highway  intervenes  between  the  plain- 
tiff's lot  and  high  water  mark,  if  the  fee  is  in  the  plaintiff."'' 
So  when  a  speedway  was  constructed  along  a  tidal  river,  mostly 
below  high  water  mark,  which  could  not  be  crossed  except  by 


esDruxy  v.  Midland  K.  R-  Co.,  127 
Mass.  571 ;  Carli  v.  Stillwater  St. 
E.  &  T.  Co.,  28  Minn.  373,  41  Am. 
Eep.  290;  Union  Depot  etc.  Co.  v. 
Brunswick,  31  Minn.  297;  Rumsey 
V.  New  York  &  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  125 
N.  Y.  681,  25  N.  E.  1080;  Rumsey  v. 
New  York  &  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  133 
N.  Y.  79,  30  N.  E.  654,  28  Am.  St. 
Rep.  600,  15  L.R.A.  618,  6  Am.  R. 
R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  67;  Rumsey  v.  New 
York  &  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  136  N. 
Y.  543,  32  N.  E.  979;  Saunders  v. 
N.  Y.  Cent.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  144  ]S. 
Y.  75,  38  N.  E.  992;  Saunders  v.  New 
York  Cent.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  71  Hun 
153,  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  927;  Hedges  v. 
West  Sliore  K.  R.  Co.,  80  Hun  310, 
30  N.  Y.  Supp.  92;  Delaplaine  v.  C. 
&  X.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  42  Wis.  214;  Died- 
rieh  v.  N.  W.  Union  Ry.  Co.  id.  248; 
Railway  Co.  v.  Renwick,  102  U.  S. 
180;  S.  C.  49  la.  664;  North  Shore 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Pion,  14  App.  Cas.  612, 
affirming  S.  C.  14  Duvall  677 ;  Biga- 
ouette  V.  North  Shore  R.  R.  Co.,  17 
Duvall,  363 ;  and  see  New  York  Cent, 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Aldridge,  135  N.  Y. 
83,  32  N.  E.  50;  Mehrhof  Bros.  Brick 
Mfg.  Co.  V.  Delaware  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
51  N.  J.  L.  56,  16  Atl.  12.  Contra: 
Gould  V.  Hudson  River  R.  R.  Co., 
6  N.  Y.  522;  S.  C.  12  Barb.  616; 
Getty  V.  Same,  21  Barb.  617 ;  Penn- 
sylvania R.  R.  Co.  V.  New  York  etc. 
E.  R.  Co.,  23  N.  J.  Eq.  157 ;  Stevens 
V.  Pater.son  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  34  N.  J. 
L.  532,  3  Am.  Rep.  269;  Toralin  v. 
D.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  32  la.  106,  7 
Am.  Rep.  176;  Boston  &  Worcester 


R.  R.  Co.  V.  Old  Colony  R.  R.  Co., 
12  Cush.  605;  Thayer  v.  New  Bed- 
ford R.  R.  Co.,  125  Mass.  253;  Or- 
merod  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  13 
Fed.  370.  And  see  Wood  v.  Chicago 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  60  la.  456;  Chicago 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Porter,  72  la.  426 
Starnes  v.  Molson,  1  Montreal  L.  Q, 
B.  425 ;  Widder  v.  Buffalo  etc.  R.  R, 
Co.,  20  U.  C.  Q.  B.  638;  Regina  v. 
Buffalo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  U.  C.  Q. 
B.  208 ;  Widder  v.  Buffalo  etc.  R.  R, 
Co.,  24  U.  C.  Q.  B.  222. 

6  6Brisbine  v.  St.  Paul  &  Sioux 
City  Ry.  Co.,  23  Minn.  114;  Chesa- 
peake &  Ohio  Canal  Co.  v.  Union 
Bank,  5  Cranch,  C.  C.  509.  But  it  is 
otherwise  where  the  fee  of  the  street 
is  in  the  public.  EUinger  v.  Mo. 
Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  112  Mo.  525,  20  S. 
W.  800 ;  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Mo.  Pac. 
R.  R.  Co.  114  Mo.  13,  21  S.  W.  202. 
To  the  same  effect  as  the  last  cases 
cited:    Backus  v.  Detroit,  49  Mich. 

110,  13  N.  W.  380,  43  j\m.  Rep.  447; 
Smith  V.  St.  Louis  Public  Schools, 
30  Mo.  290;  Potomac  S.  B.  Co.  v. 
Upper  S.  B.  Co.,  109  U.  S.  672,  3 
S.  C.  445,  4  S.  E.  15.  Some  cases 
hold  tnat  a  street  along  the  water 
front  cuts  off  the  riparian  riglits  of 
the  adjacent  owner,  without  regard 
to  whether  the  public  has  a  fee  or 
an  easement.     Godfrey  v.  Alton,  12 

111.  27,  52  Am.  Dec.  476;  Rowan  v. 
Portland,  8  B.  Mon.  232;  Pewaukee 
V.  Savoy,  103  Wis.  271,  79  N.  W. 
436,  74  Am.  St.  Rep.  859,  50  L.R.A. 
836;  McCloskey  v.  Pacific  Const.  Co., 
100  Fed.  794,  —  C.  C.  A.  — . 


132  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    102 

pedestrians  above  or  below  grade.®''  Booms  may  not  be  con- 
structed so  as  to  cut  off  access  to  riparian  property.^*  Nor  can 
a  city,  in  making  an  improvement  of  the  channel  of  a  tidal 
river,  deposit  mud  and  debris  in  front  of  private  property  so  as 
to  cut  off  access  to  the  channel.*'^  In  Massachusetts  it  is  held 
that  a  riparian  owner  has  no  right  to  the  ebb  and  flow  of  the 
tide  over  flats  between  high  and  low  water  mark,  which  belong 
in  fee  to  another,  and  that  a  city,  owning  the  fee  of  such  flats, 
may  fill  them  up  and  thus  prevent- the  flow  of  the  tide,  to  the 
riparian  owner,  without  being  liable  to  him  in  damages.''^  A 
navigable  slip  adjacent  to  plaintiff's  premises  cannot  be  filled 
up,  or  obstructed,  by  a  city,  without  compensation.'^  But  as 
riparian  rights  are  held  to  be  subject  to  the  public  right,  works 
for  the  improvement  of  navigation  may  be  constructed,  though 
access  from  private  property  to  navigable  water  is  thereby  pre- 
vented or  impaired.''^ 

The  right  of  the  State,  as  the  trustee  for  the  public,  of  lands 
below  high  water  mark,  to  grant  a  right  of  way  over  the  same  to 
a  railroad  corporation,  is  considered  and  sustained  in  Saunders 
V.  New  York  Central  etc.,  E.  R.  Co.''*  Whether  the  grant  or 
condemnation  of  a  right  of  way  below  high  water  mark,  or  along 
the  bank,  takes  absolutely  the  riparian  rights,  would  doubtless 
depend  upon  whether  a  fee  or  an  easement  was  acquired.  In 
the  former  case  there  would  probably  be  a  complete  taking  of  the 
riparian  rights,''^  but  in  the  latter  a  taking  only  to  the  extent  of 
the  impairment.'* 

67Matter  of  New  York,  168  N.  Y.  Corp.  Rep.  176.     Compare  Egan   v. 

134,  61  N.  E.  158,  56  L.R.A.  500.  Hart,  45  La.  Ann.  1358,  14  So.  244; 

osReeves  v.  Backus-Brooks  Co.,  83  Payne   v.   English,   79   Cal.   540,   21 

Minn.  339,  86  N.  W.  337;   Burrows  Pac.  952. 

V.  Gray's  Harbor  Boom  Co.,  44  Wash.  7  3Sage  v.   New  York,   154  N.   Y. 

630,   87   Pac.   937;    see   ante,   §   85.  61,  61  Am.  St.  Rep.  592;   Scrantom 

69-70Gariteev.  Mayor  etc.  of  Balti-  v.  Wheeler,  57  Fed.  803,  6  C.  C.  A. 

more,  52  Md.  422.     See  also  Langdon  585;  and  see  ante,  §  85. 
V.  Mayor  etc.  of  New  York,  93  N.  Y.  74144  N.  Y.  75,  38  N.  E.  992,  43 

129;    Butcher's   Ice   &   Coal    Co.   v.  Am.    St.    Rep.    729,   26   L.R.A.    378. 

Philadelphia,  156  Pa.  St.  54,  27  Atl.  See  also   Chicago  etc.  R.  R.   Co.  v. 

37G.  Porter,  72  la.  426. 

7iHenry  v.  City  of  Newburyport,  7  6City  of   St.   Louis   v.   Mo.  Pac. 

149  Mass.  582,  22  N.  E.  75,  5  L.R.A.  R.  R.  Co.,  114  Mo.  13,  21  S.  W.  202; 

179.  Harford  v.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R.  R.  Co., 

7  2Babcock   v.    City   of  Buffalo,    1  43    Minn.    104,    44    N.    W.    U44,    7 

Sheldon  317;  Ligare  v.  City  of  Clii-  L.R.A.  722;   Ellinger  v.  Mo.  Pac.  R. 

cago,   139   III.   4G,   28   N.   E.   934,  32  R.  Co.,  112  Mo.  525,  20  S.  W.  8O0. 
Am.   St.  Rep.   179,  5  Am.  R.  R.   &  7  6New    Jersey   Zinc   &   I.    Co.   v. 


§  102 


WATEES. 


133 


It  has  been  held  that  a  proprietor  upon  a  navigable  stream 
cannot  recover  for  any  damages  to  his  property  by  reason  of  an 
authorized  dam  or  bridge  across  the  river  which  prevents  navi- 
gation between  his  premises  and  the  general  system  of  waters 
with  which  the  stream  connects.'^  So  the  construction  of  a 
bridge  or  highway  across  the  mouth  of  a  cove,  which  prevented 
those  living  on  its  shore  from  having  access  to  the  sea,  has  been 
held  not  to  be  a  taking  of  any  property  of  such  shore  owners.''^ 
Tavo  recent  cases  upon  this  point  deserve  mention.  In  one  case, 
the  plaintiff  owned  property  situated  on  a  cove  connected  with 
Passamaquoddy  bay  by  a  navigable  channel,  by  which  the 
plaintiff  had  access  to  the  bay  and  high  seas.  His  property  con- 
sisted of  a  grist  mill  and  store  and  he  transported  most  of  his 
goods  and  supplies  by  water.     The  defendant  railroad  company 


Morris,  44  N.  J.  Eq.  398,  15  Atl.  227, 
1  L.R.A.  133;  New  York  Central  etc. 
R.  E.  Co.  V.  Aldridge,  135  N.  Y.  83, 
32  N.  E.  50;  Eumsey  v.  New  York 
&  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  125  N.  Y.  681, 

25  N.  E.  1080;  Saunders  v.  New 
York  Central  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  144  N. 
Y.  75,  38  N.  E.  992,  43  Am.  St.  Rep. 
729,  26  L.R.A.  378.  In  Smart  v. 
Aroostook  Lumber  Co.,  103  Me.  37, 
the  plaintiff  owned  a  summer  cot- 
tage on  a  navigable  stream  about 
five  miles  above  the  village  of  P. 
The  defendant  built  a  dam  and  mill 
at  P.  and  filled  the  river  with  logs 
so  as  to  prevent  navigation  be- 
tween P.  and  the  plaintiflf's  cottage. 
It  was  held  that  he  suffered  special 
damage  and  could  recover. 

77Parker  v.  Cutter  Mllldam  Co., 
20  Me.  253 ;  Blackwell  v.  Old  Colony 
R.  R.  Co.,  122  Mass.  1 ;  Swanson  v. 
Miss.  &  Rum  River  Boom  Co.,  42 
Minn.  532,  44  N.  W.  986;  Dover  v. 
Portsmouth  Bridge,  17  N.  H.  200; 
Sugar  Refining  Co.  v.  Jersey  City, 

26  N.  J.  Eq.  247;  Matter  of  Water 
Commissioners,  3  Edwards,  Ch.  290; 
Lansing  v.  Smith,  8  Cow.  140;  8. 
C.  4  Wend.  9;  State  v.  Charleston 
Lt.  &  W.  Co.,  68  S.  C.  540,  47  S.  E. 
979 ;  Oilman  v.  Philadelphia,  3  Wall. 


713.  See  Thomas  v.  Wade,  48  Fla. 
311,  37  So.  743;  Stofflet  v.  Estes,  104 
Mich.  208,  62  N.  W.  347 ;  Viebahn  v. 
Crow  Wing  Co.,  96  Minn.  276,  104 
N.  W.  1089,  3  L.R.A.(N.S.)  1126; 
Pedrick  v.  Raleigh  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
143  N.  C.  485,  55  S.  E.  877,  10  L.R.A. 
(N.S.)554;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Fergu- 
son, 105  Tenn.  552,  59  S.  W.  343,  80 
Am.  St.  Rep.  90S.  No  recovery  can 
be  had  for  the  temporary  interrup- 
tion of  navigation  while  rebuilding 
a  draw.  Hamilton  v.  Vicksburg  er.c. 
R.  R.  Co.,  119  U.  S.  280;  and  see 
Willson  v.  Marsh  Co.,  2  Pet.  245; 
Farmers'  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Albemarle  R. 
R.  Co.,  117  N.  C.  579,  23  S.  E.  213, 
29  L.R.A.  700;  Mehrhof  Bros.  Mfg. 
Co.  V.  Delaware  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  51 
N.  J.  L.  56,  16  Atl.  12. 

'80'Brien  v.  Norwich  &  Worcester 
Ry.  Co.,  17  Conn.  371 ;  Clark  v.  Say- 
brook,  21  Conn.  313.  See  Ocker- 
hausen  v.  Tyson,  71  Conn.  31,  40  Atl. 
1041;  Matter  of  New  York,  West 
Shore  &  Buffalo  Ry.  Co.,  101  N.  Y. 
685;  Trustees  of  Southampton  v. 
Jessup,  162  N.  Y.  122,  56  N.  E.  538; 
Carvalho  v.  Brooklyn  etc.  Turnpike 
Co.,  56  App.  Div.  522,  67  N.  Y.  S. 
539;  S.  C.  affirmed,  173  N.  Y.  586, 
65  N.  E.  1115. 


134 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  102 


was  authorized  to  cross  the  channel  upon  a  trestle  and  this  con- 
struction was  approved  by  the  federal  government.  The  effect 
was  to  prevent  navigation  through  the  channel,  whereby  the 
plaintiff's  business  was  injured  and  his  property  depreciated  in 
value.  In  a  suit  against  the  railroad  for  damages  the  court 
held  that  the  bridge  was  a  lawful  structure  and  that  his  loss 
was  damnum  absque  injuria.''^ 


"Frost  V.  Washington  Co.  R.  R. 
Co.,  9G  Me.  76,  51  Atl.  806,  59  L.R.A. 
68.  The  court  says ;  "The  only  right 
of  the  plaintiff  interfered  with  by 
the  defendant  company  was  his 
right  of  navigation  by  water  in  and 
out  of  the  cove  through  the  channel. 
This  right  of  the  plaintiiT,  however, 
was  not  his  private  property  nor 
even  his  private  right.  It  could' not 
be  bought,  sold,  leased  or  inherited. 
He  did  not  earn  it,  create  it  or  ac- 
quire it.  He  did  not  own  it  as 
against  the  sovereign.  The  right 
was  the  right  of  the  public,  the  title 
and  control  being  in  the  sovereign  in 
trust  for  the  public  and  for  the  ben- 
efit of  the  general  public,  and  not 
for  any  particular  individual.  The 
plaintiff  only  shared  in  the  public 
right.  He  had  no  right  against  the 
public.  The  sovereign  had  absolute 
control  of  it  and  Could  regulate,  en- 
large, limit  or  even  destroy  it,  as  he 
might  deem  best  for  the  whole  pub- 
lic and  this  witliout  making  or  pro- 
viding for  any  compensation  to  such 
individuals  as  might  be  inconven- 
ienced or  damaged  thereby.  The 
sovereign  cannot  take  private  prop- 
erty for  public  uses  without  provid- 
ing for  just  compensation  to  its 
owner,  but  this  constitutional  pro- 
vision does  not  limit  the  power  of 
the  sovereign  over  public  rights.  If, 
in  the  evolution  of  life  and  com- 
merce, the  sovereign  comes  to  be- 
lieve that  the  public  good  will  be  in- 
creased by  the  creation  of  some  new 
or  additional  means  of  communica- 
tion and  commerce  at  the  expense 


or  even  sacrifice  of  some  older  one 
enjoyed  merely  as  a  public  right,  the 
sovereign  can  so  ordain,  even  to  the 
detriment  of  individuals.  If,  in  the 
judgment  of  the  sovereign,  a  rail- 
road across  a  navigable  channel 
of  water  and  completely  obstructing 
its  navigation  is  of  more  benefit  to 
the  public  than  the  navigation  of 
the  channel,  he  has  the  unrestricted 
power  to  thus  close  the  channel  to 
navigation,  without  making  compen- 
sation to  those  who  had  been  wont 
to  use  it.  Every  individual  making 
use  of  a  merely  public  privilege  must 
bear  in  mind  that  he  may  be  law- 
fully deprived  of  that  privilege 
whenever  the  sovereign  deems  it  nec- 
essary for  the  public  good,  and  he 
must  order  his  business  accordingly. 
Unless  the  person  authorized  by  stat- 
ute to  obstruct  or  close  a  navigable 
channel  is  required  by  statute  to 
make  compensation  to  persons  in- 
jured by  such  action,  he  is  under  no 
legal  obligation  to  do  so.  In  such 
case  the  inconvenience  and  loss  how- 
ever great,  an  damnutn  absque  inju- 
ria. The  company  has  damaged  the 
plaintifl'  but  it  has  not  wronged  him. 
The  defendant  company  has  not  in- 
terfered with  the  private  property 
nor  private  rights  of  the  plaintiff. 
It  has  lawfully  by  express  authority 
of  the  sovereign,  merely  abridged  the 
use  of  a  public  right  which  was  with- 
in the  exclusive  control  of  the  sov- 
ereign. For  this  lawful  act  it  is 
not  obliged  to  make  any  compensa- 
tion to  the  plaintiff  any  more  man 
to    all    other    persons    who    might 


§    103  WATEES.  135 

In  the  other  case  the  plaintiff  owned  about  five  hundred  feet 
of  frontage  on  a  cove  which  connected  with  a  tidal  navigable 
river.  The  defendant  railroad  company  was  authorized  to  cross 
the  mouth  of  the  cove  by  an  embankment  and  bridge.  The  cove 
was  shallow,  being  practically  dry  at  low  tide  and  having  two  to 
three  feet  of  water  at  high  tide.  It  was  found  as  a  fact  that  the 
uses  of  the  cove  and  outlet  for  navigation  had  always  been  and 
in  the  nature  of  things  must  always  continue  to  be  insignificant 
and  that  the  bridge  and  embankment  were  no  material  inter- 
ference with  such  navigation  as  was  possible.  On  the  rights 
of  shore  owners  in  the  cove,  the  court  says :  "Riparian  propri- 
etors in  the  cove  have  the  right  to  wharf  out,  and  to  reclaim, 
but  they  are  rights  confined  to  the  cove,  and  to  be  exercised  there- 
in, and  not  in  the  main  river ;  and  to  be  exercised  by  each,  sub- 
ject to  the  riparian  rights  of  his  neighbors,  and  to  the  rights 
of  the  public  in  the  cove  and  its  waters.  They  also  have,  each, 
the  important  right  of  access ;  that  is,  the  right  to  go  from  their 
land  to  the  river,  and  from  the  river  to  their  land,  through  the 
waters  of  the  cove.  This  right  is  distinct  from  the  right  of  each 
•as  a  member  of  the  public  to  navigate  the  waters  of  the  cove. 
It  is  a  private  right  belonging  to  each  as  an  owner  of  land 
bordering  upon  waters  forming  part  of  a  great  water  highway. 
However  much  courts  may  differ  upon  the  question  whether 
such  a  right  can  be  destroyed  or  impaired  by  the  state  without 
compensation  to  the  owner,  they  all  agree  that  the  right  of  access 
exists."  80 

Building  a  bridge  or  dam  across  the  mouth  of  a  non-navigable 
bayou  is  held  to  give  abutters  on  the  bayou  no  cause  of  action, 
although  it  might  be  made  navigable.®^  But  a  city  cannot  lay 
out  a  street  across  a  navigable  waterway  or  bayou  so  as  to  destroy 
the  same  for  navigation.*^ 

§  103   (84b).     Establishing  harbor  lines  and  interfering 

have   occasion,   however   seldom,    to  14  So.  244;  St.  Louis  etc.  E.  R.  Co. 

navigate  the  channel."  pp.  85,  86.  v.  Schneider,  30  Mo.  App.  620;  Pot- 

soRichards  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  ter   v.   Indiana   etc.   R.   R.    Co.,   95 

Co.,  77  Conn.  501,  505,  60  Atl.  295,  Mich.   389,  54  N.   W.   956.     In  the 

69  L.R.A.  929.     In  Thomas  v.  Ash-  latter   case   it  is   said   the   plaintiff 

land  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  122  Wis.  519,  100  may  recover  if  he  shows  special  dam- 

N.  W.  993,  106  Am.  St.  Rep.  1000,  age. 

it  is  held  that  riparian  owners  on  saLigare  v.  City  of  Chicago,  139 

a  cove  are  entitled  to  access  to  navi-  111.  46,  28  N.  E.  934,  5  Am.  R.  R.  & 

gable  water.  Corp.  Rep.  176,  32  Am.  St.  Rep.  179. 

siEgan  v.  Hart,  45  La.  Ann.  1358, 


136  EMINENT   DOMAIN.  §    103 

with  piers  and  wharves.  The  establishing  of  harbor  lines  or 
dock  lines  is  simply  a  regulation  of  the  private  right  of  build- 
ing piers  and  wharves  out  to  navigable  water,  in  the  interest 
of  the  public  right  of  navigation  and  commerce.  The  establish- 
ment of  such  lines  and  prohibiting  the  building  of  piers  and 
wharves  beyond  such  lines,  is  not  a  taking  of  private  property, 
and  no  compensation  need  be  made  to  riparian  owners  on  account 
thereof.^^  But  existing  piers,  extending  beyond  the  lines  so 
established,  cannot  be  taken  or  destroyed  without  compensation, 
unless  they  are  an  obstruction  to  navigation.^*  Merely  estab- 
lishing a  harbor  line,  which  cuts  off  a  portion  of  plaintiff's 
wharf,  is  not  a  taking,  when  no  attempt  is  made  to  remove  it.^^ 
A  pier  which  obstructs  navigation  is  a  public  nuisance,*®  and 
the  owner  is  not  entitled  to  compensation  if  it  is  taken  or 
impaired  by  works  for  the  improvement  of  navigation.*'  Where 
the  abutter  owns  the  bed  of  a  stream,  a  dock  line  cannot  be  es- 
tablished which  prevents  the  erection  of  such  structures  in  or 
over  the  water  as  do  not  interfere  with  the  public  use  of  the 
stream.**  JTor  can  a  dock  line  be  established  which  at  certain 
points  passes  across  the  natural  bank  of  the  river.*®  The  right 
to  collect  wharfage  fees  cannot  be  taken  without  compensation.®" 

8  3  State  V.  Sargent,  45  Conn.  358;  Farist  Steel  Co.  v.  City  of  Bridge- 

Farist  Steel  Co.  v.  City  of  Bridge-  port,  60  Conn.  278,  22  Atl.  561. 

port,  60  Conn.  278,  22   Atl.  561 ;  Har-  siYates   v.   Milwaukee,    10   Wall. 

Ian  &  H.  Co.  v.  Paschall,  5  Del.  Ch.  497;  City  of  Chicago  v.  Lafiin,  49  111. 

435;  Commonwealth  V.  Alger,  7  Cush.  172. 

53;  City  of  Grand  Rapids  v.  Powers,  seProsser  v.  Northern  Pac.  K.  E. 

89  Mich.   94,  50  N.   W.   661,   5  Am.  Co.,  152  U.  S.  59,  14  S.  C.  528;  Yes- 

E.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  490,  28  Am.  St.  ler     v.     Washington     Harbor     Line 

Eep.  276,  14  L.R.A.  498;  Bowlby  v.  Comrs.,  146  U.  S.  646,  13  S.  C.  190; 

Shively,  22   Ore.  410,  30  Pac.   154;  Paine  Lumber  Co.  v.  United  States, 

Sherman  v.  Sherman,  18  R.  I.  504,  55  Fed.  854. 

30  Atl.  459 ;  Eisenback  V.  Hatfield,  2  seAtlee   v.   Packet   Co.,   21   Wall. 

Wash.   236,  26  Pac.  539,  12  L.R.A.  3S9. 

632;   State  v.  Prosser,  2  Wash.  530,  srPaine    Lumber    Co.    v.    United 

27  Pac.  550;  Yates  v.  Milwaukee,  10  States,  55  Fed.  854. 

Wall.  497;  Weber  v.  Harbor  Comrs.,  ssCity  of  Grand  Rapids  v.  Powers, 

18  Wall.  57;  Atlee  v.  Packet  Co.,  21  89  Mich.  94,  50  N.  W.  661,  5  Am. 

Wall.  389;  Yesler  v.  Wash.  Harbor  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Eep.  490,  28  Am.  St. 

Line  Comrs.,  146  U.  S.  646,  13  S.  C.  Rep.  276,  14  L.R.A.  498;  and  see  City 

190;  Prosser  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  R.  of  Janesville  v.  Carpenter,  77  Wis. 

Co.,    152    U.    S.    59,    14    S.    C.    528;  288,  46  N.  W.  128. 

Shively  v.  Bowlby,  152  U.  S.   1,  14  ssSame. 

S.  C.  Rep.  548.     Tlie  State  may,  of  soGrant  v.  Davenport,  18  la.  179; 

course,  provide  for  compensation  in  Crocker  v.  New  York,  15  Fed.  405. 
such  cases,  if  it  sees  fit  to  do  so. 


§    104  WATEES.  13Y 

Those  States  -which  hold  the  doctrine  of  the  absolute  title  of 
the  public  to  public  waters,  of  course,  deny  any  redress  for 
injury  to  riparian  rights,  for  the  reason  that  they  do  not  recog- 
nize the  existence  of  such  rights.  It  has  accordingly  been  held 
in  such  States  that  the  converting  of  a  private  wharf  into  a 
public  one,®^  or  the  building  of  public  wharves  in  front  of 
private  property,  to  be  owned  and  controlled  by  the  public,  are 
things  which  may  be  done  without  compensation  to  the  riparian 
owner.^^  But  even  in  such  States  a  wharf  which  has  been  built 
by  express  license  from  the  State  cannot  be  taken  for  public 
use,  as  for  the  pier  of  a  bridge,  without  compensation.^*  The 
grant  by  the  State  of  the  right  to  plant  oysters  is  subject  to  the 
right  of  the  riparian  owner  to  wharf  out  through  such  beds.''* 

§  104  (84c).  Rights  of  riparian  owners  upon  lakes  and 
ponds  and  what  interference  therewith  is  a  taking.  The 
rights  of  riparian  owners  upon  lakes  and  ponds  are  the  same  as 
upon  other  waters.®*  Accordingly  the  abutting  owners  upon  a 
lake  or  pond,  whether  the  title  to  the  bed  is  in  the  public  or  the 
abutters,  have  a  right  to  have  the  water  stand  at  its  natural 
level,®®  and  it  follows  that  the  waters  cannot  be  raised  or  low- 
ered or  taken  away  without  compensation.*'^  The  temporary 
raising  of  the  water  in  a  pond  and  flooding  of  plaintiff's  land 

siHart   V.    Mayor    etc.    of   Baton  371;  Draper  v.  Brown,  115  Wis.  361, 

Rouge,  10  La.  Ann.  171;  Shepherd  v.  91  N.  W.  1001. 
New  Orleans,  6  Rob.  La.  349.  s'Same;    Valparaiso   City   Water 

92Ravenswood  v.  Fleming,  22  W.  Co.  v.  Diclcover,  17  Ind.  App.  233; 

Va.  52,  46  Am.  Rep.  485;  Payne  v.  Hebron  v.  Gravel  Road  Co.,  90  Ind. 

English,  79  Cal.  540,  21  Pac.  052.  192,  46  Am.  Rep.  199;  Troe  v.  Lar- 

9  3Lewis  V.   City  of   Portland,   25  son,  84  la.  649,  51  N.  W.  179,  35  Am. 

Ore.  133,  35  Pac.  256,  42  Am.  St.  Rep.  St.    Kep.    336;    Clark    v.    Rockland 

772,  22  L.R.A.  736;  and  see  Classen  Water   Co.,   52  Me.   68;    Fernold  v. 

V.   Guano  Co.,  81  Md.  258,   31   Atl.  Knox  Woolen  Co.,  82  Me.  48,  19  Atl. 

808.  93;  People  v.  Hulbert,  131  Mich.  156, 

9  4Prior  V.  Swartz,  62  Conn.  132,  25  91  N.  W.  211,  100  Am.  St.  Rep.  588, 

Atl.   398,   36  Am.   St.   Rep.   333,   18  64  L.R.A.  265;  Concord  Mfg.  Co.  v. 

L.R.A.  668.  Robertson,  66  N.  H.  1,  25  Atl.  713, 

95Lamphrey    v.    State,    52    Minn.  18   L.R.A.   679;    Peay  v.   Salt  Lake 

181,  53  N.  W.  1139;  and  cases  cited  City,  11  Utah  331,  40  Pac.  206;  New 

in  §  90.  Whatcom    v.    Fairhaven    Land    Co., 

9  6 Albert  Lea  v.  Nielsen,  80  Minn.  24  Wash.  493,  64  Pac.  735,  54  L.R.A. 

101,  82  N.  W.  1104,  81  Am.  St.  Rep.  190;  ante,  §  87.     And  see  next  sec- 

242;   Madson  v.  Spokane  Val.  L.  &  tion.      Compare    Kales    v.    Spokane 

W.  Co.,  40  Wash.  414,  82  Pac.  718;  Val.  L.  &  W.  Co.,  42  Wash.  43,  84 

Cedar  Lake  Hotel  Co.  v.  Cedar  Lake  Pao.  395. 
Hydraulic  Co.,  79  Wis.  297,  48  N.  W. 


138  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    105 

by  a  coffer  dam  in  the  outlet,  for  tlie  purpose  of  constructing 
a  bridge,  was  held  to  be  no  actionable  injury.*"*  And  where  a 
city,  on  the  recommendation  of  its  board  of  health  and  pursuant 
to  statutory  authority,  raised  the  surface  of  a  lake  as  a  health 
measure,  whereby  the  plaintiff's  riparian  lands  were  flooded, 
the  city  was  held  not  liable  on  the  ground  that  it  acted  as  an 
agent  of  the  State.®®  The  question  of  a  taking  was  not  discussed. 
§  105  (84d).  Withdrawing,  diverting  or  polluting 
public  waters.  We  have  considered  this  question  with  refer- 
ence to  public  rivers  in  a  former  section.-^  We  have  there  en- 
deavored to  sustain  the  view  that  the  right  to  the  flow  of  the 
stream  is  the  same,  whether  the  bed  is  public  or  private  prop- 
erty. The  same  principles  which  apply  to  public  streams  apply 
to  public  lakes  and  ponds,  so  far  as  the  conditions  make  them 
applicable.^  It  would  follow  that  the  water  of  public  lakes  and 
ponds  could  not  be  withdrawn  for  public  use,  without  compen- 
sation to  the  riparian  owners.  But  some  of  the  courts  hold 
that  the  waters  of  a  public  stream  or  pond  may  be  taken  for  pub- 
lic use,  as  to  supply  a  city  with  water,  or  for  a  canal,  without 
compensation  to  the ,  riparian  owner.^  But  in  Massachusetts, 
where  this  doctrine  prevails,  it  is  held  not  to  apply  to  the  case 
of  private  ponds.*  In  JSTew  Jersey  it  is  held  that  public  waters 
belong  absolutely  to  the  public  and  that  the  legislature  may  au- 
thorize the  pollution  of  a  tidal  stream  with  sewerage,  without 
liability  to  riparian  proprietors.^ 

ssAtwater  v.  Village  of  Canandal-  504;  Grill  v.  Rowe,  47  How.  Pr.  398; 

gua,  124  N.  Y.  602,  27  N.  E.  385,  af-  and  see  Fulmer  v.  Williams,  122  Pa. 

firming  S.  C.  56  Hun  293,  30  N.  Y.  St.  191,  15  Atl.  726,  9  Am.  St.  Eep. 

Supp.  577.  88,  1  L.E.A.  603;   Williama  v.  Ful- 

9  9Murray     v.     Grass     Lake,     125  mer,  151  Pa.  St.  405,  25  Atl.  103,  31 

Mich.  2,  83  N.  W.  995.  Am.  St.  Eep.  767;  Auburn  v.  Union 

^Ante,  §  87.  Water  Power  Co.,  90  Me.  576,  38  Atl. 

2See  last  section.  561,    38    L.E.A.    188;    St.    Anthony 

3Am.    Woolen    Co.    v.    Kennebec  Palls  Water  Power  Co.  v.  St.  Paul 

Water  Dist.,   102  Me.   153,   66  Atl.  Water  Comrs.,  168  U.  S.  349. 
316;   Fay  v.  Salem  &  D.  Aqueduct  ^Watuppa   Reservoir   Co.   v.   Fall 

Co.  Ill  Mass.  27;  Cole  v.  Eastham,  River,  154  Mass.  305,  28  N.  E.  Rep, 

133   Mass.   65;    Watuppa   Reservoir  257.     And  the  taking  the  water  of 

Co.  V.  Fall  River,  147  Mass.  548,  1  a,  public  pond  by  a  water  company, 

L.R.A.  466;  Minneapolis  Mill  Co.  v.  without  authority  of  law,  will  be  en- 

Eoard   of   Water   Comrs.,   56   Minn.  joined.     Proprietors     of     Mills     v. 

485,  58  N.  W.  33;  State  v.  Sunapee  Braintree    Water    Supply    Co.,    149 

Dam  Co.,  70  N.  H.  458,  50  Atl.  108,  Mass.  478,  21  N.  E.  761. 
59   L.R.A.   55;    Dolbear   v.   Suncook  sSayre  v.  Newark,   60  N.   J.  Eq. 

W.   W.   Co.,  72  N.  H.  562,  58  Atl.  361,  45  Atl.  985,   83  Am.   St.   Rep. 


§    106  WATEES.  139 

§  106  (85).  Miscellaneous  cases  in  regard  to  public 
waters.  The  plaintiff  had  land  on  an  island  in  the  Savannah 
Eiver  and  also  on  the  banks  of  the  same,  prepared  for  rice  fields. 
There  were  canals  by  which  the  water  could  be  let  in  at  high 
tide  and  drained  off  at  low  tide,  both  operations  being  essential 
for  rice.  The  government,  for  the  purpose  of  improving  the 
navigation  of  the  river,  built  a  dam,  which  raised  the  water  so 
that  the  plaintiff  could  not  drain  his  lands  at  low  tide  and  there- 
by interfered  with  their  use  for  raising  rice  and  diminished 
their  value.  It  was  held  that  there  was  no  taking  of  the  plain- 
tiff's property  and  that  he  could  not  recover  any  compensation." 
It  has  been  held  that  interfering  with  a  fishery  by  a  wall  or 
wharf,''  or  destroying  a  fording  by  deepening  the  channel  of  a 
public  river,*  were  damnum  absque  injuria.  A  statute  of  Wis- 
consin made  it  unlawful  for  any  person  to  drive  piles,  build 
piers,  cribs  or  other  structures  in  Eock  River,  in  Eock  County. 
It  was  held  to  be  an  attempt  to  take  the  property  of  riparian 
owners  without  compensation,  and  upon  this  and  other  grounds 
was  declared  invalid.®  Where  a  company  is  authorized  to  con- 
struct tide-water  mills,  with  suitable  basins  and  other  works 
below  high  water  mark,  a  railroad  company  cannot  cross  the 
same  without  compensation  for  the  damages  occasioned.^"  It 
has  been  held  in  California  that  one  who  erected  a  house  in  San 
Francisco  Bay  had  a  right  of  property  therein  as  against  the 
city  of  San  Francisco,  which  proposed  to  take  the  ground  it  oc- 
cupied for  a  public  slip.-^^  One  who  has  planted  oysters  in 
public  waters  for  thirty  years  acquires  no  rights  as  against  the 
public. -^^  If  one  has  an  exclusive  right  to  the  wharfage  of 
a  pier,  the  city  cannot  appropriate  the  adjoining  slip  to  the  pur- 
poses of  a  ferry  without  compensation.^^     Defendant  was  pro- 

629,  48  L.R.A.  722,  reversing  S.  C.  butes,  as  to  say  that  the  owner  shall 

58  N.  J.  Eq.  136,  42  Atl.  1068.  not  use  his  property  as  he  pleases, 

sMilla  V.  United   States,  46  Fed.  takes  it  in  violation  of  the  constitu- 

738.  tion." 

'Tinicum  Fishing  Co.  v.  Carter,  61  lOBoston  Water  Power  Co.  v.  Bos- 
Pa.  St.  21;  S.  C.  90  Pa.  St.  85.  ton  &  Worcester  E.  R.  Co.,  16  Pick. 

sZiramerman  v.  Union  Canal  Co.,  512. 
1  W.  &  S.  346.  iiGunter  v.  Geary,  1  Cal.  462. 

9City  of  Janesville  v.  Carpenter,  i2Post  v.  Kreischer,  32  Hun  49; 

77   Wis.   288,   46   N.   W.    128.     The  Lane   v.   Harbor    Comrs.,   70    Conn, 

court  says:   "Any  restriction  or  in-  685;  Lane  v.  Smith,  71  Conn.  65,  41 

terruption  of  the  common  and  nee-  Atl.  18. 

essary  use  of  property  that  destroys  i3Murray  v.  Sharp,  1  Bos.  539. 

its  value,  or  strips  it  of  its  attri- 


140  EMINENT    BOMAIN.  §    107 

ceeding  to  erect  a  building  at  the  foot  of  a  street  terminating 
on  Chatauqua  Lake,  a  navigable  body  of.  water,  and  the  city 
filed  a  bill  to  enjoin  him  from  doing  so.  It  was  held  that  the 
city  had  no  riparian  rights  and  could  not  maintain  the  bill  and 
that  only  the  Attorney-General  could  interfere.-^*  The  State 
of  Virginia  granted  to  plaintiff  submerged  lands  in  York  River 
for  oyster  beds.  The  United  States  in  improving  the  naviga- 
tion of  the  river  cut  a  channel  through  these  lands,  deposited 
materials  thereon  and  diverted  water  therefrom,  thus  occupying 
part  and  destroying  the  value  of  the  remainder  for  oyster 
raising.  It  was  held  that  the  plaintiff  had  a  property  right 
in  the  lands  granted  and  was  entitled  to  compensation  from 
the  federal  government.  ^^  A  law  setting  apart  certain  sub- 
merged lands  on  the  margin  of  Lake  Erie  for  a  public  shooting 
ground  and  forbidding  the  cutting  of  rushes  thereon  was  held 
not  to  interfere  with  the  riparian  owner's  rights.-'®  The  State 
may  develop  and  utilize  the  natural  resources  in  land  under 
tide  water,  when  there  is  no  actual  interference  with  riparian 
rights  in  so  doing."  A  statute  of  Wisconsin  forbade,  under 
a  penalty,  the  cutting  of  ice  upon  any  meandered  lake  of  the 
State  for  shipment  out  of  the  State,  without  a  license  from 
the  Secretary  of  State  and  the  payment  of  ten  cents  a  ton  upon 
all  ice  so  cut  and  shipped.  The  act  was  held  void  on  the  ground 
that  it  violated  the  fourteenth  amendment  of  the  federal  Consti- 
tution and  amounted  to  a  taking  of  property  without  compen- 
sation.^* 

§  107  (8Sa).  Riparian  rights  cannot  be  abolished  with- 
out compensation.  A  statute  of  Nebraska  authorized  corpo- 
rations to  appropriate  the  water  of  streams  more  than  twenty 
feet  in  width,  for  purposes  of  irrigation,  without  compensation 
to  riparian  owners.  It  was  held  to  be  contrary  to  the  consti- 
tution.^^ The  court  says:  "The  right  of  a  riparian  proprietor, 
as  such,  is  property,  and,  when  vested,  can  be  destroyed  or  im- 
paired only  in  the  interest  of  the  general  public,  upon  full  com- 

14 Village  of  Mayville  v.  Wilcox,  Va.  759,  47  S.  E.  875,  102  Am.  St. 

61  Hun  223,  40  N.  Y.  St.  892,  16  N,  Rep.  865. 

Y.  Supp.  15.  isRossmiller   v.    State,    114   Wis. 

isBrown  v.  United  States,  81  Fed.  169,  89  N.  W.  839,  91  Am.  St.  Rep. 

55.  910,  58  L.R.A.  93. 

16  People  V.  Silberwood,  110  Mich.  is  Clark  v.  Irrigation  Co.,  45  Neb. 

103,  32  L.R.A.  694.  799,  64  N.  W.  239. 

1 'Taylor    v.    Commonwealth,    102 


§    108  WATERS.  141 

pensation,  and  in  accordance  with  established  law.  That  the 
State  may,  in  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent  domain,  ap- 
propriate the  water  of  any  stream  to  any  purpose  which  will 
subserve  the  public  interests,  is  not  doubted.  And  that  the 
reclamation  of  the  inarable  lands  of  the  State  is  a  work  of  pub- 
lic utility,  within  the  meaning  of  the  constitution,  is  a  propo- 
sition not  controverted  in  this  proceeding.  But  even  the  State, 
in  its  sovereign  capacity,  is,  as  we  have  seen,  within  the  restric- 
tions of  the  constitution,  and  can  take  or  damage  private  prop- 
erty only  upon  the  conditions  thereby  imposed.  The  proposi- 
tion that  the  rights  of  riparian  proprietors  were  abolished  by 
operation  of  the  statute  is  therefore  without  merit."  ^°  A  stat- 
ute of  Texas,  declaring  the  unappropriated  waters  of  every 
river  or  natural  stream  within  the  arid  portions  of  the  State 
to  be  the  property  of  the  public,  was  held  to  be  inoperative  as 
to  existing  riparian  owners  on  such  streams.^-^  It  has  been  held 
that  the  State  cannot,  under  the  guise  of  a  police  regulation, 
deprive  the  riparian  owners  upon  a  lake  of  the  ordinary  and 
customary  uses  of  the  water  for  bathing,  boating,  fishing,  and 
watering  stock,  without  compensation.^^ 

§  108  (86).  Damages  from  discharge  of  sewer.  A 
municipal  corporation  has  no  right  to  discharge  a  sewer  upon 
private  property,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  and  will  be  liable 
for  any  damage  thereby  occasioned.^^     Nor  has  it  a  right  to 

^oSce  also  Lux  v.  Haggin,  69  Cal.  rig,  111  Ky.  903,  64  S.  W.  958,  98 

255,  10  Pac.  674;  City  of  Janesville  Am.  St.  Rep.  437;  Covington  v.  Ber- 

V.  Carpenter,  77  Wis.  288,  46  N.  W.  ry,  120  Ky.  582,  87  S.  W.  317;  Statu 

128;     Priewe    v.     Wisconsin     State  v.   Jersey   City,   55   N.   J.   Eq.   117; 

Land  &   Imp.  Co.,  93  Wis.   534,  67  Stoddard  v.   Saratoga   Springs,   127 

N.  W.  918,  33  L.R.A.  645.  N.  Y.  261,  27  N.  B.  1030;  New  York 

2iMcGee   Irrigation   Ditch   Co.   v.  Central  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Rochester, 

Hudson,  85  Tex.  587,  22  S.  W.  967;  127  N.  Y.  591,  28  N.  E.  416;  Bradt 

Barrett   v.    Metcalfe,    12    Tex.    Civ.  v.   Albany,   5   Hun   591 ;    Byrnes   v. 

App.  247,  33  S.  W.  758.     See  ante,  Cohoes,  5  Hun  602 ;  Beach  v.  Elmira, 

§  82.  22  Hun  158;  Duryea  v.  Mayor  ete.  of 

2  2George  v.  Chester,  59  Misc.  553;  New  York,  26  Hun  120;   Harris  v. 

Heaton  v.  Chester,  59  Misc.  558.  City  of  Philadelphia,  155  Pa.  St.  76, 

23Smith  V.  Atlanta,  75  Ga.  110;  26  Atl.  874;  Pierce  v.  Gibson 
Martin  v.  Gainsville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  County,  107  Tenn.  224,  64  S.  W.  33, 
78  Ga.  307;  Langley  v.  Augusta,  118  89  Am.  St.  Rep.  946,  55  L.R.A.  477; 
Ga.  590,  45  S.  E.  486,  98  S.  E.  133;  Winn  v.  Rutland,  52  Vt.  481;  Whip- 
Jacksonville  V.  Lambert,  62  111.  519;  pie  v.  Fair  Haven,  63  Vt.  221,21  Atl. 
Valparaiso  v.  Keyes,  30  Ind.  App.  533;  Colby  v.  Village  of  LaGrange, 
447,  66  N.  E.  175;  LouisviUe  v.  Nor-  65  Fed.  554.     But  there  is  no  lia- 


142 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  108 


discharge  the  same  into  a  private  race-way  or  canal,^*  or  mill 
pond,^^  or  even  into  tide  waters  so  as  to  impede  access  to  a  pri- 
vate wharf  or  pier,^®  nor  so  as  to  create  a  nuisance  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  private  property.^^  But  the  contrary  is  held  in  New 
Jersey  with  respect  to  tide  waters.  The  city  of  Newark  under 
legislative  authority,  discharged  a  sewer  into  a  tide  water  river 
within  twenty-five  feet  of  the  plaintiff's  premises,  and  thereby 
created  an  offensive  nuisance  in  the  vicinity  of  his  property. 
The  court  of  errors  and  appeals  held  that  the  plaintiff  was  with- 
out remedy.^*  Where  the  plaintiff  had  an  oyster  bed,  held 
under  a  grant  from  the  State  and  the  same  was  destroyed  by 
sewerage  discharged  into  the  water  some  three  hundred  feet 
away,  it  was  held  that  there  was  a  taking  of  the  plaintiff's 
property  and  that  he  was  entitled  to  compensation.^"  A  city 
is  not  liable  for  not  providing  sufficient  sewerage  or  sewers  of 
sufficient  size,^"  nor  for  an  injudicious  plan  of  sewerage,*^  but 
will  of  course  be  liable  for  any  damages  caused  by  negligence 


bility  if  the  sewer  is  laid  with  the 
plaintiff's  consent.  Searing  v.  Sara- 
toga Springs,  39  Hun  307. 

24Boston  Rolling  Mills  v.  Cam- 
bridge, 117  Mass.  396;  Elgin  Hy- 
draulic Co.  V.  Elgin,  74  111.  433 ;  Au- 
gusta V.  Marks,  124  Ga.  365,  52  N. 
E.  539.  ■ 

2  6Mill3  V.  Nashua,  63  N.  H.  42. 

2  6  Sleight  V.  Kingston,  11  Hun 
594;  Haskell  v.  New  Bedford,  108 
Mass.  208;  Bray  ton  v.  FallEiver,  113 
Mass.  218,  18  Am.  Rep.  470;  Breed 
V.  Lynn,  126  Mass.  367;  Constitu- 
tion Wharf  Co.  v.  City  of  Boston, 
150  Mass.  397,  30  N.  E.  1134; 
Butchers'  Ice  &  C.  Co.  v.  Philadel- 
phia, 156  Pa.  St.  54,  27  Atl.  376. 
Nor  so  as  to  destroy  an  oyster  bed. 
Huffmire  v.  Brooklyn,  22  App.  Div. 
N.  Y.  406.  And  see  Atwood  v.  Ban- 
gor, 83  Me.  582,  22  Atl.  466. 

2  7  Scott  V.  Nevada,  56  Mo.  App. 
189;  Bloomington  v.  Murnin,  36  111. 
App.  647;  Dierks  v.  Comrs.  of  High- 
ways, 142  111.  197,  31  N.  E.  496; 
Stewart  v.  Rutland,  58  Vt.  12; 
Champaign  v.  Forrester,  29  111.  App. 
117. 


zsSayre  v.  Newark,  60  N.  J.  Eq. 
361,  45  Atl.  985,  83  Am.  St.  Rep. 
629,  48  L.R.A.  722,  reversing  S.  C. 
58  N.  J.  Eq.  136,  42  Atl.  1068. 

2  9HuflFmire  v.  Brooklyn,  162  N.  Y. 
584,  57  N.  B.  176,  48  L.R.A.  421. 

soCarr  v.  Northern  Liberties,  35 
Pa.    St.     324,    78    Am.    Dec.    342 
Wright  V.  Wilmington,  92  N.  C.  156 
Kozell    V.    Anderson,    91    Ind.    591 
Rice   V.   Evansville,    108   Ind.  7,   58 
Am.  Rep.  22;  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Duluth,  56  Minn.  494,  58  N.  W. 
Rep.  159. 

siChicago  v.  Seben,  165  111.  371, 
46  N.  E.  244,  56  Am.  St.  Rep.  245; 
Seymour  v.  Cummins,  119  Ind.  148, 
24  N.  E.  549,  5  L.R.A.  126;  Child  v. 
Boston,  4  Allen,  41,  81  Am.  Dec. 
680;  Stock  v.  Boston,  149  Mass.  410, 
21  N.  E.  871,  14  Am.  St.  Rep.  430; 
Buckley  v.  New  Bedford,  155  Mass. 
64,  29  N.  E.  201 ;  Mills  v.  Brooklyn, 
32  N.  Y.  489;  Johnston  v.  District 
of  Columbia,  118  U.  S.  19.  But  see 
North  Vernon  v.  Voegler,  103  Ind. 
314,  2  N.  E.  821;  Louisville  v.  Nor- 
ris.  111  Ky.  903,  64  S.  W.  958,  98 
Am.  St.  Rep.  437.    "Where  the  plan 


§  109 


WATEES, 


143 


in  their  construction  or  management.^^  Damages  arising  from 
changing,  obstructing  or  otherwise  interfering  with  the  flow 
of  surface  water  by  means  of  sewers,  drains  and  culverts  are 
considered  in  subsequent  sections.^* 

§  109  (87).  Discharging  water  upon  land;  injury  by 
seeping,  saturating,  etc.  An  early  and  important  decision 
as  to  what  constitutes  a  taking  was  made  in  Connecticut.  De- 
fendant was  incorporated  for  the  purpose  of  constructing  and 
maintaining  a  canal  from  New  Haven  to  ISTorthhampton.  The 
canal  was  built  and  water  escaped  from  the  canal  by  a  waste 
wier,  and  after  passing  over  the  land  of  intermediate  proprie- 
tors, washed  and  gullied  the  plaintiff's  land.  In  a  suit  for  the 
damages,  it  was  held  that  any  injury  to  the  land  which  deprived 
the  owner  of  the  ordinary  use  and  enjoyment  of  it  was  equiva- 


adopted  by  the  municipality  must 
necessarily  cause  an  injury  to  pri- 
vate property  equivalent  to  some 
appropriation  of  the  enjoyment 
thereof  to  which  the  owner  is  en- 
titled, then  the  municipality  is  lia- 
ble ;  but  where  the  fault  found  is  with 
the  wisdom  of  the  measure,  or  its 
sufficiency  or  adaptability  to  carry 
out  or  accomplish  the  purpose  in- 
tended, and  where  its  construction 
according  to  the  plan  adopted  in- 
vades no  private  rights,  then  the 
municipality  is  not  liable."  Defer 
V.  City  of  Detroit,  67  Mich.  346,  34 
N.  W.  680. 

3  2Arnd  v.  Cullman,  132  Ala.  540, 
31  So.  478,  90  Am.  St.  Rep.  922; 
Spangler  v.  San  Francisco,  84  Cal. 
12,  23  Pac.  1091,  18  Am.  St.  Eep. 
158;  Denver  v.  Rhodes,  9  Colo.  554; 
Judd  V.  Hartford,  72  Conn.  350,  44 
Atl.  510,  77  Am.  St.  Rep.  312;  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia  v.  Gray,  6  App.  D. 
C.  314;  Reid  v.  Atlanta,  73  Ga.  523; 
Logansport  v.  Wright,  25  Ind.  512; 
Indianapolis  v.  Huffer,  30  Ind.  235; 
Terre  Haute  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  McCoy, 
113  Ind.  498;  Murphy  v.  Indianapo- 
lis, 158  Ind.  238,  63  N.  E.  469;  City 
of  Peru  V.  Brown,  10  Ind.  App.  597 ; 
Simpson    v.    Keokuk,    34    la.    568; 


Frostburg  v.  Dufty,  70  Md.  47,  16 
Atl.  642;  Frostburg  v.  Hutchins 
Bros.,  70  Md.  56,  16  Atl.  380;  Child 
V.  Boston,  4  Allen,  41 ;  Barry  v.  Low- 
ell, 8  Allen,  127;  Staunchfeld  v. 
City  of  Newton,  142  Mass.  110; 
Bates  V.  Westborough,  151  Mass. 
174,  23  N.  E.  1070,  7  L.R.A.  156; 
Allen  V.  Boston,  159  Mass.  324,  34 
N.  E.  519;  Ashley  v.  Port  Huron, 
35  Mich.  296,  20  Am.  Rep.  629;  De- 
fer v.  Detroit,  67  Mich.  346,  34  N.  W. 
680;  Taylor  v.  Austin,  32  Minn. 
247;  Haney  v.  Kansas  City,  94  Mo. 
334,  7  S.  W.  417;  City  of  Bea- 
trice V.  Leary,  45  Neb.  149,  63 
N.  W.  370,  50  Am.  St.  Rep. 
546;  Gilman  v.  Laconia,  55  N. 
PI.  130,  20  Am.  Rep.  175;  New 
York  V.  Furze,  3  Hill,  612;  Paine 
V.  Delhi,  116  N.  Y.  224,  22  N.  E. 
405,  5  L.R.A.  797;  Lewenthal  v. 
New  York,  5  Lans.  532 ;  Vanderslice 
V.  Philadelphia,  103  Pa.  St.  102; 
King  V.  Granger,  21  R.  I.  93,  79  Am. 
St.  Rep.  779;  Gross  v.  City  of  Lamp- 
sacus,  74  Tex-.  195,  11  S.  W.  1086; 
Kiesel  v.  Ogden  City,  8  Utah,  237, 
30  Pac.  758;  and  see  generally  on 
this  subject  2  Dill.  Munic.  Corp. 
§§  1046-1052. 

33;See  post  §§  112,  113,  141. 


144 


EMINEH'T    DOMAIN. 


§  109 


lent  to  a  taking,  and  that  the  plaintiff  should  recover.^*  Caus- 
ing water  to  flow  upon  land  is  a  clear  violation  of  the  right  of 
exclusive  occupation  and  enjoyment,  which  cannot  be  taken  or 
interfered  with  without  compensation,  l^umerous  cases  sup- 
port this  conclusion.^  ^  So  damage  to  land  caused  by  percola- 
tion and  seeping  from  a  mill-pond,  canal  or  reservoir,  may  be 
recovered.*®  A  railroad  company  which  permitted  the  waste 
water  from  a  tank  to  run  upon  private  property,  where  it  caused 
damage  by  freezing  and  otherwise,  was  held  liable  for  the  dam- 


3<Hooker  v.  New  Haven  &  North- 
ampton Co.,  14  Conn.  146,  36  Am. 
Dee.  477,  affirmed  in  Same  v.  Same, 
15  Conn.  312. 

3  5How  V.  Chesapeake  &  Delaware 
Canal  Co.,  5  Harr.  Del.  245;  Foot 
V.  New  Haven  &  N.  Co.,  23  Conn. 
214;  Phinizy  v.  City  Council  of  Au- 
gusta, 47  Ga.  260;  East  St.  Louis  & 
G.  R.  E.  Co.  V.  Elsentraut,  134  111. 
90,  24  N.  E.  760;  City  of  Elgin  v. 
Hoag,  25  111.  App.  650;  Sanitary 
District  v.  Conroy,  109  111.  App. 
367;  Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Lockard,  112  111.  App.  423;  Sanitary 
District  v.  Alderman,  113  111.  App. 
23;  Wells  v.  New  Haven  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  151  Mass.  46,  23  N.  E.  724,  1 
Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  708;  State 
v.  Isanti  Co.  Comrs.,  98  Minn.  89, 
107  N.  W.  730;  George  v.  Wabash 
Western  R.  R.  Co.  40  Mo.  App.  433; 
Koch  V.  Delaware  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  54 
N.  J.  L.  401,  24  Atl.  442;  Stone  v. 
State,  138  N.  Y.  124,  33  N.  E.  733; 
Wright  V.  byracuse  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
49  Hun  445,  23  N.  Y.  St.  78,  3  N. 
Y.  Supp.  480;  S.  C.  affirmed,  124  N. 
Y.  638;  Selden  v.  Delaware  &  H. 
Canal  Co.,  24  Barb.  362;  Mattuson 
V.  Lehigh  Val.  R.  R.  Co.,  36  Pa. 
Super.  Ct.  66;  Wendel  v.  Spokane 
County,  27  Wash.  121,  67  Pac.  576; 
Arimond  v.  Same,  31  Wis.  316; 
Pumpelly  v.  Green  Bay  Co.,  13  Wall. 
166;  United  States  v.  Lynch,  188  U. 
S.  445,  23  S.  C.  349;  Contra:  West 
Branch  &  Susquehanna  Canal  Co.  v. 


Mulliner,  68  Pa.  St.  357.     And  see 
Noble  V.  St.  Albans,  56  Vt.  522. 

3  6  Consolidated  Home  Supply 
Ditch  &  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hamlin,  6  Colo. 
App.  341,  40  Pac.  582;  Ellington  v. 
Bennett,  59  Ga.  286;  Young  v.  Ex- 
tension Ditch  Co.,  13  Ida.  174,  89 
Pac.  296;  Wilson  v.  New  Bedford, 
108  Mass.  261 ;  Griffin  v.  Lawrence, 
135  Mass.  365;  Aid  worth  v.  City  of 
Lynn,  153  Mass.  53,  26  N.  E.  229,  25 
Am.  St.  Rep.  608,  10  L.R.A.  210 
Righter  v.  Jersey  City  Water  Sup 
ply  Co.,  73  N.  J.  L.  208,  03  Atl.  6 
Reed  v.  State,  108  N.  Y.  407,  15  N 
E.  735;  Sayre  v.  State,  123  N.  Y 
291,  25  N.  E.  163;  Southard  v 
Brooklyn,  1  App.  Div.  N.  Y.  175 
37  N.  Y.  Supp.  136;  Schwarzenbach 
v.  Electric  W.  P.  Co.,  101  App.  Div. 
345,  92  N.  Y.  S.  187;  S.  C.  affirmed, 
184  N.  Y.  546,  76  N.  E.  1108;  Spil- 
man  v.  Roanoke  Navigation  Co.,  74 
N.  C.  675;  Welliver  v.  Pa.  Canal 
Co.,  23  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  79;  Townes  v. 
City  Council,  46  S.  C.  15;  Texas  etc. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  O'Mahoney,  24  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  631,  60  S.  W.  902;  Turpen  v. 
Turlock  Irr.  Dist.  141  Cal.  1,  74 
Pac.  295;  Fleming  v.  Lockwood,  36 
Mont.  384,  92  Pac.  962.  In  Idaho 
Springs  v.  Woodward,  10  Colo.  104, 
the  defendant  town  was  held  not  lia- 
ble, for  that  it  granted  leave  to  a 
company  to  build  a  flume  in  a  street, 
the  water  of  which  leaked  upon 
plaintiff's  premises  ana  caused  dam- 
age. 


§  no 


WATERS. 


145 


ages  resulting  therefrom.^^  Where  a  railroad  company  filled 
its  land  and  built  a  retaining  wall  against  plaintiff's  house  wall, 
through  which  the  moisture  oozed  into  plaintiff's  house,  it  was 
held  to  be  an  unreasonable  use  of  the  company's  land.^^  Where 
water  percolated  from  a  catch-basin  into  plaintiff's  cellar,  the 
town  was  held  not  liable.''® 

§  110  (88).  Rights  respecting  surface  water.  Ee- 
specting  surface  water  which  accumulates  from  rains  and  melt- 
ing snows  and  seeks  a  lower  level,  by  force  of  gravity,  without 
flowing  in  any  defined  channel,  the  rights  of  an  owner  of  land 
are  very  different  from  those  respecting  running  streams. 
There  is  considerable  confiict  in  the  decisions  upon  this  subject, 
but  we  think  it  may  be  laid  down  as  the  better  and  more  ap- 
proved doctrine,  that  an  owner  of  land  has  a  right  to  have  the 
surface  water  flow  off  from  his  land  by  the  courses  and  channels 
in  which  it  is  naturally  accustomed  to  flow,  and  that  the  lower 
proprietor  has  no  right  to  prevent  or  hinder  such  flow  by  erect- 
ing barriers  or  otherwise.*"     The  owner  of  land  also  has  a  right 


3  7Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hoag,  90  111.  339.  To  same  effect, 
Kankakee  Water  Co.  v.  Reeves,  i!^ 
111.  App.  285;  Norman  v.  Ince,  8 
Okl.  412,  58  Pac.  632. 

ssHurdman  v.  North  Eastern  R. 
R.  Co.,  L.  R.  3  C.  P.  D.  168.  To 
same  effect,  Hartman  v.  Pitts- 
burg Inclined  Plane  R.  R.  Co.  159 
Pa.  St.  442,  28  Atl.  Rep.  145. 

39Kennison  v.  Beverly,  146  Mass. 
467. 

loHughes  V.  Anderson,  68  Ala. 
280,  44  Am.  Rep.  147;  Alabama  Gr. 
So.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Prouty,  149  Ala.  7, 
43  So.  352;  Ogburn  v.  Conner,  46 
Cal.  346,  13  Am.  Dec.  213;  Sanguin- 
ette  V.  Peck,  136  Cal.  466,  69  Pac. 
98,  89  Am.  St.  Rep.  169;  Adams  v. 
Walker,  34  Conn.  466;  Laney  v. 
Jasper,  39  111.  46;  Totel  v.  Bonne- 
foy,  123  111.  653,  5  Am.  St.  Rep.  570; 
Dayton  v.  Drainage  Comrs.,  128  111. 
271,  21  N.  E.  198;  Livingston  v. 
McDonald,  21  la.  160,  89  Am.  Dec. 
563;  Pickerill  v.  Louisville,  125  Ky. 
213;  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Davis,  68  Md.  281,  11  Atl.  822;  Da- 
Em.   D. — 10. 


vis  v.  Londgreen,  8  Neb.  43;  Boyn- 
ton  V.  Langley,  19  Nev.  169,  6  Pac. 
437,  3  Am.  St.  Rep.  781;  Earle  v. 
DeHart,  12  N.  J.  L.  280;  Porter  v. 
Durham,  74  N.  C.  767;  Briscoe  v. 
Parker,  145  N.  C.  14;  Toote  v.  Clif- 
ton, 22  Ohio  St.  247 ;  Butler  v.  Peck, 
16  Ohio  St.  334,  88  Am.  Dec.  452; 
Charlton  v.  Allegheny  City,  1  Grant's 
Cases,  208;  Martin  v.  Riddle,  26  Pa. 
St.  415;  Davidheiser  v.  Rhodes,  133 
Pa.  St.  226,  19  Atl.  400;  Gray  v. 
Knoxville,  85  Tenn.  99;  Beard  v. 
Murphy,  37  Vt.  99,  86  Am.  Dec.  493 ; 
Wood  on  Nuisances,  (lat  ed. )  §  386; 
Washburn  on  Easements,  pp.  427, 
429,  (2d  ed.)  The  latter  author 
says:  "The  owner  of  the  upper 
field,  in  such  case,  has  a,  natural 
easement,  as  it  is  called,  to  have 
the  vpater  which  falls  upon  his  own 
land  flow  ott  the  same  upon  the  field 
below,  which  is  charged  with  a  cor- 
responding servitude,  in  the  nature 
of  dominant  and  servient  tene- 
ments." p.  429.  Gould  oa  Waters, 
chap.  ix. 


146 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  no 


that  the  proprietor  of  lands  higher  than  his  own  shall  not,  hy 
artificial  means,  materially  increase  the  flow  of  such  surface 
water  or  discharge  it  upon  him  in  new  or  unusual  channels.*^ 
This  is  the  rule  of  the  civil  law  and,  in  addition  to  the  cases 
cited  is  supported  by  many  others  referred  to  in  the  following 
sections.*^  Any  proprietor  may,  of  course,  consume  all  the 
surface  water  which  he  finds  upon  his  premises,  no  matter 
whence  its  source,  and  divert  the  same  whither  he  pleases,  pro- 
vided he  does  not  injure  others  by  turning  it  upon  them.  In 
other  words,  the  lower  estate  has  no  right  to  the  continued  or 
uninterrupted  flow  of  such  water.*^  These  rights  are  subject 
to  the  paramount  right  of  every  proprietor  to  make  a  reasonable 
use  of  his  own  land.     In  agricultural  districts  one  may  plough 


41  Adams  v.  Walker,  34  Conn.  466; 
Livingston  v.  McDonald,  21  la.  160, 
89  Am.  Dec.  563;  Gregory  v.  Bush, 
64  Mich.  37,  31  N.  W.  90,  8  Am.  St. 
Rep.  797 ;  Chapel  v.  Smith,  80  Mich. 
100,  45  N.  W.  69 ;  Kelly  v.  Dunning, 
39  N.  J.  Eq.  482;  Field  v.  West 
Orange,  46  N.  J.  Eq.  183;  Porter  v. 
Durham,  74  N.  C.  767;  Staton  v. 
Norfolk  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  109  N.  C. 
337,  13  S.  E.  933;  Staton  v.  Norfolk 
&  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  Ill  N.  C.  278,  16  S. 
B.  181,  17  L.R.A.  838;  Kauffman  v. 
Greismer,  26  Pa.  St.  407;  Hays  v. 
Hinkleman,  68  Pa.  St.  324;  Dav- 
idheiser  v.  Rhodes,  133  Pa.  St. 
226,  19  Atl.  Rep.  400;  Wood 
on  Nuisances,  (1st  ed.)  §  386; 
Martin  v.  Riddle,  26  Pa.  St.  415. 
In  the  latter  case  the  court 
say:  "When  two  fields  adjoin,  and 
one  is  lower  than  the  other,  the 
lower  must  necessarily  be  subject  to 
all  the  natural  flow  of  water  from 
the  upper  one.  Th6  inconvenience 
arises  from  its  position,  and  is  usu- 
ally more  than  compensated  by 
other  circumstances.  Hence  the 
owner  of  the  lower  ground  has  no 
rigut  to  erect  embankments  where- 
by the  natural  flow  of  the  water 
from  the  upper  ground  shall  be 
stopped;  nor  has  the  owner  of  the 
upper  ground  a  right  to  make  any 


excavations  or  drains  by  which  the 
flow  of  the  water  is  diverted  from 
its  natural  channel,  and  a  new  chan- 
nel made  on  the  lower  ground;  nor 
can  he  collect  into  one  channel  wa- 
ters usually  flowing  oflf  into  his 
neighbor's  field  by  several  channels, 
and  thus  increase  the  wash  upon  the 
lower  fields.''  See  Manteufel  v. 
Wetzel,  133  Wis.  619. 

i^See  Wood  v.  Moulton,  146  Cal. 
317,  80  Pac.  92;  Chorman  v.  Queen 
Anne's  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Penn.  Del.  407, 
54  Atl.  687;  Pinkstaflf  v.  StefTy,  210 
111.  406,  75  ».  E.  163;  Chicago  etc. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Reuter,  223  111.  387,  79 
N.  E.  166;  Cranson  v.  Snyder,  137 
Mich.  340,  100  N.  W.  674;  Laun- 
stein  V.  launstein,  150  Mich.  524, 
114  N.  W.  383;  Mizell  v.  McGowan, 
120  N.  C.  134,  26  S.  E.  783;  Same  v. 
Same,  125  N.  C.  439,  34  S.  E.  538; 
Garland  v.  Aurin,  103  Tenn.  555, 
53  S.  W.  940,  76  Am.  St.  Rep.  699, 
48  L.R.A.  862;  Riverside  Cotton 
Mills  V.  Lanier,  102  Va.  148,  45  S. 
E.  875. 

4  3Bufrum  V.  Harris,  5  R.  I.  243 
Cott  V.  Lewiston,  30  N.  Y.  214,  217 
Curtiss   V.   Ayrault,   47   N.   Y.    73 
Broadbent  v.  Ramsbotham,  II  Exch. 
602;  Angell  on  Watercourses,  §  108 
r;  Washburn  on  Easements,  p.  435. 


110 


WATERS. 


147 


and  cultivate  his  land,  thougli  such  use  may  in  some  degree 
change  the  quantity  or  direction  of  the  flow  of  surface  water 
upon  a  lower  proprietor,  or  may  in  some  degree  obstruct  the 
flow  of  such  water  onto  his  premises  from  higher  land.** 
In  determining  the  question  of  reasonable  use,  says  the  court  in 
one  of  the  cases  cited,  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case  would 
have  to  be  taken  into  consideration,  "and  among  them  the  nature 
and  importance  of  the  improvements  sought  to  be  made,  the 
extent  of  the  interference  with  the  water,  and  the  amount  of 
injury  done  to  the  other  land  owners  as  compared  with  the  value 
of  such  improvements,  and  also  whether  such  injury  could 
or  could  not  have  been  reasonably  foreseen."  *^ 

These  views  in  respect  to  surface  water  are  in  conflict  with 
decisions  in  several  of  the  States.*"     The  courts  of  these  States 


4  4Swett  V.  Cutts,  50  N.  H.  439, 
446,  9  Am.  Eep.  276;  Gregory  v. 
Bush,  64  Mich.  37,  31  N.  W.  90; 
Peck  V.  Goodberlett,  109  N.  Y.  180, 
16  N.  E.  350;  Rindge  v.  Sargent,  64 
N.  H.  294.  In  the  last  case  it  is  held 
that  the  reasonableness  of  the  use 
of  land,  which  obstructs  the  flow  of 
surface  water,  is  determined  by  its 
operation  upon  the  interests  of  all 
parties  affected  by  it. 

4  5Swett  V.  Cutts,  50  N.  H.  439, 
446,  9  Am.  Rep.  276.  See  Broadwell 
Dr.  Dist.  V.  Lawrence,  231  111.  86, 
83  N.  E.  104;  Of  telle  v.  Hammond, 
78  Minn.  275,  80  N.  W.  1123;  Bald- 
win V.  Ohio  Tp.,  70  Kan.  102,  78  Pac 
424,  109  Am.  St.  Rep.  414,  67  L.R.A. 
()42;  Mizell  v.  McGowan,  129  N.  C, 
C3,  39  S.  E.  729,  85  Am.  St.  Rep 
705. 

4  6  Clay  V.  Pittsburg  etc.  Ry.  Co., 
164  Ind.  439,  73  N.  E.  904;  Drake  v. 
Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  70  la.  59; 
Kansas  City  &  Emporia  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Riley,  33  Kan.  374;  Chicago  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Steck,  51  Kan.  737,  33 
Pac.  601;  Mo.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Renfro,  52  Kan.  237,  34  Pac.  802,  39 
Am.  St.  Rep.  344;  Baldwin  v.  Ohio 
Tp.,  70  Kan.  102,  78  Pac.  424,  109 
Am.   St.   Rep.   414,   67   L.R.A.   042; 


Bryant  v.  Merritt,  71  Kan.  272,  80 
Pac.  600;  Hovey  v.  Mayo,  43  Me. 
322;  Bangor  v.  Lansil,  51  Me.  521; 
Greeley  v.  Maine  Central  R.  R.  Co., 
53  Me.  200;  Morrison  v.  Bucksport 
&  Bangor  R.  R.  Co.,  67  Me.  353; 
Gannon  v.  Hargadon,  10  Allen  106, 
87  Am.  Dec.  625;  Inhabitants  of 
Franklin  v.  Eisk,  13  Allen  211; 
Parks  V.  Newburyport,  10  Gray  28, 
90  Am.  Dec.  194;  Luther  v.  Win- 
nisimmet  Co.,  9  Cush.  171 ;  Ashley 
V.  Wolcott,  11  Cush.  192;  Sprague 
V.  Worcester,  13  Gray  193;  Flagg 
V.  Same,  Id.  601;  Illinois  Cent.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Miller,  68  Miss.  760,  10  So. 
61 ;  Cox  V.  Hannibal  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
174  Mo.  588,  74  S.  W.  854;  Martin  v. 
Benoist,  20  Mo.  App.  262;  Field  v. 
Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  Mo.  App. 
600;  Burke  v.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co., 
29  Mo.  App.  370;  St.  Louis  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Schneider,  30  Mo.  App. 
620;  Collier  v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  R. 
Co.,  48  Mo.  App.  398;  Kenney  v. 
Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  69  Mo. 
App.  569;  De  Lappe  v.  Kansas  City 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  69  Mo.  App.  572; 
Graves  v.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  69  Mo.  App.  574;  Kearney  v. 
Themanson,  48  Neb.  74,  66  N.  W. 
996;  Churchill  v.  Beethe,  48  Neb.  87, 


148 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  110 


hold  that  the  owner  of  land  may  use  or  improve  it  without  any 
regard  to  the  surface  water  which  comes  upon  or  flows  over  it, 
that  he  may  erect  a  barrier  so  as  to  prevent  its  flow  on  to  his 
land,  and  may  discharge  it  in  new  channels  or  in  augmented 
quantities  upon  the  land  below.  This  is  known  as  the  "common 
law  rule,"  or  as  the  "old  common  law  rule."  This  has  b.een  so 
far  modified  by  the  later  decisions  that  it  is  held  by  many  courts 
adhering  generally  to  the  common  law  rule,  that  surface  water 
flowing  in  a  ravine,  draw,  swale  or  well  defined  natural  depres- 


66  N.  W.  992,  35  L.R.A.  442;  Town 
V.  Missouri  Pac.  E,.  R.  Co.,  50  Neb. 
768;  Egerer  v.  New  York  etc.  E.  K. 
Co.,  3  App.  Div.  157,  38  N.  Y.  S. 
319;  Edwards  v.  Charlotte  etc.  K. 
R.  Co.,  39  S.  C.  472,  18  S.  E.  58,  39 
Am.  St.  Rep.  746,  22  L.R.A.  246; 
Baltzege  v.  Carolina-Midland  R.  R. 
Co.,  54  S.  C.  242,  32  S.  E.  358,  71 
Am.  St.  Rep.  789;  Lawton  v.  South 
Bound  R.  R.  Co.  61  S.  C.  548,  39  S. 
E.  752;  Barnett  v.  Matagorda  R.  & 
I.  Co.,  98  Tex.  355,  83  S.  W.  801,  107 
Am.  St.  Rep.  636;  Norfolk  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Carter,  91  Va.  587,  22  S. 
E.  517;  Cass  v.  Dicks,  14  Wash.  75, 
53  Am.  St.  Rep.  859;  Jordan  v. 
Benwood,  42  W.  Va.  312,  26  S.  E. 
266,  57  Am.  St.  Rep.  859,  36  L.R.A. 
519;  Neal  v.  Ohio  Riv.  R.  R.  Co., 
47  W.  Va.  316,  34  S.  E.  914;  Hoyt 
V.  Hudson,  27  Wis.  656;  Heth  v. 
Kond  du  Lac,  63  Wis.  228,  53  Am. 
Rep.  279;  Waters  v.  Bay  View,  61 
Wis.  642;  Johnson  v.  Chicago  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  80  Wis.  641,  50  N.  W. 
771,  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  76,  14  L.R.A. 
495 ;  Champion  v.  Crandon,  84  Wis. 
405,  54  N.  W.  775,  19  L.R.A.  856; 
Crawson  v.  Grand  Trunli  R.  R.  Co., 
27  U.  C.  Q.  B.  68;  Ostrom  v.  Sills, 
24  Ont.  526. 

In  Minnesota  the  common  law  rule 
as  to  surface  water  has  been  gen- 
erally adopted. 

Rowe  V.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
41  Minn.  384,  43  N.  W.  76,  16  Am. 
St.  Rep.  700;  Jordan  v.  St.  Paul  etc. 


R.  R.  Co.,  42  Minn.  172,  43  N.  W. 
849,  6  L.R.A.  573;  Eollman  v.  City 
of  Mankato,  45  Minn.  457,  48  N.  W. 
192;  Brown  v.  Winona  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  53  Minn.  259,  55  N.  W.  123,  39 
Am.  St.  Rep.  603;  Werner  v.  Papf, 
94  Minn.  118,  102  N.  W.  366.  In  the 
case  of  Sheehan  v.  Flynn,  59  Minn. 
436,  61  N.  W.  462,  26  L.R.A.  632, 
the  court,  to  some  extent,  criticises 
and  disapproves  former  cases,  and 
sums  up  the  rule  of  the  court  as 
follows:  "1.  The  old  common  law 
rule  that  surface  water  is  »  common 
enemy,  which  each  owner  may  get 
rid  of  as  best  he  can,  is  in  force  in 
this  state,  except  that  it  is  modified 
by  the  rule  that  he  must  so  use  his 
own  as  not  unnecessarily  or  unreason- 
ably to  injure  his  neighbor.  Under 
this  rule,  it  is  the  duty  of  an  owner 
draining  his  own  land  to  deposit  the 
surface  water  in  some  natural  drain, 
if  one  is  reasonably  accessible;  and 
he  is  entitled  to  deposit  the  same  in 
sucli  natural  drain,  though  it  is 
thereby  conveyed  upon  the  land  of 
his  neighbor,  if  it  does  not  thereby 
unreasonably  injure  him.  2.  A  cir- 
cumstance to  be  considered  in  deter- 
mining what  is  a  reasonable  use  of 
one's  own  land,  under  this  rule,  is 
the  amount  of  benefit  to  his  estate 
thus  drained,  as  compared  with 
the  amount  of  injury  to  his  neigh- 
bor's estate  by  reason  of  casting  the 
burden  of  the  surface  water  upon  it. 
3.  Subject  to  these  limitations,  and 


§  110 


WATEES. 


149 


sion,  may  not  be  obstructed  to  the  material  injury  of  the  upper 
estate. ■'^  Also  that  surface  water  may  not  be  collected  and 
poured  in  a  stream  upon  the  lower  proprietor.*^  The  common 
law  rule  is  still  further  modified,  indirectly,  by  introducing  the 
doctrine  of  negligence,  whereby  any  injurious  interference  with 
the  flow  of  surface  water  in  the  construction  of  works  for  public 
use,  is  made  actionable  upon  that  ground.*^  But  negligence 
implies  a  corresponding  duty,  and  every  duty  implies  a  corres- 
ponding right.  To  hold  that  a  certain  manner  of  construction 
which  interferes  with  the  flow  of  surface  water  is  negligent  is 
to  hold  that  the  corporation  owes  a  duty  not  to  make  such  inter- 
ference; and  this  again  is  to  hold  that  the  party  injured  has  a 
right  to  have  the  waters  flow  without  such  interference.  Every 
one  of  these  cases  based  upon  negligence,  in  reality  affirms  that 
proprietors  have  rights  respecting  the  flow  of  surface  water,  and 


the  rule  that  he  must  in  all  cases 
do  what  is  reasonable  to  dispose  of 
the  surface  water  to  the  least  injury 
to  his  neighbors,  such  owner  has  a 
right  to  drain  his  own  land  for  some 
proper  use  and  cast  the  water  upon 
theirs,  whether  such  drainage  is  the 
direct  and  sole  purpose  of  the  im- 
provement, or  only  results  incident- 
ally therefrom."  See  Oftelie  v. 
Hammond,  78  Minn.  275,  80  N.  W. 
1123. 

The  Nebraska  court,  while  adopt- 
ing the  common  law  rule,  adopts  al- 
so substantially  the  same  modifica- 
tions of  it.  Lincoln  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Sutherland,  44  Neb.  526,  62  N. 
W.  859;  City  of  Beatrice  v.  Leary, 
45  Neb.  149,  63  N.  W.  370;  Todd  v. 
York  Co.,  72  Neb.  207,  100  N.  W. 
299,  66  L.R.A.  561. 

47St.  Louis  etc.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  And- 
erson, 62  Ark.  360,  35  S.  W.  791; 
Wharton  v."  Stevens,  84  la.  107,  50 
N.  W.  562,  35  Am.  St.  Rep.  296, 
15  L.R.A.  630;  Canton  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Paine  (Miss.)  19  So.  199;  Lin- 
coln etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Sutherland,  44 
Neb.  526,  62  N.  W.  869;  City  of 
Beatrice  v.  Leary,  45  Neb.  149,  63  N. 


W.  370;  Town  v.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co., 
50  Neb.  768;  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Carter,  91  Va.  587,  22  S.  E.  517; 
Henry  v.  Ohio  Riv.  R.  R.  Co.,  40 
W.  Va.  234,  21  S.  E.  803.  And  see 
Sullivan  v.  Browning,  67  N.  J.  Eq. 
391,  58  Atl.  302,  and  cases  cited  in 
§  89. 

^sHolmes  v.  Calhoun  County,  97 
la.  360,  66  N.  W.  145;  FoUman  v. 
City  of  Mankato,  45  Minn.  457,  48 
N.  W.  192;  Illinois  Central  R.  R 
Co.  V.  Miller,  68  Miss.  760,  10  So 
61 ;  Cannon  v.  St.  Joseph,  67  Mo 
App.  367;  Lincoln  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v 
Adams,  41  Neb.  737,  60  N.  W.  83. 
Bunderson  v.  Burlington  etc.  R.  R 
Co.,  43  Neb.  545,  61  N.  W.  721, 
Fremont  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Harlin,  50 
Neb.  698;  Clark  v.  Rochester,  43 
Hun  367;  McCarthy  v.  Far  Rock- 
away,  3  App.  Div.  379,  38  N.  Y.  S. 
989;  Bidell  v.  Sea  Cliff,  18  App.  Div. 
N.  Y.  261 ;  Johnson  v.  White  26  R. 
I.  207,  58  Atl.  658,  65  L.R.A.  U50; 
post,  §  112,  n.  55. 

■iSiS'ee  §  112  and  cases  cited;  Kear- 
ney V.  Themanson,  48  Neb.  74,  66 
N.  W.  996. 


150  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    HI 

are,  therefore,  in  effect,  innovations  upon  the  old  common  la"w 
rule. 

The  conflicting  decisions  in  regard  to  surface  water  illus- 
trate the  fact  that  property  in  land  differs  in  the  different 
States.  It  is  not  the  same  in  Illinois  that  it  is  in  the  adjoining 
State  of  Wisconsin.  In  the  former  State  it  includes  certain 
rights  in  respect  to  surface  water,  which  are  not  included  in  the 
latter.  The  subject  of  this  section  will  be  found  very  fully 
discussed  in  Gould  on  Waters,  chapter  ix. 

§  111  (88a),  What  constitutes  surface  water. — Flood 
waters  of  stream.  As  a  general  rule,  there  is  not  much 
question  as  to  what  constitutes  surface  water  and  what  does  not. 
In  those  States  which  recognize  no  rights,  or  substantially  none, 
in  respect  to  surface  water,  it  is  often  made  a  nice  question 
whether  the  waters  flowing  in  a  ravine,  channel  or  natural  de- 
pression constitute  a  stream,  which  cannot  be  interfered  with 
without  liability,  or  mere  surface  water,  which  may  be  treated 
as  a  common  enemy.  It  is  also  a  mooted  question  whether  the 
flood  waters  of  a  stream,  which  spread  out  over  the  lowlands  in 
times  of  high  water,  are  a  part  of  the  stream  or  only  surface 
water.  Without  entering  upon  a  discussion  of  these  questions, 
we  refer  to  some  of  the  authorities  where  they  are  discussed.^" 

BO  As    to   whether    the    course   by  a  continuous  body  with  the  water 

which  surface  water  finds  its  way  to  flowing  in  the  ordinary  channel,  or 

lower   levels,  is  a  water   course  or  if    it    departs    from    such    channel 

not,  see  Morrisey  v.  Chicago  etc.  K.  animo   revertendi,   presently   to   re- 

R.  Co.,  38  Neb.  406,  56  N.  W.  946;  turn,  as  by  the  recession  of  the  wa- 

Bunderson  v.  Burlington  etc.  E.  E.  ters,  it  is  to  be  regarded  as  still  a 

Co.,    43    Neb.    545,   61    N.   W.    721;  part   of  the   stream.     The   identity 

Chicago  etc.  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Stack,  51  of  the  river  does  not  depend  upon 

Kan.  737,  33  Pac.  601 ;   Gregory  v.  the  volume  of  water  which  may  hap- 

Bush,  64  Mich.  37,  31  N.  W.  90,  8  pen  to  flow  down  its  course  at  any 

Am.  St.  Eep.  797;  Neal  v.  Ohio  Eiv.  particular  season.     The  authorities 

E.  E.  Co.,  47  W.  Va.  316,  34  S.  E.  hold  that  a  stream  may  be  wholly 

914.  dry    at    times    without    losing    the 

As  to  the  flood  waters  of  a  stream,  character  of  a  water  course.     So,  on 

it  is  said  by  the  court,  in  O'Connell  the    other    hand,    it    may    have    a 

V.  East  Tenn.  V.  &  G.  E.  E.  Co.,  87  'flood  channel'  to  retain  the  surplus 

Ga.   246,   13   S.  E.  489,  27  Am.  St.  waters  until  they  can  be  discharged 

Rep.   246,    13   L.E.A.   394:     "If   the  by  the  natural  flow."     To  same  ef- 

flood    water   becomes    severed    from  feet   Sullens   v.   Chicago   etc.   R.   R. 

the    main    current,    or    leaves    the  Co.,  74  la.  659,  38  N.  W.  545,  7  Am. 

stream  never  to  return,  and  spreads  St.  Rep.  501 ;  Noe  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 

out  over  the  low  ground,  it  has  be-  Co.,  76  la.  360,  41  N.  W.  42;  Byrne 

come  surface  water;  but  if  it  forms  v.  Minn.  &  St.  L.  E.  E.  Co.,  38  Minn. 


§  112 


WATEES. 


151 


A  body  of  water  twenty-five  hundred  acres  in  extent,  formed 
solely  from  rains  and  snows,  varying  in  depth,  from  three  to 
six  feet,  filled  with  swampy  vegetation  and  the  land  under  which 
had  been  surveyed  and  sold  to  individuals,  was  held  to  be  like 
a  temporary  body  of  surface  water  and  the  owners  of  the  land 
under  the  water  and  around  it  were  held  to  have  no  riparian 
rights.^^ 

§  112  (89).  What  interference  with  surface  water  is  a 
taking.  An  interference  with  any  right  respecting  surface 
water  in  the  exercise  of  the  eminent  domain  power  is  a  taking. 
If  a  railroad  company  so  coiistructs  its  road  as  to  obstruct  the 
flow  of  surface  water  and  dam  it  back  upon  private  property, 
it  will  be  liable  therefor."^     The  same  rule  applies  to  a  munici- 


212,  36  N.  W.  339,  8  Am.  St.  Rep. 
668;  Morrissey  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 
Co.,  38  Neb.  406,  56  N.  W.  946;  Chi- 
cago etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Emmert,  53 
Neb.  237,  73  N.  W.  540;  Sparks  Mfg. 
Co.  V.  Newton,  57  N.  J.  Eq.  367; 
Clarke  v.  Patapsco  Guano  Co.,  144 
N.  C.  64,  56  S.  E.  858,  119  Am.  St. 
Rep.  931 ;  Grande  Ronde  Elee.  Co.  v. 
Drake,  46  Ore.  243,  78  Pac.  1031; 
Cook  V.  Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry.  Co., 
107  Va.  32;  Uhl  v.  Ohio  Riv.  R.  R. 
Co.,  56  W.  Va.  494,  49  S.  E.  378, 
107  Am.  St.  Rep.  968,  68  L.R.A.  138; 
Richards  v.  Ohio  Riv.  R.  R.  Co.,  56 
W.  Va.  592,  49  S.  E.  385;  Caiiro  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Brevoort,  62  Fed.  129. 
For  the  contrary  view  see  New 
York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Si)eelman,  12 
Ind.  App.  372,  40  N.  E.  541;  Mis- 
souri Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Keys,  55 
Kan.  205,  40  Pac.  275,  49  Am.  St. 
Rep.  249;  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Smith,  72  Miss.  677,  17  So.  78,  48 
Am.  St.  Rep.  579,  27  L.R.A.  762; 
Scimeider  v.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  29 
Mo.  App.  68;  Johnson  v.  Grays 
Point  Terminal  Ry.  Co.,  Ill  Mo. 
App.  378,  85  S.  W.  941.  And  see 
Yazoo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis,  73 
Miss.  678,  19  So.  487,  32  L.R.A.  262; 
Casa  v.  Dicks,  14  Wash.  75,  44  Pac. 
113,  53  Am.  St.  Rep.  859. 


BiApplegate  v.  Franklin,  109  111. 
App.  293.  It  was  held  that  one 
owner  could  drain  off  the  water 
without  liability  to  other  owners. 

5  2Savannah  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bu- 
ford,  106  Ala.  303,  17  So.  395;  Sho- 
han  V.  Alabama  Great  Southern  Ry. 
Co.,  115  Ala.  181 ;  Alabama  Gt.  So. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Prouty,  149  Ala.  7,  43 
So.  352;  Bentonville  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Baker,  45  Ark.  252;  St.  Louis  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Anderson,  62  Ark.  360, 
35  S.  W.  791;  Little  Rock,  etc.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Wallis,  82  Ark.  447,  102  S.  W. 
390;  Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cook,  106 
Ga.  450,  32  S.  E.  585;  Southern 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Cook,  117  Ga.  286,  43  S. 
E.  697;  Gillham  v.  Madison  County 
R.  R.  Co.,  49  111.  484;  Illinois  &  St. 
Louis  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Fehringer,  82 
111.  129;  Chicago  Rock  Island  &  Pa- 
cific R.  R.  Co.  V.  Casey,  90  111.  514; 
Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Henne- 
berry,  153  111.  354,  38  N.  E.  1043; 
Tetherington  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  226  111.  129,  80  N.  E.  697;  St. 
Louis  Merchants'  Bridge  Terminal 
Ry.  Ass.  V.  Schultz,  226  111.  409,  80 
N.  E.  879;  Kankakee  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Horan,  22  111.  App.  145;  Same  v. 
Same,  23  111.  App.  259;  Chicago  & 
A.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Henneberry,  28  111. 
App.  110;   Ohio  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 


152 


EMINENT   DOMAIN. 


§  112 


Eamey,"  39  111.  App.  409 ;  Chicago  & 
A.  E.  R.  Co.  V.  Henneberry,  42  111. 
App.  126;  Ohio  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Thillman,  43  111.  App.  78;  Ohio  & 
M.'r.  R.  Co.  v.  Combs,  43  111.  App. 
119;  Ohio  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Neutzel, 
43  111.  App.  108;  Wabash  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Sanders,  47  111.  App.  436;  Miller 
V.  Chicago  &  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  60  111. 
App.  51;  Illinois  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Heisner,  93  111.  App.  469;  S.  C. 
affirmed,  192  111.  571;  Cincinnati 
etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ward,  120  111.  App. 
212;  Tetherington  v.  St.  Louis  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  128  111.  App.  139;  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Stroud,  129 
111.  App.  348;  Atterbury  v.  Chicago 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  134  111.  App.  330; 
Indiana  etc.  ily.  Co.  v.  Eberle,  110 
Ind.  542,  59  Am.  Rep.  225;  Balti- 
more etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Quillen,  34 
Ind.  App.  330,  72  N.  E.  661,  107  Am. 
St.  Rep.  183;  Brake  v.  Chicago,  R. 
I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  63  la.  302,  50  Am. 
Rep.  746;  Stith  v.  Louisville  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  109  Ky.  168,  58  S.  W.  600; 
Payne  v.  Morgan's  La.  &  Tex.  R.  R. 
etc.  Co.,  38  La.  An.  164,  58  Am.  Rep. 
174;  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Davis,  68  Md.  281,  11  Atl.  822,  6 
Am.  St.  Rep.  440;  Baltimore  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Hackett,  87  Md.  224;  Jung- 
blum  V.  Minneapolis  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
70  Minn.  153,  72  N.  W.  971;  Sinai 
V.  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  71  Miss. 
547,  14  So.  87 ;  Canton  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Paine  (Miss.),  19  So.  199;  Tucker 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  66  Mo. 
App.  141;  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Shaw,  63  Neb.  3S0,  88  N.  W.  508, 
56  L.R.A.  341;  Fletcher  v.  Auburn, 
25  Wend.  462;  Raleigh  &  Augusta 
Air  Line  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wicher,  74  N. 
C.  220;  Nichols  v.  Norfolk  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.  120  N.  C.  495;  Dale  v.  South- 
ern Ry.  Co.,  132  N.  C.  705,  44  S.  E. 
399;  Fick  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co., 
157  Pa.  St.  622,  27  Atl.  783;  Gulf, 
Col.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Helsley,  C2 
Tex.  593;  Sabine  &  East  Tenn.  R.  R. 


Co.  V  Johnson,  65  Tex.  389;  Gulf, 
Col.  &  Santa  Fe  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Holli- 
day,  65  Tex.  512;  Owens  v.  Missouri 
Pacific  Ry.  Co.  67  Tex.  679;  Texas 
Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Clifton,  2  Tex. 
App.  Civil  Cas.  433;  Texas  &  P.  K. 
R.  Co.  V.  Snyder,  18  S.  W.  559; 
Gulf  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Jones,  3  Tex. 
Ct.  of  App.  J.  41,  §  22;  S.  A.  &  A. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Gwynn,  4  Tex.  Ct.  of 
App.  J.  338,  §  219;  Bonner  v.  Worth, 
5  Tex.  Civ.  App.  560,  24  S.  W.  306; 
Texas  etc.  Ry.  Co.  y.  Maddox,  26 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  297,  63  S.  W.  134; 
Texarkana  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Spencer, 
28  Tex.  Civ.  App.  251,  67  S.  W.  196; 
Gulf  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Steele,  29  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  328,  69  S.  W.  171 ;  San  An- 
tonio etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Gurley,  37  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  283,  83  S.  W.  842;  Texas 
Cent  Ry.  Co.  v.  Brown,  38  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  610,  86  S.  W.  659;  Barstow 
Irr.  Co.  V.  Black,  39  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
80,  86  S.  W.  1036 ;  International  etc. 
R,  E.  Co.  V.  Slusher,  42  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  631,  95  S.  W.  717;  Missouri 
etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Crow,  43  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  280,  95  S.  W.  743;  Missouri, 
etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Green,  44  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  247,  99  S.  W.  573;  Baugh  v. 
Gulf  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  44  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
443,  100  S.  W.  958;  Houston  etc.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Barr,  44  Tex.  Civ.  App.  57,  99 
S.  W.  437;  McGehee  v.  Tidewater 
Ry.  Co.,  108  Va.  508;  Henry  v.  Ohio 
Riv.  E.  E.  Co.,  40  W.  Va.  234,  21 
S.  E.  863.  In  Shane  v.  Kansas  City 
etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  71  Mo.  237,  36  Am. 
Dec.  480,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Mis- 
souri holds  in  accordance  with  the 
text  in  an  elaborate  opinion,  which 
overrules  prior  cases.  Compare 
Munkers  v.  Same,  72  Mo.  514;  S.  C. 
60  Mo.  334,  and  Hosher  v.  Same,  60 
Mo.  329.  But  Shane's  case  is  in 
turn  overruled  in  Abbot  v.  Kansas 
City  &  St.  Joseph  E.  E.  Co.,  83  Mo. 
271,  53  Am.  Eep.  581,  and  Jones  v. 
St.  Louis  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  84  Mo.  151. 
Where   a   railroad   embankment  ob- 


§  11^ 


WATERS. 


153 


pal  corporation  executing  a  public  work.'^^  A  railroad  com- 
pany constructed  an  embankment  which  formed  a  barrier  to  the 
natural  flow  of  surface  water  and  caused  the  same  to  collect  in 
a  ditch  beside  the  road,  in  which  it  ran  for  a  long  distance  and 
was  then  discharged  through  a  culvert  upon  the  plaintiff's  land, 
where  it  had  not  been  accustomed  to  flow  before.  The  company 
was  held  liable  on  the  ground  of  its  being  a  taking.''*     And, 


structed  surface  water  and  created 
a,  stagnant  pool,  injurious  to  health, 
the  company  was  held  liable. 
Georgia  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Jerni- 
gan,  128  Ga.  501,  57  S.  E. 
791;  Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Harde- 
man, 130  Ga.  222,  60  S.  E.  539 ;  Cane 
Belt  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Ridgeway,  38  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  108,  85  S.  W.  496;  McFad- 
den  V.  Missouri  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  41  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  350,  92  S.  W.  989.  See 
Sabetto  v.  New  York  Cent.  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  127  App.  Div.  832. 

BSConniff  v.  San  Francisco,  67 
Cal.  45;  Los  Angeles  Cem.  Ass.  v. 
Los  Angeles,  103  Cal.  461,  37  Pac. 
375;  Maguire  v.  Centerville,  76  Ga. 
84;  Lake  v.  Bok,  31  111.  App.  45; 
Pickerill  v.  Louisville,  125  Ky.  213, 
100  S.  W.  873;  Bowman  v.  New  Or- 
leans, 27  La.  Ann.  501 ;  Rice  v.  City 
of  Flint,  67  Mich.  401,  34  N.  W. 
719;  Peters  v.  Fergus  Falls,  35 
Minn.  549;  Ham  v.  Levee  Comrs.,  83 
Miss.  534,  35  So.  943;  City  of  Bea- 
trice V.  Leary,  45  Neb.  149,  63  N.  W. 
370,  50  Am.  St.  Rep.  546;  Clark  v. 
Rochester,  43  Hun  271 ;  Acker  v. 
Town  of  New  Castle,  48  Hun  312, 
15  N.  Y.  St.  894,  1  N.  Y.  Supp.  223; 
Pmnix  V.  Lake  Druramond  Canal 
Co.,  132  N.  C.  124,  43  S.  E.  578; 
Cooper  V.  City  of  Dallas,  83  Tex. 
239,  18  S.  W.  565,  29  Am.  St.  Rep. 
645;  Nussbaum  v.  Bell  Co.,  97  Tex. 
86,  76  S.  W.  97.  See  Darlington  v. 
Cloud  Co.,  75  Kan.  810,  88  Pac.  529 ; 
Kent  Co.  v.  Goodwin,  98  Md.  84,  56 
Atl.  478;  Galbraith  v.  Yates,  79 
Minn.  436,  82  N.  W.  683;  Franklin 


V.  Durgee,  71  N.  H.  186,  51  Atl.  911, 
58  L.R.A.  112;  Carroll  v.  Rye  Tp., 
13  N.  D.  458,  101  N.  W.  894. 

6  4T.  W.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Morrison, 
71  111.  616;  Illinois  Central  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Heisner,  192  HI.  571,  61  N.  E. 
656;  Albright  v.  Cedar  Rapids  etc. 
Ry.  &  Lt.  Co.,  133  la.  644,  110  N.  W. 
1052;  Fossum  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry. 
Co.,  80  Minn.  9,  82  N.  W.  979;  Ben- 
son V.  Chicago  &  Alton  R.  R.  Co., 
78  Mo.  504;  Hogenson  v.  St.  Paul, 
Minneapolis  &  Manitoba  Ry.  Co.,  31 
Minn.  224.  In  Chicago  &  Alton  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Glenney,  118  111.  487,  where 
damages  were  claimed  in  a  similar 
case,  it  was  held  that  the  company 
was  not  liable  for  damages  caused 
by  water  brought  into  its  ditch  by 
artificial  channels  connected  with 
the  ditch  without  its  consent.  And 
see  Curtis  v.  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.,  14 
Allen  55;  Moses  v.  St.  Louis.  Iron 
Mountain  &  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  85 
Mo.  86 ;  Mitchell  v.  New  York,  Lake 
Erie  &  Western  R.  R.  Co.,  36  Hun 
177;Rathke  v.  Gardner,  134  Mass.  14. 

It  is  no  defense  that  the  rail- 
road is  properly  constructed  so  far 
as  its  use  for  railroad  purposes  is 
concerned.  "A  railroad  company 
must  construct  its  road  not  only 
with  reference  to  the  safety  of  the 
traveling  public,  but  also  with  ref- 
erence to  the  rights  of  adjacent 
landowners."  McCleneghan  v.  Oma- 
ha R.  R.  Co.,  25  Neb.  523,  13  Am. 
St.  Rep.  508 ;  Clauson  v.  Chicago  etc. 
Ry.  Co.,  100  Wis.  308,  82  N.  W.  146 
is     a    similar    case    in    which  the 


154 


EMmENT    DOMAIN. 


§    11^ 


generally,  it  is  a  taking  to  collect  surface  water  into  a  channel 
and  turn  it  in  a  body  upon  the  land  of  another,  whether  the 
water  would  have  found  its  way  there  hy  nature  or  not.^^  The 
decisions  are  substantially  unanimous  as  to  the  liability  in  such 
cases,  but  the  ground  of  liability  is  usually  that  of  improper 


company  was  held  not  liable  on 
the  ground  that  it  was  the  duty  of 
the  company  to  protect  its  road 
from  surface  water  and  that  inci- 
dental injuries  to  property  in  so 
doing  was  damnum  absque  injuria. 
BBTroy  V.  Coleman,  5S  Ala.  570; 
Enfaula  v.  Simmons,  86  Ala.  515; 
Springfield  etc.  R.  K.  Co.  v.  Henry, 
44  Ark.  360;  Cloverdale  v.  Smith, 
128  Cal.  230,  60  Pac.  851;  Ruduyai 
V.  Harwinton,  79  Conn.  91,  63  Atl. 
948;  Chorman  v.  Queen  Anne's  R. 
R.  Co.,  3  Penn.  Del.  407,  54  Atl.  687 ; 
Frisbie  v.  Cowen,  18  App.  Cas.  D.  C. 
381 ;  Atkinson  v.  Atlanta,  81  Ga. 
625,  7  S.  E.  692;  Georgia  etc.  Co. 
V.  Baker,  88  Ga.  28,  13  S.  E.  831; 
City  of  Albany  v.  Sikes,  94  Ga.  30, 
20  S.  E.  257,  26  L.R.A.  653;  Elgin 
V.  Kimball,  90  111.  356;  Jackson- 
ville R.  R.  Co.  etc.  V.  Cox,  91  111. 
500;  Aurora  v.  Love,  93  III.  521; 
Young  V.  Comrs.,  134  111.  569,  25  N. 
E.  689;  Graham  v.  Keene,  143  111. 
425,  32  N.  E.  180;  Jewett  v.  Swett, 
178  111.  "96,  affirming  S.  C.  71  111. 
App.  641;  Illinois  Cent.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Heisner,  192  111.  571,  61  N.  E. 
656;  Chicago  etc.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Con- 
nors, 25  111.  App.  561 ;  Chicago  &  A. 
R.  R.  Co.  T.  Riley,  25  111.  App.  569; 
St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hurst,  25 
111.  App.  98;  S.  C.  14  111.  App.  419; 
Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Glenney, 
28  111.  App.  364;  Allen  v.  Michel,  38 
111.  App.  313;  Illinois  Central  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Heisner,  45  111.  App.  143;  Ef- 
fingham V.  Surrells,  77  111.  App.  460 ; 
Commissioners  of  Highways  v. 
Sweet,  77  111.  App.  641 ;  Crawfords- 
ville  V.  Bond,  96  Ind.  236;  Patoka 
Tp.  V.  Hopkins,  131  Ind.  142,  30  N. 


E.  896;  Valparaiso  v.  Spaeth,  166 
Ind.  14,  76  N.  E.  514;  Lake  Erie  & 
W.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Hilfiker,  12  Ind. 
App.  280,  40  N.  B.  80;  Baltimore, 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Quillon,  34  Ind. 
App.  330,  72  N.  E.  661,  107  Am.  St. 
Rep.  183;  Cromer  v.  Logansport,  38 
Ind.  App.  661,  78  N.  E.  1045; 
Holmes  v.  Calhoun  County,  97  la. 
360,  66  N.  W.  145;  Schofield  v. 
Cooper,  126  la.  334,  102  N.  W.  110; 
Baldwin  v.  Ohio  Tp.,  70  Kan.  102, 
78  Pac.  424,  109  Am.  St.  Rep.  414, 
67  L.R.A.  642;  Dennis  v.  Osborn, 
75  Kan.  557,  89  Pac.  925;  Louisville 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Brinton,  109  Ky. 
180,  58  S.  W.  604;  Louisville  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Cornelius,  111  Ky.  752, 
64  S.  W.  732;  Robertson  v.  Daviess 
Gravel  Road  Co.,  116  Ky.  913,  77 
S.  W.  189;  Thoman  v.  Covington, 
23  Ky.  L.  R.  117,  62  S.  W.  721;  Hit- 
chins  V.  Frostburg,  68  Md.  100,  11 
Atl.  826,  6  Am.  St.  Rep.  422;  Frost- 
burg V.  Hitchins,  70  Md.  56,  16  Atl. 
380;  Frostburg  v.  Dufty,  70  Md. 
47,  16  Atl.  642;  Guest  v.  Church 
Hill,  90  Md.  689,  45  Atl.  882;  Cahill 
V.  Baltimore,  93  Md.  233,  48  Atl. 
705;  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Jones,  94  Md.  24,  50  Atl.  423;  Daley 
V.  Watertown,  192  Mass.  116,  78  N. 
E.  143;  Cubit  v.  O'Dett,  51  Mich. 
347;  Gregory  v.  Bush,  64  Mich.  37, 
31  N.  W.  90,  8  Am.  St.  Rep.  797; 
Page  V.  Huckins,  150  Mich.  103,  113 
N.  W.  577;  Blakeley  v.  Devine,  36 
Minn.  53 ;  Pye  v.  Mankato,  36  Minn. 
373 ;  Olson  v.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
38  Minn.  419,  37  N.  W.  953;  Foil- 
man  V.  City  of  Mankato,  45  Minn. 
457,  48  N.  W.  192;  Robbins  v.  Will- 
mon,  71  Minn.  403,  73  N.  W.  1097; 


§  112 


WATEES. 


155 


construction.  But  all  the  cases  recognize  the  right  of  a  pro- 
prietor not  to  be  injured  by  having  the  water  poured  upon  his 
land  in  a  stream,  and  if  this  right  is  interfered  "with  by  a 
permanent  maintenance  of  the  works  causing  the  injury,  there 


Gunnerus  v.  Spring  Prairie,  91 
Minn.  473,  98  N.  W.  340,  974;  Illi- 
nois Cent.  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Miller,  68 
Miss.  760,  10  So.  Gl ;  McCormick  v. 
Kansas  Citj-,  St.  Joe  &  C.  B.  R.  R. 
Co.,  70  Mo.  359;  Pychliclce  v.  City 
of  St.  Louis,  98  Mo.  497,  11  S.  W. 
1001 ;  Carson  v.  City  of  Springfield, 
53  Mo.  App.  289;  Cannon  v.  St.  Jos- 
eph, 67  Mo.  App.  367;  Ready  v.  Mo. 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  98  Mo.  App.  467,  72  S. 
W.  707;  Fremont  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Morley,  25  ISeb.  138,  40  N.  W.  948; 
State  V.  Fillmore  County,  32  Neb. 
870,  49  N.  W.  769 ;  Lincoln  St.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Adams,  41  Neb.  737,  60  N.  W. 
83;  Bunderson  v.  Burlington  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  43  >Jeb.  545,  61  N.  W.  721; 
Fremont  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Harlin,  50 
Neb.  698,  61  Am.  St.  Rep.  578,  36 
L.R.A.  417;  Roe  v.  Howard  Co.,  75 
Neb.  448,  106  N.  W.  587;  Andrews 
V.  Steele  City,  2  Neb.  (Unof.)  676, 
89  N.  W.  739 ;  West  Orange  v.  Field, 
37  N.  J.  Eq.  600;  Field  v.  West 
Orange,  46  N.  J.  Eq.  183;  Soule  v. 
City  of  Passaic,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  28,  20 
Atl.  346;  Fuller  v.  Belleville,  67  N. 
J.  Eq.  468,  58  Atl.  176;  Seifert  y. 
Brooklyn,  101  N.  Y.  136,  54  Am. 
Rep.  664;  Clark  v.  Rochester,  43 
Hun  271 ;  McCarthy  v.  Far  Rocka- 
way,  3  App.  Div.  379,  38  N.  Y.  Supp. 
989;  Bedell  v.  Sea  Cliff,  18  App. 
Div.  261;  Chase  v.  New  York  Cent. 
R.  R.  Co.,  24  Barb.  273;  Moran  v. 
McClarus,  63  Barb.  185;  Wiekham 
v.  Lehigh  Val.  R.  R.  Co.  85  App. 
Div.  182,  83  N.  Y.  S.  146;  Branson 
V.  New  York  Cent.  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
Ill  App.  Div.  737,  97  N.  Y.  S.  788; 
Staton  V.  Norfolk  etc.  R.  C.  Co.,  109 
N.  C.  337,  13  S.  E.  933;  Staton  v. 
Norfolk  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  Ill  N.  C. 
278,   16   S.  E.  181,  17  L.R.A.   838; 


Parker  v.  Norfolk  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  119 
N.  C.  676;  Bench  v.  Wilmington  & 
W.  R.  R.  Co.,  120  N.  C.  498;  Parker 
V.  Norfolk  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  123  N.  C. 
71,  31  S.  E.  381 ;  Noble  v.  Aasen,  8 
N.  D.  77,  76  N.  W.  990;  Meyers  v. 
Vermillion,  7  Ohio  N.  P.  (N.  S.) 
90;  Huddlestun  v.  Borough  of  West  * 
Bellvue,  HI  Pa.  St.  110;  Gordon  v. 
Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  (Pa.),  6 Rep. 
727;  Elliott  v.  Oil  City,  129  Pa.  St. 
570,  18  Atl.  553;  Torrey  v.  City  of 
Scranton,  133  Pa.  St.  173,  19  Atl. 
351 ;  Weir  v.  Borough  of  Plymouth, 
148  Pa.  St.  566,  24  Atl.  94;  Bolian 
V.  Borough  of  Avooa,  154  Pa.  St. 
404,  26  Atl.  604;  Magee  v.  Pa. 
Scnuylkill  Val.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  Pa. 
Supr.  Ct.  187 ;  Eohrer  v.  Harrisburg, 
20  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  543 ;  Toole  v.  Dela- 
ware etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  27  Pa.  Supr.  Ct. 
577 ;  Johnson  v.  White,  26  R.  I.  207, 
58  Atl.  658,  65  L.R.A.  250;  StiUman 
V.  Pendleton,  26  R.  I.  585,  60  Atl. 
234;  Cain  v.  South  Bound  R.  R. 
Co.  62  S.  C.  25,  39  S.  E.  792;  Tyrus 
v.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  114 
Tenn.  579,  86  S.  W.  1074;  Gulf  etc. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Donahue,  59  Tex.  128; 
G.  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Tait,  63 
Tex.  223;  Austin  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Anderson,  79  Tex.  427,  15  S.  W.  484, 
23  Am.  St.  Rep.  350;  Texas  &  P.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.Dunn  (Tex.),  17  S.  W.  822; 
City  of  Houston  v.  Bryan,  2  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  553,  22  S.  W.  231;  Fort 
Worth  &  Denver  City  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Scott,  2  Tex.  App.  Civil  Cas.  p.  137 ; 
Houston  V.  Hutcheson,  39  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  337,  81  S.  W.  96;  Norfolk  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Carter,  91  Va.  587,  22  S. 
E.  517 ;  Peters  v.  Lewis,  28  Wash.  366, 
68  Pac.  869 ;  Clay  v.  St.  Albans,  43  W. 
Va.  539,  27  S.  E.  368,  64  Am.  St. 
Rep.   883;   McCray  v.  Fairmont,  46 


156 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  112 


is  a  taking  within  the  constitution.^®  "No  one  has  a  right  to 
collect  surface  water  in  any  considerable  quantity  upon  his  own 
premises  and  then  turn  the  same  in  a  concentrated  form  upon 
the  premises  of  his  neighbor  in  such  a  manner  as  to  cause  him 
damage.  *  *  *  And  the  law  doubtless  is  that  a  city  has  no 
greater  power  over  its  streets,  in  the  matter  of  disposing  of  sur- 
face water  which  accumulates  thereon,  than  a  private  individual 
has  in  disposing  of  the  surface  water  which  falls  or  collects  upon 
his  own  land."^''  And  this  language  will  apply  to  all  corpora- 
tions constructing  public  works  under  the  power  of  eminent 
domain.  A  railroad  company  cut  through  a  ridge  whereby 
surface  water  was  brought  upon  the  plaintiff's  land,  which  be- 
fore had  flowed  off  in  other  directions.  The  company  was  held 
liable  for  the  damage.'^  And  as  a  general  rule  when,  in  the 
execution  of  public  works,  the  course  of  surface  water  is  changed 
and  caused  to  flow  upon  land  where  it  had  not  been  accustomed 
to  flow,  the  owner  may  recover  for  the  damage.^*  Where  a 
railroad  company  diverted  surface  water  upon  the  land  of  a 
third  party  with  his  consent  whence  it  flowed  upon  the  plain- 
tiff's land  to  his  damage,  the  company  was  held  liable.®"     So 


W.  Va.  442,  33  S.  E.  245 ;  Traeewell 
V.  Wood  Co.,  58  W.  Va.  283,  52  S.  E. 
185;  Am  V.  City  of  Kansas,  4  Mc- 
Crary,  558;  Whalley  v.  Lancashire 
&  Yorkshire  Ey.  Co.,  13  L.  R.  Q,  B. 
131;  S.  C.  affirmed  16  Same,  227; 
Northwood  v.  Raleigh,  3  Ontario 
347;  Stalker  v.  Dunwick,  15  Ontario 
342;  Miner  v.  Buffalo  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
9  U.  C.  C.  P.  280;  Rowe  v.  Roches- 
ter, 22  U.  C.  C.  P.  319;  Rowe  v. 
Rochester,  29  U.  C.  Q.  B.  590. 

6  6T.  W.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Morri- 
son, 71  111.  616;  Kankakee  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Horan,  22  111.  App.  145;  New 
York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Jones,  94  Md. 
24,  50  Atl.  423;  Miller  v.  Morris- 
town,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  62,  2  Atl.  61; 
Wickham  v.  Lehigh  Val.  E.  R.  Co. 
85  App.  Div.  182,  83  N.  Y.  S.  146; 
Staton  V.  Norfolk  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  Ill 
N.  C.  278,  16  S.  E.  181;  Tyrus  v. 
Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  114 
Tenn.  579,  86  S.  W.  1074;  Norfolk  & 
W.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Carter,  91  Va.  587, 
22  S.  E.  517. 


5  7 Johnson  V.  White,  20  R.  I.  207, 
208,  209,  58  Atl.  658,  65  L.R.A.  250. 

BSBloek  V.  Gt.  Northern  Ry.  Co., 
101  Minn.  183,  112  N.  W.  03.  It  wag 
held  to  be  a  question  of  fact  whether 
it  was  reasonable  for  the  company 
to  set  loose  this  water  and  not  make 
provision  to  take  care  of  it. 

6  9  Central  of  Ga.  Ey.  Co.  v.  Wind- 
ham, 126  Ala.  552,  28  So.  392;  Bar- 
fleld  V.  Macon  Co.,  109  Ga.  386,  34 
S.  E.  596;  Elser  v.  Gross  Point,  223 
111.  230,  79  N.  E.  27,  114  Am.  St. 
Rep.  326;  Waukegan  v.  Weale,  118 
111.  App.  460;  Schrope  v.  Pioneer 
Tp.,  Ill  la.  113,  82  N.  W.  466;  Hoff- 
man V.  Muscatine,  113  la.  332,  85  N. 
W.  17 ;  Lassiter  v.  Norfolk  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  126  N.  C.  509,  38  S.  E.  48; 
Rice  V.  Norfolk  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  130 
N.  C.  375,  41  S.  E.  1031.  See  Parks 
V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  143  N.  C.  289, 
55  S.  E.  701 ;  Jordan  v.  Benwood,  42 
W.  Va.  312,  26  S.  E.  266,  57  Am.  St. 
Rep.  859,  30  L.R.A.  519. 

eoDennison  v.  Somerset  etc.  R.  R. 


§  112 


WATEES. 


157 


where  a  railroad  in  laying  its  track  in  a  street,  diverted  surface 
water  onto  the  plaintiff.''^  But  in  such  case  the  municipality 
is  not  liable."^ 

In  those  States  which  hold  the  common  law  doctrine  as  to 
surface  water,  decisions  will  be  found  contrary  to  the  foregoing 
statements  of  the  law.®^  In  Nebraska  where  the  common  law 
rule  prevails,  if  a  railroad  company  obstructs  a  draw  or  depres- 
sion which  forms  a  natural  outlet  for  surface  water  it  will  be 


Co.,  21  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  248;  Toole  v. 
Delaware  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  27  Pa. 
Supr.  Ct.  577.  To  same  effect,  Ca- 
hill  V.  Baltimore,  93  Md.  233,  48 
Atl.  705;  Daley  v.  Watertown,  192 
Mass.  116,  78  N.  E.  143. 

siMonarch  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Omaha 
etc.  Ry.  Co.,  127  la.  511,  103  N.  W. 
493. 

62Hewett  V.  Canton,  182  Mass. 
220,  65  N.  B.  42. 

esUyrne  v.  Town  of  Farmington, 
64  Conn.  367,  30  Atl.  138;  Hannaker 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  5  Dak.  1 ; 
Herring  v.  District  of  Columbia,  3 
Mackey  572;  New  Albany  &  Salem 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Higman,  18  Ind.  77; 
Cairo  &  Vincennes  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Stevens,  73  Ind.  278,  38  Am.  Rep. 
139;  Hill  V.  Cincinnati  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  109  Ind.  511;  Clay  v.  Pittsburg 
etc.  Ry.  Co.,  104  Ind.  439,  73  N.  E. 
904;  Pohlman  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry. 
Co.,  131  la.  89,  107  N.  W.  1025,  6 
L.R.A.(N.S.)  146;  Atchison  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Hammer,  22  Kan.  763,  31 
Am.  Rep.  216;  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Steck,  51  Kan.  737,  33  Pac.  601; 
Missouri  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Renfro, 
52  Kan.  237,  34  Pac.  802,  39  Am.  St. 
Rep.  344;  Parish  of  Concordia  v. 
Natchez  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  44  La.  An. 
613,  10  So.  809 ;  Greeley  v.  Me.  Cent. 
R.  R.  Co.  53  Me.  200;  Morrison  v. 
Bucksport  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  67  Me.  353 ; 
Gardiner  v.  Camden,  86  Me.  377,  30 
Atl.  13;  Cassidy  v.  Old  Colony  R.  R. 
Co.,  141  Mass.  174;  Tyler  v.  Revere, 
183  Mass.  98,  06  N.  E.  597 ;  Rowe  v. 
St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  41  Minn. 
384,  43  N.  W.  70,  16  Am.  St.  Rep. 


706,  (disapproved  in  Sheehan  v. 
Flynn,  59  Minn.  436,  61  N.  W.  462, 
26  L.K.A.  632)  ;  Jordan  v.  St.  Paul 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  42  Minn.  172,  43  N. 
W.  849,  6  L.R.A.  573,  (criticised  in 
Sheehan  v.  Flynn,  59  Minn.  436,  61 
N.  W.  462,  26  L.R.A.  632)  ;  Brown 
V.  Winona  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  53  Minn. 
259,  55  N.  W.  123,  39  Am.  St.  Rep. 
603;  Clark  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  Joe 
R.  R.  Co.,  36  Mo.  202;  Rose  v.  St. 
Charles,  49  Mo.  509;  Hosher  v.  K.  C. 
St.  J.  &  C.  B.  R.  R.  Co.,  60  Mo.  329; 
Munkres  v.  Same,  60  Mo.  334;  Same 
V.  Same,  72  Mo.  514 ;  Payne  v.  Kan- 
sas City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  112  Mo.  6, 
20  S.  W.  322,  17  L.R.A.  628;  Jones 
V.  Wabash  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  Mo. 
App.  251  ;  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Schneider,  30  Mo.  App.  620;  Col- 
lier V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  48  Mo. 
App.  398;  Kenney  v.  Kansas  City 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  69  Mo.  App. 
569;  De  Lapp  v.  Kansas  City  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  69  Mo.  App.  572; 
Graves  v.  Kansas  City  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  69  Mo.  App  574;  Morrissey 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  38 
Neb.  406,  56  N.  W.  946;  Town 
V.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  50  Neb. 
768;  Todd  v.  York  Co.,  72  Neb.  207, 
100  N.  W.  299,  66  L.R.A.  561 ;  Wag- 
ner V.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Hun 
633;  Anchor  Brewing  Co.  v.  Village 
of  Dobbs  Ferry,  84  Hun  274,  32  N. 
Y.  Supp.  371 ;  Willey  v.  Norfolk  So. 
R.  R.  Co.,  98  N.  C.  263;  Jenkins 
V.  Wilmington  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  110 
N.  C.  438,  i5  S.  E.  193;  Fleming  v. 
Wilmington  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  115  N. 


158 


EMITiTENT    DOMAIN. 


§  112 


liable.®*  In  addition  to  the  cases  already  referred  to,  there 
are  numerous  others  which  are  more  particularly  grounded  upon 
negligence  in  constructing  and  maintaining  insufficient  cul- 
verts or  ditches,  or  in  allowing  the  same  to  become  filled  up 
and  out  of  repair.®^     Cases  in  respect  to  damages  from  surface 


C.  676,  20  S.  E.  714;  Edwards  v. 
Charlotte  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  39  S.  C. 
472,  18  S.  E.  58,  39  Am.  St.  Eep. 
746,  22  L.R.A.  246;  Lawton  v.  South 
Bound  R.  R.  Co.,  61  S.  C.  548,  39 
S.  E.  752;  Texas  Trunk  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Elam,  1  Tex.  App.  Civ.  201;  O'Con- 
nor v.  Fond  du  Lac,  A.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
52  Wis.  526,  38  Am.  Rep.  754;  John- 
sou  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  80 
Wis.  641,  50  N.  W.  771,  27  Am.  St. 
Rep.  76,  14  L.R.A.  495;  Wallace  v. 
Grank  Trunk  R.  R.  Co.,  16  U.  C. 
Q.  B.  551 ;  Vanhorn  v.  Grand  Trunk 
R.  R.  Co.,  18  U.  C.  Q.  B.  356;  Crew- 
son  V.  Grand  Trunk  R.  R.  Co.,  27 
U.  C.  Q.  B.  68.  It  has  been  held  in 
Massachusetts  that  such  damages 
may  be  taken  into  consideration  in 
assessing  compensation  under  the 
statute.  Walker  v.  Old  Colony  & 
Newport  R.  R.  Co.,  103  Mass.  10, 
4  Am.  Rep.  509. 

6  4  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Shaw,  63 
Neb.  380,  88  N.  W.  508,  56  L.R.A. 
341;  St.  Joseph  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Carty  3  Neb.  (Unof.)  626,  92  N.  W. 
750. 

65St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mor- 
ris, 35  Ark.  622;  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Yarborough,  56  Ark.  612,  20 
S.  W.  515;  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Cook,  57  Ark.  387,  21  S.  W. 
1066;  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Cutchen,  80  Ark.  235,  96  S.  W.  1054; 
Macon  v.  Dannenberg,  113  Ga.  1111, 
39  S.  E.  448;  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Renter,  223  111.  387,  79  N.  E.  166; 
Ohio  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dooley,  32 
III.  App.  228;  Indiana  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Patchett,  59  111.  App.  251; 
Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Sparks, 
12  Ind.  App.  410,  40  N.  E.  546;  Ger- 


man Theological  School  v.  Dubuque, 
64  la.  736;  Willits  v.  Chicago  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  80  la.  531,  45  N.  W.  516; 
Htint  V.  Iowa  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  86 
la.  15,  52  N.  W.  668,  41  Am.  St.  Rep. 
473;  Willits  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  88  la.  281,  55  N.  W.  313,  21  Am. 
St.  Rep.  608;  Harvey  v.  Mason  City 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  129  la.  465,  105  N.  W. 
958,  113  Am.  St.  Rep.  483,  3  L.R.A. 
(N.S.)  973;  Mississippi  Central  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Caruth,  51  Miss.  77 ;  Same 
v.  Mason,  51  Miss.  234;  Lincoln  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Sutherland,  44  Neb. 
526,  62  N.  W.  859;  Kearney  v. 
Themanson,  48  Neb.  74,  66  N.  W. 
996;  Johnson  v.  Atlantic  &  St.  Law- 
rence R.  R.  Co.,  35  N.  H.  569;  Wa- 
ters V.  Greenleaf  Johnson  Lumber 
Co.,  115  N.  C.  648,  20  S.  E.  718; 
Waldrop  v.  Greenwood  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  28  S.  C.  157,  5  S.  E.  471 ;  Gen- 
try V.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  R.  Co., 
38  S.  C.  284,  16  S.  E.  893;  Carriger 
V.  R.  R.  Co.,  7  Lea,  388;  Sabine  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Brousard,  69  Tex.  617, 
7  S.  W.  374;  Green  v.  Taylor  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  79  Tex.  604,  15  S.  W.  685 ; 
Brousard  v.  Sabine  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
80  Tex.  329,  16  S.  W.  30;  Gulf  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Frederickson  (Tex.)  19 
S.  W.  124;  Galveston  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
V.  Ryan,  2  Tex.  Civ.  App.  545,  21  S. 
W.  1011;  Texas  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Whitaker,  36  Tex.  Civ.  App.  571,  82 
S.  W.  1051;  Taylor  v.  San  Antonio 
etc.  Ry.  Co.,  36  Tex.  Civ.  App.  658, 
83  S.  W.  738 ;  Waterman  v.  C.  &  P. 
R.  R.  Co.,  30  Vt.  610;  Neal  v.  Ohio 
Riv.  R.  R.  Co.,  47  W.  Va.  316,  34 
S.  E.  914;  Alton  v.  Hamilton  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  13  U.  C.  Q.  B.  595; 
L'Esperance  v.  Great  Western  R.  R. 


§  113 


WATERS. 


159 


water,  resulting  from  tte  grading  and  improvement  of  streets 
are  referred  to  in  the  next  chapter.*® 

§  113  (89a).  Miscellaneous  cases  in  regard  to  surface 
water.  Where  the  damages  are  due  solely  to  a  fall  of  rain 
so  extraordinary  as  to  amount  to  an  act  of  God,  there  is  no  lia- 
bility."^ A  railroad  company  is  not  liable  for  water  which 
comes  upon  the  plaintiff's  land  from  its  road-way,  but  which  is 
caused  to  accumulate  or  flow  upon  the  right  of  way  by  the  acts 
of  others.*^  And  where  the  accumulation  of  water  causing 
the  damage  is  due  in  part  to  the  acts  of  others  than  the  defend- 
ant, the  defendant  is  not  excused  for  its  own  part  and  it  is  held 
to  be  the  province  of  the  jury  to  determine  what  this  is  as  best 
they  can.®'  Where  a  borough  turned  surface  water  upon  a 
township  road  and  the  township  got  rid  of  it  by  turning  it  upon 
plaintiff,  it  was  held  the  latter  had  no  cause  of  action  against 
the  borough.'''*  Where  a  railroad  company  causes  water  to  ac- 
cumulate and  form  a  stagnant  pool,  injurious  to  health,  it  will 
be  liable.''^     Where  a  city  conducted  water  into  a  hole  in  an 


Co.,  14  U.  C.  Q.  B.  187;  Carrou  v. 
Great  Western  E.  R.  Co.,  14  U.  C. 
Q.  B.  192;  see  Hopper  v.  Douglas 
Co.,  75  Neb.  329,  106  N.  W.  330. 

eepost,  §  141,  and  see  Huntsville 
V.  Ewing,  116  Ala.  576,  22  So.  984; 
Downs  V.  Ansonia,  73  Conn.  33,  46 
Atl.  243;  Torrlngton  v.  Messenger, 
74  Conn.  321,  50  Atl.  873 ;  Holmes  v. 
Atlanta,  113  Ga.  961,  39  S.  E.  458; 
Holbrook  v.  Norcross,  121  Ga.  319, 
48  S.  E.  922;  Cleveland  etc.  R.  S. 
Co.  V.  Huddleston,  21  Ind.  App.  621 ; 
Morley  v.  Buchanan,  124  Mich.  128, 
82  N.  W.  802;  Dudley  v.  Buflfalo,  73 
Minn.  347,  74  N.  W.  44;  Schuett  v. 
Stillwater,  80  Minn.  287,  83  N.  W. 
180;  Harrelson  v.  Kansas  City  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  151  Mo.  482;  Flanders  v. 
Franklin,  70  N.  H.  168,  47  Atl.  88; 
McClosky  V.  Atlantic  City  R.  R.  Co., 
70  N.  J.  L.  20,  56  Atl.  669;  Sharp 
V.  Cincinnati,  4  Ohio  C.  C.  (N.  S.) 
19;  O'Donnell  v.  White,  24  R.  I.  483, 
53  Atl.  633;  Baltzeger  v.  Carolina 
Midland  R.  R.  Co.,  54  S.  C.  242,  32 
S.    E.    358,    71    Am.    St.    Rep.    789; 


Borchsenius  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  96  Wis.  448. 

6  7PhiIadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Davis,  68  Md.  281,  11  Atl.  822;  Sa- 
bine etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Brousard,  69 
Tex.  617,  7  S.  W.  374;  and  see  Fiok 
V.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  157  Pa. 
St.  622,  27  Atl.  783;  Sentman  v.  B. 
&  0.  R.  R.  Co.,  78  Md.  222,  27  Atl. 
1074. 

6  8Brimberry  v.  Savannah  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  78  Ga.  641;  Burke  v. 
Mo.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  29  Mo.  App. 
370;  and  see  Felt  v.  Vicksburg  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  46  La.  An.  549,  15  So. 
177. 

6  9  Ohio  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Combs, 
43  111.  App.  119;  Illinois  Central 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Heisner,  45  111.  App. 
143. 

'OWest  Bellevue  Bor.  v.  Huddles- 
ton,  1  Monaghan   (Pa.  Supm.)    129. 

7iLockett  V.  Ft.  Worth  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  78  Tex.  211,  14  S.  W.  564;  and 
see  Atlanta  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kim- 
berly,  87  Ga.  161,  13  S.  E.  277. 


160  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    114 

alley,  whence  it  overflowed  plaintiff,  it  was  held  liable.''^  Where 
a  railroad  intersected  ditches,  which  took  the  water  from  the 
railroad  ditches,  to  the  damage  of  land  either  above  or  below,  it 
was  held  not  liable.'^*  The  fact  that  a  ditch  is  built  along  a 
railroad  right  of  way,  which  carries  the  water  from  adjoining 
lands  to  a  stream,  does  not  require  the  company  to  keep  it  open 
and  no  action  will  lie  for  allowing  it  to  become  obstructed.''*  It 
has  been  held  that  one  who  has  stood  by  and  seen  a  railroad 
embankment  constructed  without  a  culvert  is  estopped  to  com- 
plain of  such  defect.^^  One  has  no  legal  ground  of  complaint 
that  there  is  caused  to  flow  upon  his  land  such  surface  water 
as  would  come  thereon  by  nature,  though  it  has  been  temporarily 
deflected  from  his  land  by  non-natural  causes.''® 

In  Missouri  it  is  provided  by  statute  that  every  railroad, 
within  three  months  after  its  completion,  shall  "cause  to  be  con- 
structed and  maintained  suitable  ditches  and  drains  along  each 
side  of  the  road-bed  of  such  railroad,  to  connect  with  ditches, 
drains  or  water  courses,  so  as  to  afford  sufficient  outlet  to  drain 
and  carry  off  the  water  along  such  railroad  wherever  the  drain- 
ing of  such  water  has  been  obstructed  or  rendered  necessary  by 
the  construction  of  such  railroad."  '''  A  failure  to  comply  with 
the  statute,  affords  a  cause  of  action  to  one  damnified  by  such 
failure.''*  But  the  statute  does  not  apply  unless  there  are 
ditches,  drains  or  water  courses  with  which  to  connect.''^  There 
are  similar  statutes  in  other  States.*" 

§  114  (90).     Subterranean  waters,      In  regard  to  water 

7  2  City  of  New  Albany  v.  Ray,  3  kuk  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  47  Mo.  App.  383; 

Ind.  App.  321,  29  N.  E.  611.  Clark  v.  Dyer,  81  Tex.  339,  16  S.  W. 

73Bell  V.   Norfolk   So.   R.  R.   Co.  1061. 

101  N.  C.  21,  7  8.  E.  467;  Willey  v.  'sCox  v.  Hannibal  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

Norfolk  So.  R.  R.  Co.,  98  N.  C.  203.  174  Mo.  588,  74  S.  W.  854;   Byrne 

TiLouisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc-  v.   Keokuk   etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   47   Mo. 

Afee,  30   Ind.   291.  App.   383;    Williamson   v.   Missouri 

TBPayne  v.  Morgan's  R.  R.  Co.,  43  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  115  Mo.  App.  72,  90  S. 

La.  An.  981,  10  So.  10.  W.  401;   Gebhardt  v.  St.  Louis  etc. 

76Avery  v.  Police  Jury,  12  La.  An.  R.  R.  Co.,  122  Mo.  App.  503,  99  S. 

554;  Whitney  v.  Willamette  Bridge  W.  773;  Cooper  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R. 

R.  R.  Co.,  23  Or.  188,  31  Pac,  472;  R.  Co.,  123  Mo.  App.  141,  100  S.  W. 

Felt  V.  Vicksburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  46  494. 

La.  An.  549,  15  So.  177;  Inhabitants  7  9Field  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

of  Hamilton  v.  Wainwright,  52  N.  21  Mo.  App.  600. 

J.    Eq.   419,   29   Atl.   200;    King   v.  soSee  Clark  v.  Dyer,  81  Tex.  339, 

C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  71  la.  696.  16  S.  W.  Rep.  1061. 

77Mo.  R.  S.  §  810;  Byrne  v,  Keo- 


§  114 


■WATEES. 


161 


which  permeates  the  soil  but  is  not  collected  in  any  stream  under 
ground,  the  prevailing  doctrine  is  that  the  owner  of  the  soil  may 
use  or  divert  it  as  he  sees  proper,  provided,  of  course,  that  he 
does  not  turn  it  upon  others  in  an  unreasonable  manner,  to  their 
injury.*^  Accordingly,  where  the  construction  of  a  railroad 
resulted  in  draining  off  a  tract  of  low,  marshy  ground  which  had 
served  as  a  sort  of  reservoir  for  the  plaintiff's  mill,  so  that  in 
dry  times  the  supply  was  insufficient  and  in  times  of  rain  too 
great,  it  was  held  that  the  plaintiff  had  no  cause  of  action.^^ 
And  where  a  railroad  company  has  appropriated  a  stream  of 
water  fed  by  a  spring  on  another's  land,  it  cannot  prevent  the 
owner  of  such  land  from  digging  trenches  for  the  improvement 
of  his  own  land,  though  the  effect  will  be  to  divert  the  percolat- 
ing waters  which  supply  the  spring.^^  Where  a  well,  dug  by 
a  railroad  on  its  own  land,  destroyed  a  spring  on  the  plaintiff's 
land,  it  was  held  there  was  no  liability.®*  So  where  a  spring 
was  destroyed  by  the  construction  of  a  sewer  in  a  public  street  f^ 
also  where  plaintiff's  well  was  drained  by  a  tunnel  built  by  a 
railroad  on  its  right  of  way.®® 


siActon  V.  Blundell,  12  M.  &  W. 
324;  Chasemore  v.  Richards,  7  H.  L. 
Cas.  349 ;  5  H.  &  N.  982 ;  2  H.  &  N. 
168;  Rawston  v.  Taylor,  11  Exch. 
367;  Bradford  v.  Pickle,  (1895)  A. 
C.  587;  Gould  v.  Eaton,  111  Cal.  639, 
44  Pac.  319,  52  Am.  St.  Rep.  201; 
Roath  V.  DriscoU,  20  Conn.  533; 
Tampa  W.  W.  Co.  v.  Cline,  37  Fla. 
586,  20  So.  780,  53  Am.  St.  Rep.  262, 
33  L.R.A.  376;  Edwards  v.  Haeger, 
180  111.  99;  Greenleaf  v.  Francis,  18 
Pick.  117;  Ocean  Grove  Camp  Meet- 
ing Association  v.  Asbury  Park,  40 
N.  J.  Eq.  447;  Elster  v.  City  of 
Springfield,  49  Ohio  St.  82,  30  N.  E. 
274;  Metcalf  v.  Nelson,  8  S.  D.  87, 
65  N.  W.  911,  59  Am.  St.  Rep.  746; 
Deadwood  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Barker, 
14  S.  D.  558,  86  N.  W.  619;  Willow 
Creek  Irr.  Co.  v.  Michaelson,  21 
Utah,  248,  60  Pac.  943,  81  Am.  St. 
Rep.  687,  51  L.R.A.  280;  Harriraan 
Irr.  Co.  «.  Keel,  25  Utah,  96,  69 
Pac.  719;  Miller  v.  Black  Rock 
Springs  Imp.  Co.,  99  Va.  747,  40  S. 
E.  27,  86  Am.  St.  Rep.  924;  Meyer  v. 
Em.  D.— 11. 


Tacoma  L.  &  W.  Co.,  8  Wash.  144, 
35  Pac.  601;  Wood  on  Nuisances 
(1st  ed.)  §  383;  Washburn  on  Ease- 
ments, pp.  452-457;  Gould  on  Wa- 
ters, §  280. 

8  2  Waffle  V.  New  York  Central  R. 
R.  Co.,  58  Barb.  413;  S.  C.  affirmed 
53  N.  Y.  11 ;  Regina  v.  Metropolitan 
Board  of  Worlcs,  3  B.  &  S.  710; 
Thayer  v.  Brooks,  17  Ohio  489,  49 
Am.  Dec.  474. 

8  3  Southern  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Du- 
four,  95  Cal.  615,  30  Pac.  783. 

s4Hougan  v.  Milwaukee  &  St. 
Paul  Ry.  Co.,  35  la.  558,  14  Am. 
Rep.  502;  Aldrich  v.  Cheshire  R.  R. 
Co.,  21  N.  H.  359,  53  Am.  Dec.  212; 
and  see  Lybe's  Appeal,  106  Pa.  St. 
626,  51  Am.  Rep.  542  and  Roath  v. 
Driscoll,  20  Conn.  532;  Ocean  Grove 
Camp  Meeting  Association  v.  As- 
bury Park,  40  N.  J.  Eq.  447. 

ssElster  v.  City  of  Springfield,  49 
Ohio  St.  82,  30  N.  E.  274;  Stanton 
V.  Metropolitan  B'd  of  Works,  26  L. 
J.  Ch.  300. 

8  6Galgay  v.  Great  Southern  R.  R. 


162  EMIITENT    DOMAIN.  §    114 

Many  of  the  cases  referred  to  assert  the  absolute  ownership 
of  the  proprietor  of  the  soil  in  the  waters  percolating  therein 
and  the  absolute  right  of  such  proprietor  to  dispose  of  such 
waters  or  to  make  any  use  of  his  land,  regardless  of  the  effect 
upon  the  subterranean  waters  in  his  neighbor's  land.^''  But 
this  rule  is  undergoing  modification  and  the  doctrine  of  reason- 
able use  or  of  correlative  rights  and  duties,  is  being  applied  with 
respect  to  such  waters.  In  Pennsylvania  it  has  been  held  that 
the  reason  of  the  rule  of  nonliability  for  drawing  off  or  inter- 
fering with  subterranean  waters,  is  that  the  damage  could  not 
be  foreseen  or  avoided  and  that  when  the  reason  fails  the  rule 
does  not  apply.  Thus  a  natural  gas  company  in  boring  a  well 
encoimtered  salt  water  in  one  of  the  lower  strata,  which  rose 
in  the  well,  found  its  way  through  the  upper  rock  formation 
and  destroyed  the  neighboring  wells.  The  existence  of  the  salt 
water  in  the  lower  stratum,  the  geological  formation  in  the 
vicinity  which  permitted  the  spread  of  the  salt  water  and  the 
probable  consequences  were  all  well  known  and  the  damage 
could  have  been  prevented  by  a  small  outlay.  The  company 
was  held  liable. ^^  And  many  cases  now  support  the  doctrine 
that  one  proprietor  may  not  unreasonably  interfere  with  sub- 
terranean waters  to  the  damage  of  his  neighbor  and,  accord- 
ingly, that  he  may  not  wantonly  or  maliciously  waste  the  water 
or   merchandise   it    to    the    detriment    of    other    proprietors.^^ 

Co.,  4  I.  C.  L.  E.  456.     To  same  ef-  Same  v.  Same,  139  Pa.  St.  Ill,  21 

feet,  Deadwood  Cent.  R.  E.   Co.  v.  Atl.  147. 

Barker,  14  S.  D.  558,  86  N.  W.  619;  ssKatz  v.   Walkinshaw,   141    Cal. 

Harriman  Irr.  Co.  v.  Keel,  25  Utah  116,  70  Pac.  663,  99  Am.  St.  Eep.  35, 

96,  69  Pac.  719.     But  in  Sheldon  v.  64  L.R.A.  236;  Verdugo  Canon  Wa- 

Boston    etc.   R.   R.    Co.,    172   Mass.  ter  Co.  v.  Verdugo,  152  Cal.  655,  93 

ISO,  57  N.  E.  1078,  where  a  railroad  Pac.   1021 ;    Ex  parte  Elam,   6  Cal. 

in  making  a,   deep   cut  on  its  own  App.   233;    Gagnon    v.   French   Lick 

land  drained  the  plaintiff's  well,  it  Springs  Hotel  Co.,  163  Ind.  687,  72 

was  held  liable.  N.  E.  849;  Barclay  v.  Abraham,  121 

S71n    addition    to    cases    already  la.  619,  96  N.  W.  108,  100  Am.  St. 

cited  see  Houston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Rep.  365,   64  L.R.A.  285;   Aberdeen 

East,  98  Tex.  146,  81  S.  W.  279,  107  v.  Bradford,  94  Md.  670,  51  Atl.  614; 

Am.   St.   Rep.   620,   66   L.R.A.   738;  Stillwater  Water  Co.  v.  Farmer,  89 

Huber  v  Merkel,   117   Wis.   355,   94  Minn.  58,  93  N.  W.  907,  99  Am.  St. 

N.  W.  354,  98  Am.  St.  Rep.  933,  62  Rep.   541,   66  L.R.A.  875;    Erickson 

L.R.A.  589.  V.  Crookston  W.  W.  P.  &  L.  Co.,  100 

ssCollins  T.  Chartiers  Valley  Gas  Minn.  481,  111  N.  W.  391,  8  L.R.A. 

Co.,   131    Pa.   St.    143,   18  Atl.   1012,  (N.S.)    1250;    S.   C.   105  Minn.   182, 

}7  Am.  St.  Rep.  791,  6  L.R,A,  280;  117  IS.  W.  435;   Springfield  W.  W. 


§  114 


WATEES. 


163 


Where  a  city  obtained  a  part  of  its  water  supply  from  wells 
upon  its  own  land,  to  which  a  powerful  suction  was  applied  by 
means  of  pumps  and  machinery,  and  the  effect  was  to  destroy 
a  stream  and  spring  on  the  plaintiff's  land  half  a  mile  away, 
the  city  was  held  liable.""  So  where  the  plaintiff's  land  was 
rendered  valueless  for  agricultural  purposes  by  the  withdrawal 
of  the  underground  water  in  the  same  manner  and  for  the  same 
purpose.®^  And  where  a  city  obtained  its  water  supply  from 
artesian  wells  by  pumping  and  thereby  the  water  level  in  many 
other  artesian  wells  was  lowered  beyond  the  point  where  they 
could  be  pumped  by  hand,  the  doctrine  of  correlative  rights  was 
applied,  and  the  liability  of  the  water  company  was  held  to 
depend  upon  whether  its  use  was  reasonable  in  view  of  all  the 
conditions  and  this  was  held  to  be  a  question  of  fact  to  be  deter- 
mined from  the  evidence.®^  But  in  Texas,  where  a  railroad 
company  dug  a  well  upon  lots  which  it  owned  in  fee  simple  and 


Co.  V.  Jenkins,  62  Mo.  App.  74; 
Smith  V.  Brooklyn,  160  N.  Y.  357, 
54  N.  E.  787,  45  L.E.A.  664;  Forbell 
V.  New  York,  164  N.  Y.  522,  58  N. 
E.  644,  79  Am.  St.  Rep.  666,  51 
L.E.A.  695;  Reisert  v.  New  York, 
174  N.  Y.  196,  66  N.  E.  731,  revers- 
ing S.  C.  69  App.  Div.  302,  74  N.  Y. 
S.  673;  Westphal  V.  New  York,  177 
N.  Y.  140,  69  N.  E.  369;  Hathorn 
V.  Strong's  S.  S.  Sanitarium,  55 
Misc.  445,  106  N.  Y.  S.  553;  Miller 
V.  Black  Rock  etc.  Co.,  99  Va.  747, 
40  S.  E.  27, 

In  Katz  V.  Walkinshaw,  141  Cal. 
116,  70  Pac.  663,  99  Am.  St.  Rep.  35, 
64  L.R.A.  236,  it  is  said  that  the 
right  of  each  proprietor  is  limited 
"to  such  amount  of  water  as  may 
be  necessary  for  some  useful  pur- 
pose in  connection  with  the  land  from 
which  it  is  taken." 

9  0  Smith  V.  Brooklyn,  160  N.  Y. 
357,  54  N.  E.  787,  45  L.R.A.  684, 
affirming  S.  C.  32  App.  Div.  257; 
Smith  V.  Brooklyn,  18  App.  Div. 
340 ;  and  see  Hollingsworth  &  V.  Co. 
V.  Foxborough  Water  Supply  Dist., 
165  Mass.  186,  42  N.  E.  Rep.  574; 
Merrick  Water  Co,  v,  Brooklyn,  33 


App.  Div.  N.  Y.  454;  Forbell  v.  New 
York,  27  N.  Y.  Misc.  12. 

siKorbell  v.  New  York,  164  N.  Y. 
522,  58  N.  E.  644,  79  Am.  St.  Rep. 
666,  51  L.R.A.  695;  Reisert  v.  New 
York,  174  N.  Y.  196,  66  N.  E.  731, 
reversing  S.  C.  69  App.  Div.  302,  74 
N.  Y.  S.  673;  Westphal  v.  New 
York,  177  N.  Y.  140,  69  N.  E.  369, 
affirming  S.  C.  75  App.  Div.  252,  78 
N.  Y.  S.  56. 

9  2ErJckson  v.  Crookston  W.  W.  P. 
&  L.  Co.,  100  Minn.  481,  111  N.  W. 
391,  8  L.R.A.(N.S.)  1250;  S.  C. 
105  Minn.  182,  117  N.  W.  435.  To 
same  effect,  Aberdeen  v.  Bradford, 
94  Md.  670,  51  Atl.  614.  In  the  first 
case  the  court  says: — 

"The  English  rule  was  of  neces- 
sity based  upon  the  geological  con- 
ditions affecting  water  supply  as 
they  existed  in  England.  The  rea- 
sons for  the  rule  lay  in  deductions 
from  essentially  absolute  private 
rights  in  land,  and  also  largely  in 
the  conception  of  a  sound  public  pol- 
icy applicable  to  these  conditions. 
It  was  thought  that  the  recognition 
of  correlative  rights  in  subterranean 
watere  would  work  mischievous  re- 


164 


EMIH'EJS'T    DOMAIW. 


114 


by  a  steam  pump  took  therefrom  twenty-five  thousand  gallons 
daily  to  supply  its  engines  and  shops,  and  thereby  drained  the 
plaintiff's  well,  it  was  held  there  was  no  liability  and  the  old 
rule  as  to  subterranean  waters  was  fully  recognized.®^ 

Where  an  act  of  Congress  for  the  construction  of  a  tunnel 
to  supply  the  city  of  Washington  with  water  provided  for  com- 
pensation to  any  person  injured  in  any  property  right  thereby, 
it  was  held  that  a  claim  for  damages  by  the  draining  of  a  well 
five  hundred  feet  away  was  within  the  act.®*  Where  the  waters 
of  a  stream  sink  into  the  ground  and  become  percolating  water, 
the  same  rule  applies  thereto  as  to  other  percolating  waters, 
and  the  owner  of  the  soil  may  divert  them  without  liability.®^ 
But  percolating  waters  adjacent  to  a  stream  and  moving  in  the 
same  direction  may  constitute  a  part  of  the  stream.®^     In  regard 


suits  in  curtailing  improvements 
upon  land,  would  burden  its  use 
with  liabilities  which  would  render 
the  exercise  of  legal  rights  extreme- 
ly hazardous,  and  would  result  in  a 
rule  which  would  be  too  indefinite 
in  itself  and  which  the  landowner 
would  not  be  able  to  satisfactorily 
enforce.  *  *  *  Nothing  is  better 
settled  than  that  the  fundamental 
principles  of  right  and  justice  on 
which  the  common  law  is  founded, 
and  which  its  administration  is  in- 
tended to  promote,  require  that  a 
diflferent  rule  should  be  adopted 
whenever  it  is  found  that,  owing  to 
the  physical  features  and  character 
of  a.  state,  and  the  peculiarities  of 
its  climate,  soil,  products  and  water 
supply,  the  application  of  a  common 
law  rule  tends  constantly  to  cause 
injustice  and  wrong,  rather  than  the 
administration  of  justice  and  right." 
p.  484.  In  Clarke  Co.  v.  Miss.  Lum- 
ber Co.,  80  Miss.  535,  31  So.  905, 
the  lumber  company  pumped  arte- 
sian wells  on  its  own  land  to  form 
a  basin  for  the  storage  of  logs  for 
its  mill.  The  effect  was  to  lower 
other  artesian  wells  in  the  vicinity 
and  greatly  to  impair  their  value. 
It  was  held  that  the  company  liad 


a  right  to  so  use  the  water  upon 
the  land  from  which  it  was  taken, 
in  the  business  there  carried  on  by 
the  owner.  See  Mead  v.  Melitte,  18 
S.  D.  523,  101  N.  W.  355. 

ssHouston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  East, 
98  Tex.  146,  81  S.  W.  279,  107  Am. 
St.  Rep.  620,  66  L.R.A.  738.  A  stat- 
ute making  it  a  penal  offense  to 
waste  natural  gas  was  held  valid 
in  Indiana.  Townsend  v.  State,  147 
Ind.  624,  47  N.  E.  19;  State  v.  Ohio 
Oil  Co.  150  Ind.  21,  49  N.  E.  809; 
Ohio  Oil  Co.  V.  Indiana,  177  U.  ,S. 
190,  22  S.  C.  576.  But  a  similar 
statute  as  to  wasting  water  from  ar- 
tesian wells  was  held  void  in  Wis- 
consin. Huber  v.  Merkel,  117  Wis. 
355,  94  N.  W.  354,  98  Am.  St.  Rep. 
933,  62  L.R.A.  589. 

94United  States  v.  Alexander,  148 
U.  S.  186,  13  S.  C.  527.  So  under  a 
statute  rendering  a  city  liable  for 
"damages  occasioned  by  the  laying, 
making  or  maintaining"  of  a  sewer, 
it  was  held  liable  for  draining  a 
well  on  adjoining  land.  Trowbridge 
V.  Brookline,  144  Mass.  139. 

9  6Meyer  v.  Tacoma  L.  &  W.  Co., 
8  Wash.  144,  35  Pac.  601. 

siiLos  Angeles  v.  Pomeroy,  124 
Cal.  597,  57  Pac.  585, 


§  114 


■WATEES. 


165 


to  subterranean  streams,  there  is  much  confusion  among  the  au- 
thorities as  to  the  rights  of  the  owner  of  the  soil.  The  better 
opinion,  perhaps,  is,  that  the  same  rules  apply  to  them  as  to 
percolating  waters.^''  Some  confusion  exists  in  regard  to  the 
pollution  of  water  coursing  in  subterranean  streams  or  percolat- 
ing through  the  ground.^*  It  seems  to  us,  however,  that  the 
better  doctrine  is,  that  one  has  no  more  right  to  send  impurities 
into  the  soil  below  the  surface  than  he  has  into  the  air  above 
the  surface.  One  who  creates  or  permits  noxious  and  offensive 
substances  upon  his  premises  ought  to  take  care  that  they  do 
not  escape  either  in  a  fluid  or  gaseous  form  into  or  upon  his 
neighbor's  land.®^     The  owner  of  land  has  a  right  not  to  be 


3  7Lybe'3  Appeal,  106  Pa.  St.  626; 
Smith  V.  Adams,  6  Paige  435 ; 
Wheatley  v.  Baugh,  25  Pa.  St.  528; 
Dickinson  v.  Grand  Junction  Canal 
Co.,  7  Excli.  282;  Acton  v.  Blundell, 
12  M.  &  W.  324;  Eoath  y.  DriscoU, 
20  Conn.  532;  Brown  v.  Illius,  25 
Conn.  583;  Hale  v.  McLea,  53  Cal. 
578;  Haldeman  v.  Bruckhart,  45  Pa. 
St.  514,  84  Am.  Deo.  511;  Angell  on 
Watercourses,  pp.  150-159;  Wash- 
burn on  Easements,  pp.  441-448; 
Gould  on  Waters,  §  281.  In  a.  re- 
cent case  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Florida  in  its  syllabus  states  the 
law  as  follows :  "The  owner  of  land 
through  which  subsurface  water, 
without  any  distinct,  definite,  and 
known  channel,  percolates  or  filters 
through  the  soil  to  that  of  an  ad- 
joining owner,  is  not  prohibited 
from  digging  into  his  own  soil,  and 
appropriating  water  found  there  to 
any  legitimate  purposes  of  his  own, 
though,  by  so  doing,  the  water  may 
be  entirely  diverted  from  the  land  to 
which  it  would  otherwise  naturally 
have  passed;  but,  if  subterranean 
water  has  assumed  the  proportions 
of  a  stream  flowing  in  a  well-defined 
channel,  the  owner  of  the  land 
through  which  it  flows  will  not  be 
authorized  to  divert  it,  pollute  it, 
or  improperly  use  it,  any  more  than 
if  the  stream  ran  upon  the  surface 


in  a  well-defined  course."  Tampa 
Water  Works  Co.  v.  Cline,  37  Fla. 
586,  20  So.  780,  53  Am.  St.  Rep.  262; 
33  L.R.A.  376.  And  see  Willis  v. 
Perry,  92  la.  297,  60  N.  W.  727; 
Washington  Co.  Water  Co.  v.  Car- 
ver, 91  Md.  398,  46  Atl.  979.  Any 
interference  with  rights  in  subter- 
ranean streams  by  authority  of  law 
for  public  use  would  be  a  taking. 

ssHodgkinson  v.  Ennor,  4  B.  & 
S.  229;  Womersley  v.  Church,  17 
L.  T.  Rep.  N.  S.  190;  Brown  v.  Il- 
lius, 25  Conn.  583 ;  Greencastle  v. 
Hazelett,  23  Ind.  180;  Sherman  v. 
Fall  River  Iron  Works  Co.,  5  Allen 
213.  In  Greencastle  v.  Hazelett,  a 
bill  was  filed  to  enjoin  the  City  of 
Greencastle  from  establishing  a  cem- 
etery on  a  certain  lot,  on  tne 
ground  that  it  would  corrupt  the 
waters  of  a  valuable  spring  on  plain- 
tiff's land.  The  court  held  the  city 
was  the  owner  of  the  subterranean 
streams  of  its  own  land  and  would 
not  be  liable  for  any  damages  re- 
sulting in  the  manner  alleged  in  the 
bill.  But  a  different  view  was  taken 
by  the  court  in  a  similar  case  in 
Clark  V.  Lawrence,  6  Jones  Eq.  83, 
78  Am.  Dec.  241. 

ssBallard  v.  Tomlinson,  L.  R.  29 
Ch.  Div.  115,  reversing  S.  C.  20  L. 
R.  Ch.  Div.  194;  Snow  v.  Whitehead, 
27  L.  R.  Ch.  Div.  588;   Sherman  v. 


166 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  115 


injured  in  this  manner,  and  an  interference  with  this  right 
would  be  a  taking,  if  done  under  the  power  of  eminent  domain.-' 
§  115  (91).  Interference  with  natural  barriers  against 
water.  The  owner  of  land  has  a  right  to  the  protection  af- 
forded by  natural  barriers  against  the  overflow  of  stream|  and 
ponds  or  the  action  of  waves  and  tides.^  When  this  right  is 
violated  in  the  exercise  of'  the  right  of  eminent  domain,  and 
damage  ensues,  the  owner  is  entitled  to  compensation.  The 
leading  case  upon  this  question  is  Eaton  v.  B.  M.  &  C.  R.  E. 
Co.,  51  ]Sr.  H.  504,  which  has  already  been  given  at  length  in 
the  preceding  chapter.*     Similar  decisions  have  been  made  in 


Fall  Eiver  Iron  Works,  5  Allen  213; 
Brown  V.  Illius,  25  Conn.  583;  Ot- 
tawa Gas  Light  Co.  v.  Graham,  28 
111.  73,  81  Am.  Dec.  263;  Pensacola 
Gas  Co.  V.  Pebley,  25  Fla.  381,  5  So. 
593;  Pottstown  Gas  Co.  v.  Murphy, 
39  Pa.  St.  257;  Beatrice  Gas  Co.  v. 
Thomas,  41  Neb.  662,  59  N.  W.  925; 
Anheuser-Busch  Brewing  Ass.  v. 
Peterson,  41  Neb.  893,  60  N.  W.  375. 
iThe  City  of  Boston,  in  order  to 
remove  a  nuisance,  caused  by  the 
discharge  of  a,  sewer  into  a,  pond, 
was  authorized  to  construct  such 
canals,  basins,  tanks,  etc.,  as  were 
necessary  to  cleanse  the  pond  and 
water  flowing  in  the  sewer,  and  to 
take  land  therefor.  The  city  took 
land  and  constructed  works  which 
injured  the  plaintiff's  wells  by  per- 
colation. It  was  held  that  the  act 
did  not  authorize  the  nuisance  and 
that  the  city  was  liable  in  tort  for 
the  injury.  Bacon  v.  Boston,  154 
Mass.  100,  28  N.  E.  9.  It  would 
follow  that  if  the  legislature  had  au- 
thorized the  works,  as  constructed, 
the  damage  would  have  been  a  tak- 
ing. Davis  V.  Fry,  14  Okl.  340,  78 
Pac.  180,  69  L.R.A.  460;  Branden- 
berg  V.  Zeigler,  62  S.  C.  18,  39  S.  E. 
790,  89  Am.  St.  Rep.  887,  55  L.R.A. 
414;  Attorney  General  v.  Tomline, 
12  L.  R.  Ch.  Div.  214,  48  L.  J.  Ch. 
Div.  593;  S.  C.  on  appeal,  14  L.  R. 
Ch.  Div.  58,  49  L.  J.  Ch.  Div.  377. 


In  the  latter  case  Cotton  L.  J. 
states  the  case  as  follows  (14  L.  E. 
Ch.  Div.  p.  68)  :  "The  plaintift's 
land  is  situated  a,  short  distance 
from  the  sea,  and  the  only  land  in- 
tervening between  the  plaintiff's 
land  and  the  sea  is  the  land  of  the 
defendant,  and  the  complaint  is  that 
the  defendant  is  so  dealing  with 
that  land,  by  removing  the  .  shingle 
which  constitutes  the  whole  of  the 
surface  of  that  land,  that  the  sea 
will  at  a  time  which  cannot  posi- 
tively be  stated,  but  within  a  rea- 
sonable time,  undermine  and  de- 
stroy the  land  and  the  building  of 
the  plaintiff  upon  his  land.  *  *  ♦ 
Then  the  question  which  we 
have  to  consider  is  this,  whether 
or  no  that  prospective  or  ap- 
prehended injury  to  the  land  of 
the  plaintiff  is  one,  which,  if  done, 
would  be  actionable,  and  one  which 
the  court  ought  to  restrain  by  in- 
junction. I  am  of  opinion  that  it 
is."  And  the  case  was  so  deter- 
mined in  both  courts.  Compare  Ald- 
ritt  v.  Fleischauer,  74  Neb.  66,  103 
N.  W.  1084;  Shaw  v.  Ward,  131 
Wis.  646,  HI  N.  W.  671. 

2Eaton  V.  Railroad  Co.,  51  N. 
H.  504,  12  Am.  Rep.  147 ;  Murray  v. 
Pannaci,  64  N.  J.  Eq.  147,  53  Atl. 
695;  Robinson  v.  New  York  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  27  Barb.  512. 

SAnte,  §  67. 


§    115  WATEES.  167 

New  York,*  and  Illinois.^  A  railroad  company  cut  a  channel 
through  the  watershed  between  two  streams,  whereby  the  water 
from  one  flowed  into  the  other  and  caused  the  latter  to  over- 
flow its  banks,  and  flood  the  plaintiff's  land.  The  company 
was  held  liable.^  In  another  case  a  county  laid  out  a  road 
across  a  lake  and,  instead  of  bridging  the  lake,  cut  through  its 
banks  and  drained  off  the  water  which  found  its  way  to  the 
plaintiff's  land  seven  miles  away  and  flooded  and  impaired  its 
value.  It  was  held  that  the  plaintiff's  property  was  taken  and 
the  county  liable.^  But  there  is  no  right  to  the  maintenance 
of  an  artificial  barrier,  such  as  a  railroad  embankment,  and  par- 
ties who  are  protected  by  such  an  embankment,  have  no  legal 
ground  of  complaint,  because  openings  are  made  therein  which 
let  in  the  tide.^ 

In  this  connection  we  call  attention  to  an  important  case 
which  arose  in  Milwaukee,  and  which  seems  to  us  to  have  been 
wrongly  decided.^  The  plaintiff  owned  lots  on  the  Milwaukee 
River,  near  Lake  Michigan,  upon  which  he  had  valuable  im- 
provements. The  city,  under  authority  of  a  special  act  of  the 
legislature,  made  an  artificial  channel,  260  feet  wide  and  twelve 
or  fourteen  feet  deep,  from  a  point  near  the  plaintiff's  property 
to  the  lake.  In  consequence  of  this  opening,  when  the  winds 
Avere  from  the  east,  the  waters  of  the  lake  were  driven  in  upon 
the  plaintiff's  property,  producing  very  serious  loss  and  damage. 
A  recovery  was  denied,  on  the  ground  that  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion, making  a  great  public  improvement,  solely  for  the  public 
benefit,  in  the  precise  way  authorized  by  the  legislature  and  in 

^Brown  v.  Cayuga  &  Susquehanna  eGroham   v.   Keene,   143   111.   425, 

R.  R.  Co.,  12  N.  Y.  486;   Robinson  32  N.  E.  180;  Baker  v.  Leka,  48  111. 

I'.  N.  Y.  &  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  27  Barb.  App.  353;  Dierks  v.  Conjrs.  of  High- 

512.      In   the   latter   case   the   court  ways,    142   111.    197,   31    N.   E.   496; 

say:     "The  excavation  and  removal  Hotz  v.  Hoyt,  34  111.  App.  488;  and 

of  the  banks  of  the  stream  left  the  see  Gulf  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Jones,  63 

water   to   flow   out   of   the   natural  Tex.  524;  Hoeutt  v.  Wilmington  etc. 

channel   of   the   creek   and  to   over-  R.  R.  Co.,  124  N.  C.  214. 

flow  the   plaintifi^'s   premises.     And  6  Craft  v.  Norfolk  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

this   overflow   the   jury  have   found  136  N.  C.  49,  48  S.  E.  519. 

would   not   have   happened   but   for  'Wendel  v.  Spokane  Co.,  27  Wash, 

such    alteration    and   excavation   of  121,  67  Pac.  576. 

the   natural   banks    of    the    stream.  sKoch  v.  Del.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co., 

For    the    damages    resulting    from  53  N.  J.  L.  256,  21  Atl.  284. 

such    alteration    and    excavation,    I  sAlexander  v.  Milwaukee,  16  Wis. 

think  this  action  clearly  maintain-  247. 
able." 


168  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    116 

a  careful  and  discreet  manner,  was  not  liable  for  consequential 
damages  resulting  to  private  property  therefrom.  A  distinction 
was  taken  betwSen  a  public  corporation  acting  for  the  public 
benefit  and  a  private  corporation  executing  a  public  work  for 
the  sake  of  private  emolument.  It  was  virtually  conceded  that 
if  the  cut  had  been  made  by  an  individual  upon  his  private  prop- 
erty for  his  own  use,  he  would  have  been  liable.  But  on  what 
grounds  would  he  have  been  liable  ?  Clearly  on  the  ground 
that  the  plaintiff  had  a  right  to  have  the  natural  barrier  between 
his  property  and  the  lake  remain  in  the  condition  in  which  na- 
ture had  placed  it.  The  legislature  could  not  authorize  this 
right  to  be  taken  from  him  by  a  public  or  private  corporation, 
for  any  purpose,  without  compensation.^" 

§  116  (91a).  Miscellaneous  cases  as  to  waters.  A  rail- 
road company  constructed  its  road  along  the  banks  of  a  stream. 
The  soil  washed  into  the  stream  from  the  embankment  and  was 
carried  down  and  filled  up  plaintiff's  mill  pond.  Held  that  the 
company  was  not  liable.^^  Where  a  natural  stream  was  di- 
verted into  a  highway  by  the  plaintiff,  acting  as  overseer  of  high- 
ways, where  it  ran  for  a  number  of  years,  and  was  then  turned 
back  into  its  old  channel,  it  was  held  the  plaintiff  had  no  ground 
of  complaint. -"^^  Under  the  guise  of  removing  obstructions  from 
a  small  non-navigable  stream,  a  city  cannot  widen  the  stream 
and  take  the  property  of  the  riparian  owner  without  compensa- 
tion.-'^ If  a  railroad  company,  without  authority,  removes  a 
levee  and  builds  a  new  one,  which  gives  way,  it  will  be  liable  for 
the  resulting  damages.-'*  Where  commissioners  authorized  to 
widen,  straighten  and  deepen  a  stream,  through  a  city  for  drain- 
age purposes,  adopt  a  culvert  put  in  by  the  city,  which  proves 
insufficient  to  vent  the  increased  flow,  the  city  will  not  be  liable 

lOThe  correctness  of  this  decision  149  Mass.  103,  21  N.  E.  230,  14  Am. 

has  been  questioned.     See  Pumpelly  St.   Rep.  402;   Miller  v.  Ne-w  Yorlc 

V.  Green  Bay  Co.,  13  Wall.  166,  180;  etc.   E.   E.   Co.,   125  N.   Y.   118,   26 

Arimond  v.  Green  Bay  Co.,  31  Wis.  N.   E.   35;   Caldwell  v.   East  Broad 

316.  Top   R.   E.   Co,   169   Pa.   St.  99,  32 

iiTrinity  etc.  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Mead-  Atl.  85. 

ows,  73  Tex.  32,  11  S.  W.  145.     It  i2Kellogg  v.  Thompson,  66  N.  Y. 

seems  to  be  implied  in  Salisbury  v.  88. 

Western  N.  C.  E.  E.  Co.,  91  N.  0.  is  City  of  Schenectady  v.  Furman, 

490,  which  was  a  similar  case,  that  61  Hun  171,  39  N.  Y.  St.  975. 

the    plaintiff    could    recover.      See  KHotard  v.  Texas  &  P.  E.  E.  Co., 

also   Middlesex   County    v.    McCue,  36  La.  An.  450. 


§    116  WATEES.  169 

for  damages  to  property  flooded  thereby.  ^^  Where  a  town 
bridge  was  destroyed  by  a  dam,  it  was  held  that  the  town  could 
maintain  an  action  for  the  damage.-"'  Where  the  outlet  to  a 
lake  was  deepened  and  the  flow  increased  and  so  continued  for 
twenty-four  years  it  was  held  that  it  should  be  regarded  the 
same  as  though  the  condition  and  flow  were  natural  and  that 
the  same  could  not  be  interfered  with  for  public  use  without 
compensation.^^  A  city  has  no  right  to  change  the  course  of  a 
natural  stream  and  cause  it  to  run  in  a  public  street  and  thereby 
interfere  with  access  to  abutting  property.-'*  Where  a  railroad 
company  created  a  stagnant  pool  upon  its  right  of  way  it  was 
held  liable  for  the  nuisance.-'^  When  a  railroad  embankment 
was  built  across  a  depression  in  the  bank  of  a  river  which 
prevented  flood  waters  from  reaching  plaintiff,  it  was  held  there 
was  no  liability.^" 

The  United  States  may  prevent  such  interference  by  a  State 
with  the  sources  or  tributaries  of  a  navigable  stream  as  will 
impair  or  destroy  its  navigability.^^  Riparian  rights  in  a 
stream  are  not  affected  by  State  lines.  ^^  And  where  the  diversion 
or  obstructioin  of  a  stream  in  one  State  affects  lands  or  riparian 
rights  in  another  State,  the  parties  injured  may  have  the  appro- 
priate remedies.^^  It  is  held  that  one  State  cannot  authorize 
an  injury  to  lands  or  riparian  rights  in  another  State.^*  One 
State  may  prevent  the  diversion  of  water  to  another  State,^^  and 
may  sue  in  the  federal  supreme  court  to  prevent  the  unreason- 

i5Cochrane  v.  City  of  Maiden,  152  zogingleton   v.   Atchison  etc.   Ey. 

Mass.  365,  25  N.  E.  620.     See  also  Co.,  67  Kan.  284,  72  Pac.  786. 

Kansas  City  v.  Brady,  52  Kan.  297,  ziUnited    States    v.    Rio    Grande 

34  Pac.  884,  39  Am.  St.  Kep.  349.  Dam  &  Irr.  Co.,  174  U.  S.  690. 

isHooksett  V.  Amoskeag  Mfg.  Co.,  22Hoge  v.  Eaton,  135  Fed.  441. 

44  N.  H.  105.  23Vyse  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

i7Lakeside  Paper  Co.  v.  State,  15  126  la.  90,  101  N.  W.  730;  Pine  v. 

App.  Div.  N.  Y.  169.     See  also  Stro-  Ne-w  York,  103  Fed.  337;   S.  C.  af- 

bel  V.  Bor.  of  Ephrota,  178  Pa.  St.  firmed,  Pine  v.  New  York,  112  Fed. 

50,  35  Atl.  713.  98,  50  C.  C.  A.   145;   New  York  v. 

isGuerkink  v.  Petaluma,  112  Cal.  Pine,   185   U.   S.  93,   22   S.   C.   592; 

306,  44  Pac.  570.     See  Thibodaux  v.  Hoge  v.  Eaton,  135  Fed.  441. 

Town  of  Thibodaux,  46  La.  An.  1528,  z^Same;  Octoraro  Water  Co.'s  Pe- 

16  So.  450.  tition,  15  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  767. 

19  Savannah  etc.  Ry.   Co.  v.  Pay-  2  6McCarter  v.  Hudson  Co.  Water 

ish,  117  Ga.  893,  45  S.  E.  280.  Co.,  70  N.  J.  Eq.  595,  65  Atl.  489, 


170                                                EMINENT  DOMAIN.                                         §    116 

able  diversion  or  pollution  of  an  inter-state  stream  under  the 
laws  of  another  State.^'^ 

118  Am.   St.  Rep.  754,  affirming  S.  125,   22  S.   C.   552;    Same  v.   Same, 

C.  70  N.  J.  Eq.   525,  61  Atl.   710;  20G  U.  S.  46,  27  S.  C.  655;  Missouri 

Henderson    Co.    Water    Co.    v.    Mo-  v.  Illinois,  180  U.   S.  208,  21   S.  C. 

Carter,  209  U.  S.  349.  418;  Missouri  v.  Illinois,  200  U.  S. 

2  6Kansas  v.  Colorado,   185  U.   S.  496,  26  S.  C.  263. 


CHAPTER  Y. 

WHAT  CONSTITUTES  A  TAKING:     ROADS  AND  STREETS. 
I. — General  Questions. — Eights  of  Abutting  Owners. 

§  117  (91b).  Nomenclature  of  public  ways.  It  is  the 
design  of  the  present  chapter  to  consider  what  injury  or  damage 
to  abutting  property  by  the  use  or  improvement  of  the  public 
way  on  which  it  abuts  amounts  to  a  taking  witliin  the  meaning 
of  the  constitution.  Under  "roads  and  streets"  all  sorts  of 
public  ways  by  land  are  intended  to  be  included,  whether  desig- 
nated as  a  highway,  road,  street,  alley,  lane,  place  or  boulevard. 
The  word  "street"  is  ordinarily  applied  to  a  public  way  in  a 
city,  town  or  village,^  and  the  word  "road"  to  a  free  public  way 
in  the  country.^  The  word  "highway"  is  often  used  as  synony- 
mous with  either,  though  it  has  a  much  more  comprehensive 
meaning,  being  applied  to  rivers,  canals,  lakes  and  railroads,  as 
well  as  to  roads  and  streets.^  But  the  word  "street"  is  fre- 
quently applied  to  a  public  way  in  the  country  and  the  word 
"road"  to  a  public  way  in  a  city  or  village,  and  we  shall  use 
the  words  road,  street,  and  highway,  as  substantially  synony- 
mous. None  of  the  terms  applied  to  public  ways,  indicate  any- 
thing definite  as  to  the  rights  of  either  the  abutting  owner  or 
the  public. 

§  118  (91c).  Distinctions  between  rural  highways  and 
urban  streets  as  to  the  extent  of  the  public  right  or  ease- 
ment.    Many  cases  assert  a  broad  distinction  between  the  ex- 

lElliott,  Roads  and  Streets,  p.  12;  3"The  term  highway,"  says  Bou- 

State  V.  Comra.  of  Putnam  Co.,  23  vier,   "is   the  generic   name   for   all 

Fla.  632,  3  So.  164;   Commissioners  kinds  of  public  ways,  whether  they 

V.  City  of  Jacksonville,  36  Fla.  196,  be  carriage-ways,  bridle-ways,  foot- 

18  So.  339.  ways,  bridges,  turnpike  roads,  rail- 

2Elliott,  Roads  and  Streets,  pp.  4,  roads,   canals,   ferries   or   navigable 

5.  In  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mont-  rivers."   Bouvier's   Diet.,   Tit.   high- 

gomery  Co.  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  Pa.  way.      So   also    Elliott,    Roads   and 

Co.  Ct.  88,  street  and  road  are  said  Streets,  p.  1. 
to  be  synonymous.     So  as  to  street 
and  highway.     Case  of  Road  etc.,  4 
8.  &  R.  106. 

171 


172 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§    11« 


tent  of  the  public  right  or  easement  in  city  streets  and  its  extent 
in  country  highways.*  In  one  of  the  cases  cited,  it  is  said  that 
"there  is  a  wide  distinction  between  a  highway  in  the  country 
and  a  street  in  a  city  or  village  as  to  the  mode  and  extent  of  the 
enjoyment,  and,  as  a  sequence,  in  the  extent  of  the  servitude  in 
the  land  upon  which  they  are  located.  The  country  highway 
is  needed  only  for  the  purpose  of  passing  and  repassing,  and,  as 
a  general  rule,  to  which  there  are  a  few  needed  exceptions,  the 
right  of  the  public  and  of  the  authorities  in  charge  is  confined 
to  the  use  of  the  surface,  with  such  rights  incidental  thereto  as 
are  essential  to  such  use.  In  the  case  of  streets  in  a  city  there 
are  other  and  further  uses,  such  as  the  construction  of  sewers 
and  drains,  laying  of  gas  and  water  pipes,  erection  of  telegraph 
and  telephone  wires,  and  a  variety  of  other  improvements,  be- 
neath, upon  and  above  the  surface,  to  which  in  modern  times 
urban  streets  have  been  subjected.  These  urban  servitudes  are 
essential  to  the  enjoyment  of  streets  in  cities,  and  to  the  comfort 


iThis  distinction  is  particularly 
discussed  or  emphasized  in  the  fol- 
lowing cases:  Western  R.  R.  of  Ala. 
V.  Ala.  G.  T.  R.  R.  Co.,  96  Ala.  272, 
11  So.  483,  17  L.R.A.  474;  Mont- 
gomery V.  Santa  Ana  &  W.  R.  R. 
Co.,  104  Cal.  186,  37  Pac.  786,  43 
Am.  St.  Rep.  89,  25  L.R.A.  654;  10 
Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  25;  Kin- 
caid  V.  Indianapolis  Nat'l  Gas  Co., 
124  Ind.  577,  24  N.  E.  1066,  19  Am. 
St.  Rep.  113,  8  L.R.A.  602,  3  Am. 
E.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  1;  Lostutter  v. 
City  of  Aurora,  126  Ind.  436,  26  N. 
E.  184,  12  L.R.A.  259;  Chesapeake 
&  0.  Tel.  Co.  V.  Mackenzie,  74  Md. 
36,  21  Atl.  690,  28  Am.  St.  Rep.  219; 
Baltimore  Co.  W.  &  Elee.  Co.  v. 
Baltimore  Co.,  105  Md.  154,  66  Atl. 
34;  Baltimore  Co.  W.  &  Elec.  Co. 
V.  Dubreuil,  105  Md.  424,  66  Atl. 
439;  Van  Brunt  v.  Town  of  Flat- 
bush,  128  N.  Y.  50,  27  N.  E.  973; 
S.  C.  59  Hun  192,  37  N.  Y.  St.  200, 
13  N.  Y.  Supp.  645;  Eels  v.  Am. 
Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  143  N.  Y.  133,  38 
N.  E.  202,  25  L.R.A.  640,  10  Am.  R. 
R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  69;  Witcher  v.  Hol- 


land W.  W.  Co.,  66  Hun  619,  20  N. 
Y.  Supp.  560;  Iiockhart  v.  Railway 
Co.,  139  Pa.  St.  319,  21  Atl.  26; 
Wood  v.  McGrath,  150  Pa.  St.  451, 
24  Atl.  682,  16  L.R.A.  715;  McDevitt 
V.  Peoples'  Nat'l  Gas  Co.,  160  Pa. 
St.  367,  28  Atl.  948;  Pennsylvania 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Montgomery  Co.  Pass. 
R.  R.  Co.,  167  Pa.  St.  62,  31  Atl.  468, 
46  Am.  St.  Rep.  659,  27  L.R.A.  766, 
reversing  S.  C.  14  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  88, 
3  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  5«;  Elliott,  Roads, 
and  Streets,  299  et  seq.;  Zehren  v. 
Milwaukee  Elec.  R.  &  L.  Co.,  99 
Wis.  83,  67  Am.  St.  Rep.  844.  Other 
cases  cited  in  support  of  the  dis- 
tinction are  the  following:  Bloom- 
field  etc.  Gas  Co.  v.  Calkins,  62 
N.  Y.  386;  Gas  Light  Co.  v.  Rich- 
ardson, 63  Barb.  437;  Sterling's  Ap- 
peal, 111  Pa.  St.  35,  2  Atl.  105; 
Sampfs  Appeal,  116  Pa.  St.  33,  8 
Atl.  865;  Long  v.  Wilson,  119  la. 
267,  93  N.  W.  282,  97  Am.  St.  Rep. 
315,  60  L.R.A.  720 ;  Farmer  v.  Myles, 
106  La.  333,  30  So.  858;  Murray  v. 
Gibson,  21  111.  App.  488;  Indianapo- 
lis etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Hartley,  67  111. 


§  118 


EOADS    AND    STEEETS. 


173 


of  citizens  in  their  more  densely  populated  limits."  ^  Similar 
views  are  expressed  in  the  other  cases.  But  it  may  be  doubted 
whether  the  public  right  or  easement  is  any  different  in  its 
legal  essence,  though  there  may  be  a  difference  in  its  practical 
exercise.  The  legitimate  use  of  a  public  way  is  necessarily 
much  greater  in  the  city  than  in  the  country,  but  what  consti- 
tutes a  legitimate  use  would  seem  to  present  the  same  question 
whether  it  concerns  a  city  street  or  a  country  road.  There  are 
now  many  city  streets  which  were  once  country  roads,  but  there 
does  not  seem  to  be  any  doubt  but  what  they  are  subject  to  the 
same  uses  and  servitudes  as  streets  newly  established.®  Accord- 
ing to  Mr.  Elliott  the  moment  a  country  road  is  brought  within 
the  jurisdiction  of  a  town  or  city,  the  public  easement  forth- 
with becomes  enlarged  and  extended  by  operation  of  law.'^  If 
this  is  so,  then  something  has  been  subtracted  from  the  private 
property  of  the  abutting  owner  and  added  to  the  public  ease- 


439 ;  Board  of  Trade  Tel.  Co.  v.  Bar- 
nett,  107  111.  507,  47  Am.  Rep.  453. 

BMontgomery  v.  Santa  Ana  &  W. 
E.  K.  Co.,  104  Cal.  186,  37  Pac.  Rep. 
786,  43  Am.  St.  Rep.  89,  25  L.R.A. 
654,  10  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  25. 

6  In  Town  of  Palatine  v.  Kreuger, 
121  111.  72,  the  defendant  was  prose- 
cuted under  an  ordinance  which  for- 
bade the  removal  of  dirt  or  earth 
from  any  of  the  streets  of  the  town. 
The  defendant  removed  the  earth 
under  the  direction  of  the  owner  of 
the  fee  and  relied  upon  the  rights 
of  such  owner  as  a  defense.  The 
street  in  question  was  laid  out  by 
road  commissioners  before  the  town 
was  incorporated,  that  is,  while  the 
town  was  a  rural  community.  The 
town  was  incorporated  by  a  special 
charter  which  gave  it  the  usual 
powers  of  a  city  or  village  over  its 
streets.  The  court  held  that  upon 
the  incorporation  of  the  town  the 
public  at  once  acquired  the  right  to 
the  enlarged  use  and  control  of 
streets,  usually  accorded  to  cities 
and  villages,  and  that  the  town  had 
the  same  power  over  the  street  as 
though  it  had  been  laid  out  after 


incorporation.  The  court 
"Smith  street,  as  appears  from  the 
stipulation,  was  originally  a,  public 
highway  laid  out  by  the  road  com- 
missioners of  the  town  of  Palatine, 
but  when  the  town  was  incorporated 
the  highway  became  a  street  of  the 
incorporated  town,  and  it  is  to  be 
treated  in  the  same  way  as  a,  street 
laid  out  by  the  authorities  of  the 
incorporated  town,  and  the  rights 
and  obligations  of  the  defendant,  and 
.the  rights  of  the  public  in  reference 
to  the  street,  are  the  same  as  if  it 
had  been  so  laid  out  by  the  town 
after  it  became  incorporated."  p.  72. 
In  Heiple  v.  East  Portland,  13  Or. 
97,  it  is  intimated  that  the  legisla- 
ture could  change  a,  country  road  to 
a  city  street  with  all  the  usual  inci- 
dents by  a  simple  enactment.  See 
also  Smith  v.  Goldsboro,  121  N.  C. 
350;  Baltimore  Co.  W.  &  Elec.  Co.  v. 
Dubreuil,  105  Md.  424,  66  Atl.  439. 

'"There  is  some  conflict  in  the 
cases  as  to  whether  the  erection  of 
a  municipal  corporation  does  of  it- 
self oust  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
county  or  township  officers  over  ex- 
isting highways.     Our  opinion  is  that 


174 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  118 


ment,  without  compensation.  This  is  clearly  contrary  to  the 
constitution  and,  therefore,  cannot  be  the  correct  view.  The 
public  can  no  more  take,  without  compensation,  an  easement  for 
the  urban  uses  of  highways,  than  it  can  take,  without  compen- 
sation, an  easement  for  the  rural  uses  of  highways.  It  follows, 
either  that  the  public  must  have  a  very  limited  control  and  ease- 
ment in  country  roads  after  they  become  city  streets,  or  else  that 
the  easement  is  the  same  in  both  cases,  and  that  the  same  prin- 
ciples are  to  be  applied  to  both  in  determining  what  is  a  legiti- 
mate use.  The  latter  seems  to  us  the  correct  view,  and  the  pub- 
lic easement  may  be  defined  as  the  right  to  use  and  improve  the 
way  for  highway  purposes  as  the  public  needs  demand.®     The 


as  soon  as  a  town  or  city  is  incor- 
porated, the  public  ways,  that  is, 
ways  belonging  to  the  public  and  not 
owned  by  private  corporations,  come 
within  the  jurisdiction  and  control 
of  the  new  public  corporation,  unless 
the  statute  expressly  or  impliedly 
continues  the  authority  of  the 
county  or  township  officers.  It  is 
apparent  that  the  ways  must  of 
necessity  change  character  and  the 
servitude  be  much  extended.  This 
extension  carries  with  it  wider 
duties  and  greater  liabilities,  thus 
requiring  an  essentially  different 
control  and  care."  Elliott,  Roads  and 
Streets,  pp.  312,  313.  And  again: 
"The  change  which  takes  place  in 
the  extent  of  a  servitude  in  a  public 
way  is  not  effected  by  the  act  of  the 
donee  nor  after  acceptance  by  the 
act  of  the  donor,  but  by  operation 
of  law,  and  in  order  to  meet  the  de- 
mands of  the  public  welfare  and  nec- 
essity.''   Same,  p.  316. 

sThis  is  implied  in  the  opinion  of 
Peckham,  J.  in  Eels  v.  Am.  Tel.  & 
Tel.  Co.,  143  N.  Y.  133,  38  N.  E. 
202,  25  L.E.A.  640,  10  Am.  R.  R.  & 
Corp.  Rep.  69,  wherein  he  says : 
"While  concurring  in  the  view  that 
the  easement  in  a  public  street  in  a 
city  or  village  may  well  be  greater 
as  the  actual  necessities  of  the  case 
are  greater  for  sewers  and  gas  and 


water  pipes,  yet  in  this  case,  as  we 
have  to  deal  with  the  easement  in  a 
purely  country  highway,  it  is  not  im- 
portant to  discuss  how  the  easement 
became  greater  in  the  one  case  than 
in  the  other,  or  as  to  the  time  when 
the  right  to  the  enlarged  use  of  the 
highway  or  street  attaches,  or  the 
method  or  means  by  which  the  right 
to  such  enlarged  use  was  attained. 
Density  of  population  creates  pub- 
lic necessities  for  water,  light,  drain- 
age and  other  conveniences  which  do 
not  exist  in  purely  rural  districts, 
and  along  a.  purely  rural  liighway. 
Yet  the  same  land  might  alter  from 
a  country  highway  to  a  city  street, 
and  it  might  be  determined  that 
there  was  an  implied  dedication  of 
the  country  highway  at  the  time  the 
land  was  taken  to  the  uses  which  the 
future  village  or  city  street  might 
require."  Mr.  Pierce,  in  speaking  of 
the  distinction  between  city  and 
country  highways,  says :  "But  as 
both  the  highway  and  the  street  are 
appropriated  for  the  same  general 
purposes,  and  a  highway  in  a  dis- 
trict sparsely  inhabitated  at  one 
time  may,  by  the  growth  of  popula- 
tion, become  a  street  in  a  city,  this 
distinction  does  not  appear  to  rest 
upon  a  sound  basis."  Pierce  Rail- 
ways, p.  232.  This  doctrine  has  now 
become    fully    est?ibliahed    in    New 


§  118 


EOADS    AND    STEEETS. 


175 


public  needs  "will  demand  a  larger  use  in  the  city  than  in  the 
country.  But  "whatever  the  public  needs  demand,  in  the  way  of 
legitimate  highway  uses,  that  the  public  have  a  right  to  enjoy. 
Whether  a  particular  use  or  improvement  is  within  the  public 
right,  does  not  depend,  therefore,  upon  whether  the  highway  is 
in  the  city  or  country,  but  upon  the  nature  of  the  use  or  improve- 
ment, that  is,  whether  it  is  or  is  not  within  the  leigtimate  pur- 
poses of  a  highway.  In  an  Oregon  case,  where  the  limits  of  a 
city  were  extended  to  include  a  country  road,  which  was  located 
and  established  as  a  city  street,  it  was  expressly  held  that  the 
abutting  o"wner,  having  the  fee,  was  not  entitled  to  any  addi- 
tional compensation.^ 

Nor  do  the  authorities  afford  much  but  dicta  in  support  of  the 
distinction  asserted  between  urban  and  rural  highways.  In  one 
class  of  cases  certain  uses  of  a  country  road  were  held  not  to  be 
within  the  purpose  for  which  such  roads  are  established,  but 
the  same  courts  have  not  held  that  the  same  uses  of  a  city  street 
were  legitimate.^"  In  another  class  of  cases  certain  uses  of  city 
streets  are  declared  to  be  legitimate,-^^  but  this  is  quite  different 


York  by  the  recent  case  of  Palmer 
V.  Ia,rchmont  Electric  Co.,  158  N. 
Y.  231,  52  N.  E.  Rep.  1092,  wherein 
the  court  says:  "But  the  owner  of 
the  fee  in  a  country  highway,  taken, 
opened  and  dedicated  for  a  public 
use,  is  entitled  to  no  further  com- 
pensation after  the  territory  has  be- 
come thickly  settled  and  the  high- 
way has  become  a  street  of  an  in- 
corporated city.  This  was  recog- 
nized in  the  Eels  case,  and  it  is, 
therefore,  apparent  that,  at  the  time 
the  land  "was  taken  for  a  highway, 
it  was  impliedly  dedicated  to  the 
uses  which  the  public  might  in  the 
future  require."  p.  236. 

9Hiiddleston  v.  Eugene,  34  Ore. 
343,  55  Pac.  868,  43  L.R.A.  444.  To 
same  effect,  Lake  Shore  etc.  Ey.  Co. 
V.  Whiting,  161  Ind.  76,  67  N.  E. 
933;  DeKalb  Co.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Dutton, 
228  111.  178,  81  N.  E.  838,  10  L.R.A. 
(N.S.)  1057;  Callen  v.  Columbus 
Edison  Elec.  Lt.  Co.,  66  Ohio  St, 
166,  64  N.  E.  141,  58  L.R.A.  782, 


10 Western  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ala.  G. 
T.  R.  R.  Co.,  96  Ala.  272,  11  So. 
483,  17  L.R.A.  474;  Board  of  Trade 
Tel.  Co.  V.  Barnett,  107  111.  507,  47 
Am.  Rep.  453;  Eels  v.  Am.  Tel.  & 
Tel.  Co.  143  N.  Y.  133,  38  N.  E. 
202,  10  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  69, 
25  L.R.A.  640. 

iiMontgomery  v.  Santa  Ana  & 
W.  R.  R.  Co.,  104  Cal.  186,  37  Pac. 
786,  43  Am.  St.  Rep.  89,  25  L.R.A. 
654,  10  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  25; 
Lostutter  v.  City  of  Aurora,  126 
Ind.  436,  26  N.  E.  184,  12  L.R.A. 
259;  Witcher  v.  Holland  W.  W.  Co., 
66  Hun  619,  20  N.  Y.  Supp.  560; 
Lockhart  v.  Craig  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  139 
Pa.  St.  319,  21  Atl.  26;  Wood  v. 
McGrath,  150  Pa.  St.  451,  24  Atl. 
682,  16  L.R.A.  715;  McDevitt  v. 
People's  Nat.  Gas  Co.,  160  Pa.  St. 
3b/,  28  Atl.  948.  In  Chesapeake  & 
P.  Tel.  Co.  V.  Mackenzie,  74  Md. 
36,  21  Atl.  690,  28  Am.  St.  Rep.  219, 
which  contains  dicta  to  the  effect 
that  city  streets  may  be  used  for 


176  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    118 

from  holding  that  the  same  or  similar  uses  of  country  roads 
would  not  be  legitimate.  The  eases  most  relied  upon  are  those 
which  hold  that  country  highways  cannot  be  used  for  laying 
down  gas  pipes  for  the  conveying  of  natural  gas.-^*  But  when 
these  cases  are  examined  it  is  found  that  the  pipes  were  proposed 
to  be  laid,  not  for  lighting  the  highway  in  question,  or  of  furnish- 
ing gas  to  the  occupiers  of  abutting  property,  but  of  conveying 
it  past  their  premises  to  a  distant  city.  It  is  not  probable  that 
the  same  use  would  be  permitted  of  a  city  street.  The  reason 
of  the  rule  that  permits  the  use  of  streets  for  gas  and  water  pipes 
would  not  apply  to  such  a  case.-'*  So  it  was  held  in  Van  Brunt 
V.  Town  of  Flatbush,^*  that  a  sewer  could  not  be  laid  through  a 
rural  highway  in  a  town,  the  fee  of  which  was  in  the  abutting 
owners,  for  the  purpose  of  conveying  the  sewerage  of  an  ad- 
joining town  to  the  ocean.  But  it  was  plainly  intimated  that 
the  authorities  of  the  town  in  which  the  highway  was  situated 
might  have  laid  a  sewer  therein  for  the  use  of  abutters  and  the 
local  community.  In  a  Maryland  case  it  was  held  that  a  water 
main  could  not  be  laid  in  a  country  road  for  the  purpose  of 
conveying  water  past  the  abutting  premises  to  towns  and  villages 
beyond.-'^  But  the  court  recognizes  that  country  roads  may  be- 
come city  streets  and  be  subjected  to  urban  servitudes  without 
additional  compensation  to  the  owner  of  the  fee.-'*    These  cases 

purposes    for   -which   country   roads  iBBaltimore  Co.  W.  &  Elect.  Co. 

may  not,  it  was  held  that  a  tele-  v.   Dubreuil,   105   Md.   424,   66   Atl. 

phone  line  was  not  a  legitimate  use  439. 
of  a  city  street.  isThe    court   holds   that   it   is    a, 

i2Bloonifield  Gas  Co.  v.  Calkins,  question     of     fact     in     each     case 

62  N.  y.  386;  Calkins  v.  Bloomfield  whether  the  new  use  is  within  the 

Gas  Light  Co.,  1  N.  Y.  Supm.  541 ;  scope  of  the  original  easement  and 

Gas    Light    Co.    v.    Richardson,    63  says:   "The  tribunal  whose  duty  it 

Barb.  437;  Sterling's  Appeal,  111  Pa.  is  to  determine  the  question  is  not 

St.   35,  2  Atl.   Eep.   105;    Stumpf's  to  be  governed  alone  by  the  mode  of 

Appeal,  116  Pa.  St.  33,  8  Atl.  865;  user  first  adopted  or  by  the  condi- 

Webb  V.  Fuel  Co.,  16  Wkly.  L.  B.  tions  existing  at  the  time  the  high- 

121;  Kincaid  v.  Indianapolis  Natu-  way  is  acquired  by  the  public.    For 

ral  Gas  Co.,  124  Ind.  577,  24  N.  E.  example,  if  the  easement  when  ac- 

1066,  19  Am.  St.  Rep.  113,  8  L.R.A.  quired  be  over  land  which  is  in  the 

602,  3  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  1.  open  country,  but  is  so  situated  that 

isfifee  Cone  v.   City  of  Hartford,  it  will  probably  be  built  upon,  like 

28  Conn.  363.  a  street  of  a  city  or  town,  and  is 

14128    N.   y.    50,    27    N.    E.    973,  afterwards  so  built  upon,  it  would 

reversing  S.  C.  59  Hun  192,  37  N.  be  wholly  unreasonable  to  hold  that 

y.  St.  200,  13  N.  Y.  Supp.  545.  the   public   must   again   compensate 


§  120 


ROADS    AND    STEEETS. 


177 


afford  very  little  support  for  the  contention  that  city  streets 
may  be  used  for  purposes  which  would  not  be  legitimate  in  the 
case  of  country  roads.  The  only  court  in  which  it  has  been  un- 
equivocally adjudicated  that  a  certain  use  was  legitimate  in 
the  case  of  city  streets  and  not  legitimate  in  the  case  of  country 
highways,  is  that  of  Pennsylvania,  in  which  it  has  been  held  that 
an  electric  passenger  railway  is  a  legitimate  use  of  a  city  or  vil- 
lage street,  ^^  but  not  of  a  country  road.-'^ 

§  119  (9 Id).  What  is  meant  by  abutting  owners. 
The  ISFew  York  court  of  appeals  has  defined  an  "abutting  own- 
er," as  one  who  owns  land  upon  a  street  and  whose  title  termi- 
nates at  the  street  line.-'"  "While,  strictly  speaking,  a  lot,  the 
title  to  which  extends  to  the  middle  of  the  street,  may  not  be 
said  to  abut  upon  the  street,  yet  we  believe  the  phrase  "abutting 
owners,"  has  been  applied  indifferently  to  all  owners  of  lots  or 
lands  upon  or  along  a  street  or  highway,  whether  their  title  ex- 
tended to  the  center  of  the  street  or  stopped  at  the  street  line, 
and  we  shall  so  use  the  words  in  this  treatise.^" 

§  120  (91e).  Rights  of  abutting  owners. — Light,  air 
and  access.  As  we  have  already  seen,  to  constitute  a  taking, 
when  no  title  or  interest  passes,  a  private  right  must  be  impaired 
or  destroyed.^  ^     Therefore,  to  determine  whether  certain  dam- 


the  owner  of  the  fee  before  it  can 
make  such  use  of  the  highway  as  its 
then  condition  requires  and  justifies, 
provided  of  course,  they  be  within 
the  scope  of  the  original  easement. 
Indeed  we  have  many  instances  in 
this  State  of  such  changed  conditions 
— where  the  highway  when  acquired 
by  the  public  was  in  the  open  coun- 
try, but  subsequently  become  a 
street  of  a  town. ,  It  could  not  be 
successfully  contended  that  water 
and  gas  pipes  could  not  be  laid  in 
such  street  without  additional  com- 
pensation to  the  owner  of  the  fee, 
merely  because  the  land  was  origin- 
ally taken  for  a  rural  highway." 
Baltimore  Co.  W.  &  Elec.  Co.  v. 
Dubreuil,  105  Md.  424,  6G  Atl.  439. 
I'Lockhart  v.  Craig  St.  R.  R.  Co., 
139  Pa.  St.  319,  21  Atl.  26;  RaflFej-ty 
V.  Central  Traction  Co.,  147  Pa.  St. 
579,  23  Atl.  884,  30  Am.  St.  Rep. 
763,  6  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  287. 
Em.  D.— 12. 


isPennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Montgomery  Co.  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  167 
Pa.  St.  62,  31  Atl.  468,  46  Am.  St. 
Rep.  659,  27  L.R.A.  766. 

i9In  Hughes  v.  Metropolitan  El. 
R.  R.  Co.,  130  N.  Y.  14,  28  N.  I" 
765,  the  court  defines  an  "abuttiii 
lot"  as  follows:     "It  denotes  a   h, 
bounded    on    the    side    of   a    public 
street,  in  the  bed  or  soil  of  which 
the  owner  of  the  lot  has  no  title, 
estate,  interest  or  private  rights  ex- 
cept such  as  are  incident  to  a  lot 
so  situated."    See  also  Abendroth  > 
Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  122  N.  Y.  1 
25  N.  E.  496,  19  Am.  St.  Rep.  461, 
11  L.R.A.  634,  3  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp. 
Rep.  309,  312. 

2  0Elliott  Roads  and  Streets,  pp. 
519,  et  seq.;  Dillon  Munic.  Corp., 
Title  "Abutter." 

ii-Ante,  §  65. 


1V8  EMINEJSTT    DOMAIN.  §    120 

ages,  resulting  to  abutting  property  frona  the  use  or  improve- 
ment of  a  street,  amount  to  a  taking,  we  must  inquire  whether 
any  private,  right  has  been  interfered  with.  If  yes,  and  the 
damages  result  from  such  interference,  then  there  has  been  a 
taking,  and  the  right  to  compensation  follows.  It  thus  becomes 
necessary  to  inquire  what  private  rights,  if  any,  an  abutting 
owner  has  in,  or  in  respect  to,  the  street  in  front  of  his  property. 
As  these  questions  arise  almost  wholly  with  respect  to  urban 
property,  we  shall,  in  this  discussi©n,  have  regard  mainly  to  the 
conditions  of  urban  life.  While  highways  are  established  in 
the  country  largely  for  the  accommodation  of  the  general  public 
in  traveling  from  place  to  place,  streets  are  laid  out  in  cities 
and  villages,  either  partly  or  wholly,  for  the  purpose  of  afford- 
ing access,  light  and  air  to  the  property  throvigh  which  they 
pass.  As  the  country  road  of  the  present  may  become  the  city 
street  of  the  future,  it  seems  evident  that  the  same  rules  must  ap- 
ply to  both.^^  It  having  been  always  one  of  the  recognized  uses 
and  purposes  of  establishing  streets,  to  afford  access,  light  and 
air  to  the  property  through  which  they  pass,  we  think  that  with 
the  establishment  of  a  street  there  attach  to  the  adjacent  prop- 
erty, as  appurtenant  to  and  parcel  of  it,  the  private  rights  of 
access  and  of  light  and  air.^*     jSTumerous  cases,  decided  since 

22i.Ji*e,  §  120.  122,  43  Am.  Rep.  146;  Lakr  v.  Met. 

23Denver  v.  Bayer,  7  Colo.  113;  El.  K.  R.  Co.,  104  N.  Y.  268;  Craw- 
Chicago  V.  Union  Building  Ass.,  102  ford  v.  Delaware,  7  Ohio  St.  459; 
111.  379,  397,  40  Am.  Rep.  598;  Jackson  v.  Jackson,  16  Ohio  St.  163; 
Haynes  v.  Thomas,  7  Ind.  38;  Tate  Anderson  v.  Turbeville,  6  Coldw. 
V.  Ohio  &  Miss.  R.  R.  Co.,  7  Ind.  150.  In  Indiana,  Bloomington  & 
479;  Rennslaer  v.  Leopold,  106  Ind.  Western  Ry.  Co.  v.  Eberle,  110  Ind. 
29 ;  Indiana,  Bloomington  &  Western  542,  545,  59  Am.  Rep.  225,  the  court 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Eberle,  110  Ind.  542,  59  say:  "Whatever  may  be  the  rule  of 
Am.  Rep.  225;  Lexington  etc.  R.  R.  decision  elsewhere,  nothing  is  better 
Co.  V.  Applegate,  8  Dana  289,  33  settled  in  this  State,  than  that  the 
Am.  Dec.  497;  Transylvania  Univer-  owners  of  lots  abutting  on  a  street 
sity  V.  Lexington,  3  B.  Mon.  25,  27,  may  have  a  peculiar  and  distinct  in- 
38  Am.  Rep.  173;  Elizabethtown  etc.  terest  in  the  easement  in  the  street 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Coombs,  10  Bush  382;  in  front  of  their  lots.  This  interest 
Lackland  v.  North  Mo.  R.  R.  Co.,  includes  the  right  to  have  the  street 
31  Mo.  180;  Thurston  v.  St.  Joseph,  kept  open  and  free  from  any  obstruc- 
51  Mo.  510;  Burlington  &  Mo.  R.  tion  which  prevents  or  materially  in- 
R.  Co.  V.  Reinhackle,  15  Neb.  279,  terferes  with  the  ordinary  means  of 
48  Am.  Rep.  342;  People  v.  Kerr,  27  ingress  to  and  egress  from  the  lots. 
N.  y.  188,  215;  Kellinger  v.  42d  St.  It  is  distinguished  from  the  interest 
R.  R.  Co.,  50  N.  Y.  206;  Story  v.  of  the  general  public,  in  that  it  be- 
New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  90  N.  Y.  comes  a  right  appendant,  and  legal- 


§  120 


EOADS    AND    STREETS. 


179 


the  first  edition  of  this  work,  establish  beyond  question  the  ex- 
istence of  these  rights,  or  easements,  of  light,  air  and  access,  as 
appurtenant  to  abutting  lots,  and  that  they  are  as  much  property 
as  the  lots  themselves.^*     But   as  all  streets  are  established 


ly  adhering  to,  the  contiguoua 
grounds  and  the  improvements 
thereon,  as  the  owner  may  have 
adapted  them  to  the  street.  To  the 
extent  that  the  street  is  a  necessary 
and  convenient  means  of  access  to 
the  lot,  it  is  as  much  a  valuable 
property  right  as  the  lot  itself.  It 
cannot,  therefore,  be  perverted  from 
the  uses  to  which  it  was  originally 
dedicated,  or  devoted  to  uses  incon- 
sistent with  street  purposes,  with- 
out the  abutting  lot-owner's  consent, 
until  due  compensation  be  first  made 
according  to  law  for  any  injury  and 
damage  which  may  directly  result 
from  such  interference;  nor  can  a 
street  be  invaded  so  as  to  inflict 
special  and  peculiar  damage  or  in- 
jury upon  the  adjacent  lot-owner's 
property,  without  rendering  the 
wrongdoer  liable  for  such  dam- 
age. »  *  *  The  interest  in  the 
street  which  is  peculiar  and  per- 
sonal to  the  abutting  lot-owner, 
which  is  distinct  and  diff'erent  from 
that  of  the  general  public,  is  the 
right  to  have  free  access  over  it  to 
his  lot  and  buildings,  substantially 
in  the  manner  he  would  have  en- 
joyed the  right  in  case  there  had 
been  no  interference  with  the  street. 
Tlie  right  of  access  by  way  of  the 
street  is  an  incident  to  the  owner- 
ship of  the  lot,  which  cannot  be 
taken  away  or  materially  impaired 
without  liability  to  the  owner  to  the 
extent  of  the  damage  actually  in- 
curred. In  this  respect,  and  in  this 
only,  is  the  interest  of  the  abutting 
property-owner  different  in  the 
street  in  front  of,  and  beyond  the 
line  of,  his  lot,  from  that  of  the  pub- 
lic."    Similar   views  will  be  found 


expressed  in  nearly  all  the  cases 
cited  in  this  note,  and  in  many  of 
the  cases  cited  in  the  next  note. 

2  4Eachu3  V.  Los  Angeles  Consol. 
El.  R.  R.  Co.,  103  Cal.  614,  37  Pac. 
750,  42  Am.  St.  Rep.  149;  Bigelow 
V.  Ballesino,  111  Cal.  559,  44  Pac. 
307;  Williams  v.  Los  Angeles,  150 
Cal.  592,  89  Pac.  330;  Cushing- Wet- 
more  Co.  V.  Gray,  152  Cal.  118,  92 
Pac.  70;  Coats  v.  Atchison  etc.  Ry. 
Co.,  1  Cal.  App.  441,  82  Pac.  040; 
Selden  v.  City  of  Jacksonville,  28 
Fla.  558,  10  So.  457,  29  Am.  St.  Rep. 
278,  14  L.R.A.  370;  Bowden  v.  Jack- 
sonville, 52  Fla.  216,  42  So.  394; 
Harvey  v.  Georgia  Southern  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  90  Ga.  66,  15  S.  E.  783; 
Macon  v.  Wing,  113  Ga.  90,  38  S.  E. 
392;  Barrows  v.  City  of  Sycamore, 
150  III.  588,  37  N.  E.  1096,  41  Am. 
St.  Rep.  40O,  10  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp. 
Rep.  62;  Decker  v.  Evansville  Sub- 
urban etc.  K.  R.  Co.,  133  Ind.  493, 
33  N.  E.  349;  Dantzer  v.  Indianapo- 
lis Union  R.  R.  Co.,  141  Ind.  604, 
39  N.  E.  223,  50  Am.  St.  Rep.  343,  34 
L.R.A.  769, 11  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
249;  Pittsburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Noftsger,  148  Ind.  101,  47  N.  E.  332; 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Stanley,  10  Ind. 
App.  421,  37  N.  E.  288,  38  N.  E.  421 ; 
Long  V.  Wilson,  119  la.  207,  93  N. 
W.  282,  97  Am.  St.  Rep.  315,  60 
L.R.A.  720;  Leavenworth  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Curtan,  51  Kan.  432,  33  Pac. 
297;  Atchison  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Da- 
vidson, 52  Kans.  739,  35  Pac.  787; 
Fulton  V.  Short  Route  R.  R.  Trans. 
Co.,  85  Ky.  640,  4  S.  W.  332,  7  Am. 
St.  Rep.  619;  Ball  v.  Maysville  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  102  Ky.  486,  43  S.  W.  731, 
80  Am.  St.  Rep.  362;  Ferguson  v. 
Covington  etc.  Bridge  Co.,  108  Ky. 


180 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


120 


primarily  for  tlie  public  use  and  general  good,  the  right  of  the 
public  is  paramount  to  the  right  of  the  individual.  And  so  the 
private  rights  of  access,  light  and  air  are  held  and  enjoyed  sub- 
ject to  the  paramount  right  of  the  public  to  use  and  improve  the 


662,  57  S.  W.  460;  Ky.  Cent.  E.  R. 
Co.  V.  Clark,  5  Ky.  L.  R.  184;  Hept- 
ing  V.  New  Orleans  Pac.  R.  R.  Co., 
36  La.  An.  898;  Chesapeake  &  P. 
Tel.  Co.  V.  Mackenzie,  74  Md.  36, 
21  Atl.  690;  Townsend  v.  Epstein, 
93  Md.  537,  49  Atl.  629,  86  Am.  St. 
Rep.  441,  52  L.R.A.  408;  Adams  v. 
C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  39  Minn.  286, 
39  N.  W.  629,  12  Am.  St.  Rep.  644, 
1  L.R.A.  493;  Gustafson  v  Hamm, 
56  Minn.  334,  57  N.  W.  1054,  22 
L.R.A.  565;  Theobold  v.  Louisville, 
N.  0.  &  T.  R.  R.  Co.,  66  Miss.  279, 

6  So.  230,  14  Am.  St.  Rep.  564,  4 
L.R.A.  735;  Hazelhurst  v.  Mayes,  84 
Miss.  7,  36  So.  33,  64  L.R.A.  805; 
Henry  Gaus  &  Sons  Mfg.  Co.  v.  St. 
Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  113  Mo.  308, 
20  S.  W.  658,  18  L.R.A.  339,  7  Am. 
R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  235;  Spencer  v. 
Metropolitan  St.  R.  E.  Co.,  120  Mo. 
154,  23  S.  W.  126,  22  L.R.A.  668; 
Sherlock  v.  Kansas  City  Belt  R.  R. 
Co.,  142  Mo.  172,  64  Am.  St.  Rep. 
551 ;  Corby  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
150  Mo.  457;  DeGeofroy  v.  Mer- 
chants Bridge  Terminal  Ry.  Co.,  179 
Mo.  698,  79  S.  W.  386,  101  Am.  St. 
Rep.  524,  64  L.R.A.  959;  St.  Louis 
V.  Terminal  R.  E.  Ass.,  211  Mo.  364, 
109  S.  W.  041;  Martin  v.  Chicago 
etc.  E.  R.  Co.,  47  Mo.  App.  452; 
Wallace  v.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  47  Mo.  App.  491 ;  Stephenson  v. 
Mo.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  68  Mo.  App.  642; 
Davies  v.  St.  Joseph,  98  Mo.  App. 
611,  73  S.  W.  723;  Jaynes  v.  Omaha 
St.  R.  E.  Co.,  53  Neb.  631,  74  N. 
W.  67,  39  L.R.A.  751 ;  Dill  v.  School 
Board,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  421,  20  Atl. 
739;  Newman  v.  Metropolitan  El.  E. 
E.  Co.,  118  N.  Y.  618,  23  N.  E.  901, 

7  L.R.A.  289,  2  Am.  E.  R.  &  Corp. 


Rep.  318;  Abendroth  v.  Manhattan 
R.  R.  Co.,  122  N.  Y.  1,  25  N.  E.  496, 
19  Am.  St.  Rep.  461,  11  L.R.A.  634, 
3  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  309 ;  Kane 
V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  125  N.  Y. 
164,  26  N.  E.  278,  11  L.R.A.  640; 
S.  C.  Sub.  Nom.  Duyckinck  v.  New 
York  El.  E.  E.  Co.,  3  Am.  R.  R.  & 
Corp.  Rep.  744;  Reining  v.  New 
York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  128  N.  Y.  157, 
28  N.  E.  640,  14  L.R.A.  133,  5  Am. 
R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  476;  Bohm  v. 
Metropolitan  El.  R.  E.  Co.,  129  N. 
Y.  576,  29  N.  E.  802,  14  L.E.A.  344, 
5  Am.  E.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  416; 
Hughes  V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R. 
Co.,  130  N.  Y.  14,  28  N.  E.  765; 
Egerer  v.  New  York  Central  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  130  N.  Y.  108,  29  N.  E. 
95,  5  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  241; 
Bischoff  V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co., 
138  N.  Y.  257,  33  N.  E.  1073;  Hol- 
loway  V.  Southmayd,  139  N.  Y.  390, 
34  N.  E.  1047;  Mortimer  v.  New 
York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  57  N.  Y.  Supr. 
Ct.  244,  6  N.  Y.  Supp.  898;  Hine  v. 
New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  54  Hun  425, 
27  N.  Y.  St.  303,  7  N.  Y.  Supp.  464; 
Wormser  v.  Brown,  72  Hun  93,  25 
N.  Y.  Supp.  553;  Beekman  v.  ThirQ 
Ave.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  App.  Div.  279,  43 
N.  Y.  Supp.  174;  Schmitz  v.  Brook- 
lyn Union  El.  E.  E.  Co.  Ill  App. 
Div.  308,  97  N.  Y.  S.  791 ;  White  v. 
Northwestern  N.  C.  E.  E.  Co.,  113 
N.  C.  610,  18  S.  E.  330,  37  Am.  St. 
Eep.  639,  22  L.E.A.  627,  9  Am.  E. 
E.  &  Corp.  Eep.  103;  Staton  v.  Atl. 
Coast  Line  E.  E.  Co.,  147  N.  C.  428 ; 
McNulta  v.  .  Eolston,  5  Ohio  C.  C. 
330;  McQuaid  v.  Portland  &  V.  R. 
R.  Co.,  18  Ore.  237,  22  Pac.  899,  1 
Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  34;  Willam- 
ette Iron  Works  v.  Oregon  R.  &  N. 


§  121 


EOADS    AND    STEEETS. 


181 


street  for  the  purposes  of  a  highway.^"  And  as  these  private 
rights  are  thus  subject  to  the  right  of  the  public  to  use  and  im- 
prove as  a  highway,  it  follows  that,  when  such  uses  or  improve- 
ments are  made,  no  private  right  is  interfered  with  and  conse- 
quently no  private  property  is  taken.  It  follows  also  that,  as 
these  private  rights  are  subject  only  to  the  use  and  improve- 
ment of  the  street  by  the  public  for  the  purpose  of  a  highway, 
an  interference  with  these  rights  by  the  use  or  improvement  of 
the  street  for  any  other  purpose  or  by  any  other  agency,  under 
legislative  authority,  is  a  taking  of  private  property  to  the  extent 
of  such  interference.^^  The  rights  of  a  railroad  company  as  an 
owner  of  abutting  property  are  the  same  and  no  greater  than  the 


Co.,  26  Ore.  224,  37  Pac.  1016;  In  re 
Melon  St.  182  Pa.  St.  397,  38  Atl. 
482,  28  L.R.A.  275;  Johnsen  v.  Old 
Colony  R.  E.  Co.,  18  R.  I.  642,  29 
Atl.  594;  Edmison  v.  Lowry,  3  S. 
D.  77,  52  N.  W.  583,  44  Am.  St.  Rep. 
774,  17  L.R.A.  275;  South  Bound  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Burton,  67  S.  C.  515,  46 
S.  E.  340;  Prater  v.  Hamilton  Co., 
90  Tenn.  661,  19  S.  W.  233;  Hamil- 
ton County  V.  Rape,  101  Tenn.  222, 
47  S.  W.  416;  Dooley  Block  v.  Salt 
Lake  Rapid  Transit  Co.,  9  Utah  31, 
33  Pac.  229,  8  Am.  E.  R.  &  Corp. 
Rep.  327;  State  v.  Superior  Court, 
30  Wash.  219,  70  Pac.  484;  Lund  v. 
Idaho  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  50  Wash.  574, 
97  Pac.  665;  Hart  v.  Buckner,  54 
Fed.  925,  5  C.  C.  A.  1;  Muhlker  v. 
New  York  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  197  U.  S. 
544,  25  S.  C.  522.  In  the  last  case 
the  statement  of  the  text  is  held  to 
express  the  correct  doctrine  and  the 
court  adds  that  "it  is  impossible  for 
us  to  conceive  of  a  city  without 
streets,  or  any  benefit  in  streets,  if 
the  property  abutting  on  them  has 
not  attached  to  it  as  an  essential 
and  inviolable  part  easements  of 
light  and  air  as  well  as  of  access." 
p.  563. 

2BSeIden  v.  City  of  Jacksonville, 
28  Fla.  558,  10  So.  457;  Bowden  v. 
Jacksonville,  52  Fla.  216,  42  So.  394; 
Adams  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  E.  E.  Co.,  39 


Minn.  286,  39  N.  W.  629;  Gustafson 
V.  Hamm,  56  Minn.  334,  57  N.  W. 
1054;  Henry  Gaus  &  Sons  Mfg.  Co. 
V.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  113  Mo. 
308',  20  S.  W.  658,  18  L.R.A.  339,  7 
Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Eep.  235;  Halsey 
V.  Rapid  Transit  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  47 
N.  J.  Eq.  380,  20  Atl.  859;  Kane 
T.  New  York  El.  R.  E.  Co.,  125  N. 
Y.  164,  26  N.  E.  278,  11  L.E.A.  640; 
S.  C  Sub  Nom.  Duyckinck  v.  New 
York  El.  E.  E.  Co.,  3  Am.  E.  E.  & 
Corp.  Eep.  744;  Reining  v.  New 
York  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  128  N.  Y.  157, 
28  N.  E.  640,  5  Am.  E.  E.  &  Corp. 
Rep.  476;  Eauenstein  v.  New  York 
etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  136  N.  Y.  528,  32  N. 
E.  1047,  18  L.R.A.  768,  7  Am.  E.  E. 
&  Corp.  Eep.  520;  Sauer  v.  New 
York,  180  N.  Y.  27,  72  N.  E.  579, 
70  L.E.A.  717,  affirming,  90  App. 
Div.  36,  85  N.  Y.  S.  636. 

2  6Macon  v.  Wing,  113  Ga.  90,  38 
S.  E.  392;  Shawneetown  v.  Mason, 
82  111.  337,  25  Am.  Eep.  321;  Long 
V.  Wilson,  119  la.  267,  93  N.  W.  282, 
97  Am.  St.  Eep.  315,  60  L.R.A.  720; 
Townsend  v.  Epstein,  93  Md.  537,  49 
Atl.  629,  86  Am.  St.  Eep.  441,  52 
L.E.A.  409;  Adams  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  E. 
R.  Co.,  39  Minn.  280,  39  N.  W.  629; 
Kane  v.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  125 
N.  Y.  164,  26  N.  E.  278;  S.  C.  Sub. 
Nom.  Duyckinck  v.  New  York  El.  E. 
R.  Co.,  3  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 


182 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  121 


rights  of  an  individual  owner.^^  The  rights  or  easements  of 
light,  air  and  access  so  long  as  they  exist  are  indissolubly  an- 
nexed to  the  abutting  property.  They  may  be  released  or  ex- 
tinguished, in  whole  or  in  part,  but  they  cannot  be  reserved  or 
conveyed,  or  exist  separate  from  the  property  to  which  they 
pertain,  so  that  the  property  shall  be  owned  by  one  and  the  ease- 
ments by  another.^^ 

§  121  (9 If).  Origin  and  basis  of  the  rights  or  ease- 
ments of  access,  light  and  air.  The  existence  of  this  pri- 
vate right  in  all  cases  may  be  reasoned  out  as  follows:  When 
the  owner  of  a  tract  of  land  lays  the  same  out  into  lots  and 
streets,  and  sells  the  lots,  the  purchasers  of  such  lots  acquire 
as  appurtenant  thereto  a  private  right  of  way  and  access  over 
the  streets.^®     This  private  right  arises  without  any  express 


744,  Reining  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  128  N.  Y.  157,  28  N.  B.  640,  5 
Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  476;  Wil- 
lamette Iron  Works  v.  Oregon  R.  & 
N.  Co.,  26  Ore.  224,  37  Pac. 
1016,  46  Am.  St.  Rep.  620, 
29  L.R.A.  88;  Winchester  v.  Stevens 
Point,  58  Wis.  350;  Buchner  v.  Chi- 
cago etc.  Ry.  Co.,  60  Wis.  264.  And 
see  post,  §§  149  et  seq. 

2  7 Appeal  of  Philadelphia  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  2  Walker's  Pa.  Supm.  Ct.  291, 
affirming  1  Montg.  Co.  L.  Rep.  129. 

2spegram  v.  New  York  El.  R.  R. 
Co.,  147  N.  Y.  135,  41  N.  B.  424; 
Kernochan  v.  New  York  El.  R.  R. 
Co.,  128  N.  Y.  559,  29  N.  E.  65;  Pap- 
penheim  v.  Railway  Company,  128 
N.  Y.  436,  28  N.  B.  518,  26  iim.  St. 
Rep.  486,  13  L.R.A.  401;  McKenna 
V.  Brooklyn  Union  El.  R.  R.  Co., 
184  N.  Y.  391,  77  N.  E.  615,  revers- 
ing S.  C.  95  App.  Div.  226,  88  N.  Y. 
S.  762;  Schomaker  v.  Michaels,  189 
N.  Y.  61,  81  N.  E.  555.  In  the  Ker- 
nochan Case  the  court  says ;  "The 
easements  of  an  abutting  owner,  in- 
vaded, are  appurtenant  to  his  prem- 
ises, and,  in  the  nature  of  things, 
they  are  indissolubly  annexed  there- 
to, until  extinguished  by  release  or 
otherwise.     They  are  incapable  of  a 


distinct  and  separate  ownership.'' 
Where  the  deed  reserved  the  right  to 
damages  to  the  premises,  past,  pres- 
ent and  future,  by  reason  of  the  con- 
struction and  operation  of  the  road, 
it  was  held  that  while  the  right  of 
action  was  in  the  grantee,  yet  that 
he  was  a  trustee  for  the  grantor 
with  respect  thereto  and  that  the 
damages  belonged  to  the  latter  who 
could  recover  them  from  the  grantee, 
or  those  claiming  under  him.  Shep- 
ard  V.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  169  N. 
Y.  160,  62  N.  E.  151,  affirming  S.  C. 
48  App.  Div.  452,  62  N.  Y.  S.  977; 
Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Shepard, 
169  N.  Y.  170,  62  N.  B.  154,  58  L.R.A. 
115,  reversing  S.  C.  49  App.  Div. 
345,  63  N.  Y.  S.  435. 

23Prescott  V.  Edwards,  117  Cal. 
298,  49  Pac.  178,  59  Am.  St.  Rep. 
186;  McLean  v.  Llewellyn  Iron 
Works,  2  Cal.  App.  346,  83  Pac.  1082, 
1085;  Newell  v.  Sass,  142  111.  104, 
31  N.  E.  176;  Corning  v.  Woolner, 
206  111.  190,  69  N.  E.  53;  Indianapo- 
lis V.  Croas,  7  Ind.  9;  Indianapolis 
V.  Kingsbury,  101  Ind.  200,  51  Am. 
Rep.  749;  Dubuque  v.  Malony,  9  la. 
450;  Highbarger  v.  Milford,  71  Kan. 
331,  80  Pac.  633;  Schneider  v.  Jacob, 
86  Ky.  101,  5  S.  W.  350;  Dorman  v. 


§  121 


EOADS    AND    STEEETS. 


183 


grant,  and  in  the  absence  of  any  statute.^"  The  law  presumes 
that  the  parties  had  in  mind  the  advantages  to  be  derived  from 
the  use  of  the  proposed  streets,  and  implies  a  right  to  such  use 
as  a  part  of  the  grant.  This  position  is  not  open  to  controversy, 
and  is  as  good  sense  as  it  is  good  law.  If  several  persons,  ovvmers 
of  distinct  parts  of  a  tract,  should  join  in  laying  the  same  out 
into  streets  and  lots,  the  result  would  be  the  same.  The  law 
would  imply  the  grant  of  mutual  easements  of  way  and  access, 
appurtenant  to  the  respective  lots,  and  this,  as  before,  in  the 
absence  of  any  statute  or  express  mention  of  such  easements. 
These  private  rights  or  easements  are  the  presumed,  as  well  as 
the  real,  consideration  for  the  grant  or  dedication  of  a  part  of 
the  tract  to  public  use.  These  private  rights  remain  the  same 
whether  the  streets  are  accepted  by  the  public  or  not.^^  If, 
instead  of  making  a  gift  of  the  streets  to  the  public,  the  pro- 


Bates  Mfg.  Co.,  82  Me.  438,  19  Atl. 
915;  White  v.  Flannigan,  1  Md.  542; 
54  Am.  Dec.  668;  Pearson  v.  Allen, 
151  Mass.  79;  Cole  v.  Hadley,  162 
Mass.  579,  39  N.  E.  279;  Thurston 
V.  St.  Joseph,  51  Mo.  510;  McLemon 
V.  McNeley,  56  Mo.  App.  556;  Dill 
V.  School  Board,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  421, 
20  Atl.  739 ;  Matter  of  Lewis  Street, 
2  Wend.  472;  Livingston  v.  Mayor 
etc.  of  New  York,  8  Wend.  85;  Story 
V.  New  Vork  El.  E.  R.  Co.,  90  N.  Y. 
122,  165,  43  Am.  Dec.  146;  Pratt  v. 
Buffalo  City  Ry.  Co.,  19  Hun  30; 
In  re  St.  Nicholas  Terrace,  143  N. 
Y.  621,  37  N.  E.  635;  Matter  of 
Ethel  St.,  3  Miscl.  403,  24  N.  Y. 
Supp.  689;  Moore  v.  Carson,  104  N. 
C.  43,  10  S.  E.  689,  Shields  v.  Titus, 
46  Ohio  St.  528,  22  N.  E.  717; 
Ferguson's  App.  117  Pa.'  St.  426, 
11  Atl.  885;  Dobson  v.  Hohena- 
del,  148  Pa.  St.  367,  23  Atl.  1128; 
Hobson  V.  City  of  Philadelphia,  150 
Pa.  St.  595,  24  Atl.  1048;  Garvey  v. 
Harbison-Walker  Refractories'  Co., 
213  Pa.  St.  177,. 62  Atl.  778;  South 
State  Normal  School's  Case,  213  Pa. 
St.  244,  62  Atl.  908 ;  Smith  v.  Union 
S.  &  T.  Co.,  17  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  444; 
Carroll  v.  Aabury,  28  Pa.  Supr.  Ct. 


354;  Clark  v.  Providence,  10  E.  I. 
437 ;  Thaxter  v.  Turner,  17  E.  I.  799, 
24  Atl.  829;  Johnsen  v.  Old  Colony 
E.  E.  Co.,  18  R.  I.  642,  29  Atl.  594; 
Wolf  V.  Brass,  72  Tex.  133,  12  S.  W. 
159;  Cook  V.  Totten,  49  W.  Va.  177, 
38  S.  E.  491,  87  Am.  St.  Rep.  792; 
Barbour  v.  Lyddy,  49  Fed.  896 ;  Fitz- 
gerald V.  Barbour,  55  Fed.  440,  5  C. 
C.  A.  180;  Eainey  v.  Herbert,  55 
Fed.  443,  5  C.  C.  A.  183;  Bennett 
V.  Chicago  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  73  Fed. 
696 ;  United  States  v.  Certain  Lands, 
140  Fed.  463. 

3  0  Story  V.  New  York  El.  R.  R. 
Co.,  90  N.  Y.  122,  145,  43  Am.  Rep. 
146;  Kane  v.  New  York  El.  R. 
R.  Co.,  125  N.  Y.  164,  26  N. 
E.  278,  11  L.R.A.  640,  3  Am. 
R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  744;  Hughes 
V.  Met.  El.  R.  R.  Co.  130  N. 
Y.  14,  28  N.  E.  765;  Long  v. 
Wilson,  119  la.  267,  93  N.  W.  282, 
97  Am.  St.  Rep.  315,  60  L.R.A.  720. 

31  Carroll  v.  Asbury,  28  Pa.  Supr. 
Ct.  354;  Johnsen  v.  Old  Colony  R. 
R.  Co.,  18  R.  I.  642,  29  Atl.  594; 
Clark  V.  Providence,  10  R.  I.  437; 
Cook  V.  Totten,  49  W.  Va.  177,  38 
S.  E.  491,  87  Am.  St.  Rep.  792. 


184:  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    121 

prietors  should  voluntarily  grant  the  streets  for  a  consideration 
agreed  upon  and  paid  by  the  public,  it  would  still  be  true  in 
fact,  and  therefore  presumed  by  law,  that,  in  fixing  the  con- 
sideration to  be  paid,  the  parties  had  in  mind  the  advantages  to 
be  derived  from  the  use  of  the  streets.  That  is,  the  considera- 
tion to  each  proprietor  would  be  the  right  to  make  use  of  the 
streets  in  connection  with  his  lots,  and  a  certain  sum  of  money 
paid.  The  first  part  of  this  consideration  would  be  utterly  fal- 
lacious, unless  the  right  in  question  is  protected  by  the  law  of 
the  land  the  same  as  any  other  right.  To  make  the  right  a  part 
consideration  of  the  grant,  and  then  to  allow  the  public  to  invade 
or  destroy  it  at  pleasure,  would  be  a  fraud  which  the  law  will 
neither  impute  nor  allow.  ^^  Therefore,  in  the  case  of  such  a 
grant,  there  arises  by  operation  of  law  a  private  right  to  use 
the  streets  in  connection  with  the  lots  of  each  proprietor,  which 
is  as  inviolable  as  any  other  right  of  property.  If  the  streets, 
instead  of  being  established  by  dedication  or  voluntary  grant, 
are  acquired  by  forced  sale  or  condemnation,  how  is  the  matter 
changed  ?  The  price  to  be  paid,  instead  of  being  agreed  upon, 
is  ascertained  in  some  mode  provided  by  law.  The  transfer 
of  title  is  accomplished  by  legal  proceedings,  instead  of  a  deed 
of  the  parties.  In  fixing  the  price  to  be  paid  to  each  proprietor, 
the  advantages  to  be  derived  from  the  use  of  the  street  or  streets 
are  taken  into  consideration.^*     Generally,  he  actually  pays  a 

3  2  "The  claim  made  that  the  owner  are  not  only  valuable  to  him  for 
of  property  taken  for  a  street,  ob-  sanitary  purposes,  but  are  indis- 
tains,  through  the  award  of  the  com-  pensable  to  the  proper  and  beneficial 
missioners,  full  compensation  for  his  enjoyment  of  his  property,  and  are 
property,  is  unfounded,  unless  the  legitimate  subjects  of  estimate  by 
benefits  for  which  he  is  assessed  are  the  public  authorities,  in  raising  the 
inviolably  secured  to  him  by  such  fund  necessary  to  defray  the  cost  of 
proceedings.  Any  other  construction  constructing  the  street.  He  is  there- 
of the  statute  would  render  it  an  ef-  fore  compelled  to  pay  for  them  at 
iicient  engine  of  fraud  and  injustice.  their  full  value,  and  if  in  the  next 
An  abutting  owner  necessarily  en-  instant  they  may  by  legislative  au- 
joys  certain  advantages  from  the  ex-  thority  be  taken  away  and  diverted 
istence  of  an  open  street  adjoining  to  inconsistent  uses,  a  system  has 
his  property,  which  belong  to  him  by  been  inaugurated  which  resembles 
reason  of  its  location,  and  are  not  more  nearly  legalized  robbery  than 
enjoyed  by  the  general  public,  such  any  other  form  of,  acquiring  prop- 
as  the  right  of  free  access  to  his  erty."  Lahr  v.  Met.  El.  R.  R.  Co., 
premises,  and  the  free  admission  and  104  N.  Y.  268,  290,  291. 
circulation  of  light  and  air  to  and  3  3"The  benefits  to  be  received  by 
through  his  property.     These  rights  a  person  whose  land  is  taken  by  the 


§  121 


EOADS   AND    STREETS. 


185 


fixed  price  for  these  advantages,  in  the  form  of  an  assessment 
of  benefits  upon  his  remaining  property.^*  Now,  it  would  be 
the  grossest  inequity  to  compel  a  man  to  pay  for  advantages, 
whether  in  the  form  of  deductions  from  the  price  to  be  paid 
or  of  an  assessment  of  benefits,  unless  those  advantages  are  se- 
cured to  him  by  a  clear  title.  The  result  of  every  such  proceed- 
ing, therefore,  is  that  there  is  created  and  attached  to  the  lot 
or  tract  of  each  proprietor  through  which  the  street  runs,  a 
private  right,  independent  of  the  public  easement,  to  use  the 
street  for  the  purposes  of  access  to  the  lot  and  of  outlet  to  the 
general  system  of  highways.  The  proceedings  have  precisely 
the  same  effect  as  a  voluntary  grant  by  the  several  proprietors, 
and,  in  case  of  a  voluntary  grant,  the  law  will  imply  a  transfer 


public  for  a  road  are  a  part  of  the 
consideration  for  the  release  of  the 
land,  or  its  condemnation  for  a  road, 
and  when  once  vested  in  him,  or  he 
becomes  entitled  thereto,  they  are 
as  much  his  property  as  the  land 
itself,  and  neither  the  State  nor  any 
of  its  subordinate  agencies  can  de- 
prive him  of  them,  except  in  the 
manner  pointed  out  by  the  constitu- 
tion, and  that  has  not  been  done  in 
this  case."  Pearsall  v.  Board  of  Su- 
pervisors, 74  Mich.  558,  42  N.  W. 
77. 

3  4In  Wormser  v.  Brown,  72  Hun 
93,  25  N.  Y.  Supp.  553,  it  is  held 
that  an  assessment  of  benefits  must 
be  regarded  as  a  payment  for  the 
privileges  of  light,  air  and  access  af- 
forded by  the  street.  A  different 
view  is  taken  by  the  Supreme  Court 
of  New  Jersey  in  State  v.  City  of 
Elizabeth,  54  N.  J.  L.  402,  24  Atl. 
495,  wherein  the  court  says:  "It  is 
assumed  by  counsel  for  prosecutrix 
that,  because  the  prosecutrix  was 
assessed  for  a  benefit  resulting  from 
the  opening  of  this  street,  peculiar 
to  herself,  she  got  a  vested  right 
in  the  continued  existence  of  the 
street,  of  which  she  could  not  be 
stripped  without  compensation.   But 


this,  I  think,  is  more  plausible  than 
substantial.  While  the  right  she 
got  may  have  been  of  peculiar  bene- 
fit to  her  property,  yet  it  was  a, 
right  which  she  shared  with  the 
public.  The  privilege  of  using  the 
street  was  shared  by  each  member 
of  the  community.  It  may  not  have 
been  of  the  same  value  to  each  mem- 
ber of  the  community,  but  the  right 
to  use  the  street  was  in  each  citizen 
the  same.  It  was  exclusively  a  pub- 
lic right,  put  under  the  control  of 
the  representatives  of  the  public.  It 
was  subject  to  alteration  or  aboli- 
tion, when,  in  the  judgment  of  those 
to  whom  the  public  interests  were 
confided,  those  interests  demanded 
such  action.  The  assessment  of 
benefits  is  presumed  to  be  based  upon 
the  recognized  power  of  the  State 
and  its  agencies  to  modify  or  de- 
stroy the  improvement.  The  atti- 
tude of  those  who  have  been  as- 
sessed for  peculiar  benefits  differs  in 
no  respect  from  that  of  any  other 
citizen  in  regard  to  this  control'  of 
the  public  over  a  public  right."  The 
case  was  affirmed  in  the  court  of  er- 
rors and  appeals,  but  without  af- 
firming these  views.  55  N.  J.  L. 
337,  26  Atl.  939. 


186  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    121 

of  mutual  easements  of  way  and  access  appurtenant  to  the  sev- 
eral lots.^^ 

The  right  to  light  and  air  from  over  the  space  occupied  by 
the  street  arises  in  the  same  way  and  stands  upon  the  same 
footing  as  the  right  of  access.  The  reasoning  advanced  and  au- 
thorities cited  in  this  section  fully  establish  the  proposition  that, 
when  a  highway  is  established,  and  irrespective  of  the  mode  by 
which  it  is  established,  or  of  the  interest  acquired  by  the  public 
in  the  soil,  there  is  attached  to  the  abutting  property  a  right 
to  receive  light  and  air  from  the  space  above  the  surface  of 
the  street.  The  New  York  Court  of  Appeals,  in  speaking  of 
the  origin  of  these  easements  of  light,  air  and  access,  says: 
"The  plaintiff's  easements,  or  rights  in  the  nature  of  easements, 
are  not  created  by  grant  or  covenant.  They  arise,  we  think, 
from  the  situation,  the  course  of  legislation,  the  trust  created 
by  statute,  the  acting  upon  the  faith  of  public  pledges,  and  upon 
a  contract  between  the  public  and  the  property  owner  implied, 
from  all  the  circumstances,  that  the  street  shall  be  kept  open  as 
a  public  street,  and  shall  not  be  diverted  to  other  and  incon- 
sistent uses.  There  is  some  analogy,  we  think,  between  the 
rights  of  abutting  owners  as  against  the  public,  and  those  ac- 
quired by  the  public  against  private  persons,  in  streets  or  high- 
ways by  dedication.  The  public  acquires,  upon  acceptance  of 
a  dedication  by  the  owner  of  land  of  a  highway  over  the  same 
a  perpetual  easement  therein  for  a  highway,  although  there 
may  be  no  deed  or  writing  or  covenant,  and  no  formalities  at- 
tending the  transaction,  such  as  is  required  for  the  creation  of 
an  easement  at  common  law.  Here  the  State  has  dedicated  the 
streets  in  the  city  of  New  York  to  be  public  streets.  The  abut- 
ting owners  have  acted  upon  the  dedication,  and  upon  the  pledge 
of  the  public  faith  that  they  shall  continue  to  be  open  public 
streets  forever.  It  would  be  gross  injustice  to  deprive  them  of 
the  advantages  intended,  without  compensation.     The  dedica- 

3  6  "The  proceedings  by  which  land  the  statute  which  authorizes  the  ac- 
is  acquired  by  the  exercise  of  the  quisition  constitutes  the  contract  be- 
right  of  eminent  domain  amount  to  tweeu  the  citizen  and  the  public,  and 
a  statutory  conveyance  of  the  same  where  the  interest  has  once  been  ac- 
to  the  public  or  the  corporation,  and  quired  it  cannot  be  changed  or  en- 
there  is  no  distinction  between  such  larged  without  further  compensa- 
a  conveyance  and  a,  voluntary  con-  tion."  Story  v.  New  York  El.  R.  K. 
veyance  made  for  public  use.  Co.,  90  N.  Y.  122,  172,  43  Am.  Rep. 
Where  property  is  acquired  for  pub-  146. 
lie  use  by   proceedings  in  invitum. 


§  121 


EOADS    ANL    STREETS. 


187 


tion  ought  to  be,  and  we  think  is,  irrevocable."  ^®  The  existence 
of  these  private  rights  and  easements  is,  therefore,  entirely  in- 
dependent of  the  mode  in  which  the  highway  is  established,  or 
of  the  estate  or  interest  which  the  public  acquires  in  the  soil  of 
the  street,  whether  a  fee  or  less.^^  These  views  are  fully  sus- 
tained by  the  opinion  in  Story  v.  ISTew  York  El.  K.  E.  Co.^^ 


3  6Kane  v.  New  York  El.  E,.  E. 
Co.,  125  N.  Y.  164,  26  N.  E. 
278,  11  L.E.A.  640,  3  Am.  R. 
R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  744,  753,  754. 
And  in  Hughes  v.  Met.  El.  E.  R.  Co., 
130  N.  Y.  14,  28  N.  E.  765,  the  same 
court  says:  "These  street  rights  of 
an  abutting  owner  are  not  originat- 
ed by  grant,  in  terms,  of  such  in- 
cidental rights,  and  their  existence 
need  not  be  established  by  convey- 
ances in  specific  terms,  conveying 
such  right,  for  there  are  none;  nor 
by  adverse  possession  by  an  abut- 
ting owner,  for  the  right  is  incapa- 
ble of  such  possession  as  against  the 
city.  The  private  rights  appurte- 
nant to  abutting  lots  arise  by  opera- 
tion of  law  from  contiguity,  like 
rights  for  the  adjacent  and  subja- 
cent support  of  land,  and  their  ex- 
istence is  presumed."  The  views  of 
the  text  are  also  sustained  by  the 
reasoning  in  In  re  Melon  Street,  182 
Pa.  St.  397,  402,  403,  38  Atl.  482,  28 
L.R.A.  275. 

3  7"What  are  the  rights  of  a  lot- 
holder  in  reference  to  the  adjacent 
streets  and  alleys  ?  The  owner  in  fee 
of  a  tract  of  land  may  have  it  sur- 
veyed into  town  lots,  streets  and  al- 
leys, and  without  selling  any  of  the 
lots  or  acknowledging  the  plat,  he 
may  destroy  the  survey  and  vacate 
the  streets  and  alleys.  But  if  he 
convey  away  any  of  the  lots,  the 
right  of  the  free  use  of  the  adjacent 
streets  will  pass  to  the  grantees  as 
appurtenant  to  their  lots;  and  such 
grantees  will  not  only  have  a  servi- 
tude or  easement  in  the  adjacent 
streets  and  alleys  as  appurtenant  to 


the  lots,  but  the  conveyance  itself 
would  be  a  dedication  of  the  streets 
and  alleys  to  the  public  as  well  as 
to  the  private  use  of  the  lots.  This 
would  be  the  result  without  any 
statutory  dedication  by  acknowledg- 
ing and  filing  the  plat  with  the 
county  recorder.  The  effect  of  a 
statutory  dedication,  however,  is 
precisely  the  same.  It  vests  in  the 
adjacent  lot-holder  the  right  to  the 
use  of  the  streets  as  appurtenant  to 
his  lot,  and  this  easement  is  as 
much  property  as  the  lot  itself.  It 
is  a  property  interest,  independent 
of  the  right  of  the  public  highways, 
and  the  lot-holder  is  as  much  en- 
titled to  protection  in  the  enjoyment 
of  this  appurtenant  easement  as  he 
is  in  the  enjoyment  of  the  lot  itself. 
Hence,  whatever  injures  or  destroys 
this  easement,  is  to  that  extent  a 
damage  to  the  lot.  So  if  in  grading 
a  street  it  be  raised  so  high  as  to 
throw  the  surface  water  back  upon 
the  lot,  or  prevent  a  free  access  to 
the  street;  or  if  the  street  be  ex- 
cavated so  low  as  to  render  the  ease- 
ment of  no  use  to  the  lot,  the  lot- 
holder  is  thereby  damaged  to  the  ex- 
tent of  the  loss  of  such  easement." 
Thurston  v.  City  of  St.  Joseph,  51 
Mo.  510.     And  see  post,  §  127. 

3  890  N.  Y.  122,  43  Am.  Rep.  146. 
Also  by  numerous  cases  decided  by 
the  same  court  since  the  first  edi- 
tion. See  especially  Kane  v.  New 
York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  125  N.  Y.  104,  20 
N.  E.  278,  11  L.R.A.  640;  S.  C.  Sub. 
Nom.  Duyckinck  v.  New  York  El. 
R.  R.  Co.,  3  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
744;  Hughes  v.  Met.  El.  R.  R.  Co., 


188  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    122 

§  122  (91g).     Further  as  to  the  right  to  light  and  air. 

The  existence  and  nature  of  this  right  are  very  ably  expounded 
in  an  opinion  of  the  Court  of  Errors  and  Appeals  of  'Ne^ 
Jersey,  which  is  worthy  of  special  attention.^  ^  Complainant 
owned  land  abutting  on  the  Morris  Canal,  and  had  erected  a 
building  with  windows  overlooking  the  canal.  The  fee  of  the 
right  of  way  occupied  by  the  canal  was  vested  in  the  Canal  Com- 
pany for  public  use  as  a  canal.  The  Canal  Company  authorized 
the  defendant  to  erect  a  building  .over  the  canal  and  adjacent 
to  complainant's  lot,  the  effect  of  which  would  be  to  close  up 
the  windows  in  complainant's  building  and  completely  cut  him 
off  from  light,  air  or  access  over  the  canal.  The  court  held, 
fourteen  judges  concurring,  that,  though  the  canal  was  a  public 
highway  and  the  fee  was  vested  in  the  company,  yet  the 
complainant  had  a  right  to  light  and  air  which,  though  subordi- 
nate to  the  use  of  the  land  as  a  public  highway,  was  paramount 
to  any  other  use,  and  that,  as  the  building  was  not  for  the  im- 
provement of  the  canal  as  a  highway,  its  erection  should  be 
enjoined.    The  court  says : 

"There  are,  it  appears  to  me,  two  classes  of  rights,  originat- 
ing in  necessity  and  in  the  exigencies  of  human  affairs,  spring- 
ing up  coeval  with  every  public  highway,  and  which  are  recog- 
nized and  enforced  by  the  common  law  of  all  civilized  nations. 
The  first  relates  to  the  public  passage;  the  second,  subordinate 
to  the  first,  but  equally  perfect  and  scarcely  less  important,  re- 
lates to  the  adjoining  owners.  Among  the  latter  is  that  of  re- 
ceiving from  the  public  highway  light  and  air. 

"In  the  first  place,  has  not  the  adjacent  owner  upon  the 
'alta  regia  via,'  the  ordinary  public  highway,  of  common  right 
the  privilege  of  receiving  from  it  light  and  air  ?  Universal 
usage  is  common  law.  What  has  this  been  ?  Men  do  not  first 
build  cities,  and  then  lay  out  roads  through  them,  but  they 
first  lay  out  roads,  and  then  cities  spring  up  along  their  lines. 
As  a  matter  of  fact  and  history,  have  not  all  villages,  towns 

130  N.  Y.  14,  28  N.  E.  765;  and  casea  and  Theobald  v.  Louisville  etc.  R.  E. 

cited  in  §  120,  note  24.    The  reason-  Co.,  66  Miss.  279,  6  So.  230,  14  Am. 

ing  and  conclusions  of  this  section  St.  Eep.  564,  4  L.E.A.  735.    See  also 

have    been    fully    adopted    and    ap-  Adams  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  E.  E.  Co.,  39 

proved  in  White  v.  Northwestern  N.  Minn.  286,  39  N.  W.  629,  12  Am.  St. 

C.  E.  E.  Co.,  113  N.  C.  610,  18  S.  E.  Eep.  644,  1  L.E.A.  493. 

330,  37  Am.  St.  Eep.  639,  22  L.E.A.  3  9Barnett  v.  Johnson,  15  N.  J.  Eq. 

627,  9  Am.  R.  E.  &  Corp.  Eep.  103,  481,  487. 


§  122  EOADS  AND  STEEETS.  189 

and  cities  in  tliis  country  and  in  all  others,  now  and  at  all  times 
past,  been  built  upon  this  assumed  right  of  adjacency?  Is  not 
every  "window  and  every  door  in  every  house  in  every  city, 
town  and  village  the  assertion  and  maintenance  of  this  right? 

"When  people  build  upon  the  public  highway,  do  they  inquire 
or  care  who  owns  the  fee  of  the  road-bed  ?  Do  they  act  or  rely 
upon  any  other  consideration,  except  that  it  is  a  public  highway 
and  they  the  adjacent  owners  ?  Is  not  this  a  right  of  universal 
exercise  and  acknowledgment  in  all  times  and  in  all  countries, 
a  right  of  necessity,  without  which  cities  could  not  have  been 
built,  and  without  the  enforcement  of  which  they  would  soon 
become  tenantless  ?  It  is  a  right  essential  to  the  very  existence 
of  dense  communities.  What  must  be  the  consequence,  to  per- 
mit the  accidental  owner  of  a  part  or  the  whole  of  the  road-bed 
to  wall  up  or  throw  a  thin  curtain  in  front  of  the  adjacent 
buildings  or  by  any  other  contrivance  shut  out  from  them  the 
light  and  air  ?  Suppose  the  owner  of  the  fee  should  try  the 
experiment  to  the  east  of  the  complainant's  house,  and  wall  up 
Broad  street,  would  it  be  tolerated  for  a  moment,  or,  if  enforced, 
would  it  not  soon  turn  our  streets  into  tunnels,  and  seal  up  cities 
in  darkness  ? 

"If  it  be  said  that  there  are  no  cases  sustaining  this  right, 
so  there  are  none  establishing  this  right,  to  light  and  air  at  all, 
or  to  the  right  of  passage.  It  is  a  right  founded  in  such  an  ur- 
gent necessity  that  all  laws  and  legal  proceedings  take  it  for 
granted.  A  right  so  strong  that  it  protects  itself,  so  urgent  that, 
upon  any  attempt  to  annul  or  infringe  it,  it  would  set  at  defiance 
all  legislative  enactment  and  all  judicial  decisions.  It  is  the 
mode  by  which  the  sovereign  power,  in  the  exercise  of  its  emi- 
nent domain,  since  land  has  become  the  object  of  private  owner- 
ship, ab  imo  usque  ad  ccelum,  at  the  same  time  that  it  creates 
a  right  of  passage,  opens  up  and  reserves  to  all,  as  the  increasing 
density  of  the  population  demands  it,  the  use  of  the  common 
elements  of  light  and  air.  We  cannot  conclude  otherwise  than 
that  a  right  so  essential,  so  universal  in  its  exercise  in  all  time 
and  among  all  nations,  exists,  not,  as  was  said  in  the  case  of 
Gough  V.  Bell,  2  Zab.  441,  by  a  common  law  local  to  ISTew  Jer- 
sey, but  by  a  law  common  to  the  whole  civilized  world." 

This  case  anticipates  the  principle  upon  which  compensa- 
tion was  at  last  secured  in  the  elevated  railway  cases  in  New 
York. 


190 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  123 


§  123  (91h).  To  how  much  of  the  street  the  rights  or 
easements  of  light,  air  and  access  extend.  It  -would  seem 
just  that  these  rights  or  easements  should  extend  to  so  much  of 
the  street  as  is  necessary  for  their  reasonable  enjoyment.  They 
undoubtedly  extend  to  the  full  width  of  the  street,  at  least,  as 
respects  light  and  air.*"  Some  cases  would  limit  the  easements 
of  light  and  air  to  the  space  in  front  of  the  property  in  ques- 
tion,*-"^  but  it  may  be  doubted  whether  these  easements  do  not 
extend  so  far  on  either  side  of  a  lot  as  is  necessary  to  prevent 
any  erection  or  use  which  will  obstruct  the  access  of  light  and 
air  to  the  lot.*^  The  extent  and  limits  of  the  right  of  access 
cannot  well  be  defined.  But,  in  general,  it  includes  the  right 
to  use  the  street  as  an  outlet  from  the  abutting  property  to  a 
connecting  highway,  by  any  mode  of  travel  or  conveyance  ap- 
propriate to  a  highway ;  also,  the  right  to  use  the  street  in  front 
of  the  property,  in  connection  with  the  use  and  enjoyment  of 
the  property,  in  such  manner  as  is  customary  or  reasonable.*'' 


■lOMetropolitan  W.  S.  El.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Springer,  171  111.  170,  49  N.  E. 
416;  Adams  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co., 
39  Minn.  286,  39  N.  W.  629,  12  Am. 
St.  Rep.  644,  1  L.R.A.  493;  Gustaf- 
son  V.  Hamm,  56  Minn.  334,  57  N. 
W.  1054,  22  L.R.A.  565;  White  v. 
Northwestern  N.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  113 
N.  C.  610,  18  S.  E.  330,  9  Am.  R.  R. 
&  Corp.  Rep.  103,  37  Am.  St.  Rep. 
639,  22  L.R.A.  627;  Madden  v.  Jr-a. 
R.  R.  Co.,  21  Ohio  C.  C.  73;  Willa- 
mette Iron  Works  v.  Oregon  R.  & 
N.  Co.,  26  Or.  224,  37  Pac.  1016. 

41  Adams  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co., 
39  Minn.  286,  39  N.  W.  629,  12  Am. 
St.  Rep.  644,  1  L.R.A.  493. 

4  2In  Wilson  v.  New  York  El.  R. 
R.  Co.,  9  Miscl.  657,  30  N.  Y.  Supp. 
547,  it  is  held  that  the  easements  are 
not  confined  to  the  space  immediate- 
ly in  front  of  the  lot.  And  see  First 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Tyson,  133  Ala.  459,  32 
So.  144,  91  Am.  St.  Rep.  46,  59 
L.R.A.  379;  Field  v.  Barling,  149 
III.  556,  37  N.  E.  850,  41  Am.  St. 
Rep.  311,  10  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
707;   Townsend  v.   Epstein,   93   Md. 


537,  49  Atl.   629,   86  Am.   St.   Rep. 
481,  52  L.R.A.  409. 

4  3Cushing-Wetmore  Co.  v.  Gray, 
152  Cal.  118,  92  Pac.  70;  Har- 
vey V.  Georgia  Southern  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  90  Ga.  66,  15  S.  E.  783;  Dant- 
zer  V.  Indianapolis  Union  R.  R.  Co., 
141  Ind.  604,  39  N.  E.  223,  11  Am. 
R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  249,  50  Am.  St. 
Rep.  343,  34  L.R.A.  769;  O'Brien  v. 
Central  I.  &  S.  Co.,  158  Ind.  218,  63 
N.  E.  302,  92  Am.  St.  Rep.  305,  57 
L.R.A.  508;  Pennsylvania  Co.  v. 
Stanley,  10  Ind.  App.  421,  37  N.  E. 
288,  38  N.  E.  421 ;  Highbarger  v.  Mil- 
ford,  71  Kan.  331,  80  Pac.  633;  Haw- 
ley  V.  Baltimore,  33  Md.  270,  280; 
Baltimore  v.  Frick,  82  Md.  77;  Re- 
gan V.  Boston  Gas  Lt.  Co.,  137  Mass. 
37;  Atchison  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Boer- 
ner,  34  Neb.  240,  51  N.  W.  842,  33 
Am.  St.  Rep.  637;  Matter  of  Twen- 
ty-ninth St.,  1  Hill,  189;  Reis  v. 
New  York,  188  N.  Y.  58,  80  N.  E. 
573,  affirming  S.  C.  113  App.  Div. 
464,  99  N.  Y.  S.  291;  Collins  v. 
Asheville  Land  Co.,  128  N.  C.  563,  39 
S.  E.  21,  83  Am.  St.  Rep.  720;  Mc- 


§  124  EOADS  AND  STREETS.  191 

In  one  of  the  cases  cited  it  is  said :  "We  think  we  may  safely 
assert,  however,  that  the  obstruction  of  the  easement  of  access 
need  not  always  be  upon  the  front  of  the  lot  whose  owner  is  af- 
fected, but  that  if  the  obstruction,  though  remote,  renders  ac- 
cess to  such  lot  impossible,  or  impairs  it  in  a  substantial  man- 
ner, at  the  point  where  it  abuts  upon  the  street,  the  property 
right  of  the  lot  owner  is  invaded,  and  he  may  recover.  To 
illustrate  this  proposition,  if  a  street  were  fully  obstructed  on 
either  side  of  one's  lot,  so  that  the  lines  of  the  lot  could  not 
be  reached,  access  would  be  denied  to  the  lot  owner,  though  the 
street  in  front  of  his  lot  had  upon  it  no  obstruction.  The  prop- 
erty rights  of  the  lot  owner,  as  against  the  public,  are  cotermin- 
ous with  the  lines  of  his  lot,  but  that  property  right  may  be  ob- 
structed, and  its  uses  defeated,  by  cutting  off  ingress  and  egress 
to  and  from  such  lines  from  points  upon  the  street  beyond  such 
lines.     In  such  case  there  should  be,  and  is,  a  remedy."  ** 

§  124  (91i).  Other  rights  of  abutting  owners;  ease- 
ment of  view,  etc.  Recent  cases  support  the  right  of  the  abut- 
ter to  an  unobstructed  view,  or  right  of  prospect,  as  it  is  some- 
times called,  which  would  include  both  an  unobstructed  view 
from  the  premises  and  an  unobstructed  view  of  the  premises 
from  any  part  of  the  street.*^     In  one  of  the  cases  cited  it  is 

Quigg  V.  Cullens,  56  Ohio  St.  649,  etc.  E.  R.  Co.,  18  Okl.  308,  88  Pao. 

47  N.  E.  595;  Beatty  v.  Kinnear,  21  1048,  9  L.R.A.    (N.S.)    496. 
Ohio  C.  C.  384;  In  re  Melon  St.,  182  n'Da.ntzeT   v.   Indianapolis   Union 

Pa.  St.  397,  38  Atl.  482,  28  L.R.A.  E.  R.  Co.,  141  Ind.  604,  39  N.  B.  223, 

275;   Johnsen  v.   Old  Colony  R.  R.  11  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  249,  50 

Co.,  18  R.  I.  642,  29  Atl.  594;  State  Am.  St.  Rep.  343,  34  L.R.A.  769. 
V.  Hamilton,  109  Tenn.  276,  70  S.  W.  45First  Nat.  Bank   v.  Tyson,  133 

619;   Wilkins  ^.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Ala.   459,   32    So.    144,   91    Am.    St. 

Co.,  110  Tenn.  442,  75  S.  W.  1026;  Rep.  46,  59  L.R.A.  399;   First  Nat. 

Cook  V.  Totten,  49  W.  Va.  177,  38  Bank  v.  Tyson,  144  Ala.  457,  39  So. 

S.  E.  491,  87  Am.  St.  Rep.  792;  Tilly  560;    Williams   v.   Los  Angeles   Ry. 

V.  Mitchell  &  Lewis  Co.,  121  Wis.  1,  Co.,  150  Cal.  592,  89  Pac.  330;  Cod- 

98    N.    W.    969,    105    Am.    St.    Rep.  man  v.  Evans,  5  Allen  308;  Jaynes 

1007;   post,  §§   191,  196-212.     Com-  v.  Omaha  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  53  Neb.  631, 

pare  Newton  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  74  N.  W.  67,  39  L.R.A.  751 ;  Dill  v. 

Co.,  72  Conn.  421,  44  Atl.  813;  Rob-  School  Board,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  421,  20 

inson  v.  Brown,   182  Mass.  266,  65  Atl.  739.    Judge  Dillon  says :  "There 

N.   E.  377;   Putnam  v.  Boston  etc.  seems   to   be    no   good    reason    why 

R.  R.  Co.,  182  Mass.  351,  65  N.  E.  such    easement    should   not    include 

790;     Shehan    v.    Fall    River,    187  also    the    right    (within    reasonable 

Mass.  356,  73  N.  E.  544;  Cheney  v.  limits)     to    an   unobstructed    view; 

Boston    Consolidated   Gas    Co.,    198  and  hence  the  right  to  insist  on  the 

Mass.  356;   Scrutchfield  v.  Choctaw  removal    of   an    obstruction    in    the 


192  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    124 

said:  "It  is  difficult  to  understand,  wliy  an  easement  of  view, 
from  every  part  of  a  public  street,  is  not,  like  light  and  air,  a 
valuable  right,  of  Avhich  the  owner  of  a  building  on  the  street, 
ought  not  to  be  deprived  by  an  encroachment  on  the  highway 
by  a  coterminous  or  adjacent  proprietor.  The  right  of  view,  or 
prospect,  is  one  implied,  like  other  rights,  from  the  dedication 
of  the  street  to  public  uses.  As  was  well  said  by  the  learned 
judge  below  in  respect  to  this  right :  'It  seems  to  be  a  valuable 
right  appurtenant  to  the  ownership  of  land  abutting  on  the 
highway,  and  to  stand  upon  the  same  footing,  as  to  reason,  with 
the  easement  of  motion,  light  and  air,  and  to  be  inferior  to  them 
only  in  point  of  convenience  and  necessity,  and  that  an  inter- 
ference with  it  is  inconsistent  with  the  public  right  acquired 
by  dedication.  The  opportunity  of  attracting  customers  by  a 
display  of  goods  and  signs  is  valuable,  as  I  have  no  doubt  the 
streets  of  any  city  in  the  world  will  demonstrate.'  "  *®  And  in 
a  recent  'New  York  case,  in  speaking  of  the  easement  of  the 
abutter,  it  is  said:  "The  easement  extends  to  all  parts  of  the 
street  which  enlarge  the  use  and  increase  the  value  of  the  ad- 
jacent lot.  It  is  not  limited  to  light,  air  and  access,  but  includes 
all  the  advantages  which  spring  from  the  situation  of  the 
abutter's  land  upon  the  space  of  the  open  street."  *''  This  lan- 
guage would  clearly  embrace  the  right  of  view,  though  the  right 
of  view  was  not  in  question  in  the  case.  The  suit  was  brought 
by  an  abutting  owner  to  recover  for  the  negligent  destruction  of 
shade  trees  in  front  of  his  property,  where  the  fee  of  the  street 
was  in  the  public.  The  court  sustained  the  right  of  recovery 
and,  in  an  elaborate  opinion,  holds  that  the  abutting  owner 
has  other  rights  than  those  of  light,  air  and  access.*^    This  right 

street  which  interferes  materially  Ala.  459,  32  So.  144,  91  Am.  St.  Rep. 
and  in  an  unusual  manner  with  the  46,  59  L.K.A.  399. 
abutter's  prospect,  even  though  i^Donahue  v.  Keystone  Gas  Co., 
light,  air  and  travel  be  not  mate-  181  N.  Y.  313,  73  N.  E.  1108,  106 
rially  interfered  with  by  such  ob-  Am.  St.  Eep.  549,  70  L.R.A.  761. 
struction."  2  Dill.  Munic.  Corp.,  ^sThe  court  says:  "The  easement 
p.  889,  note  2.  In  Codman  v.  Evans,  (of  the  abutter  in  the  street),  as  for 
5  Allen  308,  311,  the  court  says  that  convenience  it  may  be  called,  con- 
an  abutter  is  entitled  "to  have  the  sists  in  the  right  to  have  the  street 
whole  space  occupied  by  a  street  kept  open  and  includes  all  the  inci- 
open  from  the  soil  upwards  for  the  dental  privileges  which  may  fairly 
free  admission  of  light  and  air  and  be  implied  from  that  right.  •  It  is 
the  prospect  unobstructed  from  any  the  proximity  of  the  street,  the  sit- 
point."  nation  of  the  abutting  land  with 
46First  Nat  Bank  v.   Tyson,   133  reference  to   an  open  street,  which 


§  325 


EOADS    AND    STEEETS. 


193 


is  subject  of  course  to  all  legitimate  street  uses,  but  it  cannot 
be  interfered  with  for  private  purposes  with  or  without  com- 
pensation nor  by  structures  placed  in  the  street  for  public  pur- 
poses which  are  not  legitimate  street  uses,  unless  compensation 
is  made.*^  An  abutter  has  no  greater  right  to  use  the  street 
in  front  of  his  property  than  any  other  member  of  the  public, 
except  in  connection  with  his  abutting  property.^" 

§  125,  Rights  of  abutting  owners  a  matter  of  State  law. 
It  will  be  quite  manifest  from  this  chapter  that  the  rights  of 
abutting  owners  differ  in  different  States.  What  they  are  is  a 
matter  of  State  law  to  be  declared  by  the  legislature  or  deter- 
mined by  the  courts  of  the  State.  Upon  this  point  the  supreme 
court  of  the  United  States  says :    "The  same  law  which  declares 


gives  to  the  abutting  owner  the 
special  right  to  the  enjoyment  and 
use  of  whatever  is  permitted  or 
maintained  by  the  public  authorities 
as  a  part  of  the  street.  These  ease- 
ments are  created  by  operation  of 
law  when  streets  are  opened  and  they 
are  presumed  to  be  paid  for  by  tak- 
ing the  benefits  into  account  when 
land  is  procured  for  the  purpose. 
Such  benefits  are  'coej^tensive  with 
the  use'  to  which  the  street  may  by 
law  be  devoted  They  frequently  in- 
duce owners  of  land  to  donate  or 
dedicate  a  part  thereof  for  the  pur- 
pose of  a  street.  If  the  street  is  im- 
proved so  as  to  be  more  useful,  or 
ornamented  so  as  to  be  more  beau- 
tiful, the  public  is  benefited  general- 
ly and  the  abutter  is  benefited  spe- 
cially. So  long  as  a,  hitching  post 
or  a  shade  tree  is  physically  and 
legally  a  part  of  the  street,  he  is  en- 
titled to  all  the  special  benefits 
which  flow  therefrom  to  his  lot,  free 
from  interference  by  a  wrongdoer, 
but  subject  to  removal  by  the  mu- 
nicipal government.  The  easement 
extends  to  all  parts  of  the  street 
which  enlarge  the  use  and  increase 
the  value  of  the  adjacent  lot.  It  is 
not  limited  to  light,  air  and  access, 
but  includes  all  the  advantages 
Em.  D.— 13. 


which  spring  from  the  situation  of 
the  abutter's  land  upon  the  open 
space  of  the  street.  These  rights  ex- 
ist whether  he  owns  the  fee  of  the 
street  or  not.  As  they  are  depend- 
ent upon  the  street  and  cannot  exist 
without  it,  they  are  a  part  of  it  and 
become  'an  integral  part  of  the  es- 
tate' of  the  abutting  owner,  subject 
to  interference  by  no  one  except  the 
representatives  of  the  public.''  Don- 
ahue v.  Keystone  Gas  Co.,  181  N.  Y. 
313,  319,  320,  73  N.  E.  1108,  106  Am. 
St.  Rep.  549,  70  L.R.A.  761. 

"See  cases  already  cited  in  this 
section.  It  has  been  held  in  New 
York  that  in  estimating  the  just 
compensation  to  be  made  for  injury 
to  the  abutter's  rights  by  an  ele- 
vated railroad,  nothing  could  be  al- 
lowed for  noise,  loss  of  privacy,  or 
obstructing  the  view  of  the  prem- 
ises from  the  opposite  side  of  the 
street.  Messenger  v.  Manhattan  R. 
R.  Co.,  129  N.  Y.  502,  29  N.  E.  955; 
Bischoff  V.  New  York  El.  R.  II.  Co., 
138  N.  Y.  257,  33  N.  E.  1073;  Sea- 
side &  B.  B.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  South  Re- 
formed Dutch  Church,  83  Hun  U3, 
31  N.  Y.  Supp.  630. 

"Montgomery  v.  Parker,  114  Ala. 
118,  62  Am.  S\  Rep.  95. 


194:  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    126 

the  easements  defines,  qualifies  and  limits  them.  Surely  such 
questions  must  be  for  the  final  determination  of  the  State 
court.  It  has  authority  to  declare  that  the  abutting  land  owner 
has  no  easement  of  any  kind  over  the  abutting  street;  it  may 
determine  that  he  has  a  limited  easement,  or  it  may  determine 
that  he  has  an  absolute  and  unqualified  easement.  The  right  of 
an  owner  of  land  abutting  on  public  highways  has  been  a  fruit- 
ful source  of  litigation  in  the  courts  of  all  the  States,  and  the 
decisions  have  been  conflicting,  and  often  in  the  same  State 
irreconcilable  in  principle.  The  courts  have  modified  or  over- 
ruled their  own  decisions,  and  each  State  has  in  the  end  fixed 
and  limited,  by  legislation  or  judicial  decision,  the  rights  of 
abutting  owners  in  accordance  with  its  own  view  of  the  law 
and  public  policy."  ^^ 

§  126  (91  j).  Rights  of  abutting  owners  as  adjoining 
proprietors.  The  public,  as  owner  of  the  street,  is  in  fact  an 
adjoining  proprietor,  whether  it  owns  the  fee  or  only  an  ease- 
ment. Has  the  public  any  greater  right  than  an  individual  pro- 
prietor, or  does  it  hold  the  street  subject  to  the  same  limitations 
and  conditions  that  attach  to  private  ownership  ?  We  think  the 
latter.  In  the  use  of  the  street  the  public  is  subject  to  the  same 
limitations  that  an  individual  would  be  who  held  the  street  as 
his  private  property.^^  The  abutting  owner  has  the  same  rights 
with  respect  to  the  use  of  the  street  that  he  has  with  respect  to 
the  use  of  any  other  adjacent  property.  Consequently,  he  has  a 
right  to  the  support  of  the  soil  by  that  of  the  street,  a  right  to 
the  exclusive  possession  of  his  inclosure  as  against  encroach- 
ments from  the  street,  a  right  not  to  be  injured  by  any  in- 
terference with  the  flow  of  surface  water  or  running  streams 

"Sauer  v.   New  York,   206  U.   S.  inflict  damage  beyond  that  which  a 

536,  27  S.  C.  686.  private  owner  might  have  inflicted 

°^"In  the  control  and  improvement  without  liability  did  not  exist." 
of  its  thoroughfares  for  public  use  Hunger  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  57  Minn, 
the  city  has  the  same  rights  and  9,  58  N.  W.  601.  To  same  effect, 
powers  as  a  private  owner  has  over  Steam's  Exrs.  v.  City  of  Richmond, 
his  own  land  and  is  subject  to  the  88  Va.  992,  14  S.  B.  847,  6  Am.  R.  R. 
same  liabilities.  It  would  be  liable  &  Corp.  Rep.  247 ;  Rice  v.  City  of 
for  damages  caused  to  plaintiff's  Flint,  67  Mich.  401,  34  N.  W.  719; 
property  by  grading  the  avenue  and  Nichols  v.  City  of  Duluth,  40  Minn, 
street,  just  as  a  private  owner  of  the  389,  42  N.  W.  84;  City  of  New  West- 
soil  over  which  they  were  laid  would  minster  v.  Brighouse,  20  Duvall  520; 
have  been  liable  when  improving  it  and  many  cases  cited  in  the  follow- 
for  his  own  use;   and  the  right  to  ing  sections. 


§  126  EOADS  AND  STEEETS.  195 

caused  by  the  use  of  the  street  which  would  be  actionable  if  made 
by  an  individual,  and,  generally,  a  right  not  to  be  injured  by  any 
unreasonable  use  of  the  land  which  forms  the  street.^^  These 
rights,  unlike  those  of  access  and  frontage,  are  absolute  and  par- 
amount in  the  individual,  and  the  public  must  so  use  and  im- 
prove the  streets  as  not  to  interfere  with  such  rights,  or  else 
make  "just  compensation"  for  the  damages  occasioned  by  such 
interference.^* 

It  is  evident  that  these  rights  exist  in  the  abutting  owner, 
unless  they  are  taken  or  acquired  by  the  public  when  the  street 
is  established.  They  always  exist  with  respect  to  adjoining 
property,  unless  they  have  been  expressly  reserved  or  granted 
in  favor  of  other  property.  These  rights  are  never  expressly 
granted,  released  or  condemned  when  a  street  is  established. 
The  land  alone  is  taken,  or  granted,  or  dedicated,  as  the  case 
may  be.  But  land  is  always  understood  to  have  attached  to  it 
these  universal  rights  and  obligations  relating  to  its  use  and 
enjoyment.  When  the  public  take  land  for  a  street  in  invitum, 
why  should  they  be  held  to  have  acquired  by  implication  some- 
thing which  they  did  not  ask  for  ?  Why  should  a  grant  or  dedi- 
cation of  land  to  the  public,  for  a  particular  use,  be  held  to  have 
vested  in  the  public  more  than  a  grant  of  the  same  land,  for 
the  same  use,  to  an  individual,  would  vest  in  him  ?  The  use  of 
the  land  for  a  street  does  not  necessarily  require  that  these 
rights  of  support,  etc.,  should  be  in  the  public.  It  is  always 
possible  and  practicable  to  improve  a  street  without  interfering 
Avith  such  rights.  It  is  vastly  more  for  the  public  interest  that 
the  public  should  occasionally  incur  increased  expense  in  mak- 
ing improvements,  to  avoid  interfering  with  such  rights,  than 
that  the  public  should  in  all  cases  be  compelled  to  pay  for  the 
loss  of  such  rights  when  a  street  is  established.  It  has  been  said, 
in  some  cases,  that  a  jury  or  other  tribunal  for  assessing  dam- 
age, when  a  street  is  laid  out,  take  into  consideration  the  possi- 
bility of  future  damage  by  improving  the  street,  and  increase 

S3Post,     §§     139-142,     234.     "The  5 4 Same;  and  §§  234,  852.    In  Nich- 

rights  of  the  public  in  property  are  ols  v.  City  of  Duluth,  40  Minn.  389, 

to  be  governed  by  the  same  rules  of  42  N.  W.  84,  the  court,  in  speaking 

law  as  the  rights  of  individuals,  and  of  one  of  these  rights,  says:   "This 

the  maxim  sic  utero  tuo  ut  alienuni  right  of  the  lateral  support  of  the 

non  laedas,  applies  with  equal  force  adjoining  soil,  being  a  natural  one, 

in   the   one   case   as   in   the   other."  is  absolute,  and  independent  of  any 

Stone  V.  Augusta,  46  Me.  127.  question  of  negligence." 


196  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    127 

their  allowance  accordingly.'^  We  think  the  fact  is  otherwise, 
but  the  impossibility  of  forming  an  accurate  or  even  approxi- 
mate estimate  of  such  damages  is  sufficient  to  rebut  any  presump- 
tion of  their  having  been  included  in  the  assessment.  Who  can 
estimate  what  the  needs  of  the  public  will  require,  or  the  whims 
of  public  officers  suggest  ?  To  attempt  to  include  such  damages 
is  to  send  the  jury  into  the  realm  of  pure  speculation.  The 
more  reasonable,  the  more  practicable  and  the  juster  view  is 
that  such  damages  are  not  the  subject  of  assessment  in  such 
cases.^^  While  these  views  as  to  the  rights  of  abutting  owners  do 
not  accord  with  all  the  decided  cases — no  views  can  do  that — 
they  are  supported,  if  not  by  the  more  numerous,  at  least  by 
the  later  and  better-reasoned  cases.'''  We  shall  go  more  fully 
into  the  decisions  in  the  following  sections  in  the  treatment  of 
the  separate  rights  to  which  we  have  referred  in  this  section. 

§  127  (91k).  Whether  the  public  have  a  fee  or  an 
easement  in  the  street,  the  title  is  in  trust  for  street  uses 
only.  Though  the  fee  of  a  street  is  in  the  public,  yet  it  is  not 
an  absolute,  but  only  a  qualified  or  conditional  fee.'^  The  pub- 
lie,  whether  represented  by  city.  State  or  county,  holds  the  fee 
in  trust  for  public  use  as  a  street,  and  for  no  other  purpose,®^ 
and  when  the  use  ceases  the  fee  reverts  to  him  from  whom  it  was 

5  5,Sfee  authorities  cited  post,  §  134,  The  city  cannot  sell  or  convey  it, 

note  98.  or  encumber  it  in  any  way,  or  con- 

'"Post,  chap.  xxiv.  sent  that  it  shall  be  encumbered.    It 

"This   section   is  quoted   and   ap-  cannot    build    upon    it,    or    permit 

proved  in  Stearns'  Ex'r  v.  City  of  others   to   do   so.     The   land   could 

Richmond,  88  Va.  992,  14  S.  E.  847,  not  be  sold  for  the  debts  of  the  city, 

6  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  247.  for  its  estate  is  only  a  trust  estate. 

"'Leadville  v.   Bohn  Min.   Co.,   37  The  act  provides  what  the  city  can 

Colo.    248,    86   Pac.    1038,   8   L.R.A.  do  with  the  fee,  and  that  is  to  keep 

(N.S.)    422;   People  v.  Kerr,  27  N.  it  open  as  a,  public  street,  and  that 

Y.  188;  Kimball  v.  Kenosha,  4  Wis.  is  all  the  city  can  do  with  it  and 

321 ;   Goodall  V.   Milwaukee,  S  Wis.  is  all  the  right  the  public  has  taken 

32 iand  see  Abendroth  v.  Manhattan  away  from  the  original  owner.    The 

Ry.  Co.,  52  N.  Y.  Supr.  Ct.  274  and  whole  duty,  power  and  trust  of  the 

cases   cited  in  next  note.     In  Mat-  city,  in  the  fee,  is  to  keep  it  open, 

ter  of  Gilbert  Elevated  Ry.  Co.,  38  the  fee  being  taken  because  the  city 

Hun  437,  448,  452-3,  the  court  ap-  can  thereby  better  perform  its  duty 

prove   the  following  language  from  and  its  trust  in  that  regard  than  if 

the    commissioners'    report:       "The  any    other    quality    of    estate    were 

city  takes  the  fee  in  terms,  but  only  taken." 

for    one    specified    purpose,   viz.,    in  ™HaskelI  v.  Denver  Tramway  Co., 

trust   to   keep   the   land   open   as   a  23  Colo.  60,  46  Pac.  121 ;  Leadville 

public  street.    The  fee  is  not  an  ab-  v.  Bohn  Min.  Co.,  37  Colo.  248,  80 

solute,  unqualified,  unconditional  fee. '  Pac.  1038,  8  L.R.A.(N.S.)   422;  Im- 


§  127 


EOADS    AND    STREETS. 


197 


lay  V.  Railroad  Co.,  26  Conn.  256,  68 
Am.  Dec.  392;  Carter  v.  Chicago, 
57  III.  283;  Chicago  v.  Wright,  69 
111.  318;  Kreigh  v.  Chicago,  86  111. 
407;  City  of  Morrison  v.  Hinkson, 
87  111.  587,  589,  29  Am.  Rep.  77; 
Smith  V.  McDowell,  148  111.  51,  35 
N.  E.  141,  22  L.R.A.  393;  Field  v. 
Barling,  149  111.  556,  37  N.  E.  850, 
41  Am.  St.  Rep.  311,  24  L.R.A. 
406,  10  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  707 ; 
Barrows  v.  City  of  Sycamore,  150 
111.  588,  37  N.  E.  1096,  10  Am.  R. 
R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  62,  41  Am.  St.  Rep. 
400;  Chicago  Tel.  Co.  v.  N.  W.  Tel. 
Co.,  199  111.  324,  05  N.  E.  329;  Penn- 
sylvania Co.  V.  Bond,  202  111.  95,  66 
N.  E.  941 ;  People  v.  Harris,  203  111. 
272,  67  N.  E.  785,  96  Am.  St.  Rep. 
304;  People  v.  Atchison  etc.  Ry. 
Co.,  217  111.  594,  75  N.  E.  573;  Chi- 
cago etc.  Ry.  Co.'  v.  People,  222  111. 
427,  78  N.  E.  790 ;  Weage  v.  Chicago 
etc.  N.  R.  Co.,  227  111.  421,  81  N.  E. 
424,  11  L.R.A.(N.S.)  589;  Gregsten 
V.  Chicago,  40  111.  App.  607 ;  Hibbard 
V.  Chicago,  59  111.  App.  470;  Chicago 
General  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Chicago  City 
R.  R.  Co.,  62  111.  App.  502;  Chicago 
V.  Verdon,  119  111.  App.  494;  Stanley 
V.  Davenport,  54  la.  463 ;  Gilchrist 
Co.  V.  Des  Moines,  128  la.  49,  102 
N.  W.  831;  Bateman  v.  City  of 
Covington,  90  Ky.  390,  14  S.  W.  361, 
3  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  508;  Lab- 
ry  v.  Gilmour,  121  Ky.  367,  89  S. 
W.  231 ;  New  Orleans  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  44  La.  Ann. 
748,  11  So.  77;  Pool  v.  Falls  Road 
Elec.  R.  R.  Co.,  88  Md.  533,  41  Atl. 
1069;  Townsend  v.  Epstein,  93  Md. 
537,  49  Atl.  629,  86  Am.  St.  Rep. 
441,  52  L.R.A.  409;  Schurmeier  v. 
St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  10  Minn. 
82,  88  Am.  Dec.  59 ;  St.  Paul  v.  Chi- 
cago etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  63  Minn.  330, 
63  N.  W.  267,  34  L.R.A.  184,  65  N. 
W.  Rep.  649,  68  N.  W.  Rep.  458; 
Sanborn  v.  Van  Duyne,  90  Minn. 
215,  96  N.  W.  41 ;  Theobold  v.  Louis- 
ville etc.   R.   R.   Co.,   66  Miss.   279, 


14  Am.  St.  Rep.  504,  4  L.R.A.  735; 
Jaynes  v.  Omaha  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  53 
Neb.  631,  74  N.  W.  67,  39  L.R.A. 
751 ;  Burlington  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co., 
56  N.  J.  Eq.  259,  38  Atl.  849;  Duyne 
V.  Knox  Hat  Mfg.  Co.,  71  N.  J.  Eq. 
375;  People  v.  Kerr,  27  N.  Y.  188; 
Story  V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co., 
90  N.  Y.  122,  43  Am.  Rep.  146;  Lahr 
V.  Met.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  104  N.  Y.  268; 
Kane  v.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  125 
N.  Y.  164,  26  N.  E.  278,  3  Am.  R. 
R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  744,  11  L.R.A.  640; 
Matter  of  New  York,  174  N.  Y.  26, 
66  N.  E.  584,  affirming  S.  C.  74  App. 
Div.  197,  77  N.  Y.  S.  737 ;  Ackerman 
V.  True,  175  N.  Y.  353,  67  N.  E.  629, 
reversing  S.  C.  71  App.  Div.  143,  75 
N.  Y.  S.  695 ;  Lawrence  v.  New  York, 
2  Barb.  577;  Rhinehart  v.  Redfield, 
93  App.  Div.  410,  87  N.  Y.  S.  789; 
Callen  v.  Columbus  Edison  Elec.  Lt. 
Co.,  66  Ohio  St.  166,  64  N.  E.  141,  58 
L.R.A.  782;  Lake  Shore,  etc.,  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Elyria,  69  Ohio  St.  414,  69  N.  E, 
738;  Lake  Shore  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Elyria,  14  Ohio  C.  C.  48;  Strader  v. 
Cincinnati,  1  Handy,  446;  Coalville 
Pass.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Wilkes-Barre 
Southside  R.  R.  Co.  5  Luzerne  Leg. 
Reg.  Rep.  340;  Humer  v.  Mayer,  1 
Humph.  403;  Mayor  v.  Brown,  9 
Heisk.  1 ;  Smith  v.  Railroad  Co.,  87 
Tenn.  626,  630;  State  v.  Taylor,  107 
Tenn.  455,  64  S.  W.  766;  Cereghino 
V.  Ore.  Short-Line  R.  R.  Co.,  26  Utah 
467,  73  Pac.  634,  90  Am.  St.  Rep. 
843;  Kimball  v.  City  of  Kenosha,  4 
Wis.  321,  330;  Goodall  v.  Milwaukee, 
5  Wis.  32.  "The  grant  is  expressly 
upon  trust  (though  dedicated  or  con- 
fiscated), for  a  public  purpose,  that 
the  lands  may  be  appropriated  and 
used  forever  as  public  streets.  •  *  * 
The  city  has  neither  the  right  nor 
the  power  to  apply  any  such  prop- 
erty to  other  than  public  uses,  and 
those  included  within  the  objects  of 
the  grant.  Whatever  may  be  the 
quantity  or  the  quality  of  the  estate 
of    the    city    of    New    York    in    it> 


198  EMINENT   DOMAIN.  §    127 

acquired,  unless  otherwise  provided  by  statute.^"  If  the  public 
has  only  an  easement  there  is  no  question  about  its  being  held 
in  trust  for  street  uses  only."^  In  one  of  the  cases  cited,  which 
related  to  a  platted  street  where  the  statute  provided  that  the 
effect  of  the  plat  should  be  to  vest  the  fee  of  the  streets  in  the 
municipality,  the  court  says:  "It  seems  plain  that  the  effect 
of  the  provision  is  not  to  vest  in  the  municipality  a  fee  simple 
absolute  in  the  streets,  but  only  a  determinable  and  a  qualified 
fee,  and  that  what  is  granted  to  the  city  is  to  be  held  in  trust 
for  the  uses  intended,  viz :  for  street  uses,  and  street  uses 
only."  ^^  It  was  further  held  in  the  same  case  that  this  limita- 
tion upon  the  public  title  necessarily  implied  that  there  was  a 
substantial  interest  in  the  street  not  conveyed  by  the  plat  and 
that  this  interest  remained  in  the  abutting  owners  and  was  in 
the  nature  of  an  incorporeal  hereditament.  It  has  sometimes 
been  supposed  that  the  public  might  have  such  an  absolute  fee 
as  would  authorize  it  to  make  any  use  of  the  street  it  saw  fit 
irrespective  of  the  abutting  owners.®^  But  we  know  of  no  in- 
stance of  such  a  fee,  nor  do  we  see  how  it  would  be  possible. 
However  absolute  the  fee  of  the  public  may  have  once  been, 
its  devotion  of  the  land  to  street  uses  and  the  express  or  implied 
invitation  to  abutters  to  improve  their  property  with  reference 
to  the  street,  would  give  rise  to  mutual  rights  and  obligations 
which  could  not  be  abrogated  at  the  will  of  either  party.  By 
acting  upon  the  invitation  to  use  the  land  as  a  street,  the  abut- 
ters would  acquire  a  right  to  have  the  space  kept  open  as  a 
street  and  to  enjoy  light,  air  and  access  therefrom.''*  It  follows 
that  a  municipality  has  no  power  to  grant  the  use  of  streets 

streets,    that    estate    is    essentially  "See  cases  in  last  two  notes, 

public  and  not  private  property  and  62Callen  v.  Columbus  Edison  Elec. 

the  city,  in  holding  i+,  is  the  agent  Lt.  Co.,  66  Ohio  St.  166,  64  N.  E.  141, 

and  trustee  of  the  public  and  not  a  58  L.R.A.  782.     Where  the  city  had 

private  owner  for  profit  or  emolu-  the    fee    it    was    held    to    own    the 

ment."    People  v.  Kerr,  27  N.  Y.  188,  mineral,    underneath     the     surface. 

197.  Leadville  v.  Coronado  Min.  Co.,  29 

eoGebhart  v.  Reeves,  75  111.  301;  Colo.   17,  67  Pac.  289;  Leadville  v. 

Helen  v.  Webster,  85  111.  116;  Unit-  St.  Louis  S.  &  M.  Co.,  29  Colo.  40, 

ed  States    v.    Harris,  1  Sumner  21.  67  Pac.  1126. 

But  in  Kansas  it  is  held  that  the  fee  "'/See  2  Dill.  Munic.  Corp.  §  704. 

reverts  to  the  abutting  owner.    Sho-  "Kane  v.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co., 

waiter  v.  So.  Kan.  R.  R.  Co.,  49  Kan.  125  N.  Y.  164,  26  N.  E.  278,  3  Am.  R. 

421,  32  Pac.  92.     See  generMij  El-  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  744,  11  L.R.A.  640. 
liott,  Roads  &  Streets,  pp.  670,  671. 


§  128 


EOADS    AND    STREETS. 


199 


for  private  purposes  and  that  abutting  owners  who  suffer  special 
damages  by  reason  thereof  may  have  the  appropriate  remedies 
to  prevent  or  recover  damages  therefor.^" 

§  128  (911).  Ownership  of  the  fee  of  streets  and  dis- 
tinctions based  thereon.  There  is  great  confusion  and  con- 
flict in  the  authorities  arising  out  of  considerations  based  upon 
the  fee  of  streets.  Thus  the  ISTew  York  decisions  hold  that  the 
abutting  owner  is  entitled  to  compensation  when  an  elevated 
railroad  is  constructed  in  front  of  his  property,  whether  he  owns 
the  fee  of  the  street  or  not,^''  but  as  to  surface  railroads  of  all 
kinds,  award  him  compensation  if  he  owns  the  fee  and  deny 


"°Beebe  v.  Little  Kock,  68  Ark.  39, 
56  S.  W.  791 ;  Laing  v.  Americus,  86 
Ga.  758,  13  S.  E.  107,  4  Am.  R.  R. 

6  Corp.  Rep.  228;  Smith  v.  McDow- 
ell, 148  111.  51,  35  N.  E.  141,  22 
L.R.A.  393 ;  Hibbard  v.  Chicago,  173 
111.  91,  50  N.  E.  256,  40  L.R.A.  621 ; 
Snyder  v.  Mt.  Pulaski,  176  111.  397, 
52  N.  E.  62,  44  L.R.A.  407 ;  Penn.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Chicago,  181  111.  289,  54  N. 
E.  825;  People  v.  Harris,  203  111.  272, 

07  X.  E.  785,  96  Am.  St.  Rep.  304; 
People  V.  Clean  St.  Co.,  225  111.  470, 
80  X.  E.  298,  116  Am.  St.  Rep.  156,  9 
L.R.A.  (X.S.)  455;  Hibbard  v.  Chi- 
cago, 59  111.  App.  470;  Chicago  v. 
Pooley,  112  111.  App.  343;  Chicago  v. 
Verdon,  119  111.  App.  494;  Chicago 
Cold  Storage  Warehouse  Co.  v.  Peo- 
ple, 127  111.  App.  179;  State  v.  Ber- 
ditta,  73  Ind.  185,  38  Am.  Rep.  117; 
Labry  v.  Gilmour,  121  Ky.  307,  89 
S.  W.  231 ;  Townsend  v.  Epstein,  93 
Md.  537,  49  Atl.  629,  86  Am.  St.  Rep. 
441,  52  L.R.A.  409;  Brauer  v.  Balti- 
more Refrigerating  etc.  Co.  99  Md. 
367,  58  Atl.  21,  105  Am.  St.  Rep. 
304,  66  L.R.A.  403 ;  St.  Paul  v.  Chi- 
cago etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  63  Minn.  330,  63 
N.  W.  267,  65  N.  W.  049,  68  N.  W. 
458,  34  L.R.A.  184;  Schopp  v.  St. 
Louis,  117  Mo.  131,  22  S.  W.  898,  8 
Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  391,  20 
L.R.A.  783;  State  v.  St.  Louis,  161 
Mo.  371,  61  S.  W.  658;  Beecher  v. 
Newark,   65  N.   J.   L.   307,   47   Atl. 


466,  affirming  S.  C.  64  N.  J.  L.  475, 
46  Atl.  166;  Swift  v.  Delaware  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  66  N.  J.  Eq.  34,  57  Atl. 
456;  Ackerman  v.  True,  175  N.  Y. 
353,  67  N.  E.  629,  reversing  S.  C.  71 
App.  Div.  143,  75  N.  Y.  S.  695;  Mc- 
Millan V.  Klaw  &  Erlanger  Con.  Co., 
107  App.  Div.  407,  95  N.  Y.  S.  365; 
Herrick  v.  Cleveland,  7  Ohio  C.  C. 
470;  Cereghino  v.  Ore.  Short-Line  R. 
R.  Co.,  26  Utah  467,  73  Pac.  634,  90 
Am.  St.  Ry.  843.  Compare  Rothschild 
V.  Chicago,  227  111.  205,  81  N.  E.  407; 
State  V.  Stoner,  39  Ind.  App.  104,  79 
N.  E.  399. 

A  different  rule  prevails  in  Iowa 
where  it  is  held  that  the  city  takes 
an  absolute  fee  which  it  may  dis- 
pose of  for  private  uses.  Barr  v. 
Oskaloosa,  45  la.  275;  Marshalltown 
V.  Forney,  61  la.  578,  16  N.  W.  740; 
Dempsey  v.  Burlington,  66  la.  387, 
24  N.  W.  508 ;  Williams  v.  Carey,  73 
la.  194,  34  N.  W.  813;  Spitzer  v. 
Eunyan,  113  la.  619,  85  N.  W.  782; 
Harrington  v.  la.  Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  126 
la.  388,  102  N.  W.  139. 

"Story  V.  N.  Y.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  90 
N.  Y.  122,  43  Am.  Rep.  146 ;  Lahr  v. 
Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  104  N.  Y. 
268;  Kane  v.  New  York  El.  R.  R. 
Co.,  125  N.  Y.  104,  26  N.  E.  278,  11 
L.R.A.  640;  S.  C.  Sub.  Nom. 
Duyckinck  v.  New  York  El.  R.  R. 
Co.,  3  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  744. 


200 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§    128 


him  compensation  if  he  does  not.'''  Commercial  railroads  and 
even  horse  railroads  are  held  in  this  State  not  to  be  legitimate 
street  uses,  but  if  the  abutter  does  not  happen  to  own  the  fee, 
he  can  get  no  compensation,  however  much  he  may  be  damaged. 
In  the  elevated  railroad  cases  he  gets  compensation,  because  his 
easements  are  interfered  with  by  a  use  foreign  to  the  purposes 
of  a  highway.  But  in  case  of  the  commercial  railroad  he  can- 
not get  compensation  though  the  same  easements  are  interfered 
with  by  a  use  also  inconsistent  with  street  purposes  and  differ- 
ing only  as  to  the  structure  placed  in  the  street.  It  has  accord- 
ingly been  held  in  New  York  that,  in  a  proceeding  to  condemn 
the  fee  of  a  street,  the  abutter  is  entitled  to  substantial  dam- 
ages.^* So  in  Tennessee  it  is  held  that  the  abutting  owner  may 
recover  compensation  for  a  steam  dummy  railroad  in  the  street 
in  front  of  his  property  if  he  owns  the  fee,  but  otherwise  if  the 
fee  is  in  the  public.®'  Similar  distinctions  are  made  in  other 
States.'^'' 

On  the  other  hand,  many  recent  cases  question  or  repudiate 
distinctions  based  upon  the  ownership  of  the  fee,  as  respects 
the  uses  which  the  public  may  make  of  the  soil  or  the  right  of 
the  abutter  to  compensation.^^    The  opinions  of  the  text  writers 


"Fobes  V.  Rome  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  121 
N.  y.  505,  24  N.  E.  919,  3  Am.  R. 
R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  182,  8  L.R.A.  453; 
Williams  v.  New  York  Cent.  R.  R. 
Co.,  16  N.  Y.  97,  69  Am.  Dec.  632; 
Craig  V.  Railroad  Co.,  39  N.  Y.  404; 
Kellinger  v.  Railroad  Co.,  50  N.  Y. 
206. 

«'City  of  Buffalo  v.  Pratt,  131  N. 
Y.  293,  30  "N.  E.  233,  6  Am.  R.  R. 
&  Corp.  Rep.  499,  27  Am.  St.  Rep. 
592,  15  L.R.A.  413. 

6  9East  End  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Doyle, 
88  Tenn.  747,  13  S.  W.  936,  9  L.R.A. 
100,  2  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  747; 
Smith  V.  Railroad  Co.,  87  Tenn.  626, 
11  S.  W.  709;  Iron  Mt.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bingham,  87  Tenn.  522,  11  S.  W. 
705,  4  L.R.A.  622. 

"Florida  So.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown, 
23  Fla.  104;  Moses  v.  Pittsburgh  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  21  111.  516;  Murphy  v. 
Chicago,  29  111.  279,  81  Am.  Dec. 
307;  Indianapolis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 


Hartley,  67  111.  439;  Cox  v.  Louis- 
ville etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  48  Ind.  178; 
Kineaid  v.  Indianapolis  Natural 
Gas.  Co.,  124  Ind.  577,  24  N.  E.  1086, 
19  Am.  St.  Rep.  113,  8  L.R.A.  602; 
Milburn  v.  Cedar  Rapids,  12  Iowa, 
246;  Kucherman  v.  C.  C.  &  D.  R.  R. 
Co.,  46  Iowa,  366;  Phipps  v.  West 
Maryland  R.  R.  Co.,  66  Md.  319; 
Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Williams, 
86  Va.  696,  11  S.  E.  106,  19  Am. 
St.  Rep.  908;  post,  §§  153,  154. 

TiFulton  V.  Short  Route  R.  R. 
Trans.  Co.,  85  Ky.  640,  4  S.  W.  332, 
7  Am.  St.  Rep.  619;  Hepting  v.  New 
Orleans  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  36  La.  Ann. 
898;  Chesapeake  &  P.  Tel.  Co.  v. 
Mackenzie,  74  Md.  36,  21  Atl.  690, 
28  Am.  St.  Rep.  219;  Schurmeier  v. 
St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  10  Minn.  82, 
88  Am.  Dec.  59;  Adams  v.  C.  B.  & 
Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  39  Minn.  286,  39  N.  W. 
629,  12  Am.  St.  Rep.  644,  1  L.R.A. 
493;    Lamm  v.   Chicago   etc.   R.   R. 


§  128 


EOAI>S    AND    STEEETS. 


201 


also  incline  in  the  same  direction.''^  "It  is  difficult  to  imagine," 
says  the  supreme  court  of  South  Carolina,  "a  right  more  empty 
and  theoretical  than  private  ownership  of  the  fee  in  the  street 


Co.,  45  Minn.  71,  47  N.  W.  455,  10 
L.R.A.  268;  Theobold  v.  Louisville 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  66  Miss.  279,  6  So. 
230,  14  Am.  St.  Rep.  564,  4  L.R.A. 
735;  Bronson  v.  Albion  Telephone 
Co.,  67  Neb.  Ill,  93  N.  W.  201,  60 
L.R.A.  426;  Improvement  Co.  v.  Ho- 
boken,  36  N.  J.  L.  540;  Van  Home 
V.  New  York  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  48 
N.  J.  Eq.  332;  Halsey  v.  Rapid 
Transit  R.  R.  Co.,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  380; 
Donahue  v.  Keystone  Gas  Co.,  181 
N.  Y.  313,  73  N.  E.  1108,  106  Am. 
St.  Rep.  549,  70  L.R.A.  761,  affirm- 
ing S.  C.  90  App.  Div.  388,  85  N.  Y. 
S.  478;  White  v.  Northwestern  N. 
C.  R.  R.  Co.,  113  N.  C.  610,  18  S. 
E.  630,  9  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
103,  37  Am.  St.  Rep.  639,  22  L.R.A. 
627;  Blackwell  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Gist, 
18  Okla.  516,  90  Pac.  889; 
McQuade  v.  Portland  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  18  Ore.  237,  22  Pac.  899,  1  Am. 
R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  34;  Willamette 
Iron  Works  v.  Oregon  R.  &  N.  Co., 
26  Ore.  224,  37  Pac.  1016,  46  Am.  St. 
Rep.  620,  29  L.R.A.  88;  South 
Bound  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Burton,  67  S. 
C.  515,  46  S.  E.  340;  Dooley  Block 
V.  Salt  Lake  Rapid  Transit  Co.,  9 
Utah  31,  33  Pac.  Rep.  229,  8  Am. 
R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  327 ;  Stewart  v. 
Ohio  Riv.  R.  R.  Co.,  38  W.  Va.  438, 
18  S.  E.  Rep.  604 ;  Barney  v.  Keokuk, 
94  U.  S.  324.  In  McQuade  v.  Port- 
land etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  Ore.  237,  22 
Pac.  899,  Thayer,  C.  J.,  speaking  for 
the  court,  says:  "Too  much  im- 
portance, it  seems  to  me,  has  been 
attached  to  the  question  of  owner- 
ship of  the  fee  in  the  street.  •  •  ♦ 
The  use  of  the  land  as  a  street  in- 
cludes practically  its  entire  bene- 
ficial interest.  There  is  no  estate  of 
a  private  character  left  in  the  dedi- 
cator, if  the  fee  does  remain  in  him. 


which  he  can  utilize,  and  if  it  vests 
in  the  lot  owner  by  virtue  of  his 
deed  to  the  lot,  it  confers  no  rights 
which  are  not  secured  to  him  by  the 
implied  covenant,  arising  out  of  the 
conveyance,  that  he  shall  have  a 
right  of  way  over  the  street,  and 
egress  and  ingress  to  and  from  liis 
premises  by  means  thereof.  The  lot 
owner's  rights  in  the  street  are  just 
as  sacred,  so  far  as  I  can  see,  in  the 
one  case  as  in  the  other."  In  a  re- 
cent Mississippi  "case  it  is  said :  "A 
distinction  is  made  by  some  of  the 
authorities  in  cases  where  the  fee 
in  the  soil  of  the  street  is  in  the 
public — the  State,  county,  or  city — 
and  where  it  remains  in  the  abut- 
ting owner;  and  in  the  first  case, 
the  right  of  the  abutting  owner  to 
compensation  is  denied,  and  in  the 
latter,  it  is  recognized  and  allowed. 
We  perceive  no  well-founded  differ- 
ence in  principle  in  such  distinction. 
If  the  fee  is  in  the  public,  it  is 
held  in  trust,  expressly  or  im- 
pliedly, that  the  land  shall  be  used 
as  a  street,  and  it  cannot  be  applied 
to  any  other  purpose  without  a 
breach  of  trust.  It  is  only  where 
the  fee  is  in  the  public,  free  from 
any  trust  or  duty,  that  it  may  be 
disposed  of  for  any  purpose  that  the 
public  may  deem  proper.  Whether 
the  abutting  owner  has  simply  an 
easement  in  the  street,  while  the  fee 
is  in  the  public  or  in  some  other 
owner,  or  whether  he  has  both  the 
fee  and  the  easement,  he  is  equally 
entitled  to  require  that  nothing 
shall  be  done  in  derogation  of  his 
rights."  Theobold  v.  Louisville  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  66  Miss.  279,  6  So.  230, 
14  Am.  St.  Rep.  564,  4  L.R.A.  735. 

'-Cooley  Const.  Lim.,  p.  682,  note 
3    (6th  Ed.)  ;   2  Dill.  Munic.  Corp. 


202  EMINENT   BOMAIN.  §    128 

of  an  established  city.  The  possibility  of  regaining  possession 
of  the  property  by  abandonment  of  the  street  is  so  remote  that 
it  may  ordinarily  be  regarded  as  a  negligible  factor.  The  adja- 
cent owner  has  no  present  beneficial  use  differing  in  the  slightest 
degree  from  that  -which  is  acquired  by  a  purchaser,  for  himself 
and  his  assigns,  who  buys  a  lot  abutting  on  a  street  laid  out  by 
the  State  or  the  city  on  its  own  land.  In  the  one  case,  in  his 
dedi'cation  he  retains,  and  in  the  other,  by  the  state's  or  city's 
dedication  he  acquires,  certain  street  privileges  which  constitute 
property."  ''^ 

The  cases  which  have  contributed  more  than  any  others  to 
break  down  the  distinction  made  in  the  earlier  cases,  as  to  the 
ownership  of  the  fee  of  streets,  are  the  New  York  Elevated 
railroad  decisions.'*  The  authority  of  these  cases  is  somewhat 
shaken  by  the  fact  that  the  same  court  has,  since  the  earlier 
decisions,  reaffirmed  the  old  distinction  in  the  case  of  surface 
railroads.'^  The  inconsistency  of  the  two  positions  seems  mani- 
fest, and,  doubtless,  if  the  court  had  not  been  embarrassed  by 
prior  decisions,  the  result  in  Fobes  v.  Home  etc.,  E.  R.  Co. 
would  have  been  different.  Courts  of  other  States  will  be  more 
likely  to  follow  the  logic  and  good  sense  of  the  elevated  railroad 
cases  and  reject  the  fine  distinctions  attempted  in  the  case  of 
surface  railroads.''^ 

In  transactions  between  man  and  man  concerning  property, 
we  are  not  aware  of  any  instance  in  which  the  ownership  of 
the  fee  of  the  street  has  cut  any  figure  in  fixing  the  price  of 
the  property  or  influencing  the  parties.  The  width  of  the  street, 
the  manner  in  which  it  is  improved,  the  condition  of  the  pave- 

§§    704,    704a;    Keasby   on   Electric  10  L.R.A.  268,  it  is  said:     "If  the 

Wires,  pp.  61-68.  abutting    owner,     independently    of 

'^South  Bound  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bur-  the    ownership    of    the    fee    of    the 

ton,  67  S.  C.  515,  46  S.  E.  340.  street,  has  an  easement  in  the  street 

"Story  V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  in  front  of  his  lot  to  the  full  width 

90    N.    Y.    122,    43    Am.    Rep.    146;  of  it  for  the  purpose  of  access,  light 

Lahr  v.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  and    air,    which    is    property,    and 

104  N.  Y.  268;  Kane  v.  New  York  cannot  be  taken  from  him  without 

El.  R.  R.  Co.,  125  N.  Y.  164,  26  N.  compensation,   it  is  difficult  for  us 

E.  278,  11  L.R.A.  640,  3  Am.  R.  R.  to    see    what    difference    it    makes 

&  Corp.  Rep.  744.  whether     the     easement     is     taken 

'"Fobes  V.  Rome  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  121  away   or   its    enjoyment    interfered 

N.  Y.  505,  24  N.  E.  919,  8  L.R.A.  with  by  a,  railroad  constructed  and 

453,  3  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  182.  operated    on    the    surface    of     the 

'"Thus   in   Lamm   v.   Chicago   etc.  ground,    or    at    an    elevation   above 

R.  R.  Co.,  45  Minn.  71,  47  N.  W.  455,  it." 


§  128 


KOADS    AND    StEEEl'S. 


203 


ment,  the  question  of  sewers,  water,  gas,  etc.,  are  factors  of  more 
or  less  importance.  But  whether  the  title  extended  to  the  cen- 
ter of  the  street  or  stopped  at  the  street  line,  we  never  knew  to  be 
the  subject  of  inquiry.  "The  right  of  adjacency,  the  advantage 
of  having  your  land  upon  the  highway  with  right  of  access  and 
light  and  air,  this  is  what  the  people  understand  and  value. 
Who  owns  the  fee  they  do  not  know  nor  care."  ''''  So  in  case 
of  any  use  of  the  street  prejudicial  to  the  abutting  property, 
as  by  a  railroad,  the  amount  of  damage  actually  done  to  the 
property  would  not  vary  one  iota,  whether  the  abutter  owned 
the  fee  or  not.  The  damage  to  the  technical  fee  is  nothing. 
The  whole  appreciable  injury  is  sustained  by  the  property 
beyond  the  street  line,  and  arises  from  the  interference  with 
the  easements  of  light,  air  and  access  and  the  annoyances  occa- 
sioned by  the  particular  use  of  the  street,  whatever  it  may  be. 

So  the  uses  which  the  public  may  make  of  a  street  do  not 
depend  upon  the  ownership  of  the  fee.''^  If  the  fee  is  in  the 
abutting  owner,  it  is  subject  to  all  legitimate  street  uses.  If 
it  is  in  the  public,  it  is  in  trust  for  street  uses,  and  is  subject  to 
certain  rights  or  easements  in  the  abutting  owner  which  cannot 


"Keasby  on  Electric  Wires,  pp. 
66,  67. 

""Distinctions  based  upon  the 
legal  ownership  of  the  fee  in  respect 
to  the  rights  of  the  abutting  pro- 
prietor have  produced  much  con- 
fusion, resulting  in  many  conflicting 
decisions;  but  the  true  principle, 
which  has  been  slowly  but  surely 
evolved  from  protracted  discussion 
and  experience,  is  that  in  respect  to 
the  use  of  the  soil  for  the  purposes 
of  a  street  (and  apart  from  those 
reversionary  or  other  rights  pecu- 
liar to  legal  ownership)  it  is  wholly 
immaterial  where  the  legal  title  re- 
sides. The  very  power  to  take  pri- 
vate property  for  public  use,  as  well 
as  the  capacity  ot  a  municipal  cor- 
poration to  acquire  it  in  any  way, 
necessarily  implies  that  it  is  to  be 
held  in  trust  for  public  purposes; 
and  in  the  case  of  land  acquired  for 
the  purposes  of  a  street  there  is 
something  in  the  nature  of  a  con- 


tract, under  which  two  co-existent 
and  inviolable  rights  are  created 
— one  belonging  to  the  public  to  use 
and  improve  the  street  for  the  ordi- 
nary purposes  of  a  street;  the  other, 
to  the  abutting  owner  to  have  ac- 
cess to  and  from  his  property,  and 
to  enjoy  such  use  of  the  street  as  is 
customary  and  reasonable.  If  the 
owner  voluntarily  dedicates  or 
grants  a  strip  of  land  to  a  city  for  a 
street  it  must  be  presumed  that  he 
does  so  in  consideration  of  the  con- 
templated benefits  accruing  to  his 
adjoining  property  by  reason  of  the 
strip  being  used  for  the  legitimate 
purposes  of  a  street  only.  If  the 
grant  be  made  upon  a  pecuniary 
consideration,  it  is  also  fair  to  as- 
sume that  in  estimating  the  amount 
to  be  paid  the  value  of  the  benefits 
above  mentioned  were  likewise  con- 
sidered." White  v.  Northwestern  N. 
C.  R.  R.  Co.,  113  N.  C.  610,  18  S.  E. 
330,  9  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  103, 


204  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    128 

be  impaired  by  any  diversion  of  the  street  to  other  uses.^* 
Whether,  therefore,  the  public  has  an  easement  only  or  the  fee, 
it  has  nothing  more  than  a  perpetual  right  to  use  the  land  for 
street  or  highway  purposes.  The  street  cannot  be  devoted  to 
other  uses  without  violating  the  rights  of  the  abutting  owners. 
What  are  legitimate  street  uses,  is  a  question  which  in  no  way 
depends  upon  the  fee.  It  necessarily  follows  from  what  has 
already  been  said,  that  the  abutting  owner's  right  to  compen- 
sation, in  case  of  any  particular  use  of  the  street,  depends  upon 
whether  the  use  is  within  the  purposes  for  which  highways 
and  streets  exist  and  are  established.  If  it  is,  then  the  abutting 
owners'  rights  are  subject  to  that  use  and  he  has  no  legal  cause 
for  complaint.  If  not,  then  the  use  is  a  perversion  of  the 
street,  a  violation  of  the  trust  and  authority  vested  in  the  public, 
and  an  unlawful  interference  with  the  property  rights  of  the 
abutting  owner,  for  which  he  may  have  the  appropriate  rem- 
edies. 

Undoubtedly  the  ownership  of  the  fee  would  make  a  differ- 
ence in  the  remedies  open  to  the  abutter  in  case  of  an  improper 
use  of  the  street.^"  But  the  right  to  compensation  and  the 
measure  of  damages  should,  in  equity  and  good  conscience,  be  the 
same  whether  the  fee  is  in  the  abutter  or  in  the  public,  and  this 
result  may  be  worked  out,  not  only  without  violence  to  legal  prin- 
ciples, but  in  harmony  with  them.  When  part  of  a  tract  or  prop- 
erty is  taken,  just  compensation  is  the  difference  in  value  before 
and  after  the  taking,  excluding  general  benefits.*^  Where  the 
abutter  owns  the  fee  of  a  street  and  it  is  used  for  some  purpose 
which  is  not  a  legitimate  street  use,  he  is  entitled  to  compensa- 
tion the  same  as  in  any  case  of  partial  taking.*^  Where  the 
fee  is  in  the  public,  the  abutter  has  easements  of  light,  air  and 
access  which  are  property.  To  take  or  impair  these  is  to  take 
a  part  of  the  property  in  the  abutting  lot,  as  much  so  as  to  take 
the  right  of  exclusion.  Logically,  there  is  a  partial  taking  of 
the  lot,  as  much  as  if  one  corner  of  it  was  cut  off,  and  the  same 
rule  of  compensation  may  be  applied,  as  in  the  former  case.*^ 

37  Am.  St.  Eep.  639,  22  L.R.A.  627.  8  ogee  chap,  xxviii. 

To  the  same  eflfect  Eels  v.  Am.  Tel.  Si-Fost,  §  693. 

&  Tel.  Co.,  143  N.  Y.  133,  38  N.  E.  szpost,  §  735. 

202,  10  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  69,  s^Post,  §  503, 

25  L.R.A.  640. 

"See   the    preceding    sections,   §§ 
119-126. 


§    129  EOADS    AND    STEEETS.  205 

It  seems  every  way  desirable  that  a  distinction,  which  is 
never  made  in  the  every  day  dealings  between  man  and  man, 
touching  abutting  property,  should  be  abandoned  by  the  courts. 
There  is  no  substantial  distinction  between  a  perpetual  ease- 
ment for  street  uses  and  a  fee  for  street  uses.  There  is  a  man- 
ifest injustice  in  awarding  compensation  to  one  man  for  a  rail- 
road in  a  street  or  other  similar  use,  and  denying  it  to  another, 
solely  on  a  distinction  which  is  so  purely  technical  and  unsub- 
stantial. And  so  of  any  distinction  in  the  elements  or  measure 
of  damages. 

11. — Steeet  Geade  Oases. 

§  129  (92).  Early  English  cases.  The  earliest  case  to 
recover  for  a  change  of  grade  is  that  of  Leader  v.  Moxon,  ^* 
decided  in  1773,  in  the  English  Court  of  Common  Pleas.  Cer- 
tain commissioners  were  authorized  by  act  of  parliament  "to 
pave,  repair,  sink  or  alter  certain  streets  in  such  manner  as  they 
should  think  fit."  Defendants,  acting  under  these  commission- 
ers, raised  the  grade  of  a  street  some  six  feet  in  front  of  plain- 
tiff's house,  intercepting  the  light  and  preventing  access  there- 
to. The  plaintiff  brought  suit  for  the  damages  so  occasioned  to 
his  premises,  and  the  action  was  sustained.  The  case  is  badly 
reported  and  the  ground  of  the  decision  is  hard  to  make  out. 
But  Gould,  J.,  is  reported  as  saying:  "Every  man  of  common 
sense  must  understand  that  this  act  of  parliament  ought  to  be 
carried  into  execution  without  doing  such  enormous  injury  to 
individuals  as  hath  been  manifestly  done  to  the  plaintiff  in  this 
case.  Whenever  a  trust  is  put  in  commissioners  by  act  of  parlia- 
ment, if  they  misdemean  themselves  in  that  trust,  they  are  an- 
swerable criminally  in  the  King's  Bench ;  if  they  aggrieve  and 
damnify  the  subject,  as  they  have  done  in  the  present  case,  they 
are  answerable  in  this  court,  civiliter  in  damages  to  the  party  in- 
jured.*" Blackstone,  J.,  says:  "I  am  of  the  same  opinion. 
*  *  *  I  think  the  commissioners  have  acted  arbitrarily  and 
tyrannically,  and  that  the  damages  are  too  small."  This  case, 
instead  of  becoming  an  authority,  was  speedily  overruled  and 
explained  away.  Twenty  years  later  Lord  Kenyon  laid  down 
the  law  in  the  case  of  The  Governor  and  Company  of  the  British 

843  Wils.  461,  2  Bl.  924.  "3  Wils.  467. 


206  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    130 

Cast  Plate  Manufacturers  v.  Meredith,*®  whicli  has  ever  since 
been  a  leading  case,  both  in  England  and  America.  Certain 
commissioners,  acting  under  and  in  accordance  with  an  act  of 
parliament,  raised  the  street  in  front  of  the  land  of  the  plaintiff 
"who  brought  suit  for  damages.  Lord  Kenyon  says:  "If  this 
action  could  be  maintained,  every  turnpike  act,  paving  act,  and 
navigation  act,  would  give  rise  to  an  infinity  of  actions.  If 
the  legislature  think  it  necessary,  as  they  do  in  many  cases, 
they  enable  the  commissioners  to  award  satisfaction  to  the  indi- 
viduals who  happen  to  suffer;  but  if  there  be  no  such  power, 
the  parties  are  without  remedy,  provided  the  commissioners 
do  not  exceed  their  jurisdiction.  *  *  *  Some  individuals 
suffer  an  inconvenience  under  all  these  acts  of  parliament;  but 
the  interests  of  the  individual  must  give  way  to  the  accommo- 
dation of  the  public."  His  Lordship  questioned  the  correct- 
ness of  the  report  of  Leader  v.  Moxon,  and  explained  it  on  the 
ground  that  the  commissioners  in  that  case  had  abused  their 
authority  and  acted  in  an  arbitrary  and  abusive  manner.*'^ 
The  principle  of  this  decision  is  that  no  action  will  lie  for  the 
doing  of  that  which  is  authorized  by  an  act  of  parliament; 
and  the  reason  is  that  an  act  of  parliament  is,  in  England,  the 
supreme  law  of  the  land.  The  same  principle  has  been  reiter- 
ated in  numerous  cases.®* 

§  130  (93).  Value  of  English  precedent  in  constitu- 
tional questions.  The  English  cases  to  which  we  have  re- 
ferred have  been  much  cited  in  America  to  show  that  the  owner 

"4  T.  R.  794,  1792.  authority  in  raising  the  pavement  so 

"Leader  v.  Moxon  has  been  simi-  as   to   obstruct   the   plaintiff's   win- 

larly  explained  in  other  cases.     In  dows."     So  Littledale  to   the   same 

Sutton  V.  Clark,  6  Taunton,  28,  1815,  effect. 

the    court,    referring    to    it,    says:  **Sutton  v.  Clark,  6  Taunton,  28; 

"The  court  thought  that  they    (the  1  E.  C.  L.  R.  493;  Jones  v.  Bird,  5 

commissioners    in    that   case)    were  B.  &  Aid.   837;    7   E.   C.  L.  R.  455; 

acting  in  a  most  tyrannical  and  op-  Hall  v.  Smith,  2  Bing.  156;  9  E.  C. 

pressive   manner,   and   that,   though  L.   524;    Boulton  v.   Crowther,   2  B. 

they  had  a  right  to  pave,  and  per-  &   C.   703;    9   E.   C.  L.  R.   306;   The 

haps   to   raise,   the   street,  they  had  King  v.  The  Bristol  Dock  Co.,  6  B. 

acted  so  arbitrarily,  that  they  were  &  C.  181.     In  Boulton  v.  Crowther, 

answerable."     Also    in    Boulton    v.  the  act  provided    for    compensation 

Crowther,  2  B.  &  C.  703,  708,  1824;  S.  for  property  taken,  and  it  was  insist- 

C.  9  E.  C.  L.  R.  306,  Bailey,  J.,  said:  ed  that  to  diminish  its  value  by  cut- 

"In   Leader   v.   Moxon   the   decision  ting   off   access,  etc.,   was   a  taking 

proceeded  upon  the  ground  that  the  within    the    act,    but    it    was    held 

commissioners   had     exceeded    their  otherwise. 


130 


EOADS    AND    STEEETS. 


207 


of  property  damaged  by  works  of  a  public  nature,  such  as  a 
change  of  grade,  cannot  recover  compensation  for  such  dam- 
age. But  it  is  evident  that  they  have  no  proper  application  in 
such  eases.  In  England,  as  we  have  said,  an  act  of  parliament 
is  the  supreme  law  of  the  land.  Courts  cannot  declare  that 
wrong  which  an  act  of  parliament  has  made  lawful.  In  all 
cases  of  damage  from  the  execution  of  public  works,  the  Eng- 
lish courts  have  simply  to  inquire  whether  the  works  were  au- 
thorized by  law  and  whether  they  have  been  executed  with  care 
and  skill.  If  so,  there  can  be  no  recovery  unless  a  remedy  is 
provided  by  the  act.  But  in  the  United  States  an  act  of  the 
legislature  may  be  no  justification  whatever.  The  legislature 
is  powerless  to  do  that  which  the  constitution  prohibits.  And, 
in  case  of  damages  caused  by  public  works,  it  is  necessary  in  this 
country  to  inquire,  not  only  whether  the  works  are  authorized 
by  law  and  have  been  carefully  executed,  but  also  whether 
the  damage  amounts  to  a  taking  of  property  within  the  meaning 
of  the  constitution.  In  solving  this  last  question  the  English 
cases  afford  us  no  aid,  or  practically  none.  This  distinction 
is  frequently  lost  sight  of,  and  we  wish  to  insist  upon  it  here, 
once  for  all.^® 


"This  distinction  is  pointed  out 
by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Ohio  in 
Crawford  v.  Village  of  Delaware,  7 
Ohio  St.  459,  466,  1857,  from  which 
we  quote  as  follows :  "The  power  of 
the  English  parliament  is  supreme. 
It  would  be  quite  as  absurd  for  Eng- 
lish courts  to  pronounce  an  act  of 
parliament,  adopted  by  the  three 
Estates  of  the  Realm,  unconstitu- 
tional, or  unauthorized,  as  for  this 
court  to  pronounce  a  provision  of 
the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  unconstitutional  and  void. 
'What  the  parliament  doeth,  no  au- 
thority on  earth  can  undo.'  An  au- 
thority, therefore,  derived  from  the 
supreme  power  of  the  State,  or,  in 
other  words,  operations  undertaken 
and  conducted  by  virtue  of  an  act  of 
parliament,  cannot  be  deemed  unau- 
thorized in  view  of  the  English  law, 
or  lay  any  foundation  for  a  common 
law  action  for  damages.    If,  indeed, 


the  supreme  power  of  a  State 
authorizes  and  directs  an  act  to  be 
done,  who  has  the  power  to  pro- 
nounce that  act  unlawful?  No  co- 
ordinate power  exists  to  control  it. 
The  grantee  of  a  franchise  or  a  pub- 
lic agent,  so  long  as  he  does  not 
transcend  the  authority  conferred 
upon  him  by  act  of  parliament,  in 
the  exercise  even  of  eminent  domain 
or  its  incidents,  represents  the  su- 
preme power  of  the  State;  and  just 
so  far  as  the  same  supreme  power 
has  provided  the  mode  and  means 
of  compensation  for  the  violation  of 
the  rights  of  private  property,  in 
the  exercise  of  eminent  domain  or 
its  incidents,  there  is  a  remedy;  but 
no  further.  It  is  true,  that  it  is  the 
duty  of  parliament,  and  one  which 
is  in  general  scrupulously  per- 
formed, to  provide  compensation  to 
individuals  who  are  deprived  of 
their  property,  for  the  public  use,  or 


208  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    131 

§  131  (94).  Leading  cases  in  the  United  States.  Cal- 
lendar  v.  Marsh.  The  leading  case  in  this  country  is  that 
of  Callendar  v.  Marsh,  decided  in  ISaS.""  The  defendant, 
acting  as  highway  surveyor  for  the  city  of  Boston,  cut  down  tlie 
street  in  front  of  plaintiffs  house  so  as  to  lay  hare  its  walls  and 
endanger  its  falling,  to  remedy  which  he  was  obliged  to  incur 
large  expense.  The  court  having  determined  that  the  work  was 
authorized  by  legislative  enactment,  proceeded  to  consider 
whether  the  plaintiff's  property  was  taJcen  within  the  meaning 
of  the  constitution,  and  whether  he  could  recover  upon  any 
ground.  This  question  they  solved  in  the  negative.  The  court 
held  this  provision  applied  only  to  property  actually  taken  and 
appropriated  by  the  government,  and  not  to  consequential  dam- 
ages; that  when  the  highway  was  established,  whether  by  con- 
demnation or  otherwise,  the  public  acquired  not  only  the  right 
to  pass  over  the  surface  in  the  state  it  was  in  when  first  made  a 
street,  but  also  the  right  to  repair  and  amend  the  street  in  such 
manner  as  the  public  needs  might  from  time  to  time  require ; 
that  the  liability  to  damages  by  such  alterations  was  a  proper 
subject  for  the  inquiry  of  those  who  laid  out  the  road,  or,  if  the 
title  was  acquired  by  purchase,  the  proprietor  might  claim  com- 
pensation not  only  for  the  land  taken,  but  for  such  damages,  and 
that  persons  purchasing  upon  a  street  after  the  lay-out,  were 
supposed  to  indemnify  themselves  against  loss  by  reason  of 
further  improvements  or  to  take  the  chance  of  such  improve- 
ments. The  court  also  says  that  the  same  principle  applied  as 
in  case  of  adjoining  proprietors.®^  This  case  has  had  an  im- 
portant influence  in  moulding  the  law  of  this  country. 

§  132  (95).  Other  early  cases.  A  few  years  after  the 
decision  in  Callendar  v.  Marsh,  the  same  question  arose  in  Ten- 
nessee and  Kentucky,  and  was  decided  in  the  same  way,  though 
without  reference  to  the  case  from  Massachusetts.     In  both 

who  are  injuriously  affected  by  the  for  damages  occasioned  by  the  con- 
erection  of  public  works.  But  there  struction  of  a  public  work,  any  fur- 
is  no  power  over  parliament  to  en-  ther  than  is  specially  provided  for 
force  this  duty,  or  to  create  a  liabil-  by  the  law  itself,  do  not  simply  de- 
ity, beyond  what  parliament  specifi-  cide  a  principle  of  municipal  law, 
cally  recognizes  and  provides.  Hence  but  announce  a  constitutional  prin- 
the  English  courts,  in  holding  that  ciple,  inseparable  from  a  recognition 
an  action  against  commissioners  of  of  the  fiat  of  the  supreme  power  of 
streets  or  municipal  officers  or  their  State." 
agents,  acting  under  the  authority  soi  Pick.  417,  430. 
of  an  act  of  parliament,  will  not  lie  "On   this   point   the   court   says: 


§  132 


EOADS    AND    STREETS. 


209 


the  former  States,  the  law  applicable  to  adjoining  proprietors 
was  made  the  basis  of  the  rule  laid  down.®^  The  question  was 
disposed  of  in  a  summary  way  in  an  early  case  in  Pennsylvania 
by  a  reference  to  the  English  cases,  and  a  sweeping  assertion 
that  the  defendant  corporation  had  the  power  and  could  not  be 
made  responsible  for  mere  consequential  injury.®^ 

The  question  was  elaborately  considered  by  the  New  York 
Court  of  Appeals  in  Eadcliff's  Executors  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of 
Brooklyn,  in  1850.^*  The  street  was  cut  down  in  front  of 
plaintiff's  premises  so  that  his  soil,  shrubbery,  fences,  etc.,  fell 
into  the  street,  and  he  was  put  to  great  expense  in  restoring  his 
premises  and  adapting  them  to  the  new  grade.  The  case  was 
said  "to  fall  within  the  principle  that  a  man  may  enjoy  his 
land  in  the  way  such  property  is  usually  enjoyed,  without  being 
answerable  for  the  indirect  or  consequential  damages  which 


"The  streets  on  which  the  plaintiflF's 
house  stands  had  become  public 
property  by  the  act  of  laying  them 
out  conformably  to  law,  and  the 
value  of  the  land  taken  must  have 
been  either  paid  for,  or  given  to  the 
public,  at  the  time,  or  the  street 
could  not  have  been  legally  estab- 
lished. Being  legally  established, 
although  the  right  or  title  in  the 
soil  remained  in  him  from  whom  the 
use  was  taken,  yet  the  public 
acquired  the  right,  not  only  to  pass 
over  the  surface  in  the  state  it  was 
in  when  iirst  made  a  street,  but  the 
right  also  to  repair  and  amend  the 
street,  and,  for  this  purpose,  to  dig 
down  and  remove  the  soil  sufficie  itly 
to  make  the  passage  safe  and  con- 
venient. Those  who  purchase  house 
lots  bordering  upon  streets  are  sup- 
posed to  calculate  the  chance  of  such 
elevations  and  reductions  as  the  in- 
creasing population  of  the  city  may 
require,  in  order  to  render  the  pas- 
sage to  and  from  the  several  parts 
of  it  safe  and  convenient,  and,  as 
their  purchase  is  always  voluntary, 
they  may  indemnify  themselves  in 
the  price  of  the  lot  which  they  buy, 
or  take  the  chance  of  future  im- 
Em.  D.—U. 


provements,  as  they  shall  see  fit. 
The  standing  laws  of  the  land  giving 
to  surveyors  the  power  to  make 
these  improvements,  every  one  who 
purchases  a  lot  upon  the  summit  or 
on  the  decline  of  a  hill,  is  presumed 
to  foresee  the  changes  which  public 
necessity  or  convenience  may  re- 
quire, and  may  avoid  or  provide 
against  a  loss."  And  again,  "We  can 
perceive  no  difference  in  the  prin- 
_  ciple  on  which  this  action  is  found- 
ed, and  that  which  was  involved  in 
the  case  of  Thurston  v.  Hancock,  12 
Mass.  220."  The  latter  is  a  leading 
case  as  to  the  rights  of  adjoining 
proprietors,  in  which  the  rule  is  laid 
down  that  if  a  man  does  what  he 
has  a  right  to  do  on  his  own  land, 
without  trespassing  upon  any  law, 
custom,  title  or  possession,  he  is  not 
liable  for  injurious  consequences 
which  may  result,  unless  he  acts  ma- 
liciously. 

"Keasy  v.  City  of  Louisville,  4 
Dana,  Ky.  154,  29  Am.  Dec.  395, 
1836;  Humes  v.  Mayor  etc.  of  Knox- 
ville,  1  Humph.  403,  1839. 

"Green  v.  Borough  of  Reading,  9 
Watts,  382. 

"i  N.  Y.  195,  203,  53  Am.  Deo.  357. 


210  EMINEI^T    DOMAIIT.  §    133 

may  be  sustained  by  an  adjoining  land  owner."  "In  leveling 
and  grading  the  street,"  says  the  court,  "they  (the  defendants) 
were  at  work  on  their  own  land,  doing  a  lawful  act  for  a  lawful 
purpose."  The  conclusion  follows  that  they  could  not  be  liable, 
for  no  person  is  responsible  for  the  consequences  of  a  lawful  act 
done  upon  his  own  property.  It  was  also  held  upon  authority 
and  upon  principle  that  the  damages  complained  of  were  not 
a  taking  within  the  constitution,  and  consequently  that  the  laws 
authorizing  the  acts  which  produced  the  injuries  were  valid  and 
a  complete  justification.  "If  the  statute  under  which  the  de- 
fendants acted  is  constitutional,  it  is  settled  that  they  are  not 
answerable  to  third  persons,  whatever  damage  they  may  have 
suffered.  Indeed,  it  is  absurd  to  say,  that  public  officers  may 
be  liable  to  an  action  for  what  they  have  done  under  lawful 
authority,  and  in  a  proper  manner."  "^ 

This  case,  with  that  of  Callendar  v.  Marsh,  ante,  may  be  con- 
sidered as  having  settled  the  law  of  this  country  as  respects 
claims  for  damages  caused  by  elevating  or  depressing  the  grade 
of  streets.  Many  cases  in  other  States  have  been  disposed  of 
by  a  simple  reference  to  these  two  authorities. 

§  133  (95).  The  general  doctrine.  In  conformity  with 
the  foregoing  cases,  it  has  been  held  in  nearly  every  State  in 
the  Union,  that  there  can  be  no  recovery  for  damages  to  abutting 
property  resulting  from  a  mere  change  of  grade  in  the  street 
in  front  of  it,  there  being  no  physical  injury  to  the  property 
itself,  and  the  change  being  authorized  by  law.^" 

"The  same  court,  in  Cogswell  v.  10  So.  457,  29  Am.  St.  Rep.  278,  14 

New  York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford  L.R.A.  370;  Bowdeu  v.  Jacksonville, 

R.  R.  Co.,  103  N.  Y.  10,  57  Am.  Rep.  52  Fla.  216,  42  So.  394;  Markham  v. 

701,  in  reference  to  Radcliff's  case,  Atlanta,  23  Ga.  402;  Mayor  etc.  of 

says:     "The     case    carries     to     the  Macon  v.  Hill,  58  Ga.  595;  Fuller  v. 

utmost  limit  the  right  of  the  legis-  Atlanta,  66  Ga.  80;  Roberts  v.  Chi- 

lature,  for  public  reasons,  to  inter-  cago,  26  111.  249 ;  Murphy  v.  Chicago, 

fere  with  private  property  to  the  in-  29  111.  279,  81  Am.  Dec.  307 ;  City  of 

jury  of  the  owner  without  making  Quincy  v.  Jones,  76  111.  231 ;  Snyder 

compensation."  v.  Rockport,  6  Ind.  237 ;  La  Fayette 

''Simmons  v.  City  of  Camden,  26  v.  Spencer,  14  Ind.  399;  Macy  v.  In- 

Ark.  276;  Burritt  v.  New  Haven,  42  dianapolis,  17  Ind.  267;  La  Fayette 

Conn.   174;   Durand  v.  Ansonia,  57  v.  Spencer,  19  Ind.  326;  Columbus  v. 

Conn.   70,   17  Atl.  283;    District  of  Storey,  33  Ind.  195;  Terre  Haute  v. 

Columbia  v.  Atchison,  31  App.  Cas.  Turner,  36  Ind.  522;  Kokomo  v.  Ma- 

D.  C.  250;  Dorman  v.  Jacksonville,  han,  100  Ind.  242;  North  Vernon  v. 

13  Fla.  538,  7  Am.  Rep.  253;  Selden  Voegler,  103  Ind.  314;  Rensselaer  v. 

V.  City  of  Jacksonville,  28  Fla.  558,  Leopold,  106  Ind.  29;  Valparaiso  v. 


§  134 


BOADS    AliTD    STEEETS. 


211 


§  134  (97).  Ratio  decidendi  of  these  cases.  An  exam- 
ination of  the  cases  cited  in  the  last  section  shows  that,  so  far 
as  the  courts  have  attempted  to  reason  out  their  decisions,  their 
conclusions  have  been  made  to  rest  upon  one  or  more  of  the 
following  grounds : 

First.  That,  when  a  street  or  highway  is  laid  out,  compen- 
sation is  given  once  for  all,  not  only  for  the  land  taken,  but 


Spaeth,  166  Ind.  14,  76  N.  E.  514; 
Baker  v.  Shoals,  6  Ind.  App.  319,  33 
N.  E.  664;  Creal  v.  Keokuk,  4  G. 
Greene  (la.),  47;  Freeland  v.  City 
of  Muscatine,  9  la.  461 ;  Cole  v. 
Same,  14  la.  296 ;  Ellis  v.  Iowa  City, 
29  la.  229;  Russell  v.  City  of  Bur- 
lington, 30  la.  262;  City  of  Burling- 
ton V.  Gilbert,  31  la.  356 ;  Reilly  v. 
Ft.  Dodge,  118  la.  633,  92  N.  W.  887; 
Wilbur  T.  Ft.  Dodge,  120  la.  555,  95 
N.  W.  186;  Mathodist  Episcopal 
Church  V.  Wyandotte,  31  Kan.  721; 
Interstate  Consol.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Early, 
46  Kan.  197,  26  Pac.  422;  Atchison 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Arnold,  52  Kan.  729, 
35  Pac.  780;  Keasy  v.  City  of 
Louisville,  4  Dana  (Ky.)  154,  29 
Am.  Dec.  395;  Newport  &  Cincinnati 
Bridge  Co.  v.  Foote,  9  Bush  (Ky.) 
264;  Reynolds  v.  Shreveport,  13  La. 
An.  426;  Briggs  v.  Lewiston  &  Au- 
burn Horse  R.  R.  Co.,  79  Me.  363,  1 
Am.  St.  Rep.  316;  Peddicord  v.  Bal- 
timore etc.  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  34  Md.  463 ; 
Guest  V.  Church  Hill,  90  Md.  689,  45 
Atl.  882;  De  Lander  v.  Baltimore 
Co.,  94  Md.  1,  50  Atl.  427;  Callendar 
V.  Marsh,  1  Pick.  418;  Underwood  v. 
Worcester,  177  Mass.  173,  58  N.  E. 
589 ;  Hyde  v.  Boston  etc.  St.  Ry  Co., 
194  Mass.  80,  80  N.  E.  517;  Pontiac 
V.  Carter,  32  Mich.  164;  Schneider  v. 
Detroit,  72  Mich.  240,  40  N.  W.  329, 
2  L.R.A.  54;  Cummings  v.  Dixon,  139 
Mich.  269,  102  N.  W.  751;  Lee  v. 
City  of  Minneapolis,  22  Minn.  13; 
Henderson  v.  Minneapolis,  32  Minn. 
319;  Genois  v.  St.  Paul,  35  Minn. 
330;  Rakowsky  v.  City  of  Duluth,  44 
Minn.  188,  46  N.  W.  338;  Robinson 


V.  Great  Northern  R.  R.  Co.,  48 
Minn.  445,  51  N.  W.  384;  Yanish  v. 
City  of  St.  Paul,  50  Minn.  518,  52 
N.  W.  925;  St.  Louis  v.  Gurno,  12 
Mo.  414;  Taylor  v.  St.  Louis,  14  Mo. 
20,  55  Am.  Dec.  89;  Hoffman  v.  St. 
Louis,  15  Mo.  051;  Shattner  v.  City 
of  Kansas,  53  Mo.  162;  Nebraska 
City  V.  Lampkin,  6  Neb.  27,  1877; 
Burden  v.  Nashua,  17  N.  H.  477, 
1845 ;  Healey  v.  New  Haven,  47  N.  H. 
305;  Plum  v.  Morris  Canal  Co.,  10 
N.  J.  Eq.  256;  Fish  v.  Mayor  etc.  of 
Rochester,  6  Paige  268;  Graves  v. 
Otis,  2  Hill  466;  Waddell  v.  Mayor 
etc.  of  New  York,  8  Barb.  95;  Rad- 
cliflf's  Executors  v.  Mayor  etc.  of 
Brooldyn,  4  N.  Y.  195;  Conklin  v. 
New  York  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  102  N.  Y. 
107;  Sauer  v.  New  York,  180  N.  Y. 
27,  72  N.  E.  579,  70  L.R.A.  717,  af- 
firming S.  C.  90  App.  Div.  36,  85  N. 
Y.  S.  636;  Smith  v.  Boston  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  181  N.  Y.  132,  73  N.  E.  679,  af- 
firming S.  C.  99  App.  Div.  94,  91  N. 
Y.  S.  412;  Hosmer  v.  Gloversville,  27 
Misc.  669;  McCarthy  v.  Far  Rock- 
away,  3  App.  Div.  379,  38  N.  Y. 
Supp.  989 ;  Smith  v.  White  Plains,  67 
Hun  81,  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  450;  Wolfe 
V.  Pieraon,  114  N.  G.  627,  19  S.  E. 
264;  Brand  v.  Multnomah  Co.,  38 
Ore.  79,  60  Pac.  390,  62  Pac.  209,  84 
Am.  St.  Rep.  772,  50  L.R.A.  389; 
Green  v.  Borough  of  Reading,  9 
Watts,  382;  Henry  v.  Pittsburgh  & 
Allegheny  Bridge  Co.,  8  W.  &  S.  85; 
O'Connor  v.  Pittsburgh,  18  Pa.  St. 
187;  In  re  Ridge  Street,  29  Pa.  St. 
391 ;  City  of  Reading  v.  Keppleman,61 
Pa.  St.  233 ;  Smith  v.  Chiltenham,  35 


212 


EMINENT    DOMAIIT. 


§  134 


for  damages  •which  may  at  any  time  be  occasioned  hy  adapting 
the  surface  of  the  street  to  the  public  needs.  ^'^ 

Second.  That  the  public,  as  proprietors  of  the  street,  stand 
in  the  same  relation  to  the  abutting  lot  owners  as  an  individual 
would  who  owned  the  strip  of  land  constituting  the  street,  and 
that  their  rights,  duties  and  liabilities  are  determined  by  the 
same  rules  as  apply  to  adjoining  proprietors  of  land.®* 


Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  507;  Rounds  v.  Mum- 
ford,  2  R.  I.  154;  Gerhard  v.  See- 
konk  Riv.  Bridge,  15  R.  I.  334,  5  Atl. 
199;  Sullivan  V.  Webster,  16R.  I.  33, 
11  Atl.  771;  O'Donnell  v.  White,  24 
R.  I.  483,  53  Atl.  633;  Garraux  v. 
Greenville,  53  S.  C.  575,  31  S.  E.  597; 
Braralett  v.  Laurens,  58  S.  C.  60,  36 
S.  E.  444;  Kendall  v.  Columbia,  74 
S.  C.  539,  54  S.  E.  777;  Humes  v. 
Mayor  etc.  of  Knoxville,  1  Humph. 
(Tenn.)  403;  Penniman  v.  St.  Johns- 
bury,  54  Vt.  306;  Smith  v.  City 
Council  of  Alexandria,  33  Gratt. 
208;  Kehrer  v.  Richmond  City,  81 
Va.  745;  Home  Bldg.  Co.  v.  City  of 
Roanoke,  91  Va.  52,  20  S.  E.  895,  27 
L.R.A.  551 ;  Harrisburg  v.  Roller,  97 
Va.  582,  34  S.  E.  523 ;  Brown  v.  City 
of  Seattle,  5  Wash.  35,  31  Pac.  313, 
7  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  64 ;  Smith 
V.  Eau  Claire,  78  Wis.  487,  47  N.  W. 
830;  Walsh  v.  Milwaukee,  95  Wis. 
16;  McCuUough  v.  Campbellsport, 
123  Wis.  334,  101  N.  W.  709;  Gosz- 
ler  v.  Georgetown,  6  Wheat.  593, 
1821 ;  Smith  v.  Corporation  of  Wash- 
ington, 20  How.  135,  1857;  Transpor- 
tation Co.  V.  Chicago,  99  U.  S.  035; 
Regina  v.  Perth,  14  L.  R.  Q.  B.  15/3. 
"'Callendar  v.  Marsh,  1  Pick.  418 ; 
Skinner  v.  Hartford  Bridge  Co.,  29 
Conn.  523;  Rounds  v.  Mumford,  2 
R.  I.  154;  Fellows  v.  City  of  New 
Haven,  44  Conn.  240,  26  Am.  Rep. 
447;  City  of  Pontiac  v.  Carter,  32 
Mich.  164,'  172.  In  the  latter  case 
the  court,  per  Cooley,  J.,  says:  "The 
injury  in  all  these  cases  is  incidental 
to  an  exercise  of  public  authority, 
which  in  itself  must  be  assumed  to 
be   proper,  because   it  is   had  by   a 


public  body  acting  within  its  juris- 
diction, and  not  charged  with  malice 
or  'want  of  good  faith.  It  must, 
therefore,  be  regarded  as  an  injury 
that  every  citizen  must  contemplate 
as  one  that,  with  more  or  less  likeli- 
hood, might  happen.  When  the  land 
was  taken  for  a  street,  if  damages 
were  assessed,  they  would  cover  this 
possible  injury,  and  it  could  never  be 
known  subsequently  that  the  jury,  in 
estimating  them,  did  not  calculate 
upon  a  change  in  the  grade  of  the 
proposed  street  as  probable,  and  at- 
tach considerable  importance  to  it  in 
their  estimate.  It  is  matter  of  com- 
mon observation,  that  much  beyond 
the  value  of  land  taken  is  sometimes 
given  in  these  cases;  not  because  of 
any  present  injury,  but  because  con- 
tingencies cannot  be  fully  foreseen. 
And  the  rule  in  such  cases  is,  that 
all  possible  damages  are  covered  by 
the  award,  except  such  as  may  re- 
sult from  an  improper  or  negligent 
construction  of  the  public  work,  or 
from  an  excess  of  authority  in  con- 
structing it.  In  other  words,  the 
award  covers  all  damages  resulting 
from  the  doing  in  a,  proper  manner 
whatever  the  public  authorities  have 
the  right  to  do ;  but  it  does  not  cover 
injuries  from  negligence  or  from 
trespasses.  And  one  who  gives  his 
land  for  the  purpose  of  a  public  way 
is  supposed  to  contemplate  all  the 
same  contingencies,  and  to  make  the 
gift  on  the  supposition  that  the  in- 
cidental benefits  will  equal  or  exceed 
all  possible  incidental  injuries." 

"'Callendar  v.  Marsh,  1  Pick.  418; 
Radcliff  V.  Mayor  etc.  of  Brooklyn, 


§  135  STREETS  AND  EOADS.  213 

Third.  That  this  species  of  damages  is  not  a  taking  within 
the  meaning  of  the  constitution,  and,  consequently,  if  the  works 
occasioning  the  damage  are  authorized  by  law,  no  action  will 
lie.^®     We  shall  advert  to  these  principles  further  on.^ 

§  135  (98).  The  Ohio  cases.  The  decisions  in  Ohio  are 
exceptional.  The  first  cases  went  up  on  a  demurrer  to  the 
declaration.  In  Goodloe  v.  Cincinnati,^  the  suit  was  for  dam- 
ages caused  to  plaintiff's  property  by  cutting  down  a  street,  and 
the  declaration  alleged  that  it  was  done  illegally  and  maliciously. 
In  Smith  v.  Cincinnati,^  the  facts  were  the  same,  except  that  the 
acts  were  only  charged  to  have  been  done  illegally.  In  both 
cases  a  demurrer  to  the  declaration  was  overruled,  and  in  both 
cases  there  were  afterwards  trials  and  judgments  for  the  plain- 
tiff in  the  court  below  upon  the  general  issue.  These  demurrers 
would  not  have  been  decided  differently,  probably,  in  any  other 
State.*  In  Scovil  v.  Geddings,"  the  defendants,  by  authority 
of  the  trustees  of  Cleveland,  lowered  the  street  in  front  of  plain- 
tiff's property,  and  the  suit  was  for  damages  thereby  occasioned. 
The  court  held  that  such  damages  were  not  a  taking  within  the 
constitution,  and  that  the  action  would  not  lie.  The  leading 
case  of  Callendar  v.  Marsh  was  cited  with  approval.  This  case 
is  explained  or  reconciled  in  the  later  decisions  by  distinguishing 
between  the  corporate  authorities  and  their  agents,  holding  that 
the  latter  would  not  in  any  event  be  i^ersonally  liable  for  doing 
that,  as  agents 'of  the  corporation,  which  the  corporation  had 
power  to  do.®  This,  however,  would  be  contrary  to  the  general 
rule  that  in  actions  ex  delicto  agents  and  principals  are  alike 
responsible. 

The  question  of  the  liability  of  the  corporation  was  presented 
to  the  court  in  a  case  which  went  up  shortly  after  from  the 

4  N.  Y.  195;  Quiney  v.  Jones,  76  Ills.  Radeliflf  v.  Brooklyn,  4  N.  Y.  195; 

231;  Waddell  v.  Mayor  etc.  of   New  Wilson  v.  New  York,  1  Denio  595; 

York,  8  Barb.  95;  Humes  v.  Mayor  Reynolds  v.  Shreeveport,  13  La.  An. 

etc.   of   Knoxville,    1    Humph.    403;  426;   City  of  Pontiac  v.  Carter,  32 

Simmons  v.  City  of  Camden,  26  Ark.  Mich.   164. 

276;  Smith  v.  Corporation  of  Wash-  lAnie,  §§  120-128. 

ington,  20  How.   135.     The  analogy  24  Ohio  500,  1831,  22  Am.  Dec.  764. 

is  expressly  denied  in  some   cases:  84  Ohio  515,  1831. 

Fellows  V.  New  Haven,  44  Conn.  240,  iPost,  §  143. 

253;   Goodall  v.  Milwaukee,  5  Wis.  '  7  Ohio,  Pt.  2,  211,  1836. 

32.  'See  Crawford  v.  Village  of  Dela- 

"Callendar  v.  Marsh,  1  Pick.  418;  ware,  7  Ohio  St.  459. 
Maoy  V.  Indianapolis,  17  Ind.  267; 


214:  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    135 

same  city/  and  It  was  again  held  that  such,  damages  did  not 
constitute  a  taking  or  give  any  right  of  action,  and  Callendar 
y.  Marsh  and  Seovil  v.  Geddings  are  cited  with  approbation. 
In  both  these  cases  in  the  Yth  and  8th  Ohio  it  appears  that  a 
statute  gave  a  remedy  in  such  cases,  but  the  decisions,  unless 
possibly  the  latter,  are  not  put  upon  the  ground  that  the  statu- 
tory remedy  was  exclusive.  It  remained  for  the  court  to  dis- 
cover, in  a  later  case,  that  this  was  the  ground  of  decision  in 
those  cases.  ^ 

In  Rhodes  v.  Cleveland,®  it  appeared  that  the  city  cut  ditches 
and  water  courses  along  the  streets  in  such  a  manner  as  to  cause 
water  to  flow  upon  and  wash  away  the  plaintiff's  land.  The 
defendant  was  held  liable,  but  not  upon  any  very  tangible 
grounds.  The  decision  was  not  based  upon  constitutional  right, 
but  rather  upon  natural  equity  and  the  maxim  sic  utere  tuo  ut 
alienum  non  lcBdas.^°  This  case  is  the  starting  point  of  the 
peculiar  doctrine  of  the  Ohio  court,  but  it  is  to  be  observed  that 
it  was  not  for  damages  caused  by  a  change  of  grade,  but  by  a 
physical  invasion  of  the  property,  and  belongs  to  a  class  in  which 
a  recovery  has  been  allowed  in  many  other  States.  ■'^'^  The  next 
case  is  that  of  McGomb  v.  Town  of  Akron,  ^^  which  was  twice  in 

'Hickox  V.  Cleveland,  8  Ohio  543,  other,  the  same  principle  of  ethics 
1838.  demands  of  them  to  repair  it  and 
siO  Ohio  159,  1840.  no  reason  occurs  to  the  court,  why 
910  Ohio  159,  1840.  the  same  remedy  should  not  be  ap- 
"The  court  says:  "Upon  the  plied,  to  compel  justice  from  them." 
whole,  then,  we  believe  that  justice  The  fault  with  this  reasoning  is, 
and  good  morals  require  that  a  cor-  first,  that  courts  do  not  administer 
poration  should  repair  a,  consequen-  law  upon  ethical  principles,  and,  sec- 
tial  injury,  which  ensues  from  the  ond,  that  individuals  cannot  com- 
exercise  of  its  functions,  and  that  if  mit  injuries  in  the  proper  exercise 
we  go  further  than  adjudicated  of  their  lawful  powers.  An  injury 
cases  have  yet  gone,  we  do  not  is  the  violation  of  a  legal  right,  and 
transcend  the  line,  to  which  we  are  lawful  power  in  one  to  violate  the 
conducted  by  acknowledged  princi-  legal  right  of  another  is  an  absurd- 
pies.  *  *  »  That  the  rights  of  ity,  a  contradiction  in  terms.  Of 
one  should  be  so  used,  as  not  to  ira-  course  a  person  may  exercise  law- 
pair  the  rights  of  another,  is  a  prin-  ful  powers  with  negligence  and  so 
ciple  of  morals,  which  from  very  re-  render  himself  liable,  but  then  the 
mote  ages  has  been  recognized  as  a  liability  is  based  upon  the  negli- 
maxim  of  law.  If  an  individual,  ex-  gence  and  not  on  the  exercise  of  the 
ercising  his  lawful  powers,  commit  powers, 
an  injury,  the  action  on  the  case  is  ''^''-Post,  §  141. 
the  familiar  remedy;  if  a  corpora-  1215  Ohio  474,  1846;  Town  of  Ak- 
tion,  acting  within  the  scope  of  its  ron  v.  McComb,  18  Ohio  229,  51  Am. 
authority,  should  work  wrong  to  an-  Dec.  453,  1849. 


§  135  EOADS  AND  STREETS.  215 

the  Supreme  Court.  McCorab  had  erected  a  store  upon  his  lot 
and  adjusted  it  to  the  grade  of  Howard  street,  upon  which  his 
lot  abutted.  There  was  at  this  time,  however,  no  established 
grade.  Afterwards  the  town  lowered  the  grade,  in  consequence 
of  which  the  value  of  the  plaintiil's  property  was  greatly  depre- 
ciated, though  it  was  not  otherwise  damaged.  The  corporation 
was  held  liable  "to  the  extent  of  the  real  and  substantial  injury 
done  to  the  plaintiff's  property  by  its  act  of  leveling  the  street." 
The  decision  appears  to  rest  upon  the  broad  ground  of  natural 
right  and  justice.  Thus  the  court  say:  "If  a  municipal  cor- 
poration, for  the  good  of  all  within  its  limits,  see  proper  to  cut 
down  a  street,  it  is  nothing  more  than  right  that  an  injury  there 
done  to  a  single  individual  should  be  shared  by  all."  ^*  In 
all  these  cases  the  question  whether  a  corporation  can  be  made 
liable  in  an  action  of  tort  is  much  discussed,  with  an  implication 
that  if  that  question  is  answered  in  the  affirmative  its  liability 
in  this  class  of  cases  would  necessarily  follow.''* 

The  unsatisfactory  nature  of  these  decisions  seems  to  have 
impressed  itself  upon  the  Ohio  court,  and,  when  the  question 
next  comes  up  for  decision,  we  find  them  making  a  careful 
review  of  all  the  prior  cases;  and,  although  their  results  are 
approved  and  adhered  to,  the  loose  grounds  upon  which  they 
rest  are  tacitly  abandoned  and  their  doctrine  established  upon  a 
new  basis.  The  case  referred  to  is  that  of  Crawford  v.  Village 
of  Delaware.  ■'^  In  that  case,  the  plaintiff  had  built  a  house 
upon  his  lot,  with  reference  to  the  grade  of  the  adjacent  street 
as  it  then  existed.  Afterwards  the  defendant  established  a 
grade  for  the  street  some  six  feet  below  the  natural  surface,  and 

"15  Ohio,  p.  480.  would  not  have  been  liable,  the  de- 
"Bronson,  C.  J.,  of  the  New  York  cision  is  entitled  to  no  respect  what- 
Court  of  Appeals,  referring  to  Mo-  ever.  If  the  court  intended  to  hold. 
Comb  V.  Akron,  15  Ohio  474,  says:  that  persons,  whether  artificial  or 
"If  the  case  goes  on  the  ground  that  natural,  were  answerable  for  the 
the  corporation,  thougli  it  had  am-  damages  which  might  result  to  an 
pie  authority  to  grade  the  street,  did  adjoining  landowner  from  the  grad- 
it  in  an  illegal  and  improper  man-  ing  of  the  street,  though  the  act  was 
ner,  and  thereby  caused  an  injury  to  done  under  ample  authority,  and  in 
the  plaintiff's  property,  the  decision  a  proper  manner,  the  case  is  in  con- 
is  well  enough.  But  if  the  doctrine  fiict  with  many  decisions,  and  can- 
of  the  case  be,  that  the  corporation  not  be  law  beyond  the  State  of 
was  answerable,  because  it  was  a  Ohio."  Radcliff  v.  Mayor  etc.  of 
corporation,  and  when  a  natural  per-  Brooklyn,  4  N.  Y.  195,  205,  1850. 
son,  acting  under  the  like  authority,  "7  Ohio  St.  459,  1857. 


216  EMINENT   DOMAIN.  §    135 

made  the  necessary  excavation  opposite  the  plaintiff's  premises. 
The  court  instructed  the  jury,  among  other  things,  "that  when 
such  corporation  neglects  to  fix  any  grade,  and  none  is  estab- 
lished for  a  street,  and  the  owner  of  a  lot  builds  upon  and  im- 
proves his  lot  in  reference  to  the  then  existing  state  of  the  road 
or  street  used  in  front  of  his  lot,  and  uses  ordinary  discretion 
and  judgment  in  making  his  improvements,  having  reference 
to  the  probable  future  improvements  of  the  town,  and  with 
reference  also  to  the  right  possessed  by  the  corporate  authorities 
to  make  a  reasonable  and  proper  grade  of  such  street,  and  he  is 
afterwards  injured  by  the  making  of  such  grade,  he  is  entitled 
to  recover  for  actual  damages  he  may  sustain,  even  though  the 
grade  so  afterward  made  may  be  a  reasonable  and  proper  one. 
But  if  he  so  locates  his  house  without  such  reasonable  reference 
to  future  reasonable  and  proper  improvements  of  the  streets 
adjoining  his  lot,  and  without  such  exercise  of  discretion  and 
judgment,  and  the  town  afterwards  makes  such  reasonable  and 
proper  grade,  and  he  is  thereby  injured,  he  cannot  recover  for 
such  injury.  That  in  ascertaining  whether  such  act  of  the  de- 
fendant in  making  the  improvement,  was  a  just  and  reasonable 
exercise  of  its  authority  to  improve  the  street,  the  jury  are 
authorized  to  take  into  consideration  any  evidence  showing  that 
it  was  the  first  improvement  and  the  first  grading  of  the  street, 
also  showing  the  inequality  of  the  ground,  and  that  the  plain- 
tiff's property  was  so  situated  in  relation  to  it,  as  that  the  grade 
and  improvements  should  have  been  reasonably  anticipated  by 
the  plaintiff;  and  where  such  grade  and  improvements  could 
have  been  thus  anticipated  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  discretion 
and  judgment,  the  plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to  damages  for  the 
making  of  such  reasonable  and  proper  grade  and  improvement." 
There  was  conflicting  evidence  upon  the  points  submitted  by  the 
instructions;  the  jury  appear  to  have  found  for  the  defendant, 
and  judgment  on  the  verdict  was  afiirmed.-^®  The  right  to 
recover  at  all  in  such  cases  is  based  upon  the  ground  that  an 
abutting  owner's  right  to  the  use  of  a  street  is  itself  property 
which  cannot  be  taken  without  compensation.-'''  The  court 
then  go  on  to  lay  down  the  following  propositions : 

"We   say  "appear  to  have  found  favor  which  he  sought  to  have  set 

for  the  defendant,"  because  it  is  a  aside. 

matter     of     inference     only.      The  "Thus  the  court:    "Distinct  from 

plaintiff  toolc  the  case  up.    It  may  be  the   right   of    the    public   to   use   a 

the  jury  found  a  small  verditet  in  his  street,  is  the  right  and  interests  of 


§  135  EOADS  AND  STEEETS.  217 

First.  That  the  owner  of  an  unimproved  lot  cannot  recover 
for  filling,  ditching  or  cutting  down  a  street,  for  he  is  presumed 
to  purchase  the  lot  with  a  view  to  the  future  improvement  of 
the  street  in  such  reasonable  manner  as  the  public  authorities 
may  deem  expedient. 

Second.  That  the  owner  of  a  lot  upon  a  street,  the  grade  of 
which  has  not  been  established,  must  use  reasonable  care  and 
judgment  in  making  his  improvements,  with  reference  to  the 
right  possessed  by  the  corporation  to  make  a  reasonable  and 
proper  grade. 

Third.  That  when  the  owner  of  a  lot  makes  improvements 
with  reasonable  care  and  judgment,  in  view  of  the  right  of  the 
corporation  to  make  a  reasonable  and  proper  grade,  or  makes 
improvements  with  reference  to  a  grade  already  established,  and 
a  change  is  afterwards  made  in  the  street  which  interferes  with 
the  access  to  his  improvements  from  the  street,  he  is  entitled  to 
recover  damages. 

"It  is,"  says  the  court,  "as  positive  and  substantial  an  injury 
to  private  property,  and  as  direct  an  invasion  of  private  right, 
incident  to  a  lot,  as  if  the  erections  upon  the  lot  were  taken  for 
public  use.  It  comes  not  within  the  letter,  but  manifestly  with- 
in the  spirit,  of  the  constitution,  which  requires  compensation 
for  property  taken  for  public  use." 

In  Jackson  v.  Jackson,-'*  the  ground  of  recovery  in  such  cases 
is  still  more  explicitly  stated.  A  township  road  ran  through 
the  plaintiff's  farm,  connecting  with  a  county  road.  This  was 
altered  up  to,  but  not  upon,  his  farm.  This  suit  was  brought 
to  recover  damages  alleged  to  have  been  occasioned  to  his  farm 
by  such  alteration.  A  recovery  was  denied,  on  the  ground  that 
the  damages  were  too  remote.  In  commenting  upon  prior  cases, 
it  was  held  that  compensation  had  been  given  in  highway  cases, 
in  obedience  to  the  constitution,  as  for  private  property 
taken  for  public  use,  and  that  the  cases  only  went  to  the  extent 

the  owners  of  lots  adjacent.  The  ties  and  franchises,  assured  to  them 
latter  have  a  peculiar  interest  in  the  by  contracts  and  by  law,  and  with- 
street,  which  neither  the  local  nor  out  which  their  property  would  be 
the  general  public  can  pretend  to  comparatively  of  little  value.  This 
claim:  a  private  right  of  the  nature  easement,  appurtenant  to  the  lots, 
of  an  incorporeal  hereditament,  unlike  any  right  of  one  lot  owner  in 
legally  attached  to  their  contiguous  the  lot  of  another,  is  as  much  prop- 
grounds,  and  the  erections  thereon ;  erty  as  the  lot  itself."  p.  469. 
an  incidental  title  to  certain  facili-  "16  Ohio  St.  163,  168,  1865. 


218  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    135 

of  holding  that  the  adjacent  owner,  "has  a  private  right  of  access 
to  and  from  the  street  or  highway ;  and,  when  he  has  made  im- 
provements on  his  land,  with  direct  reference  to  the  adjoining 
highway  as  then  established,  and  with  reasonable  reference 
to  its  prospective  improvement  and  enjoyment  by  the  public, 
he  has  a  private  right  of  way,  or  passage,  to  and  from  the 
highway  as  it  then  exists;  and  any  substantial  change  in  the 
highway,  to  the  injury  of  such  passage  or  way,  is  an  invasion 
of  his  private  property;  and  this  private  right  extends  so  far 
as  the  reasonable  and  convenient  enjoyment  of  such  improve- 
ments requires  the  use  of  the  adjacent  highway;  but,  beyond 
such  necessary  use  thereof,  the  private  right  is  merged  in  that  of 
the  public;"  that,  as  the  plaintiff  had  not  been  deprived  of  any 
such  private  right  in  this  case,  no  property  of  his  had  been 
taken,  and  he  could  not  recover. 

In  Cincinnati  v.  Penny^^  all  the  cases  were  again  reviewed 
and  the  same  doctrines  affirmed.  Penny  sued  for  damages  to 
a  building  occasioned  by  excavating  for  a  sewer.  His  recovery 
was  defeated  on  the  ground  that  he  did  not  exercise  reasonable 
prudence  in  the  erection  of  his  building,  in  view  of  the  right 
of  the  city  to  appropriate  the  alley  to  such  uses  in  the  future. 
"We  have  no  disposition,"  says  the  court,  "to  depart  from  the 
line  of  decisions  formerly  made  by  this  court  upon  this  subject. 
*  *  *  Yfe  believe  the  principles  established  by  our  former 
cases  to  be  most  just  and  equitable." 

In  Youngstown  v.  Moore,^"  the  same  principles  were  fully 
approved,  and  a  judgment  for  damages  caused  by  lowering  the 
grade  of  a  street  was  affirmed. 

'Next  comes  the  case  of  Akron  v.  The  Chamberlain  Com- 
pany,^^  decided  in  1878.  In  1842  the  Chamberlain  Company 
built  a  flouring  mill  upon  the  lot  in  question.  At  that  time 
no  grade  had  been  established  for  the  street  in  front.  In 
1876  the  grade  of  the  street  was  raised  fourteen  feet  in  front  of 
the  mill,  and  the  company  brought  this  suit  for  the  damages 
thereby  occasioned,  and  recovered  a  verdict  and  judgment  for 
$9,600. 

The  court  "adhere,  with  entire  satisfaction,  to  the  doctrines 
enunciated,  in  Cincinnati  v.  Penny,"  but  explain  that  it  never 
had  been  decided,  and  that  the  court  had  never  intended  to  de- 

"21  Ohio  St.  499,  504,  1871,  8  Am.  ''34    Ohio    St.  328,  1878,  32  Am. 

Rep.  73.  Rep.  367. 

"30  Ohio  St.   133,  .1876. 


§  135  EOADS  AND  STREETS.  219 

cide,  that  if  an  owner  used  reasonable  care  and  judgment  in 
making  improvements  and  was  afterwards  injured  by  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  grade,  he  could  recover  though  the  grade  was  a 
reasonable  and  proper  one.  "We  are  now  unanimously  of  opin- 
ion," says  the  court,  "that  if  the  subsequent  grade,  in  such  case, 
be  reasonable,  or,  in  other  words,  if  it  be  established  in  the  rea- 
sonable exercise  of  the  authority  conferred  on  the  municipality, 
at  the  time  it  is  made,  then  such  grade  should  have  been  antici- 
pated by  the  owner  of  the  adjacent  lot,  and  his  improvements 
should  have  been  made  with  reference  thereto." 

The  right  of  recovery  is  limited  to  three  cases:  (1)  where 
one  builds  to  an  established  grade  and  it  is  changed  to  his  dam- 
age ;  (2)  where  one  builds  before  a  grade  is  established,  but  suc- 
ceeds in  anticipating  the  grade  which  is  afterwards  established, 
and  the  grade  after  being  so  established  is  changed;  (3)  where 
one  builds  before  a  grade  is  established  and  afterwards  an  un- 
reasonable grade  is  established.  The  court  holds  that  a  grade 
may  be  established  in  the  sense  here  intended,  not  only  by  an 
ordinance  or  resolution  for  that  purpose,  but  also  by  any  im- 
provement of  the  street  indicating  permanency.^^ 

In  the  recent  case  of  Akron  v.  Huber,^^  the  court  affirms  the 
doctrine  of  Akron  v.  The  Chamberlain  Co.,  but  refuses  to  extend 
the  liability  of  municipalities  for  a  change  of  grade,  and  a  re- 
covery was  denied  on  the  ground  that  the  grade  established, was 
a  reasonable  one  and  should  have  been  anticipated  by  the  plain- 
tiff when  he  built. 

'^The  court  says:  "While  we  rec-  subsequent  changes.  And  it  would 
ognize  the  general  rule  to  be,  that  seem  to  follow,  as  a  logical  sequence, 
no  liability  on  the  part  of  a  munici-  that  if,  before  a  permanent  grade  is 
pality  for  injury  to  abutting  prop-  thus  established,  the  owner  of  an 
erty,  by  reason  of  improvement  of  a  abutting  lot  improves  the  same  with 
street,  exists  where  such  improve-  reference  to  a  reasonable  grade  to  be 
ment  is  properly  made,  yet  this  rule  established  in  the  future  and  his  an- 
is  subject,  as  we  have  seen,  to  the  ticipations  are  realized  in  the  sub- 
exception  that  where  abutting  prop-  sequent  establishmenr  of  the  grade, 
erty  is  improved  with  reference  to  he  should  thereafter,  in  respect  to 
an  existing  street,  so  graded  or  such  improvement,  be  entitled  to  en- 
improved  under  the  authority  joy  the  same  right  in  the  grade  of 
of  the  public  agents  having  the  con-  the  street  which  was  thus  fairly  and 
trol  thereof,  as  to  indicate  fairly  reasonably  anticipated,  as  if  he  had 
and  reasonably,  permanency  in  the  improved  his  lot  after  the  grade  had 
character  of  the  street  improvement,  been  so  established." 
a  liability  is  cast  upon  the  city  or  ==78  Ohio  St.  372,  85  N.  E.  583. 
village   for    injury    resulting   from 


220  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    135 

The  right  of  recovery  is  in  all  cases  limited  to  the  property 
in  front  of  which  the  change  is  made.  Where  the  grade  of  a 
street  on  which  the  plaintiff  abutted  was  raised  on  a  part  near 
but  not  in  front  of  plaintiff,  it  was  held  he  could  not  recover, 
although  his  property  was  damaged.^* 

Upon  a  review  of  all -the  Ohio  cases,  therefore,  it  appears 
that  no  recovery  can  be  had  in  any  ease  for  damages  to  unim- 
proved property  by  reason  of  a  change  of  grade,  that  where 
property  is  improved  and  the  improvements  are  adjusted  to  an 
established  grade,  whether  built  before  or  after  its  establishment, 
a  recovery  may  be  had  for  any  damages  occasioned  by  a  change 
of  grade,  and  finally  that,  if  improved  property  is  damaged  by 
an  unreasonable  grade  or  by  an  unreasonable  exercise  of  the 
power  to  grade,  then  there  may  be  a  recovery.  ^^  Where  a  grade 
was  lowered  two  feet  but  the  convenience  of  access  was  not  im- 
paired nor  the  property  depreciated  in  value,  it  was  held  that 
there  was  no  taking  and  no  liability.^* 

In  all  the  later  cases  the  right  of  recovery  is  based  upon  the 
constitutional  guaranty  that  private  property  shall  not  be  taken 
for  public  use  without  just  compensation.  The  private  prop- 
erty which  is  taken  in  such  cases  is  spoken  of  as  the  right  of 
access.  ^^  But  the  right  of  access  exists  the  same,  whether  the 
property  is  improved  or  unimproved,  and  whether  a  grade  has 
been. established  or  not.  If  to  interfere  with  it  in  one  case  is 
a  taking,  then  such  interference  should  be  a  taking  in  every 
case.  'No  good  ground  exists  for  a  distinction.  That  there 
ought  to  be  compensation  in  some  cases  and  not  in  others  is  a 
consideration  which  addresses  itself  to  the  legislature  and  not 
to  the  courts.  The  uncertain,  rambling  and  contradictory  condi- 
tion of  the  Ohio  cases  on  this  subject  is  itself  evidence  that  they 
are  not  founded  upon  a  logical  basis. 

^*Eagle   White   Lead   Company  v.  ledo,  9  Ohio  C.  C.  462;  Cheseldine  v. 

Cincinnati,   1    Cinn.   Supr.   Ct.    154,  Comrs.,  6  Ohio  C.  C.  450;  Pitton  v. 

1871;  Smith  v.  Board  of  Comrs.,  50  City  of  Cincinnati,  3  Ohio  C.  C.  593; 

Ohio  St.  628,  35  N.  E.  796.  Nolte  v.  City  of  Cincinnati,  3  Ohio 

^Since  the  first  edition  was  writ-  C.  C.  503.  Cutting  down  the  mar- 
ten tliere  have  been  no  decisions  gin  of  a  street  to  the  established 
which  change  the  rule  of  the  prior  grade  of  the  driveway,  held  not  a, 
cases,  or  which  afford  any  new  illus-  change  of  grade.  Cincinnati  v. 
trations  of  its  application.  See  City  Roth,  20  Ohio  C.  C.  317. 
of  Cincinnati  v.  Whetstone,  47  Ohio  ^Lotzee  v.  Cincinnati,  61  Ohio  St. 
St.  196,  24  N.  E.  409;  Smith  v.  272,  55  N.  E.  828. 
Board  of  Comrs.,  50  Ohio  St.  628,  35  ^Crawford  v.  Village  of  Delaware, 
N.  E.  796;   Neubert  v.  City  of  To-  7  Ohio  St.  469. 


§  136  EOADS  AND  STEBBTS.  221 

§  136  (99).  The  law  of  Kentucky.  It  appears  from 
cases  already  cited^^  that  the  earlier  decisions  in  Kentucky 
accord  with  the  prevailing  doctrine,  but  in  a  somewhat  recent 
case  the  court  of  that  State  has  taken  an  intermediate  ground. ^^ 
The  plaintiff,  a  rolling-mill  company  in  the  city  of  Louisville, 
owned  an  entire  block  of  ground  upon  which  it  had  erected 
extensive  works  at  a  cost  of  some  two  hundred  thousand  dollars. 
The  premises  and  adjacent  streets  were  subject  to  an  annual 
overflow  from  the  Ohio  River.  The  works  were  constructed  in 
such  manner  that  their  only  outlet  was  onto  and  over  Brook 
street.  The  city  passed  an  ordinance  for  raising  the  grade  of 
Brook  street  so  that,  at  the  point  of  the  company's  gateway, 
which  was  their  only  means  of  ingress  and  egress,  the  street 
would  be  twelve  feet  above  the  company's  lot.  The  ordinance 
also  required  the  company  either  to  fill  up  their  lot  or  build  a 
retaining  wall  for  the  protection  of  the  street,  and  provided  that, 
in  default  of  the  company  doing  so,  the  city  might  construct 
the  same  at  the  company's  expense.  It  appeared  that  the  result 
of  this  improvement  would  be  to  render  the  property  of  the 
company  almost  worthless,  and  besides,  if  the  ordinance  was 
carried  out  as  to  the  retaining  wall,  it  would  compel  the  coiu- 
pany  to  incur  a  large  expense  to  accomplish  the  destruction  of 
its  own  property.  It  was  one  of  the  "hard  cases"  so  proverbial 
for  "bad  law."  The  court  seem  to  have  been  appalled  by  the 
magnitude  of  the  loss  with  which  the  company  was  threatened, 
and  granted  an  injunction  restraining  the  work  until  compensa- 
tion should  be  made  to  the  company.  The  decision,  which  is 
by  a  majority  of  the  court,  seems  to  be  based  upon  the  ground 
that  the  case  was  an  extraordinary  one,  in  which  all  the  ordinary 
principles  and  presumptions  failed;  that,  while  lot-owners  may 
be  taxed  specially  for  local  improvements,  yet  such  right  rests 
upon  the  fact  that  special  benefits  are  conferred  and  that  when 
the  foundation  of  the  right  fails,  as  in  this  case,  the  right  is 
gone,  and  that,  while  such  lot-owners  may  be  presumed  to  have 
purchased  in  contemplation  of  the  right  of  the  public  to  make 
such  improvements  as  are  ordinary  and  usual,  yet,  that  this  was 
of  such  an  extraordinary  and  unusual  character  that  the  law 
would  not  presume  that  it  was  assented  to  by  the  plaintiff  when 

2Uw*e,  §  132. 

=»Louisville  v.  Rolling  Mill  Co.,  3 
Bush.  416,  1807. 


222  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    137 

it  purchased  the  property.  It  does  not  seem  to  us  that  this 
decision,  as  put  by  the  court,  is  either  logical  or  sound.  It  is 
treated  in  the  opinion  as  the  case  of  raising  the  grade  of  a  street 
for  its  improvement.  In  this  view  there  is  nothing  extraordi- 
nary or  unusual  about  the  improvement.  It  is  not  unusual  for 
a  street  to  be  raised  or  lowered  ten  feet.  The  only  extraordinary 
and  unusual  feature  presented  by  the  case  is  the  very  large 
amount  of  damage  accruing  to  the  complainant.  Had  it  not 
been  for  this  feature  of  the  case,  that  is,  the  extreme  hardship 
of  it,  the  bill  would  undoubtedly  have  been  summarily  dismissed. 
The  only  possible  ground  which  we  can  see  for  justifying  the 
decision  is  that  it  was  proposed  to  raise  the  grade  of  the  street, 
not  for  the  purpose  of  improving  the  street  for  use  as  a  high- 
way, but  to  form  a  dike  or  levee  against  the  river.  But  even 
this  view  would  not  warrant  the  injunction,  but  only  an  action 
for  damages.  There  is  no  logical  ground  for  a  distinction  be- 
tween usual  and  slight  changes  and  great  and  unusual  changes 
in  the  grade  of  a  street.  There  is  no  reason  why  compensation 
should  be  given  for  the  large  damage  caused  by  raising  the  grade 
ten  feet,  and  none  for  the  small  damage  by  raising  the  grade  one 
foot.  The  damages  are  the  same  in  kind  in  all  cases  where  the 
grade  of  a  street  is  changed,  and  logically  there  should  be  a 
right  to  recover  in  all  cases  or  in  none.^°  A  recent  case  in  Ten- 
nessee also  holds  that  where  access  to  abutting  property  is  im- 
paired or  destroyed  by  a  change  of  grade  there  is  a  taking.^  "^ 

§  137  (100a).  Interfering  with  access,  light  and  air  by 
change  of  grade  not  a  taking.  It  has  already  been  shown 
that  the  private  rights  of  access,  light  and  air  are  subject  to  the 
right  of  the  public  to  use  and  improve  the  street  for  highway 
purposes.^^  As  these  rights  are  subject  to  the  right  of  the  public 
to  improve,  it  follows  that  when  such  improvements  are  made 
no  private  right  is  interfered  with  and  consequently  that  no 
private  property  is  taken.  This  is  the  ground  upon  which  the 
prevailing  doctrine  as  to  change  of  grade  must  rest.  If  the 
rights  of  access,  light  and  air  are  subject  to  the  right  of  the  pub- 
lie  to  improve,  then  when  access  is  rendered  less  convenient  by 

'"/See  comments  of  Judge  Dillon  on  So.   457,   29   Am.   St.   Rep.   278,    14 

this  case  in  his  work  on  Municipal  L.E.A.   370. 

Corporations,  §  784,  note.     See  ulso  "Hamilton    County    v.  Rape,  101 

remarks   of  the  court  in  Selden  v.  Tenn.  222,  47  S.  W.  416. 

City  of  Jacksonville,  28  Fla.  558,  10  32Ante,  §  120. 


§  138  ROADS  AND  STEEETS.  223 

the  exercise  of  that  right  by  the  public,  or  the  light  and  air  are 
obstructed  thereby,  the  owner  has  no  legal  ground  -of  complaint. 
§  138  (100b).  Peculiar  and  extraordinary  changes  of 
grade,  and  changes  for  some  ulterior  purpose  other  than 
the  improvement  of  the  street.  The  doctrine  that  the 
rights  of  abutting  owners  are  subbject  to  the  right  of  the  public 
to  grade  and  improve  streets,  is  one  which  has  often  resulted  in 
great  hardship  to  individuals.  This  is  a  reason  why  the  doctrine 
should  be  restricted,  so  far  as  is  consistent  with  sound  legal  prin- 
ciples. The  doctrine  is  founded  upon  the  theory  that  when  a 
street  is  established  there  is  taken  into  consideration  the  fact 
that  future  improvements  of  the  street  may  necessitate  a  change 
in  the  surface  and  the  land  is  supposed  to  be  given,  or  compen- 
sation made,  with  this  in  view.^^  But  it  is  manifest  that  only 
ordinary  changes  of  grade  can  be  thus  anticipated,  that  is,  such 
changes  as  may  be  necessary  to  secure  a  uniform,  even  surface 
for  the  purpose  of  facilitating  traffic  on  the  street.  The  rule 
should  cease  to  apply  when  the  reason  of  it  fails.  Consequently 
the  rule  should  not  apply  where  the  grade  is  changed  for  some 
ulterior  purpose  not  connected  with  the  improvement  of  the 
street,  or  when  it  is  made  necessary  by  artificial  conditions,  such 
as  a  railroad,  canal  or  bridge.^*    This  reasoning  is  sustained  by 

33 Ante,  §§  120-128,  134.  ment  in  part  of  a  street  if,  in  its 

"In  Reining  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  judgment,  this  will  promote  the  pub- 

R.  Co.,  128  N.  Y.  157,  168,  28  N.  E.  lie  convenience  and  the  purposes  of 

640,   14  L.R.A.   133,   the    court,    in  the  street  as  a  highway.     But    we 

spealcing  of  the  power  to  establish  thinlc  it  cannot  under  the  guise  of 

and  change  grades,  says:     "The  pri-  exercising  the  power,  appropriate  a 

mary  object  of  this  power  contained  part  of  the  street  to  the  exclusive, 

in  municipal  charters,  is  to  enable  or  practically  to  the  exclusive,  use 

the  municipal  authorities  to  render  of  a  railroad  company,  so  as  to  cut 

a  street  more  safe  and  convenient  for  off  abutting  owners  from  the  use  of 

public  travel,  to  afford  drainage,  in  any  part  of  the  street  in  the  accus- 

short,  to  adapt  it  more  perfectly  to  tomed  way,  without  making  compen- 

the  purposes  of  a  public  way.    It  is  sation    for    the    injury    sustained." 

claimed  that   the    city   under    this  The   city  had  permitted  a  railroad 

power  could   lawfully   authorize   an  to    construct    a,    sloping    causeway 

embankment  in  part  of  the  street,  twenty-four  feet  wide  in  the  middle 

leaving  the  other  part  on  a  lower  of  the  street  and  had  approved  the 

level.     We  are  not   called  upon   to  grade  upon  which  it  was  built.    The 

say  whether  there  is  any  limit  to  railroad  company  was  held  liable  to 

the  exercise  of  municipal  authority  the  abutting  owner  for  the  damages 

or  that  the  city  cannot  in  exercising  to  his  property.    In  Kentucky  where 

the  power  to  establish  and  alter  the  a,  street  was  depressed  to  go  under 

grade  of  streets,   raise   an  embank-  a  railroad  it  was  held  that  the  cost 


224  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    138 

some  of  the  authorities,  but  not  by  all.  It  has  been  held  that  if 
the  grade  is  raised,  not  for  the  purpose  of  improving  the  street, 
but  for  the  purpose  of  forming  a  dike,  the  abutting  owner  may 
recover  for  the  damage  to  his  property.^'  So  where  the  change 
was  made  for  the  purpose  of  procuring  material  to  be  used  else- 
where.^® Where  a  street  was  on  a  side  hill  it  was  held  that  a 
different  grade  could  be  established  for  the  two  halves  of  the 
street,  with  a  retaining  wall  in  the  center,  without  liability  to 
the  abutters,^''  but  it  might  reasonably  be  held  that  such  an 
improvement  was  an  ordinary  one,  in  view  of  the  contour  of 
the  surface.  It  has  been  held  that  a  tunnel  beneath  the  surface 
of  the  street,^^  or  the  open  approach  to  a  tunnel  in  the  center 
of  the  street,^*  do  not  entitle  the  abutting  owner  to  compensa- 
tion. In  bridging  streams  it  frequently  becomes  necessary  to 
place  the  bridge  above  the  grade  of  the  adjacent  shores  and 
to  build  elevated  approaches  to  it  upon  the  connecting  streets. 
Whether  the  damage  to  private  property  by  such  approaches  is 
a  taking  is  a  question  upon  which  the  authorities  disagree.  The 
weight  of  authority  is  that  where  the  bridge  is  exclusively  for 
street  traffic,  the  approaches  thereto  are  to  be  treated 
as  mere  changes  of  grade  for  which  no  recovery  can 
be  had.*"  In  an  Oregon  case  the  defendant  was  au- 
thorized   to    build    a    bridge    across    the    Willamette    river 

of  the  improvement,  in  so  far  as  it  "Chicago  v.  Rumsey,  87  Ills.  348. 

was  made  necessary  by  the  railroad  But  see  Coyne  v.  Memphis,  118  Tenn. 

could  not    be    made  a  charge  upon  651,  102  S.  W.  355. 

abutting  property.    Louisville  Steam  ^ONewport  v.  Cinn.  Bridge  Co.,  9 

Forge  Co.  v.  Mehler,  112  Ky.  438,  64  Bush.    264;    Willis    v.    Winona,    59 

S.  W.  396,  652.  Minn.   27,   60    N.   W.   814;    Willets 

''Shawneetown   v.   Mason,    82   111.  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Mercer  Co.,  62  N.  J.  L. 

337,  25  Am.  Rep.  321;  Winchester  v.  95,  40  Atl.   782;   Brand  v.  Multno- 

Stevens  Point,  58  Wis.  350;  City  of  mah  Co.,  38  Ore.  79,  60  Pao.  390,  62 

JefFersonville  v.  Myers,  2  Ind.  App.  Pac.   209,  84  Am.  St.  Rep.   772,  50 

532,  28  N.  E.  999.  L.R.A.  389;  Sullivan  v.  Webster,  16 

^'Mayor  etc.  of  Macon  v.  Hill,  58  R.  I.  33,  11  Atl.  771;  Walsh  v.  Mil- 

Ga.  595.  waukee,  95  Wis.   16.     In  Frater  v. 

='Yanish  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  50  Hamilton  Co.,  90  Tenn.  661,  19  S.  W. 
Minn.  518,  52  N.  W.  925;  Munger  v.  233,  it  was  held  there  could  be  re- 
City  of  St.  Paul,  57  Minn.  9,  58  N.  covery  in  case  of  a  county  bridge. 
W.  601.  See  Read  v.  Camden,  53  N.  See  also  Martin  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R. 
J.  L.  322,  21  Atl.  565 ;  S.  C.  reversed  Co.,  47  Mo.  App.  452 ;  Wallace  v. 
54  N.  J.  L.  347,  24  Atl.  549.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  47  Mo. 

"Hodgkinson  v.  Long  Island  R.  R.  App.  491. 
Co.,  4  Edwards  Ch.  411;   Adams  v. 
Saratoga  &  Washington  R.  R.  Co., 
11  Barb.  414. 


§  138  EOADS  AND  STREETS.  225 

between  the  cities  of  Portland  and  East  Portland,  "for 
the  purpose  of  travel  and  commerce,  as  a  railroad,  wagon 
road  and  passenger  bridge,  and  to  charge  and  collect  tolls  and 
fares  thereon."  In  pursuance  of  such  authority  it  constructed 
a  double-decked  steel  bridge,  the  upper  deck  being  for  ordinary 
street  traffic  and  the  lower  for  railroad  traffic.  An  approach 
was  constructed  to  the  upper  deck,  starting  upon  Third  street 
at  G  street  and  extending  along  the  middle  of  Third  street  until 
near  H  street,  and  thence  reaching  the  bridge  by  a  curve.  The 
approach  was  thirty  feet  wide,  and  rose  from  the  grade  of  G 
street  to  a  height  of  thirteen  and  one-half  feet  at  H  street. 
Though  built  of  timbers,  it  was,  practically,  a  solid  structure. 
The  plaintiff's  property  abutted  on  Third  street  and  extended 
from  G  street  to  H  street.  At  G  street  and  for  most  of  the  dis- 
tance there  was  eighteen  feet  between  the  approach  and  the  lot 
line  and  eight  feet  between  it  and  the  sidewalk.  The  inference 
is  that  plaintiff  did  not  own  the  fee  of  the  street.  The  court 
held  that  the  structure  was  not  to  be  treated  as  a  mere  change  of 
grade  but  was  an  exclusive  appropriation  of  a  part  of  the  street 
to  the  use  of  a  private  corporation,  subversive  of  and  repugnant 
to  its  use  as  a  public  thoroughfare,  which  could  not  be  made 
without  compensation  to  the  plaintiff.*^    So  where  a  bridge  was 

"Willamette  Iron  Works  v.  Ore-  street;  and,  while  such  permission 
gon  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.,  26  Ore.  224,  37  included  as  a  consequence  the  con- 
Pac.  1016,  46  Am.  St.  Rep.  620,  29  struction  of  a  solid  roadway  above 
L.R.A.  88.  To  the  point  that  the  and  over  the  street  surface,  it  does 
approach  was  a  mere  change  of  not  follow  that  what  was  done  was 
grade  the  court  says:  "The  argu-  in  exercise  of  the  power  to  alter  or 
ment  that  the  building  of  the  ap-  change  the  grade  of  a  street.  The 
proach  was  a  mere  change  of  street  grade  remained  the  same  after 
the  grade  of  the  street,  authorized  the  approach  was  built  as  before, 
by  proper  municipal  authority,  is  and  this  approach  is  no  part  of  the 
clearly  untenable.  The  city  of  Port-  street,  but  i^  foreign  thereto,  and 
land  has  undoubted  plenary  power  as  useless  for  general  street  pur- 
to  alter  or  change  the  grade  of  a  poses  as  any  of  the  structures  re- 
public street  by  proper  proceedings  fcrred  to  in  the  cases  cited.  We  do 
under  its  charter,  but  the  act  of  the  not  think  a  public  street,  or  any 
municipal  authorities  in  granting  portion  thereof,  can  lawfully  be  ap- 
defendant  permission  to  occupy  the  propriated  to  the  exclusive  and  per- 
street  did  not  purport  to  be  an  ex-  manent  use  of  a  private  corporation 
ercise  of  such  power.  It  was  sim-  under  the  guise  of  an  exercise  of  the 
ply  conferring  upon  the  defendant,  power  to  alter  or  change  the  grade, 
so  far  as  the  city  was  able,  the  The  primary  object  of  this  grant  of 
right  to  the  exclusive  and  perma-  power  is  to  enable  the  municipality 
nent  use  of  a  portion  of  the  public  to  make  the  streets  safe  and  eon- 
Em.  D. — 15. 


226 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  138 


built  over  a  private  canal  or  raceway  and  was  put  at  a  high  grade 
to  accommodate  the  owner  and  not  to  improve  the  street  for  pur- 
poses of  travel,  it  was  held  that  abutters  could  recover  for  dam- 
ages by  the  approach.*^  Where  streets  are  carried  over  rail- 
roads by  means  of  a  bridge  or  viaduct  or  under  them  by  de- 
pressing the  street  with  approaches  in  front  of  abutting  prop- 
erty, which  impair  or  destroy  access,  or  interfere  with  light  and 
air,  the  viaducts  and  their  approaches  have  been  put  by  the 
courts  upon  the  same  footing  as  an  ordinary  change  of  grade  and, 
consequently,  are  held  not  to  be  any  additional  servitude  upon 
the  street  or  taking  of  the  property  rights  of  abutting  owners.*' 
There  may  be  a  recovery  in  Ohio,  under  the  peculiar  doctrines 
of  that  State,**  and  some  States  give  a  remedy  in  such  cases 
by  statute.*''  So  the  abutter  may  recover  in  such  cases  where 
the  constitution  guarantees  compensation  for  property  damaged, 
injured  or  destroyed.®"    In  Michigan  it  is  held  that  a  city  can- 


venient  for  public  travel,  and  not 
to  divert  them  from  legitimate  street 
purposes  to  the  exclusive  use  of  some 
private  corporation.  Conceding, 
therefore,  that  defendant  occupies 
this  street  by  lawful  authority,  and 
hence  its  structure  is  not  a  nuisance, 
yet  it  invades  the  legal  rights  of  an 
abutting  owner,  and  is  an  appro- 
priation of  the  property  of  such 
owner  without  compensation,  which 
is  beyond  the  power  of  the  legisla- 
ture or  municipality,  or  both,  con- 
stitutionally, to  authorize  or  sanc- 
tion." 

^'Eanson  v.  Sault  Ste  Marie,  143 
Mich.  661,  107  N.  W.  439;  Morris 
V.  Sault  Ste.  Marie,  143  Mich.  672, 
107  N.  W.  443.  See  Bartels  v.  Hous- 
ton, 32  Tex.  Civ.  App.  389,  74  S.  W. 
326;  Sandpoint  v.  Doyle,  14  Ida. 
749,  95  Pac.  945. 

"Seldeu  v.  City  of  Jacksonville, 
28  Fla.  558,  10  So.  457,  29  Am.  St. 
Rep.  278,  14  L.K.A.  370;  Eowden  v. 
Jacksonville,  52  Fla.  216,  42  So.  394; 
Hart  v.  Atlanta,  100  Ga.  274;  Hyde 
V.  Boston  etc.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  194  Mass. 
80,  80  N.  E.  517;  Schneider  v.  City 
pf  Detroit,  72  Mich.  240.  40  N.  W. 


329,  2  L.R.A.  54;  Robinson  v.  Great 
Northern  R.  R.  Co.,  48  Minn.  445, 
51  N.  W.  384;  Conklin  v.  New  York 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  102  N.  Y.  107,  6  N. 
E.  663;  Ottenot  v.  New  York  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  119  N.  Y.  603,  23  N.  E.  169; 
Home  Bldg.  etc.  Co.  v.  City  of  Roan- 
oke, 91  Va.  52,  20  S.  E.  895,  27 
L.R.A.  551 ;  Colclough  v.  Milwaukee, 
92  Wis.  182,  65  N.  W.  1039. 

**Cohen  v.  Cleveland,  43  Ohio  St. 
190;  Leonard  v.  Cassidy,  8  Ohio  C. 
C.  529;  Lake  Shore  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Brown,  16  Ohio  C.  C.  269;  ante, 
§  135. 

''Nicks  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
84  la.  27,  50  N.  W.  222;  Parker  v. 
Boston  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Cush.  107, 
50  Am.  Dee.  709;  Kelly  v.  City  of 
Minneapolis,  57  Minn.  294,  59  N.  W. 
304,  47  Am.  St.  Rep.  605,  26  L.R.A. 
92 ;  Read  v.  City  of  Camden,  54  X.  J. 
L.  347,  24  Atl.  549,  reversing  53  N. 
J.  L.  322,  21  Atl.  565. 

""Bentley  v.  City  of  Atlanta,  92 
Ga.  623,  18  S.  E.  1013;  Chicago  v. 
Lonergan,  196  HI.  518,  63  N.  E. 
1018;  Beaver  v.  City  of  Harrisburg, 
156  Pa.  St.  547,  27  Atl.  4;  Cass  v. 
Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  159  Pa.  St. 


§  138  EOADS  AND  STREETS.  227 

not  build  such  a  viaduct  and  approaches  under  the  general  pow- 
er to  establish  grades  and  that,  when  built  without  other  authori- 
ty it  is  an  illegal  structure  and  that  the  city  is  liable  for  the 
damages  thereby  sustained  by  abutting  owners.^'  In  Tennes- 
see where  the  center  of  a  street  was  depressed  in  order  to  make 
a  subway  under  a  railroad,  thereby  interfering  with  access  to 
abutting  property,  such  interference  was  held  to  be  a  taking 
for  which  compensation  must  be  made.''^  Changes  of  grade  in 
connection  with  railroads  upon  or  across  streets,  are  consid- 
ered in  subsequent  sections.^^ 

It  has  been  held  in  New  York  that  the  legislature  may  au- 
thorize the  construction  of  a  viaduct  in  a  street,  so  as  to  create 
a  second  street  surface,  without  providing  for  compensation  to 
abutting  property  owners.  The  plaintiff,  in  the  case  referred  to, 
owned  a  building  and  property  in  New  York  city  at  the  corner 
of  155th  street  and  Eighth  avenue.  One  Hundred 
and  Fifty  Fifth  street  is  intersected  by  a  bluff  sev- 
enty feet  high.  The  viaduct  connected  with  the  top 
of  the  bluff  and  was  supported  by  iron  columns  in  the  street 
and  occupied  its  full  width.  At  the  plaintiff's  premises  it  was 
fifty  feet  high.  It  impaired  the  easements  of  access,  light  and 
air  and  annoyed  the  occupants  of  the  property  by  the  dirt,  dust 
and  noise  occasioned  by  the  structure  and  its  use.  The  suit 
was  to  enjoin  the  use  of  the  viaduct,  and  compel  its  removal, 
or  in  the  alternative  for  the  recovery  of  just  compensation  for 
taking  the  easements  and  in  either  case  for  the  recovery  of  past 
damages.  The  court  held  that  the  viaduct  was  a  proper  street 
use  and  a  decree  dismissing  the  bill  was  affirmed.  The  court 
says :  "It  is  devoted  to  ordinary  traffic  by  teams,  vehicles  and 
pedestrians.  It  is  prohibited  for  railroad  purposes.  It  is  one 
of  the  uses  to  which  public  highways  were  primarily  opened 
and  devoted.  It  was  constructed  under  legislative  authority  in 
the  exercise  of  governmental  powers  for  a  public  purpose.  It  is 
not,  therefore,  a  nuisance  and  the  plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to 
have  its  maintenance  enjoined  or  to  recover  in  this  action  the 
consequential  damages  sustained."  ®*    The  decision  was  affirmed 

273,    28    Atl.    161;    Walters    v.    St.  240,  40  N.  W.  329 ;  Phelps  v.  Detroit, 

Louis,  132  Mo.  1,  33  S.  W.  441 ;  Fred  120  Mich.  447,  79  N.  W.  640. 

V.  Kansas  City  Cable  R.  R.  Co.,  65  ''"Coyne  v.  Memphis,  118  Tenn.  651, 

Mo.  App.  121 ;  Omaha  v.  McGavock,  102  S.  W.  355. 

47  Neb.  313,  66  N.  W.  415;  post,  §  Bspost,  §§  174,  178. 

349.  "Sauer  v.   New  York,   180  N.   Y. 

"Schneider  v.   Detroit,   72  Mich,  37,  33,  72  N.  E,  579,  70  L.R.A.  717, 


228  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    138 

by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  on  the  ground  that 
the  rights  of  abutting  owners  was  a  matter  of  State  law  and,  the 
highest  court  of  the  State  having  held  that  the  plaintiff  had  no 
easements  of  light,  air  and  access  as  against  a  structure  erected 
by  the  public  and  devoted  to  street  traffic,  its  decision  was  con- 
clusive of  the  matter.^^ 

It  seems  to  the  writer  that  this  decision  is  erroneous,  that 
the  viaduct  was  not  a  change  of  grade,  since  the  old  grade  re- 
mained exactly  as  before,  that  it  was  an  improvement  of  a 
most  extraordinary  character  which  could  not  have  been  contem- 
plated when  the  street  was  established  and  was  not  within  the 
public  right  acquired,  and,  consequently,  that  it  was  such  an 
improvement  as  could  not  be  made  without  compensation  to  the 
abutting  owners.  It  was  in  effect  the  establishment  of  a  new 
street  over  the  existing  one,  which  could  not  be  done  without 
compensation  for  property  taken.  We  think  the  true  view  is 
expressed  by  Vann,  J.,  in  his  dissenting  opinion  who  says :  "I 
dissent  upon  the  ground  that  the  construction  by  a  municipal 
corporation  of  a  new  and  independent  street  in  the  form  of  a 
bridge,  fifty  feet  high  and  sixty-three  feet  wide,  extending 
lengthwise  through  block  after  block  of  an  existing  street,  which, 
graded  and  paved  for  years,  is  left  undisturbed  except  by  the 
huge  columns  supporting  the  elevated  structure,  is  neither  the 
improvement  of  the  street  as  a  street,  nor  a  proper  street  use 
sanctioned  by  precedent,  or  coming  within  the  reasonable  con- 
templation of  the  parties  when  the  fee  of  the  surface  street  was 
acquired  from  the  abutting  owner,  who  has  no  access  to  the  aerial 
street  from  his  premises,  and  when  this  is  done  without  compen- 
sation, it  is  a  taking  of  private  property  for  public  use  in  direct 
violation  of  the  constitution."  ^* 

affirming  90  App.  Div.  36,  85  N.  Y.  tiflF's  easement  was  a  taking  of  his 

S.  636,  which  in  turn  affirmed  Saner  property  for  which  he  was  entitled 

V.   New  York,  40  Misc.  585,   83  N.  to  compensation  under  the  constitu- 

Y.  S.  27.     In  Sauer  v.  New  York,  tion. 

44  App.  Div.  305,  60  N.  Y.  S.  648,  the  ssSauer  v.  New  York,  206  U.  S. 

same  plaintiff  brought  suit  for  dam-  536,  27  S.  C.  686.    Justices  McKenna 

ages  to  his  business  and  recovered  and  Day  dissent, 
a,  judgment  for  $30,000  which  was  5  6Sauer  v.  New  York,  180  N.  Y. 

reversed  for  error  in  the  admission  27,  34,  72  N.  E.  579,  70  L.R.A.  717. 

of  evidence,  the  court  holding  that  Bartlett   J.    concurring   with   Vann 

the   viaduct   was   not   a   change   of  J.    adds:       "Under    the    judgment 

grade  nor  a  proper  street  use,  and,  about   to   be   made   the    city    could 

that  the  interference  with  the  plain-  bridge    Fifth    Avenue,    from    110th 


§  139 


EOADS    AND    STREETS. 


229 


§  139  (101).  Lowering  grade. — Interfering  with  sup- 
port of  soil.  We  have  stated  in  a  previous  section  the  reasons 
in  support  of  the  position  that  the  abutting  owner  has  a  right 
to  the  support  of  his  soil  in  that  of  the  street.^''  It  follows  that 
an  interference  with  this  right,  by  cutting  down  a  street  and  re- 
moving the  support  of  the  adjacent  soil,  is  a  taking  for  which 
compensation  must  be  made.  But  the  older  cases  are  against 
this  position.^®  The  older  cases  make  no  distinction  between  the 
different  kinds  of  damages  which  may  be  occasioned  to  abutting 
property  by  the  improvement  of  the  streets.  All  such  damages 
are  treated  as  consequential  and  remediless.  Yet,  in  some  of 
these  cases,  and  in  others  by  the  same  courts,  the  rights  and  lia- 
bilities of  the  public  with  respect  to  the  adjoining  owner  are 
held  to  be  governed  by  the  law  of  adjoining  proprietors.  But  ad- 
joining proprietors  have  mutual  rights  of  support,  and,  if  the 
analogy  is  carried  out,  it  must  be  held  that  the  adjacent  owner 
has  a  right  to  the  support  of  his  soil  in  that  of  the  street.  This 
seems  to  us  the  juster  view,  and  the  more  recent  cases  have  so 
adjudicated.^*     In  such  cases  recovery  may  be  had  for  injury 


Street  to  Washington  Square,  at  a 
level  above  the  heights  of  the  ad- 
joining structures,  thereby  impairing 
the  light,  air  and  access  of  every 
residence  and  business  building,  and 
under  the  plea  of  a  street  use  escape 
all  liability  for  damages.  If  this 
can  be  done  it  simply  amounts  to 
confiscation."  p.  34.  Where  the  via- 
duct interfered  with  the  station  of 
an  elevated  railroad  the  city  was 
held  liable.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  New  York,  89  Hun  429,  35  N. 
y.  S.  505.  In  Seattle  Transfer  Co. 
V.  Seattle,  27  Wash.  520,  08  Pac. 
90,  the  construction  of  an  elevated 
roadway  twenty  feet  wide  in  the 
center  of  a  street  was  held  to  entitle 
the  abutters  to  damages,  but  the 
constitution  of  that  State  requires 
compensation  to  be  made  for  prop- 
erty damaged  as  well  as  for  prop- 
erty taken. 

6'! Ante,  §  126;  post,  §  234. 

58Fellows  V.  New  Haven,  44  Conn. 
240,  26  Am.  Rep.  447;  Rome  v. 
Omberg,    28    Ga.    46;     Mitchell    v. 


Rome,  49  Ga.  19;  Quiney  v.  Jones, 
76.111.  231;  Taylor  v.  St.  Louis,  14 
Mo.  20,  55  Am.  Dee.  89 ;  Callendar  v. 
Marsh,  1  Pick.  418;  Radcliffe  v. 
Brooklyn,  4  N.  Y.  195;  Mears  v. 
Comrs.  of  Wilmington,  9  Ired.  L.  73, 
49  Am.  Dec.  412;  Cheever  v.  Shedd, 
13  Blateh.  258. 

ssDelphi  v.  Evans,  36  Ind. 
90,  10  Am.  Rep.  12;  Aurora 
V.  Fox,  78  Ind.  1;  Dyer  v. 
St.  Paul,  27  Minn.  457;  Arm- 
strong v.  St.  Paul,  30  Minn.  299; 
Nichols  v.  City  of  Duluth,  40  Minn. 
389,  42  N.  W.  84;  Kuaehke  v.  St. 
Paul,  45  Minn.  225,  47  N.  W.  780, 
Farrell  v.  St.  Paul,  62  Minn.  271,  64 
N.  W.  809;  Keating  v.  Cincinnati, 
38  Ohio  St.  141;  Columbus  v.  Wil- 
lard,  7  Ohio  C.  C.  113;  Stearns 
Ex'r  V.  City  of  Richmond,  88  Va. 
992,  14  S.  E.  847,  6  Am.  R.  R.  & 
Corp.  Rep.  247;  Parke  v.  City  of 
Seattle,  5  Wash.  1,  31  Pao.  Rep.  310, 
32  Pac.  82,  34  Am.  St.  Rep.  839,  20 
L.R.A.  68;  Jones  v.  Seattle,  23  Wash. 
753,  63  Pac.  553;  McCuUough  v. 
Campbellsport,  123  Wis.  334,  101  N, 


230 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  140 


to  improvements  where  their  weight  did  not  cause,  the  slide.®" 
Where  the  excavation  of  a  street  causes  a  slide  which  reaches 
property  not  abutting  on  the  street,  the  right  to  compensation 
would  seem  to  be  clear  since  it  cannot  be  presumed  that  the  own- 
er wa.«  compensated  thefefor  when  the  street  was  established."^ 
In  Washington,  where  a  city  cut  down  the  grade  of  a  street 
so  that  it  would  be  seventy-seven  feet  below  the  plaintiff's  lot 
and  proposed  to  cut  a  slope  upon  the  plaintiff's  lot  extending 
back  seventy-seven  feet,  it  was  held  that  there  was  a  damaging 
but  not  a  talcing  of  the  plaintiff's  property,  within  the  consti- 
tution.82 

§  140  (102).  Raising  grade. — Encroachment  of  the 
filling.  The  right  of  exclusion,  or  the  right  of  complete  posses- 
sion and  enjoyment,  is  one  of  the  essential  elements  of  property 
in  land.  If  any  one  has  a  right  to  encroach  upon  my  land  in 
any  way,  then  I  have  not  complete  control  of  it,  nor  a  full  and 
absolute  property  in  it.  The  public  have  no  right,  in  raising 
the  grade  of  a  street,  to  allow  the  filling  to  slide  or  encroach 
upon  the  adjoining  land.  Such  an  occupation  of  or  encroach- 
ment upon  adjacent  property  is  actionable.®*     Such  a  direct 


W.  709;  Damkoehler  v.  Milwaukee, 
124  Wis.  144,  101  N.  W.  706;  Dahl- 
man  v.  Milwaukee,  131  Wis.  427,  110 
N.  W.  479,  111  N.  W.  675 ;  New  West- 
minster V.  Brighouse,  20  Duvall  520. 
See  Moore  v.  Albany,  98  N.  Y.  396.  In 
Nichols  V.  Duluth,  40  Minn.  389,  42 
N.  W.  84,  the  court  says:  "Every 
person  has  a  right  ex  jurw  natures 
to  the  lateral  support  of  the  adjoin- 
ing soil,  and  is  entitled  to  damages 
for  its  removal.  A  municipal  cor- 
poration has  no  greater  rights  or 
powers  in  that  regard  over  the  soil 
of  the  streets  than  a  private  owner 
has  over  his  own  land,  and  will  be 
liable  in  damages  for  removing  this 
lateral  support  the  same  as  would 
a  private  owner  if  improving  his 
property  for  his  own  use.  It  is  no 
defense  that  the  excavation  was 
necessary  for  the  purpose  of  grad- 
ing the  street.  If  the  city  desires 
greater  rights  than  those  possessed 
by  private  owners  it  must  acquire 
them  by  the  exercise  of  eminent  do- 


main. It  must  either  do  this,  or 
else  itself  substitute  other  lateral 
support  in  place  of  the  soil  which 
it  removes.  The  liability  of  the  city 
in  these  cases  does  not  depend,  as 
appellant  assumes,  upon  its  negli- 
gence in  making  the  excavation. 
This  right  of  the  lateral  sup- 
port of  the  adjoining  soil,  being  a 
natural  one,  is  absolute,  and  inde- 
pendent of  any  question  of  negli- 
gence." 

Talcott  Bros.  v.  Des  Moines,  134 
la.  113,  109  N.  W.  311,  120  Am.  St. 
Hep.  419,  is  the  only  case  decided  to 
the  contrary  since  the  first  edition 
was  published. 

eoKeating  v.  Cincinnati,  38  Ohio 
St.  141. 

siKeating  v.  Cincinnati,  38  Ohio 
St.  142;  Damkoehler  v.  Milwaukee, 
124  Wis.  144,  101  N.  W.  706. 

6  2Compton  V.  Seattle,  38  Wash. 
514,  80  Pac.  757. 

6  3Hendershott  v.  Ottumwa,  46  la. 
658,  26  Am.  Rep.   182;    West   Cov- 


§  140 


EOADS   AND   STEEETS. 


^31 


invasion  of  one's  property  is  without  right  and  might  undoubted- 
ly be  enjoined.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  public  in  such  a  case 
to  support  the  filling  by  a  retaining  wall  in  the  street  itself. 
But  if  this  is  not  done  and  an  action  is  brought  for  damages 
and  a  recovery  had,  the  public  thereby  acquire  a  right  of  lateral 
support  for  the  causeway  in  the  street."*  If  the  property  is  va- 
cant, the  damages  could  hardly  exceed  the  cost  of  a  retaining 
wall  and  of  removing  the  filling  which  had  fallen  upon  the  lot. 
If  the  property  is  improved,  any  injury  to  the  improvements 
would  be  included.^^  In  Nelson  v.  West  Duluth,*"'  it  is  held  that 
the  measure  of  damages  is  the  diminution  in  the  value  of  the 
property  by  reason  of  the  earth  being  imposed  upon  it,  and  that 
the  cost  of  removing  the  earth  and  building  a  retaining  wall 
cannot  be  recovered,  if  it  is  more  than  such  diminution.     So  in 


ington  V.  Schultz,  30  S.  W.  410,  16 
Ky.  L.  R.  831 ;  Ludlow  v.  Froste,  20 
Ky.  L.  R.  216,  45  S.  W.  661;  Lud- 
low V.  Detwiler,  20  Ky.  L.  R.  894, 
47  S.  W.  881;  Vanderlip  v.  Grand 
Rapids,  73  Mich.  522,  41  N.  W.  677, 
3  L.R.A.  247;  Schneider  v.  Brown, 
142  Mich.  45,  105  N.  W.  13;  Over- 
man V.  St.  Paul,  39  Minn.  120,  39 
N.  W.  66;  Nelson  v.  West  Duluth, 
55  Minn.  497,  57  N.  W.  149;  Brad- 
well  V.  City  of  Kansas,  75  Mo.  213; 
Tegeler  v.  Kansas  City,  95  Mo.  App. 
162,  68  S.  W.  953;  Dodson  v.  Cin- 
cinnati, 34  Ohio  St.  276;  Davis  v. 
Silverton,  47  Ore.  171,  82  Pac.  16; 
O'Donnell  v.  White,  23  R.  I.  318,  50 
Atl.  333;  Koch  v.  Sackman-Phillips 
Inv.  Co.,  9  Wash.  405,  37  Pac.  703; 
Bunker  v.  Hudson,  122  Wis.  43, 
99  N.  W.  448 ;  MeCulIough  v.  Camp- 
bellsport,  123  Wis.  334,  101  N.  W. 
709.  In  Broadwell  v.  City  of  Kan- 
sas, 75  Mo.  213,  the  defendant  raised 
the  grade  of  a  street  about  even  with 
the  top  of  plaintiff's  house,  and  the 
filling  encroached  upon  his  lot  to 
such  an  extent  as  to  crush  and  ruin 
his  house.  The  court  says:  "More- 
over, section  16  article  1  of  the  Con- 
stitution of  1865,  provided  that:  'no 
private  property  ought  to  be  taken 
or    applied   to   public   use,   without 


just  compensation.'  Here  the  city 
and  its  servant  took  the  property 
of  plaintiffs  within  the  meaning  of 
that  section.  The  taking  of  property 
within  that  prohibition  may  be 
either  total  or  absolute,  or' a  taking 
pro  tanto.  Any  injury  to  the  prop- 
erty of  an  individual  which  deprives 
the  owner  of  the  ordinary  use  of  it,  is 
equivalent  to  a  taking  and  entitles 
him  to  compensation.  So  a  partial 
destruction  or  diminution  of  value 
of  property  by  an  act  of  government 
which  directly  and  not  merely  inci- 
dentally affects  it,  is  to  that  extent 
an  appropriation."  See  Fuller  v. 
Grand  Rapids,  105  Mich.  529,  63  N. 
W.  530;  Harley  v.  Jones,  165  Pa.  St. 
34,  30  Atl.  499. 

To  the  contrary:  Fellows  v.  City 
of  New  Haven,  44  Conn.  240,  26 
L.R.A.  447;  Shaw  v.  Crocker,  42  Cal. 
435;  Mayo  v.  Springfield,  136  Mass. 
10;  Mayo  v.  Same,  138  Mass.  70; 
and  see  Moore  v.  Albany,  98  N.  Y. 
396;  Carll  v.  Northport,  11  App.  Div. 
120,  42  N.  Y.  Supp.  576. 

6  4  Dodson  V.  Cincinnati,  34  Ohio 
St.  276;  Bunker  v.  Hudson,  122  Wis. 
43,  99  N.  W.  448. 

esBradwell  v.  City  of  Kansas,  75 
Mo.  213. 

6  655  Minn.  497,  55  N.  W.  149. 


232 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  141 


Wisconsin  where  it  is  held  that  as  between  the  cost  of  a  retain- 
ing wall  and  the  removal  of  the  earth  on  the  one  hand  and  the 
diminution  in  value  of  the  estate  on  the  other,  the  verdict  should 
be  for  the  less  sum.®^  If  the  owner  consents  in  advance  that 
the  city  may  deposit  earth  upon  his  lot  to  support  the  filling  of 
the  street,  he  dedicates  an  easement  of  support  to  the  public 
use  and  will  be  estopped  to  claim  damages  or  compel  a  removal 
of  the  earth.®* 

§  141  (103).  Damages  from  surface  water.  ISTevins  v. 
City  of  Peoria,"^  is  a  leading  case  upon  this  question.  The  city 
of  Peoria  graded  its  streets  in  such  a  manner  as  to  cause  a 
stream  of  water  and  mud  to  flow  on  to  the  plaintiff's  property 
in  times  of  rain,  and  also  to  cause  a  pond  to  accumulate  upon 
adjacent  property,  which,  by  becoming  stagnant,  diffused  un- 
wholesome vapors  over  the  plaintiff's  premises.  The  city  was 
held  liable,  on  the  ground  that  the  damages  complained  of  were 
a  taking,  within  the  meaning  of  the  constitution.'^''    It  was  held 


sTBunker  v.  Hudson,  122  Wis.  43, 
99  N.  W.  448.  The  court  says: 
"The  recovery  of  depreciated  value, 
limited  as  it  vpas  to  the  cost  of  a 
retaining  wall  and  removal  of  the 
earth,  clearly  contemplates  that  one 
or  the  other  of  those  situations  is 
going  to  be  permanent.  If  plaintiffs 
recovered  for  the  diminished  value 
of  their  premises  resulting  from  this 
wall  of  earth  serving  to  support  the 
grade  of  the  street  to  its  full  width, 
then  they  would  have  received  pay- 
ment for  the  privilege  of  keeping 
the  earth  there.  In  other  words, 
they  would  have  in  practical  effect, 
sold  to  the  city  an  easement  to  that 
extent.  Hence  they  would  have  no 
right  to  remove  that  earth  so  as  to 
jeopardize  the  street  or  cause  it  to 
cave  or  wash  away.  Doubtless,  by 
limiting  their  damages  to  the  cost 
of  a  retaining  wall  and  of  the  re- 
moval of  the  earth,  they  would  have 
the  right,  after  the  collection  of  this 
judgment,  to  exercise  their  choice  to 
do  such  acts  at  their  own  expense, 
but  must  then  at  their  peril  so  con- 
struct the   wall  as  to  furnish  safe 


and  perfect  support  for  the  street 
at  its  established  grade  to  the  ut- 
most of  its  legal  limits."    p.  56. 

6  8 Williams  v.  Hudson,  130  Wis. 
297,  110  N.  W.  239. 

6  941  111.  502,  50S,  89  Am.  Dec. 
392. 

TOThe  court  says:  "The  city  is  the 
owner  of  the  streets,  and  the  legis- 
lature has  given  it  power  to  grade 
them.  But  it  has  no  more  power 
over  them  than  a,  private  individual 
has  over  his  own  land,  and  it  cannot, 
under  the  specious  plea  of  public 
convenience,  be  permitted  to  exercise 
that  dominion  to  the  injury  of  an- 
other's property  in  a  mode  that 
would  render  a  private  individual  re- 
sponsible in  damages  without  being 
responsible  itself.  Neither  State  nor 
municipal  government  can  take  pri- 
vate property  for  public  use  with- 
out due  compensation  and  this  be- 
nign provision  of  our  constitution  is 
to  be  applied  by  the  courts  whenever 
the  property  of  the  citizen  is  in- 
vaded, and  without  reference  to  the 
degree."  This  case  has  been  fol- 
lowed and  approved  in  the  follow- 


§  141 


EOADS    AND    STEEETS. 


233 


that  the  city  had  no  greater  power  over  its  streets  than  a  private 
individual  had  over  his  own  land,  and  that  the  law  of  adjoining 
proprietors  was  applicable.  This  is  the  true  rule  to  be  applied 
it  all  such  cases.  In  any  given  case,  the  test  is :  If  an  individ- 
ual owned  the  streets  in  question,  and  had  made  the  same  works, 
would  he  be  liable  for  the  damages  complained  of?  It  is  now 
almost  uniformly  held  that,  if  a  city  so  grades  or  otherwise  im- 
proves its  streets  as  to  collect  surface  water  in  a  stream  and  pour 
it  directly  upon  private  property,  it  will  be  liable  for  the  ensuing- 
damages.' "■  This  is  a  direct  and  entirely  unauthorized  invasion 
of  property  rights.    There  is,  however,  considerable  dissent  from 


ing  subsequent  decisions  in  the  same 
State:  City  of  Aurora  v.  Gillett,  56 
111.  132;  City  of  Aurora  v.  Reed, 
57  111.  29,  11  Am.  Rep.  1;  City  of 
Dixon  V.  Baker,  65  111.  518,  16  Am. 
Rep.  591;  Tearney  v.  Smith,  86  111. 
391.  In  Aurora  v.  Reed  the  street 
in  question  was  improved  while  the 
plaintiff's  lot  was  vacant.  He  after- 
wards built  upon  his  lot,  and  the 
water  ran  into  his  basement.  It  was 
held  that  this  circumstance  made  no 
difference,  that  he  had  a  right  to 
improve  his  lot  and  enjoy  it  free 
from  any  such  invasion  or  annoy- 
ance. 

7iTroy  V.  Coleman,  58  Ala.  570; 
Union  Springs  v.  Jones,  58  Ala.  654; 
Holmes  v.  Atlanta,  113  Ga.  961,  39 
S.  E.  458;  Elgin  v.  Kimball,  90  111. 
356;  Elgin  v.  Welch,  16  111.  App. 
483;  S.  C.  23  111.  App.  185;  Indian- 
apolis v.  Lawyer,  38  Ind.  348;  Weis 
<i.  Madison,  75  Ind.  241,  39  Am.  Rep. 
135;  Evansville  v.  Decker,  84  Ind. 
325,  43  Am.  Rep.  86 ;  North  Vernon 
V.  Voegler,  89  Ind.  77;  Crawfords- 
ville  V.  Bond,  90  Ind.  236;  Sullivan 
V.  Phillips,  110  Ind.  320;  Valparaiso 
V.  Spaeth,  166  Ind.  14,  76  N.  E.  514; 
Guest  v.  Church  Hill,  90  Md.  689, 
45  Atl.  882;  Manning  v.  Lowell,  130 
Mass.  21;  Pennoyer  v.  Saginaw,  8 
Mich.  296;  Ashley  v.  Port  Huron, 
35  Mich.  296,  24  Am.  Rep.  552; 
Cubit  V.  O'Dett,  51  Mich.  347;  Mor- 


ley  V.  Buchanan,  124  Mich.  128,  82 
N.  W.  802;  Kobs  v.  Minneapolis,  22 
Minn.  159;  O'Brien  v.  St.  Paul,  25 
Minn.  331 ;  Thurston  v.  St.  Joseph, 
51  Mo.  510;  Field  v.  West  Orange, 
36  N.  J.  Eq.  118;  West  Orange  v. 
Field,  37  N.  J.  L.  600;  Byrnes  v. 
Cohoes,  67  N.  Y.  204;  Bastable  v. 
Syracuse,  8  Hun  587 ;  Noonan  v.  Al- 
bany, 79  N.  Y.  470,  35  Am.  Rep.  540 ; 
Seifert  v.  Brooklyn,  101  N.  Y.  136, 
54  Am.  Rep.  664;  Rhodes  v.  Cleve- 
land, 10  Ohio  159;  Limerick  etc. 
Turnpike  Co.'s  Appeal,  -80  Pa.  St. 
425;  Huddleston  v.  West  Bellevue, 
111  Pa.  St.  110;  Torrey  v.  City  of 
Scranton,  133  Pa.  St.  173,  19  Atl. 
351;  Inmann  v.  Tripp,  11  R.  I.  520, 
23  Am.  Rep.  520;  Johnson  v.  White, 
26  R.  L  207,  58  Atl.  658,  65  L.R.A. 
250;  Houston  v.  Hutcheson,  39  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  337,  81  S.  W.  96 ;  Gillison 
V.  Charleston,  16  W.  Va.  282,  37  Am. 
Rep.  763;  Jordan  v.  Benwood,  42 
W.  Va.  312,  26  S.  E.  266,  57  Am. 
St.  Rep.  859,  36  L.R.A.  519;  Mc- 
Crary  v.  Fairmount,  46  W.  Va.  442, 
33  S.  E.  245;  Pettigrew  v.  Evans- 
ville, 25  Wis.  223;  Rowe  v.  Roch- 
ester, 29  U.  C.  Q.  B.  590;  ante,  §  112. 
And  see  Stamford  v.  San  Francisco, 
111  Cal.  198,  43  Pac.  605;  Commis- 
sioners V.  Whitsett,  15  111.  App.  318; 
Palmer  v.  O'Donnell,  15  111.  App. 
324;  Wilbur  v.  Ft.  Dodge  120  la, 
555,    95    N.    W.    186;    McCarthy   v. 


234 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  141 


this  view,  especially  in  the  earlier  cases.''*  Where  a  natural  out- 
let for  surface  water  is  obstructed  by  raising  the  grade  of  a 
street,  and  the  water  is  thus  caused  to  accumulate  and  stand  on 
private  property,  the  corporation  will  be  liable.''^  And  so  in 
some  States  where  the  water  is  obstructed  and  caused  to  accumu- 
late on  the  plaintiff's  property,  though  no  defined  channel  or 
marked  depression  is  interfered  with.'^*  But  where  the  law  of 
the  State  is  that  every  owner  of  land  may  improve  his  lot  as  he 
pleases,  without  liability  on  account  of  surface  water,  there 
will,  of  course,  be  no  liability  on  the  part  of  municipal  corpo- 
rations for  any  interference  with  the  flow  of  surface  water 
whereby  it  is  dammed  back  or  turned  upon  private  property. '^^ 


Far  Rockaway,  3  App.  Div.  379,  38 
N.  Y.  Supp.  989;  Carll  v.  Northport, 
11  App.  Div.  120,  42  N.  Y.  Supp.  576. 
'2Bronson  v.  Wallingford,  54 
Conn.  513;  Downs  v.  Anaonia,  73 
Conn.  33,  46  Atl.  243;  Roll  v.  Au- 
gusta, 34  Ga.  326;  Conwell  v.  Em- 
rie,  4  Ind.  209;  Vincennes  v.  Rich- 
ards, 23  Ind.  381;  Platter  v.  Sey- 
mour, 86  Ind.  323;  Cummings  v. 
Seymour,  79  Ind.  491 ;  Cumberland 
V.  Willison,  50  Md.  138;  Flagg  v. 
Worcester,  13  Gray  601 ;  Turner  v. 
Dartmouth,  13  Allen  291;  Alden  v. 
Minneapolis,  24  Minn.  254;  St.  Louis 
V.  Gurno,  12  Mo.  414;  Taylor  v.  City 
of  St.  Louis,  14  Mo.  20,  55  Am.  Dec. 
89;  Hoffman  v.  St.  Louis,  15  Mo. 
651 ;  (Last  three  cases  overruled  in 
Thurston  v.  St.  Joseph,  51  Mo.  510)  ; 
Steinmeyer  v.  St.  Louis,  3  Mo.  App. 
256;  Foster  v.  St.  Louis,  4  Mo.  App. 
564;  Same  v.  Same,  71  Mo.  157; 
Stewart  v.  Clinton,  79  Mo.  603; 
Durkee  v.  Town  of  Union,  38  N.  J.  L. 
21;  Kavanaugh  v.  Brooklyn,  38 
Barb.  232;  Mills  v.  Brooklyn,  32  N. 
Y.  489;  Lynch  v.  Mayor  etc.  of  New 
York,  76  N.  Y.  60;  Wright  v.  Wil- 
mington, 92  N.  C.  156;  Wakefield  v. 
Newell,  12  R.  I.  75;  Allen  v.  Chip- 
pewa Falls,  52  Wis.  430,  38  Am. 
Rep.  748;  Waters  v.  Bay  View,  61 
Wis.  642;  Heth  v.  Fond  du  Lac,  63 
Wis.    228;    see    also    the    following 


cases  where  the  lots  were  below 
grade:  Freyburg  v.  Davenport,  63 
la.  119;  Gilfeather  v.  Council  BhiiTs, 
69  la.  310;  Morris  v.  Council  BlufTs, 
67  la.  343,  56  Am.  Rep.  343;  Mes- 
sing V.  District  of  Columbia,  3 
Maekey,  572;  Gilluly  v.  Madison,  63 
Wis.  518,  52  Am.  Rep.  299;  HirtU 
V.  Indianapolis,  18  Ind.  App.  673; 
Hart  V.  Baraboo,  101  Wis.  368; 
Yager  v.  Fairmount,  43  W.  Va.  259 ; 
Sharp  V.  Cincinnati,  4  Ohio  C.  0. 
(N.  S.)   19. 

7  3Kemper  v.  Louisville,  14  Bush 
(Ky.)  87;  McClure  v.  City  of  Red 
Wing,  28  Minn.  186.  A  similar  case 
was  differently  decided  in  Hoyt  v. 
Hudson,  27  Wis.  656,  where  it  was 
held  that  the  defendant  was  not  lia- 
ble for  obstructing  a  ravine  which 
formed  the  natural  outlet  of  sur- 
face water. 

liSee  ante,  §§  112,  113;  North  Jud- 
son  V.  Lighteap,  41  Ind.  App.  565. 

'5  Herring  v.  District  of  Columbia, 
3  Maekey  572;  Davis  v.  City  of 
Crawfordsville,  119  Ind.  1,  21  N.  E. 
449;  Valparaiso  v.  Spaeth,  166  Ind. 
14,  76  N.  E.  514;  Walter  v.  County 
•Comrs.,  35  Md.  385 ;  Sprague  v.  Wor- 
cester, 13  Gray  193;  Dickinson  y. 
Worcester,  7  Allen  19;  Rose  v.  St. 
Charles,  49  Mo.  509 ;  Imler  v.  Spring- 
field, 55  Mo.  119;  Wilson  v.  Mayer 
etc.  of  New  Y'ork,  1  Denio  595;  Mills 


§  142 


EOADS    AND    STREETS. 


235 


In  Iowa  it  is  held  that,  where  the  injury  to  adjoining  property 
could  be  foreseen,  and  it  was  practicable  and  reasonable  to  pre- 
vent it  by  the  construction  of  sewers  and  culverts,  it  is  the  duty 
of  the  corporation  to  do  so,  and  that  for  neglect  of  this  duty  it 
will  be  liable.'"  The  liability  is  put  upon  the  ground  of  a  want 
of  care  and  skill  in  the  construction  of  the  works.''  Where  sur- 
face water  is  caused  to  accumulate  in  a  pond  which,  by  becoming 
stagnant,  diffuses  unwholesome  vapors  over  the  neighborhood, 
the  corporation  will  be  liable,  provided  the  accumulation  is  due 
to  its  wrongful  act  as  by  obstructing  a  natural  outlet  for  such 
water.'*  The  subject  of  surface  water,  and  liability  for  inter- 
ference with  the  flow  of  the  same,  are  treated  in  a  former  chap- 
ter.'» 

§  142  (104).  Interfering  with  natural  streams.  Where 
a  municipal  corporation,  in  improving  its  streets  dr  in  building 
or  repairing  a  bridge,  interferes  with  the  flow  of  a  natural 
stream,  it  will  be  liable  for  any  damage  resulting  to  private 


V.  City  of  Brooklyn,  32  N.  Y.  489; 
Gould  V.  Booth,  66  N.  Y.  62;  Wat- 
son V.  City  of  Kingston,  114  N.  Y. 
88,  21  N.  E.  102';  Acker  v.  Town  of 
New  Castle,  48  Hun  312,  15  N.  Y. 
St.  894,  1  N.  Y.  Supp.  223;  Anchor 
Brewing  Co.  v.  Village  of  Dobbs 
Ferry,  84  Hun  274,  32  N.  Y.  Supp. 
371;  Bush  v.  City  of  Portland,  19 
Or.  45,  23  Pac.  667,  20  Am.  St.  Rep. 
789;  Lafferty  v.  Girardville,  1  Mon- 
aghan  (Pa.  Supm.)  513;  Hoyt  v. 
Hudson,  27  Wis.  656;  and  see  Lan- 
der V.  City  of  Bath,  85  Me.  141,  26 
Atl.  Hep.  1091;  Almy  v.  Coggeshall, 
19  R.  I.  549.  So  held  also  where  a 
natural  watercourse  was  intercept- 
ed; Mayor  etc.  of  Philadelphia  v. 
Randolph,  4  W.  &  S.  514. 

7  6Cotes  V.  Davenport,  9  la.  227; 
Templin  v.  Iowa  City,  14  la.  59,  81 
Am.  Dec.  455;  Ellis  v.  Same,  29  la. 
229;  Damour  v.  Lyons  City,  44  la. 
276;  Russell  v.  Burlington,  30  la. 
262;  Ross  v.  Clinton,  46  la.  606,  26 
Am.  Rep.  169;  Powers  v.  Council 
Bluffs,  50  la.  197 ;  see  Commissioners 
of  Kensington  v.  Wood,  10  Pa.  St. 


93;  Rowe  v.  Addison,  34  N.  H.  308; 
Parker  v.  Nashua,  59  N.  H.  402; 
Clark  V.  Rochester,  43  Hun  271. 

TTSee  also  Los  Angeles  Cemetery 
Ass.  V.  Los  Angeles,  103  Cal.  461,  37 
Pac.  Rep.  375;  Princeton  v.  Gieske, 
93  Ind.  102 ;  Benson  v.  Wilmington,  9 
Houston  359;  Schuett  v.  Stillwater, 
80  Minn.  287,  83  N.  W.  180;  Haney 
V.  City  of  Kansas,  94  Mo.  334,  7  S. 
W.  417;  Flanders  v.  Franklin,  70 
N.  H.  168,  47  Atl.  88;  Rutherford  v. 
HoUey,   105  N.  Y.   632. 

7  8Nevins  v.  Peoria,  41  111.  502,  89 
Am.  Dec.  392;  Weeks  v.  Milwaukee, 
10  Wis.  242;  Smith  v.  Milwaukee, 
18  Wis.  63;  Clark  v.  Rochester,  43 
Hun  271;an(i:seea»*e§§108,112,113. 
Contra:  Clark  v.  Wilmington,  5 
Harr.  (Del.)  243;  Taylor  v.  St. 
Louis,  14  Mo.  20,  55  Am.  Dec.  89; 
Russell  V.  Burlington,  30  la.  262; 
Allen  V.  City  of  Paris,  1  Tex.  App. 
Civil  Cas.  p.  506;  and  see  Corcoran 
V.  City  of  Benicia,  96  Cal.  1,  30  Pac. 
Rep.  798;  Watson  v.  Kingston,  43 
Hun  367. 

TSAnte,  §§  110-113. 


236 


EMIITENT    rvOMAIIT. 


§  143 


jDroperty.^"  If  a  city  substitutes  a  drain  or  sewer  of  insufficient 
capacity  for  a  natural  watercourse,  and  the  water  is  set  back 
upon  private  property,  it  will  be  liable.*^  And,  generally,  a 
city  interferes  with  a  stream  of  water  at  its  peril.*^ 

§  143  (105).  Unlawful  change  of  grade.  A  recovery 
may  be  had  in  all  cases  where  the  change  of  grade  is  unlawful,** 
as  when  the  statute  requires  the  consent  of  a  certain  proportion 
of  the  property  holders,  and  the  change  is  made  without  such 
consent,**  or  provides  that  the  woi'k  shall  not  be  done  until  after 
an  assessment  of  benefits  to  defray  the  expense  has  been  con- 
firmed, and  such  provision  is  disregarded,*^  or  requires  a  two- 


soMayor  etc.  of  Helena  v.  Thomp- 
son, 29  Ark.  569 ;  Larrabee  v.  Clover- 
dale,  131  Cal.  96,  63  Pac.  143;  Mc- 
Cord  V.  High,  24  la.  336;  Lawrence 
V.  Inhabitants  of  Fairhaven,  5  Gray 
110;  Perry  v.  Worcester,  6  Gray  544; 
Stone  V.  Augusta,  46  Me.  127;  iut 
see  Mayor  etc.  of  Philadelphia  v. 
Randolph,  4  W.  &  S.  514;  Ely  v. 
Rochester,  26  Barb.  133. 

siMayor  etc.  of  Helena  v.  Thomp- 
son, 29  Ark.  569.  A  similar  case 
was  differently  and  it  seems  to  us 
wrongly  decided  in  Collins  v.  Phila- 
delphia, 93  Pa.  St.  272. 

8  2In  McMahon  v.  Council  Bluffs, 
12  la.  268,  it  was  held  that  a  bill 
would  not  lie  to  prevent  a  city 
changing  the  bed  of  a  stream  so  as 
to  cause  the  same  to  flow  in  the 
street  in  front  of  the  plaintiff's 
property.  On  the  subject  of  inter- 
fering with  the  flow  of  streams  see 
the  last  chapter. 

ssRoberts  v.  Chicago,  26  111.  249; 
Lafayette  v.  Nagle,  113  Ind.  425; 
Freeland  v.  Muscatine,  9  la.  461 ; 
Richardson  v.  Webster  City,  111  la. 
427,  82  N.  W.  920;  Brown  v.  Web- 
ster City,  115  la.  511,  88  N.  W. 
1070;  Richardson  v.  Sioux  City,  136 
la.  436,  113  N.  W.  928;  Topeka 
V.  Sells,  48  Kan.  520,  29  Pac.  604; 
Schneider  v.  Detroit,  72  Mich.  240, 
40  N.  W.  329,  2  L.R.A.  54;  Phelps 
V.  Detroit,  120  Mich.  447,  79  N.  W. 


640;  Rakowslcy  v.  Duluth,  44  Minn. 
188,  46  N.  W.  338;  Hill  v.  St.  Louis, 
59  Mo.  412;  Themanson  v.  City  of 
Kearney,  35  Neb.  881,  53  N.  W.  1009; 
Fuller  V.  Mt.  Vernon,  171  N.  Y.  247, 
63  N.  E.  984,  affirming  S.  C.  64  App. 
Div.  621 ;  Leman  v.  New  York,  5 
Bos.  414;  Triest  v.  New  York,  55 
Misc.  459,  105  N.  Y.  S.  571 ;  Meinzer 
V.  Racine,  68  Wis.  241 ;  Drummond 
V.  City  of  Eau  Claire,  85  Wis.  556, 
55  N.  W.  1028;  Ayres  v.  Windsor, 
14  Ont.  682;  West  v.  Parkdale,  15 
Ont.  319.  But  see  West  v.  Parkdale, 
12  U.  C.  App.  393.  The  power  to 
establish  grades  must  be  strictly 
pursued.  State  v.  City  of  Bayonne, 
54  N.  J.  L.  293,  23  Atl.  648;  State 
V.  Borough  of  Rutherford,  55  N.  J. 
L.  450,  26  Atl.  933;  Farrell  v.  St. 
Paul,  62  Minn.  271,  64  N.  W.  809, 
54  Am.  St.  Rep.  641;  Feuerstein  v. 
Jackson,  8  Ohio  C.  C.  396;  Fisher 
v.  Naysmith,  106  Mich.  71,  64  N. 
W.  19;  Blanden  v.  Ft.  Dodge,  102  la. 
441;  Paine  v.  Lettsville,  103  la.  481; 
Sweet  V.  Conley,  20  R.  I.  381,  39  Atl. 
326. 

s^Crossett  v.  Janesville,  28  Wis. 
420;  Mott  V.  New  York,  2  Hilton, 
358 ;  Fohnsbee  v.  City  of  Amsterdam, 
142  N.  Y.  118,  36  N.  E.  821,  affirming 
S.  C.  66  Hun  214,  21  N.  Y.  Supp.  42. 

SBDore  v.  Milwaukee,  42  Wis.  108; 
Friedrich  v.  Milwaukee,  114  Wis. 
304,  90  N.  W.  174. 


§  144 


EOADS    AND    STREETS. 


237 


thirds  vote  of  the  city  council  which  is  not  obtained,^®  or  when 
the  change  is  made  by  a  railroad  company  or  individuals  without 
authority.^''  A  city  was  held  liable  where  the  grade  of  a  street 
was  changed,  not  for  the  purpose  of  improving  the  street,  but 
to  get  material  to  be  used  in  other  parts  of  the  city.^^  An  un- 
authorized change  of  grade  may  be  made  valid  by  ratification,**^ 
or  by  act  of  the  legislature.®"  In  such  case  it  has  been  held  that 
a  party  injured  can  only  recover  the  damages  sustained  between 
the  making  of  the  change  and  the  ratification  or  confirmation.*"^ 
It  is  held  that  an  imauthorized  change  of  grade  may  be  en- 
joined.^^  Where  a  city  could  only  change  a  grade  by  ordinance, 
and  a  change  was  made  without  an  ordinance,  it  was  held  the 

city  was  not  liable,  though  the  persons  executing  the  work  would 
be.«3 

§  144  (106).     When    the    work    is    negligently    done. 

Damages  which  result  from  negligence  or  unskillfulness  in  doing 
the  work  are  actionable.^*    In  such  cases  the  question  of  a  taking 


86Trustees  of  P.  E.  Church  v.  Ana- 
mosa,  76  la.  538,  41  N.  W.  313;  Cald- 
well V.  Nashua,  122  la.  179,  97  N. 
W.  1000;  Markham  v.  Anamosa,  122 
la.  689,  98  N.  W.  493. 

8  7Karst  V.  St.  Paul  S.  &  T.  F. 
R.  R.  Co.,  22  Minn.  118;  Same  v. 
Same,  23  Minn.  401 ;  Price  v.  Knott, 
8  Oreg.  438;  Schaufele  v.  Doyle,  86 
Cal.  107,  24  Pac.  834;  Larned  v. 
Briscoe,  62  Mich.  393,  29  N.  W. 
22;  Gebling  v.  City  of  St.  Joseph,  49 
Mo.  App.  430. 

ssMayor  etc.  of  Macon  v.  Hill,  58 
Ga.  595. 

ssAppeal  of  McCormick,  165  Pa.  St. 
386,  30  Atl.  986;  Deer  v.  Sheraden, 
220  Pa.  St.  307,  69  Atl.  814;  Wolfe 
V.  Pearson,  114  N.  C.  627,  19  S.  E. 
264. 

soHimmelmann  v.  Hoadley,  44  Cal. 
213;  Hoadley  v.  San  Francisco,  50 
Cal.  265. 

siWolfe  V.  Pearson,  114  N.  C.  627, 
19  S.  E.  264. 

9  2Schaufele  v.  Doyle,  86  Cal.  107, 
24  Pac.  834 ;  Koeffler  v.  City  of  Mil- 
waukee, 85  Wis.  397,  55  N.  W.  400; 


and  see  Mayor  etc.  of  Baltimore  v. 
Porter,  18  Md.  284. 

9  3  Reed  v.  Peck,  163  Mo.  333,  63 
S.  W.  734 ;  Gebling  v.  St.  Joseph,  49 
Mo.  App.  430;  Beatty  v.  St.  Joseph, 
57  Mo.  App.  251;  Hall  v.  Trenton, 
86  Mo.  App.  326;  Kroffe  v. 
Springfield,  86  Mo.  App.  530;  Koep- 
pen  V.  Sedalia,  89  Mo.  App.  648; 
Gardner  v.  St.  Joseph,  96  Mo.  App. 
657,  71  S.  W.  63.  And  so  where  the 
grade  was  raised  above  the  estab- 
lished grade  by  mistake  of  the  city 
engineer  in  giving  the  grades.  Sie- 
vers  V.  San  Francisco,  115  Cal.  648, 
47  Pac.  687,  56  Am.  St.  Rep.  153. 

siDistrict  of   Columbia  v.  Atchi- 
son, 31  App.  Cas.  D.  C.  250;  North 
Vernon   v.    Voegler,    103    Ind.    314 
Paris  V.  Current,  15  Ky.  L.  R.  126 
Wegmann  v.   Jeflferson,   61   Mo.  55 
Thompson  v.  Booneville,  61  Mo.  282 
Werth  v.   Springfield,   78  Mo.   107 
Mears  v.  Wilmington,  9  Ired.  L.  73 
49  Am.  Dec.  412;  Smith  v.  Alexan 
dria,   33   Gratt.  208;   Harrisburg  v, 
Roller,  97  Va.  582,  34  S.  E.  523. 


238  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    145 

does  not  arise.  The  gist  of  the  action  is  negligence,  and  the 
recovery  is  limited  to  such  damages  as  result  from  that  cause. 

§  145  (107).  Power  to  establish  grades  a  continuing 
one.  It  is  immaterial  whether  the  damages  complained  of  are 
caused  by  bringing  the  natural  surface  of  the  street  into  conform- 
ity with  the  first  established 'grade,  or  by  changing  a  grade  al- 
ready established.  The  power  to  improve  and  graduate  streets 
is  a  continuing  power,  which  municipal  corporations  or  public 
authorities  possess  for  the  public  benefit,  and  which  is  not  ex- 
hausted by  the  first  exercise  nor  capable  of  being  bargained 
away.  This  question  first  arose  in  a  very  early  case  in  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States.®^  The  corporation  of 
Georgetown,  having  power  to  graduate  and  level  streets,  passed 
an  ordinance  to  fix  the  grade  of  certain  streets,  and  provided  that 
the  grade  so  established  should  forever  thereafter  be  considered 
as  the  true  graduation  of  the  streets  so  graduated  and  be  binding 
upon  the  corporation  and  all  other  persons  whatever,  and  be 
forever  thereafter  regarded  in  making  improvements  on  said 
streets.  The  plaintiff  improved  his  lot  with  reference  to  the 
grade  so  established,  and  the  corporation  afterwards  passed  an 
ordinance  changing  the  grade.  The  suit  was  to  enjoin  the 
change.  The  court  held  that  the  plaintiff  had  no  remedy,  that 
the  power  in  question  was  a  continuing  one,  and  that  the  corpo- 
ration could  not,  by  contract  or  otherwise,  abridge  or  annul  its 
legislative  functions.  All  the  authorities  are  in  accord  with  this 
decision.^® 

§  146  (108).  Power  of  city  to  make  compensation. 
The  justice  of  the  claim  for  compensation  in  such  cases  is  so 
plain,  that  any  public  corporation  would  undoubtedly  be  sus- 

95Goszler  v.  Georgetown,  6  Wheat.  162;  Waddell  v.  Mayor  etc.  of  New 

593.  York,  8  Barb.  95;  Rounds  v.  Mum- 

9  6Macey  v.  Indianapolis,  17  Ind.  ford,  2  R.  I.  154;  Matter  of  Furman 

267;    Kokomo   v.    Malion,    100   Ind.  Street,  17  Wend.  649;  City  of  Tren- 

242;  Creal  v.  Keokuk,  4  G.  Greene,  ton  v.  McQuade,  52  N.  J.  Eq.  669, 

la.  47;  Russell  v.  Burlington,  30  la.  29  Atl.  354;  Columbus  Gas  Light  etc. 

262 ;  Methodist  Episcopal  Church  v.  Co.  v.  City  of  Columbus,  50  Ohio  St. 

Wyandotte,  31  Kan.  721;   Keasy  v.  65,  33  N.  E.  292,  40  Am.   St.  Rep. 

Louisville,  4  Dana  154,  29  Am.  Dec.  648,     19     L.R.A.     510;     Wabash    v. 

395;  Reynolds  v.  Shreveport,  13  La.  Defiance,     52     Ohio     St.     262,     40 

Ann.    426;    Peddicord   v.   Baltimore  N.  E.  89;   Grant  v.  Hyde  Park,  67 

etc.  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  34  Md.  463;  City  Ohio   St.    166,    175,   65   N.   E.   891; 

of  Pontiac  v.  Carter,  32  Mich.  104;  Roanoke  Gas  Co.  v.  Roanoke,  88  Va. 

Hoffman  v.  St.  Louis,  15  Mo.  051;  810,  14  S.  E.  665;  Mead  v.  Portland, 

Schattner  v.  City  of  Kansas,  53  Mo.  200  U.  S.  148,  26  S,  C.  171. 


i    14:8  BOADS    AND    STEEETS.  239 

tained  by  the  courts  in  the  voluntary  discharge  of  such  a  claim. 
And  where  a  city,  by  ordinances,  establishes  a  grade  and  pledges 
its  faith  that  such  grade  shall  not  thereafter  be  changed  to  the 
injury  of  any  individual  without  full  compensation,  the  city 
will  be  compelled  to  live  up  to  its  pledge.®' 

§  147  (109).  Miscellaneous  cases.  A  city  is  not  liable 
for  inconvenience  occasioned  by  a  ditch  along  a  street  which  is 
constructed  under  proper  authority,  even  though  it  becomes  en- 
larged by  erosion  so  as  greatly  to  impair  access  to  adjoining  prop- 
erty.^* Where  a  turnpike  company  takes  a  highway,  it  will  have 
the  same  right  to  repair  and  improve  it  as  the  highway  commis- 
sioners, and  will  not  be  liable  for  consequential  damages  for 
which  the  commissioners  are  not  liable.  ®®  Wo  recovery  can  be 
had  for  damage  to  business  during  the  progress  of  improvements 
on  a  street.^  Where  the  charter  of  a  city  provided  that  the 
council  should  establish  the  general  grade  of  its  streets  as  soon 
as  practicable,  and  that  the  city  should  pay  for  damages  caused 
by  any  change  of  such  grades,  in  a  case  arising  under  the  charter 
it  was  held  that  the  court  could  not  determine  when  it  was  prac- 
ticable for  the  city  to  establish  general  grades,  and  consequently 
could  not  cast  the  city  in  damages  on  the  ground  of  neglect  to 
comply  with  the  law.^  Where  it  was  shown  that  a  proposed 
change  of  grade  would  render  the  street  impassable,  and  be  no 
benefit  but  a  detriment  to  the  public,  it  was  held  that  a  bill 
would  lie  to  enjoin  the  change.* 

§  148  (109a).  Right  to  compensation  for  change  of 
grade  under  statutes  and  recent  constitutions.  The  right 
to  compensation  for  a  change  of  grade  under  statutes  specially 
providing  therefor,  and  under  recent  constitutions  giving  com- 
pensation for  property  damaged  or  injured,  as  well  as  for  prop- 
erty taken,  is  treated  of  in  a  subsequent  chapter.* 

s'Goodall   V.   Milwaukee,   5    Wis.  iPlant  v.  Long  Island  K.  R.  Co., 

32;  and  see  Fisk  v.  Springfield,  116  10  Barb.  26.     See  Munn  v.  Boston, 

Mass.  88.  183  Mass.  421,  67  N.  E.  312. 

ssLambar   v.    St.    Louis,    15    Mo.  2gchattner  v.  City  of  Kansas,  53 

610;   Benjamin  v.  Wheeler,  8  Gray  Mo.  162. 

409;    lut    see    Carondelet    Canal    &  3Armstrong   v.    St.   Louis,   3  Mo. 

Nav.    Co.   V.   New    Orleans,    38    La.  App.  151. 

An.  308.  ifost,  chap.  viii. 

99Dexter  v.  Broat,  16  Barb.  337. 


240  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    149 


III. — ^Eaileoads  in  Streets. 

§  149  (110).  In  general.  It  is  common  all  over  the  coun- 
try for  railroads  to  be  laid  down  upon  the  streets  of  cities  and 
\fillages.  The  loss  which  has  been  occasioned  to  individuals  by 
this  means  is  very  great;  the  suits  which  have  been  instituted 
to  recover  for  such  loss  are  very  numerous ;  the  decisions  which 
have  been  rendered  therein  by  the  different  courts,  and  even  by 
the  same  courts  at  different  times,  are  conflicting  and  irreconcil- 
able.^ "Few  questions,"  says  the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals, 
"have  come  before  the  courts  in  this  generation  of  greater  prac- 
tical importance,  or  involving  larger  pecuniary  interests,  than 
those  growing  out  of  the  construction  of  railways  in  city 
streets."  ^ 

§  150  (110a).  Classification  of  railroads.  Eailroads 
now  exist  in  great  variety  as  regards  motors  and  motive  power, 
the  size  and  style  of  cars  and  coaches,  the  nature  of  their  traffic 
and  methods  of  operation  and  construction.  It  is  probable  that 
these  variations  will  be  multiplied  in  the  coming  years.  It  is 
doubtful  whether  any  permanent  and  satisfactory  classification 
can  now  be  made.  There  has  been  a  general  concurrence,  how- 
ever, in  embracing  all  railroads  in  two  divisions  or  classes;  (1) 
commercial  railroads,  and  (2)  street  railroads.^^  Commercial 
railroads  embrace  all  railroads  for  general  freight  and  passenger 
traffic  between  one  town  and  another,  or  between  one  place  and 
another.'^  So  far  they  have  not  been  successfully  operated,  to 
any  extent  at  least,  except  by  steam.  They  are  usually  not 
constructed  upon  the  public  streets  or  highways  except  for  short 

6This  was  said  in  the  first  edition  "Railroads    for   general    traffic''   by 

and    has    been    greatly    emphasized  Caldwell,    J.,    in   Williams    v.    City 

by  the  litigation  since  that  time.  Electric   Street  R.   R.   Co.,   41    Fed. 

6Kane  v.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  Rep.    556.      They    are    also    called 

125  N.  Y.  164,  26  N.  E.  278,  11  L.R.A.  "Commercial  railroads"  as  in  Newell 

640;   S.  C.  Sub.  Norn.  Duycknick  v.  v.   Minneapolis    etc.   R.   R.    Co.,    35 

New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Am.  R.  R.  Minn.   112,   119,   59   Am.  Rep.   303; 

&  Corp.  Rep.  744.  East   End   St.  R.   R.   Co.  v.   Doyle, 

eaWilder     v.     Aurora    etc.     Elec.  88  Tenn.  747,  9  L.R.A.  100,  2  Am. 

Traction  Co.,  216  111.  493,  75  N.  E.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  747,  and  Nichols 

194.  V.  Ann  Arbor  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  87  Mich. 

TThis   class   of   railroads   is  most  361,  49   N.   W.   538,   16  L.R.A.   371. 

generally  referred  to  as  the  "ordi-  The  phrase  "Commercial  railroads" 

nary  steam  railroad."     See  2  Dill.  is    employed    in    many    other    cases 

Munic.  Corp.,  §  725.    They  are  called  cited  in  the  following  sections. 


§  151  EOADS  AND  STKEETS.  241 

distances.  Street  railroads  embrace  all  such  as  are  constructed 
and  operated  in  the  public  streets  for  the  purpose  of  conveying 
passengers  with  their  ordinary  hand  luggage  from  one  point 
to  another  on  the  street.*  Street  passenger  railroads  exist  in 
great  variety  as  regards  their  modes  of  construction  and  opera- 
tion and  may  be  classified  as  follows:  (1)  Horse  railroads. 
(2)  Elevated  railroads.  (3)  Cable  roads.  (4)  Steam  motor 
railroads.  (5)  Electric  railroads.  (6)  Under  ground  rail- 
roads. As  different  conclusions  have  been  reached  by  the  same 
courts  regarding  the  use  of  streets  for  these  different  sorts  of 
roads,  we  shall  consider  them  separately. 

There  is  now  a  kind  of  railroads  known  as  interurhan  roads, 
which  connect  different  towns  and  generally  resemble  both  the 
commercial  railroad  and  the  street  railroad.  Eor  convenience 
they  may  be  regarded  as  a  third  and  distinct  class  of  railroads 
and,  as  respects  the  use  of  streets,  they  will  be  considered  in  a 
separate  section.® 

§  151  (111).  Is  a  commercial  railroad  a  legitimate  use 
of  a  street  or  highway?  To  us  it  seems  so  clear  that  a  com- 
mercial railroad  is  foreign  to  the  legitimate  uses  of  a  highway, 
that  we  never  have  been  able  to  understand  how  a  court  could 
reach  a  contrary  conclusion.  Highways  are  established  to  ac- 
commodate the  public  in  traveling  from  place  to  place.  From 
time  immemorial,  prior  to  the  discovery  of  steam,  they  were  for 
the  common  use  of  every  citizen,  by  any  means  of  locomotion 

sHarvey  v.  Aurora  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  way  is,  that  it  is  built  upon  and 
174  III.  295,  51  N.  B.  163;  Aurora  passes  along  streets  and  avenues  for 
V.  Elgin  etc.  Traction  Co.,  227  111.  the  convenience  of  those  moving 
485,  81  N.  E.  544,  118  Am.  St.  Rep.  from  place  to  place  thereon.  Its 
284;  Gillette  v.  Aurora  Rys.  Co.,  228  fundamental  purpose  is  to  accommo- 
III.  261,  81  N.  E.  1005;  Diebold  v.  date  street  travel,  and  not  travel  to 
Ky.  Traction  Co.,  117  Ky.  146,  77  iS.  or  from  points  beyond  the  city  lines. 
W.  674,  63  L.R.A.  637;  Nichols  v.  Commercial  railroads  embrace  all 
Ann  Arbor  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  87  Mich.  railroads  for  general  freight  and  pas- 
361,  49  N.  W.  538,  541,  16  L.R.A.  senger  traffic  betvpeen  one  town  and 
371;  Rafferty  v.  Central  Traction  another,  and  street  railways  em- 
Co.,  147  Pa.  St.  579,  23  Atl.  884,  30  brace  all  such  as  are  constructed 
Am.  St.  Rep.  763,  6  Am.  R.  R.  &  and  operated  in  the  public  streets 
Corp.  Rep.  287;  Williams  v.  City  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  passen- 
Elec.  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  41  Fed.  556.  In  gers  with  their  ordinary  luggage 
Aurora  v.  Elgin  etc.  Traction  Co.,  from  one  point  to  another  on  the 
227  111.  485,  81  N.  E.  544,  118  Am.  street."  p.  496. 
St.  Rep.  284,  the  court  says:  "The  ^Post,  §  258. 
chief  characteristic  of  a  street  rail- 
Em.  D.— 16. 


242  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    151 

he  ctose  to  select.  They  were  not  used  by  one  person  in  any 
way  which  was  not  open  to  all.  No  One  had  a  private  right  or 
any  exclusive  privilege  therein.  It  was  free  to  all  upon  like 
conditions.  Such  being  the  character  of  the  public  highway,  it 
was  subject  to  use  by  any  new  means  of  locomotion  which  could 
be  employed  by  all  the  public,  and  was  not  destructive  of  the 
old  methods  of  travel.  A  carriage  propelled  upon  the  ordinary 
surface  of  the  road  by  steam  or  electricity  would  be  just  as 
legitimate  as  a  carriage  drawn  by  horses.  Such  use  would  be 
equally  open  to  every  citizen.  The  railroad  does  not  fall  within 
the  scope  of  such  uses.  It  requires  a  permanent  structure  in  the 
street,  the  use  of  which  is  private  and  exclusive,  so  far  as  its 
peculiar  traffic  is  concerned,  (it  gives  to  an  individual  or  corpo- 
ration a  franchise  and  easement  in  the  street,^"  inconsistent  with 
the  public  right.  To  hold  that  a  commercial  railroad  is  one  of 
the  proper  and  legitimate  uses  of  a  street  leads  to  the  absurd 
consequence  that  a  street  might  be  filled  with  parallel  tracks 
which  would  practically  exclude  all  ordinary  travel  and  still  be 
devoted  to  the  ordinary  uses  of  a  highway,  t  The  law  ought  not 
to  tolerate  such  a  consequence.  We  shall  not  review  the  au- 
thorities or  attempt  to  reconcile  them.  They  will  be  found  in 
the  note.^^ 

The  question  first  arose  in  this  country  in  case  of  Philadel- 

lONew   Orkans,    Spanish   Fort   &  Brancli  R.  R.  Co.,  26  Conn.  249,  68 

Lake  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Delamore,  114  U.  Am.  Dee.  392;  South  Carolina  R.  R. 

S.  501.  Co.  V.  Steiner,  44  Ga.  546;  Athens 

11  We  shall  cite  in  this  note  only  Terminal    Co.   v.    Athens    F.    &   M. 

cases  in  which  the  particular  point  Works,   129  Ga.  393,  58  S.  E.  891 ; 

is  discussed.     The  same  point  is  in-  Indianapolis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hart- 

volved  in   other  cases   subsequently  ley,  67  111.  439;  O'Connell  v.  Chicago 

cited.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  184  111.  308,  56  N.  E. 

First,  cases  holding  commercial  353;  Spalding  v.  Macomb  etc.  Ry. 
railroads  not  to  be  one  of  the  legiti-  Co.,  225  111.  585,  80  N.  E.  327;  Cox 
mate  users  of  a  street:  Western  Ry.  v.  Louisville  R.  R.  Co.,  48  Ind.  178; 
of  Ala.  V.  Ala.  G.  T.  R.  R.  Co.,  96  Kucheman  v.  C.  C.  &  D.  Ry.  Co., 
Ala.  272,  11  So.  483,  17  L.R.A.  474;  46  la.  366;  Phipps  v.  West  Mary- 
Reichert  v.  St.  Louis  R.  R.  Co.,  51  land  R.  R.  Co.,  66  Md.  319;  Spring- 
Ark.  491,  5  L.R.A.  183;  Southern  field  v.  Connecticut  Riv.  R.  R.  Co., 
Pacific  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Reed,  41  Cal.  4  Gush.  63,  71 ;  Grand  Rapids  &  In- 
256;  (6m*  see  Montgomery  v.  Santa  diana  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Heisel,  47  Mich. 
Ana  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  104  Cal.  186,  37  393;  Ecorse  Tp.  v.  Jackson  etc.  Ry. 
Pac.  786,  10  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  Co.,  153  Mich.  393 ;  Harrington  v.  St. 
25,  43  Am.  St.  Rep.  89,  25  L.R.A.  Paul  &  Sioux  City  R.  R.  Co.,  17 
654)  ;  Denver  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Domke,  Minn.  215;  Adams  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R. 
11     Colo.     247;     Imlay     v.     Union  R.  Co.,  39  Minn.  286,  39  N.  W.  629, 


§  151 


ROADS    AND    STEEETS. 


243 


phia  &  Trenton  E.  R.  Co.,  decided  in  1840.^^  The  case  was 
certiorari  to  review  proceedings  for  the  location  of  the  road.  The 
location  had  been  made  upon  certain  streets  in  pursuance  of  the 
charter  of  the  company  which  authorized  such  use  of  the  streets 
without  providing  for  any  compensation  to  the  abutting  owners. 
It  was  contended  that  the  charter  was  invalid' because  it  took 
the  property  of  the  abutters  without  compensation  and  because 
such  use  of  the  streets  was  "in  derogation  of  the  public  and  pri- 
vate uses  to  which  they  had  been  applied."  The  proceedings 
were  affirmed  and  the  most  absolute  control  of  the  State  over 
the  streets  asserted.  The  court  says :  "What  is  the  dominion  of 
the  public  over  such  a  street  ?  In  England  a  highway  is  the  prop- 
erty of  the  king  as  parens  patriae,  or  universal  trustee ;  in  Penn- 
sylvania, it  is  the  property  of  the  people,  not  of  a  particular 


12  Am.  St.  Rep.  644,  1  L.R.A.  493; 
Theobald  v.  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
66  Miss.  279,  6  So.  230,  14  Am.  St. 
Rep.  564,  4  L.R.A.  735;  Hastings  & 
Grand  Island  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ingalls, 
15  Neb.  123;  Chamberlain  v.  Eliza- 
bethport  Steam  Cordage  Co.,  41  N 
J.  Eq.  43;  Burlington  v.  Penn.  R 
R.  Co.,  56  N.  J.  Eq.  259,  38  Atl.  849 
Williams  v.  New  York  Central  R.  R 
Co.,  16  N.  Y.  97,  69  Am.  Dec.  632 
Fanning  v.  Osborn  &  Co.,  34  Hun  121 
Fobes  V.  Rome  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  121 
N.  Y.  505,  24  N.  E.  919,  8  L.R.A 
453,  3  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  182 
Syracuse  Solar  Salt  Co.  v.  Rome  etc 
R.  R.  Co.,  67  Hun  153,  22  N.  Y 
Supp.  321 ;  White  v.  Northwestern 
N.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  113  N.  C.  610,  18 
S.  E.  330,  9  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
103,  37  Am.  St.  Rep.  639,  22  L,R.A. 
627;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Williams,  35 
Ohio  St.  168;  Lawrence  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  O'Hara,  48  Ohio  St.  343,  28  N. 
E.  175;  South  Bound  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Burton,  67  S.  C.  515,  46  S.  E.  340; 
Iron  Mt.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bingham,  87 
Tenn.  522,  11  S.  W.  705,  4  L.R.A. 
622;  Hodges  v.  Seaboard  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  88  Va.  653,  14  S.  E.  380;  Ford 
V.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  14 
Wis.  609,  80  Am.  Dec.  791;  Carl  v. 
Sheboygan  &  Fond  du  Lac  R.  R.  Co., 


46  Wis.  625;  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Milwaukee  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  95  Wis. 
561,  70  N.  W.  678,  60  Am.  St.  Rep. 
136,  37  L.R.A.  856. 

Second,  eases  holding  the  con- 
trary: Montgomery  v.  Santa  Ana 
&  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  104  Cal.  186,  37  Pac. 
786,  10  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  25, 
43  Am.  St.  Rep.  89,  25  L.R.A.  654; 
Garnett  v.  Jacksonville  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  20  Fla.  889 ;  Moses  v.  Pittsburgh 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  111.  516;  Murphy  v. 
Chicago,  29  111.  279,  81  Am.  Dec. 
307;  (These  cases  are  also  overruled 
by  67  111.  439,  ante.  But  see  City  of 
Olney  v.  Wharf,  115  111.  519,  56  Am. 
Rep.  178)  ;  Milburn  v.  Cedar  Rapids, 
12  la.  246;  Cook  v.  Burlington,  36 
la.  357;  (These  cases  are  over- 
ruled by  46  la.  366,  ante)  ;  Fulton 
v.  Short  Route  R.  R.  Trans.  Co.,  85 
Ky.  640,  4  S.  W.  332,  7  Am.  St.  Rep. 
619;  Werges  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  35  La.  An.  641 ;  Hepting  v.  New 
Orleans  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  36  La.  An. 
898;  Porter  v.  North  Missouri  R.  R. 
Co.,  33  Mo.  128;  Morris  &  Essex 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Newark,  10  N.  J.  Eq. 
352;  Chapman  v.  Albany  &  Schnec- 
tady  R.  R.  Co.,  10  Barb.  360;  Faust 
V.  Passenger  Ry.  Co.,  3  Phil.  R.  164. 

126  Wharton,  25,  36  Am.  Dec.  202. 


244  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    151 

district,  but  of  the  whole  State ;  who,  constituting  as  they  do  the 
legitimate  sovereign,  may  dispose  of  it  by  their  representatives, 
and  at  their  pleasure.  /Highways,  therefore,  being  universally 
the  property  of  the  State,  are  subject  to  its  absolute  direction 
and  control." 

The  question  arose  almost  simultaneously  in  the  State  of  New 
York,  in  Fletcher  v.  The  Auburn  &  Syracuse  K.  K.  Co.^^  The 
defendant  constructed  its  road  across  a  highway  near  plaintifE's 
premises,  on  an  embankment  four  feet  high,  in  such  manner 
as  to  impede  access  thereto  and  to  cause  them  to  be  frequently 
inundated  with  vpater.  The  defendants  were  duly  authorized 
by  the  legislature,  but  the  court  say  that  this  authority  was  only 
intended  to  protect  the  company  from  indictment  for  a  public 
nuisance,  and  not  against  claims  for  private  damages  arising 
from  consequential  injury  to  adjacent  owners,  and,  further,  that 
if,  by  a  fair  construction  of  the  grant,  the  power  conferred  was 
broad  enough  to  protect  the  company  against  consequential  dam- 
ages to  private  interests,  the  grant,  to  that  extent,  would  be  void, 
since  it  would  be  a  violation  of  the  fundamental  law  of  the  land. 
The  right  to  recover  was  based  upon  the  constitution  and  treated 
as  a  matter  beyond  doubt.  This  doctrine  was  affirmed  in  a  sim- 
ilar case  which  arose  a  year  later  in  the  same  court.  ^*  In  the 
latter  case  it  was  urged  that  the  use  of  the  highway  by  the  de- 
fendant was  only  in  accordance  with  the  original  design  for 
which  the  way  was  laid  out,  viz.,  the  accommodation  of  the  pub- 
lic, and  that  for  this  compensation  had  been  made.  But  the 
court  held  that  the  railroad  was  a  new  and  distinct  user,  differ- 
ent from  the  original  design,  and  constituted  an  additional  bur- 
den or  easement  on  the  land.'^  /following  these  cases  are  a  num- 
ber of  decisions  in  the  Supreme  Court  in  which  the  doctrine  is 
maintained  that  a  railroad,  upon  a  public  street,  is  a  use  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  legitimate  purposes  of  a  street,  being  simply 
a  new  and  improved  mode  of  public  travel./"     The  law  of  the 

1325  Wend.  462,  1841.  Co.,  10  Barb.  26,  1850;  Chapman  v. 

i^Trustees  etc.  v.  The  Auburn  &  Albany  &  Schenectady  E.  R.  Co.,  10 

Rochester    R.    R.    Co.,    3    Hill    567,  Barb.  360,  1851 ;  Adams  v.  Saratoga 

1842.  &  Washington  R.  R.   Co.,  11   Barb. 

iBSee    also    Mahon    v.    Utiea    &  414,  1851;  Hentz  v.  Long  Island  R. 

Schenectady  R.  R.  Co.,  Hill  &  Denio's  R.  Co.,  13  Barb.  646,  1852;  Milhau 

Supplement,   156,   1843.  v.  Sharp,  15  Barb.   193,  1853;   Wil- 

isThese  cases  are  Drake  v.  Hud-  liams  v.   New  York   Central  R.   R. 

son  River  R.  R.   Co.,  7   Barb.   508,  Co.,   18   Barb.   222,   1854;    Covey   v. 

1849;   Plant  v.   Long  Island  R.   R.  Buffalo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  Barb.  482, 


§  152 


EOADS   AND    STKEETS. 


245 


State  was,  however,  finally  established  by  the  Court  of  Appeals 
in  favor  of  the  earlier  cases,  in  Williams  v.  New  York  Central 
E.  E.  Co." 

§  152  (112).  Commercial  railroad  in  street. — Right  to 
compensation  generally.  If  it  be  conceded  that  a  railroad  is 
one  of  the  uses  for  which  a  street  was  originally  designed,  it  of 
course  follows  that  the  abutting  o^vner  is  not  entitled  to  com- 
pensation when  a  railroad  is  laid  in  front  of  his  property.  In 
such  case  the  establishment  of  a  railroad  on  a  street  does  not  dif- 
fer in  principle  from  the  establishment  of  a  stage  line  along 
the  same  street  or  the  introduction  of  some  new  kind  of  vehicle. 
Accordingly,  all  courts  which  maintain  this  doctrine,  hold  that 
there  is  no  right  to  compensation.-'*    The  doctrine  itself  is  prac- 


1856.  In  these  decisions  the  cases  of 
Fletcher  v.  Auburn  &  Syracuse  K. 
E.  Co.  and  Trustees  etc.  v.  Auburn 
&  Rochester  R.  R.  Co.,  ante,  are  re- 
garded as  distinguishable  or  as  over- 
ruled by  Eadcliff  v.  Mayor  etc.  of 
Brooklyn,  4  N.  Y.  195. 

1716  N.  Y.  97,  108,  69  Am.  Dee. 
632.  The  court  says:  "If  the  only 
difference  consisted  in  the  introduc- 
tion of  a  new  motive  power,  it  would 
not  be  material.  But  is  there  no 
distinction  between  the  common 
right  of  every  man  to  use  upon  the 
road  a  conveyance  of  his  own  at  will," 
and  the  right  of  a  corporation  to  use 
its  conveyances  to  the  exclusion  of 
all  others;  between  the  right  of  a 
man  to  travel  in  his  own  carriage 
without  pay,  and  the  right  to  travel 
in  the  car  of  a  railroad  company 
on  paying  their  price ?"  Again:  "The 
right  of  the  public  in  a  highway  is 
an  easement,  and  one  that  is  vested 
in  the  whole  public.  Is  not  the 
right  of  a  railroad  company,  if  it  has 
a  right  to  construct  its  track  upon 
the  road,  also  an  easement?  This 
cannot  be  denied,  nor  that  the  lat- 
ter easement  is  enjoyed,  not  by  the 
public  at  large,  but  by  a  corpora- 
tion; because  it  will  not  be  pre- 
tended thstt  every  man  would  have 
a  right  to  go  and  lay  down  his  tim- 


bers, and  his  iron  rails,  and  make 
a  railroad  upon  a  highway.  Here, 
then,  are  two  easements;  one  vested 
in  the  public,  the  other  in  the  rail- 
road company.  These  easements  are 
property,  and  that  of  the  railroad 
company  is  valuable.  How  was  it 
acquired?  It  has  cost  the  company 
nothing.  The  theory  must  be  that 
it  is  carved  out  and  is  a  part  of  the 
public  easement,  and  is  therefore 
the  gift  of  the  public.  This  would 
do  if  it  was  given  solely  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  public.  But  it  is  mani- 
fest that  it  is  at  the  joint -expense 
of  the  public  and  the  owner  of  the 
fee.  Ought  not  the  latter,  then,  to 
have  been  consulted?" 

iSjSee  §  151,  note  11,  part  second; 
also  Huges  v.  Miss.  &  Mo.  R.  R. 
Co.,  12  la.  261 ;  Louisville  &  Frank- 
fort R.  R.  Co.  V.  Brown,  17  B.  Mon. 
763;  Elizabethtown  &  Paducah  R. 
R.  Co.,  79  Ky.  52;  Fulton  v.  Short 
Route  Transf.  Co.,  85  Ky.  640,  4  S. 
W.  332,  7  Am.  St.  Rep.  619;  Faust 
V.  Passenger  Ry.  Co.,  3  Phil.  164; 
Montgomery  v.  Santa  Ana  &  W.  R. 
R.  Co.,  104  Cal.  186,  37  Pac.  786,  43 
Am.  St.  Rep.  89,  25  L.R.A.  654,  10 
Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  25;  Werges 
v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  35  La.  An. 
641 ;  Hepting  v.  New  Orleans  Pac.  R. 
R.  Co.,  36  La.  An.  898;  Neitsey  v. 


246 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  153 


tically  obsolete,  having  been  overruled  in  nearly  every  State  that 
formerly  adopted  it. 

§  153  (113).  Right  to  compensation  when  fee  of  street 
in  abutting  owner.  With  respect  to  the  interest  of  the  abut- 
ting ovyner,  highways  may  be  divided  into  two  classes:  First, 
those  in  which  the  public  have  an  easement  only ;  second,  those 
in  which  the  public  have  the  fee.^^  In  respect  to  the  first  class, 
the  abutting  owner  is  entitled  to  every  right  and  advantage,  in 
that  part  of  the  street  of  which  he'owns  the  fee,  not  required  by 
the  public.  He  has  the  entire  right  and  property  in  the  soil, 
subject  to  the  easement  of  the  public.^"  The  easement  of  the 
public  is  the  right  to  use  and  improve  the  street  for  the  purposes 
of  a  highway  only.  A  commercial  railroad  on  a  street,  being 
foreign  to  such  purposes,^ ^  is  an  interference  with  the  adjoining 
owners'  proprietary  rights  in  the  soil,  and  an  acquisition  or 
taking  of  an  estate  or  interest  in  his  land,  for  which  he  is  en- 
titled to  compensation  as  in  other  cases.^^    If  the  abutting  owner 


Baltimore  &  0.  R.  R.  Co.,  5  Mackey 
34;  Glick  v.  Baltimore  &  0.  R.  R. 
Co.,  19  D.  C.  412;  Tate  v.  M.  K.  & 
T.  R.  R.  Co.,  64  Mo.  149;  Corey  v. 
Buffalo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  Barb.  482 ; 
Appeal  of  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  2  Walker's  Pa.  Supm.  Ct.  Rep. 
291 ;  Yates  v.  Town  of  West  Grafton, 
34  W.  Va.  783,  12  S.  E.  1075. 

19 As  to  distinctions  based  upon 
the  ownership  of  the  fee  of  streets 
see  ante,  §  124. 

impost,  §  852. 

21566  ante,  §  151. 

2  2Western  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ala.  G.  S. 
R.  R.  Co.,  96  Ala.  272,  11  So.  483, 
17  L.R.A.  474;  Alabama  G.  S.  R.  S. 
Co.  V.  Collier,  112  Ala.  681;  Mobile 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Alabama  Midland 
R.  R.  Co.,  116  Ala.  51,  23  So.  57; 
Reichert  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
51  Ark.  491,  5  L.R.A.  183;  Southern 
Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Reed,  41  Cal.  256; 
Carson  v.  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  35  Cal. 
325;  Weyl  v.  Sonoma  Valley  R.  R. 
Co.,  69  Cal.  202;  Imlay  v.  Union 
Branch  R.  R.  Co.,  26  Conn.  249,  68 
Am.  Dec.  392;  Nicholson  v.  New 
York  &  New  Haven  R.  R.   Co.,  22 


Conn.  73;  McKean  v.  New  York  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  75  Conn.  343,  53  Atl.  656, 
61  L.R.A.  730;  Knapp  &  C.  Mfg.  Co. 
V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  76  Conn. 
311,  56  Atl.  502,  100  Am.  St.  Rep. 
994;  Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Southern  Invest.  Co.,  53  Fla.  832,  44 
So.  351;  Atlanta  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Atlanta  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  125  6a.  529, 
-  54  S.  E.  736;  Indianapolis  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Hartley,  67  HI.  439;  Bond  v. 
Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  171  111.  508, 
49  N.  E.  545 ;  Rock  Island  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Johnson,  204  111.  488,  68  N. 
E.  549;  Spalding  v.  Macomb  etc. 
Ry.  Co.,  225  111.  585,  80  N.  E.  327; 
Protzman  v.  Indianapolis  &  Cinu. 
R.  R.  Co.,  9  Ind.  467,  68  Am.  Dec. 
650;  Indiana  Central  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Boden,  10  Ind.  96;  New  Albany  & 
Salem  R.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Dailey,  12  Ind. 
551 ;  Cox  V.  Louisville  R.  R.  Co.,  48 
Ind.  178;  Indianapolis  etc.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Smith,  52  lud.  428;  Terre  Haute 
&  Logansport  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bissell, 
108  Ind.  113;  Striekler  v.  Midland 
R.  R.  Co.,  125  Ind.  412,  25  N.  E. 
455;  Porter  v.  Midland  R.  R.  Co., 
125  Ind.  476,  25  N.  E.  556,  3  Am.  R. 


153 


EOADS    AND    STREETS. 


24:7 


has  title  to  the  center  of  the  street  only,  and  the  railroad  is  laid 
wholly  on  the  half  of  the  street  beyond  his  line,  his  right  to  com- 
pensation would  be  controlled  by  the  same  principles  as  where 
the  fee  of  the  whole  is  in  the  public,  which  is  discussed  in  the 


R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  357;  Kucheman  v. 
C.  C.  &  D.  Ry.  Co.,  46  la.  366; 
Phipps  V.  West  Md.  E.  R.  Co.,  66 
Md.  319;  Grand  Rapids  &  Ind.  E. 
R.  Co.  V.  Heisel,  38  Mich.  62,  31 
Am.  Rep.  306;  S.  C.  47  Mich.  393; 
Hoffman  v.  Flint  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  114 
Mich.  316,  72  N.  W.  167;  Schur- 
meier  v.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  10 
Minn.  82,  88  Am.  Dee.  59;  Gray  v. 
First  Division  of  St.  Paul  &  Pacific 
R.  R.  Co.,  13  Minn.  315;  Molitor  v. 
Same,  14  Minn.  285;  Harrington  v. 
St.  Paul  &  Sioux  City  R.  R.  Co.,  17 
Minn.  215;  Adams  v.  Hastings  &  Da- 
kota R.  R.  Co.,  18  Minn.  260;  Hartz 
V.  St.  Paul  &  Sioux  City  R.  R.  Co., 
21  Minn.  358;  Witt  v.  St.  Paul  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  38  Minn.  122,  35  N.  W. 
862;  Papooshek  v.  Winona  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  44  Minn.  195,  46  N.  W.  329; 
Theobald  v.  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
66  Miss.  279,  6  So.  230,  14  Am.  St. 
Rep.  564,  4  L.R.A.  735;  Central  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Hatfield,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  323; 
Starr  v.  Camden  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  24 
N.  J.  L.  592;  Chamberlain  v.  Eliza- 
bethport  Steam  Cordage  Co.,  41  N.  J. 
Eq.  43;  Bork  v.  United  N.  J.  R.  R. 
&  C.  Co.,  70  N.  J.  L.  268,  57  Atl.  412, 
103  Am.  St.  Rep.  808;  Wager  v. 
Troy  Union  R.  R.  Co.,  25  N.  Y.  526; 
Carpenter  v.  Oswego  &  S.  R.  R.  Co., 
24  N.  Y.  655;  Henderson  v.  N.  Y. 
C.  R.  R.  Co.,  78  N.  Y.  423;  Coats- 
worth  V.  Lehigh  Val.  R.  R.  Co.,  156 
N.  Y.  451 ;  Washington  Cemetery  v. 
Prospect  Park  &  Coney  Island  R. 
R.  Co.,  7  Hun  655;  Matter  of  Pros- 
pect Park  etc.  R.  R.  Co..  13  Hun 
345 ;  Hussner  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  R. 
Co.,  30  Hun  409 ;  People  v.  Law,  22 
How.  Pr.  109;  Clark  v.  Brooklyn 
City  R.  R.  Co.,  30  Hun  409;  Syra- 


cuse Solar  Salt  Co.  v.  Rome  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  67  Hun  153,  22  N.  Y.  Supp. 
321;  Ray  v.  New  York  Bay  Exten- 
sion R.  R.  Co.,  34  App.  Div.  3  (For 
other  New  York  cases  see  ante,  § 
151)  ;  White  v.  Northwestern  N.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  113  N.  C.  610,  18  S.  E. 
330,  9  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  103, 
37  Am.  St.  Rep.  639,  22  L.R.A.  627 ; 
Parrott  v.  Cincinnati  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
10  Ohio  St.  624;  Cincinnati  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Cumminsville,  14  Ohio  St. 
523;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Williams,  35 
Ohio  St.  168;  Lawrence  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
O'Harra,  48  Ohio  St.  343,  28  N.  E. 
175;  Harmon  v.  Louisville  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  87  Tenn.  614,  11  S.  W.  703; 
Hodges  v.  Seaboard  etc.  R.  Co.,  88 
Va.  653,  14  S.  E.  380;  Petersburg  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Burtons,  1  Va.  Dec.  397; 
Ford  V.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  14 
Wis.  609,  80  Am.  Dec.  791 ;  Pomeroy 
v.  Milwaukee  &  Chi.  R.  R.  Co.,  16 
Wis.  640;  Hegar  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  26  Wis.  624;  Sherman  v. 
Mil.  Lake  Sliore  &  Western  R.  R. 
Co.,  40  Wis.  645;  Chapman  v.  Osh- 
kosh  &  Miss.  R.  R.  Co.,  33  Wis.  629; 
Carl  V.  Sheboygan  &  Fond  du  Lao. 
R.  R.  Co.,  46  Wis.  625;  Bleseh  v. 
C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  48  Wis.  168; 
Buekner  v.  Chi.  Mil.  &  N-  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  56  Wis.  403;  Hanlin  v.  Chicago 
&  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  61  Wis.  515;  Trus- 
tees V.  Milwaukee  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  77 
Wis.  158,  45  N.  W.  1086;  Taylor  v. 
Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  83  Wis.  636, 
53  N.  W.  853 ;  Evans  v.  Chicago  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  86  Wis.  597,  57  N.  W.  357, 
39  Am.  St.  Rep.  908;  Frey  v.  Duluth 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  91  Wis.  309,  64  N. 
W.  1038;  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Milwaukee  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  95  Wis. 
561,  70  N.  W.  678,  60  Am.  St.  Rep. 


248 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  154 


following  sections. ^^  Where  a  railroad  is  laid  upon  a  turnpike, 
the  owner  of  the  fee  may  have  compensation  for  the  additional 
burden.^*  Where  a  railroad  company  is  authorized  to  appro- 
priate a  highway  and  lay  out  a  new  one  to  accommodate  the 
public,  the  appropriation  of  the  highway  amounts  to  a  vaca- 
tion of  it,  the  title  reverts  to  the  owner,  and  he  is  entitled  to 
compensation  as  if  no  highway  existed.^® 

§  154  (115).  Right  to  compensation  where  fee  of 
street  in  the  public.  It  having  been  determined  that,  though 
the  fee  of  a  street  is  in  the  public,  the  abutting  owner  has  cer- 
tain private  rights  therein,  appurtenant  to  his  property,^®  it  fol- 
lows that,  when  those  rights  are  interfered  with  under  the  power 
of  eminent  domain,  or  by  a  use  of  the  street  which  is  not  within 
the  public  easement,  there  has  been  a  taking  within  the  con- 
stitution.^^    The  existence  and  operation  of  a  commercial  rail- 


136,  37  L.R.A.  856;  Lange  v.  La 
Crosse  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  118  Wis.  558,  95 
N.  W.  952. 

To  the  contrary  are  the  following 
cases:  Harrison  v.  New  Orleans, 
Pacific  K.  R.  Co.,  34  La.  An.  462,  44 
Am.  Rep.  438;  Snyder  v.  Pennsyl- 
vania R.  R.  Co.,  55  Pa.  St.  340; 
Phila.  &,  Trenton  R.  R.  Co.,  6  Whart. 
25,  36  Am.  Deo.  202;  McLauehlin  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  5  Rich.  S.  C.  583; 
Perry  v.  New  Orleans  M.  &  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  55  Ala.  413,  28  Am.  Rep.  740; 
Montgomery  v.  Santa  Ana  &  W.  R. 
R.  Co.,  104  Cal.  186,  37  Pac.  786,  43 
Am.  St.  Rep.  89,  25  L.R.A.  654; 
Neitsey  v.  Baltimore  &  0.  R.  R.  Co., 
5  Mackey  34;  Click  v.  Baltimore  & 
0.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  D.  C.  412;  Fulton 
V.  Short  Route  R.  R.  Trans.  Co.,  85 
Ky.  640,  4  S.  W.  332,  7  Am.  St.  Rep. 
619;  Werger  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  35  La.  An.  641 ;  Hepting  v. 
New  Orleans,  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  36  La. 
An.  898;  Tate  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  R.  R. 
Co.,  64  Mo.  149;  Corey  v.  Buflfalo 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  Barb.  482;  Appeal 
of  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  2 
Walker's  Pa.  Supm.  Ct.  Rep.  291; 
Yates  V.  Town  of  West  Grafton,  34 
W.  Va.  783,  12  S.  E.  1075. 


2  3"If  the  road  is  laid  wholly  on 
the  other  half  of  the  street,  the 
abutter's  right  to  compensation 
would  be  the  same  as  in  cases  where 
the  fee  of  the  entire  street  is  in  the 
public."  Stewart  v.  Ohio  Riv.  R. 
R.  Co.,  38  W.  Va.  438,  18  S.  E.  604. 
See  Terre  Haute  &  Logansport  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Bissell,  108  Ind.  113;  Heiss 
V.  Milwaukee  &  Lake  Winnebago  R. 
R.  Co.,  69  Wis.  555;  Kuhl  v.  Chicago 
&  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  101  Wis.  42; 
Trustees  v.  Milwaukee  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
77  Wis.  158,  45  N.  W.  Rep.  1086; 
Beck  v.  Erie  Terminal  R.  R.  Co., 
11  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  363;  Alabama  G. 
S.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Collier,  112  Ala.  681, 
14  So.  327;  Cobb  v.  Warren  St.  Ry. 
Co.,  218  Pa.  St.  366,  67  Atl.  654; 
Ackar  v.  Knoxville,  117  Tenn.  224,  96 
S.  W.  973. 

z^Mahon  v.  Utica  &  Schenectady 
R.  R.  Co.,  Supl.  to  Hill  &  Denio, 
156;  Mifflin  v.  Railroad  Co.,  16  Pa. 
St.  182.  In  the  latter  case  the  turn- 
pike was  vested  in  the  railroad  com- 
pany by  act  of  the  legislature. 

2  5Phillips  V.  Dunkirk,  Warren  & 
Pittsburgh  R.  R.  Co.,  78  Pa.  St.  177. 

2  6An(e,  §§  120-124. 

27Jnfe,  §  65. 


§  154 


KOADS    AND    STREETS. 


249 


road  in  the  street  is  such  a  use  and  is  necessarily  some  interfer- 
ence with  the  rights  of  abutting  owners,  and,  to  the  extent  of 
such  interference,  a  right  to  compensation  exists.^*  For  any 
physical  injury  to  the  abutting  property,  as  by  casting  cinders 
upon  it,  polluting  the  air  with  smoke  and  gases,  or  by  vibrations 
communicated  through  the  soil  to  an  extent  which  would  be 
actionable  if  the  property  was  not  a  street,  a  recovery  may  be 
had.^^  With  respect  to  this  class  of  injuries  the  abutting 
owner's  rights  are  the  same  as  though  the  street  was  private 
property,  and  these  rights  are  discussed  elsewhere.*"  The  ten- 
dency of  the  later  decisions  is  towards  the  protection  of  private 
rights  and  the  more  accurate  ascertainment  and  definition  of 
those  rights.  .It  is  now  well  settled  by  the  great  weight  of  au- 
thority that,  where  the  fee  of  a  street  is  in  the  abutting  owner, 
he  may  recover  for  the  additional  burden  caused  by  a  commercial 
railroad  laid  on  the  street./  These  cases  necessarily  proceed  upon 
the  basis  that  a  commercial  railroad  is  not  a  legitimate  street 
use.  The  cases  which  deny  compensation  in  any  case,  on  the 
ground  that  such  a  railroad  is  a  legitimate  use  of  a  highway,  are 
so  clearly  against  good  sense  and  reason  that  we  do  not  think 


2  8 Western  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ala.  G.  T. 
R.  R.  Co.,  96  Ala.  272,  11  So.  483,  17 
L.R.A.  474;  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Reed,  41  Cal.  256;  Ford  v.  Santa 
Cruz  R.  R.  Co.,  59  Cal.  290;  South 
Carolina  Railroad  Co.  v.  Steiner,  44 
Ga.  546;  C.  B.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Twine,  23  Kan.  585,  33  Am.  Rep. 
203 ;  Ft.  Scott  W.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Fox,  42  Kan.  490,  22  Pac.  583 ;  Eliza- 
bethtown  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Combs,  10 
Bush  382;  J.  M.  &  I.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Esterle,  13  Bush,  Ky.  667;  Schur- 
meier  v.  St.  Paul  &  Pacific  R.  R. 
Co.,  10  Minn.  82,  88  Am.  Dec.  59; 
Adams  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  39 
Minn.  286,  39  N.  W.  629,  12  Am.  St. 
Rep.  644,  1  L.R.A.  493;  Theobold  v. 
Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  66  Miss. 
279,'#So.  230,  14  Am.  St.  Rep.  564, 
4  L.R.A.  735;  Story  v.  New  York 
Elevated  R.  R.  Co.,  90  N.  Y.  122,  43 
Am.  Rep.  146;  White  v.  Northwes- 
tern N.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  113  N.  C.  610, 
18  B.  B.  330,  9  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp. 


Rep.  103,  37  Am.  St.  Rep.  639,  22 
L.R.A.  627;  South  Bound  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Burton,  67  S.  C.  515,  46  S.  E. 
340 ;  Stewart  v.  Ohio  Riv.  R.  R.  Co., 
38  W.  Va.  438,  18  S.  E.  604. 

2  9  South  Carolina  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Steiner,  44  Ga.  546 ;  Atchison  &  Neb- 
raska R.  R.  Co.  V.  Garside,  10  Kan. 
552;  Crosby  v.  Owensboro  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  10  Bush,  288 ;  Elizabethtown  R. 
R.  Co.,  V.  Combs,  10  Bush,  382;  J. 
M.  &  I.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Esterle,  13  Bush 
66T;  Ball  v.  Maysville  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  102  Ky.  486,  43  S.  W.  731,  80 
Am.  St.  Rep.  362;  Willis  v.  Ky.  & 
Ind.  Bridge  Co.,  104  Ky.  186,  46  S. 
W.  488;  Short  Route  Transfer  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Fulton,  12  Ky.  L.  R.  232; 
Randle  v.  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  65  Mo. 
325 ;  Parrott  v.  Cincinnati  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  3  Ohio  St.  330;  Same  v.  Same, 
10  Ohio  St.  624;  G.  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Eddins,  29  Alb.  L.  J.  518. 

3  0See  Post,  §§  236-238. 


250 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  154 


they  require  further  discussion.  The  right  to  recover  where 
the  fee  is  in  the  public  is  involved  in  so  much  doubt  by  the  au- 
thorities that  we  have  collected  in  a  note  all  the  cases  which  in- 
volve the  question,  with  such  comment  as  seems  appropriate.^^ 


siAteSoma.  No  recovery,  whether 
fee  in  owner  or  public.  Parry  v. 
New  Orleans  M.  &  C.  K.  R.  Co.,  55 
Ala.  413.  This  case  is  overruled  and 
the  contrary  doctrine  established  by 
Western  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Alabama  G. 
T.  R.  R.  Co.,  96  Ala.  272,  11  So. 
483,  17  L.R.A.  474;  Alabama  G.  S. 
E.  R.  Co.  v.  Collier,  112  Ala.  681; 
Mobile  etc.  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Ala.  Mid- 
land R.  R.  Co.,  116  Ala.  51,  23  So. 
57. 

California.  Fee  in  public,  no  com- 
pensation. Carson  v.  Central  R.  R. 
Co.,  35  Cal.  325.  Overruled  by  later 
cases.  Southern  Pacific  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Reed,  41  Cal.  256;  Schulte  v. 
North  Pacific  Transportation  Co.,  50 
Cal.  592;  Ford  v.  Santa  Cruz  R.  R. 
Co.,  59  Cal.  290.  But  no  recovery 
can  be  had  unless  actual  damages 
are  sustained.  Hogan  v.  Central  Pa- 
cific R.  R.  Co.,  71  Cal.  83.  The  late 
case  of  Montgomery  v.  Santa  Ana  & 
W.  R.  R.  Co.,  104  Cal.  186,  37  Pac. 
Rep.  786,  43  Am.  St.  Rep.  89,  25 
L.R.A.  654,  10  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp. 
Rep.  25,  again  holds  that  a.  railroad 
for  freight  and  passengers  is  a  le- 
gitimate street  use,  but  holds  also 
that  the  abutter  is  entitled  to  dam- 
ages, whether  or  not  he  may  be 
vested  with  the  fee  to  the  center  of 
the  street  if  his  right  of  ingress  and 
egress  or  his  right  to  light  and  air 
are  interfered  with.  See  Constitu- 
tion of  California,  ante,  §  18,  also 
Smith  V.  So.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  146 
Cal.  164,  79  Pac.  868,  106  Am.  St. 
Rep.  17;  Brown  v.  Rea,  150  Cal.  171, 
88  Pac.  713;  City  Store  v.  San  Jose 
etc.  Ry.  Co.,  150  Cal.  277,  88  Pac. 
977 ;  Coats  v.  Atchison  etc.  Ry.  Co., 
1  Cal.  App.  441,  82  Pac.  640. 

Colorado.     In   favor   of   recovery. 


Denver  v.  Bayer,  7  Colo.  113;  Den- 
ver etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Domke,  11  Colo. 
247. 

District  of  Columbia.  Against  re- 
covery whether  fee  in  the  abutter  or 
in  the  public.  Nottingham  v.  B.  & 
P.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  McArthur  517;  Neit- 
sey  V.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  5 
Mackey  34;  Click  v.  Baltimore  & 
0.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  D.  C.  412. 

Florida.  See  Florida  Southern  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Brown,  23  Fla.  104. 

Georgia.  Earlier  cases  against  re- 
covery. Savannah,  A.  &  G.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Shields,  33  Ga.  601;  Roll  v. 
City  Council  of  Augusta,  34  Ga.  326 ; 
Overruled  in  South  Carolina  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Steiner,  44  Ga.  546,  560.  In 
this  case  the  court  says:  "The  own- 
ers of  lands  and  tenements  on  Wash- 
ington street  are  entitled  to  have 
and  enjoy  all  the  rights  and  privi- 
leges which  legally  appertain  there- 
to, incorporeal  as  well  as  corporeal; 
for  when  the  law  doth  give  anything 
to  one,  it  giveth  impliedly  whatso- 
ever is  necessary  for  enjoying  the 
same.  If  the  railroad  companies,  by 
permission  of  the  public  authorities, 
have  located  their  road  on  the  pub- 
lic street  of  the  city,  and  by  the  use 
thereof,  in  running  their  trains,  have 
invaded  any  of  the  legal  rights  of 
the  owners  of  the  lands  and  tene- 
ments on  the  street  by  hindering,  ob- 
structing or  disturbing  them  in  the 
regular  use  and  lawful  enjoyment  of 
the  same,  then  the  owners  of  such 
lands  and  tenements  are  entitled  to 
recover  such  damages  as  they  have 
actually  sustained  by  such  invasion 
of  their  legal  rights  to  the  enjoy- 
ment of  their  property,  although  the 
railroad  companies  may  not  have 
located  their  road  on  any  part  of  it. 


§  154 


EOADS    AND    STREETS. 


251 


We  have  allowed  this  to  stand  as  it  was  written  in  the  first 
edition.  Since  then  it  has  become  very  firmly  established  that 
the  abutter,  though  he  has  not  the  fee  of  the  street,  has  certain 


The  invading,  hindering,  obstructing 
or  disturbing  them  in  the  regular 
use  and  lawful  enjoyment  of  their 
property  is  an  interference  with 
their  private  legal  rights  to  that 
property,  and,  to  that  extent,  is  the 
taking  of  private  property  for  public 
use,  for  which  just  compensation 
should  be  made." 

Illinois.  Fee  in  public,  no  com- 
pensation, on  the  ground  that  a  rail- 
road is  a  legitimate  use.  Moses  v. 
Pittsburgh,  Ft.  W.  &  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
21  111.  516.  The  ground  of  this  case 
overruled  in  Indianapolis  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Hartley,  67  111.  439;  see  also 
C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  McGinnis,  79 
111.  269.  The  right  to  recover  is  now 
settled  by  the  constitution;  ante,  § 
25. 

Indiana.  Tate  v.  Ohio  &  Miss.  R. 
R.  Co.,  7  Ind.  479;  Button  v.  In- 
diana Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  7  Ind.  522; 
Protzman  v.  Indianapolis  &  Cin.  R. 
R.  Co.,  9  Ind.  467,  68  Am.  Dee.  650 ; 
Indiana  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Broden, 
10  Ind.  96 ;  New  Albany  &  Salem  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  O'Daily,  12  Ind.  551 ;  Same 
V.  Same,  13  Ind.  353;  Cox  v.  Louis- 
ville R.  R.  Co.,  48  Ind.  178;  Dwen- 
ger  V.  Chicago  &  Grand  Trunk  R.  R. 
Co.,  98  Ind.  153.  These  cases  leave 
the  question  in  doubt  where  the  fee 
is  in  the  public  and  the  railroad  is 
laid  on  the  surface  of  the  street.  In 
Decker  v.  Evansville  Suburban  R. 
R.  Co.,  133  Ind.  493,  33  N.  E.  349, 
it  is  held  that  an  abutter,  though  he 
has  not  the  fee  is  entitled  to  com- 
pensation if  his  access  is  materially 
interfered  with.  And  see  Pittsburgh 
&  C.  R.  Co.  V.  Noftsger,  148  Ind.  101. 

Iowa.  Rule  of  no  compensation 
where  fee  in  public  is  firmly  up- 
held. Milburn  v.  Cedar  Rapids,  12 
la.  246;   Hughes  v.  Miss.  &  Mo.  R. 


R.  Co.,  12  la.  261 ;  Clinton  v.  Cedar 
Rapids  etc.  E.  R.  Co.,  24  la.  455 
Slatten  v.  Des  Moines  Valley  R.  R, 
Co.,   29   la.    148,   4   Am.   Rep.   205 
Davenport  v.  Stevenson,  34  la.  225 
Ingraham  v.  C.  D.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co. 
34  la.  249;  Ingram  v.  Same,  38  la, 
669;  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  New 
ton,  36  la.  299;  Hine  v.  K.  &  D.  M, 
R.  R.  Co.,  42  la.  636;  Cadle  v.  Mus 
catine  Western  R.  R.  Co.,  44  la.  11 
Frith  v.  Dubuque,  45  la.  406;  Davis 
V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ky.  Co.,  46  la.  389 
Simplot  V.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  Paul 
Ry.     Co.,     5     McCrary     158.     The 
ground  taken,  in  some  of  the  cases, 
that  a  railroad  is  a  legitimate  use 
of  a  street,  is  overruled  in  Kuche- 
man  v.  C.  C.  &  D.  Ry.  Co.,  46  la. 
366.    But  the  later  ease  of  O'Connor 
V.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  56  la. 
735,  affirms  the  doctrine  of  no  com- 
pensation,   when    the    fee   is    in    the 
public.     Compensation    is    now   re- 
quired by  statute.     §  344,  post. 

Kansas.  No  recovery,  fee  in  pub- 
lic. Atchison  &  Nebraska  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Garside,  10  Kan.  552.  This 
ease  is  virtually,  though  not  ex- 
pressly, overruled  in  the  later  cases 
of  C.  B.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Twine, 
23  Kan.  585,  33  Am.  Rep.  203;  Same 
V.  Andrews,  26  Kan.  702;  Central 
Branch  Union  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Andrews,  30  Kan.  590.  This  last 
case  has  been  several  times  in  the 
Supreme  Court  since  the  first  edi- 
tion and  is  reported  as  follows :  34 
Kan.  565;  37  Kan.  162;  37  Kan. 
641;  41  Kan.  370,  21  Pae.  276.  In 
Kansas,  N.  &  D.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cuy- 
kendall,  42  Kan.  234,  21  Pac.  1051, 
the  rule  to  be  deduced  from  recent 
decisions  of  the  court  is  stated  to 
be  that,  "in  order  to  justify  a  re- 
covery for  damages  by  the  abutting 


252 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  154 


private  rights  of  access,  light  and  air,  which  are  as  much  prop- 
erty as  the  lot  itself ;  also  that  any  interference  with  such  rights 
by  a  use  which  is  not  within  the  legitimate  purposes  of  a  high- 


lot-owner,  there  must  be  such  a 
practical  obstruction  of  the  street  in 
front  of  the  lots  that  the  owner  is 
denied  ingress  and  egress  to  and 
from  them.  While  the  title  to  the 
streets  is  in  the  county,  the  legis- 
lature has  given  to  the  city  govern- 
ment the  power  of  full  control.  The 
abutting  lot-owner  has  no  greater 
right  to  the  use  of  the  public  street 
than  a  railroad  company  that  has 
been  authorized  to  construct  its  line 
along  it.  Each  must  respect  the 
use  of  the  other,  but  nothing  short 
of  a  practical  obstruction  of  the  use 
by  one  will  be  a  cause  of  action  to 
the  other.  A  railroad  is  not  an  un- 
reasonable obstruction  to  the  free 
use  of  the  street,  but  rather  a  new 
and  improved  method  of  using  the 
same,  and  germain  to  its  principal 
object  as  a  passageway,  like  the 
electric,  steam-motor  and  horse-car 
lines.  So  that,  if  the  location  and 
construction  of  the  line  of  railroad 
is  authorized  by  the  city  council, 
and  its  location  in  the  street  is  such 
as  to  give  the  lot-owner  ingress  and 
egress  to  and  from  his  lots,  such  use 
of  the  street  by  the  railroad  com- 
pany does  not  interfere  with  the  use 
of  the  lot-owner,  and  consequently 
he  cannot  recover  for  those  remote 
and  indirect  inconveniences  'arising 
from  smoke,  noise,  offensive  vapors, 
sparks,  fires,  shaking  of  the  ground,' 
and  other  annoyances."  See  Ottawa 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Larson,  40  Kan. 
301,  19  Pac.  661,  2  L.R.A.  59;  Kan- 
sas, K.  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.  V.  McAfee,  42 
Kan.  239,  21  Pac.  1052;  Ft.  Scott, 
W.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Fox,  42  Kan. 
490,  22  Pac.  583 ;  Wichita  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Smith,  45  Kan.  264,  25  Pac. 
623;  Kansas,  N.  &  T>.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Mahler,  45  Kan.   565,   26  Pac.   22; 


Herndon  v.  Kansas,  N.  &  D.  R.  R. 
Co.,  46  Kan.  560,  26  Pac.  959;  Leav- 
enworth etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Curtau,  51 
Kan.  432,  33  Pac.  297;  Chicago  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Union  Inv.  Co.,  51  Kan. 
600,  33  Pac.  378;  Ottawa  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Peterson,  51  Kan.  604,  33 
Pac.  606;  Atchison  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Luening,  52  Kan.  732,  35  Pac.  801; 
Atchison  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Arnold,  52 
Kan.  729,  35  Pac.  780;  Atchison  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Davidson,  52  Kan.  739, 
35  Pac.  787;  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Schwake,  70  Kan.  141,  78  Pac. 
431,  68  L.R.A.  673. 

Kentucky.  The  general  doctrine 
is  that  the  abutting  owner  cannot 
recover,  whether  fee  in  the  public  or 
otherwise.  Lexington  &  Ohio  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Applegate,  8  Dana  (Ky.)  289, 
33  Am.  Dec.  497;  Wolft  v.  Coving- 
ton &  Lexington  R.  R.  Co.,  15  B. 
Mon.  404;  Louisville  &  Frankfort 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Brown,  17  B.  Mon.  763; 
Crosby  v.  Owensboro  &  Russellville 
R.  R.  Co.,  10  Bush,  (Ky.)  288; 
Elizabethtown  &  Paducah  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Thompson,  79  Ky.  52.  But  the 
abutting  owner's  right  to  use  the 
street  is  recognized  as  property,  and 
any  unreasonable  use  of  the  street 
by  a  railroad  is  actionable.  Eliza- 
bethtown etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Combs,  10 
Bush,  382;  J.  M.  &  I.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Esterle,  13  Bush  667;  Fulton  v. 
Short  Route  R.  R.  Trans.  Co.,  85 
Ky.  640,  4  S.  W.  332,  7  Am.  St.  Rep. 
619;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Orr,  91  Ky.  109,  15  S.  W.  8;  Com- 
monwealth V.  City  of  Frankfort,  92 
Ky.  149,  17  S.  W.  287;  Striekley  v. 
Chesapeake  &  0.  R.  R.  Co.,  93  Ky. 
323,  20  S.  W.  261;  Henderson  Belt 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dechamp,  95  Ky.  219, 
24  S.  W.  605;  Chesapeake  &  0.  R.  R. 
Co.   V.   Kobs,    (Ky.)    30   S.   W.   6; 


154 


EOADS    AND    STEEETS. 


253 


Maysvilie  &  B.  S.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  In- 
gram, (Ky.)  30  S.  W.  8;  Dulaney  v. 
Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  100  Ky. 
628.  Exactly  at  what  point  the  use 
becomes  unreasonable  and  what  rule 
is  to  be  applied  in  determining 
what  is  an  unreasonable  use  the 
cases  do  not  inform  us.  But,  when 
it  is  conceded  that  the  abutting 
owners  have  a  private  right  to  use 
the  street,  we  think  a  right  to  re- 
cover follows  in  every  case  of  a  dis- 
turbance of  that  right.  The  later 
cases  sustain  a  recovery  for  any  ma- 
terial interference  with  the  right  of 
access  and  for  damages  by  smoke, 
cinders,  noise  and  vibration.  Ball 
V.  Maysvilie  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  102  Ky. 
486,  43  S.  W.  731,  80  Am.  St.  Rep. 
362;  Covington  etc.  R.  R.  &  B.  Co. 
V.  Kleymeler,  105  Ky.  609,  49  S.  W. 
484;  Ferguson  v.  Covington  etc. 
Bridge  Co.,  108  Ky.  662,  57  S.  W. 
460;  Ky.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Clark, 
5  Ky.  L.  R.  184;  Louisville  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Finlay,  7  Ky.  L.  R.  129;  Short 
Route  Transfer  Ry.  Co.  v.  Fulton, 
12  Ky.  L.  R.  232;  Louisville  So.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Cogar,  15  Ky.  L.  R.  444; 
Louisville  So.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hooe,  18 
Ky.  L.  R.  521,  35  S.  W.  266,  38  S. 
W.  131.  There  is  no  presumption 
that  the  abutter  owns  the  fee.  Bon- 
durant  v.  North  Carolina  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  5  Ky.  L.  R.  101. 

Louisiana.  No  right  to  compensa- 
tion in  any  case.  New  Orleans,  M.  & 
C.  R.  R.  Co.,  26  La.  An.  517;  Koeh- 
mel  V.  Same,  27  La.  An.  442;  Harri- 
son v.  New  Orleans  Pacific  R.  R. 
Co.,  34  La.  An.  462,  44  Am.  Rep. 
438;  Hill  v.  Chicago,  St.  Louis  & 
New  Orleans  R.  R.  Co.,  38  La.  An. 
599.  But  an  unreasonable  location 
in  a  street  so  as  to  take  part  of 
plalntiflf's  awning  was  restrained  in 
Laviosa  v.  Chi.  St.  L.  &  N.  O.  R.  R. 
Co.,  1  McGloin,  La.  299.  A  right  to 
compensation  is  now  assured  by  the 
constitution.    Ante,  §  30,  see:  Hept- 


ing  V.  New  Orleans  Pac.  R.  R.  Co., 
36  La.  An.  898. 

Michigan.  Right  to  recover  when 
fee  in  public  not  directly  passed 
upon;  but  see  Grand  Rapids  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Helsel,  38  Mich.  62,  31  Am. 
Rep.  306;  Same  v.  Same,  47  Mich. 
393.  Abutter  may  recover  when  he 
owns  the  fee.  Hoffman  v.  Flint  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  114  Mich.  316,  72  N.  W. 
167. 

Minnesota.  Abutting  owner  may 
have  compensation,  though  fee  in 
the  public.  Schurmeir  v.  St.  Paul 
&  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  10  Minn.  82,  105, 
88  Am.  Dec.  59;  Cash  v.  Union 
Depot  etc.  Co.,  32  Minn.  101;  Adams 
V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  39  Minn. 
286,  39  N.  W.  629,  12  Am.  St.  Rep. 
644,  1  L.R.A.  493;  Lamm  v.  Chicago 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  45  Minn.  71,  47  N.  W. 
455,  10  L.R.A.  268. 

Mississippi.  See  Donnaker  v. 
State  of  Mississippi,  8  S.  &  M.  649 ; 
New  Orleans,  J.  &  G.  N.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Moye,  39  Miss.  374.  Neither  of 
these  cases  passes  directly  upon  the 
right  to  compensation  when  the  fee 
Is  in  the  abutting  owner.  In  the  re- 
cent case  of  Theobald  v.  Louisville 
N.  0.  &  T.  R.  R.  Co.,  66  Miss.  279, 
6  So.  230,  14  Am.  St.  Rep.  564,  4 
L.R.A.  735,  it  is  held  that  the  abut- 
ting owner  is  entitled  to  compensa- 
tion whether  he  owns  the  fee  or  not, 
and  the  positions  taken  in  this  chap- 
ter as  to  the  rights  of  abutting  own- 
ers are  fully  approved. 

Misso:iri.  In  this  State  no  dis- 
tinction appears  to  have  been  based 
upon  the  ownership  of  the  fee.  No 
damages  can  be  recovered  for  a  rail- 
road on  the  surface  of  a  street,  if 
built  and  operated  in  a  proper  man- 
ner. Lackland  v.  North  Mo.  R.  R. 
Co.,  31  Mo.  180;  Same  v.  Same,  34 
Mo.  259;  Tate  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  R.  R. 
Co.,  64  Mo.  149;  Randle  v.  Pacific 
R.  R.  Co.,  65  Mo.  325;  Swenson  v. 
Lexington,  69  Mo.  157;  Botto  v.  Mo. 


254 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  154 


Paoifie  R.  R.  Co.,  11  Mo.  App.  589; 
Cross  V.  St.  Louis,  K.  C.  &  N.  Ry. 
Co.,  77  Mo.  318;  Henry  Gaus  & 
Sons  Mfg.  Co.  V.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  113  Mo.  308,  20  S.  W.  658,  7 
Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  235,  18 
L.R.A.  339.  In  the  last  case  the 
court  goes  so  far  as  to  hold  that  a 
commercial  railroad  laid  at  the  sur- 
face of  a  street  is  not  only  not  a 
taking  of  the  property  of  abutting 
owners,  but  not  even  a  damaging  of 
their  property  within  the  meaning 
of  a  constitution  requiring  compen- 
sation for  property  damaged  as  well 
as  taken.  See  post,  §  351.  But 
where  the  railroad  is  laid  on  an  em- 
bankment, or  elevated  structure,  or 
upon  or  close  to  the  sidewalk,  or  in 
a  narrow  street  so  as  practically  to 
destroy  it  as  a  thoroughfare,  it  is 
held  the  abutter  may  have  a  remedy, 
either  for  damages  or  an  injunction. 
Smith  V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
98  Mo.  20,  11  S.  W.  Rep.  259;  Lock- 
wood  V.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  122  Mo. 
86,  26  S.  W.  698,  24  L.R.A.  516; 
Knapp,  Stout  &  Co.  v.  St.  Louis 
Transfer  R.  R.  Co.,  126  Mo.  26,  28 
S.  W.  626;  Schulenburg  etc.  Co.  v. 
St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  129  Mo.  455, 
31  S.  W.  796;  De  Geofroy  v.  Mer- 
chants Bridge  Terminal  Ry.  Co.,  179 
Mo.  698,  79  S.  W.  386,  101  Am.  St. 
Rep.  524,  64  L.R.A.  959.  In  the  case 
of  Sherlock  v.  Kansas  City  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  142  Mo.  172,  43  S.  W.  629,  64 
Am.  St.  Rep.  551,  the  court  says: 
"While  this  court,  by  a  long  line  of 
decisions  from  Lackland  v.  R.  R.,  31 
Mo.  180,  down  to  and  including 
Gaus  &  Sons  v.  R.  R.,  113  Mo.  308, 
has  held  that  'the  laying  of  a  rail- 
road track  on  the  established  grade 
and  operating  a  steam  railroad 
thereon,  does  not  subject  the  street 
to  a  servitude  different  from  that 
which  was  contemplated  in  the  orig- 
inal dedication,'  it  has  been  seri- 
ously questioned,  and  it  may  be 
gravely  doubted  whether  the  weight 


of  modern  authority  in  this  country 
is  not  rightly  arrayed  against  such 
a  doctrine." 

Nebraska.  The  abutting  owner 
may  recover,  though  the  fee  is  in  the 
public.  Burlington  &  Missouri  Riv. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Reinhackle,  15  Neb.  279, 
48  Am.  Rep.  342;  Chicago  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Sturey,  55  Neb.  137,  75  N.  W. 
557. 

,  New  Jersey.  Morris  &  Essex  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Newark,  10  N.  J.  Eq.  352; 
H.  B.  Anthony  Shoe  Co.  v.  West  Jer- 
sey R.  R.  Co.,  57  N.  J.  Eq.  607.  A 
commercial  railroad  is  an  additional 
burden  on  the  fee.  Bork  v.  United 
N.  J.  R.  R.  &  C.  Co.,  70  N.  J.  L.  268, 
57  Atl.  412,  103  Am.  St.  Rep.  808. 

New  Mexico.  See  New  Mexican 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Hendricks,  (N.  M.)  30 
Pae.  901. 

Neio  York.  The  right  to  compen- 
sation, when  the  fee  is  in  the  public, 
would  seem  to  be  settled  by  the  ele- 
vated railroad  cases.  Story  v.  New 
York  Elevated  R.  R.  Co.,  90  N.  Y. 
122,  43  Am.  Rep.  146;  Mahady  v. 
Brunswick  R.  R.  Co.,  91  N.  Y.  148; 
Matter  of  East  River  Bridge  etc.,  26 
Hun  490.  This  prediction,  made  in 
the  first  edition,  has  not  been  ful- 
filled, but  the  court  of  appeals, 
while  adhering  fully  to  the  doctrine 
enunciated  in  the  elevated  railroad 
cases,  above  cited,  has  reaffirmed  the 
earlier  doctrine,  that  an  abutting 
owner,  not  having  the  fee  of  the 
street,  cannot  recover  for  a,  com- 
mercial railroad  laid  on  the  surface 
or  legal  grade  of  the  street.  Fobes 
V.  Rome,  W.  &  0.  R.  R.  Co.,  121  N. 
Y.  505,  24  N.  E.  919,  8  L.R.A.  453, 
3  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  182;  Case 
V.  Cayuga  County,  34  N.  Y.  Supp. 
595.  In  the  Fobes  case  it  is  inti- 
mated that  there  might  be  a  remedy 
for  an  excessive  use  of  the  street. 
But  if  access  is  interfered  with  by 
an  embankment,  made  for  the  ac- 
commodation of  the  railroad  and 
not   in  good  faith   as   a   change   of 


§  154 


EOADS    AND    STEEBTS. 


255 


grade,  then  the  abutter  may  recover 
for  such  interference.  Reining  v. 
New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  128  N.  Y. 
157,  28  N.  E.  640,  14  L.R.A.  133,  5 
Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  476;  Egerer 
V.  New  Yorlc  Central  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
130  N.  Y.  108,  29  N.  E.  95,  5  Am.  R. 
R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  241 ;  Coatsworth  v. 
Lehigh  Valley  R.  R.  Co.,  156  N.  Y. 
451,  51  N.  E.  301.  Compare  Rauen- 
stein  V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  136 
N.  Y.  528,  32  N.  E.  1047,  7  Am.  R. 
R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  520,  18  L.R.A.  768. 
And  see  cases  cited  in  §  156. 

Ifevada.  Virginia  &  T.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Lynch,  13  Nev.  92. 

North  Carolina.  White  v.  North- 
western N.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  113  N.  C. 
610,  18  S.  E.  330,  9  Am.  R.  R.  & 
Corp.  Rep.  103,  37  Am.  St.  Rep.  639, 
22  L.R.A.  627,  repudiates  the  dis- 
tinctions based  upon  the  ownership 
of  the  fee  of  the  street  and  holds 
that  the  abutter  may  recover 
whether  he  has  the  fee  or  not.  So 
also  Staton  v.  Atlantic  Coast  Line 
R.  R.  Co.,  147  N.  C.  428. 

Ohio.  Parrott  v.  Cincinnati  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  3  Ohio  St.  330;  S.  C.  10 
Ohio  St.  624;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Ham- 
bleton,  40  Ohio  St.  496. 

Pennsylvania.  Right  to  compen- 
sation denied  in  all  cases.  Phila.  & 
Trenton  R.  R.  Co.,  6  Wharton,  25, 
36  Am.  Dec.  202;  Mercer  v.  Pitts- 
burgh, Ft.  W.  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  36  Pa. 
St.  99;  Snyder  v.  Pennsylvania  R. 
R.  Co.,  55  Pa.  St.  340 ;  Cleveland  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Speer,  56  Pa.  St.  325, 
94  Am.  Dec.  84;  Black  v.  Phila.  & 
R.  R.  R.  Co.,  58  Pa.  St.  249;  Dan- 
ville, H.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Com- 
monwealth, 73  Pa.  St.  29;  Struthers 
V.  Dunkirk  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  87  Pa.  St. 
282.  In  the  latter  case  the  court 
was  urged  to  overrule  former  de- 
cisions, but  refused  to  do  so.  See 
also  Philadelphia  v.  Empire  Passen- 
ger R.  R.  Co.,  3  Brews.  547 ;  Faust  v. 
Passenger  Railway  Co.,  3  Phila.  164. 


Compensation  is  now  secured  by  the 
constitution  of  1874.  In  Kane  v. 
New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  125  N.  Y. 
164,  26  N.  E.  278,  3  Am.  R.  R.  & 
Corp.  Rep.  744,  11  L.R.A.  640,  it  is 
said  by  Andrews,  J.,  delivering  the 
opinion  of  the  court,  and  referring 
to  the  Pennsylvania  courts:  "The 
courts  of  that  State  have  strenu- 
ously asserted  the  supreme  power  of 
the  legislature  to  appropriate  streets 
to  public  uses  destructive  of  their 
ordinary  use  as  public  ways,  and 
have  denied  the  right  of  abutting 
owners  to  compensation,  however 
serious  the  injury  to  their  property 
occasioned  by  such  appropriation. 
The  injustice  of  this  rule  led  to  the 
insertion  in  the  new  constitution  of 
Pennsylvania,  adopted  in  1874,  of  a 
provision  declaring  that  municipal 
and  other  corporations,  invested 
with  the  privilege  of  taking  private 
property  for  public  use,  should  make 
compensation  for  property  'taken, 
injured  or  destroyed,'  by  the  con- 
struction of  their  works,  etc.'' 

South  Carolina.  Recovery  denied 
without  regard  to  fee.  McLauchlin 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  5  Rich.  583.  This 
ease  overruled  and  the  right  to  re- 
cover compensation,  though  the  fee 
is  in  the  public,  affirmed.  South 
Bound  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Burton,  67  S.  C. 
515,  46  S.  E.  340.  And  see  Wilkins 
V.  Gaffney  City,  54  S.  C.  199,  32  S. 
E.  299. 

Tennessee.  When  fee  in  the  pub- 
lic there  can  be  no  recovery  unless 
the  abutter's  right  of  access  is  un- 
reasonably interfered  with.  Iron  Mt. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Bingham,  87  Tenn.  522, 
11  S.  W.  705,  4  L.R.A.  622;  Brumit 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  106  Tenn.  124,  60  S. 
W.  505. 

Texas.  Fee  in  the  public,  no  com- 
pensation. H.  &  T.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  V. 
Odum,  53  Tex.  343;  overruled  in  G. 
C.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Eddins,  29 
Alb.  L.  J.  518.  The  right  to  recover 
is  now  settled  by  the  constitution. 


256  EMINENT    BOMAIN,  §    155 

way,  is  a  taking  within  the  constitution  and  that  a  commercial 
railroad  is  such  a  use.^^ 

§  155  (115a).  Right  to  compensation  where  fee  of 
street  in  third  party.  It  sometimes  happens  that  the  fee  of 
a  street  is  in  neither  the  abutting  owner  or  the  public,  but  in  a 
third  party.^^  In  such  case  the  rights  of  the  abutting  owner, 
as  against  the  public,  are  the  same  as  though  the  public  had  the 
fee,  and  the  rights  of  the  public  are  the  same  as  though  the  fee 
was  in  the  abutting  owner.  The  right  to  compensation  would 
be  the  same  as  in  cases  where  the  public  has  the  fee,  and  is  treat- 
ed in  the  last  section. 

§  156.  Commercial  railroad  on  viaduct:  New  York 
Park  avenue  cases.  An  interesting  series  of  cases  arose  in  New 
York  out  of  the  following  facts:  The  New  York  and  Harlem 
Railroad  Company  occupied  Park  Avenue  in  New  York  city 
with  its  tracks,  which  were  constructed  at  some  places  in  cuts  and 
at  other  places  upon  a  solid  embankment  of  earth  and  masonry. 
Park  Avenue  crosses  the  Harlem  river  and  in  1890  Congress 
passed  an  act  requiring  the  existing  bridges  over  the  Harlem 
to  be  replaced  by  bridges  twenty-four  feet  above  high  tide.^*  In 
order  to  meet  this  requirement  the  legislature  of  New  York  in 
1892  passed  an  act  for  the  reconstruction  and  elevation  of  the 
railroad  tracks  on  Park  avenue  and  for  the  construction  of  a  new 
and  higher  bridge  over  the  Harlem  river.  The  railroad  was  to 
be  placed  on  a  steel  structure,  at  a  much  higher  grade  than  be-^ 

Ante,  §  54;  Morrow  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  stitution  of  1872,  the  abutter  may 

R.  R.  Co.,  81  Tex.  405,  17  S.  W.  44.  recover  to  the  extent  his  property  is 

Vermont.    Hatch  v.  Vermont  Cen-  depreciated  by  the  construction  and 

tral  R.  R.  Co.,  25  Vt.  49;  S.  C.  28  operation   of   the   railroad,   whether 

Vt.  142;  Richardson  v.  Same,  25  Vt.  he  owns  the  fee  or  not.     Stewart  v. 

465,  60  Am.  Dec.  459.  Ohio  Riv.  R.  R.  Co.,  38  W.  Va.  438, 

Washington.       The      constitution  18  S.  E.  604;  Arbenz  v.  Wheeling  & 

gives     compensation     for     property  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  33  W.  Va.  1,  10  S.  E. 

taken   or   damaged.     See   Hatch   v.  14,  5  L.R.A.  371 ;  Guinn  v.  Ohio  Riv. 

Tacoma  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  6  Wash.  1,  32  R.  R.  Co.,  46  W.  Va.  151,  33  S.  B. 

Pac.  1063;  Kaufman  v.  Tacoma  etc.  87,  76  Am.  St.  Rep.  806. 
R.  R.  Co.,  11  Wash.  632,  40  Pac.  137.  s^Ante,  §§  120,  151. 

West  Virginia.     The  propriety  of  ssCeclcer  v.   Evansville  Suburban 

distinctions  based  upon  tlie  owner-  &  R.  R.  Co.,  133  Ind.  493,  33  N.  E. 

ship  of  the  fee  is  much  discussed  in  349. 

Spencer  v.  Point  Pleasant  &  Ohio  R.  a  4 Vol.  26  U.   S.  Stats,  at  Large, 

R.  Co.,  23  W.  Va.  406,  426-432,  but  p.  437.     See  Muhllcer  v.  New  York 

the  case  is  decided  on  other  grounds.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  173  N.  Y.  549,  6'6  N. 

It  is  now  settled  that,  under  the  con-  E.  558. 


§  156  EOADS  AND  STEEETS.  257 

fore,  and  Park  avenue  was  to  be  improved  for  travel  at  the  ordi- 
nary grade.  The  work  was  to  be  done  by  the  State  through 
a  commission  appointed  by  the  mayor  of  New  York  and  the 
expense  was  to  be  equally  divided  between  the  city  and  the  rail- 
road company  up  to  $1,500,000,  the  railroad  company  paying 
all  excess  over  that  sum.  The  fee  of  the  street  was  in  the  public. 
The  work  was  done  pursuant  to  the  act  and  the  railroads  com- 
menced using  the  structure  on  Feb.  16,  1897.  The  statute  made 
no  provision  for  compensation  to  abutting  owners.  Abutting 
owners  on  Park  avenue  brought  suits  for  damages  or  injunction 
and  in  the  first  case  which  reached  the  court  of  appeals,  it 
was  held  that  the  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  recover  all  damages 
occasioned  by  the  excess  in  heighth  and  width  of  the  new  struc- 
ture over  the  old.^^  But  in  later  cases  it  was  determined  that 
there  could  be  no  recovery  on  the  ground  that  the  work  was  done 
by  the  State  for  the  improvement  of  the  street.^®  There  was 
a  strong  dissent  from  this  conclusion  and  many  instructive 
opinions  were  filed.  The  elevated  railroad  cases  are  distin- 
guished on  the  ground  that  they  were  an  additional  use  of  the 
street  for  the  benefit  of  a  private  corporation  while  the  viaduct 
in  question  was  a  scheme  for  improving  the  street  for  ordinary 
travel.^^    In  later  cases  it  was  held  that  there  might  be  a  recov- 

3  5Lewis  V.  New  York  etc.  E.  R.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  62  App.  Div.  290,  70 

Co.,  162  N.  Y.  202,  56  N.  E.  540.  N.  Y.  S.  10S8;  S.  C.  reversed  173  N, 

3  6Fries  v.   New  York  etc.  R.   R.  Y.   644,   66   N.   E.   1116;    Larney  v, 

Co.,  169  N.  Y.  270,  62  N.  E.  358,  re-  New  York  etc.  R.  R.   Co.,  62  App 

versing  S.  C.  57  App.  Div.,  577,  68  N.  Div.   311,  71   N.  Y.   S.  27;   Pape  v, 

Y.  S.  670;  Muhlker  v.  New  York  etc.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  74  App 

R.  R.  Co.,  173  N.  Y.  549,  66  N.  E.  Div.  175,  77  N.  Y.  S.  725;  S.  C.  re 

5.58,   reversing   S.   C.    60   App.   Div.  versed,  175  N.  Y.  504,  67  N.  E.  1036 

621 ;  Dolan  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Caldwell  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 

Co.,  175  N.  Y.  367,  67  N.  E.  612,  re-  HI  App.  Div.  164,  97  N.  Y.  S.  588 

versing  S.  C.  74  App.  Div.  434,  77  Wallaeh  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co, 

N.  Y.  S.  815.     In  the  last  case  it  is  111  App.  Div.  273,  97  N.  Y.  S.  717 

said:     "The  evident  purpose  of  this  Bremer  v.  New  York  Central  etc.  R. 

legislation  was  to  open  up  Park  ave-  R.  Co.,  118  App.  Div.  139,  103  N.  Y, 

nue  as  a  street  through  its  entire  S.  318. 

width,  and  to  facilitate  travel  across  37"The   decisions   in  the   elevated 

the  same  between  the  portions  of  the  railroad    cases    are    not    in    point, 

city    lying    on    either    side    of    the  There  no  attempt  was  made  by  the 

street."     p.   370.     See  also  the  fol-  state  to  improve  the  street  for  the 

lowing    cases    growing   out   of   the  benefit   of   the   public.      Instead,    it 

same   improvement:    Wilde  v.   New  granted  to  a  corporation  the  right  to 

York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  168  N.  Y.  597,  mal<e    an    additional    use    of     the 

61   N.  E.  554-   Siegel  v.  New  York  street,  in  the  doing  of  which  it  took 
Em.    D.— 17. 


258 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  156 


ery  for  damages  caused  by  a  station,  outside  the  limits  of  the 
regular  structure.^®  Cases  involving  liability  for  the  structure 
itself  were  taken  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States, 
and  there  the  ruling  of  the  New  York  court  was  reversed'.'  The 
plaintiff,  in  the  case  decided,  acquired  his  property  after  the 
decisions  in  the  New  York  elevated  railroad  cases  and  he  was 
held  thereby  to  have  acquired  by  contract  a  right  to  the  ease- 
ments of  light,  air  and  access  as  adjudicated  in  those  cases  which 
could  not  be  impaired  by  the  State  or  its  agents  without  compen- 
sation. It  was  held  that  there  was  no  room  for  distinction  be- 
tween the  elevated  railroad  cases  and  the  one  under  discussion 
and  that  the  former  were  in  point  and  decisive.** 

Much  stress  was  laid  by  the  New  York  courts  upon  the  fact 
that  the  Park  avenue  viaduct  was  built  by  the  State  and  the 
railroads  compelled  to  occupy  it.*"  Upon  this  point  and,  re- 
ferring to  the  elevated  railroad  cases,  the  United  States  Supreme 
Court  says :  "Another  distinction  is  claimed,  as  we  have  already 
observed,  between  the  case  at  bar  and  those  cases.  The  act  of 
the  railroad  in  occupying  the  viaduct,  it  is  said,  was  the  act  of  the 


certain  easements  belonging  to  abut- 
ting owners,  which  it  was  compelled 
to  compensate  them  for."  Muhlker 
V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  173  N. 
Y.  549,  536,  66  N.  E.  588.  And  see 
Pries  V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
169  N.  Y.  270,  62  N.  E.  358. 

3  8Dolan  V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  175  N.  Y.  367,  67  N.  E.  612,  re- 
versing S.  C.  74  App.  Div.  434,  77 
N.  Y.  S.  815 ;  Ketcham  v.  New  York 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  177  N.  Y.  247,  69  N. 
E.  533,  reversing  S.  C.  76  App.  Div. 
619. 

ssMuhlker  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  197  U.  S.  544,  25  S.  C.  522 ;  Bir- 
rell  V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  198 
U.  S.  390,  25  S.  C.  667.  The  fact 
that  access  was  improved  was  held 
to  be  no  reason  why  the  plaintiff 
should  not  recover  for  interference 
vpith  light  and  air.  Four  judges  dis- 
sent from  the  decision. 

4  0Thus  in  Muhlker  v.  New  York 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  173  N.  Y.  549,  66  N. 
E.  558,  at  page  554,  the  court  says: 
f'The   State    had    the   power   to   do 


these  things  and  all  of  them,  and 
defendant,  having  the  right  to  move 
its  trains  over  the  street,  which 
could  not  be  taken  away  from  it,  did 
not  lose  that  right  and  became  o. 
trespasser  because  it  obeyed  the 
command  of  the  statute,  which  it 
could  not  refuse  to  obey,  to  operate 
its  trains  upon  the  structure  which 
the  State  had  built.  The  plaintiff 
was  injured  by  the  change  as  ap- 
pears from  the  findings.  But  who 
caused  the  injury?  The  defendant, 
■which  obeyed  the  command  of  the 
statute  which  it  had  not  the  right  to 
resist,  or  the  State,  which  had 
power  to  make  the  changes  which 
were  made  in  the  street  and  did 
make  them  and  then  compelled  de- 
fendant to  make  use  of  them?  The 
question  admits  of  but  one  answer, 
and  that  is,  it  was  the  State."  To 
the  same  effect  is  Fries  v.  New  York 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  169  N.  Y.  270,  62  N. 
E.  358.  See  especially  pages  277, 
282  and  283  of  the  official  report. 


§  156  EOADS  ANB  STEEETS.  259 

State.  *  *  *  The  answer  need  not  be  hesitating.  The  per- 
mission, or  command  of  the  State,  can  give  no  power  to  invade 
private  rights,  even  for  a  public  purpose  without  payment  of 
compensation;  and  payment  of  such  compensation,  when  neces- 
sary to  the  performance  of  the  duties  of  a  railroad  company, 
may  be,  as  we  have  already  observed,  part  of  its  submission 
to  the  command  of  the  State."  *^  This  decision  was  rendered  in 
1905  and  in  the  meantime  the  legislature  of  New  York  passed 
an  act  providing  for  compensation  to  abutting  owners  on  ac- 
count of  the  viaduct,  to  be  paid  by  the  State,  and  ascertained 
by  the  court  of  claims,  with  a  proviso  that  the  award  should  not 
include  any  damages  for  which  any  railroad  corporation  was 
or  might  be  liable  and  that  the  facts  proved  should  be  such  as 
to  make  out  a  case  of  liability  were  the  State  a  corporation 
or  private  individual.*^  This  act  has  been  held  to  be  valid,** 
but  how  it  will  be  applied,  in  view  of  the  decision  of  the  fed- 
eral court,  remains  to  be  seen. 

In  Missouri,  where  a  commercial  railroad  at  the  grade  of  the 
street  is  held  to  be  a  legitimate  street  use,  it  is  also  held  that,  if 
it  is  constructed  upon  an  elevated  structure,  it  constitutes  an 
additional  burden  for  which  compensation  must  be  made  to 
the  abutting  owner.**  So  in  New  York  where  the  abutter  has 
no  remedy  when  the  fee  of  the  street  is  in  the  public  and  a  com- 
mercial railroad  is  laid  at  grade,  he  may  recover  when  the  road 
is  laid  on  an  embankment  or  causeway  in  the  middle  of  the 
street.*^ 

But  the  true  view  is  that  a  commercial  railroad  is  not  a  proper 
street  use  *"  and  cannot  be  authorized  without  compensation  to 
the  abutting  owner,  whether  he  owns  the  fee  or  otherwise  and 
the  manner  of  construction  simply  goes  to  the  question  of  dam- 
ages, not  to  the  question  of  liability.  Such  a  railroad  is  mani- 
festly more  injurious  when  constructed  upon  a  steel  viaduct,  or 
upon  an  embankment  or  in  a  cut  than  upon  the  surface.*^ 

4iMuhlker  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  ferman  v.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.,  120 

Co.,  197  U.  S.  544,  569,  25  S.  C.  522.  App.  Div.  528,  105  N.  Y.  S.  487. 

42Laws  of  1901,  chap.  729.  45Reining  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R. 

4  3Sander  v.  State,  182  N.  Y,  400,  Co.,  128  N.  Y.  157,  28  N.  E.  640,  14 

75  N.  E.  234,  reuersjjjir  S.  C.  90  App.  L.R.A.    133;    Egerer    v.    New  York 

Div.  618.  Cent.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  130  N.  Y.  108, 

44De  Geofroy  v.  Merchants  Bridge  29  N.  E.  95,  14  L.R.A.  381. 
Terminal  Ry.  Co.,  179  Mo.  698,  79  S.  i^Ante,  §§  151-154. 

W.   386,   101   Am.   St.   Rep.   524,   64  4 'Besides  the  cases  already  cited 

L.R.A.  959.     To  same  effect  is  Lef-  in  this  section  we  refer  to  the  fol- 


260  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    157 

§  157  (115b).  Elevated  street  railroads.  The  railroads 
here  intended  are  of  the  type  found  in  New  York  and  Chicago, 
consisting  of  a  steel  structure  supported  by  columns  in  the  street, 
upon  which  the  cars  are  operated  in  trains,  with  stations  at  con- 
venient distances.  They  are  devoted  to  passenger  traffic  only. 
Such  railroads  are  clearly  not  within  the  ordinary  and  legiti- 
mate uses  for  which  highways  are  established.  If  the  fee  of 
the  street  is  in  the  abutting  owner,  he  is  entitled  to  compensa- 
tion, as  in  case  of  the  ordinary  steam  railroad.*^  If  the  fee  is 
not  in  the  abutting  owner,  he  is  still  entitled  to  recover  for 
damages  occasioned  to  his  property  by  interfering  with  his  right 
of  access  and  his  right  to  light  and  air.  These  rights  are  prop- 
erty, and,  to  impair  or  destroy  them  is  a  taking.*^  Various 
questions  in  reference  to  the  elevated  railways  of  New  York 
City  came  before  the  courts  of  New  York  prior  to  1882,^"  but 
the  right  to  compensation  was  not  authoritatively  passed  upon 
until  the  decision  made  by  the  Court  of  Appeals  in  Story  v. 
New  York  Elevated  Railroad  Co.  decided  in  that  year.^^  Plain- 
tiff owned  an  improved  lot  abutting  on  Front  street,  in  which 
the  defendant  proposed  to  construct  "a  road  upon  a  series  of 
columns,  about  fifteen  inches  square,  fourteen  feet  and  six  inches 
high,  placed  five  inches  inside  the  edge  of  the  sidewalk,  and  car- 
rying girders,  from  thirty-three  to  thirty-nine  inches  deep,  for 
the  support  of  cross  ties  for  three  sets  of  rails  for  a  steam  rail- 
lowing:  Railroad  on  embankment  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  489;  Matter  of  East 
in  street:  Smith  v.  Kansas  City  River  Bridge  &  Rapid  Transit  Co., 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  98  Mo.  20,  11  S.  W.  10  Abb.  New  Cases,  245;  Matter  of 
259.  In  cut:  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  East  River  Bridge  etc.  Co.,  26  Hun 
R.  Co.  V.  Schwake,  70  Kan.  141,  78  490;  Matter  of  Brooklyn  Rapid 
Pac.  431,  68  L.R.A.  673.  In  tunnel:  Transit  Co.,  63  How.  Fr.  404.  A 
Terry  v.  Richmond,  94  Va.  537,  27  S.  collection  of  Elevated  Railway  cases 
E.  429.  And  see  New  Castle  v.  Lake  with  »  note  will  be  found  in  Vol.  3, 
Erie  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  155  Ind.  18,  57  Abbott's  New  Cases,  as  follows: 
N.  B.  516;  Coatsworth  v.  Lehigh  Patten  v.  New  York  Elevated  R.  R. 
Valley  R.  R.  Co.,  156  N.  Y.  45,  51  N.  Co.,  p.  306;  Ninth  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
E.  301;  ante,  §  138;  post,  §  178.  Same,  p.  347;   Sixth  Ave.  R.  R.  v. 

*«An.te,  §  153.  Gilbert  Elevated  R.  R.  Co.,  p.  372; 

iSAnte,  §  64.  Matter  of  New  York  Elevated  R.  R. 

soMatter  of  New  York  Elevated      Co.,  p.  401;  Gilbert  Elevated  R.  R. 
R.  R.  Co.,  70  N.  Y.  327;  Matter  of      Co.  v.  Anderson,  p.  434;   Spader  v. 
Gilbert  Elevated  Ry.  Co.,  70  N.  Y.      New  York   Elevated  R.   R.   Co.,   p. 
361;   Matter  of  Kings  County  Ele-      467;   Story  v.  Same,  p.  478. 
vated  Ry.   Co.,  82  N.  Y.  95;   Sixth  5 190  N.  Y.  122,  43  Am.  Rep.  146, 

Ave.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Gilbert  Elevated  Ry.,      decided  Oct.  17th,  1882,  found  also  in 
43  N.  Y.  Supr.  Ct.  292;  S.  C.  41  N.      11  Abb.  New  Cases,  p.  236. 


§  157  EOADS  AND  STEEETS.  261 

road."  The  cars  intended  for  the  road,  when  placed  thereon, 
would  extend  eleven  feet  above  the  tracks,  would  project  two 
feet  over  the  sidewalk  on  either  side  of  the  street  and  reach  with- 
in nine  feet  of  plaintiff's  buildings.  It  was  found  as  matter  of 
fact  that  the  existence  of  this  structure  and  operation  of  the 
road  would  interfere  with  access  to  the  plaintiff's  premises,  and 
would,  to  some  extent,  intercept  the  light  and  air  from  his  build- 
ing and  impair  the  enjoyment  and  value  of  his  property.  The 
lot  and  street  in  question  were  originally  a  part  of  a  tract  of 
land  platted  and  sold  by  the  city  of  New  York,  and  in  the  deeds 
from  the  city  it  is  declared  that  "the  said  several  streets  shall 
forever  thereafter  continue  and  be  for  the  free  and  common 
passage  of,  and  as  public  streets  and  ways  for  the  inhabitants 
of  the  said  city,  and  all  others  passing  and  returning  through 
or  by  the  same,  in  like  manner  as  the  other  streets  of  the  said 
city  now  are  or  lawfully  ought  to  be."  Front  street  was  one 
of  the  streets  referred  to.  .Plaintiff's  lot  was  originally  conveyed 
as  bounded  on  Front  street,  and  whatever  rights  in  the  street 
had  attached  to  the  lot  originally  were  duly  vested  in  the  plain- 
tiff. ^The  case  was  principally  considered  on  the  theory  that 
the  fee  of  the  street  was  in  the  city.  It  was  held  that  the  original 
purchaser  acquired  certain  rights  in  the  street,  in  the  nature  of 
an  easement  therein  appurtenant  to  his  lot.  "But  what  is  the 
extent  of  this  easement?"  says  the  court  (p.  146).  "What  rights 
or  privileges  are  secured  thereby?  /Generally,  it  may  be  said, 
it  is  to  have  the  street  kept  open,  so  that  from  it  access  may  be 
had  to  the  Iot7-a«d-li^Tt'HEd  air  furnished  across  the  open  way. 
The  street  occupies  the  surface  and  to  its  uses  the  rights  of  the 
adjacent  lots  are  subordinate,  but  above  the  surface  there  can  be 
no  lawful  obstruction  to  the  access  of  light  and  air,  to  the  detri- 
ment of  the  abutting  ovmer.  To  hold  otherwise  would  enable  the 
city  to  derogate  from  its  own  grant,  and  violate  the  arrange- 
ment on  the  faith  of  which  the  lot  was  purchased.  This  in  effect 
was  an  agreement,  that  if  the  grantee  would  buy  the  lot  abutting 
on  the  street,  he  might  have  the  use  of  light  and  air  over  the 
open  space  designated  as  a  street.  In  this  case  it  is  found  by 
the  trial  court  in  substance,  that  the  structure  proposed  by  the 
defendant,  and  intended  for  the  street  opposite  the  plaintiff's 
premises,  would  cause  an  actual  diminution  of  light,  depreciate 
the  value  of  the  plaintiff's  warehouse  and  thus  work  his  injury. 


262 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  15Y 


In  doing  this  thing  the  defendant  will  take  his  property  as  much 
as  if  it  took  the  tenement  itself."  ^^ 

Although,  in  this  particular  case,  the  street  in  question  was 
laid  out  by  the  city  itself,  which  also  originally  granted  the  plain- 
tiff's lot  with  a  covenant  that  the  street  should  forever  remain 
open  as  a  public  street,  yet  the  principles  of  the  decision  will 
apply  with  equal  force  to  property  abutting  upon  streets  estab- 
lished by  private  dedication  or  by  condemnation.  (In  platting 
and  conveying  the  property  the  city  acted  merely  as  a  private 
partyA  The  deeds  of  conveyance  executed  by  the  city  did  not 
expressly  transfer  any  rights  in  the  streets  as  appurtenant  to 
the  abutting  property,  nor  define  how  the  streets  were  to  be  used 
and  enjoyed  except  in  general  terms  which  would  have  been 
implied  by  law.  The  meaning  of  the  covenant  in  the  deed,  that 
the  streets  in  question  are  to  be  kept  open,  as  public  streets, 
"in  like  manner  as  the  other  streets  of  the  said  city  now  are  or 
lawfully  ought  to  be,"  is  to  be  determined  by  reference  to  the 


6  2The  conclusions  of  the  court 
upon  the  whole  case  are  given  by 
Tracy,  J.,  as  follows: 

"First.  That  the  plaintiff,  by 
force  of  the  grant  of  the  city,  made 
to  his  grantors,  has  a  right  or  privi- 
lege in  Front  street,  which  enables 
him  to  have  the  same  kept  open  and 
continued  as  a  public  street  for  the 
benefit  of  his  abutting  property. 

"Second.  That  this  right  or  privi- 
lege constitutes  an  easement,  in  the 
bed  of  the  street,  which  attaches  to 
the  abutting  property  of  the  plain- 
tiff, and  constitutes  private  property, 
within  the  meaning  of  the  constitu- 
tion, of  which  he  cannot  be  deprived, 
without  compensation. 

"Third.  That  such  a  structure  as 
the  court  found  the  defendant  was 
about  to  erect  in  Front  street,  and 
which  it  has  since  erected,  is  incon- 
sistent with  the  use  of  Front  street 
as  a  public  street. 

"Fourth.  That  the  plaintiff's  prop- 
erty has  been  taken  and  appropri- 
ated by  the  defendant  for  public  use 
without  compensation  being  made 
therefor. 


"Fifth.  That  the  defendant's  acts 
are  unlawful,  and  as  the  structure  is 
permanent  in  its  character  and,  if 
suffered  to  continue,  will  inflict  a 
permanent  and  continuing  injury 
upon  the  plaintiff  he  has  the  right  to 
restrain  the  erection  and  continu- 
ance of  the  road  by  injunction. 

"Sixth.  That  the  statutes  under 
which  the  defendant  is  organized 
authorize  it  to  acquire  such  property 
as  may  be  necessary  for  its  construc- 
tion and  operation  by  the  exercise  of 
the  right  of  eminent  domain. 

"Seventh.  The  injunction  prohibit- 
ing the  continuance  of  the  road  in 
Front  street,  should  not  be  issued 
until  the  defendant  has  had  a  rea- 
sonable time  after  this  decision  to 
acquire  the  plaintiff's  property  by 
agreement,  or  by  proceedings  to  con- 
demn the  same."  pp.  178,  179.  The 
decision  of  the  court  is  by  Andrews, 
Ch.  J.,  Rapallo,  Danforth,  and 
Tracy,  JJ.  Miller,  Earl  and  Finch, 
JJ.,  dissent. 


§  157  EOADS  AND  STEEETS.  263 

general  law  and  custom  whicli  regulates  the  uses  of  streets  in 
cities.  The  court  does  not  determine  whether  an  elevated  rail- 
road is  a  legitimate  use  of  Front  street  by  reference  to  the 
deed  of  the  city,  but  by  reference  to  the  manner  in  which  the 
streets  of  a  city  have  been  immemorially  used  and  enjoyed.  Had 
the  property  in  question  been  platted  and  sold  by  a  private  indi- 
vidual, the  purchasers  would  have  acquired  the  same  rights  in 
Front  street  as  the  grantees  of  the  city  acquired.  And  so,  had 
the  streets  in  question  been  established  by  condemnation,  the 
result  to  the  abutting  property  would  have  been  the  same.^*  fln 
short,  the  right  to  light,  air  and  access  over  a  public  street 
is  a  universal  and  inseparable  constituent  of  abutting  property. 
Such  right  is  property,  as  sacred  as  the  lot  itself,  and  cannot 
be  interfered  with  or  taken  for  public  use  without  compensa- 
tion.5*) 

These  views  in  regard  to  the  logical  scope  of  the  decision  in 
the  Story  case  are  in  accordance  with  the  later  case  of  Lahr  v. 
Metropolitan  Elevated  K.  R.  Co.^^  In  the  latter  case  the  Court 
of  Appeals  was  strenuously  urged  to  reconsider  or  modify  its 
decision  in  the  Story  case,  or  at  least  confine  its  application  to 
property  held  by  grant  from  the  city  itself  upon  covenants  simi- 
lar to  those  in  question  in  the  Story  ease.  But  the  court  refused 
to  do  either,  and  expressly  approved  of  its  former  decision  and 
declared  that,  "wherever  the  principles  of  that  case  logically 
lead  us  we  feel  constrained  to  go,  and  give  full  effect  to  the  rule 
therein  stated,  that  abutters  upon  public  streets  in  cities  are  en- 
titled to  such  damages,  as  they  may  have  sustained  by  reason  of  a 
diversion  of  the  street  from  the  use  for  which  it  was  originally 
taken,  and  its  illegal  appropriation  to  other  and  inconsistent 


B34»<e,  §§  120-123.  is   a   perversion   of  the   use   of   the 

5  4Peyser  v.  New  York  Elevated  R.  street  from  the  purposes  originally 
R.  Co.,  12  Abb.  New  Cases,  276;  designed  for  it,  and  is  a  use  which 
Glover  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  66  neither  the  city  authorities  nor  the 
How.  Pr.  77.  legislature  can  legalize  or  sanction, 

6  5104  N.  Y.  268.  without  providing  compensation  for 
6  6"We  hold   that  the  Story  case  the  injury  inflicted  upon  the  prop- 
has  definitely  determined:  erty  of  abutting  owners. 

"First.    That  an  elevated  railroad  "Second.     That   abutters   upon    a 

in  the  streets  of  a  city,  operated  by  public  street,  claiming  title  to  their 

steam  power  and  constructed  as  to  premises  by  grant  from  the  munici- 

form,    equipments    and    dimensions  pal    authorities,    which    contains    a 

like  that  described  in  the  Story  case,  covenant  that  a  street  is  to  be  laid 


264 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  157 


Accordingly,  in  the  case  last  referred  to,  the  principles  of  the 
Story  case  were  applied  where  the  street  was  established  by 
condemnation  and  the  fee  acquired  by  the  public  for  use  as  a 
highway.  /In  another  case  it  appeared  that  the  street  was  estab- 
lished under  an  act  which  provided  that  the  streets  opened  there- 
under should  be  converted  to  the  use  of  the  public  in  the  man- 
ner "now  designated  and  settled  by  law,  and  uch  other  man- 
ner as  the  legislature  may  hereafter  deem  proper  to  enact."  It 
was  held,  however,  that  the  legislature  could  not  enact  that  an 
elevated  railroad  should  be  operated  in  the  street'  without  com- 
pensation to  the  abutting  owners./'' 

Since  the  first  edition  in  1888  the  question  has  been  decided 
in  accordance  with  the  earlier  cases  in  numerous  decisions  of 
the  New  York  courts  and  in  respect  to  streets  established  under 
almost  every  conceivable  variety  of  circumstances  and  condi- 
tions. °*  /It  is  the  settled  law  of  that  State  that  the  abutting 


out  in  front  of  such  property  shall 
forever  thereafter  continue  for  the 
free  and  common  passage  of,  and  as 
public  streets  and  ways  for  the  in- 
habitants of  said  city,  and  all  others 
passing  and  returning  through  or  by 
the  same,  in  like  manner  as  the  other 
streets  of  the  same  city  now  are  or 
lawfully  ought  to  be,  acquire  an 
easement  in  the  bed  of  the  street  for 
ingress  and  egress  to  and  from  their 
premises,  and  also  for  the  free  and 
uninterrupted  passage  and  circula- 
tion of  light  and  air  through  and 
over  such  street  for  the  benefit  of 
the  property  situated  thereon. 

"Third.  That  the  ownership  of 
such  easement  is  an  interest  in  real 
estate,  constituting  property  within 
the  meaning  of  that  term,  as  used 
in  the  constitution  of  the  State,  and 
requires  compensation  to  be  made 
therefor  before  it  can  lawfully  be 
taken  from  its  owner,  for  public  use. 

"Fourth.  That  the  erection  of  an 
elevated  railroad,  the  use  of  which 
is  intended  to  be  permanent,  in  a 
public  street,  and  upon  which  cars 
are  propelled  by  steam  engines,  gen- 
erating steam  and  smoke,  and  dis- 


tributing in  the  air  cinders,  dust, 
ashes  and  other  noxious  and  delete- 
rious substances,  and  interrupting 
the  free  passage  of  light  and  air  to 
and  from  adjoining  premises,  con- 
stitutes a  taking  of  the  easement, 
and  its  appropriation  by  the  rail- 
road corporation,  rendering  it  liable 
to  the  abutters  for  the  damage  occa- 
sioned by  such  taking."  Lahr.  v. 
Met.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  104  N.  Y.  268, 
288. 

6  ^American  Primitive  Methodist 
Society  v.  Brooklyn  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  46 
Hun  530. 

5  sin  Kane  v.  New  York  El.  R.  R. 
Co.,  125  N.  Y.  164,  26  N.  E.  278,  11 
L.R.A.  640,  3  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
744,  the  question  arose,  with  refer- 
ence to  a  street  established  under 
the  Dutch  regime  and  while  the  civil 
law  was  in  force  in  the  city,  but  the 
same  conclusions  were  reached.  See 
also  Hine  v.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co., 
54  Hun  425,  27  N.  Y.  St.  303,  7  N. 
Y.  Supp.  464  and  Mortimer  v.  New 
York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  57  N.  Y.  Supr. 
Ct.  244,  6  N.  Y.  Supp.  898,  where 
the  same  phase  is  elaborately  dis- 
cussed. 


§  1-7 


EOADS    AND    STEEETS. 


265 


owner,  irrespective  of  the  ownership  of  the  fee,  and  irrespective 
of  the  manner  in  which  the  street  was  established,  has  certain 
easements  of  light,  air  and  access  and  is  entitled  to  compensa- 
tion when  these  are  interfered  with  by  an  elevated  railroad  in  the 
street.^') 

A  system  of  elevated  railroads  has  been  establisheed  in  Chica- 
go, partly  upon  streets  and  alleys  and  partly  upon  property 
acquired  or  condemned  for  that  purpose.     It  has  been  held  that 


BSThe  elevated  railroad  cases  in 
New  York  are  very  numerous,  but 
most  of  them  relate  to  other  ques- 
tions than  the  right  to  compensation 
and  will  be  referred  to  in  their  ap- 
propriate connection.  We  cite  the 
following  as  among  the  more  im- 
portant new  cases,  which  deal  with 
the  rights  of  abutting  owners  and 
the  right  to  compensation:  New- 
man V.  Met.  El.  E.  E.  Co.,  118  N.  Y. 
618,  23  N.  E.  901,  7  L.E.A.  289,  2  Am. 
E.  E.  &  Corp.  Eep.  318;  Abendroth 
V.  Manhattan  E.  E.  Co.,  122  N.  Y. 
1,  25  N.  E.  496,  19  Am.  St.  Eep.  461, 
11  L.E.A.  634,  3  Am.  E.  E.  &  Corp. 
Eep.  309,  affirming  S.  C.  54  N.  Y. 
Supr.  Ct.  417;  Kane  v.  New  York 
El.  E.  E.  Co.,  125  N.  Y.  164,  26  N. 
E.  278;  S.  C.  Sub.  Nom.  Duyckinck 
V.  New  York  El.  E.  E.  Co.,  3  Am.  E. 
E.  &  Corp.  Eep.  744,  affirming  S.  C. 
15  Daly  294,  6  N.  Y.  St.  526;  Wil- 
liams V.  Brooklyn  El.  E.  E.  Co.,  126 
N.  Y.  96,  26  N.  E.  1048;  American 
Bank  Note  Co.  v.  New  York  El.  E. 
E.  Co.,  129  N.  Y.  252,  29  N.  E.  302, 
5  Am.  E.  E.  &  Corp.  Eep.  583 ;  Mes- 
senger v.  Manhattan  E.  E.  Co.,  129 
N.  Y.  502,  29  N.  E.  955;  Bohm  v. 
Metropolitan  El.  E.  E.  Co.,  129  N. 
Y.  576,  29  N.  E.  802,  14  L.E.A.  344, 
5  Am.  E.  E.  &  Corp.  Eep.  416; 
Hughes  V.  Met.  El.  E.  E.  Co.,  130  N. 
Y.  14,  28  N.  E.  765;  Bischoflf  v.  New 
York  El.  E.  E.  Co.,  138  N.  Y.  257, 
33  N.  E.  1073 ;  Bremer  v.  Manhattan 
Ey.  Co.,  191  N.  Y.  333,  84  N.  E.  59. 
In  a  recent  Maryland  case  the  court, 
referring  to  the  New  York  Elevated 


E.  E.  cases,  says:  "The  New  York 
doctrine  involves  this  inextricable 
dilemma,  viz..  (ff  the  grading  of  a 
street  by  a  municipal  corporation 
cuts  off  all  access  to  a  person's 
house,  albeit  his  property  is  thereby 
destroyed  and  rendered  valueless,  it 
is  not  taken,  in  the  constitutional 
sense;  but  if  a  railroad  company,  in 
lawfully  constructing  its  road,  does 
precisely  the  same  thing  that  the 
city  did  in  grading  the  street,  then 
the  abutter's  property  is  taken, 
though  not  physically  entered  upon 
at  all."  Garrett  v.  Lake  Eoland  El. 
E.  E.  Co.,  79  Md.  277,  29  Atl.  830,  10 
Am.  E.  E.  &  Corp.  Eep.  39.  But  the 
court  here  ignores  an  important  and 
controlling  distinction  between  grad- 
ing a  street  and  constructing  an  ele- 
vated railroad  in  it.  ffhe  former  is 
a  legitimate  use  of  the  street  for 
highway  purposes,  the  latter  is  not. 
The  abutter's  rights  of  light,  air  and 
access,  being  subject  to  the  right  of 
the  public  to  use  and  Improve  the 
street  for  highway  purposes  (ante, 
§  120),  he  cannot  complain  of  a 
change  of  grade,  and  nothing  is 
taken  from  him  thereby;  but  such 
rights  not  being  subject  to  any  but 
legitimate  street  uses,  and  an  ele- 
vated railroad  not  being  such  a  use, 
any  interference  with  the  easements 
by  its  construction  and  operation  is 
so  much  taken  from  his  property  and 
he  is  entitled  to  compensation  there- 
for under  the  constitution.  Ante, 
§  64. 


266 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  157 


they  are  a  lawful  use  of  tlie  streets,  but  the  court  evidently 
intend  by  this  that  it  is  competent  for  the  legislature  to  author- 
ize their  costruction  therein.*"  Compensation  to  abutting 
owners  is  guaranteed  by  the  constitution,  in  the  provision  which 
requires  compensation  to  be  made  for  property  damaged  as  well 
as  for  property  taken,  so  that  the  question  of  whether  such  use 
of  the  streets  constitutes  a  taking  does  not  necessarily  arise.®  ^ 
There  are  elevated  railways  in  Boston  but  the  statute  which 
authorized  them  required  that  compensation  should  be  made 
to  abutting  owners,  "who  are  damaged  by  reason  of  the  location, 
construction,  maintenance  and  operation  of  said  lines  of  rail- 
way." ®^.  Under  this  statute  it  is  held  to  make  no  difference 
whether  the  abutter  owns  the  fee  or  not.**  In  New  Jersey 
compensation  is  required  by  statute  and  provision  made  for 
condemning  in  advance  the  rights  of  abutting  owners.®*     A  few 


fiODoane  v.  Lake  Street  Elevated 
R.  E.  Co.,  165  111.  510,  46  N.  E.  520, 
56  Am.  St.  Rep.  265,  36  L.R.A.  97. 
The  court  says:  "It  is  conceded  that 
the  common  council  of  the  City  of 
Chicago  is,  by  the  provisions  of  our 
statute,  given  exclusive  control  and 
supervision  of  its  streets,  the  fee  of 
which  is  vested  in  the  municipality. 
While  they  are  held  in  trust  for  the 
public  use  and  can  only  be  appro- 
priated to  the  purposes  for  which 
they  were  dedicated,  it  is  the  settled 
law  of  this  State  that  permitting 
street  railroads  to  be  placed  therein 
is  not  subjecting  them  to  an  unlaw- 
ful use.  It  has  often  been  so  de- 
cided by  this  court  as  to  surface 
roads,  and  no  good  reason  lias  been 
suggested,  and  none  we  think  can  be 
offered,  for  making  a  distinction  in 
this  regard  between  elevated  and 
surface  roads.  The  road  in  question, 
if  constructed  in  conformity  with  the 
requirements  of  the  ordinance,  will 
certainly  obstruct  travel  upon  the 
street  by  other  means  less,  and  be 
less  hazardous  to  the  public,  than 
would  be  a  surface  road.    The  pillars 


upon  which  the  superstructiire  is  to 
be  built,  which,  it  is  claimed,  will 
exclude  the  public  from  a  part  of  the 
street,  are  but  a  necessary  part  of 
the  road  as  much  so  as  are  the  rails 
and  other  parts  of  tracks  con- 
structed upon  the  ground,  or  as  are 
trolley  posts  placed  in  the  street  for 
operating  an  electric  road  by  the 
trolley  system.  It  is  true  that  all 
these  things  do  to  some  extent  inter- 
fere with  the  use  of  the  street  by  or- 
dinary vehicles,  but  the  inconve- 
nience is  one  which  must  be  borne 
for  the  benefit  resulting  to  the  public 
from  the  better  modes  of  travel  thus 
afforded."  And  see  Metropolitan  W. 
S.  El.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Springer,  171  111. 
170,  49  N.  E.  416;  Chicago  Office 
Bldg.  V.  Lake  St.  Ry.  Co.,  87  111. 
App.  594. 

siAldis  V.  Union  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  203 
111.  567,  68  N.  E.  95. 

6  2Baker  v.  Boston  El.  Ry.  Co.,  183 
Mass.  178,  66  N.  E.  711. 

6  3Ibid. 

64Sullivan  v.  North  Hudson 
County  R.  E.  Co.,  51  N.  J.  li.  518,  18 
Atl.  689. 


§  157  EOADS  AND  STREETS.  267 

miscellaneous  cases  bearing  somewhat  upon  the  subject  of  the 
section  are  referred  to  below.^^ 

It  seems  to  the  writer  that  elevated  street  railroads  may  con- 
stitute a  distinct  class  as  distinguished  from  surface  street  rail- 
roads of  all  kinds.  The  elevated  structure  creates  a  second 
street  surface,  a  second  story,  so  to  speak,  which  seems  utterly 
at  variance  with  the  original  dedication  of  the  street  to  public 
use  as  a  highway.  If  such  a  structure  and  use  is  legitimate  we 
might  have  one  with  two  or  three  stories,  each  devoted  to  the 
same  or  different  kind  of  traffic,  or  such  a  one  as  was  contem- 
plated in  a  recent  New  York  case,  consisting  of  a  two-storied 
viaduct,  supported  on  brick  arches,  the  first  story  fifty  feet  above 
the  surface  and  the  second  seventy-five  feet.^® 

The  question  of  what  constitutes  an  elevated  railroad  has  been 
passed  upon  in  Maryland.^''  The  question  was  whether  a  cer- 
tain structure,  proposed  to  be  built  upon  North  avenue,  in  the 
city  of  Baltimore,  was  an  elevated  railroad  within  the  meaning 
of  a  statute,  which  provided  that  no  elevated  railroad  should  be 
constructed  in  or  through  the  city  of  Baltimore,  except  under  a 
special  charter  of  the  general  assembly.  It  was  held  that  a 
street  railroad  built  upon  vertical  iron  pillars  at  an  elevation  of 
twenty  feet  above  the  street,  and  extending  a  distance  of  three 
quarters  of  a  mile,  was  an  elevated  road,  within  the  meaning  of 
the  statute,  and  the  fact  that  the  road  was  elevated  only  for 
the  purpose  of  avoiding  the  tracks  of  a  steam  railroad  on  the 
surface  of  the  street,  and  that  a  descent  was  made  as  soon  as 
said  tracks  were  out  of  the  way,  would  not  take  the  case  out  of 
the  operation  of  the  statute. 

65New  York  El.  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Fifth  esPeople's   Rapid   Transit   Co.   v. 

Nat'l  Bank,  135  U.  S.  432,  10  S.  C.  Dash,  125  N.  Y.  93,  26  N.  E.  25.    The 

Rep.  743 ;  Fifth  Nat'l  Bank  v.  New  question  involved  v/as  whether  a  cor- 

York  El.   R.   R.   Co.,   24   Fed.   114;  poration  to  construct  such  a  railroad 

Hayes  v.  Waverly  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  51  could  be  formed  under  the  general  in- 

N.  J.  Eq.  345,  27  Atl.  648;  Pennsyl-  corporation  law.     It  was  decided  in 

vania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Miller,  132  U.  S.  the  negative.     The  railroad  was  not 

75,  10  S.  C.  34,  1  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  to  be  a  street  railroad  but  was  to  be 

Rep.  15 ;  Jones  v.  Railroad  Co.,  151  used  exclusively  for  passenger  traffic. 

Pa.  St.  30,  25  Atl.  134,  31  Am.  St.  67Koch  v.  North  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.,  75 

Rep.  722,  17  L.R.A.  758;  Fulton   v.  Md.  222,  23  Atl.  463,  15  L.R.A.  377. 

Short  Route  R.  R.  Trans.  Co.,  85  Ky.  See   Fulton   v.    Short  Route   R.   R. 

640,  4  S.  W.  332,  7  Am.  St.  Rep.  619;  Trans.  Co.,  85  Ky.  640,  4  S.  W.  287, 

Freiday  v.  Sioux  City  Rapid  Transit  7  Am.  St.  Rep.  619. 
Co.,   92  la.   191,  60  N.  W.   656,   26 
L.E.A.  246. 


268 


EMINENT    I>OMAIN. 


§  158 


In  Illinois  it  has  been  held,  that  an  elevated  railroad  may 
be  constructed  under  the  general  railroad  law  of  the  State.®* 
A  different  conclusion  has  been  reached  in  Pennsylvania**  and 
New  York.^" 

§  158  (115c).  Horse  railroads.  It  has  been  determined 
in  numerous  decisions,  and  without  dissent  except  in  the  State 
of  New  York,  that  the  use  of  a  street  by  a  horse  railroad  con- 
structed and  operated  in  the  ordinary  manner  falls  within  the 
purposes  for  which  streets  are  established  and  maintained,  and 
consequently,  that  for  any  damages  resulting  from  such  use  to 
the  abutting  owner,  he  can  recover  no  compensation,  whether  the 
fee  of  the  street  is  in  him  or  in  the  public.'^  ^  In  New  York 
State,  after  various  decisions  which  left  the  matter  in  doubt, ''^ 
it  was  finally  held,  in  Craig  v.  Rochester  City  &  Brighton  R.  E. 


6sLieberman  v.  Chicago  etc.  E.  E. 
Co.,  141  III.  140,  30  N.  E.  544. 

esPotts  V.  Quaker  City  El.  R.  R. 
Co.,  161  Pa.  St.  396,  29  Atl.  108; 
Commonwealth  v.  Northeastern  El. 
R.  R.  Co.,  161  Pa.  St.  409,  29  Atl. 
112;  Potts  V.  Quaker  City  El.  R.  R. 
Co.,  12  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  593. 

'oPeople's  Rapid  Transit  Co.  v. 
Dash,  125  N.  Y.  93,  26  N.  E.  25; 
Schafer  v.  Brooklyn  &  L.  I.  R.  R. 
Co.,  124  N.  Y.  630,  26  N.  E.  311. 

7iCarson  v.  Central  R.  R.  Co.  35 
Cal.  325;  Market  Street  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Central  R.  R.  Co.,  51  Cal.  583; 
Elliott  V.  Fair  Haven  &  Westville  R. 
R.  Co.,  32  Conn.  579  (a  nisi  prius 
case  only)  ;  Randall  v.  Jacksonville 
St.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  Fla.  409;  State  v. 
Jacksoriville  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  29  Fla. 
590,  10  So.  590;  Savannah  &  Thun- 
derbolt R.  R.  Co.  V.  Savannah,  45  Ga. 
602;  Eichels  v.  Evansville  Streeo  Ry. 
Co.,  78  Ind.  261,  41  Am.  Rep.  561; 
Clinton  v.  Clinton  &  Lyons  Horse 
Railway  Co.,  37  la.  61 ;  Stange  v. 
Hill  &  West  Dubuque  Street  Ry.  Co., 
54  la.  669;  Stanley  v.  Davenport,  54 
la.  463;  Brown  v.  Duplessis,  14  La. 
An.  842;  Briggs  v.  Lewiston  &  Au- 
burn R.  R.  Co.,  79  Me.  363,  1  Am.  St. 
Rep.  316;  Peddicord  v.  Baltimore  etc. 
E.    R.    Co.,    34    Md.    463;    Hiss    v. 


Baltimore  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  52  Md.  242, 
36  Am.  Rep.  371;  Hodges  v.  Balti- 
more Passenger  Ry.  Co.,  58  Md.  603; 
Attorney  General  v.  Metropolitan  R. 
R.  Co.,  125  Mass.  515;  Hinchman  v. 
Patterson  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  N.  J.  Eq. 
75;  Hogencamp  v.  Same,  17  N.  J. 
Eq.  83;  Jersey  City  &  Bergen  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Jersey  City  &  Hoboken  H.  R. 
R.  Co.,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  61;  Patterson 
etc.  H.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Patterson,  24  N. 
J.  Eq.  158;  West  Jersey  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Cape  May  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  34  N.  J. 
Eq.  164;  Van  Home  v.  Newark  Pass. 
R.  R.  Co.,  48  N.  J.  Eq.  332,  21  Atl., 
1034;  Street  Railway  v.  Cummins- 
ville,  14  Ohio  St.  524;  Peterson  v. 
Navy  Yard  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  5  Phil.  199 ; 
Texas  &  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Rosedale 
Ry.  Co.,  64  Tex.  80,  53  Am.  Rep.  739; 
Hobart  v.  Milwaukee  City  Ry.  Co., 
27  Wis.  194,  9  Am.  Rep.  461;  Van 
Bokelen  v.  Brooklyn  City  Ry.  Co.,  5 
Blatch.  379. 

7  2Davis  V.  Mayor  etc.  of  New 
York,  14  N.  Y.  506;  Milhau  v.  Sharp, 
15  Barb.  193,  27  N.  Y.  611 ;  Wetmore 
V.  Story,  22  Barb.  414;  Mason  v. 
Brooklyn  City  etc:  R.  R.  Co.,  35 
Barb.  373;  People  v.  Law,  34  Barb. 
494;  People  v.  Kerr,  37  Barb.  357,  27 
N.  Y.  188,  25  How.  Pr.  258. 


§  160  EOADS  AND  STREETS.  269 

Co.,  ^^  that  a  horse  railroad  was  an  additional  burden  upon  the 
soil  for  which  the  abutting  owner,  having  the  fee,  was  entitled  to 
compensation.  In  a  later  case  it  was  determined  that,  where 
the  fee  of  the  street  is  in  thejgublic,_the  laying  of  a  horse  railroad 
on  the  surface  of  the  street,  under  lawful  autliority  from  the 
municipality,  was  not  a  taking  of  any  property  of  the  abutting 
owner.  ^* 

§  159  (llSd).  Cable  railroads.  Although  the  cable  sys- 
tem of  operating  railroads  has  been  in  use  for  a  long  time,  there 
seems  to  have  been  little  question  made  as  to  the  right  to  employ 
this  system  when  authorized  by  the  legislature.  As  the  cable 
road  leaves  the  street  in  substantially  the  same  condition  as  the 
horse  railroad  and  is  operated  in  substantially  the  same  manner, 
except  as  to  motive  power,  it  has  doubtless  been  assumed  that 
the  same  principles  would  apply  to  it.  This  assumption  has 
been  verified  by  a  recent  case  in  Pennsylvania  which  holds  that  a 
cable  road  is  not  an  additional  burden  upon  the  soil,  entitling  the 
abutting  owner  to  compensation.  The  reasoning  of  the  court 
is,  that  street  railways  are  legitimate  highway  uses  and  "whether 
the  motive  power  of  the  cars  be  horses,  electricity  or  a  submerged 
cable  makes  no  difference  in  the  use,  and  no  one  of  these  modes 
of  use  confers  any  right  of  action  upon  the  abutting  owner."  ^^ 

§  160  (115e).  Steam  motor  railroads.  The  question 
whether  a  street  railroad,  operated  by  means  of  a  steam  motor, 
is  a  legitimate  street  use,  was  first  passed  upon  in  Minnesota  in 
1886.'^®  The  plaintiff  brought  ejectment  to  recover  possession 
of  the  street  in  front  of  his  property  as  against  the  defendant 
which  had  occupied  it  with  its  railroad.     The  defendant's  road 

7  3  Craig  V.  Eochester  City  etc.  R.  See    also,    Indianapolis     Cable     St. 

R.  Co.,  39  Barb.  494,  39  N.  Y.  404;  E.     R.     Co.     v.     Citizens'  '  St.     R. 

see  also  Thayer  v.   Rochester  City  R.  Co.,  127  lud.  369,  24  N.  E.  1054, 

etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  Abb.  N.  C.  52.  26  N.  E.  893,  8  L.R.A.  539;  Brady  v. 

7  4KelIinger  v.  Forty-second  Street  Kansas  City  Cable  Ey.  Co.,  Ill  Mo. 

etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  50  N.  Y.  206 ;  see  also  329,  19  S.  W.  953;  People  v.  Newton, 

Mahady  v.  Brunswick  R.  R.  Co.,  91  112  N.  Y.  396,  3  L.R.A.  174;  In  re 

N.  Y.  148.  Third  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.,  121  N.  Y.  530, 

76Rafferty  v.  Central  Traction  Co.,  24  N.  E.  951,  9  L.R.A.  124;  Railroad 

147  Pa.  St.  579,  23  Atl.  884,  30  Am.  v.  Duncan,  111  Pa.  St.  352;  Lorie  v. 

St.  Eep.  763,  6  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  North  Chicago   City   R.   R.   Co.,   32 

Rep.  287.    To  the  same  effect  is  liar-  Fed.  Rep.  270. 

risen  v.  Mt.  Auburn  Cable  R.  R.  Co.,<  7  6Newell  v.  Minneapolis  etc.  R.  R. 

17  Weekly  Bull.  265   (Hamilton  Co.  Co.,  35  Minn.  112,  27  N.  W.  839,  59 

C.  P.  Ohio),  referred  to  in  Keasby  Am.  Rep.  303. 
on  Electric  Wires,   p.   104,  note  4. 


270  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    160 

extended  from  a  point  within  the  city  of  Minneapolis  to  Lake 
Minnatonka,  eighteen  miles  beyond  the  city.  The  track  con- 
sisted, of  T  rails  laid  so  as  to  conform  to  the  surface  of  the  street 
and  placed  so  as  to  be  readily  crossed.  The  cars  used  were  from 
thirty-four  to  thirty-seven  feet  long.  The  motors  were 
about  twenty  feet  long.  The  trains  consisted  of  from  one  to 
four  cars.  Within  the  city  it  was  operated  like  any  ordinary 
street  passenger  railway  so  far  as  concerned  speed  and  the  taking 
up  and  letting  down  of  passengers^  Beyond  the  city  it  was 
operated  like  any  ordinary  steam  railroad  for  general  traffic.  It 
was  held  to  be  a  proper  and  legitimate  use  of  the  street  as  a 
highway,  and  a  judgment  for  the  defendant  was  affirmed. 
Mitchell,  J.,  dissented  on  the  ground  that  the  road  was  a  new  and 
different  use  of  the  street  from  that  contemplated  when  it  was 
acquired.  The  opinion  of  the  court  proceeds  on  the  basis  that 
a  horse  railway  is  a  legitimate  street  use,  and  that  the  road  in 
question  is  not  substantially  different;  that  the  surface  of  the 
street  was  not  essentially  disturbed;  that  it  did  not  appear  to 
seriously  interfere  with  the  ordinary  use  of  the  street  and  was 
an  aid  to  the  traffic  thereon.  The  same  doctrine  is  held  in 
California  and  Maine. '^'^  In  Tennessee  a  steam  dummy  street 
railroad  was  held  to  be  an  additional  servitude  upon  the  fee  of 
the  street,  and  a  use  different  from  and  inconsistent  with  the 
ordinary  use  of  a  highway.  The  reasons  for  this  conclusion  are 
found  in  those  features  which  resemble  the  general  traffic  rail- 
road, viz. :  the  steam  engine,  the  noise,  smoke  and  vibration,  the 
weight,  length  and  speed  of  the  trains,  and  the  danger  to  life 
and  property.'^*     In  an  Oregon  case  the  plaintiff  sued  for  dam- 

7 'Montgomery  v.  Santa  Ana  etc.  known  as  railroad  traffic,  the  com- 
Co.,  104  Cal.  186,  37  Pac.  784,  43  pany  may,  perhaps,  be  said  to  make  a 
Am.  St.  Rep.  89,  25  L.R.A.  654 ;  new  and  different  use  of  the  land.  But 
Briggs  V.  Lewiston  &  Auburn  E.  R.  we  have  no  occasion  now  to  express 
Co.,  79  Me.  363,  1887.  The  court  any  opinion  on  that  question.  This  de- 
held,  in  the  latter  case,  that  whether  fendant  company  is  using  the  land  as 
operated  by  horse  or  steam  power  a  street.  Its  railroad  is  a  street  rail- 
the  use  was  legitimate.  As  to  the  road.  Its  cars  are  used  by  those  who 
motor,  it  says:  "We  do  not  think  wish  to  pass  from  place  to  place  on 
the  motor  is  the  criterion.  It  is  the  street.  A  change  in  the  motor 
rather  the  use  of  the  street.  If  the  is  not  a  change  in  the  use." 
railroad  company  exclusively  occupy  7sEast  End  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Doyle, 
the  land— shut  off  the  street  from  88  Tenn.  747,  13  S.  W.  936,  9  L.R.A. 
it,  deprive  it  of  its  character  of  bear-  100,  2  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  747. 
ing  the  easement  of  a  street — use  it,  Compare  Smith  v.  Street  E.  R.  Co., 
not  for  street  traffic,  but  for  what  is  87  Tenn.  626, 


§  161  EOADS  AND  STREETS.  271 

ages  to  his  property  by  reason  of  the  construction  and  operation 
of  a  sti'eet  railroad  in  front  of  his  property.  The  road  was  oper- 
ated with  steam  motors,  and  appears  to  have  been  used  solely 
for  street  passenger  traffic.  The  plaintiff  claimed  to  own  the 
fee  of  the  street,  but  the  court  held  that  this  was  immaterial, 
that  the  only  substantial  rights  the  plaintiff  had  in  the  street 
were  the  rights  of  ingress  and  egress  and  that  these  existed  the 
same  whether  he  owned  the  fee  or  not;  that  the  construction  of 
a  railroad  of  any  kind  in  a  street  under  authority  from  the  legis- 
lature, does  not  necessarily  violate  the  right  of  the  fee  owner 
and  does  not  "put  the  land  to  a  use  foreign  to  that  contemplated 
in  the  establishment  of  the  highway."  It  also  held  that  if  the 
railway  interfered  with  the  enjoyment  of  the  plaintiff's  prop- 
erty by  obstructing  access  thereto,  to  such  an  extent  as  to  mate- 
rially depreciate  its  value,  then  he  was  entitled  to  recover  the 
amount  of  such  depreciation.'*  In  Michigan  a  street  railway, 
operated  by  a  steam  motor,  constructed  on  the  side  of  a  street, 
with  cuts  and  fills  and  laid  with  T  rails,  was  held  to  be  an  addi- 
tional burden  on  the  fee  of  the  street.^"  A  few  other  cases  bear- 
ing on  the  question  are  referred  to  in  the  note,  but  none  of  them 
are  directly  in  point.^^  It  is  plain,  therefore,  that  the  authori- 
ties leave  it  very  much  in  doubt  whether  a  steam  motor  railroad 
is  a  legitimate  street  use  or  not. 

§  161  (llSf).  Electric  trolley  railroads.  There  is  a 
very  unanimous  concurrence  of  the  courts  in  the  position  that 
the  construction  and  operation  of  a  street  passenger  railway 
on  the  surface  of  a  street  by  means  of  the  trolley  system  is  a 
legitimate  street  use  and  not  the  imposition  of  an  additional 
burden  on  the  fee,  and  that  the  abutter,  w'hether  he  owns  the 
fee  or  not,  is  not  entitled  to  compensation  for  any  damages  re- 
sulting therefrom.®^     The  first  case  to  be  decided  by  a  court 

7  9McQuaid  v.  Portland  R.  K.  Co.,  liams  v.  City  Electric  St.  E.  R.  Co., 

18  Or.  237,  22  Pac.  899,  1  Am.  R.  R.  41   Fed.   556;   Hussner  v.   Brooklyn 

&  Corp.  Rep.  34.    To  the  same  effect :  City  R.  R.  Co.,  114  N.  Y.  433,  11  Am. 

Paquet  v.  Mt.  Tabor  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  St.  Rep.  679;  Onset  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Or.  233,  22  Pac.  906.  County  Comrs.,  154  Mass.  395,  28  N. 

soNiehols  v.  Ann  Arbor  &  Y.  St.  E.  286. 

R.  R.  Co.,  87  Mich.  361,  49  N.  W.  8  2Birmingham     Traction     Co.     v. 

538,  16  L.R.A.  371.    The  court  stood  Birmingham  R.  R.  &  Elec.  Co.,  119 

three  to  two.  Ala.  137,  24  So.  502,  43  L.R.A.  233; 

siStange  v.  Hill  &  West  Dubuque  Baker  v.  Selma  St.  &  Suburban  Ry. 

St.  R.  R.  Co.,  54  la.  669;  Stanley  v.  Co.,  130  Ala.  474,  30  So.  464;  Same  v. 

City  of  Davenport,  54  la.  463;  Wil-  Same,  135  Ala.  552,  33  So.  685,  93 


272 


EMINEITT    DOMAIN'. 


§  161 


Am.  St.  Rep.  42;  Morris  v.  Mont- 
gomery Traction  Co.,  143  Ala.  246,  38 
So.  834;  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bridgeport  Traction  Co.,  65  Conn. 
410,  32  Atl.  953,  29  L.R.A.  367;  Can- 
astotia.  Knife  Co.  v.  Newington  Tram- 
way Co.,  69  Conn.  146,  36  Atl.  1107; 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Atlanta  Ry.  & 
P.  Co.,  Ill  Ga.  679,  36  S.  E.  873,  51 
L.R.A.  125;  Chicago  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  West  Chicago  St.  R.  R.  Co., 
156  111.  270,  40  N.  E.  1008,  12  Am. 
R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  522;  Winnetka  v. 
Chicago  etc.  Elec.  Ry.  Co.,  204  111. 
297,  68  N.  E.  407,  affirming  S.  C.  107 
111.  App.  117;  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  General  Electric  Co.,  79  111.  App. 
569;  Chicago  etc.  T.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Whiting,  139  Ind.  297,  38  N.  E.  604, 
11  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  507,  47 
Am.  St.  Rep.  264,  26  L.R.A.  337; 
Snyder  v.  Ft.  Madison  St.  R.  R.  Co., 
105  la.  284,  75  N.  W.  179,  41  L.R.A. 
345;  Louisville  Bagging  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
Central  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  95  Ky.  50,  23 
S.  W.  592;  Ashland  etc.  St.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Faulkner,  106  Ky.  332,  51  S.  W. 
806,  43  L.R.A.  554;  Louisville  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Poster,  108  Ky.  743,  57  S.  W. 
480,  50  L.R.A.  813;  Georgetown  etc. 
Traction  Co.  v.  Mulholland,  25  Ky. 
L.  R.  578,  76  S.  W.  148;  Taylor  v. 
Portsmouth  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  91  Me. 
193,  39  Atl.  560,  64  Am.  St.  Rep.  216; 
Millbridge  etc.  Elec.  R.  R.  Co.,  ap- 
pellants, 96  Me.  110,  51  Atl.  818;  Par- 
sons V.  Waterville  etc.  St.  Ry.  Co., 
101  Me.  173,  63  Atl.  728;  Poole  v. 
Falls  Road  Elec.  R.  R.  Co.,  88  Md. 
533,  41  Atl.  1069;  Lonaconing  etc. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Consolidated  Coal  Cc,  95 
Md.  630,  53  Atl.  420 ;  Howe  v.  West 
End  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  167  Mass.  46,  44 
N.  E.  386;  Eustis  v.  Milton  St.  Ry. 
Co.,  183  Mass.  586,  67  N.  E.  663;  De- 
troit City  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mills,  85 
Mich.  634,  48  N.  W.  1007 ;  People  v. 
Ft.  Wayne  &  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  92  Mich. 
522,  52  N.  W.  1010 ;  Dean  v.  Ann  Ar- 
bor St.  R.  R.  Co.,  93  Mich.  330,  53  N. 
W.  396;  Niemann  v.  Detroit  Subur- 


ban St.  R.  R.  Co.,  103  Mich.  256,  61 
N.  W.  519;  Austin  v.  Detroit  etc.  Ry. 
Co.,  134  Mich.  149,  96  N.  W.  35; 
Mannel  v.  Detroit  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  139 
Mich.  106,  102  N.  W.  633;  Placke  v. 
Union  Depot  R.  R.  Co.,  140  Mo.  634, 
41  S.  W.  915;  Ruckert  v.  Grand  Ave. 
Ry.  Co.,  163  Mo.  260,  63  S.  W.  814; 
Nagel  V.  Lindell  Ry.  Co.,  167  Mo.  89, 
66  S.  W.  1090;  State  v.  Jersey  City, 
57  N.  J.  L.  293,  30  Atl.  531,  26  L.R.A. 
281 ;  Roebling  v.  Trenton  Pass.  R.  R. 
Co.,  58  N.  J.  L.  666,  34  Atl.  1090,  33 
L.R.A.  129;  Montelaire  Military 
Academy  v.  N.  J.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  70  N. 
J.  L.  229,  57  Atl.  1050;  S.  C.  65  N. 
J.  L.  328,  47  Atl.  890;  Budd  v.  Cam- 
den Horse  R.  R.  Co.,  70  N.  J.  L.  782, 
59  Atl.  229 ;  Ehret  v.  Camden  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  61  N.  J.  Eq.  171,  47  Atl.  562; 
Budd  V.  Camden  Horse  R.  R.  Co.,  61 
N.  J.  Eq.  543,  48  Atl.  1028;  Camden 
etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  U.  S.  Cast  Iron  Pipe 
&  F.  Co.,  68  N.  J.  Eq.  279,  59  Atl. 
523 ;  Cincinnati  Inclined  Plane  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  City  &  Suburban  Tel.  Ass.,  48 
Ohio  St.  390,  27  N.  E.  890,  12  L.R.A. 
534;  Mt.  Adams  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Winslow,  3  Ohio  C.  C.  425;  Simmons 
V.  City  of  Toledo,  5  Ohio  C.  C.  124; 
Simmons  v.  Toledo,  8  Ohio  C.  C. 
535;  Schoff  v.  Cleveland  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  16  Ohio  C.  C.  252;  Lockhart  v. 
Craig  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  139  Pa.  St.  419, 
21  Atl.  26;  Lockhart  v.  Craig  St. 
R.  R.  Co.,  8  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  470;  Com- 
monwealth V.  West  Chester,  9  Pa. 
Co.  Ct.  542;  Heilman  v.  Lebanon  & 
A.  R.  R.  Co.,  10  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  241; 
Central  Pa.  Tel.  etc.  Co.  v.  Wilkes- 
Barre  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  11  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 
417;  Taggart  v.  Newport  St.  R.  R. 
Co.,  16  R.  I.  668,  19  Atl.  326,  2  Am. 
R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  44;  Cumberland 
Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  United  Electric  R. 
R.  Co.,  93  Tenn.  492,  29  S.  W.  104, 
10  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  549,  27 
L.R.A.  236;  San  Antonio  Rapid 
Transit  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Limburger, 
88  Tex.  79,  30  S.  W.  533,  53  Am.  St. 


§  161  EOADS  AND  STEEETS.  273 

of  last  resort  was  in  Rhode  Island.®^  The  object  of  the  suit  was 
to  enjoin  the  defendant  from  erecting  and  maintaining  poles 
and  wires  in  the  street  in  front  of  the  plaintiff's  property,  for 
the  purpose  of  operating  its  road  by  means  of  electricity.  The 
court,  while  recognizing  the  distinction  between  the  ordinary 
steam  railroad  and  the  horse  railroad,  held  that  the  distinction 
properly  rested  "not  on  any  difference  in  the  motive  power,  but 
in  the  different  effects  produced  by  them,  respectively,  on  the 
highways  or  streets  which  they  occupy."  It  held  that  a  street 
railway,  operated  in  the  usual  manner,  was  in  furtherance  of 
the  original  uses  of  the  street,  and  not  obstructive  of  such  uses, 
and  that  the  use  of  electricity  as  a  motive  power  made  no  differ- 
ence ;  that  as  the  motive  power  was  not  the  criterion,  electricity 
might  be  used,  and  the  poles  and  wires  necessary  to  conduct  the 
electricity  were  thus  "directly  ancillary  to  the  uses  of  the  street 
as  such." 

The  New  York  court  of  appeals,  following  its  decision  in 
regard  to  horse  railroads,®*  holds  that  an  electric  street  rail- 
road is  an  additional  burden  upon  the  fee  of  the  street.*^  But 
if  the  abutter  has  not  the  fee  he  has  no  remedy.^®  The  supreme 
court  of  Mississippi  holds  that  an  electric  street  railway  is  not 
a  legitimate  street  use  and  imposes  an  additional  burden  on  the 
soil.*^     In  Nebraska  it  has  been  held  that  the  poles  and  wires 

Rep.  730;  Dooley  Block  V.  Salt  Lake  ssPeck    v.    Schenectady    etc.    Ry. 

Rapid   Transit   Co.,   9   Utah   31,   33  Co.,   170   N.  Y.   298,   63   N.   E.   357, 

Pac.  229,  8  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  afflrming  S.  C.  67  App.  Div.  359,  73 

327;  Reid  v.  Norfolk  City  R.  R.  Co.,  K  Y.  S.  794;  Paige  v.  Schenectady 

94  Va.  117,  26  S.  E.  428,  64  Am.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  178  N.  Y.  102,  70  N.  E.  213, 

Rep.  708,  36  L.R.A.  274;   Richmond  reversing  S.  C.  84  App.  Div.  91,  82 

Traction  Co.  v.  Murphy,  98  Va.  104,  N.  Y.  S.  192.     See  Tracy  v.  Troy  & 

34  S.  E.  982;  La  Crosse  City  Ry.  Co.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  54  Hun  550,  27  N.  Y. 

V.  Higbee,  107  Wis.  389,  83  N.  W.  St.  633,  7  N.  Y.  Supp.  892;  Clark  v. 

701,    51    L.R.A.    923;    Linden   Land  Middletown-Goshen  Traction  Co.,  10 

Co.  V.  Milwaukee  Elec.  Ry.  &  Lt.  Co.,  App.  Div.  354,  41  N.  Y.  Supp.  1109. 

107  Wis.  493,  83  N.  W.  851;  Youn-  seKennedy  v.  Minneola  etc.  Trac- 

kin  V.  Milwaukee  L.   H.  &  T.   Co.,  tion  Co.,  178  N.  Y.  508,  71  N.  E.  102, 

112  Wis.  15,  87  N.  W.  861 ;  Same  v.  affirming  S.  C.  77  App.  Div.  484,  78 

Same,  120  Wis.  477,  98  N.  W.  215.  N.  Y.  S.  937.     So  where  the  road  is 

ssTaggart  v.   Newport   St.  R.  R.  on   the   further  half   of  the   street. 

Co.,  16  R.  I.  668,  19  Atl.  326,  2  Am.  Roberts  v.  Huntington  R.  R.  Co.,  56 

R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  44,  1890.  Misc.  62. 

s^Craig   v.   Rochester   etc.   R.   R.  s'Slaughter  v.  Meridian  St.  &  Ry. 

Co.,  39  N.  Y.  404.  Co.,  (Miss.),  48  So.  6, 
Em.  D.— 18. 


274 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


161 


of  a  trolley  road  are  an  additional  burden  on  the  street,  because 
they  permanently  and  exclusively  occupy  parts  of  the  street.^* 

In  Pennsylvania  it  is  held  that  an  electric  railway  cannot  be 
laid  down  upon  a  country  road  though  it  is  a  proper  use  of 
city  or  village  streets.*®  The  decision  goes  both  upon  the 
ground  that  the  statutes  in  regard  to  street  railroads  were  not 
intended  to  apply  to  country  roads  and  also  upon  the  ground 
that  a  distinction  exists  between  urban  and  rural  highways  and 
that  the  latter  are  not  subject  to  many  uses  which  the  former 
are.  But  the  weight  of  authority,  as  well  as  the  reason  of  the 
matter,  is  that  the  "same  rule  applies  to  country  roads  as  to 
city  streets.®" 

It  has  been  held  that  an  abutter  has  no  legal  ground  of  com- 
plaint because  the  road  is  laid  wholly  on  his  side  of  the  street  or 
near  his  boundary®^  but  he  would  have  a  remedy  for  any  un- 
reasonable or  excessive  use  of  the  street  or  for  any  unnecessary 
interference  with  his  easement  of  access,®^  as  by  planting  a  trol- 


ssJaynes  v.  Omaha  St.  R.  R.  Co., 
53  Neb.  631,  74  N.  W.  67,  39  L.R.A. 
751. 

8  9  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mont- 
gomery Co.  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  167  Pa. 
St.  62,  31  Atl.  468,  46  Am.  St.  Rep. 
659,  27  L.R.A.  766,  reversing  14  Pa. 
Co.  Ct.  88,  3  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  58. 

90 Austin  V.  Detroit  etc.  Ry.  Co., 
134  Mich.  149,  96  N.  W.  35;  Ehret  v. 
Camden  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  60  N.  J.  Eq. 
246,  46  Atl.  578;  Same  v.  Same,  61 
N.  J.  Eq.  171,  47  Atl.  562;  ante,  § 
118. 

91  Ashland  etc.  St.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Faulkner,  106  Ky.  332,  51  S.  W. 
806,  43  L.R.A.  554;  Austin  v.  De- 
troit etc.  Ry.  Co.,  134  Mich.  149,  96 
N.  W.  35;  Budd  v.  Camden  Horse 
R.  R.  Co.,  61  K.  J.  Eq.  543,  48  Atl. 
1028;  Budd  v.  Camden  Horse  R.  R. 
Co.,  70  N.  J.  L.  782,  59  Atl.  229; 
San  Antonio  Rapid  Transit  St.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Limburger,  88  Tex.  79,  30  S. 
W.  533,  53  Am.  St.  Rep.  730. 

9  2LouisvilIe  Ry.  Co.  v.  Foster,  108 
Ky.  743,  57  S.  W.  480,  50  L.R.A.  813; 
Roebling  v.  Trenton  Pass.  Ry.  Co.,  58 
N.  J.  L.  666,  34  Atl.  1090,  33  L.R.A. 


129;  La  Crosse  City  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hig- 
bee,  107  Wis.  389,  83  N.  W.  701,  51 
L.R.A.  923.  In  the  first  of  these 
cases  the  plaintiff  sued  for  damages 
to  his  property  by  reason  of  noise, 
smells,  dust,  etc.,  caused  by  a  turn 
table  near  his  premises,  the  sweeping 
of  cars  and  use  of  the  street  as  a, 
terminal  and  the  court  held  that  the 
plaintiff  "as  the  owner  of  city  prop- 
erty fronting  on  the  street,  must 
subini|t  to  all  those  noises,  smells  and 
disturbfinces  that  are  usual  in  city 
life,  including  the  use  of  the  higli- 
way  by  the  street  railway,  in  so  far 
as  they  were  reasonably  incidental  to 
the  operation  of  a  street  railway  in 
a  city,  and  borne  by  the  public  gen- 
erally; and  that,  so  far  as  the  injury 
complained  of  arose  from  these 
causes,  there  could  be  no  recovery; 
but  that  she  could  recover  for  any 
substantial  injury  to  her  property 
arising  from  the  location  or  opera- 
tion of  the  turntable  or  cars  that 
was  caused  by  such  noises,  smells,  and 
disturbances  as  were  not  fairly  inci- 
dental to  the  usual  operation  of  such 
a  street  railway,  and  borne  by  the 


§  162  EOADS  AND    STEEETS.  275 

ley  pole  in  front  of  his  door."*  The  right  to  use  streets  for  the 
electric  trolley  railroad  and  its  limitations  are  well  summed  up 
hy  the  supreme  court  of  Wisconsin,  as  follows :  "1.  A  railroad 
constructed  on  the  grade  of  a  street  and  operated  so  as  not  to 
materially  interfere  with  the  common  use  thereof  for  public 
travel  by  ordinary  modes,  or  with  private  rights  of  abutting 
land  owners,  and  for  the  purpose  of  transporting  persons  from 
place  to  place  on  such  streets  at  their  reasonable  convenience, 
is  not  an  additional  burden  on  the  fee  thereof.  2.  A  railroad 
satisfies  the  above  essentials,  regardless  of  the  motive  power 
used  or  how  it  is  applied,  if  it  be  strictly  a  street  railroad  for 
the  carriage  of  passengers  on  the  street,  taking  them  on  and 
discharging  them  at  reasonable  points,  and  it  be  so  constructed 
and  operated  as  not  to  materially  interfere  with  the  ordinary 
modes  of  using  the  street  for  public  travel  or  with  private 
rights.  3.  A  supporting  trolley  wire  pole,  set  in  the  street  in 
front  of  the  sidewalk,  does  not  violate  the  above  rule  if  it  be 
placed  with  reasonable  regard  for  the  convenience  of  the  owner 
of  the  fee  of  the  land  on  which  it  is  located,  and  so  as  not  to 
materially  interfere  with  access  to  his  lot  Outside  the  street 
line."  »* 

§  162  (llSg).  Subways  or  underground  street  rail- 
roads. The  first  case  involving  such  a  railroad  arose  in  New 
York.  In  the  matter  of  ISTew  York  District  Railway  Co.,®^  a 
proposed  railway,  confined  to  the  limits  of  a  city  and  constructed 
on  the  streets  underneath  their  surface  was  held  to  be  a  street 
railway.  The  case  was  an  application  by  the  railway  company 
for  the  appointment  of  commissioners  to  determine  whether  its 
railroad  ought  to  be  built.  The  question  whether  such  a  railway 
was  a  legitimate  street  use  or  whether  abutting  owners  would 
be  entitled  to  compensation  in  case  their  property  was  injured 

property  owners  generally  along  the  9  4Sylabus  in  La  Crosse  City  Ey. 

line."    751.  Co.  v.  Higbee,  107  Wis.  389,  83  N.  W. 

9  3Trolley  poles  should  be  so  placed  701,  51  L.R.A.  923. 
as  to  do  no  unnecessary  damage  to  sbio7  N.  Y.  42.    See  Terry  v.  Eich- 

the  abutting  property.    Snyder  v.  Ft.  mond,  94  Va.  537.     In  this  case  it 

Madison  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  105  la.  284,  75  was  held  that  a  railroad,  which  had 

N.  W.  179,  41  L.R.A.  34S.  Where  the  authority  to  go  through  a.  street  in 

location  of  poles  is  fixed  by  the  mu-  a  tunnel,  must  make  compensation 

nicipality,  the  abutter  may  compel  for  injury  to  private  rights, 
the  removal  of  a  pole  in  a  diflferent 
location.  '  Moore  v.  Camden  etc.  Ry. 
Co.,  73  N.  J.  L.  599,  64  Atl.  116. 


276  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    162 

or  depreciated  thereby  was  not  before  the  court.  The  court 
would  seem  to  indicate  that  they  would  be.  "Where  the  rail- 
way runs  under  the  streets,  the  adjoining  owners  are  as  much 
and  as  dangerously  affected  as  where  it  runs  on  their  surface  or 
above  them.  Whether  the  new  surface  is  safe  and  sufficient,  or 
weak  and  perilous,  and  invites  or  frightens  away  passage; 
whether  the  openings  obstruct  or  hinder  access  to  the  abutter, 
or  pour  out  through  the  ventilators  smoke  and  steam  upon  his 
premises ;  whether  his  vaults  and  foundations  will  remain  safe 
and  secure,  or  be  undermined  or  weakened  by  vibration; 
whether  his  gas  and  water  supply  will  continue  ample  and  con- 
venient, and  the  new  sewerage  work  him  no  injury;  all  these 
are  to  him  questions  of  vital  importance,  affecting  his  comfort 
and  convenience,  the  success  of  his  business  and  the  value  of 
his  property." 

Subways  for  street  passenger  railroads  are  in  operation  in 
Boston  and  the  same  have  been  held  not  to  be  a  taking  of  any 
property  of  the  owner  of  the  fee.  The  court  says : — 'fit  can  hard- 
ly be  contended  that  this  is  an  unreasonable  mode  of  using  the 
streets  in  reference  either  to  travelers  or  abutters.  If  it  is  not 
an  unreasonable  mode  of  using  them,  the  mere  fact  that  it  de- 
prives abutters  of  the  use  of  vaults  and  other  similar  under- 
ground structures  in  the  streets,  which  they  have  heretofore 
maintained  is  of  little  consequence.  /Abutters  are  bound  to 
withdraw  from  occupation  of  streets  above  or  below  the  surface 
whenever  the  public  needs  the  occupied  space  for  travel.  The 
necessary  requirements  of  the  public  for  travel  were  all  paid 
for  when  the  land  was  taken,  whatever  they  may  be,  and  whether 
the  particulars  of  them  were  foreseen  or  not.  The  only  limita- 
tion upon  them  is  that  they  shall  be  of  a  kind  that  are  not  un- 
reasonable.)' ^^ 

Whether  the  subway  in  New  York  city  is  a  proper  street,  use 
has  been  questioned  but  not  decided.  ^'^  Where  an  imauthorized 
deviation  was  made  from  the  authorized  route,  whereby  the 

96Sears  v.  Crocker,  184  Mass.  58G,  S'March   v.   New   York,   69   App. 

588,  589,  69  N.  E.  327,  100  Am.  St.  Div.  1,  74  N.  Y.  S.  630.    In  a  recent 

Eep.  577.     The  legislature  may  au-  case  in  the  supreme  court  it  has  been 

tliorize  the  construction  of  a  subway  held  that  an  a,butting  owner,  having 

for  street  railroads  in  the  streets  of  the  fee,  is  entitled  to  compensation. 

a   city   without   the   consent   of   the  Matter    of    Rapid    Transit    R.     R. 

city.     Prince  v.  Crocker,  116  Mass.  Comrs.,  128  App.  Div.  103. 
347,  44  N.  E.  446. 


§  164  KOADS  AND  STEEETS.  277 

tunnel  was  brought  nearer  the  abutting  property  and  great  dam- 
age done  to  it,  the  court  refused  to  approve  of  the  deviation,  ex- 
cept on  condition  that  compensation  be  made  for  such  damage.^* 

§  163.  Other  kinds  of  street  railroads.  The  electric 
trolley  railroad  has,  for  the  most  part,  displaced  all  other  kinds 
of  street  roads.  There  are  in  New  York  city  and  possibly  else- 
where street  railroads  operated  by  means  of  an  "underground 
trolley,"  that  is  the  wire  carrying  the  electric  current  is  under- 
ground and  connection  is  made  through  a  slot  between  the  rails. 
There  are  also  electric  railways  operated  by  means  of  a  storage 
battery.  It  is  manifest  that  both  of  these  are  less  injurious 
than  the  overhead  trolley  and  must  be  accounted  legitimate  street 
uses  if  the  latter  are.  The  "underground  trolley"  railroad 
has  been  held  not  to  be  an  additional  burden  on  the  street.®^ 

§  164  (llSh).  Street  railroads. — General  conclusions. 
As  already  shown  a  street  railroad  is  ordinarily  understood  to 
mean  a  railroad  constructed  and  operated  in  a  public  street  and 
confined  to  local  passenger  traffic.  In  addition  to  the  cases 
cited  in  the  preceding  sections  there  are  many  others  which  hold 
that  a  street  railroad,  as  thus  defined,  is  a  legitimate  street  use, 
without  taking  into  account  the  motive  power  or  the  way  in 
which  it  is  applied.^ 

In  the  history  of  street  railroads,  we  have  in  the  order  of 
time,  as  a  propelling  power :  first,  animals ;  second,  steam,  and 
third,  electricity.  For  twenty  years  or  more  after  the  introduc- 
tion of  street  railroads,  they  were  operated  by  animal  power 
exclusively.  Horse  railroads  and  street  railroads  were  for  a 
long  time  practically  synonymous.  During  this  time  the  doc- 
trine was  worked  out  by  the  courts  that  horse  railroads  were  a  le- 

ssMatter  of  Board  of  Eapid  Tran-  N.  W.  447;  Ecorse  Tp.  v.  Jackson  etc 

sit  R.  E.  Comrs.,  104  App.  Div.  468,  Ry.    Co.,   153   Mich.    393;    Elfelt   v 

93  N.  Y.  S.  930;  S.  C.  117  App.  Div.  Stillwater  St.  R.  R.   Co.,  53  Minn 

160,  102  N.  Y.  S.  400.   *  68,  55  N.  W.  116;  Ransom  v.  Citi 

9  9  St.   Michael's   P.   E.   Church  v.  zens'  R.  R.  Co.,  104  Mo.  375,  16  S.  W 

Forty-second  St.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  26  416;    Merrick   v.    Intramontaine   E 

Misc.  601.  R.  Co.,  118  N.  C.  1081,  24  S.  E.  667 

iFinch  V.   Riverside   &  A.  R.   R.  Perry  v.  Wilkes-Barre  &  K.  Pass.  R 

Co.,  87  Cal.  597,  25  Pac.  765;  Haskell  R.    Co.,   4   Luzerne   Leg.   Rep.   519 

V.  Denver  Tramway  Co.,  23  Colo.  60,  Scranton  etc.  Traction  Co.  v.  Del.  & 

46  Pac.  121 ;  People  v.  Ft.  Wayne  &,  H.  Canal  Co.,  1  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  409 

E.  R.  R.  Co.,  92  Mich.  522,  52  N.  W.  Smith  v.  East  End  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  87 

1010,  16  L.R.A.  752;  Taylor  v.  Bay  Tenn.  626,  11  S.  W.  709. 
City  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  101  Mich.  140,  59 


278  EMINENT    DOMAIN,  §    164 

gitimate  street  use.  The  reasons  assigned  in  support  of  this  doc- 
trine consisted  in  the  tracks  being  laid  on  the  Surface  of  the  street 
in  such  manner  as  to  be  readily  crossed  or  used  longitudinally  by 
ordinary  vehicles,  in  the  motive  power  being  the  same  as  that  of 
ordinary  vehicles,  in  the  fact  that  the  cars  were  operated  with  no 
more  noise,  jar  or  disturbance  than  that  produced  by  other  ve- 
hicles, and  in  the  fact  that  their  business  consisted  in  conveying 
passengers  from  one  point  to  another  on  the  street  in  aid  of  the 
ordinary  street  traffic.  The  horse  railroad  decisions  were  also 
founded  upon  certain  negative  reasons,  so  to  speak,  or  particu- 
lars which  distinguish  them  from  the  steam  railroad.  They 
were  held  to  be  legitimate  street  uses  because  they  presented 
certain  positive  characteristics,  and  also  because  they  did  not 
present  certain  other  characteristics  which  were  peculiar  to 
steam  railroads.  Thus  horse  railroads  were  distinguished  from 
steam  railroads,  in  the  rails  and  construction  of  the  track,  in 
the  motive  power,  in  the  speed  with  which  the  cars  were  pro- 
pelled, in  the  noise  and  vibrations  produced,  the  smoke  and 
steam  emitted,  the  liability  of  the  engine  to  frighten  horses, 
the  danger  to  life  and  limb  and  the  size  and  weight  of  the  cars 
and  locomotives.^     When  the  steam  motor  and  electric  roads 

2Thu3   in   Citizens'   Coach   Co.  v.  obvious,  however,  that  an  ordinary 

Camden  Horse  E.  E.  Co.,  33  N.  J.  Eq.  horse  railroad,  in  occupying  a  high- 

267,   36  Am.  Eep.   542,   it   is   said:  way  with  its  track,  and  making  use 

"Considering  the  developments  of  the  of  it  with  its  cars,  produces  a  dif- 

railroads  of  the  country,  it  is  now  ferent  result  from  that  produced  by 

perfectly   obvious    that   the   use   of  such   an   occupation   and   use  by   a 

a  public  highway  longitudinally  by  railroad    operated    by    steam.     By 

a  railroad  operated  by  steam,  is  a  legislative  direction,  the  track  of  the 

use   entirely   inconsistent   with   and  horse  railroad  is  required  to  be   (as 

destructive    of    the    public    use    to  in  this  case)  so  constructed  not  only 

which   the   highway   was   originally  as  not  to  interfere  with  or  prevent 

devoted.    The  rate  of  speed  at  which  the  passage  of  other  vehicles,  but  to 

such  roads  are  operated  are  danger-  be    adapted    to    such    passage    both 

ous  to  the  public,  who  would  other-  across    and    along    the    rails.     The 

wise  use  the  highway.    It  makes  use  cars  are  drawn  by  animals  such  as 

of  rails  not  adapted  to,  but  obstruct-  usually  draw  the  vehicles  used  on 

ive   of,   the   ordinary  public  use   of  public  highways.     They  carry  along 

the  highway  by  the  usual   vehicles  the    highway    such    passengers    as 

of   travel   thereon.     The   noise,   the  otherwise  would  be  obliged  to  pass 

danger,  the  obstruction  of  its  road-  over  it  on  foot  or  in  other  vehicles, 

bed,  all  combine  to  make  the  use  of  and  do  so  with  no  more  injury  in 

the  highway  by  such  a  railroad  in-  the   way  of  noise,   jar,   or   disturb- 

compatible  with  its  general  use  as  ance   than  would  be   occasioned  by 

a    public   highway.     *     *     *     It   is  the  passage  of  other  vehicles.     The 


§  164 


EOADS    AND    STREETS. 


279 


came  before  the  courts,  the  doctrine  in  regard  to  horse  rail- 
roads -was  already  well  established.  The  phrase  street  railroads 
was  conveniently  substituted  for  that  of  horse  railroads  in  the 
forrmdcB  of  this  doctrine,  and  the  horse  railroad  cases  were  thus 
made  to  sanction  the  steam  motor  and  electric  railroad.  Every 
reason  but  one  on  which  the  horse  railroad  decisions  were 
founded  was  disregarded.  It  was  held  that  the  track  need  not 
be  like  the  horse  railroad  track,  but  might  consist  of  T  rails.* 
It  was  held  that  the  motive  power  was  immaterial,*  and  the 
matter  of  noise,  smoke  and  vibration  was  lost  sight  of  altogether. 
The  whole  matter  was  made  to  turn  upon  the  nature  of  the 


use,  if  it  be  novel  and  peculiar  in  its 
form,  it  is  but  a  modification  of  the 
original  use  to  which  the  highway 
was  devoted  when  it  became  a  high- 
way. The  burden  imposed  thereby 
upon  the  landowner,  so  far  as  the 
use  of  his  property  is  concerned,  is 
identical  in  kind  and  no  greater  in 
degree  than  was  originally  imposed 
upon  the  land  when  the  highway 
was  opened." 

In  South  Carolina  K.  E.  Co.  v. 
Stein,  44  Ga.  546,  558  (1871),  it  is 
said:  "I  think  the  streets  may  be 
used,  and  bars  laid  upon  them  and 
cars  drawn  over  them  by  horses; 
but  there  is  something  in  a  locomo- 
tive power,  in  throwing  smoke  into 
the  houses  along  the  street,  its  tre- 
mendous weight  shaking  the  houses 
and  breaking  plastering  and  walls; 
and  in  the  noise  and  screeching  of 
whistles,  which,  in  the  machinery 
employed,  may  make  it  the  subject 
matter  of  injury,  which  the  horse 
car,  slowly  driving  along,  would  not 
occasion.  It  is  not  in  the  use  of 
the  street  for  ears,  but  in  the  mode 
of  use."  In  Hinchman  v.  Paterson, 
H.  R.  Co.,  17  N.  J.  Eq.  75,  80,  1864, 
the  chancellor  says  of  horse  rail- 
ways: "They  are  ordinarily,  as  in 
this  case,  required  to  be  laid  level 
with  the  surface  of  the  street,  in 
conformity  with  existing  grades.  No 
excavations  or  embankments  to  af- 


fect the  land  are  authorized  or  per- 
mitted. The  use  of  the  road  is 
nearly  identical  with  that  of  the 
ordinary  highway.  The  motive 
power  is  the  same.  The  noise  and 
jarring  of  the  street  by  the  cars  is 
not  greater,  and  orainarily  less, 
than  that  produced  by  omnibuses 
and  other  vehicles  in  ordinary  use." 

See  also  Hodges  v.  Baltimore 
Union  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  58  Md.  603 
Indianapolis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hunt 
ley,  67  HI.  439,  444;  Cox  v.  Louis 
ville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  48  Ind.  178 
Grand  Rapids  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Heisel,  38  Mich.  62,  31  Am.  Rep 
306;  Williams  v.  New  York  Central 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  N.  Y.  97,  108,  69 
Am.  Dec.  632;  Imlay  v.  Union 
Branch  R.  R.  Co.,  26  Conn.  249,  68 
Am.  Dec.  392. 

sNewell  v.  Minneapolis  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  35  Minn.  112,  59  Am.  Rep.  303; 
Niemann  v.  Detroit  Suburban  St.  R. 
R.  Co.,  103  Mich.  256,  61  N.  W.  519. 

^Briggs  V.  Lewiston  etc.  Horse  R. 
R.  Co.,  79  Me.  363;  Halsey  v.  Rapid 
Transit  R.  R.  Co.,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  380, 
20  Atl.  859;  Williams  v.  City  Elec- 
tric St.  R.  R.  Co.,  41  Fed.  556;  Tag- 
gart  V.  Newport  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  R. 
I.  326,  19  Atl.  326,  2  Am.  R.  R.  & 
Corp.  Rep.  44;  Raflerty  v.  Central 
Traction  Co.,  147  Pa.  St.  579,  23  Atl. 
884,  30  Am.  St.  Rep.  763. 


280  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    165 

traiSc,  the  transportation  of  passengers  from  one  point  to  an- 
other upon  the  street. 

Considering  all  the  cases,  except  a  few  to  be  noticed  in  the 
two  following  sections,  and  having  due  regard  to  the  weight  of 
authority  and  the  trend  of  judicial  opinion  we  should  say 
that  the  general  doctrine  to  be  extracted  from  the  street  rail- 
road cases  is  that  a  railroad  is  a  legitimate  street  use  provided, 
first,  that  the  road  is  devoted  exclusively  to  street  passenger 
traffic,  and,  second,  that  its  track  is  laid  to  conform  to  the  sur- 
face of  the  street,  and  so  as  to  obstruct  ordinary  travel  as  little 
as  possible.  This  excludes  a  road  with  cuts  and  fills,  because 
of  the  cuts  and  fills.*  It  excludes  the  elevated  railroad,  because 
of  the  elevation  of  the  tracks  above  the  surface  and  the  super- 
structure which  such  elevation  makes  necessary.  It  excludes 
the  commercial  railroad  because  of  the  nature  of  its  trafiic.  It 
admits  any  sort  of  motive  power  and  any  sort  of  motor;  it 
admits  any  size  or  weight  of  cars  and  trains  of  any  length ; ' 
it  admits  any  sort  of  superstructure  or  substructure  which  may 
be  necessary  to  apply  the  motive  power,  which  does  not  mate- 
rially interfere  with  the  ordinary  use  of  the  street  or  with 
access  to  abutting  property. 

§  165.  Interurban  railroads.  An  interwhan  railroad, 
as  commonly  understood  in  the  first  decade  of  the  twentieth 
century,  means  an  electric  railway  operated  through  and  be- 
tween different  cities  and  towns,  and  carrying  only  passengers, 
or  passengers,  light  freight  and  express.'^     They  are  sometimes 

SNichols  V.  Ann  Arbor  etc.  R.  R.  sey  v.  Union  Traction  Co.,  169  Ind. 

Co.,  87  Mich,  361,  49  N.  W.  538;  West-  563,  81  N.  E.  922. 
heffer  v.  Lebanon  &  A.  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  'In   Iowa  an   interurban   railway 

163   Pa.   St.   54,   29   Atl.   873.     See  is    defined    by    statute    as    follows: 

Green  v.  City  &  Suburban  R.  R.  Co.,  "Any    railway    operated    upon    the 

78  Md.  294,  28  Atl.  626,  44  Am.  St.  streets  of  a  city  or  town  by  electric 

Rep.  288;  post,  §  178.     In  Austin  v.  or  other  power   than  steam,  which 

Detroit  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  134  Mich.  149,  extends  beyond  the  corporate  limits 

96  N.  W.  35,  a  trolley  road  was  held  of    such    city    or    town    to    another 

not  to  be  an  additional  burden  on  a  city,     town     or     village,     or     any 

country  highway  though  the  grade  railway     operated    by     electric     or 

was  cut  down  some  four  feet  along  other  power  than  steam,  extending 

the  plaintiff's  farm.  from  one  city,  town  or  village  to  an- 

6The  length  of  trains  would  doubt-  other  city,  town  or  village,  shall  be 

less  be  subject  to  municipal  or  legisla-  known   as   an   interurban   railway." 

tion  regulation,  even  after  the  fran-  Cedar   Rapids   v.   Marion   City   Ry. 

chise  had  been  granted  and  had  be-  Co.,  125  la.  430,  101  N.  W.  176.    The 

come  a  binding  contract.     See  Kin-  case  relates  only  to  the  mode  of  as- 


§  165  EOADS  AND  STREETS.  281 

constructed  wholly  upon  streets  and  highways  and  sometimes 
partly  or  mostly  on  private  rights  of  way.  In  passing  into 
or  through  cities  and  towns,  where  there  are  street  railways, 
they  are  usually  operated  upon  the  street  railway  tracks.  The 
name,  in  so  far  as  it  is  descriptive,  is  not  exclusively  appli- 
cable to  the  class  of  roads  referred  to.  All  commercial  rail- 
roads are  interurban  railroads.  And  many  street  railroads  are 
also  interurban  roads,  especially  in  the  vicinity  of  large  cities. 
But  the  name  may  be  accepted  as  a  convenient  one  to  desig- 
nate a  class  of  railroads  which  are  becoming  increasingly  nu- 
merous. The  questions  to  be  considered  are  whether  these  rail- 
roads when  constructed  and  operated  upon  streets  and  highways 
constitute  an  additional  burden  upon  the  soil  or  a  taking  of 
any  rights  of  the  abutting  owners. 

As  far  back  as  the  day  of  horse  railroads  there  were  many  in- 
terurban street  railroads  between  cities  and  their  suburbs  or 
between  adjacent  or  nearby  towns.  They  were  constructed  and 
operated  as  ordinary  street  railroads  and  were  held  to  be  legiti- 
mate street  uses  without  noticing  their  interurban  character.* 
When  electric  power  was  introduced  these  roads  were  multiplied 
in  number  and  extended  in  their  operations  until  the  true 
interurban  railroad  was  evolved.*  Interurban  street  passenger 
railroads,  constructed  and  operated  like  the  ordinary  street 
railroad,  have  generally  been  held  not  to  impose  an 
additional    burden    on    the    street    or    highway.^"      In  none 

sessing  the   property   of   such   rail-  Ry.  &  Lt.  Co.,  99  Wis.  83,  74  N.  W. 

roads  for  taxation.    In  Ohio   inter-  538,  67    Am.  St.  Rep.  844,  41  L.R.A. 

urban  railroads  are  classed  by  stat-  575. 

ute  with  street  railroads.     State  v.  loCanastota  Knife  Co.  v.  Newing- 

Dayton  Traction  Co.,  64  Ohio  St.  272,  ton  Tramway  Co.,  69  Conn.  146,  36 

60  N.  E.  291;  Cincinnati,  Lawrence-  Atl.  1107;  Cleveland  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

burg  &  Aurora  Elec.  St.  K.  R.  Co.  v.  Feight,   41    Ind.  App.   416;    George- 

Lohe,  68  Ohio  St.  101,  67  N.  E.  161;  town  &   Lexington   Traction   Co.   v. 

Cincinnati  etc.  Elec.  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mulholland,  25  Ky.  L.  R.  578,  76  S. 

Cincinnati   etc.  R.  R.   Co.,  21   Ohio  W.  148;   Taylor  v.  Portsmouth  etc. 

C.    C.   391 ;    Chambers   v.    Cleveland  Ry.  Co.,  91  Me.  193,  39  Atl.  560,  64 

etc.  Traction  Co.,  5  Ohio  C.  C.   (N.  Am.  St.  Rep.  216;  Green  v.  City  and 

S.)  298.  Suburban    Ry.    Co.,    78    Md.    294; 

sPeddicord  v.   Baltimore,   Catons-  Lonaconing    Midland    &    Frostburg 

ville  &  Ellicotts'  Mills  Pass.  R.  R.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Consolidated  Coal  Co.,  95 

Co.,  34  Md.  463 ;  Hiss  V.  Baltimore  &  Md.    630,    53    Atl.    420;    Jeffers    v. 

Hampden  Pass.  Ry.  Co.,  52  Md.  242.  Annapolis,  107  Md.    268;    Howe    v. 

9The    process    of    development    is  West  End  St.  Ry.  Co.,  167  Mass.  46, 

traced  in  Zehren  v.  Milwaukee  Elec.  44  N.  E.  386;  Austin  v.  Detroit  etc. 


282 


EMIITEITT    DOMAIN. 


165 


of  the  cases  cited,  except  two,  was  any  account  taken 
of  the  distinction  between  interurban  passenger  traffic 
and  urban  passenger  traffic. -^^  In  Pennsylvania  such  a 
road  was  held  to  be  an  additional  burden  upon  a  country 
highway,  not  because  it  was  an  interurban  road  but  because  a 
street  railroad  is  held  not  to  be  within  the  public  easement  in 
such  a  highway. ^^  In  Wisconsin  an  interurban  street  passenger 
railway  is  held  to  be  an  additional  burden  both  upon  country 
highways  and  city  streets.  The  question  first  arose  with  respect 
to  the  country  highway.     A  corporation  operating  the  street 


Ry.  Co.,  134  Mich.  149,  96  N.  W.  35; 
Smith  V.  Jaclcson  &  Battle  Creek 
Traction  Co.,  137  Mich.  20,  100  N. 
W.  121 ;  Newell  v.  Minneapolis  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  35  Minn.  112,  27  N.  W. 
839,  59  Am.  Rep.  303;  West  Jersey 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Camden,  Gloucester  & 
Woodbury  Ry.  Co.,  52  N.  J.  Eq.  31, 
29  Atl.  423;  Ehret  v.  Camden  & 
Trenton  R.  R.  Co.,  61  N.  J.  Eq.,  171, 
47  Atl.  567;  Ranken  v.  St.  Louis  & 
B.  Suburban  Ry.  Co.,  98  Fed.  479. 
In  Nichols  v.  Ann  Arbor  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  87  Mich.  361,  49  N.  W.  538,  16 
L.R.A.  371,  such  a  road  was  held  to 
be  an  additional  burden,  because 
constructed  with  cuts  and  fills.  See 
also  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Whit- 
ing etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  139  Ind.  297, 
38  N.  E.  604,  47  Am.  St.  Ry.  264, 
26  L.R.A.  337;  New  York  Central 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Auburn  Interurban 
R.  R.  Co.,  178  N.  Y.  75,  70  N.  E. 
117 ;  McQuaide  v.  Portland  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  18  Ore.  237,  22  Pac.  899 ;  Paquet 
V.  Mt.  Tabor  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  Ore. 
233,  22  Pac.  906. 

iiCanastota  Knife  Co.  v.  Newing- 
ton  Tramway  Co.,  69  Conn.  146,  36 
Atl.  1107;  Newell  v.  Minneapolis 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  35  Minn.  112,  27  N. 
W.  839,  59  Am.  Rep.  303.  In  the 
former  case,  speaking  of  the  street 
railway,  the  court  says:  "Its  main 
purpose  is  presumably,  and  should  be 
in  fact,  to  facilitate  and  further  the 
use  of  every  street  through  which  it 


passes.  If  it  should  run  over  a 
thinly  settled  country  road  between 
two  cities,  this  would  be  no  less 
true.  Highways  are  for  through 
travel  as  fully  as  for  local  travel. 
A  street  railway  laid  over  them 
must  always  serve  both  purposes,  to 
a  greater  or  less  extent.  If  it  fails 
in  either,  it  loses  its  identity  with 
ordinary  highway  use.  A  steam 
railroad  ordinarily  serves  but  one, 
and  thus  has  not  such  identity.''  p. 
154.  In  the  latter  case  the  court  re- 
ferring to  the  interurban  traffic  of 
the  road  in  question,  says:  "A  per- 
son who  desires  to  go  from  any  part 
of  Minneapolis  to  San  Francisco  has 
the  same  right  to  use  the  streets  of 
the  former  city  for  the  purpose  of 
passing  out  of  it  on  his  way  to  his 
destination  as  a  person  who  simply 
desires  to  pass  from  one  place  in 
Minneapolis  to  another  in  the  same 
city.  The  use  of  the  streets  is  just 
as  legitimate,  and  just  as  clearly 
and  completely  a  lawful  and  proper 
enjoyment  of  the  public  and  common 
easement,  in  the  one  case  as  in  the 
other."  To  same  eflfect,  Jeffers  v. 
Annapolis,  107  Md.  268. 

1 2Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mont- 
gomery Co.  Pass.  Ry.  Co.,  167  Pa. 
St.  62,  31  Atl.  468,  46  Am.  St.  Rep. 
659,  27  L.R.A.  766.  And  see  Heilman 
V.  Lebanon  &  Anville  St.  Ry.  Co.. 
145  Pa.  St.  23,  23  Atl.  329. 


§  165 


EOADS   AND    STEEETS. 


283 


car  system  in  Milwaukee  proposed  to  construct  a  line  to  a  sub- 
urban village  through  an  intervening  country  town.  In  a  suit 
by  an  abutting  owner  to  enjoin  the  construction  of  the  road 
on  one  of  the  highways  in  such  town,  it  was  held  that  the 
road  was  an  additional  burden  and  could  not  be  constructed 
without  compensation  to  the  owner  of  the  fee''  Subsequently 
the  same  rule  was  applied  to  city  streets  and  it  was  held  that 
an  interurban  railway,  transporting  passengers  through  and  be- 


isZehren  v.  Milwaukee  Eleo.  Ry.  & 
Lt.  Co.,  99  Wis.  83,  74  N.  W.  538,  67 
Am.  St.  Rep.  844,  41  L.E.A.  575. 
The  court  says:  "The  street  rail- 
way in  its  inception  is  a  purely 
urban  institution.  It  is  intended  to 
facilitate  travel  in  and  about  the 
city,  from  one  part  of  the  munici- 
pality to  another,  and  thus  relieve 
the  sidewalks  of  foot  passengers  and 
the  roadway  of  vehicles.  It  is  thus 
an  aid  to  the  exercise  of  the  ease- 
ment of  passage;  strictly,  a  city 
convenience,  for  use  in  the  city,  by 
people  living  or  stopping  therein, 
and  fully  under  the  control  of  munic- 
ipal authorities,  who  have  been  en- 
dowed with  ample  power  for  that 
purpose.  This  strictly  urban  char- 
acter of  the  street  railways  remained 
practically  unchanged  for  many 
years,  and  during  these  years  the 
long  line  of  decisions  grew  up  recog- 
nizing the  street  railway  as  merely 
an  improved  method  of  using  the 
street,  and  rather  as  a  help  to  the 
street  than  as  a  burden  thereon. 
Time,  however,  has  made  changes  in 
conditions.  New  motive  power  has 
been  discovered,  and  it  is  found  that 
by  its  use  an  enlarged  city  street 
car  may  profitably  be  run  long  dis- 
tances, and  compete  to  some  extent 
with  the  steam  railway.  It  is  pro- 
posed to  convert  the  city  railways 
into  lines  of  passenger  transporta- 
tion, covering  long  distances  and  con- 
necting widely  separated  cities  and 
villages,  by  using  the  country  high- 
ways, and  operating  long  and  heavy 


coaches,  sometimes  made  up  into 
trains  of  heavy  oars.  Thus  the 
urban  railway  has  developed  into  the 
interurban  railway,  and  threatens 
soon  to  develop  into  the  interstate 
railway.  The  small  car  which  took 
up  passengers  at  one  corner,  and 
dropped  them  at  another,  has  be- 
come a  large  coach,  approximating 
the  ordinary  railway  coach  in  size, 
and  has  become  a  part,  perhaps,  of  a 
train  which  sweeps  across  the  coun- 
try from  one  city  to  another,  bear- 
ing its  load  of  passengers  ticketed 
through,  with  an  occasional  local 
passenger  picked  up  on  the  highway. 
The  purely  city  purpose  which  the 
urban  railway  subserved  has  de- 
veloped into  or  been  supplanted  by 
an  entirely  different  purpose,  namely, 
the  transportation  of  passengers 
from  city  to  city  over  long  stretches 
of  intervening  country.  Where  this 
train  or  car,  with  its  load  of  through 
passengers,  is  passing  through  a, 
country  town  it  is  clearly  serving  no 
township  purpose,  save  in  the  most 
limited  sense.  It  is  very  difficult  to 
say  that  this  use  of  a  country  high- 
way is  not  an  additional  burden.  It 
is  built  and  operated  mainly  to  ob- 
tain the  through  travel  from  city  to 
city,  and  only  incidentally  to  take 
up  a  passenger  in  the  country  town. 
This  through  travel  is  unquestion- 
ably composed  of  people  who  other- 
wise would  travel  on  the  ordinary 
steam  railroad,  and  would  not  use 
the  highway  at  all.  Thus,  the  oper- 
ation of  this  newly  developed  street 


284 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§   165 


tween  cities,  was  an  additional  burden  upon  the  city  streets.-'* 
In  a  proceeding  by  such  a  railroad  to  condemn  the  right  to  use 
a  city  street,"  it  was  held  that  damages  should  be  assessed  on  the 
same  basis  as  though  the  road  was  a  commercial  railroad.^" 
But  many  interurban  railroads  are  authorized  to  carry  and 
make  a  practice  of  carrying  both  freight  and  passengers  and  the 
question  arises  whether  such  a  road  is  an  additional  burden  on 
a  street  or  highway.  In  Illinois  such  railroads  are  classed  as 
commercial  railroads  as  respects  the  use  of  streets,  even  though 
limited  to  the  transportation  of  ordinary  baggage,  mail,  express 
and  milk.-'®  So  in  Ohio  an  interurban  railroad,  authorized  to 
carry  baggage,  packages,  boxed  and  barrelled  freight,  farm  prod- 
uce, express  matter  and  U.  S.  mail,  was  held  to  be  an  additional 


railway  (so  called)  upon  the  coun- 
try road  is  precisely  opposite  to  the 
operation  of  the  urban  railway  upon 
the  city  street.  It  burdens  the  road 
with  travel  which  otherwise  would 
not  be  there,  instead  of  relieving  it 
by  the  substitution  of  one  vehicle  for 
many. 

"However  we  regard  this  develop- 
ment of  the  urban  into  the  inter- 
urban railway,  it  seems  utterly  im- 
possible and  illogical  to  say  that  it 
is  essentially  the  same  in  its  pur- 
pose and  effects  as  the  mere  street 
railway,  which  was  held  in  the  Ho- 
bart  Case  (Hobart  v.  Milwaukee 
City  E.  R.  Co.,  27  Wis.  194)  not  to 
be  an  additional  burden  on  the  fee. 
The  reasons  given  for  that  holding  in 
that  case  either  do  not  apply  at  all, 
or  only  in  a  very  limited  degree,  to 
the  interurban  railroad.  The  differ- 
ence is  not  so  much  in  the  change 
of  motive  power  as  in  the  entirely 
different  character  of  the  use.  Sup- 
pose a  steam  railway  corporation 
were  organized  to  carry  passengers 
only  from  city  to  city,  and  should 
attempt  to  lay  its  tracks  upon  the 
country  roads  without  compensa- 
tion; is  there  any  doubt  but  that 
it  would  be  held  that  it  could  not 
do  so?     We  think  not.     Our  conclu- 


sion is  that  an  interurban  electric 
railway  running  upon  the  highways 
through  country  towns,  is  an  addi- 
tional burden  upon  the  highway." 
pp.  95-97. 

KYounkin  v.  Milwaukee  L.  H.  & 
T.  Co.,  112  Wis.  15,  87  N.  W.  861; 
Same  v.  Same,  120  Wis.  477,  98  N. 
W.  215. 

isAbbott  V.  Milwaukee  L.  H.  &  T. 
Co.,  126  Wis.  634,  106  N.  W.  523,  4 
L.R.A.(N.S.)  202.  See  a iso  the  fol- 
lowing, which  were  proceedings  by 
the  same  company  to  condemn  the 
easements  infringed  upon.  Wilbur 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Milwaukee  Lt.,  H.  & 
Traction  Co.,  134  Wis.  352,  114  N. 
W.  813;  Brickies  v.  Same,  134  Wis. 
358,  114  N.  W.  810;  Gosa  v.  Same, 
134  Wis.  369,  114  N.  W.  815;  Tem- 
pleton  V.  Same,  134  Wis.  377,  114  N. 
W.  808;  Putney  Bros.  Co.  v.  Same, 
134  Wis.  379,  114  N.  W.  809;  Marsh 
v.  Same,  134  Wis.  384,  114  N.  W. 
804;  Petrie  v.  Same,  134  Wis.  394, 
114  N.  W.  808. 

16  Wilder  v.  Aurora  etc.  Elec.  Trac- 
tion Co.,  216  111.  493,  75  N.  E.  194; 
Aurora  v.  Elgin  etc.  Traction  Co., 
227  111.  485,  81  N.  E.  544,  118  Am. 
St.  Rep.  284;  Roekford  etc.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Keyt,  117  111.  App.  32. 


§  165  KOADS  AND  STREETS.  285 

burden  on  a  highway.''^  An  electric  railroad  proposed  to  be 
built  on  roads  and  streets  between  Milwaukee  and  Kenosha  and 
authorized  to  carry  freight  and  passengers,  express  and  mail 
matter,  was  held  to  be  a  commercial  railroad  by  the  supreme 
court  of  AVisconsin.-'^  The  question  has  received  elaborate  con- 
sideration in  two  Indiana  cases.  In  the  earlier  case  a  bill  was 
filed  to  enjoin  the  use  of  a  street  in  Ft.  Wayne  by  an  interurban 
railroad.  The  company  was  authorized  to  carry  passengers,  ex- 
press, mail  and  baggage.  Cars  were  to  be  operated  singly,  un- 
less by  permission  of  the  city  when  trains  of  two  cars  could 
be  run.  It  was  held  not  to  be  an  additional  burden  on  the 
street.  "If  constructed  and  operated  in  the  manner  described," 
says  the  court,  "in  what  essential  particular  will  the  defendant's 
railroad  differ  from  an  ordinary  electric  street  railroad  ?  Both 
kinds  of  roads,  when  deemed  necessary,  use  the  T  rail,  and  their 
cars  are  propelled  by  the  same  motive  power.  The  carriage 
of  light  express  matter,  passenger  baggage,  and  mail  matter 
upon  street  cars  would  not  constitute  ground  of  complaint  on 
the  part  of  abutting  lot  owners.  If  only  one  car  is  run,  the 
street  is  occupied,  and  obstructed  by  it  to  no  greater  extent  than 
it  would  be  by  a  street  car.  If  two  constitute  a  train,  they 
will  take  up  no  more  space  and  do  no  more  injury  than  a  motor 
car  and  trailer,  which  are  commonly  run  upon  street  railroad 
tracks  when  the  business  of  the  company  requires  such  addi- 
tional car.  The  fact  that  light  express  matter,  passenger  bag- 
gage, and  United  States  mail  matter  are  carried  on  a  car  does 
not  affect  the  property  owner  nor  injure  his  property.  The 
transportation  of  articles  of  this  kind  does  not  create  any  re- 
semblance between  the  interurban  electric  railroad  and  a  steam 
railroad  carrying  ordinary  goods  and  merchandise,  and  results 
in  none  of  the  annoyances  and  injuries  which  are  caused  by 
either  passenger  or  freight  trains,  on  such  a  railroad."  '^  In  the 
later  case,  suit  was  brought  to  enjoin  the  operation  of  interur- 

iTSchaaf  v.  Cleveland  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  Co.,  120  Mo.  App.  335,  96  S.  W.  707, 

66  Ohio  St.  215,  64  N.  E.  145;  Cham-  where  interurban  railroads  carrying 

bers  V.  Cleveland  etc.  Traction  Co.,  freight  and  passengers  were  classed 

5  Ohio  C.  C.  (N.S.)  298.  with    commercial    railroads,    as    re- 

isChicago  etc.  R.  R.   Co.  v.  Mil-  spects  the  duty  to  fence  their  tracks, 
waukee  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  95  Wis.  561,  isMordhurst    v.    Ft.    Wayne    etc. 

70  N.  E.  678,  60  Am.  St.  Rep.  136,  Traction  Co.,  163  Ind.  268,  275,  71 

37  L.R.A.  856.     And  see  Hannah  v.  N.  E.  642,  106  Am.  St.  Rep.  222,  68 

Met.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  81  Mo.  App.  78  and  L.R.A.  105. 
Riggs   V.    St.   Francois   County   Ry. 


286  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    165 

ban  cars  and  trains  over  a  street  railroad  track  in  Indianapolis. 
The  company  was  authorized  to  carry  passengers,  mail,  express 
and  baggage  as  in  the  former  case.  There  appears  to  have  been 
no  limit  to  the  number  of  cars  -which  might  be  operated  together 
and  trains  of  three  cars,  each  sixty  feet  long,  were  in  fact  run 
upon  the  street.  The  trains  did  not  stop  between  the  city  limits 
and  the  terminal  of  the  road.  There  were  opinions  by  all  the 
judges.  Three  of  the  judges  held  that  such  a  road,  operated  in 
a  proper  and  reasonable  manner,  with  due  regard  to  the  rights 
of  abutting  owners  and  the  demands  of  ordinary  traffic,  was 
not  an  additional  burden  on  the  street.  The  case  was  decided 
on  demurrer  to  the  complaint,  which  alleged  the  trains  were  run 
at  from  twenty  to  thirty  miles  an  hour,  that  the  plaintiff's  house 
was  jarred  so  that  the  plaster  fell  and  pictures  were  shaken  from 
the  walls,  that  horses  hitched  in  the  street  were  frightened  and 
the  sleep  of  the  family  disturbed  by  the  noise.  The  same  judges 
held  that  the  complaint  showed  an  unlawful  and  unjustifiable 
manner  of  operating  the  road  and  that  the  plaintiff  was  entitled 
to  recover  the  damages  caused  by  such  unlawful  use.^"  Two 
of  the  judges  were  of  the  opinion  that  an  interurban  railroad 
carrying  freight  and  passengers  was  an  additional  burden.  A 
California  case  holds  that  an  interurban  road  for  the  transpor- 
tation of  both  freight  and  passengers  is  a  proper  use  of  a  street 
and  that  an  abutting  owner  cannot  prevent  such  use  but  that, 

2  0Kinsey  v.   Union  Traction  Co.,  pany,  and  in  conformity  to  such  city 

169  Ind.  563,  81  N.  E.  922.  regulations  as  the  authorities  may 

The  conclusion  of  the  court  was  from    time    to    time    impose    upon 

guardedly    stated     as     follows:     "I  street  cars  operated  in  the  streets  of 

therefore   conclude   upon   this   point  the  city,  and  with  the  sanction  and 

that  interurban  cars  of  suitable  size,  under  the  regulation  of  the  city  au- 

construction  and  finish,  for  the  car-  thorities,  temporarily,  and  in  times 

riage    of   both   passengers,   and    ex-  of  emergency  created  by  special  oc- 

press     and     light-package     freight,  casion,  such  a  reasonable  and  limited 

with  permission  of  the  city  authori-  number  more  than  one  as  shall  be 

ties,  may  be  run  singly  into  the  city  required  to  meet  the  transient  wants 

of  Indianapolis,  upon  the  tracks  of  of  the  public  for  passenger  carriage, 

the  local  company,  laid  according  to  provided  such  increased  number,  in 

the   law   regulating   street   railroad  size  and  manner  of  operation,  is  in 

tracks   in   city   streets,   to   a   point  substantial    conformity    to   the    au- 

within  the  city,  and  over  the  tracks  thorized   custom   of   the   local   com- 

first    designated    by    the    board    of  pany  on  like  occasions,  and  does  not 

public  works  and  common  council,  at  materially   increase   the   burden    of 

a  reasonable  rate  of  speed,  not  ex-  the   highway   easement,  nor  unduly 

ceeding  that  allowed  by  law  or  ordi-  interfere    with    other     proper    and 

nance  to  the  cars  of  the  local  com-  legitimate  uses  of  the  street." 


§  166  EOADS  AND  STREETS.  287 

under  the  constitutional  provision  giving  compensation  for  prop- 
erty taken  or  damaged,  he  may  recover  for  any  damage  to  his 
property  occasioned  by  such  use.^"-  These,  so  far  as  we  are 
aware,  embrace  all  the  decisions  relating  to  the  use  of  streets 
by  interurban  railroads. 

Starting  with  the  well  settled  propositions  that  the  street  pas- 
senger railway  is  a  legitimate  street  use  and  that  the  commercial 
railroad  is  not,  it  does  not  seem  difficult  to  dispose  of  the  inter- 
urban railroad.  In  so  far  as  it  is  operated  as  a  street  passenger 
railway,  in  aid  of  local  travel,  stopping  at  street  crossings,  or 
at  convenient  intervals  to  take  up  and  let  down  passengers,  it 
is  on  the  same  basis  as  the  urban  street  railway.  If  not  operated 
for  the  accommodation  of  local  travel  and  in  substantially  the 
same  manner  as  the  urban  street  railway,  it  should  be  classed 
with  the  commercial  railroad,  with  the  consequent  liability  to 
abutting  owners.  Such  a  railroad,  with  its  trains  sweeping 
across  the  country  at  twenty  or  thirty  miles  an  hour,  and  some- 
times more,  stopping  only  at  cities  and  towns  and  at  infrequent 
intervals  in  the  country,  and  in  the  cities  and  towns  stopping 
only  for  the  accommodation  of  its  interurban  passengers  and 
not  at  all  for  local  traffic  on  the  street,  is  clearly  analogous  to 
the  steam  railroad  and  competes  with  it  and  it  alone.  If  the 
interurban  railroad  of  this  class  had  followed  the  horse  rail- 
road, in  the  order  of  development,  there  is  no  doubt  but  what 
it  would  have  been  classed  with  the  steam  railroad  and  not  with 
the  horse  railroad. 

If  the  interurban  railroad  carries  freight  as  well  as  passen- 
gers, the  analogy  to  the  steam  railroad  is  complete.  Most  of 
the  freight  so  carried  is  such  as  would  otherwise  seek  transpor- 
tation on  the  steam  railroad  rather  than  in  drays  and  wagons 
on  the  streets  and  highways.  The  question  of  freight  traffic 
is  further  considered  in  the  following  section. 

§  166.  Street  railroads  carrying  freight.  The  question 
whether  a  street  railroad  carrying  both  freight  and  passengers 
is  a  legitimate  street  use  or  additional  burden  on  the  street,  is 
a  question  which  is  now  pressing  for  solution.  Such  use  of  the 
streets  has  been  authorized  in  several  of  the  States.  There  is  no 
question,  of  course,  but  what  the  legislature  has  power  to  do 

2  iMontgomery  v.  Santa  Ana  etc. 
Co.,  104  Cal.  186,  37  Pac.  786,  43 
Am.  St.  Rep.  89,  25  L.R.A.  654. 


288  EMINENT    DOMAIIf.  §    166 

this.    The  only  question  is  whether  it  can  be  done  without  com- 
pensation to  the  abutting  owners. 

This  question  has  been  considered  to  some  extent  in  the  sec- 
tion upon  interurban  railroads.^^  In  one  of  the  cases  there 
cited,  which  involved  the  transportation  of  freight  cars  over 
the  street  railway  tracks  in  Indianapolis,  the  court  says :  "Un- 
doubtedly the  chief  business  of  street  cars  is  the  carriage  of 
passengers,  but  there  appears  in  the  law  of  the  highway  no  ob- 
jection to  the  carriage  of  light  and  package  freight.  It  has, 
perhaps,  always  been  the  custom  in  Indianapolis  to  carry  for 
its  passengers,  hand  baggage,  filled  and  unfilled  market  baskets, 
tool  boxes,  baby  carriages,  clothes  baskets,  and  all  manner  of 
small  articles  and  packages  that  may  be  conveniently  handled 
from  the  platform;  also,  to  carry  without  an  accompanying 
passenger,  the  United  States  mail  from  the  central  ofiice  to  the 
various  substations  of  the  city;  likewise,  a  large  number  of 
packages  of  newspapers  from  down  town  offices,  and  depots 
receiving  consignments  from  St.  Louis,  Cincinnati  and  Chicago, 
to  the  hundreds  of  distributing  points  throughout  the  city.  Ke- 
pair  and  construction  materials,  and  perhaps  some  private 
freight,  are  hauled  through  the  city  in  the  local  company's 
cars,  and  no  complaint  is  heard  or  inconvenience  manifest.  Be- 
sides, what  principle  can  be  advanced  in  condemnation  of  the 
inclosed,  reasonably  sized,  neatly  constructed  freight  or  express 
car  ?  Was  not  the  transportation  of  property  over  the  roads  as 
deeply  seated  in  the  dedicatory  purpose  as  the  passage  of  per- 
sons ?  Plainly,  the  reasons  which  justify  the  one  support  the 
other.  The  heavy  drays  and  wagons  employed  in  handling 
the  commerce  of  the  city  are  a  greater  obstruction  to  the 
street,  and  menace  to  the  safety  of  those  using  it,  than  the  num- 
ber of  pedestrians.  Therefore  a  suitable  car,  comparatively 
noiseless,  confined  to  a  fixed  track  four  or  five  feet  wide,  in  the 
center  of  the  street,  to  which  track  vehicles  may  be  safely  ad- 
justed by  keeping  to  the  right,  and  which  car  will  carry  twenty 
fold  more  freight  or  express  than  a  wagon  occupying  the  same 
amount  of  space  on  the  street,  and  meandering  in  an  irregular 
track,  cannot,  for  any  sufficient  reason,  be  declared  a  nuisance, 
or  an  improper  use  of  the  street.  No  use  should  be  improper 
that  produces  no  extra  hazard,  and  makes  the  way  easier,  safer 
and  more  convenient,  as  a  passageway  for  the  public  in  com- 

2U?i«e,  §  165. 


§  166 


EOADS   AND    STBEETS. 


289 


mon.^^  Similar  views  have  been  expressed  by  the  supreme  court 
of  California  in  case  of  an  interurban  street  railroad  authorized 
to  carry  both  freight  and  passengers.^* 


2  3Kinsey  v.  Union  Traction  Co., 
169  Ind.  563,  81  N.  E.  922,  940.  See 
also  Mordhurst  v.  Ft.  Wayne  etc. 
Traction  Co.,  163  Ind.  268,  71  N.  E. 
642,  106  Am.  St.  Rep.  222,  66  L.R.A. 
105. 

2  4lIontgomery  v.  Santa  Ana  &  W. 
E.  R.  Co.,  104  Cal.  186,  37  Pac.  Rep. 
786,  43  Am.  St.  Rep.  89,  25  L.R.A. 
654,  10  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  25. 
The  court  says:  "A  'street  railway' 
has  been  defined  as  'a  railway  laid 
down  upon  roads  or  streets  for  the 
purpose  of  carrying  passengers.' 
Elliott,  supra,  557.  It  is  further 
said  by  the  same  author  that  'the 
distinctive  and  essential  feature  of 
a  street  railway,  considered  in  rela- 
tion to  other  railroads,  is  that  it  is 
a  railway  for  the  transportation  of 
passengers,  and  not  of  freight.'  It 
is  said  to  exclude  the  idea  of  the 
carriage  of  freight,  and  that  a  rail- 
road over  which  heavily-laden 
freight  trains  are  drawn  cannot 
be  considered  a  street  railway. 
Street  cars  are  little  more  than  car- 
riages for  transportation  of  pas- 
sengers, propelled  over  fixed  tracks, 
to  which  their  wheels  are  adapted, 
and  as  a  convenient,  comfortable, 
and  economical  mode  of  conveyance, 
their  use  has  become  well-nigh  uni- 
versal in  cities,  and  as  they  add, 
when  properly  constructed,  little  or 
nothing  to  the  burdens  of  the  serv- 
ient tenement,  their  use  is  upheld 
without  the  necessity  of  compensa- 
tion to  the  abutting  owner.  The 
use  of  a  public  street,  however,  for 
an  ordinary  railway  for  the  trans- 
portation of  freight  and  passengers, 
it  has  heen  said  by  the  highest  au- 
thority, imposes  a  new  burden  upon 
the  street,  not  contemplated  in  its 
Em.  D. — 19. 


dedication,  and,  therefore,  the  user 
cannot  be  indulged  without  compen- 
sation to  the  abutting  owner  of 
property  upon  such  public  street. 
We  are  at  a  loss  for  any  good  reason 
for  this  distinction,  or  to  see  why 
the  transportation  of  freight  by  mod- 
ern and  improved  methods  is  not 
equally  entitled  to  encouragement 
with  the  transportation  of  passen- 
gers. The  essential  wants  of  the 
citizens  demand  the  former  equally 
with  the  latter.  If  there  is  any  dif- 
ference in  the  burden  imposed  upon 
the  street,  it  is  in  degree,  and  not  in 
kind.  The  great  highways  of  Eng- 
land were  constructed,  not  so  much 
for  the  convenience  of  passengers  as 
for  the  transportation  of  freight.  In 
the  infancy  of  commerce,  when  trade 
and  traffic  by  land  was  insignificant 
in  volume,  when  the  sumpter  horse, 
which  answered  to  our  modern  pack 
mule,  answered  all  the  purposes  of 
transportation  for  goods,  footpaths, 
bridlepaths,  and  lanes  served  all 
needed  purposes;  but  with  the 
growth  of  inland  commerce,  and  the 
need  of  greater  facilities  for  the  in- 
terchange of  commodities,  the  use  of 
wheeled  vehicles,  and,  as  a  means 
thereto,  the  highway,  as  we  know  it, 
became  a  necessity.  The  App'an 
Way,  commenced  312  B.  C,  which  has 
provoked  the  admiration  of  the 
world,  was  entitled  to  commendation 
for  its  roadway  sixteen  feet  in  width, 
constructed  for  the  transportation  of 
burdens,  while  the  paths  of  eight  feet 
on  each  side  of  it  for  foot  passengers, 
and  upon  which  the  Roman  legions 
were  wont  to  march,  were  unpaved. 
In  the  construction  of  modern  high- 
ways, urban  and  suburban,  the  great 
difficulty  and  the  prominent  object 


290 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  166 


In  JSTew  York  a  statute  passed  in  1890  authorizes  street  rail- 
roads to  convey  "persons  and  property  in  cars  for  compensa- 
tion." In  a  suit  by  an  abutting  owner,  having  the  fee  of  the 
street,  to  enjoin  a  street  railroad  from  operating  express  cars 
over  his  land,  the  court  of  appeals  affirmed  a  decree  dismissing 
the  bill.^''  In  subsequent  cases  in  the  same  court  this  decision 
has  been  regarded  as  settling  the  question  of  the  right  to  operate 


has  been  to  build  and  adapt  them,  by 
grade,  width  and  structure  of  road-  ' 
bed,  to  the  carriage  of  freight.  Yet 
we  are  told  in  effect  that,  so  far  as 
modern  methods  are  concerned,  so 
far  as  ease,  speed  and  economy  are 
involved,  improvements  are  to  be 
limited  to  the  transportation  of  pas- 
sengers; that  cars  with  wheels  ad- 
justed to  move  upon  fixed  tracks, 
when  applied  to  the  transportation 
of  passengers,  are  within  the  con- 
templated objects  in  view  in  opening 
a  road  or  street,  and,  therefore,  add 
nothing  material  to  the  burden  of 
the  servitude  of  the  abutting  land- 
owner, while  a  precisely  similar 
structure,  adapted  to  the  transpor- 
tation of  freight,  adds  an  additional 
burden,  of  a  diflferent  character,  to 
the  servitude,  and  cannot  be  toler- 
ated without  compensation  to  the 
abutting  owner.  An  interminable 
string  of  heavy  drays  may  thunder 
through  the  street  from  early  morn- 
ing until  set  of  sun,  a,  menace  to  all 
who  frequent  the  thoroughfare,  and 
an  inconvenience  to  all  dwellers 
thereon;  but  the  cars  of  a  railway, 
which  move  usually  but  a,  few  times 
a  day,  and  with  infinitely  less  an- 
noyance to  the  public,  upon  tracks 
so  adjusted  to  the  surface  as  to  oc- 
casion little  or  no  inconvenience, 
cannot  be  tolerated.  We  fail  to 
appreciate  the  philosophy  of  the  dis- 
tinction. On  the  contrary,  we  af- 
firm that,  when  a  public  street  in  a 
city  is  dedicated  to  the  general  use 
of  the  public,  it  involves  its  use  sub- 
ject to  municipal  control  and  limita- 


tions, for  all  the  uses  and  purposes 
of  the  public  as  a  street,  including 
such  methods  for  the  transportation 
of  passengers  and  freight  as  modern 
science  and  improvements  may  have 
rendered  necessary,  and  that  the  ap- 
plication of  these  methods,  and  in- 
deed of  those  yet  to  be  discovered, 
must  have  been  contemplated  when 
the  street  was  opened  and  the  right 
of  way  obtained,  whether  by  dedica- 
tion, purchase  or  condemnation  pro- 
ceedings, and  hence  that  such  a  user 
imposes  no  new  burden  or  servitude 
upon  the  owner  of  the  abutting  land. 
The  object  of  the  user  being  within 
the  conceded  rights  of  the  public, 
the  methods  of  its  accomplishment 
are  subject  to  legislative  control, 
and  subject,  also,  to  an  action  for 
damages  by  any  abutting  owner, 
whether  or  not  he  may  be  vested 
with  the  fee  to  the  center  of  the 
street,  whose  right  of  Ingress  and 
egress,  or  his  right  to  light  and  air 
shall  be  interfered  with." 

2  0De  Grauw  v.  Long  Island  Elee. 
Ry.  Co.,  43  App.  Div.  502,  60  N.  Y. 
S.  163;  S.  C.  affirmed  on  opinion  be- 
low, 163  N.  Y.  597,  57  N.  E.  IIOS. 
The  Supreme  Court  says:  "In  the 
struggle  which  is  going  on  for  the 
transportation  of  persons  and  prop- 
erty, it  must  be  confessed  that 
street  surface  railroads  are  not 
backward  in  the  assertion  of  all  the 
rights  which  the  grant  of  power 
confers.  But  the  law  is,  and  the 
courts  may  be  relied  upon  to  enforce 
the  law,  that  the  right  of  use  of  the 
street   by   the    public    is    first    and 


§  166 


EOADS    AND    STEEETS. 


291 


freight  cars  upon  street  railroads.^^  In  Massachusetts  a  private 
horse  railroad  laid  upon  a  street  or  highway  from  a  quarry  to 
a  steam  railroad  and  used  for  the  transportation  of  freight  only 
was  held  to  be  within  the  public  easement  and  not  an  additional 
burden  on  the  soil.^^  In  Texas  it  has  been  held  that  a 
street  railroad  for  the  transportation  of  freight  may  be  au- 
thorized to  use  the  streets  and  that  the  abutter  cannot  enjoin 
such  use  but  that  such  a  road  is  to  be  treated  as  a  commerciaf 
railroad  as  respects  the  right  of  the  abutting  owner  to  compen- 
sation.^* In  Ohio  street  railroads  are  authorized  by  statute 
to  carry  both  freight  and  passengers  and  the  right  to  do  so  has 
been  upheld,  but  the  suit  did  not  involve  the  rights  of  abutting 
owners.^^  In  Wisconsin  an  act  of  1898  authorizes  the  forma- 
tion of  street  railway  corporations  with  power  to  carry  freight 
and  passengers,  and  also  authorizes  municipal  corporations  to 
grant  the  use  of  streets  to  such  corporations  for  both  kinds  of 
traffic.    In  a  suit  to  annul  a  franchise  to  such  a  corporation  it 


primary;  the  right  of  use  by  the 
street  surface  railroad  is  secondary 
and  subordinate.  It  has  the  para- 
mount right  of  use  of  its  tracks,  but 
not  the  exclusive  use,  and  when  the 
right  of  the  public  or  an  individual 
member  of  it  requires  the  use  of  the 
street  for  a  proper  purpose,  the 
right  of  the  railroad  company  must 
yield  thereto,  even  though  the  effect 
be,  for  the  time,  to  stop  the  opera- 
tion of  its  cars  thereon.  We  have, 
at  all  times,  been  mindful  of  these 
conditions,  and  when  upholding  the 
rights  of  a  railroad  in  a  given  case, 
we  have  been  careful  to  place  a  lim- 
itation thereon,  and  have  uniformly 
asserted  that  whatever  be  the  char- 
acter of  operation  by  the  railroad, 
and  whatever  use  it  sought  to  make 
of  the  street,  such  use  is  subject  to 
the  authority  of  the  public  therein, 
and  the  public  authority  may,  when- 
ever necessary  for  the  preservation 
of  the  street  for  street  purposes, 
regulate  and  restrain  the  use  there- 
of by  the  railroad.  We  are  not  at 
all  sure  that  the  transportation  in 
single  cars  of  such   property   as  is 


the  subject  of  the  present  contract 
increases,  or  will  increase,  the  bur- 
den of  use  of  the  street.  Such  prop- 
erty must  be  transported  through 
the  city  in  cars  or  upon  wagons. 
Whether  the  use  of  the  former  is 
more  burdensome  than  would  be  the 
latter  is,  to  say  the  least,  an  open 
question.  Time  will  demonstrate." 
p.  509. 

2  6  "That  the  power  exists  to  run 
such  cars  is  no  longer  an  open  ques- 
tion in  this  court."  Matter  of  Still- 
water etc.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  171  N.  Y. 
589,  597,  64  N.  E.  511,  reversing  S. 
C.  72  App.  Div.  294,  76  N.  Y.  S.  69. 
And  see  Hatfield  v.  Straus,  189  N. 
Y.  208,  82  N.  E.  172,  affirming  S.  C. 
117  App.  Div.  671,  102  N.  Y.  S.  934. 

27White  V.  Blanchard  Bros.  etc. 
Co.,  178  Mass.  363,  59  N.  E.  1025. 
Compare  Green  v.  Portland,  32  Me. 
431. 

2  8Aycock  V.  San  Antonio  Brewing 
Co.,  26  Tex.  Civ.  App.  341,  63  S.  W. 
953;  Rische  v.  Texas  Trans.  Co.,  27 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  33,  66  S.  W.  324. 

2  9State  v.  Dayton  Traction  Co., 
64  Ohio  St.  272,  60  N.  E.  291. 


292  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    166 

was  taken  for  granted  that  such  a  railroad  would  be  an  addi- 
tional burden  on  the  street  but  the  question  was  not  directly 
passed  upon.^"  An  act  of  Maryland  of  1898  authorized  the 
street  railway  companies  of  Baltimore  to  transact  an  express 
business  upon  their  lines  of  railway  in  Baltimore  and  adjoin- 
ing counties.  A  city  and  suburban  express  company  arranged 
with  the  railway  companies  to  operate  its  own  express  cars  over 
the  railway  tracks  and  obtained  from  the  city  authority  to  lay 
a  switch  track  from  the  tracks  in  the  street  to  its  premises.  The 
owner  of  the  property  adjoining  the  premises  of  the  express 
company  filed  a  bill  to  enjoin  the  laying  of  the  switch  track. 
The  supreme  court  held  that  the  railway  company  was  author- 
ized to  make  the  traffic  arrangement,  that  the  express  company 
was  doing  a  public  business  and  that  the  switch  track  to  facili- 
tate the  conduct  of  the  business  was  a  proper  use  of  the  street 
and  could  not  be  prevented  by  the  plaintiff.^  ^  It  would  seem 
to  follow  that  the  operation  of  express  cars  on  the  street  rail- 
way tracks  was  a  legitimate  use  of  the  street.  The  use  of  street 
cars  for  the  transportation  of  freight  has  but  just  begun. 
Whether  the  practice  is  likely  to  increase  and  become  general 
remains  to  be  seen.  When  we  direct  our  attention  to  the  mov- 
ing freight  car,  taking  the  place  of  twenty  drays,  twenty  pairs 
of  horses  and  twenty  drivers,^^  the  advantages  of  such  a  use  of 
the  streets  seem  obvious.  It  is  presumably  more  economical. 
It  saves  wear  and  tear  of  the  street,  diminishes  the  accumula- 
tion of  dirt  and  filth,  relieves  congestion  and  diminishes  the 
noise  and  confusion.  The  movement  of  the  freight  ear  would  no 
more  interfere  with  abutting  property  than  the  movement  of  the 
passenger  car.  To  the  extent  that  the  freight  car  is  a  substitute 
for  traffic  teams  on  the  street  it  thus  tends  to  make  the  street 
quieter,  cleaner,  freer  and  more  sanitary.  And  since  the  street 
exists  as  much  for  the  movement  of  freight  as  for  the  movement 
of  persons,  there  seems  to  be  no  reason  why  the  street  freight 
car  should  not  be  put  upon  the  same  basis  as  the  street  passenger 
car,  in  so  far  as  concerns  the  mere  movement  of  the  car  on  the 
trades  and  in  so  far  as  it  carries  freight  which  would  otherwise 
be  carried  in  vehicles  on  the  streets.  Certainly  the  street  rail- 
road decisions  cannot  be  made  to  justify  the  street  freight  car 

aoLinden  Land  Co.  v.  Milwaukee  Co.,  104  Md.  423,  65  Atl.  45. 
Ry.  &  Lt.  Co.,  107  Wis.  493,  83  N.  szKinsey  v.  Union  Traction  Co., 

W.  851.  169  lud.  563,  81  N.  E.  922. 

siDulaney  v.  United  Rya.  &  Elec. 


§  166  EOADS  AND  STEEETS.  293 

for  anything  but  local  freight  traffic.  Through  freight  traffic  is 
the  business  of  the  commercial  railroad.  To  bring  freight  traffic 
on  the  street  which  would  otherwise  not  come  there  at  all  is  not 
to  aid  the  street  traffic  or  relieve  the  street  but  rather  to  put  an 
additional  burden  upon  it  and  interfere  with  the  ordinary  use. 

But  how  is  local  freight  traffic  to  be  handled  upon  street 
freight  cars  ?  There  is  a  wide  difference  between  the  transpor- 
tation of  freight  and  the  transportation  of  passengers.  Freight 
cannot  handle  itself.  The  operation  of  freight  cars  on  street 
railroad  tracks  for  the  collection  and  delivery  of  freight  from 
door  to  door  on  the  street  would  seem  to  be  utterly  out  of  the 
question.  The  stopping,  standing  and  starting  of  such  cars  and 
the  transfer  of  freight  to  and  from  the  abutting  property  would 
greatly  interfere  with  the  ordinary  traffic  on  the  street.  If 
such  cars  were  operated  on  the  same  tracks  with  passenger  cars, 
the  passenger  service  would  be  rendered  of  no  value.  If  on  sepa- 
rate tracks,  the  street  would  be  still  further  incumbered  and 
ordinary  traffic  still  more  inconvenienced.  In  either  case  the 
street  would  be  turned  into  a  freight  yard  from  end  to  end. 
The  only  other  way  of  handling  local  freight  would  be  by  means 
of  switch  tracks  to  abutting  property.  These  curved  tracks  with 
their  frogs  and  intersections  and  the  movement  of  cars  in  and 
out  would  also  be  a  serious  interference  with  ordinary  traffic. 
Since  this  privilege  could  not  be  granted  to  one  and  denied 
to  another,  such  switch  tracks  might  become  so  numerous  on 
business  streets  as  to  render  ordinary  traffic  difficult  and  danger- 
ous. Whichever  method  is  employed  it  is  manifest  that  such 
traffic  and  such  conditions  bear  little  analogy  to  the  street 
passenger  service  and  cannot  be  justified  as  legitimate  street 
uses  on  the  basis  of  the  street  railroad  cases.  The  street  passen- 
ger service  involves  simply  the  movement  of  the  car  and  its 
stopping  for  very  brief  intervals  to  receive  and  discharge  passen- 
gers. The  passengers  look  after  themselves.  Freight  transpor- 
tation is  an  entirely  different  matter.  The  freight  must  be 
loaded  and  unloaded,  which  involves  long  stops  on  the  street 
or  the  removal  of  the  car  from  the  street  by  means  of  switch 
tracks  to  abutting  property.  There  is  no  reason  why  the  princi- 
ple of  the  street  railway  cases  should  be  extended  to  include 
a  traffic  so  entirely  different  in  its  nature  and  involving  such 
a  different  use  of  the  street. 

It  would  seem  from  the  nature  of  the  case  that  the  transpor- 
tation of  local  freight  in  street  cars  was  only  practicable  betwoca 


294:  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    167 

points  that  can  be  reached  by  means  of  switch  tracks  to  abutting 
property.  But  it  has  been  held  in  New  York  that  such  switch 
tracks  to  private  property  are  a  purely  private  purpose  for  which 
the  use  of  streets  cannot  be  granted.^*  If  this  view  is  correct 
but  little,  if  any,  use  can  be  made  of  street  railways  for  local 
freight  traffic,  since  the  legislature  cannot  take  property  for 
private  use  with  or  without  compensation. 

§  167  (115i).  Railroads  in  streets. — General  conclu- 
sions. In  regard  to  the  use  of  streets  for  railroad  purposes 
two  things  may  be  regarded  as  settled :  Firsts  that  the  ordinary 
commercial  steam  railroad  is  not  a  legitimate  street  use  and 
that  it  cannot  be  laid  in  a  street  or  highway  without  compensa- 
tion to  the  abutting  owner,  whether  he  owns  the  fee  or  not; 
second,  that  the  ordinary  surface  street  railroad  for  local  pas^ 
senger  traffic  only  is  a  legitimate  street  use  and  that  such  use  of 
a  street  may  be  made  without  compensation  to  the  abutting 
owner,  without  regard  to  the  ownership  of  the  fee.  Beyond 
this  the  law  is  unsettled.  Just  now  the  battle  is  over  the  inter- 
urban  railroad  and  the  street  car  carrying  freight.  What  new 
questions  may  arise  in  the  future,  in  consequence  of  new  ideas 
in  railroad  construction  and  operation,  or  new  inventions  in 
motive  power  and  appliances;  or  new  demands  for  traffic,  can- 
not be  foreseen.  That  new  questions  will  arise  is  as  certain  as 
that  progress  will  continue.  It  is  also  probable  that  it  will  be- 
come more  and  more  difficult  to  distinguish  railroads  on  the 
basis  of  their  physical  characteristics,  their  methods  of  opera- 
tion or  the  nature  of  their  traffic.  Originally  the  distinction 
between  the  steam  railroad  and  the  horse  railroad  was  very 
marked.  But  through  the  discovery  and  application  of  electrical 
power  the  horse  railroad  has  developed  into  the  trolley  road 
and  that  in  turn  into  the  interurban  railroad.  The  latter  cer- 
tainly resembles  the  steam  railroad  more  than  it  does  the  horse 
railroad.  If  street  cars  should  carry  freight  and  if  the  steam 
railroads  should  adopt  electrical  power,  the  differences  between 
the  different  railroads  would  become  very  shadowy.  It  will 
probably  be  more  and  more  difficult  to  maintain  distinctions 
in  law  between  different  sorts  of  railroads,  based  upon  differ- 
ences in  motive  power,  traffic  or  methods  of  construction  and  op- 
eration. 

3  3Hatfield  v.  Straus,  189  N.  Y.  Compare  Dulaney  v.  United  Rys.  & 
208,  82  N.  E.  172,  affirming  S.  G.  Elec.  Co.,  104  Md.  423,  65  Atl.  45. 
117  App.  Div.  671,  102  N.  Y.  S.  934.      And  see  post,  §  173. 


§  167 


EOADS    AND    STREETS. 


295 


It  seems  to  the  writer  that  there  is  no  rational  basis  for  a 
distinction  between  surface  roads  and  that  either  all  should 
be  admitted  as  legitimate,  or  all  excluded  as  illegitimate,  street 
uses.  As  between  these  alternatives  the  latter  should  be  chosen. 
A  railroad  involves  a  fixed  and  permanent  structure  in  the  street 
which  is  more  or  less  of  an  obstruction  to  ordinary  travel.  If 
one  track  is  a  legitimate  use  there  seems  to  be  no  escape  from 
the  consequence  that  any  number  of  tracks  is  legitimate.  It 
rests  simply  with  the  proper  public  authorities  to  determine 
how  many  tracks  will  best  subserve  the  public  interests.^*  And 
so  a  street  might  be  filled  with  railroad  tracks  and  all  ordinary 
traffic  excluded  therefrom,  and  yet  be  held  to  be  devoted  to  legiti- 
mate and  proper  street  uses.^''  And  this  is  a  palpable  absurd- 
ity.^® For  these  reasons  we  think  that  railroads  are  not  legiti- 
mate street  uses.^'^  This  conclusion  does  not  prevent  the  use  of 
streets  by  railroads,  since  property  devoted  to  one  public  use 
may  be  taken  for  another  public  use  or  a  joint  use  permitted. 


3*8ee  post.  §  171. 

3  5  "To  hold  that  a  railroad  is  one 
of  the  legitimate  uses  of  a  public 
street  leads  to  the  inconsistency 
that  the  street  may  be  monopolized 
by  a  corporation  or  an  individual, 
and  filled  with  parallel  tracks, 
which  would  practically  exclude  all 
ordinary  travel,  and  still  be  said  to 
be  devoted  to  the  ordinary  uses  of  a 
public  street."  Theobald  v.  Louis- 
ville R.  R.  Co.,  66  Miss.  279,  6  So. 
230,  14  Am.  St.  Rep.  564,  4  L.R.A. 
735.  And  the  court  in  Jaynes  v. 
Omaha  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  53  Neb.  631, 
74  N.  W.  67,  39  L.R.A.  751,  in  hold- 
ing that  the  plaintiflF  was  entitled  to 
compensation  for  a  trolley  pole  in 
front  of  her  premises,  said:  "If  a 
railway  company  without  responsi- 
bility to  the  abutting  owner,  may 
build  and  maintain  in  the  street  one 
track,  it  may  construct  and  main- 
tain any  number.  If  it  may  with 
impunity  place  and  maintain  in  the 
street  in  front  of  the  lot  owner's 
property  poles  fifty  feet  apart,  it 
may  place  them  five  feet  apart,  or 
closer,  until  the  premises,  with  poles 


and  wires  in  front,  will  resemble  the 
pictures  one  sees  of  the  staked  cor- 
ral of  the  South  African  Zulu.  Such 
a  staking  in  of  premises  would,  of 
course,  impair  their  value;  and  yet 
the  difference  in  the  case  supposed 
and  the  one  under  consideration  is 
one  of  degree  only."     pp.  654,  653. 

3  6  Courts  which  hold  that  certain 
railways  are  legitimate  street  uses 
would  avoid  this  absurdity  by  also 
holding  that  there  is  a  limit  to  the 
extent  of  such  use,  that  railroads 
cannot  monopolize  a  street  even 
with  legislative  authoritj',  unless 
compensation  is  made  to  tiie  abut- 
ter. See  Canastota  Knife  Co.  v. 
Newington  Tramway  Co.,  69  Conn. 
146,  36  Atl.  1107;  Lonaconing  Mid- 
land etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Consolidated 
Coal  Co.,  95  Md.  630,  53  Atl.  420; 
West  Jersey  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Camden  etc. 
Ry.  Co.,  52  N.  J.  Eq.  31,  29  Atl.  423. 
But  how  and  upon  what  principle  are 
the  courts  to  set  limits  to  legitimate 
street  uses  which  the  legislature  has 
authorized? 

31  See  Slaughter  v.  Meridian  L.  & 
Ry.  Co.   (Miss.),  48  So.  6. 


296  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    168 

It  simply  prevents  sueh  use  being  made  without  just  compensa- 
tion to  abutting  property  owners.  The  justice  of  this  view  is 
shown  by  numerous  statutes  and  constitutions  which  require 
compensation  in  such  cases.^®  The  manifest  justice  of  requiring 
compensation  where  damage  is  inflicted  should  incline  courts  to 
extend  the  analogy  of  the  steam  railroad  cases  rather  than  that 
of  the  horse  railroad  cases. 

§  168  (115j).  Whether  a  railroad  is  a  proper  or  legiti- 
mate street  use  is  a  question  pi  law.  Nearly  all  the  cases 
which  determine  whether  a  railroad  is,  or  is  not,  a  legitimate 
street  use,  treat  the  question  as  one  of  law.^^  The  question  was 
directly  passed  upon  in  Williams  v.  Brooklyn  El.  K.  E.  Co.,*" 
in  which  the  court  says :  "But  it  cannot  be  left  to  the  jury  to 
say  whether  the  structure  is  or  is  not  one  which  the  legislature 
or  the  municipality  may  authorize  as  against  an  abutting  own- 
er, upon  the  theory  that  it  is  a  question  of  fact,  and  not  of  law, 
depending  upon  the  extent  of  the  interference  in  a  particular 
case  with  the  public  right  of  passage  or  with  the  enjoyment  by 
the  abutting  owners  of  their  premises."  So  in  a  Minnesota  case 
where  it  is  said :  "This  question  of  consistency  or  inconsistency 
is  a  question  of  law;  that  is  to  say,  the  facts  of  a  given  case 
being  ascertained,  it  is  for  the  court  to  pronounce  upon  their 
effect,  and  to  determine  whether  the  manner  of  using  the  street 
complained  of  is  or  is  not,  all  things  considered,  a  substantial 
infringement  upon  the  common  public  right.*  ^ 

§  169  (116).  Authority  to  occupy  a  street,  how  grant- 
ed and  construed.  Before  a  railroad  company  can  lawfully 
occupy  a  street,  it  must  have  authority  to  do  so  from  the  legis- 
lature, or  from  some  municipal  corporation  having  power  to 
grant  it.  A  railroad  cannot  occupy  a  street  imder  its  general 
authority  to  make  a  location,  but  such  right  must  be  expressly 
granted  or  necessarily  implied.*^  This  is  true  of  all  kinds  of 
railroads,  for  though  street  railroads  are  generally  held  to  be  a 

SiSee  Ruokert  v.  Grand  Ave.  Ey.  the  manner  in  which  the  railroad  is 

Co.,   163    Mo.   260,   63    S.   W.   814;  constructed  and  used.     See  §  171. 

Strickford  v.  Boston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  4  0126  N.  Y.  96,  26  N.  E.  1048. 

73  N.  H.  81,  59  Atl.  367;  Richmond  4iNewell  v.  Minneapolis  etc.  R.R. 

Traction  Co.  v.  Murphy,  98  Va.  104,  Co.,   35   Minn.    112,    115,   27   N.   W. 

34  S.  E.  982;  post,  %§  344,  351.  839,  59  Am.  Rep.  303. 

ssPerhaps  the  only  exception  is  to  ^zKavanagh  v.  Mobile  etc.  R.  R. 

be  found  in  those  cases  which  make  Co.,  78  Ga.  271,  2  S.  E.  636;   Daly 

the  right  of  recovery  depend  upon  v.  Georgia  Southern  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 


§  169 


BOADS    AND    STREETS. 


297 


legitimate  street  use,  they  are  not  so  in  the  sense  that  any  who 
choose  may  occupy  the  streets  for  that  purpose.  Municipal  cor- 
porations cannot  grant  the  use  of  streets  for  railroad  purposes 
without  legislative  authority.**    In  case  of  commercial  railroads 


80  Ga.  793,  7  S.  E.  146,  12  Am.  St 
Rep.  286;  Athens  Terminal  Co.  v. 
Athens  F.  &  M.  Works,  129  Ga.  393, 
58  S.  E.  891 ;  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Chicago,  121  111.  176,  11  N.  E. 
907;  Chicago  Terminal  Transfer  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Chicago,  220  111.  310,  77 
N.  E.  204;  People  v.  South  Park 
Comrs.,  221  111.  522,  77  N.  E.  925; 
Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Lie'bf  reid, 
92  Ky.  407,  17  S.  W.  870;  New  Or- 
leans etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  City  of  New 
Orleans,  26  La.  An.  517 ;  Springfield 
V.  Conn.  Riv.  R.  R.  Co.,  4  Gush.  63; 
Cooper  V.  Alden,  Harr.  Mich.  72; 
Nash  V.  Lowry,  37  Minn.  261,  33  N. 
W.  787;  Morris  &  Essex  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Newark,  10  N.  J.  Eq.  352;  Van 
Home  V.  Newark  Passenger  R.  R. 
Co.,  48  N.  J.  Eq.  332,  21  Atl.  1034; 
Burlington  v.  Penn  R.  R.  Co.,  56  N. 
J.  Eq.  259,  38  Atl.  849 ;  Gray  v.  New 
York  etc.  Traction  Co.,  56  N.  J.  Eq. 
463,  40  Atl.  21 ;  Trenton  St.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  63  N.  J.  Eq.  276, 
49  Atl.  481;  State  v.  Hoboken,  35 
N.  J.  L.  205;  State  v.  Board  of 
Chosen  Freeholders,  56  N.  J.  L.  416, 
28  Atl.  553;  Davis  v.  Mayor  etc.  of 
New  York,  14  N.  Y.  506;  Milhau  v. 
Sharp,  27  N.  Y.  611,  84  Am.  Dec. 
314;  Wetmore  v.  Story,  22  Barb. 
414;  In  re  Rochester  Electric  R.  R. 
Co.,  123  N.  Y.  351,  25  N.  E.  381; 
Sloan  v.  People's  Elec.  R.  R.  Co., 
7  Ohio  C.  C.  84;  Steel  ton  Borough 
v.  East  Harrisburgh  Pass.  R.  R.  Co., 
11  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  161 ;  Watkins  v.  West 
Phila.  Pass  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Pa.  Dist. 
Ct.  463;  Haines  v.  Twenty-second 
St.  etc.  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Pa.  Dist. 
Ct.  506;  Appeal  of  Pittsburg  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  1  Penny.  449;  Citizens'  St. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Africa,  100  Tenn.  26; 


>Torfolk  Ry.  &  Lt.  Co.  v.  Consoli- 
<lated  Turnpike  Co.,  100  Va.  243,  40 
S.  E.  897 ;  Hart  v.  Buehner,  54  Fed. 
925,  5  C.  C.  A.  1;  Knoxville  v. 
Africa,  77  Fed.  501,  23  C.  C.  A.  252; 
Pembroke  v.  Canadian  Cent.  R.  R. 
Co.,  3  Ontario  503;  Regina  v.  Train, 
9  Cox  C.  C.  180.  So  as  to  crossing 
street.  Clifton  Heights  v.  Kent 
Mfg.  Co.,  220  Pa.  St.  585,  69  Atl.  1114. 
It  has  been  held  that  lawful  au- 
thority to  occupy  a  street  will  be 
presumed  after  the  lapse  of  twenty 
years.  Higbee  v.  Camden  &  Amboy 
R.  R.  Co.,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  435;  Morris 
&  Essex  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Prudden,  20  N. 
J.  Eq.  530. 

4  3Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mo- 
bile etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  124  Ala.  162,  26 
So.  895 ;  Mobile  v.  Louisville  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  124  Ala.  132,  26  So.  902; 
Humphreys  v.  Ft.  Smith  Traction, 
L.  &  P.  Co.,  71  Ark.  152,  71  S.  W. 
662;  Daly  v.  Ga.  Southern  R.  R.  Co., 
80  Ga.  793,  7  S.  E.  146,  12  Am.  St. 
Rep.  286;  Augusta  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Augusta,  100  Ga.  701,  28  S.  E.  126; 
Jeflfers  v.  Annapolis,  107  Md.  268; 
Detroit  Citizens  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Detroit,  110  Mich.  384,  68  N.  W. 
304,  64  Am.  St.  Rep.  350;  State  v. 
East  Fifth  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  140  Mo. 
539,  41  S.  W.  955,  62  Am.  St.  Rep. 
742,  38  L.R.A.  218;  Thompson  v. 
Ocean  City  R.  R.  Co.,  60  N.  J.  L.  74, 
36  Atl.  1087;  Tallon  v.  Hoboken,  60 
N.  J.  L.  212,  37  Atl.  895;  Beekman 
V.  Third  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  App.  Div. 
279,  43  N.  Y.  Supp.  174;  Geneva  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  N.  Y.  Cent.  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  24  App.  Div.  N.  Y.  335;  Potts  v. 
Quaker  City  EI.  R.  R.  Co.,  161  Pa. 
St.  393,  29  Atl.  108;  Arbenz  v. 
Wheeling  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  33  W.  Va. 


298 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  169 


the  prevailing  doctrine  is  that  this  authority  must  be  given  in 
express  terms,  and  that  it  cannot  be  derived  from  a  general 
power  to  control  and  regulate  the  streets  of  the  municipality.** 
Power  to  "make  ordinances  concerning  the  rights  of  way,  regu- 
lation of  street  cars,  street  railways,  and  other  railroads"  was 
held  not  to  confer  power  to  grant  the  use  of  a  street  to  a  steam 
railroad  company.*^  Whether  such  general  power  is  sufficient 
to  authorize  a  municipality  to  grant  the  use  of  its  streets  to  a 
street  railroad  company  is  a  disputed  question.*''     A  want  of 


1,  10  S.  E.  14,  5  L.R.A.  371;  Knox- 
ville  V.  Africa,  77  Fed.  501,  23  C.  C.  A. 
252.  The  franchise  emanates  from 
the  State,  though  granted  immedi- 
ately by  a  municipality.  Ibid. 
Where  the  power  is  conferred  upon 
a  city,  only  the  legislative  body  can 
grant  the  franchise.  Schwede  v. 
Hamrich  Bros.  Brewing  Co.,  29 
Wash.  21,  69  Pac.  362.  The  legis- 
lature may  provide  that  the  right 
shall  only  be  granted  to  corpora- 
tions. Goddard  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ey. 
Co.,  202  111.  362,  66  N.  E.  1066. 

4  4Perry  v.  New  Orleans  &  Chatta- 
nooga R.  R.  Co.,  55  Ala.  413,  28  Am. 
Rep.  740;  Daly  v.  Ga.  Southern  R. 
R.  Co.,  80  Ga.  793,  12  Am.  St.  Rep. 
286;  Covington  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  City 
of  Covington,  9  Bush  127;  2  Dillon, 
Munic.  Corp.  §  705.  A  city  having 
power  to  give  such  consent  and  not 
being  restricted  to  any  particular 
mode,  may  do  so  by  resolution  or 
vote,  as  well  as  by  ordinance.  Mer- 
chant's Union  Barb  Wire  Co.  v.  Chi- 
cago, B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  70  la.  105. 
A  provision  in  a  city  charter  au- 
thorizing the  laying  of  railroads  in 
streets  on  consent  of  a  majority  of 
the  land  owners  was  held  to  refer  to 
horse  railroads  only.  Chamberlain 
V.  Elizabethport  Steam  Cordage  Co., 
41  N.  J.  Eq.  43.  A  provision  in  a 
charter  that  the  company  should  not 
occupy  any  street  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  city  was  held  not  to  con- 
fer authority  even  with  consent. 
Pennsylvania    R.    R.    Co.    v.    Phila. 


Belt  R.  R.  Co.,  10  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  625. 
And.  see  Asheville  St.  R.  E..  Co.  v. 
West  Asheville  R.  R.  Co.,  114  N.  C. 
725,  19  S.  E.  697;  Tallon  v.  Hoboken, 
60  N.  J.  L.  212;  Burlington  v.  Penn. 
R.  R.  Co.,  56  N.  J.  Eq.  259,  38  Atl. 
849. 

4  5Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mo- 
bile etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  124  Ala.  162,  26 
So.  895.  If  the  power  is  in  doubt 
it  does  not  exist.     Ibid. 

4  6The  following  cases  deny  the 
authority:  Humphreys  v.  Ft.  Smith 
T.  L.  &  P.  Co.,  71  Ark.  152,  71  S.  W. 
662;  Covington  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cov- 
ington, 9  Bush.  127;  Stillwater  v. 
Lowry,  83  Minn.  275,  86  N.  W.  103; 
Davis  V.  New  York,  14  N.  Y.  506; 
People  V.  Kerr,  27  N.  Y.  188;  Mil- 
hau  V.  Sharp,  27  N.  Y.  611;  Norfolk 
Ry.  &  Lt.  Co.  V.  Consolidated  Turn- 
pike Co.,  100  Va.  243,  40  S.  E.  897. 
Contra:  State  v.  Jacksonville  St.  R. 
R.  Co.,  29  Fla.  590,  10  So.  590;  Hen- 
derson V.  Ogdeu  City  R.  R.  Co.,  7 
Utah  199,  26  Pac.  286;  Ogden  City 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Ogden  City,  7  Utah  207, 
26  Pac.  288;  Detroit  Citizens'  St.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  City  of  Detroit,  64  Fed. 
628,  12  C.  C.  A.  365.  See  Powell 
V.  Macon  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  92  Ga. 
209,  17  S.  E.  1027;  Almand 
V.  Atlanta  Consolidated  St.  Ry. 
Co.,  108  Ga.  417,  34  S.  E.  36; 
New  Orleans  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  New 
Orleans,  44  La.  An.  748,  11  So.  77; 
Same  v.  Same,  44  La.  An.  728,  11  So. 
78 ;  People's  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Memphis  R. 
R.  Co.,  10  Wall.  38.     A  grant  by  a 


§5  169 


EOADS    AND    STEEETS. 


299 


previous  authority  may  be  cured  by  ratification.*^  The  legisla- 
ture may  grant  the  use  of  streets  to  railroads  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  municipality  in  which  they  are  situated.**  But  the 
consent  of  the  municipality  is  frequently,  if  not  generally  re- 
quired, and  when  required,  is  a  condition  precedent  to  any  valid 
franchise  to  use  the  streets.*  *•    A  consent  procured  by  means  of 


city  contrary  to  law  is  void.  Cool- 
ville  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wilkes-Barre 
Southside  R.  R.  Co.,  5  Luzerne  Leg. 
Reg.  Rep.  340.  A  constitutional 
provision  against  the  granting  of 
special  privileges  and  immunities 
does  not  prevent  the  grant  of  such 
a  franchise.  Atchison  St.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  31  Kan.  660. 
Under  authority  to  ''grade,  pave,  re- 
pair or  otherwise  improve  its 
streets,"  a  city  cannot  lay  street 
railroad  tracks  in  a  street  for  the 
purpose  of  leasing  them  to  others  to 
be  operated  as  a  street  railroad.  At- 
torney General  v.  Detroit  Common 
Council,  148  Mich.  1,  111  N.  W.  860. 

4  7Nash  V.  Lowry,  37  Minn.  261, 
33  N.  W.  787;  Pembroke  v.  Canada 
Central  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Ontario  503.  A 
city  may  be  estopped  from  alleging 
that  tracks  were  laid  in  a  street 
without  authority.  Spokane  St.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  City  of  Spokane  Falls,  6 
Wash.  521,  33  Pac.  1072. 

<  8  State  V.  Jacksonville  St.  R.  R. 
Co.,  29  Fla.  590,  10  So.  590;  Mil- 
bridge  etc.  Elec.  R.  R.  Co.,  appel- 
lants, 96  Me.  110,  51  Atl.  818;  Can- 
ton V.  Canton  Cotton  Warehouse 
Co.,  84  Miss.  268,  36  So.  266,  105  Am. 
St.  Rep.  428,  65  L.R.A.  561 ;  Appeal 
of  Borough  of  Milvale,  131  Pa.  St. 
1,  18  Atl.  993,  1  Am.  R.  R.  Corp. 
Rep.  151;  Harrisburg  City  Pass.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  City  of  Harrisburg,  149 
Pa.  St.  469,  24  Atl.  56 ;  Citizens'  St. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  City  of  Memphis,  53 
Fed.  Rep.  715.  The  legislature  may 
authorize  the  construction  of  a  sub- 
way for  railroads  in  the  streets  of  a 
city    without    the    consent   of    such 


city.  Prince  v.  Crocker,  116  Mass. 
347,  44  N.  E.  Rep.  446.  But  it  is 
otherwise  provided  by  the  constitu- 
tion in  Missouri.  State  v.  Lindell 
R.  R.  Co.,  151  Mo.  162.  The  adop- 
tion of  a  constitutional  provision 
that  "any  association  or  corporation 
organized  for  the  purpose,  shall  have 
the  right  to  construct  and  operate  a 
railroad  between  any  points  within 
the  state,  and  to  connect  at  the  State 
line  with  railroads  of  other  States," 
was  held  not  to  repeal  or  annul  a 
statute  prohibiting  railroads  from 
occupying  any  street,  lane  or  alley, 
in  any  incorporated  city  without  the 
consent  of  such  city.  Pittsburg  v. 
Pittsburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  205  Pa.  St. 
13,  54  Atl.  468. 

4  0  City  of  Philadelphia  v.  River 
Front  R.  R.  Co.,  173  Pa.  St.  334,  34 
Atl.  60;  Appeal  of  Pittsburgh  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  1  Penny.  449;  West  Jer- 
sey Traction  Co.  v.  Camden  Horse 
R.  R.  Co.,  53  N.  J.  Eq.  163,  35  Atl. 
49;  State  v.  Cape  May,  58  N.  J.  L. 
565,  34  Atl.  397 ;  McKeesport  v.  Cit- 
izens' Pass  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Pa.  Supr.  Ct. 
249. 

The  fact  that  the  railroad  is  laid 
on  a  turnpike  with  the  consent  of 
the  turnpike  corporation  will  not  re- 
lieve it  from  also  getting  the  consent 
of  the  municipality.  In  re  Rochester 
Electric  R.  R.  Co.,  123  N.  Y.  351,  25 
N.  E.  381 ;  Steelton  Borough  v.  East 
Harrisburg  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  11  Pa.  Co. 
Ct.  161.  In  all  such  cases  the  fran- 
chise comes  from  the  State.  Chicago 
City  R.  R.  Co.  v.  People,  73  HI.  541. 
A  law  requiring  such  consent  wai 
held  to  apply  to  grants  previously 


300 


EMINENT    DOMAIN, 


§  169 


bribery,  duress  or  fraud  is  invalid.^"  So  if  it  is  not  given  in  the 
manner  and  in  accordance  -with  the  conditions  imposed  by  the 
statute.'^  Where  a  company  was  organized  to  construct  a  street 
railroad  through  several  municipalities,  it  was  held  that  it  must 
get  the  consent  of  all  before  it  could  construct  any  part.°^  A 
city  has  no  power  to  authorize  railroads  upon  streets  for  private 
use.^^ 


made  but  not  acted  upon.  Hanson 
V.  Chicago  etc.  E.  R.  Co.,  61  Iowa 
588;  Appeal  of  Lorimer  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  137  Pa.  St.  533,  20  Atl.  570.  But 
see  Stroudsburg  v.  Stroudsburg 
Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  12  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  124. 
Where  the  act  requires  the  consent 
of  the  "local  authorities"  it  means 
"the  officers  of  the  city,  town  or  vil- 
lage whose  duties  and  powers  relate 
to  the  supervision,  care  and  mainte- 
nance of  the  streets  or  highways." 
In  re  Rochester  Electric  R.  R.  Co., 
123  N.  Y.  351,  25  K  E.  381.  Com- 
pare Sewede  v.  Hemrich  Bros.  Brew- 
ing Co.,  29  Wash.  21,  69  Pac.  362. 
The  provision  in  the  constitution  of 
Pennsylvania  that  "any  association 
or  corporation  organized  for  the  pur- 
pose, shall  have  the  right  to  construct 
and  operate  a  railroad  between 
any  points  within  the  State,  and  to 
connect  at  the  State  line  with  rail- 
roads of  other  States,"  was  held  not 
to  repeal  or  abrogate  a  prior  statute 
prohibiting  railroads  from  occupy- 
ing any  street,  lane  or  alley  in  any 
incorporated  city  without  the  con- 
sent of  such  city.  Pittsburg  v.  Pitts- 
burg etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  205  Pa.  St.  13, 
54  Atl.  468. 

soLehigh  Coal  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  Inter- 
county  St.  E.  R.  Co.,  167  Pa.  St.  75, 
31  Atl.  471;  Tamaqua  &  L.  St.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Inter-county  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  167 
Pa.  St.  91,  31  Atl.  473.  An  ordi- 
nance giving  consent  was  held  in- 
valid, where  stockholders  of  the  com- 
pany were  members  of  the  council 
and  their  votes  were  necessary  to  its 


passage.  Jolly  v.  Pittsburgh  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  16  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  1. 

6 1  Thompson  v.  Board  of  Super- 
visors, 111  Cal.  553,  44  Pac.  230; 
People  V.  Cray  croft.  111  Cal.  544,  44 
Pac.  463;  Harvey  v.  Aurora  etc.  Ry. 
Co.  186  111.  283,  57  N.  E.  857;  Avon- 
by-the-Sea  L.  &  I.  Co.  v.  Neptune 
City,  53  N.  J.  Eq.  178,  32  Atl.  Rep. 
220;  State  v.  Newark,  57  N.  J.  L. 
309,  30  Atl.  Rep.  528;  State  v.  Nep- 
tune City,  57  N.  J.  L.  362,  30  Atl. 
Rep.  529 ;  Camden  Horse  R.  E.  Co.  v. 
West  Jersey  Traction  Co.,  58  N.  J. 
L.  102,  32  Atl.  Rep.  72;  State  v. 
Shivers,  58  N.  J.  L.  124,  33  Atl.^lep. 
55;  Stockton  v.  North  Jersey  St.  R. 
R.  Co.  (N.  J.  Ch.),  34  Atl.  Rep. 
688;  Beekman  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  R. 
Co.,  13  App.  Div.  279,  43  N.  Y.  Sup. 
174.  Where  by  statute  the  right  can 
only  be  granted  to  a  corporation,  a 
grant  to  individuals  is  void.  Wilder 
v.  Aurora  etc.  Elec.  Traction  Co.,  216 
111.  493,  75  N.  E.  194. 

6  2Pennsylvania  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Tur- 
tle Creek  Val.  R.  R.  Co.,  179  Pa.  St. 
584,  36  Atl.  348;  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Parkersburg  etc.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  26  Pa. 
Supr.  Ct.  159. 

ssMacon  v.  Harris,  75  Ga.  761;  S. 
C.  73  Ga.  428;  Heath  v.  Des  Moines 
&  St.  Louis  Ry.  Co.,  61  la.  11 ;  Mike- 
sail  V.  Durkee,  34  Kan.  509;  Com- 
monwealth v.  City  of  Frankfort,  92 
Ky.  149,  17  S.  W.  287;  Greene  v. 
Portland,  32  Me.  431;  Bradley  v. 
Pharr,  45  La.  An.  426,  12  So.  618,  19 
L.E.A.  647;  Gustafson  v.  Hamm,  56 
Minn.  334,  57  N.  W.  1054,  22  L.R.A. 


§  169 


EOABS  AKTD  STEEETS. 


301 


There  is  a  difference  of  opinion  in  tlie  authorities,  as  to  wheth- 
er the  grant  of  a  franchise  to  operate  a  railroad  in  a  street,  can 
be  made  exclusive,  even  by  authority  of  the  legislature.^*  But 
it  is  quite  clear  that  a  municipal  corporation  cannot  make  such 
a  grant,  without  express  authority,^'  and  that  a  grant  will  not 
be  construed  to  be  exclusive  unless  so  expressed.^"  It  is  held 
that  the  grant  may  be  for  a  period  extending  beyond  the  corpo- 
rate existence  of  the  grantee.®^  In  some  States  municipal  cor- 
porations are  not  authorized  to  grant  or  consent  to  the  construc- 
tion of  a  railroad  in  a  street  without  the  consent  of  the  owners 


565;  Glaesner  v.  Anheuser-Busch 
Brewing  Assn.,  100  Mo.  508,  13  S.  W. 
707,  2  Am.  E.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  420; 
State  V.  Trenton,  36  N.  J.  L.  79; 
Fanning  v.  Osborne  &  Co.,  34  Hun 
121;  S.  C.  102  N.  Y.  441;  Appeal  of 
Hartman  Steel  Co.,  129  Pa.  St.  551, 
18  Atl.  553;  Barker  v.  Hartman 
Steel  Co.,  6  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  183.  But  see 
White  V.  Blanchard  Bros.  Granite 
Co.,  178  Mass.  363,  59  N.  E.  1025.  As 
to  whether  a  track  or  railroad  is  for 
private  or  public  use  see  post,  §  264. 

6  4Elliott  Roads  and  Streets,  pp. 
566-569;  2  Dill.  Munic.  Corp.  §§  715, 
716,  727;  Birmingham  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Birmingham  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  79  Ala. 
465,  58  Am,  Rep  815;  Des  Moines 
St.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Des  Moines  etc.  R. 
E.  Co.,  73  Iowa  513,  33  N.  W.  610, 
35  N.  W.  602;  Davis  v.  New  York, 
14  N.  Y.  506 ;  Milhau  v.  Sharp,  27  N. 
Y.  611,  84  Am.  Dec.  314;  11  Am.  R. 
E.  &  Corp.  Rep.  448,  note  2. 

5  5Florida  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ocala 
St.  R.  R.  Co.,  39  Fla.  300;  St.  Louia 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Belleville,  20  111. 
App.  580 ;  New  Orleans  City  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  New  Orleans,  44  La.  An.  748, 
11  So.  77 ;  Same  v.  Same,  44  La.  An. 
728,  11  So.  78;  Detroit  Citizens'  St. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Detroit,  110  Mich.  384, 
68  N.  W.  304,  64  Am.  St.  Rep.  350; 
Parkhurst  v.  City  of  Salem,  23  Or. 
472,  32  Pac.  304,  7  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp. 
Rep.  562;  Henderson  v.  Ogden  City 
K.  E.  Co.,  7  Utah  199,  26  Pac.  286; 


11  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  463,  note 
6  and  numerous  cases  there  cited; 
Detroit  Citizens'  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  De- 
troit, 171  U.  S.  48;  New  Orleans 
City  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Crescent  City  R.  R. 
Co.,  12  Fed.  308. 

seCovington  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cov- 
ington etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Ky.  L.  R. 
318;  North  Baltimore  Pass.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Mayor  etc.  of  Baltimore,  75 
Md.  247,  23  Atl.  470;  Turney  v.  So. 
Pac.  Co.,  44  Ore.  280,  75  Pac.  144,  76 
Pac.  1080;  Pennsylvania  S.  0.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
157  Pa.  St.  42,  27  Atl.  683;  Philadel- 
phia etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Berks  County, 
2  Woodward's  Decs.  361;  City  of 
Houston  V.  Houston  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  83 
Tex.  548,  19  S.  W.  127,  6  Am.  R.  R.  & 
Corp.  Rep.  108;  Newport  News  etc. 
Ry.  &  Elec.  Co.  v.  Hampton  Roads  Ry. 
&  Elec.  Co.,  102  Va.  795,  47  S.  E.  839; 
11  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  p.  463, 
note  7  and  cases  cited. 

5 'Detroit  Citizens'  St.  E.  E.  Co. 
v.  City  of  Detroit,  64  Fed.  628,  12 
C.  C.  A.  365.  As  to  power  of  city  to 
grant  franchise  for  a  term  of  years 
see  City  of  Houston  v.  Houston  City 
St.  E.  E.  Co.,  83  Tex.  548,  19  S.  W. 
127,  6  Am.  E.  E.  &  Corp.  Rep.  108; 
People's  R.  R.  v.  Memphis  E.  E.,  10 
Wall.  38 ;  City  of  Detroit  v.  Detroit 
City  E.  R.  Co.,  56  Fed.  867;  Louis- 
ville Trust  Co.  V.  City  of  Cincinnati, 
75  Fed.  716. 


302 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  169 


of  a  certain  amount  of  frontage  on  the  street.^*  A  municipality 
may  impose  reasonable  conditions  in  giving  its  consent  to  use 
the  street  ^'  and,  -when  it  has  an  absolute  right  of  refusal,  it 


6  8  Without  attempting  to  discuss 
the  questions  arising  under  such 
statutes  we  refer  to  some  cases' 
thereon.  Wiggins  Ferry  Co.  v.  East 
St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  107  111.  450; 
Hunt  V.  Chicago  Horse  &  D.  K.  E. 
Co.,  121  111.  638;  Tibbets  v.  West  & 
South  Towns  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  153  111. 
147,  38  N.  E.  664;  Doane  v.  Chicago 
City  R.  R.  Co.,  160  111.  22,  45  N.  E. 
507,  35  L.R.A.  588;  Doane  v.  Lake 
St.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  165  111.  510,  46  N. 
E.  520,  56  Am.  St.  Rep.  265,  36 
L.R.A.  97;  McGann  v.  People,  194 
111.  526,  62  N.  E.  941,  reversing  S. 
C.  97  111.  App.  587;  Mercer  County 
Traction  Co.  v.  United  N.  J.  R.  R. 
&  C.  Co.,  64  N.  J.  Eq.  588,  54  Atl. 
819 ;  Same  v.  Same,  65  N.  J.  Eq.  574, 

56  Atl.  897 ;  Same  v.  Same,  68  N.  J. 
Eq.  714,  61  Atl.  461;  Orton  v.  Me- 
tuchen,  66  N.  J.  L.  572,  49  Atl.  814; 
Currie  v.  Atlantic  City,  66  N.  J.  L. 
671,  50  Atl.  504,  reversing  S.  C.  66 
N.  J.  L.  140,  48  Atl.  615;  Shepard  v. 
East  Orange,  69  N.  J.  L.  133,  53  Atl. 
1047 ;  Same  v.  Same,  70  N.  J.  L.  203, 

57  Atl.  441 ;  Montclair  Military 
Academy  v.  N.  J.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  70 
N.  J.  L.  229,  57  Atl.  1050;  S.  C.  65 
N.  J.  L.  328,  47  Atl.  890;  In  re  Third 
Ave.  R.  R.  Co.,  121  N.  Y.  536,  24  N. 
E.  951,  9  L.R.A.  124;  S.  C.  56  Hun 
537,  31  N.  Y.  St.  645,  9  N.  Y.  Supp. 
833 ;  White  v.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co., 
139  N.  Y.  19,  34  N.  B.  887,  8  Am.  R. 
R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  739,  and  cases  cited 
in  note;  Dusenbury  v.  New  York 
etc.  Traction  Co.,  46  App.  Div.  267, 
61  N.  Y.  S.  420;  Adee  v.  Nassau 
Elec.  R.  R.  Co.,  65  App.  Div.  529,  72 
N.  Y.  S.  992;  S.  C.  affirmed,  173  N. 
Y.  580,  65  N.  E.  1113;  Fox  v.  New 
York  City  Interborough  R.  R.  Co., 
112  App.  Div.  832,  98  N.  Y.  S.  338; 
Mt.     Auburn     Cable    R.    R.    Co.    v. 


Neare,  54  Ohio  St.  153,  42  N.  E.  768; 
Hamilton  etc.  Traction  Co.  v.  Par- 
rot, 67  Ohio  St.  181,  65  N.  E.  1011, 
60  L.R.A.  531  ■;  Forest  City  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Day,  73  Ohio  St.  83,  76  N.  E. 
396;  Sloane  v.  People's  Elee.  R.  R. 
Co.,  7  Ohio  C.  C.  84;  Simmons  v.  To- 
ledo, S  Ohio  C.  C.  535 ;  Day  v.  Forest 
City  Ry.  Co.,  5  Ohio  C.  C.  (N.  S.) 
393;  Isom  v.  Low  Fare  Ry  Co.,  10 
Ohio  C.  C.  (N.  S.)  89;  Beeson  v. 
Chicago,  75  Fed.  880. 

6  9  Byrne  v.  Chicago  General  R.  R. 
Co.,  169  111.  75,  48  N.  E.  703;  People 
V.  Suburban  R.  R.  Co.,  178  111.  594, 
53  N.  E.  349;  Chester  v.  Wabash  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  182  111.  382,  55  N.  E.  524; 
Citizens  Horse  R.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of 
Belleville,  47  111.  App.  388 ;  Byrne  v. 
Chicago  General  R.  R.  Co.,  63  III. 
App.  438;  Rutherford  v.  Hudson 
Riv.  Traction  Co.,  73  N.  J.  L.  227, 
63  Atl.  84;  People  v.  O'Brien,  111  N. 
Y.  1,  18  N.  E.  692,  7  Am.  St.  Rep. 
684,  2  L.R.A.  255 ;  Gaedeke  v.  Staten 
Island  Midland  R.  R.  Co.,  46  App. 
Div.  219,  61  N.  Y.  S.  290;  Delaware 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Oswego,  92  App. 
Div.  551,  86  N.  Y.  S.  1027;  City  of 
Allegheny  v.  Millville  etc.  St.  R.  R. 
Co.,  159  Pa.  St.  411,  28  Atl.  202; 
Township  of  Plymouth  v.  Chestnut 
Hill  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  168  Pa.  St.  181, 
32  Atl.  19;  S.  C.  15  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  442 
Minersville  v.  Schuylkill  Elec.  Ry, 
Co.,  205  Pa.  St.  394,  54  Atl.  1050 
Edwards  v.  Pittsburg  Junction  R.  R, 
Co.,  215  Pa.  St.  597,  64  Atl.  798 
Burke  v.  Cumberland  Traction  Co., 
15  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  159.  Illegal  condi 
tions  do  not  vitiate  the  grant.  Gal- 
veston etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Galveston,  91 
Tex.  17,  36  L.R.A.  44.  Conditions 
inconsistent  with  a  statute  are  void. 
Los  Angeles  Ry.  Co.  v.  Los  Angeles, 
152  Cal.  242,  92  Pac.  490, 


§  169 


EOADS    AND    STEEETS. 


303 


can  impose  any  conditions  it  sees  fit.®"  When  a  grant  has  heen 
made  and  accepted  or  acted  upon  it  constitutes  an  irrevocable 
contract.''^  In  Maryland  it  has  been  held  that  such  a  grant 
may  be  revoked  by  a  city  after  the  tracks  are  laid,  but  there 
would  be  an  obligation  to  make  compensation.**^  Where  the 
grant  is  to  construct  a  road  within  a  limited  time,  the  grant 
will  be  forfeited  if  the  condition  is  not  complied  with.®^  Where 
the  grant  is  to  lay  one  or  more  tracks  within  three  years,  addi- 
tional tracks  cannot  be  laid  after  the  three  years  have  expired."* 
Where  the  grant  was  without  limit  but  reserved  the  right  to 
forfeit  the  franchise  if  the  road  was  not  built  within 
five  years,  it  was  held  the  road  could  be  built  at  any  time  before 
a  forfeiture  was  declared."*  A  municipal  corporation  by  grant- 
ing the  franchise  is  not  thereby  made  liable  for  damages  by  the 
construction  and  operation  of  the  road."® 


soChicago  Terminal  Transfer  R. 
E.  Co.  V.  Chicago,  220  111.  310,  77  N. 
E.  204;  Monroe  v.  Detroit  etc.  Ry. 
Co.,  143  Mich.  315,  106  N.  W.  704; 
St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kirkwood, 
159  Mo.  239,  60  S.  W.  110,  53  L.R.A. 
300. 

6iPort  of  Mobile  v.  Louisville  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  84  Ala.  115;  Town  of  Ar- 
eata V.  Areata  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  92 
Cal.  039,  28  Pac.  676;  City  of  Belle- 
ville V.  Citizens'  Horse  R.  R.  Co.,  152 
111.  171,  38  N.  E.  584,  26  L.R.A.  681 ; 
Harvey  v.  Aurora  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  186 
111.  283,  57  N.  E.  857;  Mattison  v. 
Alton  etc.  Traction  Co.,  235  111.  346, 
85  N.  E.  596;  Columbus  v.  Columbus 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  37  Ind.  294;  East 
Louisiana  R.  R.  Co.  v.  New  Orleans, 
46  La.  An.  526,  15  So.  157;  Willis  v. 
Erie  Pass.  Ry.  Co.,  188  Pa.  St.  71, 
41  Atl.  1119;  Wheeling  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Triadelphia,  58  W.  Va.  487,  52 
S.  E.  499,  4  L.R.A.  (N.  S.)  321;  Bal- 
timore T.  &  G.  Co.  V.  City  of  Balti- 
more, 64  Fed.  Rep.  153.  The  grant 
may  of  course  be  revoked  before  ac- 
ceptance. East  St.  Louis  Union  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  East  St.  Louis,  39  111.  App. 
398.  A  general  grant  to  a  street 
railway  company  of  the  right  to  use 
any  and  all  streets  of  a  city  from 


time  to  time  as  it  may  elect,  was 
held  to  be  revocable  at  any  time  as 
to  streets  not  used.  Logansport  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Logansport,  114  Fed.  688. 

6  2Lake  Roland  El.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
City  of  Baltimore,  77  Md.  352,  26 
Atl.  510,  7  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
619,  20  L.R.A.  126. 

6  3 Atchison  Street  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Nave,  38  Kan.  744,  17  Pac.  587,  5 
Am.  St.  Rep.  800;  State  v.  Latrobe, 
81  Md.  222,  31  Atl.  788.  A  city  can- 
not declare  a  forfeiture  for  breach  of 
condition  unless  the  right  to  do  so 
is  reserved,  as  the  power  to  adjudge 
a  forfeiture  pertains  to  the  judi- 
ciary. Alexandria  v.  Morgan's  La. 
etc.  Co.,  109  La.  50,  33  So.  65. 

6  4  Chicago  Terminal  Transfer  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Chicago,  220  HI.  310,  77  N. 
E.  204;  Chicago  v.  Chicago  Terminal 
Transfer  R.  R.  Co.,  121  111.  App.  197 ; 
Eastern  Wis.  Ry.  &  Lt.  Co.  v.  Winne- 
bago Traction  Co.,  126  Wis.  179,  105 
N.  W.  571.  For  a  forfeiture  clause  in 
a  statute  held  self-executing  see  Los 
Angeles  Ry.  Co.  v.  Los  Angeles,  152 
Cal.  242,  92  Pac.  490. 

csLouisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bowl- 
ing Green  Ry.  Co.,  110  Ky.  788,  63  S. 
W.  4. 

66Sorensen    v.    Greeley,    10    Colo. 


304 


EMINEBTT    DOMAIN. 


§  169 


Authority  to  occupy  a  street,  -whether  obtained  directly  from 
the  legislature  or  from  a  local  municipality,  only  protects  the 
company  to  the  extent  of  the  public  right  or  easement  in  the 
street,  and  leaves  the  company  to  deal  with  private  rights  as  in 
other  cases."  ^  Authority  to  occupy  a  street  includes  authority 
to  use  a  bridge  forming  part  of  the  street,  even  though  it  be- 
longs to  a  private-  corporation."^  Grants  of  authority  are  strict- 
ly construed.""  Authority  to  occupy  a  street  has  been  held  to 
include  authority  to  construct  a  turnout  to  a  depot,''"  and  to 
lay  switch-tracks  to  abutting  property.''^  Authority  to  build 
an  elevated  railroad  in  a  street  does  not  authorize  any  part 


369;  Green  v.  Portland,  32  Me.  431; 
Terry  v.  Richmond,  94  Va.  537; 
Hatch  V.  Tacoma  etc.  K.  R.  Co.,  6 
Wash.  1,  32  Pac.  1063;  Kaufman  v. 
Tacoma  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  11  Wash.  632, 
40  Pac.  137. 

6  7  Coats  V.  Atchison  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
1  Cal.  App.  441,  82  Pac.  640;  Illinois 
Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Turner,  194  111. 
575,  62  N.  E.  798,  affirming  S.  C.  97 
111.  App.  219;  Aldis  v.  Union  El.  R. 
R.  Co.,  203  111.  567,  68  N.  E.  95; 
Gray  v.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  13 
Minn.  315;  Lamm  v.  Chicago  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  45  Minn.  71,  47  N.  W.  455,  10 
L.R.A.  268;  Cape  Girardeau  etc. 
Road  Co.  V.  Renfoe,  58  Mo.  265; 
Washington  Cemetery  v.  P.  P.  &  C. 
I.  R.  R.  Co.,  68  N.  Y.  591 ;  Matter  of 
New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  70  N.  Y. 
327,  354;  Staton  v.  Atlantic  Coast 
Line  R.  R.  Co.,  147  N.  C.  428;  South 
Bound  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Burton,  67  S.  C. 
515,  46  S.  E.  340;  Eastern  Wis.  Ry. 
&  Lt.  Co.  V.  Hackett,  135  Wis.  464. 

espittsburgh  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Point 
Bridge  Co.,  165  Pa.  St.  37,  30  Atl.  511, 
26  L.R.A.  323.  But  the  railroad 
company  may  be  made  to  bear  the 
expense  of  strengthening  the  bridge 
if  necessary,  and  may  be  prevented 
from  using  the  bridge  until  the  work 
is  done.  Berks  County  v.  Reading 
City  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  167  Pa.  St.  102, 
31  Atl.  474,  663;  Laure  v.  Oil  City 
St.  R.  R.  Co.,  170  Pa.  St.  249,  32  Atl. 


977.  See  State  v.  Board  of  Chosen 
Freeholders,  56  N.  J.  L.  416,  28  Atl. 
553. 

6  9Mobile  V.  Louisville  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  124  Ala.  132,  26  So.  902 ;  Harvey 
V.  Aurora  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  186  111.  283, 
57  N.  E.  857;  Blocki  v.  People,  220 
111.  444,  77  N.  E.  172;  Chicago  Ter- 
minal Transfer  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Chicago, 
203  111.  576,  68  N.  E.  99 ;  Aurora  v. 
Elgin  etc.  Traction  Co.,  227  111.  485, 
81  N.  E.  544,  118  Am.  St.  Rep.  284; 
Chicago  V.  Chicago  Terminal  Trans- 
fer R.  R.  Co.,  121  111.  App.  197;  In- 
diana Ry.  Co.  V.  Hoffman,  162  lud. 
593,  69  N.  E.  399;  State  v.  City  of 
Trenton,  54  N.  J.  L.  92,  23  Atl.  281 ; 
State  V.  City  of  Newark,  54  N.  J.  L. 
102,  23  Atl.  284;  People  v.  Newton, 
112  N.  Y.  396,  19  N.  E.  831,  3  L.R.A. 
174;  City  of  Philadelphia  v.  Citi- 
zens' Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  151  Pa.  St.  128, 
24  Atl.  1099;  Junction  Pass.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Williamsport  Pass.  R.  R.  Co., 
154  Pa.  St.  116,  26  Atl.  295;  Cleve- 
land Elec.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cleveland  etc. 
Ry.  Co.,  204  U.  S.  116,  27  S.  C.  202. 

7  0New  Orleans  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
2d  Municipality,  1  La.  An.  128; 
Knight  v.  Carrolton  R.  R.  Co.,  9  La. 
An.  284. 

71  Beaver  v.  Beaver  Val.  R.  R.  Co., 
217  Pa.  St.  280,  66  Atl.  520;  Morris- 
town  V.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  3 
Mont.  Co.  L.  Rep.  5. 


§  169  EOADS  AND  STEEETS.  305 

of  the  depot  or  stairs  to  be  constructed  on  a  cross  street. ''^  A 
city  has  no  power  to  grant  the  use  of  a  street  for  a  station  or 
for  yard  purposes  and  an  ordinance  granting  such  right  was  an- 
nulled at  the  suit  of  the  people.^*  Where  a  company  must 
specify  its  route  in  its  articles  of  incorporation,  the  consent 
of  the  city  that  it  may  occupy  streets  not  specified  in  its  route, 
is  of  no  validity.^*  Authority  to  lay  a  single  track  with  neces- 
sary switches,  does  not  justify  switches  of  unnecessary  length 
and  frequency  so  as  to  make  practically  a  double  trackJ^  Un- 
der a  grant  to  construct  a  surface  road  and  to  intersect,  cross, 
join  and  unite  with  other  railroads,  an  incline  cannot  be  built 
to  connect  with  an  elevated  road.''®  Authority  to  occupy  a  street 
when  necessary  means  a  practical  necessity.'''  A  grant  is  not 
void  because  the  location  of  the, tracks  in  the  street  is  not  speci- 
fied, as  that  is  a  matter  for  subsequent  regulation.''^  In  case  of 
a  dedicated  street,  it  has  been  held  that  the  municipal  authorities 
could  not  authorize  its  use  by  a  street  railroad,  until  after  ac- 
ceptance.''* When  the  franchise  expires  the  road  and  its  equip- 
ment remain  the  property  of  the  company  holding  the  franchise 
and  the  municipality  cannot  take  possession  of  the  same  or 
make  a  valid  grant  thereof  to  another  company.*" 

7  2Mattlage  v.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  7  9Russell    v.    Chicago    Eleo.    Ey. 

Co.,  67  How.  Pr.  232;  S.  C.  14  Daly  Co.,  205  111.  155,  68  N.  E.  727.     But 

1 ;    Bremer   v.   Manhattan   Ry.   Co.,  such  an  act  would  itself  seem  to  be 

191  N.  Y.  333,  84  N.  E.  59;  and  see  an  acceptance  of  the  street,  unless 

Douglass    V.    Leavenworth,    6    Kan.  acceptance  was  required  to  be  made 

App.  96;   Birrell  v.  New  York  etc.  in    some    specified    way.     See  post, 

R.  R.  Co.,  41  N.  Y.  App  Div.  506;  §  495. 

Manhattan    Ry.    Co.    v.    Astor,    126  soCleveland  Eleo.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cleve- 

App.  Div.  907.  land  etc.  Ry.  Co.  204  U.  S.  116,  27 

7  3  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  People,  S.  C.  202.    We  refer  to  a  few  miscel- 

222  111.  427,  78  N.  E.  790,  affirming  laneous  cases  on  the  giving  of  au- 

S.  C.  120  111.  App.  306.  thority     to     railroads     to     occupy 

'^Knoxville  v.  Africa,  77  Fed.  Rep.  streets.    Matter  of  Crosstown  St.  R. 

501,  23  C.  C.  A.  252.  R.  Co.,  68  Hun  236,  22  N.  Y.  Supp. 

75Willis  v.  Railroad,  188  Pa.  St.  818;  Adamson  v.  Nassau  Electric  R. 

56,    41    Atl.    307;     Bridgewater    v.  R.  Co.,  89  Hun  261,  34  N.  Y.  Supp. 

Beaver  Val.  Traction  Co.,  214  Pa.  St.  1073;  S.  C.  12  Miscl.  600;  Atkinson 

343,  63  Atl.  796.  v.  Asheville  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  113  N.  C. 

76Eldert  v.  Long  Island  Elec.  R.  581,  18  S.  E.  284;   Rahn  Township 

R.  Co.,  28  App.  Div.  N.  Y.  451.  v.  Tamaqua  &  L.  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  167 

77Wayzata  v.  Great  Northern  R.  Pa.  St.  84,  31  Atl.  472;  Homestead 

R.  Co.,  67  Minn.  385.  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Pittsburgh  etc.  St. 

78Baker  v.  Selma  St.  &  Subn.  Ry.  R.  R.  Co.,  166  Pa.  St.  162,  30  Atl. 

Co.,  130  Ala.  474,  30  So.  464.  950,  27  L.E.A.  383.     In  Wisconsin  a 
Em.   D.— 20. 


306 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  170 


§  170  (117).  Rights  of  company  as  to  manner  of  con- 
structing and  operating  road.  If  the  grant  of  authority  spe- 
cifies the  particular  part  of  the  street  to  be  occupied,  or  imposes 
any  conditions  as  to  construction  or  operation,  such  provisions 
must  be  complied  with.^^  Every  such  grant  is  accompanied  with 
the  implied  condition,  that  the  road  shall  be  so  constructed  and 
operated  as  to  produce  no  unnecessary  or  unreasonable  inter- 
ference with  public  or  private  rights.*^  This  necessarily  fol- 
lows from  the  fact  that  the  user  is  a  joint  one,  and  that  the 
highway  is  not  abandoned,  though  the  soil  is  devoted  to  an  ad- 


franchise  to  construct  and  operate  a 
street  railroad  cannot  be  granted  to  a 
railroad  company  organized  under 
the  general  railroad  law.  State  v. 
Milwaukee  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  116  Wis. 
142,  92  Wis.  546.  Where  a  company 
obtained  permission  to  use  a  street 
it  was  held  estopped  to  deny  that  it 
was  a  street.  Bedenbaugh  v.  South- 
ern Ry.  Co.,  69  S.  C.  1,  48  S.  E.  53. 

siPacific  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Leavenworth 
City,  1  Dill.  393.  Where  a  statute 
required  tracks  to  be  placed  as 
nearly  as  possible  in  the  middle  of  a 
street,  it  means  as  nearly  as  practi- 
cable. Finch  V.  Riverside  &  A.  R.  R. 
Co.,  87  Cal.  597,  25  Pac.  765. 

8  2Baker  v.  Selma  St.  &  Suburban 
Ry.  Co.,  135  Ala.  552,  33  So.  685,  93 
Am.  St.  Rep.  42;  St.  Louis  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Neely,  63  Ark.  636,  37 
L.R.A.  616 ;  Shea  v.  Potrero  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  44  Cal.  414;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  City  of  Quincy,  139  111.  355, 
28  N.  E.  1069;  Town  of  Rice  v.  Chi- 
cago etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  30  111.  App.  481 ; 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Whitley 
Co.,  95  Ky.  215,  24  S.  W.  604,  44  Am. 
St.  Rep.  220;  Hepting  v.  New  Or- 
leans Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  36  La.  An. 
898 ;  Shreveport  v.  St.  Louis  S.  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  115  La.  885,  40  So.  298; 
Poole  V.  Falls  Road  Elec.  R.  R.  Co., 
88  Md.  533,  41  Atl.  1069;  Pennsylva- 
nia S.  V.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Phila.  &  R.  R. 
Co.,  157  Pa.  St.  42,  27  Atl.  683; 
Jones   V.  Erie  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  109 


Pa.  St.  333,  32  Atl.  535,  47  Am.  St. 
Rep.  916;  Heilman  v.  Lebanon  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  180  Pa.  St.  627,  37  Atl. 
199;  Philadelphia  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Berks  County  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Wood- 
ward's Decs.  361 ;  Stroudsburg 
Borough  v.  Stroudsburg  Pass.  R.  R. 
Co.,  12  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  124;  Strouds- 
burg Borough  V.  Wilkes-Barre  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  12  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  395;  Berks 
&  D.  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Lebanon  &  M. 
St.  R.  E.  Co.,  3  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  55 ;  Ar- 
benz  V.  Wheeling  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  33 
W.  Va.  1,  10  S.  E.  14,  5  L.R.A.  371 ; 
City  of  Moundsville  v.  Ohio  R.  R. 
Co.,  37  W.  Va.  92,  16  S.  E.  514,  20 
L.R.A.  161 ;  Evans  v.  Chicago  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  86  Wis.  597,  57  N.  W.  354; 
In  Heilman  v.  Lebanon  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  180  Pa.  St.  627,  628,  37  Atl.  199, 
the  court  says:  "When  permission 
is  given  them  to  occupy  a  public 
street,  they  acquire  thereby  not  an 
exclusive  right  upon  its  surface,  but 
a  right  concurrent  with  that  of  the 
general  public.  Their  cars  are  a  sub- 
stitute for  the  private  carriage  and 
the  public  omnibus.  They  must 
move  them  along  their  tracks  upon 
the  surface  of  the  street  to  the  grade 
of  which  they  are  required  to  con- 
form. They  have  no  right  to  grade 
or  fill  or  in  any  manner  interfere 
with  the  access  to  private  property 
from  the  highway,  or  so  to  construct 
the  road  as  to  interfere  with  public 
travel,  or  disturb  adjacent  owners." 


§  170 


EOADS    AND    STEEETS. 


307 


ditional  public  use.  Thus,  under  a  general  authority  to  occupy 
a  street,  the  road  must  be  laid  substantially  at  the  grade  of  the 
street,  that  is,  with  only  such  elevations  and  depressions  as  are 
necessary  to  secure  a  regular  grade,*^  and  in  the  traveled  road- 
way, and  not  over  the  curb  or  sidewalk.**  Under  such  general 
authority  only  a  single  track  can  be  laid  down,  and  that  can 
only  be  used  for  purposes  of  transportation.*'  But  the  authori- 
ties are  not  uniform  upon  this  point  *°  and  doubtless  much  would 


saSavannah  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Shiels,  33  Ga.  601;  Tate  v.  Ohio  & 
Miss.  R.  R.  Co.,  7  Ind.  479;  Hutton 
V.  Indiana  Central  Ry.  Co.,  7  Ind.  522 ; 
Protzman  v.  Indianapolis  &  Cinn. 
R.  R.  Co.,  9  Ind.  467,  68  Am.  Dec. 
650 ;  Lackland  v.  North  Missouri  R. 
R.  Co.,  31  Mo.  180;  S.  C.  34  Mo.  259; 
Randle  y.  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  65  Mo. 
325;  Swenson  v.  Lexington,  69  Mo. 
157;  Cross  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  Ry.  Co., 
77  Mo.  318;  Smith  v.  Kansas  City 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  98  Mo.  20,  11  S.  W. 
259;  Farrar  v.  Midland  Elec.  Ry. 
Co.,  101  Mo.  App.  140,  74  S.  W.  500; 
Heilman  v.  Lebanon  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
180  Pa.  St.  627,  37  Atl.  199;  Berks  & 
D.  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Lebanon  &  M.  St. 
R.  R.  Co.,  3  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  55.  The 
company  may  make  such  alterations 
of  grade  as  are  reasonably  necessary 
for  the  proper  construction  of  the 
road.  Laroe  v.  Northampton  St.  Ry. 
Co.,  189  Mass.  254,  75  N.  E.  255.  Au- 
thority to  lay  tracks  on  a  street  at 
a  given  grade,  means  that  the  final 
surface  must  be  of  that  grade,  not 
that  the  street  may  be  brought  to 
tliat  grade  and  then  the  ties  and 
rails  placed  on  top  of  that.  Given 
V.  Des  Moines  70  la.  637.  But  in 
such  case  the  company  will  be 
estopped  from  alleging  that  its  road 
was  not  properly  constructed.  Eslich 
V.  Mason  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  75  la. 
443,  39  N.  W.  700. 

s^Lavison  v.  Chicago,  St.  L.  &  N. 
0.  Ry.  Co.,  1  McGloin,  La.  299;  hut 
see  contra,  Koelmel  v.  New  Orleans, 
M.  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  27  La.  An.  442; 


Kennedy  v.  Detroit  R.  R.  Co.,  108 
Mich.  390,  66  N.  W.  495;  Breen  v. 
Pittsburg  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  220  Pa.  St. 
612,  69  Atl.  1047.  If  some  other  loca- 
tion than  the  middle  of  the  street 
is  specified  in  the  grant,  the  road 
may,  of  course,  be  laid  as  specified. 
Kellinger  v.  Forty-seCond  St.  R.  R. 
Co.,  50  N.  Y.  206 ;  Carson  v.  Central 
R.  R.  Co.,  35  Cal.  325;  Clark  v.  Sec- 
ond etc.  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Phil.  259. 
But  in  Ohio  it  is  held  that  if  the 
track  is  so  located  as  to  be  an  ob- 
struction to  the  convenient  access  to 
the  abutting  property,  the  owner  is 
entitled  to  compensation.  Street 
Railway  v.  Cumminsville,  14  Ohio  St. 
523.  A  grant  is  not  bad  because  it 
does  not  specify  the  location  of  the 
tracks,  as  that  is  a  matter  for  sub- 
sequent regulation.  Baker  v.  Selma 
St.  &  Suburban  Ry.  Co.,  130  Ala.  474, 
30  So.  464. 

ssLackland  v.  North  Missouri  R.  R. 
Co.,  31  Mo.  180;  Southern  Pacific  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Reed,  41  Cal.  256;  contra: 
Davis  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  46  la. 
389. 

SBThe  following  hold  the  contrary: 
Workman  v.  So.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  129 
Cal.  536,  62  Pac.  185;  Davis  v.  C.  & 
N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  46  la.  389;  and  see 
Street  Railway  Co.  v.  West  Side  Ry. 
Co.,  48  Mich.  433.  In  Indianapolis 
&  St.  Louis  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Calvert,  110 
Ind.  555,  it  was  held  that  one  who 
had  granted  the  right  to  lay  one 
track  in  the  street  in  front  of  his 
property  could  not  enjoin  the  con- 
struction of  a  switch  which  was  laid 


308 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  170 


depend  upon  the  language  of  tlie  grant.  Authority  to  construct 
a  line  of  street  railway  on  a  specified  street  was  held  to  authorize 
a  double  track.*^  Such  an  authority  does  not  authorize  a  double 
decked  road.^*  Authority  to  cross  a  street  does  not  sanction 
the  occupation  of  the  street  with  concrete  abutments  supporting 
a  trestle.*^  Authority  to  lay  tracks  or  a  single  or  double  track 
is  not  exhausted  by  laying  one  track.^"  The  company,  having 
once  located  its  track,  has  exhausted  its  right  of  choice,  and  may 
not  move  it  to  a  different  location,'^  The  company  may  not 
build  a  depot  *^  or  passenger  platform,^^  a  water  hydrant,^* 
a  switch  tower  ®'  or  other  structure  ®^  in  the  street,  or  turn  it  into 


on  the  same  ties  and  projected  four- 
teen inches  for  a  space  of  nineteen 
feet  opposite  his  property.  But  au- 
thority to  construct  a  single  traclc 
was  held  not  to  authorize  side  tracks 
in  Kavanagh  v.  Mobile  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
78  Ga.  271. 

STBrown  v.  Atlanta  Ry.  &  P.  Co., 
113  Ga.  462,  39  S.  E.  71. 

ssMatter  of  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co., 
189  N.  Y.  428,  82  N.  E.  443;  Dun- 
more  V.  Scranton  Ry.  Co.,  34  Pa. 
Supr.  Ct.  294. 

8  9  Delaware  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Syra- 
cuse, 165  Eed.  631   (C.  C.  A.) 

soWorkman  v.  So.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co., 
129  Cal.  536,  62  Pac.  185;  Varwig  v. 
Cleveland  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  6  Ohio  C. 
C.  439;  Detroit  Citizens  St.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Board  of  Public  Works,  126  Mich. 
554,  85  N.  W.  1072;  Ransom  v.  Citi- 
zens' R.  R.  Co.,  104  Mo.  375,  16  S. 
W.  416.  Where  a  company  had  au- 
thority to  occupy  so  much  of  certain 
streets  as  "may  be  necessary  for  the 
construction  of  its  track,  sidings 
and  branches,"  and  it  constructed 
and  used  a,  single  track  for  many 
years,  it  was  held  to  have  exhausted 
its  power.  Pennsylvania  S.  V.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Philadelphia  &  N.  R.  R.  R.  Co., 
157  Pa.  St.  42,  27  Atl.  683. 

oiLittle  Miami  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Nay- 
lor,  2  Ohio  St.  ^35,  59  Am.  Dec.  667; 
especially  if  the  new  position  is  more 
injurious  to  abutting  property.  Du- 
tacli  V.  Hannibal  &  St.  Joseph  R.  R. 
Co.,  89  Mo.  483.     See  contra,  Snyder 


V.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  55  Pa.  St. 
340.  It  is  held  that  a  company  may 
change  the  gauge  of  its  road  at 
pleasure,  when  not  restricted.  Ap- 
peal of  Borough  of  Millvale,  131  Pa. 
St.  1,  18  Atl.  993,  1  Am.  R.  E.  & 
Corp.  Rep.  151.  And  see  Denver  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Barsaloux,  15  Col.  290, 
25  Pac.  165;  Denver  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Toohey,  15  Col.  297,  25  Pac.  166.  If 
tracks  are  first  laid  too  near  to- 
gether, they  may  be  changed  to  give 
the  proper  space.  Simpson  v.  Phila. 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  4  Mont.  Co.  L.  Rep. 
102. 

s2Barney  v.  Keokuk,  4  Dill.  593, 
affirmed  94  U.  S.  324;  Cooper  v. 
Alden,  Harr.  Mich.  72;  Village  of 
Wayzata  v.  Great  Northern  R.  R. 
Co.,  50  Minn.  438,  52  N.  W.  913; 
Riley  v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  32  Pa. 
Super.  Ct.  579.  Authority  to  con- 
struct an  elevated  railroad  on  a 
street  does  not  authorize  a  depot  or 
stairs  on  an  intersecting  street. 
Mattlage  v.  New  York  El.  Ry.  Co., 
67  How.  Pr.  232. 

ssHigbee  v.  Camden  &  Amboy  R. 
R.  Co.,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  276,  20  N.  J.  Eq. 
435. 

9  4  Chicago  Great  Western  Ry.  Co. 
V.  First  M.  E.  Church,  102  Fed.  85, 
42  C.  C.  A.  178,  50  L.R.A.  488. 

9  5 Williams  v.  Los  Angeles  Ry.  Co., 
150  Cal.  592,  89  Pac.  330. 

9  6Taber  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  28  R.  I.  269. 


§  170 


KOADS    AND  STREETS. 


309 


a  switch  yard  or  freight  delivery  or  place  for  the  storage  of 
cars.®'^  Nor  change  the  grade  of  its  tracks  without  authority. 
The  company  may  lay  a  switch  track  to  its  barns  and  occupy 
for  a  short  distance  for  that  purpose  a  street  not  named  in  its 
grant.''®  And  the  company  may  lay  water  pipes  on  its  right  of 
way  across  streets  to  conduct  water  to  a  suitable  place  for  its 
engines.®^  Where  two  companies  have  a  franchise  on  the  same 
street  each  should  locate  with  due  regard  to  the  rights  of  the 
other  and  so  as  to  best  accommodate  the  public.-^  The  rights 
of  the  company  are  at  all  times  subject  to  reasonable  regulation 
by  the  municipality.^ 


s'Neitzey  v.  Baltimore  etc.  K.  E. 
Co.,  0  Mackey  34;  Trook  v.  B.  &  P. 
R.  R.  Co.,  3  McArthur,  D.  C.  392; 
Glick  V.  Baltimore  &  0.  R.  R.  Co., 
19  D.  C.  412;  Fitzgerald  v.  Baltimore 
&  0.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  D.  C.  513;  Balti- 
more &  0.  E.  E.  Co.  V.  Fitzgerald,  2 
App.  Cas.  D.  C.  501 ;  Atlantic  etc. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Montezuma,  122  Ga.  1,  49 
S.  E.  738;  Owensborougli  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Sutton  (Ky.)  13  S.  W.  1086; 
Grand  Rapids  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Heisel,  38  Mich.  62,  31  Am.  Rep.  306 ; 
S.  C.  47  Mich.  393;  Lackland  v. 
North  Missouri  R.  R.  Co.,  31  Mo. 
180;  Randle  v.  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  65 
Mo.  325;  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Angel,  41  N.  J.  Eq.  316;  Mahady  v. 
Brunswick  R.  R.  Co.,  91  K  Y.  148; 
Iron  Mt.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bingham,  87 
Tenn.  522,  11  S.  W.  705,  4  L.E.A. 
622;  Baugh  v.  Texas  &  N.  O.  E.  E. 
Co.,  80  Tex.  56,  15  S.  W.  587.  As  to 
whether  u,  city  may  authorize  such 
a  use  of  streets  as  against  abutting 
owners,  see  Gilchrist  Co.  v.  Des 
Moines,  128  la.  49,  102  N.  W.  831; 
Cummins  v.  Summunduwot  Lodge,  9 
Kan.  App.  153,  58  Pac.  486;  Lake 
Shore  etc.  Ey.  Co.  v.  Elyria,  69 
Ohio  St.  414,  69  N.  E.  738;  Pickup 
V.  Phila.,  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  29  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.  631.  In  Baltimore  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Fitzgerald,  2  App.  Cas.  D.  C.  501, 
the  court  says:  "What  the  legisla- 
tive power  has  given  to  the  company 


is  simply  the  right  which  individuals 
have  by  the  common  law,  the  right 
of  transit  over  certain  streets  of  the 
city — substantially  that  and  nothing 
more.  Individuals,  in  their  use  of 
the  right  of  transit,  may  not  con- 
vert the  streets  into  freight  yards, 
or  into  places  of  storage  for  their 
wagons,  or  into  stables  for  their 
horses.  When  the  right  of  transit  is 
given  to  a,  railroad  company,  why 
should  it  be  construed  to  mean  any 
more  than  it  does  in  the  case  of  an 
individual,  due  regard  being  had  to 
the  different  instrumentalities  used." 
Chester  v.  B.  0.  E.  E.  Co.,  217  Pa. 
St.  402,  66  Atl.  654. 

9  8Brooklyn  Heights  E.  E.  Co.  v. 
Brooklyn,  152  N.  Y.  244,  46  N.  E. 
Eep.  509. 

9  9iCanton  v.  Canton  Cotton  Ware- 
house Co.,  84  Miss.  268,  36  So.  266, 
105  Am.  St.  Eep.  428,  65  L.R.A.  561. 

iGeneral  Electric  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Chi- 
cage  City  E.  E.  Co.,  66  111.  App.  362. 

2State  V.  St.  Paul  City  Ey.  Co., 
78  Minn.  331,  81  N.  W.  200;  Allen 
V.  Jersey  City,  53  N.  J.  L.  522,  22 
Atl.  257 ;  State  v.  Atlantic  etc.  E.  E. 
Co.,  141  N.  C.  736,  53  S.  E.  290; 
Baltimore  v.  Baltimore  T.  &  G.  Co., 
166  U.  S.  673,  17  S.  C.  Eep.  696. 
And  see  Pittsburgh  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Chicago,  159  111.  369,  42  N.  E.  Rep. 
781 ;  Burlington  v.  Burlington  St.  R. 
R.  Co.,  49  la.  144. 


310  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    lYl 

§  171  (117a).  The  doctrine  of  an  unreasonable  or  ex- 
cessive use  of  streets  by  railroads,  as  a  basis  for  compen- 
sation. Some  of  the  States  which  hold  that  railroads  of  ail 
kinds  are  legitimate  street  uses,  have  sought  to  avoid  the  harsh 
consequences  of  this  doctrine  by  introducing  the  qualification, 
that  for  any  unreasonable  or  excessive  use  of  the  street  the 
abutter  may  have  compensation.  Thus  in  a  recent  Kentucky 
case  it  is  said :  "The  design  of  a  railroad  is  to  facilitate  travel. 
It,  therefore,  subserves  the  object  of  a  street  dedication  instead 
of  destroying  it.  It  may,  therefore,  under  legislative  sanction, 
have  a  joint  occupancy  of  a  street  with  other  modes  of  travel 
having  the  same  end  in  view ;  but  it  cannot  occupy  or  use  it  to 
the  unreasonable  exclusion  or  obstruction  of  such  other  modes. 
The  limitation  upon  the  public  right  is  that  the  appropriation 
of  the  street  must  not  be  inconsistent  with  the  end  for  which  it 
was  established."  And  again:  "It  follows  that  the  construction 
of  a  railroad  along  a  public  street  is  not,  per  se,  an  encroach- 
ment upon  the  individual  right  of  the- abutting  lot-owner,  and 
whether  he  can  complain  depends  not  upon  the  fact  of  its  ex- 
istence, but  the  manner  of  its  construction  and  operation.  If 
he  is  thereby  deprived  of  its  reasonable  use,  he  may  appeal 
to  the  courts  for  relief ;  but  if  he  is  merely  inconvenienced  there- 
by, or  suffers  some  remote  consequential  injury,  it  is  damnum 
absque  injuria."  And  in  a  subsequent  part  of  the  opinion  the 
court  indicates  what  might  be  regarded  as  an  unreasonable  use. 
"Undoubtedly,  if  the  structure  shall  be  so  located  as  to  unrea- 
sonably obstruct  the  abutting  lot-owner's  means  of  egress  and 
ingress  from  and  to  his  lot;  or,  if  he  suffers  substantial  injury 
by  having  smoke,  sparks  or  cinders  thrown  into  his  house;  or 
its  walls  be  cracked  by  the  movement  of  heavy  trains,  he  would 
be  entitled  to  recover  for  the  damages  directly  resulting  from 
such  causes."  *     There  are  a  number  of  cases  in  other  States 

3  Fulton  V.  Shor<-  Route  Trans.  Co.,  30  S.  W.  6;  Maysville  &  B.  S.  R.  R. 

85  Ky.  640,  652-655,  4  S.  W.  332,  7  Co.  v.  Ingram    (Ky.),  30  S.  W.  8; 

Am.  St.  Rep.  619.     See  also  Louis-  Maysville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Conner 

ville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Orr,  91  Ky.  (Ky.),  29  S.  W.  344;  Covington  etc. 

109,  15  S.  W.  8;   Commonwealth  v.  R.  R.  &  Bridge  Co.  v.  Kleymeier,  105 

City  of  Frankfort,  92  Ky.  149,  17  S.  Ky.  609,  49  S.  W.  484;  Ferguson  v. 

W.  287;  Kentucky  &  I.  Bridge  Co.  Covington  etc.  Bridge  Co.,  108  Ky. 

V.  Kreiger,  93  Ky.  243,  19  S.  W.  738;  662,    57    S.    W.    460;    Elizabethtown 

Strickley  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  R.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Tierney,  11  Ky.  L. 

Co.,  93  Ky.  323,  20  S.  W.  261 ;  Chesa-  R.  526 ;  Louisville  Southern  R.  R.  Co. 

peake  &  0.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kobs  (Ky.),  v.  Cogar,  15  Ky.  L.  R.  444;  Louis- 


§  171 


EOADS   AND    STKEETS. 


Sll 


which  give  more  or  less  of  support  to  this  doctrine.*  In  a 
Tennessee  case  the  court,  in  enjoining  the  laying  of  a  third 
track  in  a  street  forty-one  feet  wide,  said:  "A  public  street, 
either  with  or  without  the  consent  of  municipal  authorities,  can- 
not be  converted  into  a  mere  roadbed  for  railroad  tracks,  over 
which  trains  will  be  constantly  operated,  to  the  destruction  of 
the  public  use,  and  of  the  business  and  property  interest  of 


vlUe  Southern  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hooe,  18 
Ky.  L.  R.  521,  35  S.  W.  266,  38  S. 
W.  131. 

*In  Kansas,  while  it  is  the  gen- 
eral doctrine  that  the  abutter  can- 
not recover  for  the  ordinary  incon- 
veniences occasioned  by  a  commercial 
railroad  in  a  street,  yet  he  may  re- 
cover, if  there  is  such  a  practical  ob- 
struction of  the  street  in  front  of  his 
lots  as  to  amount  to  a  denial  of 
access.  Kansas  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Cuykendall,  42  Kan.  234,  21  Pac. 
1051;  Wichita  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Smith,  45  Kan.  264,  25  Pac.  623; 
Atchison  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Davidson, 
52  Kan.  739,  35  Pac.  787.  The  court 
appears  to  rule,  as  matter  of  law, 
that  where  there  is  ample  room  be- 
tween the  sidewallc  and  the  railroad 
for  the  passage  of  vehicles,  there  can 
be  no  recovery.  Kansas  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Cuykendall,  42  Kan.  234,  21 
Pac.  1051 ;  Kansas  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Mahler,  45  Kan.  565,  26  Pac.  22; 
Wichita  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  45 
Kan.  264,  25  Pac.  623;  Herndon  v. 
Kansas  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  46  Kan.  560, 
26  Pac.  959.  See  also  Ottawa  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Larson,  40  Kan.  301,  19 
Pac.  661,  2  L.R.A.  59;  Central 
Branch  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Andrews, 
41  Kan.  370,  21  Pac.  276;  Kansas 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  McAfee,  42  Kan. 
239,  21  Pac.  1052 ;  Chicago  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Union  Inv.  Co.,  51  Kan.  600, 
33  Pac.  378.  In  Missouri  the  doc- 
trine that  a  commercial  railroad, 
laid  at  the  grade  of  a  street,  is  a 
legitimate  use  of  the  street,  has  long 
been  established,  but  late  cases  have 


introduced  the  qualification  that  if 
the  street  is  so  narrow  that  the  run- 
ning of  trains  excludes  ordinary 
traffic  for  the  time  being,  or  if  the 
road  is  laid  on  one  side  or  over  the 
sidewalk,  so  as  to  be  especially  in- 
jurious to  abutting  property,  the 
abutting  owners  may  enjoin  its  con- 
struction or  operation.  Lockwood  v. 
Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  122  Mo.  86,  26 
S.  W.  698,  24  L.R.A.  516;  Knapp, 
Stout  &  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  Trans.  Co., 
126  Mo.  26,  28  S.  W.  627;  Schulen- 
burg  &  B.  L.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R. 
R.  R.  Co.,  129  Mo.  455,  31  S.  W.  796; 
Brown  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  137 
Mo.  529,  38  S.  W.  1099;  Watson  v. 
Robertson  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.,  69  Mo. 
App.  548;  Sherlock  v.  Kansas  City 
Belt  R.  R.  Co.,  142  Mo.  172,  43  S.  W. 
629,  64  Am.  St.  Rep.  551;  Corby  v. 
Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  150  Mo.  457, 
52  S.  W.  282.  In  the  first  of  these 
cases  the  court  says:  "Beginning 
with  Lackland  v.  Railroad  Co.,  31 
Mo.  183,  this  court  has  vmiformly 
held  that  laying  a  track  on  the  es- 
tablished grade  of  a  street,  under 
legislative  authority,  and  operating 
a  steam  railway  thereon,  was  not 
subjecting  the  street  to  a  public  use 
different  from  that  contemplated  in 
the  original  grant.  This  proposi- 
tion was  most  ably  and  strenuously 
attacked  in  Gaus  &  Sons  Manuf.  Co. 
V.  St.  Louis  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  113  Mo. 
308,  20  S.  W.  658,  but  we  felt  con- 
strained by  the  unbroken  line  of  de- 
cisions to  adhere  to  it.  Porter  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  33  Mo.  128;  Cross  v. 
Railway  Co.,  77  Mo,  321;  Smith  v. 


312 


EMINENT   DOMAIN. 


§  171 


Railroad  Co.,  98  Mo.  24,  11  S.  W. 
Rep.  259;  Kansas  City,  St.  J.  &  C. 
B.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  St.  Joseph  T.  R.  R. 
Co.,  97  Mo.  469,  10  S.  W.  826;  Rude 
V.  City  of  St.  Louis,  93  Mo.  408,  6 
S.  W.  257.  This  proposition  un- 
qualifiedly leads  to  this  conclusion: 
A  city  may  authorize  a,  steam  rail- 
road to  occupy  a  street  with  its 
tracks,  and  operate  its  trains  over 
it.  The  abutting  proprietors  can- 
not recover  damages  for  the  injury 
resulting  to  their  property,  although 
it  is  subject  to  smoke,  noise  and 
cinders  at  all  hours  of  day  and  night, 
and  all  ingress  and  egress  for  the 
legitimate  purposes  of  business  cut 
off,  except  at  such  times  as  the  rail- 
road may  elect  not  to  run  trains 
upon  it.  Debarred  from  redress  in 
that  direction,  they  apply  to  a  court 
of  equity  to  restrain  what  they  con- 
ceive is  a  public  and  private  nui- 
sance, and  ask  for  protection  of 
their  own  right  to  use  the  street  as 
abutting  owners,  and  are  met  with 
the  assertion  that  what  the  law  it- 
self licenses  cannot  be  a  nuisance,  and 
that  they  must  submit  to  whatever 
inconvenience  ensues,  because  they 
might  have  anticipated  that  the 
street  would  be  subjected  to  this 
servitude  when  they  purchased  their 
property.  If  these  propositions  are 
true,  then  it  results  that  an  abut- 
ting property  owner  on  a  street  may 
have  his  property  damaged  or  de- 
stroyed without  redress,  notwith- 
standing the  constitutional  guaranty 
'that  private  property  shall  not  be 
taken  or  damaged  for  public  use 
without  just  compensation.'  Const, 
art.  2,  §  21.  But,  while  it  has  been 
said  that  a  city  might  authorize  a 
railroad  company  to  lay  its  tracks  in 
its  streets,  it  also  has  been  deter- 
mined by  this  court  and  many  others 
that  the  city  could  not,  in  the  exer- 
cise of  its  power,  create  a,  nuisance 
in  the  streets,  or  devote  them,  or 
any  part  of  them,  to  a  purpose  in- 


consistent with  the  rights  of  the 
public  or  abutting  property  owners. 
Thus,  in  Dubach  v.  Railroad  Co.,  89 
Mo.  483,  1  S.  W.  Rep.  86,  Judge 
Henry,  speaking  for  the  whole  court, 
said:  'If  the  character  of  a,  street 
should  be  such  that  defendant's 
track  could  not  be  laid  upon  the 
street  without  hindering  the  public 
from  using  it,  then,  no  matter  how 
important  to  the  company  that  its 
track  should  be  laid  in  that  street, 
it  could  not  be  done.'  'Nor  is  it  com- 
petent for  a  city  to  authorize  such 
use  of  a  street  dedicated  as  a  street 
as  will  destroy  it  as  a,  thoroughfare 
for  the  public  use.'  In  this  case  it 
is  too  plain  to  be  evaded  that  the 
grant  conferred  by  this  ordinance 
practically  creates  a  monopoly  in  de- 
fendant in  the  use  of  this  street. 
*  *  *  Every  time  the  defendant 
uses  this  street  with  its  trains  it 
absolutely  deprives  all  teamsters  of 
ordinary  freight  wagons  access  to 
this  street,  and,  as  the  ordinance 
gives  defendant  the  privilege  of 
using  it  with  its  trains  as  often  as 
it  pleases,  such  use  is  utterly  incom- 
patible with  the  purposes  for  which 
this  street  was  created,  and  is  un- 
reasonable. The  municipal  assembly 
had  no  right  to  appropriate  this 
street    to    defendant's    use    in    this 


way. 


*     #     * 


No     case     in     this 


State  is  authority  for  such  exclusive 
use  of  a  highway,  and,  if  it  was,  we 
should  not  follow  it.  The  company 
is  a  common  carrier,  and  entitled  as 
such  to  collect  tolls,  but  not  ex- 
clusive right  to  monopolize  a  public 
street,  and  shut  out  the  public  and 
other  carriers.  Holding,  as  we  do, 
that  this  ordinance,  in  view  of  the 
facts  developed,  amounts  to  a  prac- 
tical condemnation  of  this  portion  of 
Collins  street  to  the  private  and 
almost  exclusive  use  of  defendant, 
we  think  the  injunction  was  prop- 
erly granted  by  the  Circuit  Court, 
auu  plaintiffs  had  such  an  interest 


§  171  EOADS  AND  STEEETS.  313 

those  abutting  thereon."  ^  The  doctrine  is  not  confined  to  com- 
mercial railroads,  but  has  been  applied  to  street  railroads  ^  and 
interurban  roads.''  These  cases,  as  it  seems  to  the  writer,  are 
a  virtual  confession  of  error  in  holding  railroads  to  be  a  legiti- 
mate street  use.  They  illustrate,  however,  the  tendency  of 
courts  to  work  out  in  one  way  or  another,  substantial  justice 
to  the  property  owner.  The  theory  of  the  cases  would  seem  to 
be  that  while  a  railroad  is  a  proper  street  use  and  in  line  with 
the  purposes  for  which  streets  are  established,  yet  if  it  materially 
interferes  with  the  abutting  owner's  rights  or  easements  in  the 
street,  or  interferes  with  the  enjoyment  of  such  rights  and  ease- 
ments so  as  to  produce  a  material  impairment  of  the  property, 
then  the  abutter  is  entitled  to  compensation.  The  question  turns 
upon  the  effect  of  the  railroad  on  the  abutting  property.  There 
does  not  seem  to  be  any  criterion  to  measure  this  effect  but  a  pe- 
cuniary one.  If  property  is  depreciated  in  value  from  any  cause 
it  is  materially  affected  and  it  does  not  seem  as  though  any  dis- 
tinction could  be  made  between  a  large  and  a  small  deprecia- 
tion. These  cases,  if  thus  interpreted,  will,  therefore,  bring 
about  the  same  result  as  those  which  hold  that  a  railroad  is  not 
a  legitimate  street  use,  for  in  the  latter  class  of  cases  there  can  be 
no  recovery,  if  there  is  no  diminution  in  value.® 

In  a  recent  Kentucky  case,  at  the  suit  of  an  abutting  owner, 

as  would  enable  them  to  maintain  SAshland,     etc.     St.    Ry.     Co.    v. 

the    action."      The    following    cases  Faullcner,  106  Ky.  332,  51  S.  W.  806, 

also   may   be    referred   to   as   being  43  L.R.A.  554;  McQuaid  v.  Portland 

more  or  less  in  line  with  the  fore-  &,  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  Or.  237,  22  Pac. 

going,  though  some  of  them  contain  899,  1  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  34; 

dicta  only.     Newell  v.  Minneapolis  Paquet  v.  Mt.  Tabor  St.  R.  R.  Co., 

etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  35  Minn.  112,  59  Am.  18   Ore.    233,    22   Pac.    908;    Dooley 

Rep.  303;  People  v.  Ft.  Wayne  etc.  Block  v.   Salt  Lake  Rapid  Transit 

R.  R.   Co.,  92  Mich.  522,  52  N.  W.  Co.,  9  Utah,  31,  33  Pac.  229,  8  Am. 

1010,  16  L.R.A.  752;  State  v.  Tren-  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.   327;    Smith  v. 

ton  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  58  N.  J.  L.  666,  East  End.  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  87   Tenn. 

34  Atl.  1090;  Iron  Mt.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  026,  11  S.  W.  709. 
Bingham,  87  Tenn.  522,  11  S.  W.  705,  TMordhurst    v.    Ft.    Wayne    etc. 

4  L.R.A.   622;    Brumit   v.   Railroad  Traction  Co.,  163  Ind.  268,  71  N.  E. 

Co.,   106  Tenn.   124,  60  S.  W.  505;  642,  106  Am.  St.  Rep.  222,  68  L.R.A. 

Jackson  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  41  105 ;  Kinsey  v.  Union  Traction  Co., 

Fed.  656.  109  Ind.  563,  81  N.  E.  922. 

sPepper    v.    Union   Ry.    Co.,    113  sPost,  §  751. 

Tenn.  53,  85  S.  W.  864,  to  same 
eflfect;  Mason  v.  Ohio  River  R.  R. 
Co.,  51  W.  Va.  183,  41  S.  B.  418. 


314: 


EMINENT   BOMAIN. 


§  172 


a  decree  was  entered,  limiting  a  railroad  company,  which  had 
authority  to  occupy  a  street,  to  a  single  track  laid  in  the  middle 
of  the  street  and  also  restricting  the  number  of  freight  trains 
which  might  be  operated  during  business  hours.  On  appeal 
the  decree  was  sustained  as  to  the  former  part  and  reversed  as 
to  the  latter,  thus  holding  that  a  court  of  equity  cannot,  in  ad- 
vance, restrict  a  company  as  to  the  use  of  its  tracks.® 

§  172  (117b).  Railroads  in  streets  constructed  with- 
out authority,  or  used  in  a  way  not  authorized. — Remedies 
of  abutters.  A  railroad  in  a  street  may  be  unauthorized  be- 
cause constructed  without  any  color  of  authority  whatever,  or 
because  constructed  under  an  apparent  authority  which  is  void 
for  any  reason,^"  or  has  expired,^^  or  because  constructed  in  a 
manner  or  location  not  within  the  authority  granted. -^^  In  all 
such  cases  the  railroad  is  a  public  nuisance  ^*  and  the  abutter 
is  entitled  to  the  same  remedies  as  in  any  other  similar  case  of 


sKentucky  &  I.  Bridge  Co.  v. 
Kreiger,  93  Ky.  243,  19  S.  W.  738. 

loDaly  V.  Georgia  etc.  E.  R.  Co., 
80  Ga.  793,  12  Am.  St.  Rep.  286; 
Georgia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Harvey,  84 
Ga.  372,  10  S.  E.  971;  Common- 
wealth V.  City  of  Frankfort,  92  Ky. 
149,  17  S.  W.  287;  Lockwood  v. 
Wabash  E.  R.  Co.,  122  Mo.  86,  26  S. 
W.  698,  24  L.R.A.  516;  Schulenberg 
etc.  Co.  V.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
129  Mo.  455,  31  S.  W.  796;  Steven- 
son V.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  (Mo.),  31 
S.  W.  Rep.  793;  Appeal  of  Hartman 
Steel  Co.,  129  Pa.  St.  551,  18  Atl. 
553;  Thomas  v.  Inter-County  St.  R. 
R.  Co.,  167  Pa.  St.  120,  31  Atl.  426. 

iiAtchison  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Nave, 
38  Kan.  744,  17  Pac.  587,  5  Am.  St. 
Rep.  800. 

i2Reynolds  v.  Presidio  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  1  Cal.  App.  229,  81  Pac.  1118; 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wliitley 
County  Court,  95  Ky.  215,  24  S.  W. 
604,  44  Am.  St.  Rep.  220;  Hepting 
V.  New  Orleans  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  30 
La.  An.  898;  Village  of  Wayzata  v. 
Great  Northern  R.  R.  Co.,  50  Minn. 
438,  52  N.  W.  Rep.  913;  Knapp, 
Stout  &  Co.  V.   St.  Louis   Transfer 


E.  R.  Co.,  126  Mo.  26,  28  S.  W.  Rep. 
627;  Thompson  v.  Pennsylvania  R. 
R.  Co.,  51  N.  J.  L.  42,  15  Atl.  833; 
Hussner  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  R.  Co., 
114  N.  Y.  433,  21  N.  E.  1002,  11  Am. 
St.  Rep.  679;  Mattlage  v.  New  York 
El.  R.  R.  Co.,  67  How.  Pr.  232,  14 
Daly  1;  Galveston  Wharf.  Co.  v. 
Gulf  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  81  Tex.  494,  17 
S.  W.  57 ;  Dooley  Block  v.  Salt  Lake 
Rapid  Transit  Co.,  9  Utah  31,  33 
Pac.  229,  8  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
327. 

isBirmingham  Ry.  Lt.  &  P.  Co.  v. 
Moran,  151  Ala.  187,  44  So.  152;  City 
Store  V.  San  Jose  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  150 
Cal.  277,  88  Pac.  977;  Kavanagh  v. 
Mobile  .etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  78  Ga.  271; 
Glaesner  v.  Anheuser-Busch  Brewing 
Assn.,  100  Mo.  508,  13  S.  W.  707,  2 
Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  420;  Van 
Home  V.  Newark  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  48 
N.  J.  Eq.  332,  21  Atl.  1034;  Louis- 
ville etc.  E.  E.  Co.  V.  Cincinnati  etc. 
Ey.  Co.,  3  Ohio  N.  P.  (N.S.)  109; 
Appeal  of  Hartman  Steel  Co.,  129 
Pa.  St.  551,  18  Atl.  553;  Thomas  v. 
Inter-County  St.  E.  E.  Co.,  167  Pa. 
St.  120,  31Atl.  476;  Watkinsv.West 
Phila.  Pass.  E.  E.  Co.,  1  Pa.  Dist.  Ct. 


§  172 


EOADS   AND    STKEETS. 


315 


public  nuisance  in  the  streets.'*  If  the  abutting  owner  has  the 
fee,  he  is  entitled  to  the  same  rights  and  remedies  as  though  the 
public  easement  did  not  exist,  and  may  maintain  trespass,'^ 
ejectment '"  or  bill  for  injunction. ''  If  the  fee  is  in  the  pub- 
lic, as  both  title  and  possession  would  be  in  a  third  party,  the 
only  remedy  of  the  abutting  owner  is  an  action  on  the  case,  or 
a  bill  for  injunction.-'*  But  a  bill  cannot  be  maintained  for  that 
purpose  by  one  who  does  not  own  property  upon  the  street, 
though  he  be  a  tax-payer.-'®  If  the  abutter  does  not  own  the  fee 
he  must  show  some  special  damages  in  order  to  be  entitled  to  an 
action,^"  but  this  may  consist  in  the  diminution  in  the  value  of 


463;  Haines  v.  22d.  St.  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  1  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  506;  City  of 
Moundsville  v.  Ohio  R.  R.  Co.,  37 
W.  Va.  92,  16  S.  E.  514,  20  L.R.A. 
161;  Hetzel  v.  B.  &  0.  R.  R.  Co.,  169 
U.  S.  26. 

i4Baltimore  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Tay- 
lor, 6  App.  D.  C.  259;  Garnett  v. 
Jacksonville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  Fla. 
889;  Morris  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Newark, 
10  N.  J.  Eq.  352;  Parrot  v.  Cincin- 
nati etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Ohio  St.  330; 
Cooper  V.  Alden,  Harr.  Mich.  72; 
Knickerbocker  Ice  Co.  v.  Philadel- 
phia &  Reading  R.  R.  Co.,  15  Phila. 
48 ;  Hopkins  v.  Calasauqua  Mfg.  Co., 
180  Pa.  St.  199,  36  Atl.  735 ;  Patton 
V.  Olymphia  D.  &  L.  Co.,  15  Wash. 
210,  46  Pac.  237. 

i6MorreU  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
49  Minn.  526,  52  N.  W.  140;  Florida 
Southern  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown,  23  Fla. 
104;  Jacksonville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Lockwood,  33  Fla.  573,  15  So.  327; 
Post,  §  931,  and,  generally,  as  to 
remedies  in  such  cases,  see  post, 
chap,  xxviii. 

isWager  v.  Troy  Union  R.  R.  Co., 
25  N.  Y.  526;  Carpenter  v.  Oswego 
&  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  24  N.  y".  655.  Con^ 
tra:  Edwardsville  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Sawyer,  92  111.  377.    See  post,  §  926. 

I'Imlay  v.  Union  Branch  R.  R. 
Co.,  26  Conn.  249,  68  Am.  Dec.  392; 
Southern  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  Bull,  116 
Ga.  776,  43  S.  E.  52;  Cox  v.  Louis- 


ville R.  R.  Co.,  48  Inc  178;  Har- 
rington v.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
17  Minn.  215;  Swinhart  v.  St.  Louis 
etc.  Ry.  Co.,  207  Mo.  423,  105  S.  W. 
1043;  Henderson  v.  New  York  Cent. 
R.  R.  Co.,  78  N.  Y.  423;  Wright  v. 
Syracuse  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  92  Hun  32, 
36  N.  Y.  S.  901 ;  Auchinloss  v.  Met. 
R.  R.  Co.,  69  App.  Div.  63,  74  N.  Y. 
S.  534;  Thomas  v.  Inter-County  St. 
R.  R.  Co.,  167  Pa.  St.  120,  31  Atl. 
476;  Hannum  v.  Media  etc.  Elec.  Ry. 
Co.,  200  Pa.  St.  44,  49  Atl.  789 ;  Hall 
v.  Pa.  R.  R.  Co.,  215  Pa.  St.  172, 
64  Atl.  408;  Ford  v.  Chicago  &  N. 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  14  Wis.  609,  80  Am. 
Dec.  791;  Allen  v.  Clausen,  114  Wis. 
244,  90  N.  W.  181;  post,  §  891. 

18 Atchison  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Nave, 
38  Kan.  744,  17  Pac.  587,  5  Am.  St. 
Rep.  800 ;  Dooley  Block  v.  Salt  Lake 
Rapid  Transit  Co.,  9  Utah  31,  33 
Pac.  229,  8  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
327 ;  Hart  v.  Buchner,  54  Fed.  925. 

19  Davis  V.  New  York,  14  N.  Y. 
506. 

2  0Reynolds  v.  Presidio  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  1  Cal.  App.  229,  81  Pac.  1118; 
Jacksonville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Thomp- 
son, 34  Fla.  346,  16  So.  282;  Kav- 
anagh  v.  Mobile  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  78 
Ga.  271 ;  East  Tennessee  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Boardman,  96  Ga.  356,  23  S. 
E.  403;  Atchison  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Nave,  38  Kan.  744,  17  Pac.  587,  5 
Am.    St.   Rep.    800;    Van   Home   v. 


316 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  173 


Ms  property.^^  When  the  road  is  constructed  in  a  negligent 
and  improper  manner,^  ^  or  when  it  is  so  operated  or  used  as  to 
unnecessarily  obstruct  the  street,^^  the  company  will  be  liable. 
The  subject  of  remedies  is  elsewhere  discussed.^* 

§  173.  Switch  tracks  to  private  property  and  railroads 
for  private  use.  It  is  a  general  rule  that  the  use  of  streets 
cannot  be  granted  for  private  purposes.^"  It  follows  neces- 
sarily that  a  purely  private  railway  cannot  be  constructed  upon, 
across  or  along  a  public  street  or  highway.  There  is  practically 
no  question  about  this  proposition,  the  difficulty  lying  in  its 
application.  The  great  weight  of  authority  is  that  a  side, 
switch  or  spur  track  connecting  a  railroad  with  private  prop- 
erty, such  as  a  factory,  elevator,  quarry  or  other  place  of  busi- 
ness and  for  the  accommodation  of  the  owner  of  the  property 
is  a  private  use  and  that  such  tracks  cannot  be  laid  upon  or  across 
the  streets  and  highways.^"     The  question  was -much  debated 


Newark  Pass.  R.  E.  Co.,  48  N.  J.  Eq. 
332,  21  Atl.  1034;  Watkln  v.  W. 
Phila.  Pass.  K.  E.  Co.,  1  Pa.  Dist. 
Ct.  463 ;  Haines  v.  22d  St.  etc.  R.  E. 
Co.,  1  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  506. 

2ijSee  post,  §§  199,  951. 

2  2Cadle  V.  Muscatine  Western  R. 
R.  Co.,  44  la.  11;  Brewer  v.  Boston 
C.  &  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  113  Mass.  52; 
Kansas  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  McAfee,  42 
Kan.  239,  21  Pac.  1052;  Hepting  v. 
New  Orleans  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  36  La. 
An.  898;  McQuaid  v.  Portland  & 
V.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  Ore.  237,  22  Pac. 
899,  1  Am.  E.  E.  &  Corp.  Eep.  34; 
Paquet  v.  Mt.  Tabor  St.  E.  E.  Co., 
18  Ore.,  233,  22  Pac.  906;  Harman 
V.  Louisville  R.  R.  Co.,  87  Tenn.  614, 
11  S.  W.  703;  Cane  Belt  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Ridgeway,  38  Tex.  Civ.  App.  108, 
85  S.  W.  496;  Evans  v.  Chicago 
etc.  E.  R.  Co.,  86  Wis.  597,  57  N.  W. 
354,  39  Am.  St.  Rep.  908. 

2  3Canastota  Knife  Co.  v.  Newing- 
ton  Tramway  Co.,  69  Conn.  146; 
Neitzey  v.  Baltimore  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
5  Maekey  34;  Click  v.  B.  &  0.  R. 
R.  Co.,  19  D.  C.  412;  Fitzgerald  v. 
B.  &  0.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  D.  C.  513; 
Baltimore  &  P.  R.  R.   Co.  v.  Fitz- 


gerald, 2  App.  Cas.  D.  C.  501 ;  Frith 
V.  Dubuque,  45  la.  406;  Atchison  & 
Nebraska  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Garside,  10 
Kan.  552 ;  Owensborough  etc.  E.  E. 
Co.  V.  Sutton  (Ky.),  13  S.  W.  1086; 
Stevenson  v.  Mo.  Pac.  E.  E.  Co. 
(Mo.),  31  S.  W.  793;  Thompson  v. 
Pennsylvania  E.  E.  Co.,  51  N.  J.  L. 
42,  15  Atl.  833;  State  v.  Trenton 
Pass.  E.  E.  Co.,  58  N.  J.  L.  686,  34 
Atl.  1090,  33  L.E.A.  129;  Mahady 
v.  Brunswick  R.  R.  Co.,  91  N.  Y. 
148;  Green  v.  New  York  Central  R. 
R.  Co.,  65  How.  Pr.  154;  Mt.  Au- 
burn Cable  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Neare,  54 
Ohio  St.  153,  42  N.  E.  768;  Smith  v. 
East  End  St.  E.  E.  Co.,  87  Tenn. 
626,  11  S.  W.  709;  Iron  Mt.  E.  E. 
Co.  V.  Bingham,  87  Tenn.  522,  4  L. 
E.  A.  622;  Baugh  v.  Texas  &  N.  0. 
R.  R.  Co.,  80  Tex.  56,  15  S.  W.  587. 

iiSee  Chapters  27  and  28. 

2  54nfe,  §  127. 

2  6Macon  v.  Harris,  73  6a.  42; 
Macon  v.  Harris,  75  Ga.  761 ;  Heath 
v.  Des  Moines  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  61  la.  11 ; 
Mikesell  v.  Durkee,  34  Kan.  509; 
Commonwealth  v.  Frankfort,  92  Ky. 
149,  17  S.  W.  287;  Bradley  v.  Pharr, 
45  La.  An.  426,  12  So.   618;   Green 


§  173  EOADS  AND  STEEETS.  317 

in  one  of  the  New  York  cases  cited  where  the  proprietor  of  a 
department  store  in  the  city  of  New  York  was  licensed  by  the 
city  authorities  to  construct  a  switch  track  from  his  store  to  the 
street  car  tracks  in  front  with  a  view  to  operating  freight  cars 
beween  his  store  and  a  delivery  station  some  miles  away.  At 
the  suit  of  the  owner  of  the  adjoining  property  the  court  en- 
joined the  construction  of  the  track,  as  being  for  a  private  use. 
"There  can  be  no  doubt,"  says  the  court,  "that  an  abutting  owner 
in  a  city  has  the  right  of  free  access  to  and  from  his  property  in 
the  usual  way.  He  may  use  for  that  purpose  such  means  of  con- 
veyance for  the  transportation  and  delivery  of  goods  and  mer- 
chandise as  are  usual  and  customary,  but  the  right  of  ingress 
and  egress  by  railroad  cars  running  upon  railroad  tracks  has 
not  yet,  I  think,  been  sanctioned  by  custom  or  by  law.  The 
claim  of  right  in  that  regard  is  far  in  advance  of  any  use  of 
the  public  streets  that  has  heretofore  been  recognized.  It  may  be 
argued  that  if  the  abutting  owner  may  use  carriages,  wagons, 
trucks  and  even  motor  cars  for  the  purpose  of  free  access  and 
the  transaction  of  his  business,  why  not  permit  him  to  use  rail- 
road cars  upon  a  railroad  track  ?  Such  an  argument  is  mis- 
leading, since  if  carried  to  its  logical  conclusion  the  result  would 
be  that  the  governing  body  in  a  city  would  have  the  power  to 
surrender  the  use  of  streets  to  private  parties  for  exclusively 
private  purposes."  ^^ 

V.  Portland,  32  Me.  431 ;   Gustafson  31  W.  Va.  710,  8  S.  E.  453.    And  see 

V.  Hamm,  56  Minn.  334,  57  N.  W.  post,  §  264. 

1054;  Glaesner  v.  Anheuser-Busch  27Hatfield  v.  Straus,  189  N.  Y. 
Brewing  Co.,  100  Mo.  508,  13  S.  W.  208,  82  N.  E.  172,  affirming  S.  C.  117 
707,  2  Am.  K.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  420;  App.  Div.  671,  102  N.  Y.  S.  934. 
Swift  V.  Delaware  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  66  Four  judges  concurred  in  the  opin- 
io. J.  Eq.  34,  57  Atl.  456;  State  v.  ion  and  three  dissented.  We  quote 
Trenton,  36  N.  J.  79;  Fanning  v.  from  the  dissenting  opinion  as  fol- 
Osborne,  102  N.  Y.  441,  reversing  lows:  "The  right  to  lay  pipes  or 
S.  C.  34  Hun  121 ;  Hatfield  v.  Straus,  other  conduits  for  the  transmission 
189  N.  Y.  208,  82  N.  E.  172,  affirm-  of  gas,  electricity,  steam,  light,  heat 
ing  S.  C.  117  App.  Div.  671,  102  or  power,  like  the  right  to  lay  tracks 
N".  Y.  S.  934;  Barker  v.  Hartman  for  oars  in  which  to  transport  pas- 
Steel  Co.,  129  Pa.  St.  551,  18  Atl.  sengers  or  property,  must  be  granted 
553;  Richi  v.  Chattanooga  Brewing  for  public  use,  but  for  the  purpose 
Co.,  105  Tenn.  651,  58  S.  W.  646;  of  using  the  gas,  electricity,  steam, 
Cereghino  v.  Ore.  Short  Line  R.  R.  light,  heat  and  power  individual 
Co.,  26  Utah  467,  73  Pac.  634,  90  members  of  society  constituting  the 
Am.  St.  Rep.  843;  Pittsburgh  etc.  public  are  granted  permission  to  ex- 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Benwood  Iron  Works,  cavate  in  the  public  streets  and  high- 


318 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


174 


In  Illinois  such  spur  or  switch  tracks  are  regarded  as  a  part 
of  the  railway  and  a  public  use,  though  serving  but  a  single  es- 
tablishment and  constructed  at  the  expense  of  its  owner.  ^^ 
When  such  a  track  is  open  to  all  who  wish  to  use  it  and  either 
does  serve  various  parties  or  is  capable  of  doing  so,  it  is  a  public 
use  and  may  be  laid  in  a  street.^^  So  such  a  track  may  be  laid 
to  the  premises  of  an  express  company  for  use  in  its  business,  as 
such  companies  are  common  carriers  and  the  use  is  a  public 
one.^** 

§  174  (118).  Railroad  across  street. — Right  of  abutter 
on  street  to  compensation.  A  railroad  cannot  be  laid  across 
a  highway  without  compensation  to  the  owner  of  the  fee.*^  Gen- 
erally, the  mode  of  crossing  and  the  duties  of  the  company  in 


ways  and  permanently  lay  pipes  and 
other  conduits  to  connect  their  abut- 
ting property  with  the  pipes  and 
other  conduits  in  the  streets  and 
highways  through  which  to  take  the 
gas,  etc.  for  private  use.  Unless 
spur  tracks  of  some  kind  are  allowed 
to  the  owners  of  abutting  property, 
the  loading  and  unloading  of  express 
cars  must  necessarily  be  confined  to 
the  public  streets,  and  thus  public 
travel  will  be  delayed  and  the  gen- 
eral public  as  well  as  individuals  be 
greatly  inconvenienced. 

"For  the  purpose  of  confining 
abutting  owners  to  a  reasonable  use 
of  the  public  streets  it  is  no  more 
necessary  to  require  that  express 
cars  be  loaded  and  unloaded  in  the 
streets  and  highways  than  it  is  that 
individual  consumers  of  gas  or  water 
be  required  to  take  the  same  in  some 
way  from  the  distributing  pipes  in 
the  public  streets.  A  reasonable  use 
of  all  public  service  corporations 
would  seem  to  require  that  abutting 
owners  of  property  be  allowed  lo 
make  such  reasonable  connection 
with  the  public  service  pipes,  con- 
duits or  tracks  as  will  tend  to  public 
utility.  The  defendant's  goods, 
wares  and  merchandise  must  be 
transported  from  place  to  place,  and 
I  cannot  see  that  running  one  car 
over  a   spur  track  from  the  street 


surface  railroad  would  be  more  in- 
convenient to  the  public  than  run- 
ning heavy  motor  cars  or  trucks 
drawn  by  horses  at  irregular  inter- 
vals over  the  defendant's  driveway. 
If  such  a  use  of  the  street  tends  to 
public  benefit  it  cannot  be  said  to 
be  an  unreasonable  use  thereof.  No 
actual  permanent  taking  of  a  por- 
tion of  the  street  for  private  pur- 
poses is  proposed.  The  board  of 
estimate  and  apportionment  in  their 
discretion  may  have  found  that  the 
use  of  such  spur  track  within  the 
hours  mentioned  would  relieve  a  con- 
gested street  and  generally  tend  to 
the  public  good."    pp.  229,  230. 

2  8Truesdale  v.  Peoria  Grape  Sugar 
Co.,  101  111.  561 ;  Mills  v.  Parlin,  106 
111.  60;  Chicago  Dock  &  Canal  Co. 
v.  Garrity,  115  111.  155,  3  N.  E.  448; 
People  v.  Blocki,  203  111.  363,  67  N. 
E.  809.  And  see  White  v.  Blanchard 
Bros.  etc.  Co.,  178  Mass.  363,  59  N. 
E.  1025 ;  Stockdale  etc.  v.  Eio  Grande 
Western  By.  Co.,  28  Utah  201,  77 
Pac.  849. 

2  9  Clark  V.  Blackmar,  47  N.  Y. 
150;  post,  §  264. 

3  0Dulaney  v.  United  Rys.  &  Eleo. 
Co.,  104  Md.  423,  65  Atl.  45. 

siTrustees  v.  Auburn  &  Rochester 
E.  R.  Co.,  3  Hill  567 ;  Starr  v.  Cam- 
den etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  24  N.  J.  L.  592. 


§  174 


EOADS    AND    STREETS. 


319 


respect  to  the  same  are  defined  by  statute.  Crossings  above  or 
below  grade  are  frequently  made,  requiring  alteration  in  the 
surface  of  the  street  to  make  suitable  approaches.  For  damages 
resulting  from  such  lateral  approaches,  the  right  to  recover  de- 
pends upon  principles  already  discussed  in  this  chapter.  Dif- 
ferent States  hold  different  doctrines.  If  the  crossing  above  or 
below  grade  is  wholly  unnecessary,  the  company  will  be  liable 
for  damages  caused  by  the  lateral  approaches.^^  As  such  changes 
of  grade  are  made  solely  to  accommodate  the  railroad  company, 
and  not  at  all  for  the  purpose  of  improving  the  highway  for 
travel,  being  always,  in  fact,  a  detriment  to  the  highway  as  such, 
the  abutting  owners  should  receive  compensation  for  any  injury 
to  their  rights  in  the  street  as  already  defined,  as  by  interfering 
with  access  or  light  and  air,  as  well  as  for  actual  invasion  of 
their  lots,  as  by  turning  surface  water  onto  them  or  otherwise. 
Some  courts  have  allowed  a  recovery  for  such  damages,^^  and 
others  have  denied  it.^*     Damages  to  abutting  property  by  the 


3  2Louisville  &  Nashville  K.  E.  Co. 
V.  Hodge,  6  Bush  141 ;  Farrant  v. 
First  Division  of  St.  Paul  &  Pac.  Ry. 
Co.,  13  Minn.  311.  The  company 
may  make  necessary  alterations; 
Commonwealth  v.  Hartford  &  New 
Haven  R.  R.  Co.,  14  Gray  379. 

3  3 Alabama  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wil- 
liams, 92  Ala.  277,  9  So.  203;  Nichol- 
son V.  New  York  &  New  Haven  R.  R. 
Co.,  22  Conn.  74;  Longworth  v.  Meri- 
den  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  61  Conn.  451,  23 
Atl.  827 ;  Indianapolis  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Smith,  52  Ind.  428;  Egbert  v. 
Lake  Shore  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  0  Ind. 
App.  350,  33  N.~E.  659;  Pennsylvania 
Co.  V.  Stanley,  10  Ind.  App.  421,  37 
N.  E.  288,  38  N.  B.  421;  Hitchcock 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  88  Iowa, 
242,  55  N.  W.  337 ;  Louisville  &  N.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Finley,  86  Ky.  294,  5  S.  W. 
753;  Kaiser  v.  St.  Paul  S.  &  T.  F.  R. 
R.  Co.,  22  Minn.  149;  Perrine  v.  Pa. 
R.  R.  Co.,  72  N.  J.  L.  398,  61  Atl. 
87 ;  McNulta  v.  Ralston,  5  Ohio  C.  C. 
330;  Wead  v.  St.  Johnsbury  &  L.  C. 
R.  E.  Co.,  64  Vt.  52,  24  Atl.  361; 
Buchner  v.  C.  M.  &  N.  W.  Ey.  Co.,  56 
Wis.  403;  Buchner  v.  Chicago,  Mil. 


&  St.  Paul  Ey.  Co.,  60  Wis.  264; 
Shealy  v.  Chicago  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  72 
Wis.  471,  40  N.  W.  145;  Shealy  v. 
Chicago  etc.  E.  R.  Co.,  77  Wis.  653, 
46  N.  W.  887;  West  v.  Parkdale,  8 
Ont.  59;  West  v.  Parkdale,  7  Ont. 
270. 

34Nottingham  v.  B.  &  P.  R.  R.  Co., 
3  McArthur,  517;  Franz  v.  Sioux 
City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  55  la.  107 ;  Atch- 
ison etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Arnold,  52  Kan. 
729,  35  Pac.  780 ;  Atchison  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Luening,  52  Kan.  732,  35  Pac. 
801;  Whittier  \.  Portland  &  Ken- 
nebec R.  R.  Co.,  38  Me.  26 ;  Putnam 
V.  Boston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  182  Mass. 
351,  6S  N.  E.  790;  Hyde  v.  Boston 
etc.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  194  Mass.  80,  80  N. 
E.  517;  Phelps  v.  Detroit,  120  Mich. 
447,  79  N.  W.  640;  Towle  v.  Eastern 
Railroad,  17  N.  H.  519;  Uline  v. 
New  York  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  101  N.  Y. 
98,  4  N.  E.  536,  54  Am.  Rep.  661; 
Conklin  v.  New  York,  Ontario  & 
Western  Ry.  Co.,  102  N.  Y.  107; 
Ottenot  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
119  N.  Y.  603,  23  N.  E.  169;  Eauen- 
stein  V.  New  York  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  136 
N.  Y.  528,  32  N.  E.  528,  18  L.E.A. 


320 


EMIl^ENT    DOMAIK. 


§  174 


construction  of  viaducts  or  bridges  over  railroads,  and  by  the 
approaches  to  such  viaducts  or  bridges,  are  considered  in  another 
section.^^  Where  a  railroad  crosses  a  cid  de  sac,  and  so  inter- 
feres with  the  access  to  property  thereon,  a  recovery  may  be 
had,  although  the  surface  of  the  street  is  not  interfered  with.''® 
But  where  a  street  was  crossed  by  a  cut  two  blocks  away  from 
the  plaintiff's  property,  it  was  held  he  could  not  recover,  as  his 
right  of  access  or  outlet  was  not  interfered  with.*^  Where  a 
street  was  crossed  seventy-one  feet  from  the  plaintiff's  property 
and  blocked  up  at  that  point,  so  as  to  leave  plaintiff  on  a  cul 
de  sac,  he  was  held  entitled  to  recover  damages.^^  So  where  one 
end  of  an  alley  was  blockaded,  so  as  to  interfere  with  access  to 
the  rear  of  plaintiff's  lot.^®  Where  the  crossing  is  at  a  distance 
from  the  plaintiff's  property  and  the  street  is  obstructed  or 
rendered  inconvenient  and  the  plaintiff's  property  is  thereby 
depreciated  in  value,  the  question  of  liability  is  one  upon  which 


768,  7  Am.  R.  K.  &  Corp.  Rep.  520; 
S.  C.  120  N.  Y.  661,  24  N.  B.  1020; 
Buck  V.  Conn.  &  Pass.  River  R.  R. 
Co.,  42  Vt.  370;  Richardson  v.  Ver- 
mont Central  R.  R.  Co.,  25  Vt.  465, 
60  Am.  Dec.  459. 

Si  Ante,  §  138,  post,  §§  178,  191. 
Harvey  v.  Georgia  Southern  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  90  Ga.  66,  15  S.  E.  Rep.  783. 

3  6Brakken  v.  Minneapolis  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  29  Minn.  41;  Hayes  v.  Chi- 
cago etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  46  Minn.  349,  49 
N.  W.  Rep.  61. 

STShaubut  v.  St.  Paul  &  Sioux  City 
R.  R.  Co.,  21  Minn.  502;  and  see 
Brakken  v.  Minneapolis  &  St.  Louis 
Ry.  Co.,  32  Minn.  425;  S.  C.  31  Minn. 
45,  and  29  Minn.  41 ;  also  Rochette  v. 
Chicago,  Mil.  &  St.  Paul  Ry.  Co.,  32 
Minn.  201 ;  Barnum  v.  Minnesota 
Transfer  Co.,  33  Minn.  365;  Lakkie 
v.  Chicago  etc..  R.  R.  Co.,  44  Minn. 
438,  46  N.  W.  912.  But  see  Glaessner 
V.  Anheuser-Busch  Brewing  Assn., 
iOO  Mo.  508,  13  S.  W.  707,  2  Am.  R.  R. 
&  Corp.  Rep.  420. 

ssjohnsen  v.  Old  Colony  R.  R.  Co., 
18  R.  I.  642,  29  Atl.  594.  But  see 
O'Connor  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
56  la.  735. 


3  9Harvey  v.  Georgia  So.  R.  R.  Co., 
90  Ga.  66,  15  S.  E.  783 ;  Pennsylvania 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Stanley,  10  Ind.  App. 
421,  37  N.  E.  288,  38  N.  E. 
421 ;  Kaji  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
57  Minn.  422,  59  N.  W.  493;  Leaven-- 
worth  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Curtan,  51 
Kan.  432,  33  Pac.  297. 

4  0In  addition  to  the  cases  already 
cited  we  refer  to  the  following  cases 
favoring  the  right  of  recovery:  Chi- 
cago v.  Pulcyn,  129  111.  App.  179; 
Danville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Tidrick,  137 
111.  App.  553;  Park  v.  C.  &  S.  W. 
R.  R.  Co.,  43  la.  636 ;  Dairy  v.  Iowa 
Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  113  la.  716,  84  N.  W. 
683.  Contra :  Little  Rock,  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Newman,  73  Ark.  1,  83  S.  W. 
653,  108  Am.  St.  Rep.  17;  Newton  v. 
New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  72  Conn. 
420,  44  Atl.  813;  Grey  v.  Greenville, 
etc.  Ry.  Co.,  59  N.  J.  Eq.  372,  46  Atl. 
638;  Matter  of  Grade  Crossing 
Comrs.,  166  N.  Y.  69,  59  N.  E.  706; 
Scrutchfield  v.  Choctaw  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
18  Okl.  308,  88  Pac.  1048,  9  L.R.A. 
(N.S.)  496.  And  see  Sheehan  V.  Fall 
River,  187  Mass.  356,  73  N.  E.  544; 
Buckholz  V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
148  N.  Y.  640,  43  N.  E.  76;  Buckholtz 


§  175 


EOADS   AND    STREETS. 


321 


the  authorities  are  very  conflicting.*"  The  question  is  more 
fully  treated  in  a  subsequent  section.*' 

The  duty  of  a  railroad  company  to  restore  a  highway  crossed 
is  a  continuing  one,  and  where  it  crosses  by  a  bridge,  it  must 
be  replaced  when  necessary.*^  But  it  is  not  obliged  to  strengthen 
a  bridge  in  order  to  make  it  safe  for  a  street  railway.**  Au- 
thority to  cross  any  highway  in  the  line  of  the  railway  does 
not  authorize  a  track  on  a  curve,  which  does  not  cross  the  high- 
way but  begins  a  branch  road.**  Legislative  authority  to  cross 
any  public  road  or  way,  was  held  to  include  city  streets  as  well 
as  country  roads.*  ^ 

§  175  (119).  Right  of  municipality  having  the  fee  of 
street  to  receive  compensation.  As  we  have  already  had  oc- 
casion to  observe  a  municipal  corporation,  though  holding  the 
fee  of  its  streets,  holds  them  simply  as  a  tnistee  for  the  public.*" 
It  has  no  such  private  right  or  interest  therein,  as  entitles  it  to 
compensation  when  a  railroad  is  laid  thereon  by  legislative  au- 
thority, though  without  its  consent.*'^  The  same  rule  applies 
to  street  railroads  as  to  commercial  railroads.*^  So  as  to  a  public 
bridge.**    So  the  legislature  may  authorize  the  use  of  city  streets 


V.  New  York  etc.  R.  K.  Co.,  71  App. 
Div.  452,  75  N.  Y.  S.  824,  S.  C. 
affirmed  177  N.  Y.  550,  69  N.  E.  1121 ; 
Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Shepard, 
72  App.  Div.  108,  76  N.  Y.  S.  247; 
Shepherd  v.  Baltimore  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
130  U.  S.  426,  9  S.  C.  598. 

iiPost,  §  191. 

4  2  Chesapeake  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dyer 
County,  87  Tenn.  712,  11  S.  W.  943, 
and  see  Henry  v.  Wabash  Western  R. 
R.  Co.,  44  Mo.  App.  100. 

isBrideu  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  27  R.  I.  569,  65  Atl.  315. 

■iiBangor  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith, 
47  Me.  34. 

4  6  Canton  v.  Canton  Cotton  Ware- 
house Co.,  84  Miss.  268,  36  So.  266, 
105  Am.  St.  Rep.  428,  65  L.R.A.  561. 

nAnte,  §  127. 

4  7  Savannah  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Sa- 
vannah, 45  6a.  602 ;  Clinton  v.  Cedar 
Rapids  &  Mo.  River  R.  R.  Co.,  24  la. 
455;  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  New- 
Em.  D.— 21. 


ton,  36  la.  299;  Canton  v.  Canton 
Cotton  Warehouse  Co.,  84  Miss.  268, 
36  So.  268,  105  Am.  St.  Rep.  428,  65 
L.R.A.  561 ;  People  v.  Kerr,  27  N.  Y. 
188;  Milwaukee  v.  Milwaukee  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  7  Wis.  85.  See  Richmond 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Estill  Co.,  105  Ky. 
808,  49  S.  W.  805.  Contra,  Donnaker 
V.  State,  8  S.  &  M.  649. 

4  8Savannah  &  Thunderbolt  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Savannah,  45  Ga.  602 ;  Clinton 
V.  Clinton  &  Lyons  H.  Ry.  Co.,  37  la. 
61;  Milbridge  etc.  Elec.  R.  R.  Co., 
Appellants,  96  Me.  110,  51  Atl.  818; 
People  V.  Kerr,  27  N.  Y.  188. 

"County  of  Floyd  v.  Rome  St.  R. 
R.  Co.,  77  Ga.  614.  So  the  legislature 
may  authorize  a  drainage  district  to 
remove  a  county  bridge  and  require 
the  county  to  rebuild  at  its  own  ex- 
pense. Heffner  v.  Cass  &  Morgan 
Cos.,  193  111.  439,  62  N.  E,  201,  58 
L.R.A.  3C3, 


322 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  176 


for  other  purposes,  as  for  gas  pipes,^°  or  a  telephone  line>^^  with- 
out compensation  to  the  municipality.''^  But  where  a  railroad 
company  made  an  exclusive  appropriation  of  a  part  of  a  public 
highway  including  a  bridge,  and  tore  down  the  bridge  and  used 
the  materials,  it  was  held  that  the  town  could  recover  therefor,^* 
being  put  in  this  respect  upon  the  same  footing  as  a  turnpike 
company.  And  where  a  railroad  was  so  constructed  as  to  destroy 
a  portion  of  a  county  road,  it  was  held  that  the  county  could 
maintain  an  action  for  damages.^*,  A  municipality  may  enjoin 
the  construction  of  a  railroad  upon  a  street  without  authority,"* 
and  when  a  railroad  or  any  of  its  appurtenances  is  unlawfully 
upon  a  street,  it  can  maintain  an  action  for  its  removal.*" 

§  176  (120).  When  the  owner  is  estopped  from  claim- 
ing damages.  Where  the  owner  of  property  urges  or  induces 
a  railroad  company  to  locate  its  road  upon  the  adjacent  street, 
or  gives  his  consent  thereto,  he  will,  after  the  invitation  or  con- 
sent has  been  acted  upon,  be  estopped  from  claiming  damages  or 
enjoining  the  operation  of  the  road.*''     But  a  consent  to  locate 


soLa  Harfe  v.  Elm  Tp.  Gas  etc.  Co., 
69  Kan.  97,  76  Pac.  448. 

51  State  Line  Telephone  Co.  v. 
Ellison,  121  App.  Div.  499,  106  N.  Y. 
S.  130;  Zanesville  v.  Zanesville  Tel. 
&  Tel.  Co.,  64  Ohio  St.  67,  59  N.  E. 
781,  83  Am.  St.  Rep.  725,  52  L.E.A. 
150. 

5  2In  State  v.  Dunlap,  49  Wash. 
.385,  95  Pac.  321,  it  appears  that  a 
statute  permitted  railroad  companies 
to  take  highways  not  in  any  munici- 
pality upon  making  compensation  to 
the  county.  So  in  Nebraska  not  ex- 
cepting city  streets.  South  Omaha 
V.  Omaha  B.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  76  Neb. 
718,  107  N.  W.  988. 

ssTroy  v.  Cheshire  R.  R.  Co.,  23 
N.  H.  83,  55  Am.  Dec.  177. 

5  4Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Whitley  County  Court,  95  Ky.  215, 
24  S.  W.  604,  44  Am.  St.  Rep.  220; 
Big  Sandy  Ry.  Co.  v.  Boyd  County, 
125  Ky.  345.  And  where  a  highway 
was  flooded  by  a  dam  it  was  held  the 
public  authorities  could  recover  dam- 
ages. Commissioners  of  Highways 
V.  Sperling,  120  Mich.  493,  79  N.  W. 
§93, 


6  5Stamford  v.  Stamford  H.  R.  R. 
Co.,  56  Conn.  381,  1  L.R.A.  375; 
Brunswick  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of 
Waycross,  88  Ga.  68,  13  S.  E.  835; 
City  of  Philadelphia  v.  Phila.  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  19  Phil.  507 ;  Williamsport  v. 
Williamsport  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Pa. 
Co.  Ct.  39;  Philadelphia  v.  Phila.  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  7  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  390.  But  see 
Supervisors  v.  Sea  View  R.  R.  Co., 
23  Hun  180. 

BsVillage  of  Wayzata  v.  Great 
Northern  R.  R.  Co.,  50  Minn.  438,  52 
N.  W.  913;  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Mo. 
Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  114  Mo.  13,  21  S.  W. 
202;  Morris  &  Essex  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Newark,  10  N.  J.  Eq.  352 ;  Rio  Grande 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Brownsville,  45  Tex.  88. 

"Joyce  v.  East  St.  Louis  El.  St. 
R.  R.  Co.,  43  111.  App.  157;  Burkham 
V.  Ohio  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  122  Ind.  344, 
23  N.  E.  799;  Union  Barb  Wire  Co. 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  79 
la.  614,  44  N.  W.  900;  Wolf 
V.  Covington  &  Lexington  R.  R. 
Co.,  15  B.  Mon.  404;  Miller  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  6  Hill  61 ;  Murdock  v. 
Prospect  Park  &  Coney  Island  R.  R. 


§  178  EOADS  AND  STEEETS.  323 

an  elevated  railroad  in  the  middle  of  the  street,  is  not  a  con- 
sent to  build  over  the  sidewalk  and  -will  not  bar  an  action  for 
the  latter  mode  of  construction.®^  Where  the  location  of  a 
railroad  in  a  street  was  indicated  by  a  single  red  line,  a  consent 
to  the  location  is  a  consent  to  a  single  track  only,  and  does  not 
bar  an  action  for  an  additional  track.®" 

§  177  (121).  Measure  of  damages:  Remedies.  A 
discussion  of  the  proper  measure  of  damages  and  of  the  elements 
which  may  properly  be  considered  in  all  cases  where  a  recovery 
may  be  had  for  injuries  by  a  railroad  laid  in  a  public  street, 
together  with  a  consideration  of  the  proper  remedies  to  be  re- 
sorted to  in  such  cases,  are  reserved  for  a  subsequent  part  of 
this  treatise,  to  which  the  reader  is  referred.®" 

§  178  (121a).  Where  there  is  a  change  of  grade  in 
connection  with  the  construction  of  a  railroad  in  a  street. 
It  has  already  been  shown  that  damages  occasioned  by  a  change 
of  grade  for  the  purpose  of  improving  a  street  as  a  highway  are 
not  a  taking  within  the  constitution.*"^  We  have  also  endeavored 
to  show  that  if  the  grade  is  changed  for  any  other  purpose  than 
to  improve  the  street  for  passage,  any  injury  to  the  abutting 
property  caused  thereby  will  amount  to  a  taking."^  Ordinarily 
when  a  railroad  is  laid  in  a  street  it  is  required  to  conform  to 
the  grade  of  the  street. ^^  If  a  grade  has  been  established  and  the 
street  has  never  been  brought  to  the  grade  so  established,  a  rail- 
road will  not  be  liable  to  abutters  for  merely  bringing  the  street 
to  the  established  grade  in  order  to  lay  its  tracks  at  such  grade."* 

Co.,  10  Hun  598;  Heinburg  v.  Man-  Co.,  26  Conn.  249;  South  Carolina  E. 

hattan  Ry.  Co.,  162  N.  Y.  352,  56  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Steiner,  44  Ga.  546;  Hender- 

E.  899 ;  Smythe  v.  Brooklyn  El.  R.  R.  son  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  78  N. 

Co.,   193   N.   Y.   335,   modifying   121  Y.  423.    As  to  the  apportionment  of 

App.  Div.  282 ;  Wolford  v.  Fisher,  48  damages  where  only  part  of  the  track 

Ore.  479,  84  Pac.  850,  87  Pac.  530,  7  is  on  the  land  of  the  abutting  owner, 

L.R.A.  (N.S.)  991.    See  further  post,  see  Blesch  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  48 

§  760;  Oklahoma  City  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wis.  168;  S.  C.  43  Wis.  183;  Kuche- 

Dunham,  39  Tex.  Civ.  App.  575,  88  man  v.  C.  C.  &  D.  Ry.  Co.,  46  la.  366. 

S.  W.  849.  Remedies,  post,   chapters  xxvii  and 

ssShaw  V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  xxviii. 
78  App.  Div.  290,  79  K.  Y.  S.  915.  eiAnte,  §§  96,  137. 

59Stephens  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  enAnte,  §§  137,  138. 

Co.,  175  N.  Y.  72,  67  N.  E.  119,  re-  esSmith  v.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R. 

versing  61  App.  Div.  612.  Co.,  98  Mo.  20,  11  S.  W.  259;  Farrar 

eoMeasure  of  Damages,  post,  §  735.  v.  Midland  Elec.  Ry.   Co.,   101   Mo. 

A  few  of  the  leading  cases  are  here  App.  140,  74  S.  W.  500. 
cited.    Imlay  v.  Union  Branch  R.  R.  e^Interstate  Consol.  R.  T.  R.  R.  Co. 


324 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  1Y8 


But  sometimes  the  grade  is  changed,  not  for  the  purpose  of  fa- 
cilitating ordinary  trajBBe,  but  of  accommodating  the  tracks  of 
a  railroad  company.  According  to  the  better  reason,  as  we  con- 
ceive it,  the  abutter  in  such  case  is  entitled  to  recover  for  any 
damage  to  his  property  caused  by  the  change.  The  authorities, 
however,  are  conflicting  and,  perhaps,  on  the  whole,  do  not  favor 
a  recovery.®^    In  a  New  York  case  a  railroad  was  constructed 


V.  Early,  46  Kan.  197,  26  Pac.  422; 
Offut  V.  Montgomery  Co.,  94  Md.  115, 
50  Atl.  419;  Underwood  v.  Worcester, 
177  Mass.  173,  58  N.  E.  589.  Contra: 
Stritesky  v.  Cedar  Rapids,  98  la.  373, 
67  N.  W.  271. 

6  5  The  following  are  opposed  to  a 
recovery  on  the  ground  of  a  taking. 
Protzman  v.  Indianapolis  etc.  E.  R. 
Co.,  9  Ind.  467;  Weir  v.  Owensboro 
&  N.  E.  E.  Co.  (Ky.),  21  S.  W.  643; 
Briggs  V.  Lewiston  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
79  Me.  363,  10  Atl.  47,  1  Am.  St.  Eep. 
316 ;  O'Brien  v.  Baltimore  Belt  R.  R. 
Co.,  74  Md.  363,  22  Atl.  141 ;  Garrett 
V.  Lake  Roland  EI.  R.  R.  Co.,  79  Md. 
277,  29  Atl.  830,  10  Am.  R.  E.  & 
Corp.  Eep.  39 ;  Oflfutt  v.  Montgomery 
Co.,  94  Md.  115,  50  Atl.  419;  Under- 
wood V.  Worcester,  177  Mass.  173,  58 
N.  E.  589 ;  Laroz  v.  Northampton  St. 
Ey.  Co.,  189  Mass.  254,  75  N.  E.  255 ; 
Austin  V.  Detroit  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  134 
Mich.  149,  96  N.  W.  35 ;  Thompson  v. 
Macon  City,  106  Mo.  App.  84,  80  S. 
W.  1 ;  Corey  v.  Buffalo  etc.  E.  E.  Co., 
23  Barb.  482;  County  of  Chester  v. 
Brewer,  117  Pa.  St.  647,  12  Atl.  577. 
And  see  Green  v.  City  &  Suburban  E. 
E.  Co.,  78  Md.  294,  28  Atl.  626,  44  Am. 
St.  Eep.  288. 

The  following  cases  favor  a  recov- 
ery: Chicago  etc.  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Eisert, 
127  Ind.  156,  26  N.  E.  759;  Atchison  & 
C.  E.  R.  Co.  V.  Davidson,  52  Kan.  739, 
35  Pac.  787;  Nichols  v.  Ann  Arbor 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  87  Mich.  361,  49  N. 
W.  538,  16  L.E.A.  371 ;  Tate  v.  M.  K. 
&  T.  R.  E.  Co.,  64  Mo.  149;  Egerer 
V.  New  York  Cent.  etc.  E.  E.  Co., 
130  N,  Y.  108,  29  N.  E.  95,  5  Am.  E. 


E.  &  Corp.  Eep.  241 ;  Reining  v. 
New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  128  N.  Y. 
157,  28  N.  E.  640,  14  L.E.A.  133,  5 
Am.  E.  E.  &  Corp.  Eep.  476;  Coats- 
worth  V.  Lehigh  Val.  R.  R.  Co.,  156 
N.  Y.  451;  Coyne  v.  Memphis,  118 
Teun.  651,  102  S.  W.  355;  Zehren  v. 
Milwaukee  Elec.  R.  R.  Co.,  99  Wis. 
83,  74  N.  W.  538,  67  Am.  St.  Rep. 
844. 

The  following  cases,  involving  the 
right  to  recover  in  such  cases,  arose 
under  constitutions  or  statutes  giv- 
ing compensation  for  property  dam- 
aged or  injured  as  well  as  for  prop- 
erty taken:  Alabama  M.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Coskry,  92  Ala.  254,  9  So.  202; 
Eslich  V.  Mason  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
75  la.  443,  39  N.  W.  700;  Taylor  v. 
Bay  City  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  101  Mich. 
140,  59  N.  W.  447;  Sheehy  v.  Kansas 
City  Cable  R.  R.  Co.,  94  Mo.  574,  7 
S.  W.  579,  4  Am.  St.  Rep.  396; 
Smith  V.  Kansas  City  etc.  E.  E.  Co., 
98  Mo.  20,  11  S.  W.  259;  Brady  v. 
Kansas  City  Cable  E.  E.  Co.,  Ill 
Mo.  329,  19  S.  W.  953;  Spencer  v. 
Met.  St.  E.  E.  Co.,  58  Mo.  App.  513; 
Fred  v.  Kansas  City  Cable  E.  E. 
Co.,  65  Mo.  App.  121 ;  Nebraska  etc. 
E.  E.  Co.  V.  Scott,  31  Neb.  571,  48  N. 
W.  390;  County  of  Chester  v. 
Brewer,  117  Pa.  St.  647,  12  Atl.  577; 
Baltimore  etc.  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Duke,  129 
Pa.  St.  422,  18  Atl.  560;  Westheffer 
V.  Lebanon  &  A.  St.  E.  E.  Co.,  163 
Pa.  St.  54,  29  Atl.  873;  Hatch  v.  Ta- 
coma  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  6  Wash.  1,  32 
Pac.  1063;  Kaufman  v.  Tacoma  etc. 
E.  E.  Co.,  II  Wash.  632,  40  Pac. 
137;  Arbenz  v,  Wheeling  etc,  R.  R, 


§  178 


EOADS    AND    STREETS. 


325 


on  an  embankment  supported  by  retaining  walls  in  the  middle  o£ 
a  street.  The  embankment  was  twenty-four  feet  wide  and  six 
feet  high  opposite  the  plaintiff's  property.  The  grade  and  plan 
were  approved  by  the  city  authorities.  It  was  held  that  the  in- 
terference with  access  to  the  plaintiff's  property  was  a  taking 
within  the  constitution,  though  the  fee  of  the  street  was  in  the 
city.*®  In  a  precisely  similar  ease  in  Maryland  it  was  held 
that  there  was  no  taking.*^  A  change  of  grade  for  the  benefit 
of  a  railroad  company  does  not  come  within  the  general  au- 
thority vested  in  municipal  corporations  to  establish  and  change 
the  grade  of  streets.®^  If  a  change  of  grade  is  made  by  a  rail- 
road company  without  authority,  the  company  will  be  liable  in 
tort  for  all  damages  thereby  occasioned  to  abutting  property."^ 
Where,  after  a  railroad  had  been  constructed  on  its  own  right  of 
way  fifty  feet  wide,  land  on  either  side  was  taken  for  a  street, 
abutters  are  not  entitled  to  damages  for  a  change  of  grade  of  the 


Co.  33  W.  Va.  1,  10  S.  E.  14,  5  L.R.A. 
371.  See  also  Jacksonville  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Thompson,  34  Fla.  346,  10  So. 
282;  Kansas  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cuyk- 
endall,  42  Kan.  234,  21  Pac.  1051; 
Witt  V.  St.  Paul  &  N.  P.  R.  R.  Co., 
38  Minn.  122,  35  N.  W.  862;  Jarboe 
V.  Carrollton,  73  Mo.  App.  347;Hulett 
V.  Missouri  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  80  Mo. 
App.  87 ;  Iron  Mt.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bing- 
ham, 87  Tenn.  522,  11  S.  W.  705,  4 
L.R.A.  622;  Trustees  First  Cong. 
Church  V.  Milwaukee  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
77  Wis.  158,  45  N.  W.  1086;  Jackson 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  41  Fed. 
656;  Hendrie  v.  Toronto  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  26  Ontario  667. 

6  6Reining  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  128  N.  Y.  157,  28  N.  E.  640,  14 
L.R.A.  133. 

67Garrett  v.  Lake  Roland  El.  R. 
R.  Co.,  79  Md.  277,  29  Atl.  Rep.  830, 
24  L.R.A.  396,  10  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp. 
Rep.  39.  The  defendant  railroad 
company  built  a  causeway  about 
fifteen  feet  wide  in  the  center  of  a 
street,  to  form  the  approach  to  a 
bridge  by  which  the  railroad  was 
carried  over  another  railroad.  The 
causeway  was  of  masonry  and  left 


less  than  ten  feet  between  it  and  the 
curb.  It  was  nine  feet  high  at  the 
bridge  and  declined  to  the  grade  of 
the  street.  Plaintiff  owned  lots 
abutting  on  the  street, opposite,  but 
did  not  own  the  fee  of  the  street. 
Held,  that  the  interference  with 
access  and  other  injury  to  plaintiff's 
property  did  not  constitute  a  taking 
thereof  within  the  meaning  of  the 
constitution. 

esPhelps  v.  Detroit,  120  Mich. 
447,  79  N.  W.  640;  Reining  v.  New 
York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  128  N.  Y.  157, 
28  N.  E.  640,  14  L.R.A.  33;  Zehren 
V.  Milwaukee  Elec.  R.  R.  Co.,  99 
Wis.  S3,  74  N.  W.  538,  67  Am.  St. 
Rep.  844. 

esPeabody  v.  Boston  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  181  Mass.  76,  62  N.  E.  1047; 
Peabody  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
187  Mass.  489,  73  N.  E.  649;  Smith 
V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  98 
Mo.  20,  11  S.  W.  259;  Farrar  v.  Mid- 
land Elec.  Ry.  Co.,  101  Mo.  App.  140, 
74  S.  W.  500;  United  N.  J.  R.  R.  & 
C.  Co.  V.  Lewis,  68  N.  J.  Eq.  437,  59 
Atl.  227;  Murray  Hill  Land  Co.  v. 
Milwaukee  Lt.,  H.  &  T.  Co.,  110  Wis. 
555,  86  N.  W.  199. 


326  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    179 

railroad,  the  same  being  still  on  its  private  right  of  ■waj.''°  If 
a  railway  so  constructs  its  road  in  a  street  as  to  turn  surface 
water  on  the  plaintiff's  property,  it  will  be  liable.''^  Under 
the  general  rule  as  to  damages  from  a  change  of  grade,  if  the 
grade  of  tracks  is  changed  in  good  faith  for  the  benefit  of  the 
highway,  there  can  be  no  recovery. ''^ 

§  179  (121b).  Compensation  for  additional  track  or 
change  of  use.  In  Indiana  it  has  been  held  that  when  a  rail- 
road company  locates  its  road  upon  a  public  street,  the  fee  of 
which  is  in  the  abutting  owners,  and  damages  are  assessed  and 
paid  in  the  usual  way,  the  company  will  acquire  the  right  to  lay 
down  as  many  tracks  as  its  business  may  require,  and  that  such 
right  can  be  exercised  from  time  to  time  as  the  business  of  the 
company  increases.^*  According  to  this  view  a  railroad  com- 
pany, by  condemning  a  right  of  way  through  a  street,  would  ac- 
quire the  same  rights  in  the  street,  at  least  as  against  abutting 
owners,  as  it  would  have  in  a  right  of  way  over  private  property. 
Certainly  such  a  result  ought  not  to  be  countenanced  unless  the 
statutes  clearly  compel  it.  When  a  railroad  seeks  to  condemn 
a  right  of  way  in  a  street  it  can  only  acquire  a  right  to  the  joint 
use  of  the  street,  and  its  application  should  describe  exactly 
the  extent  of  the  right  or  joint  use  proposed  to  be  acquired ;  in 
other  words,  the  number  of  tracks  to  be  laid  down  and  their  lo- 
cation, and  how  they  are  to  be  used.'^*  This  is  the  only  way  in 
which  the  rights  of  the  railroad,  the  public  and  the  abutting 

7  0Bennett  v.   Long   Island   K.   R.  the   location   of    a    railroad   along, 

Co.,  181  N.  Y.  431,  74  N.  E.  418,  af-  upon  and  over  a  street  or  highway, 

firming  S.  C.  89  App.  Div.  379,  85  N.  the    location    and   appropriation    is 

Y.  S.  938.  made  with  a  view  of  future  use  and 

7iMonarch  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Omaha  etc.  occupancy  by  the  railroad  company 

Ry.  Co.,  127  la.  511,  103  N.  W.  493;  to  the  full  extent  and  purpose  as  the 

McCloskey  v.   Atlantic   City   R.   R.  future  operation  and  business  of  the 

Co.,  70  N.  J.  L.  20,  56  Atl.  669 ;  atite,  company  may  demand.     It  gives  to 

§§  112,  141.    'See  Hewett  v.  Canton,  the  company,  as  against  the  prop- 

182  Mass.  220,  65  N.  E.  42.  erty    owners    affected    thereby,  the 

7  2Welde  V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  right  to  use  such  street  or  highway, 

Co.,  28  App.  Div.  379.  upon  which  the  road  is  located,   a 

'sWhite  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  full  and  complete  right  to  use  the 

122  Ind.  317,  23  N.  E.  782,  7  L.R.A.  same,   for   railroad   purposes,  in  as 

257,  2  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  138 ;  full    and    ample    a    manner    as    the 

Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Eisert,  127  necessity  of  the  company    may    de- 

Ind.  156,  26  N.  E.  759.     In  the  first  mand." 

of  these  cases  the  court  says:     "In  liPost,  §§  549-552. 
appropriation  of  a  right  of  way,  or 


§  179 


EOADS    AND    STREETS. 


327 


owners  can  be  defined  and  the  damages  assessed  upon  an  intelli- 
gent basisJ"  In  most  cases  railroads  are  constructed  in  streets 
by  virtue  of  a  legislative  or  municipal  grant  of  authority,  and 
not  by  virtue  of  a  condemnation.  If  the  construction  of  the 
railroad  is  wrongful  as  against  the  abutting  owner,  he  has  his 
remedy  for  damages,  but  he  can  only  recover  for  the  damages 
actually  sustained,  and  these  must  depend  upon  the  use  which 
has  actually  been  made  of  the  street.  He  can  only  recover  the 
damages  caused  by  the  tracks  already  laid.  If,  after  damages 
have  been  assessed  for  the  original  entry,  or  after  the  same  have 
been  barred  by  the  lapse  of  time,  an  additional  track  is  laid, 
either  under  the  original  or  a  subsequent  authority,  there  is  a 
clear  right  to  recover  the  damages  thereby  occasioned. ''® 
The  fact  that  a  narrow  gauge  track  is  changed  to  a  standard 
gauge  laid  on  the  same  ties  or  that  heavier  trains  are  operated 
was  held  to  give  no  right  to  compensation.''''  But  in  another 
case,  where  a  dummy  passenger  railroad  changed  hands  and  was 
used  by  the  purchaser  chiefly  for  heavy  freight  trains  drawn  by 
the  ordinary  locomotive,  it  was  held  that  an  abutting  owner  had 
a  right  of  actioh  for  the  damage  resulting  to  his  property  from 


7  6Philadelphia  etc.  E.  E.  Co.  v. 
Berks  County  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Wood- 
ward's Decs.  (Pa.  Supm.)  361; 
Pennsylvania  S.  V.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Phil- 
adelphia etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  157  Pa.  St. 
42,  27  Atl.  683;  Jones  v.  Erie  &  W. 
V.  R.  R.  Co.,  169  Pa.  St.  333,  32  Atl. 
335,  47  Am.  St.  Rep.  916.  In  the  last 
case  the  court  says :  "The  presump- 
tion arising  under  the  general  rail- 
road laws  that  a  railroad  company 
takes,  when  it  enters  by  virtue  of  the 
right  of  eminent  domain,  the 
breadth  of  60  feet  for  its  right  of 
way,  is  only  applicable  where  the 
entry  is  adverse,  and  upon  property 
subject  to  seizure  or  appropriation 
under  general  laws.  It  does  not  ap- 
ply to  an  entry  upon  a  public  street, 
whether  made  under  authority  of  the 
act  of  assembly  incorporating  the 
company,  or  by  virtue  of  municipal 
consent." 

7  6Denver  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Costes,  1  Col.  App.  336,  28  Pac.  1129; 


Rock  Island  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  John- 
son, 204  111.  488,  68  N.  E.  549;  Ho- 
gan  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  208 
111.  161,  69  N.  E.  853;  McCarty  v.  C. 

B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  34  111.  App.  273; 
Maltman  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
41  111.  App.  229;  Stephens  v.  New 
York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  175  N.  Y.  72,  67 
N.  E.  119;  In  re  New  York  El.  R.  R. 
Co.,  76  Hun  384,  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  110; 
Maitland  v.  Manhattan  R.  R.  Co.,  9 
Miscl.  616,  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  428;  C.  C. 
&  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Reeder,  6  Ohio 

C.  C.  354;  Northern  Central  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Holland,  117  Pa.  St.  613,  12 
Atl.  575.  And' see  Ranson  v.  Citi- 
zens' R.  R.  Co.,  104  Mo.  375,  16  S. 
W.  416;  Varwig  v.  Cleveland  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  6  Ohio  C.  C.  439;  Dilley  v. 
Wilkes-Barre  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  12  Pa. 
Co.  Ct.  270;  Illinois  Central  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Davis,  71  111.  App.  99. 

'7Kakeldy  v.  Columbia  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  37  Wash.  675,  80  Pac.  205. 


328 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  180 


the  change.''^    So  where  the  track  was  changed  from  the  surface 
of  the  street  to  an  embankment.''* 

§  180  (121c).  Street  railroads  crossing  commercial 
railroads.  The  right  of  way  which  a  steam  railroad  acquires 
across  a  street  is  subject  to  the  easement  of  the  public  in  the 
street  and  to  the  use  of  the  street  for  all  legitimate  street  pur- 
poses. A  street  railroad,  being  generally  held  to  be  a  legitimate 
street  use/"  it  follows  that  it  may  be  laid  across  the  tracks  of  a 
steam  railroad,  intersecting  the  street  without  compensation.*' 
The^  same  rule  has  been  held  to  apply  in  case  of  interurban  rail- 
roads constructed  on  a  street  or  highway  and  crossing  a  commer- 


786rossman  v.  Houston  etc.  Ey. 
Co.,  99  Tex.  641,  92  S.  W.  838;  Bir- 
mingham Belt  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lockwood, 
150  Ala.  610,  43  So.  819.  See  Stette- 
gast  V.  Houston,  38  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
623,  87  S.  W.  197. 

TSLouisville  etc.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Cum- 
nock, 25  Ky.  L.  E.  1330,  77  S.  W. 
933. 

so  Ante,  §§  164,  167. 

siNew  York  etc.  R.  E.  Co.  v. 
Bridgeport  Traction  Co.,  65  Conn. 
410,  32  Atl.  953,  29  L.E.A.  367; 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Atlanta  Ey.  & 
P.  Co.,  HI  Ga.  679,  36  S.  E. 
873,  51  L.R.A.  125;  Chicago  etc. 
R.  E.  Co.  V.  West  Chicago  St.  E.  E. 
Co.,  156  111.  270,  40  N.  E.  1008,  12 
Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  522;  General 
Eleo.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  184  111.  588,  56  N.  E.  963 ;  Pitts- 
burgh etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  West  Chicago 
St.  R.  R.  Co.,  54  HI.  App.  273;  Chi- 
cago etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Whiting  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  139  Ind.  297,  38  N.  E.  604, 
11  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  507,  47 
Am.  St.  Rep.  264,  26  L.R.A.  337; 
Elizabethtown  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ash- 
land &  C.  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  96  Ky.  347, 
26  S.  W.  181;  Louisville  etc.  R.  E. 
Co.  V.  Bowling  Green  Ey.  Co.,  110 
Ky.  788,  63  S.  W.  4;  Central  Pass. 
Ey.  Co.  V.  Philadelphia  etc.  E.  E. 
Co.,  95  Md.  428,  62  Atl.  752;  St. 
Louis  &  Suburban  Ey.  Co.  v. 
Lindell    E.    E.    Co.,    190    Mo.    246, 


88  S.  W.  634;  Morris  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Newark  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  51  N. 
J.  Eq.  379,  29  Atl.  184;  Cincinnati 
etc.  Elec.  St.  Ry.  v.  Cincinnati  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  21  Ohio  C.  C.  391;  Cleve- 
land etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Urbana  etc.  Ry. 
Co.,  5  Ohio  C.  C.  (N.  S.)  583;  Buf- 
falo etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Du  Bois  Trac- 
tion Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  149  Pa.  St.  1, 
24  Atl.  179;  North  Penn.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Inland  Traction  Co.,  205  Pa.  St. 
579,  55  Atl.  774;  Delaware  etc.  R.  E. 
Co.  V.  Wilkes-Barre  &  W.  S.  R.  R. 
Co.,  1  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  627;  Du  Bois 
Traction  Pass  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Buffalo 
etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  10  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  401; 
Pennsylvania  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Inland 
Traction  Co.,  25  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  115; 
Atchison  etc.  Ey.  Co.  v.  General  Elec. 
Ey.  Co.,  112  Fed.  689,  50  C.  C.  A. 
424 ;  East  St.  Louis  Ey.  Co.  v.  Louis- 
ville etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  149  Fed.  159,  79 
C.  C.  A.  107.  And  see  Highland  Ave. 
etc.  E.  E.  Co.  V.  Birmingham  Union 
E.  E.  Co.,  93  Ala.  505,  9  So.  568; 
Birmingham  Traction  Co.  V.  Bir- 
mingham E.  E.  &  Elec.  Co.,  119  Ala. 
129,  24  So.  368;  Atchison  St.  E.  E. 
Co.  V.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  31  Kan. 
660;  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  St. 
Joseph  Terminal  R.  R.  Co.,  97  Mo. 
457,  10  S.  W.  826;  Chicago  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Beatrice  Rapid  Transit  &  P. 
Co.,  47  Neb.  741,  66  N.  W.  830;  Buf- 
falo etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  New  York  etc. 
R.   R.   Co.,   72  Hun   587,   25   N.   Y. 


§  181 


EOADS    AND    STEEETS. 


329 


cial  railroad.*^  Of  course  the  street  railroad  company  must  con- 
struct the  crossing  at  its  own  expense  and  with  as  little  injury 
to  the  other  company  as  possible.®^  Where  a  grade  crossing  of 
a  steam  railroad  and  street  railroad  is  abolished  by  raising  the 
tracks  of  the  former,  the  work  must  be  so  done  as  to  give  suffi- 
cient head  room  for  the  cars  of  the  street  railroad  company.** 
The  crossing  of  steam  railroads  by  street  railroads  is  frequently 
regulated  by  statute.*' 

§  181  (121  d).  Railroads  in  streets. — Miscellaneous 
cases.  The  abutting  owner  has  no  easement  in  the  street  for 
backing  up  teams  to  the  sidewalk  for  the  purpose  of  loading 
and  unloading  freight,  and  the  interference  with  such  use  of 
the  street  by  laying  a  railroad  therein  affords  no  ground  for  an 
injunction  or  suit  for  damages.*®  When  streets  are  dedicated 
by  plat  and  the  right  is  reserved  to  use  them  for  railroad  pur- 


Supp.  265;  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
General  Elec.  R.  R.  Co.,  79  111.  App. 
569;  Consolidated  Traction  Co.  v. 
South  Orange  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  56  N.  J. 
Eq.  569,  40  Atl.  15.  One  street  rail- 
road company  may  cross  the  tracks 
of  another  without  compensation. 
Birmingham  Ry.  &  Elec.  Co.  v.  Bir- 
mingham Traction  Co.,  122  Ala.  349, 
25  So.  192. 

s2South  East  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Evansville  etc.  Elec.  Ry.  Co.,  169 
Ind.  339,  82  N.  E.  765 ;  Cleveland  etc. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Feight,  41  Ind.  App.  416. 
In  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  N.  O. 
Terminal  Co.,  120  La.  978,  45  So. 
962,  it  was  held  that  a  steam  rail- 
road laid  along  a  street  is  subject  to 
the  right  of  another  steam  railroad 
to  cross  its  tracks  and  that  the  ex- 
pense of  constructing  the  crossing 
should  be  divided  between  the  com- 
panies. 

8  3Ibid.  Central  Pass  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  95  Md. 
428,  52  Atl.  752;  Briden  v.  New 
York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  27  R.  I.  569,  05 
Atl.  315.  In  the  former  case  the 
steam  road  filed  a  bill  to  enjoin  the 
street  railroad  from  crossing,  until 
it  agreed  to  construct  the  crossing 


and  keep  it  in  repair  at  its  own  ex- 
pense. Pending  the  suit  the  crossing 
was,  by  agreement,  put  in  by  the 
street  railroad  company.  On  the 
final  hearing  the  defendant  was  en- 
joined from  using  the  crossing  until 
it  entered  into  an  agreement  with 
the  plaintiff  to  keep  the  grossing  in 
repair  in  accordance  with  the  re- 
quirements of  the  plaintiff's  en- 
gineers and  this  decree  was  affirmed. 
In  the  Rhode  Island  case,  where  the 
highway  was  carried  over  the  steam 
road  by  a  bridge,  it  was  held  that 
the  street  railroad  must  strengthen 
the  bridge  at  its  own  expense. 

8  4  Chicago  General  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  181  111.  605. 

8  6;See  Jackson  etc.  Traction  Co.  v. 
Comrs.  of  Railroads,  128  Mich.  164, 
87  N.  W.  133 ;  Trenton  St.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
United  N.  J.  R.  R.  &  C.  Co.,  60  N.  J. 
Eq.  500,  46  Atl.  763 ;  Geneva  etc.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  New  York  Cent.  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
163  N.  Y.  228,  57  N.  E.  498. 

ssHobart  v.  Milwaukee  City  R.  R. 
Co.,  27  Wis.  194,  9  Am.  Rep.  461; 
Louisville  Bagging  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Cen- 
tral Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  95  Ky.  50,  23  fcl. 
W.  592 ;  Taylor  v.  Bay  City  St.  R.  R. 
Co.,  101  Mich.  140,  59  N.  W.  447. 


330  EMINENT    DOMAIN,  181 

poses,  the  reservation  confers  no  greater  right  than  an  ordinary 
grant.*''  Where  land  is  dedicated  for  a  street,  with  a  railroad 
thereon,  the  dedication  is  subject  to  the  right  of  the  railroad 
company**  Where  lots  are  conveyed  to  a  railroad  company  to 
be  used  for  railroad  purposes,  it  does  not  carry  the  right  to  use 
the  street  to  the  center  line  thereof  for  such  purposes,  to  the  dam- 
age of  other  property  of  the  grantor.*^  The  fact  that  a  street 
has  been  mapped  out  through  plaintiff's  land  does  not  give  a  rail- 
road company  any  right  to  occupy  it  without  compensation.^" 
Where  a  boulevard  was  laid  out  under  a  special  act  of  the  legis- 
lature, with  a  provision  that  no  railway  or  tramway  should  be 
constructed  thereon  without  compensation  to  the  owner  of  the 
fee,  the  same  as  though  no  highway  existed,  it  was  held  the 
legislature  could  not  abrogate  this  condition  by  authorizing  a 
railroad  without  compensation.®^  Where  a  railroad  was  built 
on  the  property  of  the  company,  adjoining  a  street  or  alley,  and 
the  filling  encroached  slightly  thereon,  it  was  held  the  owner 
opposite  had  no  right  of  action.®^  An  abutment  or  arch  in  a 
street  for  the  use  of  a  railroad,  and  authorized  by  municipal 
authority,  is  not  a  nuisance,  which  can  be  prevented  or  abated.®^ 
A  telephone  company  may  compel  a  railroad  company  subse- 
quently occupying  the  street  with  trolley  wires,  to  put  up  guard 
wires  where  it  crosses  the  telephone  line,  the  duty  being  enjoined 
by  ordinance.®*  A  consent  of  abutters  to  lay  tracks  in  a  street 
does  not  authorize  any  encroachment  on  their  property,  though 
the  street  is  too  narrow  to  accommodate  the  tracks.®^  An  abutter 
can  recover  nothing  for  gate  fixtures,  erected  on  his  fee  pursu- 
ant to  municipal  authority  or  direction.""     One  railroad  com- 

8  70ttawa  etc.  E,.  R.  Co.  v.  Larson,  E.  Co.,  66  la.  440;  Morris  v.  Wiscon- 

40  Kan.  301,  19  Pae.  661,  2  L.R.A.  sin  Midland  R.  R.  Co.,  82  Wis.  541, 

59.  52  N.  W.  758. 

ssCity  of  Denver  v.  Denver  etc.  R.  ssChicago  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

R.  Co.,  17  Col.  583,  31  Pac.  338.  Elgin,  91  111.  251;  Gates  v.  Kansas 

ssLamm  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  Ill  Mo.  28,  19  S. 

45  Minn.  71,  47  N.  W.  455,  10  L.R.A.  W.  957. 

268.  9  4  State  v.  Janesville  St.  R.  R.  Co., 

soQuigley  v.  Penn.  S.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  87  Wis.  72,  57  N.  W.  970,  41  Am.  St. 

121  Pa.  St.  35,  15  Atl.  478,  S.  C.  4  Rep.  23. 

Mont.  Co.  L.  Rep.  179.  ssCurtin  v.  Rochester  R.  E.  Co.,  78 

siMatter  of    Southern    Boulevard  Hun  555,  29  N.  Y.  Supp.  521. 

R.  R.  Co.,  58  Hun  497,  38  N.  Y.  St.  "Trustees  First  Cong.  Church  v. 

550,  12  N.  Y.  Supp.  466;  appeal  from  Milwaukee  etc.  R.  R.   Co.,  77  Wis. 

same  dismissed,  128  N.  Y.  93.  158,  45  N.  W.  1086. 
9  2Rinard  v.  Burlington  &  W.  R. 


§  182  EOADS  AND  STREETS.  331 

panj'  may  be  prevented  by  injunction  from  wrongfully  interfer- 
ing with  another  company  in  laying  its  tracks  in  a  street.®'^  A 
city  cannot  authorize  the  construction  of  a  railroad  on  a  private 
street.^*  A  city  may  impose  reasonable  regulations  upon  a  rail- 
road company  as  to  the  manner  of  laying  its  tracks,  though  its 
authority  is  derived  directly  from  the  legislature.®"  A  railroad 
company,  owning  abutting  property,  is  entitled  to  the  same  rem- 
edies as  any  other  abutter.^  Where  a  railroad  had  built  an 
overhead  crossing,  it  was  held  that  a  street  railroad  company 
could  not  use  it  without  compensation.^  Where  two  main  tracks 
and  three  or  four  side  tracks  had  been  laid  in  a  street  one  hun- 
dred feet  wide  under  due  authority  and  had  been  in  use  eighteen 
years,  it  was  held  the  city  could  not  compel  the  removal  of  the 
tracks  when  they  did  not  appear  to  be  an  unreasonable  use  of  the 
street.* 

IV.  Othee  uses  of  Streets. 

§  182  (126).  What  are  legitimate  street  uses  gener- 
ally. In  regard  to  the  uses  which  the  public  authorities  can 
make,  or  authorize  to  be  made,  of  the  land  acquired  for  streets, 
the  general  rule  is  that  streets  are  laid  out  primarily  to  accommo- 
date the  public  in  traveling  from  place  to  place,  and  for  use  in 
the  transportation  of  goods  and  property,  and  that  the 
right  attaches  to  do  whatever  is  necessary  or  proper  to  facilitate 
such  travel  and  transportation  in  the  usual  and  ordinary  modes. 
"The  primary  law  of  the  highway  is  motion,  and  whatever  ve- 
hicles are  used,  or  whatever  method  of  transmission  of  intel- 
ligence is  adopted,  the  vehicle  must  move  and  the  intelligence 
be  transmitted  by  some  moving  body,  which  must  pass  along  the 
highway,  either  on  or  over  or  perhaps  under  it;  but  it  cannot 
permanently  appropriate  any  part  of  it."  *     But,  while  the  pur- 

97Chicago   General   E.   R.    Co.   v.  Reading  Paper  Mills,  149  Pa.  St.  18, 

West  Chicago  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  63  111.  24  Atl.  205. 

App.  464;   Central  Crosstown  R.  R.  2  Carolina    Central    R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Co.  V.  Met.  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  App.  Wilmington  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  120  N.  C. 

Div.  N.  Y.  229.  520;     Pennsylvania     R.    R.    Co.    v. 

9  8Talbot  V.  Richmond  etc.  R.  R.  Greensburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  176  Pa.  St. 

Co.,  31  Gratt.  685.  559,  35  Atl.  122,  36  L.R.A.  839. 

ssHarrisburg     City    Pass.   R.    R.  sColorado  Springs  v.  Colorado  etc. 

Co.  V.  Harrisburg,  7  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  584;  Ry.  Co.,  38  Colo.  107,  89  Pac.  820. 
Same  v.  Same,  7  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  593.  ■JEels  v.  American  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co., 

iPennsylvania  S.  V.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  143  N.  Y.  133,  38  N.  E.  202,  25  L.R.A. 


332 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  182 


pose  of  streets  is  primarily  for  public  travel  and  transportation, 
yet  in  populous  districts  it  has  been  the  immemorial  custom  to 
employ  them  for  other  purposes  of  a  public  nature  which,  though 
having  little  or  no  connection  with  the  use  or  improvement  of 


040,  10  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  69. 
In  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Wil- 
liams, 86  Va.  696, 11  S.E.  106, 19  Am. 
St.  Rep.  908,  2  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp. 
Rep.  258,  the  court  says:     "The  right 
of  the  commonwealth  is  to  use  by  go- 
ing along  over.    This  is  the  extent  of 
the  right.    If  the  right  was  granted  to 
the  defendant  to  go  over  simply  to 
carry  its  messages,  then  the  right 
granted  was  in  existence  before  the 
grant,  and  the  right  to  go  over  is  not 
only  not  disputed,  but  distinctly  ad- 
mitted.    This  is  the  servitude  over 
the  land  fixed  upon  it  by  law  and  the 
whole    extent   of    it.      If    anything 
more  is  taken,  it  is   an  additional 
servitude,   and   is   a   taking   of   the 
property  within  the  meaning  of  the 
constitution."     See  also  Donovan  v. 
AUert,  11  N.  D.  289,  91  N.  W.  441,  95 
Am.   St.  Rep.  720,    58    L.R.A.  775; 
Cincinnati  Inclined  Plane  R.  R.  Co. 
V.   City  &   Suburban  Tel.  Ass'n,   48 
Ohio  St.  390,  27  N.  E.  890,  12  L.R.A. 
534,  4  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  533; 
Dailey  v.  State,  51  Ohio  St.  348,  37 
N.  E.  710,  24  L.R.A.  724,  10  Am.  R. 
R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  687.     On  the  other 
hand,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Minne- 
sota in  a  recent  case  has  declared  in 
favor  of  a  more  enlarged  conception 
of  the  purpose  of  highways.  It  says : 
"It    seems    to    us    that    a    limita- 
tion    of     the     public     easement     in 
highways   to  travel   and   the   trans- 
portation  of   persons   and   property 
in    movable    vehicles    is    too    nar- 
row.    In  our  judgment,  public  high- 
ways, whether  urban  or  rural,  are 
designed  as  avenues  of  communica- 
tion; and,  if  the  original  conception 
of  a  highway  was  limited  to  travel 
and   transportation   of   property   in 
movable    vehicles,    it    was    because 


these  were  the  only  modes  of  commu- 
nication then  known;  that  as  civili- 
zation advanced,  and  new  and  im- 
proved   methods    of    communication 
and  transportation  were  developed, 
these  are  all  in  aid  of  and  within  tlie 
general  purpose  for  which  highways 
are  designed.     Whether  it  be  travel, 
the  transportation    of    persons  and 
property,  or  the  transmission  of  in- 
telligence, and  whether  accomplished 
by  old  methods  or  by  new  ones,  they 
are   all  included  within  the  public 
'highway  easement,'  and  impose  no 
additional  servitude  on  the  land,  pro- 
vided they  are  not  inconsistent  with 
the  reasonably  safe  and  practical  use 
of  the  highway  in  other  and  usual 
and  necessary  modes,  and  provided 
they  do  not  unreasonably  impair  the 
special  easements  of  abutting  owners 
in  the  street  for  purposes  of  access, 
light,  and  air.     It  is  impracticable, 
as  well  as  dangerous,  to  attempt  to 
lay  down,  except  in  this  general  form, 
any  rule  or  test  of  universal  applica- 
tion as  to  what  is  or  what  is  not  a 
legitimate   'street  or   highway  use.' 
Courts  have  often  attempted  to  do  so, 
but  have  always  been  compelled  by 
the  logic    of    events   to  shift  their 
ground.  The  only  safe  way  is  to  keep 
in  mind  the  general  purpose  of  high- 
ways, and  adopt  a  gradual  process  of 
inclusion    and    exclusion    as    cases 
arise.     *     *     *     It  is  said  that  'the 
primary  law  of  the  street  is  motion.' 
It     is     true     motion     is     the     law 
of    the  street,    in    the    sense    that 
the    person    or    thing   to   be    trans- 
mitted or   transported  must  move; 
but  it  is  not  true  in  the  sense  that 
the  medium  or  agency  by  or  through 
which     it     is     conveyed     or     trans- 
mitted    must     move.      Pipes     laid 


§  isa 


EOADS    AND  STREETS. 


333 


the  street  as  a  highway,  are  not  inconsistent  with  such  use." 
Out  of  this  usage  has  grown  up  a  rule  that  streets  in  cities  and 
villages  may  be  used  for  various  incidental  purposes,  such  as 
sewer,  gas  and  water  pipes.  The  best  general  statement  of  this 
rule,  which  we  have  met  with,  is  found  in  the  case  of  In  re 
City  of  Yonkers,^  and  is  as  follows :  "It  is  part  of  the  purpose 
in  view  when  land  is  taken  or  dedicated  for  use  as  a  public 
street  in  a  city,  that  it  shall  be  used  not  only  for  the  purpose  of 
mere  passage  and  repassage,  but  for  all  such  incidental  purposes, 
including  the  building  of  sewers  therein,  as  may  be  necessary, 
appropriate  and  usual  for  the  proper  enjoyment  of  such  street."  '' 
But  these  generalizations  are  of  but  little  practical  value.  As 
to  every  new  use  proposed  the  question  will  arise  as  to  whetJier 
it  is  an  exercise  of  the  right  of  passage  or  is  such  a  purpose  as  is 
"necessary,  appropriate  and  usual"  for  the  "proper  enjoyment" 
of  the  street.^ 


for  the  transmission  of  water,  gas, 
and  steam  are  immovable.  So  are 
the  tracks  of  street  railways,  also  the 
poles  and  wires  of  the  trolley  system. 
And  it  can  make  no  difference  in  prin- 
ciple whether  the  immovable  struc- 
ture is  on,  under,  or  above  the  sur- 
face of  the  ground,  for  the  rights  of 
the  owner  of  the  fee  are  the  same  in 
either  case.  Subject  only  to  the  pub- 
lic easement  for  highway  purposes, 
he  remains  the  owner  of  the  land  up- 
ward and  downward  indefinitely.  If 
the  transmission  of  intelligence  by 
telegraph  or  telephone  is  not  in- 
cluded in  the  public  easement  in  a 
highway,  it  would  be  equally  an  in- 
vasion of  his  rights  of  property,  even 
if  the  wires  were  placed  under- 
ground. If  an  immovable  structure 
in  a  highway  constitutes  an  addi- 
tional servitude,  it  is  not  merely  be- 
cause it  is  immovable,  but  because  it 
unreasonably  interferes  with  the  gen- 
eral use  of  the  street  by  the  public, 
or  because  it  unreasonably  impairs 
the  special  easements  of  abutting 
ovraers."  Cater  v.  N.  W.  Tel.  Exch. 
Co.,  60  Minn.  539,  63  N.  W.  Ill,  51 
Am.  St.  Rep.  543,  28  L.R.A.  310. 
Similar  views  are  expressed  in  the 


following:  Magee  v.  Overshiner,  150 
Ind.  127,  49  N.  E.  951,  65  Am.  St. 
Rep.  358,  40  L.R.A.  370;  Taylor  v. 
Portsmouth  etc.  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  91  Me. 
193,  39  Atl.  560,  64  Am.  St.  Rep.  216; 
Cumberland  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  Avritt, 
120  Ky.  34,  85  S.  W.  204;  Frazier  v. 
East  Tenn.  Tel.  Co.,  115  Tenn.  416, 
90  S.  W.  620,  112  Am.  St.  Rep.  856, 
3  L.R.A.   (N.S.)   323. 

6"No  structure  upon  the  street  can 
be  authorized  which  is  inconsistent 
with  the  continued  use  of  the  same 
as  an  open  public  street."  Story  v. 
New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  90  N.  Y. 
177,  43  Am.  Rep.  146.  To  the  same 
eflFect  Jaynes  v.  Omaha  St.  R.  R.  Co., 
53  Neb.  631,  74  N.  W.  67,  39  L.R.A. 
751. 

6117  N.  Y.  564,  573,  23  N.  E.  601. 

7/See  also  McDevitt  v.  People's 
Nat.  Gas.  Co.,  160  Pa.  St.  367,  28  Atl. 
948;  Van  Brunt  v.  Town  of  Flatbush, 
59  Hun  192,  37  N.  Y.  St.  200,  13  N. 
Y.  Supp.  545. 

sin  Halsey  v.  Rapid  Transit  St.  R. 
R.  Co.,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  380,  20  Atl.  859, 
it  is  said :  "Any  use  of  a  street  which 
is  limited  to  an  exercise  of  the  right 
of  passage,  and  which  is  confined  to 
a  mere  use  of  the  public  easement, 


334 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  182 


In  Massachusetts  it  is  held  that  the  puhlic  easement  in  a 
street  "includes  every  kind  of  travel  and  communication  for 
the  movement  of  transportation  of  persons  or  property  which 
is  reasonable  and  proper  in  the  use  of  the  public  street.  It  in- 
cludes the  use  of  all  kinds  of  vehicles  v^hich  can  be  introduced 
with  a  reasonable  regard  for  the  safety  and  convenience  of  tho 
public,  and  every  reasonable  means  of  transportation,  transmis- 
sion and  movement  beneath  the  surface  of  the  ground  as  well 
as  upon  or  above  it."  ® 

The  easement  of  the  public  is  not  limited  to  the  particular 
methods  of  use  in  vogue  when  the  easement  was  acquired,  but 
includes  improved  methods  which  the  progress  of  society  finds 
necessary  or  convenient,  and  which  do  not  subvert  the  use  of  the 
street  by  the  public  in  the  ordinary  way.-^"  The  new  use  must 
not  be  inconsistent  with  the  common  and  ordinary  modes  of 
using  the  street.  "If  the  use  complained  of  is  such  that  the 
public  and  common  right  of  passage  of  persons  and  things  can- 
not be  enjoyed  without  substantial  impairment  on  account  of 
the  manner  of  such  use,  then  it  is  inconsistent  with  the  public 


whether  it  be  by  old  methods  or  new, 
and  which  does  not  in  any  substan- 
tial degree  destroy  the  street  as  a 
means  of  free  passage,  common  to  all 
the  people,  is  a  legitimate  use,  and 
within  the  purposes  for  which  the 
public  acquired  the  land." 

9New  England  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v. 
Boston  Terminal  Co.,  182  Mass.  397, 
65  N.  E.  835.  In  Sears  v.  Crocker,  184 
Mass.  586,  588,  69  N.  E.  327,  100  Am. 
St.  Rep.  577,  it  is  said:  "Our  system, 
which  leaves  to  the  landowner  the 
use  of  a  street  above  or  below  or  on 
the  surface,  so  far  as  he  can  use  it 
without  interference  with  the  rights 
of  the  public,  is  just  and  right,  but 
the  public  rights  in  these  lands  are 
plainly  paramount,  and  they  include, 
as  they  ought  to  include,  the  power 
to  appropriate  the  streets  above  or 
below  the  surface  as  well  as  upon  it, 
in  any  way  that  is  not  unreasonable, 
in  reference  either  to  the  acts  of  all 
who  have  occasion  to  travel  or  to  the 


effect  upon  the  property  of  abutters." 
See  also  White  v.  Blanchard  Bros. 
Granite  Co.,  178  Mass.  363,  59  N.  E. 
1025;  Eustis  v.  Milton  St.  Ey.  Co., 
183  Mass.  586,  67  N.  E.  663 ;  Cheney 
V.  Boston  Consolidated  Gas  Co.,  198 
Mass.  356. 

10  Cumberland  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v. 
Avritt,  120  Ky.  34,  85  S.  W.  204: 
"The  dedication  of  a  street  must  be 
presumed  to  have  been  made,  not  for 
such  purposes  and  uses  only  as  were 
known  to  the  landowner  and  plotter 
at  the  time  of  such  dedication,  but 
for  all  public  purposes,  present  and 
prospective,  consistent  with  its  char- 
acter as  a  public  highway,  and  not 
actually  detrimental  to  the  abutting 
real  estate."  Mordhurst  v.  Ft.  Wayne 
etc.  Traction  Co.,  163  Ind.  268,  280, 
71  N.  E.  642,  106  Am.  St.  Rep.  222,  66 
L.R.A.  105.  See  also  Kinsey  v.  Union 
Traction  Co.,  169  Ind.  563,  81  N.  E. 
922. 


§  183 


EOADS    AND    STEEETS. 


335 


and  common  right,  and  not  a  proper  and  lawful  use  of  the  ease- 
ment of  the  street."  ^^ 

§  183  (127).  Sewers  and  drains.  Drainage  is  neces- 
sary for  the  proper  construction  and  maintenance  of  highways, 
both  in  city  and  country.  The  manner  in  whqjh  this  drainage 
can  be  best  secured  is  solely  a  question  for  the  proper  authorities. 
In  the  country,  an  open  drain  may  suffice,  but  in  the  city,  where 
the  whole  surface  of  the  street  is  needed  for  travel,  a  covered 
sewer  is  required.  As  the  proper  drainage  of  house-lots  and 
cellars,  and  the  prompt  removal  of  tho  liquid  refuse  from  dwel- 
lings, are  necessary  to  the  public  health,  and  therefore  matters  of 
public  concern,  the  public  may  provide  the  means  for  such  drain- 
age and  removal  and  construct  public  sewers  in  the  streets  for 
that  purpose. -^^     But  a  sewer,  constructed  through  the  streets 


iiNewell  V.  Minneapolis  etc.  E,.  R. 
Co.,  35  Minn.  112,  27  N.  W.  839,  59 
Am.  Eep.  303. 

12  Cone  V.  Hartford,  28  Conn.  3G3, 
372;  Leeds  v.  Richmond,  102  Ind. 
372 ;  McMahon  v.  Council  Bluffs,  12 
la.  268;  Boston  v.  Richardson,  13 
Allen  146,  159;  Chelsea  Dye-House 
and  Laundry  Co.  v.  Commonwealth, 
164  Mass.  350,  41  N.  E.  649;  Lincoln 
V.  Commonwealth,  164  Mass.  1,  41  N. 
E.  112;  Cabot  v.  Kingman,  166  Mass. 
403,  44  N.  E.  344,  33  L.R.A.  45 ;  War- 
ren v.  Grand  Haven,  30  Mich.  24; 
White  V.  Yazoo  City,  27  Miss.  357; 
Glasby  v.  Morris,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  72; 
Traphagen  v.  Jersey  City,  29  N.  J. 
Eq.  206;  Stoudinger  v.  Newark,  28 
K  J.  Eq.  187;  S.  C.  on  appeal,  28  N. 
J.  Eq.  446;  In  re  City  of  Yonkers,  117 
y.  Y.  564,  23  N.  E.  661;  Kelsey  v. 
King,  32  Barb.  410;  Allison  v.  Cin- 
cinnati, 2  Cinn.  Super.  Ct.  462;  Cin- 
cinnati V.  Penny,  21  Ohio  St.  499,  8 
Am.  Rep.  73;  Elster  v.  Springfield,  49 
Ohio  St.  82,  34  N.  E.  274 ;  Lockart  v. 
Craig  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  139  Pa.  St.  419, 
21  Atl.  26. 

In  Cone  v.  Hartford,  the  court 
says :  "There  cannot  be  a  doubt  that, 
in  the  laying  out  and  establishment 
of  a  highway,  the  right  of  repairing 


and  maintaining,  as  well  as  of  origi- 
nally constructing  it,  is  embraced, 
and  therefore,  when  damages  are  as- 
sessed to  a  person  for  laying  out  and 
constructing  a  road  upon  his  land, 
those  damages  include  compensation 
as  well  for  the  repairing  of  such  road 
as  its  original  construction.  Such 
reparation  embraces  and  extends  to 
the  making  of  such  gutters,  drains 
and  sewers  as  are  necessary  and 
proper  in  order  to  preserve  the  high- 
way in  good  condition  for  the  pur- 
poses for  which  it  was  made.  And, 
for  these  purposes,  we  have  no  doubt 
that  it  is  as  competent  to  construct 
drains  and  sewers  below,  as  it  is  upon 
the  surface  of  the  ground.  On  ordi- 
nary country  roads  the  gutters  upon 
their  sides  are  usually  deemed  suffi- 
cient to  carry  off  the  water  and  filth 
upon  them.  In  populous  places,  how- 
ever, where  they  accumulate  in 
greater  quantities,  or  where  it  may 
be  necessary  for  the  public  to  use,  for 
passing  and  other  proper  purposes, 
every  part  of  the  highway,  it 
is  frequently  requisite  to  make 
the  drains  of  the  highway  be- 
neath its  surface,  and  the  safety 
as  well  as  the  commodiousness 
of  the  public  travel,  and  the  health- 


336  EMINENT    BOMAIN.  §    184 

of  a  town,  which  is  not  for  use  of  the  town  or  the  ahutting  own- 
ers, but  solely  to  carry  the  sewerage  of  an  adjoining  town  to  the 
sea,  is  an  additional  servitude  upon  the  street  and  cannot  be 
built  without  compensation  to  the  owners  of  the  fee.l*  So  of 
a  sewer  upon  a  country  road  to  carry  the  sewerage  of  a  city  to 
a  stream. '^^  The  making  of  a  drain  or  open  ditch  on  the  side 
of  a  street,  if  for  the  amelioration  of  the  street,  is  a  proper  use 
of  the  street,  for  which  the  abutting  owner  has  no  legal  ground 
of  complaint. -^^  But  the  public  authorities  cannot  authorize  a 
private  drain  to  be  laid  in  a  street  over  the  fee  of  others.*" 

§  184  (128).  Water  pipes.  Water  is  a  prime  necessity, 
and  in  densely  populated  districts  cannot  be  obtained  from  the 
soil  without  danger  to  health.  A  supply  of  pure  water, 
therefore,  becomes  a  matter  of  public  concern,  and  its  distribu- 
tion by  public  authority  by  means  of  pipes  laid  in  the  public 
streets  is  an  ancient  and  universal  custom.  Such  a  supply  is 
not  only  a  requisite  to  the  public  health,  but  for  the  public  safe- 
ty as  well,  in  order  to  afford  the  means  of  extinguishing  fires  and 
preventing  conflagrations,  and  may  even  be  connected  with  the 
use  of  the  street  for  travel,  when  used  for  sprinkling.  Such  a 
use  of  urban  streets  is  proper  and  legitimate.-'''  But  to  lay  pipes 
in  a  country  highway  for  the  purpose  of  conducting  water  to  a 

fulness  of  the  people  in  its  vicinity  488.     But  the  contrary  is  held  in 

may  also  require  it.    It  is  no  objec-  Wood  v.  McGrath,  150  Pa.  St.  461, 

tion,  therefore,  to  a  sewer  in  a  high-  24  Atl.  682,  16  L.R.A.  715.    And  see 

Vf3i,j,  that  it  is  made  beneath  the  sur-  Smith  v.  Simmons,  103  Pa.  St.  32,  49 

face  of  the  ground,  if  the  circum-  Am.  Rep.  119;  Susquehanna  Depot  v. 

stances  render  it  proper  so  to  con-  Simmons,  112  Pa.  St.  384,  5  Atl.  434, 

struct  it."  56  Am.  Rep.  317;  Glasby  v.  Morris, 

13  Van  Brunt  v.  Town  of  Flatbush,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  72;  Conrad  v.  Smith,  32 

128  N.  Y.  50,  27  N.  E.  973,  reversing  Mich.  429. 

S.  C.  59  Hun  192,  37  N.  Y.  St.  200,  "Bishop    v.    North    Adams    Fire 

13  N.  Y.  Supp.  545.     Compare  Cum-  Dist.,  167  Mass.  364,  45  N.  E.  925; 

mins  V.  City  of  Seymour,  79  Ind.  491.  Crooke  v.  Flatbush  Water  Works  Co., 

14 Whitney  v.  Toledo,  8  Ohio  C.  C.  29  Hun  245;  Same  v.  Same,  27  Hun 

(N.S.)  577.  72;  Witcher  v.  Holland  W.  W.  Co., 

iBCummins  v.    Seymour,   79   Ind.  66   Hun   619,   20  N.  Y.   Supp.   560; 

491,  41  Am.  Rep.  618;  McMahon  v.  same  affirmed  without  opinion,  142 

Council  Bluffs,  12  la.  268;  Wilson  v.  N.  Y.  626;  Village  of  Pelham  Manor 

Duncan,  74  la.  491,  38  N.  W.  Rep.  v.  New  Rochelle  Water  Co.,  143  N.  Y., 

371;  Randall  v.  Christiansen,  76  la.  532,  38  N.  E.  711;   Provost  v.  New 

169,  40  N.  W.  703;  Highway  Comrs.  Chester  Water  Co.,  162  Pa.  St.  275,  29 

V.  Ely,  54  Mich.  173;  White  v.  Yazoo  Atl.  914;  Smith  v.  Goldsboro,  121  N, 

City,  27  Miss.  357.  C,  350,  28  S.  B.  479. 

leMurray  v.  Gibson,  21  lU.  App, 


§  185 


EOADS    AND    STEEETS. 


337 


town  would  be  an  additional  burden  for  whicb  the  owner  of  tbe 
fee  would  be  entitled  to  compensation.^^  Where  a  water  pipe 
was  laid  underneath  the  sidewalk,  so  as  to  prevent  the  abutter 
building  stairs  to  his  basement,  it  was  held  he  could  recover  no 
compensation.-'" 

§  185  (129).  Gas  pipes.  Gas  is  not,  like  water,  a  nec- 
essity in  the  sense  of  being  absolutely  indispensable,  but  it  has 
become  a  practical  necessity  in  all  urban  communities.  The 
right  to  lay  pipes  in  the  streets  of  cities  and  villages  for  the  dis- 
tribution of  gas  has  never  been  questioned,  but  has  often,  in- 
directly, received  judicial  sanction.^"  But  a  country  highway 
cannot  be  used  for  the  purpose  of  conveying  natural  gas  to  a 
distant  city.^^  This  is  an  additional  burden,  for  which  compen- 
sation must  be  made.  It  is  otherwise  when  those  living  along 
the  road  where  the  pipe  is  laid  are  to  receive  gas  for  light  and 
heat.^^  And  in  Massachusetts  it  is  held  that  gas  mains  may  be 
laid  through  a  city  street  for  the  purpose  of  conveying  gas  to 
another  municipality  without  compensation  to  the  owner  of  the 
fee  in  the  street.  ^^     A  city  is  not  entitled  to  compensation  for 


isBaltimore  County  W.  &  Elec.  Co. 
V.  Dubruvil,  105  Md.  424,  66  Atl.  439. 
See  ante,  §  183,  note  13;  post,  §  135, 
note,  21. 

isProvost  V.  New  Chester  Water 
Co.,  162  Pa.  St.  275,  29  Atl.  914. 

20Story  V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co., 
90  N.  Y.  at  p.  161,  43  Am.  Rep.  146; 
West  V.  Bancroft,  32  Vt.  p.  371; 
Tompkins  v.  Hodgson,  2  Hun  146; 
People  V.  Bowen,  30  Barb.  24;  Smith 
V.  Central  Diat.  Tel.  Co.,  2  Ohio  C.  C. 
259,  263;  Boston  v.  Richards,  13 
Allen  146,  160;  Pierce  »r.  Drew,  136 
Mass.  75,  81,  49  Am.  Rep.  7;  Cheney 
V.  Boston  Consol.  Gas  Co.,  198  Mass. 
356;  McDevitt  v.  People's  Natural 
Gas  Co.,  160  Pa.  St.  367,  28  Atl.  948. 
See  Mallory  v.  City  of  Bradford,  1 
Pa;.  Dist.  Ct.  670;  King  v.  Philadel- 
phia Co.,  154  Pa.  St.  160,  26  Atl.  308, 
35  Am.  St.  Rep.  817,  21  L.R.A.  141 ; 
Levis  V.  Newton,  75  Fed.  884. 

2iKincaid  v.  Indianapolis  Nat.  Gas 
Co.,  124  Ind.  577,  24  N.  E.  1068,  19 
Am.  St.  Rep.  113,  8  L.R.A.  602,  3  Am. 
Era.  D.— 22. 


R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  1;  Board  of 
Comrs.  V.  Indianapolis  Nat.  Gas  Co., 
134  Ind.  209,  33  N.  E.  972;  Windfall 
Nat.  Gas  Co.  v.  Terwilliger,  152  Ind. 
364,  53  N.  E.  284;  Consumers'  Gas 
Trust  Co.  V.  Huntsinger,  14  Ind.  App. 
156,  39  N.  E.  423,  42  N.  E.  640;  Huff- 
man V.  State,  21  Ind.  App.  449,  52  N. 
E.  713;  Ward  v.  Triple  State  Nat. 
Gas  &  Oil  Co.,  115  Ky.  723,  74  S.  W. 
709;  Bloomfield  etc.  Gas  Light  Co.  v. 
Calkins,  62  N.  Y.  386;  S.  C.  1  Thomp. 
etc.  541,  549;  Calkins  v.  Bloomfield 
etc.  Gas  Light  Co.,  1  N.  Y.  Supm. 
541;  Sterling's  Appeal,  111  Pa.  St. 
35.  But  where  the  fee  of  the  highway 
is  in  tl^e  public,  the  abutter  is  not 
entitled  to  compensation.  Ward  v. 
Triple  State  Nat.  Gas  &  Oil  Co.,  115 
Ky.  723,  74  S.  W.  709. 

2  2Hardman  v.  Cabot,  60  W.  Va. 
664,  55  S.  E.  756,  7  L.R.A.  (N.S.) 
506. 

2  3Cheney  v.  Boston  Consolidated 
Gas  Co.,  198  Mass.  356. 


338 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  186 


the  laying  of  gas  pipes  in  its  streets  by  authority  of  the  legisla- 
ture,^* but  it  may  prevent  such  use  of  its  streets  without  authori- 
ty.^^ It  has  been  held  that  one  gas  company  has  no  standing 
in  court  to  contest  the  right  of  a  rival  company  to  occupy  a 
street,  so  long  as  its  property  and  rights  are  not  interfered 
with.28 

§  186  (130).  Steam,  electricity,  etc.  Within  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  foregoing  cases  would  be  the  laying  of  pipes  in 
streets,  for  the  purpose  of  conducting  and  distributing  gas  or 
steam  for  heating,  or  the  laying  of  subterranean  cables  or  wires 
for  supplying  electricity,  either  for  lighting  or  other  general 
use.^'^ 

§  187  (131).  Telegraph  and  telephone  lines.  The  lines 
of  a  telegraph  or  telephone  company  are  on  the  same  footing 
as  the  steam  railroad.  They  form  no  part  of  the  equipment  of 
a  public  highway,  but  are  entirely  foreign  to  its  use.  Where 
the  fee  of  the  street  is  in  the  abutting  owner,  he  is  clearly  en- 
titled to  compensation  for  the  additional  burden  placed  upon 
his  land.^^     When  the  fee  is  in  the  public,  the  abutting  owner 


2  4La  Harpe  v.  Elm  Tp.  Gas  etc. 
Co.,  69  Kan.  97,  76  Pac.  448;  People 
V.  Bowen,  30  Barb.  24. 

2  5  Citizens'  Gas  etc.  Co.  v.  Elwood, 
114  Ind.  332.  So  such  use  of  the 
streets  may  be  prevented  by  indict- 
ment. Queen  v.  Longton  Gas  Co.,  2 
EI.  &  El.  651,  105  E.  C.  L.  R.  650. 

3  6Coffeyville  M.  &  Gas  Co.  v.  Citi- 
zens' Nat.  Gas  Co.,  55  Kan.  179,  40 
Pac.  326.  But  see  People's  Gas  Light 
Co.  V.  Jersey  City  Gas  Light  Co.,  46 
N.  J.  L.  297. 

2  7Carli  V.  Railroad  Co.,  28  Minn, 
at  p.  376,  41  Am.  Rep.  290;  Berks  & 
Dauphin  Turnpike  Road  v.  Lebanon 
Steam  Co.,  5  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  354;  Empire 
City  Subway  Co.  v.  Broadway  &  S. 
A.  R.  R.  Co.,  87  Hun  279,  33  N.  Y. 
Supp.  1055.    Sut  see  post,  §  188. 

Where  the  legislature  grants  the 
right  to  a  company  to  place  and 
maintain  its  electric  wires  under- 
ground subject  to  the  regulations  of 
the  municipality,  the  latter  may  re- 
quire the  grantee  to  take  the  wires 


of  other  companies  in  its  conduits  or 
the  city  may  provide  the  conduits  for 
all  the  wires.  State  v.  Towers,  71 
Conn.  G57,  42  Atl.  1083. 

2  8Board  of  Trade  Tel.  Co.  v.  Bar- 
nett,  107  111.  507,  47  Am.  Rep.  453; 
Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.  v.  Eaton,  170 
111.  520,  49  N.  E.  365,  62  Am.  St.  Rep. 
390,  39  L.R.A.  722;  Burrell  v.  Am. 
Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  224  111.  268,  79  N.  E. 
705,  8  L.R.A.  (N.S.)  1091;  De  Kalb 
Co.  Telephone  Co.  v.  Dutton,  228  111. 
178,  81  N.  E.  838,  10  L.R.A.  (N.S.) 
1057;  American  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v. 
Jones,  78  111.  App.  372;  Union  Elec. 
Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  Applequest,  104  111. 
App.  517 ;  Chesapeake  &  P.  Tel.  Co.  v. 
Mackenzie,  74  Md.  36,  21  Atl.  690,  28 
Am.  St.  Rep.  219;  Md.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co. 
v.  Ruth,  106  Md.  644,  68  Atl.  358; 
Stowers  v.  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  68 
Miss.  559,  9  So.  356,  24  Am.  St.  Rep. 
290,  12  L.R.A.  864;  Bronson  v.  Al- 
bion Telephone  Co.,  67  Neb.  Ill,  93  N. 
W.  201,  60  L.R.A.  426;  Nicoll  v.  New 
York  etc.  Co.,  62  N.  J.  L.  733,  42  Atl. 


§  187 


EOADS    AND    STREETS. 


339 


583,  72  Am.  St.  Rep.  666;  S.  C.  62  N. 
J.  L.  156,  40  Atl.  627;  Eels  v.  Am. 
Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  U3_N.  Y.  133,  38  N. 
E.  202,  25  L.R.AT  640,  10  Am.  R.  R. 
&  Corp.  Rep.  69 ;  Jemison  v.  Bell  Tel- 
ephone Co.,  ISO  N.  Y.  493,  79  N.  E. 
728;  Osborne  v.  Auburn  Telephone 
Co.,  189  N.  Y.  393,  82  N.  Y.  S.  428, 
reversing  S.  0.  Ill  App.  Div.  702; 
Bashfield  v.  Empire  State  Tel.  Co., 
71  Hun  532,  24  N.  Y.  Supp.  1006; 
Comisky  v.  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  41 
N.  Y.  App.  Div.  245;  Gray  v.  York 
State  Telephone  Co.,  92  App.  Div. 
89,  86  N.  Y.  S.  771 ;  Powers  v.  State 
Line  Telephone  Co.,  116  App.  Div. 
737,  102  N.  Y.  S.  34;  Gray  v.  York 
State  Telephone  Co.,  41  Misc.  109, 
83  N.  Y.  S.  920;  Hudson  Riv.  Tele- 
phone Co.  V.  Eorrestal,  56  Misc.  133; 
Donovan  v.  Allert,  11  N.  D.  289,  91 
N.  W.  441,  95  Am.  St.  Rep.  720,  58 
L.R.A.  775;  Dusenbury  v.  Mutual 
Union  Tel.  Co.,  11  Abb.  New  Cases, 
440;  Metropolitan  Telephone  &  Tel- 
egraph Co.  v.  Colwell  Lead  Co.,  50 
N.  Y.  Supr.  Ct.  488;  Tiffany  v.  Unit- 
ed States  Illuminating  Co.,  51  N.  Y. 
Supr.  Ct.  280;  S.  C.  67  How.  Pr.  73; 
Wade  V.  Carolina  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  147 
N.  C.  219;  Cosgriff  v.  Tri-State  Tel- 
ephone Co.,  15  N.  D.  210,  107  N.  W. 
525;  Dailey  v.  State,  51  Ohio  St. 
348,  37  N.  E.  710,  24  L.R.A.  724; 
Smith  V.  Central  District  P.  &  Tel. 
Co.,  2  Ohio  C.  C.  259;  Tanninan  v. 
City  &  Suburban  Tel.  Ass.,  1  Ohio  N. 
P.  (N.S.)81;  Mantell  v.  Bucyrus  Tel- 
ephone Co.,  20  Ohio  C.  C.  345 ;  West- 
ern Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Williams,  86 
Va.  696,  11  S.  E.  106,  2  Am.  R.  R.  & 
Corp.  Rep.  258,  19  Am.  St.  Rep.  908; 
Kreuger  v.  Wis.  Telephone  Co.,  106 
Wis.  96,  81  N.  W.  1041,  50  L.R.A. 
298;  Pacific  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.  v. 
Irvine,  49  Fed.  113;  Kester  v.  West- 
ern Union  Tel.  Co.,  108  Fed.  926. 
The  following  New  York  cases  hold 
a  telephone  line  to  be  a  proper  use  of 
H,  city  or  village  street  but  are  over- 
ruled by  later  decisions  of  the  Court 


of  Appeals  cited  above:     Johnson  v. 
New  York  etc.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  76 
App.  Div.  564,  78  N.  Y.  S.  598 ;  Gan- 
nett v.  Independent  Telephone   Co., 
55  Misc.  555,  106  N.  Y.  S.  3.    In  Eels 
V.  Am.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  143  N.  Y.  133, 
38  N.  E.  210,  25  L.R.A.  640,  10  Am. 
R.  R.  &  Corp.   Rep.  69,  the  court 
says:    "We  thinlc  neither  the  State 
nor  its  corporation  can  appropriate 
any  portion  of  the  public  highway 
permanently  to  its  own  special,  con- 
tinuous and  exclusive  use  by  setting 
up  poles  therein,  although  the  pur- 
pose to  which  they  are  to  be  applied 
is  to  string  wires  thereon,  and  thus 
to  transmit  messages  for  all  the  pub- 
lic at  a  reasonable  compensation.   It 
may  be  at  once  admitted  that  the 
purpose  is  a  public  one,  although  for 
the  private  gain  of  a  corporation; 
but  the  constitution   provides   that 
private  property  shall  not  be  taken 
for  public  use  without  compensation 
to  the  owner.     Where  land  is  dedi- 
cated or  taken  for  a  public  highway, 
the  question  is,  what  are  the  uses 
implied  in  such  dedication  or  tak- 
ing?     Primarily    there    can    be    no 
doubt  that  the  use  is   for  passage 
over  the  highway.     The  title  to  the 
fee  of  the  highway  generally  remains 
in  the  adjoining  owner,  and  he  re- 
tains the  ownership  of  the  land,  sub- 
ject only  to  the  public  easement.    If 
this    easement   do    not    include    the 
right  of  a  telegraph  company  to  per- 
manently   appropriate    any    portion 
of   the   highway,   however   small   it 
may  be,  to  its  own  special,  continu- 
ous and  exclusive  use,  then  the  de- 
fendant herein  has  no  defense  to  the 
plaintiff's  claim.    Although  the  pur- 
pose of  a  public  highway  is  for  the 
passage  of  the  public,  it  may  be  con- 
ceded  that   the   land   forming   such 
highway  was  not  taken  for  the  pur- 
pose of  enabling  the  public  to  pass 
over  it  only  in  the  then  known  vehi- 
cles,  or   for   using   it   in   the   then 
known  methods  for  the  conveyance 


340 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  187 


may  recover  for  any  interference  with  his  rights  in  the  street.^* 
It  is  held  to  make  no  difference  that  the  city  fire  alarm  and  po- 


of property  or  the  transmission  of 
intelligence.     Still  the  primary  law 
of  the  highway  is  motion,  and  what- 
ever vehicles  are  used,  or  whatever 
method   of   transmission   of   intelli- 
gence is  adopted,  the  vehicle  must 
move  and  the  intelligence  be  trans- 
mitted by  some  moving  body,  which 
.  must  pass  along  the  highway,  either 
on  or  over  or  perhaps  under  it;  but 
it   cannot   permanently   appropriate 
any  part  of  it.    *    *     *    We  cannot 
agree  that  this  permanent  appropri- 
ation and  exclusive  possession  of  a 
small   portion   of   the   highway   can 
properly  be  regarded  as  any  newly 
discovered  method  of  exercising  the 
old   public   easement,   for    the   very 
reason     that     this     so-called     'new 
method'  is  a  permanent,  continuous 
and  exclusive  use  and  possession  of 
some  part  of  the  public  highway  it- 
self, and,  therefore,  cannot  be  simply 
a  new  method  of  exercising  such  old 
public  easement.    It  is  a  totally  dis- 
tinct and  different  kind  of  use  from 
any  heretofore  known.     It  is  not  a 
mere  difference  in  the  kind  of  vehi- 
cle, or  in  their  number  or  capacity, 
or  in  the  manner,  method  or  means 
of  locomotion.     All  these  might  be 
varied,     increased     as     to     number, 
capacity  or  form,  altered  as  to  means 
or  rapidity  of  locomotion,  or  trans- 
formed in  their  nature  and  charac- 
ter, and  still  the  use  of  the  highway 
might  be  substantially  the  same — a 
highway  for  passage  and  motion  of 
some   sort.     Here,   however,   in   the 
use  of  the  highway  by  the  defendant 
is  the  fact  of  permanent  and  exclu- 
sive appropriation  and  possession,  a 
fact   which   is,   as   it   seems   to   us, 
wholly  at  war  with  that  of  the  legiti- 
mate public  eaesment  in  a  highway." 
In  Willis  V.  Erie  T.  &  T.  Co.,  37 
Minn.    347,    the   court    was   equally 


divided  and  the  judgment  of  the 
lower  court  in  favor  of  the  abutting 
owner  was  affirmed,  no  opinion  be- 
ing given.  In  New  Jersey  an  act 
passed  March  11,  1880,  Supp.  to  Rev. 
Stat.  p.  1022,  requires  compensation 
to  be  made  when  telegraph  or  tele- 
phone poles  are  set  in  a  street.  The 
following  cases  have  arisen  under 
the  statute  involving  its  validity  and 
the  method  of  procedure  under  it: 
Turnpike  Co.  v.  News  Co.,  43  N.  J. 
L.  381 ;  Broome  v.  N.  Y.  &  N.  J.  Tel. 
Co.,  49  N.  J.  L.  624;  Winter  v.  N.  Y. 
&  N.  J.  Tel.  Co.,  51  N.  J.  Eq.  83.  In 
Roake  v.  Am.  Telephone  &  Telegraph 
Co.,  41  N.  J.  Eq.  35,  the  chancellor 
refused  a  preliminary  injunction  on 
a  bill  filed  to  prevent  the  stringing 
of  wires  in  front  of  the  plaintiff's 
premises  on  the  ground  that  his 
right  was  doubtful.  In  Broome  v. 
N.  Y.  &  N.  J.  Tel.  Co.,  42  N.  J.  Eq. 
141,  a  mandatory  injunction  was 
granted  to  compel  the  removal  of 
poles  set  in  the  highway  in  front  of 
plaintiff's  premises,  the  fee  of  the 
street  being  in  him,  and  the  erection 
of  other  poles  was  prohibited.  In 
Howell  V.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  4 
Mackey,  424  (1886),  an  injunction 
to  prevent  the  erection  of  telegraph 
poles  in  front  of  the  plaintiff's  prop- 
erty was  denied  on  the  ground  that 
plaintiff  would  suffer  no  irreparable 
injury  and  that  the  remedy  at  law 
was  adequate.  The  main  question 
was  not  discussed. 

2  9  In  Chesapeake  etc.  Tel.  Co.  v. 
Mackenzie,  74  Md.  36,  21  Atl.  690, 
the  right  to  compensation  was  sus- 
tained irrespective  of  the  fee  of  the 
street.  On  this  point  the  court  says : 
"If  the  fee  be  in  the  city,  or  in  some 
third  person,  then — First,  what  are 
the  rights,  in  a  case  like  this,  of  the 
owner  of  a  lot  abutting  on  the  street  t 


§  187 


EOADS    AND    STEEETS. 


341 


lice  wires  are  attached  to  the  same  poles. ^''  It  is  evident  that 
poles  and  wires  may  be  so  placed  as  not  to  afford  the  slightest 
impediment  to  the  access  of  light  and  air  or  to  ingress  and  egress. 
In  such  case,  the  fee  being  in  the  public,  there  is  no  taking,  be- 
cause there  is  no  damage.^ ^  Whether  there  is  or  is  not  damage 
is  a  question  of  fact,  and,  if  damage  can  be  shown,  the  remedy 
is  clear  upon  the  authority  of  cases  discussed  in  previous  sec- 
tions of  this  chapter.  There  is  a  strong  dissent  from  these 
views,  several  of  the  courts  holding  that  a  telegraph  or  tele- 
phone line  is  a  legitimate  street  use,  and  may  be  placed  in  a 
street  without  compensation  to  the  abutting  owner,  whether  he 
owns  the  fee  or  not.^^  As  will  be  seen  by  reference  to  the 
notes,  the  courts  of  last  resort  are  about  equally  divided  on  the 


and,  secondly,  how  are  those  rights 
aflfected  by  the  provisions  of  the  Code 
relied  on  in  the  pleas  ?  There  is  some 
diversity  of  opinion  in  the  decided 
cases  upon  the  first  of  these  ques- 
tions, but  all  agree  in  going  at  least 
this  far — and  we  are  not  required  to 
go  any  further  in  deciding  this  ap- 
peal— that  where  the  fee  or  legal 
title  has  passed  from  the  original 
proprietor,  as  in  cases  where  the  land 
has  been  acquired  for  streets  by  the 
exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent  do- 
main, the  adjoining  owner  cannot 
maintain  an  action  for  injuries  to 
the  soil  or* ejectment,  but  he  never- 
theless has  a  remedy  for  any  special 
injury  to  his  rights  by  the  unauthor- 
ized acts  of  others.  Hence,  if  an  ap- 
propriation of  a  street  by  a  person 
or  body  corporate,  even  under  legis- 
lative and  municipal  sanction,  un- 
reasonably abridges  the  right  of  ad- 
jacent lot-owners  to  use  the  street  as 
a  means  of  ingress  and  egress,  or 
otherwise,  they  are  thereby  deprived 
of  a,  right  without  compensation; 
and  an  action  will  lie  against  the 
person  or  corporation  guilty  of 
usurping  such  unreasonable  and  ex- 
clusive use  for  the  recovery  of  such 
immediate  and  direct  damages  as  the 
abutter  may  sustain." 

soDeKalb  County  Telephone  Co.  v. 


Button,  228  111.  178,  81  N.  E.  838,  10 
L.R.A.  (N.S.)   1057. 

siHolleran  v.  Bell  Telephone  Co., 
64  App.  Div.  41,  71  N.  Y.  S.  685;  S. 
C.  aflirmed  177  N.  Y.  573,  69  N.  E. 
1122;  Gay  v.  Mutual  Union  Tel.  Co., 
12  Mo.  App.  485;  Forsyth  v.  Balti- 
more &  Ohio  Tel.  Co.,  12  Mo.  App. 
494;  Hays  v.  Columbia  Telephone 
Co.,  21  Ohio  C.  C.  480. 

3  2Hobbs  v.  Long  Distance  Tel.  & 
Tel.  Co.,  147  Ala.  393,  41  So.  1003,  7 
L.R.A.  (N.S.)  87;  Magee  v.  Over- 
shiner,  150  Ind.  127,  49  N.  1?.  951,  65 
Am.  St.  Rep.  358,  40  L.R.A.  370 ;  Co- 
burn  V.  New  Telephone  Co.,  156  Ind. 
90,  59  N.  E.  324,  52  L.R.A.  671;  Mc- 
Cann  v.  Johnson  County  Tel.  Co.,  69 
Kan.  210,  76  Pac.  870,  66  L.R.A.  171 ; 
Cumberland  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  Avritt, 
120  ICy.  34,  85  S.  W.  204;  Irwin  v. 
Great  Southern  Telephone  Co.,  37  La. 
An.  63 ;  Pierce  v.  Drew,  136  Mass.  75, 
49  Am.  Rep.  7 ;  People  v.  Eaton,  100 
Mich.  208,  59  N.  W.  145,  24  L.R.A. 
721;  Cater  v.  Northwestern  Tel. 
Exch.  Co.,  60  Minn.  539,  63  N.  W. 
Ill,  51  Am.  St.  Rep.  543,  28  L.R.A. 
310;  (Compare  Willis  v.  Erie  Tel.  & 
Tel.  Co.,  37Minn.  347,  34N.W.  337.) 
Julia  Building  Ass'n  v.  Bell  Tel.  Co., 
88  Mo.  258,  57  Am.  Rep.  398;  City  of 
St.  Louis  V.  Bell  Tel.  Co.,  96  Mo.  623, 
10  S.  W.  197,  9  Am.  St.  Rep.  370,  2 


342 


EMINEI^T    DOMAIN. 


§  187 


question.  The  text  writers  generally  favor  the  right  to  com- 
pensation.^^ Under  constitutions  giving  compensation  for  prop- 
erty damaged  or  injured  for  public  use,  there  may  he  a  re- 


L.E.A.  278;  Gay  v.  Mutual  Union 
Tel.  Co.,  12  Mo.  App.  485;  Forsythe 
V.  Baltimore  &  O.  Tel.  Co.,  12  Mo. 
App.  494;  Hershfield  v.  Koeky  Mt. 
Bell  Co.,  12  Mont.  102,  29  Pac.  883; 
Shinzel  v.  Bell  Telephone  Co.,  31  Pa. 
Supr.  Ct.  221 ;  Kirby  v.  Citizens'  Tel- 
ephone Co.,  17  S.  D.  362,  97  N.  W.  3 ; 
Frasier  v.  East  Tenn.  Telephone  Co., 
115  Tenn.  416,  90  S.  W.  620,  112  Am. 
St.  Rep.  856,  3  L.R.A.  (N.S.)  323; 
Maxwell  v.  Central  D.  &  P.  Tel.  Co., 
51  W.  Va.  121,  41  S.  E.  125;  Lowther 
V.  Bridgeman,  57  W;  Va.  306,  50  S.  E. 
410;  Southern  Bell  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v. 
Nalley,  165  Fed.  263.  These  cases  all 
go  upon  substantially  the  same 
ground  which  is  thus  stated  in  Pierce 
V.  Drew,  136  Mass.  75,  81:  "When 
the  land  was  taken  for  a  highway 
that  which  was  taken  was  not  merely 
the  privilege  of  traveling  over  it  in 
the  then  known  vehicles,  or  of  using 
it  in  the  then  known  methods,  for 
either  the  conveyance  of  property  or 
the  transmission  of  intelligence.  *  *  * 
The  discovery  of  the  telegraph  de- 
veloped a  new  and  valuable  mode  of 
communicating  intelligence.  Its  use 
is  certainly  similar  to,  if  not  identi- 
cal with,  that  public  use  of  transmit- 
ting information  for  which  the  high- 
way was  originally  taken,  even  if  the 
means  adopted  are  quite  different 
from  the  post-boy  and  the  mail- 
coach.  It  is  a  newly  discovered 
method  of  exercising  the  old  public 
easement,  and  all  appropriate 
methods  must  have  been  deemed  to 
have  been  paid  for  when  the  road 
was  laid  out.''  These  views  are  most 
ably  and  convincingly  answered  in 
the  dissenting  opinion  in  the  same 
case.  To  say  that  a  telegraph  or  tel- 
ephone line  is  a  legitimate  street  use 


because  it  accomplishes  some  of  the 
objects  for  which  the  street  is  estab- 
lished, lays  down  a  principle  which 
justifies  the  use  of  a  street  for  the 
commercial  railroad,  the  elevated 
railroad  or  even  for  a  canal.  There 
is  absolutely  no  analogy  between  or- 
dinary travel  and  the  telegraph  or 
telephone,  and  it  is  even  more  foreign 
to  street  uses  proper  than  the  com- 
mercial railroad.  In  East  Tenn.  Tel- 
ephone Co.  V.  Russellville,  106  Ky. 
667,  51  S.  W.  308,  21  Ky.  L.  R.  305,  is 
a  dictum  to  the  effe.ct  that  a  tele- 
phone line  is  an  additional  burden. 
3  32  Dill.  Mimic.  Corp.  §  698a; 
Elliott,  Roads  and  Streets,  pp.  533- 
530;  Keasbey  on  Electric  Wires,  pp. 
82-84.  We  also  refer  to  the  following 
cases  as  having  some  bearing  on  the 
subject:  Southern  Bell  Tel.  &  Tel. 
Co.  V.  Francis,  109  Ala.  224,  19  So.  1, 
55  Am.  St.  Rep.  930,  31  L.R.A.  193; 
Bradley  v.  Southern  New  Eng.  Tel. 
Co.,  66  Conn.  559,  34  Atl.  499,  32 
L.R.A.  280 ;  Chicago  Telephone  Co.  v. 
N.  W.  Telephone  Co.,  199  111.  324,  65 
N.  E.  329;  Chamberlain' v.  la.  Tel. 
Co.,  119  la.  619,  93  N.  W.  596;  East 
Tenn.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Anderson  Co.  Tel. 
Co.,  115  Ky.  488,  74  S.  W.  218;  Postal 
Tel.  Cable  Co.  v.  Baltimore,  79  Md. 
502,  29  Atl.  819,  24  L.R.A.  161; 
Mich.  Telephone  Co.  v.  St.  Joseph, 
121  Mich.  502,  80  N.  W.  383,  80  Am 
St.  Rep.  520,  47  L.R.A.  87;  Mich. 
Telephone  Co.  v.  Benton  Harbor,  121 
Mich.  512,  80  N.  W.  386,  47  L.R.A. 
104;  Duluth  v.  Duluth  Telephone  Co., 
84  Min.  486,  87  N.  W.  1127;  State 
V.  Red  Lodge,  30  Mont.  338,  76  Pac. 
758;  State  v.  Red  Lodge,  33  Mont. 
345,  83  Pac.  642;  Neb.  Telephone  Co. 
V.  Western  Independent  L.  D.  T.  Co., 
OS  Neb.  772,  95  N.  W.  18;  State  v. 


§  188 


EOADS    AND    STKEETS. 


343 


covery  for  anj  damage  to  abutting  property  by  reason  of  a 
telegraph  or  telephone  line  in  the  street.^* 

Telephone  wires  placed  in  a  conduit  u'nder  the  surface  of  a 
street  and  intended  to  supply  telephone  service  to  residents 
on  the  street,  would  seem  to  come  within  the  principle  of  the  de- 
cisions as  to  gas  and  water  pipes  in  streets,  and,  therefore,  to  be 
such  a  use  of  the  street  as  could  be  made  without  compensation 
to  the  abutting  owner.^^ 

§  188  (131a).  Electric  wires  for  lighting  and  other 
purposes.  It  seems  beyond  question  from  the  authorities  that, 
under  the  general  power  to  improve  streets  and  render  them 
more  convenient  and  safe  for  travel,  the  public  authorities  may 
provide  for  lighting  them  at  night.  If  this  is  so,  it  can  hardly  be 
that  such  authorities  are  limited  to  any  particular  kind  or  sys- 
tem of  lighting.  It  follows  that  poles  and  wires  may  be  placed 
in  the  street  for  the  purpose  of  lighting  them  by  means  of 
electricity.  Such  a  use  is  directly  connected  with  and  incident 
to  the  public  right  of  passage.  The  abutting  owner  would  have 
no  ground  of ,  complaint,  in  the  absence  of  any  abuse  of  the  right 


Bayonne,  59  N.  J.  L.  101,  34  Atl. 
1080;  Hudson  Eiv.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Water- 
vliet  T.  &  R.  R.  Co.,  135  N.  Y.  393,  32 
N.  E.  148,  6  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
619,  31  Am.  St.  Rep.  838,  17  L.R.A. 
674;  Weeks  v.  N.  Y.  &  N.  J.  Tele- 
phone Co.,  86  App.  Dlv.  257,  83  N.  Y. 
S.  678;  Cincinnati  Inclined  Plane  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  City  &  Suburban  Tel.  Ass'n 
48  Ohio  St.  390,  27  N.  E.  Rep.  890,  4 
Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  533,  12  L.R.A. 
534 ;  Worth  v.  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co., 
7  Ohio  C.  C.  290 ;  Burns  v.  Columbus 
Citizens'  Telephone  Co.,  10  Ohio  C.  C. 
(N.S.)  307;  New  Castle  City  v.  Cen- 
tral D.  &.P.  Tel.  Co.,  207  Pa.  St.  371, 
56  Atl.  931;  Wirth  v.  Postal  Tel. 
Cable  Co.,  7  Ohio  C.  C.  290;  York 
Tel.  Co.  V.  Kersey,  5  Pa.  Dist.  Ct. 
366;  Russ  v.  Pennsylvania  Tel.  Co., 
15  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  226 ;  Memphis  Tel.  Co. 
V.  Hun,  16  Lea,  456;  Rugg  v.  Com- 
mercial Union  Tel.  Co.,  66  Vt.  208, 
28  Atl.  1036;  Western  Union  Tel.  Co. 
V.  Bullard,  67  Vt.  272,  31  Atl.  286; 
State  V.  Sheboygan,  111  Wis.  23,  86 


N.  W.  657;  St.  Louis  v.  Western 
Union  Tel.  Co.,  149  U.  S.  465,  13  S.  C. 
990;  Southern  Bell  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v. 
Richmond,  103  Fed.  33,  44  C.  C.  A. 
147 ;  Morristown  v.  East  Tenn.  Tele- 
phone Co.,  115  Fed.  304,  53  C.  C.  A. 
132.  The  case  of  American  Tel.  & 
Tel.  Co.  V.  Pearce,  71  Md.  535,  18  Atl. 
910,  1  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  73,  de- 
cides that  a  telegraph  or  telephone 
line  on  a  railroad  right  of  way  for 
general  commercial  use,  is  an  addi- 
tional burden  on  the  soil  for  which 
the  owner  is  entitled  to  compensa- 
tion. 

3  4Shinzel  v.  Bell  Telephone  Co., 
31  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  221;  Maxwell  v. 
Central  D.  &  P.  Tel.  Co.,  51  W.  Va. 
121,  41  S.  E.  125;  post,  §  352. 

ssCoburn  v.  New  Telephone  Co., 
156  Ind.  90,  59  N.  E.  324,  52  L.R.A. 
671;  Castle  v.  Bell  Telephone  Co., 
49  App.  Div.  437,  63  N.  Y.  S.  482; 
Bums  V.  Columbus  Citizens  Tele- 
phone Co.,  10  Ohio  C.  C.  (N.  S.) 
307. 


344 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


§  188 


to  so  use  the  street.^®  The  lighting  of  private  premises,  how- 
ever, has  no  connection  whatever  with  the  use  of  a  street  for 
public  passage,  and  the  placing  of  poles  and  wires  or  other 
appliances  in  the  street  for  that  purpose  cannot,  therefore,  be 
justified  as  a  street  use.  It  would  follow  that  poles  and  wires, 
to  be  used  exclusively  for  private  lighting,  cannot  be  placed  in 
a  public  street  without  compensation  to  the  abutting  owner  for 
any  damage  sustained.^'^  In  regard  to  poles  and  wires  to  be 
used  for  both  public  and  private  lighting,  the  logical  position 
would  seem  to  be  that  the  abutting  owner  would  be  entitled  to 
a  remedy  to  the  extent  of  the  unlawful  use.^*  It  may  be  doubt- 
ed, however,  whether  these  distinctions  are  practicable,  and  it 
is  probable  that  the  use  of  streets  for  electric  light  wires  will  be 
sustained,  without  regard  to  whether  they  are  for  public  or  pri- 
vate lighting,  but  that  the  abutting  owner  will  have  a  remedy 
for  any  unnecessary  injury  to  his  rights,  as  by  obstructing  his 
doorway  with  a  pole.^*     In  Massachusetts  poles  and  wires  for 


sBLoeber  v.  Butte  General  Elec- 
tric Co.,  16  Mont.  1,  39  Pac.  912,  11 
Am.  R.  K.  &  Corp.  Rep.  260,  50 
Am.  St.  Rep.  468;  French  v.  Robb, 
67  N.  J.  L.  260,  51  Atl.  509,  91  Am. 
St.  Rep.  433,  57  L.R.A.  956;  Palmer 
V.  Larchmont  Elec.  Co.,  158  N.  Y. 
231,  52  N.  E.  1092,  43  L.R.A.  672. 

3  7  See  Carpenter  v.  Capital  Elec. 
Co.,  178  111.  29,  52  N.  E.  973,  69 
Am.  St.  Rep.  286,  43  L.R.A.  645; 
French  v.  Robb,  67  N.  J.  L.  260,  51 
Atl.  509,  91  Am.  St.  Rep.  433,  57 
L.R.A.  956;  Callen  v.  Columbus  Edi- 
son Elec.  Lt.  Co.,  66  Ohio  St.  166, 
64  N.  E.  141,  58  L.R.A.  782. 

3  sit  was  so  held  in  French  v. 
Robb,  67  N.  J.  L.  260,  51  Atl.  509, 
91  Am.  St.  Rep.  433,  57  L.R.A.  956. 
So  in  Gurnsey  v.  Northern  Cal.  Pow- 
er Co.,  7  Cal.  App.  534. 

3  9  Lines  of  poles  and  wires  for  pub- 
lic and  private  lighting  are  held  to 
be  a  proper  street  use  in  Illinois  and 
Mississippi.  MoWethey  v.  Aurora 
Elec.  Lt.  &  P.  Co.,  202  111.  218,  67 
N.  E.  9,  affirming  Aurora  Elec.  Lt. 
&  P.  Co.  V.  McWethey,  104  111.  App. 
479;   Gulf  Coast  lee  &  Mfg.  Co.  v. 


Bowers,  80  Miss.  570,  32  So.  113; 
Hazelhurst  v.  Mayes,  84  Miss.  7,  36 
So.  33,  64  L.R.A.  805.  In  Tuttle  v. 
Brush  Electric  Illuminating  Co.,  50 
N.  Y.  Super.  Ct.  464  (1883),  the  suit 
was  to  prevent  tlie  erection  of  elec- 
tric light  poles  in  the  street  in  front 
of  plaintiff's  property,  and  to  compel 
the  removal  of  those  already  erected. 
The  fee  of  the  street  was  in  the 
public  for  street  uses.  The  poles 
were  to  be  used  for  street  lighting 
and  for  private  lighting.  Ingraham, 
J.,  denied  the  relief,  holding  that 
such  poles  for  the  purpose  of  light- 
ing the  street  were  proper,  but 
doubting  whether  poles  could  be 
erected  for  the  purpose  of  lighting 
private  premises.  In  the  same  year. 
Maxwell,  J.,  of  the  court  of  com- 
mon pleas  of  Ohio,  enjoined  the  erec- 
tion of  electric  light  poles  in  the 
street,  though  the  plaintiff  did  not 
have  the  fee.  McLean  v.  Brush  Elec- 
tric Light  Co.,  9  Cinn.  Law  Bull. 
65  (1883).  In  People  ex  rel.  Mc- 
Manus  v.  Thompson,  65  How.  Pr. 
407  (1883),.  Haight,  J.,  held  that 
poles    and    wires    for    street    light- 


§  188 


EOADS   ANB   STREETS. 


345 


electric  lighting  are,  by  statute,  placed  upon  the  same  footing 
as  poles  and  wires  for  the  telegraph  and  telephone.  Compen- 
sation must  be  made  to  abutting  owners  for  any  injury  to  their 
property  caused  thereby,  but  not  for  any  injury  to  the  fee  of  the 
street.*"  At  the  present  time  it  is  common  to  use  the  streets  for 
wires  for  fire  alarm  purposes,  and  to  aid  in  the  police  serv- 


ing were  a  proper  use  of  a 
street.  The  decision  in  the  case 
was  affirmed  without  passing  upon 
this  question.  32  Hun  93.  In  Tif- 
fany V.  U.  S.  Illuminating  Co.,  51 
N  Y.  Super.  Ct.  280;  67  How.  Pr.  73 
(1885),  the  .  New  York  superior 
court,  general  term,  affirmed  a  de- 
cree enjoining  the  erection  of  elec- 
tric light  poles  in  front  of  plaintiflf's 
property.  The  court  says :  "Its  bus- 
iness is  to  furnish  light  to  the  city 
corporation  for  the  public  lighting 
of  the  streets,  and  to  private  indi- 
viduals to  light  private  houses.  Tlie 
former  may  involve  a  public  and  or- 
dinary use  of  the  street;  the  latter 
would  involve  a  use  of  the  street  for 
private  purposes.  On  the  plaintiff 
showing  that  the  defendant,  a,  pri- 
vate corporation,  is  about  to  obstruct 
the  street  with  poles,  etc.,  it  would 
appear  prima  facie,  that  it  was 
without  authority  to  do  so.  The 
defenoant,  to  absolve  itself  from  re- 
sponsibility, must  show  the  author- 
ity. Its  evidence  on  this  point  is 
most  general  and  does  not  show 
that  every  part  of  its  proposed 
work  is  necessary  or  highly  conven- 
ient for  both  the  public  and  the 
private  use.  It  is  entirely  consis- 
tent with  the  testimony,  that  the 
particular  pole  and  wire  that 
would  be  in  front  of  the  plaintiflf's 
house,  would  not  be  necessary  to  the 
public  use."  In  Johnson  v.  Thomp- 
son-Houston Electric  Co.,  54  Hun 
469,  7  N.  Y.  Supp.  716  (1889),  it 
was  held  at  general  term  that  an 
abutting    owner    could    not    compel 


the  removal  from  in  front  of  his 
premises  of  an  electric  light  pole, 
from  which  a,  street  lamp  was  to 
be  suspended,  and  which  was  to  be 
used  both  for  lighting  the  streets 
and  private  premises.  It  was 
doubted  whether  a  street  could  be 
used  for  poles  and  wires  for  pri- 
vate lighting,  and  intimated  that 
the  plaintiff  might  have  such  use 
enjoined  until  compensation  was 
made.  Consumers'  Gas  &  El.  Light 
Co.  V.  Congress  Spring  Co.,  69  Hun 
133,  39  N.  Y.  St.  703,  15  N.  Y.  Supp. 
624  and  Berlew  v.  Electric  Illumin- 
ating Co.,  1  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  651  (1886) 
support  the  view  that  light  wires 
are  a  legitimate  street  use.  So  does 
Loeber  v.  Butte  General  Electric  Co. 
16  Mont.  1,  39  Pac.  912,  50  Am.  St. 
Rep.  468,  11  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
260,  wherein  it  was  held  that  the 
plaintiff  could  not  enjoin  the  erec- 
tion of  a  light  pole  in  an  alley,  in 
the  rear  of  his  premises,  the  fee  of 
which  was  in  the  public.  See  also 
Electric  Construction  Co.  v.  Heffer- 
man,  12  N.  Y.  Supp.  336.  In  Haver- 
ford  Electric  Light  Co.  v.  Hart,  13 
Pa.  Co.  Ct.  369,  1  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  571, 
electric  light  poles  were  held  to  be 
an  additional  burden  on  a  country 
highway.  Also  in  Palmer  v.  Larch- 
mont  Electric  Co.,  6  App.  Div.  12,  39 
N.  Y.  Supp.  522.  The  erection  of  a 
light  pole  in  front  of  the  plaintiff's 
premises,  without  authority  was  en- 
joined in  Malone  v.  Waukesha  Elec. 
Lt.  Co.  120  Wis.  485,  98  N.  W.  247. 
4 "See  Suburban  Light  &  Power 
Co.  V.  Board  of  Aldermen,  153  Mass. 


346  EMINE]SrT    DOMAIN.  §    189 

ice.*^  Electricity  is  also  distributed  to  some  extent  by  means 
of  wires  in  streets  to  be  converted  into  mechanical  power.  It 
is  not  too  much  to  expect  that  at  no  distant  day  its  use  for  this 
purpose  will  greatly  increase,  and  also  that  it  will  become  prac- 
ticable for  heating  purposes.  It  is  manifest,  however,  that 
while  all  these  applications  of  electricity  subserve  a  public  pur- 
pose in  aid  of  which  the  power  of  eminent  domain  may  be 
invoked,  none  of  them  are  connected  with  or  in  aid  of  the  pub- 
lic right  of  passage  in  a  street,  and  are  not  properly  street  uses.*^ 
Although  the  process  of  putting  electric  wires  under  the  sur- 
face of  streets,  for  the  various  purposes  for  which  they  are  used, 
has  been  going  on  for  a  number  of  years,  no  question  appears 
to  have  been  made  by  abutting  owners  as  to  the  right  to  use 
the  streets  in  that  way.** 

§  189  (132).  Markets.  A  public  market  is  entirely  for- 
eign to  the  legitimate  uses  of  a  public  highway,  and  when  a  part 
of  the  highway  is  devoted  to  such  use  by  legislative  authority, 
the  abutting  owner  is  entitled  to  compensation,  whether  the  fee 
is  in  him  or  in  the  public.**  But,  where  fifty  feet  in  the  middle 
of  a  street  was  condemned  for  market  purposes,  the  abutting 
owners  cannot  enjoin  its  use  for  that  purpose  on  account  of  the 

200,  26  N.  E.  447;  Pub  Stats.  Mass.  We    refer    to    the    following    cases 

c.  109;  Acts,  1883,  c.  221;  Acts,  1889,  growing  out  of  electric  light  wires 

c.  398.  in  streets,  but  which  did  not  involve 

4iln   Callen  v.   Columbus  Edison  any  controversy  with  abutting  own- 

Elec.  Lt.  Co.,  66  Ohio  St.  166,  64  N.  ers.     Crowder  v.  Town  of  Sullivan, 

E.  141,  58  L.E.A.  782,  it  is  doubted  128  Ind.  486,  28  N.  E.  94,  13  L.R.A. 

whether    such    wires   are    a    proper  647;    City   of   Newport  v.   Newport 

street   use.      See   De    Kalb    County  Light  Co.,  89  Ky.  454,  12  S.  W.  1040, 

Telephone    Co.   v.    Button,    228    111.  1    Am.    R.    R.    &    Corp.    Eep.    397; 

178,  81  N.  E.  838,  10  L.E,.A.(N.S.)  State  v.  Murphy,  130  Mo.  10,  31  S. 

1057.  W.  594,  12  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 

42See    Edison    Elec.    111.    Co.    v.  370,   31   L.R.A.  798;   Nebraska  Tel. 

Hooper,   85  Md.   110,   36   Atl.    113;  Co.  v.  York  Gas  &  El.  Light  Co.,  27 

Smith  V.  Goldboro,   121   N.   C.   350,  Neb.  284,  43  N.  W.  126;  Grand  Eap- 

28  S.  E.  479;  Young  v.  York  Haven  ids  E.  L.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Grand  Rapids 

Elec.  T.  Co.,  15  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  843.  E.  L.  &  G.  Co.,  33  Fed.  659. 

4  3ln  State  v.  Murphy    (Mo.),  34  4 4 state  v.  Mobile,  5  Porter  (Ala.) 

S.  W.  51,  it  was  held  that  the  privi-  279;    Lutterloh   v.    Cedar  K.eys,    15 

lege  of  constructing  electrical  sub-  Fla.  306;   Schopp  v.  St.  Louis,  117 

ways  in  the  streets  of  a  city  could  Mo.  131,  22  S.  W.  898,  8  Am.  R.  R. 

not  be   granted   to   a   private   com-  &   Corp.   Rep.   391,   20   L.R.A.   783; 

pany,  whose  object  was  to  lease  the  State  v.  Lavanac,  34  N.  J.  L.  201, 

same  for  gain,  though  they  were  ex-  205;    Herrick  v.   Cleveland,   7   Ohio 

pected  to  be  leased  for  puMic  uses.  C.  C.  470.     In  State  v.  Lavanac,  34 


§  190 


EOADS    AND    STEEETS. 


347 


concourse  of  teams  in  front  of  their  property  thereby  occa- 
sioned.*^ 

§  190  (132a).  Destruction  of  or  injury  to  shade  trees 
in  streets.  Where  the  public  owns  the  fee  of  the  street,  the 
abutting  owner  has  no  proprietary  right  in  the  soil  or  minerals, 
or  in  the  herbage  or  trees  growing  thereon.  The  public  au- 
thorities may,  therefore,  cut  or  remove  the  trees  in  their  discre- 
tion, and  the  abutter  has  no  remedy,  though  his  property  may  be 
damaged  thereby.*''  In  New  York  it  is  held  that  the  abutter, 
though  he  does  not  own  the  fee  of  the  street,  has  an  interest  in 
shade  trees  in  the  nature  of  an  easement,  which  is  on  the  same 
basis  as  the  easements  of  light  and  air,  and  that  this  inter- 
est is  sufficient  to  enable  him  to  maintain  an  action  for  their 
destruction  by  a  wrongdoer.*^  But  when  the  abutter  owns  the 
fee  of  the  street,  he  owns  the  trees  thereon,  subject  to  the  public 
easement.*^  The  rights  of  the  public  in  such  case  are  thus 
stated  in  a  recent  Wisconsin  case:  "The  right  of  the  public  to 
use  the  street  for  the  purposes  of  travel  extends  to  the  portions 
set  apart  or  used  for  sidewalks,  as  well  as  to  the  way  for  car- 


N.  J.  L.  201,  the  court  says: "I  think 
the  true  rule  is  that  land  taken  by 
the  public  for  a  particular  use  can- 
not be  applied,  under  such  a  se- 
questration, to  any  other  use,  to  the 
detriment  of  the  land  owner.  Tliis 
is  the  only  rule  which  will  adequate- 
ly protect  the  constitutional  right  of 
the  citizen.  To  permit  land  taken 
for  one  purpose,  and  for  which  the 
landowner  has  been  compensated,  to 
be  applied  to  another  and  additional 
purpose,  for  which  he  has  received 
no  compensation,  would  be  a  mere 
evasion  of  the  spirit  of  the  funda- 
mental law  of  the  State.  Land  tak- 
en and  applied  for  the  ordinary  pur- 
poses of  a  street  would  often  be  an 
improvement  of  the  adjacent  prop- 
erty; an  appropriation  of  it  to  the 
uses  of  a  market  would,  perhaps, 
as  often  be  destructive  of  one-half 
of  the  value  of  such  property."  In 
Philadelphia  v.  Slocum,  14  Phil.  141, 
it  was  held  that  where  land  was 
dedicated  for  a  street  with  a  proviso 


that  a  certain  space  in  the  center 
should  be  used  for  market  purposes, 
the  city  might  abandon  the  market 
and  improve  the  whole  as  a  street. 

"Henkel  v.  Detroit,  49  Mich.  249, 
13  N.  W.  611,  43  Am.  Rep.  404. 
And  see  Miller  v.  Webster  City,  94 
la.  162,  62  N.  W.  648,  11  Am.  E.  R. 
&  Corp.  Rep.  346.  Where  a  city  au- 
thorized the  use  of  a  street  for  mar- 
ket purposes  by  allowing  wagons  to 
stand  against  the  curb  for  purposes 
of  traffic,  whereby  a  nuisance  re- 
sulted, it  was  held  that  the  abutting 
fee  owner  could  enjoin.  Richmond 
V.  Smith,  148  Ind.  294. 

4  6  City  of  Atlanta  v.  Holliday,  96 
Ga.  546,  23  S.  E.  509. 

4 'Donahue  v.  Keystone  Gas  Co., 
181  N.  y.  313,  73  N.  E.  1108,  lOB 
Am.  St.  Rep.  549,  70  L.R.A.  701, 
aflirming  S.  C.  90  App.  Div.  380,  85 
N.  Y.  S.  478;  Lane  v.  Lamke,  53 
App.  Div.  395,  65  N.  Y.  S.  1090. 

isPost,  §  853;  Lancaster  v.  Rich- 
ardson, 4  Lans.  136. 


348  EMIITENT    DOMAIN.  §    190 

riages,  wagons,  etc.,  and,  in  short,  to  the  entire  width  of  the 
street  upon  which  the  land  of  the  lot-owner  abuts.  As  against 
the  lot-owner,  the  city  as  trustee  of  the  public  use,  has  an  un- 
doubted right,  whenever  its  authorities  see  fit,  to  open  and  fit 
for  use  and  travel  the  street  over  which  the  public  easement 
extends,  to  its  entire  width,  and  whether  it  will  so  open  and  im- 
prove it,  or  whether  it  should  be  so  opened  or  improved,  is  a 
matter  of  discretion,  to  be  determined  by  the  public  authorities 
to  whom  the  charge  and  control  of.  the  public  interests  in  and 
over  such  easements  is  committed.  With  this  discretion  of  the 
authorities,  courts  cannot  ordinarily  interfere  upon  the  com- 
plaint of  a  lot-owner,  so  long  as  the  easement  continues  to  exist ; 
and  no  mere  non-user,  however  long  continued,  will  operate  as 
an  abandonment  of  the  public  right,  even  th'ough,  until  needed 
for  a  public  use,  the  authorities  should  treat  the  street  as  the 
property  of  the  owner  of  the  lot.  The  public  authorities,  rep- 
resenting its  interests,  will  not  be  thereby  estopped  from  remov- 
ing obstructions  therefrom,  and  opening  and  fitting  it  for  pub- 
lic use  to  its  entire  width.*®  The  public  use  is  the  dominant 
interest,  and  the  public  authorities  are  the  exclusive  judges 
when  and  to  what  extent  the  street  shall  be  improved.  Courts 
can  interfere  only  in  case  of  fraud  or  oppression,  constituting 
manifest  abuse  of  discretion."  ^°  Undoubtedly  the  proper  pub- 
lic authorities  may  cause  the  removal  of  shade  trees  in  a  street 
where  they  constitute  an  obstruction  to  travel  or  when  neces- 
sary for  the  improvement  of  the  street  without  liability  to 
the  owner  of  the  fee.^-'  But,  as  intimated  in  the  Wisconsin 
case  above  quoted,  the  courts  will  interfere  to  prevent  or  redress 
the  wrong  to  the  owner  of  the  fee  by  the  removal  of  trees,  when 
the  authorities  abuse  the  discretion  vested  in  them.  And  it 
is  an  abuse  of  discretion  to  remove  valuable  shade  trees  when 

4  9  Citing  state  v.  Leaver,  62  Wis.  Bilbid;  Vanderhurst  v.  Tholcke, 
387,  22  N.  W.  576;  Eeilly  v.  City  of  113  Cal.  147,  45  Pac.  266;  Castle- 
Racine,  51  Wis.  526,  8  N.  W.  417;  bury  v.  Atlanta,  74  Ga.  164;  Pat- 
Childs  V.  Nelson,  69  Wis.  125,  33  terson  v.  Vail,  43  la.  142;  Cart- 
N.  W.  587.  Wright  v.  Liberty  Telephone  Co.,  205 

soChase  V.  City  of  Oskosh,  81  Wis.  Mo.  126,  103  S.  W.  982,  12  L.R.A. 

313,  51  N.  W.  560,  6  Am.  R.  R.  &  (N.S.)    1125;  Colston  v.  St.  Joseph, 

Corp.  Rep.   1,  29  Am  St.  Rep.   898,  106   Mo.  App.   714,   80   S.   W.   590; 

15  L.R.A.  553-.     This  case  is  quoted  Sherman  v.  Butcher,  72  N.  J.  L.  53, 

and    approved    in    Tate   v.    City    of  60  Atl.  336. 
Greensborough,  114  N.  C.  392,  19  S. 
E.  767,  24  L.E.A.  671. 


§  190  BOADS  AND  STREETS.  349 

there  is  no  reasonable  necessity  therefor. °^  In  Massachusetts 
shade  trees  are  protected  by  statute,  and  can  only  be  removed 
upon  complaint  to  the  proper  authorities  and  a  determination 
by  them  that  the  public  necessity  so  requires,  of  which  proceed- 
ing the  owner  is  entitled  to  notice  with  an  opportunity  to  be 
heard.°*  And  in  Michigan  a  city  was  held  liable  for  removing 
shade  trees  without  notice  to  the  abutting  owner  and  giving  him 
an  opportunity  to  transplant  them,  and  this  in  the  absence  of 
any  statute  on  the  subject.^*  A  statute  of  ISTew  Hampshire 
provided  for  designating  and  marking  ornamental  and  shade 
trees  in  the  public  highways  and  for  their  care  and  preserva- 
tion and  for  the  acquisition  of  title  thereto  by  purchase  or 
condemnation  and  also  forbade  the  injury  or  destruction  of 
trees  so  marked  and  designated  under  a  penalty.  In  a  suit 
for  the  penalty  against  an  abutting  owner  for  cutting  down  such 
a  tree,  the  court  held  the  statute  unconstitutional,  as  amounting 
to  a  taking  of  the  abutter's  property  without  compensation.^' 
Whether  trees  may  be  mutilated  or  removed  to  make  room  for 
electric  wires  or  railroads  or  other  such  uses,  will  depend  upon 
the  view  taken  as  to  whether  these  are  legitimate  street  uses. 
If  they  are  held  to  be  so,  then  they  stand  upon  the  same  footing 
as  ordinary  street  improvements.^"  If  not,  then  they  cannot 
be  placed  in  the  street  at  all  without  compensation  to  the  abutter, 

6  2City  of  Atlanta  v.  HoUiday,  96  City  of  Lowell,  149  Mass.  85,  21  N. 

Ga.  546,  23  S.  E.  509;   City  of  Mt.  E.  233. 

Carmel   v.   Bell,   52   111.   App.   427;  B4Stretcli  v.  Cassopolis,  125  Mich. 

City  of  Mt.  Carmel  v.  Shaw,  52  111.  167,  84  N.  W.  51,  84  Am.  St.  Rep. 

App.  429;   Bills  v.  Belknap,  36  la.  567,  51  L.R.A.  345;  Miller  v.  Ypsil- 

583;    Everett  v.   Council   Bluffs,   46  anti  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  125  Mich.  171,  84 

la.  60 ;  Chisman  v.  Deck,  84  la.  344,  N.  W.  49,  84  Am.  St.  Rep.  569,  51 

51  N.  W.  55;  Frostburg  v.  Wineland,  L.R.A.  955. 

98  Md.  239,  56  Atl.  811,  103  Am.  St.  55Bigelow  v.  Whitcomb,  72  N.  H. 

Rep.  399,  64  L.R.A.  627 ;   Stretch  v.  473,  57  Atl.  680,  65  L.R.A.  676. 

Cassopolis,  125  Mich.  167,  84  N.  W.  seSouthern  Bell  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v. 

51,  84  Am.  St.  Rep.  567,  51  L.R.A.  Francis,  109  Ala.  224,  19  So.  1,  55 

345;  Cross  v.  Morristown,  18  N.  J.  Am.   St.   Rep.   930,   31   L.R.A.   193; 

Eq.    305,    313;    Tainter    v.    Morris-  Huntting  v.  Hartford   St.  Ry.   Co., 

town,    19    N.    J.    Eq.    46;    State   v.  73  Conn.  179,  46  Atl.  824;  Miller  v. 

Mayor  etc.  of  Vineland,  56  N.  J.  K  Ypsilanti  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  125  Mich.  171, 

474,   28  Atl.    1039,   23   L.R.A.   685;  84  N.  W.  49,  84  Am.  St.  Rep.  569, 

Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Smith,  04  51  L.R.A.  955 ;   McAntire  v.  Joplin 

Ohio  St.  106,  59  N.  E.  890.  Tel.  Co.,  75  Mo.  App.  535;  Dodd  v. 

5  3 White  V.  Godfrey,  97  Mass.  472;  Consolidated  Traction  Co.,  57  N.  J. 

Bliss  V.  Ball,  99  Mass.  597;  Chase  v.  L.  482,  31  Atl.  980.     In  the  Michi- 


350  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    191 

and  this  compensation  would  include  any  injury  to  his  trees. 
For  any  unauthorized  or  unnecessary  interference  with  shade 
trees  for  any  of  these  purposes,  the  abutter,  owning  the  fee, 
may  recover  damages.^''  There  is  no  necessity,  in  the  legal 
sense,  for  cutting  or  trimming  trees,  merely  because  it  is  more 
convenient  or  less  expensive.®*  If  interference  with  trees  can 
reasonably  be  avoided,  the  companies  are  bound  to  let  them 
alone. 

§  191  (132b).  Interfering  with  access  by  obstructing 
street  at  a  distance  from  the  plaintiff's  property. 
Whether  a  plaintiff  can  recover  damages  when  the  street  upon 
which  he  abuts  is  closed  or  obstructed  at  a  point  not  in  front  of 
his  property,  is  one  of  the  vexed  questions  of  the  law.  Accord- 
ing to  the  better  view,  as  it  seems  to  the  writer,  the  private  right 
of  access  is  the  right,  not  only  to  go  from  one's  property  to 
the  street  and  from  the  street  to  the  property,  but  also  to  use 
the  street  in  either  direction  as  an  outlet  to  the  general  system 
of  highways.®^  This  right  extends  at  least  to  the  next  inter- 
secting street.*"  Consequently  if  the  street  upon  which  the 
plaintiff  abuts  is  wrongfully  closed  or  obstructed  in  either  di- 
rection, at  a  point  between  the  plaintiff's  property  and  the  next 

gan  case  it  was  held  that  though  a  59  N.  E.  890;  Marshall  v.  Am.  Tel. 

street  railway  company  had  a  right  &  Tel.  Co.,  16  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  615; 

to  remove  trees,  a  removal  of  them  Memphis     Tel.     Co.     v.     Hun,     16 

without  notice  to  the  owner  would  Lea  456;    O'Connor  v.  Nova   Scotia 

render  the  company  liable.  Tel.     Co.,     22     Duvall     276;     And 

B7Hoyt    V.    Southern    New    Eng.  see    Cumberland    Tel.    &    Tel.    Co. 

Tel.  Co.,  60  Conn.  385,  22  Atl.  957;  v.  Cassedy,  78  Miss.  666,  29  So.  762; 

Bradley  v.  Southern  New  Eng.  Tel.  Osborne  v.  Auburn  Telephone  Co.,  Ill 

Co.,  66  Conn.   559,  34  Atl.  499,  32  App.  Div.  702,  97  N.  Y.  S.  874.     In 

L.R.A.  280 ;   Rockford  Gas  etc.  Co.  Darling  v.  Newport  Elec.  Lt.  Co.,  74 

V.      Ernst,      68      111.      App.      300;  N.  H.  515,  it  was  held  that  an  elec- 

Tisso    V.     Great     So.    Tel.    &    Tel.  trio  company  had  no  right  to  trim 

Co.,   39   La.   An.   996,  3   So.   261,   4  trees     which     grew     upon     private 

Am.  St.  Rep.  248;  Wyant  v.  Central  ground     and     projected     into     the 

Telephone  Co.,  123  Mich.  51,  81  N.  street,  without  an  assessment  of 
W.    928,   81   Am.    St.   Rep.    155,   47 


L.R.A.  497;  Hazelhurst  v.  Mayes,  84  5  8 Van  Siclen  v.  Jamaica  Elec.  Lt. 

Miss.  7,  36  So.  33,  64  L.R.A.  805;  Co.,  45  App.  Div.  1,  61  N.  Y.  S.  210; 

Cartwright  v.  Liberty  Telephone  Co.,  S.  C.  affirmed  168  N.  Y.  650,  61  N. 

205    Mo.    126,    103    S.    W.    982,    12  E.   1135;    Brown  v.   Asheville  Elec. 

L.R.A.(N.S.)  1125;  State  v.  Graeme,  Co.,  138  N.  C.  533,  51  S.  E.  62,  107 

130    Mo.    App.    138;    McCruden    >f.  Am.  St.  Rep.  554,  69  L.R.A.  631. 

Rochester  R.  R.  Co.,  5  Misc.  59,  25  ^^Ante,  §  123;  post,  §  198. 

N.    Y.    Supp.    114;    Western   Union  eolbid. 
Tel.  Co.  V.  Smith,  64  Ohio  St.  106, 


191 


EOADS   AND    STEEETS, 


351 


intersecting  street,  this  right  is  violated  and  an  action  accrues/'^ 
So  where  the  plaintiff's  property  was  on  a  cul  de  sac  and  his 
outlet  was  blocked  or  obstructed.''^  If  such  closure  or  obstruc- 
tion is  lawfully  made  for  a  public  purpose,  there  is  a  taking 
or  damaging  of  the  plaintiff's  property  for  which  compensation 
may  be  had  under  the  constitution.®^  If  the  obstruction  is 
more  remote  from  the  plaintiff's  property  it  is  generally  held 
that  there  can  be  no  recovery.®* 


61  Gushing- Wctmore  Co.  v.  Gray, 
152  Cal.  118,  92  Pac.  70;  Harvey  v. 
Ga.  Southern  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  90  Ga. 
66,  15  S.  E.  783;  Brunswick  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Hardy,  112  Ga.  604,  37 
S.  E.  888,  52  L.R.A.  396;  Southern 
Cotton  Oil  Co.  V.  Bull,  116  Ga.  776, 
43  S.  E.  52;  Savannah  etc.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Gill,  118  Ga.  737,  45  S.  E.  623; 
Winnetka  v.  Clifford,  201  111.  475, 
66  N.  E.  384;  O'Brien  v.  Central 
Iron  etc.  Co.,  158  Ind.  218,  63  N.  E. 
302,  92  Am.  St.  Rep.  305,  57  L.R.A. 
508;  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Stan- 
ley, 10  Ind.  App.  421,  37  N.  E.  288, 
38  N.  E.  421 ;  Park  v.  C.  &  S.  W.  R. 
R.  Co.,  43  la.  636;  Dairy  v.  Iowa 
Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  113  la.  716,  84  N.  W. 
688;  Young  v.  Rothrock,  121  la. 
588,  96  N.  W.  1105;  Leavenworth 
etc.  R.  E.  Co.  V.  Curtan,  51  Kan. 
432,  33  Pac.  297;  Atchison  etc.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Armstrong,  71  Kan.  366,  80 
Pac.  928,  114  Am.  St.  Rep.  474,  1 
L.R.A.(N.S.)  113;  Dyche  v.  Weich- 
selbaum,  9  Kan.  App.  360,  58  Pac. 
126;  Richardson  v.  Davis,  91  Md. 
390,  46  Atl.  964;  Kaje  v.  Chicago 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  57  Minn.  422,  59  N. 
W.  493 ;  Fitzer  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry. 
Co.,  105  Minn.  221,  117  N.  W.  434; 
Glaessner  v.  Anheuser-Busch  Brew- 
ing Co.,  100  Mo.  508,  13  S.  W.  707, 
2  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  420;  Au- 
tenreith  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  E.  Co., 
36  Mo.  App.  254;  Dries  v.  St.  Jos- 
eph, 98  Mo.  App.  611,  73  S.  W.  723; 
Ellis  V.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  131 
Mo.  App.  395;  Morris  &  C.  Dredg- 
ing Co.  V.  Jersey  City,  64  N.  J.  L. 


587,  46  Atl.  609;  Perrine  v.  Penn. 
R.  R.  Co.,  72  N.  J.  L.  398,  61  Atl. 
87;  Buckholz  v.  New  York  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  148  N.  Y.  640,  43  N.  E.  76; 
Ackerman  v.  True,  56  App.  DiV.  54, 
66  N.  Y.  S.  6;  Gillender  v.  New 
York,  127  App.  Div.  612;  Tise  v. 
Whataker-Harvey  Co.,  144  N.  C.  507, 
57  S.  E.  210;  Madden  v.  Penn.  Ry. 
Co.,  21  Ohio  C.  C.  73;  Johnston  v. 
Old  Colony  R.  R.  Co.,  18  R.  I.  642, 
29  Atl.  594;  Richardson  v.  Lone 
Star  Salt  Co.,  20  Tex.  Civ.  App.  486, 
post,  §§  202,  203. 

Contra:  San  Jose  Ranch  Co.  v. 
Brooks,  74  Cal.  463,  16  Pac.  250; 
Newton  v.  ISIew  York,  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
72  Conn.  420,  44  Atl.  813;  Stuffle- 
beam  v.  Montgomery,  3  Ida.  20,  26 
Pac.  125;  Jacksonvflle  etc.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Thompson,  34  Fla.  346,  16  So.  282, 
26  L.R.A.  410;  O'Connor  v.  St.  Lou- 
is etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  56  la.  735;  Har- 
rington V.  la.  Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  126  la. 
388,  102  N.  W.  139;  Grey  v.  Green- 
ville etc.  Ry.  Co.,  59  N.  J.  Eq.  372, 
46  Atl.  638.  See  Guttery  v.  Glenn, 
201  111.  275,  66  N.  E.  305 ;  Davenport 
v.  Dedham,  178  Mass.  382,  59  N.  E. 
1029;  Davenport  v.  Hyde  Park,  178 
Mass.  385,  59  N.  E.  1030. 

6  2Brakken  v.  Minneapolis  etc.  Ry. 
Co.,  29  Minn.  41,  11  N.  W.  124;  S. 
C.  31  Minn.  45,  16  N.  W.  459;  32 
Minn.  425,  21  N.  W.  414;  Hayes  v. 
Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  46  Minn.  349, 
49  N.  W.  61. 

6  3  See  post,  §§  202-207,  354. 

64Ibid;  Shaubert  v.  St.  Paul  etc. 
E.  R.  Co.,  21  Minn.  502 ;  Rochette  v. 


352 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  192 


§  192  (121e).     Damage  to  railroads,  water  pipes,  gas 
pipes,  etc,  by  the  grading  and  improvement  of  streets. 

The  power  to  grade  and  change  the  grade  of  streets  and  other- 
wise improve  them  in  aid  of  the  right  of  passage  is  continuing 
and  inalienable.^*  A  grant  of  the  right  to  lay  down  and  operate 
a  railroad  in  a  street,®"  or  to  lay  water  or  gas  pipes  therein  "^ 
is  subject  to  the  paramount  right  of  the  public  to  grade  and 
improve  the  street.  It  follows  that  the  grantees  of  such  privi- 
leges cannot  recover  for  any  damage  to  their  property  resulting 
from  such  improvements,  when  the  same  are  executed  with  due 
care  and  skill.  Accordingly,  when  the  grade  of  a  street  is  low- 
ered and  water  or  gas  pipes  are  exposed  or  brought  too  near  the 
surface,  there  is  no  remedy  against  the  city  either  to  prevent 
the  change  or  recover  damages  therefor,  but  the  company  must 
lower  its  pipes  at  its  own  expense."'^  So  where  the  grade  was 
raised  and  the  pipes  were  buried  too  deep."*  A  gas  company 
may  be  compelled  to  remove  its  pipes  to  make  way  for  a  munici- 
pal water  main.®®  A  railroad  company  cannot  prevent  a  change 
of  grade,  but  may  be  compelled  to  change  the  grade  of  its  tracks 
to  conform  to  a  new  grade  of  the  street."*     But  this  power  of 


Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  32  Minn.  201, 
20  N.  W.  140;  Barnum  v.  Minn. 
Transfer  Ry.  Co.,  33  Minn.  365,  23 
N.  W.  538;  Kakkie  v.  St.  Paul  etc. 
Ry.  Co.,  44  Miniv  438,  46  N.  W.  912. 

6  6Roanoke  Gas  Co.  v.  City  of  Ro- 
anoke, 88  Va.  810,  14  S.  E.  665,  6 
Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  88;  Ante 
§  145. 

6  6Ridge  Ave.  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Philadelphia,  10  Phil.  37;  Chicago, 
B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  City  of  Quincy, 
136  111.  563,  27  N.  E.  192,  29  Am. 
St.  Rep.  334;  Ridge  Ave.  Pass.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Philadelphia,  181  Pa.  St.  592, 
37  Atl.  910. 

6  7Roekland  Water  Co.  v.  City  of 
Rockland,  83  Me.  267,  22  Atl.  166; 
Natick  Gas  Lt.  Co.  v.  Natick,  175 
Mass.  246,  56  N.  E.  292;  Stillwater 
Water  Co.  v.  City  of  Stillwater,  50 
Minn.  498,  52  N.  W.  893;  National 
W.  W.  Co.  V.  City  of  Kansas,  20  Mo. 
App.  237;  In  matter  of  Deering,  93 
N.  Y.  361;   Columbus  Gas  Light  & 


Coke  Co.  V.  City  of  Columbus,  50 
Ohio  St.  65,  33  N.  E.  292,  7  Am.  R. 
R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  472,  40  Am.  St.  Rep. 
648,  19  L.R.A.  510;  Scranton  Gas  & 
W.  Co.  V.  Scranton  City,  214  Pa.  St. 
580,  64  Atl.  84;  Pittsburg  v.  Con- 
solidated Gas  Co.,  34  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 
374 ;  Roanoke  Gas  Co.  v.  City  of  Ro- 
anoke, 88  Va.  810,  14  S.  E.  665,  6 
Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  88;  South- 
wark  Water  Co.  v.  District  Board, 
L.  R.   (1898)   2  Ch.  603. 

6  8  Jamaica  Pond  Aqueduct  Co.  v. 
Brookline,  121  Mass.  5. 

6  9Pittsburg  V.  Consolidated  Gas 
Co.,  34  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  374. 

'oHampton  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry. 
Co.,  125  111.  App.  412;  McHale  v. 
Easton  &  B.  Transit  Co.,  169  Pa.  St. 
416,  32  Atl.  Rep.  461;  City  of  De- 
troit V.  Ft.  Wayne  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  90 
Mich.  646,  51  N.  W.  Rep.  688,  6 
Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  188.  But 
a  contractor,  paving  a  street,  has 
no   right  imneeessarily   to   obstruct 


§  192 


EOADS    AND    STEEETS. 


353 


changing  the  grade  of  streets  cannoi  be  so  exercised  as  to  destroy 
the  franchise  of  a  railroad  company  lawfully  authorized  to  oc- 
cupy a  street.  A  railroad  was  authorized  to  be  built  upon  a 
street  along  the  shore  of  Puget  Sound,  in  Seattle,  and  to  connect 
with  the  wharves  along  its  route.  The  railroad  and  surround- 
ing property  were  destroyed  by  fire.  Thereupon  the  city  raised 
the  grade  of  intersecting  streets  so  as  to  render  it  impossible  for 
the  railroad  to  be  reconstructed  without  cutting  through  the 
embankments  made  by  such  changes  of  grade.  In  a  suit  by  the 
city  to  enjoin  such  cutting,  the  bill  was  dismissed  on  the  ground 
that  the  city's  power  to  grade  the  streets  must  be  so  exercised  as 
not  to  destroy  the  company's  franchise.'^  ^  Where  a  railroad 
crossed  a  street  under  an  ordinance  which  required  it  to  build  a 
bridge  so  as  to  allow  use  of  the  full  width  of  the  street,  and  the 
city  subsequently  widened  the  street,  it  was  held  that  the  railroad 
company  was  entitled  to  compensation  for  having  to  reconstruct 


the  operation  of  street  ears,  and 
may  be  prevented  from  so  doing. 
Milwaukee  St.  R.  K.  Co.  v.  Adlam, 
85  Wis.  142,  55  N.  W.  Kep.  181,  8 
Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  320. 

7iCity  of  Seattle  v.  Columbia  & 
P.  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  6  Wash.  379,  33 
Pac.  Rep.  1048.  The  court  says: 
"Under  such  a  state  of  facts,  we 
think  the  well-settled  rule  of  law  is 
that  the  city's  right  to  graduate  its 
streets  or  alter  the  grades  thereof  is 
not  an  absolute  one,  to  be  exercised 
at  its  option,  regardless  of  its  ef- 
fect upon  others,  but  it  is  a,  power 
which  must  be  reasonably  exercised 
with  reference  to  the  rights  of  par- 
ties interested.  It  cannot  be  exer- 
cised to  the  extent  of  working  the 
destruction  of  such  a  franchise  pre- 
viously granted.  This  would  amount 
to  an  unauthorized  taking  of  prop- 
erty, and  none  of  the  cases  cited  by 
appellant,  in  our  opinion,  support 
such  contention,  as  none  of  them  go 
to  the  extent  of  holding  that  the 
city  may.  so  alter  and  change  the 
grades  of  its  streets  as  to  work  a 
4estruction  of  a  valuable  property 
under  such  circumstances,  but  the 
Em.  D.— 23. 


right  to  change  the  grades  of  streets 
is  sustained  upon  the  ground  that 
the  same  may  be  done  consistently 
with  the  preservation  of  rights  pre- 
viously acquired  by  others.  *  »  • 
The  property  of  railroad  companies 
is  as  much  within  the  protection  of 
the  law  as  that  of  any  other  com- 
pany or  of  any  individual.  Rail- 
roads are  recognized  as  essential  to 
the  welfare  and  prosperity  of  the 
people,  and,  because  of  their  capaci- 
ty for  usefulness  to  the  whole  peo- 
ple, railroad  companies  are  invested 
with  large  powers  of  a  public  na- 
ture. The  laws  of  the  state  also 
provide  for  the  organization  of 
cities,  and  large  powers  are  granted 
to  them  relating  to  the  control  and 
regulation  of  matters  within  the 
municipal  limits;  but,  where  a 
broad  interpretation  of  such  powers 
clashes  with  acquired  property 
rights,  as  in  this  instance,  such  rea- 
sonable construction  should  be  giv- 
en them  as  shall  not  have  the  ef- 
fect of  destroying  or  even  materially 
injuring  such  rights.  The  city  must 
so  use  its  powers  as  to  enable  the 
respondents    to    have    a    reasonable 


354r  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    193 

the  bridge.''^  Where  a  railroad  crosses  a  street  by  a  bridge  and 
is  allowed  to  occupy  a  part  of  the  street  with  piers,  it  may  be 
compelled  to  remove  them  without  compensation  when  the  traffic 
on  the  street  requires  if^  Where  a  statute  provided  that  any 
person  damaged  by  altering  a  street  should  be  entitled  to  com- 
pensation, it  was  held  to  apply  to  a  water  company  whose  pipes 
were  exposed  by  a  change  of  grade.''* 

§  193  (121f).  Damage  to  railroads,  water  and  gas 
pipes  by  the  construction  of  sewers.  The  construction  of 
sewers  differs  from  the  grading  of  streets  which  was  considered 
in  the  last  section,  in  that  the  grading  of  a  street  ordinarily 
extends  to  the  entire  surface,  while  a  sewer  occupies  but  a  small 
portion  of  the  width.  If  the  construction  of  a  sewer  necessarily 
interferes  with  water  or  gas  pipes  or  a  railroad,  and  causes 
damage  thereto,  there  is  no  remedy  and  no  taking,  because  the 
respective  franchises  are  subject  to  the  right  of  the  city  to  con- 
struct sewers.''^  But  it  may  be  doubted  whether  a  city  has  an 
absolute  discretion  to  locate  a  sewer  where  it  pleases,  regardless 
of  the  consequences  to  those  having  franchises  in  the  street. 
Thus  it  has  been  held  that  the  location  of  a  sewer  in  the  center 
of  a  street,  on  the  line  of  a  railroad,  will  be  enjoined,  when  it 
can  just  as  well  be  laid  elsewhere  in  the  street.^*  Where  a 
street  was  laid  out  over  a  railroad  right  of  way  without  making 
the  railroad  a  party,  it  was  held  that  it  could  recover  any  ex- 
use  and  enjoyment  of  theirs  and  not  43  Atl.  104;  Kirby  v.  Citizens'  R. 
so  as  to  render  it  impossible  or  even  Co.,  48  Md.  168,  30  Am.  Rep.  455; 
very  difficult  for  the  respondents  to  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mor- 
reconstruct  and  operate  their  rail-  ley,  45  Mo.  App.  304;  Portsmouth 
roads."  Gas  Light  Co.  v.  Shanahan,  65  N.  H. 

7  2Kansas  City  v.  Kansas  City  233,  19  Atl.  1002 ;  Brooklyn  El.  R.  R. 
Belt  R.  E.  Co.,  102  Mo.  633,  14  S.  Co.  v.  Brooklyn,  2  App.  Div.  98,  37 
W.  808,  3  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  N.  Y.  Supp.  560;  Elster  v.  City  of 
522,  10  L.R.A.  851.  Springfield,  49  Ohio  St.  82,  30  N.  E. 

TSDelaware  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Buf-  274;  Bryn  Mawr  Water  Co.  v. 
falo,  158  N.  y.  266,  53  N.  E.  44;  Lower  Marion  Tp.,  15  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 
Delaware  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Buffalo,  527;  San  Antonio  v.  San  Antonio 
158  N.  Y.  478,  53  N.  E.  533.  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  Tex.  Civ.  App.  1. 

TiParis   Mountain   Water   Co.   v.  '6Des  Moines  City  R.  Co.  v.  City, 

Greenville,  53  S.  C.  82,  30  S.  E.  699.      of  Des  Moines,  90  la.  770,  58  N.  W.- 

76Raihvay  Co.  v.  Louisville,  8  770,  26  L.R.A.  767;  Scranton  G.  & 
Bush  415;  New  Orleans  Gas  Lt.  Co.  W.  Co.  v.  Scranton,  11  Pa.  Dist. 
v.  Drainage  Commission,  111  La.  838,  Ct.  671;  Clapp  v.  City  of  Spokane, 
35  So.  929;  S.  C.  affirmed,  197  U.  S.  53  Fed.  515;  Contra,  Spokane  St. 
453,  25  S.  C.  471;  Brunswick  Gas  R.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Spokane,  5 
Light  Co.  v.  Brunswick,  92  Me.  493,      Wash.  634,  32  Pac.  456. 


§    194:  EOADS    AND    STEEETS.  355 

pense  incurred  in  consequence  of  a  sewer  being  built  across  its 
tracks  on  such  street.''^ 

§  194  (133).  Miscellaneous  uses.  A  well  or  cistern 
may  be  constructed  in  a  street  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining 
water  to  be  used  in  sprinkling  the  streets  or  extinguishing  fires 
or  convenience  of  the  public,  provided  this  can  be  done  without 
damage  to  the  abutting  owner  or  destruction  of  the  public  use.'^* 
The  sprinkling  of  streets  is  one  mode  of  making  their  use  more 
convenient,  and  the  public  may  use  the  street  for  such  appli- 
ances for  that  purpose  as  are  reasonable  under  the  circum- 
stances. But  a  city  may  not  erect  a  water  tank  in  the  street 
for  use  in  sprinkling  and  such  use  may  be  enjoined  by  the  abut- 
ting owner.'*  But  the  plea  that  a  structure  is  for  use  in  the 
amelioration  of  the  streets  will  not  justify  the  serious  obstruc- 
tion of  a  street  by  the  indirect  means  of  such  amelioration,  as 
by  the  erection  of  pumping  works  in  a  street,*"  or  a  mill  for 
sawing  lumber  or  crushing  stone  for  a  pavement.  Nor  can  a 
street  be  occupied  by  a  stand  pipe®'  or  used  for  boring  wells*^ 
to  obtain  a  public  water  supply.  The  erection  of  a  pound  for 
the  confinement  of  stray  animals,  or  of  a  jail  or  lock-up  upon 
a  public  street,  is  a  misappropriation  which  may  be  enjoined 

7 'Baltimore  v.  Cowen,  88  Md.  447,  150  111.  588,  37  N.  E.  1096,  41  Am.  St. 

41  Atl.  900.  Eep.  400,  10  Am.  R.  E.  &  Corp.  Rep. 

'8 West  V.  Bancroft,  32  Vt.   307;  62,  reversing  S.  C.  49  111.  App.  590. 

Barter  v.  Commonwealth,  3  Penn.  &  In  a  suit  by  an  abutting  owner  to 

Watts,  253;  Savage  v.  Salem,  23  Or.  recover  damages  because  of  such  a 

381,  31   Pac.   832,  37  Am.   St.   Rep.  stand  pipe  a  declaration  which  al- 

088,  7  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  428.  leged   that   the   plaintiff's   property 

In  Dubuque  v.  Malony,   9  la.  450,  was  damaged  by  reason  of  the  ap- 

the    city    had    constructed    a    brick  prehension  that  the  stand  pipe  would 

cistern    in    the    street    for    similar  fall  or  be  blown  upon  the  plaintiff's 

purposes,  and  the  defendant,  in  dig-  property  or  that  it  might  burst  and 

ging  for  the  foundation  of  his  build-  flood     it;     and     which     stated     no 

ing,  removed  the  support  of  the  soil  ground  for  such  apprehension,  was 

so  that  it  burst  and  was  destroyed.  held   to   state   no   cause   of   action. 

The  city  sued  for  damages,  and  a  re-  Doyle  v.  Sycamore,  193  111.  501,  61 

covery   was    denied   on   the   ground  N.  E.  1117. 

that  such  use  of  the  street,  the  fee  8  20dneal  v.  City  of  Sherman,  77 

being  in   the  abutting  owners,  was  Tex.  182,  14  S.  W.  Rep.  31.    In  Lost- 

not  justified.  Utter  v.  City  of  Aurora,  126  Ind,  436, 

73Davis  v.  Appleton,  109  Wis.  580,  26  N.  E.  18i,  12  L.R.A.  259,  it  was 

85  N.  W.  515.  held  that  a.  city  could  maintain  a 

soCity  of  Morrison  v.  Hinkson,  87  well  and  pump  in  a  street  without 

111.  587,  29  Am.  Rep.  77.  subjecting  the  soil  to  an  additional 

81  Barrows   v.   City   of   Sycamore,  servitude. 


356  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    194 

by  the  abutting  owner,®^  or  for  which  trespass  will  lie.®*  The 
erection  of  ornamental  or  memorial  statuary  at  proper  places 
in  public  streets  is  sanctioned  by  long  and  universal  usage,  and 
may  be  regarded  as  a  legitimate  use  of  the  same.*'  A  munici- 
pality may  authorize  the  use  of  a  street  for  a  street  fair  when 
travel  and  access  are  not  materially  interfered  with  thereby.** 
The  erection  of  lamps  for  street  lighting,  of  hydrants,  fire  plugs, 
drinking  fountains  and  watering  troughs,  all  fall  within  the 
principles  heretofore  laid  down  as  to  the  appropriate  use  of 
streets.  Weighing  scales  cannot  be  placed  in  a  street  over  the 
objection  of  an  abutter  who  has  the  fee.*''  A  canal  for  any 
purpose  would  seem  to  be  a  perversion  of  the  street,  and,  there- 
fore, a  use  which  could  not  be  authorized  without  compensa- 
tion.** But  drains  for  the  improvement  of  a  highway  are 
proper  though  they  interfere  with  access.*®  A  street  cannot  be 
used  for  warehouse.^"  a  band  stand,®^  electric  light  plant®^  or 
other  building.®^  A  city  was  held  not  liable  to  an  abutting 
owner  for  obstructing  access  to  his  premises  by  wagons  by  means 
of  a  platform  and  step  for  the  use  of  pedestrians.®*  An  elevated 
footway  over  a  street  a  hundred  feet  from  plaintiff's  premises 
was  held  to  be  no  obstruction  to  his  light  and  air,  and  so  to 
afford  him  no  cause  of  action.®^  When  the  abutter  owns  the 
fee,  it  has  been  held  that  a  city  cannot  authorize  the  use  of  the 

ssLutterloh    v.    Town    of    Cedar  Colo.   579,   26   Pac.   129;    Tucker  v. 

Keys,  15  Fla.  306.  Inhabitants  of  Russell,  14  Pick.  279; 

8  4  Winchester  v.  Capron,  63  N.  H.  Taylor  v.  Chicago  etc.  E,.  K.  Co.,  83 

605,  56  Am.  Eep.  554.  Wis.  636,  53  N.  W.  853. 

ssThompkins  v.  Hodgson,  2  Hun  89Dean  v.  Millard,  151  Mich.  582, 

146.  115  N.  W.  739. 

ssState   V.   Stoner,   39   Ind.   App.  sopacket  Co.  v.   Sorrels,  50  Ark. 

104,  79  N.  E.  399.  466;  Bingham  v.  Doane,  9  Ohio  165; 

s'Cline  v.  Cornwall,  21  Grant  Ch.  Attorney  General  v.  Tarr,  148  Mass. 

129.    But  where  a  city  had  power  to  309,  19  N.  E.  358,  2  L.E.A.  87. 

provide  for  weighing  hay,  coal,  etc.,  siRichmond  v.  Smith,  101  Va.  161, 

it  was  held  that  it  could  grant  to  an  43  S.  E.  345. 

individual  the  right  to  place  scales  9  2McIhenny  v.  Trenton,  148  Mich, 

in  the  street  in  front  of  his  premises  381,   111   N.  W.   1083,  118  Am.   St. 

and  that,  after  such  grant  had  been  Rep.  583,  10  L.R.A.(N.S.)   623. 

acted  upon  it  could  not  be  revoked.  9  3Pettit   v.   Grand   Junction,   119 

Town  of  Spencer  v.  Andrew,  82  la.  la.  352,  93  N.  W.  381. 

14,  47  N.  W.  1007,  12  L.R.A.  115.  94Hobson  v.  City  of  Philadelphia, 

ssCity  of  Fresno  v.  Fresno  Canal  155  Pa.  St.  131,  25  Atl.  1046. 

&  Irr.  Co.,  98  Cal.  179,  32  Pac.  943;  ssQttendorf   v.    Agnew,    13   Daly, 

Walley  v.  Platte  &  D.  Ditch  Co.,  15  16;  Knox  v.  New  York,  55  Barb.  404. 


§  194 


EOADS    AND    STKETS. 


357 


street  for  a  hack  stand.  ^"  Where  the  fee  is  in  the  abutting 
owner,  he  is  entitled  to  the  herbage  growing  thereon,  and  a  law 
or  ordinance  allowing  it  to  be  depastured  by  the  public  is  void."^ 
As  to  the  taking  of  a  highway  for  a  turnpike  or  ferry  landing, 
the  reader  is  referred  to  a  subsequent  section.''*  2To  action  will 
lie  on  account  of  changes  in  the  relative  width  of  roadway  and 
sidewalk.^^  'Nov  because  the  curb  is  placed  nearer  the  lot  line  on 
one  side  than  on  the  other. -"^  Nor  because  a  portion  of  the  street 
is  set  apart  for  a  bicycle  path  ^  or  speedway.^  Under  legislative 
authority  the  control  of  a  city  street  may  be  turned  over  to  park 
commissioners  and  traffic  teams  excluded  therefrom,  but  it  is 
intimated  that  if  abutters  are  damaged  thereby  they  would  have 
a  remedy.*  When  railroad  tracks  are  elevated  to  avoid  a  gTade 
crossing,  the  railroad  company  may  be  permitted  to  occupy  a 
part  of  the  street  for  the  supports  of  its  bridge.''  The  legisla- 
ture may  authorize  the  use  of  space  under  the  stairs  of  an  ele- 
vated railroad  for  news  stands  and  booths,  when  such  use  does 
not  interfere  with  the  travel  on  the  street."     So  the  space  under  a 


ssMcCaffrey  v.  Smith.  41  Hun  117. 
See  Odell  v.  Bretney,  62  App.  Div. 
595,  71  N.  Y.  S.  449. 

9  7  Woodruff  V.  Neal,  28  Conn.  165; 
Cole  V.  Drew,  44  Vt.  49.  Contra: 
Hardenburk  v.  Loekwood,  25  Barb. 
9.  Where  such  a  law  was  in  force 
when  the  highway  was  laid  out,  it 
was  held  that  compensation  was 
made  in  view  of  such  statute,  and 
that  the  act  was  valid  as  to  such 
highway.  Griffin  v.  JIartin,  7  Barb. 
297. 

ispost,  §§  219,  220. 

ssMunson  v.  Mallory,  36  Conn. 
165,  4  Am.  Rep.  52;  O'Neil  v.  Arm- 
strong, 17  Phil.  273;  and  see  Carter 
V.  Chicago,  57  111.  283;  Chicago  v. 
Wright,  69  III.  318;  Topliff  v.  Chi- 
cago, 196  111.  215,  36  N.  E.  692;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Borough  of  Beaver, 
171  Pa.  St.  542,  33  Atl.  112. 

iMcGrew  v.  Kansas  City,  64  Kan. 
61,  67  Pae.  438;  McGrew  v.  Kansas 
City,  69  Kan.  606,  77  Pac.  698.  So 
where  a  street  was  so  improved  as 
to  leave  a  space  for  grass  and  side- 
walk on  one  side  and  only  for  side- 


walk on  tlie  otlier,  it  was  held  a 
person  on  the  latter  side  could  not  re- 
cover damages.  English  v.  Danville, 
170  111.  131,  S.  C.  69  111.  App.  288. 
But  where  the  sidewalk  was  removed 
and  the  curb  placed  on  the  street 
line  it  was  held  the  abutter  was  en- 
titled to  damages.  Xarehold  v.  West- 
port,  71  Mo.  App.  508. 

2Ryan  v.  Preston,  59  App.  Div.  97, 
69  N.  Y.  S.  100;  O'Donnell  v.  Pres- 
ton, 74  App.  Div.  80,  77  N.  Y.  S. 
305;   Kyan  v.   Preston,  32  Misc.   92, 

60  N.  Y.  S.  162. 

sScovel  V.  Detroit,  146  Mich.  93, 
109  N.  W.  20. 

^Kreigh  v.  Chicago,  86  111.  407; 
People  v.  \A'alsh,  96  111.  232,  36  Am. 
Rep.  135;  Cicero  Lumber  Co.  v.  Ci- 
cero, 176  III.  9,  51  N.  E.  758,  68  Am. 
St.  Rep.  155,  42  L.R.A.  696 ;  and  see 
Simon  v.  Northrop,  27  Ore.  488,  40 
Pac.  560,  30  L.R.A.  171. 

sSummerfield  v.  Chicago,  197  111. 
270,  64  N.  E.  490. 

ePeopIe  v.  Keating,  108  N.  Y.  300, 

61  N.  E.  637,  rcverdnp  S.  C.  62  App. 
Div.  348,  71  N.  Y.  S.  97. 


358 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§   195 


bridge  or  viaduct  which  is  incapable  of  use  as  a  street,  may  be 
leased  for  any  purpose  which  does  not  interfere  with  the  use 
of  the  bridge.'^  Where  the  abutter  owned  the  fee  and  the  city 
laid  a  flagstone  sidewalk,  it  was  held  that  it  became  a  part  of 
the  realty  and  the  city  was  held  liable  for  removing  it  because 
the  abutter  refused  to  pay  for  it.*  There  is  no  liability  for 
the  necessary  interference  with  access  during  the  construction 
of  authorized  public  works  in  a  street.® 

§  195.  The  franchiste  to  use  streets  and  its  incidents. 
This  subject  has  been  considered  with  respect  to  railways  in 
a  former  section.-^"  The  legislature  has  paramount  authority 
over  streets  and  highways  and  municipalities  can  only  exer- 
cise such  control  thereover  as  has  been  granted  to  them  by  that 
body.^"-  Consequently  a  municipal  corporation  cannot  grant 
the  right  to  use  its  streets  for  any  purpose  unless  it  has  been 
authorized  to  do  so  by  the  legislature.^^  Powers  granted  to 
municipal  corporations  over  streets  may  be  resumed  at  the 
pleasure  of  the  legislature,^^  which  may  itself  grant  the  use  of 
streets  in  cities  without  their  consent.-'*     As  a  general  rule  no 


'Ejcard  Boiler  &,  Engine  Co.  v. 
Toledo,  6  Ohio  C.  C.   (N.  S.)  501. 

spiatt  V.  Oneonta,  88  App.  Div. 
192,  84  N.  Y.  S.  699;  S.  C.  affirmed 
■without  opinion,  183  N.  Y.  516,  76 
N.  E.  1106. 

sLefkovitz  v.  Chicago,  238  111.  23. 

10 Ante,  §  169. 

iiChamberlain  v.  la.  Telephone 
Co.,  119  la.  619,  93  N.  W.  596;  La 
Harpe  v.  Elm  Tp.  Gas  etc.  Co.,  69 
Kan.  97,  76  Pac.  448 ;  New  England 
Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  Boston  Terminal 
Co.,  182  Mass.  397,  65  N.  E.  835; 
United  E.  R.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Jersey  City, 
71  N.  J.  L.  80,  58  Atl.  71;  Fries  v. 
New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  169  N.  Y. 
270,  62  N.  E.  358,  reversing  S.  C.  57 
App.  Div.  577,  68  N.  Y.  S.  670;  Muhl- 
ker  V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  173* 
N.  Y.  549,  66  N.  E.  558;  2  Dill. 
Munic.  Corp.  §§  680,  683. 

i2/6i(J.;  Domestic  Tel.  Co.  v.  New- 
ark, 49  N.  J.  L.  344;  Beekraan  v. 
Flint  ave.  R.  R.  Co.,  153  N.  Y.  144, 
47  N.  E.  277;  Potter  v.  CoUis,  156 


N.  Y.  16,  50  N.  E.  413;  Phoenix  v. 
Gannon,  123  App.  Div.  93,  108  N.  Y. 
S.  255;  State  v.  Monroe,  40  Wash. 
545,  82  Pac.  888. 

i3"The  legislature,  representing 
the  state,  has  paramount  authority 
over  its  public  ways,  including  the 
streets  in  cities  as  well  as  the 
country  roads,  and  the  legislature 
can  at  any  time  resume  the  power 
previously  granted  to  municipal  sub- 
divisions of  the  state."  United  R.  R. 
&  C.  Co.  v.  Jersey  City,  71  N.  J.  L. 
80,  81,  58  Atl.  71. 

i4La  Harpe  v.  Elm  Tp.  Gas  etc. 
Co.,  69  Kan.  97,  76  Pac.  448;  Mil- 
bridge  etc.  Elec.  R.  E.  Co.,  appel- 
lants, 96  Me.  110,  51  Atl.  818;  Che- 
ney V.  Boston  Consolidated  Gas  Co., 
198  Mass.  356;  Rochester  etc.  Water 
Co.  V.  Rochester,  176  N.  Y.  36,  68 
N.  E.  117,  affirming  S.  C.  84  App. 
Div.  71,  82  W.  Y.  S.  455;  Economic 
P.  &  C.  Co.  V.  Buffalo,  59  Misc.  571 ; 
State  V.  Sheboygan,  111  Wis.  23,  86 
N.  W.  657. 


§  195 


EOADS   AND    STEEETS. 


359 


person  or  corporation  can  occupy  a  street  or  highway  for  any 
structure  such  as  a  railway,  water  main,  gas  main,  electric 
wires  or  conduits,  without  a  grant  from  the  legislature,  either 
directly  or  through  a  municipal  corporation  to  which  the  power 
has  been  delegated.  ■^^  And  any  such  structure  or  appliance 
placed  in  the  street  without  such  authority  is  a  public  nuisance 
and  any  abutting  owner  whose  easements  in  the  street  are  im- 
paired thereby  may  have  his  action  for  damages  or  abatement  of 
the  nuisance.-'®  But  it  has  been  held  in  Kansas  that  a  natural 
gas  company  could  lay  its  pipes  in  the  public  highways  without 
any  permission  from  the  legislature  or  local  authorities,  the 
same  being  for  the  transportation  of  a  commodity  and  within 
the  public  easement.-''^  When  a  grant  to  use  the  streets  for  a 
public  purpose  has  been  made  and  accepted,  there  is  a  binding 
contract  which  cannot  be  revoked  or  impaired  without  compen- 
sation.^* Structures  and  appliances  placed  in  the  street  under 
a  valid  franchise  are  the  private  property  of  the  grantee  and 
are  protected  by  the  Constitution,  the  same  as  other  private 


i5East  Tenn.  Telephone  Co.  v. 
Anderson  Co.  Telephone  Co.,  115  Ky. 
488,  74  S.  W.  218;  Twin  Village 
Water  Co.  v.  Damariseotta  Gas  Lt. 
Co.,  98  Me.  325,  56  Atl.  1112;  Pur- 
nell  V.  McLane,  98  Md.  589,  5G  Atl. 
830;  Baltimore  Co.  W.  &  Elec.  Co.  v. 
Baltimore  Co.,  105  Md.  154,  66  Atl. 
34;  Southern  Bell  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co. 
V.  Mobile,  162  Fed.  523. 

isNeb.  Telephone  Co.  v.  Western 
Independent  L.  D.  T.  Co.,  68  Neb. 
772,  95  N.  W.  18;  ante,  172. 

Instate  V.  Kansas  Natural  Gas  Co., 
71  Kan.  508,  80  Pac.  962,  114  Am. 
St.  Rep.  507.  The  suit  was  by  the 
attorney  general  to  oust  the  com- 
pany from  such  use  of  the  public 
ways.  The  court  says :  "The  conten- 
tion of  the  state  is  that  the  use 
■which  the  gas  company  is  making  of 
the  highway  is  exceptional,  and  may 
be  exercised  only  under  a  franchise 
from  the  state,  mediately  or  imme- 
diately. We  think  this  is  an  over- 
statement of  the  proposition.  The 
use  is  not  exceptional.  The  trans- 
portation   of    commodities    on    the 


highways  is  one  of  the  uses  for 
which  it  has  always  been  main- 
tained. The  means,  however,  used 
by  the  gas  company  in  the  transpor- 
tation of  gas  are  exceptional.  A  de- 
mand for  this  method  has  not  here- 
tofore existed  in  this  state;  but 
shall  this  fact  alone  deprive  the 
defendant  of  the  use  of  the  highway 
for  a  usual  and  proper  purpose,  un- 
less such  use  necessarily  obstruct, 
seriously  inconvenience  or  endanger 
public  travel?  »  »  »  The  public 
highway  is  maintained  for  the  trans- 
portation of  the  commodities  of  the 
country,  and  the  means  employed  for 
such  purpose  need  only  be  such  as 
not  to  interfere  with  public  travel 
to  the  extent  hereinbefore  stated.  It 
is  not  shown  that  such  privilege  has 
been  abused  by  the  defendant  in  this 
case,  nor  is  it  claimed  that  the  use 
by  the  gas  company  has  or  will  in- 
convenience or  obstruct  public  travel. 
Judgment  for  the  plaintiff  is  there- 
fore denied."    p.  510. 

isPeople  v.  Central  Union  Tel.  Co., 
192  111.  307,  61  N.  E.  428,  85  Am. 


360 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


191: 


property.-'^  Such  structures  and  appliances  are  held  subject  to 
the  right  of  the  public  authorities  to  change  or  improve  the  street 
as  the  public  interests  require.^**  And  also,  it  is  held,  subject  to 
the  right  of  the  public  authorities  to  discontinue  or  vacate  the 
street,  in  which  case  the  right  to  use  the  land  ceases  and  the  own- 
er of  such  structures  and  appliances  must  remove  them  at  hi* 
own  expense.^^  In  the  case  last  referred  to  certain  streets  in 
Boston  were  discontinued  and  taken  for  a  terminal  station.  The 
plaintiff,  an  electrical  company,  had  conduits  in  these  streets  for 
its  wires.  The  company  removed  its  wires  but  the  conduits 
could  not  be  removed  without  destroying  them.  It  was  held 
that  the  company  could  not  recover  for  its  loss,  either  by  peti- 
tion under  the  statute,  as  for  property  taken,  or  in  tort.^^ 


St.  Rep.  338;  Chicago  Telephone  Co. 
V.  N.  W.  Telephone  Co.,  199  111.  324, 
65  N.  E.  329;  Kalamazoo  v.  Kalama- 
zoo H.  L.  &  P.  Co.,  124  Mich.  74, 
82  N.  W.  811;  N.  W.  Telephone 
Exch.  Co.  V.  Minneapolis,  81  Minn. 
140,  83  N.  W.  527,  86  N.  W.  69,  53 
L.R.A.  175;  Duluth  v.  Duluth  Tele- 
phone Co.,  84  Minn.  486,  87  N.  W. 
1127;  Rochester  etc.  Water  Co.  v. 
Rochester,  176  N.  Y.  36,  68  N.  E. 
117,  affirming  S.  C.  84  App.  Div.  71, 
82  N.  Y.  S.  455;  Southern  Kan.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Oklahoma  City,  12  Old.  82,  69 
Pac.  1050;  Mead  v.  Portland,  45  Ore. 
1,  76  Pac.  347;  Wl^eeling  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Triadelphia,  58  W.  Va.  487, 
52  S.  E.  499,  4  L.R.A.(N.S.)  321; 
Morristown  v.  East  Tenn.'  Tel.  Co., 
115  Fed.  304,  53  C.  C.  A.  132. 

isMontgomery  Lt.  &  W.  P.  Co.  v. 
Citizens'  Lt.  H.  &  P.  Co.,  142  Ala. 
462,  38  So.  1026;  Missouri-Edison 
Elec.  Co.  V.  Weber,  102  Mo.  App.  95. 

204m<e,  §§  192,  193. 

2iNew  England  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v. 
Boston  Terminal  Co.,  182  Mass.  397, 
65  N.  E.  835. 

2  2New  England  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v. 
Boston  Terminal  Co.,  182  Mass.  397, 
65  N.  E.  835;  Boston  Electric  Lt. 
Co.  V.  Boston  Terminal  Co.,  184  Mass. 
568,  69  N.  E;  346.     In  the  former 


case,  which  was  a  petition  under  the 
statute,  the  court  says:  "All  the 
statutes  and  ordinances  upon  which 
the  petitioners  rely  as  a  justification 
for  their  action  in  constructing  con- 
duits in  the  public  streets  and  as 
giving  them  rights  of  property  there, 
are  merely  provisions  for  the  regula- 
tion of  the  different  public  rights 
in  the  streets.  None  of  them  pur- 
ports to  convey  private  rights  of 
property.  Most  of  them  expressly 
state  the  limitations  upon  the  au- 
thority given,  and  make  the  peti- 
tioners subject  to  possible  future 
proceedings  terminating  or  modify- 
ing their  rights.  But  where  there  is 
no  such  express  provision  the  result  is 
the  same;  their  rights  in  connection 
with  the  rights  of  the  public  are  sub- 
ject to  reasonable  regulation,  or 
even  to  termination  at  any  time,  if 
the  supreme  authority  acting  in  the 
pviblic  interest  shall  so  determine. 
It  follows  that  they  have  no  rights 
of  property  in  the  street,  and  their 
structures  that  were  built  therein 
were  personal  property  which  they 
had  a  right  to  remove,  and  whieli 
could  not  be  subject  for  the  assess- 
ment of  damages  under  statutes  of 
this  kind."     p.  400. 


§  195 


ROADS    A2<D    STREETS. 


3(Ji 


Grants  of  franchises  by  municipal  corporations  must  be  made 
in  accordance  with  the  power  eonferred^^  and  where  a  city  was 
empowered  to  grant  franchises  by  ordinance,  a  grant  by  resolu- 
tion was  held  to  be  ineffective.^*  Such  grants  are  subject  to 
the  police  power  and  to  regulation  in  the  interests  of  the  pub- 
lic.'''' Grantees  of  franchises  may  be  compelled  to  change  the 
location  of  structures  in  the  street  as  the  public  needs  require 
and  without  compensation  for  the  trouble  and  expense.^®  A 
municipality  cannot  grant  an  exclusive  franchise  without  ex- 
press legislative  authority  ^^  and  a  mere  grant  gives  no  exclusive 
right.^*  A  general  grant  to  a  gas  company  to  lay  its  pipes  in 
any  and  all  streets  of  a  city,  was  held  valid.  ^*  When  no  dura- 
tion is  fixed  for  such  gTants  they  are  held  not  to  be  in  perpetuity 
but  during  the  existence  of  the  municipality  making  the  grant 
and  when  such  municipality  ceases  to  exist  the  grant  termi- 
nates.^" A  statute  giving  telegraph  and  telephone  companies 
the  right  to  construct  their  lines  upon  the  public  roads  or  high- 
ways of  the  State  has  generally  been  held  to  include  the  streets 


saPhoenix  v.  Gannon,  123  App. 
Div.  93,  108  N.  Y.  S.  255;  and  see 
London  Mills  v.  White,  208  III.  289, 
70  N.  E.  313;  Lowther  v.  Bridgeman, 
57  W.  Va.  306,  50  S.  E.  410;  Hard- 
man  V.  Cabot,  60  W.  Va.  664,  55  S. 
E.  756,  7  L.R.A.(N.S.)    506. 

2  4Morristown  v.  East  Tenn.  Tele- 
phone Co.,  115  Fed.  304,  53  C.  C.  A. 
132. 

25State  T.  St.  Paul  City  Ey.  Co., 
78  Minn.  331,  81  N.  W.  200;  Carth- 
age V.  Garner,  209  Mo.  688, 108  S.  W. 
521;  Economic  P.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Buf- 
falo, 59  Misc.  571;  New  Castle  City 
V.  Central  D.  &  P.  Tel.  Co.,  207  Pa. 
St.  371,  56  Atl.  931. 

2  6Merced  Falls  Gas  &  Elec.  Co.  v. 
Turner,  2  Cal.  App.  720,  84  Pac. 
239;  Atlantic  etc.  By.  Co.  v.  Cor- 
dele,  125  Ga.  373,  54  S.  E.  155; 
Atlantic  etc.  By.  Co.  v.  Cordele,  128 
Ga.  293,  57  S.  E.  493;  Crocker  v. 
Boston  Elec.  Lt.  Co.,  180  Mass.  51G, 
62  N.  E.  978;  Carthage  v.  Central 
iS\  Y.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  185  N.  Y.  448, 
78  N.  E.  165,  113  Am.  St.  Eep.  9.32, 
reversing  110  App.  Div.  625;  People 


V.  Ellison,  188  N.  Y.  523,  81  N.  E. 
447,  afp.rming  115  App.  Div.  254,  101 
N.  Y.  S.  35;  Am.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v. 
Millcreek,  195  Pa.  St.  643,  46  Atl. 
140;  Am.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  Harbor 
Creek  Tp.,  23  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  437; 
Charlottsville  v.  Southern  By.  Co. 
97  Va.  428,  34  S.  E.  98 ;  Washington 
etc.  By.  Co.  v.  Alexandria,  98  Va. 
344,  36  S.  E.  385 ;  Ganz  v.  Ohio  Pos- 
tal Tel.  Cable  Co.,  140  Fed.  692,  72 
C.  C.  A.  186. 

270klahoma  v.  Oklahoma  Gas  & 
Elec.  Co.,  13  Okl.  454,  74  Pac.  98; 
Clarksburg  Elec.  Lt.  Co.  v.  Clarks- 
burg, 47  W.  Va.  739,  35  S.  E.  994, 
.50  L.E.A.  142;  Hutchinson  W.  L.  & 
P.  Co.  V.  Hutchinson,  144  Fed.  256. 

2  8  Columbus  V.  Columbus  Gas  Co., 
76  Ohio  St.  309,  81  N.  E.  440. 

2  9Kalamazoo  v.  Kalamazoo  H.  L. 
&  P.  Co.,  124  Mich.  74,  82  N.  W.  811 ; 
Meyers  v.  Hudson  Co.  Elec.  Co.,  03 
N.  J.  L.  573,  44  Atl.  713. 

soPeople  v.  Chicago  Telephone  Co., 
220  111.  238,  77  N.  E.  245;  Venner 
V.  Chicago  City  Ey.  Co.,  236  111.  349, 
86  N.  E.  266. 


362  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    196 

of  cities  and  villages.*^  All  such  grants  are  strictly  construed 
in  favor  of  the  public.^^ 

V. — Damages   peom   the   Vacation,   Discontinuance  and 
Closing  of  Streets  and  Highways. 

§  196.     The  power  to  vacate  streets  and  highways.    The 

legislature  has  plenary  authority  over  the  public  streets  and 
highways  and  may  itself  vacate  and  discontinue  them,  as  it 
may  deem  best  for  the  public  good,  or  it  may  delegate  the  power 
to  do  so  to  municipal  corporations  and  local  authorities,  sub- 
ject, in  either  case,  to  such  limitations  as  the  constitution  may 
impose.^*  In  one  of  the  cases  cited  the  supreme  court  of  Cali- 
fornia says :  "That  the  legislature  possesses  competent  power  to 
vacate  a  street  in  a  city;  that  the  legislature  may  delegate  or 
commit  such  power  to  the  municipal  authorities  of  the  city ;  that 
its  exercise  by  the  municipal  authorities  is  dependent  upon  the 
will  and  subject  to  the  control  of  the  legislature ;  and  that  after 
such  power  has  been  committed  to  the  municipal  authorities, 
the  legislature  may  revoke  it  in  part  as  well  as  in  whole,  or, 
without  an  express  revocation,  may  itself  exercise  it  in  any 
particular  instance,  are  propositions  about  which  there  can  be 

31  Chamberlain    v.    la.    Telephone  City,  123  Fed.  232,  59  C.  C.  A.  236. 

Co.,  119  la.  619,  93  N.  W.  596;  N.  One  legislature  cannot  bind  future 

W.  Telephone  Exch.  Co.  v.  Minneapo-  ones  by  enacting  that  no  street  rail- 

lis,    81    Minn.    140,    86   N.    W.    69;  way  franchise  shall  be  granted  on 

Duluth  V.  Duluth  Telephone  Co.,  84  certain   streets.      Commonwealth   v. 

Minn.  486,  87  N.  W.  1127;  State  v.  Broad  St.  Ey.  Co.,  219  Pa.  St.  11, 

Red  Lodge,   30  Mont.   338,   76   Pac.  67  Atl.  958.     As  to  annexing  condi- 

758;   State  v.  Red  Lodge,  33  Mont.  tions  to  grant  by  city  see  Mich.  Tel. 

345,    83   Pac.    642;    Point   Pleasant  Co.   v.    St.   Joseph,    121   Mich.   502, 

Elec.  Lt.  &  P.  Co.  V.  Bayhead,   62  80  N.  W.  383,  80  Am.  St.  Rep.  520, 

K.  J.  Eq.  296,  49  Atl.  1108;  State  v.  47  L.R.A.  87;  Mich.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Ben- 

Sheboygan,  111   Wis.  23,  86  N.  W.  ton  Harbor,  121  Mich.  512,  80  N.  W. 

657;  Abbott  v.  Duluth,  104  Fed.  833.  386,  47  L.R.A.  104;  Keystone  State 

3  2  Chicago  Terminal  Transfer  R.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  Ridley  Park,  28  Pa. 
R.  Co.  V.  Chicago,  203  111.  576,  68  N.  Super.  Ct.  635 ;  Southern  Bell  Tel.  & 
E.  99;  ante,  §  169.  A  grant  without  Tel.  Co.  v.  Richmond,  103  Fed.  33, 
limitation  as  to  time  was  held  good  44  C.  C.  A.  147. 
for  the  life  of  the  company  in  Wyan-  3  3Polack  v.  S.  F.  Orphan  Asylum, 
dotte  Elec.  Lt.  Co.  v.  Wyandotte,  48  Cal.  490;  San  Francisco  v.  Burr, 
124  Mich.  43,  82  N.  W.  821,  but  was  108  Cal.  460;  Whitsett  v.  Union 
held  revocable  at  any  time  as  to  Depot  &  R.  R.  Co.,  10  Colo.  243,  15 
future  exercises  of  the  power  In  Pac.  339 ;  Marietta  Chair  Co.  v.  Hen- 
Boise  City  etc.  Water  Co.  v.  Boise  derson,   121   Ga.   399,  49  S.  E.  312, 


§    li)T  KOADS   AJSD    STEEETS.  363 

no  controversy  in  this  State."  **  Doubtless  there  would  be  no 
question  about  the  correctness  of  these  propositions  in  any  State, 
unless  there  were  constitutional  provisions  in  the  way.  The 
power  to  vacate  and  close  public  streets  is  as  necessary  for  the 
public  good  as  the  power  to  establish  them,  in  order  that  the 
public  may  be  relieved  from  the  expense  of  maintaining  useless 
streets  and  highways  and  from  liability  for  their  non-repair  or 
defective  condition,  and  in  order  also  that,  though  the  ways  are 
not  useless,  the  space  occupied  by  them  may  be  devoted  to  more 
pressing  public  needs,  or  that  improvements  for  the  public  safety 
and  welfare  may  be  carried  out.^''  It  of  course  follows  from 
what  has  already  been  said  that  a  municipal  corporation  or 
local  body  cannot  vacate  or  discontinue  a  street  or  highway  un- 
less authorized  to  do  so  by  the  legislature  and  then  only  in  the 
manner  and  to  the  extent  that  the  law  provides.^" 

§  197.  Right  to  compensation  for  the  vacation  or  clos- 
ing of  streets.  General  principles.  When  a  street  is  va- 
cated or  closed  by  statutory  authority,  the  right  of  any  person 
damaged  thereby  to  compensation  depends  upon  the  consti- 
tution or  upon  some  statute  making  provision  therefor.  In 
many  of  the  States  there  are  statutes  which  provide  for  compen- 
sation in  such  cases.*^     If  there  is  no  statute  giving  compensa^ 

104  Am.  St.  Rep.  156;  Smith  v.  Ma-  95;  State  v.  Snedecker,  30  N.  J.  L. 

con,  129  Ga.  227,  58  S.  E.  713 ;  Meyer  80.    Most  of  the  cases  hereafter  cited 

V.  Teutopolis,  131  111.  552,  23  N.  E.  in   this    chapter    are   authority   for 

651;  Haynes  v.  Thomas,  7  Ind.  38;  this  point. 

McLachlau  v.  Gray,  105  la.  259,  74  3  6Macintosh  v.  Nome,   1   Alaska, 

N.  W.  773 ;  Leavenworth  v.  Douglass,  492 ;    Texarkana   v.  Leach,   66   Ark. 

59  Kan.  416,  53  Pac.  123;   State  v.  40,  48  S.  W.  807,  74  Am.   St.  Eep. 

Board  of   Park   Comrs.,    100   Minn.  68;    Cromwell   v.   Brown,   50   Conn. 

150,  110  N.  W.  1121,  9  L.R.A.(N.S.)  470;    Marietta    Chair    Co.    v.    Hen- 

1045 ;  Coster  V.  Albany,  43  N.  Y.  399 ;  derson,    121    Ga.  399,  49  S.  E.  312, 104 

Fearing   v.    Irwin,    55    N.    Y.    486;  Am.  St.  Eep.  156;  Coker  v.  Atlanta 

Beatty    v.    Kinnear    Mfg.    Co.,    21  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  123  Ga.  483,  51  S.  E. 

Ohio    C.    C.    384;    McGee's    Appeal,  481;  Louisville  v.  Bannon,  99  Ky.  74, 

114  Pa.   St.  470,  8  Atl.  237;   Poni-  35  S.  W.  120;  Miller  v.  Corinna,  42 

schil  V.  Hoquiam  Sash  &  Door  Co.,  Minn.  391,  44  N.  W.  127;  Coleman  v. 

41    Wash.    303,    83    Pac.    316;    Arm-  Holden,    88   Miss.    798,   41    So.    374; 

strong  V.  County  Court,  54  W.  Va.  I«ighton  v.  Concord  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

503,  46  S.  E.  131.  72  N.  H.  224,  55  Atl.  938. 

=  4Polack  V.  S.  F.  Orphan  Asylum,  s'/See  East  St.  Louis  v.  O'Flynn, 

48  Cal.  490,  492.  119  111.  200,  10  N.  E.  395,  59  Am. 

ssLevee   District   v.    Farmer,    101  Rep.  795;  Parker  v.  Catholic  Bishop, 

Cal.  178,  35  Pac.  569,  23  L.R.A.  388;  146  111.  158,  34  N.  E.  473,  afjlrming 

Coffey  County  v.   Venard,   10  Kan.  S.  C.  41   111.  App.  74;   Butterworth 


364  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    197 

tion,  then  the  right  must  be  derived  from  the  constitution,  if  at 
all.  Some  constitutions  provide  only  for  compensation  "when 
property  is  taken  for  public  use,  -while  others  provide  also  for 
compensation  when  property  is  damaged  or  injured  for  public 
use.**  The  statutes  which  provide  for  compensation  are  usu- 
ally general  in  their  terms  and  the  same  in  phrase  and  legal  ef- 
fect as  the  constitutional  provisions  last  referred  to.  The  right 
to  compensation  therefor,  when  property  is  claimed  to  be  in- 
jured by  the  vacation  or  closing  of  a  street,  will  depend  upon 
whether  the  injury  complained  of  is  a  taking  within  the  con- 
stitution or  whether  it  is  damage  or  injury  within  the  meaning  of 
the  constitutional  and  statutory  provisions  referred  to.  There 
is  a  taking  if  any  private  right  appurtenant  to  the  property  in 
question  is  destroyed  or  interfered  with,  otherwise  not.**  Such 
destruction  or  injury  to  private  rights  would  also  be  damage 
or  injury  within  the  meaning  of  those  words  as  used  in  constitu- 
tions and  statutes.*"  But  they  include  something  more  and  are 
generally  held  to  embrace  damages  that  are  special  and  peculiar 
to  the  plaintiff  or  which  would  be  actionable  but  for  the  statu- 
tory authority.*^  If  a  street  is  closed  or  obstructed  without 
statutory  authority  the  act  is  a  public  nuisance.  The  right  of 
any  particular  person  to  recover  for  injury  to  his  property  by 
such  a  nuisance  will  depend  upon  whether  his  damage  is  special 
and  peculiar  within  the  meaning  of  the  law. 

It  is  thus  manifest  that  the  principal  questions  which  arise 
in  connection  with  the  vacation  and  closing  of  streets  and  upon 
which  the  right  to  relief  depends,  are  what  private  "rights"  exist 

V.    Bartlett,    50   Ind.    537;    Cook   v.  Petition  of  Concord,  50  N.  H.  530; 

Quick,  127  Ind.  477,  26  N.  E.  1007;  Matter  of  New  York,  28  App.  Div. 

Brady  v.  Shinkle,  40  la.  576 ;  Hicks  143 ;  Matter  of  Morris  Ave.,  56  App. 

V.  Ward,  69  Me.  436;  Smith  v.  Bos-  Div.  122,  67  N.  Y.  S.  603;  Matter  of 

ton,  7   Gush.  234;   Nichols  v.  Rich-  Vanderbilt  Ave.,  95  App.  Div.  533, 

mond,  162  Mass.  170,  33  N.  E.  501;  88  N.  Y.  S.  769;  Blackvvell  etc.  Ry. 

Kimball  v.  Homan,  74  Mich.  699,  42  Co.  v.  Gist,  18  Okl.  516,  90  Pae.  889; 

N.  W.  167 ;  Buhl  v.  Fort  St.  Union  In  re  Melon  St.,  182  Pa.  St.  397,  38 

Depot  Co.,  98  Mich.  596,  57  N.  W.  Atl.   482,   28   L.R.A.   275;    Ruscomb 

829,  23  L.R.A.  392,  9  Am.  R.  R.  &  St.,  30  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  476;  Attorney 

Corp.   Rep.   173 ;   In  re  Big  Hollow  General  v.  Sherry,  20  R.  I.  43,  37  Atl. 

Road,  111   Mo.   326,   19   S.  W.   947;  43. 

Heinrich  v.  St.  Louis,  125  Mo.  424,  iiAnte,  §§  15-61. 

28  S.  W.  626,  46  Am.  St.  Rep.  490;  soAnte,  §  65. 

Lindsay  v.  Omaha,  30  Neb.  512,  46  i^Fost,  §  362. 

N.  W.  627,  27  Am.   St.  Rep.  415;  4iPosf,  §§  363,  364. 


§  198  EOADS  AND  STREETS.  365 

in  the  street  and  what  constitutes  special  damage.     These  ques- 
tions will  be  next  considered. 

§  198.  Private  rights  in  streets  and  highways.  This 
subject  has  already  been  considered  in  the  earlier  sections  of 
this  chapter,*^  but  more  with  reference  to  the  rights  of  an  abut- 
ting owner  in  the  street  in  front  of  his  property  or  immediately 
adjacent  thereto.  Some  further  considerations  seem  necessary 
with  special  reference  to  the  subject  in  hand  and  to  the  rights 
of  such  owners  in  the  street  beyond  their  lot  lines  and  in  neigh- 
boring streets  upon  which  they  do  not  abut.  Highways  and 
streets  may  be  established  in  three  ways:  by  dedication;  by 
prescription ;  and  by  condemnation.  The  most  common  form  of 
dedication  is  that  by  plat.  The  effect  of  platting  a  tract  of 
ground  and  of  selling  lots  with  reference  to  such  plat,  is  thus 
stated  by  the  editor  of  Smith's  Leading  Cases  in  a  passage  often 
quoted :  "If  the  owner  of  land  lays  out  and  establishes  a  town, 
and  makes  and  exhibits  a  plan  of  the  town,  with  various  plats  of 
spare  ground,  such  as  streets,  alleys,  quays,  etc.,  and  sells  the 
lots  with  clear  reference  to  that  plan,  the  purchasers  of  lots  ac- 
quire, as  appurtenant  to  their  lots,  every  easement,  privilege 
and  advantage  which  the  plan  represents  as  belonging  to  them  as 
a  part  of  the  town,  or  to  their  owners  as  citizens  of  the  town. 
And  the  right  thus  passing  to  the  purchaser  is  not  the  mere 
right  that  such  purchaser  may  use  these  streets,  or  other  public 
places,  according  to  their  appropriate  purposes,  but  a  right 
vesting  in  the  purchasers,  that  all  persons  whatever,  as  their 
occasion  may  require  or  invite,  may  so  use  them ;  in  other  words, 
the  sale  and  conveyance  of  lots  in  the  town,  and  according  to 
its  plan,  imply  a  grant  or  covenant  to  the  purchasers,  that  the 
streets  and  other  public  places,  indicated  as  such  upon  the  plan, 
shall  be  forever  open  to  the  use  of  the  public,  free  from  all  claims 
or  interference  of  the  proprietor  inconsistent  with  such  use."  *^ 
The  correctness  of  this  statement  is  attested  by  many  cases 
which  have  laid  down  the  law  in  similar  language.**  Accord- 
ing to  some  authorities  each  purchaser  under  the  plat  acquires 

i'Ante,  §§  120  et  seq.  106;   Wiekliffe  v.  Lexington,  11   B. 

■132    Smith's    Leading   Cases,    7tli  Mon.    163.     The   passage   is   quoted 

Am.   Ed.    p.    154,    citing   Rowan   v.  and  approved  in  Zearing  v.  Eaber,  74 

Portland,  8  B.  Mon.  232,  237;  Bow-  III.  409,  411,  412  and  Earl  v.  Chica- 

ling  Green  v.  Hobsen,  3  B.  Mon.  478,  go,  136  111.  277,  285,  280. 

481;   Huber  v.  Gazley,  18  Ohio  18;  44Chambers  v.  Talladega  Real  Est. 

Dummer  v.  Jersey  City,  Spencer,  86,  &  L.  Ass.,  126  Ala.  290,  28  So.  636; 


366 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  198 


the  right  to  have  all  the  streets  and  alleys  laid  down  on  the  plat 
kept  open  and  to  that  extent  has  a  private  right  in  each  and 
all  of  the  streets  and  alleys  on  the  subdivision.*^  But  the 
prevailing  rule  is  that  the  purchaser  of  a  lot  according  to  a  plat 
acquires  an  easement  only  in  such  streets  and  alleys  laid  down 
on  the  plat  as  are  necessary  for  the  reasonable  and  convenient 
enjoyment  of  the  lot  conveyed.*^     This  rule  fixes  no  precise 


McLean  v.  Llewellyn  Iron  Works,  2 
Cal.  App.  346,  83  Pac.  1082,  1085; 
Elsendrath  v.  Chicago,  192  111.  320, 
61  N.  E.  419;  Thompson  v.  Maloney, 

199  111.  276,  65  N.  E.  236,  93  Am. 
St.    Rep.    133;    Russell    v.   Lincoln, 

200  111.  511,  65  N.  E.  1088;  Russell 
V.  Chicago  etc.  Elec.  Ry.  Co.,  205  111. 
155,  68  N.  E.  727;  Indianapolis  v. 
Cross,  7  Ind.  9;  Rowan  v.  Portland, 
8  B.  Mon.  232 ;  Winter  v.  Payne,  33 
ria.  470,  15  So.  211 ;  Porter  v.  Car- 
penter, 39  Fla.  14,  21  So.  788;  Price 
V.  Stratton,  45  Fla.  535,  33  So.  644; 
Horton  v.  Williams,  99  Mich.  423, 
58  N.  W.  369;  Longworth  v.  Sede- 
vic,  165  Mo.  221,  65  S.  W.  260;  Tay- 
lor V.  Hopper,  62  N.  Y.  649;  Clean 
V.  Steyner,  135  N.  Y.  341,  32  N.  E. 
9;  Lord  V.  Atkins,  138  N.  Y.  184,  33 
N.  E.  1035;  Matter  of  Adams,  141 
N.  Y.  297,  36  N.  E.  318;  Kerrigan 
V.  Backus,  69  App.  Div.  329,  74  N. 
Y.  S.  906 ;  Collins  v.  BuflFalo  Furnace 
Co.,  73  App.  Div.  22,  76  N.  Y.  S. 
420;  Smith  v.  Smith,  120  App.  Div. 
278,  104  N.  Y.  S.  1106;  Moose  v.  Car- 
son, 104  N.  C.  431,  10  S.  E.  689; 
Ermentrout  v.  Stitzel,  170  Pa.  St, 
540,  33  Atl.  109;  Fereday  v.  Manke- 
dick,  172  Pa.  St.  535,  34  Atl.  46; 
Quicksall  v.  Philadelphia,  177  Pa. 
St.  301,  35  Atl.  609;  Higgins  v. 
Sharon,  5  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  92;  Common- 
wealth V.  Shoemaker,  14  Pa.  Supr. 
Ct.  194,  202;  Witman  v.  Smeltzer, 
16  Pa.  Supr.  285 ;  Smith  v.  Union  S. 
&  S.  Co;,  17  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  444;  Cbr- 
sicana  v.  Zorn,  97. Tex.  317,  78  S. 
W.  924;  McFarland  v.  Lendekugel, 
107   Wis.   474.  83  N.  W.   757.     See 


Barr  v.  Oskaloosa,  45  la.  275;  Kim- 
ball V.  Kenosha,  4  Wis.  321. 

iBIndianapolis  v.  Kingsbury,  101 
Ind.  200,  51  Am.  Rep.  749;  Hall  v. 
Breyfogle,  162  Ind.  494,  70  N.  E. 
883;  Collins  v.  Asheville  Land  Co., 
128  TSr.  C.  563,  39  S.  E.  21,  83  Am. 
St.  Rep.  720;  Cook  v.  Totten,  49  W. 
Va.  177,  38  S.  E.  491,  87  Am.  St. 
Rep.  792.  And  see  South  Western 
State  Normal  School's  Case,  213  Pa. 
St.  244,  62  Atl.  908. 

4  6Roberts  v.  Mathews,  137  Ala. 
523,  34  So.  624,  97  Am.  St.  Rep.  56; 
Field  V.  Barling,  149  111.  556,  37  N. 
E.  850,  41  Am.  St.  Rep:  311,  10  Am. 
R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  707;  Highbarger 
V.  Milford,  71  Kan.  331,  80  Pac.  633; 
Rodgers  v.  Parker,  9  Gray,  445;  Fox 
V.  Union  Sugar  Co.,  109  Mass.  292; 
Regan  v.  Boston  Gas  Lt.  Co.,  137 
Mass.  37;  Pearson  v.  Allen,  151 
Mass.  79,  23  N.  E.  731,  21  Am.  St. 
Rep.  426 ;  Diamond  Match  Co.  v.  On- 
tonagon, 72  Mich.  249,  40  N.  W.  448 ; 
Horton  v.  Williams,  99  Mich.  423, 
58  N.  W.  369;  Dodge  v.  Pennsyl- 
vania R.  R.  Co.,  43  N.  J.  Eq.  351; 
S.  C.  affirmed  on  opinion  below,  45 
N.  J.  Eq.  368;  Taylor  v.  Hopper,  62 
N.  Y.  649;  Kerrigan  v.  Backus,  69 
App.  Div.  329,  74  N.  Y.  S.  906^  Mad- 
den V.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  21 
Ohio  C.  C.  73;  Ermentrput.  v.  Stjtzel, 
170.Pa.  St.  540,  33  Atl.  109;  Fereday 
V.  Mankedick,  172  Pa.  St.  535,  34  Atl. 
46;  Garvey.  v.  Harbison-Walker  Re- 
fractories Co.,  213  Pa.  St.  177,  62 
Atl.  778;  Johnston  v.  Old  Colony  R. 
R.  Co.,  18  R.  I.  642,  29  Atl.  549,  49 
Am.  St.  Rep.  800;  State  v.  Hamilton, 


§  198  EOADS  AND  STREETS.  367 

limit  to  the  private  rights  acquired  but  the  reasonable  applica- 
tion of  the  rule  would  include  such  streets  and  parts  of  streets 
as  give  value  to  the  lot  and  the  loss  of  which  would  render  the 
lot  less  valuable  to  use  or  sell.  The  grant,  according  to  well 
recognized  principles,  should  be  construed  in  favor  of  the  pur- 
chaser and  he  should  be  held  to  acquire  all  that  is  fairly  neces- 
sary for  the  enjoyment  of  the  property  conveyed.  Some  cases 
hold  that  the  purchaser  acquires  the  right  to  have  the  street 
on  which  his  property  abuts  kept  open  to  the  next  connecting 
street  in  each  direction  and  no  farther.*^ 

Where  two  or  more  owning  adjoining  tracts  in  severalty 
united  in  platting  the  same,  it  was  held  that  a  purchaser  from 
one  acquired  no  right  in  the  streets  laid  down  on  the  plat,  except 
such  parts  of  the  streets  as  were  on  the  land  of  his  grantor.** 
But  it  would  seem  that  by  uniting  in  the  plat  the  proprietors 
agreed  to  represent  and  treat  the  plat  as  a  unit  and  that  a  pur- 
chaser from  any  one  should  get  the  same  rights  in  the  streets  as 
though  all  belonged  to  one  person.  If  this  result  could  not  be 
worked  out  on  the  basis  of  a  grant  it  might  on  that  of  estoppel. 
When  the  owner  of  a  tract  plats  his  property  and  makes  the 
streets  continuous  with  those  in  an  older  and  adjoining  plat,  the 
purchaser  of  a  lot  in  the  former  is  held  to  get  no  private  right 
to  the  streets  in  the  latter.*® 

A  street  may  be  dedicated  by  grants  of  land  describing  it  as 
a  boundary  and  in  such  case  there  is  an  implied  covenant  that 

109  Tenn.  276,  70  S.  W.  619.    In  the  son  of  an  obstruction  to  such  street 

last  case  it  is  said  that  the  true  rule  or  way." 

is  laid  down  in  Jones  on  Easements,  4  7Hawlcy   v.    Baltimore,    33    Md. 

§   347,  as  follows:     "When   land  is  270;  Baltimore  v.  Frick,  82  Md.  77; 

sold   by   reference   to   a   plan   upon  Canton   Co.   v.   Baltimore,   106   Md. 

which   several   streets   and   avenues  69;   Glasgow  v.  St.  Louis,  107  Mo. 

are  laid  out,  the  grantee  does  not  •  198,  17  S.  W.  743,  S  Am.  E.  R.  & 

necessarily  acquire  an  easement  in  Corp.  Rep.   192;   Matter  of  Twenty 

all   such  streets   or  ways.     He   ac-  Ninth  bt.,  1  Hill  189;  Eeis  v.  New 

quires  an  easement  in  the  street  or  York,  188  N.  Y.  58,   80  N.  E;  573, 

way  upon  which  his  lot  is  .situated,  affirming   S.  C.   113  App.  Div.   464, 

and  in  such  other  streets  or  ways  99  N.  Y.  S.  291. 

as   are   necessary   or   convenient   to  <8Patterson  v.  Duluth,  21  Minn. 

enable  him  to  reach  a  highway.    He  493. 

acquires  no  easement  in  a  street  or  .   4  9K;imballv.  Homan,  74  Mich.  699, 

way  which  his  land  does  not  touch,  42  N.  W.  167.    And  see  Shauburt  v. 

and  which  does  not  lead  to  a  high-  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  Minn.  502. 

way;   and  he  is  not  entitled  to  an  But  the  principle  of  estoppel  might 

injunction  or  other  remedy  by  rea-  apply  here  in  some  cases. 


368  '  eminejst  domain.  §  198 

there  is  sucb  a  way,  that,  so  far  as  the  grantor  is  concerned 
it  shall  be  continued,  that  the  grantee,  his  heirs  and  assigns,  shall 
have  the  benefit  of  it  and  that  the  grantee  is  entitled  as  purchaser 
to  have  the  space  of  ground  left  open  forever  as  a  street,  and 
to  the  right  of  using  the  way  for  every  purpose  that  may  be  usual 
and  reasonable  for  the  accommodation  of  the  granted  premises.''" 
Manifestly  the  grantee  in  such  a  case  would  get  the  same  right 
as  in  case  of  platted  streets.  So  when  land  is  conveyed  as 
bounded  on  a  public  highway  of  which  the  grantor  owns  the 
fee  and  though  the  fee  of  the  highway  is  excluded  from  the 
grant.^^  But  if  the  grantor  does  not  own  the  fee  of  the  high- 
way his  deed  of  land  bounded  thereon  is  held  to  convey  no 
j)rivate  rights  therein.  ^^  Where  one  dedicates  a  highway  whoily 
on  his  own  land  but  contiguous  to  the  land  of  another,  the  latter 
acquires  no  private  right  in  the  way.^^  But  if  the  highway 
was  accepted  and  the  latter  should  improve  his  property  with 
reference  to  the  highway  or  should  sell  to  a  third  party,  a 
right  to  have  the  way  kept  open  might  arise  by  estoppel. 

Just  what  private  rights  abutters  have  in  streets  and  high- 
ways established  by  prescription  or  condemnation,  it  is  some- 
what difficult  to  determine.  But  it  would  seem  that  both  the 
public  and  those  claiming  the  fee  should  be  estopped  from  deny- 
ing the  existence  of  a  private  right  of  access  and  of  light  and 
air,  as  to  those  who  have  purchased  or  improved  abutting  prop- 
erty on  the  faith  of  the  advantages  afforded  by  the  street  or 
highway  and  that  this  private  right  of  access  should  be  held 
to  include  an  outlet  in  both  directions  to  the  general  system  of 

eoTeasley  v.  Stanton,  136  Ala.  641,  Pittsburg  etc.  E.  R.  Co.,  36  Pa.  St. 

33    So.    823,    96   Am.    St.    Rep.    88;  99. 

Haynes  v.  Thomas,  7  Ind.  38;  Louis-  eiHolloway    v.     Southmayd,     139 

ville    etc.    E.  R.  Co.  v.  Hennin,  14  Ky.  N.  Y.  390,  34  N.  E.  1047;  Holloway 

L.E.  526;   Witsonv.Gutman,79Md.  '*'•  Delano,  64  Hun  27;  Holloway  v. 

405,  29  Atl.  608,  24  L.R.A.  403;  Par-  Delano,  64  Hun  34.     See  Dodge  v. 

ker  V.  Smith,  17  Mass.  413;  Parker  P^'^"'  ^-  ^-  ^°-'  *^  ^-  J-  ^1-  351; 

y.  Framingham,  8  Met.  260;  White      ^-   ^•/'^™f ' /^   ^-   ^-   ^l"   ^*"'' 
^  Wheeler  v.  Clark,  58  N.  Y.  267. 


V.  Tide  Water  Oil  Co.,  50  N.  J.  Eq. 
1,    25    Atl.    199;    White's    Bank    v. 


6  2 Wheeler  v.  Clark,  58  N.  Y.  267; 
Kings  County  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stev- 
Nichols,    64    N.    Y.    65;    Matter    of      ^^^^  ^^^  ^_  y.  411,  5  N.  E.  353. 
Opening    Eleventh    Ave.,    81    N.    Y.  6  3 Attorney  General  v.  Sherry,  20 

436;  Davis  v.  Morris,  132  N.  C.  435,  ^  i_  43^  37  ^tj  344  £„(  ^^^  Oliver 
43  S.  E.  950;  In  re  Melon  St.,  182  Schlemmer  Co.  v.  Steinman  &  M. 
Pa.  St.  397,  38  Atl.  482,  28  L.R.A.  Furn.  Co.,  2  Ohio  N.  P.  (N.S.)  293; 
275;  Clymer  v.  Roberts,  220  Pa.  St.  S.  C.  affirmed,  7  Ohio  C.  C.  (N.S.) 
162,  69  Atl.  548.    Compare  Mercer  v.      468. 


§  198  EOADS  AND  STEEETS.  369 

streets.  Many  cases  hold  that  these  private  rights  exist  in 
favor  of  every  abutting  owner,  without  considering  how  the 
street  was  established  or  how  such  owner  obtained  title  to  his 
property.  "Every  owner  of  ground  on  any  street  in  Lexing- 
ton," says  the  supreme  court  of  Kentucky,  "has  a  right,  as  in- 
violable as  it  is  indisputable,  to  the  common  and  unobstructed 
use  of  the  contiguous  highway,  so  far  as  it  may  be  necessary 
for  affording  him  certain  incidental  easements  and  services, 
and  a  convenient  outlet  to  other  streets.  And  of  this  right  the 
legislature  cannot  deprive  him,  without  his  consent,  or  a  just 
compensation  in  money.  The  extent  of  this  appurtenant  right, 
dependent  upon  circumstance,  may  not,  in  a  particular  case, 
be  easily  definable  with  mathematical  precision.  As  far  as  it 
exists,  however,  it  partakes  of  the  character  of  private  property, 
and  is  therefore  protected  by  the  fundamental  law  as  property. 
But  it  cannot,  as  to  each  proprietor  of  ground,  be  coextensive 
with  all  the  streets  and  alleys  of  the  city.  As  a  private  right, 
it  must,  like  that  of  vicinage,  be  limited  by  its  own  nature  and 
end — ^that  is  chiefly  by  the  necessity  of  convenient  access  to,  and 
outlet  from,  the  ground  of  each  proprietor."  ^* 

Where  a  street  is  opened  or  extended  by  condemnation  and 
abutting  property  is  specially  assessed  for  benefits  on  account 
of  the  improvement,  it  would  seem  just  that  the  payment  of 
such  assessment  should  secure  to  the  property  the  advantages 

54Transylvania  University  v.  Lex-  v.  Central  I.  &  S.  Co.,  158  Ind.  218, 
ington,  3  B.  Mon.  25,  38  Am.  Dec.  63  N.  E.  302,  92  Am.  St.  Rep.  305, 
173.  "The  owners  of  lots  bordering  57  L.E.A.  508;  Long  v.  Wilson,  119 
upon  a  public  street  have  an  ease-  la.  267,  93  N.  W.  282,  97  Am.  St. 
ment  of  way  in  the  street,  in  addi-  Eep.  315,  60  L.R.A.  720;  Hiller  v. 
tion  to  the  use  of  it  in  common  with  Railroad  Co.,  28  Kan.  p.  628 ;  Lex- 
the  people  generally.  This  addition-  ington  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Applegate, 
al  right  of  way  is  private  property,  8  Dana  289,  33  Am.  Dec.  497 ;  Gar- 
within  the  protection  of  the  law,  as  gan  v.  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  89 
much  as  if  it  were  corporeal  prop-  Ky.  212,  12  S.  W.  259;  Bannin  v. 
erty,  and  cannot  be  taken  for  public  Rohmeiser,  90  Ky.  48,  13  S.  W.  444; 
use  without  just  compensation.''  Plumer  v.  Johnston,  63  Mich.  165, 
Anderson  v.  Turbeville,  6  Coldw.  150.  29  N.  W.  687;  Diamond  Match  Co. 
To  same  effect:  Smith  v.  McDowell,  v.  Ontonagon,  72  Mich.  249,  40  N. 
148  111.  51,  35  N.  E.  141;  Field  v.  W.  448;  Pearsall  v.  Board  of  Super- 
Barling,  149  111.  556,  37  N.  E.  850,  visors,  74  Mich.  558,  42  N.  W.  77; 
10  Am.  R.  E.  &  Corp.  Rep.  707;  Heinrich  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  125 
World's  Columbian  Exposition  v.  Mo.  424,  28  S.  W.  626;  Strader  v. 
Brennan,  51  III.  App.  128;  Rensse-  Cincinnati,  1  Handy,  446;  Ante, 
laer  v.  Leopold,  106  Ind.  29;  O'Brien  §§  120,  121. 
Em.  D.— 24. 


370  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    191) 

paid  for,  wliicli  are  none  other  than  the  easements  of  access, 
light  and  air.  Some  of  the  authorities  so  hold^°  but  others  take 
a  different  view."** 

§  199.  What  is  special  damage  from  the  obstruction 
of  a  street.  When  a  specific  statute  gives  compensation  for 
property  damaged  by  the  vacation  or  discontinuance  of  a  street 
or  highway  or  other  public  work  or  a  constitution  in  general 
terms  guarantees  compensation  for  property  damaged  or  injured 
for  public  use,  the  rule,  almost  universally  applied,  is  "that 
those  damages  can  be  recovered  which  could  have  been  recovered 
at  common  law,  had  the  acts  which  caused  them  been  done 
without  statutory  authority."  ®^  Some  courts  hold  that  the 
words  in  question  mean  more  but  we  believe  that  none  hold  that 
they  mean  less.^*  When  a  street  or  highway  is  closed  or  ob- 
structed without  statutory  authority  a  public  nuisance  is  cre- 
ated, and  actionable  damage  depends  upon  the  question  of 
special  or  peculiar  injury  resulting  from  the  nuisance.  One 
line  of  cases  holds  that  if  the  obstruction  is  not  in  front  of  the 
plaintiff's  property  and  does  not  cut  off  his  access,  so  that  he 
can  still  get  from  his  property  to  the  general  system  of  streets 
and  highways,  then  he  does  not  suffer  any  special  or  peculiar 
damage,  though  access  in  one  direction  may  be  cut  off  or  inter- 
fered with  and  though  his  property,  by  reason  of  the  obstruction, 
is  rendered  less  valuable  to  use  or  to  sell.®^     The  reasoning  is 

6  5Wormser  v.  Brown,  72  Hun  93,  and  Canals  v.  Nashua  etc.  E.  E.  Co., 

25  N.  Y.  S.  553;  Oliver  Schlemmer  10  Cush.  385;  Willard  v.  Cambridge, 
Co.  V.  Steinman  &  M.  Furn.  Co.,  2  3  Allen,  574;  Stanwood  v.  Maiden, 
Ohio  N.  P.  (N.S.)  293.  157  Mass.  17,  31  N.  E.  702,  16  L.E.A. 

66Chicago  V.  Union  Building  Ass.,  591;  Shaw  v.  Boston  etc.  E.  R.  Co., 

102  111.  379,  397,  398,  40  Am.  Eep.  159  Mass.  597,  35  N.  E.  92;  Daven- 

598;  Dantzer  v.  Indianapolis  Union  port  v.  Dedliam,  178  Mass.  382,  59  N. 

Ey.  Co.,  141  Ind.  604,  39  N.  E.  223,  E.   1029;   Davenport  v.  Hyde  Park, 

50  Am.  St.  Eep.  343,  34  L.E.A.  709,  178  Mass.  385,  59  N.  E.  1030 ;  Eobin- 

11  Am.  E.  E.  &  Corp.  Eep.  249;  Kean  son  v.  Brown,  182  Mass.  266,  65  N. 

V.  Elizabeth,  54  N.  J.  L.  462,  24  Atl.  E.    377;    Hyde   v.    Fall    River,    197' 

495;  S.  C.  affirmed  55  K  J.  L.  337,  Mass.  4;  Shawburt  v.  St.  Paul  etc.  E. 

26  Atl.  939.  See  quotation  from  lat-  E.  Co.,  21  Minn.  502;  Eochette  v. 
ter  case  in  note  34,  §  121.  Chicago  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  32  Minn.  201 , 

B'Stanwood  v.  Maiden,  157  Mass.  20    N.    W.    140;    Barnum    v.    Minn. 

17,   31    N.   E.   702,    16   L.R.A.   691;  Transfer  Ry.  Co.,  33  Minn.  365,  23 

Coster  v.  Albany,  43  N.  Y.  399.  Minn.  538 ;   Lakkie  v.  St.  Paul  etc. 

6  8See  post,  §  365.  Ry.  Co.,  44  Minn.  438,  46  N.  W.  912; 

BsGuttery  v.  Glenn,  201   111.  275,  Enders  v.  Friday,  78  Neb.  510;  Gray 

66  N.  E.  305;  Proprietors  of  Locks  v.  Greenville  etc.  Ry.  Co.  59  N.  J. 


§  199 


EOADS    AND    STBEETS. 


371 


that  the  diminution  in  value  of  the  property  is  due  to  the  fact 
that  the  owner  or  occupier  of  the  property  and  those  who  desire 
to  reach  or  do  business  with  him  suffer  delay  and  inconvenience 
in  consequence  of  the  obstruction,  that  such  delay  and  inconven- 
ience are  not  actionable  and  therefore  the  damage  to  the  property 
which  results  because  of  such  delay  and  inconvenience  is  not 
actionable.""     On  the  other  hand,  another  line  of  cases  holds 


Eq.  372,  46  Atl.  638;  Coster  v.  Al- 
bany, 43  N.  Y.  399. 

The  subject  of  special  damages  is 
also  much  discussed  in  the  following 
eases  which  relate  to  the  vacation 
of  streets  and  highways;  Whitsett 
V.  Union  Depot  &  R.  E.  Co.,  10  Colo. 
243,  15  Pac.  339;  Newton  v.  New 
York  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  72  Conn.  420, 
44  Atl.  813;  Chicago  %.  Union  Bldg. 
Ass.,  102  111.  379,  40  Am.  Eep.  598; 
East  St.  Louis  v.  O'Flynii,  119  111. 
200,  59  Am.  Eep.  795;  Dantzer  v. 
Indianapolis  Union  Ey.  Co.,  141  Ind. 
604,  39  N.  E.  223,  50  Am.  St. 
Rep.  343,  34  L.E.A.  769,  11  Am.  E. 
E.  &  Corp.  Eep.  249;  Smith  v.  Bos- 
ton, 7  Cush.  254;  Castle  v.  Berk- 
shire, 11  Gray  26;  Davis  v.  County 
Comrs.,  153  Mass.  218,  26  N.  E.  848, 
11  L.R.A.  750;  Hammond  f.  County 
Comrs.,  154  Mass.  509,  28  N.  E.  902; 
Nichols  V.  Richmond,  162  Mass.  170, 
38  N.  E.  501 ;  Buhl  v.  Fort  St.  Union 
Depot  Co.,  98  Mich.  596,  57  N.  W. 
829,  23  L.R.A.  392;  Bailey  v.  Culver, 
84  Mo.  531,  affirming  12  Mo.  App. 
175;  Glasgow  v.  St.  Louis,  107  Mo. 
198,  17  S.  W.  743,  3  Am.  R.  R.  & 
Corp.  Rep.  192;  Cram  v.  Laconia,  71 
N.  H.  41,  51  Atl.  635,  57  L.E.A.  282; 
Kean  v.  Elizabeth,  54  N.  J.  L.  402, 
24  Atl.  495 ;  S.  C.  affirmed,  55  N.  J. 
L.  337,  26  Atl.  939;  Kinnear  Mfg. 
Co.  v.  Beatty,  65  Ohio  St.  264,  62 
N.  E.  341,  87  Am.  St.  Rep.  000,  re- 
versing S.  C.  sub.  nom.  Beatty  v. 
Kinnear  Mfg.  Co.  21  Ohio  C.  C.  384; 
Ponischil  v.  Hoquiam  S.  &  D.  Co., 
41  Wash.  303,  83  Pac.  316;  Mottman 
V.  Olympia,  46  Wash.   301,   88  Pac. 


579;  Montreal  v.  Drummond,  L.  R. 
1  H.  L.  384. 

eolbid.  See  especially  Proprietors 
of  Locks  and  Canals  v.  Nashua  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  10  Cush.  385;  Stanwood 
V.  Maiden,  157  Mass.  17,  31  N.  E. 
702,  16  L.R.A.  591 ;  Cram  v.  Laconia, 
71  N.  H.  41,  51  Atl.  635,  57  L.R.A. 
282.  In  the  case  first  cited  the  court 
says :  "Why  is  the  market  value  of 
an  estate,  thus  situated  diminished? 
Is  it  not  because  whenever  a  pur- 
chaser in  seeking  a  home,  or  a  lot 
to  build  one  on,  he  perceives  at  a 
glance  that  in  passing  from  his 
home  to  the  places  he  will  have  most 
occasion  to  frequent,  he  must  en- 
counter the  inconveniences  of  an  in- 
tervening railroad,  such  as  passing 
over  an  embankment,  danger  of  de- 
tention by  trains,  exposure  of  child- 
ren to  accident,  and  tlie  like,  consid- 
erations which  render  the  houses  less 
eligible  and  attractive?  Such  a  view 
applies  itself  to  the  tastes,  motives 
and  inducements  of  purchasers.  Now 
the  inconveniences  of  crossing  a  rail- 
road track,  elevated  or  depressed, 
or  at  grade,  the  possible  detention 
by  trains,  the  noise  and  smoke  and 
frightening  of  liorses,  the  danger  to 
persons,  especially  to  children,  are 
those  which  the  whole  community 
suffer  alike,  in  a  greater  or  less  de- 
gree; but  it  cannot  be  contended  that 
every  member  of  such  community,  or 
even  those  so  situated  as  to  feel 
them  in  a  greater  degree  than  others, 
can  maintain  a  claim  against  tiie 
company  for  damages  on  this  ac- 
count.    Is  then  the  apprehension  of 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  199 


that  if  the  wrongful  closing  or  obstruction  of  a  street  impairs 
access  to  property  whereby  it  is  diminished  in  value,  the  owner 
suffers  a  special  damage  for  which  he  may  recover.®^  So  if 
property  is  depreciated  in  value  by  a  structure  in  the  street 


these  inconveniences,  which  might 
tend  to  alarm  purchasers,  and  deter 
or  discourage  them  from  buying,  a 
more  tenable  ground  to  support  a 
claim  for  damages?  We  think  not. 
They  are  common  to  the  whole  com- 
munity, to  be  borne  by  the  public 
in  consideration  of  the  greater  pub- 
lic good  to  be  acquired."  Proprie- 
tors of  Locks  &  Canals  v.  Nashua 
etc.  K.  R.  Co.,  10  Cush.  385. 

siCabbell  v.  Williams,  127  Ala. 
320,  28  So.  405;  Birmingham  Ry.  L. 
&  P.  Co.  V.  Moran,  151  Ala.  187,  44 
So.  152;  Davis  v.  Epstein,  77  Ark. 
221,  92  S.  W.  19;  Harvey  v.  Ga. 
Southern  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  90  Ga.  66, 
15  S.  B.  783;  Southern  Cotton  Oil 
Co.  V.  Bull,  116  Ga.  776,  43  S.  E.  52; 
Savannah  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Gill,  118 
Ga.  737,  45  S.  E.  623;  Chicago  v. 
Pulcyn,  129  111.  App.  179;  Danville 
etc.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Tidrick,  137  111. 
App.  553 ;  Martin  v.  Marks,  154  Ind. 
549,  57  N.  E.  249;  O'Brien  v.  Central 
I.  &S.  Co.,  158  Ind.  218,63  N.  E.  308, 
92  Am.  St.  Rep.  305,  57  L.R.A.  508; 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Stanley,  10  Ind. 
App.  421,  37  N.  E.  288,  38  N.  E. 
421 ;  Park  v.  C.  &  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co., 
43  la.  636;  Dairy  v.  la.  Cent.  Ry. 
Co.,  113  la.  716,  84  N.  W.  688; 
Young  v.  Rothrock,  121  la.  588,  96 
N.  W.  1105;  Dyche  v.  Weichselbaum, 
9  Kan.  App.  360,  58  Pac.  126;  Rich- 
ardson v.  Davis,  91  Md.  390,  46  Atl. 
964;  Brauer  v.  Baltimore  Refrigerat- 
ing etc.  Co.,  99  Md.  367,  58  Atl.  21, 
105  Am.  St.  Rep.  304,  66  L.R.A.  403 ; 
Brakken  v.  Minneapolis  etc.  Ry.  Co., 
29  Minn.  41,  11  N.  W.  124;  S.  C.  31 
Minn.  45,  16  N.  W.  459  and  32  Minn. 
425,  21  N.  W.  414;  Hayes  v.  Chicago 
etc.  Ry.  Co.,  46  Minn.  349,  49  N.  W. 


61 ;  Aldrich  v.  Wetmore,  52  Minn.  164, 
53  N.  W.  1072;  Fitzer  v.  St.  Paul 
City  Ry.  Co.,  105  Minn.  221,  117  N. 
W.  434;  Glaessner  v.  Anheuser-Busch 
brewing  Co.,  100  Mo.  508,  13  S.  W. 
707,  2  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  420; 
Autenrieth  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  36  Mo.  App.  254;  Dries  v.  St. 
Joseph,  98  Mo.  App.  611,.  73  S.  W. 
723;  Ellis  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
131  Mo.  App.  395;  Morris  etc.  Dredg- 
ing Co.  V.  Jersey  City,  64  N.  J.  L. 
587,  46  Atl.  609;  Buchholz  v.  New 
York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  148  N.  Y.  640, 
43  N.  E.  76;  Gillender  v.  New  York, 
127  App.  Div.  612;  Tise  v.  Whataker- 
Harvey  Co.,  144  N.  C.  507,  57  S.  E. 
210;  Mellor  v.  Philadelphia,  160  Pa. 
St.  614,  28  Atl.  991;  Robbins  v. 
Scranton,  217  Pa.  St.  577,  66  Atl. 
977;  Richardson  v.  Lone  Star  Salt 
Co.,  20  Tex.  Civ.  App.  486,  49  S.  W. 
647;  Tilley  v.  Mitchell  &  Davis  Co., 
121  Wis.  1,  98  N.  W.  969,  105  Am. 
St.  Rep.  1007 ;  Milwaukee  Boiler  Co. 
V.  Wadham,  0.  &  G.  Co.,  126  Wis. 
32,  105  N.  W.  312;  McCarthy  v.  Met. 
Board  of  Works,  L.  R.  7  C.  P.  508; 
S.  C.  affirmed,  L.  R.  8  C.  P.  191  and 
L.  R.  7  Eng.  &  I.  App.  243;  Cale- 
donia Ry.  Co.  V.  Walker's  Trustees, 
L.  R.  7  App.  Cas.  259;  McQuade  v. 
The  King,  7  Can.  Exch.  318;  Mac- 
arthur  v.  The  King,  8  Can.  Exch. 
245;  Cook  V.  Bath,  L.  R.  6  Eq.  Cas. 
177. 

See  also  the  following  cases  which 
arose  out  of  the  vacation,  or  at- 
tempted, vacation  of  streets;  Tex- 
arkana  v.  Leach,  66  Ark.  40,  48  S. 
W.  807,  74  Am.  St.  Rep.  68;  Coker 
v.  Atlanta  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  123  Ga.  483, 
51  S.  E.  481 ;  Chicago  v.  Burcky,  158 
111.  103,  42  N.  E.  178,  49  Am.  St.  Rep. 


§  199 


KOADS    AND    STEEETS. 


373 


wliich  obstructs  the  light,  air  or  view  to  and  from  the  property.®" 
In  case  of  an  obstruction  -which  interferes  with  access  to  prop- 
erty, the  effect  upon  the  property  is  quite  distinct  from  the  de- 
lay and  inconvenience  which  the  owner  suffers  in  consequence 
of  being  unable  to  use  the  street.  The  latter  is  common  to  the 
public  Avhile  the  former  is  not.  The  right  to  use  the  public 
streets  and  to  have  them  kept  open  as  a  means  of  access  to 
property  has  a  special  and  peculiar  value  to  the  owner  of  the 
property,  which  is  entirely  distinct  from  his  right  to  use  the 
streets  as  one  of  the  public,  and  this  special  and  peculiar  inter- 
est extends  to  so  much  of  the  streets  and  system  of  streets  as  are 
necessary  to  afford  convenient  access  to  the  property  and  as 
give  value  thereto  and  when  a  street  is  closed  or  obstructed  so 
near  the  property  as  to  affect  its  value  there  is  an  impairment 
of  this  special  and  peculiar  right  or  interest  and  a  special  and 
peculiar  injury  results. 

The  matter  is  well  put  by  the  supreme  court  of  Iowa  in  a 
case  which  arose  out  of  the  following  facts:  A  railroad  com- 
pany crossed  the  street  near  the  plaintiff's  property  upon  an 
embankment  which  blocked  the  street  at  that  point.    The  plain- 


142,  29  L.R.A.  568;  Chicago  v.  Webb, 
102  111.  App.  232;  Chrisman  v.  Oma- 
ha etc.  Ry.  &  B.  Co.,  125  la.  133, 
100  N.  W.  63;  Leavenworth  etc.  Ey. 
Co.  V.  Curlan,  51  Kan.  432,  33  Pac. 
297;  Hayden  v.  Stewart,  71  Kan.  11, 
80  Pac.  43;  Gargan  v.  Louisville  etc. 
Ry.  Co.,  89  Ky.  212,  12  S.  W.  259,  6 
L.R.A.  340 ;  Bannon  v.  Eohmeiser,  90 
Ky.  48,  13  S.  W.  444,  29  Am.  St.  Rep. 
355 ;  Van  Witsen  v.  Gutman,  79  Md. 
405,  29  Atl.  608,  24  L.R.A.  403 ;  Horton 
V.  Williams,  99  Mich.  423,  58  N.  W. 
369;  Dean  v.  Ann  Arbor  R.  R.  Co., 
137  Mich.  459,  100  N.  W.  773;  Van- 
derburgh V.  Minneapolis,  98  Minn. 
329,  108  N.  W.  480,  6  L.R.A. (N.S.) 
741;  Foust  V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  212 
Pa.  St.  213  61  Atl.  829;  Walsh  v. 
Scranton,  23  Pa.  Supr.  276 ;  Hagger- 
ty  V.  Scranton,  23  Pa.  Supr.  279; 
Chicago  V.  Baker,  86  Fed.  753,  30  C. 
C.  A.  364;  Chicago  v.  Baker,  98  Fed. 
830,  39  C.  C.  A.  318;  Ante,  §§  174, 
191,  post,  §  354. 


6  2First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Tyson,  133 
Ala.  459,  32  So.  144,  91  Am.  St. 
Rep.  46,  59  L.R.A.  399;  S.  C.  144 
Ala.  457,  39  So.  560;  Field  v.  Bar- 
ling, 149  111.  556,  37  N.  E.  850,  41  Am. 
St.  Rep.  311,  10  Am.  R.  E.  &  Corp. 
Rep.  707;  People  v.  Harris,  203  111. 
272,  67  N.  E.  785,  96  Am.  St.  Rep. 
304;  Townsend  v.  Epstein,  93  Md. 
537,  49  Atl.  629,  86  Am.  St.  Rep. 
441,  52  L.R.A.  409;  Bischof  v.  Mer- 
chants' Nat.  Bank,  75  Neb.  838,  106 
N.  W.  996,  5  L.R.A.(N.S.)  486; 
Beecher  v.  Newark,  64  N.  J.  L.  475, 
46  Atl.  168;  S.  C.  affirmed  65  N.  J. 
L.  307,  47  Atl.  466;  Ackerman  v. 
True,  175  N.  Y.  353,  67  N.  E.  629; 
Ackerman  v.  True,  56  App.  Div.  54, 
66  N.  Y.  S.  6;  McMillan  v.  Klaw  & 
Erlanger  Constr.  Co.,  107  App.  Div. 
407,  95  N.  Y.  S.  365;  Tilley  v.  Mit- 
chell &  Lewis  Co.,  121  Wis.  1,  98  N. 
W.  969,  105  Am.  St.  Rep.  1007.  See 
Sauttee  v.  Utica  City  Nat.  Bank,  45 
Misc.  15,  90, N.  Y.  S  838. 


3Y4  EMINEM-T    DOMAIIT.  §    199 

tiff's  property  was  lessened  in  value  and  his  business  damaged. 
In  a  suit  against  the  railroad  for  the  damages  sustained  the 
court  aflSrmed  a  judgment  for  the  plaintiff  and,  after  discussing 
the  question  of  special  damage  from  a  public  nuisance,  pro- 
ceeded as  follows :  "That  the  obstruction  of  a  highway,  whereby 
the  property  of  an  individual  is  rendered  less  valuable  as  a 
place  of  business,  affords  a  ground  of  action  for  damage  is 
clearly  within  the  principles  above  stated,  we  cannot  doubt. 
The  right  to  the  enjoyment  of  property  is  an  individual  right, 
which  in  no  manner  pertains  to  the  public;  it  is  held  distinct 
and  separate  from  the  rights  possessed  on  account  of  the  indi- 
vidual being  a  member  of  society.  He  travels  the  highway  in 
exercise  of  the  rights  he  possesses  in  common  with  the  public. 
If  deprived  of  that  right  he  could  not  maintain  an  action. 
Therefore  he  could  base  no  claim  for  damages  on  the  ground  of 
being  deprived  of  the  use  of  the  highway  by  an  obstruction. 
But  if  the  highway  gives  value  to  his  property  by  affording 
access  thereto  by  himself  and  others,  he  is  deprived  of  an  indi- 
vidual right  to  the  enjoyment  of  property  in  its  most  useful 
condition  by  a  nuisance  which  obstructs  travel  upon  it.  This 
illustration  serves  to  point  out  the  distinctions  between  such 
injuries  resulting  from  a  nuisance  for  which  an  action  will  lie, 
and  those  that  are  not  actionable."  ®* 

6  3  Park  V.  C.  &  S.  W.  K.  R.  Co.,  ial  damage  and  were  entitled  to 
43  la.  636,  639.  And  see  especially  maintain  the  suit.  The  court  says: 
Aldrich  v.  Wetmore,  52  Minn.  164,  "As  before  indicated,  a  person  whose 
53  N.  W.  1072;  In  re  Melon  St.,  182  lot  abuts  upon  the  particular  piece 
Pa.  St.  397,  38  Atl.  482,  28  L.R.A.  of  street  which  is  unlawfully  closed 
275;  Tilley  v.  Mitchell  &  Lewis  Co.,  or  obstructed  is  universally  held  to 
121  Wis.  1,  98  N.  W.  969,  105  Am.  be  specially  and  peculiarly  injured, 
St.  Rep.  1007.  In  the  latter  case  though  he  may  have  other  access  to  , 
the  city  narrowed  a  60  foot  street  his  lot;  but  many  of  the  cases  draw 
to  a  20  foot  street  by  vacating  strips  an  arbitrary  line  at  this  point,  and 
on  each  side,  at  the  instance  of  the  maintain  that  when  the  plaintiff's 
defendant  company  which  owned  the  lot  fronts  upon  another  part  of  the 
property  on  both  sides  and  which  street  no  such  injury  is  shown.  Cer- 
was  also  given  permission  to  con-  tainly  the  distinction  is  illogical, 
nect  its  buildings  by  a  bridge  across  The  man  whose  lot  fronts  upon  the 
the  unvacated  part  of  the  street.  In  next  block  may  be  fully  as  deeply 
a  suit  by  property  owners  in  the  injured  in  the  decreased  value,  rent- 
next  and  remoter  blocks  to  restrain  ability  and  desirability  of  his  lot  as 
the  obstruction  of  the  street  by  the  man  whose  lot  fronts  on  the  block 
building  on  the  vacated  strip,  or  by  which  is  closed.  One  may  suffer  as 
erecting  the  connecting  bridge,  the  great  damage  in  his  estate  as  the 
court  held  that  they  suffered  a  spec-  other.     True    there    may   be   many 


§200 


EOADS    AND    STREETS. 


375 


§  200.     Vacating  or  closing  street  in  front  of  property. 

When  a  street  or  alley  is  vacated  and  closed  in  front  of  prop- 
erty there  is  a  taking  of  the  appurtenant  easements  and  the  own- 
er is  entitled  to  compensation. •**  In  one  of  the  cases  cited  it  is 
said:  "It  may  be  of  no  importance  to  the  general  public 
whether  a  particular  street  is  vacated  or  not.  It  is  important  to 
the  individual  owner  of  abutting  property  that  he  shall  be  able  to 
get  to  and  from  his  residence  or  business,  and  that  the  public 
shall  have  the  means  of  getting  there  for  social  or  business 
purposes.     In  such  a  case  access  to  thoroughfares  connecting  his 


such  individual  owners,  but  that 
cannot  affect  individual  rights. 
There  may  be  twenty  or  there  may 
be  fifty  of  them,  but  if  each  has  suf- 
fered great  damage  to  his  estate  by 
the  unlawful  closing  of  a  street,  why 
shall  not  each  have  his  action. 
Neither  twenty  men  nor  fifty  men 
constitute  the  general  public.  The 
general  public  is  composed  of  the 
great  mass  of  individuals  who  own 
no  property  in  the  vicinity  and  who 
may  wish  to  pass  over  the  street 
or  not,  and  who,  if  they  do,  simply 
suffer  the  trifling  inconvenience  of 
being  obliged  to  make  »  circuitous 
trip.  The  man  who  owns  a  lot  in 
the  next  block,  and  whose  lot  has 
lost  a  great  part  of  its  value  by  rea- 
son of  the  closing  of  the  street,  man- 
ifestly suffers  some  injury  different 
in  its  nature  from  the  mere  incon- 
venience suffered  by  the  general 
public.  There  are  at  least  two  plain- 
tiffs in  the  present  case  who  own 
lots  fronting  on  Eighth  street — one 
in  the  next  block  to  the  east,  and  the 
other  two  blocks  to  the  west  of  the 
block  attempted  to  be  vacated.  The 
complaint  alleges  distinctly  that  the 
property  of  each  will  be  greatly  de- 
preciated in  value  by  the  proposed 
vacation  and  occupation  of  the 
street.  We  hold  this  to  be  a  sufficient 
allegation  of  special  and  peculiar  in- 
jury to  entitle  them  to  maintain  an 
action  of  this  kind,  and  we  do  not 


find  it  necessary  to  go  further  or 
sritically  examine  the  rights  of  the 
remaining  plaintiffs."     pp.  7,  8. 

6  4Bigelow  V.  Ballerino,  111  Cal. 
559,  44  Pac.  307;  Pennsylvania  Co. 
V.  Bond,  202  111.  95,  66  N.  E.  941; 
Chicago  V.  Webb,  102  111.  App.  232; 
Long  V.  Wilson,  119  la.  267,  93  N. 
W.  282,  97  Am.  St.  Rep.  315,  60 
L.R.A.  720;  Eidgeway  v.  Osceola, 
(la.)  117  N.  W.  974;  Louisville  etc. 
E.  R.  Co.  V.  Hannen,  14  Ky.  L.  R. 
526;  Pearsall  v.  Eaton  County,  71 
Mich.  438,  39  N.  W.  578;  Pearsall  v. 
Eaton  County,  74  Mich.  558,  42  N. 
W.  77,  4  L.R.A.  193;  Wendt  v.  Board 
of  Supervisors,  87  Minn.  403,  92  N. 
W.  404;  Laurel  v.  Rowell,  84  Miss. 
435,  36  So.  543;  Heinrich  v.  St. 
Louis,  125  Mo.  424,  28  S.  W.  626, 
46  Am.  St.  Rep.  490;  Lindsay  v. 
Omaha,  30  Neb.  512,  46  N.  W.  627, 
27  Am.  St.  Rep.  415;  Grinnell  v. 
Portage  Co.  Comrs.,  6  Ohio  C.  C. 
(N.S.)  180;  Oliver  Sehlemmer  Co. 
V.  Steinman-M.  Furn.  Co.  2  Ohio  N. 
P.  (N.S.)  293;  S.  C.  affirmed,  7  Ohio 
C.  C.  (N.S.)  468;  Pence  v.  Bryant, 
54  W.  Va.  263,  46  S.  E.  275;  John- 
ston V.  Lonstorf,  128  Wis.  17,  107  N. 
W.  459.  See  HoUoway  v.  South- 
mayd,  139  N.  Y.  390,  34  N.  E.  1047; 
Holloway  v.  Delano,  64  Hun  27; 
Same  v.  Same,  64  Hun  34;  Pettibone 
V.  Hamilton,  40  Wis.  402;  James  v. 
Darlington,  71  Wis.  173. 


3T6  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    200 

property  with  other  parts  of  the  town  or  city  has  a  peculiar 
A'alue  to  him;  apart  from  that  shared  in  by  citizens  generally, 
and  his  right  to  the  street  as  a  means  of  enjoying  the  free  and 
convenient  use  of  his  property  has  a  value  quite  as  certainly  as 
the  property  itself.  If  this  special  right  is  of  value, — and  it  is 
of  value  if  it  increases  the  worth  of  his  abutting  premises, — 
then  it  is  property,  regardless  of  the  extent  of  such  value.  Sure- 
ly no  argument  is  required  to  demonstrate  that  the  depriva- 
tion of  the  use  of  property  is  to  that  extent  the  destruction  of  its 
value.  Under  the  allegations  of  the  petition,  then,  shutting 
off  the  approach  to  the  plaintiff's  homestead  was  the  taking  of 
his  property."  ^^  It  is  no  answer  that  the  plaintiff  may  still  use 
his  own  half  of  the  street  or  alley  for  the  purposes  of  access.*® 
As  already  shown  the  right  of  access  extends  to  the  full  width 
of  the  street."^  So  one  is  entitled  to  compensation  who  has  a 
private  right  of  way  terminating  on  the  vacated  part,  as  the 
right  of  way  is  rendered  useless.®*  Where  land  was  platted  so 
that  the  only  access  to  certain  lots  was  over  a  space  marked 
"Public  Square,"  and  the  city  vacated  a  part  of  this  square 
so  as  to  destroy  access  to  the  lots,  the  owners  were  held  entitled 
to  compensation.®' 

Contrary  decisions  have  been  made  in "  Pennsylvania''''  and 
lowa.^^  In  the  Iowa  case  referred  to,  the  plaintiff  owned  two 
lots  upon  Kossuth  street,  in  Oskaloosa.  The  lots  and  street 
were  platted  by  one  White.  The  fee  of  the  street  was  in  the 
public,  the  reversion  in  White.  The  plaintiff's  lots  were  im- 
proved, at  an  expense  of  several  thousand  dollars,  with  dwellings 
occupied  by  tenants.  The  Central  Railroad  Company  procured 
a  quitclaim  from  White,  of  Kossuth  street,  secured  from  the 
City  Council  an  ordinance  vacating  the  street,  and  then  pro- 
ceeded to  cut  down  the  grade  six  feet  and  fill  it  with  railroad 
tracks  constructed  and  used  in  such  manner  as  to  prevent  access 
to  the  plaintiff's  premises  and  preclude  all  travel  on  the  street 

ssLong   V.    Wilson,    119   la.    267,  Mass.  421,  67  N.  E.  312;  People  T. 

269,  93  N.  W.  282,  97  Am.  St.  Rep.  Highway  Comrs.,  35  Mich.  15. 

315,  60  L.R.A.  720.  csBorghart  v.  Cedar  Rapids,  126 

"I-Ieinrich  v.  St.  Louis,  125  Mo.  la.  313,  101  N.  W.  1120,  68  L.R.A. 

424,  28  S.  W.  636,  46  Am.  St.  Rep.  306. 

490.  7opaul  V.  Carver,  24  Pa.  St.  207, 

eTAnte,  §§  120,  201.  64  Am.  Dec.  649. 

esWebster   v.   I^owell,    142   Mass.  'iBarr  v.  Oskaloosa,  45  la.  275. 
324,  8  N.  E.  54;  Munn  v.  Boston,  183 


§  201  EOADS  AND  STREETS.  377 

by  the  plaintiff  or  the  public.  The  value  of  plaintiff's  property 
was  almost  wholly  destroyed.  In  a  suit  against  the  city  and 
railroad  company  the  plaintiff  set  up  the  foregoing  facts,  the 
defendants  demurred,  and  the  demurrer  was  sustained.  It  was 
held  that,  on  vacation  of  the  street,  the  title  vested  in  the  rail- 
road company  under  its  deed  from  White,  that  plaintiff  ceased 
to  have  any  rights  in  the  soil  of  the  street,  and  could  no  more 
complain  of  the  building  of  the  railroad  upon  it  than  he  could 
if  it  had  been  built  on  an  adjacent  lot.  But,  according  to  the 
great  weight  of  authority,  any  interest  which  White  had  in  the 
street  was  burdened  with  private  easements  in  favor  of  the 
plaintiff^^  and  even  if  the  city  was  held  to  take  an  absolute  fee,^* 
it  yet  in  effect  invited  the  public  to  buy  and  improve  property 
on  the  street  and  should  have  been  held  estopped  to  deny  to  the 
plaintiff  the  right  to  those  easements  which  were  indispensable 
to  the  enjoyment  of  the  property.  The  case  has  been  much 
cited  but  has  been  virtually  overruled  by  the  later  Iowa  cases 
cited  in  this  section.^* 

§  201.  Narrowing  street  in  front.  It  has  often  been 
laid  down  as  the  law  that  one  who  buys  property  on  a  street 
has  a  right  to  have  the  street  kept  open  to  its  full  width. '^^  It 
would  follow  that  a  street  could  not  be  narrowed  without  com- 
pensation to  the  abutting  owner.  But  the  authorities  are  not 
uniform.  Property  was  platted  with  a  street  along  a  river. 
The  legislature  vacated  all  of  the  street  but  fifty  feet  adjacent 
to  the  abutting  lots.  The  act  was  held  void  and  an  owner  of 
one  of  the  lots  was  held  entitled  to  recover  damages  against  one 

i2Ante,  §§  120,  198.  571;  Cole  v.  Shannon,  1  J.  J.  Marsh. 

'SThia    seems   to   be   the   law   in  218;  Campbell  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Dye, 

Iowa.     See  Dempsey  v.  Burlington,  18  B.  Mon.  761 ;   Stanwood  v.  Mal- 

66  la.  387,  24  N.  W.  508;  Lake  City  den,  157  Mass.  17,  31  N.  E.  702,  16 

V.  Fulkerson,  122  la.  569,  98  N.  W.  L.R.A.    591;    Nichols   v.    Richmond, 

376;  Harrington  v.  la.  Central  Ky.  162  Mass.  170,  38  N.  E.  501;  Nichol- 

Co.,  126  la.  388,  102  N.  W.  139.  son  v.  Stockett,  Walker,  Miss.   67 ; 

''*See  especially  Ridgeway  v.  Os-  I«ighton  v.  Concord  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

ceola,  (la.)  117  N.  W.  974.    See  also  72  N.  H.  224,  55  Atl.  938;  Kakeldy 

the  following  cases  on  the  subject  of  t.  Columbia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  37  Wash, 

his  section:   Levee  District  v.   Far-  075,  80  Pac.  205. 
mer,  101   Cal.   178,  35  Pac.  569,  23  7  5Haynes  v.  Thomas,  7   Ind.  38; 

L.R.A.  388;  Marrietta  Chair  Co.  v.  White  v.  Tidewater  Oil  Co.,  50  N.  J. 

Henderson,  121  Ga.  399,  49  S.  E.  312,  Eq.  1,  25  Atl.  199;  Moose  v.  Carson, 

104   Am.    St.    Rep.    156;    Fesser    v.  104  N.  C.  431,  10  S.  E.  689;  Madden 

Achenbach,  29   111.  App.   373;   Ells-  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  Ohio  C.  C.  73; 

worth  V.  Chickasaw  County,  40  la.  Ante,  §  123. 


378  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    202 

building  on  the  vacated  part  in  front  of  his  lotJ"  Other  cases 
are  to  the  same  effect.^''  But  where  the  north  thirty-one  feet 
of  street  was  vacated  it  was  held  in  California  that  the  prop- 
erty on  the  opposite  side  of  the  street  was  neither  taken  nor 
damaged  within  the  constitution  and  that  its  owners  had 
no  standing  to  contest  the  proceeding^*  In  an  Iowa  case 
a  city  proposed  to  vacate  twelve  feet  off  the  east  side  of 
a  street  fifty-three  and  one  half  feet  wide  and  give  the 
same  to  the  adjacent  owners  on  condition  that  they  would  give 
a  like  amount  off  the  rear  of  their  lots  to  widen  another  street. 
It  was  held  that  those  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  street  would 
suffer  no  actionable  damage  and  could  not  prevent  the  con- 
summation of  the  scheme. ''*''  Where  a  city  was  laid  out  pursuant 
to  act  of  Congress  which  reserved  a  space  along  a  river  for  pub- 
lic highways  and  other  public  uses,  it  was  held  that  part  of  the 
space  next  the  river  could  be  devoted  to  railroad  purposes 
and  that  abutting  owners  could  not  prevent  it.'®  Where  dam- 
ages are  given  by  statute  when  a  street  is  vacated  or  discontin- 
ued, the  statute  is  held  to  apply  to  the  narrowing  of  a  street,  in 
favor  of  those  abutting  on  the  narrowed  part.*"  It  is  held  that 
one  three  blocks  away  from  the  narrowed  part  may  not  enjoin, 
though  his  property  is  depreciated.*^ 

§  202.  Vacating  or  closing  street  so  as  to  cut  off  access 
to  property  in  one  direction.  Whether  one  may  recover  com- 
pensation when  the  street  in  front  of  his  property  is  closed  or 
vacated  between  his  property  and  the  next  connecting  street  on 
one  side,  so  as  to  cut  off  access  in  that  direction,  while  leaving 
access  in  front  and  in  the  other  direction  unimpaired,  is  one 

76Haynea  v.  Thomas,  7  Ind.  38.  427,  where  a  99-foot  street  was  nar- 

77Hyde  V.  Fall  River,  197  Mass.  4;  rowed  by  vacating  2   feet  on   each 

Stehr  V.  Mason  City  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  77  side.     And  see  Patton  v.  Rome,  124 

Neb.  641,  110  JT.  W.  701;  Lawrence  Ga.  525,  52  S.  E.  742. 

V.  New  York,  2  Barb.  577;  People  v.  TSaWilliams  v.   Gary,  73  la.  194, 

Commissioners     of     Highways,     53  34  N.  W.  813. 

Barb.  70;  Egerer  v.  New  York  Cent.  'sBurlington  Gas  Lt.  Co.  v.  Bur- 

etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  130  N.  Y.  108,  29  N.  liugton  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  91  la.  470,  59 

E.  95,  14  L.R.A.  381,  5  Am.  R.  R.  N.  W.  292;  S.  C.  affirmed  165  U.  S. 

&  Corp.  Rep.  245;  Moose  v.  Carson,  370. 

104  N.  C.  431,  10  S.  E.  689.  soRensselaer  v.  Leopold,  106  Ind. 

7  8Brown    v.    San    Francisco,    124  29;  Morris  v.  Philadelphia,  199  Pa. 


Cal.  274,  57  Pac.  82.     See  also  Mt, 
Carmel  v.  Shaw,  155  III.  37,  39  N.  E 
584,  40  Am.  St.  Rep.  311,  27  L.R.A 
580,  reversing  S.  C.  52  111.  App.  429 
and  Mt.  Carmel  v.  Bell,  52  111.  App 


St.  357,  49  Atl.  70. 

siCummings  Realty  &  Inv.  Co.  v. 
Deere  &  Co.,  208  Mo.  66,  108  S.  W. 
496,  14  L.R.A.(N.S.)    822. 


§    '^'^^  EOADS    AI^'D    STEEETS.  379 

of  the  vexed  questions  of  the  law.  A  leading  case  on  the  ques- 
tion is  that  of  Smith  v.  Boston,®^  decided  by  the  supreme  court 
of  Massachusetts.  The  street  on  which  the  plaintiff  abutted 
was  vacated  near  to  but  not  in  front  of  his  property.  He  had 
access  in  the  other  direction.  The  case  was  a  petition  for  dam- 
,  ages  under  the  statute,  which  was  as  follows : — "If  damage  shall 
be  sustained  by  any  t:  arson  in  their  property,  by  the  laying  out 
altering  or  discontinuing  any  highway,  the  commissioners  shal", 
estimate  the  amount  of  damage,  sustained  by  such  persons,  and, 
in  their  return,  shall  state  the  share  of  each  separately."  "In 
estimating  the  damages  sustained  by  any  person  in  his  prop- 
erty, by  the  laying  out,  altering  or  discontinuing  of  any  high- 
way, the  jury  shall  take  into  consideration  all  the  damage  done 
to  the  complainant,  whether  by  talcing  his  property,  or  by  in- 
juring it  in  any  manner:  and  they  shall  also  allow  by  way  of 
set-off,  the  benefit,  if  any,  to  the  property  of  the  complainant, 
by  reason  of  such  laying  out,  alteration  or  discontinuance."  ®^ 
The  laneruage  of  the  statute  could  hardly  be  more  compreheu' 
sive  but  the  court  hold  that  the  plaintiff  did  not  sustain  dam- 
age within  the  meaning  of  the  statute,  though  his  property  was 
depreciated  in  value  by  the  discontinuance  of  the  street.  Th* 
basis  of  the  decision  is  that  the  statute  contemplated  actionable 
damage  and  that  the  plaintiff's  damage  would  not  have  been  ac- 
tionable, if  the  street  had  been  closed  without  legal  authority. 
"The  inconvenience  of  the  petitioner  is  experienced  by  him," 
says  the  court,  "in  common  with  all  the  rest  of  the  members 
of  the  commimity.  He  may  feel  it  more,  in  consequence  of 
the  proximity  of  his  lots  and  buildings ;  still  it  is  a  damage 
of  like  kind,  and  not  in  its  nature  peculiar  or  specific."  ®* 
This  case  has  been  approved  and  followed  in  many  subsequent 
cases  in  the  same  court  involving  similar  facts^®  and  has 
exerted  a  marked  influence  upon  the  law  of  the  country.  It  is 
now  the  settled  doctrine  in  Massachusetts  that  property  is  not 

827  Cuah.  254.  153   Mass.   218,   26   N.   E.   848,    11 

8  3Kev.   Stats.    Mass.  1836,  c.  24,  L.R.A.    750;    Hammond   v.    County 

§§  11,  35.  Comrs.,  154  Mass.  509,  28  N.  E.  902; 

siSmith  V.  Boston,  7  Gush.  254.  Stanwood  v.  Maiden,  157  Mass.  17, 

ssproprietors  of  Locks  &  Canals  31  N.  E.  702,  16  L.R.A.  591;  Nicliols 

V.  Nashua  etc.  K.  R.  Co.,  10  Gush.  v.  Richmond,  162  Mass.  170,  38  N. 

385 ;    Castle  v.   Berkshire,   11   Gray  E.  501 ;  Putnam  v.  Boston  etc.  R.  R. 

26;    Hartshorn    v.    South    Reading,  Co.,   182  Mass.   351,   65   N.  E.  790: 

3  Allen,  501 ;  Willard  v.  Cambridge,  Hyde  v.  Fall  River,  189  Mass.  439, 

3  AUen  574;  Davis  v.  County  Comrs.,  75  N.  E.  953,  2  L.R.A.  (N.S.)  269- 


380 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  202 


damaged  within  the  statute  by  the  vacation  of  a  street  or  high- 
way, unless  it  abuts  upon  the  part  of  the  street  vacated  or  i?  cut 
oiT  altogether  from  the  general  system  of  highways.  T'le  doc- 
trine is  admitted  to  be  harsh  in  some  cases  but  is  adhered  to  as 
affording  a  definite  and  practical  rule  and  on  the  groimd  of 
sta"e  decisis  and  the  acquiescence  of  the  legislature.*®  Many 
otlier  courts  follow  the  Massachusetts  doctrine  and  hold  that, 
when  access  to  property  is  cut  off  in  one  direction  by  the  vaea- 
t'on  or  closing  of  the  street  upon  which  it  abuts  but  may  be 
had  in  the  other  direction,  the  property  is  not  tiJien  or  damaged 
within  the  meaning  of  constitutions  or  statutes  giving  comp  en- 
sation.*^ 

On  the  other  hand  there  are  many  cases  which  'hold  a  co:i- 
+rary  doctrine.     A  statute  of  Pennsylvania,  local  to  Phila 
delphia,  gave  comprnsatioii  in  general  terms  for  damage  to 
property  by  the  vacatmg  of  roads  and  streets  in  that  city.** 


8  6  "Although  the  doctrine  may 
sometimes  be  rather  harsh  in  its  ap- 
plication to  special  cases,  there  are 
sound  reasons  on  which  it  rests. 
The  chief  of  these  reasons  are,  that 
to  hold  otherwise  would  be  to  en- 
courage many  trivial  suits;  that  it 
would  discourage  public  improve- 
ments if  a  whole  neighborhood  were 
to  be  allowed  to  recover  damages  for 
such  injuries  to  their  estates  and 
that  the  loss  is  of  a  kind  which  pur- 
chasers of  land  must  be  held  to  have 
contemplated  as  liable  to  occur,  and 
to  have  made  allowance  for  in  the 
price  which  they  paid."  Davis  v. 
County  Comrs.,  153  Mass.  218,  224, 
225,  26  N.  E.  848,  11  L.E.A.  750. 

"None  of  the  considerations  which 
have  been  urged  seem  to  us  to  war- 
rant our  overruling  a  construction  of 
a,  statute  which  has  been  settled  for 
forty  years,  seemingly  to  the  satis- 
faction of  the  legislature,  and 
which  has  been  followed  elsewhere 
by  courts  of  the  highest  respectabili- 
ty." Stanwood  v.  Maiden,  157  Mass. 
17,  31  N.  E.  702,  16  L.II.A.  591. 

s'Newton  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  E. 
Co.,  72  Conn.  420,  44  Atl.  813;  Ells 


worth  V.  Chicasaw  County,  40  la. 
571;  Brady  v.  Shinkle  40  la.  576; 
Dempsey  v.  Burlington,  66  la.  387. 
24  N.  W.  508;  Harrington  v.  Xa. 
Cent.  By.  Co.,  126  la.  388,  102 
N.  W.  139;  Bailey  v.  Culver,  84  Mo. 
531,  affirming  S.  C.  12  Mo.  App. 
531;  Cram  v.  Laconia,  71  N.  H.  41, 
51  Atl.  635,  57  L.R.A.  282;  Herbert 
v.  Penn.  E.  E.  Co.,  43  N.  J.  Eq.  21 ; 
Coster  V.  Albany,  43  N.  Y.  399; 
Wheeler  v.  Clark,  58  N.  Y.  267; 
Kings  Co.  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stevens, 
101  N.  Y.  411,  5  N.  E.  353;  Buch- 
holz  V.  New  York  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  14!: 
N.  Y.  640,  43  N.  E.  76;  Buchholz  v. 
New  York  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  71  App. 
Div.  452,  75  N.  Y.  S.  824;  S.  C. 
affirmed,  177  N.  Y.  550,  69  N.  E. 
1121;  Kinnear  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Beatty,  65 
Ohio  St.  264,  62  N.  E.  341,  87  Am. 
St.  Rep.  600,  reversing  S.  C.  21 
Ohio  C.  C.  384;  Scrutchfield  v.  Choc- 
taw etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  18  Okl.  308,  88 
Pac.  1048,  9  L.E.A.(N.S.)  496;  Pon- 
ischil  V.  Hoquiam  S.  &  D.  Co.,  41 
Wash.  303,  83  Pac.  316;  Montreal  v. 
Drummond,  L.  E.  1  H.  L.  384. 

8  8The    statute    was    as    follows: 
"That  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  juries 


§  202  EOADS  AND  STEEETS.  381 

lu  a  case  under  the  statute,  the  plaintiff  owned  property  on 
Melon  street  in  the  block  between  9th  and  10th  streets.  A 
part  of  Melon  street  was  closed  next  to  9th  street,  leaving  the 
plaintiff  upon  a  cul  de  sac.  He  was  cut  off  from  9th  street 
but  the  street  in  front  of  his  property  was  undisturbed  and  he 
had  access  to  the  general  system  of  streets,  via  10th  street  as 
before.  His  property  was  depreciated  and  it  was  held  that  he 
was  entitled  to  recover.  The  court  says:  "Where  the  part 
of  a  street  in  front  of  a  property  is  vacated  the  owner's  right  to 
compensation  is  conceded,  but  the  right  is  denied  unless  there 
is  an  actual  vacation  and  closing  of  the  part  of  the  street  on 
which  the  property  abuts.  It  is  evident,  however,  that  without 
the  impairment  of  the  owner's  outlet  in  one  direction  his  prop- 
erty may  be  rendered  entirely  worthless  by  a  change  in  the 
physical  condition  of  a  street.  To  draw  the  line  between  own- 
ers who  may  and  owners  who  may  not  recover,  at  the  point 
where  the  deprivation  of  access  is  total,  is  to  draw  it  arbitrarily. 
The  abutting  owner's  special  right  in  a  street  as  a  means  of 
access  to  his  property  is  not  limited  to  the  part  of  the  street 
on  which  his  property  abuts.  Such  a  limitation  of  his  right 
would  deny  him  compensation  if  all  of  the  street  except  that 
part  immediately  in  front  if  his  property  were  vacated.  His 
right  is  the  right  of  access  in  any  direction  which  the  street 
pennits.  As  affecting  this  right  no  distinction  can  be  drawn 
between  a  partial  and  a  total  deprivation  of  access ;  the  impair- 
ment of  the  right  is  a  legal  injury  differing  in  degree  only  from 
its  total  destruction.  If  the  street  is  vacated  on  both  sides  of 
his  property  so  as  to  cut  him  off  from  other  streets,  his  means 
of  access  is  as  effectually  destroyed  as  if  the  entire  street  were 
vacated.  If  the  street  is  vacated  on  one  side  only  and  his  prop- 
erty is  left  at  the  end  of  a  cul  de  sac,  if  the  street  is  decreased  in 
width  so  as  to  be  impassable  to  vehicles;  or  if  one  means  of 
access  is  taken  away  by  the  closing  of  a  back  street  or  alley,  his 
injury  may  be  less,  but  the  difference  is  one  of  degree  only.  In 
either  case  he  has  sustained  a  loss  by  the  destruction  of  an  im- 
portant element  in  the  market  value  of  his  property,  and  he  has 

selected  to  assess  damages   for  the  second,  to  ascertain  and  apportion 

opening,    widening    or    vacating    of  the   same  among  and  against  such 

roads  or  streets,  within  said  city,  to  owners  of  land  as  shall  be  benefited 

ascertain  and  report  to  the  court:  by  such  opening,  widening  or  vacat- 

first,     what     damages     the    parties  ing  any  such  road  or  street" — P.  L. 

claiming  the  same  are  entitled  to;  18.58,  p.  385. 


382 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§    202 


been  injured  in  a  legal  sense."  *'  This  view  is  also  supported 
by  many  decisions  in  Pennsylvania  and  other  states  involving 
similar  facts.®"  In  Illinois  vrhere  the  plaintiff's  property  abut- 
ted upon  an  alley  ■which  was  vacated  and  closed  at  one  end  but 
a  new  alley  at  right  angles  was  opened  to  a  connecting  alley,  so 
that  the  plaintiff  could  use  the  alley  in  front  of  his  property 
as  before  but  would  have  to  go  further  to  reach  certain  points, 
it  was  held  that  the  plaintiff's  property,  though  depreciated, 
was  not  taken  or  damaged  for  pijblic  use."^  But  where  the 
plaintiff's  property  was  on  the  corner  of  Sixty-first  and  Stat^ 
streets  in  Chicago  and  Sixty-first  street  was  vacated  just  beyond 
the  line  of  his  property,  it  was  held  that  the  plaintiff  could  re- 
cover for  the  depreciation  of  his  property.®^     This  and  other 


8  9In  re  Melon  St.,  182  Pa.  St.  397, 
403,  404,  38  Atl.  482,  28  L.K.A.  275, 
reversing  S.  C.  1  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  63. 

soO'Brien  v.  Central  I.  &  S.  Co., 
158  Ind.  218,  63  N.  E.  302,  92  Am. 
St.  Rep.  305,  57  L.E.A.  508;  Penn- 
sylvania Co.  V.  Stanley,  10  Ind.  App. 
421,  37  N.  E.  288,  38  K.  E.  421; 
lieavenworth  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Curlan, 
51  Kan.  432,  33  Pac.  297;  Hayden 
V.  Stewart,  71  Kan.  11,  80  Pac.  43; 
Highbarger  v.  Milford,  71  Kan.  331, 
80  Pac.  633;  Louisville  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Finly,  86  Ky.  294,  5  S.  W. 
753;  Gargan  v.  Louisville  etc.  Ey. 
Co.,  89  Ky.  212,  12  S.  W.  259,  6 
L.R.A.  340;  Martin  v.  Louisville,  97 
Ky.  30,  29  S.  W.  864;  Bannon  v. 
Rohmeier,  90  Ky.  48,  13  S.  W.  444, 
29  Am.  St.  Rep.  355;  Louisville  v. 
Bannon,  99  Ky.  74,  35  S.  W.  120; 
Van  Witsen  v.  Gutman,  79  Md.  405,  29 
Atl.  608,  24  L.E.A.  403;  Goss  v. 
Highway  Commissioner,  63  Mich. 
608,  30  N.  W.  197;  Horton  v.  Wil- 
liams, 99  Mich.  423,  58  N.  W.  369; 
Dean  v.  Ann  Arbor  R.  R.  Co.,  137 
Mich.  459,  100  N.  W.  773;  Kaje  v. 
Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.  57  Minn.  422, 
59  N.  W.  493;  Vanderburgh  v. 
Minneapolis,  98  Minn.  329,  108  N. 
W.  480,  6  L.R.A.(N.S.)  741;  Dries 
V.  St.  Joseph,  98  Mo.  App.  611,  73 


S.  W.  723;  Mellor  v.  Philadelphia, 
160  Pa.  St.  614,  28  Atl.  991;  Foust 
V.  Pa.  R.  R.  Co.,  212  Pa.  St.  213, 
61  Atl.  829;  Robbins  v.  Scranton, 
217  Pa.  St.  577,  66  Atl.  977;  Walsh 
V.  Scranton,  23  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  276; 
Haggerty  v.  Scranton,  23  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.  279;  Ruscomb  St.,  33  Pa. 
Super.  Ct.  148;  S.  C.  30  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.  476;  Black  v.  Pittsburg  etc.  St. 
Ey.  Co.,  34  Pa.  Super.  416;  John- 
ston V.  Old  Colony  R.  R.  Co.,  18  R. 
I.  642,  29  Atl.  594,  49  Am.  St.  Rep. 
800;  Tilley  v.  Mitchell  &  L.  Co.,  121 
Wis.  1,  98  N.  W.  969,  105  Am.  St. 
Eep.  1007;  Chicago  v.  Baker,  86 
Fed.  753,  30  C.  C.  A.  364;  Chicago 
V.  Baker,  98  Fed.  830,  39  C.  C.  A. 
318;  Mason  City  etc.  E.  E.  Co.  v. 
Wolf,  148  Fed.  961,  78  C.  C.  A.  589; 
McQuade  v.  The  King,  7  Can.  Exch. 
318;  Maeartlmr  v.  The  King,  8  Can. 
Exch.  245;  Cook  v.  Bath,  L.  R.  6 
Eq.   Cas.   177. 

siParker  v.  Catholic  Bishop,  146 
111.  158,  34  N.  E.  473,  affcrming  S.  C. 

41  111.  App.  74. 

3  2Chicago  V.  Burcky,  158  111.  103, 

42  N.  E.  178,  49  Am.  St.  Rep.  142, 
29  L.R.A.  568,  affirming  S.  C.  under 
title  of  Lake  v.  Burcky,  57  111.  App. 
647. 


§  203 


KOADS    AND    STEEETS. 


38? 


cases  place  Illinois  in  line  with  the  courts  which  hold  that  there 
may  be  a  recovery  when  access  to  property  is  cut  off  in  one 
direction  by  the  vacation  or  closing  of  a  street.®*  This  seems 
to  the  writer  to  be  the  correct  view  and  is  in  accordance  with 
previous  conclusions  as  to  rights  of  abutting  owners  and  special 
damage.** 

§  203.  When  the  vacated  part  is  beyond  the  next  cross 
street  from  the  plaintiff's  property.  The  cases  already  con- 
sidered are  where  the  vacation  is  in  front  of  the  plaintiff's  prop- 
erty or  in  the  same  block,  so  that  his  access  is  cut  off  entirely 
or  in  one  direction.  The  case  now  to  be  considered  is  where 
the  vacation  is  in  the  next  or  some  remoter  block  and  the  plain- 
tiff has  left  access  in  both  directions  to  the  system  of  streets. 
To  reach  certain  points  in  the  direction  of  the  vacation  the 
plaintiff  must  make  a  detour  and  this  fact  and  the  diversion 
of  travel  and  the  loss  of  a  thoroughfare  depreciate  the  value  of 
his  property.  The  decisions  are  nearly  unanimous  to  the  effect 
that  in  such  case  the  plaintiff's  property  is  not  taken  or  damaged 
and  that  he  cannot  prevent  the  closing  of  the  street  or  recover 
damages  therefor.®^     While  this  conclusion  may  be  correct  so 


9  3Rigney  v.  Chicago,  102  111.  64; 
Winnetka  y.  Clifford,  201  111.  475, 
66  N.  E.  384;  Chicago  v.  Pulcyn, 
129  111.  App.  179 ;  Danville  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Tidrick,  137  111.  App.  553. 

SiSee  ante,  §§  197,  199.  When 
a  street  is  wrongfully  closed  or  ob- 
structed so  as  to  cut  off  access  to 
property  in  one  direction  there  is 
special  damage  and  a  right  of  re- 
covery. Birmingham  Ry.  L.  &  P. 
Co.  V.  Moran,  151  Ala.  187,  44  So. 
152;  Texarkana  v.  Leach,  60  Ark. 
40,  48  S.  W.  807,  74  Am.  St.  Rep. 
68;  Park  v.  C.  &  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co., 
43  la.  636;  Dairy  v.  la.  Cent.  Ry. 
Co.,  113  la.  716,  84  N.  W.  688;  Van- 
deburgh  v.  Minneapolis,  93  Minn.  81, 
100  N.  W.  668;  Glaessner  v.  Anheu- 
ser-Busch Brew.  Co.,  100  Mo.  508, 
13  S.  W.  707,  2  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp. 
Rep.  420;  Longworth  v.  Sedevic,  165 
Mo.  221,  65  S.  W.  260:  And  see 
Commissioners  of  Highways  v. 
Quinn,  136  111.  604,  27  N.  E.   186; 


Taylor  v.  Commissioners  of  High- 
ways, 88  111.  526;  Whitman  v. 
Comrs.  of  Highways,  96  111.  292; 
Petition  of  Concord,  50  N.  H.  530; 
Buchholz  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  148  N.  Y.  640,  43  N.  E.  76; 
Buchholz  V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
71  App.  Div.  452,  75  N.  Y.  S.  824; 
S.  C.  affirmed,  177  N.  Y.  550,  69  N. 
E.  1121. 

ssDennis  v.  Mobile  etc.  Ry.  Co., 
137  Ala.  649,  35  So.  30,  97  Am.  St. 
Rep.  69;  Little  Rock  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Newman,  73  Ark.  1,  83  S.  W.  653, 
108  Am.  St.  Rep.  17 ;  Polack  v.  S.  F. 
Orphan  Asylum,  48  Cal.  490;  Sy- 
mons  V.  San  Francisco,  115  Cal.  555, 
42  Pac.  913,  47  Pac.  453;  Whit- 
sett  V.  Union  Depot  &  R.  R.  Co., 
10  Colo.  243,  15  Pac.  339;  Chicago 
Union  Bldg.  Ass.,  102  111.  379,  40 
Am.  Rep.  598 ;  East  St.  Louis  v.  0'- 
Flynn,  119  111.  200,  59  Am.  Rep. 
795;  Guttery  v.  Glenn,  201  111.  275, 
66  N.   E.   305;    Dantzer   v.   Indian- 


384 


EMINENT    DOMAIIT. 


§  204 


far  as  the  question  of  a  taking  is  concerned,  its  correctness  may 
be  questioned  when,  by  virtue  of  the  constitution  or  a  statute, 
compensation  is  given  for  property  damaged  or  injured."" 

§  204.     When  the  property  is  cut  off  entirely,  though 
street  is  left  intact  in  front.     By  the  vacation  or  closing  of 


apolis  Union  Ry.  Co.,  141  Ind.  604, 
39  N.  E.  223,  50  Am.  St.  Rep.  343, 
34  L.R.A.  769,  11  Am.  R.  K.  &  Corp. 
Rep.  249;  Hall  v.  Lebanon,  31  Ind. 
App.  265,  67  N.  E.  703;  Gray  v. 
Iowa  Laud  Co.,  26  la.  387;  Mo- 
Lachlan  v.  Gray,  105  la.  259,  74  N. 
W.  773;  Hiller  v.  Atchison  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  28  Kan.  625;  Arnold  v.  Weiker, 
55  Kan.  510,  40  Pac.  901;  Leaven- 
worth V.  Douglass,  59  Kan.  416,  53 
Pac.  123;  Cole  v.  Shannon,  1  J.  J. 
Marsh.  218;  Pearson  v.  Allen,  151 
Mass.  79,  23  N.  E.  731,  21  Am.  St. 
Rep.  426;  Putnam  v.  Boston  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  182  Mass.  351,  65  N.  E. 
790;  People  v.  Ingham  Co.,  20  Mich. 
95;  Kimball  v.  Homan,  74  Mich.  699, 
42  N.  W.  167;  Buhl  v.  Fort  St.  Un- 
ion Depot  Co.,  98  Mich.  596,  57  N. 
W.  829,  23  L.R.A.  392,  9  Am.  R.  R. 
&  Corp.  Rep.  173 ;  Baudistel  v.  Jack- 
son, 110  Mich.  357,  68  N.  W.  292; 
Baudistel  v.  Mich.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co., 
113  Mich.  687,  71  N.  W.  1114;  Beu- 
tel  V.  West  Bay  City  Sugar  Co., 
132  Mich.  587,  94  N.  W.  202;  Glas- 
gow V.  St.  Louis,  107  Mo.  198,  17 
S.  W.  743,  3  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp. 
Rep.  192;  Knapp,  Stout  &  Co.  v.  St. 
Louis,  153  Mo.  560,  55  S.  W.  104; 
Knapp,  Stout  &  Co.  v.  St.  Louis,  156 
Mo.  343,  56  S.  W.  1102;  Cummings 
Realty  &  Inv.  Co.  v.  Deere  &  Co., 
208  Mo.  66,  106  S.  W.  496,  14  L.R.A. 
(N.  S.)  822;  Dodge  v.  Penn.  R.  R. 
Co.,  43  N.  J.  Eq.  351 ;  S.  C.  affirmed, 
45  N.  J.  Eq.  366;  Kean  v.  Elizabeth, 
54  N.  J.  L.  462,  24  Atl.  495;  S.  C. 
affirmed,  55  N.  J.  L.  337,  26  Atl. 
939;  Fearing  v.  Irwin,  55  N.  Y.  486; 
Matter  of  Grade  Crossing  Comrs., 
160  N.  Y.  69,  59  N.  E.  706 ;  Reis  v. 


New  York,  188  N.  Y.  58,  80  N.  E. 
573,  affirming  S.  C.  113  App.  Div. 
464,  99  N.  Y.  S.  291;  McGee's  Ap- 
peal, 114  Pa.  St.  470,  8  Atl.  237; 
Cherry  v.  Rock  Hill,  48  S.  C.  553, 
26  S.  E.  798;  State  v.  Taylor,  107 
Tenn.  455,  64  S.  W.  766;  Smith  v. 
St.  Paul  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  39  Wash.  355, 
81  Pac.  840,  1(J9  Am.  St.  Rep.  889, 
70  L.R.A.  1018;  Mottman  v.  Olym- 
pia,  45  Wash.  361,  88  Pae.  579; 
Kimball  v.  Kenosha,  4  Wis.  321; 
Tilley  v.  Mitchell  &  Lewis  Co.,  121 
Wis.  1,  98  N.  W.  969,  105  Am.  St. 
Rep.  1007. 

The  following,  though  not  cases  of 
vacation,  are  to  the  same  effect: 
Davenport  v.  Dedham,  178  Mass. 
382,  59  N.  E.  1029;  Davenport  v. 
Hyde  Park,  178  Mass.  385,  59  N.  E. 
1030;  Patterson  v.  Duluth,  21  Minn. 
493;  Rochette  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry. 
Co.,  32  Minn.  201,  20  N.  W.  140; 
Lakkie  v.  St.  Paul  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  44 
Minn.  438,  46  N.  W.  912;  Shaubut 
v.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  Minn. 
502;  Barnum  v.  Minn.  Transfer  Ry. 
Co.,  33  Minn.  365,  23  N.  W.  538; 
Schuster  v.  Lemond,  27  Minn.  253, 
6  N.  W.  802;  State  v.  Barton,  36 
Minn.  145,  30  N.  W.  454;  State  v. 
Holman,  40  Minn.  369,  41  N.  W. 
1073;  Gray  v.  Greenville  etc.  Ry.  Co., 
59  N.  J.  Eq.  372,  46  Atl.  638;  In 
re  C-  N.  0.  &  S.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  Ohio 
C.  C.  308. 

sofifee  post,  §§  353,  354,  363. 
Coker  v.  Atlanta  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  123 
Ga.  483,  51  S.  E.  481;  Glasgow  v. 
St.  Louis,  87  Mo.  678,  affirming  15 
Mo.  App.  112;  Madden  v.  Penn.  Ry. 
Co.,  21  Ohio  C.  C.  73. 


§  204  EOADS  AND  STEEETS.  385 

part  of  a  street,  property  may  be  cut  off  altogether  from  access 
to  the  general  system  of  streets,  though  the  street  in  front  of 
the  propery  remains  open  as  before.  It  is  pretty  generally  held 
that  in  such  case  the  owner  of  the  property  so  isolated  is  en- 
titled to  compensation,  either  under  the  constitution  or  statute.®^ 
The  Massachusetts  court,  which  enforces  a  very  strict  rule  of 
liability  as  against  the  property  owner,  in  cases  of  the  vacation, 
closing  or  obstruction  of  streets,  says:  "Ordinarily  on  discon- 
tinuance of  a  street,  only  those  persons  whose  property  abuts 
on  the  part  discontinued,  suffer  special  and  peculiar  damages. 
Commonly  such  persons  are  the  only  ones  whose  property  is 
cut  off  from  access  to  the  world  outside.  If  this  access  is  only 
made  less  convenient  by  the  necessity  of  using  some  other  part 
of  the  highway,  instead  of  the  part  discontinued,  their  incon- 
venience in  that  particular  is  of  the  same  kind  as  that  of  the 
public  generally.  But  if  their  access  to  their  property  to  the 
general  system  of  public  highways  of  the  city  or  town  is  cut  off 
altogether  the  case  is  different.  It  has  repeatedly  been  recog- 
nized that  in  such  a  case  they  may  suffer  special  and  peculiar 
damages.  *  *  *  It  never  has  been  held  that  one  whose 
access  to  a  general  system  of  public  streets  in  a  city  or  town 
is  entirely  cut  off,  suffers  only  the  same  kind  of  damage  by  the 
discontinuance  of  a  street  as  one  of  the  public  who  is  merely 
obliged  to  travel  further  through  public  streets  to  reach  his 
destination."  ®® 

svButterworth  v.  Eartlett,  50  Ind.  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  32  Minn.  425,  21  N.  W. 

537;  Cook  v.  Quick,  127  Ind.  477,  26  414;  Hayes  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co., 

N.  E.  1007;  MacGinnitie  v.  Silvers,  46  Minn.  349,  49  N.  W.  61;  Auten- 

167  Ind.  321,  78  N.  E.  1013 ;  Putnam  rieth  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  36 

V.  Boston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  182  Mass.  Mo.  App.  254. 

351,  65  N.  E.  790 ;  Plummer  v.  John-  The  contrary  is  held  in  the  follow- 

ston,  63  Mich.  165,  29  N.  W.  687;  ing  cases  where  country  roads  were 

McQuigg  V.  Cullins,  56  Ohio  St.  649,  discontinued  or   closed.     Atwood  v. 

47  N.  E.  595;  Strader  v.  Cincinnati,  Partree,    56    Conn.     80;     Campbell 

1    Handy   446;    Mellor  v.   Philadel-  Turnpilce  Co.  v.  Dye,  18  B.  Mon.  761. 

phia,  160  Pa.  St.  614,  28  Atl.  991;  ssputnam   v.   Boston    etc.   R.    R. 

Smith  V.  Mitchell,  21  Wash.  536,  58  Co.,   182   Mass.   351,   354,  65  N.  E. 

Pac.  667,  75  Am.  St.  Rep.  858.  790.    Where  a  street  was  wrongfully 

To   the   same   effect,    though   not  obstructed  by  private  parties  so  as 

cases     of     vacation:      Brakken     v.  to  cut  off  the  plaintiff's   outlet  to 

Minneapolis  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  29  Minn.  the   system   of    streets,  the   damage 

41,  11  N.  W.  124;  Brakken  v.  Minne-  was  held  to  be  actionable.    Cushing- 

apolis  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  31  Minn.  45,  16  Wetmore  Co.  v.  Gray,  152  Cal.  118, 

N.  W.  459;  Brakken  v.  Minneapolis  92  Pac.  70.     After  speaking  of  the 
Em.  D.— 25. 


38.6 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


.§..205 


§  205.  Vacation  and  discontinuance  of  country  high- 
ways. Some  authorities  make  a  distinction  between  country 
highways  and  city  streets  as  respects  the  rights  of  abutting  own- 
ers.^® But  we  believe  the  true  rule  to  be  that  the  legal  rights 
of  the  abutter  are  the  same,  when  the  mode  of  establishment  is 
the  same.  The  question  has  already  been  sufficiently  discussed.-^ 
A  number  of  cases  hold  that  where  a  highway  is  discontinued 
which  affords  the  only  outlet  to  one's  farm,  or  the  only  prac- 
ticable outlet,  he  is  entitled  to  compensation.^  Perhaps  an  equal 
number  hold  the  contrary  and  that  the  damage  in  such  cases  is 
neither  the  taking  nor  damaging  of  property  for  public  use.^ 
But  where  the  plaintiff  does  not  abut  upon  the  vacated  part  of 
the  highway  and  is  not  cut  off  from  access  to  a  public  highway, 
it  is  generally  held  that  he  cannot  recover,  though  he  may  have 
to  go  further  to  reach  certain  points  and  this  may  affect  the 


right  of  access,  the  court 
"This  right  of  property  is  as  much 
invaded  by  obstructions  which  have 
the  eflfect  of  absolutely  preventing 
access  to  the  premises  along  the 
street  as  it  is  by  obstructions  pre- 
venting access  from  the  premises  to 
the  street  immediately  in  front  of  the 
land.  As  to  the  latter,  it  is  thor- 
oughly established  that  the  obstruc- 
tion constitutes  a  private  as  well 
as  a  public  nuisance.  The  attempt- 
ed distinction  between  the  two  cases 
appears  to  us  to  be  too  technical  to 
afford  a  sufficient  basis  for  a  rule 
granting  the  relief  in  the  one  case 
and  denying  it  in  the  other." 

9 9"Xhe  distinction  is  this:  Ordin- 
ary highways,  or  what  are  termed 
county  roads,  are  created  by  law  for 
the  public,  and  the  land  or  its  use  tak- 
en from  the  owner  in  the  first  place 
by  paying  him  its  value;  or  there 
may  be  some  times  such  a  dedica- 
tion by  the  individual  owner  and  an 
acceptance  of  the  county  court,  as 
will  create  this  easement  without 
compensation.  The  streets  of  a, 
town  or  city  are  acquired  by  grant 
with  the  implied  right  of  ingress 
and  egress  to  the  abutting  lot  own- 


er, the  grantor,  or  the  party  making 
the  dedication,  saying  to  the  owners 
of  lots,  this  right  of  ingress  and 
egress  you  shall  have.  But  not  so 
with  an  ordinary  public  road.  The 
state  creates  the  easement  for  the 
entire  public;  its  use  is  that  of  the 
public,  one  citizen  having  as  much 
right  to  this  use  as  another,  and 
when  its  abandonment  or  non-use 
is  deemed  necessary  for  the  public 
good,  the  county  court  may  discon- 
tinue it  altogether."  Bradbury  v. 
Walton,  94  Ky.  163,  167,  21  S.  W. 
869. 

lAnte,  §  120. 

2Butterworth  v.  Bartlett,  50  Ind. 
537;  Cook  v.  Quick,  127  Ind.  477,  26 
N.  E.  1007 ;  People  v.  Highway  Com- 
missioners, 35  Mich.  15;  Pearsall  v. 
Eaton  County,  71  Mich.  438,  39  N. 
W.  578;  Pearsall  v.  Eaton  County, 
74  Mich.  558,  42  N.  W.  77,  4  L.R.A. 
193 ;  Wendt  v.  Board  of  Supervisors, 
87  Minn.  403,  92  N.  W.  404;  Mc- 
Quigg  V.  Cullins,  56  Ohio  St.  649, 
47  N.  E.  595;  Grinnell  v.  Portage 
Co.  Comrs.,  6  Ohio  C.  C.  (N.  S.) 
180. 

sLevee  District  v.  Farmer,  101 
Cal.  178,  35  Pac.  569,  23  L.R.A.  388; 


§    206  KOADS  AT^D  STItEETS.  387 

value  of  his  farm.*  But  where  a  highway  was  discontinued 
which  afforded  the  only  access  to  the  plaintiff's  farm  and  a  new 
one  laid  out  which  afforded  access  but  which  was  very  incon- 
venient and  impracticable,  it  was  held  that  the  new  road  was  no 
reasonable  substitute  for  the  old,  that  the  plaintiff  was  en- 
titled to  compensation  and  that,  as  the  statute  provided  for 
none,  the  closure  of  the  old  road  should  be  enjoined.^ 

§  206.  When  damage  by  the  vacation  or  closing  of 
streets  and  highways  amounts  to  a  taking.  It  is  manifest 
that  when  a  street  or  highway  is  vacated  there  is  no  physical 
interference  with  the  possession  of  property.  On  the  other 
hand  property  is  thereby  relieved  of  a  public  burden,  and  it 
would  at  first  blush  seem  that  property  is  restored  instead  of 
taken.  But  assuming  that  the  vacation  or  discontinuance  of 
a  street  or  highway  amounts  to  its  closure,  the  act  of  vacation 
destroys  such  private  rights  of  passage  and  of  light  and  air 
as  may  exist  in  the  vacated  street.  To  the  extent  that  si:ch 
private  rights  are  interfered  with  or  destroyed  there  is  a  taking 
of  property  within  the  constitution.''  The  nature  and  extent 
of  these  private  rights  have  already  been  discussed. '^  They 
differ  in  different  states  and  with  the  manner  in  which  the 
street  is  established.  ISTearly  all  the  authorities  agree  that 
there  are  such  rights  and  that  their  impairment  or  destruction 
for  public  use  is  a  taking  of  property  within  the  constitution. 
According  to  the  better  reason  and  the  weight  of  authority,  there 
is  a  taking  when  the  street  or  highway  upon  which  property 
abuts  is  vacated  and  closed  in  front  of  the  property  or  when 
by  the  vacation  and  closure  property  is  cut  off  from  access  to  the 
general  system  of  streets  and  highways,  though  the  street  in 
front  remains  intact.®     Where  by  the  vacation  and  closure  of  a 

Ellsworth   V.   Chicasaw    County,   40  sMeQuigg  v.  Culling,  56  Ohio  St. 
la.  571;  (irove  v.  Allen,  92  la.  519,  649,  47  N.  E.  595.    See  also  the  fol- 
61    N.    W.    175;    Coflfey    County    v.  lowing  which  relate  to  the  discon- 
Venard,  10  Kan.  95 ;  Campbell  Turn-  tinuance  of  country  highways ;  Fes- 
pike  Co.  v.   Dye,   18   B.  Mon.  761;  ser  v.  Achenbach,  29  111.  App.  373; 
Bradbury  v.  Walton,  94  Ky.  163,  21  Goss  v.  Highway   Comr's.,  63  Mich. 
S.  W.  869.  608,  30  N.  W.  197;  Petition  of  Con- 
4Brady  v.  Shinkle,  40  la.  576 ;  Mc-  cord,  50  N.  H.  530 ;  People  v.  Comrs. 
Lachlan  v.  Gray,  105  la.  259,  74  N.  of  Highways,  53  Barb.  70. 
W.   773;    Cole  v.   Shannon,   1   J.   J.  «Ante,  §  65. 
Marsh.  218;   People  v.  Ingham  Co.,  lAnte,  §§  120-124,  197. 
20   Mich.    95;    Hamman   v.    County  sHaynes   v.   Thomas,   7    Ind.    38; 
Comrs.  154  Mass.  509,  28  N.  E.  902.  Butterworth    v.    Bartlett,    50  .  Ind. 


388' 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


§    206 


street  access  to  property  is  cut  off  in  one  direction  but  remains 
unimpaired  in  the  other,  the  majority  of  courts  hold  there  is 
no  taking  and  no  constitutional  right  to  compensation.®     As' 


537;  Rensselsier  v.  Leopold,  106  Ind. 
29;  McGinnitie  v.  Silvers,  167  Ind. 
321,  78  N.  E.  1013;  Long  v.  Wilson, 
119  la.  267,  93  N.  W.  282,  97  Am.  St. 
Rep.  315,  60  L.R.A.  720;  Borghart 
V.  Cedar  Rapids,  126  la.  313,  101 
N.  W.  1120,  68  L.R.A.  306;  Leaven- 
worth etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Curlan,  51  Kan. 
432,  33  Pac.  297;  Lexingtpn  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Applegate,  8  Dana,  Ky. 
289,  33  Am.  Dec.  497;  Transylvania 
University  v.  Lexington,  3  B.  Mon. 
25,  38  Am.  Dec.  173;  Louisville  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Hennen,  14, Ky.  L.  R. 
526;  People  v.  Highway  Comr.,  35 
Mich  15;  Pluraer  v.  Johnston,  63 
Mich.  165,  29  N.  W.  687 ;  Pearsall  v. 
Eaton  Co.,  71  Mich.  438,  39  N.  W. 
578;  Pearsall  v.  Eaton  Co.  74  Mich. 
558,  42  N.  W.  77,  4  L.R.A.  193;  Kaje 
V.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  57  Minn. 
422,  59  N.  W.  493;  Vanderburg  v. 
Minneapolis,  98  Minn.  329,  108  N. 
W.  480,  6  L.R.A.(N.S.)  741;  Laurel 
V.  Rowell,  84  Miss.  435,  36  So.  543; 
Leighton  v.  Concord  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
72  N.  H.  224,  55  Atl.  938;  Holloway 
v.  Southmayd,  139  N.  Y.  390,  34  N. 
E.  1047;  Holloway  v.  Delano,  64 
Hun  27;  Holloway  v.  Delano,  04 
Hun  34;  Lawrence  v.  New  York,  2 
Barb.  577;  Moose  v.  Carson,  104  N. 
C.  431,  10  S.  E.  689;  McQuigg  v. 
Cullins,  56  Ohio  St.  649,  47  N.  E. 
595;  Strader  v.  Cincinnati,  Handy, 
446;  Madden  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R. 
Co.,  21  Ohio  C.  C.  73;  Grinnell  v. 
Portage  Co.  Comrs.,  6  Ohio  C.  C. 
(N.  S.)  180;  Anderson  v.  Turbeville, 
6  Coldw.  150;  Johnston  v.  Lonstorf, 
128  Wis.  17,  107  N.  W.  459. 

The  contrary  is  held  in  Barr  v. 
Oskaloosa,  45  la.  275,  as  respects 
the  vacation  and  closing  of  a  city 
street.     So  in  the  following  which 


relate  to  country  roads:  Levee  Dis- 
trict V.  Farmer,  101  Cal.  178,  35 
Pac.  569,  23  L.R.A.  388;  Atwood  v. 
Partree,  56  Conn.  80;  Ellsworth  v. 
Chicasaw  Co.,  40  la.  571;  Brady  v. 
Shinkle,  40  la.  576;  Grove  v.  Allen, 
92  la.  519,  61  N.  W.  175;  McLachlan 
V.  Gray,  105  la.  259,  74  N.  W.  773; 
Coffey  Co.  v.  Venard,  10  Kan.  95; 
Campbell  etc.  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Dye,  18 
B.  Mon.  761. 

9Newton  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  72  Conn.  420,  44  Atl.  813;  Dant- 
zer  V.  Indianapolis  Union  Ry.  Co., 
141  Ind.  604,  39  N.  E.  223,  50  Am. 
St.  Rep.  343,  34  L.R.A.  769,  11  Am. 
R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  249;  Dempsey  v. 
Burlington,  66  la.  387,  24  N.  W. 
508;  Harrington  v.  la.  Cent.  Ry.' 
Co.,  126  la.  388,  102  N.  W.  139; 
Hammond  v.  County  Comrs.,  154 
Mass.  509,  28  N.  E.  902;  People  v. 
Ingham  Co.,  20  Mich.  95;  Kimball 
v.  Homan,  74  Mich.  699,  42  N.  W. 
167;  Buhl  v.  Fort  St.  Union  Depot 
Co.,  98  Mich.  596,  57  N.  W.  829,  23 
L.R.A.  392,  9  Am.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
173;  Bailey  v.  Culver,  84  Mo. 
531,  affirming  S.  C.  12  Mo.  App.  531; 
Cram  v.  Laconia,  71  N.  H.  41,  51 
Atl.  635,  57  L.R.A.  282;  Coster  v. 
Albany,  43  N.  Y.  399;  Fearing  v. 
Irwin,  55  N.  Y.  486;  Wheeler  v. 
Clark,  58  N.  Y.  267 ;  Kings  Co.  Fire 
Ins.  Co.  V.  Stevens,  101  N.  Y.  411,  5 
N.  E.  353;  Buchholz  v.  New  York 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  71  App.  Div.  452, 
75  N.  Y.  S.  824;  S.  C.  affirmed,  177 
N.  Y.  550,  69  N.  E.  1121;  Matter  of 
Grade  Crossing  Comrs.  166  N.  Y.  69, 
59  N.  E.  706;  Reis  v.  New  York, 
188  N.  Y.  58,  80  N.  E.  573,  affirming 
113  App.  Div.  464,  99  N.  Y.  S.  291; 
Kinnear  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Beatty,  65  Ohio 
St.  264,  62  N.  W.  341,  87  Am.  St. 


§  206  EOADS  AND  STREETS.  389 

the  courts  which  hold  this  doctrine  concede  that  to  cut  one  oif 
altogether  from  access  is  a  taking,  it  follows  that  the  right  of 
access  is  a  floating  right,  a  right  of  access  in  one  direction  or 
the  other,  until  it  is  cut  off  in  one  direction,  when  it  becomes 
a  fixed  and  absolute  right  in  the  other.  This  seems  a  very 
unreasonable  position  and  is  contrary  to  all  the  decisions  in 
controversies  between  private  parties  touching  the  rights  of  lot 
owners  in  platted  and  dedicated  streets.'"  The  more  reason- 
able rule  is  that  the  owner  of  a  lot  on  a  street  in  a  city  or  town 
has  a  private  right  of  access  in  both  directions  which  extends 
as  far,  at  least,  as  the  next  connecting  highway. "-^  "While  we 
do  not  think,"  says  the  court  in  one  case  "that  when  one  pur- 
chases a  parcel  of  ground  bounded  by  a  laid  out  and  dedicated 
street,  in  a  given  platted  parcel  of  land,  he  thereby  becomes 
vested  for  all  time  with  the  right  to  travel  over  and  along  all  of 
the  streets  and  alleys  of  such  platted  parcel  of  ground,  or  even 
all  of  the  streets  that  it  would  be  convenient  for  him  to  use 
we  do  think  that  he  obtains  the  right  to  the  use  of  such  streets 
as  are  reasonably  necessary  for  the  enjoyment  of  the  land 
so  purchased  by  him.  These  streets  are  ordinarily  such  as 
bound  the  block  in  which  his  land  is  situated,  or  such  as  furnisli 
access  to  his  property  from  either  direction."  '^  It  follows 
that  when  access  is  cut  off  in  one  direction  or  partially  by  the 
vacation  or  closing  of  a  street,  there  is  a  taking  of  the  private 
right  of  access  in  that  direction  and  that  there  is  a  right  to  com- 
pensation for  the  damage  thereby  inflicted  upon  the  property.*^ 
When  the  vacated  part  is  beyond  the  next  connecting  highway 
from  the  plaintiff's  property,  so  that  he  has  access  in  both 
directions,  there  it  is  held  by  all  the  authorities  that  there  is  no 

Eep.  600,  reversing  S.  C.  Beatty  v.  71  Kan.  331,  80  Pac.  633;  Louisville 

Kinnear   Mfg.    Co.,   21    Ohio    C.    C.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Finley,  86  Ky.  294, 

384;  Scrutchfield  v.  Choctaw  etc.  R.  53  S.  W.  753;  Gargan  v.  Louisville 

R.  Co.,  18  Okl.  308,  88  Pac.  1048,  9  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  89  Ky.  212,  12  S.  W. 

L.R.A.(N.S.)    496;    Gerhard  v.   See-  259,  6  L.R.A.  340;  Bannon  v.  Roh- 

konk  River  Bridge  Comrs.,  15  R.  I.  meier,  90  Ky.  48,  13  S.  W.  444,  29 

334;   Cherry  v.  Rock  Hill,  48  S.  C.  Am.  St.  Rep.  355;  Louisville  v.  Ban- 

553,  26  S.  E.  798.  non,  99  Ky.  74,  35  S.  W.  120;  VanWit- 

lOSeeante,  §§  121-123,  197.  sen  v.  Gutman,  79  Md.  405,  29  Atl. 

lllhid.  608,  24  L.R.A.  403;  Horton  v.  Wil- 

i2Highbarger  v.  Milford,  71  Kan.  liams,  99  Mich.  423,  58  N.  W.  369; 

331,  340,  80  Pac.  633.  Tilley  v.  Mitchell  &  Levfis  Co.,  121 

isRidgevvay  v.  Osceola    (la.)    117  Wis.  1,  98  N.  W.  969,  105  Am.  St. 

N.  W.  974;  Highbarger  v.  Milford,  Rep.  1007. 


390 


EMU^ENT  DOMAIN'. 


§  207 


taking-  of  the  plaintiff's  property,  though  the  closing  of  the 
street  at  the  point  in  question,  renders  his  property  Jess  valu- 
able, i* 

§  207.  When  depreciation  of  value  from  the  vacation 
and  closing  of  streets  amounts  to  damage  or  injury  within 
constitutions  and  statutes.  When  access  to  property  is  cut 
off  entirely  by  the  vacation  and  closing  of  a  street  in  front  of 
the  property  or  elsewhere,  there  is  no  question  but  what  it'  is 
damaged  or  injured  within  constitution  and  statutes  giving 
compensation  for  property  damaged  or  injured  by  the  vacation 
and  discontinuance  of  streets  and  highways.''^  So  where  a  pri- 
vate right  of  way  is  cut  off  or  obstructed,  by  the  vacation  and 


i4polack  V.  S.  F.  Orphan  Asylum, 
48  Cal.  490;  East  St.  Louis  v.  0' 
Flynn,  119  111.  200,  59  Am.  Rep. 
795;  Hall  v.  Lebanon,  31  Ind.  App. 
265,  67  N.  E.  703;  Gray  v.  la.  Land 
Co.,  26  la.  387 ;  Williams  v.  Gary,  73 
la.  194,  34  N.  W.  813;  Hiller  v. 
Atchison  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  28  Kan.  625; 
Arnold  v.  Weiker,  55  Kan.  510,  40 
Pac.  901 ;  Leavenworth  v.  Douglass, 
59  Kan.  416,  53  Pac.  123;  Cole  v. 
Shannon,  1  J.  J.  Marsh  218;  Bau- 
distel  V.  Jackson,  110  Mich.  357,  68 
N.  W.  292;  Beutel  v.  West  Bay  City 
Sugar  Co.,  132  Mich.  587,  94  N.  W. 
202;  Dean  v.  Ann  Arbor  K.  R.  Co., 
137  Mich.  459,  100  N.  W.  773;  Her- 
bert V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  43  N.  J.  Eq. 
21;  Dodge  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  43 
N.  J.  Eq.  351;  S.  C.  affirmed,  45 
N.,  J.  Eq.  366;  Kean  v.  Elizabeth,  54 
N.  J.  L.  462,  24  Atl.  495;  S.  C.  af- 
firmed, 55  N.  J.  L.  337,  26  Atl.  939 ; 
In  re  Cincinnati  etc.  Ry.  Co.  19 
Ohio  C.  C.  308 ;  State  v.  Taylor,  107 
Tenn.  455,  64  S.  W.  766. 

isBigelow  V.  Ballerino,  111  Cal. 
559,  44  Pac.  307;  Butterworth  v. 
Bartlett,  50  Ind.  537 ;  Cook  v.  Quick, 
127  Ind.  477,  26  N.  E.  1007;  Put- 
nam V.  Boston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  182 
Mass.  351,  65  N.  E.  790;  Wendt  v. 
Board  of  Supervisors,  87  Minn.  403, 
92  N.  W.  404;  Smith  v.TVIitchell,  21 


Wash.  536,  58  Pac.  667,  75  Am.  St. 
Rep.  858.  The  contrary  is  held  with 
respect  to  a  country  highway  in 
Levee  District  v.  Farmer,  101  Cal. 
178,  35  Pac.  569,  23  L.R.A.  388, 
wherein  the  court  says:  "The  crea- 
tion of  highways  by  use,  or  under 
the  statute,  creates  an  easement  for 
the  benefit  of  the  public  for  such 
time  only  as  the  public  necessities 
and  convenience  may  require,  and 
creates  no  covenant  or  obligation  in 
favor  of  an  abutter  that  it  shall  al- 
ways exist;  but,  on  the  contrary,  the 
statutes,  while  providing  for  the  es- 
tablishment and  maintenance  of 
highways,  also  provide  for  vacating 
the  same,  and  abutters  must  be 
held  to  have  acquired  and  improved 
their  property  in  view  of  that  fact, 
and  hence  no  one  can  acquire  a 
legal  interest  in  it  other  than  that 
which  is  common  to  all,  and  this 
common  interest  the  authority  re- 
lied upon  by  appellant  concedes  does 
not  entitle  an  abutter  to  damages 
upon  the  vacation  of  the  road.  The 
public  use  ceases  upon  such  vaca- 
tion; and  any  injury  to  appellant 
consequent  upon  such  ending  of  the 
use  cannot  be  held  to  be  a,  taking  or 
damaging  for  a  public  use."  pp.  186, 
187.  See  also  Fesser  v.  Achenbach, 
29  111.  App.  373. 


§207 


EOADS  AND  STEEETS. 


391 


closing  of  tlie  street  witli  which  it  connects.^*  So  in  the  case 
of  corner  lots,  if  one  of  the  streets  is  vacated."  So  if  a  street 
is  narrowed.^*  It  seems  equally  clear  to  the  writer  that  prop- 
erty is  damaged  within  the  meaning  of  the  law  when  access 
thereto  is  cut  off  in  one  direction,  but  the  authorities  are  con- 
flicting.^' Where  the  vacated  part  of  the  street  is  still  more 
remote  from  the  property  in  question,  as  when  it  is  in  the  next 
block,  or  farther,  or  beyond  the  next  intersecting  street,  it  is 
generally  held  that  there  is  no  damage  or  injury  within  the  legal 


16 Webster  v.  Lowell,  142  Mass. 
324,  8  N.  E.  54;  Munn  v.  Boston, 
183  Mass.  421,  67  N.  E.  312;  Peo- 
ple V.  Highway  Commissioner,  35 
Mich.  15. 

I'Kidgeway  v.  Osceola  (la.)  117 
N.  W.  974;  Heinrich  v.  St.  Louis, 
125  Mo.  424,  28  S.  W.  626,  46  Am. 
St.  Eep.  490. 

isHyde  v.  Fall  River,  197  Mass. 
4;  Stehr  v.  Mason  City  etc.  Ky.  Co., 
77  Neb.  641,  110  N.  W.  701;  ante, 
§  201.  But  in  California  where  a 
street  one  hundred  feet  wide  was 
narrowed  by  the  vacation  of  the 
north  thirty  one  feet,  it  was  held 
that  the  property  on  the  opposite 
side  of  the  street  was  not  damaged 
within  the  constitution.  Brown  v. 
San  Francisco,  124  Cal.  274,  57  Pac. 
82. 

I9ln  favor  of  right  to  compensa- 
tion; Chicago  V.  Burkey,  158  111. 
103,  42  N.  E.  178,  49  Am.  St.  Eep. 
142,  29  L.R.A.  568,  affirming  Lake  v. 
Burcky,  57  111.  App.  547;  Winnetka 
v.  Clifford,  201  111.  475,  66  N.  E. 
384;  Chicago  v.  Webb,  102  111.  App. 
232;  Gargan  v.  Louisville  etc.  Ry. 
Co.,  89  Ky.  212,  12  S.  W.  259,  6 
L.R.A.  340;  Bannon  v.  Eoluneier,  90 
Ky.  48,  13  S.  W.  444,  29  Am.  St. 
Rep.  355;  Louisville  v.  Bannon,  99 
Ky.  74,  35  S.  W.  120;  Vanderburgh 
v.  Minneapolis,  98  Minn.  329,  108 
N.  W.  480,  6  L.R.A.(N.S.)  741; 
Mellor  v.  Philadelphia,  160  Pa.  St. 
614,  28  Atl.  991;   In  re  Melon  St., 


182  Pa.  St.  397,  38  Atl.  482,  28 
L.R.A.  275;  Foust  v.  Penn.  R.  R. 
Co.,  212  Pa.  St.  213,  61  Atl.  829; 
Robbins  v.  Scranton,  217  Pa.  St. 
577,  66  Atl.  977;  Black  v.  Pittsburg 
etc.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  34  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 
416;  Johnston  v.  Old  Colony  E.  R. 
Co.,  18  R.  I.  642,  29  Atl.  594,  49  Atl. 
800;  Tilley  v.  Mitchell  &  Lewis  Co., 
121  Wis.  1,  98  N.  W.  969,  105  Am. 
St.  Rep.  1007;  Chicago  v.  Baker,  86 
Fed.  753,  30  C.  C.  A.  364;  Chicago 
V.  Baker,  98  Fed.  830,  39  C.  C.  A. 
318;  Mason  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Wolf,  148  Fed.  961,  78  CCA.  589; 
McQuade  v.  The  King,  7  Can.  Exch. 
318;  Macarthur  v.  The  King,  8  Can. 
Exch.  245;  Cook  v.  Bath,  L.  R.  6 
Eq.  Cas.  177.  Where  a  new  way  was 
opened  so  as  to  afford  access  in  the 
same  direction  as  that  cut  off  by  the 
vacation,  it  was  held  there  could  be 
no  recovery,  £5iough  the  new  'way 
was  less  convenient:  Parker  v.  Cath- 
olic Bishop,  146  111.  158,  34  N.  E. 
473,  affirming  41  111.  App.  74;  How- 
ell V.  Morrisville,  212  Pa.  St.  349, 
61  Atl.  932. 

Contra:  Smith  v.  Boston,  7  Cush. 
254;  Castle  v.  Berkshire,  11  Gray, 
26;  Hartshorn  v.  South  Reading,  3 
Allen  501 ;  Davis  v.  County  Comrs., 
153  Mass.  218,  26  N.  E.  848,  11 
L.R.A.  750;  Nichols  v.  Richmond, 
162  Mass.  170,  38  N.  E.  501;  Hyde 
V.  Fall  River,  189  Mass.  439,  75  N. 
E.  953,  2  L.R.A.(N.S.)  269;  Buhl 
T.    Fort    St.    Union    Depot    Co.,    98 


392 


EMIIJENT  DOMAIN. 


§    207 


meaning  of  those  terms.*"  "Where  a  short  street  which  termin- 
ated opposite  the  plaintiff's  property,  was  vacated  and  closed, 
it  was  held  that  the  property  was  damaged  within  the  constitu- 
tion, if  it  was  thereby  depreciated  in  value.*^ 

We  have  endeavored  to  show  elsewhere,  that  if  property  is 
lessened  in  value  by  an  interference  under  statutory  authority 
with  a  right,  public  or  private,  which  the  owner  is  entitled  to 
make  use  of  in  connection  with  such  property,  then  he  is  en- 
titled to  recover  for  such  loss  in  value  under  constitutions  and 
statutes  giving  compensation  for  property  damaged  or  injured 
for  public  use.**  Under  this  rule,  if  property  is  diminished  in 
value  by  the  vacation  and  closing  of  a  street,  whether  at  a  point 
near  or  remote  he  is  entitled  to  compensation  under  the  consti- 
tutions and  statutes  referred  to. 

The  rule  usually  applied  in  interpreting  these  constitutional 
and  statutory  provisions  is  "that  those  damages  can  be  recovered 
which  could  have  been  recovered  at  common  law,  had  the  acts 


Mich.  596,  57  N.  W.  829,  23  L.R.A. 
392  9  Am.  R.  E.  &  Corp.  Rep.  173; 
Glasgow  V.  St.  Louis,  107  Mo.  198, 
17  S.  W.  743,  3  Am.  R.  E.  Corp. 
Eep.  192;  Cram  v.  Laconia,  71  N. 
H.  41,  51  Atl.  635,  57  L.E.A.  282; 
Smith  V.  St.  Paul  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  39 
Wash.  355,  81  Pac.  840,  109  Am. 
St.  Rep.  889,  70  L.E.A.  1018;  Ponis- 
chil  V.  Hoquiam  Sash  &  Door  Co.,  41 
Wash.  303,  83  Pac.  316;  Mottman 
V.  Olympia,  45  Wash.  361,  88  Pac. 
579;  Montreal  v.  Drummond,  L.  E. 
1  H.  L.  384.  See  Eodgers  v.  Parker, 
9  Gray,  445,  where  the  statute  pro- 
vided that  "the  right  of  way  of  any 
lot  owner  should  not  be  impaired" 
by  the  vacation,  and  it  was  held  not 
to  enlarge  the  right  to  compensation. 
Kinnear  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Beatty,  65  Ohio 
St.  264,  62  N.  E.  341,  87  Am.  St. 
Eep.  600,  reversing  Beatty  v.  Kin- 
near  Mfg.  Co.,  21  Ohio  C.  C.  384. 
20Dennis  v.  Mobile  etc.  Ry.  Co., 
137  Ala.  649,  35  So.  30,  97  Am.  St. 
Eep.  69;  Little  Eock  etc.  E.  E.  Co. 
V.  Newman,  73  Ark.  1,  83  S.  W.  653, 
108  Am.   St.  Rep.   653;    Symons  v. 


San  Francisco,  115  Cal.  555,  42  Pac. 
913,  47  Pac.  453;  Whitsett  v.  Union 
Depot  &  E.  R.  Co.,  10  Colo.  243,  15 
Pac.  339;  Chicago  v.  Union  Bldg. 
Ass.,  102  111.  379,  40  Am.  Eep.  598; 
East  St.  Louis  v.  O'Flynn,  119  III. 
200,  59  Am.  Eep.  795;  Pearson  v. 
Allen,  151  Mass.  79,  23  N.  E.  731, 
21  Am.  St.  Eep.  426;  Stanwood  v. 
Maiden,  157  Mass.  17,  31  N.  E.  702, 
16  L.E.A.  691;  Knapp,  Stout  &  Co. 
V.  St.  Louis,  153  Mo.  560,  55  S.  W. 
104;  Same  v.  Same,  156  Mo.  343,  56 
S.  W.  1102;  Cummings  Eealty  &Imp. 
Co.  v.  Deere  &  Co.,  208  Mo.  66,  106  S. 
W.  496,  14  L.E.A.(N.S.)  822;  Mc- 
Gees  Appeal,  114  Pa.  St.  470,  8  Atl. 
237;  Lawrence  v.  Philadelphia,  154 
Pa.  St.  20,  25  Atl.  1079;  Eockafel- 
ler  V.  Northern  Central  Ey.  Co., 
212  Pa.  St.  485,  61  Atl.  960;  Eus- 
comb  Street,  30  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  476; 
S.  C.  33  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  148. 

2iCoker  v.  Atlanta  etc.  Ey.  Co., 
123  Ga.  483,  51  S.  E.  481.  Directly 
the  contrary  is  held  in  Stanwood  v. 
Maiden,  157  Mass.  17,  31  N.  E.  702, 
16  L.E.A.  591. 

Impost,  §  363. 


§  208  KOADS  AND  STEEETS.  393 

■which  caused  them  been  done  -without  authority  of  statute."  ^* 
This  brings  us  to  the  question  of  special  damages  from  a  public 
nuisance,  for  if  a  street  is  closed  or  obstructed  without  authority 
of  law  the  act  is  a  public  nuisance.  We  have  already  endeav- 
ored to  show  that  if  property  is  so  situated  that  it  is  depreciated 
in  value  by  such  public  nuisance,  the  owner  suffers  a  special 
damage,  though  in  his  attempt  to  travel  the  street  he  suffers  only 
the  same  kind  of  inconvenience  as  the  general  public.'**  Ac- 
cordingly, if  property  is  depreciated  in  value  by  the  vacation 
and  closing  of  a  street  or  highway,  the  owner  is  entitled  to  re- 
cover therefor  under  constitutions  giving  compensation  for  prop- 
erty damaged  or  injured  for  public  use,  or  under  statutes  giving 
compensation  for  property  damaged  by  the  vacation  or  discon- 
tinuance of  streets  and  highways. 

§  208.  Pennsylvania  decisions  as  to  taking  and  damag- 
ing by  the  vacation  of  streets.  The  decisions  in  Pennsyl- 
vania are  somewhat  peculiar  and  require  special  mention.  It 
was  held  in  an  early  case,  where  a  street  was  vacated  by  an  act 
of  the  legislature,  that  there  was  no  taking  of  the  property  of 
abutting  owners  and  that  they  had  no  remedy.^'  In  1874  the 
constitution  of  the  State  was  amended  by  adding  the  following 
with  reference  to  the  eminent  domain  power:  "Municipal  and 
other  corporations  and  individuals  invested  with  the  privilege 
of  taking  private  property  for  public  use  shall  make  just  com- 
pensation for  property  taken,  injured  or  destroyed,  by  the  con- 
struction or  enlargement  of  their  works,  highways  or  improve- 

23Stanwood  v.  Maiden,  157  Mass.  to  vacate  it,  the  consequential  loss  if 

17,  31  N.  E.  702,  16  L.E.A.  591.  there  be  any,  must  be  borne  by  those 

2* Ante,  %  199.  who  suffer  it,  just  as  they  bear  what 

zsPaul  V.  Carver,  24  Pa.  St.  207,  might  result  from  a  refusal  to  make 

64  Am.  Dec.  649.     The  court  says:  it  in  the  first  place.    It  is  true  that 

"Surrendering  the  right  of  way  over  there  is  much  property  in  the  com- 

a  public  road  to  the  owners  of  the  monwealth    whose    principal    value 

soil,  is  not  taking  private  property  would  be  taken  away  by  closing  the 

for  public  use,  and  the  proprietors  of  avenues  which  lead  to  it ;  and  we  arc 

other  land  incidentally  injured  by  the  warned  that  if  we  do  not  declare  it 

discontinuance  of  the  road  are  not  unconstitutional,    an    act    may    be 

entitled  to  compensation.    A  private  passed  to  vacate  Chestnut  street.    If 

road  is  private  property,  and  an  act  the  possible  abuse  of  power  were  sufli- 

of  assembly  to  close  it  up  without  cient  to  prove  that  the  legislature 

paying  for  it,  would  be  depriving  the  cannot  have  it,  theii  it  would  also 

owner  of  Ms  property.    But  a  public  prove  that  it  does  not  exist  at  all ; 

road  belongs  to  nobody  but  the  State ;  and  this  would  bring  us  to  the  absurd 

and  when  the  government  sees  proper  conclusion  that  there  is  no  authority 


394 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


20D 


ments,  "whicli  compensation  shall  be  paid  or  secured  before 
such  taking,  injury  or  destruction."  ^®  Since  the  adoption  of 
this  amendment  it  has  been  repeatedly  held  that  the  vacation 
of  a  street  was  not  a  taking,  injury  or  destruction  of  prop- 
erty within  the  provision,  and  that  there  could  be  no  re- 
covery in  the  absence  of  a  statute  giving  compensation  in  such 
eases.^'^  "Vacating  a  street  takes  no  property  from  anyone. 
*  *  *  There  is  no  constitutional  right  to  damages  even  on 
the  ground  of  injury  under  the  present  constitution."  ^*  A 
statute  exists  applicable  to  Philadelphia,  giving  compensation 
for  the  vacation  of  streets,  and  cases  under  this  statute  have 
already  been  cited.  ^® 

§  209.  Purpose  and  motive  of  the  vacation.  In  Iowa 
the  fee  of  streets  in  cities  and  towns  is  in  the  municipality  and 
it  has  been  repeatedly  held  that  the  municipality  may  vacate  a 
street  and  devote  the  land  to  any  use  it  pleases,  whether  public 
or  private,  and  that  abutters  whose  access  is  destroyed  or  im- 
paired have  no  remedy.  It  has  been  so  held  where  a  street  was 
vacated  and  turned  over  to  a  railroad  company  for  its  depot  or 


anywhere  in  the  State  to  vacate  a 
useless  road  and  substitute  a  better 
one  in  its  place.  Every  function  of 
government  may  be  injudiciously 
exercised,  but  still  we  must  trust  it 
with  somebody.  That  of  vacating 
roads  is  as  necessary  as  any  other; 
and  while  we  cannot  promise  that 
everybody's  interests  will  be  taken 
care  of,  we  have  faith  enough  in  our 
system  to  believe  that  no  atrocious 
wrong  will  be  done."    pp.  211,  212. 

2  64nie,  §  49. 

2  7McGee's  Appeal,  114  Pa.  St.  470, 
8  Atl.  237 ;  Lawrence  v.  Philadelphia, 
154  Pa.  St.  20,  25  Atl.  1079 ;  Wetherill 
V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  195  Pa.  St.  156,  45 
Atl.  658;  Carpenter  v.  Pennsylvania 
R.  R.  Co.,  195  Pa.  St.  160,  45  Atl.  685; 
Daughters  of  Am.  Rev.  v.  Schenley, 
204  Pa.  St.  572,  54  Atl.  366 ;  Howell 
v.  Morrisville,  212  Pa.  St.  349,  61 
Atl.  932;  Rockafeller  v.  Northern 
Central  Ry.  Co.,  212  Pa.  St.  485,  61 
Atl.  960;  Nocton  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co., 
32  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  555. 

2  8 Wetherill  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  195 


Pa.  St.  156,  45  Atl.  658.  And  in  the 
late  case  of  Howell  v.  Morrisville, 
212  Pa.  St.  349,  61  Atl.  932,  the  Court 
says:  "It  must  therefore  be  ac- 
cepted as  se+tled  law,  that  the  vaca- 
tion of  a  highway  or  street  is  not  an 
injury  to  abutting  landowners  within 
the  provisions  of  the  constitution  re- 
quiring compensation,  and  in  the  ab- 
sence of  special  legislative  provision 
for  damages,  none  can  be  recovered." 
p.  352. 

See  the  following:  Foust  v.  Penn. 
R.  R.  Co.,  212  Pa.  St.  213,  61  Atl.  829 ; 
Robbins  v.  Scranton,  217  Pa.  St.  577, 
66  Atl.  977;  Walsh  v.  Scranton,  23 
Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  276 ;  Haggerty  v.  Scran- 
ton, 23  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  279 ;  Carroll  v. 
Asbury,  28  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  354;  Black 
V.  Pittsburg  etc.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  34  Pa. 
Supr.  Ct.  416. 

29Mellor  V.  Philadelphia,  160  Pa. 
St.  614,  28  Atl.  991 ;  In  re  Melon  St., 
182  Pa.  St.  397,  38  Atl.  482,  28  L.R.A. 
275,  reversing  1  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  63; 
Ruscomb  St.,  30  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  476; 
S.  C.  33  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  148. 


§  209  EOADS  AND  STKEETS.  395 

tracks.®"  So  where  a  street  was  vacated  and  given  over  to  the 
adjacent  owner  to  be  built  upon  or  otherwise  employed  for  his 
private  use.*^  In  the  cases  cited  the  vacation  was  directly  at- 
tacked on  the  ground  that  it  was  for  a  private  purpose.  In 
som«  of  the  cases  it  is  intimated  that  equity  will  interfere  to 
prevent  an  abuse  of  the  power.®  ^ 

The  general  rule  is  that  the  power  to  vacate  streets  and  high- 
ways is  a  power  to  be  exercised  from  considerations  of  public 
policy  and  for  the  purpose  of  promoting  the  public  welfare  and 
not  for  the  benefit  of  private  individuals  and  corporations.®® 
"A  city  cannot  barter  away  strfeets  and  alleys,  nor  can  it  do 
indii-ectly,  by  invoking  its  power  of  vacating  ways  what  it 
cannot  do  directly.  Streets  and  alleys  are  not  to  be  vacated 
at  the  instance  of  individuals  interested  only  in  the  acquisition 
of  the  vacated  property,  and  the  exercise  of  legislative  discre- 
tion in  such  matters  must,  at  least  upon  the  face  of  the  record, 
be  free  from  affirmative  evidence  that  such  discretion  was  in- 
voked for  individual  gain,  and  its  exercise  influenced  by  an  offer 
to  divide  the  property  acquired."  ®*  Accordingly  when  it  ap- 
pears upon  the  face  of  the  proceedings,  as  from  the  petition  or 
ordinance,  or  from  some  contract  or  arrangement  between  the 
parties,  that  the  object  of  the  vacation  is  to  promote  private  in- 
terests it  will  be  declared  void  at  the  suit  of  parties  affected.®^ 
But  the  mere  fact  that  upon  vacation  the  bed  of  the  street 
reverts  to  private  parties  and  is  put  to  private  uses,  does  not 

soBarr  v.  Oskaloosa,  45  la.  275;  Corp.  Rep.  192;  Laurel  v.  Howell,  84 

Spitzer  v.  Runyan,  113  la.  619,  85  N.  Miss.  435,  36  So.  543;  Pence  v.  Bry- 

W.  782;  Harrington  v.  la.  Cent.  Ry.  ant,  54  W.  Va.  263,  46  S.  E.  275; 

Co.,  126  la.  388,  102  N.  W.  139.  cases  cited  in  the  following  notes. 

siMarshalltown  v.  Forney,  61  la.  siHorton   v.    Williams,    99   Mich. 

378,  16  K.  W.  740;  Dempsey  v.  Bur-  423,  430,  58  N.  W.  369. 

lington,  66  la.  387,  24  N.  W.  508;  •      ssSmith  v.  McDowell,  148  111.  51, 

Williams  v.  Carey,  73  la.  194,  34  X.  35  N.  E.  141,  22  L.R.A.  393;  DeLand 

W.  813.    On  vacation  the  city  gets  an  v.  Dixon  Power  &  Lt.  Co.,  225  111.  212, 

absolute  title  to  the  property.    Lake  80  N.  E.  25;  Louisville  v.  Bannon,  99 

City  V.  Fulkerson,  122  la.  569,  98  N.  Ky.  74,  35  S.  W.  120;  Van  Witsen  v. 

W.  376.  Gutman,  79  Md.  405,  29  Atl.  608,  24 

szwilliams  v.   Carey,  73  la.   194,  L.R.A.  403;  Horton  v.  Williams,  99 

197,   34   N.   W.   813;    McLachlan   v.  Mich.  423,  58  N.  W.  369;  People  v. 

Gray,  105  la.  259,  74  N.  W.  773.  Comrs.  of  Highways,  53  Barb.  70; 

ssWeage  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  Ashland  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  105 

227  111.  421,  81  N.  E.  424,  11  L.R.A.  Wis.  398,  80  N.  W.  1101 ;  Ashland  v. 

(N.S.)  589;  Glasgow  v.  St.  Louis,  107  No.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  119  Wis.  204,  96 

Mo.  198,  17  S.  W.  743,  3  Am.  R.  R.  &  N.  W.  688. 


396 


EMIISTENT  DOMAIN. 


§    209 


show  that  the  power  of  vacation  was  exercised  for  a  private  and 
not  for  a  public  purpose.^®  Such  reversion  is,  in  most  cases,  a 
necessary  incident  of  the  vacation  and  if  that  fact  vitiated  the 
proceeding  the  power  to  vacate  would  be  nugatory.  The  motives 
of  a  common  council  or  local  legislative  body  in  vacating  a  street 
or  highway  are  not  the  subject  of  judicial  inquiry  ^''  and,  unless 
it  appears  on  the  face  of  the  proceedings  or  from  some  record  or 
writing  in  connection  with  the  matter,  that  the  purpose  was  to 
benefit  private  parties,  the  vacation^  will  be  sustained.*® 


3  6Meyer  v.  Teutopolis,  131  111.  552, 
23  N.  E.  651;  Parker  v.  Catholic 
Bishop,  146  111.  158,  34  N.  E.  473, 
affirming  S.  C.  41  111.  App.  74 ;  People 
V.  Wieboldt,  233  111.  572,  84  N.  E.  646 ; 
Kensselaer  v.  Leopold,  106  Ind.  29; 
Ponischil  v.  Hoquiam  Sash  &  D.  Co., 
41  Wash.  303,  83  Pac.  316;  Tilley  v. 
Mitchell  &  Lewis  Co.,  121  Wis.  1,  98 
N.  W.  969,  105  Am.  St.  Eep.  1007. 

3  7Meyer  v.  Teutopolis,  131  111.  552, 
556,  23  N.  E.  651 ;  Amboy  v.  111.  Cent. 
R.  R.  Co.,  236  111.  236,  86  N.  E.  238; 
Rensselaer  v.  Leopold,  106  lud.  29; 
Glasgow  V.  St.  Louis,  107  Mo.  198, 
17  S.  W.  743,  3  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp. 
Rep.  192;  Bellevue  v.  Bellevue  Imp. 
Co.,  65  Neb.  52,  90  N.  W.  1002;  En- 
dres  V.  Friday,  78  Neb.  510;  Tilley  v. 
Mitchell  &  Lewis  Co.,  121  Wis.  1,  98 
N.  W.  969,  lOS  Am.  St.  Rep.  1007; 
1  Dill.  Munic.  Corp.  §  311. 

alhid.  The  question  arose  in 
State  V.  City  of  Elizabeth,  54  N.  J.  L. 
462,  24  Atl.  495,  and  the  court  dis- 
posed of  it  as  follows:  "Nor  do  I 
find  any  substance  in  the  point  that 
the  vacation  was  made  to  subserve  a 
private  interest.  It  is  true  that  the 
proceedings  for  vacation  were  taken 
immediately  after  a  petition  for  such 
vacation  had  been  presented  by  the 
trustees  of  the  Trumbull  estate.  The 
vacated  portion  of  the  street  had 
been  laid  over  the  Trumbull  lands. 
There  appears  to  have  been  an  oppor- 
tunity to  sell  a  tract  of  said  land  to  a 
company    which    would    locate    ex- 


tensive works  upon  it,  and  so  in- 
crease the  prosperity  of  that  portion 
of  the  city.  The  required  piece  of 
land  could  not  have  been  obtained 
without  a  vacation  of  this  part  of 
York  street.  This  was  probably  the 
principal  inducement  to  the  action 
of  the  common  council.  But  the  mo- 
tives which  induce  municipal  pro- 
ceedings of  this  kind  are  always  of  a 
mixed  character.  Regard  for  private 
interests  are  necessarily  intertwined 
with  public  interests.  The  size  of 
lots  for  building  purposes  is  a  proper 
factor  to  be  taken  into  consideration 
in  the  vacation  of,  as  well  as  in  the 
laying  out  or  altering,  streets.  If  the 
motive  of  a  common  council  in  exer- 
cising the  power  conferred  upon  it 
by  the  legislature  can  ever  be  ques- 
tioned is  doubtful.  If  the  courts  can 
enter  into  the  motives  of  the  munic- 
ipal legislature  in  respect  to  acts  of 
this  kind  in  any  case,  it  must  be  one 
in  which  the  public  interests  have 
been  glaringly  sacrificed  to  subserve 
private  ends.  Nothing  of  this  sort 
appears  in  this  case.  The  vacated 
portion  of  the  street  runs  through 
salt  meadows,  and  crosses  an  un- 
bridged  creek,  and  there  is  not  a 
house  or  building  along  the  line  of  it. 
Between  the  property  of  the  prosecu- 
trix and  the  vacated  part  of  the 
street,  York  street  is  crossed  by 
Schiller  street,  which  is  open  and 
built  upon.  Under  all  the  circum- 
stances, the  action  of  the  commoD 


§    209  EOADS  AKD  STJREEXS.  397 

In  one  of  the  cases  cited  the  defendant  company  owned  the 
blocks  on  opposite  sides  of  the  street  in  question,  which  was  60 
feet  wide.  On  petition  of  the  defendant  the  city  vacated  the 
north  25  feet  and  south  15  feet  of  this  street  through  the  block 
and  also  authorized  the  defendant  to  connect  its  premises  by  a 
bridge  across  that  part  of  the  street  not  vacated.  The  defendant 
had  a  manufacturing  plant  and  proposed  to  occupy  with  its 
buildings  the  vacated  strips  and  connect  them  by  a  bridge  over 
the  street,  as  provided  in  the  ordinance.  Property  owners  in 
the  vicinity  filed  a  bill  to  enjoin  such  use  of  the  vacated  or  un- 
vacated  parts  of  the  street,  averring  among  other  things  that  the 
street  was  not  vacated  in  the  public  interest  but  solely  for  the 
benefit  of  the  defendant  company.  The  ordinance  recited  that 
the  vacation  was  made  because  the  parts  vacated  were  of  no 
public  utility  and  because  the  public  interests  required  it.  No 
fraud  or  corruption  was  charged.  The  statute  provided  for 
compensation  to  those  damaged  by  the  vacation.  On  demurrer 
to  the  bill  it  was  held  that  it  showed  no  ground  for  equitable  re- 
lief so  far  as  the  vacation  was  concerned  and  on  the  question  of 
the  vacation  being  void  because  for  a  private  purpose,  the  court 
says:  "The  sole  claim  is  that  the  council  have  vacated  a  part 
of  a  street  for  a  private  use  when  it  was  needed  by  the  public. 
This  means  that  the  motives  of  the  councilmen  were  wrong 
and  their  judgment  unsound.  We  think  the  courts  will  not 
entertain  an  inquiry  into  the  truth  of  these  charges.  *  *  * 
It  was  within  the  power  of  the  council  to  vacate  the  street,  when 
in  its  judgment  the  public  interest  required  such  action,  and 
even  though  the  council  may  have  been  wrong  in  its  judgment, 
or  may  have  mistaken  a  private  interest  for  a  public  one,  our 
conclusion  is  that  the  courts  cannot  arrest  the  operation  of  the 
ordinance  for  these  reasons,  and  hence  that  no  cause  of  action 
is  stated  in  the  first  count  of  the  complaint."  ^*  It  is  not  un- 
common for  a  party,  owning  property  on  both  sides  of  a  street 
or  alley,  to  procure  the  vacation  of  the  part  of  the  street  or 
alley,  which  separates  his  property,  so  as  to  make  the  property 
continuous  and  to  occupy  the  whole  with  a  building  or  plant. 

council  is  not  properly  the  subject  of  178;   Amboy  v.   111.    Central   R.   R. 

a  suspicion  of  being  influenced  by  any  Co.,  236  111.  236,  86  N.  E.  238. 
considerations  other  than  to  conserve  ssTilley  v.  Mitchell  &  Lewis  Co., 

the  best  interests  of  the  city."    This  121  Wis.  1,  12,  13,  98  N.  W.  969,  1.Q5 

case  was  affirmed  in  55  N.  J.  L.  337,  Am.  St.  Rep.  1007. 
26  Atl.  939.    See  also  ante,  §§  138, 


398 


EMINENT   DOMAIN. 


§  20& 


But  where  nothing  more  appears  than  that  the  vacation  has  been 
made  on  the  request  of  the  party  benefited,  it  has  been  sus- 
tained.**' 

The  abolition  of  grade  crossings/^  the  construction  or  im- 
provement of  railroad  depots  and  terminals,*^  and  the  re-ar- 


<  "Marietta  Chair  Co.  v.  Henderson, 
121  Ga.  399,  49  S.  E.  312,  104  Am.  St. 
Eep.  156;  Chicago  v.  Union  Bid. 
Ass'n,  102  111.  379,  40  Am.  Rep.  598; 
Parker  v.  Catholic  Bishop,  146  111. 
158,  34  N.  E.  473,  affirmmg  41  111. 
App.  74;  People  v.  Friend,  233  111. 
572,  84  N.  E.  646;  Marshalltown  v. 
Eaney,  61  la.  578,  16  IST.  W.  740; 
Bailey  v.  Culver,  84  Mo.  531,  affirm- 
ing 12  Mo.  App.  531;  Glasgow  v.  St. 
Louis,  107  Mo.  198,  17  S.  W.  743,  3 
Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  192 ;  Knapp, 
Stout  &  Co.  V.  St.  Louis,  156  Mo. 
343,  56  S.  W.  1102;  Kinnear  Mfg.  Co. 
V.  Beatty,  65  Ohio  St.  264,  62  jST.  E. 
341,  87  Am.  St.  Rep.  600,  reversing 
S.  C.  Beatty  v.  Kinnear  Mfg.  Co.,  21 
Ohio  C.  C.  384 ;  Ponischil  v.  Hoquiam 
S.  &  D.  Co.,  41  Wash.  303,  83  Pac. 
316;  Tilley  v.  Mitchell  &  Lewis  Co., 
121  Wis.  1,  98  N.  W.  969,  105  Am.  St. 
Rep.  1007.  In  Knapp,  Stout  &  Co. 
V.  St.  Louis,  153  Mo.  560,  55  S.  W. 
104,  it  is  held  that  an  ordinance  va- 
cating a  street  may  be  annulled  for 
fraud  and  corruption  but  that  an 
averment  that  the  ordinance  was  not 
passed  for  any  public  purpose  but 
solely  to  give  a  private  corporation 
the  use  of  the  property,  did  not  show 
fraud. 

Where  a  consideration  was  paid,  the 
vacation  was  held  void,  as  for  a  pri- 
vate purpose.  Louisville  v.  Bannon, 
99  Ky.  74,  35  S.  W.  120;  Horton  v. 
Williams,  99  Mich.  423,  58  N.  W.  309. 
So  where  the  same  purpose  was  evi- 
dent from  recitals  in  the  proceed- 
ings. Smith  v.  McDonald,  148  111. 
51,  35  N.  E.  141,  22  L.R.A.  393;  De- 
Land  V.  Dixon  P.  &  L.  Co.,  225  111. 
212,  80  N.  E.  25 ;  Van  Witsen  v.  Gut- 


man,  79  Md.  405,  29  Pac.  608,  24 
L.R.A.  403. 

iiNewton  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  72  Conn.  420,  44  Atl.  813 ;  Chi- 
cago v.  Burcky,  158  111.  103,  42  N.  E. 
178,  49  Am.  St.  Rep.  142,  29  L.R.A. 
568,  affirming  S.  C.  sub  nom.  Town 
of  Lake  v.  Burcky,  57  111.  App.  547; 
People  V.  Atchison  etc  Ry.  Co.,  217 
111.  594,  75  N.  E.  573;  Spitzer  v. 
Runyan,  113  la.  619,  85  N.  W.  782; 
Davis  V.  County  Comrs.,  153  Mass. 
218,  26  N.  E.  848,  11  L.R.A.  750; 
Nichols  V.  Richmond,  162  Mass.  170, 
38  N.  E.  501 ;  Dodge  v.  Penn.  R.  R. 
Co.,  43  N.  J.  Eq.  351 ;  S.  C.  affirmed, 
45  N.  J.  Eq.  366 ;  Dean  v.  Ann  Arbor 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  137  Mich.  459,  100  N. 
W.  773;  Buchholz  v.  New  York  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  71  App.  Div.  452,  75  N. 
Y.  S.  824;  S.  C.  affirmed,  177  N.  Y. 
550,  69  N.  E.  1121;  Matter  of  Grade 
Crossing  Comrs.,  166  N.  Y.  69,  59 
N.  E.  706;  Foust  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co., 
212  Pa.  St.  213,  61  Atl.  829;  Chicago 
V.  Baker,  98  Fed.  830,  39  C.  C.  A. 
318. 

4  2Dennis  v.  Mobile  etc.  Ry.  Co., 
137  Ala.  649,  35  So.  30,  97  Am.  St. 
Rep.  69;  Whitsett  v.  Union  Depot  & 
R.  R.  Co.,  10  Colo.  243,  15  Pac.  339 ; 
East  St.  Louis  v.  O'Flynn,  119  111.  200, 
59  Am.  Rep.  795 ;  Amboy  v.  111.  Cent. 
R.  R.  Co.,  236  111.  236,  86  N.  E.  238; 
Dantzer  v.  Indianapolis  Union  Ry. 
Co.,  141  Ind.  604,  39  N.  E.  223,  50 
Am.  St.  Rep.  343,  34  L.R.A.  769,  11 
Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  249;  Leaven- 
worth etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Curlan,  51  Kan. 
432,  33  Pac.  297;  Leavenworth  v. 
Douglass,  59  Kan.  416,  53  Pac.  123; 
Spetzer  v.  Runyan,  113  la.  619,  85  N. 
W.    782;    Buhl   V.   Fort    St.    Union 


210 


EOADS  AST)  STEEETS, 


399 


rangement  of  streets  to  secure  a  more  regular  and  harmonious 
system,  are  public  purposes  for  -which  the  power  of  vacation  may 
properly  be  exercised.'*®  So  where  the  vacation  is  for  public 
or  quasi  public  buildings  or  grounds.** 

§  210.  Exercise  and  construction  of  the  statutory  au- 
thority. Power  to  lay  off,  open,  widen,  straighten,  establish 
and  improve  streets  does  not  confer  power  to  vacate  them.*' 
So  of  a  power  "to  open,  lay  out,  widen,  straighten  or  otherwise 
change"  streets  and  alleys.*®  But  the  latter  provision  was  held 
sufficient  to  narrow  a  street  for  a  short  distance  by  vacating 
a  strip,  so  as  to  make  the  street  of  uniform  width.*  ^  And  gen- 
erally the  power  to  vacate  streets  has  been  held  to  authorize  the 
narrowing  of  a  street  by  vacating  a  part  longitudinally.*®  Un- 
der a  statute  which  provides  that  any  alley  or  highway  which 
has  become  useless  may  be  vacated,  a  part  of  a  street  which  has 
become  useless  may  be  vacated.*'  A  statute  provided  that  a 
road  which  had  been  laid  out  and  "opened  in  part,"  could  be 
vacated ;  held  that  the  statute  would  apply  if  84  feet  had  been 
opened  and  made  fit  for  travel.^"    The  statutory  authority  must 


Depot  Co.,  98  Mich.  596,  57  N.  W. 
829,  23  L.R.A.  392,  9  Am.  R.  R.  & 
Corp.  Rep.  173;  Kaje  v.  Chicago  etc. 
Ry.  Co.,  57  Minn.  422,  59  N.  W.  493; 
Vanderburgh  v.  Minneapolis,  93 
Minn.  81,  100  N.  W.  668;  Vander- 
burgh V.  Minneapolis,  98  Minn.  329, 
108  N.  W.  480,  6  L.R.A.(N.S.)  741. 
And  see  Coker  t.  Atlanta  etc.  Ry.  Co., 
123  Ga.  483,  51  S.  E.  489;  Kakeldy 
V.  Columbia  R.  R.  Co.,  37  Wash. 
675,  80  Pac.  205;  Columbus  v. 
Union  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  137  Fed.  869, 
70  C.  C.  A.  207.  In  Wisconsin  it  has 
been  held  that  a  city  had  no  power 
to  vacate  a  street  and  turn  it  over  to 
a  railroad  company  in  consideration 
of  improvements  to  be  made  on  other 
streets  by  the  company.  Ashland  v. 
C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  105  Wis.  398, 
80  N.  W.  1101 ;  Ashland  v.  No.  Pac. 
Ry.  Co.,  119  Wis.  204,  96  N.  W.  688. 
4  3Lindsay  v.  Omaha,  30  Neb.  512, 
46  N.  W.  627,  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  415; 
Matter  of  New  York,  28  App.  Div. 
143. 


4<For  a  college  or  school.  Meyer 
v.  Teutopolis,  131  111.  552,  23  N.  E. 
651;  Cherry  v.  Rock  Hill,  48  S.  C. 
553,  26  S.  E.  798.  For  a  hospital  or 
asylum.  Polack  v.  S.  F.  Orphan 
Asylum,  48  Cal.  490;  Reis  v.  New 
York,  188  N.  Y.  58,  80  N.  E.  573, 
affirming  113  App.  Div.  464,  99  N.  Y. 
S.  291.  For  a  State  Capitol.  Mott- 
man  v.  Olympia,  45  Wash.  361,  88 
Pac.  579. 

4  5Texarkana  v.  Leach,  66  Ark.  40, 
48  S.  W.  807,  74  Am.  St.  Rep.  68. 

<  6  Coker  v.  Atlanta  etc.  Ry.  Co., 
123  Ga.  483,  51  S.  E.  481. 

4  7Patton  V.  Rowe,  124  Ga.  525,  52 
S.  E.  742. 

■isBrown  v.  San  Francisco,  124  Cal. 
274,  57  Pac.  82 ;  Mt.  Carmel  v.  Shaw, 
155  111.  37,  39  N.  E.  584,  46  Am.  St. 
Rep.  311,  27  L.R.A.  580,  reversing 
S.  C.  52  111.  App.  429. 

4  9In  re  Swanson  street,  163  Pa.  St. 
323,  30  Atl.  Rep.  207. 

BOUnion  Township  Road,  10  Pa. 
Co.  Ct.  433. 


400 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


§  210 


be  substantially  complied  -with  as  to  petition,  notice  and  pro- 
cedure generally,  or  the  attempted  vacation  will  be  ineffectual.®^ 
Where  a  statute  provided  that  a  city  should  not  vacate  a  street 
"when  objected  to  by  property  owners  adjacent  thereto  or  by 
those  having  a  direct  or  substantial  interest  therein,"  it  was 
held  that  one  just  outside  of  the  city  limits,  at  whose  land  the 
street  terminated,  was  not  within  the  statute,  and  consequently 
could  not  defeat  the  vacation  by  objecting.®^  But  where  it  was 
proposed  to  narrow  a  street  by  vacating  a  strip  on  one  side,  it 


siGreist  v.  Amrhyn,  80  Ooim.  280; 
People  V.  Atchison  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  217 
111.  594,  75  N.  E.  573;  Small  v.  Bin- 
ford,  41  Ind.  App.  440;  Hayes  v. 
Tyler,  85  la.  126,  52  N.  W.  116; 
Devoe  v.  Smeltser,  86  la.  385,  53  N. 
W.  287;  Harris  v.  Board  of  Super- 
visors, 88  la.  219,  55  N.  W.  324; 
Mills  V.  Board  of  Comrs.,  50  Kan. 
635,  32  Pac.  361 ;  Martin  v.  City  of 
Louisville,  97  Ky.  30,  29  S.  W.  864; 
Big  Sandy  Ry.  Co.  v.  Boyd  County, 
125  Ky.  345;  Goss  v.  Highway  Com- 
missioner, 63  Mich.  608,  30  N.  W. 
197 ;  Price  v.  Stagray,  68  Mich.  17,  35 
N.  W.  815;  Pearsall  v.  Eaton  Co.,  71 
Mich.  438,  39  N.  W.  578 ;  Pearsall  v. 
Eaton  Co.,  74  Mich.  558,  42  N.  W.  77, 
4  L.R.A.  193;  Kimball  v.  Homan,  74 
Mich.  699,  42  N.  W.  167;  Davis  v. 
Board  of  Supervisors,  89  Mich.  295, 
50  N.  W.  862;  Curry  v.  Rosell,  99 
Mich.  524,  58  N.  W.  472;  Hatt  v. 
Napoleon,  144  Mich.  266,  107  N.  W. 
1058;  Miller  v.  Corinna,  42  Minn. 
391,  44  N.  W.  127;  Nicholson  v. 
Stoekett,  Walker,  Miss.,  67 ;  In  re  Big 
Hollow  Road,  111  Mo.  326,  19  S.  W. 
947;  Letherman  v.  Hauser,  77  Neb. 
731,  110  N.  W.  745;  DeForest  v. 
Wheeler,  7  Ohio  St.  286;  Latimer  v. 
Tillamook  County,  22  Or.  291,  29 
Pac.  734 ;  Road  in  Ross  Township,  36 
Pa.  St.  87;  Chartier's  Township 
Road,  48  Pa.  St.  314;  Vacation  of 
Henry  Street,  123  Pa.  St.  346,  16 
Atl.  785;  In  re  Vacation  of  Union 
Street,  140  Pa.  St.  625,.  21  Atl.  406; 


In  re  Vacation  of  Public  Road,  160 
Pa.  St.  104,  28  Atl.  649;  In  re  Swan- 
son  St.,  163  Pa.  St.  323,  30  Atl.  207; 
Matter  of  Vacation  of  Certain 
Streets,  17  Phil.  660;  Union  Town- 
ship Road,  10  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  433 ;  Yates 
v.  West  Grafton,  33  W.  Va.  507,  II 
S.  E.  8;  Pettibone  v.  Hamilton,  40 
Wis.  402;  James  v.  City  of  Darling- 
ton, 71  Wis.  173,  36  N.  W.  834; 
Schroeder  v.  Klipp,  120  Wis.  245,  97 
N.  W.  909;  Johnston  v.  Lonstorf,  128 
Wis.  17,  107  N.  W.  459;  Morris  v. 
Edwards,  132  Wis.  91„  112  N.  W.  248. 
As  to  who  are  parties  "inter- 
ested" in  case  of  a  vacation,  or  who 
are  entitled  to  notice  or  to  object  or 
appeal  see  Commissioners  of  High- 
ways v.  Quinn,  136  111.  604,  27  N.  E. 
186;  Brandenburg  v.  Hittel  (Ind.) 
37  N.  E.  329;  Linning  v.  Barnett,  134 
Ind.  332,  33  N.  E.  1098;  Arnold  v. 
Weiker,  55  Kan.  510,  40  Pac.  901; 
Bradbury  v.  Walton,  94  Ky.  163,  12 
S.  W.  869;  Roxedale  v.  Seip,  32  La. 
Ann.  435;  Kimball  v.  Homan,  74 
Mich.  699,  42  N.  W.  167;  Baudistel 
V.  Mich.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  113  Mich, 
687,  71  N.  W.  1114;  Schuster  v. 
Lemond,  27  Minn.  253,  6  N.  W.  802; 
State  V.  Barton,  36  Minn.  145,  30  N. 
W.  454;  State  v.  Hohman,  40  Minn. 
369,  41  N.  W.  1073;  State  v.  Sne- 
deker,  30  N.  J.  L.  80;  Gay  v.  West 
Streets,  7  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  217;  Yates  v. 
Grafton,  33  W.  Va.  507. 

B2House  V.  Greensburg,  93  Ind.  533. 


§  210  ROADS  AND  STKEETS.  401 

was  held  that  abutters  on  the  opposite  side  were  adjacent  within 
the  statute.°^  Where  a  statute  forbade  the  closing  of  public 
roads  without  the  consent  of  the  contiguous  property  owners, 
it  was  held  to  mean  those  who  abutted  on  the  part  closed.^*  Un- 
der some  statutes  a  road  may  be  discontinued  before  it  has  been 
actually  opened. ^°  But  where  county  commissioners  had  duly 
ordered  a  road  opened,  it  was  held  that  they  could  not  at  a 
subsequent  session  reconsider  their  vote,  and  so  in  effect  vacate 
the  road,  without  complying  with  the  statute  in  that  regard.^" 
An  alteration  of  a  highway  is  held  to  work  a  discontinuance  of 
such  parts  of  the  old  way  as  are  not  included  in  the  new  loca- 
tion.^'^  It  has  been  held  that  a  highway  could  not  be  discon- 
tinued during  the  pleasure  of  the  authorities,  reserving  the 
right  to  open  it  again  without  paying  any  damages,^*  also  that 
a  city  could  not  vacate  a  street  for  twenty  years,  during  which 
it  was  to  be  put  to  private  use.''*  In  an  Illinois  case  it  appeared 
that  a  certain  railroad  company  had  occupied  certain  streets 
with  its  tracks  under  due  authority  for  twenty  years  or  more. 
The  city  passed  an  ordinance  requiring  the  company  to  elevate 
its  tracks  in  order  to  abolish  grade  crossings  and  providing  that 
the  streets  so  far  as  occupied  by  the  tracks  and  embankment 
should  be  discontinued  and  vacated.  Thereupon  the  persons 
entitled  to  the  reversion  in  the  streets  filed  a  bill  to  prevent 
the  occupation  of  their  property  without  compensation.  The 
court  held,  construing  the  entire  ordinance,  that  its  effect  was 
to  give  to  the  railroad  company  the  exclusive  use  of  the  streets 
so  far  as  necessary  to  accomplish  the  elevation  and  not  to  vacate 
the  streets  so  as  to  catise  a  reversion  of  the  bed  of  the  streets."" 

63Lowe  V.  Lawrenceburg  Roller  Co.,  72  N.  H.  224,  55  Atl.  938;  Road 
Mills  Co.,  161  Ind.  495,  69  N.  B.  148.  in  Manlieim  Tp.,  12  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 
But  see  Rensselaer  v.  Leopold,  106      279. 

I°<i-  29-  5  8  Cheshire  Turnpike  v.  Stevens,  10 

5  4Roxedale  v.   Seip,   32   La.  Ann.      j^  jj   jgg 

^^-  sDGlasgow  V.  St.  Louis,  87  Mo.  678, 

5=Millett  v.  County  Comrs.,  80  Me.  g_  ^   jg  -^^  ^j^. 

427,  15  Atl.  Rep.  24;  Seuter  v.  Pugh,  ,„,,^  "           „  .            j.     i,   r.   n 

'                    i,            „,  , ,        „  eoWeage  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

9Gratt.  260.    BmJ  «ee  Webb  v.  Town  f      oi  -kt   v   aoa    ii  r  -o  ^ 

,  „     ,      TT.,,   „,  ^          A^a  227  111.  421,  81  N.  E.  424,  11  L.R.A. 

of  Rocky  Hill,  21  Conn.  468.  ,^^„^     ^    '      ^,                '            ^^  ^ 

.,TT-,,         -KT      1,    /-.       i     Kn  Tr„„        (N.S.)    589.     The   court   says   that 
5  6Mills  V.  Neosho  County,  50  Kan.       ^         '  ■' 

„„^   oo  p  „   -jfli  when  elevation  becomes  necessary  for 

67City  and  County  of  San  Fran-  the  public  safety  and  convenience  "we 

Cisco  V.  Burr,  108  Cal.  460,  41  Pae.  are  of  opinion  the  city  council  has 

482;  Commonwealth  v.  Boston  &  A.  the  right  to  authorize  the  use  by  the 

R.  R.  Co.,  150  Mass.  174,  22  N.  E.  railroad  company  of  such  portions  of 

913;  Leighton  v.  Concord  etc.  R.  R.  its  streets  as  may  be  necessary  for 
Em.  D.— 26. 


402 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


§  211 


Where  the  vacation  of  a  street  was  procured  by  a  county  for 
the  purpose  of  erecting  public  buildings  thereon,  whereby  a 
drain  belonging  to  a  city  was  destroyed,  it  was  held  the  city  was 
entitled  to  compensation.^^ 

§  211.  EfEect  of  vacation  on  private  rights  in  street. 
As  we  have  seen  streets  and  highways  cannot  be  discontinued 
except  by  the  legislature  or  by  its  authority."^  Sometimes  the 
statute  authorizing  the  vacation  or  discontinuance  of  streets  and 
highways  provides  for  compensation  for  property  damaged  there- 
by, and  sometimes  it  is  silent  on  the  subject.  In  the  former 
case,  it  would  seem  that  the  intent  of  the  statute  was  to  provide 
for  extinguishing  private  rights  and  for  closing  the  street  and 
that  damages  should  be  assessed  on  this  basis.  Most  of  the 
cases  apparently  proceed  upon  this  theory.**     The  contrary  has 


that  purpose,  and  that  such  use  of 
the  streets  is  not  a  diversion  of 
them  to  an  unauthorized  or  unlaw- 
ful purpose.  In  this  ease  the  de- 
fendant in  error  had  been  given  a 
perpetual  easement  in  the  street  for 
its  tracks  and  the  operation  of  its 
trains  thereon.  The  city  council  had 
not  the  power  to  take  this  right  from 
it,  but  it  did  have  authority  to  re- 
quire it  to  elevate  its  tracks.  In  the 
judgment  of  the  council  such  eleva- 
tion made  necessary  the  occupation 
of  portions  of  the  street  its  entire 
width  by  the  embankment  and  struc- 
ture upon  which  the  tracks  were  to 
be  laid.  Defendant  in  error's  tracks 
would,  when  elevated,  still  be  in  the 
street,  and  its  right  to  continue  to 
use  the  street  was  not  terminated  by 
the  adoption  of  the  ordinance.  It 
would  still  lawfully  occupy  and  use 
the  street  as  a  street.  The  necessity 
for  the  defendant  in  error  occupying 
the  whole  or  part  of  the  street  for 
the  purpose  of  complying  with  the 
ordinance  necessitated  the  exclusion 
of  the  general  public  therefrom. 
This  was  the  purpose  and  effect  of 
the  ordinance.  The  exclusion  of  the 
public  from  the  use  of  the  street  and 
the  continuation  of  its  use  by  the 
defendant    in    error    did    not    have 


the  effect  of  causing  a  reversion  to  the 
dedicators,  as  would  have  been  the 
case  had  the  street  been  vacated  for 
the  purpose  of  abandoning  its  use 
entirely  as  a  street.  *  *  »  By 
the  passage  of  the  track  elevation 
ordinance,  therefore,  the  city  did  not 
divest  defendant  in  error  of  the  right 
to  use  and  occupy  the  streets,  and 
there  was  no  reversion  to  the  dedi- 
cators, their  heirs,  devisees  and 
grantees."    pp.  427,  430. 

As  to  construction  of  statutes  re- 
lating to  vacation  of  street,  see  also 
Madison  Road,  37  Pa.  St.  417; 
Henry  Street  Vacation,  123  Pa.  St. 
340,  16  Atl.  785;  Union  Street  Vaca- 
tion, 140  Pa.  St.  525,  21  Atl.  408; 
Palo  Alto  Road,  160  Pa.  St.  104,  2S 
Atl.  649. 

fiiCincinnati  v.  Hamilton  County, 
1  Disney  3. 
62 Ante  §  196. 

6  3Winetka  v.  Clifford,  201  111.  475, 
66  N.  E.  384;  Butterworth  v.  Bart- 
lett,  50  Ind.  537;  Rensselaer  v.  Leo- 
pold, 106  Ind.  29;  Cook  v.  Quick,  127 
Ind.  477,  26  N.  E.  1007 ;  Webster  v. 
Lowell,  142  Mass.  324,  8  N.  E.  54; 
Stanwood  v.  Maiden,  157  Mass.  17, 
31  N.  E.  702,  16  L.R.A.  591;  Put- 
nam v.  Boston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  182 
Mass.   351,   65   N.   E.   790;   Munn   v. 


§  211 


EOADS  AXD  STKEETS. 


403 


been  held  in  ISTew  York.  The  legislature  passed  an  act  to  alter 
the  map  or  plan  of  certain  portions  of  ^ew  York  city.  The 
act  provided  that  commissioners  should  make  a  new  plan  for  such 
portions  of  the  city  and  should  lay  out  and  survey  streets,  ave- 
nues and  public  places  and  should  make  and  file  maps  of  the 
same,  that  all  streets,  avenues  and  roads  not  shown  on  the  maps 
should,  from  and  after  the  time  of  making  and  filing  the  same 
"cease  to  be  or  remain  public  streets,  avenues,  roads,  squares  or 
public  places,"  and  that  "all  damages  to  any  land  or  to  any 
building  or  other  structure  thereon"  by  reason  of  the  closing  of 
such  streets  should  be  ascertained  and  paid  in  a  manner  specified. 
It  was  held  that  the  damages  here  p::ovided  for  related  only  to 
the  extinguishment  of  the  public  easement  and  that  the  private 
rights  of  abutting  owners  were  not  affected  by  the  discontinu- 
ance of  the  street  and  the  assessment  and  payment  of  damages 
as  provided  in  the  statute."'' 


Boston,  183  Mass.  421,  67  X.  E.  312 ; 
Cram  v.  Laeonia,  71  N.  H.  41,  51  Atl. 
635,  57  L.R.A.  282;  Matter  of  New 
York,  28  App.  Div.  143;  Matter  of 
Vanderbilt  Ave.,  95  App.  Div.  533, 
88  N.  Y.  S.  769;  Matter  of  Vander- 
bilt Ave.,  119  App.  Div.  882,  104  N. 
Y.  S.  1133;  In  re  Melon  St.,  182  Pa. 
St.  397,  38  Atl.  482,  28  L.R.A.  275; 
Ruscomb  Street,  30  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  476; 
S.  C.  33  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  148. 

6  4Holloway  v.  Southmayd,  139  N. 
Y.  390,  34  N.  E.  1047 ;  S.  C.  HoUoway 
v.  Delano,  64  Hun  27;  64  Hun  34. 
What  is  said  by  the  Court  of  Ap- 
peals on  this  subject  is  as  follows: 
"The  appellant  further  contends  that 
these  special  easements,  if  acquired 
by  the  abutting  owner,  were  law-  ' 
fully  extinguished  and  condemned, 
as  the  results  of  the  proceedings 
had  under  the  act  of  1867,  providing 
for  the  closing  of  the  Bloomingdale 
road.  In  that  he  is  mistaken.  The 
purpose  and  the  effect  of  that  act, 
it  is  plain  from  its  language,  were  to 
discontinue  the  road  aa  -  a  public 
highway  and,  in  so  doing,  to  ex- 
tinguish the  public  easement.  The 
legislature  was  not  concerned  with 


private  easements  and  rights  in 
land  covered  by  the  public  highway. 
Its  action  left  these  private  ease- 
ments as  they  were;  the  public  had 
no  interest  in  their  destruction. 
The  award  of  damages  was  to  com- 
pensate property  owners  who  could 
prove  tliey  had  been  injured  by  the 
discontinuance  of  a  public  highway. 
It  is  obvious  that  the  presence  of  a 
public  highway  in  front  of  one's 
premises,  by  reason  of  the  many 
public  and  general  advantages  it 
offers,  confers  a,  distinct  value  upon 
them  and  that  its  proposed  discon- 
tinuance may  result  in  a  diminished 
value  to  the  owner.  The  situs  of  a. 
parcel  of  land  enters  into  its  value. 
If  upon  a  public  and  prominent  thor- 
oughfare, it  has  a  value  which  it 
would  not  possess  if  the  thoroughfare 
were  closed  or  changed.  How  great 
the  loss  in  value  is,  or  if  any  is  in 
fact  sustained,  may  turn  upon  a  con- 
sideration of  the  circumstances  sur- 
rounding the  proposed  alteration ; 
but  the  legislature,  in  providing  for 
awards  of  damages,  looks  at  the 
general  fact  of  a  change  being  made, 
which  may  affect   injuriously  land- 


404 


EMIU'EJS^T  DOMAIN. 


311 


When  the  statute  does  not  provide  for  compensation,  the  effect 
of  a  vacation  would  seem  to  be  to  extinguish  the  puhlic  right  or 
easement  and  to  leave  private  rights  unaffected.  The  private 
rights  of  abutters,  so  far  as  they  are  recognized  by  law  as  pri- 
vate property,  are  distinct  from  the  public  right  and  independ- 
ent of  it.®^  This  being  the  case,  it  follows  that  the  abandonment 
of  the  public  right,  under' a  statute  making  no  provision  for 
compensation,  leaves  the  private  rights  as  before.***  Speating 
of  a  dedicated  street,  the  court  in  one  case  says:  "The  public 
might  reject  or  accept,  or  having  accepted  might  renounce,  the 
public  right  involved  in  the  transaction,  but  the  action  of  the 
public  could  not  change  the  private  right  of  the  parties  created 
by  their  own  contract,"  as  between  themselves  and  those  claiming 
under  them."  "''  According  to  this  view,  the  abutting  owner 
may  have  his  suit  for  injunction  or  damages  against  anyone 
interfering  with  his  private  rights,  as  by  closing  or  obstructing 
the  vacated  street,  and  the  fact  of  vacation  would  be  no  defense.*"* 


owners  and  authorizes  compensation 
in  such  cases."    139  N.  Y.  410. 

esHaynes  v.  Thomas,  7  Ind.  38; 
Rensselaer  v.  Leopold,  106  Ind.  29; 
Long  V.' Wilson,  119  la.  267,  93  N.  W. 
282,  97  Am.  St.  Eep.  315,  60  L.R.A. 
720;  Borghart  v.  Cedar  Eapids,  120 
la.  313,  101  N.  W.  1120,  68  L.R.A. 
306;  Highbarger  v.  Milford,  71  Kan. 
331,  80  Pac.  633;  Louisville  etc.  R. 
R.  C6.  V.  Hennen,  14  Ky.  L.  R.  526; 
Holloway  v.  Southmayd,  139  N.  Y. 
390,  34  N.  E.  1047 ;  Smith  v.  Smith, 
120  App.  Div.  278,  104  N.  Y.  S.  1106; 
McQuigg  V.  CuUins,  56  Ohio  St.  649, 
47  N.  E.  595;  Madden  v.  Penn.  R.  E. 
Co.,  21  Ohio  C.  C.  73;  Stfader  v.  Cin- 
cinnati, Handy  446;  In  re  Melon 
St.,  182  Pa.  St.  397,  38  Atl.  482,  28 
L.R.A.  275;  Carroll  v.  Asbury,  28 
Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  354;  Black  v.  Pittsburg 
etc.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  34  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  416 ; 
Johnston  v.  Old  Colony  R.  R.  Co.,  18 
R.  I.  642,  29  Atl.  594,  49  Am.  St.  Rep. 
800;  State  v.  Taylor,  107  Tenn.  455, 
04  S.  W.  766;  Cook  v.  Totten,  49  W. 
Va.  177,  38  S.  E.  491,  87  Am.  St.  Rep. 
792. 

6  6lbid.     Horton   v.   Williams,   99 


Mich.  423,  58  N.  W.  369;  Heilscher  v. 
Minneapolis,  46  Minn.  529,  49  N.  W. 
287,  5  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  115; 
Johnson  v.  Cox,  42  Misc.  301,  86  N. 
Y.  S.  601;  Oliver  Schlemmer  Co.  v. 
Steinman  &  M.  Turn.  Co.,  2  Ohio  N. 
P.  (N.S.)  293;  S.  C.  affirmed,  7  Ohio 
C.  C.  (N.S.)  468;  State  v.  Taylor, 
107  Tenn.  455,  64  S.  W.  766. 

6  7Carroll  v.  Asbury,  28  Pa.  Supr. 
Ct.  354,  360. 

esHaynes  v.  Thomas,  7  Ind.  38; 
Long  V.  Wilson,  119  la.  267,  93  N.  W. 
282,  97  Am.  St.  Rep.  315,  60  L.R.A. 
720;  Chrisman  v.  Omaha  etc.  Ry.  & 
B.  Co.,  125  la.  133,  100  N.  W.  63; 
Borghart  v.  Cedar  Rapids,  126  la. 
313,  101  N.  W.  1120,  68  L.R.A.  306; 
Hay  den  v.  Stewart,  71  Kan.  11,  80 
Pac.  43;  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hannen,  14  Ky.  L.  E.  526;  Heilscher 
V.  Minneapolis,  46  Minn.  529,  49  N. 
W.  287,  5  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  115 ; 
Longworth  v.  Sedevic,  165  Mo.  221, 
65  S.  W.  260;  Holloway  v.  South- 
mayd, 139  N.  Y.  390,  34  N.  E.  1047 ; 
Holloway  v.  Delano,  64  Hun  27; 
Holloway  v.  Delano,  64  Hun  34; 
Johnson  v.  Cox,  42  Misc.  301,  86  N. 


§  212  EOADS  AND  STEEETS,  405 

Where  a  highway  was  discontinued  which  afforded  the  only 
practical  access  to  the  plaintiff's  farm,  the  court  enjoined  the 
owner  of  the  fee  from  closing  up  the  vacated  part  and  in  doing 
so  said:  "The  effect  of  the  judgment  of  the  trustees  ordering 
the  road  Yacated,  is  to  relieve  the  public  of  any  duty  to  keep  it 
in  repair,  but  it  does  not  authorize  the  trustees,  or  anybody 
else,  to  close  the  road  up,  or  obstruct  it,  and  thus  deprive  Cullins 
of  the  right  to  travel  it."  ""  But  some  cases  proceed  upon  the 
theory  that  the  effect  of  the  vacation  is  to  authorize  the  closure 
of  the  street  by  those  to  whom  the  title  reverts,  that  so  far  as 
this  would  destroy  or  interfere  with  private  rights  there  is  a 
taking  of  private  property  and  that,  if  the  statute  makes  no  pro- 
vision for  compensation,  it  is  void  and  of  no  effect.''''  Thus  the 
supreme  court  of  California  holds  that  "the  vacation  of  a  high- 
way, when  duly  and  legally  effected,  involves  something  more 
than  a  mere  constructive  closing  which  would  leave  the  street 
still  a  street,  but  no  longer  subject  to  municipal  control.  It 
involves  a  physical  closing  as  well,  which  entitles  the  owner  of 
the  soil  once  occupied  by  the  highway  to  take  full  and  complete 
possession  of  their  land."  ""^ 

§  212.  Remedies.  When  the  proceedings  to  vacate  or  dis- 
continue a  street  or  highway  are  void  for  want  of  statutory  au- 
thority, or  because  the  conditions  prescribed  have  not  been  com- 
plied with,  or  because  taken  for  a  private  purpose,  or  for  any 
other  reason,  equity  will  enjoin  the  closure  or  obstruction  of  the 
street  at  the  suit  of  one  who  would  be  specially  damaged  there- 
by.''^    If  the  act  provides  for  compensation  and  the  proceed- 

Y.  S.  601;   McQuigg  v.  Cullins,  56  'OBannon  v.  Rohmeier,  90  Ky.  48, 

Ohio  St.  649,  47  N.  E.  595;  Strader  13  S.  W.  444,  29  Am.  St.  Rep.  355; 

V.   Cincinnati,  Handy  446;   Madden  Pearaall  v.  Eaton  Co.,  71  Mich.  438, 

V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  Ohio  C.  C.  73;  39  N.  W.  578;  Pearsall  v.  Eaton  Co., 

Beatty  v.  Kinnear  Mfg.  Co.,  21  Ohio  74  Mich.  558,  42  N.  W.  77,  4  L.R.A. 

C.  C.  384;  Oliver  Schlemmer  Co.  v.  193.    See  Leighton  v.  Concord  etc.  R. 

Steinman  &  M.  Turn.  Co.,  2  Ohio  N.  R.  Co.,  72  N.  H.  224,  55  Atl.  938; 

P.  (N.S.)  293;  S.  C.  affirmed,  7  Ohio  Grinnell  v.   Portage   Co.   Comrs.,   6 

C.  C.  (N.S.)  468;  Carroll  v.  Asbury,  Ohio  C.  C.  (N.S.)  180. 

28  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  354;  Black  V.  Pitts-  7iBigelow  v.   Ballerino,   111    Cal. 

burg  etc.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  34  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  559,  565,  44  Pac.  307. 

416;  Smith  v.  Mitchell,  21  Wash.  536,  72Texarkana  v.  Leach,  66  Ark.  40, 

58  Pac.  667,  75  Am.  St.  Rep.  858;  48  S.  W.  807,  74  Am.  St.  Rep.  68; 

Johnston  v.  Lonstorf,  128  Wis.   17,  Coker  v.  Atlanta,  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  123 

107  N.  W.  459.  Ga.   483,  51   S.  E.  481 ;    DeLand  v. 

GSMcQuigg  V.  Cullins,  56  Ohio  St.  Dixon  P.  &  L.  Co.,  225  HI.  212,  80  N. 

649,  654,  47  N.  E.  595.  B.  125;  Louisville  v.  Bannon,  99  Ky. 


406 


EMINEITT  DOMAIN. 


§  212 


ings  are  regular,  injunction  will  not  lie.''*  And  where  the  con- 
stitution requires  compensation  for  property  damaged  or  injured 
for  public  use,  it  is  held  that  one  damaged  by  the  vacation  of 
a  street  has  an  adequate  remedy  at  law  in  an  action  for  damages 
and  that  an  injunction  will  not  be  granted.^*  In  some  jurisdic- 
tions the  order  or  ordinance  declaring  the  vacation  may  be  re- 
viewed by  writ  of  certiorariJ^ 


74,  35  S.  W.  120;  Van  Witsenv.  Gut- 
man,  79  Md.  405,  29  Atl.  608, 24  L.R.A. 
403;  Horton  v.  Williams,  99  Mich. 
423,  58  N.  W.  369;  Laurel  v.  Rowell, 
84  Miss,  435,  36  So.  543;  Coleman  v. 
Holden,  88  Miss.  798,  41  So.  374; 
Glasgow  V.  St.  Louis,  87  Mo.  678, 
affirming  S.  C.  15  Mo.  App.  112; 
Letherman  v.  Hauser,  77  Neb.  731, 
110  N.  W.  745;  Lawrence  v.  New 
York,  2  Barb.  577 ;  Pence  v.  Bryant, 
54  W.  Va.  263,  46  S.  E.  275;  Pet- 
tibone  v.  Hamilton,  40  Wis.  402; 
James  v.  Darlington,  71  Wis.  173. 
See  Ashland  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
105  Wis.  398,  80  N.  W.  1101 ;  Ashland 
V.  No.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  119  Wis.  204,  96 
N.  W.  088.  Where  plaintiff  has  ac- 
quiesced for  twenty  years  in  the  vaca- 
tion, he  has  waived  any  invalidity. 
Morris  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Prudden,  20 
N.  J.  Eq.  530,  reversing  S.  C.  entitled. 
Attorney  General  v.  Morris  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  386 ;  Yates  v.  West 
Grafton,  33  W.  Va.  507. 

'sparker  v.  Catholic  Bishop,  146 
111.  158,  34  N.  E.  473,  affirming  S.  C. 
41  111.  App.  74;  Lindsay  v.  Omaha,  30 
Neb.  512,  46  N.  W.  627,  27  Am.  St. 
Rep.  415;  Morris  v.  Philadelphia,  199 
Pa.  St.  357,  49  Atl.  70;  Tilley  v. 
Mitchell  &  Lewis  Co.,  121  Wis.  1,  98 
N.  W.  969,  105  Am.  St.  Rep.  1007. 


7  4Dennis  v.  Mobile  etc.  Ry.  Co., 
137  Ala.  649,  35  So.  30,  97  Am.  St. 
Rep.  69;  Ridge  way  v.  Osceola,  (la.) 
117  N.  W.  974;  Vanderburg  v.  Minne- 
apolis, 98  Minn.  329,  108  N.  W.  480, 
6  L.R.A.{N.S.)  741;  Vanderburgh  v. 
Minneapolis,  93  Minn.  81,  100  N.  W. 
668.  See  Marietta  Chair  Co.  v.  Hen- 
derson, 121  Ga.  399,  49  S.  E.  312,  104 
Am.  St.  Rep.  156;  Kakeldy  v.  Colum- 
bia etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  37  Wash.  675,  80 
Pac.  205.  Contra:  Bigelow  v.  Bal- 
lerino.  111  Cal.  559,  44  Pac.  307. 

7  6Brown  v.  San  Francisco,  124  Cal. 
274,  57  Pac.  82;  McLachlan  v.  Gray, 
105  la.  259,  74  N.  W.  773;  People  v. 
Ingham  Co.,  20  Mich.  95;  Goss  v. 
Highway  Commissioner,  63  Mich.  608, 
30  N.  W.  197 ;  Kimball  v.  Homan,  74 
Mich.  699,  42  N.  W.  167 ;  Baudistel  v. 
Jackson,  110  Mich.  357,  68  N.  W.  292; 
Spitzer  v.  Runyan,  113  la.  619,  85  N. 
W.  782;  Kean  v.  Elizabeth,  54  N.  J. 
L.  462,  24  Atl.  495 ;  S.  C.  affirmed,  55 
N.  J.  L.  337,  26  Atl.  939.  For  other 
remedies  see  Atwood  v.  Partree,  56 
Conn.  80 ;  People  v.  Atchison  etc.  Ry. 
Co.,  217  111.  594,  75  N.  E.  573;  Smith 
V.  McDowell,  148  111.  51,  35  N.  E.  141, 
22  L.R.A.  393;  People  v.  Wieboldt, 
233  111.  572,  84  N.  E.  646;  Rodgers  v. 
Parker,  9  Gray  445. 


CHAPTEE  VI. 


OTHER  CASES  OF  TAKING. 


§  213  (135).  Impairing  franchises.  A  franchise  may 
be  defined  as  a  privilege  or  authority  vested  in  certain  persons 
by  grant  of  the  sovereign,  to  exercise  powers  or  to  do  and  per- 
form acts  -which  without  such  grant  they  could  not  do  or  per- 
form.* The  right  to  construct,  maintain  and  operate  a  toll- 
bridge,  ferry,  turnpike,  railroad,  canal  and  the  like  is  a  fran- 
chise, which  must  emanate  directly  or  indirectly  from  the  sov- 
ereign power.  ^  The  property  in  connection  with  which  the  fran- 
chise is  made  available,  and  the  franchise  itself,  are  of  course, 
subject  to  the  power  of  eminent  domain  like  all  other  property.* 
When  a  part  of  the  property  or  the  whole  property  and  franchise 
are  taken  for  public  use  there  is  no  doubt  as  to  the  nature  of 


iTuckahoe  Canal  Co.  v.  Tuekahoe 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  U  Leigh  (Va.)  42,  36 
Am.  Dec.  374;  Wilmington  Water 
Power  Co.  v.  Evans,  166  111.  548,  40 
N.  E.  1083. 

2Dyer  v.  Tuskaloosa  Bridge  Co.,  2 
Porter  (Ala.)  296,  27  Am.  Dec.  655; 
Enfield  Toll  Bridge  Co.  v.  Hartford  & 
New  Haven  R.  R.  Co.,  17  Conn.  63,  42 
Am.  Dec.  716;  Binghamton  Bridge,  3 
Wall.  51,  81 ;  Chicago  City  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  People,  73  111.  541 ;  Lytle  v.  Breck- 
enridge,  3  J.  J.  Marsh.  663;  McRob- 
erts  V.  Washburue,  10  Minn.  23 ;  New 
York  V.  Starin,  106  N.  Y.  1. 

3La  Fayette  Plank  Road  Co.  v. 
New  Albany  &  Salem  R.  R.  Co.,  13 
Ind.  90;  Enfield  Toll  Bridge  Co.  v. 
Hartford  &  New  Haven  R.  R.  Co.,  17 
Conn.  40,  454,  42  Am.  Dec.  716 ;  State 
v.  Noyes,  47  Me.  189;  White  River 
Turnpike  Co.  v.  Vermont  Central  R. 
R.  Co.,  21  Vt.  590 ;  Brainard  v.  Miss- 
isiquoi  R.  R.  Co.,  48  Vt.  107;  West 

407 


River  Bridge  Co.  v.  Dix,  6  How.  507, 
543;  Powell  v.  Sammon,  31  Ala.  552; 
Ft.  Wayne  L.  &  I.  Co.  v.  Maumee 
Avenue  Gravel  R.  R.  Co.,  132  Ind.  80, 
30  N.  E.  880,  15  L.R.A.  651 ;  McRob- 
crts  V.  Washburne,  10  Minn.  23 ;  New 
York  V.  Starin,  108  N.  Y.  1;  In  re 
City  of  Brooklyn,  143  N.  Y.  596,  38 
N.  E.  983,  26  L.R.A.  270.  The  legis- 
lature may  repeal  the  charter  of  a 
corporation,  where  the  right  to  do  so 
is  reserved,  and  may  authorize  a  new 
company  to  take  any  of  the  property 
of  the  old  upon  making  compensa- 
tion. Greenwood  v.  Freight  Co.,  105 
U.  S.  13.  The  expiration  of  a  fran- 
chise to  construct  and  operate  a  rail- 
road in  a  street,  gives  the  munici- 
pality no  right  to  appropriate  or 
grant  the  track  and  its  equipment 
without  compensation.  Cleveland 
Elec.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cleveland  etc.  Ry. 
Co.,  204  U.  S.  116,  27  S.  C.  202. 


408 


EM.INE^'T  DOMAIN. 


214 


the  act  or  the  right  to  compensation.*  But  toll-bridges,  ferries, 
turnpikes,  railroads  and  the  like  are  often  very  seriously  in- 
jured by  the  construction  of  competing  lines  which  draw  away 
patronage  and  impair  the  value  of  the  franchise.  The  question 
arises  under  what  circumstances,  if  at  all,  the  owners  of  the 
franchise  so  impaired  may  claim  compensation,  as  a  matter  of 
constitutional  right. 

§  214  (136).  When  the  franchise  is  not  exclusive. 
The  grant  of  a  franchise  may  be  exclusive,  or  the  grant  may  be 
silent  in  that  respect.  A  toll-bridge  or  ferry  is  often  granted 
with  a  provision  that  no  other  bridge  or  ferry  shall  be  erected 
within  a  certain  distance  above  or  below  the  one  granted,  and 
this  exclusiveness  may  be  limited  or  unlimited  in  its  duration. 
So  a  railroad,  turnpike,  canal  or  other  means  of  travel  or  com- 
munication may  be  granted  between  two  points  with  a  proviso 
excluding  any  similar  grant.  As  all  grants  by  the  sovereign  are 
construed  in  favor  of  the  sovereign,  the  grant  of  a  franchise  will 
not  be  deemed  exclusive  unless  so  expressed.^    Where  the  grant 


^Matter  of  Flatbush  Avenue,  1 
Barb.  286;  Seneca  Road  Co.  v.  Au- 
burn &  Rochester  R.  R.  Co.,  5  Hill 
170;  Boston  Water  Power  Co.  v. 
Boston  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  Pick.  360; 
Matter  of  Hamilton  Avenue,  14  Barb. 
405;  Chicago  General  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Chicago  City  R.  R.  Co.,  62  111.  App. 
502.    See  post,  §  214,  note  8. 

^Montgomery  Lt.  &  W.  P.  Co.  v. 
Citizens'  Lt.  H.  &  P.  Co.,  142  Ala. 
462,  38  So.  1026;  Phoenix  Water  Co. 
V.  Phoenix,  9  Ariz.  430,  84  Pac.  1095 ; 
Green  v.  Ivey,  45  Fla.  338,  33  So.  711 ; 
Town  of  Golconda  v.  Field,  108  III. 
419;  Crowder  v.  Town  of  Sullivan, 
128  Ind.  486,  28  N.  E.  94,  13  L.R.A. 
647;  City  of  Rushville  v.  Rush- 
ville  Nat.  Gas  Co.,  132  Ind. 
575,  28  N.  E.  853,  15  L.R.A. 
321;  People's  Elec.  L.  &  P. 
Co.  V.  Capital  Gas  &  Elec.  Lt.  Co., 
116  Ky.  76,  75  S.  W.  280;  North 
Baltimore  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Balti- 
more, 75  Md.  247,  23  Atl.  470 ;  Revere 
Water  Co.  v.  Winthrop,  192  Mass. 
455,  78  N.  E.  497;  Lake  v.  Va.  & 
Truckee  R.  R.  Co.,  7  Nev.  294;  Power 


V.  Village  of  Athens,  99  N.  Y.  592; 
S.  C.  26  Hun  282;  Syracuse  Water 
Co.  V.  City  of  Syracuse,  116  N.  Y. 
167,  22  N.  E.  381;  In  re  City  of 
Brooklyn,  143  N.  Y.  596,  38  N.  E.  98?, 
affirming  S.  C.  73  Hun  499,  26  N.  Y. 
Supp.  198;  Skancateles  W.  W.  Co.  v. 
Skaneateles,  161  N.  Y.  154,  55  N.  E. 
S62,  46  L.R.A.  687;  Columbus  v. 
Columbus  Gas.  Co.,  76  Ohio  St.  309, 
81  N.  E.  440 ;  Johnson  v.  Crow,  87  Pa. 
St.  184;  Titusville  Elec.  Lt.  &  P.  Co. 
V.  Titusville,  196  Pa.  St.  3,  46  Atl. 
195;  Boyertown  Water  Co.  v.  Boyer- 
town,  200  Pa.  St.  394,  50  Atl.  189; 
Hastings  Water  Co.  v.  Hastings,  216 
Pa.  St.  178,  65^  Atl.  403;  Newport 
News  etc.  Ry.  &  Elec.  Co.  v.  Hampton 
Roads  Ry.  &  Elec.  Co.,  102  Va.  795, 
47  S.  E.  839 ;  North  Springwater  Co. 
v.  Tacoma,  21  Wash.  517,  58  Pac.  773, 
47  L.R.A.  214;  Wood  v.  Seattle,  23 
Wash.  1,  62  Pac.  135,  52  L.R.A.  369; 
State  V.  Taylor,  36  Wash.  607,  79  Pac. 
286;  Clarksburg  Elec.  Lt.  Co.  v. 
Clarksburg,  47  W.  Va.  739,  35  S.  E. 
994,  50  L.R.A.  142;  Sistersville  Ferry 
Co.  V.  Russell,  52  W.  Va.  356,  43  S.  E. 


§  214 


OTHEE  CASES  OE  TAKING. 


409 


is  not  by  its  terms  exclusive,  the  legislature  or  municipality  is  not 
precluded  from  granting  a  similar  franchise  or  erecting  a  rival 
way  or  structure,  the  result  of  which  may  be  to  greatly  impair 
or  even  totally  destroy  the  value  of  the  former  grant,  and  such 
damage  is  not  a  taking  of  the  former  franchise  which  entitles  its 
owner  to  compensation.  This  principle  was  settled  in  the  lead- 
ing case  of  Charles  River  Bridge  v.  Warren  Bridge,®  and  has 
been  confirmed  by  numerous  decisions.'^     Of  course,  if  any  prop- 


107,  59  L.R.A.  513 ;  Janesville  Bridge 
Co.  V.  Stoughton,  1  Pinney,  667; 
Mills  V.  St.  Clair  County,  8  How.  569; 
Thompson-Houston  Electric  Co.  v. 
City  of  Newton,  42  Fed.  723 ;  Helena 
V.  Helena  W.  W.  Co.,  122  Fed.  1,  58 
C.  C.  A.  381;  Tillamook  Water 
Co.  V.  Tillamook  City,  150  Fed. 
117,  80  C.  C.  A.  71;  Franklin 
Trust  Co.  V.  Peninsular  Pure  Water 
Co.,  161  Fed.  855,  89  C.  C.  A.  49. 

67  Pick.  233,  affirmed  in  11  Pet. 
420. 

'Dyer  v.  Tuskaloosa  Bridge  Co.,  2 
Porter  (Ala.)  296;  Phoenix  Water 
Co.  V.  Phoenix,  9  Ariz.  430,  84  Pac. 
1095;  Bartram  v.  Central  Turnpike 
Co.,  25  Cal.  283;  Salem  v.  Hamburg 
Turnpike  Co.  v.  Town  ojE  Lyme,  18 
Conn.  451 ;  Green  v.  Ivey,  45  Fla. 
335,  33  So.  711;  General  Elec.  R.  K. 
Co.  V.  Chicago  City  R.  R.  Co.,  66  111. 
App.  362;  East  St.  Louis  Connecting 
Ry.  Co.  V.  East  St.  Louis  Union  Ry. 
Co.,  108  HI.  265;  Bush  v.  Peru 
Bridge  Co.,  3  Ind.  21;  LaFayette 
Plank  Road  Co.  v.  New  Albany  & 
Salem  R.  R.  Co.,  13  Ind.  90;  Piatt  v. 
Covington  &  Cincinnati  Bridge  Co.,  8 
Bush.  31 ;  Phelps  v.  Parish  of  More- 
house, 12  La.  An.  649;  Day  v.  Stet- 
son, 8  Me.  365;  State  v.  Noyes,  47 
Me.  189;  Washington  &  Bait.  Turn- 
pike Road  V.  Bait.  &  Ohio  R.  R.  Co., 
10  G.  &  J.  392;  Bait.  &  Havre  de 
Grace  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Union  R.  R. 
Co.,  35  Md.  224 ;  Revere  Water  Co.  v. 
Winthrop,  192  Mass.  455,  78  N.  -E. 
497 ;  Long  v.  City  of  Duluth,  49  Minn. 
280,  51  N.  W.  913,  32  Am.  St.  Rep. 


547 ;  Fort  Plain  Bridge  Co.  v.  Smith, 
30  N.  Y.  44;  Syracuse  Water  Co.  v. 
City  of  Syracuse,  116  N.  Y.  167,  22 
N.  E.  381 ;  Skaneateles  W.  W.  Co.  v. 
Skaneateles,  161  N.  Y.  154,  55  N.  E. 
562,  46  L.R.A.  687;  Oswego  Falls 
Bridge  Co.  v.  Fish,  1  Barb.  Ch.  547 ; 
Empire  City  Subway  Co.  v.  Broad- 
way etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  87  Hun  279,  33  N. 
Y.  Supp.  1055;  State  ex  rel.  v.  City 
of  Hamilton,  47  Ohio  St.  52,  23  N.  E. 
Rep.  935,  2  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
60;  Bridgewater  Ferry  Co.  v.  Sharon 
Bridge  Co.,  145  Pa.  St.  404,  22  Atl. 
1039;  Boyertowu  Water  Co.  v.  Boyer- 
town,  200  Pa.  St.  394,  50  Atl.  189; 
Hastings  Water  Co.  v.  Hastings,  216 
Pa.  St.  178,  65  Atl.  403;  Hydes  Ferry 
Turnpike  Co.  v.  Davidson  County,  91 
Tenn.  291,  18  S.  W.  Rep.  626;  City  of 
Houston  V.  Houston  City  R.  R.  Co., 
83  Tex.  548,  19  S.  W.  127,  6  Am.  R. 
R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  106;  Sommerville  v. 
Wimbush,  7  Gratt.  205;  Newport 
News  etc.  Ry.  &  Elec.  Co.  v.  Hamp- 
ton Roads  Ry.  &  Elec.  Co.,  102  Va. 
795,  47  S.  E.  839;  North  Springs 
Water  Co.  v.  Tacoma,  21  Wash.  517, 
58  Pac.  773,  47  L.R.A.  214;  Wood  v. 
Seattle,  23  Wash.  1,  62  Pac.  135,  52 
L.R.A.  369;  State  v.  Taylor,  36 
Wash.  607,  79  Pac.  286;  Clarksburg 
Elec.  Lt.  Co.  V.  Clarksburg,  47  W. 
Va.  739,  35  S.  E.  994,  50  L.R.A.  142; 
Janesville  Bridge  Co.  v.  Stoughton, 
1  Pinney  667 ;  Hamilton  G.  &  C.  Co. 
V.  City  of  Hamilton,  146  Ui  S.  258, 
13  S.  C.  Rep.  90,  7  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp. 
Rep.  76;  Skaneateles  W.  W.  Co.  v. 
Skaneateles,  184  U.  S.  354,  22  S.  C. 


410 


EMISTEJS^T  DOMAIIf. 


§  215 


erty  is  taken,  compensation  must  be  made.*  The  grant  of  a 
franchise  and  its  acceptance  by  acting  upon  it  or  otherwise, 
creates  a  contract  and  the  franchise  cannot  be  recalled  or  re- 
voked.® 

§  215  (137).  When  the  franchise  is  exclusive.  There 
is  no  doubt  as  to  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  grant,  or  to 
authorize  the  granting,  of  exclusive  privileges  and  franchises, 
when  the  same  is  not  forbidden  by  the  constitution.'"  But 
municipal  corporations  cannot  grant  exclusive  franchises  unless 


400;  Helena  W.  W.  Co.  v.  Helena, 
195  U.  S.  383,  25  S.  C.  40;  Knoxville 
Water  Co.  v.  Knoxville,  200  U.  S.  22, 
26  S.  C.  224;  Thompaon-Houston  El. 
Co.  V.  City  of  Newton,  42  Fed.  723; 
Kansas  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Payne,  49 
Fed.  114,  1  C.  C.  A.  183;  Helena  v. 
Helena  W.  W.  Co.,  122  Fed.  1,  58  C. 
C.  A.  381 ;  Meridian  v.  Farmer's  L. 
&  T.  Co.,  143  Fed.  67,  74  C.  C.  A. 
221;  Tillamook  Water  Co.  v.  Tilla- 
mook City,  150  Fed.  117,  80  C.  C.  A. 
71.  In  Fort  Plain  Bridge  Co.  v. 
Smith,  30  N.  Y.  44,  the  plaintiff  had 
a  toll  bridge  across  the  Mohawk 
River,  and  defendant  erected  a  free 
bridge  within  forty-nine  feet  of  it, 
the  effect  of  which  was  totally  to  de- 
stroy the  value  of  the  plaintiff's  fran- 
chise. It  was  held  that  the  plaintiff 
was  without  remedy. 

It  makes  no  difference  that  the 
State  itself  is  largely  interested  in 
the  management  and  profits  of  the 
new  enterprise.  Illinois  &  Mich. 
Canal  Co.  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
14  111.  314;  Matter  of  Hamilton,  14 
Barb.  405;  Brooklyn  City  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Coney  Island  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  35 
Barb.  364;  New  York  &  Harlem  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Fortj'-second  Street  R.  R. 
Co.,  50  Barb.  285;  affirmed  same,  p. 
309;  S.  C.  26  How.  Pr.  68;  White 
River  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Vermont  Cen- 
tral R.  R.  Co.,  21  Vt.  590;  Tuckahoe 
Canal  Co.  v.  Tuckahoe  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  11  Leigh  42;  Turnpike  Co.  v. 
State,  3  Wall.  210. 

Contra:    Hall  v.  Ragsdale,  4  Stew 


&  Porter,  252;  Newburg  Turnpike 
Co.  V.  Miller,  5  Johns.  Ch.  101; 
Franklin  &  Columbia  Turnpike  Co.  v. 
County  Court,  8  Humph.  342.  And 
see  Hudson  etc.  Del.  Canal  Co.  v.  N. 
Y.  &  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  9  Paige  323 ;  Ben- 
nett Water  Co.  v.  Miljvale,  200  Pa. 
St.  613,  50  Atl.  155. 

sLa  Fayette  Plank  R.  Co.  v.  New 
Albany  &  Salem  R.  R.  Co.,  13  Ind. 
90;  Baltimore  etc.  Co.  v.  Union  R.  R. 
Co.,  35  Md.  224;  Matter  of  Flatbush 
Avenue,  1  Barb.  286;  Seneca  Road 
Co.  V.  Auburn  &  Rochester  R.  R.  Co., 

5  Hill  170;  Pittsburg  &  Lake  Erie 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Jones,  111  Pa.  St.  204; 
Moses  v.  Sanford,  11  Lea  731. 

9  People  V.  Central  Union  Tel.  Co., 
192  111.  307,  61  N.  E.  428,  85  Am.  St. 
Rep.  338;  Chicago  Telephone  Co.  v. 
N.  W.  Telephone  Co.,  199  111.  324,  65 
N.  E.  329;  Kalamazoo  v.  Kalamazoo 
H.  L.  &  P.  Co.,  124  Mich.  74,  82  N. 
W.  811;  Columbus  v.  Columbus  Gas 
Co.,  76  Ohio  St.  309,  81  N.  E.  440; 
ante,  §  195;  post,  §  215,  note,  18. 

lOLivingston  v.  Van  Ingen,  9 
Johns.  507,  573;  Muncy  Elec.  L.  H. 

6  P.  Co.  v.  People's  Elec.  L.  H.  &  P. 
Co.,  218  Pa.  St.  636,  67  Atl.  956; 
Slaughter  House  Cases,  16  Wall.  66 ; 
New  Orleans  Gas  Co.  v.  Louisiana 
Light  Co.,  115  U.  S.  650;  New  Or- 
leans Water  Works  Co.  v.  Rivers,  115 
U.  S.  674 ;  Louisville  Gas  Co.  v.  Citi- 
zens' Gas  Co.,  115  U.  S.  683;  St.  Tam- 
many Water  Works  v.  New  Orleans 
Water  Works,  120  U.  S.  04;  Note  to 
Ford     V.     Chicago     Milk     Shippers' 


§  215 


OTTIEE  CASES  OF  TAKIXO. 


411 


expressly  authorized  so  to  do.^^  Grants  will  be  construed  in 
favor  of  the  public  and  against  the  exclusive  right. -^^  A  statute 
forbidding  a  county  court  from  granting  the  right  to  operate  a 
ferry  within  half  a  mile  of  an  existing  ferry,  does  not  prevent 
the  legislature  from  authorizing  a  ferry  within  the  prohibited 
limits.'^ 

When  the  grant  of  a  franchise  is  exclusive,  this  is  but  a  cir- 
cumstance which  increases  its  value  without  changing  its  es- 
sential character.  It-  is  still  property,  and  subject  to  the  power 
of  eminent  domain.^*  The  power  to  take  a  franchise  for  pub- 
lic use  will  be  discussed  in  a  subsequent  chapter.-'^  The  question 
now  is,  what  impairment  of  its  value  or  interference  with  its 
exercise  or  enjoyment  will  amount  to  a  taking.     In  so  far  as  it 


Assn.,  11  Am.  R.  E.  &  Corp.  Rep.  433, 
448. 

Where  the  constitution  prohibits 
the  granting  of  exclusive  rights, 
privileges  and  immunities  an  ex- 
clusive ferry  privilege  cannot  be 
granted.  Carroll  v.  Campbell,  110 
Mo.  557,  19  S.  W.  809.  The  granting 
of  an  exclusive  ferry  franchise  is  not 
a  taking  of  the  property  of  those  on 
the  banks  of  the  stream  above  or  be- 
low. Murray  v.  Mefee,  20  Ark.  561. 
In  State  v.  Tower,  84  Me.  444,  24  Atl. 
898,  it  was  held  that  the  State  could 
grant  an  exclusive  privilege  of  fish- 
ing within  the  waters  of  the  State 
whether  tidal  or  otherwise. 

iiMontgomery  Gas  Light  Co.  v. 
City  Council,  87  Ala.  245,  6  So.  113; 
Citizens'  Gas  etc.  Co.  v.  Elwood,  114 
Ind.  332;  Crowder  v.  Town  of  Sulli- 
van, 128  Ind.  486,  28  N.  E.  94;  City 
of  Newport  v.  Newport  Light  Co.,  84 
Ky.  166;  Long  v.  City  of  Duluth,  49 
Minn.  280,  51  N.  W.  913,  32  Am.  St. 
Rep.  547;  St.  Louis  Gas  Light 
Co.  v.  St.  Louis  Gas,  Fuel  &  Power 
Co.,  16  Mo.  App.  52 ;  State  v.  Cincin- 
nati Gas  Co.,  18  Ohio  St.  202;  Okla- 
homa Ter.  V.  Oklahoma  Gas  &  Elec. 
Co.,  13  Okl.  454,  74  Pac.  98;  Mead- 
ville  Nat.  Gas  Co.  v.  Meadville  Fuel 
Gas  Co.,  1  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  448;  Jackson 


County  H.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Inter-State 
Rapid  Transit  Ry.  Co.,  24  Fed.  Rep. 
306;  Grand  Rapids  E.  L.  &  P.  Co.  v. 
Grand  Rapids  E.  L.  &  G.  Co.,  33  Fed. 
Rep.  659;  Hutchinson  W.  L.  &  P.  Co. 
v.  Hutchison,  144  Fed.  256;  11  Am. 
R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.,  p.  463,  and  cases 
cited. 

i2Knovxille  Water  Co.  v.  Knox- 
ville,  200  U.  S.  22,  26  S.  C.  224. 

13 Williams  v.  Wingo,  177  U.  S. 
001,  20  S.  C.  793;  Fanning  v.  Gre- 
goire,  16  How.  524.  The  existence  of 
two  ferries  within  a  mile  may  be  good 
ground  for  refusing  a  license  to  a 
third  between  the  two.  Sistersville 
Ferry  Co.  v.  Russell,  52  W.  Va.  356, 
43  S.  E.  107,  59  L.R.A.  513. 

i^iPost,  §§  438,  439;  Mason  v.  Har- 
per's Ferry  Bridge  Co.,  17  W.  Va. 
396 ;  Salem  &  Hamburg  Turnpike  Co. 
V.  Lyme,  18  Conn.  451 ;  Piscataqua 
Bridge  Co.  v.  N.  H.  Bridge  Co.,  7  N. 
H.  35;  La  Fayette  Plank  Road  Co. 
V.  New  Albany  &  Salem  R.  R.  Co.,  13 
Ind.  90;  Boston  &  Lowell  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Salem  &  Lowell  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Gray 
1;  Boston  Water  Power  Co.  v.  Bos- 
ton &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  Pick.  360; 
Philadelphia  &  Gray's  Ferry  Pas- 
senger Ry.  Co.'s  Appeal,  102  Pa.  St. 
123. 

lePos*,  §§  438,  439. 


412 


EMINENT  DOMAI^r. 


§    215 


is  exclusive,  it  will  be  protected  by  the  law.  The  exclusive 
right  is  property,  -which  cannot  be  interfered  veith,  except  for 
public  use  and  upon  Just  compensation  made.^®  The  exercise 
of  a  rival  franchise  within  the  express  terms  of  the  grant  is 
a  taking,  and  may  be  enjoined  unless  compensation  is  provided.*^ 
An  act  granting  a  franchise  is  a  contract  between  the  grantee 
and  the  State,  and  any  subsequent  act  impairing  its  obliga- 
tion is  void.-'*  If  the  original  grant  is  not  exclusive,  but  is 
made  exclusive  by  a  subsequent,  act  without  any  consideration, 
such  subsequent  act  is  not  binding  upon  the  State  and  m,ay  be 
disregarded.^''  It  is  otherwise  if  there  is  a  consideration  for 
such  subsequent  act.^°  An  exclusive  frajichise  or  privilege  in 
a  matter  of  public  concern  can  be  created  only  by  the  sovereign 
power.  It  cannot  be  secured  by  contract  with  individuals  or 
corporations.  Thus  the  grant  by  a  railroad  company  of  the  ex- 
clusive right  of  maintaining  a  telegraph  line  along  its  right 
of  way,^^  or  the  grant  by  an  individual  of  the  exclusive  right 


ispiscataqua  Bridge  Co.  v.  N.  H. 
Bridge  Co.,  7  N.  H.  35. 

iTGa.  Northern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Tifton 
etc.  Ry.  Co.,  109  Ga.  762,  35  S.  E. 
104;  People's  Elec.  Lt.  &  P.  Co.  v. 
Capital  Gas  &  Elec.  Lt.  Co.,  116  Ky. 
76,  75  S.  W.  280;  Hatten  v.  Furman, 
123  Ky.  844;  Peru  v.  Barrett,  100 
Me.  213,  60  Atl.  968,  109  Am.  St.  Rep. 
494,  70  L.R.A.  567 ;  Boston  &  Lowell 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Salem  &  Lowell  R.  R. 
Co.,  2  Gray  1 ;  St.  Louis  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
N.  W.  St.  Louis  Ry.  Co.,  69  Mo.  65 ; 
Piscataqua  Bridge  Co.  v.  N.  H. 
Bridge  Co.,  7  N.  H.  35 ;  Power  v.  Vil- 
lage of  Athens,  99  N.  Y.  592;  S.  C.  26 
Hun  282;  Muney  Elec.  Lt.  H.  &  P. 
Co.  V.  People's  Elec.  Lt.  H.  &  P.  Co., 
218  Pa.  St.  636,  67  Atl.  956 ;  Turnpike 
Co.  V.  Davidson  Co.,  106  Tenn.  258, 
61  S.  W.  68;  Binghamton  Bridge,  3 
Wall.  51;  Vicksburg  v.  Vicksburg 
W.  W.  Co.,  202  U.  S.  453,  26  S.  C. 
660,  and  cases  cited  in  following  sec- 
tion. 

isDartmouth  College  v.  Wood- 
ward, 4  Wheat.  625;  Binghamton 
Bridge,  3  Wall.  51;  Powell  v.  Sam- 
mon,  31  Ala.  552;  Chicago  Municipal 


Gas  L.  Co.  V.  Town  of  Lake,  130  111. 
42,  22  N.  E.  616. 

19  Johnson  v.  Crow,  87  Pa.  St.  184; 
Wheeling  Bridge  Co.  v.  Wheeling  & 

B.  Bridge  Co.,  34  W.  Va.  155,  11  S. 
E.  1009,  affirmed,  138  U.  S.  287,  11  S. 

C.  301. 

2  0East  Hartford  v.  Hartford 
Bridge  Co.,  17  Conn.  79,  S.  C.  16 
Conn.  149,  10  How.  511. 

21  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Am. 
Union  Tel.  Co.,  65  Ga.  160,  38  Am. 
Rep.  781 ;  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Tel.  Co. 
V.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  24  Fed. 
319;  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Bur- 
lington ■  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  McCrary 
130,  11  Fed.  1;  Western  Union  Tel. 
Co.  V.  Am.  Tel.  Co.,  9  Biss.  72;  West- 
ern Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  Tel.  Co., 
19  Fed.  660 ;  Western  Union  Tel.  Co. 
V.  B.  &  0.  Tel.  Co.,  23  Fed.  12;  Pacific 
Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.  v.  Western 
Union  Tel.  Co.,50  Fed. 493 ;  Mercantile 
Trust  Co.  V.  Atlantic  &  P.  R.  R.  Co., 
63  Fed.  910.  Coniro;  Western  Union 
Tel.  Co.  V.  A.  &  P.  Tel.  Co.,  7  Biss. 
367;  Canadian  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  17  Can.  Sup. 
Ct.  151 ;  and  see  Western  Union  Tel. 


§  21G 


OTIIEE  CASES  OF  TAKI^s'O. 


413 


of  constructing  pipe  lines  over  his  land  for  the  transportation 
of  oil  is  void  as  against  public  policy.  ^^ 

§  216  (138).  What  is  an  interference  with  an  exclusive 
franchise?  Bridges  and  ferries.  The  grant  of  the  right  to 
maintain  a  toll-bridge  with  a  provision  that  no  other  bridge  or 
ferry  shall  be  allowed  for  a  certain  distance  above  or  below  the 
same,  is  not  violated  by  the  erection  of  a  railroad  bridge  with- 
in the  specified  limits  which  is  used  exclusively  for  the  passage 
of  trains  as  a  part  of  the  general  line  of  the  road.^^  In  such 
case  there  is  no  taking  and  no  right  to  compensation.  But  such 
grant  is,  of  course,  violated  by  the  erection  of  a  bridge  for  ordi- 
nary travel.^*  An  exclusive  franchise  to  maintain  a  ferry  will 
be  protected  from  infringement,  and  a  rival  bridge  or  ferry  can 
only  be  established  by  an  exercise  of  the  eminent  domain  pow- 
er. ^^  The  grant  of  an  exclusive  privilege  being  in  derogation  of 
common  right  and  tending  to  create  monopolies,  should  receive 

The  grant  of  "the  exclusive  right  and 


a  strict  construction.^® 


Co.  V.  Chicago  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  86  111. 
246,  29  Am.  Rep.  28. 

2  2West  Virginia  Transportation 
Co.  V.  Ohio  River  Pipe  Line  Co.,  22 
W.  Va.  600. 

2  3Mohawk  Bridge  Co.  v.  Utica  & 
Schenectady  R.  R.  Co.,  6  Paige  554; 
Thompson  v.  New  York  &  Harlem  R. 
R.  Co.,  3  Sandf.  Ch.  025;  McRae  v. 
Wilmington  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Jones  Law, 
186;  McLeod  v.  Savannah,  Albany  & 
Gulf  R.  R.  Co.,  25  Ga.  445;  Bridge 
Co.  V.  Hoboken  Land  &  Improvement 
Co.,  13  N.  J.  Eq.  81,  affirmed  in  Court 
of  Errors  and  Appeals ;  Same,  p.  503, 
affirmed  in  Supreme  Court  of  United 
States,  1  Wall.  116;  Lake  v.  Vir- 
ginia &  Truckee  R.  R.  Co.,  7  Nev. 
294. 

Contra  :  Enfield  Toll  Bridge  Co.  v. 
Hartford  &  New  Haven  R.  R.  Co.,  17 
Conn.  40,  42  Am.  Rep.  716. 

2  4Piscataqua  Bridge  Co.  v.  New 
Hampshire  Bridge,  7  N.  H.  35;  Bing- 
hamton  Bridge,  3  Wall.  51 ;  Horrell 
V.  Ellsworth,  17  Ala.  576;  Nicon  v. 
Tallahassee  Bridge  Co.,  47  Ala.  052; 
Kansas  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Payne,  49 
Fed.  114,  1  C.  C.  A.  183.     AtuI  see 


Hartford  Bridge  Co.  v.  Union  Ferry 
Co.,  29  Conn.  210;  Townsend  v. 
Blewett,  5  How.  (Miss.)  503. 

25Blanchard  v.  Abraham,  115  La. 
989,  40  So.  379;  Peru  v.  Barrett,  100 
Me.  213,  60  Atl.  968,  109  Am.  St.  Rep. 
494,  70  L.R.A.  567;  McRoberts  v. 
Washburn,  10  Minn.  23;  New  York 
V.  Starin,  106  N.  Y.  1;  Riverton 
Ferry  Co.  v.  McKeesport  &,  D.  Bridge 
Co.,  1  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  587.  And  see 
Lindsay  v.  Lindjy,  20  Ark.  573; 
Haynes  v.  Wells,  26  Ark.  464;  Gales 
V.  Anderson,  13  111.  413;  Patterson 
V.  Wollmann,  5  N.  D.  608,  67  N.  W. 
1040,  33  L.R.A.  536. 

2eShorter  v.  Smith,  9  Ga.  517;  Sa- 
vannah V.  Vernon  Shell  Road  Co.,  88 
Ga.  342,  14  S.  E.  610;  Long  v.  City  of 
Duluth,  49  Minn.  280,  51  N.  W.  913, 
32  Am.  St.  Rep.  547;  New  York  v. 
Starin,  106  N.  Y.  1 ;  State  v.  City  of 
Hamilton,  47  Ohio  St.  52,  23  N.  E. 
Rep.  935,  2  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
60,  67 ;  Emerson  v.  Commonwealth, 
108  Pa.  St.  Ill ;  Parkersburg  Gas  Co. 
V.  Parkersburg,  30  W.  Va.  435;  Sis- 
tersville  Ferry  Co.  v.  Russell,  52  W. 
Va.  356,  43  S.  E.  107,  59  L.R.A.  513; 


414  EMINENT  D03VIAIN.  §    217 

privilege  of  building  and  maintaining  a  bridge  across  the  Kan- 
sas Eiver  at  the  city  of  Lawrence  for  the  period  of  twenty-one 
years,"  was  held  not  to  be  violated  by  the  establishment  of  a 
ferry  at  the  same  place.^'^  The  converse  of  this  proposition  is 
denied  in  two  cases  in  which  it  is  held  that  the  exclusive  right 
of  maintaining  a  ferry  within  certain  limits  is  violated  by  the 
erection  of  a  toll-bridge  within  those  limits.^*  A  licensed  bridge 
or  ferry,  though  having  no  exclusive  right,  will  be  protected  from 
competition  by  an  unlicensed  bridge  or  ferry.  ^^ 

§  217  (139).  Same:  Other  franchises.  While,  in  the 
absence  of  any  exclusive  right,  the  construction  of  free  public 
roads,  the  effect  of  which  may  be  to  diminish  tolls,  is  not  action- 
able,^" yet  the  construction  of  such  roads  for  the  express  pur- 
pose of  enabling  the  traveling  public  to  avoid  toll-gates  is  an  act 
of  bad  faith  and  will  be  enjoined.^ ^  The  operation  of  a  steam 
railroad  alongside  a  turnpike  is  held  not  to  be  an  unwarrantable 
interference  with  the  franchise  of  the  turnpike  company.^  ^  A 
United  States  mail  contractor  cannot  use  a  toll  road  without  pay- 
ing toll,  nor  could  the  government  itself.^*  The  extension  of 
the  limits  of  a  city,  so  as  to  embrace  a  toll  road,  does  not  deprive 
the  company  of  the  right  to  take  tolls,  and  such  right  can  only 
be  taken  by  virtue  of  the  eminent  domain  power^^* 

Where  a  railroad  is  authorized  between  two  places  with  a  pro- 
vision that  no  other  road  shall  be  authorized  between  the  same 

Stein  V.  Bienville  Water  Supply  Co.,  siHall    v.    Rugsdale,    4    Stew.  & 

34  Fed.  145.  Porter,   252;    Franklin  &   Columbia 

2 'Parrott  V.  Lawrence,  2  Dill.  332;  Turnpike    Co.   v.  County  Court    of 

see  also  Bush  v.  Peru  Bridge  Co.,  3  Maury,  8  Humph.  342;  Hydes  Ferry 

Ind.  21 ;  and  see,  in  support  of  the  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Davidson  County,  91 

general  proposition,  Hartford  Bridge  Tenn.  291,  18  S.  W.  626;  Turnpike 

Co.  V.  Union  Ferry  Co.,  29  Conn.  210.  Co.  v.  Davidson,  108  Tenn.  258,  61 

28Gates  v.  McDaniel,  2  Stew.  211;  S.  W.  68. 

19  Am.  Dec.  49;  and  Mason  v.  Har-  3  2Bordentown  etc.  Turnpike  Co.  v. 

per's  Ferry  Bridge  Co.,   17  W.  Va.  Camden  &  Amboy  E.  E.  Co.,  17  N.  J. 

396;  see  also  Queen  v.  Cambrian  Ry.  L.  314. 

Co.,  40  L.  J.  Q.  B.  169.  ssDickey  v.  Maysville  Road  Co.,  7 

2  9Green  v.  Ivey,  45  Fla.  338,  33  So.  Dana,  113. 

711;  Blackwood  v.  Tanner,  112  Ky.  34Ft.  Wayne  L.  &  I.  Co.  v.  Mau- 

672,  06  S.  W.  500;  Carroll  v.  Camp-  mee  Ave.  Gravel  Road  Co.,  132  Ind. 

Ibell,  108  Mo.  550,  17  S.  W.  884;  Ca-  80,  30  N.  E.  880,  15  L.R.A.  651;  and 

tawba  Toll  Bridge  Co.  V.  Flowers,  110  see  Highland    Park    v.  Detroit  etc. 

N.  C.  381,  14  S.  B.  918.  Road  Co.,  95  Mich.  489,  55  N.  W.  382. 

aoDerry  Tp.  Road,  30  Pa.  Supr.  Ct. 
538. 


§    217  OTHEK  CASES  OF  TAKISa.  ilS 

places  for  thirty  years,  the  formation  of  a  continuous  line  be- 
tween the  two  places  by  an  arrangement  between  three  distinct 
companies  is  a  violation  which  will  be  enjoined.^''  The  exclu- 
sive right  of  constructing  a  railroad  is  not  violated  by  the  con- 
struction of  a  horse  railway  within  the  specified  limits.^"  The 
exclusive  privilege  of  transporting  passengers  between  certain 
points  is  not  interfered  with  by  a  road  for  merchandise  only.^'^ 
A  dummy  railroad  upon  a  street  was  held  to  be  an  interference 
with  the  exclusive  privilege  of  operating  a  horse  railroad  on  the 
same  street.^*  But  such  exclusive  privilege  is  not  violated  by  the 
construction  of  another  horse  railroad  on  the  same  street  for  a 
short  distance  only,  merely  as  a  connecting  link.^®  The  city 
of  Des  Moines  granted  to  the  Des  Moines  Street  K.  R.  Co.  the 
exclusive  right  for  thirty  years  to  use  all  the  streets  of  the  city 
for  street  cars,  to  be  operated  by  animal  power  only,  with  a  pro- 
vision that  "the  said  city  of  Des  M<?ines  shall  not,  until  after 
the  expiration  of  said  tenn,  grant  to  or  confer  upon  any  person 
or  corporation  any  privileges  which  will  impair  or  destroy  the 
rights  and  privileges  herein  granted  to  said  company."  It  was 
held  that  a  grant  of  the  right  to  use  the  streets  for  electric  cars 
was  no  infringement  of  the  first  grant.*"  A  competing  omnibus 
line  will  not  be  allowed  to  use  the  track  of  a  horse  railroad 
company;*^   and,   although  a  horse  railroad  company  has  no 

3  6  Boston  &  Lowell  R.  R.   Co.  v.  public  conveyance,  would  impair  the 

Salem  &  Lowell  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Gray  1.  revenue  of  the  Narrow-Gauge  Com- 

S6Louiaville   &   P.    R.    R.    Co.    v.  pany,   and  thus   impair    its    rights 

Louisville  City  Ry.  Co.,  2  Duvall  175.  vmder  this  ordinance.     Its  right  is 

"Richmond     etc.    R.    R.    Co.    v.  to  operate  a  horse  railroad.    It  is  en- 
Louisa  R.  R.  Co.,  13  How.  71.  titled  to  the  exclusive  right  to  do  so, 

3  8Denver  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Denver  and   to   use   all   improvements   that 

City  Ry.  Co.,  2  Col.  673.  may  be  made  thereto ;  but  to  nothing 

3  9Street   Railway    Co.    of    Grand  more.     The  city  cannot  impair  that 

Rapids  V.  West  Side  Street  Railway  right;  but  it  does  not  follow  that  it 

Co.,  48  Mich.  433.  may  not  authorize  other  means  of 

^oTeachout  v.  Des  Moines  Broad  street  travel.     It  did  not  undertake 

Gauge  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  75  la.  722,  38  to  confer  upon  the  company  the  right 

N.  W.  Rep.   145.     The  court  says :  to  carry  all  the  passengers  who  might 

"It  may  well  be  questioned  whether  desire  to  travel  by  public  conveyance 

the  city  had  any  power  to  contract  upon  the  streets;  and  it  did  not,  by 

that  no  other  means  of  public  travel  the  ordinance,  contract  that  new  and 

should  be  allowed  upon  the  streets  of  improved  and  undiscovered  methods 

the   city   except  by  cars   drawn  by  of  travel  might  not  be  adopted  as  the 

horses  for  the  period  of  thirty  years.  public  wants  might  demand." 
If  so,  the  establishment  of  hack-lines  4 1  Citizens'   Coach  Co.  v.   Camden 

or  omnibus-lines,  or  other  means  of  II.  R.  R.  Co.,  33  N.  J.  Eq.  267,  36  Am. 


416  EilliVEXT  DOilAIN,  §    217 

exeulsive  right  in  a  street,  a  new  company  will  not  be  allowed 
to  lay  down  its  tracks  so  that  one  rail  of  the  new  track  will  be 
between  the  two  rails  of  the  old  track,  without  compensation.*^ 

It  does  not  seem  to  have  been  customary  to  grant  exclusive 
rights  to  canal  companies.  At  least  no  cases  appear  in  the  re- 
ports based  upon  such  a  right.  A  competing  railroad  impairing 
the  franchise  of  a  canal  is  not  a  taking,*^  but  it  has  been  inti- 
mated that  a  railroad  within  a  few  feet  of  a  canal  might  produce 
actionable  injury,  if,  by  frightening  the  horses,  or  otherwise,  it 
materially  injured  the  rights  and  property  of  the  company.** 

An  exclusive  right  to  furnish  gas  or  water  to  a  city  or  village, 
or  to  use  the  streets  for  that  purpose,  will  be  protected  by  injunc- 
tion.*'' But  an  exclusive  privilege  of  lighting  with  gas  is  not 
infringed  by  the  grant  of  a  privilege  to  light  with  electricity 
in  the  same  territory.*^  An  exclusive  franchise  "to  supply 
heat  to  the  public  from  gas  within  the  city  of  Pittsburgh,"  was 
held  not  to  preclude  a  franchise  to  supply  heat  to  the  same  public 
from  natural  gas  brought  from  without  the  city.*'^  So  an  exclu- 
sive right  to  supply  a  city  with  water  from  "Three  Mile  Creek" 
is  not  interfered  with  by  a  grant  to  supply  water  derived  from 
other  sources.**  "Where  the  exclusive  right  of  furnishing  water 
within  a  certain  borough  was  granted  by  statute  to  a  private  com- 
pany, the  construction  and  operation  of  works  by  the  borough 
itself  was  held  to  be  no  infringement  of  the  grant.*®    But  it  has 

Eep.  542,  affirming  S.  C.  31  N.  J.  Eq.  4  4Hudson  &  Delaware  Canal  Co.  v. 
525.  In  Camden  Horse  E.  K.  Co.  v.  A'.  Y.  &  Erie  E.  E.  Co.,  9  Paige  323. 
Citizens'  Coach  Co.,  28  N.  J.  Eq.  145,  4  5Metropolitau  Gas  Co.  v.  Hyde 
wliich  is  the  same  case,  a  preliminary  Park,  27  111.  App.  361 ;  City  of  New- 
injunction  was  granted,  but  was  set  port  v.  Newport  Light  Co.,  84  Ky. 
aside  in  Citizens'  Coach  Co.  v.  Cam-  166;  White  v.  Meadville,  177  Pa.  St. 
den  H.  E.  E.  Co.,  29  N.  J.  Eq.*299,  on  643,  35  Atl.  695,  34  L.E.A.  567;  Vicks- 
grounds  not  affecting  the  merits  of  burg  v.  Vicksburg  W.  W.  Co.,  202  U. 
the  case.  S.  453,  26  S.  C.  660.    And  see  Citizens' 

4  2HamiIton    etc.  Traction    Co.  v.  Water  Co.  v.  Bridgeport  Hydraulic 

Hamilton  etc.  Elec.  Traction  Co.,  69  Co.,  55  Conn.  1. 

Ohio  St.  402,  69  N.  E.  991;  Union  leParkersburg  Gas  Co.  v.  Parkers- 
Passenger  Ey.  Co.  V.  Continental  Ey.  burg,  30  W.  Va.  435. 
Co.,  11  Phil.  321;  Fidelity  Trust  etc.          4  7Emerson  v.  Commonwealth,  108 
Co.  V.  Mobile  St.  E.  E.  Co.,  53  Fed.  Pa.  St.  111. 
687.                                                                     4sStein  v.  Bienville  Water  Supply 

*  slllinois  &  Michigan  Canal  Co.  v.  Co.,  34  Fed.  145. 
C.  &  E.  I.  E.  E.  Co.,  14  111.  314;  Tuck-  4  9Lehigh  Water  Co.'s  Appeal,  102 

alioe  Canal  Co.  v.  Tuckahoe  etc.  E.  E.  Pa.  St.  515. 
Co.,  11  Leigh  42,  30  Am.  Eep.  374. 


§    yi8  OTHEE  OASES  OF  TAKING.  417 

been  held  in  the  same  State  that,  -where  a  city  had  power  to  con- 
struct municipal  waterworks  and  also  to  contract  with  a  private 
corporation  for  a  water  supply,  it  could  not  do  both  and  that, 
after  contracting  for  a  supply  it  could  not  establish  municipal 
works  during  the  period  of  the  contract.®"  A  city  made  a  con- 
tract with  a  private  company  to  supply  water  within  the  city 
for  thirty  years  and  stipulated  not  to  grant  to  any  other  person 
or  corporation,  any  contract  .or  privilege  to  furnish  water  with- 
in the  city  during  such  period.  It  was  held  that  the  contract 
was  to  be  construed  in  favor  of  the  public  and,  as  there  was  no 
stipulation  against  municipal  works,  the  city  could  establish 
them  within  the  thirty  years.®  ^ 

The  forfeiture  of  a  franchise  is  not  a  taking  of  property  with- 
in the  constitution.®*  Under  the  right  reserved  to  amend  the 
charter  of  a  plank-road  company,  the  legislature  cannot  re- 
quire it  to  remove  its  gates  within  a  populous  city  so  as  to 
throw  open  to  the  free  use  of  the  public  two  and  a  half  miles 
of  its  road.®^  This  would  be  to  deprive  the  company  of  its 
property  without  due  process  of  law. 

§  218  (139a).  Electrical  franchises  and  electricalinter- 
ference.  A  telegraph  or  telephone  line  upon  a  street  may  be 
damaged  by  the  construction  and  operation  of  an  electric  rail- 
way on  the  same  street.  Such  damage  may  arise,  both  from  in- 
duction and  conduction.  Some  courts  have  held  that  the  grant 
to  a  telegraph  or  telephone  company  is  subject  to  the  use  of  the 
street  for  all  legitimate  street  purposes,  that  the  electric  rail- 
way is  such  in  purpose,  and,  therefore,  that  the  telegraph  or 
telephone  company  has  no  remedy  for  damage  caused  by  the 
railroad  company,  unless  it  is  due  to  negligence.®*     In  Tennes- 

B»White  V.  Meadville,  177  Pa.  St.  54Cincinnati  Inclined  Plane  E.  K. 

643,  35  Atl.  695,  overruling  Howard's  Co.  v.  City  &  Suburban  Tel.  Assn.,  48 

Appeal,  162  Pa.  St.  374,  29  Atl.  641,  Ohio  St.  390,  27  N.  E.  890,  12  L.R.A. 

and  Fingal  v.  Millvale,  162  Pa.  St.  534,  4  Am.  R.  E.  &  Corp.  Hep.  533 ; 

393,  29  Atl.  644;  Bennett  Water  Co.  Hudson  Riv.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Watervliet 

V.  Millvale,  200  Pa.  St.  613,  50  Atl.  T.  &  R.  R.  Co.,  135  N.  Y.  393,  32  N.  E. 

155;   S.  C.  202  Pa.  St.  616,  51  Atl.  148,  31  Am.  St.  Rep.  838,  17  L.R.A. 

1098.  674,  6  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  619, 

BiKnoxville    Water    Co.  v.  Knox-  reversing  61  Hun  140;   Cumberland 

ville,  200  XJ.  S.  22,  26  S.  C.  224.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  United  Electric  R. 

52State  Bank  v.  State,  1  Blackf.  R.  Co.,  42  Fed.  272,  12  L.R.A.  544; 

267,  12  Am.  Dec.  234.  National   Tel.   Co.   v.   Baker,  L.   R. 

BSDetroit    v.    Detroit    &    Howell  (1893)  2  Oh.  D.  186. 
Plank  Road  Co.,  43  Mich.  140. 
Em.  D.— 27. 


418  EMIJSTENT  DOMAIN.  §    218 

see  it  has  been  held  that  if  the  railroad  company  places  its  poles 
and  wires  so  as  to  interfere  with  those  of  the  telephone  company, 
the  former  will  be  liable  for  damage  occasioned ;  also  that  injury 
to  the  telephone  company  by  conduction  or  the  escape  of  elec- 
tricity through  the  ground  to  the  telephone  wires,  both  compa- 
nies using  the  ground  as  a  return  circuit,  was  such  a  damage  as 
amounted  to  a  taking  of  the  telephone  company's  property,  for 
which  compensation  must  be  made ;  but  that  the  injury  by  induc- 
tion, being  one  which  inevitably  resulted  from  the  exercise  of 
its  right  by  the  railroad  company,  was  one  which  must  be  borne 
or  obviated  by  the  telephone  company.^^  In  Missouri,  where  tel- 
egraph and  telephone  lines  are  held  to  be  legitimate  street  uses,  a 
light  company  was  restrained  from  placing  its  wires  within  eight 
feet  of  the  wires  of  a  telegraph  company.*®  An  electric  rail- 
road will  be  prevented  by  injunction  from  any  unnecessary  in- 
terference with  a  telephone  company.*'^  The  grant  to  an  elec- 
trical company  to  use  the  streets  for  poles  and  wires  confers  no 
exclusive  right  and  the  like  privilege  may  be  granted  to  others.^* 
The  first  company  will  be  protected  from  any  unnecessary  or 
unreasonable  interference  and  no  further.'*  "As  between  two 
corporations  exercising  similar  franchises  upon  the  same  street, 
priority,  though  it  does  not  create  monopoly,  carries  superiority 
of  rights,  and  equity  will  adjust  conflicting  interests,  as  far  as 
possible,  controlling  them,  so  that  each  company  may  exercise 

56Cumberland  Tel.  &  Tel.   Co.  v.  178,  100  Am.  St.  Rep.  53;  Newport 

United  Electric  R.  R.  Co.,  93  Tenu.  News  etc.  Ry.  &  Elec.  Co.  v.  Hamp- 

492,  29  S.  W.  104,  27  L.R.A.  236,  10  ton  Roads  Ry.  &  Elec.  Co.,  102  Va. 

Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  549.    See  also  795,  47  S.  E.  839. 

Cefitral    Pa.   Tel.   &   Supply   Co.   v.  5  9Montgomery  Lt.  &  W.  P.  Co.  v. 

Wilkes-Barre  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  11  Pa.  Citizens'  L.  H.  &  P.  Co.,  142  Ala. 

Co.  Ct.  417.  462,  38  So.  1026;  Chicago  Telephone 

56VVestern  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Elec-  Co.  v.  N.  W.  Telephone  Co.,  199  111. 

trie  Light  Co.,  46  Mo.  App.  120.    See  324,  65  N.  E.  329;  N.  W.  Telephone 

also  Nebraska  Tel.  Co.  v.  York  Gas  Exch.  Co.,  v.  Twin  City  Telephone  Co., 

etc.  .Co.,  27  Neb.  284,  43  N.  W.  126;  89  Minn.  495,  95  N.  W.  460;  Western 

Paris  Elec.  L.  &  R.  R.  Co.  v.  S.  W.  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Elec.  Lt.  &  P.  Co., 

Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.   (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  27  178  N.  Y.  325,  70  N.  E.  866,  reversing 

S.  W.  902;  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  S.  C.  81  App.  Div.  655;  Cumberland 

Los  Angeles  Elec.  Co.,  76  Fed.  178.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  Louisville  Home 

5 'Birmingham  Traction  Co.  v.  Tel.  Co.,  110  Fed.  593;  Same  v.  Same, 
Southern  Bell  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  119  110  Fed.  596.  See  East  Tenn.  Tele- 
Ala,  144,  24  So.  731.  phone    Co.   v.   Anderson    Telephone 

i«i^ni.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co,  v.  Morgan  Co.,  115  Ky.  488,  74  S.  W.  218. 
County  Tel.  Co.,  138  Ala.  597,  30  So. 


§    219  OTHEK  OASES  OE  TAKING.  419 

its  own  franchise  as  fully  as  is  compatible  with  the  necessary 
rights  of  another.  "  ®°  A  company  lawfully  using  the  street 
may  prevent  interference  by  a  second  company  having  no  lawful 
right  to  use  the  street.^  ^ 

§  219  (140).  Change  of  use,  or  an  additional  use. 
We  have  already  discussed  this  subject,  in  some  of  its  aspects,  in 
the  chapter  upon  streets  and  highways.**  We  have  there  shown 
that  land  taken  for  a  street  could  not  be  devoted  to  any  addi- 
tional use,  distinct  from  its  use  as  a  highway,  without  compen- 
sation to  the  abutting  owner  for  any  interference  with  his  rights. 
It  may  be  laid  down  as  a  general  proposition  that,  where  an 
easement  only  is  taken,  the  land  will  revert  to  the  owner  of  the 
fee  when  it  ceases  to  be  used  for  the  particular  purpose  for  which 
it  was  taken.**  The  soil  cannot  be  devoted  to  a  different  use, 
whether  more  or  less  onerous,  vnthout  a  new  condemnation  and 
compensation  paid.**  When  a  fee  simple  estate  is  taken  for  pub- 
lic use,  it  may  be  either  absolute  or  qualified.  If  absolute,  then 
no  individual  has  any  interest  in  the  land  or  its  use,  and  it  may 
be  devoted  to  any  purpose  in  the  discretion  of  the  legislature,  or 
even  sold  to  private  parties.*^  A  qualified  fee  is  one  which  is 
held  in  trust,  as  it  were,  for  some  particular  public  use  or  uses, 
the  execution  of  which  affects  the  value  or  enjoyment  of  particu- 
lar property.  In  such  case  the  owners  of  the  property  so  affected 
have  a  right  to  the  faithful  execution  of  the  trust,  in  the  nature 
of  an  easement  in  the  property  so  held  in  trust,  and  the  legisla- 
ture cannot  divert  it  to  a  different  use  without  compensation 
to  the  owners  of  the  property  affected.  Thus  lands  taken  for 
an  asylum,  jail  or  school-house  are  usually  held  by  a  fee  simple 
absolute,  while  lands  acquired  for  streets  and  public  grounds, 
though  held  in  fee,  are  nevertheless  held  in  trust  for  the  use 
specified.  The  nature  of  this  trust,  where  the  land  is  held  for 
street  purposes,  and  the  rights  or  easements  of  abutting  owners 
therein  have  been  considered  in  the  last  chapter.**  As  a  gen- 
eral rule,  land  dedicated  for  a  public  park  or  square,  may  not  be 

6  ON.   W.   Telephone  Exch.   Co.  v.  6  4  See    cases    cited    in    following 

Twin  City  Telephone  Co.,  89  Minn.  notes,   also   ante,    §§    149-193;    and 

495,  95  N.  W.  460.  State    v.    Laverack,    34    N.,    J.    L. 

siMerchants  P.  &  D.  Tel.  Co.  v.  201;  Jackson  v.  Big  Sandy  etc.  R.  R. 

Citizens  Telephone  Co.,  123  K.y.  90,  Co.,  63  W.  Va.  18. 

93  S.  W.  642.  esPost,  §  858. 

624m*e,  chap.  v.  oeAnte,  §§  120-124. 

<S3Post,  §§  861,  862. 


420 


BMINEITT  DOMAIISr. 


§  219 


diverted  to  other  uses,  such  as  a  jail,®''  court-house  or  public  office 
building^*®  or  otherwise,®*  and  those  having  property  adjacent 
to  such  square  or  public  ground,  have  a  right  in  the  nature  of 
an  easement  that  the  trust  attached  to  such  public  grounds  shall 
be  faithfully  executed. ''"  Public  parks  may  be  used  for  build- 
ings in  aid  of  the  purpose  for  which  they  are  established,  such 
as  museums,  art  galleries,  casinos  and  the  like.'^^    Also  for  free 


STFlaten  v.  City  of  Moorhead,  51 
Minn.  518,  53  N.  W.  807,  19  L.R.A. 
195;  Corporations  of  Sequin  v.  Ire- 
land, 57  Tex.  183. 

6  8McIntyre  v.  EI  Paso  County,  15 
Colo.  App.  78,  61  Pae.  237;Prinee- 
ville  V.  Auten,  77  111.  325 ;  Rowzee  v. 
Piercers  Miss.  846,  65  Am.  St.  Rep. 
625,  40  L.R.A.  402;  Fesaler  v.  Union, 
67  N.  J.  Eq.  14,  56  Atl.  272;  Foster 
V.  City  of  Buffalo,  64  How.  Pr.  127. 
In  Pennsylvania  it  is  held  that  the 
great  square  of  a  county  town  may 
be  used  for  a  court-house,  but  when 
a  new  court-house  has  been  built  the 
old  one  cannot  be  retained  and  rented 
in  part  for  private  purposes  and  used 
in  part  for  a  treasurer's  office.  Com- 
monwealth V.  Bowman,  3  Pa.  St.  202. 

69Douglass  V.  Montgomery,  118 
Ala.  599,  24  So.  745,  43  L.R.A.  376; 
Gordon  Co.  v.  Calhoun,  128  Ga.  781, 
58  S.  E.  360;  Riverside  v.  MacLain, 
210  111.  308,  71  N.  E.  408,  102  Am.  St. 
Rep.  164,  66  L.R.A.  288;  Ocean  City 
Land  Co.  v.  Ocean  City,  73  N.  J.  L. 
493,  63  Atl.  1112;  Clercq  v.  Galli- 
polis,  7  Ohio,  pt.  1,  217 ;  Morrow  v. 
Highland  Grove  Traction  Co.,  219  Pa. 
St.  619,  69  Atl.  41;  Stumer  v. 
County  Court,  42  W.  Va.  724,  36 
L.R.A.  300;  Gihuan  v.  City  of  Mil- 
waukee, 55  Wis.  328;  United  States 
V.  Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Biss. 
174;  Davenport  v.  Buffington,  97 
Fed.  234,  38  C.  C.  A.  453,  46  L.R.A. 
377;  Murray  v.  Allegheny,  136  Fed. 
57,  69  C.  C.  A.  65;  Attorney  General 
V.  Sunderland,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  Div.  634. 
And  see  State  Historical  Assn.  v. 
Lincoln,  14  Neb.  336. 


TORiverside  v.  MacLain,  210  111. 
308,  71  N.  E.  408,  102  Am.  St.  Rep. 
164,  66  L.R.A.  288 ;  Fessler  v.  Union, 
67  N.  J.  Eq.  14,  56  Atl.  272;  Ocean 
City  Land  Co.  v.  Ocean  City,  73  N. 
J.  L.  493,  63  Atl.  1112;  Foster  v. 
Buffalo,  64  How.  Pr.  127 ;  Conrad  v. 
West  End  Hotel  &  Land  Co.,  126  N. 
C.  776,  36  S.  E.  282 ;  Morrow  v.  High- 
land Grove  Traction  Co.,  219  Pa.  St. 
619,  69  Atl.  41,  But  see  Anderson  v. 
Rochester  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  9  How  Pr. 
553;  Clark  v.  City  of  Providence,  16 
R.  L  337,  15  Atl.  Rep.  763;  Mowry 
V.  City  of  Providence,  16  R.  I.  422,  16 
Atl.  Rep.  511.  In  the  latter  cases  the 
city  of  Providence  was  authorized  by 
the  legislature  to  discontinue  a  pub- 
lic park  and  sell  the  lands  at  pleas- 
ure. It  was  held  that  owners  of  land 
in  the  vicinity  could  not  enjoin  the 
carrying  into  effect  of  the  act.  In 
Manson  v.  South  Bound  R.  R.  Co., 
64  S.  C.  120,  41  S.  E.  838,  it  was  held 
that  one  who  did  not  abut  on  a  pub- 
lic park  had  no  interest  to  maintain 
a  bill  to  enjoin  its  use  as  a  railway 
station.  But  some  cases  hold  a  resi- 
dent and  taxpayer  may  have  a  bill 
to  enjoin  a  diversion  in  such  cases. 
Mclntyre  v.  El  Paso  County,  15  Colo. 
App.  78,  61  Pac.  237;  Davenport  v. 
Buffington,  97  Fed.  234,  38  C.  C.  A. 
453,  46  L.R.A.  377. 

'1  "Public  parks  have  come  to  be 
recognized  as  not  only  the  natural 
place  for  walks  and  drives,  afoot, 
awheel  or  with  horse  and  carriage, 
for  boating,  skating  and  other  out- 
door athletics,  but  also  as  the  appro- 
priate and  most  effective  location  for 


§  219 


OTHEK  CASES  OF  TAKING. 


421 


public  libraries/^  monuments  and  statuary.'^*  Land  conveyed 
to  a  town  for  a  market  cannot  be  used  for  a  court-bouse/*  and 
land  dedicated  for  a  court-bouse  cannot  be  used  for  otber  pur- 
posesJ^  Railroads  may  be  laid  in  public  parks,  for  tbe  pur- 
pose of  facilitating  tbe  enjoyment  and  use  of  the  park.'^®     As 


monuments  and  statues,  either  to  his- 
toric heroes  or  to  pure  art,  fountains, 
flower  displays,  botanical  and  zoolog- 
ical gardens,  museums  of  nature  and 
art,  galleries  of  paintings  and  sculp- 
ture, music  stands  and  music  halls, 
and  all  other  agencies  of  aesthetic 
enjoyment  of  eye  and  ear."  Laird 
V.  Pittsburg,  205  Pa.  St.  1,  6,  54  Atl. 
324,  61  L.K.A.  332.  Also  Ross  v. 
Long  Branch,  73  N.  J.  L.  292,  63  Atl. 
609. 

'sSpires  v.  Los  Angeles,  150  Cal. 
64,  87  Pac.  1026;  Laird  v.  Pittsburg, 
205  Pa.  St.  1,  54  Atl.  324,  61  L.K.A. 
332;  Attorney  General  v.  Sunder- 
land, L.  R.  2  Ch.  Div.  634.  In  the 
Pennsylvania  case  the  city  of  Pitts- 
burg sought  to  condemn  property  for 
an  addition  to  Schenley  park.  The 
Carnegie  Free  Library,  containing  a 
library,  museum  and  music  hall,  oc- 
cupied a  site  in  the  park.  A  part  of 
the  addition  was  to  be  used  for  an 
enlargement  of  the  library.  It  was 
held  that  such  a  library  was  a  proper 
use  of  the  park  and  that  the  condem- 
nation could  be  made.  The  court 
says:  "The  Free  Library  Building 
as  already  said  contains  an  art  gal- 
lery, museum  and  music  hall  besides 
a  free  library.  The  latter  is  as  much 
devoted  to  the  public  recreation  as 
the  other  parts.  It  affords  a  place  of 
resort  and  entertainment  for  the 
public  at  large  in  rainy  and  inclem- 
ent weather,  and  at  all  times  for 
those  who  prefer  quiet  study  to  sight- 
seeing or  more  active  amusement.  It 
may  be  conceded  as  argued  by  ap- 
pellants that  a  library  in  itself  is  not 
an  integral  part  of  a  park,  and  were 
the  taking  here  complained  of  a  tak- 


ing directly  and  solely  for  a  library 
site,  a  different  question  would  be 
presented.  But  a  library  occupying 
only  a  very  small  fraction  of  the 
park  area,  not  interfering  at  all  sub- 
stantially with  its  open  air  and  free 
space,  does  not  differ  in  legal  effect 
from  the  museums,  picture  galleries, 
music  stands  and  other  incidental 
meins  of  promoting  the  entertain- 
ment and  pleasure  of  the  people. 
Should  the  city,  therefore,  decide  to 
devote  the  land  now  in  controversy 
to  the  enlargement  of  the  free  library 
building  it  could  not  be  fairly  said  to 
be  a  use  outside  of  what  is  legiti- 
mately implied  in  the  authority  to 
take  for  a  public  park."    pp.  6,  7. 

7  3Parsons  v.  Van  Wyck,  56  App. 
Div.  329,  67  N.  Y.  S.  1054. 

7  4 Attorney  General  v.  Goderich,  5 
Grant  (U.  C.)  402. 

7  6Lamar  County  v.  Clements,  49 
Tex.  348.  Where  land  was  dedicated 
for  a  court-house  and  standing  room 
for  wagons,  etc.,  it  was  held  that  the 
city  could  not  lay  it  out  into  grass 
plats,  walks,  etc.  Board  of  Super- 
visors V.  City  of  Wincheifer,  84  Va. 
467,  4  S.  E.  844. 

7  6People  V.  Park  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  76 
Cal.  156;  Philadelphia  v.  Commis- 
sioners of  Fairmount  Park,  16  Pa. 
Co.  Ct.  625;  Philadelphia  v.  Mc- 
Manes,  175  Pa.  St.  28,  34  Atl.  331. 
Where  a  city  had  only  an  easement  in 
lands  held  for  park  purposes,  a,  rail- 
road through  the  park  was  held  an 
additional  burden  for  which  the  fee 
owner  was  entitled  to  compensation. 
Newton  v.  Manufacturers  Ey.  Co., 
115  Fed.  781,  53  C.  C.  A.  599. 


422 


EMINENT   DOMAIN. 


§  220 


to  what  use  may  be  made  of  land  along  a  river  or  water  front 
dedicated  to  public  use,  there  is  considerable  doubt  under  the 
authorities.'''^  A  city  condemned  a  strip  of  land  for  laying 
water  pipes.  It  was  held  that  a  telephone  line  thereon,  connect- 
ing the  pumping  station  with  the  central  fire  station  and  for 
the  exclusive  use  of  the  city,  was  an  additional  burden.'® 

§220(141).  Change  of  use:  Instances.  The  differ- 
ent kinds  of  toll-roads  are  public  highways,  in  the  same  sense, 
and  to  the  same  extent,  as  ordinary  roads.  The  only  difference 
is  as  to  the  manner  of  maintaining  them.''®  Consequently,  when 
a  turnpike  is  laid  out  over  a  common  highway,®"  or  when  a  turn- 
pike is  made  a  common  highway,  to  be  maintained  at  the  pub- 
lic expense,®^  the  owner  of  the  fee  is  entitled  to  no  compensa- 
tion.    There  has,  in  fact,  been  no  change  of  use,  nor  any  addi- 


7  7Platt  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

74  la.  127,  37  N.  W.  107 ;  McNeil  v. 
Hicks,  34  La.  An.  1090;  Attorney 
General  v.  Tarr,  148  Mass.  309,  19  N. 
E.  358,  2  L.R.A.  87 ;  In  re  Mayor  etc. 
of  New  York,  135  N.  Y.  253,  31  N.  E. 
1043;  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cin- 
cinnati, 76  Ohio  St.  48*1,  81  N.  B.  893 ; 
Portland  &  Willamette  Valley  R.  R. 
Go.  V.  Portland,  14  Or.  188;  Memphis 
V.  Wright,  6  Yerg.  497;  Williams  v. 
Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  110  Tenn.  442, 

75  S.  W.  1026;  Union  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chic- 
asaw  Cooperage  Co.,  116  Tenn.  594, 
95  S.  W.  171 ;  Burlington  Gas  Light 
Co.  V.  Burlington  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  165 
U.  S.  370,  17  S.  C.  359;  Illinois  etc. 
R.  &  C.  Co.  V.  St.  Louis,  2  Dill.  70. 

7  8Spoka'ne  v.  Colby,  16  Wash.  610. 

7  9State  V.  Maine,  27  Conn.  641,  71 
Am.  Dec.  89,  and  cases  cited  in  the 
following  notes. 

soTurner  v.  Rising  Sun  etc.  Turn- 
pike Co.,  71  Ind.  547;  Stratton  v. 
Elliott,  83  Ind.  425;  Danville  etc. 
Road  Co.  V.  Campbell,  87  Ind.  57; 
Palmer  v.  Logansport  etc.  Gravel  R. 
Co.,  108  Ind.  137 ;  Douglass  v.  Boons- 
borough  Turnpike  Co.,  22  Md.  219, 
85  Am.  Dec.  647;  Morgan  v.  Mon- 
mouth Plank  Road  Co.,  26  N.  J.  L. 
99;  Wright  v.  Carter,  27  N.  J.  L.  76; 
Walker  v.   Caywood,   31   N.   Y.   51; 


Benedict  v.  Goit,  3  Barb.  459;  Chag- 
rin Falls  &  Cleveland  Plank  Road  Co. 
v.  Cane,  2  Ohio  St.  419;  Nolensville 
V.  Baker,  4  Humph.  315;  Panton 
Turnpike  Co.  v.  Bishop,  II  Vt.  198. 
But  see,  as  involving  a  contrary  doc- 
trine, Williams  v..  Natural  Bridge 
Plank  Road,  21  Mo.  580,  and  Cape 
Girardeau  etc.  Road  Co.  v.  Renfroe, 
58  Mo.  265,  274.  Where  a  public  road 
is  taken  by  a  turnpike  company  the 
erection  of  a  toll-house  on  the  road  is 
an  additional  burden.  Wright  v. 
Carter,  27  N.  J.  L.  76,  and  remarks 
on  this  case  in  State  v.  Laverack,  34 
N.  J.  L.  at  p.  207.  Same  point  as  to 
toll-house,  Stratton  v.  Elliott,  83  Ind. 
425 ;  Danville  etc.  Road  Co.  v.  Camp- 
bell, 87  Ind.  57;  Perkins  v.  Moores- 
town  etc.  Turnpike  Co.,  48  N.  J.  Eq. 
499,  22  Atl.  180. 

81  State  v.  Maine,  27  Conn.  641,  71 
Am.  Dec.  89 ;  Murray  v.  Commission- 
ers of  Berkshire,  12  Met.  455;  Hing- 
ham  &  Quincy  Bridge  Co.  v.  County 
of  Norfolk,  6  Allen  353;  Pierce  v. 
Somersworth,  10  N.  H.  369 ;  Barclay 
V.  Lebanon,  11  N.  H.  19;  Heath  v. 
Barman,  49  Barb.  496;  Heath  v.  Bar- 
more,  50  N.  Y.  302;  Pittsburgh  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Commonwealth,  104  Pa. 
St.  583. 


§    220  OTHER  OASES  OF  TAKING.  423 

tional  burden  cast  upon  the  land.  Where  a  highway  is  taken  by 
a  turnpike  company,  the  company  has  the  same  right  to  repair 
and  improve  it,  by  changing  the  grade  or  otherwise,  that  the 
public  had,  and  will  not  be  liable  for  consequential  damages  re- 
sulting therefrom.*^  Nor  in  such  case  is  the  town  entitled  to 
compensation  for  the  expense  of  making  the  road  in  the  first 
instance.®*  It  is  generally  held  that  a  ferry  landing  upon  a 
highway  is  an  additional  burden  for  which  the  owner  of  the  fee 
is  entitled  to  compensation.**  If  or  can  a  ferry  landing  be  es- 
tablished upon  a  turnpike  without  compensation  to  the  owner 
of  the  franchise.*®  Where  by  agreement  between  an  electric 
power  company  and  a  trolley  company  a  new  line  of  poles,  higher 
and  with  longer  arms,  and  carrying  the  wires  of  both  companies, 
was  to  be  substituted  in  a  street  for  the  poles  and  wires  of  the 
trolley  company,  it  was  held  that  the  new  line  would  impose  an 
additional  burden  on  the  fee  and  that  the  owner  could  enjoin  the 
proposed  construction  until  the  right  was  acquired  in  the  manner 
provided  by  law.*^  Land  taken  for  a  turnpike  cannot  be  trans- 
ferred to  a  railroad  company  without  compensation  to  the  own- 
er of  the  fee.*^  But  a  turnpike  may  be  condemned  for  a  rail- 
road when  authorized  by  the  legislature,  and  in  such  case  the 
owner  of  the  fee  is  only  entitled  to  compensation  for  the  addi- 
tional burden  upon  his  soil,  if  any.**  It  has  been  held  that  a 
street  railroad  may  be  laid  over  a  toll-bridge,  under  such  terms  as 
will  protect  the  rights  of  the  bridge  company  and  the  traveling 
public,  without  compensation  to  the  bridge  company.*®    A  rail- 

82Benedict  v.  Goit,   3  Barb.  459;  v.  Wynns,  2  Dev.  (N.C.)  402;  Cham- 
Douglass  V.  Boonesborough  Turnpike  bers  v.  Farry,  1  Yeates  167 ;  Chess  v. 
Co.,  22  Md.  219,  85  Am.  Dec.  64;  lut  Manown,  3  Watts  219. 
«ee  Williams  V.  Natural  Bridge  Turn-  ssLexington  etc.  Turnpike  Co.  v. 
pike  Co.,  21  Mo.  580.  McMurtry,  3  B.  Mon.  516.    Contra: 

ssTown  of  Barnet  v.  Passumpsic  Clarke  v.  White,  5  Bush  353. 

Turnpike  Co.,   15  Vt.  757;   see  also  s  6 Young     \.     York    Haven    Elec. 

Monmouth  County  v.  Red  Bank  etc.  Transmission   Co.,   15  Pa.   Diat.   Ct. 

Turnpike  Co.,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  91 ;  Water-  843. 

bury  River  Turnpike  Co.  v.   Litch-  sTMahon  v.  New  York  Central  R. 

field,  26  Conn.  209.    Upon  the  repeal  R.  Co.,  24  N.  Y.  658 ;  Ellicottville  etc. 

of  a  turnpike  charter  the  pike  does  Plank  Road  Co.  v.  Buffalo  etc.  R.  R. 

not  become  a  public  highway,  which  Co.,  20  Barb.  644. 

the  public  are  bound  to  keep  in  re-  ssBrainard  v.  Missisquoi  R.  R.  Co., 

pair.    State  v.  New  Boston,  11  N.  H.  48  Vt.  107;  Miffin  v.  Railroad  Com- 

407.  pany,  16  Pa.  St.  182. 

84Prosser  v.  Wappello,  18  la.  327;  sspittsburgh  etc.  Pass.  R.  R.  Co. 

Prosser  v.  Davis,  18  la.  367;  Pipkin  v.  Point  Bridge  Co.,  165  Pa.  St.  37, 


424  EMINENT   DOMAIN.  §    220 

road  on  a  canal  bank  is  an  additional  use.®"  Where  a  railroad 
company  is  authorized  to  condemn  a  canal,  it  has  been  held 
that  the  land  does  not  revert  to  the  owner  of  the  fee,  but  the  pub- 
lic easement  is  transferred  to  the  railroad  company,  and  the 
owner  of  the  fee  is  only  entitled  to  such  damages  as  are  occa- 
sioned by  the  new  use.®^  But,  if  the  public  easement  is  volun- 
tarily abandoned,  the  soil  reverts  to  the  owner  of  the  fee.  This 
right  of  reversion  is  property,  of  which  the  owner  cannot  be  de- 
prived without  compensation.  Accordingly,  where  a  railroad  ■ 
company  has  an  easement  only,  and  transfers  its  right  of  way 
to  a  municipal  corporation  for  a  street,  pursuant  to  an  authority 
given  by  the  legislature,  and  takes  up  and  removes  its  track, 
the  land  reverts  to  the  owner  of  the  fee,  and  he  can  maintain 
ejectment  therefor.^^  So  where  an  easement  is  taken  for  a 
canal  which  is  abandoned  and  the  right  of  way  transferred  to  a 
railroad  company.*^  Land  which  is  subject  to  a  ferry  landing 
may  be  used  for  a  bridge  without  further  compensation.®*  Prop- 
erty abutting  on  an  alley  cannot  be  said  to  be  damaged  by 
taking  the  alley  for  a  street,  as  the  street  affords  the  same 
privileges  as  the  alley.  ®^  A  third-class  road,  on  which  the  owner 
of  the  fee  is  allowed  to  maintain  gates,  cannot  be  changed  to  a 
second-class  road,  on  which  gates  are  not  allowed  without  further 
compensation.'®     Nor  can  a  private  road  be  made  a  public  way 

30  Atl.  511,  26  L.E.A.  323.    And  see  636,  53  N.  W.  853,  it  ia  said  that  even 

County  of  Floyd  v.  Rowe  Street  R.  R.  if  a  canal  company  has  a  fee  in  its 

Co.,  77  6a.  614.    Contra:   New  York  right  of  way,  it  cannot  transfer  the 

etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Fair  Haven  etc.  R.  same  to  a  railroad  company,  so  as  to 

R.  Co.,  70  Conn.  610.  authorize  its  use  for  railroad  pur- 

9  0La  Fayette,  Muncie  &  B.  R.  R.  poses,  without  compensation  to  those 

Co.  V.  Murdock,  68  Ind.  137;  Vought  to  whom  the  land  would  revert.    And 

V.  Columbus  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  58  Ohio  see  Whitney  v.  State  of  New  York,  96 

St.  123.  N.  Y.  240. 

siHatch  V.  Cincinnati  &  Indiana  s^Hudson  v.  Cuero  Land  &  Emi- 

R.  R.  Co.,  18  Ohio  St.  92;  Chase  v.  gration  Co.,  47  Tex.  56,  26  Am.  Rep. 

Sutton  Manufacturing  Co.,  4  Cush.  289. 
152.    But  see  note  93.  ssFagan  v.  Chicago,  84  111.  227. 

9  2Heard  v.  Brooklyn,  60  N.  Y.  242;  ssBounds  v.  Kirven,  63  Tex.  159; 

Strong  V.  Same,  68  N.  Y.  1.  Compare  Woodbridge  v.  Eastland  Co.,  70  Tex. 

cases  cited  in  last  note.  680,  8  S.  W.  Rep.  503 ;  Parker  County 

ssPittsburgh  &  Lake  Erie  R.  R.  v.  Jackson,  5  Tex.  Civ.  App.  36,  23  S. 

Co.  V.  Bruce,  102  Pa.  St.  23.    In  Tay-  W.  924. 
lor  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  83  Wis. 


§  221 


OTHEE  CASES  OF  TAKING. 


425 


without  consent  or  compensation.®'^     Where  an  irrigation  canal 
is  enlarged  and  causes  new  damage  an  action  will  lie.** 

§  221  (141a).  New  burdens  on  railroad  right  of  way. 
A  line  of  telegraph  or  telephone  on  a  railroad  right  of  way  is 
an  additional  burden,  for  which  compensation  must  be  made  to 
the  owner  of  the  fee,®*  unless  the  line  is  constructed  for  the  use 
of  the  railroad  company  in  the  operation  of  its  road  and  dispatch 
of  its  business.^  A  railroad  company  may,  from  time  to  time, 
construct  as  many  tracks  and  sidetracks  on  its  right  of  way  as 
it  deems  necessary  for  the  transaction  of  its  business.^  But 
where  a  right  of  way  is  acquired  for  main  line  only,  sidetracks 
cannot  be  laid  thereon  without  additional  compensation.^  IsTor 
can  a  railroad  company  grant  a  part  of  its  right  of  way  to  the 
use  of  another  company  as  against  the  owner  of  the  fee.*  But 
it  has  been  held  that  one  railroad  company  may  grant  the  joint 
use  of  its  tracks  to  another  company,  without  imposing  any 
additional  burden  on  the  land  or  entitling  the  owner  to  com- 
pensation.'    Where  a  right  of  way  was  condemned  through  a 


3 'Indianapolis  v.  Kingsbury,  101 
Ind.  200,  51  Am.  Rep.  749.  But  see 
Clayton  v.  County  Court,  58  W.  Va. 
253,  52  S.  E.  103,  2  L.R.A.  (N.S.) 
598. 

ssClear  Creek  Land  &  Ditch  Co.  v. 
Kilkenny,  5  Wyo.  38. 

9  9 American  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v. 
Smith,  71  Md.  535,  18  Atl.  910,  1  Am. 
R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  73;  Phillips  v. 
Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  130  N.  C.  513, 
41  S.  E.  1022,  89  Am.  St.  Rep.  868; 
Hodges  V.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co., 
133  N.  C.  225,  45  S.  E.  572;  Pittoek  v. 
Central  Dist.  &  Print.  Tel.  Co.,  31  Pa. 
Supr.  Ct.  589.  And  see  Atlantic  &  P. 
Tel.  Co.  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  6 
Biss.  158;  Mercantile  Trust  Co.  v. 
Atlantic  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  63  Fed.  513. 

iWestern  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Rich, 
19  Kan.  517.  In  this  case  it  was  held 
that  a  telegraph  was  indispensable 
for  the  safe  and  proper  operation  of 
ii  railroad,  and  that  it  made  no  dif- 
ference that  the  telegraph  was  being 
constructed  by  a  distinct  company 
and  for  the  joint  use  of  the  two  cor- 
porations. 


2East  Tenn.  V.  &  G.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Telford's  Exrs.,  89  Tenn.  293,  14  S. 
W.  776,  3  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
364 ;  Borough  of  Pottsville  v.  People's 
R.  R.  Co.,  148  Pa.  St.  175,  23  Atl.  900; 
White  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  122 
Ind.  317,  23  N.  E.  782,  7  L.R.A.  257, 
2  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  138. 

sDounisthorpe  v.  Fremont  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  30  Neb.  142,  46  N.  W.  Rep. 
240,  3  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  R«p.  172. 

4Ft.  Worth  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Jen- 
nings, 76  Tex.  373,  13  S.  W.  270,  8 
L.R.A.  180,  2  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
121;  Blakely  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  34  Neb.  284,  51  N.  W.  767,  6  Am. 
R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  262;  Piatt  v. 
Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  43  Ohio  St. 
228;  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Piatt,  47 
Ohio  St.  336,  25  N.  E.  1028. 

BMiller  v.  Green  Bay  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
59  Minn.  169,  60  N.  W.  1006,  11  Am. 
R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  246,  26  L.R.A.  443. 
And  this  is  especially  true  where  the 
statute  in  force  at  the  time  of  con- 
demnation provides  for  a  joint  use 
upon  making  compensation  to  the 
first  company.     Stevens  v.  St.  Louis 


426  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    222 

tract  of  land  abutting  on  a  river,  and  the  railroad  company  was 
afterwards  authorized  to  build  a  bridge,  with  approaches,  both 
for  railroad  and  highway  traffic,  it  was  held  that  the  latter  use 
was  an  additional  burden  on  the  soil,  entitling  the  owner  to 
compensation.®  The  substitution  of  electricity  for  steam  as  a 
motive  power  imposes  no  additional  burden  on  the  right  of  way.'^ 
The  rights  of  the  railroad  company  in  its  right  of  way,  generally, 
are  treated  in  another  connection.® 

§  222  (141b).  Joint  use  of  tracks.  It  has  never  been 
intimated  that  one  commercial  railroad  could  acquire  the  right 
to  use  the  tracks  of  another  such  railroad,  except  by  agreement 
or  an  exercise  of  the  eminent  domain  power.  And  no  such  right 
can  be  condemned  without  express  legislative  authority.'  But 
it  has  been  claimed  that  the  legislature  may  provide  for  the  joint 
use  of  street  car  tracks  under  the  police  power.  ^^  This  is  un- 
doubtedly a  mistaken  view.  For  any  damage  or  inconvenience 
resulting  from  a  legitimate  exercise  of  the  police  power,  no  com- 
pensation can  be  had.-^^  The  tracks  and  franchises  of  a  street 
railroad  company  are  private  property,  and  are  protected  by  the 
constitution,  the  same  as  any  other  property.-'*  It  necessarily 
follows  that  to  authorize  one  company  to  use  the  tracks  of  an- 
other, is  to  take  the  property  of  the  latter,  and  this  cannot  be 

Merchants  Bridge  T.  Ry.  Co.,  152  Mo.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Southern  R.  R.  Co.,  105 

212,  53  S.  W.  1066.  Mo.  562,  16  S.  W.  920,  4  Am.  R.  R.  & 

sPayne  v.  Kansas  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  Corp.  Rep.  622. 
46  Fed.  546;  Kansas  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v,  uPost,  §  243. 

Payne,  49  Fed.  114,  1  C.  C.  A.  183;  izTown  of  Areata  v.  Areata  &  M. 

Kansas  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Le  Flora,  49  R.  R.  Co.,  92  Cal.  639,  28  Pae.  676; 

Fed.  119,  1  C.  C.  A.  192.  Citizens'  Horse  R.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of 

7Howley  v.  Central  Valley  R.  R.  Belleville,  47  111.  App.  388;  City  of 

Co.,  213  Pa.  St.  36,  62  Atl.  109.  Belleville  v.  Citizens'  Horse  R.  R.  Co., 

sPost,  §§  845-860.  152  111.  171,  38  N.  E.  584,  26  L.R.A. 

9Minneapolis  &  St.  Louis  R.  R.  Co.  681;   Chicago  General  R.  R.   Co.   v. 

V.  Minneapolis  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  61  Chicago  City  R.  R.  Co.,  10  Nat.  Corp. 

Minn.  502,  63  N.  W.  1035.    And  see  Rep.  651;  Covington  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

State  V.  Jacksonville  Terminal  Co.,  Covington   &    Cinn.    St.    R.   R.    Co. 

41  Fla.  377,  27  So.  225.  (Ky.),  19  Am.  Law  Reg.  (N.S.)  265; 

loBooth  street  Ry.  Law,  §§  110,  S.  C,  1  Ky.  Law  Rep.  341;  Canal  & 

115;  Covington  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cov-  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Orleans  R.  R.  Co.,  44  La. 

ington  &  Cinn.  St.  R.  R.  Co.   (Ky.),  An.  54,  10  So.  389;  People  v.  O'Brien, 

19  Am.  L.  Reg.  (N.S.)  765;  Canal  &  111  N.  Y.  1,  7  Am.  St.  Rep.  684,  2 

C.   St.  R.   R.   Co.,  v.   Crescent  City  L.R.A.  255;  Brooklyn  Central  R.  R. 

R.    R.    Co.,    41    La.  An.  561,  C  So.  Co.  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  R.  Co.,  32 

849;  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wade,  91  Barb.  358;  Kinsman  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Cal.  449,  27  Pao.  768 ;  Union  Depot  Broadway  &  iST.  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  36  Ohio 


§  222 


OTHEK  OASES  OF  TAKING. 


427 


done  without  compensation.^^  In  many  cases  the  right  is  re- 
served when  the  original  grant  is  made,  to  permit  other  com- 
panies to  use  the  tracks,  on  specified  terms  and  conditions.^* 
In  Pennsylvania  it  is  held  that  a  joint  use  of  street  car  tracks 
cannot  be  authorized,  as  it  is  taking  the  property  of  one  corpo- 
ration to  be  devoted  to  the  same  public  use  by  another  corpora- 
tion.-'^ In  case  of  a  corporation  organized  to  provide  depot  and 
terminal  facilities  to  railroads  in  Jacksonville,  it  was  held  by 
the  supreme  court  of  Florida,  that  it  could  be  compelled  to  furn- 


St.  239;  Toledo  Consolidated  St.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Toledo  Electric  St.  E.  R. 
Co.,  50  Ohio  St.  603,  36  N.  E.  312;  S. 
C.  6  Ohio  C.  C.  362;  Jersey  City  & 
Hoboken  Horse  R.  R.  Co.  t.  Jersey 
City  &  Bergen  R.  R.  Co.,  21  N.  J.  Eq. 
550;  S.  C.  20  N.  J.  Eq.  61;  Camden 
Horse  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Citizens'  Coach 
Co.,  28  N.  J.  Eq.  145;  S.  C.  29  N.  J. 
Eq.  299,  31  N.  J.  Eq.  525,  33  N.  J.  Eq. 
267;  Union  Pass  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Conti- 
nental R.  R.  Co.,  11  Phila.  321;  City 
of  Houston  V.  Houston  City  St.  R.  R. 
Co.,  83  Tex.  548,  19  S.  W.  127,  6  Am. 
R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  106.  Compare  Lake 
Roland  El.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Balti- 
more, 77  Md.  352,  26  Atl.  510,  20 
L.R.A.  126,  7  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
619;  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wade,  91 
Cal.  449,  27  Pac.  768,  25  Am.  St.  Rep. 
201. 

isCovington  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cov- 
ington &  Cinn.  St.  R.  R.  Co.  (Ky.), 
19  Am.  L.  Reg.  (N.S.)  765;  Louis- 
ville City  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Central  Pass. 
R.  R.  Co.,  87  Ky.  223,  8  S.  W.  329; 
Canal  &  C.  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Crescent 
City  R.  R.  Co.,  41  La.  An.  561,  6  So. 
849 ;  Canal  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Orleans 
R.  R.  Co.,  44  La.  An.  54,  10  So.  389; 
Canal  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  St.  Charles 
St.  R.  R.  Co.,  44  La.  An.  1069,  11  So. 
702;  Canal  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Crescent 
City  R.  R.  Co.,  44  La.  An.  485,  10  So. 
888;  New  Orleans  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Canal  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  47  La.  An.  1476, 
17  So.  834,  12  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
590;  Crescent  City  R.  R.  Co.  v.  New 


Orleans  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  48  La.  An.  856, 

19  So.  868;  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  63  Md. 
263;  North  Baltimore  Pass.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  North  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.,  76  Md.  233, 
23  Atl.  466;  Jersey  City  &  Hoboken 
Horse  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Jersey  City  &  Ber- 
gen R.  R.  Co.,  21  N.  J.  Eq.  550;  S.  C. 

20  N.  J.  Eq.  61 ;  Sixth  Ave.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Kerr,  72  N.  Y.  330;  Sixth  Ave.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Kerr,  45  Barb.  138;  Brook- 
lyn Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Brooklyn 
City  R.  R.  Co.,  32  Barb.  358;  Kins- 
man St.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Broadway  &  N. 
St.  R.  R.  Co.,  36  Ohio  St.  239;  Toledo 
Consol.  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Toledo  Elec- 
tric St.  R.  R.  Co.,  50  Ohio  St.  603,  36 
N.  E.  312;  S.  C.  6  Ohio  C.  C.  362; 
Union  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Continental 
R.  R.  Co.,  11  Phila.  321 ;  2  Dill.  Mun. 
Corp.  §  727. 

"Grand  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Lindell 
R.  R.  Co.,  148  Mo.  637;  Grand  Ave. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Citizens'  R.  R.  Co.,  148 
Mo.  665.  The  subject  of  the  joint  use 
of  tracks  will  be  found  treated  in  its 
various  phases  in  note  to  Grand  Ave. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  People's  R.  R.  Co.,  12 
Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  594,  603. 

isPhiladelphia  etc.  St.  Ry.  Co.'s 
Petition,  203  Pa.  St.  354,  53  Atl.  191 ; 
Commonwealth  v.  Uwchlan  St.  Ry. 
Co.,  203  Pa.  St.  608,  53  Atl.  513. 
So  one  company  cannot  be  authorized 
to  straddle  the  tracks  of  another. 
Commonwealth  v.  Bond,  214  Pa.  St. 
307,  63  Atl.  741,  112  Am.  St.  Rep. 
745. 


428  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    223 

ish  its  facilities  to  a  particular  railroad  upon  a  compensation 
fixed  by  the  railroad  commissioners,  and  that  this  was  an  exer- 
cise of  the  police  power  and  not  of  the  eminent  domain,  and  that 
the  compensation  need  not  be  fixed  by  twelve  men  as  required  by 
the  constitution  in  case  of  an  appropriation  to  public  use.^® 

§  223  (142).  Interfering  with  an  easement.  We  have 
already  seen  that  to  interfere  with  or  destroy  any  right  appurte- 
nant to  property  is  a  taking  within  the  constitution.-^'^  We  have 
heretofore  treated  only  of  those  natural  rights  appurtenant  to 
land  which  may  be  interfered  with  by  works  upon  adjacent 
land.  But  one  may  have  annexed  to  his  land  easements  in  the 
land  of  others,  derived  by  grant  or  prescription.  Such  ease- 
ments cannot  be  destroyed  or  impaired  by  public  works  without 
compensation.^*  This  principle  is  well  illustrated  by  the  case 
of  Arnold  v.  Hudson  River  R.  R.  Co.^®  Arnold  was  the  o-wner 
of  a  factory,  with  the  right  to  take  water  from  a  pond  at  some 
distance  from  his  factory  and  convey  it  thereto,  over  the  land 
of  another,  in  a  race  way  or  trunk,  either  over  or  under  the 
ground.  For  this  purpose  Arnold  had  built  and  had  in  use  a 
trunk  some  six  feet  above  the  ground.  The  defendant,  having 
acquired  title  to  a  portion  of  the  intervening  lands,  took  down 
the  trunk,  laid  it  beneath  the  ground  and  its  tracks,  and  then 
raised  the  water  by  means  of  a  penstock  into  the  old  trunk. 
Arnold  permitted  this  to  be  done  on  the  assurance  of  the  com- 
pany's agent  that  it  would  make  the  watercourse  as  good  as  for- 
merly, and  also  keep  the  same  in  repair.  The  water  power  was 
impaired,  and  the  expense  of  repairs  was  increased.  It  was 
held  that  the  easement  was  property  within  the  constitution, 
and  that  the  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  compensation.     The  prin- 

1  estate  v.  Jacksonville  Terminal  Ann  Arbor  R.  E.  Co.,141  Mich.  84, 104 
Co.,  41  Fla.  377,  27  So.  225.  N.  W.  375;  Detroit  Leather  Specialty 
T-TAnte,  §  65.  Co.  v.  Mich.  Cent.  E,.  E.  Co.,  149 
isstricklerv.  Colorado  Springs,  18  Mich.  588,  113  N.  W.  14;  Willey  v. 
Col.  61,  26  Pac.  313,  25  Am.  St.  Rep.  Norfolk  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  96  N.  C. 
245;  Spencer  v.  New  York  etc.  E.  E.  408;  NeflF  v.  Penn.  E.  E.  Co.,  202  Pa. 
Co.,  62  Conn.  242,  25  Atl.  350;  In-  St.  371,  51  Atl.  1038;  Alexandria  etc. 
dianapolis  &  Cumberland  Gravel  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Faunce,  31  Gratt  761. 
Eoad  Co.  V.  Belt  Ey.  Co.,  110  Ind.  5 ;  See  Kingsland  v.  New  York,  110  N. 
De  Lander  r.  Baltimore  Co.,  94  Md.  Y.  569,  18  N.  E.  Rep.  435. 
1,  50  Atl.  427;  Munn  v.  Boston,  183  1955  N.  Y.  661.  See  aUo,  for  corn- 
Mass.  421,  67  N.  E.  312;  Levi  v.  ments  on  same  ease.  Story  v.  N.  Y. 
Worcester  Consol.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  193  Elevated  R.  R.  Co.,  90  N.  Y.,  p.  149, 
s.  116,  78  N.  E.  853;  Hyman  v.  43  Am.  Rep.  146. 


§  224 


OTHEE  CASES  OF  TAKING. 


429 


ciple  of  this  case  will  apply  to  all  easements.^"  One  who  has  a 
mere  parol  license  to  hunt  and  fish  over  lands  has  no  such  inter- 
est as  entitles  him  to  compensation  for  interference  by  a  railroad 
company.  ^^ 

§  224.  Restrictive  covenants.  When  one  conveys  a  tract 
of  land  upon  condition  that  it  shall  not  be  used  in  a  certain  way 
and  this  condition  is  imposed  for  the  benefit  of  the  remaining 
lands  of  the  grantor,  the  latter  has  an  interest  in  the  tract  con- 
veyed in  the  nature  of  an  easement  and  may  prevent  a  violation 
of  the  condition.^^  And  where  the  owner  of  a  tract  conveys  dif- 
ferent portions  to  different  grantors  and  imposes  the  same  re- 
striction upon  the  use  in  each  conveyance,  not  only  does  the 
grantor  have  an  interest  in  each  part  conveyed,  appurtenant  to 
the  part  not  conveyed,  but  each  purchaser  acquires  a  similar  in- 
terest in  all  the  other  tracts  so  conveyed  and  may  enforce  the 
restriction  as  to  such  tracts.^'  When  property  subject  to  a  re- 
strictive covenant  is  taken  for  public  use,  the  owner  of  the  prop- 
erty for  whose  benefit  the  restriction  is  imposed,  is  entitled  to 
compensation.  Thus  where  the  owners  of  lots  covenant  that 
certain  portions  of  the  lots  shall  not  be  built  upon  or  occupied 


soSo  of  rights  appurtenant,  as  the 
right  obtained  from  a  city  to  extend 
a  pier  into  navigable  water.  Matter 
of  New  York,  193  N.  Y.  503,  reversing 
121  App.  Div.  702.  See,  in  this  con- 
nection, Boston  Gas  Light  Co.  v.  Old 
Colony  &  Newport  Ey.  Co.,  14  Allen 
444;  McSweeney  v.  Commonwealth, 
185  Mass.  371,  70  N.  E.  429. 

2iBird  V.  Great  Eastern  Ry.  Co., 
34  L.  J.  C.  P.  366. 

2  2Trustees  of  Colimibia  College  v. 
Lynch,  70  N.  Y.  440;  Same  v. 
Thatcher,  87  N.  Y.  311;  Hodge  v. 
Sloan,  107  N.  Y.  244;  Rowland  v.  Mil- 
ler, 139  N.  Y.  93,  34  N.  E.  765,  22 
L.R.A.  182;  Meigs  v.  Milligan,  177 
Pa.  St.  66,  35  Atl.  600. 

2  3In  Evans  v.  Foss,  194  Mass.  513, 
80  N.  E.  587,  9  L.R.A.(N.S.)  1039, 
which  was  a  bill  to  enforce  a  restrict- 
ive covenant  against  carrying  on  any 
business  offensive  to  the  occupants  of 
dwelling  houses,  the  court  says;  "It 
is  a  familiar  principle  of  law,  which 


has  been  applied  in  many  cases,  that 
when  one  makes  deeds  of  different 
portions  of  a  tract  of  land,  each  con- 
taining the  same  restriction  upon  the 
lot  conveyed,  which  is  imposed  as  a 
part  of  a  general  plan  for  the  benefit 
of  the  several  lots,  such  restriction 
not  only  imposes  a  liability  upon  the 
grantee  of  each  lot  as  between  him 
and  the  grantor,  but  it  gives  him  a 
right  in  the  nature  of  an  easement, . 
which  will  be  enforced  in  equity 
against  the  grantee  of  one  of  the 
other  lots,  although  there  is  no  direct, 
contractual  relation  between  the  two. 
Through  the  common  character  of  the 
deeds  the  grantees  are  given  an  in- 
terest in  a  contractual  stipulation 
which  is  made  for  their  common  bene- 
fit." p.  515.  To  same  effect:  Simp- 
son V.  Mikkelsen,  196  111.  575,  63  N. 
E.  1036;  Tobey  v.  Moore,  130  Mass. 
448;  Jeffries  v.  Jeffries,  117  Mass. 
184;  Sanborn  v.  Rice,  129  Mass.  387; 
Jackson  v.  Stevenson,  156  Mass.  496. 


430  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    225 

with  buildings  above  a  certain  height,  each  acquires  an  easement 
of  light,  air  and  prospect  in  the  lots  of  the  other  covenantors,  and 
when  some  are  taken  for  a  court-house  free  of  any  easements,  the 
owners  of  the  others  are  entitled  to  compensation.^*  In  another 
case  a  man  owning  a  tract  of  land  opened  a  street  through  it  and 
laid  out  the  part  on  one  side  for  a  private  park  or  recreation 
ground  and  on  the  other  into  building  lots.  These  lots  were 
sold  to  divers  parties  subject  to  a  covenant  not  to  erect  or  permit 
to  be  erected  thereon  any  erection  or  -building  of.  any  kind  nearer 
to  the  street  than  a  certain  building  line  and  not  to  erect  any 
buildings  on  the  land  conveyed  other  than  dwelling  houses 
fronting  on  the  street  of  a  specified  value.  A  railroad  com- 
pany took  the  lots  and  built  an  embankment  thereon  for  its 
tracks  which  encroached  on  the  building  line.  It  was  held  that 
the  grantor  was  entitled  to  compensation  for  the  destruction  of 
the  restrictive  covenants  and  a  very  substantial  judgment  was 
affirmed.^®  In  case  of  land  platted  and  sold  for  summer  resi- 
dences on  the  seashore,  the  deeds  contained  restrictive  covenants 
which  forbade  the  use  of  the  property  for  many  objectionable 
trades  and  businesses  specified  by  name  or  for  any  other  noxious, 
dangerous  or  offensive  trade  or  business  whatever.  In  a  pro- 
ceeding by  the  United  States  to  condemn  a  part  of  the  lots  for 
the  public  defense,  it  was  held  that  the  covenants  related  to 
private  uses  and  would  not  be  infringed  by  the  use  proposed.  ^^ 
In  the  same  case,  some  squares  or  grounds  dedicated  as  public 
parks  were  taken,  and  it  was  held  that  lot  owners  who  had  a 
right  to  insist  upon  the  preservation  of  the  parks,  were  entitled 
to  compensation.*'^ 

§  225  (143).  Possessory  rights  in  public  lands.  One 
having  the  mere  naked  possession  of  public  lands  is  not  entitled 
to  compensation  when  the  same  are  taken  for  public  use.** 
The  fact  that  such  a  person  has  a  right  to  pre-empt  or  intends 

2  4Ladd  V.  Boston,  151  Mass.  585,  112  Fed.  622;     Wharton    v.  United 

24  N.  E.  858,  21  Am.  St.  Rep.  585.  States,  153  Fed.  876,  83  C.  C.  A.  58. 

2ELong  Eaton  Recreation  Grounds  27fifee  11  Cyc.  1051. 

Co.  V.  Midland  Ry.  Co.  (1902)  K.  B.  2  8Allard  v.  Loban,  3  Martin,  La. 

574.     "There  is  in  this  case  a  nega-  N.  S.  293  ;  Doran  v.  Central  Pacific  R. 

tive  easement  adding  to  the  monetary  R.  Co.,  24  Cal.  245 ;  Hobart  v.  Ford, 

value  of  the  estate.    Why  that  should  *  Nev.  77;  Rosa  v.  Missouri,  Kansas 

not  be  the  subject  of  compensation  it  &    Texas    Ry.    Co.,     18     Kan.     124. 

is  difficult  to  conceive."    Mathew  L.  Contra:   Cal.  Northern  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

J.,  p.  585.  Gould,  21  Cal.  254. 

2  6United  States  v.  Certain  Lands, 


§    226  OTHEE  CASES  OS'  TAKING.  431 

to  do  SO,  is  immaterial,  unless  he  has  actually  taken  steps,  by 
entry  and  payment,  to  secure  his  right.^^  If  the  right  of  way 
through  public  lands  is  granted  to  a  railroad  company,  one  sub- 
sequently acquiring  title  thereto  takes  subject  to  such  right  of 
way.^"  But  it  has  been  held  that  one  having  growing  crops 
upon  public  lands  is  entitled  to  compensation  for  injury  there- 
to." 

§  226  (144).  Mapping  Territory  into  streets  and 
blocks  for  future  improvements.  It  has  been  a  common  prac- 
tice in  the  older  cities  for  the  legislature  to  authorize  the  public 
authorities  to  make  a  map  of  vacant  lands,  indicating  the  loca- 
tion of  streets,  alleys  and  public  grounds  for  future  improve- 
ment, and  to  provide  that  when  the  streets  are  opened  they  shall 
be  opened  as  designated  on  the  map,  and  that  no  improvements 
shall  be  placed  upon  the  parts  designated  as  streets  or  public 
grounds.  It  is  evident  that,  if  such  an  act  is  valid,  the  owner 
would  be  deprived  or  at  least  greatly  restricted  in  the  enjoyment 
of  one  of  the  most  valuable  rights  of  property,  without  any  com- 
pensation, viz. :  the  right  of  user.  Consequently,  so  much  of 
such  an  act  as  restricts  the  right  to  make  improvements  is  void, 
and  when  such  streets  are  opened  the  owners  of  property  taken 
are  entitled  to  compensation  precisely  the  same  as  though  the 
streets  had  not  been  previously  designated.^  ^  The  mere  making 
of  such  a  map  or  plat  does  not  affect  any  right  of  property,  and 

ssWestem   Pacific   R.   R.    Co.   v.  419;  Baltimore  v.  Hook,  62  Md.  371; 

Kerr,    41    Cal.    489;     Hamilton    v.  State  v.  Carragan,  36  N.  J.  L.  62; 

Spokane  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Idaho  898,  Forster  v.  Scott,  136  N.  Y.  577,  32  N. 

28  Pac.  408.     See  Denver  etc.  R.  R.  E.  976,  18  L.R.A.  543,  affirming  S.  C. 

Co.  V.  Wilson,  28  Colo.  6,  62  Pac.  843;  60  N.  Y.  Supr.  313;  In  re  44th  St.,  7 

Union  Pae.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Harris,  76  Pa.  Co.  Ct.,  69;  Warren  v.  Bunnell, 

Kan.  255,  91  Pac.  68;  Jamestown  etc.  11  Vt.  600;  Paine  Lumber  Co.  v.  City 

R.  R.  Co.  V.  Jones,  7  N.  D.  619,  76  of  Oshkosh,  86  Wis.  397,  56  N.  W. 

N.  W.  227;  Slaight  v.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  1088;  and    see    Beidler's    Appeal,  1 

Co.,  39  Wash.  576,  81  Pac.  1062.  Monaghan  (Pa.  Supm.  Ct.)  336;  Ger- 

soDavis  V.  East  Tenn.  &  Ga.  R.  R.  man-American    Real     Est.     Co.    v. 

Co.,  1  Sneed  94.  Meyers,  32  App.  Div.  N.  Y.  41. 

siGillan   v.   Hutchinson,   16   Cal.         Such  an   act   waa   held   valid   in 

K3 ;    Rosa    v.  Missouri,  Kansas    &  New   York   on  the  ground  that  it  was 

Texas  Ry.  Co.,  18  Kan.  124.  passed  before  there  was  any  limita- 

3  2Terrill   v.    Town   of   Bloomfield  tion  in  the  constitution  of  that  State 

(Ky.),  21  S.  W.  1041;  Moale  v.  Bal-  upon  the  power  of  eminent  domain, 

timore,  5  Md.  314,  61  Am.  Dec.  276;  and  compensation  fbr  improvements 

Stewart  v.  Baltimore,  7  Md.  500 ;  Bal-  placed  within  the  lines  of  a  proposed 

timore  v.  St.  Agnes'  Hospital,  48  Md.  street  was  denied,  although  the  atvee!; 


432 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


§    226 


is  not  a  taking.*^  l^or  does  the  filing  of  such  a  map  under  such 
a  statute  constitute  any  incumbrance  upon  the  land  designated 
as  a  street,  and  a  vendee  cannot  successfully  object  to  the  title 
on  that  ground.**  If  the  owner  conveys  with  reference  to  such 
map  or  plat,  he  thereby  adopts  the  same  and  dedicates  for  public 
use  so  much  of  his  land  as  is  thereon  designated  for  streets  and 
public  places,*®  and  when  they  are  afterwards  opened  for  use 
is  entitled  only  to  nominal  damages.*®  The  failure  of  a  city 
to  open  streets  which  have  been  projected  does  not  render  it 
liable  to  one  who  has  built  on  the  supposition  that  that  would 
be  done.*^ 


was  not  actually  laid  out  until  seven- 
teen years  after  the  map  was  made. 
Matter  of  Furman  Street,  17  Wend. 
649.  This  case  was  followed  in  Penn- 
sylvania without  noticing  the  ground 
on  which  it  rested.  Forbes  Street,  70 
Pa.  St.  125;  see  also  District  of  City 
of  Pittsburgh,  2  W.  &  S.  320;  In  re 
Sedgeley  Avenue,  88  Pa.  St.  509; 
Matter  of  Snyder  Avenue,  14  Phil. 
346;  Matter  of  127th  Street,  56 
How.  Pr.  60. 

ssDistrict  of  Columbia  v.  Armes,  8 
App.  Cas.  D.  C.  393;  State  v.  Sey- 
mour, 35  N.  J.  L.  47 ;  New  York  Cen- 
tral etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  HafiFen,  90  Hun 
260,  35  N.  Y.  Supp.  806;  Singer  v. 
New  York,  47  App.  Div.  42,  62  N.  Y. 
S.  347;  S.  C.  affirmed,  165  N.  Y.  658, 
59  N.  E.  1130;  District  of  City  of 
Pittsburgh,  2  W.  &  S.  320;  Burch  v. 
City  of  McKeesport,  166  Pa.  St.  57, 
30  Atl.  1023;  South  Twelfth  Street, 
217  Pa.  St.  362,  66  Atl.  568.  But  see 
State  V.  Hudson  County  Ave.  Corns., 
37  N.  J.  L.  12. 

3  4Forster  v.  Scott,  136  N.  Y.  577, 
32  N.  E.  976,  18  L.E.A.  543,  affirming 
S.  C.  60  N.  Y.  Supr.  Ct.  313;  Singer 
V.  New  York,  47  App.  Div.  42,  62  N. 
Y.  S.  347;  S.  C.  affirmed,  165  N.  Y 
658,  59  N.  E.  1130.  In  the  opinion  of 
the  Court  of  Appeals  in  the  former 
case  it  is  said :  "Whenever  a  law  de- 
prives the  owner  of  the  beneficial  use 
and  free  enjoyment  of  his  property. 


or  imposes  restraints  upon  such  use 
and  enjoyment  that  materially  affect 
its  value,  without  legal  process  or 
compensation,  it  deprives  him  of  his 
property,  within  the  meaning  of  the 
constitution.  All  that  is  beneficial  in 
property  arises  from  its  use  and  the 
fruits  of  that  use,  and  whatever  de- 
prives a  person  of  them  deprives  him 
of  all  that  may  be  desirable  or  valu- 
able in  the  title  or  possession.  It  is 
not  necessary,  in  order  to  render  a 
statute  obnoxious,  to  the  restraints 
of  the  constitution,  that  it  must,  in 
terms  or  in  effect,  authorize  an  actual 
physical  taking  of  the  property  or  the 
thing  itself,  so  long  as  it  affects  its 
free  use  and  enjoyment,  or  the  power 
of  disposition  at  the  will  of  the 
owner.  •  •  •  As  the  plaintiff  in 
the  case  at  bar  was  virtually  de- 
prived of  the  right  to  build  upon  his 
lot  by  the  statute  in  question,  and  as 
this  circumstance  obviously  impaired 
its  value,  and  interfered  with  his 
power  of  disposition,  it  was  to  that 
extent  void  as  to  him,  and  created  no 
incumbrance  upon  it." 

sBClark  v.  City  of  Elizabeth,  37  N. 
J.  L.  120;  Matter  of  Furman  Street, 
17  Wend.  649. 

ziSee  cases  in  last  note  and  post, 
§  743;  and  see  Morris  Canal  Co.  v. 
Jersey  City,  12  N.  J.  Eq.  252;  Same 
on  appeal,  p.  547. 

3  7Collins  V.  Savannah,  77  Ga.  745. 


§    228  OTHEE  CASES  OF  TAKING.  433 

§  227  (144a).  Establishing  building  lines.  The  at- 
tempt by  statute  or  ordinance  to  establish  building  lines  on  a 
street,  whereby  the  abutting  owners  are  prohibited  from  placing 
any  building  within  a  specified  distance  of  the  street  line,  is 
similar  to  the  practice  noticed  in  the  last  section.  Such  a  law 
deprives  the  owner  of  the  lawful  use  of  his  property,  and 
amounts  to  a  taking  thereof  within  the  meaning  of  the  consti- 
tution, and,  consequently,  can  only  be  carried  out  by  making 
provision  for  the  compensation  of  the  owner.^*  In  commenting 
upon  such  an  ordinance,  the  supreme  court  of  Missouri,  in  the 
case  cited,  says :  "The  day  before  the  ordinance  went  into  opera- 
tion defendant  had  the  unquestionable  right  to  build  at  will  on 
his  lot.  The  day  afterwards  he  was  as  effectually  prevented 
from  building  on  the  forty  feet  strip,  except  under  the  peril  of 
punishment,  as  if  the  city  had  built  a  wall  around  it,  and  this, 
too,  without  any  form  of  notice,  any  species  of  judicial  inquiry, 
or  any  tender  of  compensation.  If  this  is  not  a  'taking'  by  mere 
arbitrary  edict,  it  is  difficult  to  express  in  words  the  meaning 
which  should  characterize  the  act  of  the  city." 

§  228  (145).  Justifiable  entries.  One  of  the  constituent 
rights  of  property  in  land  is  the  right  of  exclusion,  that  is,  the 
right  to  exclude  others  from  its  possession  and  enjoyment.  This 
right,  however,  is  not  absolute,  but  is  subject  to  certain  overrul- 
ing necessities.  Thus  an  entry  upon  land  will  be  justified,  not 
only  without  consent  of  the  owner,  but  even  against  his  positive 
prohibition,  if  necessary  to  escape  bodily  harm  or  secure  prop- 
erty which  is  found  there  without  the  privity  or  fault  of  its 
owner.  If  a  highway  is  impassable,  one  may  go  round  the 
obstruction  on  private  property.*®  All  such  entries,  however, 
are  limited  by  the  necessities  of  the  case  and  must  be  made  with 
the  least  possible  injury,  and  continued  for  only  a  reasonable 
time.**  A  somewhat  similar  necessity  justifies  an  entry  on 
private  property  for  the  purpose  of  making  preliminary  surveys. 

See  also  Funke  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  3  9Morey  v.  Fitzgerald,  56  Vt.  487, 

122  Mo.  132,  26  S.  W.  1034.  56  Am.  Eep.  538;  Campbell  v.  Race,  7 

asCity  of  St.   Louis  v.  Hill,   116  Cush.  408,  54  Am.  Dec.  728;   2  Bl. 

Mo.  527,  22  S.  W.  861,  8  Am.  R.  R.  &  Com.  37 ;  Ball  v.  Herbert,  3  T.  R.  253 ; 

Corp.  Rep.  422;  People  v.  Calder,  89  Ruch  v.  New  Orleans,  43  La.  An.  275, 

App.   Div.   503,   85  N.   Y.   S.   1015;  9  So.  473. 

Hawkins  v.  Pittsburg,  220  Pa.  St.  7,  40Orr  v.  Quimby,  54  N.  H.  590. 
69  Atl.  283.    See  Byrnes  v.  Riverton, 
64  N.  J.  L.  210,  44  Atl.  857. 
Em.  D. — 28. 


434:  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    228 

Unless  this  was  allowable  it  would  be  almost  impossible  to  con- 
struct a  public  work,  such  as  a  railway  or  canal.  It  has  accord- 
ingly been  held  that  an  entry  for  preliminary  surveys  is  not  a 
taking,  but  may  be  justified  on  the  ground  of  necessity.*^  Such 
an  entry  has  been  held  not  to  be  a  taking  for  which  compensation 
must  be  first  made.*^  If  possession  be  continued  an  unreason- 
able time,  or  any  unnecessary  damage  is  done,  the  persons  mak- 
ing or  authorizing  the  entry  become  trespassers  ai>  initio.*^ 
The  possession  gained  by  such  entry  cannot  be  continued  for  the 
purpose  of  construction,**  or  the  prosecution  of  experimental 
works.*^  And  so,  on  the  same  ground,  and  subject  to  the  same 
limitations,  an  entry  upon  private  property  is  justifiable  for 
the  purpose  of  measuring  or  establishing  public  boundaries,*® 
or  for  making  coast  surveys  by  the  general  government.*'^  But 
this  right  does  not  justify  the  inflicting  of  substantial  and  per- 
manent damage.  And  where  an  act  provided  for  the  survey 
and  marking  of  the  boundary  between  two  counties  and  the 
state  engineer,  in  pursuance  of  the  act,  entered  upon  a  large 
estate  and  cut  a  path  through  the  forest  from  five  to  twenty-five 
feet  wide  and  more  than  three  miles  long,  to  be  used  as  a  base 
line  in  determining  the  boundary,  it  was  held  that  the  damage 
was  such  as  could  not  be  inflicted  without  compensation  and  as 
the  act  made  no  provision  therefor,  the  engineer  and  his  assist- 
ants were  held  liable  in  trespass.**  It  has  been  held  in  Penn- 
sylvania that  the  temporary  occupation  of  private  property  ad- 
jacent to  a  railroad  by  shanties,  stables,  shops,  etc.,  during  the 
construction  of  the  road,  was  justifiable  without  compensation.*® 
In  the  opinion  of  the  court,  the  question  is  treated  as  one  of 

4lCushman  v.  Smith,  34  Me.  247;  Cal.  528;  Cushman  v.  Smith,  34  Me. 

Orr  V.  Quimby,  54  IST.  H.  590,  596;  247. 

Polly  V.  Saratoga  etc.  K.  E.  Co.,  9  <  SMorris  &  Essex  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Hud- 
Barb.  449;  Bonaparte  v.  Camden  &  son  Tunnel  E.  E.  Co.,  25  N.  J.  Eq. 
Amboy  E.  E.   Co.,  Bald.   205,  225;  384,  388. 

Stuart  V.  Baltimore,  7  Md.  500,  516;  "Winslow  v.  Gifford,  6  Gush.  327; 

State  V.  Seymour,  35  N.  J.  L.  47,  53;  Litchfield  v.  Pond,  186  N.  Y.  66,  78 

Walther  v.  Warner,  25  Mo.  277.  N.  E.  719,  reversing  S.  C.  105  App. 

42State  V.  Simons,  145  Ala.  95,  40  Div.  229,  93  N.  Y.  S.  1016. 

So.  662.  -4  70rr  v.  Quimby,  54  N.  H.  590,  596, 

iiSee  last  note;   also  Bellingham  isLitchfield  v.  Pond,  186  N.  Y.  66, 

Bay  E.  &  N.  Co.  v.  Loose,  2  Wash.  78  N.  E.  719,  reversing  S.  C.  105  App. 

500,  27  Pac.  174.  Div.  229,  93  N.  Y.  S.  1016. 

4  4Davis  V.  San  Lorenzo  E.  E.  Co.,  4  9Landerbrun  v.  Duffy,  2  Pa.  St. 

47  Cal.  517 ;  California  &  Pacific  E.  398. 
E.  Co.  V.  Central  Pacific  E.  E.  Co.,  47 


229 


OTHEE  CASES  OF  TAKING. 


435 


statutory  construction  merely.     It  seems  to  us  that  such  an  in- 
trusion is  prohibited  by  the  constitution.''*' 

§  229  (146).  Injuries  by  blasting.  It  is  a  common  prac- 
tice in  the  construction  of  a  railroad  or  other  public  "work  to 
resort  to  blasting,  in  consequence  of  which  fragments  of  rock 
are  frequently  projected  beyond  the  limits  of  the  company's 
land.  Casting  rock  upon  a  man's  land  is  a  violation  of  his  right 
of  exclusion.  All  the  authorities  agree  that  there  must  be  com- 
pensation for  such  damages.  But  some  cases  hold  that  such  com- 
pensation is  included  in  the  original  award,  and  that  a  separate 
action  therefor  will  not  lie.°^  Other  cases  hold  the  contrary 
doctrine,  which  seems  to  us  the  better  rule."^  One  from  whom 
no  land  has  been  taken,  and  who  consequently  has  received  no 
award  of  compensation,  would  be  entitled  to  recover  for  such 
damages  within  the  principle  of  either  class  of  cases.^^    Debris 


50St.  Peter  v.  Denison,  58  N.  Y. 
416,  17  Am.  Rep.  258. 

eiSabin  v.  Vermont  Central  E.  R. 
Co.,  25  Vt.-  363;  Dodge  v.  County 
Commissioners  of  Essex,  3  Met.  380; 
Brown  v.  Providence,  Warren  & 
Bristol  R.  R.  Co.,  5  Gray  35;  White- 
house  V.  Androscoggin  R.  R.  Co.,  52 
Me.  208;  see  also  Tibbetts  v.  Knox  & 
Lincoln  R.  R.  Co.,  62  Me.  437 ;  Eaton 
V.  E.  &  N.  A.  Ry.  Co.,  59  Me.  520,  8 
Am.  Rep.  430.  In  Blackwell  v. 
Lynchburg  &  D.  R.  R.  Co.,  Ill  N.  C. 
151,  16  S.  E.  12,  32  Am.  St.  Rep.  786, 
which  was  a  suit  for  injury  to  plain- 
tiff by  a  rock  projected  200  yards 
from  the  place  of  the  blast,  the  court 
says:  "Excavating  by  blasting  is 
one  of  the  approved  methods  of  con- 
structing a  railway,  and  the  prudent 
use  of  such  an  agency  in  removing 
hard  material  is  always  deemed  to 
have  been  in  contemplation  when  the 
damage  was  assessed  for  the  right  of 
way,  as  a  necessai-y  incident  to  the 
privilege.  But  when  damage  is  done 
to  the  land  of  the  owner,  adjacent  to 
that  within  the  condemned  boundary, 
if  it  results  from  managing  or  hand- 
ling explosive  material  carelessly  or 
unskillfully,  or  from  the  unnecessary 


use  of  such  as  is  so  powerful  that  the 
injury  might  be  expected  to  follow  as 
a  natural  or  probable  consequence, 
the  corporation  is  answerable  in  a 
new  action.  «  *  »  We  do  not 
think  that  the  privilege  of  throwing 
stones  through  the  air  200  or  more 
yards,  and  beyond  the  right  of  way, 
so  as  to  endanger  the  lives  of  the 
owners  of  adjacent  land  and  of  the 
members  of  their  families,  when  en- 
gaged in  their  domestic  duties  in  and 
around  their  dwelling  house,  passes 
with  the  right  of  way,  as  a  necessary 
incident  to  the  casement."  The  same 
observations  would  apply  in  ease  of 
injury  to  property. 

52Hay  V.  Cohoes  Co.,  2  N.  Y.  159, 
51  Am.  Dec.  284;  S.  C.  3  Barb.  42; 
Tremain  v.  Same,  2  N.  Y.  163;  St. 
Peter  v.  Denison,  58  N.  Y.  416, 17  Am. 
Rep.  258;  Carman  v.  Indiana  R.  R. 
Co.,  4  Ohio  St.  399.  As  to  the  lia- 
bility of  the  company  for  such  dam- 
ages where  the  work  is  done  by  a  eon- 
tractor,  compare  last  case  holding 
that  it  is,  and  last  two  cases  of  last 
note  holding  that  it  is  not. 

5  3FitzSimons  &  Connell  Co.  v. 
Braun,  199  111.  390,  65  N.  E.  249,  59 
L.R.A.  421;  Chicago  v.  Murdock,  212 


436  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    229 

thus  cast  upon  adjoining  land  must  be  removed  in  a  reasonable 
time,  even  though  there  is  no  liability  for  the  original  intru- 
sion.®* In  a  recent  Hew  York  case,  brought  for  injuries  to 
the  plaintiff's  house  caused  by  jarring  and  concussion,  resulting 
from  blasting  on  the  right  of  way  of  defendant,  through  and  near 
the  plaintiff's  lot,  the  court  of  appeals  adjudicated  the  follow- 
ing propositions:  1.  The  powers  granted  to  said  road  corpora- 
tions are  construed  as  privileges  conferred,  but  upon  the  under- 
standing that  they  shall  be  exercised  in  strict  conformity  to 
private  rights,  and  under  the  same  responsibility  as  though  the 
acts  done  in  the  execution  of  such  powers  were  done  by  an  indi- 
vidual. 2.  The  test  of  the  permissible  use  of  one's  own  land 
is  not  whether  the  use  causes  damage  to  his  neighbor,  but  the 
inquiry  is,  was  the  use  a  reasonable  exercise  of  the  dominion 
which  the  owner  of  property  has  by  virtue  of  his  ownership  over 
his  property,  having  regard  to  all  interests  affected,  his  own  and 
those  of  his  neighbors,  and  having  in  view  also  public  policy. 
3.  A  railroad  company  which,  having  to  do  blasting  on  its  own 
land  in  order  to  lay  its  tracks,  exercises  due  care  in  doing  it, 
and  uses  charges  of  no  greater  force  than  are  necessary  for  the 
purpose,  is  not  liable  for  injury  to  adjoining  property  arising 
merely  from  the  incidental  jarring.  4.  If  the  damage  in  such 
case  results  from  the  failure  of  the  railroad  company  to  use  due 
care,  it  will  be  liable.®^     The  question  as  to  whether  injuries 

111.  9,  72  N.  E.  46,  103  Am.  St.  Rep.  73.     According  to  these  authorities 

221 ;  Dodge  v.  County  Commissioners  the  question  resolves  itself  into  an 

of  Essex,  3  Met.  380 ;  Carman  v.  In-  inquiry  as  to  what  is  a  reasonable  use 

diana   R.   R.   Co.,   4  Ohio   St.   399 ;  of  one's  own  land.   Undoubtedly  every 

Gossett  V.   Southern    Ry.    Co.,    115  owner  of  land  may  make  a  reasonable 

Tenn.  376,  89  S.  W.  737,  112  Am.  St.  use   of   his   laud.     So   every  owner 

Rep.  846,  1   L.R.A.(N.S.)    97;   Far-  of  land  has  a  right  not  to  be  injured 

nandis  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.,  41  in  its  use  or  enjoyment  by  an  unrea- 

Wash.  486,  84  Pac.  18,  111  Am.  St.  sonable  use  of  adjoining  land.    These 

Rep.  922,  5  L.R.A.  (N.S.)  1086.  mutual   rights   and   obligations   are 

BiSabin  v.  Vermont  Central  R.  R.  elaborately  discussed  in  Thompson  v. 

Co.,  25  Vt.  363 ;  St.  Peter  v.  Denison,  Androscoggin     River     Improvement 

58  N.  Y.  416,  17  Am.  Rep.  258.  Co.,  54  N.  H.  545,  and  Eaton  v.  Rail- 

55Booth  V.  Rome  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  road  Co.,  51  N.  H.  504,  12  Am.  Rep. 

140  N.  Y.  267,  35  N.  E.  592,  9  Am.  147.     What  is  a  reasonable  or  un- 

R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  92,  37  Am.  St.  reasonable  use  of  one's  land  is  largely 

Rep.  552,  24  L.R.A.  105.     To  same  a  question  of  fact.    Any  use  may  be 

effect:     Holland  Hoare  Co.  v.  Baird,  declared  reasonable  when,  though  it 

169  IST.  Y.  136,  62  N.  E.  149,  reversing  may  in  some  cases  injuriously  affect 

S.  0.  49  App.  Div.  180,  63  N.  Y.  S.  adjoining  property,  the  right  to  make 


§    231  OTIIEE  CASES  OF  TAKING.  437 

from  blasting  should  be  included  in  tbo  estimate  of  damages 
will  be  considered  hereafter.'" 

§  230  (147).  Injury  to  business.  All  damages  which 
result  from  the  proper  construction,  use  and  operation  of  public 
works,  where  no  right  of  property  is  taken  or  interfered  with, 
are  not  a  taking  and  are  not  actionable.  ^^  So,  too,  are  all  such 
loss  and  inconvenience  as  result  from  temporarily  obstructing  the 
uSe  of  public  highways  by  land  or  water  in  consequence  of  the 
construction  of  improvements  therein  by  the  public  authorities.'* 
This  results  from  the  fact  that  the  use  of  such  highways  in  con- 
nection with  private  property  is  subordinate  to  the  right  of  the 
public  to  make  such  improvements.  For  damage  to  business 
carried  on  in  whole  or  in  part  upon  property  taken,  the  reader 
is  referred  to  the  chapter  on  damages.'^ 

§  231  (148).  Highways  laid  out  adjacent  to  but  not 
taking  one's  land.  AMiere  a  highway  is  laid  out  alongside  of 
a  person's  land,  but  without  taking  any  of  it,  it  is  held  that  he 
is  not  entitled  to  compensation,  although  the  duty  of  maintain- 
ing the  whole  fence  on  his  front  is  cast  upon  him,  when  before 
that  he  was  only  obliged  to  maintain  half.""  All  the  authori- 
ties are  one  Avay  upon  this  question,  but  their  correctness  is 
questionable.     Where  by  law  the  burden  of  maintaining  a  divi- 

such  use  would  tend  to  the  "highest  5  7Hooker  v.  New  Haven  &  North- 
enjoyment  of  land  by  the  entire  com-  ampton  Co.,  15  Conn.  312,  319; 
munity  of  proprietors."  See  Thomp-  Bailey  v.  Boston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  182 
son  V.  Androscoggin  River  Improve-  Mass.  537,  66  N.  E.  203. 
ment  Co.,  54  X.  H.  545.  This  is  not  csAdair  v.  Atlanta,  124  Ga.  288, 
materially  different  from  the  test  52  S.  E.  739;  Brooks  v.  Boston,  19 
laid  down  in  the  New  York  case.  Pick.  174;  Troy  &  Boston  R.  R.  Co. 
Now  it  may  be  seriously  doubted  v.  Northern  Turnpike  Co.,  16  Barb, 
whether  the  right  to  use  explosives  100;  Plant  v.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co., 
in  excavating  upon  one's  land  in  such  10  Barb.  26;  Linton  Pharmacy  v. 
manner  as  to  shake  down  or  greatly  McDonald,  48  Misc.  125,  90  N.  Y.  S. 
impair  buildings  on  adjoining  prop-  675;  Acker  v.  Knoxville,  117  Tenn. 
erty,  is  one  which,  on  the  whole,  will  224,  96  S.  W.  973 ;  Northern  Trans- 
conduce  to  the  highest  enjoyment  of  portation  Co.  v.  Chicago,  99  U.  S. 
land  by  the  entire  community.  In  635;  S.  C.  7  Biss.  45. 
other  words,  it  would  seem  more  to  sspast,  §  727. 
the  advantage  of  the  whole  commu-  soHoag  v.  Switzer,  61  111.  294; 
nity  that  one  who  desired  to  excavate  People  v.  Supervisors  of  Oneida 
rock  on  his  land  should  be  required  to  County,  19  Wend.  102;  Kennett's 
do  so  in  such  manner  as  not  to  ma^  Petition,  24  N,  H.  139. 
terially  injure  adjoining  property. 

sepost,  %  828;  and  see  Matter  of 
Thompson,  43  Hun  416. 


438  EMIIfEIfT  DOMAIiq^.  §    232 

sion  fence  is  cast  equally  upon  adjoining  proprietors,  there  are 
mutual  rights  and  obligations  attached  to  the  respective  estates. 
Each  has  a  right  to  compel  the  other  to  contribute  his  proportion. 
This  right  is  appurtenant  to  the  estate,  for  it  passes  with  it. 
Likewise  the  obligation.  When  the  adjoining  estate  is  taken 
for  a  highway,  this  right  is  taken  with  it,  and  compensation  to 
the  extent  of  the  loss  should  be  made.  A  city  bought  a  lot  ad- 
jacent to  plaintiff's  and  laid  it  out  as  a  street.  The  plaintiff 
sued  for  damages  on  account  of  being  deprived  of  privacy  and 
rendered  liable  for  assessments  for  the  improvement  of  the  new 
street.  It  was  held  that  plaintiff's  property  was  neither  taken 
nor  damaged,  within  the  meaning  of  the  constitution.®^ 

§  232  (149).  Interfering  with  the  right  of  exclusion. 
Any  invasion  of  property,  except  in  case  of  necessity  as  hereto- 
fore explained,  either  upon,  above  or  below  the  surface,  and 
whether  temporary  or  permanent,  is  a  taking:  as  by  construct- 
ing a  ditch  through  it,®^  passing  under  it  by  a  tunnel,®*  laying 
gas,  water  or  sewer  pipes  in  the  soil,®*  or  extending  structures 
over  it,  as  a  bridge  or  telephone  wire.®®  Even  a  temporary  occu- 
pation, as  for  an  annual  training,®"  or  a  road  during  sleighing 
time,®''  can  only  be  made  pursuant  to  law,  for  a  public  use  and 
upon  compensation  made.®^  ISTor  can  public  authorities  inter- 
fere with  the  control  or  use  of  a  private  way,  except  upon  mak- 

siPeel  V.  City  of  Atlanta,  85  Ga.  64Sinith  v.  Atlanta,  92  Ga.  119,  17 

138,   11   S.  E.  582,  2  Am.  R.  R.  &  S.   E.  Rep.   981;    Noon  v.   Scranton 

Corp.  Rep.  413.     See  also  Eunice  v.  City,  7  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  123. 

City  of  St.  Louis,  122  Mo.  132,  26  S.  esMetropolitan  W.  S.  El.  R.  R.  Co. 

W.  1034;   Wells  v.  Harris,  137  Mo.  v.  Springer,  171  111.  170,  49  N.  E.  416; 

612.  Butler  v.  Frontier  Telephone  Co.,  186 

62Reeves   v.    Treasurer    of    Wood  N.  Y.  486,  79  N.  E.  716,  116  Am.  St. 

County,  8  Ohio  St.  333;  Watson  v.  Rep.  563,  11  L.R.A.(N.S.)  920,  affirm- 

Trustee,  21  Ohio  St.  667;  People  v.  ing  S.  C.  109  App.  Div.  217,  95  N.  Y. 

Haines,  49  N.  Y.  587;   Plummer  v.  S.  684;  Bass  v.  Met.  W.  S.  El.  R.  R. 

Sturtevant,  32  Me.  325.     A  statute  Co.,  82  Fed.   857,  27  C.  C.  A.   147. 

in  force  since  before  the  Revolution,  And  see  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v. 

permitting  the  surveyors  of  highways  Moyle,   51   Kan.   185,   32   Pac.   895 ; 

to  enter  upon  land  adjoining  the  way.  Drainage  Comrs.  v.  Knox,  237   111. 

for    the     purpose     of     constructing  148. 

drains,  but  providing  for  no  compen-  eeRrigham   v.   Edmonds,   7   Gray 

sation,  was  held  void  in  Ward  v.  359. 

Peck,  49  N.  J.  L.  42.  6  7Holcomb  v.  Moore,  4  Allen  529; 

esSparrow  v.  Oxford,  Worcester  &  Holden  v.  Cole,  1  Pa.  St.  303. 

Wolverhampton  Ry.  Co.,  2  DeG.  McN.  i^See  Markham  v.  Brown,  37  Ga. 

&  G.  94;  Farmer  v.  Waterloo  &  City  277. 
R.  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  (1895)  1  Ch.  D.  527. 


§    233  OTHEE  CASES  OF  TAKING.  439 

ing  compensation.®^  An  encroachment  upon  abutting  property 
in  filling  a  street  or  building  a  railroad  embankment,  or  by 
means  of  earth  throAvn  out  from  an  excavation,  is  actionable  and 
if  authorized  by  law  would  be  a  taking. '"'  And  where  a  city 
built  a  wall  along  a  school  lot,  which  was  pressed  out  by  the 
filling  so  as  to  overhang  the  adjoining  lot,  it  was  held  an  action- 
able nuisance.''^  Where  coal  underlying  the  surface,  is  owned 
separately  from  the  surface,  it  will  be  protected  from  intrusion 
the  same  as  other  property.'^*  The  legislature  cannot  authorize 
the  use  of  private  property  for  a  ferry  landing  without  compen- 
sation."* A  statute  of  Montana  provided  that  in  case  of  a  suit 
concerning  the  title  to  mining  claims  or  for  damages  thereto 
the  court  might  by  order  allow  either  party  to  inspect,  survey 
and  measure,  the  underground  workings  of  the  mine  for  pur- 
poses pertaining  to  the  litigation.  It  was  held  that  the  statute 
was  valid  and  that  an  entry  under  it  was  not  a  taking  or  dam-' 
aging  of  property  within  the  constitution.'^* 

§  233  (ISO),  Easement  of  levee  in  Louisiana.  Kipa- 
rian  property  upon  the  Mississippi,  in  the  State  of  Louisiana, 
is  subject  to  the  easement  of  levee,  that  is,  the  right  of  the  State 
to  use  so  much  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  construction  of  proper 
levees  and  to  repair  or  re-locate  the  same  from  time  to  time  as 

69Morse  v.  Stocker,  1  Allen,  150.  TiMiles  v.  City  of  Worcester,  154 

lOAnte,  §  140;  Wichita  &  W.  K.  R.  Mass.  511,  28  N.  E.  676. 
Co.  V.  Fechheimer,  49  Kan.  643,  31  7  2Penn  Gas  Coal  Co.  v.  Versailles 

Pac.  127;   Schneider  v.  Brown,   142  Fuel  Gas.  Co.,  131  Pa.  St.  522,  19  Atl. 

Mich.  45,  105  N.  W.  13;  Tegeler  v.  933;  Eobbins  v.  Guffy,  20  Phila.  400. 
Kansas  City,  95  Mo.  App.  162,  68  S.  7  3Blake  v.  McCarthy,  56  Miss.  654. 

W.  953;  Pinnix  v.  Lake  Drummond  7 estate  v.  District  Court,  28  Mont, 

etc.  Canal  Co.,  132  N.  C.  124,  43  S.  E.  528,  73  Pac.  230.     Says  the  Court: 

578;  Cherry  v.  Lake  Drummond  etc.  "Every  citizen  has  the  right  to  the 

Canal  Co.,  140  N.  C.  422,  53  S.  E.  138,  exclusive  enjoyment  of  his  property, 

111  Am.  St.  Rep.  850;  Davis  v.  Silver-  without  interruption  or  evasion;  yet 

ton,  47  Ore.  171,  82  Pac.  16;  Bigham  this  general  rule  of  right  must,  under 

V.   Pitts    Construction    Co.,    29    Pa.  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  yield  to 

Supr.  Ct.  86;  O'Donnell  v.  White,  23  the  higher  right  of  public  necessity, 

R.  I.  318,  50  Atl.  333;  Sims  v.  Ohio  that   equal   justice   may   be   admin- 

Riv.  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  56  S.  C.  30,  33  S.  E.  istered  upon  conflicting  rights  of  dif- 

746;  Bunker  v.  Hudson,  122  Wis.  43,  ferent  citizens.     Every  citizen  holds 

99  N.  W.  448 ;  McCullough  v.  Camp-  his  property  subject  to  this  burden, 

bellsport,  123  Wis.  334,  101   N.  W.  and  when  the  necessity  arises  his  pri- 

709;  Williams  v.  Hudson,  130  Wis.  vate   right  must  give   way   to   this 

297,  110  N.  W.  239.  higher  law."   p.  545. 


440 


E5IINENT  DOMAIIT. 


§  234 


the  public  exigencies  may  require.''^  And  this  is  true  though 
the  title  to  the  property  is  derived  from  the  United  States  and 
belongs  to  a  citizen  of  another  state.''®  This  servitude  "was  at- 
tached to  the  land  at  the  time  of  its  original  grant.^''  But  the 
land  only  is  so  subject,  and  if  buildings  are  destroyed  in  con- 
structing a  levee,  the  owner  is  entitled  to  compensation. ''*  ]N"or 
does  the  servitude  extend  to  the  case  where  the  necessity  for  the 
levee  -is  created  by  some  collateral  or  distinct  improvement,  such 
as  the  closing  of  a  bayou.''*  This  servitude  is  peculiar  to  the 
law  of  Louisiana.*"  Where  a  city  instituted  proceedings  to 
condemn  property  for  use  for  levee  purposes  which  proceeded 
to  judgment,  it  was  held  that  it  could  not  recede  from  the  judg- 
ment and  construct  the  levee  without  compensation  by  virtue  of 
the  servitude.*^ 

§  234  (151).  Interfering  with  the  right  of  support. 
■  Every  owner  of  land  has  a  right  to  the  lateral  support  of  his 
soil  in  its  natural  condition,  and  no  person  is  entitled  to  so  exca- 
vate upon  his  own  land  as  to  deprive  the  soil  of  his  neighbor 
of  its  natural  support  and  thereby  cause  it  to  slide  into  the 
excavation.®^     This  right  extends  only  to  the  soil,  and  not  to 


'BMithoff  V.  Town  of  CarrolUon, 
12  La.  An.  185;  Bass  v.  State,  34  La. 
An.  494;  Ruch  v.  City  of  New  Or- 
leans, 43  La.  An.  275,  9  So.  473; 
Peart  v.  Meeker,  45  La.  An.  421,  12 
So.  490;  Hart  v.  Board  of  Levee 
Comrs.,  54  Fed.  559. 

ToEldridge  v.  Trezevant,  160  U.  S. 
452,  16  S.  C.  345. 

7  7Mitlioflf  V.  Town  of  CarroUton, 
12  La.  An.  185. 

7SCash  V.  Whitworth,  13  La.  An. 
401;  Mithoff  v.  CarroUton,  12  La. 
An.  185;  contra;  Dubose  v.  Levee 
Comrs.,  11  La.  An.  165;  Hanson  v. 
La  Fayette,  18  La.  295. 

vsCash  V.  Whitworth,  13  La.  An. 
401.  But  see  Egan  v.  Hart,  45  La. 
An.  1358,  14  So.  244. 

«oSee  Richardson  v.  Levee  Comrs., 
58  Miss.  539,  9  So.  351. 

siln  re  City  of  New  Orleans,  20  La. 
An.  394. 

82Stimmel  v.  Brown,  7  Houst.  219, 
30  Atl.  996;   Guest  v.  Reynolds,  09 


111.  478,  18  Am.  Rep.  570;  Moellering 
V.  Evans,  121  Ind,  195,  22  N.  E.  989, 
6  L.R.A.  449;  Clemens  v.  Speed,  93 
Ky.  284,  19  S.  W.  660,  19  L.R.A.  240; 
Boothby  v.  Androscoggin  R.  R.  Co., 

51  Me.  318 ;  Baltimore  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Reaney,  42  Md.  117;  Thurston  v. 
Hancock,  12  Mass.  220,  7  Am.  Dec. 
57;  Gilmore  v.  DriscoU,  122  Mass. 
199,  201,  23  Am.  Rep.  312;  Gilder- 
sleeve  V.  Hammond,  109  Mich.  431, 
67  N.  W.  519,  33  L.R.A.  46;  Nichols 
V.  City  of  Duluth,  40  Minn.  389,  42 
N.  W.  84,  12  Am.  St.  Rep.  743;  Mc- 
Cullough  V.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

52  Minn.  12,  53  N.  W.  802,  47  Am. 
St.  Rep.  630 ;  Charless  v.  Rankin,  22 
Mo.  566;  McGuire  v.  Grant,  25  N.  J. 
L.  356;  Lasala  v.  Holbrook,  4  Paige 
169,  25  Am.  Dec.  524;  Farrand  v. 
Marshall,  19  Barb.  380;  Mosier  v. 
Ore.  Nav.  Co.,  39  Ore.  256,  64  Pac. 
453,  87  Am.  St.  Rep.  652;  Novotney 
V.  Danforth,  9  S.  D.  301,  68  N.  W. 
749;   Beard  v.  Murphy,  37  Vt.  99; 


§  234 


OTHER  CASES  OF  TAKING. 


441 


improvements  placed  upon  it  which  increase  the  weight.^^  If, 
in  the  execution  of  public  works  under  authority  of  law,  excava- 
tions are  made  and  the  soil  of  an  individual  gives  Avay  in  con- 
sequence of  being  deprived  of  its  lateral  support,  there  is  a 
taking  to  the  extent  of  such  deprivation,  and  the  individual  is 
entitled  to  compensation  for  the  resulting  damage.  The  right 
of  lateral  support  is  a  part  of  his  property  in  the  land,  as  much 
so  as  his  right  of  user,  or  of  exclusion.  When  he  is  deprived 
of  it  his  property  is  taken  just  as  much  as  if  his  property  was 
invaded.**  "The  right  of  a  landowner  to  have  his  property 
protected  against  an  excavation  which  will  cause  it  to  subside 
is  a  part  of  his  property  in  the  land,  alike  in  nature  and  im- 
portance to  the  right  of  user  and  exclusion,  and  the  depriva- 
tion of  the  right  is  a  taking  of  property  as  much  as  an  actual 
appropriation  of  the  soil."  ®^  Notwithstanding  the  clear  justice 
and  logic  of  this  position,  there  is,  perhaps,  as  much  authority 
against  it  as  for  it.  It  has  been  held  that,  where  a  railroad 
company  excavated  upon  its  own  land,  so  that  the  plaintiff's 
soil  slid  into  the  excavation,  the  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  recover 
damages.*®     The  contrary  doctrine  has  been  held  in  prescisely 


Stearns'  Exrs.  v.  City  of  Eielimond, 
88  Va.  992,  14  S.  E.  847,  6  Am.  R.  K. 
&  Corp.  Rep.  247;  Damkoehler  v. 
Milwaukee,  124  Wis.  144,  101  N.  W. 
706;  Washburn  on  Easements,  pp. 
614-516;  Wood  on  Nuisances,  §  172, 
and  cases  cited  below.  In  Gilmore  v. 
DriscoU,  the  court  (Gray,  C.  J.,) 
says:  "Every  owner  of  land  is  en- 
titled, as  against  his  neighbor,  to 
have  the  earth  stand  and  the  water 
flow  in  its  natural  condition.  *  »  ♦ 
In  the  case  of  land,  which  is  fixed  in 
its  place,  each  owner  has  the  absolute 
right  to  have  his  land  remain  in  its 
natural  condition,  unaffected  by  any 
act  of  his  neighbor;  and,  if  the 
neighbor  digs  upon  or  improves  his 
own  laud  so  as  to  injure  this  right, 
he  may  maintain  an  action  against 
him,  without  proof  of  negligence." 

8  3Lasala  v.  Holbrook,  4  Paige  169; 
City  of  Quincy  v.  Jones,  76  111.  231 ; 
Wood  on  Nuisances,  §  175;  Moeller- 


ing  V.  Evans,  121  Ind.  195,  22  N.  E. 
989,  6  L.E.A.  449. 

8*  Quoted  and  followed  in  Hosier 
V.  Ore.  Nav.  Co.,  39  Ore.  256,  64  Pac. 
453,  87  Am.  St.  Rep.  652. 

ssDamkoehler  v.  Milwaukee,  124 
Wis.  144,  151,  101  N.  W.  706. 

s^Dickinson  v.  Pere  Marquette  R. 
R.  Co.,  148  Mich.  461,  111  N.  W.  1078; 
Kopp  V.  Northern  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  41 
Minn.  310,  43  N.  W.  73 ;  McCullough 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  52  Minn. 
12,  53  N.  W.  802;  Church  of  Holy 
Communion  v.  Pateraon  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  66  N.  J.  L.  218,  49  Atl.  1030, 
55  L.R.A.  81,  reversing  S.  C.  63  N. 
J.  L.  470,  43  Atl.  696;  S.  C.  on  second 
appeal,  68  N.  J.  L.  399,  53  Atl.  1079 ; 
Ludlow  v.  Hudson  River  R.  R.  Co.,  6 
Lans.  128 ;  Ruppert  v.  West  Side  Belt 
R.  R.  Co.,  25  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  613; 
Richardson  v.  Vermont  Central  R. 
R.  Co.,  25  Vt.  465,  60  Am.  Dec.  459 ; 
and  see  New  Orleans,  Baton  Rouge 
etc.  R.  E.  Co.  V.  Brown,  64  Miss.  479. 


442  EMUSrEIfT  DOMAIN.  §    234 

similar  cases  in  Maine  and  Kentucky.*'^  In  both  these  cases  the 
railroad  companies  obtained  title  by  deed,  in  the  usual  form. 
In  Maine-  a  recovery  was  denied,  on  the  ground  that  the  act  of 
the  legislature  was  an  authority  and  license  to  the  company  to 
construct  the  road  in  the  manner  it  did,  and,  as  it  had  not  been 
guilty  of  negligence,  no  action  would  lie.  The  court  says :  "It 
is  a  principle  of  the  common  law  that  a  man  must  not  dig  so 
near  the  land  of  another  as  thereby  to  withdraw  the  natural  sup- 
port of  the  soil,  and  render  it  liable  to  break  away  and  slide 
down  of  its  own  weight;  but  this  principle  does  not  apply  to 
excavations  made  in  pursuance  of  a  license ;  and  a  license  from 
the  legislature,  if  within  its  constitutional  limits,  affords  as 
ample  protection  as  a  license  from  the  injured  party."  The 
right  of  support  was  thus  conceded  to  exist.  This  right  was 
property,  and  the  legislature  could  not  license  a  railroad  com- 
pany to  take  away  the  plaintiff's  property  without  an  equivalent 
as  required  by  the  constitution.  Such  a  license  was  not  "within 
its  constitutional  limits."  In  the  Kentucky  case  a  recovery  was 
denied,  on  the  ground  that  the  plaintiff  sold  the  right  of  way  to 
the  company  for  use  as  a  right  of  way,  and  it  must  be  presumed 
that  he  estimated  and  obtained  the  damages  which  would  result 
from  such  use.  But  the  grant  of  land  even  to  be  excavated  for 
materials  does  not  authorize  the  grantee  to  deprive  the  adjoin- 
ing land  of  the  grantor  of  its  support.**  The  grant  of  land 
for  a  railroad  or  other  public  use  is  simply  a  grant  of  the  land, 
as  land,  and  it  is  still  subject  to  the  same  obligations  in  respect 
to  adjacent  or  neighboring  land  as  if  granted  to  a  private  indi- 
vidual for  private  use.** 

Where  the  grade  of  a  street  is  cut  down  and  the  soil  of  the 
abutting  owner  slides  into  the  street,  he  is  entitled  to  recover.®" 

8  7Boothby     v.     Androscoggin     &  90 Aurora  v.  Fox,  78  Ind.  1;  Dyer 

Kennebec   R.   E.   Co.,   51    Me.    318;  v.  St.  Paul,  27  Minn.  457 ;  Armstrong 

Hortsman  v.  Covington  &  Lexington  v.  St.  Paul,  30  Minn.  299;   Nichols 

R.  R.  Co.,  18  B.  Mon.  218.    Compare  v.  Duluth,  40  Minn.  389,  42  N.  W. 

City  of  New  Westminster  v.  Brig-  84;  Moore  v.  Albany,  98  N.  Y.  396; 

house,  20  Duvall  520,  where  a  city  Columbus  v.  Willard,  7  Ohio  C.  C. 

was  held  liable  for  taking  away  the  113;  Keating  v.  Cincinnati,  38  Ohio 

support  of  plaintifiF's  soil  in  lowering  St.    141 ;    Stearns   Exrs.   v.   City   of 

the  grade  of  a  street.  Richmond,  88  Va.  992,  14  S.  E.  847,  6 

ssRyekmau  v.  Gillis,  6  Lans.  79;  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  247;  Damr 

Ludlow  V.  Hudson  River  R.  E.  Co.,  koehler  v.  Milwaukee,  124  Wis.  144, 

6  Lans.  128.  101    N.   W.    706 ;    Dahlman   v.   Mil- 

itPost,  §§  820,  824.  waukee,  131  Wis.  427,  110  N.  W.  479, 


§    235  OTHEE  CASES  OF  TAKING.  443 

But  this  question,  so  far  as  it  relates  to  streets,  is  discussed 
elsewhere.  ^"^  Where  a  city  excavated  in  the  bed  of  a  river, 
to  form,  a  basin  for  the  settling  of  sewerage,  and  thus  deprived 
plaintiff's  land  of  its  support,  it  was  held  liable.^^  So  where 
the  city  in  digging  a  sewer  removes  quicksand  by  pumping  and 
damages  the  abutting  property  by  depriving  it  of  support."^ 
Some  cases  hold  that  a  city  is  not  liable  for  damage  to  property 
by  subsidence  or  otherwise,  resulting  from  the  digging  of  a  sewer 
in  a  street,  in  the  absence  of  negligence,  misconduct  or  want  of 
skill  on  the  part  of  its  servants  or  agents.®*  Where  a  telephone 
company,  in  setting  a  pole,  interfered  with  the  lateral  support 
of  the  plaintiff's  building,  it  was  held  liable  for  the  damages."' 
So  when  the  subsidence  is  caused  by  the  excavation  of  a  tunnel 
in  the  street  or  near  the  property.®®  In  case  of  interfering 
with  the  right  of  support,  the  action  accrues  when  the  damage 
results,  and  not  when  the  excavation  is  made.®'' 

§  235  (151a).  Consequential  injuries  to  property  by 
the  operation  of  a  railroad :  Noise,  smoke,  cinders,  jarring, 
vibrations,  etc.  When  part  of  a  tract  of  land  is  taken  for  a 
railroad  just  compensation  includes  damage  to  the  remainder 
by  reason  of  the  use  of  the  part  taken  for  railroad  purposes.®* 
When  such  compensation  has  been  paid  the  railroad  company  ac- 
quires the  right  to  operate  its  road  in  the  usual  way  without  any 
further  liability  to  the  owner  of  such  remainder  for  damage  or 
inconvenience  resulting  therefrom.  But  railroads  are  frequent- 
ly constructed  adjacent,  or  in  close  proximity,  to  land  no  part 
of  which  has  been  taken.  Such  land  may  be  damaged  and  de- 
preciated by  the  proximity  of  the  railroad,  and  by  the  noise, 

111  N.  W.  675;  City  of  New  West-  Rep.  580,  the  city  was  held  liable  in 

minster  v.  Brighouse,  20  Duvall  520.  such   case  on  the  ground  of  negli- 

Contra:  Talcott  Bros.  v.  Des  Moines,  gence. 

134  la.  113,  109  N.  W.  311,  120  Am.  seCumberland  Tel.  &  Tel.   Co.  v. 

St.  Rep.  419.     And  see  cases  cited  Foster,  117  Ky.  389,  78  S.  W.  150. 

ante,  §  139.  ssFitzSimmons  &   Connell   Co.   v. 

91  Ante,  %  139.  Braun,  199  111.  390,  65  N.  E.  249,  59 

saPomroy  v.  Granger,  18  R.  I.  624,  L.R.A.  421 ;  Chicago  v.  Rust,  117  III. 

29  Atl.  690.  -^VV-   427 ;    Farnandis  v.   Great  No. 

3  3  Cabot   V.   Kingman,    166   Mass.  Ry.  Co.,  41  Wash.  486,  84  Pac.  18, 

403,  44  N.  E.  344,  33  L.R.A.  45.  Ill    Am.    St.    Rep.    922,    5    L.R.A. 

9  4Uppington    v.    New    York,    165  (N.S.)  1086. 

N.  Y.  222,  59  N.  E.  91,  53  L.R.A.  550;  9  7  Ludlow  v.  Hudson  River  R.  R. 

Fyfe  V.  Turtle  Creek,  22  Pa.  Supr.  Co.,  6  Lans.  128. 

Ct.,  292.     In  Gerst  v.  St.  Louis,  185  9»Poat,  §  686. 
Mo.  191,  84  S.  W.  34,  105  Am.  St. 


444  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    235 

smoke,  cinders,  jarring,  vibrations  and  other  annoyances  arising 
from  the  operation  of  the  road.  According  to  the  general  prin- 
ciples heretofore  enunciated,  if  such  damages  would  be  action- 
able but  for  the  statutory  authority,  then  they  amount  to  a 
taking,  for  which  compensation  must  be  made.'®  But  the  au- 
thorities are  not  harmonious  upon  this  point.  In  a  suit  brought 
to  recover  for  damage  to  the  plaintiff's  property,  no  part  of 
which  had  been  taken,  caused  by  the  noise,  smoke,  cinders,  vi- 
brations,  etc.,  resulting  from  the  use  of  railroad  tracks  on  ad- 
jacent property,  the  supreme  court  of  Minnesota  denied  a  re- 
covery and  state  their  reasons,  as  follows:  "Railroads  are  a 
public  necessity.  They  are  always  constructed  and  operated 
under  authority  of  law.  They  bring  to  the  public  great  bene- 
fits; to  some  persons  more,  to  other  persons  less.  The  operat- 
ing them  in  the  most  skillful  and  careful  manner  causes  to  the 
public  necessary  inconveniences,  such  as  noise,  smoke,  cinders, 
vibrations  of  the  ground,  interference  with  travel  at  the  cross- 
ings of  roads  and  streets,  and  the  like.  One  person  may  suffer 
more  from  these  than  another.  For  instance,  one  whose  prem- 
ises lie  within  a  hundred  feet  of  the  railroad  will  feel  the 
inconveniences  in  a  greater  degree  than  one  whose  premi- 
ises  are  at  the  distance  of  a  thousand  feet ;  and  one  who  has  to 
pass  many  times  a  day  along  a  street  crossed  by  a  railroad  suffers 
more  inconvenience  from  it  than  one  who  seldom  has  occasion 
to  pass.  But  the  difference  is  only  in  degree,  not  in  kind.  Such 
inconveniences  are  common  to  the  public  at  large.  If  each 
person  had  a  right  of  action  because  of  such  inconveniences,  it 
would  go  far  to  render  the  operating  of  railroads  practically 
impossible."  ^  The  question  has  recently  received  very  elab- 
orate consideration  in  ISTew  Jersey.  The  railroad  was  in  the 
rear  of  plaintiff's  lot  upon  elevated  tracks.  The  complaint 
was  for  nuisance  in  the  use  of  the  tracks,  resulting  from  noise, 
smoke,  smells,  etc.,  caused  by  switching,  making  and  unmaking 
trains,  leaving  cars  standing  in  the  vicinity  loaded  with  stock 
and  the  like.  The  company  pleaded  its  statutory  authority, 
and  alleged  that  its  road  was  operated  with  no  unnecessary  in- 

9Un*e,  §  65.  Rep.  644,  1  L.E.A.  493;  Cameron  v. 

iCarroU  v.  Wis.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  42  Minn.  75, 

40  Minn.  168,  41  N.  W.  681.    See  also  43  N.  W.  785;  Kaje  v.  Chicago  etc. 

the  following  cases  in  the  same  court :  R.  R.  Co.,  57  Minn.  422,  59  N.  W. 

Adams  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  39  493. 
Minn.  286,  39  N.  W.  629,  12  Am.  St. 


§  235 


OTHEE  CASES  OF  TAKING. 


445 


jury  to  the  plaintiff.  The  plea  was  held  good  on  demurrer.^ 
It  was  conceded  that  the  acts  complained  of  amounted  to  an 
actionable  nuisance  but  for  the  statutory  authority,  but  it  was 
held  that  the  legislature  had  plenary  control  over  the  subject  of 
"incidental"  or  "consequential"  damages,  though  the  same 
might  amount  to  half  the  value  of  the  property.  The  reason- 
ing of  the  court  cannot  be  better  answered  than  by  an  opinion 
of  the  same  court  in  a  prior  case,  in  which  the  court  by  Dixon, 
J.,  says:  "An  act  of  the  legislature  cannot  confer  upon  indi- 
viduals or  private  corporations,  acting  primarily  for  their  own 
profit,  although  for  public  benefit  as  well,  any  right  to  deprive 


2Beseman  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  E.. 
Co.,  50  N.  J.  L.  235,  13  Atl.  164.  The 
judgnaent  of  the  supreme  court  was 
affirmed  by  the  court  of  errors  and 
appeals  on  the  opinion  of  the  former 
court,  so  that  the  opinion  has  the 
sanction  of  both  courts.  52  N.  J.  L. 
221,  20  Atl.  169  (1890).  We  quote 
from  the  opinion  as  follows :  "It  is 
a  radical  error  to  regard  these  cor- 
porations as  simply  private.  They 
have  a  public  as  well  as  a  private 
aspect,  and  it  is  on  this  account  that 
the  immunity  in  question  belongs  to 
them.  *  *  *  These  roads,  in  view  of 
their  effect  upon  social  and  commer- 
cial interests,  are  of  vastly  more  im- 
portance than  are  most  of  the  public 
highways,  and  it  is  on  account  of 
this  transcendent  usefulness  that 
they,  to  a  large  extent,  have  been  and 
must  be  regarded  as  public  agencies. 
Looking  at  them  in  this  light,  it  is 
but  following  the  ordinary  path  to 
declare  that  they  are  not  responsible 
for  those  incidental  damages  that  re- 
sult from  the  proper  exercise  of  their 
functions.  This  is  the  settled  rule. 
The  legislature  may  authorize  the 
altering  the  grade  of  a  city  street; 
such  act  may  occasion  immense  loss 
to  the  owners  of  abutting  property, 
and  such  loss  is  damnum  absque  in- 
juria, the  reason  being  that  the  im- 
provement is  a  matter  of  public  con- 
cern, and  that  each  individual  mem- 


ber of  the  community,  while  he  is  en- 
titled to  its  benefits,  must  submit  to 
its  burthens.  The  attitude  of  a  rail- 
road company,  so  far  as  relates  to 
the  application  of  legal  principles,  is 
not  dissimilar.  They  run  their 
trains  by  legislative  authority  for 
the  public  benefit,  and  on  that  ac- 
count, in  doing  such  acts,  they  are 
so  far  forth  the  representatives  of 
the  body  of  the  people.  The  defend- 
ant alleges  that  it  has  kept  entirely 
within  the  limits  of  its  chartered 
rights  in  running  its  trains,  and  that 
the  plaintiff  has  suffered  no  damage 
except  such  as  is  necessarily  incident 
to  such  transactions,  and  it  seems  to 
me  that  if  this  be  true  this  action 
cannot  be  maintained."  (pp.  240, 
241.)  *  *  *  "Nor  have  I  found  any 
serious  constitutional  difficulty  with 
reference  to  this  question.  It  has  not 
been  unobserved  that  it  is  said  that 
as  the  legislature  cannot  authorize, 
by  force  of  the  constitution  of  the 
State,  property  to  be  taken  for  public 
use  without  compensation,  it  follows 
that  it  cannot  legalize  an  injury  to 
such  property.  The  argument  is  that 
to  injure  property  for  the  public 
benefit  to  the  extent  say,  of  one-half 
of  its  value,  is,  in  substance,  to  take 
for  that  purpose  a  moiety  of  it.  But 
this  line  of  reasoning  excludes  alto- 
gether, as  it  appears  to  me,  the  legis- 
lative control  over  the  subject.    As 


44:6 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


§  235 


persons  of  the  ordinary  enjoyment  of  their  property,  except 
upon  condition  that  just  compensation  be  first  made  to  the 
owners.  This  principle  rests  upon  the  express  terms  of  the 
constitution.    In  declaring  that  private  property  shall  not  be  tak- 


already  remarked,  if  the  right  of  ac- 
tion cannot  be  taken  from  the  land- 
owner when  the  injury  to  his  prop- 
erty is  equal  to  one-half  its  value, 
neither  can  this  be  done  when  it  is 
damaged  to  the  extent  of  one- 
twentieth  part  of  its  value,  or  in  any 
other  actionable  degree.  To  hold 
otherwise  would  be  not  only  illogical 
but  impracticable,  for  who  would  be 
able  to  say  to  what  degree  the  dam- 
age must  go  in  order  to  give  the 
right  of  action.  In  my  opinion  the 
legislative  power  covers  the  entire 
field  of  incidental  injuries.  In  the 
ease  cited  from  the  English  reports 
it  was  held  that  the  burning  of  a  hay- 
stack by  the  engine  of  an  unchartered 
company  was  a  loss  that  could  be  re- 
dressed by  action,  without  respect  to 
the  question  whether  the  fire  had 
been  kept  with  proper  care  or  not; 
and  yet  the  court  declared,  as  has 
always  been  judicially  declared  in 
this  State,  that  if  such  engine  had 
been  used  under  legislative  authority 
such  loss  would  have  been  remediless. 
This,  it  is  evident,  was  maintaining 
a  legislative  right  to  deprive  a  person 
of  a  right  of  action  due  to  him  at 
common  law  for  an  injury  resulting 
in  the  esntire  destruction  of  his  prop- 
erty, and  this  is  the  legal  principle 
that  has  practically  been  enforced  in 
this  State  from  the  existence  of  its 
first  railroad  up  to  the  present  hour. 
And  it  is  the  entire  doctrine  that 
must  be  abrogated  if  we  say  that  by 
force  of  the  constitution  the  legisla- 
ture cannot  exempt  these  companies 
from  responsibility  for  those  things 
that  are  the  necessary  concomitants 
of  the  use  of  the  road.  When  prop- 
erty has  been  incidentally  injured,  no 


matter  to  what  extent,  as  an  un- 
avoidable result  of  a  public  improve- 
ment, such  loss  has  always  been 
deemed  remediless,  and  it  has  never 
been  supposed  that  the  property  so 
injured  was  taken,  in  the  constitu- 
tional sense,  for  the  public  use.  All 
the  public  improvements  in  the  State 
have  been  built  and  are  now  resting 
on  this  foundation.  For  my  part, 
therefore,  I  find  no  embarrassment 
in  disposing  of  the  present  subject, 
for  I  have  put  railroads  in  the  cate- 
gory of  public  agents,  and  have  re- 
garded them  as  possessed  of  all  the 
immunities,  in  the  particular  in 
question,  belonging  to  such  an  office; 
for  to  me  it  does  not  appear  to  be 
consistent  with  reason  to  declare 
that  these  exemptions  may  be  be- 
stowed upon  an  inconsiderable  turn- 
pike company  but  cannot  be  given  in 
favor  of  these  great  highways  con- 
necting distant  countries  and  ex- 
tending over  a  continent."  pp.  244- 
246.  In  the  prior  cases  of  Pennsyl- 
vania R.  R.  Co.  v.  Angel,  41  N.  J.  Eq. 
316,  and  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Thompson,  45  N.  J.  Eq.  870,  14 
Atl.  897,  19  Atl.  622,  both  de- 
cided by  the  court  of  errors  and 
appeals,  similar  injuries  were  held  to 
be  actionable,  but  the  tracks  in  these 
cases  were  in  a  public  street  and  the 
use  complained  of  was  held  to  be  in 
excess  of  the  authority  granted  to  the 
railroad  company.  Beideman  v.  At- 
lantic City  R.  R.  Co.,  19  Atl.  (N.  J. 
Ch.)  731  is  similar  to  the  Beseraan 
Case,  and  is  decided  in  accordance 
therewith.  Compare  Costigan  v. 
Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  54  N.  J.  L. 
233,  23  Atl.  810;  Hennessey  v.  Car- 
mony,  50  N.  J.  Eq.  616,  25  Atl.  374. 


§    235  OTHER  CASES  OF  TAICING.  447 

en  without  recompense,  that  instrument  secures  to  owners,  not 
only  the  possession  of  property,  but  also  those  rights  which  ren- 
der possession  valuable.  Whether  you  flood  the  farmer's  fields 
so  that  they  cannot  be  cultivated,  or  pollute  the  bleacher's  stream 
so  that  his  fabrics  are  stained,  or  fill  one's  dwelling  with  smells 
and  noise  so  that  it  cannot  be  occupied  with  comfort,  you  equally 
take  away  the  owner's  property.  In  neither  instance  has  the 
owner  any  less  of  material  things  than  he  had  before,  but  in  each 
case  the  utility  of  his  property  has  been  impaired  by  a  direct 
invasion  of  the  bounds  of  his  private  dominion.  This  is  a 
taking  of  his  property  in  the  constitutional  sense;  of  course, 
mere  statutory  authority  will  not  avail  for  such  an  interference 
with  private  property."  *  But  the  authorities  generally  are 
in  accord  with  the  later  New  Jersey  cases.*  In  a  Maryland  case 
the  rear  of  the  plaintiff's  property  abutted  upon  an  open  cut 
connecting  two  tunnels.  The  operation  of  trains  drew  the 
smoke  and  soot  from  the  tunnels  to  the  cut  whence  they  were 
cast  upon  the  plaintiff's  property.  Complaint  was  also  made 
of  the  noise  and  vibration.  The  acts  were  held  to  amount  to  a 
taking  of  the  plaintiff's  property  and  he  was  held  entitled  to 
recover  irrespective  of  negligence.  ** 

In  the  case  of  railroads  in  streets  there  is  a  difference  of  opin- 
ion, whether  damages  should  be  allowed  for  the  annoyances 

3Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Angel,  Co.,  133  Ind.  493,  33  N.  E.  349,  the 

41  N.  J.  Eq.  316,  329,  7  Atl.  432,  56  court  says:     "Injuries  which  result 

Am.  St.  Rep.  1  (Court  of  Errors  and  from   the   careful   construction   and 

Appeals).  operation  of  a  railroad  on  the  land 

^Decker   v.    Evansville    Suburban  of  another  are  common  to  all  those 

etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  133  Ind.  493,  33  N.  E.  whose  lands  are  in  close  proximity 

349;  Densmore  v.  Central  la.  R.  R.  to  such  road,  and  for  such  injuries 

Co.,  72  la.  182;  Atchison  etc.  Ry.  Co.  there  can  be  no  recovery,  in  the  ab- 

V.  Armstrong,  71  Kan.  366,  80  Pac.  sence  of  a  statute  entitling  the  owner 

978,  114  Am.  St.  Rep.  474,  1  L.R.A.  to  maintain  such  action.''    Lincoln  v. 

(N.S.)  113;  Werges  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  Commonwealth,  164  Mass.  368,  41  N. 

R.  R.  Co.,  35  La.  An.  641 ;  Davis  v.  E.  Rep.  489  and  Essex  v.  Local  Board 

Baltimore  etc.  R.  R.   Co.,   102  Md.  for  Acton,  L.  R.  14  H.  L.  153   (S.  C. 

371,  62  Atl.  572;  Emigrant  Mission  14  Q.  B.  D.  753,  17  Q.  B.  D.  447), 

Committee  v.   Brooklyn  R.   R.   Co.,  though  not  relating  to  railroads,  are 

165  N.  y.  604,  58  N.  E.  756,  affirming  important  in  the  general  discussion 

S.  C.  20  App.  Div.  596,  47  N.  Y.  S.  of  the  points  involved. 

344;  Thompson  v.  Seaboard  Air  Line  sBaltimore  Belt  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Sat- 

Ey.'co.,  142  N.  C.  318,  55  S.  E.  205;  tier,  100  Md.'306,  59  Atl.  654;  S.  C. 

Cincinnati  Connecting  Belt  R.  R.  Co.  102  Md.  595,  64  Atl.  507 ;  Baltimore 

V.  Burski,  4  Ohio  C.  C.  (N.S.)  98.    In  Belt  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Sattler,  105  Md.  264, 

Decker  v.  Evansville  Suburban  R.  R.  05  Atl.  752. 


448 


EMINENT  DOMAIN, 


235 


occasioned  by  noise,  smoke  and  vibrations.®  In  the  New  York 
elevated  railroad  cases  it  is  beld  that  sucli  damages  may  be 
recovered  where  the  occupation  of  the  railroad  company  is 
wrongful,  but  cannot  be  considered  in  estimating  the  just  com- 
pensation to  be  paid  for  the  permanent  interference  with  the 
abutter's  easements.'^ 

Such  damages  may  be  recovered  under  constitutions  or  stat- 
utes which  give  compensation  for  property  damaged  or  injured 
for  public  use,  whether  the  railroad  is  on  a  public  street  or  its 
private  property.® 


6The  following  cases  favor  the 
allowance  of  such  damages:  South 
Carolina  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Steiner,  44  6a. 
546;  Wilson  v.  Des  Moines  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  67  la.  509 ;  Mix  v.  LaFayette  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  67  111.  319;  Elizabethtown 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Combs,  10  Bush.  382; 
Fulton  V.  Short  Route  R.  Trans.  Co., 
85  Ky.  640,  4  S.  W.  332,  7  Am.  St. 
Rep.  619 ;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Orr,  91  Ky.  109, 15  S.  VV.Rep.  8;Mays- 
ville  &  B.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Ingram,  (Ky.) 
30  S.  W.  8.  Contra:  Werges  v.  St. 
Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  35  La.  An.  641 ; 
Adams  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  39 
Minn.  286,  39  N.  W.  629,  12  Am.  St. 
Rep.  644,  1  L.R.A.  493;  Handle  v. 
Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  65  Mo.  325;  Parrott 
V.  Cincinnati  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  10  Ohio 
St.  624.    And  see  post,  §§  735,  736. 

'American  Bank  Note  Co.  v.  New 
York  El.  R.  R.  Co.  129  N.  Y.  252,  29 
N.  E.  302,  5  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
583;  Messenger  v.  Manhattan  R.  R. 
Co.,  129  N.  Y.  502,  29  N.  E.  955; 
Bischoff  V.  New  York  El.  R.  R.  Co., 
138  N.  Y.  257,  33  N.  B.  1073;  Sperb 
V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  137  N. 
Y.  155,  32  N.  E.  1050,  20  L.R.A.  752, 
7  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  554;  Sperb 
V.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  61  Hun 
539,  41  N.  Y.  St.  155,  16  N.  Y.  Supp. 
392;  Sloan  v.  New  York  El.  R.  R. 
Co.,  63  Hun  300,  44  N.  Y.  St.  583,  17 
N.  Y.  Supp.  769;  Jordan  v.  Metro- 
politan El.  R.  R.  Co.,  60  N.  Y. 
Supp.    385;     Golden    v.    Metropoli- 


tan El.  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Misc.  142,  20 
N.  Y.  Supp.  630;  Purdy  v.  Manhattan 
R.  R.  Co.,  3  Misc.  50,  22  N.  Y.  Supp. 
943;  Diehl  v.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  R. 
Co.,  11  Misc.  14,  31  N.  Y.  Supp.  839. 
sLake  Erie  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Scott, 
132  111.  429,  24  N.  E.  78,  8  L.R.A. 
330;  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Darke, 
148  111.  226,  35  N.  E.  750,  9  Am.  R. 
R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  73;  Chicago  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Leah,  152  111.  249,  38  N.  E. 
556;  111.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Trustees 
of  Schools,  212  111.  406,  72  N.  E.  39; 
Wis.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wieczorek, 
51  111.  App.  498;  Met.  West  Side  El. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Goll,  100  111.  App.  323; 
Davenport  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Sinnet, 
111  111.  App.  75;  111.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Trustees  of  Schools,  128  111.  App. 
Ill;  Ball  V.  Marysville  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  102  Ky.  486,  43  S.  W.  731,  80 
Am.  St.  Rep.  362;  Willis  v.  Ky.  & 
Ind.  Bridge  Co.,  104Ky.  186,  46  S.  W. 
488;  Covington  etc.  R.  R.  &  Bridge 
Co.  V.  Kleymeier,  105  Ky.  609,  49  S. 
W.  484;  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Geikel,  9  Ky.  L.  R.  813;  Louisville 
Southern  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cogar,  15  Ky. 
L.  R.  444;  Louisville  Southern  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Hooe,  18  Ky.  L.  R.  521, 
35  S.  W.  266,  38  S.  W.  131; 
Baker  v.  Boston  El.  Ry.  Co.,  183 
Mass.  178,  66  N.  E.  711 ;  Chicago  K. 
&  N.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Hazels,  26  Neb.  364, 
42  N.  W.  93;  Omaha  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Janecek,  30  Neb.  276,  46  N.  W.  478, 
27  Am.  St.  Rep.  399,  3  Am.  R.  R.  & 


§  235 


OTHEE  CASES  OF  TAKING. 


449 


The  maintaining  and  use  of  coal  chutes  or  bins  for  coaling 
engines,  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  plaintiff's  property,  has 
been  held  to  be  an  actionable  nuisance  in  Illinois,  New  York, 
Worth  Carolina  and  Texas,®  but  the  contrary  in  lowa.^"  The 
maintenance  of  stock  yards  by  a  railroad  company  near  the 
plaintiff  has  been  held  an  actionable  nuisance  in  Iowa  and 
Missouri.  ^^  In  Wisconsin  it  is  held  that,  if  they  are  properly 
located  and  properly  managed,  there  can  be  no  recovery  for  the 
annoyances   caused  thereby.-^'     If  by  reason  of  neglect   and 


Corp.  Eep.  268;  Omaha  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Mosehel,  38  Neb.  281,  56  N.  W. 
875 ;  Gainsville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hall, 
78  Tex.  16,  14  S.  W.  259,  9  L.K.A. 
298,  3  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  251 ; 
Ft.  Worth  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Downie, 
82  Tex.  383,  17  S.  W.  Rep.  620;  Gulf 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Necco  (Tex.)  15  S. 
W.  Rep.  1102;  Stockdale  v.  Rio 
Grande  Western  Ry.  Co.,  28  Utah, 
201,  77  Pac.  849 ;  Smith  v.  St.  Paul 
etc.  Ry.  Co.,  39  Wash.  355,  81  Pac. 
840,  109  Am.  St.  Rep.  889,  70  L.R.A. 
1018;  post,  §  357. 

The  contrary  is  held  in  Georgia 
and  Pennsylvania.  Austin  v.  Au- 
gusta Terminal  Ry.  Co.,  108  Ga.  671, 
34  S.  E.  852,  47  L.R.A.  755;  Pennsyl- 
vania R.  R.  Co.  V.  Lippincott,  116 
Pa.  St.  472,  9  Atl.  871 ;  Pennsylvania 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Marchant,  119  Pa.  St. 
541,  13  Atl.  690,  4  Am.  St.  Rep.  659; 
Dooner  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co., 
142  Pa.  St.  36,  21  Atl.  755;  Jones  v. 
Erie  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  151  Pa.  St.  30, 
25  Atl.  134,  31  Am.  St.  Rep.  722,  17 
L.R.A.  758;  Pennsylvania  Co.  for  In- 
surance V.  Pennsylvania  S.  V.  R.  H. 
Co.,  151  Pa.  St.  334,  25  Atl.  107. 

oWiley  v.  Elwood,  134  111.  281,  25 
N.  E.  570;  Spring  v.  Delaware  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  88  Hun  385,  34  N.  Y. 
Supp.  810;  Thomason  v.  Seaboard 
Air  Line  R.  R.  Co.,  142  N.  C.  300,  55 
S.  E.  198;  Daniel  v.  Ft.  Worth  etc. 
Ry.  Co.,  96  Tex.  327,  72  S.  W.  578. 
So  of  a  turntable.  Garvey  v.  Long 
Island  R.  R.  Co.,  9  App.  Div.  254,  41 
N.  Y.  Supp.  397;  Garvey  v.  Long 
Em.  D.— 29. 


Island  R.  R.  Co.,  159  N.  Y.  323,  54 
N.  E.  57,  70  Am.  St.  Rep.  550.  See 
Cleveland  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Patterson, 
67  111.  App.  351. 

lODunsmore  v.  Central  la.  R.  R. 
Co.,  72  la.  182. 

11  Shirley  v.  Cedar  Rapids  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  74  la.  169,  37  N.  W.  133;  Biel- 
man  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  50  Mo. 
App.  152.  And  see  Pittsburgh  etc. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Crothersville,  159  Ind. 
330,  64  N.  E.  914. 

i2Dolan  V.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co., 
118  Wis.  362,  95  N.  W.  385.  The 
court  says:  "The  railway  company 
must  use  all  reasonable  diligence  in 
the  location  of  its  yards,  to  avoid  in- 
jury to  others,  and  must  manage 
them  with  approved  methods,  using 
all  reasonable  skill  to  prevent  their 
becoming  a  nuisance.  It  cannot  un- 
necessarily or  unreasonably  locate  its 
yards  in  close  proximity  to  dwellings 
or  business  houses,  to  their  injury, 
without  incurring  liability.  It  must, 
doubtless,  in  order  to  perform  its 
duty,  place  the  yard  in  a  reason- 
ably practicable  and  convenient  loca- 
tion in  the  vicinity  of  its  station,  for 
the  reception  and  shipping  of  cattle, 
but  it  must  at  the  same  time  place 
them  where  they  will  do  the  least 
possible  injury  to  others.  If  these 
requirements  be  fulfilled,  and  if  the 
yards  be  operated  without  negligence, 
and  with  that  skill  and  diligence  to 
avoid  noise  and  noxious  smells  there- 
from which  the  importance  of  their 
duty  demands,  there  can  be  no  liabil- 


450 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


§  235 


mismanagement  the  yards  become  a  nuisance,  the  company  -will, 
of  course,  be  liable.-'*  Where  a  railroad  company  located -its 
engine  house  and  repair  shops  close  to  a  church,  it  was  held 
a  recovery  could  be  had  for  the  annoyances  and  damage  caused 
by  the  noise,  smoke,  cinders,  etc.-'*  But  -where  a  railroad  sta- 
tion and  terminal  -was  located  across  the  street  from  a  church, 
-with  tracks  crossing  the  street  near  the  church,  it  was  held 
that  there  could  be  no  recovery  for  the  nuisance  caused  by  the 
noise,  smoke,  smells  and  the  lik^,  which  emanated  therefrom.'" 
On  general  principles,  when  railroad  appurtenances  such  as  a 
round  house,  switch  yards,  repair  shop  or  terminal  plant  cause 
a  nuisance  to  neighboring  property  by  reason  of  noise,  smoke, 
cinders,  vibrations,  etc.,  there  may  be  a  recovery.**  But  there 
are  authorities  to  the  contrary.-''' 

In  England  there  can  be  no  recovery  for  such  damages, 
unless  allowed  by  statute,  because  there  is  no  higher  law  than 
an  enactment  of  the  legislature.'*  But  an  act  of  Parliament, 
which  authorizes  what  would  otherwise  be  a  nuisance,  without 
pro-viding  for  compensation  to  those  injured,  is  declared  by  the 
courts  to  be  harsh  legislation.'^ 


ity,  even  though  injury  may  result  to 
others.  Such  injury,  like  many 
others,  is  simply  one  of  the  penalties 
we  have  to  pay  for  the  conveniences 
of  modern  methods  of  transporta- 
tion."   pp.  365,  366. 

And  see  London  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Truman,  L.  R.  11  H.  L.  45. 

isAnderson  v.  Burlington  etc.  Ry. 
Co.,  82  Minn.  293,  84  N.  W.  145,  1021 ; 
Anderson  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co., 
85  Minn.  337,  88  N.  W.  1001. 

14  Baltimore  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Fifth 
Baptist  Church,  108  U.  S.  317;  Balti- 
more &  P.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Fifth  Baptist 
Church,  137  U.  S.  588,  11  S.  C.  185. 
To  same  effect:  Chicago  Gt.  West- 
ern Ry.  Co.  v.  First  M.  K.  Church, 
102  Fed.  85,  42  C.  C.  A.  178,  50  L.R.A. 
488.  In  Porterfield  v.  Bond,  38  Fed. 
Rep.  391,  the  plaintiff  recovered  for 
damages  caused  by  vibrations  pro- 
duced by  trains  running  past  his 
premises  at  a  prohibited  speed. 

iBTaylor  v.  Seaboard  Air  Line  R. 
R.  Co.,  145  N.  C.  400,  59  S.  E.  129. 


leKuhn  v.  III.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  Ill 
111.  App.  323;  Louisville  etc.  Ter- 
minal Co.  V.  Jacobs,  109  Tenn.  727, 
72  S.  W.  954,  61  L.R.A.  188;  Louis- 
ville etc.  Terminal  Co.  v.  Lellyett, 
114  Tenn.  368,  85  S.  W.  881,  1 
L.R.A.(N.S.)  49;  Rainey  v.  Red 
River  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  99  Tex.  276,  89 
S.  W.  768,  90  S.  W.  1096;  St.  Louis 
etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Shaw,  99  Tex.  559,  92 
S.  W.  30;  Tisxas  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Edrington,  100  Tex.  496,  101  S.  VV. 
441,  9L.R.A.(N.S.)  988. 

i7Ga.  R.  R.  &  Banking  Co.  v.  Mad- 
dox,  116  Ga.  64,  42  S.  E.  315;  Fried- 
man V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  89 
App.  Div.  38,  85  N.  Y.  S.  404;  S.  C. 
affirmed,  180  N.  Y.  550,  73  N.  E.  1123; 
Ross  V.  Cincinnati  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  5 
Ohio  C.  C.  (N.S.)  565. 

isfi'ee  ante,  §  103. 

19"I  do  not  think  there  can  be  any 
doubt  that  if  on  the  true  construc- 
tion of  a  statute  it  appears  to  be  the 
intention  of  the  legislature  that 
powers  should  be  exercised,  the 
proper  exercise  of  which  may  occa- 


§  23G 


OTHEK  CASES  OF  TAKIXG. 


451 


§  236  (152).  Polluting  the  atmosphere.  The  owner  of 
land  has  a  right  that  the  air  which  comes  upon  his  premises  shall 
come  in  its  natural  condition,  free  from  artificial  impurities.^" 
This  right  has  its  correlative  obligation,  Avhich  is  that  one  must 
not  use  his  own  premises  in  such  a  manner  as  to  discharge  into 
the  atmosphere  of  his  neighbor  dust,  smoke,  noxious  gases  or 
other  foreign  matter  which  substantially  affect  its  wholesome- 
ness.^^  This  right  is  very  fully  treated  by  Mr.  Wood  in  his 
work  on  Jfuisances,  and  a  reference  thereto  will  suffice.^  ^  The 
right  to  pure  air  is  property,  and  to  interfere  with  the  right 
for  public  use  is  to  take  property.^^     "There  can  be  no  question 


sion  a  nuisance  to  the  owners  of 
neighboi'ing  land,  and  that  this 
should  be  free  from  liability  to  an 
action  for  damages,  or  an  injunction 
to  prevent  the  continued  proper  exer- 
cise of  these  powers,  effect  must  be 
given  to  the  intention  of  the  legisla- 
ture. No  doubt  when  compensation 
is  not  given  to  those  interested  in  the 
neighboring  land,  this  is,  as  against 
them,  harsh  legislation."  Black- 
burne,  J.  in  London  etc.  R.  E.  Co.  v. 
Truman,  L.  R.  11  H.  L.  45,  60.  See 
also  Essex  v.  Local  Board  for  Acton, 
L.  R.  14  H.  L.  153;  S.  C.  14  Q.  B.  D. 
753,  17  Q.  B.  D.  447 ;  Rex  v.  Pease,  4 
B.  &  A.  .30,  24  E.  C.  L.  R.  24;  Attor- 
ney General  v.  Metropolitan  R.  R. 
Co.,  L.  K.  (1894)  1  Q.  B.  D.  384. 

2  0State  V.  Luce,  9  Houst.  396; 
Ponder  v.  Quitman  Ginnery,  122  Ga. 
29,  49  S.  E.  746;  Susquehanna  Fer- 
tilizer Co.  V.  Malone,  73  Md.  268,  20 
Atl.  900,  25  Am.  St.  Rep.  595,  9 
L.R.A.  737 ;  Bohan  v.  Port  Jervis  Gas 
Light  Co.,  122  N.  Y.  18,  25  X.  E.  246, 
9  L.R.A.  711,  3  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp. 
Rep.  318;  Wood  on  Nuisance,  §§  469, 
494. 

2ilbid. 

2  2Wood  on  Nuisances,  Chapters  13 
and  14. 

2  3Baltimore  &  Potomac  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Fifth  Baptist  Church,  108  U.  S. 
317;  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Angel, 
41  N.  J.  Eq.  316;   Cogswell  v.  New 


York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford  R.  R. 
Co.,  103  N.  Y.  10,  57  Am.  Rep.  701 ; 
Abendroth  v.  Manhattan  El.  Ry.  Co., 
19  Abb.  N.  C.  247 ;  Caro  v.  Same,  46 
N.  Y.  Supr.  Ct.  138.  But  see  Briesen 
v.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.,  31  Hun  112. 
In  Cogswell  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  the  court  intimated  pretty  clearly 
that  it  would  hold  it  a  taking  to  fill 
the  atmosphere  of  one's  premises 
with  smoke,  soot,  gases,  etc.,  if  called 
upon  to  do  so,  but  decide  the  case  on 
other  grounds.  In  Pennsylvania  R. 
K.  Co.  V.  Angel  the  court  says :  'But, 
secondly,  an  act  of  the  legislature 
cannot  confer  upon  individuals  or 
private  corporations,  acting  primar- 
ily for  their  own  profit,  although  for 
public  benefit,  as  well,  any  right  to 
deprive  persons  of  the  ordinary  en- 
joyment of  their  property,  except 
upon  condition  that  just  compensa- 
tion be  first  made  to  the  owners. 
This  principle  rests  upon  the  express 
terms  of  the  constitution.  In  de- 
claring that  private  property  shall' 
not  be  taken  without  recompense;' 
that  instrument  secures  to  owners, 
not  only  the  possession  of  property, 
hut  also  those  rights  which  render' 
possession  valuable.  Whether  you 
flood  the  farmer's  fields  so  that  they 
cannot  be  cultivated,  or  pollute  the 
bleacher's  stream  so  that  his  fabrics 
are  stained,  or  fill  one's  dwelling 
with  smells  and  noise  so  that  it  can 


452  EJCIXENT  DOMAIN.  §    236 

that  the  erection  of  fas  works,  or  the  setting  up  of  any  other 
noxious  trade  in  the  vicinity  of  my  premises  that  emits  noxious 
odors,  which  are  sent  over  my  lands  in  quantity  and  volume,  suffi- 
cient to  essentially  interfere  with  the  use  of  that  air  for  the 
ordinary  purposes  of  breath  and  life,  so  as  to  constitute  a  legal 
nuisance,  is  such  a  taking  of  my  property  as  the  legislature 
may  not  permit  without  compensation.  What  possible  dis- 
tinction can  there  be  between  the  actual  taking  of  my  property, 
6r  a  part  of  it,  and  occupying  it  for  the  erection  of  a  railroad 
track  or  a  gas  house  and  invading  it  by  an  agency  that  operates 
as  an  actual  abridgment  of  its  beneficial  use  and  possibly  a 
complete  and  practical  ouster?  There  certainly  can  be  none. 
By  the'  erection  of  such  works  a  burden  is  imposed  upon  my 
property ;  the  property  itself  is  actually  invaded  by  an  invisible, 
yet  a  pernicious,  agency,  that  seriously  impairs  its  use  and  en- 
joyment, as  well  as  its  value.  The  impregnation  of  the  atmos- 
phere with  noxious  mixtures  that  pass  over  my  land  is  an  inva- 
sion of  a  natural  right,  a  right  incident  to  the  land  itself,  and 
essential  to  its  beneficial  enjoyment.  My  right  to  pure  air  is 
the  same  as  my  right  to  pure  water ;  it  is  an  incident  of  the  land, 
annexed  to  and  a  part  of  it,  and  it  is  as  sacred  as  my  right  to 
the  land  itself.  Therefore,  I  apprehend  that  the  legislature  has 
no  power  to  shield  one  from  liability  for  all  the  consequences  of 
the  exercise  of  an  occupation  that  produces  such  results  any  more 
than  it  has  to  authorize  the  flooding  of  my  lands  or  the  perma- 
nent diversion  of  a  stream."  ^*  Legislative  authority  to  carry 
on  a  business  does  not  authorize  it  to  be  carried  on  in  such  a 
manner  or  at  such  a  place  that  it  will  be  a  nuisance  to  neighbor- 
ing property.^^  An  act  which  authorized  a  particular  business 
at  a  particular  place  which  necessarily  defiled  the  air  so  as  to 

not    be    occupied    in    comfort,    you  2  < Wood    on    Nuisances,   1st   Ed. 

equally  take  away  the  owner's  prop-  §  755. 

erf^r.     In  neither   instance  has   the  2  6N.   W.    Fertilizer   Co.   v.   Hyde 

owner  any  less  of  material   things  Park,  70  111.  634;  S.  C.  affirmed,  97 

than  he  had  before,  but  in  each  case  U.  S.  659 ;   Churchill  v.  Burlington 

the  utility  of  his  property  has  been  Water  Co.,  94  la.  89,  62  N.  W.  646; 

impaired  by  a  direct  invasion  of  the  Payne  v.  Wayland,  131  la.  659,  109 

bounds  of  his  private  domain.    This  la.  203;  Baltimore  v.  Fairfield  Imp. 

is  the  taking  of  his  property  in  a  Co.,  87  Md.  352,  39  Atl.  1081,  67  Am. 

constitutional     sense.      Of     course,  St.  Rep.  344,  40  L.R.A.  494;  Bacon 

mere   statutory   authority   will   not  v.  Boston,  154  Mass.  100,  28  N.  E.  9; 

avail  for  such  an  interference  with  Matthews  v.  Stillwater  G.  &  E.  L. 

private  property."     p.  329.  Co.,  63  Minn.   493,  65  N.  W.  947; 


§  236 


OTHER  CASES  OF  TAKING. 


453 


create  a  nuisance  would  be  void  unless  it  was  for  public  use,  and, 
if  for  public  use,  such  as  manufacturing  gas  for  a  city,  would 
be  subject  to  the  constitutional  limitation  of  making  compen- 
sation.^^ Where  a  city  discharges  sewerage  into  a  pond  or 
stream  or  otherwise,  so  as  to  create  a  nuisance,  it  will  be  liable.  ^^ 
So  a  garbage  dump,^^  a  garbage  crematory,^®  or  sewerage  dis- 
posal plant,^"  or  a  sewerage  farm^^  may  be  a  nuisance  and,  if 
so,  will  be  enjoined.     So  where  a  railroad  company  so  constructs 


King  V.  Vicksburg  Ry.  &  Lt.  Co.,  88 
Miss.  456,  42  So.  204,  117  Am.  St. 
Kep.  749,  6  L.R.A.  (N.S.)  1036; 
Board  of  Health  v.  Lederer,  52  N.  J. 
L..  675,  29  Atl.  444;  Bohan  v.  Port 
Jervis  Gas  Lt.  Co.,  122  N.  Y.  18,  25 
N.  E.  246,  9  L.R.A.  711;  Louisville 
etc.  Terminal  Co.  v.  Jacobs,  109  Tenn. 
727,  72  S.  W.  954,  61  L.R.A.  188; 
Rainey  v.  Red  River  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  99 
Tex.  276,  89  S.  W.  768,  90  S.  W. 
1096;  Townsend  v.  Norfolk  Ry.  &  Lt. 
Co.,  105  Va.  22,  52  S.  E.  970,  115  Am. 
St.  Rep.  842,  4  L.R.A.  (JST.S.)  87. 

2  6 Wood  on  Nuisances,  §  750;  King 
V.  Vicksburg  Ry.  &  Lt.  Co.,  88  Miss. 
456,  42  So.  204,  117  Am.  St.  Rep. 
749,  6  L.R.A.(N.S.)  1036;  Rainey  v. 
Red  River  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  99  Tex.  276, 
89  S.  W.  768,  90  S.  W.  1096.  And 
generally  where,  in  the  construction 
and  operation  of  public  works,  a, 
nuisance  is  created,  an  action  will 
lie.  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  English,  73 
Ga.  366;  Quinn  v.  Chicago  B.  &  Q. 
R.  R.  Co.,  63  la.  510;  Gould  v.  Roch- 
ester, 105  N.  Y.  46;  Morgan  v.  Bing- 
hamton,  32  Hun  602;  Suffolk  v. 
Parker,  79  Va.  660. 

2  7Lind  v.  City  of  San  Luis  Obispo, 
109  Cal.  340,  42  Pac.  437 ;  Piatt  Bros. 
&  Co.  v.  Waterbury,  72  Conn.  531,  45 
Atl.  154,  77  Am.  St.  Rep.  335,  48 
L.R.A.  691;  Waterbury  v.  Piatt 
Bros.  &  Co.,  75  Conn.  387,  53  Atl. 
958,  96  Am.  St.  Rep.  229;  Water- 
bury v.  Piatt  Bros.  &  Co.,  76  Conn. 
435,  56  Atl.  856;  Augusta  v.  Marks, 
124  Ga.  365,  52  S.  E.  539;  Dierks  v. 
Comrs.  of  Highways,  142  HI.  197,  31 


N.  E.  496;  City  of  Jacksonville  v. 
Doan,  145  HI.  23,  33  N.  E.  878;  City 
of  Champaign  v.  Forrester,  29  111. 
App.  117;  City  of  Jacksonville  v. 
Doan,  48  111.  App.  247;  Loughran  v. 
Des  Moines,  72  la.  382;  Randolph  v. 
Bloomfield,  77  la.  50,  41  N.  W.  562, 
14  Am.  St.  Rep.  268 ;  Middlesex  Co. 
V.  City  of  Lowell,  149  Mass.  509,  21 
N.  E.  872;  Bacon  v.  Boston,  154 
Mass.  100,  28  N.  E.  9 ;  Edmundson  v. 
City  of  Moberly,  98  Mo.  523,  11  S. 
W.  990;  Pierce  v.  Gibson  Co.,  107 
Tenn.  224,  64  S.  W.  33,  89  Am.  St. 
Rep.  946,  55  L.R.A.  477;  Winchell  v. 
Waukesha,  110  Wis.  101,  85  N.  W. 
668,  84  Am.  St.  Rep.  902.  And  see 
Seufferle  v.  Macfarland,  28  App.  Cas. 
D.  C.  94;  Bloomington  v.  Costello,  65 
111.  App.  407 ;  Robb  v.  Village  of  La 
Grange,  57  111.  App.  386 ;  Barrett  v. 
Mt.  Greenwood  Cem.  Assn.,  57  111. 
App.  401 ;  Titus  v.  City  of  Boston, 
161  Mass.  209,  36  N.  E.  793 ;  Lincoln 
V.  Commonwealth,  164  Mass.  368,  41 
N.  E.  489;  Owens  v.  Lancaster,  182 
Pa.  St.  257,  37  Atl.  858;  Essex  v. 
Local  Board  for  Acton,  L.  R.  14  H. 
L.  153;  S.  C.  14  Q.  B.  D.  753,  17  Q. 
B.  D.  447. 

2  8Shreck  v.  Coeur  D'Alene,  12  Ida. 
708,  87  Pac.  1001;  Stephenville  v. 
Brown,  29  Tex.  Civ.  App.  384,  68  S. 
W.  833. 

2SKobbe  v.  New  Brighton,  23  App. 
Div.  243. 

soGerow  v.  Liberty,  106  App.  Div. 
357,  94  N.  Y.  S.  949. 

3iSorivner  v.  Paris,  26  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  196,  62  S.  W.  1075. 


454 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


§  236 


its  road  as  to  create  a  stagnant  pool,  whicli  becomes  a  nuisance 
to  adjacent  property.*^  Where  a  city  used  land  of  its  own  for 
crushing  stone  and  injured  the  plaintiff  by  the  dust  sent  into 
his  atmosphere  and  deposited  upon  his  land,  it  was  held  liable.*^ 
But  where  a  city  acquired  land  across  the  street  from  the  plain- 
tiff and  built  thereon  an  embankment  and  bridge  from  which 
dust  and  dirt  were  projected  upon  the  plaintiff's  lot,  the  city 
was  held  not  liable,  the  court  treating  the  question  as  one  of 
statutory  construction  only.**  But  this  case  has  been  over- 
niled.*^  Where  a  water,  light  or  power  plant  creates  a  nuisance 
by  reason  of  gas,  smoke,  cinders,  etc.,  an  action  will  lie.*®  And 
if  the  same  is  authorized  by  law  for  a  public  purpose  the  dam- 
age is  a  taking.*'^  A  town  having  power  to  establish  a  cemetery 
may  not  locate  it  where  it  would  be  a  nuisance.**  A  hospital  or 
pest  house  may  be  enjoined  as  a  nuisance,*®  but  the  erection  of 


ssLouisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Fin- 
ley,  86  Ky.  294,  5  S.  W.  753;  Atlanta 
&  F.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Kimberly,  87  Ga. 
101,  13  S.  E.  277;  Lockett  v.  Ft. 
Worth  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  78  Tex.  211, 
14  S.  W.  564. 

ssWaldron  v.  Haverhill,  143  Mass. 
582.  See  Chicago-Virden  Coal  Co.  v. 
Wilson,  67  111.  App.  443. 

3  4Rand  v.  City  of  Boston,  164 
Mass.  354,  41  N.  E.  484.  See  Sadlier 
V.  New  York,  104  App.  Div.  82,  93  N. 
Y.  S.  579;  S.  C.  affirmed,  185  N.  y. 
408,  78  N.  E.  272;  Sadlier  v.  New 
York,  40  Misc.  78,  81  N.  Y.  S.  308. 

3  5Hyde  v.  Fall  River,  189  Mass. 
439 ;  McKean  v.  New  England  R.  R. 
Co.,  199  Mass.  292,  295. 

3  6Hyde  Park  T.  H.  Light  Co.  v. 
Porter,  167  111.  276,  47  N.  E.  206;  S. 
C.  64  111.  App.  152;  Chicago  North 
Shore  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Payne,  192  111. 
239,  61  N.  E.  467 ;  Churchill  v.  Bur- 
lington Water  Co.,  94  la.  69,  62  N. 
W.  646;  Matthews  v.  Stillwater  G. 
&  E.  L.  Co.,  63  Minn.  493,  65  N.  W. 
947 ;  King  v.  Vicksburg  Ry.  &  Lt.  Co., 
88  Miss.  456,  42  So.  204,  117  Am. 
St.  Rep.  749,  6  L.R.A.(N.S.)  1036; 
Chamberlain  v.  Mo.  Elec.  Lt.  &  P. 
Co.,  158  Mo.  1,  57  S.  W.  1021;  Bly  v. 


Edison  Elec.  111.  Co.,  172  N.  Y.  1,  64 
N.  E.  745;  Pritchard  v.  Edison  Elec. 
111.  Co.,  179  N.  Y.  364,  72  N.  E.  243, 
affirming  8.  C.  92  App.  Div.  178,  87 
N.  Y.  S.  225 ;  Miller  v.  Edison  Elec. 
III.  Co.,  184  N.  Y.  17,  76  K  E.  734, 
3  L.R.A.(N.S.)  1060,  reversing  S.  C. 
97  App.  Div.  638 ;  Bly  v.  Edison  Elec. 
III.  Co.,  Ill  App.  Div.  170,  97  N.  Y. 
S.  592;  S.  C.  affirmed  188  N.  Y.  82,  81 
N.  E.  1160;  Gauster  v.  Met.  Elec. 
Co.,  214  Pa.  St.  628,  64  Atl.  91; 
Greenville  v.  Alland  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.)  27  S.  W.  292;  Townsend  v. 
Norfolk  Ry.  &  Lt.  Co.,  105  Va.  22, 
52  S.  E.  970,  115  Am.  St.  Rep.  842,  4 
L.R.A.(N.S.)   87. 

STIbid.  See  especially  King  v. 
Vicksburg  Ry.  &  Lt.  Co.,  88  Miss. 
456,  42  So.  204,  117  Am.  St.  Rep. 
749,  6  L.R.A.(N.S.)  1036;  Gauster 
v.  Met.  Elec.  Co.,  214  Pa.  St.  628,  64 
Atl.  91. 

ssPayne  v.  Wayland,  131  la.  659, 
109  N.  W.  203.  And  see  Elliott  v. 
Ferguson,  37  Tex.  Civ.  App.  40. 

ssDeaconness  Home  &  Hospital  v. 
Bontjes,  207  111.  553,  69  N.  E.  748,  64 
L.R.A.  215 ;  Cherry  v.  Williams,  147 
N.  C.  452. 


§    237  OTHEE  CASES  OF  TAKING.  455 

one  •will  not  be  enjoined,  as  it  cannot  be  told  in  advance  whether 
it  will  be  a  nuisance  or  not.*"  Likewise  an  open  sewer,* ^  or 
noxious  mill  dam*^  may  be  abated  as  nuisances.*^ 

§  237  (152a).  Where  the  public  use  of  land  produces 
a  physical  or  structural  injury  to  adjacent  land.  Disturb- 
ance of  the  soil  by  pressure,  vibration,  flooding  or  perco- 
lation. In  Hennessey  v.  Carmony,**  the  vice-chancellor  says : 
"Upon  reason  and  authority  I  think  there  is  a  clear  distinction 
between  that  class  of  nuisances  which  affect  air  and  light  merely, 
by  way  of  noises  and  disagreeable  gases,  and  obstruction  of  light, 
and  those  which  directly  affect  the  land  itself,  or  structures  upon 
it."  But  it  may  be  doubted  whether  there  is  any  good  ground, 
either  in  legal  principles  or  physical  science,  for  such  a  distinc- 
tion. A  land  owner's  right  in  the  space  above  the  surface  are 
quite  as  important  and  valuable  as  his  rights  in  or  below  the 
surface,  or  in  structures  upon  the  land.  In  order  to  be  se- 
cure in  the  enjoyment  of  his  property  he  needs  the  same  pro- 
tection for  the  one  sort  of  rights  as  for  the  other.  What  valid 
distinction  can  be  made  between  discharging  smoke  or  noxious 
gases  into  the  atmosphere,  which  find  their  way  into  the  air  of 
the  adjoining  lot  and  cause  a  nuisance,  and  the  discharge  of 
water  or  noxious  liquids  which  flow  upon  adjoining  property 
or  percolate  through  its  soil  so  as  to  create  a  nuisance  upon  the 
land  ?  *^     The  operation  of  machinery  may  communicate  vibra- 

loManning   v.    Bruce,    186    Mass.  "50    2Sr.  J.  Eq.  616,  25  Atl.  374. 

282,  71  N.  E.  537.    And  see  Arnold  v.  And  see  Costigan  v.  Pennsylvania  R. 

Stanford,  113  Ky.  852,  69  S.  W.  726;  R.  Co.,  54  N.  J.  L.  233,  23  Atl.  810. 

Barry  v.  Smith,  191  Mass.  78,  77  N.  "In  Hauck  v.  Tide  Water  Pipe 

E.  1099,  5  L.R.A.(N.S.)  1028;  Lorain  Line  Co.,  153  Pa.  St.  368,  26  Atl.  644, 

V.  Rolling,  3  Ohio  C.  C.   (N.S.)   660.  34  Am.  St.  Rep.  710,  20  L.R.A.  642, 

4iRand  Lumber  Co.  v.  Burlington,  which  was  a  suit  for  damages  caused 

122  la.  203,  97  N.  W.  1096.  by  oil  which  had  escaped  from  the 

4  2Richards  v.  Dougherty,  133  Ala.  pipes   of   the   defendant   and   perco- 

569  31  So.  934.  lated  through  the  soil  to  the  plain- 

4 3 As    to    nuisance    of    fertilizing  tiff's  springs,  the  court  says:    "The 

plant  see  Swift  v.  Broyles,  115  6a.  appellant   attempted   to  distinguish 

885,  42  S.  E.  277,  58  L.R.A.  390;  N.  this  case  from  Robb  v.  Carnegie,  by 

W.  Fertilizing  Co.  v.  Hyde  Park,  70  the  fact  that  in  the  latter  case  the 

111.  634;  S.  C.  affirmed,  97  U.  S.  659 ;  smoke  and  gases  from  the  works  were 

Susquehanna   Fertilizer   Co.   v.   Ma-  carried  by  the  wind,  and  lodged  upon 

lone,  73  Md.  268,  20  Atl.  900,  25  Am.  the  plaintiff's  land;  while  in  the  lat- 

St.  Rep.  595,  9  L.R.A.  737 ;  Susque-  ter  ease  the  escaping  oil  merely  per- 

hanna  Fertilizer  Co.  v.  Spangler,  86  colated    through    the   soil   until   it 

Md.  562,  39  Atl.  270,  63  Am.  St.  Rep.  reached     plaintiffs     springs.      The 

533^  essential    difference    between    being 


-156  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    237 

lions  to  the  air  which  make  life  a  burden  to  those  in  the  neigh- 
borhood by  reason  of  the  noise  so  produced,  and  at  the  same  time 
may  communicate  vibrations  to  the  land,  which  crack  the  walls 
and  shake  down  the  plaster  of  the  houses  in  which  they  live. 
How  can  a  distinction  be  made  between  the  two,  when  both 
kinds  of  injury  go  to  the  extent  of  materially  impairing  the  use 
and  enjoyment  of  the  property  ? 

Where  a  railroad  company  builds  an  embankment  on  its  own 
land,  which,  owing  to  the  yielding  nature  of  the  subsoil,  settles, 
and,  by  lateral  pressure,  causes  an  upheaval  of  the  adjacent  land, 
it  will  be  liable  for  the  damage.*^  "Where  a  city  erected  a  pump- 
ing station,  upon  a  lot  adjoining  plaintiff's,  which  damaged  his 
property  by  noise  and  vibrations,  it  was  held  the  city  was  liable, 
not  on  the  ground  of  a  taking,  but  on  the  ground  that  the  legisla- 
tive authority  did  not  authorize  the  works  where  they  would  be 
a  nuisance,  and,  therefore,  that  the  city  should  have  selected  a 
different  location  or  acquired  more  land.*^  A  recovery  has  been 
allowed  for  vibrations  caused  by  an  electric  light  plant.**  Where 
a  railroad  company  builds  a  fence  upon  its  own  land  to  protect 
its  tracks  from  snow,  it  is  not  liable  for  an  accumulation  of  snow 
on  the  adjoining  land  caused  by  the  same  fence.*®  Injuries 
to  land  by  flooding  it  with  water,  by  interfering  with  the  flow  of 
water,  or  by  the  percolation  of  noxious  substances,  have  been 
considered  in  a  former  chapter.^" 

carried      through      the      air      and  Braun,  199  III.  390,  65  N.  E.  249,  59 

percolating  through  the  soil  has  not  L.R.A.  421 ;  Chicago  v.  Murdock,  212 

been  made  to  appear.    We  regard  it  111.  9,  72  N.  E.  46,  103  Am.  St.  Rep. 

as  a  distinction  without  a  diflference."  221 ;  Gossett  v.  Southern  Ey.  Co.,  115 

■lOHerbert  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Tenn.  376,  89  S.  W.  737,  112  Am.  St. 

R.  Co.,  43  N.  J.  Eq.  21,  10  Atl.  872;  Rep.   846,   1   L.R.A.  (N.S.)    97;    Far- 

Costigan  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  nandis  v.  Gt.  Northern  Ry.  Co.,  41 

54  N.  J.  L.  233,  23  Atl.  810;  Roush-  Wash.  486,  84  Pac.  18,  11]  Am.  St. 

lange  v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  115  Rep.  922,  5  L.R.A. (N.S.)  1086. 
Ind.  106,  17  N.  E.  198.  4  8Shelfer  v.  City  of  London  Elec- 

4  7Morton  v.  New  York,  140  N.  Y.  trie  Lighting  Co.,  L.  R.    (1895),   1 

207,  35  N.  E.  490,  22  L.R.A.  241,  af-  Ch.  D.  287. 

firming  65  Hun  32,  47  N.  Y.  St.  64,  19  ^sCarron  v.  Western  R.  R.  Co.,  8 

N.  Y.  Supp.  603.    But  temporary  an-  Gray  423. 

noyances  of  the  same  kind,  while  ^oSee  chap,  iv;  also  Athens  Mfg. 
building  a  tunnel,  were  held  to  be  Co.  v.  Rucker,  80  Ga.  292;  Stone  v. 
damnum  absque  injuria,  in  Lester  v.  Augusta,  46  Me.  127;  Bacon  v.  Bos- 
New  York,  79  Hun  479,  29  N.  Y.  ton,  154  Mass.  100,  28  N.  E.  Rep.  9 ; 
Supp.  1000,  though  they  were  con-  Rise  v.  City  of  Flint,  67  Mich.  401,  34 
tinued  for  nearly  three  years.  But  N.  W.  Rep.  719;  Mundy  v.  New  York 
see  Fitz  Simmons  &  Connell  Co.  v.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  75  Hun  479,  27  N.  Y. 


§    238  OTHEE  CASES  OF  TAKING.  457 

§  238  (152b).  If  the  use  of  property  for  public  pur- 
poses produces  a  nuisance,  those  injured  are  entitled  to 
compensation.  This  proposition  is  sustained  by  many  of  the 
cases  cited  in  the  preceding  sections.  It  is  immaterial  whether 
the  particular  use  of  the  property  in  question  is  authorized  by 
the  legislature  or  not.  The  right  not  to  be  injured  by  a  nuisance 
on  adjoining  land  cannot  be  taken  without  compensation.  This 
seems  to  us  the  only  logical  conclusion.''^  The  Massachusetts 
court  has  held  that  "the  legislature  may  authorize  small  nui- 
sances without  compensation,  but  not  great  ones."®^  But  where 
is  the  line  to  be  drawn  ?  The  courts  of  New  Jersey,  perceiving 
this  difficulty,  have  held  that  it  cannot  be  drawn  anywhere,  and 
have  hence  concluded  that  the  legislature  can  authorize  all  nui- 
sances, both  great  and  small.^^  But  it  is  certainly  more  logical, 
more  just  and  more  in  keeping  with  the  trend  of  modern  deci- 
sions to  hold  that  no  right  of  property  can  be  taken,  destroyed 
or  materially  impaired,  without  compensation.  Numerous  deci- 
sions, cited  in  this  and  the  last  three  chapters,  support  this  con- 
clusion, and  it  is  unnecessary  to  repeat  them.  In  a  suit  to  re- 
cover for  the  nuisance  of  noise,  smoke,  cinders,  etc.,  caused  by 
a  railroad  company,  the  court  says:  "In  legal  effect,  the  nui- 
sance resulting  from  the  use  made  of  these  structures  by  the  de- 
fendant constitutes  a  partial  taking  of  the  plaintiff's  property, 
for  which  compensation  must  be  made.  If  two  private  citizens 
own  adjacent  lots,  one  cannot  establish  and  maintain  on  his  own 
lot  a  nuisance  which  has  the  effect  of  depriving  his  neighbor 
of  any  beneficial  use  of  his  lot  without  making  compensation  for 
the  injury;  and  no  more  can  a  private  corporation  erect  and 
maintain  a  nuisance  on  its  own  premises,  or  in  a  public  street, 
which  has  the  effect  to  deprive  an  adjacent  or  abutting  owner 
of  the  beneficial  use  of  his  property,  without  making  compensa- 

Supp.  469 ;  Hauck  V.  Tide  Water  Pipe  102,  28  N.  E.  9.     And  see  Davis  v. 

Line  Co.,  153  Pa.  St.  366,  26  Atl.  644,  Sawyei-,   133    Mass.   239;     Common- 

34  Am.  St.  Rep.  710,  20  L.R.A.  642;  wealth  v.  Parks,  155  Mass.  531,  532, 

Riddle's  Exrs.  v.  Delaware  County,  30  N.  E.  174;  Murtlia  v.  Lovewell,  166 

156  Pa.St.  643,  27  Atl.  Rep.  569;  High  Mass.  391,  44  N.  E.   347;   Levin  v. 

Bridge  Lumber  Co.  v.  United  States,  Goodwin,  191  Mass.  341,  77  N.  E.  718, 

69  Fed.  Rep.  320,  16  C.  C.  A.  460;  114  Am.  St.  Rep.  616. 
Broadbent   v.   Imperial   Gas    Co.,   7  BSBeseman  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R. 

De  G.  McN.  &  G.  436;  Imperial  Gas  Co.,  50  N.  J.  L.  235,  13  Atl.  Rep.  164. 

Co.  V.  Broadbent,  7  H.  L.  Cas.  600.  See  statement  and  quotations  from 

i'i-An.te,  §§   65  et  seq.,  235-237.  the  case,  ante,  §  235,  note  2. 

6  2Bacon  v.  Boston,  154  Mass.  100, 


458  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    239 

tion  for  the  injury.  There  is  no  such  thing  as  a  natural  person 
or  a  private  corporation  having  a  'lawful  right'  to  invade  the 
premises  of  an  abutting  owner,  and  appropriate  his  property; 
and  there  is  no  difference  in  principle  between  an  actual  physi- 
cal invasion  of  one's  property  and  the  creation  and  maintenance 
of  a  nuisance  which  has  the  effect  to  deprive  him  of  its  beneficial 
use."«* 

§  239  (153).  Miscellaneous  decisions  as  to  what  con- 
stitutes a  taking.  A  leasehold  interest  in  public  property 
derived  from  the  State  cannot  be  taken  without  compensation.^" 
A  right  to  recover  for  flowage  is  a  valuable  right  of  property, 
within  the  protection  of  the  constitution.^"  But  one  has  no 
such,  vested  right  in  an  award  of  damages  for  property  taken 
for  public  use  as  will  prevent  the  legislature  from  authorizing , 
a  court  to  set  it  aside  for  good  cause  shown.^''  The  unauthorized 
use  of  a  patented  machine  by  the  government  is  not  a  taking, 
but  a  mere  infringement  of  a  patent  right.®*  Fixing  the  maxi- 
mum of  fees  to  be  allowed  an  attorney  for  defending  a  pauper 
charged  with  crime,  does  not  violate  the  constitution  as  to  the 
taking  of  private  property  for  public  use.®®  One  who  furnishes 
books  to  a  State  under  a  contract  for  less  than  they  are  worth, 
has  no  claim  against  the  State  for  the  difference  on  the  ground 
that  his  property  has  been  taken  for  public  use.®" 

An  act  authorizing  the  sale  of  lands  held  in  joint  tenancy, 
tenancy  in  common  and  coparcenary,"  ■■■  or  the  real  estate  of 
minors,"^  is  not  invalid.  Where  land  is  held  in  trust  or  for  life 
with  remainder  over,  it  has  been  held  that  the  legislature  may 
authorize  the  sale  of  the  land  and  the  application  of  the  proceeds 
according  to  the  rights  of  the  parties."^  A  law  giving  an  occu- 
pying claimant  the  option  of  purchasing  the  land  or  selling  the 
improvements,  after  judgment  against  him  in  ejectment,  was 

s^Chicago  Gt.  Western  Ry.  Co.  v.  ssgamuels  v.  County  of  Dubuque, 

First  M.  E.  Clmrcli,  102  Fed.  85,  91,  13  la.  536. 
42  C.  C.  A.  178,  50  L.R.A.  488.  eoshoals  v.  State,  2  Chand.  Wis. 

5  5McCauley  v.  Waller,  12  Cal.  500 ;  182. 
Same  v.  Brooks,  16  Cal.  11.  siRichardson  v.  Munson,  23  Conn. 

BSNeponset  Meadow  Co.  v.  Tileson,  94. 
133  Mass.  189.  62Rice  v.  Parkman,  16  Mass.  326. 

5 'Matter  of  Widening  Broadway,  esNorris  v.  Clymer,  2  Pa.  St.  277; 

61  Barb.  483.  Sohier  v.  Mass.  General  Hospital,  3 

5  8  Pitcher  v.  United  States,  1  Ct.  Gush.  483,  496;  Lindsay  v.  Hubbard, 

of  CI.  7.  44  Conn.  109.      . 


§    239  OTIIEE  CASES  OF  TAKIISTG.  459 

held  invalid  as  a  taking/'*  So  of  a  law  authorizing  a  court  to 
confirm  and  make  valid  a  deed  previously  executed  by  a  married 
woman,  which  was  not  properly  acloiowledged."'  The  legisla- 
ture has  no  power  to  authorize  the  sale  of  private  property,  for 
other  than  public  uses,  Avithout  the  consent  of  the  owner,  except 
in  cases  of  necessity,  arising  from  the  infancy,  insanity,  or  other 
incompetency  of  those  in  whose  behalf  it  acts.""  An  act  com- 
pelling the  city  of  Boston  to  transfer  a  cemetery  to  a  private 
corporation  was  held  invalid.®^  The  property  of  a  private  elee- 
mosynary institution  cannot  be  taken  away  from  it  by  the  legis- 
lature.®* An  act  that,  when  a  town  is  divided,  part  of  the  prop- 
erty of  the  old  town  shall  belong  to  the  new,  does  not  violate  the 
constitution.®*  An  act  allowing  the  building  of  a  party  wall 
partly  on  the  adjoining  land  of  another  is  not  a  taking.''"'  The 
legislature  may  provide  that  the  lien  of  a  special  assessment  shall 
take  precedence  of  a  prior  mortgage.^  ^  Where  vessels,  being 
suspected  of  being  about  to  sail  on  a  marauding  expedition,  are 
detained  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  a  statute,  there  is 
no  taking  within  the  constitution.''^  The  discontinuance  of  a 
railroad  is  not  a  taking  of  the  property  of  those  who  are  damaged 
thereby.^^  So  where  the  laying  out  of  a  new  highway  diverts 
travel  from  past  the  plaintiff's  property  and  renders  it  less  valu- 
able.''* An  act  establishing  the  Torrens  system  of  land  trans- 
fers was  held  to  be  invalid  for  the  reason,  among  others,  that  its 
operation  would  take  private  property  for  private  use  and  witli- 

6  4McCoy  V.  Grandy,  3  Ohio  St.  463.  7  2Graham  v.  United  States,  2  Ct. 

ssPearce's  Heirs  v.   Patton,  7   B.  of  Claims,  327.     Where  the  Govern- 

Mon.  162,  167.  ment  had  possession  of  a  vessel  under 

6  6Powers  V.  Bergen,  6  N.  Y.  358.  a  charter  party,  which  gave  an  option 

6  ^Proprietors  of  Mt.  Hope  Ceme-  to  purchase  at  an  appraised  value, 
tery  v.  City  of  Boston,  158  Mass.  509,  and  during  such  possession  the  vessel 
33  N.  E.  695.  See  also  People  v.  Por-  is  destroyed  by  the  Government,  it  is 
ter,  26  Hun  622 ;  Board  of  Regents  v.  to  be  deemed  a  taking  under  the  con- 
Painter,  102  Mo.  464,  14  S.  W.  938;  tract  and  not  under  the  eminent  do- 
Webb  v.  New  York,  64  How.  Pr.  10.  main  power.  Bogert  v.  United  States, 

ssBoard  of  Education  v.  Bakewell,  2  Ct.  of  Claims,  159. 
122  HI.  339.  7  3Kinealy  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R. 

6  9Bristol  v.  New  Chester,  3  N.  H.  Co.,  69  Mo.  658. 
533.  7  4Huflf  V.  Donehoo,  109  Ga.  638,  34 

TOHunt  V.  Arnbruster,  17  N.  J.  Eq.  S.  E.  1035. 
208. 

TiMurphy  v.  Beard,  138  Ind.  560, 
39  N.  E.  33. 


460  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    239 

out  compensation.''^  The  lessee  of  a  stall  in  a  city  market  was 
held  to  have  no  such  estate  therein  as  would  enable  him  to  main- 
tain trespass  against  a  railroad  company  taking  possession  under 
the  power  of  eminent  domain^"  The  legislature  authorized 
a  dam  across  the  outlet  of  a  creek  in  which  the  tide  ebbed  and 
flowed.  The  dam  was  built  and  maintained  by  the  owners  of 
meadows  thereby  reclaimed  from  overflow.  After  being  main- 
tained for  nearly  a  hundred  years,  the  legislature  declared  the 
creek  navigable  and  ordered  the  removal  of  the  dam.  It  was 
held  that  the  dam  was  private  property  and  could  not  be  taken 
without  compensation.''^  Drawing  down  a  mill  dam  in  order 
to  repair  a  highway  or  bridge  is  not  a  taking.^®  A  statute  giving 
double  damages  for  loss  by  reason  of  negligent  fires  is  not  uncon- 
stitutional, as  taking  the  property  of  one  person  for  the  benefit 
of  another  without  compensation.''®  Imposing  a  fine  upon  a 
corporation  in  obedience  to  a  state  law  for  a  refusal  to  produce 
books  and  papers  in  a  judicial  proceeding,  is  neither  a  taking 
of  property  for  public  use  without  compensation  or  a  taking 
without  due  process  of  law.^"  When,  in  case  of  emergency, 
property  is  seized  temporarily  for  use  as  a  pest  house  ^^  or  for  a 
military  camp,^^  the  owner  is  entitled  to  compensation.  Pre- 
venting a  turnpike  company  from  taking  tolls  after  its  franchise 
has  expired  is  not.  a  taking  of  property  for  public  use.^^  Ex- 
cepting certain  parts  of  a  county  from  the  operation  of  a  general 
stock  law  is  not  a  taking  as  to  such  parts,  though  the  effect  is  to 
turn  them  into  a  common  pasture.**  Biit  requiring  the  owners 
of  such  parts  to  fence  the  same  is  a  taking  for  private  use  and 
forbidden  by  the  constitution.*''  An  act  providing  that  unsilb- 
divided  tracts  of  land  might,  for  the  purpose  of  spreading  assess- 

75State  V.  Guilbert,   56  Ohio  St.  soConsolidated    Eendering    Co.  v. 

575.    But  see  People  v.  Crissman,  41  Vermont,  207  U.  S.  541,  28  S.  C.  178. 

Colo.  450;  People  v.  Simon,  176  111.  siBrown    v.    Pierce    County,    28 

165,  52  N.  E.  910.  Wash.  345,  68  Pae.  872, 

76Strickland  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  s2Chicago  v.  Chicago  League  Ball 

Co.,  154  Pa.  St.  348,  26  Atl.  431.  Club,  97  111.  App.  637. 

7  7Glover  v.  Powell,  10  N.  J.  Eq.  8  3  State  v.  Scott  County  Road  Co., 

211.  207  Mo.  54,  105  S.  W,  752. 

7  8East  Montpelier  v.  Wheelock,  70  siGoodale  v.  Sowell,  62  S.  C.  516, 

Vt.  391,  41  Atl.  432;  Aitken  v.  Wells  40  S.  E.  970. 

River,  70  Vt.  309,  40  Atl.  829,  67  Am.  alUd. 
St.  Rep.  672,  41  L.R.A.  566. 

7  9  Allen  V.  Bainbridge,  145  Mich. 
366,  108  N.  W.  732. 


§  241  OTHEE  CASES  OF  TAKING,  461 

ments  for  house  drains  and  water  service  pipes,  be  divided  into 
lots  of  tvpenty-five  feet  frontage  each,  was  held  void  as  depriving 
the  owner  of  dominion  over  his  land  and  thereby  taking  it  fro 
tanto  without  due  process  of  law.*® 

§  240  (154).  Damages  from  negligence.  Damages  re- 
sulting from  negligence  are  always  actionable.  Consequently  a 
recovery  may  be  had  for  all  damages  which  result  from  the  negli- 
gent or  improper  construction  or  operation  of  public  works.*^ 
Such  damages  are,  of  course,  not  a  taking,  and  are  not  included 
in  the  award  of  compensation.** 

§  241.  Public  property  not  within  the  constitutional 
provision.  An  act  of  Illinois  provided  for  the  organization  of 
drainage  districts  and  the  construction  by  the  district  of  ditches, 
drains  and  levees,  and  authorized  the  drainage  commissioners 
to  remove  any  bridge,  culvert  or  embankment,  if  found  necessary 
in  their  judgment,  and  required  the  proper  corporate  authorities 
to  reconstruct  or  replace  the  same  at  their  own  expense.  In  case 
of  a  district  organized  under  the  act,  the  commissioners  found 
it  necessary  to  enlarge  a  creek  and,  in  order  to  do  so,  removed 
a  county  bridge  over  the  same.  The  counties  owning  the 
bridge  sued  for  damages  and  the  court  held  that  the  bridge  was 
public  property  and  not  within  the  protection  of  the  constitu- 
tion, that  the  acts  of  the  defendants  were  within  the  authority  of 
the  statute  and  that  they  were  not  liable.*"  In  a  proceeding  by 
the  United  States  to  condemn  a  portion  of  the  town  of  ISTahant 

ssChicago  V.  Wells,  23G  111.  129.  Counties,  193  111.  439,  62  N.  E.  201, 

8  TTerre  Haute  &  Indiana  R.  E.  Co.  58  L.R.A.  353.    The  court  says :   "We 

V.  MoKinley,  33  Ind.  274;  Blood  v.  are  unable  to  see  that  this  eonstitu- 

Nashua  &  Lowell  R.  E.  Co.,  2  Gray  tional  provision  relates  in  any  way 

137,  61  Am.  Dec.  444;  Estabrooks  v.  to  the  question  in  controversy.    The 

Peterborough  &   Shirley  R.  E.  Co.,  bridge  in  question  in  this  case  was 

12  Cush.  224;  Bungenstock  v.  Nish-  not  private  property,  but  belonged  to 

nabotna  Dr.  Dist.,  163  Mo.  198,  64  S.  the  public.    In  no  legal  sense  can  it 

W.  149;  Johnson  v.  Atlantic  &  St.  be  said  that  roads  and  bridges   in 

Lawrence  R.  R.  Co.,  35  N.  H.  569;  counties      are      private      property. 

Delaware  etc.  Canal  Co.  v.  Lee,  22  N.  Counties    are    but    political    subdi- 

J.  L.  243;  Bellinger  v.  Kevv  York  Cen-  visions  of  the  State,  and  are  subject 

tral  R.  R.  Co.,  23  N.  Y.  42 ;  Eobinson  to  the  full  control  of  the  State  acting 

V.  New  Y'ork  &  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  27  through  the  legislature  by  general 

Barb.  512;  Waterman  v.  Connecticut  law,  and  the  property  they  hold  is 

etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  30  Vt.  610.  not  private  but  public  property.  *  *  * 

ssCases  in  last  note.    Post,  §§  714,  Such  being  the  law,  it  is  clear  that 

829;   Board  of  Comrs.  v.  State,  147  the  constitutional  provision  involved 

Ind  476.  ^^^  ^°  application  to  this  case,  and 

saHeffner    v.    Cass    and    Morgan  that  the  legislature  has  full  power  to 


i62  EMIlfENT  DOMAIN.  §    242 

for  defensive  purposes,  including  all  roads,  -ways  and  avenues 
included  within  the  description  and  all  buildings  and  structures 
thereon,  the  town  made  a  claim  for  compensation  for  the  streets, 
street  improvements,  water  pipes  and  sewers  taken  and  for 
damage  to  the  water  and  sewerage  systems  by  the  taking.  The 
State  of  Massachusetts  had  given  its  consent  to  the  appropria- 
tion. It  was  assumed  that  the  State  might  have  taken  all  of  this 
property  without  compensation  to  the  town  but  it  was  held  that 
its  consent  to  the  taking  did  not  have  the  eifect  to  transfer  this 
right  to  the  federal  government  and  that  the  town  was  entitled  to 
compensation  for  all  the  items  claimed,  except  the  soil  of  the 
streets.®" 

§  242  (155).  Taking  under  the  guise  of  taxation. 
We  have  already  distinguished  the  eminent  domain  power  from 
that  of  taxation.®^  Many  attempts  have  been  made  to  invalidate 
a  tax  on  the  ground  that  it  was  a  violation  of  the  constitutional 
provision  prohibiting  the  taking  of  private  property  for  public 
use  without  just  compensation.  But,  with  a  few  exceptions, 
it  has  generally  been  held  that  this  limitation  has  no  application 
to  the  taxing  power.  The  limitations  upon  that  power  are  to  be 
found  in  the  nature  of  the  power  itself,  and  in  other  provisions 
of  the  constitution  having  express  reference  to  taxation.*^  Ac- 
cordingly it  has  been  held  that  a  water  tax,®*  a  tax  to  pay  boun- 
ties to  soldiers,®*  or  a  tax  in  aid  of  a  railroad  or  similar  public 
works,®'  or  upon  the  franchises  or  business  of  a  corporation,®*  is 

authorize  another  public  corporation  Opinion  of  Justices,  190  Mass.  Oil, 

to    remove  a  public    bridge  over  a  77  N.  E.  820. 

stream  which  runs  across  a  public  sBQibbons     v.     Mobile     &     Great 

highvfay  without  compensation,   al-  Northern  R.   R.   Co.,   36  Ala.   410; 

though  such  bridge  may  have  been  stein  v.  Mobile,  24  Ala.  591 ;  Presi- 

constructed  by  the  county."    pp.  448,  dent  &  Comrs.  of  Revenue  v.  State, 

**9-  45  Ala.  399;  Aurora  v.  West,  9  Ind. 

soNahant   v.    United    States,    136  74     Stewart  v.  Supervisors  of  Polk 

Fed.  273,  70  C.  C.  A.  641,  69  L.R.A.  bounty,  30  la.  9,  1  Am.  Rep.  238; 


Clarke  v.  Rochester,  24  Barb.  446; 
Grant  v.  Courter,  24  Barb.  232;  Gib- 
son V.  Mason,  5  Nev.  283,  303;  C.  W. 


723;   United  States  v.  Nahant,  153 

Fed.  520,  82  C.  C.  A.  470.     See  ante,. 

§  175. 

^T-Ante,  §  4. 

9  2Cooley  on  Taxation,  chap.  3.  ^t""  ^-  ^-  ^°-  ^-  '^1''^*°°  C^^^^^'  ^ 

9  3Allenv.  Drew,44Vt.  174.  ^hio   St.   101-2;    Norris  v.   City  of 

9 estate  v.  Demarest,  32  N.  J.  L.      Waco,  57  Tex.  635;  Oilman  v.  Sheboy- 

528;   Booth  v.  Woodbury,  32  Conn.      t)an,  2  Black  510;  Pine  Grove  v.  Tal- 

118.    Such  a  tax  held  invalid  as  being      cott,  19  Wall.  666;  County  of  Mobile 

for  a  private  purpose.     Opinion  of      v.  Kimball,  102  U.  S.  691. 

Justices,  186  Mass.  603,  72  N.  E.  95;  seHorn    Silver  Min.    Co.   v.   New 


§  342  OTUEE  CASES  OF  TAKING.  463 

not  a  taking  of  private  property  under  the  eminent  domain 
power.  The  only  instances  in  which  a  proposed  tax  has  been 
held  to  be  a  taking,  and  so  within  the  limitations  imposed  upon 
the  exercise  of  the  power  of  eminent  domain  by  the  legislature, 
are  special  assessments  for  local  improvements  and  the  taxation 
of  farming  lands  for  municipal  purposes.*'' 

The  question  as  to  special  assessments  has  been  discussed  in 
a  former  chapter.®*  It  has  been  held  in  many  cases  that  a  spe- 
cial assessment  upon  property  for  a  local  improvement  in  excess 
of  the  benefits  accruing  to  the  property  therefrom,  is  as  to  such 
excess  a  taking  of  property  for  public  use  without  compensa- 
tion.'® The  supreme  court  of  Nebraska  says  that  "it  is  ele- 
mentary constitutional  law  that  the  only  foundation  for  a  local 
assessment  lies  in  the  special  benefits  conferred  by  the  improve- 
ment, and  that  a  local  assessment  beyond  the  special  benefits  con- 
ferred is  a  taking  of  private  property  for  public  use  without 
compensation."  ^  On  the  other  hand  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States  has  recently  sustained  a  statute  of  Missouri  which 
required  the  whole  cost  of  a  local  improvement  to  be  assessed 
upon  the  abutting  property  according  to  frontage  and  which 
made  no  provision  for  determining  the  question  of  benefits.^ 
And  many  other  cases  in  the  same  and  other  courts  have  held 
the  same  view.*    Where  part  of  a  lot  or  tract  is  taken  for  opening 

York,  143  U.  S.  305,  12  S.  C.  403.    A  Commissioners,  173  Mass.  350,  53  N. 

tax  on  telegraph  poles  in  streets,  is  E.  138;  Dexter  v.  Boston,  176  Mass. 

valid.     St.  Louis  v.  Western  Union  247,  57  N.  E.  379,  79  Am.  St.  Rep. 

Tel.  Co.,  148  U.  S.  92,  13  S.  C.  485,  306;  Lorden  v.  Coffey,  178  Mass.  489, 

7  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  589;  St.  60  N.  E.  124;  Edwards  v.  Bruorton, 

Louis  V.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  149  184  Mass.  529,  69  N.  E.  328;  State  v. 

U.  S.  465,  13  S.  C.  990;  Postal  Tel.  Pilsbury,   82  Minn.   359,   85   N.   W. 

Cable  Co.  v.  Baltimore,  79  Md.  502,  175;  Cain  v.  Omaha,  42  Neb.  120,  60 

29    AtL   819,   24    L.R.A.    161.     See  N.  W.  368 ;  King  v.  Portland,  38  Ore. 

Hodges  V.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  402,  63  Pac.  2,  55  L.R.A.  812;  Hutch- 

72  Miss.  910,   18  So.  84,  29  L.R.A.  inson  v.  Storrie,  92  Tex.  685,  51  S. 

770.  W.  848,  45  L.R.A.  289;   Lathrop  v. 

91  See,   as  to  license  tax,  Living-  Racine,  119  Wis.  461,  97  N.  W.  192. 

ston  V.  Paducah,  80  Ky.  656.  iCain  v.  Omaha,  42  Neb.  120,  60  N. 

ssAnte,  §  5.  W.  368. 

99Adams  v.   Shelbyville,   154  Ind.  2Freneh  v.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving 

467,  57  N.  E.  114,  77  Am.  St.  Rep.  Co.,  181  U.  S.  324,  21  S.  C.  625. 

484,    49    L.R.A.    797;    Ijouisville    v.  sMontgomery  v.  Moore,   140   Ala. 

Bitser,  115  Ky.  359,  73  S.  W.  1115;  638,  37  So.  291;  Barfield  v.  Gleason, 

Weed  V.  Boston,  172  Mass.  28,  51  N.  Ill  Ky.  491,  63  S.  W.  964;  Voight  v. 

E.  204,  42  L.R.A.  642 ;  Sears  v.  Street  Detroit,  123  Mich.  547,  82  N.  W.  253 ; 


464 


EMIXEIfX  DOMAIN. 


§  242 


or  widening  a  street,  it  has  been  held  that  the  cost  of  the  part 
taken  cannot  be  assessed  upon  the  part  remaining  to  an  amount 
exceeding  the  special  benefits  to  such  part  by  the  opening  or 
widening  of  the  street.*  And  where  the  constitution  forbids 
the  consideration  of  benefits  in  case  of  property  taken  for  public 
use,  no  part  of  the  cost  of  the  property  taken  can  be  assessed 
back  upon  the  part  not  taken.^  A  sale  of  property  to  pay  a 
special  assessment  or  any  other  tax  is  not  a  taking.^ 


Goodrich  v.  Detroit,  123  Mich.  559, 
82  N.  W.  255;  Cass  Farm  Co.  v.  De- 
troit, 124  Mich.  433,  83  N.  W.  108; 
Wilzinski  v.  Greenville,  85  Miss.  393, 
37  So.  807;  Edwards  House  Co.  v. 
Jackson,  91  Miss.  429,  45  So.  14; 
Prior  V.  Buehler  etc.  Co.,  170  Mo. 
439,  71  S.  W.  205;  McMillan  v.  Butte, 
30  Mont.  220,  76  Pac.  203;  People  v. 
Pitt,  169  N.  y.  521,  62  N.  E.  662,  58 
L.R.A.  372,  affirming  S.  C.  64  App. 
Div.  316,  72  N.  Y.  S.  191;  Webster  v. 
Fargo,  9  N.  D.  208,  82  N.  W.  732,  56 
L.R.A.  156;  Harrisburg  v.  McPher- 
ran,  200  Pa.  St.  S43,  49  Atl.  988; 
Wight  V.  Davidson,  181  U.  S.  371, 
21  S.  C.  616;  Tona\¥anda  v.  Lyon,  181 
U.  S.  389,  21  S.  C.  609;  Webster  v. 
Fargo,  181  U.  S.  394,  21  S.  C.  645; 
Cass  Farm  Co.  v.  Detroit,  181  U.  S. 
396,  21  S.  C.  644;  Detroit  v.  Parker, 
181  U.  S.  399,  21  S.  C.  645;  Wormley 
v.  District  of  Columbia,  181  U.  S. 
402,  21  S.  C.  609;  Shumate  v.  Heman, 
181  U.  S.  402,  21  S.  C.  645;  Schaefifer 
V.  Werling,  188  U.  S.  516,  23  S.  C. 
449;  Hibben  v.  Smith,  191  U.  S.  310, 
24  S.  C.  88;  Cleveland  etc.  Ky.  Co.  v. 
Porter,  210  U.  S.  177,  28  S.  C.  647. 
And  see  Harton  v.  Avondale,  147 
Ala.  458,  41  So.  934;  CoflFman  v.  St. 
Francis  Dr.  Dist.,  83  Ark.  54,  103  S. 
W.  179;  State  v.  Robert  P.  Lewis 
Co.,  72  Minn.  87,  75  N.  W.  108,  42 
L.R.A.  639;  Sperry  v.  Flygare,  80 
Minn.  325,  83  N.  W.  177,  81  Am.  St. 
Rep.  261,  49  L.R.A.  757;  State  v. 
Robert  P.  Lewis  Co.,  82  Minn.  390,  85 
N.  W.  207,  86  N.  W.  611,  53  L.R.A. 


421;  State  v.  Macalester  College,  87 
Minn.  165,  91  N.  W.  484. 

^Davidson  v.  Wight,  16  App.  Cases 
D.  C.  371;  Cain  v.  Omaha,  42  Neb. 
120,  60  N.  W.  368;  Hutchinson  v. 
Storrie,  92  Tex.  685,  51  S.  W.  848, 
45  L.R.A.  289;  Norwood  v.  Baker, 
172  U.  S.  269 ;  Martin  v.  District  of 
Columbia,  205  U.  S.  135,  27  S.  C. 
440.  "The  courts  will  not  permit 
municipalities  to  evade  the  provision 
of  the  constitution  that  the  property 
of  no  person  shall  be  taken  or  dam- 
aged for  public  use  without  just  com- 
pensation by  paying  the  compensa- 
tion, and  then,  under  the  guise  of 
taxation,  taking  it  back  from  the 
person  entitled."  Cain  v.  Omaha,  42 
Neb.  120,  60  N.  W.  368.  But  in  City 
of  Covington  v.  Worthington,  88  Ky. 
206,  10  S.  W.  790,  11  S.  W.  1038,  a 
street  was  extended  through  the 
plaintiff's  property,  and  he  was  as- 
sessed for  benefits  more  than  the 
amount  of  his  damages,  and  the  as- 
sessment was  sustained.  And  see 
Turner  v.  City  of  Detroit,  104  Mich. 
326,  62  N.  W.  405.  A  statute  author- 
izing a  personal  judgment  for  special 
assessments  was  held  invalid  as  per- 
mitting a  taking  without  compensa- 
tion. Raleigh  v.  Peace,  110  N.  C.  32, 
14  S.  E.  521,  17  L.R.A.  330. 

E  Cincinnati  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cincin- 
nati, 62  Ohio  St.  465,  57  N.  E.  229, 
49  L.R.A.  566;  Dayton  v.  Bauman, 
66  Ohio  St.  379,  64  N.  E.  433. 

eWilliams  v.  Cammack,  27  Miss. 
209. 


§  242 


OTHEE  CASES  OF  TAKING. 


465 


It  has  been  held  in  Kentucky  that  lands  used  simply  for 
agricultural  purposes  cannot  be  annexed  to  a  city  and  subjected 
to  the  payment  of  municipal  taxes,  for  the  reason  that  such  a 
tax  is  an  attempt  to  take  private  property  for  public  use  without 
just  compensation,  and  is  therefore  voidJ  These  decisions  have 
been  followed  in  Iowa*  and  in  an  early  case  in  Nebraska,"  which 
latter  case  however  was  subsequently  overruled.  ■'''  The  prin- 
ciple has  been  extended  to  a  railroad  bridge  within  the  limits  of 
a  city  but  separated  from  the  built-up  part  by  a  mile  of  farming 
lands.^^  An  act  authorizing  a  city  to  tax  farming  land  outside 
of  its  limits,  which  was  so  situated  as  not  to  be  benefited  by  the 
expenditure  of  the  tax,  was  held  void  as  an  attempt  to  take  prop- 
erty for  public  use  without  compensation.^^ 


TCheaney  v.  Hooser,  9  B.  Mon.  330, 
344;  Covington  v.  Southgate,  15  B. 
Mon.  491;  Sharp  v.  Dunavan,  17  B. 
Mon.  223 ;  Malthera  v.  Shields,  2  Met. 
(Ky.)  553.  In  Arbegust  v.  City  of 
Louisville,  2  Bush  271,  275,  276,  it  is 
said:  "When  in  the  judgment  of  the 
legislature  the  interest  of  »  subur- 
ban population  demands  local  regu- 
lations, and  the  peace,  tranquility, 
and  order  of  the  public  indicates  that 
such  is  necessary,  we  cannot  doubt 
its  constitutional  power  to  so  enact, 
nor  question  its  power  to  tax  for 
such  purposes  the  real  as  well  as  the 
personal  estate  of  the  people,  nor  the 
large  as  well  as  the  small  lots  in- 
cluded therein;  for  it  is  more  con- 
sonant with  the  entire  genius, 
equality,  and  justice  of  our  constitu- 
tion and  laws,  that  each  should  bear 
the  burdens  of  that  government  which 
protects  his  person  and  property  ac- 
cording to  the  worth  of  his  estate, 
than  to  discriminate  against  the 
small  in  favor  of  the  large  property- 
holders.  But  whatever  may  be  said 
of  the  intrinsic  justice  of  such  meas- 
ures, there  is  no  power  in  the  courtw 
to  control  this  when  the  taxing  power 
is  conferred  in  good  faith  to  uphold 
local  government,  and  give  police 
regulations  to  the  population,  and 
not  merely  to  embrace  taxable  prop- 
Em.  D.— 30. 


erty  for  revenue  purposes  in 
order  to  lighten  the  burdens  of 
others.  And  these  are  the  prin- 
ciples heretofore  announced  and  ad- 
hered to  by  this  court  through  a  train 
of  decisions  including  the  cases  of 
Cheaney  v.  Hooser,  9  B.  M.  330; 
Sharp's  Ex'r  v.  Dunaven,  17  B.  M. 
223;  Maltus  v.  Shields,  2  Met.  553, 
and  Southgate  v.  Covington,  15  B.  M. 
291.  It  is  sometimes  difficult  to  de- 
tennine  from  the  facts  whether  local 
government  to  a  population  or  taxa- 
tion for  revenue  purposes  be  the  real 
incentive  to  the  enactment ;  but  when 
this  is  clearly  manifested,  then  the 
proper  application  of  the  principle  is 
not  embarrassing."  See  also  Board 
of  Trustees  v.  Gill,  94  Ky.  138,  21  S. 
W.  579. 

sMorford  v.  Unger,  8  la.  82 ;  Lang- 
worthy  v.  Dubuque,  13  la.  86 ;  Same 
V.  Same,  16  la.  271 ;  Fulton  v.  Daven- 
port, 17  la.  404;  Buell  v.  Ball,  20  la. 
282;  O'Hare  v.  Dubuque,  22  la.  144; 
Deiman  v.  Ft.  Madison,  30  la.  542; 
Taylor  v.  Waverly,  94  la.  661,  63  N. 
W.  347. 

sBradshaw  v.  Omaha,  1  Neb.  16. 

lOTurner  v.  Althaus,  6  Neb.  54. 

nArnd  v.  Union  Pac.  E.  R.  Co., 
120  Fed.  912,  57  C.  C.  A.  184. 

i2Territory  of  Utah  v.  Daniels,  6 
Utah  288,  22  Pac.  159. 


46  G  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    242 

In  Wisconsin  it  has  been  held  that  farming  lands  cannot  be 
annexed  to  a  village  for  the  sole  purpose  of  increasing  its  tax- 
able property,  and  that  the  act  of  annexation  itself  was  void.'^ 
The  current  of  authority,  however,  as  well  as  the  reason  of  the 
matter,  is  clearly  the  other  way.^*  Municipal  corporations, 
their  existence,  extent,  and  powers,  are  entirely  within  the  con- 
trol of  the  legislature,  unless  restrained  by  other  provisions  of 
the  constitution  than  that  relating  to  eminent  domain.  The 
legislature  may  divide  or  consolidate  them,  expand  or  contract 
their  limits  as  it  sees  fit.  These  propositions  are  almost  ele- 
mentary and  substantially  undisputed.  For  the  courts  to  say 
what  lands  within  a  municipal  corporation  may  be  taxed  for 
municipal  purposes,  and  what  not,  is  clearly  judicial  legislation 
and  involves  insuperable  diiEculties.  These  are  well  pointed 
out  by  the  supreme  court  of  IsTebraska  in  Turner  v.  Athaus,'" 
from  which  we  quote  as  follows:  "The  rule  contended  for  is, 
that  the  theory  of  compensation  to  the  owner  of  property  within 
the  corporate  limits  of  a  city  by  way  of  protection  or  benefit, 
derived  from  the  city  government,  applies  to  property  used  and 
occupied  for  city  purposes,  and  is  co-extensive,  only,  with  that 
line  or  point  where  it  ceases  to  operate  beneficially  to  the  pro- 
prietor in  a  municipal  point  of  view.  Who  is  the  arbiter  to  de- 
fine this  line — and  where  is  it  to  be  exactly  found  ?  If  the  judi- 
ciary is  to  act  as  such  arbiter,  then  it  seems  clear  that  it  must 
do  one  of  two  things,  either  to  pronounce  the  act  unconstitutional 
■ — -(as  in  Smith  v.  Sherry,)^"  and  upon  such  decision,  as  already 
shown,  the  tax  district  will  be  destroyed — or  it  must,  by  legisla- 
tive action,  amend  and  change  the  law,  and  classify  the  prop- 
erty within  the  city  limits,  so  as  to  subject  part  thereof  to  taxa- 
tion, and  exempt  the  other  part  from  taxation,  and 
this  must  be  done  by  piecemeal  as  each  case  shall  arise.  But  in 
the  adjudication  of  cases  which  must  constantly  arise  under 
the  rule  contended  for,  it  seems  impossible  to  discover  any  test, 
or  criterion,  by  which  uniformity  and  certainty  of  decisions 
may  be  obtained.     The  opinions  of  men  are  so  diversified  and 

isSmitK  V.  Sherry,  50  Wis.  210.  6  Neb.  54;  Kelley  v.  Pittsburgh,  85 
i4Stiltz  V.  Indianapolis,  55  Ind.  Pa.  St.  170;  Appeal  of  Hewitt,  88  Pa. 
515;  Logansport  v.  Seybold,  59  Ind.  St.  55;  Noris  v.  City  of  Waco,  57 
225;  Giboney  v.  Cape  Girardeau,  58  Tex.  635;  Forsythe  v.  City  of  Ham- 
Mo.  141 ;  Groflf  v.  Frederick  City,  44  mond,  68  Fed.  774. 
Md.  67;  Martin  v.  Dix,  52  Miss.  53,  156  Neb.  54,  74. 
24  Am.  Eep.  661 ;  Turner  v.  Althaus,           1650  Wis.  210. 


§    243  OTHEE  CASES  OF  TAKING.  467 

varied,  that  what  to  one  mind  may  seem  clearly  right  arid  proper, 
to  another  may  clearly  appear  to  be  wrong  and  unjust.  By  one 
court  lands  may  be  adjudged  subject  to  taxation,  and  by  another 
the  same  lands,  or  lands  similarly  situated,  may  be  adjudged 
exempt  from  taxation.  Which  would  be  right?  Who  can  de- 
cide the  question  ?  It  therefore  seems  difficult  to  escape  the 
conclusion  that  the  decision  of  each  case,  as  it  shall  arise,  must 
depend  upon  the  caprice  of  the  arbiter  who  determines  it,  for 
he  cannot  resolve  the  question  upon  any  principle  of  legal 
science.  Hence  the  exercise  of  judicial  power  in  apportioning 
the  taxes  of  a  district  affords  no  security  against  the  abuse  of 
the  taxing  power ;  but  on  the  contrary,  it  may  be  fraught  with 
more  danger,  and  result  in  greater  injustice,  than  a  uniform  sys- 
tem of  taxation  established  by  legislative  enactment." 

An  act  providing  for  fencing  a  large  tract  of  land  and  levy- 
ing a  tax  to  build  and  maintain  the  fences,  was  held  void  as 
being  for  a  private  purpose  and  as  a  taking  of  private  proper- 
ty, without  compensation.  ■''' 

§  243  (156).  Taking  under  the  guise  of  the  police  pow- 
er. Regulating  the  use  of  property,  the  construction,  re- 
pair and  height  of  buildings  and  the  like.  Fire  limits. 
While  the  theoretical  distinction  between  the  police  power  and 
the  power  of  eminent  domain  is  clear  and  definite,  it  is  not  al- 
ways easy  to  distinguish  them  in  their  practical  application. 
That  is  sometimes  attempted  under  the  police  power  which  can 
only  be  accomplished  by  an  exercise  of  eminent  domain.  We 
shall  not  go  at  length  into  this  question,  but  advert  briefly  to 
some  of  the  cases  in  which  the  question  has  been  made.  All 
property  is  subject  to  the  police  power  of  the  State  ^*  and,  under 
this  power,  uses  of  property  which  are  detrimental  to  the  public 
health,  safety,  morals  and  welfare,  may  be  regulated  and  re- 
strained.-'* 

1 'Hancock  Stock  &  Fence  Law  Co.  81  N.  W.  200;  Westport  v.  Mulhol- 

V.  Adams,  87  Ky.  417,  9  S.  W.  246;  land,  159  Mo.  86,  60  S.  W.  77,  53 

Fort  V.  Goodwin,  36  S.  C.  445,  15  S.  L.R.A.  442;   Tenement  House  Dept. 

E.  723.     And  see  Cypress  Pond  Dr.  v.  Moeschen,  179  N.  Y.  325,  72  N.  E. 

Co.  V.  Hooper,  2  Met.  (Ky.)  350.  231,  103  Am.  St.  Rep.  910,  70  L.R.A. 

islnreKelso,  147CaI.  609,  82Pac.  704. 
241,  109  Am.  St.  Rep.  178,  2  L.R.A.  ^^Ihid.      Greenburg     v.     Western 

(N.S.)  796;  Chicago  v.  Jackson,  196  Turf  Ass.,  140  Cal.  357,  73  Pae.  1050; 

HI.  496    63  N.  E.   1013;     Common-  Same  v.  Same,  148  Cal.  126,  82  Pac. 

wealth  V.  Alger,  7  Cush.  53;  State  v.  084;  New  Orleans  v.  Murat,  119  La. 

St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  78  Minn.  331,  1093,  44  So.  898;   Belmont  v.  New 


468 


EMINENT  DOMAIIT. 


§  243 


Tire  limits  may  be  established  and  the  manner  of  building 
regulated  with  a  view  to  preventing  the  spread  of  fires.  ^^  The 
erection  or  repairing  of  wooden  buildings  in  cities  may  be  pro- 
hibited, and  such  a  regulation  is  not  a  taking  of  a  partially  de- 
stroyed building.  ^^ 

The  height  of  buildings  may  be  limited,  as  very  high  build- 
ings increase  the  danger  to  persons  and  property  in  case  of  fire 
and  may  affect  the  public  health  by  shutting  out  light,  air  and 
sunshine. ^^  An  act  of  Massachusetts  limiting  the  height  of 
buildings  in  the  business  district  of  Boston  to  one  hundred  and 
twenty-five  feet  and  in  the  residence  district  to  eighty  feet  and 
providing  for  fixing  the  boundaries  of  the  district  by  a  commis- 
sion was  held  valid  as  an  exercise  of  the  police  power.  ^*  Statutes 
of  Massachusetts  limiting  the  height  of  buildings  around  Cop- 
ley Square  in  Boston  and  about  the  State  House,  made  provi- 
sion for  compensation.^* 

An  act  prohibiting  the  use  of  any  building  not  "now"  used 
for  that  purpose,  for  slaughtering,  rendering  and  the  like,  is 


Eng.  Brick  Co.,  190  Mass.  442,  77  N. 
E.  504;  St.  Louis  v.  Gait,  179  Mo.  8, 
77  S.  W.  876,  63  L.R.A.  778;  Western 
Turf  Ass.  V.  Greenburg,  204  U.  S. 
359,  27  S.  C.  384;  Halter  v.  Nebraska, 
205  U.  S.  34,  27  S.  C.  419;  Wilming- 
ton Star  Min.  Co.  v.  Fulton,  205  U.  S. 
60,  27  S.  C.  412. 

2  0Canepa  v.,  Birmingham,  92  Ala. 
358,  7  So.  180;  Ex  parte  Fisher,  72 
Cal.  125 ;  Wadleigh  v.  Gilman,  12  Me. 
403,  28  Am.  Dec.  188;  Salem  v. 
Maynes,  123  Mass.  372;  Brady  v. 
Northwestern  Insurance  Co.,  11  Mich. 
425;  Hubbard  v.  Medford,  20  Or.  315, 
25  Pac.  Rep.  640;  Knoxville  v.  Bird, 
12  Lea  121,  47  Am.  Rep.  326;  Roanol<e 
V.  Boiling,  101  Va.  182,  43  S.  E.  343; 
City  of  Olympia  v.  Mann,  1  Wash. 
389,  25  Pac.  337,  12  L.R.A.  150; 
Wheeler  v.  Aberdeen,  45  Wash.  63,  87 
Pac.  1081. 

ziFirst  Nat'I  Bank  v.  Sarlls,  129 
Ind.  201,  28  N.  b.  434,  5  Am.  R.  E. 
&  Corp.  Rep.  77,  28  Am.  St.  Rep.  185, 
23  L.R.A.  807;  Brady  v.  Northwest- 
ern  Insurance   Co.,    11    Mich.   425; 


State  V.  Johnson,  114  N.  C.  846,  19 
S.  E.  599;  Klinger  v.  Bickal,  117  Pa. 
St.  326,  11  Atl.  555. 

2  2 Attorney  General  v.  Williams, 
174  Mass.  476,  55  N.  E.  77,  47  L.R.A. 
314;  Welch  v.  Swasey,  193  Mass. 
364,  79  N.  E.  745,  118  Am.  St.  Rep. 
523 ;  Am.  Unitarian  Ass.  v.  Common- 
wealth, 193  Mass.  470,  79  N.  E.  878; 
People  V.  D'Oench,  111  N.  Y.  359,  18 
N.  E.  862. 

2  3 Welch  V.  Swasey,  193  Mass.  364, 
79  N.  E.  745,  118  Am.  St.  Rep.  523. 
This  case  affirmed  by  Supreme  Court 
of  United  States  May  17,  1909. 

2  4 Attorney  General  v.  Williams, 
174  Mass.  476,  55  N.  E.  77,  47  L.R.A. 
314;  Parker  v.  Commonwealth,  178 
Mass.  199,  59  N.  E.  634;  Attorney 
General  v.  Williams,  178  Mass.  330, 
59  N.  E.  812;  Cole  v.  Boston,  181 
Mass.  374,  63  N.  E.  1061;  Williams 
V.  Boston,  190  Mass.  541,  77  N.  E. 
509;  Am.  Unitarian  Ass.  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 193  Mass.  470,  79  N.  E. 
878. 


§    243  OTIIEK  CASKS  OF  TAKIXG.  469 

not  unconstitutional  as  interfering  with  private  property  with- 
out compensation.^^  The  use  of  property  in  certain  localities  for 
carrying  on  unwholesome  or  objectionable  manufactures  or  busi- 
ness, may  be  prohibited.  ^"^  And  an  act  prohibiting  the  use  of 
property  for  certain  purposes  or  the  carrying  on  of  a  business 
injurious  to  the  public  health  or  public  morals,  though  author- 
ized by  tlie  legislature  and  though  it  may  destroy  and  greatly 
impair  the  value  of  property,  is  neither  a  taking  for  public  use 
under  the  power  of  eminent  domain,  nor  a  violation  of  a  con- 
tract.^^  But  such  regulations  must  be  reasonable  in  view  of  the 
rights  of  property  as  well  as  the  public  welfare.  In  the  month 
of  AugTist  the  city  of  Los  Angeles  passed  an  ordinance  fixing  the 
limits  within  which  gas  works  might  be  erected  and  carried  on. 
The  plaintiff  bought  property  within  this  district,  obtained  a  per- 
mit for  the  erection  of  gas  works  thereon  and  in  September  com- 
menced the  works.  In  November  of  the  same  year  the  city 
amended  the  ordinance  so  as  to  exclude  the  plaintiff's  property 
from  the  district  and  thereby  made  it  a  penal  offense  for  the 
plaintiff  to  proceed  and  operate  his  works.  The  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States,  reversing  the  supreme  court  of  California, 
held  that  the  amendment  was  not  a  proper  police  regulation 
and  amounted  to  a  taking  of  the  plaintiff's  property  without  due 
process  of  law.^*     An  ordinance  making  it  a  misdemeanor  to 

2  6Watertown  v.  Mayo,  109  Mass.  Park,  89  Md.  40G.     In  Lake  View  v. 

315,  12  L.K.A.  G94.  Rose  Hill  Cemetery  Co.,  70  111.  191, 

26Ex  parte   Lacey,   108   Cal.   326,  22  Am.  Rep.  71,  tliree  of  the  seven 

41  Pac.  411,  49  Am.  St.  Rep.  93,  38  judges  dissenting,  it  was  held  that 

L.R.A.    640;    Green   v.    Savannah,    6  the  Cemetery  Company,  having  been 

( !a.  1 ;  Waters  Pierce  Oil  Co.  v.  New  authorized  hj  cliarter  to  acquire  five 

Iberia,  47  La.  An.  863,  17  So.  343;  hundred  acres  of  land  in  Lake  View, 

City  of  Newark  v.  Watson,  .56  N.  J.  to   be   used   for   cemetery   purposes, 

L.  667,  29  Atl.  487,  24  L.R.A.  843;  could  not  be  deprived  of  the  priv- 

State  v.  Pendergrass,  106  N.  C.  664,  ileges  of  using  a  portion  of  the  land 

10  S.  E.  1002;  City  of  Austin  v.  Aus-  so   acquired   for   cemetei-y   purposes, 

tin  City  Cem.  Ass'n,  87  Tex.  330,  28  without  compensation.   See  also  New 

S.  W.  528,  47  Am.  St.  Rep.  114,  11  Orleans    Water    Works    Co.    v.    St. 

Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  265.  Tammany  Water  Works  Co.,  4  Wood 

2 'Northwestern  Fertilizing  Co.  v.  134. 

Hyde  Park,  70  111.  634,  affirmed,  97  2  8Dobbins  v.  Los  Angeles,  195  U. 

U.   S.  6.59;   Butchers'  Union   Co.  v.  S.  223,  ^5  S.  G.  18,  reversing  S.  G.  X3d 

Crescent   City   Co.,    Ill    U.    S.    746,  Cal.  179,  7'2  Pac. '970,  96  Am.  St.  Rep. 

same  case  below,  4  Wood  96;  Boyd  95;  Daly  v.  Elton,  195  U.  S.  242,  25 

v.  Alabama,  94  U.  S.  045 ;  Beer  Co.  v.  S.  C.  i2,  reversing  S.  C.  Sub  Norn. 

Mas'salchusetts,  97  U.  S.  25;  Stone  v.  In  re   Daly,   l39   Cal.   216,   72  Pac, 

Mis.sissippi,  101  U.  S.  814;  Spring  v.  1097. 


470  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    243 

maintain  gas  works  in  a  sparsely  settled  district  was  held  un- 
reasonable and  void.^®  An  act  of  Ifew  York  making  it  unlaw- 
ful to  carry  on  or  continue  in  the  borough  of  Brooklyn  the 
business  of  rendering  garbage  was  held  to  be  unconstitutional 
as  to  the  plaintiff's  plant,  situated  upon  an  island  and  not  a 
nuisance  or  detrimental  to  health  and  representing  an  invest- 
ment of  half  a  million.^'* 

The  legislature  may  regulate  the  construction  and  use  of 
wharves  and  piers  and  prescribe  dock  lines,^"^  but  cannot  declare 
a  dock  which  has  been  rightly  and  properly  built,  a  nuisance, 
and  abate  it  without  compensation,  because  it  projects  beyond 
a  dock  line  afterwards  established.*^  An  act  prohibiting  the 
taking  of  sand  or  gravel  from  a  sea  beach  was  held  valid  as  a 
proper  regulation  of  the  use  of  private  property  for  the  preser- 
vation of  Boston  harbor,  and  a  person  violating  the  act  was 
found  guilty  though  he  owned  the  fee  of  the  land  whence  he 
took  the  sand.**  But  an  act  prohibiting  a  railroad  company 
from  opening  an  embankment,  which  protected  the  shore  from 
the  waves  and  tide,  was  held  an  unlawful  restriction  upon  the 
use  of  property.** 

A  statute  prohibiting  natural  gas  to  be  sent  through  pipes  at 
a  greater  pressure  than  300  pounds  to  the  square  inch  was  held 
to  be  a  valid  police  regulation  and  not  a  taking.*^  A  statute 
to  prevent  the  waste  of  natural  gas  or  oil  from  wells  is  a 
valid  police  regulation  and  not  a  taking  of  property  without 
compensation.*" 

The  construction  and  use  of  billboards  upon  private  prop- 
erty may  be  regulated  so  far  as  necessary  to  provide  for  the 

29In  re   Smith,   143  Cal.   368,   77  siState  v.  Sargent,  45  Conn.  358; 

Pac.  180.  Commonwealth  v.  Alger,  7  Cush.  53; 

SQIST.  Y.   Sanitary  Utilization  Co.  Eoosevelt  v.  Godard,  52  Barb.  533. 

V.  Dept.  of  Health,  61  App.  Div.  106,  32Chieago  v.  Laflin,  49  111.   172; 

70  N.  Y.  S.  510.     For  other  regula-  Yates  v.  Milwaukee,  10  Wall.  497; 

tions  held  invalid  as  a  taking  or  un-  Ryan  v.  Brown,   18  Mich.   196,   100 

lawful     interference     with     private  Am.  Dec.  154. 

property  see  George  v.  Chester,  59  3  3  Commonwealth  v.  Tewksbury,  11 

Misc.   553;     Heaton    v.   Chester,   59  Met.  55. 

Misc.  558;  Malone  v.  Williams,  118  3  4Koch  v.  Delaware  etc.  R.  B..  Co., 

Tenn.   390 ;    State  v.   Redmond,   134  53  N.  J.  L.  256,  21  Atl.  284. 

Wis.  89,  114  N.  W.  137.    In  the  last  sBjamieson  v.  Ind.  Nat.  Gas  &  Oil 

case   the   upper  berth   law  of   Wis-  Co.,  128  Ind.  555,  28  N.  E.  76,   12 

consin  was  held  invalid  as  a  taking  L.R.A.  652. 

of  private  property  for  private  use.  ssState  v.  Ohio  Oil  Co.,  150  Ind. 


§  243 


OTHEE  CASES  OF  TAKING. 


471 


public  safety  and  welfare  and  various  regulations  of  this  sort 
have  been  sustained.^''  But  an  ordinance  forbidding  the  erec- 
tion of  signs  or  billboards  upon  private  property  without  regard 
to  any  danger  to  the  public  was  held  void  as  an  attempt  to  take 
private  property  without  compensation.^*  So  of  an  act  or  regu- 
lation forbidding  the  use  of  private  property  in  the  vicinity  of 
parks  and  boulevards  for  such  purposes.^'  So  of  an  ordinance 
of  Passaic  forbidding  the  erection  of  billboards  more  than  eight 
feet  high,  or  within  ten  feet  of  the  street  line  or  without  a 
permit  from  the  building  inspector.*"  But  a  very  similar  or- 
dinance was  held  valid  in  New  York.*^  A  game  law  of  ISTew 
York  forbidding  the  possession  of  game  during  the  closed  sea- 
son under  a  penalty,  was  held  valid  even  as  applied  to  game 
brought  from  without  the  State.*  ^ 

Fishing  with  a  net  or  seine  may  be  prohibited,  even  in  pri- 
vate waters.*^  An  ordinance  limiting  the  amount  of  land  any 
person  or  family  may  cultivate  within  a  city  is  not  void  as  a 


21,  49  N.  E.  809;  Ohio  Oil  Co.  v. 
State,  150  Ind.  694,  49  N.  E.  1107; 
Ohio  Oil  Co.  V.  State,  150  Ind.  698, 
50  N.  E.  1124;  Given  v.  State,  160 
Ind.  552,  66  N.  E.  750;  Common- 
•wealth  V.  Trent,  117  Ky.  35,  77  S.  W. 
390;  Ohio  Oil  Co.  v.  Indiana,  177  U. 
S.  190,  20  S.  C.  576;  Same  v.  Same, 
177  U.  S.  212,  20  S.  C.  585 ;  Same  v. 
Same,  177  U.  S.  213,  20  S.  C.  585.  A 
similar  statute  to  prevent  the  waste 
of  water  from  artesian  wells  was 
held  void  in  Wisconsin.  Huber  v. 
Merkel,  117  Wis.  355,  94  N.  W.  354, 
62  IcR.A.  589.  See  contra.  Ex  parte 
Elam,  6  Cal.  App.  233,  91  Pac.  811. 

37Chicago  V.  The  Gunning  System, 
214  111.  628,  73  N.  E.  1035,  70  L.R.A. 
230;  Rochester  v.  West,  164  N.  Y. 
510,  58  N.  E.  673,  79  Am.  St.  Rep. 
659,  53  L.R.A.  548,  affirming  S.  G. 
29  App.  Div.  125,  51  N.  Y.  S.  482; 
Gunning  System  v.  Buffalo,  75  App. 
Div.  31,  77  N.  Y.  S.  987;  In  re  Wil- 
shire,  103  Fed.  620;  Whitmier  &  F. 
Co.  V.  Buffalo,  118  Fed.  773.  And  see 
Gunning  System  v.  Buffalo,  62  App. 
Div.  497,  71  N.  Y.  S.  155. 


ssBill  Posting  Sign  Co.  v.  Atlantic 
City,  71  N.  J.  L.  72,  58  Atl.  342. 

2  3  Commonwealth  v.  Bo=ton  Adver- 
tising Co.,  188  Mass.  348,  74  N.  E. 
601,  108  Am.  St.  Rep.  494,  69  L.R.A. 
817;  People  v.  Green,  85  App.  Div. 
400,  83  N.  Y.  S.  460. 

lOPassaic  v.  Paterson  Bill  Posting 
Co.,  72  N.  J.  L.  285,  62  Atl.  267,  111 
Am.  St.  Rep.  676,  reversing  S.  C.  71 
N.  J.  L.  75,  58  Atl.  343.  And  see 
Crawford  v.  Topeka,  53  Kan.  756. 

4iRochester  v.  West,  164  N.  Y.  510, 
58  N.  E.  673,  79  Am.  St.  Rep.  659,  53 
L.R.A.  548,  affirming  S.  C.  29  App. 
Div.  125,  51  N.  Y.  S.  482. 

42New  York  v.  Hesterberg,  211  U. 
S.  31,  affirming  People  v.  Hesterberg, 
184  N.  Y.  126,  76  N.  E.  1032. 

"People  V.  Bridges,  142  111.  30,  31 
N.  E.  115,  16  L.R.A.  684;  Common- 
wealth V.  Follett,  164  Mass.  477,  41 
N.  E.  676;  Ex  parte  Fritz,  86  Miss. 
210,  38  So.  722,  109  Am.  St.  Rep. 
700;  State  v.  Theriault,  70  Vt.  617, 
41  Atl.  1030,  67  Am.  St.  Rep.  695. 


472  EMINEISTT  DOMAIN.  §    243 

taking.**  Nor  an  ordinance  imposing  a  penalty  for  permitting 
water  to  run  upon  a  street  or  alley  from  any  well  or  spring.*'' 
The  legislature  may  prohibit  a  use  of  property  which  violates 
a  duty  that  the  owner  owes  to  his  neighbor  or  the  State,  and 
hence  may  prohibit  the  owner  of  lands,  delinquent  for  taxes, 
from  peeling  bark  or  cutting  timber  thereon.*®  Where  a  city 
gave  the  plaintiff  the  exclusive  right  of  boating  and  fishing  on 
its  reservoir  in  part  consideration  of  lands  conveyed  for  its 
water  works,  such  use  cannot  be  j)rohibited  without  compensa- 
tion.*'' Private  property  cannot  be  seized  and  occupied  as  a 
smallpox  hospital  under  the  police  power.*  ^  An  act  which 
restricts  one  in  the  use  of  his  property  in  a  particular  manner  in 
order  that  another  may  use  his  in  that  manner  to  greater  ad- 
vantage is  void.**  An  act  excepting  certain  tracts  of  land  from 
the  operation  of  a  law  giving  the  right  to  distrain  and  impound 
trespassing  cattle,  thus  leaving  such  tracts  to  be  trespassed  upon 
without  redress,  was  held  to  deprive  the  owners  of  such  tracts 
of  their  property  without  due  process  of  law.^"  Pursuant 
to  a  grant  from  a  city,  a  railroad  company  laid  down  side  tracks 
in  a  street  and  used  them  for  seventeen  years  for  loading  and 
unloading  ears.  The  city  then  passed  an  ordinance  forbidding- 
such  use  of  the  streets.  It  was  held  that  the  grant  was  a  fran- 
chise and  irrevocable ;  that  the  effect  of  the  ordinance  was  to 
destroy  it,  and  that  its  enforcement  should  be  enjoined.^^  An 
act  compelling  railroad  companies  to  permit  the  erection  and 
operation  of  elevators  on  their  right  of  way  at  a  nominal  rental, 
was  held  void,  as  a  taking  without  compensation.^^    A  law  mak- 

4  4Town  of  Summerville  v.  Press-  ■'9 Commonwealth     v.     Bacon,     13 

ley,'  33    S.  C.  56,   H    S.  E.   545,  8  Bush    (Ky.)    210,  26  Am.  Eep.  189. 

L.R.A.  854,  3  Am.  R.  E.  &  Corp.  Rep.  The  act  prohibited  any  one  within 

101.     "This  power  to  restrain  a  pri-  three  hundred  yards  of  a  fair  ground 

vate    injurious    use    of   property   is  from  furnishing  feed  and  shelter  for 

very  different  from  the  right  of  emi-  horses, 

nent  domain."  6  0  Smith  v.  Bivens,  56  Fed.  352. 

<6Staggs  V.  City  of  Martinsville,  Biport  of  Mobile  v.  Louisville  etc. 

140  Ind.  476,  39  N.  E.  241.  R.  R.  Co.,  84  Ala.  115. 

leprentice  v.  Weston,   111   N.  Y.  szMissouri  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Xe- 

460,  18  M.  E.  720.  braska,  164  U.  S.  403,  17  S.  C.  130, 

47Dunham    v.    New    Britain,    55  reversing  S.  C.  29  Neb.  550;  Chicago 

Conn.  378.    See  Proprietors  of  Mills  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  State,  50  Neb.  399 ; 

V.  Commonwealth   164  Mass.  227,  41  State  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  30 

N.  E.  280.  Minn.  402. 

4SMarkham  v.  Brown,  37  Ga.  277. 


§    243  OTHEE  CASES  OF  TAKING.  473 

ing  it  a  misdemeanor  to  build  or  maintain  a  fence  extending 
more  than  three  miles  in  the  same  general  direction,  without 
providing  a  gateway  of  a  specified  kind,  was  held  to  violate  the 
eminent  domain  provision  of  the  constitution. °^  The  following 
regulations  were  held  not  to  be  a  taking  in  the  respective  cases 
cited :  Forbidding  the  taking  of  ice  from  Des  Moines  river  in 
Des  Moines ;  ^*  forbidding  use  of  national  flag  for  advertis- 
ing ;  ^^  forbidding  the  interment  of  dead  bodies  within,  or  the 
further  use  of  a  cemetery  within,  the  city  limits ;  ^^  forbidding 
the  taking  of  oysters  under  a  certain  size ;  °^  making  it  a  penal 
offense  to  permit  noxious  weeds  to  grow  upon  land ;  ^^  making 
it  a  penal  offense  to  pollute  the  waters  of  a  stream,  spring  or 
pond.^*  An  ordinance  forbidding  the  sale  of  milk  in  bottles 
unless  the  capacity  of  the  bottle  is  indicated  thereon,  is  not  a 
taking  of  bottles  which  do  not  conform  to  the  ordinance.®" 

An  ordinance  of  iN'ew  Orleans  prescribing  limits  outside  of 
which  no  woman  of  lewd  character  should  dwell  was  held  not 
to  deprive  those  within  the  district  of  any  property  right.®  ^  A 
statute  of  New  Hampshire,  which  provided  for  designating  and 
marking  ornamental  and  shade  trees  in  the  public  highways 
and  for  their  care  and  preservation  and  which  forbade  their 
injury  or  destruction  under  a  penalty,  was  held  void  as  taking 
the  property  of  the  abutting  owner  without  compensation.®^ 
The  grant  to  a  person  of  the  exclusive  right  of  disposing  of  the 

5  3Dilworth    v.    State     (Tex.    Civ.  S.  587,  20  S.  C.  788,  affirming  S.  C. 

App.) ,  36  S.  W.  274.  51  La.  An.  93. 

54Board  of  Park  Comrs.  v.  Dia-  62Bigelow  v.  Wliitcomb,  72  N.  H. 

mond  lee  Co.,  130  la..  603,  105  N.  W.  473,  57  Atl.  680,  65  L.R.A.  676.    The 

203,  3  L.R.A.  (N.S.)   1103.  court  says:   "An  effective  prohibition 

5  5Halter  v.    State,   74   Neb.    757,  against  one's  use  and  enjoyment  of 

105  N.  W.  298.  his  property  in  a,  usual  and  otlier- 

5  60dd  Fellows   Cem.  Ass.  v.   San  wise    appropriate    manner    deprives 

Francisco,  140  Cal.  226,  73  Pac.  987 ;  him  of  his  property,  as  much  as  its 

Laurel  Hill  Cemetery  v.  San  Fran-  actual  taking  or  asportation  against 

Cisco,  152  Cal.  464.  his  will."     p.  479.     A  requirement 

^'Windsor  v.  State,  103  Md.  611,  that  buildings  to  be  erected  shouhl 

64  Atl.  288.  conform  in  general  character  and  ap- 

5  8St.  Louis  v.  Gait,  179  Mo.  8,  77  pearance    with    the    buildings    pre- 

S.  W.  876,  63  L.R.A.  778.  viously  erected  in  the  same  locality, 

5  9 Commonwealth  v.  Emmers,  221  would  be  an  unwarranted  interfer- 

Pa.  St.  298.  sJice  with  the  rights    of    property. 

eoChicago  v.  Bowman  Dairy  Co.,  Bostock  v.  Sams,  95  Md.  400,  52  Atl. 

234  111.  294,  84  N.  E.  913;  123  Am.  1130,  93  Am.  St.  Rep.  394,  59  L.R.A. 

St.  Rep.  100.  282. 

siL'Hote  V.  New  Orleans,  177  U. 


474  EMINEBTT  DOMAIIf.  §    244 

garbage  of  a  city  and  an  ordinance  forbidding  any  garbage  to 
be  placed  or  deposited  elsewhere  than  at  the  works  of  such  per- 
son, are  not  void  as  taking  the  property  of  householders  in  the 
garbage  without  compensation."^ 

The  senate  of  Maine  propounded  to  the  justices  of  the  supreme 
court  of  that  State  the  question  whether  a  law  to  regulate  or 
restrict  the  cutting  of  trees,  upon  wild  or  uncultivated  land 
by  the  owner  thereof,  without  making  compensation  to  such 
owner  would  be  valid,  and  the  justices  answered  the  question 
in  the  affirmative.  The  justices  were  of  opinion  that  the  word 
taken  in  the  constitution  should  be  construed  strictly  as  against 
the  police  power  of  the  State  and  say :  "There  are  two  reasons 
of  great  weight  for  applying  this  strict  construction  of  the  con- 
stitutional provision  to  property  in  land:  (1)  Such  property 
is  not  the  result  of  productive  labor,  but  is  derived  solely  from 
the  State  itself,  the  original  owner;  (2)  the  amount  of  land 
being  incapable  of  increase,  if  the  owners  of  large  tracts  can 
waste  them  at  will  without  State  restriction,  the  State  and  its 
people  may  be  helplessly  impoverished  and  one  great  purpose  of 
government  defeated. 

"Kegarding  the  question  submitted,  in  the  light  of  the  doc- 
trine above  stated  (being  that  of  Maine  and  Massachusetts  at 
least),  we  do  not  think  the  proposed  legislation  would  operate 
to  'take'  private  property  within  the  inhibition  of  the  consti- 
tution. While  it  might  restrict  the  owner  of  wild  and  unculti- 
vated lands  in  the  use  of  them,  might  delay  his  taking  some  of 
the  product,  might  defer  his  anticipated  profits,  and  even  there- 
by might  cause  him  some  loss  of  profit,  it  would  nevertheless 
leave  him  his  lands,  their  product,  and  increase  untouched,  and 
without  diminution  of  title,  estate  or  quantity.  He  would  still 
have  large  measure  of  control  and  large  opportunity  to  realize 
values.  He  might  suffer  delay  but  not  deprivation.  While  the 
use  might  be  restricted,  it  would  not  be  appropriated  or 
'taken'  "  "* 

§  244  (156a).  Legislative  regulation  and  control  of 
railroads  and  other  corporations.  Imposing  new  liabilities. 
Corporations  may  be  made  liable  for  consequential  damages  to 

63Cal.  Reduction  Co.  v.  Sanitary  6<0pinion  of  the  Justices,  103  Me. 

Reduction  Works,  199  U.  S.  306,  26      506,  69  Ail.  627. 
S.  C.  100;  Gardner  v.  Michigan,  199 
U.   S.   325,   26   S.   C.   106;    State  v. 
Robb,  100  Me.  180,  60  Atl.  874. 


§   2W 


OTIIEE  CASES  Olf  TAKIKG. 


47i; 


property  by  works  or  improvements  thereafter  constructed, 
though  they  ha4  previously  been  exempt  from  such  liability."^ 
Railroad  companies  may  be  made  liable  for  wrongfully  causing 
the  death  of  persons."*  They  may  be  made  absolutely  liable 
for  fires  communicated  by  their  locomotives,"''  and  may  be 
compelled  to  fence  their  tracks,  construct  cattle  guards,  etc., 
and  made  liable  for  all  injuries  to  stock  resulting  from  a  fail- 
ure to  comply  with  such  regulations.®*  Statiites  imposing  a 
liability  in  such  cases  of  double  the  value  of  the  stock  killed,"" 
or  making  the  company  liable  for  attorney's  fees  in  suits  brought 
for  such  injuries,  have  been  sustained.'"'  But  a  statute  mak- 
ing railroad  companies  absolutely  liable  for  stock  killed  or  in- 
jured, irrespective  of  negligence,  is  void,  as  depriving  them 
of  their  property  without  due  process  of  law.''^  Requiring 
railroad  companies  to  contribute  toward  the  expense  of  a  State 
railroad  commission,  is  not  a  taking  of  their  property  contrary 
to  law.'^^    Railroad  companies  may  be  compelled  to  keep  a  flag- 


ssPennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Miller, 
132  U.  S.  75,  10  S.  C.  34. 

6  6Boston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  State, 
32  N.  H.  215;  Southwestern  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Paulk,  24  Ga.  356;  Coosa  Riv. 
Steamboat  Co.  v.  Barclay,  30  Ala. 
130;  Brown  v.  Buffalo  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
22  N.  Y.  191 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Bos- 
ton etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  134  Mass.  211. 

6  7McCandless  v.  Richmond  &  D. 
R.  R.  Co.,  38  S.  C.  103,  18  S.  E.  429, 
18  L.R.A.  440,  7  Am.  K.  R.  &  Corp. 
Rep.  366;  Lipfeld  v.  Charlotte  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  41  S.  C.  285,  19  S.  E.  497; 
Regan  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  60 
Conn.  124,  22  Atl.  503,  25  Am.  St. 
Rep.  306;  Martin  v.  New  York  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  62  N.  Y.  331,  25  Atl.  239. 

csMinneapolis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Emmons,  149  U.  S.  364,  13  S.  C.  870, 
7  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  755;  S. 
C.  40  Minn.  133,  42  N.  W.  789;  Nel- 
son V.  Minneapolis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  40 
Minn.  131,  42  N.  W.  788. 

esLittle  Rock  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Payne,  33  Ark.  816,  34  Am.  Rep.  55 ; 
Cairo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  People,  92  111. 


97,  34  Am.  Rep.  112;  Treadway  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  43  la.  527;  Barnett  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  68  Mo.  56;  Cummings 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  70  Mo.  570;  Speal- 
man  v.  Railroad  Co.,  71  Mo.  434; 
Humes  v.  Railroad  Co.,  82  Mo.  221 ; 
Humes  v.  Mo.  Pae.  R.  R.  Co.,  115  U. 
S.  512. 

'oRailroad  Co.  v.  Duggan,  109  111. 
537;  Perkins  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  103  Mo.  54,  15  S.  W.  320,  11 
L.R.A.  426.  And  see  Cameron  v.  Chi- 
cago etc.  E.  R.  Co.,  63  Minn.  384, 
31  L.R.A.  553,  65  N.  W.  652. 

7iBirmingham  Mineral  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Parsons,  100  Ala.  662,  13  So.  602; 
Wadsworth  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  R.  Co., 
18  Colo.  600,  33  Pac.  515,  8  Am.  R.  R. 
&  Corp.  Rep.  127;  Denver  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Outcalt,  2  Colo.  App.  395,  31 
Pac.  176;  Denver  etc.  R.  E.  Co.  v. 
Davidson,  2  Colo.  App.  443,  31  Pac. 
181. 

7  2  Charlotte  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Gibbs, 
142  U.  S.  386,  12  S.  C.  255,  5  Am.  R. 
R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  575;  S.  C.  27  S.  C. 
385,  4  S.  E.  49. 


4.76  EMINENT   DOMAIN.  §    245 

man  at  crossings/*  and  street  railroad  companies  to  have  a 
driver  and  conductor  on  each  car,''*  to  water  their  tracks,"* 
and  to  so  construct  cars  as  to  protect  motormen  from  the  weath- 
er.'* Railroads  and  corporations  may  be  subjected  to  many 
other  restrictions  and  requirements  in  the  conduct  of  their  busi- 
ness and  use  of  their  property,  without  infringing  their  rights 
of  property. '''  Municipal  corporations  may  be  made  liable  for 
property  destroyed  by  mobs.''*  A  statute  of  Massachusetts  re- 
quired railroad  companies  to  sell  1,000-mile  passenger  tickets 
for  twenty  dollars  and  made  such  tickets  good  for  passage  on 
any  railroad  in  the  State ;  required  each  company  to  redeem  the 
tickets  issued  by  it  on  presentation,  and  to  accept  for  passage 
tickets  issued  by  other  companies.  It  was  held  to  be  unconsti- 
tutional, among  other  reasons,  because  by  compelling  one  com- 
pany to  accept  the  tickets  issued  by  other  companies,  its  prop- 
erty was  taken  for  public  use  without  any  adequate  provision 
for  compensation.''* 

§  245  (156b).  Regulating  or  prohibiting  businesses,  oc- 
cupations, contracts,  and  the  like.  It  has  been  held  that  the 
right  to  contract  and  the  right  to  labor  are  property,*"  and,  in 
this  view,  the  right  to  carry  on  any  kind  of  business  or  engage 

Testate    V.    Cozzena,    42    La.    An.  City    of    Grand    Rapids    v.    Grand 

1069,  8  So.  268 ;  Toledo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  Rapids  Hydraulic  Co.,  66  Mich.  606, 

V.  Jacksonville,  67   111.   37,   16  Am.  33  N.  W.  749;  State  v.  Murphy,  130 

Rep.  611 ;  Lake  Shore  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mo.  10,  31  S.  W.  594,  12  Am.  R.  R.  & 

Cincinnati,  30  Ohio  St.  604.  Corp.  Rep.  370,  31  L.R.A.  798;  New 

7  4  South  Covington  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  York  v.  23d  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  113  N.  Y. 

Berry,  93  Ky.  43,  18  S.  W.  1026,  40  311,  21  N.  E.  60;  McCoy  v.  Cincin- 

Am.   St.  Rep.   161,   15  L.R.A.   604;  nati  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  Fed.  3. 

Trenton  Horse  R.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  'SFolsom  v.  City  of  New  Orleans, 

Trenton,  53  N.  J.  L.  132,  20  Atl.  1076.  28  La.  An.  936;  Darlington  v.  New 

75City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Savannah,  York,  31  N.  Y.  164,  88  Am.  Dec.  248; 

77  Ga.  731.  Matter  of  Pennsylvania  Hall,  5  Pa. 

7 estate  v.  Nelson,  52  Ohio  St.  88,  St.  204;  County  of  Allegheny  v.  Gib- 

39  N.  E.  22,  26  L.R.A.  317;  State  v.  son,  90  Pa.  St.  397,  35  Am.  Rep.  670; 

Smith,  58  Minn.  35,  59  N.  W.  545,  25  Louisiana  v.  New  Orleans,  109  U.  S. 

L.R.A.  759.  285. 

7  7State  V.  New  Haven  etc.  R.  R.  7 9 Attorney  General  v.  Boston  &  A. 

Co.,  43  Conn.  351 ;  City  of  Indianap-  R.  R.  Co.,  160  Mass.  62,  35  N.'  E.  252, 

olis  V.  Consumers'  Gas  Trust  Co.,  140  9  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  569,  22 

Ind.  107,  39  N.  E.  433,  49  Am.  St.  L.R.A.  112. 

Rep.  183,  27  L.R.A.  514;  Boston  etc.  sC'Labor    is    property,    and    the 

R.  R.  Co.  V.  Western  R.  R.  Co.,  14  laborer  has  the  same  right  to  sell  his 

Gray  253;  Lexington  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  labor,  and  to  contract  with  reference 

V.  Fitchburg  R.  R.  Co.,  14  Gray  266;  thereto,  as  has  any  other  property- 


§  245 


OTHER  CASES  OF  TAKING. 


477 


in  any  occupation,  is  property.*^  Many  laws  prohibiting  or  re- 
stricting the  right  to  contract,  or  labor,  or  carry  on  business, 
have  been  held  void,  because  they  deprived  the  citizen  of  his 
property  without  due  process  of  law.  But  whatever  deprives  a 
citizen  of  his  property  without  due  process  of  law  necessarily 
takes  his  property,  either  for  public  or  private  use,  without  com- 
pensation, and  such  laws  are,  therefore,  also  obnoxious  to  the 
eminent  domain  provision  of  the  constitution.  "The  legisla- 
ture can  no  more  destroy  a  business  by  statute,  without  provid- 
ing for  compensation,  than  it  can  authorize  a  corporation  to 
take  a  piece  of  real  estate  for  public  use,  except  upon  compen- 
sation." ®^  Under  the  police  power  such  prohibitions  and  re- 
strictions may  be  placed  upon  the  right  to  contract  and  to  labor, 
as  the  public  welfare  demands.  Thus  the  manufacture  and 
sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  may  be  prohibited  altogether,  though 
the  result  of  such  prohibition  may  be  to  render  buildings,  ma- 
chinery and  fixtures  used  for  that  purpose,  of  little  or  no  value.*® 


owner.  ♦  •  »  The  right  to  acquire, 
possess  and  protect  property  includes 
the  right  to  make  reasonable  con- 
tracts, and  when  an  owner  is  de- 
prived of  one  of  the  attributes  of 
property,  like  the  right  to  make  con- 
tracts, he  is  deprived  of  his  property 
within  the  meaning  of  the  constitu- 
tion." Kitchie  v.  People,  155  111.  98, 
40  N.  E.  454,  46  Am.  St.  Rep.  315,  29 
L.K.A.  79.  And  see  Braceville  Coal 
Co.  V.  People,  147  111.  66,  35  N.  E.  62, 
37  Am.  St.  Rep.  206,  22  L.R.A.  340 ; 
State  V.  Goodwill,  33  W.  Va.  179,  10 
S.  E.  285,  25  Am.  St.  Rep.  863,  6 
L.R.A.  621. 

8i"A  calling,  business   or  profes- 
sion, chosen  and  followed,  is  prop- 
erty."    State  V.  Chapman,  69  N.  J. 
L.  464,  466,  55  Atl.  94. 
S2lUd. 

sspeople  V.  Hawley,  3  Mich.  330, 
342.  In  this  case  the  court  says :  "In 
the  exercise  of  its  police  power  .a 
State  has  full  power  to  prohibit, 
under  penalties,  the  exercise  of  any 
trade  or  employment  which  is  found 
to  be  hazardous  or  injurious  to  its 
citizens  and  destructive  of  the  best 


interests  of  society,  without  provid- 
ing compensation  to  those  upon 
whom  the  prohibition  operates." 
Mugler  V.  Kansas,  123  U.  S.  623. 
The  latter  is  the  decision  sustaining 
the  prohibitory  amendment  to  the 
constitution  of  Kansas  and  the  legis- 
lation passed  to  carry  it  into  effect. 
The  nature  of  the  decision  is  so  well 
known  that  no  extended  comment 
upon  it  is  necessary.  We  quote  the 
following  extract  from  the  opinion 
as  particularly  in  point  in  this  con- 
nection: '"As  already  stated,  the 
present  case  must  be  governed  by 
principles  that  do  not  involve  the 
power  of  eminent  domain,  in  the  ex- 
ercise of  which  property  may  not  be 
taken  for  public  use  without  com- 
pensation. A  prohibition  simply 
upon  the  use  of  property  for  pur- 
poses that  are  declared,  by  valid  leg- 
islation, to  be  injurious  to  the 
health,  morals,  or  safety  of  the  com- 
munity, eanot  in  any  sense,  be 
deemed  a  taking  or  an  appropriation 
of  property  for  the  public  benefit. 
Such  legislation  does  not  disturb 
the  owner  in  the  control  or  use  of  his 


478 


EMINENT  DOMAIN, 


§    245 


So  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  oleomargarine  and  other  imita- 
tions of  butter  may  be  prohibited,  and  the  effect  of  such  a  stat- 
ute is  not  to  take  property  without  compensation  within  the 
eminent  domain  limitation.**  A  law  prohibiting  any  but  cor- 
porations to  carry  on  a  banking  business,*"  or  an  insurance  busi- 


property  for  lawful  purposes,  nor 
restrict  his  right  to  dispose  of  it,  but 
is  only  a  declaration  by  the  State 
that  its  use  by  any  one,  for  certain 
forbidden  purposes,  is  prejudicial  to 
the  public  interests.  Nor  can  legis- 
lation of  that  character  come  within 
the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  in  any 
case,  unless  it  is  apparent  that  its 
real  object  is  not  to  protect  the  com- 
munity or  to  promote  the  general 
well-being,  but,  under  the  guise  of 
police  regulation,  to  deprive  the 
owner  of  his  liberty  and  property, 
without  due  process  of  law.  The 
power  which  the  States  have  of  pro- 
hibiting such  use  by  individuals  of 
their  property  as  will  be  prejudicial 
to  the  health,  the  morals,  or  the 
safety  of  the  public,  is  not — and, 
consistently  with  the  existence  and 
safety  of  organized  society,  cannot 
be — ^burdened  with  the  condition 
that  the  State  must  compensate  such 
individual  owners  for  pecuniary 
losses  they  may  sustain,  by  reason  of 
their  not  being  permitted,  by  a 
noxious  use  of  Uieir  property,  to  in- 
flict injury  upon  the  community. 
The  exercise  of  the  police  power  by 
the  destruction  of  property  which  is 
itself  a  public  nuisance,  or  the  pro- 
hibition of  its  use  in  a  particular 
way,  whereby  its  value  becomes  de- 
preciated, is  very  different  from  tak- 
ing property  for  public  use,  or  from 
depriving  a  person  of  his  property 
without  due  process  of  law.  In  the 
one  case,  a  nuisance  only  is  abated; 
in  the  other,  unoffending  property  is 
taken  away  from  an  innocent  owner. 
It  is  true,  that,  when  the  defendants 
in  these  cases  purchased  or  erected 


their  breweries,  the  laws  of  the  State 
did  not  forbid  the  manufacture  of  in- 
toxicating liquors.  But  the  State 
did  not  thereby  give  any  assurance, 
or  come  under  an  obligation,  that  its 
legislation  upon  that  subject  would 
remain  unchanged.  Indeed,  as  was 
said  in  Stone  v.  Mississippi,  above 
cited,  the  supervision  of  the  public 
health  and  the  public  morals  is  a 
governmental  power,  'continuing  in 
its  nature,'  and  'to  be  dealt  with  as 
the  special  exigencies  of  the  moment 
may  require;'  and  that,  'for  this  pur- 
pose, the  largest  legislative  discre- 
tion is  allowed,  and  the  discretion 
cannot  be  parted  with  any  more  than 
the  power  itself.'  So  in  Beer  Co.  v. 
Massachusetts,  97  U.  S.  32:  If  the 
public  safety  or  the  public  morals 
require  the  discontinuance  of  any 
manufacture  or  traffic,  the  hand  of 
the  legislature  cannot  be  stayed  from 
providing  for  its  discontinuance  by 
any  incidental  inconvenience  Which 
individuals  or  corporations  may  suf- 
fer,' "  pp.  668-670.  See  also  Kidd  v. 
Pearson,  128  U.  S.  1,  9  S.  C.  6;  Foster 
V.  Kansas,  112  U.  S.  201,  206;  Peo- 
ple V.  McGann,  34  Hvin  358;  Ingram 
V.  State,  39  Ala.  247;  Dorman  v. 
State,  24  Ala.  216;  State  v.  City 
Council  of  Aiken,  42  S.  C.  222,  20  S. 
E.  221,  overruling  McCullough  v. 
State,  41  S.  C.  220,  19  S.  E.  458. 

8  4Powell  V.  Pennsylvania,  127  U. 
S.  678,  8  S.  C.  992,  1257;  Plumley  v. 
Massachusetts,  155  U.  S.  461,  15  S.  C. 
154.  But  see  People  v.  Marx,  99  N. 
y.  376. 

8  5  State  ex  rel.  Goodsell  v.  Wood- 
manse,  1  N.  D.  246,  46  N.  W.  970,  1 1 
L.R.A.  420.    But  the  contrary  is  held 


§  245 


OTHEE  CASES  OF  TAKING. 


479 


ness,'®  has  been  sustained.  And  generally  the  reasonable  regu- 
lation of  a  business  or  profession  is  not  a  taking  of  property 
for  public  use  without  compensation.^'''  An  ordinance  of  the 
city  of  ]!^'ew  Orleans  requiring  vendors  of  milk  to  furnish  gratu- 
itously, on  application  of  sanitary  inspectors,  samples  of  milk, 
not  exceeding  one-half  pint,  for  inspection  and  analysis,  was 
held  not  to  take  property  for  public  use  without  compensation.*® 
On  the  other  hand  laws  prohibiting  the  payment  of  wages  in 
orders,  scrip  or  evidences  of  indebtedness,  not  redeemable  in 
lawful  money,*®  or  the  employment  of  females  in  any  factory 
or  workshop  for  more  than  eight  hours  in  any  one  day,""  or 
prohibiting  the  manufacture  of  cigars  in  tenement  houses,*"^  or 
forbidding  the  offering  of  gifts  as  an  inducement  to  make  pur- 
chases,®^ and  many  similar  laws  have  been  held  invalid,  as  an 


in  State  v.  Scougal,  3  S.  D.  55,  51  N. 
W.  858,  40  Am.  St.  Eep.  603,  25 
L.E.A.  250,  6  Am.  E.  E.  &  Corp.  Eep. 
165. 

8  6  Commonwealth  v.  Vrooman,  164 
Pa.  St.  306,  30  Atl.  217,  10  Am.  E.  E. 
&  Corp.  Eep.  519,  44  Am.  St.  Eep. 
756,  15  L.E.A.  477. 

8  7State  V.  Eichcreek,  167  Ind.  217, 
77  N.  E.  1085,  119  Am.  St.  Eep.  491, 
5  L.E.A.(N.S.)  874;  State  v.  Chap- 
man, 69  N.  J.  L.  464,  55  Atl.  94.  Pure 
food  laws  upheld:  Grossman  v.  Lur- 
man,  171  N.  Y.  329,  63  N.  E.  1097,  98 
Am.  St.  Eep.  599,  affirming  S.  C.  57 
App.  Div.  393,  68  N.  Y.  S.  311;  Peo- 
ple V.  Eierecker,  169  N.  Y.  53,  61  N. 
E.  990,  88  Am.  St.  Eep.  534,  57  L.E.A. 
178,  affirming  S.  C.  58  App.  Div.  391, 
68  N.  Y.  S.  1067;  State  v.  Capital 
City  Dairy  Co.,  62  Ohio  St.  350,  57  N. 
E.  62,  57  L.E.A.  181 ;  Commonwealth 
V.  Kevin,  202  Pa.  St.  23,  51  Atl.  594, 
90  Am.  St.  Eep.  613. 

8  8  State  V.  Dupaquier,  46  La.  An. 
577,  15  So.  502,  26  L.E.A.  162.  An 
ordinance  of  same  city  prohibiting 
the  sale  of  lottery  tickets  held  valid. 
State  V.  Dobard,  45  La.  An.  1412,  14 
So.  253. 

8  9Leep  V.  St.  Louis  etc.  E.  E.  Co., 
58  Ark.  407,  25  S.  W.  76,  23  L.E.A. 


264,  9  Am.  E.  R.  &  Corp.  Eep.  185; 
Ramsey  v.  People,  142  III.  380,  32  N. 
E.  364,  17  L.E.A.  853;  Braceville 
Coal  Co.  v.  People,  147  111.  66,  35  N. 
E.  62,  37  Am.  St.  Eep.  206,  22  L.E.A. 
340;  State  v.  Loomis,  115  Mo.  307, 
22  S.  W.  350,  21  L.R.A.  789;  God- 
charles  v.  Wigeman,  113  Pa.  St.  431, 
6  Atl.  354;  State  v.  Fire  Creek  C.  & 
C.  Co.,  33  W.  Va.  188,  10  S.  E.  288, 
25  Am.  St.  Eep.  891 ;  State  v.  Good- 
will, 33  W.  Va.  179,  10  S.  E.  285,  25 
Am.  St.  Eep.  863,  6  L.E.A.  621. 

soEitchie  v.  People,  155  111.  98,  40 
N.  E.  454,  46  Am.  St.  Eep.  315,  29 
L.E.A.  79. 

91  In  re  Jacobs,  98  N.  Y.  98,  50  Am. 
Eep.  636. 

9  2Montgomery  v.  Kelly,  142  Ala. 
552,  38  So.  67,  110  Am.  St.  Eep.  43, 
70  L.E.A.  209;  Hewin  v.  Atlanta,  121 
Ga.  723,  49  S.  E.  765,  67  L.E.A.  795; 
Long  V.  State,  74  Md.  565,  22  Atl.  4, 
28  Am.  St.  Rep.  268 ;  Commonwealth 
V.  Sisson,  178  Mass.  578,  60  N.  E. 
385;  State  v.  Eamseyer,  73  N.  H.  31, 
50  Atl.  958;  People  v.  Gillson,  109 
N.  Y.  389,  17  N.  E.  343,  4  Am.  St. 
Eep.  854;  State  v.  Dalton,  22  E.  I. 
77,  46  Atl.  234,  84  Am.  St.  Rep.  818, 
48  L.E.A.  775;  Young  v.  Common- 
wealth, 101  Va.  853,  45  S.  E.  327.    In 


480 


EMINENT  DOMAIHr. 


§  246 


unconstitutional   interference   with   the   liberty   and  property 
rights  of  the  citizen. 

§  246  (156c).  Regulating  rates  and  charges.  The  ex- 
istence of  a  right  or  power  in  the  State  to  regulate  or  fix  the 
charges  which  may  be  lawfully  demanded  for  certain  services 
or  commodities,  is  evidenced  by  an  almost  immemorial  exercise 
of  such  right  in  England  and  America  and  is  established  in  this 
country  by  a  long  line  of  decisions  by  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  States,  beginning  with  Munn  v.  Illinois,**  in  1876, 
and  coming  down  to  the  present  time.  The  right  to  exercise 
this  power  in  the  case  of  common  carriers,**  telegraph  and  tele- 


People  r.  Gillson,  109  N.  Y.  389,  17 
N.  E.  343,  4  Am.  St.  Eep.  854,  the 
court  says:  "Under  an  exercise  of 
the  police  power  the  enactment  must 
have  reference  to  the  comfort,  the 
safety  or  the  welfare  of  society,  and 
it  must  not  be  in  conflict  with  the 
constitution.  The  law  will  not  allow 
the  rights  of  property  to  be  invaded 
under  the  guise  of  a  police  regulation 
for  the  protection  of  health,  when  it 
is  manifest  such  is  not  the  object 
and  purpose  of  the  regulation.  {See 
Austin  V.  Murray,  16  Pick.  121; 
Com.  V.  Alger,  7  Gush.  53,  84,  cited 
with  approval  in  Matter  of  Jacobs, 
98  N.  y.  98.)  As  is  also  said  in  the 
last  case,  it  is  generally  for  the  legis- 
lature to  determine  what  laws  and 
regulations  are  needed  to  protect  the 
public  health  and  serve  the  public 
health  and  safety,  and  if  measures 
are  calculated,  intended,  convenient 
or  appropriate  to  accomplish  such 
ends,  the  exercise  of  its  discretion  is 
not  the  subject  of  judicial  review. 
But  these  measures  must  have  some 
relations  to  these  ends.  Courts  must 
be  able  to  see,  upon  a  perusal  of  the 
enactment,  that  there  is  some  fair, 
just  and  reasonable  connection  be- 
tween it  and  the  ends  above  men- 
tioned; unless  such  relation  exists 
the  enactment  cannot  be  upheld  as  an 
exercise  of  the  police  power." 
9394  U.  S.  113. 


9  4Munn  V.  Illinois,  94  U.  S.  113; 
Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Iowa,  94  U. 
S.  155;  Peik  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
94  U.  S.  164;  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Ackley,  94  U.  S.  179;  Ruggles  v. 
Illinois,  108  U.  S.  526;  Stone  v. 
Farmers  L.  &  T.  Co.,  116  U.  S.  307; 
Stone  V.  Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co., 
116  U.  S.  347;  Stone  v.  New  Orleans 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  116  U.  S.  352;  Wabash 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Illinois,  118  U.  S. 
557;  Dow  v.  Beidelman,  125  U.  S. 
680;  Georgia  R.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Smith, 
128  U.  S.  174;  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Minnesota,  134  U.  S.  418,  10  S.  C. 
462,  702,  2  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
564;  Minneapolis  Eastern  R.  E.  Co. 
V.  Minnesota,  134  U.  S.  467,  10  S.  C. 
473;  Chicago  &  G.  T.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Wellman,  143  U.  S.  339,  12  S.  C.  408, 
5  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  638;  St. 
Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Gill,  156  U.  S. 
649,  15  S.  C.  484,  11  Am.  R.  R.  & 
Corp.  Rep.  709;  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Pendleton,  156  U.  S.  667,  15  S. 
C.  413 ;  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Tomp- 
kins, 176  U.  S.  167,  20  S.  C.  336;  At- 
lantic Coast  Line  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Florida,  203  U.  S.  256,  27  S.  C.  108; 
Same  v.  Same,  203  U.  S.  261,  27  S. 
C.  109 ;  111.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Inter- 
state Com.  Com.,  206  U.  S.  441,  27 
S.  C.  700;  Prentis  v.  Atlantic  Coast 
Line  R.  R.  Co.,  211  U.  S.  210;  Rail- 
road Commissioners  v.  Pensacola  & 
A.  R.  R.  Co.,  24  Fla.  417;  Storrs  v. 


§  246 


OTHEE  OASES  OF  TAKING. 


481 


phone  companies,®^  water,  gas,  light  and  irrigation  companies,*** 
hackmen,  draymen,  turnpikes,  bridges,  ferries,®^  public  millers 
and  all  persons  or  corporations  exercising  any  franchise  or 
privilege  emanating  from  the  government,  may  be  regarded  as 
settled  beyond  question.  The  right  to  regulate  the  charges  of 
grain  elevators  is  also  well  settled,  although  those  engaged  in 
the  business  do  not  hold  any  franchise  or  privilege  from  the 


Pensacola  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  29  Fla. 
617,  11  So.  226;  State  v.  Atlantic 
Coast  Air  Line,  48  Fla.  114,  37  So. 
652;  Same  v.  Same,  48  Fla.  146,  37 
So.  657;  State  v.  Seaboard  Air  Line 
R.  R.  Co.,  48  Fla.  150,  37  So.  658; 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Atlantic  Stove 
Works,  128  Ga.  207,  57  S.  E.  427; 
Hill  V.  Wadley  Southern  Ry.  Co., 
128  Ga.  705,  57  S.  E.  795;  Chicago  B. 
A  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Jones,  149  111.  361, 
37  N.  E.  247,  41  Am.  St.  Rep.  278,  24 
L.R.A.  141,  10  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp. 
Rep.  234;  Board  of  R.  R.  Comrs.  v. 
Symms  Grocer  Co.,  53  Kan.  207,  35 
Pac.  217,  9  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
676;  Wellman  v.  Chicago  &  G.  T.  R. 
R.  Co.,  83  Mich.  592,  3  Am.  R.  R.  & 
Corp.  Rep.  703;  Corporation  Com- 
mission 7.  Seaboard  Air  Line  R.  R. 
Co.,  127  N.  C.  283,  37  S.  E.  266; 
Norfolk  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Pendleton, 
88  Va.  350,  13  S.  E.  709. 

9  5Hockett  V.  State,  105  Ind.  250, 
55  Am.  Rep.  201 ;  Central  Union  Tel. 
Co.  V.  State,  118  Ind.  194;  Central 
Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  State,  123  Ind.  113, 
24  N.  E.  215,  2  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp. 
Rep.  406;  Chesapeake  etc.  Tel.  Co. 
V.  B.  &  0.  Tel.  Co.,  66  Md.  399 ;  State 
V.  Mo.  etc.  Telephone  Co.,  189  Mo. 
83,  88  S.  W.  41;  Home  Tel.  &  Tel. 
Co.  V.  Los  Angeles,  211  U.  S.  265. 

9 « Spring  Valley  W.  W.  Co.  v.  City 
and  County  of  San  Francisco,  82 
Cal.  286,  22  Pac.  910,  1  Am.  R.  R.  & 
Corp.  Rep.  96,  16  Am.  St.  Rep.  116, 
6  L.R.A.  756;  Deninger  v.  Recorder's 
Court,  145  Cal.  629,  79  Pac.  360; 
Deninger  v.  Recorder's  Court,  145 
Cal.  638,  79  Pac.  364;  Freeport 
Water  Co.  v.  Freeport,  186  111.  179, 
Em.  D.— 31. 


57  N.  E.  862;  Chicago  v.  Rogers 
Park  Water  Co.,  214  111.  212,  73  N. 
E.  375;  Chicago  v.  Rogers  Park 
Water  Co.,  116  111.  App.  200;  City 
of  Rushville  v.  Rushville  Nat.  Gas 
Co.,  132  Ind.  575,  28  N.  E.  853,  15 
L.R.A.  321;  Westfield  Gas  &  M.  Co. 
V.  Mendenhall,  142  Ind.  538,  41  N. 
E.  1033;  Cedar  Rapids  Water  Co.  v. 
Cedar  Rapids,  118  la.  234,  91  N.  W. 
1081;  In  re  Pryor,  55  Kan.  724,  41 
Pac.  958,  29  L.R.A.  398;  State  v. 
Laclede  Gas  &  L.  Co.,  102  Mo.  472, 
14  S.  W.  974;  Aqua  Pura  Co.  v. 
Las  Vegas,  10  N.  M.  6,  60  Pac.  208, 
50  L.R.A.  224;  Saratoga  Springs  v. 
Saratoga  G.,  E.  L.  &  P.  Co.,  191  N. 
Y.  123,  83  N.  E.  693,  18  L.R.A. 
(N.S.)  713;  Spring  Valley  W. 
W.  V.  Schottler,  110  U.  S.  347; 
Freeport  Water  Co.  v.  Freeport,  180 
U.  S.  587,  21  S.  C.  493;  Stanislaus 
Co.  V.  San  Joaquin  etc.  Irr.  Co.,  192 
U.  S.  201,  24  S.  C.  241 ;  Vicksburg  v. 
Vicksburg  Water  Co.,  206  U.  S.  496, 
27  S.  C.  762;  Boise  City  Irr.  &  L.  Co. 
V.  Clark,  131  Fed.  415,  65  C.  C.  A. 
399. 

9  7Covington  &  L.  Turnpike  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Sandford  (Ky.),  20  S.  W. 
1031;  Commonwealth  v.  Covington 
&  Cinn.  Bridge  Co.  (Ky.),  21  S.  W. 
1042,  7  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  638 ; 
S.  C.  on  appeal,  154  U.  S.  204,  14  S. 
C.  1087,  10  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
399.  A  municipal  corporation  may 
not  regulate  rates  unless  authorized 
by  statute.  Richmond  v.  Richmond 
Nat.  Gas  Co.,  168  Ind.  82,  79  N.  E. 
1031 ;  State  v.  Mo.  etc.  Telephone  Co., 
189  Mo.  83,  88  S.  W.  41. 

"Every     corporation     or     person 


4S2 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


§    2iti 


State. ^^  So  of  stockyards.®*  The  general  rule  has  been  laid 
down  that  whenever  a  property  or  business  is  "affected  with  a 
public  interest"  or  "devoted  to  a  public  use,"  it  is  subject  to 
public  regulation.-'  "Many  kinds  of  business,"  says  the  supreme 
court  of  Kansas,  "carried  on  without  special  franchises  or  priv- 
ileges are  treated  as  public  in  character,  and  have  therefore  been 
subjected  to  legislative  regulation  and  control.  The  nature  and 
extent  of  the  business,  the  fact  that  it  closely  touches  a  great 
many  people,  and  that  it  may  afford  opportunities  for  imposi- 
tion and  oppression,  as  in  cases  of  monopoly  and  the  like,  are 
circumstances  affecting  property  with  a  public  interest."  ^ 

The  right  to  regulate  rates  and  charges  may  be  precluded  by 
contract,  either  in  the  form  of  charter  provision  or  otherwise,^ 
and  the  States  cannot  regulate  the  charges  for  interstate 
commerce.*     It  was  formerly  understood  that  the  power  of  the 


who,  by  reason  of  privileges  received 
from  the  State,  such  as  the  right  to 
use  the  highways,  or  the  right  to  ex- 
ercise the  power  of  eminent  domain, 
is  in  the  business  of  supplying  the 
general  public  with  any  commodity 
or  service  necessary  or  convenient 
for  the  general  comfort  and  welfare 
is  subject  to  the  dominion  and  super- 
vision of  public  authority,  so  far  as 
may  be  necessary  to  prevent  such 
business  from  being  carried  on  un- 
justly or  oppressively  by  the  imposi- 
tion of  excessive  charges  for  such 
commodity  or  services.  This  do- 
minion is  exercised  for  the  general 
good,  and  it  is  one  form  of  what  is 
known  as  the  police  power."  Denin- 
ger  V.  Recorder's  Court,  145  Cal.  638, 
79  Pac.  364. 

ssMunn  v.  Illinois,  94  U.  S.  113, 
S.  C.  69  III.  80;  Budd  v.  New  York, 
143  U.  S.  517,  12  S.  C.  Rep.  468,  5 
Am.  R.  E.  &  Corp.  Rep.  610;  S.  C. 
117  N.  Y.  1;  Brass  v.  North  Dakota, 
153  U.  S.  391,  14  S.  C.  Rep.  857,  10 
Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  380. 

soRatcliff  V.  Wichita  Union 
Stock  Yards  Co.,  74  Kan.  1,  86  Pac. 
150,  118  Am.  St.  Rep.  298,  6  L.R.A. 
(N.S.)   834. 


iMunn.  V.  Illinois,  94  U.  S.  113. 
And  see  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  p.  739; 
Tiedemanon  Police  Power,  p.  233; 
People  V.  Budd,  117  N.  Y.  1,  27-29. 

zRatcliff  V.  Wichita  Union  Stock 
Yards  Co.,  74  Kan.  1,  6,  86  Pac.  150, 
118  Am.  St.  Rep.  298,  6  L.R.A.(N.S.) 
834. 

3Ruggles  V.  Illinois,  108  U.  S.  526; 
Stone  V.  Farmer  L.  &  T.  Co.,  116  U. 
S.  307;  Stone  v.  Illinois  Central  R. 
R.  Co.,  116  U.  S.  347 ;  Dow  v.  Beidle- 
man,  125  U.  S.  680 ;  Georgia  R.  &  B. 
Co.  V.  Smith,  128  U.  S.  174;  Norfolk 
&  W.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Pendleton,  156  U. 
S.  667,  15  S.  C.  Rep.  413;  Cleveland 
V.  Cleveland  City  Ry.  Co.,  194  U.  S. 
517,  24  S.  C.  756;  Cleveland  v.  Cleve- 
land Elec.  Ry.  Co.,  194  U.  S.  538,  24 
S.  C.  764;  Vicksburg  v.  Vicksburg 
W.  W.  Co.,  206  U.  S.  496,  27  S.  C. 
762 ;  In  re  Prior,  55  Kan.  724,  41  Pac. 
958,  29  L.R.A.  398;  State  v.  Laclede 
Gas  Co.,  102  Mo.  472,  14  S.  W.  974. 

4  Wabash  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Illinois, 
118  U.  S.  577;  Covington  &  Cinn. 
Bridge  Co.  v.  Kentucky,  154  U.  S. 
204,  14  S.  C.  Rep.  1087,  10  Am.  R.  R. 
&  Corp.  Rep.  399 ;  Gulf  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Hefflry,  158  U.  S.  98,  15  S.  C.  Rep. 
802. 


§  246 


OTHEU  CASES  OF  TAKING. 


483 


legislature  to  fix  rates  and  charges  was  absolute,^  but  that  idea 
is  now  exploded.  If  such  was  the  case,  it  is  manifest  that  it 
would  be  within  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  greatly  impair 
or  even  destroy  the  value  of  property  by  fixing  rates  that  were 
unreasonably  low.  To  fix  rates  which  are  unreasonably  low 
for  any  property  or  business,  affected  with  a  public  interest, 
is  to  take  property  for  public  use  without  compensation,  as  well 
as  to  deprive  of  property  without  due  process  of  law.®  The 
power,  therefore,  is  limited  to  the  fixing  of  reasonable  rates 
and  the  reasonableness  of  rates  established  may  be  inquired  into 
by  the  courts.^  An  act  requiring  street  railroads  to  carry  pupils 
in  the  public  schools  to  and  from  school  at  half  rates  was  held 


sChieago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Jones, 
149  111.  361,  37  N.  E.  247,  10  Am.  R. 
R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  234,  41  Am.  St.  Rep. 
278,  24  L.R.A.  141;  Covington  etc. 
T.  Co.  V.  Sandford  (Ky.),  20  S.  W. 
1031;  Wellman  v.  Chicago  &  G.  T. 
R.  R.  Co.,  83  Mich.  .592,  3  Am.  R.  R. 
&  Corp.  Rep.  703;  Munn  v.  Illinois, 
94  U.  S.  113. 

oSan  Diego  Water  Co.  v.  San 
Diego,  118  Cal.  556,  62  Am.  St.  Rep. 
261,  38  L.R.A.  460;  Pensacola  &  A. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  State,  25  Fla.  310;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Covington  &  Cinn. 
Bridge  Co.  (Ky.),  21  S.  W.  1042,  7 
Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  638;  St. 
Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Gill,  156  U.  S. 
649,  15  S.  C.  484,  11  Am.  R.  R.  & 
Corp.  Rep.  709;  Covington  etc.  Road 
Co.  V.  Sandford,  164  U.  S.  578,  17  S. 
C.  198;  Smythe  v.  Ames,  169  U.  S. 
466;  Prentis  v.  Atlantic  Coast  Line 
R.  R.  Co.,  211  U.  S.  210. 

'Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Minne- 
sota, 134  U.  S.  418,  10  S.  C.  Rep.  462, 
702,  2  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  564; 
Minneapolis  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Minnesota,  134  U.  S.  467,  10  S.  C. 
Rep.  473;  Reagan  v.  Farmers'  L.  & 
T.  Co.,  154  U.  S.  362,  14  S.  C.  Rep. 
1047,  9  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  641 ; 
Reagan  v.  Mercantile  Trust  Co.,  1.54 
U.  S.  413,  14  S.  C.  Rep.  1060;  Reagan 
v.  Mercantile  Trust  Co.,   154  U.   S. 


418,  14  S.  C.  Rep.  1062;  Reagan  v. 
Farmers'  L.  &  T.  Co.,  154  U.  S.  420, 
14  S.  C.  Rep.  1062 ;  St.  Louis  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Gill,  156  U.  S.  649,  15  S.  C. 
Rep.  484,  11  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
709;  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Tomp- 
kins, 176  U.  S.  167,  20  S.  C.  336;  Mis- 
souri Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Smith,  60  Ark. 
221,  29  S.  W.  752;  Chicago  v.  Rogers 
Park  Water  Co.,  214  111.  212,  73  N.  E. 
375,  affirming  S.  C.  116  111.  App.  200; 
State  V.  Sioux  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  46 
Neh.  682,  65  N.  W.  766,  31  L.R.A.  47 ; 
Logan  Nat.  Gas  &  Fuel  Co.  v.  Chilli- 
cothe,  65  Ohio  St.  186,  62  N.  E.  122; 
Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  Philadelphia  Co., 
220  Pa.  St.  100,  68  Atl.  676;  Common- 
wealth V.  Atlantic  Coast  Line  Ry. 
Co.,  106  Va.  61,  55  S.  E.  572,  117  Am. 
St.  Rep.  983,  7  L.R.A.  (N.S.)  1086; 
Mercantile  Trust  Co.  v.  Texas  &  P. 
R.  R.  Co.,  51  Fed.  529 ;  Ames  v.  Union 
Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  64  Fed.  165.  Rates 
fixed  by  the  legislature  or  by  legis- 
lative commission  are  deemed  to  be 
prima  fade  just  and  reasonable. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Atlanta  Stove 
Works,  128  Ga.  207,  57  S.  E.  429; 
Hill  V.  Wadley  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  128 
Ga.  705,  57  S.  E.  795;  Atlantic  Coast 
Line  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Florida,  203  U.  S. 
256,  27  S.  C.  108 ;  Seaboard  Air  Line 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Florida,  203  U.  S.  261,  27 
S.  C.  109. 


484 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


§    247 


valid  as  a  police  regulation  in  the  interest  of  education.®  Ke- 
quiring  railroad  companies  to  sell  mileage  tickets  at  reduced 
rates  is  held  to  be  a  taking  of  property  without  due  process  of 
law.®  But  such  a  statute  was  held  valid  in  New  York  as  to 
corporations  thereafter  organized  and  as  applied  to  business 
within  the  State,  i** 

§  247  (156d).  Taking,  injuring  or  destroying  property 
in  the  abatement  of  nuisances,  or  when  made,  kept,  or 
used  in  violation  of  law.  "To  destroy  property  because  it  is 
a  public  nuisance  is  not  to  appropriate  it  to  public  use,  but  to 
prevent  any  use  of  it  by  the  owner,  and  to  put  an  end  to  its 
existence,  because  it  could  not  be  used  consistently  with  the 
maxim,  sic  utere  iiM  id  alienum  non  Iwdas."  ^^  Any  nuisance 
may  be  abated,  such  as  a  pig  sty,^^  a  stagnant  pool,^*  or  a  mill 
pond  which  has  become  befouled  by  sewerage  or  otherwise,^* 
without  compensation  for  the  property  destroyed  or  interfered 
with.^^  Low,  wet  grounds  in  populous  localities  may  be  filled 
up  at  the  expense  of  the  owners  for  the  purpose  of  preserving 
the  public  health.  ■'''    But  land  upon  which  there  is  no  nuisance 


sCommonwealth  v.  Interstate  Con- 
solidated St.  Ry.  Co.,  187  Mass.  436, 
73  N.  E.  530. 

sBeardsley  v.  New  York  etc.  K.  R. 
Co.,  162  N.  Y.  230,  56  N.  E.  488 ;  Lake 
Shore  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  173 
U.  S.  684,  19  S.  C.  565. 

loPurdy  v.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  162  N. 
Y.  42,  56  N.  E.  508,  48  L.R.A.  669. 

iiDunbar  v.  City  Council  of  Au- 
gusta, 90  Ga.  390,  17  S.  E.  907. 

12  St.  Louis  V.  Stern,  3  Mo.  App. 
48. 

isBaker  v.  Boston,  12  Pick.  184,  22 
Am.  Deo.  421. 

iiNew  Castle  City  v.  Raney,  6  Pa. 
Co.  Ct.  87 ;  Americus  v.  Mitchell,  79 
6a.  807;  People  v.  Board  of  Health, 
140  N.  Y.  1,  35  N.  E.  320,  37  Am.  St. 
Rep.  522;  Jeremy  Imp.  Co.  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 106  Va.  482,  56  S.  E.  224. 
But  under  authority  to  abate 
nuisances  a  city  cannot  fill  up  a  slip 
which  has  become  foul  by  reason  of 
its  own  failure  to  prevent  the  cast- 
ing of  filth  and  refuse  therein,  and 
when  it  can  be  cleaned  out  at  small 


expense.  'Babcoik  v.  Buffalo,  56  N. 
Y.  268.  And  when  the  statute  points 
out  the  manner  of  abatement,  it  must 
be  strictly  pursued  or  a  liability  will 
be  incurred.  Frank  v.  Atlanta,  72 
Ga.  428. 

isSee  generally  Attorney  General 
V.  Hunter,  1  Dev.  Eq.  12;  Eason  v. 
Perkins,  2  Dev.  Eq.  38;  Denver  v. 
Mullen,  7  Col.  345.  But  only  the 
nuisance  can  be  abated.  Railroad 
tracks  cannot  be  torn  up  because 
they  are  used  in  a  way  to  create  a 
nuisance.  Chicago  v.  Union  Stock 
Yards  etc.  Co.,  164  111.  224,  45  N.  E. 
430,  35  L.R.A.  281. 

isKirkland  v.  State,  72  Ark.  171, 
78  S.  W.  770;  Bush  v.  Dubuque,  69 
la.  233;  Leavitt  v.  Cambridge,  120 
Mass.  157;  Farnsworth  v.  Boston, 
126  Mass.  1 ;  Bancroft  v.  Cambridge, 
126  Mass.  438 ;  Welch  v.  Boston,  126 
Mass.  442;  Patrick  v.  Omaha,  1  Neb. 
(Unof.)  250,  95  N.  W.  477;  City  of 
Charleston  v.  Werner.  38  S.  C.  488. 
17  S.  E.  33,  8  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
73,  37  Am.  St.  Rep.  776;  Charleston 


§  247 


OTHEE  OASES  OF  TAKING, 


485 


belonging  to  one  proprietor  cannot  be  occupied  with  drains  or 
other  works  for  the  purpose  of  abating  a  nuisance  on  the  lands 
of  others,  unless  compensation  is  made.-''''  Intoxicating  liquors 
kept  or  made  in  violation  of  law  may  be  destroyed.^*  So 
of  gambling  instruments.^®  Bread  made  under  weight  in  viola- 
tion of  law  may  be  forfeited ;  ^^  cattle  taken  damage  feasant 
may  be  impounded  and  sold  after  reasonable  notice.  ^^  So  a 
building  which  is  in  such  condition  as  to  endanger  life  and 
property  may  be  declared  a  nuisance  and  destroyed  without 
compensation.^^  So  of  a  building  ^*  or  clothing,  bedding,  etc., 
infected  with  smallpox.''*  Likewise  a  building  erected  in  viola- 
tion of  a  valid  fire  ordinance.^®  Damaged  grain,^*  diseased  ani- 
mals,^^  milk  kept  for  sale  and  below  the  standard  prescribed  by 
law,^®  food  unfit  for  human  consumption,^®  and  fish  nets  used 


V.  Werner,  46  S.  C.  323,  24  S.  E.  207; 
Sweet  V.  Rechel,  37  Fed.  323. 

1 'Matter  of  Chessbrough,  78  N.  Y. 
232;  S.  C.  17  Hun  561;  Cavanaugh  v. 
Boston,  139  Mass.  426. 

isBeer  Co.  v.  Massachusetts,  97  U. 
S.  25;  State  v.  Snow,  3  E.  I.  64;  ex 
parte  Keeler,  45  S.  C.  537,  23  S.  E. 
865,  55  Am.  St.  Rep.  785,  31  L.R.A. 
678.  But  see  Wynehamer  v.  People, 
13  N.  Y.  378;  Scott  v.  Donald,  165  U. 
S.  58,  17  S.  C.  265.  On  the  evacua- 
tion of  Richmond  by  the  confederates 
the  city  council  ordered  the  destruc- 
tion of  certain  liquor  and  pledged  the 
city  to  pay  for  the  same.  In  a  suit 
to  recover  its  value  it  was  held  that 
it  was  taken  under  the  police  power 
and  not  under  the  power  of  eminent 
domain  and  that  there  could  be  no  re- 
covery. Wallace  v.  Richmond,  94 
Va.  204. 

isGarland  Novelty  Co.  v.  State,  71 
Ark.  138,  71  S.  W.  257;  Furth  v. 
State,  72  Ark.  161,  78  S.  W.  759; 
Frost  V.  People,  193  111.  635,  61  N.  E. 
1054,  86  Am.  St.  Rep.  352;  Board  of 
Police  Commissioners  v.  Wagner,  93 
Md.  182,  48  Atl.  455,  86  Am.  St.  Rep. 
423,  52  L.R.A.  775. 

zoGuillotte  V.  New  Orleans,  12  La. 
An.  432;  In  re  Nasmith,  2  Ontario 
192. 


2iDillard  v.  Webb,  55  Ala.  468. 

22Harvey  v.  Dewoody,  18  Ark.  252, 
52  Am.  Rep.  173;  Theilan  v.  Porter, 
14  Lea  622;  Raymond  v.  Fish,  51 
Conn.  80. 

2  3Singo  V.  Joliet,  237  111.  300,  86 
N.  E.  663. 

2  4Perry  v.  Oregon,  139  111.  App. 
606. 

2SHine  v.  New  Haven,  40  Conn. 
478;  King  v.  Davenport,  98  111.  305, 
38  Am.  Rep.  89 ;  City  of  Brooklyn  v. 
Franz,  87  Hun  54,  33  N.  Y.  Supp. 
869.  As  to  destroying  obstructions 
in  streets  as  nuisances,  see  State  v. 
Jersey  City,  34  N.  J.  L.  31 ;  Hoey  v. 
Gilroy,  129  N.  Y.  132,  29  N.  E.  85; 
Gas  Light  Co.  v.  Hart,  40  La.  An. 
474,  4  So.  215. 

26Dimbar  v.  City  Council  of  Au- 
gusta, 90  Ga.  390,  17  S.  E.  907. 

2 'Livingston  v.  Ellis  Co.,  30  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  19,  68  S.  W.  723;  Lowe  v. 
Conroy,  120  Wis.  151,  97  IST.  W.  942, 
102  Am.  St.  Rep.  983,  66  L.R.A.  907. 

2  8Deems  v.  Baltimore,  80  Md.  164, 
30  Atl.  648,  45  Am.  St.  Rep.  339,  26 
L.R.A.  541. 

29North  Am.  Cold  Storage  Co.  v. 
Chicago,  211  U.  S.  306. 


486  EMINENT   DOMAIN.  §    248 

in  violation  of  law/"  may  be  summarily  destroyed  and  such  de- 
struction is  not  a  taking  for  public  use,  requiring  compensation 
to  be  made.**^^ 

In  all  such  cases  the  owner  may  have  a  hearing  on  the  ques- 
tion of  whether  his  property  was  within  the  condemnation  of 
the  law  by  bringing  a  suit  against  the  officers  who  have  seized 
and  destroyed  it  and  in  such  a  suit  the  defendants  must  prove 
the  existence  of  the  facts  necessary  to  justify  their  action.*^ 

§  248  (156e).  Compelling  railroads  and  others  to 
make  alterations  and  construct  works  for  the  purpose  of 
promoting  the  public  safety,  convenience  and  welfare. 
Where  the  charter  of  a  water-power  company  is  subject  to 
amendment,  alteration  or  repeal  at  the  pleasure  of  the  legis- 
lature, it  may  be  compelled  to  construct  a  fishway  in  its  dam 
without  compensation.^*  And  some  authorities  hold  that  a  dam 
is  erected  subject  to  the  right  of  the  legislature  to  require  the 
construction  of  a  fishway,  without  compensation,  whether  there 
is  any  reservation  covering  the  matter  in  the  charter  or  statute 
or  not ;  **  other  cases  hold  that  such  a  requirement  cannot  be 
enforced  without  compensation,  in  the  absence  of  such  a  reser- 
vation.*^ A  railroad  company  may  be  compelled  to  erect  such 
structures  and  submit  to  such  regulations  as  are  necessary  for 
the  safety  of  the  public  or  security  of  property,  and  according- 

aoLawton  v.  Steele,  119  N.  Y.  226,  ssCommisaionera   of   Inland  Fish- 

23  N.  E.  878,  16  Am.  St.  Rep.  813,  eries  v.  Holyoke  Water  Power  Co., 

7  L.R.A.  134;  S.  C.  affirmed,  152  U.  S.  104  Mass.  446,  6  Am.  Rep.  247 ;  Hol- 

133 ;  State  v.  French,  71  Ohio  St.  186,  yoke  Co.  v.  Lyman,  15  Wall.  500;  see 

73  N.  E.  216,  104  Am.  St.  Rep.  770.  also  S.  P.  Commonwealth  v.  Eastern 

The  nature  and  limits  of  the  police  R.  R.  Co.,  103  Mass.  254,  4  Am.  Rep. 

power  are  much  discussed  in  the  ease  555. 

first  cited.  Bittenhaus  v.  Johnston,  92  34Parker  v.  People,  111   III.  581; 

Wis.  477,  66  N.  W.  805,  32  L.R.A.  State  v.  Beardsley,  108  la.  396,  79  N. 

380.     Compare  Colon  v.  Lisk,  153  N.  W.  138;  West  Point  W.  P.  &  L.  I. 

Y.  188,  47  N.  E.  302,  60  Am.  St.  Rep.  Co.  v.  State,  49  Neb.  218,  66  N.  W.  6. 

009.  3 estate  v.  Glen,  7  Jones,  L.  321; 

31  As  to  killing  of  animals  by  of-  Cornelius  v.  Glen,  ibid,  512;  People 

ficers  of  humane  society,  see  King  v.  v.  Piatt,  17  Johns.  195;  Woolever  v. 

Hayes,  80  Me.  206,  13  Atl.  Rep.  882;  Stewart,  36  Ohio  St.  146,  38  Am.  Rep. 

Sahr  V.  Scholle,  89  Hun  42,  35  N.  Y.  569 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Pennsylvania 

97;  Munn  v.  Corbin,  8  Colo.  App.  113,  Canal  Co.,  66  Pa.  St.  41,  5  Am.  Rep. 

44  Pac.  783.  329. 

3  2Sings  V.  Joliet,  237  111.  300,  86  N. 
E.  663;  North  Am.  Cold  Storage  Co. 
r.  Chicago,  211  U.  S.  306. 


§  248 


OXHEE  CASES  Or  TAKING. 


487 


ly  may  be  required  to  disuse  steam  upon  city  streets,^®  to  con- 
struct and  maintain  cattle-guards  and  fences,^ '^  to  widen  and  re- 
pair bridges  over  its  road,^*  to  reconstruct  on  a  different  plan  a 
bridge  by  whicli  it  crosses  a  street,  so  as  to  remove  obstructions 
from  the  street,^®  to  enlarge  a  bridge  over  a  stream  to  accommo- 
date the  increased  flow  of  water  caused  by  the  discharge  of 
drainage  ditches  into  the  stream,*"  to  remove  dangerous  grade 
crossings,*^  to  construct  and  maintain  stations  at  the  intersec- 


ssNorth  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Lake  View,  105  111.  207,  44  Am.  Rep. 
788;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Richmond,  96  U. 
S.  521. 

3  7Birmingham  Mineral  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Parsons,  100  Ala.  662,  13  So.  602; 
Ohio  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Russell,  115  111. 
52;  Emmons  v.  Minneapolis  &  St. 
Louis  Ry.  Co.,  35  Minn.  503;  Kansas 
City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Spencer,  72 
Miss.  491,  17  So.  168;  Yazoo  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Harrington,  85  Miss.  366,  37 
So.  1016;  Nelson  v.  Vermont  & 
Canada  R.  R.  Co.,  26  Vt.  717 ;  Thorp 
V.  Rutland  &  Burlington  R.  R.  Co., 
27  Vt.  140;  Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Humes,  115  U.  S.  512;  Minne- 
apolis &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Emmons, 
149  U.  S.  364,  13  S.  C.  870,  7  Am.  R. 
R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  755. 

ssEnglish  v.  New  Haven  &  North- 
ampton Co.,  32  Conn.  240;  Char- 
lottesville V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  97 
Va.  428,  34  S.  E.  98 ;  Chicago  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Nebraska  170  U.  S.  57. 
But  see  Kansas  City  v.  Kansas  City 
Belt  R.  R.  Co.,  102  Mo.  633,  14  S.  W. 
808,  3  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  522, 
10  L.R.A.  851. 

3  9  Delaware  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Buf- 
falo, 158  N.  Y.  266,  53  N.  E.  Rep.  44; 
Delaware  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Buffalo, 
158  N.  Y.  478,  53  N.  E.  Rep.  533. 

40Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  People, 
212  111.  103,  72  N.  E.  219;  S.  C. 
affirmed,  200  U.  S.  561,  26  S.  C.  341. 

41  People  V.  Union  Pac.  R.  R.  Co., 
20  Col.  186,  37  Pac.  610;  Suffleld  v. 
Northampton    Co.,    53    Conn.    367; 


WoodruflF  V.  Catlin,  54  Conn.  277; 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Waterbury,  55  Conn. 
19;  Town  of  Weatbrook's  Appeal,  57 
Conn.  96,  17  Atl.  368;  Town  of  Fair- 
field's Appeal,  57  Conn.  167,  17  Atl. 
764;  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.'s  Ap- 
peal, 58  Conn.  532,  20  Atl.  670; 
WoodruflF  V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
59  Conn.  63,  20  Atl.  17 ;  Doolittle  v. 
Selectmen  of  Branford,  59  Conn. 
402,  22  Atl.  336 ;  New  York  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Waterbury,  60  Conn.  1,  22  Atl. 
439 ;  New  York  &  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Town  of  Bristol,  62  Conn.  527,  26  Atl. 
122;  Cullen  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  66  Conn.  211,  33  Atl.  910; 
Mooney  v.  Clark,  69  Conn.  241 ;  Ar- 
gentine V.  Atchison  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  55 
Kan.  730,  41  Pac.  946,  30  L.R.A.  255; 
Veazie  v.  Mayo,  45  Me.  560 ;  State  v. 
Noyes,  47  Me.  189;  In  re  Selectmen 
of  Norwood,  161  Mass.  259,  37  N.  E. 
199 ;  In  re  Old  Colony  R.  R.  Co.,  163 
Mass.  356,  40  N.  E.  198;  State  v. 
Minneapolis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  39  Minn. 
219,  39  N.  W.  153;  State  v.  St.  Paul 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  38  Minn.  246; 
State  v.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
35  Minn.  131,  59  Am.  Rep.  313;  Chi- 
cago etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  State,  47  Neb. 
550,  66  N.  W.  624;  State  v.  City  of 
Camden,  53  N.  J.  L.  322,  21  Atl.  565 ; 
Harriman  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  Ill 
Tenn.  538,  82  S.  W.  213 ;  New  York  & 
N.  E.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Town  of  Bristol, 
151  U.  S.  556,  9  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp. 
Rep.  593.  A  city  cannot  compel  the 
elevation  of  tracks  to  abolish  grade 
crossings  without  legislative  author- 


488 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


§  248 


tions  -with  other  roads,*  ^  to  unite  in  the  construction  of  union  sta- 
tions and  to  make  such  changes  in  the  location  of  tracks  as  may 
be  necessary  to  accomplish  the  purpose,*^  to  maintain  bulletin 
boards  at  stations,  showing  -whether  trains  are  on  time  or  not,** 
to  provide  separate  and  equal  accommodations  for  the  white  and 
colored  races,*^  and  in  these  and  like  cases  there  is  simply  an 
exercise  of  the  police  power  and  not  a  taking  of  property  for 
public  use  under  the  power  of  eminent  domain.*^  So  a  rail- 
road company  having  constructed  a  tunnel  under  a  navigable 
river,  may  be  compelled  to  lower  the  tunnel  at  its  own  expense, 
when  the  necessities  of  navigation  require  it.*''  But  a  statute  of 
South  Carolina  requiring  railroad  companies  to  construct  spur 
tracks  to  manufacturing  plants  and  industrial  enterprises  with- 


ity.  State  v.  Indianapolis  Union  Ry. 
Co.,  160  Ind.  45,  66  N.  E.  163,  60 
L.R.A.  831. 

4  2State  V.  Wabash  etc.  E.  E.  Co., 
83  Mo.  144;  San  Antonio  etc.  E.  R. 
Co.  V.  State,  79  Tex.  264,  14  S.  W. 
Eep.  1063;  State  v.  Kansas  City  etc. 
E.  E.  Co.,  32  Fed.  Eep.  722.  A  rail- 
road company  may  be  compelled  to 
erect  stations  at  such  places  as  the 
public  convenience  and  necessity 
reasonably  require.  Minneapolis  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Minnesota,  193  U.  S.  53, 
24  S.  C.  396 ;  Dolan  v.  New  York  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  175  N.  Y.  367,  67  N.  E.  612. 

4  3Dewey  v.  Atlantic  Coast  Line  E. 
E.  Co.,  142  N.  C.  392,  55  S.  E.  292. 

4  estate  V.  Indiana  etc.  E.  R.  Co., 
133  Ind.  69,  32  N.  E.  817,  18  L.R.A. 
502;  State  v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  133 
Ind.  700,  32  N.  E.  822;  Pennsylvania 
Co.  v.  State,  142  Ind.  428,  41  N.  E. 
937,  12  Am.  R.  E.  &  Corp.  Eep.  581 ; 

4  6Louisville  etc.  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Miss- 
issippi, 133  U.  S.  587,  1  Am.  E.  E.  & 
Corp.  Rep.  724;  Ex  parte  Plessy,  45 
La.  Ann.  80,  11  So.  948,  7  Am.  R.  R. 
&  Corp.  Rep.  383,  18  L.R.A.  639. 

4  sWhere  a  railroad  crosses  a  street 
it  may  be  compelled  to  change  its 
grade  to  conform  to  a  change  in  the 
grade  of  the  street.  Cleveland  v. 
Augusta,  102  Ga.  233;  Houston  etc. 
R.  E.  Co.  V.  Dallas,  98  Tex.  396,  84  S. 


W.  648.  The  following  are  additional 
illustrations:  Metropolitan  E.  E. 
Co.  V.  Macfarland,  20  App.  Cas.  D.  C. 
421;  People  v.  Detroit  United  Ry. 
Co.,  134  Mich.  682,  97  N.  W.  36,  104 
Am.  St.  Rep.  626,  63  L.R.A.  746;  Cor- 
poration Commission  v.  Atlantic 
Coast  Line  R.  E.  Co.,  137  N.  0.  1,  49 
S.  E.  191,  115  Am.  St.  Eep.  636; 
Same  v.  Same,  139  N.  C.  126,  51  S.  E. 
793 ;  Corporation  Commission  v.  Sea- 
board Air  Line  E.  R.  Co.,  140  N.  C. 
239,  52  S.  E.  941 ;  Atlantic  Coast  Line 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  N.  C.  Corporation  Com- 
mission, 206  U.  S.  1,  27  S.  C.  585. 

4 'People  V.  West  Chicago  St.  E.  E. 
Co.,  115  111.  172,  3  N.  E.  439;  West 
Chicago  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  People,  214 
111.  9,  73  N.  E.  393;  S.  C.  affirmed, 
201  U.  S.  506,  26  S.  C.  518.  So  a 
bridge  company  may  be  compelled  to 
make  changes  to  facilitate  naviga- 
tion, where  the  bridge  in  its  present 
condition  is  an  obstruction,  though 
it  was  no  obstruction  when  built,  and 
such  is  not  a  taking.  Union  Bridge 
Co.  v.  United  States,  204  U.  S.  364, 
27  S.  0.  367.  See  State  v.  Ashtabula 
Co.  Comrs.,  7  Ohio  C.  C.  (N.S.)  469; 
S.  C.  8  Ohio  C.  C.  (N.S.)  169; 
United  States  v.  Parkersburg  Branch 
E.  E.  Co.,  143  Fed.  224,  74  C.  C.  A. 
354;  United  States  v.  Union  Bridge 
Co.,  143  Fed.  377. 


§  248 


OTHEE  OASES  OF  TAKING. 


489 


in  half  a  mile  of  the  main  track,  the  expense  to  be  borne  by  the 
applicant  in  the  first  instance  and  refunded  by  the  company  out 
of  freights  received,  was  held  void  as  taking  property  for  a 
private  use.*®  But  a  similar  statute  was  enforced  in  North 
Carolina.**  So  a  statute  was  held  invalid  which  required  rail- 
road companies  to  construct  and  keep  in  repair  ditches  on  their 
right  of  way  for  the  benefit  of  contiguous  land.^"  So  of  a  statute 
which  provided  for  laying  drains  across  rights  of  way  and  re- 
quired the  company  to  make  and  maintain  the  necessary  open- 
ings without  compensation.^^  A  statute  requiring  railroad  com- 
panies to  provide  and  maintain,  light  and  keep  clean,  separate 
water  closets  or  privies  for  men  and  women,  at  every  station 
where  they  receive  or  discharge  passengers,  under  penalty  of 
one  hundred  dollars  a  week  for  a  failure  to  comply,  was  held 
to  be  arbitrary  and  oppressive  and  to  deprive  of  property  with- 
out due  process  of  law.'^  Owners  of  electric  wires  in  streets 
of  cities  may  be  compelled  to  put  them  underground,''^  and 
owners  of  tenement  houses  may  be  required  to  provide  a  supply 


isMays  v.  Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry. 
Co.,  75  S.  C.  455,  56  N.  E.  30. 

4  9  Corporation  Commission  v.  Sea- 
board Air  Line  E.  R.  Co.,  140  N.  C. 
239,  52  S.  E.  941. 

60  Chicago  etc.  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Keith, 
67  Ohio  St.  279,  65  N.  E.  1020,  60 
L.R.A.  525. 

siChicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chappell, 
124  Mich.  72,  82  N.  W.  800. 

5  2Missouri  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  State, 
100  Tex.  420,  100  S.  W.  766  ;Ft.  Worth 
etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  State,  100  Tex.  425, 
100  S.  W.  768;  Missouri  etc.  Ry.  Co. 
>'.  State,  100  Tex.  426, 100  S.W.  768; 
Southern  Kansas  Ry.  Co.  r.  State, 
100  Tex.  437, 100  S.  W.  1197.  Where  a 
company  got  its  right  of  way  under 
a  statute  which  made  no  provision 
for  private  crossings,  it  cannot  be 
compelled  to  construct  them  at  its 
own  expense.  Owazarzak  v.  Gulf  etc. 
Ry.  Co.,  31  Tex.  Civ.  App.  229,  71  S. 
W.  793. 

6  3 American  Rapid  Tel.  Co.  v.  Hess, 
126  N.  Y.  641,  26  N.  E.  919,  4  Am. 
R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  199,  13  L.R.A. 


454;  People  v.  Ellison,  188  N.  Y.  523, 
81  N.  E.  447,  affirming  S.  C.  115  App. 
Div.  254,  101  N.  Y.  S.  55;  Western 
Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  New  York,  38  Fed. 
552,  3  L.R.A.  449.  But  a  municipal 
corporation  cannot  compel  such 
change  without  express  legislative 
authority.  Carthage  v.  Central  N.  Y. 
Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  185  N.  Y.  448,  78  N. 
E.  165,  reversing  S.  C.  110  App.  Div. 
625.  Where  the  city  of  Minneapolis 
ordered  the  wires  of  a  telephone  com- 
pany to  be  put  underground  in  the 
business  part  of  the  city  covering 
nearly  a  square  mile  and  later  or- 
dered them  underground  in  the  larger 
part  of  the  city  and  it  appeared  that 
the  poles  and  wires  were  not  an  ob- 
struction or  menace  in  the  territory 
covered  by  the  second  order  and  that 
compliance  would  involve  a  ruinous 
expense,  the  second  order  was  held 
arbitrary  and  unreasonable.  N.  W. 
Telephone  Exch.  Co.  v.  Minneapolis, 
81  Minn.  140,  83  N.  W.  527,  86  N.  W 
69,  53  •L.R.A.  175. 


490 


-EMINENT  l)OMAIN, 


§  248 


of  water  on  each  floor/*  and  to  replace  school  sinks  and  privy 
vaults  with  individual  water  closets,  though  compliance  may 
cost  ten  or  twenty  per  cent  of  the  value  of  the  property.^® 

Some  cases  hold  that  a  railroad  company  cannot  be  compelled 
to  construct  a  highway  across  its  track,  even  though  the  power 
to  modify  or  repeal  its  charter  is  reserved.^*  Other  cases  hold 
that  it  may  be  done  when  the  power  to  repeal,  alter  or  amend 
the  charter  is  reserved. "^  A  recent  case  in  Maine  sustained,  as 
a  valid  police  regulation,  a  statute  which  made  it  the  duty  of 
a  railroad  company,  when  a  new  highway  was  laid  out  over  its 
tracks,  to  construct  and  maintain  the  crossing.^^  And  this  is 
the  prevailing  doctrine.^*    Public  service  corporations,  occupy- 


54Health  Department  v.  Trinity 
Church,  145  N.  Y.  32,  39  N.  E.  833. 

ssTenement  House  Dept.  v. 
Moeschen,  89  App.  Div.  526,  85  N.  Y. 
S.  704;  Same  v.  Same,  90  App.  Div. 
603,  85  N.  Y.  S.  1148;  Same  cases 
affirmed,  179  N.  Y.  325,  72  N.  E.  231, 
103  Am.  St.  Rep.  910,  70  L.R.A.  704; 
last  cast  affirmed,  Moeschen  v.  Tene- 
ment House  Dept.,  203  U.  S.  583,  27 
S.  C.  781. 

seillinois  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bloomington,  76  111.  447;  People  v. 
Lake  Shore  &  Mich.  Southern  Ry.  Co., 
52  Mich.  277 ;  Kansas  City  v.  Kansas 
City  Belt  Ry.  Co.,  187  Mo.  146,  86  S. 
W.  190;  Miller  v.  New  York  &  Erie 
R.  R.  Co.,  21  Barb.  513. 

5 'Albany  Northern  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Brownell,  24  N.  Y.  345;  Boston  &  Al- 
bany R.  R.  Co.  V.  Greenbush,  52  N.  Y. 
510 ;  Portland  &  Rochester  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Deering,  78  Me.  61. 

ssThe  court  says:  "Corporations 
derive  their  existence  from  the  State, 
and  hence  are  subject  to  the  State 
even  more  completely  than  indi- 
viduals. Corporations  created  for 
public  purposes  and  invested  with 
large  powers,  as  railroad  corpora- 
tions are,  can  properly  be  required  to 
do  any  reasonable  thing  and  to  as- 
sume permanently  any  reasonable 
duty,  which  shall  promise  greater 
security  from  the  dangers  attendant 


upon  the  exercise  of  their  powers. 
There  must  needs  be  a  highway.  The 
crossing  at  the  railroad  must  be  kept 
in  repair.  To  permit  any  divided  au- 
thority or  responsibility  as  to  the 
crossing  would  be  dangerous.  The 
railroad  company  would  loudly  re- 
monstrate if  the  municipality  were 
given  the  power  to  manage  the  cross- 
ing. The  company  needs  the  entire 
control  for  its  own  protection  as  well 
as  that  of  its  passengers.  By  oper- 
ating its  road  it  occasions  the  danger. 
It  is  not  unreasonable  that  the  rail- 
road company  should  provide  against 
the  danger  so  occasioned.  Such  a  re- 
quirement does  not  seem  to  be  an 
'alteration,  amendment  or  repeal'  of 
the  charter  of  the  Boston  and  Maine 
Railroad  Company.  The  company 
exercises  all  the  powers  and  priv- 
ileges it  had  before  the  enactment  of 
the  statute  requiring  this  duty  of 
maintaining  crossings.  The  statute 
simply  requires  more  care  and 
greater  security  in  such  exercise. 
However  the  statute  may  affect  the 
company  or  its  charter,  we  think  the 
company  is  subject  to  it."  Railroad 
Co.  v.  County  Comrs.,  79  Me.  386,  395. 
5  9  Hughes  V.  Arkansas  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  74  Ark.  194,  85  S.  W.  773 ;  State 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  98  Minn.  380, 
108  N.  W.  261 ;  State  v.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry. 
Co.,  98  Minn.  429,  108  N.  W.  269 ;  111. 


§  249 


OTHEE  CASES  OF  TAKING. 


491 


ing  the  public  streets,  may  be  compelled  to  change  the  location 
of  their  tracks,  poles,  pipes,  conduits  or  other  works,  or  to  re- 
construct the  same,  when  necessary  for  the  public  health,  safety, 
convenience  or  welfare,  and  such  requirement  is  not  a  taking 
of  property  for  public  use  without  compensation.®" 

But  a  corporation  cannot  be  deprived  of  its  essential  rights 
without  compensation.  Thus,  a  bridge  company  cannot  be 
compelled  to  construct  a  draw,®^  or  a  turnpike  company  to  re- 
move or  open  its  gates.*"  A  statute  providing  that,  where  a 
railroad  was  laid  adjacent  to  or  upon  a  highway,  unobstructed 
residence  crossings  should  be  provided  and  maintained  by  the 
railroad,  if  so  ordered  by  the  railroad  commissioners,  was  held 
to  take  the  property  of  the  company  without  compensation  and 
to  be  void.®* 

§  249  (156f).  Taking  under  the  guise  of  the  police 
power.    Conclusions.      As  a  result  of  the  decisions  cited  in 


Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Copiah  Co.,  81 
Miss.  685,  33  So.  502;  III.  Cent.  R.  E. 
Co.  V.  Swalm,  83  Mias.  631,  36  So. 
147;  Mo.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cass 
County,  76  Neb.  396,  107  N.  W.  773; 
Yonkers  v.  New  York  Cent.  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  165  N.  Y.  142,  58  N..  E.  877 ; 
Clarendon  v.  Rutland  R.  R.  Co.,  75 
Vt.  6,  52  Atl.  1057.  See  Cincinnati 
etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Troy,  68  Ohio  St.  510, 
67  N.  E.  1051. 

soMerced  Falls  Gas  &  Elec.  Co.  v. 
Turner,  2  Cal.  App.  720,  84  Pac.  239 ; 
Macon  Consolidated  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Macon,  112  Ga.  782,  38  S.  E.  60; 
Atlantic  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cordele,  125 
Ga.  373,  54  S.  E.  155;  S.  C.  128  Ga. 
293,  57  S.  E.  493 ;  Crocker  v.  Beaton 
Elec.  Lt.  Co.,  180  Mass.  516,  62  N.  E. 
978;  People  v.  Geneva  etc.  Traction 
Co.,  112  App.  Div.  581,  98  N.  Y.  S. 
719;  S.  C.  affirmed  186  N.  Y. 
516,  78  N.  E.  1109;  Am.  Tel.  &  Tel. 
Co.  V.  Millcreek,  195  Pa.  St.  643,  46 
Atl.  140;  New  Castle  City  v.  Central 
D.  &  P.  Tel.  Co.,  207  Pa.  St. 
371,  56  Atl.  931 ;  Am.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co. 
V.  Harbor  Creek,  23  Pa.  Supr.  Ct. 
437;  Pittsburg  v.  Consolidated  Gas 
Co.,  34  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  374 ;  Pawcatuck 


Valley  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Westerly,  22  R. 
I.  307,  47  Atl.  691 ;  Washington  etc. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Alexandria,  98  Va.  344,  36 
S.  E.  385;  Ganz  v.  Ohio  Postal  Tel. 
Cable  Co.,  140  Fed.  692,  72  C.  C.  A. 
186.  A  street  railroad  company  may 
be  compelled  to  pave  between  its 
tracks,  when  the  right  to  alter, 
amend  or  repeal  its  charter  ia  re- 
served. Fair  Haven  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
New  Haven,  203  U.  S.  379,  27  S.  C. 
74. 

siWashington  Bridge  Co.  v.  State, 
18  Conn.  53.  To  same  effect:  Denver 
V.  Denver  Cable  City  R.  R.  Co.,  22 
Col.  565,  45  Pac.  439.  But  see 
United  States  v.  Monongahela  Bridge 
Co.,  160  Fed.  712. 

6  2Turnpike  Co.  v.  Davidson  Co., 
3  Tenn.  Ch.  396 ;  Powell  v.  Sammons, 
31  Ala.  552;  and  see  City  of  Phila- 
delphia v.  Scott,  9  Phil.  171,  81  Pa. 
St.  80;  City  of  Schenectady  v.  Fur- 
man,  145  N.  Y.  482,  40  N.  'E.  221, 
45  Am.   St.   Rep.   624. 

6  3People  V.  Detroit  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
79  Mich.  471,  44  N.  W.  934,  2  Am. 
R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  215,  7  L.R.A. 
717. 


492 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


§    249 


the  foregoing  sections  and  the  principles  upon  which  they  de- 
pend, we  think  the  following  conclusions  may  be  deduced :  The 
use  of  property  may  be  regulated  as  the  public  welfare  demands. 
A  public  nuisance  may  be  abated  and  private  property  inter- 
fered with  or  destroyed  for  that  purpose.  The  conduct  of  any 
business  detrimental  to  the  public  interests  may  be  prohibited. 
Property  made  or  kept  in  violation  of  law  may  be  destroyed. 
Railroad  corporations,  and  others  invested  with  the  power  of 
eminent  domain,  because  their  business  is  of  public  utility,  may 
be  subjected  to  such  regulations  in  regard  to  their  charges  and 
the  conduct  of  their  business  as  the  legislature  deem  wise  and 
proper  for  the  general  good.  They  may  be  compelled  to  adopt 
such  appliances  and  execute  such  additions  or  changes  in  their 
works  or  property  and  take  such  precautions  as  are  necessary 
to  the  public  safety.  Beyond  this,  private  property  cannot  be 
interfered  with  under  the  police  power,  but  resort  must  be  had 
to  the  power  of  eminent  domain  and  compensation  made.®* 

The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  which  is  the  final 
arbiter  upon  these  questions  says:    "The  validity  of  a  police 


6  <  Coyne  v.  Memphis,  118  Tenn. 
651,  102  S.  W.  355;  Askam  v.  King 
County,  9  Wash.  1,  36  Pac.  1097. 

An  act  prohibiting  the  manufac- 
ture of  cigars  or  tobacco  in  a  certain 
class  of  tenement  houses  in  cities  of 
over  five  hundred  thousand  popula- 
tion, of  which  there  was  only  one  in 
the  State,  was  held  invalid  in  Matter 
of  Jacobs,  98  N.  Y.  98,  50  Am.  Eep. 
636;  S.  C.  33  Hun  #74.  Ordinances 
compelling  abutting  owners  to  clean 
the  snow  and  ice  from  their  side- 
walks and  to  keep  them  in  repair 
were  held  invalid  in  Illinois.  Grid- 
ley  V.  Bloomington,  88  111.  554,  30 
Am.  Eep.  566;  Chicago  v.  O'Brien, 
111  111.  532,  53  Am.  Rep.  640;  Chi- 
cago V.  Crosby,  111  111.  538.  But  the 
contraiy  has  been  held  in  other 
States.  InreGoddard,  16Pick.  504; 
Union  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cambridge,  11 
Allen  287 ;  Kirby  v.  Boylston  Market 
Assn.  14  Gray  252,  74  Am.  Dee.  682 ; 
Village  of  Carthage  v.  Frederick,  122 
N.  Y.  268,  3  Am.  E.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
538,  19  Am.  St.  Eep.  490,  10  L.R.A. 


178;  St.  Louis  v.  Conn.  Mut.  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  107  Mo.  92,  18  S.  W.  145,  28  Am. 
St.  Ee^.  402;  Commonwealth  v. 
Cutter,  156  Mass.  52,  29  N.  E.  1146. 
In  some  of  these  cases  it  was  con- 
tended, that  the  effect  of  such  regu- 
lations was  to  take  private  property 
for  public  use  without  compensation. 
See  also,  as  illustrating  the  text, 
Philadelphia  etc.  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Phila- 
delphia, 47  Pa.  St.  325;  Albany  v. 
Watervliet  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  45  Hun 
442;  Clark  y.  Syracuse,  13  Barb.  32; 
Philadelphia  v.  Scott,  81  Pa.  St.  80, 
22  Am.  Eep.  738. 

The  legislature  cannot  bargain 
away  its  police  power,  at  least  so  far 
as  the  public  health  and  the  public 
morals  are  concerned.  Butchers' 
Union  Co.  v.  Crescent  City  Co.,  Ill 
U.  S.  746;  and  see  New  Orleans  Gas 
Co.  V.  Louisiana  Light  Co.,  115  U.  S. 
650;  New  Orleans  Water  Co.  v. 
Eivers,  115  U.  S.  674;  Louisville  Gaa 
Co.  V.  Citizens'  Gas  Co.,  115  U.  S. 
683. 


§    '2-l:'J  OTHEK  OASES  OF  TiUCING.  493 

regulation,  whether  established  directly  by  the  State  or  by  some 
public  body  acting  under  its  sanction,  must  depend  upon  the 
circumstances  of  each  case  and  the  character  of  the  regulation^ 
whether  arbitrary  or  reasonable  and  whether  really  designed 
to  accomplish  a  legitimate  public  purpose.  Private  property 
cannot  be  taken  for  public  use  under  a  police  regulation  relating 
strictly  to  the  public  health,  the  public  morals  or  the  public 
safety,  any  more  than  under  a  police  regulation  having  no  re- 
lation to  such  matters,  but  only  to  the  general  welfare.  *  *  * 
The  constitutional  requirement  of  due  process  of  law,  which 
embraces  compensation  for  private  property  taken  for  public 
use,  applies  in  every  case  of  the  exertion  of  governmental  pow- 
er. If  in  the  execution  of  any  power,  no  matter  what  it  is, 
the  government,  federal  or  State,  finds  it  necessary  to  take 
private  property  for  public  use,  it  must  obey  the  constitutional 
injunction  to  make  or  secure  just  compensation  to  the  owner. 
If  the  means  employed  have  no  real,  substantial  relation  to  the 
public  objects  which  government  may  legally  accomplish,  if 
they  are  arbitrary  and  unreasonable,  beyond  the  necessities 
of  the  case,  the  judiciary  will  disregard  mere  forms  and  inter- 
fere for  the  protection  of  rights  injuriously  affected  by  such 
illegal  action."  ®^ 

6  6Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Drainage      S.  C.  341,  affirming  S.  0.  212  111.  103, 
Comrs.,  200  U.  S.  661,  592,  593,  26      72  K.  E.  219. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

MEANING  OF  THE  WORDS  "PUBLIC  USE." 

§  250  (157).     Taking    for    private    use    unauthorized. 

Only  a  few  of  the  State  constitutions  in  terms  prohibit  the  tak- 
ing of  private  property  for  private  use.^  All  courts,  however, 
agree  in  holding  that  this  cannot  be  done.^  Different  courts  find 
different  reasons  for  this  conclusion,  some  putting  it  on  the 
ground  of  an  implied  prohibition  in  the  eminent  domain  provi- 


iSee  provisions  in  the  constitu- 
tions of  Alabama,  Colorado,  Georgia, 
Louisiana  and  Missouri,  ante,  §§  16, 
19,  23,  30,  37. 

2Sadler  v.  Langham,  34  Ala.  311; 
Mountain  Park  Terminal  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Field,  76  Ark.  239,  88  S.  W.  897; 
Gillan  v.  Hutchinson,  16  Cal.  153; 
Lorenz  v.  Jacob,  63  Cal.  73;  Nickey 
V.  Stearns  Ranchos  Co.,  126  Cal.  150, 
58  Pac.  459 ;  Hart  v.  Tresise,  36  Colo. 
146,  84  Pac.  685,  4  L.R.A.(N.S.)  872; 
Prior  V.  Swartz,  62  Conn.  132,  25  Atl. 
398,  36  Am.  St.  Rep.  333,  18  L.R.A. 
668;  Hand  Gold  Mining  Co.  v. 
Parker,  59  Ga.  419,  421;  Nesbitt  v. 
Trumbo,  39  111.  110,  89  Am.  Dec.  290; 
Board  of  Education  v.  Bakewell,  122 
111.  339;  Great  Western  Nat.  G.  & 
0.  Co.  V.  Hawkins,  30  Ind.  App.  557, 
66  N.  E.  765;  Bankhead  v.  Brown, 
25  la.  540;  Fleming  v.  Hull,  73  la. 
598,  35  N.  W.  673 ;  Sisson  v.  Board  of 
Supervisors,  128  la.  442,  104  N.  W. 
454,  70  L.R.A.  440;  Harding  v.  Funk, 
8  Kan.  315,  323;  Clark  v.  Board  of 
County  Comrs.,  69  Kan.  542,  77  Pac. 
284,  66  L.R.A.  965;  Robinson  v. 
Swope,  12  Bush  21,  27  ;  Pearce's  Heirs 
V.  Patton,  7  B.  Mon.  162;  Cypress 
Pond  Dr.  Co.  v.  Hooper,  2  Met.  Ky. 
350;  Hancock  Stock  &  Fence  Land 
Co.  V.  Adams,  87  Ky.  417,  9  S.  W. 


246;  Pickerill  v.  Louisville,  125  Ky. 
213,  100  S.  W.  873;  Bradley  v.  Pharr, 
45  La.  An.  426,  12  So.  618,  19  L.R.A. 
647 ;  Williams  v.  Judge  of  Eighteenth 
Judicial  Dist.,  45  La.  An.  1295,  14 
So.  57 ;  Bangor  R.  R.  Co.  v.  McComb, 
60  Me.  290;  Ulmer  v.  Lime  Rock  R. 
R.  Co.,  98  Me.  579,  57  Atl.  1001,  66 
L.R.A.  387 ;  Brown  v.  Gerald,  100  Me. 
351,  61  Atl.  785,  109  Am.  St  Rep. 
526,  70  L.R.A.  472;  Hepburn's  Case,  3 
Bland  (Md.)  95;  Hoye  v.  Swan's 
Lessee,  5  Md.  237,  244;  New  Central 
Coal  Co.  V.  George's  Creek  Coal  & 
Iron  Co.,  37  Md.  537;  VanWitsenv. 
Gutman,  79  Md.  405,  29  Atl.  608,  24 
L.R.A.  403;  Arnsperger  v.  Crawford, 
101  Md.  247,  61  Atl.  413,  70  L.R.A. 
479 ;  Cary  Library  v.  Bliss,  151  Mass. 
364,  25  N.  E.  92;  Turner  v.  Nye,  154 
Mass.  579,  28  N.  E.  1048,  14  L.R.A. 
487 ;  Woodward  v.  Central  Vt.  Ey.  Co. 
180  Mass.  599,  62  N.  E.  1051 ;  Toledo 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  East  Saginaw  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  72  Mich.  206,  40  N.  W.  436; 
Board  of  Health  v.  Van  Hoesen,  87 
Mich.  533,  49  N.  W.  894;  Berrien 
Springs  W.  P.  Co.  v.  Berrien  Circ. 
Judge,  133  Mich.  48,  94  N.  W.  379, 
103  Am.  St.  Rep.  438 ;  State  v.  Polk 
Co.  Comrs.,  87  Minn.  325,  92  N.  W. 
216,  60  L.R.A.  161;  Minn.  Canal  & 
Power   Co.   v.   Koochiching   Co.,   97 


494 


§  250 


WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USE. 


495 


sion  of  the  constitution/  some  on  the  ground  that  it  would  be 
contrary  to  the  provision  that  no  person  shall  be  deprived  of 


Minn.  429,  107  N.  W.  405,  5  L.R.A. 
(N.S.)  638;  Brown  v.  Beatty,  34 
Miss.  227,  240,  69  Am.  Dec.  389; 
Dickey  v.  Tennison,  27  Mo.  373; 
Helena  Power  Transmission  Co.  v. 
Spratt,  35  Mont.  108,  88  Pae.  773,  8 
L.R.A.(N.S.)  567;  Jenal  v.  Green 
Island  Dr.  Co.,  12  Neb.  163;  Forney 
V.  Fremont  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  Neb. 
465,  36  N.  W.  806 ;  Weltou  v.  Dickson, 
38  Neb.  767,  57  N.  W.  555,  41  Am.  St. 
Rep.  771,  22  L.R.A.  496;  Chicago  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  State,  50  Neb.  399;  Day- 
ton Mining  Co.  v.  Seawell,  11  Nev. 
394,  399;  Concord  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Greeley,  17  N.  H.  47;  Rockingham 
Co.  L.  &  P.  Co.  V.  Hobbs,  72  N.  H. 
531,  58  Atl.  46,  66  L.R.A.  581; 
Scudder  v.  Trenton  Delaware  Falls 
Co.,  1  N.  J.  Eq.  694,  726;  Matter  of 
Albany  Street,  11  Wend.  151 ;  Blood- 
good  V.  Mohawk  &  Hudson  R.  R.  Co., 
18  Wend.  9,  59;  Matter  of  John  & 
Cherry  Streets,  19  Wend.  659 ;  Taylor 
V.  Porter,  4  Hill  140,  40  Am.  Dec. 
274;  Embury  v.  Conner,  3  N.  Y.  511, 
53  Am.  Dec.  325;  S.  C.  2  Sandf.  89; 
Matter  of  Eureka  Basin  Warehouse 
and  Manuf .  Co.,  96  N.  Y.  42 ;  Matter 
of  Niagara  Falls  &  Whirlpool  R.  R. 
Co.,  108  N.  Y.  375,  15  N.  E.  429; 
Matter  of  Split  Rock  Cable  R.  R.  Co., 
128  N.  Y.  408,  28  N.  E.  506;  S.  C.  58 
Hun  351,  34  N.  Y.  St.  169,  12  N.  Y. 
Supp.  116;  Waterloo  Woolen  Mfg. 
Co.  V.  Shanahan,  128  N.  Y.  345,  28 
N.  E.  358,  14  L.R.A.  481 ;  Pocantico 
W.  W.  Co.  V.  Bird,  130  N.  Y.  249,  29 
N.  E.  246;  Matter  of  Tuthill,  163  N. 
Y.  133,  57  N.  E.  303,  79  Am.  St.  Rep. 
574,  49  L.R.A.  781;  Harrison  v. 
Thompson,  9  Barb.  350;  Bennett  v. 
Boyle,  40  Barb.  551;  Beckman  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  3  Paige,  73;  Wormser 
V.  Brown,  72  Hun  93,  25  N.  Y,  Supp. 
553;  Carey  v.  Dewey,  127  App.  Div. 
478;  Kenedy  v.  Erwin,  Busbee  L. 
387;  State  v.  Lyle,  100  N.  C.  497,  6 


S.  E.  379;  McQuillen  v.  Hatton,  42 
Ohio  St.  202;  Lake  Erie  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Hancock  Co.,  63  Ohio  St.  23, 
57  N.  E.  1009 ;  Witham  v.  Osburn,  4 
Ore.  318,  18  Am.  Rep.  287;  Dalles 
Lumbering  Co.  v.  Urquhart,  16  Ore. 
67,  19  Pae.  78;  Grande  Ronde  Elec. 
Co.  V.  Drake,  46  Ore.  243,  78  Pae. 
1031 ;  McCaudless'  Appeal,  70  Pa.  St. 
210;  Waddell's  Appeal,  84  Pa.  St. 
90;  City  of  Wilkes-Barre  v.  Wyo- 
ming Historical  &  Geological  Soc, 
134  Pa.  St.  616,  19  Atl.  809;  Peify 
V.  Mountain  Water  Supply  Co.,  214 
Pa.  St.  340,  63  Atl.  751;  Dunn  v. 
Charleston,  Harper  (S.C.)  189;  Fort 
V.  Goodwin,  36  S.  0.  445,  15  S.  E. 
723 ;  Boyd  v.  Winnsboro  Granite  Co., 
66  S.  C.  433,  45  S.  E.  10;  Clack  v. 
White,  2  Swan,  540;  Nash  v.  Clark, 
27  Utah,  158,  75  Pae.  371,  101  Am. 
St.  Rep.  953,  1  L.R.A. (N.S.)  208; 
Tyler  v.  Beacher,  44  Vt.  648,  8  Am. 
Rep.  398;  Fallsburg  P.  &  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
Alexander,  101  Va.  98,  43  S.  E.  194, 
99  Am.  St.  Rep.  855,  61  L.R.A.  129; 
Varner  v.  Martin,  21  W.  Va.  534; 
Valley  City  Salt  Co.  v.  Brown,  7  W. 
Va.  191;  Pittsburgh  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Benwood  Iron  Works,  31  W.  Va. 
71,  8  S.  E.  453;  Osborn  v.  Hart,  24 
Wis.  89,  1  Am.  Rep.  161;  Wisconsin 
Water  Co.  v.  Winans,  85  Wis.  26,  54 
N.  W.  1003,  39  Am.  St.  Rep.  813,  20 
L.R.A.  662;  In  re  Theresa  Dr.  Dist., 
90  Wis.  301,  63  N.  W.  288 ;  Huber  v. 
Merkel,  117  Wis.  355,  94  N.  W.  354, 
98  Am.  St.  Rep.  933,  62  L.R.A.  589; 
Kaukauna  Water  Power  Co.  v.  Green 
Bay  &  M.  Canal  Co.,  142  U.  S.  254, 
12  S.  C.  173.  Taking  the  land  of 
one  for  the  private  use  of  another, 
was  held  an  abuse  of  power  by  a 
municipal  corporation,  in  Pills  v. 
Boswell,  8  Ontario  680. 

sSee  last  note,  and  especially  the 
following  cases:  Bankhcad  v. 
Brown,    25    la.    540;     Robinson    v. 


496 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


§  250 


his  property  except  by  the  law  of  the  land ;  *  others,  on  the 
ground  that  it  would  be  subversive  of  the  fundamental  priu" 
ciples  of  free  government,®  or  contrary  to  the  spirit  of  the  con- 
stitution.® The  conclusion  is  undoubtedly  a  correct  one  and  is 
too  well  settled  by  authority  to  necessitate  any  inquiry  into  the 
true  grounds  upon  which  it  rests.  "It  is  conceded  on  all  hands," 
says  Judge  Cooley,  "that  the  legislature  has  no  power,  in  any 
case,  to  take  the  property  of  one  individual  and  pass  it  over  to 
another  without  reference  to  some  use  to  which  it  is  to  be 
applied  for  the  public  benefit."  '' 


Swope,  12  Bush  21,  27;  Brown  v. 
Gerald,  100  Me.  351,  61  Atl.  785,  109 
Am.  St.  Rep.  526,  70  L.E.A.  472; 
Arnsperger  v.  Crawford,  101  Md.  247, 
61  Atl.  413,  70  L.R.A.  497;  Talbut 
V.  Hudson,  16  Gray  417;  Minn. 
Canal  &  P.  Co.  v.  Koochiching  Co.. 
97  Minn.  429,  107  N.  W.  405,  5 
L.R.A.(]Sr.S.)  63S;  Welton  v.  Dick- 
son, 38  Neb.  767,  57  N.  W.  559;  Con- 
cord E.  R.  Co.  V.  Greeley,  17  N.  H. 
47,  54 ;  Rockingham  Co.  L.  &  P.  Co., 
72  N.  H.  531,  58  Atl.  46,  66  L.R.A. 
581;  Matter  of  Albany  Street,  11 
Wend.  151 ;  Bloodgood  v.  Mohawk  & 
Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  18  Wend.  9,  59; 
Matter  of  Tuthill,  163  N.  Y.  133, 
57  N.  B.  303,  79  Am.  St.  Rep.  574, 
49  L.R.A.  781 ;  State  v.  Lyle,  100  N. 
C.  497,  6  S.  E.  379;  Dalles  Lumber- 
ing Co.  V.  Urquhart,  16  Ore.  67,  19 
Pac.  78;  Grande  Ronde  Elec.  Co.  v. 
Drake,  46  Ore.  243,  78  Pac.  1031; 
Sedgwick  on  Const.  Law,  p.  447  (2d 
ed.). 

iNesbitt  V.  Trumbo,  39  111.  110; 
Taylor  v.  Porter,  4  Hill  140,  40  Am. 
Dec.  274;  Embury  v.  Conner,  3  N.  Y. 
611,  53  Am.  Dec.  325. 

5  Concord  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Greeley,  17 
N.  H.  47,  56;  Hepburn's  Case,  13 
Bland  (Md.)  95;  Bloodgood  v.  Mo- 
hawk &  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  18  Wend. 
9,  56. 

BMatter  of  Peter  Townsend,  39  N. 
Y.  171,  182.  In  Concord  v.  Greeley, 
17  N.  H.  47,  55,  the  court  says :    "We 


have  no  doubt  that  a  law  providing 
merely  that  the  property  of  A  should 
be  taken  from  him  and  given  to  B, 
either  with  or  without  consideration, 
would  be  repugnant  to  the  constitu- 
tion. Not,  indeed,  to  the  letter  of 
any  particular  clause  contained  in  it, 
but  to  its  spirit  and  design,  which, 
throughout  the  whole,  discounte- 
nance the  idea  that  the  property  of 
the  citizen  is  held  by  any  such  uncer- 
tain tenure  as  the  arbitrary  discre- 
tion of  the  legislature  in  a  matter  of 
mere  private  right,  unconnected  with 
any  considerations  of  public  utility. 
Such  a  law  would  not  be  so  much  in 
repugnance  to  the  constitution  as  it 
would  be  to  the  principles  which  hold 
human  society  together;  which, 
while  they  recognize  the  power  of 
the  legislature  to  be  supreme,  do  not 
admit  it  to  be  arbitrary."  See  also 
Welton  V.  Dickson,  38  Neb.  767,  57 
N.  W.  559. 

'Cooley  Const.  Lim.  (6th  ed.)  p. 
651.  "The  right  of  eminent  domain, 
however,  does  not  permit  the  sover- 
eign power  to  take  the  property  of 
one  citizen  and  transfer  it  to  another 
even  for  full  compensation.''  Forney 
V.  Fremont  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  Neb. 
465,  468,  36  N.  W.  806.  So  aUo 
Gillan  v.  Hutchinson,  16  Cal.  153; 
Board  of  Education  v.  Bakewell,  122 
111.  339;  Cary  Library  v.  Bliss,  151 
Mass.  364,  25  N.  E.  92;  Board  of 
Health  v.  VanHoesen,  87  Mich.  533, 


§  251 


WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USE. 


497 


§  251   (158).     The  question  of  public  use  a  judicial  one. 

It  is  manifest  that  the  legislature,  in  providing  for  the  con- 
demnation of  private  property,  must  determine  in  the  first 
instance  whether  the  use  for  which  it  is  proposed  to  make  the 
condemnation  is  a  public  one.  But  this  determination  is  not 
final.  All  the  courts,  we  believe,  concur  in  holding  that,  wheth- 
er a  particular  use  is  public  or  not,  within  the  meaning  of  the 
constitution,  is  a  question  for  the  judiciary.*     Some  dicta  have 


49  N.  W.  894.  In  Coster  v.  Tide 
Water  Co.,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  54,  63,  the 
Chancellor  says:  "There  is  no  pro- 
hibition in  the  constitution  of  this 
State,  or  in  any  of  the  State  consti- 
tutions, that  I  know  of,  against  tak- 
ing private  property  for  private  use. 
But  the  power  is  nowhere  granted  to 
the  legislature.  The  constitution 
vests  in  the  senate  and  general  as- 
sembly the  legislative  or  law-making 
power.  They  can  make  laws,  the 
rules  prescribed  to  govern  our  civil 
conduct.  They  are  not  sovereign  in 
all  things;  the  executive  and  judicial 
power  is  not  vested  in  them.  Taking 
the  property  of  one  man  and  giving 
it  to  another  is  not  making  a  law,  or 
rule  of  action ;  it  is  not  legislation,  it 
is  simply  robbery.  This  power  was 
not  necessary  or  useful  to  be  given 
to  the  legislature  for  any  of  the  pur- 
poses for  which  the  government  was 
instituted;  and  it  was  not  given.  It 
is  the  principle  of  all  free  govern- 
ments, that  no  right  of  the  citizen 
should  be  surrendered  to  the  sover- 
eign, that  is  not  necessary  for  the 
purposes  of  government.  This 
maxim  pervades  all  republican  gov- 
ernments as  well  as  monarchies ;  for 
the  tyranny  of  a  majority,  or  of  cor- 
rupt representatives,  is  just  as  op- 
pressive, and  far  more  odious,  than 
that  of  a  monarch.  This  is  the  aim 
of  all  our  constitutional  restrictions. 
The  first  declaration  in  the  bill  of 
rights,  that  forms  the  first  article  of 
our  State  constitution,  affirms  that 
one  of  the  unalienable  rights  of  every 
Em.  D. — 32. 


man  is  that  of  acquiring,  possessing, 
and  protecting  property;  and  the  last 
declaration  therein  says  that  such 
enumeration  of  rights  shall  not  be 
construed  to  deny  others  retained  by 
the  people.  This  shows  that  the  right 
of  private  property  was  made  sacred 
by  the  constitution,  to  be  invaded  by 
no  one,  not  even  the  legislative 
power,  except  where  such  control  was 
expressly  given  by  that  instrument. 
Again,  the  sixteenth  declaration  of 
the  bill  of  rights,  which  declares  that 
private  property  shall  not  be  taken 
for  public  use  without  just  compensa- 
tion; and  the  ninth  provision  of  the 
seventh  section  of  the  fourth  article 
of  the  constitution,  the  article  de- 
fining and  restricting  legislative 
power,  which  declares  that  individ- 
uals and  private  corporations  shall 
not  be  authorized  to  take  private 
property  for  public  use  without  com- 
pensation first  made  to  the  owners; 
both  show,  by  inevitable  implication, 
that  it  was  not  intended  to  confer  on 
the  legislature  the  power  of  taking 
private  property  for  private  use  at 
all." 

8  Sadler  v.  Langham,  34  Ala.  311 ; 
Sanford  v.  Tucson,  8  Ariz.  247,  71 
Pac.  247;  Mountain  Park  Terminal 
Ey.  Co.  V.  Field,  76  Ark.  239,  88  S. 
W.  897 ;  Stockton  &  Visalia  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Stockton,  41  Cal.  147 ;  Consolidated 
Channel  Co.  v.  Central  Pacific  E.  R. 
Co.,  51  Cal.  269;  San  Mateo  County 
V.  Coburn,  130  Cal.  631,  63  Pac.  78; 
Laguna  Dr.  Dist.  v.  Charles  Martin 
Co.,  144  Cal.  209,  77  Pac.  933;  Madera 


498 


EMINENT   DOMAIN. 


§    251 


been  understood  as  announcing  the  doctrine  that  it  was  compe- 
tent for  the  legislature  not  only  to  decide  upon  the  necessity 
and  expediency  of  an  exercise  of  the  power  of  eminent  domain, 
but  also  to  determine  absolutely  what  uses  are  public  within 
the  meaning  of  the  constitution.  We  think-  it  more  likely  that 
these  dicta  have  been  misapprehended  than  that  any  judge  ever 
intended  to  announce  such  a  doctrine,  and  the  dicta  usually 


Ry.  Co.  V.  Raymond  Granite  Co.,  3 
Cal.  App.  668,  87  Pac.  27 ;  Tanner  v. 
Treasury  T.  M.  &  R.  Co.,  35  Colo.  593, 
83  Pac.  464,  4  L.R.A.  (N.S.)  106;  New 
York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Long,  69  Conn. 
424;  Young  v.  Harrison,  6  Ga.  130; 
Parkham  v.  Justices  etc.,  9  Ga.  341 ; 
Loughbridge  v.  Harris,  42  Ga.  501 ; 
Bridwell  v.  Gate  City  Terminal  Co., 
127  Ga.  520,  56  S.  E.  624,  10  L.R.A. 
(N.S.)  909;  Logan  v.  Stogdale,  123 
Ind.  372,  24  N.  E.  135,  8  L.R.A.  58; 
Mull  V.  Indianapolis  etc.  Traction 
Co.,  169  Ind.  214,  81  N.  E.  657;  Great 
Western  Nat.  G.  &  0.  Co.  v.  Hawkins, 
30  Ind.  App.  557,  66  N.  E.  765;  Bank- 
head  V.  Brown,  25  la.  540 ;  Lake  Keon 
Nav.  etc.  Co.  v.  Klein,  63  Kan.  484, 
65  Pac.  684;  Williams  v.  Judge  of 
Eighteenth  Judicial  District,  45  La. 
An.  1295,  14  So.  57 ;  Kennebec  Water 
Dist.  V.  Waterville,  96  Me.  234,  52 
Atl.  774;  Ulmer  v.  Lime  Rock  R.  R. 
Co.,  98  Me.  579,  57  Atl.  1001,  66 
L.R.A.  387;  Brown  v.  Gerald,  100  Me. 
351,  61  Atl.  785,  109  Am.  St.  Rep. 
526,  70  L.R.A.  472 ;  New  Central  Coal 
Co.  V.  George's  Creek  Coal  &  Iron  Co., 
37  Md.  537;  Van  Witsen  v.  Gutman, 
79  Md.  405,  29  Atl.  608,  24  L.R.A. 
403;  Arnsperger  v.  Crawford,  101 
Md.  247,  61  Atl.  413,  70  L.R.A.  497; 
Talbot  V.  Hudson,  16  Gray,  417 ;  In  re 
St.  Paul  &  Northern  Pacific  Ry.  Co., 
34  Minn.  227 ;  Minn.  Canal  &  P.  Co. 
V.  Koochiching  Co.,  97  Minn.  429,  107 
N.  W.  405,  5  L.R.A.  (N.S.)  638;  Dickey 
V.  Tennison,27  Mo.  373 ;  County  Court 
of  St.  Louis  County  v.  Griswold,  58 
Mo.  175,  194-196;  Savannah  v.  Han- 
cock, 91  Mo.  54 ;  City  of  Cape  Girar- 


deau V.  Houek,  129  Mo.  607,  31  S.  W. 
933;  St.  Louis  v.  Brown,  155  Mo.  545, 
56  S.  W.  298;  Welton  v.  Dickson,  38 
Neb.  767,  57  N.  W.  559,  41  Am.  St. 
Rep.  771,  22  L.R.A.  496;  Dayton  Min- 
ing Co.  V.  Seawell,  11  Nev.  394,  399; 
Concord  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Greeley,  17  N. 
H.  47;  Rockingham  Co.  L.  &  P. 
Co.  V.  Hobbs,  72  N.  H.  531,  58 
Atl.  46,  66  L.R.A.  581;  Scudder 
V.  Trenton  Delaware  Palls  Co., 
1  N.  J.  Eq.  694,  726;  Coster  v. 
Tide  Water  Co.,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  54; 
Albright  v.  Sussex  Co.  Lake  &  Park 
Co.,  68  N.  J.  L.  523,  53  Atl.  612; 
Matter  of  Deansville  Cemetery  Asso- 
ciation, 66  N.  Y.  569,  23  Am.  Rep.  86; 
Matter  of  Niagara  Falls  v.  Whirlpool 
R.  R.  Co.,  108  N.  Y.  375,  15  N.  E.  429; 
Pocantico  W.  W.  Co.  v.  Bird,  130  N. 
Y.  249,  29  N.  E.  246;  In  re  City  of 
Brooklyn,  143  N.  Y.  596,  38  N.  E.  983, 
26  L.R.A.  270;  Martin  v.  Bums,  155 
N.  Y.  23,  49  N.  E.  246;  Harris  v. 
Thompson,  9  Barb.  350 ;  McQuillen  v. 
Hatton,  42  Ohio  St.  202;  Bridal 
Veil  Limibering  Co.  v.  Johnson, 
30  Ore.  205,  46  Pac.  790,  60  Am. 
St.  Rep.  818,  34  L.R.A.  368; 
Apex  Transportation  Co.  v.  Gar- 
bade,  32  Ore.  582,  54  Pac.  367,  882; 
Fanning  v.  Gilliland,  37  Ore.  369,  61 
Pac.  636,  67  Pac.  209,  82  Am.  St.  Rep. 
758;  Grande  Ronde  Elec.  Co.  v. 
Drake,  46  Ore.  243,  78  Pac.  1031; 
Pittsburgh  v.  Scott,  1  Pa.  St.  309, 
314;  In  re  R.  I.  Suburban  Ry.  Co.,  22 
R.  L  455,  48  Atl.  590;  In  re  R.L  Sub- 
urban Ry.  Co.,  22  R.  I.  457,  48  Atl. 
591,  52  L.R.A.  879;  Anderson  v. 
Turbeville,  6  Coldw.  150;  Ryan  v. 
Terminal  Co.,  102  Tenn.  Ill,  50  S.  W. 


§  252 


WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USE. 


499 


referred  to  do  not  necessitate  any  such  construction.®  While  the 
legislature  cannot  make  a  use  public  by  declaring  it  so/"  yet 
its  declaration  will  be  respected  by  the  courts,  unless  it  is  pal- 
pably without  reasonable  foundation.''^  And  the  use  will  be 
scrutinized  less  closely  when  the  property  is  vested  in  the 
State  or  some  public  agency,  than  when  it  is  vested  in  a  private 
corporation.'* 

§  252  (159).  State  of  the  authorities  as  to  the  mean- 
ing of  the  words,  "public  use."  It  is  easily  determined,  as 
has  been  shown  in  the  two  preceding  sections,  that  private  prop- 
erty can  be  taken  only  for  public  use,  and  that  what  is  a  public 
use  is  a  question  for  the  courts.  When,  however,  we  come  to 
seek  for  the  principles  upon  which  the  question  of  public  use 
is  to  be  determined,  or  to  define  the  words,  "public  use,"  in  the 
light  of  judicial  decisions,  we  find  ourselves  utterly  at  sea.  "No 
question  has  ever  been  submitted  to  the  courts,"  says  one  au- 
thority, "upon  which  there  is  a  greater  variety  and  conflict  of 
reasoning  and  results  than  that  presented  as  to  the  meaning 
of  the  words,  'public  use,'  as  found  in  the  different  State  con- 


744,  45  L.R.A.  303;  Borden  v.  Tres- 
palacios  R.  &  I.  Co.,  98  Tex.  494,  86 
S.  W.  11, 107  Am.  St.  Rep.  640;  Tyler 
V.  Beacher,  44  Vt.  648,  8  Am.  Rep. 
398 ;  Varner  v.  Martin,  21  W.  Va.  534, 
550;  Pittsburgh  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ben- 
wood  Iron  Works,  31  W.  Va.  71, 
8  S.  E.  453 ;  Hench  v.  Pritt,  62  W.  Va. 
270,  57  S.  E.  808;  Wisconsin  Water 
Co.  V.  Winans,  85  Wis.  26,  54  N.  W. 
1003,  39  Am.  St.  Rep.  813,  20  L.R.A. 
662;  Priewe  v.  Wis.  S.  L.  &  I.  Co., 
93  Wis.  534,  67  N.  W.  918,  33  L.R.A. 
645 ;  Shoemaker  v.  United  States,  147 
U.  S.  282,  13  S.  C.  361;  Walker  v. 
Shasta  Power  Co.,  160  Fed.  856, 
87  C.  C.  A.  660. 

9  See  Sadler  v.  Langham,  34  Ala. 
311,  326. 

10  San  Mateo  County  v.  Coburn, 
130  Cal.  631,  63  Pac.  78;  Tanner  v. 
Treasury  Tunnel  M.  &  R.  Co.,  33 
Colo.  593,  83  Pae.  464,  4  L.R.A. 
(N.S.)  106;  New  York  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Offield,  77  Conn.  417,  59  Atl. 


510;  Logan  v.  Stogdale,  123  Ind.  372, 
24  N.  E.  135,  8  L.R.A.  33;  Great 
Western  Nat.  G.  &  0.  Co.  v.  Haw- 
kins, 30  Ind.  App.  557,  66  N.  E.  765 ; 
Minn.  Canal  &  P.  Co.  v.  Koochiching 
Co.,  97  Minn.  429,  107  N.  W.  405,  5 
L.R.A.(N.S.)  638;  Jacobs  v.  Clear- 
view  Water  Supply  Co.,  220  Pa.  St. 
388,  69  Atl.  870;  In  re  R.  I.  Subur- 
ban Ry.  Co.,  22  R.  I.  455,  48  Atl. 
590. 

iiSan  Mateo  County  v.  Coburn, 
130  Cal.  631,  63  Pac.  78;  Sisson  v. 
Board  of  Supervisors,  128  la.  442, 
104  N.  W.  454,  70  L.R.A.  440;  Ulmer 
V.  Lime  Rock  R.  R.  Co;,  98  Me.  579, 
57  Atl.  1001,  66  L.R.A.  387;  Welton 
V.  Dickson,  38  Neb.  767,  57  N.  W. 
559;  United  States  v.  Gettysburg 
Electric  R.  R.  Co.,  160  U.  S.  688,  16 
S.  C.  427. 

i2United  States  v.  Gettysburg 
Electric  R.  R.  Co.,  160  U.  S.  688,  16 
S.  C.  427 ;  Walker  v.  Shasta  Power 
Co.,  160  Fed.  856,  87  C.  C.  A.  660. 


500  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    253 

stitutions  regulating  the  right  of  eminent  domain."  ^*  A  pe- 
rusal of  the  cases  cited  in  this  chapter  will  verify  this  state- 
ment. Courts  have  generally  avoided,  and  wisely  so,  the  enunci- 
ation of  general  principles  or  the  giving  of  general  definitions, 
which  might  prove  stumbling  blocks  in  subsequent  cases  or  work 
mischief  in  their  practical  application.  It  is  the  duty  of  courts 
simply  to  apply  the  law  to  the  case  in  hand.  But  every  decision 
necessarily  proceeds  upon  the  basis  of  certain  general  principles, 
which,  whether  expressed  or  not,  are  capable  of  being  discovered 
and  applied  to  future  cases.  In  a  treatise  of  this  sort,  it  is 
proper  to  seek  out  the  general  principles  which  \mderlie  the  de- 
cision of  specific  cases,  as  to  what  constitutes  a  public  use,  and 
so  expound  the  law  as  to  afford  a  guide  in  its  application  to  new 
cases  and  conditions  as  they  arise.  Before  proceeding  to  inquire 
as  to  the  proper  construction  and  meaning  of  the  words  public 
use,  it  will  be  well  to  divest  the  subject  of  certain  outlying 
considerations  which  are  sometimes  supposed  to  affect  the  ques- 
tion, but  in  reality  do  not. 

§  253  (160).  The  question  of  public  use  not  affected 
by  the  agency  employed.  As  we  shall  see  hereafter,  it  is 
competent  for  the  legislature  to  delegate  to  individuals  or  cor- 
porations the  right  to  take  private  property  for  public  use.-^* 
In  determining  whether  the  use  in  such  case  is  public  or  not, 
it  is  an  immaterial  consideration  that  the  control  of  the  prop- 
erty is  vested  in  private  persons  who  are  actuated  solely  by  mo- 
tives of  private  gain,^®    or  that  private  benefits  will  incidentally 

iSDayton  Mining  Co.  v.  Seawell,  Mont.  60,  94  Pac.  631;  Bloodgood  T. 
11  Nev.  394,  400;  see  also  Cooley  Mohawk  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  Wend.  9, 
Const.  Lim.  p.  *532.  In  Farnsworth  21,  83;  Ryan  v.  Terminal  Co.,  102 
V.  Lime  Rock  R.  R.  Co.,  83  Me.  440,  Tenn.  Ill,  50  S.  W.  744,  45  L.R.A. 
22  Atl.  373,  it  is  said:  "There  must  303;  Salt  Co.  v.  Brown,  7  W.  Va. 
be  enterprises  occupying  such  mid-  191,  197.  In  18  Wend.  p.  21,  Sen- 
die  ground  on  this  question,  so  near  ator  Edwards  says:  "Does  the  fact 
to  the  boundary  line  between  public  that  the  power  to  construct  the  road 
use  and  private  use  that  it  may  be  is  given  to  a  company  alter  the 
difficult  to  say  on  which  side  of  the  nature  of  the  grant?  Surely  not.  It 
line  the  facts  would  place  them.  is  entirely  immaterial  who  con- 
There  must  be  instances  at  either  ex-  structs  the  road,  or  who  defrays  the 
treme,  and  all  the  way  between  ex-  expense  of  the  construction.  The 
tremes."  object  for  which  it  is  constructed 
Kfost,  §  374.  must  determine  the  nature  of  the 
IB  Brown  v.  Beatty,  34  Miss.  227,  gi'ant,  whether  for  public  or  private 
240,  69  Am.  Dec.  389;  Spratt  v.  use."  p.  21.  Also  Concord  R.  R.  Co. 
Helena  Power  Transmission  Co.,  37  v.  Greeley,  17  N.  H.  47,  60;  Matter 


§  254 


WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USB. 


501 


accrue  from  the  condemnation.^®  Railroads,  canals,  turnpikes 
and  ferries  are  familiar  instances  of  such  appropriation,  and 
the  principle  is  of  universal  application.  "The  inquiry  must 
necessarily  be,  what  are  the  objects  to  be  accomplished?  not, 
■who  are  the  instruments  for  attaining  them  ?"  ^'^ 

§  254  (161).  Nor  by  the  fact  that  the  use  or  benefit 
is  local  or  limited.  It  is  not  necessary  that  the  entire  com- 
munity, or  any  considerable  portion  of  it,  should  directly  par- 
ticipate in  the  benefits  to  be  derived  from  the  property  taken.-'* 
"The  public  use  required,  need  not  be  the  use  or  benefit  of  the 
whole  public  or  State,  or  any  large  portion  of  it.  It  may  be 
for  the  inhabitants  of  a  small  or  restricted  locality ;  but  the  use 
and  benefit  must  be  in  common,  not  to  particular  individuals  or 
estates."  ^®    A  school-house  site  for  a  district  of  a  dozen  families 


of  Tounsend,  39  N.  Y.  171;  Bellona 
Company  Case,  3  Bland  Chy.  442; 
Cottrill  V.  Myrick,  12  Me.  222;  Po- 
cantico  W.  W.  Co.  v.  Bird,  130  N.  Y. 
249,  29  N.  E.  246;  Lancey  v.  King 
County,  15  Wash.  9,  45  Pac.  645,  34 
L.R.A.  817. 

isSissou  V.  Board  of  Supervisors, 
128  la.  442,  104  N.  W.  454,  70  L.R.A. 
440 ;  Minn.  Canal  &  P.  Co.  v.  Koochi- 
ching Co.,  97  Minn.  429,  107  N.  W. 
405,  5  L.Il.A.(N.S.)   638. 

iTWillyard  v.  Hamilton,  7  Ohio, 
pt.  2,  111,  30  Am.  Dec.  195. 

isAldridge  v.  T.  C.  &  D.  R.  R.  Co., 
2  Stew.  &  Per.  199,  23  Am.  Dec.  297 ; 
Gilmer  v.  Lime  Point,  18  Cal.  229; 
Laguna  Dr.  Dist.  v.  Charles  Martin 
Co.,  144  Cal.  209,  77  Pac.  933; 
Kramer  v.  Los  Angeles,  147  Cal. 
668,  82  Pac.  334;  Madera  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Raymond  Granite  Co.,  3  Cal.  App. 
668,  87  Pac.  27;  Bridwell  v.  Gate 
City  Terminal  Co.,  127  Ga.  520,  56 
S.  E.  624,  10  L.R.A.{N.S.)  909; 
Cleveland  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Polecat  Dr. 
Dist.,  213  111.  83,  72  N.  E.  684; 
O'Reilly  v.  Kankakee  Valley  Drain- 
ing Co.,  32  Ind.  169;  Riche  v.  Bar 
Harbor  Water  Co.  (Me.)  28  Alb.  L. 
J.  498;  Ulmer  v.  Lime  Rock  R.  R. 
Co.,  98  Me.  579,  57  Atl.  1001,  66 
L.R.A.   387;    Brown  v.  Gerald,  100 


Me.  351,  61  Atl.  785,  109  Am.  St. 
Rep.  526,  70  L.R.A.  472;  Talbot  v. 
Hudson,  16  Gray  417,  425;  Lien  v. 
Norman  County,  80  Minn.  58,  82  N. 
W.  1094;  Rockingham  Co.  L.  &  P. 
Co.  V.  Hobbs,  72  N.  H.  531,  58  Atl. 
46,  66  L.R.A.  581;  Coster  v.  Tide 
Water  Mill  Co.,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  54; 
Albright  v.  Sussex  Co.  Lake  &  Park 
Commission,  68  N.  J.  L.  523,  53  Atl. 
612;  Martin  v.  Burns,  155  N.  Y.  23; 
Bloomfield  etc.  Natural  Gas  Light 
Co.  v.  Richardson,  63  Barb.  437,  448; 
Hartwell  v.  Armstrong,  19  Barb.  166; 
Jacobs  V.  Clearview  Water  Supply 
Co.,  220  Pa.  St.  388,  69  Atl.  870;  Lewis 
County  V.  Gordon,  20  Wash.  80,  54 
Pac.  779;  Skagit  County  v.  McLean, 
20  Wash.  92,  54  Pac.  781 ;  State  v. 
Superior  Court,  47  Wash.  397,  92  Pac. 
269. 

isCoster  v.  Tide  Water  Co.,  18  N. 
J.  Eq.  54,  68.  Similar  views  are 
expressed  in  Ross  v.  Davis,  97  Ind. 
79,  and  McQuillen  v.  Hatton,  42  Ohio 
St.  202.  "The  term  implies  'the  use 
of  the  many,'  or  "by  the  public,'  but 
it  may  be  limited  to  the  inhabitants 
of  a  small  or  restricted  locality,  but 
the  use  must  be  common  and  not  for 
a  particular  individual."  Pocantieo 
W.  W.  Co.  V.  Bird,  130  N.  Y.  249-259, 
29  N.  E.  246. 


502 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


255 


is  as  undeniably  for  public  use  as  the  ground  for  a  State-bouse.^" 
If  tbe  use  is  open  to  all  upon  equal  terms  who  are  so  situated 
as  to  be  able  to  enjoy  tbe  privilege,  it  is  immaterial  bow  few 
actually  avail  tbemselves  of  the  rigbt.^^  Tbe  amount  of  benefit 
to  be  derived  from  a  particular  improvement  or  system  of  im- 
provements is  a  consideration  which  addresses  itself  to  the  leg- 
islature, and  not  to  the  courts. 

§  255  (162).  Nor  by  the  necessity  or  lack  of  necessity 
for  the  condemnation.  Some  courts  have  held  that,  in  order 
to  uphold  an  exercise  of  tbe  power  of  eminent  domain,  a  ne- 
cessity must  exist  for  its  exercise,  in  order  to  accomplish  tbe 
purpose  sought,  and  that  this  question  of  necessity  is  in  some 
way  an  element  in  determining  whether  the  taking  is  for  pub- 
lic use.^^  Thus  it  is  argued  that  a  hotel  or  theater  is  not  a  pub- 
lic use  within  the  meaning  of  the  constitution,  because  the  pub- 
lic can  be  accommodated  in  those  respects  without  resorting 
to  the  power  of  eminent  domain. ^^     Nearly  all  tbe  cases,  how- 


2  0In  a  case  where  the  question  was 
whether  the  taking  for  a  district 
school  was  for  a  public  use,  the  court 
says:  "Every  public  use  is,  to  some 
extent,  local,  and  benefits  a  partic- 
ular section  more  than  others.  Kail- 
roads  and  canals,  the  most  extensive 
of  our  public  works,  do  so  in  some 
degree.  Burying  grounds,  aque- 
ducts, mills,  and  many  highways  are 
as  purely  local  as  this,  and  no  per- 
son can  derive  benefit  from  them  ex- 
cept by  becoming  a  resident  in  their 
vicinity.  In  the  same  way  this  may 
be  for  the  benefit  of  any  citizen.  But 
the  use  in  the  present  case  has  a 
more  enlarged  and  liberal  view.  It 
is  a  benefit  and  advantage  to  the 
whole  country,  that  all  the  children 
should  be  educated,  and  thus,  any 
means  of  educating  the  children  in 
any  district,  benefit  the  whole.  To 
accomplish  this  great  object  of  edu- 
cating the  whole,  it  becomes  neces- 
sary that  a  great  number  of  schools 
should  be  supported  to  make  them 
accessible  to  all;  but  the  principle 
remains  the  same,  as  if  all  the  chil- 
dren of  the  State  could  attend  a  sin- 


gle school;  they  are  all  but  separate 
means  to  accomplish  the  same  great 
and  general  benefit."  Williams  v. 
School  District,  33  Vt.  271,  279; 
Township  Board  v.  Hackman,  48  Mo. 
243,  245. 

21  State  V.  Superior  Court,  48 
Wash.  277,  93  Pac.  423;  post,  §  312. 

22Eyerson  v.  Brown,  35  Mich.  333, 
24  Am.  Rep.  564;  Jordan  v.  Wood- 
ward, 40  Me.  317,  323;  Dayton  Min- 
ing Co.  V.  Seawell,  11  Nev.  394;  Salt 
Go.  V.  Brown,  7  W.  Va.  191,  199; 
Varner  v.  Martin,  21  W.  Va.  534, 
556.  In  the  last  case  the  court  says, 
the  use  "must  be  clearly  a  needful 
one  for  the  public,  one  which  cannot 
be  given  up  without  obvious  general 
loss  and  inconvenience;"  also,  that 
it  "must  be  impossible,  or  very  dif- 
ficult at  least,  to  secure  the  same 
public  uses  and  purposes  in  any  other 
way  than  by  authorizing  the  condem- 
nation of  private  property."  And 
see  Stearns  v.  Barre,  73  Vt.  281,  50 
Atl.  1086,  87  Am.  St.  Rep.  721,  58 
L.R.A.  240. 

2  3  Dayton  Mining  Co.  v.  Seawell, 
11  Nev.  394. 


§    256  WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USE.  50o 

ever,  hold  that  the  question  of  necessity  is  distinct  from  the  ques- 
tion of  public  use,  and  that  the  former  question  is  exclusively  for 
the  legislature.^*  The  necessity,  expediency  or  propriety  of 
exercising  the  power  of  eminent  domain,  and  the  extent  and 
manner  of  its  exercise,  are  questions  of  general  public  policy 
and  belong  to  the  legislative  department  of  the  government. 
They  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  question  of  what  constitutes 
a  public  use. 

§  256  (163).  The  words  "public  use"  a  limitation. 
Many  courts  seem  to  treat  the  question  of  What  is  a  pvhlic  use? 
as  though  the  question  was  For  what  furposes  may  the  power  of 
eminent  domain  be  properly  exercised.  This  is  a  serious  error. 
The  power  of  eminent  domain,  as  we  have  before  shown,  is 
the  power  of  a  sovereign  State  to  appropriate  private  property 
to  particular  uses  for  the  purpose  of  promoting  the  general  wel- 
fare. ^^  This  power  was  originally  in  the  people,  in  their  sov- 
ereign capacity,  and  was  by  them  delegated  to  the  legislature  in 
the  general  grant  of  legislative  power.  In  the  absence  of  any 
restrictions,  the  legislature  could  take  private  property  for  any 
purpose  calculated  to  promote  the  general  good.  By  the  provi- 
sion in  question,  the  people  said  to  the  legislature,  in  effect,  You 
shall  not  exercise  this  power  except  for  public  use.  To  give 
these  words  any  effect,  they  must  be  construed  as  limiting  the 
power  to  which  they  relate,  that  is,  as  limiting  the  purposes  for 
which  private  property  may  be  appropriated.  As  the  power  is 
by  its  nature  limited  to  such  purposes  as  promote  the  general 

2  4San   Mateo   County   v.   Coburn,  61  Atl.  785,  1C9  Am.  St.  Rep.  526,  70 

130  Cal.  631,  63  Pac.  78:  Tanner  v.  L.R.A.  472;  St.  Louis  v.  Brown,  155 

Treasury   Tunnel   M.   &   R.   Co.,   35  Mo.  545,  56  S.  W.  298;  Southern  111. 

Colo.  593,  83  Pac.  464,  4  L.R.A.  (N.S.)  &  Mo.  B.  Co.  v.  Stone,  174  Mo.  1,  73 

106;  Savannah  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Postal  S.  W.  453,  63  L.R.A.  301 ;  Albright  v. 

Tel.  Cable  Co.,  115  Ga.  554,  42  S.  B.  Sussex   Co.   Lake   &   Park   Commis- 

1 ;  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Morrison,  sion,  68  N.  J.  L.  523,  53  Atl.  612 ; 

195   111.   271,    63   N.   E.    96;    Water  Buffalo  &  New  York  R.  R.   Co.  v. 

Works  Co.  V.  Burkhardt,  41  Ind.  364,  Brainard,  9  N.  Y.  100,  109;  People  v. 

370;  Speck  v.  Kenoyer,  164  Ind.  431,  Smith,  21  N.  Y.  595;  Bloomfield  etc. 

73  N.  E.  896;  Mull  v.  Indianapolis  Natural  Gas  Light  Co.  v.  Richard- 

etc.  Traction  Co.,   169  Ind.   214,  81  son,  63  Barb.  437;  Anderson  v.  Tur- 

N.  E.  657;  Challiss  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  beville,  6  Coldw.  150,  160;   Ryan  v. 

Ry.  Co.,  16  Kan.  117,  126;  Lake  Keon  Terminal  Co.,  102  Tenn.   Ill,  50  S. 

Nav.  etc.  Co.  v.  Klein,  03  Kan.  484,  W.  744,  45  L.R.A.  303;  Cooley  Const. 

65  Pac.  684;   Kennebec  Water  Dist.  Lim.  *538;   post,  §   369. 
V.   Waterville,   96   Me.   234,   52  Atl.  ^^Ante,  §  1. 

774;  Brown  v.  Gerald,  100  Me.  351, 


504  EMINESTT  DOMAIN.  §    257 

welfare,  it  is  evident  that  the  words  public  use,  if  they  are  to  be 
construed  as  a  limitation,  cannot  be  equivalent  to  the  general 
welfare  or  public  good.  They  must  receive  a  more  restricted 
definition. 

§  257  (164).  Statement  of  doctrines.  The  different 
views  which  have  been  taken  of  the  words  "public  use"  resolve 
themselves  into  two  classes :  one  holding  that  there  must  be  a  use 
or  right  of  use  on  the  part  of  the  public  or  some  limited  portion 
of  it,  the  other  holding  that  they  are  equivalent  to  public  benefit, 
utility  or  advantage.  Some  of  the  many  definitions  of  the  words 
public  use  are  here  given.  "The  words  'public  use'  mean  public 
utility,  advantage  or  what  is  productive  of  public  benefit."  ^® 
"If  the  public  interest  can  be  in  any  way  promoted  by  the  taking 
of  private  property,  it  must  rest  in  the  wisdom  of  the  legisla- 
ture to  determine  whether  the  benefit  to  the  public  will  be  of 
sufficient  importance  to  render  it  expedient  for  them  to  exercise 
the  right  of  eminent  domain,  and  to  authorize  an  interference 
with  the  private  rights  of  individuals  for  that  purpose."  ^'^  "By 
the  public  use  is  meant  for  the  use  of  many,  or  where  the  public 
is  interested."  ^*  "Whatever  is  benoflcially  employed  for  the 
community  is  of  public  use  and  a  distinction  cannot  be  toler- 
ated." ^®  Similar  definitions,  making  the  words  equivalent 
to  public  benefit  or  advantage,  are  numerous.*"  On  the  other 
hand,  numerous  cases  hold  that,  to  constitute  a  public  use  the 

2  601msteadv.  Camp,  33  Conn.  532,  Highland  Boy  Gold  Min.  Co.  v. 
89  Am.  Dec.  221.  Strickley,  28  Utah  215,  78  Pac.  296, 

27Chancellor   Walworth   in   Beek-  107  Am.  St.  Rep.  711,  1  L.R.A.(N.S.) 

man  v.  Saratoga  &  Schenectady  R.  976;     S.     C.    affirmed,    Strickley   v. 

R.  Co.,  3  Paige  45,  73.  Highland  Boy  Gold  Min.  Co.,  200  U. 

28Seely  v.  Sebastian,  4  Oregon  25.  S.  527,  26  S.  C.  301.    As  illustrating 

29Aldridge  v.  T.  C.  &  D.  R.  R.  Co.,  this  broad  view  of  the  subject,  the 

2  Stew.  &  Per.  199,  23  Am.  Dee.  297.  supreme  court  of  Idaho  says:    "It  is 

3  oTodd  V.  Austin,  34  Conn.  78 ;  enough  if  the  taking  tends  to  enlarge 
Hand  Gold  Min.  Co.  v.  Parker,  59  the  resources,  increase  the  industrial 
Ga.  419;  Potlatch  Lumber  Co.  v.  energies  and  promote  the  productive 
Peterson,  12  Ida.  769,  88  Pac.  426,  power  of  any  considerable  part  of  the 
118  Am.  St.  Rep.  233;  Tuttle  v.  inhabitants  of  a  section  of  the  State, 
Moore,  3  Ind.  Ter.  712,  64  S.  W.  585 ;  or  leads  to  the  growth  of  towns  and 
Bellona  Company's  Case,  3  Bland  the  creation  of  new  channels  for  the 
Ch.  442;  Talbot  v.  Hudson,  16  Gray  employment  of  private  capital  and 
417 ;  Pittsburgh  v.  Scott,  1  Pa.  St.  labor,  as  such  results  indirectly  con- 
309,  314;  Nash  v.  Clark,  27  Utah  tribute  to  the  general  prosperity  of 
158,  75  Pac.  371,  101  Am.  St.  Rep.  the  whole  community."  Potlatch 
953,  1  L.R.A.(KS.)  208;  S.  C.  af-  Lumber  Co.  v.  Peterson,  12  Ida.  769, 
firmed,  198  U.  S.  361,  25  S.  C.  676;  88  Pac.  426,  118  Am.  St.  Rep.  233. 


§  268 


WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USE. 


505 


property  must  be  taken  into  the  direct  control  of  the  public 
or  of  public  agencies,  or  the  public  must  have  the  right  to  use 
in  some  way  the  property  appropriated.^^ 

§  258  (165).  Proper  construction  of  the  words  "pub- 
lic use."  It  is,  of  course,  impossible  to  reconcile  these  dif- 
ferent views,  and  the  question  is,  which  one  is  correct.  "The 
meaning  of  the  words  cannot  be  ascertained  by  reading  the  con- 
stitution. No  attempt  is  there  made  to  define  them.  Nor  is 
there  any  clause  in  that  instrument,  which,  by  its  bearing  upon 
them,  teaches  us  the  precise  meaning  which  they  were  intended 
to  have.     We  must,  therefore,  look  elsewhere  for  a  true  con- 


siSlioU  V.  German  Coal  Co.,  118 
111.  427;  Amsperger  v.  Crawford,  101 
Md.  247,  61  Atl.  413,  70  L.K.A.  497; 
Jenal  v.  Green  Island  Dr.  Co.,  12 
Neb.  163;  Matter  of  Eureka  Basin 
Warehouse  &  Mfg.  Co.,  96  N.  Y.  42; 
Jacobs  V.  Clearvlew  Water  Supply 
Co.,  220  Pa.  St.  388,  69  Atl.  870; 
Memphis  Freight  Co.  v.  Memphis,  6 
Coldw.  419;  Healey  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Morris,  33  Wash.  490,  74  Pac.  681, 
99  Am.  St.  Rep.  964,  63  L.R.A.  820; 
State  V.  White  River  Power  Co.,  39 
Wash.  648,  82  Pac.  150,  2  L.R.A. 
(N.S.)  842;  Varner  v.  Martin,  21  W. 
Va.  534;  Hench  v.  Pritt,  62  W.  Va. 
270,  57  S.  E.  808;  and  cases  cited  in 
next  section.  In  Vance  v.  Martin,  21 
W.  Va.  534,  552,  656,  the  court 
divided  cases  of  appropriation  into 
two  classes,  as  follows :  First,  Where 
"the  property  condemned  is  under  the 
direct  control  and  use  of  the  govern- 
ment, or  public  officers  of  the  gov- 
ernment, or  what  is  almost  the  same 
thing  in  the  direct  use  and  occupa- 
tion of  the  public  at  large,  though 
under  the  control  of  private  persons 
or  corporations.''  Second,  Where  "it 
is  in  the  direct  use  and  occupation  of 
private  persons  or  of  a  corporation, 
and  the  general  public  has  only  an 
indirect  and  qualified  use  of  the 
property  condemned,  or  perhaps  no 
use  properly  of  any  kind  of  the  prop- 
erty condemned,  but  simply  derives 


from  its  use  by  and  for  a  private  per- 
son or  corporation,  some  indirect  ad- 
vantage, as  by  the  promotion  of  the 
general  prosperity  of  the  com- 
munity." As  to  cases  of  the  first 
class,  the  court  concludes  there  is  no 
question  as  to  the  public  use.  In  re- 
gard to  the  second  class,  the  court 
proceeds  as  follows :  "I  think  we  can 
show  from  the  decisions,  that  a  per- 
son or  corporation  claiming  to  belong 
to  this  second  class,  and  to  have  leg- 
islative authority  to  condemn  lands, 
must  first  show  that  he  or  they  are 
possessed  of  each  and  all  of  these 
three  qualifications:  First,  the  gen- 
eral public  must  have  a  definite  and 
fixed  use  of  the  property  to  be  con- 
demned, a  use  independent  of  the 
will  of  the  private  person  or  private 
corporation  in  whom  the  title  of  the 
property  when  condemned  will  be 
vested;  a  public  use  which  cannot  be 
defeated  by  such  private  owner,  but 
which  public  use  continues  to  be 
guarded  and  controlled  by  the  gen- 
eral public  through  laws  passed  by 
the  legislature;  second,  this  public 
use  must  be  clearly  a  needful  one  for 
the  public,  one  which  cannot  be  given 
up  without  obvious  general  loss  and 
inconvenience;  third,  it  must  be  im- 
possible, or  very  difiicult  at  least,  to 
secure  the  same  public  uses  and  pur- 
poses in  any  other  way  than  by  au- 
thorizing the   condemnation  of  pri- 


506  EMINENT    DOMAIN".  §    258 

struction."  ^^  If  we  look  to  our  dictionaries,  we  find  the  same 
confusion  as  in  the  decisions.  Thus,  "use"  is  defined  as,  first, 
"the  act  of  employing  anything  or  the  state  of  being  employed 
for  any  purpose;  application,  employment,  service;"  second, 
"the  quality  that  makes  a  thing  proper  for  a  purpose;  benefit, 
utility,  advantage."  *^  To  constitute  a  public  use  according  to 
the  first  of  these  definitions,  it  is  necessary  that  the  public 
should  in  some  way  use  or  be  entitled  to  use  or  enjoy  the  prop- 
erty taken.  According  to  the  second  definition,  it  would  be  a 
public  use  if  the  property  taken  was  so  employed  as  to  enure 
in  any  way  to  the  public  benefit  or  advantage. 

If  we  go  back  a  century  and  place  ourselves  in  the  situation 
of  those  who  framed  the  constitutions  of  the  original  States, 
we  shall  find  that  the  principal  purposes,  if  not  the  only  pur- 
poses, for  which  private  property  was  appropriated  were  for 
ways  and  mills.  The  mills  were  mostly  saw-mills  and  grist- 
mills, and  were  accustomed,  and  in  most  cases  obliged,  to  saw 
and  grind  for  toll  for  whomsoever  applied.^*  They  were  for 
public  use,  in  the  stricter  sense  of  the  phrase.  There  was  noth- 
ing in  the  practice  of  the  States  at  the  time  the  earlier  consti- 
tutions were  adopted  to  require  that  the  words  public  use  should 
have  the  meaning  of  public  benefit  or  advantage. 

The  use  of  a  thing  is  strictly  and  properly  the  employment  or 
application  of  the  thing  in  some  manner.^''  The  public  use  of 
anything  is  the  employment  or  application  of  the  thing  by  the 
public.     Public  use  means  the  same  as  use  by  the  public,  and 

vate  property.     If  any  one  of  these  ^iPost,  §  275. 

essentials  is  wanting,  the  courts  will  3  6  Such  is  the  first  meaning  given 

declare  the  act  of  the  legislature  au-  by  all  lexicographers,  and  the  one  re- 

thorizing  such  condemnation  of  pri-  quired  by  the  etymology  of  the  word, 

vate  property  to  be  unconstitutional.  It    is    from  the  Latin  utor,   which 

because  it  would  amount  to  taking  means  "to  use,  make  use  of,  avail 

private  property  for  private  and  not  one's   self  of,  employ,  apply,  enjoy, 

for  public  uses."     See  also  Salt  Co.  "  etc."     Of  course  constitutional  law 

v.  Brown,  7  W.  Va.  191,  139.   Public  cannot  be  turned  into  a  question  of 

use  and  public  benefit  are  not  the  etymology,  but,  in  questions  of  this 

same.     Wis.  River  Imp.  Co.  v.  Pier  sort,   which   necessarily    turn   upon 

(Wis.),  118  N.  W.  857.  nice  distinctions,  and  where  there  is 

3  2Concord  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Greeley,  17  no  definite  clue  to  guide  us,   it  is 

N.  H.  47,  60.  proper  to  look  at  the  original  and 

33 See     Worcester,     Webster     and  controlling  definition  of  the  words 

other    lexicographers,    all    of   whom  employed, 
give   and    illustrate    these   different 
uses  of  the  word. 


§  258 


WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USE. 


50T 


this  it  seems  to  us  is  the  construction  the  words  should  receive 
in  the  constitutional  provision  in  question.^*  The  reasons  which 
incline  us  to  this  view  are :  First,  That  it  accords  with  the  pri- 
mary and  more  commonly  understood  meaning  of  the  words ; 
second,  it  accords  with  the  general  practice  in  regard  to  taking 
private  property  for  public  use  in  vogue  when  the  phrase  was 
first  brought  into  use  in  the  earlier  constitutions;  third,  it  is 
the  only  view  which  gives  the  words  any  force  as  a  limitation 
or  renders  them  capable  of  any  definite  and  practical  applica- 
tion.*'' 


3  6  "The  test  whether  a  use  is  pub- 
lic or  not  is  whether  a  public  trust 
is  imposed  upon  the  property, 
whether  the  public  has  a  legal  right 
to  the  use,  which  cannot  be  gainsaid, 
or  denied,  or  withdrawn  at  the  pleas- 
ure of  the  owner."  Farmers'  Market 
Co.  V.  Philadelphia  R.  R.  Co.,  10  Pa. 
Co.  Ct.  25.  "What  is  a  public  use  is 
incapable  of  exact  definition.  The 
expressions  public  interest  and  pub- 
lic use  are  not  synonymous.  The 
establishment  of  furnaces,  mills  and 
manufactures,  the  building  of 
churches  and  hotels,  and  other  simi- 
lar enterprises,  are  more  or  less  mat- 
ters of  public  concern,  and  promote,, 
in  a  general  sense,  the  public  welfare. 
But  they  lie  without  the  domain  of 
public  uses  for  which  private  owner- 
ship may  be  displaced  by  compulsory 
proceedings."  Matter  of  Niagara 
Falls  &  Whirlpool  R.  R.  Co.,  138  N. 
y.  375,  15  N.  B.  429.  And  see  Matter 
of  Split  Rock  Cable  R.  R.  Co.,  128  N. 
Y.  408,  28  N.  E.  506;  Pooantico  W. 
W.  Co.  V.  Bird,  130  N.  Y.  249,  29  N. 
B.  246;  Board  of  Health  v.  Van  Hoe- 
sen,  87  Mich.  533,  49  N.  W.  894;  Fork 
Ridge  Baptist  Gem.  Assn.  v.  Redd, 
33  W.  Va.  262,  10  S.  E.  405.  In  the 
last  case  it  is  held,  that  where  the 
property  condemned  will  come  under 
the  control  of  a  private  corporation 
or  individuals,  to  constitute  a  public 
use,  it  must  appear:  "(1)  The  use 
which  the  public  is  to  have  of  the 


property  must  be  fixed  and  definite ; 
the  general  public  must  have  a  right 
to  a  certain  definite  use  of  the  pri- 
vate property,  on  terms  and  for 
charges  fixed  by  law;  and  the  owner 
of  the  property  must  be  compelled  by 
law  to  permit  the  general  public  to 
enjoy  it.  (2)  This  use  of  the  prop- 
erty by  the  public  must  be  a  substan- 
tially beneficial  one,  which  is  obvi- 
ously needful  for  the  public,  and 
which  it  could  not  do  without,  except 
by  suffering  great  loss  or  inconven- 
ience. (3)  The  necessity  for  con- 
demnation must  be  obvious.  It 
must  obviously  appear  from  the 
location  of  the  property,  or  from 
the  character  of  the  use  to  which 
it  is  to  be  put,  that  the  pub- 
lic could  not,  without  great  difficulty, 
obtain  the  use  of  this  or  other  land, 
which  would  answer  the  same  gen- 
eral purpose,  unless  it  be  condemned ; 
and  in  such  case  the  courts  will 
judge  of  the  necessity  for  condemna- 
tion." 

3 'These  views  are  strongly  sup- 
ported by  the  following  authorities, 
in  many  of  which  the  text  is  quoted 
and  approved:  Cleveland  etc.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Polecat  Dr.  Dist.,  213  111.  83, 
72  N.  B.  684;  Great  Western  Nat. 
G.  &  O.  Co.  V.  Hawkins,  30  Ind.  App. 
557,  66  N.  B.  765;  Sisson  v.  Board  of 
Supervisors,  128  la.  442,  104  N.  W. 
454,  70  L.R.A.  440;  Ulmer  v.  Lime 
Rock  R.  R.  Co.,  98  Me.  579,  57  Atl. 


508  EMINEWT    DOMAIN.  §    258 

If  the  constitution  means  that  private  property  can  be  taken 
only  for  use  hy  the  public,  it  affords  a  definite  guide  to  both 
the  legislature  and  the  courts.  Though  the  property  is  vested 
in  private  individuals  or  corporations,  the  public  retain  cer- 
tain definite  rights  to  its  use  or  enjoyment,  and  to  that  extent 
it  remains  under  the  control  of  the  legislature.  If  no  such 
rights  are  secured  to  the  public,  then  the  property  is  not  taken 
for  public  use  and  the  act  of  appropriation  is  void.  This  inter- 
pretation will  cover  every  case  of  aippropriation  that  has  been 
deemed  lawful  by  any  court,  except  a  few  in  relation  to  mills, 
mines  and  drainage.  If  exceptional  circumstances  require  ex- 
ceptional legislation  in  those  respects  in  any  State,  it  is  very 
easy  to  provide  for  it  specially  in  the  constitution,  as  has  been 
done  in  several  States. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  the  constitution  means  that  private  prop- 
erty may  be  taken  for  any  purpose  of  public  benefit  and  utility, 
what  limit  is  there  to  the  power  of  the  legislature  ?  This  view 
places  the  whole  matter  ultimately  in  the  hands  of  the  judiciary, 
as  though  the  constitution  read  that  private  property  may  be 
taken  for  such  purposes  as  the  Supreme  Court  deem  of  public 
benefit  or  advantage.  The  public  welfare  is  committed  generally 
to  the  keeping  of  the  legislature.  It  is  a  numerous  body,  com- 
ing directly  from  the  people  and  supposed  to  be  acquainted  with 
their  condition  and  needs.    All  questions  of  general  public  wel- 

1001,  66  L.E.A.  387;  Arnsperger  v.  L.R.A.  879;  Eyan  v.  Terminal  Co., 

Crawford,  101  Md.  247,  61  Atl.  413,  102  Tenn.  Ill,  50  S.  W.  744,  45  L.E.A. 

70     L.R.A.     497;     Berrien     Springs  303;   Borden  v.  Trespalacio  R.  &  I. 

Water   Power   Co.  v.   Berrien   Circ.  Co.,  98  Tex.  494,  86  S.  W.  11,  107  Am. 

Judge,  133  Mich.  48,  94  N.  W.  379,  St.  Rep.  640;  Avery  v.  Vt.  Elec.  Co., 

103  Am.  St.  Rep.  438;  Minn.  Canal  75  Vt.  235,  54  Atl.  179,  98  Am.  St. 

&  Power  Co.  v.  Koochiching  Co.,  97  Rep.  818,  59  L.R.A.  817;   Fallsburg 

Minn.  429,  107  N.  W.  405,  5  L.R.A.  P.  &  M.  Co.  v.  Alexander,  101  Va. 

(N.S.)  638;  Rockingham  Co.  L.  &  P.  98,  43  S.  E.  194,  99  Am.  St.  Rep.  855, 

Co.  V.  Hobbs,  72  N.  H.  531,  58  Atl.  46,  61  L.R.A.  129;  Dice  v.  Sherman,  107 

66  L.R.A.  581 ;  Matter  of  Tuthill,  163  Va.  424,  59  S.  E.  808 ;  Healy  Lumber 

N.  Y.  133,  57  N.  E.  303,  79  Am.  St.  Co.  v.  Morris,  33  Wash.  490,  74  Pac. 

Rep.  574,  49  L.R.A.  781,  reversing  S.  681,  99  Am.  St.  Rep.  964,  63  L.R.A. 

C.  36  App.  Div.  49 ;  Cozard  v.  Kan-  820 ;  State  v.  White  River  Power  Co., 

awha  Hardwood  Co.,  139  N.  C.  283,  39  Wash.  648,  82  Pac.  150,  2  L.R.A. 

51  S.  E.  932,  111  Am.  St.  Rep.  779,  1  (N.S.)  842;  State  v.  Superior  Court, 

L.R.A.  (N.S.)    969;   Jacobs  v.  Clear-  42  Wash.  660,  85  Pac.  666,  5  L.R.A. 

view  Water  Supply  Co.,  220  Pa.  St.  (N.S.)    672;    Shasta    Power  Co.  v. 

388,  69  Atl.  870;  InreR.  I.  Suburban  Walker,  149  Fed.  568. 
Ey.  Co.,  22  E.  I.  457,  48  Atl.  591,  52 


§    258  WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USE.  509 

fare  and  advantage  fall  appropriately  within  the  province  of 
the  legislature.  They  have  opportunities  for  judging  correctly, 
ways  and  means  of  information  which  the  courts  do  not  and 
cannot  have.  It  cannot  be  presumed  that  the  people  ever  in- 
tended to  commit  such  a  question  to  the  courts.  Whether  the 
public  will  have  the  use  of  property  taken  under  a  particular 
statute  is  a  question  which  may  be  readily  determined  from  an 
inspection  of  the  statute,  but  whether  a  particular  improvement 
will  be  of  public  utility  is  a  question  of  opinion  merely,  about 
which  men  may  differ,  and  which  cannot  be  referred  to  any 
definite  criterion.  "The  moment  the  mode  of  use  is  disregarded, 
and  we  permit  ourselves  to  be  governed  by  speculations  upon  the 
benefits  that  may  result  to  localities  from  the  use  which  a  man 
or  set  of  men  propose  to  make  of  the  property  of  another,  that 
moment  we  are  afloat  without  any  certain  principles  to  guide 
us."  **  Says  the  supreme  court  of  Maryland :  "There  will  be 
found  two  different  views  of  the  meaning  of  these  words  which 
have  been  taken  by  the  courts ;  one,  there  must  be  a  use,  or  right 
of  use  hy  the  public,  or  some  limited  portion  of  the  public ;  the 
other  that  they  are  equivalent  to  public  utility  or  advantage. 
If  the  former  is  the  correct  view,  the  legislature  and  the  courts 
have  a  definite,  fixed  guide  for  their  action.  If  the  latter  is 
to  prevail,  the  enactment  of  laws  upon  this  subject  will  reflect 
the  passing  popular  feeling,  and  their  construction  will  reflect 
the  various  temperaments  of  the  judges,  who  are  thus  left  free 
to  indulge  their  own  views  of  public  utility  or  advantage.  We 
cannot  hesitate  to  range  this  court  with  those  which  hold  the 
former  to  be  the  true  view."  **  And  the  supreme  court  of  Texas 
says :  "We  are  not  inclined  to  accept  that  liberal  definition  of 
the  phrase  'public  use'  adopted  by  some  authorities,  which  makes 

ssTraey,  Senator,  in  Bloodgood  v.  public  from  the  mode  in  which  indi- 
Mohawk  &  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  18  viduals  in  pursuit  of  their  own  in- 
Wend.  9,  60.  Also,  in  the  same  terests  use  their  property,  will  con- 
opinion,  p.  65:  "Can  the  constitu-  stitute  a  public  use  of  it,  within  the 
tional  expression,  public  use,  be  made  intentions  of  the  constitution,  it  will 
synonymous  with  public  improve-  be  found  very  diflScult  to  set  limits  to 
ment,  or  general  convenience  or  ad-  the  power  of  appropriating  private 
vantage,  without  involving  conse-  property."  And  see  Howard  Mills 
quences  inconsistent  with  the  reason-  Co.  v.  Schwartz  L.  &  C.  Co.,  77  Kan. 
able  security  of  private  property;  599,  99  Pac.  559. 
much  more  with  that  security  which  3  9Arnsperger  v.  Crawford,  101  Md. 
the  constitution  guarantees?  If  an  247,  253,  61  Atl.  413,  70  L.E.A.  497. 
incidental  benefit,  resulting    to    the 


510 


EMINENT  DOMAIN". 


§    258 


it  mean  no  more  than  the  public  welfare  or  good,  and  under 
Avhich  almost  any  kind  of  extensive  business  which  promotes  the 
prosperity  and  comfort  of  the  country  might  be  aided  by  the 
power  of  eminent  domain.  With  the  court  of  appeals  and  coun- 
sel for  plaintiffs  and  those  authorities  which  they  follow,  we 
agree  that  property  is  taken  for  public  use  as  intended  by  the 
constitution  only  when  there  results  to  the  public  some  definite 
right  or  use  in  the  business  or  undertaking  to  which  the  prop- 
erty is  devoted.  And  we  further  agrge  that  this  public  right  or 
use  should  result  from  the  law  itself  and  not  be  dependent  en- 
tirely upon  the  will  of  the  donee  of  the  power."  *** 


40Bordeu  v.  Trespalacios  R.  &  Y. 
Co.,  98  Tex.  494,  509,  86  S.  W.  11,  107 
Am.  St.  Rep.  640.  The  question  is 
very  elaborately  considered  in  Healy 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Morris,  33  Wash.  490, 
74  Pae.  681,  99  Am.  St.  Rep.  964,  63 
L.R.A.  820,  from  which  we  quote  as 
follows:  "It  seems  to  us,  however, 
that  this  is  the  announcement  of  a 
dangerous  doctrine,  tending  to  en- 
croach upon  private  rights  which  the 
constitution  has  attempted  to  safe- 
guard, and  to  render  such  rights  as 
uncertain  and  varying  as  are  the  in- 
terests of  different  localities  and 
opinions  of  different  judges  on  dif- 
ferent branches  of  business.  Under 
such  a  rule  an  act  might  be  construed 
to  be  legal  one  year,  because  a  certain 
business  was  found  to  be  profitable 
to  the  community  at  large,  and  the 
next  year  held  void  because  the  busi- 
ness was  not  a  paying  one.  The  con- 
stitution is  the  fundamental  law.  Its 
enactments,  whether  they  constitute 
grants  or  limitations,  are  presumed 
to  be  stable,  and  uniform,  and  to  con- 
stitute a  check  on  the  more  mutable 
sentiment  and  actions  of  members  of 
different  legislatures.  And  it  seems 
to  us  that  the  result  of  such  a  con- 
struction would  be  a  virtual  removal 
of  any  constitutional  inhibition  on 
legislative  power  in  this  respect, 
leaving  the  legislative  will  as  free 
and  untrammeled  as  in  those  states 


where  the  legislatures  are  permitted 
to  act  in  consonance  with  the  in- 
herent power  of  sovereignty,  and  no 
constitutional  enactments  have  inter- 
vened. It  was  no  doubt  for  the  pur- 
pose of  preventing  enthusiastic  legis- 
lation, practically  destroying  this 
limitation,  that  the  question  of  pub- 
lic use  was  especially  submitted  to 
the  courts,  who  are,  and  should  be, 
ever  watchful  in  maintaining  invio- 
late the  constitutional  rights  of  the 
citizen. 

"It  cannot  be  that,  within  the 
meaning  of  the  constitution,  the  dis- 
tinction between  public  policy  and 
public  use  is  to  be  obliterated.  It 
might  be  of  unquestionable  public 
policy,  and  for  the  best  interests  of 
the  State,  to  allow  condemnation  of 
lands  in  every  instance  where  it 
would  result  in  aiding  prosperous 
business  enterprises  which  would 
give  employment  to  labor,  stimulate 
trade,  increase  property  values,  and 
thereby  increase  the  revenues  of  the 
State,  even  if  the  enterprise  was 
purely  private;  for  such  is  the  rela- 
tion, under  our  form  of  government, 
between  public  and  private  pros- 
perity that  one  cannot  be  enjoyed  to 
any  appreciable  extent  without 
favorably  influencing  the  other.  But 
it  is  evident  that  this  was  not  the 
kind  of  public  use  that  was  in  the 
minds  of  the  framers  of  the  constitu- 


§    258  WHAT  IS  A  PtJBLIO  USB.  511 

It  has  sometimes  been  said  that  the  construction  of  the  words 
public  use  which  we  have  preferred  would  afford  less  security 
to  private  property  than  the  one  we  have  rejected.  Thus,  one 
court  says :  "If  public  occupation  and  enjoyment  of  the  object 
for  which  land  is  to  be  condemned  furnishes  the  only  and  true 
test  for  the  right  of  eminent  domain,  then  the  legislature  would 
certainly  have  the  constitutional  authority  to  condemn  the  lands 
of  any  private  citizen  for  the  purpose  of  building  hotels  and  the- 
aters. Why  not  ?  A  hotel  is  used  by  the  public  as  much  as  a 
railroad.  The  public  have  the  same  right,  upon  payment  of  a 
fixed  compensation,  to  seek  rest  and  refreshment  at  a  public  inn 
as  they  have  to  travel  upon  a  railroad."  *^  But  certainly  a 
hotel  is  also  for  the  public  benefit  and  advantage  as  well  as  a 
railroad,  and  is  as  much  within  one  construction  of  the  words 
public  use  as  the  other.  But  why  may  not  the  legislature  pro- 
vide for  acquiring  by  condemnation  a  site  for  a  hotel  or  theater 
to  which  the  public  shall  have  the  right  to  resort,  and  which  shall 
be  subject  to  public  regulation  in  its  management  and  charges  ? 
Is  not  this  a  mere  question  of  expediency  and  public  policy? 
And  is  not  our  opinion  upon  this  question  the  outgrowth  of  the 
state  of  society  in  which  we  live  and  the  usages  and  practices 
to  which  we  are  accustomed  ?  In  ancient  times  vast  sums  of 
money  were  expended  in  the  construction  and  maintenance  of 

tion;  and  it  seems  to  ub  that  the  and  machine  shops  of  almost  every 
logic  of  those  courts  which  have  sus-  conceivable  kind,  would  be  entitled 
tained  appellants  contention  is  jus-  to  some  consideration  for  the  same 
tified  solely  on  grounds  of  public  reasons;  thereby  actually  destroying 
policy.  any  distinctions  between  public  and 
"It  seems  scarcely  necessary  to  private  use,  for  the  principle  in  one 
particularize  to  show  to  what  extent  instance  is  the  same  as  in  the  other ; 
this  doctrine  might  practically  be  the  difference  is  only  in  degree." 
carried.  Under  such  liberal  con-  pp.  504-506.  And  after  reviewing 
struction,  the  brewer  could  success-  authorities,  the  court  concludes 
fully  demand  condemnation  of  neigh-  thus :  "But  from  a  consideration  of 
bors'  land  for  the  purpose  of  erection  all  the  authorities  and  from  our  own 
of  a  brewery,  because,  forsooth,  views  on  construction,  we  are  of 
many  citizens  of  the  State  are  profit-  opinion  that  the  use  under  consider- 
ably engaged  in  the  cultivation  of  ation  must  be  either  a  use  by  the 
hops.  Condemnation  would  be  in  public,  or  by  some  agency  which  is 
order  for  grist  mills,  and  for  fac-  quasi  public,  and  not  simply  a,  use 
tories  for  manufacturing  the  cereals  which  may  incidentally  or  indirectly 
of  the  State,  because  there  is  a  large  promote  the  public  interest  or  gen- 
agricultural  interest  to  be  sustained.  eral  prosperity  of  the  State."  p.  509,. 
Tanneries,  woolen  factories,  oil  re-  ^iDayton  Mining  Co.  v.  Seawell, 
fineries,  distilleries,  packing  houses,  11  Nev.  394,  411. 


512  EMIJSTENT   DOMAIM'.  §    259 

public  theaters,  which  were  regarded  as  among  the  most  import- 
ant of  public  institutions.  A  proposal  to  condemn  a  site  for  a 
theater  would  not  have  sounded  strange,  so  far  as  the  purpose 
goes,  in  the  ears  of  Pericles  or  Cicero.*^ 

There  is  no  constitutional  limitation  to  the  effect  that  the 
power  of  eminent  domain  shall  not  be  exercised  unless  it  would 
be  otherwise  impossible  or  difEcult  to  accomplish  the  purpose 
sought.  There  are  dicta  to  this  effect,  but  no  decisions  that  we 
are  aware  of. 

Some  discretion  must  be  left  to  the  legislature.  It  is  not 
to  be  presumed  that  they  are  wholly  destitute  of  integrity  or 
judgment.  The  people  have  left  it  for  them  to  determine  for 
what  public  uses  private  property  may  be  condemned.  If  they 
abuse  their  trust,  the  responsibility  is  not  upon  the  courts,  nor 
the  remedy  in  them.  For  further  verification  of  the  views  here 
expressed  we  must  refer  to  the  subsequent  sections  of  this  chap- 
ter and  the  cases  therein  cited. 

§  259  (166).  Highways:  Questions  of  public  use,  as 
affected  by  their  character,  purpose  or  other  circumstances. 
Perhaps  no  better  example  of  a  public  use  can  be  given  than 
that  of  the  ordinary  highway,  where  the  easement  or  right  of 
way  vests  in  the  public  for  the  common  and  equal  use  of  all.** 
Private  property  taken  for  a  highway  is  taken  for  public  use, 
though  the  way  terminates  on  ground  used  for  a  church  and 
cemetery  and  be  laid  out  wholly  to  afford  access  to  such  ground,** 
or  though  it  accommodates  but  a  single  family,*''  or  though  it 

*  8In  a  recent  case  it  is  said :   "The  Superior  Court,  29  Wash.  1,  69  Pac. 

uses  which  should  be  deemed  public  366;     State  v.   Superior    Court,   47 

in  reference  to  the  right  of  the  legis-  Wash.  11,  91  Pac.  241.    A  highway  is 

lature  to  compel  an  individual  to  a  public  use,  though  of  special  in- 

part  with  his  property  for  a  compen-  terest    to    local    property    owners, 

sation,   and  to   authorize   or   direct  Wheelwright   v.   Boston,    188   Mass. 

taxation  to  pay  for  it,  are  being  en-  521,  74  N.  E.   937.     Footways  and 

larged  and  extended  with  the  prog-  alleys   are  within  the  definition  of 

ress  of  the  people  in  education  and  highways.     Boston  &  Albany  R.  R. 

refinement."     Attorney     General    v.  Co.  v.  Boston,  140  Mass.  87;  Savan- 

Williams,  174  Mass.  476,  55  N.  B.  nah  v.  Hancock,  91  Mo.  54. 
77.  4  4  West  Pikeland  Eoad,  63  Pa.  St. 

4  3San   Mateo   County   v.   Cobum,  471 ;  Kissinger  v.  Hanselman,  33  Ind. 

130  Cal.  631,  63  Pac.  78;  Miller  v.  80;  Cemetery  Assn.  v.  Meninger,  14 

Colonial  Forestry  Co.,  73  Conn.  500,  Kan.  312. 

503,  48  Atl.  98;   Speck  v.  Kenoyer,  4  5Robert3  v.  Williams,  15  Ark.  43; 

164  Ind.  431,  73  N.  B.  896;  State  v.  Johnson  v.   Supervisors  of  Clayton 


§  259 


WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USE. 


513 


be  a  mere  cul  de  sac*^  or  though  it  he  laid  out  in  one  town  solely 
for  the  henefit  of  lands  and  persons  belonging  in  another  town 
or  another  State,*''  or  though  its  purpose  be  to  afford  access  to 
a  farm,  lumber  yard,  or  mine.*®  So  a  highway  may  be  laid  out 
terminating  at  a  State  line,*®  or  town  line,^"  or  river,®^  or  to 
connect  with  a  highway  to  be  laid  out  in  an  adjoining  county.*^ 
A  highway  may  be  laid  out  to  form  an  approach  to  a  bridge, 
built  by  a  corporation  created  by  Congress.^*  But  a  road  which 
does  not  connect  with  or  intersect  any  public  road  is  not  a 
highway  and  cannot  be  laid  out  as  such.®^  It  is  immaterial 
what  the  object  of  travel  on  the  road  may  be,  whether  pleasure  or 
business.     The  proper  authorities  may  lay  out  roads  to  accom- 


Co.,  61  la.  89;  Pagels  v.  Oaks,  64  la. 
198;  Drake  v.  Clay,  Sneed.,  Ky.  139 
( but  see  Fletcher's  Heirs  v.  Fugate,  3 
J.  J.  Marsh,  Ky.  631 )  ;  Fanning  v. 
Gilleland,  37  Ore.  369,  61  Pac.  636, 
67  Pac.  209,  82  Am.  St.  Rep.  758; 
Paine  v.  Leicester,  22  Vt.  44;  Lewis 
V.  Washington,  5  Gratt.  265.  Contra: 
Kuowles'  Petition,  22  N.  H.  361; 
Underwood  v.  Bailey,  59  N.  H.  480. 
In  Richards  v.  Wolf,  82  la.  358,  47 
N.  W.  1044,  31  Am.  St.  Rep.  501,  it 
was  held  that  a  highway  could  not  be 
laid  out  which  would  be  practically 
for  the  convenience  of  one  person, 
whose  land  abutted  on  another  high- 
way. The  prior  cases  above  cited 
from  the  same  State  were  dis- 
tinguished. Bee  Matter  of  Whites- 
town,  24  N.  Y.  Misc.  150. 

4  6Sheaff  V.  People,  87  111.  189; 
Masters  v.  McHolland,  12  Kan.  17; 
Cemetery  Assn.  v.  Meninger,  14  Kan. 
312;  Fields  v.  Colby,  102  Mich.  450, 
60  N.  W.  1048;  People  v.  Van  Al- 
styne,  3  Keyes  35;  State  v.  Superior 
Court,  42  Wash.  521,  85  Pac.  256; 
Sehatz  v.  Pfeil,  56  Wis.  429;  John- 
ston V.  Lonstrof,  128  Wis.  17,  107  N. 
W.  459.  But  see  Holdane  v.  Village 
of  Cold  Spring,  23  Barb.  103;  Hol- 
dane V.  Cold  Spring,  21  N.  Y.  474; 
Greene  v.  O'Connor,  18  R.  I.  56,  25 
Atl.  692,  19  L.R.A.  262;  Mabler  v. 
Brumder,  92  Wis.  477,  66  N.  W.  502, 
Em.   D.— 33. 


31  L.R.A.  695;  Matter  of  Burdick,  27 
N.  Y.  Misc.  298. 

4  7Gilman  v.  Westfield,  47  Vt.  20; 
Crosby  v.  Hanover,  36  N.  H.  404. 

isMorrison  v.  Thistle  Coal  Co.,  119 
la.  705,  94  N.  W.  507;  Masters  v. 
McHolland,  12  Kan.  17;  State  v. 
Bishop,  39  N.  J.  L.  226;  Robinson  v. 
Winch,  66  Vt.  110,  28  Atl.  884.  See 
Matter  of  Lawton,  24  N.  Y.  Misc. 
426. 

4  9Riee  v.  Rindge,  53  N.  H.  530. 
BOGoodwin     v.     Wetliersfield,     43 

Conn.  437. 

51  Watson  V.  Town  Council  of 
South  Kingstown,  5  R.  I.  562 ;  Moore 
v.  Ange,  125  Ind.  562,  25  N.  E.  816. 

52Peckham  v.  Town  of  Lebanon,  39 
Conn.  231.  If  the  statute  requires  a 
highway  to  lead  to  some  public  point 
or  place,  a  highway  terminating  at  a 
railroad  is  bad.  Road  in  Upper  Dar- 
by, 2  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  366. 

5  4Luxton  V.  North  Riv.  Bridge  Co., 
153  U.  S.  525. 

5  estate  v.  Price,  21  Md.  448;  Snow 
V.  Town  of  Sandgate,  66  Vt.  461,  29 
Atl.  673 ;  Wallmau  v.  R.  Connor  Co., 
115  Wis.  617,  92  N.  W.  374.  "To  be 
public.  It  must  not  only  be  nominally 
open  for  use  by  the  public,  but  it 
must  be  so  located  that  the  public 
can  get  on  to  it  at  some  point."  Last 
case,  p.  620. 


514 


EMIITEITT  DOMAIW. 


§  25y 


modate  all  lawful  travel.  It  lias  accordingly  been  held  that  high- 
ways may  be  laid  out  for  the  purpose  of  affording  access  to  points 
which  command  a  fine  view  or  are  resorted  to  for  pleasure.^® 
So  the  public  nature  of  the  use  is  not  affected  by  the  fact  that 
the  expense  is  defrayed  in  whole  or  in  part  by  private  contri- 
bution,^'^ but  it  has  been  held  that  a  road  which  it  not  of  public 
utility  cannot  be  laid  out  merely  because  private  parties  are  will- 
ing to  defray  the  expense.^^  Land  taken  for  a  ditch  to  drain  and 
improve  a  highway  is  taken  for  a  public  use.*®  In  the  absence 
of  special  statutory  or  constitutional  provisions  it  is  for  the 
proper  public  authorities  to  determine  whether  a  particular  high- 
way is  necessary  and  proper,  and  with  this  question  the  courts 
have  nothing  to  do.  A  highway  is  a  public  use,  but  the  need  of 
it  is  a  question  of  expediency.®"  Taking  property  to  widen  a 
street  or  highway  is  for  a  public  use  as  much  as  the  original  es- 
tablishment of  a  highway.*^    And  a  street  may  be  widened  for 


B6Higginson  v.  Nahant,  11  Allen, 
530;  Petition  of  Mount  Washington 
Road  Co.,  35  N.  H.  134. 

5  7  Santa  Ana  v.  Harlin,  99  Cal. 
538,  34  Pac.  224 ;  Townsend  v.  Hoyle, 
20  Conn.  1 ;  Chicago  etc.  K.  E.  Co.  v. 
Naperville,  169  111.  25,  48  N.  E.  335; 
Butts  V.  Geary  County,  7  Kan.  App. 
302;  Inhabitg,nts  of  Vasselborough, 
19  Me.  338;  Coombs  v.  County 
Comrs.,  68  Me.  484 ;  Parks  v.  Boston, 
8  Pick.  218,  19  Am.  Dec.  322;  Cope- 
land  V.  Packard,  16  Pick.  217 ;  Blake 
V.  County  Comrs.,  114  Mass.  583;  At- 
kinson V.  Newton,  169  Mass.  242,  47 
N.  E.  1029;  Seafield  v.  Bohne,  169 
Mo.  537,  69  S.  W.  1051;  Smith  v. 
Conway,  17  N.  H.  586,  592;  Kelley  v. 
Kenuard,  60  N.  H.  1 ;  State  v.  Jus- 
tice, 24  N.  J.  L.  413 ;  State  v.  City  of 
Orange,  54  N.  J.  L.  Ill,  22  Atl.  1004, 
14  L.R.A.  62;  State  v.  New  Bruns- 
wick, 58  N.  J.  L.  225,  33  Atl.  477; 
Commissioners  of  Canal  Fund  v. 
Perry,  5  Ohio,  58 ;  State  v.  Collins,  6 
Ohio,  126;  Dwiggins  v.  Denver,  24 
Ohio  St.  629 ;  Bern  v.  Penn  Tp.  Road, 
2  Monaghan  (Pa.)  105;  Patchen  v. 
Doolittle,  3  Vt.  457 ;  State  v.  Geneva, 
107  Wis.  1,  82  N.  W.  550. 


ssBlackman  v.  Halves,  72  Ind.  515 ; 
Dudley  v.  Cilley,  5  N.  H.  558;  Hamp- 
ton V.  Poland,  50  N.  J.  L.  367,  13  Atl. 
174;  Commonwealth  v.  Sawin,  2  Pick. 
547 ;  Frederick  Street,  12  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 
577;  East  Whiteland  Tp.  Road,  30 
Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  211;  State  v.  Ryan,  127 
Wis.  599,  106  N.  W.  1093.  In  the  lat- 
ter case  an  order  establishing  a  road 
was  held  void,  where  it  appeared  that 
before  entering  the  order  the  com- 
missioners took  a  bond  from  a  private 
individual  conditioned  that  he  would 
construct  the  road  at  his  own  ex- 
pense, though  two  of  the  three  com- 
missioners were  in  favor  of  laying 
out  the  road  before  the  bond  was 
given  and  testified  that  they  were 
not  influenced  by  it. 

6  9Smeaton  v.  Martin,  57  Wis.  364. 

iopost,  §  369.  San  Mateo  County 
V.  Coburn,  130  Cal.  631,  63  Pac.  78; 
Opp  V.  Timmons,  149  Ind.  236,  48  Ind. 
1038;  Speck  v.  Kenoyer,  164  Ind.  431, 
73  N.  E.  896;  New  Orleans  v.  Stein- 
hardt,  52  La.  An.  1043,  27  So.  586. 

siMendocino  County  v.  Peters,  2 
Oal.  App.  24,  82  Pac.  1122. 


§  260 


WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USE. 


615 


the  purpose  of  securing  land  for  ornamental  purposes  and  for 
light  and  air.*^ 

§  260  (167).  Private  roads.  Laws  have  existed,  and, 
perhaps,  do  still  exist  in  most  of  the  States  for  the  laying  out  of 
what  are  usually  called  private  roads,  but  which  are  also  called 
in  some  States,  township,  neighborhood  or  pent  roads.  These 
statutes  have  in  some  cases  been  held  valid,  and  in  others  inval- 
id. There  is,  however,  but  little,  if  any,  real  conflict  of  au- 
thority, as  appears  when  the  cases  are  examined  and  compared. 
The  key  to  their  reconciliation  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  the 
phrase  private  roads  or  private  ways  is  used  in  different  States 
and  different  statutes  to  designate  roads  of  entirely  different 
character.  "Where  the  road,  though  laid  out  on  the  application 
and  paid  for  and  kept  in  repair  by  a  particular  individual  who 
is  especially  accommodated  thereby,  is,  in  fact,  a  public  road 
and  for  the  use  of  all  who  may  desire  to  use  it,  then  it  is  regarded 
as  accomplishing  a  public  purpose  for  which  land  may  be  con- 
demned.®^ But  when  the  road,  after  being  laid  out,  becomes 
the  property  of  the  applicant,  from  which  he  may  lawfully  ex- 


8  2Matter  of  Clinton  Ave.,  57  App. 
Div.  166,  68  N.  Y.  S.  196;  S.  C.  af- 
firmed, 167  N.  Y.  624,  60  N.  E.  1108. 

esRoberts  v.  Williams,  15  Ark.  43; 
Pippin  V.  May,  78  Ark.  18,  93  S.  W. 
64;  Sherman  v.  Buick,  32  Cal.  241, 
91  Am.  Dec.  577 ;  Butte  Co.  v.  Boyds- 
ton,  64  Cal.  110;  Monterey  County  v. 
Gushing,  83  Cal.  507,  23  Pa.  700;  Los 
Angeles  County  v.  Reyes  (Cal.),  32 
Pac.  233;  Madera  County  v.  Ray- 
mond Granite  Co.,  139  Cal.  128,  72 
Pac.  915;  Mariposa  County  v. 
Knowles,  146  Cal.  1,  79  Pac.  525; 
Hickman's  Case,  4  Harr.  (Del.)  580; 
Brewer  v.  Bowman,  9  Ga.  37;  Latah 
County  V.  Petei;son,  2  Idaho,  1118,  29 
Pac.  1089,  16  L.R.A.  81;  Latah 
County  V.  Hasfurther,  12  Ida.  797,  88 
Pac.  433;  Johnson  County  v.  Min- 
near,  72  Kan.  326,  83  Pac.  828;  Den- 
ham  V.  County  Comrs.  of  Bristol,  108 
Mass.  202;  Davis  v.  Smith,  130  Mass. 
113;  Downing  v.  Corcoran,  112  Mo. 
App.  645,  87  S.  W.  114;  Metcalf  v. 
Bingham,  3  N.  H.  459;  Clark  v.  Bos- 
ton etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  24  N.  H.  118;  Proc- 


tor V.  Andover,  42  N.  H.  348;  Perrine 
V.  Farr,  22  N.  J.  L.  356;  Cook  v. 
Vickers,  141  N.  C.  101,  53  S.  E.  740; 
Shaver  v.  Starrett,  4  Ohio  St.  494; 
Ferris  v.  Bramble,  5  Ohio  St.  109; 
County  of  Douglas  v.  Clark,  15  Ore. 
3,  16  Pac.  420;  Wolcott  v.  Whitcomb, 
40  Vt.  40;  Whitingham  v.  Bowen,  22 
Vt.  317;  Brock  v.  Barnett,  57  Vt. 
172.  The  text  is  sustained  in  Towns 
V.  Klamath  County,  33  Or.  225,  53 
Pac.  604,  in  which  the  court  says: 
"If  by  a  fair  construction  and  opera- 
tion of  the  statutes,  the  road,  when 
laid  out,  is  in  fact  a  public  road,  for 
the  use  of  all  who  may  desire  to  use 
it,  the  law  is  not  liable  to  the  charge 
of  unconstitutionality,  and  is  valid, 
though  the  road  may  be  laid  out  on 
the  application  of,  paid  for  and  kept 
in  repair  by  the  petitioner,  and  pri- 
marily designed  for  his  benefit;  but 
if  such  road  is  to  become  a  mere  pri- 
vate way,  and  not  open  to  the  public, 
the  law  sanctioning  it  is  void,"  p. 
232.  See  also  Sullivan  v.  Kline,  33 
Ore.  260,  64  Pac.  154. 


516 


EMINENT  DOMAIN'. 


§  260 


clud^i  the  public,  then  the  use  is  strictly  private,  and  the  law 
authorizing  the  condemnation  of  property  therefor  is  void."*  In 
many  cases,  it  will  be  found,  the  constitutional  question  is  not 
raised  or  considered.®^ 

Whether  a  private  way  is  the  exclusive  property  of  the  appli- 
cant or  is  open  to  public  use  must  be  determined  from  the  stat- 
ute. If  the  statute  provides  that  it  shall  be  for  public  use,** 
or  for  the  exclusive  use  of  the  applicant,  that  settles  the  ques- 
tion.*'' If  any  part  of  the  expense  may  be  imposed  upon  the 
public,  that  circumstance  would  indicate  that  it  was  intended 
to  be  for  the  use  of  the  public.**  Where  the  statute  provides 
that  the  applicant  shall  pay  the  cost  of  the  road  and  that  it  shall 


6  <  Sadler  v.  Langham,  34  Ala.  311; 
Nesbitt  V.  Trumbo,  39  111.  110,  89  Am. 
Dec.  290;  Crear  v.  Crossly,  40  111. 
175;  Wild  v.  Deig,  43  Ind.  455,  13 
Am.  Rep.  399;  Stewart  v.  Hartman, 
46  Ind.  331;  Logan  v.  Stogdale,  123 
Ind.  372,  24  N.  E.  135,  8  L.R.A.  58; 
Bankhead  v.  Brown,  25  la.  540 ;  Clark 
V.  Board  of  Comrs.,  69  Kan.  542,  77 
Pae.  284,  66  L.R.A.  965;  Dent  v. 
Smith,  76  Kan.  381,  92  Pae.  307; 
Shake  v.  Frazer,  94  Ky.  143,  21  S.  W. 
583;  Dickey  v.  Tennison,  27  Mo.  373; 
Welton  V.  Dickson,  38  Neb.  767,  57  N. 
W.  559,  41  Am.  St.  Rep.  771,  22 
L.R.A.  496;  Taylor  v.  Porter,  4  Hill 
140,  40  Am.  Dec.  274;  Mohawk  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  T.  Artcher,  6  Paige  83; 
Burgwyn  v.  Lockhart,  Winston  Law, 
269;  Plimmons  v.  Frisby,  ibid,  201; 
Witham  v.  Osburn,  4  Ore.  318,  18  Am. 
Rep.  287 ;  Beaudrot  v.  Murphy,  53  S. 
C.  118,  30  S.  E.  825;  Rice  v.  Alley,  1 
Sneed  51;  Clack  v.  White,  2  Swan 
540;  Healy  Lumber  Co.  v.  Morris,  33 
Wash.  490,  74  Pae.  681,  99  Am.  St. 
Rep.  964,  63  L.R.A.  820;  Varner  v. 
Martin,  21  W.  Va.  534;  Osborn  v. 
Hart,  24  Wis.  89,  1  Am.  Rep.  161; 
Wallman  v.  R.  Connor  Co.,  115  Wis. 
617,  92  N.  W.  374. 

65Leach  v.  Day,  27  Cal.  643; 
Reynolds  v.  Reynolds,  15  Conn.  83; 
Bradford  v.  Cole,  8  Fla.  263 ;  Ryker 
V.  KcElroy,  28  Ind.  179;  McCauley  v. 


Dunlap,  4  B.  Mon.  57;  Rout  v. 
Mountjoy,  3  B.  Mon.  300;  Jones' 
Heirs  v.  Barclay,  2  J.  J.  Marsh  73; 
Littlejohn  v.  Cox,  15  La.  An.  67; 
Perry  v.  Webb,  21  La.  An.  247; 
North  Berwick  v.  Commissioners  of 
York,  25  Me.  69;  Lyon  v.  Hamor,  73 
Me.  56;  Owings  v.  Worthington,  10 
G.  &  J.  283 ;  Hall  v.  Pettit,  88  Mich. 
158,  50  N.  W.  117;  Singleton  v.  Com- 
missioners, 2  Nott.  &  McC.  526;  War- 
lick  V.  Lowman,  103  N.  C.  122,  9  S. 
E.  458;  Burwell  v.  Sneed,  104  N.  C. 
118,  10  S.  E.  152;  Warlick  v.  Low- 
man,  104  N.  C.  403,  10  S.  E.  474; 
Road  Case,  4  Yates  514. 

6  6Loveland  v.  Town  of  Berlin,  27 
Vt.  713. 

6  7 Wild  V.  Deig,  43  Ind.  455,  13  Am. 
Rep.  399.  But  in  Logan  v.  Stogdale, 
123  Ind.  372,  24  N.  E.  135,  8  L.R.A. 
58,  an  act,  which  authorized  the  lay- 
ing out  of  "branch  highways"  on  the 
petition  of  any  freeholder  who  had 
no  outlet  to  a  highway,  was  held  void, 
though  the  roads  provided  for  were 
declared  to  be  highways. 

ssDenham  v.  County  Commission- 
ers, 108  Mass.  202.  Here  the  statute 
authorized  the  laying  out  of  "private 
ways  for  the  use  of  one  or  more  of  the 
inhabitants,"  but  the  applicant  was 
only  to  pay  such  part  of  the  cost  as 
the  commissioners  should  deem  reas- 
onable, and  the  residue,  if  any,  was  to 


§    260  WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USE.  517 

be  for  the  use  of  himself,  his  heirs  or  assigns,  it  will  he  deemed 
to  intend  that  the  road  shall  be  private  property,  and  the  act  will 
be  void.^*  So  where  the  statute  provided  that  the  applicant 
should  pay  the  damages  assessed  and  the  cost  of  laying  out 
the  road  and  that  thereupon  "such  road  shall  be  considered 
as  the  private  way  of  such  person,  who  shall  keep  open  and  re- 
pair the  same  at  his  own  expense." '"'  Where  the  act  provides 
that  the  road  shall  be  laid  out  on  the  application  of  the  individual 
or  individuals  to  be  benefited,  who  are  to  pay  the  expense  of  its 
establishment  and  maintenance,  and  gives  no  other  indication  of 
intent,  it  is  generally  held  to  provide  for  a  strictly  private  road, 
and  to  be  void.''^  The  supreme  court  of  Iowa  assigns  the  fol- 
lowing reasons  for  this  conclusion : 

"Mrst.  The  statute  denominates  them  'private  roads,'  and 
is  entitled,  'an  act  to  provide  for  establishing  private  roads.' 
If  the  roads  established  thereunder  were  not  intended  to  be  pri- 
vate, and  different  from  ordinary  and  public  roads,  there  was  no 
necessity  for  the  act. 

"Second.  Such  road  may  be  established  on  the  petition  of 
the  applicant  alone ;  and  he  must  pay  the  costs  and  damages  oc- 
casioned thereby,  and  perform  such  other  conditions  as  to  fences, 
etc.,  as  the  board  may  prescribe. 

"Third.  The  public  are  not  bound  to  work  or  keep  such 
roads  in  repair,  and  this  is  a  very  satisfactory  test  as  to  whether 
a  road  is  public  or  private. 

"Fourth.  We  see  no  reason,  when  such  a  road  is  established, 
why  the  person  at  whose  instance  this  was  done,  might  not  lock 
the  gates  opening  into  it,  or  fence  it  up,  or  otherwise  debar  the 
public  to  any  rights  thereto."  '"^ 

On  the  other  hand,  such  roads  have  been  held  public  on  the 
ground  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  court  so  to  construe  the  act, 
if  possible,  as  to  make  it  valid,'^*  and  this  even  in  case  of  an  act 

be  paid  by  the  town.    In  the  particu-  Wild  v.  Deig,  43  Ind.  455,  13   Am 

lar  case  the  applicant  paid  the  whole  Rep.    399    {overruling    Kissinger   v. 

cost,  but  it  was  held  a  public  way.  Hansleman,  33  Ind.  80)  ;  Stewart  v. 

6  9Nesbitt  V.  Trumbo,  39  111.  110,  Hartman,  46  Ind.  331;  Bankhead  v. 

89  Am.  Dec.  290;  Taylor  v.  Porter,  4  Brown,  25  la.  540;  Dickey  v.  Tenni- 

Hill  140,  40  Am.  Dec.  274;  Varner  v.  son,  27  Mo.  373;  Witham  v.  Osburn, 

Martin,  21   W.  Va.  534;   Osborn  v.  4  Ore.  318. 

Hart,  24  Wis.  89,  1  Am.  Eep.  161.  7  2Bankhead  v.  Brown,  25  la.  540, 

70Arnaperger  v.  Crawford,  101  Md.  547. 

247,  61  Atl.  413,  70  L.R.A.  497.  73Roberts  v.  Williams,  15  Ark.  43. 

7iSadler  v.  Langham,  34  Ala.  311; 


518 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  260 


which  provided  that  the  roads  should  "be,  to  all  intents  and  pur- 
poses, private  roads  for  the  use  of  the  parties  interested."  ''* 
Though  the  cost  and  repair  of  the  road  are  cast  upon  the  appli- 
cant, yet,  if  the  repairs  are  subject  to  the  supervision  and  con- 
trol of  public  officers,  it  will  be  deemed  a  public  road.'^^ 


'74Sherman  v.  Buick,  32  Cal.  241, 
251.  In  this  case  the  court,  referring 
to  the  legislature,  says:  "By  dis- 
tinguishing or  classifying  roads  or 
highways  by  the  words  'public'  and 
'private,'  and  providing  different 
modes  for  their  establishment  and 
support,  and  declaring  that  the  latter 
class  'shall  be,  to  all  intents  and  pur- 
poses, private  roads  for  the  use  of 
parties  interested,'  they  give  color  to 
the  idea  that,  in  their  judgment,  they 
have  the  power  to  create  and  are 
creating  a  road  for  private  use,  and 
to  make  and  are  making  it  the  pri- 
vate property  of  certain  persons  to 
the  exclusion  of  all  others.  If  we 
look  solely  at  their  language  without 
regard  to  the  true  nature  of  the  only 
power  which  they  possessed  in  the 
premises,  an  impression  that  the 
property  of  the  owner  of  the  land  is 
taken  for  private  use  is  created,  for 
there  is  an  apparent,  if  not  an  ex- 
press, appropriation  of  it  to  the  use 
of  certain  parties  to  the  exclusion  of 
all  others.  But  it  is  well  understood 
that  the  language  of  the  legislature 
is  to  be  read  in  all  cases  by  the  light 
of  the  constitution,  with  the  spirit  of 
which  it  is  always  presumed  to  be 
consistent.  In  construing  it,  it  is 
the  duty  of  the  courts  to  look  to  the 
true  object  and  to  trace  out  the  true 
results,  and  not  to  be  guided  by  those 
which  the  legislature  has  mistakenly 
assumed  or  declared;  and  if  they  be 
found  to  be  consistent  with  the  con- 
stitution, or  within  the  acknowledged 
power  of  the  legislature,  to  uphold 
the  act  as  to  its  legitimate  results 
and  to  discard  all  else.  Thus,  if  the 
legislature   provides   for  the  laying 


out  and  establishing  of  a  certain 
class  of  roads  or  highways  which 
from  any  cause,  whether  for  the  pur- 
poses of  classification  or  otherwise, 
is  denominated  'private,'  or  as  being 
for  the  especial  benefit  of  certain  in- 
dividuals upon  whom  the  burden  of 
cost  and  repair  is  cast,  instead  of  the 
public  at-  large,  it  by  no  means  fol- 
lows that  such  roads  become  the  pri- 
vate property  or  estate  of  the  indi- 
viduals designated,  even  if  the  legis- 
lature has  at)  provided  in  express 
terms;  for  where  roads  are  laid  out, 
whether  mainly  for  the  accommoda- 
tion of  particular  neighborhoods  or 
individuals  or  not,  it  must  be  under- 
stood as  having  been  provided  for  the 
use  of  every  one  who  may  have  occa- 
sion to  travel  it,  and  hence  as  being 
public.  In  other  words,  the  legis- 
lature has  no  power  to  lay  out  and 
establish  'private  roads,'  in  the  sense 
that  they  are  to  be  the  private  prop- 
erty of  particular  individuals,  or 
that  they  are  what  are  denominated 
'private  ways'  at  common  law;  and 
hence,  so  far  as  they  undertake  to 
do  so,  their  action  is  simply  null  and 
void ;  but  the  road  so  laid  out  and 
established  becomes  a  way  over 
which  all  may  lawfully  pass  who 
have  occasion,  and  therefore  public; 
and  the  language  employed  by  the 
legislature,  so  far  as  it  relates  to  the 
legal  character  of  the  road — as  pub- 
lic or  private — ^must  be  understood 
as  being  used  for  the  purpose  of  dis- 
tinguishing it  from  all  other  roads, 
or,  in  general  terms,  for  the  purposes 
of  classification." 

TSHickman's  Case,  4  Harr.   (Del.) 
580,  and  Statutes  of  Delaware. 


§    2C0  WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USE.  519 

In  Kentucky  a  statute  has  existed  since  1820  providing  for 
the  establishment  of  private  passways  over  the  land  of  others, 
when  necessary  to  enable  a  citizen  "to  attend  courts,  elections, 
a  meeting-house,  a  mill,  a  warehouse,  ferry,  to  pass  from  one 
tract  of  land  to  another  owned  hy  liim,  or  railroad  depot  most 
convenient  to  his  residence."  ''^  The  validity  of  this  statute 
passed  unchallenged  for  many  years,''''  but  was  finally  passed 
upon  in  Robinson  v.  Swope.''^  It  seems  to  have  been  con- 
ceded that  all  such  passways  were  private  property.  The  court, 
in  view  of  the  long  acquiescence  in  the  enforcement  of  the  stat- 
ute and  the  manifest  utility  of  such  ways  and  of  the  statute  be- 
ing in  force  when  the  present  constitution  was  adopted,  sustains 
the  act,  except  the  clause  in  italics,  which,  being  a  recent  intro- 
duction and  not  of  public  utility,  was  held  void.  The  same  view 
is  implied  in  Georgia''^  and  perhaps  also  in  Connecticut,^" 
though  in  neither  State  has  the  point  been  decided.  In  Penn- 
sylvania statutes  have  existed  for  the  establishment  of  private 
roads  since  1735.*^  They  may  be  laid  out  from  "dwellings 
and  plantations  to  a  highway  or  place  of  necessary  public  resort, 
or  to  any  private  way  leading  to  a  highway."  *^  The  roads  here 
provided  for  are  spoken  of  as  quasi  public,*^  and  have  been  sus- 
tained as  a  valid  exercise  of  the  power  of  eminent  domain.®*    It 

76Statutes  of  Ky.  1883,  p.  770.  94  Ky.  143,  21  S.  W.  583,  is  a  similar 

77Jones'  Heirs  v.  Barclay,  2  J.  J.  ease.   And  see  Vice  v.  Eden,  113  Ky. 

Marsh  73 ;  McCauley  v.  Dunlap,  4  B.  255,  68  S.  W.  125,  as  to  when  a  neces- 

Mon.   57;   Rout  v.   Mountjoy,   3  B.  sity  is  shown  within  the  statute. 

Men.   300;    Troutman   v.   Barnes,   4  7  9Brewer   v.   Bowman,   9   Ga.   37. 

Met.  (Ky.)  337.  The  law  was  held  void  because  it  did 

7  812  Bush.  21.    "We  have  no  hesi-  not  provide  for  compensation. 

tation  in  holding,"   says  the  court,  soReynolds  v.  Reynolds,  15  Conn. 

"that  the  general  assembly  may,  in  83.     The  court  here  expressly  declines 

the  exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent  to  consider  the  question  because  not 

domain,  authorize  the  establishment  properly  raised. 

of  private  passways  over  the  lands  of  siWaddell's  Appeal,  84  Pa.  St.  at 

others  when  it  is  necessary  to  enable  p.  92. 

any  inhabitant  of  the  State  to  attend  s^Purdon's  Statutes,  p.  646.     Act 

courts,  elections,  or  mills,  or  to  reach  13,  June,  1836. 

an     established     public     highway."  ssWaddell's  Appeal,  84  Pa.  St.  90, 

p.  25.    It  is  to  be  observed,  however,  94. 

that  the  point  decided  in  this  case  84Pocopsen  Road,  16  Pa.   St.   15; 

was  that  such  a  way  could  not  be  also,  Stuber's  Road,  28  Pa.  St.  199; 

laid  out  to  pass  from  one  tract  of  a  Sandy  Lick  Creek  Road,  51  Pa.  St. 

man's  land  to  another,  and  that,  con-  94;  Keeling's  Road,  59  Pa.  St.  358; 

sequently,     the     remainder     of     the  Dickinson   Tp.   Road,   23   Pa.   Supr. 

opinion  is  dictum.    Shake  v.  Fraser,  Ct.  34. 


520 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


§    260 


has  been  held  under  other  statutes  in  that  State  that  a  right  of 
way  for  mere  private  use  cannot  be  condemned.®^ 

It  has  never,  we  think,  been  decided  in  any  case  that  private 
property  could  be  condemned  for  a  private  road  for  the  exclu- 
sive use  of  the  applicant,  and  we  know  of  no  principle  upon 
which  such  a  proceeding  can  be  justified.  It  is  undoubtedly 
within  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  lay  out  public  ways  to  con- 
nect private  premises  with  a  public  way  or  place  of  public  re- 
sort.*^ It  is  a  question  for  the  legislature  whether  the  public 
welfare  will  be  promoted  by  such  an  appropriation. 

It  has  been  held  that  where  one  has  a  way  of  necessity  over 
the  land  of  another  at  common  law,  it  is  competent  for  the  legis- 
lature to  prescribe  how  this  shall  be  established,  and  that  such 
a  law  would  not  divest  private  property  for  private  use,  but 
only  regulate  the  exercise  of  an  existing  private  right.*^  The 
owner  of  land  taken  for  a  private  road  may  waive  the  unconsti- 
tutionality of  the  act  and  recover  the  damages  awarded.**  In 
some  States  the  laying  out  of  private  ways  is  expressly  sanc- 
tioned by  the  constitution,*®  or  the  constitution  is  construed  as 
giving  such  authority."*    A  constitutional  provision  authorizing 


sBMcCaudless'  Appeal,  70  Pa.  St. 
210;  Waddell's  Appeal,  84  Pa.  St.  90. 

SBBankhead  v.  Brown,  25  la.  540, 
554;  Witham  v.  Osburn,  4  Ore.  318, 
18  Am.  Rep.  287;  Wild  v.  Deig,  43 
Ind.  455,  13  Am.  Rep.  399;  and  see 
Lewis  V.  Washington,  5  Gratt  265. 

sTSnyder  v.  Warford,  11  Mo.  513, 
49  Am.  Dec.  94;  Lawrence,  J.,  in 
Crear  v.  Crossly,  40  111.  175. 

ssPos*,  §  260.  One  who  has  peti- 
tioned for  a  private  road  and  used 
it,  will  be  estopped  from  denying  the 
validity  of  the  proceedings  when 
sued  for  the  damages  awarded.  Fer- 
nald  V.  Palmer,  83  Me.  244,  22  Atl. 
467.  Those  who  have  accepted  the 
damages  for  the  laying  out  of  pri- 
vate roads  will  be  estopped  from 
questioning  their  validity.  Arns- 
perger  v.  Crawford,  101  Md.  247,  61 
Atl.  413,  70  L.R.A.  497. 

^^ Michigan  constitution,  art.  18, 
sec.  14 ;  Soheh  v.  Detroit,  45  Mich. 
620;     Ayres    v.   Riclii\rds,    38   Mich. 


214;  South  Carolina  constitution, 
art.  1,  sec.  23;  State  v.  Stockhouse, 
14  S.  C.  417.  Alahama,  art.  1,  sec. 
5;  Steele  v.  County  Comrs.,  83  Ala. 
304.  Colorado,  art.  2,  sec.  14. 
Qeorgia,  art.  1,  sees.  17,  20;  Norman- 
dale  Lumber  Co.  v.  Knight,  89  Ga. 
Ill,  14  S.  E.  Rep.  882.  Missouri,  art. 
2,  sec.  20;  Belk  v.  Hamilton,  130  Mo. 
292,  32  S.  W.  Rep.  656.  Montana, 
art.  3,  sec.  15;  State  v.  District 
Court,  14  Mont.  476,  37  Pae.  Rep.  7. 
Washington,  art.  1,  sec.  16;  Long  v. 
Billings,  7  Wash.  267,  34  Pac.  Rep. 
936.  New  York,  art.  1,  sec.  7;  and 
see  Illinois,  art.  4,  sec.  30. 

soArt.  1,  sec.  14  of  the  constitution 
of  Idaho  provides  as  follows:  "The 
necessary  use  of  lands  for  reservoirs 
or  storage  basins,  for  the  purposes 
of  irrigation,  or  for  rights  of  way  for 
the  construction  of  canals,  ditches, 
flumes,  or  pipes,  *  *  *  or  any  other 
use  necessary  to  the  complete  devel- 
opment of  the  material  resources  of 


§  260 


WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC   USB. 


521 


the  taking  of  lands  for  private  ways  of  necessity,  is  not  self- 
executing,  and  such  ways  cannot  be  laid  out  without  statutory 
authority.®^  When  private  ways  are  permitted  by  the  constitu- 
tion when  certain  conditions  exist,  these  conditions  must  be  af- 
firmatively shown  in  order  to  justify  the  exercise  of  the  power.*^ 
Where  the  constitution  sanctions  the  establishment  of  "private 
ways  of  necessity,"  or  "in  cases  of  necessity,"  ®^  one  cannot  be 
laid  out  simply  because  it  will  be  more  convenient  or  less  ex- 
pensive for  the  applicant,  than  one  on  his  own  land.®*  To  create 
such  a  necessity  as  is  contemplated,  it  is  probable  that  the  ap- 
plicant's land  would  have  to  be  surrounded  by  the  land  of 
others.*'     The  statutory  power  to  lay  out  private  roads  of  any 


the  State,  *  *  *  is  hereby  declared  to 
be  a  public  use.''  This  was  held  to 
authorize  the  laying  out  of  private 
roads.  Latah  County  v.  Peterson,  2 
Idaho  1118,  29  Pac.  1089,  16  L.R.A. 
81.  "The  necessity  for  such  private 
roads  is  apparent  when  it  is  stated 
that  it  would  be  impossible  to  im- 
prove very  many  valuable  tracts  of 
land  in  this  State  which  are  not 
reached  by  public  highways,  unless 
this  power  existed.  Such  roads  are 
therefore  necessary  to  the  complete 
development  of  the  material  re- 
sources of  the  State." 

siLong  V.  Billings,  7  Wash.  267, 
34  Pac.  936. 

9  zjformandale  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Knight,  89  Ga.  HI,  14  S.  E.  882; 
Latah  County  v.  Peterson,  2  Idaho 
1118,  29  Pac.  1089,  16  L.R.A.  81; 
Belk  v.  Hamilton,  130  Mo.  292,  32  S. 
W.  656;  State  v.  District  Judge,  14 
Mont.  476,  37  Pac.  7;  Long  v.  Bill- 
ings, 7  Wash.  267,  34  Pac.  939. 

9  3vgee  constitutional  provisions  of 
Colorado,  Georgia,  Missouri  and 
Washington  above  cited,  note  89. 

9<Normandale  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Knight,  89  Ga.  HI,  14  S.  E.  882; 
Chattanooga  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Phil- 
pot,  112  Ga.  153,  37  S.  E.  181; 
Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Fleming, 
110  Ga.  995,  47  S.  E.  541;  Jones  v. 


Venable,  120  Ga.  1,  47  S.  E.  549; 
Gaines  v.  Lunsford,  120  Ga.  370,  47 
S.  E.  967, 102  Am.  St.  Rep.  109;  Neal 
V.  Neal,  122  Ga.  804,  50  S.  E.  929. 
Compare  Pippin  v.  May,  78  Ark.  18, 
93  S.  W.  64.  See  Vice  v.  Eden,  113 
Ky.  255,  68  S.  W.  125;  Chandler  v. 
Reading,  129  Mo.  App.  63.  A  law 
authorizing  the  taking  of  property 
for  private  use  "must  be  closely 
scrutinized,  strictly  construed  and 
sparingly  enforced."  Chattanooga 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Philpot,  112  Ga.  153, 
154,  37  S.  E.  181. 

9  6Belk  V.  Hamilton,  130  Mo.  292, 
32  S.  W.  656.  In  Chattanooga  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Philpot,  112  Ga.  153,  37 
S.  E.  181,  the  court  says:  "The  word 
■'necessity'  as  used  in  the  constitu- 
tion is  to  be  given  its  most  restricted 
meaning.  So  construing  it,  a  case  of 
necessity  authorizing  the  laying  out 
of  a  private  way  would  not  arise 
unless  it  was  shown  that  the  way 
sought  to  be  laid  out  was  indispen- 
sable to  the  use  or  enjoyment  of  the 
farm  or  place  of  residence,  as  the 
case  might  be.  If  there  is  a  way  by 
which  the  applicant  can  lawfully 
reach  his  farm  or  place  of  residence, 
a  case  of  necessity  does  not  exist 
within  the  meaning  of  the  constitu- 
tion." 


522 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


261 


description  must  be  strictly  complied  with  and  all  the  ccHiditions 
precedent  must  be  shown  to  exist.®® 

§  261  (168).  Toll  roads,  bridges  and  ferries.  Prop- 
erty taken  for  toll  roads,  toll  bridges  and  ferries  is  taken  for  pub- 
lic use.'''  They  are  public  highways  which  every  member  of  the 
public  is  entitled  to  use,  and  do  not  differ  in  any  essential  par- 
ticular from  the  common  highway  opened  and  maintained  at  the 
expense  of  the  public.*® 

§  262  (169).  Canals.  Canals  to  be  used  as  highways 
by  water  are  a  public  use.®*  But  more  water  cannot  be  taken 
than  is  necessary  for  navigation,  for  the  purpose  of  selling  it  to 
private  individuals  for  power  or  other  use.^     But  so  long  as 


9 'Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Flem- 
ing,  119  Ga.  995,  47  S.  E.  541 ;  Breaux 
V.  Bienvenue,  51  La.  An.  687,  25  So. 
321 ;  Hall  v.  Pettit,  88  Mich.  158,  50 
N.  W.  117;  Warlick  v.  Lowman,  103 
N.  C.  122,  9  S.  E.  458;  Burwell  v. 
Sneed,  104  N.  C.  118,  10  S.  E.  152; 
Warlick  v.  Lowman,  104  N.  C.  403, 
10  S.  E.  474;  In  re  Road  in  Breneh- 
nock  Tp.,  2  Woodward's  Decs.  (Pa.) 
437. 

9  7 Arnold  v.  Covington  &  Cincin- 
nati Bridge  Co.,  1  Duval  372;  Young 
V.  Buckingham,  5  Ohio  485;  Plecker 
V.  Rhodes,  30  Gratt.  795.  A  horse 
ferry  is  a  public  use.  Day  v.  Stet- 
son, 8  Me.  365;  Young  v.  McKenzie, 
3  Ga.  31.  So  of  land  taken  for  an 
approach  to  a  public  ferry.  Drake 
v.  Clay,  Sneed,  139.  Or  a  bridge. 
Luxton  V.  North  Riv.  Bridge  Co.,  153 
U.  S.  525. 

9  8  "A  road  constructed  and  sup- 
ported by  a  turnpike  corporation 
differs  in  no  essential  characteristic 
from  a  common  highway,  established 
and  supported  by  a  town,  a  borough, 
or  a  city.  Their  origin  and  objects 
are  identical.  Both  emanate  from 
the  same  supreme  power,  acting 
through  the  legislature,  the  courts, 
or  other  depositaries  of  authority 
designated  by  the  laws.  Both  are 
called  into  existence,  and  supported. 


to  subserve,  in  exactly  the  same  way. 
the  public  necessities  and  conveni- 
ence and  both  alike  are  intended  to 
endure  for  an  indefinite  period,  and 
so  long  as  that  convenience  re- 
quires or  that  necessity  exists. 
The  funds  for  making  and  repairing 
them,  indeed,  are  drawn  from  differ- 
ent sources  and  in  different  modes — 
the  one,  from  travelers  by  a  toll — the 
other,  from  the  community  by  a  tax ; 
and  the  turnpike  company  is  per- 
mitted to  take,  for  the  benefit  of  its 
stockholders,  the  contingent  profits 
in  compensation  for  the  contingent 
losses  of  the  enterprise;  but  still  the 
public  interest  in  the  road  and  the 
burden  upon  the  land  are  essentially 
the  same  in  both."  State  v.  Maine, 
27  Conn.  641,  646,  71  Am.  Dec.  89. 

ssMatter  of  Peter  Townsend,  39  N. 
Y.  171;  Willyard  v.  Hamilton,  7 
Ohio  (pt.  2)  111,  30  Am.  Dec.  195; 
Dalles  Lumbering  Co.  v.  Urquhart, 
16  Ore.  67,  19  Pac.  78;  Kaukauna 
Water  Power  Co.  v.  Green  Bay  &  M. 
Canal  Co.,  142  U.  S.  254,  12  S.  C. 
173;  Chesapeake  etc.  Canal  Co.  v. 
Key,  3  Cranch,  C.  C.  599. 

iCooper  V.  Williams,  5  Ohio,  391, 
24  Am.  Dec.  299;  Buckingham  v. 
Smith,  10  Ohio  288;  Varick  v.  Smith, 
5  Paige,  137. 


262 


WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USE. 


523 


the  State  acts  in  good  faitli  and  with  a  bona  fide  intent  of  pro- 
moting the  main  purpose  in  view,  it  may  dispose  of  any  surplus 
water  or  water  power,  incidentally  taken  or  created,  for  private 
uses  and  appropriate  the  proceeds  of  such  disposition.^  Where 
the  water  of  a  stream  was  taken  for  a  canal  and  the  supply  of 
a  mill  cut  off,  it  was  held  that  a  raceway  could  not  be  made 
through  private  property  from  the  canal  to  the  mill  in  order 
to  supply  it  with  water,  the  mill-owner  having  agreed  to  accept 
the  same  in  lieu  of  damages  for  interfering  with  the  stream. 
This  would  be  taking  one  man's  property  to  make  compensation 
to  another.* 


'Kaukauna  Water  Power  Co.  v. 
Green  Bay  &  M.  Canal  Co.,  142  U.  S. 
254,  12  S.  C.  173.  Here  the  State 
constructed  a  dam  for  the  bona  fide 
purpose  of  furnishing  water  to  a 
public  canal  and  it  was  held  that  it 
was  entitled  to  the  water  power  inci- 
dentally created  and  could  dispose  of 
it  to  private  parties.  The  court  says : 
"The  true  distinction  seems  to  be 
between  cases  where  the  dam  is 
erected  for  the  express  or  apparent 
purpose  of  obtaining  a  water  power 
io  lease  to  private  individuals,  or 
where  in  building  a  dam  for  a  public 
improvement,  a  wholly  unnecessary 
excess  of  water  is  created,  and  cases 
where  the  surplus  is  a  mere  incident 
to  the  public  improvement  and  a 
reasonable  provision  for  securing  an 
adequate  supply  of  water  at  all  times 
for  such  improvement.  No  claim  is 
made  in  this  case  that  the  water 
power  was  created  for  the  purpose  of 
selling  or  leasing  it,  or  that  the  dam 
was  erected  to  a  greater  height  than 
was  reasonably  necessary  to  create  a 
depth  of  water  sufficient  for  the  pur- 
poses of  navigation  at  all  seasons  of 
the  year.  So  long  as  the  dam  was 
erected  for  the  bona  fide  purpose  of 
furnishing  an  adequate  supply  of 
water  for  the  canal  and  was  not  a, 
colorable  device  for  creating  a  water 
power,  the  agents  of  the  State  are 
entitled  to  great  latitude  of  discre- 


tion in  regard  to  the  height  of  the 
dam  and  the  head  of  the  water  to  be 
created;  and  while  the  surplus  in  this 
case  may  be  unnecessarily  large, 
there  does  not  seem  to  have  been  any 
bad  faith  or  abuse  of  discretion  on 
the  part  of  those  charged  with  the 
construction  of  the  improvement. 
Courts  should  not  scan  too  jealously 
their  conduct  in  this  connection  if 
there  be  no  reason  to  doubt  that  they 
were  animated  solely  by  a  desire  to 
promote  the  public  interests,  nor  can 
they  undertake  to  measure  with 
nicety  the  exact  amount  of  water  re- 
quired for  the  purposes  of  the  public 
improvement.  Under  the  circum- 
stances of  this  case  we  think  it 
within  the  power  of  the  State  to  re- 
tain within  its  immediate  control 
such  surplus  as  might  incidentally  be 
created  by  the  erection  of  the  dam." 
The  court  cites  the  following  cases 
as  supporting  its  conclusions 
Cooper  V.  Williams,  4  Ohio  253 
Buckingham  v.  Smith,  10  Ohio  288 
Little  Miami  Elevator  Co.  v.  Cincin- 
nati, 30  Ohio  St.  629,  643 ;  Hubbard 
v.  City  of  Toledo,  21  Ohio  St.  379 
Fox  V.  Cincinnati,  104  U.  S.  783 
Spaulding  v.  Lowell,  23  Pick.  71,  80 
French  v.  Inhabitants  of  Quincy,  3 
Allen  9 ;  Attorney  General  v.  Eau 
Claire,  37  Wis.  400;  State  v.  Eau 
Claire,  40  Wis.  533. 

SMcArthur  v.  Kelley,  5  Ohio  139. 


524 


EMINBITT  DOMAIN. 


§  263 


§  263  (170).  Railroads,  their  connections  and  appur- 
tenances. When  railroads  were  first  introduced,  some  question 
was  made  as  to  their  being  a  public  use,  but  it  has  long  been 
settled  that  they  are.*  A  railroad  company  may  be  authorized 
to  condemn  land  for  all  appurtenances  necessary  to  the  conve- 
nient and  proper  operation  of  the  road,  such  as  depots,^  freight 
houses,®  yard  room,''  side  tracks,*  gravel  pits,*  water  supply,^" 
and  the  like.-^^     An  electric  railway  may  condemn  land  for  a 


4Aldridge  V.  T.  C.  &  D.  R.  R.  Co., 
2  Stew.  &  For.  199,  23  Am.  Dec.  297; 
Davis  V.  Same,  4  Ibid,  421 ;  Cairo  & 
Fulton  R.  R.  Co.,  v.  Turner,  31  Ark. 
494;  San  Francisco  A.  &  S.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Caldwell,  31  Cal.  367;  Moran  v. 
Ross,  79  Cal.  159,  21  Pac.  547;  En- 
field Toll  Bridge  Co.  v.  Hartford  & 
New  Haven  R.  R.  Co.,  17  Conn.  40,  42 
Am.  Dec.  716;  Whiteman  v.  W.  &  S. 
R.  R.  Co.,  2  Harr.  (Del.)  514; 
O'Hara  v.  Lexington  &  Ohio  R.  R. 
Co.,  1  Dana  (Ky.)  232;  Lexington  & 
Ohio  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Applegate,  8  Dana 
289,  33  Am.  Dec.  497;  Shreveport  & 
A.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Hollingsworth,  42  La. 
An.  729,  7  So.  693 ;  The  Bellona  Com- 
pany Case,  3  Bland,  Chy.  442 ;  Boston 
Water  Power  Co.  v.  Boston  &  Wor- 
cester R.  R.  Co.,  23  Pick.  360; 
Swan  V.  Davidson  County  Comrs.,  18 
Minn.  482 ;  Brown  v.  Beatty,  34  Miss. 
227,  69  Am.  Dec.  389;  Concord  Rail- 
road Co.  V.  Greeley,  17  N.  H.  47; 
Beekman  v.  Saratoga  &  Schenectady 
R.  R.  Co.,  3  Paige  45;  Bloodgood  v. 
Mohawk  &  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  14 
Wend.  51 ;  Same  v.  Same,  18  Wend. 
9;  Buffalo  &  New  York  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Brainard,  9  N.  Y.  100;  Seacomb  v. 
Milwaukee  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  49  How.  Pr. 
75;  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Chappell,  Rice,  L.  383;  Buffalo, 
Bayou  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ferris,  26 
Tex.  588;  Tait  v.  Matthews,  33  Tex. 
112;  Bonaparte  v.  Camden  &  Amboy 
R.  R.  Co.,  1  Baldwin,  U.  S.  205; 
Baltimore  &  Ohio  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Van 
Ness,  4  Cranch  595 ;  Cherokee  Nation 
V.  Southern  Kansas  R.  R.  Co..  33  Fed. 


900.  Bee  People  v.  Salem,  20  Mich. 
452. 

sState  V.  Railroad  Comrs.,  56  Conn. 
308;  Small  v.  Georgia  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
87  Ga.  602,  13  S.  E.  694;  Ewing  v. 
Ala.  &  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  68  Miss.  551,  9 
So.  295 ;  Hannibal  &  St.  Joe  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Muder,  49  Mo.  165;  Matter  of  New 
York  Central  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  59  Hun 
7 ;  Geizy  v.  C.  W.  &  Z.  R.  R.  Co.,  4 
Ohio  St.  308. 

6  Central  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Feldman, 
152  Cal.  303,  92  Pac.  849;  In  Matter 
of  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kip,  46 
N.  Y.  546;  Matter  of  New  York  Cen- 
tral etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  77  N.  Y.  248;  New 
York  Central  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Metro- 
politan Gas  Light  Co.,  5  Hun  201. 
Right  to  take  for  warehouse  ques- 
tioned. Cumberland  Valley  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  McLanahan,  59  Pa.  St.  23. 

'Eldridge  v.  Smith,  34  Vt.  484; 
Rensselaer  &  S.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis,  43 
N.  Y.  137. 

8St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Petty, 
57  Ark.  359,  21  S.  W.  884,  20  L.R.A. 
434. 

9  Hopkins  v.  Florida  Cent.  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  97  Ga.  107,  25  S.  E.  452 ;  Sag- 
inaw etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bordner,  108 
Mich.  236,  66  N.  W.  62. 

lODillou  V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  67  Kan.  687,  74  Pac.  251. 

iiThe  question  is  extensively  con- 
sidered in  Milwaukee  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Milwaukee,  34  Wis.  271.  A  statute 
exempted  from  taxation  the  property 
of  a  railroad  necessarily  used  in  oper- 
ating its  road.  The  exemption  was 
held  to  be  co-extensive  with  the  right 


§  263 


WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USE. 


525 


power  house  and  car  barn,-'^  and  for  a  transmission  line  from  its 
power  house  to  its  railway.  ^^  But  in  Ehode  Island  such  a  pur- 
pose is  held  not  to  be  a  public  use  within  the  constitution.^* 
But  property  cannot  be  taken  for  things  not  necessary  to  the 
operation  of  the  road  or  which  do  not  require  a  particular  loca- 
tion with  reference  to  the  right  of  way,  such  as  tenement  houses 
for  employees/^  and  shops  for  manufacturing  new  rolling 
stock.  ^®     It  has  been  held  that  property  may  be  condemned  for 


of  the  company  to  take  by  condemna- 
tion. It  was  held  indirectly  that  the 
company  could  not  condemn  for  grain 
elevators  nor  for  a.  building  used 
chiefly  for  a  hotel,  though  inci- 
dentally for  a  station. 

i2Eddleman  v.  Union  Co.  Traction 
&  P.  Co.,  217  111.  409,  75  N.  E.  510; 
Metropolitan  St.  Ey.  Co.  v.  Walsh, 
197  Mo.  392,  94  S.  W.  860. 

I'MuU  V.  Indianapolis  etc.  Trac- 
tion Co.,  169  Ind.  214,  81  N.  E.  657. 

i4In  re  R.  I.  Suburban  Ey.  Co.,  22 
E.  I.  455,  48  Atl.  590;  In  re 
E.  I.  Suburban  Ey.  Co.,  22  E.  I.  457, 
48  Atl.  591,  52  L.E.A.  879.  In  the 
latter  case,  the  court  says:  "A  com- 
mon carrier  serves  both  the  public 
and  itself.  It  has  its  public  and  pri- 
vate functions.  The  public  part  is 
the  exercise  of  its  franchise  for  the 
accommodation  of  the  parties;  the 
private  part  is  its  incidental  busi- 
ness, with  which  the  public  is  not 
concerned,  and  which  the  company 
manages  for  its  own  interests.  The 
company  carries  passengers  over  its 
road  as  a  public  duty ;  but  the  gener- 
ation of  power  to  propel  cars  is  the 
private  business  of  the  company. 
Whatever  is  necessary  for  the  exer- 
cise of  the  franchise  is  for  the  benefit 
of  the  public;  but  that  which  per- 
tains simply  to  means  of  supply  is 
the  private  business  of  the  company." 
pp.  459,  460. 

iBEldridge  v.  Smith,  34  Vt.  484; 
Rensselaer  &  S.  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Davis,  43 
N.  Y.  137 ;  State  v.  Commissioners  of 
Mansfield,  23  N.  J.  L.  510. 


i«Eldridge  v.  Smith,  34  Vt.  484, 
493;  Matter  of  New  York  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Kip,  46  N.  Y.  546,  552;  West 
River  Bridge  Co.  v.  Dix,  6  How.  507, 
546.  In  the  first  case  the  court  says : 
"Is  an  establishment  for  the  manu- 
facture of  railroad  cars  a  legitimate 
railroad  purpose,  so  that  the  com- 
pany would  have  a  right  to  take  land 
for  it  against  the  will  of  the  owner? 
The  defendants  say,  that  as  the  com- 
pany must  necessarily  have  cars  in 
order  to  carry  on  their  business, 
therefore  they  must  have  the  right  to 
manufacture  them,  and  have  works 
for  that  purpose.  But  this  argument 
proves  too  much.  Eailroads  must 
have  iron,  in  great  quantities,  for 
their  track  and  other  purposes.  Does 
this  authorize  them  to  take  ore  beds 
and  lands  for  forges  and  foundries, 
and  manufacture  their  own  iron? 
They  must  have  wood,  sleepers,  and 
timber  for  depots,  and  large  quan- 
tities of  lumber  of  various  kinds. 
Does  this  authorize  them  to  take 
timbered  lands,  and  sites  for  mills, 
against  the  will  of  the  owners  ?  They 
must  have  glass,  nails,  paint,  and 
many  other  things.  Can  they  by 
compulsory  measures  provide  them- 
selves the  means  to  manufacture 
them  all?  We  think  it  very  clear 
they  cannot.  If  the  company  must 
manufacture  their  own  cars  or  go 
without,  then,  doubtless,  their  manu- 
facture would  be  regarded  as  a  neces- 
sity of  the  railroad,  but  the  manu- 
facture of  cars  and  engines  is  a  dis- 
tinct branch  of  mechanical  industry, 


526 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


§  263 


repair  shops  and  that  this  would  be  a  public  use.^^  These  differ, 
undoubtedly,  from  shops  for  the  manufacture  of  new  cars,  or 
engines,  since  the  former  are  indispensable  to  every  railroad, 
while  the  latter  are  not.  New  rolling  stock  can  be  purchased 
of  those  who  make  a  business  of  its  manufacture.  But  facilities 
for  the  repair  of  such  stock  do  not  usually  exist  within  any  prac- 
ticable distance,  and  unless  the  companies  could  have  such  facil- 
ities conveniently  located,  they  might  be  hampered  in  their  serv- 
ice and  the  public  greatly  incommoded.  A  railroad  company 
may  condemn  land  for  a  track  to  a  public  warehouse  or  eleva- 
tor, ^^  or  to  connect  with  a  wharf  or  pier,^®  or  for  the  purpose 


carried  on  wholly  independent  of  any 
connection  with  railroads,  and  is  a 
branch  of  business  in  which  rail- 
roads do  not  usually  engage  at  all; 
and  in  this  case  it  seems  to  have 
been  quickly  demonstrated,  that  it 
was  better  to  rely  on  supplying  them- 
selves with  cars  by  purchase  from 
those  whose  legitimate  business  it 
was  to  make  them. 

"Although  railroad  companies 
must  have  engines  and  cars,  iron, 
lumber,  wood  and  many  other  things 
in  large  quantities,  in  order  to  build 
and  operate  their  roads,  it  is  sup- 
posed they  can  supply  themselves  as 
private  persons  do,  by  purchase  in 
the  ordinary  way,  and  they  are  not 
created  or  designed  to  be  independ- 
ent of  all  other  branches  of  industry 
and  business  in  the  country,  but  to  be 
additional  aids  to  their  successful 
development.  The  company  must 
have  shops  for  the  repair  of  cars 
and  engines,  as  they  are  so  often 
needed,  and  as  they  cannot  well  be 
moved  for  repairs,  nor  can  facilities 
be  found  for  repairs  in  the  country 
generally,  but  the  company  were  al- 
ready supplied  with  all  necessary  ac- 
commodations for  repairs.  We  are  of 
opinion  that  an  establishment  for  the 
manufacture  of  cars  is  not  a  legiti- 
mate railroad  necessity,  so  that  the 
company  could  properly  condemn 
land  on  which  to  erect  one." 


iTFor  "depot,  engine  house  and  re- 
pair shops,"  Hannibal  &  St.  Joe  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Muder,  49  Mo.  165;  for 
"turn-outs,  depots,  engine  houses, 
shops  and  turn-tables,"  C.  B.  &,  Q.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Wilson,  17  III.  123;  for  a 
"paint  shop,  and  lumber  and  timber 
sheds,"  Low  v.  Galena  &  Chicago 
Union  R.  R.  Co.,  18  111.  324.  In  the 
Illinois  cases  the  constitutional  ques- 
tion of  public  use  was  not  raised. 
The  only  question  was  whether  the 
purposes  specified  were  within  the 
'  statute.  Nor  does  it  appear  that 
the  constitutional  question  was  ac- 
tually raised  in  the  Missouri  case. 
After  referring  to  the  cases  from 
Illinois  and  Vermont  the  court  says : 
"All  these  adjudications  proceed 
upon  the  assumption  that  the  appro- 
priation of  land,  for  the  purpose 
stated  in  the  plaintiff's  petition,  is 
an  appropriation  of  private  property 
to  a  public  use."  p.  166.  See  also 
Eldridge  v.  Smith,  34  Vt.  484,  and 
quotation  in  last  note. 

isFisher  v.  C.  &  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  104 
111.  323;  Chicago  Dock  &  Canal  Co. 
V.  Garrity,  115  111.  155.  A  city  may 
grant  permit  to  lay  a  track  in  a 
street  to  a  private  elevator.  Clarke 
V.  Blackmar,  47  N.  Y.  150. 

isRensselaer  &  S.  R.  E.  Co.  v. 
Davis,  43  N.  Y.  137. 


§    263  WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC   USE.  527 

of  diverting  a  stream  in  order  to  avoid  a  bridge,  where  the  public 
safety  will  thereby  be  promoted.^"  "Whatever  is  essential  and 
indispensable  to  the  construction,  maintenance  or  running  of  the 
road,  is  allowed  to  be  taken."  ^^  The  question  of  public  use 
does  not  depend  upon  the  length  of  the  road^^  and  a  company 
organized  to  build  a  connecting  link  between  two  other  roads 
which  are  separated  by  a  river,  is  for  a  public  use  and  may  exer- 
cise the  right  of  eminent  domain.^*  A  railroad  built  from 
Denver  east  to  the  State  line  to  coal  mines  of  the  company,  and 
equipped  and  operated  in  the  usual  way  for  the  transportation  of 
freight  and  passengers,  was  held  a  public  use.**  That  a  road 
is  limited  to  the  transportation  of  freight  does  not  make  it  for 
private  use.*^  A  belt  road  around  a  city,  organized  for  general 
commercial  purposes  but  designed  chiefly  to  transfer  loaded 
and  empty  cars  from  one  road  to  another,  is  a  public  use.^®  A 
company  was  organized  to  provide  terminal  facilities  for  rail- 
roads, and  could  be  compelled  to  furnish  such  facilities  upon 
terms  fixed  by  the  railroad  commissioner  in  case  of  disagreement, 
and  which  was  authorized  and,  on  certain  conditions,  could  be 
compelled  to  construct  tracks  and  operate  suburban  trains,  was 
held  to  be  for  a  public  purpose  and  such  a  company  as  could 
be  vested  with  the  power  of  eminent  domain.*''  And  generally 
the  construction  of  union  stations  and  terminals  by  a  corporation 
organized  for  that  purpose,  is  a  public  use  for  which  property 
may  be  condemned.**  It  is  no  objection  that  a  railroad  is  built 
especially  for  the  accommodation  of  certain  mines  or  industrial 
plants,  so  long  as  it  is  in  law  a  public  highway  and  prepared  to 

zoReusch  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Union  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  41  Fed.  293. 

57  la.  687.  -And  see  Denver  R.  Laud  &  Coal  Co. 

2iNew  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Gun-  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  34  Fed.  380. 

niaon,  1  Hun  496,  497.  2  6Brown  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

2  2Madera    Ry.    Co.    v.    Raymond  137  Mo.  529,  38  S.  W.  1099. 

Granite  Co.,  3  Cal.  App.  668,  87  Pac.  26Col)ier  v.   Union   Ry.   Co.,   113 

27;  Bridwell  v.  Gate  City  Terminal  Tenn.  96,  83  S.  W.  155. 

Co.,   127   Ga.  520,  56  S.  E.  624,  10  2  7Fort    St.    Union    Depot    Co.    v. 

L.R.A.(N.S.)    909;   Caretta  Ry.   Co.  Morton,  83  Mich.  265,  47  N.  W.  228, 

V.  Va.  —  Pocahontas  Coal  Co.,  62  3  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  438. 

W.  Va.  185,  57  S.  E.  401.  2  8Bridwell  v.  Gate  City  Terminal 

2  3Niemeyer  v.  Little  Rock  June-  Co.,   127   Ga.  520,  56  S.  E.   624,   10 

tion  R.  R.  Co.,  43  Ark.  Ill;  Phila-  L.R.A.(N.S.)   909;  Riley  v.  Charles- 

delphia  etc.  Ferry  Co.  v.  Inter  City  ton  Union  Station  Co.,  71  S.  C.  457, 

Link  R.  R.  Co.,  73  N.  J.  L.  86,  62  51  S.  E.  485,  110  Am.  St.  Rep.  579; 

Ati.  184.  Ryan  v.  Terminal  Co.,  102  Tenn.  Ill, 

2  4  Colorado  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.  v.  50  S.  W.  744,  45  L.R.A.  303. 


528  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    263 

carry  for  all  who  desire  its  service.*®  But  a  railroad  used  exclu- 
sively for  transporting  coal  or  freight  for  its  stockholders  and 
which  has  no  depots,  freight  houses,  or  facilities  for  doing  a 
public  business,  is  a  private  enterprise.^"  But  such  railroads 
are  authorized  by  the  constitution  in  South  Carolina.^  ^  A  rail- 
road in  the  gorge  of  the  Niagara  river,  from  the  falls  to  the 
"whirlpool,"  which  could  not  be  reached  without  passing  over 
the  State  reservation  or  private  property,  along  which  no  habita- 
tions could  be  built  and  on  which, no  freight  could  be  carried, 
and  which  could  only  be  used  for  conveying  sightseers  along  the 
river  during  the  summer  months,  was  held  not  to  be  such  a 
road  as  was  contemplated  by  the  general  statutes  of  New  York, 
and  not  a  public  use,  for  which  the  power  of  eminent  domain 
could  be  exercised.^*  Similar  views  are  expressed  by  the  su- 
preme court  of  Virginia  in  a  proceeding  by  an  electric  railway 
company  to  condemn  land  for  a  park  and  terminal  near  the 
great  falls  of  the  Potomac  river.  The  court  says  that  "to  gratify 
the  senses  of  the  pleasure  seeker  and  thereby  incidentally  to 
increase  revenues  is  without  the  domain  of  a  public  use 
for  which  private  property  may  be  taken  imder  the  power  of 
eminent  domain."  **  But  the  real  point  of  the  decision  was  that 
the  proposed  condemnation  was  not  authorized  by  the  statute, 
under  which  the  proceedings  were  had.  A  statute  of  Pennsyl- 
vania permitting  one  street  railway  company  to  condemn  the 
joint  use  of  the  tracks  of  another  company  for  not  exceeding 
twenty-five  hundred  feet  when  necessary  "either  to  construct  a 
circuit  upon  its  road  or  to  connect  with  the  road  of  any  passen- 

2  9Madera    Ry.    Co.    v.    Raymond  siEx  parte  Baeot,  36  S.  C.  125,  15 

Granite  Co.,  3  Cal.  App.  668,  87  Pac.  S.  E.  204,  16  L.R.A.  586. 
27;   Kansas  etc.  Ry.   Co.  v.  N.   W.  3  2Matter     of     Niagara     Falls     & 

Coal  &  M.  Co.,  161  Mo.  288,  61  S.  W.  Whirlpool  R.  R.  Co.,  108  N.  Y.  375, 

684,  84  Am.  St.  Rep.  717,  51  L.R.A.  15   N.   E.   429;    Matter   of   Niagara 

936;   Butte  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mon-  Falls  &  Whirlpool  R.  R.  Co.,  121  N. 

tana  U.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  Mont.  504,  41  Y.  319,  24  N.  E.  452;  and  see  Matter 

Pac.   232,  50  Am.   St.  Rep.  508,  31  of  Split  Rock  Cable  Road  Co.,  128  N. 

L.R.A.  298 ;  State  v.  Superior  Court,  Y.  408,  28  N.  E.  506.    Compare  ante 

42  Wash.  675,  85  Pac.  669;  Caretta  §  259;  post,  §  271. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Va.  Pocahontas  Coal  Co.,  3  3Great  Falls  Power  Co.  v.  Great 

62  W.  Va.  185,  57  S.  E.  401.    And  see  Falls  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  104  Va.  416,  52 

next  section.  S.  E.  172. 

sostate  V.  Railway  Co.,  40  Ohio 
St.  504;  Weidenfeld  v.  Sugar  Run 
R.  R.  Co.,  48  Fed.  615. 


§  264 


WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USB. 


529 


ger  railway  already  in  existence,"  was  held  void  as  not  being 
for  a  public  use,  the  only  effect  of  the  condemnation  being  "to 
transfer  the  property  of  one  private  corporation  to  a  new  one, 
for  the  same  public  use,  both  being  transporters  of  passengers 
for  profit."  3* 

The  consolidation  of  connecting  railroads  and  the  establish- 
ment of  through  lines  is  a  public  purpose  for  which  the  power 
of  eminent  domain  may  be  exercised  and  the  shares  of  dissent- 
ing stockholders  may  be  condemned  to  effect  such  consolidation.*^ 

Where,  under  a  general  railroad  law,  a  road  is  built  for  private 
use,  its  operation  may  be  enjoined  at  the  suit  of  an  individual,^^ 
or  the  franchise  annulled  at  the  suit  of  the  people.*'^ 

§  264  (171).  Lateral  and  branch  railroads,  switch  and 
spur  tracks  to  private  property.  Certain  decisions  in  Penn- 
sylvania have  sometimes  been  understood  as  laying  down  the 


3<Philadelphia  etc.  St.  Ry.  Co.'s 
Petition,  203  Pa.  St.  354,  53  Atl. 
191. 

3  6New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Offield,  77  Conn.  417,  59  Atl.  510; 
Same  v.  Same,  78  Conn.  1,  60  Atl. 
740;  Black  v.  Delaware  etc.  Canal 
Co.,  24  N.  J.  Eq.  455;  Spencer  v. 
Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry.  Co.,  137  N. 
C.  107,  49  S.  E.  96.  In  the  New 
Jersey  case  which  is  a  decision  by 
the  court  of  errors  and  appeals  it  is 
said:  "There  can  be  no  doubt  that 
a  railroad  company  may  be  empow- 
ered to  extend  their  road  beyond  the 
point  to  which  it  was  built  under  the 
original  grant,  if  proper  compensa- 
tion is  provided  for  stockholders  who 
may  resist  it,  and  I  can  see  no  dififer- 
enee  in  principle,  whether  the  orig- 
inal company,  in  order  to  secure  a 
through  route  under  one  manage- 
ment, is  authorized  to  take  the  lands 
of  individuals,  or  to  take  the  prop- 
erty which  individuals  have  in  the 
stock  of  an  existing  road.  In  the 
first  case,  for  the  purpose  of  estab- 
lishing the  through  route,  one  kind 
of  private  property,  to  wit,  the  lands 
of  individuals,  is  taken  by  the  cor- 
poration ;  in  the  second  case,  another 
Em.  D.— 34. 


kind  of  property,  to  wit,  the  shares 
of  stock  of  individuals  in  an  existing 
company,  is  authorized  to  be  con- 
demned. In  the  latter  instance,  the 
use  is  as  clearly  a  public  use  as  in 
the  former,  and  when  the  legislature 
declares  that  it  may  be  done  it  is  no 
more  necessary  to  declare  in  the 
grant  that  the  public  necessity  re- 
quires it,  than  it  is  essential,  in  order 
to  validate  a  railroad  charter,  that 
there  should  be  an  express  announce- 
ment by  the  legislature  that  it  is  in 
aid  of  public  uses."  Black  v.  Dela- 
ware etc.  Canal  Co.,  24  N.  J.  Eq. 
455,  470. 

S6A  road  between  the  mines  and 
mill  of  a  company,  McCaudless'  Ap- 
peal, 70  Pa.  St.  210;  see  also  Edge- 
wood  R.  R.  Co.'s  Appeal,  79  Pa.  St. 
257 ;  Weidenfeld  v.  Sugar  Run  R.  R. 
Co.,  48  Fed.  615. 

"A  road  to  transport  coal  from 
the  company's  mine  a  distance  of 
about  five  miles.  People  v.  Pitts- 
burgh R.  R.  Co.,  53  Cal.  694.  So  of  a 
road  used  and  equipped  only  for 
transporting  coal  from  the  private 
mines  of  the  company's  stockholders. 
State  v.  Railway  Co.,  40  Ohio  St. 
504. 


530  EMINENT   DOMAIN,  §    264 

doctrine  that  private  property  could  be  taken  for  a  lateral  rail- 
road connecting  a  mine  or  mill  with  a  railroad,  canal  or  navi- 
gable stream,  though  the  lateral  road  was  for  the  private  use 
of  the  owner  of  the  mine  or  mill.*®  The  supreme  court  of  that 
State  seems  to  have  so  understood  itself  at  an  early  date,*®  but 
afterwards  discovered  its  mistake.*"  An  act  of  1832  provided 
that  the  owners  of  any  land,  mills,  quarries,  coal  mines,  lime- 
kilns or  other  real  estate  might  condemn  lands  for  a  railroad 
to  any  railroad,  canal  or  navigable  stream  not  exceeding  a  dis- 
tance of  three  miles.  Section  seven  of  the  act  provided  that  any 
person  could  use  the  road  for  the  transportation  of  freight  on  the 
payment  of  a  certain  specified  compensation.*^  This  statute 
has  remained  in  force  until  the  present  time.  These  lateral 
roads,  therefore,  are  for  public  use,  and  the  cases  referred  to 
form  no  exception  to  the  general  current  of  authority.*^  Sim- 
ilar roads  are  sanctioned  in  Maryland,  where,  though  con- 
structed for  the  particular  advantage  of  individuals,  they  are 
also  open  to  the  public  as  occasion  requires.**  The  legislature 
of  Missouri,  by  special  charter,  authorized  a  company  to  con- 
struct a  railroad  from  its  coal  lands  to  the  Missouri  river,  but 
provided  that  it  should  be  a  public  carrier  of  passengers  and 
freight.  It  was  rightly  held  to  be  for  public  use.**  A  general 
statute  of  West  Virginia  authorizes  the  condemnation  of  a  right 
of  way  under  or  over  the  surface  from  any  timber,  coal  or 
mineral  lands  for  the  purpose  of  development  or  of  conveying 
the  product  of  such  lands  to  market,  provided  the  court,  to  which 
application  is  made,  "is  of  the  opinion  that  the  purpose  for  which 
the  property  is  to  be  taken  is  of  public  utility."  *^  In  a  case 
arising  under  the  statute  the  court  held  that  the  words  public 

3  SHarvey  V.  Thomas,  10  Watts  63;  Co.,   166  Pa.   St.  430,  31   Atl.   131; 

Harvey  v.  Lloyd,  3  Pa.  331 ;  Shoen-  Rochester  etc.  C.  &  I.  Co.  v.  Berwind- 

berger  v.  Mulhollan,  8  Pa.  134;  Hays  White  Min.  Co.,  ^4  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  104. 
V.    Risher,    32    Pa.    169;   Brown  v.  isNew  Central  Coal  Co.  v.  Georges 

Corey,  43  Pa.  495.  Creek  Coal  and  Iron  Co.,  37  Md.  537 ; 

ssHarvey  v.  Thomas,  10  Watts  63.  N.  Y.  Mining  Co.  v.  Midland  Mining 

40Haya  v.  Risher,  32  Pa.  St.  169.  Co.,  99  Md.  506,  58  Atl.  217. 

4iPurdon's   Statutes,   p.   492;    see  **  Dietrich  v.  Murdock,  42  Mo.  279. 

also  Boyd  v.  Negley,  40  Pa.  St.  377.  To  same  effect:     Kansas  etc.  Ry.  Co. 

izSee  also  Schofield  v.  Penn.  S.  V.  v.  N.  W.  Coal  &  Min.  Co.,  161  Mo.  288, 

R.  R.  Co.,  12  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  122;  Pitts-  61  S.  W.  684,  84  Am.  St.  Rep.  717, 

burgh  etc.  R.  R.   Co.  v.  Pittsburgh  51  L.R.A.  936. 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  159  Pa.  St.  331,  28  Atl.  4Bp,ev.  Stats,  o.  171,  §§  60,  51, 

155:  Rudolph  v.  Penn.  S.  V.  R.  R. 


§    264  WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC   USB.  531 

utility,  in  the  statute,  meant  the  same  as  public  use  in  the  con- 
stitution, and  that,  in  the  particular  case,  the  purpose  did  not 
appear  to  be  a  public  one,  but  do  not  pass  generally  upon  the 
statute.*^  In  a  later  case  a  similar  statute  was  held  void  as 
providing  for  the  condemnation  of  land  for  a  railway  for  pri- 
vate use.*'  A  statute  of  Iowa  permits  the  owner  or  lessee  of 
lands  having  coal,  stone  or  mineral  thereon  to  condemn  land  for 
a  "public  way"  to  any  highway  or  railroad,  such  owner  or  lessee 
to  pay  all  damages  and  to  construct  and  maintain  the  road. 
After  the  way  was  established  a  railroad  could  be  laid  thereon. 
The  act  made  no  provision  for  the  expenditure  of  public  moneys 
thereon,  and  did  not  in  any  way  define  the  rights  of  the  public 
therein.  The  Supreme  Court  of  that  State  held  that  the  statute 
intended  that  the  way  should  be  for  the  use  .of  the  public,  and 
so  sustained  the  act.  The  court  says :  "We  ought  not  to  declare 
any  act  of  the  legislature  void,  if  a  construction  can  fairly  be 
put  upon  it  under  which  it  can  be  sustained.  In  the  title,  as 
well  as  in  the  body  of  the  act,  the  ways  for  the  establishment  of 
which  it  provides  are  described  as  public  ways,  and  the  legisla- 
ture must  be  presumed  to  have  intended  that  they  should  be 
public  ways,  in  the  ordinary  sense  in  which  that  term  is  used; 
that  is,  that  the  public  should  have  the  right  to  use,  occupy 
and  enjoy  them  as  ways  or  roads.  It  is  not  material  that  the 
rights  and  privileges  of  the  public  with  reference  to  them  are  not 
specially  defined  in  the  act,  for  the  rights  and  privileges  of  the 
people  generally  with  reference  to  public  highways  are  defined  in 
the  general  statutes  on  the  subject.  Neither  is  it  material  that  no 
special  provision  is  made  in  the  act  for  the  improvement  of  such 
ways,  or  for  putting  them  in  condition  for  public  use  at  public 
cost.  The  authority  for  making  such  improvements  could  prob- 
ably be  found  in  the  general  statutes  which  govern  the  subject, 
if  there  should  be  occasion  for  its  exercise.  And  we  think  that 
it  makes  no  difference  that  the  mine-owner  may  be  the  only 
member  of  the  public  who  may  have  occasion  to  use  the  way  after 
it  has  been  established.  The  character  of  a  way,  whether  it 
is  public  or  private,  is  determined  by  the  extent  of  the  right 
to  use  it,  and  not  by  the  extent  to  which  that  right  is  exercised. 
If  all  the  people  have  the  right  to  use  it,  it  is  a  public  way, 

46Salt  Co  V.  Brown,  7  W.  Va.  191.  "Hench  v.  Pritt,  62  W.  Va.  270,  57 

Compare  Pittsburgh  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  S.  E.  808 ;  Scott  Lumber  Co.  v.  Wol- 

Benwood  Iron  Works,  31  W.  Va.  710,  ford,  62  W.  Va.  555,  59  S.  E.  516. 
8  S.  B.  453. 


532  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    264 

althougli  the  number  who  have  occasion  to  exercise  the  right  is 
very  small."  **  A  similar  statute  of  New  Jersey  has  been  sus- 
tained by  the  courts  of  that  State,  though  it  differs  from  the 
Iowa  statute,  in  that  it  expressly  requires  the  road  to  carry 
freight  for  any  one  who  has  occasion  to  use  it.*®  The  laying 
out  of  an  underground  railroad  under  this  statute,  about  two- 
thirds  of  a  mile  long  from  a  coal  mine  to  a  railroad,  was  sus- 
tained. 

In  Illinois  it  has  been  held  that,  a  railroad  company  cannot 
condemn  land  for  a  spur  about  three-quarters  of  a  mile  to  a 
brick-yard,  and  that  such  a  road  was  neither  authorized  by  the 
statute  nor  the  constitution.^"  Also  that  a  railroad  from  a  coal 
mine  to  a  railroad  was  not  a  public  purpose  for  which  land  could 
be  taken.®  ^  But  we  believe  that  it  is  now  the  established  law  of 
Illinois  that  a  switch  or  spur  track  from  a  railroad  to  a  business 
plant  is  to  be  regarded  as  part  of  the  railroad  system  and  a  pub- 
lic use,  even  though  paid  for  by  private  parties,  and  that  the  right 
of  way  for  such  tracks  may  be  granted  in  the  public  streets  or 
property  condemned  therefor.®^  There  is  a  sharp  conflict  of 
authority  as  to  whether  switch  and  spur  tracks  to  private  prop- 
erty are  a  public  use  for  which  property  may  be  condemned. 
They  seem  a  proper  mode  of  making  the  facilities  of  the  rail- 
road available  and,  if  open  to  all  who  are  so  situated  as  to  be  able 
to  use  them,  upon  equal  terms,  there  is  no  sound  reason  why  they 

4  8Phillips  V.  Watson,  63  la.  28,  18  111.  526,  62  N.  E.  94;  People  v.  Blocki, 

N.  W.  659.    Also  Morrison  v.  Thistle  203  111.  363,  67  N.  E.  809.    In  Chicago 

Coal  Co.,  119  la.  705,  94  N.  W.  507.  Dock  &  Canal  Co.  v.  Garrity,  115  111. 

4  9DeCamp     v.     Hibernia     Under-  155,   3  N.   E.   448,   the  court  says: 

ground  K.  E.  Co.,  47  N.  J.  L.  43,  "But  we  have  held  that  there  may  be 

affirmed  by  the  Court  of  Errors,  47  a  grant  to  private  individuals  of  the 

N.  J.  L.  518.  right  to  lay  tracks  in  the  street  con- 

BOChicago  &  Eastern  111.  R.  K.  Co.  necting  with  public  railway  tracks 

V.  Wiltse,  116  111.  449,  6  N.  E.  49.  previously  laid,  and  extending  to  the 

5iSholl  V.  German  Coal  Co.,  118  manufacturing      establishments      of 

111.  427,  10  N.  E.  199.     In  this  case  those  laying  the  tracks;  but  in  such 

the   petition  was  by  the  coal  com-  cases  the  tracks  so  laid  become,  in 

pany.    See  also  Koelle  v.  Kneeht,  99  legal   contemplation,   to   all   intents 

III.  396.  and   effects,   tracks   of   the   railway 

B2TruesdaIe  v.  Peoria  Grape  Sugar  with  which  they  are  connected,  and 

Co.,  101  111.  561 ;  Mills  v.  Parlin,  106  open  to  the  public  use  and  subject  to 

111.  60;  South  Chicago  R.  R.  Co.  v.  the  public  control  in  all  respects  as 

Dix,  109  111.  237;   Chicago  Dock  &  other  railway  tracks  open  to  public 

Canal   Co.  v.  Garrity,   115  111.   155,  use.    We  have  not  regarded  the  cir- 

3  N.  E.  448;  McGann  v.  People,  194  cumstances  that  they  were  laid  with 


§  264 


WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC   USE. 


533 


should  not  be  regarded  as  a  public  use.^^  The  very  fact  that 
condemnation  is  necessary  in  order  to  establish  them,  shows  that 
they  are  capable  of  being  used  by  more  than  one.  Of  course 
switch  and  spur  tracks  owned  and  constructed  by  private  parties 
for  their  exclusive  use,  are  not  a  public  use,  and  statutes  allow- 
ing condemnation  for  such  tracks  transcend  the  constitution.^* 
Eailroads  connecting  mines,  mills,  etc.,  with  lines  of  trans- 


private  funds,  and  that  they  termi- 
nated opposite  or  within  convenient 
contiguity  of  a  private  manufactu- 
ring establishment,  as  materially  af- 
fecting them,  and  giving  a  private 
character  to  their  use.  All  termini 
of  tracks  and  switches  are  more  or 
less  beneficial  to  private  parties,  but 
the  public  character  of  the  use  of  the 
tracks  is  never  aflfected  by  this.  If 
they  are  open  to  the  public  use  indis- 
criminately, and  under  the  public 
control  to  the  extent  that  railroad 
tracks  generally  are,  they  are  tracks 
for  public  use.  It  may  be,  in  such 
cases,  that  it  is  expected,  or  even  that 
it  is  intended,  that  such  tracks  will  be 
used  almost  entirely  by  the  manufac- 
turing establishment,  yet  if  there  is 
no  exclusion  of  an  equal  right  of  use 
by  others,  and  this  singleness  of  use 
is  simply  the  result  of  location  and 
convenience  of  access,  it  cannot  affect 
the  question.''    p.  167. 

5  3Madera  Ey.  Co.  v.  Raymond 
Granite  Co.,  3  Cal.  App.  668,  87  Pac. 
27 ;  Hurd  v.  Atchison  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  73 
Kan.  83,  84  Pac.  553;  Kansas  City 
etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  La.  Western  R.  R.  Co., 
116  La.  178,  40  So.  627,  5  L.R.A.  512; 
Farnsworth  v.  Lime  Rock  R.  R.  Co., 
83  Me.  440,  22  Atl.  373;  Ulmer  v. 
Lime  Rock  R.  R.  Co.,  98  Me.  579,  57 
Atl.  1001,  66  L.R.A.  387;  Toledo  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  East  Saginaw  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  72  Mich.  206,  40  N.  W.  436; 
Kettle  River  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Eastern  R. 
R.  Co.,  41  Minn.  461,  43  N.  W.  469, 
6  L.R.A.  Ill;  Minneapolis  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Nicolin,  76  Minn.  302,  79  N.  W. 
304;  Liedel  v.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  89 


Minn.  284,  94  N.  W.  877;  Robey  v. 
State,  76  Neb.  450;  Clarke  v.  Black- 
mar  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  47  N.  Y.  150; 
Corporation  Commission  v.  Seaboard 
Air  Line  R.  R.  Co.,  140  N.  C.  239,  52 
S.  E.  941 ;  State  v.  Toledo  Ry.  &  T. 
Co.,  1  Ohio  C.  C.  (N.S.)  513;  Wol- 
ford  V.  Fisher,  48  Ore.  479,  84  Pac. 
850,  87  Pac.  530,  7  L.R.A.  (N.S.)  991; 
Stockdale  v.  Rio  Grande  Western  Ry. 
Co.,  28  Utah  101,  77  Pac.  849;  Zirch 
V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  102  Va.  17,  45 
S.  E.  802,  102  Am.  St.  Rep.  805; 
State  V.  Superior  Court,  42  Wash. 
675,  85  Pac.  669;  Chicago  etc.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Morehouse,  112  Wis.  1,  87  N. 
W.  849,  88  Am.  St.  Rep.  918,  56 
L.R.A.  240.  Contra:  Green  v.  Port- 
land, 32  Me.  431 ;  Pere  Marquette  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  U.  S.  Gypsum  Co.,  (Mich.), 
117  N.  W.  733;  Gustafson  v.  Hamm, 
56  Minn.  334,  57  N.  W.  1054,  22 
L.R.A.  565;  Glaessner  v.  Anheuser- 
Busch  Brewing  Assn.,  100  Mo.  508,  13 
S.  W.  707,  2  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
420;  Appeal  of  Hartman  Steel  Co., 
129  Pa.  St.  551,  18  Atl.  553;  Kyle  v. 
Texas  &  N.  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  p.  518,  §  436;  Pittsburg  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Benwood  Iron  Works,  31  W. 
Va.  710,  8  S.  E.  453.  See  State  v. 
Superior  Court,  46  Wash.  516,  90  Pac. 
663 ;  Richards  v.  Ferguson  Implement 
Co.,  125  Mo.  App.  428,  102  S.  W.  606; 
Salem  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Alderman  &  Sons 
Co.,  78  S.  C.  1. 

s^Leigh  V.  Garysburg  Mfg.  Co.,  132 
N.  C.  167,  43  S.  E.  632;  Cozard  v. 
Kanawha  Hardware  Co.,  139  N.  C. 
283,  51  S.  E.  932,  111  Am.  St.  Rep. 
779,  1  L.R.A. (N.S.)  969. 


534  EMINENT    DOiVIAIN.  §    265 

portation  are  sometimes  authorized  by  the  constitution.®^  A 
constitutional  provision  permitting  the  condemnation  of  prop- 
erty for  private  v^rays  of  necessity,  includes  a  way  for  a  private 
railroad  of  necessity.'* 

There  appears  to  be  no  reason  why  lateral  roads  should  not 
be  eonsti-ucted,  if  they  are  required  to  serve  the  public,  as  occa- 
sion requires.  The  system  of  so-called  private  and  lateral  roads 
appears  to  have  had  its  fullest  development  in  Pennsylvania,  and 
a  summary  of  the  legislation  and  decisions  on  that  subject  will 
be  found  in  the  case  of  Waddell's  Appeal.'^ 

§  265  (172).  Other  means  of  transportation  and  com- 
munication: the  telegraph  and  telephone,  petroleum 
tubes,  elevated  tramways,  etc.  A  telegraph  or  telephone 
line  designed  for  the  service  of  the  public  and  subject  to  regula- 
tion by  the  legislature  is  a  public  use  for  which  property  may  be 
taken.®®  The  same  is  true  of  lines  of  tubing  for  the  convey- 
ance of  petroleum,  the  same  being  for  general  use  and  subject 
to  public  regulation.®*  And  so,  generally,  any  means  of  convey- 
ing passengers  or  goods,  or  of  transmitting  intelligence,  which  is 
at  the  service  of  the  public  generally,  would  be  a  public  use  for 
which  property  might  be  condemned.®"  A  statute  of  ITew  York 
authorized  the  formation  of  companies  to  construct  elevated 
tramways  for  carrying  material  in  buckets  and  conferred  upon 

55Ex  parte  Bacot,  36  S.  C.  125,  15  BSNew  Orleans  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

S.  E.  204,  16  L.R.A.  586.     And  see  Southern  &  Atlantic  Tel.  Co.,  53  Ala. 

People  V.   District   Court,   11    Colo.  211;  Mobile  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Postal 

147.  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  120  Ala.  21;  Union 

SBGarbutt  Lumber  Co.  v.  Ga.  etc.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Colo.  Postal  Tel. 

Ry.  Co.,  HI  Ga.  714,  36  S.  E.  942;  Cable  Co.,  30  Colo.  163,  69  Pac.  564, 

Jones  V.  Venable,  120  Ga.  1,  47  S.  E.  97  Am.  St.  Rep.  106;  Pierce  v.  Drew, 

549.  136  Mass.  75,  49  Am.  Rep.  7 ;  State  v. 

6784  Pa.  St.  90.     See  generally,  in  St.. Louis,  145  Mo.  551,  46  S.  W.  981, 

addition  to  cases  cited  in  this  section,  42  L.R.A.  113;  Am.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v. 

St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Petty,  57  St.  Louis  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  202  Mo.  658, 

Ark.  359,  21  S.  W.  884,  20  L.R.A.  434 ;  101    S.    W.    576;    Turnpike    Co.    v. 

Butte  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Montana  U.  R.  American  etc.  News  Co.,  43  N.  J.  L. 

R.  Co.,  16  Mont.  504,  41  Pac.  232,  50  381 ;    Postal  Tel.   Cable  Co.  v.   Ore. 

Am.    St.   Rep.   508,   31    L.R.A.   298;  Short  Line  R.  R.  Co.,  23  Utah  474,  65 

State  V.  Railway  Co.,  40  Ohio  St.  504;  Pac.  735,  90  Am.  St.  Rep.  705. 

Weidenfeld  v.  Sugar  Run  R.  R.  Co.,  59West  Va.  Trans.  Co.  v.  Volcanid 

48  Fed.  615;  Denver  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Coal  &  Oil  Co.,  5  W.  Va.  382. 

Union  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  34  Fed.  386;  soConcord  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Greeley,  17 

Colorado  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Union  N.  H.  47,  61. 
Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  41  Fed.  293. 


§    267  WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USE,  S35 

them  the  power  of  eminent  domain.  The  stockholders  of  the 
Solvay  Process  Company  organized  a  corporation  under  this  act 
and  constructed  a  road  four  miles  long,  between  the  works  of 
said  company  and  Onondaga  lake.  There  was  no  public  access 
to  its  termini  and  all  its  capacity  was  required  by  the  Solvay 
Process  Company.  In  a  proceeding  to  condemn  additional  land 
for  terminal  facilities,  it  was  held  not  to  be  for  a  public  use."^ 
A  statute  of  Oregon  authorized  anv  company  organized  to  trans- 
port timber,  lumber  or  cordwood  to  construct  railroad  skidways, 
tramways,  chutes  and  flumes,  and  to  condemn  land  therefor  and 
declared  that  the  work  should  "be  deemed  to  be  for  the  public 
benefit,"  and  that  the  owners  should  "afford  to  all  persons  equal 
facilities  in  the  use  thereof  for  the  purposes  to  which  they  ar.? 
adapted  upon  payment  or  tender  of  reasonable  compensation,  for 
such  use."  On  a  petition  to  condemii  for  a  skidway  under  this 
statute  it  appeared  that  the  petitioner  was  organized  in  the  inter- 
est of  a  lumbering  company,  that  the  termini  of  the  way  were  on 
the  land  of  this  company,  and  that  there  was  no  access  to  the 
way  except  over  private  property.  It  was  held  to  be  for  private 
use.«2 

§  266  (172a).  Public  grain  elevators.  An  act  of  Min- 
nesota providing  for  the  erection  of  public  grain  warehouses  and 
grain  elevators  on  or  near  the  right  of  way  of  railways  and  au- 
thorizing the  condemnation  of  sites  therefor,  was  held  valid  on 
the  ground  that  the  taking  was  for  a  public  use.*^ 

§  267  (173).  Urban  improvements:  sewers,  water, 
gas  and  light.  The  condemnation  of  property  for  public  sew- 
ers and  drains,®*  or  works  for  the  disposition  of  sewerage,^  ^  for 

eiMatter  of  Split  Rock  Cable  R.  R.  ssStewart  v.  Great  Northern  R.  E. 

Co.,  128  N.  Y.  408,  28  N.  E.  506.    The  Co.,  65  Minn.  515,  68  N.  W.  208. 
court  says  that  "a  possible  limited  6  4MeDaniel  v.  City  of  Columbus, 

use  by  a  few,  and  not  then  as  a  right  91  Ga.  462,  17  S.  E.  1011 ;  Huntington 

but  by  way  of  permission  or  favor,  is  v.  Amiss,  167  Ind.  375,  79  N.  E.  199; 

not  sufficient  to  authorize  the  taking  Hildreth   v.    Lowell,    11    Gray   345; 

of  private  property  against  the  will  Horton  v.  Andrus,  191  N.  Y.  231. 
of  the  owner."  esKingman  et.  al..  Petitioners,  151 

62Apex  Transportation  Co.  v.  Gar-  Mass.  566,  27  N.  E.  778. 
bade,  32  Ore.  582,  52  Pae.  673,  54 
Pac  367,  882. 


536 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


§  268 


supplying  a  city  or  to-wn  with  water,®^  or  gas,®^  or  light,®*  is 
so  manifestly  for  public  use  that  it  has  heen  seldom  questioned 
and  never  denied.  So  supplying  a  city  and  its  inhabitants  with 
natural  gas  is  a  public  use.*® 

§  268.  Electricity  for  light,  heat  and  power  and  works 
for  generating  and  transmitting  same.  The  furnishing  of 
electricity  to  the  public  for  light,  heat  or  power,  that  is  to  such 
members  of  the  public  within  a  given  territory  as  may  desire  the 
current  for  any  or  all  of  such  purposes,  is  a  public  use  for  which 
the  power  of  eminent  domain  may  be  exercised.'^"    "The  fcaowl- 


eeBurden  v.  Stein,  27  Ala.  104, 
116,  62  Am.  Dec.  758;  Cummings  v. 
Peters,  56  Cal.  593;  St.  Helena  Water 
Co.  V.  Forbes,  62  Cal.  182,  45  Am. 
Rep.  659 ;  Riche  v.  Bar  Harbor  Water 
Co.,  75  Me.  91 ;  Kane  v.  Mayor  etc.  of 
Baltimore,  15  Md.  240;  Reddall  v. 
Bryan,  14  Md.  444,  74  Am.  Dec.  550; 
Wayland  v.  County  Commissioners, 
4  Gray  500;  Lombard  v.  Stearns,  4 
Cush.  60;  Thorn  v.  Sweeney,  12  Nev. 
251;  Olmstead  v.  Proprietors  of  the 
Morris  Aqueduct  Co.,  46  N.  J.  L.  495, 
affirmed  by  Court  of  Errors,  47  N.  J. 
L.  311;  Pocantico  Water  Works  Co. 
V.  Bird,  130  N.  Y.  249,  29  N.  E.  246; 
Stamford  Water  Co.  v.  Stanley,  39 
Hun  424;  Matter  of  New  Rochelle 
Water  Co.,  46  Hun  525;  Witcher  v. 
Holland  W.  W.  Co.,  66  Hun  619,  20 
N.  Y.  St.  560;  Rome  v.  Whitestown 
W.  W.  Co.,  113  App.  Div.  547,  100 
N.  Y.  S.  357;  S.  C.  affirmed  187  N. 
Y.  542,  80  N.  E.  1106;  State  v.  Eau 
Claire,  40  Wis.  533. 

6  7La  Harpe  v.  Elm  Tp.  Gas  etc. 
Co.,  69  Kan.  97,  76  Pac.  448;  Bloom- 
field  etc.  Natural  Gas  Light  Co.  v. 
Richardson,  63  Barb.  437. 

6  sMatter  of  E.  Canada  Creek  Elec. 
L.  &  P.  Co.,  49  Misc.  565,  99  N.  Y. 
S.  109. 

6  9  State  V.  Toledo,  48  Ohio  St.  112, 
26  N.  E.  1061,  11  L.R.A.  729. 

7  0  Jones  V.  North  Ga.  Elec.  Co.,  125 
Ga.  618,  54  S.  E.  85,  6  L.R.A.(N.S.) 
122;  Hollister  v.  State,  9  Ida.  8,  71 


Pac.  541;  Hollister  v.  Clark,  9  Ida. 
672,  77  Pac.  1132;  Minn.  Canal  & 
Power  Co.  v.  Koochiching  Co.,  97 
Minn.  429,  107  N.  W.  405,  5  L.R.A. 
(N.S.)  638;  Minn.  Canal  &  Power  Co. 
V.  Pratt,  101  Minn.  197, 112  N.  W.  395, 
11  L.R.A.(N.S.)  105;  Helena  Power 
Transmission  Co.  v.  Spratt,  35  Mont. 
108,  88  Pac.  773,  8  L.R.A.(N.S.)  567; 
Spratt  V.  Helena  Power  Transmis- 
sion Co.,  37  Mont.  60,  94  Pac.  631; 
Rockingham  Co.  L.  &  P.  Co.  v. 
Hobbs,  72  N.  H.  531,  58  Atl.  46,  66 
L.R.A.  581;  Matter  of  Niagara  L.  & 
O.  Power  Co.,  Ill  App.  Div.  686,  97 
N.  Y.  S.  853;  Brown  r.  Weaver 
Power  Co.,  140  N.  C.  333,  52  S.  B. 
954;  Little  Miami  L.  H.  &  P.  Co.  t. 
White,  6  Ohio  N.  P.  (N.S.)  201; 
McMeekin  v.  Central  Carolina  Power 
Co.,  80  S.  C.  512;  State  v.  Centralia 
etc.  Ry.  &  P.  Co.,  42  Wash.  632,  85 
Pac.  344;  State  v.  Olympia  L.  &  P. 
Co.,  46  Wash.  511,  90  Pac.  656;  Wis. 
Riv.  Imp.  Co.  V.  Pier  (Wis.),  118 
N.  W.  857;  Shasta  Power  Co.  v. 
Walker,  149  Fed.  568;  Walker  v. 
Shasta  Power  Co.,  160  Fed.  856,  87 
0.  C.  A.  660,  19  L.RA.(N.S.)  725. 

And  see  Stoy  v.  Indiana  Hydraulic 
Power  Co.,  166  Ind.  316,  76  N.  B. 
1057;  Grande  Ronde  Elec.  Co.  v. 
Drake,  46  Ore.  243,  78  Pac.  1031; 
Avery  v.  Vt.  Elec.  Co.,  75  Vt.  235,  54 
Atl.  179,  98  Am.  St.  Rep.  818,  59 
L.R.A.  817;  Fallsburg  P.  &  M.  Co.  v. 
Alexander,  101  Va.  98,  43  S.  E.  194, 


§    268  WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC   USB.  637 

edge  recently  acquired  concerning  electricity  has  made  it  pos- 
sible to  divide  power  into  any  desired  portions  and  to  freely 
transmit  the  same  to  almost  any  point  for  use.  This  has  created 
a  demand  for  power  which,  though  not  so  universal  as  the  de- 
mand for  water,  is  nevertheless  of  a  public  character.  Like 
water,  electricity  exists  in  nature  in  some  form  or  state,  and  be- 
comes useful  as  an  agency  of  man's  industry  only  when  collected 
and  controlled.  It  requires  a  large  capital  to  collect,  store  and 
distribute  it  for  general  use.  The  cost  depends  largely  upon  the 
location  of  the  power  plant.  A  water  power  or  a  location  upon 
tide  water  reduces  the  cost  materially.  It  may  happen  that  the 
business  cannot  be  inaugurated  without  the  aid  of  the  power  of 
eminent  domain  for  the  acquisition  of  necessary  land  or  rights 
in  land.  All  these  considerations  tend  to  show  that  the  use  of 
land  for  collecting,  storing,  and  distributing  electricity,  for  the 
purposes  of  supplying  power  and  heat  to  all  who  may  desire  it, 
is  a  public  use,  similar  in  character  to  the  use  of  land  for  collect- 
ing, storing  and  distributing  water  for  public  needs — a  use  that 
is  so  manifestly  public  'that  it  has  seldom  been  questioned  and 
never  denied.' "  ^^ 

And  where  the  object  to  be  accomplished  is  the  production  and 
distribution  of  electricity  to  the  public  for  any  of  the  purposes 
mentioned,  property  and  property  rights  may  be  condemned  for 
whatever  purpose  is  necessary  to  accomplish  such  object.  Con- 
sequently land  and  water  rights  may  be  condemned  for  dams, 
reservoirs,  canals  and  flumes  for  the  creation  and  utilization  of 
water  power  to  be  used  in  generating  the  electric  current  and  for 
works  for  such  generation.'^*  Also  for  works  and  rights  of  way 
for  transforming,  transmitting  and  distributing  the  current.''^ 

99  Am.  St.  Efip.  855,  61  L.R.A.  129;  Ga.  618,  54  S.  E.  85,  6  L.R.A.(N.S.) 

State  V.  White  Eiver  Power  Co.,  39  122;  Hollister  v.  State,  9  Ida.  8,  71 

Wash.   648,   82   Pae.   150,  2  L.R.A  Pac.  541;  Hollister  v.  State,  9  Ida. 

(N.S.)  842 ;  State  V.  Superior  Court,  672,   77   Pac.    1132;    Helena   Power 

42  Wash.  660,  85  Pac.  666,  5  L.B,.A.  Transmission  Co.  v.  Spratt,  35  Mont. 

(N.S.)   672;   State  v.  Tolt  P.  &  T.  108,  88  Pac.  773,  8  L.K.A. ( N.S. )  567; 

Co.,  50  Wash.  13,  96  Pac.  519.  Brown  v.  Weaver  Power  Co.,  140  N. 

The  contrary  is  held  in  an  elabor-  C.  333,  62  S.  E.  954;  State  v.  Cen- 

ate  opinion  in  Brown  v.  Gerald,  100  tralia  etc.  Ey.  &  P.  Co.,  42  Wash.  632, 

Me.  351,  61  Atl.  785, 109  Am.  St.  Rep.  85  Pac.  394;  State  v.  Olympia  L.  & 

526,  70  L.R.A.  472.  P.  Co.,  46  Wash.  511,  90  Pac.  656; 

7iRockingham  Co.  L.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Shasta  Power  Co.  v.  Walker,  149  Fed. 

Hobbs,  72  N.  H.  531,  58  Atl.  46,  66  568. 
L.R.A.  581.  7  3Rocking]iam  Co.  L.  &  P.  Co.  v. 

72Jones  V.  North  Ga.  Elec.  Co.,  125  Hobbs,  72  N.  H.  531,  58  Atl.  46,  66 


538 


EMINENT    DOMAIlf. 


§    269 


§  269.  The  supply  and  distribution  of  water  for  power 
purposes.  The  supply  and  distribution  of  water  for  power 
for  commercial  and  manufacturing  purposes,  would  seem  to  be  on 
the  same  basis  as  the  production  and  supply  of  electricity  for  the 
same  purpose.  A  statute  of  Pennsylvania  authorized  the  exer- 
cise of  the  eminent  domain  power  for  "the  supply,  storage  or 
transportation  of  water  and  water  power  for  commercial  and 
manufacturing  purposes."  The  statute  was  upheld  as  providing 
for  a  public  use.'^*  A  Minnesota  corporation  was  organized, 
among  other  things,  to  create  a  water  power  and  to  supply  water 
power  from  the  wheels.  It  was  held  that  water  power  from  the 
wheels  must  be  used  at  the  wheels  and,  from  the  nature  of  the 
case,  could  only  be  supplied  to  a  few  consumers,  and  therefore 
would  not  be  a  public  use.'^^  Furnishing  water  to  manufacturing 
companies  for  use  in  boilers  was  held  to  be  a  private  use  in 
Washington.^® 

§  270  (174).  Public  buildings:  schools,  markets,  hos- 
pitals, etc.  Property  taken  for  public  buildings  of  all  kinds, 
such  as  city  halls,'''^  court  houses,'^*  jails,  public  schools,^*  mar- 


L.R.A.  581;  Matter  of  Niagara  L.  & 
O.  Power  Co.,  Ill  App.  Div.  686,  97 
N.  Y.  S.  853. 

'4  Jacobs  V.  Clearview  Water  Sup- 
ply Co.,  220  Pa.  St.  388,  69  Atl.  870. 
The  court  says :  "It  is  conceded  that 
the  supply  of  water  to  the  public  for 
domestic  purposes  is  a  public  use,  but 
it  is  denied  that  the  supply  of  water 
for  commercial  and  manufacturing 
purposes  is  a  public  use.  The  dis- 
tinction is  more  apparent  than  real. 
It  rests  on  »  very  narrow  edge.  It 
is  based  on  the  theory  that  a  large 
number  of  individual  citizens  living 
in  the  community  where  the  re- 
spondent company  transacts  its  busi- 
ness will  not  engage  in  commercial 
and  manufacturing  enterprises,  and 
therefore  will  not  participate  in  the 
use  of  water  and  water  power  for 
such  purposes.  An  enterprise  does 
not  lose  the  character  of  a  public 
use  because  that  use  may  be  limited 
by  circumstances  to  a  comparatively 
small  part  of  the  public."     p.  394. 


To  same  effect:  Wis.  Riv.  Imp.  Co. 
T.  Pier   (Wis.),  118  N.  W.  857. 

76Minn.  Canal  &  Power  Co.  v. 
Koochiching  County,  97  Minn.  429, 
107  N.  W.  405,  5  L.R.A.(N.S.)  638. 
The  case  was  really  disposed  of  upon 
other  grounds.  See  also  Smith  v. 
Barre  Water  Co.,  73  Vt.  310,  50  Atl. 
1055 ;  State  v.  White  Riv.  Power  Co., 
39  Wash.  648,  82  Pac.  150,  2  L.R.A. 
(N.S.)  842;  Brown  v.  Gerald,  100  Me. 
351,  61  Atl.  785,  109  Am.  St.  Rep. 
526,  70  L.R.A.  472. 

restate  v.  Superior  Court, 
(Wash.),  99  Pac.  3. 

7  7Cincinnati  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Vil- 
lage of  Belle  Centre,  48  Ohio  St.  273, 
27  N.  E.  464. 

'sjockheck  v.  Board  of  Comrs.,  53 
Kan.  780,  37  Pac.  621. 

7  9  Chamberlain  v.  Morgan,  68  Pa. 
St.  168 ;  Williams  v.  School  District, 
33  Vt.  271 ;  Long  v.  FuUer,  68  Pa.  St. 
170;  Township  Board  v.  Haokman,  48 
Mo,  243 ;  Rittenhouse  v.  Creasy,  2  Lu- 
zerne Leg.  Rep.  (Pa.)  241. 


§  271 


WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC   USE. 


539 


■  kets,*"  almshouses,®^  and  the  like,  is  taken  for  public  use.  This 
right  has  been  questioned  in  some  decisions,  but  never  denied  in 
any  decided  case.*^  So  a  postoffice  and  custom  house  **  and 
other  public  works  for  the  general  government  are  a  public  use 
for  which  the  State's  power  of  eminent  domain  may  be  exer- 
cised.®* 

§  271  (175).  Public  parks  and  pleasure  drives. — Aes- 
thetic purposes.  Pleasure  and  recreation  are  not  only  essen- 
tial to  health,  but  tend  to  the  improvement  of  character.  No  bet- 
ter instance  of  a  public  use  can  be  given  than  that  of  a  public 
square  or  park  in  the  midst  of,  or  convenient  to,  a  dense  popu- 
lation. Private  property  may  be  taken  for  the  purpose  of  se- 
curing such  means  of  recreation  and  health.®^  A  park  is  a  public 
use,  though  not  located  in  a  city  or  town,  but  only  in  the  vicinity 
of  it.®^  Land  may  be  taken  on  each  side  of  a  highway  to  be  kept 
open  for  court  yards  and  ornament.®^  Highways  may  be  laid 
out  for  the  purpose  of  affording  access  to  a  position  which  com- 
mands a  fine  view  or  for  accommodating  pleasure  driving.*®    The 


8  "Matter  of  Application  of  Cooper, 
28  Hun  515.  But  see  Twelfth  St. 
Market  Co.  v.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  142  Pa.  St.  580,  21  Atl.  989. 

siHayward  v.  Mayor  etc.  of  New 
York,  8  Barb.  486. 

82Justice  Woodbury  in  West  River 
Bridge  Co.  v.  Dix,  6  How.  p.  546, 
says:  "Who  ever  heard  of  laws  to 
condemn  private  property  for  public 
use,  for  a  marine  hospital  or  State 
prison?  So  a  custom-house  is  a  pub- 
lic use  for  the  general  govermnent, 
and  a  court-house  or  jail  for  a  State. 
But  it  would  be  difficult  to  find  pre- 
cedent or  argument  to  justify  taking 
private  property,  without  consent  to 
erect  them  on,  though  appropriate 
for  the  purpose.  No  necessity  seems 
to  exist,  which  is  sufficient  to  justify 
so  strong  a  measure.  A  particular 
locality  as  to  a  few  rods  in  respect  to 
their  site  is  usually  of  no  conse- 
quence.'' For  comments  on  this  lan- 
guage see  33  Vt.  278,  279. 

83Burt  V.  Merchants'  Ins.  Co.,  106 
Mass.  356,  8  Am.  Rep.  339. 

aSee  post,  §  309. 


8  6  United  States  v.  Cooper,  9  Mackey 
104;  County  Court  v.  Griswold,  58 
Mo.  175;  Owners  of  Ground  v.  Mayor 
etc.  of  Albany,  15  Wend.  374. 
Brooklyn  Park  Co.  v.  Armstrong, 
45  N.  Y.  234;  Matter  of  Commis- 
sioners for  Central  Park,  63  Barb. 
282;  Laird  v.  Pittsburg,  205  Pa.  St. 
1,  54  Atl.  324,  61  L.R.A.  332;  Shoe- 
maker V.  United  States,  147  U.  S. 
282,  13  S.  C.  Rep.  361.  See  aUo  the 
following  cases  which  impliedly  sus- 
tain the  same  proposition:  Cook  v. 
South  Park  Comrs.,  61  111.  115;  Winn 
V.  Board  of  Park  Comrs.  (Ky.)  14  S. 
W.  Rep.  421 ;  Holt  v.  Somerville,  127 
Mass.  408;  Foster  v.  Boston  Park 
Comrs.,  131  Mass.  225;  S.  C.  133 
Mass.  321;  Kerr  v.  South  Park 
Comrs.,  117  U.  S.  379. 

"County  Court  v.  Griswold,  58 
Mo.  175. 

8 'Matter  of  Bushwick  Avenue,  48 
Barb.  9;  Matter  of  Clinton  Ave.,  57 
App.  Div.  166,  68  N.  Y.  S.  196;  S.  C. 
affirmed,  167  N.  Y.  624,  60  N.  E. 
1108. 

88Higginson  v.  Nahant,   11   Allen 


540 


EMIIfENT  DOMAIN. 


§  271 


taking  of  a  large  tract  in  the  Adirondacks  for  a  State  park  was 
held  to  be  for  a  public  use.^®  An  act  of  New  Jersey  "to  acquire 
rights  of  fishing  common  to  all  in  fresh  water  lakes  in  certain 
counties,  to  acquire  lands  adjoining  thereto  for  public  use  and 
enjoyment  therewith,  and  to  regulate  the  same,"  was  held  void 
because  the  right  of  fishing  could  not  be  taken  without  taking 
the  water  or  lake  itself  andi  because  the  object  of  the  act  was  not 
a  public  use  within  the  constitution.*" 

Whether  aesthetic  purposes  are  a  public  use  for  the  promo- 
tion of  which  property  may  be  taken  has  been  made  a  question.*^ 
An  act  limiting  the  height  of  buildings  around  a  public  square 
and  providing  compensation  to  the  owners  of  property  affected 
was  sustained  in  Massachusetts.®^  And  it  has  been  implied  by 
the  same  court  that  the  right  to  use  property  for  display  adver- 
tising by  means  of  bill  boards,  posters  and  the  like  might  be 
taken  on  making  compensation.** 


530;  Mount  Washington  Boad  Co., 
35  N.  H.  134;  see  Bryan  v.  Bran- 
ford,  50  Conn.  246;  Woodstock  v. 
Gallup,  28  Vt.  687;  Great  Falls 
Power  Co.  v.  Great  Palls  etc.  B,.  R. 
Co.,  104  Va.  416,  62  S.  E.  172;  ante, 
§  259. 

ssPeople  V.  Adirondack  R.  R.  Co., 
160  N.  y.  225,  reversing  S.  C.  39 
App.  Div.  34. 

9<>The  act  was  sustained  by  the 
Supreme  Court.  Albright  v.  Sussex 
County  Lake  and  Park  Commission, 

68  N.  J.  L.  523,  53  Atl.  612.  On  ap- 
peal this  decision  was  reversed  by 
the  court  of  errors  and  appeals.  Al- 
bright V.  Sussex  County  Lake  & 
Park  Commission,  71  N.  J.  L.  303, 
57  Atl.  398,  108  Am.  St.  Rep.  749,  69 
L.R.A.  768.  And  on  rehearing  the 
act  was  held  void  m  toto.  Albright 
V.  Sussex  County  Lake  &  Park  Com- 
mission, 71  N.  J.  L.  309,  59  Atl.  146, 

69  L.R.A.  768.  The  court  says: 
"But  not  only  does  the  constitution 
require  that  the  property  taken  shall 
be  for  the  public ;  it  is  necessary  that 
it  should  be  for  use.  The  chief  pur- 
pose in  the  enjoyment  of  the  prop- 
erty must  be  utility.    But  it  cannot 


be  doubted  that  the  main  object  of 
the  present  statute  is  to  furnish  a 
means  of  amusement  or  sport  to  the 
few  persons  who  have  the  inclina- 
tion and  leisure  for  such  pastime. 
The  public  utility  to  be  subserved 
by  such  indulgence  is  imperceptible. 
•  *  *  We  have  found  no  instance  of 
the  exercise  of  the  power  in  order  to 
a£FoTd  a  means  of  pastime  capable  of 
being  enjoyed  by  only  a  few  per- 
sons." Albright  v.  Sussex  Co.  Lake 
&  Park  Commission,  71  N.  J.  L.  303, 
306,  307,  57  Atl.  398,  108  Am.  St. 
Rep.  749,  69  L.R.A.  768. 

siiSce  cases  cited  in  last  note; 
also  Farist  Steel  Co.  v.  Bridgeport, 
60  Conn.  278;  Bostock  v.  Same,  95 
Md.  400,  52  Atl.  1130,  93  Am.  St. 
Rep.  394,  59  L.R.A.  282;  Passaic  v. 
Paterson  Bill  Posting  Co.,  72  N.  J. 
L.  285,  62  Atl.  267,  111  Am.  St.  Rep. 
676;  Great  Falls  Power  Co.  v.  Great 
Falls  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  104  Va.  416,  52 
S.  E.  172. 

9  2  Attorney  General  v.  Williams, 
174  Mass.  476,  55  N.  E.  77.  See 
ante,  §  243. 

9  3  Commonwealth  v.  Boston  Ad- 
vertising Co.,  188  Mass.  348,  74  N. 


§  272 


WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USE. 


541 


§  272  (175a).  Converting  spots  of  historic  interest  in- 
to public  grounds :  battle  fields.  Acts  of  Congress  provid- 
ed for  the  condemnation  of  land  "for  the  purpose  of  preserving 
the  lines  of  battle  at  Gettysburg,  Pa.,  and  for  properly  marking 
with  tablets  the  positions  occupied  by  the  various  commands  of 
the  armies  of  the  Potomac  and  of  Northern  Virginia  on  that 
field,  and  for  the  opening  and  improving  avenues  along  the 
positions  occupied  by  troups  upon  those  lines,  and  for  fencing 
the  same,  and  for  determining  the  leading  tactical  positions  of 
batteries,  regiments,  brigades,  division,  corps  and  other  organiza- 
tions, with  reference  to  the  study  and  correct  understanding  of 
the  battle,  and  to  mark  the  same  with  suitable  tablets,  each  bear- 
ing a  brief  historical  legend,  compiled  without  praise  and  with- 
out censure."  This  was  held  to  be  within  the  powers  vested  in 
Congress  and  a  public  use  for  which  the  power  of  eminent  do- 
main could  be  exercised.** 


E.   601,   108   Am.   St.   Kep.   494,   69 
L.R.A.  817.     See  ante,  §  243. 

91  United  States  y.  Gettysburg 
Electric  E.  R.  Co.,  160  U.  S.  688,  16 
S.  C.  427,  reversing  S.  C.  67  Fed.  869. 
The  court  says:  "The  end  to  be  at- 
tained, by  this  proposed  use,  as  pro- 
vided for  by  the  act  of  Congress,  is 
legitimate,  and  lies  within  the  scope 
of  the  constitution.  The  battle  of 
Gettysburg  was  one  of  the  great  bat- 
tles of  the  world.  The  numbers  con- 
tained in  the  opposing  armies  were 
great ;  the  sacrifice  of  life  was  dread- 
ful; while  the  bravery,  and,  indeed, 
heroism,  displayed  by  both  the  con- 
tending forces,  rank  with  the  highest 
exhibition  of  those  qualities  ever 
made  by  man.  The  importance  of 
the  issue  involved  in  the  contest  of 
which  this  great  battle  was  a,  part 
cannot  be  overestimated.  The  ex- 
istence of  the  government  itself,  arid 
the  perpetuity  of  our  institutions, 
depended  upon  the  result.  Valuable 
lessons  in  the  art  of  war  can  now  be 
learned  from  an  examination  of  this 
great  battlefield,  in  connection  with 
the  history  of  the  events  which  there 


took  place.  Can  it  be  that  the  gov- 
ernment is  without  power  to  pre- 
serve the  land,  and  properly  mark 
out  the  various  sites  upon  which  this 
struggle  took  place?  Can  it  not 
erect  the  monuments  provided  for  by 
these  acts  of  Congress,  or  even  take 
possession  of  the  field  of  battle,  in 
the  name  and  for  the  benefit  of  all 
the  citizens  of  the  pountry,  for  the 
present  and  for  the  future?  Such  a, 
use  seems  necessarily  not  only  a  pub- 
lie  use,  but  one  so  closely  connected 
with  the  welfare  of  the  republic  it- 
self as  to  be  within  the  powers 
granted  congress  by  the  constitution 
for  the  purpose  of  protecting  and 
preserving  the  whole  country.  It 
would  be  a  great  object  lesson  to  all 
who  looked  upon  the  land  thus  cared 
for,  and  it  would  show  a  proper  rec- 
ognition of  the  great  things  that 
were  done  there  on  those  momentous 
days.  By  this  use  the  government 
manifests  for  the  benefit  of  all  its 
citizens  the  value  put  upon  the 
services  and  exertions  of  the  citizen 
soldiers  of  that  period.  Their  suc- 
cessful effort  to  preserve  the  integ- 
rity and  solidarity  of  the  great  re- 


542 


EMINENT   DOMAIN. 


§  273 


§  273  (176).  Cemeteries.  Public  places  of  sepulture  are 
undoubtedly  a  public  use,  and  the  power  of  eminent  domain  may 
be  exercised  for  this  purpose,  when  the  cemetery  is  to  be  under 
the  control  of  public  authorities,  or  when  the  right  of  sepulture 
is  public  and  general.®^  But  cemetery  associations  cannot  con- 
demn land  for  burial  purposes,  to  be  vested  in  the  association 
and  lot-holders  as  their  private  property,  and  in  which  the  pub- 


public  of  modern  times  is  forcibly 
impressed  upon  every  one  who  looks 
over  the  field.  The  value  of  the  sac- 
rifices then  freely  made  is  rendered 
plainer  and  more  durable  by  the  fact 
that  the  government  of  the  United 
States  through  its  representatives  in 
congress  assembled,  appreciates  and 
endeavors  to  perpetuate  it  by  this 
most  suitable  recognition.  Such 
action,  on  the  part  of  congress 
touches  the  heart,  and  comes  home 
to  the  imagination  of  every  citizen, 
and  greatly  tends  to  enhance  his 
love  and  respect  for  those  institu- 
tions for  which  these  heroic  sacri- 
fices were  made.  The  greater  the 
love  of  the  citizen  for  the  institu- 
tions of  his  country,  the  greater  is 
the  dependence  properly  to  be  placed 
upon  him  for  their  defense  in  time 
of  necessity,  and  it  is  to  such  men 
that  the  country  must  look  for  its 
safety.  The  institutions  of  our 
country,  which  were  saved  at  this 
enormous  expenditure  of  life  and 
property,  ought  to  and  will  be  re- 
garded with  proportionate  affection. 
Here  upon  this  battlefield  is  one  of 
the  proofs  of  that  expenditure,  and 
the  sacrifices  are  rendered  more  ob- 
vious and  more  easily  appreciated 
when  such  a  battlefield  is  preserved 
by  the  government  at  tjie  public  ex- 
pense. The  right  to  take  land  for 
cemeteries  for  the  burial  of  the  de- 
ceased soldiers  of  the  country  rests 
on  the  same  footing,  and  is  connected 
with,  and  springs  from,  the  same 
powers  of  the  constitution.  It  seems 
very  clear  that  the  government  has 


the  right  to  bury  its  own  soldiers, 
and  to  see  to  it  that  their  graves 
shall  not  remain  unknown  or  un- 
honored.  No  narrow  view  of  the 
character  of  this  proposed  use  should 
be  taken.  Its  national  character  and 
importance,  we  think,  are  plain. 
The  power  to  condemn  for  this  pur- 
pose need  not  be  plainly  and  unmis- 
takably deduced  from  any  one  of  the 
particularly  specified  powers.  Any 
number  of  those  powers  may  be 
grouped  together,  and  an  inference 
from  them  all  may  be  drawn  that  the 
power  claimed  has  been  conferred. 
It  is  needless  to  enlarge  upon  the 
subject,  and  the  determination  is 
arrived  at  without  hesitation  that 
the  use  intended,  as  set  forth  in  the 
petition  in  this  proceeding,  is  of  that 
public  nature  which  comes  within 
the  constitutional  power  of  congress 
to  provide  for  by  the  condemnation 
of  land."  See  United  States  v.  Tract 
of  Land,  70  Fed.  940. 

9  5Edwards  v.  Stonington  Cemetery 
Association,  20  Conn.  466;  Evergreen 
Cemetery  Association  v.  New  Haven, 
43  Conn.  234,  241;  Westfield  Cem. 
Assn.  v.  Danielson,  62  Conn.  319,  26 
Atl.  345;  Starr  Burying  Ground 
Ass.  V.  North  Lane  Cem.  Ass.,  77 
Conn.  83,  58  Atl.  467;  Forneman  v. 
Mt.  Pleasant  Cem.  Assn.,  135  Tnd. 
344,  35  N.  E.  271;  Balch  v.  County 
Comrs.  of  Essex,  103  Mass.  lOj , 
Tracy  v.  Bittle,  213  Mo.  302,  112  S. 
W.  45;  Standards  Corners  Rural 
Cem.  Assn.  v.  Brandes,  35  N.  Y. 
Supp.  1015;  Matter  of  Lyons  Cem. 
Ass.,   93  App.   Div.   19,   86   X.   Y.   S. 


274 


WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USE. 


543 


lie  have  no  rights.'®  It  is  no  objection  that  the  privilege  must 
be  paid  for,  nor  that  the  price  varies  according  to  location,  nor 
that  the  price  operates  as  a  practical  exclusion  of  a  portion  of 
the  public.®^ 

§  274  (177).  Improvement  of  navigation.  As  we  have 
already  seen,  all  navigable  streams  are  public  highways  by  water, 
and  the  public  not  only  have  a  right  to  traverse  them,  but  to 
improve  them  for  that  purpose,  and  private  property  may  be  con- 
demned in  order  to  effect  such  improvements.**  Any  occupa- 
tion or  interference  with  private  property  for  the  purpose  of  im-' 
proving  navigation,  as  by  the  construction  of  canals  or  dams  is 
for  public  use."  A  boom  to  facilitate  the  running,  storing  and 
handling  of  logs  is  an  improvement  of  such  highway  and  a  pub- 
lic use.^  Land  may  be  taken  on  the  banks  of  navigable  streams 
for  public  landing  places,  including  yard  room  for  storing  and 
handling  freight.^  The  establishment  of  harbor  lines  and  im- 
provement of  harbors  fall  in  the  same  category.*  A  company 
was  chartered  by  the  legislature  of  Tennessee  for  the  purpose  of 


960;  Memphis  State  Line  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Forest  Hill  Cem.  Co.,  116  Tenn. 
400,  94  S.  W.  69 ;  Edgecumbe  v.  Bur- 
lington, 46  Vt.  218;  United  States  v. 
Gettysburg  Electric  R.  R.  Co.,  160 
U.  S.  688,  16  S.  C.  427. 

ssEvergreen  Cemetery  Association 
V.  Beecher,  53  Conn.  551,  5  Atl.  353; 
Board  of  Health  v.  Van  Hoesen,  87 
Mich.  533,  49  N.  W.  894 ;  Matter  of 
Deansville  Cemetery  Association,  66 
N.  Y.  569,  23  Am.  Rep.  86;  Fork 
Ridge  Baptist  Cem.  Assn.  v.  Redd, 
33  W.  Va.  262,  10  S.  E.  405. 

9  ^Evergreen  Cemetery  Associa- 
tion V.  Beecher,  53  Conn.  551,  5  Atl. 
353.  The  court  says :  "Corporations 
take  land  by  right  of  eminent  do- 
main primarily  for  the  benefit  of  the 
public,  incidentally  for  the  benefit 
of  themselves.  As  a  rule  men  are 
not  allowed  to  ride  in  cars,  or  pass 
along  turnpikes,  or  cross  toll  bridges, 
or  have  grain  ground  at  the  mill, 
without  making  compensation.  One 
man  asks  and  pays  for  a  single  seat 
in  a  ear  ;  another  for  a  special  train; 
all  have  rights ;  each  pays  in  propor- 


tion to  his  use;  and  some  are  ex- 
cluded because  of  their  inability  to 
pay  for  any  use;  nevertheless  it  re- 
mains a  public  use  as  long  as  all 
persons  have  the  same  measure  of 
right  for  the  same  measure  of 
money."  p.  553. 

9  8Matter  of  Petition  of  United 
States,  96  N.  Y.  227;  S.  C.  67  How. 
Pr.  121. 

9  9Hazen  v.  Essex  Co.,  12  Cush. 
475;  Calking  v.  Baldwin,  4  Wend. 
667,  21  Am.  Dec.  168. 

iCotton  v.  Miss.  &  Rum  River 
Boom  Co.,  22  Minn.  372;  Samish 
River  Boom  Co.  v.  Union  Boom  Co., 
32  Wash.  586,  73  Pac.  670 ;  Patterson 
V.  Boom  Co.,  3  Dill.  465;  S.  C.  af- 
firmed, 98  U.  S.  403. 

zPearson  v.  Johnson,  54  Miss.  259 ; 
Belcher  Sugar  Refining  Co.  v.  St. 
Louis  Grain  Elevator  Co.,  10  Mo. 
App.  401 ;  Pittsburgh  v.  Scott,  1  Pa. 
St.  309. 

sFarist  Steel  Co.  v.  City  of 
Bridgeport,  60  Conn.  278,  22  Atl. 
561  ;  Moore  v.  Sanford,  151  Mass. 
285,  24  N.  E.  323,  7  L.R.A.  151 


544  EMINEiq^T  DOMAIN.  §    275 

constructing  sheds,  railroads,  engines  and  other  equipments  to 
be  used  in  loading  and  unloading  freight  on  or  from  steamboats 
and  other  craft  touching  at  Memphis.  This  was  held  not  to  be 
a  public  use  which  would  authorize  the  condemnation  of  private 
property.  The  ground  of  this  decision  was  that  it  was  a  public 
convenience,  merely,  and  not  a  necessity,  and  that  it  was  not 
subject  to  public  regulation  in  its  charges  and  services.*  Con- 
verting a  private  stream  into  a  highway  for  floating  logs  and 
timber  is  a  public  use  for  which  Jand  or  riparian  rights  may  be 
condemned.^ 

§  275  (178).  Water  mills  and  water  power.  Prior  to 
the  Revolution,  and,  consequently,  long  before  the  courts  of  this 
country  were  called  upon  to  adjudicate  upon  the  question  of  pub- 
lic use,  it  had  been  the  practice  to  permit  the  erection  of  dams 
for  water  power  and  to  provide  for  a  statutory  adjustment  of 
the  damages  to  property  overflowed.®  After  the  Revolution  and 
the  adoption  of  State  constitutions  containing  the  eminent  do- 
main provision  in  question,  this  practice  continued,  no  question 
being  made  for  some  time  as  to  the  constitutionality  of  such  pro- 
ceedings.'^ When  at  last  the  question  was  raised  as  to  the  public 
use  of  these  mills,  the  practice  had  been  so  long  acquiesced  in 
and  encouraged  and  so  much  capital  had  become  invested  in 
such  enterprises,  that  the  courts  were  hardly  in  a  condition  to 
give  the  question  a  fair  consideration.  Courts  are  not,  and  per- 
haps ought  not  to  be,  free  from  the  influence  of  the  circumstances 
which  surround  a  case  and  the  consequences  which  may  flow 

^Memphis    Freight   Co.   v.   Mem-  In  Great  Falls  Manf.  Co.  v.  Fernald, 

phis,  4  Cold.  419.  47  N.  H.  444,  459,  such  acts  are  said 

sPotlatch  Lumber  Co.  v.  Peterson,  to  have  been  in  force  in  that  State 

12  Ida.  769,  88  Pac.  426,  118  Am.  St.  since  1718. 

Rep.  233;   Martin  v.  Burns,  155  N.  'Stowell  v.  Flagg,   11  Mass.  364, 

Y.  23,  49  N.  E.  246;  Brewster  v.  J.  1814;  Cogswell  v.  Essex  Mill  Corp., 

&  J.  Rogers  Co.,  169  N.  Y.  73,  62  N.  6  Pick.  94,  1827;  Wolcott  v.  Woolen 

E.  164,  58  L.R.A.  495,  afjlrming  S.  C.  Manf.  Co.,  5  Pick.  292,  1824;  Fiske 

42  App.  Div.  343,  59  N.  Y.  S.  32;  v.  Framingham  Manf.  Co.,  12  Pick. 

State  V.  Superior  Court,  47  Wash.  67,  1831 ;  French  v.  Braintree  Manf. 

397,  92  Pac.  269.  Co.,  23  Pick.  216,  1839;  Crenshaw  v. 

6Acts   of    8   Anne,    1714,    and    13  Slate  River   Co.,   6  Rand.  Va.   245, 

Anne,   1719,   in    Colony    of    Masaa-  1828;   Bibb  v.  Mountjoy,  2  Bibb  1, 

chusetts  Bay,  Ancient  Charters,  pp.  1810;   Afee  v.  Kennedy,   1  Litt.  92, 

388,  404;   and  see  remarks  of  court  1822;   Smith  v.   Connelly's  Heirs,  1 

in  Boston  &  Roxbury  Mill.  Corp.  v.  T.  B.  Mon.  58,  1824;  Shackleford  v, 

Newman.  12  Pick.  407-9,  and  Mur-  Coffee,  4  J.  J.  Marsh  40,  1830. 
dock  V.   Stickney,   8   Cusli.   113,   117. 


§  275 


■WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC   USE. 


545 


from  a  particular  decision.  Most  of  the  mills  which  existed  in 
these  early  years  were  grist-mills  and  saw-mills,  accustomed  to 
grind  and  saw  for  the  public,  and  dependent  upon  the  custom  of 
the  public  for  their  success  and  profit.  In  most  States  they  were 
regulated  by  law  and  compelled  to  serve  the  public  for  a  stipu- 
lated toll  and  in  regular  order.* 


sWe  have  not  access  to  all  the  old 
statutes  of  the  different  States  en- 
acted prior  to  the  time  when  the 
constitutionality  of  the  mill  acts 
was  called  in  question,  but  give  be- 
low sufficient  to  sustain  the  text. 

Alahama.  All  mills  were  declared 
to  be  for  public  use,  and  were  re- 
quired to  be  commenced  within  one 
and  completed  within  three  years 
after  leave  granted.  Grist  mills 
were  required  to  grind  according  to 
turn  and  well  and  sufficiently  all 
grain  brought  thereto  and  for  a  toll 
fixed  by  the  county  court  where 
located.  Acts  of  1811  and  1812.  The 
act  of  1812  authorized  the  erection 
of  grist-mills,  saw-mills,  cotton  gins 
or  other  useful  water  works.  Tom- 
lin's  Digest,  Laws  of  Ala.,  pp.  623- 
626. 

Connecticut.  The  first  act  author- 
izing flowage  by  dams  appears  to 
have  been  passed  in  1864.  Acts  of 
1864,  p.  40.  There  had  existed,  how- 
ever, since  1796  a  statute  regulating 
the  tolls  and  duties  of  millers.  Acts 
and  Laws,  1796. 

Delaware.  As  far  back  as  1752  an 
act  was  passed  for  regulating  the 
tolls  of  millers,  and  from  time  to 
time  during  the  remainder  of  the 
century  acts  were  passed  compelling 
millers  to  grind  for  the  public,  to 
keep  their  mills  in  repair,  and  other- 
wise regulating  them.  Laws  of  Del. 
1829,  pp.  402,  403.  Laws  of  Del. 
1797,  passim. 

Georgia  had  a  similar  act  passed 
in  1786.  Prince's  Digest  of  Laws  of 
Ga.  p.  339. 

Kentucky.  In  1797  an  act  was 
Em.  D. — 35. 


for  the  erection  of  water 
grist-mills.  Applicants  were  obliged 
to  commence  their  mill  in  one  year 
and  complete  it  in.  three  years  and 
keep  it  in  repair  under  a  penalty. 
Millers  were  required  to  grind  well 
and  sufficiently  the  grain  brought  to 
their  mills  in  due  time  as  the  same 
was  brought.  In  1810  the  provisions 
of  this  act  were  extended  to  "any 
kind  of  water  works."  Littell  & 
Swigert  Digest  of  Laws  of  Ky.,  1822, 
pp.  935-939. 

Maryland.  Acts  of  1704  and  1816 
regulate  tolls  for  grinding.  Dorsey's 
Statutes,  vol.  1,  pp.  3  and  640.  No 
act  for  a  statutory  assessment  of 
damages  appears  to  have  existed  up 
to  1840. 

Massachusetts.  The  first  act  for  a 
statutory  assessment  of  damages 
from  flowage  was  passed  in  1714. 
Ancient  Charters,  p.  404.  The  pre- 
amble refers  to  mills  as  "serviceable 
for  the  public  good  and  benefit  of 
the  town,  or  considerable  neighbor- 
hood in  or  near  to  which  they  have 
been  erected."  Which  indicates  that 
saw-mills  and  grist-mills  for  public 
use  were  in  mind.  The  act,  however, 
provides  for  "any  water-mill  or 
mills.''  Other  early  acts  regulate 
the  tolls  and  duties  of  millers.  Act 
of  1635,  Ancient  Charters,  p.  157; 
also  pp.  388,  469.  The  act  of  1796 
was  a  revision  of  the  statutes  on  this 
subject.  Perpetual  Laws,  vol.  2,  p. 
344.  The  act  applies  to  "any  water 
mill."  The  preamble  recites  as  fol- 
lows: "Whereas  the  erection  and 
support  of  mills  to  accommodate  the 
inhabitants  of  the  several  parts  of 


j46 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


276 


§  276  (179).  The  same:  Leading  cases.  The  question 
as  to  the  constitutionality  of  these  mill  acts  appears  to  have  been 
made  almost  simultaneously  in  two  different  States,  Massachus- 


the  State  ought  not  to  be  discouraged 
by  many  doubts  and  disputes,"  etc. 
This  shows  that  the  legislature  had 
in  mind  public  mills.  The  act  also 
regulates  the  tolls  and  prescribes  the 
duties  of  millers.  There  were  after- 
wards many  additions  and  amend- 
ments to  this  act  and  also  many  spe- 
cial acts  passed  for  the  erection  of 
particular  mills  or  water  power. 

New  Hampshire.  In  1718  an  act 
was  passed  authorizing  the  erection 
of  water  mills  and  providing  a  statu- 
tory remedy  for  flowage.  The  act 
regulates  the  toll  of  millers.  The  act 
is  given  in  full,  together  with  a 
summary  of  legislation  on  the  sub- 
ject, in  44  N.  H.  448-450. 

New  Jersey.  An  act  of  1696  pre- 
scribes the  tolls  of  millers.  Learning 
&  Spicer's  Grants  etc.  of  N.  J.  547. 
Similar  regulations  were  continued 
in  force  until  the  present  century. 
Nixon's  Digest  of  Laws,  p.  547 ;  Rev. 
Stat.  1821,  p.  446.  I  find  no  laws  for 
the  erection  of  mills  or  the  assess- 
ment of  damages  to  lands. 

North  Carolina.  An  act  of  1777 
allows  the  erection  of  water  grist- 
mills only,  and  provides  for  an  as- 
sessment of  damages  caused  by  flow- 
age.  All  millers  are  required  to 
grind  "according  to  turn,"  and  "well 
and  sufficiently,"  for  a  prescribed 
toll.  After  the  right  has  been  ac- 
quired, the  applicant  must  commence 
his  works  within  a  year  and  complete 
them  within  three  years.  This  act 
continued  in  force  at  least  until  1821. 
Rev.  Stat.  1821,  vol.  1,  p.  345. 

Pennsylvania.  Mill  acts  do  not  ap- 
pear to  have  existed  in  this  State  in 
early  times.  An  act  of  1803  permits 
the  erection  of  dams  in  all  but 
specified  streams,  but  the  persons 
erecting  such  dams  are  not  to  "in- 


fringe on  or  injure  the  rights  or 
privileges  of  the  owner  or  possessor 
of  any  private  property  on  said 
stream.''     Purdon's  Statutes,  p.  592. 

Rhode  Island.  An  act  of  1726  reg- 
.  ulates  the  tolls  of  millers.  Rev.  Stat. 
1822,  p.  376.  An  act  of  1734  pro- 
vides for  the  erection  of  "water 
mills"  and  an  assessment  of  damages 
from  flowage.     Same,  p.  374. 

South  Carolina.  In  1712  an  act 
was  passed  offering  a  beneflt  to  the 
one  who  should  first  erect  and  put  in 
successful  operation  a  wind  or  water 
saw-mill,  or  a  wind  or  water  grist- 
mill. Statutes  at  Large,  vol.  2,  p. 
388.  In  1744  an  act  was  passed 
which  prohibited  the  erection  or 
maintenance  of  dams  which  flooded 
the  lands  of  others  and  provided  for 
their  abatement.  Ibid.  vol.  3,  p.  609. 
This  act,  at  first  passed  for  three 
years  only,  was  revived  and  made 
perpetual  in  1783.  Ibid.  vol.  4,  p. 
540.  In  1785  an  act  was  passed  reg- 
ulating tolls  taken  by  millers.  Ibid. 
vol.  4,  p.  652. 

Vermont.  An  act  of  1797  regu- 
lates the  tolls  and  duties  of  millers. 
Rev.  Laws,  1797,  p.  407.  No  flowage 
laws  existed  until  a  recent  date. 

Virginia.  Various  acts  were 
passed  from  1645  to  1666  regulating 
the  charges  and  duties  of  millers. 
Henning's  Stat,  at  Large,  vol.  1,  pp. 
301,  348,  485;  vol.  2,  p.  242.  In  1667 
an  act  was  passed  allowing  the 
owner  on  one  side  of  a  stream  to  con- 
demn an  acre  of  land  on  the  opposite 
side  for  the  purpose  of  erecting  a 
mill  "for  the  grinding  of  corn."  Ibid. 
vol.  2,  p.  260.  In  1745  the  first  act 
was  passed  allowing  an  assessment 
of  damages  for  flowage.  Ibid.  vol.  5, 
p.  360.  This  act  applied  generally  to 
water  mills.     In  1748  these  various 


§    276  WHAT   IS  A  PUBLIC    USE.  547 

etts  and  N^ew  Jersey."  In  Boston  &  Eoxbury  Mill  Corporation 
V.  J^ewman,  the  plaintiff  was  authorized  to  construct  a  system 
of  dams  and  works  for  the  purpose  of  operating  grist-mills,  iron 
manufactories  and  other  mills  by  means  of  tide  water.  The  act 
was  held  valid  principally  on  the  ground  that  the  establishment 
of  such  mills  would  be  a  great  public  benefit.  The  acts  of  the 
Colony  and  State  in  reference  to  mills  were  referred  to  as  show- 
ing the  light  in  which  the  legislature  and  the  people  had  re- 
garded such  works.  The  court  says:  "We  should  be  at  a  loss 
to  imagine  any  undertaking  of  an  individual  or  association  of 
persons  with  a  view  to  private  emolument,  in  which  the  public 
had  a  more  certain  and  direct  interest  and  benefit."  "Take  the 
grist-mill  established  in  this  city,  as  an  example.  Is  it  of  no 
benefit  to  have  the  corn  ground  near  to  the  inhabitants,  rather 
than  at  a  distance  ?  'But  you  cannot  compel  the  miller,  to,  grind 
your  corn  for  the  toll,  as  you  may  the  proprietors  of  the  turn- 
pike to  let  you  travel  over  the  road  for  a  toll.'  If  there  be  not 
an  actual,  there  is  a  moral  necessity  imposed  upon  the  owner  of 
the  mill,  to  accommodate  the  public  to  the  extent  of  his  power. 
Who  ever  heard  of  a  refusal?  And  in  regard  to  the  manufac- 
turing establishments,  is  it  nothing  to  the  public  that  great  num- 
bers of  citizens  have  the  means  of  employment  brought  to  their 
homes  ?"  i" 

In  Scudder  v.  Trenton  Del.  Falls  Co.^^  the  decision  was  by 
the  Chancellor  only.  He  says:  "May  we  not,  in  considering 
what  shall  be  deemed  a  public  use  and  benefit,  look  at  the  ob- 
jects, the  purposes,  and  the  results  of  the  undertaking  ?  The 
water  power  about  to  be  created,  will  be  sufficient  for  the  erec- 
tion of  seventy  mills,  and  factories,  and  other  works  dependent- 
on  such  power.  It  will  be  located  at  the  seat  of  government,  at 
the  head  of  tide  water,  and  in  a  flourishing  and  populous  dis- 
trict of  country.  It  will  be  no  experiment  in  a  country  like 
ours ;  and,  judging  from  the  results  in  other  places,  we  may  make 
a  sufficiently  accurate  calculation  as  to  the  result  here.  Take  the 
town  of  Paterson  as  an  example.  The  water  power  there  is  in 
the  hands  of  individuals — a  company  like  this.    They  are  imder 

acts  were  revised  and  continued  in  Scudder  v.  Trenton  Del.   Falls   Co., 

force  at  least  until  after  the  adop-  1  N.  J.  Eq.  694,  1832. 

tion  of  the  first  constitution.    Ibid.  lOBoston  &  Roxbury  Mill  Corp.  v. 

vol.  6,  p.  55.  N'ewman,  12  Pick.  467. 

sBoston  &  Eoxbury  Mill  Corp.  v.  ni  N.  J.  Eq.  694,  728. 
Newman,    12   Pick.    467,   476,    1832; 


§48  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    277 

no  obligation  to  lease  or  sell  any  mills  or  privileges  to  tlie  pub- 
lic ;  and  yet  see  the  result  of  a  few  years'  operation.  Paterson 
is  now  the  manufacturing  emporium  of  the  State,  with  a  popu- 
lation of  eight  thousand  souls.  It  has  increased  the  value  of 
property  in  all  that  district  of  country;  opened  a  market  for 
the  produce  of  the  soil,  and  given  a  stimulus  to  industry  of  every 
kind.  May  we  not  hope  that  a  similar  benefit  may  be  experi- 
enced here  ?  *  *  *  The  ever  varying  condition  of  society  is 
constantly  presenting  new  objects'of  public  importance  and  util- 
ity ;  and  what  shall  be  considered  a  public  use  or  benefit  may  de- 
pend somewhat  on  the  situation  and  wants  of  the  community 
for  the  time  being.  The  great  principle  remains :  There  must 
be  a  public  use  or  benefit ;  that  is  undisputable.  But  what  that 
shall  consist  of,  or  how  extensive  it  shall  be  to  authorize  an  ap- 
propriation of  private  property,  is  not  easily  reducible  to  gen- 
eral rule.  Looking  at  this  case  in  all  its  bearings,  and  believing 
as  I  do  that  great  benefit  will  result  to  the  community  from 
the  contemplated  improvement,  I  am  not  satisfied  to  declare  the 
act  of  incorporation,  or  that  part  of  it  which  is  now  in  question, 
void  and  unconstitutional."    The  act  was  accordingly  sustained. 

In  the  same  year  a  case  was  decided  in  Tennessee  which  inti- 
mates that  to  take  land  for  a  saw-mill  or  paper-mill  or  any  kind 
of  mill  except  a  public  grist-mill  would  not  be  a  taking  for  a 
public  use.'^^  The  decision  in  the  case  was  that,  under  an  act 
which  related  solely  to  grist-mills,  an  application  for  a  grist-mill, 
saw-mill  and  paper-mill  could  not  be  granted.  These  early  cases 
were  not  very  carefully  considered,  but  they  were  sufiicient  to 
establish  the  law  of  the  States  where  they  were  made,  and  to 
exert  an  important  influence  upon  the  law  of  sister  States. 

§  277  (180).  The  same:  Law  in  the  different  States 
at  the  present  time.  The  taking  of  land  for  water-power  for 
running  any  kind  of  mills  or  machinery  is  held  to  be  for  public 
use  upon  principle  in  Connecticut,^^  Indiana,^*  Massachusetts,^^ 

i2Harding    v.    Goodlet,    3    Yerg.  streams  and   rivers  and  ponds  and 

Tenn.  41  (1832),  24  Am.  Dec.  546.  lakes,  and  compelling  them  with  a 

isOlmstead  v.  Camp,  33  Conn.  532,  gigantic  energy  to  turn  machinery 

551,  89  AmTbec.  221 ;  Todd  v.  Austin,  and  drive  mills,  and  thereby  build  up 

34    Conn.    78,    90;     Occum    Co.    v.  cities  and  villages,  and  extend  the 

Sprague  Manf.  Co!,  35  Conn.  490.   In  business,  the  wealth,  the  population 

Olmsted  V.  Camp  the  court  says:    "It  and  the  prosperity  of  the  State."  In 

would    be    difficult    to    conceive    a  Todd  v.  Austin  this  proposition  ia 

greater  public  benefit  than  garnering  laid  down :     "The    legislature    may 

up  the  waste  waters  of  innumerable  lawfully  grant  rights  of  easement  to 


§  271 


WHAT  IS  A  PUBTJC   USE. 


549 


Xew  Hampshire,^®  and  New  J  ersey ;  ^^  and  also  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  in  a  case  which  went  up  from  New 
Hampshire.'*  The  constitutionality  of  acts  for  this  purpose  has 
been  seriously  questioned,  but  nevertheless  uphold  either  on  the 
groimd  of  authority  or  long  and  general  acquiescence  and  usage 
in  Iowa/®  Kansas,^"  Maine,^'  Minnesota,^^   JSTebraska,^'   and 


individuals  or  corporations  to  enable 
them  to  erect  and  operate  structures, 
if  the  resul'^  of  their  operation  is  the 
production  of  an  article  or  thing  in- 
tended to  be  furnished  or  sold  to  the 
public  for  a  beneficial  use,  and  to 
supply  their  reasonable  wants." 

KHankins  v.  Lawrence,  8  Blackf. 
266;  Kepley  v.  Taylor,  1  Blackf.  492. 
See  Great  Western  Nat.  Gas  &  Oil 
Co.  V.  Hawkins,  30  Ind.  App.  557,  66 
K  E.  765. 

isBoston  &  Roxbury  Mill  Corp.  v. 
Newman,  12  Pick.  467;  Hazen  v. 
Essex  Co.,  12  Cush.  475;  JIurdock  v. 
Stickney,  8  Cush.  113;  Otis  Co.  v. 
Ludlow  Mfg.  Co.,  186  Mass.  89,  70  N. 
E.  1009.  In  Murdock  v.  Stickney,  8 
Cush.  113,  the  court  doubt  whether 
the  mill  acts  could  be  sustained  if 
the  question  was  a  new  one,  but  say 
it  is  too  late  to  question  them  after 
being  in  full  operation  for  a  century 
and  a  half.  In  this  case  also  tlie 
Court  take  the  position  that  the  mill 
acts  are  not  an  exercise  of  the  power 
of  eminent  domain  at  all,  but  the 
argument  is  too  obscure  to  be  con- 
densed. An  interesting  commentary 
upon  the  mill  acts,  in  which  the  posi- 
tion taken  in  8  Cush.  is  elaborated, 
will  be  found  in  Lowell  v.  Boston,  111 
Mass.  454,  15  Am.  Rep.  39.  A  state- 
ment of  this  case  will  be  found  in 
§  279,  post.  In  Turner  v.  Nye,  154 
Mass.  579,  28  N.  E.  1048,  14  L.R.A. 
487,  doubt  is  again  expressed  whether 
the  mill  acts  could  be  sustained  as 
new  legislation.  See  opinion  of  the 
court,  p.  582. 

leGreat  Falls  Manf.  Co.  v.  Fer- 
nald,  47  N.  H.  444 ;  Amoskeag  Manf. 


Co.  V.  Head,  56  N.  H.  386;  Ash  v. 
Cummings,  50  N.  H.  591;  Amoskeag 
Manf.  Co.  v.  Worcester,  60  N.  H. 
522 ;  Amoskeag  Manf.  Co.  v.  Goodale, 
62  N.  H.  66.  In  Rockingham  Co.  Lt. 
&  P.  Co.  V.  Hobbs,  72  N.  H.  531,  58 
Atl.  46,  66  L.R.A.  581,  it  is  said  that 
the  mill  cases  of  New  Hampshire  are 
sui  generis  and  that  they  "cannot  be 
regarded  as  declaring  that  'public 
use'  in  the  bill  of  rights  is  synony- 
mous with  public  benefit,  public  ad- 
vantage, or  any  use  that  is  for  the 
benefit  and  welfare  of  the  State." 

i7Scudder  v.  Trenton  Del.  Falls 
Co.,  1  N.  J.  Eq.  694. 

isHead  v.  Amoskeag  Manf.  Co., 
113  U.  S.  9. 

isBurnham  v.  Thompson,  35  la. 
421;  Gammell  v.  Potter,  0  la.  548. 
In  Fleming  v.  Hall,  73  la.  598,  35  N. 
W.  673,  doubt  is  expressed  whether, 
if  the  question  was  now  (1887)  to 
come  up  for  the  first  time  the  mill 
acts  would  not  be  held  unconstitu- 
tional. 

2  0Venard  v.  Cross,  8  Kan.  248; 
Harding  v.  Funk,  8  Kan.  315,  323. 
In  the  former  case  it  is  argued  that, 
when  the  constitution  was  adopted, 
mill  acts  had  been  in  operation  in 
other  States,  and  if  the  people  had 
intended  to  stop  the  practice  they 
would  have  said  so  in  express  terms. 
One  judge  dissents  on  principle,  but 
acquiesces  in  the  decision  for  the  rea- 
son above  stated.  It  is  doubtful 
whether  these  cases  sustain  anything 
more  than  public  grist-mills.  In 
Harding  v.  Funk  the  court  says :  "The 
fact,  however,  is  that  the  mills  pro- 
vided   for    under    our    statute     are 


550 


EMINEA'T   DOMAIX. 


§  277 


Wisconsin.^*  On  the  other  hand,  such  acts  have  been  held  to  be 
unconstitutional  as  authorizing  the  taking  of  private  property  for 
private  use,  except  in  case  of  public  mills,  in  the  States  of  Ala- 


neither  absolutely  private  millg  nor 
absolutely  public  mills,  but  they  par- 
take of  the  character  of  both.  They 
might  perhaps  properly  be  called 
quasi  public  mills.  It  Is  not  necessary 
for  us  to  say  wliat  would  be  our  deci- 
sion upon  this  question  if  the  same 
was  a  new  question  in  this  country. 
But  it  is  not  a  new  question.  It  has 
been  long  and  well  settled  by  legisla- 
tive, executive,  and  judicial  construc- 
tion, practice,  and  usage ;  and  we  are 
not  now  at  liberty  to  depart  from 
such  construction,  practice,  and 
usage."  See  also  Rev.  Stat.  1860, 
chaps.  65  and  66. 

21  Jordan  v.  Woodward,  40  Me.  317, 
323.  "The  mill  act,  as  it  has  existed 
in  this  State,  pushes  the  power  of 
eminent  domain  to  the  verge  of  con- 
stitutional inhibition.''  "Strictly 
speaking,  private  property  can  only 
be  said  to  have  been  taken  for  public 
use  when  it  has  been  so  appropriated 
that  the  public  have  certain  well- 
defined  rights  to  that  use  secured,  as 
the  right  to  use  the  public  highway, 
the  turnpike,  the  public  ferry,  the 
lailroad,  and  the  like.  But  when  it 
is  so  appropriated  that  the  public 
have  no  rights  to  its  use  secured,  it 
is  difficult  to  perceive  how  such  an 
appropriation  can  be  denominated  ii 
l)ublic  use."  Also  in  Ingram  v.  Me. 
Water  Co.,  98  Me.  56G,  57  Atl.  893. 

2  2Miller  v.  Troost,  14  Minn.  365, 
369.  "Had  not  similar  laws,  in 
States  having  constitutional  re- 
straints similar  to  ours,  been  uni- 
formly sustained  by  the  courts,  we 
should  hesitate  long  before  upholding 
this  one.  The  decisions,  however,  are 
HO  numerous,  and  by  courts  of  so 
great    authority,  that  we    are    con- 


strained to  hold  the  law  to  be  consti- 
tutional." In  Coates  v.  Campbell, 
37  Minn.  498,  35  N.  W.  Rep.  366,  an 
act  authorizing  a  city  to  issue  bonds 
to  aid  in  the  construction  of  a  dam 
for  improving  a  private  water  power 
was  held  to  be  void,  because  the  ob- 
ject was  not  a  public  purpose  for 
which  taxes  could  be  levied. 

2  3Travers  v.  Merrick  County,  14 
Neb.  327. 

2  4Newcomb  v.  Smith,  1  Chandler, 
71,  1849.  In  this  case  two  of  the  five 
judges  dissent  in  an  elaborate 
opinion.  In  Thien  v.  Voegtlander,  3 
Wis.  461,  the  decision  in  Newcomb  v. 
Smith  is  impliedly  questioned,  while 
in  Pratt  v.  Brown,  3  Wis.  603,  the 
minority  opinion  is  commended,  but 
the  court  do  not  deem  it  necessary  to 
reconsider  the  question,  because  the 
act  in  question  had  in  the  meantime 
been  repealed.  Other  acts  were  sus- 
tained in  Babb  v.  Mackey,  10  Wis. 
371;  Fisher  v.  Horicon  Iron  &  Manf. 
Co.,  10  Wis.  351,  though  in  the  latter 
case  the  court  distinctly  says  that 
they  would  hold  the  mill  act  uncon- 
stitutional, but  for  the  large  invest- 
ments which  had  been  made  upon  the 
faith  in  the  decision  in  Newcomb  v. 
Smith.  In  Attorney  General  v.  Eau 
Claire,  37  Wis.  400,  436,  the  court 
says :  "This  court,  as  now  organized, 
has,  in  submission  to  the  rule  stare 
decisis,  reluctantly,  against  its  own 
views,  followed  Newcomb  v.  Smith, 
1  Chand.  71,  in  upholding  the  mill- 
dam  act."  See  also  Bowers  v.  Bears, 
12  Wis.  213,  221 ;  McCord  v.  Sylves- 
ter, 32  Wis.  451;  Allaby  v.  Mil- 
waukee Elee.  Service  Co.,  135  Wis. 
345,  116  N.  W.  4. 


§  278 


WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC   USE. 


551 


bama,^"  Georgia,^®  Illinois,^''  Michigan,^*  New  York,^"  Ver- 
mont,*" Virginia/'^  and  West  Virginia. ^^  A  recent  case  in  Kan- 
sas would  seem  to  place  that  State  in  the  class  last  referred  to. 
A  statute  permitted  the  condemnation  of  land  for  "milling  and 
other  manufacturing  corporations  using  power."  It  was  held 
that  a  steam-mill  grinding  flour  and  feed  for  the  market  could 
not  exercise  the  power  and  that  the  application  of  the  statute 
must  be  limited  to  corporations  serving  the  public  directly  such 
as  public  grist-mills.^" 

§  278  (181).  The  same:  Review  of  the  decisions. 
Saw-mills  and  grist-mills,  carding  and  fulling-mills,  cotton  gins 
and  other  mills,  which  are  regulated  by  law  and  obliged  to 
serve  the  public,  are  undoubtedly  a  public  use.**  But,  as  re- 
spects all  other  kinds  of  mills,  although  they  may  be  a  public 
benefit,  they  are  not  a  public  use  within  the  meaning  of  the 


2  5Sadler  v.  Langham,  34  Ala.  311; 
Bottoms  V.  Brewer,  54  Ala.  288.  In 
the  former  case  it  is  said  that  long 
acquiescence  in  such  acts  is  no  rea- 
son for  sustaining  them.  By  the 
code  in  force  in  1891  tlie  power  of 
eminent  domain  may  be  exercised  for 
the  establishment  of  a  dam  "for  any 
water  grist-mill,  saw-mill,  gin,  or  fac- 
tory, to  be  operated  for  the  public.'' 
In  a  proceeding  under  the  statute  it 
is  held  a  fatal  defect  if  the  petition 
fails  to  show  that  the  proposed  mill 
is  to  be  operated  for  the  public.  Mc- 
Culley  V.  Cunningham,  96  Ala.  583, 
11  So.  694. 

2  6Loughbridge  v.  Harris,  42  Ga. 
501.  Here  it  is  denied  that  even 
grist-mills  are  u  public  use. 

2  7  Gay  lord  v.  Sanitary  District,  204 
111.  576,  68  N.  E.  522,  98  Am.  St.  Rep. 
235,  63  L.R.A.  582. 

2  8Ryerson  v.  Brown,  35  Mich.  333, 
24  Am.  Rep.  564;  overruling  Hart- 
well's  Petition,  2  Nisi  Pruis  Rep.  97, 
1871.  In  this  case  (Ryerson  v. 
Brown),  Judge  Cooley,  in  an  elabo- 
rate opinion,  reviews  the  authorities 
and  discusses  the  principles  appli- 
cable to  the  question  under  considera- 
tion. 


2  9fifee  dictum  in  Hay  v.  Cohoes  Co., 
3  Barb.  42. 

soTyler  v.  Beacher,  44  Vt.  648,  8 
Am.  Rep.  398;  Avery  v.  Vt.  Elec.  Co., 
75  Vt.  235,  54  Atl.  179,  98  Am.  St. 
Rep.  818,  .59  L.R.A.  817.  The  follow- 
ing is  also  an  instructive  and  well- 
considered  case.  In  re  Barre  Water 
Co.,  62  Vt.  27,  20  Atl.  Rep.  109,  3 
Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  136. 

31  Dice  v.  Sherman,  107  Va.  424,  59 
S.  E.  388. 

3  2Varner  v.  Martin,  21  W.  Va.  534. 
This  case  contains  an  elaborate 
opinion  which  discusses  the  question, 
but  the  decision  is  not  directly  in 
point.  In  Oregon  land  may  be  con- 
demned for  a  flume  to  convey  water 
to  lumber  mills.  Maffet  v.  Quine,  93 
Fed.  Rep.  347. 

ssHoward  Mills  Co.  v.  Schwartz: 
L.  &  C.  Co.,  77  Kan.  599,  95  Pae.  559. 
Aiid  see  S.  W.  Mo.  Lt.  Co.  v.  Schen- 
rich,  174  Mo.  235,  73  S.  W.  496. 

3  4  Sadler  v.  Langham,  34  Ala.  311; 
MoCulley  v.  Cunningham,  96  Ala. 
583,  11  So.  694;  State  v.  Edwards,  86 
Me.  102,  29  Atl.  947,  41  Am.  St.  Rep. 
528,  25  L.R.A.  504 ;  Harding  v.  Good- 
lett,  3  Yerg.  41,  24  Am.  Dec.  546; 
Varner  v.  Martin,  21  W.  Va.  534. 


552  EMINENT    DOMAIK-.  §    278 

constitution..  ISTo  one  of  the  public  has  any  right  in  these  mills. 
'No  one  of  the  public  can  require  any  service  at  their  hands. 
They  are  as  absolutely  private  property  and  for  private  use  as 
a  steam-mill  or  a  business  block.^^  In  the  original  States  it  is 
almost  certain  that,  at  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the  first  con- 
stitutions— ^that  is,  from  1777  to  1800 — the  power  of  eminent 
domain  had  never  been  exercised  for  the  establishment  of  any 
mills  except  such  as  were  public,  either  by  law  or  practice.  These 
acts  were  prompted  by  the  great  and  urgent  necessity  which  ex- 
isted in  the  early  history  of  the  country  for  mills  for  grinding 
grain  and  sawing  logs.  It  was  undoubtedly  the  understanding 
of  the  legislature  and  people  that  the  mill  acts  had  reference 
to  mills  of  this  character.  The  fact,  therefore,  that  no  reference 
is  made  to  mills  or  mill  acts  in  the  early  constitutions  cannot 
be  construed  into  a  recognition  of  all  kinds  of  water  mills  as  a 
public  use. 

It  must  be.  confessed,  however,  that  many  courts  which  have 
been  called  upon  to  pass  upon  the  validity  of  these  acts  for  the 
first  time  have  labored  under  peculiar  difficulties.  The  question 
has  not  generally  arisen  in  any  State  until  a  large  amount  of 
capital  had  become  invested  upon  the  assumption  of  their  '.validi- 
ty. To  have  declared  them  unconstitutional,  it  was  supposed, 
would  have  been  to  jeopardize  these  investments,  and  bring  loss 
and  ruin  to  many  citizens.  The  legislatures  and  people  of  the 
newer  States  were  justified  in  accepting  the  construction  given 
by  the  courts  of  the  older  States  to  a  constitutional  provision 
which  the  newer  States  had  adopted  from  the  older  ones.  These 
decisions  were  the  best  attainable  information.  The  first  case 
holding  the  acts  in  question  unconstitutional  was  not  decided 
until  1859,  and  then  no  legislature  had  reason  to  suspect  their 
invalidity.^"  When  the  question  first  arose  in  Massachusetts 
in  1832,^''  the  court  of  that  State  had  very  plausible  grounds  for 
sustaining  the  act  in  question,  on  the  ground  of  a  contemporane- 
ous construction  by  the  legislature  and  of  long  acquiescence  on 
the  part  of  the  people  and  legal  profession.^*  The  'New  Jersey 
court,  which  passed  upon  the  question  at  the  same  time,^*  had 
similar  grounds  to  go  upon,  and,  besides,  was  free  from  any  em- 
barrassment occasioned  by  the  constitution,  since  the  constitu- 

seColev.  La  Grange,  113  U.  S.  1.  ssCooley   Const.   Lim.   pp.   67-72; 

ssSadler  v.  Langham,  34  Ala.  311.  Sedgwick  Con.  Law.  pp.  412,  413. 

37Boston  &  Roxbury  Mill  Corp.  v.  ssScudder  v.   Trenton   Del.   Falls 

Newman,  12  Pick.  467,  1832.  Co.,  1  N.  J.  Eq.  694,  1832. 


§    278  WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USE.  553 

tion  of  that  State  contained  no  provision  as  to  taking  private 
property  for  public  use  until  1844:.  When  the  question  next 
arose  in  Indiana,  in  1846,*"  the  court  was  sustained  in  its  views, 
not  only  by  contemporaneous  construction  and  long  acquiescence, 
but  also  by  the  authority  of  the  decisions  in  Massachussetts  and 
New  Jersey.  The  next  case,  which  arose  in  Wisconsin  in 
1849,*^  presented  still  stronger  inducements  to  sustain  the  act. 
The  act  there  in  question  was  taken  largely  from  the  statutes 
of  Massachusetts.  The  constitutional  provision  in  question  had 
been  transplanted  from  the  older  States,  where  it  had  not  only 
received  a  practical  construction  by  the  legislatures  in  favor  of 
the  mill  acts,  but  had  also  been  construed  by  the  courts  in  favor 
of  such  acts.  Moreover,  the  act  in  question  was  in  force  when 
the  constitution  was  adopted.  Every  State  which  has  since  been 
called  upon  to  adjudicate  upon  this  question  has  labored  under 
similar  embarrassments. 

But,  while  these  considerations  may  explain,  they  do  not  jus- 
tify, the  decisions  which  have  been  made.  The  doctrine  of  con- 
temporary construction  or  long  acquiescence  will  not  justify  up- 
holding a  statute  which  is  plainly  repugnant  to  the  constitution.*^ 
Especially  is  this  true  where  no  material  embarrassment  will 
result  from  an  adverse  decision.  Stress  has  been  laid  in  many 
cases  upon  the  fact  that  a  large  amount  of  capital  had  become 
invested  under  the  mill  acts  which  would  be  endangered  or 
swept  away  if  these  acts  were  declared  invalid.  But  this  we 
think  is  a  mistake.  Those  whose  property  had  been  condemned 
for  mills  had  received  the  damages  awarded  and  would  be  es- 
topped from  questioning  the  validity  of  the  proceedings  by  which 
it  was  acquired.*^  This  principle  would  have  relieved  and  still 
relieves  the  question  of  most  of  its  embarrassment.  The  pros- 
perity of  the  State  would  not  have  been  affected  by  such  a  de- 
cision, for  it  is  not  probable  that  in  this  age  of  steam  and  enter- 
prise there  would  have  been  one  less  mill  in  consequence.** 

4  0Hankinga  v.  Lawrence,  8  Blackf.  i^Post,  §  871. 

266.     In  the  previous  case  of  Kepler  4<In  Fleming  v.  Hull,  73  la.  598, 

V.  Taylor,  1  Blackf.  492,  the  question  35  N.  W.  Hep.  673,  it  is  said :    "But 

■was  not  made,  though  the  acts  are  ex-  if  such  statutes  were  enacted  now  for 

pressly  sanctioned  by  the  court.  the  first  time,  it  is  possible,  if  not 

4iNewcomb  v.  Smith,  1  Chand.  71,  probable,  that  they  could  not  be  sus- 

1849.  tained." 

4  2Story  on  Const.  §  407;  Cooley, 
Const.  Lim.  70,  71;  1  Lewis'  Suth. 
Statutory  Construction,  §  82. 


554 


EMINENT   DOJIAIN. 


§    279 


§  279  (182).  Massachusetts  doctrine  that  the  mill  acts 
do  not  fall  under  the  eminent  domain  power.  A  doctrine 
has  grown  up  in  Massachusetts  that  the  mill  acts  are  not  an  exer- 
cise of  the  power  of  eminent  domain  at  all,  but  are  referable 
to  the  same  power,  and  to  be  classed  with  the  same  acts,  that  reg- 
ulate the  duties  of  adjoining  proprietors  to  each  other  in  regard 
to  division  fences  and  party  walls,  and  the  enjoyment  and  par- 
tition of  joint  estates.*^  This  doctrine  has  also  lately  found  its 
way  into  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  through  a 
judge  from  Massachusetts.**  The  doctrine  is  very  fully  elab- 
orated in  Lowell  v.  Boston,*'^  from  which  we  make  the  follow- 
ing quotation : 

"The  mill  acts,  so  called,  are  often  referred  to  as  authorizing 
the  exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent  domain  by  private  parties 
for  their  exclusive  private  benefit.  And  the  language  of  the 
court,  used  arguendo,  has  been  sometimes  such  as  to  imply  that 
the  growth  and  prosperity  of  manufacturing  and  other  indus- 
trial enterprises  were  of  such  importance  to  the  public  welfare. 


4  5Fiske  V.  Framingliam  Manf.  Co., 

12  Pick.  68,  70-72;  Williams  v.  Nel- 
son, 23  Pick.  141,  143;  French  v. 
Braintree  Manf.  Co.,  23  Pick.  216, 
218-221;  Gary  v.  Daniels,  8  Met.  466, 
476,  477,  41  Am.  Dec.  532;  Murdock 
V.  Stickney,  8  Cush.  113,  116;  Bates 
X .  Weymouth  Iron  Co.,  8  Cush.  548, 
552,  553;  Gould  v.  Boston  Dock  Co., 

13  Gray,  442,  450;  Storm  v.  Man- 
chaug  Co.,  13  Allen  10;  Lowell  v. 
Boston,  111  Mass.  454,  15  Am.  Rep. 
39 ;  Turner  v.  Nye,  154  Mass.  579,  28 
y.  E.  1048,  14  L.R.A.  487;  Otis  Co. 
V.  Ludlow  Mfg.  Co.,  186  Mass.  89,  70 
X.  E.  1009. 

■iBHead  v.  Amoskeag  Manf.  Co., 
113  U.  S.  9,  opinion  by  Gray,  J.  In 
Pumpelly  v.  Green  Bay  Co.,  13  Wall. 
166,  the  United  States  Court  holds 
that  flooding  property  by  means  of 
a  dam  is  a  taking.  In  Head  v.  Amos- 
keag Manf.  Co.,  ante,  the  same  court 
holds  that  property  may  be  flooded 
by  a  dam  in  order  to  create  a  water 
power  to  operate  the  mill  of  a  private 
manufacturing  corporation.    In  Cole 


V.  La  Grange,  in  the  same  volume, 
page  1,  it  holds  that  neither  the 
power  of  eminent  domain  nor  of  tax- 
ation can  be  exercised  for  the  pur- 
pose of  aiding  a  private  manufactur- 
ing company.  We  do  not  see  how 
these  three  decisions  can  stand  to- 
gether. If  a  flooding  is  taking,  then 
land  can  only  be  flooded  for  a,  public 
use.  If  land  may  be  flooded  to  afford 
water  power  for  a  mill,  then  it  fol- 
lows that  a  mill  is  a  public  use.  But 
if  a  mill  is  a  public  use  for  which  the 
power  of  eminent  domain  may  be  ex- 
ercised, why  is  it  not  a  public  use 
for  which  the  power  of  taxation  may 
be  exercised?  The  only  reconcilia- 
tion that  can  be  made  of  these  cases 
is  to  limit  the  opinion  in  Head  v. 
Amoskeag  Manf.  Co.  to  the  particu- 
lar point  decided,  viz. :  that  the  mill 
acts  of  New  Hampshire  were  due 
process  of  law  in  that  State  at  the 
time  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  was 
adopted. 

47111  Mass.  454,  464,  15  Am.  Rep. 
39. 


§    279  WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC   USE.  555 

as  to  justify  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent  domain  in  their 
behalf,  as  a  public  use.** 

"That  mills  for  the  sawing  of  lumber  for  purposes  of  build- 
ing, grinding  grain  for  food,  and  the  manufacture  of  material 
for  clothing,  may  be  of  such  necessity  to  a  community,  especially 
in  the  early  settlement  of  a  country,  as  to  make  their  establish- 
ment a  provision  for  a  public  service,  we  do  not  question.  It  is 
doubtless  within  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  declare  the  ex- 
istence of  a  public  exigency  for  the  establishment  of  a  mill,  for 
which  tlie  right  of  eminent  domain  may  properly  be  exercised ; 
as  in  the  case  of  the  Boston  &  Koxbury  Mill  Corporation,  and 
the  Salem  Milldam  Corporation.  What  may  be  the  limits  of 
legislative  power  in  that  direction,  and  whether  there  are  any 
limits  except  in  the  sound  discretion  of  the  legislature,  it  is 
needless  noM'  to  inquire.  We  are  satisfied  that  the  mill  acts  are 
not  founded  upon  that  poAver,  and  do  not  authorize  its  exercise. 

"The  advantages  to  be  deri^'ed  from  a  running  stream  by  tlic 
several  riparian  proprietors,  are  of  natural  right.  Each  one 
may  make  use  of  its  waters,  as  they  flow  through  his  lands,  in  a 
reasonable  manner,  for  such  purposes  as  they  are  adapted  to 
serve.  In  order  that  each  may  have  his  opportunity  in  turn, 
each  is  entitled  to  have  the  water  allowed  to  flow  to  and  from 
his  land  as  it  has  been  accustomed  to  flow,  with  only  such  modi- 
fication as  results  from  such  reasonable  use.  Hence,  all  pro- 
prietors upon  a  stream,  from  its  source  to  its  mouth,  have,  in  a 
certain  sense,  a  common  interest  in  it,  and  a  common  right  to 
the  enjoyment  of  all  its  capacities.  Among  those  capacities  no 
one  is  more  important  than  that  of  the  force  of  the  current  to 
supply  power  for  the  operation  of  mills.  To  make  that  force 
practicably  serviceable  requires  a  considerable  head  and  fall  at 
the  point  where  it  is  to  be  applied ;  often  more  than  can  be  gained 
within  the  limits  of  one  proprietor.  The  use  of  the  stream  in 
this  mode  has  always  been  regarded  as  a  reasonable  use,  not- 
Avithstanding  the  effect  of  the  dam,  by  which  the  head  is  created, 
to  retard  the  water  in  its  flow  to  the  proprietor  below,  and  to  set 
it  back  and  thus  diminish  or  destroy  the  force  of  the  current 
above.  One  who  thus  appropriates  the  force  of  the  current  is  in 
the  enjoyment  of  a  common  right,  in  which  he  is  protected,  al- 
though he  may  thereby  prevent  a  like  use  subsequently  by  the 

4  3Citing  Boston  &  Roxbury  Mill  v.  Essex  Co.,  ]2  Cush.  475,  478;  Tal- 
Co.  V.  Newman,  12  Pick.  407;  Hazen       bot  v.  Hudson,  16  Gray,  417,  426. 


556  EMINENT  DOMAia^.  §    279 

proprietor  above.*  ^  But  this  protection  extends  no  farther  than 
to  justify  the  appropriation  of  a  part  of  that  quality  of  the 
stream  which,  until  so  appropriated,  is  common  to  all.  It  does 
not  justify  any,  even  the  least,  injury  to  land  outside  the  channel. 
Without  some  law  to  control,  the  mill-owner  would  be  exposed, 
not  merely  to  the  liability  to  make  just  compensation  for  in- 
juries thus  occasioned,  but  to  harassing  suits  for  damages  and 
to  abatement  of  his  dam  as  causing  a  nuisance.  This  liability 
and  the  inevitable  controversies  growing  out  of  conflicting  rights 
in  the  stream  itself,  tending  to  defeat  all  advantageous  use  of 
its  power,  led  to  the  adoption  of  laws  regulating  and  protect- 
ing the  beneficial  use  of  streams  for  mill  purposes.  The  St.  of 
1795,  c.  74,  is  introduced  by  the  recital:  'Whereas  the  erection 
and  support  of  mills,  to  accommodate  the  inhabitants  of  the 
several  parts  of  the  State,  ought  not  to  be  discouraged  by  many 
doubts  and  disputes,  and  some  special  provisions  are  found  neces- 
sary relative  to  flowing  adjacent  lands  and  mills  held  by  several 
proprietors.'  But  there  is  no  public  service  secured  through  the 
mill  acts,  except  so  far  as  it  may  result  incidentally,  and  as  the 
inducements  of  private  interest  may  lead  mill-owners  to  devote 
their  mills' to  purposes  favorable  to  the  public  accommodation. 
The  same  rights  and  protection  are  secured  to  all  who  may  be 
possessed  of  sites  for  mills,  whatever  the  purpose  for  which  their 
mills  may  be  designed,  and  however  useless  for  all  purposes  of 
public  accommodation  or  advantage.  There  is  no  discrimination 
in  this  respect,  and  no  provision  to  secure  any  public  service  that 
may  be  supposed  to  have  been  contemplated.  Further  than  this, 
each  proprietor  is  allowed  to  avail  himself  of  the  rights  secured 
by  the  mill  acts,  in  his  own  mode  and  for  his  own  purposeis,  at 
his  own  discretion,  without  the  intervention  of  any  public  ofiicer 
or  other  tribunal  or  board,  to  whom  such  a  governmental  func- 
tion as  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent  domain  is  ordinarily 
entrusted,  when  not  under  the  special  direction  of  the  legislature 
itself. 

"A  consideration,  still  more  conclusive  to  this  point,  is,  that 
in  fact  no  private  property,  or  right  in  the  nature  of  property, 
is  taken  by  force  of  the  mill  acts,  either  for  public  or  private 
use.  They  authorize  the  maintenance  of  a  dam  to  raise  a  head 
of  water,  although  its  effect  will  be  to  overflow  the  land  of  an- 

4  3  Citing    Hatch    v.    Dwight,     17      Met.  466;  Gould  v.  Boston  Duck  Co., 
Mass.  289,  296;   Cary  v.  Daniels,  8      13  Gray  442. 


§    279  -WHAT    IS    A    PUBLIC    USE.  557 

other  proprietor.  This  right  of  flowage  is  sometimes  inaccu- 
rately called  an  easement.^"  But  it  is  not  so.  It  confers  no  right 
in  the  land  upon  the  mill-owner,  and  takes  none  from  the  land- 
owner.^^ In  Murdock  v.  Stickney,"^^  Chief  Justice  Shaw  re- 
marks, in  reference  to  the  mill  acts:  'The  principle  on  which 
this  law  is  founded  is  not,  as  has  sometimes  been  supposed,  the 
right  of  eminent  domain,  the  sovereign  right  of  taking  private 
property  for  public  use.  It  is  not  in  any  proper  sense  a  taking 
of  the  property  of  an  owner  of  the  land  flowed,  nor  is  any  com- 
pensation awarded  by  the  public'  In  Bates  v.  Weymouth  Iron 
Co.,®*  he  says:  'It  is  a  provision  by  law,  for  regulating  the 
rights  of  proprietors,  on  one  and  the  same  stream,  from  its  rise 
to  its  outlet,  in  a  manner  best  calculated,  on  the  whole,  to  pro- 
mote and  secure  their  common  rights  in  it.'  Similar  declara- 
tions are  made  in  Fiske  v.  Framingham  Manuf.  Co.,®*  and 
Williams  v.  l^Telson.®®  'This  regulation  of  the  rights  of  ri- 
parian proprietors,  both  in  respect  to  the  stream  and  to  their  ad- 
jacent lands,  liable  to  be  affected  by  its  use,  involves  no  other 
governmental  power  than  that  'to  make,  ordain  and  establish  all 
manner  of  wholesome  and  reasonable  orders,  laws,  statutes 
and  ordinances,'  as  the  general  court  'shall  adjudge  to  be  for 
the  good  and  welfare  of  this  Commonwealth,  and  for  the  govern- 
ment and  ordering  thereof,  and  of  the  subjects  of  the  same.' 
Const,  of  Mass.  c.  1.  §  1,  art.  iv.    , 

"All  individual  rights  of  property  are  held  subject  to  this 
power,  which  alone  can  adjust  their  manifold  relations  and  con- 
flicting tendencies.  The  absolute  right  of  the  individual  must 
yield  to  and  be  modified  by  corresponding  rights  in  other  indi- 
viduals in  the  community.  The  resulting  general  good  of  all,  or 
the  public  welfare,  is  the  foundation  upon  which  the  power  rests, 
and  in  behalf  of  which  it  is  exercised ;  whether  by  restricting  the 
use  of  private  property  in  a  manner  prejudicial  to  the  public,®" 
or  by  imposing  burdens  upon  it  for  the  protection  or  convenience 
in  part  of  the  public;  ^''  or  by  modifying  rights  of  individuals, 

sociting  Hunt  v.  Whitney,  4  Met.  6412  Pick.  68. 

603;  Talbot  v.  Hudson,  16  Gray  417,  6623  Pick.  141. 

422,  426.  BBCiting  Commonwealth  v.  Alger, 

siCiting  Murdock  v.   Stickney,   8  7  Gush.  53. 

Cu8h.  113;  Storm  v.  Manchaug  Co.,  67Citing    Goddard,  Petitioner,   16 

13  Allen  10.  Pick.  504;  Baker  v.  Boston,  12  Pick. 

528  Cush.  113.  184,  193;  Salem  v.  Eastern  R.  R.  Co., 

6S8  Cush.  548,  553.  98  Mass.  431. 


658  EMINENT   DOMAIN.  §    280 

in  respect  of  their  mutual  relations,  in  order  to  secure  their  more 
advantageous  enjoyment  by  each."  The  court  then  alludes  to 
various  other  statutes,  such  as  those  relating  to  property  held  by 
joint  tenants  and  tenants  in  common,  to  the  drainage  of  mead- 
ows, and  the  like,  and  then  concludes  as  follows :  "We  find  in 
tliese  statutes  no  exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent  domain,  or  of 
the  governmental  power  of  taxation." 

§  280  (183).  The  mill  acts  fall  under  the  eminent  do- 
main power.  There  can  be  no  question,  it  seems  to  us,  but 
that  the  flooding  of  land  by  a  mill-dam  is  a  taking.  It  inter- 
feres with  the  right  to  have  the  water  of  the  stream  flow  off  in  its 
accustomed  manner,  and  excludes  the  owner  from  the  use  and 
enjoyment  of  so  much  of  the  land  as  is  covered  by  water,  and 
may  greatly  deteriorate  that  which  is  not  flooded.  This  has  been 
expressly  held  to  be  a  taking  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States,®"  and  by  almost  every  court  in  the  Union.® ^  It 
is  the  appropriation  of  private  property  to  a  particular  use,  and 
this  can  only  be  done  under  the  eminent  domain  power.®^  It 
follows,  therefore,  that  it  can  only  be  done  for  a  public  use, 
and  upon  just  compensation  being  made.  Consequently,  the 
only  possible  basis  upon  which  the  mill  acts  can  stand  is  that 
mills  are  a  public  use  within  the  meaning  of  the  constitution. 
This  can  only  be  true  of  that  class  of  mills  which  are  obliged  to 
serve  the  public,  and,  unless  the  acts  are  limited  to  such  mills, 
they  cannot  be  sustained.  The  Massachusetts  court  escapes  this 
conclusion  by  maintaining  that  the  flooding  of  lands  by  a  mill- 
dam  is  not  a  taking.  "A  consideration,  still  more  conclusive  to 
this  point,  is,  that  in  fact  no  private  property,  or  right  in  the 
nature  of  property,  is  taken  by  force  of  the  mill  acts,  either  for 
public  or  private  use.  They  authorize  the  maintenance  of  a 
dam  to  raise  a  head  of  water,  although  its  effect  will  be  to  over- 
flow the  land  of  another  proprietor.  This  right  of  flowage  is 
sometimes  inaccurately  called  an  easement.  But  it  is  not  so.  It 
confers  no  right  in  the  land  upon  the  mill  owner  and  takes  none 
from  the  land  owner."  ''^    The  Massachusetts  doctrine  rests  upon 

soPumpelly  v.  Green  Bay  Co.,  13  main,  the  sovereign  right  of  taking 

Wall.  166.  private     property    for    public    use." 

eiAnte,  §  80.  Ingram  v.  Me.  Water  Co.,  98  Me.  566, 

6  2The   Supreme    Court  of  Maine,  57  Atl.  893. 
which  sustains  such  acts,  says :   "The  63Lowell    v.    Boston,     III     Mass. 

principle  upon  which  these  laws  are  466,  15  Am.  Rep.  39.    In  Boston  Mfg. 

founded  is  the  right  of  eminent  do-  Co.  v.  Burgin,  114  Mass.  340,  341,  343, 


§  280 


WHAT    IS    A    PUBLIC     CSE. 


559 


this  position,  and  we  think  we  have  shown  that  the  position  is 
untenable.**  The  prohibition  of  the  constitution  applies  to  the 
legislative  power  in  all  its  branches,  and  prevents  private  prop- 
erty from  being  appropriated  to  a  particular  use,  unless  that 
use  is  by  or  for  the  public. 

We  have  treated  this  question  thus  at  length,  not  because 
we  think  that  the  mill  acts  in  themselves  are  an  evil,  but  because 
we  believe  that  they  cannot  be  justified  upon  principle  without 
virtually  expunging  the  words  public  use  from  the  constitu- 


the  position  of  the  court  is  further 
defined  as  follows :  "Such  exercise  of 
the  right  of  fliowage  is  not  the  enjoy- 
ment of  an  easement  in  the  land 
flowed.  It  is  not  adverse  to  the  title 
or  possession  of  the  owner ;  and  being 
permitted  by  law,  and  not  actionable 
except  by  complaint  for  compensa- 
tion, it  will  not  ripen  into  title  by 
lapse  of  time.  When  the  right  has 
become  absolute  by  the  payment  of 
gross  damages,  or  by  exercise  of  the 
right  without  compensation  for  more 
than  twenty  years,  it  is  commonly 
called  an  easement.  But  it  is  an 
easement  in  respect  of  the  use  of  the 
stream  only,  and  not  an  interest  in 
or  right  over  the  land  flowed.  Wil- 
liams V.  Nelson,  23  Pick.  141;  Mur- 
dock  V.  Stickney,  8  Cush.  113;  Storm 
V.  Manchaug  Co.,  13  Allen  10.  The 
right  to  maintain  the  dam  and  to 
keep  up  the  head  of  water  is  given  to 
all  mill-owners  by  statute.  The  flow- 
age  of  adjacent  lands  is  incidental, 
and  compensation  is  made  according 
to  the  degree  of  injury.  But  the  right 
to  occupy  the  surface  of  the  land  with 
water  of  the  pond  is  not  taken,  and 
the  landowner  may  exclude  it  if  he 
sees  fit  to  do  so.  And  when  the  right 
of  the  millowner  becomes  absolute 
by  paying  gross  damages  or  by  pre- 
scription, it  is  only  a  right  to  keep 
up  the  dam  without  rendering  com- 
pensation for  such  incidental  in- 
jury." See  also  Turner  v.  Nye,  154 
Mass.  579,  28  N.  E.  1048,  14  L.R.A. 
487,  where  the  same  idea  is  repeated. 


In  Wood  V.  Kelley,  30  Me.  47,  the 
right  of  flowage  is  spoken  of  as  an 
easement. 

6<Field,  C.  J.,  in  a  dissenting 
opinion,  in  Turner  v.  Nye,  154  Mass. 
579,  28  N.  E.  1048,  14  L.R.A.  487, 
says:  "Notwithstanding  what  has 
been  said  in  some  of  our  decisions, 
overflowing  a  person's  land  without 
his  consent  is  a  taking  of  property 
while  the  overflow  continues,  and  is  a 
tort  which  would  be  enjoined  unless 
the  statutes  authorized  it.  The  mill 
acts  were  originally  sustained  on  the 
ground  that  the  erection  of  water 
mills  was  for  the  public  benefit,  and 
this  was  strictly  true  of  grist-mills 
and  saw-mills,  if  the  public  had  the 
right  to  have  their  grain  ground  and 
their  logs  sawed  at  the  mills.  The 
acts,  liowever,  extended  to  mills  of 
all  kinds,  in  most  of  which  the  in- 
terests of  the  public  were  less  direct ; 
still,  the  erection  of  water  mills, 
when  water  was  the  only  available 
source  of  power,  was  always  of  pub- 
lic concern,  suflicient  to  justify  the 
damming  of  streams,  if  compensation 
were  paid  to  the  persons  whose  lands 
were  overflowed.  Mill  acts  were  in 
force  long  before  the  adoption  of  the 
constitution,  and  it  could  not  prop- 
erly be  held  that  it  was  the  intention 
of  that  instrument  to  render  them 
void.  But  the  damming  of  the  waters 
of  a  running  stream,  so  that  the 
lands  of  the  upper  proprietor  are 
overflowed,  is  something  more  than 
the    reasonable    use    of    the    water, 


560  EMINENT  DOMAIN,  §    281 

tion.®'  The  principle  of  these  decisions  may  he  used  to  justify 
the  invasion  of  private  rights  for  any  purpose  which  the  legis- 
lature or  the  courts  for  the  time  being  may  happen  to  consider 
of  public  utility.  The  courts  should  enforce  the  constitution 
as  it  is,  and  leave  the  people,  if  they  deem  mill  acts  essential 
to  the  prosperity  of  the  State,  to  provide  for  them  by  an  amend- 
ment to  the  constitution."^ 

§  281  (183a).  Promoting  fish  culture,  cranberry  cul- 
ture and  the  like.  In  Massachusetts  a  statute  which  author- 
ized a  person  to  erect  a  dam  and  flood  the  lands  of  others,  sub- 
ject to  the  duty  of  making  compensation  as  under  the  mill  acts, 
for  the  purpose  of  cultivating  fish  for  his  own  personal  use, 
pleasure  or  profit,  was  held  valid,  on  the  same  ground  as  the 
mill  acts."^  The  statute  is  held  not  to  be  an  exercise  of  the 
power  of  eminent  domain,  but  of  the  power  to  make  laws  for 
the  good  and  welfare  of  the  commonwealth,  and  for  the  govern- 
ment and  ordering  thereof  and  of  the  subjects  of  the  same,  and 
the  opinion  is  expressed  that  the  flooding  is  not  a  taking,  since 
the  owner  whose  land  is  flowed  may  bank  out  the  water.  A  sim- 
ilar statute  exists,  permitting  the  erection  of  dams  in  aid  of  the 
cultivation  of  cranberries.  The  constitutionality  of  the  latter 
act  has  not  been  challenged  or  directly  passed  upon,  but  its  valid- 
ity has  been  assumed  in  numerous  cases.''*    A  statute  declaring 

which  every  proprietor  is  entitled  to  provides  "that  private  property  shall 
make,  as  it  runs  through  his  land,  not  be  taken  for  private  use  unless 
without  paying  any  compensation  to  by  consent  of  the  owner,  except  for 
the  upper  or  lower  proprietors.  It  private  ways  of  necessity,  and  except 
has  never  been  supposed  that  the  mill  for  reservoirs,  drains,  flumes,  or 
acts  would  be  sustained  if  they  con-  ditches,  on  or  across  the  lands  of 
tained  no  provision  for  compensation  others,  for  agriculture,  mining,  mill- 
to  the  persons  whose  lands  were  ing,  domestic  or  sanitary  purposes." 
flowed."  Sec.  14,  Art.  2.    This  was  held  to  au- 

6  5The  supreme  court  of  Vermont,  thorize  condemnation  of  land  for  a 

in  Avery  v.  Vt.  Elec.  Co.,  75  Vt.  235,  ditch  to  carry  water  to  operate  an 

54  Atl.  179,  98  Am.  St.  Eep.  818,  59  electric    light    plant.    Lambom    v. 

L.R.A.  817,  repudiates    the    Massa-  Bell,  18  Col.  346,  32  Pac.  989,  7  Am. 

chusetts  doctrine  that  the  mill  acts  E.  E.  &  Corp.  Rep.  747. 
fall  under  the  police  power  and  that  STTurner  v.  Nye,   154  Mass.  579, 

the  flooding  of  land  pursuant  thereto  28  N.  E.  1048,  14  L.R.A.  487. 
is  not  a  taking  and  says:.  "We  think  esBearse  v.  Perry,  117  Mass.  211; 

Mr.  Lewis  is  right  in  saying  that  ap-  Hinckley    v.   Nickerson,   117    Mass. 

propriations  of  this  character  cannot  213;  Blackwell  v.  Phinney,  126  Miss, 

be   sustained   without  virtually  ex-  458;  Howes  v.  Crush,  131  Mass.  207; 

purging  the  words  'public  use'  from  Turner  v.  Nye,  154  Mass..  579,  28  N. 

the  constitution."  p.  243.  E.  1048,  14  L.R.A.  487. 

6  6The    constitution    of    Colorado 


§    283  WHAT    IS    A    PUBLIC    USE.  5G1 

that  it  should  not  be  actionable  to  cross  uncultivated  private 
lands  to  fish  in  public  waters,  provided  no  damage  was  done, 
was  held  void  as  authorizing  the  taking  of  private  property  for 
private  use.*'' 

§  282  (184).  Development  of  mines.  The  tendency  of 
those  decisions  which  sustain  the  mill  acts,  is  illustrated  by  some 
cases  now  to  be  noticed.  The  legislature  of  Nevada  passed  an 
act  in  which  it  was  declared  that  "the  production  and  reduc- 
tion of  ores  are  of  vital  necessity  to  the  people  of  this  State ;  are 
pursuits  in  which  all  are  interested  and  from  which  all  derive 
a  benefit;  so  the  mining,  milling,  smelting  or  other  reduction 
of  ores  are  hereby  declared  to  be  for  the  public  use  and  the  right 
of  eminent  domain  may  be  exercised  therefor."  In  Daton  Min- 
ing Co.  V.  Sewell,'^"  the,  question  was  whether  the  company  could 
condemn  a  strip  of  land,  "in  order  to  transport  the  wood,  lum- 
ber, timbers  and  other  materials  to  enable  it  to  conduct  and 
carry  on  its  business  of  mining."  The  strip  of  land  after  being 
condemned,  would  be  the  private  property  of  the  mining  com- 
pany. The  court,  after  reviewing  the  mill  cases  at  length,  says : 
"In  the  light  of  these  authorities,  nearly  all  of  which  were  de- 
cided prior  to  the  adoption  of  our  State  constitution,  I  think  it 
would  be  an  unwarranted  assumption  on  our  part  to  declare 
that  the  framers  of  the  constitution  did  not  intend  to  give  to  the 
term  'public  use'  the  meaning  of  public  utility,  benefit  and  ad- 
\'antage,  as  construed  in  the  decisions  we  have  quoted.  The  rea- 
sons in  favor  of  sustaining  the  act  imder  consideration  are  cer- 
tainly as  strong  as  any  that  have  been  given  in  support  of  the 
mill-dam  or  flowage  acts,  as  well  as  some  of  the  other  objects 
heretofore  mentioned.  Mining  is  the  greatest  of  the  industrial 
pursuits  of  this  State.  All  other  interests  are  subservient  to  it. 
Our  mountains  are  almost  barren  of  timber,  and  our  valley 
lands  could  never  be  made  profitable  for  agricultural  purposes 
except  for  the  fact  of  a  home  market  having  been  created  by 
the  mining  developments  in  different  sections  of  the  State.  The 
mining  and  milling  interests  give  employment  to  many  men,  and 
the  benefits  derived  from  this  business  are  distributed  as  much, 
and  sometimes  more,  among  the  laboring  classes  than  with  the 
owners  of  the  mines  and  .mills.     The  mines  are  fixed  by  the 

B9New  England  Trout  &  Salmon  70ll  Nev.  394,  408,  1876. 

Club  V.  Mather,  68  Vt.  338,  35  Atl. 
323,  33  L.Pv.A.  569. 

Em.  D.— 36. 


562  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    282 

laws  of  nature,  and  are  often  found  in  places  almost  inaccessible. 
For  the  purpose  of  successfully  conducting  and  carrying  on 
the  business  of  'mining,  milling,  smelting  or  other  reduction  of 
ores,'  it  is  necessary  to  erect  hoisting  works,  to  build  mills,  to 
construct  smelting  furnaces,  to  secure  ample  grounds  for  dump- 
ing waste  rock  and  earth ;  and  a  road  to  and  from  the  mines  is 
always  indispensable.  The  sites  necessary  for  these  purposes 
are  oftentimes  confined  to  certain  fixed  localities.  Now,  it  so 
happens,  or,  at  least,  is  liable  to  happen,  that  individuals,  by 
securing  title  to  the  barren  lands  adjacent  to  the  mines,  mills  or 
works,  have  it  within  their  power,  by  unreasonably  refusing 
to  part  with  their  lands  for  a  just  and  fair  compensation,  which 
capital  is  always  willing  to  give  without  litigation,  to  greatly  em- 
barrass, if  not  entirely  defeat,  the  business  of  mining  in  such 
locations.  In  my  opinion,  the  mineral  wealth  of  this  State  ought 
not  to  be  left  undeveloped  for  the  want  of  any  quantity  of  land 
actually  necessary  to  enable  the  owner  or  owners  of  mines  to 
conduct  and  carry  on  the  business  of  mining.  Ifature  has  de- 
nied to  this  State  many  of  the  advantages  which  other  States  pos- 
sess ;  but  by  way  of  compensation  to  her  citizens,  has  placed  at 
their  doors  the  richest  and  most  extensive  silver  deposits  ever 
yet  discovered.  The  present  prosperity  of  the  State  is  entirely 
due  to  the  mining  developments  already  made,  and  the  entire 
people  of  the  State  are  directly  interested  in  having  the  future 
developments  unobstructed  by  the  obstinate  action  of  any  indi- 
vidual or  individuals."  The  act  was  of  course  sustained,  and, 
conceding  the  mill  acts  to  be  valid,  the  conclusions  of  the  court 
are  sound.  The  decision  was  approved  in  a  subsequent  ease  in 
which  it  was  beld  that  land  might  be  condemned  for  a  shaft.^' 
So  it  has  been  held  in  Georgia  that  land  could  be  condemned  for 
a  ditch  to  conduct  water  for  hydraulic  mining.'^  And  yet  it 
was  held  in  Georgia,  only  six  years  before,  that  even  grist-mills 
under  public  regulation  were  not  a  public  use.''*    'No  reference, 

TiOverman   Silver  Mining  Co.  v.  oflScers  of  the  State,  or  through  the 

Corcoran,  15  Nev.  147,  1880;  and  see  medium  of  corporate  bodies,  or  by 

Douglass  V.  Byrnes,  59  Fed.  29,  31.  means     of     individual     enterprise." 

7  2Hand  Gold  Mining  Co.  v.  Parker,  Adding  to  the  wealth  of  the  State  by 

59    Ga.  .419,  423,   1877.     The    court  tlie  pioduction  of  gold  was  held  to  be 

says:   "The  right  of  eminent  domain  a  sufficient  public  good, 
may  be  exercised  by  the  general  as-  'SLoughbridge  v.   Harris,   42  Ga. 

sembly  in  this  State,  when  it  is  for  501,  1871. 
the  public  good,  either  through   the 


§    282  AVHAT    IS    A    PUBLIC    USE.  563 

however,  was  made  to  this  or  any  other  case.  A  statute  of  Utah 
authorizing  the  power  of  eminent  domain  to  be  exercised  for 
"roads,  railroads,  tramways,  tunnels,  ditches,  flumes,  pipes  and 
dumping  places  to  facilitate  the  milling,  smelting  or  other  re- 
duction of  ores,  or  the  working  of  mines,"  was  held  valid  and 
the  condemnation  under  it  of  a  right  of  way  for  an  aerial  tram- 
way two  miles  long,  from  the  plaintiff's  mine  to  a  railroad, 
for  the  transportation  of  ore,  was  sustained  as  a  public  use.''* 
A  similar  statute  was  upheld  in  Alaska.''^ 

On  the  other  hand  the  validity  of  such  laws  has  been  denied 
in  California,'^''  Pennsylvania,''^  and  Washington,^*  and  virtu- 
ally so  in  West  Virginia.'*  This  is  undoubtedly  the  correct 
view.  In  the  California  case  it  was  sought  to  condemn  land  for 
a  bedrock  flume  to  carry  dirt  and  gravel  from  mining  claims  and 
for  a  place  of  deposit  for  the  tailings  and  refuse  from  the  mines. 
The  court  says :  "The  proposed  flume  is  to  be  constructed  solely 
for  the  purpose  of  advantageously  and  profitably  washing  and 
mining  plaintiff's  mining  ground.  It  is  not  even  pretended  that 
any  person  other  than  the  plaintiff  will  derive  any  benefit  what- 
ever from  the  structure  when  completed.  !N^o  public  use  can 
possibly  be  subserved  by  it.  It  is  a  private  enterprise  to  be  con- 
ducted solely  for  the  personal  profit  of  the  plaintiff,  and  in 
which  the  community  at  large  have  no  concern.  It  is  clear  that 
this  case  does  not  come  within  the  meaning  of  that  clause  of 
the  constitution  which  permits  the  taking  of  private  property  for 
public  use  after  just  compensation  made."  This  language  is  of 
general  application.*" 

The  taking  of  private  property  for  the  development  of  mines 
may  be  authorized  by  the  constitution,  and  this  has  been  done 

74Highland  Boy  Gold  Jlin.  Co.  v.  7  8State    v.     Superior    Court,     33 

Strickley,  28  Utah  215,  78  Pac.  296,  Wash.  542,  74  Pae.  686. 

107  Am.  St.  Rep.  711,  1  L.R.A.  976;  79Valley  City  Salt  Co.  v.  Brown,  7 

S.  C.  affirmed,  Strickley  v.  Highland  W.  Va.  191. 

Boy  Gold  Min.  Co.,  200  U.  S.  527,  26  soA  law  exists  in  Iowa  allowing 

S.  C.  301.    See  post,  §  315.  the  condemnation  of  property  for  the 

7  5Miocene  Ditch  Co.  v.  Jacobson,  purpose  of  draining  mines.     But,  as 

146  Fed.  680,  77  C.  C.  A.  106.  to  whether  it  is  valid  in  that  respect, 

7  ff Consolidated    Channell     Co.    v.  it  has  not  been  decided.     See  Ahern 

Central  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  51  Cal.  269,  v.  Dubuque  Lead  &  Level  Mining  Co., 

1876,-  see  also  Gillan  v.  Hutchinson,  48  la.  140.    And  see  generally  Butte 

16  Cal.  153.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Montana  U.  R.  R. 

77Waddell's  Appeal,  84  Pa.  St.  90;  Co;,  16  Mont.  .504,  41  Pac.  232,  50  Am. 

Edgwood  R.  R.  Co.'s  Appeal,  79  Pa.  St.  Rep.  508,  31  L.R.A.  298. 
St.  257. 


564  EMIJSfEJSTT    DOMAIIs^.  §    28o 

in  Colorado  and  other  States.^  "■  The  development  of  the  mineral 
resources  of  a  State  is  a  public  benefit  for  which  the  power  of 
eminent  domain  may  be  exercised,  when  the  restriction  imposed 
by  the  words  public  use  is  removed.*^ 

§  283  (185).  Drains,  ditches,  levees,  etc.,  for  improv- 
ing wet  and  overflowed  land.  Statutes  for  the  improve- 
ment and  reclamation  of  low,  wet  and  overflowed  lands  by  means 
of  drains  and  levees  have  been  common  in  the  United  States 
for  at  least  a  century.  These  statutes  have  been  made  to  apply 
to  a  great  variety  of  circumstances  and  dijBfer  greatly  in  their 
phraseology,  purpose  and  details.  There  has  been  much  litiga- 
tion growing  out  of  these  statutes,  in  which  their  validity  has 
not  been  questioned,  and  in  which,  therefore,  their  validity  has 
been  tacitly  assumed.  There  have  also  been  quite  a  number  of 
cases  in  which  these  statutes  have  been  assailed  as  unconstitu- 
tional. They  have  generally  been  upheld,  but  their  validity  has 
been  put  upon  different  grounds  by  different  courts,  some  hold- 
ing that  they  are  referable  to  the  power  of  eminent  domain 
and  subject  to  the  constitutional  limitations  on  that  power,*" 
others  holding  that  they  are  an  exercise  of  the  police  power, 
or  of  the  still  more  general  power  to  make  all  such  laws  as  the 
legislature  shall  deem  for  the  good  of  the  State,  and  hence  are 
not  subject  to  the  limitations  as  to  public  use  and  just  compen- 
sation.** 

siAnte,  §  18,  22a,  35a,  52a.    Down-      eral  v.  MeClear,  146  Mich.  45,  109  N. 


ing  V.  More,  12  Colo.  316,  20  Pac.  766 
Lamborn  v.  Bell,  18  Colo.  346,  32  Pac 
989,  7  Am.  E.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  747 
Denver  Power  &  Irr.  Co.  v.  Denver 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  30  Colo.  204,  69  Pac. 


W.  27;  Jenal  v.  Green  Island  Drain- 
ing Co.,  12  Neb.  163;  Draining  along 
Pequest  River,  41  N.  J.  L.  175;  Same, 
39  N.  J.  L.  433;  People  v.  Nearing,  27 
K.  Y.  308;  Matter  of  Ryers,  72  N. 


058,  60  L.R.A.  383;  Tanner  v.  Treas-  Y.  1,  28  Am.  Rep.  88;  Matter  of  Tut- 

ury  Tunnel  Min.  &  Reduction  Co.,  35  lull,  163  N.  Y.  133,  57  N.  E.  303,  79 

Colo.  593,  83Pac.  464,  4L.R.A.(N.S.)  Am.   St.   Rep.   574,   49   L.R.A.   781; 

106;   Helena   etc.   Reduction   Co.   v.  Hartwell  v.  Armstrong,  19  Barb.  166; 

Lynch,  25  Mont.  497,  65  Pac.  919;  Burk  v.  Ayers,  19  Hun  17  ;  Sessions  v. 

Bailie  v.  Larson,  138  Fed.  177.  Krunkilton,  20  Ohio  St.  349;   Seely 

8  2fifee  ante,  §  1;  post,  §  315.  v.   Sebastian,  4  Ore.  25;   Askam  v. 

ssNiekey  v.   Starns  Ranchos  Co.,  King  County,  9    Wash.   1,  36    Pac. 

126  Cal.  150,  58  Pac.  459 ;  Laguna  Dr.  1097 ;  Hayward  v.  Snohomish  County, 

Dist.  V.  Martin  Co.,  144  Cal.  209,  77  11  Wash.  429,  39  Pac.  652. 
Pac.  933 ;  Fleming  v.  Hull,  73  la.  598,  8  4Hagar   v.    Supervisors,   47    Cal. 

35  N.  W.  673 ;  People  v.  Supervisors,  222 ;    O'Reiley   v.    Kankakee   Valley 

26  Mich.  22 ;  Kinnie  v.  Barr,  68  Mich.  Draining  Co.,  32  Ind.  169;  Zigler  v. 

025,  36  N.  W.  1097 ;  Attorney  Gen-  Menges,  121  Ind.  99,  22  N.  E.  782,  16 


§  284  WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USE.  565 

§  284  (186).  Decisions  referring  such  improvements 
to  the  police  power,  or  power  to  legislate  for  the  general 
welfare.  The  leading  case  on  this  subject  is  that  of  Coster  v. 
Tide  Water  Co.^^  The  court  says:  "But  there  is  another 
branch  of  legislative  power  that  may  be  appealed  to,  as  authoriz- 
ing the  taking  of  the  lands  required  for  the  works  to  drain  these 
meadows.  It  is  the  power  of  the  government  to  prescribe  public 
regulations  for  the  better  and  more  economical  management  of 
the  property  of  persons  whose  property  adjoins,  or  which,  from 
some  other  reason,  can  be  better  managed  and  improved  by 
some  joint  operation,  such  as  the  power  of  regulating  the  build- 
ing of  party  walls ;  making  and  maintaining  partition  fences  and 
ditches;  constructing  ditches  and  sewers  for  the  drainage  of 
uplands  or  marshes,  which  can  more  advantageously  be  drained 
by  a  common  sewer  or  ditch.  This  is  a  well-known  legislative 
power,  recognized  and  treated  by  all  jurisconsults  and  writers 
upon  law  through  the  civilized  world;  a  branch  of  legislative 
power  exercised  by  this  State  before  and  since  the  Revolution, 
and  before  and  since  the  adoption  of  the  present  constitution, 
and  repeatedly  recognized  by  our  courts.  The  legislature  has 
power  to  regulate  these  subjects,  either  by  general  law,  or  by 
l^articular  laws  for  certain  localities  or  particular  and  defined 
tracts  of  land.  When  the  constitution  vested  the  legislative 
power  in  the  Senate  and  general  assembly,  it  conferred  the 
power  to  make  these  public  regulations  as  a  well  understood  part 
of  the  legislative  power."  This  case  is  relied  upon  in  all  sub- 
sequent cases  which  refer  the  drainage  and  levee-acts  to  the 
police  power,  or  power  to  legislate  for  the  general  welfare.^" 
The  position  is  stated  by  Wells,  J.,  in  Lowell  v.  Boston,^^  as 
follows,  referring  to  the  acts  for  the  improvement  of  meadows : 
"The  action  taken  therein  relates  to  that  in  which  all  have  a 
common  interest,  or  in  reference  to  which  all  are  affected  by  a 

Am.  St.  Rep.  357;  Lowell  v.  Boston,  Wurtz  v.  Hoagland,  114  U.  S,  606; 

111  Mass.  454,  468,  15  Am.  Kep.  39;  Shelley  v.  St.   Charles  Co.,  17  Fed. 

Lien  v.  Xorman  Co.,  80  Minn.  58,  82  909.      Compare   In   re    Theresa   Dr. 

N.  W.   1094;   Coster  v.  Tide  Water  Dist.,  90  Wis.  301,  63  N.  W.  288. 
Co.,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  54;  State  T.  Blake,  8518  N.  J.  Eq.  54,  68,  1866. 

.36  N.  J.  L.  442;  Pool  v.  Trexler,  76  ss^ee  O'Reiley  v.  Kankakee  Drain- 

N.  C.  297;  Winslow  v.  Winslow,  95  ing   Co.,  32  Ind.  169;Zigler  v.  Menges, 

N.  C.  24;  Donnelly  v.  Decker,  58  Wis.  121  Ind.  99,  22  X.  E.  782,  16  Am.  St. 

461,  46  Am.  Rep.  637;  State  v.  Stew-  Rep.  357;  Pool  v.  Trexler,  76  N.  C. 

art,  74  Wis.  620,  43  N.  W.  947 ;  State  297 ;  Donnelly  v.  Decker,  58  Wis.  461. 
V.  McNay,  90  Wis.  104,  62  N.  W.  917;  snil  Mass.  454,  15  Am.  Rep.  39.. 


666  EMINENT    DOMAIK.  §    284 

common  necessity.  That  common  necessity  is  met,  and  that 
common  interest  secured,  by  subjecting  the  individual  rights 
to  such  modifications  as  the  commissioners  may  judge  to  be 
most  practicable  to  secure  the  best  advantage  of  all.  The  nat- 
ural conflict  of  rights  which  would  arise  if  each  were  left  to 
insist  on  his  own,  regardless  of  consequences  to  others,  is  avoided 
by  the  intervention  of  this  common  agent,  by  whom  they  are 
adjusted  with  due  regard  for  the  interests  of  all  as  well  as  of 
each."  The  acts  in  question  are  likened  by  Wells,  J.,  to  the  mill 
acts,  acts  in  relation  to  the  repair  of  houses  and  mills  owned  by 
tenants  in  common,  acts  for  the  partition  of  joint  estates,  for 
the  regulation  of  wharves,  etc.**  The  question  is  elaborately 
considered  in  the  recent  case  of  Donnelly  v.  Decker,*^  but  no 
new  or  different  arguments  or  principles  are  therein  referred 
to.  The  general  proposition  is  tliat,  when  several  estates  are 
affected  detrimentally  by  some  common  cause  which  cannot  be 
removed  except  by  some  common  improvement,  then  the  legis- 
lature may  direct  such  improvement  to  be  made  at  the  common 
expense,  under  its  general  power  to  legislate  for  the  public  wel- 
fare. If  the  cases  referred  to  are  examined,  it  will  be  seen  that 
this  general  conclusion  is  inferred  from  the  assumed  validity 
of  laws  relating  to  adjoining  proprietors  and  joint  estates.  But 
none  of  these  laws  attempt  to  appropriate  a  man's  property  to 
a  particular  use  against  his  will,  and  therefore  do  not  support 
the  conclusion  which  is  sought  to  be  derived  from  them.®" 

8  8111  Mass.  p.  468.  adopted  and  having  been  acquiesced 
8958  Wis.  461  (1883) ,  46  Am.  Rep.      in  ever  since.    What  is  said  in  Lovcell 

637.  V.  Boston,  111  Mass.  454,  is  dictum 

9  0 When  the  authorities  are  care-  only.  O'Keiley  v.  Kankakee  Valley 
fully  examined,  it  appears  that  the  Draining  Co.,  32  Ind.  169,  is  based 
view  that  the  drainage  acts  are  re-  wholly  upon  Coster  v.  Tide  Water 
ferable  to  the  police  power,  or  gen-  Co.,  ante,  and  subsequent  cases  in 
eral  welfare  power,  has  very  little  the  same  State,  by  implication  at 
support.  In  Coster  v.  Tide  Water  least,  sanction  the  view  that  such 
Co.,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  54,  tlie  decision  is  works  fall  under  the  power  of  emi- 
by  the  Chancellor  only,  but  though  nent  domain.  Ross  v.  Davis,  97  Ind. 
this  view  is  casually  approved  by  the  79 ;  Neff  v.  Reed,  98  Ind.  341 ;  Lipes 
Court  of  Errors  and  Appeals  in  State  v.  Hand,  104  Ind.  503;  Heick  v. 
V.  Blake,  36  N.  J.  L.  442,  it  is  clearly  Voight,  110  Ind.  279.  But  in  a  more 
disapproved  in  Matter  of  Drainage  recent  case  it  is  said:  "Our  own 
along  Pequest  River,  41  N.  J.  L.  175,  cases,  already  cited,  refer  the  au- 
where  such  acts  are  sustained  on  the  thority  to  direct  the  drainage  of  wet 
ground  of  their  having  been  in  exis-  lands  to  the  police  power  of  the 
tence    when    the    constitution    was  State,  and  in  so  far  as  the  drainage 


§  285 


WHAT    IS    A    PUBLIC    USE. 


567 


§  285  (187).  These  improvements  referable  to  the  em- 
inent domain  power.  All  the  statutes  in  question  provide 
for  constructing  drains  or  levees  across  the  lands  of  those  who 
are  unwilling  to  have  them.  Private  property  is  thus  devoted 
to  a  particular  use,  permanent  in  its  nature,  against  the  will 
of  its  owner.  The  rights  of  exclusion,  of  user  and  of  disposition 
are  interfered  with  or  entirely  destroyed.  The  question  is, 
whether  this  can  be  done  without  an  exercise  of  the  power  of 
eminent  domain.  It  is  not  a  question  of  advantage  or  disad- 
vantage to  the  owner,  hut  of  constitutional  right.  The  police 
power,  so  far  as  it  relates  to  property,  is  a  power  to  regulate 
its  use,  and  is  negative  or  inhibitory  in  its  character.     A  man 


does  promote  the  health,  comfort  and 
convenience  o£  the  public  it  is  by 
virtue  of  this  great  power  that  the 
authority  is  exercised."  Zigler  v. 
Menges,  121  Ind.  99,  22  N.  E.  782.  In 
Lien  v.  Norman  County,  80  Minn.  58, 
82  N.  W.  1094,  drainage  laws  are 
viewed  as  an  exercise  of  the  police 
power,  but  in  subsequent  cases  in  the 
same  State  they  are  clearly  recog- 
nized as  involving  an  exercise  of  the 
eminent  domain  power.  State  v. 
Polk  County  Comrs.,  87  Minn.  325, 
92  N.  W.  216,  60  L.R.A.  161 ;  Miller 
v.  Jensen,  102  Minn.  391,  113  N.  W. 
914;  State  v.  Board  of  Suprs.,  102 
Minn.  442,  114  N.  W.  244,  120  Am. 
St.  Eep.  640.  Pool  v.  Trexler,  76  N. 
C.  297,  is  an  extreme  ease  and  en- 
titled to  little  respect  as  an  authority 
outside  of  North  Carolina,  as  is  evi- 
dent from  the  following,  which 
contains  all  that  is  said  by  way  of 
argument  on  the  point:  "These  two 
powers,  'eminent  domain,'  and  'police 
regulations,'  are  distinct,  and  yet 
they  are  frequently  confounded.  By 
the  one,  the  property  of  A  is  given  to 
B.  By  the  other,  the  property  of  A 
is  left  in  him,  but  is  made  subser- 
vient to  the  general  welfare.  'Cart- 
ways,' Bat.  Eev.  Ch.  104,  §  38,  fur- 
nishes an  analogy.  Under  the  power 
to  make  'police  regulations,'  the  land 
of  A  is  made  subservient  to  the  land 
of  B  for  the  purposes    of    a    road. 


After  some  contestation  the  question 
of  the  power  of  the  General  Assembly 
was  yielded.  So  in  our  case  the 
power  of  the  General  Assembly  to 
make  the  land  of  A  subservient  to  the 
land  of  B  for  the  purpose  of  drainage 
must  alone  be  yielded  upon  the  au- 
thorities and  upon  the  reason  of  the 
thing."  This  case  is  followed  in 
Winslow  v.  Winslow,  95  N.  C.  24. 
The  case  of  Wurts  v.  Hoagland,  114 
U.  S.  606,  went  up  from  New  Jersey 
and  simply  follows  the  New  Jersey 
law,  the  point  of  the  decision  being 
that  the  drainage  laws  of  that 
State,  as  interpreted  and  applied  by 
the  courts,  did  not  result  in  depriv- 
ing the  citizen  of  his  property  with- 
out due  process  of  law,  or  in  depriv- 
ing him  of  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws.  In  Donnelly  v.  Decker,  58  Wis. 
461,  46  Am.  Rep.  637 ;  State  v.  Stew- 
art, 74  Wis.  620,  43  N.  W.  947,  and 
State  V.  McNay,  90  Wis.  104,  62  N. 
W.  917,  the  drainage  laws  in  ques- 
tion were  upheld  as  an  exercise  of  the 
police  power,  while  in  the  case  of  In 
re  Theresa  Dr.  Dist.,  90  Wis.  301, 
63  N.  W.  288,  the  drainage 
law  there  involved  was  held  invalid 
as  authorizing  the  taking  of  prop- 
erty for  a  use  which  was  not  public. 
A  more  particular  statement  of  these 
cases  will  be  found  in  the  notes  to 
§  304,  post. 


568 


EMINENT    DOMAIN". 


§  285 


cannot  be  compelled,  under  the  police  power,  to  devote  his  prop- 
erty to  any  particular  use,  however  advantageous  to  himself  or 
beneficial  to  the  public ;  but  he  may  be  compelled  to  refrain  from 
any  use  which  is  detrimental  to  the  public."^  This  is  the  be- 
ginning and  the  end  of  the  police  power  over  private  property. 
^0  instance  can  be  cited,  outside  of  the  mill  and  drainage  acts, 
(which  are  in  controversy),  in  which  the  owner  of  private  prop- 
erty has  been  compelled  to  devote  it,  or  submit  to  its  devotion, 
to  a  particular  use,  by  virtue  of  the  police  power,  or  of  any  other 
power  except  that  of  eminent  domain.^^ 

Again,  if  the  acts  in  question  are  not  under  the  power  of 
eminent  domain,  then  there  is  no  obligation  to  make  compensa- 
tion for  the  property  appropriated  for  ditches  or  levees,®*  and 
one  proprietor  might  be  compelled  to  contribute  both  land  and 
money  for  an  improvement  which  is  no  benefit  to  him.  A  tract 
of  land  which  requires  drainage  may  be  so  situated  that  it  can 
only  be  drained  by  a  ditch  through  another  tract  which  does  not 
require  it  and  would  not  be  benefited  by  it.®*  In  such  case  cer- 
tainly the  drain  could  only  be  made  under  the  power  of  eminent 
domain.®'     And,  in  any  case,  the  land  occupied  by  drains  or 


51/Sfee  ante,  §  243  et  seq. 

9  2Cooley,  Const.  Lim.  chap.  16; 
Dillon,  Munlc.  Corp.  §§  93  et  seq.; 
Sedgwick  Const.  Law,  pp.  435-441. 

9  3  Sedgwick  Con.  Law,  499-502; 
State  V.  Blake,  36  N.  J.  L.  442,  447 ; 
Mugler  V.  Kansas,  123  U.  S.  623.  In 
nearly  all  the  cases  it  is  assumed  that 
compensation  must  be  made,  but  in 
Donnelly  v.  Decker,  58  Wis.  461,  46 
Am.  Eep.  637,  the  contrary  doctrine 
is  distinctly  held.  But  the  case  of  In 
re  Theresa  Drainage  Dist.,  90  Wis. 
301,  63  N.  W.  288  (1895),  distinctly 
holds  "that  to  dig  ditches  or  drains 
across  the  lands  of  private  owners, 
under  an  apparent  legislative  au- 
thority, is  a  taking  of  the  lands,"  and 
such  taking  can  only  be  made  for  a 
public  use  and  upon  the  payment  of 
just  compensation.  Compare  State 
ex  rel.  v.  Stewart,  74  Wis.  620,  43  N. 
W.  947;  State  v.  McKay,  90  Wis. 
104,  62  N.  W.  917. 

9  4People  V.  Nearing,  27  N.  Y.  306; 


Askam  v.  King  County,  9  Wash.  1, 
36  Pac.  Rep.  1097. 

9  5  In  Askam  v.  King  County,  9 
Wash.  1,  36  Pac.  Rep.  1097,  it  is  in- 
timated that  this  might  be  done 
under  the  police  power.  The  court, 
after  having  determined  that  the 
drainage  act  in  question  could  not  be 
sustained  as  an  exercise  of  the  emi- 
nent domain  power,  proceed  to  say: 
"The  act  in  question  cannot  be  sus- 
tained on  this  ground.  Can  it  be  as 
an  exercise  of  the  police  power  of  the 
State  ?  We  think  not ;  for  while  it  is 
undoubtedly  true  that  in  extreme 
emergencies  the  rights  of  private 
parties,  as  to  property,  must  yield  to 
the  requirements  of  the  public,  yet,  to 
authorize  such  interference,  the  emer- 
gency must  be  such  as  to  make  the 
action  necessary.  The  law  under  con- 
sideration was  not,  in  our  opinion, 
enacted  for  the  purpose  of  authoriz- 
ing private  rights  to  be  interfered 
with  without  compensation,  because 


§   I'SC 


WHAT    IS    A    PUBLIC    USE. 


>69 


ditches  is  devoted  to  a  particular  use,  and  this,  as  we  have 
shown  in  discussing  the  mill  acts,  cannot  be  done  under  any 
branch  of  the  legislative  power,  except  the  use  be  public  and 
compensation  be  made.®"  In  other  words,  it  can  only  be  done  by 
invoking  the  eminent  domain  power.®^ 

§  286  (188).  The  question  of  public  use.  The  promo- 
tion of  the  public  health  is  undoubtedly  a  public  use  within  the 
meaning  of  the  constitution,  and  private  property  may  be  taken 
for  the  construction  of  drains,  levees  or  other  works  in  order 
to  accomplish  this  object."*    In  New  York  it  is  held  that  drains 


necessary  for  the  protection  of  the 
public.  It  is  true  that  there  are 
some  things  in  the  act  which  indi- 
cate that  the  interests  of  the  public 
were  to  be  considered  in  the  determi- 
nation of  the  question  as  to  whether 
or  not  the  improvement  was  neces- 
sary, but  there  nowhere  appears  any 
intention  to  declare  that  the  public 
interests  are  such  that  it  is  necessary 
that  private  rights  should  be  set 
aside  in  order  that  they  may  be  pro- 
tected. Even  if  we  concede  that  the 
requirements  of  the  law  are  such 
that  the  board  of  county  commis- 
sioners must  decide  that  the  swamps 
to  be  drained  are  a  nuisance,  before 
they  will  proceed  in  the  matter,  yet 
the  intention  does  not  appear  in  the 
act  to  declare  the  nuisance  to  be  of 
such  imminent  danger  to  the  public 
welfare  as  to  require  private  prop- 
erty of  others  than  those  maintain- 
ing the  nuisance  to  be  taken  without 
compensation.  Under  the  provisions 
of  the  act,  the  land  of  private  parties 
situated  at  some  distance  from  the 
swamps  and  low  lands  to  be  drained 
may  be  taken;  and  to  sustain  such 
taking  under  the  police  power  of  the 
State  would  require  such  a  clear 
declaration  on  the  part  of  the  legis- 
lature of  its  intent  to  take  such  prop- 
erty for  that  purpose  without  com- 
pensation, as  to  make  such  intention 
certain.  The  act  in  question  does  not 
make  this  intention  so  apparent,  if 


apparent  at  all."  But  we  apprehend 
that  if  the  legislature  had  distinctly 
declared  their  intention,  that  the 
lands  of  A  might  be  taken  without 
compensation  for  a  drain  to  abate  a 
nuisance  solely  on  the  lands  of  B,  the 
court  would  have  held  it  invalid  as 
to  A. 

9  ^Ante,  §  280. 

9 'See  cases  cited  ante,  §  283. 

9  8"That  the  promotion  and  preser- 
vation of  the  public  health  is  a  public 
purpose,  cannot  be  doubted.  The 
legislation  of  the  State  in  creating 
boards  of  health  in  cities,  villages 
and  towns,  and  vesting  in  them  great, 
if  not  extreme  and  arbitrary  powers, 
show  this.  There  is  scarcely  any  one 
object  which  has  been  the  subject  of 
more  enactments  than  this,  or  as  to 
which  more  power  is  given  to  officials 
over  the  citizen  and  his  property,  and 
by  more  summary  proceedings.'' 
Matter  of  Ryers,  72  N.  Y.  1,  28  Am. 
Rep.  88.  See  also  Zigler  v.  Menges, 
121  Ind.  99,  22  X.  E.  782,  16  Am.  St. 
Rep.  357 ;  Hull  v.  Baird,  73  la.  528. 
35  N.  W.  613;  Sisson  v.  Board  of 
Suprs.,  128  la.  442,  104  iST.  W.  454,  70 
L.R.A.  440;  Duke  v.  O'Bryan,  100  Ky. 
710,  39  S.  W.  444,  824;  New  Orleans 
Drainage  Co.,  11  La.  An.  338;  Ding- 
ley  V.  Boston,  100  Mass.  544;  Ban- 
croft V.  Cambridge,  126  Mass.  438; 
Kinnie  v.  Bare,  08  Mich.  025,  36  N. 
W.  672;  Lake  Erie  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Comrs.,  63  Ohio  St.  23,  57  N.  E.  1009; 


570 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


§■  286 


can  only  he  constructed  for  this  purpose."^  As  wet  lands  are 
undoubtedly  unhealthful,  it  is  evident  that  the  public  health  may 
be  made  the  real  or  ostensible  ground  of  nearly  all  the  drainage 
laws  which  have  ever  been  passed.  It  is  never  an  objection  to 
an  exercise  of  the  power  of  eminent  domain  that  it  is  instigated 
by  private  persons  whose  private  interests  will  thereby  be  pro- 
moted. So  a  drain  which  will  in  fact  promote  the  public  health 
is  none  the  less  a  public  use  because  it  is  sought  by  particular 
individuals  whose  estates  will  be  thereby  improved.  Most  drain- 
age laws,  however,  are  not  conditioned  upon  the  public  health. 
Some  of  these  laws  permit  any  one  or  more  persons  to  construct 
a  drain  across  the  land  of  others  without  any  consideration  of 
the  public  health  or  public  welfare.^  Such  statutes  clearly  per- 
mit the  taking  of  private  property  for  private  use,  and  are  void.^ 


Lewis  County  v.  Gordon,  20  Wash.  80, 
54  Pac.  779;  Skagit  Co.  v.  McLean, 
20  Wash.  92,  54  Pac.  781;  State  v. 
Stewart,  74  Wis.  620,  43  N.  W.  947; 
In  re  Theresa  Drainage  Dist.,  90  Wis. 
301,  63  N.  W.  288. 

9  9Matter  of  Ryers,  72  N.  Y. 
1,  28  Am.  Rep.  88.  So  by 
statute  in  Michigan,  1  Howell's  Stat. 
1882,  p.  474 ;  Kinnie  v.  Base,  88  Mich. 
025,  30  N.  W.  Rep.  672.  And  see  Hull 
V.  Baird,  73  la.  528,  35  N.  W.  Rep. 
613;  Hulburt  v.  Harris,  3  App.  Div. 
30,  37  N.  Y.  Supp.  1056.  But  the 
constitution  has  since  been  changed 
to  permit  condemnation  for  drains 
for  agricultural  purposes.  Ante,  § 
43;  Matter  of  Tuthill,  36  App.  Div. 
N.  Y.  492;  S.  C.  reversed  and  the  con- 
stitutional amendment  held  to  be  in 
conflict  with  the  federal  constitution, 
which  forbids  a  State  to  deprive  one 
of  his  property  without  due  process 
of  law.  Matter  of  Tuthill,  163  N.  Y. 
133,  57  N.  E.  303,  79  Am.  St.  Rep. 
574,  49  L.R.A.  781.  8ee  post,  §§ 
298,  315. 

lAn  act  of  Connecticut  passed  in 
1853,  R.  S.  1854,  p.  780,  permitted  any 
owner  of  land  to  drain  across  the 
land  of  others.  This  was  construed, 
but  no  question  made  as  to  its  valid- 


ity, in  French  v.  White,  24  Conn.  170. 
So  a  law  of  New  York  passed  in  1895, 
1  Laws  of  N.  Y.  1895,  p.  227,  C.  384. 

2]Srickey  v.  Stearns  Ranches  Co., 
126  Cal.  150,  58  Pac.  459;  Fleming  v. 
Hull,  73  la.  598,  35  N.  W.  673;  Cy- 
press Pond  Dr.. Co.  v.  Hooper,  2  Met; 
(Ky.)  350;  State  v.  Board  of  Super- 
visors, 102  Minn.  442,  114  N.  W.  244, 
120  Am.  St.  Rep.  640;  Jenal  v.  Green 
Island  Dr.  Co.,  12  Neb.  163;  Matter 
of  Tuthill,  163  N.  Y.  133,  57  N.  B. 
303,  79  Am.  St.  Rep.  574,  49  L.R.A. 
781 ;  Reeves  v.  Wood  County,  8  Ohio 
St.  333 ;  Smith  v.  Atlantic  etc.  R.  E. 
Co.,  25  Ohio  St.  91. 

A  statute  of  Nebraska  permitted 
any  three  or  more  persons,  being 
owners  of  lands  wet  or  liable  to  be 
overflowed,  to  form  a  corporation  for 
constructing  drains  or  levees  for  the 
reclamation  of  their  lands.  This  act 
was  held  void  in  Jenal  v.  Green 
Island  Draining  Co.,  12  Neb.  163,  167. 
The  court  says :  "There  is  no  condi- 
tions upon  which  their  right  to  locate 
a  ditch  depend,  except  that  they  are 
owners  of  wet  and  overflowed  land. 
A  ditch  may  be  located  and  opened 
across  the  land  of  individual  owners 
merely  to  subserve  private  interests." 
A  similar  law  conferring  like  author- 


§    286  WHAT    IS    A    PUBLIC    USE.  571 

On  the  other  hand  a  drain  through  a  large  tract  of  wet  or 
swampy  land  belonging  to  numerous  proprietors,  into  which  all 
can  drain  whose  lands  incline  towards  it,  would  seem  to  be  a 
public  use,  although  the  only  object  accomplished  is  the  drain- 
age and  improvement  of  private  property.  As  has  been  already 
observed,  a  public  use  does  not  necessarily  mean  for  the  use  of 
the  entire  community,  but  for  the  use  of  all  within  a  given  lo- 
cality.* Thus  a  drain  for  the  use  of  all  within  a  certain  district 
is  as  much  for  public  use  as  a  school-house  for  the  use  of  a  par- 
ticular school  district.  The  school-house  is  for  the  use  of  those 
who  have  children  of  school  age  residing  within  the  school  dis- 
trict. The  drain  is  for  those  who  have  land  needing  drainage 
within  the  drainage  district.  The  public  outside  of  the  school 
district  have  no  right  in  the  school-house  whatever,  though  all 
share  indirectly  in  the  benefits  which  result  from  the  schooling 
there  provided.  So  of  the  drainage  district.  The  improvement 
of  the  land  in  a  particular  locality  is  a  benefit  to  the  whole 
State.  The  instances  of  a  supply  of  water  or  gas  for  a  city  or 
village  afford  similar  analogies.  The  difference  between  such  a 
ditch  which  is  kept  open  and  public  for  the  use  of  a  particular 
district  and  land  taken  for  a  mill  or  mill-dam  is  obvious.  Un- 
less the  mill  is  for  public  use,  as  heretofore  explained,  the  mill 
and  dam  become  the  private  property  of  the  person  or  corpora- 
tion making  the  condemnation,  as  absolutely  and  exclusively  as 
if  it  had  been  acquired  by  private  purchase.  Therefore,  it  seems 
to  us,  that  a  law  which  provides  for  the  drainage  of  a  given  dis- 
trict by  means  of  drains  which  are  for  the  common  use  of  all 
the  lands  within  the  district,  is  valid  as  effectuating  a  public 

ity  upon  any  five  or  more  was  upheld  for  private  use.    Fleming  v.  Hull,  73 

in  Anderson  v.  The  Kerns  Draining  la.  598,  35  N.  W.  Rep.  673.     So  in 

Co.,  14  Ind.  199.    8ee  also  Norfleet  v.  Indiana.     Gifford  Drainage  Dist.  v. 

Cromwell,  70  N.  C.  634,  16  Am.  Rep.  Shroer,  145  Ind.  572,  44  N.  E.  Rep. 

787;  Pool  V.  Trexler,  76  N.  C.  297.  636. 

In  the  latter  case  it  is  said  that  such  3"The  public  use  or  benefit  need 

drains  may  be  made  to  drain  the  not  extend  to  the  whole  public,  or 

property  of  one  man  or  a  single  acre  any  large  portion  of  it,  within  the 

of  ground.     In  Oregon  an  act  which  jurisdiction   of   the   legislature.     It 

enabled  any  person  whose  land  re-  may  be  limited  to  the  inhabitants  of 

quired  draining  to  open  a  ditch  over  a  small  locality,  but  the  benefit  must 

the   lalid  of   others   was  upheld   as  be  in  common,  not  to  particular  per- 

being   for   a    public   use.      Seely   v.  sons  or  estates."    O'Reily  v.  Kanka- 

Sebastian,  4  Ore.  25.    An  almost  pre-  kee  Valley  Draining  Co.,  32  Ind.  169, 

cisely  similar  statute  of  Iowa  was  185;  onte,  §  254. 
held  Invalid,  as  authorizing  a  taking 


572  EMi:s"EKT  DOMAiisr.  §  287 

use  Avitliin  the  meaning  of  the  constitution.  But  a  law  -whicli 
enables  one  or  more  proprietors  to  construct  a  drain  across  the 
lands  of  others  for  the  benefit  of  their  particular  estates,  is 
void  as  authorizing  a  taking  for  a  private  purpose.  A  laAv 
such  as  we  have  indicated  would  be  valid,  might  be  special,  desig- 
nating the  particular  district  to  be  drained,  or  general,  providing 
for  the  organization  of  drainage  districts  of  a  qiuisv  public 
character.* 

As  we  have  before  intimated,  the  legislation  on  this  subject . 
presents  almost  every  conceivable  variety  of  method.  And  the 
decisions  present  almost  as  much  variety  of  reasoning  and  con- 
clusion on  the  subject  as  the  laws  present  in  form.  In  the  suc- 
ceeding sections  we  have  given  a  review  of  the  decisions  of  each 
State,  with  such  reference  to  the  laws  passed  upon  as  will  make 
them  intelligible.  The  diversified  and  multifarious  views  ex- 
pressed in  these  decisions  and  the  antagonistic  conclusions 
reached  are  some  evidence,  at  least,  that  the  courts  have  not 
found  the  true  philosophy  of  the  drainage  question  or  the  true 
criterion  by  which  to  test  particular  laws.  Whether  we  have  sug- 
gested them  here,  we  leave  the  reader  to  judge. 

§  287  (189).  Drains,  etc. — Decisions  of  California. 
An  act  incorporated  a  certain  defined  district  as  the  Washington 
Drainage  District  of  Yolo  County,  created  a  board  of  trustees 
and  other  ofiicers,  and  provided  for  a  tax  on  the  district  for  works 
to  be  constructed  under  the  supervision  of  the  board.  The  ob- 
ject of  the  act  was  to  secure  the  drainage  of  the  district  and  pre- 
vent its  overflow  by  the  Sacramento  river.®  This  act  was  held 
valid.  The  court  says :  "We  think  the  power  of  the  legislature 
to  compel  local  improvements,  which,  in  its  judgment,  will  pro- 
mote the  health  of  the  people,  and  advance  the  public  good,  is 
unquestionable."  **  An  act  of  1880 ''  providing  for  a  division 
of  the  whole  State  into  drainage  districts,  and  for  an  elaborate 
system  of  improvements,  was  declared  void  on  other  grounds 
than  those  imder  discussion.*  An  act  of  1881  "to  provide  a 
system  of  drainage  for  agricultural,  swamp  and  overflowed 
lands,"  enacted  that  when  "two  or  more  owners  shall  petition 

■4This  section  quoted  and  approved  ^Stats.  1880,  p.  123. 

in  Laguna  Dr.  Dist.  v.  Martin  Co.,  'People  v.  Parks,  58  Cal.  624.    And 

144  Cal.  209,  77  Pac.  933.  see  Brandenstein  v.  Hoke,  101  Cal. 

6 Acts  1867-8,  p.  466.  131,  35  Pac.  562. 

6Hagar  v.  Supervisors  of  Yolo  Co., 
47  Cal.  222,  233. 


§  287  WHAT  IS  A  ruBLic  use.  573 

the  board  of  supervisors  for  a  ditch,  drain  or  other  water  course," 
the  supervisors  should  appoint  a  day  for  a  hearing  on  the  pe- 
tition and  give  notice  thereof  and  that  "if  the  supervisors  shall 
find  that  the  construction  of  the  ditch  would  be  conducive  to  the 
general  welfare  of  the  land  owners  so  petitioning"  the  work 
should  be  done,  land  condemned  therefor  and  the  cost  assessed 
upon  the  property  benefited.  The  act  was  held  void  as  authoriz- 
ing a  taking  for  a  private  purpose.®  An  act  of  1885  that  on  the 
petition  of  the  owners  of  two-thirds  of  any  body  of  land  sus- 
ceptible of  one  mode  of  drainage,  the  same  could  be  organized 
into  a  district  for  the  purpose  of  effecting  such  drainage.  The 
act  required  no  finding  that  the  drainage  was  for  the  public 
health  or  welfare.  It  was  held  that  such  drainage  was  a  public 
purpose  for  which  the  power  of  eminent  domain  could  be  ex- 
ercised, and  condemnation  by  a  district  embracing  only  one 
hundred  and  sixty  acres  was  sustained.  The  court  says:  "It 
is  to  the  interest  of  every  State,  and  hence  conducive  to  the 
public  good,  that  all  its  land  should  be  utilized  and  made  pro- 
ducti%'e,  and  this  end  attained  in  any  particular  locality  or  lo- 
calities is  a  benefit  to  the  entire  State.  A  moment's  thought  will 
suggest  that  whatever  tends  to  increase  the  area  of  cultivable 
land  materially  adds  to  the  productive  capacity  of  the  State, 
increases  her  resoiirces,  induces  settlement,  promotes  her  indus- 
trial energies,  and  enlarges  her  revenue.  And  whether  legisla- 
tion operates  to  facilitate  the  draining  of  land  so  as  to  adapt 
it  to  cultivation,  or  to  irrigate  it  so  as  to  promote  its  productive- 
ness, the  same  principle  applies,  and  the  end  to  be  attained  is 
the  same,  public  prosperity  and  welfare.  And  not  only  is  drain- 
age legislation  supported  as  being,  from  a  material  point  of 
view,  conducive  to  the  public  good,  but  it  is  equally  sustained 
as  being  within  the  exercise  of  the  police  power  of  the  State — in 
the  interest  of  the  public  health.  Ponds,  marshes  and  low, 
swampy  places  are  generally  recognized  as  a  menace  to  the  pub- 
lic health  of  the  neighborhood  in  which  they  exist  as  generating 
malaria,  and,  hence,  it  is  matter  of  public  interest  that  they 
should  be  abated  and  removed."  ^^ 

sNickey  v.   Stearns   Ranches   Co.,  it  be  said  because  the  area  of  over- 

126  Cal.  150,  58  Pac.  459.  flowed  land  embraced  in  the  district 

lOLaguna  Dr.  Dist.  v.  Charles  Mar-  amounts  to  a  fraction  less  than  one 

tin  Co.,  144  Cal.  208,  214,  215,  77  Pac.  hundred  and  sixty  acres  that  the  ob- 

93.3.    In  regard  to  the  size  of  the  die-  ject  of  the  district  in  this  proceeding 

trict,  the  court  says:     "Neither  can  is  not  effectuating  a  public  Tise  with- 


574 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


§    288 


§  288  (189a).  Same.  Illinois.  Drainage  laws  are  au- 
thorized by  a  special  provision  of  the  constitution.*^  Laws  for 
the  organization  of  drainage  districts  and  the  construction  of 
drains  for  the  use  of  all  within  the  district  are  held  to  be  for  a 
public  use.'^ 

§  289  (190).  Same.  Indiana.  In  this  State  drainage 
acts  are  upheld,  both  under  the  eminent  domain  and  police  pow- 
ers.** But  it  must  appear  in  each  case  that  the  proposed  work 
will  be  of  public  utility.  "The  drainage  of  a  man's  farm,  sim- 
ply to  render  it  more  valuable  to  the  owner,  would  not  be  a 
work  of  public  utility,  in  the  constitutional  sense  of  the  tei-m; 
and  a  corporation,  organized  and  acting  for  such  a  purpose, 
would  no  more  be  acting  in  a  public  undertaking,  than  would 
a  company  organized  and  acting  for  the  clearing  up  of  men's 
farms  and  putting  them  in  a  better  state  of  cultivation  than  the 
proprietors  were  willing  to  do,  though  the  public  and  adjoining 
proprietors  might  be,  in  a  substantial  degree,  benefited  by  the 
operation."  **  Under  the  statute  now  in  force  it  must  appear 
that  the  proposed  drain  will  improve  the  public  health,  benefit 


in  the  meaning  of  the  constitution. 
The  area  of  a  drainage  district  is  not 
a  matter  from  which,  of  itself,  it  can 
be  determined  whether  the  district 
corporation  is  exercising  the  right  of 
eminent  domain  for  the  private  ad- 
vantage of  the  owners  within  its  ter- 
ritory, rather  than  as  a  public  agency- 
exercising  it  for  a  public  use.  It  is 
apparent  from  the  act  that  it  con- 
templates by  its  provisions  a,  subdi- 
vision of  the  State  into  districts,  so 
that  the  lands  which,  by  reason  of 
natural  conditions,  are  capable  of  one 
common  system  of  drainage  shall  be 
embraced  in  one  district ;  but  of 
course,  in  the  nature  of  things,  these 
districts  could  not  be  expected  to  be 
all  of  the  same  area;  in  organizing 
these  districts  there  would  have  to 
be  taken  into  consideration  the  area 
of  overflowed  land  as  it  existed,  be  it 
great  or  small,  which  was  capable  of 
drainage  under  one  practical  common 
system,  and  under  the  terms  of  the 
a^t  it  is  made  the  duty  of  the  board 


of  supervisors  in  providing  for  the 
organization  of  the  district,  with  a 
view  to  have  all  the  land  capable  of 
one  mode  of  drainage  included 
therein,  to  see  that  no  land  is  ex- 
cepted from  said  district  which 
should  properly  be  included  therein, 
and  to  exclude  all  land  improperly 
included,  so  that  the  area  of  the  land 
overflowed  could  not  affect  the  ques- 
tion of  public  use  in  providing  for  its 
drainage."    p.  218. 

iiConst.  1870,  Art.  4,  §  31;  anic,  § 
25;  Blake  v.  People,  109  III.  504; 
Chronic  v.  Pugh,  136  111.  539,  27  N.  E. 
415. 

12  Cleveland  etc.  Ey.  Co.  v.  Polecat 
Dr.  Dist.,  213  111.  83,  72  N.  E.  684. 
And  see  Heffner  v.  Cass  &  Morgan 
Counties,  193  111.  439,  62  N.  E.  201, 
58  L.R.A.  353. 

13  Anderson  v.  Kerns  Draining  Co., 
14  Ind.  199;  O'Reiley  v.  Kankakee 
Valley  Draining  Co.,  32  Ind.  169. 

1414  Ind.  p.  202.  Approved  in  Till- 
man v.  Kircher,  64  Ind.  104. 


§    293  WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USE.  575 

a  public  highway  in  the  county,  or  street  of  a  town  or  city,  or 
be  of  public  utility.  The  constitutionality  of  this  statute  is  no 
longer  regarded  as  an  open  question.^^  A  statute  of  1893,  au- 
thorizing the  formation  of  drainage  districts  and  the  constmc- 
tion  of  drains  -without  any  requirement  that  they  should  be  for 
the  benefit  of  the  public  health  or  of  public  utility,  was  held  to 
be  invalid.^" 

§  290  (191).  Same.  Iowa.  Drainage  for  the  "public 
health,  convenience  or  welfare"  is  held  constitutional.*'  A  law 
will  be  so  construed,  if  possible,  as  to  be  valid  and,  therefore, 
as  permitting  drainage  only  for  the  public  health  or  for  the 
public  convenience  and  utility.  ■**  But  a  statute  which  enabled 
any  person,  who  should  desire  to  do  so,  to  construct  a  tile  or 
other  underground  drain  through  the  lands  of  another,  was  held 
void  as  authorizing  a  taking  for  private  use.-*^ 

§  291.  Same.  Kansas.  An  act  authorizing  drainage  for 
the  public  health,  convenience  and  welfare  was  sustained.^" 

§  292  (191a).  Same.  Kentucky.  The  inhabitants  of  a 
certain  wet  district,  comprising  about  14,000  acres,  were  in- 
corporated for  the  purpose  of  providing  drainage  for  the  same. 
Six  persons  were  named  as  trustees  and  vested  with  the  neces- 
sary powers,  and  authorized  to  levy  a  tax  upon  the  lands  up  to 
the  limit  of  25  cents  per  acre  per  year  for  ten  years.  It  was 
held  that  the  act  was  to  accomplish  a  private  purpose  and  was 
void.^*  But  drainage  for  the  public  health  is  recognized  as  a 
public  use.^^ 

§  293   (191b).     Same.     Michigan.     It  is  held  that  under 

isRoss  V.  Davis,  97  Ind.  79;  Wish-  440.  Hull  v.  Baird,  73  la.  528,  35  N. 

mier  v.  State,  97  Ind.  160;  Neff  v.  W.  613,  tends  to  support  the  proposi- 

Eeed,  98  Ind.  341 ;  Anderson  v.  Baker,  tiou  that  drainage  is  a  public  use 

98  Ind.  587;  Lipes  v.  Hand,  104  Ind.  only  when  necessary  for  the  public 

503;  Heick  v.  Voight,  110  Ind.  279;  health. 

Zigler  V.  Menges,  121  Ind.  99,  22  N.  isSisson  v.  Board  of  Supervisors, 

E.  782,  16  Am.  St.  Rep.  357;  Pound-  128  la.  442,  104  N.  W.  454,  70  L.R.A. 

stone  V.  Baldwin,   145  Ind.   139,  44  440. 

N.  E.  191 ;  Huntington  v.  Amiss,  167  isFleming  v.  Hull,  73  la.  598,  35  N. 

Ind.  375,  79  N.  E.  199.  W.  673. 

isGiiford  Drainage  Dist.  V.  Shroer,  2  0Grifl5th  v.  Pence,  9  Kan.  App. 

145  Ind.  572,  44  N.  E.  636.  253,  59  Pac.  677. 

i7Hatch  V.  Pottawattamie  Co.,  43  2iCypress  Pond  Dr.  Co.  v.  Hooper, 

la.  442;  Patterson  v.  Baiuner,  43  la.  2  Met.  Ky.  350. 

477;  Sisson  v.  Board  of  Supervisors,  2  2Duke  v.  O'Bryan,  100  Ky.  710. 
128  la.  442,  104  N.  W.  454,  70  L.R.A. 


576  EMIITENT    DOMAIN.  §    294 

the  constitution,  as  well  as  under  the  statutes,  land  cannot  be 
taken  for  drains  except  to  promote  the  public  health.^* 

§  294.  Same.  Minnesota.  An  act  of  1887  provided  that 
on  petition  of  property  owners  the  county  commissioners  of  a 
county  could  establish  a  ditch  when  found  to  be  conducive  to 
the  public  health,  convenience  or  welfare,  or  when  of  public 
benefit  or  utility.^*  The  ditch  was  constructed  by  the  county 
commissioners  and  kept  in  repair  out  of  the  public  funds  by  the 
officers  of  the  township  in  which  the  ditch  or  any  part  thereof 
was  located.  The  act  was  held  valid  as  providing  for  a  public 
object.^"  This  act  was  repealed  and  a  new  one  substituted  in 
1901,  which  was  A-ery  similar  in  its  scope,  except  that  it  required 
no  finding  that  the  ditch  would  be  conducive  to  the  public  health, 
convenience  or  welfare.  The  act  was  construed  as  authorizing 
ditches  only  when  a  public  object  would  be  promoted  and,  as  so 
construed,  was  sustained.^®  The  act  was  again  revised  in  1905^^ 
and  the  establishment  of  the  ditch  was  made  conditional  upon 
its  being  a  public  benefit  or  for  the  promotion  of  the  public 
health.  The  act  was  again  held  valid. ^®  In  all  these  cases  the 
drain  provided  for  was  a  public  drain,  made  and  kept  in  repair 
by  the  public  authorities  and  for  the  common  benefit  of  the  lands 
through  which  it  was  constructed. 

In  1907  the  legislature  passed  an  act  which  permitted  the 
construction  of  a  drain  across  the  lands  of  others  when  any  per- 
son or  persons  are  owners  of  any  swamp,  marsh  or  wet  land 
"which  on  account  of  its  condition  may  endanger  the  public 
health,  or  the  drainage  of  which  will  result  in  the  reclamation 
of  otherwise  waste  lands,"  or  "where  the  construction  of  such 
ditch  or  drain  is  of  benefit  or  advantage  to  adjoining  owner  or 
owners."  ^®  This  act  was  held  void  as  permitting  one  man  to 
drain  across  the  lands  of  another.*" 

2  3Kinnie  v.  Bare,  68  Mich.  625,  36  270.  230,  Laws  of  1905. 

]Sr.  W.  672;  Attorney  General  v.  Mc-  2  8Miller  v.  Jensen,  102  Minn.  391, 

Clear,  146  Mich.  45,  109  N.  W.  27;  1  113  N.  W.  914. 

Howell's     Statutes,     1882,    p.     474;  2  9C.  191,  Laws  of  1907. 

Const.  Art.  14,  §  9.  soState  v.  Board  of   Supervisors, 

24C.  97,  Laws  of  1887.  102  Minn.  442,  114  N.  W.  244,  120  Am. 

2  5Lien    v.     Norman     County,    80  St.  Rep.  640. 

Minn.  58,  82  N.  W.  1094.  See   also   the   following  cases   re- 

26State   V.    Polk    Co.    Comrs.,    87  lating  to  drainage  laws:     Curran  v. 

Minn.  325,  92  N.  W.  216,  60  L.R.A.  Sibley  County,  56  Minn.  432,  57  N. 

161;     McMillan    v.    Board    of    Co.  W.  1070;  Curran  v.  Sibley  County,  47 

Comrs.,  92  Minn.  16,  100  N.  W.  384.  Minn.  313,  50  N.  W.  237;  Witty  v. 


§    297  WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USE.  577 

§  295.  Same.  Missouri.  The  constitution  of  this  State 
permits  a  taking  for  drains  and  ditches  across  the  lands  of 
others.*^  Drainage  laws  have  existed  since  1877  which  permit 
the  organization  of  drainage  districts  of  not  less  than  six  hun- 
dred and  forty  acres  in  area  and  the  construction  of  drains  by 
such  districts.  The  law  is  of  course  held  valid.*^  Another 
law  provides  that  one  or  more  persons  may  secure  a  drain  across 
the  lands  of  others  for  agricultural  or  sanitary  purposes  and  this 
too  was  held  valid.*^ 

§  296  (192).  Same.  Nebraska.  An  act  empowering 
any  three  or  more  persons,  being  owners  of  wet  or  overflowed 
land,  to  form  a  corporation  for  the  construction  of  drains  or 
levees  over  the  land  of  others,  was  held  void  as  authorizing  a 
taking  for  private  use.  But  laws  permitting  drainage  for  the 
jjublic  health,  convenience  and  welfare  are  sustained.^* 

§  297  (193).  Same.  New  Jersey.  An  act  for  the  rec- 
lamation of  tidewater  marshes  was  passed  in  1788,  and  with  vari- 
ous amendments  has  remained  in  force  to  the  present  time.  So 
also  an  act  for  the  drainage  of  swamp  or  meadow  lands.^^  In 
Coster  V.  Tide  Water  Co.*®  acts  of  this  character  were  referred 
to  the  police  power.  In  the  Court  of  Errors  it  was  held  that 
the  construction  of  dikes,  etc.,  to  prevent  the  overflow  of  large 
districts  of  country,  was  a  public  use  for  which  property  might 
be  taken.  But  the  drainage  of  meadows  was  referred  to  the 
police  power.*''  A  special  act  for  the  drainage  of  lands  on  the 
upper  Passaic  was  held  valid  in  State  v.  Blake,**  and  again 
in  the  same  case  in  a  later  volume,**  where  it  was  referred  to 
the  police  power.*"  In  1871  an  act  was  passed  for  the  drainage 
of  wet  lands  where  the  owners  of  a  major  part  of  the  land  to  be 
affected  so  desired.*^    In  Matter  of  Application  for  Drainage,*^ 

Board  of  County  Comrs.,  76  Minn.  Griffin,  31  Neb.  668,  48  N.  W.  819; 

286,  79  N.  W.  112;   Dressen  v.  Co.  Dodge  County  v.  Acorn,  61  Neb.  376, 

Comrs.,  76  Minn.  290,  79  N.  W.  113;  85  N.  W.  292. 

Clapp  V.  Minn.  Grass  Twine  Co.,  81  3  6 Vol.  1  R.  S.  1877,  p.  641. 

Minn.  511,  84  N.  W.  344.  3618  N.  J.  Eq.  54. 

3i.Ante,  §  37.  37Tide  Water  Co.  v.  Coster,  18  N. 

3  2Mound  City  Land  &  Stock  Co.  v.  J.  Eq.  518,  531,  1866. 

Miller,  170  Mo.  240,  70  S.  W.  721,  3835  N.  J.  L.  208,  1871. 

!)4  Am.  St.  Rep.  727,  60  L.R.A.  190.  3936  N.  J.  L.  442,  447,  1872. 

3  3Lile  V.  Gibson,  91  Mo.  App.  480;  4  0A  similar  case:     O'Neill  v.  Ho- 

R.  S.  1899,  §§  6951-6974.  boken,  72  N.  J.  L.  67,  60  Atl.  50. 

34Jenal  v.  Green  Island  Dr.  Co.,  12  4iPub.  Laws,  1871,  p.  25. 

Xeb.  163;  Dakota  County  v.  Cheney,  4235  N.  J.  L.  497,  1872. 
22  Neb.  437,  35  N.  W.-211;  Darst  v. 
Em.  D.— 37. 


578  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    298 

this  act  was  held  valid  and  referred  to  the  eminent  domain  pow- 
er. Also  in  Matter  of  Commissioners  etc.  on  Pequest  Elver.** 
On  an  appeal  of  the  latter  case  to  the  Court  of  Errors  and 
Appeals,**  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  was  affirmed,  but 
the  view  that  the  act  could  be  sustained  as  an  exercise  of  the 
eminent  domain  power  was  questioned,  and  its  validity  rested 
upon  the  antiquity  of  such  statutes  and  long  acquiescence  in 
them.*^  But,  while  drainage  acts  are  thus  upheld  in  this  State, 
the  power  cannot  be  exercised  for  the  profit  of  a  private  corpora- 
tion not  interested  in  the  lands  to  be  affected.*® 

The  act  of  1871  above  referred  to  came  before  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States,  on  appeal  from  the  court  of  last 
resort  of  Ifew  Jersey,  and  it  was  held  that  the  act  did  not  de- 
prive an  owner  of  his  property  without  due  process  of  law, 
within  the  meaning  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States.*'^ 

§  298  (194).  Same.  New  York.  Drainage  works  can 
only  be  executed  for  the  public  health,  the  promotion  of  which  is 
a  public  use.*®  In  the  earlier  cases  wherein  drainage  laws  were 
sustained,  it  appeared  that  the  public  health  would  be  promoted, 
although  that  was  not  made  a  condition  to  the  exercise  of  the 
powers  granted.*®     In  1894  the  constitution  of  this  State  was 

<339  N.  J.  L.  433,  1877.  health),  as  a  just  and  constitutional 
4441  N.  J.  L.  175,  1879.  exercise  of  the  power  of  the  legisla- 
*^See  the  same  case  again  in  42  ture  to  establish  regulations  by 
N.  J.  L.  553,  1880.  which  adjoining  lands,  held  by  vari- 
es State  V.  Driggs,  45  N.  J.  L.  91.  ous  owners  in  severalty,  and  in  the 
See  also  Coster  v.  Tide  Water  Co.,  18  improvement  of  which  all  have  a 
N.  J.  Eq.  54,  518.  common  interest,  but  which,  by 
4  7Wurts  v.  Hoagland,  114  U.  S.  reason  of  the  peculiar  natural  condi- 
606.  After  reviewing  the  New  Jersey  tion  of  the  whole  tract,  cannot  be 
cases,  the  court  says :  "This  review  improved  or  enjoyed  by  any  of  them 
of  the  cases  clearly  shows  that  gen-  without  the  concurrence  of  all,  may 
eral  laws  for  the  drainage  of  large  be  reclaimed  and  made  useful  to  all 
tracts  of  swamps  and  low  lands,  upon  at  their  joint  expense.  The  case 
proceedings  instituted  by  some  of  the  comes  within  the  principle  upon 
proprietors  of  the  lands  to  compel  all  which  this  court  upheld  the  validity 
to  contribute  to  the  expense  of  their  of  general  mill  acts  in  Head  v. 
drainage,  have  been  maintained  by  Amoskeag  Manufacturing  Co.,  113 
the  courts  of  New  Jersey  (without  U.  S.  9."  See  ante,  §  279. 
reference  to  the  power  of  taking  pri-  ^sMatter  of  Ryers,  72  N.  Y.  1,  28 
vijte  property  for  the  public  use  Am.  Eep.  88,  1878;  Burk  v.  Ayera, 
under  the  right  of  eminent  domain,  19  Hun  17. 

or   to   the   power   of   suppressing   a  ^sHartwell  v.  Armstrong,  19  Barb, 

nuisance    dangerous    to    the    public  166,  1854;  People  v.  Nearing,  27  N. 


§    300  WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USE.  579 

luueuded  so  as  to  permit  the  legislature  to  pass  general  laws  au- 
thorizing the  owners  or  occupants  of  agricultural  land  to  drain 
them  across  the  lands  of  others.^" 

In  pursuance  of  this  amendment  the  legislature  in  1895  passed 
an  act  "in  relation  to  the  drainage  of  agricultural  lands,"  where- 
by a  person  owning  agricultural  lands  might  procure  their 
drainage  or  protection  from  overilow  by  means  of  a  drain  or 
dyke  on  the  lands  of  another.^^  The  proceedings  were  instituted 
by  a  petition  to  the  supreme  court  and  the  drain  or  dyke  was 
to  be  constructed  and  kept  in  repair  by  a  board  of  commissioners 
who  assessed  the  cost  upon  the  property  benefited.  The  act  was 
lield  invalid  on  the  ground  that  the  constitutional  amendment 
did  not  authorize  a  law  under  which  the  compensation  and 
damages  could  be  assessed  upon  the  property  benefited.^^  A 
■stiU  more  important  question  was  mooted  in  the  case,  Gray,  J., 
holding  that  the  constitutional  amendment  itself  was  void,  as 
authorizing  the  taking  of  property  for  a  private  use  in  viola- 
tion of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  federal  Constitution. 
Parker  and  Haight,  JJ.,  were  of  a  contrary  opinion.  The  other 
judges  did  not  express  themselves  upon  this  question.  We  shall 
recur  to  the  subject  in  a  later  section.^^ 

§  299  (195).  Same.  North  Carolina.  Drainage  for 
the  benefit  of  private  estates  is  sustained,  first  as  a  public  use 
under  the  eminent  domain  power,  in  ISTorfleet  v.  Cromwell,®* 
and  afterwards  under  the  police  power,  in  Pool  v.  Trexler,®^ 
and  Winslow  v.  Winslow.®^ 

§  300.  Same.  North  Dakota.  A  drainage  law  provid- 
ing for  the  construction  and  maintenance  of  drains  "whenever 
the  same  shall  be  conducive  to  the  public  health,  convenience  or 
welfare,"  and  which  drains  are  constructed,  owned  and  kept  in 
repair  by  the  counties  in  which  they  are  situated  and  established, 
is  upheld  as  constitutional.^'' 

Y.  306,  1863;  People  v.  Jefferson  Co.  6470  N.  C.  634,  16  Am.  Rep.  787. 

Ct.,  55  N.  Y.  604;  Matter  of  Drain-  5  676  N.  C.  297. 

ing   Certain   Swamp  Lands,  5  Hun  5  695  N.  C.  24.     See  also  William- 

116;   Woodruff  v.   Fisher,   17   Barb.  son  v.  Canal  Company,  78  N.  C.  156; 

224;  see  ante,  §  286.  Porter  v.  Armstrong,  129  N.  C.  101, 

iOBee  ante,  §  43.  39  S.  E.  799;  Porter  v.  Armstrong, 

511  Laws  of  1895,  p.  27,  c.  384.  134  N.  C.  447,  46  S.  E.  997;  Porter 

5  2Matter  of  Tuthill,  163  N.  Y.  133,  v.  Armstrong,  139  N.  C.  179,  51  S. 

57  N.  E.  303,  7«  Ahl  St.  Rep.  574,  E.  926. 

49  L.R.A.  781.  s'Redmond  v.  Chacey,  7  N.  D.  231, 

tiPost,  §  315.  73   N.   W.   1081;    Erickson   v.    Cass 


580  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    301 

§  301  (196).  Same.  Ohio.  An  act  whicli  authorized 
the  construction  of  drains  on  the  application  of  one  or  more  per- 
sons, without  any  consideration  of  the  public  welfare,  was  held 
void;  but  it  was  held  that  drains,  levees,  etc.,  might  be  con- 
structed when  necessary  for  the  "public  health,  convenience  or 
welfare."  ^*  Thereupon,  in  1859,  ^*  an  act  was  passed  au- 
thorizing County  Commissioners,  on  petition  of  one  or  more 
owners,  to  establish  ditches,  drains,  etc.,  when  the  same  are  "de- 
manded by  or  will  be  conducive  tq  thg  public  health,  convenience 
or  welfare."  This  act  was  held  valid  in  Thompson  v.  Treasurer 
of, Wood  County;  *"  also,  a  similar  act  *^  passed  in  1862.^^ 

The  Eevised  Statutes  of  1886,  §  4511,  provide  that  the 
trustees  of  a  township  may  establish  a  ditch  whenever,  in  their 
opinion,  the  same  will  be  conducive  to  the  public  health,  con- 
venience or  welfare.  It  was  held  that  under  this  statute  a  ditch 
could  not  be  established,  the  only  effect  of  which  would  be  to 
render  the  lands  of  two  proprietors  more  productive.**  "The 
prosperity  of  each  individual  conduces,  in  a  certain  sense,  to 
the  public  welfare,  but  this  fact  is  not  a  sufficient  reason  for 
taking  other  private  property  to  increase  the  prosperity  of  indi- 
vidual men.  The  draining  of  marshes  and  ponds  may  be  for 
the  promotion  of  the  public  health  and  so  become  a  public  ob- 
ject ;  but  the  draining  of  farms  to  render  them  more  productive, 
is  not  such  an  object."  The  "public  health,  convenience  or  wel- 
fare" to  be  promoted  have  reference  to  the  locality  of  the  ditch. 
The  finding  that  a  ditch,  five  miles  long  and  extending  into  two 
counties,  "will  be  conducive  to  the  public  health,  convenience  and 
welfare  of  the  neighborhood,  is  a  finding  that  the  community 
generally  in  the  vicinity  are  benefited,  and  not  merely  the  lands 
of  the  petitioner  and  others.  It  is  a  finding  that  it  is  for  the 
public  welfare  as  distinguished  from  a  mere  private  advan- 
tage." ®*    A  ditch  to  drain  public  roads  or  public  school  grounds 

County,  11  N.  D.  494,  92  N.  W.  841 ;  59Laws  of  1859,  p.  58. 

Turnquist  v.  Cass  County,  11  N.  D.  son  Ohio  St.  678. 

514,  92  N.  W.  852.     See  Martin  v.  eiLaws  of  1862,  p.  93. 

Tyler,  4  N.  D.  270,  60  N.  W.  392;  szSessions  v.  Crunkelton,  20  Ohio 

State  V.  Fisk,  15  N.  D.  219,  107  N.  St.  349. 

W.  191;  Alstad  V.  Sim,  15  N.  D.  629,  6  3McQuillen   v.   Hatton,   42   Ohio 

109  N.  W.   66;    Sim  v.  Kosholt,   16  St.  202. 

N.  D.  77,  112  N.  W.  50.  siChesbrough    v.    Commissioners, 

5  8Reeves    v.    Treasurer    of    Wood  37.  Ohio  St.  508,  516;  Lake  Erie  etc. 

Co.,  8  Ohio  St.  333,  1858.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Hancock  Co.,  63  Ohio  St. 


§    304  WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USE.  681 

is  a  public  use."®  But  an  act  which  authorized  the  construction 
of  levees  whenever,  in  the  opinion  of  the  probate  judge,  they 
would  be  conducive  to  the  health,  convenience  or  welfare  of  any 
number  of  citizens  of  his  county,  or  were  necessary  for  the  pro- 
tection of  the  land  of  such  citizens,  was  held  invalid,  as  permit- 
ting the  taking  of  private  property  for  private  use.®* 

§  302  (197).  Same.  Oregon.  An  act  under  which  any 
person  might  secure  the  construction  of  a  ditch  over  the  land  of 
others  was  held  valid,  as  promoting  a  public  use,  in  Seely  v. 
Sebastian.®'^ 

§  303  (197a).  Same.  Washington.  A  drainage  law 
which  provided  for  the  construction  of  drains  and  ditches,  dikes 
and  levees,  but  made  no  provision  for  compensation  to  those  whose 
lands  were  taken  or  damaged,  unless  the  owners  appeared  and 
claimed  compensation,  was  held  to  be  void,  as  being  in  violation 
of  the  constitution,  which  requires  compensation  to  be  first  made 
for  property  taken  or  damaged  for  public  use."^  The  question  of 
public  use  was  not  discussed.  Thereupon  the  legislature  passed 
an  act  to  cure  the  defect  in  the  former  law  and  provided  for  the 
recondemnation  of  the  necessary  land,  where  ditches  had  been 
constructed  in  whole  or  in  part,  under  the  old  law."®  This  law 
was  held  valid  and  it  was  also  held  that  the  construction  of 
ditches  for  the  drainage  of  land  otherwise  useless  for  agricultural 
purposes  is  a  public  use,  for  which  private  property  may  be 
taken." 

§  304  (198).  Same.  Wisconsin.  A  statute  that  any  six  or 
more  freeholders,  residing  in  any  tovsm  and  desiring  to  have  any 
ditch  or  drain  laid  out  for  draining  any  marsh,  swamp  or  over- 
flowed lands,  or  any  existing  ditch  enlarged,  might  make  appli- 
cation therefor  to  the  supervisors  of  the  town,  who  were  required 
to  lay  out  the  same,  "if,  in  their  judgment  such  ditch,  drain  or 
enlargement  is  demanded  or  will  conduce  to  the  public  health 

23,  57  N.  E.  1009;  Northern  Ohio  R.  Stiles,  10  Wash.  388,  39  Pae.   116; 

R.  Co.  V.  Hancock  Co.,  63  Ohio  St.  Hayward  v.   Snohomish   County,   11 

32,  57  N.  E.  1023.  Wash.  429,  39  Pao.  652.     The  act  in 

BSLake  Erie  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Han-  question   uses   the   drainage  law  of 

cock  Co.,  63  Ohio  St.  23,  57  N.  B.  1890.     Laws  of  1889-1890,  ch.  21,  p. 

1009.  652. 

ccSmithv.  Atlantic  &  Great  West-  ssLaws  of  1895,  ch.  89,  p.  142. 

em  R.  R.  Co.,  25  Ohio  St.  91,  1874.  70Lewis    County    v.    Gordon,    20 

6  74   Ore.   25.  Wash.  80,  54  Pac.  779 ;  Skagit  County 

esAskam  v.  King  County,  9  Wash.  v.  McLean,  20  Wash.  92,  54  Pac.  781. 
],  36  Pac.  1097;   Skagit  County  v. 


582  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    304 

or  welfare,"  was  held  valid  as  an  exercise  of  the  police  power.^^ 
A  special  act  relating  to  Dane  county  was  also  upheld,  whicli 
permitted  the  construction  of  drains  and  other  works  for  the 
reclamation  of  wet  lands,  upon  the  application  of  twenty-five 
or  more  owners  of  such  lands,  provided  that  commissioners,  after 
a  hearing  of  parties  interested,  should  be  of  the  opinion  "that 
the  public  health  or  welfare  will  be  thereby  promoted."  ''^  On 
the  other  hand  a  law  of  1891  that  "whenever  a  majority  of  the 
owners  of  lands  within  a  district  proposed  to  be  organized,  who 
shall  have  arrived  at  lawful  age,  and  who  shall  represent  one- 
third  in  area  of  the  lands  to  be  reclaimed  or  benefited,  or  when- 
ever the  adult  owners  of  more  than  one-half  of  such  lands  desire 
to  construct  a  drain  or  drains,  ditch  or  ditches,  levee  or  levees, 
or  other  work  across  the  lands  of  others  for  agricultural,  sani- 
tary or  mining  pui"poses,  or  to  maintain  and  keep  in  repair  any 
such  drain,"  etc.,  they  may  apply  to  the  circuit  court  of  the  prop- 
er county,  and  if  the  court  finds  "that  the  proposed  drain  or 
drains,  ditch  or  ditches,  levee  or  levees,  or  other  works,  is  or  are 
necessary,  or  will  be  useful  for  the  drainage  of  the  lands  pro- 
posed to  be  drained  thereby,  for  agricultural,  sanitary 
or  mining  purposes,"  the  court  shall  appoint  three  competent 
persons  as  commissioners  to  lay  out  and  construct  the  proposed 
works,  was  held  to  be  invalid  as  authorizing  the  taking  of  private 
property  for  private  use.''*     It  is  settled  by  the  later  decisions 

'iDonnelly  v.  Decker,  58  Wis.  461,  useful  to  some,  or  perhaps  many,  pri- 

46  Am.  Rep.  637 ;  State  v.  MeNay,  90  vate  owners  of  land,  by  way  of  in- 

Wis.  104,  62  N.  W.  917.    In  the  first  creasing  the  usefulness  and  value  of 

of  these   cases,   p.   466,   it   is   said:  their  lands.     But  that  is  merely  a 

"It  is  obvious,  at  first  blush,  that  private  advantage.     It  interests  the 

this  law  cannot  be  sustained  as  pro-  public  only  indirectly  and  remotely, 

viding   for   a   work   for   the   public  in  the  same  way  and  sense  in  which 

use."  the  public  interest  is   advanced  by 

7  2  State  v.   Stewart,  74  Wis.  620,  the    thrift   and   prosperity   of   indi- 

43  N.  W.  947.  vidual  citizens.    Donnelly  v.  Decker, 

73In  re  Theresa  Drainage  Dist.,  supra.  Some  home  or  homes  might 
90  Wis.  301,  63  N.  W.  288  (May  15,  be  made  more  cheerful  and  more 
1895).  The  court  says:  "There  is  healthful.  But  one  man's  property 
in  the  entire  statute  no  expression  or  cannot  be  taken  to  make  another 
intimation  that  it  was  any  part  of  man's  home  more  cheerful  or  health- 
the  consideration  upon  which  the  im-  ful.  It  is  only  when  it  will  make  the 
provement  should  be  authorized  that  homes  of  the  public  more  healthful 
it  should  be  either  necessary  or  de-  that  any  man's  property  can  be  taken 
sirable  to  promote  any  public  inter-  for  'sanitary  purposes.'  But  it  is 
est,  convenience,  or  welfare.  No  urged  that  the  term  'sanitary  pur- 
doubt,  such  an  improvement  may  be  poses'  comprehends  and  imports  the 


§  306 


WHAT  IS  A  I^UBLIC   USE. 


583 


that  drains  to  promote  the  public  health  and  welfare  are  a  public 
use  for  which  private  property  may  be  taken  and  that,  when 
the  construction  of  a  drain  requires  the  taking  of  property,  it 
involves  an  exercise  of  the  eminent  domain  power.''* 

§  305  (199).  Same.  Other  States.  The  foregoing  em- 
brace all  of  the  decisions  which  have  come  to  our  notice  in  which 
drainage  laws  have  been  assailed  as  not  being  a  legitimate  ex- 
ercise of  the  eminent  domain  power.  Some  miscellaneous  cases 
in  which  they  are  attacked  on  other  grounds  are  given  in  the 
note.''^ 

§  306  (200).     Levees,  dikes,  etc.      Dikes  and  levees  to 


idea  of  the  public  health.  If  so,  it 
might  save  this  statute.  Webster  de- 
fines the  word  'sanitary'  as  'per- 
taining to  or  designed  to  secure  san- 
ity or  health.'  The  Century  Diction- 
ary defines  it  as  'pertaining  to  health 
or  hygiene,  or  the  preservation  of 
health.'  It  will  be  seen  that  the  word 
is  of  purely  abstract  meaning.  It  is 
utterly  devoid  of  any  suggestion  of 
numbers  or  of  public  or  private  re- 
lation. It  imports  neither.  For  such 
purpose  it  is  strictly  neutral  and  im- 
partial. Without  some  qualifying 
word,  it  is  inoperative  to  designate 
the  purpose  as  a  public  one,  or  as  in 
the  interest  of  the  public  health.  It 
is,  no  doubt,  for  the  legislature  to 
specify  the  use  and  purpose  for  which 
it  authorizes  private  property  to  be 
appropriated.  It  should  be  expressed 
clearly;  for  it  cannot  be  enlarged  by 
a  doubtful  construction,  nor  be  pre- 
stuned  to  be  larger  than  the  purpose 
which  is  expressed.  Dill.  Mun.  Corp. 
(4th  Ed.)  §  603.  This  is  not  a  ques- 
tion of  the  construction  of  ambiguous 
words  or  terms.  But  it  is  an  entire 
failure  to  express  in  any  form  that 
the  taking  of  property  for  which  it 
provides  is  to  be  for  a  public  use. 
So  it  must  be  held  that  it  does  not 
provide  for  a  taking  for  a  public  use. 
It  could  not  lawfully  provide  for  a 
taking  for  any  other  than  a  public 
use.     It  cannot  support  proceedings 


for  the  condemnation  of  lands  as  for 
a  public  use.    It  is  entirely  invalid." 

We  do  not  see  how  these  different 
cases  can  be  reconciled.  In  the  last 
case  it  is  held  to  be  settled  law  "that 
to  dig  ditches  or  drains  across  the 
lands  of  private  owners,  under  an  ap- 
parent legislative  authority,  is  a  tak- 
ing of  the  lands."  It  does  not  make 
any  difference  what  the  purpose  of  the 
ditch  or  drain  is.  To  occupy  a  man's 
land  with  a  ditch  or  drain  is  to  take 
his  land.  Consequently  such  a  ditch 
or  drain  can  only  be  constructed  for  a 
public  purpose.  In  Donnelly  v.  Deck- 
er, 58  Wis.  461,  it  is  held  that  a  ditcli 
or  drain  to  promote  the  public  health 
or  welfare  is  not  a  public  purpose. 
Hence  it  follows  by  the  logic  of  the 
latest  decision  that  the  case  of  Don- 
nelly V.  Decker  upheld  the  taking  of 
private  property  for  a  private  pur- 
pose, and  it  would  seem  to  be  over- 
ruled by  implication.  But  the  latest 
decision  does  not  attempt,  in  express 
terms,  to  overrule,  explain  or  dis- 
tinguish the  prior  cases. 

7  4Eude  v.  St.  Marie,  121  Wis.  634, 
99  N.  W.  460. 

'^Egyptian  Levee  Co.  v.  Hardin,  27 
Mo.  495,  72  Am.  Dee.  276;  New  Or- 
leans Drainage  Co.,  11  La.  An.  338; 
Cypress  Pond  Draining  Co.  v.  Hoop- 
er, 2  Met,  (Ky.)  350;  Shelley  v.  St. 
Charles  Co.,  17  Fed.  909. 


684 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


§    306 


prevent  the  overflow  of  extensive  districts  of  country  by  streams 
or  tide-waters  are  a  public  use.'^^  They  are  a  direct  and  imme- 
diate benefit  to  all  the  land  affected  by  them,  and  may  be  neces- 
sary for  the  preservation  of  life  and  property.  Both  the  powers 
of  taxation  and  of  eminent  domain  may  be  exercised  for  this 
purpose.^''  If  the  public  health  will  be  promoted  by  such  im- 
provements, the  case  is  clear.^*  If  the  public  ways  or  other 
public  means  of  travel,  transportation  or  communication  will 
be  improved  or  secured  from  interruption  and  damage,  the  case 
is  equally  clear.''®  The  only  doubt  arises,  when  the  only  object 
and  effect  of  such  works  is  the  improvement  of  private  property. 


7  6Missouri  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  v.  Cam- 
bern,  66  Kan.  365,  71  Pac.  809,  af- 
firming  S.  C.  10  Kan.  App.  581,  63 
Pac.  605;  Ham  v.  Levee  Comrs.,  83 
Miss.  534,  35  So.  943;  Egyptian  Levee 
Co.  V.  Hardin,  27  Mo.  495, 72  Am.  Dec. 
276;  Tide  Water  Co.  v.  Coster,  18  N. 
J.  Eq.  518,  523;  Matter  of  Drainage 
along  Pequest  Kiver,  41  N.  J.  L.  175, 
178;  Norfleet  v.  Cromwell,  70  N.  C. 
634,  639;  Hansen  v.  Hammer,  16 
Wash.  315,  46  Pac.  332. 

7TIn  Coster  v.  Tide  Water  Co.,  18 
N.  J.  Eq.  54,  and  518,  the  act  passed 
upon  created  a  corporation  for  the 
reclamation  and  protection  of  the 
tide-water  marshes  about  Newark 
Bay  by  means  of  dikes,  drains  and 
other  works.  Of  this  act  the  Court 
of  Errors  and  Appeal  say:  "That 
the  legislative  authority  is  competent 
to  effect  the  end  provided  for  in  this 
act,  I  can  entertain  no  doubt.  The 
purpose  contemplated  is  to  reclaim 
and  bring  into  use  a  tract  of  land 
covering  about  one-fourth  of  the 
county  of  Hudson  and  several  thous- 
and acres  in  the  county  of  Union. 
This  large  district  is  now  compara- 
tively useless.  In  its  present  condi- 
tion it  impairs  very  materially  the 
benefits  which  naturally  belong  to 
the  adjacency  of  the  territory  of  the 
State  to  its  navigable  waters.  It  is 
difficult,  from  the  great  expense  of 
such  works,  to  build  roads  across  it, 


and  consequently  it  has  heretofore  in- 
terposed a  barrier  to  anything  like 
easy  access,  except  by  means  of  rail- 
roads, from  one  town  to  another  sit- 
uated upon  its  borders.  To  remove 
these  evils  and  to  make  this  vast 
region  fit  for  habitation  and  use 
seems  to  me  plainly  within  the  legiti- 
mate province  of  legislation;  and,  to 
effect  such  ends,  I  see  no  reason  to 
doubt  that  both  the  prerogatives  of 
taxation  and  eminent  domain  may  be 
resorted  to.  From  the  earliest  times, 
the  history  of  the  legislation  of  this 
State  exhibits  many  examples  of  the 
exercise  of  both  these  powers  for  pur- 
poses not  dissimilar,  and  by  these 
means,  without  question,  many  im- 
provements have  been  effected.  The 
principle  is  similar  to  that  which 
validates  the  transfer,  by  legislative 
authority,  of  private  property  to  pri- 
vate corporations  for  the  construc- 
tion of  railroads  and  canals,  or  the 
construction  of  sewers  and  streets, 
and  the  imposition  of  the  expense 
upon  the  lands  benefited."  p.  520.  See 
also  Cooley  on  Taxation,  p.  427; 
Reelfoot  Lake  Levee  Dist.  v.  Daw- 
son, 97  Tenn.  151,  36  S.  W.  1041,  34 
L.R.A.  725. 

■!»See  post,  §  307;  ante,  §  286. 

7»Coster  V.  Tide  Water  Co.,  18  N. 
J.  Eq.  54;  Tide  Water  Co.  v.  Coster, 
18  N.  J.  Eq.  518. 


§    306  WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USE.  585 

In  sucH  case  the  same  principles  ■would  seem  to  apply  as  in  case 
of  drains  and  ditches  for  the  reclamation  of  wet  lands,  or  the 
irrigation  of  arid  lands.^" 

There  is  also  another  view  by  which  the  works  in  question 
can  be  sustained.  Every  natural  stream  is  public,  in  the  sense 
of  being  for  the  common  use  and  benefit  of  the  proprietors  of 
all  the  lands  drained  by  it  or  subject  to  its  influence,  and  any 
improvement  of  it  by  dikes  or  otherwise  for  the  benefit  of  such 
lands  is  a  public  purpose,  as  being  for  the  common  use  and  bene- 
fit of  all  such  lands  as  are  affected  by  the  improvements.  There- 
fore, the  construction  of  a  levee  which  shall  confine  the  waters 
of  a  stream  to  its  channel  and  prevent  the  overflow 
of  the  adjacent  country  is  a  public  use  for  which  property  may 
be  taken  or  taxes  levied.  And  similar  considerations  apply  to 
tide-waters.  The  shores  of  the  sea  are  public  for  all  purposes, 
and  may  be  improved,  not  only  for  the  purposes 
of  navigation,  but  also  to  prevent  erosion  or  submersion  of  the 
adjacent  land.  According  to  this  view,  dikes  and  levees  to  pre- 
vent the  overflow  of  streams  or  tide-waters  are  a  public  use  per 
se,  and  it  rests  absolutely  with  the  legislature  to  determine  when 
the  power  of  eminent  domain  shall  be  exercised  for  that  purpose, 
and  what  the  extent  of  benefit  must  be  to  justify  a  resort  to  that 
power.**  The  courts  may  always  protect  the  individual  from 
the  perversion  of  laws  authorizing  the  appropriation  of  private 

soSee  ante,  §  286;  post,  §  308.  v.  Atlantic  &  Great  Western  R.  E. 

81  We  do  not  understand  how  the  Co.,  25  Ohio  St.  91,  an  act  which  au- 

taking  for  a  certain  definite  purpose  thorized  the  erection  of  a  levee  when- 

can  be  a  public  use  or  not,  according  ever,  in  the  opinion  of  the  probate 

to  the  result  of  an  investigation  of  judge,  it  will  be  conducive  to  the 

the  circumstances  of  each  proposed  health,  convenience  or  welfare  of  any 

exercise  of  the  power  for  that  pur-  niunber  of  citizens  of  his  counfy,  or 

pose.    A  purpose  for  which  property  is  necessary  for  the  protection  of  the 

may  be  taken  must  be  held  to  be  a  land  of  such  citizens  or  any  of  them 

public  use  or  not,  according  to  the  from  overflow,  was  held  invalid  as  au-  , 

nature  and  character  of  the  purpose  thorizing  the  taking  of  property  for 

itself.    As  to  whether  the  power  of  private  use.    It  seems  to  us  this  law 

eminent  domain  shall  be  exercised  for  might  be  upheld,  on  the  ground  that 

a  purpose  in  its  nature  public,  and  the  erection  of  a  levee  to  confine  the 

the  time,  manner  and  extent  of  its  waters    of    a    stream    within    their 

exercise,   in   the   absence   of   special  natural  channel  is  a  public  use.    An 

constitutional  provisions,  are  exclu-  act  which  is  in  fact  for  the  promotion 

sively  legislative  questions.     A  con-  of  a  public  use  may  be  upheld,  though 

trary  view  is  expressed  in  a  drainage  the   legislature  has   declared   a   use 

case  in  35  N.  J.  L.,  p.  505.    In  Smith  which  is  not  public. 


586  EMINEIfT  DOMAIN.  §    307 

property  for  public  use.  Levee  acts  have  almost  uniformly  been 
upheld  by  the  courts,  though  they  have  move  frequently  been 
called  in  question  under  the  power  of  taxation  than  under  that 
of  eminent  domain.*^  In  Louisiana,  lands  on  the  banks  of  the 
Mississippi  are  subjected  to  a  levee  servitude,  by  virtue  of  which 
the  same  may  be  occupied  for  that  purpose  without  compensa- 
tion.^* In  Missouri  levee  acts  have  been  referred  to  the  police 
power.** 

§  307  (201),  The  public  health  and  safety.  Abolishing 
grade  crossings,  ISTothing  is  more  vital  to  the  welfare  of  the 
State  than  the  public  health,  and  works  calculated  to  promote 
the  public  health,  by  removing  the  causes  of  disease  or  affording 
to  populous  communities  a  supply  of  pure  air,  pure  water  or 
means  of  necessary  recreation,  are  a  public  use.*^  We  have  al- 
ready had  occasion  to  refer  to  this  subject  in  connection  with 
public  parks  *®  and  drainage.*^  Drains  may  be  constructed  or 
dams  destroyed  **  in  order  to  relieve  low  grounds  of  their  ex- 
cessive moisture  and  render  them  more  salubrious.  Low  grounds 
in  the  neighborhood  of  populous  districts  may  be  filled  to  abate 
a  nuisance,  and  the  power  of  eminent  domain  exercised  for  this 
purpose.*®  So  to  promote  the  public  safety  grade  crossings  of 
railroads  may  be  abolished  and  this  is  a  public  purpose  for  which 
property  may  be  taken  or  public  money  appropriated.®" 

§  308  (202).  Irrigation.  The  construction  of  canals, 
conduits  and  other  works  to  convey  or  store  water  for  irriga- 
tion in  localities  where  the  rainfall  is  insuiEcient  or  too  uncer- 
tain for  agricultural  purposes,  and  which  are  for  the  use  of  all 
those  capable  of  being  supplied  by  them  upon  terms  which  may 

82Upheld  under  power  of  eminent  ^^Ante,  §  271. 

domain:     Tide  Water  Co.  v.  Coster,  ^^Ante,  §  286. 

18  N.  J.  Eq.  518.    Upheld  under  tax-  8  8  Woodruff    v.    Fisher,    17    Barb, 

ing  power:     McGhee  v.  Mathis,  21  224;  Talbot  v.  Hudson,  16  Gray  417; 

Ark.  40;   Williams  v.  Cammack,  27  Miller  v.  Craig,  11  N.  J.  Eq.  175. 

Miss.  209;  Alcorn  v.  Hamer,  38  Miss.  ssDingley   v.    Boston,    100    Mass. 

652;   Daily  v.  Swope,  47  Miss.  367;  544;     Bancroft    v.    Cambridge,    126 

Egyptian  Levee  Co.  v.  Hardin,  27  Mo.  Mass.  438;  Sweet  v.  Rechel,  159  U.  S. 

495,    72    Am.    Dec.    276;     Boro    v.  380,  16  S.  C.  43;  Ante)  §  247. 

Phillips,  4  Dill.  216;  Cooley  on  Taxa-  soSummerfield  v.  Chicago,  197  111. 

tion,  p.  427 ;  Gould  on  Waters,  §  247.  270,  64  N.  E.  490 ;  Millard  v.  Roberts, 

ssSee  ante,  §  233.  202  U.   S.  429,   26  S.  C.  674.     For 

8<Morrison  v.  Morey,  146  Mo.  543,  numerous   cases   arising  out  of   the 

48  S.  W.  629.  abolition  of  grade  crossings  see  ante, 

ssMatter  of  Ryers,  72  N.  Y.  1,  28  §  248. 
Am.  Rep.  88. 


§  308 


■WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USE. 


587 


be  regulated  by  law,  would  seem  to  be  a  public  use  within  the 
meaning  of  the  constitution.'*^  A  statute  of  Utah  which  per- 
mitted one  person  to  condemn  a  right  of  way  for  an  irrigating 
ditch  for  the  purpose  only  of  irrigating  his  own  land  was  upheld 
as  providing  for  a  public  use  by  the  supreme  court  of  Utah."^ 
And  this  decision  was  affirmed  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States,  which  held  that  in  the  particular  case,  the  defend- 
ant was  not  deprived  of  his  property  without  due  process  of 
law.**  Several  of  the  State  constitutions  provide  especially 
for  the  condemnation  of  property  for  irrigation  purposes.®* 
These  would  be  valid  under  the  decision  last  cited,  though  they 
permitted  one  man  to  condemn  for  his  private  use. 


siOury  V.  Goodwin,  3  Ariz.  255,  36 
Pac.  376,  4  Am.  R.  E.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
81 ;  Cummings  v.  Peters,  56  Cal.  593; 
Lux  V.  Haggin,  69  Cal.  255;  Irriga- 
tion District  y.  Williams,  76  Cal.  360, 
18  Pae.  379;  Irrigation  v.  De  Lappe, 
79  Cal.  351,  21  Pac.  825 ;  In  re  Madera 
Irrigation  Diet.,  92  Cal.  296,  28  Pac. 
272,  675,  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  106,  14 
L.R.A.  755,  5  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
288;  Aliso  Water  Co.  v.  Baker,  95 
Cal.  268,  30  Pac.  537;  Lindsay 
Irrigation  Co.  v.  Mehrtens,  97  Cal. 
676,  32  Pae.  802;  Oritz  v.  Han- 
sen, 35  Colo.  100,  83  Pac.  964; 
Witterding  v.  Green,  4  Ida.  473, 
45  Pae.  134;  Lake  Keon  Nav.  Co. 
V.  Klein,  63  Kan.  484,  65  Pac.  684; 
Salazar  v.  Smart,  12  Mont.  395,  30 
Pac.  676;  Ellinghouse  v.  Taylor,  19 
Mont.  462,  48  Pac.  757 ;  Helena  Power 
Trans.  Co.  v.  Spratt,  35  Mont.  108, 
88  Pac.  773,  8  L.R.A.(N.S.)  567; 
Cummings  v.  Hyatt,  54  JiTeb.  35,  74 
N.  W.  411;  Crawford  Co.  v.  Hath- 
away, 67  Neb.  325,  93  N.  W.  781,  108 
Am.  St.  Rep.  647,  60  L.R.A.  889; 
Albuquerque  L.  &  I.  Co.  v.  Gutierrez, 
10  N.  M.  177,  61  Pac.  357 ;  Umatilla 
Irr.  Co.  v.  Barnhart,  22  Or.  389,  30 
Pac.  37;  Miles  v.  Benton  Tp.,  11  S. 
D.  450,  78  N.  W.  1004;  McGee  Irr. 
Ditch  Co.  V.  Hudson,  85  Tex.  587,  22 
S.  W.  967;  Borden  v.  Trespalaeios 
R.  &  I.  Co.,  98  Tex.  494,  88  S.  W.  11, 
107  Am.  St.  Rep.  640;  Prescott  Irri- 
gation Co.  V.  Flathers,  20  Wash.  454, 


55  Pac.  635;  Nash  v.  Clark,  27  Utah 
158,  75  Pac.  371,  101  Am.  St.  Rep. 
953,  1  L.R.A.  (N.S.)  208;  S.  C.  af- 
firmed, Clark  V.  Nash,  198  U.  S.  361, 
25  S.  C.  676.  The  question  is  very 
elaborately  argued  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Arizona  in  the  case  first 
cited.  The  California  act  of  1887, 
which  has  been  upheld  in  the  Cali- 
fornia cases  above  cited,  is  declared 
to  be  unconstitutional  by  Ross,  Cir- 
cuit Judge,  as  authorizing  the  taking 
of  property  for  private  use,  in  Brad- 
ley V.  Fallbrook  Irr.  Dist.,  68  Fed. 
Rep.  948.  But  this  decision  has 
been  reversed  in  an  elaborate 
opinion  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States.  Fallbrook  Irr.  Dist. 
V.  Bradley,  164  U.  S.  112,  17  S.  C. 
Rep.  56.  The  taking  of  private  prop- 
erty for  irrigation  works  is  provided 
for  by  a  special  constitutional  pro- 
vision in  Colorado.  Ante,  §  19.  And 
see  Sand  Creek  Lateral  Irr.  Co.  v. 
Davis,  17  Col.  326,  29  Pac.  Rep.  742 ; 
San  Luis  Land  etc.  Co.  v.  Kenilworth 
Canal  Co.,  3  Col.  App.  244,  32  Pac. 
Rep.  860. 

9  2Nash  v.  Clark  27  Utah  158,  75 
Pac.  371,  101  Am.  St.  Rep.  953,  1 
L.R.A. (N.S.)   208. 

9  3Clark  V.  Nash,  198  U.  S.  361,  25 
S.  C.  676. 

9 4 See  §  19,  Colorado;  §  24,  Idaho; 
§  38,  Montana;  §  47,  Oklahoma;  § 
j8,  Washington;  §  61,  Wyoming. 


688  EMINENT  DOMAIN  §    309 

§  309  (203).  Taking  for  the  United  States.  Property 
taken  for  the  use  of  the  general  government  is  taken  for  a  public 
purpose,  for  which  the  State  may  exercise  its  power  of  eminent 
domain.  Thus  it  has  been  held  that  the  United  States  may, 
through  the  machinery  of  the  States,  take  private  property  for 
a  postoffice,®^  for  a  fort,®®  for  naval  purposes,®''  for  works  to  sup- 
ply the  national  capital  with  water,®®  or  for  the  purpose  of 
prosecuting  the  coast  survey.®'  This  power  has  been  denied  in 
Michigan.^  It  seems  to  us,  however,  that  property  taken  for 
the  use  of  the  national  government,  being  for  the  use  of  all  the 
people  of  all  the  States,  is  certainly  for  the  use  of  the  people 
of  that  State  where  it  is  located,  who  would  be  likely  to  be 
especially  interested  in  the  improvement  to  be  made. 

§  310.  Taking  for  use  in  foreign  State.  The  public  use 
for  which  property  may*  be  taken  is  a  public  use  within  the 
State  from  which  the  power  is  derived.  "It  seems  to  be  an 
admitted  fact  generally,  that  the  power  inheres  in  a  State  for 
domestic  uses  only,  to  be  exercised  for  the  benefit  of  its  own 
people,  and  cannot  be  extended  merely  to  promote  the  public 
uses  of  a  foreign  State.^  In  the^case  cited  it  was  held  that  a 
Georgia  corporation,  engaged  in  supplying  water  to  two  cities 
in  Alabama  and  to  one  city  in  Georgia,  could  condemn  land  in 
Alabama  for  the  purpose  of  preserving  the  purity  of  its  water 
supply.  "While  a  State,"  says  the  court,  "will  take  care  to  use 
this  power  for  the  benefit  of  its  own  people,  it  will  not  refuse 
to  exercise  it  for  such  purpose,  because  the  inhabitants  of  a 
neighboring  State  may  incidentally  partake  of  the  fruits  of  its 
exercise.     Such  a  refusal  would  violate  the  principles  of  a  just 

sBBurt   V.   Merchants'    Insurance  thority  of  the  nation  is  ample  for  the 

Co.,  106  Mass.  356,  8  Am.  Rep.  339.  supply  of  its  own  needs  in  this  regard 

9  6In  re  League  Island,  1   Brews.  under    all    circumstances.     In    the 

Pa.  524;  Gilmer  v.  Lime  Point,  18  second  place,  the  eminent  domain  in 

Cal.  229.  any  sovereignty  exists  only  for  its 

STBranch  v.   Lewerenz,   75   Conn.  own  purposes;   and  to  furnish  ma- 

319,  53  Atl.  658.  chinery  to  the  general  government 

9  8Ileddell  v.  Ryan,  14  Md.  444,  74  under,  and  by  means  of  which,  it  is 

Am.  Dec.  550.  to  appropriate  lands  for  national  ob- 

9  90rr  V.  Quimby,  54  N.  H.  590.  jects,  is  not  among  the  ends  contem- 

iTrombley  v.  Humphrey,  23  Mich,  plated  in  the  creation  of  the  State 

471,  476.     The  court  says:     "In  the  government." 

first  place  there  can  be  no  necessity  2Columbus  W.  W.  Co.  v.  Long,  121 

for  the  exercise  of  this  right  by  the  Ala.  245,  25  So.  702. 
States  for  this  purpose,  for  the  au- 


§    312  WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USB.  589 

public  policy,  and  the  neighborly  comity  -which  should  exist  be- 
tween States."  * 

§  311  (204).  Taking  all  of  a  tract  when  only  a  part 
is  required.  Statutes  for  widening  or  opening  streets  some- 
times provide  that,  where  part  of  a  lot  is  required,  the  whole 
may  be  taken  and  the  part  not  required  sold  for  the  benefit  of 
the  improvement.  Such  statutes  are  not  void,  but  they  cannot 
be  enforced  against  the  will  of  the  owner,  as  the  part  not  needed 
for  the  street  would  be  taken  for  private  use.*  But  the  owner 
may  consent  to  the  taking,  and  thereby  a  valid  title  will  be 
acquired  by  the  city.^  The  taking  of  the  compensation  awarded 
amounts  to  such  consent,  and  the  owner  cannot  afterwards  re- 
claim the  property.®  If  the  law  simply  provides  that  the  owner 
may  require  the  city  to  take  the  whole,  it  is  not  objectionable, 
since  it  is  inoperative  without  the  owner's  consent.'^ 

§  312  (205).  Miscellaneous  cases:  Settling  private 
controversies.  The  legislature  of  Kentucky  passed  an  act  cre- 
ating a  corporation  with  power  to  fence  a  tract  of  some  fifteen 
hundred  acres  of  land  which  was  subject  to  annual  floods  carry- 
ing off  the  fences.  The  cost  was  to  be  made  a  tax  upon  the  sev- 
eral owners,  according  to  acreage.  The  law  was  held  invalid 
as  not  being  for  a  public  purpose.*  A  New  York  corporation 
was  formed  under  the  general  law  for  the  purpose  of  acquiring 
certain  swamp,  marsh  and  other  lands  in  the  County  of  Kings, 
which  were  particularly  described  in  the  certificate  of  incorpo- 
ration, and  to  excavate,  construct  and  maintain  one  or  more 
basins,  docks,  wharves  and  piers,  and  to  erect  thereon  suitable 
warehouses,  mills,  furnaces,  foundries,  factories,  shops  and  such 
other  buildings  as  might  be  necessary  and  proper  for  docking, 
loading  and  unloading  vessels,  for  the  storage  of  goods  and  for 

sibid.  511,  53  Am.  Dec.  325,  overruling  same 

^Matter     of    Albany     Street,     11  case  in  2  Sandf.  89. 

Wend.  149,  25  Am.  Dec.  618 ;  Embury  'Mayor  etc.  of  Baltimore  v.  Clunet, 

V.  Conner,  3  N.  Y.  511,  53  Am.  Dec.  23  Md.  449,  464;  Boulat  v.  Munici- 

325 ;   S.  C.  2  Sandf.  98 ;  Matter  of  pality  No.  1,  5  La.  An.  363. 

John  and  Cherry  Streets,  19  Wend.  sSeufHetown  Fence  Co.  v.  McAIlis- 

659;  Bennett  v.  Boyle,  40  Barb.  551 ;  ter,  12  Bush.  (Ky.)  312.    The  follow- 

Dunn  V.  City  Council  of  Charleston,  ing    are     similar    cases:      Hancock 

Harper    (11    S.   C.)    189;    Gregg   v.  Stock  &  Fence  Law  Co.  v.  Adams,  87 

Baltimore,  56  Md.  256.  Ky.  417,  9  S.  W.  246;  Fort  v.  Good- 

5/5Mf.  win,    36   S.   C.   445,   15   S.   E.    723; 

6  Sherman  v.  Kane,  46  N.  Y.  Supr.  Goodate  v.  Sowell,  62  S.  C.  516,  40 

Ct.  310;  Embury  v.  Conner,  3  N.  Y.  S.  E.  970. 


590  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    312 

carrying  on  generally  the  business  of  a  dock,  warehousing  and 
manufacturing  company,  and  in  any  and  every  other  proper  and 
suitable  way  promoting  and  increasing  the  facilities  for  com- 
merce, manufactures  and  business  generally.  A  special  act, 
afterwards  passed,  authorized  the  company  to  condemn  any  of 
the  lands  specified  which  it  could  not  acquire  by  agreement,  and 
provided  that  the  basin  of  the  company  should  at  all  times  be 
open  to  public  use  for  all  vessels  that  might  apply  therefor,  but 
left  by  far  the  greater  part  of  the  works  under  the  absolute 
control  of  the  company.  The  Court  of  Appeals  held  that  the  ob- 
ject was  not  a  public  use.  "We  cannot  regard  such  a  project 
as  a  public  purpose  or  use  which  justifies  the  delegation  to  this 
company  of  the  right  of  eminent  domain.  The  enterprise  is,  in 
substance,  a  private  one,  and  the  pretense  that  it  is  for  a  public 
purpose  is  merely  colorable  and  illusory.  The  taking  of  private 
property  for  private  purposes  cannot  be  authorized  even  by  legis- 
lative act,  and  the  fact  that  the  use  to  which  the  property  is  in- 
tended to  be  put,  or  the  structure  intended  to  be  built  thereon, 
will  tend  incidentally  to  benefit  the  public  by  affording  addi- 
tional accommodations  for  business,  commerce  or  manufactures, 
is  not  sufiicient  to  bring  the  case  within  the  operation  of  the 
tight  of  eminent  domain,  so  long  as  the  structures  are  to  remain 
under  private  ownership  and  control,  and  no  right  to  their  use 
or  to  direct  their  management  is  conferred  upon  the  public."  * 
To  take  the  property  of  one  and  transfer  it  to  another  in  order 
to  settle  a  private  controversy  concerning  title  to  the  property,  is 
not  a  taking  for  public  use,  however  numerous  the  controversies 
or  however  extensive  the  property  in  question.'"  In  1869  an 
act  was  passed  in  Pennsylvania  to  provide  for  the  extinction  of 
irredeemable  ground  rents  upon  payment,  by  the  owners  of  the 
"land  out  of  which  they  issued,  of  damages  or  compensation  to 
be  ascertained  as  provided  in  the  act.  This  was  held  invalid  as 
authorizing  the  taking  of  private  property  for  private  use.-''  It 
has  been  held  that,  under  the  eminent  domain  power,  congress 
may  provide  for  the  extinguishment  of  Indian  titles  to  land  and 
for  the  sale  and  transfer  of  such  land  to  private  parties.'^     An 

sMatter  of  Application  of  E.  B.  W.  sylvania  claimants  to  property  in  the 

&  M.  Co.,  96  N.  Y.  42,  48.  latter  State.    See  also  Hoye  v.  Swan's 

10  Van  Home's  Lessee  v.  Dorrance,  Lessee,  5  Md.  237. 
2  Dall.  304;   Lessee  of  Pickering  t.  uPalairet's  Appeal,  67  Pa.  St.  479. 

Rutty,  1  S.  &  E.  511.    These  are  cases  i2Tuttle  v.  Moore,  3  Ind.  Ter.  712, 

growing  out  of  laws  for  settling  dis-  64  S.  W.  585. 
putes  between  Connecticut  and  Penn- 


§    313  WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USE.  591 

act  authorizing  a  court  to  confirm  and  make  valid  a  deed  pre- 
viously executed  by  a  married  woman,  -which  was  not  properly 
acknowledged,  was  held  invalid  as  an  attempt  to  take  private 
property  for  a  private  purpose.-'*  Public  bath  houses  ^*  and 
poor  farms  ^'  are  public  uses,  for  which,  doubtless,  private  prop- 
erty could  be  condemned.  Land  may  be  taken  to  procure  gravel 
for  the  repair  of  streets.^®  Where  an  act  provides  for  a  general 
scheme  for  laying  out,  changing  and  discontinuing  streets  for 
the  improvement  of  a  particular  locality  and  provides  for  acquir- 
ing the  fee  of  discontinued  streets  to  be  held  for  private  use,  it 
is  not  obnoxious  to  the  objection  that  it  authorizes  a  taking  for 
private  use.^''  An  act  of  Colorado  providing  "that  the  public 
shall  have  the  right  to  fish  in  any  stream  of  this  State,  stocked 
at  public  expense,  subject  to  actions  in  trespass  for  any  damage 
done  property  along  the  bank  of  any  such  streams,"  was  held 
invalid  as  an  attempt  to  take  private  property  for  private  use.^** 
§  313.  To  constitute  a  public  use  the  public  must  have 
a  legal  right  to  the  use  or  service  for  which  the  property 
is  taken.  Where  property  is  taken  by  private  corporations  or 
individuals,  it  must  not  only  appear  that  the  purpose  of  the 
taking  is  a  public  use,  but  also  that  the  public  have  a  right  to 
that  use  independent  of  the  will  of  the  condemning  party.  ^^ 

isPearce's  Heirs  v.  Patton,  7  B.  581 ;  Jacobs  v.  Clearview  Water  Sup- 

Mon.  162,  167.  ply  Co.,  220  Pa.  St.  388,  69  Atl.  870 ; 

i4Poillon  V.  Brooklyn,  101  N.  Y.  Memphis  Freight  Co.  v.  Memphis,  4 

132.  Coldw.  419;  Ryan  v.  Terminal  Co., 

iBTyrone  Tp.  School  District's  Ap-  102  Tenn.  Ill,  50  S.  W.  744,  45  L.R.A. 

peal,  1  Monaghan    (Pa.  Supm.  Ct.)  303;  Borden  v.  Tres.palaeios  R.  &  I. 

20.  Co.,  98  Tex.  494,     86  S.  W.  11,  107 

I'Sommerville    v.    Waltham,    170  Am.  St.  Rep.  640 ;  Avery  v.  Vermont 

Mass.  160.  Elec.  Co.,  75  Vt.  235,  54  Atl.  179,  98 

i7Matter   of   Mayor   etc.   of   New  Am.   St.  Rep.   818,   59   L.R.A.   817; 

York,  157  N.  Y.  409,  52  N.  E.  1126,  Fallaburg  P.  &  M.  Co.  v.  Alexander, 

affirming  28  App.  Div.  143.  101  Va.  98,  43  S.  E.  194,  99  Am.  St. 

isHartmanv.  Tresise,  36Colo.  146,  Rep.   855,   61   L.R.A.   129;    State  v. 

84  Pac.  685,  4  L.R.A.(N.S.)  872.  White  River  Power   Co.,   39   Wash. 

lOLake  Keon  Nav.  etc.  Co.  v.  Klein,  648,  82  Pac.  150,  2  L.R.A.  (N.S.)  842 ; 

63  Kan.  484,  65  Pac.  684,  93  Am.  St.  State  v.   Superior   Court,  42  Wash. 

Rep.    299;     Howard    Mills     Co.    v.  660,  85  Pac.  666,  5  L.R.A.  ( N.S. )  672 ; 

Schwartz  L.  &  C.  Co.,  77  Kan.  599,  95  State  v.  Tolt  P.  &  T.  Co.,  50  Wash. 

Pac.  559;  Berrien  Springs  W.  P.  Co.  13,     96     Pac.     519;      Caretta     Ry. 

V.  Berrien  Circ.  Judge,  133  Mich.  48,  Co.  v.  Va.  Pocahontas  Coal  Co.,   62 

94  N.  W.  379,  103  Am.  St.  Rep.  438 ;  W.  Va.  185,  57  S.  E.  401 ;  Hench  v. 

Rockingham  Co.  L.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Hobbs,  Pritt,  62  W.  Va.  270,  57  S.  E.  808 ; 

72  N.  H.  531,  58  Atl.  46,  66  L.R.A.  Scott  Lumber  Co.  v.  Wolford,  62  W. 


592  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    313 

"The  service  proposed,"  says  the  court  in  one  case,  "must  be 
such  as  every  individual  member  of  the  community,  similarly 
situated,  shall  have  the  right  to  demand  and  receive  upon  like 
conditions  as  any  other  member,  \^hether  the  corporation  would 
accede  to  the  bidding  or  not.  The  community  might  be  large 
or  small,  or  the  service  might  be  limited  to  a  few,  or  extended 
to  many ;  but  within  the  compass  of  the  proposed  service  every 
individual  similarly  situated  should  be  entitled  to  it  as  of  right 
upon  like  conditions;  otherwise  it  is  hardly  conceivable  how 
such  an  institution  could  be  considered  a  public  service  corpora- 
tion. If  it  may  serve  whom  it  pleases  and  deny  whom,  it  pleases, 
although  those  it  accommodates  may  be  a  part  of  the  general 
public,  the  service  becomes  of  private  consequence  merely,  and 
the  real  public  is  ignored.  So  that,  unless  all  may,  under  like 
and  similar  conditions  and  circumstances,  demand  and  receive 
as  of  right,  it  is  not  a  public,  but  a  private  service."  *"  Thus 
where  a  corporation  was  authorized  to  create  water  power  or 
electricity  for  its  own  use  or  the  use  of  others,  it  was  held  that 
it  could  not  condemn,  as  it  was  optional  with  the  company  wheth- 
er it  would  serve  itself  or  the  public.*^  But  where  the  authority 
is  general,  to  provide  and  furnish  a  power  or  service,  and  the 
power  of  eminent  domain  is  conferred,  there  is  an  implied  obliga- 
tion to  serve  the  public  on  demand  and  impartially  and  the  use 
is  held  to  be  a  public  use.*^  "The  delegation  of  the  power  of 
eminent  domain  to  a  corporation  is  not  always  accompanied 
vsdth  an  express  imposition  of  the  obligation  to  serve  the  public 
reasonably  and  equitably.  A  corporation  by  the  acceptance  and 
exercise  of  the  power  impliedly  undertakes  such  service  respect- 
ing the  subject  for  which  the  power  is  exercised."  ^* 

Va.  555,  59  S.  E.  516;  Wis.  Eiv.  Imp.  ham  Co.  L.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Hobbs,  72  N. 

Co.  V.  Pier   (Wis.)   118  N.  W.  857;  H.  531,  58  Atl.  46,  66  L.E.A.  581; 

Shasta  Power  Co.  v.  Walker,  149  Fed.  Kansas  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  N.  W.  Coal  & 

568.  Min.  Co.,  161  Mo.  288,  61  S.  W.  684, 

2  0Shasta  Power  Co.  v.  Walker,  149  84  Am.  St.  Rep.  717,  51  L.R.A.  936; 

Fed.  568,  572.  Helena  Power  Transmission  Co.  v. 

siBerrien    Springs   Water   Power  Spratt,  35  Mont.  108,  88  Pao.  773,  8 

Co.  V.  Berrien  Circ.  Judge,  133  Mich.  L.R.A.  (N.S.)    567;   Borden  v.  Tres- 

48,  94  N.  W.  379,  103  Am.  St.  Rep.  palacios  R.  &  I.  Co.,  98  Tex.  494,  86 

438;  Fallsburg  P.  &  M.  Co.  v.  Alex-  S.  W.  11,  107  Am.  St.  Rep.  640. 
ander,  101  Va.  98,  43  S.  B.  194,  99  zsRookingham  Co.  L.  &  P.  Co.  v. 

Am.  St.  Rep.  855,  61  L.R.A.  129.  Hobbs,  72  N.  H.  531,  537,  58  Atl.  46, 

22Lake  Koen  Nav.  etc.  Co.  v.  Klein,  66  L.R.A.  581. 
63  Kan.  484,  65  Pac.  684;  Rocking- 


§    314  WHAT  IS  A  PUBIJO  USE.  593 

§  314  (206).  Combination  of  public  and  private  use 
in  the  same  act  or  proceeding.  An  act  which  authorized 
the  erection  of  a  dam  across  a  navigable  river  by  a  city,  either 
for  the  purpose  of  water  works  for  the  city  or  for  the  purpose 
of  leasing  the  water  for  private  use  was  held  void.^* 
So,  in  a  State  where  the  only  kind  of  mills  regarded  as  a  public 
use  are  public  grist-mills,  a  statute  which  authorized  the  con- 
demnation of  property  for  the  erection  of  a  mill  or  other  ma- 
chinery was  held  void.^^  In  this  case  the  court  says:  "We 
have,  then,  the  case  of  a  statute,  which,  in  the  employment  of  a 
generic  phrase,  without  expressing  the  different  species  included 
in  that  genus,  attempts,  by  words  not  separable,  to  confer  a  gen- 
eral authority,  a  part  of  the  patent  object  of  which  are  vsdthin, 
and  others  without,  the  pale  of  constitutional  power.  In  such 
case,  we  have  no  discretion  but  to  pronounce  the  entire  clause 
unconstitutional."  A  company  was  chartered  to  construct  and 
operate  plants  and  water  power  and  "to  manufacture  and  gen- 
erate water  power,  electrical  and  other  power,  light  or  heat,  and 
utilize  and  transmit  and  distribute  such  power,  light  or  heat  to 
any  place  or  places  for  its  own  use  or  for  the  use  of  other  indi- 
viduals or  corporations,"  and,  in  aid  of  such  purposes,  was  given 
the  power  of  eminent  domain.  It  was  held  that  the  company 
could  not  condemn  for  the  purposes  of  its  charter.^*  So  where  a 
statute  conferred  the  power  of  eminent  domain  upon  corpora- 
tions organized  to  create,  v^e,  lease  and  sell  water  power.  ^^ 

But  other  cases  hold  that,  when  a  statute  authorizes  the  con- 
demnation of  property  for  various  purposes,  some  of  which  are 
public  and  some  private,  the  authority  will  be  good  and  may  be 
exercised  for  such  of  the  purposes  specified  as  are  in  fact  pub- 
lic.^    So  a  corporation  organized  for  both  public  and  private 

2  4  Attorney  General  v.  Eau  Claire,  Berrien  Circ.  Judge,  133  Mich.  48,  94 

37  Wia.  400.    After  this  decision  the  N.  W.   379,   103  Am.   St.  Kep.  438. 

act  was  amended  so  as  to  make  the  And  see  Hercules  Water  Co.  v.  Fer- 

water-works  compulsory  and  permit  nandez,  5  Cal.  App.  726;  La.  Nav.  & 

the  leasing  of  only  surplus  water,  and  Fisheries  Co.  v.  DouUut,  114  La.  906, 

was  then   sustained.     State  v.  Eau  38  So.  613. 
Claire,  40  Wis.  533.  2  8Lake  Keen  etc.  Co.  v.  Klein,  63 

2  5Sadler  v.  Langham,  34  Ala.  311,  Kan.  484,  65  Pac.  684,  93  Am.  St.  Rep. 

333.  299 ;  Brown  v.  Gerald,  100  Me.  351,  61 

26Fallsburg  P.  &  M.  Co.  v.  Alex-  Atl.  785,  109  Am.  St.  Rep.  526,  70 

ander,  101  Va.  98,  43  S.  E.  194,  99  L.R.A.  472 ;  Minn.  Canal  &  Power  Co. 

Am.  St.  Rep.  855,  61  L.R.A.  129.  v.  Koochiching  Co.,  97  Minn.  429,  107 

2  7Berrien   Springs   W.   P.    Co.  v.  N.  W.  405,  5  L.R.A.  638;  In  re  R.  I. 
Em.  D.— 38. 


594  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    314: 

purposes  may  condemn  property  in  aid  of  the  purposes  wMcli 
are  public.^*  And  this  is  in  accordance  with  a  general  rule, 
which  has  been  thus  stated  by  the  supreme  court  of  New  Hamp- 
shire: "The  rule  of  construction  universally  adopted  is  that 
when  a  statute  may  constitutionally  operate  upon  certain  per- 
sons, or  in  certain  cases,  and  was  not  evidently  intended  to  con- 
flict with  the  constitution,  it  is  not  to  be  held  unconstitutional 
merely  because  there  may  be  persons  to  whom,  or  cases  in  which, 
it  cannot  constitutionally  apply;  but  it  is  to  be  held  constitu- 
tional and  to  be  construed  not  to  apply  to  the  latter  persons  or 
cases,  on  the  ground  that  courts  are  bound  to  presume  that 
the  legislature  did  not  intend  to  violate  the  constitution."  ^* 
According  to  this  rule  the  power  of  eminent  domain  may  be 
exercised  for  such  purposes  as  are  a  public  use,  while  the  other 
purposes  must  be  accomplished,  if  at  all,  without  the  aid  of 
that  power.  Thus  where  a  corporation  was  authorized  to  con- 
demn property  for  "its  corporate  purposes,"  it  was  held  to 
mean  only  such  purposes  as  were  a  public  use.**^  And  in  pro- 
ceedings under  such  a  statute  the  petition  should  clearly  show 
that  the  property  sought  is  to  be  devoted  to  a  purpose,  which  is 
not  only  within  the  statutory  powers,  but  also  a  public  use  within 
the  constitution.^^  If  the  petition  is  general  to  condemn  for 
the  use  of  the  corporation  or  for  the  purposes  of  the  charter  or 

Suburban  Ry.  Co.,  22  E.  I.  455,  48  Fackler,  91  Wis.  418,  64  N.  W.  1029; 

Atl.  590;  In  re  R.  I.  Suburban  Ry.  Freight    Tax    Case,   15   Wall.   232; 

Co.    22'   R.    I.    457,    48    Atl.    591,  Packet  Co.  v.  Keokuk,  95  U.  S.  80,  24 

52     L.R.A.     879;      State     v.     Cen-  L.  ed.  377;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Shutte, 

tralia  etc.  Ry.  &  P.  Co.,  42  Wash.  103  U.  S.  118,  26  L.  ed.  327;  Super- 

G32,  85  Pac.  344;  State  v.  Olympic  L.  visors  v.  Stanley,  105  U.  S.  305,  313, 

&  P.  Co.,  46  Wash.  511,  90  Pac.  656.  314,  26  L.  ed.  1044;   United  States 

And  see  Thorn  v.  Ga.  Mfg.  &  Public  v.  Central  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  118  U.  S. 

Service  Co.,  128  Ga.  187,  57  S.  E.  75.  235,  6  S.  C.  1038,  30  L.  ed.  173;  Mc- 

2  9 Walker   v.    Shasta   Power    Co.,  CuUough  v.  Virginia,  172  U.  S.  102, 

160  Fed.   856,   87   C.   C.   A.  660,   19  19  S.  C.  134,  43  L.  ed.  382;  1  Lewis' 

L.R.A.(N.S.)   725.  Sutherland  Stat.  Constr.  §§  298-300. 

soOpinion  of  the  Justices,  41  N.  siin  re  R.  I.  Suburban  Ry.  Co.,  22 

H.   555.     To  same  effect:     State  v.  R.  I.  455,  48  Atl.  590;   In  re  R.  I. 

Smiley,  65  Kan.   240,   69  Pac.   199;  Suburban  Ry.  Co.,  22  R.  I.  457,  48 

Grimes  v.  Eddy,  126  Mo.  168,  28  S.  Atl.  591,  52  L.R.A.  879. 

W.    756,    47   Am.    St.   Rep.    653,   26  szstate  v.  Centralia  etc.  Ry.  &  P. 

L.R.A.  638;  State  v.  McGowan,  138  Co.,  42  Wash.  632,  85  Pac.  344;  State 

Mo.  187,  39  S.  W.  771 ;  Citizens'  Nat.  v.  Superior  Court,  42  Wash.  660,  85 

Bank  V.  Graham,  147  Mo.  250,  48  S.  Pac.  666,  5  L.R.A.(N.S.)   672;  State 

W.  910;  Northrup  v.  Hoyt,  31  Ore.  v.  Olympia  L.  &  P.  Co.,  46  Wash.  511, 

524,  49  Pac.  754;  State  v.  Mines,  38  90  Pac.  656. 
W.  Va.  125,  18  S.  E.  470;   State  v. 


§    315  WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USE.  595 

organization,  the  proceeding  should  be  dismissed.^^  So  an 
application  under  an  act  to  condenm  property  for  purposes, 
part  of  whieh  are  within,  and  part  not  within,  the  act,  will  be 
bad  in  toto.^* 

§  315  (206a).  Taking  for  other  than  a  public  purpose 
violates  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  of  the  federal  consti- 
tution. The  fourteenth  amendment  forbids  any  State  to  deprive 
a  person  of  his  property  without  due  process  of  law.  To  take 
property  for  other  than  a  public  purpose,  either  under  the  guise 
of  taxation  or  of  eminent  domain,  is  to  violate  this  provision.^  ^ 
Hence  the  purpose  of  the  taking  may  present  a  federal  question, 
though  arising  under  State  laws.  But  in  thus  applying  the  fed- 
eral Constitution  the  broadest  possible  construction  should  be 
given  to  the  eminent  domain  power.  The  words  "public  use" 
import  a  limitation  upon  the  eminent  domain  power  with  respect 
to  the  purposes  for  which  it  may  be  exercised.^®  The  States  are 
not  compelled  to  retain  this  limitation.  In  its  absence,  the 
power  may  be  exercised  for  any  purpose  which  promotes  the 
general  welfare  of  the  State.^'^  This  would  include  many  cases 
where  the  property  taken  is  devoted  to  strictly  private  uses,  as 
in  the  case  of  private  roads,  mills,  drains  and  the  like.  Instead 
of  doing  away  with  the  usual  limitation  on  the  subject,  special 
provisions  may  be  adopted  permitting  the  condemnation  of 
property  for  particular  purposes,  as  has  been  done  in  many 
States  with  reference  to  private  roads,  drainage,  irrigation  and 
the  development  of  mines.  These  special  provisions  are  in 
the  nature  of  exceptions  to  the  general  provision,  which  limits 
the  taking  to  a  public  use.  The  legislature  of  a  State  may  not 
take,  or  authorize  the  taking  of  private  property,  except  for 
public  use,  but  the  State  itself,  the  people  in  their  collective 

tsllid.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  136;  Smith  v.  Barre 

3  4Thus,  under  an  act  for  the  erec-  Water  Co.,  73  Vt.  310,  50  Atl.  1055. 

tion  of  grist-mills,  an  order  of  the  SBLoan  Association  v.  Topeka,  20 

court  condemning  land  for  a  grist-  Wall.   655;    Fallbrook   Irr.   Dist.   v. 

mill,  saw-mill  and  paper-mill  is  void.  Bradley,  164  U.  S.  112,  17  S.  C.  56; 

Harding  v.  Goodlet,  3  Yerg.  41,  24  Clark  v.  Nash,  198  U.  S.  361,  25  S.  C. 

Am.  Dec.  546.     To  same  efifect,  Gay-  676 ;  Strickley  v.  Highland  Boy  Gold 

lord   V.    Sanitary   District,   204   111.  Min.  Co.,  200  U.  S.  527,  26  S.  C.  301 ; 

576,  68  N.  E.  522,  98  Am.  St.  Rep.  Matter  of  Tuthill,  163  N.  Y.  133,  57 

235,  63  L.R.A.  582.    And  see  MeCul-  N.  E.  303,  79  Am.  St.  Rep.  574,  49 

ley  V.  Cunningham,  96  Ala.  583,  11  L.R.A.  781. 

So.  Rep.  694;  In  re  Barre  Water  Co.,  ssAnte,  §  256. 

62  Vt.  27,  20  Atl.  Rep.  109,  3  Am.  R.  s'JAnte,  §  1. 


596  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    315 

capacity,  may  take,  or  authorize  the  taking,  of  private  property 
for  any  purpose  of  public  utility  or  public  welfare.  We  have 
endeavored  to  show  that  public  use  means  a  use  by  the  public, 
a  use  in  which  the  public  participates  as  of  right.**  The  words 
pvhlic  utility  or  public  welfare  have  a  broader  meaning.  The 
policy  of  permitting  private  property  to  be  taken  for  a  particular 
purpose  may  promote  the  public  welfare,  though  the  purpose 
may  not  be  a  public  use,  as  we  have  defined  it.  Just  what 
purposes  the  public  welfare  will  include,  will  depend  upon  the 
ideas  and  needs  and  practices  of  the  time.  They  will  vary  from 
age  to  age.  What  is  said  by  Mr.  Judson  in  reference  to  the 
public  purpose  in  taxation,  will  apply  equally  to  the  power  of 
eminent  domain.  "The  public  purpose  which  will  warrant  the 
exercise  of  the  taxing  power  is  that  which  is  sustained  by  the 
prevailing  and  controlling  public  opinion  of  the  time;  not  the 
public  opinion  in  the  popular  sense,  which  is  conclusively  re- 
ilected  in  the  expression  of  the  legislative  will,  but  the  trained 
and  thoughtful  judicial  opinion.  The  public  opinion  of  one  age 
or  generation,  however,  as  reflected  in  judicial  opinions  concern- 
ing the  proper  scope  of  governmental  activity,  or  as  to  what 
are  the  public  purposes  of  taxation,  is  not  the  public  opinion 
of  another  age  or  of  another  generation."  *® 

At  the  present  time  there  are  at  least  three  things  which  are 
deemed  to  promote  the  public  welfare  in  such  way  and  in  such 
sense  as  to  justify  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  eminent  domain, 
though  the  property  taken  is  not  devoted  to  the  use  of  the  public 
but  becomes  the  private  property  of  the  petitioner,  as  truly 
and  completely  as  if  he  had  purchased  it  by  private  contract. 
These  three  things  are,  (1)  the  reclamation  of  wet  and  arid 
lands,*"  (2)  the  development  and  utilization  of  the  mineral 
resources  of  the  land,*^  and  (3)  the  development  and  utilization 
of  water  power.*  ^  Wherever  the  local  conditions  are  such  that 
these  improvements  affect,  in  a  material  degree,  the  general 
prosperity  and  welfare  of  the  State,  there  they  become  matters 

saAnte,  §  258.  Min.  Co.,  200  U.  S.  527,  26  S.  C.  301, 

3  9  Judson  on  Taxation,  §  46.  affirming  Highland  Boy  Gold  Min. 

loWurts  V.  Hoagland,  114  U.  S.  Co.   v.   Strickley,   28  Utah,   215,   78 

606;  Clark  v.  Nash,  198  U.  S.  361,  25  Pac.  296,   107  Am.   St.  Kep.  711,   1 

S.  C.  676,  affirming  Nash  v.  Clark,  27  L.R.A.  (N.S.)   976. 

Utah  158,  75  Pac.  371,  101  Am.  St.  4  2Head  v.  Amoskeag  Mfg.  Co.,  113 

Rep.  953,  1  L.R.A.(N.S.)  208.  U.  S.  9. 

4iStrickley  v.  Highland  Boy  Gold 


§    315  WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USE.  597 

of  such  public  concern  as  justifies  the  exercise  of  the  eminent 
domain  power  to  make  them  possible.  The  reclamation  of  a 
single  farm  or  tract  of  land  cannot  be  a  matter  of  public  concern. 
But  a  policy  which  makes  it  possible  to  reclaim  all  wet  and  arid 
tracts  is  a  matter  of  public  concern,  provided  there  is  enough 
such  land  in  the  State,  so  that  its  reclamation  will  affect  appre- 
ciably the  public  welfare.  To  carry  out  this  policy,  it  must  be 
possible  for  a  single  owner  to  reclaim  his  land  by  works  upon 
the  land  of  others  and  therefore  the  power  of  eminent  domain 
may  be  exercised  for  such  purpose.  The  same  reasoning  holds 
good  with  respect  to  mines  and  water  power.  It  follows  that 
the  States  may  provide  for  the  improvements  mentioned  by  con- 
stitutional amendment  and  that  such  amendments  and  the  taking 
of  private  property  in  pursuance  thereof  will  not  violate  the 
fourteenth  amendment  of  the  federal  constitution. 

These  views  are  fully  sustained  by  decisions  of  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States,  whose  interpretation  of  the  four- 
teenth amendment  is  final.  A  statute  of  Utah  which  permitted 
a  single  proprietor  to  condemn  a  right  of  way  for  an  irrigating 
ditch  across  the  lands  of  others  was  sustained  as  a  valid  exercise 
of  the  eminent  domain  power.*^     The  principle  of  this  case 

<3Clait  V.  Nash,  198  U.  S.  361,  25  tion  is  asserted  under  a  State  stat 
S.  C.  676,  affirming  Nash  v.  Clark,  27  ute,  we  are  always,  where  it  can 
Utah  158,  75  Pac.  371,  101  Am.  St.  fairly  be  done,  strongly  inclined  to 
Rep.  953,  1  L.R.A.(N.S.)  208.  The  hold  with  the  State  courts,  when  they 
federal  court,  in  course  of  its  opinion,  uphold  a  State  statute  providing  for 
Bays:  "Whether  a  statute  of  a  State  such  condemnation.  The  validity  of 
permitting  condemnation  by  an  indi-  such  statutes  may  sometimes  depend 
vidual  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  upon  many  different  facts,  the  ex- 
water  for  his  land  or  for  mining  istenoe  of  which  would  make  a  public 
should  be  held  to  be  a  condemnation  use,  even  by  an  individual,  where,  in 
for  a  public  use,  and,  therefore,  a  the  absence  of  such  facts,  the  use 
valid  enactment,  may  depend  upon  a  would  clearly  be  private.  Those  facta 
number  of  considerations  relating  to  must  be  general,  notorious  and  ac- 
the  situation  of  the  State  and  its  knowledged  in  the  State,  and  the 
possibilities  for  land  cultivation,  or  State  courts  may  be  assumed  to  be 
the  successful  prosecution  of  its  min-  exceptionally  familiar  with  them, 
ing  or  other  industries.  Where  the  They  are  not  the  subject  of  judicial 
use  is  asserted  to  be  public,  and  the  investigation  as  to  their  existence, 
right  of  the  individual  to  condemn  but  the  local  courts  know  and  appre- 
for  the  purpose  of  exercising  such  use  ciate  them.  They  understand  the 
is  founded  upon  or  is  the  result  of  situation  which  led  to  the  demand 
some  peculiar  condition  of  the  soil  for  the  enactment  of  the  statute,  and 
or  climate,  or  other  peculiarity  of  the  they  also  appreciate  the  results  upon 
State,  where  the  right  of  condemna-  the  growth    and    prosperity  of  the 


598 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


315 


would 'cover  reclamations  by  drains  or  dykes.**  In  another 
case  from  Utah  the  same  court  sustained  a  statute  of  Utah 
which  permitted  the  owner  of  a  mine  to  condemn  a  right  of  way 
across  the  land  of  others  for  an  aerial  line  of  transportation. 
The  court  says:  "In  the  opinion  of  the  legislature  and  the 
supreme  court  of  Utah  the  public  welfare  of  that  State  demands 
that  aerial  lines  between  the  mines  upon  its  mountain  sides 


State,  which  in  all  probability  would 
flow  from  a  denial  of  its  validity. 
These  are  matters  which  may  prop- 
erly be  held  to  have  a  material  bear- 
ing upon  the  question  whether  the 
'  individual  use  proposed  might  not  in 
fact  be  a  public  one.  It  is  not  alone 
the  fact  that  the  land  is  arid  and  that 
it  will  bear  crops  if  irrigated,  or  that 
the  water  is  necessary  for  the  pur- 
pose of  working  a  mine,  that  is  ma- 
terial ;  other  facts  might  exist  which 
are  also  material,  such  as  the  partic- 
ular manner  in  which  the  irrigation 
is  carried  on  or  proposed,  or  how  the 
mining  is  to  be  done  in  a  particular 
place  where  water  is  needed  for  that 
purpose.  The  general  situation  and 
amount  of  the  arid  land,  or  of  the 
mines  themselves,  might  also  be  ma- 
terial, and  what  proportion  of  the 
water  each  owner  should  be  entitled 
to;  also  the  extent  of  the  population 
living  in  the  surrounding  country, 
and  whether  each  owner  of  land  or 
mines  could  be,  in  fact,  furnished 
with  the  necessary  water  in  any  other 
way  than  by  the  condemnation  in  his 
own  behalf,  and  not  by  a  company, 
for  his  use  and  that  of  others.  *  *  • 
But  we  do  not  desire  to  be  under- 
stood by  this  decision  as  approving  of 
the  broad  proposition  that  private 
property  may  be  taken  in  all  cases 
where  the  taking  may  promote  the 
public  interest  and  tend  to  develop 
the  natural  resources  of  the  State. 
We  simply  say  that  in  this  particular 
case,  and  upon  the  facts  stated  in  the 
findings  of  the  court,  and  having  ref- 
erence   to    the    conditions    already 


stated,  we  are  of  opinion  that  the 
use  is  a  public  one,  although  the  tak- 
ing of  the  right  of  way  is  for  the  pur- 
pose simply  of  thereby  obtaining  the 
water  for  an  individual,  where  it  is 
absolutely  necessary  to  enable  him 
to  make  any  use  whatever  of  his 
land,  and  which  will  be  valuable  and 
fertile  only  if  water  can  be  obtained. 
Other  landowners  adjoining  the  de- 
fendant in  error,  if  any  there  are, 
might  share  in  the  use  of  the  water 
by  themselves  taking  the  same  pro- 
ceedings to  obtaiQ  it,  and  we  do  not 
think  it  necessary,  in  order  to  hold 
the  use  to  be  a  public  one,  that  all 
should  join  in  the  same  proceedings 
or  that  a  company  should  be  formed 
to  obtain  the  water  which  the  indi- 
vidual landowner  might  then  obtain 
his  portion  of  from  the  company  by 
paying  the  agreed  price,  or  the  price 
fixed  by  law."   pp.  367-370. 

*i8ee  Matter  of  Tuthill,  163  N.  Y. 
133,  57  N.  E.  303,  79  Am.  St.  Rep. 
574,  49  L.R.A.  781.  Under  the 
amendment  to  the  constitution  of 
New  York  of  1894  in  relation  to 
drainage  {ante,  §  43)  an  act  was 
passed  whereby  one  person  could 
drain  his  lands  or  protect  them  from 
overflow  by  works  upon  the  lands  of 
others  and  could  exercise  the  power 
of  eminent  domain  for  such  works. 
Gray,  J.,  was  of  opinion  that  such  a 
law  violated  the  14th  Amendment  but 
Parker,  C.  J.,  and  Haight,  J.,  were  of 
a  contrary  opinion.  The  question 
was  not  decided,  as  the  law  was  held 
invalid  upon  other  grounds. 


§    315  WHAT  IS  A  PUBLIC  USE.  599 

and  the  railways  in  the  valleys  below  should  not  be  made  im- 
possible by  the  refusal  of  a  private  owner  to  sell  the  right  to 
cross  his  land.  The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  does 
not  require  us  to  say  that  they  are  wrong."  *^ 

*5Strick;ley  v.  Highland  Boy  Gold  Co.  v.  Strickley,  28  Utah  215,  78  Pac. 
Min.  Co.,  200  U.  S.  527,  26  S.  C.  301,  296,  107  Am.  St.  Rep.  711,  1  LJR.A. 
affirming  Highland  Boy  Gold  Min.       (N.S.)  976. 


CHAPTEK  VIII. 

MEANING  OF  THE  WORDS  "DAMAGED,"  "INJURED,"  AND 
"INJURIOUSLY  AFFECTED." 

I.  In  Statutes. 

§  316  (206b).  Statutes  giving  damages  for  change  of 
grade:  Connecticut.  These  statutes  vary  so  much  that  we 
shall  notice  the  decisions  of  each  State  separately. 

A  statute  of  Connecticut  provides  that  "when  the  owner  of 
land  adjoining  a  public  highway,  or  of  any  interest  in  such  land, 
shall  sustain  special  damage  or  receive  special  benefit  to  his  prop- 
erty by  reason  of  any  change  in  the  grade  of  such  highway 
by  the  town,  city  or  borough  in  which  such  highway  be  situated, 
such  town,  city  or  borough  shall  be  liable  to  pay  to  hini  the 
amount  of  such  special  damage,  and  shall  be  entitled  to  receive 
from  him  the  amount  or  value  of  such  special  benefits,  to  be  as- 
certained in  the  manner  provided  for  ascertaining  damages  and 
benefits  occasioned  by  laying  out  or  altering  highways  therein."  ^ 
It  is  held  that  the  "special  damage"  to  be  allowed  under  this 
statute  "differs  in  no  essential  respect  from  the  damage  that 
would  be  appraised  for  injury  to  adjoining  land,  if  the  altera- 
tion were  an  original  layout,  causing  a  similar  injury.  Such 
damage  includes  the  diminution  in  the  market  value  of  the  land 
caused  by  the  alteration,  to  be  determined  by  considering  every- 
thing by  which  that  value  is  legitimately  affected."  ^  The  stat- 
ute applies  to  improvements  under  the  "Good  Roads  Act," 
though  the  same  are  supervised  by  the  State,  which  also  bears 
part  of  the  expense.*  The  destruction  of  a  sidewalk  or  shade 
trees  may  be  taken  into  consideration.*     Also  the  cost  of  a  re- 

IR.  S.  1888,   §  2703;   R.  S.   1902,  Co.  v.  Birmingham,  62  Conn.  456,  26 

§  2051.  Atl.  348;  S.  C.  61  Conn.  518,  24  Atl. 

2Platt    V.    Town    of     Milford,    66  978. 

Conn.  320,  34  Atl.  82;   Cook  v.  An-  sGriswold    v.  Guilford,  75    Conn. 

sonia,   66    Conn.  413,   34    Atl.   183 ;  192,  52  Atl.  742. 

Holley  V.  Town    of    Torrington,  63  <Shelton   Co.   v.   Birmingham,   62 

Conn.  426,  433,  28  Atl.  613;  Shelton  Conn.   456,   26   Atl.   348;    Holley  v. 

600 


§    317  PEOPEETT  DAMAGED  OE  IITJUEED.  601 

taining  wall  and  the  regrading  of  the  lot.^  If  a  change  is  made 
■without  complying  with  the  statute  an  action  at  law  will  lie 
for  the  damage.*  A  change  of  grade  of  the  sidewalk  or  from 
the  natural  grade  of  the  street  is  within  the  statute.''  The  action 
accrues  when  the  change  is  made,  not  when  it  is  ordered.*  But 
a  private  action  cannot  be  brought  until  the  city  has  been  guilty 
of  unreasonable  delay  to  have  the  damages  assessed  or  refused 
to  do  so.*  The  rights  of  the  parties  are  held  to  be  governed 
by  the  law  in  force  when  the  change  is  finally  ordered.  Thus 
when  a  change  of  grade  was  ordered  while  a  statute  like  the 
one  quoted  was  in  force  but  was  not  executed  until  after  the 
repeal  of  the  statute,  it  was  held  that  the  abutter  was  entitled 
to  compensation.^" 

§  317  (207).  The  same:  Indiana.  A  statute  of  Indi- 
ana provides  that,  "when  the  city  authorities  have  once  estab- 
lished the  grade  of  any  street  or  alley  in  the  city,  such  grade 
shall  not  be  changed  until  the  damages  occasioned  by  such  change 
shall  have  been  assessed  and  tendered  to  the  parties  injured  or 
affected  by  such  change,  and  such  damages  shall  be  collected  by 
the  city  from  the  party  or  parties  making  such  change  of  grade 
in  the  manner  provided  for  the  collections  of  street  improve- 
ments." ^^  The  statute  applies  only  to  cities,  not  to  incor- 
porated towns. *^  If  the  city  fails  to  have  the  damages  assessed 
and  paid  as  required  by  the  statute,  a  common  law  action 
will  Ue."^^  But  no  action  lies  to  recover  nominal  damages.-'* 
An  established  grade  within  the  statute  is  a  grade  established 
in  pursuance  of  some  ordinance  or  order  of  the  common  council, 
involving  some  general  plan  of  improvement  or  grading  of  a 

Town  of  Torrington,  63  Conn.  426,  sGilpin  v.  Ansonia,  68  Conn.  72, 

28  Atl.  613 ;  Cook  v.  City  of  Ansonia,  35  Atl.  777. 

66  Conn.  413,  34  Atl.  183.  lOHealey  v.  New  Haven,  49  Conn. 

sPickles  V.  Ansonia,  76  Conn.  278,  394. 
56  Atl.  552.  liR.  S.  1881,  §  3073. 

6Healey  v.  New  Haven,  49  Conn.  i2Baker  v.  Town  of  Shoals,  6  Ind. 

394;  Holley  v.  Town  of  Torrington,  App.  319,  33  N.  E.  664. 
63  Conn.  426,  28  Atl.  613;   Cook  v.  i3La  Fayette  v.  Wortman,  107  Ind. 

City  of  Ansonia,  66  Conn.  413,  34  Atl.  404;  La  Fayette  v.  Nagle,  113  Ind. 

183.  425. 

'McGar  v.  Bristol,  71  Conn.  652,  "Burkham  v.  Ohio  &  M.  E.  R.  Co., 

42  Atl.  1000 ;  Pickles  v.  Ansonia,  76  122  Ind.  344,  23  N.  E.  799. 
Conn.  278,  56  Atl.  552. 

spickles  V.  Ansonia,  76  Conn.  278, 
56  Atl.  552. 


602  EMIJSTENT    DOM  A  TIT.  .  §    318 

street  or  some  specific  portion  thereof.'"  Accordingly  no  dam- 
ages can  be  recovered  when  the  change  is  from  a  natural  grade 
merely.-'®  Where  the  city  engineer  and  committee  on  streets 
agreed  with  the  plaintiff  on  a  grade  to  -which  he  adapted  his 
building,  and  afterwards  the  council  fixed  a  lower  grade,  this 
was  held  not  to  be  a  change  within  the  statute. '''  A  change 
of  grade  of  the  sidewalk  or  part  of  the  street  is  within  the  stat- 
ute.'* Where  the  town  of  Wabash  established  the  grade  of  a 
street  with  reference  to  which  the  plaintiff  built,  and  afterwards 
the  town  became  a  city,  and  then  changed  the  grade  so  estab- 
lished, it  was  held  the  city  was  not  liable,  because  it  had  not  es- 
tablished the  prior  grade.'* 

§  318  (208).  The  same:  Iowa.  A  statute  provided 
that,  where  a  grade  had  been  established  and  improvements  made 
according  to  the  grade  so  established,  and  the  grade  was  changed 
so  as  to  injure  or  diminish  the  value  of  such  property,  the  city 
making  the  change  should  pay  to  the  owner  or  owners  of  said 
property  the  amount  of  such  damage.*"  It  is  held  that  "prop- 
erty is  improved  according  to  the  established  grade,  within  the 
meaning  of  the  statute,  whenever  it  is  so  improved  that  it  can 
be  comfortably  and  conveniently  used  for  the  purpose  to  which 
it  is  devoted  while  the  street  upon  which  it  abuts  is  maintained 
at  that  grade."  *'  Where  the  improvements  are  made  before 
the  grade  is  established,**  or  after  it  is  established  but  according 
to  the  natural  surface  and  not  according  to  the  established 
grade,**  there  can  be  no  recovery  for  bringing  the  surface  to 

iBMattingly  v.  Plymouth,  100  Ind.  siConklin  v.  Keokuk,  73  la.  343. 
546 ;  City  of  Anderson  v.  Bain,  120  "We  think  it  quite  clear  that  the  im- 
Ind.  254,  22  N.  E.  323;  City  of  Val-  provement  of  a  lot  'according  to  the 
paraiso  v.  Adams,  123  Ind.  250,  24  grade'  of  the  adjacent  street  does  not 
N.  E.  107 ;  City  of  Huntington  v.  require  that  the  foundations  of  build- 
Griffith,  142  Ind.  280,  41  N.  E.  8,  589.  ings  erected  thereon  shall  be  exactly 

i^Ibid.;  Keehn  v.  McGillicudy,  15  at  grade,  or  at  any  invariable  eleva- 

Ind.  App.  580,  44  N.  E.  554.  tlon  above  or  below  it."     Stevens  v. 

I'Mattingly  v.  Plymouth,  100  Ind.  Cedar  Rapids,  128  la.  227,  103  N.  W. 

545.  363. 

isKokomo  V.  Mahan,  100  Ind.  242.  2  2 Wilbur  v.  Ft.  Dodge,  120  la.  555, 

19 Wabash  v.  Alber,  88  Ind.  428.  To  95  Jf.  W.  186. 

same  effect   City   of  Huntington   v.  23Farmer  v.  Cedar  Rapids,  116  la. 

Griffith,  142  Ind.  280,  41  N.  E.  8,  589.  322,  89  N.   W.   1105;   Reilly  v.  Ft. 

Compare  Nolte  v.  City  of  Cincinnati,  Dodge,  118  la.  633,  92  N.  W.  887. 
3  Ohio  C.  C.  503. 

20Code  of  1873,   §    469;    Code  of 
1897,  §  785. 


§    318  PROPERTY    DAMAGED    OE    INJ0EED.  603 

the  established  grade.  Under  the  statute  the  damage  to  both 
land  and  buildings  may  be  recovered.^*  If,  however,  the  prop- 
erty is  -worth  more  after  the  change  than  before,  it  has  not  been 
damaged,  although  expense  will  have  to  be  incurred  to  adjust 
it  to  the  new  grade.^®  The  measure  of  damages  is  the  difference 
in  value  before  and  after  the  improvement.*®  Where  a  new 
pavement  was  put  down,  and  the  surface  at  the  curb  was  a  few 
inches  lower  than  the  old  pavement,  but  the  curb  and 
center  of  the  street  remained  the  same,  it  was  held  not  to  be  a 
change  of  grade  within  the  statute.^'^  Putting  macadam  on  a 
street,  though  it  elevates  the  surface,  is  not  a  change  of  grade.^* 
One  who  has  filled  in  and  graded  his  lot  preparatory  to  building 
upon  it,  may  recover,  though  no  building  has  been  erected.^* 
An  established  grade  is  one  adopted  by  ordinance  or  resolu- 
tion of  the  council.*"  The  fact  that  a  city  has  worked  or  im- 
proved a  street  at  a  particular  grade  does  not  make  it  an  estab- 
lished grade  within  the  statute.*^  The  action  accrues  when  the 
change  is  actually  made,  and  when  any  part  of  the  work  is  done 
in  front  of  the  property.**  The  fact  that  the  plaintiff  changes 
his  improvements  to  conform  to  the  new  grade  before  the  work 
is  done  does  not  bar  his  action.*'  The  remedy  given  by  the 
statute  is  exclusive.**  The  act  does  not  apply  to  changes  which 
were  ordered  before  the  law  took  effect,  but  which  were  not 

24Dalzell  V.  Davenport,  12  la.  437;  soMorton   v.   Burlington,   106   la. 

Hempstead  v.  Des  Moines,  52  la.  303,  50;  Farmer  v.  Cedar  Eapids,  116  la. 

3  N.  W.  123.     It  is  immaterial  that  322,  89  N.  W.  1105. 

the  change  is  back  to  the  natural  siKepple  v.  Keokuk,  61  la.  653,  17 

surface.    Ressegien  v.  Sioux  City,  94  N.  W.  140. 

la.  543,  63  N.  W.  184,  28  L.R.A.  389.  3  2Hempstead  v.  Des  Moines,  63  la. 

26Hempstead  v.  Des  Moines,  52  la.  36,  18  N.  W.  676.     In  this  case  an 

303,  3  N.  W.  123.  established  grade    was    lowered  six 

26Stewart  v.  Council  Bluffs,  84  la.  feet,  and  ttie  city  first  lowered  the 

91,  50  N.  W.  219;  MeCash  v.  Burling-  roadway  and  the  plaintiff  recovered 

ton,  72  la.  26,  33  N.  W.  346 ;  Rich-  damages  for  that,  and  afterwards  the 

ardson  v.  Webster  City,  111  la.  427,  sidewalks    were    lowered    and    the 

82  N.  W.  920;   Millard  v.  Webster  plaintiff  brought  another  suit;  it  was 

City,  113  la.  220,  84  N.  W.  1044.  held  that  the  former  suit  was  a  bar. 

27Coate8  V.  Dubuque,  68  la.  550,  27  But  see  Buser  v.  Cedar  Rapids,  115 

N.  W.  750.  la.  683,  87  N.  W.  404 ;  Foley  v.  Cedar 

28Warren  r.  Henry,  31  la.  31.  Rapids,  133  la.  64,  110  N.  W.  158. 

2  9Chase  v.  Sioux  City,  86  la.  603,  ssYork  v.   Cedar  Rapids,   130  la. 

63  N.  W.  333 ;  to  same  effect,  Season-  453,  103  N.  W.  790. 

good  T.  Cincinnati,  5  Ohio  C.  C.  225.  s^CoIe  v.  Muscatine,  14  la.  296. 


604  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §  319 

executed  until  afterward.*^  Where  the  grade  of  a  street  was 
changed,  which  necessitated  changes  on  intersecting  streets,  it 
was  held  a  recovery  could  be  had  for  damages  to  property  on 
the  latter  streets,  by  reason  of  such  incidental  change,  though  no 
change  was  formally  ordered.^® 

§  319  (208a).  Same:  Kansas.  An  established  grade 
cannot  be  changed  until  the  damage  to  property  owners,  which 
may  be  caused  thereby,  has  been  assessed  and  paid  or  deposited, 
and  a  particular  mode  of  assessment  is  provided  for.^''  Under 
this  statute  there  is  no  liability  when  a  change  is  made  from 
a  natural  to  an  established  grade.**  Where  the  notice  served 
on  the  plaintiff  showed  that  the  grade  would  be  raised  two  or 
three  inches  in  front  of  his  property,  which  would  be  no  damage, 
but  the  change  actually  ordered  and  made  was  a  lowering  of 
eighteen  inches,  it  was  held  the  city  was  liable  in  a  common  law 
action.*®  The  measure  of  damages  is  the  difference  in  market 
value  before  and  after  the  change.*  ° 

§  320  (208b).  Same:  Maine.  A  recent  statute  provides 
that,  "when  a  way  or  street  is  raised  or  lowered  by  a  surveyor 
or  person  authorized,  to  the  injury  of  an  owner  of  land  adjoin- 
ing, he  may  apply  in  writing  to  the  municipal  officers,  and  they 
shall  view  such  way  or  street  and  assess  the  damages,  if  any  have 
been  occasioned  thereby."  *^  The  measure  of  damages  is  the 
diminution  of  market  value  caused  by  the  change,  and  if  there 
is  no  diminution  there  can  be  no  recovery.*^ 

§  321  (209).  The  same:  Massachusetts.  The  statute 
provides  that,  "where  an  owner  of  land  adjoining  a  highway  sus- 
tains damage  in  his  property  by  reason  of  any  raising  or  lowering 
or  other  act  done  for  the  purpose  of  repairing  such  way,  he  shall 
have  compensation  therefor."  **     Under  this  statute  the  abut- 

36Cotesv.  Davenport,  9  la.  227.  lOParker  v.  City  of  Atchison,  46 

360onklin  v.  City  of  Keokuk,  73  Kan.  14,  26  Pae.  435,  5  L.R.A.  775; 

la.  343,  35  N.  W.  444.  City  of  Topeka  v.  Martineau,  42  Kan. 

37Laws   1881,   e.   37,   §    18;    Gen.  387,  22  Pac.  419. 

Stat.  1889,  par.  562;  Parker  v.  City  iiStat.  1887,  chap.  97.    See  Hurley 

of  Atchison,  46  Kan.  14,  26  Pac.  435 ;  v.  South  Thomaston,  101  Me.  538,  64 

Leavenworth  v.  Duffy,  10  Kan.  App.  Atl.  1050. 

124,  62  Pac.  433.  42Chase  v.  City  of  Portland,  86  Me. 

38Interstate  Consol.  R.  T.  E.  R.  367,  29  Atl.  1104. 

Co.  v.  Early,  46  Kan.  197,  26  Pac.  4  sThere  appear  to  be  different  atat- 

422.  utes  on  the  subject  and  a  statement 

3  8  City  of  Topeka  v.  Sells,  48  Kan.  and  history  of  the  same  will  be  found 

620,  29  Pac.  604.  in    the    following  eases :     Sisson  v. 


§    321  PEOPBETY  DAMAGED  OE  INJUEED.  605 

ting  owner  is  entitled  to  recover  for  any  damages  to  his  property 
by  reason  of  the  proper  execution  of  any  such  improvement.** 
The  word  "damage"  is  not  confined  to  injuries  for  which  an 
action  lay  at  common  law,  as  between  individuals,  but  covers 
all  damages  flowing  from  the  change,  such  as  interfering  with 
access,  or  the  flow  of  surface  water.*^  Where  a  street  is  laid  out, 
the  compensation  awarded  includes  such  damages  as  may  be 
occasioned  by  the  construction  of  the  street  as  proposed  in  the 
order  of  laying  out,*®  but,  where  a  street  was  laid  out  in  1861, 
and  a  grade  established  but  the  street  was  not  built  at  such 
grade,  and  the  city  by  repairs  and  otherwise  recognized  the 
existing  grade,  and  in  1877  the  street  was  made  to  conform  to 
the  grade  so  originally  established,  it  was  held  to  be  a  change  of 
grade  within  the  statute.*^  If  no  grade  is  established  when 
the  street  is  laid  out,  the  establishing  of  a  grade  afterwards  and 
bringing  the  street  to  such  grade  is  a  change  within  the  statute.*^ 
The  statute  has  been  held  to  apply  to  a  case  where,  by  removing 
dirt  from  in  front  of  premises  for  the  purpose  of  repairing  else- 
where, access  thereto  was  interfered  with.*^  An  agreement  not 
to  claim  compensation  for  land  taken  for  a  highway,  does  not 
preclude  the  owner  from  recovering  damages  for  a  change  of 
grade  made  after  the  highway  has  been  established.®"  Where 
both  the  street  and  abutting  land  fall  away  from  natural  causes, 
the  street  may  be  raised  to  the  established  grade  without  incur- 
ring liability.^  ^  If  property  abuts  on  two  streets  both  of  which 
are  improved,  the  damages  by  the  improvement  of  each  street 
must  be  kept  distinct.®^  The  statute  only  applies  to  property 
abutting  on  the  street  where  the  change  is  made.*^*  The  action 
accrues  when  the  work  is  done,  and  not  when  the  change  is  or- 

New  Bedford,  137  Mass.  255;   Sul-  ^sgnow     v.     Provincetown,     109 

livan  V.  Fall  River,  144  Mass.  579 ;  Mass.  123 ;  Lane  v.  Boston,  125  Mass. 

Albro  V.  Fall  River,  175  Mass.  590,  519. 

56  N.  E.  894.  "Burr   v.   Leichester,   121   Mass. 

4  4Flagg   T.    Worcester,    13    Gray  241. 

601.  BOFernald    v.    Boston,    12     Cush. 

4  6Woodbury  v.  Beverly,  153  Mass.  574. 

245,  26  N.  B.  851.  siQarrity   v.    Boston,    161    Mass. 

4  6Byaii  V.  Boston,  118  Mass.  248;  530,  37  N.  E.  672. 

Geraghty  v.  Boston,  120  Mass.  416;  5  2Bemis  v.  Springfield,  122  Mass. 

Murphy  v.  Boston,  Ibid.  419;  Brady  110. 

V.  Fall  River,  121  Mass.  262.  5  3 Wilbur  v.   Taunton,  123  Mass. 

4 'Cambridge  v.   County   Commis-  522. 
sioners,  125  Mass.  529. 


606  EMIIfENT  DOMAIN.  §    322 

dered.^*  A  change  of  grade  made  by  a  street  railroad  company 
under  statutory  authority  is  not  within  the  statutes  above  re- 
ferred to  and  no  compensation  can  be  had  for  damages  occa- 
sioned by  such  change  of  grade.^^ 

§  322.  The  same:  Michigan.  The  general  act  of  1895 
for  the  incorporation  of  villages,  which  reincorporated  all  vill- 
ages then  existing  under  the  act,  provided  that  the  grades  of 
streets  could  be  established  and  changed  by  the  council  and  that 
"whenever  the  grade  of  any  street  or  sidewalk  shall  have  been 
heretofore  or  shall  hereafter  be  established,  and  improvements 
shall  thereafter  be  made  by  the  owner  or  occupant  of  the  ad- 
jacent property  in  conformity  to  such  grade,  such  grade  shall 
not  be  changed  without  compensation  to  the  owner  for  all  dam- 
ages to  such  property  resulting  therefrom."  It  is  held  that  a 
grade  cannot  be  established  within  the  meaning  of  the  statute  by 
user  but  only  by  formal  action  of  the  council  in  accordance  with 
the  statute.®*  Consent  to  the  change  estops  the  abutter  from 
claiming  damages.**' 

§  323  (210).  The  same:  Minnesota.  The  charter  of 
St.  Paul  provides  that,  if  a  grade  once  established  is  changed, 
"all  damages,  costs  and  charges  arising  therefrom  shall  be  paid 
by  the  city  to  the  owner  of  any  lot  or  parcel  of  land  or  tenement 
which  may  be  affected  or  injured  in  consequence  of  the  alteration 
of  such  grade."  The  act  prescribed  no  remedy  and  a  common 
law  action  was  held  proper.  It  was  also  held  in  the  same  case 
that  the  right  of  action  accrued  when  the  change  was  finally 
ordered  by  the  proper  tribunal,  and  that  an  owner  need  not 
delay  his  action  until  the  change  was  actually  made,  and  that 
a  recovery  could  be  had  for  all  the  damages  which  would  be  occa- 
sioned by  the  change.®*  Subsequently  acts  were  passed  provid- 
ing a  remedy  and  making  it  exclusive,  but  they  were  held  not  to 

5  4  Brown  v.  Lowell,  8  Met.  172.  See  Laroe  v.  Northampton  St.  Ry.  Co., 

generally:      Dana    v.     Boston,     176  189  Mass.  254,  75  N.  E.  255 ;  Hyde  v. 

Mass.  97,  57  N.  E.  325;   Garvey  v.  Boston  etc.   St.  Ry.  Co.,  194  Mass. 

Revere,  187  Mass.  545,  73  N.  E.  664;  80,  80  N.  E.  517. 

Galeano  V.  Boston,  195  Mass.  64,  80  seCummings  v.  Dixon,  139  Mich. 

N.  E.  579.  269,  102  N.  W.  751. 

sBPurinton  v.  Somerset,  174  Mass.  6'Wheat  v.  Van  Line,  149  Mich. 

556,  55  N.  E.  461 ;  Vigeant  v.  Marl-  314,  112  N.  W.  933. 

borough,    175   Mass.   459,   56   N.   E.  ssMcCarthy  v.  St.  Paul,  22  Minn. 

709;    Underwood  v.   Worcester,    177  527.     It  seems  to  us  the  decision  is 

Mass  173,  58  N.  E.  589 ;   Hewett  v.  wrong  as  to  the  time  when  the  cause 

Canton,  182  Mass.  220,  65  N.  E.  42;  of  action  arises  in  such  a  case.     A 


§    o25  PHOPERTY  DAMAGED  OE  INJUKOiD.  607 

apply  to  a  change  made  before  their  passage.^®  A  viaduct  over 
a  railroad  A\'hich  took  all  the  travel  along  the  street  was  held  to 
be  a  change  of  grade  within  the  statute.®" 

§  324  (211).  The  same:  Missouri.  The  charter  of  the 
city  of  St.  Louis  contains  the  following  provision:  "The  city 
shall  be  liable  for  damages  sustained  by  any  owner  of  real 
estate  upon  which  permanent  buildings  shall  have  been  erected 
by  any  change  of  grade  of  any  street  upon  which  such  real 
estate  shall  front."  Under  this  provision  the  city  was  held 
liable  for  damages  by  a  causeway  in  the  middle  of  the  street, 
thirty-two  feet  wide,  though  a  space  nine  feet  wide  between  the 
causeway  and  the  sidewalk  was  left  on  each  side  of  the  street 
at  the  old  grade.®  ^  So  the  city  was  held  liable  where  the  grade 
of  a  street  was  ordered  to  be  raised,  but  was  not  in  fact  raised 
to  the  full  height  ordered.®*  The  charter  of  the  city  of  St. 
Joseph  provided  for  damages  to  abutting  owners,  in  case  of  a 
change  of  grade  which  had  been  previously  fixed  or  established. 
It  was  held  that  a  grade  might  be  fixed  or  established  by  improv- 
ing a  street  at  its  natural  grade  without  aiiy  ordinance  in  terms 
fixing  the  grade.®^  Compensation  is  now  secured  by  the  consti- 
tution.®* 

§  325.  The  same:  New  Hampshire.  A  statute  giv- 
ing damages  for  a  change  of  grade  was  first  passed  in  1848.®'* 
As  amended  in  1867  it  required  compensation  to  be  made  "if  in 

change  of  grade  on  paper  does  not  allow  the  city  to  evade  responsibility- 
injure  any  one.  After  a  change  has  for  every  change  of  grade  by  leaving 
been  ordered  it  might  be  reoon-  a  few  feet,  or  even  a  few  inches,  un- 
sidered  before  execution.  In  the  touched  along  the  lateral  boundaries 
meantime  an  owner  might  have  ob-  of  the  street.  *  •  •  The  change  of 
tained  judgment.  See  post,  §  970.  grade  contemplated  by  the  charter 
5  9Taylor  v.  St.  Paul,  25  Minn.  129.  provision  is  manifestly  any  such 
eoWilkin  v.  St.  Paul,  33  Minn.  alteration  as  will  raise  or  lower  the 
181.  For  a  statute  held  not  to  im-  principal  current  of  travel  or  trans- 
pose such  liability,  see  Willis  v.  City  portation."  To  same  effect,  Dyer  v. 
of  Winona,  59  Minn.  27,  60  N.  W.  St.  Louis,  11  Mo.  App.  590.  See  also 
814.  Mitchell  v.  St.  Louis,  14  Mo.  App. 

BiStickford  v.   St.   Louis,   7   Mo.  600. 
App.  217;  affirmed,  75  Mo.  309.    The  62gchumacher  v.  St.  Louis,  3  Mo. 

city  contended  that  the  charter  only  App.  297. 

embraced  a  change  of  grade  over  the  esGibson  v.   Zimmerman,   27   Mo. 

whole  width  of  the  street.     On  this  App.  90. 
point  the  court  says:    "Such  an  in-  'uPost,  §  361;  ante,  §  37. 

terpretation   would     substitute    the  65Laws  of  1848,  c.  725,  §  1. 

shadow  for  the  substance.     It  would 


608  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    326 

repairing  a  highway  by  authority  of  the  town  the  grade  is  raised 
or  lowered,  or  a  ditch  made  at  the  side  thereof,  whereby  damages 
is  occasioned  to  any  estate  adjoining."  ^®  A  change  of  grade  of 
the  sidewalk  or  from  a  natural  grade  is  within  the  statutes.®'^ 
The  action  accrues  when  the  change  is  made  and  the  right  to 
recover  is  in  the  owner  at  the  time  and  does  not  pass  by  a  subse- 
quent deed  of  the  property.^*  The  assessment  should  cover  all 
damages,  past,  present,  and  prospective.®* 

§  326  (212),  The  same:  New  Jersey.  Under  a  stat- 
ute giving  damages  for  a  change  of  grade,  it  was  held  that,  where 
a  street  is  widened  and  then  the  grade  of  the  street  subsequently 
changed,  the  damages  occasioned  by  reducing  the  new  part  to  the 
grade  of  the  old  must  be  presumed  to  have  been  included  in  the 
award  for  the  original  taking.'''*  Where  the  statute  allows  dam- 
ages only  to  improved  property,  an  award  for  property  not  im- 
proved will  be  void.''^  The  owner  may  recover  not  only  for  all 
structural  damage  to  his  buildings  but  also  for  loss  of  rentals 
during  such  time  as  the  buildings  are  necessarily  rendered  un- 
tenantable by  making  the  change  of  grade  and  adjusting  the 
buildings  to  the  new  grade.^*  Securing  a  modification  of  the 
order  for  a  change  does  not  bar  the  recovery  of  damages  for  the 
change  actually  made.'^*  Mandamus  will  lie  to  compel  the  city 
authorities  to  make  an  award.''*  One  to  whom  damages  have 
been  awarded  for  a  change  of  grade  cannot  be  assessed  for  bene- 
fits for  the  same  improvement.  The  first  adjudication,  that  the 
premises  are  damaged  by  the  change,  concludes  both  parties 
while  it  stands.''^  A  statute  making  it  lawful  for  a  municipality 
to  give  compensation  for  a  change  of  grade  was  held  to  be 
obligatory.''® 

§  327  (213).     The  same:    New  York.     Acts        giving 

66R.  S.  1867,  c  76,  §  20;  Hinckley  72Newark  v.  Weeks,  71  N.  J.  L. 

V.  Franklin,  69  N.  H.  614,  45  Atl.  448,  59  Atl.  901. 

643.  73Klaus  v.  Jersey  City,  69  N.  J. 

«'/6m?.  L.  127,  54  Atl.  220. 

esHodgman  v.  Concord,  69  N.  H.  ''*Ihid. 

349,  41  Atl.  287.  TBDavis  v.  City  of  Newark,  54  N. 

69Sawyer  v.  Keene,  47  N.  H.  173.  J.  L.  595,  25  Atl.  336. 

'■"Van  Riper  v.  Essex  Road  Board,  Teciark  v.  Elizabeth,  61  N.  J.  L. 

38  N.   J.  L.   23.     The  statute  was  565,  40  Atl.  616,  737.    Bee  generally: 

passed  in  1858.     See  R.  S.  p.  1009,  Manufacturers'  Land  &  Imp.  Co.  v. 

§  70;  Vorrath  v.  Hoboken,  49  N".  J.  L.  Camden,  71  N.  J.  L.  490,  59  Atl.  1 ; 

285.  Same  v.  Same,  73  N.  J.  L.  263,  63 

71  State  v.  Sayer,  41  N.  J.  L.  158.  Atl.  5. 


§  327         PEOPEETY  DAMAGED  OB  INJUKED.  609 

damages  for  a  change  of  grade  in  the  streets  of  New  York  City 
have  existed  since  1852.''^  A  general  act  of  1883,  applicable 
to  incorporated  villages,  gives  compensation  for  damages  by  a 
diange  of  grade.''*  There  have  probably  been  many  special  acts 
on  the  subjects®  There  appears  to  have  been  very  little  litiga- 
tion under  these  acts  which  has  found  its  way  into  the  reports. 
It  is  held  that  the  remedy  provided  by  the  statute  is  exclusive 
and  that  an  ordinary  suit  will  not  lie.***  Also  that  the  statutory 
provisions  as  to  remedy  must  be  strictly  complied  with.*^ 

The  right  to  damages  accrues  when  the  work  is  done,  and  not 
when  the  change  is  ordered.*^  The  gradual  removal  of  a  bank 
of  earth  between  the  traveled  roadway  and  the  street  line,  is  not 
a  change  of  grade.**  Nor  is  the  mere  leveling  the  surface  of  a 
street  to  produce  a  uniform  grade.**  Where  the  statute  gives 
damages  to  the  owners  of  buildings  fronting  on  the  street,  it 
excludes  the  allowance  of  damages  to  the  land.*"*  The  fact  that 
one  has  deeded  the  land  for  the  street,  does  not  preclude  him 
from  claiming  damages  for  a  change  of  grade  afterward  made.*® 
But  where  one  deeded  land  for  a  street  to  a  village  which  was 
liable  for  damages  for  a  change  of  grade  and  the  village  was 
made  a  city  which  was  not  liable  for  such  change,  and  the  grade 
of  the  street  was  changed  by  the  city,  it  was  held  the  grantor 
obtained  no  vested  right  to  the  remedy  and  that  he  could  not 

7  7Laws  of  1852,  c.  52,  pp.  46-47;  Dlv.  137,  81  N.  Y.  S.  1049;  Melen- 

Laws  of  1867,  vol.  2,  o.  697,  pp.  1748-  backer  v.  Salamanca,  188  N.  Y.  370, 

1750;  Laws  of  1872,  vol.  2,  c.  729,  p.  80  N.  E.   1090,   affirming   116  App. 

1726.  Div.  691. 

TSLaws  of  1883,  c.  113;  Whitmore  szpeople  r.  ZoU,  97  N.  Y.  203;  Nu- 

V.  Village  of  Tarrytown,  137  N.  Y.  gent  v.  New  York,  58  Misc.  453. 

409,  33  N.  E.  489.  8  3 Whitmore  v.  Tarrytown,  137  N. 

79See  People  v.  Fitch,  147  N.  Y.  Y.  409,  33  N.  E.  489. 

355,  41  N.  E.  695;  People  v.  Gilon,  84Farrington  v.  Mt.  Vernon,   166 

121  N.  Y.  551,  24  N.  E.  944;  People  N.  Y.  233,  59  N.  E.  826,  affirming  51 

V.  Gilon,  76  Hun  346,  27  N.  Y.  Supp.  App.  Div.  250,  64  N.  Y.  S.  863;  Com- 

704.  esky  v.  Suffern,  179  N.  Y.  393,  72 

soHeiser  v.  New  York,  104  N.  Y.  N.  E.  320,  reversing  S.  C.  83  App. 

68,  affirming  29    Hun  446 ;    Helen-  Div.  137,  81  N.  Y.  S.  1049 ;  Bissell  v. 

backer  v.  Salamanca,  188  N.  Y.  370,  Larchmont,  57  App.  Div.  61,  67  N.  Y. 

80  N.   E.   1090,   affirming   116  App.  S.  692;  Stenson  v.  Mt.  Vernon,  104 

Div.  691;  Smith  v.  White  Plains,  67  App.  Div.  17,  93  N.  Y.  S.  309. 

Hun  81,  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  450;  Matter  ssPeople  v.  Gilon,  76  Hun  346,  27 

of  Ehrsam,  37  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  272;  N.  Y.  Supp.  704. 

Hoy  V.  Salamanca,  57  Misc.  81.  seBartlett  v.  Tarrytown,  52  Hun 

siComesky  v.  Suffern,  179  N.  Y.  380,  24  N.  Y.  St.  272,  5  N.  Y.  Supp. 

393,  72  N.  B.  320,  reversing  83  App.  240. 
Em.  D.— 39. 


610  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    327 

recover.*''  A  change  of  grade  made  by  a  railroad  company  by 
permission  of  the  village  is  within  the  statute.**  So  is  a  change 
from  a  natural  grade,  which  has  not  been  established  except  by 
user.*®  There  is  no  vested  right  in  the  remedy  and  it  may  be 
taken  away  by  repeal  of  the  statute.®"  A  statute  giving  com- 
pensation to  the  owners  of  real  estate  claimed  to  be  damaged 
was  held  not  to  embrace  a  tenant  for  years.®*  A  viaduct  over 
a  railroad  was  held  to  be  a  change  of  grade.®^  One  who  builds 
after  the  grade  is  established  cannot  have  damages  for  bringing 
the  street  to  the  grade  so  established.'^  When  the  statute  re- 
quires the  claim  for  damages  to  be  presented  "within  sixty  days 
after  such  change  of  grade  is  effected,"  it  means  sixty  days  from 
;he  completion  of  the  work.®*  A  municipal  corporation  may  be 
ade  liable  for  changes  of  grade  previously  made.®®  A  statute 
that  "in  any  tovsm  in  which  a  highway  has  been  or  hereafter 
shall  be  repaired,  graded  and  macadamized,  etc.,  the  owner  or 
owners  of  the  land  adjacent  to  the  said  highway  shall  be  entitled 
to  recover  from  the  town  the  damages  resulting  from  any  change 
of  grade,"  was  held  to  be  retroactive  and  to  apply  to  changes 
made  before  the  act  was  passed.®®  After  the  grade  of  a  street 
had  been  changed  an  act  was  passed  authorizing  the  board  of 
revision  "in  its  discretion  to  ascertain  and  determine  the  dam- 
age" to  certain  property  thereby  and  to  award  compensation  to 
the  owners  thereof.  The  making  of  an  award  was  held  to  be 
purely  discretionary.®' 

8  7Lawton    v.    New   Eoehelle,   123      Div.  355,  79  N.  Y.  S.  1031;  People  v. 
App.  Div.  832.  Muh,  101  App.  Div.  423,  92  N.  Y.  S. 

ssMatter  of  Stack,  50  Hun  385,  21  22;  S.  C.  affirmed,  183  N.  Y.  540,  76 

N.  Y.  St.  953,  3  N.  Y.  Supp.  231.  N.  E.  1105. 

ssFolmsbee  v.  Amsterdam,  142  N.  s^phippg  v.  North  Pelham,  61  App. 

Y.  118,  36  N.  E.  821,  affirmmg  S.  C.  Div.  442,  70  N.  Y.  S.  630. 

66  Hun  214;  Bartlett  v.  Tarrytown,  9BMatter  of  Anderson,  178  N.  Y. 

55  Hun  492,  30  N.  Y.  St.  341,  8  N.  416,  70  N.  E.  921,  reversing  S.  C.  91 

Y.   Supp.  739;  Matter  of  Greer,  39  App.  Div.  563;  Matter  of  Borup,  182 

N.  Y.  App.  Div.  22;  Stenson  v.  Mt.  N.  Y.  222,  74  N.  E.  838,  108  Am.  St. 

Vernon,  104  App.  Div.  17,  93  N.  Y.  Rep.  798,  affirming  S.  C.   102  App. 

S.  309.  Div.  262,  92  N.  Y.  S.  624. 

9  "Smith  V.  White  Plains,  67  Hun  ssMatter  of  Anderson,  178  N.  Y. 
81,  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  450.  416,  70  N.  E.  921,  reversing  S.  C.  91 

"Matter  of  Ehrsam,  37  App.  Div.  App.  Div.  563. 
N.  Y.  272.  sTPeople  v.  Phillips,  88  App.  Div. 

9  2Matter      of       Grade      Crossing  560,  85  N.  Y.  S.  200.    See  generally: 

Comrs..  154  N.  Y.  550.  Torge  v.  Salamanca,  176  N.  Y.  324, 

ssMatter  of  E.   187   St.,  78  App.  68  N.  E.  626,  reversing  86  App.  Div. 


§  329  PEOPEKTY  DAMAGED  OB  INJUBEI  611 

The  Greater  New  York  charter  provides  as  follows:  "After 
the  taking  effect  of  this  act  there  shall  be  no  liability  to  abutting 
owners  for  originally  establishing  a  grade ;  nor  any  liability  for 
changing  a  grade  once  established  by  lawful  authority,  except 
where  the  owner  of  the  abutting  property  has  subsequently  to 
such  establishment  of  grade  built  upon  or  otherwise  improved 
the  property  in  conformity  with  such  established  grade  and  such 
grade  is  changed  after  such  buildings  or  improvements  have 
been  made.  *  *  *  ^  grade  shall  be  deemed  established  by 
lawful  authority  within  the  meaning  of  this  section  where  it  waa 
originally  adopted  by  the  action  of  the  public  authorities,  or 
where  the  street  or  avenue  has  been  used  by  the  public  as  of 
right  for  twenty  years  and  been  improved  by  the  public  au- 
thorities at  the  expense  of  the  public  or  the  abutting  owners."  "* 
We  believe  no  decisions  of  general  interest  have  been  rendered 
on  this  provision.^^ 

§  328  The  same:  Ohio.  A  statute  provides  for  an  as- 
sessment of  damages  when  an  owner  of  a  lot,  or  of  land,  bound- 
ing or  abutting  upon  a  proposed  improvement,  claims  that  he 
will  sustain  damages  by  reason  of  the  improvement.  ^  Where  an 
owner  has  graded  his  lot  to  correspond  to  an  established  grade, 
he  may  recover  damages  for  a  change  of  grade.  ^  Where  the 
traveled  way  was  some  feet  below  the  margins  and  the  grade 
was  changed  and  the  street  cut  down  to  the  new  grade  for  the 
whole  width,  it  was  held  an  abutter  could  not  recover  for  cut- 
ting down  the  margins  to  the  old  grade. ^ 

§  329  (214).  The  same:  Pennsylvania.  An  act  of 
1854  in  relation  to  Philadelphia  provided  "that  in  any  altera- 
tion that  may  be  made  of  the  regulation  of  any  portion  of  the 

211,    86   N.    Y.    S.    672;    Matter   of  9 s§  951  Greater  New  York  Charter 

Rogers  Place,  65  App.  Div.  1,  72  N.  as  amended  by  c.  466,  Laws  of  1901. 

Y.  S.  459;   Matter  of  Trinity  Ave.,  ^tgee  Triest  v.  New  York,  193  N. 

81  App.  Div.  215,  80  N.  Y.  S.  732;  Y.  525,  reversing  126  App.  Div.  934; 

Matter  of  Briggs  Ave.,  84  App.  Div.  Mayer  v.  New  York,  193  N.  Y.  535, 

312,  82  N.  Y.  S.  575 ;  Matter  of  Sum-  affirming  127  App.  Div.  926. 

mit  Ave.,  84  App.  Div.  455,  82  N.  Y.  iR.   S.  1886,   §  2315;   R.   S.   1890, 

S.   1027;   Matter  of  Tiffany  St.,  84  §2315. 

App.  Div.  525,  82  N.  Y.  S.  852;  Peo-  zSeasongood  v.  Cincinnati,  5  Ohio 

pie  V.  Leonard,  87  App.  Div.  269,  84  C.  C.  225. 

N.  Y.  S.  341 ;  Matter  of  Borup,  89  3  Cincinnati  v.  Roth,  20  Ohio  C.  C. 

App.  Div.  183,  85  N.  if.  S.  828;  Mat-  317. 

ter  of  Anderson,  91  App.  Div.  563,  87 

N.  Y.  S.  24;  S.  C.  reversed,  178  N.  Y. 

416,  70  N.  E.  921. 


612.  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    330 

city,  in  conformity  with  the  provisions  of  this  section,  whereby 
damages  may  ensue  to  private  property,  compensation  shall 
be  made  for  such  damages,  to  be  ascertained  and  paid  by  law 
as  in  case  of  damages  for  opening  streets."  This  act  only  ap- 
plies to  the  change  of  an  established  grade.*  The  right  to  dam- 
ages is  held  to  accrue  when  the  new  grade  has  been  duly  estab- 
lished and  confirmed  according  to  law.  The  owner  is  not  re- 
quired to  wait  until  the  work  is  completed.^  Where  a  statute 
provided  that  when  the  grade  of  a  street  was  changed,  thereby 
causing  damage  to  the  owner  or  owners  of  property  abutting 
thereon,  compensation  should  be  made  to  such  owners,  it  was 
held  that  one  might  have  compensation  whose  property  abutted 
on  the  street,  though  it  did  not  abut  upon  the  part  where  the 
change  was  made.® 

§  330  (215).  The  same:  Rhode  Island.  A  statute 
gave  compensation  to  abutting  owners  for  damages  "by  any 
change  in  the  grade  of  a  highway."  Where  a  grade  was  recog- 
nized by  the  city  as  the  grade  of  the  street,  and  was  afterwards 
changed,  it  was  held  that  the  abutting  owner  was  entitled  to  dam- 
ages, though  the  first  grade  had  never  been  formally  established 
by  the  board  of  aldermen.'^  But  a  subsequent  case  holds  that 
the  statute  only  applies  to  a  change  from  an  established  grade.^ 
One  having  a  leasehold  interest  as  tenant  from  year  to  year  is 
such  an  owner.^  Any  claim  for  such  damages  was  required  to  be 
presented  to  the  board  of  aldermen  within  forty  days  after  the 
change  was  completed ;  it  was  held  that  after  the  forty  days  the 
aldermen  had  no  jurisdiction  to  allow  it.-^" 

§  331.  The  same:  South  Carolina.  By  its  charter  the 
city  of  Greenville  had  power  "to  lay  out,  adopt,  alter,  widen,  and 
open"  streets,  roads  and  ways  and  the  charter  provided  that  "any 
person  damaged  by  the  closing  or  from  the  altering  of  any  such 
street,  road  or  way,  shall  be  duly  compensated  therefor  by  the 

«In  re  Ridge  Ave.,  99  Pa.  St.  469 ;  SLewis  v.  Homestead,  194  Pa.  St. 

Philadelphia  v.  Wright,  100  Pa.  St.  199,  45  Atl.  123. 

235;  Matter  of  Change  of  Grade  of  'Aldrioh  v.   Providence,   12  K.  I. 

Germantown  Ave.,  15  Phila.  413;  In  241. 

re    Levering    St.,    14    Phila.    349;  sGardner    v.    Town    Council    of 

In   re  Germantown  Ave.,   14  Phila.  Johnstown,  16  R.  I.  94,  12  Atl.  888 ; 

351 ;  In  re  Plan  166,  143  Pa.  St.  414,  O'Donnell  v.  White,  24  R.  I.  483,  53 

22  Atl./669.  Atl.  633. 

5Matter  of  Change  of  Grade  of  5th  sQiHigan  v.  Providence,  11  R.  I. 

and  6th  streets,  12  Phila.  587 ;  Camp-  258. 

bell  V.  Philadelphia,  108  Pa.  St.  300.  lOAnness  v.  Providence,  13  R.  I.  17. 


§    332  PEOPEETY  DAMAGED  OE  INJUEED.  613 

city  council."  A  change  of  grade  is  held  to  he  an  altering  within 
the  charter  for  which  compensation  must  be  made."  The  stat- 
ute is  held  to  cover  damages  to  the  pipes  of  a  water  company.  ^^ 
The  measure  of  damages  to  abutting  property  is  the  difference 
before  and  after  the  change.**  The  statutory  remedy  is  exclu- 
sive.** 

§  332  (216).  The  same:  Tennessee.  A  statute  provid- 
ed that,  when  the  owner  of  a  lot  desired  to  build,  he  might  apply 
to  the  city  authorities  and  have  the  grade  of  the  street  fixed,  and 
if,  after  the  building  was  constructed,  the  grade  was  changed, 
he  should  have  compensation  for  any  damages.  The  grade  of 
a  street  was  established  in  1866,  and  plaintiff  raised  his  building 
to  correspond.  Two  years  later  the  grade  was  changed.  It  was 
held  that  plaintiff  could  recover  under  the  statute.*®  It  is  held 
that  the  statute  should  be  liberally  construed,  and  that  a  grade 
may  be  established  without  an  ordinance.  If  the  city  council 
directs  it  engineer  to  fix  grades,  and  he  does  so,  such  grades  are 
established  within  the  statute.**  A  general  act  was  passed  in 
1891,  giving  compensation  for  any  damage  to  property  by  reason 
of  any  change  in  the  natural  or  established  grade  of  any  street 
or  highway  or  of  other  acts  done  for  the  repair  or  improvement 
of  such  ways.*''  Where  a  city  permitted  the  grade  of  a  street 
to  be  cut  down  by  those  who  desired  the  earth,  it  was  held  liable, 
though  there  was  no  formal  order  for  the  change.*®     The  meas- 

11  Paris  Mt.  Water  Co.  v.  Green-  citizen  to  be  reinbursed  for  damages 
ville,  53  S.  C.  82,  30  S.  B.  699 ;  Maul-  done  to  his  property  by  city  author- 
din  V.  Greenville,  53  S.  C.  285,  31  S.  ities,  occasioned  by  works  for  the  ad- 

B.  252;  Garraux  v.  Greenville,  53  S.  vantage  of  the  general  public.     The 

C.  575,  31  S.  B.  597;  Greenville  v.  citizen  whose  property  is  thus  in- 
Mauldin,  64  S.  C.  438,  42  S.  E.  200;  jured,  ought  not  to  be  required  to 
Hauldin  v.  Greenville,  64  S.  C.  444,  bear  the  entire  burden,  the  benefits  of 
42  S.  E.  202.  which     he      shares      perhaps     very 

i2Paris  Mt.  Water  Co.  v.  Green-  slightly,  in  common  with  other  in- 

ville,  53  S.  C.  82,  30  S.  E.  699.  habitants  of  the  city,  the  improve- 

isMauldin  v.  Greenville,  64  S.  C.  ments  frequently  being  of  no  per- 

444,  42  S.  B.  202.  sonal  advantage  to  him,  whatever." 

uGarraux  v.  Greenville,  53  S.  C.  isChattanooga  v.  Geiler,   13  Lea, 

575,  31  S.  B.  597.     And  see  Kendall  611. 

V.  Columbia,  74  S.  C.  539,  54  S.  E.  iTActs  of  1891,  c.  31,  p.  67.   Same 

777;  Greenville  v.  Earle,  80  S.  C.  321.  amended  in  1893,  acts  of  1893,  c.  41, 

iBMayor  of  Nashville  v.  Nichol,  3  p.  63;  Shannon's  Code,  §  1988. 

Bax.   338.     The   court   says:      "We  isKnoxville  v.   Harth,   105   Tenn. 

think,  however,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  436,  58  S.  W.  650,  80  Am.  St.  Rep. 

court  to  give  a  liberal  construction  to  901. 
statutes  in  favor  of  the  right  of  a 


G14  EMIJ!^ENT  DOMAIN.  §    333 

lire  of  damages  is  the  difference  in  value  of  the  property  before 
and  after  the  change.  ^^ 

§  333.  The  same:  Vermont.  An  act  of  1884  gave  dam- 
ages when  a  highway  was  raised  or  lowered  more  than  three  feet 
in  front  of  any  dwelling  house  or  other  building.^"  The  dam- 
ages recoverable  are  such  as  result  from  the  excess  of  raising 
or  lowering  over  three  feet.^^ 

§  334  (216a).  Same:  Washington.  A  general  statute 
prohibits  a  change  of  grade  so  as  to  necessitate  the  raising  or 
lowering  of  buildings,  without  prepayment  of  the  damages.^^ 
It  is  held  to  apply  only  to  a  change  from  a  grade,  either  formally 
adopted  by  ordinance  or  resolution,  or  by  the  actual  improve- 
ment of  the  street.*^ 

§  335  (217).  The  same:  Wisconsin.  The  charter  of 
Milwaukee  required  the  city  to  establish  the  grade  of  all  streets, 
and  contained  this  provision :  "When  the  established  grade  shall 
be  thereafter  altered,  all  damages,  costs  and  charges  arising  there- 
from shall  be  paid  by  the  city  to  the  owner  of  any  lot  or  parcel 
of  land  or  tenement  which  may  be  affected  in  consequence  of 
the  alteration  of  such  grade."  Under  this  statute  it  was  held 
that  it  was  no  defence  to  an  action  for  damages  by  the  changing 
of  an  established  grade,  that  the  city  had  not  established  the 
grade  of  all  its  streets  f^  that  the  doing  of  the  work  by  the  plain- 
tiff in  front  of  his  premises  pursuant  to  an  order  of  the  council 
was  no  bar  to  his  recovery  f^  that  the  signing  of  a  petition  for 
a  chainge  of  grade  different  from  the  one  ordered  was  no  bar;^" 
nor  the  signing  of  a  petition  to  complete  the  work  already  be- 
gun. ^^  The  building  of  a  causeway  forty  feet  wide  in  the  mid- 
dle of  a  street  was  held  to  be  a  change  within  the  statute,  though 
twenty  feet  was  left  on  each  side  at  the  old  grade.^*  The  meas- 
ure of  damages  is  the  depreciation  in  the  value  of  the  property 
caused  by  the  change,  and  in  arriving  at  this  it  is  proper  to 
consider  the  cost  of  adjusting  the  property  to  the  new  gxade, 
the  cost  of  making  the  change  in  the  street  which  is  a  charge 

isAcker   v.   Knoxville,   117   Tenn.  24Goodrich  v.  Milwaukee,  24  Wis. 

224,  96  S.  W.  973.  422. 

20Vt.  Stats.  1894,  §§  3357-3361.  25Pearce   v.   Milwaukee,    18   Wis. 

21  Fairbanks    v.    Rockingham,    75  428. 

Vt.  221,  54  Atl.  186;  S.  C.  73  Vt.  124,  26Luscombe  v.  Milwaukee,  36  Wis. 

50  Atl.  802.  511. 

22Gen.  Stat.,  §  759.  27Herzer   v.   Milwaukee,   39   Wis. 

2  3Sargent  v.  City  of  Taeoma,  10  108. 

Wash.  212,  38  Pac.  1048.  28Dove  v.  Milwaukee,  42  Wis.  108. 


§    336  PEOPEETY  DAMAGED  OE  INJUEED.  615 

upon  the  lot,  the  damage  to  trees  if  any,  and  also  any  benefit 
which  will  accrue  to  the  property  by  the  change.  ^^  The  right 
of  action  accrues  when  the  work  is  done,  and  not  when  the  order 
is  passed,  and  suit  must  be  brought  by  the  owner  at  the  former 
time.^"  A  law  providing  that  the  grade  of  certain  streets  could 
be  changed  without  making  compensation,  or,  in  effect  suspend- 
ing the  operation  of  the  charter  as  to  such  streets,  was  held  void 
as  depriving  the  property  owners  affected  of  the  equal  protection 
of  the  laws.*"-  Other  municipal  charters  have  given  damages 
for  a  change  of  grade.  Where  a  charter  was  repealed  after  an 
ordinance  was  passed  for  a  change  of  grade,  but  before  the  ordi- 
nance became  effective  by  publication,  it  was  held  to  defeat  the 
claim  for  compensation.^^  Where  the  statute  required  an  as- 
sessment of  damages  before  the  work  was  done,  a  change  with- 
out complying  is  unlawful  and  an  action  will  lie.  And  the  plain- 
tiff is  not  estopped  because  he  made  no  objection  to  the  doing  of 
the  work.**  Paving  a  street,  whereby  it  is  made  slightly  higher 
in  the  middle  is  not  a  change  of  grade.**  A  statute  gave  com- 
pensation in  case  a  municipality  should  close  up,  use  or  obstruct 
a  highway  so  as  materially  to  interfere  with  its  usefulness  as 
such,  to  the  injury  or  damage  of  abutting  owners.  It  was  held 
not  to  apply  to  a  change  of  grade.*' 

§  336  (218a).  When  the  statute  refers  merely  to  a 
change  of  grade  must  it  be  from  a  previously  established 
grade?  Such  statutes  are  remedial  and  should  be  liberally 
construed  and,  therefore,  should  be  held  to  apply  to  a  change 
from  a  natural  grade,  where  the  street  has  been  used  at  such 
grade.**     This  is  in  accordance  with  the  rule  adopted  in  con- 

2  9French  v.  Milwaukee,  49  Wis.  See  State  v.  Superior,  108  Wis.  16, 
584;   Church  v.  Same,  34  Wis.  66;       83  N.  W.  1100. 

Stadler  v.  Same,  34  Wis.  98;  Church  s^Sanderson  v.  Herman,  108  Wis. 

r.    Same,   31    Wis.   512;    Stowell   v.  662,  84  N.  W.  890,  85  N.  W.  141. 

Same,  31  Wis.  523;  Tyson  v.  Same,  ssgmith   v.   Eau   Claire,   78   Wis. 

50  Wis.  78.  487,  47  N.  W.  830. 

soTysonv.  Milwaukee,  50  Wis.  78;  asBartlett  v.  Tarrytown,  55  Hun 

cmtra:    McCarthy  v.   St.   Paul,   22  492,  30  N.  Y.  St.  341,  8  N.  Y.  Supp. 

Minn.  527.  739;  Aldrich  v.  Providence,  12  R.  I. 

3iAnderson  v.  Milwaukee,  82  Wis.  241.     And  see  Cambridge  v.  County 

279,  52  N.  W.  95.  Comrs.,  125  Mass.  529 ;  Snow  v.  Prov- 

3  2Smith  V.  Eau  Claire,  78  Wis.  incetown,  109  Mass.  123;  Lane  v. 
487,  47  N.  W.  830.  Boston,   125    Mass.  519;    Matter  of 

33jorgenson  v.  Superior,  111  Wis.  Greer,  39  App.  Div.  N.  Y.  22;  Blair 
561,  87  N.  W.  565 ;  Friedrich  v.  Mil-  v.  Charleston,  43  W.  Va.  62,  64  Am. 
waukee,  114  Wis.  304,  90  N.  W.  174.       St.  Rep.  837,  35  L.R.A.  852. 


616 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


§  337 


struing  constitutions  giving  compensation  for  property  damaged 
or  injured  by  public  improvements.^'^  Some  courts  hold  that  the 
statute  refers  only  to  a  grade  established  by  actual  improvement 
of  the  street  or  one  formally  adopted  by  ordinance  or  resolu- 
tion.** 

§  337  (218b).  What  constitutes  an  established  grade. 
Many  statutes  in  express  terms  limit  the  remedy  for  a  change 
of  grade  to  a  change  from  a  previously  established  grade.  The 
authorities  differ  as  to  what  constitutes  an  established  grade 
within  the  meaning  of  such  statutes.  Some  hold  that  the  grade 
must  have  been  established  by  some  express  action  of  the  munici- 
pal authorites  adopting  or  fixing  the  grade.*®  Others  hold  that 
a  grade  may  be  established  by  implication,  or  by  improving  the 
street  at  its  natural  grade  or  otherwise.*" 

§  338  (218c).  What  constitutes  a  change  of  grade. 
Macadamizing  or  paving  a  street,  whereby  the  surface  is  slightly 
raised,  is  not  a  change  of  grade.*  ^  So  merely  leveling  the  sur- 
face to  make  it  uniform.*^     Raising  or  lowering  a  part  of  the 


STEachus  V.  Los  Angeles  Consol. 
El.  R.  R.  Co.,  103  Cal.  614,  37  Pac. 
750,  42  Am.  St.  Rep.  149;  City  of 
Bloomington  v.  Pollock,  141  111.  346, 
31  N.  E.  146;  Sheey  v.  Kansas  City 
Cable  R.  R.  Co.,  94  Mo.  574,  7  S.  W. 
579;  Smith  v.  Kansas  City  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  98  Mo.  20,  11  S.  W.  259; 
Davis  V.  Mo.  Pae.  R.  R.  Co.,  119  Mo. 
180,  24  S.  W.  777,  41  Am.  St.  Rep. 
648,  9  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  117; 
Smith  V.  City  of  St.  Joseph,  122  Mo. 
643,  27  S.  W.  344;  Dale  v.  City  of  St. 
Joseph,  59  Mo.  App.  566;  Norris- 
towu's  Appeal,  3  Walker  (Pa.  Supm. 
Ct.)  146;  City  of  Ft.  Worth  v. 
Howard,  3  Tex.  Civ.  App.  537,  22  S. 
W.  1059. 

3  8  Gardiner  v.  Town  Council  of 
Johnston,  16  R.  I.  94,  12  Atl.  888; 
O'Donnell  v.  White,  24  R.  I.  483,  53 
Atl.  633 ;  Sargent  v.  City  of  Tacoma, 
10  Wash.  212,  38  Pac.  1048. 

ssMattingly  v.  Plymouth,  100  Ind. 
545;  City  of  Anderson  v.  Bain,  120 
Ind.  254,  22  N.  E.  323;  City  of  Val- 
paraiso V.  Adams,  123  Ind.  250,  24 
N.   E.   107;    City  of  Huntington  v. 


Griffith,  142  Ind.  280,  41  N.  E.  8,  589 ; 
Kepple  V.  Keokuk,  61  la.  653; 
Fanner  v.  Cedar  Rapids,  116  la.  322, 
89  N.  W.  1105. 

<  "Gibson  v.  Zimmerman,  27  Mo. 
App.  90;  Folmsbee  v.  Amsterdam, 
142  N.  Y.  118,  36  N.  E.  821;  Stenson 
V.  Mt.  Vernon,  104  App.  Div.  17,  93 
N.  Y.  S.  309;  Cincinnati  v.  Roth,  20 
Ohio  C.  C.  317 ;  Chattanooga  v.  Gei- 
ler,  13  Lea,  611;  see  also  cases  cited 
in  last  section  and  Smith  v.  Board  of 
Comrs.,  50  Ohio  St.  628,  35  N.  B. 
796;  Neubert  v.  City  of  Toledo,  9 
Ohio  C.  C.  462;  Matter  of  Grade 
Crossing  Comrs.,  154  N.  Y.  550. 

"Warren  v.  Henry,  31  la.  31; 
Coates  V.  Iowa,  68  la.  550 ;  Bogard  v. 
O'Brien  (Ky.),  20  S.  W.  1097;  Zear- 
foss  v.  Lansdale,  1  Mont.  Co.  L.  R.  R. 
157;  Sanderson  v.  Herman,  108  Wis. 
662,  84  N.  W.  890,  85  N.  W.  141. 

4  2Farrington  v.  Mt.  Vernon,  166 
N.  Y.  233,  59  N.  E.  826,  affirming  S. 
C.  51  App.  Div.  250,  64  N.  Y.  S.  863; 
Comesky  v.  Suffern,  179  N.  Y.  393, 
72  N.  E.  320,  reversing  S.  C.  83  App. 
Div.  137,  81  N.  Y.  S.  1049;  Bissell  v. 


§  339  PEOPEKTT  DAMAGED  OE  INJURED.  617 

street,**  building  a  causeway  in  the  middle,**  or  a  viaduct  over 
it,*'  have  been  held  to  be  changes  of  grade.  Filling  a  street 
which  has  settled,  so  as  to  compensate  for  the  settling,  is  not  a 
change  of  grade.*®  Where  a  bank  ten  feet  wide  was  left  between 
the  traveled  way  and  the  lot  lines,  its  gradual  removal  by  the 
city  and  others,  wanting  to  use  the  earth,  was  held  not  to  be  a 
change  of  grade.*''  It  is  immaterial  that  the  change  is  made 
by  a  railroad,  with  the  approval  of  the  municipal  authorities.** 
Where  the  grade  of  two  parallel  adjacent  streets  is  changed,  the 
grade  of  an  intersecting  street  between  the  two  is  not  thereby 
changed  by  implication  to  correspond.*^ 

§  339  (218d).  The  right  and  remedy  are  wholly  de- 
pendent upon  the  statute.  There  being  no  constitutional 
right  to  compensation  for  a  change  of  grade,  the  whole  matter  is 
in  the  control  of  the  legislature,  which  may  give  compensation  to 
such  extent  and  under  such  circumstances  and  conditions  as  it 
sees  fit^"  If  a  right  to  compensation  is  created  and  no  remedy 
provided  a  common  law  action  will  lie.'^  So  if  the  initiative 
is  cast  upon  the  municipality  and  it  fails  to  have  the  damages 
assessed,^^  or  otherwise  fails  to  comply  with  the  law  in  making 
the  change.^*  If  the  statute  provides  a  remedy,  that  is  exclu- 
sive.'^*    A  repeal  of  the  statute  takes  away  the  remedy.'"'' 

Larchmont,  57  App.  Div.  61,  67  N.  Y.  eoMatter  of  Beale  St.,  39  Cal.  496. 

S.  692;  Stenson  v.  Mt.  Vernon,  104  siMcCarthy  v.  St.  Paul,  22  Minn. 

App.  Div.  17,  93  N.  T.  S.  309.  527;  Taylor  v.  St.  Paul,  25  Minn. 

4  3Kokomo  V.  Mahan,  100  Ind.  242.  129. 
So  where  the  sidewalk  is  lowered;  S2Lafayette  v.  Wortman,  107  Ind. 
McGar  v.  Bristol,  71  Conn.  652,  48  404;  Jorgenson  v.  Superior,  111  Wis. 
Atl.  1000;  Hinckley  v.  Franklin,  69  561,  87  N.  W.  665;  Friedrich  v.  Mil- 
iar. H.  614,  45  Atl.  643.  waukee,  114  Wis.  304,  90  N.  W.  174. 

<4Stiekford  v.   St.   Louis,   7   Mo.  BSHolley  v.  Torrington,  63  Conn. 

App.    217;    affirmmg,    75   Mo.    309;  426,  28  Atl.  613 ;  Cook  v.  Ansonia,  66 

Dove  V.  Milwaukee,  42  Wis.  108.  Conn.  413,  34  Atl.  183;  City  of  To- 

4  5Wiikin  V.   St.  Paul,  33    Minn,  peka  v.  Sells,  48  Kan.  520,  29  Pac. 

181.    See  ante,  §  138.  604;    Lafayette  v.   Nagle,   113   Ind. 

4  6Garrity  v.  City  of   Boston,  161  425. 

Mass.  530,  37  N.  E.  672.  B4Cole  v.  Muscatine,  14  la.  296; 

47Whitmore  v.  Tarrytown,  137  N.  Reilly  v.  Ft.  Dodge,  118  la.  633,  92 

Y.  409,  33  N.  E.  489.  N.  W.  887 ;  Golding  v.  Attleborough, 

48lnterstate  Consol.  T.  R.  R.  Co.  172  Mass.  223,  51  N.  E.  1076;  Abel  v. 

V.  Early,  46  Kan.  197,  26  Pac.  422;  Minneapolis,  68  Minn.  89;  Heiser  v. 

Matter  of  Stack,  50  Hun  385,  3  N.  Y.  New  York,  104  N.  Y.  68,  affirming  29 

Supp.  231.  Hun  446;  Melenbacker  v.  Salamanca, 

49Morton  v.   Burlington,    106   la.  188  N.  Y.  370,  80  N.  E.  1090,  a/^irmmj; 

50,  75  N.  W.  662.  116   App.    Div.    691  ;     Hoy   v.    Sala- 


618 


EMINENT   DOMAIN. 


§  340 


§  340  (218e).  When  the  action  accrues.  The  language 
of  the  statute  may  determine  when  the  action  accrues,  but,  in 
the  absence  of  anything  express  in  the  statute,  the  better  rule  is 
that  it  accrues  when  the  work  is  done,®''  though  some  courts  have 
held  that  it  accrues  when  the  change  is  ordered.®'^ 

§  341  (218f).  Whether  the  statute  applies  to  changes 
ordered  before  but  made  after  it  takes  effect.  It  has  been 
held  that  such  a  statute  did  not  apply  to  a  change  of  grade  or- 
dered before  the  statute  took  effect  but  which  was  not  executed 
until  afterwards.^*  But  the  contrary  would  seem  to  be  the 
better  rule,  and  the  one  in  harmony  with  the  prevailing  rule  as 
to  when  the  action  accrues.®' 

§  342  (218g).  Elements  and  measure  of  damages. 
Where  compensation  is  given  generally  for  damages  to  abutting 
property  by  a  change  of  grade,  the  measure  of  damages  is  the 
diminution  in  value,  caused  by  the  change.®"  If  the  property 
is  not  lessened  in  value  there  can  be  no  recovery,  though  expense 
will  have  to  be  incurred  in  adjusting  the  property  to  the  new 


manca,  57  Misc.  81  j  Anness  v.  Provi- 
dence, 13  R.  I.  17 ;  Garraux  v.  Green- 
ville, 53  S.  C.  575,  31  S.  E.  597;  Ken- 
dall V.  Columbia,  74  S.  C.  539,  54  S. 
E.  777. 

6  6  Smith  V.  White  Plains,  67  Hun 
81,  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  450;  Smith  v.  Eau 
Claire,  78  Wis.  487,  47  N.  W.  830. 

5  6Pickel3  V.  Ansonia,  76  Conn.  278, 
56  Atl.  552;  Hempstead  v.  Des 
Moines,  63  la.  36;  Brown  v.  Lowell, 
8  Met.  172;  Hodgman  v.  Concord,  69 
N.  H.  349,  41  Atl.  287 ;  People  v.  Zoll, 
97  N.  Y.  203;  Phipps  v.  North  Pel- 
ham,  61  App.  Div.  442,  70  N.  Y.  S. 
630 ;  O'Brien  v.  Penn.  S.  V.  R.  R.  Co., 
119  Pa.  St.  184,  13  Atl.  74;  Ogden  v. 
City  of  Philadelphia,  143  Pa.  St.  430, 
22  Atl.  694;  Jones  r.  Bangor,  144  Pa. 
St.  638,  23  Atl.  252;  North  Chester  v. 
Eckfeldt,  1  Monaghan  (Pa.  Supm. 
Ct.),  732;  Tyson  v.  Milwaukee,  50 
Wis.  78. 

6  7McCarthy  v.  St.  Paul,  22  Minn. 
527;  Matter  of  Change  of  Grade  of 
Sth  and  6th  sts.,  12  Phila.  587;  Ker- 


shaw V.  Philadelphia,  20  Phila.  318; 
Campbell  v.  Philadelphia,  108  Pa.  St. 
300.    Bee  generally  post  §  970. 

ssCotes  V.  Davenport,  9  la.  227. 

6  9City  of  Bloomington  v.  Pollock, 
141  111.  346,  31  N.  E.  146;  S.  C.  38 
111.  App.  133;  cmd  see  cases  cited  in 
last  section. 

soPlatt  V.  Town  of  Milford,  66 
Conn.  320,  34  Atl.  82;  McCosh  v. 
Burlington,  72  la.  26;  Stewart  v. 
Council  BluflFs,  84  la.  61,  50  N.  W. 
219;  Richardson  v.  Webster  City,  111 
la.  427,  82  N.  W.  920;  Millard  v. 
Webster  City,  113  la.  220,  84  N.  W. 
1044;  Parker  v.  City  of  Atchison,  46 
Kan.  14,  26  Pac.  435;  Chase  v.  City 
of  Portland,  86  Me.  367,  29  Atl.  1104; 
Woodbury  v.  Beverly,  153  Mass.  245, 
26  N.  E.  851 ;  Dale  v.  City  of  St.  Jo- 
seph, 59  Mo.  App.  566;  Mauldin  v. 
Greenville,  64  S.  C.  444,  42  S.  E.  202; 
Acker  v.  Knoxville,  117  Tenn.  224,  96 
S.  W.  973;  Fairbanks  v.  Rocking- 
ham, 75  Vt.  221,  54  Atl.  186;  French 
V.  Milwaukee,  49  Wis.  584. 


§  3i3 


PEOPEETY  DAMAGED  OB  INJUEED. 


619 


grade." ^  There  can  be  no  recovery  of  nominal  damages."^  In- 
terference with  access,  the  cost  of  adjusting  the  property  to  the 
new  grade,  injury  from  surface  water,  and  whatever  affects  the 
value  of  the  property  may  be  taken  into  consideration.®^  The 
statute  may  limit  the  right  of  compensation  to  improved  prop- 
erty,®* or  to  the  buildings  alone. "^ 

§  343  (218h).  Estoppel  to  claim  damages.  The  fact 
that  an  abutter  has  dedicated  or  conveyed  land  for  the  street, 
or  released  any  claim  for  damages  in  consequence  of  its  estab- 
lishment, does  not  estop  him  from  claiming  compensation  for 
a  change  of  grade.®"  Nor  is  the  plaintiff  estopped  by  the  fact 
that  he  has  done  the  work  in  front  of  his  property  in  compli- 
ance with  an  order  of  the  council,®''  nor  by  the  fact  that  he  has 
requested  the  completion  of  a  change  already  begun.®*  Where  a 
person  builds  to  the  natural  grade  after  a  different  grade  has 
been  established,  he  cannot  recover  for  damages  caused  by  bring- 
ing the  street  to  the  established  grade.®*  Where  an  abutter 
built  on  a  ridge  to  the  natural  grade  and  the  grade  of  the  street 
was   afterwards   lowered,    it  was   held  he   was   not   estopped 


siHempstead  v.  Des  Moines,  52  la. 
303. 

saBurkham  v.  Ohio  &  M.  R.  R.  Co., 
122  Ind.  344,  23  N.  E.  799. 

6  3Shelton  Co.  v.  Birmingham,  62 
Conn.  456,  26  Atl.  348 ;  HoUey  v.  Tor- 
rington,  63  Conn.  426,  28  Atl.  613; 
Cook  V.  City  of  Ansonia,  66  Conn. 
413,  34  Atl.  183;  Pickles  v.  Ansonia, 
76  Conn.  278,  56  Atl.  552 ;  City  of  To- 
peka  V.  Martineau,  42  Kan.  387,  22 
Pac.  419,  5  L.R.A.  775 ;  Chase  v.  City 
of  Portland,  86  Me.  367,  29  Atl.  1104; 
Woodbury  v.  Beverly,  153  Mass.  245, 
26  N.  E.  851 ;  Newark  v.  Weeks,  71  N. 
J.  L.  448,  59  Atl.  901;  Mauldin  v. 
Greenville,  64  S.  C.  444,  42  S.  E.  202; 
Church  V.  Milwaukee,  34  Wis.  66; 
Stadkr  v.  Ibid.,  34  Wis.  98 ;  Church 
V.  Ibid.,  31  Wis.  512;  Stowell  v. 
Ibid.,  31  Wis.  523;  French  v.  Ibid., 
49  Wis.  584;  Tyson  v.  Ibid.,  50  Wis. 
78;  post  §  737. 

6  4Conkliu  V.  City  of  Keokuk,  73 
la.  343,  35  N.  W.  444 ;  Chase  v.  Sioux 
City,  86  la.  603,  53  N.  W.  333. 


6  6People  V.  Gilon,  76  Hun  346,  27 
N.  Y.  Supp.  704. 

6  6Fernald  v.  Boston,  12  Cush.  574; 
Bartlett  v.  Tarrytown,  52  Hun  380, 
24  N.  Y.  St.  272,  5  N.  Y.  Supp.  240. 

s'Pearce  v.  Milwaukee,  18  Wis. 
428. 

ssHerser  v.  Milwaukee,  39  Wis. 
108 ;  Hickman  v.  City  of  Kansas,  120 
Mo.  110,  25  S.  W.  225;  Klaus  v.  Jer- 
sey City,  69  N.  J.  L.  127,  54  Atl.  220 ; 
and  see  Luscombe  v.  Milwaukee,  36 
Wis.  511.  But  where  the  property 
owner,  after  an  ordinance  for  a 
change  of  grade  had  been  passed, 
petitioned  for  the  making  of  the  im- 
provement, he  was  held  to  be 
estopped.  Preston  v.  Cedar  Rapids, 
95  la.  71,  63  N.  W.  577.  And  see  gen- 
erally: York  V.  Cedar  Rapids,  130 
la.  453,  103  N.  W.  790;  Wheat  v. 
Van  Tine,  149  Mich.  314,  112  N.  W. 
933;  Jorgensen  v.  Superior,  111  Wis. 
561,  87  N.  W.  565. 

6  90maha  v.  Williams,  52  Neb.  40. 


C)20  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    344 

to  recover  damages  on  the  ground  that  he  should  have  foreaeen 
that  a  change  would  be  necessary  J" 

§  344  (219).  Statutes  giving  damages  for  railroads  in 
streets.  The  code  of  Iowa,  §  464,  empowers  cities  to  grant  or 
forbid  the  laying  of  railroad  tracks  in  streets,  "but  no  railway 
track  can  thus  be  located  and  laid  down  until  after  the  injury 
to  the  property  abutting  on  the  street,  alley  or  public  places  upon 
which  such  railroad  is  proposed  to  be  located  has  been  ascertained 
and  compensated"  in  the  manner  provided  by  law.  This  was 
held  to  apply  as  to  any  tracks  laid  after  its  passage,  and  that 
a  recovery  was  not  limited  merely  to  damages  from  change  of 
grade.'^^  It  was  held  not  to  apply  to  a  horse  railway,''^  nor  to 
a  railroad  crossing  a  street. '^^  But  if  the  crossing  is  diagonal, 
so  that  any  part  of  the  track  or  embankment  is  opposite  the  plain- 
tiff's lot,'^*  or  if  the  crossing  is  above  or  below  grade,  necessitating 
an  approach  in  front  of  plaintiff's  property,''^  there  may  be  a 
recovery.  No  right  can  be  acquired  until  the  compensation  has 
been  ascertained  and  paid  and  a  company  laying  down  and 
using  a  track  without  making  compensation,  and  its  successors 
in  title,  are  trespassers.''* 

Where  permission  to  lay  a  railroad  in  a  street  was  granted 
upon  condition  of  paying  all  damages  to  private  property,  it 
was  held  that  only  actionable  damages  were  intended.'''^  But 
where  the  condition  was  that  the  railroad  company  should  pay 
all  damages  that  might  accrue  to  the  property  owners  on  the 
street  by  reason  of  the  construction  of  the  road,  it  was  held  that 

'OMcGar  r.  Bristol,  71  Conn.  652,  Johnsbury  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  64  Vt.  52,  24 

42  Atl.  1000.  Atl.  361. 

TiDrady  v.  D.  M.  &  Ft.  D.  R.  R.  TBNicks  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

Co.,  57  la.  393,  10  N.  W.  754;  Mer-  84  la.  27,  50  N.  W.  222;  Hitchcock  v. 

chants'  Union  Barb  Wire  Co.  v.  Chi-  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  88  la.  242,  55 

cago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  70  la.  105,  N.  W.  337;  Middleton  v.  Mason  City 

28  N.  W.  494.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  127  la.  433,  103  N.  W. 

7  2  Sears    v.    Marshalltown    Street  364. 

Ry.  Co.,  65  la.  742,  23  N.  W.  150.  7  6Harbach  v.  Des  Moines  etc.  R.  R. 

73Morgan    v.   Des    Moines   &   St.  Co.,  80  la.  593,  44  N.  W.  348,  1  Am. 

Louis  Ry.  Co.,  64  la.  589,  21  N.  W.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  449,  11  L.R.A. 

96,   52   L.R.A.   462.     But   see   New  113. 

Castle  &  Franklin  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc-  '^Sargeant  v.  Ohio  &  Mississippi 

Chesney,  85  Pa.  St.  522.  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Handy,  Ohio,  52;  Hen- 

7  4Enos  V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  derson  Belt  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Deehamp,  95 

78  la.  28,  42  N.  W.  575;   Gates  v.  Ky.  219,  24  S.  W.  605 ;  Same  v.  Same, 

Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  82  la.  518,  48  14  Ky.  L.  E.  44. 
N.  W.  1040.     And  see  Wead  v.  St. 


§    344  PSOPEETr  DAMAGED  OE  INJXJEED.  621 

a  recovery  could  be  had,  not  only  for  the  depreciation  in  value 
of  the  property,  but  also  for  interruption  and  damage  to  business 
during  the  progress  of  the  v?ork.'^®  Where  a  statute  provides 
that  when  tracks  are  laid  upon  a  public  street,  the  company  shall 
be  responsible  for  injuries  done  by  such  location  to  private 
property  lying  upon  or  near  the  street,  one  vphose  property  is 
situated  a  few  feet  beyond  the  terminus  of  the  road  is  entitled 
to  recover. ''^  Under  the  provision  of  a  street  railway  company's 
charter  that  "whenever  any  estate  abutting  on  a  street  or  high- 
way upon  or  over  which  the  rails  of  said  corporation  shall  be 
laid  shall  be  injured  thereby  the  said  corporation  shall  be  liable 
to  pay  the  owner  or  owners  thereof  the  damages  thereby  occa- 
sioned to  said  estate,"  damages  can  be  recovered  for  injuries  re- 
sulting from  the  laying  of  the  rails  only  as  distinguished  from 
those  resulting  from  the  using  of  them  as  laid.*"  But  unless 
limited  by  the  statute  the  measure  of  damages  is  the  depreciation 
in  value  caused  by  the  construction  and  use  of  the  tracks.*^ 
Abutters  on  both  sides  of  the  street  may  recover  though  the  rail- 
road is  laid  wholly  on  one  side.*^  A  statute  giving  compensa- 
tion for  damage  caused  by  electric  lines  for  the  transmission 
of  intelligence  and  in  case  of  electric  light  and  electric  power 
lines  and  passed  before  electric  railways  were  in  common  use, 
was  held  not  to  apply  to  the  latter.**  A  statute  of  Massachusetts 
in  relation  to  elevated  railroads  in  the  streets  of  Boston  gave 
compensation  to  abutting  owners  "who  are  damaged  by  reason 
of  the  location,  construction,  maintenance  and  operation  of  said 
lines  of  railway."  The  word  "damage"  "is  held  to  include 
only  damage  that  is  direct  and  proximate,  as  distinguished  from 

7  8  St.  Louis  etc.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Capps,  siNJcks  v.  Chicago  etc.  E,.  R.  Co., 

67  m.  607;  S.  C.  72  111.  188;  Same  84  la.  27,  50  N.  W.  222;  Boyne  City 

V.  Haller,  82  111.  208.  etc.  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Anderson,  146  Mich. 

7  9Lake  Roland  El.  R.  R.   Co.  v.  328,  109  N.  W.  429,  117  Am.  St.  Rep. 

Webster,  81    Md.  529,  32  Atl.   186.  642,   8   L.R.A.(N.S.)    306;    Railway 

"The  right  to  redress  depends  upon  Co.  v.  Gardner,  45  Ohio  St.  309,  13 

the  question  whether    damage    was  N.  E.  69;  post,  §  735. 

done,  and  not  on  the  proximity  or  S2Kuhl  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  R. 

distance  of  the  operative  cause  of  the  Co.,  101  Wis.  42,  77  N.  W.  155;  Lenz 

injury.''     Under    a    similar    statute  v.  Chicago  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  Ill   Wis. 

property  300  feet  away  was  held  to  lfl8,  86  N.  W.  607. 

be   "near  to"   the    street    occupied.  ssMcDermott  v.  Warren  etc.  E.  R. 

Wheeling  etc.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Laughlin,  Co.,  172  Mass.  197,  51  N.  E.  972. 
15  Ohio  C.  C.  1. 

soVose  V.  Newport  St.  R.  E.  Co., 
17  E.  I.  134,  20  Atl.  267. 


622  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    345 

that  which  is  remote  and  consequential,  and  to  include  only 
that  which  is  special  and  peculiar  to  the  petitioner  and  to  those 
similarly  situated,  as  distinguished  from  that  which  is  com- 
mon, affecting  generally  persons  and  property  in  the  vicinity."  ** 
The  statute  applies  alike  to  those  who  own  the  fee  and  to  those 
who  own  a  less  estate.  An  act  of  Missouri  required  street  rail- 
road companies  to  have  determined  in  advance,  in  the  mode 
pointed  out  in  the  statute,  the  damages  that  would  be  done  by 
the  building  and  operation  of  such  railroads  to  the  real  and 
personal  property  on  the  line  of  the  road,  and  section  3  of  the 
act  was  as  follows :  "Damages  in  this  act  is  hereby  defined  to  be 
the  depreciation  in  the  value  of  the  property  that  may  result 
from  the  construction  and  operation  of  the  proposed  railway." 
^Notwithstanding  the  very  clear  and  specific  directions  of  the 
statute  the  supreme  court  held  that  a  street  surface  railroad 
was  a  legitimate  street  use  and  that,  though  the  abutting  prop- 
erty was  depreciated  in  value  thereby,  the  property  was  not 
taken  or  damaged  within  the  meaning  of  the  constitution  or 
statute.*® 

§  345  (220).  Statutes  giving  damages  in  other  cases. 
The  charter  of  a  railroad  company  required  it  "to  pay  all  dam- 
ages that  may  arise  to  any  person  or  persons."  This  was  held 
to  embrace  damages  of  every  description,  incidental  and  con- 
sequential, as  well  as  direct,  and  to  apply  to  those  no  part  of 
whose  land  was  taken  as  well  as  to  those  over  whose  land  the  road 
was  laid.*®  Injury  to  a  building  by  excavating  on  the  adjoining 
lot,  whereby  the  foundations  were  weakened,*'^  also  by  raising 
the  grade  of  the  street  in  front,  whereby  access  was  impeded  and 

8  4Baker  v.  Boston  El.  Ry.  Co.,  183  Strickford  v.  Boston  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

Mass.  178,  66  N.  E.  711.  73  N.  H.  1,  59  Atl.  367;  Pittsburg, 

8  6Ruekert  v.  Grand  Ave.  Ry.  Co.,  Va.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Rose,  74  Pa.  St. 

163  Mo.  260,  63  S.  W.  814;  Nagel  v.  362;  Wead  v.  St.  Johnsbury  etc.  R. 

Lindell  Ry.  Co.,  167  Mo.  89,  66  S.  W.  R.  Co.,  64  Vt.  52,  24  Atl.  361 ;  Hodges 

1090.  r.  Seaboard  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  88  Va.  653, 

The   following   cases   arose   under  14  S.  E.  380;  Richmond  Traction  Co. 

such  statutes,  but  involve  questions  v.  Murphy,  98  Va.  104,  34  S.  E.  982; 

that   will   be   considered   elsewhere :  Trustees  v.  Milwaukee  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

O'Brien  v.  Baltimore  Belt  R.  R.  Co.,  77  Wis.  158,  45  N.  W.  1086 ;  Grafton 

74  Md.  363,  22  Atl.  141;  Onset  St.  R.  v.  Baltimore  &  Ohio  R.  R.   Co.,  21 

R.  Co.  V.  County  Comrs.,  154  Mass.  Fed.  309. 

395,  28  N.  E.  286;  Grand  Rapids  &  ssfiradley   v.   New   York   &   New 

Indiana  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Heisel,  47  Mich.  Haven  R.  R.  Co.,  21  Conn.  294. 

393;   Taylor  v.  Bay  City  St.  R.  R.  STSame. 
Co.,  80    Mich.   77,    45    N.  W.   335; 


§    345  PBOPBBTT  DAMAGED  OE  INJURED.  623 

water  turned  on  the  property/®  were  held  to  be  within  the 
statute.  The  charter  of  a  gas  and  water  company  required 
it  to  make  compensation  for  "any  injury  done  to  private  prop- 
erty." The  court  interpreted  this  as  follows :  "  'Private  prop- 
erty' necessarily  includes  everything  that  can  be  held  or  owned 
by  private  persons  and  'injury'  any  and  every  damage  to  which 
it  can  or  may  be  subjected."  *® 

A  statute  of  Massachusetts  provided  as  follows:  "Every  rail- 
road corporation  shall  be  liable  to  pay  all  damages  that  shall 
be  occasioned  by  laying  out  and  making  and  maintaining  their 
road,  or  by  taking  any  land  or  materials  as  provided  in  the 
preceding  section."  *"  The  following  cases  of  damage  have  been 
held  to  be  within  the  statute :  The  draining  of  plaintiff's  well  by 
a  deep  cut,*^  injury  to  plaintiff's  building  by  blasting/^  and 
injury  by  raising  the  grade  of  the  street  in  front  of  plaintiff's 
property.®^  An  important  case  arose  out  of  the  following  facts  : 
Plaintiff  owned  premises  in  Lowell  abutting  on  Western  avenue. 
A  railroad  company  crossed  the  avenue  near  the  plaintiff's  prem- 
ises, and  between  them  and  the  center  of  the  city.  The  track 
was  several  feet  above  the  grade  of  the  street,  and  on  either  side 
suitable  approaches  were  made.  The  result  of  this  was  to  cause 
numerous  detentions  to  plaintiff,  to  impair  the  convenience  of 
the  road,  and  to  depreciate  the  value  of  plaintiff's  property.  JSTo 
part  of  the  plaintiff's  property  was  taken.  The  court  held  that 
the  plaintiff  was  not  entitled  to  damages.®*  It  is  difficult  to 
reconcile  this  case  with  an  earlier  one  in  the  same  court.  A 
corporation  was  authorized  to  erect  dams  on  a  stream,  by  a  stat- 
ute which  provided  that  any  person  "sustaining  any  damage 
to  his  land"  by  reason  thereof  might  obtain  compensation.  The 
plaintiff  had  a  soap  and  candle  mill  on  the  stream.     The  dam 

8 s Same;     and    Nicholson  v.   New  Am.  St.  Rep.  320,  where  a  well  was 

York  &  New  Haven  R.  R.  Co.,  22  drained  by  a  cut  for  a  sewer,  and  the 

Conn.  74;  Burritt  v.  New  Haven,  42  statute  as  to  damage  was   similar. 

Conn.  174.  See    also    McNamara    v.    Common- 

ssLycoming  Gas  &  Water  Co.  v.  wealth,  184  Mass.  304,  68  N.  E.  332. 

Moyer,  99  Pa.  St.  615.  9  2Dodge     v.      Commissioners     of 

90R.  S.   1836,  c.  39,   §  56;   R.   S.  Essex,  3  Met.  380. 

1882,  c.  112,  §  95.  9  3Gardiner  v.  Boston  &  Worcester 

9 1  Parker  V.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  9  Cush.  1. 

Co.,  3  Cush.  107,  50  Am.  Dec.  709.    To  9  4  Proprietor  of  Locks  and  Canals 

the   same   effect   are   Trowbridge   v.  v.  Nashua  &  Lowell  R.  R.   Co.,   10 

Brookline,  144  Mass.  139,  and  Bick-  Cush.  385. 
ford  V.  Hyde  Park,  173  Mass.  552,  73 


624  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    345 

cut  off  his  water  commuiiication  with  Boston,  whereby  transpor- 
tation was  rendered  more  expensive.  It  was  held  that  he  could 
recover.®^  In  the  former  case  there  was  an  interference  with  a 
highway  by  land,  in  the  latter  an  interference  with  a  highway 
by  water.  In  both  cases  the  interference  caused  a  depreciation 
of  the  plaintiff's  property.  In  neither  case  was  any  part  of  the 
plaintiff's  property  taken. 

Under  a  statute  which  provided  for  the  payment  of  "aU  dam- 
ages that  shall  be  sustained  by  any  persons  in  their  property 
*  *  *  by  the  construction  of  any  aqueducts,  etc.,  for  tiie 
purpose  of  the  act,"  it  was  held  that  an  injury  by  transporting 
materials  over  land  was  embraced  by  the  act  and  the  remedy  pro- 
vided by  the  act  was  exclusive.**  But  a  statute  giving  damages 
for  property  taken  or  affected  by  a  public  work  does  not  cover 
damages  by  negligence  or  unskilfulness.®^  An  act  which  pro- 
vides that  the  mayor  and  aldermen  of  a  city  shall  have  power 
to  ascertain  any  damage  done  to  property  by  a  certain  improve- 
ment, and  to  provide  for  payment  of  the  same,  imposes  an  im- 
perative duty  and  vests  a  right  of  action  in  the  ovsmer  of  prop- 
erty so  injured,  whether  the  city  makes  such  provision  or  not.** 
In  Pennsylvania  it  has  been  held  that  an  act  requiring  com- 
pensation for  any  injury  or  damage  to  private  property  by  par- 
ticular works  includes  all  damages,  consequential  and  remote.** 

^BBoston  &  Roxbury  Mill  Corpora-  claims  as  the  commonwealth  would 

tion  V.  Gardner,  2  Pick.  33.  have  been  held  liable  for,  and  hence 

9  slower  V.  Boston,  10  Cush.  235.  was  held  not  liable  for  consequential 

STBailey    v.  Mayor  etc.  of    New  damages.     Delaware  Division  Canal 

York,  3  Hill,  531.  Oo.    v.    McKeen,    52    Pa.    St.    117. 

9  sGregg  V.  Mayor  etc.   of    Balti-  Where  a  company  was  authorized  to 

more,  56  Md.  256.  improve  a  stream  and  required  to 

9SBuckwalter  v.  Black  Rock  file  a  bond  "sufficient  to  indemnify  all 
Bridge  Co.,  38  Pa.  St.  281 ;  Watson  v.  persons  holding  property  on  said 
Pittsburgh  &  Connellsville  E,.  E.  Co.,  stream  for  any  loss  by  reason  of  said 
37  Pa.  St.  469;  Mifflin  v.  Railroad  improvement,"  this  was  held  not  to 
Co.,  16  Pa.  St.  182;  see  also  Coster  v.  enlarge  the  company's  liability  so  as 
Albany,  52  Barb.  276.  In  the  follow-  to  make  it  responsible  for  conse- 
ing  case  it  was  held  that  legal  injury  quential  damages.  Woodward  v. 
only  is  intended;  Shrunk  v.  Schuyl-  Webb,  65  Pa.  St.  254.  But  where  a 
kill  Navigation  Co.,  14  S.  &  R.  71.  gas  company  gave  a  voluntary  bond 
Where  a  canal  was  transferred  by  to  pay  the  plaintiff  "all  damages  of 
the  State  to  a  private  company,  who  whatsoever  nature  or  kind"  that  he 
agreed  to  pay  "any  and  all  claims  for  might  sustain  by  constructing  or  re- 
damages  or  other  demands  against  pairing  pipe  lines  across  certain  de- 
the  commonwealth,''  the  company  scribed  property,  the  language  was 
was   held   bound  to   pay   only   such  held  to  cover  consequential  damages. 


§  345  PEOPEETY  DAMAGED  OE  INJUEED.  625 

Under  an  act  which  provides  for  an  assessment  of  damages  sus- 
tained by  reason  of  any  excavation  or  embankment  made  in  the 
construction  of  a  railroad,  proceedings  cannot  be  had  to  assess 
damages  for  an  additional  track  in  a  street.^  Under  an  act 
giving  compensation  "to  all  parties  interested  for  all  damages 
by  them  sustained  by  reason  of  the  exercise  of  such  pov^ers," 
it  was  held  that  damage  to  goods  could  be  recovered.^  Where 
a  canal  was  abandoned  and  granted  to  a  city  by  the  State  upon 
condition  that  the  city  should  "be  liable  for  all  damages  which 
might  accrue  from  the  vacation  of  said  canal,"  it  was  held  the 
city  would  only  be  liable  for  such  damages  as  would  have  been 
a  legal  claim  against  the  State.^  A  statute  authorizing  a  com- 
pany to  take  land  and  material,  for  improving  the  navigation  of 
a  river,  "being  accountable  to  the  owners  thereof  for  all  dam- 
ages, if  any,"  does  not  make  the  company  liable  for  consequential 
damages,  as  by  changing  the  current  so  as  to  wash  away  the 
plaintiff's  banks.*  Statutes  giving  damages  for  telephone  poles 
and  fixtures  in  a  street,®  for  a  public  urinal  in  a  street,®  and  for 
the  vacation  of  a  highway,'^  are  cited  in  the  margin.  A  naviga- 
tion company  was  made  liable  for  consequential  damages  to 
property  situated  on  either  side  of  its  improvements.  This  was 
held  to  refer  to  contiguous  property  and  not  to  property  situated 
some  ways  below  a  dam  and  injured  thereby.*  A  statute  of 
Massachusetts  authorized  the  State  Board  of  Agriculture  to  take 
measures  for  the  extermination  of  the  gypsy  moth,  and  to  enter 
upon  lands  for  that  purpose,  and  provided  that  "the  owner  of 
any  land  so  entered  upon,  who  should  suffer  damage  by  such 
entry  and  acts  done  thereon,"  by  the  board,  might  recover  there- 
for from  the  city  or  town  in  which  the  land  was  situated.  This 
was  held  not  to  extend  to  personal  property  on  the  land,  such 

Pennsylvania  Nat.  Gas  Co.  v.  Cook,  sHubbard  v.   City  of   Toledo,   21 

123Pa.  St.  170, 16Atl.  762.     And  see  Ohio  St.  379.    To  same  effect,  Coster 

as  in  line  with  the  text;   Common-  v.  Albany,  43  N,  Y.  399. 

wealth  V.  Snyder,  2  Watts  418;  Bos-  <Brooks  v.  Cedar  Brook  etc.  Imp. 

ton  Belting  Co.  v.  City  of  Boston,  152  Co.,  82  Me.  17,  19  Atl.  87,  17  Am.  St. 

Mass.  307,  25  N.  E.  613.  Rep.  459,  7  L.R.A.  460. 

1  Cumberland  Valley  E.  R.  Co.  v.  6  Chesapeake  &  P.  Tel.  Co.  r.  Mack- 

Rhoadarmer,  107  Pa.  St.  214.  enzie,  74  Md.  36,  21  Atl.  690. 

zKnock  V.  Metropolitan  Railway  sBadger  v.  Boston,  130  Mass.  170. 

Co.,  4  L.  R.  C.  P.  131 ;  38  L.  J.  C.  P.  78.  'Brandenburg  v.  Hittel  (Ind.)   37 

To  same  effect;  Jabb  v.  The  Hull  N.  E.  Rep.  329. 

Dock  Co.,  9  A.  &  E.  N.  S.  443, 58  E.  C.  'Ihmsen  v.  Monongahela  Nav.  Co., 

L.  R.  441.  32  Pa.  St.  153. 
Em.  D.— 40. 


62G  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    345 

as  cord  wood,  and  that  there  could  be  no  recovery  under  the 
statute  for  its  destruction.*  Another  act  of  the  same  State  to 
provide  for  a  metropolitan  water  supply,  provided  for  taking 
the  business  part  of  the  town  of  West  Boylston  and  contained  a 
provision  as  follows:  "In  case  any  individual  or  firm  owning 
on  April  1,  1895,  an  established  business  on  land  in  the  town  of 
West  Boyleston,  whether  the  same  shall  be  taken  or  not  under 
this  act,  or  the  heirs  or  personal  representatives  of  such  individ- 
ual or  firm,  shall  deem  that  such  business  is  decreased  in  value 
by  the  carrying  out  of  this  act,  whether  by  loss  of  custom  or 
otherwise,  and  is  unable  to  agree  with  said  board  as  to  the 
amount  of  damages  to  be  paid  for  such  injury,  such  damages 
shall  be  determined  and  paid  in  the  manner  hereinbefore  pro- 
vided." It  was  held  that  though  such  damages  were  not  recov- 
erable under  the  constitution,  there  was  nothing  to  prevent  the 
legislature  from  providing  for  such  compensation,^"  and  various 
cases  construing  the  act  as  to  what  constituted  an  established 
business  and  as  to  the  elements  and  measure  of  damages  are 
referred  to  in  the  margin.  ^"^  Where  an  act  gave  compensation 
for  "all  damages  sustained  by  any  person  or  corporation  by  the 
taking  of  land  or  any  right  therein  under  this  act,"  it  was  held 
that  one,  no  part  of  whose  land  was  taken,  could  not  recover 
for  the  temporary  flooding  of  his  land  during  the  construction 
of  the  works.  ■'^  A  statute  of  New  York  to  provide  for  an  addi- 
tional water  supply  for  the  city  of  ISTew  York  gives  compensa- 
tion not  only  for  the  injury  or  destruction  of  an  established  busi- 
ness but  also  to  employees  of  six  months'  standing  in  any  such 
business  or  upon  land  taken  who  are  thrown  out  of  employ- 
ment.^^ 

Statutes  giving  compensation  in  general  terms  for  property 
damaged  or  injured  are  similar,  in  effect,  to  the  constitutional 

sGlobe  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lexington,  Commonwealth,  188  Mass.  59,  74  N. 

173  Mass.  6.  E.  287,  69  L.R.A.   599;   Whiting  v. 

lOEarle    v.     Commonwealth,     180  Commonwealth,  196  Mass.  468,  82  N. 

Mass.  579,  63  N.  E.  10,  91  Am.  St.  E.  670. 

Rep.  326,  57  L.R.A.  292.  izMcSweeney    v.    Commonwealth, 

iilhid.;  Gavin  v.  Commonwealth,  185  Mass.  371,  70  N.  E.  429.    See  also 

182  Mass.  190,  65  N.  E.  37 ;  Sa\vyer  v.  Whitney  v.  Commonwealth,  190  Mass. 

Commonwealth,  182  Mass.  245,  65  N.  531,  77  N.  E.  516. 

E.  52,  59  L.R.A.  726;   Fairbanks  v.  isSee  Laws  of  Xew  York,  1905,  c. 

Commonwealth,  183  Mass.  373,  67  N.  724,  §  42  as  amended  by  §  9,  c.  315 

E.   335;    Sawyer  v.   Commonwealth,  Laws  of  1906;  Matter  of  Simmons,  58 

185  Mass.  356,  70  N.  E.  438 ;  Allen  v.  Misc.  581,  109  N.  Y.  S.  1036. 


§    346  PEOPEETY  DAJIAGED  OR  IXJUEED.  €27 

provisions  considered  in  the  subsequent  sections  of  this  chapter 
and  decisions  thereunder  are  grouped  with  those  construing 
such  constitutional  provisions,  under  the  appropriate  headings. 
Where  there  are  different  statutes  of  this  sort  in  the  same  State, 
giving  compensation  for  property  damaged  by  different  sorts 
of  public  Tvorks  or  improvements,  they  should  be  regarded  as 
resting  upon  the  same  reasons  and  should  be  so  construed,  if 
possible,  as  to  be  uniform  in  their  operation  and  in  the  results 
which  they  accomplish.^* 

II. — In  Constitutions. 

§  346  (221).  Constitutional  provisions.  When  the  peo- 
ple of  Illinois  revised  their  constitution  in  1870,  they  intro- 
duced an  important  change  into  the  provision  respecting  the 
power  of  eminent  domain.  The  provision  reads  as  follows: 
"Private  property  shall  not  be  taken  or  damaged  for  public  use 
without  just  compensation."  ^°  Nearly  every  other  State  which 
has  revised  its  constitution  since  1870  has  followed  the  example 
set  by  Illinois  by  adding  the  word  damaged,  or  its  equivalent,  to 
the  provision  in  question.^"  Prior  to  1870,  as  appears  from  the 
preceding  sections,  statutes  had  been  passed  in  many  of  the 

i4Sheldon  v.  Boston  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  i,  §  17,  1876.     "Taken,  destroyed  or 

172  Mass.  180,  182,  51  N.  E.  1078;  damaged."     Minnesota  art.  i,  §  13, 

Hyde  v.  Fall  River,  189  Mass.  439,  75  as  amended  in  1896.    In  the  new  eon- 

N.  E.  953,  2  L.R.A.(lsr.S.)  269.  stitution  of  Pennsylvania,  adopted  in 

i5Art.  II,  §  13.  1874,  a  provision  was  inserted  as  fol- 

i6"Taken  or  damaged."     Illinois,  lows:     "Municipal    and    other    cor- 

art.  ii,  §  13,  1870;  West  Virginia,  art.  porations   and   individuals   invested 

iii,  §  9,  1872;  Missouri,  art.  i,  §  20,  with  the  privilege  of  taking  private 

1875;   Nebraska,  art.  1,  §  21,  1875;  property  for  public  use  shall  make 

Colorado,  art.  ii.  §   14,  1876;   Cali-  just  compensation  for  the  property 

fornia,  art.  i,  §  14,  1879;  Louisiana,  talcen,  injured  or  destroyed  by  the 

art.  156,  1879;  Mississippi,  art.  iii,  §  construction  or   enlargement  of   its 

17,    1890;    Montana,   art.   iii,    §    14,  works,   highways    or    improvements, 

1889;  North  Dakota,  art.  i,  §  4,  1889;  which   compensation    shall   be    paid 

Oklahoma,  §  32,  1907 ;  South  Dakota,  before  such  taking,  injury  or  destrue- 

art.  vi,  §  13,  1889;  Utah,  art.  i,  §  22,  tion."    Art.  i,  §  8.    The  new  constitu- 

1895;    Virginia,   art.    i,   §    6,    1902;  tions  of  Alabama  adopted  in  1875  and 

Washington,  art.  i,  §  16;  Wyoming,  1901    contain    the    same    provision, 

art.  i,  §  32.     "Taken,  injured  or  de-  Art.  xiii,  §  7.    In  both  States  the  gen- 

stroyed."    Kentucky,     §    242,    1891.  eral  provision  as  to  taking  remains. 

"Taken,  appropriated  or  damaged."  The   exceptions   are   Florida,  Idaho, 

Arkansas,  art.  ii,  §  22,  1874.    "Taken,  New  York,  North  Carolina  and  South 

damaged  or  destroyed."     Texas,  art.  Carolina. 


628  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    347 

States  giving  compensation  for  property  damaged  or  injured 
in  particular  cases  or  for  particular  public  uses.  These  statutes 
related  mostly  to  the  change  of  street  grades.  In  England, 
since  1845,  compensation  has  been  allowed  by  act  of  Parliament 
for  property  "injuriously  affected"  by  the  construction  of  pub- 
lic works.  ^^  The  proper  meaning  of  the  words  damaged  or 
injured  in  these  late  constitutions  is  now  to  be  considered. 

§  347  (222).  The  terms  "damaged,"  "injured"  and  "in- 
juriously affected"  are  synonymous.  The  legal  profession 
are  familiar  with  a  distinction  between  damage  and  injury. 
Damnum  absque  injuria  has  been  the  answer  to  many  a  lawsuit, 
which,  being  interpreted,  means  that  there  may  be  damage  or 
loss  without  any  violation  of  legal  right.  In  common  usage, 
however,  these  words  are .  practically  synonymous.  Webster 
defines  damage  as  "any  hurt,  injury  or  harm  to  one's  estate;" 
and  injury  he  defines  as  "any  wrong  or  damage  done  to  a  man's 
person,  rights,  reputation  or  goods."  The  people  of  Pennsyl- 
vania, when  they  said  that  private  property  should  not  be  injured 
for  public  use  without  compensation,  undoubtedly  understood 
and  intended  the  same  thing  as  the  people  of  Illinois,  who  said 
that  it  should  not  be  damaged  for  public  use  without  compensa- 
tion. The  evil  to  be  remedied  was  the  same  in  both  States. 
In  England  the  word  damaged,  in  a  statute  providing  compensa- 
tion for  land  damaged,  was  held  equivalent  to  the  words  injuri- 
ously affected  and  given  the  same  construction.-^*  Likewise  the 
words  all  damages,  in  a  similar  statute.-'*  So  also  the  word 
injured.^"  The  word  injured,  in  a  New  Jersey  statute,  was 
construed  by  the  courts  of  that  State  to  mean  the  same  as  the 
words  injuriously  affected,  in  the  English  statute.^^  So  of  the 
word  damaged  in  the  constitution  of  Colorado.*^  The  Supreme 
Court  of  Georgia,  referring  to  the  words  damaged,  injured  and 

I'Land  Clauses  Consolidation  Act,  2iColumbia  Delaware  Bridge  Co.  v. 

§  68.  Geisse,  35  N.  J.  L.  558. 

isHall  V.  Mayor  of  Bristol,  L.  R.  2  2  2Town  of  Longmont  v.  Parker,  14 

C.  P.  322;  see  also  Eipley  v.  Great  Colo.  386,  23  Pae.  443,  20  Am.  St. 

Northern  Ry.  Co.,  L.  E.  10  Ch.  App.  Rep.  277,  2  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 

435.  91.     "In  those  eases  the  words  are 

i9East  &  West  India  Docks  etc.  'injuriously  affected,'  which  are  cer- 

Co.  V.  Gattke,  3  McN.  &  G.  155 ;  New  tainly  in  meaning  and  intention  the 

River  Co.  v.  Johnson,  2  E.  &  E.  435;  same  as  the  word  'damaged'  in  our 

S.  C.  105  E.  C.  L.  R.  434.  constitution." 

2  0Rickett's  Case,  2  Bng.  &  Irish 
App.  193. 


§  348 


PEOPEETV  DAMAGED    OE    I^fJUEED. 


629 


injuriously  affected,  says:  "All  these  terms  are  believed  to  be 
equivalent  in  meaning  and  extent."  ^^  And  the  Supreme  Court 
of  Washington,  speaking  of  these  words  in  recent  constitutions, 
says  that,  though  the  constitutions  differ  slightly  in  phraseology, 
''their  substance  is  exactly  the  same."  "*  And  so  of  other 
courts.^''  ' 

§  348  (223).  Damages  from  change  of  grade.  All 
damage  resulting  to  abutting  property  by  reason  of  lowering  or 
raising  the  street  in  front  of  it,  is  within  the  constitutional  pro- 
visions in  question,  and  compensation  must  be  made  therefor.^" 


2  3Peel  V.  Atlanta,  85  Ga.  138,  11  S. 
E.  582,  2  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  413. 

z^Brown  v.  City  of  Seattle,  5 
Wash.  35,  31  Pac.  313,  32  Pac.  Rep. 
214,  7  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  64. 

2  5Tidewater  Ry.  Co.  v.  Shartzer, 
107  Va.  562,  59  S.  E.  407. 

2  6Montgomery  v.  Townsend,  80 
Ala.  489;  S.  C.  84  Ala.  478,  4  So.  780; 
Winter  v.  City  Council,  83  Ala.  589 ; 
City  Council  of  Montgomery  v.  Mad- 
dox,  89  Ala.  181,  7  So.  433,  2  Am.  R. 
R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  426 ;  Town  of  Avon- 
dale  V.  McFarland,  101  Ala.  381,  13 
So.  504;  Montgomery  v.  Lemle,  121 
Ala.  609,  25  So.  919;  New  Decatur  v. 
Scharfenberg,  147  Ala.  367,  41  So. 
1025,  119  Am.  St.  Rep.  81 ;  Reardon 
V.  San  Francisco,  66  Cal.  492,  56  Am. 
Rep.  109;  De  Long  v.  Warren  (Cal.) 
36  Pac.  1009 ;  Eaehus  v.  Los  Angeles 
Consol.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  103  Cal.  614,  37 
Pac.  750,  42  Am.  St.  Rep.  149;  Ban- 
croft V.  San  Diego,  120  Cal.  432; 
Eaehus  V.  Los  Angeles,  130  Cal.  492, 
62  Pac.  829;  Smith  v.  Los  Angeles, 
136  Cal.  156,  68  Pac.  595;  Atlanta  v. 
Green,  67  Ga.  386 ;  Moore  v.  Atlanta, 
70  Ga.  611 ;  Castlebury  v.  Atlanta,  74 
Ga.  164;  Atlanta  v.  Wood,  78  Ga. 
276;  Atkinson  v.  Atlanta,  81  Ga.  625, 
7  S.  E.  692;  Smith  v.  Floyd  County, 
85  Ga.  422,  11  S.  E.  850;  City  Council 
of  Augusta  V.  Schrameck,  96  Ga.  426, 
23  S.  E.  400;  Bariield  v.  Macon  Co., 
109  Ga.  386,  34  S.  E.  598;  Rough  ton 
V.  Atlanta,  113  Ga.  948,  39  S.  E.  316; 


Ficken  v.  Atlanta,  114  Ga.  970,  41  S. 
E.  58;  Columbus  v.  McDaniel,  117  Ga. 
823,  45  S.  E.  59;  East  Rome  v.  Lloyd, 
124  Ga.  852,  53  S.  E.  103;  Atlantic 
etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  McKnight,  125  Ga.  328, 
54  S.  E.  148;  Macon  v.  Daly,  2  Ga. 
App.  355,  58  S.  E.  540;  Pekin  v. 
Brereton,  67  III.  477 ;  Bloomington  v. 
Brokaw,  77  111.  1.94;  Pekin  v.  Winkel, 
77  111.  56;  Elgin  v.  Eaton,  83  111.  535, 
25  Am.  Rep.  412;  S.  C.  2  III.  App.  90; 
Springer  v.  City  of  Chicago,  135  111. 
552,  26  N.  E.  514,  12  L.R.A.  609,  4 
Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  52;  Tinker  v. 
City  of  Rockford,  137  111.  123,  27  N. 
E.  74;  Tinker  v.  City  of  Rockford 
(111.)  28  N.  E.  573;  Hohman  v.  City 
of  Chicago,  140  111.  226,  29  N.  E.  071 ; 
City  of  Bloomington  v.  Pollack,  141 
111.  346,  31  N.  E.  146;  City  of  Joliet  v. 
Blower,  155  111.  414,  40  X.  E.  619; 
Schroeder  v.  Joliet,  189  111.  48,  59  N. 
E.  550,  52  L.R.A.  634;  Chicago  v. 
Jackson,  196  111.  496,  63  N.  E.  1013; 
Chicago  V.  Lonergan,  196  111.  518,  63 
N.  E.  1018;  Grant  Park  v.  Trah,  218 
111.  516,  75  N.  E.  1040;  City  of  Elgin 
V.  McCullum,  30  111.  App.  416;  Os- 
good V.  Chicago,  44  111.  App.  532; 
City  of  Springfield  v.  Griffith,  46  111. 
App.  246;  City  of  Savanna  v.  Loop, 
47  111.  App.  214;  City  of  Joliet  v. 
Blower,  49  111.  App.  464;  Hermann 
V.  City  of  East  St.  Louis,  58  111.  App. 
166;  Hopkins  v.  City  of  Ottawa,  59 
111.  App.  288;  North  Alton  v.  Dorsett, 
59  UK  App.  612;  East  St.  Louis  v. 


630 


EM12^-J:NT  DOMAIIT. 


§  348 


It  is  immaterial  wlietlier  the  whole  surface  of  the  street  is  raised 
or  lowered  or  only  a  part  of  it,  as  where  a  causeway  is  built  in 


Murphy,  89  111.  App.  22;  Danville  v. 
Sehultz,  99  111.  App.  287 ;  Barrington 
V.  Meyer,  103  111.  App.  124;  Wheeler 
V.  Bloomington,  105  111.  App.  97; 
Grant  Park  v.  Trah,  115  111.  App. 
291 ;  Charleston  v.  Newman,  130  111. 
App.  6;  Henderson  v.  McClain,  102 
Ky.  402,  43  S.  W.  700,  39  L.R.A.  349; 
Layman  v.  Heeler,  113  Ky.  221,  67 
S.  W.  995;  Hay  v.  Lexington,  114  Ky. 
665,  71  S.  W.  867;  Ludlow  T.  Det- 
weller,  20  Ky.  L.  R.  894,  47  S.  W. 
881;  Louisville  v.  Hegan,  20  Ky.  L. 
R.  1532,  49  S.  W.  532;  Mt.  Sterling 
V.  Jephson,  21  Ky.  L.  R.  1028,  53  S. 
W.  1046;  Covington  v.  Taffee,  24  Ky. 
L.  R.  373,  68  S.  W.  629 ;  Manning  v. 
Shreveport,  119  La.  1044,  44  So.  882; 
Diekerman  v.  Duluth,  88  Minn.  288, 
92  N.  W.  1119;  Salden  v.  Little  Falls, 
102  Minn.  358,  113  N.  W.  884,  120 
Am.  St.  Rep.  635,  13  L.R.A.  (N.S.) 
790;  Vicksburg  v.  Herman,  72  Miss. 
211,  16  So.  434;  Rainey  v.  Hinds 
County,  78  Miss.  308,  28  So.  875: 
Yazoo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Lefoldt,  87 
Miss.  317,  39  So.  459;  Werth  v. 
Springfield,  78  Mo.  107 ;  Householder 
V.  City  of  Kansas  City,  83  Mo.  488 ; 
Davis  V.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  119  Mo. 
180,  24  S.  W.  77,  41  Am.  St.  Rep. 
648,  9  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  117; 
Hickman  v.  City  of  Kansas,  120  Mo. 
no,  25  S.  W.  225;  Spencer  v.  Met. 
St.  R.  R.  Co.,  120  Mo.  154,  23  S.  W. 
126,  22  L.R.A.  668;  Clinkingbeard  v. 
City  of  St.  Joseph,  122  Mo.  641,  27 
S.  W.  521;  Smith  v.  City  of  St. 
Joseph,  122  Mo.  643,  27  S. 
W.  344;  Smith  v.  City  of  Kansas 
City,  128  Mo.  23,  30  S.  W.  314; 
Farrar  v.  Midland  Elec.  Ry.  Co.,  162 
Mo.  469,  63  S.  W.  115;  Imber  v.  City 
of  Springfield,  30  Mo.  App.  689 ;  Car- 
son V.  City  of  Springfield,  53  Mo. 
App.  289 ;  Walker  v.  Sedalia,  74  Mo. 
App.  70;  Hampton  v.  Kansas  City, 


74  Mo.  App.  129 ;  Restesky  v.  Delmar 
Ave.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  106  Mo.  App.  382, 
85  S.  W.  665 ;  Less  v.  Butte,  28  Mont. 
27,  72  Pac.  140,  98  Am.  St.  Rep.  545, 
61  L.R.A.  601;  Schaller  v.  City  of 
Omaha,  23  Neb.  325,  36  N.  W.  533; 
City  of  Omaha  v.  Kramer,  25  Neb. 
49^  41  N.  W.  295,  13  Am.  St.  Rep. 
504;  City  of  Omaha  v.  Schaller,  26 
Neb.  522,  42  N.  W.  721 ;  Hammond  v. 
City  of  Harvard,  31  Neb.  635,  48  N. 
W.  462;  Lowe  v.  Omaha,  33  Neb. 
587,  50  N.  W.  760;  Fremont  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Setright,  34  Neb.  253,  51 
N.  W.  833;  Svanson  v.  City  of 
Omaha,  38  Neb.  550,  57  N.  W.  289; 
Dayton  v.  City  of  Lincoln,  39  Neb.  74, 
57  N.  W.  754;  Harvard  v.  Crouch,  47 
Neb.  133,  66  N.  W.  276;  Douglas 
County  V.  Taylor,  50  Neb.  535; 
Omaha  L.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Douglas 
County,  62  Neb.  1,  86  N.  W.  936; 
New  Brighton  v.  United  Presbyterian 
Church,  96  Pa.  St.  331 ;  Pusey  v.  Alle- 
gheny, 98  Pa.  St.  522 ;  New  Brighton 
V.  Peirsol,  107  Pa.  St.  280 ;  O'Brien  v. 
Penn.  S.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  119  Pa.  St.  184, 
13  Atl.  74;  Ogden  v.  City  of  Philadel- 
phia, 143  Pa.  St.  430,  22  Atl.  694; 
O'Brien  v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  150 
Pa.  St.  589,  24  Atl.  1047,  30  Am.  St. 
Rep.  832;  Lawrence  v.  Philadelphia, 
154  Pa.  St.  20,  25  Atl.  1079 ;  Mellor 
v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  160  Pa.  St. 
614,  28  Atl.  991;  Brady  v.  Wilkes- 
barre,  161  Pa.  St.  246,  28  Atl.  1085; 
City  of  Philadelphia  v.  Rudderow, 
166  Pa.  St.  241,  31  Atl.  53;  Lewis  v. 
Borough  of  Darby,  166  Pa.  St.  613,  31 
Atl.  335;  Seaman  v.  Borough  of 
Washington,  172  Pa.  St.  467,  33  Atl. 
756;  In  re  Chatham  St.,  191  Pa.  St. 
604,  43  Atl.  365;  Kelenke  v.  West 
Homestead,  216  Pa.  St.  476,  65  Atl. 
1079;  Bond  v.  Philadelphia,  218  Pa. 
St.  475,  67  Atl.  805 ;  Norristown's  Ap- 
peal, 3  Walker's  Pa.  Supm.  Ct.  146; 


§  348 


PKOPEETX  DAMAGED  OE  INJUEED. 


631 


the  middle,^ '^  or  an  embankment  on  one  side,^*  or  the  sidewalk 
only  is  raised  or  lowered.^^  When  a  roadway  forty  feet  wide 
was  graded  doAvn  by  a  turnpike  company  in  the  middle  of  a 
highway  sixty  feet  wide,  and  thirty  years  after  the  public  au- 
thorities graded  down  the  sides  of  the  street  to  correspond,  it 
was  held  to  be  a  change  of  grade.^"  Where  a  street  is  opened 
and  graded  in  one  proceeding,  compensation  should  be  assessed 
both  for  the  taking  and  the  grading.^  ^  But  where  a  change  is 
made  from  the  natural  grade  after  a  street  is  opened,  compen- 


In  re  Levering  Street,  14  Phil.  349; 
In  re  Germantown  Ave.,  14  Phil.  351 ; 
Lloyd  V.  Philadelphia,  17  Phil.  202; 
Wilkesbarre  Paper  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
Wilkesbarre,  5  Luzerne  Leg.  Reg. 
Rep.  333;  Cooper  v.  Seranton  City, 
21  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  17;  Seale  v.  Lead, 

10  S.  D.  312,  39  L.R.A.  345;  Texar- 
kana  v.  Talbot,  7  Tex.  Civ.  App.  202, 
26  S.  W.  451 ;  San  Antonio  v.  Mullaly, 

11  Tex.  Civ.  App.  590,  33  S.  W.  256; 
City  of  Ft.  Worth  v.  Howard,  3  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  537,  22  S.  W.  1059;  Kim- 
ball V.  Salt  Lake  City,  32  Utah  253, 
90  Pac.  395 ;  Hempstead  v.  Salt  Lake 
City,  32  Utah  261,  90  Pac.  397; 
Swift  V.  Newport  News,  105  Va.  108, 
52  S.  E.  821,  3  L.R.A.(N.S.)  404; 
Brown  v.  City  of  Seattle,  5  Wash. 
35,  31  Pac.  313,  32  Pac.  Rep.  214,  7 
Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  64;  Swope  v. 
Seattle,  35  Wash.  69,  76  Pac.  517; 
Compton  V.  Seattle,  38  Wash.  514,  80 
Pac.  757 ;  Hart  v.  Seattle,  42  Wash. 
113,  84  Pac.  640;  Fletcher  v.  Seattle, 
43  Wash.  627,  86  Pac.  1046,  88  Pac. 
843;  Johnson  v.  Parkersburg,  16  W. 
Va.  402,  37  Am.  Rep.  779;  Hutchin- 
son v.  Parkersburg,  25  W.  Va.  226; 
Blair  v.  Charleston,  43  W.  Va.  62, 
64  Am.  St.  Rep.  837,  35  L.R.A.  852; 
Barnes  v.  Grafton,  61  W.  Va.  408,  50 
S.  E.  608;  Crowe  v.  Charlestown,  02 
W.  Va.  91 ;  Chicago  v.  Taylor,  125  U. 
S.  161 ;  McElroy  v.  Kansas  City,  21 
Fed.  257;  Lehigh  Valley  Coal  Co.  v. 
Chicago,  26  Fed.  415;  Blanchard  v. 
City  of  Kansas,  5  McCrary  217; 
Queen  v.  Vestry  of  St.  Luke's  etc.,  L. 


R.  6  Q.B.572;S.  C.7L.R.Q.B.  148; 
Queen  v.  The  Wallasey  Local  Board 
of  Health,  L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  351 ;  Queen  v. 
Eastern  Counties  Ry.  Co.,  2  A.  &  E. 
N.  S.  347;  S.  C.  42  E.  C.  L.  R.  706; 
Adams  v.  Toronto,  12  Ontario,  243; 
Veomans  v.  Wellington,  4  U.  C.  App. 
301;  Pratt  V.  City  of  Stratford,  16 
U.  C.  App.  5;  Moore  v.  Great  South- 
ern etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  10  Irish  C.  L.  R. 
46;  Tuohey  v.  Same,  10  Irish,  C.  L. 
R.  98. 

2'Eachus  V.  Los  Angeles  Consoli- 
dated Electric  R.  R.  Co.,  103  Cal.  614, 
37  Pac.  750,  42  Am.  St.  Rep.  149; 
Rainey  v.  Hinds  County,  78  Miss.  308, 
28  So.  875;  Chouteau  v.  St.  Louis,  8 
Mo.  App.  48;  see  also  the  following 
cases  under  statutes,  but  involving 
the  same  principle:  Stickford  v.  St. 
Louis,  7  Mo.  App.  217;  affirmed  in 
75  Mo.  309;  Dore  v.  Milwaukee,  42 
Wis.  108. 

2  8Shawneetown  v.  Mason,  82  111. 
337,  25  Am.  Rep.  321. 

2  9  City  Council  of  Montgomery  v. 
Maddox,  89  Ala.  181,  7  So.  433,  2 
Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  426;  Grant 
Park  V.  Trah,  218  111.  516,  75  N.  E. 
1040,  affirming  S.  C.  115  111.  App. 
291.  And  see  cases  cited  in  next  sec- 
tion. 

soHarp  v.  Glenolden,  28  Pa.  Supr. 
Ct.  116.  See  Thompson  v.  Macon 
City,  106  Mo.  App.  84,  80  S.  W.  1. 

siPusey  V.  Allegheny,  98  Pa.  St. 
522;  Sedgeley  Ave.,  217  Pa.  St.  313, 
66  Atl.  546. 


632 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


§  34S 


sation  must  be  made  for  the  change.^  ^     The  contrary  is  held  in 


3  2Eachus  V.  Los  Angeles  Consol. 
El.  E.  E.  Co.,  103  Cal.  614,  37  Pac. 
750,  42  Am.  St.  Eep.  149;  City  of 
Bloomington  v.  Pollack,  141  111.  346, 
31  N.  E.  146;  City  of  Elgin  v.  Eaton, 
83  111.  535,  25  Am.  Eep.  412;  Man- 
ning T.  Shreveport,  119  La.  1044,  44 
So.  882;  Sallden  v.  Little  Falls,  102 
Minn.  358,  113  N.  W.  884,  120  Am.  St. 
Rep.  635,  13  L.R.A.(N.S.)  790;  Davis 
V.  Missouri  Pac.  E.  E.  Co.,  119  Mo. 
180,  24  S.  W.  777,  41  Am.  St.  Eep. 
648,  9  Am.  E.  E.  &  Corp.  Eep.  117  j 
Hickman  v.  City  of  Kansas,  120  Mo. 
110,  25  S.  W.  225;  Smith  v.  St.  Jo- 
seph, 122  Mo.  643,  27  S.  W.  344;  Less 
V.  Butte,  28  Mont.  27,  72  Pac.  140, 
98  Am.  St.  Eep.  545,  61  L.E.A.  601 ; 
New  Brighton  v.  United  Presbyterian 
Church,  96  Pa.  St.  331;  Hendrick's 
Appeal,  103  Pa.  St.  358;  Jones  v. 
Bangor,  144  Pa.  St.  638,  23  Atl.  252 ; 
O'Brien  v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  150 
Pa.  St.  589,  24  Atl.  1047,  30  Am.  St. 
Eep.  832;  Winner  v.  Graner,  173  Pa. 
St.  43,  33  Atl.  698;  Klenke  v.  West 
Homestead,  216  Pa.  St.  476,  65  Atl. 
1079;  Norristown's  Appeal,  3  Walk- 
er's Pa.  Supm.  Ct.  146;  Wilkesbarre 
Paper  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Wilkesbarre,  5  Lu- 
zerne Legal  Eeg.  Eep.  333;  City  of 
Ft.  Worth  V.  Howard,  3  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  537,  22  S.  W.  1059 ;  Fletcher  v. 
Seattle,  43  Wash.  627,  86  Pac.  1046, 
88  Pac.  843.  In  the  first  case  cited 
the  court  says:  "The  same  rule  is 
applicable  when  a  street  is  for  the 
first  time  reduced  to  an  established 
grade  as  when  a  change  in  the  grade 
has  been  made  after  the  street  has 
once  been  brought  to  such  grade. 
The  suggestion  that,  when  the  owner 
dedicates  his  land  for  a  street,  it  is 
with  the  understanding  and  consent 
on  his  part,  binding  also  upon  his 
grantees,  that  it  will  be  subsequently 
fitted  for  use  by  grading,  applies  with 
as   much    force   to    any   subsequent 


change  in  the  established  grade  as  to 
the  first  establishment  of  a  grade. 
The  power  of  the  city  to  determine 
the  grade  is  not  exhausted  with  its 
first  exercise,  and  the  dedication  by 
the  owner  must  be  deemed  to  have 
been  made  with  a  knowledge  of  this 
principle  as  much  as  with  a  consent 
to  the  establishment  of  any  grade. 
The  purchaser  of  a  city  lot  fronting 
upon  a.  street  takes  it  subject  to  a 
right  in  the  public  to  make  the  street 
available  for  the  enjoyment  of  the 
easement  therein  for  which  the  street 
was  originally  dedicated;  but  we  are 
not  aware  that  it  has  ever  been  held, 
where  the  foregoing  constitutional 
provision  prevailed,  that  the  public 
had  a  right  to  establish  any  grade 
it  might  choose,  irrespective  of  the 
damage  such  owner  might  sustain. 
This  right  to  establish  a  grade  in  the 
street  is  attended  with  the  corres- 
ponding obligation  imposed  by  the 
constitution  to  make  compensation 
for  any  damage  to  the  private  prop- 
erty which  may  be  caused  by  the  pub- 
lie  in  its  exercise  of  the  right.  It 
may  be  conceded  that  the  dedication 
of  a  street  carries  with  it  the  right 
to  make  such  a  reasonable  grade  as 
will  adapt  it  for  use,  for  in  such  a 
case  the  grading  of  the  street  would 
have  the  efl^ect  to  increase  rather 
than  to  diminish  the  value  of  the  lots 
adjacent  thereto  by  making  them  ac- 
cessible to  the  public ;  but,  if  the  mu- 
nicipality deems  it  desirable  to  estab- 
lish such  a  grade  as  will  cause  a 
damage  rather  than  a  benefit  to  tlie 
lots,  the  owner  is  entitled  to  compen- 
sation for  the  amount  of  this  dam- 
age. The  establishment  of  the  grade 
is  for  the  benefit  of  the  public  rather 
than  of  the  adjacent  owner,  and  if, 
in  establishing  such  grade,  the  owner 
suffers  damage,  his  property  has  been 
damaged  'for  public  use.'" 


§  348 


I'EOrEIlTY  DAMAGED  OK.  INJUEED. 


G33 


Colorado.^'  One  who  buys  property  on  a  street  after  a  grade 
has  been  established  should  improve  with  reference  to  the  estab- 
lished grade  and  not  with  reference  to  the  natural  grade.  And 
where,  in  such  a  case,  the  purchaser  improved  with  reference 
to  the  natural  grade,  and  the  city  afterwards  cut  down  the  street 
three  feet  to  the  established  grade,  it  was  held  that  no  recovery 
could  be  had.^*  And  generally  if  improvements  are  put  upon 
property  after  a  grade  has  been  established,  no  damages  can  be 
recovered  for  injury  to  such  improvements  by  bringing  the  street 
to  the  grade  so  established.^^  The  constitution  does  not  apply 
to  a  change  of  grade  made  prior  to  its  adoption,^"  but  it  is  no 
bar  to  a  recovery  that  the  change  was  ordered  or  the  grade  estab- 
lished prior  to  the  adoption  of  the  constitution,  if  the  actual 
change  was  not  made  until  afterwards.*''     Nor  that  the  improve- 


33Leiper  v.  Denver,  36  Colo.  HO, 
85  Pac.  849,  118  Am.  St.  Eep.  101,  7 
L.E.A.(N.S.)  108.  The  court  says: 
"We  are  now  constrained  to  hold  that 
for  reasonable,  and  carefully  made, 
changes  of  the  grade  of  a,  public 
street  from  the  natural  surface  to  a 
legally  established  grade  in  the  first 
instance,  a  municipality  is  not  liable 
to  the  abutting  lot  owner  for  conse- 
quential damages  to  his  property." 
p.  113. 

34Denver  v.  Vemia,  8  Colo.  399. 

3  5Manning  v.  Shreveport,  119  La. 
1044,  44  So.  882;  Davis  v.  Mo.  Pac. 
R.  E.  Co.,  119  Mo.  180,  24  S.  W.  777, 
41  Am.  St.  Eep.  648,  9  Am.  E.  E.  & 
Corp.  Eep.  117;  Clinkingbeard  v.  St. 
Joseph,  122  Mo.  641,  27  S.  W.  521 ; 
Axford  V.  Philadelphia,  19  Phila. 
483;  Blair  v.  Charleston,  43  W.  Va. 
62,  64  Am.  St.  Eep.  837,  35  L.E.A. 
852.  Compare  Nolte  v.  Cincinnati,  3 
Ohio  C.  C.  503.  In  this  case  it  was 
held,  that  if  the  work  of  bringing  a 
street  to  an  established  grade  was 
not  done  in  a  reasonable  time,  prop- 
erty owners  might  consider  the  grade 
abandoned,  and  improve  their  prop- 
erty with  reference  to  the  existing 
grade,  and  recover  damages  to  such 
improvements    if    the    change    was 


afterwards  made.  The  court  says: 
"To  say  that,  in  a  large  city,  where 
property  is  of  so  great  value,  and 
taxes  high,  the  city  can  by  a  mere 
paper  ordinance,  fix  a  grade  which 
may  require  heavy  cuts  and  fills  to 
be  made,  and  keep  back  any  improve- 
ment according  to  the  grade  for  a 
great  many  years,  and  prevent  the 
abutting  proprietor  from  making  any 
improvements  on  his  property  except 
according  to  such  grade,  and  which 
improvement  may  be  entirely  inacces- 
sible until  the  grade  is  made,  and 
which  the  city  may  never  carry  out, 
seems  to  us  as  sacrificing  the  in- 
terests of  property  holders  in  a  man- 
ner the  spirit  of  our  law  does  not 
warrant."  p.  507. 

36Folkenson  v.  Easton  Borough, 
116  Pa.  St.  523. 

3  7Eachus  V.  Los  Angeles  Consol. 
El.  E.  E.  Co.,  103  Cal.  614,  37  Pac. 
750,  42  Am.  St.  Eep.  149;  City  of 
Bloomington  v.  Pollack,  141  111.  346, 
31  N.  E.  146;  Ogden  v.  City  of  Phila- 
delphia, 143  Pa.  St.  430,  22  Atl.  694; 
Swift  V.  Newport  News,  105  Va.  108, 
62  S.  E.  821,  3  L.E.A.(N.S.)  404. 
Compare  Chicago  v.  Eumsey,  87  111. 
348;  In  re  Plan  166,  143  Pa.  St.  414, 
22  Atl.  689. 


G34  EMINEITT    DOMAIN.  §    348 

ments  were  made  before  the  constitution  was  changed.*®  The 
right  to  compensation  accrues  when  the  change  of  grade  is  ac- 
tually made  and  is  governed  by  the  law  in  force  at  that  time.*^ 
If  a  change  of  grade  is  made  without  the  authority  of  the  city,  it 
Avill  not  be  liable  for  damages  resulting  therefrom,**'  but  a  grade 
not  legally  established  may  be  ratified  and  adopted  so  as  to  bind 
the  city.*^  When  a  city  ordered  a  change  of  grade  of  a  railroad, 
necessitating  a  change  of  grade  in  the  streets  crossing  it,  the 
latter  change  is  authorized  as  much  as  if  specified  in  the  order.*  ^ 
The  fact  that  a  change  of  grade  was  made  by  a  city  to  enable 
it  to  construct  a  system  of  sewers  calculated  to  abate  a  nuisance, 
does  not  affect  the  right  to  compensation.**  Where  a  change  of 
grade  damaged  lots  on  an  intersecting  street  by  preventing  the 
flow  of  surface  water  therefrom,  it  was  held  that  the  owner  could 
recover.**  And  so  generally  when  property  is  damaged  by  in- 
terfering with  surface  water.*^  If  the  change  is  made  by  a 
railroad  company,  with  or  without  authority,  the  company  is 
liable.*®  A  deed,  or  dedication  of  land  for  a  street  is  no  bar  to 
recovery.*''  Where  a  sidewalk  was  built  by  special  assessment 
and  the  grade  changed  in  doing  so,  it  was  held  that  the  assess- 
ment was  no  bar  to  a  recovery  of  damages  for  the  change  of 
grade.*®  But  if  one  requests  the  change  to  be  made,  he  is  es- 
topped to  claim  damages  because  of  the  change.*^ 

ssDickerman  v.  Diilutli,  88  Minn.  <4In  re  Chatham  Street,  191  Pa. 

288,  92  N".  W.  1119;  Kimball  v.  Salt  St.  604,  43  Atl.  365. 
Lake  City,  32  Utah  253,  90  Pac.  395.  *  5Barfield  v.  Macon  County,   109 

ssEast  Rome  v.  Lloyd,  124  Ga.  852,  Ga.  386,  34  S.  E.  596 ;  Hay  v.  Lexing- 

53  S.  E.  103;  Devlin  v.  Philadelphia,  ton,  114  Ky.  665,  71  S.  W.  867;   Mt. 

206  Pa.   St.  518,  56  Atl.  21;   ante,  Sterling  v.   Jephson,  21   Ky.  L.  R. 

§  338.  1028,  53  S.  W.  1046. 

<0Bibb  County  v.  Reese,  115  Ga.  ^sAtlantic  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
346,  41  S.  E.  636;  Werth  v.  Spring-  Knight,  125  Ga.  328,  54  S.  E.  148; 
field,  22  Mo.  App.  12 ;  Gardner  v.  St.  Yazoo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Lefoldt,  87 
Joseph,  96  Mo.  App.  657,  71  S.  W.  Miss.  317,  39  So.  459;  Farrar  v.  Mid- 
63.  And  see  Vaile  v.  City  of  Inde-  land  Elec.  Ry.  Co.,  162  Mo.  469,  63 
pendence,  116  Mo.  333,  22  S.  W.  Rep.  S.  W.  115. 

695;    Huckenstein    v.  City  of  Alle-  4 'Houston  v.  Bartels,  36  Tex.  Civ. 

gheny,  165  Pa.  St.  367,  30  Atl.  Rep.  App.  498,  82  S.  W.  323;  Fletcher  v. 

982.  Seattle,  43  Wash.  627,  86  Pac.  1048, 

4iBibb  County  v.  Reese,  115  Ga.  88  Pac.  843. 
346,  41  S.  E.  636;  Imler  v.  City  of  4SGrant    Park   v.    Trah,    218    111. 

Springfield,  30  Mo.  App.  669.  516,  75  N.  E.  1040,  affirming  S.  C. 

4=Lewis  v.  Homestead,  194  Pa.  St.  115  111.  App.  291. 
190.  45  Atl.  123.  4  9New  Decatur    v.   Scharfenberg, 

"City  of  Philadelphia  v.  Rudde-  147  Ala.  367,  41  So.  1025,  119  Am.  St. 

row,  166  Pa.  St.  241,  31  Atl.  53.  Rep.  81. 


350 


PEOPEKTY  DAMAGED  OE  INJUEED. 


6c: 


§  349  (223a).  Viaducts,  tunnels,  causeways,  bridge 
approaches  and  the  like  in  streets.  The  construction  of  via- 
ducts, bridges  and  tunnels  and  approaches  thereto,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  carrying  streets  over  or  under  railroad  tracks,  streams  or 
other  obstructions,  though  often  of  great  public  utility,  is  fre- 
quently attended  with  great  damage  to  property  abutting  on  such 
improvements.  All  such  damage  is  within  the  constitution  and 
may  be  recovered.^*  Such  improvements  stand  upon  the  same 
footing  as  a  change  of  grade.^^  So  a  recovery  may  be  had  where 
the  grade  of  a  street  is  raised  for  the  purpose  of  forming  a 
levee,^^  or  where  an  approach  to  a  bridge  is  built  therein  which 
affects  the  abutting  property  by  impeding  access  and  by  the 
dust,  noise  and  jarring  caused  by  traffic  on  the  same.'^ 

§  350  (224).     Decisions  in  Alabama  and  Pennsylvania. 


socity  of  Pueblo  v.  Strait,  20  Colo. 
13,  36  Pac.  790,  47  Am.  St.  Rep.  273, 

24  L.II.A.  392;  Smith  v.  Floyd 
County,  86  Ga.  422,  11  S.  E.  850; 
Bentley  v.  Atlanta,  92  Ga.  623,  18  S. 
E.  1013;  Pause  v.  Atlanta,  98  Ga. 
92,  58  Am.  St.  Rep.  290;  Stack  v. 
East  St.  Louis,  85  111.  377,  28  Am. 
Rep.  619;  Springer  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago, 135  III.  552,  26  N.  E.  514,  12 
L.R.A.  609,  4  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
52;  Tinker  v.  City  of  Rockford,  137 
111.  123,  27  N.  E.  74 ;  Tinker  v.  City 
of  Rockford  (111.),  28  N.  E.  573; 
Hohman  v.  City  of  Chicago,  140  III. 
226,  29  N.  E.  671;  Hermann  v.  City 
of  East  St.  Louis,  58  111.  App.  166; 
Chicago  V.  JlcShane,  102  111.  App. 
239;  Chicago  v.  Anglmn,  104  III.  App. 
188;  Star  &  Crescent  Milling  Co.  v. 
Sanitary  District,  120  111.  App.  555; 
Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cumnock, 

25  Ky.  L.  R.  1330,  77  S.  W.  933; 
Spencer  r.  iletropolitan  St.  R.  R. 
Co.,  120  Mo.  154,  23  S.  W.  126,  22 
L.R.A.  668;  City  of  Omaha  v.  Kra- 
mer, 25  Neb.  492,  41  N.  W.  295,  13 
Am.  St.  Rep.  504;  Fremont  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Setright,  34  Neb.  253,  51  N.  W. 
833;  County  of  Chester  v.  Brower, 
117  Pa.  St.  647,  12  Atl.  577;  Brower 
V.  County  of  Chester,  1  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  1 ; 
Beaver  v.  City  of  Harrisburg,  156  Pa. 


St.  547,  27  Atl.  4;  Case  v.  Pennsyl- 
vania Co.,  159  Pa.  St.  273,  28  Atl. 
161 ;  Lafean  v.  York  County,  20  Pa. 
Supr.  Ct.  573;  Coyne  v.  Memphis,  118 
Tenn.  651, 102  S.  W.  355 ;  Burton  Lum- 
ber Co.  v.  Houston,  45  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
363;  Chicago  v.  Taylor,  125  U.  S. 
161;  Chicago  v.  Le  Moyne,  119  Fed. 
662,  56  C.  C.  A.  278.  And  see  Eachus 
V.  Los  Angeles  Cousol.  El.  R.  R.  Co., 
103  Cal.  614,  37  Pac.  750,  42  Am.  St. 
Rep.  149;  Shano  v.  Bridge  Co.,  189 
Pa.  St.  245,  42  Atl.  128,  69  Am.  St. 
Rep.  808;  In  re  Walnut  St.  Bridge, 
191  Pa.  St.  153,  43  Atl.  88;  Cobb  v. 
Warren  St.  Ry.  Co.,  218  Pa.  St.  366, 
G7  Atl.  654.  In  Chicago  v.  Rumsey, 
87  111.  348,  suit  was  brought  for  dam- 
ages to  property  abutting  on  the  open 
approach  to  a  tunnel  under  the  Chi- 
cago river.  A  recovery  was  denied 
because  the  ordinance  was  passed, 
the  contracts  let  and  the  work  com- 
menced before  the  new  constitution 
took  effect.  And  see  South  v.  East 
London  Ry.  Co.,  42  L.  J.  477. 

siSee  ante,  §  138. 

6  2Shawneetown  v.  Mason,  82  111. 
337,  25  Am.  Rep.  321;  Beckett  v. 
Midland  Ry.  Co.,  1  L.  R.  C.  P.  241 ; 
S.  C.  3  L.  R.  C.  P.  82. 

Esstack  v.  East  St.  Louis,  85  111. 
377. 


G36  EMIICENT  DOMAIN.  §    350 

What  constitutes  a  construction  or  enlargement  of  works, 
highways  or  improvements.  These  States  have  a  limited 
extension  of  the  right  to  damages,  requiring  municipal  and 
other  corporations  and  individuals  invested  with  the  power  of 
eminent  domain  to  make  compensation  for  property  taken,  in- 
jured or  destroyed  by  the  construction  or  enlargement  of  their 
works,  highways  or  improvements.^*  In  Pennsylvania  the  ques- 
tion as  to  what  constitutes  a  construction  or  enlargement  of  a 
street  or  highway  does  not  appear  to  have  been  discussed.  Suits 
for  damages  arising  from  a  change  of  grade,  whether  from  a 
natural  grade  or  an  established  grade  have  uniformly  been  up- 
held,^^  and  a  liberal  construction  of  the  constitution  has  been 
favored.*®  The  purport  of  the  decisions  is  that  any  change  of 
grade  is  within  the  provision  in  question.  A  different  view 
was  at  first  taken  in  Alabama  but  has  since  been  repudiated. 
In  City  Council  of  Montgomery  v.  Townsend,'^  it  was  held  that 
it  was  not  every  change  of  grade  that  could  be  considered  a  "con- 
struction" or  "enlargement"  of  a  street  or  highway,  but  only 
such  as  could  not  have  been  reasonably  and  fairly  foreseen  at 
the  time  of  the  original  establishment  of  the  street  or  high- 
way.''^    In  City  Council  of  Montgomery  v.  Maddox,*'  Somer- 

siAnte,  §§  16,  49.  In   re   Levering   St.,    14  Phil.   349; 

5  6New  Brighton  v.  United  Presby-  Lloyd  v.  Philadelphia,  17  Phil.  202; 

terian  Church,  96  Pa.  St.  331 ;  Pusey  Wilkesbarre     Paper     Mfg.     Co.     v. 

V.  Allegheny,  98  Pa.  St.  522;   Hen-  Wilkesbarre,    5    Luzerne    Leg.   Ecg. 

drick's  Appeal,  103  Pa.  St.  358 ;  New  Eep.  333. 

Brighton  v.  Piersol,  107  Pa.  St.  280;  6  6New  Brighton  v.  United  Prcs- 
O'Brien  V.  Penn.  S.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  119  byterian  Church,  96  Pa.  St.  331; 
Pa.  St.  184,  13  Atl.  74;  Ogden  V.  City  County  of  Chester  v.  Brower,  117 
of  Philadelphia,  143  Pa.  St.  430,  22  Pa.  St.  647,  12  Atl.  577. 
Atl.  694;  O'Brien  v.  City  of  Phila-  5780  Ala.  489,  2  So.  Rep.  155;  84 
delphia,  150  Pa.  St.  589,  24  Atl.  1047 ;  Ala.  478,  4  So.  780 
Mellor  V.  City  of  Philadelphia,  160  6  sin  City  Council  of  Montgomery 
Pa.  St.  614,  28  Atl.  991 ;  Brady  v.  v.  Townsend,  84  Ala.  478,  482,  4  So. 
Wilkesbarre,  161  Pa.  St.  246,  28  Atl.  Rep.  780,  it  is  said:  '"A  material 
1085;  City  of  Philadelphia  v.  Rudde-  change,  operating  injuriously  to  ad- 
row,  166  Pa.  St.  241,  31  Atl.  53;  joining  premises,  occasioned  by  a 
Lewis  V.  Borough  of  Darby,  166  Pa.  contingency  which  could  not  have 
St.  613,  31  Atl.  335;  Seaman  v.  been  reasonably  and  fairly  foreseen, 
Washington,  172  Pa.  St.  467,  33  Atl.  or,  made  merely  because  the  cor- 
756;  In  re  Chatham,  191  Pa.  St.  porate  authorities  may  judge  that 
604,  43  Atl.  365;  Klenlce  v.  West  the  public  convenience  would  be  in- 
Homestead,  216  Pa.  St.  476,  65  Atl.  creased  thereby,  or  the  general  ap- 
1079;  Bond  v.  Philadelphia,  218  Pa.  pefirance  of  the  street  improved,  is 
St.  475,  67  Atl.  805 ;  Norristown's  Ap-  a  new  description  of  injury  in  the 
peal,  3  Walker's  Pa.  Supm.  Ct.  146;  enlarged   sense  of   the  constitution, 


§  350 


PEOPEETY  DAMAGED  OE  INJUEED. 


637 


ville,  J.,  in  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court,  expressed  him- 
self as  follows:  "I  have  no  difficulty,  for  myself,  in  reaching 
the  conclusion  that,  under  the  provisions  of  our  present  consti- 
tution, if  the  contiguous  proprietor  of  a  house  and  lot  is  injured, 
in  the  sense  of  being  damaged,  by  the  grading  of  a  street,  in  the 
mode  exhibited  by  the  evidence  in  this  case,  and  this  grading 
is  done  by  the  authority  of  the  municipality,  and  by  reason 
of  this  improvement  the  pecuniary  value  of  the  property  is 
diminished,  the  owner  is  entitled  to  be  compensated  for  the  dam- 
ages he  has  sustained.  This  rule  has  the  advantage  of  being 
plain  in  meaning,  and  of  easy  application  in  practice.  It  har- 
monizes, moreover,  in  policy  with  that  distinguishing  feature  of 
modem  republican  constitutions  which  has  in  view  the  protec- 
tion of  private  rights  and  personal  liberty,  against  the  unjust 
oppression  and  encroachments  of  governmental  power;  and  the 
measure  of  damages  in  such  cases  will  be  the  decrease  in  the 


which  casts  upon  the  property  owner 
an  additional  burden,  entitling  him 
to  compensation.'  It  is  not  every 
change  operating  an  increase  of  con- 
venience which  falls  within  this 
rule.  Changes  generally  have  for 
their  object  increase  of  convenience. 
This  power  may  be  exercised  com- 
pletely at  one  time,  or,  on  several 
occasions,  as  circumstances  may  sug- 
gest; and  it  authorizes  the  munici- 
pality to  so  alter  the  grade  or  sur- 
face of  the  streets,  as  to  make  them 
useful,  convenient  and  safe  for  travel 
and  transportation,  as  the  same  may 
be  likely  to  be  in  request  generally, 
or  on  the  particular  street.  To 
come  within  the  clause  of  the  con- 
stitution we  are  discussing,  the 
change,  alteration  or  improvement 
must  go  beyond  this.  It  must  be  the 
result  of  a  contingency  not  likely  to 
be  foreseen,  or  anticipated,  or  must 
be  an  increasing  convenience  above 
the  ordinary  standard  of  'useful, 
convenient  and  safe,'  or,  must  be 
made  for  ornamentation  or  for  the 
purpose  of  improving  the  general  ap- 
pearance of  the  street.  We  have 
thus  attempted  to  define,  as  well  as 


we  can,  the  two  classes  of  street 
alteration  or  improvement.  The 
power  to  make  such  as  fall  within 
the  one  class,  is  conclusively  pre- 
sumed to  have  been  conferred  by  the 
act  of  dedication,  or  by  the  judg- 
ment of  condemnation.  In  fact,  it 
is  so  generally  conferred,  that  it  may 
almost  be  said  to  be  inherent  in  mu- 
nicipal organization.  For  the 
proper  exercise  of  this  power,  the 
attingent  property  holder,  though 
injured,  is  without  redress.  For  in- 
jury suffered  from  the  other,  he  is 
entitled  to  compensation  under  the 
new  provision  of  our  constitution 
of  1875.  But  whether  the  case  falls 
within  the  one  class  or  the  other, 
must  depend  on  so  many  phases  and 
shadings  of  fact,  that  it  can  rarely, 
if  ever,  become  a  question  of  law. 
Larger  license  must  be  allowed  in  a 
city  than  in  a  village,  in  a  commer- 
cial center  and  crowded  thorough- 
fare, than  in  an  obscure  off-street. 
Hence,  it  is  a  mixed  question  of  law 
and  fact,  to  be  pronounced  on  by  a 
jury  under  proper  instructions." 

5989  Ala.  181,  7  So.  433,  2  Am. 
R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  426. 


638  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    351 

actual  value  of  the  property  occasioned  by  the  improvement  thus 
made  for  the  public  benefit.  Unless  this  construction  be  given 
the  constitution,  it  will  fail,  in  my  opinion,  to  afford  that  just 
indemnity  for  the  wrongs  of  the  citizens  which  was  intended 
to  be  accomplished  by  its  framers ;  which  was,  I  repeat,  to  re- 
quire the  public  to  bear  the  burden  of  municipal  improvements 
of  this  nature  made  for  the  public  benefit,  and  not  to  crush  the 
private  citizen  by  imposing  upon  him  alone  the  entire  damage 
which  may  have  been  caused  to  his  property.  Such  an  improve- 
ment seems  to  me  to  be  a  'construction  or  enlargement'  of  a  high- 
way, within  the  meaning  of  the  clause  under  consideration. 
And  I  do  not  see  that  any  dedication  of  a  street,  however  long 
ago  it  may  have  been  made,  could  operate  to  withdraw  the  case 
from  the  operation  of  the  law,  in  force  at  the  time  the  improve- 
ment is  made,  which  declares,  in  effect,  that  the  municipality 
shall  indemnify  the  citizen  for  any  injury  or  damage  to  his 
property  resulting  from  such  improvement,  equally  with  any 
injury  or  damage  done  him  by  the  actual  taking  of  such  prop- 
erty. It  can  make  no  difference  in  the  justice  of  the  case  if 
one's  property  is  reduced  to  one-half  its  original  value  by  an 
actual  taking,  or  by  indirectly  covering  up  his  premises  with 
earth  piled  up  at  his  doorstep  in  leveling  a  street  or  in  digging 
down  a  sidewalk  so  as  to  render  a  ladder  necessary  for  access  to 
the  place  of  his  abode  or  his  business."  But  the  judges  were 
equally  divided  on  the  question  of  adopting  the  views  of  Justice 
Somerville  or  adhering  to  the  views  expressed  in  Townsend's 
case.  In  the  more  recent  case  of  Town  of  Avondale  v.  McFar- 
land,®"  the  majority  of  the  court  adopted  the  opinion  of  Justice 
Somerville  in  Maddox's  case,  and  Townsend's  case  was  overruled 
in  so  far  as  it  conflicted  with  that  opinion. 

A  county  has  been  held  to  be  a  municipal  corporation  within 
the  meaning  of  the  constitution.®^ 

§  351  (225).  Damages  by  railroads  in  streets.  Where 
a  railroad  is  laid  down  in  a  public  street  or  alley,  the  abutting 
property  is  damaged  within  the  meaning  of  the  constitution, 
to  the  extent  of  the  depreciation  caused  by  the  construction  and 
operation  of  the  road.''^     In  Pennsylvania,  where  the  consti- 

6  0101  Ala.  381,  13  So.  504.  Delaware  County's  Appeal,  119  Pa. 

siBrower  v.  County  of  Chester,  1  St.  159,  13  Atl.  62. 
Pa.  Co.  Ct.  1;  County  of  Chester  v.  6  2Columbu3   &   W.   R.   E.   Co.  v. 

Brower,  117  Pa.  St.  647,  12  Atl.  577;  Withrow,  82  Ala.  190;  Alabama  M. 


§  351 


PEOPEETY  DAMAGED  OE  IN'JUEED. 


639 


R.  R.  Co.  V.  Coskey,  92  Ala.  254,  9 
So.  202;  Highland  Ave.  &  B.  E.  R. 
Co.  V.  Matthews,  99  Ala.  24,  10  So. 
267 ;  Birmingham  Ry.  Lt.  &  P.  Co.  v. 
Oden,  146  Ala.  495,  41  So.  129;  Hot 
Springs  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Williamson,  45 
Ark.  429;  Little  Rock  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Greer,  77  Ark.  387,  96  S.  W.  129; 
Mullin  V.  So.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  83  Cal. 
240,  23  Pac.  264;  Eaehus  v.  Los  An- 
geles Consol.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  103  Cal. 
614,  37  Pac.  750,  42  Am.  St.  Rep.  149; 
Montgomery  v.  Santa  Ana  &  W.  R. 
R.  Co.,  104  Cal.  186,  37  Pac.  786,  10 
Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  25,  43  Am. 
St.  Rep.  89,  25  L.R.A.  654;  St.  Clair 
V.  San  Francisco  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  142 
Cal.  647,  76  Pac.  485;  Smith  v. 
Southern  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  146  Cal. 
164,  79  Pac.  868,  106  Am.  St.  Rep.  17; 
Reynolds  v.  Presidio  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

I  Cal.  App.  229,  81  Pac.  1118;  Denver 
V.  Boyer,  7  Colo.  113,  2  Pac.  6;  Den- 
ver etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Schmitt,  11  Colo. 
56;  Denver  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bourne, 

II  Colo.  59;  Denver  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Domke,  11  Colo.  247;  Union  Pac.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Foley,  19  Colo.  280,  35  Pac. 
542;  Union  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Benson, 
19  Colo.  285,  35  Pac.  544;  Colorado 
Mid.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Trevarthen,  1  Colo. 
App.  152,  27  Pac.  1012;  Denver  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Coates,  1  Colo.  App.  336, 
28  Pac.  1129;  Campbell  v.  Metropoli- 
tan St.  R.  R.  Co.,  82  Ga.  320,  9  S.  E. 
1078;  Fouche  v.  Rome  St.  R.  R.  Co., 
84  Ga.  233,  10  S.  E.  1046,  1  Am.  R.  R. 
&  Corp.  Rep.  188 ;  Ivey  v.  Georgia  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  84  Ga.  536,  11  S.  E.  128; 
Georgia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ray,  84  Ga. 
376,  11  S.  E.  352;  Brunswick  &  W. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Waycross,  88  Ga.  68,  13 
S.  E.  835;  Harvey  v.  Georgia  So.  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  90  Ga.  66,  15  S.  E.  783; 
Streyer  v.  Georgia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  90 
Ga.  56,  15  S.  E.  637;  Powell  v.  Macon 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  92  Ga.  209,  17  S.  E. 
1027;  Atlantic  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Knight,  125  Ga.  328,  54  S.  E.  148; 
Atlanta  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Atlanta  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  125  Ga.  529,  54  S.  E.  736; 


Mix  V.  La  Fayette  etc.  E.  R.  Co.,  07 
HI.  319;  Stone  v.  Fairbury  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  68  111.  394,  18  Am.  Rep.  556; 
Chicago  &  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Francis,  70  111.  238;  Stetson  v.  Chi- 
cago &  Evanston  R.  R.  Co.,  75  111.  74 ; 
Patterson  v.  Chicago,  D.  &  V.  R.  R. 
Co.,  75  111.  588;  Chicago,  M.  &  St. 
Paul  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hall,  90  111.  42;  S.  C. 
8  111.  App.  621;  Pittsburgh,  Ft. 
Wayne  &  Chicago  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Reide, 
101  111.  157;  Chicago  &  Western  I. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Ayers,  106  111.  511;  Chi- 
cago etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  McAuley,  121 
111.  160;  Penn  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Heiss,  141  111.  35,  31  N'.  E.  138,  0  Am. 
R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  407 ;  Chicago  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wedel,  144  111.  9,  32  N. 
E.  547;  Davenport  etc.  Terminal  Co. 
V.  Johnson,  188  111.  472,  59  N.  E.  497 ; 
111.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Turner,  194  111. 
575,  62  N.  E.  798,  affirming  S.  C.  97 
111.  App.  219;  Aldis  v.  Union  El.  R. 
R.  Co.,  203  111.  567,  68  N.  E.  95; 
Spalding  v.  Macomb  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  225 
111.  585,  80  N.  E.  327;  Chicago  & 
Western  Indiana  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Berg, 
10  111.  App.  607 ;  Same  v.  George,  Id. 
646;  Same  v.  Phillips,  Id.  648; 
Chicago  &  Eastern  111.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Loeb,  8  111.  App.  627;  Maltman  v. 
Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  41  111.  App. 
229;  McCarty  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  34  111.  App.  273;  Chicago  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Leach,  41  111.  App.  584; 
Atchison  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Piatt,  53 
111.  App.  263 ;  Lake  St.  El.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Brooks,  90  111.  App.  173;  111.  Cent. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Schmidgall,  91  111.  App. 
23;  HI.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kreeble,  95 
111.  App.  185;  Griveau  r.  South  Chi- 
cago City  Ry.  Co.,  130  111.  App.  519; 
Ball  V.  Maysville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  102 
Ky.  486,  43  S.  W.  731,  80  Am.  St. 
Rep.  362 ;  Willis  v.  Ky.  &  Ind.  Bridge 
Co.,  104  Ky.  186,  46  S.  W.  488;  Louis- 
ville So.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Cogar,  15  Ky. 
L.  R.  444;  Loiiisville  So.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Hooe,  18  Ky.  L.  R.  521,  35  S.  W. 
266,  38  S.  W.  131;  Chesapeake  etc. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Rice,  20  Ky.  L.  R.  1930,  90 


640 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


§  351 


tution  only  gives  compensation  for  property  injured  by  the 
"construction  or  enlargement"  of  works  or  improvements,®*  it 
is  held  that  compensation  may  be  had  for  damages  by  the  con- 
struction of  railroads  in  streets,  though  not  for  damages  caused 
by  their  operation,  as  by  smoke,  noise,  cinders,  etc.®*     But  in 


S.  W.  541 ;  Koch  V.  Ky.  &  Ind.  Bridge 
Co.,  26  Ky.  L.  R.  216,  80  S.  W.  1133; 
Hepting  v.  New  Orleans  Pac.  E.  R. 
Co.,  36  La.  An.  898;  Griffin  v.  Shreve- 
port  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  41  La.  An.  808, 
6  So.  624;  McMahan  v.  St.  Louis  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  41  La.  An.  827,  6  So.  640; 
Helmer  v.  Colo.  Southern  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  (La.),  47  So.  443;  Alabama  &  V. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Bloom,  71  Miss.  247,  15 
So.  Rep.  72;  Gottschalk  v.  C.  &  B. 
&  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  Neb.  550 ;  Omaha 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Rogers,  16  Neb.  117; 
Omaha  Belt  R.  R.  Co.  v.  McDermott, 
25  Neb.  717,  41  N.  W.  Rep.  648; 
Omaha  etc.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Janecek,  30 
Neb.  276,  40  N.  W.  478,  27  Am.  St. 
Rep.  399;  Nebraska  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Scott,  31  Neb.  571,  48  N.  W.  390;  Chi- 
cago etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  O'Conner,  42 
Neb.  90,  60  N.  W.  326;  Jaynes  v. 
Omaha  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  53  Neb.  631,  74 
N.  W.  67,  39  L.R.A.  751 ;  Galveston 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Eddins,  60  Tex.  656; 
Same  v.  Bock,  63  Tex.  245;  Same  v. 
Fuller,  63  Tex.  467 ;  Texas  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Goldberg,  68  Tex.  685;  Lyles 
V.  Texas  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  73  Tex.  95; 
Morrow  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
81  Tex.  405,  17  S.  W.  44;  Williams  v. 
Galveston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Tex.  App. 
Civil  Cas.  131 ;  Galveston  etc.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Graves,  Ibid.,  301;  Belt  Line  St. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Crabtree,  2  Tex.  App.  Civil 
Cas.  p.  579;  Aycock  v.  San  Antonio 
Brewing  Co.,  26  Tex.  Civ.  App.  341, 
63  S.  W.  953;  Rische  v.  Texas  Trans. 
Co.,  27  Tex.  Civ.  App.  33,  66  S.  VV. 
324;  Schier  v.  Cane  Belt  Ry.  Co.,  45 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  295 ;  Stockdale  v.  Rio 
Grande  Western  Ry.  Co.,  28  Utah 
201,  77  Pac.  849;  Kaufman  v.  Tacoma 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  11  Wash.  632,  40  Pac. 


637;  Seattle  Transfer  Co.  v.  Seattle, 
27  Wash.  520,  68  Pac.  90;  Lund  v. 
Idaho  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  50  Wash.  574, 
97  Pac.  665;  Arbens  v.  Wheeling  & 
H.  E.  E.  Co.,  33  W.  Va.  1,  10  S.  E. 
14,  5  L.E.A.  371;  Fox  v.  Baltimore 
&  0.  R.  R.  Co.,  34  W.  Va.  466,  12  S. 
E.  757;  Stewart  v.  Ohio  Riv.  R.  E. 
Co.,  38  W.  Va.  438,  18  S.  E.  604; 
Guinn  v.  Ohio  Eiv.  E.  E.  Co.,  46  W. 
Va.  151,  33  S.  E.  87,  76  Am.  St.  Eep. 
806;  Hart  v.  Piedmont  etc.  E.  E.  Co., 
52  W.  Va.  396,  44  S.  E.  155;  Pennsyl- 
vania E.  E.  Co.  V.  Miller,  132  U.  S. 
75,  10  S.  C.  Eep.  34,  1  Am.  E.  E.  & 
Corp.  Eep.  15;  Hot  Springs  E.  E.  Co. 
V.  Williamson,  136  U.  S.  121,  10  S.  C. 
Eep.  955;  Osborne  v.  Mo.  Pac.  E.  E. 
Co.,  147  U.  S.  248,  13  S.  C.  Rep.  299; 
Mollandin  v.  Union  Pacific  R.  R.  Co., 
4  McCrary,  290,  14  Fed.  Rep.  394; 
Frankle  v.  Jackson,  30  Fed.  Rep.  398; 
Osborne  v.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  E.  Co.,  35  Fed. 
Eep.  84;  Jackson  v.  Chicago  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  41  Fed.  Rep.  656;  Beckett  v. 
Midland  Ry.  Co.,  1  L.  R.  C.  P.  241, 
affirmed,  3  L.  R.  C.  P.  82;  Queen  v. 
Eastern  Counties  Ry.  Co.,  2  A.  &  E. 
N.  S.  347,  42  E.  C.  L.  R.  706;  Har- 
rocks  V.  Met.  E.  E.  Co.,  4  B.  &  S.  357, 
116  E.  C.  L.  E.  314. 

6  3  See  ante,  §  49. 

61  Duncan  v.  Pennsylvania  E.  R. 
Co.,  94  Pa.  St.  435;  S.  C.  13  Phil.  68; 
Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.'s  Appeal,  115 
Pa.  St.  514;  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Lippincott,  116  Pa.  St.  472,  9  Atl. 
871 ;  Pennsylvania  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Mar- 
chant,  119  Pa.  St.  541,  13  Atl.  690,  4 
Am.  St.  Eep.  659;  Pennsylvania  S. 
V.  E.  E.  Co.  V.  Ziemer,  124  Pa.  St. 
560,  17  Atl.  187;  Baltimore  &  C.  V. 
E.  E.  Extension  Co.  v.  Duke,  129  Pa. 


§  351 


PKOPEETT  DAMAGED  OE  INJURED. 


641 


Pennsylvania  S.  V.  E.  Co.  v.  Walsh,"^  whei'e  a  railroad  was  laid 
close  to  plaintiff's  curb  line,  the  court  seems  to  hold  that  the 
interference  with  access  by  the  passage  of  trains  may  be  taken 
into  account.  In  Missouri  it  is  held  that  a  railroad,  laid  so  as 
to  conform  to  the  grade  of  the  street,  is  not  a  taking  or  dam- 
aging of  the  abutting  property  within  the  meaning  of  the  con- 
stitution, though  such  property  is  depreciated  thereby.""  But 
if  the  railroad  is  laid  otherwise  than  upon  the  grade  of  the  street, 


St.  422,  18  Atl.  566;  Cass  v.  Pennsyl- 
vania Co.,  159  Pa.  St.  273,  28  Atl. 
161 ;  Ryan  v.  Penn.  S.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  2 
Mont.  Co.  L.  R.  31 ;  Quigley  v.  Penn. 
S.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Mont.  Co.  L.  R.  109; 
O'Brien  v.  Penn.  S.  "V.  R.  R.  Co.,  4 
Mont.  Co.  L.  R.  57.  In  Beck  v.  Erie 
Terminal  R.  R.  Co.,  11  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 
363,  it  was  held  that  abutters  on  the 
north  side  of  a  street  were  not  en- 
titled to  damages  for  a  railroad  on 
the  south  half  of  the  street,  if  they 
still  had  convenient  access  to  their 
property.  Compare  Shano  v.  Bridge 
Co.,  189  Pa.  St.  245,  42  Atl.  128,  69 
Am.  St.  Rep.  808. 

65124  Pa.  St.  544, 17  Atl.  186;  S.  C. 
5  Mont.  Co.  L.  R.  57.  The  court  says : 
"It  was  urged,  however,  that  the 
mere  laying  down  of  the  tracks  in 
front  of  the  plaintiff's  property  was 
not,  of  itself,  an  injury;  that  it  was 
a  benefit,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the 
street  had  been  greatly  improved  by 
having  been  repaved  with  Belgian 
blocks  in  a  superior  manner ;  and  the 
injury  was  the  sole  result  of  the  use 
and  operation  of  the  road.  This  is 
plausible,  but  unsound.  Where  the 
question  is  the  obstruction  of  access 
to  property  by  the  building  of  a  rail- 
road, it  is  impossible  to  separate  tiie 
construction  from  the  operation  of 
the  road.  Such  a  doctrine  would  be 
a  misapplication  of  the  rule  laid 
down  in  Railroad  Co.  v.  Marchant, 
supra.  It  would  be  an  unsavory  tech- 
nicality to  hold  that  a  railroad  laid 
down  by  the  curb  in  front  of  a  man's 
door,  with  trains  constantly  passing 
Em.  D.— 41. 


and  repassing,  did  not  interfere  with 
his  access  to  his  house,  and  was  not 
an  injury  caused  by  the  construction 
of  the  road.  No  authority  for  such 
a  proposition  can  be  found  in  any- 
thing this  court  has  ever  said." 

6  6Henry  Gauss  &  Sons  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  113  Mo.  308, 
20  S.  W.  658,  18  L.R.A.  339,  7  Am.  R. 
R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  235.  This  case  is 
commented  on  somewhat  in  Osborne 
v.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  147  U.  S.  248, 
13  S.  C.  299,  in  a  way  that  warrants 
the  inference  that  the  latter  court 
regarded  the  former  decision  as  er- 
roneous. The  subject  of  railroads  in 
streets  is  elaborately  considered  in 
De  Geofroy  v.  Merchants'  Bridge  Ter- 
minal Ry.  Co.,  179  Mo.  698,  79  S.  W. 
386,  101  Am.  St.  Rep.  524,  64  L.R.A. 
959,  wherein  the  court,  sitting  in 
bank,  says:  "That  the  power  of  a 
city  or  other  municipal  corporation 
in  Missouri  to  authorize  the  construc- 
tion of  railroads  in  the  public  streets 
is  'a  modified  right,  a  right  hedged 
about  with  many  qualifications;' 
that  it  does  not  include  the  right  to 
grant  a  railroad  the  exclusive  use  of 
the  surface  of  a  street  even  when  laid  , 
at  grade.  Neither  can  the  municipal 
authority  grant  the  power  to  a  rail- 
road company  of  such  use  of  a  street 
as  will  destroy  or  unreasonably  in- 
terfere with  the  right  of  an  abutting 
property  holder  of  access  to  or  egress 
from  hia  property  or  deprive  him  of 
his  easement  of  light  and  air  from 
the  street.  The  street  on  which  a 
railroad  is  constructed  on  the  grade 


G42 


EMINENT   DOMAIN. 


§  351 


the  abutter  is  entitled  to  compensation.®''  The  same  rule  ap- 
plies to  street  railways  as  to  commercial  railways,  for  the  ques- 
tion does  not  depend  upon  what  is  a  legitimate  street  use,  but  on 
whether  the  abutting  property  is  damaged  for  public  use.*^  But 
a  distinction  seems  to  be  made  in  Pennsylvania  and  this  may  be 
justified  by  the  peculiar  provisions  of  the  constitution  of  that 
State.®"  It  is  immaterial  whether  the  fee  of  the  street  is  in 
the  public  or  in  the  adjoining  owner.''''     So  a  recovery  may  be 


cannot  be  used  for  side  tracks,  the 
storing  of  cars,  for  water  tanks  or 
like  structures."  p.  715.  See  Ruck- 
ert  V.  Grand  Ave.  Ry.  Co.,  163  Mo. 
260,  63  S.  W.  814;  Nagel  v.  Lindell 
Ry.  Co.,  167  Mo.  89,  66  S.  W.  1090. 

6  7Sheehy  v.  Kansas  City  Cable  R. 
R.  Co.,  94  Mo.  574,  7  S.  W.  579,  4  Am. 
St.  Rep.  396;  Smith  v.  Kansas  City 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  98  Mo.  20,  11  S.  W. 
259;  Gates  v.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  Ill  Mo.  28,  19  S.  W.  957;  Brady 
V.  Kansas  City  Cable  R.  R.  Co.,  Ill 
Mo.  329,  19  S.  W.  953;  Spencer  v. 
Metropolitan  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  120  Mo. 
154,  23  S.  W.  Rep.  126,  22  L.R.A. 
668 ;  De  Geof  roy  v.  Merchants  Bridge 
Terminal  Ry.  Co.,  179  Mo.  698,  79  S. 
W.  386,  101  Am.  St.  Rep.  524,  64 
L.R.A.  959 ;  Spencer  v.  Met.  St.  R.  R. 
Co.,  58  Mo.  App.  513. 

ssBirmingham  Ry.  L.  &  P.  Co.  v. 
Oden,  146  Ala.  495,  41  So.  129;  Mont- 
gomery V.  Santa  Ana  etc.  Co.,  104 
Cal.  186,  37  Pac.  786,  43  Am.  St. 
Rep.  89,  25  L.R.A.  654;  Reynolds  v. 
Presidio  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Cal.  App. 
229,  81  Pac.  1118;  Campbell  v.  Met- 
ropolitan St.  R.  R.  Co.,  82  Ga.  320, 
9  S.  E.  1078;  Fouche  v.  Rome  St.  R. 
R.  Co.,  84  Ga.  233,  10  S.  E.  726,  1  Am. 
R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  188;  Aldis  v. 
Union  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  203  111.  567,  68 
N.  E.  95;  Sheehy  v.  Kansas  City 
Cable  R.  R.  Co.,  94  Mo.  574,  7  S.  W. 
579,  4  Am.  St.  Rep.  396;  Brady  v. 
Kansas  City  Cable  R.  R.  Co.,  Ill  Mo. 
329,  19  S.  W.  953 ;  Spencer  v.  Met.  St. 
R.  R.  Co.,  58  Mo.  App.  513;  Hot 
Springs  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Williamson,  136 


U.  S.  121,  10  S.  C.  955.  But  see  San 
Antonio  Rapid  Transit  St.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Limburger,  88  Tex.  79,  30  S.  W. 
533,  53  Am.  St.  Rep.  730;  Ruckert  v. 
Grand  Ave.  Ry.  Co.,  163  Mo.  260,  63 
S.  W.  814;  Nagel  v.  Lindell  Ry.  Co., 
167  Mo.  89,  66  S.  W.  1090. 

6  9Lockart  v.  Craig  St.  R.  R.  Co., 
139  Pa.  St.  419,  21  Atl.  26;  S.  C.  8 
Pa.  Co.  Ct.  470;  Raiferty  v.  Central 
Traction  Co.,  147  Pa.  St.  579,  23  Atl. 
884,  30  Am.  St.  Rep.  763,  6  Am.  R.  R. 
&  Corp.  Rep.  287;  Lockart  v.  Craig 
St.  R.  R.  Co.,  8  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  470;  Com- 
monwealth V.  West  Chester,  9  Pa.  Co. 
Ct.  542 ;  Heilman  v.  Lebanon  &  A.  R. 
R.  Co.,  10  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  241 ;  Dilly  v. 
Wilkesbarre  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  12  Pa. 
Co.  Ct.  270 ;  Township  of  Mahaney  v. 
Beaver  Meadow  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  Pa. 
Co.  Ct.  344 ;  Perry  v.  Wilkesbarre  etc. 
Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  4  Luzerne  Leg.  Reg. 
Rep.  519.  But  where  a  street  railway 
was  laid  under  an  ordinance  which 
made  it  liable  for  all  damages  to 
abutting  property,  it  was  held  liable 
for  the  diminution  in  the  value  of  the 
property.  May  v.  Carbondale  Trac- 
tion Co.,  167  Pa.  St.  343,  31  Atl.  Rep. 
667.  The  constitution  of  Pennsyl- 
vania limits  the  liability  for  property 
injured  but  not  taken  to  corporations 
and  individuals  "invested  witli  the 
privilege  of  taking  private  property 
for  public  use.''  Ante,  §  49.  Street 
railway  corporations  are  not  usually 
vested  with  such  power. 

TODenver  v.  Bayer,  7  Colo.  113; 
Gottschalk  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  14 
Neb.  550;  Stewart  v.  Ohio  Riv.  R.  R. 


§  35S 


PEOPEKTY  DAJIACIED   OR  USTJtJEED. 


643 


had  for  damages  caused  by  laying  an  additional  track  in  a 
street/^  or  by  moving  a  track  nearer  the  plaintiff's  property.''^ 

§  352  (226).  Damages  by  other  uses  of  streets.  Dam- 
ages resulting  to  abutting  property  by  any  improvement  or  use 
of  streets  for  public  purposes  are  undoubtedly  within  the  con- 
stitution. Where  a  city  erected  a  tank  and  steam  engine  in 
front  of  plaintiff's  property,  for  the  purpose  of  supplying  water 
to  its  citizens,  Avliich  caused  smoke  and  cinders  to  be  thrown 
upon  his  property  and  depreciated  its  value,  it  was  held  that  he 
could  recover.'^^  So  where  the  city  placed  a  standpipe  in  the 
street  near  plaintiff's  property.''*  If  abutting  property  is  in- 
jured by  the  construction  of  sewers  or  drains  in  the  street,'" 
or  by  ditches  or  canals  for  conveying  water,''"  a  recovery  may  be 
had.  In  Missouri  the  erection  of  telephone  poles  in  a  street 
is  held  not  to  come  within  the  constitutional  i:>rovision  as  to 
damage.''^  But  we  think  this  is  clearly  an  error.''^  ^Vhere  an 
abutter  has  built  an  area  to  afford  light  to  his  basement,  under  a 
revocable  license  from  the  city,  the  city  may  fill  up  the  area 
and  cut  off  the  light,  and  tlie  abutter  will  have  no  claim,  as  for 
property  damaged,  injured,  or  destroyed  within  the  constitu- 
tion.'®    In  Pennsylvania  it  has  been  intimated  but  not  decided 


Co.,  3S  W.  Va.  438,  18  S.  E.  604; 
ante,  §  128. 

71  Denver  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Domke, 
11  Colo.  247;  Denver  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Costes,  1  Colo.  App.  336,  28  Pae. 
Rep.  1129;  Pittsburgh  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Reich,  101  111.  157 ;  Hogan  v.  Chi- 
cago etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  208  111.  161,  69 
N.  E.  853;  McCarty  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R. 
R.  Co.,  34  111.  App.  273;  Maltman  v. 
Chicago  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  41  111.  App. 
229 ;  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Con- 
nor, 42  Xeb.  90,  60  N.  W.  326 ;  North- 
ern Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Holland,  117 
Pa.  St.  613,  12  Atl.  575;  Dilley  v. 
Wilkesbarre  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  12  Pa. 
Co.  Ct.  270. 

7  2Patent  v.  Phil.  &  Reading  R.  R. 
Co.,  14  Weekly  Notes  (Pa.)  545; 
Maltman  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  41 
111.  App.  229. 

73Morrison  V.  Hinkson,  87  111.  587, 
29  Am.  Rep.  77. 

74Barrows  v.  City  of  Sycamore,  150 


111.  588,  37  N.  E.  1096,  10  Am.  R.  R. 
&  Corp.  Rep.  62,  41  Am.  St.  Rep.  400. 

7  5Gerst  »-.  St.  Louis.  185  Mo.  191, 
84  S.  W.  34,  105  Am.  St.  Rep.  580; 
City  of  Plattsmouth  v.  Boeck,  32 
Neb.  297,  49  N.  W.  167 ;  Ladd  v.  City 
of  Philadelphia,  171  Pa.  St.  485,  33 
Atl.  62;  Chatham  Street,  16  Pa. 
Supr.  Ct.  103;  Johnson  v.  St.  Louis, 
137  Fed.  439;  Stainton  v.  Metropoli- 
tan Board  of  Works,  26  L.  J.  Ch.  300. 

'STown  of  Longmont  v.  Parker,  14 
Colo.  380,  23  Pae.  Rep.  443,  20  Am. 
St.  Rep.  277,  2  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp  Rep. 
91 ;  Walley  v.  Platte  &  D.  Ditch  Co., 
15  Colo.  579,  20  Pae.  129. 

7 7 Julia  Building  Association  v. 
Bell  Telephone  Co.,  88  Mo.  258,  57 
Am.  Rep.  398. 

7  86'ee  ante,  §  187;  Maxwell  v.  Cen- 
tral D.  &  P.  Tel.  Co.,  51  W.  Va.  121, 
41  S.  E.  125. 

79Winter  v.  City  Council,  83  Ala. 
589. 


644:  EMUfElIfT  DOMAIN.  §    353 

that  an  abutter  may  have  his  action  at  law  for  any  damages 
sustained  by  the  laying  of  a  gas  main  underneath  the  sidewalk 
adjacent  to  his  property.*" 

§  353  (226a).  Damages  by  the  vacation  of  streets. 
This  subject  has  been  fully  considered  in  a  former  chapter,  both 
as  to  when  such  damages  are  a  taking  and  when  damage  or  in-, 
jury  within  constitutions  and  statutes,*^  though  not  with  refer- 
ence to  the  effect  of  the  constitutional  provisions  now  under  con- 
sideration. But  the  authorities  hold  that  an  abutter  is  not  en- 
titled, by  virtue  of  these  provisions,  to  recover  damages  occa- 
sioned by  the  vacation  of  a  street,  or  part  of  a  street,  if  his  prop- 
erty does  not  abut  upoii  the  part  vacated,  and  he  is  not  deprived 
of  an  outlet  from  his  property.®^  Property  which  abuts  on  the 
vacated  part  or  is  deprived  of  an  outlet  is  damaged  within  the 
constitution.** 

§  354  (227).  Impeding  access  to  premises  by  interfer- 
ing with  public  ways  not  in  front  of  same.  We  have  already 
seen  that  if,  by  any  authorized  use  or  improvement  of  the  street 
in  front  of  property,  access  thereto  is  impeded  or  it  is  other- 
wise depreciated  in  value,  the  property  is  damaged  and  a  recov- 
ery may  be  had.  But  it  frequently  happens  that  a  public  im- 
provement on  a  street  or  public  way  affects  the  value  of  property 
which  does  not  abut  upon  the  improvement,  and  the  question 
is  whether  in  such  case  the  property  is  damaged  or  injuriously 
affected.  This  question  has  received  careful  consideration  both 
in  England  and  the  United  States. 

In  the  case  of  McCarthy  v.  Metropolitan  Board  of  Works,** 
the  plaintiff,  McCarthy,  resided  and  carried  on  business  as  a 
dealer  in  lime,  brick,  sand,  ballast  and  other  building  materials 
on  premises  near  a  dock,  known  as  Whitef  riars'  Dock,  which  was 
a  public  dock  on  the  Thames.  The  dock  was  separated  from 
plaintiff's  premises  by  a  public  street  twenty  feet  wide  and  the 

soMcDevitt  v.  People's  Nat.  Gas  re  Melon  St.,  1  Pa.  Supr.  63.    Com- 

Cc,  160  Pa.  St.  367,  28  Atl.  948.  pare  Town  of  Lake  v.  Burky,  57  111. 

ilAnte,  §§  197-208.  App.  547.    But  see  §§  200-208. 

8  2Glasgowv.  City  of  St.  Louis,  107  ssBigelow  v.  Balerino,      111  Cal. 

Mo.  198,  17  S.  W.  743,  5  Am.  R.  R.  &  559,  44  Pac.  307. 
C!orp.  Rep.  192;  Bailey  v.  Culver,  84  84L.  R.  7  C.  P.  508;   affirmed  in 

Mo.  531;  Parker  v.  Catholic  Bishop  Exch.  Chamber,  L.  R.  8  C.  P.  191  (5 

of  Chicago,  146  111.  158,  34  N.  E.  478;  Moak's  Rep.  256)  ;  affirmed  in  House 

In  re  Vacation  of  Howard  Street,  142  of  Lords,  L.  R.  7  Eng.  &  Irish  App. 

Pa.   St.  601,  21  Atl.   974;   Hare  v.  243  (10  Moak's  Rep.  1). 
Rice,  142  Pa.  St.  608,  21  Atl.  976;  In 


§    354  PEOPEETY  DAMAGED  OR  IKJUEED.  645 

distance  from  this  street  to  the  river  along  the  dock  was  352 
feet.  The  dock  was  largely  used  by  the  plaintiff  in  the  way  of 
his  business,  but  he  had  no  right  or  easement  in  the  dock  other 
than  as  one  of  the  public,  nor  was  there  appurtenant  or  otherwise 
belonging  to  his  premises  any  other  right  or  privilege  in  or  to 
the  dock.  By  reason  of  its  proximity  to  the  plaintiff's  premises, 
and  the  access  thereby  afforded  to  and  from  the  Thames,  the 
premises  were  rendered  more  valuable  to  sell  or  occupy  with 
reference  to  the  uses  to  which  any  owner  might  put  them.  In 
the  execution  of  the  works  authorized  by  the  Thames  embank- 
ment acts,  a  solid  embankment  was  carried  along  the  foreshore 
of  the  Thames,  thus  permanently  stopping  up  and  destroying 
Whitefriars'  Dock.  By  reason  thereof  access  along  the  dock  from 
the  plaintiff's  premises  to  and  from  the  Thames  was  prevented, 
and  his  premises  were  permanently  damaged  and  diminished  in 
value.  The  plaintiff  recovered  judgment  in  the  Court  of  Com- 
mon Pleas,  which  held  that  his  premises  were  injuriously  af- 
fected, and  this  decision  was  affirmed  by  the  Exchequer  Chamber 
and  House  of  Lords.  Many  elaborate  opinions  were  delivered 
in  which  the  grounds  of  the  decision  were  fully  considered  and 
all  prior  decisions  touching  the  questions  in  issue  were  re- 
viewed. We  shall  refer  to  the  principles  of  this  case  further 
on.  The  McCarthy  case  was  fully  approved  by  the  House  of 
Lords  in, Caledonia  Ry.  Co.  v.  Walker's  Trustees,*^  which  in- 
volved a  similar  state  of  facts.  There  are  many  other  English 
cases  which  go  upon  the  same  ground.*" 

In  Eigney  v.  Chicago,^''  it  appeared  that  Eigney  owned  an 
improved  lot  on  Kinzie  street,  which  street  was  intersected  at 

857  Appeal  Cas.  259.  struction  is  temporary  only,  being  oo- 

seChamberlain  V.  The  West  End  of  casioned  by  the  construction  of  the 

London  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  2  Best  &  Smith,  works,   the   premises   are  not   inju- 

605,  110  E.  C.  L.  R.  604,  31  L.  J.  Q.  riously    affected   within    the    mean- 

13,  201;  affirmed  same,  617;  Glover  ing     of     the    Lands     Clauses     Act, 

V.  North  Staffordshire  Ry.  Co.,  20  L.  and  compensation    must   be    sought 

J.  N.  S.  Q.  B.  376;  Wood  v.  Stour-  under  a  different  provision.    Rickett 

bridge  Ry.  Co.,  16  Q.  B.  N.  S.  222;  111  v.  Metropol.  Ry.  Co.,  5  Beat  &  Smith, 

E.  C.  L.  R.  221;  Cameron  v.  Charing  149,  117  E.  C.  L.  R.  149,  affirmed  L. 

Cross  Ry.,  16  C.  B.  N.  S.  430;  111  E.  R.  2  House  of  Lords,  175.    See  the 

C.  L.  R.  430;   33  L.  J.  C.  P.  313;  ease  of  the  Caledonian  Railway  Co. 

Senior  v.  Metropolitan  Ry.  Co.,  2  H-.  v.    Ogilvy,   2   Macq.   So.   App.   229; 

&  C.  (Ech.)  258;  Wadham  v.  North-  Regina  v.  Met.  Board  of  Works,  4  L. 

eastern  Ry.  Co.,  14  L.  R.  Q.  B.  747;  R.  Q.  B.  358. 

Ford  V.  Metropolitan  R.  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  87Rigney  v.  Chicago,  102  III.  64. 
17  Q.  B.  D.  12.    But,  where  the  ob- 


646  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    354 

right  angles  by  Halsted  street,  at  a  point  220  feet  west  of  Rig- 
ney's  property.  The  city  built  a  viaduct  on  Halsted  street  over 
Kinzie  street,  so  as  entirely  to  prevent  access  to  Halsted  street 
from  Kinzie  except  by  stairs.  The  evidence  showed  that  Hal- 
sted street  was  an  important  thoroughfare,  upon  which  horse 
car  lines  were  operated,  affording  communication  with  all  parts 
of  the  city.  No  change  whatever  was  made  in  Kinzie  street 
in  front  of  Kigney's  property  or  elsewhere,  but,  as  a  result  of 
the  construction  of  the  viaduct,  and  cutting  off  access  to  Halsted 
street  along  Kinzie  street,  Rigney's  property  was  depreciated 
one-fourth  or  more.  The  supreme  court  of  Illinois  held  that 
Rigney's  property  was  damaged  within  the  meaning  of  the  con- 
stitution.** These  cases  settle  the  doctrine  that  an  obstruction 
or  interference  with  a  public  street  or  way  need  not  necessarily 
be  in  front  of  or  contiguous  to  the  property  claimed  to  be  af- 
fected thereby,  in  order  to  authorize  a  recovery.  It  is  sufficient 
if  it  is  such  an  obstruction  or  interference  as  produces  a  diminu- 
tion in  the  value  of  the  property,  as  distinguished  from  mere 
personal  inconvenience  to  the  owner.** 

The  conclusions  thus  stated  in  the  first  edition  have  been 
verified  by  numerous  decisions  since  rendered,  and,  we  believe, 
without  any  material  dissent,  except  in  the  case  of  Missouri, 
as  shown  below.  If  a  street  or  public  way  communicating  with 
the  plaintiff's  premises  is  obstructed  elsewhere. than  in  front  of 
the  plaintiff's  property,  as  by  a  viaduct  or  bridge,  or  approach 
thereto,  or  by  a  railroad  crossing  a  street  in  a  cut  or  on  an 
embankment,  or  otherwise,  and  the  result  of  such  obstruction  is 
to  render  such  property  less  valuable  either  to  sell  or  to  use,  then 
the  property  is  damaged,  and  compensation  may  be  recovered 
to  the  extent  of  the  depreciation.®" 

88A    somewhat    similar    case    is  Pulcyn,  129  111.  App.  179;  Danville 

found  in  East  St.  Louis  v.  Lockliead,  etc.  K.  E.  Co.  v.  Tedrick,  137  111.  App. 

7  111.  App.  83;  also  East  St.  Louis  v.  553;  Republican  Valley  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

O'Flynn,  19  111.  App.  64.  Fellons,  16  Neb.  169;  Atchison  etc. 

89Caledonian  Ry.  Co.  v.  Walker's  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Boener,  34  Neb.  240,  51 

Trustees,  7  Appeal  Cas.  259.  N.  W.  842,  33  Am.  St.  Rep.  637 ;  S.  C. 

soTexarkana  v.  Leads,  66  Ark.  40,  affirmed,  45  Neb.  453,  63  N.  W.  787; 

48  S.  W.  807,  74  Am.  St.  Rep.  68;  Ft.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Neill,  58 

Collins   etc.   Ry.   Co.   v.   France,   41  Neb.  239,  78  N.  W.  521 ;  O'Brien  v. 

Colo.   512,   92  Pac.  953;    Harvey  v.  Pennsylvania  S.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  119  Pa. 

Georgia  Southern  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  90  St.  184,  13  Atl.  74;  Mellor  v.  City  of 

Ga.  66,  15  S.  E.  783 ;  Burky  v.  Town  Philadelphia,  160  Pa.  St.  614,  28  Atl. 

of  Lake,  30  111.  App.  23;  Chicago  v.  991;  In  re  Melon  Street,  182  Pa.  St. 


§  354 


PEOrEETY  DAMAGED  OE  IXJUEED. 


Gil 


397,  38  Atl.  482,  28  L.R.A.  27S;  Foust 
V.  Pa.  E.  E.  Co.,  212  Pa.  St.  213,  61 
Atl.  829;  Eobbins  v.  Scranton,  217 
Pa.  St.  577,  66  Atl.  977;  Walsh  v. 
Scranton,  23  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  276 ;  Hag- 
gerty  v.  Scranton,  23  Pa.  Supr.  St. 
279 ;  Harvey  v.  G.  C.  &  S.  F.  E.  E.  Co., 
3  T«x.  Ct.  of  App.  336,  §§  278-280; 
Brown  v.  City  of  Seattle,  5  Wash.  35, 
31  Pac.  313,  32  Pac.  Eep.  214,  7  Am. 
R.  E.  &  Corp.  Eep.  64;  Mason  City 
etc.  E.  E.  Co.  V.  Wolf,  148  Fed.  961, 
78  C.  C.  A.  589  (Neb.  Case)  ;  Mc- 
Quade  v.  The  King,  7  Can.  Exch.  318; 
Macarthur  v.  The  King,  8  Can.  Exch. 
245;  anie,  §§  189,  198-208.  Compare 
the  following  cases  which  are  more  or 
less  opposed  to  the  text:  Gilbert  v. 
Greeley  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  13  Colo.  501,  22 
Pac.  814;  Union  Pac.  E.  R.  Co.  v. 
Foley,  19  Colo.  280,  35  Pac.  542; 
Union  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Benson,  19 
Colo.  285,  35  Pac.  544;  Jacksonville 
etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Thompson,  34  Fla.  346, 
16  So.  282,  26  L.R.A.  410;  Davenport 
V.  Dedham,  178  Mass.  382,  59  N.  E. 
1029;  Davenport  v.  Hyde  Park,  178 
Mass.  385,  59  N.  E.  1030;  Putnam  v. 
Boston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  182  Mass.  351, 
65  N.  E.  790;  Detroit  v.  C.  H.  Little 
Co.,  146  Mich.  373,  109  N.  W.  671 ;  S. 
C.  141  Mich.  637,  104  N.  W.  1108; 
Matter  of  Grade  Crossing  Comrs.,  166 
N.  Y.  69,  59  N.  E.  706;  McGee's  Ap- 
peal, 114  Pa.  St.  470,  8  Atl.  237;  Law- 
rence V.  City  of  Philadelphia,  154  Pa. 
St.  20,  25  Atl.  1079;  Howell  v.  Mor- 
risville,  212  Pa.  St.  349,  61  Atl.  932; 
Santry  v.  Pennsylvania  S.  V.  E.  E. 
Co.,  4  Mont.  Co.  L.  E.  144;  Enochs  v. 
Philadelphia,  2  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  83; 
Smith  V.  St.  Paul  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  39 
Wash.  355,  81  Pac.  840,  109  Am.  St. 
Eep.  889,  70  L.E.A.  1018;  Ponischil 
V.  Hoquiam  S.  &  D.  Co.,  41  Wash. 
303,  83  Pac.  316;  Mottman  v.  Olym- 
pia,  45  Wash.  361,  88  Pac.  579. 

In  Mellor  v.  City  of  Philadelphia, 
160  Pa.  St.  614,  28  Atl.  991,  the  plain- 
tiff's property  was  on  the  north  side 
of  Trenton  avenue.    The  property  on 


the  south  side  of  Trenton  avenue  was 
occupied  by  railroad  tracks,  running 
parallel  to  the  avenue.  To  avoid 
grade  crossings  the  side  streets  ad- 
jacent to  the  plaintiflT  were  lowered 
so  as  to  go  under  the  tracks  and,  as 
we  understand  it,  under  Trenton  ave- 
nue also.  Access  from  Trenton  ave- 
nue to  the  side  streets,  except  for 
pedestrians,  was  rendered  impossible. 
Trenton  avenue  upon  which  the 
plaintiff's  property  abutted  remained 
unchanged,  but  access  to  the  nearest 
side  streets  was  cut  off.  .  In  holding 
that  the  plaintiff's  property  was  in- 
jured, within  the  meaning  of  the  con- 
stitution, the  court  says:  "Defend- 
ant's contention  was  that  this  pro- 
vision is  inapplicable  to  any  of  the 
cases  under  consideration,  because 
neither  of  the  properties  front  or 
abut  on  either  of  the  streets  the 
grade  of  which  was  changed.  This 
would,  indeed,  be  a  very  narrow  and 
unreasonable  construction  of  the 
words  above  quoted,  especially  in 
view  of  the  history  and  object  of  the 
constitutional  provision.  It  was  in- 
tended to  provide  against  the  great 
injustice  that  was  continually  re- 
sulting from  the  ruling  of  this  court 
in  O'Connor  v.  Pittsburgh,  18  Pa.  St. 
189,  that  'the  constitutional  pro- 
vision for  the  case  of  private  prop- 
erty taken  for  public  use  extends  not 
to  the  case  of  property  injured  or  de- 
stroyed.' In  connection  with  this 
statement  of  the  controlling  prin- 
ciple in  that  case,  Mr.  Chief  Justice 
Gibson  suggested  that  the  omission 
might  be  supplied  by  ordinary  legis- 
lation, but  no  such  legislative  action 
was  ever  taken.  It  was  not  until  the 
adoption  of  our  present  constitution, 
nearly  a  quarter  of  a  century  there- 
after, that  an  appropriate  remedy 
was  provided  in  the  form  of  the  sec- 
tion above  quoted.  In  doing  this,  the 
people  of  the  commonwealth  recog- 
nized, in  a  practical  way,  the  justice 
of    compensating    private    property 


648 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


§  354 


A  recent  case  in  Missouri  is  apparently  in  conflict  with  these 
views.  The  plaintiff's  premises  were  situated  upon  High  street, 
which  was  crossed  by  a  railroad  two  blocks  or  more  away.  The 
crossing  was  of  such  a  character  as  completely  to  obstruct  the 
street  at  that  point.  Two  streets  intersected  High  street,  at  right 
angles,  between  the  plaintiff's  premises  and  the  crossing.  The 
jury  found  that  the  plaintiff's  premises  were  damaged  or  de- 
preciated to  the  amount  of  two  thousand  dollars,  and  he  recov- 
ered judgment  for  that  sum.  The  Supreme  Court  reversed  the 
case,  holding  that  the  plaintiff's  damages  were  the  same  in 
kind  as  those  suffered  by  the  public  generally,  and  that  for  such 
damages  no  recovery  could  be  had,  even  under  the  word  dam- 
aged in  the  new  constitution.^'  This  case  was  approved  and 
followed  in  two  similar  cases,  decided  a  year  or  so  later.  ^^    In 


owners,  not  only  for  property  taken, 
but  also  for  property  injured  or  de- 
stroyed by  municipal  and  other  cor- 
porations and  individuals  of  the 
specified  class,  by  the  construction 
and  enlargement  of  their  works, 
highways,  or  improvements.  There 
is  nothing  in  the  phraseology  of  the 
section  that  can  be  even  tortured  into 
a  limitation  of  its  provisions  to  prop- 
erty fronting  or  abutting  on  the  par- 
ticular work,  highway,  or  improve- 
ment by  the  construction  or  enlarge- 
ment of  which  said  property  was  in- 
jured or  destroyed.  The  section  in 
question  cannot  be  thus  narrowly 
construed  without  reading  into  it 
words  which  are  not  in  it,  and  were 
never  intended  to  be  there.  It  was 
contended  on  behalf  of  the  city  that, 
inasmuch  as  the  properties  of  the 
several  plaintiffs  do  not  front  on 
Orthodox  street,  they  'are  not  en- 
titled to  any  damages;  that,  because 
Trenton  avenue  has  not  been 
changed,  the  plaintifi's,  no  matter 
how  much  they  may  have  been  in- 
jured, are  not  entitled  to  damages 
for  the  alteration  of  the  side  street;' 
and  points  for  charge  substantially 
to  that  effect  were  submitted.  The 
learned  trial  judge  very  properly  re- 
fused to  thus  narrowly  and  unreason- 


ably construe  the  constitution.  He 
rightly  conceded,  however,  'that 
where  the  street  which  undergoes  an 
alteration  is  not  sufficiently  near  to 
the  property  of  a  citizen  as  to  make 
the  injury  approximate  and  imme- 
diate and  substantial,  he  would  have 
no  right  to  claim  damages  for  change 
of  grade  of  such  a  street;'  and,  in 
connection  therewith,  he  appropri- 
ately added:  'In  case  of  properties 
situated  as  these  properties  are,  and 
so  affected  by  the  change  of  grade 
that  their  ingress  and  egress  to 
and  from  their  houses  is  virtu- 
ally injured, — partly  destroyed, — 
and  where  the  injury  is  so  obvious 
that  it  admits  of  comparatively  easy 
calculation  as  to  the  extent  of  the 
diminution  of  the  value  of  the  prop- 
erty, I  cannot  doubt  that  such  a  case 
is  covered  by  the  constitution.' " 

siRude  V.  St.  Louis,  93  Mo.  408, 
6  S.  W.  257. 

9  2Fairchild  v.  City  of  St.  Louis, 
97  Mo.  85,  11  S.  W.  60;  Canman  v. 
City  of  St.  Louis,  97  Mo.  92,  11  S. 
W.  60.  To  same  effect  Gates  v.  Kan- 
sas City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  Ill  Mo.  28, 
19  S.  W.  957.  And  see  Burde  v.  St. 
Joseph,  130  Mo.  App.  453,  110  S.  W. 
27. 


§    354:  PEOPEETY  DAMAGED  OK  Ilf  JUEED.  649 

these  cases  the  street  on  which  the  plaintiffs  abutted  was  ob- 
structed by  a  railroad  crossing  below  grade  and  the  street  was 
closed  at  that  point.  In  one  case  the  plaintiff's  property  was 
350  feet  from  the  obstruction,  and  in  the  other  125  feet.  If 
the  plaintiff's  premises  were  depreciated  in  value  by  reason  of 
the  obstruction  complained  of,  then,  it  seems  to  us,  both  the 
premise  and  conclusion  of  the  court  are  wrong.  When  prop- 
erty is  so  situated  with  respect  to  a  public  way  that  its  perma- 
nent obstruction  depreciates  its  market  value,  then  the  owner 
of  the  property  suffers  a  special  and  peculiar  damage  by  reason 
of  such  obstruction,  different  from  that  of  the  public  generally."'* 
It  is  tacitly  conceded  by  the  Missouri  court,  and  is  unquestion- 
ably the  law,  that,  if  the  plaintiff's  damages  were  special  and 
peculiar,  then  he  had  a  right  of  action  under  the  constitutional 
provision  in  question.  The  right  to  damages  cannot  be  reduced 
to  a  question  of  distance,  but  depends  upon  the  fact  of  the  mar- 
ket value  of  the  premises  being  actually  depreciated  by  reason 
of  the  obstruction  or  improvement.  The  supreme  court  of  Mis- 
souri seems  to  have  come  to  the  same  conclusion  as  to  what  is  a 
special  or  peculiar  damage  in  a  subsequent  case  and  to  thus  have 
cut  away  the  ground  upon  which  the  decisions  above  referred  to 
were  based.  A  switch  track  was  laid  across  the  street  on  which 
plaintiff  abutted,  connecting  with  a  brewery.  The  court  found 
that  the  track  was  laid  for  a  private  use,  that  the  permission 
to  use  the  street  was  therefore  void  and  the  track  a  public  nui- 
sance. The  plaintiff's  property  was  75  feet  from  the  crossing 
but  the  evidence  showed  that  its  value  would  be  depreciated  by 
the  obstruction.  This  was  held  to  be  such  a  special  injury  as 
entitled  the  plaintiff  to  an  injunction.  No  reference  is  made  to 
the  cases  above  cited.®* 

S3  Ante,  §§  174,  191,  199.  Where  Mo.  App.  498;  Wesson  v.  Washburn 
property  is  so  situated  with  respect  Iron  Co.,  13  Allen  95;  Blane  v. 
to  any  kind  of  a  public  nuisance  that  Khimpke,  29  Cal.  156 ;  Frink  v.  Law- 
it  is  permanently  depreciated  in  rence,  20  Conn.  117,  50  Am.  Dec.  274; 
value  if  the  nuisance  is  regarded  as  Brown  v.  Watrous,  47  Me.  161 ; 
permanent,  or  the  value  of  its  use  is  Ottawa  Gas  Light  Co.  v.  Graham,  28 
lessened  if  it  is  regarded  as  tempo-  111.  73,  81  Am.  Dec.  263;  Illinois 
rary,  then  the  owner  of  the  property  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Grabill,  50  111. 
suffers  a  special  and  peculiar  dam-  242;  Attorney  General  v.  Londsdale, 
age,  different  from  that  of  the  public  7  L.  R.  Eq.  Cas.  390.  See  also 
generally,  for  which  a  private  action  opinions  in  the  McCarthy  case,  ante. 
will  lie.  Stetson  v.  Faxon,  19  Pick.  9<Glaessner  v.  Anheuser-Busch 
147;  Francis  v.  Schoellkoff,  53  N.  Y.  Brewing  Ass.,  100  Mo.  508,  13  S.  W. 
152;    Givens   v.   Van   Studdiford,   4  707,  2  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  420. 


C50  EMINENT   DOMAIN.  S    354 

The  contention  that  such  an  interpretation  of  the  constitu- 
tion will  give  rise  to  an  indefinite  number  of  claims,  is  one  which 
has  been  often  made,  but  is  without  merit.  The  constitution 
guarantees  compensation  for  property  damaged  or  injured  for 
public  use.  The  right  to  compensation  is  coextensive  with  the 
damage  or  injury,  both  in  space  and  in  amount.  This  point  was 
fully  considered  in  the  McCarthy  case,  and  in  reference  to  it 
Justice  Bramwell  says:  "If  it  is  to  be  asked  where  the  line 
is  to  be  drawn,  I  answer  not  by  distance  in  point  of  measure- 
ment. Premises  might  be  injuriously  affected  by  the  stopping 
of  a  landing  place  ten  miles  away,  if  there  was  no  other  within 
twenty  of  the  premises  affected.  The  line  is  to  be  drawn  by  as- 
certaining whether  the  premises  are  actually  or  potentially  af- 
fected for  present  or  other  purposes,  or  the  man,  whether  it 
is  only  the  person  who  happens  to  be  using  them.  It  is  said 
this  might  give  the  right  to  make  an  immense  number  of  claims. 
Suppose  it  did.  Suppose  there  were  one  thousand  claims  of 
£1,000  each.  If  they  are  well  founded,  £1,000,000  of  property 
is  destroyed,  and  why  is  not  that  part  of  the  cost  of  the  improve- 
ment; and,  if  taken  into  account  as  such,  why  should  not  the 
loser  of  it  receive  it  ?"  ®^  And  the  supreme  court  of  Wisconsin, 
in  an  action  for  wrongfully  obstructing  a  street,  says:  "True, 
there  may  be  many  such  individual  owners,  but  that  cannot 
affect  individual  rights.  There  may  be  twenty  or  there  may 
be  fifty  of  them,  but  if  each  has  suffered  great  damage  to  his 
estate  by  the  unlawful  closing  of  a  street,  why  shall  not  each 
have  his  action  ?    Neither  twenty  men  nor  fifty  men  constitute 

The  court  says :   "The  city  having  no  dence  is  that  these  proposed  crossings 

rightful  authority  to  enact  the  ordi-  will  have  the  effect  to  divert  travel 

nance,  the  switch  tracks  constructed  to  streets  west  of  the  brewery,  and 

thereunder   on   the   public   highway  thereby   decrease   the   value   of   the 

would  be  a  public  nuisance;  and,  in  plaintiff's  property,  and  take  away 

order  for  the  plaintiff  to  maintain  some  of  the  trade  which  he  at  this 

this  injunction,  he  must  show  some  time  enjoys.     The  evidence  satisfied 

special   injury   over   and   above   the  the  trial  court,  and  it  satisfies  us, 

general  injury  to  the  general  public.  that  plaintiff  will  suffer  an  injury 

Some  of  the  evidence  offered  by  the  which  entitles  him  to  maintain  this 

defendant  is  that  the  construction  of  suit." 

the  switch  will  not  decrease  the  value  SBMcCarthy  v.  Metropolitan  Board 

of  the  plaintiff's  property.     On  the  of  Works,  L.  R.  8  C.  P.  191,  210.    In 

other  hand,  it  is  alleged  and  shown  the  House  of  Lords  Lord  Penzance 

that  plaintiff's  property    is    within  gives  expression  to  similar  views  as 

seventy-five    feet    of    the    proposed  follows: 

crossing,  and  the  weight  of  the  evi-  "It  was  asked,  in  argument,  where 


§   o5(i 


PBOPEETY  DAMAGED  OE,  INJUEED. 


C51 


the  general  public.  The  general  public  is  composed  of  the  great 
mass  of  individuals  who  own  no  property  in  the  vicinity  and  who 
may  wish  to  pass  over  the  street  or  not,  and  who,  if  they  do, 
simply  suffer  the  trifling  inconvenience  of  being  obliged  to  make 
a  circuitous  trip."  "* 

§  355  (228).  Competing  ferries,  bridges,  etc.  It  has 
been  held,  by  the  supreme  court  of  West  Virginia,  that  where 
a  statute  prohibited  another  ferry  within  half  a  mile  of  one  al- 
ready established,  the  statute  would  include  a  toll-bridge  as  well 
as  a  ferry,  and  that  the  diminution  in  value  of  the  ferry  by  rea- 
son of  the  establishment  of  a  toll-bridge  within  the  prohibited 
distance  was  a  damage  and  not  a  taking  within  the  constitu- 
tion."'^ So  the  English  courts  have  held  a  similar  injury  to  be 
an  injurious  affecting."*  And  where  a  railroad  was  built  along 
a  stream,  so  as  to  interfere  with  a  ferry,  it  was  held  that  the 
proprietor  was  entitled  to  compensation.®" 

§  356  (229).  Interference  with  water  rights.  In  Duke 
of  Buccleuch  v.  Metropolitan  Eoard  of  Works,'  the  plaintiff's 
property  consisted  of  a  leasehold  interest  in  a  mansion  house 


are  the  claims  to  compensation  to 
stop,  if  the  rule  is  so  applied?  The 
answer,  I  think  is,  that  in  each  case 
the  right  to  compensation  will  accrue 
whenever  it  can  be  established  to  the 
satisfaction  of  the  jurj'  or  arbitrator 
that  a  special  value  attaches  to  the 
premises  in  question  by  reason  of 
their  proximity  to,  or  relative  posi- 
tion with,  the  highways  obstructed, 
and  that  this  special  value  has  been 
permanently  destroyed  or  abridged 
by  the  obstruction.  If  this  limit  be 
thought  to  be  a  wide  one,  and  the 
number  of  claimants  under  it  likely 
to  be  numerous,  that  is  only  the  mis- 
fortune of  the  undertaking,  for  the 
limit  does  not  exceed  the  range  of  the 
injury.  On  the  other  hand,  all  claim 
for  compensation  will  vanish  as,  re- 
ceding from  the  highway,  the  case 
comes  into  question  of  lands  of  which 
(though  their  owners  may  have  used 
the  highway  and  found  convenience 
in  so  doing)  it  cannot  be  predicated 
and  proved  that  the   value  of    the 


lands  depends  on  the  position  rela- 
tively to  the  highway  which  they 
occupy."  Metropolitan  Board  of 
Works  V.  McCarthy,  L.  E.  7,  Eng.  & 
I.  App.  243,  214. 

9  6Tilley  v.  Mitchell  &  Lewis  Co., 
121  Wis.  1,  98  N.  W.  969,  105  Am.  St. 
Rep.  1007.  To  same  effect:  Park  v. 
C.  &  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  43  la.  636;  In 
re  Melon  St.,  182  Pa.  St.  397,  38  Atl. 
482,  28  L.R.A.  275;  Tidewater  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Shartzer,  107  Va.  562,  59  S.  E. 
407,  17  L.R.A.(N.S.)  1053. 

9  7Mason  v.  Harper's  Ferry  Bridge 
Co.,  17  W.  Va.  396.  According  to  the 
views  of  the  author,  such  an  inter- 
ference with  an  exclusive  right  is  a 
taking.    See  ante,  §§  215,  216. 

9  8»S'ee  Hopkins  v.  The  Great  West- 
ern Railway  Co.,  L.  R.  2  Q.  B.  D. 
224;  Queen  v.  Cambria  Railway  Co., 
L.  R.  6  Q.  B.  422. 

9  9  Cooling  V.  Great  Northern  R.  R. 
Co.,  19  L.  J.  Q.  B.  25. 

15  L.  R.  Ex.  221,  affirmed,  5  L.  R. 
Eng.  &  Irish  App.  418. 


652  EMINENT    DOMAIN.  §    356 

and  grounds  abutting  on  the  Thames  River.  He  not  only  had 
free  access  to  the  river,  but  the  grounds  were  secluded  and 
quiet  by  reason  of  the  river  frontage  and  thereby  rendered  more 
valuable  to  sell  or  occupy.  The  defendant  constructed  an  em- 
bankment along  the  river  frontage  -which  was  to  serve  as  a  pub- 
lic highway.  The  result  of  this  was  to  cut  off  access  to  the  river 
and  to  destroy  the  quiet  and  seclusion  of  the  premises.  It  was 
held  that  the  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  recover  the  full  amount  of 
the  depreciation  of  his  premises.^.  Where  a  railroad  was  con- 
structed along  the  shore  of  the  sea  below  high-water  mark,  thus 
interfering  with  one's  access  to  the  sea,  his  property  was  held 
to  be  injuriously  affected.^  So  an  interference  with  access  to 
a  dock  on  a  stream  by  a  bridge  is  within  the  constitutional 
provision  as  to  damage.*  Damage  which  results  to  a  lower 
proprietor  by  changes  in  the  flow  of  a  stream  in  consequence  of 
the  removal  of  shoals  is  not  actionable.®  The  right  to  recover 
for  diverting  the  waters  of  a  stream  to  the  damage  of  a  lower 
proprietor  was  referred  to  this  provision  of  the  constitution  in 
Eeading  v.  Althouse,®  though  we  think  such  a  diversion  is 
clearly  a  taking,  as  shown  in  a  previous  chapter. '^  Under  the 
English  acts  it  is  held  that  compensation  in  such  cases  must  be 
had  under  the  clause  giving  damages  for  land  injuriously  af- 
fected.* 

^Compare  Eegina  v.  Metropolitan  wide,  and  known  as  Channel  street. 

Board  of  Works,  L.  E.  4  Q.  B.  358;  The    defendants,    the    State    harbor 

38  L.  J.  Q.  B.  201.  commissioners,   proposed  to  erect  a 

sQueen  v.  Eynd,  16  I.  C.  L.  E.  29;  wharf  in  Channel  street  in  front  of 

Bell  V.  Hull  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  6  M.  &  W.  plaintiff's  property,  thirty  feet  wide 

699 ;  but  see  Falls  v.  Belfast  etc.  E.  and  thus  cut  off  his  access  to  the  bay. 

E.  Co.,  12  I.  C.  L.  E.  233.  On  a  bill  to  enjoin,  the  opinion  was 

^Chicago  etc.  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Stein,  75  expressed  that  this  would  not  be  a 

111.  41 ;  Chicago  &  Alton  E.  E.  Co.  v.  taking  or  damaging  of  the  plaintiff's 

Maher,  91  111.  312.    It  has  been  held  property  within  the  constitution,  but 

in  Pennsylvania  that  an  interference  the  decision  itself  was  based  on  a 

with    the    feeders    of    an    artificial  question  of  title, 

stream  which  had  flowed  for  over  a,  BRhodes     v.     Airedale     Drainage 

century  was  to  be  regarded  as  an  in-  Comrs.,  L.  E.  1  C.  P.  Div.  402;  S.  C. 

jury  rather  than  a  taking  under  their  Same,  p.  380. 

present  constitution.     City  of  Eead-  693  Pa.  St.  400;  Lycoming  Gas  & 

ing  V.  Althouse,  93  Pa.  St.  400.     In  W.  Co.  v.  Moyer,  99  Pa.  St.  615. 

Payne  v.  English,  79  Cal.  540,  21  Pac.  tAnte,  §  74. 

952,    plaintiff   had    piers    and    slips  sBush  v.   Trowbridge  Water  Co., 

abutting  on  an  arm  of  the  bay  of  44  L.  J.  Ch.  645;  S.  C.  L.  R.  10  Ch. 

San    Francisco,    two    hundred    feet  App.  459. 


§    357  PEOPEETY  DAMAGED  OE  INJUEED.  G53 

We  have  considered  at  length  in  a  former  chapter  the  right 
to  recover  for  damage  to  land  by  interfering  with  riparian  rights 
appurtenant  thereto,  or  by  flooding  it  permanently  or  temporari- 
ly by  works  for  public  use,  or  by  injuriously  affecting  it  in 
any  way  through  the  agency  of  water,  and  we  should  say  that 
any  such  damage,  which  is  not  held  to  be  a  taking,  would 
clearly  be  a  damage  or  injury  within  the  constitution.  Causing 
surface  water  to  flow  upon  land  where  it  is  not  accustomed  to 
flow,  or  obstructing  its  flow  so  as  to  cause  a  submergence  or 
saturation,  by  grading  and  improving  streets,®  or  the  building 
of  railroads,^*'  or  other  works  for  public  use,^^  have  been  held 
to  be  remediable  under  this  provision.  So  of  a  bridge,  dam  or 
other  works  which  interfere  with  the  flow  of  a  stream  so  as  to 
flood  the  land  above  or  wash  away  the  land  below. •'^  Damage  by 
the  pollution  of  a  stream  with  sewage  or  otherwise,  if  not  held 
to  be  a  taking,  is  clearly  a  damage  or  injury  witliin  the  con- 
stitution.'^ But  where  a  railroad  constructed  its  road  along  the 
banks  of  a  stream  upon  a  sandy  soil,  it  was  held  not  liable  for 
injury  to  a  mill  pond  by  sand  washed  into  the  stream  from  the 
railroad  land  and  emhankment.-'* 

§  357  (230).  Damages  from  the  operation  of  a  railroad 
or  its  appurtenances  on  the  private  property  of  the  com- 
pany. Noise,  smoke,  vibrations,  etc.  The  operation  of  a 
railroad,  the  switching  of  cars  to  and  fro,  the  use  of  coal  bins, 
stock  yards,  etc.,  may  be  a  serious  annoyance  to  the  occupiers  of 
adjacent  property,  by  reason  of  the  noise,  smoke,  cinders,  vi- 
brations, smells,  etc.  The  use  and  value  of  property  may  be 
greatly  impaired  thereby.  The  question  whether  such  an  im- 
pairment of  property  constitutes  an  independent  cause  of  action 
is  quite  distinct  from  the  question  whether  such  annoyances  may 

9Town  of  Avondale  v.  McFarland,  Cal.  618,  42  Pac.  240;  Bradbury  v. 

101  Ala.  381,  13  So.  504;  Atlanta  v.  Vandalia  Levee  &  Dr.  Dist.,  236  III. 

Wood,  78  Ga.  276;  Atchison  v.  At-  36;   Delaware  County's  Appeal,  119 

lanta,  81  Ga.  625,  7  S.  E,  692;  Carson  Pa.  St.  159,  13  Atl.  62;  Fredericks  v. 

V.  City  of  Springfield,  53  Mo.  App.  Pennsylvania  Canal  Co.,  148  Pa.  St. 

289;  In  re  Chatham  Street,  191  Pa.  317,  23  Atl.  1067. 

St.  604,  43  Atl.  365.  isjoplin  Consol.  Min.  Co.  v.  City 

lOAnte,  §§  78-81,  112.  of  Joplin,  124  Mo.  129,  27  S.  W.  406; 

iiMayor  etc.  of  Albany  v.  Sikes,  Smith  v.  Sedalia,  152  Mo.  283,  53  S. 

94  Ga.  30,  20  S.  E.  257,  26  L.R.A.  W.  907,  48  L.R.A.  711;  S.  C.  182  Mo. 

653;  Ware  v.  Regents  Canal  Co.,  3  1,  81  S.  W.  165. 

De  G.  &  J.  212.  KTrinity     etc.     R.     R.     Co.     v. 

i2Tyler   v.   Tehama   County,    109  Meadows,  73  Tex.  32,  11  S.  W.  145. 


G54 


EMINENT   DOMAIN. 


§  357 


be  taken  into  consideration  when  part  of  a  tract  is  taken,  or  when 
a  railroad  is  laid  in  a  street  or  highway.  In  the  latter  case  the 
annoyances  referred  to  are  mere  incidents  to  what  is  in  law  the 
main  grievance.  ^^  But  in  the  former  case  they  constitute  the 
principal  and  only  cause  of  complaint.  Whether  the  impair- 
ment caused  by  such  annoyances  constitutes  a  taking  we  have 
already  considered.'"  But  whether  a  taking  or  not,  it  would 
seem  that  such  an  impairment  of  property  was  a  damage  or  in- 
jury within  the  purview  of  recent  constitutions.  Where  the 
use  and  operation  of  a  railroad  or  switch  yards  on  the  private 
property  of  the  company  adjacent  to,  or  in  the  near  vicinity 
of  the  plaintiff's  property,  or  across  the  street  from  him,  de- 
preciates the  value  of  his  property  by  reason  of  the  noise,  smoke, 
vibration,  etc.,  his  property  is  damaged  within  the  constitution 
and  he  is  entitled  to  compensation. '''     So  where  the  damage  re- 


isfifee  post,  §§  739-741. 

i^Ante,  §  235. 

1 'Stone  V.  Fairbury,  Pontiac  & 
North  Western  Ey.  Co.,  68  111.  394, 
18  Am.  Rep.  556;  Chicago  ete.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Leah,  152  111.  249,  38  N.  E. 
556;  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Drake, 
148  111.  226,  35  N.  E.  750,  9  Am.  R. 
R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  73;  111.  Cent.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Trustees  of  Schools,  212  111. 
406,  7'  N.  E.  39;  Chicago  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Coggswell,  44  111.  App.  388; 
Wisconsin  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Wieczorek,  51  111.  App.  498;  Met. 
West  Side  El.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Goll,  100 
111.  App.  323;  Davenport  ete.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Sinnet,  111  111.  App.  75;  111.  Cent. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Trustees  of  Schools,  128 
111.  App.  Ill;  Willis  V.  Ky.  &  Ind. 
Bridge  Co.,  104  Ky.  186,  46  S.  W. 
488;  Covington  ete.  R.  R.  &  Bridge 
Co.  V.  Kleymeier,  105  Ky.  609, 
49  S.  W.  484;  Chicago  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Hazels,  26  Neb.  364, 
42  N.  W.  93;  Omaha  ete.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Janecek,  30  Neb.  276,  46  N.  W. 
478,  3  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  268; 
Omaha  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Moschel,  38 
Neb.  281,  56  N.  W.  875;  Gulf  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Necco  (Tex.)  15  S.  W.  Rep. 
1102,  18  S.  W.  564;  Gainesville  etc. 
R.   R.   Co.  V.   Hall,   78  Tex.   09,   14 


S.  W.  259,  9  L.R.A.  298,  3  Am.  R.  E. 
&  Corp.  Rep.  251 ;  Ft.  Worth  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Downie,  82  Tex.  383,  17  S. 
W.  620;  Houston  ete.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Davis,  45  Tex.  Civ.  App.  212;  Novich 
V.  Trinity  ete.  Ry.  Co.,  45  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  664;  Stoekdale  v.  Rio  Grande 
Western  Ry.  Co.,  28  Utah  201,  77  Pac. 
849;  Tidewater  Ry.  Co.  v.  Shartzer, 
107  Va.  562,  59  S.  E.  407,  17 
L.R.A.(N.S.)  1053;  Smith  v.  St. 
Paul  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  39  Wash.  355,  81 
Pac.  840,  109  Am.  St.  Rep.  889,  70 
L.R.A.  1018;  Mason  City  etc.  R.  E. 
Co.  V.  Wolf,  148  Fed.  961,  78  C.  C.  A. 
589.  See  Morrison  v.  Hinkson,  87 
111.  587,  29  Am.  Rep.  77.  Compare 
Atchison  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Lenz,  35 
111.  App.  330;  Hammersmith  etc.  E. 
R.  Co.  V.  Brand,  L.  R.  4  Eng.  &  Ir. 
App.  171.  An  elevated  railroad 
crossed  the  street  on  which  the  plain- 
tiff's property  abutted,  31  feet  north 
of  his  property.  He  brought  suit  for 
damages  to  his  property  by  the  noise, 
vibration,  obstruction  of  view  and 
of  light.  The  plaintiff  does  not  ap- 
pear to  have  made  out  a  case  of 
nuisance  or  obstruction  of  light  and 
the  court  found  that  there  was  no 
interference  with  any  right,  public 
or  private,  and,  therefore,  no  right  to 


§  357 


PEOPEETY  DAMAGED  OE  ijSTJUEED. 


suits  from  the  use  of  coal  bins,  water  tanks,  round  houses  and 
the  like,  similarly  situated  with  reference  to  the  plaintifE's  prop- 
erty.'* Where  a  railroad  was  laid  alongside  a  highway  opposite 
the  plaintiff's  farm  and  impaired  the  value  of  the  farm  by  ren- 
dering access  thereto  with  teams  and  stock  more  dangerous,  he 
was  held  entitled  to  recover  compensation.'* 

A  different  view  is  taken  of  the  constitution  of  Pennsylvania 
by  the  supreme  court  of  that  State.  Railroad  companies  in  that 
State  are  required  to  make  compensation  for  property  taken, 
injured  or  destroyed  by  the  construction  or  enlargement  of 
their  works,  and  this  compensation  is  required  to  be  paid  in 
advance.^"  It  is  held  that  one,  no  part  of  whose  property  has 
been  taken,  cannot  recover  for  the  damages  resulting  from  the 
lawful  and  proper  operation  of  a  railroad  adjacent  to  or  in  the 
near  vicinity  of  his  property.^'     Also  that  the  word  injured  in 


recover.  Aldrich  v.  Met.  W.  S.  El. 
R.  R.  Co.,  195  111.  456,  63  N.  E.  155, 
57  L.R.A.  237. 

isWiley  v.  Elwood,  134  111.  281,  25 
X.  E.  570;  Kuhn  v.  111.  Cent.  R.  R. 
Co.,  Ill  111.  App.  323;  Bramlette  v. 
Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  113  Ky. 
300,  68  S.  W.  145 ;  Omaha  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Janecek,  30  Neb.  276,  46  N. 
W.  478,  3  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp. 
Rep.  268;  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
O'Connor,  42  Neb.  90,  60  N.  W. 
326;  Louisville  &  N.  Terminal  Co. 
V.  Jacobs,  109  Tenn.  727,  72  S. 
W.  954,  61  L.R.A.  188;  Same  v. 
Lellyett,  114  Tenn.  368,  85  S.  W.  881, 
1  L.R.A.(N.S.)  49;  Ft.  Worth  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Downie,  82  Tex.  383,  17  S. 
W.  620;  Daniel  v.  Ft.  Worth  etc.  Ry. 
Co.,  96  Tex.  327,  72  S.  W.  578 ;  Rainey 
V.  Red  River  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  99  Tex. 
276,  89  S.  W.  768,  90  S.  W.  1096,  122 
Am.  St.  Rep.  622,  3  L.R.A.(N.S.) 
590 ;  St.  Louis  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Shaw,  99 
Tex.  559,  92  S.  W.  30, 122  Am.  St.  Rep. 
663,  6  L.R.A.(N.S.)  245;  Texas  etc. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Edrington,  100  Tex.  496, 
101  S.  W.  441,  9  L.R.A.(N.S.)  988. 
So  of  the  power  house  of  an  electric 
railway.  Chicago  North  Shore  St. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Payne,  192  III.  239,  61  N. 


E.  467 ;  King  v.  Vicksburg  Ry.  &  Lt. 
Co.,  88  Miss.  456,  42  So.  204,  117  Am. 
St.  Rep.  749,  6  L.R.A.(N.S.)  1036. 
But  the  construction  of  a  freight 
house  and  railroad  yards  across  the 
street  from  the  plaintiff  cannot  be 
enjoined  because  the  locality  is  a, 
residence  neighborhood.  Walther  v. 
Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  215  III.  456, 
74  N.  E.  401. 

isLake  Erie  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Scott,  132  111.  429,  24  N.  E.  78,  8 
L.R.A.  330,  S.  C.  32  111.  App.  292. 
It  has  been  held  in  Illinois  that  lots 
adjacent  to  a  railroad,  no  parts  of 
which  were  taken,  were  damaged  to 
the  extent  of  "the  depreciation  in 
market  value  of  the  same  by  reason 
of  the  construction  and  maintenance 
of  the  road."  Eberhart  v.  Chicago 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  70  111.  347. 

208ee  ante,  §  49. 

21  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Lip- 
pincott,  116  Pa.  St.  472;  Pennsyl- 
vania R.  R.  Co.  V.  Marehant,  119  Pa. 
St.  541,  13  Atl.  690,  4  Am.  St.  Rep. 
059 ;  Dooner  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  E. 
Co.,  142  Pa.  St.  36,  21  Atl.  755;  Penn- 
sylvania Company  for  Insurance  v. 
Pennsylvania  S.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  151  Pa. 
St.  334,  25  Atl.  107. 


656  emijN'ent  DOMAiif,  §  358 

the  constitution  embraces  only  such  wrongs  as  would  be  action- 
able but  for  the  statutory  authority,  and  such  as  are  occasioned 
by  the  construction  and  enlargement  of  works  and  improvements, 
as  distinguished  from  their  use  or  operation.^^ 

The  supreme  court  of  Georgia  takes  a  similar  view,  although 
the  constitution  of  that  State  provides  in  general  terms  that 
private  property  shall  not  be  taken  or  damaged  for  public 
purposes  without  just  compensation  first  paid.^*  A  plaintiff 
sued  for  damages  to  his  property  by  reason  of  railroad  tracks 
and  yards  near  his  property.  A  common  law  nuisance  was  clear- 
ly shown  by  reason  of  the  noise,  smoke,  cinders,  vibrations,  etc., 
in  the  operation  of  the  yards;  also  that  the  property  in  ques- 
tion was  materially  depreciated  in  value.  A  majority  of  the 
court  held  that  there  could  be  no  recovery,  and  elaborate  opinions 
were  given  on  both  sides  of  the  question.^* 

A  recovery  may  be  had  for  damage  caused  by  dust  and  dirt 
drifting  upon  one's  premises  from  a  bridge  or  embankment.^'' 
Damage  arising  from  the  fact  that  premises  can  be  overlooked 
from  a  railroad  embankment,  or  by  persons  traveling  over  the 
same  in  coaches,  have  been  held  not  to  be  within  the  English 
act ;  ^^  also  damages  caused  by  vibrations  made  by  passing 
trains.  ^^ 

§  358  (231).  Miscellaneous  cases.  Obstructing  the  ac- 
cess of  light  to  premises  is  a  damage  for  which  a  recovery  may 
be  had.^*    Plaintiffs  had  a  rifle  range,  and,  for  the  purpose  of 

22/Sfee  especially  Pennsylvania  R.  26Stack  v.  City  of  East  St.  Louis, 

K.  Co.  V.  Marchant,  119  Pa.  St.  541,  85  111.  377,  28  Am.  Rep.  619;  Chicago 

13   Atl.   690,   4   Am.    St.   Rep.    659.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Coggswell,  44  111. 

This   case  was  affirmed  in  the   Su-  App.  388;  Shano  v.  Bridge  Co.,  189 

preme  Court  of  the  United  States,  Pa.  St.  245,  42  Atl.  128;  Turner  v. 

but  the  latter  court  only  considered  Sheffield  &  Rotherham  R.  R.  Co.,  10 

whether  the  constitution  of  Pennsyl-  M.  &  W.  425;  East  and  West  India 

vania,  as  construed  by  the  Supreme  Docks  and  Birmingham  Junction  Ry. 

Court  of  that  State,  operated  to  de-  Co.  v.  Gattke,  20  L.  J.  N.  S.  Ch.  217. 

prive  the  plaintiff  of  his  property  2  6Iu  re  Penny,  7  Ellis  &  B.  660;  90 

without  due  process  of  law,  or  of  the  E.  C.  L.  R.  658;  26  L.  J.  Q.  B.  N.  S. 

equal      protection      of      the      laws.  225;  Shano  v.  Bridge  Co.,  189  Pa.  St. 

Marchant  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  245,  42  Atl.  128,  69  Am.  St.  Rep.  808. 

153  U.  S.  380,  14  S.  C.  894.  27Brand  v.  Hammersmith  City  Ry. 

2Un<e,  §  23.  Co.,  L.  R.  1  Q.  B.  130;  S.  C.  (E.'cch. 

2 4 Austin  v.  Augusta  Terminal  Co.,  Cham.)    L.  R.   2  Q.   B.  223;    S.  C. 

108  Ga.  671,  34  S.  E.  852,  47  L.R.A.  (House  of  Lords)    L.  R.  4  Eng.  St. 

755.    Also  Georgia  R.  R.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Irish  App.  171. 

Maddox,  116  Ga.  64,  42  S.  E.  315.  2  8Eagle  v.  Charing  Cross  Ry.  Co., 


§  358         PEOPEETY  DAMAGED  OE  INJUEED.  657 

maintaining  it,  had  an  interest  in  three  fields  in  a  straight  line. 
On  one  field  was  the  range.  The  plaintiffs  had  a  verbal  arrange- 
ment with  the  owner  of  the  next  field,  revocable  on  notice,  by 
which  they  paid  him  forty-nine  pounds  a  year  liquidated  dam- 
ages. The  third  field  was  leased  to  the  plaintiffs.  A  road  was 
constructed  through  the  middle  field,  which  rendered  the  range 
useless  for  the  purpose  for  which  plaintiffs  held  it.  It  was  held 
that  the  interest  of  plaintiffs  in  the  first  and  third  fields  was 
injuriously  affected.*®  The  construction  of  street  railway  tracks 
across  the  tracks  of  a  commercial  railroad,  which  intersect  the 
street,  is  not  a  taking  or  damaging  of  the  property  of  the 
commercial  road.^"  Where  a  railroad  purchased  the  rear  end  of 
plaintiff's  lot  and  went  under  the  surface  in  a  tunnel,  con- 
structing a  ventilating  shaft  therein,  which  was  afterwards 
enlarged  so  as  to  increase  the  annoyance  to  plaintiff  by  smoke, 
gases,  etc.,  it  was  held  the  plaintiff  had  no  cause  of  action  for 
such  increased  discomfort.^'  Where  plaintiff's  property  was 
diminished  in  value  by  the  construction  of  a  jail  or  fire-engine 
house  adjacent  thereto,  it  was  held  that  his  property  was  not 
damaged  within  the  meaning  of  the  constitution.^^  In  an  Illi- 
nois case  the  plaintiff  brought  a  suit  for  damages  to  his  property 
by  reason  of  a  small-pox  hospital  erected  and  maintained  by 
the  defendant  city  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  street  from  the 
plaintiff's  property.  The  court  held  that  the  depreciation  of 
the  plaintiff's  property  was  not  damage  within  the  constitution 
and  that  he  could  not  recover.     "We  can  see  no  difference  in 

2  L.  R.  C.  638;  Turner  v.  Sheffield  &  264,  26  L.R.A.  337,  11  Am.  R.  R.  & 
Rotherham  R.  R.  Co.,  10  M.  &  W.  Corp.  Rep.  507 ;  New  York  etc.  R.  R. 
425;  London  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Trus-  Co.  v.  Bridgeport  Traction  Co.,  65 
tees  of  Gower  Walk  School,  L.  R.  24  Conn.  410,  32  Atl.  953,  29  L.R.A.  367 ; 
Q.  B.  D.  40,  326.  See  also  Barrows  v.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  St.  Jo- 
City  of  Sycamore,  150  111.  588,  37  N.  seph  Terminal  R.  R.  Co.,  97  Mo.  457, 
B.  1096,  41  Am.  St.  Rep.  400,  10  Am.  10  S.  W.  826. 
R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  62.  siAttorney  General  v.  Metropoli- 

2  9Holt  V.  The  Gas  Light  &  Coke  tan  R.  R.  Co.,  L.  R.   (1894)   1  Q.  B. 

Co.,  7  L.  R.  Q.  B.  728.  D.  384. 

soChicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  West  3  2Bacon  v.   Walker,   77   Ga.   336; 

Chicago  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  156  111.  270,  40  Long  v.  Klberton,  109  Ga.  28,  34  S.  E. 

N.  E.  1008,  12  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  333,  77  Am.  St.  Rep.  363,  46  L.R.A. 

522;  Pittsburgh  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  West  428 ;  Van  de  Vera  v.  Kansas  City,  107 

Chicago  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  54  111.  App.  Mo.  83,   17   S.  W.  695,  28  Am.  St. 

273 ;  Chicago  etc.  Terminal  R.  R.  Co.  Rep.  396,  5  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 

V.  Whiting  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  139  Ind.  196.    And  see  the  following  sections. 
297,  38  N.  E.  604,  47  Am.  St.  Rep. 
Em.  D.— 42. 


658  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    359 

principle,"  says  the  court,  "between  the  right  "of  a  city  to  estab- 
lish and  maintain  a  small-pox  hospital  and  to  erect  and  use  jails, 
fire  engine  houses,  calabooses  and  the  like."  ^*  A  contrary  con- 
clusion has  been  reached  in  Kentucky,  -where  the  constitution 
requires  compensation  for  property  taken,  injured  or  destroyed. 
A  small-pox  hospital  was  erected  on  a  twenty  acre  tract  adjoin- 
ing the  plaintiff's  farm  of  three  hundred  and  twenty-five  acres. 
The  hospital  was  750  feet  from  the  plaintiff's  line  and  half  a 
mile  from  his  residence.  The  plaintiff  was  held  entitled  to 
recover  the  depreciation  in  value  of  his  farm  by  reason  of  the 
pest  house.**  Depreciation  to  abutting  property  caused  by  rais- 
ing the  grade  of  a  railroad  on  its  private  right  of  way  is  not 
damage  within  the  constitution.*'  So  when  the  plaintiff's  prop- 
erty is  injured  by  the  laying  out  of  a  new  highway,  which  di- 
verts travel  from  past  his  premises.*®  Loss  by  depreciation  in 
property  pending  proceedings  to  condemn  it,  which  proceed- 
ings were  unreasonably  delayed  and  finally  abandoned,  was  held 
to  be  damage  within  the  constitution.*^ 

§  359  (232),  The  words  in  question  were  intended  to 
enlarge  the  right  to  compensation.  There  can  be  no  doubt 
but  what  the  words  in  question  were  intended  to  enlarge  the 
right  to  compensation.  Any  other  construction  would  render 
the  words  nugatory.  They  are  "an  extension  of  the  common 
provision  for  the  protection  of  private  property."  **  "The 
words,  injured  or  destroyed,  were  not  used  in  vain  and  without 
meaning.  It  was  intended  that  they  should  have  effect,  and 
unless  they  operate  to  impose  a  liability  not  previously  existing, 

33Frazer  v.  Chicago,  186  111.  480,  property."    p.  367.     See  also  Arnold 

57  N.  E.  1055,  78  Am.  St.  Rep.  296,  v.  Stanford,  113  Ky.  852,  69  S.  W. 

51  L.R.A.  306.  726.      A   general    hospital    was   en- 

34Paducah  v.  Allen,  111  Ky.  361,  joined  as  a  nuisance  in  Deaconess 

63  S.  W.  981,  98  Am.  St.  Rep.  42.  Home  &  Hospital  v.  Bontjes,  207  111. 

The  court  says :     "We  therefore  con-  553,  69  N.  E.  748,  64  L.R.A.  21,5. 
elude  that  where    a    city    or    other  s^Kotz  v.  111.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  188 

municipality  erects  and  maintains  a  III.  578,  59  N.  E.  240;  Osburn  v.  Chi- 

public  institution,  which,  by  reason  cage,  105  111.  App.  217. 
of  its  nature,  endangers  the  lives  or  seHuflF  v.  Donehoo,  109  Ga.  638,  34 

health  of  the  occupants  of  adjacent  S.  E.   1035;   Elbert  Co.  v.  Swift,  2 

premises,  as  by  subjecting  them  to  Ga.  App.  47,  58  S.  E.  396. 
contagious  or  infectious  diseases,  it  STWinklemau  v.  Chicago,  213  111. 

is  not  only  a  nuisance,  but  it  is  such  360,  72  N".  E.  1066. 
an  invasion  of  the  property  rights  of  3  9 Transportation  Co.  v.   Chicago, 

such    adjacent    holder    as    amounts  99  U.  S.  p.  642. 
both  to  an  injuring  and  a  taking  of 


§  359 


PEOPEETY  DAMAGED  OE  INJUEED. 


659 


they  are  without  operation."  *°  The  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States,  referring  to  the  constittition  of  Illinois,  says: 
"The  use  of  the  word  'damaged'  in  the  clause  providing  for 
compensation  to  the  oAvners  of  private  property,  appropriated 
to  public  use,  could  have  been  used  with  no  other  intention  than 
that  expressed  by  the  State  court.    Such  a  change  in  the  organic 


cecity  Council  of  Montgomery  v. 
Townsend,  80  Ala.  489,  492.  To  the 
same  effect  are  the  following  cases: 
City  Council  of  Montgomery  v.  Mad- 
dox,  89  Ala.  181,  7  So.  433,  2  Am.  R. 
R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  426;  Hot  Springs  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Williamson,  45  Ark.  429; 
Reardon  v.  San  Francisco,  66  Cal. 
492,  56  Am.  Rep.  109 ;  Denver  v. 
Bayer,  7  Col.  113;  City  of  Buffalo  v. 
Strait,  20  Col.  13,  36  Pac.  790;  Camp- 
bell V.  Metropolitan  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  82 
Ga.  320,  9  S.  E.  1078;  Rigney  v.  Chi- 
cago, 102  111.  04;  Henderson  v.  Mc- 
Clain,  102  Ky.  402,  43  S.  W.  700,  39 
L.R.A.  349;  City  of  Vicksburg  v. 
Herman,  72  Miss.  211,  16  So.  434; 
Van  de  Vere  v.  Kansas  City,  107  Mo. 
83,  17  S.  W.  695,  5  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp. 
Rep.  196 ;  Gottschalk  v.  Chicago,  Bur- 
lington &  Quincy  R.  R.  Co.,  14  Neb. 
550;  Omaha  &  Republican  Valley  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Struden,  22  Neb.  343; 
Schaller  v.  City  of  Omaha,  23  Neb. 
325,  36  N.  W.  533 ;  City  of  Omaha  v. 
Kramer,  25  Neb.  492,  41  N.  W.  295, 
13  Am.  St.  Rep.  504;  Seace  v.  Wayne 
County,  72  Neb.  162,  100  N.  W.  149; 
County  or  Chester  v.  Brower,  117  Pa. 
St.  647,  12  Atl.  577;  Searle  v.  Lead, 
10  S.  D.  312,  73  N.  W.  101,  39  L.R.A. 
345 ;  Gainsville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hall, 
78  Tex.  169,  14  S.  W.  259,  3  Am.  R.  R. 
&  Corp.  Rep.  251,  9  L.R.A.  298;  Tide- 
water Ry.  Co.  V.  Shartzer,  107  Va. 
562,  59  S.  E.  407,  17  L.R.A. 
(N.S.)  1053;  Brown  v.  City  of 
Seattle,  5  Wash.  35,  31  Pac.  313,  32 
Pac.  214,  7  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
64;  Smith  v.  St.  Paul  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  39 
Wash.  355,  81  Pac.  840,  109  Am.  St. 
Rep.  889,  70  L.R.A.  1018;  Johnson  v. 
Parkersburg,  16  W.  Va.  402,  37  Am. 


Rep.  779.  In  Galveston  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Fuller,  63  Tex.  467,  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  Texas  says:  "This 
language  is  broader  than  that  used 
in  the  former  constitutions  of  this 
State,  and  was  doubtless  intended  to 
meet  all  cases  in  which,  even  in  the 
proper  prosecution  of  a  public  work 
or  purpose,  the  right  or  property  of 
any  person,  in  a  pecuniary  way,  may 
be  injuriously  affected  by  reason  of 
the  thing  being  made  thereby  less 
valuable,  or  its  use  by  the  owner 
restricted  by  the  public  use  to  which 
it  is  wholly  or  partially  applied, 
without  compensation  having  been 
first  made  to  the  owner.  It  is  also 
not  improbable  that  it  was  intended, 
by  the  language  found  in  the  present 
constitution,  to  meet  and  correct 
r  ils  which  had  sometimes  been 
thought  to  result  to  the  property- 
owner  from  a  narrow  and  technical 
meaning  sometimes  put  by  the  courts 
upon  the  word  'taken'  used  in  the 
former  constitutions  of  this  State  and 
in  the  constitutions  of  the  most  of 
the  other  States.  The  word  'prop- 
erty,' as  used  in  the  section  of  the 
constitution  referred  to,  is  doubtless 
used  in  its  legal  sense,  and  means  not 
only  the  thing  owned,  but  also  every 
right  which  accompanies  ownership 
and  its  incidents.  Thus  considered, 
under  the  rules  established  by  the 
great  weight  of  judicial  decisions, 
and  opinions  of  elementary  writers 
eminent  for  their  learning,  the  facts 
of  this  case  amount  to  a  taking  of 
private  property  for  a  public  use." 
p.  469.  *  «  *  "The  word  'dam- 
aged' is  evidently  used  in  the  sense 


660 


EMINEISTT  DOMAIN-. 


360 


law  of  the  State  was  not  meaningless.  But  it  would  be  meaning- 
less if  it  should  be  adjudged  that  the  constitution  of  1870  gave 
no  additional  or  greater  security  to  private  property  sought  to 
be  appropriated  to  public  use  than  was  guaranteed  by  the  former 
constitution."  *^ 

§  360  (232a),  The  words  in  question  should  be  liber- 
ally construed.  The  provisions  of  the  constitution  requir- 
ing compensation  to  be  made  for  property  taken,  injured  or  dam- 
aged for  public  use,  are  intended  for  the  protection  of  private 
rights.  They  are  remedial  in  character.  They  should,  there- 
fore, be  liberally  construed  in  favor  of  the  individual  whose 
property  is  affected,  and  the  authorities  so  hold.*^  "The  lan- 
guage of  the  constitution  is  to  be  construed  liberally  so  as  to 
carry  out  and  not  defeat  the  purpose  for  which  it  was 
adopted."  ** 

§  361  (233),  They  include  any  physical  injury  to  prop- 
erty not  held  to  be  a  taking.     In  the  chapters  on  What  Conr 


in,  which  tlie  word  'injured'  is  ordi- 
na,rily  understood.  By  damage  is 
meant  'every  loss  or  diminution  of 
what,  is .  9,  man's  own,  occasioned  by 
the  fault  of  another,'  whether  this  re- 
sults directly  to  the  thing  owned,  or 
be  but  an  interference  with  the  right 
which  the  owner  has  to  the  legal  and 
pi:t)per  use  of  his  own.  If  by  the  con- 
struction of  a  railway  or  other  public 
work  an  injury  peculiar  to  a  given 
property  be  inflicted  upon  it,  or  its 
owner  be  deprived  of  its  legal  and 
proper  use,  or  of  any  right  therein  or 
thereto ;  that  is,  if  an  injury,  not 
suffered  by  that  particular  property 
or  right  only  in  common  with  other 
property  or  rights  in  the  same  com- 
munity or  section,  by  reason  of  the 
general  fact  that  the  public  works 
exist,  be  inflicted,  then  such  property 
may  be  said  to  be  damaged."  p.  470. 
Compare  Stanwood  v.  Maiden,  157 
Mass.  17,  31  N.  E.  702,  16  L.R.A.  591. 

4iChicago  v.  Taylor,  125  U.  S.  161, 
8  S.  C.  820.  Section  quoted  and  ap- 
proved in  Tidewater  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Shartzer,  107  Va.  562,  59  S.  E.  407, 
17L.R.A.(N.S.)  1053. 

4  2City  of  Pueblo  v.  Strait,  20  Golo. 


13,  36  Pac.  790,  47  Am.  St.  Rep.  273, 
24  L.R.A.  392;  Allen  v.  Common- 
wealth, 188  Mass.  59,  74  N.  E.  287,  69 
L.R.A.  599;  Schaller  v.  City  of 
Omaha,  23  Neb.  325,  36  N.  W.  533; 
City  of  Omaha  v.  Kramer,  25  Neb. 
492,  41  N.  W.  295,  13  Am.  St.  Rep. 
504;  Matter  of  Grade  Crossing  Com- 
missioners, 59  App.  Div.  498,  69  N. 
Y.  S.  52;  S.  C.  affirmed,  168  N.  Y. 
659;  Paris  Mt.  Water  Co.  v.  Green- 
ville, 53  S.  C.  82,  30  S.  E.  699;  Tide- 
water Ry.  Co.  V.  Shartzer,  107  Va. 
562,  59  S.  E.  407,  17  L.R.A. 
(N.S.)  1053.  In  Boyd  v.  United 
States,  116  U.  S.  616,  635,  it  is  said 
that  "constitutional  provisions  for 
the  security  of  person  and  property 
should  be  liberally  construed.  A 
close  and  literal  construction  de- 
prives them  of  half  their  efiicacy,  and 
leads  to  gradual  depreciation  of  the 
right,  as  if  it  consisted  more  in 
sound  than  in  substance.  It  is  the 
duty  of  courts  to  be  watchful  for  the 
constitutional  rights  of  the  citizen, 
and  against  any  stealthy  encroach- 
ments thereon." 

4  3County  of  Chester  v.  Brower,  117 
Pa.  St.  647,  12  Atl.  577. 


§    362  PEOPEETT  DAMAGED  OE  INJURED.  661 

stitutes  a  Taking,  we  have  endeavored  to  show  that  any  physical 
injury  to  property  is  a  taking,  but  all  the  decisions  do  not  bear 
out  this  conclusion.**  In  States  which  hold  that  there  is  any 
kind  of  physical  injury  which  is  not  a  taking,  the  words  in 
question  would  clearly  cover  such  physical  injury.  Thus  any 
invasion  of  one's  premises  by  water  or  gases,  or  by  casting  upon 
them  smoke  or  cinders,  or  affecting  them  by  vibrations,  if  not 
held  to  be  a  taking,  would  certainly  be  a  damage  or  injury  within 
the  constitutional  provisions  now  under  consideration.*'  In 
order  that  smoke,  cinders,  gases^  vibrations,  etc.,  should  amount 
to  a  taking,  they  must  constitute  a  common  law  nuisance.**  But 
the  invasion  of  property  by  any  of  these  agencies,  in  a  degree 
to  materially  affect  its  value,  is  a  damage  or  injury,  though  not 
a  nuisance.*^  Probably  mere  noise  would  not  give  a  right  of 
recovery  unless  it  amounted  to  a  nuisance,**  nor  vibrations,  un- 
less they  produced  a  physical  injury.** 

§  362  (234) .  Also  any  interference  with  private  rights 
not  held  to  be  a  taking.  We  have  also  endeavored  to  .  show 
that  any  interference  with  any  private  right  appurtenant  to 
property,  such  as  the  right  of  support,  the  right  to  pure  air,  etc., 
was  a  taking  for  which  compensation  must  be  made  under  our 
constitutions  as  they  existed  prior  to  1870.'"     Many  courts, 

*i8ee  ante,  §§  62-68;  chapters  iii.,  Daniel  v.  Ft.  Worth  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  96 

iv.,  v.,  vi.  Tex.  327,  72  S.  W.  578;  St.  Louis  etc. 

*sAnte,  §§  356  et.  seq.;  111.  Cent.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Shaw,  99  Tex.  559,  92  S. 

K.  E,  Co.  V.  Trustees  of  Schools,  212  W.  30,  122  Am.  St.  Rep.  663,  6  L.R.A. 

111.  406,  72  N.  E.  39;  Davenport  etc.  (N.S.)  245;   Texas  etc.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Ed- 

Ey.  Co.  V.  Sinnet,  111  111.  App.  75;  rington,  100  Tex.  496,  101  S.  W.  441, 

Kuhn  V.  111.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  Ill  111.  9  L.R.A.    (N.S.)    988;    Stockdale  v. 

App.  323 ;  Henderson  v.  McClain,  102  Rio  Grande  Western  Ry.  Co.,  28  Utah 

Ky.  402,  43  S.  W.  700,  39  L.E.A.  349;  201,  77  Pac.  849;  Tidewater  Ry.  Co. 

Willis  V.  Ky.  &  Ind.  Bridge  Co.,  104  v.    Shartzer,    107    Va.    562,    59    S. 

Ky.  186,  46  S.W.  488;  Covington  etc.  E.     407,     17     L.R.A. (N.S.)      1053; 

E.  E.  &  Bridge  Co.  v.  Kleymeier,  105  Smith  v.   St.  Paul  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  39 

Ky.  609,  49  S.  W.  484;  King  v.  Vicks-  Wash.  355,  81  Pac.  840,  109  Am.  St. 

burg  Ey.  &  Lt.  Co.,  88  Miss.  456,  42  Eep.  889,  70  L.E.A.  1018. 

So.   204,    117   Am.   St.   Eep.   749,   6  ieAnte,  §§  235-238. 

L.E.A.  (N.S.)    1036;    Louisville    etc.  i^See  cases  already  cited  in  this 

Terminal   Co.   v.   Jacobs,   109  Tenn.  section.     Also  ante,  §  357. 

727,  72  S.  W.  954,   61  L.E.A.   188;  ^sGossett  v.  Southern  Ey.  Co.,'115 

Louisville     etc.     Terminal     Co.     v.  Tenn.  376,  89  S.  W;  737,  112  Am.  St. 

Lellyett,  114  Tenn.  368,  85  S.  W.  881,  Eep.  846,  1  L.E.A. (N.S.)  97. 

1  L.E.A.(N.S.)  49;  Gossett  v.  So.  Ey.  "111.  Cent.  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Trustees 

Co.,  115  Tenn.  376,  89  S.  W.  737,  112  of  Schools,  212  111  406,  72  N.  E.  39. 

Am.  St.  Eep.  846,  1  L.E.A.  (N.S.)  97;  so  Ante,  §§  234-238. 


662  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    363 

however,  have  held  otherwise.  We  think  it  clear  that,  where 
such  interference  is  held  not  to  be  a  taking,  it  must  be  held 
to  be  a  damage  or  injury.  So  far,  we  think,  no  question  can 
arise  as  to  the  interpretation  of  the  words  under  consideration. 

§  363  (235).  And,  generally,  any  damage  to  property 
arising  from  an  interference  with  a  right,  public  or  private, 
which  does  not  amount  to  a  taking.  After  forty  years  of 
litigation  in  England  over  the  proper  construction  of  the  words, 
injuriously  affected,  we  think  it  may  now  be  regarded  as  settled, 
that  they  include  any  damage  to  property  produced  by  an  in- 
terference with  a  right,  either  public  or  private,  which  the  owner 
or  occupier  is  entitled  to  make  use  of  in  connection  with  the 
property,  and  the  loss  or  impairment  of  which  renders  the  prop- 
erty less  valuable.^^  In  McCarthy's  Case  the  Lord  Chancellor 
says :  "My  Lords,  in  his  very  able  argument  at  your  Lordship's 
bar,  Mr.  Thesinger  stated  what  he  would  rely  upon  as  a  defini- 
tion of  the  right  to  compensation,  and,  having  considered  this 
case  very  fully,  I  myself  should  not  be  disposed  to  find  fault 
with  any  part  of  that  definition,  although  definitions  are  always 
matters  of  very  considerable  difficulty.  Mr.  Thesinger  stated 
that  the  test  which  he  would  submit  as  one  which  he  thought 
would  explain  and  reconcile  the  various  cases  upon  this  subject, 
was  this,  that  where  by  the  construction  of  works  there  is  a 
physical  interference  with  any  right,  public  or  private,  which 
the  owners  or  occupiers  of  property  are  by  law  entitled  to  make 
use  of,  in  connection  with  such  property,  and  which  right  gives 
an  additional  market  value  to  such  property,  apart  from  the  uses 
to  which  any  particular  owner  or  occupier  might  put  it,  there  is 
a  title  to  compensation,  if,  by  reason  of  such  interference,  the 
property,  as  a  property,  is  lessened  in  value."  ^* 

Substantially  the  same  test  is  adopted  by  the  supreme  court 
of  Illinois  in  interpreting  the  word  "damaged"  in  the  consti- 
tution of  that  State.  "In  all  cases,"  says  the  court,  "to  warrant 
a  recovery,  it  must  appear  that  there  has  been  some  direct  physic- 
al disturbance  of  a  right,  either  public  or  private,  which  the 
plaintiff  enjoys  in  connection  with  his  property,  and  which 

6iThe  doctrine  is  settled  and  the  5  zMetropolitan  Board  of  Works  v. 

cases  reviewed  in  McCarthy  v.  Metro-      McCarthy,  7  E.  &  I.  App.  Cas.  243, 
politan   Board   of   Works,   L.    R.    7      253. 
Eng.   &   Irish  App.   243,   and   Cale- 
donian Railway  v.  Walker's  Trustees, 
L.  R.  7  App.  Cas.  259. 


§  363 


PEOPEETY  DAMAGED  OE  INJUEED. 


663 


gives  to  it  an  additional  value,  and  that  by  reason  of  such  dis- 
turbance he  has  sustained  a  special  damage  with  respect  to  his 
property  in  excess  of  that  sustained  by  the  public  generally."  ®* 
In  a  more  recent  case  the  same  court  has  held  the  disturbance 
of  the  right  need  not  necessarily  be  a  "direct  physical  disturb- 
ance" in  order  to  bring  the  case  within  the  constitution.  A 
railroad  was  constructed  alongside  a  highway  and  the  farm  op- 
posite was  diminished  in  value  because  access  thereto  over  the 
highway  was  rendered  dangerous  and  inconvenient  by  the  opera- 
tion of  the  road.  It  was  held  that  the  farm  was  damaged  within 
the  meaning  of  the  constitution.^* 


B3Rigney  v.  Chicago,  102  111.  64, 
81.  This  language  is  quoted  and  ap- 
proved as  a  proper  Interpretation  of 
the  Illinois  constitution  by  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  the  United  States  in 
the  case  of  Chicago  v.  Taylor,  125  U. 
S.  161.  And  see  Aldrieh  v.  Met.  West 
Side  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  195  111.  456,  63 
N.  E.  155,  57  L.R.A.  237;  111. 
Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v  Trustees  of  Schools, 
212  111  406,  72  N.  E.  39;  Chicago  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Coggswell,  44  111.  App. 
88;  Met.  West  Side  El.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Goll,  100  111.  App.  323. 

5 4 Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Scott,  132  111.  429,  24  N.  E.  78,  8 
L.R.A.  330.  After  referring  to  the 
Rigney  case,  above  cited,  the  court 
says:  "We  are  inclined  to  think  that 
there  is  no  good  reason  for  dis- 
tinguishing between  an  injury  aris- 
ing from  an  interference  with  ap- 
pellee's right  to  the  advantages  the 
highway  gave  his  farm,  caused  by  a 
physical  obstruction  placed  therein, 
as  in  the  foregoing  case,  and  where 
the  same  kind  of  an  injury  is  pro- 
duced by  the  operation  of  trains  be- 
side it.  In  either  case  the  advan- 
tages given  the  farm  by  the  highway 
have  to  some  extent  been  destroyed, 
and  the  land  lessened  in  value.  If  it 
be  conceded  that  the  result  of  oper- 
ating the  road  has  in  fact  injured 
appellee's  farm  in  a  way  not  common 
to  the  public,  and  thereby  made  it 


less  valuable,  it  would  seem  to  follow 
as  a  necessary  consequence  that  it 
has  been  damaged  for  public  use. 
Such  operation,  being  lawful,  and 
confined  to  the  right  of  way,  does 
not  release  appellant  from  liability; 
for  it  would  clearly  be  liable  for 
damages  caused  by  an  unlawful  act, 
and,  as  we  understand  the  constitu- 
tional provision  that  private  prop- 
erty shall  not  be  taken  nor  damaged 
for  public  use  without  just  compen- 
sation, it  means  to  cover  cases 
where  damages  are  caused  by  acts 
that  are  legal,  and  entirely  within 
the  power  of  the  corporation  perform- 
ing them,  but  in  the  doing  of  which, 
for  the  use  and  benefit  of  the  public, 
private  property  is  damaged.  It  fol- 
lows, therefore,  that  appellant's 
proposition  that  'a  corporation  is  not 
liable  unless  an  individual  doing  the 
same  thing  on  his  private  property 
would  be,'  as  applied  to  this  case  is 
not  sound.  An  individual  cannot 
legally  take  or  damage  private  prop- 
erty for  public  use,  but  a  railroad 
company  can  lawfully  do  either,  if  in 
so  doing  it  makes  compensation." 
This  is  from  the  opinion  of  the  ap- 
pellate court,  adopted  and  approved 
by  the  Supreme  Court.  The  leaving 
of  abutting  property  in  a  condition, 
or  the  use  of  it  in  a  way,  to  endanger 
travel  on  the  adjacent  street,  is  un- 


664 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


§  363 


In  speaking  of  the  word  damaged  in  the  constitution  of  Ne- 
braska, the  supreme  court  of  that  State  says :  "It  -was  to  grant 
relief  in  cases  where  there  was  no  direct  injury  to  the  real 
estate  itself,  but  some  physical  disturbance  of  a  right  which  the 
owner  possesses  in  connection  with  his  estate,  by  reason  of  which 
he  sustains  special  injury  in  respect  to  such  property  in  excess 
of  that  sustained  by  the  public  at  large."  ^*  Similar  conclusions 
have  been  reached  in  other  States.^"    The  test  here  proposed  is 


doubtedly  a  public  nuisance.  Elliott, 
Roads  and  Streets,  p.  S42  et  seq.  The 
operation  of  a  railroad  on  private 
property  adjacent  to  a  street  or  high- 
way, without  authority  of  law,  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  frighten  horses 
and  endanger  travel,  would,  there- 
fore, be  to  maintain  a  public 
nuisance.  If  the  use  of  the  property 
on  the  opposite  side  of  the  street  was 
thereby  interfered  with  so  as  to 
diminish  its  rental  or  salable  value, 
the  owner  would  suffer  a  special  dam- 
age, and  would  be  entitled  to  main- 
tain a  private  action.  Consequently, 
it,  would  follow  that  when  the  same 
damage  results  from  a,  railroad  au- 
thorized by  law,  the  owner  would 
have  a  remedy  under  the  constitu- 
tion; and  the  case  is  no  exception  to 
the  general  rule. 

sBGottschalk  v.  Chicago,  Burling- 
ton &  Quincy  R.  R.  Co.,  14  Neb.  550, 
560;  Omaha  Belt  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Dermott,  25  Neb.  717,  41  N.  W.  648; 
Stehr  v.  Mason  City  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  77 
Neb.  641,  110  N.  W.  701.  But  com- 
pare City  of  Omaha  v.  Kramer,  25 
Neb.  492,  41  N.  W.  295,  13  Am.  St. 
Rep.  504;  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hazels,  26  Neb.  364,  42  N.  W.  93; 
Schaller  v.  City  of  Omaha,  23  Neb. 
325,  36  N.  W.  533.    See  next  section. 

BSEachus  V.  Los  Angeles  Consol. 
El.  R.  R.  Co.,  103  Cal.  614,  37  Pac. 
7S0,  42  Am.  St.  Rep.  149;  City  of 
Pueblo  V.  Strait,  20  Colo.  13,  36  Pac. 
790;  Peel  v.  Atlanta,  85  Ga.  138,  11 
S.  E.  582,  2  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
413;    Campbell   v.   Metropolitan   St. 


:rt.  R.  Co.,  82  Ga.  320,  9  S.  E.  1078; 
Bramlette  v.  Louisville  etc.  R.  E. 
Co.,  113  Ky.  300,  68  S.  W.  145;  Lud- 
low V.  Detwiller,  20  Ky.  L.  R.  894, 
47  S.  W.  881 ;  City  of  Vicksburg  v. 
Herman,  72  Miss.  211,  16  So.  434; 
King  V.  Vicksburg  Ry.  &  Lt.  Co.,  88 
Miss.  456, 42  So.  204, 117  Am.  St.  Rep. 
749,  6  L.R.A.(N.S.)  1036;  Vail  de 
Vere  v.  Kansas  City,  107  Mo.  83,  17 
S.  W.  695,  28  Am.  St.  Rep.  396,  5 
Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  196;  Penn- 
sylvania R.  R.  Co.  v.  Marchant,  119 
Pa.  St.  541,  13  Atl.  690,  4  Am.  St. 
Rep.  659;  Pennsylvania  S.  V.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Walsh,  124  Pa.  St.  544,  17  Atl. 
186;  Foust  v.  Pa.  R.  R.  Co.,  212  Pa. 
St.  213,  61  Atl.  829;  Trinity  &  S.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Meadows,  73  Tex.  32,  11 
S.  W.  145;  Gainsville  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Hall,  78  Tex.  169,  14  S.  W.  259,  9 
L.R.A.  298,  3  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
251;  Ft.  Worth  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Downie,  82  Tex.  383,  17  S.  W.  620; 
Brown  v.  City  of  Seattle,  5  Wash.  35, 
31  Pac.  313,  32  Pac.  Rep.  214,  7  Am. 
R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  64;  Mason  City 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Wolf,  148  Fed.  961, 
78  C.  C.  A.  589.  In  the  last  case, 
which  is  under  the  constitution  of 
Nebraska,  the  court  says:  "The 
right  of  recovery  under  the  State 
constitution  is  not  limited  to  those 
cases  in  which  the  property  of  a  pri- 
vate owner  is  actually  invaded  or  ap- 
propriated by  a  railroad  company-. 
It  extends  to  cases  whejre  the  value 
of  the  property  is  depreciated  by  the 
disturbance  of  some  right,  either  pub- 
lic or  private,  which  the  owner  en- 


§    365  PEOPEKTY  DAMAGED  OE  INJUEED.  665 

one  which  can  be  readily  applied  in  all  cases,  which  gives  ample 
scope  to  the  words  in  question,  and  which  affords  full  protec- 
tion to  the  owners  of  private  property,  without  casting  any  un- 
necessary burden  upon  those  engaged  in  works  of  a  public  nature. 

§  364  (235a).  When  claim  based  on  an  interference 
with  a  public  right,  the  plaintiff's  damages  must  be  special 
and  peculiar.  According  to  the  rule  laid  down  in  the  last  sec- 
tion the  owner  of  property  may  recover,  as  for  a  damage  or 
injury,  under  the  constitution,  though  the  only  actual  injury  or 
wrongful  act  complained  of  consists  of  an  obstruction  or  inter- 
ference with  a  right  which  he  enjoys  in  common  with  the  pub- 
lic. In  such  case,  it  is  the  universal  rule  that  the  plaintiff  must 
show  an  injury  or  damage  which  is  special  and  peculiar  to  him- 
self ;  as  distinguished  from  that  suffered  by  the  public  at  large.''^ 
But  diminution  in  value  of  the  property,  resulting  from  the  in- 
terference, is  a  special  and  peculiar  injury  within  the  rule.^^ 

§  365  (235b).  Different  views  regarding  the  proper 
construction  of  the  word  "damaged"  or  "injured."  In  en- 
deavoring to  give  a  general  interpretation  to  the  words  damaged 
or  injured,  as  used  in  recent  constitutions,  courts  have  usually 
adopted  one  or  the  other  of  the  following  views:  1.  That  the 
words  embrace  only  what  are  known  as  actionable  damages,  that 
is,  such  damages  as  would  forrh  the  basis  of  an  action  at  common 

joys  in  connection  therewith.  It  124  Cal.  274,  57  Pac.  82;  Town  of 
matters  not  whether  the  disturbance  Longmont  v.  Parker,  14  Colo.  386,  23 
proceeds  from  works  and  operations  Pac.  443,  20  Am.  St.  Rep.  277,  2  Am. 
upon  public  highways,  or  from  those  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  91 ;  Fairchild  v. 
upon  grounds  acquired  and  owned  by  City  of  St.  Louis,  97  Mo.  85,  11  S.  W. 
the  company  itself;  and  in  the  latter  60;  Carman  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  9V 
case  the  method  of  acquisition.  Mo.  92,  11  S.  W.  60;  Glaessner  v. 
whether  by  purchase  or  by  the  exer-  Anheuser-Busch  Brewing  Ass.,  100 
cise  of  the  power  of  eminent  domain.  Mo.  508,  13  S.  W.  707,  2  Am.  R.  R.  & 
is  immaterial.  The  right  of  recovery  Corp.  Rep.  420 ;  Van  de  Vere  v.  Kan- 
includes  damage  to  the  property  sas  City,  107  Mo.  83,  17  S.  W.  695,  28 
from  noise,  smoke,  cinders,  and  vibra-  Am.  St.  Rep.  396,  5  Am.  R.  R.  & 
tions  of  the  ground,  and  the  obstruc-  Corp.  Rep.  196;  Gates  v.  Kansas  City 
tion  or  impairment  of  the  right  of  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  Ill  Mo.  28,  19  S.  W. 
the  owner  to  make  use  of  public  high-  Rep.  957;  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
ways  in  the  vicinity.  The  measure  Marchant,  119  Pa.  St.  541,  13  Atl. 
of  the  recovery  is  the  difference  be-  690;  Pennsylvania  S.  V.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
tween  the  market  value  of  the  prop-  Walsh,  124  Pa.  St.  544,  17  Atl.  186; 
erty  before  the  construction  and  oper-  Trinity  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Meadows,  73 
ation  of  the  railroad  and  its  market  Tex.  32,  11  S.  W.  145. 
value  afterwards."  p.  967.  ssAnte,  §  199;  post,  §  951. 
5 'Brown  v.  Board  of  Supervisors, 


666 


EMIN^ENT   DOMAIN. 


§  365 


law,  but  for  the  statutory  authority.^*  2.  That  they  embrace 
only  damages  caused  by  some  physical  injury  to  the  property, 
or  by  an  interference  with  some  private  right  appurtenant  to  the 
property,  or  of  some  public  right,  which  the  owner  is  entitled 
to  make  use  of  in  connection  with  the  property.^"     3.     That 


5  9Brown  v.  San  Francisco,  124  Cal. 
274,  57  Pac.  82;  Town  of  Longmont 
V.  Parker,  14  Colo.  386,  23  Pac.  443, 
28  Am.  St.  Eep.  396,  2  Am.  R.  E.  & 
Corp.  Rep.  91;  Peel  v.  Atlanta,  85 
Ga.  138,  11  S.  E.  582,  2  Am.  R.  R.  & 
Corp.  Rep.  413;  Campbell  v.  Metro- 
politan St.  R.  R.  Co.,  82  Ga.  320,  9  S. 

E.  1078;  Austin  v.  Augusta  Terminal 
Ry.  Co.,  108  Ga.  671,  34  S.  E.  852,  47 
L.R.A.  755;  Ga.  R.  R.  &  B.  Co.  v. 
Maddox,  116  Ga.  64,  42  S.  E.  315; 
Baker  v.  Boston  El.  Ry.  Co.,  183 
Mass.  178,  66  N.  E.  711;  Coster  v. 
Albany,  43  N.  Y.  399;  Pennsylvania 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Marchant,  119  Pa.  St. 
541,  13  Atl.  690;  Pennsylvania  S.  V. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Walsh,  124  Pa.  St.  544, 
17  Atl.  186;  Trinity  &  S.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Meadows,  73  Tex.  32,  11  S.  W.  145; 
Gainsville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hall,  78 
Tex.  169,  14  S.  W.  259,  3  Am.  R.  E.  & 
Corp.  Eep.  251 ;  Haney  v.  G.  C.  &  S. 

F.  E.  R.  Co.,  3  Tex.  Ct.  of  App.  p. 
336,  §§  278-280;  Smitb  v.  St.  Paul 
etc.  Ry.  Co.,  39  Wash.  355,  81  Pac. 
840,  109  Am.  St.  Rep.  889,  70  L.R.A. 
1018.  And  see  Henderson  Belt  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Deehamp,  95  Ky.  219,  24  S.  W. 
605;  McMahon  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  41  La.  An.  827,  6  So.  640.  In  the 
case  of  Peel  v.  Atlanta,  85  Ga.  138, 
11  S.  E.  582,  2  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
413,  it  is  said :  "The  effect  of  such 
provisions  is  not  to  authorize  com- 
pensation in  all  cases  where  property 
may  be  injured  by  public  works,  but 
only  where  the  enjoyment  of  some 
right  of  the  plaintiff  in  reference  to 
his  property  is  interfered  with,  and 
the  property  thereby  rendered  less 
valuable.  The  test  is,  would  the  in- 
jury, if  caused  by  a  private  person 


without  authority  of  statute,  give  the 
plaintiff  a  cause  of  action  against 
such  person?  If  so,  then  he  is  en- 
titled to  compensation  notwith- 
standing the  statute  which  legalizes 
the  damaging  work.  The  constitu- 
tional or  statutory  provision  simply 
prevents  the  defendant  from  shield- 
ing himself  under  legislative  au- 
thority against  liability  for  damages 
consequent  upon  the  work.  Hence,  if 
no  part  of  the  plaintiff's  land  is 
taken,  and  no  other  right  of  his  is 
disturbed,  he  cannot  have  compensa- 
tion." And  in  Trinity  etc.  R.  E.  Co. 
v.  Meadows,  73  Tex.  32,  11  S.  W.  145, 
the  court  says:  "We  do  not  under- 
stand that  it  was  intended  to  give  an 
action  against  those  constructing 
public  works,  for  acts  which  if  done 
by  persons  in  pursuit  of  a  private 
enterprise  would  not  have  been 
actionable.  *  *  *  If  a  corporation  do 
an  act  which  it  acquires  a  right  to 
do  by  virtue  of  its  franchise  granted 
for  public  use,  and  if  a  person  hav- 
ing no  franchise  could  not  have  done 
the  act  lawfully,  and  the  property  of 
another  is  directly  damaged,  then  we 
understand  that  the  constitutional 
provision  requires  that  notwithstand- 
ing the  franchise  the  corporation 
shall  be  liable."  On  the  subject  of 
actionable  damage  see  Stanwood  v. 
Madden,  157  Mass.  17,  31  N.  E.  702, 
16  L.E.A.  591 ;  Nichols  v.  Eichmond, 
162  Mass.  170,  38  N.  E.  501. 

6  0 Van  de  Vere  v.  Kansas  City,  107 
Mo.  83,  17  S.  W.  695,  28  Am.  St.  Eep. 
396,  5  Am.  E.  E.  &  Corp.  Rep.  196. 
"Whether  the  plaintiff  must  now,  in 
all  cases,  where  claiming  that  his 
property  has  been  'damaged'  for  pub- 


§  365 


PEOPEETY  DAMAGED  OE  INJUEED, 


667 


they  cover  any  loss  or  injury  whieli  may  properly  be  taken  into 
consideration,  in  estimating  damages  to  the  balance  of  a  tract 
when  part  is  taken.®'  4.  That  they  embrace  any  depreciation 
caused  by  the  construction  and  operation  of  works  for  public 
use,  no  matter  how  occasioned.*^  The  third  and  fourth  of  these 
rules  of  construction  doubtless  amount  to  the  same  thing,  that 
property  is  damaged  whenever  it  is  depreciated  in  value  by  the 
construction  or  operation  of  works  for  public  use.  The  first  rule 
is  doubtless  too  restricted,  since  in  some  cases  and  in  some  juris- 
dictions, it  would  exclude  compensation  for  injuries,  which  were 


lie  use,  show  that  the  injury  is  one 
for  which  he  might  have  maintained 
an  action  if  the  act  had  not  been  done 
by  authority  of  law,  we  need  not  say 
in  this  case.  What  we  do  say  is  this : 
that  he  must  show  that  the  property 
itself,  or  some  right  or  easement  con- 
nected therewith,  is  directly  affected, 
and  that  it  is  specially  affected." 
See  also  cases  cited  in  last  section 
and  Gates  v.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  Ill  Mo.  28,  19  S.  W.  957. 

siBrewer,  J.,  in  Omaha  Horse  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Cable  Tramway  Co.,  32  Fed. 
727,  in  speaking  of  the  construction 
of  the  word  "damaged,"  says:  "It  is 
futile  to  attempt  a  general  answer, 
or  to  lay  down  a  rule  to  determine  all 
cases.  One  proposition  may  be  af- 
firmed. Whenever  a  proposed  public 
use  causes  to  property,  no  part  of 
which  is  taken,  an  injury  of  such  a 
character  as,  if  it  accrued  when  a 
portion  of  the  property  was  taken, 
would  be  a  proper  element  of  dam- 
ages to  the  part  not  taken,  there  is 
a  damage  within  the  scope  and  pro- 
tection of  this  constitutional  pro- 
vision, entitling  the  owner  to  compen- 
sation." As  to  what  damages  may 
thus  be  taken  into  consideration  see 
post,  §  748. 

62ln  City  of  Omaha  v.  Kramer,  25 
Neb.  492,  41  N.  W.  295,  13  Am.  St. 
Rep.  504,  the  court  says  that  "the 
words,  'or  damaged,'  in  section  21, 
art.  1,  of  the  constitution,  include  all 


actual  damages,  resulting  from  the 
exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent  do- 
main, which  diminish  the  market 
value  of  private  property.  ♦  *  * 
The  fact  that  damages  are  conse- 
quential will  not  preclude  a  recovery 
if  the  construction  and  operation  of 
the  public  improvement  is  the  cause 
of  the  injury,  and  it  is  not  necessary 
that  the  damages  be  caused  by  tres- 
pass, or  an  actual  physical  invasion 
of  the  owner's  real  estate.  The  test 
is,  excluding  general  benefits,  is  the 
property  in  fact  damaged  ?  If  so,  the 
owner  is  entitled  to  compensation.  It 
is  not  within  the  scope  of  the  au- 
thority of  the  law-making  depart- 
ment of  the  government  to  take  the 
property  of  A.  and  give  it  to  B.,  even 
if  B.  has  the  right  to  condemn  prop- 
erty for  public  use.  This  being  so, 
it  is  equally  beyond  the  power  of  such 
department  to  confer  the  right  on  B. 
to  damage  or  destroy  the  property  of 
A.  without  making  compensation 
therefor.  The  right  of  the  legislature 
to  authorize  the  taking  of  private 
property  for  public  use  is  based  on 
the  condition  that  an  equivalent  in 
value  be  paid  to  the  owner.  If  the 
property  is  diminished  in  actual 
value  by  reason  of  a  public  improve- 
ment, it  is  to  the  extent  of  the  dimi- 
nution taken  for  public  use,  as  much 
as  if  it  was  directly  appropriated. 
The  cases  differ  in  regard  to  the 
mode  of  appropriation  only.    In  the 


668  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    3615 

intended  to  be  idemnified.®^    The  matter  is  further  considered 
in  the  following  section. 

§  366  (236).  Damages  not  embraced  by  the  words  in 
question.  It  is  evident  that  the  rule  of  interpretation  laid 
down  in  section  365  will  not  embrace  every  species  of  loss  or  de- 
preciation to  property  which  is  due  directly  to  public  improve- 
ments. Unless  property  is  physically  affected  or  the  owner  is 
disturbed  in  the  enjoyment  of  some  right  which  he  is  entitled 
to  make  use  of  in  connection  with  his  property,  he  cannot  re- 
cover. If  the  loss  or  depreciation  arises  from  the  mere  proximity 
of  the  work  or  improvement,  as  from  its  unsightly  nature  or 
its  incongruity  with  the  uses  to  which  the  neighboring  property 
is  put,  there  can  be  no  recovery.  There  are  no  decided  cases  to 
which  we  can  refer  on  this  point,  but  we  can  easily  illustrate 
our  meaning.  Suppose  the  public  authorities  purchase  or  con- 
demn a  lot  in  a  fashionable  residence  locality  and  erect  and  main- 
tain a  jail  thereon,  and  suppose  the  direct  effect  is  to  depreciate 
the  surrounding  property  twenty-five  to  fifty  per  cent.  Is  the 
property  so  depreciated  damaged,  injured,  or  injuriously  af- 
fected within  the  meaning  of  the  provisions  in  question?  We 
answer  in  the  negative,  because  the  owners  have  not  been  dis- 
turbed, either  in  the  enjoyment  of  their  estates,  or  of  any  right 
connected  with  their  estates.  Their  property  and  rights  remain 
as  before.  The  same  effect  might  be  produced  if  an  individual 
should  establish  on  the  same  lot  a  boarding-house,  a  school  or 
a  factory.  It  seems  to  us  the  true  rule  is  that,  unless  the  depre- 
ciation is  due  to  the  disturbance  of  some  right,  no  recovery  can 
be  had.  In  any  other  case  the  loss  is  the  same  as  is  often  sus- 
tained by  one  proprietor  by  the  lawful  use  of  adjacent  or  neigh- 
boring property,  and  is  damnum  absque  injuria. 

one  case,  all  the  property  is  taken,  mere  diminution  in  value  would  sus- 

while  in  the  other  it  is  taken  only  to  tain  a  recovery.    In  the  Kramer  case 

the  extent  that,  it  is  diminished  in  the  street  in  front  of  plaintiff  was 

value ;  and  in  either  case  the  owner  occupied  by  a  viaduct.    In  the  Hazels 

is  entitled  to  be  compensated  for  his  case  the    street    on  which  plaintiflF' 

loss."     The  case  of  Pennsylvania  R.  abutted  was  obstructed  and  closed  a 

R.  Co.  V.  Marchant,  119  Pa.  St.  541,  block  west   of   his  property.     Com- 

13  Atl.  690,  4  Am.  St.  Rep.  659,  is  pare  Woodbury  v.  Beverly,  153  Mass. 

referred   to   and   disapproved.      The  245,  26  N.  E.  851. 
Kramer  case  is  approved  in  Chicago  <>3See  Woodbury    v.    Beverly,  153 

etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Hazels,  26  Neb.  364,  Mass.  245,  26  N.  E.  851 ;  Tidewater 

42  N.  W.  Rep.  93.    But  in  neither  of  Ry.  Co.  v.  Shartzer,  107  Va.  562,  59 

these   cases   was   it   decided   that   a  S.  E.  407,   17  L.R.A.(N.S.)    1053. 


§  366         PBOPEK.TT  DAMAGED  03i  INJURED.  669 

The  foregoing  remains  as  written  in  the  first  edition,  but  the 
conclusions  stated  have  been  verified  by  recent  decisions.  In 
speaking  generally  of  the  constitutional  provisions  in  question, 
the  supreme  court  of  California  says:  "The  constitution  does 
not,  however,  authorize  a  remedy  for  every  diminution  in  the 
value  of  property  that  is  caused  by  a  public  improvement.  The 
damage  for  which  compensation  is  to  be  made  is  a  damage  to 
the  property  itself,  and  does  not  include  a  mere  infringement 
of  the  owner's  personal  pleasure  or  enjoyment.  Merely  render- 
ing; private  property  less  desirable  for  certain  purposes,  or  even 
causing  personal  annoyance  or  discomfort  in  its  use,  will  not 
constitute  the  damage  contemplated  by  the  constitution ;  but  the 
property  itself  must  suffer  some  diminution  in  substance,  or 
be  rendered  intrinsically  less  valuable,  by  reason  of  the  pub- 
lie  use.  The  erection  of  a  county  jail  or  a  county  hospital  may 
impair  the  comfort  or  pleasure  of  the  residents  in  that  vicinity, 
and  to  that  extent  render  the  property  less  desirable,  and  even 
less  salable;  but  this  is  not  an  injury  to  the  property  itself,  so 
much  as  an  influence  affecting  its  use  for  certain  purposes.  But 
whenever  the  enjoyment  by  the  plaintiff  of  some  right  in  ref- 
erence to  his  property  is  interfered  with,  and  thereby  the  prop- 
erty itself  is  made  intrinsically  less  valuable,  he  has  suffered 
a  damage  for  which  he  is  entitled  to  compensation."  ®* 

Although  the  opinion  has  been  expressed  in  some  cases  that 
there  could  be  a  recovery  for  mere  depreciation  caused  by  a 
public  improvement  or  the  use  of  public  works,®^  yet  a  recovery 
has  not  been  allowed  in  any  case,  unless  there  was  some  physical 
injury  to  the  plaintiff's  property,  as  by  noise,  smoke,  gases,  vi- 
brations or  otherwise,  an  interference  with  the  street  in  front  of 
his  property,  or  with  some  right  appurtenant  thereto,  or  which 
he  was  entitled  to  make  use  of  in  connection  with  his  property. 
On  the  other  hand,  several  cases  have  held  that  mere  deprecia- 
tion, caused  by  the  proximity  of  a  public  improvement,  afforded 
no  ground  for  redress.  Thus  it  has  been  held  that  the  erection 
of  a  fire-engine  house ""  or  jail "'  on  a  lot  adjoining  plaintiff's 
afforded  no  cause  of  action,  though  his  property  was  depreciated 

6  4Eachus  V.  Los  Angeles   Consol.  Mo.  83,  17  S.  W.  695,  5  Am.  R.  R.  & 

El.  R.  R.  Co.,  103  Cal.  614,  37  Pac.  Corp.  Rep.  196,  28  Am.  St.  Rep.  396. 

750,  42  Am.  St.  Rep.  149.  67Bacon  v.  Walker,  77   Ga.   336; 

esSee  cases  cited  in  last  section.  Long  v.  Elberton,  109  Ga.  28,  34  S. 

note  62.  E.  333,  77  Am.  St.  Rep.  363,  46  L.R.A. 

eeVan  de  Vere  v.  Kansas  City,  107  428. 


670  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    366 

thereby.  So  where  the  plaintiff's  property  was  depreciated  by 
the  laying  out  of  a  new  road  which  diverted  travel  from  past  his 
premises.**  The  principle  of  these  decisions  would  cover  the 
case  of  a  school-house,  court-house,  market  or  other  public  build- 
ing, erected  upon  adjacent  property.  In  almost  every  city  there 
are  localities  in  which  the  erection  and  use  of  such  a  building 
would  depreciate  the  surrounding  property.  In  such  case  there 
is  no  invasion  or  physical  injury  of  the  property  affected,  nor 
an  interference  with  any  right,  public  or  private,  connected  there- 
with. The  only  ground  of  complaint  is,  that  one  owner,  by  a 
perfectly  legitimate  use  of  his  property,  has  depreciated  the 
value  of  the  adjoining  property.  The  same  result  might  have 
happened  by  the  establishment  of  a  store  or  factory.  Every 
owner  takes  the  chance  of  having  the  value  of  his  property  en- 
hanced or  diminished  by  the  use  made  of  surrounding  property, 
and  the  character  of  the  improvements  put  upon  it.  He  has  no 
cause  of  complaint  on  account  of  the  nature  of  such  uses  or  im- 
provements, unless  they  amount  in  law  to  a  nuisance.*^  The 
grievances  which  lead  to  the  insertion  of  the  words  "damaged" 
or  "injured"  in  recent  constitutions,  did  not  consist  in  the  fact 
that  such  damages  as  have  just  been  referred  to  went  without 
redress,  but  in  the  fact  that,  under  the  restricted  interpretation 
put  upon  the  word  "taken,"  private  property  might  be  subjected 
to  physical  injuries,  and  valuable  rights  appurtenant  thereto  or 
connected  therewith,  might  be  impaired  or  destroyed  for  public, 
use  without  compensation.'"*  These  words  were  not  inserted 
for  the  purpose  of  preventing  the  public  from  doing  what  every, 
private  individual  may  do  without  liability  to  his  neighbor. 
They  were  not  intended  to  confer  a  right  of  action  for  a  use  of 
property  by  the  public,  which  a  private  individual  might  make 
without  legislative  authority.'' "^ 

esHuff  V.  Donehoo,  109  Ga.  638,  34  Maddox,  89  Ala.  181,  7  So.  433,  2  Am. 

S.  E.  1035 ;  Elbert  County  v.  Swift,  2  R.  R.  &   Corp.   Rep.  426;     City    of 

Ga.  App.  47,  58  S.  E.  396.  Vicksburg  v.  Herman,  72  Miss.  211, 

6  9In  Peel  v.  Atlanta,  85  Ga.  138,  16  So.  434;  Van  de  Vere  v.  Kansas 

11  S.  E.  582,  2  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  City,  107  Mo.  83,  17  S.  W.  695,  28  Am. 

Rep.  413,  the  city  bought  a  lot  next  St.  Rep.  396,  6  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp. 

to  plaintiff  and  laid  it  out  as  a  street.  Rep.  196;  Trinity  &  S.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

It  was  held  the  plaintiff's  property  Meadows,  73  Tex.  32,  11  S.  W.  145; 

was  not  damaged.     And  see  Trinity  Brown  v.  City  of  Seattle,  5  Wash.  35, 

etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Meadows,  73  Tex.  32,  31  Pac.  313,  32  Pac.  Rep.  214,  7  Am. 

11  S.  W.  145.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  64. 

roCity  Council  of  Montgomery  v.  'i/See  Aldrich  v.  Met.  West  Side 


§  366 


PEOPEETY  DAMAGED  OE  IiVJCEED. 


671 


El.  R.  R.  Co.,  195  111.  456,  63  N.  E. 
155,  57  L.R.A.  237;  Smith  v.  St.  Paul 
etc.  Ry.  Co.,  39  Wash.  355,  81  Pac. 
840,  109  Am.  St.  Rep.  889,  70  L.R.A. 
1018. 

The  leading  cases  in  the  United 
States  on  the  construction  of  the 
words  in  question  are  here  given: 
City  Council  of  Montgomery  v.  Town- 
send,  80  Ala.  489 ;  Hot  Springs  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Williamson,  45  Ark.  429; 
Reardon  v.  San  Francisco,  66  Cal. 
492,  56  Am.  Rep.  109 ;  Eachus  v.  Los 
Angeles  Consol.  El.  R.  R.  Co.,  103 
Cal.  614,  37  Pac.  750,  42  Am.  St. 
Rep.  149;  Denver  v.  Bayer,  7  Colo. 
113 ;  City  of  Pueblo  v.  Strait,  20  Colo. 
13,  36  Pac.  790,  47  Am.  St.  Rep.  273, 
24  L.R.A.  392;  Atlanta  v.  Green,  67 
Ga.  386;  Campbell  v.  Metropolitan 
St.  R.  R.  Co.,  82  Ga.  320,  9  S.  E.  1078; 
Rigney  v.  Chicago,  102  111.  64;  Chi- 
cago &,  Western  Indiana  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Ayres,  106  111.  511 ;  Lake  Erie  &  W. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Scott,  132  111.  429,  24  N. 
E.  78,  8  L.R.A.  330;  Wiley  v.  El  wood, 
134  IlL  281,  25  N.  E.  570;  Chicago 


etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Drake,  148  111.  226, 
35  N.  E.  750,  9  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp. 
Rep.  73 ;  Gottschalk  v.  Chicago,  Bur- 
lington &  Quincy  R.  R.  Co.,  14  Neb. 
550;  Omaha  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Janecek, 
30  Neb.  276,  46  N.  W.  478,  27  Am.  St. 
Rep.  399,  3  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep. 
268;  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mar- 
chant,  119  Pa.  St.  541,  13  Atl.  690,  4 
Am.  St.  Rep.  659;  Mellor  v.  City  of 
Philadelphia,  160  Pa.  St.  614,  28  Atl. 
991;  Galveston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Fuller,  63  Tex.  467;  Gainsvill^  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Hall,  78  Tex.  169,  14  S. 
W.  259,  9  L.R.A.  298,  3  Am.  R.  R.  & 
Corp.  Rep.  251 ;  Johnson  v.  Parkers- 
burg,  16  W.  Va.  402.  The  leading 
cases  in  England  are  McCarthy  v. 
Metropolitan  Board  of  Works,  7  Eng. 
&  I.  App.  243;  Caledonian  Railway 
V.  Walker's  Trustees,  7  App.  Cas.  259. 
Damages  by  reason  of  negligence  in 
the  construction  of  works  are,  of 
course,  not  included.  Edmundson  v. 
Pittsburgh  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  Ill  Pa.  St. 
316. 


CHAPTER  IX. 


THE  STATUTORY  AUTHORITY. 


§  367  (237).     Power  of  the  legislature  generally.    The 

power  of  eminent  domain,  being  an  incident  of  sovereignty,  is 
inherent  in  the  federal  government  and  in  the  several  States,  by 
virtue  of  their  sovereignty.^  It  does  not  exist  in  any  subordinate 
political  division  or  public  corporation  unless  granted  by  the 
sovereign  power.  Consequently  it  does  not  exist  in  any  terri- 
torial government  unless  it  has  been  expressly  granted  by  con- 
gress.^ This  power,  with  all  its  incidents,  is  vested  in  the 
legislatures  of  the  several  States  by  the  general  grant  of  legis- 
lative powers  contained  in  the  constitution.  From  this  it  fol^ 
lows,  first,  that  the  power  can  only  be  exercised  by  virtue  of  a 
legislative  enactment ;  ^  second,  that  the  time,  manner  and  oc- 


1  Fulton  V.  Town  of  Dover,  8  Hous- 
ton (Del.),  78;  S.  C.  6  Del.  Ch.  1; 
Jones  V.  No.  Ga.  Elec.  Co.,  125  Ga. 
618,  54  S.  C.  85,  6  L.R.A.(N.S.)  122; 
Consumers'  Gas  Trust  Co.  v.  Harless, 
131  Ind.  446,  29  N.  E.  1062,  15  L.R.A. 
505;  Lafayette  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  But- 
ner,  162  Ind.  460,  70  N.  E.  529;  Sisson 
V.  Board  of  Supervisors,  128  la.  442, 
104  N.  W.  454,  70  L.R.A.  440;  Peo- 
ple V.  Fisher,  190  N.  Y.  468,  83  N.  E. 
482;  Darlington  v.  United  States,  82 
Pa.  St.  382;  Spring  City  Gas  Light 
Co.  V.  Pennsylvania  S.  V.  R.  R.  Co., 
167  Pa.  St.  6,  31  Atl.  368;  Winona 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Watertown,  4  S.  D. 
323,  56  N.  W.  1077;  Painter  v.  St. 
Clair,  98  Va.  85,  34  S.  E.  989 ;  Balti- 
more &  Ohio  R.  R.  Co.  V.  P.  W.  &  Ky. 
R.  R.  Co.,  17  W.  Va.  812,  841 ;  Kohl 
V.  United  States,  91  U.  S.  367; 
United  States  v.  Fox,  94  U.  S.  315, 
320;  Jones  v.  Walker,  2  Paine  C.  C. 
688.    Ante,  §§  1-3. 

2Newcomb  v.  Smith,  1  Chand.  Wis. 


71 ;  Pratt  v.  Brown,  3  Wis.  603;  Oury 
V.  Goodwin,  3  Ariz.  255,  26  Pac.  255; 
Sanford  v.  Tucson,  8  Ariz.  247,  71 
Pac.  247. 

sin  re  Pet.  of  Alston,  1  Penn.  Del. 
359;  Parham  v.  Decatur  County,  9 
Ga.  341 ;  Tyson  v.  Rogers,  33  Ga.  473; 
Sholl  V.  German  Coal  Co.,  118  III. 
427;  Leeds  v.  Richmond,  102  Ind. 
372;  Richland  School  Tp.  v.  Over- 
meyer,  164  Ind.  382,  73  N.  E.  811; 
Lake  Keon  Nav.  etc.  Co.  v.  Klein,  63 
Kan.  484,  65  Pac.  684,  93  Am.  St. 
Rep.  299 ;  Bethum  v.  Turner,  1  Me. 
Ill,  10  Am.  Dec.  36;  Schmidt  v.  Dens- 
more,  42  Mo.  225;  Helena  Power 
Transmission  Co.  v.  Spratt,  35  Mont. 
108,  88  Pac.  773,  8  L.R.A.  (N.S.)  567; 
Claremont  Ry.  &  Lt.  Co.  v.  Putney, 
73  N.  H.  431,  62  Atl.  727;  Matter  of 
Niagara  Falls  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  108  N. 
Y.  375,  15  N.  E.  429;  Matter  of 
Poughkeepsie  Bridge  Co.,  108  N.  Y. 
483,  15  N.  E.  601 ;  Matter  of  Union 
Elevated  R.  R.  Co.,  113  N.  Y.  275,  21 


672 


i  367 


THE  STATUTOKY  AUTHOBITT. 


673 


casion  of  its  exercise  are  wholly  in  the  control  and  discretion  of 
the  legislature,  except  as  restrained  by  the  constitution,*  "It 
lies  in  its  discretion  to  determine  to  what  extent,  on  what  occa- 
sions, and  under  what  circumstances  this  power  shall  be  exer- 
cised." ® 


N.  E.  81 ;  Bridal  Veil  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Johnson,  30  Ore.  205,  46  Pac.  790,  60 
Am.  St.  Rep.  818,  34  L.R.A.  368; 
Jacobs  V.  Clearview  Water  Supply 
Co.,  220  Pa.  St.  388,  69  Atl.  870;  Wal- 
lace V.  Richmond,  94  Va.  204; 
Painter  v.  St.  Clair,  98  Va.  85,  34  S. 
E.  989;  City  of  Tacoma  v.  State,  4 
Wash.  64,  29  Pac.  847 ;  Long  v.  Bill- 
ings, 7  Wash.  267,  34  Pac.  936;  St. 
Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Thomas,  34 
Fed.  774;  United  States  v.  Rauers, 
70  Fed.  748. 

In  matter  of  Poughkeepsie  Bridge 
Co.,  108  N.  Y.  483,  490,  it  is  said: 
"The  power  of  eminent  domain  which 
resides  in  the  State  as  an  attribute 
of  sovereignty,  is  nevertheless  dor- 
mant until  called  into  exercise  by  an 
act  of  the  legislature.  Until  a  statute 
authorizes  an  exercise  of  the  power, 
it  is  latent  and  potential  merely,  and 
not  active  or  efficient,  and  the  State 
can  neither  exercise  the  prerogative, 
nor  can  it  delegate  its  exercise,  ex- 
cept through  the  medium  of  legisla- 
tion. Therefore  it  is  that  whenever 
an  attempt  is  made  either  by  the  of- 
ficers of  the  State  or  by  a  corporation 
organized  for  a  public  purpose  to 
take  private  property  under  the' 
power  of  eminent  domain,  the  of- 
ficers or  body  claiming  the  right 
must  be  able  to  point  to  a  statute 
conferring  it.  In  the  absence  of  stat- 
utory authority  private  property  can- 
not be  invaded  by  this  power,  how- 
ever strong  may  be  the  reasons  for 
the  appropriation." 

4  Consumers'  Gas  Trust  Co.  v.  Har- 

less,  131  Ind.  446,  29  N.  E.  1062,  15 

L.R.A.  505;  Lafayette  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Butner,  162  Ind.  460,  70  N.  B.  529; 

Em.  D.— 43. 


Richland  School  Tp.  v.  Overmeyer, 
164  Ind.  382,  73  N.  E.  811;  Central 
Branch  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Atchison, 
T.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  28  Kan.  453; 
Van  Witsen  v.  Gutman,  79  Md.  405, 
29  Atl.  608,  24  L.R.A.  403;  Swan  v. 
Williams  et  al.,  2  Mich.  427;  Fair- 
child  V.  St.  Paul,  46  Minn.  540,  49  N. 
W.  325;  State  v.  Engleman,  106  Mo. 
628,  17  S.  W.  759 ;  Simpson  v.  Kansas 
City,  111  Mo.  237,  20  S.  W.  38;  Sea- 
comb  V.  Milwaukee  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  49 
How.  Pr.  75;  Bachler's  Appeal,  90 
Pa.  St.  207 ;  Winona  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Watertown,  4  S.  D.  323,  56  N.  W. 
1077;  Samish  River  Boom  Co.  v. 
Union  Boom  Co.,  32  Wash.  586,  73 
Pac.  670;  Secombe  v.  Railroad  Co., 
23  Wall.  108;  St.  Louis  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Thomas,  34  Fed.  Rep.  774.  In  Swan 
V.  Williams,  2  Mich.  427,  the  court 
says :  "It  rests  in  the  wisdom  of  the 
legislature  to  determine  when,  and 
in  what  manner,  the  public  neces- 
sities require  its  exercise,  and  with 
the  reasonableness  of  the  exercise  of 
that  discretion  courts  will  not  inter- 
fere." Wilkin  V.  First  Div.  of  St. 
Paul  &  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  16  Minn. 
271;  Weir  v.  St.  Paul,  Stillwater  & 
Taylor's  Falls  R.  R.  Co.,  18  Minn. 
155;  Roanoke  City  v.  Berkowitz,  80 
Va.  616;  post,  §  369. 

BVan  Witsen  v.  Gutman,  79  Md. 
405,  29  Atl.  608.  In  Richland  School 
Tp.  V.  Overmeyer,  164  Ind.  382,  73  N. 
B.  811,  the  court  says :  "The  right  to 
appropriate  private  property  to  pub- 
lic use  lies  dormant  in  the  State 
until  legislative  action  is  had,  point- 
ing out  the  occasions,  the  modes,  con- 
ditions and  agencies  for  its  appropri- 
ation," p.  385. 


C74  EMIKEIfT  DOMAIIT.  §    368 

§  368  (237).  People's  charters.  The  constitution  of 
Missouri  permits  cities  of  over  one  hundred  thousand  population 
to  frame  their  own. charters.  Provisions  for  the  exercise  of  the 
eminent  domain  pov^er  contained  in  such  charters  are  valid,  the 
power  emanating  directly  from  the  people,  instead  of  through 
the  legislature.®  The  sarae  ruling  has  been  made  in  Minnesota.' 
When  it  is  said,  as  in  the  last  section,  that  the  exercise  of  the 
power  must  originate  with  the  legislature,  the  statement  is  made 
in  view  of  the  usual  conditions  in  which  all  legislative  power  is 
vested  in  that  body.  The  sovereign  powers  reside  in  the  people 
as  the  ultimate  source  and  they  may  delegate  their  exercise  di- 
rectly to  municipalities.  And  a  constitutional  provision  author- 
izing cities  to  frame  their  own  charters,  authorizes  the  adop- 
tion of  such  provisions  for  the  exercise  of  the  eminent  domain 
power  as  are  necessary  to  enable  them  to  construct  and  carry  on 
such  local  improvements  as  the  local  needs  require.*  In  the 
case  referred  to  there  was  an  enabling  act  passed  by  the  legis- 
lature in  pursuance  of  the  constitutional  provision,  and  it  was 
held  that  this  might  be  treated  as  an  implied  authority  from  the 
legislature  to  insert  in  the  charter  the  necessary  eminent  domain 
provisions. 

§  369  (238).  The  necessity  or  expediency  of  exercising 
the  power  is  exclusively  for  the  legislature.  Whether  the 
power  of  eminent  domain  shall  be  put  in  motion  for  any  par- 
ticular public  purpose,  and  whether  the  exigencies  of  the  occa- 
sion and  the  public  welfare  require  or  justify  its  exercise,  are 
questions  which  rest  entirely  with  the  legislature.®    "When  the 

sKansas  City  v.  Marsh  Oil  Co.,  140  County  v.  Coburn,  130  Cal.  631,  63 

Mo.  458,  41  S.  W.  943.  Pae.  78;  Alameda  v.  Cohen,  133  Cal. 

'State  V.  District  Court,  87  Minn.  5,  65  Pac.  127;  Oritz  v.  Hansen,  35 

146,  91  N.  W.  300.  Colo.   100,   83   Pac.   964;    Tanner  v. 

■sibU.  'Treasury  Min.  &  Reduction  Co.,  35 

9Aldridge  v.  Tuscumbia,  Courtland  Colo.  593,  83  Pac.  464,  4  L.R.A.  (N.S.) 
&  Decatur  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Stew.  &  Por.  106;  Waterbury  v.  Piatt  Bros.  &  Co., 
199,  23  Am.  Dec.  297;  Sadler  V.  Lang-  76  Conn.  435,  56  Atl.  856;  White- 
ham,  34  Ala.  311 ;  New  &  Old  Decatur  man's  Executrix  v.  Wilmington  & 
Belt  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Karcher,  112  Susquehanna  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Harr. 
Ala.  676,  21  So.  825;  Gilmer  v.  Lime  (Del.)  514;  Parliam  v.  Justices  etc. 
Point,  18  Cal.  229;  Sherman  V.  Brick,  of  Decatur  County,  9  Ga.  341; 
32  Cal.  241,  91  Am.  Dec.  577;  Lent  v.  Thomas  v.  Milledgeville  R.  R.  Co.,  99 
Tillson,  72  Cal.  404;  Moran  v.  Ross,  Ga.  714,  27  S.  E.  756;  Thorn  v.  Ga. 
79  Cal.  159,  21  Pac.  547;  Wulzen  v.  Mfg.  etc.  Co.,  128  Ga.  127,  57  S.  E. 
Board  of  Supvrs.,  101  Cal.  15,  35  Pac.  75;  Chicago,  Rock  Island  &  Pacific 
353,  40  Am.  St.  Rep.  17 ;  San  Mateo  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Town  of  Lake,  71  111.  333; 


§  369 


THE   STATUTOEY  AUTIIOEITY. 


675 


Chicago  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Pontiac, 
169  111.  155,  48  N.  E.  485;  Baugh- 
man  v.  Heinzelman,  180  111.  251,  54 
N.  E.  313;  Pittsburg  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Sanitary  District,  218  111.  286,  75  N. 
E.  892;  Gillette  v.  Aurora  Ry.  Co., 
228  111.  261,  81  N.  E.  1005;  Water 
Works  Co.  V.  Burlihart,  41  Ind.  364; 
Consumers'  Gaa  Trust  Co.  v.  Harless, 
131  Ind.  446,  29  N.  E.  1062,  15  L.R.A. 
505 ;  Mull  V.  Indianapolis  etc.  Trac- 
tion Co.,  169  Ind.  214,  81  N.  E.  657; 
Bankhead  v.  Brown,  25  la.  540 ;  Cher- 
okee V.  The  S.  C.  &  I.  F.  Town  Lot 
&  Land  Co.,  52  la.  279;  Bennett  v. 
Marion,  106  la.  628,  76  N.  W.  844; 
Sisson  V.  Board  of  Supervisors,  128 
Ind.  442,  104  K  W.  454,  70  L.R.A. 
440 ;  Challiss  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F. 
R.  R.  Co.,  16  Kan.  117,  126;  Lake 
Keon  Nav.  etc.  Co.  v.  Klein,  63  Kan. 
484,  65  Pac.  684,  93  Am.  St.  Rep.  299 ; 
Moseley  v.  York  Shore  Water  Co.,  94 
Me.  83,  46  Atl.  809 ;  Kennebec  Water 
District  v.  Waterville,  96  Me.  234,  52 
Atl.  774;  Brown  v.  Gerald,  100  Me. 
351,  61  Atl.  785,  109  Am.  St.  Rep.  526, 
70  L.R.A.  472;  Talbot  v.  Hudson,  16 
Gray,  417,  424;  Haverhill  Bridge 
Props.  V.  County  Corns,  of  Essex,  103 
Mass.  120,  4  Am.  Rep.  518;  Holt  v. 
Somerville,  127  Mass.  408;  Appleton 
V.  Newton,  178  Mass.  276,  59  N.  E. 
648;  Swan  v.  Williams,  2  Mich.  427; 
State  Park  Comrs.  v.  Henry,  38 
Minn.  266,  36  N.  W.  874;  State  v. 
Rapp,  39  Minn.  65,  38  N.  W.  926; 
Fairchild  v.  St.  Paul,  46  Minn.  540, 
49  N.  W.  325;  Stewart  v.  Great 
Northern  R.  R.  Co.,  65  Minn.  515,  68 
N.  W.  208;  Minneapolis  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Hartland,  85  Minn.  76,  88  N. 
W.  423;  Dickey  v.  Tennison,  27  Mo. 
373;  Simpson  v.  Kansas  City,  111  Mo. 
237,  20  S.  W.  38;  City  of  Cape 
Girardeau  v.  Houck,  129  Mo.  607,  31 
S.  W.  933;  Southern  111.  &  Mo. 
Bridge  Co.  v.  Stone,  174  Mo.  1,  73 
S.  W.  453,  63  L.R.A.  301 ;  Welton  v. 
Dickson,  38  Neb.  767,  57  N.  W.  559, 


41  Am.  St.  Rep.  771,  22  L.R.A.  496; 
Paxton  etc.  Irr.  Canal  &  L.  Co.  v. 
Farmers'  etc.  Irr.  &  L.  Co.,  45  Neb. 
884,  64  N.  W.  343,  29  L.R.A.  853; 
Howard  v.  Board  of  Supervisors,  54 
Neb.  443,  74  N.  W.  953;  Coster  v. 
Tide  Water  Co.,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  54  and 
518;  State  v.  City  of  Orange,  54  N.  J. 
L.  Ill,  22  Atl.  1004,  14  L.R.A.  62; 
Buffalo  &  New  York  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Brainard,  9  N.  Y.  100;  People  v. 
Smith,  21  N.  Y.  595;  Matter  of  Wil- 
liam A.  Fowler,  53  N.  Y.  60;  Matter 
of  Niagara  Falls  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  103 
N.  Y.  375,  15  N.  E.  Rep.  429;  Matter 
of  Poughkeepsie  Bridge  Co.,  108  N. 
Y.  483,  15  N.  E.  Rep.  601 ;  People  v. 
Adirondack  R.  R.  Co.,  160  N.  Y.  225 ; 
People  V.  Fisher,  190  N.  Y.  468,  83 
N.  E.  482;  Beekman  v.  Saratoga  & 
Schenectady  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Paige,  45; 
Harris  v.  Thompson,  9  Barb.  350; 
Matter  of  Deansville  Cemetery  Ass., 
5  Hun  482;  Call  v.  Wilkesboro,  115 
N.  C.  337,  20  S.  E.  468 ;  Dalles  Lum- 
bering Co.  V.  Urquhart,  16  Ore.  67,  19 
Pac.  78;  Bridal  Veil  Lumbering  Co. 
V.  Johnson,  30  Ore.  205,  46  Pac.  790, 
60  Am.  St.  Rep.  818;  34  L.R.A.  368; 
Apex  Transportation  Co.  v.  Garbade, 
32  Ore.  582 ;  Winona  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Watertown,  4  S.  D.  323,  56  N.  W. 
1077 ;  Anderson  v.  Turbeville,  6 
Coldw.  150;  Ryan  v.  Terminal  Co., 
102  Tenn.  Ill,  50  S.  W.  744,  45  L.R.A. 
303 ;  Tyler  v.  Beacher,  44  Vt.  648,  8 
Am.  Rep.  398 ;  Roanoke  City  v.  Ber- 
kowitz,  80  Va.  616;  Tait'a  Executor 
V.  Central  Lunatic  Asylum,  84  Va. 
271,  4  S.  E.  697;  Painter  v.  St.  Clair, 
98  Va.  85,  34  S.  E.  989 ;  Baltimore  & 
Ohio  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Pittsburg,  Wheel- 
ing &  Ky.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  W.  Va.  812; 
Smeaton  v.  Martin,  57  Wis.  364; 
State  V.  Stewart,  74  Wis.  620,  43  N. 
W.  947;  Wisconsin  Water  Co.  v. 
Winans,  85  Wis.  26,  54  N.  W.  1003, 
39  Am.  St.  Rep.  813,  20  L.R.A.  662; 
St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Thomas, 
.34  Fed.  774. 


676 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


§  369 


use  is  public,  the  necessity  or  expediency  of  appropriating  any 
particular  property  is  not  a  subject  of  judicial  cognizance."  ^* 
"The  general  principle  is  now  well  settled  that  when  the  uses 
are  in  fact  public,  the  necessity  or  expediency  of  taking  private 
property  for  such  uses  by  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  eminent 
domain,  the  instrumentalities  to  be  used  and  the  extent  to  which 
such  right  shall  be  delegated  are  questions  appertaining  to  the 
political  and  legislative  branches  of  the  government."  ^^ 

The  question  of  necessity  is  sometimes  confounded  with  that 
of  public  use,^^  and  it  has  sometimes  been  maintained  that  the 
exercise  of  the  power  of  eminent  domain  must  be  founded  on  a 
public  necessity.'^    But  we  know  of  no  case  in  which  it  has  been 


"It  is  not  indispensable  that  the 
legislature  shall  determine  that  any 
given  enterprise  is  necessary  or 
proper,  before  putting  in  opera- 
tion the  power  of  eminent  do- 
main. This  power  is  primarily  an 
absolute  one,  and  theoretically  exists 
in  this  absolute  form  in  the  ultimate 
source  of  authority  in  every  organ- 
ized society.  In  the  constituted  gov- 
ernment of  this  State,  the  right  of 
exercising  it  has  been  confided  to  the 
legislature,  restricted  by  only  two 
conditions:  one,  that  compensation 
shall  be  made  to  the  owner  of  the 
property  taken;  the  other,  that  the 
use  for  which  property  may  be  taken 
shall  be  a  public  use.  In  other  re- 
spects it  is  without  limit.  Whether 
the  purpose  to  be  subserved  be  neces- 
sary or  wise,  is  for  the  legislature 
alone."  Ct.  of  Errors  and  Appeals 
in  National  Docks  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Cen- 
tral R.  R.  Co.,  32  N.  J.  Eq.  755,  763. 

lOBoom  Co.  V.  Patterson,  98  U.  S. 
403,  406.  Similar  language  will  be 
found  in  the  following  cases:  Geisy 
V.  Cincinnati,  Wilmington  &  Zanes- 
ville  R.  R.  Co.,  4  Ohio  St.  308; 
County  Court  v.  Griswold,  58  Mo. 
175;  Chicago  &  Eastern  Ill.R.R.  Co. 
V.  Wiltse,  116  111.  449;  Towns  v.  Kla- 
math County,  33  Ore.  225,  233;  and 
in  many  of  the  cases  cited  in  the  last 
note. 


iiMatter  of  Niagara  Falls  & 
Whirlpool  R.  R.  Co.,  108  N.  Y.  375, 
383,  15  N.  E.  429. 

12 Ante,  §  255. 

isCary  Library  v.  Bliss,  151  Mass. 
364,  25  N.  E.  92.  In  this  case  money 
had  been  given  to  a  town  for  a  public 
library  to  be  managed  and  controlled 
by  a  board  of  trustees  consisting  of 
the  selectmen,  the  school  committee 
and  settled  ministers  of  the  place. 
The  legislature  afterwards  created  a 
corporation,  to  be  managed  and  con- 
trolled by  a  different  body,  and  di- 
rected the  transfer  of  the  property 
to  this  corporation.  The  act  also  pro- 
vided for  the  acquisition  of  the  prop- 
erty by  the  new  corporation  under 
the  power  of  eminent  domain.  After 
the  transfer  the  property  was  to  be 
used  in  the  same  manner  and  for  the 
same  purposes  as  before.  The  court 
appears  to  hold  that  so  much  of  the 
act  as  provided  for  the  acquisition 
of  the  property  under  the  eminent 
domain  power,  was  invalid,  because 
the  proposed  taking  was  not  founded 
on  a  public  necessity.  "Property  can 
be  taken  in  this  way  only  in  the  exer- 
cise of  the  paramount  right  of  the 
government,  founded  on  a  public 
necessity.  *  *  ♦  The  question 
arises,  whether  taking  property 
from  one  party,  who  holds  it  for  a 
public  use,  by  another,  to  hold  it  in 


§  370 


THE    STATUTOET    AUTIIOKITY. 


C77 


adjudicated  that  an  appropriation  of  private  property  for  a  rec- 
ognized public  use,  or  an  authority  to  make  such  appropriation, 
was  void  because,  in  the  opinion  of  the  court,  there  was  no  neces- 
sity for  an  exercise  of  the  eminent  domain  power.-'* 

§  370  (239).  When  the  power  of  eminent  domain  has 
been  delegated,  the  propriety  of  its  exercise  rests  with  the 
grantee.  AVhen  authority  to  take  property  for  public  use  has 
been  conferred  by  the  legislature,  it  rests  with  the  grantee  to 
determine  whether  it  shall  be  exercised,  and  when  and  to  what 
extent  it  shall  be  exercised,^^  provided,  of  course,  that  the  power 


the  same  manner  for  precisely  the 
same  public  use,  can  be  authorized 
\mder  the  constitution.  Can  such  a 
taking  be  founded  on  a  public  neces- 
sity? '  *  '^  In  every  ease  it  is  a 
judicial  question  whether  the  taking 
is  of  such  a  nature  that  it  is  or  may 
be  founded  on  a  public  necessity.  If 
it  is  of  that  nature,  it  is  for  the 
legislature  to  say  whether  in  a  par- 
ticular case  the  necessity  exists.  We 
are  of  opinion,  that  the  proceeding 
authorized  by  the  statute  was  in  its 
nature  merely  a  transfer  of  property 
from  one  party  to  another,  and  not 
an  appropriation  of  property  to  pub- 
lic use,  nor  a  taking  which  was,  or 
which  could  be  found  by  the  legisla- 
ture to  be,  a  matter  of  public  neces- 
sity." The  true  ground  and  reason 
of  this  decision  would  seem  to  be 
that  an  act  which  merely  accom- 
plishes the  transfer  of  property  from 
one  owner  to  another,  does  not  sub- 
serve any  public  purpose  and  is  not, 
therefore,  a  public  use. 

i<"The  authority  to  detei-mine  in 
any  case  whether  it  is  necessary  or  ex- 
pedient to  peiTuit  the  exercise  of  the 
power  of  eminent  domain,  when  not 
prohibited  by  the  constitution,  rests 
with  the  legislative  department  of 
the  State;  and  the  propriety  of  tak- 
ing private  property  for  public  use 
is  not  a  judicial  question,  but  one  of 
political  sovereignty,  and  a  hearing 
upon  the  facts  of  such  propriety  or 


necessity  is  not  required."  Richland 
School  Tp.  V.  Overmeyer,  164  Ind. 
382,  385,  386,  73  N.  E.  811.  Compare 
Stearns  v.  Barre,  73  Vt.  281,  50  Atl. 
1086,  87  xVm.  St.  Rep.  721,  58  L.R.A. 
240. 

iBSt.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Fay- 
etteville,  75  Ark.  532,  87  S.  W.  1174; 
United  States  v.  Baltimore  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  27  App.  Cas.  D.  C.  105;  Chicago 
&  Eastern  111.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wiltse, 
116  111.  449,  454,  6  N.  E.  49;  O'Hare 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  139  111.  151, 
28  N.  E.  953;  Schuster  v.  Sanitary 
District,  177  111.  626,  52  N.  E.  855; 
Bass  V.  City  of  Ft.  Wayne,  121  Ind. 
389,  23  N.  E.  259,  1  Am.  R.  R.  & 
Corp.  Rep.  173;  Richland  School  Tp. 
V.  Overmeyer,  164  Ind.  382,  73  N.  E. 
811 ;  Williams  v.  Gary,  73  la.  194,  34 
N.  W.  813;  Barrett  v.  Kemp,  91  la. 
290,  59  N.  W.  76;  Cotton  v.  Miss- 
issippi &  Rum  River  Boom  Co.,  22 
Minn.  372;  Am.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  St. 
Louis  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  202  Mo.  656,  101 
S.  W.  576;  Matter  of  Union  El.  R. 
R.  Co.,  113  N.  Y.  275,  21  N.  E.  81; 
Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Diehm,  128 
Pa.  St.  509,  18  Atl.  522;  Heine  v. 
Columbia  etc  R.  R.  Co.,  16  Pa.  Dist. 
Ct.  840;  Memphis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Union  Ry.  Co.,  116  Tenn.  500,  95  S. 
W.  1019;  Samish  River  Boom  Co.  v. 
Union  Boom  Co.,  32  Wash.  586,  73 
Pac.  670;  United  States  v.  Certain 
Lands,  145  Fed.  654. 


678 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


370 


is  not  exceeded  or  abused.  These  questions  are  political  in  tlieir 
nature,  and  not  judicial.  Thus,  whether  a  particular  road,  street 
or  alley  shall  be  laid  out,^®  or  an  existing  street  widened,^''  or 
any  similar  improvement  made,^*  in  the  absence  of  any  special 
statutory  provisions,  rests  entirely  with  the  local  authorities 
vested  with  power  in  the  premises.'®  The  courts  cannot  in- 
quire into  the  motives  which  actuate  the  authorities  or  enter  into 
the  propriety  of  making  the  particular  improvements.^* 
The  same  may  be  said  of  individuals  and  corporations  vested 


isCommission's  Court  of  Lowndes 
Co.  V.  Bowie,  34  Ala.  461 ;  St.  Louis 
etc.  K.  R.  Co.  V.  Fayetteville,  75  Ark. 
532,  87  S.  W.  1174;  City  of  Santa 
Ana  V.  Harlin,  99  Cal.  538,  34  Pac. 
224;  Symons  v.  San  Francisco, 
(Cal.)  42  Pac.  913;  Santa  Ana  v. 
Brunner,  132  Cal.  234,  64  Pac.  287; 
Alameda  v.  Cohen,  133  Cal.  5,  65 
Pac.  127;  Harwinton  v.  Catlin,  19 
Conn.  520;  Borough  of  Stonington  v. 
States,  31  Conn.  213;  Poulan  v.  At- 
lantic Coast  Line  E.  E.  Co.,  123  Ga. 
605,  51  S.  E.  657;  Dunlap  v.  Mount 
Sterling,  14  111.  251 ;  Curry  v.  Mount 
Sterling,  15  111.  320;  Chicago  etc.  R. 
E.  Co.  V.  Pontiac,  169  111.  155,  48  N. 
E.  485;  English  v.  Danville,  170  111. 
131,  48  N.  E.  328 ;  Lawliss  v.  Eeese,  4 
Bibb  309 ;  Baldwin  v.  Bangor,  36  Me. 
518 ;  Methodist  Church  v.  Baltimore, 
6  Md.  391,  48  Am.  Dec.  540; 
Knoblauch  v.  Minneapolis,  56  Minn. 
321,  57  N".  W.  928;  City  of  Kansas  v. 
Baird,  98  Mo.  215,  11  S.  W.  242,  562; 
State  V.  Engleman,  106  Mo.  628,  17 
S.  W.  759;  State  v.  Bishop,  39  N.  J. 
L.  226;  Matter  of  Folts  Street,  18 
App.  Div.  N".  Y.  568;  Fanning  v. 
Gilliland,  37  Ore.  369,  61  Pac.  636, 
67  Pac.  209,  82  Am.  St.  Eep.  758; 
West  River  Bridge  Co.  v.  Dix,  16  Vt. 
446;  Gallup  v.  Woodstock,  29  Vt. 
347. 

"Dunham  v.  Hyde  Park,  75  111. 
371 ;  Gilbert  v.  New  Haven,  39  Conn. 
467;  New  Orleans  v.  Steinhardt,  52 
La.  Ann.  1043,  27  So.  586. 

isKelsey  v.  King,  32  Barb.  410; 


Stout  V.  Freeholders,  25  N.  J.  L.  202; 
Iron  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Ironton,  19  Ohio  St. 
299;  Wulzen  v.  Board  of  Suprvs., 
101  Cal.  15,  35  Pac.  353,  40  Am.  St. 
Rep.  17;  Lynch  v.  Forbes,  161  Mass. 
302,  37  N.  E.  437;  Sample  v.  Carroll, 
132  Ind.  496,  32  N.  E.  220,  42  AM.  St. 
Eep.  402. 

19  Cases  apparently  holding  a  con- 
trary doctrine  are.  White's  Case,  2 
Overton,  109;  Lecoul  v.  Police  Jury, 
20  La.  An.  308. 

2  0Dunham  v.  Hyde  Park,  75  HI. 
371;  Eichland  School  Tp.  v.  Over- 
meyer,  164  Ind.  382,  73  N.  E.  811. 
In  the  latter  case  the  statute  pro- 
vided that  whenever  in  the  opinion 
of  the  township  trustee  it  shall  be 
considered  necessary  to  purchase  any 
real  estate  upon  which  to  build  a 
school  house,  he  might  proceed  to  ac- 
quire the  same  by  condemnation. 
The  case  was  a  proceeding  of  this 
sort  and  the  court  says:  "The  Gen- 
eral Assembly  of  Indiana  has  dele- 
gated to  school  corporations  the 
power  of  eminent  domain,  and  to  the 
township  trustee  the  authority  to  de- 
termine the  necessity  for  its  exercise. 
In  acquiring  land  for  a  school-house, 
and  for  other  purposes  connected 
therewith,  no  right  to  a  hearing  as 
to  the  necessity  or  expediency  of  the 
appropriation  has  been  reserved  to 
the  landowner,  either  in  the  consti- 
tution or  laws  of  the  State.  The  dis- 
cretion conferred  upon  the  township 
trustee  under  these  statutes  is 
broad,   comprehensive  and  absolute. 


§  371 


THE    STATUTOEY    AUTHOBITY. 


679 


with  the  power  of  eminent  domain  and  acting  from  considera- 
tions of  private  emolument,  so  far  as  relates  to  the  necessity  or 
propriety  of  exercising  the  power  or  of  taking  the  particular 
property.  ^^  But  an  abuse  of  the  discretion  and  authority  con- 
ferred by  eminent  domain  statutes,  may  be  prevented  or  re- 
dressed by  the  courts.^^  Sometimes  the  constitution  or  statute 
requires  the  question  of  necessity  to  be  determined  as  a  judicial 
question.-^ 

§  371  (240).  The  authority  to  condemn  must  be  ex- 
pressly given  or  necessarily  implied.  The  exercise  of  the 
power  being  against  common  right,  it  cannot  be  implied  or  in- 
ferred from  vague  or  doubtful  language,  but  must  be  given  in 
express  terms  or  by  necessary  implication."*  "When  the  right 
to  exercise  the  power  can  only  be  made  out  by  argument  and 


and  the  court  cannot  control  its  exer- 
cise in  a  proceeding  of  this  kind; 
nor  can  the  court  substitute  its  judg- 
ment, or  the  judgment  of  the  jury, 
for  that  of  the  officer  designated  by 
law,  as  to  the  expediency  or  necessity 
of  making  the  proposed  appropri- 
ation of  land." 

21  Gates  V.  Boston  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
53  Conn.  333 ;  O'Hare  v.  Chicago  etc. 
K.  R.  Co.,  139  III.  151,  28  N.  E.  923; 
St.  Paul  V.  Nickl,  42  Minn.  262,  44  N. 
W.  59 ;  Matter  of  Union  Elevated  R. 
R.  Co.,  113  N.  Y.  275,  21  N.  E.  81; 
N'orton  y.  Wallkill  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  42 
How.  Pr.  228;  Pennsylvania  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Diehm,  128  Pa.  St.  509,  18  Atl. 
522;  Colorado  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Union  Pac.  R.  E.  Co.,  41  Fed.  293; 
Douglass  v.  Byrnes,  59  Fed.  29. 

2  2Williams  v.  Carey,  73  la.  194, 
34  N.  W.  813;  Ham.  v.  Levee  Comrs., 
83  Miss.  534,  35  So.  943;  Pennsyl- 
vania R.  R.  Co.  V.  Diehm,  128  Pa.  St. 
509,  18  Atl.  522.    And  see  ante  §  314. 

2  3See  post,  §  598. 

2  4MeCarthy  v.  So.  Pac.  Co.,  148 
Cal.  211,  82.  Pac.  615;  Butler  v. 
Thomasville,  74  Ga.  570 ;  Oconee  Elee. 
Lt.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Carter,  111  Ga.  106,  36 
S.  E.  457;  Ga.  R.  R.  &  B.  Co.  v. 
Union  Point,  119  Ga.  809,  47  S.  E. 
183;  Stowe  v.  Newborn,  127  Ga.  421, 


56  S.  E.  516;  Phillips  v.  Scales 
Mound,  195  111.  353,  63  N.  E.  180; 
Gillette  v.  Aurora  Rys.  Co.,  228  111. 
261,  81  N.  E.  1005  ;  Allen  v.  Jones,  47 
Ind.  438 ;  Gano  v.  Minneapolis  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  114  la.  713,  87  N.  W.  714,  89 
Am.  St.  Rep.  393,  55  L.R.A.  263; 
Perry  v.  Wilson,  7  Mass.  393; 
Schmidt  v.  Densmore,  42  Mo.  225; 
S.  W.  Mo.  Lt.  Co.  v.  Scheurich,  174 
Mo.  235,  73  S.  W.  496;  ClaremontRy. 
&  Lt.  Co.  V.  Putney,  73  N.  H.  431,  62 
Atl.  727;  Erie  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Steward, 
170  N.  Y.  172,  63  N.  E.  118;  Man- 
hattan Ry.  Co.  V.  Astor,  126  App. 
Div.  907;  Miami  Coal  Co.  v.  Wighton, 
19  Ohio  St.  560;  State  ex  rel.  v. 
Salem  Water  Co.,  5  Ohio  C.  C.  58; 
Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.'s  Appeal,  93 
Pa.  St.  150;  Woods  v.  Greensboro 
Nat.  Gas  Co.,  204  Pa.  St.  606,  54  Atl. 
470;  Penn.  Telephone  Co.  v.  Hoover, 
209  Pa.  St.  555,  58  Atl.  922,  affirming 
S.  C.  24  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  96;  Snee  v. 
West  Side  Belt  R.  R.  Co.,  210  Pa.  St. 
480,  60  Atl.  94;  Pfoutz  v.  Penn.  Tele- 
phone Co.,  24  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  105; 
Middle  Creek  Elec.  Co.  v.  Hughes,  34 
Pa.  Co.  Ct.  270;  City  of  Tacoma  v. 
State,  4  Wash.  64,  29  Pac.  847 ;  West- 
ern Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Pa.  R.  R.  Co., 
195  U.  S.  540,  26  S.  C.  133;  Same  v. 
Same,  195  U.  S.  594,  25  S.  C.  150  j 


680  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    371 

inference,  it  does  not  exist.^^  "There  must  be  no  effort  to  prove 
the  existence  of  such  high  corporate  right,  else  it  is  in  doubt; 
and,  if  so,  the  State  has  not  granted  it."  ^®  If  the  act  is  silent 
on  the  subject,  and  the  powers  given  by  it  can  be  exercised  with- 
out resort  to  condemnation,  it  is  presumed  that  the  legislature 
intended  that  the  necessary  property  should  be  acquired  by 
contract.^''  Thus  the  authority  to  construct  and  maintain 
booms, ^*  or  bridges,^®  does  not  carry  with  it  the  right  to  condemn 
property.  If  the  act  makes  no  provision  for  compensation,  it 
is  presumed  that  the  legislature  did  not  intend  that  the  power 
of  eminent  domain  should  be  exercised.^"  A  city  had  power 
to  construct  and  regulate  sewers,  drains  and  cisterns,  also  to 
provide  on  what  terms  real  estate  in  such  city  might  be  drained 
by  means  of  surface  or  under  drains  over  and  across  other  real 
estate  therein.  It  was  held  that  neither  provision  gave  power 
to  condemn.^  ^  A  statute  in  relation  to  Detroit  gave  power  to 
open,  extend,  widen  or  straighten  streets  or  alleys.  A  subse- 
quent provision  as  to  compensation  omitted  the  case  of  widening. 
It  was  held  that  the  power  to  widen  could  not  be  exercised  by 
condemnation.^^  Statutory  authority  to  lay  out  and  establish 
streets,  alleys  and  avenues,  was  held  not  to  confer  the  power  to 
condemn  land  for  such  purposes.^^     In  this  case  there  was  no 

United  States  v.  Eauers,  70  Fed.  Rep.  Point  Boom  Co.  v.  Eeilly,  44  Wis. 

748.     "In  favor  of  such  right  there  295. 

can  be  no  implication  unless  it  arises  2  9Thatcher     v.     The     Dartmouth 

from  a  necessity   so  absolute  that,  Bridge  Co.,  18  Pick.  501 ;  Payne  v. 

without  it,  the  grant  itself  will  be  Kansas  &  A.  E..  R.  Co.,  46  Fed.  Rep. 

defeated.     It  must,  also,  be  a  neces-  546.    But  where  power  was  given  to 

sity  which  arises  from  the  very  na-  construct  a  bridge   coupled  with  a 

ture  of  things,  over  which  the  cor-  provision  for  the  ascertainment  of 

poratiou  has  no  control;  it  must  not  damages  for  property  taken  therefor, 

be  a  necessity  created  by  the  company  the  right  to  condemn  was  held  to  be 

itself  for  its  own  convenience  or  for  necessarily      implied.      Linton      v. 

the  sake  of  economy."    Pennsylvania  Sharpsburg    Bridge   Co.,    1    Grant's 

R.  R.  Co.'s  Appeal,  93  Pa.  St.  150,  Cases,  414. 

159.  soChamberlain    v.     Elizabethport 

2  5Penn.  Telephone  Co.  v.  Hoover,  Steam  Cordage  Co.,  41  N.  J.  Eq.  43; 

209  Pa.  St.  555,  58  Atl.  922.  Chaffee's  Appeal,  56  Mich.  244;  In  re 

26/6id.  Manderson,  51  Fed.  301,  2  CCA.  490; 

2  ^Chamberlain     v.     Elizabethport  In  re  Montgomery,  48  Fed.  896. 

Steam  Cordage  Co.,  41  N.  J.  Eq.  43;  siAUen  v.  Jones,  47  Ind.  438;  see 

Leeds  v.  Richmond,  102  Ind.  372.  also  Leeds  v.  Richmond,  102  Ind.  372. 

28Grand   Rapids   Booming   Co.   v.  32Chaffee's  Appeal,  56  Mich.  244. 

Jarvis,  30  Mich.  308,  323;  Perry  v.  33Ga.   R.   R.   &  B.   Co.  v.   Union 

Wilson,  7   Mass.   393;    The   Stevens  Point,  119  Ga.  809,  47  S.  E.  183;  City 


§    372  THE    STATU'TOKY    AUTHOEITY.  6S1 

general  law  to  which  the  city  in  question  could  resort,  and  it 
attempted  to  provide  by  ordinance  a  mode  of  condemnation. 
But  where  a  county  board  of  supervisors  was  empowered  to  build 
and  keep  in  repair  county  buildings  and  to  provide  suitable 
rooms  for  the  use  of  the  county,  it  was  held  that  this  was  suiR- 
cient  authority  to  condemn  land  for  a  court  liouse;^*  In  an- 
other case,  where  commissioners  were  empowered  to  select  a  site 
for  a  city  hall,  either  certain  lands  owned  by  the  city  or  any 
other  lands,  and  to  cause  a  city  hall  to  be  erected  thereon,  it  was 
held  by  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  iffew  York,  that,  in  case  land 
not  owned  by  the  city  had  been  selected,  there  would  have  been 
no  power  to  condemn,  and,  if  the  commissioners  could  not  have 
agreed  with  the  owner,  they  could  have  proceeded  no  further 
in  the  matter.^^  As  a  rule,  a  municipal  corporation  cannot  con- 
demn property  beyond  its  limits,  unless  authority  to  do  so  is 
expressly  given.^" 

The  rule  that  the  power  to  condemn  is  not  to  be  implied,  is 
further  illustrated  in  subsequent  sections  which  treat  of  the  con- 
struction of  statutes  giving  authority  to  condemn. ^'^  'No  general 
rule  can  be  laid  down  as  to  when  the  right  to  condemn  will  be 
implied  or  inferred,  and  when  not.  Such  implication  will  more 
readily  be  made  in  favor  of  public  corporations  exercising  pow- 
ers solely  for  the  public  use  and  benefit  than  in  favor  of  private 
individuals  or  corporations  organized  for  pecuniary  profit.^* 

§  372  Same:  Illustrations.  A  statute  provided  that 
when  the  property  and  franchises  of  a  corporation  were  sold  at 
judicial  sale,  the  purchasers  should  become  the  owners  of  the  cor- 
porate rights,  liberties,  privileges  and  franchises  of  such  corpo- 
ration and  should  constitute  a  new  corporation,  entitled  to  all 
such  rights,  liberties,  franchises  and  privileges.  It  was  held  that 
if  the  old  corporation  had  the  power  of  eminent  domain,  the  new 
one  would  also.^®  Where  a  company  was  organized  to  supply 
electricity  for  light,  heat  and  power  and  was  authorized  to  use 

of  Taeoma  v.  State,  4  Wash.  64,  29  Warner  v.  Town  of  Gunnison,  2  Colo. 

Pac.  847 ;  Georgia  R.  R.  &  B.  Co.  v.  App.  430,  31  Pac.  238,  where,  however, 

Decatur,  129  Ga.  502,  59  S.  E.  217.  the  power  was  held  to  have  been  eon- 

3  4  Supervisors  of  Culpepper  County  f erred. 

V.  Gorrell,  20  Gratt.  484.  iTPost,  §§  378^02. 

ssPeople  ex  rel.  Hayden  v.  City  of  ssQuoted  and  approved  in  Leitzsey 

Rochester,  50  N.  Y.  525.  v.  Columbia  Water  Power  Co.,  47  S. 

soHoughton  v.  Huron  Copper  Co.,  C.  404,  34  L.R.A.  215. 

57  Mich.  547;  Drain  Commissioners  soBrinkerhoff  v.  Newark  etc.  Trac- 

V.   Baxter,  67  Mich.   127.     See  also  tion  Co.,  66  N.  J.  L.  478,  49  Atl.  812. 


682 


EMINENT    DOilAIN. 


§  37: 


any  public  street,  lane,  alley  or  highway  for  its  distributing 
Avorks,  it  was  held  power  to  condemn  the  necessary  easement 
in  the  street  was  implied.*"  Where  a  corporation  is  organized 
for  a  public  purpose  and  it  is  authorized  to  take  and  to  purchase 
necessary  lands  and  the  statute  contains  provisions  as  to  making 
compensation,  the  intent  to  confer  the  power  of  eminent  domain 
is  shown.*  ^  The  telegraph  includes  the  telephone  and  laws  con- 
ferring the  power  of  eminent  domain  for  the  construction  of  lines 
of  telegraph  are  held  to  apply  to  companies  for  the  construction 
of  telephone  lines.*^  The  contrary  is  held  in  Mississippi  where 
they  have  been  kept  distinct  in  legislation.*^  The  act  of  congress 
declaring  all  railroads  to  be  post  roads  and  providing  "that  any 
telegraph  company  now  organized,  or  which  may  hereafter  be  or- 
ganized under  the  laws  of  any  State  in  the  Union,  shall  have  the 
right  to  construct,  maintain  and  operate  lines  of  telegraph 
*  *  *  over  and  along  any  of  the  military  or  post  roads  of  the 
United  States  which  have  been  or  may  hereafter  be  declared 
such  by  act  of  congress,"  does  not  confer  upon  telegraph  com- 
panies the  power  to  condemn  the  right  to  place  their  lines  upon 
railroad  rights  of  way.** 


4  0Brown  v.  Radnor  Tp.  Elec.  Lt. 
Co.,  208  Pa.  St.  453,  57  Atl.  904; 
Radnor  Tp.  Elec.  Lt.  Co.'s  Petition, 
208  Pa.  St.  460,  57  Atl.  1135;  Radnor 
Tp.  Elec.  Lt.  Co.  v.  Brown,  208  Pa. 
St.  461,  57  Atl.  1135. 

"Rockingham  County  L.  &  P.  Co. 
V.  Hobbs,  72  N.  H.  531,  58  Atl.  46, 
66  L.R.A.  581. 

4  2  Chesapeake  etc.  Tel.  Co.  v.  B.  & 
O.  Tel.  Co.,  66  Md.  399 ;  N.  W.  Tele- 
phone Exch.  Co.  V.  Chicago  etc.  Ry. 
Co.,  76  Minn.  334,  79  N.  W.  315; 
Same  v.  Minneapolis,  81  Minn.  140, 
83  N.  W.  527,  86  N.  W.  69;  People's 
Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  Berks  etc.  Turn- 
pike Road  Co.,  23  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  401; 
Pa.  Telephone  Co.  v.  Hoover,  27  Pa. 
Co.  Ct.  61 ;  San  Antonio  etc.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  S.  W.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  93  Tex.  313, 
55  S.  W.  117,  77  Am.  St.  Rep.  884, 
40  L.R.A.  459 ;  Gulf  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
S.  W.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  18  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  500,  45  S.  W.  151;  Same  v. 
Same,  25  Tex.  Civ.  App.  488,  61  S.  W. 


400;  Wis.  Telephone  Co.  v.  Oshkosh, 
62  Wis  32,  21  N.  W.  828;  Roberts  v. 
Wis.  Telephone  Co.,  77  Wis.  589,  46 
N.  W.  800;  State  v.  Sheboygan,  111 
Wis.  23,  86  N.  W.  657;  Cumberland 
Telephone  Co.  v.  United  Elec.  Co.,  17 
Fed.  825. 

4SAlabama  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cumber- 
land Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  88  Miss.  438,  41 
So.  258. 

4  4 Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Pa. 
R.  R.  Co.,  195  U.  S.  540,  25  S.  C.  133; 
Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Pa.  R.  R. 
Co.,  195  U.  S.  594,  25  S.  0.  150;  N.  W. 
Telephone  Exch.  Co.  v.  Chicago  etc. 
Ry.  Co.,  76  Minn.  334,  79  N.  W.  315. 

The  following  additional  cases  are 
referred  to  on  the  question  of  what 
language  is  suOBcient  to  confer  the 
power  of  eminent  domain;  Enfield 
Toll  Bridge  Co.  v.  Hartford  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  17  Conn.  454;  S.  C.  17  Conn.  40, 
42  Am.  Dec.  716;  Hartshorn  v.  111. 
Val.  Traction  Co.,  210  III.  609,  71  N. 
E.  012;   Helm  v.  Grayville,  224  111. 


§  374 


THE    STATUTOEY    AUTHOEITT. 


G83 


§  373  (241).  How  the  authority  may  be  given.  This 
is  purely  a  matter  of  legislative  discretion,  unless  limited  by  the 
constitution.  The  authority  may  be  given  by  a  special  act  to 
a  particular  person  or  corporation,  or  by  a  general  act  or  gen- 
eral incorporation  laws.*^  Municipal  corporations  may  be  au- 
thorized to  make  certain  improvements,  or  compelled  to  do  so, 
in  the  discretion  of  the  legislature.*" 

§  374  (242).  To  whom  authority  may  be  given.  For- 
eign corporations.  Strictly  speaking,  the  legislature  cannot 
delegate  the  power  of  eminent  domain.*'^  It  cannot  divest  itself 
of  sovereign  powers.  But,  in  exercising  the  power,  it  can  select 
such  agencies  as  it  pleases,  and  confer  upon  them  the  right 
to  take  private  property  subject  only  to  the  limitations  contained 
in  the  constitution.*®     Accordingly  it  has  been  held  that  the 


274,  79  N.  E.  689 ;  Smith  v.  Claussen 
Park  Dv.  &  L.  District,  229  111.  155, 
82  N.  E.  278;  David  Bradley  Mfg. 
Co.  V.  Chicago  etc.  Traction  Co.,  229 
111.  170,  82  N.  E.  210;  Mercer  County 
V.  Wolff,  237  111.  74;  Shreveport 
Traction  Co.  v.  Kansas  City  etc.  Ry. 
Co.,  119  La.  759,  44  So.  457;  Clare- 
mont  Ry.  &  Lt.  Co.  v.  Putney,  73  N. 
H.  431,  62  Atl.  727;  State  v.  Newark, 
54  N.  J.  L.  62,  23  Atl.  129;  Wendel 
V.  Board  of  Education  (N.  J.  L.), 
70  Atl.  152;  State  v.  City  of  Newark, 
.54  N.  J.  L.  62,  23  Atl.  129 ;  Commis- 
sioners V.  Judges  of  Queens  County, 
17  Wend.  9;  Matter  of  Rochester 
Electric  R.  R.  Co.,  57  Hun  56,  10  N. 
Y.  Supp.  379;  Adee  v.  Nassau  Elec. 
R.  R.  Co.,  72  App.  Div.  404,  76  N.  Y. 
S.  589;  S.  C.  affirmed,  177  N.  Y.  548, 
69  N.  E.  1120;  Schenectady  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Peck,  88  App.  Div.  201,  84  N.  Y.  S. 
759;  State  v.  Salem  \Vater  Co.,  5 
Ohio  C.  C.  58;  Ralm  Tp.  v.  Tamaque 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  4  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  29; 
City  of  Springville  v.  Fullmer,  7 
Utah  450,  27  Pac.  577. 

4  5De  Witt  v.  Duncan,  46  Cal.  342; 
Moran  v.  Ross,  79  Cal.  159,  21  Pac. 
547;  Chestates  Pyrites  Co.  v.  Caven- 
ders  Creek  Gold  Min.  Co.,  119  Ga. 
354,  46  S.  E.  422,  100  Am.  St.  Rep. 


174;  Weir  v.  St.  Paul,  Stillwater  & 
Taylor's  Falls  R.  R.  Co.,  18  Minn. 
155 ;  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R. 
Co.,  31  N.  J.  *Eq.  475;  National 
Docks  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Central  R.  R.  Co., 

32  N.  J.  Eq.  755;  Buffalo  &  New 
York  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Brainard,  9  N.  Y. 
100. 

4  6Matter  of  Sixth  St.,  11  Phila- 
delphia 414. 

47Sholl  V.  German  Coal  Co.,  118  111. 
427;  Brewster  v.  Hough,  10  N.  H. 
138.  Nor  can  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion bin.d  itself  by  an  agreement  not 
to  execise  the  power  of  eminent  do- 
main with  which  it  is  vested.  Matter 
of  Opening  First  St.,  66  Mich.  42, 

33  N.  W.  15. 

4  8 Yost's  Report,  17  Pa.  St.  424; 
Matter  of  Deansville  Cem.  Ass.  5 
Hun  482;  State  v.  Rapp,  39  Minn. 
65,  38  N.  W.  926;  Wisconsin  Water 
Co.  V.  Winans,  85  Wis.  26,  54  N.  W. 
1003,  39  Am.  St.  Rep.  813,  20  L.R.A. 
062.  In  State  v.  Rapp,  39  Minn.  65, 
38  N.  W.  926,  the  court  says :  "The 
manner  of  the  exercise  of  this  right 
is,  except  as  to  compensation,  unre- 
stricted by  the  constitution,  and  ad- 
dresses itself  to  the  legislature  as  a 
question  of  policy,  propriety,  or  fit- 
ness, rather  than  of  power.    They  are 


G84 


EMIA'EITT  DOMAI::?. 


§  374 


right  may  be  conferred  upon  corporations,  public  *'  or  private,^" 
upon  individuals,^^  upon  foreign  corporations,^^  or  a  consoli- 


under  no  obligation  to  submit  the 
question  to  a  judicial  tribunal,  but 
may  determine  it  themselves,  or  dele- 
gate it  to  a  municipal  corporation,  to 
a  commission,  or  to  any  other  body 
or  tribunal  they  see  fit." 

"State  V.  Eapp,  39  Minn.  65,  38 
N.  W.  926;  Winona  etc.  E.  R.  Co.  v. 
City  of  Watertown,  4  S.  D.  323,  56 
N.  W.  1077 ;  Matter  of  Thompson,  57 
Hun  419,  10  N.  Y.  Supp.  705;  Spring 
City  Gas  Light  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania 
S.  V.  R.  E.  Co.,  167  Pa.  St.  6,  31  Atl. 
368. 

6  0  Denver  Power  &  Irr.  Co.  v.  Den- 
ver &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  30  Colo.  204, 
69  Pac.  568,  60  L.R.A.  383;  New 
York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Long,  69  Conn. 
424;  Mims  v.  Macon  &  Western  R.  R. 
Co.,  3  Ga.  333;  Hand  Gold  Mining  Co. 
v.  Parker,  59  Ga.  419;  Brown  v. 
Gerald,  100  Me.  351,  61  Atl.  785,  109 
Am.  St.  Rep.  526,  70  L.R.A.  472; 
Tide  Water  Canal  Co.  v.  Archer,  9 
Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  479;  Fort  St.  Union 
Depot  Co.  V.  Morton,  83  Mich.  265,  47 
N.  W.  Rep.  228,  3  Am.  R.  E.  &  Corp. 
Eep.  438;  Concord  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Gree- 
ley, 17  N.  H.  47 ;  Ash  v.  Cmumings,  50 
N.  H.  591;  Bloodgood  v.  Mohawk  & 
Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  18  Wend.  9;  Buf- 
falo City  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Brainard,  9  N. 
Y.  100;  Matter  of  Union  El.  R.  R. 
Co.,  113  N.  Y.  275,  21  jST.  E.  81;  L.  C. 
&  C.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Chappell,  Rice  (S. 
C.)  383;  Boom  Co.  v.  Patterson,  98 
U.  S.  403.  In  Matter  of  Union  El. 
R.  E.  Co.,  113  N.  Y.  275,  21  N.  E.  81, 
it  is  said:  "Much  has  been  said 
upon  this  subject  of  the  exercise  of 
the  right  of  eminent  domain  by  pri- 
vate corporations,  and  it  is  not  neces- 
sary to  dwell  upon  it  here  at  any 
length.  The  right  resides  in  the 
State  at  any  time  to  resume  the  pos- 
session of  private  property  for  public 
use,   upon  just   compensation  being 


made.  What  it  can  thus  do  directly, 
it  may,  in  the  furtherance  of  a  public 
purpose,  delegate  the  right  to  do  to 
a  corporation,  which  has  been  created 
to  subserve  some  supposed  public  con- 
venience or  necessity,  and  thus  be- 
comes invested  with  a  guusi  public 
character."  Compare  People  v.  Salem, 
20  Mich.  452. 

siMoran  v.  Eoss,  79  Cal.  159,  21 
Pac.  547;  Pocautico  Water  Works 
Co.  V.  Bird,  130  N.  Y.  249,  29  N.  E. 
246;  Matter  of  Petition  of  Kerr,  42 
Barb.  119;  also  cases  in  last  note. 
Compare  Finney  v.  Sommerville,  80 
Pa.  St.  59. 

5  2Columbus  W.  W.  Co.  v.  Long,  121 
Ala.  245,  25  So.  702;  Eussell  v.  St. 
Louis  S.  W.  Ey.  Co.,  71  Ark.  451,  75 
S.  W.  725;  Dodge  v.  Council  Bluffs, 
57  la.  560;  Abbott  v.  New  York  etc. 
E.  E.  Co.,  145  Mass.  450;  Gray  v.  St. 
Louis  &  San  Francisco  Ey.  Co.,  81 
Mo.  126;  St.  Louis  etc.  E.  E.  Co.  v. 
Lewsight,  113  Mo.  060,  21  S.  W.  210; 
Southern  111.  &  Mo.  Bridge  Co.  v. 
Stone,  174  Mo.  1,  73  S.  W.  453,  63 
L.R.A.  301;  S.  C.  affirmed  sub.  nom. 
Stone  V.  So.  111.  &  Mo.  Bridge  Co., 
206  U.  S.  267,  27  S.  C.  605;  Helena 
Power' Transmission  Co.  v.  Spratt,  35 
Mont.  108,  88  Pac.  773,  8  L.R.A. 
(N.S.)  567;  Matter  of  Peter  Town- 
send,  39  N.  Y.  171;  New  York  etc. 
E.  E.  Co.  V.  Welsh,  143  N.  Y.  411,  38 
N.  E.  378,  42  Am.  St.  Eep.  734; 
Morris  Canal  &  Banking  Co.  v.  Town- 
send,  24  Barb.  658;  New  York  &  Erie 
E.  E.  Co.  V.  Young,  33  Pa.  St.  175; 
Gulf  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  S.  W.  Tel.  &  Tel. 
Co.,  25  Tex.  Civ.  App.  488,  61  S.  W. 
406;  Miocene  Ditch  Co.  v.  Lyng,  138 
Fed.  544,  70  C.  C.  A.  458.  In  Iowa  it 
was  held  that,  though  a  foreign  cor- 
poration did  not  have  power  to  con- 
demn land  in  that  State,  a  domestic 
companj',  organized  at  the  instance  of 


§    374  THE    STATUTORY    AUTIIOEITT.  C85 

dated  company  composed  in  part  of  a  foreign  corporation,"'  and 
upon  the  federal  government.''*  Such  has  been  the  common  prac- 
tice since  the  Revolution,  and  the  right  to  do  so  has  never  been 
a  matter  of  serious  question ;  and  it  may  be  regarded  as  settled 
law  that,  in  the  absence  of  special  constitutional  restriction,  it 
is  solely  for  the  legislature  to  judge  what  persons,  corporations 
or  other  agencies  may  properly  be  clothed  with  this  power.'* 
The  general  grant  of  the  power  of  eminent  domain  to  all 
corporations  of  a  certain  class  or  organized  for  certain  purposes, 
is  held  not  to  include  foreign  corporation.®*  This  is  in  accord- 
ance with  the  rule  of  strict  construction  universally  applied  to 
such  statutes,®'^  and  also  in  accordance  with  the  rule  that  statutes 
are  presumed  to  refer  and  apply  only  to  persons  and  things 
within  the  State  enacting  them.**  Where  a  statute  provided  for 
the  issuing  of  permits  to  foreign  corporations  to  do  business  in 
the  State  upon  certain  conditions  and  enacted  that  "such  cor- 
porations, on  obtaining  such  permits,  shall  have  and  enjoy  all 
of  the  privileges  conferred  by  the  laws  of  this  State  on  corpora- 
tions organized  under  the  laws  of  this  State,"  it  was  held  that 
a  foreign  telephone  company,  upon  complying  with  the  statute, 
would  have  the  same  right  to  condemn  property  as  a  domestic 

a.   foreign   company,   could  condemn  Henderson  Bridge  Co.,  141  Fed.  51,  72 

land  for  the  purpose  of  leasing  it  to  C.  C.  A.  539;  Baldwin  v.  Postal  Tel. 

such  foreign  corporation.     Lower  v.  Cable  Co.,  78  S.  C.  419;  Barnett  v. 

Chicago  &  Quiney  E.  E.  Co.,  59  la.  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  79  S.  C.  462. 

563.  But  a  statute  giving  to  telegraph  and 

5  3  Toledo,  A.  A.  &  G.  Ey.   Co.  v.  telephone  companies  the  right  to  con- 

Dunlap,   47    Mich.    456 ;    Trester   v.  struct  their  lines  across  and  along  • 

Missouri  Pac.  E.  E.  Co.,  33  Neb.  171,  streets,  highways,  railroads,  canals, 

49  N.  W.  1110.  turnpikes,  etc.,  was  held  to  include 

5  4Burt  V.  Merchants'  Ins.  Co.,  108  foreign  companies.    Cumberland  Tel. 

Mass.  356,  8  Am.  Eep.  339 ;  Gilmer  v.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  Yazoo  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  90 

Lime  Point,  18  Cal.  229.  Miss.  686,  44  So.  166;  State  v.  Eed 

65Ash  V.  Cummings,  50  N.  H.  591;  Lodge,     30     Mont.     338,     76     Pac. 

and  cases  cited  in  note  48.  758.     An    Iowa    statute    conferred 

5  6Chestates  Pyrites  Co.  v.  Caven-  power   upon   "railroad   corporations 

ders  Creek  Gold  Min.  Co.,  119  Ga.  organized    under    the    laws    of    this 

354,  46  S.  E.  422,  100  Am.  St.  Eep.  State;"  held,  necessarily,  a  denial  of 

174;  Helena  Power  Transmission  Co.  the    right    to    foreign    corporations. 

V.  Spratt,  35  Mont.  108,  88  Pac.  773,  Holbert  v.  St.  Louis,  K.  C.  &  N.  E.  E. 

8  L.E.A.(N.S.)   567;  Central  Union  Co.,  45  la.  23. 
Telephone  Co.  v.  Columbus  Grove,  8  si  Post,  §  388. 

Ohio  C.  C.  (N.S.)  81;  Duke  V.  Postal  682      Lewis'      Sutherland      Stat. 

Tel.  Cable  Co.,  71  S.  C.  95,  50  S.  E.  Constr.  §§  513.  514. 
675;  Evansville  etc.  Traction  Co.  v. 


686  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    374 

corporation.'*  A  constitutional  provision  of  Montana  that  for- 
eign corporations  should  not  enjoy  within  the  State  any  greater 
rights  or  privileges  than  domestic  corporations  of  similar  charac- 
ter was  held  not  to  confer  by  implication  the  same  rights  and 
privileges,  but  to  be  a  mere  limitation  upon  the  power  of  the 
legislature.^"  The  right  in  question,  in  the  case  referred  to,  was 
that  of  eminent  domain.  A  statute  of  Missouri  provided  that 
on  complying  with  certain  conditions  foreign  corporations  "shall 
be  subject  to  all  the  liabilities,  res.trictions  and  duties  which  arc 
or  may  be  imposed  upon  corporations  of  like  character  organ- 
ized under  the  laws  of  this  State,  and  shall  have  no  other  or 
greater  ■powers."  The  clause  in  italics  was  held  to  mean  that 
they  should  have  the  same  powers  as  domestic  corporations  and 
that  the  words  were  effective  to  confer  such  powers,  and  an 
Illinois  corporation  was  held  entitled  to  condemn  property  in 
Missouri,  even  though  it  did  not  have  power  to  do  so  in  its  own 
State." 

Some  State  constitutions  prohibit  the  exercise  of  the  power 
by  foreign  corporations."^  A  proceeding  by  a  foreign  corpora- 
tion as  lessee  of  a  domestic  corporation,  was  held  within  the 
prohibition  by  the  ISTebraska  supreme  court.^^  Proceedings  in- 
stituted in  violation  of  the  provision  should  be  dismissed  when- 
ever the  fact  appears.**  A  prohibition  that  a  foreign  corporation 
may  not  "condemn  or  appropriate"  lands,  was  held  not  to  pre- 
vent its  acquiring  property  by  agreement.®''  And  where  land 
has  been  acquired  by  violation  of  such  a  provision,  one  who  has 
accepted  the  compensation  awarded,  is  estopped  from  questioning 
the  company's  title,"®  and  the  title  has  been  held  to  be  good 
against  all  except  the  State."^  It  has  been  argued  that  the  pro- 
hibition would  apply  to  a  corporation  created  by  congress,®*  and 

ssSanAntonioetc.  Ry.  Co.  V.  S.  W.  ezAnte,  §§  17,  39. 

Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  93  Tex.  313,  55  S.  W.  esstate  v.  Scott,  22  Xeb.  628.    And 

117,  77  Am.  St.  Rep.  884,  49  L.R.A.  see  Koening  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co., 

459.    See  Evansville  etc.  Traction  Co.  27  Neb.  699,  43  N.  W.  423. 

V.  Henderson  Bridge  Co.,  141  Fed.  51,  64Xrester  v.  Missouri  Pae.  R.  R. 

72  C.  C.  A.  539 ;  Miocene  Ditch  Co.  v.  Co.,  23  Xeb.  242,  36  N.  W.  502. 

Lyng,  138  Fed.  544,  70  C.  C.  A.  458.  6  5  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Foltz, 

BOHelena  Power  Transmission  Co.  52  Fed.  627. 

V.  Spratt,  35  Mont.  108,  88  Pac.  773,  eelMd. 

8  L.R.A.  (N.S.)   567.  e-jiyers  y.  McGavock,  39  Xeb.  843, 

61  Southern  III.  &  ilo.  Bridge  Co.  58  N.  W.  522,  42  Am.  St.  Rep.  627. 

V.  Stone,  174  Mo.  1,  73  S.  W.  453,  63  ssHid. 
L.R.A.   .301;   S.   C.   194  Mo.   175,  92 
S.  W.  475. 


§  376 


THE    STATUTORY    AUTIIOPaTY. 


687 


this  -would  doubtless  be  true  if  it  had  no  express  authority  to 
condemn.  But  congress  may  create  a  corporation  "with  power 
to  condemn  property  in  a  State,  for  a  purpose  within  its  con- 
stitutional powers,  as  in  aid  of  interstate  commerce,  despite  any 
prohibition,  contained  in  the  constitution  or  laws  of  the  State.*"* 

§  375  (242a).  Direct  appropriation  by  the  legislature. 
It  is  competent  for  the  legislature  to  appropriate  property  direct- 
ly, by  an  act  duly  passed,  instead  of  conferring  authority  to  do 
so,  and  this  has  occasionally  been  done.'''' 

§  376  (243).  Delegation  and  transfer  of  authority  by 
grantees  of  the  legislature :  Contractors  and  agents :  Re- 
ceivers. When  authority  to  take  property  by  virtue  of  the  pow- 
er of  eminent  domain  is  conferred  by  the  legislature,  it  becomes 
a  personal  trust,  and  cannot  be  delegated  or  transferred,  except 
by  legislative  sanction.'^-'-    Purchasers  under  a  mortgage,''"  grant- 


esCalifornia  v.  Central  Pac.  E.  R. 
Co.,  127  U.  S.  1,  39;  Mining  Co.  v. 
Pennsylvania,  125  U.  S.  181, 186,  8  S. 
C.  737 ;  Pensacola  Tel.  Co.  v.  Western 
Union  Tel.  Co.,  96  U.  S.  1,  12;  6  Am. 
R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  607  et  seq. 

70Mims  V.  Macon  &  Western  R.  R. 
Co.,  3  Ga.  (3  Kelly)  333;  Gillette  v. 
Aurora  Rys.  Co.,  228  111.  261,  81  N.  E. 
1005;  State  v.  Spencer,  53  Kan.  655, 
37  Pac.  174;  Hingham.  &  Quincy 
Bridge  &  Turnpike  Co.  v.  County  of 
N'orfolk,  6  Allen  353;  Matter  of 
Union  Ferry  Co.,  98  N.  Y.  139; 
Matter  of  Application  of  Mayor  etc. 
of  New  York,  99  N.  Y.  569  {affirming 
34  Hun  441 )  ;  Genet  v.  Brooklyn,  99 
N.  Y.  296;  McCormack  v.  City  of 
Brooklyn,  108  N.  Y.  49,  14  N.  E.  808; 
Mott  V.  Eno,  181  N".  Y.  346,  74  N.  E. 
229,  reversing  97  App.  Div.  580,  90 
N.  Y.  S.  608 ;  Matter  of  Department 
of  Public  Works,  53  Hun  280,  25  N. 
Y.  St.  9,  6  N.  Y.  Supp.  750;  State  v. 
Collis,  20  App.  Div.  N.  Y.  341; 
Matter  of  Riverside  Parks,  59  App. 
Div.  603,  69  N.  Y.  S.  742;  S.  C. 
affirmed,  167  N.  Y.  627,  60  N.  E. 
1116;  Delap  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  3 
Miscl.  22,  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  179;  Smed- 
ley  v.  Erwin,  51  Pa.  St.  445;  In  re 
Towanda  Bridge  Co.,  91  Pa.  St.  216; 
Township  of  Mahoney  v.  Comry,  103 


Pa.  St.  362;  Painter  v.  St.  Clair,  98 
Va.  85,  34  S.  E.  989;  Baltimore  & 
Ohio  R.  R.  Co.  V.  B.  W.  &  Ky.  R.  R. 
Co.,  17  W.  Va.  812,  841;  State  v. 
Hogue,  71  Wis.  384,  36  N.  W.  860; 
Boom  Co.  V.  Patterson,  98  U.  S.  403 ; 
United  States  v.  Harris,  1  Sumner 
21. 

'iHarris  v.  Inhabitants  of  Marble- 
head,  10  Gray  40;  Stewart's  Appeal, 
56  Pa.  St.  413;  Lyon  v.  Jerome,  26 
Wend.  485,  reversing  S.  C.  in  15 
Wend.  569.  "This  is  an  exceedingly 
delicate  and  important  power,  and 
only  exists  in  the  State  by  virtue  of 
her  right  of  eminent  domain  as  sover- 
eign. In  expressly  granting  this 
power,  a  confidence  in  the  grantee  of 
the  power,  as  to  its  exercise,  is  im- 
plied. It  cannot,  therefore,  be  dele- 
gated. It  must  be  exercised  by  the 
grantee  in  person,  and  not  by  proxy 
or  substitute.  The  commissioner  can 
act  by  others.  He  must  judge  him- 
self. He  only  can  decide  upon  the 
necessity  or  expediency  in  any  case 
of  appropriating  private  property  to 
public  use;  but  He  may  employ  his 
subordinate  officers  or  agents  to  carry 
such  decision  into  effect.  Lyon  v. 
Jerome,  20  Wend.  485,  498. 

7  2 Atkinson  v.  Marietta  R.  R.  Co., 
15  Ohio  St.  21. 


688 


EMIJifElST  DOMAIN. 


§  376 


ees  ''^  or  lessees  ''*  of  the  property  and  franchises  of  a  corpora- 
tion authorized  to  condemn  property  for  public  use,  cannot,  by 
virtue  of  such  purchase,  grant  or  lease,  exercise  such  power. 
Being  a  personal  trust,  the  power  must  be  exercised  by  the 
grantee  in  person/^  and,  in  case  of  corporations,  by  the  govern- 
ing body  of  the  corporation,  which  ordinarily  is  the  board  of 
directors.'^®  From  these  principles  it  follows  that,  where  cor- 
porations, or  others  who  are  empowered  to  take  materials  for 
the  construction  of  works,  employ  contractors  who  engage  to 
furnish  their  own  materials,  the  power  of  eminent  domain  does 
not  pass  to  the  contractors  by  virtue  of  the  contract,  but  they 
must  provide  their  materials  as  best  they  can.''^     A  city,  hav- 


'SMahouey  v.  Spring  Valley  Water 
Works,  52  Cal.  159;  Abbott  v.  New 
York  &  N.  E.  R.  E.  Co.,  145  Mass. 
450.  In  the  last  of  these  cases  the 
court  reviews  a  number  of  acts  from 
which  an  intent  that  the  power  to 
condemn  should  pass  with  the  prop- 
erty and  franchises  of  a  railroad  was 
inferred. 

■^iMuU  V.  Indianapolis  etc.  Trac- 
tion Co.,  169  Ind.  214,  81  N.  E.  657; 
Worcester  v.  Norwich  &  Worcester  R. 
R.  Co.,  109  Mass.  103;  Lewis  v.  Ger- 
mantown  etc.  E.  R.  Co.,  16  Phila. 
608;  Barker  v.  Hartman  Steel  Co.,  6 
Pa.  Co.  Ct.  183;  Hespenheide's  Ap- 
peal, 4  Penny.  71 ;  Western  Union 
Tel.  Co.  V.  Pa.  R.  R.  Co.,  195  U.  S. 
594,  25  S.  C.  150. 

7  5Lyon  V.  Jerome,  26  Wend.  485. 

7  6Eastern  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Boston  & 
Maine  R.  R.  Co.,  Ill  Mass.  125,  130, 
15  Am.  Rep.  13. 

7  7  Schmidt  v.  Densmore,  42  Mo. 
225;  Lyon  v.  Jerome,  26  Wend.  485; 
St.  Peter  v.  Dennison,  58  N.  Y.  416, 
17  Am.  Rep.  258.  A  contrary  doe- 
trine  is  maintained  in  Illinois.  Hinde 
V.  Wabash  Navigation  Co.,  15  111.  72; 
Lesher  v.  The  Wabash  Navigation 
Co.,  14  111.  85,  56  Am.  Dec.  494.  In 
this  case,  however,  there  appears  to 
have  been  a  resolution  of  the  canal 
commissioners  authorizing  the  appro- 
priation, but  the  court  disregarded  it 


in  their  decision.  In  Vermont  Cen- 
tral R.  R.  Co.  V.  Baxter,  22  Vt.  365, 
it  was  held  that  one  who  contracted 
to  build  a  section  of  road  and  to 
furnish  all  materials,  necessarily 
took  the  company's  power  to  appro- 
priate them  in  imntum,  and  that  the 
company  was  liable  directly  to  the 
owner  therefor.  The  statute  in  that 
case  provided  that,  where  a.  railroad 
company  had  by  its  engineers,  agents 
or  servants  taken  any  materials  from 
contiguous  lands  for  use  in  the  con- 
struction of  its  road,  and  had  failed 
to  have  the  damages  therefor  as- 
sessed within  two  years,  the  owner 
might  have  his  common  law  remedy 
therefor.  (§  30,  C.  26  Compiled 
Stats.  1850).  The  court  held  that 
the  contractors  were  agents  or  ser- 
vants within  the  statue.  Bliss  v. 
Hosmer,  15  Ohio,  44,  may  also  seem 
at  first  blush  to  be  opposed  to  the 
text.  That  was  trespass  against  the 
contractor  on  a  canal  for  taking  ma- 
terials, and  judgment  was  given  for 
the  defendant.  The  statute  pro- 
vided that  the  commissioners  and  any 
agent,  superintendent  and  engineer 
employed  by  them  might  enter  on  pri- 
vate property  and  take  materials. 
The  contract  provided  that  the  con- 
tractors should  furnish  their  own 
materials,  but,  if  they  could  not  ob- 
tain them  at  a  fair  price,  the  com- 


§  3Y7 


THE  STATUTOEY  AUTHOEITY. 


689 


ing  power  to  condemn  property  for  water  works,  cannot,  by  a 
contract  with  a  water  company  which  has  no  such  power,  con- 
fer upon  the  latter  the  power  of  condenmation.''*  The  receiver 
of  a  corporation  invested  with  the  power  may  exercise  it,  when 
authorized  to  do  so  by  the  court.''® 

§  377  (244).  A  lease  of  the  property  and  franchises  of 
a  corporation  does  not  destroy  its  right  to  condemn.*" 
This  is  true  though  the  term  of  the  lease  is  for  the  entire  life  of 
the  corporation.®^  The  lease  is  but  a  mode  of  enabling  the  cor- 
poration to  discharge  its  duties  to  the  public,  and  the  necessities 
of  further  condemnations  would  be  the  same,  whether  the  duties 
which  the  corporation  owes  to  the  public  are  discharged  by  the 
corporation  directly,  or  by  its  lessee.*^  It  has  been  held  that  the 
lessee  may  prosecute  proceedings  in  the  name  of  the  lessor.*' 


missioners  or  their  engineer  would 
give  an  order  for  appropriating  tliem. 
An  order  was,  in  fact,  given  by  the 
engineer  to  talce  the  materials  in 
question.  In  this  case,  therefore,  the 
statute  expressly  authorized  any 
agent  or  engineer  of  the  commission- 
ers to  enter  and  take  materials, 
which  differs  materially  from  the 
case  of  Lyon  v.  Jerome,  ante.  Such 
a  contract,  however,  does  not  prevent 
the  corporation  or  principal  from 
appropriating  materials  by  condem- 
nation for  the  benefit  of  the  con- 
tractor. Ten  Broeck  v.  Sherrill,  71 
N.  Y.  276. 

7  8  State  V.  Salem  Water  Co.,  5 
Ohio  C.  C.  58. 

7  9Morrison  v.  Forman,  177  111.  427, 
53  N.  E.  73,  in  which  the  court  says : 
"A  court  of  equity  having  in  charge 
the  property  of  a  railroad  company 
is  authorized  to  do  any  act  within 
the  corporate  power  the  performance 
of  which  is  necessary  to  preserve  the 
property  of  the  company  for  the  ben- 
efit of  the  company  and  its  creditors. 
If,  when  property  comes  into  the 
hands  of  the  court,  the  corporation 
is  engaged  in  some  proper  and  legiti- 
mate undertaking  the  completion 
whereof  is  essential  to  the  successful 
Em.  D. — ii. 


maintenance  and  operation  of  the 
road  and  to  the  preservation  of  the 
property,  the  court  may  proceed  to 
complete  the  imdertaking,  and  if  re- 
quired will  transfer  to  and  clothe  its 
receiver  with  such  power  and  au- 
thority as  the  corporation  possessed 
to  institute  the  appropriate  legal 
proceedings  to  condemn  any  real 
estate  which  ought  to  be  acquired  in 
order  to  finish  and  make  useful  and 
available  that  which  the  corporation 
was  engaged  in  constructing  when 
the  court  displaced  it  in  the  posses- 
sion of  its  property."  p.  430. 

soBeekman  v.  Lincoln  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  79  Neb.  89;  Matter  of  New  York, 
Lackawanna  &  Western  Ky.  Co.,  35 
Hun  220,  affirmed  in  99  N.  Y.  12; 
Snyder  v.  Baltimore  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
210  Pa.  St.  500,  60  Atl.  151. 

siMatter  of  New  York  etc.  Ry.  Co., 
99  N.  Y.  12. 

s2Kip  V.  New  York  &  Harlem  R. 
R.  Co.,  67  N.  Y.  227;  Deitrichs  v. 
Lincoln  &  Northwestern  R.  R.  Co., 
13  Neb.  361;  Chicago  &  Western  In- 
diana R.  R.  Co.  V.  Illinois  Central  R. 
R.  Co.,  113  111.  156. 

ssGlaser  v.  Glenwood  R.  R.  Co., 
208  Pa.  St.  328,  57  Atl.  713. 


690 


EMINEIifT  DOMAIN. 


§  378 


But  the  lessee  may  not  condemn  property  for  itself  under  cov- 
er of  proceedings  in  the  name  of  the  lessor  and  under  the 
powers  conferred  upon  the  latter.**  And  in  the  case  referred 
to  it  was  held  to  be  a  question  of  fact  whether  such  an  attempt 
was  being  made. 

§  378  (245).  The  manner  of  proceeding  may  be 
changed  at  the  pleasure  of  the  legislature.  It  is  no  part  of 
the  contract  between  the  State  and  a  corporation  vested  with  the 
power  of  eminent  domain,  that  the  mode  of  condemning  prop- 
erty shall  remain  unchanged.*^  Consequently  the  tribunal  to 
assess  damages  may  be  changed,^®  jurisdiction  may  be>  trans- 
ferred from  one  court  to  another  *''  and  a  right  of  appeal  may 
be  gTanted  where  none  existed  before.**  These  and  like  matters 
relate  to  the  remedy  which,  according  to  well  settled  principles, 
may  be  changed  without  impairing  existing  contracts,  provided 
no  substantial  right  secured  by  the  contract  is  impaired.  The 
substantial  right  in  the  case  under  consideration  is  the  right 
to  take  private  property  by  compulsory  proceedings.^®  It  fol- 
lows that  laws  changing  the  procedure  apply  to  pending  pro- 
ceedings, unless  a  contrary  intent  is  expressed.®" 


s^Beclonan  v.  Lincoln  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  79  Neb.  89. 

SBSpringfield  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hall, 
67  111.  99;  Cowan  v.  Penobscott  R.  R. 
Co.,  44  Me.  140;  Long's  Appeal,  87 
Pa.  St.  114;  McCrea  v.  Port  Royal 
R.  R.  Co.,  3  S.  C.  381,  16  Am.  Rep. 
729;  Mississippi  R.  R.  Co.  v.  McDon- 
ald, 12  Heisk.  54;  Bait.  &  Susque- 
hanna R.  R.  Co.  V.  Nesblt,  10  How. 
395;  Bolilman  v.  Green  Bay  &  Minn. 
Ry.  Co.,  40  Wis.  157. 

8  6  Chesapeake  &  Ohio  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Patton,  9  W.  Va.  648. 

8  "United  Railroad  &  Canal  Co.  v. 
Weldon,  47  N.  J.  L.  59. 

ssFarnum's  Petition,  51  IST.  H.  376; 
Long's  Appeal,  87  Pa.  St.  114. 

ssMeCrea  v.  Port  Royal  R.  R.  Co., 
3  S.  C.  381,  10  Am.  Rep.  729. 

soChicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Guthrie, 
192  111.  579,  61  N.  E.  658;  Heinl  v. 
Terre  Haute,  161  Ind.  44,  66  N.  E. 
450;  Ross  v.  Board  of  Supervisors, 
128  la.  427,  104  K.  W.  506,  1  L.R.A. 


(N.S.)  431;  Paterson  etc.  Traction 
Co.  V.  De  Gray,  70  N.  J.  L.  59,  56  Atl. 
250;  Van  Emburgh  v.  Paterson  etc. 
Traction  Co.,  70  N.  J.  L.  668,  59  Atl. 
461 ;  Matter  of  Ludlow  Street,  172  X. 
Y.  542,  65  N.  E.  494,  affirming  S.  C.  59 
App.  Div.  180,  68  N.  Y.  S.  1046;  Mat- 
ter of  Commissioner  of  Pub.  Works, 
111  App.  Div.  285,  97  N.  Y.  S.  503; 
S.  C.  affirmed,  185  N.  Y.  391,  78  N.  E. 
146;  Wheeling  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  To- 
ledo etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  72  Ohio  St.  368, 
74  N.  E.  209,  106  Am.  St.  Rep.  622; 
Texas  Midland  R.  R.  Co.  v  S.  W. 
Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  24  Tex.  Civ.  App.  198, 
58  S.  W.  152;  Gulf  etc.  Ry.  Co.  y.  S. 
W.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  25  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
488,  61  S.  W.  406;  Chelan  County  v. 
Navarre,  38  Wash.  684,  80  Pac.  845. 
See  post,  §  380.  Where  a  party  claims 
that  a  law  passed  pending  proceed- 
ings applies  and  the  court  orders  ac- 
cordingly and  the  proceedings  are  so 
conducted;  he  cannot  object  after- 
wards that  the  law  was  not  applie- 


§    379  THE   STATUTORY  AUTIIOPaTY.  C91 

§  379   (246).     The  right  to  impose  additional  liabilities. 

The  charter  of  a  corporation  being  a  contract,  the  right  secured 
by  it  cannot  be  impaired  by  subsequent  legislation.  A  statute 
imposing  upon  such  corporations  a  liability  for  consequential 
damages  to  property  by  reason  of  works  already  executed,  where 
no  such  liability  existed  before,  has  accordingly  been  held  to 
be  imconstitutional  and  void.®^  If  the  right  to  repeal,  alter  or 
amend  such  charter  is  reserved,  a  liability  for  consequential 
damages  as  to  the  future  may  imdoubtedly  be  imposed."^  What- 
ever may  be  the  limitation  of  the  right  so  reserved,  it  is  cer- 
tain that,  under  it,  the  legislature  has  the  right  to  make  any 
reasonable  amendments  regulating  the  mode  in  which  the  fran- 
chise granted  shall  be  used  and  enjoyed,  and  to  impose  any 
reasonable  duties  and  obligations  upon  the  corporation.  To  make 
the  corporation  liable  for  consequential  damages  to  private  prop- 
erty as  to  any  future  Avorks  by  it  constructed,  or  any  future  ex- 
ercise by  it  of  the  power  of  eminent  domain,  wovild  certainly 
be  reasonable,  for  it  is  but  just  that  such  a  corporation  should 
make  good  to  an  individual  any  loss  svistained  by  him  in  respect 
of  his  property  by  reason  of  the  exercise  of  the  corporate  pow- 
ers. Where  the  right  to  occupy  the  streets  of  a  city  is  granted 
to  a  railroad  corporation  by  the  municipality,  such  right  is  sub- 
ject to  any  conditions  which  may  be  imposed  by  general  law 
prior  to  its  exercise.  ^Vhere  the  right  to  lay  a  double  track  in 
a  street  was  granted  to  a  corporation,  and  after  one  track  was 
laid  a  law  was  passed  requiring  compensation  to  be  made  to 
abutting  owners  for  damages  occasioned  by  laying  railroads  in 
streets,  it  was  held  the  second  track  could  not  be  laid  without 
making  compensation  as  required  by  the  act."^ 

Whether   such   corporations   can  be   subjected   to   additional 

able.     Columbia  Heights  Realty  Co.  Atl.  575;  Pierce  on  Railways,  p.  456; 

V.   Macfarland,   31   App.    Cas.   D.   C.  Parker  v.  Metropolitan  Ry.  Co.,  109 

112.  Mass.  500;   Shields  v.  Ohio,  95  U.  S. 

9 1  Bailey  V,  Philadelphia,  Wilming-  .319,   324;    Worcester    >.    Norwich   & 

ton  &  Bait.  R.  R.  Co.,  4  Harr.  (Del.)  Worcester  E.  R.  Co.,  109  Mass.  103; 

389,  44  Am.  Dee.  593 ;  Towie  v.  East-  Portland  &  Oxford  Central  R.  R.  Co. 

ern  R.  R.  Co.,  18  N.  H.  547,  47  Am.  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  46  Me.  69. 

Dec.  153;    Monongahela   Navigation  ssDrady  v.  Des  Moines  &  Ft.  D.  R. 

Co.  V.  Coon,  6  Pa.  St.  379,  47  Am.  R.  Co.,  57  la.  393;  S.  P.  Mulholland 

Dee.  474.  v.  D.  M.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  00  la.  740 ; 

9  2Monongahela  Nav.  Co.  v.  Blair,  To  same  effect,  Taylor  v.  Bay  City 

20  P.  St.  71;  Northern  Central  R.  R.  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  80  Mich.  77,  45  N.  W. 

Co.  V.  Holland,  117  Pa.  St.  613,  12  335. 


692  EMINEIfT  DOMAISr.  §    379 

liabilities  as  to  future  exercises  of  tlie  power  of  eminent  do- 
main or  future  improvements  of  property  already  condemned, 
-when  no  right  to  alter,  repeal  or  amend  their  charter  is  reserved, 
is  a  question  of  great  importance,  because  Upon  its  solution  de- 
pends the  efficacy,  as  to  such  corporations,  of  the  constitutional 
and  statutory  provisions  giving  compensation  for  property  dam- 
aged or  injured,  as  well  as  for  property  taken.  In  Pennsylvania 
it  is  held  that  such  liability  can  be  imposed  without  impairing 
the  obligation  of  the  charter.®*  The  reasoning  of  the  court  is 
as  follows :  "The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  undoubtedly 
precludes  a  State  from  impairing  the  obligation  of  a  charter 
even  through  an  amendment  of  its  organic  law ;  but  this  restrict 
tion  has  never  been  held  to  forbid  such  remedial  legislation  as 
may  be  requisite  to  give  effect  to  antecedent  rights,  or  provide 
a  remedy  for  injuries  that  previously  went  unredressed.  A  child 
was  entitled  to  support  from  its  father  at  common  law,  but 
he  could  not  recover  damages  for  the  frustration  of  this  right 
through  the  parent's  death  from  injuries  occasioned  by  the 
negligence  of  an  individual  or  body  corporate.  The  act  which 
now  affords  a  remedy  for  such  deprivations,  and  under  which 
damages  are  constantly  assessed  and  judgments  rendered,  is  of 
recent  origin,  and  was  passed  since  the  creation  of  the  Pennsyl- 
vania Kailroad  Company,  and  yet  it  has  never,  that  I  am  aware 
of,  been  contended  that  it  was  invalid  as  to  pre-existing  corpo- 
rations or  impaired  their  chartered  privileges.  In  like  manner 
the  citizen  has  a  natural  right  to  compensation,  for  the  conse- 
quences of  acts  done  for  the  public  benefit  that  are  injurious 
to  his  estate  or  person,  and  a  statute  which  affords  a  remedy  can- 
not justly  be  assailed  as  unconstitutional.  Such  an  argument 
would  obviously  be  fallacious  if  advanced  on  behalf  of  an  indi- 
vidual, and  the  principle  is  the  same  when  the  defendant  is  a 
corporation.  A  power  conferred  by  a  charter  cannot  be  abro- 
gated without  impairing  the  obligation  of  the  contract ;  but  the 
legislature  does  not,  in  making  such  a  grant,  contract  that  per- 
sons who  are  injuriously  affected  by  the  exercise  of  the  power  are 
not  entitled  to  indemnity,  nor  that  it  will  not  provide  a  means 
for  rendering  their  demand  effectual.  This  may  be  tested  by 
supposing  the  incorporation  of  a  railway  company  in  a  State 

siDuncan    v.  Pennsylvania    Rail-  preme   Court,   43   Legal.   Intel.  79: 

road  Co.,  94  Pa.  St.  435,  443.     See  Northern  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hol- 

also  Patent  v.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  land,  117  Pa.  St.  613,  12  Atl.  575. 
Co.,   17   Phil.   291,   affirmed  by   Su- 


§  380 


THE    STATUTOBY    ATJTHOEITY. 


693 


■where,  as  was  long  the  case  in  Rhode  Island,  there  is  no  consti- 
tutional restraint  on  the  right  of  eminent  domain,  and  the  sub- 
sequent enactment  of  a  law  providing  that  land  should  not  be 
taken  for  the  use  of  the  road  without  payment.  Would  any  one 
contend  that  such  a  statute  impaired  vested  rights,  or  was  with- 
in the  prohibition  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  ?  If 
the  question  must  be  answered  in  the  negative,  the  legislature 
might  obviously  proceed  to  give  a  remedy  for  property  injured 
or  destroyed."  This  ruling  has  since  been  approved  by  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States.®^  But  a  statute  imposing 
additional  liability  will  not  apply  in  case  of  works  previously 
constructed.'® 

§  380  (247).  Effect  of  the  repeal,  amendment  or  ex- 
piration of  statutes.  The  lapse  of  the  time  within  which  the 
compulsory  powers  conferred  by  a  statute  can  be  exercised  puts 
an  end  to  any  further  proceedings,  as  well  as  to  the  right  to 
condemn.  *''  Where  the  act  imposes  no  limit,  none  can  be  im- 
posed by  construction.'*  Whether  compulsory  powers  have  ex- 
pired or  have  otherwise  been  lost  by  delay  or  neglect,  often  be- 
comes a  question  of  difficulty.    Where  a  railroad  company  was 


SBPennsylvauia  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Miller, 
132  U.  S.  75,  10  S.  C.  Rep.  34,  1  Am. 
R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  15;  affirming  S. 
C.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Duncan, 
111  Pa.  St.  352,  5  Atl.  Rep.  742.  The 
court  says:  "Although  it  may  have 
been  the  law  in  respect  to  the  defend- 
ant, prior  to  the  constitution  of  1873, 
that  under  its  charter,  and  the  stat- 
utes in  regard  to  it,  it  was  not  liable 
for  such  consequential  damages,  yet 
there  was  no  contract  in  that  charter, 
or  in  any  statute  in  regard  to  the  de- 
fendant, prior  to  the  constitution  of 
1873,  that  it  should  always  he  exempt 
from  such  liability,  or  that  the  State, 
by  a  new  constitutional  provision,  or 
the  legislature,  should  not  have 
power  to  impose  such  liability  upon 
it  in  cases  which  should  arise  after 
the  exercise  of  such  power.  But  the 
defendant  took  its  original  charter 
subject  to  the  general  law  of  the 
State,  and  to  such  changes  as  might 
be  made  in  such  general  law,  and  sub- 


ject to  future  constitutional  pro- 
visions or  future  general  legislation, 
since  there  was  no  prior  contract 
with  the  defendant,  exempting  it 
from  liability  to  such  future  general 
legislation  in  respect  of  the  subject 
matter  involved." 

ssLampley  v.  Atlantic  Coast  Line 
E,  R.  Co.,  71  S.  C.  156,  50  S.  E.  773. 

9 'New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bos- 
ton etc.  R,  R.  Co.,  36  Conn.  196; 
Hartford  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Montague, 
72  Conn.  687,  45  Atl.  961 ;  Hartford 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Wagner,  73  Conn. 
506,  48  Atl.  218 ;  In  re  Hartford  etc. 
E.  R.  Co.,  74  Conn.  662,  51  Atl.  943; 
Peavey  v.  Calais  R.  R.  Co.,  30  Me. 
498;  Atlantic  &  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
St.  Louis,  66  Mo.  228;  Morris  & 
Essex  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Central  R.  R.  Co., 
31  N.  J.  L.  205 ;  State  v.  Bergen  Neck 
R.  R.  Co.,  53  N.  J.  L.  108,  20  Atl. 
762. 

ssThicknesse  v.  Lancaster  Canal 
Co.,  4  M.  &  W.  471. 


694 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§    380 


required  to  commence  its  road  and  expend  ten  per  cent  of  its 
capital  in  five  years  and  complete  its  road  in  a  certain  other 
period  and  in  default  of  so  doing  the  statute  provided  its  cor- 
porate existence  and  powers  should  cease,  and  the  company  had 
done  neither,  it  was  held  that  the  statute  executed  itself,  that  no 
proceedings  or  forfeiture  were  necessary,  and  that  consequently 
it  could  not  condemn  after  the  periods  specified  had  elapsed.®' 
The  same  effect  was  given  to  a  forfeiture  clause,  the  words  of 
which  were,  "This  act  and  all  the  powers,  rights  and  franchises 
herein  and  hereby  granted  shall  be  deemed  forfeited  and  ter- 
minated." ^  On  the  other  hand  a  provision  in  the  charter  of 
a  bridge  corporation  that  the  bridge  should  be  commenced  with- 
in two  years,  "or  this  act  and  all  rights  and  privileges  granted 
hereby  shall  be  null  and  void,"  was  held  not  to  be  self-executing, 
and  the  corporation  was  permitted  to  condemn  after  the  two 
years  had  expired.^    Upon  the  expiration  or  repeal  of  a  statute 


9  9Matter  of  Brooklyn  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  72  N.  Y.  245,  S.  C.  55  How.  Pr. 
14. 

iBrooldyn  Steam  Transit  Co.  v. 
City  of  Brooklyn,  78  N.  Y.  524. 

2  New  York  &  L.  I.  Bridge  Co.  v. 
Smith,  148  N.  Y.  540,  42  N.  E.  1088. 
After  referring  to  the  cases  above 
cited  the  court  says:  "It  requires, 
however,  strong  and  unmistakable 
language,  such  as  each  of  the  cases 
referred  to  presents,  to  authorize  the 
court  to  hold  that  it  was  the  inten- 
tion of  the  legislature  to  dispense 
with  judicial  proceedings  on  the  in- 
tervention of  the  attorney  general. 
In  the  case  at  bar  the  words  of  for- 
feiture are,  'All  rights  and  privileges 
granted  hereby  shall  be  null  and 
void.'  It  cannot  be  said  that  the 
words  'shall  be  null  and  void'  dis- 
close the  legislative  intent  to  make 
this  clause  self-executing.  The  words 
'null  and  void,'  as  used  in  this  con- 
nection, clearly  mean  voidable.  The 
word  'void'  is  often  used  in  an  un- 
limited sense,  implying  an  act  of  no 
effect,  a  nullity  ah  initio.  Inskeep  v. 
Lecony,  1  N.  J.  Law,  112.  In  the  case 
at  bar  it  was  not  so  employed,  but 


rather  in  its  more  limited  meaning. 
We  think  these  words  mean  no  more 
than  if  the  legislature  had  said,  in 
ease  of  default,  the  corporation  'shall 
be  dissolved.'  The  attorney  general 
was  authorized  to  treat  the  charter 
of  the  bridge  company  as  voidable, 
and  by  appropriate  legal  proceedings 
to  have  terminated  its  corporate  ex- 
istence. The  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States,  in  passing  upon  the 
meaning  of  the  words  'void  and  of  no 
effect,'  uses  this  language:  'But 
these  words  are  often  used  in  stat- 
utes and  legal  documents  *  *  *  in 
the  sense  of  'voidable'  merely, — that 
is,  capable  of  being  avoided, — and  not 
as  meaning  that  the  act  or  transac- 
tion is  absolutely  a  nullity,  as  if  it 
never  had  existed,  incapable  of  giv- 
ing rise  to  any  rights  or  obligations 
under  any  circumstances.'  Ewell  v. 
Daggs,  108  U.  S.  148,  2  Sup.  Ct.  408." 
Where  an  act  provided  for  extending 
a  street  and  directed  the  corporation 
counsel  to  commence  proceedings 
therefor  within  three  months,  it  was 
held  the  power  was  not  lost  by  a 
neglect  to  proceed  within  the  time 
limited.    Stevenson  v.  Mayor  etc.  of 


§  380 


THE  STATUTOllY  AUTIIOEITY. 


095 


all  inchoate  proceedings  founded  thereon  fall  to  the  ground,^ 
unless  there  is  a  saving  clause  in  the  repealing  acf*  A  saving 
clause  in  the  repeal  of  a  drainage  law  that  the  repeal  should  not 
affect  any  pending  proceeding  in  which  a  ditch  has  been  or- 
dered established,  was  held  not  to  save  a  proceeding  pending  on 
appeal  from  county  commissioners,  as  the  appeal  had  the  effect  to 
vacate  the  order  establishing  the  ditch^  The  repeal  of  an  act 
does  not  affect  the  substantial  rights  of  the  parties  acquired  un- 
der it.** 

The  effect  of  a  change  or  amendment  of  a  statute  pending 


New  York,  3  N.  Y.  Supr.  133.  A  pro- 
vision in  a  railroad  charter  that,  if 
the  road  is  not  commenced  and  com- 
pleted within  a  specified  time,  the 
company  should  forfeit  all  rights  ac- 
quired under  the  act,  can  only  be 
taken  advantage  of  by  the  State.  A 
failure  to  comply  is  no  defense  to 
condemnation  proceedings.  Matter 
of  Brooklyn  El.  E.  R.  Co.,  125  N.  Y. 
434,  26  N.  E.  474. 

sCohen  v.  Gray,  70  Cal.  85; 
County  of  Menard  v.  Kincaid,  71  111. 
587;  Taylor  v.  Strayer,  167  Ind.  23, 
78  N.  B.  236,  119  Am.  St.  Rep.  469; 
Clemans  v.  Hatch,  168  Ind.  291,  78 
N.  E.  1065;  Williams  v.  County 
Comrs.  of  Lincoln  County,  35  Me. 
345;  State  v.  Passaic,  36  N.  J.  L. 
382;  Commonwealth  v.  Beatty,  1 
Watts  382;  Hampton  v.  Common- 
wealth, 19  Pa.  St.  329;  Boyer's  Peti- 
tion, 15  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  531;  Hatfield 
Township  Pvoad,  4  Yeates  392;  Terry 
V.  McClung,  104  Va.  599,  52  S.  E. 
355;  Stephens  v.  Marshall,  3  Chand. 
Wis.  222;  Pratt  v.  Brown,  3  Wis. 
603;  French  v.  Owen,  5  Wis.  112; 
Brocklebank  v.  Whitehaven  Junction 
Ry.  Co.,  15  Sim.  632.  Contra:  Bur- 
rows V.  Vandevier,  3  Ohio  383.  Where 
an  act  approved  March  31,  1866, 
required  a  road  to  be  laid  on  or  be- 
fore March  1,  1866,  it  was  held  to 
be  directory  as  to  time.  People  ex 
rel.  etc.  v.  Board  of  Supervisors,  33 
Cal.  487. 


<Downs  V.  Tovra  of  Huntington,  35 
Conn.  588 ;  County  of  Menard  v.  Kin- 
caid, 71  111.  587;  McClarren  v.  Jef- 
ferson School,  169  Ind.  140,  82 
N.  E.  73,  13  L.R.A.(]Sr.S.)  417; 
Champlain  v.  McCrea,  165  N.  Y. 
264,  59  N.  E.  83.  And  see  generally 
as  to  saving  clauses  and  saving  stat- 
utes, 1  Lewis'  Suth.  Stat.  Constr. 
§  287;  2 /6id.  §§  351-355.  Under  the 
English  Acts,  where  a  company  has 
given  an  owner  notice  that  it  will 
require  his  lands,  it  may  go  on  and 
complete  the  purchase  after  the  ex- 
piration of  its  compulsory  powers. 
Salisbury  v.  Great  Northern  R.  R. 
•  Co.,  17  Q.  B.  840,  21  L.  J.  Q.  B.  185, 
16  Jur.  740;  and  see  Birmingham  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Queen,  15  Q.  B.  647,  20  L.  J. 
Q.  B.  304;  Ystalyfera  Iron  Co.  v. 
Neath  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L.  R.  Eq.  142,  43. 
L.  J.  Ch.  476,  29  L.  T.  N.  S.  662; 
Rangely  v.  Midland  R.  R.  Co.,  37  L. 
J.  Ch.  313,  3  L.  R.  Ch.  306. 

BTaylor  v.  Strayer,  167  Ind.  23,  78 
N.  E.  236,  119  Am.  St.  Rep.  469. 

BDuluth  v.  Duluth  Telephone  Co., 
84  Minn.  486,  87  N.  W.  1127;  Dow  v. 
Electric  Co.,  68  N.  H.  59,  31  Atl.  22; 
S.  C,  sub  nom.,  Electric  Co.  v.  Dow, 
166  U.  S.  489,  17  S.  C.  645;  Geneva 
etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  163  N.  Y.  228,  57  N.  E.  498; 
Rochester  etc.  Water  Co.  v.  Roches- 
ter, 176  N.  Y.  36,  68  N.  E.  117,  af- 
firming S.  C.  84  App.  Div.  71,  82  N. 
Y.  S.  450.  See  generally,  1  Lewis' 
Suth.  Stat.  Constr.  §§  282-285. 


C96 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


§    380 


proceedings  under  it  must  depend  largely  upon  the  circum- 
stances of  the  particular  case.  If  the  right  to  condemn  or  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  particular  court  or  tribunal  before  which 
the  proceedings  are  pending  is  taken  away,  the  proceedings 
must  necessarily  fall  to  the  ground;  but  if  there  is  simply  a 
change  in  the  mode  of  procedure,  then  they  may  be  continued 
under  the  new  statute.''  Where  an  amendatory  act  provides 
an  unconstitutional  method  of  assessing  damages,  the  amend- 
ment is  void  and  the  original  act  remains  in  force,  and  pro- 
ceedings had  in  accordance  therewith  are  valid.*  The  charter 
of  Sing  Sing,  passed  in  1859,  provided  that  the  proceedings  to 
lay  out,  open  and  widen  streets  should  be  according  to  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Revised  Statutes  in  regard  to  laying  out  highways. 
In  1880  the  charter  was  revised  and  the  same  provision  re-en- 
acted ;  it  was  held  to  mean  the  Revised  Statutes  as  they  were  in 
1859,  and  not  as  they  had  been  amended  by  an  act  of  1875." 
An  act  of  1835  provided  a  mode  of  assessing  damages.  An  act 
of  1838  provided  a  different  mode.     An  act  of  1842  abolishing 


'Emerson  v.  Western  Union  R.  E. 
Co.,  75  111.  176;  Hyslop  v.  Finch,  99 
111.  171 J  Chicago  etc.  K.  R.  Co.  v. 
Guthrie,  192  111.  579,  61  N.  E.  658; 
Heinl  v.  Terre  Haute,  161  Ind.  44, 
66  N.  E.  450;  Ross  v.  Board  of  Super- 
visors, 128  la.  427,  104  N.  W.  506, 
1  L.R.A.(N.S.)  431;  Treacy  v.  Eliz- 
abethtown  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  85  Ky.  270, 
3  S.  W.  168;  S.  C.  80  Ky.  266;  Van 
Emburgh  v.  Paterson  etc.  Traction 
Co.,  70  N.  J.  L.  668,  59  Atl.  461 ;  Mat- 
ter of  Ludlow  Street,  172  N.  Y.  542, 
65  N.  E.  494,  affirming  S.  C.  59  App. 
Div.  180,  69  N.  Y.  S.  1046;  Matter  of 
Commissioner  of  Public  Works,  111 
App.  Div.  285,  97  N.  Y.  S.  503;  S.  C. 
affirmed,  185  N.  Y.  391,  78  N.  E.  146; 
Wheeling  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Toledo 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  72  Ohio  St.  368,  74  N. 
E.  209,  106  Am.  St.  Rep.  622;  Fene- 
lon's  Petition,  7  Pa.  St.  173;  Uwch- 
lan  Township  Road,  30  Pa.  St.  156; 
Hickory  Tree  Road,  43  Pa.  St.  139; 
Tex.  Midland  R.  R.  Co.  v.  S.  W.  Tel. 
&  Tel.  Co.,  24  Tex.  Civ.  App.  198,  58 
S.  W.  152;  Gulf  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  S.  W. 


Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  25  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
488,  61  S.  W.  406;  Chelan  County  v. 
Navarre,  38  Wash.  684,  80  Pac.  845; 
Bohlman  v.  Green  Bay  &  Minnesota 
Ry.  Co.,  40  Wis.  157.  In  New  Hamp- 
shire it  is  held  that  pending  proceed- 
ings are  not  affected  by  a  statute  re- 
lating to  procedure  only.  Colony  v. 
Dublin,  32  N.  H.  432;  Boston  & 
Maine  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cilley,  44  N.  H. 
578;  Wentworth  v.  Farmington,  48 
N.  H.  207;  Matter  of  New  York,  34 
N.  Y.  App.  Div.  468.  An  act  may  be 
passed  and  expressly  made  applicable 
to  pending  proceedings.  Bridgeport 
V.  Hubbell,  5  Conn.  237;  City  and 
County  of  San  Francisco  v.  Kiernan, 
98  Cal.  614,  33  Pac.  720;  Ross  v. 
Board  of  Supervisors,  128  la.  427, 
104  N.  W.  506,  1  L.R.A.(N.S.)  431. 

sCampbell  v.  Detroit,  14  Mich. 
276 ;  Shepardson  v.  Milwaukee  &  Be- 
loit  R.  R.  Co.,  6  Wis.  605. 

9  Matter  of  Altering  etc.  Main 
Street,  98  N.  Y.  454,  affirming  S.  0. 
30  Hun  424. 


§  381 


THE    STATUTOEY   AUTHORITY. 


697 


the  board  created  by  the  act  of  1838  was  held  equivalent  to  a 
repeal  of  a  repealing  act,  and  the  act  of  1835  was  held  to  be 
restored.^"  A  repeal  of  an  act  under  which  damages  have  been 
assessed,  after  the  right  thereto  has  vested,  does  not  affect  the 
rights  of  the  parties.  ^^  Generally  the  procedure  should  be  ac- 
cording to  the  law  in  force  at  the  time.^^  Proceedings  under 
an  act  which  has  been  repealed  or  has  ceased  to  operate  are  void 
and  of  no  effect.'^ 

§  381  (248).  General  and  speciallaws :  Repeal  by  im- 
plication. As  a  rule,  a  general  law  does  not  repeal  a  prior 
special  law  merely  because  it  embraces  the  same  subject  mat- 
ter.-^* An  intent  to  repeal  the  special  law  must  be  manifested 
either  by  express  words,  or  by  language  extending  the  operation 
of  the  general  law  to  all  cases  embraced  by  it,  or  there  must  be 
some  inconsistency  or  absurdity  in  the  two  standing  together. 
Accordingly  a  general  law  in  regard  to  the  assessment  of  dam- 
ages or  other  procedure  in  condemnation  proceedings  will  not 
supersede  the  provisions  of  special  charters  on  the  subject,^® 
unless  expressly  made  applicable  to  all  cases  for  condemnation,^® 
or  plainly  intended  as  a  revision  of  all  prior  laws,  general  and 
special,  upon  the  subject.  ^^ 


lODirectors  of  Poor  v.  Kailroad 
Co.,  7  W.  &  S.  236. 

iiPeople  V.  Supervisors  of  West- 
chester, 4  Barb.  64;  People  v.  Com- 
mon Council  of  Buffalo,  140  N.  Y. 
300,  35  N.  E.  485 ;  People  v.  Common 
Council,  2  Misc.  7,  21  N.  Y.  Supp.  601. 

i2McCrea  v.  Champlain,  35  App. 
Div.  N.  Y.  89. 

isByme  v.  Drain,  127  Cal.  663,  60 
Pac.  433;  Baird  v.  Monroe,  150  Cal. 
560,  89  Pac.  352 ;  State  v.  Tenny,  58 
S.  C.  215,  36  S.  E.  555. 

141  Lewis'  Suth.  Stat.  Constr. 
§§  274,  275;  Shroder  v.  Lancaster, 
170  Pa.  St.  136,  32  Atl.  587. 

iBTenn.  Coal,  Iron  &  R.  E.  Co.  v. 
Birmingham  So.  Ry.  Co.,  128  Ala. 
526,  29  So.  455 ;  North  Missouri  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Gott,  25  Mo.  540;  State  v. 
Clarke,  25  N.  J.  L.  54;  State  v.  Tren- 
ton, 36  N.  J.  L.  198;  Hudson  River 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Cutwater,  3  Sand.  689; 
Norfolk  &  Southern  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ely, 


95  N.  C.  77;  Dallas  County  v.  Plow- 
man, 99  Tex.  509,  91  S.  W.  221. 

isSanta  Cruz  v.  Enright,  95  Cal. 
105,  30  Pac.  197 ;  Paterson  etc.  Trac- 
tion Co.  v.  De  Gray,  70  N.  J.  L.  59, 
56  Atl.  250 ;  Van  Emburgh  v.  Pater- 
son etc.  Traction  Co.,  70  N.  J.  L. 
6^8,  59  Atl.  461;  Marlor  v.  Phila- 
delphia etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  166  Pa.  St. 
524,  31  Atl.  255;  McCrea  v.  Port 
Royal  R.  R.  Co.,  3  S.  C.  381,  16  Am. 
Rep.  729.  But  in  Gardner  v.  Ga.  R. 
R.  &  B.  Co.,  117  Ga.  522,  43  S.  C.  863, 
a  general  law  for  the  condemnation 
of  private  property,  which  provided 
that  "all  corporations  or  persons  au- 
thorized to  take  or  damage  private 
property  for  public  purposes  shall 
proceed  as  herein  set  forth,''  was  held 
not  to  aflfeet  the  procedure  under  a 
special  railroad  charter. 

1 'Organ  v.  Memphis  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  51  Ark.  235,  11  S.  W.  96;  Treacy 
V.  Elizabethtown  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  85 


698 


EMINENT    DOMAIN. 


§  38^ 


§  382  (248).     Two     acts     conferring     same     power. 

There  may  be  two  complete  acts  in  reference  to  the  same  sub- 
ject matter,  such  as  the  construction  of  gravel  roads,  the  acqui- 
sition of  parks,  etc.,  though  having  inconsistent  provisions,  un- 
der either  of  which  proceedings  may  be  had,  if  the  legislature 
expressly  declares  in  the  second  that  it  was  not  their  intention 
to  repeal  any  former  act  on  the  subject.-'*  So  a  corporation 
may  have  the  option  of  proceeding  under  its  special  charter  or 
under  the  general  law.-'®  In  cases  where  there  are  two  stat- 
utes available  the  proceedings  should  be  wholly  under  one.^° 

§  383  (24D).  Effect  of  a  change  in  the  form  of  muni- 
cipal government.  Municipalities  frequently  put  off  one 
form  of  government  for  another,  whereby  radical  changes  are 
made  in  the  form  of  government.  Towns  and  villages  become 
cities.  One  law  of  incorporation  is  exchanged  for  another. 
The  laws  under  -which  such  changes  are  made  frequently  do, 
and  always  ought,  to  make  provisions  for  all  pending  suits  and 


Ky.  270,  3  S.  W.  168;  S.  C.  80  Ky. 
260;  Knight  v.  Aroostook  Riv.  R.  R. 
Co.,  67  Me.  291;  Hunt  v.  Card,  94 
Me.  386,  47  Atl.  921 ;  State  v.  Jersey 
City,  54  N.  J.  L.  49,  22  Atl.  1052; 
Lehigh  Val.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Phillips- 
burg,  73  N.  J.  L.  138,  62  Atl.  194; 
lloore  V.  Sui^erior  &  St.  Croix  R.  R. 
Co.,  34  Wis.  173. 

isLos  Angeles  v.  Leaves,  119  Cal. 
164,  51  Pac.  34;  Oakland  v.  Thomp- 
son, 151  Cal.  572,  91  Pac.  387 ;  Robin- 
son V.  Ripley,  111  Ind.  112;  Driscoll 
V.  Taunton,  160  Mass.  486,  36  N.  E. 
495;  Detroit  v.  Daly,  68  Mich.  503; 
Trowbridge  v.  Detroit,  99  Mich.  443, 
58  N.  W.  308 ;  Shroder  v.  Lancaster, 
170  Pa.  St.  136,  32  Atl.  587. 

isMcMahon  v.  Cincinnati  &  Chi- 
cago Short  Line  R.  R.  Co.,  5  Ind.  413 ; 
Cascades  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Sohns,  1  Wash. 
Ter.  N.  S.  558.  .And  see  generally 
where  there  are  different  statutes 
■which  may  apply:  City  and  County 
of  San  Francisco  v.  Kiernan,  98  Cal. 
014,  33  Pac.  720;  Crow  v.  Judy,  139 
Ind.  562,  38  N.  E.  415;  In  re  City  of 
Cedar  Rapids,  85  la.  39,  51  N.  W. 
1142;   Arnold  v.  Council  Bluffs,  85 


Iowa  441,  52  N.  W.  347;  Knight  v. 
Aroostook  Riv.  R.  R.  Co.,  67  Me.  291 ; 
Howes  V.  Belfast,  72  Me.  46 ;  Kearney 
Tp.  V.  Ballantine,  54  N.  J.  L.  194,  23 
Atl.  Rep.  821;  State  v.  West  Ho- 
boken,  54  N.  J.  L.  508,  24  Atl.  Rep. 
477;  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Welsh,  143  N.  Y.  411,  38  N.  E.  378, 
42  Am.  St.  Rep.  734;  City  of  Syra- 
cuse V.  Stacey,  86  Hun  441,  33  N.  Y. 
Supp.  929;  Durham  &  N.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  R.  Co.,  106  N. 
C.  16,  10  S.  E.  1041 ;  Gwinner  v.  Le- 
high R.  R.  Co.,  55  Pa.  St.  126;  Ap- 
peal of  Borough  of  Hanover,  150  Pa. 
St.  202,  24  Atl.  669;  Appeal  of  Hunt- 
ington etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  149  Pa.  St.  133, 
24  Atl.  189;  In  re  Public  Alley,  160 
Pa.  St.  89,  28  Atl.  506;  Seaman  v. 
Borough  of  Washington,  172  Pa.  St. 
407,  33  Atl.  756 ;  In  re  Sewer  St.,  20 
Phil.  367;  West  Whiteland  Road,  4 
Pa.  Co.  Ct.  511 ;  Chestnut  St.,  8  Pa. 
Co.  Ct.  55;  Sewickley  Borough  v. 
Jennings,  12  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  75;  Tuttle 
V.  Knox  County,  89  Tenn.  157,  14  S. 
W.  486. 

2  0 Verona  v.  Railroad  Co.,  187  Pa. 
St.  358,  41  Atl.  276. 


§    383  THE  STATUTOEY  AUTIlOraiY.  699 

proceedings  and  all  accrued  rights  and  liabilities  in  sucli  a 
way  as  to  prevent  confusion  or  loss.  But  sometimes  this  is  not 
done,  and  the  question  arises,  what  would  be  the  effect  of  such 
a  change  upon  pending  proceedings  for  condemnation?  It 
would  be  difficult  to  lay  down  any  general  rule  for  such  cases, 
but  the  following  decisions  may  be  noticed:  County  Commis- 
sioners acquired  jurisdiction  to  lay  out  a  town  way  in  the  town 
of  Lawrence,  in  July,  1852.  The  way  was  finally  located  and 
established  April  12,  1853.  On  March  29,  1853,  the  town 
became  a  city,  by  accepting  a  charter  granted  by  the  legislature. 
By  this  charter  jurisdiction  of  the  subject  matter  was  taken 
away  from  the  county  commissioners  as  to  the  incorporated 
territory.  The  charter  continued  the  town  officers  until  the 
organization  of  the  city  government,  which  did  not  take  place 
till  April  18,  1853.  The  lay-out  was  held  valid.^i  In  another 
case  the  Scheme  and  Charter  for  the  city  and  county  of  St. 
Louis  was  adopted  on  August  22,  1876,  and  by  its  terms  was  to 
be  operative  in  sixty  days  thereafter.  A  controversy  arose 
over  its  adoption,  which  was  not  determined  until  Mai'ch  5, 
1877,  and  until  then  it  was  unknown  whether  it  was  adopted 
or  not.  On  ISTovember  26,  1876,  proceedings  were  begun  for 
opening  a  street,  pursuant  to  ordinances  passed  in  January 
and  July,  1876.  These  proceedings  were  finally  completed, 
by  the  confirmation  of  the  commissioner's  report,  on  March  26, 
1877.  The  proceedings  were  begun  and  carried  on  according 
to  the  old  charter.  The  new  charter  provided  that  all  ordi- 
nances for  the  opening  of  any  street  upon  which  proceedings 
should  not  be  begun  when  the  charter  went  into  operation  should 
stand  repealed.  In  theory  the  new  charter  was  in  operation 
from  and  after  October  22,  1876.  But  the  proceedings  were 
sustained  on  what  was  called  the  de  facto  principle.  ^^  A  stat- 
ute of  California  provided  that  the  board  of  water  commission- 
ers of  a  township  should  establish  a  ditch  upon  receiving  a 
petition  from  a  majority  of  the  persons  in  a  township  liable  to 
work  on  water  ditches.  Such  petition  was  presented  to  the 
commissioners  of  San  Jose  township  and,  pending  proceedings 
under  it,  Azusa  township  was  set  off  from  San  Jose.  The  com- 
missioners of  Azusa  township,  in  which  the  proposed  ditch  would 
be,  filed  a  supplemental  petition  and  continued  the  proceedings. 

2iDurant    v.    Lawrence,    1    Allen  22St.  Louis  v.   Stoddard,   15  Mo. 

125.  App.  173. 


TOO 


EMia'ENT   DOMAIW. 


§  384 


This  was  held  to  be  erroneous,  and  it  was  further  held  that  new 
proceedings  would  have  to  be  begun,  based  upon  a  petition  by  the 
required  number  of  persons  residing  in  the  new  township.^* 

§  384  (250).  Conflict  of  jurisdiction  between  different 
authorities  having  power  in  the  same  territory.  Where  a 
city  or  borough  is  vested  with  power  to  lay  out  and  improve 
streets,  the  authorities  of  a  town  or  county  embracing  such  city 
or  borough  are  precluded  from  exercising  the  same  power  with- 
in the  same  territory.^*  Of  course  it  is  otherwise  if  the  city 
or  borough  has  no  authority  in  the  premises.^'  So  it  is  held 
that  under  a  general  drainage  act  a  ditch  cannot  be  established 
wholly  within  a  city  which  has  full  power  to  make  sewers  and 
drains  for  any  purpose  for  which  they  are  needed.^*  This 
seems  the  reasonable  rule.  To  hold  otherwise  might  bring 
about  very  disagreeable  and  disastrous  conflicts  of  jurisdiction 
and  authority.  Some  courts  have  held,  however,  that  in  such 
cases  the  jurisdiction  is  concurrent.^^     In  many  cases  town 


2  3  Dal  ton  V.  Water  Commissioners, 
49  Cal.  222;  see  also,  on  the  same 
subject,  Minhinnah  v.  Haines,  29  N. 
J.  L.  388;  Road  in  Sterrett  Tp.,  123 
Pa.  St.  231,  16  Atl.  777;  Shaaber  v. 
City  of  Reading,  133  Pa.  St.  643,  19 
Atl.  419. 

2  4  Shields  v.  Highway  Comrs.,  158 
111.  214,  41  N.  E.  985;  Gascho  v,  Solil, 
155  Ind.  417,  58  N.  E.  547;  Gallagher 
V.  Head,  7J?Ia.  173;  State  v.  Clarke, 
25  N.  J.  L.  54;  State  v.  Trenton,  36 
N.  J.  L.  198;  Cherry  v.  Board  of 
Comrs.,  52  N.  J.  L.  544,  20  Atl.  970, 
affirming  S.  C.  51  N.  J.  L.  417,  18 
Atl.  299;  In  re  Piscataway  &  B.  Tps., 
54  N.  J.  L.  539,  24  Atl.  759 ;  Freeman 
V.  Price,  63  N.  J.  L.  151,  43  Atl.  432; 
Atlantic  Coast  Line  Elec.  E.  R.  Co. 
V.  Griffin,  64  N.  J.  L.  513,  46  Atl. 
1062;  Salsbury  v.  Gaskin,  66  N.  J.  L. 
Ill,  48  Atl.  531;  Pleasant  Hill  v. 
Commissioners,  71  Ohio  St.  133,  72  N. 
E.  896;  Easton  Road  Case,  3  Rawle, 
195;  Somerset  etc.  Road,  74  Pa.  St. 
01;  South  Chester  Road,  80  Pa.  St. 
370;  Cowan's  Case,  1  Overton  310; 
Street  in  Donnington,  3  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 
455;  Road  in  Huntington,  11  Pa.  Co. 


Ct.  119;  Norwood  v.  Gonzales 
County,  79  Tex.  218,  14  S.  W.  Rep. 
1057.  And  see  In  re  Twenty-eighth 
St.,  15  Phil.  350. 

2  6 Washington  v.  Fisher,  43  N.  J. 
L.  377;  State  v.  Troth,  34  N.  J.  L. 
377;  Road  in  Mercer,  14  S.  &  R.  447; 
Matter  of  Callowhill  St.,  32  Pa.  St. 
361. 

2  6 Anderson  v.  Endicutt,  101  Ind. 
539. 

2  7  Norwich  v.  Story,  25  Conn.  44; 
Bennington  v.  Smith,  29  Vt.  254; 
Windham  v.  Cumberland  County 
Commissioners,  26  Me.  406.  In  such 
case  the  authorities  first  instituting 
proceedings  will  be  entitled  to  pro- 
ceed. Monroe  v.  Danbury,  24  Conn. 
199;  Powers  v.  City  Council  of 
Springfield,  116  Mass.  84.  Special 
cases:  The  charter  of  Newark,  ap- 
proved March  11,  1857,  gave  to  the 
city  council  the  power  to  lay  out  and 
open  streets.  By'  act  of  March  20, 
1857,  exclusive  power  over  the  sub- 
ject was  conferred  upon  commis- 
sioners to  be  appointed  by  the  coun- 
cil; held  a  repeal  of  the  former  act 
as  to  the  power  in  question.     State 


§  385 


TnE  STATUTOEY  AUTIIOEITT. 


TOl 


or  county  authorities  have  authority  to  lay  out  town  or  county 
roads,  while  the  city  or  village  authorities  have  exclusive  juris- 
diction of  purely  local  streets.^*  The  authorities  of  the  larger 
jurisdiction  may  lay  out  a  way  wholly  within  the  smaller  when 
it  is  of  the  character  over  which  they  have  jurisdiction.**  In 
Massachusetts  it  is  held  that  the  selectmen  of  a  town  may  lay 
out  a  highway  wholly  within  their  town,  but  extending  to  the 
town  limits  and  there  connecting  with  other  roads  so  as  to 
form  a  continuous  inter-town  thoroughfare,  though  the  county 
commissioners  alone  have  jurisdiction  to  establish  inter-town 
ways.^°     But  the  contrary  is  held  in  iN'ew  Hampshire.^^ 

§  385  (251).  Statutes  have  no  extra-territorial  effect. 
It  is  a  general  rule  that  statutes  have  no  extra-territorial  ef- 
fect.^* It  follows  that  one  State  cannot  authorize  the  condem- 
nation of  property  in  another  State  ;^^  also,  that  it  cannot  au- 
thorize works  which  will  produce  actionable  damages  in  another 


V.  Newark,  28  X.  J.  L.  491.  The  city 
of  New  Orleans  was  divided  into 
municipalities  i  held  that  one  mu- 
nicipality could  not  open  a  street,  the 
center  line  of  which  was  the  dividing 
line  between  it  and  another  munici- 
pality, under  a,  statute  formerly  ap- 
plicable to  the  whole  city.  Munici- 
pality No.  1  V.  Young,  5  La.  An.  362. 
And  see  People  v.  Lake  County,  33 
Cal.  487;  Sparling  ".  Dwenger,  60 
Ind.  72. 

2  8State  V.  County  Comrs.,  23  Fla. 
632;  Harkness  v.  Waldo  County 
Comrs.,  26  Me.  353;  Herman  v. 
County  Comrs.,  39  Me.  583;  City  of 
Deering  v.  County  Comrs.,  87  Me. 
151,  32  Atl.  797 ;  Cragie  v.  Mellen,  6 
Mass.  7 ;  Monterey  v.  County  Comrs., 
7  Cush.  394;  People  v.  Highway 
Comr.,  15  Mich.  347;  Wells  v.  Mc- 
Laughlin, 17  Ohio  97;  Palo  Alto 
Road  View,  13  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  537 ;  Kelly 
V.  Danby,  46  Vt.  504. 

2  Din  the  following  cases  it  was 
held  that  county  commissioners 
could,  under  a  proper  petition,  lay 
out  a  way  wholly  within  a  town  or 
village:    Harkness  v.  Waldo  County 


Comrs.,  26  Me.  353;  Herman  v. 
County  Comrs.,  39  Me.  583;  Wells 
V.  McLaughlin,  17  Ohio  97 ;  Kelly  v. 
Danby,  46  Vt.  504.  Under  a  petition 
for  a  way  in  two  towns,  a,  way  can- 
not be  laid  out  wholly  in  one  of  the 
towns :  Hopkinton  v.  Winship,  35  N. 
H.  209;  Petition  of  Newport,  39  N. 
H.  67. 

3  "Monterey  v.  County  Comrs.,  7 
Cush.  394. 

aiGriffin's  Petition,  27  N.  H.  343. 
And  see  Biddeford  v.  County  Comrs., 
78  Me.  105. 

321  Lewis'  Suth.  Stat.  Constr., 
§  13. 

ssSoutheru  111.  &  Mo.  Bridge  Co. 
V.  Stone,  174  Mo.  1,  73  S.  W.  453,  63 
L.E.A.  301;  Crosby  v.  Hanover,  36 
N.  H.  404;  Saunders  v.  Bluefield  W. 
W.  &  Imp.  Co.,  58  Fed.  133;  St. 
Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  S.  W.  Tel.  & 
Tel.  Co.,  121  Fed.  276,  58  C.  C.  A. 
198;  Evansville  Traction  Co.  v.  Hen- 
derson Bridge  Co.,  134  Fed.  973.  In 
Crosby  v.  Hanover,  36  N.  H.  404,  the 
attempt  was  to  condemn  a  bridge 
across  the  Connecticut  River,  one  end 
of  which  was  in  Vermont. 


T02  EMINEN^T  DOMAIN-.  §    386 

State,^*  or  in  territory  -within  a  State,  jurisdiction  over  which 
has  been  ceded  to  the  United  States.*^  Where  a  mill  erected 
in  Massachusetts  flowed  lands  in  New  Hampshire,  it  was  held 
that  damages  could  not  be  assessed  in  iNew  Hampshire  under 
the  statutes  of  the  latter  State  in  relation  to  mills.^®  And, 
generally,  the  mill  acts  of  one  State  do  not  apply  to  mills 
erected  out  of  the  State,  though  flowing  lands  in  the  former 
State.^^  But  where  a  mill  or  other  works  in  one  State  pro- 
duces damage  in  another  State,  a  common  law  action  can  be 
maintained  in  the  State  where  the  works  are  situated.^* 

The  city  of  Worcester,  Massachusetts,  took  the  waters  of 
Tatnuck  Brook  for  public  use,  as  a  water  supply  for  said  city. 
The  brook  was  a  tributary  of  the  Blackstone  Eiver,  and  the 
diversion  of  the  waters  of  the  brook  diminished  the  supply  of 
water  coming  to  mills  on  the  Blackstone  Kiver  situated  in 
Ehode  Island.  In  Manville  Company  v.  Worcester,^'  the 
plaintiff,  having  a  mill  in  the  latter  State,  was  allowed  to  main- 
tain an  action  of  tort  in  Massachusetts  for  damages  caused  by 
the  diversion.  lii  Banigan  v.  Worcester**  it  appeared  that 
several  suits  were  begun  in  the  superior  court  of  Worcester 
county,  Massachusetts,  under  the  statutes  of  the  latter  State, 
by  the  owners  of  mill  property  situated  on  the  Blackstone  River 
in  Ehode  Island,  for  a  statutory  assessment  of  damages  by 
reason  of  the  diversion  of  Tatnuck  Brook.  These  cases  were 
removed  to  the  Federal  court,  and  it  was  held  by  Carpenter, 
J.,  that  the  suits  were  reiaovable,  and  that  the  petitions  were 
well  brought  under  the  statute.*^ 

§  386  (252).  When  a  naked  or  defective  authority  to 
condemn  may  be  exercised  according  to  previous  statutes, 

3  4Farnum  v.  Blackstone  Canal  Co.,  3  9138  Mass.  89. 

1  Sumner  46;  Holyoke  Water  Power  ^ogo  Fed.  392. 

Co.    V.    Connecticut     River    Co.,    22  "This  view  is  also  supported  by 

Blatch.  131.  Brickett  v.  Haverhill  Aqueduct  Co., 

3  5United  States  v.  Ames,  1  W.  &  142  Mass.  394,  where  it  was  held  that 

M.  76.  one  who  owned  lands  situated  partly 

3  6  Salisbury  Mills  v.  Forsaith,  57  in  Massachusetts  and  partly  in  New 

N.  H.  124.    To  the  same  effect,  Woos-  Hampshire,  which  were  injured  by 

ter  V.  Great  Falls  Manf.  Co.,  39  Me.  the  diversion  of  a  stream  in  Massa- 

246.  chusetts  to  supply  a  village,  must 

^Tlhid.  seek  his  remedy  under  the  statute  for 

3  8Wooster  v.   Great   Falls   Manf.  his  lands  in  both  States,  and  that  an 

Co.,   39   Me.  246;   Mannville   Co.  v.  action  of  tort  would  not  lie. 
Worcester,  138  Mass.  89. 


§    386  THE   STATUTOEY  AUTJIOEITY.  '703 

and  when  not.  The  provision  of  the  constitution  that  com- 
pensation must  be  made  for  property  taken  for  public  use  is 
absolute  and  imperative.  When  the  legislature  authorizes  the 
taking  of  private  property  it  must  make  provision  for  ascertain- 
ing and  paying  compensation.  But  such  provision  need  not  be 
made  in  each  particular  act  conferring  authority.  Where 
authority  to  condemn  is  conferred  by  an  act  which  is  silent  as 
to  compensation,  it  sometimes  becomes  a  nice  question  whether 
the  provisions  of  prior  statutes  can  be  invoked  to  help  it  out. 
Where  an  additional  authority  to  condemn  property'  is  conferred 
upon  a  company  it  may  be  exercised  according  to  the  provisions 
of  prior  statutes  applicable  to  the  company.*^  Where  power 
to  lay  out  streets  and  alleys  is  conferred  by  special  act  upon  a 
particular  borough,  or  is  contained  in  a  special  charter,  the 
municipality  may  proceed  according  to  the  provisions  of  the 
general  law  in  regard  to  highways.**  The  same  is  true  also 
where  the  legislature  direct  or  authorize  the  proper  authorities 
to  lay  out  a  particular  street  or  highway.**  In  a  case  which 
arose  in  Virginia  it  appeared  that  the  government  of  county 
affairs  was  vested  in  the  county  court  which  was  authorized  to 
condemn  property  when  necessary  for  the  use  of  the  county. 
By  a  subsequent  statute  the  management  of  the  county  affairs 
was  vested  in  a  board  of  supervisors,  whose  duty  it  was  among 
other  things,  to  provide  suitable  buildings  for  the  use  of  the 
county.  It  was  held  that  the  authority  to  condemn  property 
for  county  buildings  was  necessarily  implied,  and  that  com- 
pensation could  be  assessed  according  to  the  prior  statute,  which 
in  terms  applied  only  to  the  county  court.*  ^  A  corporation 
was  created  by  special  charter,  with  power  to  buy,  maintain 
or  manage  any  works,  public  or  private,  which  may  tend,  or 
be  designed,  to  improve,  increase,  facilitate  or  develop,  trade, 
travel,  transportation  of  freight,  live  stock,  passengers  or  any 
other  traffic  by  land  or  water  in  the  United  States.  It  was 
authorized  "to  enter  upon  and  occupy  the  lands  of  individuals 
or  companies,  on  making  payment  therefor  or  giving  security 

4  2Railroad   Co.   v.   State,   9   Bax.  Me.     431;      Warner     v.     Hennepin 

522;   Heady  v.  Vevay  etc.  Turnpike  County,  9  Minn.  139;  Hamlin  v.  New 

Co.,  52  Ind.  117.  Bedford,  143  Mass.  192. 

4  3Barnes   v.    Springfield,   4   Allen  <  5  Supervisors  of  Culpepper  v.  Gor- 

488;  Sharett's  Road,  8  Pa.  St.  89.  rell,  20  Gratt.  484.     Compare  §  371 

4  4Smedley  v.   Erwin,   51    Pa.    St.  and  cases  there  cited. 
445;  City  of  Belfast,  Appellants,  53 


704  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    386 

according  to  law."  ]Sro  mode  of  procedure  was  pointed  out, 
and  it  would  appear  that  there  was  no  general  eminent  domain 
statute.  It  was  held  that  the  company  could  proceed  to  con- 
demn under  the  law  applicable  to  the  particular  kind  of  works 
it  proposed  to  construct;  that  is,  it  could  use  the  railroad  law, 
if  it  proposed  to  construct  a  railroad,  the  natural  gas  law,  if 
it  proposed  to  transport  natural  gas,  and  so  on.*®  General 
eminent  domain  statutes  are  now  common,  which  provide  a 
complete  mode  of  procedure  for  the  condemnation  of  property 
and  ascertaining  the  compensation.  When  such  statutes  are 
in  force  a  naked  power  to  condemn  may  be  exercised  under  the 
general  law.*'^  And  where  in  ca,se  of  drainage  laws,  the  mode 
provided  for  ascertaining  the  compensation  was  held  to  be 
invalid,  it  was  held  that  resort  could  be  had  to  the  general  law 
to  effect  the  condemnation.** 

A  Kentucky  statute  as  to  parks  in  cities  of  the  first  class, 
authorized  the  condemnation  of  property,  provided  what  the 
petition  should  contain  in  certain  cases  and  made  full  pro- 
vision for  the  payment  of  the  compensation,  but  contained  a 
provision  as  to  procedure  which  was  found  to  be  nugatory.  It 
was  held  that  the  condemnation  might  be  made  by  petition  to 
any  court  of  competent  jurisdiction  and  the  proceedings  con- 
ducted according  to  the  course  of  the  common  law.*® 

4  6Carothers   v.   Philadelphia   Co.,  common  law;  that  the  circuit  court 

118  Pa.  St.  468,  12  Atl.  314.  of  Jefferson  county,  being  a  court  of 

■*7Poulan  V.  Atlantic  Coast  Line  original  and  general  jurisdiction,  has 
R.  R.  Co.,  123  Ga.  605,  51  S.  E.  657;  jurisdiction  of  the  proceeding.  The 
Stowe  V.  Newborn,  127  Ga.  421,  56  court  can  permit  the  jury  to  hear 
S.  E.  516;  Mercer  County  v.  Wolff,  such  evidence  as  may  be  offered  as  to 
237  111.  74;  Orange  County  v.  Ells-  the  necessity  of  condemning  prop- 
worth,  98  App.  Div.  275,  90  N.  Y.  S.  erty,  and  as  to  its  value,  and  have 
576.  the  jury  view  the  property  sought  to 

4  8  Cleveland  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Polecat  be  condemned,  and  instruct  it  as  to 

Dr.  Dist.,  213  111.  83,  72  N.  E.  684;  the  method  of  ascertaining  and  fixing 

Smith  V.  Claussen  Park  D.  &  L.  Dist.,  the  value  of  the  property  taken,  and 

229  111.  155,  82  N.  E.  278.  as  to  the  damages  for  taking  same, 

<i>Board    of    Park  Comrs.  v.   Du  if  any  results.     It  would  be  within 

Pont,  110  Ky.  743,  62  S.  W.  891.  The  the  power  of  the  court  to  fix  the  day 

court  says :    "We  are  of  the  opinion  upon  which  the  money  should  be  paid 

that  the  legislature  intended,  upon  to  the  owner  of  the  property  taken, 

the  filing  of  the  petition  for  the  con-  and  to  adjudge  that,  upon  the  board's 

demnation    of    private  property  for  failure  to  pay  it  at  that  time,  the 

park  purposes,  the  procedure  should  proceedings  were  to  be  void,  or  to  be 

be  according    to    the  course  of  the  regarded    as    being    abandoned.     It 


§  386 


THE  STATUTOEY  AUTHORITY. 


705 


A  chapter  of  the  general  statutes  of  Minnesota,  relating  to 
roads,  cartways  and  bridges,  contained  complete  provisions  for 
the  laying  out  of  town  roads  by  town  supervisors.  It  contained 
a  section  as  to  town  line  roads  as  follows:  "Whenever  the 
supervisors  of  any  town  receive  a  petition  praying  for  the  loca- 
tion of  a  new  road,  or  the  altering  or  discontinuing  of  an  old 
one,  on  the  line  between  two  towns,  such  road  shall  be  laid  out, 
altered,  or  discontinued  by  two  or  more  of  the  supervisors  of 
each  of  said  towns,  either  on  such  line  or  as  near  thereto  as 
the  convenience  of  the  ground  will  admit;  and  they  may  so 
vary  the  same  either  to  one  side  or  the  other  of  such  line  as 
they  think  proper."  The  statute  contained  no  other  provision 
as  to  procedure  in  case  of  such  roads  and  there  was  no  pro- 
vision as  to  how  the  damages  were  to  be  paid  or  apportioned, 
or  how  a  record  was  to  be  made  for  each  town.  It  was  held 
that  the  procedure  as  to  town  roads  should  be  applied  with 
appropriate  and  necessary  changes,  that  the  papers  should  be 
kept  and  record  made  by  the  town  in  which  the  petition  was 
filed  and  a  copy  filed  in  the  other  town,  and  that  the  damages 
should  be  apportioned  by  the  supervisors  of  the  two  towns 
acting  jointly.^** 


seems  to  us  that  the  court  would 
have  complete  jurisdiction  to  protect 
the  rights  of  all  parties  concerned;" 
p.  754. 

soHurst  V.  Martinsburg,  80  Minn. 
40,  82  N.  W.  1099.  As  such  cases  are 
rare,  we  quote  from  the  opinion  as 
follows:  "The  several  provisions  of 
the  chapter,  so  far  as  applicable  to 
the  subject  in  hand,  are  not  as  full 
and  complete  as  well-considered  and 
carefully  prepared  statutes  might  be 
made,  but  omissions  as  to  the  mode 
and  manner  of  conducting  the  pro- 
ceedings thereby  authorized  may  be 
supplied  by  intendment,  and  do  not 
affect  the  constitutionality  of  the 
law  as  a  whole.  Other  sections  of 
this  statute  provide  for  laying  out 
town  roads  by  town  supervisors,  for 
notice  to  all  interested  parties,  and 
for  damages  and  compensation  for 
land  taken.  And,  unless  the  section 
under  consideration  is  to  be  stricken 
Em.  D. — 45. 


from  the  statutes,  and  held  entirely 
meaningless,  such  other  provisions 
must  be  referred  to,  and  applied  to 
proceedings  to  lay  out  a  town-line 
road  under  it.  They  may  be  resorted 
to  and  applied  without  much  diffi- 
culty, and  the  legislature  evidently 
so  intended.  The  supervisors  receiv- 
ing the  petition  for  such  town-line 
road  must  take  the  active  charge  and 
conduct  of  the  proceedings,  but  in  the 
matter  of  determining  whether  the 
road  shall  be  laid  out,  and  in  assess- 
ing damages,  they  can  act  only  in 
conjunction  with  the  supervisors  of 
the  adjoining  town.  The  records  may 
be  kept  in  the  town  in  which  the  pro- 
ceedings are  commenced,  and  dupli- 
cates filed  in  the  adjoining  town ;  and 
the  matter  of  the  division  of  the  dam- 
ages to  be  paid,  between  the  towns, 
must  be  left  to  the  judgment  and  dis- 
cretion of  both  boards.  The  notices 
required  to  be  given,  in  the  case  of 


706 


EMINENT   DOMAIN. 


§  387 


§  387  (253).     The  authority  must  be  strictly  pursued. 

This  is  a  proposition  so  universally  conceded  and  so  often  reit- 
erated by  the  courts  that  it  requires  no  discussion,  and  we  shall 
simply  refer  to  some  of  the  principal '  cases  illustrating  the 
doctrine.®^     "As  private  property  can  be  taken  for  public  uses, 


an  ordinary  town  road  must  be  served 
in  the  same  manner  in  this  proceed- 
ing. Three  copies  should  be  posted 
in  each  town. 

"Statutes  must  be  so  construed 
as  to  give  eflFect  to  every  section  and 
part,  and,  when  any  doubts  arise  as 
to  the  constitutionality  thereof,  such 
doubts  must  be  resolved  in  favor  of 
the  law.  That  the  legislature  in- 
tended that  the  section  of  the  statute 
under  consideration  should  have 
some  force  and  effect  is  too  evident 
to  be  for  a  moment  doubted.  And 
that  it  was  further  intended  that 
the  other  sections  on  the  subject  of 
laying  out  town  roads  generally 
should  be  resorted  to  and  applied  to 
this  section  and  proceedings  under  it, 
we  have  no  doubt.  We  so  construe 
and  interpret  it."    pp.  42,  43. 

Compare,  with  last  two  cases 
Chaffer's  Appeal,  56  Mich.  244,  and 
Wautauga  Water  Co.  v.  Scott,  111 
Tenn.  321,  76  S.  W.  888. 

siMobile  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ala.  Mid. 
R.  R.  Co.,  87  Ala.  501,  6  So.  404;  New 
&  Old  Decatur  Belt  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Karcher,  112  Ala.  676,  21  So.  825; 
Roberts  v.  Williams,  15  Ark.  43; 
Beusley  v.  Mountain  Lake  Water  Co., 
13  Cal.  306,  73  Am.  Dee.  575;  Curran 
v.  Shattuck,  24  Cal.  427;  Lincoln  v. 
Colusa,  28  Cal.  662;  Damrell  v.  Board 
of  Supervisors  etc.  40  Cal.  154;  Shep- 
herd V.  Turner,  129  Cal.  530,  62  Pac. 
106;  Colo.  Fuel  &  Iron  Co.  v.  Four 
Mile  Ry.  Co.,  29  Colo.  90,  66  Pac. 
002;  Keefer  v.  Bridgeport,  68  Conn. 
401,  36  Atl.  801;  Brown  v.  Macfar- 
land,  19  App.  Caa.  D.  C.  525;  Fla. 
Cent.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bear,  43  Fla. 
319,  31  So.  287;  Young  v.  McKenzie, 


3  Ga.  31 ;  Justices  etc.  v.  Plank  Road 
Co.,  9  Ga.  475;  Hyslop  v.  Finch,  99 
111.  171;  Chicago  &  Alton  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Smith,  78  111.  96;  Reid  v.  Ohio 
Miss.  R.  R.  Co.,  126  111.  48,  17  ST.  E. 
807;  Phillips  v.  Scales  Mound,  195 
111.  353,  63  N.  E.  180;  Funderburk  v. 
Spengler,  234  111.  574,  85  N.  E.  193; 
Finke  v.  Zeigemiller,  77  la.  253,  42 
N.  W.  183;  Gauo  v.  Minneapolis  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  114  la.  713,  87  N.  W.  714, 
89  Am.  St.  Rep.  393,  55  L.R.A.  203 ; 
New  Orleans  v.  Sohr,  16  La.  An.  393; 
Mayor  etc.  of  Jefferson  v.  Delachaise, 
22  La.  An.  26;  Calder  v.  Police  Jury, 
44  La.  An.  173,  10  So.  726;  Pingree  v. 
Co.  Comrs.,  30  Me.  351 ;  Hubbard  v. 
Great  Falls  Mfg.  Co.,  80  Me.  39,  12 
Atl.  878;  Harris  v.  Inhabitants  of 
Marblehead,  10  Gray  40;  Wamesit 
Power  Co.  v.  Allen,  120  Mass.  352; 
Derby  v.  Framingham  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
119  Mass.  516;  Kroop  v.  Forman,  31 
Mich.  144;  Detroit  Sharpshooters' 
Association  v.  Highway  Commis- 
sioners, 34  Mich.  36;  Toledo,  Ann 
Arbor  &  Northern  Mich.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Munson,  57  Mich.  42;  Stockett  v. 
Nicholson,  Walker,  Miss.  75;  St. 
Louis  V.  Franks,  78  Mo.  41;  Chicago 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Young,  96  Mo.  39,  8 
S.  W.  776;  Orrick  School  Dist.  v. 
Dorton,  125  Mo.  439,  28  S.  W.  765; 
Nishnabotna  Dr.  Dist.  v.  Campbell, 
154  Mo.  151,  55  S.  W.  276;  Williams 
V.  Kirby,  169  Mo.  622,  70  S.  W.  140; 
In  re  Grading  Bledsoe  Hill,  200  Mo. 
630,  98  S.  W.  631 ;  State  v.  Tarrelly, 
36  Mo.  App.  282 ;  Taylor  v.  Todd,  48 
Mo.  App.  550;  Spurgeon  v.  Bartlett, 
56  Mo.  App.  349 ;  Rousey  v.  Wood,  57 
Mo.  App.  650;  Glass  v.  Basin  Min. 
etc.  Co.,  22  Mon.  151,  55  Pac.  1047; 


387 


THE  STATUTOIIY  AUTIIOEITY. 


707 


against  the  consent  of  the  owner  only  in  snch  cases,  and  by  such 
proceedings,  as  may  be  specially  provided  by  law,  and  as  these 
proceedings  are  not  according  to  the  common  law,  and  are  in 
derogation  of  pri-\'ate  right,  and  as  they  wholly  depend  on  stat- 
ute regulation  in  this  State,  any  one  using  this  extraordinary 
and  harsh  power  must  comply  with  all  the  provisions  of  the 
statute."  ^^  A  strict  compliance  with  the  statute  does  not  nec- 
essarily mean  a  literal  and  exact  compliance.^*  A  substantial 
compliance  will  suffice.''*     As  to  what  is  a  substantial  compli- 


Helena  v.  Rogan,  26  Mont.  452,  68 
Pae.  798;  S.  C.  27  Mont.  135,  69  Pac. 
709 ;  Nelson  v.  Harlan  County,  2  Neb. 
(Unof.)  537,  89  N.  W.  458;  State  v. 
Van  Geison,  15  N.  J.  L.  339;  Griscom 
V.  Gilmore,  same,  p.  475;  State  v. 
Jersey  City,  25  N.  J.  L.  309;  State 
V.  Town  of  Bergen,  33  N.  J.  L.  72; 
State  V.  Jersey  City,  54  N.  J.  L.  49, 
22  Atl.  1052;  State  v.  Hernsley,  59 
N.  J.  L.  149 ;  State  v.  Larabee,  59  N. 
J.  L.  259 ;  Hampton  v.  Clinton  Water 
etc.  Co.,  65  N.  J.  L.  158,  46  Atl.  650; 
Whittingham  v.  Hopkins,  70  N.  J.  L. 
322,  57  Atl.  402;  Manda  v.  Orange, 
75  N.  J.  L.  251 ;  Leyba  v.  Armijo,  11 
N.  M.  437,  68  Pac.  939;  Newell  v. 
Wheeler,  48  N.  Y.  486;  Miller  v. 
Brown,  56  N.  Y.  383;  Schneider  v. 
Rochester,  160  N.  Y.  165;  reversing 
33  App.  Div.  458 ;  Matter  of  Schrei- 
ber,  53  How.  Pr.  359 ;  Harbeck  v.  To- 
ledo, 11  Ohio  St.  219 ;  Grant  v.  Hyde 
Park,  67  Ohio  St.  166,  65  N.  E.  891 ; 
Woodniff  V.  Douglass  Co.,  17  Ore. 
314,  21  Pac.  49;  Grande  Ronde  Elec. 
Co.  V.  Drake,  46  Ore.  243,  78  Pac. 
1031;  Killbuck  Private  Road,  77  Pa. 
St.  39;  Appeal  of  Borough  of  Cur- 
wensville,  129  Pa.  St.  74;  Harbaugh's 
Road,  8  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  671;  Painter's 
Lateral  R.  R.  Co.,  198  Pa.  St.  461,  48 
Atl.  299;  Bell  v.  Ohio  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
1  Grant  105 ;  McCotter  v.  New  Shore- 
ham,  21  R.  I.  43,  41  Atl.  572 ;  Town  of 
Wayne  v.  Caldwell,  1  S.  D.  483,  47 
N.  W.  547,  36  Am.  St.  Rep.  750; 
Lewis  V.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  5  S. 
D.  148,  58  N.  W.  580 ;  Gulf  etc.  R.  R. 


Co.  V.  Poindexter,  70  Tex.  98,  7  S.  W. 
316;  Galveston  Wharf  Co.  v.  Gulf  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  72  Tex.  454,  10  S.  W.  537; 
Gulf,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mud 
Creek,  I.  A.  &  M.  Co.,  1  Tex.  App. 
Civil  Cas.  p.  169;  Post  v.  Rutland  R. 
R.  Co.,  80  Vt.  551,  69  Atl.  156; 
Painter  v.  St.  Clair,  98  Va.  85,  34  S. 
E.  989 ;  Adams  v.  Clarksburg,  23  W. 
Va.  203;  Fork  Ridge  Baptist  Cem. 
Ass.  v.  Redd,  33  W.  Va.  262,  10  S.  E. 
405;  Charleston  &  S.  S.  Bridge  Co.  v. 
Comstock,  36  W.  Va.  263,  15  S.  E. 
69;  Bohbnan  v.  Green  Bay  &  Minn. 
Ry.  Co.,  40  Wis.  157;  Eraser  v. 
Mulany,  129  Wis.  377,  109  N.  W.  139; 
Herron  v.  Improvem't  Comrs.,  L.  R. 
(1892)  A.  C.  498.  "The  form  by 
which  private  property  may  be  taken 
for  public  purposes  having  been  pre- 
scribed, it  must  be  strictly  pursued, 
or  the  attempt  will  be  ineffectual  and 
the  proceedings  void,  and  all  persons 
acting  under  the  color  of  them  will  be 
trespassers."  Stewart  v.  Wallis,  30 
Barb.  344. 

5  2Fork  Ridge  Baptist  Cem.  Ass.  v. 
Redd,  33  W.  Va.  262,  10  S.  E.  405. 

6  3Darrow  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
169  Ind.  99. 

5  4Darrow  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
169  Ind.  99,  81  N.  E.  1081 ;  Nickerson 
v.  Lynch,  135  Mo.  471,  37  S.  W.  128; 
Jones  V.  Zink,  65  Mo.  App.  409; 
Dodge  County  v.  Acorn,  61  Neb.  376, 
85  N.  W.  292;  Charleston  etc.  S.  S. 
Bridge  Co.  v.  Comstock,  36  W.  Va. 
263,  15  S.  E.  69. 


708 


EMIITENT   DOMAIN. 


§    388 


ance  will  be  considered  in  future  chapters  relating  to  procedure 
and  the  validity  of  the  proceedings  when  collaterally  attacked. 
Courts  cannot  dispense  with  the  forms  and  conditions  pre- 
scribed by  law,  on  the  notion  that  they  are  not  essential.  The 
very  fact  that  they  are  prescribed  naakes  them  matters  of  sub- 
stance.®^ When  the  matter  is  in  doubt  the  general  rule  applies 
in  favor  of  the  property  owner  and  against  the  party  attempt- 
ing to  enforce  the  statute. 

§,  388  (254).  The  authority  to  condemn  will  be  strictly 
construed.  All  grants  of  power  by  the  government  are  to  be 
strictly  construed,  and  this  is  especially  true  with  respect  to 
the  power  of  eminent  domain,  which  is  more  harsh  and  per- 
emptory in  its  exercise  and  operation  than  any  other.®®     "An 


5  5  Hawkins  v.  Pittsburg,  220  Pa. 
St.  7,  69  Atl.  283.  "Every  condition 
prescribed  in  the  grant  must  be  com- 
plied with,  and  the  proceedings  must 
be  conducted  in  the  manner  and  with 
the  formalities  prescribed  in  the 
grant  of  power.  Formalities  and 
modes  of  procedure  prescribed  are  of 
the  essence  of  the  grant,  which  the 
courts  cannot  disregard  on  a  concep- 
tion that  they  are  not  essential." 
State  V.  Jersey  City,  54  N.  J.  L.  49, 
22  Atl.  Eep.  1052. 

6  6Keynolds  v.  Spears,  I  Stew.  34; 
Martin  v.  Eushton,  42  Ala.  289 ;  Mo- 
bile etc.  E.  E.  Co.  V.  Ala.  Mid.  E.  E. 
Co.,  87  Ala.  501 ;  Oritz  v.  Hansen,  35 
Colo.  100,  83  Pac.  964;  Waterbury  v. 
Piatt  Bros.  &  Co.,  75  Conn.  387,  53 
Atl.  958,  96  Am.  St.  Eep.  229;  Florida 
Cent.  etc.  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Bear,  43  Fla. 
319,  31  So.  287;  Alabama  Great 
Southern  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Gilbert,  71  Ga. 
591 ;  Hopkins  v.  Fla.  Cent.  etc.  E.  E. 
Co.,  97  Ga.  107,  25  S.  E.  452;  Oconee 
Elec.  Lt.  &  P.  Co.  V.  Carter,  111  Ga. 
106,  36  S.  E.  457;  Chestates  Pyrites 
Co.  V.  Cavenders  Creek  Gold  Min. 
Co.,  119  Ga.  354,  46  S.  E.  422, 100  Am. 
St.  Eep.  174;  Chicago  &  Eastern  Illi- 
nois E.  E.  Co.  V.  Wiltse,  116  111.  449, 
6  N.  E.  49 ;  Harvey  v.  Aurora  etc.  E. 
E.  Co.,  174  111.  295,  51  N.  E.  163; 
Phillips  V.  Scales  Mound,  195  111.  353, 


63  N.  E.  180;  Funderburk  v.  Speng- 
ler,  234  111.  574,  85  N.  E.  193;  Chi- 
cago etc.  Ey.  Co.  v.  Chicago  Me- 
chanics Inst.,  239  111.  197 ;  Eward  v. 
Lawrenceburgh  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  7  Ind. 
711 ;  Atchison  etc.  Ey.  Co.  v.  Kansas 
City  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  67  Kan.  569,  70 
Pac.  939,  73  Pac.  899;  Board  of  Park 
Comrs.  V.  Du  Pont,  110  Ky.  743,  62 
S.  W.  891;  Breaux  v.  Bienvenu,  51 
La.  An.  687,  25  So.  321 ;  Spofford  v. 
B.  &  B.  E.  E.  Co.,  66  Me.  26;  Binney's 
Case,  2  Bland.  Ch.  (Md.)  99;  City  of 
Detroit  v.  Wabash  etc.  E.  E.  Co.,  63 
Mich.  712,  30  N.  W.  321;  Belcher 
Sugar  Eefining  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  Grain 
Elevator  Co.,  82  Mo.  121;  Kansas 
City  Interurban  Ey.  Co.  v.  Davis,  197 
Mo.  669,  95  S.  W.  881,  114  Am.  St 
Eep.  790;  Cox  v.  Tifton,  18  Mo.  App, 
450;  Chandler  v.  Eeading,  129  Mo. 
App.  63;  Claremont  Ey.  &  Lt.  Co.  v. 
Putney,  73  N.  H.  431,  62  Atl.  727; 
Simpson  v.  South  Staffordshire 
Water  Works  Co.,  34  L.  J.  Eq.  380; 
Jersey  City  v.  Central  E.  E.  Co.,  40 
jST.  J.  Eq.  417;  Watson  v.  The  Ac- 
quacknonck  Water  Co.,  36  N.  J.  L. 
195 ;  Beck  v.  United  N.  J.  E.  E.  Co., 
39  N.  J.  L.  45;  Central  E.  E.  Co.  v. 
Hudson  Terminal  Co.,  46  N.  J.  L. 
289;  Hampton  v.  Clinton  Water  etc. 
Co.,  65  N.  J.  L.  158,  46  Atl.  650;  Met- 
lar  V.  Middlesex  County  etc.  Traction 


§  388 


THE  STATUTOEY  AUTHOEITY. 


709 


act  of  this  sort,"  says  Bland,  J.,  "deserves  no  favor ;  to  construe 
it  liberally  would  be  sinning  against  the  rights  of  property."  "'^ 
But,  as  in  other  cases,  such  a  construction  will,  if  possible,  be 
given  to  an  act  as  will  carry  into  effect  the  chief  and  manifest 


Co.,  72  N.  J.  L.  524,  63  Atl.  497,  re- 
versing S.  C.  sub  nom.  Middlesex  etc. 
Traction  Co.  v.  Metlar,  70  N.  J.  L. 
98,  56  Atl.  142;  Mauda  v.  Orange,  75 
N.  J.  L.  251 ;  Belknap  v.  Belknap,  2 
Johns.  Ch.  463,  7  Am.  Dec.  548 ;  New 
York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kip,  46  N.  Y. 
546,  7  Am.  Rep.  385;  Matter  of 
Poughkeepsie  Bridge  Co.,  108  N.  Y. 
483,  15  N.  E.  601 ;  Matter  of  Union 
El.  R.  R.  Co.,  113  N.  Y.  275,  21  N.  E. 
81;  Erie  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Steward,  170 
N.  Y.  172,  63  N".  E.  118,  affirming  S. 
C.  61  App.  Div.  480,  70  N.  Y.  S.  698; 
Lea  V.  Johnson,  9  Iredell  Law,  15; 
Carolina  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Pennearden 
L.  &  M.  Co.,  132  N.  C.  644,  44  S.  E. 
358;  Miami  Coal  Co.  v.  Wigton,  19 
Ohio  St.  560;  City  of  Cincinnati  v. 
Sherike,  47  Ohio  St.  217,  25  N.  E. 
169;  Cleveland  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  South, 
78  Ohio  St.  10;  Central  Union  Tele- 
phone Co.  V.  Colmnbus  Grove,  8  Ohio 
C.  C.  (N.S.)  81;  Packer  v.  Sunbury 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  Pa.  St.  211 ;  Pitts- 
burgh &  Lake  Erie  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Brace, 
102  Pa.  St.  23;  Woods  v.  Greensboro 
Nat.  Gas  Co.,  204  Pa.  St.  606,  54  Atl. 
470;  Pa.  Telephone  Co.  v.  Hoover,' 209 
Pa.  St.  555,  58  Atl.  922 ;  Snee  v.  West 
Side  Belt  R.  R.  Co.,  210  Pa.  St.  480, 
60  Atl.  94;  Lazarus  v.  Morris,  212  Pa. 
St.  128,  61  Atl.  815;  Pa.  Telephone 
Co.  V.  Hoover,  24  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  96; 
Pfoutz  V.  Pa.  Telephone  Co.,  24  Pa. 
Supr.  Ct.  105;  S.  W.  State  Normal 
School,  26  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  99;  Warren 
Academy  of  Sciences,  29  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 
30;  Woolard  v.  Nashville,  108  Tenn. 
353,  67  S.  W.  801 ;  O'Neal  v.  City  of 
Sherman,  77  Tex.  182,  14  S.  W.  31 ; 
Charlottesville  v.  Maury,  96  Va.  383, 
31  S.  E.  520;  Painter  v.  St.  Clair,  98 
Va.  85,  34  S.  E.  989;  Norfolk  etc.  Ry. 


Co.  V.  Lynchburg  Cotton  Mills  Co., 
106  Va.  376,  56  S.  E.  146;  Seattle  v. 
Fidelity  Trust  Co.,  22  Wash.  154,  60 
Pac.  133;  State  v.  Superior  Court,  36 
Wash.  381,  78  Pac.  1011;  Mills  v.  St. 
Clair  County,  8  How.  569;  City  of 
Madison  v.  Daley,  58  Fed.  751 ;  West 
V.  Parkdale,  8  Ontario  59;  Lamb  v. 
North  London  R.  R.  Co.,  4  L.  R.  Ch. 
522,  21  L.  T.  N.  S.  98;  Gray  v.  Liver- 
pool &  Bury  Ry.  Co.,  9  Veav.  391. 

"In  construing  statutes  which  are 
claimed  to  authorize  the  exercise  of 
the  power  of  eminent  domain,  a  strict 
rather  than  a  liberal  construction  is 
the  rule.  Such  statutes  assume  to 
call  into  active  operation  a  power 
which,  however  essential  to  the  exist- 
ence of  the  government,  is  in  deroga- 
tion of  the  ordinarj^  rights  of  private 
ownership  and  of  the  control  which 
an  owner  usually  has  of  his  property. 
The  rule  of  strict  construction  of 
condemnation  statutes  is  especially 
applicable  to  delegations,  of  the 
power  by  the  legislature  to  private 
corporations.  The  motive  of  the  pro- 
moters of  such  corporations  is 
usually  private  gain,  although  their 
creation  may  subserve  a  public  pur- 
pose. When  such  corporations  claim 
to  exercise  this  delegated  power,  the 
rule  of  strict  construction  accords 
with  the  ordinary  rule  that  delega- 
tions of  public  powers  to  individuals 
or  private  corporations  are  to  be 
strictly  construed  in  behalf  of  the 
public,  and  by  the  other  principle 
that  private,  rights  are  not  to  be  di- 
vested except  hy  the  clear  warrant  of 
law."  Matter  of  Poughkeepsie  Bridge 
Co.,  108  N.  Y.  483,  490;  491. 

57Binney's  Case,  2  Bland.  Ch.  99. 


YIO 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


§    389 


purpose  for  which  it  was  passed,^*  and  such  as  will  give  effect 
to  all  its  words.*®  It  will  be  so  construed  as  to  support  its 
validity  rather  than  otherwise.®"  "Statutes  granting  these 
powers  are  not  to  be  construed  so  literally,  or  so  strictly  as  to 
defeat  the  evident  purpose  of  the  legislature.  They  are  to 
receive  a  reasonably  strict  and  guarded  construction,  and  the 
powers  granted  will  extend  no  further  than  expressly  stated, 
or  than  is  necessary  to  accomplish  the  general  scope  and  pur- 
pose of  the  grant.  If  there  remains  a  doubt  as  to  the  extent  of 
the  power,  after  all  reasonable  intendments  in  its  favor,  the 
doubt  should  be  solved  adversely  to  the  claim  of  power."  "^ 

§  389  (254a).  Provisions  as  to  compensation  and  rem- 
edy and  in  favor  of  the  property  owner  should  be  liberally 
construed.  This  is  a  familiar  rule,  but  a  few  cases  in  which  it 
is  enunciated  are  referred  to.®^ 

§  390  (255).  Construction  of  statutes  as  to  location. 
In  determining  whether  statutes  confer  the  right  to  exercise  the 


ssThe  Belloua  Company  Case,  3 
Bland.  Ch.  442 ;  Canandaigua  v.  Ben- 
edict, 24  App.  Div.  N.  Y.  348;  Nun- 
namaker  v.  Colupibia  W.  R,  R.  Co., 
47  S.  C.  485,  25  S.  E.  751,  58  Am.  St. 
Kep.  905,  34  L.R.A.  222 ;  Puyallup  v. 
Lacey,  43  Wash.  110,  86  Pac.  215; 
Dyer  v.  Baltimore,  140  Fed.  880. 

5  9Beck  V.  United  N.  J.  R.  R.  Co., 
39  N.  J.  L.  45.  Such  statutes  should 
be  given  a  consistent  and  reasonable 
construction  and  such  as  will  give  ef- 
fect to  all  the  words,  if  possible.  Mc- 
Leod  V.  So.  Deerfield  Water  Supply 
Dist.,  193  Mass.  6,  78  N.  E.  764. 

6  0  Commissioners'  Court  v.  Street, 
116  Ala.  28,  22  So.  629 ;  Howard  Mills 
Co.  V.  Schwarts  L.  &  C.  Co.,  77  Kan. 
599,  95  Pac.  559;  State  v.  Polk 
County  Comrs.,  87  Minn.  325,  92  N. 
W.  216,  60  L.R.A.  161;  St.  Joseph  v. 
Zimmerman,  142  Mo.  155;  St.  Louis 
V.  Brown,  155  Mo.  545,  56  S.  W.  298; 
Shively  v.  Lankford,  174  Mo.  535,  74 
S.  W.  835 ;  Grossman  v.  Patton,  186 
Mo.  661,  85  S.  W.  548;  Morris  v. 
Washington  County,  72  Neb.  174,  100 
N.  W.  144;  Littleton  v.  Berlin  Mills 


Co.,  73  N.  H.  1,  58  Atl.  877;  Town  of 
Keysport  v.  Cherry,  51  N.  J.  L.  417, 
18  Atl.  299;  State  Water  Supply 
Commission  v.  Curtis,  192  N.  Y.  319, 
affirming  125  App.  Div.  117;  Brown- 
ing V.  Collis,  21  N.  Y.  Misc.  155 ;  Car- 
roll V.  Griffith,  117  Tenn.  500,  97  S.  W. 
66;  Pittsburgh  v.  Scott,  1  Pa.  St. 
309;  In  re  Barre  Water  Co.,  62  Vt. 
27,  20  Atl.  109,  3  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp. 
Rep.  136;  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v. 
Williams,  86  Va.  696,  11  S.  E.  106,  2 
Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  258,  19  Am. 
St.  Rep.  908. 

eiNew  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kip, 
46  N.  Y.  546,  7  Am.  Rep.  385. 

6  2Torrington  v.  Messenger,  74 
Conn.  321,  50  Atl.  873;  Dyer  v.  Bel- 
fast, 88  Me.  140,  33  Atl.  790;  Matter 
of  Grade  Crossing  Comrs.,  59  App. 
Div.  498,  69  N.  Y.  S.  52;  S.  C.  af- 
firmed, 168  N.  Y.  659,  dl  N.  E.  1129; 
Schuylkill  Nav.  Co.  v.  Loose,  19  Pa. 
St.  15;  Nashville  v.  Nichol,  3  Bax. 
338 ;  Lenz  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  Ill 
Wis.  198,  86  N.  W.  607;  ante,  §  360; 
West  V.  Parkdale,  8  Ont.  59. 


§    390  THE   STATUTOEY  AUTHOKITT.  711 

power  of  eminent  domain,  the  rules  of  strict  construction  are 
to  be  applied.  But  when  the  power  has  undoubtedly  been  con- 
ferred by  a  statute,  then,  in  so  far  as  it  attempts  to  define  the 
location  or  route,  it  is  to  receive  a  reasonable  rather  than  a 
strict  construction.  It  is  against  common  right  that  a  person  or 
corporation  should  have  the  power,  but,  having  the  power,  it  is 
for  the  general  good  that  they  should  not  be  hampered  or  em- 
barrassed by  a  narrow  and  technical  interpretation  of  it.*^ 
Power  to  construct  a  railroad  "to  the  place  of  shipping  lumber" 
on  a  tide-water  river  authorizes  an  extension  of  the  tracks  over 
flats  and  tide-water  to  a  point  where  lumber  may  be  conveniently 
shipped."*  Authority  to  build  a  railroad  terminating  at  some 
suitable  point  on  another  railroad  "between  Metser's  ford  and 
Wager's  ford  on  the  river  Schuylkill,"  was  held  not  to  authorize 
a  connection  with  the  Schuylkill  canal  and  the  maintenance  of  a 
canal  basin  as  an  appurtenance.®^  Where  the  route  of  a  rail- 
road was  described  in  a  statute  in  part  as  running  through  the 
towns  A,  B,  0,  D,  etc.,  it  was  held  that  the  order  named  was 
not  imperative.®*  A  railroad  had  power  to  appropriate  con- 
tiguous lands,  not  exceeding  five  acres,  for  warehouse  purposes. 
It  was  held  it  could  only  take  lands  immediately  adjoining  its 
right  of  way.®^  A  company  was  authorized  to  condemn  lands 
"adjoining  their  road  as  constructed  on  their  right  of  way  as 
located."  It  was  held  not  to  authorize  the  taking  of  land^  ad- 
joining a  side  or  spur  track.®*  A  company  was  authorized  to 
occupy  a  certain  street  and  to  take  ground  near  or  convenient 
to  said  street  for  depot  purposes.  It  purchased  grounds  so  that 
it  had  to  cross  another  street  in  order  to  reach  them.  It  was 
held  it  had  no  power  to  cross  such  street,  but  should  have  selected 
lands  adjacent  to  the  street  occupied."®  Authority  to  build  an 
elevated  railroad  on  a  street,  does  not  authorize  any  part  of  a 

esPierce    on    Railroads,    p.    258;  depot.    Karnes  v.  Drake,  103  Ky.  134, 

Petersburg  Sch.  Dist.  v.  Peterson,  14  44  S.  W.  444. 

N.  D.  344,  103  2Sr.  W.  756,  940;  Ches-  sspiymouth  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Col  well, 

apeake  &  Ohio  Canal  Co.  v.  Key,  3  39  Pa.  St.  337,  80  Am.  Dec.  526. 

Cranch.  C.  C.  599.  6  6 Commonwealth  v.  Fitchburg  K. 

6  4Peavey  v.  Calais  R.  R.  Co.,  30  R.  Co.,  8  Cush.  240. 

Me.  498.  A  power  to  construct  a  rail-  6  7  Bird  v.  W.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  8 

road  from  a  mine  to  the  most  conve-  Rich.  Eq.  S.  C.  46. 

nient  and    suitable    railroad  depot  esAkers  v.  United  New  Jersey  R. 

within  three  miles,  was  held  not  to  R.  Co.,  43  N.  J.  L.  110. 

authorize  a  road  merely  connecting  « 'Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.'s  Appeal, 

with  a  railroad  where  there  was  no  93  Pa.  St.  150. 


712  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    390 

depot  or  stairs  on  a  cross  street. ''"  The  location  of  a  railroad 
partly  in  another  State  -will  not,  for  that  reason,  be  held  invalid 
by  the  courts  of  the  State  to  which  the  corporation  belongs.'^ 
An  act  provided  that  a  railroad  might  be  constructed  "to  some 
suitable  point  in  Orange  street,  or  some  street  north  of  said, 
street,  or  south  of  Market  street,  in  the  city  of  Newark;"  held 
that  the  act  related,  not  to  the  route,  but  to  the  termination  of  the 
road,  and  that  the  company  was  not  precluded  from  locating 
upon  or  along  Market  street.''^  .  A  statute  required  that  where 
a  new  railroad  was  to  be  built  between  two  points  where  "a 
railroad  is  now  constructed,"  it  should  be  located  ten  miles  at 
least  from  the  old  road,  was  held  not  to  prevent  a  new  road  with- 
in less  than  ten  miles  of  a  road  in  process  of  construction.'^*  A 
railroad  company  was  empowered  to  manufacture  iron  and  steel 
from  ore  obtained  on  its  own  lands ;  held  it  could  not  locate  its 
road  and  station  over  an  iron  mine  for  the  purpose  of  obtain- 
ing the  mine,  and  not  in  good  faith  for  the  purposes  of  its  road.'* 
A  railroad  charter  provided  that  "nothing  in  this  act  contained 
shall  authorize  said  corporation  to  make  a  location  of  their 
track  within  any  city  without  the  consent  of  the  common  council 
of  such  city."  This  was  held  to  apply  not  only  to  main  track 
but  also  to  appurtenances,  such  as  depots,  engine  houses,  and  the 
like  and  to  mean  the  territory  of  the  city  as  it  existed  when  the 
location  was  made  and  not  when  the  charter  was  passed.''^ 

where  an  avenue  was  directed  to  be  laid  out  in  a  direct 
line  .between  two  points  and  the  act  also  provided  that  it  should 
not  be  laid  through  any  buildings,  yards  or  orchards,  without 
the  consent  of  the  owner,  it  was  held  that  deviations  might  be 
made  to  avoid  buildings.'®    Authority  to  lay  out  a  highway  on 

70Mattlage  V.  New  York  El.  E.  K.  'sCharles    Street    Avenue    Co.    v. 

Co.,  67  How.  Pr.  232,  14  Daly  1.  Merryman,  10  Md.  536.     The  follow- 

'iPiedmont  &  Cumberland  Ry.  Co.  ing  cases  illustrate  the  same  prin- 

V.  Speelman,  67  Md.  260;    and    see  eiple:    State  v.  Wilton  R.  R.  Co.,  19 

Matter  of  New  York  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  N.  H.  521 ;  Fall  River  Iron  Works  Co. 

Co.,  88  N.  Y.  279.  v.  Old  Colony  &  Fall  River  R.  E.  Co., 

7  2McFariand  v.  Orange  etc.  R.  R.  5  Allen  221;  Heath  v.  Des  Moines  & 

Co.,  13  N.  J.  Eq.  17.  St.  Louis  Ry.  Co.,  61  la.  11 ;  Clark  v. 

7  3Macon  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Macon  Blackmar,  47  N.  Y.  150.    Underagen- 

&  D.  R.  R.  Co.,  86  Ga.  83,  13  S.  E.  157.  eral  railroad  law  a  road  may  be  built 

7  4  Jenkins  v.  Central  Ontario  R.  R.  which  is  wholly  within  one  city.  Na- 

Co.,  4  Ont.  593.  tional  Docks  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Central  R. 

'5111.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Chicago,  E.  Co.,  32  N.  J.  Eq.  755. 
176  U.  g.  646,  20  S.  C.  509,  affirming 
S.  C.  173  111.  471,  50  N.  E.  1104. 


§    390  THE  STATUTORY  AUTHOKITT.  Vl3 

a  line  between  two  towns  does  not  authorize  a  highway  wholly 
within  one  town,  but  bounded  on  one  side  by  the  division  lineJ'' 
On  the  other  hand,  the  fact  that  the  statute  provides  that,  in 
case  of  a  road  on  the  line  between  two  towns,  the  proceedings 
shall  be  before  the  commissioners  of  both  towns,  does  not  pre- 
vent the  commissioners  of  one  town,  having  jurisdiction  to  lay 
out  roads  in  their  own  town,  from  laying  out  a  road  along  the 
division  line,  but  wholly  in  their  town.''*  Under  authority  to 
lay  out  a  road  upon  and  along  the  division  line  between  two 
counties,  it  was  held  that  the  center  of  the  road  must  coincide 
with  the  division  line  and  that  where  a  creek  formed  the  line  a 
lay-out  was  impossible.''*  Under  authority  to  lay  out  highways 
from  "town  to  town  and  from  place  to  place,"  a  highway  may 
be  laid  out  wholly  within  a  town.*" 

A  statute  provided  that  land  might  be  taken  for  a  cemetery, 
when  "land  necessary  therefor  cannot  be  obtained  in  any  suitable 
place  at  a  reasonable  price  by  contract  with  the  owner."  It 
was  held  that  by  "any  suitable  place"  the  legislature  meant 
nothing  less  than  the  most  suitable  place,  or  a  place  as  suitable 
as  any  other,  or  as  suitable  as  the  town  could  afford  to  pay  for.*^ 

A  drainage  statute  provided  for  the  appointment  of  an  en- 
gineer to  survey  and  locate  the  ditch  petitioned  for,  and  author- 
ized him  to  shorten  or  extend  the  ditch  from  the  outlet  named  in 
the  petition  far  enough  to  reasonably  effectuate  the  purpose  for 
which  it  was  intended.  This  was  held  not  to  authorize  the  ex- 
tension of  a  ditch  four  miles  long,  seven  miles  beyond  the  outlet 
named  in  the  petition.*^ 

As  a  general  rule  statutes  conferring  the  power  of  eminent 
domain  upon  corporations  and  individuals  vest  a  large  discre- 
tion in  the  grantees  as  to  the  location  of  their  lines  and  works, 
and  the  courts  cannot  interfere  with  the  exercise  of  this  discre- 
tion unless  there  is  bad  faith  or  an  excess  of  authority.** 

7  7Matter  of  the  Town  of  Bridport,  8  2Lager    v.    Sibley    County,    100 

24  Vt.  176.  Minn.  85,  110  N.  W.  355. 

7  8Mack  V.  Commissioners  of  High-  "Union  Pacific  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Colo. 

„  ^,,    ._„  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  30  Colo.  133, 

ways,  41  111.  378.  ^^  p^^    ^^^^  ^^  ^^    g^              ^^^g. 

V9Roaring  Creek  Road,  11  Pa.  St.      g^^^j^  ^    ^^^^^j,^  j32  j^^    ^gg^  3^ 

356.  N.     E.    220;     Bass   v.    City   of   Ft. 

soNew  Vineyard  v.  Somerset,  15  Wayne,  121  Ind.  389,  23  N.  E.  259,  1 

Me.  21.  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  173 ;   New 

siCrowell  v.  Londonderry,  63  N.  H.  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Daily,  57  Misc. 

42.  311;  Petersburg  Sch.  Dist.  v.  Peter- 


714 


EMIITEIS-T  DOMAIN-. 


§  391 


§  391   (256).     Construction  of  statutes  as  to  the  pur- 
pose for  which  the  power  may  be  exercised:    Railroads. 

A  railroad  company  had  a  general  power  to  condemn  property 
for  tlie  purposes  of  its  incorporation.  It  was  licensed  by  the 
city  of  Buffalo  to  lay  its  track  along  a  street  and  across  a  canal 
slip,  provided  it  built  and  maintained  a  swing-bridge  over  the 
slip.  It  was  held  that  it  could  condemn  land  in  order  to  obtain 
room  in  which  to  swing  the  bridge.**  So  if  it  becomes  the  duty 
of  a  railroad  company  to  carry  a.iighway  over  or  under  its  road, 
it  may  condemn  the  land  necessary  therefor.®*  Under  authority 
to  construct  a  "railway  and  works,"  land  may  be  taken  for  a 
station.*^  So  under  a  general  authority  to  condemn  land  for  a 
railroad,  or  for  its  corporate  purposes,  a  railroad  company  may 
condemn  land  for  its  necessary  appurtenances,  such  as  depots, 
freight  houses,  terminal  yards,  switch  and  spur  tracks  and  the 
like.®'^    A  statute  provided  that  a  company  owning  a  completed 


son,  14  N.  D.  344,  103  N.  W.  756, 
940;  Gano  v.  Bristol  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
196  Pa.  St.  442,  46  Atl.  372;  Price  v. 
Pa.  R.  R.  Co.,  209  Pa.  St.  81,  58  Atl. 
137;  Heine  v.  Columbia  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
16  Pa.Dist.Ct.  840;  Tenn.  Cent.  R.R. 
Co.  V.  Campbell,  109  Tenn.  655,  73 
S.  W.  112;  Samish  Riv.  Boom  Co.  v. 
Union  Boom  Co.,  32  Wash.  586,  73 
Pac.  670;  Douglass  v.  Byrnes,  59 
Fed.  29 ;  Colorado  Eastern  R.  R.  Co. 
T.  Union  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  41  Fed.  293; 
Oregon  Short  Line  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  Ill  Fed. 
842,  49  C.  C.  A.  663;  London 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Truman,  L. 
R.  11  H.  L.  45.  Compare  Morton 
V.  Mayor  etc.  of  New  York,  140  N. 
Y.  207,  35  N.  E.  490,  22  L.R.A.  241 ; 
Lowell  V.  Washington  County  R.  R. 
Co.,  90  Me.  80,  37  Atl.  869. 

s^Matter  of  New  York,  Lacka- 
wanna &  Western  R.  R.  Co.,  33  Hun 
148. 

8  5  State  V.  St.  Paul  etc.  Ry.  Co., 
35  Minn.  131. 

seCother  v.  Midland  Ry.  Co.,  2 
Phillips,  469. 

8  7  Central  Pac.   Ry.   Co.  v.   Feld- 


man,  152  Cal.  303,  92  Pac.  849; 
State  V.  Railroad  Comrs.,  56  Conn. 
308;  Gardner  v.  Ga.  R.  R.  &  B.  Co., 
117  Ga.  522,  43  S.  E.  863;  Kansas 
City  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  La.  Western  E. 
R.  Co.,  116  La.  178,  40  So.  627,  5 
L.R.A.{N.S.)  512;  Ewing  v.  Ala- 
bama &  Va.  R.  R.  Co.,  68  Miss.  551, 
9  So.  295;  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Kip,  46  N.  Y.  546,  7  Am.  Rep. 
385;  In  re  Iiong  Island  R.  R.  Co., 
143  N.  Y.  67,  37  N.  E.  636;  Nashville 
&  Chattanooga  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cow- 
ardine,  11  Humph.  348.  In  State 
V.  Railroad  Comrs.,  56  Conn.  308, 
313,  the  court  says:  "Depots  for 
passengers  and  freight  are  essential 
parts  of  railroads.  A  railroad  is 
incomplete  without  them.  It  is 
doubtless  true  that  in  speaking  of 
the  several  parts  of  a  railroad  we 
distinguish  between  the  main  tracks, 
sidetracks  or  turnouts,  and  depots; 
but  when  we  speak  of  a  railroad 
from  one  place  to  another,  we  use 
the  word  in  a  comprehensive  sense 
as  embracing  all  these,  and  mean  by 
it,  so  far  as  real  estate  is  concerned, 
all  the  land  and  buildings  owned  by 


§    391  THE    STATUTORY    AUTHOEITY.  TIS 

railroad  could  condemn  land  "for  necessary  additional  depot 
grounds"  on  getting  the  approval  of  the  railroad  commissioners. 
It  was  held  that  the  right  was  not  limited  to  the  enlargement  of 
existing  depot  grounds,  but  that  land  might  be  condemned  for 
a  new  station.**  Under  authority  to  a  company  to  take  land 
necessary  for  its  works,  it  can  only  take  land  to  be  occupied 
by  its  works,  and  cannot  condemn  land  merely  to  get  earth  or 
materials  for  construction.*^  Power  to  lay  a  double  track  means 
on  the  same  right  of  way.^*  A  railroad  company  cannot  con- 
demn for  widening  a  street  upon  which  it  is  proposed  to  lay  its 
track.®^  It  has  been  held  that  a  lessee  company  may  condemn 
for  the  purpose  of  enlarging  the  right  of  way  of  its  lessor.®^  A 
railroad  company  may  not  condemn  for  a  dam  across  a  navigable 
stream  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  water  for  locomotives.^^ 
But  where  authority  is  given  to  condemn  for  water  stations,  the 
company  may  condemn  for  a  dam  and  flowage,  though  the  water 
will  set  back  twelve  hundred  feet.^*  Where  a  railroad  company 
was  chartered  to  construct  a  road  from  one  specified  place  to 
another,  it  was  held  that  it  could  not  condemn  land  to  construct 
a  road  for  part  of  the  distance.®^  A  railroad  crossed  a  bend  in 
the  river.  It  had  authority  to  take  what  was  necessary  for  the 
construction  and  operation  of  its  road.  It  was  held  it  could  con- 
demn land  for  a  new  channel  so  as  to  avoid  two  bridges  and  also 
take  the  riparian  rights  on  the  old  channel.  ^^     But  in  Pennsyl- 

the    corporation    and    necessary    or  szHespenheide's  Appeal,  4  Penny. 

convenient  for  the  transaction  of  its  71. 

business."     See  Taussig  v.  St.  Louis  ssQulf  etc.  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Taequard, 

Val.  Transfer  Ey.  Co.,  133  Fed.  220,  3  Tex.  Ct.  of  App.  p.  179,  §  142. 

66  C.  C.  A.  274.  3  4Smithko   v.   Pittsburgh   etc.   E. 

ssjager  v.  Dey,  80  la.  23,  45  N.  E.  Co.,  5  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  543. 

W.  391.  SBKansas  City  Interurban  Ey.  Co. 

ssEversfieldv.  Mid-Sussex  Ey.  Co.,  v.  Davis,  197  Mo.  669,  95  S.  W.  881, 

3  DeG.  &  J.  286;  Bentinclc  v.  Nor-  114  Am.  St.  Eep.  790. 

folk  Estuary  Co.,  8  DeG.  McN.  &  G.  ssBigelow  v.  Draper,  6  N.  D.  152. 

714;  see  oiso  Parsons  V.  Howe,  41  Me.  State   v.    District   Court,   34   Mont. 

218;    Nevf   York   etc.   E.   E.   Co.   v.  535,  88  Pac.  44,   115  Am.   St.  Eep. 

Gunnison,  1  Hun  496;  S.  C.  3  N.  Y.  540  is  a  similar  case  but  the  com- 

Supm.  Ct.  Eep.  632.  pany  had  express  authority  to  divert 

9  0People  V.  New  York  &  Harlem  the   stream   when   necessary.     Com- 

E.  E.  Co.,  45  Barb.  73.  pare  Cleveland  etc.  Ey.  Co.  v.  South, 

siChicago  etc.  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Gait,  78  Ohio  St.  10,  84  N.  E.  418. 
133  111.  657,  23  N.  B.  425,  24  N.  E. 
Kep.  674,  1  Am.  E.  R.  &  Corp.  Eep. 
365. 


716 


EMINENT   DOMAIN. 


§    391 


vania,  "where  the  right  of  way  was  limited  to  sixty  feet,  except 
for  embankments,  cuttings,  sidings,  turnouts,  depots  and  sta- 
tions, it  was  held  the  company  could  not  take  an  extra  width  in 
order  to  make  a  new  channel  for  a  stream  and  save  two  bridges.®^ 
Unless  otherwise  provided  in  the  act,  a  company  may  be  or- 
ganized under  a  general  railroad  law  to  construct  a  railroad 
wholly  within  a  city,  or  across  a  river,  and  may  condemn  proper- 
ty therefor.**  A  railroad  a  mile  long  and  underground  was  held 
within  the  authority."  So  one, three  miles  long  and  mostly  in 
one  city.-^  In  one  case  the  authority  was  to  construct,  maintain 
and  operate  a  railroad  "between  the  points  named  in  the  ar- 
ticles of  incorporation,  commencing  at  or  within,  and  extend- 
ing to  or  into,  any  city,  village,  town  or  place  named  as  a 
terminus  of  its  road."  It  was  held  to  justify  a  road  wholly  with- 
in one  city.^  Under  authority  to  construct  a  railway  from  one 
place  to  another,  a  belt  road  may  be  built  around  a  city.*  Rail- 
road corporations  were  required  to  specify  in  their  certificate 
of  incorporation  the  names  of  the  places  of  the  termini  of  the 


9  7Snee  v.  West  Side  Belt  R.  R. 
Co.,  210  Pa.  St.  480,  60  Atl.  94.  The 
statute  also  gave  authority  to  enter 
upon  all  land  upon  which  the  rail- 
road and  appurtenances  may  be  lo- 
cated, "or  which  may  be  necessary 
or  convenient  for  the  erection  of  the 
same,  or  for  any  purpose  necessary 
or  useful  in  the  construction,  main- 
tenance or  repair  of  said  railroad 
and  therein  and  thereon  to  dig,  ex- 
cavate and  embank,  make,  grade 
and  lay  down  and  construct  the 
same."  It  was  claimed  that  this 
justified  a  taking  for  the  proposed 
new  channel  but  the  court  held 
otherwise.  So  in  Philadelphia  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.'s  Petition,  32  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 
337.  Where  a  railroad  right  of  way 
was  limited  to  a  width  of  sixty  feet 
"except  in  the  neighborhood  of  deep 
cuttings  or  high  embankments,"  an 
embankment  three  to  five  feet  high 
was  held  not  to  justify  the  taking  of 
a  greater  width.  Curtis  v.  Colum- 
bus etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  Pa.  Dist.  Ct. 
1017. 


ssNiemeyer  v.  Little  Rock  Junc- 
tion R.  R.  Co.,  43  Ark.  Ill;  Wiggins 
Ferry  Co.  v.  East  St.  Louis  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  107  111.  450;  National  Docks 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  United  N.  J.  R.  R. 
Co.,  53  N.  J.  L.  217,  21  Atl.  570; 
Cincinnati  International  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Murray,  10  Ohio  N.  P.  (N.SJ 
301. 

ssSparks  v.  Philadelphia  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  212  Pa.  St.  105,  61  Atl.  881. 

iBridwell  v.  Gate  City  Terminal 
Co.,  127  Ga.  520,  56  S.  E.  624,  10 
L.R.A.(N.S.)   909. 

2  State  V.  Union  Terminal  R.  R. 
Co.,  72  Ohio  St.  455,  74  N.  E.  642. 
Almost  identical  words  were  given 
the  same  effect  in  Long  Branch 
Comrs.  V.  West  End  R.  R.  Co.,  29 
N.  J.  Eq.  566,  approved  in  National 
Docks  Ry.  Co.  v.  Central  R.  R.  Co., 
32  N.  J.  Eq.  755. 

3  State  V.  Martin,  51  Kan.  462,  33 
Pac.  9;  Collier  v.  Union  Ry.  Co.,  113 
Tenn.  96,  83  S.  W.  155.  But  see 
Gillette  v.  Aurora  Ry.  Co.,  228  111. 
261,  81  N.  E.  1005. 


§    392  THE  STATUTOKY  AUTHORITY.  71 7 

road,  and  the  county  or  counties,  city  or  cities  through  which 
it  should  pass,  and  were  authorized  to  construct  a  railroad  "be- 
tween the  points  named  in  the  certificate,  commencing  at  or 
within  and  extending  to  or  into  any  town,  city  or  village  named 
as  the  place  of  termini  of  such  road."  It  was  held  that  the 
termini  of  the  road  need  not  be  within  any  city,  village  or 
town.* 

A  traction  act  authorized  railroad  companies  formed  there- 
under to  condemn  not  exceeding  sixty  feet  in  width,  "either 
as  an  extension  of  the  line  of  an  existing  railway,  or  a  new  line." 
The  word  extension  was  held  to  refer  to  longitudinal  extension 
and  not  lateral  extension,  and  that  a  company  could  not  condemn 
to  widen  an  existing  right  of  way.^ 

§  392  (256a).  Same:  Branch  and  lateral  railroads. 
An  act  conferring  authority  upon  a  railroad  to  construct 
branches  from  its  main  line,  means  the  main  line  as  it  existed  at 
the  time  the  act  was  passed.®  The  charter  of  a  railroad  company 
gave  it  power  to  construct  "branches  or  lateral  roads  in  any  di- 
rection whatsoever  in  connection  with  the  said  railroad,  not  ex- 
ceeding ten  miles  each  in  length."  It  was  held  that  it  could 
construct  a  branch  running  in  the  same  general  direction  as  the 
main  line  and  connecting  with  another  railroad. '^  It  has  been 
held  no  objection  that  the  branch  is  twice  as  long  as  the  main 
line.®  The  power  to  build  laterals  or  branches  implies  the  power 
to  condemn  for  that  purpose.*  A  railroad,  authorized  to  con- 
struct a  specified  main  line  and  branches,  cannot  construct  the 
branch  and  abandon  the  main  line.^"     Under  a  power  to  "con- 

4Uiiion  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Canton  R.  R.  sVolmer  v.  Schuylkill  Riv.  E.  S. 

Co.,  105  Md.  12,  65  Atl.  409.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  Phil.  248. 

sMetlar  v.  Middlesex  etc.  Traction  sNehall  v.  Galena  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 

Co.,  72  N.  J.  L.  524,  63  Atl.  497,  re-  U  111.  273. 

versing  S.  C.     suh.  nom.    Middlesex  loQcelet  v.  Met.   Transit  Co.,  48 

etc.  Traction  Cb.  v.  Metlar,  70  N.  J.  Hun  520,  15  N.  Y.  St.  936,  1  N.  Y. 

L.  98,  56  Atl.  142.  Supp.  74.    Bee  further  on  the  power 

sCity  of  Philadelphia  v.  Philadel-  to  take  for  branch  or  lateral  roads: 

phia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  Phil.  507.    To  Arrington  v.  Savannah  &  W.  R.  R. 

same  effect:      People's  Pass.  R.   R.  Co.,  95  Ala.  434,  11  So.  7;  Graff  v. 

Co.  V.  Market  St.  Pass.  R.  R.  Co.,  8  Evergreen  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

Pa.  Co.  Ct.  273.  502;  Schofield  v.  Pennsylvania  S.  V. 

'Blanton  v.  Richmond  etc.  R.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  12  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  122;  Wheel- 
Co.,  86  Va.  618,  10  S.  E.  925.     And  ing  Bridge  etc.  Co.  v.  Camden  Consol. 
see  Nehall  v.  Galena  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  Oil  Co.,  35  W.  Va.  205,  13  S.  E.  369. 
111.  273;  Baltimore  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Waters,  105  Md.  396,  66  Atl.  685. 


718 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


§  393 


struct,  maintain  and  operate  branches  within  the  limits  of  any 
county  through  "which  said  road  may  pass,"  it  was  held  that  a 
road  wholly  within  a  city  could  avail  of  the  statute  and  that  the 
privilege  was  not  confined  to  roads  passing  through  a  county.  ^^ 
Power  to  construct  switches,  turnouts  or  branches  does  not  justi- 
fy a  cut-off  around  a  city  between  two  points  on  the  main  line 
and  designed  to  take  part  of  the  through  traffic.-'^ 

§  393  (256b).  Same:  Street  and  elevated  railroads. 
The  General  Eailroad  Law  of  Illinois  provides  for  the  organiza- 
tion of  corporations  "for  the  purpose  of  constructing  and  oper- 
ating any  railroad"  in  the  State.  The  Chicago  and  Southside 
Rapid  Transit  Company  was  organized  under  the  act  for  the 
declared  purpose  of  constructing  a  "railroad"  between  certain 
termini  in  the  city  of  Chicago.  Its  real  purpose  was  to  con- 
struct an  elevated  railroad.  The  supreme  court  of  Illinois  held 
that  such  a  purpose  was  within  the  act  and  that  such  a  road 
could  be  built  under  the  company's  charter,  and  that  land  could 
be  condemned  therefor.^^    But  it  is  held  that  a  system  of  street 


iiGray  v.  Greenville  etc.  Ey.  Co., 
59  N.J.  Eq.  372,  46  Atl.  638. 

i2Erie  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Steward,  170 
K.  Y.  172,  63  N.  E.  118,  affirming  61 
App.  Div.  480,  70  N.  Y.  S.  698;  Nor- 
folk etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lynchburg  Cot- 
ton Mills  Co.,  106  Va.  376,  56  S.  E. 
146.  Compare  Baltimore  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Waters,  105  Md.  396,  66  Atl. 
685. 

i3Lieberman  v.  Chicago  &  S.  S.  R. 
T.  R.  Co.,  141  111.  140,  30  N.  E.  544. 
The  court  says:  "We  are  able  to 
perceive  no  reason  why  the  word 
'railroad,'  as  here  used,  should  not 
be  construed  to  apply  to  elevated 
railroads  as  well  as  to  any  others. 
While  most  railroads,  for  obvious 
reasons,  are  so  constructed  as  to 
make  their  grade  conform  as  nearly 
as  practicable  to  that  of  the  earth's 
surface,  yet  it  is  a  fact,  with  which 
every  one  is  familiar,  that  they  are 
sometimes  constructed  wholly  be- 
neath the  surface,  and  sometimes 
upon  an  elevation  above  the  surface. 
It  is  also  a  matter  of  common  knowl- 


edge that  an  ordinary  surface  rail- 
road may  and  often  does,  in  different 
parts  of  its  line,  run  through  tun- 
nels excavated  beneath  the  surface, 
or  upon  structures  so  built  as  to  ele- 
vate it  above  the  surface.  But  it  has 
never  been  supposed  that,  whether 
they  run  beneath  or  above  the  sur- 
face, they  are  any  the  less  entitled 
to  the  name  of  'railroads.'  Nor  does 
the  fact  that  a  railroad  is  wholly 
underground  or  wholly  raised  above 
the  surface  make  it  any  the  less  a 
railroad.  The  term  'railroad,'  as 
used  in  the  act  of  1872,  is  clearly 
broad  enough  to  include  an  elevated 
railroad;  and  we  think  the  legisla- 
ture clearly  intended  to  use  the  word 
in  a  sense  sufficiently  broad  and  gen- 
eral to  include  railroads  of  that  char- 
acter. The  same  word,  when  used  in 
the  petitioner's  articles  of  incorpora- 
tion, must  be  deemed  to  be  used  in  a 
sense  equally  general.  The  peti- 
tioner, then,  by  its  incorporation,  be- 
came authorized  to  construct  a  rail- 
road between  the  designated  points; 


§    393  THE  STATUTORY  AUTHOEITY.  719 

railroads  cannot  be  constructed  under  this  law.'*  It  is  held  in 
Pennsylvania  that  an  elevated  street  passenger  railroad  com- 
pany Qould  not  be  organized  nor  such  a  railroad  constructed 
under  the  General  Railroad  Law  of  that  State. '^  But  there  had 
been  one  course  of  legislation  for  ordinary  steam  railroads,  and 
another  for  street  passenger  railroads,  and  the  two  systems  had 
been  kept  quite  distinct.  Moreover  the  General  Kailroad  Law 
expressly  provided  that  the  provisions  of  the  act  should  "not  be 
construed  so  as  to  authorize  the  formation  of  street  passenger 
railway  companies  to  construct  passenger  railways  in  any  city 
or  borough  of  this  commonwealth."  A  similar  conclusion  has 
been  reached  by  the  New  York  courts  in  construing  the  General 
Railroad  Law  of  that  State.  ■'''  In  the  first  case  cited,  which  was 
a  proceeding  for  condemnation,  it  was  held  that  the  General 
Railroad  Law  did  not  confer  power  to  construct  an  elevated 
railroad  through  the  city  of  New  York,  in  the  form  of  a  two- 
story  viaduct,  having  a  height  of  seventy-five  feet,  and  crossing 
the  streets  upon  steel  bridges  sixty  feet  above  the  surface.  Fol- 
lowing this  decision  it  was  held  in  the  other  case  that  the  same 
law  did  not  authorize  the  construction  of  an  ordinary  elevated 
railroad  along  the  streets  of  a  city,  and,  of  course,  the  company 
could  not  have  condemned  the  easements  of  abutting  owners  for 
the  purpose  of  its  organization.  But  a  company  organized  under 
the  general  railroad  act  may  make  a  connection  with  an  elevated 
railroad.-'^  The  general  railroad  laws  of  New  York  and  Mis- 
souri have  been  held  to  authorize  the  formation  of  corporations 
to  construct  and  operate  horse  and  street  railroads.-'®  Statutes 
authorizing  the  condemnation  of  property  for  railroad  purposes 
have  been  held  not  to  apply  to  street  railroads.'^    But  a  general 

and  the  authority  thus  obtained  in-  I'Beekman  v.  Brooklyn  &  B.  R.  R. 

eluded,  ex  vi  termini,  that  of  con-  Co.,  89  Hun  84,  35  N.  Y.  Supp.  84. 
structing  an  elevated  railroad."  isin  re  Washington  St.  &  0.  R.  R. 

"Gillette  v.  Aurora  Rys.  Co.,  228  Co.,  115  N.  Y.  442,  22  N.  E.  356;  St. 

ni.  261,  81  N.  E.  1005.  Louis  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Northwestern  R. 

isPotts  V.  Quaker  City  El.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  2  Mo.  App.  69. 
Co.,  161  Pa.  St.  396,  29  Atl.  108;  S.  isThompson-Houaton  Electric  Co, 

C.  12  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  593;  Commonwealth  v.  Simon,  20  Ore.  60,  25  Pac.  147,  23 

V.  Northeastern  R.  R.  Co.,  161  Pa.  St.  Am.   St.  Rep.  86,   10  L.R.A.  251,   3 

409,  29  Atl.  112.  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  393;  Ralm 

isPeople's   Rapid   Transit   Co.   v.  Tp.  v.  Tamaqua  &  L.  St.  R.  R.  Co., 

Dash,   125  N.  Y.  93,  26  N.  E.   25;  4  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  29. 
Schafer  v.  Brooklyn  &  L.  I.  R.  R. 
Co.,  124  N.  Y.  630,  26  N.  E.  311. 


r20 


EMINENT  DOMAIN. 


§  393 


statute  of  Louisiana  conferring  the  power  o±  eminent  domain 
lipon  any  corporation  constituted  under  the  laws  of  that  State 
for  the  construction  of  railroads,  was  held  to  include  stregt  and 
electric  railroads.^*  A  general  law  conferred  upon  street  rail- 
road companies  power  to  take  and  hold  such  land  as  might  be 
necessary  for  the  purpose  of  installing  and  maintaining  power 
plants.  This  was  held  only  to  authorize  the  condemnation  of 
land  for  the  site  of  a  plant  and  not  to  authorize  the  taking  of 
water  and  water  power  to  operate  the  plant.^^  Where  a  street 
railroad  company  was  empowered  to  condemn  private  property 
when  necessary  for  the  construction,  maintenance  or  operation 
of  its  road,  it  was  held  that  the  company  could  not  deviate 
from  the  highway  except  to  avoid  obstructions  or  difficulties, 
which  could  not  reasonably  be  otherwise  overcome.^^  The  ques- 
tion of  necessity  is  one  of  fact  to  be  found  in  each  case  and  the 
right  to  condemn  depends  upon  this  fact.  Municipal  authorities 
cannot  prevent  condemnation  in  a  proper  case  by  refusing  con- 
sent to  a  location  on  private  property,^*  nor  authorize  condem- 
nation in  an  improper  case  by  giving  such  consent.^* 


2  0Shreveport  Traction  Co.  v.  Kan- 
sas City  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  119  La.  759, 
44  So.  457.  And  see  Birmingham 
Union  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Elyton  Land  Co., 
114  Ala.  70;  South  &  North  Ala.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Highland  Av.  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  119  Ala.  105,  24  So.  114;  Matter 
of  South  Beach  R.  R.  Co.,  119  N.  Y. 
141,  23  N.  E.  486,  affirjning  53  Hun 
131,  25  N.  Y.  St.  328,  6  N.  Y.  Supp. 
172;  Matter  of  Rochester  Electric  R. 
R.  Co.,  57  Hun  56,  10  N.  Y.  S.  379. 

ziClaremont  Ry.  &  Lt.  Co.  v.  Put- 
ney, 73  N.  H.  431,  62  Atl.  727.  See 
In  re  R.  I.  Suburban  Ry.  Co.,  22  R. 
I.  455,  48  Atl.  590 ;  In  re  R.  I.  Sub- 
urban Ry.  Co.,  22  R.  L  457,  48  Atl. 
591,  52  L.R.A.  879. 

2  2Harvey  v.  Aurora  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
174  111.  295,  51  N.  E.  163.  The  court 
says :  "If,  in  the  construction  of  the 
road  in  the  highway,  difficulties  or 
obstructions  were  encountered  which 
rendered  it  impracticable  to  con- 
struct the  road  in  the  highway,  a 
necessity    might    arise,    within    the 


meaning  of  the  law,  which  would  au- 
thorize the  company  to  leave  the 
highway  and  go  upon  private  prop- 
erty until  the  difficulty  encountered 
was  overcome,  when  a  return  could 
be  made  to  the  highway;  or  if  suffi- 
cient land  could  not  be  had  in  the 
street  for  sidetracks,  turnouts,  or 
stations,  and  the  same  were  neces- 
sary for  a  successful  operation  of  the 
road,  under  the  statute  the  company 
^yould  have  the  right  to  resort  to  pri- 
vate property."  S.  C.  Aurora  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Harvey,  178  111.  477,  53 
N.  E.  331 ;  Harvey  v.  Aurora  etc.  Ry. 
Co.  186  111.  286,  57  N.  E.  857. 
Same  point:  Hartshorn  v.  111.  Val. 
Traction  Co.,  210  111.  609,  71  N.  E. 
612. 

2  3Harvey  v.  Aurora  etc.  Ry.  Co., 
186  111.  283,  57  K.  E.  857. 

2  4  Dewey  v.  Chicago  etc.  Elec.  Ry. 
Co.,  184  111.  426,  56  N.  E.  804.  A 
street  railway  may  construct  its  line 
upon  private  property  acquired  by 
purchase    or    consent.     Farnum    v. 


§    394  THE  STATUTOET  AUTHOEITT.  721 

§  394  (256c).  Same:  Roads  and  streets.  Statutes  giv- 
ing authority  to  lay  out  private  roads  are  very  strictly  con- 
structed and  confined  to  the  particular  cases  -specified  in  the 
statute.^^  But  authority  to  lay  out  a  private  road  to  the  near- 
est highway  does  not  mean  that  it  must  be  laid  out  on  the 
shortest  line  to  the  highway.^®  Authority  to  lay  out  private 
roads  from  dwellings  and  plantations  to  a  public  highway,  does 
not  authorize  one  from  a  coal  bank  or  coal  mine.^'^  Authority 
to  lay  out  highways  and  townways  includes  a  public  footway.^* 
A  statute  permitting  roads  for  private  and  public  use  to  be  laid 
out  "from  one  dwelling  or  plantation  of  an  individual  to  any 
public  road,  or  from  one  public  road  to  another,  or  from  a  lot 
of  land  to  a  public  road,  or  from  a  lot  of  land  to  a  public  water- 
way," was  held  not  to  authorize  a  road  connecting  several  lots 
of  land  with  a  public  road.^*  Power  to  regulate  and  improve 
streets  does  not  confer  authority  to  open  streets.^*  But  power 
to  a  city  to  condenan  for  its  public  corporate  purposes  includes 
streets  and  alleys.*^  Authority  to  lay  out  and  vacate  public 
roads,  and  to  open  or  extend  any  street,  lane  or  alley,  was  held 
not  to  authorize  the  widening  of  a  twenty-foot  alley  to  a  fifty- 
foot  street.*"  Authority  to  widen  and  straighten  a  street  is  not 
authority  to  extend  it.**  Authority  to  survey  a  highway  that  has 
become  uncertain  does  not  justify  the  taking  of  land  not  in- 
cluded in  the  street.**  Under  power  to  alter  streets  the  width 
may  be  diminished,*^  but  an  entirely  new  road  cannot  be  laid 
out  between  the  termini  of  the  old  one.*®  Power  to  lay  out  and 
alter  roads  is  power  to  lay  out  a  new  road  and  discontinue 

Haverhill  etc.  St.  Ky.  Co.,  178  Mass.  soKnowles   v.    Muscatine,    20   la. 

300,  59  N.  E.  755.  248. 

2  5Killbuck  Private  Eoad,  77  Pa.  "State    v.    Superior    Court,    44 

St.  39;  Klicker  v.  Guilbaud,  47  N.  J.  Wash.  476,  87  Pae.  521. 

L.     277;     Commissioners     of     Bibb  ^^I"  re  Liberty  Alley,  8  Pa.   St. 

County  V.  Harris,  71  Ga.  250;  Lyon  381. 

v.  Hamor,  73  Me.  56.  sswidening  of  Thirty-fourth  St., 

2  estate   v.    Stockhouse,   14   8.   C.      ^^  ^^^^^-  ^^'^^ 
^^y  34Beckwith  v.  Beckwith,  22  Ohio 

St.    180.     But    see    Culver    v.    Fair 
Haven,  67  Vt.  163,  31  Atl.  143. 

ssHeiple  v.  Clackamas  County,  20 
Ore.  147,  25  Pac.  291.    And  see  Wil- 
2  8Boston  &  A.  K.  E.  Co.  v.  Boston,      jiama  v.  Carey,  73  la.  194,  34  N.  W. 
140  Mass.  87.  813. 

29Funderburk  v.  Spengler,  234  III.  ssQloucester  v.  County  Comrs.,  3 

574,  85  N.  E.  193.  Met.  375. 

Em.  D.^6. 


27Ca]houn'8  Road,  8  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 
222;  Palmer's  Private  Eoad,  16  Pa. 
Co.   Ct.   340. 


722  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    395 

an  old  one  for  which  the  new  is  a  substitute.^^  Under  a  general 
power  to  lay  out  highways  it  was  held  that  a  town  had  power 
to  divert  one  channel  of  a  stream  into  the  other  channel  so  as 
to  avoid  two  bridges.^*  A  statute  for  the  laying  out  of  public 
roads  was  held  to  contemplate  one  of  sufficient  width  and  grade 
to  accommodate  vehicles  and  not  to  justify  the  establishment  of 
a  bridle  path  for  horse-back  travel  only.^* 

§  395  (256d).  Same:  Statutes  relating  to  thg  taking 
of  materials  for  the  repair  of  roads  and  bridges.  It  is  com- 
mon to  provide  by  statute  that  the  proper  officers  may  enter 
upon  private  property  and  take  timber  and  materials  for  the  re- 
pair of  roads  and  bridges,  the  compensation  to  be  afterwards  ad- 
justed. Where  the  constitution  does  not  require  prepayment 
for  property  taken,  and  adequate  provision  is  made  whereby  the 
owner  may  obtain  compensation,  such  statutes  are  valid.*"  Au- 
thority to  enter  upon  unimproved  lands  and  take  materials 
for  repairing  highways  and  bridges  does  not  authorize  the  taking 
of  timbers  which  the  owner  has  prepared  for  his  own  use,"*"^  nor 
justify  an  entry  upon  improved  lands.*  ^  Such  an  authority 
must  be  construed  as  giving  a  reasonable  discretion  to  the  officer 
charged  with  its  execution.  He  is  not  confined  to  the  land  im- 
mediately adjacent  to  the  place  where  the  material  is  used,  but 
he  may  not  take  the  material  at  will  anywhere  in  his  jurisdic- 
tion.** 

§  396  (256e).  Same:  Drains,  levees,  irrigation. 
Under  authority  to  construct  ditches  from  a  highway  to  a  natural 
water-course,  one  cannot  be  made  to  a  pond.**  Power  to  drain 
the  low  or  swamp  lands  of  one  man  across  the  lands  of  another 
does  not  authorize  a  drain  onto  the  lands  of  another,  unless  it 
connects  with  some  pond  or  water-course  so  as  to  produce  no 
harm.*^  Where  ditches  were  allowed  to  be  established  which 
would  be  of  benefit  to  any  highway  or  street  of  any  town  or 
city,  the  turnpike  of  an  incorporated  company  was  held  to  be 

s'Millcreek  Road,  29  Pa.  St.  195.  Matthews,  25  Ore.  484,  36  Pac.  529, 

3  8 Anthony  v.  Adams,  1  Met.  284.  24    L.R.A.     355;     Cherry    v.    Lane 

3  9Terry  v.  McClung,  104  Va.  599,  County,  25  Ore.  487,  36  Pac.  531. 

52  S.  E.  355.  "Goodman  v.  Bradley,  2  Wis.  257. 

40McOsker  v.  Burrell,  55  Ind.  425.  42Jackson  v.  Rankin,  67  Wis.  285. 

And  see  Lindell  v.  Hannibal  etc.  R.  <3Collins  v.  Crecy,  8  Jones  L.  333. 

R.  Co.,  25  Mo.  550;  Palmer  v.  State,  ■»  4McLaughlin  v.  Sandusky,  17  Neb. 

Wright,  (Ohio),  364;  Branson v.G«e,  110. 

25  Ore.  462,  36  Pac.  527;  Cherry  v.  isSherman  v.  Tobey,  3  Allen  7. 


§    397  THE   STATUTOEY  AUTHORITY.  T23 

-within  the  act.**^  A  statute  for  draining  lands,  provided  for  the 
construction  of  levees,  if  necessary  to  accomplish  the  drainage 
sought.  Held  not  to  authorize  a  levee  sixty  miles  long  not  con- 
nected with  any  drain  or  ditch.*''  A  statute,  for  the  purpose  of 
drainage,  permitted  the  straightening,  etc.,  of  the  channel  of  a 
water-course.  Held  not  to  authorize  such  straightening  as  a 
principal  object,  when  the  drainage  was  a  mere  incident.** 
§  397  (256e).  Same:  Dams,  water  and  water  power. 
Under  authority  to  erect  a  dam  and  reservoir  for  the  use  of 
a  corporation  and  of  mills  below,  the  corporation  may  maintain 
a  dam  and  sell  part  of  the  power  to  the  lower  mills.*®  Power 
to  build  a  dam  for  working  a  water  mill,  does  not  authorize  a 
dam  to  raise  water  for  floating  logs  to  a  steam  mill.^"  Authority 
to  condemn  for  a  mill  does  not  authorize  a  taking  for  a  tail 
race.®^  An  existing  corporation  was  authorized  to  take  the 
waters  of  certain  specified  ponds  and  to  "construct,  lay  down 
and  maintain,  any  dam  or  dams,  pipes,  fountains,  or  reservoirs 
whatsoever,  upon  or  over  any  land  whatsoever."  The  only  pro- 
vision for  compensation  was  to  persons  suffering  damage  "by 
the  taking  the  water  aforesaid."  It  was  held  it  could  only  take 
the  waters  mentioned  and  that  it  could  not  condemn  land  for  a 
dam  or  for  flooding.  ^^  An  act  in  regard  to  the  construction  of 
waterworks  gave  power  "to  lay  down  all  such  pipes  and  conduits 
for  water"  as  should  be  necessary  and  proper  to  carry  into  effect 
the  act.  It  was  held  that  land  might  be  taken  for  an  open  con- 
duit to  convey  water  from  a  pond  to  a  pumping  station. ^^  A 
company  was  empowered  to  furnish  the  town  of  B  with  water 
for  the  extinguishment  of  fires  and  "for  domestic,  sanitary  and 
other  purposes."  Held  the  words  "other  purposes,"  must  be  con- 
strued to  mean  other  like  purposes,  that  is,  such  as  were  a  public 
use,  and  that  water  could  not  be  taken  for  the  purpose  of  furnish- 
ing mechanical  power.®*    Where  a  water  company  has  a  sufiicient 

46Neff  V.  Reed,  98  Ind.  341.  sscheyney  v.  Atlantic  City  W.  W. 

"Updike  V.  Wright,  81  III.  49.  Co.,  55  N.  J.  L.  235,  26  Atl.  95.    And 

«8Scruggs  V.  Reese,  128  Ind.  399,  see  Rialto  Irr.  Dist.  v.  Brandon,  103 

27  N.  E.  748.  Cal.  384,  37  Pac.  484. 

■1 9 Amoskeag  Mfg.  Co.  V.  Worcester,  6  4In  re  Barre  Water  Co.,  62  Vt. 

60  N.  H.  522.  27,  20  Atl.  109,  3  Am.  R.  R.  &  Corp. 

soDixon  V.  Eaton,  68  Me.  542.  Rep.  136;  Smith  v.  Barre  Water  Co., 

51  Coulter  V.  Hunter,  4  Rand.  58,  73  Vt.  310,  50  Atl.  1055. 
15  Am.  Dec.  726. 

5  2Pickman  v.  Peahody,  145  Mass. 
480,  14  N.  E.  751. 


724  EMINENT   DOMAIJf.  §    398 

supply  of  water  for  the  inhabitants  of  the  place  named  in  its 
charter,  it  cannot  condemn  an  additional  supply  to  furnish  cus- 
tomers outside  of  that  territory.®'  Power  to  condemn  the  water 
of  certain  springs  includes  the  power  to  condemn  riparian  rights 
in  the  flow  of  the  springs.^®  The  Missouri  statute  as  to  mills 
and  mill  dams  is  held,  in  view  of  its  history,  to  refer  to  grist- 
mills only  and  not  to  authorize  condemnation  for  water  power  to 
generate  electricity,  though  for  public  use.^^ 

§  398  (256e).  Same:  Telegraphs  and  telephones. — 
Electric  companies.  Power  to  condemn  for  a  telegraph  line 
includes  a  telephone  line.®*  Authority  to  construct  telephone 
lines  "along  and  parallel  to  any  railroad  in  the  State"  was  held 
to  authorize  the  construction  of  a  line  on  the  right  of  way  and 
to  condemn  for  that  purpose.®^  Where  telegraph  and  telephone 
companies  had  power  to  condemn  property  "for  the  purpose  of 
constructing  new  lines,"  it  was  held  that  a  new  route  for  an 
old  line  was  a  "new  line"  within  the  statute.®" 

§  399  (256e).  Same:  Mxmicipal  puqioses.  A  general 
act  entitled  "An  Act  to  empower  cities  to  acquire  land  for  public 
use  by  condemnation,"  and  which  authorize  them  to  condemn 
land  "for  any  lawful  public  use  or  purpose,"  applies  only  to 
such  public  uses  as  the  city  is  otherwise  empowered  to  promote.®^ 
Under  a  power  to  construct  a  system  of  sewage  disposal,  a  city 
cannot  condemn  the  right  to  discharge  a  sewer  upon  a  tract  of 
land,  leaving  the  owner  to  dispose  of  it  as  he  can.®^  So  under 
a  similar  power  to  condemn  for  a  sewerage  system,  it  was  held  a 
city  could  not  condemn  the  right  to  pollute  a  stream  with  sew- 
erage, temporarily,  as  for  a  period  of  five  years.®^     Under  au- 

ssDetwiler  v.  Citizens  Water  Co.,  160,   71   S.  W.   270,   60  LJt.A.   145. 

25  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  481.  See  ante,  §  371. 

ssWautauga  Water  Co.  v.  Scott,  B9S.  W.  Telephone  Co.  v.  Kansas 

111  Tenn.  321,  76  S.  W.  888.  City  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  109  La.  892,  33  So. 

57S.  W.  Mo.  Lt.  Co.  T.  Scheurich,  910. 

174  Mo.  235,  73  S.  W.  496;  Scheurich  soCumberland  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v. 

V.  S.  W.  Mo.  Lt.  Co.,  109  Mo.  App.  Yazoo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  90  Miss.  686, 

406,   84   S.   W.    1003.     See   Howard  44  So.  166. 

Mills  Co.  V.  Schwartz  L.  &  C.  Co.,  sistate  v.  City  of  Newark,  54  N. 

77  Kan.  599,  95  Pae.  559.  J.  L.  62,  23  Atl.  129.    And  see  In  re 

ssGulf  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  S.  W.  Tel.  Thompson,   86   Hun  405,   33  N.  Y. 

&  Tel.  Co.,  18  Tex.  Civ.  App.  500,  45  Supp.  467. 

S.  W.  151 ;  Gulf  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  S.  W.  ezColby  v.  La  Grange,  65  Fed.  Rep. 

Tel.   &,  Tel.   Co.,  25  Tex.   Civ.   App.  554. 

488,  61  S.  W.  406;  Ft.  Worth  etc.  Ry.  esWaterbury  v.  Piatt  Bros.  &  Co., 

Co.  V.  S.  W.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  96  Tex.  75  Conn.  387,  53  Atl.  958,  96  Am.  St. 


§    400  THE  STATTJTOEY  AUTHOBITT.  725 

thority  to  "acquire,  to  open  and  to  lay  out  public  grounds  or 
squares,  streets,  alleys  and  highways,"  land  cannot  be  condemned 
for  a  city  prison.®'*  Power  to  condemn  "for  public  wharves, 
docks,  slips,  basins  and  landings  on  navigable  waters  and  for  the 
improvement  of  water-courses,"  was  held  not  to  authorize  the 
taking  of  land  to  enlarge  a  harbor.®^  Authority  "to  build,  or 
acquire  by  purchase,  lease  or  gift,  and  to  maintain  ferries  and 
bridges,  and  the  appurtenances  thereto"  authorizes  condemnation 
for  a  ferry  landing  and  approaches.®*  A  city  had  power  "to 
improve  rivers  and  streams  flowing  through  such  city  or  ad- 
joining the  same ;  to  widen,  straighten  and'  deepen  the  channel 
thereof  and  remove  obstructions  therefrom."  Under  this  power 
a  city  on  one  side  of  a  stream  was  held  to  have  power  to  condemn 
land  on  the  other  side  of  the  stream  in  order  to  straighten  and 
improve  it.*''  A  municipality  may  be  authorized  to  condemn 
property  beyond  its  limits.** 

§  400  (2S6e).  Same.  Miscellaneous.  A  statute  pro- 
vided for  the  condemnation  of  land  "to  construct  a  canal  or  a 
railroad  or  a  turnpike,  graded,  macadamized  or  plank  road  or 
bridge  or  a  work  of  public  utility."  It  was  held  not  to  authorize 
condemnation  for  a  ferry.*® 

A  statute  authorizing  the  formation  of  corporations  to  im- 
prove the  navigation  of  any  river  does  not  authorize  an  incor- 
poration to  improve  a  stream  not  navigable  for  any  purpose  in 
a  state  of  nature.'^*  Under  authority  to  take  materials  "neces- 
sary for  the  prosecution  of  the  improvements  intended  by  this 
act  and  to  make  all  such  canals,"  etc.,  it  was  held  that  materials 
could  be  taken  for  repairs  as  well  as  for  construction.''^  Au- 
thority to  condemn  land  for  a  cemetery  does  not  permit  the  tak- 

Eep.  229.    Other  suits  arising  out  of  works.     Indianapolis  v.  Consumers' 

the  same  matter :     Piatt  Bros.  &  Co.  Gas  Trust  Co.,  144  Fed.  640,  75  C.  C. 

V.  Waterbury,  72  Conn.  531,  45  Atl.  A.    442,   reversing    S.    C.    sub   nom. 

154,  77  Am.  St.  Rep.  335,  48  L.R.A.  Quimby   v.    Consumers'    Gas   Trust 

691;  Waterbury  v.  Piatt  Bros.  &  Co.,  Co.,  144  Fed.  362. 

76  Conn.  435,  56  Atl.  856.  e^Puyalluy  v.  Laeey,  43  Wash.  110, 

oiEast  St.  Louis  v.  St.  John,  47  86  Pac.  215. 

111.  463.  6  8  State    v.    Superior    Court,    35 

6  6  South  Haven  v.  Probate  Judge,  Wash.  303,  77  Pac.  382. 

140  Mich.  117,  103  N.  W.  521.  6  9Sandford  v.  Martin,  31  la.  67. 

6  6Helm  V.  Graybill,  224  HI.  274,  7  0East   Branch    etc.    Imp.    Co.   v. 

79  N.  E.  689.    Under  poSver  to  estab-  Lumber  Co.,  69  Mich.  207,  37  N.  W. 

lish  and  construct  gas  works,  held  a  Rep.  192. 

city    could    purchase    Natural    Gas  71  Bates  v.  Cooper,  5  Ohio  115. 


726 


EMIITENT  DOMAIN, 


§  401 


ing  of  land  for  a  road  to  a  cemetery.  ^^  Power  to  regulate  public 
landings  does  not  give  power  to  lay  out  new  landings.^*  Under 
authority  to  condemn  sites  for  school-houses,  not  exceeding  one 
acre,  a  district  may  condemn  to  enlarge  a  lot  to  a  size  not  ex- 
ceeding the  limit  fixed.''*  A  gas  company  authorized  to  condemn 
land  "for  the  laying  of  pipe  lines  for  the  transportation  and  dis- 
tribution of  natural  gas,"  cannot  condemn  a  right  of  way  for 
pipe  lines  and  also  for  a  telegraph  or  telephone  line  to  be  used 
only  in  the  operation  of  such  pipe  lines.''*  A  law  specifying 
particular  purposes  for  which  land  may  be  condemned,  by  im- 
plication, excludes  other  purposes.'® 

§  401  (257).  Meaning  of  the  words  "to,"  "from,"  "at" 
or  "near"  a  place,  in  statutes  describing  termini  and  loca- 
tion. These  words  must  receive  a  reasonable  construction,  and 
in  such  statutes  have  uniformly  been  held  to  be  inclusive."  Au- 
thority to  construct  a  road  to  or  from  a  place  is  confined  to  the 


72Fore  V.  Hoke,  48  Mo.  App.  254. 

■(3  Commissioners  v.  Judges,  17 
Wend.  9 ;  Pearsall  v.  Post,  20  Wend. 
111. 

7*Springboro  School  Dist.,  21  Pa. 
Co.  Ct.  23. 

7  6  Woods  V.  Greensboro  Nat.  Gas. 
Co.,  204  Pa.  St.  606,  54  Atl.  470. 

TSCity  of  Detroit  v.  Wabash  etc. 
R.  E.  Co.,  63  Mich.  712,  30  N.  W. 
321 ;  City  of  Syracuse  v.  Benedict, 
86  Hun  343,  33  N.  Y.  Supp.  944;  In 
re  Thompson,  86  Hun  405,  33  N.  Y. 
Supp.  467.  And  see  many  of  the 
cases  cited  in  the  preceding  sections. 
And  see  generally:  Oconee  Elec.  Lt. 
&  P.  Co.  V.  Carter,  111  Ga.  106,  36 
S.  E.  457;  Potlatch  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Peterson,  12  Ida.  769,  88  Pac.  426, 
118  Am.  St.  Eep.  233. 

TiTo:  Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Union  Springs  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  144  Ala. 
639,  39  So.  473,  2  L.R.A.(N.S.)  144; 
In  re  Kenan,  109  Ga.  819,  35  S.  E. 
312;  Moses  V.  Pittsburgh  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  21  m.  516;  Indianapolis  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Hartley,  67  111.  439; 
Farmer's  Turnpike  v.  Coventry,  10 
Johns.  389 ;  Rio  Grande  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Brownsville,  45  Tex.  88. 


From:  Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Union  Springs  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  144  Ala. 
639,  39  So.  473,  2  L.R.A.(N.S.)  144; 
Hazelhurst  v.  Freeman,  52  Ga.  244; 
Chicago  &  Northwestern  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Chicago  &  Evanston  R.  R.  Co.,  112 
111.  589;  McCartney  v.  Chicago  & 
Evanston  R.  R.  Co.,  112  111.  611 ;  St. 
Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Go.  v.  Hannibal 
Union  Depot  Co.,  125  Mo.  82,  28  S. 
W.  483 ;  Western  Pennsylvania  R.  R. 
Co.'s  Appeal,  99  Pa.  St.  155;  Tenn- 
essee &  Alabama  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Adams, 
3  Head  596;  In  re  Bronson,  1  On- 
tario 415.  See  Brock  v.  Dore,  166 
Mass.  161,  44  N.  E.  Rep.  142. 

At  or  near:  Mason  v.  Brooklyn 
City  &  Newton  R.  R.  Co.,  35  Barb. 
373;  Mohawk  Bridge  Co.  v.  Utica  & 
Schenectady  R.  R.  Co.,  6  Paige  554; 
State  V.  Hudson  Tunnel  R.  R.  Co.,  38 
N.  J.  L.  548;  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  31  N.  J.  Eq. 
475;  Griffin  v.  House,  18  Johns.  397; 
Purifoy  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  R.  Co., 
108  N.  C.  100,  12  S.  E.  Rep.  741. 

Generally:  Pierce  on  Railroads, 
p.  258.  The  only  case  holding  a  con- 
trary doctrine  is  North  Eastern  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Payne,  8  Rich.  S.  C.  177, 


§    402  THE  STATUTOBY  AUTHOEITY.  727 

territory  then  within  the  corporate  limits,  and  does  not  authorize 
an  extension  into  new  territory  afterwards  addedJ®  A  statute 
fixing  a  terminus  of  a  railroad  at  or  near  a  place  was  held  to  be 
satisfied  in  one  case  by  a  location  2,475  feet  from  the  place,''® 
and  in  another  by  a  location  a  mile  and  half  away.®"  Authority 
to  construct  a  railroad  "on  the  most  practicable  route  from  the 
town  of  Spartenburg,  passing  near  the  village  of  Union,  to 
connect"  with  a  specified  railroad,  was  held  to  mean  that 
the  road  should  be  so  located  as  to  be  convenient  and  useful 
to  the  inhabitants  of  Union  and  that  the  road  could  be  built 
through  the  village  and  land  condemned  therefor.*^  A  statute 
fixing  the  eastern  terminus  of  the  Union  Pacific  Railroad  at  a 
point  "on  the  western  boundary  of  Iowa"  was  held  to  be  satis- 
fied by  a  point  on  the  east  shore  of  the  Mississippi  Eiver.*^ 

§  402  (258).  Change  of  location.  In  nearly  all  statutes 
conferring  the  power  of  eminent  domain,  some  discretion  is  left 
with  those  who  are  vested  with  the  power,  in  respect  to  the  desig- 
nation of  the  property  to  be  taken.  Formerly,  when  public 
works  were  constructed  mostly  under  special  laws  and  charters, 
it  was  common  to  specify  with  more  or  less  particularity  the 
termini  and  route  of  any  proposed  railroad,  canal  or  other  public 
way.  In  the  present  day  it  is  more  common  to  provide  by  gen- 
eral laws  for  all  works  of  this  character  under  which  both  the 
route  and  termini  are  left  to  the  determination  of  those  who 
choose  to  avail  themselves  of  the  statute  In  such  cases  the  arti- 
cles of  incorporation  take  the  place,  somewhat,  of  the  former 
special  charters,  and,  in  so  far  as  they  designate  the  location, 
route  or  termini  of  the  proposed  work,  would  probably  receive 
a  similar  construction.*^     In  either  case  there  remains  a  dis- 

which  holds  that  authority  to  con-  soParke's  Appeal,  64  Pa.  St.  137. 

struct    a    road    "from    Charleston"  siHill  v.  Southern  Ky.  Co.,  67  S. 

would  not  permit  the   company   to  C.  548,  46  S.  E.  486. 

enter  the  city.  8  2Union  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hall, 

7  8  Commonwealth  v.  Erie  &  North  91  U.  S.  343. 

East  R.  R.  Co.,  27  Pa.  St.  339,  67  Am.  saUnder  authority  to  file  amended 

Dec.  471;  Pontchartrain  R.  R.  Co.  v  articles  of  incorporation  to  correct 

La  Fayette  &  Pontchartrain  R.  R.  any    defect    or    informality    in    the 

Co.,  10  La.  Ann.  741 ;  Chope  v.  Detroit  original,  it  was  held  that  a  change 

&  Howell  Plank  Road  Co.,  37  Mich,  could  not  he  made  in  the  location  and 

195,  26  Am.  Rep.  512.  termmi    of    the    road.     Matter    of 

79Fall  River  Iron  Works  Co.  v.  Old  Riverhead  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  36  N.  Y. 

Colony  &   Fall  River  R.  R.  Co.,   5  App.  Div.  514. 
Allen  221. 


728  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    402 

cretion  to  be  exercised  in  the  actual  location  of  the  road  accord- 
ing to  the  general  route  and  termini  specified  in  the  charter  or 
articles  of  incorporation.  When  the  choice  or  discretion  which 
is  thus  given  has  been  exercised,  the  power  is  exhausted,  and 
the  location  cannot  be  changed,  in  the  absence  of  a  statutory 
provision  permitting  such  changes  to  be  made.**  "The  general 
rule  is,"  says  the  court  in  one  case,  "that  where  the  termini  and 
general  route  of  a  railroad  are  prescribed  by  the  charter,  leaving 
the  determination  of  details  to  the  discretion  of  the  corporation, 
the  power  of  the  company  to  fix  the  location  of  the  road  is  ex- 
hausted after  such  discretion  has  been  exercised,  and  it  cannot 
relocate  its  road  without  statutory  authority  to  do  so,  and  being 
without  power  to  relocate  its  road  the  company  is  without  power 
to  condemn  a  right  of  way  for  a  line  which  it  cannot  lawfully 
locate."  *^  But  this  principle  is  not  to  be  applied  too  rigidly. 
A  general  or  material  change  of  location  cannot  be  made.  But 
minor  changes  can  be  made,  which  experience  or  change  of  cir- 
cumstances have  demonstrated  to  be  necessary  or  desirably.  The 
growth  of  a  town  in  a  certain  direction  may  make  a  former  loca- 
tion of  a  depot  very  inconvenient.  A  railroad  may  be  destroyed 
by  a  mountain  slide  or  a  washout  in  such  a  way  that  reconstruc- 
tion would  be  impracticable  or  impossible.     In  such  cases  it 

8  4  state  V.  New  Haven  etc.  Co.,  45  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  9  Paige  323;  McMur- 

Conn.     331 ;     Leverett     v.     Middle  trie  v.  Stewart,  21  Pa.  St.  322 ;  Mor- 

Georgia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  96  Ga.  385,  row  v.  Commonwealth,  48  Pa.  St.  305 ; 

24  S.  E.  154;  Brown  v.  Atlantic  etc.  McKay  v.  Pa.  Water  Co.,  6  Pa.  Diet. 

Ry.  Co.,  126  Ga.  248,  55  S.  E.  24;  Ct.  364 ;  Lehigl  Valley  Coal  Co.  v.  U. 

Atlantic  etc.  Ry.   Co.  v.  Kirkland,  S.  Pipe  Line  Co.,  7  Luzerne  Leg.  Reg. 

129  Ga.  552;   Cairo  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Rep.  77 ;  In  re  Providence  &  W.  R.  R. 

Woodyard,  226  111.  331,  80  N.  E.  882;  Co.,  17  R.  I.  324,  21  Atl.  Rep.  966; 

Lusby  V.  Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  Pierce  on  Railroads,  p.  254.    Contra: 

73  Miss.  360,  19  So.  239,  36  L.RA.  E.x  parte  South  Carolina  R.  R.  Co., 

510;  Morris  &  Essex  R.R.  Co.  V.  Cen-  2  Rich.  L.  S.  C.  434.    See  Washing- 

tral  R.  R.  Co.,  31  N.  J.  L.  205;  Matter  ton  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Coeur  D'Alene 

of  Poughkeepsie  Bridge  Co.,  108  N.  R.  &  N.  Co.,  60  Fed.  981,  9  C.  C.  A. 

Y.  483,  15  N.  E.  601;  Erie  R.  R.  Co.  303;      Kirkland     v.     Atlantic     etc. 

V.  Steward,  170  N.  Y.  172,  63  N.  E.  Ry.  Co.,  126  Ga.  246,  55  S.  E.  23; 

118,  affirming  S.  C.  61  App.  Div.  480,  Doubet  v.  Independent  District,  135 

70  N.  Y.  S.  698 ;  Brooklyn  Central  la.  95.     A  city  cannot  relocate  an 

R.  R.  Co.  V.  Brooklyn  City  R.  R.  Co.,  alley  in  the  absence  of  special  au- 

32    Barb.    358;    Mason  v.   Brooklyn  thority.     Hawkins  v.  Pittsburg,  220 

City  &  Newton  R.  R.  Co.,  35  Barb.  Pa.  St.  7,  69  Atl.  283. 

373;  People  v.  New  York  &  Harlem  SBQairo  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Woodyard, 

R.   R.  Co.,  45  Barb.  73;   Hudson  &  226  111.  331,  80  N.  E.  882. 
Delaware  Canal  Co.  v.  New  York  & 


§    402  THE    STATUTORY  AUTHOKITT.  729 

seems  to  us  a  change  of  location  may  be  made  so  as  to  obviate 
the  inconvenience  in  the  one  case  or  the  difficulty  in  the  other. 
And  so  are  the  authorities.  Where  the  location  of  a  lock-house 
on  a  canal  proves  inconvenient  or  unsuitable,  a  new  location  can 
be  made.*®  In  another  case  two  railroads  intersected  at  G  and 
crossed  the  Y  river,  not  far  from  that  place,  on  independent 
bridges.  These  were  burnt  during  the  war.  After  the  war,  both 
roads  being  much  crippled  financially,  they  united  in  building 
one  bridge  on  the  line  of  one  of  the  roads,  and  the  other  con- 
demned a  short  intersecting  line  in  order  to  avail  itself  of  the 
new  bridge.  It  was  held  that  it  might  lawfully  do  so.*''  And 
the  location  of  a  depot  or  station  within  a  city  or  town  may  be 
changed  and  land  condemned  for  the  new  location.** 

Where  the  statute  gave  the  right  to  railroad  corporations  to 
make  a  change  of  location,  whenever  a  better  and  cheaper  route 
could  be  had,  or  whenever  any  obstacle  occurred,  either  by  way  of 
difficulty  of  construction  or  inability  to  procure  right  of  way  at 
a  reasonable  cost,  it  was  held  that  the  privilege  must  be  exercised 
before  completion.*®  Where  a  railroad  is  permitted  to  deviate 
not  exceeding  one  mile  from  the  route  laid  down  in  its  maps  and 
plans,  it  may  not  extend  its  road  a  mile.*"  The  charter  of  a 
horse  railroad  company  authorized  it  to  uso  a  certain  street,  and 
provided  that,  in  order  to  avoid  an  obstruction  on  that  street, 
it  might  use  such  portions  of  any  of  the  adjacent  streets  as  might 
be  necessary.  It  was  held  that,  after  the  obstruction  was  re- 
moved, it  could  lay  its  track  on  the  first-named  street.*^    Where 

8  6Ligat  V.  Commonwealth,  19  Pa.  222  HI.  396,  78  N.  E.  784;  Chicago 

St.  456.    In  this  case  the  court  says :  etc.  Ky.   Co.  v.  Chicago  Mechanics 

"If  a  lot  of  ground,  on  which  a  lock-  Inst.,  239  111.  197. 

house   has  been  erected,   should  be  ssMoorehead  v.  Little  Miami  R.  R. 

deemed  no   longer   suitable   or   con-  Co.,  17  Ohio,  340 ;  Little  Miami  R.  R. 

venient  for  its  appropriate  uses,  the  Co.  v.  Naylor,  2  Ohio  St.  235,  59  Am. 

canal  commissioners  have  power  to  Dec.   667;    Atkinson  v.  Marietta   & 

take  possession  of  other  ground  for  Cincinnati  R.  R.  Co.,  15  Ohio  St.  21. 

the  purpose  of  erecting  a  new  lock-  soMurphy  v.  Kingston  etc.  R.  R. 

house.    Their  power  is  not  exhausted  Co.,  11  Ontario  582,  reversing  S.  C. 

by  the  first  appropriation.    Errors  of  11  Ontario  302.    The  following  cases 

location,   in  matters   of   that   kind,  construe      statutes      permitting      a 

which  are  but  incidents  to  the  main  change  of  location:     Boston  etc.  R. 

work,  may  be  corrected  without  spe-  R.  Co.  v.  Midland  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Gray 

cial  application  to  the  legislature."  340;   Hewitt  v.  St.  Paul  etc.  R.  R. 

8  7Mis9issippi   &  Tennessee   R.   R.  Co.,  35  Minn.  226. 

Co.  V.  Devaney,  42  Miss.  555.  siphila.  &  Gray's  Ferry  Passenger 

sschicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  People,  Ry.  Co.'s  Appeal,  102  Pa.  St.  123.    In 


730  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    403 

the  power  to  change  the  location  of  a  railroad  was  expressly 
given  by  statute,  it  was  held  it  could  be  exercised  after  a  partial 
construction  of  the  road.^^  A  statute  provided  that  "every  rail- 
road corporation,  except  elevated  railway  corporations,  may,  by 
a  vote  of  two  thirds  of  its  directors,  alter  or  change  the  route  of 
its  road  or  its  termini^  or  locate  such  route  or  any  part  thereof, 
or  its  termini,  in  a  county  adjoining  any  county  named  in  its 
certificate  of  incorporation,  if  it  shall  appear  to  them  that  the 
line  can  be  improved  thereby."  It  was  held  that  under  this  stat- 
ute the  terminus  could  only  be  changed  to  an  adjoining  county 
for  the  purpose  of  improving  the  existing  line  by  affording  great- 
er conveniences  or  facilities  in  operating  that  line,  and  not  for 
the  purpose  of  getting  new  business.®* 

§  403  (259).  Successive  appropriations.  In  the  ab- 
sence of  any  restriction  or  limitation,  the  power  to  take  private 
property  may  be  exercised  by  the  grantee  from  time  to  time  as 
necessity  requires.  If  this  were  not  so,  it  would  be  necessary 
to  anticipate  all  future  needs  at  the  outset.  The  company  con- 
demning would  thus  not  only  have  to  take  and  pay  for  property 
in  advance,  but  it  might  be  saddled  with  property  which  it  could 
never  use  at  all.  On  the  other  hand,  either  from  taking  too  nar- 
row a  view  of  the  future  or  from  the  growth  of  business  beyond 
any  reasonable  anticipation,  it  might  in  a  few  years  find  itself 
unable  properly  to  discharge  its  duties  to  the  public.**  Accord- 
Brown  V.  Atlantic  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  126  first  exercise,  every  railroad  com- 
Ga.  248,  55  S.  E.  24,  it  was  held,  con-  pany,  if  financially  able  so  to  do, 
struing  a  statute  as  to  change  of  lo-  would  be  likely,  in  order  to  provide 
cation,  that  the  change  could  not  be  for  the  future,  to  take  more  land 
made  after  the  road  was  constructed.      than  it  needed,  and  this  would  have 

9  2Eel  River  &  Eureka  R.  R.  Co.  a  tendency  to  work  a  greater  hard- 
V.  Field,  67  Cal.  429 ;  Cape  Girardeau  ship  upon  property  owners  than  if 
etc.  Road  Co.  v.  Dennis,  67  Mo.  438.  only   so   much   land   was   taken   as 

9 'Matter  of  Greenville  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  would  meet  the  needs  of  the  railroad 
172  N.  Y.  462,  65  N.  E.  278,  affirming  company,  with  the  right  to  make  ad- 
S.  C.  75  App.  Div.  220,  78  N.  Y.  S.  ditional  condemnations  to  meet  sub- 
24.  sequent  necessities.    As  has  already 

'^Hamilton  v.  Annapolis  &  Elk  been  said,  it  would  be  well  nigh  im- 
Ridge  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Md.  553;  S.  C.  1  possible  for  a  railroad  company  to 
Md.  Ch.  107 ;  In  re  Providence  &  W.  R.  determine,  at  its  inception,  how  much 
R.  Co.,  17  R.  I.  324,  21  Atl.  965.  In  land  it  would  need  at  the  end  of  a 
Gardner  v.  Ga.  R.  R.  &  B.  Co.,  117  .successful  career  of  say  twenty  years ; 
Ga.  522,  43  S.  E.  863,  the  court  says:  but  even  if  that  could  be  done  with 
"If  it  should  be  held  that  a  general  precision,  and  it  were  financially  able 
power  to  condemn  is  exhausted  in  its      to  acquire  the  land,  to  require  it  to 


§  408 


THE  STATUTORY  AUTHOEITY. 


731 


ingly  a  railroad  company,  after  having  located  and  completed 
its  road,  may,  as  the  expansion  of  its  business  requires,  and  with- 
in the  limitations  imposed  by  statute,  if  any,  take  additional 
land  for  right  of  way,'*°  terminal  facilities,^*^  depot  accommoda- 
tions,®^ side  tracks,®^  branches,"®  shops,  ^  or  for  any  other  pur- 
pose for  which  its  compulsory  powers  may  be  exercised.^  A 
company  to  supply  a  city  with  water  may  make  successive  ap- 
propriations of  land  or  water,  as  the  population  and  demands  for 
water  increase.*    So  in  regard  to  a  power  to  take  lands  in  order 


condemn  land  in  advance  of  its  needs 
would  be  oppressive  and  subversive 
of  its  rights."    pp.  532,  533. 

9  5  Cooper  V.  Anniston  etc.  R.  E. 
Co.,  85  Ala.  106;  Chicago  &  Western 
Ind.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Illinois  Central  R. 
E.  Co.,  113  III.  156;  Chicago  etc.  Elec. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  211 
111.  352,  71  N.  E.  1017;  Prather  v. 
Jeffersonville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  52  Ind. 
16;  Peck  v.  New  Albany  &  Chicago 
R.  R.  Co.,  101  Ind.  366;  Matter  of 
South  Brooklyn  R.  &  T.  Co.,  50  Hun 
405,  18  N.  Y.  St.  51,  2  N.  Y.  Supp. 
613;  Matter  of  New  York  Central  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  67  Barb.  426. 

9  6Gardner  v.  Ga.  R.  R.  &  B.  Co., 
117  Ga.  522,  43  S.  E.  863;  Central 
Branch  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Atchison, 
Topeka  &  Santa  Fe  R.  R.  Co.,  26 
Kan.  669. 

9  7Deitrich3  v.  Lincoln  &  North 
Western  R.  R.  Co.,  13  Neb.  361. 

9  8St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Petty, 
57  Ark.  359,  21  S.  W.  884,  20  L.R.A. 
434;  State  Board  v.  People,  229  111. 
430,  82  N.  E.  324;  Hurd  v.  Atchison 
etc.  Ry.  Co.,  73  Kan.  83,  84  Pae.  553 ; 
Ewing  V.  Ala.  &  Va.  R.  R.  Co.,  68 
Miss.  551,  9  So.  295;  Philadelphia, 
Wilmington  &  Bait.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wil- 
liams, 54  Pa.  St.  103;  Toledo  &  W.  R. 
R.  Co.  y.  Daniels,  16  Ohio  St.  390. 
In  the  last  case  it  is  said:  "Prima 
facie  power  to  do  any  act  is  power  to 
do  it  in  such  manner  and  at  such 
time  as  is  usual,  convenient  and 
reasonable, — in  such  way  as  prudent 
men  manage  their  own  concerns." 


ssPittsburgh,  V.  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Pittsburgh,  C.  &  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  159 
Pa.  St.  331,  28  Atl.  Rep.  155. 

iChicago,  Burlington  &  Quincy  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Wilson,  17  111.  123. 

2Fisher  v.  Chicago  &  Springfield 
R.  R.  Co.,  104  111.  323;  Brown  v.  Phil- 
adelphia, W.  &  B.  R.  R.  Co.,  58  Md. 
539 ;  Cincinnati  v.  Cincinnati  So.  Ry. 
Co.,  1  Ohio  N.  P.(N.S.)  361;  Vir- 
ginia &  Truckee  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Lovejoy, 
8  Nev.  100 ;  Simpson  v.  Lancaster  & 
Carlisle  Ry.  Co.,  15  Sim.  580 ;  Stamps 
V.  Birmingham  &  Stone  Valley  Ry. 
Co.,  2  Phillips  673.  A  power  to 
widen  a  railroad  right  of  way  in 
order  to  accommodate  traffic  and 
secure  the  safety  of  persons  and  prop- 
erty is  not  exhausted  by  one  exercise. 
Sutton  V.  Pa.  R.  R.  Co.,  211  Pa.  St. 
554,  60  Atl.  1090 ;  Sutton  v.  Pa.  R.  R. 
Co.,  13  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  474.  In  Hop- 
kins V.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
94  Md.  257,  51  Atl.  404  and  Dolfield 
V.  Western  Md.  R.  R.  Co.,  107  Md. 
584,  the  section  is  quoted  to  this 
point  and  its  doctrine  pronounced 
sound  and  salutary. 

sThom  V.  Ga.  Mfg.  etc.  Co.,  128 
Ga.  187,  57  S.  E.  75;  Johnson  v.  Utica 
Water  Works  Co.,  67  Barb.  415; 
Water  Commissioners  v.  Lawrence,  3 
Edw.  Ch.  552;  Edgewood  Water  Co. 
V.  Troy  Water  Co.,  7  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  476; 
Kellar  v.  Riverton  Consolidated 
Water  Co.,  34  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  301. 


732  EMINEITT  DOMAIlf.  §    404 

to  secure  materials  for  an  aqueduct.*  A  street  or  other  railroad 
company,  authorized  to  lay  two  tracks  upon  a  street,  or  one  or 
more  tracks,  may  lay  one  at  one  time  and  one  at  another.^  So 
a  power  to  a  street  railroad  company  to  construct,  use  and  operate 
all  necessary  and  convenient  turnouts,  side  tracks,  etc.,  is  not 
limited  to  those  necessary  when  the  road  is  first  constructed.® 
A  special  act  authorized  the  connection  of  two  railroads  by  tracks 
on  the  streets  of  a  city  upon  consent  of  the  people  given,  and 
such  consent  was  given  and  the  tracks  constructed.  It  was  held 
that  the  power  was  exhausted  and  that  an  additional  track  could 
not  be  laid  thirty  years  after,  though  a  fresh  consent  was  ob- 
tained.'^ Where  a  railroad  sixty-six  feet  wide  is  purchased  by 
another  company  which  had  power  to  condemn  a  hundred  feet 
in  width,  it  was  held  the  latter  company,  after  operating  the 
road  for  several  years,  might  widen  to  a  hundred  feet.*  Where 
park  commissioners  have  power  to  connect  any  public  park  with 
any  part  of  any  incorporated  city  by  taking  any  street  or  streets 
leading  to  such  park,  the  power  is  not  exhausted  by  taking  one 
street.^  The  power  to  establish  harbor  lines,  like  the  power  to 
establish  the  grade  of  streets,^"  is  a  continuing  power,  and  new 
lines  may  be  established  which  operate  to  discontinue  old  ones.'* 
Where  a  railroad  company  is  authorized  to  condemn  not  exceed- 
ing one  hundred  feet  for  right  of  way,  it  cannot  acquire  a  right 

of  way  by  purchase  and  then  condemn  an  additional  hundred 
feet.  12 

§  404  (260).     Where  the  provisions  of  one  statute  are 
adopted  by  another,  or  extended  to  another  jurisdiction. 

This  is  frequently  done  in  statutes  relating  to  eminent  domain, 
and  sometimes  leads  to  great  confusion  and  perplexity.  The 
courts  will,  if  possible,  in  such  cases  effectuate  the  intention  of 

^Matter  of  Water  Commissioners,  ^Savannah  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wood- 

3  Edwards  Ch.  552.  ruff,  86  Ga.  94,  13  S.  E.  156. 

eWorkman  v.  So.  Pae.  R.  R.  Co.,  sChilds  v.  Central  R.  E.  Co.  of  N. 

129  Cal.  536,  62  Pac.  185 ;  Ranson  v.  J.,  33  N.  J.  L.  323. 

Citizens  R.  R.  Co.,  104  Mo.  375,  16  sWest  Chicago  Park  Comrs.  v.  Mc- 

S.  W.  416;  Varwig  v.  Cleveland  etc.  Mullen,  134  HI.  170,  25  N.  E.  676,  10 

R.  R.  Co.,  6  Ohio  C.  C.  439;  People's  L.R.A.  215. 

Passenger   Ry.   Co.   v.    Baldwin,    14  ^oAnte,  §  145. 

Phila.  231 ;  Dumnore  v.  Seranton  Ry.  uParist  Steel  Co.  v.  Bridgeport,  60 

Co.,  34  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  294.  Conn.  278,  22  Atl.  561. 

sDetroit  Citizens'  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  i2Crandall  v.  Des  Moines  etc.  R. 

Board  of  Public  Works,  126  Mich.  R.  Co.,  103  la.  684. 
654,  85  N.  W.  1072. 


§    404  THE   STATUTOEY  AUTHOFaTY.  733 

the  legislature.^*  Certain  commissioners  were  authorized  to  re- 
move all  dams  on  a  stream  and  to  execute  other  works  for  the 
benefit  of  health  and  drainage.  The  act  provided  that  the  dam- 
ages should  be  assessed  "in  the  same  manner"  as  in  laying  out 
highways.  This  was  held  to  mean  that  similar  proceedings 
should  be  had,  so  far  as  applicable  to  the  subject-matter,  and 
that  much  was  left  to  implication  in  the  manner  of  adapting  the 
proceedings  to  the  subject-matter.^*  A  statute  in  reference  to 
assessing  betterments  in  Boston  was  made  applicable  to  the  city 
of  Charlestown.  In  Boston  the  authority  was  vested  in  the  board 
of  aldermen,  which  also  had  general  authority  to  lay  out  streets. 
In  applying  the  act  to  Charlestovm  it  was  held  that  the  authority 
did  not  vest  in  its  board  of  aldermen,  but  in  the  body  which  had 
jurisdiction  in  laying  out  and  improving  streets,  viz. :  the  city 
council.-''  A  statute  relating  to  the  laying  out  of  highways  and 
town  ways  by  county  commissioners  was  made  applicable  to  the 
laying  out  of  streets  by  the  city  council  of  cities.  It  was  held 
that  a  provision  that  the  county  commissioners  should,  if  re- 
quested, view  the  premises,  did  not  require  that  the  city  council 
should  view  the  premises,  but  that  a  view  by  a  committee  would 
suffice.^®    Where  an  act  provided  that  in  case  of  land  taken  for 

i3It  would  take  too  much  8pace  to  429;  Craig  v.  Supervisors,  10  Wend, 
state  each  case  so  as  to  show  clearly  585;  Matter  of  Riverside  Park,  95 
the  points  decided.  The  following  App.  Div.  552,  89  N.  Y.  S.  6;  Road 
are  in  point:  Board  of  Directors  York  Water  Co.,  24  Pa.  St.  397; 
V.  Redditt,  79  Ark.  154,  95  S.  W.  482;  Memphis  v.  Hastings,  113  Tenn.  142, 
Atlantic  Coast  Line  R.  R.  Co.  v.  86  S.  W.  609,  69  L.R.A.  750;  Lenz 
Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.,  120  Ga.  268,  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  Ill  Wis.  198, 
48  S.  E.  15 ;  Taylor  v.  Pettijohn,  24  86  N.  W.  607 ;  Broadbent  v.  Imperial 
111.  312;  Terre  Haute  v.  Evansville  Gas  Light  Co.,  7  De  G.  M.  &  G.  436,  3 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  149  Ind.  174,  46  N.  E.  Jur.  N.  S.  221,  26  L.  J.  Ch.  276; 
77,  37  L.R.A.  189 ;  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Ferrar  v.  Comrs.,  4  L.  R.  Exch.  227, 
Co.  V.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  30  Ind.  38  L.  J.  Exch.  102,  21  L.  T.  N.  S.  295, 
App.  654,  66  N.  E.  919;  Moseley  v.  17  W.  R.  709;  Daugey  v.  London,  38 
York  Shore  Water  Co.,  94  Me.  83,  46  L.  J.  C.  P.  298,  17  W.  R.  1106,  20 
Atl.  809;  Kennebeck  Water  Dist.  v.  L.  T.  N.  S.  921. 
Waterville,  96  Me.  234,  52  Atl.  774;  i4Phillips  v.  County  Commission- 
Boston  El.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Presho,  174  ers,  122  Mass.  258. 
Mass.  99,  54  N.  E.  348;  Danforth  v.  iBLockwood  v.  Charlestown,  114 
Groton  Water  Co.,  176  Mass.  118,  Mass.  416.  For  a  similar  case  see 
57  N.  E.  351 ;  Sawyer  v.  Met.  Water  Day  v.  Board  of  Aldermen  of  Spring- 
Board,  178  Mass.  267,  59  N.  E.  658 ;  field,  102  Mass.  310. 
Appleton  V.  Newton,  178  Mass.  276,  isTaintor  v.  Cambridge,  192  Mass. 
59  N.  E.  648 ;  McSweeney  v.  Com-  522,  78  N.  E.  545. 
monwealth,  185  Mass.  371,  70  N.  B. 


734  EMINENT  DOMAIN.  §    405 

parks  the  proceedings  should  be  the  same  as  in  case  of  street 
openings,  it  was  held  to  mean  that  the  proceedings  in  park  cases 
should  conform  to  the  law  applicable  to  streets  as  its  exists  from 
time  to  time  when  park  proceedings  are  begun.*'  An  act  to  en- 
able cities  to  build  sewers  and  to  acquire  lands  for  that  purpose 
required  that  the  proceedings  therefor  should  conform  to  the 
proceedings  now  provided  by  law  for  the  acquiring  of  land  for 
the  opening  of  streets  in  such  cities.  It  was  held  that  in  pro- 
ceedings by  a  city  to  acquire  land  for  a  sewer,  it  must  conform 
to  the  special  provisions  in  its  charter  for  acquiring  land  for 
a  street,  whatever  they  may  be.*®  If  the  act  adopted  or  referred 
to  provides  for  an  appeal  or  review,  an  appeal  or  review  may  be 
had.*^  Where  a  telegraph  company  was  authorized  to  condemn 
and  to  proceed  as  provided  in  a  specified  chapter  relating  to  rail- 
roads, it  was  held  that  the  chapter  was  adopted  as  then  existing 
and  not  as  afterwards  amended.*"  References  to  sections  of 
other  statutes  by  a  wrong  number  will  be  corrected,  when  the 
intent  can  be  clearly  made  out,  otherwise  not.^* 

§  405  (261).  Validity  and  effect  of  statutes  legalizing 
defective  proceedings.  The  legislature  may  legalize  irregu- 
lar or  defective  proceedings  which  it  might  have  authorized  in 
the  form  in  which  they  have  been  taken.**  If  the  defect  is  one 
of  power,  it  can  be  supplied  by  a  subsequent  act.*^    In  all  cases, 

i7In  re  Vernon  Park,  163  Pa.  St.  O'Brien  v.  Commissioners  of  Balti- 

70,  29  Atl.  972.  more  County,  51  Md.  15;  Pitkin  v. 

isState  V.  City  of  Jersey  City,  54  Springfield,  112  Mass.  509;   Spauld- 

N.  J.  L.  49,  22  Atl.  1052.  ing  v.  Nourse,  143  Mass.  490;  State 

19 Austin  V.   Belleville  etc.  R.  E..  v.  Bruggerman,  31  Minn.  493;  State 

Co.,  19  111.  310;  C.  Street,  118  Pa.  St.  v.  Newark,  27  N.  J.  L.  185;  State  v. 

171,  12  Atl.  345;  In  re  Vernon  Park,  Union,  33  N.  J.  L.  350;  State  v.  Ber- 

163  Pa.  St.  70,  29  Atl.  972.  gen,  34  N.  J.  L.  438;  State  v.  Passaic, 

20Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.  v.  Southern  36  N.  J.  L.  382;  State  v.  Passaic,  37 

R.  R.  Co.,  98  Fed.  190.  N.  J.  L.  65;   People  ex  rel.  etc.  v. 

21  Williamson  v.  Houser,  169  Ind.  McDonald,  69  N.  Y.  362;   Board  of 

397,  82  N.  E.  771;   Board  of  Park  Water  Comrs.  v.  Dwight,  101  N.  Y. 

Comrs.  V.  Du  Pont,  110  Ky.  743,  62  9;  Burgett  v.  Norris,  25  Ohio  St.  308; 

S.  W.  891;    2    Lewis'    Suth.    Stat.  Mattingly  v.   District  of  Columbia, 

Constr.  §  410.    And  see  generally  on  97  U.  S.  687 ;  Bums  v.  Multnomah, 

the  subject  of  the  section  2  Lewis'  8    Sawyer   543.     Contra,    Seibert  v. 

Suth.  Stat.  Constr.  §§  405^13.  Linton,  5  W.  Va.  57. 

2  2Bennett  v.  Fisher,  26  la.   497;  2  3Spaulding  v.  Nourse,  143  Mass. 

Eichman  v.  Board  of  Supervisors,  77  490;  Himmelman  v.  Hoadley,  44  Cal. 

la.   513,   42  N.   W.  422;    Clinton  v.  213;   Hoadley  v.  San  Francisco,  50 

Walliker,  98  la.  655,  68  N.  W.  431 ;  Cal.  265. 


§    406  THE  STATUTOBY  AUTHOEITY.  735 

however,  intervening  rights  must  not  be  impaired.^*  It  is  no 
objection  to  such  an  act  that  it  is  passed  while  an  appeal  or 
certiorari  is  pending  to  review  the  proceedings.^^  Where  a  ditch 
had  been  constructed  under  an  unconstitutional  law,  it  was  held 
that  the  right  of  way  might  be  recondemned  and  the  assessment 
of  damages  and  benefits  relevied  under  a  valid  law.^'  But  the 
legislature  cannot  legalize  what  it  could  not  authorize  in  the  first 
instance  and  so  cannot  legalize  the  laying  out  of  a  highway  with- 
out compensation.^'' 

§  406  (261a).  The  legislature  cannot  surrender  or  pre- 
clude itself  from  the  exercise  of  the  eminent  domain  power. 
If  this  were  not  so  it  would  be  possible  for  one  legislature  to 
block  and  render  forever  impossible  the  most  needed  and  valua- 
able  public  improvements.  A  legislature  could  grant  a  right  of 
way  across  the  State  and  make  a  binding  stipulation  that  it 
should  never  be  crossed  by  any  other  line  of  transportation  or 
communication.  And  if  the  eminent  domain  power  could  thus 
be  bargained  away,  so  could  the  police  power  and  power  of  taxa- 
tion. The  State  might  thus  soon  cease  to  be  sovereign,  and  cor- 
porations and  franchise-holders  become  the  dominant  power. 
The  result  of  this  process  of  reasoning  is  that  the  sovereign 
powers  of  the  State  cannot  be  bargained  away,  restrained,  sur- 
rendered or  extinguished  by  the  action  of  the  legislature.^*  If 
there  is  any  exception  to  this  rule  it  applies  to  the  power  of  taxa- 
tion only,  which  may  be  surrendered  or  commuted,  as  to  par- 
ticular persons  or  property,  for  a  valuable  consideration  re- 
ceived by  the  State.  ^*  But  even  this  exception  has  not  been  es- 
tablished without  emphatic  protest.    Judge  Cooley  sums  up  his 

2«Mattingly  v.  District  of  Colum-  N.  W.  1072;  Heacock  v.  Sullivan,  70 

bia,    97    U.    S.    687 ;    Schumaker   v.  Kan.  750,  79  Pac.  659. 

Toberman,  56  Cal.  508;  Holliday  v.  See  further  on  the  subject  of  eura- 

City  of  Atlanta,  96  Ga.  377,  23  S.  E.  tive  statutes  the  following :     Spencer 

Rep.  406;  Board  of  Comrs.v.  Fahlor,  v.  Merchant,  100  N.  Y.  585;   S.  C. 

132  Ind.  426,  31  2Sr.  E.  1112.  affirmed,   Spencer  v.   Merchant,   125 

25Statev.  Newark,  27  N.J.  L.  185;  U.   S.   345;    People  v.   Stillings,   75 

State  V.  Union,  33  N.  J.  L.  350.  App.   Div.    569,    75    N.    Y.    S.    333 ; 

2  6Curran    v.    Sibley    County,    56  People  v.  Stillings,  76  App.  Div.  143, 

Minn.  432,  57  N.  W.  1070;  Curran  v.  78  N.  Y.  S.  942;  Whitlock  v.  Haw- 

Sibley  County,  47  Minn.  313,  50  N.  kins,  105  Va.  242,  53  S.  E.  401;   2 

W.  237;  Lewis  County  v.  McGeorge,  Lewis'  Suth.  Stat.  Constr.  §§  675-677. 

47  Wash.  414,  92  Pac.  268.    And  see  2  8Cooley  Const.  Lim.  6th  Ed.  pp. 

Sudberry  v.  Graves,  83  Ark.  344,  103  337-342. 

S.  W.  728.  29Cooley  Const.  Lim.  6th  Ed.  pp. 

27Huteh  V.  Barnes,  124  la.  251,  99  148,  337,  338. 


736  EMIifENT  DOMAIN.  §    406 

discussion  of  this  subject  as  follows :  "It  would  seem,  therefore, 
to  be  the  prevailing  opinion,  and  one  based  upon  sound  reason, 
that  the  State  cannot  barter  away,  or  in  any  manner  abridge  or 
weaken,  any  of  those  essential  powers  which  are  inherent  in  all 
governments,  and  the  existence  of  which  in  full  vigor  is  impor- 
tant to  the  wellbeing  of  organized  society ;  and  that  any  contracts 
to  that  end  are  void  upon  general  principles,  and  cannot  be  saved 
from  invalidity  by  the  provision  of  the  national  constitution  now 
under  consideration.  If  the  tax  cases  are  to  be  regarded  as  an 
exception  to  this  statement,  the  exception  is  perhaps  to  be  con- 
sidered a  nominal  rather  than  a  real  one,  since  taxation  is  for 
the  purpose  of  providing  the  State  a  revenue,  and  the  State  laws 
which  have  been  enforced  as  laws  in  these  cases  have  been  sup- 
posed to  be  based  upon  a  consideration  by  which  the  State  re- 
ceives the  benefit  which  would  have  accrued  from  an  exercise 
of  the  relinquished  power  in  the  ordinary  mode."  ^^  The  au- 
thorities are  quite  conclusive  to  the  effect  that  the  police  power 
cannot  be  surrendered  or  restricted.^  ^  And  we  believe  that  the 
authorities  are  equally  emphatic  with  respect  to  the  eminent 
domain  power.^*  An  agreement  or  stipulation,  either  by  the 
State  or  a  municipal  corporation,  that  the  power  of  eminent  do- 
main shall  not  be  exercised  in  a  particular  manner  or  in  respect 
to  certain  property,  is  null  and  void.*^  The  granting  of  an  ex- 
clusive privilege  or  franchise  is  neither  in  form  or  substance  an 
agreement  that  the  power  of  eminent  domain  shall  not  be  exer- 

soCooley  Const.  Lim.  6th  Ed.  pp.  138;    People    v.    Adirondack   R.    K. 

341,  342.  Co.,  160  N.  Y.  225,  238,  54  N.  E.  689; 

aiNew  Orleans  Gas  Co.  v.  Louisi-  In  re  Twenty-second  Street,  102  Pa. 
ana  Light  Co.,  115  U.  S.  650;  New  St.  108;  S.  C.  15  Phil.  409;  Lock 
Orleans  Water  Works  Co.  v.  Rivers,  Haven  Bridge  Co.  v.  Clinton  County, 
115  U.  S.  674;  Louisville  Gas.  Co.  v.  157  Pa.  St.  379,  27  Atl.  726;  Corn- 
Citizens'  Gas  Co.,  115  U.  S.  683;  St.  monwealth  v.  Broad  St.  Ry.  Co.,  219 
Tammany  Water  Works  v.  New  Or-  Pa.  St.  11,  67  Atl.  958. 
leans  Water  Works,  120  U.  S.  64;  ssjud.  A  contract  between  a  city 
Butchers  Union  Co.  v.  Crescent  City  and  a  railroad  company  that  no 
Co.,  Ill  U.  S.  746;  Beer  Co.  v.  Massa-  street  should  be  opened  over  its  prop- 
chusetts,  97  U.  S.  25;  Fertilizing  Co.  erty  was  held  void.  Matter  of  Open- 
V.  Hyde  Park,  97  U.  S.  659 ;  Stone  ing  First  Street,  66  Mich.  42,  33  N. 
V.  Mississippi,  101  U.  S.  814.  W.  15.    And  see  also,  I«ggett  v.  De- 

3  2Hyde  Park  v.  Cemetery  Ass.,  119  troit,  137  Mich.  247,  100  N.  W.  566; 

111.  141,  7  N.  E.  627 ;  Brimmer  v.  Bos-  In  re  Southern  Boulevard  R.  R.  Co., 

ton,  102  Mass.  19;  Matter  of  Open-  146  N.  Y.  352,  40  N.  E.  1000;  S.  C. 

ing  First  Street,  66  Mich.  42,  33  N.  143  N.  Y.  258,  38  N.  E.  276. 
W.  15 ;  Brewster  v.  Hough,  10  >r.  H. 


§    408  THE  STATUTORY  AUTHOEITY.  737 

cised  to  take  or  interfere  with  such  franchise  or  privilege.  The 
exclusive  feature  is  inserted  in  order  to  induce  private  parties 
to  invest  their  capital  in  an  enterprise  which  might  otherwise 
be  rendered  valueless  without  redress  by  the  making  of  similar 
grants  to  others.  The  legislature  thereby  simply  creates  a  valu- 
able right  or  property,  but  this  property  remains  subject  to  the 
eminent  domain  power,  like  any  other  property.^*  A  provision 
in  a  charter  that  the  property  of  the  company  shall  not  be  taken 
for  certain  public  uses,  is  void  as  a  contract,  and  amounts  simply 
to  the  expression  of  a  legislative  intent  that,  for  the  time  being, 
the  power  of  eminent  domain  shall  not  be  so  exercised.^  ^  The 
legislature  having  full  power  to  grant  or  withhold  the  exercise 
of  the  right  of  eminent  domain,  it  is  competent  for  it  to  provide 
that  streets  shall  not  be  laid  through  cemeteries  or  railroad 
grounds,  but  it  is  also  competent  to  reverse  this  policy  at  any 
time. 

§  407.  Agreements  not  to  condemn.  Whether  a  pri- 
vate corporation  invested  with  the  power  of  eminent  domain,  in 
order  to  enable  it  to  accomplish  a  public  purpose,  may  bind  itself 
not  to  condemn  specified  property,  or  more  than  a  specified 
amount  may  be  doubted.  Such  a  covenant  would  seem  to  be 
against  public  policy,  as  it  might  prevent  improvements  which 
the  public  interests  demand.  And  it  has  been  so  adjudicated.^" 
It  has  been  held  that  such  a  covenant  does  not  run  with  the  land 
so  as  to  bind  the  successors  of  the  covenantor  acquiring  the  rail- 
road by  foreclosure.^^  Also  that  a  court  of  equity  would  not 
enforce  the  covenant  but  leave  the  parties  to  their  remedy  at 
law.^® 

§  408  (261b).  Exercise  of  the  power  by  Congress. 
Congress,  as  the  national  legislature,  may  exercise  the  power  of 
eminent  domain,  for  the  promotion  of  any  purpose  within  its 
constitutional  powers,  and  subject  to  the  limitation  contained  in 
the  federal  constitution.^^    As  the  local  legislature  of  the  Dis- 

siAnfe,  §  215;  post,  §§  438,  439.  s'Morris  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hoboken 

ssHyde  Park  v.  Cemetery  Ass.,  119  «tc.  E.  R.  Co.,  68  N.  J.  Eq.  328,  59 

111.  141,  7  N.  E.  627;  In  re  Twenty-  Atl.  332. 

second  St.,  102  Pa.  St.  108,  15  Phil.  ssibid. 

409.  ssLuxton  v.  North  Eiv.  Bridge  Co., 

36Chioago   etc.  E.  E.   Co.  v.   III.  153   U.   S.   525;    Nahant  v.   United 

Cent.  E.  E.  Co.,  113  111.  156;  South  States,  136  Fed.  273,  70  C.  C.  A.  641, 

Chicago  City  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Calumet  69  L.E.A.  723. 

etc.  St.  E.  E.  Co.,  70  111.  App.  254; 

Cornwall  v.  Louisville  etc.  E.  E.  Co., 

87  Ky.  72,  7  S.  W.  553. 
Em.  D.— 47. 


r38 


EMINEIifT    DOMAIN. 


§    409 


met  of  Columbia,  it  may  exercise  the  power  for  any  municipal 
or  legitimate  public  use.*"  In  taking  property  in  the  States,  it 
may  provide  a  procedure  of  its  own,  or  adopt  or  make  use  of 
that  provided  by  the  States.*^ 

§  409  (261c).  Constitutionality  of  eminent  domain 
statutes  generally.  Statutes  which  provide  for  an  exercise  of 
the  eminent  domain  power  must  not  only  comply  with  the  emi- 
nent domain  provisions  of  the  constitution,  but  with  those  pro- 
visions which  relate  to  the  manner  and  form  of  legislation  or 
which  otherwise  limit  the  power  of  the  legislature  The  stat- 
ute, either  by  itself  or  in  connection  with  other  legislation,  must 
provide  for  compensation.*^  The  taking  must  be  for  a  public 
use  *^  and  that  use  must  be  defined  in  the  act.**  The  statute 
must  not  be  obnoxious  to  the  constitutional  provisions  as  to  local 
and  special  legislation,*^  nor  to  the  provision  that  a  person  shall 
not  be  deprived  of  his  property  without  due  process  of  law,*" 
nor  to  any  other  limitations.*''^     It  must  conform  to  the  provi- 


^oSlioemaker  v.  United  States,  147 
V.  S.  282,  13  S.  C.  361 ;  United  States 
V.  Cooper,  9  Mackey  104. 

<i  Jones  V.  United  States,  48  Wis. 
385 ;  In.  re  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 
45  Fed.  396,  11  L.R.A.  275. 

*2Post,  §  673.  Brunswick  &  W. 
R.  K.  Co.  T.  City  of  Waycross,  94 
Ga.  102,  21  S.  E.  145 ;  Garbutt  Lum- 
ber Co.  V.  Georgia  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  Ill 
Ga.  714,  36  S.  E.  942 ;  Commonwealth 
V.  Boston  Advertising  Co.,_  188  Mass. 
348,  74  N.  E.  601,  108  Am.  St.  Rep. 
494,  69  L.R.A.  817 ;  Morris  v.  Wash- 
ington County,  72  Neb.  174,  100  X. 
W.  144;  Littleton  v.  Berlin  Mills  Co., 
73  N.  H.  11,  58  Atl.  877;  Cherry  v. 
Board  of  Comrs.,  52  X.  J.  L.  544,  20 
Atl.  970;  Litchfield  v.  Pond,  180  X. 
Y.  66,  78  N.  E.  719,  reversing  S.  C. 
105  App.  Div.  229,  93  N.  Y.  S.  1016 ; 
In  re  Widening  of  Burnish  St.,  140 
Pa.  St.  531,  21  Atl.  500;  Tuttle  v. 
Justice  of  Knox  Count}',  89  Tenn. 
157,  14  S.  W.  486 ;  Wautauga  Water 
Co.  V-.  Scott,  111  Tenn.  321,  70  S.  W. 
888;  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Wil- 
liams, 86  Va.  696,  11  S.  E.  108,  2  Am. 


R.  R.  &  Corp.  Rep.  258,  19  Am.  St. 
Rep.  908. 

*3See  chap  7.  State  v.  City  of 
Orange,  54  X.  J.  L.  Ill,  22  Atl.  1004, 
14  L.R.A.  62. 

<4In  re  Theresa  Drainage  Dist.,  90 
Wis.  301,  03  X.  W.  288. 

*5City  of  Pasadena  v.  Stinson,  91 
Cal.  238,  27  Pac.  604;  Commissioners 
of  Parks  and  Boulevards  v.  Moesta, 
91  Mich.  149,  51  X.  W.  903;  Xcw 
York  &  L.  I.  Bridge  Co.  v.  Smith,  148 
X.  Y.  540,  42  X.  E.  1088 ;  Swikehard 
V.  ilichels,  8  Miscl.  568,  29  X.  Y. 
Supp.  777  ;  Matter  of  Lexington  Ave., 
29  Hun  303,  63  How.  Pr.  462;  State 
V.  Cowles,  64  Ohio  St.  162,  59  X.  E. 
•895;  Appeal  of  Wilbert,  137  Pa.  St. 
494,  21  Atl.  74 ;  Wagner  v.  Milwaukee 
County,  112  Wis.  601,  88  X^.  W.  577. 

impost,  §§  564-569..  Smith  v. 
Cochrane,  9  Wash.  85,  37  Pac.  Rep. 
311,  494. 

4 'Memphis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  r.  Birm- 
ingham etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  96  Ala.  571, 
11  So.  642,  18  L.R.A.  166;  New  Y'ork 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Offield,  77  Conn.  417, 
59    Atl.    510;    People    v.    Township 


409 


THE    STATUTORY    AUTIIOEITY. 


(39 


sion  as  to  the  title  of  acts  *®  and  to  all  other  provisions  as  to  the 
manner  of  passing  laws.*"  A  title  which  indicates  the  purpose 
of  the  act  to  be  that  of  creating  municipal  corporations  or  of 
conferring  additional  powers  thereon,  is  sufScient  to  cover  pro- 
visions conferring  the  right  of  eminent  domain  for  municipal 
public  uses.°°  An  act  requiring  questions  of  necessity  or  public 
utility  to  be  determined  by  a  court,  was  held  not  to  be  void  as 
imposing  legislative  duties  on  the  court.®  ^  And  where  an  act 
of  the  legislature  confirmed  the  report  of  commissioners  ap- 
pointed by  a  court  to  devise  and  report  a  plan  for  the  abolition 
of  certain  grade  crossings  and  provided  for  carrying  out  the 
plan  it  was  held  not  void  as  a  usurpation  of  judicial  functions 
by  the  legislature,  since  the  legislature  might  in  the  first  instance 


Board,  25  Mich.  153;  Mt.  Clemens  v. 
ilacomb  Circ.  Judge,  119  Mich.  293, 
77  N.  W.  936;  Attorney  General  v. 
Pingree,  120  Mich.  550,  79  N.  W.  814, 
46  L.R.A.  407 ;  Tyson  v.  Washington 
County,  78  Neb.  211,  110  N.  W.  634; 
State  V.  Commissioners,  54  Ohio  St. 
333,  43  N.  E.  587 ;  Dallas  County  v. 
Plowman,  99  Tex.  509,  91  S.  W.  221; 
Senor  v.  Board  of  Comrs.,  13  Wash. 
48,  42  Pac.  Rep.  552;  State  v.  Froeh- 
lich,  115  Wis.  32,  91  N.  W.  115,  95 
Am.  St.  Eep.  894,  58  L.R.A.  757. 

4  8Poulan  V.  Atlantic  Coast  Line  R. 
R.  Co.,  123  Ga.  605,  51  S.  E.  657; 
Mull  V.  Indianapolis  etc.  Traction 
Co.,  169  Ind.  214,  81  N.  E.  657;  Sisson 
V.  Board  of  Supervisors,  128  la.  442, 
104  N.  W.  454,  70  L.R.A.  440 ;  Enter- 
prise V.  Smith,  62  Kan.  815,  62  Pac. 
324;  Lien  v.  Norman  County,  80 
Minn.  58,  82  N.  W.  1094;  Sliively 
V.  Lankford,  174  J\Io.  535,  74  S.  W. 
835;  Coward  v.  North  Plainfield,  63 
N.  J.  L.  61,  42  Atl.  805;  Slocum  v. 
Neptune,  68  N.  J.  L.  595,  53  Atl.  301 ; 
Van  Cleve  v.  Passaic  Val.  Sewerage 
Comrs.,  71  N.  J.  L.  183,  58  Atl.  571 ; 
Seaside  Realty  &  Imp.  Co.  v.  At- 
lantic City,  74  N.  J.  L.  178,  64  Atl. 
1081;  Sweet  v.  City  of  Syracuse,  128 
N.  Y.  680,  27  N.  E.  1081 ;  Matter  of 
Clinton  Ave.,  57  App.  Div.  166,  68 


N.  Y.  S.  196;  S.  C.  affirmed,  167  N.  Y. 
624,  00  N.  E.  1108;  Nicholson 
Borough,  27  Pa.  Supr.  Ct.  570; 
Marysville  Water  Co.  v.  West  Fair- 
view  etc.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  13  Pa.  Dist.  Ct 
365 ;  Ryan  v.  Terminal  Co.,  102  Tenn 
111,  50  S.  W.  744,  45  L.R.A.  303 
Franklin  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Long  Dis 
tance  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  118  Tenn.  88 
Adams  v.  San  Angelo  Water  Works 
^Co.,  80  Tex.  486,  25  S.  W.  605 
Borden  v.  Trespalacios  R.  &  I.  Co.,  98 
Tex.  494,  86  S.  W.  11,  107  Am.  St. 
Rep.  640;  State  v.  Superior  Court,  28 
Wash.  317,  68  Pac.  957,  92  Am.  St. 
Rep.  831;  Weed  v.  Goodwin,  36 
Wash.  31,  78  Pac.  36. 

<9Spratt  V.  Helena  Power  Trans- 
mission Co.,  37  Mont.  60,  94  Pac. 
631;  Niagara  Co.  I.  &  W.  S.  Co.  v. 
(lollege  Heights  Land  Co.,  Ill  App. 
Div.  170,  98  N.  Y.  S.  4;  Memphis  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Union  Ry.  Co.,  116  Tenn. 
500,  95  S.  W.  1019;  State  v.  Superior 
Court,  44  Wash.  476,  87  Pac.  521. 

6  "Coward  v.  North  Plainfield,  63 
N.  J.  L.  61,  42  Atl.  805. 

BiMcGee  v.  Hennepin  County,  84 
Minn.  472,  88  N.  W.  C;  State  v. 
Crosby,  92  Minn.  176,  99  N.  W.  636. 
See  Tyson  v.  Washington  County,  78 
Neb.  211,  110  N.  W.  634. 


740  EMINENT  D03IAIN.  §    4:10 

have  decided  upon  the  plan  and  provided  for  its  accomplish- 
ment.®^ 

§  410.  Parties  availing  of  statute  cannot  object  to  its 
validity.  As  the  legislature  may  grant  or  withhold  the  privi- 
lege of  exercising  the  eminent  domain  power,  it  may  annex  such 
conditions  to  the  exercise  of  the  privilege  as  it  sees  fit,  provided 
the  same  do  not  conflict  with  the  constitution.®^  This  question 
was  very  elaborately  considered  in  the  Iowa  case  cited.  The  stat- 
ute as  to  the  taking  of  property  by  railroad  companies  provided 
that  "the  corporation  shall  pay  all  the  costs  of  the  assessment 
made  by  the  commissioners  and  those  occasioned  by  the  appeal, 
including  reasonable  attorneys'  fees  to  be  taxed  by  the  court, 
unless  on  the  trial  thereof  the  same  or  a  less  amount  of  dam- 
ages is  awarded  than  was  allowed  by  the  commissioners."  The 
court  held  the  proposition  above  stated  and  also  that  the  provi- 
sion as  to  attorneys'  fees  was  not  class  legislation  because  made 
applicable  to  railroad  companies  only,  and  not  to  all  persons  and 
corporations  exercising  the  power  of  eminent  domain.®* 

It  was  further  held  in  the  same  case  that  a  corporation 
availing  itself  of  the  privilege  granted,  was  estopped  to  deny 
the  validity  of  the  conditions  imposed.  And  this  is  the  general 
rule.®®  In  the  case  cited  from  Ifew  Hampshire  the  statute  re- 
quired the  condemnor  to  pay  the  value  of  the  property  as  fixed 
by  the  committee  or  jury  and  fifty  per  centum  additional.     In 

saProvidence  etc.  Steamboat  Co.  v.  114  la.  713,  87  N.  W.  714,  89  Am. 

Fall  River,  183  Mass.  535,  67  N.  E.  St.  Rep.  393,  55  L.R.A.  263;   Xew- 

647.  buryport  Water  Co.  v.  Newbuiyport, 

5  3Gano  V.  Minneapolis  etc.  R.  R.  168  Mass.  541,  47  X.  E.  533;  GIou- 
Co.,  114  la.  713,  87  N.  W.  714,  89  Am.  eester  Water  Supply  Co.  v.  Glou- 
St.  Rep.  393,  55  L.R.A.  263 ;  Dow  v.  eester,  179  Mass.  365,  60  JT.  E.  977 ; 
Electric  Co.,  68  N.  H.  59,  31  Atl.  22;  Am.  Unitarian  Asso.  v.  Common- 
Cincinnati  etc.  Traction  Co.  v.  Felix,  wealth,  193  Mass.  470,  79  N.  E.  878 ; 
5  Ohio  C.  C.  (N.S.)  270;  Wiler  v.  People  v.  Calder,  153  Mich.  724; 
Logan  N'at.  Gas  &  Fuel  Co.,  6  Ohio  Dow  v.  Elec.  Co.,  68  N.  H.  59,  31  Atl. 
C.  C.  (N.S.)  206;  S.  C.  affirmed  with-  22;  S.  C.  Electric  Co.  v.  Dow,  166  U. 
out  opinion,  72  Ohio  St.  628,  76  N.  E.  S.  489,  17  S.  C.  645;  Wiler  v.  Logan 
1128.  Xat.  Gas  &  Fuel  Co.,  6  Ohio  C.  C. 

6  4Gano  V.  Minneapolis  etc.  R.  R.  (N.S.)  206;  S.  C.  affirmed,  72  Ohio 
Co.,  1141a.  713,  87N.W.  714,  89  Am.  St.  628,  76  N.  E.  1128;  Atlantic 
St.  Rep.  393,  55  L.R.A.  263.  And  see  Coast  Line  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Soutli 
Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Guthrie,  192  Bound  R.  R.  Co.,  57  S.  C.  317,  35  S. 
111.  579,  61  N.  E.  658.  E.  553;  Newburyport  Water  Co.  v. 

5  5New   York   etc.   R.    R.    Co.   v.      Newburyport,  193  U.  S.  561,  24  S.  C. 
Wheeler,  72  Conn.  481,  45  Atl.  14;       553. 
Gano  V.  Minneapolis  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 


§    410  THE  STATUTOEY  ATJTHOPaTY.  T41 

holding  that  one  who  had  availed  of  the  statute  to  acquire  the 
right  of  flowage  could  not  object  to  the  validity  of  the  condition 
the  court  says :  "When  a  legislative  grant  of  authority  to  exer- 
cise the  power  of  eminent  domain  contains  a  condition  that  the 
grantee  shall  pay  more  than  the  value  of  the  property  taken 
under  the  power,  the  grantee  accepting  the  grant  and  exercising 
the  power  cannot  question  the  constitutionality  of  the  condition. 
The  defendants  were  authorized  to  flow  the  plaintiff's  land  upon 
the  condition,  among  others,  that  they  pay  the  damages  thereby 
done  to  him  and  fifty  per  cent  in  addition.  The  statute  is  per- 
missive. It  confers  a  privilege  which  the  defendants  were  at 
liberty  to  exercise  or  not  as  they  saw  fit.  But  they  cannot  take 
and  enjoy  the  benefit  without  performing  the  condition  on 
which  it  is  given.  By  their  exercise  of  the  power  conferred, 
flowing  the  plaintiff's  land  and  applying  for  an  assessment  of 
the  damages,  they  are  precluded  from  denying  the  validity  of 
the  condition.  The  question  of  its  constitutionality  under  either 
the  federal  or  State  constitution  is  not  open  to  them."  ®^ 

B6D0W  V.  Electric  Co.,  68  N.  H.      tically   affirmed   in   Electric   Co.   v. 
59,  31  Atl.  22.    This  case  was  prac;      Dow,  166  U.  S.  489,  17  S.  C.  645. 


KP  5599  L67  1909 

1  . 

Author 

Lewis,  John 

Vol. 

"^"^       A   treatise  on  the  law  of 
eminent  domain  inthe  U.S. 

Got