An army officer's Philippine studies

■^

All books are subject to recall after two weeks ^
Olin/Kroch Library

DATE DUE

ifttflriitii:

JDLlOa

f

Interiil

rarv

i^

Loa

n

GAYLORD

PRINTED IN U.S.A.

Cornell University
Library

The original of tiiis bool< is in
the Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright restrictions in
the United States on the use of the text.

http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924075924641

AN ARMT OFFICER'S PHILIPPINE STUDIES

AN

ARMY OFFICER'S
PHILIPPINE STUDIES

BY

aiaptain 31. f . iMaaoi/ Hunt. 1. ^. A,.

(Retired)-

MANILA, P. I.

UNIVERSITY PRESS

1912

90546

[Copies deposited in the Executive Bureau, Division of Ar-
chives, Patents, Copyrights and Trade-Marks, Government of the
Philippine Islands.]

CONTENTS

Page

Editor's Foreword VII

First Paper.
General Characteristics of the Filipinos .... S

Second Paper.

General Condition of the Philippine Islands Prior

to the Katipunan Rebellion of 1896 .... 32

Third Paper.
Secret Societies of the Philippines 64

Fourth Paper.
Filipino Revolutions and Revolts 103

Fifth Paper.
The War of Conquest. ...,....,. 201

Sixth Paper.
The Civil Government of the Philippines. . . . 277

Seventh Paper.

The Position of the Insular Civil Government
towards the Catholic Church in the Philip-
pines . 291

Index 335

EDITOR'S FOREWORD

The publication of this book has been arranged for
and carried through in fulfilment of a promise made to
its author as he lay on his death- bed. But apart from
thus satisfying an obligation of friendship, the editor
trusts there is some warrant in his believing that he is
also doing a service to his and to the author's American
countrymen.

History has not yet said its last word about our war
with Spain. The question of the Philippines has not
yet reached a satisfactory solution, and, viewed in all
its antecedent circumstances, cannot lightly be assumed
to be of little moment or of no particular intrinsic dif-
ficulty. More light is needed on the subject. More clear-
ing away of irrelevant matter is demanded. A proper
pathway for the much desired meeting of justice and
peace is yet to be made. For. unbiased research and dis-
passionate judgment are by no means dominant character-
istics displayed by many who, in the past, have treated
themes handled in this work.

The late Captain Blunt was not a man to boast of
possessing any extraordinary qualifications as a writer.
But to all that knew him — and the number includes rep-
resentative men of all classes and creeds- he was ever
the soul of honor, just, generous, loyal, experienced in
travel above the average, a keen observer and a pains-
taking student, a charming personality of unusual mark,
and a gentleman of high ideals worthy of the traditions
of his distinguished ancestry.

By his European education he was peculiarly fitted

VIII

to appreciate at their just value the European elements
and forces that played so important a part both for good
and evil in the history of the Philippines. He seemed
to possess an exceptionally well balanced faculty of
analyzing not only individual character and action, but
also the organized workings of groups and parties of
men, and the motives, ideals, and passions that underlay,
inspired, or directed their movements.

Because of this faculty and also by reason of his
Catholic faith and of his loyalty to the Church— a loyalty
that was as far removed from fanaticism as light is from
darkness — he was in a position to state a great many
facts about the present case of the Philippines, as few
Americans have had them brought to their attention
before. Not all, of course, will agree with him in his
conclusions. But who can deny that it will be a boon
to many to learn that a cultured American officer could
calmly move amid the heterogeneous elements now
composing the population of the Philippines, and could
take account of the past government of the Islands, and
of their relations to Spain and Spanish sovereignty, to
Catholic Rome and to the Catholic Church, without find-
ing cause for the rancor and hatred, the prejudice and
injurious words, the" opprobrium and injustice that so
many of his countrymen have expended and heaped upon
almost everything associated with the Spanish name and
with the Catholic religion?

Other merits, no doubt, will be found revealed in the
work, though the author himself considered it incomplete
and regretted that he could not finish it to his satis-
faction. For one thing, it clearly shows that the ele-
ments of practically every revolt against Spain in the
Philippines were largely, if not entirely, dominated
by unprincipled renegades and selfish "hungry adven-
turers." Had these men won the day, there would have
been realized throughout the Islands, as one most
undoubted result among several, the same wholesale
plunder and spoliation of Church property that has

IX

characterized the present "liberty fraternity-equality"
governments of Portugal and Prance; only, as was
amply evidenced by the Katipunero patriots, there
would have been more barbarism and fiendishness
brought into play in the final disposition of their helpless
victims.

The absurdity of the assumption that the friars dom-
inated or controlled the Spanish government and the
courts is also made manifest. Of all the governors and
other high officials at the head of affairs during the
evolution of the crisis in the Philippines, there was not
one but would properly have resented the imputation
that he was not acting 'on his own authority and re-
sponsibily. Furthermore there was hardly one of them,
indeed it may be doubted is there was even one of them,
that was a thoroughly practical Catholic. Of liberalistic
political affiliations and largely imbued with the antag-
onistic sentiments of European Latin masonry, they
would no more have submitted to the wishes of the friars
in the direction and government of the Islands than a
Protestant sect of today would go to the same source
for counsel in their religious affairs and undertakings.
No unbiased student, who knows even a little of the
intimate life and habitual thought of CathoUcs, whether
lay or clerical, can fail to grasp the significance and
certainty of this position. When, for instance, it is
charged, as it sometimes is, that the friars compassed
the death of Rizal, it is therefore clear that the charge
is mere malicious calumny without a shred of evidence
to back it up.

Possibly another happy sequel to Captain Blunt's
"Studies" may be some lessening of the tendency among
a certain class of Americans to exalt our national dig-
nity and superiority by the process of forever trying to
sink Spain deeper and deeper into a veritable muckhole
of alleged ignorance, incompetency, perfidy, and general
cussedness, religious and political. Quite recently an
American daily in Manila referred editorially to the

X

"past wherein the (Filipino) people in the mass had no
rights and received no consideration". That is the
stupid expression of such canting rant as few Spaniards,
if any, however low and despicable, could be guilty of.
If the latter were to point to the American Indians as a
practical illustration of the benefits of American right-
eousness, justice, and consideration, Spain, in her treat-
ment of the Filipino, would certainly not be a loser by
the comparison.

May there be no further growth amongst us of the
spirit that seeks to make our country great by a cheap
and petty belittlement of a nation to which the Americas
owe much, and whose deserving in any respect it were
no disgrace to acknowledge, despite the traducing bigot-
ry of many centuries that has left its sorry trail on
many a page of English literature.

By an analogous process of reasoning, that same
spirit ought logically to glorify our presidents and
statesmen of today far above Washington, Jefferson,
and other early immortals of the Union for some such
paltry reason as that these didn't grant franchises to
electrict light and telephone companies, or never sat in
a swivel chair, nor had any conception of the wonderful
means of modern locomotion. And let it be borne in
mind that when flaw-pickers, mudthrowers, and human
tumble-bugs begin on America and the Americans, they
are not one whit less provided with resources, or with
reasons, motives, and material to work with, than the
misguided publicists who, in respect to American ideals
and operations in the Islands, ply their avocation and
make a pusillanimous job of it, chiefly by vilifying Spain
and the Catholic Church.

The text of the author's manuscript, partly emended
by himself, has been revised, but along lines fully ap-
proved and sanctioned by him before his death, and in
no wise affecting the substantial meaning of any, even
the slightest, part of his work. In some cases notably
in the last paper, the editor has added notes of his

XI

own, whenever he thought they would serve to illustrate
Captain Blunt's statements or convey additional apposite
information. Occasional misprints and some variations
ia the use of capital letters have crept into the book,
despite the vigilance of the editor, whose Pilpino com-
positors had little or no knowledge of English; but it is
hoped that the errors are not numerous enough to mar
the work or to occasion any inconvenience to its readers-
There remains a word to be said about the life of
the author, which, full of adventure, reads in many re-
spects like romance. He was born in Washington. D. C,
January 22, 1849. He was the son of Simon Fraser
Blunt, who served in the U. S. navy, and of Ellen Key
Blunt, daughter of Francis Scott Key, a lawyer and the
.nuthor of the world-famed national hymn, "the Star-^
Spangled Banner." He was named after John Y. Mason,
who was Secretary of the Navy and a personal friend of
the elder Blunt.

At the age of twelve years, he was taken abroad by
his mother. There he acquired the greater part of his
scholastic education, distinguishing himself among other
things by becoming fluent in the use of German, French^
and Spanish. His linguistic ability was of great service
to him in his later years.

At the outbreak of the Civil War, he desired to enter
the Confederate Navy, and he was offered a commission
by Admiral Semmes, but some obstacle arose preventing-
him from realizing his plans. He subsequently enlisted
in the French army and became a member of the Red
Cross Corps. Later he entered the Papal Zouaves. He
served under the famous General de Charette and was
among the last to surrender when the victorious Italians
carried Rome. He next betook himself to Spain to enlist
in the Carlist cause. He became a trusted member of
Don Carlos' imperial guard. After some years of service
there, when there were no further prospects for his
patron, he went to England and joined the British army.
He was assigned to the First Royal Dragoons. Later

XII

through the influence of friends at home, he was released
from his enlistment and returned to the United States,
visiting the home of his uncle, George H. Pendleton, a
senator from Ohio.

His connection with the U. S. Army began in the
term of President Arthur, who appointed him a second
lieutenant. His first appointment was to the Tenth In-
fantry. In 1896 he was transferred to the Fifth Cavalry,
and a year later he graduated from the Cavalry School
at Port Leavenworth. In 1893 he was made first lieuten-
ant, and at the outbreak of the Spanish- American war,
he was transferred to the Third Cavalry. He served
for a time in the Quartermaster's Department in Cuba.
He was made captain in the Fifteenth Cavalry in 1901
and sent to the Philippines. One year later he was
retired because of physical disability.

Captain Blunt continued to live in the Philippines,
however, and proved an efficient member of the Philip-
pine Constabulary, in which he secured a position, serv-
ing up to the time of his death. Aside from his duties,
which brought him into personal touch with many of
the personages described, quoted, or referred to in his
book, he still found time for research and for occasional
literary work. Among otherthings he made an English
translation of a geographical textbook, which was and
still is in use in a number of private colleges. While in
the regular army, he wrote a book entitled "Maxims for
Training Remount Horses for Military Purposes."

His lamented death occurred at the Military Division
Hospital, November 22, 1910, after he had received the
last rites' and sacraments of the Catholic Church. His
funeral took place from the Church of Santo Domingo,
Manila, November 27. A cavalry escort accompanied
the remains from and back to the Army morgue. Major-
General Duvall and his staff attended the services. The
pall-bearers, all personal friends of the deceased, were
Colonel Brainard, Colonel Bellinger, Colonel Harbord,
Colonel Screven, Captain Hornbrook, and Captain Met-

XIII

calf. The remains were taken to the United States by the
December transport, and towards the latter part of Jan-
uary, 1911, they were interred, with military honors, in
the national cemetery at Arlington, overlooking the
Potomac at Washington, D. C, the city of his birth.

May he rest in peace.

John R. Volz.

Manila, P. I., July 4, 1912.

FIRST PAPER

UENEBAL CHAR&CTEeiSTICS OF THE FILIPIKOS

FIRST PAPER

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FILIPINOS

-X-

To investigate and reliably describe a country or a
people, so as to give a just appreciation of the real exist-
ing conditions of either, it is not only necessary to be
familiar with the natural resources of the former, but it
is of greater importance to understand the character of
the latter. It goes without saying that the investigator
must not only be in touch with all classes, but he must-
also gain the individual confidence of those with whom
he comes in contact. This latter is the more imperative
because of differences in race, language, religion, civili-
zation, manners and customs, and climate likewise —
differences which more or less widely separate the coun-
try he is studying from his own country and people.

To accomplish the desired end, then, he must live
among the subjects of his investigations and with them,
speak a language they speak, know their history, tradi-
tions and political aspirations, respect their religious
beliefs, at least tolerate, if he does not understand, their
superstitions and, as far as is consistent, conform to their
manners and customs. He must moreover interest
himself in their troubles, not only in the way that ap-
pears best for them from his point of view, but also with
due consideration for their ideas, wishes, and prejudices-
in the matter. He must bear in mind that the "other-
man" has a country and a people of which, in all proba-
bility, he is both fond and proud, and that he has inher-
ited a religion,- a language, and manners and customs-

•which were those of his ancestors. These things he has
from his childhood been taught to honor and revere, and
to all of them, no matter how obsolete, unintelligible, or
'barbarous they may appear to a stranger, he is undoubt-
■edly as sincerely and firmly attached as is the stranger
to the kindred things of his own country.

Conformity to some such precepts and methodis about
■ihe only way to gain the desired confidence, and it is
only after it has been gained that the "other man" will
^unbend, and, so to speak, lower his guard, enabling a
•correct understanding of his appreciation of things and
events to be reached. In a word, he who studies another,
especially of alien race, must be willing to put himself
in the other's place, condescending to. look at things
through his eyes and endeavoring to appreciate them from
his standpoint. Only in this way can he hope to gain
an insight into the other's mental workings and thus
account for motives and actions that otherwise may
appear inexplicable to him.

The writer, in studying the Filipino during a nine
_years' residence in the Philippines, has endeavored to
comply with the precepts and method he lays down.
Moreover as translator of many of the reports made by
the provincial governors, when the census of the Islands
was taken in 1902, he had exceptional opportunities of
seeing the natives as painted by themselves, especially
in the reports of such of the native provincial, governors
as were supervisors of the census of their provinces. As
a result, he has found, by adding the information con-
tained in them and that derived from other sources, to
his own personal observations, the following to be the
general characteristics of the inhabitants of the Philip-
pine Islands.

The Filipino is a Malay. Owing to admixture with
•other races, however, the various tribes of the archipel-
ago differ more of less from one another. Yet with the
•exception of the Negritos, their general physical charac-
teristics and languages show a common origin. In gen-

eral terms the Filipino may be described as sbort, thick-
set, well built, of good muscle, and v6ry active. For his
size and weight he is very powerful. He has straight
black hair, thick nose and lips, high cheek bones, good
teeth, large intelligent black eyes, and a well developed
forehead. In color he varies from dark brown to almost
white.

Many of the women are exceedingly beautiful. Near-
ly all of them, have handsome figures, .small delicate
hands and feet, a wealth of bl^ck hair, of which they
take great care and arp justly proud, a clear complexion,
wonderful eyes, anci a fine, erect carriage. Even among
the peasantry and laboring classes they retain their
good looks far past the prime of life. This is probably
because what is known in Europe and America as the
"struggle for existence", with its ravages on the human
frame, is unknown to them; for nature has provided
bountifully for the inhabitants of these islands. There
is such an abundance of plantains, bread-fruit, mangos,
papayas and other natural food-stuffs growing spontan-
eously, that it may safely be stated that work, so far as
providing for daily bread goes, is practically unneces-
sary save for a very few days in the year. Beyond this-
daily bread, the wants of the natives are very few and
are easily supplied. As a consequence it seems that old
age comes to them gently, and without stamping on them
that haggard, careworn appearance so common to those
of the same class who have reached middle life in less.
favoured climes.

These islanders, by their mode of life, up to the
present simple and free from excesses, once they have
arrived at the age of puberty, are ordinarily healthy and
long lived. On the other hand the death rate among-
children, owing principally to the lack of proper care in
the matter of diet, is very heavy. As soon as a child is-
able to reach out, it is allowed to eat whatever it can lay-
its hands on. Thus most of the ills from which their
children suffer are a result of the over indulgence care-

6

iessly permitted by the parents. The Filipino child as
a rule sleeps when it wishes during the day time, and is
allowed to remain up at night as long as it pleases. It
eats when it is hungry, is never whipped, and rarel.y cries
unless suffering from some bodily ailment. Though very
much petted by its parents and all who come in contact
with it, it is fairly well behaved and while shy with stran-
gers, it is very respectful to its parents and elders. It
is usually very scantily clad, if clad at all, and always
appears to be fat and happy.

The Filipino adult is essentially conservative in his
opinions and mode of life. As a rule he is slow to adopt
new ideas or methods, and will resist, stubbornly though
passively, all innovations that are suddenly or violently
thrust upon him. If, however, they are presented with
tact, he will examine them and if he is convinced that
there is any advantage to be gained by so doing, he will
adopt them.

In general he is law-abiding and perfectly submissive
to what he recognizes as the constituted powers- He has
indeed a grea;t respect for constituted authority as repre-
sented by its officials, but for the law itself, as an abstract
principle, no matter how much he may dread it as a con-
crete fact, he has no respect whatever. He looks upon
it merely as an instrument or engine to bend his will to
that of someone else. As a matter of fact all that he
really respects in connection with it is its administrator,
who, if he knows how to make himself personally agree-
able and looked up to, can enforce bad or oppressive laws
with less difficulty and with a better general result, than
a person of less dignity and popularity could administer
laws that the individual Filipino himself recognized as
rgreathy superior and more liberal.

In his intercourse with strangers he lacks aggres-
siveness and is easily browbeaten. To all appearances he
is shifting and vacillating in his opinions. In common
Tvith the other Orientals, he does not possess what is so
■characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon races — a burning desire,

commonly disguised under the name of "loving one's
neighbour as oneself", altruism, and the like, to meddle
in the affairs of others. Consequently he is perfectl
willing that others should do and think as best suits
themselves, so long as this is no source of immediate or
direct inconvenience to him. He very rarely exm'esses
his opinions on any subject unasked, or gives /one "a
piece of his mind", particularly if by so doing^e thinks
he is likely to wound or give offense. But he is
a keen judge of character. Before answering a ques-
tion or expressing his views, he will make a mental en-
deavor to ascertain the views of his interlocutor, with
whom he is quite likely to agree merely to avoid friction
or to get out of entering into what he considers a useless
discussion of subjects on which he has already made up
his mind. It is only with difficulty that he is moved from
his original convictions by argument, and therefore he
cannot understand how anyone else may be persuaded
into a change of opinion.

In all business of an official nature, he is ceremo-
nious and prolix. He approaches it with great formal-
ity out of respect for the position of the person with
whom he is treating as well as for his own. In com-
ing to the point, he is not given to "cutting ofi cor-
ners". In conversation with strangers or casual acqu-
aintances, he very rarely corrects a mistake or endeav-
ors to remove a false' impression when he has rea-
son to suppose it to be deeply rooted, for apart from
being naturally polite he is anxious to please. At times
he will even go further, making statements which he very
well knows are at variance with facts, if he thinks that
by so doing he will be agreeable to his hearer. This is
especially the case in matters not directly important to
him, and so he often confirms a stranger in erroneous
opinions when he thinks that these are based on fixed
preconceived ideas of no matter what origin. Indeed he
is very well aware of the scanty thanks accorded to those
who rudely shatter the idols of others, even though they

may be only of clay. He has no hesitation in leading
one astray if he thinks it is to his advantage to do so.
For these reasons his expressed views on any subject of
a serious nature, above all if he has any interest at stake,
should be accepted with caution. The best way to elicit
information from him is to adopt a system of round-about
conversation concerning the subject at issue, and then
as much attention should be paid to what he leaves unsaid
as to what he actually says.

In disposition the Filipino, especially the Tagalog,
is kindly, genial, and sociable. He has a fairly keen
sense of humor but he is highly sensitive to ridicule.
He is reserved with strangers and while he may be sus-
picious of them, he endeavors not to show it. From gen-
erations of intercourse with the Spaniards his manners
are grave and formal as well as courteous and polite. His
deportment really sits easily on him, and, though he re-
frains from betraying it, he inwardly resents what he con-
siders coarseness or lack of breeding. The tone and
manner of his address to his own people and to strangers
of long residence in the country, are very different from
those he uses in his intercourse with Americans. He will
not enter the house or office of a European without re-
moving his hat, but he will not unlikely omit this
ceremony in the case of an American. This does not
arise from, a desire to cringe to the one or to be insolent
to the other. It is based upon his observation of the lack ,
of those little courtesies of every day intercourse between '
Americans themselves, and he sincerely thinks that he
is pleasing and flattering them by imitating them.

In respect to classes he is perfectly willing to look ;
up to and respect them. Though ready to try raising '
himself to the level of those he considers above him, he
heartily despises anyone who shows any tendency to
come down from the class to which he thinks he belongs,
or who attempts by collectively raising a lower to a high-
er, to realize what might be called the "dead level'^tof
an abstract democracy. What Americans call "the ^-

9

nity of labour", is meaningless to him. He can- see noth-
ing to admire or respect in it as an idea, because he
considers work in itself merely an inconvenience to be
avoided if possible, though not to be ashamed of if nec-
essary. Consequently he refrains from performing
services for himself if he can have them performed for
him by others.

Like all other Orientals he considers hospitality a
sacred duty, binding on rich or poor alike, and he
always cheerfully fulfills it. In entertaining his guests,
he is lavish to the limit of his means and often beyond
them. Until very lately, there being no hotels or inns
except perhaps in one or two of the larger cities outside
Manila, a traveler in the provinces, unless he had
acquaintances in the towns he visited, had to stay at the
"convento' or rectory, the town hall, or in the house of
some one of the inhabitants of the place where night
might overtake him. To propose to pay for anything
received in the way of entertainrgent in a private house i
no matter how poor the owner might be, was to offer an
insult and to be guilty of a breach of good manners.

The Filipino is quite as fond of money as any Cau-
casian and is willing to do as much as others to acquire
in. But he' has no appreciation of its value in the Euro-
pean or American sense of the word. His idea is that it
should be used while he is able to enjoy it and not be
hoarded until he is past the age of doing so, leaving it
for someone else to spend. Consequently while young
he will squander it in gambling, horse-racing, and espe-
cially in cock-fighting, the latter amusement being as
popular with him as bull-fighting is with the Spaniard,
or horse-racing is with the Englishman, or base-ball
with the American.

In his business dealings he is generally shrewd
enough, feeling no more scruples than the members of
othfer races in driving a bargain. At times, however, he
will haggle absurdly or ask exorbitant prices according
to some caprice of the moment. If he takes a liking to

2

10
the person with whom he is dealing or desires to do him
a service, he will often sell at cost, or even below it,
just as he will perform services for inadequate remun- ■
oration or perhaps for none at all, trusting to recoup his
loss of time and money in some other transaction with
the same person or by overcharging someone else. If,
on the other hand, an intending purchaser has made
himself distasteful, or is indifferent, and there is no im-
mediate necessity that presses, no price however high
will tempt the Filipino to sell, nor will he depart from
the price he has once set though he will be perfectly
polite in his refusal. Any attempt to beat him down, or
any argument to show him the advantage to himself of
accepting an offer, is but a waste of effort. At the same
time it is very possible that he will sell the article in
question at a lower price to someone else.

If the Filipino is lazy, it is more from the absence of
an incentive, or to speak more correctly, of what he con-
siders a necessity for. working, than from any distaste
for work itself. Moreover he considers time of no im-
portance. Foreigners, who generally are in the Philip-
pines only to' make all they can in the shortest space of
time, so as to return to their own country to enjoy the
fruits of their enterprise and energy, readily see how
much their capital could profit by his labor, were the
Filipino willing to work steadily for wages, but they brand
him as worthless because he cannot be depended upon to
do so. For himself or to his immediate personal ad vantage,
he works well and rapidly, regardless of hours or time;
but he cannot be brought to see any good in working one
instant longer for the enriching of others than is absolutely
required. When he applies himself he makes a fairly
good mechanic. He is apparently slow, yet if left alone
at a task with which he is familiar, he will show a re-
markable amount of progress. Any attempt to hurry him,
however, is more than likely to have an effect contrary to
the one desired.

As a river or harbor boatman, he shows an amount

11

of energy, determination, and courage that is truly ad-
mirable. This can be vouched for by any one who has
made a trip up the Rio Cagayan del Norte, say from Tu-
guegarao to Eschague, at any season of the year, or who
has taken part in the lightering of freight to and from
steamers at Vigan when, as is very often the case, the
sea on the bar at the river mouth of that place is a trifle
rough.

As a student in good condition, he learns rapidly and
well. So true is this that as a rule the Filipino youth
at the start will outstrip a European companion. But
according to foreign teachers his capacity for absorbing
knowledge is soon reached and in the long run he falls
behind. This is said to be a source of disappointment to
the American teachers, who are not prepared for such an
outcome, though it possibly arises from a failure on the
part of the Filipino to appreciate the "might-come-handj''"
theory, or from a lack of ambition on the part of the
youth, who perhaps is a carpenter by trade, to take a
course of biology, or of a dressmaker to make a grand
showing in calculus. In the majority of cases where the
scholars go beyond the three "R's", it is purely with
a view to qualify for the Civil Service and thus become
eligible for some government employment which will
preclude the necessity of manual labor.

As a civil employee the Filipino is fairly trustwor-
thy in anything he really undertakes, though he is liable,
for the sake of- getting rid of importunate persons, to be
ambiguous in his answers or to promise what he does
not seo his way to perform. This arises not so much
from an intention or desire to deceive as from a lack of
moral courage to say "no".

He is fond of borrowing money and though slow in
repaying it, he never repudiates a debt of his own con-
tracting or one contracted by his parents or the head
of his family. He is by no means shy in asking and it is
hard to make him take "no" for an answer. On the
other hand he does not resent a refusal or the granting

12

of only a part of what he asked for. He takes great
interest in the affairs of his immediate neighbors and
friends, and consequently develops considerable activity
as a gossip. r

The Filipinos in general and. the Visayans in par-
ticular make, when well led, excellent soldiers. They
may be lacking in resourcefulness and deficient in initia-
tive, but they certainly possess physical courage, and
death has not the terrors for them that it has for the
average European. They will undergo great privations
without murmuring, and obey blindly without stopping
to question whether the order received is lawful or not,
leaving the responsibility for ulterior consequences that
may arise with the officer in command. Should the
ofiicer ever shirk this responsibility or leave the blame
to rest on a subordinate, his utility as a commander
ceases and that soldier is no longer to be depended upon
in any emergency.

As a house servant the Filipino is, if properly hau-
led, very good. By treating him gently, firmly, and
justly, one has little trouble with him. No matter how
unimportant, trivial, or arbitrary an order may be, if it
is given seriously and quietly, as though obedience were
required as a matter of course, the Filipino servant will
speedily though perhaps un«uccessf-ully endeavor to
carry it out. In this he is unlike the Chinaman, who has
a set way of doing things and is unwilling to depart from
it. But any vacillation on the part of the master or any
display of a tendency to consult the taste, wishes, or con-
venience of the servant, or any attempt at facetiousness
will always result badly. To no people in the world
can the proverb that "too much familiarity breeds Con-
tempt", be more aptly applied than to the Filipinos of
all classes.

Whether by nature or by art, the Filipino has great
command over himself and rarely gives way to his temper
or allows it to get the upper hand. With him wordy alter-
cations or angry squabbles are rare. When, however.

13

from no matter what cause he loses control of himself and'
passion gets the better of him, his moral pendulum seems
to swing to the other extreme of the arc and even beyond
it. He becomes a fiend incarnate without sense of per-
sonal danger or of moral or physical responsibility. He
is as dangerous to those in his immediate vicinity, wheth-
er Jfri end or foe, who attempt to interfere with him, as
a "musth" elephant or a wounded grizzly bear at bay.

As an illustration of this the murder of his wife and
mother-in-law by a famous Filipino artist some time ago
in Paris is cited. While the tragedy was going on, a son
and brother of its victims was calmly walking up and
down a courtyard below, though he knew his mother and
sister were being killed. This displays the strangely
impassive side of the Filipino character. (1)

Taking to heart whatever he considers an insult or
an injury, he is vindictive and waits patiently until the
opportunity of avenging it in greater measure, or with
impunity, presents itself. On the other hand he I'arely
or never harbors resentment for punisment in cases in
which he realizes that he is wrong.

Like Orientals in general, he has a keen sense of
justice, but he can see no reason for the law's delay. In
this connection, he likes the proverb, "bis dat qui cito
dat", (he gives twice who gives quickly), and punishment
administered-immediately is by far more effective as a
correctional measure than after a protracted trial such
as lawyers love. Procrastination of the law's workings
appears to him merely a means of avoiding punishment
if he knows he is guilty, or an endeavor to procure an
unjust conviction if he believes himself to be innocent-
Punishment may correct him individually for offenses
committed, or the fear of its repetition may prevent him

(1) This created quite a stir in Paris at the time but the court
before which he was tried found extenuating circumstances in that
the parties in question were semi-savages. For a detailed^ account
of this affair s6e "La Gazette des Tribunaux" of Paris, February
9th, 1893.

14

. from committing them again, but to punish one for an
offense with any hope that the examplemay cause others
to refrain from the infraction of any law or ordinance is
practically useless.

In spite of the cheapness of Tuba and Nipa alcohols,
commonly known as "Vino", drunkenness is a rare vice
among the natives, though of late it is becoming more
common. The daily report-book of the Santa Cruz Po-
lice Station showed more cases of drunkenness among
them in the last three months of 1909 than during the
whole of the five previous years.

In religion, the members of the civilized tribes are
as a rule staunch Roman Catholics and as such believe
in God, love their families, and leave it to the Church to
define the articles of faith. Since the American occu-
pation, many of the poorer and more ignorant classes have
joined the Aglipayan schism or some of the numerous
Protestant denominations introduced from England, the
United States, or Germany. The most of these changes,
more especially among the educated classes, have
been from personal or political motives, a fact which
many Of the converts not only make no secret of but
openly proclaim. As a rule impending death makes them
return to the faith in which they were born. What the
effect of the Protestant proselytizing may have on the
rising generation is hard to forecast, but on adults of the
present it simply amounts to taking the faith they have
had away from them without giving any in return, In
spite of the teachings of all Christian denominations, the
Filipino mind, like that of all other Orientals, is strongly
tinged with fatalism, and as a result, in accepting the
inevitable, he is yery mu,ch a philosopher. He bears his
own troubles and reverses, no matter how severe they
may be, with stoicism, but to the sufferings of others,
not immediately connected with him, he is absolutely in-
different.

Many authors accuse the Filipino of a complete lack
of any sense of gratitude. This however the writer has

1,5

found to be an error. In all probability it arises from'
the Filipino's failing to show what foreigners consider
a proper appreciation for something he has had forced
upon him, which, no matter how highly prized by the
donor, the Filipino did not want, or for which he hEid no
particular use, while something he did want was with-
held. Gifts like these, whether in the shape of commer-
cial or political reforms, generally strike him as being^
by far more to the present advantage of_the donor than
to himself and it gives him little concern that future gene-
rations of his people may possibly reap some benefit from
them. The writer, however, has found that the Filipino,
if treated fairly and considerately, is just as grateful for
a favor as any member of any of the many other races
and nationalities he has come in contact with.

The necessity of blind obedience to parents and the
heads or elder members of families, as well as to those
whom they consider are in authority o'ver them, is re-
cog.nized to its fullest extent. So also is the obligation-
of carrying out their orders at all costs. This idea of
blind obedience has in fact often been pushed to its log-
ical conclusion by followers of the insurgent leaders-
pleading an order from those they considerfed in author-
ity over them as a reason for committing acts of bloodshed
or violence; and it seemed a strange doctrine to them
to be held individually responsible for carrying oufe
such an order. The victims of such orders very rarely,
harbored any great resentment or grudge against the-
persons who executed them but concentrated the weight
of their resentment against the person by whom they
werp issued.

y' Filipino society is very patriarchal and there are no —
fixed lines or impassable gulfs dividing it into classes/
The divisions, such as they are, shade imperceptibly from -,
one into the other, blending into a not inharmonious
whole, in which the claims of kinship, no matter how far
removed, are everywhere recognized as obligatory. In
this respect it is very much like the organization of the

IP

old Scotch clans. /A Filipino, no matter how well-to-do
either socially or financially, would never think of deny-
ing kinship with the poorest or most obscure relation,^
however slight the connection or remote the relationshin/

y^Among themselves their intercourse is characterize
by respect and courtesy, and it. is not considered a sign
of education or good manners for one set to despise or
look down upon another. They rarely speak harshly of,
or criticise each other to strangers unless there, is a case
of some personal grudge to satisfy or of an injury to ven-
tilate. They are rather prone to seek excuses for the
shortcomings of their neighbours. In respect to imme-
diate family ties, members of families are very closely
united. They consider sharing whatever they have to
be a fnatter of course. Thus persons in the prime of life
will toil to support a number of hangers-on who are rel-
atives too young or too old to 'work for themselves.
The younger ones in their turn contribute to the support
of their elders in their old age/

/ In the intercourse of families and between relatives
of the third and fourth degree, great respect is paid to
age and primogeniture. People of the same class, par-
ents and children, never forget the distinctions due to
age and precedence. From childhood they are carefully
taught the observance of the delicate shades of respect
between the different degrees of relationship, and this
is sometimes shown in their intercourse with one anoth-
er by the use of certain set forms of speech, applied
according to the degrees of consanguinity and seniority/

/ Parents are, paradoxical as it may seem, very exact-
ing and very indulgent at the same time. They have a
great aversion to separation from their children, wheth-
er legitimate or not. So strong is this aversion, that it
is no uncommon occurrence to find parents, children, and
grandchildren as well as nephews and nieces all living
under the same roof. When the younger Qjies marry,
the couple generally return from church to 'the house of
the parents of one of the contracting parties. As a rule

.17
children up to legal age and even after, live with their
parents/ '

Marriages between relations, within the third and
fourth degrees of kinship, are looked upon with a cer-
tain degree of repugnance. Once married, however, no
matter what offences they may commit against one an-
other, and if there be no open and scandalous infidelity
on the part of the wife, the parties carry out in its integ-
rity the biblical injunction to "cleave to one another".
Absolute divorce is unknown, as there is no law in the
Islands that can dissolve the marriage tie, and legal sep-
arations are considered more or less discreditable to
both husband and wifcy^ Whether this is the cause of
great forbearance on the part of both parties, or the re-
sult of it, is hard to say, but the forbearance exists and
as a consequence drunken husbands on the one hatid and
screaming viragoes on the other, are practically unknown
among these people.

Marriages are generally celebrated according to the
rites of the Roman Catholic Church, or in the case of
schismatics according to those of the denomination to
which the parties belong. Civil marriages are rare, and
as a rule take place between natives and foreigners
who are not Catholics, or persons whom, for canonical
reasons, the clergy of the Catholic Church have refused
to unite. Among all classes and under all circumstan-
ces, civil marriages are not regarded by Filipinos of
cither sex as binding (2) with the same moral force, or as
entailing the same moral obligations, as religious mar-
riages. As a matter of fact they are looked upon more

(2) Many marriag-es, relig-ious and civil, were contracted during'
the first three or four years of American , occupation between
• Americans and native women. . Some of the Americans seem to
have felt the obligation to be so slight a one, that it is believed
that were an authenticated list of these marriages publislied in the
United States, a wide field would be opened to prosecutions for big-
amy, to say nothing of abandonment.

3

as a means of legalizing temporary cohabitations than
anything else.

ZThe Filipino is jealous of the honor of his wife or
^„3rida", and careless almost to indifference about that
of his daughter or sister. Nor is he very particular as to
what his wife's antecedents may have been before he
married her/ It is not meant by this that immorality is
more rampant or more tolerated among Filipinos than
among other people or nationalities, but there is perhaps
more charity/ Consequently a lapse from virtue on the
part of an unmarried woman is looked upon as a misfor-
tune to be deplored rather than as a crime to be punish-
ed and a case of antenuptial incontinence on the part of
a girl, provided it has not been openly scandalous and
promiscuous, is not regarded as an unpardonable offence,
any more than it would be in a man, nor is it considered
as an insurmountable barrier to marriage by either of
the contracting parties. /

Although Filipina women do not usually marry
ea.rly, grandmothers at thirty are not uncommon. Such
as do not marry, and these are very few, generally re-
tire from the world to the seclusion of a convent or bea-
terio in some capacity or another, and consequently the
"old maid" of Europe and the United States is practical-
ly unknown. The Filipinas, no matter what their con-
duct previous to marriage may have been, as a rule make
good wives and tender mothers, and are very devoted
to their husbands and children. The "mother-in law" is
also a "raraavis'y No Filipina would brook any interfer-
ence between herself and her husband, so long as she
lives with him. Whatever his shortcomings may be, he
is her "marido", (husband), and as such always occupies
the first place in her considerationV

No matter what their social or financial circumstan-
ces may be, the maternal instinct is very strong with
them and they have not that aversion to motherhood
which has of late become so characteristic of the middle
classes of the Anglo-Saxon races. Whether this be due

19

to racial instinct or to the teachings of the Roman Cath-
olic Church, which places prevention of conception,
abortion, and murder in the same moral category, is hard
to say, but the fact remains that the Filipina is proud of
her "olive branches^ and regards them as a manifest
testimony of her husband's affection. A couple without
children ai'e looked upon as objects of commiseration
both by themselves and their friends. Having no chil-
dren of their own, they generally adopt some and treat
them in every way the same as they would their own
offspring.

There are undoubtedly many unmarried couples
living together "by common consent", (3) for there is no
race of women on earth more willing to enter into tem-
porary a,s well as permanent alliances. The average
concubine, however, at least to all outward appearances,
is as well behaved as the average married woman the
world over. This is possibly because the parties to
such unions, though not socially recognized among the
better classes to the extent of being formally received
into the circles to which they may properly be-
long, do not so lose caste as in other countries, nor
are they relentlessly ostracized by their families or
friends. Furthermore, the children of such unions are
not cast out upon the charity of the world or con-
signed to the stern mercies of some foundling estab-
lishment (4).

/Parents as a rule take care of and provide for such
offspring, and it is no very uncommon thing to see the
illegitimate children of a husband's dead mistress brought
up and cared for by his proper wife, especially if she

(3) These irregular unions are now far more common than
formerly, having increased in proportion to the decrease of the
power of the Catholie-Churoh. The clergy always used all their in-
tiuenee to break them up by insisting on the parties marrying.

(4) The proportion of illegitimate births in the Philippines
has increased in the last decade at a ratio of about ten per cent
for each year over its predecessor.

20

has none of her own. But even if she has children, she
does not seem to be able to find it in her heart to visit
the sins of the father' on his unlawful progeny. The
lawful wife does not as a rule op^ly object to her hus-
band's maintaining his illegitimate children in a reason-
able manner, even should their mother be living, so long
as he has severed his connection with her. No one in-
deed would attempt to separate an unmarried mother Irom
her child on alleged religious or moral grounds/^

According to Anglo-Saxon standards, this condition
of affairs is highly immorarl, and yet in its way it perhaps
has its advantages. Up to quite recently there were
very few Filipina public women promiscuously plying
■their trade as such, and even at present the number is
■comparatively small. About seventy-five per cent of the
registered public prostitutes in the Islands are Europeans,
Americans, or Japanese, who have come to the Philip-
pines for their special purpose in the course of the last
*en years. (5).

Filipina women are generally amiable in their dispo-
■sition, though mildly and sometimes fiercely jealous.
According to early writers, they, especially the Visayans,
'were given up to unbridled sensuality. This however
lis no longer the case. Instances of sexual depravity
and unnatural practices among them are now i-arer than
among the more highly civilized European races.

With money at her command, the Filipina is very
extravagant. She is fond of jewelry, often considering
.it, apart from its ornamental purposes, as an investment.
■She also loves fine clothes, handsome horses, and car-
Tiages. Owing to the cheapness of horse-flesh and vehi-
•«les, and the low rate of wages, it is a poor family in-
deed that does not possess a private conveyance of some

(5) According- to foreign medical men who have been estab-
lished in Manila for many years, venereal diseases have increased
in the last eight years about five hundred per cent.

21

description, even though they may liave to "make war
pay for war" by I'enting it out when not in use. (6).

In misfortune however, she recognizes that she has
to bow to fate and, to all outward appearances, she takes
her reverses gracefully if not cheerfully, not wasting
her time, souring her disposition, or annoying her
friends by useless lamentations or repinings over past
prosperity. She generally makes the most of her pres-
ent conditions, whatever they may be. Under all cir-
cumstances she makes a careful and frugal housewife..
A poor white man marrying, or living in concubinage
with, a native woman or a mestiza, will find the union
to be very much to his pecuniary advantage, for she is
an excellent business woman and will buy and sell, no
matter in what quantities, more advantageously than he
possibly could, and she will manage his household most
economically. The Pilipina has another advantage over
her American or European sister in so far as she ha&
much less actual manual labor falling to her lot. In-
one branch alone, domestic service, about seventy-five-
per cent of the household work is done by men or boys,
whereas in Europe and the United States the contrary
is the case.

The manners of the Pilipinas are very gentle and
quiet. Among their own people or with Spaniards, who
from centuries of association understand them, they
show a number of little graces in their intercourse with
persons of their own age or with their elders, that are
very attractive. In conversation they are self-possessed
and sprightly, without however being boisterous, self
assertive, or hoydenish. They never ape the masculine
in manners, speech, or dress. Their language is always,
direct, sometimes to a degree that shocks the mock mod-
est susceptibilities of a senseless euphemism. Stilli

(6) There are in Manila about 2500 public vehicles dedicated!
to the transportation of persons, and as many more private ones;,
or about one to every ninety persons of the 240,000 that comprise-
the population of the city.

22

they are in all essentials modest and well behaved.
They never talk "at" one, or endeavor to attract atten-
tion. Whether all this is the effect of climate, temper-
ament, lack of energy and animal spirits, or the result
of the religious education that most of them have received
in greater or lesser degree, it is hard to say. But in
any case Pilipina women of education have a peculiar
charm of their own that is very engaging.

They are fOnd of social gatherings, pu blic or p_riyate
entertainments, dancing, church proc e ssions , religious
festivals, and theatre going. They are also great gam-
blers, the principal game among the women being Pan-
guingue", which is a complicated combination of six or
eight packs of cards very much resembling "Bezique".
They moreover speculate freely in lottery tickets, raf-
fles, and races, and there are those among them, who in
common with the men win and lose large sums at
"Monte" or in the cock-pits. It is but fair to them how-
ever, to state that excess in these things is as rare among
them as among women of other countries. Not looking
upon them as either sins or crimes, any more than Amer-
icans so look upon "Progressive Euchre" "Bridge",
or "Poker", they are more frank and open in the prac-
tice of them. Of late, lawn-tennis has become popular
among the members of the well-to-do classes and base-
ball among the poorer.

In common with the men they have artistic tastes
and instincts, and the majority of them who have receiv-
ed any education at all beyond the three "R's", and
some who have not, draw, paint, or embroider with great
taste and many with remarkable skill.

All Filipinos have a keen ear for music, of which
they are very fond. It is true they have not yet produced
composers, performers, or singers of more than local
celebrity, but a remarkably large proportion of them
play and sing very well. Their principal instruments
are the violin, harp, piano, bandurria, and guitar.

The ordinary costume of the men consists of a knit

23

undershii;'t, white or colored, over which is worn a "ca-
misa china", a sort of loose sack or blouse without collar
or cuffs, of plain white cotton, pifla, calibo, or sinamay
of any color. The nether man is encased in loose
drawers of some cotton stuff, either plain or colored, and
plush "chinelas", slippers, without socks protect his
feet. The head is covered with any kind of hat, hard
or soft, of felt, straw, or buri. In the more remote prov-
inces this is replaced by a, "salacot", a species of hard
mushroom shaped hat, more or less elaborately orna-
mented with silver around the edges, and a circular plate
or ball of the same metal on top.

The men of the better classes as a rule wear clothes
of light cloth, silk, or cotton drill, cut in better or
worse imitation of the European fashions. Leather or
canvas shoes are worn, and the principal object sought
in the whole costume appears to be comfort for a hot
climate.

The majority of the native women of all classes, in
Manila as well as in the provinces, dress in what is
known as the "Mestiza" style, which, apart from being
graceful, easy, and modest, is, from a hygienic point of
view, particularly well adapted to the climate. This
costume consists of a low-necked bodice of some light
material such as "Pifla", "Calibo", or "Sinamay", with
immense open sleeves, over which is worn, shawl-wise,
a large kerchief of the same material folded diagonally,
so that the points reach the waist in front and behind.
Under this is worn a chemise which reaches to the ankles
and over which is a white petticoat more or less elaborate-
ly ornamented with lace, open work, or embroidery of
various colors, according to the means and taste of the
wearer. The outer. garment is an overskirt of "sinamay",
"jusi", imported piece-goods, silk, or w;hatever they can
afford. It is sometimes cut with a pointed train that is
gathei'ed up and held in front with one hand while the
other holds a fan.

Outside of the overskirt is generally worn a piece of

24

more or less elaborately ornamented black or dark color-
e(J stuff called the "tapis", very like an apron, that
goes completely around the hips and reaches to a little
below the knees. This sets off a good figure wonderful-
ly and also improves the appearance of a bad one. The
tapis is a distinguishing mark between the Spanish Creol-
es, Mestizas, and the full-blooded Indians, or natives,
and is supposed to be worn only by the latter.

When attending religious ceremonies, and only then,
the Filipina covers her head, using for this purpose the
lace mantilla as worn by Spanish women, or a ''velo",
(veil) consisting of a piece of light transparent black
veiling about a yard and a half square and more or less
elaborately ornamented with dots, beads, spangles, or
the like, or a plain black veil of finer or coarser close
woven material according to her means or taste. Any
of these head coverings, when worn by one accustomed
to them, can be made very graceful aind effective.
; Corsets are very rarely worn and stockings on very
formal, occasions. The usual foot-gear consists of
"chinelas", (heelless slippers), "chorchosi", (heelless
flippers with cork soles about half an inch thick), "za-
patillas' , (high heeled slippers) and "zapatos", (any kind
of heeled shoe). These are generally of plush, brocade,
silk, kid, or leather of any color, and more or less elab-
orately embroidered with gold or colors and beaded ac-
cording to taste and means.

This costume has, from a woman's point of view, the
advantage of being capable of any amount of ornamen-
tation and of bein^ made from any material from the
most delicate "pina", or the richest brocades, to the
coarsest "sinamay" and the cheapest imported piece-
goods. The embroideries of some of the skirts alone
have been known to cost from P 500.00 to F 1000.00. All
classes have excellent taste, and although the colors
worn are what the Europeans would call glaring, they
are well. selected, well combined, and capitally suited to
the wearers. One ornament worn by all classes, rich aAd

■25

poor, young and old, at all times and on all occasions is a
necklace made of champaca, sampaguita or ilangilang
flowers strung on a thread of abaci. These are very
fragrant and are hawked about the streets. As they
cost but a few centavos they find a ready sale at all
hours an'd in all quarters. ' ,

The Mestiza dress, rarely varied, is worn by the
women of all the civilized tribes and is very becoming to
them. As long as they stick- to it, they are quite
charming and attractive and always appear at their ease.
When however they venture, as some of the would-be'
better classes unfortunately do, into cornets and Euro-
pean-cut clothes, they sometimes make curious mistakes
in their applications of articles Of dress. The same per-
sons that one has seen and admired in'their native cos-
tume are hardly recognizable in the conventional , ga,rb
of Western civilization. Their charm has vanished and
they have become stiff, awkward, and ungainly in their
bearing, and conscious and strained in their manner,
and have more the appearance of housemaids on a holi-
day than of persons of refinement.

The native costume in all its glory can best be
seen at Antipolo on Saturdays and Sundays' of the
month of May. There at certain hours of the day the
crowd in the streets presents a mass of the richest and
most vivid possible combinations of color from black
to white. The scene dazzles the eye and beggars des-
cription. It can only be compared to a moving and ever
changing mass of gigantic and gorg'eously variegated
double tulips.

In their person amd dress, all classes are remark-
ably clean, even the poorest of them changing every
article of clothing three or four times a week. This,
coupled with the fact that they bathe on every available
occasion and that the vast majority of them for the
greater part of the time wear neither shoes or stockings,
is the reason that a Filipino crowd, no matter how dense
it may be or how close the building in which it is assem-

4

26

bled, is never offensive, save for perfumes, good, bad,
or indifferent, of which they are very fond. In going to
or coming from their homes, the laboring classes are
very neat in their appearance, for as a rule they put off
their working clothes on leaving their work. When mis-
fortune overtakes them, no matter what other eoonomies""
theyTnay'pTrt into practice,, their wash bill is the last one
they think of cutting down.

' TheTr"h"ODies~ahd immediate interior surroundings
are very clean and in this particular could serve as models
to many other nationalities with greater pretensions
to cleanliness. Travelers are often fond of calling at-
tention to what they are pleased to call the misery and
filth of the poorer Filipinos, but of their own knowledge
the critics generally know little or nothing of the same
conditions prevailing among similar classes of their own
countries. Had they ever been thrown among their own
poverty stricken countrymen or visited them from some
other motive than mere curiosity, they would realize that
•cleanliness or filth, is, in a measure, only relative, and that
while it may look well on paper to run down the Filipino
and his surroundings, the quarters of the great cities of
Europe and America inhabited by the poorer classes, as
well as the conditions of these classes themselves in res-
pect to personal cleanliness and surroundings, would
by no means be the gainers in a fair and impartial com-

_ parison between them and our Islanders.

The interiors of their houses are more or less elab-
orately ornamented and decorated according to their
means, for they are fond of pretty things in the shape of
furniture, pictures, hangings, bronzes, glass and china-
ware, and especially of plants and flowers. In the selec-
tion and arrangement of these things, all classes display
•remarkable taste and artistic judgment.

"-^ Recent American and English writers, more partic-
-ularly in the last six or eight years, and especially the
American newspapers of Manila, have united in placing
the Filipino on a very low plane, and some American

27

statesmen have not only denounced them as savages
and ingrates, but they have declared it their opinion
that a part of them are incapable of civilization. Many
of these criticisms of the Islands and the Islanders are
based on very superficial observations made in the course
of a few weeks' sojourn in Manila, under the auspices of
some bevy or another of native political mountebanks.
These oracles of information, -just as rats are said to
desert a ship when sinking, are of the kind who out of
sheer selflslmes turn from one country or party to an-
other. Many of them threw over Spain for the Filipino
Republic and the Filipino Republic for the United States,
in their anxietj'- to obtain and retain public offices and em-
ployments. Many of them -were later required, or
"allowed", to resign, if they were not absolutely dismiss-
ed from their positions, while others who knew how
to shape their course and trim their sails, still remain
somewhere and somehow on a convenient pay-roll.

Such men, though bright plausible talkers, were more
anxious to accomplish their own personal ends than to
impart real information. In their intercourse with Amer-
ican officials and visiting tourists, they always tried to
ascertain the preconceived ideas of their interlocutors.
Then by telling only as much as they judged would be
acceptable, or by giving opinions of what they thought
should be the case, as positive statements of what it ac-
tually was, they naturally confirmed the big white broth
ers in just the opinion, one-sided and erroneous, that
under the circumstances they were bound to get and have.

It is on some such second-hand information, derived
from sources like the above, that many who have had
much to do with the shaping of American policy and
opinions in regard to the Philippine Islands and how they
should be governed, have undoubtdely based their judg-
ement. Is it not a matter of record that of our makers of
policy and of our colonial legislators, anything more
than a very small minority was never within a thousand
miles of the archipelago? Under these circumstances

28

and considering thg,t the Filipinos in manners and cus-
toms, character and characteristics were then, as they
still are, utterly unlike any people we heretofore had
ever come into contact with, it is not to be wondered at
that grave errors concerning them should have been
made. The only wonder is that these errors have not
been graver in themselves and more far-reaching in
their effects on the governing of this people.

SECOND PAPER

GENERAL CONDITION OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS PRIOR
TO THE KATIPUNAN REBELLION OF 1896.

SECOND PAPER

SEMBAL CONDITION OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS PRIOR
TO THE KATIPIAN REBELLION OF 1896 (^)

While the Spanish administration of the Philippine-
Islands was far from perfect, it has been painted, for
the English-speaking world, in much darker colors than
it "really deserved, and that principally by persons
whose knowledge of it was mostly superficial, second-
hand, or in a very few cases based on actual ex-
perience in the archipelago. It has therefore been
commonly condemned out of hand by the English and
American general public without having had a fair
hearing, or indeed without any hearing at all. The
information leading to such condemnation was large-
ly based on exparte statements of persons smarting-
under some real or imaginary grievance. It is the
familiar story of the usual results of unsuccessful
or frustrated schemes and enterprises involving the-
exploitation of the Islands or their inhabitants to the-
personal benefit of interested parties. These schemes
would have turned out just as their promoters wished,
had they received the countenance of the colonial
government, but the rub was that they were either
disapproved or they were sanctioned as undertaken
by others.

(1) On the principle that two wrong actions do not make
one right one, the comparisons in this paper would be odious,
had they been made merely as a "tu quoque". But they werfr
not so made. They have been set forth in order to assist anyone
one who has patience to read, to form his own standard by
which to measure conditions such as they thei) Were.

32

It may by said that no colonial government is
quite perfect, and rarely is any considered to be such
even by the people of the mother country or by the
colonists themselves. More rarely still does any give
complete satisfaction to either or both at once, even
though they are necessarily, • to a greater or lesser
extent, in sympathy with it as forming part of the
national government.

It is therefore not to be wondered at that the
Hispano-Filipino government fared badly at the hands
of writers and critics of other nationalities, who were
openly hostile to the country it represented.

The supreme government of the Philippine Islands
came directly under the ministry of Ultramar (Col-
onies) in Spain, of which ministry it formed a special
branch. This branch included a Council for the Phil-
ippines in Madrid, to which all measures and projects
regarding the Islands were referred. There was also
a special bureau in the Spanish Exchequer which was
in charge of all financial matters pertaining to the
a,rchipelago.

The insular government proper was under a Gov-
ernor General, who was a high ranking military officer.
As direct representative of the King and the home
government, he was clothed with very extensive powers.
These, since he could proclaim martial law wheriever
he considered that the circumstances warranted his
doing so, amounted practically to the power of life
and death.

The Governor General was assisted by two delib-
erative bodies, the Junta de Autoridades (Committee
of Authorities) and the Council of Administration.
These could discuss and, in conjunction with the Gov-
ernor General might suggest measures concerning the
Philippines to the ministry in Spain; but such meas-
ures became laws only after they had been passed
and approved by the Madrid Government. They had
authority, however, to enact such local ordinances as

33

were necessary to put the fundamental laws, made
in Spain, into action in the archipelago. Thus the
expressed views of these bodies would necessarily
carry great weight, but they were in no way binding
on the action of the Governor General. Not only were
their functions solely of an advisory and executive
nature, but he could summon or adjourn them at his
pleasure. The existing laws, however, provided for
a considerable amount of local, i. e., provincial and mu-
nicipal, autonomy. (2)

The Governor General was in, supreme command of
the Spanish and Colonial land and sea forces stationed in
the Islands. At discretion, he could assume the direc-
tion of either or both, though the land forces were direct-
ly under the command of the "Segundo Cabo" (Second
Chief or what would be equivalent to the present Divi-
sion Commander), while the sea forces were under the
Admiral of the Filipino Squadron. He was also ex-offi-
cio Presiding Officer of all civil deliberative bodies of
the insular government.

The details of this government were carried out by
the Departments of Hacienda (Exchequer and Finance),
and Fomento (Executive Administration). These de-
partments were further subdivided into departmental bu-
reaus, such as Customs, Agriculture, Manufactures, Pub-
lic Works, Education, Justice, Forestry, etc., each under
its respective chief. The chiefs of these departments and
bureaus, though appointed by "Royal Order" direct from
Madrid, were under the immediate authority of the Gov-

(2) See statement of Cayetano Arellano before the Phillippine
Commission, April 14th, 1899. Also that of Manuel Sastron before
same Commission, Ma.> 14th, 1899.

General Joseph Wheeler in an interview at San Francisco,
March 7th, 1900, says in substance that under the Spanish regime
they (the Philippine Islands) had practically a system similar to
that known as our "territorial system" whereby they had authority
to make their own laws and govern themselves. The two deliber-
ative bodies mentioned in the text are in all probability what he
referred to,

5

9054G

ernor General, for they, as well as their departments and
their branches, were subject to his inspection, criticism,
and orders.

While land and sea forces stationed in the Philip-
pines were for the time being under the supreme com-
mand of the Governor General, the routine department-
al details of their affairs were managed respectively by
the Ministers of War and Marine in Spain.

The different provinces of the Islands were divided,
for administrative purposes, into two classes. Civil Gov-
ernorships and Military Commanderies. The first were
established as a rule in those provinces in which the
greater number of the inhabitants were collected in or-
ganized municipalities, and the second in provinces in
which the bulk of the population consisted of the wild
tribes, "infieles", now know as the non- Christian tribes,
that lived in a semi-nomadic state or were merely collect-
ed in "Rancherlas".

Up to 1886, provincial affairs were managed by offi-
cials known as "Alcaldes Mayores", who combir^ed the
executive and judicial functions in their own persons.
In the above year, however, this was changed and the
two functions were separated. These officials were re-
placed by Civil Governors and judges of the Court of First
Instance.

The local affairs of these provinces and command-
eries were administered by officials of the "Politico"
(Executive), Judiciary, "Hacienda" (Exchequer) and Re-
ligious (3) branches of the general colonial government.
Each province and commandery had a staff of subordinate
employees pertaining to these branches. Their numerical
strength was in proportion to the extent and importance

(.3) All priests, whether secular or regular, who were in charge
ol parishes, received a certain percentage of the sums collected in
their parishes for cedula tax and thus were in a measure stipen-
diaries of the government. In this paper, therefore, they have been
classed among the officials of the province, though strictly speaking
they, ex-officio, formed no part of them.

35

of the province. The functions of the above cited local
branches are sufficiently explained by their nomencla-
ture.

In such of the provinces as were under purely civil
administration, the "Jefes Politicos", Political Chiefs or
Governors, almost invariably Spaniards, were officials of
the ''Administration" (Executive Department): and the
"Jefes Politico- Militar" (Military chiefs or commanders)
in charge of the Military Commanderies, were officers of
the Army and Navy, according to the location of the
commanderies. In some cases these Military or Naval
officers united in their own persons the functions of all
the administrative branches of their commanderies, with
the exception of those of the religious.

The provinces under civil administration were divided
into Pueblos (Towns and Townships), and the pueblos
were further subdivided into Barrios, (Hamlets, Wards
or Districts) and in the Military commanderies, the wild
tribes were as a rule divided into "Rancherias."

There was a judiciary that consisted of an Attorney
General in Manila ("Fiscal") and of the dependent "Pis-
cales" in the provinces, who fulfilled the functions of
attorney general, district attorney, and public prosecu-
tors as we understand them.

There was a supreme court divided into two sections,
civil and criminal, that formed part of the "Audiencia",
or appellate courts. There were also superior courts,
(Courts of First Instance), in Manila and a judge of the
court of first instance in the capitol of each province.
There was a justice of the peace in every pueblo or
township. The.judges of the superior courts, some of
whom were Spaniards and some natives, were appointed
from Madrid. The justices of peace were appointed
from Manila.

Cases originated in the justice's court, and if not
terminated there, went to the higher courts according to
their importance or on appeal. The final court of appeal
in the Islands was the "Audiencia" or supreme court in

36
Manila, but from it cases could be taken on appeal to
Spain.

In 1887, the Spanish Penal and Civil codes were in-
troduced, and though the laws in themselves were excel-
lent, the procedure was cumbersome, antiquated, and
prolix, and admitted of great delays in the dispensing of
justice.

The Governor General was ex-fficio Presiding Offi-
cer of the Municipality of Manila, and the Civil Gover-
nor of the city, appointed from Madrid, was vice-Pres-
ident. There was also a first and second Alcalde, (May-
or and vice-Mayor), fourteen Regidores (Aldermen),
appointed from Manila, a secretary, and the necessary
staff of clerks, messengers, and other employees.

The office of Civil Governor of Manila was appoint-
ive, as also originally were those of the Regidores.
These, however, had virtually become a self perpetua-
ting body. While their term of office was limited to two
years only, they practically elected their own successors;
although as a rule they did not serve for two successive
terms.

The Regidores of Manila were further subdivided
into committees, such as of Ways and Means, Public
Works, Public Health, Audits and Accounts, Lighting of
the streets. Building of new markets. Building of new
cemeteries, Police, etc., the same Regidores serving as
members of several different committees at the same
time.

The cities of Tloilo, Cebu, Batangas, Vigan, Nueva
Caceres and Jaro had similar, though not so elaborate,
civic organizations, modeled on that of Manila. There
was also, in most municipalities, an official known as
the "Capitan Chino", who was the head man of the Chi-
nese located there, who practically managed the Chinese
colony and who was the go-between for them and the
civic administrations.

For the purposes principally of tax collections and
of registration, the rural and urban populations were

37

divided into groups called !'Barangays", each consisting
of about forty of fifty farnilies. Every group had a head
man, "Jefe de Barangay", whose duty it was to keep the
accounts, collect the taxes, and the like, and though this
office was considered onerous and there was no salary
attached to it, there must have been some emoluments,
for there seems to have been no difficulty in getting per-
sons to occupy it. The incumbents of . this office were
selected every two years.

That the Filipino Colonial Government, according to
Anglo-Saxon standards, was defective in its machinery
is a fact. That many of its officials may have been
corrupt is beyond question. Still both of these defects were
very much exaggerated, not only by foreign travelers,
but by Spaniards themselves. The latter were usually
intensely patriotic, but they were not far from the
first to criticize and roundly abuse the government and
its measures, above all when as "Outs" they were
discussing the "Ins". At the same time they would bit-
terly resent a foreigner's doing the same thing. The
criticisms of the Filipinos of a certain well known class
were still more bitter.

In these discussions, no allowance was made for
existing conditions however abnormal, and no tales, no
matter how wild or improbable, were denied circulation.
Little justice and no mercy were shown, when men
and measures of the opposite party came in for discus-
sion or criticism. In this manner, many rash statements,
originating in personal or party motives, were put for-
ward by discontented Spaniards or natives, and accepted
as facts by foreigners who were not in a position to ascer-
tain the truth concerning them. Such statements later
found their way into newspapers, magazines, or books as
the "statements of a Spaniard of distinction", or they
would be "authentic information given by a leading mer-
chant of Manila who was in a position to know", or the
like. Hence it often happened that correspondents or
authors accepted at their face value, and took no steps to

38

verify, declarations, no matter how sweeping or far reach-
ing, made by strangers on unfamiliar subjects, and then
embodied them without even investigation in their next
letter or book. The public they were written for, provid-
ed their prejudices were backed up or their preconceived
opinions confirmed, accepted and cited them as incontro-
vertible facts. For this there was no other and no better
reason than that they appeared in such a journal or mag-
azine, or in a book of such or such an authoi*.

As a Colonial Government the Philippine adminis-
tration suited Spain, just as the present government of
these Islands administered by the Philippine Commis-
sion suits the United States; and as it would have been
folly in the past to expect Spain to shape her policy
or to conduct her colonial affairs in accordance with
the views or desires of other nations rather than of
her own, so were it folly now to expect that the Uni-
ted States will look to foreigners for guidance in Phil-
ippine affairs. Those who did not like the Spanish
Colonial Government, such as it was, were at lib-
erty to do what Governor Taft, in a speech made at
Iloilo, is credited with having advised certain complain-
ing outsiders to do, when they did not like the conditions
then existing under the American Civil Government-
leave the Islands.

Whether the Spanish Colonial Government was better
suited to the Philippines and their people than is the one
administered by the present Philippine Commission un-
der the authority of the United States, may admit of dis-
cussion. That the Spanish Government was better liked
by the majprity of average Filipinos of all classes and
conditions does not admit of a doubt.

The follies and blunders of England's administration
of her colonies in North America and other places have
been ignored, forgotten, and glozed over by the general-
ity of English and American writers. On the other hand,
the follies and blunders of Spain's administration of her
colonies the world over, have been pointed out, remem-

39

bered, held up to vituperation, and condemned by them
to the fullest extent. Accenting their sweeping accusa-
tions without investigation therefore, and unqualifiedly
condemning Spain because of the shortcomings of some
or many of the Spanish officials, ought to be as far
from common justice and consistency as it would be to
condemn the Government of the United States on account
of the maladministration of the funds of the "Freedman's
Bureau", or because of the Star Route scandals, the frauds
from time to time brought to light in the administration
of the Post Office, or the scandals in connection with the
purchase of public timber lands, not to mention" other
things. What American of average information can
candidly claim for the civil administration of the great
cities of the United States, above all for the richer and
more important ones, anything like purity of government
and freedom from corruption, as often as hands are held
up in holy horror of Spain's administration of the Philip-
pines or her other colonies?

That the Spanish colonial administration and system,
during the three hundred and ninety years it lasted, may
have been good, bad, or indifferent, depends very much on
the point of view from which it is criticized. But after all
has been said for and against it, one fact supremely worthy
of notice rem-ains, a fact which all writers seem so far to
have left in the background or to have studiously ignor-
ed, and that is that of all nations from the beginning of
the Christian era down to the present time, Spain with
the aid of this very system held her colonies in undis-
puted possession by the colonists themselves longer than
any other nations ever did theirs.

The richest and most . important British colonies of
the North Americancontinent were discovered, conquer-
ed, or acquired by treaty; but owing to the tyrannies and
the abuse meted out to the colonists by Great Britain,
they were lost to her between the beginning of the sev-
enteenth and the last quarter of the eighteenth cen-
turies.

40

Prance started settlements in Canada and Louisiana,
in the seventeenth century but by the last quarter of
the eighteenth, Canada had been wrested from her by
England, while Louisiana, ceded by treaty to Spain and
again returned to France, was finally purchased in
1803, by the United States. In these two colonies the
French language, except in a few Canadian districts, has
,at present practically died out and has been replaced by
the English.

Brazil, discovered by the Portuguese and settled by
them in the sixteenth century, became an independent
empire in the first decade of the nineteenth century, and
at that time, all that remained to Portugal of her once
vast colonial possessions in Africa, India, and China,
were some unimpdrtant places on the coasts of these
three countries.

Spain commenced the colonization of the Antilles in
the last decade of the fifteenth century and the first col -
ony lost by her was the Island of Jamaica, taken from
her some hundred and sixty years later (1665), by Eng-
land, when Cromwell was Lord Protector. This was
followed by her loss to France of many of the smaller
West Indian islands, which were eventually taken from
that country by England. The western part of the Is-
land of San Domingo, Haiti, passed from Spain to France
in 1714 by the Treaty of Ryswick, and in 1801 became a
Negro Republic. The remainder of the Island was aban-
doned by Spain in 1863, after she had held i t for over
three and a half centuries. It is now a republic practi-
cally under the protectorate of the United States. Puerto
Rico and the Philippines were ceded to the United States
by the Treaty of Paris, December 10th, 1898. Through
an assisted rebellion followed by the Spanish -American
War of 1898, Cuba finally, in 1902, became an indepen-
dent republic, after having been occupied by the Amer-
ican forces for about four years. (4)

(4) Later 1908-9 there was a revolution in Cuba and United
States troops had tQ be sent to restore order.

41

Mexico was the first colony lost to Spain by reason
of the rebellion of a part of its inhabitants. It has been
stated by Mexican writers that this rebellion came about
as the result of bickerings and struggles for supremacy
in that country between the Masons of the York and of
the Scottish rites, the combatant factions in the war of
independence being generally known in Mexico as "Es-
coseses" (Scots) and "Yorkinos" (Yorkers). This sta-
. tement must be accepted cautiously.

The rebellions involving the loss by Spain of her
South and Central American colonies appear to have
been brought about largely by certain native agitators,
materially assisted by French, English, Irish and other
foreign unemployed military adventurers, who after the
close of the Napoleonic wars, swarmed in Europe. Cap-
tain, afterwards Admiral, Cockrane of the British Royal
Navy was also very prominent in affording them assis-
tance by sea.

It is a curious fact that in nearly every case, the
loss of her colonies by Spain is directly traceable to
material, though indirect, assistance rendered by other
countries to the local agitators. It was these, assisted by
foreign sympathy and' money, who fostered in the col-
onies a spirit of discontent and. rebellion. In scarcely
any case did the people themselves make any particular
complaints of abuses, as did the inhabitants of the
British colonies of North America. Once these rebellions
started, money and arms appear always to have been
forthcoming from other countries, thus assuring the
rebels a success that in all probability they would other-
wise never have attained. This assistance seems to have
been extended in compliance with a survival of the for-
eign policy pursued by England in the reign of Henry
VIII, Elizabeth, Charles I, and during the Commonwealth
under Cromwell, and to all appearances, was rendered

Havana newspapers asserted that this revolution was brought
about by the ex-Consul of the United States with a view to ne-
cessitating- American intervention and annexation by his country.

6

42

as much with a view to the crippling of Spain as a Euro-
pean power, as out of any sympathy for the real or imagi-
nary wrongs or sufferings of the colonists. In no case
does it appear that the people of the revolted colonies
reaped any immediate material advantages over their
former conditions . Whatever solid benefit there was usu-
ally went to the leaders, whilst the people were left with
increased personal expenses, and the countries formed
from the colonies were burdened with increased taxation ■
and with greater financial obligations than they had
before.

As the Spanish colonies were considered a part of
the Spanish Monarchy, the colonial system may be said
to have been based on the proverb, "Lo que hay de Es-
pafia es de los Espanoles", (What there is of Spain, be-
longs to the Spaniards), just as the Monroe doctrine of
' 'America for the Americans" embodies the general policy
of the United States. While the emigration of Spaniards,
(5) en masse, to the Philippines and other Spanish col-
onies was not encouraged, trade and commerce between
the archipelago and the home peninsula were greaty fos-
tered. Spaniards and Spanish interests were protected
very much the same as Americans and American interests
are protected by enactments to the effect that in all
government contracts, American materials shall, when
possible, be used to the exclusion of all others, or by

(5) As up to the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. the only
direct communication between Spain and the Philippines was via
the Cape of Good Hope, such Spaniards as came lo them, over and
above priests and officials, generallj' "cast in their lot" with the
Islands and remained until they had made a fortune or died. After
the opening of theoanal however, theclassof Spaniards in the Phil-
ippines changed. Public service became a refuge for such hangers-
on, great or small, of the leaders of the revolution in Spain (1868),
as were ''impossible" in that country, or whom the leaders wanted
to get out of their way, or whose claims on them for some govern-
ment employment were too strong to be denied recognition. Con-
sequently the archipelago was gradually overrun with needy adven-
turers, many of whom later become political agitators of the worst
description.

43

tariff and shipping laws that effectually protect Amer-
ican manufacturers and ship owners in American mar-
kets and ports.

This system of commercial policy answered very
well so far as Spain and her colonies were concerned,
for between them trade was practically free. It cannot
he denied, however, that it bore heavily upon those for-
eign merchants in the Philippines, whose dealings were
principally in commodities produced in, and imported
from, other countries, between which and the Philippines
no free trade existed. This hardship was felt more par-
ticularly by the British merchants established in the Phil-
ippines. They as well as the British public at home com-
plained bitterly of a system which protected Spanish
products in a Spanish colony, while against them as well
as merchants of other countries, there stood a customs
tariff which, small as it was (about one third of the rates
at present in force) , when 'added to certain port charges
levied on ships not flying the Spanish flag, gave a
distinct advantage to Spanish producers and ship owners
both at home and in the colonies.

The British merchants in the Philippines, like their
fellow countrymen at home, were in policy free traders.
As such they could not or would not understand why any
system of policy, commercial or otherwise, satisfactory
and apposite to Great Britain, should not be equally so to
any other nation, especially as the contrary interfered
with trade advantages that all might have reaped
had conditions been such as they desired. Under these
circumstances it is hardly to be wondered at that
they extended considerable sympathy, if nothing more,
to any person or political party proposing, by rebellion
or other means, to bring about a change that was
likely to redound to British advantage. It is not
strange either that British writers and the British nation
in general, with their overbearing intolerance of, and
characteristic contempt for, everything not British,
branded as retrograde and incapable of progress a na-

44

tion whose foreign or colonial policy was not modeled
on distinctly British lines, or at least on such as were fa-
vorable to British trade interests.

The keynote of the general Filipino situation, from
a British point of view, at the time immediately prece-
ding American intervention, was struck by Foreman when
he expressed the hope that America would substitue a
better government and one satisfactory to foreigners who
have vast trade interests in the Islands. (6) This hope,
placing as it does the interests of transient strangers
above those of the permanent inhabitants or the natives
themsolves, clearly expresses the British ideal of the rela-
tions that should exist between Great Britain and foreign
countries beyond the sea.

In the exaltation of the commercial ideal, England
always took the lead, and the colonies, apart from being
an outlet for her surplus population, became her fields
for commercial and industrial- enterprises to the exclusion
of all else. By creating artificial wants and necessities
in them she could offer reciprocal advantages to the
home manufacturer and the colonial trader, regardless
of any advantages to the native inhabitants or of what
their desires or real wants might be. Americans, as the
latest and most advanced development of the Anglo-
Saxon ideal, are preeminent in carrying their commer-
cial ideal to its logical conclusion. To such an extent is
this the case that from the keenness displayed in the
pursuit of wealth, it may be said without fear of contra-
diction that the "almighty dollar" is at the present time
practically the only standard by which anything is meas-
ured in the United States. Consequently the American ,
colonial policy must be, within limits, necessarily the
same as the British in respect to foreign countiies or col-
onies.

The French and German merchants in the Philip-

(6) "The Phillippine Islands" by John N. Foreman, page 63,
edition of 1899.

45

pines, as well as those of the nationalities whose com-
mercial policies were more akin to that of Spain, were
more philosophical than the English. Instead of inveigh-
ing against conditions which, they of themselves were
powerless to modify, they endeavored to make up for the
lack of trade concessions, which they would willingly
have accepted, by either working in with the Spanish
merchants and native consumers or by a more economical
management of their business.- (7)

It has been stated by many that no progress or ad-
vance could be made under the Spanish Government.
Accepting or rejecting this statement as an axiom on
which to base an argument one way or the other, should
depend upon what is undei-stooii by progress, and upon
the kind of person by whom the statement is made. The
responsibility for this statement would appear to rest
with English and American writers, the generality of
them having started out by assuming that whatever was
Spanish was necessarily bad beyond redemption. In
their wl-itings they have followed this assumption up
without considering the adverse circumstances with
which Spain had to contend or the trying, conditions
with vifhich she was confronted.

The Spanish Insular administration, bad as it was
alleged to have been, could point with reasonable pride
to many reforms and improvements in the Philippines.
A cable connecting Manila with Hong-Kong and through
that place with the outside world, had been laid in 1880.
Telegraphic communication had been established between

(7) There is at present no ground for complaint of discrimi-
nation from foreign merchants in respect to trade restrictions, cus-
toms duties, etc, as they are all confronted with a uniformly high
tariff. Owing to this tariff the prices of many imported articles have
advanced from fifty to one hundred and fifty per cent, but the only
persons that suffer are the native and resident cotisumers, im-
porters having put up their prices to meet the duties. There is a
very general complaint among importers that not only has the vol-
ume of trade decreased, so far as they are concerned, but that the
profits on such as exists are less than they formerly were.

46

the principal towns of Luzon. There were lines of sub-
sidized mail steamers plying regularly between the lar-
ger ports of the Islands. A railway had been built
under government guarantee from Manila to Dagupan,
opening up the richest agricultural country of Luzon.
The coasts of the Islands had been lighted in the most
important places and new light-houses were in course of
construction. (8) The Pasig River walls had been built
from the Bridge of Spain to the river mouth, the entrance
to which had been protected by stone jetties and improv-
ed by dredging. There were some forty three bridges of
masonry or a combination of masonry and wood, strong
enough for the use of vehicles of all descriptions, over
the Pasig river and the various "esteros" (creeks or es-
tuaries) that intersect Manila, to connect the streets of
the different districts and suburbs of the city, and under
thirty-seven of these bridges loaded barges could pass.

The pier of the Santa Cruz bridge had been com-
menced and carried from the bed of the Pasig river to its
surface. Other important works had been planned and
estimated by the department of "Las Obras Publicas"
(Public Works). Among them was one for straightening,
deepening, and facing with masonry, the '"esteros" of
Manila (9). That would not only have enhanced the beauty
of the city but would have afforded vastly increased
facilities in water communications to the surrounding
country and the harbor.

In this respect too the provinces had not been neg-
lected. In the neighborhood of all the larger towns,
bridges of masonry or wood had been built and roads

(8) Since that time several new light houses have been planned
and one new one commenced, while the work on two, for which the
Spaniards left the material, has been concluded. Beyond this, with
the exception of harbor beacon-lights, the coasts of the Islands are
at present very much in the same condition as they were when the
Spaniards left them in 1898.

(9) The plans are on file in the "Bureau of Archives". Manila.

47

had been constructed (10), serving as a means of commu-
nication, though where water ways wei-e available, the
greater part of the produce of the Island was transport-
ed by river from the interior or by sea from one coast
town to another.

A little over half the masonry work of the sea walls
and breakwater of the new port of Manila had been fur-
nished, and up to the breaking out of the Spanish- Amer-
ican War in 1898, work on the remainder was going on
actively. There was a system of electric lighting for
both the city and suburbs of Manila. This until replaced
by another company, was able to furnish lights
for streets, public buildings, and private houses. The
Manila Water Works had been completed in 1887, and
water was pumped some five miles, from Santolanto San
Juan del Monte, where vaulted oversetting and destrib
utiug reservoirs had been constructed, while mains had
been laid not only to Manila itself but as far as the sub-
urbs of Paco, Malate, Ermita, Binondo, Tondo, Trozo,
Santa Cruz, Sampaloc, San Nicholas, San Lazaro and
Gagalangin. Public buildings and private houses were
furnished with pure drinking water free of charge, the
only expense that had to be incurred by housholders
being the necessary piping and plumbing on their prem-
ises. In various parts of the city, there were several
ornamental public fountaips as well as a large number of
public hydrants from which those who were unwilling or
unable to go to the expense of fitting their houses with
piping, could draw water free (11). There were also the
necessary fire plugs and an organized fire brigade.

(10) These bridges and roads suffered severely between 1896-99
and from neglect and lack of repairs. Such of them as had not
been destroyed during the Katipunan rebellion were allowed to go
to ruin during the War of Conquest.

(11) The most of these free hydrants for some unaccountable
reason, have been done away with since the American occupation-
In all the districts mentioned with the exception of the Walled
City, Binondo, Santa Cruz and San Nicholas, by far the greater

48

It is true that improvements had been slow in mate-
realizing, but this was owing to a lack of ready funds
wherewith to carry them on rapidly. Besides there" ap-
pears to have been an unwillingness to increase taxation
in order to meet and overcome this condition. Prom what
can be gathered, the Spanish policy seems to have been
to "pay as you go"' for improvements undertaken by the
state, rather than to burden the colony with bonds or
debentures, profitable investments indeed to monied cor-
porations, but a drain on the country in the interest they
draw.

Education and especially primary instruction had
not been forgotten by this government. Over and above
the parochial schools, academies, colleges, seminaries,
and the university, managed by the religious orders,
there was a very complete system of public municipal
free schools, which under General Weyler's administra-
tion had been increased to some 2167 in number. These
were very well attended by both sexes, each having a
separate shcool. The official ratio was one school for
every 5000 inhabitants. Instruction in these schools was

part of the dwelllng-s were and still are small bamboo and palm
leaf constructions, While in most cases these small houses are
owned by their inhabitants, the actual value of them would not
justify the expense of laying piping in them, even were the water
free. Thus it is on the poor and laboring class that this suppression
of the free hydrants bears heaviest inasmuch as at present they
either have to carry water a much longer distance than they for-
merly did, or pay others to carry it. As all housholders who have
water in their houses have to pay water rents in the case of these
small houses, when they have water laid on, the rents have been
increased about twenty per cent. The whole population of Manila,
rich and poor, feel aggrieved at these water rents, as the money
for the original installation of the water system' was given to the
city by the Spaniard, Seiior Carriedo, under the express condition
that the inhabitants be furnished with water free. Any extra ex-
pense incidental to the water supply over and above his gift, was
to be borne by the city at large. Consequently water was furnished
free from 1877 up to the time of the American occupation.

49

given by some 3700 teachers (12) of both sexes. As a
result the Philippines could show a greater number of
natives in proportion to the population, who could read
and write, (13) to say nothing of those who could only
understand and speak the language of the mother coun-
try, than any other Asiatic colony of any European
power.

There was a nautical school under the auspices of
the government in Manila, at which boys from all parts
of the islands were not only taught the theoretical parts
of a seaman's profession but were also given practical
instruction in seamanship and fitted to become mates in
the merchant service or cadets in the Royal Navy. There
was also a free school for the teaching of trades, handi-
crafts, drawing and the like. All of these schools were
well attended and gave excellent results. (14) ,

The many reforms and improvements introduced by
the Spanish government into the Philippines from 1881

(12) This gave a proportion of about one teaciier to every 2200
of the total population, including the wild tribes.

The detailed curriculum of studies pursued in the Spanish edu-
cational establishments in the Philippines maybe found in "Exhib-
it VI'' of the report of the first Philippine Commission. That
paper, however, written by Felipe Gonzalez Calderon, devotes so
much space to indirect vituperation of the Spanish administration
and the Catholic Church, as well as to the airing of the author's own
particular views, that its value as a document from which an im-
partial reader can draw any but ex-parte conclusions, is seriously
impaired.

(13) According to General Anderson, nearly-all Filipinos could
read and write and there were many schools. General Charles
King stated that nine tenths of the people could read and write, and
that there was a fair education everywhere. Emilio Aguinaldo
stated that two thirds of the Filipinos' could read and write, Lieut.
J. D. Ford, U. S. N., stated that there was hardly a man or woman
of the middle classes that could not read and write and that the
children were given an early education.

(14) These schools were discontinued by the American author-
ities for six or seven years, though they were far and away better
equipped and had a larger attendance than anything that has since
been created to replace them.

7

50

•

to 1896, though made with the best uitentions, pro-
duced no immediate beneficial effect on the natives. The
change involved did not at once appeal to them because
it was necessarily accompanied by an increase of taxes
and custom dues, which caused a general rise in the cost
,of living.

The annual estimates called for an expenditure of
about P 17,500,000.00 ($ 8,700,000) and the estimated
sources of income showed a slight excess over this sum.
Moreover there were no general colonial, or local munic-
ipal, debts based on loans, the interest on which would
have to be wrung out of the inhabitants for the benefit
of foreign investors. In the face of these figures it can-
not be said that the people of these islands were heavily
burdened with taxes, or that they received an inadequate
return for such as were levied upon them (15).

The much talked of pillage of the people was in one
sense a myth. The state may have been robbed to a

(15) The receipts and expenditures for the year 1897 were dis-
tributed about as follows:

Receipts Expenditures

Direct taxes f'8,496,170 General charges Pl,507,900

Customs 6,200,550 State 74,000

Monopolies 576,000 Grace and Justice,

Stamps 646,000 gaols, public wor-

Lotteries, etc. 1,000,000 ship, etc 1,896,277

Crown property 257,000 Treasury (including

Miscellaneous 298,090 Custom House

Guards) 1,393,184

Civi'i Service, includ-
ing" Guardia Civil''

Constabulary 2,198,350

Education and Public

Works 615,198

Army and Navy 9,608.990

The expenditures and consequently the direct and indirec
taxation for 1908, were more than double the above and included
the Constabulary and Coast Guard service, though not the Army
and Navy, which makes the expense of the present civil government ■
proper much greater in proportion than formerly.

51

limited extent, by not receiving all the taxes collected,
or it may have suffered by having had some of its funds
occasionally diverted to other purposes than those
intended, and some small amounts may have found
their way into the pockets of the officials who collected
or administered them, but this was not in a degree or to
an extent anything like what has been alleged (16). It is
true that there were certain perquisites and vails pertain-
ing to many offices. But these, although not provided
for in the estimated salaries of the incumbents, were fully
as lawful as are the fees of Sheriffs, Collectors of Rev-
enue, or Consuls of the United States (17).

The tribute, as theretofore levied on the Indians, was

(16) Many reports of official peculations were current at the
time of the American intervention in 1898. One of them referred
specifically to the palace of the Governor-General in Manila, which
was to replace the one destroyed by the earthquake of 1882, and
on which all work had been stopped. The story was to the effect that
the work had not only been reported by the colonial authorities to
the Madrid Goverment as finished, whereas such was not the case,
but the money allotted for the building- as well as for subsequent
repairs, instead of being- applied to its purpose, had found its way
into the pockets of the Governor-General and other insular officers-

The writer endeavored to substantiate this report but was un-
able to do so, or to find any one who chose to make a positive state-
ment backed up by any Spanish or Colonial Budgets, Official Re-
ports, or documents of a like nature to support it. The custodian
of the official state-records of the archipelago submitted to the
writer the original plans and estimates for the work in question as
far as it had gone. Considering that the material was very largely
composed of hewn and squared red granite imported from Hong-
Kong the estimates did not seem excessive. It was also stated
that the monies drawn from the treasury for this building had
been applied to the purpose for which they were intended.

The same conditions were found to apply to many similar state-
ments, in which assertion has been accepted, and eagerly swallowed
as proof, though on investigation of the papers of the "Obras Piib-
jicas", no foundation can be found for them,

(17) The fees collected by the Sheriff of New York, the Col
lector of the Port of the same city, and the United States Consuls
at- Liverpool and other foreign ports, were popularly supposed to
be far in excess of the regular salaries of these officials.

abolished in 1883 and was replaced by a poll tax rep-
resented by a "Cedula Personal", which was paid by
all classes alike. This was a cause of complaint on all
hands as it necessitated a change in the system of taxa-
tion. Till then the Indians, who formerly paid the trib-
ute, became liable only for other taxes, but the Span-
iards, Europeans, and foreigners generally, who had
paid no tribute, became liable to the cedula charges,
which they, looked upon as an extra tax.

The cedula charges were levied on all and ranged
from one peseta ($0.10) up to twenty-five pesos (S 12.50)
annually per capita, in proportion to the income of the
person on whom the charge was levied (18).

The people individually were not oppressed. Pull
blooded natives were by law allowed privileges that were
denied to Spaniards, Spanish Creoles, and Mestizos (19).
Among these was the right to cut, free of charge, timber,
bamboo, and other forest products for their own use
from the public domain (20). They were allowed for
their own benefit to occupy and preempt public lands for
agricultural and other purposes, and there was no land
tax. The natives were left very much alone to manage
their own private affrairs as they saw fit. • They were
not interfered with by the authorities, nor nagged nor
worried in their occupations, amusements, or mode of
life. No effort was made to dragoon them into habits of
frugality or industry which were foreign to their nature,
and for which, so far as they could see, no necessity
existed, because owing to the climatic conditions, abso-
lute want and hunger were practically unknown.

It has been the fashion among writers to hold Spain
up to odium and execration as wantonly reckless of, and

(18) The "cedula" (poll tax) is now, 1909, two pesos ($1.00) levied
on all persons alike. This is harder on the poor than the rich.

(19) Mestizos: half-breeds between natives and other foreign
races, in fact any persons known to have Indian blood in them.

(20) TJiis, right has been abolished.

53

indifferent to; the expenditure of human life (21). She
has also been described as an inveterate persecutor and
exterminator of the aboriginal races she conquered or
colonized. An impartial examination of history demon-
strates that these accusations are not based on facts.
Even if they were, Spain had not therefore been worse
than any other nation. England, during the 15th, 16th,
I7th and 18th centuries, certainly persecuted bitterly and
unrelentingly in England, Scotland, and Ireland. In the
latter country especially, she made as determined an
effort towards the extermination of the Irish race (22) as
Spain has ever been alleged to have made towards the
extermination of native races in her dominions in any
quarter of the globe.

The massacre of -Glencoe and other proceedings of

(21) It has been estimated that in the United States in the four
years, 1901 to 1904, there were upwards of thirty thousand persons
who came to their death at the hands of others by murder, man-
slaughter, homicide, and legal executions.

Taking the reports of the Inter-State Commerce Commission
as a basis, there was an average of over twelve thousand persons,
killed outright and a hundred and Sixty thousandinjured in railway
accidents during the same period.

(22) The Earl of Essex, Elizabeth's governor in Ireland, seems
"to have waded through a sea of blood in his endeavor to subju-
g'ate that country and exterminate the Irish race, respecting- the
vitality of which he had formed too ]ow an estimate * * *. He
massacred some two hundred O'Neils by stratagem * * * and later
put to death several hundred persons, principally women and chil-
dren, whom he discovered hiding in the caves ofRathlin * * * Sir
Walter Raleig'h under Essex took part in the Smarwick massacre
and was distinguished for his willingness to hunt down Irish rebels
as mere wild beasts whose leaders might be smitten down by assas-
sination if necessary ^^ ^ ^, In his unscrupulous 'dealings with people
of other habits and beliefs than his own, Raleigh was a representa-
tive Elizabethan Englishman * * *. Drury hanged over four hundred
persons in Munster in one year * * * The horrors of this war are
impossible to exaggerate* * * and so on during the reigns of Eliz-
abeth, the Stuarts, the Commonwealth and the houses of Orange
and Hanover " See Encyclopedia Britannica for more detailed
accounts.

54

the Duke of Cumberland in Scotland, as well as the de-
portation of the highlanders from that country, are
matters of history that shed no glory on England from a
humanitarian standpoint. The atrocities committed in
the Spanish Main, 1167-71, by Morgan and the ruffians
he commanded, are unparalleled in history, and yet he
was acting under a letter of instructions from the Eng-
lish Governor of Jamaica (23). The excesses committed
by the English when, under Draper and Cornish, they
captured Manila in 1762, are far from creditable to hu-
manity. In respect to persecution for religion's sake, a
very fair idea of what it amounted to in England can be
formed from Macauley's essay on "Hallam's Constitu-
tional History" as well as from Dr. Lingard's "History
of England".

English writers of both history and romance have
expended a great deal of sentiment over the expulsion
of the Moors from Spain. As a result, it is very gener-
ally believed that the Moors suffered some serious
wrong or wanton injury. The fact that the Moors were
originally the aggressors and invaders of Spain, overrun-
ning the country and offering the inhabitants the alter-
natives of Isiamism, slavery, or the sword, is ignored.
The further fact that it was otily after eight hundred
years of continual warfare that the Spaniards regained
the mastery over their own country is likewise not put
in its proper light (24). These same writers are discreet-
ly silent on the subject of the expulsion of the French

(23) For grim cold-blooded cynicism, the letter of instructions
given to him by the Governor of Jamaica, when he made his attack
on Santiag-o de Cuba, is worthy of note.

(24) As a matter of fact the expulsion of the Moors from Spain
was nothing more than a demonstration of the superior vitality of
the Iberian race found in the peninsula by the Moorish invaders
upon their arrival. This invasion, which reached as far as Tours
in France, was, unlike the Saxon or Norman invasion of England,
unable to hold its own. The invading race, in spite of its esthetic
and intellectual superiority, in spite of the arts and sciences it in-
troduced, lacked the racial stamina necessary to hold on to what

0,1

settlers from the province of Acadia, Nova Scotia, by
the English, who certainly had nothing like the provo-
cation the Spaniards had received from the Moors (25).

In the face of such historical facts, English writers
are hardly in a position to point the finger of scorn at
Spain as a persecutor and exterminator. In spite of their
oft reiterated statements to Spain's injury, which have
met with such ready acceptation by the English-speak-
ing public,' the incontrovertible fact remains that the
only colonies of European nations in which the races
found in them when they were first discovered, now form
any considerable part of their present population or par-
ticipate to any appreciable extent in their present gov-
ernment, are precisely the countries conquered or col-
onized by this much reviled nation, and developed
under her severely condemned colonial system.

The difference between the Spanish and the Anglo-
Saxon colonial policies seems to have been, that the for-
mer was governed by religious, and the latter by com-
mercial motives. While the Anglo-Saxon policy contrib-
uted toward the increase of the wealth of the world, it
has resulted in the practical extermination of the aborig-
inal races. The Spanish policy, on the other hand,

it had conquered; and g-radually the peninsula was, inch by inch,
reconquered by the descendants of its original inhabitants, and
those of the invaders were Anally driven out. This was but a nat-
ural consequence, according- to the theory of the survival of the
attest, and it was also supported by the incontrovertible logic of
the fact that when two races come into contact, the weakest g-oes
to the wall. This has been paralleled in the removal of the Indian
tribes of North America from one reservation to another, in order
to make room for the immigrants from the overflowing population
of the once colonies, now states, of the Atlantic seaboard, and now
the races to which the aboriginal tribes belonged have practically
become extinct.

(25) In 1715 Prance renounced all claims to this province in fa-
vor of England. Later, in 1755, an English squadron came to' the
coast and as much of the French population as could be, was forced
on board the English ships of war and scattered haphazard at va-
rious jjoints along the North American coast.

56

evidently had in view the preservation and civilization
of the native races, and not the removal of them to make
place for Spaniards. As a matter of fact, the aborig-
inal races of the Philippines as well as of other countries
formed from the Spanish colonies, whether they revolted
from Spain or remained under her until they were wrest-
ed from her, have mostly increased in numbers and in
material prosperity. Their descendants today are the
owners of the lands over which their ancestors had roam-
ed as savage.s when Spain first assumed dominion over
them.

Spanish moral influence must have been very power-
ful. In spite of the fact that the native races were
always, as they still are, numerically in the ascendent,
the populations of the countries foi'med out of Spain's
revolted colonies, excepting in a few minor and insignif-
icant details, are distinctly Spanish. They still retain
in a greater or lesser degree, Spain's language, manners,
customs, and modes of life and thought.

On the other hand, in the United States, formerly
in part the colonies of North America, in parts of South
America, Australia, and New Zealand, to say nothing of
the Pacitic Ocean, all the aboriginal races under the An-
glo-Saxon colonial policy, have become practically
extinct. Their lands have gone from them and are now
the property of immigrants from other countries. Where
any of their descendants still exist, they in some cases
enjoy very much abridged political rights, but in others
they are reduced to the mere state of "hewers of wood
and drawers of water."

Individually Spaniards and Filipinos got on very
Avell together. There was much social intercourse be-
tween them. Spaniards married mestizas or full blooded
native women without losing caste in the colony or at
home. This was the case because under Spanish rule,
the general social position of women in the Philippines
was equal to that enjoyed by the women of any country
in the world.

57

The educated among the natives of the archipelago
were eligible to places of trust, honor, and emolument
under the Spanish crown, both in the Philippines and in
Spain. They held commissions in the Army and Navy,
took their regular turn of promotion in both these ser-
vices, and the majority of Civil servants of the Spanish
Insular administration were Filipinos. Those whose ser-
vices were efficient and faithful were rewarded with ti-
tles and rank. A native of Tondo, for instance, became
Spanish Minister of War. A few years ago, a native of
Pampanga was appointed Governor of the Spanish pos-
sessions on the West Coast of Africa. Many were ap-
pointed to high civil positions as well as to judgeships in
the various courts in the Islands", and a proof of the fit-
ness of their selection lies in the fact that many of them
are still on the bench under American administration. In
a word, the native Filipinos came in for as large a share
of "loaves and fishes" as there might be. They had in-
deed a greater proportionate share (26) in the ad minis-
tration and offices of the Philippines than ever was or is
accorded to the native inhabitancs of any non- Caucasian
colony of any nation of the world, excepting perhaps
some of the English West Indian Islands, where the bulk
of the population is 'composed of the descendants of Afri-
can negro slaves.

^ Prior to 1896, the Filipinos had every reason to be as
contented a community as could be found in any colony.
The Spanish rule imposed few burdens and delivered
them from many misfortunes. If progress in the modern
acceptation of the word was rare, the material want and
piisery that usually accompanies it in other and more
progressive countries, were rarer still. General living

(2(i) Under the American rule the number of civil employees
is much greater than it was under the Spanish sovereignty, though
the proportion of native to American employees both in the Fed-
eral and Insular services is much smaller now than it was under

Spain.

8

58

expenses were a fourth of what they are today (27). Mon-
ey had a greater purchasing power, and local and gen-
eral taxes were collectively about a fourth of what they
are at present. The vast majority lived in competence
if not in affluence, and by far the greater portion of the
cultivated land was owned by natives.

The magnificent houses in Manila and the provinces,
with after ten years of rebellion and warfare still exist,
and the ruins of those destroyed during that time, but
not yet rebuilt or replaced by others, are incontrovert-
ible witnesses to the fact that not only was there a
great amount of wealth in the country but it must also
have been widely distributed and freely spent.

There had been an onward march of general prog-
ress. The population and exports had increased steads
ily (28). It is safe to say that no British, Dutch, or
French colony of a like, almost exclusively native, popu-
lation could compare in prosperity with the Philippine
Islands up to the breaking out of the Katipunan rebellion
of 1895.

(27). R. F. Pedro Torra, S. J., in est/wnating- the wages that
should be paid to schoolmasters, states that:Jhere were provinces
in the archipelago in which a man can get, on as well as anybody
for F 4.00 or F 5.00 ($2.00 or $2.50) per month, and that in Manila
or its vicinity P 50.00 ($25.00) would be sufficient. See statement
ofR. F. P. Torra before the Philippine Commission, July 10th, 1899.

"A laborer who earned P0.20 ($0.10) per day for .300 days in
the year could live in luxury." See "The Philippine Islands", page
320, Edition 1899, by John Foreman.

An average of these two sums, estimates of different classes of
work. Would give P 27.50 ($13.75) per month as sufficient to live
on with decency and comfort. .

(28) The average balance of trade as computed from the Cus-
tom House returns was, between 1885 and 1896, a little over twenty
per cent in favor of the Islands annually; that is to say that in the
above period, about P 28, 000, 000 in cash found its way into the Philip-
pines to pay for the difference in value between the ex-ports over the
imports. Since 1898 to 1909, the -contrary has been the case. The
values of imports have exceeded the exports and consequently the
difference had to be drawn from the Islands in monev.

59

EDITOR'S NOTE, (Cf. p. 53). Along the same line
of thought, (note 21), and serving somewhat as a remind-
er of the old proverb that "people who live in glass
houses should not throw stones", the following statistical
paragraph is quoted from the N Y. Preemans's Journal
Sept. 2, 1911:

"The recent burning at the stake of a negro at
Coatesville, Pa., recalls that nearly five thousand public
lynchings have taken place in the United States in the
last twenty-five years, and of those put to death about
forty have been burned at the stake- So far as is known
the first man to be killed in this manner was Henry
Smith, a negro, who was killed by a mob at Paris, Texas,
in 1893. He was accused of the murder of a white wo-
man and after he had been bound with fence wire to a
steel railroad rail, wood and rubbish were heaped about
him and the dead woman's husband applied a match to
the pile. Two more negroes were burned in 1893 and in
1894 three w^re burned together at Madison, Pla. The
lynching was made the occasion of a general holiday and
the victims were flayed before being burned. They were
charged with murdering a woman-'

Negroes have been burned at the stake in nearly
all the Southern States and in Kansas, Colorado, Cali-
fornia, Pennsylvania and Delaware. There in no record
of any one suffering imprisonment or any other penalty
for participating. Many of the victims ha\rebeen burn-
ed for killing white men. The Delaware lynching oc-
curred in 1903, when George White was burned on Sun-
day in a public square in Wilmington for the murder of
Helen Bishop. One white man, Antonio Rodriguez, a,
Mexican, was burned at the stake in Rock Springs, Texas,
last year. He was charged with murdering a Mrs.
Henderson."

In the same issue of the Freeman's Journal, Captain
Blunt's plea for more fair play and less bigotry in our

60

popular judgment of Spain and Spanish policy, is admi-
rably seconded by the writer of the following: "A critic
in the New York Times, reviewing Irving Berdine Rich-
man's 'California Under Spain and Mexico' touches a
topic that often claims attention, but does not always
receive the reasonable interpretation which he suggests.
He writes:

'We talk much about the cruelty of the Spaniards
toward the Indians, with a complete indifference to the
black record of our own race in that resp.ect. The story
is told in this book of the earnest and Christian effort of
Spanish officials and priests to rescue the Indians from
the oppressions of adventurers; of their high words of
warning and rebuke and of the lengths to which they
went to save their imperiled wards-

Against their efforts avarice contended successfully;
the difference is that while the Indians suffered as much
from the English colonists, it is not easy to find any
English Governor or minister who labored as did the
Spanish officials and priests to avert that disgrace to the
white race, and it is much easier to find English clergy-
men and statesmen who acquiesced in and encouraged
the exploitation of the Indians than it is to find Span-
iards who did so- May it not be that what we have
sanctimoniously asserted to be a Spanish trait was, after
all, a trait of human nature? When Nicolas de Ovando,
Governor of Hispaniola, wrote in 1503 that the Indians
would not .A!?ork for wages, Ferdinand and Isabella
replied firmly that what was required of the Indians
should be required of them "as free persons, as they
are, and not as slaves-" Yet there were Indian slaves
in Massachusetts a century later-'

THIRD PAPER

SECRET SOCIETIES OF THE PHILIPPINES

THIRD PAPER

SECRET SOCIETIES OF THE PHILIPPINES

In countries where climate and environment render
the material conditions of life easy and where, as in the
Philippine Islands, the prominent characteristics of the
races are not individuality and aggressiveness, forms of
government are not ordinarily likely to be burning ques-
tions of paramount interest. Unless heavily taxed, harsh-
ly tyrannized over, or unduly interfered with in pursuits
and amusements of immemorial custom, the inhabitants,
within limits, are rather indifferent to government and
rulers alike. They will pay but little attention to ab-
stract wrongs. They will be little concerned about se-
curing political privileges which they have never pos-
sessed and for which they have never felt any necessity
or desire.

In the Philippines, however, there was, as every-
where else, a certain number eminently dissatisfied with
the existing order of things. The more contented the
majority of the inhabitants appeared to be, the more
anxious this class became to create a spirit of discon-
tent and thereby to bring about a radical change. Like
their kind the world over, the fewer they were in number,
the more utterly intolerant they became of all dissenting
opinions, and the more strenuously clamorous in deny-
ing that any moral, social, or material progress could be
achieved except by themselves and the means they ap-
proved.

As in other countries, this class furnished the polit-
ical agitators of the Philippines. Some of them, in
rare instances, were actuated by a sincere desire to

64

better the conditions of their countrymen. As a mat-
ter of fact, however, the great majority were anxious
for a change which, if it would not place them at
the head of affairs, would at least afford hopes
of gaining a footing among the ruling classes. -Thus
they designed to, gratify their .personal ambitions for
notoriety, power, or wealth.

To create a spirit of discontent and to bring about
an artificial condition of affairs, under which the agitators
could realize their aspirations, it became necessary to
work upon the people, till then fairly contented. These
were to be made to believe that they were suffering under
some great material wrong or injustice. They had to be
shown that some right or privilege, theretofore posses-
sed, was being withheld or had been taken away from
them. Popular hopes were to be aroused that some great
benefit would be obtained by overthrowing the existing
form of government and by substituting some other, of
which the agitators themselvs, however, had but a vague,
indistinct, and rudimentary idea. To realize this end
and to disseminate their ideas, there was no engine so
powerful or so apposite as a secret political societty.

Up to a comparatively recent period, the Filipino
masses were mostly a home abiding people. They rarely
moved from one place to another outside their own prov-
ince or neighborhood. Among them, furthermore,
there were practically no social gulfs to bridge over.
Hence secret societies could be of little use in fur-
thering merely social ends, because every one was per-
fectly known to his neighbors. There was also little
or no necessity for them as mutual aid associations be-
cause family ties are very strong and all invariably help
one another in financial and other matters. According to
the general Filipino view of such things, a secret society,
therefore, could have only one end, some political object,
aiming at the overthrow of the governing powers of the
country

To the Filipino agitators, therefore, a secret political

t)5

society, in the ordinary acceptation of tlie word, meant
nothing more or less than a political conspiracy. The
roles to be played and the rewards to be reaped by the
leaders were naturally of the greatest prominence, whiLst
those of the rank and file were of comparative insignif-
icance. But the attainment of their object by violent
or occult means, ratherthanby the more open and pacific
methods of evolution and time, was something that the
law, as it stood, prohibited or withheld. Consequently
it is by no means surprising that when the political agi-
tators first made their presence felt among the hitherto
contented inhabitants of these Islands, they chose secret
societies, whose avowed objects were social or political,
but which really were vehicles for furthering disturban-
ces, revolt, and rebellion.

Of secret societies the world over, no matter what
their declared or ostensible object may be, it can gener-
ally be safely stated that the more exclusive, the more
ritualistic, and the more mysterious they are, the more
respect and awe they will command from nine tenths of
humanity, east or west, and the greater will be the
number of applicants for admission to them. Some of
these applicants seek, under their auspices, shorter and
more convenient by-paths to social, political, or commer-
cial advantages and standing than are afforded by the
ordinary beaten roads of individual popularity, merit, or
industry. Others feeling the "magnificence of the un-
known" — "omne ignotum pro magniflco" — are attracted
by the supposed great secrets, which serve as a lure and
a goad to human curiosity.

These societies, as a rule, are divided into grades or
degrees with general or special grips, signs, and pass-
words, enabling members personally unacquainted to
recognize one another as follows or colleagues when they
first meet. Advancement from the lower grades to the
higher, or even good standing in the grades themselves,
depends upon a member's Mindly carrying out the work
assigned to him by his superiors. As first, therefore, he

9

66

is but little nearer to the realization of his ambition or to
the gaining of the final secret, than when he was a postu-
lant. In fact only such individual members as are most
energetic and successful in carrying out the work allot-
ted to them are correspondingly advanced.

Individual initiative and aggressiveness are suppos-
ed to be the distinguishing characteristics of the Euro-
pean races in general and of the Anglo-Saxon in partic-
ular. These traits allow any number of their members,
without resort to secret societies, to form political parties
or coalitions, and to work for the attaiment of Eyiy def-
inite object under chosen temporary or permanent-leaders.
Whether the object is attained or not, the party easily
resolves itself into its individual units again, if it is ex-
pedient to do so. The members will nearly always gov-
ern their collective or individual action according to the
dictates of their judgment. Or they will make changes
of policy or they will compromise to suit the exigeij-
cies of the moment without endangering the unity of
their organization, or the fixity of purpose necessary to
the accomplishment of their ulterior object.

The Oriental however — and the Filipino is an Orien-.
tal — does not possess these traits. Instinctively, and pos-
sibly without being aware of it, he looks to an oath-bound
secret association to give him the strength and moral
courage which he lacks as an individual. Consequently
when he embarks in it, no matter how indefinite or ob-
scure its general ends, or its means of accomplishing them,
he adheres to its work more tenaciously and follows his
leaders more blindly than ever would a European in an
ordinary political organization, in which leaders and fol-
owers claim and are allowed a certain elasticity of action.
Such elasticity of action cannot obtain in an oath-bound
secret association, whose leaders and followers both, the
latter according to the measure of what they are per-
mitted to know, must keep their eyes steadily fixed on
a rigid, cut and dried program.

While the heads of directing committees of secret-

67

political societies may have in view both definite objects
and detailed programs of the means of attaining them,
it is for obvious reasons inexpedient that the general run
of the subordinates should possess the same knowledge.
Members of the lower and numerically greater grades,
and especially the more recently initiated, cannot be
given more than a superficial idea of the nature of the
work to be done outside of the particular grade or degree
to which they belong, nor are they wisely made acquaint-
ed with means and details until the time for action ar-
rives. On the same principle, a general commanding an
army does not take the rank a-nd file of it into his confi-
dence. He does not explain to them in detail the general
policy dictating and governing his plans, or the min-
utiae of the operations by which he proposes to put them
into execution.

No matter in what country a society may be located or
of what races it may be composed, most of its members
necessarily are unknown to one another personally, if
the organization is of many ramifications over a widely
extended territory. The proceedings of a local branch
or lodge being secret and kept to itself, the members can
know only as much or as little about the sentiment or
conditions (1) of other branches elsewhere or about the
actual state of the whole society, as their leaders choose
to impart to them. It can therefore be readily appreciat-
ed that the leader of such a local branch or lodge has

(1) The records of many of the branches of the Filipino secret
societies of Manila and other places in the arcliipelago, siezed by
the military and civil authorities, show that the memberships of
these branches was often enormously exaggerated by local leaders.
Thus a branch in Tondo, which all told may have amounted to some
twenty or thirty members, was represented to another branch in
Pasay, on vice-versa, as amounting to many hundreds. The leaders
of these respective branches, while perhaps perfetcly well aware
of the real state of affairs, nevertheless presented the exaggerated
figures of the other branch to the members of their own to spur
them on in efforts to make others join and thus to surpass other
branches, a procedure which was fairly successful.

68

infinitely more power over tlie collective action of its
members, if not over their individual wills, than have the
leaders of two or more political parties over their follow-
ers. A political party's, local proceedings are very
measurably open to discussion, not only by its own mem-
bers but by its opponents. They are also subject to the
general comments and criticism of such as may be neu-
tral or even indifferent. All these circumstances obvi-
ously contribute to a notable limitation of power on the
part of merely political leaders.

While the greater number of the rank and file of
secret societies fail to take this fact into consideration,
the leaders do not. The more secretly perfect their or-
ganization and the greater the docility of its members,
the better are they enabled to go collectively to greater
lengths than they would in all probability be willing to
go as individuals in a general action. A body of soldiers
will advance to an attack when ordered, because, no
matter how desperate the undertaking or great the dan-
ger, each man in the line believes that his comrades will
advance the same as himself. They also know that they
have every reason to count upon the support of the re-
mainder of the force of which their particular organization
forms a part. To require any one among them to advance
alone, or to expect that any leader would rush forward
without reasonable confidence that his men would follow
him, would be the acme of folly.

It may be said that so far a great deal of this paper
has been devoted to secret societies generally and very
little to those of the Philippines in particular. But if
the reader will bear in mind that what has here been
said of more advanced and better instructed races and
nations, applies with greater force to the Filipinos, he
will realize what a powerful influence these societies ex-
ercised over a race which in the main was, and largely
still is, simple minded, credulous, and superstitious, and
how collectively they could be leadmuch farther than at
the outset their individual members had any wish or in-

69

tention to go. He will also be more likely to appreciate
the fact that, owing to the character of the Filipinos and
to the conditions under which they lived, secret societies
in the latter half of the nineteenth century and more es-
pecially towards its end, had a very great deal to do with
the politics of the Islands.

It has been stated that Mariano Marte founded ma-
sonic lodges in various parts of the Philippine Islands
as early as 1834. They did not prosper, however, and
they were therefore dissolved. Inasmuch as this state-
ment lacks confirmation, it is given here only for what
it is worth.

The first secret society in the Philippine Islands of
which there is any authentic record, was a masonic lodge
under the name of "Luz Pilipina," organized in Cavite
in 1860 by two officers of the Spanish Navy, Mendez Nii-
fiez and Malcampo. The latter of these was afterwards
Governor General of the archipelago (2). This lodge
received its charter from the grand lodge of Portugal,
was subject to it, and was affiliated to the Portuguese
lodges established in Macao and Hong Kong.

In 1868, after the mutiny of the Army and Navy in
Spain, headed respectively by General Prim and Admiral
Topete, (3) when Queen Isabela II was driven from the
throne and the visionary Spanish republic was establish-
ed for a time, a masonic lodge with a wealthy native for
secretary, was founded by foreigners in Manila, while

(2) His administration was so weak that it gave rise to a mu-
tiny in the regiment of artillery stationed in Manila. This he con-
doned and hushed up, but Moriones, who succeeded him in 1877,
found conditions so bad that he was forced to put it down with an
iron hand. For an" interesting account of this affair see ' 'The In-
habitants of the Philippines", F. H. SAWYER, page 14,

(3) Both these officers owed their rapid promotion to the high
rank they held and to the favor and protection of the Queen,

Prim, who was an ambitious adventurer and political time-ser-
ver, was later assassinated in the streets of Madrid. Topete, who
appears to have been conscientiously republican, retired from pub-
lic life on the advent of Alfonso and died shortly after.

70

others were founded, one in Pandacan, one in Cebii, and
another in Cavite.

The founders of these lodges were Spaniards of ad-
vanced anticlerical, and of what in Europe and in the
United States at the present time would be called com-
munistic or anarchistic views.

In 1884, what is known as the Cavite revolt broke
out (4). Many of the leaders and participants, who
were of the masonic body, were executed, imprisoned,
or banished from the Islands. On the other hand, oth-
ers were screened and protected by the higher Spanish
officials, many of whom were also masons. In spite of
this, however, Filipino masonry for the time being was
under a cloud, and the Spanish masons disassociated
themselves as much as possible from the mestizo and na-
tive element.

Up to 1884, only Peninsular Spaniards or Europeans,
as a rule, were admitted to membership in the lodges
founded by them in the Philippines. But gradually
pressure was brought to bear on Don Manuel Morayta, at
the time Master of the Grand Orient of Spain. As a result,
Creoles, Mestizos, and Indians (5) of advanced radical
and revolutionary views, joined the already established
lodges and subscribed liberally to their funds. There
they found brethren who, though perhaps unwilling to
go to the extremes they proposed, either as regards po-
litical ends or the means to accomplish them, yet extend-
ed to them a certain amount of sympathy and moral
support.

In 1888, Marcelo H. del Pilar left the Philippines
and pi-oceeded to Spain, where he became a close

(4) See paper on Revolutions and Revolts.

(5) By Creoles are understood persons of European descent
born in the Islands. Mestizos are persons whose fathers or moth-
ers were full blooded natives, or Indians, or had Indian blood in
their veins. Indians are full, blooded native Filipinos.

71

associate of Don Manuel Morayta. (6) Through the
latter's influence, Pilar procured charters from the
Spanish "Grand Orient" for the establishment of mason-
ic lodges whose memberships were, if expedient, to be
composed entirely of Indians. According to a general
belief, some one hundred and eighty masonic lodges were
founded in Luzon and the other islands of the archipel-
ago between that date and 1893. Over and above the
usual routine masonic work, these organizations propa-
gated distinctly separatist doctrines. This enormous in-
crease of so-called masonry, under ordinary circumstan-
ces, would have been astonishing, to say the least. Pros-
elytizing is forbidden in masonry. It is consequently
fair to suppose that the Filipino masons ignored or dis-
obeyed this precept, and that these lodges must have
been founded by persons who proposed to use them as a
cloak for other purposes.

What would seem to give strength to this view is
that, from this time on, the Spanish masons disavowd the'
Filipino masons, and that the latter used the power and
prestige that had been given to them by their charters
to turn their lodges into mere political clubs. They first
founded the lodge "Nilad", and from it other lodges, in
which the work of evolving the "Liga Filipina", and
later the "Katipunan", was carried on under the screen
of masonry. The lodge "Patria" was founded by Faus-
tino Villaruel, who was afterwards shot for his partici-
pation in the insurrection of 1896 against Spain. About
this time an alleged masonic lodge for women was found-
ed in Manila.

A notorious Filipino agitator, a certain Jose Ana-
cleto Ramos, states positively that it was he who first

(6) Later, in 1900, Morayta was elected to the Spanisl^ Cortes,
but his election was contested on the ground that he was responsi-
ble for the loss of the Philippines by having' introduced masonry
into them with a view to bringing about a revolution. He admit-
ted substantially that this was a fact, whereupon the Cortes refused
to seat him.

72

founded Filipino masonry in the archipelago, and that
he did so with the specific object of antagonizing the re-
ligious orders and of stirring up trouble. To quote his
own words, "it was I who brought about the insurrection
by establishing Free Masonry in the Philippines, thus
incurring the ire of the Friars, and their persecution of
it in turn brought about the revolution" (7).

Such a condition of affairs can hardly be realized
or understood by American or English masons. In their
countries, masonry, in common with many other secret
societies of more or less recent creation, is practically
nothing more than a very closely united, though very
widely extended, mutual aid association. But it can
easily be seen how so wide spreading and far reaching
an organization, comprising as it does within its brother-
hood, men of all nationalities and of all conditions of life,
could have been abused by those who, using the rela-
tions it afforded them with persons who would otherwise

(7) Jos6 Anacleto Ramos was one of two children whose mother
died when he was very young. His father, who was practically
penniless, then married the daughter of a rich landed propietorof
Pandacan. When his second wife died childless, he made an effort
to secure her fortune for his children by his former wife, and though
he was prevented in this by the intervention of the second wife's
family, the children were given a small amount of land from the
stepmother's estate.

Latei- Ramos became a notorious agitator, went abroad, and
established a small shop in London, where he became a mason. On
his return to the Philippines, the prestige of his connection with
the English masonry, enabled him to enter the lodges of the Euro-
pean masons established in the archipelago.

According to his own statement, he claims to have brought
about the Filipino rebellion of 1896 by establishing masonry among
the natives of the islands with a view to using it to bring about an
uprising.

After the downfall of Aguinaldo, he went back to Japan; but
he again returned to the Philippines in 1906-7, and has been, in se-
cret, an antiamerioan agitator ever since.

73

meet them as strangers, established other secret socie-
ties whose means and ends masons as a body might dis-
avow and recoil from.

Be this as it may, whatever stand masonry may take
in Anglo-Saxon countries in regard to the Catholic
Church, there can be no doubt that in the Latin or Cath-
olic countries of the continent of Europe and in South
America, the brethren of the square and compass are
and always have been bitterly and actively opposed to
that religious organization. This applies with greater
force to the Philippines. The persons who introduced
masonry into these Islands, as well as those who joined
it after it was introduced, were as a rule advanced radi-
cals or an ti clericals. There is every reason to believe
that their efforts were directed towards breaking down
the Church, which, of all the institutions they wished
to overthrow, was the strongest and most conservative.
They hoped that, once it was gotten rid of, others would
surely follow, and that on the common ruins they might
erect a government similar in form to that of the earlier
period of the first French Republic. Thus they aspired
to rise to prominence and power. Thus masonry in this
archipelago was converted into a political hot-bed in
which the "Liga Pilipina" and the "Katipunan" were
planted and in which they grew and flourished.

In 1888, an organization known as the "Comit-
tee of Propaganda" was started. It consisted of Doro-
teo Cortez, AmbrosioRianzaresBautista, Pedro Serrano,
Deodato Arellano and others. Its work was to raise
funds from such members of the well-to-do classes as
they could induce to contribute, to carry on an active lit-
erary campaign against the existing order of things,
the Catholic church in general and the religious orders
in particular. It was also devoted to the introduction of
extreme political doctrines into the Islands. This com-
mittee was essentially revolutionary in character and a
very large majority of its members were masons,

lO

74

In the same year, Marcelo H. del Pilar and Mariano
Ponce (6) went to Spain. With money provided by the
"Committee of Propaganda", they started a paper in
Barcelona called "La Solidaridad". In this organ the
extreme views of the "Propaganda Committee" were set
forth and advocated. Later, owing to its having fallen
foul of the authorities in Barcelona, this paper was trans-
ferred to Madrid and eventually it came into the hands
of Morayta, with Marcelo H. del Pilar, Dominador Go-
mez, and Bduardo Lete among the principal collabora-
tors. What purported to be a masonic lodge was estab-
lished in its offices. It was given the name of "La Soli-
daridad", the title of the paper itself, and its principal
work was the fomentation of the Filipino rebellion.

In conjunction with Morayta, Marcelo H. del Pilar
also started the "Associati6n Hispano-Pilipina" in Ma-
drid, drawing into it some seventy or eighty Filipinos
who were in that city. Among these were Dr. Rizal and
the brothers Juan and Antonio Luna. As far as it could
this association carried out the ideas enunciated in the
"Solidaridad", which, with practically no circulation in
Spain, was extensively circulated free of charge, in the
Philippines, by the "Committee of Propaganda."

In May, 1892, Rizal returned from HongKong (7) and
proceeded immediately to organize the "Liga Pilipina".
Three days after his arrival in Manila, he called a meeting
at the house of a Chinese mestizo named Ongjungco, and
among those present were Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista,

(6) Pilar died in Barcelona in great misery after the founda-
tion of the "Katipunan". Ponce remained in Spain and later went
to Japan, returning- to the Philippines in 1908-9. He started a
number of societies with distinctly antiamerican tendencies, look-
ing towards Japan as a model of government and as a source of
assistance. •

(7) See paper on Revolutions and Revolts.

75

Domingo Franco, Apolinario Mabini, (8) (later Aguinal-
do's secretary and principal adviser), Ambrosio Flores,
Juan Zulueta, Numeriano Adriano, Timoteo Paez, Pedro
Serranq, Moises Salvador, Estanislao Legaspi, Andres
Bonifacio, Teodoro Plata, Deodato Arellano, Bonifacio
Arevalo, Faustino Villaruel, Aguedo del Rosario, Fran-
cisco Nacpil, Ambrosio Salvador, and others, all more
or less directly connected with the rebellion against
Spain in 1896. Many of them had escaped capital pun-
ishment for participating in that uprising, and took an
active part in resisting the American forces in the
"War of Conquest", 1898 to 1901.

Rizal addressed this meeting, telling those who at-
tended it that he had called them together with a view
to forming a secret society.. Its ends were to be the ad-
vancement of the country and the freeing of it from
Spain- He then submitted a number of provisional reso-
lutions and rules, which were unanimously adopted.
As soon as a committee consisting of Ambrosio Salvador
and Deodato Arellano was appointed to elaborate and
develop Rizal's project, the meeting was adjourned,
subject to the call of the president.

The banishment of Dr. Jose Rizal, Doroteo Cortez,
and Ambrosio Salvador later in the same year upset
their plans for the time; but, in 1893, after considerable
correspondence with, and numerous visits to, Rizal at
Dapitan in Mindanao, to which place he had been banish-
ed, the "'Liga" resumed work. Governed by the reso-
lutions that had been offered by Rizal at the first meet-
ing, the "Supreme Council of the Liga Filipina'" was
elected. It consisted of the following members: Domin-
go Franco, president; Deodato Arellano, secretary and

(8) Mabini, with some two hundred other prisoners, was sent
to Guam by the United States authorities, where he remained foi'
nearly two years. He was eventually allowed to return to Manila
and died of cholera a few months after his arrival. He was one of
the ablest Filipinos but was bitterly opposed to American inter-
vention in the form it had assumed.

76
treasurer: Vicente Francisco, fiscal; Juan Zulueta, Es-
tanislao Legaspi, Timoteo Paez, Andres Bonifacio,
Francisco Nacpil, Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista, Ambro-
sio Flores, councilors.

Rizal though absent in banishment, remained the
guiding spirit of the "Liga" and the power behind the
throne. Branches of the league were established in the
various districts, of Manila and its immediate environs,
as well as in the more distant provinces. In the latter,
but slow progress was made.

When the league was a year old, (1894), its roembers
agreed to dissolve it. This determination was arrived
at on account of the bickerings and discords that were
continually springing up among the members. There
were differences of opinion in respect to the handling
and disposition of the funds of the society. There were
also fears of discovery by the authorities, who had
become aware of the society's existence and revolution-
ary intentions. At the meeting of the leaders, it was
decided to gather in all the books, lists, orders, and
announcements that were in circulation and to burn
them, thus doing away with all compromising documen-
tary evidence. The ''Liga" then, to all appearances at
least, was dissolved, but its members found no difficulty
in carrying on its work through the Filipino masonic
lodges.

After the dissolution of the "Liga", there remained
a permanent committee composed of Numeriano Adria-
no, Deodato Arellano, and some twenty or thirty others
of its most prominent members. They were known as
the "Compromisarios" (9). They had no special organi-
zation and worked almost independently of one another.
Their principal mission was the propagation and distri-
bution of "Lia Solidaridad", and the collection of funds
for the support of that paper as well as for the revolu-

(9) Compromisario. A person pledg-ed or compromised, alone
or with others, to a certain line of action.

77

tionary delegations in Hong Kong, Spain, and elsewhere'

The mission of these delegations was to foment
among foreigners an interest in, and sympathy for, the
projected Filipino rebellion, as well as to procure arms,
ammunition, and money. The "Compromisarios" also
devoted themselves to keeping alive the spirit of revolt
and discontent among the Filipinos, until the end of
1895, when the "Katipunan" of Andres Bonifacio took
this part of the work off their hands-

The "Liga Filipina", open as a rule only to well-
to-do persons, was organized by Jose Rizal and his
associates. But Marcelo H. del Pilar, early in 1892,
had advised the formation of an association similar in its
ulterior aims, but open to artisans, servants, laborers, and
the poorer classes generally- He had drawn up minute
instructions concerning this organization and forwarded
them from Madrid to Rizal in Manila, but the latter, pos-
sibly wishing to start his own society first, had not put
them into immediate execution. Eventually Deodato
Arellano, Andres Bonifacio, Ladislao Diua, and Teodoro
Plata, who had been commissioned by Pilar to carry out
the details of his scheme,, proceeded to organize the ''Ka-
tipunan-'"

Immediately after the banishment of Rizal, which
occurred July I2th, 1892, Andres Bonifacio called a meet-
ing of certain members of the ''Liga Filipina", to dis-
cuss the affairs of that society and, on the evening of
July 14th of the same year, they assembled at his house
in the district of an Sta. Cruz-

The names of the six members of the "Liga" who
attended this meeting were Andres Bonifacio, a native
of Manila and warehouseman of the German firm of
Fresel and Company; Teodoro Plata, also a native of
Manila and by profession an "Official de Mesa", i- e-, as-
sistant to the Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Binondo; Deodato Arellano, native of Manila and a clerk
in the office of Public Works, Valentin Diaz, an Ilocano
and an "Oficial de mesa" in the Court of First Instance of

78

Quiapo; Pantaleon Torres, a native of Manila and second
clerk of the First Class in the "Intendencia de Hacienda"
(Exchequer), who in reward for services had been given
the medal of Civil Merit by the Spanish Government;
and Ladislao Diua, a native of Cavite and a law stu-
dent in Manila.

The meeting was called to order at nine o'clock and
the subject of dissolving the "Liga Filipina" was broach-
ed. Bonifacio opposed its dissolution, but it was pointed
out to him that, owing to the elements of which its mem-
bership was composed — Spaniards, Creoles, Mestizos, and
full-blooded Indians — and because the three former
classes could not be depended on to carry out the pro-
gram of the "Liga" to its logical conclusion, the society,
as it stood, was not only in danger of going to pieces,
but was also a source of peril' to its members.

Pantaleon Torres then addressed the meeting and
suggested remodeling the "Liga Filipina" and forming
from it a purely Tagalog society. In that event its mem-
bers could be depended upon- It was to be called "Ang
Kataastaasan Kagalang-galang Katipunan nang mga
Anak nangBayan", or the "Supreme Worshipful Society
of the Sons of the Country" (10). His proposition was
warmly supported and the "Katipunan" (Secret Society)
started from that date. It was further agreed to extin-
guish the "Liga" and to push the "Katipunan", with a
program calling for the complete independence of the
Philippines,

This organization was much akin to Rizal's league.
Although three of the members of the committee that
founded it were those that had been originally designat-
ed by Pilar for that purpose, the remainder were ordi-
nary members of the "Liga". The following list of the
first supreme council of the "Katipunan" shows that it

(10) This veas generally known as Andres Bonifacio's "Kati-
punan" (Secret Society) and was commonly designated by three K's,
to which were occasionally added the letters N. M. A. N. B., which
addition represented the full title of the society.

79

comprised these three men, as well as other prominent
members of the "Liga Pilipina": Deodato Arellano, pre-
sident; Andres Bonifacio, secretary; Valentin Diaz, treas-
urer; Ladislao Diua, Teodoro Plata, Bricio Pantas, coun-
cilors (11). These two organizations overlapped each
other, so to speak, for from July, 1892, when the "Liga"
was first organized, through 1893 when the "Katipunan"
started, until 1894 when the "Liga" was supposed to be
definitely broken up, both societies were in existence.

In form and organization the "Katipunan" claimed
to be masonic (12). It used regalia and a ritual similar
to those used in masonery. It had its grips, signs, and
passwords and made use of a fantastic, and to the Indian
mind, awe inspiring initiatory ceremony. Its membership
was divided into three degrees or grades.

To insure the success and the unity they desired,
the original founders drew up a paper, performed the cer-
emony of the "Pactode Sangre", or blood pact, and
signed the document in their own blood (13).

To test the fortitude of a postulant, he was stripped
naked, a rope was bound round his waist and a bandage
was placed over his eyes. Then he took the preliminary
oath. A poniard was next put into his hands' and he was
told that a "Katipunero", who had been discovered be-
traying the secrets of the brotherhood, had been condemn-

(11) These names as well as those of the "leaguers" and
"compromisarios" are given, not because they can be of any great
interest to the public, but in order to show the connection of the
various societies with one another. Most of the prominent mem-
bers belonged to all of these organizations in succession.

(12) Whether thissocietywasatrue masonic society ornot is a*
present a matter of secondary importance. What was of impor-
tance at the time of its formation was that by the Filipinos it was
believed to be a true masonic organization, and under that
belief gained a prestige aud importance both in the Philippines and
in other countries that otherwise it would have lacked.

(13) To use the words of the narrator of the foregoing, who
claims to be one of the original ''Katipuneros" — "We initiated our-
selves by making a bold though not dangerous incision in the left
arm, and signed our names in blood."

80

ed to death for his treason. To test his sincerity, he, the
candidate, had been selected to carry out the commands
of the society and to act as executioner. The unhappy
victim, of course, was a lay figure; but the candidate with
his eyes bandaged was not supposed to be aware of the
deception. His arms were then unbound and among
other things he was made to leap through flames. The
fortitude of the postulant having thus been tried to the
satisfaction of the master presiding at the ceremonies,
he was ordered to be unbound by his sponsors, but be-
fore this was done he was addressed as follows:

' 'Brother, the courage you have shown is a sufficient
proof of your love for, and of your determination to ad-
here to, the Katipunan. It proves that you are prepared
to extirpate the slavery of your country. The cord with
which you are bound represents the chain of subjection
and the moment we loose it, you became a slave redeem-
ed from slavery. The bandage that closes your eyes
is the veil of ignorance which sank you into the abyss
of misery, and this we also remove that you may open
your eyes and see both the evil and the good."

This address being finished, the cord was loosed and
the bandage removed, the initiators in the meantime don-
ning cowls. The candidate was then tendered an oath
that read as follows:

"I, N. N-, swear in the presence of the Katipunan
and of my beloved conntry, that I will defend the broth-
erhood, respect and blindly obey the Senior Brothers
and Chiefs of the Katipunan, and cooperate with and
assist them in their necessities. I also swear that I will
defend my country and will not consent to its subjuga-
tion by other nations', and to fulfill this oath I will sacri-
fice my goods and blood."

This oath was signed with the candidate's full name,
Avritten with his blood.

The society was first propagated and organized by
means of triangles, that is to say, it was the duty of each
new member to bring two other members- Under Boni-

81

facio it made great strides and carried on an active polit-
• ical propaganda, distributing pamphlets and proclama-
tions tending to stir up the people against Spain and the
religious order?- This organization by triangles had
the further advantage of protecting the members, more
especially the leaders, against betrayal by their fellows
or inferiors- The members of the lower grades were
unacquainted with those of the higher or knew them
only by specially chosen symbolical names. All real
names, however, were a matter of record in the archives
of the society, though they were unknown excepting to
the immediate officers in the next higher group. It was
only as they were advanced that members became ac-
quainted with those who composed the higher grades-
These symbolical names were used in correspondence or
in other communications in order to avoid complications
with the police. At times, however, the very ignorance
of the true status of the bearers of these names.caused
conflicting claims on the part of the chiefs, who wanted
to command in the revolution according to their standing
in the "Katipunan"-

The avowed program of the "Katipunan," as altered
from the original one forwarded from Spain, and divested
of all circumlocutions and ambiguities, called for the ex-
pulsion of the religious orders, the confiscation and dis-
tribution among the people of their property and estates,
the death of all the insular Spaniards, and the establish-
ment of a Communistic Republic in the Philippine
Islands.

Andres Bonifacio (14) was beyond doubt a remark-

(14) Andres Bonifacio was not only the president of the Kati-
punan but also the idol of its members* Some time previous to th6
outbreak of 1896, he sent word to Emilio Aguinaldo, at Cavite
Viejo, where he had a small fishing" business, and persuaded him to
join the Katipunan. When the rebellion of 1890 broke out, Andres
Bonifacio was in command of the nebels at Naic, province of Cavite,
to which place Aguinaldo, who himself was ambitious to lead, sent
a party of his own adherents. Bonifacio was subsequently brought
before a drum head court-martial and shot,

II

82

able man, possessing an extraordinary influence over the
class of Filipinos to which he belonged. He displayed*
so great an amount of energy, audacity, and intelligence
that he was given the predominance over all his compan-
ions, and as a result, in 1893, he brought about the dep-
osition of Arellano from the Presidency and had Roman
Baza elected in his stead. Baza, however, showed so
little character and initiative that Bonifacio deposed
him also and put himself at the head of the "Katipunan".
Under his own leadership, it increased enormously in Ma-
nila and in the provinces of Cavite and Batangas, though
in the remaining provinces it made but little progress
until after the agreement of Biac-na-Bato, December, 1897.
Some who joined it did so out of sympathy with its'
objects, but many more became members from fear of its
menaces, knowing that the society did not stop short of
assaults, kidnappings, and murder to enforce its views,
orders, or demands on rich and poor alike-

From this time on, masonry in the Philippines grad-
ually dwindled away, the Spanish members disavowing
the Filipino brethern and disassociating themselves
from them, as has already been said- But the "Katipu-
nan" drew into its fold the vast majority of the members
of what the Filipino political agitators and revolutionary
leaders (15) had foisted on their ignorant and prejudiced

(15) Many of the more active and violent political agitators
and revolutionary leaders were undoubtedly masons in the univer-
sal acceptation of the term, as also were many of the Spanish of all
ranks. There can be no question that at first these latter directly
protected the former, thus aiding them to bring- about a condition
of affairs that resulted in the loss of the Philippines to Spain.

The belief that the Katipunan was an uprising of Free MasonS
against the Catholic Church in the Philippines not only prevailed
among many Filipinos, but was participated in by the correspondents
of the American newspapers (1896-1900) in the islands, and by at
least one distinguished United States senator, (Hoar), as is demon-
strated by his speech in the United States Senate, April 17th, 1900.

There can be no doubt that the reports expressed in the
daily press as well as on the floor of the Senate, went a long way

83

fellow countrymen as true masonic societies, which,
whatever they purported to be or not to be, as a matter
of fact, were nothing more than advanced revolutionary
organizations-

In the early part of 1896, Bonifacio took decisive
steps towards an armed rebellion. Various deputations
had from time to time been sent to Rizal at Dapitan,
to confer with him and solicit his advice and instructions.
The last of these visits was made by Andres Bonifacio
himself, accompanied by Pio Valenzuela, just before the
Katipunan outbreak in August, 1896.

Large sums of money had been collected by the "Ka-
tipunan" from wealthy persons by means of promises,
persuasions, or threats. Arms and munitions were pur-
chased, of which considerable amounts were landed in the
provinces of Batangas, Tayabas, and Cavite,-

The "Katipunan" also endeavored to open negotiations .
with Japan- They sent a petition signed by some 5,000
persons to the Mikado praying for the annexation of the
Philippines to his empire- This petition was received
by the Japanese government and by it turned over to the
Spanish goverment.

In spite of this apparently friendly act towards Spain
on the part of the Mikado, it is difflcult to say just what
encouragement the Filipino agitators received from
Japan. There can be no doubt that later, 1898-99, for
one reason or another, the Japanese officials, if not with
the privity of their government at least of their own
accord, coquetted with Jose Ramos, already mentioned,
(a Filipino who was naturalized a Japanese subject un-
der the name of Ishikawa), Jos^ Javier, Mariano Ponce,

toward confirming the above belief in tiie minds of a great part of
the American public, viz: that this uprising was a masonic move-
ment against the alleged tyranny and oppression of the Catholic
Church, and had much to do with influencing the Military, JMaval
and Civil authorities of the D. S. Government to support the Ka
tipunan Government as represented by Aguinaldo in the last six
months of 1897 and the first of 1897.

84

Galicano Apacibie, and others, envoys of the "Katipu-
nan", and were willing to sell them arms and ammunition
in any quantity they could pay for, to be used against
either the Spanish or American authorities-

In. 1896, the excitement due to the agitation of the
"Katipunan" reached fever heat. It was determined that
on a given day, August 30th, of that year, a general upri-
sing should take place and an energetic program should
be put into execution. Owing to a quarrel among some
of the conspirators, however, the plot was discovered on
August 19th, some ten days before the general outbreak
was to take place. The authorities commenced to make
arrests. Bonifacio and his immediate associates fled
from Manila, and the Katipunan society became the rev-
olutionary government of 1896.

But this was by no means the last of it. After the
rebellion was crushed by Polavieja and immediately af-
ter the agreement of Biacna-Bato between Primo de
Rivera and Aguinaldo, Macabulos began working to
form a central committee of the "Katipunan" and with it
operated in the provinces of Tarlac and Pangasinan, and
in the border towns of Zambales, La Union, and Nueva
Ecija. This committee kept the revolutionary spirit
alive and organized until the return of Aguinaldo to the
Philippines under the auspices of Admiral Dewey on
May 17th, 1898, (16).

Later, when Spain ceded the Philippines to the
United States by the treaty of Paris, December 10th,
1898, and when the organized resistance of Aguinaldo's
Government to the American forces occupying the
Islands was overcome, the Civil Commission assuming
the reins of government, what remained of the orig-
inal "Katipunan", as well as what had been added to
it from 1896 down to the so-called pacification, apparent-

(16) That the Katipunan remained in full though occult force
after the collapse of the first government represented by Aguinaldo,
is proved by the killings, not to mention other acts, on good au-
thority, carried into execution bv its orders.

85.

ly died away, so far as the general public was aware.
Many of its members, under such of its old leadex's as
were able to make their peace with the new government,
resolved themselves into the "Partido Federal" or the
"Partido Nacionalista".

It w^s thus that the "Katipunan" had brought
about the revolution against Spain in 1896, and it was
that society that carried it on to the s access it eventual-
ly achieved, until checked by Polavieja, and from
that to the empty convention of the Biac-na-Bato-
Prior to this convention, the local leaders and chiefs of
the revolutionary movement had rallied around Agui-
naldo. receiving their instructions from him and carrying
out his decrees. After the Biac-naBato agreement, they
flocked to the Katipunan fold to organize themselves
more effectively, holding assemblies, drawing up acts,
and promulgating decrees- Heretofore the organization
had been confined to the Tagalog provinces. It now in-
vaded Tarlac, Pampanga, Pangasinan, Zambales, and the
Visa y as provinces, using arguments when practica,ble and
force where necessary, to persuade or drive the unwill-
ing or indifferent into secret plotting or open revolt
against Spain-

The "Katipunan" had for its primary object the con-
certed and combined action of its members against
the common enemy, the Government- As an organized
body, it exercised all of its functions in secret, and
strove to attain its ends by enforcing solidarity and
joint action on the part of all its members- It was their
business to outwit and deceive all such Government offi-
cials as they might have to come in contact with-

Within itself the power of the "Katipunan" over its
members was absolute- This was regulated in detail by
its own laws, its own standard of honor, and its own
penal code. The only two crimes it recognized were
disobedience and disloyalty- Its punishment for them
was death- The Katipunero might lie, rob, or murder
if he chose, provided his action did not affect or injure

the interests of the "Katipunan." But did he disobey its
mandates or betray its secrets to the authorities, even
under torture, there was then no place in the Philippines
so remote as to hide or shelter the unfaithful Kati-
punero from the far-reaching arm of his society. Thus
a terrible menace, like an invisible sword of Damocles,
sooner or later bound to fall, was forever hanging over
the heads of the members of this fearful organization.

In enforcing solidarity and in punishing disobedience
and treachery with death, it was of course merely pro-
tecting itself and securing what the majority of its mem-
bers believed to be the greatest good of the greatest
number, without any sentimental regard for truth or
good faith in the abstract. Deception, fraud, or treach-
ery towards the Government were enforced under the
same tremendous penalties with which they were punish-
ed whenever attempted against the society itself.

There is no reason to believe, however, that the "Ka-
tipunan" and its influence on a very large mass of the
Filipino people at the present writing, is quite a thing
of the past- There are still very many survivors of the
"Katipunan" of 1892-96, and the greater part of them un-
questionably exercise an immense influence on the mass-
es of the population. Their views may not always be
adopted and their advice may not be followed at once,
but they are always at least -listened to and respected.
These men who learned their political creed in the
school of Andres Bonifacio, are still largely fanatical
believers in violent measures to bring about Filipino in-
dependence- A combination of them and of the present
political parties may some day breed a new revolt,
possibly as formidable to the power of the United States
in these Islands in the future as was that of 1896-7
to the Spanish rule in the past (17).

(17) A "Katipimero", who had been in high standing in the
original "Katipunan", in discussing the relation of that society
to the present government, said with cynical frankness; '•you
Americans should not forget that, the measure with which you

87

About 1892-97, contemporaneous with the "Katipu-

nan", another society, calling itself "La Guardia de Ho-

• nor", came into existence and was later a thorn in the

side of Aguinaldo's government, to which it was as

bitterly opposed as it was to the "Katipunan"-

The so-called "'Guai'dias de Honor" were at the outset
a religious confraternity, composed of men and women
under the name of "Guardias de Honor de Nuestra Se-
nora del Rosario." Their self-imposed duties and obli-
gations consisted in reciting the rosary daily, as well as
other prayers, and in carrying out certain supererog-
atory religious devotions and exercises. Later, as a kind
of sect, it developed great strength in Pangasinan . Some
of its original members in that province had undoubtedly
been members of the original religious organization, but
the newer members were led into the worst forms of fa-
naticism by a few crafty and unprincipled persons, whose
only object appeared to be to exploit them for their per- •
sonal benefit.

At first they interfered with no one, but later they
took to making proselytes by force, enticing them into
the woods or kidnapping them outright. After putting
them through certain initiatory ceremonies and forcing
them to take certain oaths, they gave them a false di-
ploma, purporting to make them membersof the original
society. On account of the still widely spread super-
stitious nature of the Filipinos, the sect, like many others
in the Island, was easily developed. It recognized no
political party, and while pretending to be fervent Catho-
lics, its members in the more remote districts devoted

measure, will be the one by which you will be measured. As you
sow you shall reap. What was done with the Spaniards will
be done with the Americans. The Americans taught the Fil-
ipinos treason and to use arms against their masters, the Spaniards,
and to rise and to rebel agaist them. These happenings are fresh
in the minds of the Filipinos and they have not forgotten them.
They have profited by the lesson and will put it into practice af the
flr-st opportunity."

themselves almost entirely to plunder and kidnapping.

In its new phase, it was at once forbidden by the
Spanish Bishop of Vigan, denounced by parish priests'
both secular and regular, and was rigorously hunted
down by the Spanish "Guardia Civil". In spite of all this,
however, its leaders did not abandon their practice on
the superstitions and passions of their followers- Making
the society a means of an alleged new system of religious
brigandage, a certain Valdez, who might be called its
leader, is credited with having acquired considerable
wealth.

On the arrival of Aguinaldo, acompanying the Amer-
ican expedition under Almiral Dewey, the "Guardias
de Honor" recognizing no leader but Valdez, increased
enormously in numbers. They declared themselves in-
dependent and posed as the champions of the friars and
of the Catholic Church against the "Katipunan"andthe
revolutionary government. Using this declaration as a
cloak, their exploits and irregularities increased propor-
tionately- As may be supposed, Aguidaldo and his gov-
ernment opposed them and thereby incurred their
bitter hatred-

After the conclusion of the treaty of Paris, these
fanatics entered upon what may be called their third
phase- Many natives who had received an injury atthe-
hands of the Malolos government, or who were not in
sympathy with the "Katipunan" as represented by
Aguinaldo's ephemeral republic, enrolled themselves in
this association and proceeded actively or passively
against the hated society of the three K's. A great pre-
tence was made of rescuing the Spanish prisoners,
especially the friars, that were held by the revolution-
ary government. Thislwas not from any love for Spain
or out of sympathy with the priests, but merely to em-
barass the new republic, which was most cordially ha-
ted by them-

The principal leaders in the field at that time were
Valdez, already mentioned, and a certain Pedroche, the

former in Pangasinan and the latter in Tarlac and
Nueva Ecija- Their followers amounted to some five
thousand or more men, some armed with rifles of one
kind or another, and a much larger number armed only
with bolos or lances- It can easily he imagined that
tliey spread terror wherever they went.

In 1898-9, Pedroche, who was a man of great person-
al courage and determination, went to Camiling with
the avowed intention of liberating the prisoners that were
held at that place by Aguinaldo's representatives; but
he did not succeed in putting his project into execution.
On his arrival, Ancheta, Aguinaldo's representative at
that place, was very friendly. Under the cloak of this
personal friendship, Pedroche was decoyed to an en-
tertainment, and there he met the death that was prepared
for him-

Among the members of this sect, there were
undoubtedly many sincere, though misguided, persons
whose object was the defence of the Catholic Church
against the attacks of the "Katipunan" These however
were only a small minority. The "Guardias de Honor"
generally, abusing the name of an organization that was
originally good in itself, had degenerated into nothing
better than fanatics of the worst description. The ma-
jority of them were brigands, kidnapers, and murderers.
Their only possible redeeming quality was their opposi-
tion to the deistic and atheistic tenets of the "Katipunan".

Just what part the "Guardias de Honor" played
during the war of conquest and the subsequent pacifica-
tion of the Islands is hard to say- There is every rea-
son to believe, however, that such of the bands as re-
mained in the field, operated against Filipinos and Ameri-
cans alike. Eventually their members lost their identity
in another semi-religious organization known as the
"Santa Iglesia"

In August, 1900, a meeting of the old "Katipuneros''
was called, though it is not exactly clear by whom, the
minutes on this subject being silent. But according to

12

90

their record they met on August 14th of that year, and
were certain "Katipuneros" of ultra views, dissatisfied
with the position taken by some of .the members of that
society who refused to continue an armed agitation for
the complete independence of the Philippines. After
setting a statement of this dissatisfaction before the meet-
ing, they proceeded to the election of officers and to the
reformation of the "Katipunan". According to their
notion, the "Katipunan" was a government formed to ad-
minister the revolution and to further organize a pro-
tracted resistance to the authority of the United States
in the Islands. The mfnutes of this meeting, written in
both Spanish and Tagalog, show that the following of-
ficers were elected: Santiago Alvarez, Supreme Presi-
dent; Macario Sakay, General in Chief; Alejandro San-
tiago, Treasurer; Nicasio Rafael, and (18) Pantaleon
Torres, Administrators. There were present eighty-
seven memiaers and as the votes were made unanimous,
all of them signed the proceedings.

Just how many members of Andres Bonifacio's orig-
inal "Katipunan" were included in the new organiza-
tion when it was started, or how many of them joined
it later, is beyond conjecture. But there must have been
a large number of them. Such as did not join it and give
it their active support from reasons of prudence or of
apprehension, nevertheless, beyond a doubt, gave it
their covert sympathy and financial assistance.

While this so-called government possessed no terri-
tory, it was elaborate in its machinery, having ministers
of War, State, Finance, and all the rest. With the Pres-
ident, they were all elected at this assembly and they
in turn appointed minor official secretaries, and the like.
Later, from time to time, these departments issued
edicts, proclamations, orders, and commissions, to say

(18) Pantaleon Torres was the person who proposed , the for-
mation of the original "Katipunan" in 1892. He and Santiago Al*
varez had been members of Rizal's "Liga".

91

nothing of pamphlets, manifestoes, and other papers deal-
ing with the relations of the insurgent "Katipunero" for-
ces to the people, as well as with the relations the latter
were to assume towards the United States, and with the
treatment of prisoners of war. These documents were
formal and sober in their language, and prudent in their
provisions. They demonstrated in fact that those who
had issued them had a fair command of language and
that to all outward appearances, it was evident that they
took themselves seriously.

On December 25th, 1901, another general meeting
was called. It proceeded to elaborate a constitution and
rules for the Government of the Philippine Islands or,
as they .called it, the "Tagalog Archipelago". This
constitution was very elaborate and involved. It endeav-
ored to embody too many things. It gave immense
power into the hands of the executive. It was printed
in pamphlet form in Tagalog, and was distributed broad-
cast through the Islands-

On November 28th, 1901, another ''Katipunan" elec-
tion was held. As its result Macario Sakay was elected
President, with Domingo Moriones as Minister of War,
Salustino Cruz, Minister of Grace and Justice, Nicolas
Rivera as Minister of Internal Affairs, and Ale,iandro
Santiago as Treasurer.

In its religious aspect, this new "Katipunan" pro-
ceeded, if not actually to eliminate God as heretofore
taught to, and belived by, the Filipinos, at least to sub-
stitute for Him a being called "Bathala" (19). This

(19) In an article entitled "La religion del Katipunan", which
appeared in a paper published in Madrid and called "Pilipinas antes
Jiluropa", Isabelo de los Reyes says that in respect to religion, the
advanced members of the "Katipunan" adopted "Bathalism" as
expounded by him. "Bathalism" admits no dogma whatever, nor
any other gospel than Free Science. It teaches that Spiritualism
is the most scientific and rational of all religions that base them-
selves on tradition. The expounder sums np by saying: "Our god
is a supreme being, whether under the name of Bathala or by

92

deity, according to the mythology extant in these Islands
when they were first discovered by the Spaniards,
was the presiding deity of the "Anitos", meaning the
idols which represented the departed spirits of the
ancestors of the aboriginees, and which were worshipped
by them as household gods.

This action of the "Katipunan" was consistent with
the program of its founders, a prime part of which was
to overthow the Catholic Church. They realized that
this body was essentially conservative and more than
likely, if not to support, at least not to antagonize any
regularly orgahized government, American, Spanish, or
other, that might be in force and that did not attack it.
Their policy therefore seemed to be to break up existing
religious conditions as much as they could, trusting to
future events to complete the destruction, and to chance
for something more in conformity with their political
ideas. Unlike Mahomet, Wyckliff, Luther, or Calvin,
the "Katipunan" offered nothing quite positive which
they pretended to believe was better than what they
aimed to destroy. It was not until some time later,
1901-2, that Gregorio Aglipay, under the auspices of the
American Civil Government, according to his own state-
ment, started to organize his schismatic church under
the name of the "Iglesia Independiente de Filipinas".

The secrets of this new "Katipunan" were not well
kept-' There must also have been considerable internal
dissension, for in 1902, its president, Santiago Alvarez,
was deposed for giving information concerning the so-
whatever else the people may choose to call him. Our ceremony
consists in adoring him by means of our good intentions and phil-
anthropic actions. We believe in no dogma. Our gospel or bible
is science, which we should study freely with the aid of our natural
lights "

Strange as it may seem, Isabelo de los Reyes, in spite of this
remarkable profession of faith, was employed by the I'rotestant
Bible societies to translate the Scriptures into the Ilocano dialect
for the use of the Protestant missions in the Philippines!

93 •
ciety to the American authorities, and Macario Sakay
was elected its chief, and supreme President of the In-
surgent Government.

About 1902, some fanatical bands belonging to a so-
ciety or association calling itself "La Santa Iglesia'",
known also as "Salvadorista" after the nameof its leader,
Felipe Salvador, made their appearance in the provinces
to the north of Manila. As far as was then known to the
general public, their movement was a purely religious
^affair, with strong aspirations to Filipino independence.
According to all information then attainable, the society
proposed to realize its object by invoking the interposi-
tion of God. To this end its members undertook pilgrim-
ages to the mountains and gave themselves up to fast-
ings, prayers, and penances. One of their exercises was
to lie on the ground, face downwards, and pray for four
hours daily. As the authorities both in Manila and the
provinces felt confident that they could successfully cope
with any situation thus brought to pass, they, so long as
the "Santa Iglesia" confined itself to appeals to God,
took no notice of the society except to ridicule it and its
members as a set of ignorant fanatics. In a letter deny-
ing an implied responsibility for an attack, in 1906, by a
party of '!Salvadoristas" on the detachment of Constab-
ulary stationed in the capital of his province, a provin-
cial governor described the "Santa Iglesia" as being on
a par with the well known Roman Catholic religious
confraternities of "St. Francis", "The Sacred Heart of
Jesus" and others. This report must have had some
weight. It is very probable that, until this society later
asserted its dangerous strength, the Manila authorities
for reasons given in another paper, looked upon it if not
with favor, at least with a certain amount of forbearance.
There appeared to be a tendency to tolerate, if not to en-
courage any society promising a break or schism in the
ranks of the Roman Catholic Church,, or seeking to divide
its congregations, weaken its strength, or multiply relig-
ious denominations in the Islands-

94

A certain Salvador de la Cruz is credited with hav-
ing founded this society. So far as is known, he had
been at the head of it since 1896; but there is stroiig
reason to believe that up to about 1901-02, it was known
as the "Guardias de Honor,". For political reasons the
revolutionary government at Malolos, of which Agui-
naldo was the head, looked onthisorganizationwithdes-
favor and determined to exterminate it. Salvador de la
Cruz, however, managed to escape to Manila. There, in
1896-99, undisturbed by the American Military Govern^
ment, he continued to administer the society and to
collect its revenues.

In the earlier part of 1903, Salvador de la Cruz went
from Manila to Cabaruan, in the province of Pangasinan,
where he collected a large following and became the head
of the organization at that place. The Presidente and
town council were practically at his orders and anyone
who gave trouble was "boloed". As a result there were
about one hundred murders charged to this organization.
At Cabaruan, De la Cruz was sentenced to seven months
imprisonment for being a member of the "Guardia de
Honor". Later, with Felipe Salvador he was one of the
sponsors for a church opened in Mamoamarigan, on
which a sign was placed to the effect that it belonged
to the Aglipayan Church. On the same day, the Agli-
payan priest in charge, Teodoro Cadena, who is a son-
in-law of Salvador de la Cruz, endeavored to force an
entrance into, and to take possession of, the Roman Cath-
olic Church at that place, iDut was prevented from
doing so.

In Cabaruan, Salvador de la Cruz was known among
the people as "Apo-laqui" (male God), and he had a
companion known as "Apo-bae", (female God). He also
called himself "Manuel Salvador del Mundo", and repre-
sented himself as Jesus Christ. Many families sold all
they had in order to come and live with or near him.
Both in Cabaruan and at Urdaneta, the people have been
wont to show him the greatest respect and veneration,

95

rendering him liomage by Itissing his hand and by other
ceremonious actions.

Just what the particular religious tenets of the
"Santa Iglesia" may have been at its start, orwhat.they
may have developed into later is hard to determine. So
far as is known, it has no regular expounders of doctrine,
or if it has, they, with the characteristic secretiveness
of Orientals, are very reticent on the subject to any JDer-
sons who are not members. In any case, this paper does
not propose to discuss the "Santa Iglesia" in respect to
the nature and details of its religious doctrines. It is
sufficient to say that, in contradistinction to Andres Boni-
facios's "Katipunan" of 1892, or to that of Santiago Al-
varez, of 1901, both of which were partly atheistic and
partly rather deistic or Unitarian in their tendencies, the
doctrine of the "Santa Iglesia", from what has been as-
certained, appears to be an elaborated though debased
imitation of the Roman Catholic religious ceremonies,
grossly distorted by political passions, monstrous super-
stitions, and degrading practices. The sect is not unlike
another party headed by Apolinario de la Cruz, who feign-
ed supernatural powers, and who told his followers among
other things, that a Tagalog virgin was to come down
from Heaven to wed him. Salvador de la Cruz, however,
gave it out that he is the person who is destined to be
the father of the regenerator of the Filipino nation.

Politically and religiously, Salvador de la Cruz
wields much power among his followers. He claims to
be entrusted with a supernatural mission and to support
this claim, he has surrounded himself with a great deal
of mystery and ceremony. His followers are little con-
cerned about the truth or the fallacy of his pretensions.
So long as they believe, it is a sufficient guarantee to
them of the sanctity of the "Santa Iglesia" as a body
and of its leader as a prophet.

Politically and socially, this society has a very
strong hold on the inhabitants of the pueblos of Maca-
bebe, San Simon, Bacolor, Balitiag, and San Miguel de

96

Mayumo, where alone it numbers more than 8,000 mem-
bers of both sexes. In the more distant provinces of
Tarlac, Pangasinan, Nueva Ecija, and Ilocos, the mem-
bership is many times greater. Many of the old insur-
gent leaders are supposed to belong to it, and though
they may not subscribe to its religious beliefs, there can
be little doubt that they are in thorough sympathy with
it in its political aims.

There is no evidence connecting the "Santa Iglesia"
in any direct way with the "Katipunan" either of 1892 or
of that of 1901; nor is there any record of its being a
political factor in the setfse that it has entered politics
by presenting any of its leaders or members as candi-
dates for the elections. There can be no doubt, however,
that candidates for such elective offices as there were in
the provinces, if they did not bid openly for the support
of its members as a body, endeavored to secure their in-
dividual votes. There is a strong inference, too, that
this society had no small influence on the elections for
the Assembly of 1907, as in both the provinces of Pan-
gasinan and Tarlac it is very powerful.

From 1903 to 1906 inclusively, armed bands said to
belong to this organization under Felipe Salvador, were
prowling about the provinces of Pampanga, Bulacanand
Nueva Ecija. These were supported by the inhabitants,
who furnished them with food, clothing, information, and
supplies, to say nothing of screening their movements
and protecting them generally.

On April 15th, 1906, one of these bands attacked the
post of the Constabulary at Malolos, killed several Con-
stabulary men, plundered the barracks, and carried away
all their arms. Similar attacks were made at San Jose
and at other places and there is little doubt that the
armed bands of his society acted in conjunction with the
field forces that were under the orders of Sakay, ^Villa-
fuerte, Montalan de Vega and others, until these bando-
lero leaders were captured in the summer of 1906. Since
then very little has been heard of the "Santa Iglesia" by
the general public.

97

In 1902, Pascual Poblete, a proprietor and the editor
of a paper called "El Grito del Pueblo", and also a noto-
rious agitator and political mountebank, offered his ser-
vices to the government to organize a society called "La
Sociedad de la Paz". The only outcome of his endeavor,
however, is said to be that some of the civil officials with
whom he was connected in this matter were cajoled out
of some five hundred pesos. The society was still-born.

In 1905, "La Sociedad de Intereses Filipinos" was
established in connection with various clubs in Manila
and the provinces. Their subscriptions and collections,
though ostensibly for the support of these clubs, is
thought to go toward the support of the "Santa Iglesia".
While there is no positive evidence that this is the case,
undoubtedly many of their members extend their sym-
pathy to the "Salvadoristas" in their political aspect.

There seems to be an unconquerable inclination
on the part of a certain, class of' Filipino agitators to
endeavor to put themselves at the head of affairs, or
to come into prominence by means of secret political so-
cieties. To this end another "Katipunan" was started.
This time, however, according to newspaper accounts, it
was with the consent of the Commission authorities.

On November 28th, 1906, SefLores Pantaleon Torres,
"\*alentin Diaz, Alberto Bautista, Santiago Alvarez, and
Pascual H. Poblete met at the house of the latter, and
after rendering respectful tribute to the memory of An-
dres Bonifacio, founder of the original K. K. Katipunan
N. M. A. N. M., proceeded to organize, or as they put
it, to reorganize the two former "Katipunans", to be gov-
erned by the following resolutions, which, together
with a scheme long winded and full of bombast, was
published in Poblete's paper, "Ang Kapatid nang Ba-
yan". In substance they were as follows:

1st. To obey and cause to be obeyed the regu-
lations of the former "Katipunan", as contained in a
pamphlet to be issued later.

2nd: To endeavor to restore and propagate the

13

"Katipunan", established by Andres Bonifacio in 1892.

3rd: To pledge to "Bathala" and humanity that
their efforts shall be directed to promote the welfare of
the Filipinos, to practice mutual aid among the Broth-
erhood, and to propagate and spread the "Katipunan".

4th : That the above mentioned members of the meet-
ing are to be the leaders of the "Katipunan", and anything
agreed upon by them shall be binding on all. That the
chairman and secretary shall be changed in rotation every
month among these five. , The chairman shall have no
rights or privileges above the other members and his du-
ties shall be to see that the acts passed by these principal
leaders are complied with by all other members.

5th: There shall be three ranks or grades called
respectively, "Ktipon", "Kawal," and "Bayani", viz:
"Associates", "Warriors," and "Heroes".

6th: Bach of the five original members shall sub-
scribe fifty centavos on joining, and twenty centavos each
succeeding month. The same shall be paid by all other
applicants for admission to the "Katipunan". Sefior
Poblete is to be the custodian of the money collected by
SeQor Alvarez, and the accounts are to be examined by
any one of the principal leaders when they are assembled.

7th- The funds can be disposed of only in accord-
dance with a vote of three of the founders.

8th: There shall be a meeting of five of the original
founders every Sunday at 6:30 P. M., or on any other
day or at any hour that may be determined.

9th: All measures requiring enactment must be
presented at the following meeting.

There being no further business before it, the meet-
ing was then at 9:30 P. M. adjourned.

Valentin Diaz, Chairman

Pascual H. Poblete, Secretary

Pantaleon Torres, ]

Alberto Bautista y Committee

■ Santiago Alvarez, )

It is evident that there could have been very little
sincerity or consistency in this movement. The first

99
resolution starts off by proposing to obey and cause to
be obeye'd the resolutions of the two former "Katipunans".
These were distinctly national in their tendencies. Yet
in spite of this, a radical departure is made by aiming at
something decidedly pro-American. Therefore it is hard-
ly clear how the consistent support of any number of
members of either of the two former societies can be ex-
pected, if it is proposed to alter the old program to the
extent of changing its tendencies in favor of the occu-
pancy of the Philippines by America or any other
foreign nation. As a matter of fact, the whole pro-
gram is little more than a ■ rambling statement of the
platform of the Federal party, and to all appearances,
this "Katipunan" was merely a political tool of that
party, revamped to influence the [elections for the Fil-
ipino Assembly.

Resolution N9 4 when divested of verbiage, states
that the five members starting this "Katipunan" are per-
petually to govern it in rotation, and resolution N9 6,
that Pascual H. Poblete is to hold the funds which San-
tiago Alvarez is to collect, and that the accounts are sub-
ject to the inspection of only the principal leaders, who
according to the provisions of resolution N9 4. are prac-
tically a perpetual or self -perpetuating body. Resolution
N9 7 provides that the funds can be disposed of only by
a majority vote of the founders.

This society, according to all public information, nev-
er got beyond the above embryo stage. Neither Pas-
cual H. Poblete nor Santiago Alvarez retained the con-
fidence of their immediete acquaintances or of the Fili-
pinos at large. It was popularly believed, indeed, that
both of them were employees of the insular secret ser-
vice, and that the new society was to be used merely as a
trap to catch unwary malcontents and to discover their
secret, with a view to betraying them to the authorities.

There is in existence another society called "Colo-
rum", which according to the best obtainable information,
and that is very slight, is purely fanatical. It appears to

100 ;:

be given over to any number of beliefs and superstitions,
and has its headquarters at San Pablo in the Laguna
province. Until lately, the leader of it was a certain Se-
bastian Caneo. Many of the principal leaders of the
revolution against Spain, 1896-98, and of the insurrection
against the United States, 1899-1905, are supposed to be
among its members. It is governed by a voice supposed
to emanate from a cave in Mount San Cristobal, in Ta-
yabas, where its members believe God gives His orders
to the Filipino brethren. These caves are also supposed
to be depositories where insurgents have hidden away
large supplies of arms and ammunition.

What was known as the "Military Club", consisting
of officers of the revolutionary government against Spain
in 1896-98, as well as against the United States, was
founded by Malvar, and there were other clubs each
known as "Club Popular", originally founded by Teodoro
Sandiko in August and September, 1898, in Manila and
the provinces. These, while purporting to be mutual
aid associations, a,rein reality nothing more than meeting
places of members of antiamerican political parties.

There may be other secret societies with political or
other ends in view, but if there are any of importance, ;
their secrets up to date are well kept. In the face of the
then impending election of the New Filipino Assembly,
they were not likely to become active political factors. .

Since the American occupation in 1898, political
parties and societies, both secret and others, such as
Freemasons, Oddfellows, Elks, Redmen, Foresters,
Eagles, etc., have been founded or introduced into the
Philippines. Their membership is mostly made up of
persons directly or indirectly dependent on the Amer-
ican goverment and are practically composed entirely
of the Anglo-Saxon races. There is therefore little room
to fear that they will allow political agitators to lead
them outside of their avowed objects, or that they will
endeavour to foment agitajion or stir up strife among
the natives of the archipelago.

FOURTH PAPER

FILIPINO REVOLUTIONS AND REVOLTS

FOURTH PAPER

FILIPIIIO REVOLUTIONS AND REVOLTS
I

It seems more than mere coincidence that nearly all
the disturbances in the Philippines broke out about the
same time as did the political upheavals and revolutions
in Spain itself or the revolts in her other colonies; or at
any rate, they occurred as soon as news of trouble could
reach the islands. The conclusion that might be drawn
from this is that the Filipino revolutionary leaders were
in closer touch with those of Spain than has heretofore
been supposed to be the case, and therefore took advan-
tage of the troubles of that country and her other depen-
dencies to create disturbances in the archipelago.

Up to the time of the Spanish American war and the
consequent occupation of the Philippine Islands by the
United States, it had been the custom of English and
American writers to point to the Catholic Church in gen-
eral and to the religious orders in particular as the primary
cause of all the revolutionary disturbances that occurred
in the islands during the nineteenth century. They were
wont to assert that the only panacea for these disturban-
ces was the expulsion of the orders and the seculariza-
tion or confiscation of their estates. These ex-parte state-
ments appear to have been based on allegations to the
above effect put forward by the Spanish anticlericals
generally and the Filipino revolutionists- in particular,
and as usual, writers blindly accepted them as a founda-

104

tion for their conclusions without taking the trouble to
verify them. They preferred to assume that those state-
ments were correct. Otherwise they would have had
to admit, contrary to their cherished theory, that some-
thing could be said in Spain's favor. They may possi-
bly also have taken their stand from the fact that they
were writing their books principally for the Anglo-Saxon
public, the greater part of which, to say the least, was
distinctly Protestant if not absolutely anticatholic.

Whatever discussions may have arisen and however
much may be said one way or another, impartial investi-
gation demonstrates that the more important disturban-
ces, namely those of 1872 and 1896, appear to have been
carefully organized beforehand and to have had their
ground prepared for them. They also appear to have
been due to the extreme views advocated by a compara-
tively very few leaders, rather than to the spontaneous
uprising of a people aroused by a sense of the wrongs
and oppressions supposedly suffered by the many. In
other words, these troubles can be said to have come
from the leaders down and not from the people up.

The first disturbance in the nineteenth century oc-
curred in Ilocos in 1807 and was followed closely by
another in 1811. Both were purely religious in their
character. Not that they were cases of the party
which favored the secular clergy, rising against the reg-
ular orders or vice versa; not that they were due to
alleged hardships suffered by the people at the hands
of any particular branch of the Catholic Church, but
they were directed against the doctrines of Christianity
as a whole- In fact the movement of 1811 contemplated
the establishment of an entirely new religion under a
new god called "Lungao".

In 1814, a rebellion of the natives in Ilocos and other
provinces was brought about by the Governor General's
proclaiming the equality of the Spanish and native
races. The latter had construed this into a reason for
refusing to pay the "tribute", which up to that time was

105

practically the only direct tax levied on them by the
Spainish government.

There was a mutiny of the Spanish officers of the
native troops in 1822; also another in 1828. But these
were purely military in character and were confined
to the troops themselves. The cause "is to be looked for
in the home-land. The troubles were an offshoot of the
liberal uprising in Spain agaist Fernando Vll, and had
nothing to do with local or religious conditions.

In 1826-1837, there were great disturbances among
the native Filipinos, due to differences of opinion among
them about the justice of the breaking up of the relig-
ious orders, and the confiscation and sale of their proper-
ties in that country. One party advocated the expulsion
of all the Spaniards, including the religious orders. The
other wished to turn out all the Spaniards excepting the
members of the religious orders, who were to be allowed
to remain and take charge of the government.
• In 1841, there was an insurrection of the Tagalogs
in the province of Tayabas. They were headed by one
Apolinario de la Cruz, who called himself King of the
Tagalogs. He pretended to possess divine powers and
gave out that a Tagalog virgin was to come down from
heaven to wed him . From this union there was to spring
a regenerator of the Filipino nation. Part of his pro-
gram was to tie all the Spaniards, members of the relig-
ious orders included, to trees, and to have them shot to
death with arrows bj'^ the women. His followers were
attacked and pursued by the troops. Many were killed
and the remainder dispersed. This insurrection was as-
sisted by the mutiny of a regiment of Tayabas Tagalogs
stationed in Manila at that time. Apolinario de la Cruz
was captured and with many of his 600 armed followers,
was put to death. The mutinous solders in Manila were
shot down by the loyal troops.

The events of 1848, which had so far-reaching an
effect on the affairs of Europe, seem to have left the Phil-
ippines unaffected. The next disturbance of which we

14

106.
read was an irisigniflcant attempt at a revolution, coin-
cident with one in Spain in 1854. It was headed by one
Cuesta, a Spanish mestizo, who had been educated in
Spain and had later been appointed a major of ''Cara-
bineros", or Custom House Guards, inNuevaEcija. His
followers were harangued by the Augustinian friars and
by them persuaded to disperse. Cuesta was captured
and shot, as also were some of his fellew conspirators.
Others were banished to different islands-

In January, 1872, there was an uprising, the out-
come of a conspiracy, in which the troops at Cavite and
a large number of civilians in Manila were implicated.
A secret society had been working at this plot for seve-
ral years, in fact ever since Queen Isabela II had been
deposed by the mutinous army and navy in Spain, in
1868, under the joint leadership of General Prim and
Admiral Topete.

Ever since the revolution of 1868, Spain, torn by
the extreme views of political leaders between advanced,
republicanism and ultraconservative monarchy, had been
in a more or less unquiet condition. The republic had
turned out a failure, and the compromise measure of se-
lecting Amadeo of Savoy as King, had not proved a
success. Consequently a more than fair field had been
thrown open to political agitators of all sorts and condi-
tions, and they were by no means backward in entering
it, to air their real or imaginary grievances or to reap
such solid advantages as circumstances might offer.

Among these were two Filipinos, the brothers Ma-
nuel and Antonio Regidor. In 1868, they began an
agitation in the Madrid papers in favor of certain polit-
ical and religious reforms in the Philippines. Among
other things they advocated Filipino autonomy and the
secularization of the parishes that had been founded,
and till then administered by the clergy of i-eligious
orders. A commission, presided over by the Minister of
"Ultramar" (colonies), with Generals Gandara and Cebal-
los and others, among them Manuel Regidor, as- mem-

107

bers, was appointed in Madrid to enquire into the neces-
sity for reforms in the Philippines and to discuss the
best means of introducing them.

General Carlos de la Torre, who had been one of the
leaders of the revolution against Queen Isabela II and
who had been sent as Governor of the islands, in 1868,
introduced certain arbitrary reforms, which however did
not satisfy the agitators. ' He was willing enough to com-
ply with their demands respecting the religious orders,
but he would not consider Filipino autonomy and decen-
tralization. It was to bring this autonomy about that
the plot, culminating in the Cavite revolt, was started.

By the time General Izquierdo, who succeeded to the
governorship of the island, had assumed office, this plot
had become widely extended. It had, in fact, spread to
all the towns of the archipelago, which had been flooded
with pamphlets and literature of an inflammatory nature
in Spanish as well as in the native dialects. The out-
break itself was badly planned, or to speak more cor-
rectly, it came to a head prematurely- The military mu-
tineers at Cavite, who were to be the backbone of the
movement, mistook some rockets fired on the occasion of
the celebration of a local holiday iaone of the suburbs of
Manila, on January 2()th, 1872, for the preconcerted sig-
nal between them and the conspirators in the capital.
The mutinous solders in Cavite arose, as had been agreed,
and attacked the Europeans, killing many of them . They
also seized the arsenal and offered a stubborn resistance
when, in their turn, they were attacked by the loyal
troops. The whole affair, so far as Cavite was concern-
ed, was suppressed with great severity.

The plot itself had been conducted by Zaldua, one of
the conspirators. He worked on the employees and la-
borers of the Cafiacao and Cavitenavy yards, from whom,
on the recommendation of General de la Torre, the Span-
ish government had demanded the "tribute". From this
they had theretofore been exempt, the majority of them
having served their time in the Navy. The artillerists and

108

the sailors stationed in Port San Felipe and the navy yard
had also been worked on, and agreeing to side with the
workmen, were readjy to mutiny as soon the signal from
Manila was given-
Two ex-officers of the Spanish service, Lieutenants
Montesinos and Marquecho, who were confined in Cavite,
a Sergeant named Lamadrid, and a Spaniard named
Cisneros, were the principal leaders of the rebellious
troops. All of these were killed in the suppression of
the revolt. Three secular priests, Gomez, Burgos and
Zamora, and Francisco Zaldua, a civilian, were implica-
ted in the civil part of it, and all of them were later
executed in Manila.

Colonel Butler, who up to within a day or so of the
mutiny had been Governor of Cavite, had resigned, be-
cause he was not in accord with the Governor General's
policy. He was succeeded by Governor Rojas, who,
with Colonel Sawa's regiment remained under arms in
the streets of Cavite all the night of the 20th. As soon
as the authorities at the Governor's headquarters at Ma-
lacanang, Manila, were aware of the turn affairs had
taken at Cavite, they despatched troops from Manila,
who left on the morning of the 21st, and it is due to the
promptness and energy of Governor General Izquierdo
that the military part of the proposed uprising was put
down.

There appears to have been considerable friction
between the higher naval and military authorities. As
a result, Admiral MacCrohon, in command of the Span-
ish squadron in Filipino waters, when he was certain
that there was to be trouble, weighed anchor and with
his entire co^imand, excepting one gun-boat left at the
disposal of the Captain of the Port of Manila, sailed to
the southern islands. He thus rendered the mutiny of
the artillerymen and sailors at Cavite a matter of com-
paratively little danger or difficulty. Mac Crohon's
action in this matter seems hard to explain. In the
absence of positive proof, the only logical conclusion is

109

that, though he favoured the conspiracy in principle, he
was not wilUng to participate personally in the uprising
or to take an active part in its suppression.

Many persons, Filipinos and foreigners, lay the
blame of this revolt on the religious orders. "The real
instigators of the Cavite tragedy were the Spanish friars,
etc, etc.," who, according to those sage critics, were anx-
ious to bring about the downfall of some of their ene-
mies, who were members of the secular clergy. A mo-
ment's reflection will show the absurdity of such an
assumption. The conspiracy which led up to this revolt
had been in existence too long and was far too wide-
spread, to have been a sham revolution, gotten up to put
a few insignificant persons out of the way. It is reafty
too great a demand on the credulity or prejudice of the
general public to ask it seriously to accept the theory
that any corporation, religious or other, could exercise
sufficient persuasion to induce a body of troops and civil-
ians to become a cat's paw in any such scheme. In an
undertaking of such a nature, even the most ignorant of
the participants would realize only too keenly that they
were risking their lives, liberties, and property, merely
to furnish an excuse for doing away with a dozen or so
of persons to please the friars. Had these possessed
but one fraction of the power and preponderance in in-
sular affairs with which they have been credited, they
would have been able to procure the explusion of their
enemies from the Philippines, or they could even have
compassed their death by legal or other means, without
going to the length of starting a sham revolution, which
if successful, must inevitably have resulted in their own
downfall. Even if it were admitted for the sake of ar-
gument that the members of the religious orders were,
individually or collectively, as unscrupulous as their
most inveterate enemies would have the public believe,
they have always been credited, even by those who hate
them most, with possessing a considerable amount of
common sense and political foresight. Had they really

110

been the ones to foment the revolution, as charged— an
undertaking which a very little reflection would have
shown them could easily get beyond their control— they
would have been eminently lacking in either of those
qualities-

The only circumstance that could possibly lend some
color to the theory of the friar origin of this revqlt, was
a redistribution by the church of some missions. In the
previous year, the Jesuits, who had been allowed to re-
turn to the Philippines, were put in charge of the parishes
and missions of Mindanao. These had formerly been ad-
ministered by the Recoletos, or discalced Augustinians,
who then were transferred from that island to Luzon,
where they were assigned to some of the parishes hitherto
in charge of the secular clergy. This, it was said, gave
rise to the discontent that ended in the Cavite conspiracy
and revolt. This theory, however, is overthrown by the
fact that the transfer of the Recoletos took place after
the plot, culminating in the mutiny, had been in existence
for several years and not before it. Consequently if it
had any connection with the revolt, it would be as one
of its effects rather than as one of its causes.

As a matter of fact, .the principal leaders of the
uprising were open and avowed opponents of the friars.
Moreover it seems beyond a doubt that the public pros-
ecutor's indictment, charging the projection of a revo-
lutionary government, was based on solid grounds. Hence
the so-called "Martyrs of the Friars" were in point of
fact merely victims of their own imprudence in having
entered into an advanced revolutionary movement that
had turned out unsuccessfully. Furthermore those who
have tried to connect the religious orders with the CaVite
revolt as its instigators have, in the lack of further and
more conclusive evidence than any yet adduced, failed to
make out their case (1). Later developments made it very

(1) Benito Legarda, testifying before the Philippine Commis-
sion August 12th, 1899, states that the uprising of 1872 is attributed
to the native priests.

Ill

evident that this revolt was prepared and brought about
by the propagandists of the ultra revolutionary ideas then
prevalent among many Spaniards both at home and in
the colonies.

"Some of the Filipinos, continuing their work, went
to Spain, where they founded a newspaper, called "So-
lidaridad", and a secret political society. This society,
of Filipinos united itself to the Masonic society in Spain
and they established branches here, and this society
with all the characterestics of masonry, converted itself
afterwards into the Katipunan society. This society, the
Katipunan, made great progress here in the Philippines,
for they had to do greatly with the common people; they
never had anything to do or mixed at all with the higher
class of people here in the Philippines" (2).

Antonio Regidor, in a pamphlet published by him
in Paris in 1896, states that the foreign masons distributed
arms and ammunition for this uprising, to be used in Ne-
gros, Mindanao, and Jolo; also that they furnished two
hundred and eighty thousand pounds sterling in cash,
which was distributed in Cebii, Bohol, Negros, and Pa-
nay. This statement, extraordinary as it is, is given for
what it is worth. But as Regidor figured prominently,
not only in this affair but also in the agitation that led
up to it, it is but fair to assume that he must have known
the details of the circumstances of which he speaks.

Taken at its face value, this statement would prove,
if the theory of the friars' connection with the revolt be
correct, that the friars and masons were working in
common — a theory about as logical as the practicability
of harmoniously blending fire and water.

(2) See statement of Benito Legarda before the Philippine
Commission August 12th, 1899. The society he probably refers to
was "La Asociaci6n Hispano-Pilipino" which, as well as the paper
"Solidaridad,', was started in 1888, some ten years after the Ca-
vite revolt.

112

There is at present little doubt that the details of
the original conspiracy were planned by Manuel and
Antonio Regidor, and worked out by Jacinto Zamora
and Joaquin Pardo de Tavera, an uncle of a former
commissioner of the same name. Another of the promi-
nent conspirators was Maximo Inocencio, a prosperous
contractor, from whose storehouse the signal rockets
announcing the readiness of the Manila conspirators for
the uprising were to have been fired. Though he escap-
ed punishment at the time, he was later, in 1897, exe-
cuted for complicity in the "Katipunan" outbreak in 1896.

u

Prom the revolt that failed in Cavite, in 1872,~to the
rebellion brought about by the "Katipunan" of Andres
Bonifacio in 1896, the islands to all outward appearan-
ces were comparatively quiet, .unless expeditions against
the Moros of Jolo and Mindanao can be called distur-
bances. In 1883, there were some threats of a revolution,
but the sending of additional troops from Spain over-
awed the would-be revolutionists. This apparent tran-
quillity did not prevent the secret societies from, dili-
gently preparing for another uprising. This was started
by what was then known as the "Progresista" move
ment.

The "Progresistas", as they called themselves, can
be said in general terms to have been composed of
three elements. These were, first, Spanish and Filipino
liberals, anticlericals, radicals, republicans, communists,
and anarchists, whose general aims ranged all the
way from a limited constitutional monarchy to the over-
throwing of all monarchical forms and the establishment
of a communistic republic in the Philippines, although
their program did not necessarily call for the absolute
separation of the colony from Spain. Secondly came
the Creoles and Mestizos of the colony, of all political
parties, who were more anxious for a greater amount of

113

political, personal, and social recognition (3) than for
executive or administrative reforms. In the third class
were the full blooded native Filipinos and some Mestizos,
principally "Sangleyes", or Chinese Mestizos, who
aimed at complete independence of the islands, freedom
from the control of Spain or any other country, and the
establishment of a purely national government of Fili-
pinos, for Filipinos, and by Filipinos.

The general tendencies of the first of these three
elements have been sufficiently illustrated by the pro-
ceedings of the revolutionary monarchists, republicans
and communists of Europe, whenever any of these par-
ties happened to be in power, or by the general dogmas
of the communists and anarchists of Europe and Amer-
ica. They can therefore be dismissed without further
comment.

The aims of the second element were of a more per-
sonal and complex nature. They struck, as has already
been said, more for social and political recognition than
for a reform of real or. imaginary abuses or wrongs, or
for a separation of the Philippine Islands from Spain. The
best illustration of their program is the line of action
pursued by one Pedro A. Paterno, in coquetting with the
Spanish government on the one hand and with the revo-
lution on the other. So far as his Spanish proclivities
were concerned, his conduct terminated in his acting as
agent for the Spanish Governor General in negotiating the
surrender of the rebel leaders at Biac-na-Bato. On ac-
count of this he endeavored to wring a dukedom as well
as a large sum of money from Spain in recognition of his ,
services. Onthepartof the revolutionary government,
he was elected president of the revolutionary congress ,

(3) This was stated practically in so many words by Apolina-
rio Mabini to the American officers, whose prisoner he was before
his deportation to Guam. He said that one of the principal reasons
for Filipino opposition to American intervention in the form it as-
sumed was that Americans also would withhold this recognition
from them.

15

114
summoned by Aguinaldo at Malolos, September 17, 1898.
Later with Trinidad Pardo de Tavera, Benito Legarda,
and Gregorio Araneta, he abandoned that government
when he realized that it was doomed, though he was not
so fortunate as they were in 'securing offices under the
Civil Government established in the Philippines by the
United States.

The aims of the third element can be summed up in
the program of the "Katipunan", namely, the death or
expulsion of all Spaniards and members of the religious
orders, the confiscation and distribution of their estates
among the people, and the establishment of a commun-
istic republic for the Philippine Islands.

The first two of these classes were partly composed
of men who, since 1868, had furnished the members of
the various revolutionary juntas, committees, and agents
— in other words, the agitators, who encouraged all dis-
content in the cities and backed Such insurgents as were
in the field by furnishing them with moral and material
s^jpport in the shape of arms, ammunition, money, sup-
plies, sympathy, and information. They were the men
who, for years, without going to the extent of publicly
committing themselves, had secretlj'^ fanned the sparks
of discontent and kept alive the agitation against the
Spanish government, until it burst out in a flame of
open rebellion.

With hardly an exception, these men were mere
political intriguers and mountebanks, the majority of
them being Mestizos of the Regidor, Rojas, and Yangco
class, who principally by aid and patronage received
from the government and assistance from the religious
orders, had acquired considerable wealth. These men
alleged love of race and country as their ends, though
these high sounding sentiments were in reality nothing
more than the means by which they hoped to attain,
each according to his ambitions, the power, wealth, or
social distinction they all craved. It was to gratify
those ambitions that these men endeavored to bring

115

about agitations and uprisings against Spain. In their
hearts they felt no necessity for such movements among
the people, who on the whole were indifferent to the
points all the alleged reforms had at issue. Indeed it is
doubtful if, amid the agitations which eventually came
out of the machinations of the "Katipunan" and of the
other secret societies which preceded it, these so-called
leaders had any aspirations beyond a desire to fish in
troubled waters. Therein lay their hopes that in case
the agitation should be successful, they might wring
personal advantage from such concessions as the Madrid
government might make to the colony, or that they might
be rewarded by Spain for abandoning their fellows
in case the movement should be a failure. Indepen-
dence from Spain and the formation of an indepen-
dent Filipino Government had no place in their original
program. Their political principles and morality are
very well illustrated by that political and religious
trimmer, the famous "Vicar of Bray".

The second class was composed of men whose polit-
ical horizon was limited to their own immediate surround ■
ings, with Hong Kong perhaps as an Ultima Thule. It
included individuals like Jose Rizal, Mariano Ponce, Mar-
celo H. del Pilar, Teodoro Sandiko, and the Luna broth-
ers. Some of these attended Spanish, French, or Ger-
man universities, but they were young men in every sense
of the word. In spite of natural talent or of acquired tech-
nical instruction, they had no opportunities of applying
either the one or the other to the acquisition of that prac-
tical education so necessary to those who aspire to the
conduct of public affairs. The little they knew outside
of their own narrow sphere of colonial life, and that was
very little, had been acquired, not from close personal
observation and long experience in the world of politics,
but principally from a study of ex-parte journals and
novels of the Victor Hugo type, where writers devote
their talents to holding up to execration abuses long
passed rather than to a serious consideration of practical

116

remedies for actual ills. Their ideas of the machinery
of government and their theories of reform had been ac-
quired at meetings of European working mens' political
clubs and debating societies, to which they had had ac-
cess, and the least that can be said of both their ideas
and theories is that they were crude.

The members of this category were personally tec
unimportant in the colony to allow them to look for any
recognition or preferment from Spain. Their hopes of
political prominence lay in a government, if not com-
pletely independent at least so distinctly separated from
Spain, that only a very small minority, who were not
Filipinos, would be allowed to participate in it. They
wanted, in place of the Spanish colonial regime, an
autonomous insular administration, if not an independent
government.

There was a third class, whose educational advan-
tages, if any, had not even the questionable worth of those
of the two preceding divisions. It was composed of sim-
ple minded men like Andres Bonifacio who, dazzled by
the superficial brilliancy of their more instructed com-
panions, were content to follow their precepts blindly,
echoing their utterances and imitating their actions,
without knowing what the former meant or realizing
what the latter led up to. These men were fanatics
and dreamed of a visionary government of Filipinos, by
Filipinos, and for Filipinos. The principal features of
their policy, as has already been said, was the confisca-
tion of the estates of the religious orders as well as of all
the Spaniards and other foreigners, and their partition
among the people; also a general redistribution of prop-
erty in the islands. In a word, they aimed to set up a
■communistic republic.

In all of these classes, which shaded imperceptibly
from one into the other, there were some men who had
considerable wealth and others, who, if not wealthy, were
at least well-to-do. There were also among them some
few who were sincere in their professions. If they want-.

117

ed office and government employment, it was more for
the gratification of their personal vanity or for the result-
ing social consideration than for any material benefit.
The vast majority, however, wanted the offices as a
means of living without engaging in business, trade, or
manual labour. There were others who wanted them
merely for what could be squeezed out of them, over and
above their legimate salaries and perquisites.

The members of the first of these classes were the
persons who really brought about the revolution against
Spain in 1896. Their aim appears to have been to intim-
idate the Spanish government into putting power into
their hands. This they sought to bring about by using
the second and third classes as their tools, to be cast
aside when they were done with them. But as often
happens in such cases, the very elements they had
hoped so to use got beyond their control. They were
left with the alternatives of becoming the servants of the
powers they had evoked, following them as their leaders
to lengths to which their material personal interests for-
bade them to go, or of retiring into private life. The
majority chose the latter course. Some of them only
emerged from retirement when, in May, 1898, Aguinaido
was allowed by the American authorities to put himself
at the head of the revolution that followed the naval
battle at Cavite. They joined the Filipino dictator at
Bacoor, remaining with him until he proclaimed his gov-
ernment at Malolos. But when it became clear that the
United States was not going to establish an independent
Filipino republic, or even an autonomous government,
and that consequently there would not be offices of im-
portance for all of them to occupy, they abandoned Agu-
inaido and offered their services to the United States,
which in some cases were accepted.

As can readily be figured out, these elements collect-
ively did not at that time (1872 to 1897) number many
more than one per cent of the total population of the civ-
ilized tribes of the islands. This, it will be agreed, was

118

somewhat scanty material for the formation oC a party,
which as yet had not even decided just how much or
how little of the existing form of government it proposed
to overthrow, or with just what it proposed to replace
it when it was overthrown.

As a matter of fact, the "Progresistas" and the Fi-
lipino people were very much in the same relative posi-
tions as the "Friend of Humanity" and the "Knife Grin-
der", as described in Coleridge's satire. The reasoning
methods of the "Progresista" leaders closel,y resembled
those of the "Friend of Humanity", and the sentiments
of the Filipino people, as a mass, were very much akin
to those of the "Knife Grinder". Thus the "Progresis-
tas" at that time could truthfully be described as a head
without a body. As no particular grievances existed
among the people, so far as they themselves were aware,
it became necessary to create them artificial ones. This
could best be done by arraying one class against an-
other. In this manner there would be brought into
existence a body, of which the "Progresista" leaders
could become the head and of whose affairs it could
assume the direction and control.

The principal obstacle that stood in the way of
creating such a situation was the Catholic Church, as
represented by the secular clergy and the regular
orders. Over and above being strongly conservative as
a body, to say nothing of the strength it derived from
its unity of precept and universal practice, it possessed
great wealth and influence in the islands. Unable to go
any further with their scheme, the "Progresistas" saw
that the removal of this obstacle became the main prob-
lem to be solved, and one on whose favorable solution
their whole success would depend.

The "Progresistas" had absolutely no reason to aim
at starting a religious reformation in the Philippine Is-
lands in any way resembling the so-called reformation
that took place in Europe in the middle ages. There
were no hereditary rulers possessed of sufficient power

119
or prestige to lead such a movement from conscientious
or interested motives. Even liad there been, the "Pro-
gresistas" would not have been able personally to profit
by the consequent spoliation of the church, except per-
haps indirectly, as many persons in Spain had profited
by purchasing "Iqs bienes nacionales"— national estates
— which had been the possessions of the religious orders
and had been confiscated by the government on the
suppression of those bodies in that country in 1837-38.
Moreover the people as a mass felt no particular neces-
sity for a religious change. Even were a reformation
started, the "Progresistas" could hardly expect that any
body of the people, sufficiently numerous to constitute a
working political factor, would break away from the
faith in which they were brought up, or if they did so,
that they would come over in a body to be a passive tool
serving for the advancement of others.

The surest way to bring about the removal of this
obstacle was to weaken the Catholic Church by internal
dissensions. These they thought could best be foment-
ed by arraying one class of the clergy against the other,
namely the secular against the regular. Thus they
would create discord and division in the very heart of
the body they proposed to overthrow.

No better occasion could have been found for raising
strife of this nature than at the time of the heartburnings
naturally consequent upon the transfer of the Recoletos
from Mindanao, where they had been replaced by the
Jesuit missionaries (4), to Luzon. This change, by which

(4) This change of the incumbents of the parishes held by
secular priests to incumbents belonging to the regular orders was,
in Mindanao at least, brought about gradually; i. e., as vacancies
occurred in these parishes by reason of death, removal, or incapa-
city of the secular incumbents, Jesuits were installed to replace
them. . See statement of Neil Macleod before Philippine Commis-
sion, April 17th 1899.

[The Recoletos likewise were only gradually assigned to par-
ishes, whose native pastors had died or were removed for canoni-
cal reasons. — Editor's Note.]

120

gradually many of the native pastors of parishes were'
not succeeded by members of their own secular clergy,
coming as it did about the same time as the Cavite revolt
and the execution of the three secular clergymen, Go-
mez, Burgos and Zamora, was used as a stalking-horse
in getting closer to the people to disseminate discontent
among them. Just what the bulk of the native secular
clergy may have felt as private individuals it is impossi-
ble at this time to say, but as a body they remained
loyal to the Catholic Church.

As has already been said, secret associations were
working diligently. The iirst overt sign they gave was
when one Don Jose Centeno, a man of well known anti-
clerical opinions and at that time acting Civil Governor
of Manila, is said on good authority to have insti-
gated a procession as a demonstration, and to have
countenanced a petition, against the archbishop and the
friars by the inhabitants of the district of Santa Cruz.
One Doroteo Cruz, a mestizo lawyer, was the principal
mover in this. He refrained from signing the petition
himself, but he procured some 810 signatures to it. When
such of the signers as could later be found were called
upon for an explanation of their action, some stated that
they had signed it without knowing its contents or pur-
port, others that their signatures to it were forgeries,
and all declared that they had nothing against the arch-
bishop and' the religious orders. Some of the names
appended to it were those of persons who had died be-
fore the petition was drawn up.

When it is taken into consideration that out of the
230,000 inhabitants of Manila, nearly the whole of the
subscribers were from one district, Santa Cruz, and that
there were only 810 signatures to the petition, and that
by no means all its signers took part in the procession
that accompanied it to Don Jose Centeno's house, the logi-
cal conclusion is that the petition and the accompanying
procession were in themselves flat failures. In spite of
this, however, the demonstration, such as is was, accom-

121
plished one of the ends for which it had beep originated.
It helped to keep alive the agitation started by the
"Progresistas" against the influence of the archbishop
and the religious orders. This agitation had been fur-
ther fomented by Rizal's books, "Noli me Tangere" and
"El Pilibusterismo", and the whole business culminated
in the agrarian disturbances at Calamba and Santa Rosa.

These troubles arose from the refusal of the tenants
on the Dominican estates either to pay their rents or to
obey the order of the court and vacate their hold-
ings. This refusal, if not started, was at least cham-
pioned by Rizal. When he realized that force would be
employed to support the decrees of the court in expel-
ling the recalcitrant tenants as well as to quell the dis-
turbances created by their refusal to vacate, he found it
convenient to go to Hong Kong and leave his relatives
(5) and friends to grapple as best they could with a sit-
uation he had done so much to bring about.

About this time, a Filipino Revolutionary Junta had
been founded in Hong Kong. It was composed of polit-
ical exiles and refugees from justice, and it was particu-
larly active in fomenting discontent in the islands. There
was also a great increase of secret societies and among
them an alleged masonic lodge for women was founded
in Manila.

In the meantime, Weyler had been succeeded by
Despujols as Governor General of the islands. Taking
advantage of this, Rizal entered into a correspondence
with the new official, and after voluntarily making some
promises as to his future political conduct, he sought
leave to return to Manila on the ground that he intended
to start a Filipino colony in North Borneo, part of which
island was claimed by Spain. When at length he obtain-
ed Despujols' permission, he returned to Manila, bring-

(5) The Rizal family were tenants of the Dominicans and held
a large tract of land at Calamba under a very favourable lease
from that order.

i6

122

ing with him a considerable quantity of imflammatory
and revolutionary literature in the form of proclamations,
manifestos, and the like, issued by the revolutionary
junta of Hong Kong.

As Rizal was well aware that his own baggage would
be rigorously searched at the Manila custom- house, he
put the documents in question into the trunks of his
sister, who was accompanying him on his return from
Hong Kong, where he had been residing since the Calam-
ba troubles. Possibly he thought that the trunks of his
sister might slip through the custom-house while his
were being examined, or that they might not be as thor-
oughly searched as his own, or if they were and the
compromising documents were discovered, that her sex
would ensure her more lenient treatment than he would
be likely to receive. Be this as it may, the documents
were discovered. His sister was not molested because
she was a woman. Neither was he, as he had Despu-
jols' safe conduct. But the papers were seized and sent
to the Governor General, who placed the responsibility
for their introduction into the islands where it properly
belonged.

Three days after Rizal's arrival in Manila, in May,
1892, he organized, or rather started to organize, the
"Liga Filipina", which immediately proceeded to propa-
gate revolutionary doctrines, as described „in the pre-
ceding paper. This disgusted Despojols, who became
convinced that the Borneo scheme was merely a pretext
on Rizal's part to be allowed to return to Manila, and an
endeavor to hoodwink the government, his real aim.
being to carry on further political agitation. In July of
the same year, Despujols sent for Rizal and in a person-
al interview taxed him with his duplicity and with the
introduction of revolutionary literature into the country.
Rizal denied any knowledge of the whole business, es-
pecially the introduction of the revolutionary literature;
but when Dispujols confronted him with the documents
themselves, he, in the endeavor to exculpate himself,

123

laid the blame on his sister. On the following day, July
7th, 1892, the Governor General promulgated the order
banishing him to Dapitan in the island of Mindanao..
Doroteo Cortez and Ambrosio Salvador, who had as-
sisted Rizal in organizing the "Liga", were banished
about the same time to the province of La Union.

In reference to the cause of Rizal 's banish ment, it
has been stated that the manifestoes and other papers
found in his baggage, or rather in that of his sister, were
placed there by the secret police. But those responsi-
ble for this statement give no authority in support
of it. Taking Despujols' well known liberality and
generosity of character into consideration, as well as
the fact that he, like Rizal, was a mason, and that he
was also known to be a strong Filipino sympathizer, it
seems hardly probable that he would have been a party
to any such proceeding or would have acted as he did on
any such mock evidence. It is also hard to believe that
in the face of Despujols' safe conduct to Rizal, the police
would have manufactured such evidence of their own
motion.

Rizal, who in any other country or under any other
circumstances would hardly have reached mediocrity,
was nevertheless the most brilliant man among all his '
revolutionary associates. In fact he was the only one
among them who was out of the rut of ordinary, every-
day, second-rate lawyers and doctors, who, notwithstand-
ing their academic titles, had hardly a local reputation
in their respective professions. In spite of the personal
timidity he had displayed in escaping from the islands
as soon as the Calamba and Santa Rosa troubles became
menacing, he was still looked up to by them, individual-
ly as well as collectively, and by the revolutionary so-
cieties they represented.

The next four years up to August, 1896, so far as
demonstrations, disturbances, or outbreaks were concern-
ed, were comparatively quiet. The members of the
"Liga Pilipina" however, and of the other societies that

124

were affiliated to or grew out of the ' ' Progresista move-
ment", were busily at work organizing the forthcoming
rebellion, enrolling men, and procuring money, arms and
ammunition. During that time, indeed, they got a fair
amount of all of these together.

In these same four years, Rizal, who ostensibly held
aloof from politics, had nevertheless received numerous
visits at Dapitan from members and representatives of
the various political and secret societies. Among these
was one made in 1896, by Pio Valenzuela and Andres
Bonifacio of the "Katipunan", to sound him on the sub-
ject of an uprising. Prom the position or part he had
taken in the troubles raised by the tenants on the Do-
minican estates at Calamba and Santa Rosa, he had be-
come more than a mere favorite with the "Progresistas"
generally, but more especially with what might be call-
ed the agrarian party, composed of tenants and others
who were anxious to become possessed of the friar
lands and others. Consequently his word was likely to
carry the greatest weight with all parties opposed to the
existing order of things as represented by the Spanish
goverment, and any advice he gave was more than likely
toby followed.

On the return of Valenzuela and Bonifacio from
Dapitan, the latter gave out that Rizal was in favor of
an immediate uprising. On the other hand, Valenzuela
reported that while in principle Rizal approved of an
uprising in itself, he did not deem the time ripe for it.
He therefore counselled waiting two years before making
any open movement. This statement of Valenzuela was
confirmed some months later by Rizal himself before the
court-martial that condemned him to death.

Prom Rizal's character, as shown by his former
actions in avoiding personal responsibility, it is very
possible that he had authorized both Bonifacio and Va-
lenzuela to make the statements they did, the former in
order not to allow the enthusiasm of the "Katipunan"
to cool down and the latter to serve as a screen behind

125

■which to protect himself from the charge of complicity
■with the conspirators, in case their movement should not
be a success. Just ■why he should have fixed on a delay
of two years is hard to say. There -was then, so far as
was publicly known, no positive indication of a rupture
eventually to take place between Spain. and the United
States over the Cuban or any other question. He may
possibly have had some means that the general public
did not have of forecasting future events (6), and his
endeavor to go to Cuba a few weeks after his statement
to Valenzuela, would seem to lend color to this theory.
But be this as it may, had the latter course been taken
and the "Katipunan" rebellion been put off for two
years, Spain would have been unable to resist and crush
it as far as she did, the complete independence of the
Philippines might have been an accomplished fact, and
American intervention, in the form that it eventually
assumed, might never have taken place in the Archi-
pelago.

A short time later, in August of 1896, Rizal, with
the characterestic prudence displayed on former occas-
ions in leaving the islands whenever the disturbances
raised by his associates threatened to become serious,
had started, via Spain, ostensibly for Cuba, having pre-
viously applied for and obtained permission from the
Spanish authorities in the Philippines to go to that
island as a surgeon in the Spanish military service.
Just how much sincerity there was in this step on his
part is hard to say. But coupled with his starting a
political revolutionary society, the "Liga Filipina", in-
stead of the Tagalog colony in Borneo, for which purpose
he had been allowed to return to the Philippines in 1892,
his arrival in Manila at the very time of the breaking
out of the "Katipunan" rebellion would seem to have
been more than a mere accident or coincidence.

Prom what Foreman says, the then Governor Gen-

(6) The triumph of the Republican party and the interven-
tion of the United States in Spanish colonial affairs in 1897-8.

126

eral, Blanco, had so implicit a confidence in Rizal's sin-
cerity, that he went to the extent of furnishing him
with letters of introduction and recommendation to the
Spanish ministers of War and of the Colonies. This
confidence must later have been seriously shaken. It
A^as during Blanco's administration that the request
for his arrest and return to the Philippines was ca-
bled for Manila to Barcelona. From this Blanco seems
in this matter to have had with Rizal an experience
somewhat similar to that which Despujols had had
some four years previous. When Rizal was returned
to Manila, Blanco was still in power (7) and, in his
capacity as Governor General, could have liberated
him if innocent or could have pardoned him, if he be-
lieved him only technically guilty. Inasmuch as he
did neither of these, he must have had very strong rea-
sons to believe that Rizal had deceived him as to his
real motives in leaving Daipitan for Manila just as he
had deceived Despujols in returning to Manila from
Hong Kong. Be that as it may, Blanco unhesitatingly
turned him over to his successor, Polavieja, who sent
him before a court-martial. He was tried, found guilty,
and condemned to death, and he was shot on December
30th, 1896.

Polavieja has been severely criticized for this, but
in the face of the sentence of the court, he had no alter-
native but to confirm its finding. This was the more
imperative as the country was then ablaze with rebellion.
Rizal was the most dangerous man to the Spanish
authority in the Philippines.

Ill

To return to the chronological order of events, as
early as July 5,' 1896, a lieutenant of the "Guardia Civil"

(7) Blanco was relieved from duty in Manila and sailed for
Spain In the latter part of December, 1896. Rizal was shot on De-
cember 30th of the same year.

127

reported to the Governor General, in writing, the exis-
tence of a revolutionary conspiracy. He also stated
that there were some 15,000 men affiliated to it in the
valley of the Pasig alone. But nothing was done by
Blanco until a month later. On August 6th, he convened
the "Council of Authorities", but he adjourned it again
on the following day without taking any action in the
matter. On the same day, the governor of the province
of Batangas telegraphed to Manila that arms, ammuni-
tion, and revolutionary flags had been discovered at
Taal.

When eventually the storm did burst, Blanco, to say
the least, was weak and undecided in his measures.
Neither as a statesman nor as a soldier did he rise to
the occasion, appreciate the situation, or realize its dan"
ger. If he did realize it, he took no steps to ward it off.

In testimony given before the Philippine Commission
August 12th, 1899, Benito Legarda states, in substance,
that the friars, through Andres Bonifacio, brought
about the rebellion of 1896. Like Foreman in reference
to the Cavite revolt of 1872, in endeavoring to prove too
much he proves nothing at all. His bald and unsupport-
ed statement that Andres Bonifacio was an agent of the
friars and used as such by them, is practically an asser-
tion that Jose Rizal, Emilio Aguinaldo, Eugenio Silves-
tre, Modesto Sarmiento, and Sancho Valenzuela, all of
whom were more or less closely associated with Andres
Bonifacio and were, according to their own showing, ac-
tively connected with the uprising of August, 1896, were
also agents of the friars. In other words, they were
what in police parlance are known as "stool pigeons"
or provocative agents. But as all of them, with the ex-
ception of Aguinaldo, paid for their part in this uprising
with their lives, such a theory is hardly tenable.

On August 19th, the parish priest of Tondo, Father
Mariano Gil of the Augustinian Order, discovered and
reported to the police authorities of his parish the exis-
tence of a revolutionary society. A search was immedi-

128
ately instituted. Proclamations and other documents as
well ^sthe lithographic stones from which they had been,
printed, were found and seized, and some twenty two
arrests were made. That night Blanco was forced to
take action. On August 21st, he cabled to Spain that a
vast organization with antinational tendencies had been
unearthed and brought to light.

The events which took place on the night of and the
day following Father Mariano's discovery, alarmed the
members of the "Katipunan" in Manila. All who -could'
do so fled from the city. On August 26th, a strong
force of them attacked the suburb of Caloocan, (8) but
were held in check by the detachment of the "Guardia
Civil" at that place, until the arrival of reinforcements
from Manila. Then they retreated and disappeared in
the direction of the Pasig River.

On August 30, 1896, which day, as it later trans-
pired, was the date set for the simultaneous uprising of
the "Katipunan" throughout the islands, the rebels again
concentrated about two miles from Manila at San Juan
del Monte. They seized the pumping station at Santo-
Ian, which supplied Manila with drinking water, and
proceeded to attack the powder magazine, near the
bridge over the San Juan river, which was occupied by
a detachment of artillery. A sergeant of this detach-
ment was killed and several privates wounded, but the
detachment was able to hold its own till reinforced by

(8) Horace L. Higgins in a statement before the Philippine
Commission, July 19th, 1899, says in reference to the rebellion of
1896, that "it was a put-up job by the priests. The priests got up
the fight at Caloocan''. In the ''Resena Veridica de la revolucion
Filipina" by Emilio Aguinaldo, he states that the first fight took
place at Balintauac, a district of the township of Caloocan, and
was started by the Katipuneros under the auspices of the Katipu-
nan. As Aguinaldo had a grest deal to do with that rebellion, not
only as a leading Katipunero but also later as President of the
Filipina republic, it is fair to assume that his knowledge of the
real origin of the rebellion was more extensive and more accurate
than that of Mr. Higg'ins.

129

troops from Manila, on whose arrival the first engage-
ment of the rebellion was fought.

The rebels under the command of Sancho Valen-
zuela (9), a rich rope maker, made a stubborn resistance,
but were beaten with considerable loss. Valenzuela, who
had commanded his men from the window of a house,
and three other leaders named Eugenio Silvestre, Mo-
desto Sarmiento, and Roman Peralta (10), were captured.
Of these Valenzuelo was the only person of any impor-
tance.

The defeated rebels sought safety in flight and made
for the Pasig river. There, however, they were met by
the fire of the gunboats and driven back. They then had
some close-quarter fighting with the regular troops that
had pursued them on the right bank. A number man-
aged to get into boats and canoes, with the intention of
reaching the "Laguna de Bay", but the "Guardia Civil",
stationed on the left bank of the Pasig, fired into them
and in the confusion most of the boats were upset. The
rebel loss in this fight was some two hundred killed.

The same day, August 30, martial law was pro-
claimed in Manila, and a court-martial was convened for
the trial of the captured prisoners. Pour days later.
September 14th, Valenzuela and his three companions
were shot on the "Bagumbayan", or "Paseo de la Lu-
neta", just outside of the walls of Manila.

Up the Pasig river the rebellion spread rapidly or,
to speak more correctly, the outbreaks took place very
much as they had been planned. At the town of Pasig,
a thousand rebels attacked the detachment of the "Guar-
dia Civil" stationed there, and forced it and the parish

•

(9) Sancho Valenzuela must not be confounded with Pio Va-
lenzuela, who was the Medical officer of the "Katipunan" and one
of the principal witnesses against Rizal and others in the trials
for sedition, rebellion, etc. that followed.

(10) Sarmiento, Silvestre, and Peralta had all of them been
members of the "Liga Pilipina", started some four years pre-
viously by Rizal.

17

130

priest to take refuge in the tower of the church. At
Pandacan, a suburb of Manila, a strong body of armed
natives attacked the village, pillaged the church and
rectory, drove the parish priest into the church tower,
and murdered a Spanish artilleryman. Assistance was
sent at once and the rebels were driven out with con.
siderable loss. In this action, a Spanish sergeant was
killed and several privates were wounded.

The Governor General still remained inactive.
Though the attacks of the rebels on Las Pifias and Bina-
cayan had been repulsed, his inactivity had allowed
Aguinaldo and Andres Bonifacio to organize the rebel-
lion in the province of Cavite, with headquarters at
Silang. Aguinaldo had issued a rambling proclamation,
publishing it simultaneously at Cavite Viejo, his own
home, Noveleta, and San Francisco de Malabon. It
amounted to nothing more, however, than a general ex-
hortation to the people to rise and take up arms against
the Spaniards. During Blanco's inactivity, Aguinaldo
had assembled his forces at San Francisco de Malabon
and commenced his attack upon Imus.

The town of Imus itself was nothing more than the
usual collection of bamboo and nipa houses that had
grown up around the estate house, belonging to the Re-
coleto fathers. This house was a strong building in an
enclosure surrounded by massive walls. As some seven-
teen of the fathers had taken refuge there, Imus had a
double object for the rebels. They wished first to secure
the place for use as a fortress, and secondly they desired
to capture the priests.

The place was taken by Aguinaldo after a siege that
lasted long enough to have allowed Blanco to disperse
the attacking forces, had he been minded to do so. At
least he could have thrown a sufficient gari-ison into the
place to enable it to offer an effective resistance until
the arrival of the reinforcements daily expected from
Spain. He merely remained on the defensive, however,
contenting himself with repulsing the attacks made by

131
the rebels on Las Pinas and Binacayan, and abandoning
Imus and its garrison to its fate. This on Blanco's part
was a political as well as a strategical mistake. In the
first place, it gave Aguinaldo the prestige of an early
success, and in the second, it allowed him to devote the
forces he had assembled for the siege to other purposes
as soon as the place had been captured.

When Imus fell at last, the captured priests were
treated most barbarously. Some were hacked to pieces
piecemeal, others were saturated with coal oil and then
set on fire. One was impaled on a bamboo, basted with
oil, and roasted alive over a slow fire. Pour of the sev-
enteen escaped (11).

In the other parts of Luzon, wherever they were
found, Spaniards and Creoles were treated most inhu-
manly and received no quarter from the rebels, above
all during the inactive governorship of the weak-kneed
Blanco. At Mariquina, a Mestizo and a Creole, who
were out taking photographs, were pursued by a
party of insurgents and took refuge in a house. One
of them was shot as he attempted to escape. The
house was then set on fire, burning the other alive. At
Naic, the lieutenant of the "Guardia Civil" was killed
and his wife and daughter captured. The daughter, a
child eleven years old, was ravished to death before her
mother's eyes. While a pit was being dug by the cap-
tors to bury the mother alive, she was rescued and es-
caped to Manila on the launch "Mariposa", brought
from that place to Naic by two Augustinians. When
she arrived at Manila she was a raving maniac.

The insurrection was now well under way in Cavite.
The insurgents possessed themselves of nearly all the
towns of that province and finally established themselves
in them. The country, cut up by deep ravines with riv-

(11) This account of the treatment of the Recoleto fathers is
taken almost verbatim from "The Philippine Islands" by J. M.
Foreman, edition of 1899.

132

ers running at the bottom of them, was an excessively
difficult one for the operations of troops. As these ra-
vines and the ridges separating them were parallel to
one another, they offered excellent positions for defense.
These natural fastnesses had been skilfully improved by
the insurgents and a line of defence was drawn across
the country at right angles from Noveleta to Imus.
These defences were further strengthened by throwing
up strong intrenchments and breastworks, especially in
front of the towns.

Up to the month of September, Blanco's dispatches
and communications to the Spanish government had
been misleading and contradictory. At length, after
much vacillation, he cabled to Spain for reinforcements
and from October 1st, these kept coming in steadily.

The rebellion had now spread to Nueva Bcija, where
the governor and other Europeans were forced to shut
themselves up in the government house. They would
undoubtedly have met the same fate as the prisoners
taken at Imus, but for the timely arrival of troops from
Manila, who dispersed the rebels with heavy loss.

Blanco, from the beginning of the rebellion, had
shown an astonishing lack of ordinary intelligence,
energy, and ability in endeavoring to cope with it.
Many persons, indeed, went so far as to say that he had
knowingly allowed himself to be hoodwinked by the
leaders of this movement (12), many of whom were, like
himself, masons, and that they had made use of this fact
to deceive him as to their real motives and ulterior in-
tentions, making him believe that this movement was
directed against the religious orders only and not against
Spain as a whole. Consequently when he awoke to the
reality of the situation, it was too late to take preventive

(12) General Blanco was believed to have tolerated the Kati-
punan. Pee statement of Pardo de Tavera before Philippine Com-
mission August 23rd, 1899.

133

measures (IB). Towards the end of December, 1896, he
was recalled and General Polavieja, who had been sent
from Spain to relieve him, took over the command of
the Philippines.

Polavieja, apart from having a large force of Spanish
troops at his command, was a man of considerable in-
telligence and energy. Being hampered by neither the
credulity of Despujols nor the indecision of Blanco, he
took in the situation at a glance. By acting with
promptness and decision, he very soon forced the leaders-
of the rebellion to concentrate their forces in Cavite and
to devote their entire efforts to maintaining themselves
in that province.

During the Polavieja administration, the only trouble
in the city of Manila itself was on February 25, 1897, on
which date there was a mutiny of the "Carabineros," or
Custom House Guards, at the office of the Captain of the
Port. The officer and sergeant on duty were shot by
the mutineers, who made off with some arms and ammu-
nition. They were pursued through the suburbs of Tondo
as far as the San Lazaro Hospital, and such of them as
were not killed, escaped and joined the rebels.

In the course of the next five months, the towns
held by the rebels and the works that protected them,
were stormed and captured, and the forces of the insur-

(13) Blanco seem to have been Spain's evil genius, not only in
the Philippines but in Cuba also. To this latter colony he was
sent as governor by the Sagasta ministry in spite of his miserable
management in the Philippines, where by his weakness or credu-
lity he had allowed the Katipunan rebellion to gain the headway
it did. His administration in Cuba was characterized by the same
lack of energy he had shown in the Philippines. It was during
his administration that the order to Admiral Cervera to leave the
harbor of Santiago de Cuba was given, thereby not only dooming
the squadron under that officer to certain destruction by the com-
bined forces of Admirals Schley and Sampson, but also materially
weakening the land defences of Santiago itself by the withdrawal
of the sailors and machine guns belonging to the. ships that had
been disembarked to assist in its defense.

134

rection were reduced to wandering bands. How this was
accomplished is fully described by Lieutenant Colonel
Don Pederico de Monteverde in his book "La Division
Lachambre". This paper," however, is not the place to go
into the minute details of all such events, with whose
logical relations and sequence, or with whose real na-
ture and significance it is rather concerned.

Though the mass of the rebels were armed princi-
pally with "bolos" and pikes, they were also fairly well
supplied with fire arms of one kind or another. Towards
the end of the operations, they even had several modern,
eight centimetre, rifled field pieces, though just how
these were obtained is not clear.

In a remarkably short time Polavieja accomplished
the end for which he had been sent to the Philippines,
namely breaking the neck of the rebellion. In doing
this he was as unrelenting in hunting out and punishing
conspirators in the towns as he was energetic in attack-
ing the armed forces they maintained in the field. His
administration has been criticized as being unnecessarily
severe in dealing with those who, without actually taking
an active f)art in it as combatants, sympathized with
and supported the rebellion.

While this criticism of his severity may be just in
one sense, on the other hand it must be admitted that
Polavieja's policy was logical and consistent. He recog-
nized the fact that not less but rather more, was to be
feared from the rebels who remained at home than from
those who went into the field, and that the surest way to
overcome the latter was to strike terror into the former.

After having broken up all organized resistance in
the province of Cavite, Polavieja proposed to turn his
attention to the northern provinces. To this end he
cabled to Spain for more troops in order to enable him
to garrison and hold the towns from which he had driven
out the rebels. These reinforcements were refused on
the ground that Spain, in order to face her necessities
in Cuba, was drained of every man she could spare.

135

On April 12th, 1897, Lachambre's division, after
having finished its work in Cavite, v^as brolcen up. The
troops that had composed it were used as garrisons for
that and neighboring provinces. On April 17th, Pola-
vieja resigned and left for Spain, alleging ill health as
his plea. He was succeeded by General Fernando Primo
de Rivera, who already had been Governor General of
the islands from 1880 to 1883. As soon as he had re-
lieved Polavieja of his command, he went to the front in
Cavite and finished up the little work that had been left
undone in that province by bis predecessor. Aguinaldo
and the remnants of the organized rebel forces were
finally driven out and took refuge in the hollow of Biac-
na-Bato, amid the mountain fastnesses of Angat in the
province of Bulacan, while Tinlo and others operated in
Ilocos and other northern provinces of Luzon.

General Primo de Rivera was not very anxious to
make terms with the rebel leaders. Their field forces
were beaten and the reduction of their stronghold would
only have involved a question of time. But like his pre-
decessor, Polavieja, he was hampered by an insufficiency
of troops. The Sagasta ministry was anxious for peace
hi the Philippines at any price. Primero de Rivera, there-
fore, entered into a negotiation which was proposed by
Aguinaldo and the other revolutionary leaders. He em-
ployed Pedro A. Paterno, who had offered to act as his
agent. The outcome of this negotiation was that on De-
cember 14th, 1897, Aguinaldo and his companions agreed,
on condition of receiving a certain sum of money for
themselves and an indemnity to reimburse njembers of
certain families for losses sustained by them in this in-
surrection, to withdraw from the Philippines and en-
gaged to refrain from further agitation against Spanish
authority. Pedro A. Paterno was the representative of
the Spanish Governor General, while Aguinaldo conduct-
ed the negotiation for himself and the other insurgent
leaders. They had the advantage of Paterno's advice
though, for as a matter of fact he was "carrying water

136

on both shoulders," working in the interest ofAgui-
naldo as much as, if not more than, in that of Primo de
Ri/era (14).

Indeed it has been asserted that Paterno, by exagger-
ating the strength and resources of the revolutionists
to the Spanish authorities and that of the Spaniards to
Aguinaldo, was enabled to his own advantage (15) to
make his services to both parties appear more valuable
than they really were. Ih fact he practically betrayed
both parties, each of which trusted him.

Precisely, how and with whom the idea of the nego-
tiation culminanting in the Biac-na-Bato agreement origi-
nated, is hard to determine. But it seems a matter of
some certainty that it originated with the rebels,
probably in the patriotic Junta at Hong Kong, which
was possibly inspired by its advisers, Consul General
Wildman of Hong Kong and the American Consul Wil-
liams, of Manila. Be this as it may, it was a master
stroke of policy that almost amounted to diplomacy in
taking advantage of the following facts:

President McKinley had been elected by the Repub-
lican party in 1896 and was inaugurated on March 4th,
1897. The members of that party known as "Jingoes",
demanded a vigorous foreign policy. The only country
against which such a policy could be carried out with a
maximum chance of success and a minimum fatality of
consequences in the improbable event of failure, was
Spain.

On her part Spain had endeavored by every means
in her power, short of surrendering the island of Cuba
to the Cuban rebels, to comply with the demands of the
United States. As that was a length to which she could
hardly be expected to go without a struggle, howevei"
hopeless, war was inevitable, and though Spain might

(14) See "Resena verldica de la revoluoi6n Filipina" by Emilio
Aguinaldo.

(15) See statement of Pardo de Tavera before Philippine Com-
mission August 23rd, 1899.

137

hope against hope, it is doubtful if any purely diplomatic
measures could have averted war.

A large number of the politicians and general public
of the United States were not averse to war, above all
as it promised an easy and certain victory. This was
not only flattering to the national vanity, but also held
out great possibilities in the way of expansion and an
^.cquisition of territory. The business men, merchants,
and manufacturers were also in favor of a war. They
were bound to reap rich harvests from the demands for
supplies that were sure to be made on them by the
government. "War with Spain or any other country was
naturally also a very popular measure with the Army
and Navy. It would insure an increase of both services,
to say nothing of the consequent promotion of their
members.

The sending of Admiral, then Comgiodore, Dewey
to command the Asiatic Squadron in the fall of 1897,
which according to Mr. Roosevelt "was not a mere ac-
cident", showed that the United States was preparing
for war (16). Moreover as early as November 3rd, 1897,
before the agreement of Biac-na-Bato was come to, the'
United States Consul General at Hong Kong called the
attention of the State Department at Washington to the
proposal of Aguinaldo's agent with the Hong Kong Pili-
pina Junta, for an alliance between the Pilipina Republic
and the United States, in view of the possible war be-
tween that country and Spain (17).

All these facts indicated to the revolutionists that
the advantages to be derived from some such arrange-
ment as the Biac-na-Bato agreement, by which they
would gain both time and money, were far and away
superior to any that could be derived from the continua*

(16) See article by Mr. Roosvelt in "McClure's Magazine",
October 1899.

(17) See letter of Consul General Wildman dated November
;!rd, 1897 in which he treats the subject of a Filipino republic
seriously. Senate Document 62., part 2., 55th Congress.

i8

138

tion of open hostilities. They were indeed greatly lack-
ing in both these elements.

The "Junta Patriotica" at Hong Kong and the rebel
leaders undoubtedly took all the foregoing into consider-
ation in making their forecast of the future. The
result of this forecast was that, no matter what diplo-
matic steps Spain might make to avert it, an immediate
war between the United States and that country was a
certainty.

The general tendency of the agreement of Biac-na-
Bato and the reasons for' entering into it by him, were
explained by General Primo de Rivera to the Madrid
Government in his telegram of December 12th, 1897.
His action was approved by Praxedes Sagasta, the then
Prime Minister, by telegram also, on December 13th of
the same year. The first of these two despatches (18)
gives an outline of what the agreement amounted to,
and shows that the proposals for it came originally from
the insurgents.

The revolutionary leaders agreed that on condition
they received 1,200,000 pesos, they were to deliver up to
the Spanish authorities all arms and ammunition in the
hands of the rebels, to evacuate such places as they
held, and to refrain from all armed action for three years.
It is more than doubtful if they ever even intended to
comply with the first or second of these conditions, and
it is a matter of public notoriety that once out of the
islands and safe .under British protection in Hong Kong,
they never made even a pretence of complying with the
third.

The rebel leaders alleged later that besides the
agreement of the treaty, there were certain other verbal
promises made by Primo de Rivera relative to the relig-
ious orders. These they said were never carried out,
and, therefore, they on their part were absolved from
their engagements. The Spanish authorities deny the

(18) See "Gaoeta Oficial" Madrid, December 16th, 1897.

139

existence of any agreement beyond that the rebel lead-
ers were to leave the country, deliver up their arms,
and refrain from further agitation. As the leaders of
the rebellion never made the details of the agreement
public, which they would naturally have done in support
of their allegations, had they been true, it is very prob-
able that no such verbal promises were ever made. The
Spanish government, therefore, violated no pledges giv-
en in the agreement of Biac-na-Bato. So far as it was
concerned, all the terms of the agreement were fulfilled
on payment to the Filipinos of the 1,200,000 pesos, 400,000
of which was to be paid to the revolutionary leaders on
their arrival at Hong Kong, and 400,000 to the chiefs
who remained in the islands on the delivery to the
Spanish authorities of the arms in the hands of their fol-
lowers. There was also 400,000 pesos paid to Aguinaldo
on the spot, and it was to have been used as an indemnity
to such revolutionists as had suffered in pei-son or prop-
erty and to the families of such revolutionists as had
been killed during the war. That is said to have been
added by Aguinaldo to the P400,000 paid him in Hong
Kong and given to the "war fund".

Of the 400,000 pesos left for the leaders remaining
in the islands, some was paid to them and some was used
by the Spanish authorities in purchasing their arms
from the small bands that appeared in the islands after
Aguinaldo's departure. It is also said that both Primo
de Rivera and Pedro A. Paterno got some of it (19).

The part of the indemnity to be paid to Aguinaldo
and his immediate companions who left the islands with
him, was taken to Hong Kong, to which place the rebel
leaders had decided to retire. A prominent English
merchantof Manila accompanied them as a neutral guar-
antee for the carrying out of that part of the Spanish
promise, and he deposited the sum in the Hong Kong and
Shanghai Bank subject to Aguinaldo's order.

(19) See testimony of Benito Legarda before Philippine Com-
mistion Aug'ust 12th, 1899.

140

On December 27th, 1897, Aguinaldo and some thirty
four of his companions embarked for Hong Kong under
the escort of a Spanish officer, a relative of. General
Primo de Rivera. From all accounts, it appears that
after their arrival at that place they lived very quietly
on their own resources. Instead of dividing the money
they had received from General Primo de Rivera among
themselves, or paying the indemnity to the families that
had suffered, they turned the whole sum into a War
Fund for future use.

Even before Aguinaldo and his staff left the Philip-
pines, there was considerable bickering among the rebel
leaders as to the disposal and custody of these funds.
This went on in Hong Kong, where later Isabelo Arta-
cho held that the part of it intended for the indemnifica-
tion of the sufferers by the revolution should be applied
to that purpose, while Aguinaldo and others insisted
that it should be used for war purposes only. Artacho,
to obtain possession of part of the indemnity, proposed
to sue out a writ against Aguinaldo, who to avoid ser-
vice then fled to Singapore. The affair was eventually
settled by Artacho's withdrawing his action and leaving
Aguinaldo in possession of the funds.

At the time of the agreement of Biac-na-Bato, the
strength of the rebellion under Aguinaldo was very
nearly exhausted. Had Primo de Rivera applied force,
as he wished to do, to reduce their stronghold, instead of
entering into negotiations with the rebel leaders in com-
pliance with the Sagasta-Moret policy, there is no doubt
that the rebellion would have been crushed completely.
Aguinaldo, who was very well aware of this, therefore
decided temporarily to disband his forces, giving in-
structions, however, to a certain number of the Katipunan
leaders, to prepare to start the revolutionary movement
again in six months. During this time, in expectation
of the political reforms which he assured his followers
had been einbodied in the agreement, no one was to make
any movement. But to keep the revolution alive and at

141

the same time to throw dust into the eyes of the Spanish
authorities, the revolutionists adopted a system of local
Katipunan committees, which appeared to offer them
every guarantee of success in carrying out their object.

The most important of thes^ was the committee of
Central Luzon. At the outset it was a supreme assem-
bly in charge of the central provinces of that island.
This territory was formed into a species of district under
the command of Francisco Macabulos, who had organ-
ized it in February, 1898, very shortly after Primo
de Rivera had embarked for Spain. He was practically
the absolute ruler of this district, and while later he
toolf orders from Aguinaldo himself, he did not do so
from the ministry and generals of his government.

Before leaving the Philippines, the rebel leaders
had arranged for the continuance of the rebellion by the
"Katipunan", Through its operations and by means of
instructions and advices from the "Junta Patriotica de
Pilipinas" established in Hong Kong, the military chiefs
left behind in the Philippines were ready to co-operate
with Aguinaldo on his return to the islands on May 19th,
1898.

Ponciano Rizal, a brother of Dr. Jose Rizal, Pio del
Pilar, Francisco Macabulos y Soliman, and Miguel Mal-
var were the persons designated by Aguinaldo to remain
behind. Incompliance with the Biacna-Bato agreement,
they were ostensibly to surrender the arms in possession
of the insurgents to the Spanish authorities, but in
reality they were to organize the Katipunan Committees.

Towards the end of January, 1898, Francisco Maca-
bulos had surrendered to Colonel Don Miguel Primo de
Rivera and received twelve thousand pesos as an indem-
nity. General Primo de Rivera issued a proclamation
to the effect that none of the persons comprised in the
Biac-na-Bato agreement were to be interfered with or
molested by the Spanish Civil or Military authorities in
the Philippines. Of this Macabulos availed himself in
a singular manner a very few days after his surrender.

142

He started to reorganize his forces and increase their
number. Very shortly, some willingly and some unwil-
lingly, every one in the province of Tarlac was enrolled
in the "Katipunan". No one dared to interfere with
these people for fear of drawing down the ire of General
Primo de Rivera.

The policy of Primo de Rivera after the Biac-na-Bato
agreement, seems to have been one of conciliation and
of blind confidence in the good faith of the rebel leaders
and in the certainty of their fulfilling their part of the
agreement. Whether this policy originated with him
or was dictated by the Madrid Goverment, is a matter
of minor importance. But persuant to it, incredible as
it may seem, Primo de Rivera had already sent 7,000
men back to Spain and more were under orders to leave
for home. Its only practical result, however, was to
furnish the revolutionary leaders with money to carry
out their plans for the future. It also gave them time
in which to perfect details and to organize their forces
so as to be in readiness for Aguinaldo's expected return
to the islands under the auspices of the United States.

Under the actual orders of Macabulos, but ostensi-
bly under those of Aguinaldo, bands of Katipuneros
were meanwhile raiding the northern part of the prov-
ince of Zambales. There on the 6th and 7th of March,
1898, they attacked several places. Finally they went
by sea to Aringay and Santo Tomas, where they murder-
ed the parish priest and a peninsular Spaniard, SeQor
Leter, who was in command of the volunteers.

Batangas and La Laguna were under the manage-
ment of the Katipunero committees presided over by
Ponciano Rizal and Miguel Malvar. The first of these,
when he surrendered to General Monet at Calamba, turn- .
ed in only thirteen rifles. The second, who also sur-
rendered to Moret, turned in only some hundred and
fifty unserviceable rifles and a machine gun that had
been taken from the steam launch "Polavieja". In spite
of the fact that these two leaders received some 75,000

143
pesos distributed in variolas sums, according to rank, be-
tween themselves and those under their command (20),
they continued .canvassing in favor of the revolution.
In cases in which persuasion failed they employed open
or occult violence to bring about conviction and com-
pliance with their views.

The same tactics and depredations as those of Tarlac
and the north of Luzon, went on in the provinces of Ca-
vite. La Laguna, Batangas, and Bataan, under the direc-
tion of the brothers Emiliano and Mariano Riego de
Dios, who had their encampment at Looc, Batangas.
There they were allowed to remain armed and unmo-
lested, though they had neither surrendered nor turned
over the arms of their commands to the Spanish author-
ities. These brothers transmitted the orders which Ma-
riano Trias, who was working unceasingly in enrolling
men in the low country of Cavite, issued from that prov-
ince and Batangas, where a force of three hundred well
armed men was assembled (21).

While the organization of the future uprising was
thus being carried on in the Philippines by the "Katipu-
nan", Aguinaldo and his companions in Hong Kong were
not idle. This was especially the case between the' end
of 1897 and the earlier months of 1898 when the relations
between the United States and Spain were becoming
more strained every day, and there was every possibility
of a rupture between the two countries in the immediate
future. The "Junta Patriotica Filipina" at Hong Kong,
(of which organization the American Consul-General at
that place was the honorary treasurer), as well as such
rebel leaders as had not left the Philippines, took advan-
tage of this condition of affairs to keep alive the

(20) These distributions of money to the various rebel leaders,
over and above those cited for the damages suffered during the
war, amply accounted for the 400,000 pesos, which Aguinaldo asser-
ted had never been paid.

(21) See "Nuestra Prision" by R. P. Fray Ulpiano Herrero,
Manila, 1900; in which, pages 484 to 490, a more detailed account
is given.

144

spirit of hostilities against Spain. They encouraged
and maintained armed bands in the province of Ca-
vite, in Northern Luzon, and the island of Cebii.
The numbers and strength of these bands were very
much magnified bj' the rebel accounts, to give the move-
ment they purported to represent sufficient importance
to warrant an appeal for intervention to the represen-
tatives of the United States or other powers. On the
other hand, their significance was belittled by the Spanish
authorities, who referred to the roving Filipinos as
merely "Tulisanes", or brigands. In this way it was
thought that no importance would be attached to the
movement which the Filipino leaders alleged these
bands represented, and that the case would be seen to be
insufficiently serious to justify intervention on the part
of any foreign power.

Which of these two views was correct at that time
is still an open question. But there must have been con-
siderable organization on the part of the rebel leaders,
early in 1898, when, in spite of the agreement of Biac-
na-Bato, armed resistance broke out again. To speak
more correctly, this had really never ceased at all, for
between the end of December, 1897, and the beginning
of February, 1898, the track of the Manila-Dagupan
Railway had been torn up three times, because the
company would not decline to transport Spanish troops
on its trains. Over and above this small parties of
Spanish troops had been attacked in the provinces of
Pangasinan and Pampanga, and in some places they had
been driven out and their quarters had been pillaged
and burned. In spite of the optimistic views expressed
by the Spanish authorities, they considered these trou-
bles in the north so serious that General Monet and 4,000
regular troops were sent to disperse the rebels.

There is hardly room to doubt that all of these local
affairs were parts of a detailed plan elaborated between
the rebel leaders in Hong Kong and those remaining in
the Philippines. It can hardly be doubted, either, that

145

the "sinews of war" for all of these movements were in
a large measure derived from the very funds that Primo
de Rivera had turned over to Aguinaldo and his followers
both in the islands and at Hong Kong, as a consideration
for their refraining from hostilities against Spain.

The first indication of any general organized move-
ment on the part of the rebels was on March 24th, 1898,
when the "Visayas" regiment N9 74, that had rendered
such good service under Polavieja's administration in
putting down the insurrection in the previous year, re-
fused to march against the Cavite bands and went over
to the rebels in a body, taking with them their arms,
ammunition, and accoutrements. The next day this
desertion was followed by that of another native regiment.

On the morning of March 25th, what has been called
the tragedy of the Calle Camba occurred. .This affair,
according to an eye witness, originated in a house where
a number of Katipuneros had met together. A passer-by
was attracted by the large number of persons assembled,
and after listening to the proceedings for a short while
informed the police. The Guardia Civil at once raided
the place in order to break up the meeting, and as those
attending it refused to open the doors, force was used.
This precipitated ariot in which a number of persons, en-
deavoring to escape by way of the roof, as well as others
who joined them in the streets, were killed or arrested.

As this riot occurred immediately after the desertion
of the two regiments above referred to, and as many of
the persons taking part in it wore Katipunan uniforms
and insignia, there is every reason to believe that the
majority of those present were in collusion with the
deserting soldiers, and were attempting to start an up-
rising in Manila (22).

(22) As public assembly was not permitted by law in the Phil-
ippines, even in time of peace, such persons as took part in this
must have been aware of the grave consequences they were incur-
ring in attending a political meeting against the government just
as a new insurrection had broken out.

19

146

It is a significant fact that a few days later, a well
organized uprising took place in the island of Cebii.
It was put down, so far as the city of that name was
concerned, only after some severe street fighting. A
number of Spaniards and natives were killed. Pillaging
and the burning of a part of the city by the insurgents
resulted in a destruction of private property to the amount
of nearly two million pesos.

That these bands were numerous, organized, aad
fairly well armed was evident. The Spanish garrison,
some 150 men, were driven into the fort and forced to
remain there until the arrival of troops from Ilagan. It
was only when two batallions arrived, one Spanish and
the other native, that the rebels, after some further fight-
ing, were driven from the city and forced ,' to retire to
the country districts, from which it was impossible to
dislodge them.

Thus a new revolution was started, this time in the
Visayas, which, during all the disturbances previous to
the Biac-na-Bato convention, had been comparatively
quiet and fairly loyal to Spain. This proved that the
agreement entered into by the Filipino leaders with
Primo de Rivera, namely t6 refrain from hostilities
against the Spanish insular government, was from the
start intended to be a dead letter.

IV

By this time war between Spain and the United
States had become inevitable. It was only a question of
days as to when open hostilities would actually break
out. In view of this, the "Junta Patriotica Pilipina" at
Hong Kong, through its agents, had become very active
in presenting to several European governments memor-
anda, of which no notice was taken, begging for recog-
nition of the insurrection and intervention in its favor.
Its members in that city as well as the insurgent lead-
ers in arms in the Philippines, had become very

147
anxious to identify themselves with the United States,
and to cooperate with them in expelling the Span-
iards from the Archipelago. So great was this anxiety,
indeed, that the '"Junta Patriotica Filipina'' at Hong
Kong had offered the American Consul General at
that place the post of treasurer, which, as has already
been said, he had accepted. Therefore it is not strange
that the members of the "Junta" were led by his accep-
tance to believe that in this matter the Consul General
was acting with at least the tacit approval of the Wash-
ington authorities. They dbuld not conceive that in the
face of existing conditions, an official, occupying a quasi
diplomatic post, could so far divest himself of his official
status as to accept such a position, unless the country
he represented were a party to his action.

Prior to .Aguinaldo's departure from Hong Kong
and even prior to the declaration of war, which event
the "Junta Patriotica", assisted in all probability by its
American advisers in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Ma-
nila, had already discounted, the Junta had printed and
sent to the Philippines a manifesto of nearly four
thousand words, to be distributed among such persons
.in the archipelago as were known to sympathize with
the Katipunan revolt.

This document is replete with inaccuracies in refer-
ence to the terms of the Biac-na-Bato agreement. But
even admitting that what it alleged in reference to them
was so, the Spanish authorities could not have had time,
even under more jfavorable circumstances than those
then existing, to carry out the promises it asserted had
been made. In this particular the manifesto was both
childish and illogical. Its real end appears to have been
an attempt to justify the Filipino leaders in their failure
to refrain from hostilities, to surrender their arms, and
to comply with their part of the agreement. It next
proceeds to enumerate a list of "wants", in which a per-
fectly impossible form of government is outlined. It goes
on to "demand" a great many things that the Philippines

148

already had. It utters such complaints of wrongs that
any native, who had never felt that he had either a
complaint or a grievance against Spain or the Spaniards,
would on reading it imagine that he has just ground
for both.

This manifesto, after extolling the virtues, liberties,
rights, powers, and humanitarian views of the great
North American republic, proceeds to place the Filipino
people and revolutionary leaders under the protection
and guidance of the United States.

In the events that follQwed. it is worth bearing in
mind that the actions of the United States on the one
hand and of the revolutionary government on the other,,
were based on somewhat Delphic promises of the agents
and representatives of the former, and on positively
declared intentions of those of the latter; furthermore
that both promises and intentions, at the time they were
uttered, arose from a profound ignorance on the part of
either Filipinos or Americans of the conditions that gov-
erned the motives and actions of each other.

General Basilio Agustin arrived in the Philippines
on April 11th, 1898, to relieve General Fernando Prime
de Rivera as Governor General. On the twelfth of the
same month, Primo de Rivera, after turning over the
command of the islands to his successor, sailed for Spain.
Some ten days later, April 21st, the United States
declared war against Spain.

General Agustin was new to the country, unfamiliar
with the conditions, and unacquainted with the people.
He was moreover hampered with the Biac-na-Bato
agreement, made by his predecessor. For counselors
he had, on one hand, the Filipinos headed by Pedro
Paterno, most of them Katipuneros, and as such ready
to betray him at the first favorable opportunity. On
the other he could turn to the friars, Spanish officials,
and civilians, who while loyal enough to him and to Spain,
were strong ultraconservatives. Consequently the least
that can he said is that his counsels were divided.

149

Immediately after the naval battle of Cavite, Gen-
eral Augustin issued a decree, dated May 4th, creating
and convoking an "Asamblea Consultiva"' or Consulting
Assembly. This body was to deliberate and confer with
the Governor General, whenever he might deem it advisa-
ble to consult it. It was also empowered to propose to
the Governor General such measures as it deemed advi-
sable in the interests of the country and people, provi-
ded they did not conflict with existing laws.

The Governor General, or in his absence his official
representative, was exofficio its presiding officer. The
members, who were called "Councilors of Administra-
tion", were divided into ex-officio members and elective
members as follows: Ex-offlcio members were, the mem-
bers of "La Junta de las Autoridades", the General Chief
of the Staff, the Fiscal General or Judge Advocate of the
force, the Civil Governor of Manila, the Alcalde or Mayor
of Manila, one knight of the Grand Cross of a Spanish
order of knighthood, the President of the society of "The
Friends of the Country", and the President of the Manila
Chamber of Commerce. The elective members were
eventually to be elected from among persons of good
standing in their communities. But the first twenty
were appointed by the Governor General and their
names were as follows: Cayetano Arellano, Joaquin
Gonzales, Maximo Paterno, Trinidad Pardo de Ta-
vera, Baldomero Aguinaldo, Manuel Genato, Gregorio
Araneta, Juan Rodriguez, Bonifacio Arevalo, Isaac Fer-
nando Rios, Ariston Bautista, Jose Luna, Ricardo Este-
ban Barreto, Teodoro Gonzalez, Artemio Ricarte, Pan-
taleon Garcia, Pedro Serrano, Mariano Trias, Ambrosio
Bautista, and Jos6 Losada.

From the character of the persons composing both
ex-officio and elective members, it will be seen that all
classes of the community as well as all shades of polit-
ical opinion had a representalion in it.

This assembly, after agreeing on its rules and by-
laws, proceeded to draw up a project for an autonomous

150

government foi* the Philippines. Later, in the early
part of June, 1898, this was presented to Aguinaldo,
but he, having felt the growth of power through the
moral and material support of the American commander,
and placing full reliance on the intentions" of the United
States to establish the Filipinos in an independent gov-
ernment with himself at its head, very naturally rejected
all overtures from the Spanish authorities.

By the advice of this assembly and with a view to
increasing the Spanish forces, General Augustin decided
to organize a force of militia. To this end he issued a
circular calling for volunteeer§ to join it. Had he given
the management of his affairs over to his most inveter-
ate enemy, he could not have been better directed to his
own undoing than he was by his advisers in the selection
of officers to command this militia. In looking over
their names and comparing the position they held in the
insurgent army on August 13th of the same year, it
would almost afipear that Aguinaldo and his councilors
had appointed them.

The "Katipunan" had been so successful in throwing
dust into the eyes of the Spanish authorities that, when
this militia was formed, it was so arranged that only
high ranking Katipuneros were selected as officers of it.
The proof of this is that, among the field officers
appointed to the levies made in the immediate neighbor-
hood of Manila, were Pablo Padilla, Emiliano Riego
de Dios, Baldomero Aguinaldo, Mariano Trias, Artemio
Ricarte, Pio del Pilar, Mariano Luna, and others of
their class.

As soon as the circular, calling for volunteers for
this militia, was received in the provinces, large num-
bers under the auspices of the committees of the "Kati-
punan", presented themselves and clamored for arms.
The government, believing in their professions of loy-
alty to Spain and that they desired to serve against her
enemy, the United States, issued them and in the course
of a very few days had the mortification of seeing these

151
very arms used by the militiamen against the detach-
ments of Spanish peninsular troops that were scattered
over the country.

Aguinaldo, as yet in Hong Kong, and the "Junta
Patriotica" were endeavoring to comQ to some positive
understanding with the American authorities in China.
In reference to this, Aguinaldo states that as early as
the month of March, 1898, Commander Wood of the U. S.
S. "Petrel", at the suggestion of Admiral Dewey, re-
quested an interview with him, and that between March
16th and April 6th, 1908, he had several conferences with
this officer, to whom Aguinaldo suggested the expediency
of reducing to writing whatever agreement might be
come to. Commander Wood told him he would represent
the matter to the Admiral (23).

These interviews were interrupted by Aguinaldo's
leaving Hong Kong on April 7th, in consequence of the
legal action proposed by Artacho in reference to the
distribution of the Biac-na-Bato indemnity funds, and
going to Singapore, where he arrived on April 21st. On
the 22nd, he was sought by the American Consul Gen-
eral at that place, who told him he had been informed
of his presence there by Admiral Dewey, and also that
war had been declared between Spain and the United
States on the previous day. Aguinaldo asked what con-
cessions the United States was prepared to make and
again suggested that whatever was agreed to, be made a
matter of record. The Consul General answered that
he would telegraph Admiral Dewey about the matter.
On the following day he renewed the conference, saying
that in reference to Aguinaldo's desire. Admiral Dewey
had answered "that the United States would at least
riecognize the independence of the Philippines on the
basis of a naval protectorate: that there was no neces-
sity of putting 'this in writing, because the promises
of the Admiral and the American Consul General were

(23) Extracts from Resena veridica de la revoluci6n Filipina
by Etnilio Aguinaldo.

152

sacred and would be carried out, and that "they were
not like those of the Spaniards". The Admiral's answer
concluded with the statement that "the American Gov-
ernment is very honest, very just, and very rich" (24).

The Consul General and Admiral Dewey were very
anxious for Aguinaldo to proceed to the Philippines with
the understanding that he was to raise the country in
favor of Filipino independence- The Consul General told
Aguinaldo that he would telegraph to Admiral Dewey
what had been agreed to, in order that the Admiral
might assist him in the undertaking (25) •

Their last conference was on April 28th, the Consul
General informing him that he had received a telegram
from the Admiral requesting that Aguinaldo repair to
Hong Kong at once. On the 26th, he took leave of the
Consul General at Singapore. He was informed that he
would be met at the entrance of the Hong Kong harbor
by a launch from the American squadron to take him
privately on board. The Consul General asked Agui-
naldo to make him representative of the Filipino nation
at Washington, in order to bring about promptly the rec-
ognition of the Philippines by the United States (26).

On April 27th, Admiral Dewey sailed from Mirs Bay,
where he had been lying with his squadron, awaitingthe
declaration of war and the arrival of ammunition. He
left directions with the American Consul at Hong Kong,
however, that Aguinaldo was to follow him in an Amer-
ican ship of war

Jose Alejandrino, an insurgent leader, accompanied
Dewey on this expedition (27) with the object of ascer-
taining if Aguinaldo would be acceptable to the Filipino
insurgents as their chief. On his arrival he sounded

(24) Extract from "Resena veridioa de la revoluci6n Filipina"
by Emilio Aguinaldo.

(25) Ibid.

(26) Ibid.

(27) See letter of Consul General Wildman to Mr. Moore, State
Department, dated July 18th, 1898. Senate Document 62, p. 337.

153

them on this subject and, having been assured by them
that they would accept him, Admiral Dewey sent for
Aguinaldo and some two weeks later, May 19th, he ar-
rived on the United States despatch boat, "Hugh Mc-
CuUough", accompanied by some seventeen companions.

On arriving at Hong Kong in compliance with Ad-
miral Dewey's despatch to Consul General Wildman,
Aguinaldo found that the American squadron had already
sailed. Then, on the invitation of Consul General Wild-
man, he repaired to the American Consulate. They
remained in consultation from nine until eleven, and
made arrangements for the purchase of 2000 rifles,
200,000 cartridges, and a vessel to carry them to the
Philippines. A deposit of 200,000 pesos was made with
the 'Consul General and Teodoro Sandiko to pay for
them (28).

On May I7th, Aguinaldo was accompanied to the
dock by Consul General Wildman and embarked on the
"Hugh McCullough"', after having left 67,000 pesos more
with Mr. Wildman for a further purchase of arms.
This purchase, according to Aguinaldo, was never made
nor was the money ever returned. On May 19th, he
reached Cavite and Almiral Dewey sent his aide to
accompany him on board the flag ship, "Olympia", where
he -^as received with the honors of a General of Div-
ision (29).

After the usual courtesies, Aguinaldo asked the
Admiral if the telegrams sent by him to the American
Consul General at Singapore were authentic. To this
the Admiral answered in the affirmative, adding that
the United States had come to the Philippines to free
the inhabitants from the Spanish yoke, that the United
States was rich in territory and money and had no need
of colonies, and that he had no doubt the United
States would recognize Filipino independence. The

(28) Extract from "Resetia veridica de la revuluci6n Filipina"
by Aguinaldo.

(29) Ibid.

20

154

Admiral then asked Aguinaldo if he could raise the
country against Spain and carry on a rapid campaign (30).

Aguinaldo answered that he could do nothing until
the arrival of the arms ordered of Wildman, whereupon
the Admiral offered to send a vessel to expedite matters
and offered him all the cannon captured on the Spanish
ships, as well as the arms and ammunition captured by
the "Petrel" at Corregidor Island (31). The Admiral
thanked him for his frankness and said that the Amer-
icans and Filipinos should treat each other as friends
and allies and that, as he had already said, the United
States would recognize Filipino independence. He also
told Aguinaldo to devise a national flag and that he
would recognize and protect it (82). Admiral Dewey
then told Aguinaldo to go ashore and start his army. In
the course of a few hours, however, the latter came back
to the "Olympia" very much discouraged. But Dewey
wanted Aguinaldo's help, and so he urged him not to
give up his attempt (BS).

Aguinaldo, encouraged by his second interview with
Dewey, returned to Cavite Navy Yard and proceeded to
make his headquarters in the house of the Commandant
of the Yard. From that place he issued his first orders,
circulars, and proclamations. A few days later, when
Admiral Dewey wanted the Navy Yard for his own pur-
poses, Aguinaldo moved to the town of Cavite and
occupied the building that had formerly been the seat of
the Spanish Civil Government.

On May 20th, Luciano San Miguel had reported in
person to Aguinaldo, who gave him a circular for the
Katipunan Committees and instructions to raise the
provinces of Luzon. This circular, which changed the

(30) Ibid.

(31) Extract from "Resenaveridicade laRevoluci6n Filipina"
by Emilio Aguinaldo.

(32) Ibid.

(33) See Admiral Dewey's testimony before Senate Committee,
June 25th , 1902.

155

program of the insurgent leaders from that set forth in
the manifesto issued by the "Junta Patriotica" in Hong
Kong, appears never to have reached the hands of the
American authorities. The cause of this was probably
a desire on the part of the insurgents to get into a
stronger position than they were in, before making
their program known.

On May 24th, Aguinaldo issued a proclamation,
which in tone and language was unlike any of his for-
mer or subsequent public documents. There is strong
leason to believe that, if it was not dictated verbatim, it
was at least inspired or edited for him. In it he proclaim-
ed a dictatorship with himself ab the head. This proc-
lamation was followed by a decree as to the manner in
which the war should be carried on and was supplemen-
ted by another, in which he states that as the Spaniards
proposed to enter into negotiations with the insurgents
respecting an autonomous government, he forbids the
entertaining of any such proposals from them on pain
of death.

The arms ordered from Consul (general Wildman
arrived on the "Wing-foo", . a small steamer which had
been purchased by Aguinaldo in Hong Kong. This
shipment amounted to 2000 rifles and 200,000 cartridges.
These were unloaded at the Cavite Navy Yard and
turned over to Aguinaldo, who immediately proceeded
to have them distributed in the province. What became*
of the "Wing-foo" is not clear.

Admiral Dewey had already furnished Aguinaldo
with two field guns and ammunition for them; also with
500 rifles and 20,000 cartridges accompanied by certain
instructions and advice as to how they should be
employed. Admiral Dewey also handed over to the
insurgents a steam pinnace that had formerly belonged
to the Spanish man-of-war, "Reina Cristina", permitting
it to ply freely in the bay under the insurgent flag.
Admiral Dewey seemingly attached no importance to
this, and as he did not interfere, the insurgents finally

156

came to consider that their flag was practically recogniz-
ed, by the Americans at least, on the high seas.

During this time Aguinaldo had started what he
called a "navy". So far it consisted of the steam pin-
nace already referred to, the "Filipinas", and some other
unimportant vessels of which in one way or another the
insurgents had become possessed.

The first vessel of any importance to fly the insur-
gent flag was the Compania de Filipinas, which came
into the insurgent hands in a most discreditable manner.
This steamer was despatched from Manila by the Com-
pany to which she belonged, for ports of northern Luzon
on the 18th of April. War having been declared between
Spain and the United States before she left Aparri on
her return trip, her owners telegraphed instructions to
her captain to proceed to the nearest neutral port in
Formosa so as to be safe from capture by the United
States fleet. Several hours after leaving Aparri, the
native crew, led by the second engineer Vicente Catala,
a Cuban by birth, in accordance with a prearranged plan,
murdered all the Spanish officers on board, consisting
of the captain, first and second officers, and first en-
gineer. The steamer was then navigated to Manila by
her murderous crew and, flying the insurgent flag, she
passed under the guns of the United States men-of-war
and anchored in the bay of Cavite. That Admiral Dewey
•himself did not punish the criminals, or exact their
punishment from the insurgent leaders, was probably
due to the same reason as he gave for encouraging
Aguinaldo to make his attempt to start his Army.

That the "Filipinas", which according to inter-
national law was nothing more or less than a pirate, and
other vessels were allowed by Admiral Dewey to cruise
around Manila Bay and to proceed to other parts of the
islands under the Katipunero flag, was a source of no
small astonishment to officers of foreign vessels. Some
of these officers, in the course of a call on Admiral Dew-
ey, asked for information as to how vessels flying the

157

flag of the Filipino revolutionary government, were to be
treated. To this he replied: "There is no Filipino gov-
ernment, there is no Filipino fllag".

Since the landing of Aguinaldo, about May 20th, the
land operations of the insurgents were confined entirely
to isolated engagements between the Spanish and Fili-
pino forces. With the exception of the defeat and cap-
ture of General Pefia's command through the treachery
of Pio del Pilar at Zapote bridge, and the surrender of Bu-
lacan, Tarlac, Dagupan, and San Fernando, these opera-
tions consisted principally in cutting off the small Span-
ish detachments scattered, over the country, the cap-
ture and maltreatment of such of the friars as they could
lay their hands on, the plunder and destruction of Church
and Spanish property, and the land blockade of Manila.

The arrival of General Anderson's force in the last
days of June and the first of July not only set at rest
any uneasiness that Aguinaldo and his associates may
have had respecting a possible sortie of the Spanish
forces from Manila, but it also stimulated them to make
an attempt at some important coup that would off-
set the apparent inacti ^ity of the Katipunan forces in
the vicinity of Manila, as compared with those in Bula-
can and the northern provinces.

The nearest coup in sight was offered by the "Isla
Grande" in Subig Bay. To this place the insurgents had
forced such of the Spanish detachments in Zambales and
Bataan as could get there, and there also a number of
civilian employees, priests, women, and children had
taken refuge. The Spaniards, in order not to fall into
the hands of the Filipinos, had proceeded to fortify the
place as best they could; but without artillery, they
were unable to put it into a condition to offer even a
serious show of resistance, if attacked by any force •
that had artillery.

To effect the capture of this place and its garrison,
the steamer "Filipinas" was ordered by Aguinaldo to
proceed to Subig Bay. When she arrived there, she

158

found the German man-of-war, "Irene", whose comman.
der had already furnished the refugees with food and had
also offered take off the noncombatants, an offer that
had been accepted by the civilians, priests, and women.

The commander of the "Filipinas" objected to this,
but the captain of the "Irene" ordered him off, and as
his flag was not recognized, treated him as a pirate. In
the face of this, the "Filipinas" returned to Cavite and
reported to Aguinaldo that the "Irene" had prevented
the compliance with his orders. Aguinaldo reported the
matter to Admiral Dewey, who ordered the "Raleigh",
under the command of Captain Coghlan, to reduce "Isla
Grande" and the "Filipinas'^ accompanied him on this
expedition.

After Coghlan had fired a few shots at the Spanish
defences, the Spaniards asked for a parley and as a
result it was agreed that they would surrender. The
Spaniards, however, remembering the massacre of the
150 Macabebes who had been butchered in cold bood by
Aguinaldo's forces after the surrender of Samal, made
the express stipulation that they were to surrender as
prisoners to the Americans and not to the Filipinos.
This was agreed to by Coghlan, and by his order the
soldiers, civilians, priests, women, and children were
sent on board the "Filipinas", taken to Cavite, and turn-
ed over to Aguinaldo. Two Spanish officers who pro-
tested against this as contrary to the terms of the
surrender, were shot without any further ceremony (34)-

It would be hard to find words with which to qualify
the action of Admiral Dewey and Captain Coghlan in
this matter. Either the latter came to "Isla Grande",
with specific directions from the former as to how the
prisoners were to be treated, or he did not. In the

(34) This account of the affair was given to the writer by the
Filipino pilot who claims to have accompanied the expedition and
who still is in the employment of the U. S. government. It varies
in very few particulars from the' accounts of it given in the Amer-
ican press at the time.

159
former case, it is to be supposed tliat Captain Coghlan
carried out his instructions, even though he knowingly
agreed to the conditions of the surrender without mther
the power or the intention of keeping his agreement.
In the second case, that is supposing his hands were not
tied by specific orders, he made the same conditions with
the same intention of not adhering to them, and that
without being able to get behind the orders of his com-
mander. On the other hand, it is hardly credible that
Admiral Dewey would have reversed a solemn stipulation
made by his inferior, even though something similar had
happened in the case of the Spanish garrison of Corregi-
dor Island. These had surrendered to the "Raleigh" and
been brought to Cavite Navy Yard, but a day or so later
they were turned out by the ofl&cer of the day, in com-
pliance with an order from Admiral Dewey, and as a
matter of course fell into the hands of the insurgents in
the town of Cavite.

It has been stated as an excuse that had Admiral
Dewey adhered to the terms of the surrender of Subig,
he would have had no place to keep his prisoners nor
means of subsisting them. Granting this excuse to be
valid, it would seem that it would have been generous
to allow at least the noncombatants to avail themselves
of the offer of the "Irene", instead of turning them over
to the mercies of the Katipuneros. This method of dis-
posing of his prisoners by Admiral Dewey, furnished
Aguinaldo and his government further ground on which
to base a theory of an American alliance.

As a matter of fact, many of the prisoners captured
at "Isla Grande", after having suffered many privations
and cruelties at the hands of the Katipuneros, died mis-
erably in captivity, long after the treaty of peace be-
tween Spain and the United States was signed and
ratified.

The first uprising of the Katipuneros in obedience to
the instructions given, on May 20th, to Luciano San Mi-
guel, and the circular to the Katipunan Committees of

160

the same date, occured at Ori6n in Bataan on May 29th.
Virtually the same methods as those employed there in
puttftig these instructions into execution, were followed
in all the other towns around Manila and took effect
practically withip twenty four hours of one another.

During the night of May 27th, information was sent
to the officer commanding the detachment of Spanish
"Cazadores", or Riflemen, at Ori6n, that bands of insur-
gents were in the neighborhood and were preparing to
attack and plunder the town. Early in the morning of
the 29th, this detachment, consisting of some sixty men,
was divided into two parties. These were sent out to
scout the country, one to the north and one to the south
of Ori6n. Seven Cazadores, however, under command
of a corporal, were left to take charge of the town until
the expected return of the scouting parties some time
during the forenoon of the same day. The Katipuneros,
taking advantage of the absence of the troops, pro-
ceeded to rise and barricade the town, some of them
digging trenches across the streets and others attacking
the detachment returning from the north. The com-
mander of the latter, believing he was opposed by a much
larger force than was the case, instead of cutting his way
through them by a rush, endeavored to first disperse them
by repeated volleys. His ammunition was soon exhaust-
ed and as soon as the Katipuneros, who had hidden in
the bamboo thickets and who for the greater part were
armed only with "bolos" or lances, saw this, they, out-
numering the "Cazadores" a hundred to one, rushed the
detachment and made short work of it in a hand to hand
encounter. They killed every man excepting one who
escaped by hiding in the mud of a flooded rice field (35).

Armed with the rifles which Aguinaldo had received
from Admiral Dewey as well as those of the "Wing-
foo", the Katipuneros of the Cavite coast made similar

(35) A minute account of this affair as well as of the circum-
stances leading up to it,- will be found on pages 1 to 55 of "Nuestra
Prisioa" by R. P. Fray Ulpiano Herrero, Manila, 1900.

161

attacks on Bacoor, Cavite Viejo, and a place called "el
polvorin" with generally the same results.

The first and only engagement of any importance in
the neighborhood of Manila commenced at Paranaque.
There on the 28th, the natives had made a sham attack.
Pio del Pilar, in command of his Militiamen, under pre-
tence of foiling it, had rushed forward and siezed the
bridge over the Zapote river, which was the key of the
position. On the 30th, General Pena, believing that
Pilar held the bridge for him, advanced, but when his
column of some 2,700 men was massed on the road and
unable to deploy on account of the flooded rice fields.
Pilar opened fire on it and the command was caught in
the trap that Pilar had treacherously laid. Being
unable to retreat or advance and having used up all his
ammunition, PeJia was compelled to surrender with his
entire force. The Militia stationed. at Silang, Indang,
San Francisco de Malabon, and Imus, then carried out
their part of the program. They deserted bodily to the
Katipunan, taking their arms and ammunition with
them.

As soon as Cavite Navy Yard was occupied by the
United States forces, Aguinaldo, supported by a sup-
posed American alliance, turned his attention to cooper-
ating with Admiral Dewey against the city of Manila by
land, while the Admiral prevented all access to it by
water. During the month of June, the insurgent leaders
drove the Spaniards, weakened by the desertion of the
Militia, from such places as they held, and forced them
to retire on Manila and its suburbs, These leaders were
also very active in burning and pillaging churches and
other property outside the city, though in compliance
with the strict injunctions of the American Commander,
they refrained from making any attack on Manila itself.
They confined their operations to strenuous efforts to
close in on the city and to cut off all communication with
the surrounding country, thus endeavoring to starve it
into capitulating.

21

162

Whatever verbal understanding there may have been
between Aguinaldo and the Consuls at Hong Kong and
Singapore, it is very evident from Aguinaldo's action in
consenting to leave Hong Kong for the Philippines under
Admiral Dew^ey's directions, from Mr. Pratt's speech in
reply to Dr. Santos at Singapore, June 8th, 1898, as well
as from his correspondence and that of the Consul
General at Hong Kong with the State Department at
Washington, that not only Aguinaldo and his followers
but others as well looked upon the E''ilipino insurgents
as formal allies of the United States. This belief is also
shown in the manifesto sent to the Philippines in advance
of Admiral Dewey's expedition as well as in Aguinaldo's
proclamation to his fellow countrymen, dated Cavite
May 24th, 1898. The statements made in it, as well as
those in Mr. Pratt's reply to Dr. Santos' speech above
referred to, were not disavowed by the United States
authorities, but were allowed to pass unchallenged at
the time they were made. Prom this it is fair t6 assume
that Aguinaldo and his adherents were sincere therein.

Admiral Dewey's subsequent action in taking the in-
surgent leaders to the Philippines, Mr. Pratt's utter-
ances in public as well as the correspondence carried on
by Messrs. Wildman and Williams, leave scant room
for doubt that all of these gentlemen went to the extent
of knowingly allowing Aguinaldo and his companions to
believe that an agreement really existed between them
and the United States. If they did not actually confirm
them in this belief, they took no steps to disabuse them
of their error.

Be all this as it may, the cooperation of Aguinaldo
and his forces was accepted by the American Military
and Naval commanders in the Philippines. If the Fili-
pinos were not thus formally recognized as allies, they
were, for a time at least, treated as such and the
insurgent forces were used as auxiliaries (36).

(36) The insurgent government was allowed to purchase a-rms,
and steamers to transport them to the Philippines, where for some

163
Before leaving Hong Kong, Admiral Dewey must
have been very well aware that, in accordance with the
program of destroying the Spanish squadron, the only
logical outcome of any engagement he might have with
it in Filipino waters would be the sending of a land ex-
pedition to the Philippines by the United States as soon as
it could be gotten ready, to oust the Spaniards. There-
fore it is not unfair to assume that his idea in entering
into relations with Aguinaldo was merely to utilize his
services and those of his followers as an advance guard
until this expedition could be sent. Indeed the Admiral
substantially says as much in his testimony before the
Senate Committee. In the course of it he gives as his
reason for encouraging the Filipino leader to make a
second attempt, that he "wanted his help" (37). He does
not say just why he wanted it, but the inference is that
he had no landing force of his own sufficiently large for
his purposes. To hold the city of Cavite and the sur-
rounding country and to prepare the way for whatever
American force might arrive, Aguinaldo's assistance was
accepted.

About a week after Aguinaldo's arrival. Admiral
Dewey went ashore and had an interview with him. He
pointed out that while they were acting against a com-
mon enemy, they were not acting under a common head,
and when he told him "You go your way and I'll go
mine" (38), he may not have realized that, under the
circumstances, the only construction that Aguinaldo or
any one else could put on his words was that he (Agui-
naldo) was practically placed in charge of the land
operations, while Dewey retained charge of those by sea-
Though aware of Aguinaldo's proclamation and

time the steamers cruised about Manila Bay flying the Filipino
flag. General Anderson also entered into a certain amount of cor-
respondence with Aguinaldo in reference to passes, supplies, etc.

(37) See Admiral Dewey's testimony before Senate.Committee
June 26th, 1902. '

(38) Ibid.

164
decrees, Dewey seems to have attached little or no im-
portance to them or to the , workings of the insurgents-
This apparent apathy, if it can be called such, possibly
arose from his being unaware of the organization and
strength of the Katipunan government or of the rapid
headway it had made since the arrival of Aguinaldo. It
had been given out to the Katipunan committees that
the American squadron had come to the Philippines
with their chief and not he with the squadron, to expel
the Spaniards and set up a Filipino government with
himself at the head of it- It was also given out that he
would have such towns as did not rise in his favor, des-
troyed by the guns of the American ships. The inhabi-
tants, believing that he had the power and knowing that
he had the will to carry out this threat, no matter what
their sympathies or convictions may have been, obeyed
his dictates, rose against the Spanish authorities, and
joined the revolutionary movement.

The Admiral was possibly unaware of the manipu-
lation the Filipino militia was undergoing. Indeed all
that he knew positively was that Aguinaldo proposed
to make a general uprising and attack on May 31st, though
in his correspondence he expressed doubts of his ability
to do that. These doubts probably arose from his igno-
rance of the role that the militia, raised and armed by
virtue of General Augustin's decree of May 10th, was to
play in it. Admiral Dewey states that "he was led to
believe that there was a large number of Filipinos under
arms, though as a matter of (act there was not a Filipi-
no ander arms (39) when he arrived." This conclusion

(39) In a memorandum furnished to the first Philippine Com-
mission, Admiral Dewey states that on March 30th, the United
States Consul at Manila telegraphed: "Five thousand rebels armed
in camp near city. Loyal to use in case of war". But on arriving
at Manila, it was found that as there was no insurrection to speak
of, Aguinaldo was then sent for and allowed to land in Cavite to or-
ganize an army "with the purpose of strengthening the United
States forces and weakening those of the enemy".

165

was possibly reached on his part because the Filipino
leaders failed to take him into their confidence as to
what the Katipunan was doing within the Spanish lines,
using the presence of his squadron as a stalking horse-
On the other hand, Admiral Dewey's failure to pro-
test against Aguinaldo's assumption of authority may
have been caused by confidence in his moral influence
over Aguinaldo and his power to persuade him to forego
the fruits of any advantage he might reap from success-
ful minor military operations- Even taking the con-
trary to be the case, it is hard to see how Admiral Dewey
could in this particular have acted otherwise than he
did. He had no landing force at his disposal. Until the
arrival of troops, he was powerless beyond the range of
his guns. He could not enforce any order he might have
issued conflicting with Aguiaaldo's views- Any such
display of lack of power would not only have discredited
him and his country before the Filipinos, but it would
have placed Aguinaldo in a stronger position as an in-
dependent dictator, not only towards his own country-
men but towards foreign powers also, than he possibly
could have occupied as merely an ally or auxiliary of the
United States. In a word, when the assistance of the
Katipunan was invoked against Spain, neither Admiral
Dewey nor the Consuls at Manila or Hong Kong, on
whom he must have relied to a certain extent for infor-
mation, were aware of the real conditions in the islands.
He did not realize that by associating himself with the
revolution in any way, he was playing with fire and
starting a conflagration that he would be powerless to
either quench or control.

This view is borne out by his own statement: "I did
not know then what I know now * * * or I would not
have had him (Aguinaldo) * * * I would not have had
any of them there" (40).

About this time, June and July, the insurgents were

(40) Dewey before Senate Committee, June 26th, 1902.

166

fairly well armed from various sources:— first, the unsur-
rendered arms of the men who fought in the first Kati-
punan uprising of 1896-97; secondly, those issued by Gen-
eral Augustin to the Militia, which practically went over
to the rebels in a body; thirdly, those brought in by de-
serters and others; fourthly, those captured from the
various detachments of the Spanish troops that were
scattered all over the islands; fifthly, those found in the
Cavite Arsenal as well as those surrendered by the Span-
iards to the Americans at Naic, Corregidor island, Isla
Grande, and other places, but were turned over to the
rebels by Admiral Dewey; sixthly, arms furnished by Ad-
miral Dewey and General Anderson (41); seventhly, arms
thrown into Manila Bay by the Spaniards and for which
Admiral Dewey allowed the insurgents to dive; and
eighthly, arms purchased under the auspices of the
"Junta Patriotica" and Consul General Wildman in Hong
Kong and other places in China.

At the time of the taking of Manila, therefore, it
has been authoritatively stated that the Katipuneros had
some forty or forty five thousand rifles, and some mod-
ern field guns as well as others, which, though antiqua-
ted, were still serviceable at short range- They appear
also to have had a plentiful supply of ammunition.

Early in June it was intended to bring in another
shipment of 10,000 rifles and 3,000,000 cartridges- On
consultation with Admiral Dewey, however, Mr- Wild-
man, who had charge of the purchase, decided not to
make the shipment- It was considered that the Filipi-
nos already has as many arms as it was safe to entrust
them with-

Due possibly to the probable effect he feared might
be produced on the Filipinos at large by the program of
autonomy as elaborated by the '"Asamblea Consultiva",
or to the impracticability of carrying out a government
based on an oath-bound secret society, Aguinaldo and

(41) See article by General T. M Anderson in North Amer-
ican Review, February, 1899.

167
his advisers decided on starting a fixed form of govern-
ment more in conformity with the ideas of Americans or
of other nationalities whom it was important to concil-
iate. He was not sure of the Katipunan idea, which,
under the name of "dictatorship" with himself at the
head, he had proclaimed on May 24th. Therefore, on
June 12th, he issued a decree proclaiming a "Revolution-
ary Government of the Philippines" with himself as
president. An elaborate constitution, on the lines of
that of the United States and Mexico, was drawn up by
Apolinario Mabini, who was generally known as the
brains of the revolution-

This constitution had been preceded by a sort of
decalogue, also written by Mabini, which was nothing
more than an effort to instil into the popular heart an
insatiable desire for vengeance for real or imaginary
wrongs, and which was couched in blasphemous and
bombastic language. To any other race than the semisav-
ages to whom he addressed it, this appeal Would have
called up only mixed feelings of disgust, ridicule, and
contempt.

On June 18th, Aguinaldo published his first procla-
mation as head of the Revolutionary Government. After
a ridiculously conceited preamble, he proceeds to outline
a method of expelling the Spanish forces and follows
this up with a scheme of general and local civil govern-
ment.

This proclamation, which was forwarded to Admiral
Dewey only on July 15th, 1898, was, the Admiral says,
the first intimation he had of any desire for independence
on the part of the Filipinos (42). It is difficult to see
how he could make this statement in the face of the fact
that Aguinaldo's proclamation dated May 24th, 1898, in
his capacity of dictator, had been outlined by Consul
General Wildman (43) and submitted to him for his infor-.

(42) See Admiral Dewey's testimony before Senate Committee
June 26th, 1902.

(43) See Senate Document No. 62 page 557.

168

mation and approval, before it was issued to the Filipi-
nos. It also conflicts with Admiral Dewey's telegram of
June 27th, 1898, in which he says ''these people expect
independence" and that they were "more capable of self
government than the natives of Cuba".

On June 23rd, Aguinaldo, in compliance with a vote
of his cabinet, issued a message in which he defined the
scope and powers of the Revolutionary Government.
The only original feature in it was in the clause respect-
ing the appointment of representatives. It said that
"the Government shall have the power to appoint as
provisional representatives for these provinces, (i. e.,
provinces not under the control of the Revolutionary
Government), those persons who are most distinguished
for high character and social position, etc. etc.".

This in many cases presented a source of difficulty
to the Spaniards in such places where they were in
authority, as to how they should deal with persons who
had been appointed to offices still dependent on them,
but which the Revolutionary appointees invariably de-
clared they had been appointed to without their consent.
This may have caused some innocent persons to suffer
for guilty ones and vice versa; but these appointees were
very well aware of the power and methods of the Kati-
punan in enforcing its orders and they would hardly
have dared to refuse the honors so thrust upon them.
This same condition prevailed later to a certain extent
during the "War of Conquest" and the "Pacification".

The first American expeditionary land force, under
command of General Thomas M. Anderson, arrived on
June. 30th. Owing to the operations of the insurgents,
supported by the presence of the American squadron,
all the coast towns near Manila had been abandoned by
the Spaniards. In the course of the following two
weeks, the Americans proceeded to take up a position
along the beach on the road from Cavite Viejo to Manila.

On July 1st, General Anderson accompanied by
Admiral Dewey, called on Aguinaldo. During the course

169
of the conversation they asked him why the inhabitants
of Manila did not rise as those of the provinces had
done; also if it was possible that they had accepted the
autonomy and assembly offered by General Augustin.
Aguinaldo answered that the inhabitants of Manila did
not rise because they had no arms, but that as soon as
Manila was taken, they would join him. He was confi-
dent that they were all in favor of independence (44).

Aguinaldo then went on to state that a commission
had come to him from General Augustin with a state-
ment to the effect that if he accepted the autonomy as
proposed by the "Asamblea Consultiva", they would rec-
ognize his rank and that of his companions. They
would moreover give him a million pesos and settle the
unpaid balance of the Biac-na-Bato agreement. All the
offers of this commission, however, had been rejected by
him (45) • He also stated that this commission then ques-
tioned him as to the terms offered him by the United
States and what benefits to the Filipino people were
expected to be derived from that country. To this
Aguinaldo answered that it would be difficult for him to
answer their question in view of his promise not to dis-
close the terms of his agreement with the American
commanders- He had called the attention of these com-
missioners, however, to the acts of independent sover-
eignty which the Filipino dictatorship had been allowed
to exercise under the authority of the American com-
manders, more especially in the waters of Manila Bay-
But Aguinaldo- did not tell Admiral Dewey that the ma-
jority of this commission were secretly adherents of his
and enemies of the Spanish government (46). The Gen-
eral and Admiral then took leave of Aguinaldo, recom-

(44) Extracts from. Resena verldica de la Revolucion Pilipina
by Emilio Aguinaldo.

(45) Ibid.

(46) Ibid.

22

170

mending him to study out a plan to act in combination
with them (47).

On July 4th, Aguinaldo made an official call on Gen-
eral Anderson and handed him the scheme of an auton-
omous government, which he had received from the
commissioners from Manila. On being asked by Gen-
eral Anderson if the scheme was agreeable to him, be
did not answer directly but endeavored to ascertain
the intentions of the United States government in re-
spect to the retention of the Philippines (48).

General Anderson wrote to Aguinaldo July 4th,
1898, stating his desire for amicable relations and asking
that he should cooperate with him against the Spanish
forces. He wrote again on July 6th, requesting cooper-
ation as well as the evacuation of the town of Cavite,
suggesting that Aguinaldo utilize his prisoners of war,
of whom he had upwards of 4,000, in cleaning it up.
This unusual suggestion, namely to work prisoners of
war, contrary to all customs of warfare between civilized
nations, probably arose from a wish on General .Ander-
son's part to have the placed cleaned up for his command
without calling on his own men to do the work (49).

On July 14th and 21st, General Anderson wrote
further to Aguinaldo, requesting that reconnoitering
parties be given the necessary passes, etc., to enable

(47) Ibid.

(48) For a full description of this call as well as Aguinaldo's
return call on him, see article by General T. M. Anderson in North
American Review, February, 1899.

(49) Aguinaldo has been severely criticized for having made
his prisoners of war, of which he had upwards of 4,000, work; but
from General Anderson's suggestion, he evidently took it for
granted that such was the custom among civilized nations. As for
the rations the prisoners received, it ia probable that Aguinaldo
issued them what his commissariat could afford, though Consul
General Wildman in his letter of June 21st, 1898, to Aguinaldo,

after making some other suggestions concerning them, advises
him to hold the prominent ones among them as hostages and goes

on to suggest that rice and water was a sufficient diet for them,

as "during the last few years they had lived too well"!

171

them to make a reconnaissance of Manila. In neither
of these letters does he assume any other tone than that
of. an ally, addressing the Filipino chief as "General",
"Your Excellency", and this like. This, however, may
have arisen from a desire on his part to accomplish by
diplomatic means v^hat he v^as not in a position to do
by force.

On July 14th, General P. V. Green, U. S. Volunteers,
arrived with the second expedition and disembarked at
Paraflaque, much to Aguinaldo's annoyance, as he had not
been consulted in this matter. On the 24th, Aguinaldo
protested against the "advisability of disembarking Amer-
ican troops at places that had been captured by the
Filipinos, because, as no formal agreement existed be-
tween the Filipinos and Americans, the former might
take such a proceeding as an invasion of their rights".

Up to the writing of this letter, Aguinaldo himself
had expressed no doubts as to the ulterior intention of
the United States; but there seem to have been some
misgivings on the part of those surrounding him. In his
communication he goes on to say that while he "can an-
swer for his own people, he cannot answer for the confi-
dence that another nation, whose friendship is not yet
guaranteed, might inspire in them". In this he evident-
ly referred to the United States. All his questions as
to their ultimate intentions respe'cting the Philippines
had always been met with evasive, not to say ambiguous,
answers by . the American commanders (50).

Three days after his arrival. General Green com-
menced to make requisitions on Aguinaldo for transpor-
tation, supplies, and the like. But Aguinaldo, who by
this time had became suspicious of the ulterior inten-
tion of the United States, was in no hurry to fill them.
A sort of passive resistance was springing up among the
insurgents and it was very annoying to the American
commanders, in many ways obstructing their plans and

(50) See article by General T. M. Anderson in North Amer-
ican Review, February, 1899.

172

showing that the Filipino leaders were making every
effort in their power to take Manila without American
assistance.

General Anderson, in a letter to the Adjutant Gener-
al of the U- S. Army, states that it is as dictator that
Aguinaldo had prohibited the furnishing of supplies by
the Filipinos, excepting on his own order, and goes on
say that he had written a protest against, his as-
sumption of dictatorship, his proclamations of mar-
tial law, and other kindred acts, but that, at Admiral
Dewey's request, he had refrained from publishing it.
Admiral Dewey's request in the matter was probably
based on the fact that all these proclamations and the
like had been issued by Aguinaldo prior to General
Anderson's arrival and while he, Dewey, was in sole
command. Any protest on General Anderson's part
would not only have been discourtesy, but also a reflec-
tion on his administiration, and would have led the insur-
gents to believe that there was, to say the least, a divi-
ded policy. Such a protest might also have resulted in
an open rupture with the insurgents, which would surely
have come about, had they conceived the idea that it
was not the prime and sole object of the American expe-
dition to assist them in establishing themselves in an
absolutely independent government.

Had the Filipino' leaders by any means become con-
vinced that their idea about the Americans was erroneous,
such a conviction might possibly have caused them to
accept, as a last shift, the overtures of autonomy ex-
tended by the Spanish authorities. Had such a condition
come about, it would have left General Anderson with an
empty protest hanging in the air, without any adequate
means at hand to enforce it. At the highest estimate,
his available force did not amount to over three thousand
men. He would have had no mere "military promenade"
in acting against even Aguinaldo's raw levies. Backed
up, as these might have been, by the Spanish forces,
they could have offered resistance to any force he might

173
have attempted to use and the Americans might have
become the "common enemy," with himself exposed to a
possible defeat in the field.

In the same letter, General Anderson further states
that he had underestimated the intelligence, civilization,
courage, and industry of the Filipinos. This under-
estimation of the Filipinos was evidently shared by the
authorities at home, as neither he nor they were aware
of the thorough organization that the revolution had
received from the Katipunan during the four months"
respite, December 1897 to May 1898, given it by the
Biac-na-Bato agreement.

Immediately after the destruction of the Spanish
fleet on May 1st, 1898, Admiral Dewey, after a more or
less severe bombardment, could possibly have forced the
city of Manila to capitulate. But inasmuch as he was
short of ammunition (51) and had no landing force to
garrison that city, he was humane enough not to sub-
ject it to the horrors of a bombardment with no other
immediate object in view than that of destroying it.

After Aguinaldo's arrival and the wonderful growth
of the insurgent army, there was during all of the months
of May and June no American force to furnish a garri-
son. The Admiral was unwilling, in the face of Secre-
tary Long's cable despatch in answer to his own of May
20th, to allow the Katipunan forces to occupy the city.
Such a proceeding would have been to place the "Kati-
punan" at the head of affairs in the Philippines. Had
this occurred, excepting for the purpose of supporting
it in power, Dawey might just as well have hoisted his
homeward bound pennant and sailed for the United

(51) Ip the forenoon of May 1st, Admiral Dewey, before he
was aware of the full extent of the damage he had inflicted on
Montojo's squadron, retired to the other side of Manila Bay, in or-
der, according to the newspaper accounts, to allow his men to have
breakfast. His real reason, however, was to consult his captains
and ascertain if they had sufficient ammunition to continue the
action if necessary.

174

States. As a matter of fact, all that he could do under'
the circumstances was to wait for the troops that eventu-
ally came under Generals Anderson, Green, and Merritt,
and in the meanwhile allow Aguinaldo to do as he could
or as he pleased on shore.

The arrival of the first land expedition did not mend
matters to any extent. The three thousand men who
composed it were by no means an adequate force to curb
the insurgent army, which from May to July had been
steadily and rapidly increasing. While Aguinaldo was
carrying on his operations with unbroken success in the
immediate vicinity of Manila, there were extensive upris-
ings of poorly armed bands in the central provinces during
May and June. These uprisings, however, if not put
down, were at least checked with considerable sever-
ity, especially in Pangasinan, by the Spanish detach-
ments consisting of Cazadores, native regular troops,
and Pangasinan and Ilocano Volunteers. These, up to
the arrival of the Tagalog forces and as long as any
fighting against them lasted, were more than fairly loyal
to Spain, though, as was' not unnatural, as the insur-
gents were victorious, they went over to them.

In all of these encounters, the native regular troops
and volunteers in the Spanish service, excepting the
Tagalogs, behaved admirably. It was only after the
Spanish detachments had surrendered that, as a matter
of self preservation, they joined the insurgent ranks.

Such resistance as there was, however, did not
prevent Gregorio del Pilar, Gregorio Mayor, Francisco
Macabulos in the North, and Ponciano Rizal, and others
in the provinces of Laguna and Tayabas, making great
headway.

On June 25th, Bulacan surrendered after a blockade
that lasted twenty three days. In the course of this
time, the Spanish commander realized that even the
hope of succor was vain.

Tarlac, where all the surrounding Spanish detach-
ments, amounting in all to some twelve hundred men un-

175
der command of Major Plandes, had been concentrated,
was surrendered by that officer on July 8th, practically
without firing a shot.

Major Plandes could have retired on Dagupan and
might possibly have arrived there with some of his
troops. But to have done that would have involved the
abandoning at Tarlac of a large number of Spanish and
native non-combatants who had taken refuge under his
protection. Moreover his force was not large enough to
to have allowecj him to furnish the necessary escort for
the immense train he would have been hampered with.
This train, taking the condition of the roads into consid-
eration, for the rainy season had commenced, could not
have moved at a uniform rate of more than half a mile
an hour. What men had been left him were not numer-
ous enough to have enabled liim t3 force his way through
even the small bands of badly armed insurgents that
lay between him and Dagupan.

On July 22nd, Dagupan and its garrison of 800 men
was surrendered to Pablo Tecson by Major Ceballos,
after a blockade of eight or ten days. It was but a repe-
tition of the conditions at Tarlac— an immense lot of
impedimenta, an insufficiency of troops, no base on
which to retire, and annihilation staring him in the face
if he remained in the town.

San Fernando de la Union, with a garrison of some
seventy men, Spanish and native troops, held out un-
der Major Jose Herrero for five days. On July 31st,
when his ammunition was exhausted, he was forced to
surrender.

All these e/ents occurred in rapid succession. In each
case the Spanish forces were taken at an immense dis-
advantage in that they were, compared to the insur-
gents, but few in number. As all telegraphic lines and
other means of communication were in th6 hands of the
rebels, they were completely cut off from communication
with the nearest Spanish detachments and were thus
unable eithei- to render them assistance or, by receiving

176

warning of their fate, properly to prepare for their
own defence.

On the! other hand, the insurgents, successful in their
first undertakings, were full of that confidence that is
always inspired in raw irregular levies by success over
trained and disciplined troops. "They had a further ad-
vantage in that each success gave them a fresh supply of
arms, ammunition, and military supplies (52).

It is worth noting that id all of these affairs, though
conditions and stipulations were made by the Spaniards
and agreed to by the insurgents, there was no case in
which they were observed by the latter! After the sur-
renders had taken place, the Filipinos violated all their
offers and promises in the most shameless manner.

When all hope of relief from ^ome was dashed by
the knowledge that de la Camara's squadron had return-
ed to Spain, the commanding Spanish General accepted
the offer of Mr. Edward Andre, Belgian Consul at Ma-
nila, to negotiate terms between him and Admiral Dewey
for the direct surrender of Manila to the Americans.

The idea is supposed to have originated with General
Jaudenes, the Spanish second in command. According
to Mr. Andre it came about through a chance conversa-
tion he had had with that officer and Don Juan de la
Concha, who was in command of such of the sailors of
the Spanish fleet as had, after its destruction on May 1st,
been disembarked and used in the defence of Manila.
The upshot of this conversation was that these officers
authorized him to use their names, and he went to call
on General Augustin the same evening and to lay their
proposition before him. General Augustin listened cour-
teously to what he had to say, without however giving
any definite answer one way or the other. Just how the

(52) At Bulacan they not only captured the arms and milita-

;*ry depot, but also some 80,000 pesos. This was turned over to

them by the Spanish civil intendant of that province and he was

allowed by Aguinaldo to leave the country and make a trip to

Europe.

177
negotiations were carried on is a matter of very little
importance but, according to Mr. Andre's statement, they
were satisfactory and were practically concluded by
July 24th.

When General Jaudenes took supreme command,
relieving General Augustin, August 4th, there were still
some points of difference between him and the American
commanders that had to be cleared up; but these were
adjusted in a satisfactory manner. After he had gained
all the time he could in negotiation, as it was his duty
to do, he decided to come to the comic opera arrangement
of exchanging a iew shots «to satisfy honor*, and then
to surrender on the following conditions: the Amer-
ican squadron was to engage the outlying fort of San An-
tonio Abad and, after firing a few shots, was to hoist the
signal «do you surrender?* This was to be answered
by a white flag from Manila, the bombardment was to
cease and the city was to be surrendered to the Amer-
ican forces.

In the meantime, the former U. S. Consul at Mani-
la, Mr. Oscar A. Williams, who was apparently Agui-
naldo's guide, philosopher, and friend, had already writ-
ten, advising him to place the Philippines under the
United States. On August 1st, Aguinaldo answered neg-
atively in a puerile and verbose letter containing nearly
twelve hundred words of drivel- In this he wasted a
great deal of time in flattering expressions of admiration
for the United States and appealed to abstract senti-
ments and theories, which common sense and a Vfery
cursoi-y glance at history would have shown him are in-
variably made to yield to expediency, when confronted
by actual conditions that conflict with them.

Had Aguinaldo and his advisers applie,d the ordina-
ry instruction imparted to any schoolboy, they would
have remembered the story of the «wooden horse of
Troy»- They would have been careful in invoking in
their quarrel with Spain, the intervention of a power
immeasurably stronger than that country or the Philip-

23

178

pines or both together. Had they been even a little wise,
they would have realized that «vae victis*, woe to the
conquered, is the guiding rule of the victor, because he
believes, and believes rightly, that such spoils as are to
be had, belong to him. The only argument that can con-
vince him of the contrary is force.

Aguinaldo and his advisers were thus allowing them-
selves the diversion of writing would-be diplomatic notes
and of playing at the game of an imaginary American
alliance, the wish of which was largely the "father to the
thought". In their plans, all the solid prizes were to
be won by them and the empty glory of having enabled
them to win was to go to the United States. All this
time, however, the American commanders were carrying
on the negotiations above described for the direct sur-
render of Manila to them by the Spanish General in com-
mand, a fact of which these Filipino would-be states-
men were kept in the dark.

Had the force under General Jaudenes been in a po-
sition to retire on some base, or had he had any hopes
of the siege's being raised, or had he been shut up in a
purely military work and not in a populous city like Ma-
nila, as a soldier he should, and probably would, have
made as stubborn a resistance as the circumstances jus-
tified, with a view to making the Americans pay as dear-
ly as possible for their victory. Under the existing con-
ditions, he was completely cut off. from any retreat by
land. A powerful squadron of the enemy was at hand.
Armed with guns that enabled it to keep out of the range
of any artillery he had to oppose to it, it was in a posi-
tion to destroy the city and its defences at its leisure. It
is hard to see, therefore, how the Spanish General had
any better alternative than the somewhat comic opera
arrangement he made to "fire a few shots to satisfy hon-
or" and then to surrender the city.

At the first burst, it seems strange that professional
soldiers and sailors like General Merritt and Admiral
Dewey should have entered into such a plot, more worthy

179

of the boards of the "Bouffes Parisiennes" than of the
shores of Manila Bay. Its details, with Mr. Andre as a
"deus ex machina", were more grotesquely absurd than
thosefof "Croquefer", "La Grande Duchesse" or "Les
Carabiniers". It seems strange they should have con-
sented to play the roles assigned to 'them, for, having
allowed Andre to suggest the arrangement to the Amer-
ican commanders, Jau denes could have been forced to
dance to any tune they might pipe to him. The whole
business , indeed, might have resulted in all parties con-
nected with it going down to posterity, accompanied by
a burst of Homeric laughter, as objects of scorn and
ridicule to military and naval men for all time to come.

But General Merritt's reasons for entertaining the
plan of this line of action were wise, sound, and well
considered, as conditions then stood. The arrangement
agreed upon furnished the only method by which the
American Commanders could get possession of Manila
without the participation of the Filipinos, or without an
open breach and consequent fight with them. Indeed, so
anxious was General Merrit to avoid a clash at this par-
ticular time that in his memorandum to General Anderson
on August 10th, he imperatively forbids any rupture
with the "insurgents''.

An open breach with Aguinaldo at that time
would have been excessively dangerous. The American
forces, which at best amounted to some eleven thousand
officers and men, were strung out along the beach prac-
tically in column, from Parafiaque to Pasay, with the
Filipino army, then at its perihelion, on its right flank.
In the case of a rupture, the Americans would have been
compelled to operate against Aguinaldo's forces, consist-
ing of some 15,000 well armed men, in an unknown
country, cut up with watery meadows, rice-fields, and
bamboo thickets, with whose local topography the Fili-
pinos were as familiar as the Americans were unac-
quainted. Under these circumstances, a single reverse,
no matter how trifling in itself, would have imperiled the

180

existence of the American army, especially as it was
short of ammunition (53). Furthermore, owing to the
fact that the ground it occupied was perfectly flat, the
American Army could have counted on very little sup-
port from Admiral Dewey's squadron. Every shot from
his guns, great or Small, would have had to go through
the American ranks before reaching those of the Fili-
pinos.

These considerations, which in all probability also
entered into the calculations and governed the actions
of General Merritt and Admiral Dewey, must effectually
divest all the arrangements between them and the Span-
ish authorities for the surrender of Manila, of any comic
opera features which, at a first glance, they may have
appeared to possess. That in carrying out this ar-
rangement there was some loss of life is unfortunately
true; but there can be no doubt that this was sincerely
regretted by all parties to the surrender. Besides there
was consolation in the fact that had any other course
been pursued, the loss of life on all sides would have
been immeasurably greater.

General Merritt had already declined to hold any
direct communication with the insurgents. Consequently
his dealings with them were through third parties, his
subordinate officers, the American Consul Williams, and
others. His reasons for this were obvious and sound,
from both a military and diplomatic point of view. Using
them in this particular as he did, he was not in any way
bound by any promises they made or line of action they
pursued. He could disvow either at his pleasure, should
it have appeared expedient to him to do so. That this
line of action was open to him was known by his sub-
ordinates and the Consul as well as that it was in keep-
ing with the polity and policy of the United States. If
this fact was not known to the insurgents, it was a case
of "caviat emptor", "let the buyer beware". It was no

(53) See article by Captain T. Bently Mott in "Scribners Ma-
gazine" December, 18!)S.

181
part of General Merritt's duty or of that of his sub-
ordinates to enlighten them in the matter.

This also explains what has been called the "of-
ficious interference" of the Consuls and their failure to
remember to mind their own affairs. Had eventually
any unauthorized action on their part redounded to the
the advantage of the United States, they would probably
have received due credit for it. Otherwise they would
in all probability have got a mild admonition on paper,
or perhaps a rebuke for being officials who in their
"loyal zeal for the public service, had overstepped their
authority" by making personal promises which were not
binding on their superiors^ and from which all were con-
sequently released.

After General Merritt arrived with the third ex-
pedition, July 25th, he personally made an examination
of the ground and. decided that his attack was to be
made along the beach. This decision would have been
that of any trained soldier. Farther inland the country
was too much cut up with rice-fields that could be flood-
ed, ditches, "esteros" or tidal creeks, and bamboo tMckets
which none but native troops, under the command of
officers thoroughly acquainted with the ground, could
manoeuvre over. He next decided that it was necessary
to get the insurgents out of his way, thus avoiding
"entangling alliances" that might give them the right
to claim consideration for any share they might other-
wise have in the anticipated victory.

To carry out his plan, he gave verbal directions to
General Green to persuade the insurgents to evacuate a
portion of their trenches and to allow him to occupy
them. General Green sent for Mariano Noriel, who was
in command of that part part of the Filipino lines, and
proposed to him to give up about 400 yards of trenches
next the beach. This Noriel consented to do, providing
he could obtain Aguinaldo's consent. Between two and
three in the morning, Noriel returned, saying that Agui-
naldo agreed to this on the condition that the request

182

was made in writing. General Green, to "save time"
as he expressed it, said he would post his troops in the
trenches in the morning and send his written request
afterwards. In this wise, General Green, who had taken
command of the land forces on July 28th, got possession
on the morning of the 29th of a part of Noriel's position,
about a quarter of a mile south of the Spanish entrench-
ments. The latter extended in a curved line of about
three miles in length, around the walls of the city of
Manila.

The Spanish garrison amounted to some five or six
thousand men and a large number of sick and wounded
in hospital. The combined land forces of the three
American expeditions amounted to some eleven thousand
officers and men, while the Filipinos forces amounted to
some fifteen thousand, occupying various positions from
the right of the American position at Maytubig to the
west and north of Manila. Thus the besieging force
amounted in all to upwards of twenty five thousand,
without counting the crews of Admiral Dewey's squadron.

On July 31st, the Spaniards made a night sortie, in
which they were partially successful, but they were
driven back again after some sharp fighting. The Amer-
ican troops lost in killed, wounded, and missing some forty
officers and men. The Spanish losses were never re-
ported. During the following week the Spaniards made
three more night attacks, without any other result than
a total of ten killed and wounded on the American side.

In the meantime the American lines, making use of
the Filipino trenches, had been advanced to within
about 360 yards of the Spanish position. On August
11th, as there were signs of an impending attack by the
Spaniards, the Filipinos moved towards the lines with a
view to supporting the American forces, but they were
requested to withdraw. When night came on, the Span-
iards, under cover of the darkness, made an attack on
the American works, but were driven back by the Amer-
icans, who followed them and occupied the first Spanish

183

trench. The fighting continued and the Spaniards, by
a furious bayonet charge, forced the American troops to
retire to their own lines. These they subsequently had
to abandon, leaving four field guns and some rifles in the
hands of the Spaniards, who had followed them up. The
Filipinos under Noriel then advanced and taking the
Spaniards in the flank, drove them back to their original
position and recovered the American cannon and arms,
that had been abandoned in their hasty retreat (54).
These guns and rifles were returned to the Americans
on the following day by Aguinaldo's order, in spite of
the protest of Noriel, who wished to keep them (55).

On the night of August 12th, the steamer "Pilipi-
nas" with 600 insurgent troops, started to sail for Aparri.
She was stopped by Admiral Dewey, but was eventually
allowed to proceed. This line of action on his part may
have arisen from several motives; first, his wish to avoid
breaking with the insurgents until after the taking of
Manila; or secondly, to reduce the strength of Aguinal-
do's forces by the number of men on the "Filipinas", as
well as to get that vessel itself out of Manila Bay; or
thirdly, to allow the Filipinos to fight the Americans'
battles in the north. No matter which of these motives
governed his action, the result was that the "Filipinas"
sailed for Aparri, where she arrived on August 24th. The
surrender of that place was compelled by the insurgent
forces and that indirectly prolonged the eventual "War
of Conquest".

It is said that General Merritt and his brigade
commanders, as well as Admiral Dewey and his
captains, were all acquainted with the arrangement that
had been made with the Spanish authorities (56). On

(54) See "The li'hilippine Islands" by John Foreman, page 615.

(55) " "Resena veredica de la revoluci6n Pilipina" by Emilio
Ag-uinaldo.

(56) General MacArthur, in his statement before the Senate
Committee, says that he believed that "he was going into a real
battle".

184

the evening of the 12th, General Merritt sent a
mesage to Aguinaldo that, in the assault to take
place on the following day, he was not to take part, as
it was a fight between the Americans and the Span-
iards only.

About daybreak on the morning of August 13th,
the Filipinos opened a general fire on the Spanish posi-
tion. This was answered by a desultory fire of can-
non and small arms by the Spaniards. The Americans
took no part in this attack, but later General Merritt
demanded the surrender of Manila within an hour. This
being refused, a combined land and sea attack was made
on the city.

At 9:35 a. m., the squadron opened fire. The first
shot went high, but the second struck the old stone fort
of San Antonio Abad and killed thirteen of the garrison.
Some fifty 8 inch shells and two hundred and fifty 5 inch
shells were fired. About 11 a. m., the firing from the
ships ceased and General Green, who was in immediate
command of the land forces, gave the order to advance
and assault the Spanish position.

One column, on advancing, found that Fort San An-
tonio Abad had been abandoned by the Spaniards, who
had retired to the shelter of some breastworks in the
rear of it. Another column made its way across the
fields to the right, in the direction of Malate, and a third
advanced along the beach in the direction of the Luneta.
As these columns advanced, the Spaniards gradually fell
back towards the city of Manila, feebly contesting the
ground as they did so.

The insurgents, who were located near the Spanish
lines in the direction of Paco, continued the attack after
General Green had ordered the firing to cease. At one
time, indeed, the American field guns had to be pointed
towards the insurgents to enforce obedience to his order.
The insurgents on their part pointed their guns at the
American forces, but neither side fired . The insurgents,
taking another route, then drove the Spaniards in con-

185
fusion as far as Ermita, just outside the city walls. There
Aguinaldo ordered them to cease tiring.

General Green followed up his advance by an attack
on the city itself. The Spaniards at first made what
promised to be a stubborn resistance. They fought
about an hour and then hoisted a white flag on one of the
bastions. General Green then ordered the firing to
cease and, by 1 p. m., the terms of the capitulation were
being discussed. For some time after the white flag
was hoisted, there was considerable street fighting be-
tween the insurgents and the loyal troops towards the
Sampaloc and Trozo district, outside of the walls of Ma-
nila proper. This finally ceased when the United States
forces occupie d the city of Manila. Prom this time on,
all revolutions and revolts in the Philippines, at least
so far as Spain was concerned, were over forever.

In assigning a cause for the revolt of 1896-98, nearly
all writers, English and American, give the same as
they gave for that of 1872, namely "the friars" and
their "intermeddling in politics". But while the friars
may indirectly have had something to do with it, they-
were by no means its principal or even its secondary
cause. Indeed, had the friars, that is, those men com-
prised in the four regular orders of Augustinians, Reco-
letos, Dominicans, and Franciscans, at whose door the
responsibility for these two revolts has been laid, been
left alone to manage the affairs of the Philippines, there
can be no doubt that the archipelago would be under the
dominion of Spain at the present time, and that without
the one hundreth part of either the violence or blood-
shed that resulted from wresting it from that power.
Therefore the real causes for this revolt must be looked
for elsewhere.

As a matter of fact, the loss by Spain of her two
principal colonies, Cuba and the Philippines, was due to
the results of the revolution of 1868 in Spain itself. The

24

186

agitation that brought about the loss of the Philippines,
was commenced by Manuel and Antonio Regidor. These
men under the auspices of the ultraradical, international
republican party and its leaders, which later developed
the Commune in Prance and Spain, started an agitation
in the Madrid ndwspapers, with the object of violently
upsetting the condition of affairs then existing in tlje
Philippine Islands.

It should be borne in mind that Spain never con-
quered the archipelago by force of arms. Putting aside
the trifling encounters of Salcedo and Legaspi with the
natives, and a few unimportant riots and disturbances,
which were all quelled by the existing local authorities,
Spain, without having of necessity to send a single
soldier, ruled the Philippines by her prestige and in-
fl.uence alone. By avoiding the Scylla and Charybdis of
a division of the population into classes on one hand and
a false democratic equality on the other, she peacefully
maintained her authority over them for more than three
hundred years.

The few hundred Spaniards who accompanied Le-
gaspi, and the others who, during the course of three
centuries, up to the revolution of 1868 in Spain, were
from time to time reinforced by fresh arrivals from that
country, did not come with arms in their hands to defend
a domination which no one had any idea of attacking
and from which none endeavored to emancipate them-
selves. The Spanish domination in the islands was a
recognized fact. No one wasted thought on the pos-
sibilities of an uprising nor on the necessity of an army
to maintain the Spanish authority. So far as the repel-
ling of foreign invasions went, the inhabitants of the
islands had always come forward in sufficient numbers
for that purpose.

The real causes that brought about this revolt were
various- Any one of them might not have been suf-
ficient in itself to bring about a revolution, but collec-
tively they could not fail to do so.

187

Ever since the revolution of 1868, the Spaniards,
especially the politicians who came to the Philippines,
gave evidence of a difference in both precepts and
practices concerning the home government. That really
served to break down Filipino faith in that uniform
loyalty of Spaniards to the Spanish government, which
had formerly been one of their chief characteristics.
These new comers, however, unlike the British who had
migrated to the British colonies, did not leave their
home politics in Spain, but brought with them all party
heart-burnings, rancors, bitterness, and hatreds- These
they aired to their fullest extent, thereby undermining
that respect for Spanish nationality as a unit, which
was the foundation on which the fabric of Filipino loy-
alty to Spain rested.

This was not mended by the influx of Spanish officials ■
Prior to 1868, these had been comparatively few and
they were practically permanent residents- The majori-
ty, when they went out of office, usually married and
remained in the country instead of being, like the new
officials, mere birds of passage, who, the bulk of them
having been appointed by their Madrid patrons as a rec-
ompense for political jobbery, were here today and
away tomorrow- These appointees as a rule were utter-
ly ignorant of the duties pertaining to their offices, and
were therefore dependent on the native minor officials
to do the work they should have done themselves- As
soon as they had learned how to do anything, they were
liable to be dropped for others, who had to have their
political clailns recognized- All of this subjected them
to the contempt and hatred of the natives-

The radical changes in the laws in 1887, and the
lack of a permanent body in which the more intelligent
and competent Filipinos and Spaniards in the islands could
discuss and express their opinions, if nothing more, as
to the expediency of amending such laws as were in force
or enacting such as were necessary, was another cause
of complaint. No matter how obsolete the laws in exis-

188

tence may have been, they were far and away better
adapted to the conditions prevailing in the Philippines
than could possibly be new enactments made in Madrid,
where the knowledge of Filipino affairs was at best sec-
ond hand-

The abolition of the tobacco monopoly in 1881, while
undoubtedly a benefit to the islands at large, completely
upset for the time being the relations of landlord and
tenant, to say nothing of the conditions of purchase, sale,
and manufacture of that article. It also resulted in a
change in the system of taxation as well as in the method
of collecting the taxes, and that necessarily caused a
great amount of friction.

There was also another element of discontent. A
numerous and steadily increasing class of young men
was passing university examinations. Many of them
were capable in an eminent degree of entering into the
public life of the colonies in government service, but
from lack of vacancies, owing to the large number of
Spaniards employed, they were unable to find positions.
The faculty of the University of Manila, principally
composed of Dominican friars, had already addressed a
memorial on this subject to the Spanish Government,
suggesting the increase of native employees and a cor-
responding decrease of Spaniards appointed in the is-
lands. In many cases such appointments, they said,
meant hardship, not to say absolute injustice, to the
natives.

An influx of extreme radical and ultra antireligious
ideas had been brought to the Philippines by swarms of
political and other adventurers. Most of these in one
way or another had made their own country too hot to
hold them. Some of them had been appointed to offices
and some had been allowed to go to the colonies "where
, they could do harm". All this brought a disturbing
element to the Philippines. Many were ready and anx-
ious to "fish in troubled waters", created either by them-
selves or by others. They Were hungering for any form

189
of political agitation or revolution, more especially
against the religious orders, which they considered stood
in the way of the ends they had in view.

There 'was another disturbing element consisting of
young men, who called themselves the "progresistas".
Some of these had attended European universities. They
had become imbued with the abstract, ultrasocialistic doc-
trines always more or less prevalent among a large num-
ber of continental students. By far the greater number
either modify considerably or throw over completely all
such theories as soon as the course is finished and they
are confronted with the material problems of every day
life.

These as well as others had become aware of
the weakness of Spain from the various and violent
changes introduced by the more or less "liberal" gov-
ernments in that country since 1868. Such were the first
republic, the imported royalty as represented by Amadeo
of Savoy., the republic again, again royalty under Alfon-
so XIII, and the Regency with a running accompaniment
of a communistic uprising at Cartagena and a Carlist war
in the Basque provinces. The Filipino students had noted
the willingness of the ministers of these various gov-
ernments to risk the sacrifice of colonies or anything
else, in order that they might come into and remain in
power, so long as there was power left in which they
could remain. It was through such returned travelers
that the Filipinos became aware of the weakness of
Spain and it is not strange that they should have
endeavored to utilize this knowledge to bring about a dis-
content with the existing order of things and a revolt.

There were also complaints of abuses and injustice
committed by the Spaniards in their relations with the
native classes. But these were enormously exaggerated.
The abuses were neither so extensive nor so flagrant as
they were alleged to be. They were, indeed, mostly of a
minor character, such as no government, noihatter how
watchful or zealous it be, can entirely corrector prevent.

190

In this matter, the friars came in for more than
their share of vituperation and misrepresentation. This
was not infrequently at the hands of Spanish govern-
ment officials, more especially those belonging to the so
called "liberal" parties, who for party reasons were
more anxious to bring the friars into discredit with the Fi-
lipinos than to preserve peace in the islands. Therefore
they did not hesitate to saddle on the members of the
religious orders the abuses, exactions, and tyrannies that
they themselves had committfed. When they could not
on account of the nature of their acts succeed in screen-
ing themselves behind the religious orders as principals,
they gave it to be understood that these abuses were
committed at the instigation of, or under pressure from,
the friars-

Another source of discontent in the islands was the
foreign mercantile firms established in them. These
firms had brought with them an -immense amount of
capital. Prom this they expected to receive large re-
•turns, and their expectations were for many years amply
fulfilled, in the shape of interest for money advanced on
lands, crops, and other contingencies. The value of the
land upon which mortgages had been foreclosed, or were
close on foreclosure, by one foreign firm alone, amounted
to over five million pesos. To screen their transactions,
such firms usually threw the blame, not on the altered
conditions of trade and agriculture, which were the real
causes of this condition of affairs, but on the Spanish
system of government. They pointed out to their cred-
itors or debtors that whatever harsh measures they em-
ployed were the results of the pressure brought to bear
on them by the Spanish administration.

In the British colonies of Hong Kong and Singapore,
there was a large number of adventurers who lived by
their wits . For one reason or another, they had not found
that royal road to fortune they had hoped to discover.
Many of these had been to the Philippines, where they
had failed in their undertakings . win g to the opposition

191

of the Spanish authorities, they had not been able to ex-
ploit the natives to their own advantage or to the extent
they had wished. These werd always ready to seize on
any opportunity to foment political trouble in the neigh-
boring Spanish colony. Only in this way might they
possibly rehabilitate their fallen hopes.

The local British colonial newspapers, as much with
a view to airing their political opinions as to publishing
"news" with. which to entertain their readers, kept alive
the hereditary animosity of the British nation for Spain.
They assidously revived the memory of enmities that
had been handed down from the sixteenth century to the
nineteenth-
There were also in these British colonies important
mercantile firms, willing and anxious to sell ironmong-
ery or hardware, whether in the shape of sugar-mill
machinery or machine guns, repeating rifles or hypoder-
mic syringes, to all who could and would pay for them,
regardless of their destination or of the uses to which
they were to be put.

All these British elements raised the hue and cry
against the Spanish colonial government and welcomed,
for various reasons of their own, any disturbance that
was likely to increase their trade profits or to further
their political ideas- Consequently the Filipino leaders
and agitators found in these British Colonies no lack of
persons to extend them such moral sympathy as they
craved, or such material assistance as they could pay for-
At the same time the British were more than willing to
make use of them as cat's paws to pull their commercial
or political chestnuts out of the fire-

Another source of discontent was the friars, but
this, as has already been said, was an indirect cause and
arose from their patriotism as regarded both Spain and
the Philippines- In regard to Spain they were always
for supporting her authority, and in regard to the Phil-
ippines, they 'consistently opposed the visionary and
incendiary policies of the ultra radicals-

192

It is beyond the par adventure of a doubt that had
the friars given the faintest indication, not of sympathy
for, but merely of toleration of, the leaders of the revo-
lution and their objects, the religious orders would not
have received even a shadow of opposition from the Ka-
tipuneros. They were, however, not only Spaniards but
men of more than average experience of the world. In
their former capacity they were naturally staunch sup-
' porters of the authority of their own country. In regard
to the Philippines, they could easily foresee that, put-
ting all religious questions aside, the success of theKati-
punan in ousting Spain would in a very few years have
resulted either in the Philippines becoming a colony of
'some one of the great European powers or in being di-
vided up among several of them. Consequently they
were bitter and consistent opponents of the Katipunan.

The principal grievance alleged by the Katipunan
leaders against the religious orders was the lands they
were known to have and the money they were supposed
to possess. In order to create opposition to them on the
part of the people in the Philippines and a condemna-
tion of them unheard by foreign nations, both were enor-
mously exaggerated. Even men who, according to evi-
dence taken at Manila before the first Philippines Com-
mission, were deeply indebted to the members of these
orders both individually and collectively for favors re-
ceived at their hands, did not hesitate to testify before
the Paris Peace Commission not only to what was false
but to much of which they admitted they only had a
hearsay knowledge.

Another cause of this rebellion was that long before
the declaration of war between Spain in the United
States, the American Consuls in Manila, Hong Kong,
and Singapore were in close and constant communica-
tion with the insurgent leaders and agitators, and even
though these gentlemen may have had nothing to do
directly with the first uprising of 1896, they certainly
had with that of 1897. Whenever the sub.iect of an

193
uprising was broached by a Filipino to them or to any
other American, he was invariably assured that "we are
going to whip the Spaniards and set you free"; also that
the American people would as a unit extend its most
cordial sympathy to the Filipinos or to any people who
rose against a monarchical form of government, no matter
where such an uprising might be. Therefore the Fili-
pino believed that the United States Government could
not fail to protect and favor the Filipino insurgents, at
least indirectly, if it did not go to the extent of an arm-
ed intervention in their favor.

Another cause was that at the breaking out of the
Katipunan rebellion, the entire armed force of the islands,
including Staff, Line, Guardia Civil, Custom House
Guards, Marine Infantry, Sailors, Special Corps, etc.,
did not amount to 15,000 officers and men. Of these not
ten per cent of all ranks were Spaniards. Of such as
were, by far the greater portion were in Mindanao, Jol6,
the Caroline Islands, and other remote spots. It can
therefore be readily appreciated that this condition of
affairs was of itself an incentive to the Katipuneros to
tempt the fortune of war.

There had been a rather rapid growth of democratic
nationalist ideas, such as by one means or another were
bound to spring up among the Filipinos and which, the
more they came in closer touch with other peoples and
other systems of government, could not fail to have a
decided effect upon them. This effect, unless leavened
by the presence of a strong, well organized, and disci-
plined body of peninsular troops, was certain in the end
to extend to the native soldiers. Spain, therefore, to
maintain her power in the Philippines, should have in-
creased both her army and navy in the Islands. This
was the only manner in which she could hope to overawe
the agitators • and revolutionists or to quell any distur-
bances that they might create. She could have done
this gradually and imperceptibly, without exciting the
suspicions or jealousies of the inhabitants. But she

25

194
fajled to do so and, as a result, was forced to send
30, 000 men from Spain to put down a revolt which 5.000,
had they been present in the Islands when it first broke
out, could have effectually nipped, in the bud. If the
Guardia Civil in Cavite, instead of consisting of only
a scant hundred men, had been three times that strength
and had a part of them been Spaniards, the cry of An-
dres Bonifacio and Emilio Aguinaldo would have fallen
on deaf ears in that province.

On the other hand, any increase in the military force
would have meant an increase of taxation either for the
Islands or for Spain. Up to 1898, the forces in the Phil-
ippines, both land and sea, were paid for out of the col-
onial budget. Had the increase in revenue, necessary to
have maintained the increase of force, been charged to
the colony, this would have furnished a further ground
for complaint.

In spite of all the foregoing, the main cause and
principal motive power that started and kept alive the
revolution of 1896-98, the first part of which commenced at
Balintauac in August, 1896, and ended at Biac-na-Batoin
December, 1897, were the secret societies. These began
with Masonry, as established in the Philippines, devel-
oped into the "Liga" and the "Compromisarios", and
finally ended in the "Katipunan". The members of each
of these different societies were in touch with members
of all classes in the community. They worked on such
persons as they come in contact with, by urging the hesi-
tating, encouraging the timid, flattering the hopes of
the disappointed, predicting an increase of trade to the
smaller merchants, prosperity to the planters, and a
division of lands to the tenants of the religious orders
and other land owners in the event of the success of the
Katipunan cause. In a word they used every effort that
ingenuity could devise or imagination invent, to further
their aims. When persuasion failed to enlist proselytes,
they had recourse to force to fan the spark of discontent
into the flame of rebellion, and they succeeded.

195

According to the allegation of the Katipuneros, the
principal cause for this rebellion was the tyranny and op-
pression of the frifirs. On impartial investigation, how-
ever, they do not seem to have made out their case.
Prom all that can be gathered, it appears that in a major-
ity of instances the friars enjoyed the esteem and respect
of their parishioners and were on fairly good terms with
them and were well liked by them. This is proved by
the fact, for instance, that when on Aguinaldo's orders
they were expelled from their parishes, the many abuses
and cruelties, to which, according to their accounts, they
were subjected, appear, with rare exceptions, to have
been received at the hands of members of other flocks
than their own.

That in some cases, as at Calamba and Santa Rosa,
the friars may have been strict in insisting on the en-
forcement of the decrees of the courts, respecting their
rights, was not only sanctioned but was practically com-
pelled by the circumstances of the situation. According
to all law and justice, they were the rightful landlords.
Their tenants had already recognized them as such by
having entered into leases with them and p*id them
rents. Any refusal on the part of their tenants either
•to pay their rents or to vacate their holdings, would not
have been sustained in any court in the world.

At* the beginning of the rebellion of 1896, it is safe
to assert that ninety five per cent of the population of
the islands were in favor of the Spanish government.
Such discontent as existed, strange to say, was confined
to the members of a few well-to-do families of the Taga-
logs, Mestizos, and Sangleyes in Manila and the prov-
inces immediately surrounding that city. Even in these,
it was not until the Katipunan, started under their
auspices with the help of other agitators, intriguers, and
plotters, had acquired considerable headway, that there
were any thoughts of a rebellion among the masses of
the people. Had it not been for the extreme views that
the Katipunero leaders had forced upon the country, the

196

rebellion, by judicious reforms gradually introduced,
might have been controlled and the demands put for-
ward completely satisfied. This, however, was not to be.
The majority of the leading Katipuneros were constantly
egged on by others, who, hoping that by further em-
barrassing the Spanish government they would be able
to force an issue and thereby place themselves at the
head of affairs, insisted that all their demands be satis-
fied immediately. If this was not their object, their
action was childish in the extreme. It practically
amounted to their demanding that they at once be given
a new and complicated toy, exactly like that in the pos-
session of some other child, without taking into consi-
deration the time necessary to construct it.

Between the compromise of Biac-na-Bato and the
breaking out of the war between the United States and
Spain, some of. the Filipino leaders, not in favor of a
permanent separation from the latter country, found
their way back to the support of the Spanish govern-
ment. Others wholly in favor of a separation openly
declared themselves so, while many more prudently
waited till the fortune of war should point to them the
best road for furthering their own interests. Thus the
three elements, or categories, that had existed among-
the Filipino leaders up to that time, practically dissap-
peared. In their place rose the so-called National party,
consisting almost entirely of the Filipino leaders. It
was directed first by the ".Junta Patri6tica Filipina" at
Hong Kong and later by Emilio Aguinaldo at Malolos.
This party appealed to the United States to establish it
under the form of an independent government in the
Philippine Islands.

As to the mass of the people, before it had been work-
ed up by the Katipunan into a national party, it is safe
to say that of iqdependence, so far as the abstract mean-
ing of the word goes, they at that time knew little and
cared less. Provided they were not interfered with individ-
ually or heavily taxed, it was practically a matter of indif-

197

ference to them under what form of government they liv-
ed. The Katipunan and other political leaders had held
out to tenants on the estates of the religious orders as well
as to those of other land owners, the lure of having these
estates divided among them. Similar hopes were cherish-
ed by many of the inhabitants of the chief cities and
large towns, who looked forward to seizing and making
their own the urban property they occupied as tenants.
Beyond this they took very Uttle interest in politics
proper.

At the time the agreement of Biac-ua-Bato was reach-
ed, in spite of the destruction of life and property, in
spite of the awakening of passions and the calling into
existence of hatred^ that theretofore had not existed,
the majority of the Filipinos, especially of the middle
and better classes, were still loyal to Spain. When
they realized that, through the weakness of Sagas-
ta's pusillanimous administration, their loyalty had count-
ed fof naught, that all political offenses connected with
the rebellion were to be condoned, worse still, that the
Katipuneros were to be the only recipients of honors,
favors, and money at the hands of the liberal government,
and over and above this, were to be allowed to con-
tinue their agitation through the Katipunan committees,
then only did they naturally lose heart and many of
them, some fi-om disgust, some from prudence, and
some from force, hastened to join their fortunes to the
rebellion. They thereby gave it a new chance at life,
and this was increased by the promised intervention of
the American forces as soon as the war between the
United States and Spain should be declared.

The second and most serious period of this rebellion
started with Aguinaldo's return to the Philippines under
the auspices of the United States in the month of May,
1898. This second period was made possible by Sagasta's
administration granting a respite of four months to the
Katipunan, instead of making an endeavor to crush Agui-
naldo when it could have done so. The moral encour-

198

agementand material support of the American Consuls at
Singapore, Hong-Kong and Manila, allowed it to drag
on during three or four months. Later the arms and sup-
plies furnished Aguihaldo by Admiral Dewey, as well
as those received from the American Consul at Hong
Kong, enabled the Katipuneros to enter on what was
practically a second revolution which commenced, so far
as the Filipinos were concerned, with the action at Pa-
raftaque on May 31 and ended with the surrender of
Manila on August 31, 1898.

The events that followed from then on, will be treal;-
ed in the next paper.

FIFTH PAPER

THE WAR OF COUQDEST

FIFTH PAPER

THB WAR OF COHQOEST (d

The first shot in the "War of Conquest" was fired by
one W. W. Grayson of the Nebraska regiment on the
night of February 4th, 1899, according to his own state-
ment made to a newspaper correspondent in an interview
on August 5th, 1899. As a matter of fact, the war it-
self really had commenced on May 1st, 1898, when the
Spanish squadron was destroyed by Admiral Dewey off
Cavite. It was one of the inevitable consequences of the

(1) Whoever is seeking- for a detailed account or a general
sketch of military events in the Philippines, from the naval battle
off Cavite on May 1st, 1898, to the capture of Aguinaldo at Pala-
nan on March 24th, 1901, will have to go elsewhere. This paper
purports only to discuss academically the underlying motives for
the Spanish American war, and to set forth the vacillating policy
that was pursued in waging it in the Philippines.

To illustrate this statement two examples have been chosen,
the expedition to Iloilo under General Marcus L Miller to occupy
that city, and the one under General Frederick Funston to cap-
ture the person of Emilio Aguinaldo.

The first shows conclusively how General Otis, hampered by
instructions from the then administration at Washington, instead
of occupying Iloilo as he could have done without firing a shot,
when General de los Rios offered to surrender it to him about the
beginning of December, 1899, was later forced to send an expedi-
tion under General Miller. This while strong enough to have taken
it at a very trifling sacrifice at any time, lay off that place for
over a month, vainly endeavoring to secure its surrender by nego-
tiation. When at least the expedition did land, it was met by a
conflagration that destroyed the second city in the archipelago,
so far as commercial importance was concerned.

The second demonstrates how, untrammeled by vacillating and

26

202
Spanish American War. The United States, once start-
ed on its "vigorous foreign policy", had no choice but to
carry it out to its logical conclusion. In the case of the
Philippines, it is possibly true the bow may have been
drawn "at a venture", but once the string was loosed
the arrow sped on its flight and no earthly power could
recall it.

The Spanish American War was the outcome of
the "vigorous foreign policy" advocated by James G.
Blaine. Out of this policy, during the first administra-
tion of President Cleveland and more especially during
that of Mr. Harrison, who succeeded him (1889-1893),
grew the "Imperialist policy", whose first fruit was the
dethronement of Queen Liliukalani of the Hawaiian Is-
lands. This event was brought about by certain Amer-
ican filibusters, backed up by the American Minister,
J. L. Stevens, who requested the landing of some 140
sailors from the U. S. S. "Boston" to protect American
interests (2).

The Hawaiian republic was then established, Jan-
uary 15th, 1893. It proceeded immediataily to annex
itself to the United States. The bill ratifying this
annexation was submitted to congress by Mr. Harrison

contradictory orders or instructions. General Punston was able to
carry to a successful issue an enterprise which, though insignifi-
cant in numerical strength, was, apart from the importance of its
results, one of the most daring ever undertaken in any country,
and that without the loss of a single man.

Had Spain or the Philippines been anything near an equal
match for the United States on land or water, and taken advantage
of the lat-tc-r's delays of military action dae to that policy, the
whole affair might have resulted in serious temporary disaster or
perhaps even ultimate defeat.

(2) President Cleveland sent Mr. Blount as Commissioner to
Hawaii to enquire into and report upon the revolution of January
15th, 1893. Mr. Blount in his report said, among other things, that
Mr. Stevens' action in the matter was unwarranted and that it was
only the presence of the men landed from the Boston that made
the revolution possible.

203

towards the end of his administration, February 16th,
1893, but was never acted on by Mr. Cleveland, who
succeeded Mr. Harrison on March 4 1893. Thus for
the four years of Mr. Cleveland's second administration,
(1893-1897), Hawaii and the Imperialist Policy were left
hanging in the air. When Mr. McKinley came into
power in 1897, one of the first measures of his adminis-
tration was to admit the Hawaiian republic to the Uni-
ted States as a territory.

For many years prior to the Civil War, in fact up
to 1860, those known as the Southern or slave holding
states, though practically a purely agricultural district,
were in general terms the richest and politically the most
influential portion of the United States. These states
had not unnaturally endeavored to increase their wealth,
perpetuate their power, and extend their territory, and
with it the institution of slavery, by the aid of which they
had been able to cultivate the landed estates which were
the main source of their wealth and prosperity. More-
over the slaves represented, to a very large degree,
their working or business capital.

It may be well to remember that in all the thirteen
colonies that formed the United States of America, with
the exception of Pennsylvania, negro slavery, at the
time of the revolution of 1776, was in existence, recog-
nized and protected by law. Later, when slave labor was
found to be unprofitable, it had fallen into disuse and
gradually died out in many states: still it was never
abolished by either state or federal statute until the
twelfth amendment of the United States Constitution
was enacted and promulgated December 18th, 1865.

During this time of prosperity, the states in which
slavery was still profitable looked around for some ex-
tension of territory and naturally their eyes fell on the
islands of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Santo Domingo.
During Mr. Pierce's administration, (1853-1857), Pierre
Soule was sent to Spain as Minister Plenipotentiary,
and part of his instructions was to negotiate the pur-

204

chase of Cuba from Spainfor whatever sum that country
might ask for it. Spain, however, refused to sell.

This resulted in what is known as the "Ostend Man-
ifesto". It was drawn up by the American Ministers,
at London, Paris, and Madrid, who convened at Ostend
in Belgium by order of Mr. Pierce, the President of the
United States. On October 9th, 1854, they declared
that Cuba was necessary to the United States and that,
if Spain would not sell that island, it should be wrested
from her by force.

While the then administration apparently contented
itself with Spain's refusal, a large number of the people,
more especialy those of the Southern states, did not.
As a consequence, various filibustering expeditions, that
were very popular, especially in the South, were organ-
ized by certain individuals, (3) with the hope of repeat-
ing the history of Texas. They desired to create a Cu-
ban republic, which would eventually request admission
to the United States. As these expeditions were not
supported by the United States as a nation, they were
unsuccessful. Otherwise Cuba, and possibly Puerto Rico
and Santo Domingo also, with their immense wealth in
slaves and plantation property, would have been added
to the United States as slave holding states and would
have given a power and preponderance to the Southern
or slave states, that would have made them the pre-
dominating power in the Union.

The filibustering expeditions, however, were not a
success at that time. The next move of the would-be
Cuban annexationist was to foster a rebellion against

(3) See an article by General Frederick Punston in Scribner's
Magazine for September, 1910, which gives a capital description
of the organizing and starting of ote of many similar expeditions,
that had at various time left the United States for Cuba. These
expeditions were not successful until the Republioah party, with
the "expansionists'' in the lead, came into power and committed
itself to a "vigorous foreign policy", with Spain as a prospective
enemy and the annexation of Cuba as a probable result.

205
Spain in Cuba and to endeavor to establish a retjublic in
that island. Such a rebellion was popular all over the
United States, tirst, because by ousting Spain from the
Western hemisphere, it embodied the principle of "Ame-
rica for Americans"; secondly, it was a blow aimed at
monarchical institutions in general, and thirdly, it was
especially popular in the Southern states for the reasons
given in the preceding paragi'aph.

The War of Secession, however, put an end to sla-
very in the United States. When it was over, the
Southerners no longer had the same material interest in
Cuban annexation that they formerly had, although a
sentimental interest still remained, and was perhaps
stronger than ever, especially as it offered an outlet to
ambitions and hopes that had been shattered in a four
years' fruitles struggle at home.

"We'll free Cubq," became, so to speak, a war cry
by which ardent, adventurous spirits, North and South,
could be led to tind a neutral ground. There they could
joins hands without going into details as to whether the
majority of the Cubans wanted to separate from Spain
or, if they did, whether their condition would be bettered
by so doing, or whether they wanted to come under the
United States. They were convinced that if the Cubans
did not take their view of entering the Union, they could
easily be persuaded later to concur in the wisdom or
expediency of such a step, by argument if possible, or
by force if necessary.

The revolution of 1868 in Spain, by abolishing sla-
very in the colonies of that country, had practically
ruined Cuba, also a purely agricultural country depend-
ing for its prosperity principally on slave labor. There
arose in that island a large party which, hoping for the
direct or indirect support of the United States, aspired
to start a new and independent country. Thus they
thought they would be able, according to their own ideas
and by their own methods, to settle the labor difficulties
that were staring them in the face.

206

The United States, however, was a nation tired
of war. Moreover it was just then given up to recon-
struction problems and therefore had little time and less
inclination to enter into another war with even so weak
a country as Spain. Consequently the rebellion in Cuba
dragged on, never wholly successful and never com-
pletely crushed. This condition of affairs gave an open-
ing to the aspirations of the annexationists of both the
United States and the island of Cuba. It enabled them
to cloak their desire of annexing the latter to the
former under the euphemistic and ambiguous sentiment
of altruism (4).

Although Cleveland had never favored it, yet during
his second administration the "Imperialist Policy" was
strongly advocated by a large branch of the Reoublican
party as well as by many Democrats, who were collec-
tively dubbed the "Jingoes". Foi; reasons best known
to themselves, they and certain newspapers, then called
'■yellow journals", commenced to agitate against the
Spanish dominion in Cuba, setting forth as their reason
for so doing that the abuses and atrocities on the part of
Spain towards the Cubans were intolerable to the United
States. If, however, such abuses existed to the extent
alleged, they were due to the necessary severities inci-
dent to the suppression of the Cuban rebellion. This
rebellion had originally been and still was largely sup-
ported by a vei'y active sympathy, if not on the part of
the United States as a government, at least -of a very

(4) Altruism is susceptible of opposite interpretations by the
donor and the recipient. According to the recipient, the donor
may be giving something which no matter how pr;ecious or neces-
sary, the former does not appreciate or feel the desire for. For
instance, money and food are two excellent things; but to a man
who is starving, money is valueless, unless food can be immediately
purchased with it. On th^ other hand, to insist on forcing food, in
no matter what quantities, on a man in immediate financial diffi-
culties, unless he has a market at hand in which to sell it and thus
procure money to relieve them, maybe altruistic on the partofthe
donor but it is hardly appreciated as such by the recipient.

207

large numlper of American officials, great and small, as
individuals. This sympathy was carried to the extent
of allowing the Cubans to hold a "Junta", or Assembly,
that sat publicly in the city of New York. Through this
Junta, certain officials and politicians entered into rela-
tions, indirect but none the less effective, with the so-
called Republic of Cuba, whichof itself consisted of noth-
ing more than some malcontent agitators in Cuba, of
the Junta itself in New York, and of some armed bands
under Garcia, Gomez, and other leaders. In the shape
of territory it possessed nothing more than the ground
on which these bands stood, if it possessed that much.

The native population of Cuba at this time might
have been divided into three equal parts, one of them in
favor of the revolution, another in favor of Spain, the
third "on the fence", and ready to get down on the side
on the first that might be successful. Those of the
population born in Spain were practically to a man in
favor of remaining under that country and its govern-
ment. The foreigners resident in Cuba were divided in
their opinions and desires ac^rding to the dictates of
their personal interests.

American sympathy with the revolutionists, and the
intervention that grew* out of it, were not altogether the
pure altruism their advocates would have them appear
to be. If there were advantages for Cuba in a republican
form of government, the eventual positive advantages
offered to the United States were believed to be quite
as great, if not greater, for the possession of Cuba had
been officially declared as necessary to the existence of
the United States (5).

The Imperialist and "Jingoes", no matter what
their public utterances to the contrary may have been,
were in thorough accord with Thomas Jefferson, when,
in a letter to President Monroe in 1823, he said that
"the addition of the island of Cuba to our Confederacy

(5) See "Ostend Manifesto" drawn up in October, 1854.

208
is exactly what is wanted to round our power as a nation
to the point of its utmost interest." They also stood
with John Quincy Adams, who went so far as to state,
that "Cuba gravitates to the United States as the apple,
yet hanging on its native trunk, gravitates to the earth
which sustains it". The greater force of these state-
ments may be realized when it is remembered that they
were made more than fifty years before the war with
Spain was finally declared.

In that interim, the Cuban insurgents had been liber-
ally supplied with arms, ammunition, stores, and men
by citizens of the United States, whenever they were
required. This was the case not because Cuba was mis-
managed by Spain, but because that island was coveted
as "the most interesting addition that could be made to
our system of States", to quote Jefferson once more.
Thus Americans for close on to seventy years had been
seeking an excuse for the "rounding by the United States
of her power as a nation", by the annexation of Cuba. (6).

Since the days of Jefferson, Monroe, Adams, and
Pierce, the policy of "America for the Americans" has
grown to such an extent that, at present, it may almost
be said to be "America, and as much more of the earth
as it can conquer and hold, for the Americans." This
policy may not be that of the country at large or it may
not have been in favor with the majority of citizens; yet
the clause disclaiming any desire for acquisition of ter-
ritory was not gotten into the formal declaration of war
with Spain without discussion and opposition, and even
then it only applied to the island of Cuba. The Philip-
pines and Puerto Rico were not mentioned in it, and as
a matter of fact they had theretofore been rarely men-

(6) There are many thousands of Americans who have for
years been advocating, and still advocate, the annexation of the
Bahama and Bermuda islands, as well as Canada and the other
British possessions of North America. This is not on the ground
of altruism or alleged misgovernment of these colonies by England,
but because "they ought to belong to us".

209
tioned in any of the congressional debates on the subject.
Whether this was because Puerto Rico and the Philippines
were considered mere side issues, or because the more
astute politicians were anxious to keep them in the back,
ground in order that, Spain once vanquished, both Puerto
Rico and the Philippines could become "spoils of war",
to be retained by the victor or given over to their inhab-
itants, without being hampered by the resolutions of
the declaration of war, as policy or expediency might
dictate, is at present a matter of minor importance.

It is very doubtful if, at the commencement of the war,
the United States had any fixed policy or idea concerning
its ultimate intention in regard to the Philippines. Its
allowing two months to elapse between the destruction
of the Spanish squadron and the sending of troops to
finish on land what Admiral Dewey had begun on the
water, was ample proof of this, unless indeed the Impe-
rialists trusted the Filipinos would act with respect to
the archipelago as the Hawaiians had acted with Hawaii.

The only explanation or excuse that can possibly be
urged for the vacillating policy that then prevailed at
Washington, is the hypothesis that a 'determined con-
gressional minority had hurried an undecided majority
into a war for which the country, as a whole, was not
particularly anxious, for which it was utterly unprepared,
and which in a very brief period developed into a far
more serious undertaking than it had bargained for. The
country, indeed, found itself on the horns of a dilemma.
It had either to abandon the war ignominiously or to
carry it out to its logical conclusion. Either of these al-
ternatives was decidedly repugnant to America as a
nation.

This uncertainty of purpose in respect to the Philip-
pines was largely due to the lack of accurate information
at Washington as to the real conditions in those islands.
Many false impressions had been received from the Uni-
ted States Consul at Manila, who apparently was prepar-
ed to take an ex-parte view of the case and to credit

2^

210

information received from one source only. He seemed
to ignore the fact that that source was made up of persons
who had a deep interest in bringing about the interven-
tion of the United States in Filipino affairs, and who
were prepared to make any statements they thought
would chime in with his views, whether they were correct
or not, provided they accomplished their own ends. In
the light of subsequent events, indeed, his reports appear
better calculated to suport the theories and allegations
of the radical newspapers in the United States than to
furnish an accurate and comprehensive ideaof the actual
condition of affairs, and of Filipino general opinion. In
a word, the least that could have been expected of
him was accurate information based on facts, and not
personal opinions backed up by ex-parte statements
of the insurgents and their friends. The correspon-
dence of this gentleman shows either a most remark-
able talent for correctly grasping, solving, and deciding
out of hand, problems which even the most experienced
statesmen would have approached with hesitation, or
else a blind reliance on the one-sided information he was
able, by means o'f interpreters, to extract from the insur-
gent leaders and sympathizers he came into contact with
in Manila, during the four short months he was in the
Philippines before the declaration of war. Indeed, his
letters to the State Department, as published, read more
like specimens of provincial newspaper correspondence
than like official documents. The inaccuracies contained
in them, accepted at their face value, led to a greater
expenditure of blood and treasure than can ever be
calculated.

The Washington government was led astray at the
outset by excessive zeal on the part of its agents, more
especially of its Consuls in Hong-Kong, Singapore, and
Manila. In common with the vast majority of Ameri- .
cans, these men could not understand how any one, not
already an American citizen, could not be desirous of
becoming one, in case an opportunity to do so present-

211

ed itself. -They believed that a very large and in-
fluential class of Filipinos, if not anxious as a body
to become citizens of the United States, were at least
willing to allow the United States to direct the affairs
of the Islands indefinitely. In thus reporting to Wash-
ington, they were no doubt sincere. But the insur-
gent agitators were not slow to perceive their igno-
rance as to the real state of affairs. They applauded
the idea of citizenship and protectorate. They had
no hesitancy in thus confirming those agents in any
belief, no matter how erroneous it may have been.
They said everything they thought would lead up to
American intervention and the accomplishment of their
own ideas, trusting to the professed altruism and gene-
rosity of the United States to withdraw from the Philip-
pines, when it found out its fnistake respecting real Fili-
pino sentiments in respect to annexation.

The Filipino leaders did not realize that a military vic-
tory means nothing of itself, and that its only measure is
the result it leads up to. To retire from such an expedition
to the Philippines, if it did not mean ruin to the country
at large, meant it at least to the political party in power,
because such a step was tantamount to a confession of
having committed an egregious political error. There-
fore, on the principle of self-preservation, selfishness may
be said to be the first law of nations. Neither a country
nor a party, unless absolutely forced, is obliged to sacri-
fice itself irretrievably, merely to correct a mistinder-
standing of the conditions that furnished the motives for
a certain line of action. In a vs^ord, it was a case of one
set of politicians endeavoring to overreach the other, but,
unluckily for them, the Filipinos had the shortest arms.

The negotiations of the American Consuls at Singa-
pore, Hong Kong, and Manila with Aguinaldo and his
associates, were disavowed and disapproved by the State
Department. But the administration did not disdain to
profit by them. From their despatches to it, it must haye
been fully aware of what was going on. If it was and

212

yet did not furnish Admiral Dewey with the means of
carrying out his expedition both to immediate success
and to its logical conclusion, it is hard to see how, with
any show of justice, he could be blamed for making use
of such means as he found ready to his hand in accom-
plishing his object. Under the circumstances, it became
his business to weaken or destroy the Spanish forces
through Aguinaldo, so as to allow any American expedi-
tion that eventually arrived to push forward the work he
had begun.

Just what the military policy of the Washington ad-
. ministration may have been, or what policy it proposed
to carry out in reference to the Filipino insurrection, is
at present hard to say. But the expeditionary forces
sent to the Philippines were only small. From May to
September, 1898, they amoi>nted to no more than some
sixteen thousand in all, or an average of about four
thousand men each. Any one on its arrival was individ-
ually unable, unless aided by the passive or active
cooperation of the Filipinos, to accomplish anything by
force. It looked to the Katipuneros, therefore, as though
these expeditions had been sent merely to give moral
support, and as though the United Stated had no ulterior
motive beyond helping them into power.

There can be very little doubt, however, that the
war was undertaken with an ultimate view to the acqui-
sition of territory. But the prevailing idea in the Uni-
ted States as well as with the administration was that
this acquisition was to be made at the expense of the
Spaniards and not of the Filipinos. It was to involve
nothing more than a change of allegiance on the part of
the latter from Spain to the United States. It was hard-
ly conceivable by the average American that the Kati-
puneros or any one else could imagine that any adminis-
tration or political party would enter blindly into a war,
which eventually necessitated upwards of eighty thou-
sand soldiers and sailors in the Philippines at a cost of
about a million dollars a day, without some prospect of

213
indemnification. When the United States realized, how-
ever, that the Filipino agitators were not indifferent to
who ruled them and would not tamely be content with
what practically amounted to a mere change of masters,
and that this acquisition of their territory would not be
consented to by the Filipinos without a fight, it was too
late to recede. The die had been cast and there was noth-
ing else to do but abide by the hazard of the throw.

As to the moral and material conditions prevailing
in the Philippines, the American public was completely
in the dark, and this was largely due to ignorance. It
can safely be said that, up to the declaration of the war,
nine Americans out of ten had hardly even heard of the
Philippines, beyond that they were a Spanish colony.
Consequently the American general public knew little of
these islands and of what transpired in them, and cared
less.

As a matter of fact, many persons in the United
States, at the outset, were bitterly opposed to a declara-
tion of war. Still once the country had embarked in it,
they recognized that it was their duty to support the
government, no matter what their personal opinions on
the righteousness or expediency of the question might
be. They believed also that it was the duty of the ad-
ministration to carry the war out to its logical conclusion.
To do this effectually the administration should have
■clothed the comanders of both Army and Navy abroad
with wider discretionary powers than it saw fit to do. If
ft could trust to their .skill, courage, loyalty, and patriot-
ism to command their armies or fleets in action, it would
seem to stand to reason that it could surely have trusted
to these same qualities, supplemented with average com •
jDon sense, to pass on and decide question of local policy,
applied to immediate local military conditions. As it
was, they had to resort to the telegraph, or to the decisions
of persons who were unfamiliar with these conditions.
Yet in the end the latter had to be guided in their opin-
ions by the reports of the former.

214

II

The first action of the war was the naval engagement
at Cavite, in which Admiral Dewey destroyed the obso-
lete ships of the Spanish squadron, which in tonnage
and guns amounted only to about one half of that of
his own. As for the torpedo boats, submarines, mines,
and other artificial obstructions that the Spaniards were
supposed to have placed in the channels of Manila Bay,
they existed only in the minds of the newspaper corres-
pondents. The. only thing in which the two forces were
in any way matched was the courage of the officers and
crews. The Spaniards put up as good a fight as was
possible under the circumstances. Had they had better
guns and better trained gunners. Admiral Dewey's vic-
tory might have been none the less complete, but it
would doubtless have cost him a great deal deai:er than
it did.

Considered in any light it was a brilliant victory.
Admiral Dewey and the officers and crews of his squad-
ron deserve all the credit and even more than has been
given, for the preparation and training that assured so
decided a success. In spite of his victory, however, the
Admiral was unable to put it to any use or to take any
immediate advantage of it. The administration in Wash-
ington had made no preparations for a landing force to
accompany him. It was all he could do to furnish a
guard for the navy yard at Cavite.

The forces of the Filipino insurgents, which the
American Consuls at Manila and Hong Kong had given
him to understand were in existence, turned out to be
myths. The proof of this lies in a memorandum furnished
to the first Philippine Commission by Admiral Dewey.
It is to the effect that the United States Consul at Ma-
nila on March 30th, 1898, had stated that there were five
thousand Filipinos under arms, "loyal to use in case of

215
war", whereas beyond unorganized bands, he found no
PiUpinos under arms after arriving in Manila Bay.

It was in view of this that Admiral Dewey sent to
Hong Kong for Aguinaldo, to organize an uprising
against the Spanish insular government and to raise
the country against the Spaniards. Not until some three
weeks later, after that leader had arrived and, with
arms furnished by Admiral Dewey and with others
brought from Hong Kong and landed at the Cavite navy
yard, was he enabled to start the Filipino army and
commence ,the blockade of Manila. Thus it was that
Filipino aid was invoked to help us to fight our battles.

On the day following the battle of Cavite, May 2nd,
the Spanish flag was still flying over the town of Cavite,
separated from the navy yard walls by about 250 yards
of open ground. Admiral Dewey then sent a message
to the Spanish officer in command, to the effect that if
the place was not evacuated, he would bombard it. The
Spanish commander asked for time to consult with Gen-
eral Augustin. This was granted and, as a result,
Cavite was evacuated by the Spaniards, who retired in
the direction of Novaleta, Cavite Viejo, and Las Pinas.
Admiral Dewey took no measures to provide a landing
force to protect life and property in the town. As a
consequence, no sooner had the Spanish garrison with-
drawn than the insurgent bands from the neighborhood
swooped down on the place, gutted the churches and
public buildings, and plundered the houses of the Spanish
officials and sympathizers as well as those of their per-
sonal enemies among the inhabitants. There was the
usual accompaniment of riot and debauchery, to the cry
of "Viven los Americanos", and on the following day
there was practically little left to protect. (7).

Admiral Dewey has been blamed for not having
protected the inhabitants and kept order, after he had

(7) See statement of Benito Legarda before Philippines Com-
mission, August 12th, 1899.

216

forced the Spaniards to retire. He had, however, but
two other alternatives, either to disembark a sufficient
number of men from his ships to hold and protect the
place, and that, as Cavite is a fairly large place fortified
by stone walls, would have seriously crippled the effi-
ciency of his squadron, or to leave the Spaniards in pos-
session. Either of these courses would have been un-
wise. The first would have weakened his own command.
The second, over and above weakening the prestige of
the United States not only with the Filipinos but with
other foreign nations, would have been an open confes-
sion of weakness, indecision, and haste on the part of the
government io commencing operations by ordering him
to Manila with an inadequate force at his command to
do the work that it should have foreseen would inevita-
bly be required of him when he got there.

In acting as he did, that is, in turning the place
over to the insurgents, he in all probability had counted on
the discipline of some of the five thousand armed insur-
gents "loyal to us", that had been reported to him by
the American Consul as being in the neighborhood of
Manila, to keep order in Cavite.

As for Cavite itself, it is hard to say from which it
would have suffered most, a bombardment or the revo-
lutionists. The damage caused by the former might
have been more generally distributed over the town as
a whole, whereas that caused by the latter, while it was
more confined to gutting churches, public buildings and
private houses, was more thorough. (8).

It has also been said that Admiral Dewey could
have bombarded Manila and destroyed it, or under the
threat of a bombardment, he could have forced the
Spanish garrison to retire to the interior where, "out of

(8) "The people came there from the other towns and sacked
Cavite completely. There was nothing left further to be stolen in
Cavite."

Testimony of Benito Leg'arda before the Philippines Commis-
sion, August 12th, 1899,

217

reach of the guns of the fleet, the Spaniards could
have prolonged the resistance for years". This may or
may not be so, but even granting it was, there was at
that time absolutely no advantage to be gained by
Admiral Dewey in the destruction of Manila, receiving
its surrender! or forcing the Spaniards to abandon it. In
neither of -the latter cases had he a landing force to
garrison it. He would therefore have been forced to
turn it over to the Katipunero hordes, which would have
meant nothing more than a repetition, on a large scale,
of the Cavite business, a saturnalia of pillage, rapine,
and murder. For this, though powerless to prevent it,
he would have been held morally responsible.

As to the retirement of the Spanish garrison to the
interior, beyond a doubt that was also a possibility. On
the principle of the Scotch proverb that "a pig might
whustle, but its mouth's no just made for't," such are-
treat might possibly have been carried out; but the
Spanish military authorities were well aware that an
army has to have some base of supplies from which to
draw subsistence and munitions of war. Since in the
interior of Luzon no such sources existed, they realized
beforehand that whatever force retired on the inland
towns would eventually have to suffer the same fate at
the hands of the combined American and Filipino forces
as befell the garrisons of Malolos, Tarlac, and Dagupan
at those of the Filipinos.

Had such a retreat been made, the object of the
United States, namely, to have complete liberty of action
in the Philippines, would have been seriously trammel-
ed by an alliance with the Katipunero dictatorship. The
combination of forces that it would necessarily have been
compelled to make, because of and during any such
campaign, would have placed the United States in such
a position as to render it unable to "give" the island
just such a government as it, deemed proper for them to
have, or to carry out in its own way any scheme of an-
nexation, autonomy, or independence it may have had

28

218

in view, except at a much greater sacrifice of American
life and treasure than it actually had to make. Admiral
Dewey stated the case correctly when, in speaking to a
newspaper correspondent in reference to the. insurgents
attacking the Spaniards, he said "They're saving us lots
of American soldiers in clearing out that country over
there." (9),

For three months. May to July, 1898, the only rep-
resentatives of American authority in the Philippines
were Admiral Dewey and Emilio Aguinaldo; that is to
say. Admiral Dewey represented the United States on
the water and Aguinaldo represented Filipino coopera-
tion ashore. There can be no question or doubt that,
but for the presence of Admiral Dewey's squadron, the
rebellion would have collapsed after the battle of Cavite.
The United States forces then, instead of fighting the
Filipinos, as they eventually had to do in order to obtain
possession of the Islands, would have had to fight the
Spaniards. These however would "have known when .
they were beaten". The_ consequent evacuation of the
country by them and its occupation by the United States
would have been as uneventful as was the occupation of
Cuba.

How events fell out as they did is too well known to
need any comment, beyond that what eventually happen-
ed was due to Admiral Dewey's accepting, or rather his
asking for the cooperation of the Katipunan. The mere
fact of his relations with Aguinaldo and his associates,
turn or twist it as one may, amounted to- nothing more
or less than a request for their assistance and a tacit rec-
ognition of them as allies. This recognition was the
real foundation on which the Katipunero power was
built. At the time of American intervention, the whole
Katipunan did not represent the wishes or aspirations
of ten per cent of the population of the civilized tribes of
the Philippines. Up to Aguinaldo's arrival in May,

(9) "Chicago Record", August 31st, 1900.

219

1898, the insurrectionary movement was only kept alive
by more or less direct promises made to its leaders by
Americans in general and the American Consular agents
in particular. Though these real or implied promises
were magnified in transmission to the Filipino insurgents
in the Islands, both the Katipuneros in the Islands and
their leaders in Hong Kong sincerely believed that the
persons making them were empowered to pledge the
United States in this matter and acted accordingly.

Prom the battle of Cavite up to the beginning of
July, Admiral Dewey's squadron had done very little
more than blockade the city of Manila, cruise around
Manila Bay, and by its presence encourage the Katipu-
neros. Some ships had made short cruises to the north
of Luzon and some to the southern islands. Their opera-
tions were confined to a few unimportant boat landings
and an occasional trial of the range of their guns and
the skill of their gunners. That th^ latter was excel-
lent is amply proved by the ruins of more than one church
or prominent building of the coast towns.

During the war and the preliminary peace negotia-
tions between the United States and Spain, as well as
subsequent to the capitulation of Manila, armed steam-
ers, flying the insurgent flag, frequently made their ap-
pearance in Filipino waters. To prevent their preying
on the shipping hailing from Manila and other ports of
the islands, U. S. Consul Williams, formerly of Manila,
was charged with the placing of vessels flying the
Spanish flag under the American colors.

During the months of July, August, and September,
Aguinaldo had become uneasy as to the possibility of
the Americans abandoning the islands and leaving him
to a protracted struggle with the Spaniards. Conse-
quently he was especially anxious to establish his gov-
ernment as extensively and firmly as possible. To this
end, expeditions were fitted out by the Filipino dictato-
rial government and allowed by the United States
authorities to proceed on their way to the southern is-

220

lands. These were still being held for Spain by Gea-
eral Diego de los Rios, but it was hoped to stir them up
in rebellion against that country. As these expeditions
were not actively supported by the presence of the United
States land or sea forces, they were as a rule defeated
by the Spaniards. Towards September and- October
more Tagalog expeditions were sent south by Aguinaldo.
In many places, from which the Spanish. garrisons had
been withdrawn, they were successful in establishing
the revolutionary government.

For some weeks previous to the capitulation of Ma-
nila, there had been considerable friction between the
American and Filipino leaders. When the latter, after
the fall of the city, had begun to realize that the insur-
gent forces were not to be allowed to enter Manila in a
body, either as conquerors or as allies of the conquerors,
the scales began to fall from their eyes. On. the morn-
iag of Augst 14th, Aguinaldo sent a telegram to General
Anderson to the effect that as his Filipino troops had
always been promised that they could enter Manila, but
as they were' not to be allowed to do so as a body, he did
not consider it prudent to issue an order prohibiting
them from doing so individually. He then proceeded to
state that to avoid "any disagreeable conflict before the
eyes of the Spaniards," he would send commissioners to
confer with him .

While Aguinaldo was thus apparently endeavoring
to "save his face" before the Spaniards, he failed to
realize that the latter, from the negotiations they had
concluded with the Americans, relative to the surrender
of Manila, must by this time have become fairly well
aware of the relative positions of the Filipinos and Amer-
icans, knowing that he and his associates, having serv-
ed their turn, were to be relegated to a very secondary
place.

General Anderson answered the telegram by invit-
ing Aguinaldo to come himself; but this proposition evi-
dently did not suit that chieftain. He sent a reply saying

221

that, being unable to leave his government, he would send
a commission. When it arrived, Felipe Buencamino
and Gregorio Araneta were found to be members of it.

Aguinaldo's reasons for not going in person may
have arisen from a fear of being detained against his will
by the American authorities, or lest, during his absence
from his camp, some one else might endeavor to sup
plant him and seize the reins of power, or again that his
troops, bearing in mind his mode of procedure in the
Biac-na-Bato agreement, might suspect him of a desire
to make special terms for himself. Be this as it may,
he had always recognized his inability as a diplomat and
therefore invariably entrusted the management of what-
ever political negotiations he might enter into, to his
cabinet ministers, among whom were some persons of
more than average ability.

This commission presented to the American com-
mander a paper containing ten propositions. Starting out
rather bombastically, it first granted the concession to
him of the city of Manila. This concession was as easy
to make as it would have been difficult to withold. The
American forces were already in possession and though
perhaps as yet unable, from lack of strength, to operate
beyond the works defending it, they could have held the
city indefinitely against any 'force the Filipino govern-
ment could possibly have brought against it. Secondly,
it proceeded to make a concession of the water supply,
including the pumping statiop at Santolan and the res-
ervoirs at San Juan del Monte. This was a real and an
important concession on its part. Had they so chosen,
the revolutionists could -practically have cut off the
water from Manila and General Merritt, for the reasons
given above, would have been powerless to prevent
them. Thirdly, it asked for free navigation of the Pasig
river by the steamer "Patria", and free entry for pro-
duce, etc., into the city; also permission for Filipino of-
ficers to enter and leave the American lines wearing
their side arms. There was more in this demand than

222

at first appears. In case it was granted, the "Patria"
could carry arms or supplies up the Pasig river to the
provinces of Laguna, Morong, and other places. Fourth,
it demanded that the Filipinos be allowed their share
of the "spoils of war", probably meaning the arms, can-
non, trophies, etc., as well as such money as might be
found in the treasury belonging to the Spanish Military,
Civil, or Municipal funds. The latter they were sadly
in want of, in spite of the enormous war contributions
that had been wrung out of the country by the insur-
gents. (10).

Fifth, it asked that certain buildings, the Governor's
palace at MalacaQang and the convents of Paco, Ermita,
etc. etc., be turned over to the revolutionists. This ap-
pears to have been merely an effort to fulfill their boast
that they would soon sleep and eat where, they alleged,
the Spanish Governors and Friars had feasted in luxury.
Sixth, it requested that all Spanish employees be dis-
missed and their places filled by Amerians. This also
was a very safe request, as the American authorities
were hardly likely to retain the Spanish civil employees
for one moment longer than was absolutely necessary
and would promptly give their places to Americans.
This request was supplemented by a rider, that Agui-
naldo be given the right to nominate the appointees for
such offices as the Americans might 'make. In other
words, he made an effort to acquire the indirect patron-
age of them. Seventh, it asked that no American troops

(10) In one town, Gubat, in the province of Sorsogon, the revo-
lutionary government collected in five months, October 1st, 1898 to
February 28th, 1899, some P 52, 150.00. The total amount collected
by the Spanish government was P 18,000.00 per annum or about one
seventh of the Filipino revolutionary taxes. While there are no
data. at hand to show what the revolutionists collected elsewhere,
there is every reason to believe that, within limits, the proportion
was about the same.

For details of collections at Gubat, see Exhibit I, Report of
first Philippines Commission, dated February 28th, 1899.

223

be allowed to pass the Pilipiao lines without permission of
their commanders, and the right totreatas spies ail Span-
iards passing them, excepting under the same conditions.
This endeavor to limit the movements of the American
troops was clearly not consistent with its demand for the
free ingress and egress of Filipino troops to and from«Ma-
nila as made in the third proposition. Eighth, it asked
for the return of the arms of 150 Filipino soldiers who had
been disarmed by the Americans on entering Manila.
Ninth, it demanded that all agreements be made in wri-
ting ratified by the generals-in-chief of both armies. This
was very probably the fruit of experience in reference to
former verbal agreements. Tenth, it stated that the
sending of this commission and the petitions presented
by it did not in any way signify an acquiescence in Ame-
rican sovereignty by the insurgent government longer
than military necessity demanded. .

In drawing up this paper, the insurgents chose to
assume that the terms of the capitulation with the Span-
iards conferred on the American army only the right to
occupy the harbor, city, and bay of Manila, and that
by city was meant the territory comprised within the
Spanish municipality, without regard to natural limits
or such lines of demarcation as would bring all the defen-
ses of Manila and its suburbs within these limits.

General Anderson did not discuss these points; but
in answer to the note itself, promised that a plan, show-
ing the territory to be occupied by each army, would
be sent to Aguinaldo. This answer was not satisfactory
to Aguinaldo. He then wrote to General Anderson that
on the following day he would again send his commis-
sioners to settle on limits before coming to a decision
himself as to the withdrawal of his troops and other
kindred matter.

On August 14th, General Merrit issued a proclama-
tion. The opening paragraph set forth that the United
Spates expeditionary forces had been victorious over the
land and sea forces of Spain and had received the surren-

224
der of Manila. The second paragraph proposed to protect
the inhabitants from violence, etc., and to put an end to
the existing disorders and anarchy. The four following
paragraphs merely announced the establishment of a
military government and the appointment of the Provost
Marshal's Courts and laid down certain broad police re-
gulations, etc. They appeared to have no natural con-
nection with the first and seventh. The seventh and last
paragraph is merely a repetition in other words of the
principle set forth in the first two.

The proclamation can be divided into two parts,
namely, the first, second, and seventh paragraphs, in
which General Merritt justified the presence of the Uni-
ted States forces in the Philippines. He therein assum-
ed that certaiQ conditions existed, ignoring the fact that
indirectly they were very largely due to the United
States in giving encouragement and sympathy to the
Katipunan faction which had plunged the islands into
anarchy. The third, fourth, fifth, and sixth paragraphs
are merely orders establishing military courts, and in a
general way defining their scope and duties. The proc-
lamation as a whole seemed to be little more than a
collection of glittering generalities, and to have been
drafted with a view of being as noncommittal as possible.

On August 14th, General. McArthur was appointed
Provost Marshal General of Manila. This appointment
was by no means a sinecure. It required a man of more
than average tact, determination, and executive ability
to put to rights the affairs of a city of nearly a quarter of
a million inhabitants, the vast majority of whom
were hostile to, and the remainder suspicious of, the
Americans.

Notwithstanding the energy of the Provost Marshal
and his assistants, a considerable amount of kidnapping
(11) was done in Manila by the Katipunan. The victims

(11) See Statement of Benito Legarda before the Philippine
CotDinission, August 12th, 1899,

225
were generally persons who had incurred the displeasure
of that body. They usually accompanied agents sent to
fetch them without offering a show of resistence, even
though they knew that they were going to certain
punishment, perhaps to death. This passive obedience
was founded on the general treatment theretofore extend-
ed to the insurgents by the American authorities. There
was a firm belief among Filipinos that the kidnappers
were agents acting, if not under the authority of the
American Commanders, at least with their knowledge
and consent. Besides this kidnapping there was, of
course, the usual rioting of drunken soldiers in a conquer-
ed city, but beyond this the inhabitants received very
little annoyance from the American forces.

On the same date. General Anderson was put in
command of the troops at Cavite. This took the nego-
tiations with Aguinaldo out of his hands and placed them
in those of General Merritt. In view of the undefined
policy of the then administration at Washington, General
Merrit seems to have shirked responsibility in this mat-
ter. He telegraphed to Washington for information as
to how he should proceed in enforcing his instructions
regarding the insurgents, and it was not until August
20th, that, having finally received instructions, he pro-
ceeded on the strength of them to write to Aguinaldo.
In his answer to the ten propositions of the Filipino
Commissioners of August 15th, some of these were ac-
quiesced in and some were not, and the one referring to
the "spoils of war", was ignored.

The substance of this correspondence was that Gen-
eral Merritt could not consent to a joint occupation of
the city, which had been surrendered to the United States
forces, and that any headway the insurgents had made
was due entirely to American assistance. He also stated
that he held the city and its outlying districts. He
hoped there would be no conflict; yet, as he expected
reenforcements from home, he was prepared to enforce
his orders. He also directed that the insurgents should

29

226
not be allowed to post their troops in such a manner as
to make it appear that the American army was hemmed
in by a besieging force.

General Merritt gave this letter to an aide-de-camp
on his staff with instructions to deliver it to Aguinaldo.
He also gave this aid a private memorandum, which he
was to show to Aguinaldo in case he displayed a concil-
iatory spirit. There were only two important items in •
the letter. One was an assurance that, in the case of
the Americans abandoning the islands, Aguinaldo would
be left "in as good condition as that in which he was
found by the forces of the Government." The other one
stated- his agreement with the Consul, Mr. Oscar F.
Williams, that it would be well for Aguinaldo to send
some of his leaders to visit Washington. The remainder
of the memorandum referred only to subjects of tempor-
ary importance.- Mr. Williams' advice in the matter of the
Washington envoy was unwisfe. It evidently arose from
his being as much in the dark as to what the administra-
tion proposed to do with the Filipino question, as he was
in reference to the real conditions existing in the Philip-
pines immediately before American intervention. (12).

As Aguinaldo was away from Bacoor when General
Merritt's aide arrived, the letter was left for him and
the aide returned on the following day. After receiving
Aguinaldo's reply to it, he then made known to him the
contents of his private memoradum. This latter pleased
Aguinaldo and his associates, but they wanted a construc-
tion placed on the clause respecting the condition "in
which he was found by the forces of the Government."
They were told, however, that if they wished further ex-
planation, it would have to be sought from General Mer-

(12) Later, when- the Filipino congress assembled at Malolos,
Felipe Agoncillo, in accordance with Mr. Williams' advice, was sent
to Washington by Aguinaldo with the request that he be allowed
to at least state the case of the insurgent government before the
Peace Commission that was to assemble at Paris. Agoncillo was
not received officially at Washington and his request was denied.

227

ritt himself. Aguiiialdo voiced his thanks for General
Merrit's desire, expressed in the memorandum, for an
interview, but he pleaded ill health as an excuse for not
meeting him. His real reasons may have been the same
as those that governed him when asked for an interview
by General Anderson, namely a fear of his associates.

On August 22Qd, General Merritt, so far as the third
proposition of the Filipino commission of August 15th
was concerned, had already issued an order to disarm
all Spanish soldiers entering Manila, as well as all revo-
lutionists; these latter, however, were to have their arms
returned to them on leaving the city, and revolutionary
officers were to be allowed to enter and leave Manila at
their pleasure, wearing their sword and revolvers.

On August 25th, an attempt was made to come to a
preliminary agreement between the United States com-
manders and Aguinaldo, defining the zones to be oc-
cupied by the American and Filipino forces respectively.
On August 27th, Aguinaldo answered General Merritt's
letter of the 20th, to the effect that he was surprised
that General Merritt conceived the idea that there had
been any agreement that the revolutionary forces were
to retire beyond the line designated. He and the commis-
sioners understood, he further said, that his troops were
to be withdrawn after the conditions proposed by them
were accepted, and as no written agreement had been
come to, he did not consider he had contracted any obli-
gation. He then went on to say that had it not been for
his blockade of the city by land, the Americans would
have obtained possession only of the ruins of Manila; also
that while he did not complain of the ignoring of the as-
sistance received from him and the consequent obloquy
thrown on him. by his people, he promised to retire
certain lines.

Aguinaldo's answer also contained an important rec-
tification of the request for the free navigation of the
"Patria", which had amounted to asking for free navi-
gation for all vessels under the revolutionary flag. Gen-

228

ral Merritt in answer told him that the granting of
the permission for such navigation rested with Admiral
Dewey, who would pass on that matter. He also pointed
out that the conditions relative to the withdrawal of the
Filipino forces on a definition of lines agreed to by the
commission of August 15th, had not been carried out,
and insisted that they be complied with in view of in-
structions received from Washington. In the meantime
General Merritt was ordered to Paris as a member of
the peace commission. The answer to this letter was
accordingly left to General Otis.

Aguinaldo must still have had considerable belief in
the alliance theory or an extraordinary faith in what he
considered as abstract right ultimately prevailing against
concrete might. He must also still have cherished hopes
of making some diplomatic arrangements in the future,
for he complied with General Merritt's demands with-
out any apparent opposition, even though he must have
been well aware that this officer with the few troops he
had at his command was, for the time being, unable to
enforce them.

General Otis had arrived on August 21st, in com-
mand of the fourth expedition, consisting of close to
5,000 men of all arms. He was placed in command of
the Eighth Army corps August 23rd, 1898. On General
Merritt's departure, August 29th, he took over the com-
mand of the Department of the Pacific, as Military Gov-
ernor of the Philippines, with a command that now
consisted of some 16,000 officers and men of all arms in
Manila and Cavite.

General Otis, after reading Aguinaldo's communica-
tion of August 27th to General Merritt, which had been
turned over to him on August 31st, sent a telegram to
Aguinaldo at Bacoor. stating in substance that owing to
General Merritt's sudden departure, that officer had not
been able to answer it, but that as soon as he was able
to inform himself on the subject, he would do so.

Aguinaldo, in reply, sent a letter by an aide-de

229

camp, congratulating'^General Otis on his appointment
and mentioning at tlie same time that the aide would ac-
quaint him with affairs of private importance, etc., etc.,
etc. While there is no doubt that Aguinaldo's aide was
instructed to inform General Otis of the views of Agui-
naldo and his associates in regard to the relations existing
between him and the Americans, there is no record that
any return message was sent to Aguinaldo by General
Otis.

The correspondence that eventually ensued between
Aguinaldo and General Otis was devoted mainly to an
endeavor on the part of the former to entrap the General
into some written statement, by which he might commit
himself to a recognition, direct or indirect, of the alliance
theory. The means to that end was a request that
before the Filipino troops were withdrawn to the new posi-
tion, the American General should ask Admiral Dewey
to allow free navigation to the revolutionary vessls; also
that in case the Americans evacuated the islands in the
event of a treaty of peace with Spain on the basis of
Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines, the Filipino
forces be allowed to reoccupy the positions they held on
and previous to August 13th.

These requests were evidently prompted by a desire
to give the revolutionary government a standing on
which to base a request for diplomatic interference by
any other nation that might be induced to take such a
step. In this, however, Aguinaldo was unsuccesful.
General Otis was a lawyer of no mean ability himself.
Besides he had on his staff officers of the Judge Advocate
General's Department, men who had made the law, in its
higher phases, as applied to constitutional and interna-
tional subjects, a special study. Consequently the
Americans were able to see through and parry the ruses
of the legal and diplomatic lights of the revolution.

It can, scarcely be doubted, however, that General
Otis' letters, more especially that of September 8th, had
the appearance of having been written more for what

230

the American public would think of them than for any
particular effect they would have on -the revolutionists.
General Otis, if he knew anything at all, must have
known that a few terse lines to the point would have
been enough to explain the situation. The force he had
at his- command as well as that which both he and Agui-
naldo knew was coming, would have made his few words
more convincing than a lengthy document discussing,
from an abstract point of view, the conditions then exist-
ing. His letters, indeed, were more like the chorus of a
Greek play, which explains to the audience, in this case
the general public, such parts of the drama as do not
appear in the action of the piece itself.

By this time all parties must have realized that the
only way a definite decision could be reached would be
by. an appeal to that "ultima ratio regum", the sword.
Both sides were anxious, before making this final appeal,
to justify themselves before the general public, They
wasted considerable time in diplomatic sparring, carried
on in excellent Castilian and in better English, in a pre-
tended effort to avoid the inevitable. They thus sought,
of course, to place themselves in such a position as they
thought they would like to occupy in the eyes of the
world, yet seemed not to realize that the world judges
the merits of cases of this nature only by the results of
the struggle-

Tn this matter Aguinaldo was perhaps buoyed up by
the hope that some other power might intervene in his
favor. He forgot that the intervention of the United
States between Spain and the Katipuneros was one
thing, and that of any other country between the revo-
lutionary government and the United States was another.
The Filipino leaders had evidently cheated themselves
and their followers into the illusion that, in a struggle
for independence, they would receive, if not the material
assistance, at least the moral countenance of the great
European powers. They did not consider that while
England, Prance, Germany and other nations might

231
have been willing enough to assist them to a certain
extent against Spain, to do so against the United
States, flushed as she was with victory, was quite another
affair. They did not see that no matter how much these
countries may have been privately chagrined at Amer-
ican aggrandizement, they were not disposed to show it
publicly or to dispute with the eagle the quarry he had
stricken down. Perhaps least of all did they know that
even in the event of the success of such a step, whatever
nation made it would of necessity have had to assume
the sovereignty of the islands, hampered with the same
conditions as confronted the Americans.

III.

By this time relations were becoming somewhat
strained between the Americans and the insurgents.
The latter became thoroughly convincedjthat if they want-
ed to gain their independence, they would have to fight
for it. They therefore began to make their plans to
meet th,e inevitable. Aguinaldo thought it advisable to
change to a safer and more centrally revolutionary
place, and Malolos, in the Province of Bulacan, was
chosen. This place had the advantage of being practic-
ally on the line of the Manila and Dagupan Railway, the
only one in the Philippines, and of it the insurgents
might be said to have held full control. It was also out
of reach of Dewey's guns and far away from all Amer-
ican Influence. In fact it was quite in the center of the
old rebel hotbed.

Aguinaldo had already removed his headquarters
from Bacoor to some three miles north of Manila. On
September 13th, General Otis ordered him to move still
farther away. He obeyed the order on the night of the
14th, by moving his army to Malolos, withdrawing not
only his main force, which amounted to some eight
or nine thousand men, but also the detachments he

232

had stationed at Caloocan, Binondo, Santolan, Santa
Mesa, Pandacan, Santa Ana, Pasig, and Pasay, in all
some seven thousand five hundred more. About the be-
ginning of September, Macabulos, who up to that time
had been in supreme command of the separate Katipu-
nan government established in the provinces of Tarlac
and Pangasinan and the border towns of the provinces
of Zambales, Union, and Nueva Ecija, came under Agui-
naldo's immediate command and joined his forces to
those under the central revolutionary government.

Aguinaldo declared Malolos the provisional capital
of the Pilipina Republic. A congress was summoned to
assemble there on Reptembei' 15th. About a hundred
deputies responded to this summons, among them being
Pedro A. Paterno, and the later Filipino Commissioners,
T. Pardo de Tavera, Benito Legarda, and Gregorio Ara-
neta. These deputies where all Tagalogs and mere
creatures of the Katipunan and Aguinaldo. Whenever
they voted, they cast their votes absolutely as he
dictated. (13). This "Asamblea Nacional", (National
assembly), was opened on the 15th of September and a
message from the President, Don Emilio Aguinaldo y
Pamy, was read to the representatives. Pedro A. Pa-
terno was elected President, or speaker, of the Congress,
Benito Legarda, later Commissioner arid Delegate to
Congress, was chosen as "Vice-President, and Pablo
Ocampo as Secretary.

This congress immediately proceeded to vote sev-
enty five thousand pesos ($37,500.00 U. S. Cy.) per
annum to Aguinaldo for salary and expenses and" also,
on September 21st, issued a decree imposing military
service on every able bodied male Filipino over 18 years
of age, excepting those holding office under the Revolu-
tionary government.

'On the 29th of September, the ratification of the in-

(13) See statement of Benito Leg'arda before Philippine Com-
mission, August 12th, 1899.

233
dependence of the Pilipina Republic took place with a
most elaborate program. Congress was in session. The
deputies and secretaries of the new republic, and the
President, Aguinaldo, took the oath of office. One of
the features of the day was a gorgeous civic procession,
at the head of which rode four of Aguinaldo's red-trous-
ered body-guard escorting the Filipino standard. Next
followed several companies of cavalry, under the com-
mand of Colonel Gatmaita, who, to make himself more
conspicuous, wore a cloak taken from a Church image
of the archangel Saint Michael. In the middle of the
procession was,a large float richly decorated and drawn
by six well-caparisoned horses. Cn the float sat a young
girl representing the new-born republic, with a Spanish
banner torn into shreds under her feet. Behind the
float came the recently proclaimed President followed
by his secretaries. This procession made a triumphal
march through the district and disnersed at the church of
Barasoain (14). After the procession there was a grand
banquet at which were present the president, represen-
tatives, and chiefs, and a few ManileQos.

As has already been said, when General Otis took
command, Aguinaldo's letter of August 27th was still
unanswered. He was not slow to see the advantages to
be gained by accepting Aguinaldo's view of the confer-
ence of August 15th, as set forth in that letter. On the
strength of it he assumed that there was no agreement
at all between Aguinaldo and General Merritt and thus
left himself at liberty to act as he pleased in the future
and to define the territory to be occupied by the Amer-
ican and revolutionary forces as expediency might
dictate.

In his letter of September 8th, General Otis stated
that, according to the laws of war, the city of Manila
and its defenses belonged to its captors, the American
troops. Answering Aguinaldo's allegation that it was he

(14) See Padre Ulpiano's ''Nuestra Prision."

30

234

who prevented the Spanish forces from retreating to the
interior by blocking Manila and that if it had not been for
that blockade, the Americans would have come into pos-
session only of its ruins, Otis pointed out that had Spain's
subjects been contented with their lot, there would have
been no war between that country and the United
States, that the war was undertaken for humanity's
sake, and so on. He might also have gone on to point
out that the Filipino expedition was merely an incident
arising out of the Cuban war, which, originally was the
main point at issue between the United States and Spain-

The argument that the war had been undertaken
for humanity's sake was hardly likely to appeal, with
much force to Aguinaldo and his associates. His inter-
est and theirs consisted in getting the upper hand in
Filipino affairs, to which end they had started the Ka-
tipunan and the rebellion of 1896. They assumed that
the American expedition had been sent to the Philip-
pines with the express purpose of assisting them in their
purpose. What lent further color to this theory of theirs
was the fact that Admiral Dewey had lain with his squad-
ron in Manila Bay for over three months without de-
manding the surrender of Manila, as he could have done
at any time under the threat of a bombardment in case
of a noncompliance with his demand.

It would have been enlightenment, indeed, had they
known that Admiral Dewey's real reason for acting as
he did, was because he had no landing force to put into
Manila as a garrison, for he hardly wanted a repetition,
on a large scale, of the doings of Cavite. As a matter
of fact, the revolutionists up till then had construed
Dewey's action into a desire on his part to have them
organize a government to which to turn over Manila; but
in view of the trend affairs were now taking, they com-
menced to look upon American intentions with suspicion
and alarm.

General Otis's letter went on to say that those who
surrendered actual possession conferred "a discretionary

235
power which can neither be shared or delegated. " In
this, however, his principle differed from Admiral
Dewey's practice, especially at "Isla Grande" and other
places, where the latter officer had invariably turned
over to the insurgents all places and prisoners that had
surrendered to him.

In another part of his letter, he pointed out that
the Filipino flag could be allowed to be flown on the high
seas only after a recognition of the Filipino revolutionary
government as a belligerent power. In concluding that
subject he shifted the burden of the answer to his ques-
tion upon Admiral Dewey, who was in charge of all such
matters; but he went on to doubt the Admiral's power
to grant their request. Respecting the clause asking
that, in case of a return of Spanish sovereignty, Aguinaldo
be allowed to occupy the positions he had vacated, Otis
stated that neither in law nor morals could this conces-
sion be made; moreover, in view of his orders from Wash-
ington, he was powerless to accede to the request. He
then proceeded to give Aguinaldo until September 15th
to withdraw to the lines indicated to him, and then shat-
tered his last hope by informing him that with all these
decisions and arrangements Admiral Dewey was perfectly
in accord.

Aguinaldo did not comply with General Otis' order
immediately, but on September 13th sent a commission
with a counter proposition, requesting permission to
withdraw his troops just outside the lines prescribed by
General Merritt. This was rejected. The commission
then asked that General Otis withdraw his letter of the
8th, which was also refused.

Seeing that their object was fruitless, the commis-
sioners told General Otis that the troops would be with-
drawn, but pointed out the impossibility of making them
do so by an order emanating from the American com-
mander. They therefore suggested that this be put in
the guise of a request.

As it apparently was a matter of indifference to Gen-

236

eral Otis whether the withdrawal of the insurgents, pro-
vided they could be induced to withdraw without a fight,
was in compliance with an order or a request, he wrote
a letter making the latter. On September 15th the in-
surgents withdrew from the city and suburbs. Not so,
however, Pio del Pilar (15) who refused to move his troops
from Paco. Aguinaldo sent representatives to General
Otis who stated that, if the time allowed was extended,
he would have Pilar's troops withdrawn by detachments,.
This extension was granted by General Otis.

Pilar seems to have been the only one of the insur-
gent leaders who grasped the fact that at that time the
American commanders were not a position to use force.
Therefore until they were, he thought he might profit
by that condition, complying or not, as he saw fit, with
any orders even indirectly originating with them. He
allowed no one to pass his lines without a special permit,
his troops having even gone so far as to prevent Gen-
eral Anderson from doing so.

General Otis wrote to Aguinaldo concerning these
abuses by Pilar and warned him that they would not be
tolerated in the future. At the same time he advised
Aguinaldo that he might require a piece of land at Santa
Mesa to use for hospital purposes. Aguinaldo answered
this letter by sending a commission, of which T. H.
Pardo de Tavera was a member. This body presented a
letter signed by him to the effect that they appreciated
the expressions of friendship and good feeling manifest-
ed in General Otis' letter of September 14th and acceded to

(15) Pilar was a notable character and one of the most deter-
mined of the revolutionists. He was unscrupulous, a thorough-
paced ruffian and, as good authority has it, a murderer; but he was
a good fighter and his troops' believed in him. His ambition did
not go beyond the command of a division, but he resented any in-
terference with that. He only obeyed Aguinaldo's orders when he
considered it expedient for the good of the cause to do so. As they
did not in this case chime in with his ideas as to the vacating of
Paco, he held on to it, to the no small annoyance of the insurgent
authorities as well as the Americans.

237

his request; but in view of the possibility of the Spaniard
returning to the Philippines, as a result of the Peace
Conference then in session in Paris, the Filipinos wished
to obtain some modification of General Otis' demands.
As a result General Otis agreed to the only request
of any importance made, namely that the time for evac-
uating the positions held by them be extended to Oc-
tober 25th.

The request for a place to establish a convalescent
camp at Santa Mesa was a source of uneasiness to the
revolutionary leaders. By the 20th, the revolutionary
troops were removed southward by rail, and concentra-
ted near the northern line of the city. General Otis call-
ed Aguinaldo's attention to. this threatening demonstra
tion. Aguinaldo sent a letter by T. N. Pardo de Tavera,
stating that, in view of the excited state of the country
due to the revolution, it was incumbent on him to act
cautiously. He wanted to avoid internal dissensions.
For this same reason he was also forced to enquire into
the conditions under which General Otis proposed to
establish a sanitarium within the Filipino lines. To
avoid further friction, therefore, he did not dare to ac-
quiesce in General Otis' request without coming to a
previous understanding.

General Otis answered on September 27th, to the
effect that his purpose could not in anyway be a menace.
It would really place his sick in the power of the Filipi-
nos, etc- He went on to offer the bait that the purchases
that would have to be made for this sanitarium would
benefit the surrounding country. They would help the
small trade that would spring up in furnishing supplies.

By this time Aguinaldo had become very shy of ma-
king any concessions- Ignoring the benefits to the sur-
rounding country, which in all probability were a mat-
ter of minor importance to him, he pointed out that if a
hospital were built, unless General Otis proposed to de-
pend solely on the guaranty of the Filipino government,
' an American force would have to be placed there to pro-

238

tect it. He judged that in view of the inexpediency of a
dual occupation by li^ilipinos and Americans, it might.be
a source of danger to the harmony existing between
them. He urged that he was forced to consider the mil-
lions of souls whose security and interests might be com-
promised' in the case of a conflict. Such an arrangement
therefore required a written agreement. Moreover he
could not act without consulting the representatives of
the people.

On October 10th, General Otis answered to the effect
that the convalescent camp was not necessary, and that
in fixing limits and bounderies, he would be guided by
the capitulations with Spain, which the United Statee
was bound to observe.

In the whole of this correspondence General Otis
made an effort peacefully to obtain a foothold on Santa
Mesa heights. That would have put him in possession
of the low ridge that runs from the Pasig to the north
of Manila, and would have given him the only command-
ing position near the city. Aguinaldo evidently saw
through, or thought he saw through, General Otis' de-
sign. The chieftain was not disposed to accede to it, nor,
at that juncture,, was General Otis prepared to employ'
force to back up his request.

On October 2nd, the Spanish American Peace Com-
mission, to attend which General Merritt had given over
command on August 22nd, held its preliminary meeting
at !^aris under the presidency of the Hon. John Day,
with Mr. J. B. Moore as Secretary. On December 8th,
the Commission again met for discussion. The form in
which the treaty was to be drafted was settled. The
President of the Spanish commissioners protested
against it, declaring that they had been compelled to
yield to brute force and an abuse of international law.
The document itself was signed on December 10th, 1898.

There was only one incident of importance during
the sessions of the commission. Felipe Agoncillo, who
represented the Malolos government, though refused a

239

hearing, handed a document to both commissions. It
was to the effect that the Filipinos had gone to war to
gain their independence and not to fight against Spain
in the interest of the United States.

Toward the end of November, or the beginning of
December, 1898, General Diego de los Rios, senior officer
of the Spanish forces in the southern islands, with head-
quarters at Iloilo, sent his aide-decamp to Manila on a
mission to General Otis. The substance of his message
was that he was convinced that the treaty, then under
discussion in Paris, would result in the concession of the
Philippine Islands to the United States. As the city of
Iloilo was surrounded and practically blockaded on the
land side by the revolutionary forces, he would therefore
be pleased to turn it over to the United States, whenever
General Otis desired, withdrawing the Spanish garrison
to Zamboanga. He was of the opinion that it would be
to the advantage of the United States to take possession
at the earliest possible moment.

This proposition was discussed by General Otis.
While he did not consider that it was necessary to take
any immediate action, he nevertheless thanked General
de los Rios for his offer to evacuate the town in favor of
the United States. He also sent him a message to the
effect that as soon as the negotiations of the peace com-
mission showed definitively that the United States would
succeed to Spain in the government of the Islands, he
would accept his proposition.

In acting in this inanner. General Otis was very nat-
urally cautious as to the acquisition of territory and the
responsibility attached thereto. In the first place he was
by no means certain as to the exact outcome of the pro-
posed treaty. He knew, what General de los Rios did
not, that the action of the Peace Commission at Paris
was by no means final. The-powers of the Spanish Com-
missioners might be plenipotentiary but those of the
American Commissioners were not. The Madrid Gov-
ernment might consider itself bound by whatever the

240

terms of the treaty called for, but the American govern-
ment did not consider itself so bound, because, before
becoming an absolutely irrevocable instrument, the
treaty, was subject to discussion and approval by the
United State Senate. This, coupled with the fact that
the treaty was actually passed by that body only after
considerable discussion, prov^es that General Otis was
justified in what might appear to have been over cau-
tiousness. In the second place, as a military comman-
der, he did not consider himself called on to assume the
defense of an open town, the right of possessing which
was still in doubt. He did not see that he should pro-
tect it against the Filipino troops, if he could get any
one else to defend it for him. He had the more reason
to be unwilling to go south since expeditions and sup-
plies for the revolutionists had all along been allowed
to sail from Manila for the southern islands.

As soon as the conditions of the treaty of Paris were
agreed to, December 10th, 1898, General Otis was advised
by cablegram, and this advice must have reached him by
the 12th. On the 14th, in view of General de los Rios'
proposition, as well as of a petition received from the
business men of Iloilo, he cabled to Washington that the
latter had asked for American protection, that the Span-
iards were still holding out, but would receive American
troops, that the revolutionists were reported to be favor-
able to American annexation, and also that he could send
troops to occupy the place. He then asked if he should
take action.

As no answer was recived from Washington until
December 19th, General Otis took no immediate steps in
the matter. But he must naturally have been very
anxious to secure peaceable possession of the city, the
second commercial importance in the islands. The ear-
liest opportunity would have suited him, the more so as
the revolutionists were reported to have made an attack
on the city, and though the Spaniards had repulsed this
attack, they were still hard pressed by the Filipinos.

241

General Otis conferred with Admiral Dewey on this
matter. The former was anxious to act immediately,,
even in the absence of specific instructions from Wash-
ington. But the Admiral, since General Otis had asked
for instructions, thought it wisest to wait for them.
Moreover both were of the opinion that General de los
Rios would hold out until the American troops came to
relieve him,

In this matter General Otis must have realized the
immense disadvantage he was under as a Commander in
a country like the Philippines with only limited author-
ity, or rather with none at all, so far as the sea forces of
the expedition were concerned. Had he in this particular
case been in a position to give an order to the latter, he
could have secured the possession of the city of Iloilo
before it was destroyed. On the other hand, as it even-
tually turned out, he would have had to defend it. But
the revolutionists, seeing the Americans in possession
and a naval squadron to assist in its defense, would
undoubtedly have had more hesitancy in attacking them
than in attacking the Spaniards, who had no such assis-
tance. One result, however, would seem to have been
fairly certain, and that is the city would not have been
burned.

Just what ground either General Otis or Admiral
Dewey had for assuming that General de los Rios would
hold Iloilo indefinitely against the revolutionary attacks,
thereby needlessly exposinghistroops to losses and per-
haps to a defeat, after having been ordered to abandon
it by his own government, is hard to say. It would seem
that as Spain had ceded the Philippines to the United
States by the treaty of Paris, the least the United States
could do through its General in command of the Philip-
pines, was to take over at once such places as the
Spaniards were prepared to evacuate. By General Otis'
own showing in his cablegram of December 14th, he had
the men to do it with.

On December 23rd, General Otis received a cable

31

242

gram from Washington directing him to send the neces-
sary troops to Iloilo. But he was advised it was import-
ant that there should be no conflict with the revolutio-
nists. The cable operator at Capiz had already informed
the superintendent of the cable company at Manila that
General de los Rios would leave Iloilo on the afternoon
of December 24th, and General Otis was so informed on
that day.

General Otis immediately telegraphed to General de
los Rios that in the course of the next two or three days
he would send a considerable force to Iloilo and that its
commander was ordered to confer with him. There was
no direct cable to Iloilo, however, and as the telegraph
line between that city and Capiz, one of the northern
towns of Panay, had been cut, telegrams for Iloilo from
Manila were carried by the Spanish gunboats from Ca-
piz and Iloilo. It so happened that the gun-boat had
sailed at 5:35 p. m., and that General Otis' telegram ar-
rived at Capiz at 5:50 p. m., just a quarter of an hour too
late to be forwarded to General de los Rios.

When General Otis found that he could not reach
General de los Rios by telegram, he sent Lieutenant-Col-
onel Potter to Iloilo by the "Butuan" on December 24th.
Colonel Potter reached that place on the 26th. As he
found the insurgents in possession of the city, he landed
and had an interview with the British Consul. On his
return he reported to General Otis that the town was
quiet, with Aguinaldo's flag flying, but that he was unable
to come to any conclusion as to what would be the prob-
able results of the arrival of the expedition then prepar-
ing under General Miller.

Oa December 25th General Otis received a telegram
from General de los Rios dated the 24th. It was to
the effect that the treaty of Paris was signed and that,
in accordance with orders from his government, he would
repair to Manila by the end of the month.

Immediately on hearing that General de los Rios had
left Iloilo, General Otis ordered General Marcus P. Miller

243
to proceed.to that port. lu case the Spanish forces were
still in possession, he was to take over the command of
that city from the Spanish General.

The orders given to General Miller were accom-
panied by minute instructions as to how he was to
proceed to endeavor to gain peaceful possession of Iloilo
from the revolutions ts, in case the Spaniards should have
abandoned it. They went into details concerning the
form of government to be established and also dictated,
in substance, just what General Miller should say to the
Ilongos. In a word. General Miller was sent to a place,
the actual conditions of which were completely unknown
to him and to the American authorities in Manila. He
was a commander who should have been clothed with
the largest possible amount of discretionary power, but
his hands were more completely tied than had ever been
the case of any one at the head of a similar expedition
despatched to accomplish a like object.

General de los Rios had already waited for nearly a
month since sending his aide-de-camp, Major Castro-
verde, with his proposition to receive an American gar-
rison, but he got no definite answer as to when it would
be sent. He was being continually harassed by the at-
tacks of the Filipinos who outnumbered him. Since Ilo-
ilo is ^ut two days' sail from Manila, he in all probability
thought that in waiting ten days for the arrival of the
American relieving force, after the information of the
cession of the islands to the United States had been re-
ceived, he had done all that was required of him. He
not unlikely thought that if in this time General Otis
took no steps to protect this newly acquired territory, it
was not incumbent on the Spaniards to do so for him.
Therefore he made his arrangements to start for Zam-
boanga on the 24th. On that day he withdrew his gar-
rison without molestation from the insurgent^ who, pro-
bably knowing that they would get nothing but hard
knocks from him, made no attempt to stop him.

Later an endeavor was made to shift the responsibil-

244

ity for the abandonment of Iloilo upon Spain. But at
headquarters in Manila they certainly, must have been
aWare of General de los Rios' intentions. Even if they
were not directly aware of them, the petition sent on the
14th by the foreign merchants in Iloilo must have shown
that these latter were. After General de los Eios' com-
munication in November, had it been desired to have the
Spanish garrison remain, some positive understanding
in the matter could surely have been reached by the two
Generals.

On the following day, December 25th, a small de-
tachment of Filipinos took possession of the town and
arranged to police it, refraining from any molestation of
the inhabitants. The next day, the revolutionary forces
that had been investing the city, entered and took pos-
session in a perfectly orderly manner. Don Juan Leon,
a well known citizen of the place, took temporary charge
of the civil government of the city.

On December 26th, General Miller's expedition, con-
sisting of the transports "Newport" and "Pennsylvania"
convoyed by the U. S. Ships "Baltimoi-e" and "Petrel"
and the gun-boat "Ga'llao," started from Manila for Iloilo.
The general took with him a number of native soldiers
who had been in the Spanish service. These were to be
turned loose in Panay in the hope that, as an indication
of friendliness to the Filipinos, it might cause the rev-
olutionary authorities to come to friendly terms with
General Miller. Later, on January 21st, 1899, another
batch of 600 Visayans, who had also been in the Spanish
service, was sent. General Miller got orders' to receive
and presumably disembark them at Iloilo or its vicinity.
It was thought they would give less trouble there than
if sent to other points.

Just what General Otis actually expected to ac-
,complish by sending these prisoners of war to the insur
gents at Iloilo is hard to imagine. In all previous cases
where native troops of the Spanish service fell into the
hands of the revolutionists, they either were butchered,

245

as at Samal, or were induced by moral suasion or physical
force to join the revolutionary forces. Thus this method
of disposing of prisoners served merely to increase the
number of the enemy.

This expedition was also accompanied from Manila
by certain alleged representative 'men of Iloilo who
were to help to persuade the inhabitants to favor
yielding to General Miller's command; but this commis-
.sion turned out practically a failure. On arriving at Iloilo
and finding that their own people were in possession of
the city, the wavering ones among them changed their
views. They appeared then to be afraid to express an
opinion to the Ilongosin supportof American occupation.

It seems strange that the military branch of the
revolutionary government should have been ignored
as much as it was. After all, it represented the force
of that government. As long as it remained in power,
those of the' civil element who were not in accord with
it, were not likely to have very much to say one way or
another.

General Otis evidently jumped at many of his con-
clusions. For instance, he referred to ' 'a widely prevail-
ing sentiment in the city" in favor of receiving General
Miller's force "without resistance." How he could have
'Come to that personal conclusion in this particular mat-
ter, unless it was from the foreign business men of IloJlO,
who by no m.eans repregentpri ^^^^ ^ ^^^Jl minority of
rthe inhabita,nts of that place, is hard to'say. Colonel Pot-
ter, ^ho had been sent to Iloilo by General Otis on De-
cember 24th, was back in Manila by the 29th. His stay
at Iloilo had been so brief as to preclude the possibility
of his learning any thing from the natives. Moreover
be had already stated that he was unable to come to any
conclusion as to what would be the result of the ex-
pedition then preparing under General Miller. The
conclusions of General Otis as to the sentiments of the
Ilongos were therefore mere matters of guess work,
based on the opinions or desires of others.

246

It seems there were some further communications
between General Otis and Admiral Dewey respecting
this expedition, and the latter even went so far as to sug-
gest that General Miller's expedition be recalled. This
determined General Otis to leave the war vessels and a
part of General Miller's force "to confront Iloilo," and
to scatter the remainder among the other ports of the
southern islands.

On December 30th, the Washington government was
informed that all military stations outside of Luzon, with
the exception of Zamboanga, had been evacuated by the
Spaniards. It was also told that the inhabitants, "who
may be denominated as insurgents more or less hostile
to the United States", had taken possession of them,
and that while some of them could be re-taken without
friction, all could have been so occupied before the 23rd
of December, "when Spain withdrew her forces without
our knowledge".

In making this statement, though he adhered to fact.
General Otis endeavored indirectly to throw, the respon'
sibiUty for this condition of affairs on the Spanish au-
thorities. He ignored what was glaringly evident, name-
ly that so far as relieving the Spanish garrisons was
concerned, he alone was to blame for not having done
so. General de los Rios had advised before December
10th that he was ready to turn over these places as soon
as General Otis was ready to receive them.

General Otis also chose to ignore the fact that from
the time of the arrival of the American forces in Manila
Bay and all during the armistice with Spain, pending
the negotiations of the peace commission, Aguinaldo
had been allowed by the United States authorities to
equip expeditions and to start from Manila Bay against
the Spanish authority in the southern islands, thus in
spite of the armistice, indirectly carrying on the war.
Consequently if the revolutionary forces blockading Iloilo
had acquired a development that now meant a problem
to the Americans, it was very largely due to these very

247
expeditions. That Geners^l de los Rios would hold that
place indefinitely under such circumstances was hardly
to be expected.

According to a despatch of General Otis to the Ad-
jutant-General of the Army, Aguinaldo's original cab-
inet had resigned and a new one was formed. It consist-
ed principally of "irresponsible men, who demand com-
plete independence and a war with the United States. "
That the old cabinet had resigned was fact. But this
despatch seems to imply, without saying how or why,
that the old cabinet was composed of persons of greater
responsibility and more favorably disposed towards the
United States.

Another very important fact, of which no notice at
all seems to have been taken, is that there was a Fili-
pino assembly, such as it was, in session. This new cab-
inet, no matter how responsible or irresponsible its
members may or may not have been as individuals, was
certainly ministerially responsible to its government.
Both they and Aguinaldo alleged that they were acting
under the authority of the Filipino assembly. The des-
patch also stated that there was a large number of insur-
gent troops in the field in Luzon, that there were 5,000 in
the immediate neighborhood of Manila, and also that
there was a threatened uprising in that city.

In the same despatch, General Otis stated that the
great majority of men of property desired annexation.
Any means of knowing this with certainty, however, must
have been of the most limited nature. The statement
must have been based upon impressions gathered from
members of English and other foreign mercantile firms
in Manila. The greater part of these were more or less
extensively holders of property which had been acquired
principally by the expedient of mortgage foreclosures.
Such individuals as well as concerns were likely to be
losers by legislative enactments, were any revolutionary
Filipino government to come into permanent power.

There appears to have been much dissatis"f action

248

among the revolutionists and many conflicts between them
and the inhabitants. This dissatisfaction was due to the
fact that the revolutionary forces had been restrained
from entering Manila. By the plunder of that city they
had hoped to recoup themselves for the pay due them
but not received. The conflicts with the inhabitants
were perhaps the result of an awakening on the part of
the latter from the illusion that the Katipunan had thrust
on them, namely, that the American forces would support
the revolution in everything. When it was found that
this was nob the case, they made an endeavor to shake off
the grasp that had been fixed upon them.

General Miller duly entered the Iloilo roadstead and
anchored there. But in order not to alarm the llongos
with the prospect of an American occupation, he left his
transports some thirty miles away at Point Luzaron.
He might as well have brought them with him, however.
The[re volutionists had an excellent service of information.
They were in all probability aware of the number of men
each ship had on board. When he arrived, the revolu-
tionists' flag was found flying in two places in the town,
but was lowered in the afternoon. The revolutionary
garrison at that time consisted of about 800 well armed
men, 1,000 hardly armed, and 1,000 armed with shot-guns,
pikes, bolos, etc.

As soon as the expedition anchored in front of Iloilo,
the revolutionary General sent an aide-de-camp to call
on its commander. The aide endeavored to ascertain if
General Miller was going to interfere with the revolu-
tionists. The General informed him that he had already
written a letter, addressed to the revolutionary General
and to the people of Iloilo, and setting forth the object of
his visit.

General Miller's letter to General Martin Delgado
stated in substance that, when the expedition started, it
was under the belief that the Spanish troops were still
in Iloilo, and that they would transfer the city and gov-
ernment to him in accordance with the stipulations of

249

the treaty with Spain. On his arrival, however, he finds
the city in possession of Filipino troops. He then goes
on to state that the commission of Ilongos will explain
his purpose more in detail. He mentions the men from
Panay on board the "Union", who had been captured in
the Spanish service. These would be turned over at a
later date, that they might return to their homes, etc.,
etc. No demand, direct or indirect, for the possession
of Iloilo is made, but it is requested that a commission
be sent to confer with him.

Thisletter wassentby anaide de camp, accompanied
by two other aides and the commission of representative
Ilongos that had been brought from Manila. General
Delgado, assisted by other revolutionary authorities, re-
ceived this party. The first question asked of General
Miller's aide was whether he had brought any message
from Aguinaldo. On learning he had not, and when
General Miller's letter had been read, the revolutionists
stated they had no power to act in cases affecting the
Malolos government. Though they were courteous and
polite, they showed no disposition to yield, unless forced
to do so.

On December 20th, General Miller had a conference
with the committee of Ilongos he had asked for in his letter
to General Delgado. After he had explained to them at
length the conditions from his point of view, they an-
swered that they had no power to surrender the city with-
out Aguinaldo's consent. He then asked them if they
would oppose him in the event of his landing. To this
they gave no answer. He then asked if they would have
their troops march out and allow him to take peaceable
possession on the 31st. To this they promised an an-
swer on the following day.

On the same date, December 29th, the leading mer-
chants of Iloilo had sent a letter to General Miller. It
amounted to a request not to land his force, in view of
the loss of life and property that was likely to ensue.
General Miller in his report pointed out that it was

32

250

largely at the request of many of the signers of this let-
ter that the expedition was sent, and commented on
their inconsistency. Without departing from the truth,
he might have added that not only the conditions then
prevailing at Iloilo, but in the whole of the Archipelago,
were very largely due to the moral encouragement and
material assistance that had been extended to the Kati-
tipuneros both prior and subsequent to 1896, by the
foreign merchants of Iloilo and Manila.

The merchants of Iloilo were paying their export
and import duties to the revolutionary authorities. Gen-
eral Miller later requested authority, which was not
granted, to close the port or to compel the payment of
the duties by them to his officers. General Miller also
complained that large amounts of provisions, supplies,
etc, came in American steamers to Manila, and were
shipped from there to Iloilo through the Captain of the
Port of Manila, a thing he could not understand.

The revolutionary forces had evidently increased.
They were estimated at 12,000 men, 2,500 of whom were
armed with modern rifles. It became evident that a
landing of American troops promised great loss of life
among non-combatants and much destruction of proper-
ty. Owing to the delay in making it, an attack had be-
come a much more formidable matter than it would have
been if it had been made on General Miller's arrival.
General Miller, however, expressed no doubt of being
able to take and hold the city with the force at his com-
mand, though he thought it might be prudent to have
another regiment sent him.

In one of his despatches General Miller pointed out
that, owing to their having been allowed to exercise the
powers which they had seized without meeting a vigo-
rous protest, backed up, if necessary, by a display of
force, the revolutionists were daily becoming more con-
firmed in the belief that they had a right 'to these pow-
ers. He maintained that the longer they were allowed
to hold to this belief, the greater, the harder, and the

251

more costly would be the task of undeceiving them. He
therefore urged that he be allowed to occupy Iloilo at
once.

In the meantime, General Otis had received orders
to extend military government with all despatch to the
whole ceded territory. He was also to publish the
proclamation of the President of the United States, of
which he sent General Miller a copy. In view of its
contents he recommended him to proceed with caution
and, unless forced into it, to avoid an action, in case
he met with any very decided opposition. He further
directed him to remain in the harbor and await orders.

The local government of Iloilo, to which a copy of
this proclamation had been sent, returned no answer to
General Miller. The President's proclamation was
laughed at by the people, who thought that the putting
off of the attack was due to fear. On December 30th,
an answer was sent by the revolutionary authorities.
It was to the effect that they were dependent on the Ma-
lolos government and were in accord with it. Without
express orders to the contrary from that government,
they would resist a landing.

General Otis appears to have failed to inform Gen-
eral Miller that he had modified the President's proc-
lamation. Consequently the proclamation, as published
in Iloilo, did not tally with that published in Manila.
When copies of the proclamation as published at Iloilo
reached Malolos, as they soon did, it was found to clash
with the proclamation issued by General Otis at Manila.
This caused Aguinaldoand his government considerable
uneasiness as to the ultimate intentions of the United
States.

During the month of January, 1899, the situation
became more serious. The revolutionary forces in and
around Iloilo increased in numbers. By the end of that
month they amounted to over 16,000 men, four thousand
armed with modern rifles and the remainder with all
kinds of arms, guns, pikes, bolos, etc. The garrison

252

was continually throwing up earthworks about the mouth
of the river.

This proclamation placed General Miller's ex-
pedition, which had a sufficient force to capture and
hold Iloilo, in a ridiculous light. The Americans lay in
their transports before an unfortified town, undefended
by any artillery, excepting some old smoothbore can-
non, abandoned by the Spaniards. They had the place
at the mercy of the guns of the naval vessels. This
situation must have been intolerable. As long as action
was postponed,' it gave encouragement to the rev-
olutionists.

Had the Filipinos been driven out of the city, they
probably could have opposed the further advance of the
landing force beyond its military limits. But this would
have been the case under any circumstances, excepting
that of a complete collapse and surrender of the revolu-
tionary government, an event which was hardly to be
expected just then. Even had this occurred, the country
would have had to be cleaned up of the roving parties
of- disbanded troops, which would have [infested it. In
spite of all this, the orders received from Manila enjoined
pd,tience and forbade an attack.

General Miller entered into a protracted correspon-
dence with the local government. He endeavored to
convince it that it should submit to the authority of the
United States. He used the argument that the object
of the American expedition to the Philippines was to free
the Filipino from the Spanish yoke, and that, since by
the Treaty of Paris, the United States had succeeded to
such rights as Spain had formerly posssessed, the best
thing the Filipinos could do was to submit quietly.
Since the surrender of Manila, however, the Filipinos
saw in all this that "freeing them from the Spanishyoke"
meant nothing more to them than a change of masters.
In place of the Spaniards, they were now to have the
Americans. The argument, therefore," failed to carry
conviction with it. Had General Miller been allowed,

253
instead of chopping logic with the Ilongos, to tell them
plainly from the first that, unless they were prepared to
surrender their city peaceably, he was prepared to use
force to make them do so, they might or might not have
complied with his demand. But in either case he would
have been no worse off than he was in the end. Even-
tually he had to use force to gain possession. As long,
however, as he was willing to write letters, the Ilongos
were willing to answer them. By so doing they at worst
were only putting off the evil day.

It appears that about this time a Lieutenant H.
du R. Phelan, an acting assistant surgeon, had an in-
terview with the local Visayan government authori-
ties. As General Miller makes no mention of him in
letters or report, he would seem to have had no au-
thority and his action was likely purely voluntary^
Had his effort been successful, General Miller
would certainly have taken advantage of it. On the
other hand, in case of its giving rise to any unpleasant
complications, he would as promptly have disavowed it.

In this interview. Dr. Phelan endeavored to induce
the Ilongos to accept the conditions of the treaty of
Paris and to receive the American garrison. His argu-
ments to this end were lacking in logic, and, so far as
mere academic discussion went, the Ilongos had far and
away the better of it. The whole affair would appear
to have been carried on more for the impression his
statements might produce on the people and political
parties of the United States, than on the persons to
whom he apparently addressed them. Thus Dr. Phe-
lan's mission, whether self imposed or not was, so far
as its object was concerned, practically a failure. All
he succeeded in getting was a statement to the effect
that in case Aguinaldo should order the surrender of the
city to the American forces, it would be so surrendered
at once.

In this whole business General Miller seems to have
been unfortunate. The result was the usual one under

254

similar circumstances. He. pleased nobody, not even
himself. This, however, taking into consideration the
nature of his expedition and the instructions he
received, which were to be "conciliatory but firm,"
is hardly to be wondered at. The General was
virtually required to tread two diametrically opposed
paths at the same time. Conciliation at the outset had been
construed as fear, and the Filipinos refused to be beguil-
ed any further by his ambiguous, altruistic blandish-
ments or glittering generalities. But his orders from
Manila forbade him to employ force, the only means
by which firmness of purpose could be manifested to the
Filipinos.

In a personal letter, dated January 31st, General
Otis practically lays the blame for these complications
on the former's too close adherence to the iron-bound
instructions of his original order from Washington.
Major Malory, familiar with the views and conditions
at headquarters, was then sent to him as a sort of mon-
itor to enable him to act in concert with them. This
letter discloses one thing of which very few persons
at that time were aware, namely that action in the Phil-
ippines was directed wholly from Washington, and that
this direction was governed by a vacillating policy, the
object of which appears to have been to maintain the
"status quo" in the Philippines, until the treaty of Paris,
then under discussion in the Senate, was confirmed.
Once that end was realized, the then administration
could enter upon the pleasant paths of Imperialism,
carrying out the expansion policy as it liked, to its full
extent, so far as the acquisition of the Philippine Islands
was concerned.

The revolutionary government was undoubtedly
very anxious for peaceful relations with the United
States, that is to say, if they could be established and
maintained in accordance with its ideas. These practi-
cally looked to the withdrawal of the American forces,
and to being allowed to do exactly as it pleased, wheth-

255

er right or wrong, at home or abroad. In the mean-
time, it counted on receiving the protection of the Uni-
ted States and desired that such protection- should espe-
cially consist in shouldering the responsibility for all
its actions, no matter what consequences might arise
from them. Had the United States thus consented to
an autonomy, protectorate, or regency, in fact, to any-
thing short of the complete, absolute, and unlimited
sovereignty of the Philippines, it would have placed
itself in the position of an individual gratuitously assum-
ing the guardianship of some small, irresponsible
and wayward child at a distance from him, for whose
actions he is held responsible but over whom he haS no
immediate control.

IV.

By this time -the war-fever in the United States had
cooled in one sense, though in another it burned more
fiercely than ever. On the one hand there was quite a
large class of persons who, though on altruistic princi-
ples in favor of the original idea of the war with Spain,
were not in favor of expansion, or of a war of conquest
for the acquisition of territory. The majority of these,
however, were principally busily occupied in attending
to their own personal affairs. Once the "freeing" of
Cuba was accomplished by the withdrawal of the Spanish
garrison and an "independent" republican form of gov-
ernment promised, they paid no more attention to the
war. It was their profound belief that the mission of the
United States had then been accomplished. They
thought that once a monarchical form of government had
been changed for a republican one, all would run smooth-
ly. Consequently they judged that all was over, excep-
ting the repatriation of the American troops.

There was another class which, though in principle
opposed to the war, had at the outset been carried away
by the enthusiasm of the "jingoes" and the expansionist

256

party, and had joined in tlie intervention policy, but as
a temporary measure only. Among those who composed
it was quite a number of persons who had time and in-
clination to think for themselves. Their first burst of
enthusiasm over, these began to have misgivings as to the
real sources of the trouble in the Spanish colonies. They
entertained doubts as to the actual conditions existing in
them prior to American intervention. A new idea began
to dawn on them, and that was the possibility that the al-
leged anarchy and misrule had arisen more from the
efforts of an insignificant minority of the colonists, as-
sisted by outside influences to overturn the existing gov-
ernment, than from a majority that really felt itself op-
pressed and downtrodden. It began to look as though
this minority in the archipelago was merely snatching
at the shadow of an abstract republicanism, which
promised them personal, concrete advantages. To play
this game they had no scruple in letting go the advan-
tages that the majority of their fellow colonists derived
from a mild paternalism which, while it offered the mas-
ses few opportunities for the development of the theories
of demagogues, imposed few material burdens and pro-
tected them from many ills.

These two classes or parties, if they can so be called,
were daily gaining ground in the country at large as
well as in the Senate and^House of Representatives. But
they did not recognize that the time for their pacific
theories was past. The did not see that, if they were
not prepared to accept the inevitable results of the war,
they should never have entered into it. They should
also have borne in mind that to renounce the fruits of
victory no matter whether sweet or bitter, was to re-
nounce the victory itself; that no matter how much, from
an ethical standpoint, they might wish to repair the
mistake of having entered into the Spanish American
war without counting beforehand the cost in money,
blood, and political principles involved, nothing now
remained but to go on with what had been begun. It was

257

due to the country to carry to a successful conclusion
the war that arose or the policy that grew out of their
action. Any other alternative would practically have
involved the commencement of the decadence of the
United States as a nation.

It therefore became necessary for the Expansionists,
Imperialists, Jingoes, War Party, or whatever name in-
dividually or collectively they called themselves, to coax
Congress along to the ratification of the treaty, as agreed
on at the Paris conference. The country did not realize
it, but the parting of the ways had been reached and
passed. A return to the path that had been entered was
possible but absolutely inexpedient. Such a step would
have amounted to the complete renunciation on the part
of the United States of any future right to participate
in the affairs of any country outside its own limits." It
would have involved a tacit aknowledgment that our
first effort in that direction had been conceived in igno-
rance, fostered in uncertainty, and matured in failure.

As has already been said, actual hostilities between
the insurgent government and the U. S. troops commen-
ced on February 4th, 1899. It is immaterial whether
they were commenced by the Filipinos, as claimed by
some, or by the Americans as asserted by others. As a
matter of fact, the tension that existed had become so
acute and the eventual rupture was so certain that no
one in the islands or in the United States who knew the
real conditions in the Philippines was surprised. The
only source of wonder is that both the insurgents and
the Americans had been able to hold off so long. Doubt-
less each had been waiting for the other to strike the
first blow in order to be able to justify himself toward
the rest of the world.

The immediate result of the breaking out of hos-
tilities, was that the United States Senate, on the foUow-
iug day, approved the treaty of peace as drawn up by
the American and Spanish Commissioners in Paris on
December 10th of the previous year. In accordance with

33

258

it the Philippine Islands passed from under the crown,
of Spain for ever, and became an irrevocable appanage
of the United States.

That the Filipino leaders were disappointed and dis-
gusted at this outcome is not to be wondered at. But
they should have realized that the day for small national
governments has passed. They should have known only
too well that to give them the independence they clam-
ored for, would be to turn the islands over to bloodshed,
anarchy, and ruin. Common sense showed conclusively
that any action on an immediate independence proposition
on the part of the United States would have been incom-
patible with either of the two objects with which the
Spanish American war had ostensibly been undertaken,
namely, giving the Filipinos a better and a more stable
government than they had received under Spain, or the
acquisition of territory by the United States.

There can be no doubt that, at the outset, the ad-
ministrati6n contemplated assisting the Filipinos to
form an independent government of their own, or creat-
ing an autonomous one under the protection or suzer-
ainty of the United States. But a very short time suf-
ficed to convince the American commanders in the Phil-
ippines and, through their reports, the statesmen at
home, that the only way to accomplish the first object
was unconditionally to hold the islands for the United
States. It was clear that, in spite of the crude consti-
tution proclaimed by Aguinaldo, any governnaent by and
under such men as Mabini, Sandico, Villa, and others
wliose political faith was embodied in the tremendous
tenets of the Katipunan, amplified by Mjabini's famous
decalogue, apart from giving the Archipelago a worse
government than that of the Spaniards had been or was
likely to be, would have opened the door to a series of
legalized vengeances with results worse than the hor-
rors of the reign of terror during the first French rev-
olution, or those of the Paris Commune of 1870-71. Pre-
cisely such an outcome as well as the incompeteDcy of

259
the Filipino revolutionists for self government, was
proved by the barbarities committed by them at Imus
and Naic (16), when those places fell into their hands in
1896. And all this proof was made doubly certain by the
shameless Filipino violation of the capitulations between
the Filipino leaders and the Spanish officers, whenever
the latter surrendered to them in 1898. (17).

These atrocious barbarities demonstrated one of two
things, either that the Filipino leaders were as unreliable,
barbarous, and bloodthirsty as the savage hordes that
followed them,. or that they had not sufficient authority
over the latter to restrain their excesses (18) and force
them to respect the capitulations of surx-ender into which
they, as victors, evidently entered voluntarily. It was
conclusive, therefore, that to turn the islands ever to them
would have been to initiate a reign of wanton and irres-
ponsible bloodshed which would have ended in the ruin
of the country or would have necessitated another in-
tervention on the part of the United States or of some
other power or powers.

The second possible object of the war, annexation,
in face of what is set forth in the preceding paragraph,
needs not be considered in this paper. It so turned out
that whether the United States of America wanted the
Philippine Islands or did not, whether they were neces-
sary to it in pursuit of its JDolicy or were not, whether
that policy was a wise one or not, the country had no
alternative but to hold on to what had come to its hand.

Another reason that showed the incompetency of

(16) For a detailed account of this see "The Philippine Islands"
by John N. Foreman. Edition 1899, page 519.

(17) At Samal, 200 Macabebe troops in the Spanish service
were butchered in cold blood by the revolutionary forces in spite
of the positive stipulation that their lives should be spared. See
"'Nuestra Prision" by R. F. FrayUlpiano Herrero, Manila, 1900.

(18) The excesses committed at Cavite when that place was
turned over to them by Admiral Dewey, in May, ISOg, and the' des-
truction of churches and church property in th^e neighborhood of
J\!ailila are ample proofs of this.

260

the then Filipino leaders was their ignorance in assuming-
that American consular officials had any power to pledge
their government to action, no matter how shrewd or
intelligent these officials may have been in forecasting
it along any given line or policy.

It has been stated on good authority that, about
March or April, 1899, there were some overtures between
Bmilio Aguina,ldo, Felipe Buencamino, and Pedro Pa-
te rno on the one hand and the American authorities on
the other, towards a compromise on the basis of an
autonomous government. It is unknown with whom
these overtures originated, but Aguinaldo was disposed
to listen to them. General Antonio Luna heard of this-
and, at a cabinet meeting at Cabanatuan, reproached the
dictator with wishing to betray the extreme party. !%■
was this party, according to him, which represented the
people at large. It certainly did represent the majority
of the Filipino leaders and Katipuneros, who, he said,
had gone into the field to fight for complete independence!
They would be satisfied by no such half measure as au-
tonomy. The conversation became heated. . Luna, who-
had a vipleint temper, threatened to kill Aguinaldo. The
latter, however, managed to avoid an encounter just-
then. But Luna followed up- a,nd struck Buencamino in.
the face. Buencamino then made his escape with Pedro-
Paterno and both took refuge in a stable.

Aguinaldo is credited with not having been slow to-
arrive at the conclusion that,= compromise or no compro-
mise, autonomy or complete independence, there was-
not sufficient room in the Philippines for himself and
Luna. He thereupon determined, it is said, to lay a-
trap and rid himself of the violent patriot for once and
all. To this end he summoned Luna to attend a council
of war at Cabanatuan.

Luna, as the information goes, arrived with two-
aides-de camp and a mounted escort cf twelve men. After
dismounting and dismissing his escort, he proceeded
alone to the rectory where Aguinaldo had his head-

261

quarters. On mountiug the stairs, he was met by a
junior officer, who informed him that Aguinaldo had
left with his command. Luna felt himself slighted and
expressed himself very strongly on the matter and pre-
pared to take his departure. 'As he turned to leave the
room, a sergeant of one of the two companies that Agiii-
tialdo had left at Cabanatuan, sprang from behind the
door, where he had been concealed, and attacked Luna
from behind, inflicting a severe wound.with a bolo.

Luna, seeing himself surrounded and realizing that
he was practically in the same strait as Andres Bonifacio
had been at Naic, some three years previously, drew his
revolver to defend himself. Not wishing to be overcome
by numbers in a hand to hand struggle in the rectory,
he forced his way through his assailants and rushed
down sta.irs into the plaza, to summon his escort to his
assistance. On arriving in the plaza, he was confronted
by one of the companies that Aguinaldo had left in Ca-
banatuan to arrest him at all costs. The officer in com-
mand, judging that Luna, if arrested alive, would only
be a source of embarassment to Aguinaldo, ordered hi&
men to fire a volley. Luna fell at the first discharge,
but he did not die before he had killed a number of his
assailants with his revolver.

Aguinaldo now realized that, if he wished to retain
any influence with the insurrectionary forces, he must,
for the time being at least, give up negotiations on any
basis short of absolute independence.

But to return to affairs at Iloilo, the blockade of that
place, if blockade it can be called, was still being
maintained. The Ilongos continued to strengthen their
fortifications, in spite of the warning that had been giv-
en them on February 10th, that if they persisted they
would subject the city to a bombardment.

On February 11th, four commissioners were sent by
the inhabitants to confer further with General Miller,
who had demanded the surrender of Iloilo by ten a. m.
While this conference was in progress, two shots were

262

fired by one of the naval vessels as a warning to the rev-
olutionists to desist from working on the defenses. The
insurgents, instead of discontinuing their work, answer-
ed by firing on the Americans from the fort. About 9.30
a. m., the "Baltimore" and "Petrel" became actively
engaged.

As General Miller did not anticipate this, the sailors
from the "Baltimore" and the "Petrel" were the first to
land. It was only at about 11.45, or 12 noon, that the
soldiers commenced to disembark. When they reached
the shore, they found that the sailors had advanced as
far as the Custom House, but were unable to advance any
further. The town was in flames, the insurgents having
commenced to fire it at the first shot from the Baltimore.
The alcalde of Iloilo, in imitation of the mayor of Mos-
cow in 1812, v\ras observed setting fire to his own house.
So effectually did the insurgents do their work that, by
the time the soldiers landed, they were unable to advance
through the conflagration.

There was later some talk that the town had been
set on fire by the shells from the ships of the expedition.
Undoubtedly some fires may have originated from this
source; but the main cause of the conflagration was the
revolutionary forces, as is shown by the reports of Gen-
erals Miller and Hughes (19).

From this time on the war went steadily forward.
Occasionally the revolutionary forces were successful.
But Aguina] do's older troops, composed to a very large
extent of Tagalogs, who had been trained in the Spanish
service, gradually dwindled away and were replaced by
raw levies. As large reinforcements of United States
troops were continually pouring into the islands, the
revolutionists, though occasionally making a stubborn
resistance, were little by little driven from the field.

(19) The writer of this paper remembers a conversation with
an ex-insurgent officer, in the course of which he described how
he and his men, acting under the order of the revolutionary com-
mander, set fire to one district.

263

What was once a fairly active army, became nothing-
more than isolated bands, scattered here and there over
the country, under leaders more or less prominent, whose
only logical object in still keeping the field could have
been to secure the best terms they might for themselves.

The fighting which had begun on February 4, 1899,
at San Juan and Santa Mesa, and which had resulted in
the Filipino forces being worsted with considerable loss,
continued. On February 11th, the United States forces
attacked and captured Caloocan in Luzon. On the 18th,
of the same month, the American flag was hoisted at
Bacolod in the island of Negros. There v/as some fight-
ing in Tondo on February 18th, between the United
States troops and the revolutionary forces. The latter,
in an attempt to burn Manila, had set fire to the suburbs
of Tondo and San Nicolas. On the 23rd, General Otis
burned what remained of Tondo.

By the beginning of April, the United States forces
had driven Aguinaldo from Malolos and occupied that
place. On the 20th, some 140 of General Lawton's cam-
mand were surrounded and captured by the revolu-
tionists at Binangonan. On the 23rd, Colonel Stotsen-
berg was killed in a severe action, and on the 26th there
was some fighting at Apalit.

On May 2nd, there was a conference between Gen-
eral Otis, the Philippine Commission, and some Filipino
envoys of Aguinaldo. On the 8th, thej Filipino peace
delegates entered General Lawton's lines at San Isidro
and on the 22nd, Aguinaldo's peace, Commissioners were
received by the Philippine Commission and President
McKinley's scheme of government was explained to them.

This attempt at negotiations appears to have been
abortive, for in the early part of June, there was some
skirmishing with the forces under Pio del Pilar. On the
13th, there was an artillery combat commenced at Las
Pifias. This developed into one of the severest engage-
ments of the war at Zapote Bridge.

The excessive rainfalls during June and July retard-

264

ed operations somewhat, but did not prevent General
Hall from capturing Calamba on July 27th. On August
15th, Angeles was captured by General McArthur. By
this time there were some forty thousand United States
troops in the Philippines. On September 1st, there was
some fighting in the island of Negros, which resulted in
the defeat of the revolutionists. On the 14th of this
month, the U. S. cruiser, "Charleston," made an unsuc-
cessful attempt to silence a one gun Filipino battery at
Olongapo. On the 23rd, this battery was finally silenced
after a six hours bombardment by the "Monterey" the
"Concord" and the "Zaflro." This battery with its gun,
(a 16 C. M. calib'er), was destroyed. On the 28th, Gen-
eral McArthur captured Porac. On October 8th,
General Schwan captured Noveleta, after a stubborn
resistance.

On November 7th, General Wheaton landed at San
Fabian and advanced towards Dagupan. On the 13th,
Colonel Bell captured Tarlac and on the 18th, Zamboan-
ga surrendered to the U. S. gunboat, "Castine", under
command of Lieutenant Verey.

On December 2nd, Major March, in command of a
battallion of the 2nd Volunteers, defeated Gregorio del
Pilar at Tilad pass. Pilar was killed in this engagement.
On December 20th, General Lawton was killed while
personally directing the crossing of his troops over the
river at San Mateo.

A glance at the above meager selection of dates
shows that, so far as the remainder of 1899 was concerned,
all hesitancy on the part of the administration at
Washington was over. Operations were consequently
being pushed as vigorously as the continually extending
area in which they were taking place permitted.

On January 20th, 1900, an American pack train, con-
sisting of some twenty animals, was captured in the prov-
ince of the Laguna. On April 6th, General Otis was
relieved of his command in the Philippines, to be suc-
ceeded by General McArthur, who on June 2nd asked

265

for more troops. On June 15th, Frr ic'sco Macabulos
surrendered at Tarlac with eight officers and one hun-
dred and twenty men.

In August it was estimated that the United States
land forces in the Philippines amounted to 70,000 men,
and that the war so far had cost $ 750,000.00 per diem.
Fighting still continued , but gradually the more i:npor-
tant revolutionary forces were dispersed. By the end
of 1900, the United States forces were in possession of
all places of any importance in the Philippines.

Aguinaldo had apparently vanished, some persons
believing that he was dead, others that he had left
the islands, and still others that he was in hiding.
All theories concerning him were set at rest,'.however, by
his capture— one of the most dramatic, if not one of the
most romantic, events of the war of conquest. The lead-
ing details of this exploit were effected in tTie following
manner: Aguinaldo was believed by the American au-
thorities.to be in hiding somewhere in the mountains of
N. E. Luzon. But his exact whereabouts, unknown to
them, was only ascertained with certainty after a courier
of his fell into Gcnerrl Punston's hands.

After Gregcrio del Pilar and some 60 Filipinos had
lost their lives at Tilad pass in covering Emilio Agui-
naldo's flight from Major Marshes' Battalion of the 23rd
Volunteers, the Filipino president retired, with such
forces as remained with him, to the province of Atra
and from there to the Cagayan valley. Y/hen pursuit by
the U. S. troops made him unable to hold his own togeth-
er, he broke them up into small moveable columns to
operate in the Cagayan valley. Then, accompanied by
Simeon Villa (20), Nazario Alhambra, Santiago Barce-

(20) Simeon Villa was a Tagalog, a Katipunero of long stand-
ing, and a dootor by profession. Aguinaldo had made him a Col-
onel of the Staff Corps.

He had formerly been in command of the revolutionary forces

34

266

lona, and the rest of his Staff, as well as by some 60 of
his most reliable men, he established his headquarters
at Palanan, a remote town situated in the province of
Isabela in the fastnesses of the Sierra Madre, some six
or eight miles from the sea. This place was very re- .
mote, secluded, and exceptionally difficult to approach.
Such roads and tracks as lead to it were jealously
watched by the few troops he had with him. These,
small as was their number, were amply sufficient for
that purpose.

Aguinaldo, evidently intending to continue the
struggle, had selected Palanatf as a safe place from
which to operate and also as a place in which to estab-
lish an arsenal for the manufacture of ammunition.

In the earlier part of January, 1901, he sent a courier,
a certain Cecilio Segismundo. with communications to
Urbano Lacuna who was in command of the revolution-
ary forces in central Luzon, to Teodoro Sandico, who
was in hiding in Bulacan, and to his cousin, Baldomero
Aguinaldo, (21) who had been his Minister of War, and

(21) Urbano Lacuna was a Tagalog who had been holding to-
gether what remained of the revolutionary. forces after Aguicaldo'a
flight, and had remained in command of Nueva Eeija. He operated
along the line of the Manila-Dagupan railway.

Teodoro Sandico was a Tagalog, a native of Pandacan, a Kati-
punero of long standing-, and had been a schoolmaster. Later he
went abroad, studying in Spain and in Germany, where he attended
the University of Bonn.

In 1896-7 he returned to the East. The next heard of him is
in connection "with the Filipino Revolutionary junta in Hongkong,

in the Cagayan valley in 1898-99. Among a number of barbarous
murders and other outrages officially recorded against him, there
is one of peculiarly fiendish malevolence. He had kept d, Spanish
officer prisoner, tied hand and foot for several, days, without food
or wa.er. When the officer complained of this treatment, Villa
ordered a piece of flesh to be cut from his victim's thigh. Dang-
ling this into the Spaniard's face, he said: "There's something for
you to eat."

Later in 1897-8 he ran for "ooncejal", or alderman, of the city
of Manila.

267

was then in command of the revolutionary forces in the
Province of Cavite.

His letter to Lacuna w?,s in reference to the affairs of
central Luzon. The one to Sandico vras a summons to
join him at Palanan. He lacked confidence in his entou-
rage, he said, and also informed him of his intentions re-
specting the cartridge factory. The letter to Baldomero
Aguinaldo v?as the most important of the three. In it,
besides touching on the same subjects as those contained
in the letters to Lacuna and Sandico, he requested a rein-
forcement of 400 men, even if in various detachments, to be
sent him from the Tagalog provinces. He stated that
the bearer of these despatches, Cecilio Segismundo,
would serve them as guide to Palanan.

The courier, Cecilio Segismundo, set out from Pala-
nan about January 10th, 1901, and arrived at Pantaban-
ganon February 5th. There, on applying to the local
president for means to continue his journey, that func-
tionary advised him to surrender himself to the officer
commanding the U. S. forces at that place. The advice
was followed. The American officer turned him and

where he was engaged with the U. S Consul General Wildman in
purchasing and shipping arms to Aguinaldo.

As soon as the revolution was well under way in the Philip-
pines, he joined Aguinaldo and was made a member of his cabinet
as Minister of the Interior. When Aguinaldo was driven out of
Central Luzon, he remained in hiding in the forests of Bulacan.

Previous to this, in the fall of 1898, he had been very active
in establishing popular clubs in Manila, which were nothing more
than nucleii for an uprising of his planning. These inhabitants
of Manila were to assist the revolutionists, who were to attack
the city from without, in expelling the U. S. garrison.

Later 1905-6. he was elected Governor of the province of Bu-
lacan.

Baldomero Aguinaldo was a Tagalog and an old Katipu-
nero. He had been associated with his cousia, Emilio Aguinaldo,
in the Malolos government as Minister of War, after the assassi-
nation of Antonio Luna. When the Malolos Government was
broken up, he went to Cavite province, where he commanded the
revolutionary forces and held the country for his cousin.

268
his despatches over to General Funston at San Isidro,
Nueva Ecija.

As soon as the contents of this correspondence,
written in Spanish intermixed with cipher, had been mas-
tered by the assistance of Lazaro Segovia (22), the mat-
ter was minutely discussed by General Funston, Captain
Smith, the A. D. C- to General Funston, Lieutenant
Mitchell of the 22nd Infantry, and Segovia.

The upshot of this discussioo was that General Mc-
Arthur, then in command of the United States forces in
the Philippines, was consulted. The management of the
whole affair was turned over to General Funston and he
decided that a company of Macabebe scouts, disguised as
revolutionary troops, should goto Palanan and personate
a part of the reinforcement called for in Aguinaldo's com-
munication to his cousin. This course was decided on
because Aguinaldo, hearing nothing to the contrary,
would naturally suppose that his letters had been receiv-
ed, and that the Macabebes were the troops sent in com-
pliance with his request to Baldomero Aguinaldo for
reinforcements.

As it was impossible, without disclosing its object,
to send this column under command of an American of-
ficer, and as there was no native to whom so delicate a
mission could be trusted, it was decided that General
Funston should go in command of it, accompanied by
Lieutenant Mitchell and the brothers Hazzard, who were
Lieutenants of Macabebe Scouts. To prevent discovery
of their purpose and to allay the suspicions of the natives

(22) Lazaro Segovia was a Spaniard from Madrid. He came
to the Philippine Islands as a sergeant in the Spanish army. He
deserted from the Spanish service and according to his own show-
ing, joined the revolutionary forces in the latter half of 1898, serv-
ing under the immediate command of Lazaro AlhaiBbra for some-
thing over a year and a half as first Lieutenant against the U. S.
forces.

In May, 1900, he deserted from the revolutionists and was em-
ployed by General Funston as interpreter, secret service agent,
and spy.

269

of the towns and districts through which the column
would have to pass, it was decided that these officers-
should be treated as prisoners, who had been picked up
on the road, and that a certain Hilario Talplacido, who
had been a Major of the revolutionary forces, should
figure as the officer in command of the whole force asked
for, and Lazaro Segovia should act as Captain command-
ing the company of Macabebes, which was to represent
the first detachment of the four hundred men asked for
by Aguinaldo. This arrangment was to last until the
expedition should arrive at Palanan. Then General
Punston and the American officers were to take com-
mand, surprise the place, and capture or kill Aguinaldo.
Once this was done, every one was to revert to his nor-
mal status. Cecilio Segismundo had been persuaded to
accompany the expedition as guide. The Scouts form-
ing the exp edition were carefully selected and provided
with insurrectionist uniforms and Remington rifles.

Early in March this expedition sailed from Manila
on the U. S. gunboat, "Vicksburg", for Casiguran.
There it was to disembark and qiake its way by land to
■Palanan. During the trip from Manila to Casiguran, Se-
govia carefully instructed the men who were to personate
officers and the scouts in the parts they were to play on
their way to, and after their, arrival at, Palanan.

In the night of March 13-14, the "Vicksburg" arrived
near Casiguran. During the darkness, she stood close
in shore and the expedition disembarked at about 12
miles from that place, passing the remainder of the night
on the beach. The "Vicksburg" returned to Baler. It
was agreed that she should proceed to. the coast in the
qeighborhood of Palanan on the 24th, standing off and
on until the expedition should signal her to come in and
take it off.

As soon as day broke the expedition proceeded on
its way to Casiguran. It remained there for two or three
days, collecting supplies for the six days march to Pa-
lanan. As Casiguran was a poor place, this was not

270

only a matter of difficulty but it also involved consider-
able time. The method of procedure was necessary. As
the revolutionary forces lived on the counti-y through
which they might be passing, the bringing of supplies
either from Manila or from the "Vicksburg", to ration
it would have betrayed it from the start.

During the three days that the expedition remained at
Oasiguran, forged letters, which had been prepared in Ma-
nila and purporting to be f rom JLacuna, Sandico, andBal-
domero Aguiualdo, announcing the departure of the ex-
pedition and giving the names of Talplacido as in command
of it and Segovia as commanding the flrst company, -were
sent to Palanan. These were accompanied by a letter from
Talplacido to Aguinaldo, stating that he was on his way to
Palananan and that he had some days previously captured
aparty of American surveyors, (General Punston and his
companions), whom he was bringing with him. In this
letter he also asked that rations be sent to meet him on
the road between Palanan and, Casiguran, as he was un-
able to obtain sufficient supplies at the latter place.

On March 17th, the^xpedition started out fi'om Casi-
guran for Palanan, a distance of about 60 miles by road
and reckoned as a six days march, with rations hardly suf-
ficient for four. On the 21st, it reached a place called
Laguyo, where another letter was written by Talplacido
to Aguinaldo, asking that provisions be sent to meet it.

The detachment had rather wasted its rations, such
as they were, on the first day. Consequently, from the
second day, the men had been reduced to an issue of a
quarter of the original supply. This was the only
means by which what supplies they had could be made
to last during the march through a very rough and
practically uninhabited country.

On the fourth day from Casiguran, the party reach-
ed a place called Dinudungan about eight miles from
Palanan. There there was a guard of a corporal and
six men of Aguinaldo's force. Through them Hilario
Talplacido received a communication from' Aguinaldo,

271

directing him to leave his prisoners with the guard and
to come on with his detachrnent, as it was not expedient
tliat the American prisoners should come to Palanan.

There was no choice but to obey Aguinaldo's order,
unless they wished to betray themselves. The "pi'is-
oners" were accordingly left with a guard of ten Macabe-
bes and a corporal. But Segovia, who, since the expe-
dition had arrived at Casiguran, practically directed all
its movements and took charge of all its details, quietly
gave out that in the course of an hour, in order to
deceive Aguinaldo's corporal and guard at Dinudun-
gan, he would send back for them, saying that he
had met a second messenger from Aguinaldo directing
that the prisoners be brought on. This having to leave
General Punston and his officers behind virtually placed
Segovia in complete command of the expedition. From
that time on neither General Funston nor the officers
joined it until after the capture of Aguinaldo.

At 8:00 a. m., the expedition, which then consisted
of seventy-four in all, commenced its final march. After
being half an hour on the road, three men appeared with
the rations that had been asked for. These were cooked
and eaten then and there, enough, however, for General
Funston and the officers and guard who had remained
with him at Dinudungan being sent to them.

As soon as the meal was over the expedition resum-
ed its march. During this march SegoVia had ordered
"the men to load their rifles, but enjoined great caution.
■They were not to attract the attention of the cargadores,
or porters, who had accompanied them from Casiguran,
or of the men who had brought the supplies from Pala-
nan. About noon the column was met by a sergeant
with eleven men, who informed him that he had been
sent by Aguinaldo to take charge of the prisoners. His
orders were that they remain at Dinudungan.

This was the critical moment of the expedition, but
Segovia rose to the occasion. By some means or another
he managed to detain the sergeant and his party, while

272

he sent a messenger to General Funston. The latter, in
compliajice with the feigned order of Aguinaldo to bring
on the prisoners, was already on his way to join the col-
umn. He was advised by Segovia to leave the road and
allow the Filipino sergeant and his party to pass him.
Then he was to push on to overtake the column. Agui-
naldo's sergeant would only realize that he had been
tricked when, on arriving at Dinudungan, he would
find the prisoners had left that place to rejoin the
expedition.

At two in the afternoon the expedition arrived at
about two miles from Palanan. There remained only the
river that separated the party from its quarry. When
the river was reached, there being only three canoes, some
time was taken up in crossing. But as soon as this was
done the ranks ^were formed and the expedition was
marched to the Plaza by Segovia. There he found
AguLialdo's guards drawn up to receive the reenfor-
ceme at, and Aguinaldo himself, in the company of Villa
f-nd Barcelona, was waiting in the balcony of the house-
he occupied to inspect it.

kiiGgovia formed his column up in line in front of the
guards. After having returned their salute he cautioned
the Macabebes to remember the instructions he had
given them. He then proceeded to report in person to-
Aguinaldo, from whom he received orders as to how his
men should be lodged and cared for. After having made
his report he returned to his command. While Agui_
naldo was still at the window waiting for them to march
past in review, Segovia ordered the Macabebes to fire
a volJey into Aguinaldo's guards. The latter were so
confused at this .unexpected attack that the^ fled in
disorder. Aguinaldo and Santiago Barcelona were too-
much surprised to move and the former, seeing how
hopeless the situation was, waved a white handkerchief
from the window and offere^d to surrender. In a few
moments they were secured by Segovia. Not so, how-
ever, Simeon Villa, v/ho jumped from a window and en-

273

deavored to make his escape, but was stopped by two
shots from Segovia's revolver.

Segovia then proceeded to stop the Macabebes, who
by this time were firing at random into the town. A
few moments later, after all the real work had been
done. General Funston and the other officers and the
guard that had been left with them, made their appear-
ance on the other side of the river. General Funston
and the officers who accompanied him immediately as-
sumed command. Segovia, Talplacido, and the other
natives all returned to their normal positions.

To General Funston, Lieutenant Mitchel, and Sego-
via is due the credit of having conceived and planned this
expedition. To Lazaro Segovia, who gave evidence of
possessing an overaverage amount of courage, coolness,
determination, executive ability, and tact, belongs the
credit of planning and executing the details, particularly
after the landing of the expedition at Casiguran, and
more especialy during the few hours between Dinudun-
gan and Palanan, where Aguinaldo was captured. It
was during these few but critical hours that he was
thrown entirely upon his own resources.

The method employed, dangerous as it was in every
sense of the word, was the only one that could succeed.
Had Aguinaldo had five minutes' notice of the real con-
dition of affairs, he could perhaps have offered a suc-
cessful resistance to the column, which without supplies
must inevitably have been destroyed, or he could have
made his escape. Had General Funston gone in open
command of the expedition, he would have betrayed its
object and frustrated its success. On the other hand,
it is also very doubtful if the Macabebes would have
followed Segovia, had it not been for the presence of
General Funston and the other American officers.

This expedition offerb one of the rare examples of
military history in which it would be impossible for even
the most partial historian to give more credit to any one
of the participants than another. Each had his part to

35

274

play, each part was absolxitely necessary to insure suc-
cess, and each of the actors, Americans, Spanish and Fil-
ipinos, played it. The only criticism that could be made
is that Segovia might possibly have captured Aguinaldo
without the aid of General Punston, whereas the latter
could not have done so without that of Segovia (23).

The results of this capture, inmeasurably out of
proportion to the strength of the expedition, were more
important than would at first appear. It practically put
an end to all organized and concerted resistance to the
United States forces in the Philippines by what, up till
then, had been known as the Filipino Revolutionary
Government.

(23) A very interesting' and detailed account of this expedition,
from which the. above abbreviation is taken, was written and pub-
lished in Spanish and English by Segovia, in Manila in 1902, under
the title of "La Aventura de Palanan"i

SIXTH PAPER

THE CIVIL 60VEBNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

SIXTH PAPER

THE CIVIL &OVEHNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

Before discussing the Civil Government of the Phil-
ippine Islands, implanted as a result of the Treaty of
Paris, it may perhaps be well to take a brief glance at
the policy that prompted American intervention in Fili-
pino affairs, as well as at the peculiar genius of the
Americans as a nation.

It has already been said that it is worth bearing in
mind that the actions of the United States government
on the one hand and of the revolutionary govei-nment on
the other hinged on certain interpretations of the ambig-
uous promises of the agents of the former and on the
positively declared intentions of the latter. It is further-
more not to be forgotten that both promises and in-
tentions arose from a profoijnd ignorance. The Amer-
icans did not know the Filipinos at the time, and the
Filipinos knew nothing of the conditions that governed
the motives and actions of the American Government.

The United States, since its existence as a nation,
had made greater strides towards material advancement
and financial prosperity than has ever been paralleled in
history. The people were convinced that this advancement
and prosperity was due to the form of government under
which they lived and not to the people itself. In spite of
this belief, there is no reason to doubt, all other conditions
being equal, that the American people or nation, to use
both words as a synonym, would have been just as ad-
vanced and just as materially prosperous under any other

278

form of government ranging from absolute, hereditary
monarchy to Utopian democracy. In other words, it was-
the Americans themselves and the agrarian and financial
conditions that environed them, and not the form of gov-
ernment under which they lived, that made the Amer-
ican nation what it is to day. To assert the contrary
would be to say that Negros, Indians, South Sea Island-
ers, or a mixture of any of the races, given the same
form of government in its strict sense, would have made
as good a showing in proportion to the area occupied by
them as had been made by the American people (1).

The American people as individuals, however, had
been too deeply absorbed in conducting their own per-
sonal affairs towards a satisfactory material issue to be
able to give much time or attention to the study of the
abstract reasons for their collective success as a nation.
Their internal polity and foreign policy were therefore
turned over to the leaders of the various political parties.
These in their turn had brought the.people to believe that
it was to the form of government, as shaped and direct-
ed hy these same leaders, and not to themselves, that
they ovved their national greatness and prosperity. This
belief took great hold on the popular mind. It led to a
common, popular sense of perfect security in their form
of government. Under the influence of this belief, the
nation, represented by its political leaders, became anx-
ious that other peoples and nations should enjoy a simi-
lar good fortune and a like sense of security. There is

(1) The examples furnished by the republics of Haiti, Liberia,
Santo Domingo, Belize, and Hawaii would seem, however, to point
to the contrary. In spite of most excellent and liberal fundamen-
tal laws in the shape of carefully drawn up constitutions, these
countries had so miserably mismanaged not only their internal
affairs but also their foreign relations, that other powers were
only restrained from intervening and seizing on their territory
"for the good of the inhabitants", through fear of an interposition
between them and their altruistic intentions, of a combination of
other powers individually as altruistic and collectively, much more
powerful.

279

an abstract reason for such goodwill. Any agglomera-
tions of persons feeling perfectly safe themselves easily
wish others to be safe also. Hence comes that doctrine
of altruism, through which people justify their interfer-
ence in the affairs of others on the ground that what
is dangerous to others may become dangerous to them-
selves also. They therefore endeavor to secure safety
and to exorcise danger by exact statements and minute
definitions, and, though theoretically desirous that the
prosperity and safety of others may be as great and
their adversity and danger as small as their own, the
morality of the means employed to bring about these,
ends is eclipsed by a dogmatism which judges actions
with leniency, while it endeavors to control opinions
with a hand of iron.

Because of some such mental constitution or pro-
ces, we average Americans, individually and collec-
tively, believed that, with very rare individual excep-
tions, foreigners in general and the Filipinos in partic-
ular would come under the government of the United
States not only willingly but with alacrity (2).

We thought the only obstacle that lay in the way of
the latter 's doing so was the Spanish government, hold-
ing possession of the Islands against their will. As the
Filipinos, however, had given no indication of a desire
to come under the United States, the American political
leaders recognized that, no matter how desirable such a
consummation might be, the initiating of any step in such

(2) In this belief the leaders of the Republican party had lost
sight of a conspicuous fact. Throughout all the revolution got-
ten up in the Philippines against Spain by the Katipunan society
and brought to a successful issue by the assistance of the United
States, (See General Merrit's aswer to the propositions made by
Aguinaldo's Commissioners on August 15th, 1898), in all the airing
of their real or supposed grievances, and in all the programs de-
vised hy the agitators who started the Katipunan or by the Kati-
punan which-had started the revolution, the Filipinos never dreamt
or desired that the Philippines as a country or themselves as a
people should come under the United States.

280

a direction by the United States as a nation would be
contrary to international law and national morality.

In the face of this it would have been difticult to
make the majority of Americans as a nation accept this
doctrine as one paving a way to the acquisition of terri-
tory. But the leaders of the expansionist branch of the
Republican party evidently came to the conclusion that
there was a possibility of getting not only the party but
the nation also educated up to their way of thinking.
Therefore the program put before the American people
by the leaders of the Republican party and accepted by
them at the commencement of American intervention
between Spain and her colonies, was based on two as-
sumptions: first, that the Spanish colonies were op-
Dressed and tyrannized over by the peninsular govern-
ment to a much greater degree than was supposed to
the case; and secondly, that a very large majority of the
colonists were anxious to establish an independent repub-
lican form of government. It was therefore the business
of the United States not only to assist them in doing this,
but also to guarantee the independence of any such gov-
ernment as these colonies might set up.

Any political party boldy asking the sanction of a
war merely to evict Spain from her colonies in the- far
East and to annex them to the United States would
simply have been courting defeat. Such a proposition
could not be entertained. But the' leaders of the extreme
branches of the Republican party presumably came to the
conclusi6n that the end they had in view, namely, the
annexation of the Philippines, could be attained in as
certain, though perhaps in a more circuitous manner by
persuading the country to sanction an altruistic interven-
tion between the Spanish Government and the Filipinos,
the oppressor and the oppressed, the tyrant and his vic-
tim. To bring about such ah intervention it was thought
the doctrine embodied in the Ostend manifesto re-
specting the island of Cuba, with certain limitations.
Could be put into practice in the Philippines. The best

281
means of doing this and at the same time of avoiding all
appearance of coercion, or the open employment of force
in the. beginning, was by making use of methods iden-
tical with or similar to those employed in Hawaii in 1899.

This scheme was logical enough in its conception,
but for its success, it depended on two conditions and
these in their turn depended on one another.

The first thing was to find Filipinos who were wil-
ling to play the role played in Hawaii by Mr. Dole and
the "Committee of Thirteen"; the second was to induce an
appreciable number of the Filipino people to back them
up in it. But there the parallel ended. The Hawaian
"Committee of Thirteen" were Americans. By the moral
support they received from the men disembarked from
the "Boston"' to protect American interests in Honolulu,
they were enabled to bring about the revolution and to
depose Queen Liliukulani. It naturally followed that
the form of government they set up would not only be
strictly subservient to American interests but would
eventually demand admission to the United States in one
form or another. Over and above this, practically all
Kanakas spoke English. As they had been educated
under the auspices of American missionaries, they knew
little of any countries other than the United States
and their own island. To induce them as a whole to
accept American domination or citizenship was conse-
quently no very difficult undertaking.

In the Philippines the conditions were very different.
The real leaders of the revolutions and revolts that had
occurred in those islands had been Spaniards or mesti-
zos. They looked to Spain for their persona] advance-
ment. They aimed at nothing more than putting them-
selves at the head of Filipino affairs, in order to derive
such personal advantages as they could from their posi-
tion. As the sentiment of revolt practically did not exist
among the Filipinos, it had first become necessary to
■create it. Otherwise no revolution could be brought to
iurnish a reasonable ground on which to base a policy

36

282

of intervention. The seeds of revolution were sown by-
favoring or bringing into existence the Katipunan. This
body, however, soon got beyond their control and formed
a national Filipino party with complete independence as
their goal. Moreover the education that the Filipinos
had received had been at the hands of the Spaniards.
Consequently any leanings they may have had towards
any other nationality than their own, were certainly not
likely to be towards the United States. (3).

The leaders of the extreme Republican branches
were very well aware that, should the nation become
alive to their aims in respect to annexation, the party
was very liable to be repudiated and swept from power,
unless they could persuade the nation to condone their
action. The surest way to avoid the former and to secure
the latter was to achieve some very advantageous result in
which the nation could find, if not grounds for pride, at-
least reasons for gratitude because of extraordinary ma-
terial advantages. Such a result, the leaders could then

(3) This was amply proved by the fact that it took the pres-
ence of upwards of eighty thousand American soldiers and sailors-
to bring the country under sufficient subjection to admit the im..
planting of a Civil Government in the Philippines, with the view
to making the Filipinos accept American sovereignty: Such an
array and all its concomitant influences did it require to enable the-
annexionists to show the Republican party and the United States-
the triumph they, as a branch of the party, had achieved in adding,
against the avowed principle of the party and country, a territory
whose inhabitants, to judge by the resistence they had offered, _
would certainly never have been brought under control by any
other means.

It is folly to. say that this resistance to American authority
was the result of a few scheming leaders and of the antagonism of
a few bad Spaniards and worse friars. To admit such an argument-
is to give to all three of these categories, especially to the two lat-
ter, a moral influence in directing the material affairs of the Fili-
pinos that they were assumed not to possess, which assumptioijwas-
one of the bases on which intervention rested. No people will un-
dergo the sacrifices it is forced to undergo* and the horrors of war-
fare at the hand of it own partisans, supplemented by those of an.
invading army, unless their heart is in the struggle.

283

demonstrate, would never have been achieved by an
adherence to the original program.

It is but fair to state, however, that the leaders of
the Republican party as well as the then administration
had depended on the Consular officials in Hong Kong,
Singapore and Manila for accurate information on which
to base their actions. Instead of this, however, the in-
formation they received had been most misleading and
created a very false impression as to the real state of
affairs in the Philippines. As a consequence of this, a
great deal more was taken for granted regarding an al-
leged desire of the Filipinos, as a people, to separate
from Spain and to come under the United States than
the actual facts, had they have been known, would have
warranted. (4).

The Filipinos, on their pa;rt, assumed a priori that
the majority of the American nation was in favor of giv-
ing an independent republican form of government to
the Philippine Islands. This assumption was correct,
in theory at least, but the Filipinos did not realize that
the American nation had confided its policy and polity
to the Republican party. They did not see that, except
for some national disaster, the American nation was not
likely to withdraw its confidence from that party, even
though conditions were encountered that had not been
taken into consideration, or circumstances arose that

(4) This, however, applies to the period previous to the Biac-
na-Bato agreement. Till then, a separation from Spain and inde-
pendence had only been dreamed of by some few leaders of the
Katipunan. It had only been during the four of five months'
respite granted to the Katipunan from December,- 1897, when
Aguinaldo left the Philippines in compliance with his agree-
ment with Primo de Rivera, to his return to them under the aus-
pices of Admiral Dewey, that the idea of independence took shape.
Later, during the long delay between Admiral Dewey's a victory
over the Spanish fleet in May, 1898, and the arrival of the Amer-
ican land forces under General Anderson, that idea crystalized
under the form, first, of a dictatorship, and then of an alleged
constitutional republic under Emilio Aguinaldo.

284

had not been foreseen at the outset. The Pihpinos had
no idea that the American Government might possibl^r
change its poUcy from that of establishing an inde- ,
pendent Filipino government, guaranteed by the United
States, to that of assuming complete, absolute, and in
definite control of the Archipelago, regardless of what
its inhabitants might think or feel.

Between the battle of Cavite and the arrival of
the first land expedition under General Anderson, the
political party in power at home (5), and presumably the
country at large, appear to have undergone a complete
change of view respecting the form American interven-
tion in the Philippines was eventually to assume. To
such as gave the matter any serious consideration, it
became very clear that annexation to the United States
was the only logical issue to the situation.

To this end the Americans consuls in Hongkong,
Singapore, and Manila, and the commander of the Amer-
ican squadron in Asiatic waters, with or without the
privity of the leaders of the Republican party or the
then administration, had entered into more or less direct
communications with the Katipunan, the former as
early as November, 1897, and the Matter a very few
weeks before the declaration of war in 1898. These
communications gave rise to the belief on the part of
the leaders of that society that their organization was to
be supported in its efforts to bring about a revolution

(5) It was this party, in conjunction with the "Jingoes" of
other parties, that had brought about the intervention of the
United States in the Philippines. At the start, it may not have
foreseen just what this intervention might lead up to. But it
very soon saw that the withdrawing, of the United States from the
Philippines would mean to that nation what the withdrawing of
the Roman legions from the outlying provinces of the Empire had
meant to Rome. It therefore became necessary to maintain pos-
session of the Archipelago, even at the expense of deceiving itself
and the nation as to the possibility of implanting in it the same
form of government, policy, and polity as existed in the United
States.

285

to eventuate in the establishment of an independent re-
public, and not to become a tool in the hands of the
annexionists.

It was therefore with mortification and surprise that
a large number of persons in the TTnited States awaken-
ed to the fact that the altruistic intention of annexing-
the Philippines to that country for a greater or less
period of time, was looked upon with disfavor by the
majority of Filipinos and was resisted by them with
force. It was strange to the Americans to hear that, to
the Filipinos, American intervention now meant practi-
cally a mere change of masters, bringing them no nearer
than they were at the outset to the original object for
which they had revolted and which, divested of all am-
biguities, was an independent (6) form of government,
based on their own ideas and not on any particular form
of altruism that the Americans might choose to manifest.

The Filipinos and their wishes and aspirations,
whether personal or national, were not taken into consid-
eration for two reasons; first, because they were looked
upon as children, overgrown ones if you please, who did
not know what was good for them and, consequently,
whose vagaries as to independent self-government were
not to be- indulged; secondly, because the United States
was master of the situation in the Philippines, and the
Republican party in power at home was master of the
situation in the United States. Its leaders had succeeded
in persuading the nation that its financial prosperity and
material advancement depended on their dictating the
policy and directing the polity of the nation.

Beyond implanting republicanism, in its abstract
sense, in the far East, the Republican party, in insisting
on the necessity for annexation there, may have been
governed by other and more sordid Reasons, which, while
quite as powerful as the altruism put forward, were dis-

(6) Sec document presented by Felipe Agoncillo to the Amer-
ican and Spanish Commissioners who met in Paris to agree upon,
the treaty of peace signed Decemter 10th. 1898.

286

cretely kept in the back ground. These reasons were
the supposed mineral, agricultural, and forestal wealth
of the archipelago. In all of these resources, the coun-
try was supposed to equal if not surpass California.
These would offer attractive possibilities as investments
to corporations and individuals. Moreover the Philip-
pines were supposed to hold out special inducements
to all such American clerks, handicraftsmen, labor-
ers, and the like as might choose to come to them.
The Philippines were held to be an unexploited "El
Dorado", which had been in the possession of the
Spaniards for some three hundred years or more,
but which they had been to lazy or too ignorant to de-
velop. It only awaited the vivifying influence of the
magician's wand of "modern methods", wielded by an
American Civil Government in the islands, to raise them
to a degree of prosperity hitherto undreamed of, and now
while America was in possession of them was the time
to realize this golden dream.

All this, however, was found to be a misconception
very largely owing to misleading consular reports as to
the advisability of American emigration to the Philip-
pines (7), the resources of the Archipelago, the means
necessary to their development, the methods by which
these means were to be applied, and so on. In this and
similar reports, no notice was taken of the local price of
labor which precluded the advantageous emigration to
to these islands of any but persons possessing more or
less capital, at least enough to live on, or of govern-
ment officials, who could live at the expense of the
res publica, instead of having to depend on their un-
aided efforts for existence. In a word, it was soon found
that, as the population (8), in proportion to its area, was

(7) See letter of the U. S. consul O. F. Williams to Mr. Day
of the State Department, dated July 2nd, 1898.

(8) The population of ihe Philippines is, in round numbers, 75
to the square mile and that of the United States about 30 to the
square mile.

287
greater than that of the United States, it was no place
for the laboring men to "grow up with the country."
Moreover practically all land worth occupying already
had an owner or a claimant, so there was little room for
the "pioneer" class. The cities, towns, and pueblos
were, humanly speaking, sufficient to accomodate the
population of the district in which they were located.
Any wonderful and rapid growth of cities, such as had
gone so far towards enriching the United States, was
therefore hardly to be looked for in the Islands in the
immediate future.

The American flag, however, had been hoisted over
the Philippines, and, ethics to the contrary notwithstand-
ing, no one, no matter what his party politics might be,
was anxious to pull it down. No one thought of abandon-
ing or getting rid of the place, even though, thanks to
the Republican party, it was a white elephant, whose
purchase price and maintenance had been and still was
enormous (9).

The Republican party should have faced the issue
squarely at the commencement. It should have present-
ed the facts to the country at large, which could then

(9) Spain had been paid twenty millions of dollars as an in-
demnity for what she was supposed to have in the Philippines since
she had been in possession of them. Seven millions of dollars
had been guaranteed to pay the friars for the lands that they had
been forced to part with. Three millions more han been voted by
Congress to relieve distress in the Archipelago. Thus the United
States may be said to have invested some thirty millions of dollars
in these islands, to say nothing of the cost of the Spanish-American
war and the expedition to the Philippines, which has been conser-
vatively estimated as close to a million a day from the declaration
of war in April-, 1898 to the capture of Aguinaldo in March, 1901.
This amounted in all to something over a thousand millions of
dollars over and above the usual and ordinary running expenses of
the United States for the same period.

This is a conservative- estimate and it is believed that, were all
the expenses computed, direct as well as indirect, incidental to the
war alone, this sum would be found to be far greater,

288

have decided what it wanted to do and, if necessary,
told the Filipinos, clearly and distinctly, from the begin-
ning, that there was no more intention of resigning the
islands to their inhabitants than there had been of allow-
ing the Southern states to leave the Union in 1860-66,
unless compelled by force to do so.

In doubt as to just how the country would receive
such a policy, the party therefore resolved on the more
prudent policy for itself and the more dangerous one for
the country, of temporizing with the Filipinos, trusting
to time to accomplish the miracle of making the Filipi-
nos declare themselves in favor of annexation. The
party however was averse to committing itself to any
positive declaration as to what were the real intentions of
the United States. (10).

Instead of conciliating the mass of the Filipino
people, this policy only antagonized them. This an-
tagonism did not openly assume as violent a form as it
had done in the beginning, but it was none the less in-
tense and it has became more wide spread. That the
avowed "Americanistas" increased in members is true;
but the avowed as well as the unavowed anti-" Amer-
icanistas" increased in much greater proportion, and
persons and classes that foi^merly had been at least in-
different, became more anti-"Americanista."

(10) In no case can it be pointed out that any of the Amer-
ican officials in authority stated positively what were the inten-
tions of the United States in regard to Filipino selfgoyernment or
independence. Whenever that question was forced to the front,
the Filipinos were practically told to "wait and see". Each time
it was discussed, independence was put off to a more and more re-
mote date, never affirmed and never completely denied. The lopp
hole of a possible independence was always left open. The discus-
tion invariably ended in the Filipinos having- the altruistic senti-
ments of the United States and the benefits the Americans , had
conferred on the islands pointed out to them. Th6y were told io
more or less euphemistic language that they ought to b|e. satisfied
with what they had and content to leave independencie to thp
Greek Kalends.

SEVENTH PAPER

THE POSITION OF THE INSULAR CIVIL

GOVERNMENT TOWARDS THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

IN THE PHILIPPINES.

SEVENTH PAPER

THE POSITION OF THE INSDL&R CIVIL

GOVERMENT TOWABOS THE C&TflOLIi] CHORCH

IN THE PHILIPPINES.

It is not the purpose of this paper to give a historical
sketch of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines.
To do that would involve the writing of a liistory prac-
tically of the Islands themselves. All it is proposed to
do is to set forth certain facts connected with the present
position of the Church in relation to the Civil Govern-
ment, with only such retrospective remarks as may be
necessary to illustrate some particular case in point.

It can be stated in general terms that prior to Amer-
ican intervention, the Roman Catholic Church in the
Philippines came under the jurisdiction of the Vatican
through Spain, and not directly, just as the Roman
Catholic Church in Algeria came under the same ju-
risdiction through France, both being established and
maintained in the colonies of those nations. In other
words the colonial branches of this Church formed part
and parcel of the Church as a body, as it existed in. those
nations.

To understand the situation of the Catholic Church
in the Philippine Islands before American intervention,
it must be borne in mind that the Church, under the laws

292

of Spain (1) had held its temporalities and other proper-
ties as a body or corporation, or perhaps more properly
a juridical person. Particular churches and their de-
pendencies, as edifices or estates, were administered by
members of the regular orders or of the secular clergy
(2). Although such individual members of these bodies

(1) While the Spanish Government, through special privilege
from the Holy See, had the right of presentation of clergymen to
parishes, through the Bishops, it made no claim to the absolute pos-
session or proprietorship of the churches, the lands, or establish-
ments of the various Religious Orders, or other' religious proper-
ties as a part of the Res Publica in the Philippines, any more
than it did to the property of any lay corporation. See Concordat
between the Vatican and the Spanish Government, 1851. Also the
Agreement of 1890, by which the Church was empowered to "ac-
quire, hold, and use in proprietorship, without limitation or re-
serve, all classes of property, bonds, etc." These conditions were
embodied in Article 38 of the Spanish Civil Code and made opera-
tive in the Royal Decree of July 31st, 1889, and the Royal Order
of December 4th, 1890.

(2) Editor's note: — Members of the secular clergy are such
persons in holy orders as are not bound by monastic vows or rules.
They do not live in community They are subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the Bishop of their diocese, to whom, as to their immediate
chief pastor, they owe obedience according to general ecclesias-
tical law and to the particular statutes of their diocese. A secular
priest is not disqualified from personal ownership of property.

Members of the regular clergy are bound by monastic vows and
rules. After talcing their vows they are individually disqualified,
among other [things, from ownership of any kind. They commonly
live in monasteries, convents, etc., under the jurisdiction of their
own superiors. Religious communities are capable of juridical per-
sonality, however, and as such are governed according to ecclesias-
tical law, but without being subject to the Dishop of the diocese in
which they live; that is to say, they can acquire, own, and administer
property of all kinds, and the management of their temporalities
and of their own community affairs is carried on under their own
prelates. If by agreement with the bishop of a diocese, a regular
priest is assigned to take charge of a parish, his administration of
the same is exercised under the authority of the bishop and subject
to his direction, inspection, visitation, etc.

Parish priests, whether secular oi*- regular, are personally en-
titled to their salary, which is commonly fixed by diocesan statutes,

293

enjoyed the revenues of the churches and other religious
establishments they actually administered, whether
derived from church property or from allotments of the
state, they were never in possession of the churches or
their revenues in any other, capacity than that of tem-
porary incumbent^, removable at the discretion- of their
ecclesiastical superiors. Therefore neither the rectors
individually nor the congregations collectively, attend-
ing the churches, were in any sense owners of these es-
tablishments, nor yet did these establishments belong to
the Res Publica. The lands on which they stood had gen-
erally been acquired by the Church through gift or pur-
chase. By far the greater number of the edifices them-
selves had been erected by the religious orders, assisted
by such donations of money or labor as piously inclined
persons had in one shape or another contributed towards

and to certain fees or offerings prescribed in cases of personal ser-
vice, as in the administration of baptisms and marriages and in the
conducting of funerals, etc. All other revenues belong to the
church or parish fund and must be accounted for to the bishop. A
secular priest may use his personal fees and stipends as he sees
fit. A regular priest can use such or any other fees, donations, etc.,
only by permission of his superior, but he generally turns them in-
to the common fund of his community.

It is easily seen, even from these few observations, that the
religious orders or corporations derive an unusual advantage from
their mode of life and from their thorough organization. Their
whole system of work and service and of the fruits thereof, is a
kind of socialism in the worthiest sen^e of the word. No regular
clergyman draws a salary from his corporation, in whatever capacity
he may be engaged. If he earns a salary on the outside, or otherwise
produces works or performs services that bring him emoluments
and rewards, all these go to the common fund of the community.
One who ponders these facts well will not easily be misled by carp-
ing critics and calumniators who insist that the religious orders did
not come by their holdings honestly, or possessed them to any one's
detriment. Had it not been for the peculiar character and genius
of the religious orders, for their business integrity and energy, and
for their evangelizing labors, which in many cases were not short
of heroic, the Philippines would not be what they are today and,
more than likely, they would never' have been brought into the
pale of Christianity.

294

them. In some rare cases the erection of churches had
been undertaken or assisted by the state.

They were maintained and kept in repair by part of
the funds received by their rectors. These funds, while
they varied in amounts according to circumstances,
could be applied to no other purpose. They were
partially derived from certain fixed fees for the perfor-
mance of the religious ceremonies connected with the
celebration and registration of baptisms, marriages, and
deaths. While these fees (3) themselves were not large,
the expenses attending the ceremonies for which they

(3) The fees were as follows:

For baptismal services for persons of- all classes and all races,
one candle, value three cents U. S. currency.

For marriage services for Spaniards and Europeans, $6.25 U.S.
money. For mestizos and full hooded natives, $ 3.19 U. S. money.
For funeral services for Spaniards and Europeans, $5,75 U. S
money. For mestizos, $2.50 U. S. money. For full blooded natives
$2,00 tr. S. money, if the priest accompanied the corpse to the
grave. If however the ceremony terminated with the services in
the church, only half the above fees could be charged.

The poor of all classes and all races ("poor" was interpreted
to mean all persons whose means of subsistence were daily wages)
were entitled to and recived the services free, of all charges, so far
as the Church was concerned.

Editor's note:— By way of comparison, the following examples
of fees or stipends will be interesting. They were enjoined by the
Manila diocesan synod, April, 1911, under the present ecclesiastical
■regime.

Baptisms are of four classes. The classification is not an arbi-
trary arrangement on the part of the Church, however, but is
founded on experience of what is demanded by people according to
their social standing and means.

A baptism of the first class calls for a fee of P 66.50, or $33 25,
U. S. currency. The items of charges are listed as follows:

Parochial priest's part P 5.00

Use of silver altar with adornments and hangings. ,, 30.00

Three chandeliers, each with 12 candles ,, 9.00

Eighteen candles on the altar and four for the

great candlestick ,, 5.50

Use of cope of the first class „ 2.00

,, ,,' cushion and carpet ,, 2.00

295

were charged could be increased indefinitely, according-
to the magnificence of the ceremonies or the greater
or less liberality of the persons requiring them. The
monies derived from this source were, except the priest's

Organ and organist

Sacristans .'.

Peal of church bells, five times.

,,

2.00

M

4.00

n

5.00

P 66.50

P

0.45

)»

0.10

J»

0.20

n

0.25

TOTAL

A baptism of the fourth class calls for one peso.

Parish priest's part p

Candles

Organ and organist

Sacristans

TOTAL P l.Oo
Marriages are also of four classes. The items -of charges for a
first class ceremonial are as follows:

Parish priest's part, including stipend for mass. . P 8.00-
Use of silver altar, with adornments and hangings. ,, 30.00

Three chandeliers, each with 12 candles ,, 9.00

Sixteen candles on the altars and four for the

great candelabra ,, 6.00

Four candles for bride, groom, and witnesses ,, 1.00

Vestments of the l.st class ,, 6.00

Cushions and carpet ,, 4.00-

Sacristans , , 6. 00'

Organ and organist ,, 2.00

Peals of bells four times , 4.00

Fiscal ,, 1.00

Marriage certificate , , 1.00

TOTAL P 78.75

$ 39.375

A fourth class marriage amounts to P. 7.50, or $3.25.

Parochial priest's part P 4,00'

Candles for bride, groom, and witnesses ,, .25

Sacristans ,, .50'

Organ and organist ,, .50'

Two cushions , .50

Fiscal „ .75

Marriage certificate ,, 1.00^

Total P 7.50'

296

part, required to be used in the maintenance and repair of
the churches, church buildings, vestments, supplies, etc.,
and in the pay of the sextons, sacristans, acolytes, and
other church servants.

Over and above these sources of revenue, nearly all
parochial churches had a certain amount of real estate in
the shape of houses and lands. Such properties were
■administered by the authority of the bishop of the diocese
in vrhich they were situated. The revenues derived from
this source were used for the benefit of the church or in
many cases according to the charitable intentions of
donors who gave such properties as pious endowments.
Thus the clergymen who administered such estates or
properties were, so far as the revenues were concerned,
merely agents of the church.

Many of the persons who made statements before
the Commissions boldly pleaded for a confiscation of
church property on general principles. One was inno-
cent enough to back up his plea by the tentative asser-
tion, that he believed there was a law in the United
States to the effect that no corporation was allowed to
possess more than $40,000 in real estate. If this belief
was sincere, its very candor and ignorance divested the
holder's views on the subject of any practical value. If
such a law exists, it is more honored in the breach than
in the observance. It is safe to say that there was no
state or territory within the United States at any time in
which one or more corporations did not possess' real
state to the above value.

When they were informed that no law existed in
the United States, by virtue of which such a confiscation
could be made, they suggested the enacting of one, for-
getting that the United States was hardly likely to make
any such enactment in the face of the immense holdings of
real estate by all religious denominations. An attack on
general principles on the property of one denomination
would necessarily involve an attack on all.

The idea and desire of confiscation were undoubtedly

297

based on the assertions of persons, not only before the
Peace Commission that met in Paris, but also on those of
persoiis who came before the first Philippine Commission
in Manila, 1899, to the effect that the Church, represented
by the friars, had come into possession of their property
by means and methods that would not stand a legal inves-
tigation. When the question of real ownership came be-
fore the courts, however, it was proved beyond the
peradventure of a doubt that not only were the Church
and the religious corporations, whether represented by
by the bishops or the friars, the real owners of their
properties, but they had come into possession of them by
legal means and methods, sanctioned not only by the laws
and usages of the Philippines but by those of the United
States also. Furthermore all their transfers of property
had been made in conformity with laws governing trans-
fers of a /like nature the world over.

The hierarchy, that is, the Bishops, Deans, Canons,
Prebendaries, priests etc., whether secular or regular,
received certain salaries pertaining to their offices. These
were derived from two sources, namely the rents, drawn
from real estate belonging to the particular churches (4)

(4) Like methods of securing corporate resources exist in the
churches of practically all denominations, more especially the Pro-
testant Episcopal, in the United States. Trinity Church alone,
in New York, possesses real estate in that city which is estimated
at from eighty to one hundred and sixty millions of dollars. See
Broadway Magazine, August, 1898, for details.

Editor's note. — Appallingly rash misstatements about the friars
and their lands are commonly heard among Americans of a certain
type, who would be the last in the world to admit either that they
were gullible or addicted to gulling. The writer once overheard
an American officer initiating a brother officer, evidently a new
comer, into the great secret of the land-grabbing methods of the
friars. It was on a McKinley car in the vicinity of San Pedro Ma-
eati and Guadalupe. "See all these lands around here? They all
belonged to the friars." "How did they get them?" asked the
recent arrival. "How did they get them? Why, they just came
and took them!" answered the wise one.

One cannot but regret hearing such evidences of disregard for

38

298

or to the diocese and varying according to circumstances;
and also certain fixed allotments made by the Spanish
colonial government and charged against the revenues
of the colonies, as were also other salaries of the gov-
ernment.

When the United States assumed charge of the Phil-
ippine Islands, all this was changed. Not only were
the contributions from the Res Publica discontinued,
but in many cases municipalities were allowed to seize
and hold church property, thereby preventing the Cath-
olic Church as a body, or parish priests as individuals
from receiving any benefits from their use or revenues:

The hierarchy and other ecclesiastical personnel of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines included, as has

simple truth and justice. To any one desirous of getting at the
facts in these matters, there are books, published records, and_
reports accessible, not only in the. American Circulating Library
of Manila but also in some of the friar libraries, where with a
little research any honest and unbiased student can learn to dis-
criminate between the false and the true in regard to a much
abused body of men and their business methods.

Had the officer, above referred to, done even a little salutary
reading, he could easily have learned that the estate about San
Pedro, at least in good part, was Jesuit property as early as 1637,
and that far from "just coming and taking it", they had received
it as gift from a military man of that time, ■Captain Pedro de Brito.
At that time the total population of the Philippines was only about
a half million, most of them savages at that, two facts worth
remembering. The transfer was made according to law, as were
all transfers of property to the church or to the religious orders,
whether the properties were acquired by gift or, as was most com-
monly the ease, by purchase.

It is quite the fashion, apparently, amongthe half-baked native
politicians of the day and swarms of perfervidly patriotic students,
to use the term "friars" as a convenient peg on which to hang
every imaginable grievance or wrong known in the Philippines.
"They squeezed the. people", "they dominated the courts", "they
ran the government," "they lived vicious lives", etc., etc., etc., are
charges heard or read over and over again, but one looks and listens
in vain for something approaching tangible evidence and specific
testimony in particular specific instances of cases and persons.

299

already been intimated, both secular and regular clergy.
Among the latter were the members of the various reli-
gious orders, the Augustinians, who first came to the Is-
lands in 1565, the Franciscans, who came in 1577, the
Jesuits, who arrived in 1581, the Dominicans, who came
in 1587, the Recoletos, who first established themselves
here in 1606, and others, Vincentians, Capuchins, Bene-
dictines, etc., who have come within the past century,
some quite recently.

At the time of the uprising of the "Katipunan"
against Spanish authority, in 1896, Catholic priests
were distributed as rectors among some 536 parishes,
of which 160 were controlled by the secular clergy and
370 by the regular priests (5). The majority of the par-

(5) Editor's note: — When the Spaniards first came to_ the
Philippines, it is estimated that the population was 500.000. In
1736, Father Juan de San Antonio gave it as 1,000,000. Statistics,
in 1805, placed the population at 1,741,000; in 1840, at 3,209,077; in
1860, at 4,500,000; in 1876, at 6,173,632.

According to the historian, Father Delgado,.the clergy in the
Philippines, in 1750, were located as follows:

Secular priests in 142 towns ministered to 147,269 souls.

252,963 „

141,193 ,,

209,527 ,,

99,780 „

53,384 „

Augustinians

„ 115

Franciscans

,, 63

Jesuits

„ 93

Dominicans

„ 51

Recoletos

,, 105

TOTAL 569 „ 904,116 „

These figures for towns do not include barrios, villages, chap-
els of ease, missions, etc.; and the number of souls includes only
persons registered in the parish books. Children under seven were

never counted in parochial population returns.

*
* *

According to the "Estado General," etc., of 1886, there were

then employed, for the most part in parishes, barrio chapels, and

missions

Regular priests 751

Secular ,, European and native, 722

TOTAL 1473

Regular priests, not so engaged, but doing University or col-

300

ishes controlled by the secular clergy were in the rich-
er and more civilized provinces. While it is true that
the regular orders had many of the richer parishes, they
also had charge of nearly all the poorer and more
remote ones, especially those among the uncivilized
tribes, as well as all the missions and the schools attach-
ed to them.

Although the majority of the 536 parishes of the Is-

lege work, or retired from or preparing for missions in China, Ja-
pan, etc , numbered 222.

*
* *

According to the official Catholic Directory for 1912, the clerg-y
are distributed as follows:

secular priests, regulars

Manila archdiocese, 212 227

Calbayog diocese 45 32

Cebu ,, 125 60

Jaro ,,85 56

Lipa „ 59 12

Nueva Caceres ,, 115 13

Nueva Segovia ,,82 18

Tuguegarao ,,23 15

Zamboanga ,,8 29

TOTAL 753 462

Probably the greater part by far of these regulars is devoted
to educational work.

* *
A close study of troubles arising- within the past ten years
from native antipathy to the foreign, i. e. white clergy, shows
them to be chiefly of political origin. The ogresque word, "friar"
is now applied more or less indiscriminately to all white priftsts
and. even, in some cases, to the American bishops!

The Catholic population returns for the Philippines as given
in the official Catholic Directory for 1912, probably general esti-
mates, amount to over 7,200,000. To the needs, religious and educa-
tional, of this vast number, even if it is somewhat in excess of the
reality, the services of only 1215 priests is dedicated at the present
day! Worthy vocations to the priesthood among the Filipinos
tliemselves are not numerous enough to supply the needs of the
Church, nor are they likely to increase according to present cpn-
ditions. And yet there seems to be a great deal of sympathy
among certain classes of Americans for the renegade demagogues

301

lands were under control of rectors belonging to the reg-
ular orders, (the proportion was about five priests of
the regular orders to two of the secular clergy), there
were, in all the 536 parishes, one or more secular priests,
who were assistants to such incurnbents, reguiar or secu-
lar, as might be in charge. Furthermore all the deans,
canons, and prebendaries were secular clergymen,
and nearly all the secular priests were natives of the
Islands.

The secular clergy, who were nearly all engaged
in parochial work only, could not under ordinary cir-
cumstances be removed from their parishes. More-
over they were in a measure stipendiaries of the govern-
ment and consequently to a large extent dependent on
it. Many of the members of the regular orders were
likewise engaged in parochial work. While so engaged
they were also stipendiaries, but the remainder, who
were engaged in missionary work among the Igorrotes
and other will tribes of Luzon and Mindanao, or among
the savages and Moros of Mindanao and the Southern is-
lands, who paid no cedula tax, were not- Both the secu-
lar clergy and regular priests, as stipendiaries of the
Government, drew salaries alloted from certain revenues
in the shape of a percentage on the Cedula or Poll
taxes of the inhabitants of the parishes. This made
their income vary in accordance with the number and
wealth of the parishioners (6).

who still shout against the friars, i. e., white priests of any des-
cription !

Throughout the history of the Church in the Islands, efforts
were constantly made to get a worthy native clergy. It ought not
to be a matter of wonder, to Americans especially, that these
efforts were only relatively successful, not because of opposition
on the part of the regulars but because of the natives themselves.

(6) Editor's note:— A royal decree of Feb. 7, 1859 fixed the
salary of the Archbishop of Manila at $ 12.000 per annum and of
each suffragan bishop at $ 6,000. This dollar was the Spanish duro,
containing five pesetas, each of the value of about a franc.

A royal decree of March 6, 1896 assigned salaries to the mem-

302

Members of the regular orders, whether stipendia-
ries of the government or not, were individually inde-
pendent of it, so far as financial matters were concerned.
They and their educational, missionary, and other works

bers of the Cathedral Chapter of Manila as follows: Dean $ 3,825;
Archdeacon, $ 2,500: Head master of the choristers' school, $2,500;
Precentor, $ 2,590; Treasurer, $ 2,500; three canons acting: one as
capitular consul tor, the others as assistants to the archbishop $2,000
each; two caaons without special title, $ 2.000 each: six prebenda-
ries, $ 1,500 each.

The Provisor and Vicar-General of Manila received a salary of
9 3,000 if he was not a prebendary; or if he was, $ 1,650. The same
office in Nueva Caceres, Nueva Segovia, Cebu, and Jaro was sal-
aried $ 2,000 each place.

In 1884, parish priests received $ 180 for each thousand cedulas
in the official poll of the parish, except the parishes of Cebu, Bo-
hol, Samar, Leyte, Misamis, and Mindoro, where the rate was
$ 212.50.

Parishes were classified according to the number of souls they
contained. A parish

1. de primera entrada had from 1 to 5,000

2. de segunda ,, „ ., 5,001 ,, 10,000

3. de primera ascenso ,, ,, 10,001 ,, 20,000

4. de segundo ,, ,, ,, 20,001 ,, 30,000

5. determine ,, above 30,000 souls.

A parish "de segunda entrada" was obliged to have, be-
sides the parish priest, one assistant; "de primer ascenso," two as-
sistants; "de segundo ascenso," tbree assistants; "determine," four
assistants.

Missions were active or parochial, in the latter case the con-
version of the wild inhabitants of the place being practically com-
pleted. Active missions were equivalent to a parish "de primer as-
censo"; parochial missions had the rank of a parish "de segunda
entrada."

By a royal decree, dated July 10, 1894, the salaries of the
clergy were fixed as follows.

Parish priests ' 'de 1* entrada' ' $ 500.

,, ,, 2* ,, (also missionary parish priests). » 600.
,, ,, 3.er ascenso (also priests of active mis-
sions) » 800.

,,29 „ » 900.

,, ,, termino » 1200.

Assistant parish priests » 200.

, , mission , , > 400.

303

and enterprises were supported out of the resources de-
rived largely from the estates of their Orders. But, un-
like the secularclergymen, they were liable to be sent
anywhere it might be deemed necessary or expedient,
according to the judgment or even caprice of their su-
periors.

Prior to the breaking out of the Spanish-American
War, the American public knew little of all this and
cared less. Owing to the fact that the majority of the
inhabitants of the United States are non- Catholics, it is
by no means astonishing, of course, that the reiterated
assertions of the more violent American anti- Catholics
and Spanish anti- clericals and radicals were perfuncto-
rily accepted without any questions being asked. There
was little desire to get at the real merits of the case,
more especially as there were comparatively few Amer-
icans who had anything beyond a vague knowledge that
such a place as the Philippine Archipelago existed.
Among these there were fewer still who were in a posi-
tion to lay claim to any accurate information concerning
them.

American statesmen and politicans had given their
attention to affairs nearer home. Up to the time imme-
diately preceding the breaking out of hostilities with
Spain, their interest as well as that of the general public
of the United States, so far as Spain and her colonies
were concerned, was centered almost exclusively in Cuba
and the Spanish Main. Under these conditions the aver-
age statesmen and the average citizens of the United-
States were forced to depend for information on some
few 'books of travel, most of which on investigation have
proved to be neither unbiased in their sentiments, im-
partial in their statenaents, nor correct in their conclu-
sion's. Largely through them the American general
public was wrought up to the belief that, owing to the
Catholic Church, a condition of affairs, analogous to
what might be expected from a combination of the Blue
Laws of New England and the Inquisition, as it existed.

304

in Europe in the middle ages, was actually in existence
in the Philippines at the time of American intervention.

The principal avowed cause for the intervention of
the United States in the affairs of the Philippine archi-
pelago was to redress the wrongs of the Filipinos, to
remedy the misgovernment of the Islands, and to abate
the abuses that had arisen under Spanish rule. Of these
abuses, the principal one put forward was the alleged
tyranny and the despotism of the Roman Catholic
Church. To such an extent indeed had this been pro-
claimed that it was believed to be a fact. It consequent-
ly had become axiomatic, without further investigations
or inquiry, to lay all the real or imaginary shortcomings
of the Spanish government of the Philippines, regardless
as to what their real sources or nature may have been, to
the influence of the Catholic Church on that government.

As soon as the Treaty of Paris was concluded
and the Archipelago passed from Spanish to Amer-
ican rule, the President of the United States, through
the Secretary of War, appointed a Commission with
a view to enquiring, among other things, into the
abuses that it was taken for granted existed in the Phil-
ippines. This commission was presumably clothed with
powers to recommend measures for their abatement, if
not to put into execution such measures as might be
determined on as immediately necessary to accomplish
the desired end. But whatever this commission was
empowered to do or to leave undone, it was certain to do
nothing to stultify itself or the administration that had
created it, by finding a condition of affairs in. reference
to one of the alleged sources of abuse and misgovern-
ment, namely the Catholic Church, different from what
at the outset had been assumed to exist. Prom no point
of view it could consistently take would it have b^en pol-
itic or expedient that it should have done so. It would
have been folly, therefore,' to have expected this com-
mission, composed as it was entirely of Protestants, one
of whom, moreover, was already on record as having

305

condemned the Catholic Church as it was in the Philip-
pines (7), to carry out its investigations in anything like a
friendly manner, or even in an unbiased spirit, so far as
the Church was concerned.

The above is made manifest by reading the reports
of the examinations of such as came before it. Accord-
ing to those reports, the Commission appears to have
gone exhaustively into all subjects, such as laws, civik
administration, finance, schools, labor, and Chinese im-
migration. The mineral and other resources of the Is-
lands were also fully gone into and persons testifying
on these subjects were questioned at length and minutely.
When it came to questions on the Catholic Church,
however, and its relations to the country and to the peo-
ple, its lands, possessions, revenues, or administration,
the report fails to show that any effort was made to sift
the evidence presented or to reconcile conflicting state-
ments. There was no sign that there was any particu-
lar desire for an extended knowledge Cf the situation, so

(7) See The Philippine Islands and their Inhabitants, by Pro-
fessor Dean C. Worcester, September l.st 1898, pages 339 to 349.

Professor Worpester throughout his book never misses an oc-
casion to hold the Catholic Church in the Philippines up to ridicule
and contempt through its ministers. He is careful in his arguments,
however, to base them only on quotations from other writers, but
through them he indicates his opinion on the subject as clearly as
though he had expressed it distinctly in his own words. In doing
this he cites Foreman as his authority and gives as his reason for
doing so (page 313) that he is "a loyal Catholic"- After making a
quotation covering more than three pages, Worcester states that
''it is not from lack of similar facts within my own knowledge that.
I quote him so extensively, etc".; but he refrains, however, from
giving those facts.

In quoting Foreman, the learned Professor makes two mistakes;
first. Foreman was not a Catholic, and even if he had been, his
writings show him to be anything but a loyal one; secondly, he
weakens his own argument by not adducing the best attainable
evidence in suport of it, namely the facts within his "own personal
knowledge", instead of quoting Foreman, who in this particular-
case is at best but secondary or derivative evidence.

39

306

far as that Church was concerned. The line of enquiry
pursued appears to indicate that this particular subject
was one upon which the Commissioners had already made
Tip their minds. It seems to point out that any deeper
investigation or discussion was not only lacking in inter-
est, but was also a waste of time, and that, all they
wanted to hear was such testimony as could confirm their
previous opinions for presentation to the American public.

Witnesses testifying against the Catholic Church
were allowed to wander at will over the wide fields of
glittering generalities, instead of being required to con-
fine themselves to the narrower limits of positive state-
ments of absolute facts. The majority of the state-
ments appear to have been based upon hearsay rather
than upon direct personal knowledge. This report also
shows that certain witnesses appear to have been recal-
led from time to time to testify against the Catholic
■Church and its administration, and that, on each of such
•occasions, their statements became more elaborated and
more bitter. In the intervals between these examina-
tions, they apparently acquired the idea, justly or un-
justly, that statements against the Catholic Church and
its administration would be more acceptable to the Com-
mission than testimony in its favor.

Take the testimony of Manuel Jerez Burgos, for in-
stance, which was devoted almost entirely to subjects
■connected with the relations of the Catholic Church and
its priests, regular and secular, to the people. The whole
of it consists of nothing more than sweeping general
statements. Even though the questions, to which they
purported to be answers, indicated very clearly that the
Commission Avould have been well pleased to have him
make some specific allegations, he either could not or
would not to do so. He was persistently evasive by go-
lug into generalities and ignoring any pointed inquiry.
It was only when one of the Commissioners practically
put the answer he wanted into the witness' mouth, that
the latter gave out anything near a specific reply.

307

The same applied to the answers of T. Pardo de Ta-
vera and Benito Legarda, as well as of others. Their
testimony amounted in substance to mere general state-
ments that the friars were a bad lot and that they had
tyrannized over the people and abused them, but just how
and in what particular instances was not shown.

In the early part of 1898 and previous to the break
between the military power of the United States and the
Revolutionary Government, vrherever the insurgents
under Aguinaldo had occupied the country and where-
ever his authority had reached, all the members of the
religious orders and a great number of the secular clergy
had been forcibly expelled from the churches and par-
ishes they had theretofore occupied and administered. In
nearly all cases these churches had been pillaged and
in some instances had been completely destroyed. The
places of all clergymen thus expelled had been taken by
native secular priests. Under the auspices of the Rev-
olutionary Government, these natives administered those
churches and parishes, into which, in a very large num-
ber of cases, they had simply installed themselves. Some
of these were persons who for caniionical reasons had
been expelled or suspended from the priesthood of the
Catholic Church. Later, for one reason or another,
many had broken away entirely and joined the Aglipay-
an schism. When the American forces drove the in-
surgents from such places as they occupied, these per-
sons were technically in "peaceable possession" of the
churches, religious establishments, and parishes they
had thus violently usurped under the. auspices of the
Revolutionary Government. But as a matter of fact
they were, as is evident, nothing better than violent in-
terlopers. They had seized and occupied churches and
parishes without competent authority from the Bishops
to whom they owed obedience and who represented the
Catholic Church as a- body.

During the American Military Government, in force
from 1898 to 1901, Church property had been used by it

308
for any and all purposes. Churches, convents, semina-
ries, colleges, rectories, and schools, in Manila as well
as in the provinces, were used as barracks, stables, store-
houses, canteens, hospitals, or for any other purpose,
military or civil, for which they might be convenient.
Furniture or fittings of the establishments so used, if
not plundered by the revolutionary forces or the inhabi-
tants of the country, were in many cases broken or des-
troyed by the troops or the civilians, accompanying the
American army. Much of it was carried away by them
as "souvenirs". Many churches and other religious
establishments had been burned or destroyed in the
course of military occupation. There was also much
other religious property that had never been occupied
by either the American Military or Civil Govern-
ments.

As early as Sept. 7, 1899, the Commission asked
whether the Filipinos would enter upon a war to save
their religion. This question must have originated in
an effort to ascertain how far, within limits, the interven-
ing government could go without danger of starting a
religious war.

In 1901, when the Civil Government, as represented by
the Philippine Commission, assumed the reins of power,
much of this Church property that had been occupied by
the troops, was abandoned little by little, as the military
necessity for its further use ceased, and presumably
reverted to its proper purposes, while some was turned
over to the Civil Government (8). In surrendering property

(8) Notably what was known as the San Lazaro Hospital and
estate, situated in the suburbs of Manila. This was a chaiitable
bequest managed by the Fathers of the Franciscan Order as an es-
tablishment for the treatment and care of lepers and other persons
suffering from contagious diseases.

Immediately on the occupation of Manila by the American for-
ces, one Felipe Calderon, a mestizo lawyer who had long been an
avowed and bitter opponent of Spain and the religious Orders, Tavera,
Maus, Bourns, and others induced the American military authori-
ties to take possession of it on the ground that the Franciscans

309

used by the Military Government, the rule had been and
still was to recognize as valid the claims of those who
were in peaceable possession at the time of the United
States Army's occupation of the places where such prop-
erty was located. This policy, apparently fair enough
on its face, was ambiguous, to say the least. It opened
the door to the exercise of a considerable amount of pri-
vate judgment, not to say caprice, on the part of in-

were in unlawful possession of it as being state property. Without
making any serious investigation of the subject, the military
authorities acted on Calderon's statement. There is nothing very
astonishing in the fact that Calderon and the other Filipinos, who
were bitter enemies of the Catholic Church as it existed, should
have signed the complaint in question; but what is astonishing is
that two American officers, one of the regular and one of the volun-
teer service, should have done so, because as individuals they could
have had no possible interest in the matter and as officers they
hardly did so by order. When the military government was super-
seded by the civil, the former turned the hospital and estate
over to the latter. The Franciscans appealed to the Courts and
from that time up to the present the estate has been in litigation.

Calderon, together with the Commissioner, Trinidad Pardo de
Tavera, made similar representations in respect to the "Colegio de
San Jos^," of the medical department of Santo Tomiis University.
The results were similar. In each of these cases the Government
acted on the ex-parte statements of individuals who were well
known as avowed and bitter enemies of the regular orders. Only
in the case of the college of San Jos6, it never assumed actual
possession, as it had of the San Lazaro Hospital and estate, although
it had enacted a law preparatory to doing so.

Editor's note:— The government is still in possession of San
Lazaro Hospital and apparently the Franciscans are ousted from it
for good. It is said that in the San Jos^ College case, the supreme
court was ready to hand down a decision in favor of the defendants,
namely the Church as represented by the administrators of the
institution and its estates; but in view of a compromise, at least so
the whispered story runs, between the highest civil and ecclesias-
tical auth,orities, that decision was not formally pronounced. The
compromise seems to have put a stop to all litigation, the govern-
ment retaining possession of San Lazaro, unjustly as many think,
and being pledged, as is supposed, to offer no further opposition
to the Church in regard to San Jos4 and other similar properties,
held as pious endowments or "obras pias".

310

dividual officials wherever they surrendered property
that had been occupied by the United States or the In-
sular Government.

In defining what was meant by "last peaceable pos-
session", it allowed those who might be so disposed to
recognize as "last] peaceable possessors", persons who,
under the auspices of the Revolutionary Government,
had driven out the parish priests and other representa-
tives of the Catholic Church, regular or secular. So far
as the American Civil Government went, these persons
were not only technically but actually in "peaceable pos-
.session." They had occupied it by force before the ad-
vent of the American troops, in despite of its rightful
owner, the Catholic Church, which at that time was un
able to prevent them doing so. Apart from the Aglipay-
an schismatics, many municipalities had also seized on
Church property. There is furthermore little room to
doubt that there were many cases in which officials
chose to avail themselves of the ambiguity of this an-
nounced policy, to recognize either the schismatics or the
municipalities for no other reason than that they were
personally opposed to the Catholic Church.

This line of policy has given rise to the often asked
question, "Is the Insular Government, as represented
by the Civil Commission, hostile to the Catholic Church
■ in the Philippine Islands'"? On calm reflection the an-
swer without hesitation or circumlocution is affirmative.

There are doubtless many persons, some members
of the Insular Government and some not, who will pro-
test vigorously against this assertion, alleging that, as
there is no direct evidence to sustain it, it is consec(uent-
ly untrue. Such persons lose sight of the fact that not
all conclusions are reached by means of direct evidence
or positive proof. There are many things unhesitatingly
accepted and firmly believed as facts, for which only
moral conviction exists, and of which material proof for
the time being is lacking.

The statement that the Civil Commission, which

311

governs the Philippines, is hostile to the Catholic Church,
is one of the above nature. Its truth or fallacy must be
determined by circumstantial evidence. Results reach-
ed up to the present time rather than aims proclaimed
at the start must be scrutinized. Therefore the case
will have to be argued backwards,. so to speak, from ef-
fect to cause rather than from cause to effect.

Among other officials created by Aguinaldo during
his ephemeral government, there was a "Head" of the
Filipino Church. To occupy that position one Gregorio
Aglipay was selected, a priest who had been excommuni-
cated from the Roman Catholic Church. The Filipino
government invested him with the title of bishop and gave
him the rank, privileges, pay, and uniform of a Brigadier
General of Insurgents. (*) Aglipay usually made his
appearance in public in-this uniform, wearing also a
sabre and revolver. He later headed a band of insur-
gents in northern Luzon, in the district commanded by
Tinio, who, disgusted at his methods and excesses,
issued orders to bring him before a drum-head Court
Martial. He would undoubtedly have been shot had the
proper parties been able to lay hands on him.

(*) Editor's note In January 1899, in Vigan, Aglipay was

appointed "Ecclesiastical Governor." Tiiere was a grand fiesta
on that occasion, the new dignitary himself officiating. After the
church ceremonial, a ball took place at which, among other things,
a native clergyman was seen dancing, and that in the presence of
his "ecclesiastical governor!" It was a sight that proved too much
for many of the Katipuneros themselves.

On the 25 of the same month, another ceremony took place.
The people were assembled to kiss the new flag and to swear feal-
ty to it. Some two thousand Igorotes had come down from the
hills, and they too were solemnly sworn in. After that Aglipay
reformed the clerical dress for out of doors. All the priests, and
the seminariaus as well, had to be uniformed as captains. When
the seminary boys were out for their walk, they, including the
priests that were with them, looked like a small regiment of cap-'
tains. The "Ecclesiatical Governor" himself donned the uniform
of a general, with sword, gold lace in abundance, and other inge-
nious adornments!

312

About the latter part of 1902 and the earlier of 1903,
Aglipay appeared in Manila. Having made his peace
Tvith the Civil Government, he started the Independent
Filipino Church, of which he appointed Governor Taft
as president. He also appointed a number of laymen
as honorary bishops,, among them Commissioner Pardo
de Tavera and other Filipinos, many of whom had been
prominent and active opponents to the American forces.
Governor Taft courteously declined to accept the pres-
idency of the new church but, according to statements
published by Aglipay, accompanied his refusal with
expressions of sympathy for Iiim and for his new church,
at the same time assuring him that he would find it
supported, if need be, by American cannon.

Though the American press of Manila warmly sup-
ported this schismatic movement at that time, it cast
doubts on the veracity of Aglipay's statements that he
Avas backed by the American Civil Government to the
extent he asserted. To these doubts Aglipay replied
through the press that not only had he stated the truth
but he also had documentary evidence which he could
produce, if necessai-y, in suport of his assertions. Wheth-
er Aglipay's statements, involving the Governor in an
implied official promise to follow a certain line of action
in reference to the new schism, were true or not, is a-
matter of very little importance. But what was impor-
tant was that these statements'at that time were allow-
ed to pass unchallenged by the Civil Government.
Consequently the Filipino public believed them to be
true and that was all that Aglipay wanted. He thus
accomplished the object he had in view, namely, to se-
cure for the new schism an appearance of official support
and sanction.

On the strength of -the popular belief, Aglipay per-
suaded some priests of his province of Ilocos to join his
schism. These, on breaking away from the Roman Cath-
olic Church, forcibly retained possession of churches and
Church property that they had formerly administered as

313
priests ia good standing subject to their Catholic bishop.
They resisted the installment in their places of clergymen
sent by the proper ecclesiastical superiors of the Roman
Catholic church in the Philippines. They believed, as
Aglipay had led them to do, that, in accordance with the
alleged promise of Governor Taft, they would, if neces-
sary, be supported by the United States forces and
maintained in possession of the churches and Church
property they had thus usurped^

In some cases, municipalities under the Insurgent
Government had seized and held churches and Church
property and refused, even after the American forces
had taken possession, to recognize the ownership of the
Catholic Church.

In both of the foregoing cases, the Church, through
its Bishops, had protested and appealed to the Civil
Government to be reinstated in the possession of these
churches and their dependencies. To these appeals the
Civil Government answered practically by calling atten-
tion to the "peaceable possession" policy above referred
to. It informed the applicants that the ownership of
such properties would have to be determined by law.
In this way, though it did not actually recognize the
rights of the seceding schismatics and the municipal-
ities, yet by refraining from putting the Catholic Church
in possession of its property by executive order as re-
quested, instead of abandoning it to the more tardy and :
apparently more uncertain action of the courts, it put J
the Catholic Church on the defensiye. It gave the im-
pression that it entertained grave doubts as to the va-\
lidity of the Catholic claims. By forcing the Church to
incur great expense in prosecuting these cases in the
courts, it furthermore caused that organizatfon no little
financial embarassment. What give still greater force
to this impression was that no other acts of the Insur-
gents or of their government beyond those in reference
to Church property, were recognized to the same extent
by the Civil Government.

40

314

In some cases, when these claims were tested in the
courts and after j udgments in favor of the Catholic Church
were given, the necessary machinery for putting it in pos-
session was not put into motion or, if it was, the action
of the Government was so tardy and lacking in energy
that not only the Aglipayans but the general Filipino
public assumed that, if the Civil Government was not ac-
tively and openly hostile to the Catholic Church, it was
at least in active symi>athy with the schismatics. Fur-
ther color was given to this assumption by the fact that
much of the Church property usurped by the schismatics-
was part of the property, the so-called Friar lands, of
which the religious Orders had been the last peaceable
possessors at the time of American occupation, and
which had subsequently been purchased from these
Orders by the government, though the churches them-
selves, as wfell as their rectories and immediate depen-
dencies and certain other urban church property, were
not included in the sale. The government, however, by
entering into negotiations for and consummating the pur-
chase of these estates, had practically recognized the
validity of the title of the Orders to them. Therefore on
the principal that "the greater includes the less", it is
fair to assume that if the title of the Orders were valid
so far as the property sold was concerned, they were
just as valid so far as they concerned the churches
and Church property they refrained from selling. It
would therefore follow that if these churches and
Church properties did not belong to the Catholic Church
as a corporation, they did belong to the religious Orders,
which formed a part of the Catholic Church m the Phil-
ippine Islands. For the Government to require the
Catholic Church, or any part of it, to go to law to
establish a title to what was already practically re-
cognized by that Goverment as belonging to that or-
ganizati6n, was to place the Church on the defen-
sive. It amounted to a tacit recognition of a right on
the part of the schismatics and municipalities to seize

315

and retain church property at their pleasure. This line
of action or rather of inaction, allowed the schismat-
ics and municipalities to entertain the belief that
had arisen, rightly or wrongly, namely that if the Civil
Government would not openly support them in their
usurpations, it would at least put off until the last pos-
sible moment such action as would assist the Catholic
Church in evicting them.

In the winter of 1903-1904, when the Roman Cath-
olic Bishop of Nueva Segovia obtained judgments in the
courts, supporting the claim of the Catholic Church
as a body to certain Church property, Aglipay made
a personal appeal to the Governor General to inter-
vene and have the judgments of the Court suspend-
ed. The ground he urged was^that to allow these
judgments to be carried out and the Bishop of Nueva
Segovia to take possession, would be to place the
usurping schismatics on the defensive and thus weaken
their claim. The matter was referred to the Philippines
Constabulary for investigation. What report was made
or what action, if any, was taken by the Civil Govern-
ment, is unknown to the general public. But it looked
very much as though the "active competition", hailed
by one of the Commissioners as an augury for good, was
likely, under the auspices of the government, to become
an accomplished fact.

The attitude assumed by the Civil Government in
respect to religion in its abstract sense was an avowed
impartiality to all or any particular forms of religious
belief. But it was not difficult to realize the fact that
the majority of the members of the Commission had a
decided leaning towards any religious organization op-
posed to the Catholic Church. It seemed they took spe-
cial pains to emphasize their tolerance of renegades and
outsiders, alike, whether represented by the Aglipayan
schism or any of the various Protestant denominations,
whether they originated in the Islands or were intro-
duced into them from Europe or the United States. More-

316

over one of the ablest and most energetic members of
the Commission, as has already been said, is on record as
being of the opinion, in respect to Catholicism in the
Philippines, that "the native competition which would
inevitably arise between the two forms of belief might
react wholesomely upon the individual workers them-
selves, etc." (10).

This possibly would all have been very well if there
been any other form of Christianity in the Islands to
compete with the Catholic Church. But at the time this
was written, as well as later, when the United States
intervened in insular affairs, the Catholic Church was
alone. It is therefore not unfair to infer that this Com-
missioner, no matter what his views in respect to the
Roman Catholic Church might be, would at least be in
favor of the creation or introduction into the Islands of
any such competing belief. The native Filipino mem-
bers of the Commission realized that their positions were
appointive and that their continuance in office depended
very largely upon their getting on harmoniously with
the American members, who were in the majority. Con-
sequently they were hardly likely to allow any
opinions of theirs on religious or any other subjects to
clash seriously with those of their American colleagues,
and thus jeopardize, their positions.

The most powerful and logical reason for assuming,
"a priori", the existence of hostility on the part of the
Civil Government to the Catholic Church is that the
members of the Civil Commission were hardly likely to
overlook the fact that no governing or legislative body
that makes any pretension directly or indirectly to con-
sult the will of the people it governs, can count on gen-
eral popular support or success, unless, as a body, it at
least professes the same religious belief as that profes-
sed by the majority of the people it purports to repre-

(10) The Philippine Islands and their People by Dean C. Wor-
cester, September Its. 1898, page 349.

317
sent. A governing body that does not fulfil this condi-
tion, if it proposes to rule by any other means than abso-
lute force, is confronted with two issues. It will in the
end either have to conform to the religion of the people
or make the religion of the people conform to it. If any
one doubts the correctness of this way of, stating this
argument, let him ask himself first, what he considers
the possibilities to be for the election of a Roman Cath-
olic executive and legislative body in the United States
at large or in any one state of the Union, or how long
does he think the United States would consent to be
governed by a Roman Catholic President and Congress?
And second, provided that any such governing bodies
were to come into existence, what would be the prospect
of a successful and harmonious administration of the
country as long as the bulk of the population remained,
as it is at present, distinctly Protestant and unbelieving?

It is therefore well within the range of possi-
bility that, in the face of the immense advantage to be
derived from not being confronted with anyone dominant
religious belief in the Philippines, the maxim "divide to
conquer", may have had a certain amount of influence
on the Civil Government, though possibly it may not
have presented itself or made itself felt exactly in
these terms. Instinctively, therefore, the Commission
may have acted in conformity with that principle, if not
by openly aud actively stimulating the "active competi-
tion" already mentioned, at least by going as far as it
could in that direction without actually committing itself
to the ofiicial and open support of the Aglipayan schism
or any other newly introduced denomination.

It is safe to say that at the present writing, over
ninety five percent of the population of the Philippines,
possessing any form of Christianity, belongs to the Ro-
man Catholic Church. Nor can any allowance or dif-
ference be urged whether the diocesan administration
be American, Spanish, or Filipino. The Church itself,
therefore, in so far as its relations to the people on the

318

one hand and to the government on the other are con-
cerned, so long as it remains united, is a power to be
reckoned with. That power may be ignored for a time
but eventually it will make itself felt. As a matter of
fact the Catholic Church in the Philippines, in spite of
all the political and other changes that have taken place,
is still very strong. So much is this recognized that, from
the speech of the Attorney General of the Islands.before
a meeting of the "Young Men's Christian Association"
in Manila, on July 11th, 1905, in which he stated that
the effect of the "change in the ecclesiastical adminis-
tration of the Islands cannot be forecast, etc.," it might
almost be inferred that the government of the Civil Com-
mission, so far as represented by the speaker on that oc-
casion, dreaded that the Catholic Church might outweigh
it in influence with the native population. If the Church
could be divided against itself, however, especially by
arraying the secular clergy against the members of the
religious orders, or by a schism of sufficiently numerical
importance, or by the secession of any considerable num-
ber of its members to the various Protestant denomina-
tions introduced into the islands by European or Amer-
ican missionaries, so as to divide the population of the Is-
lands into three or more religious, parties of nearly
equal strength, but with precepts and practice more
or less antagonistic to each other, the ideal "active com-
petition," already referred to, would easily become an ac-
complishad facti Now this might or might not "stimu-
late individual workers," but it would certainly do away
with any dominant religious belief. What is chiefly to
be noted, it would also relieve, whatever government or
party might be in power from thepossibility of being con-
fronted with any such dilemma as that described above.
It would neither have to conform to any parficular belief
nor have to make persons of any particular belief con-
form to it. Under the conditions indicated, any two or
more of these new divisions could always be sucessfully

319

' arrayed and played against the remaining one, as policy
or expediency might dictate.

Nearly all the educational establishments in the Phil-
ippines, such as the University, colleges, academies,
«tc., to say nothing of hospitals and seminaries, except
ing the primary municipal schools and some other
-technical schools for the teaching of trades, arts, and
sciences, which were under the direction of the Spanish
Insular Government, were not only controlled by the re-
ligious orders, but the buildings in which they were es-
tablished, as well as the revenues with which they were
administered, were their own property, or, in some cases,
Church endowments that had nothing to do with the
Res Publica. As a consequence the greater part of the
teaching and missionary work fell to these Orders. They
thus naturally became not only the bulwark but also the
directing power of the Catholic Church in the Islands-
In their hands the Church maintained that unitj^ of pre-
cept and practice which gives it its strength the world
over.

When the CivilCommissionintroduced the American
public school system into the Philippines, it is safe to
say ninety nine percent- of the Christian population was
-of the Roman Catholic faith. ■ As Catholics they would
naturally have been glad to have had at least some ru-
dimentary principles of that faith taught in these
schools. But as the Civil Government had no more idea
-of perpetuating the Catholic faith in the Islands than it
had of perpetuating the Spanish language, it proceeded
to endeavor to do away with the latter by making English
the language of instruction, and with the former by giv-
ing no instruction in any religious faith or religion.
The only people who would profit by this were the teach-
ers imported from America.

This leaving religion out of the curriculum of the
public schools in the Philippines probably arose from
the fact that the majority of the American so called
•^'educators" are Protestants, indifferentists, atheists, or

320

agnostics, who maintain as an axiom that, if morahty is
taught in the schools, religion of any sort is unnecessary.
Catholics, however, hold that morality proceeds from
religion, is inseparable from it, and should be taught at
the same time, because, admitting the Divine origin of
the Christian religion, its precepts must be true, uni-
form, and unvarying at all times, in all places, and
under all circumstances. They cannot be swayed out of
their Divine character by ephemeral, extraneous influen-
ces. Thus on the principal that the greater includes
the less, to teach religion is to teach morality also.

Morality, as an abstract idea separated from reli-
gion, is merely a sense of appreciation of right and
wrong, which, if it does not emanate from religion, is
spontaneously evolved from the inner consciousness of
the individual. Admitting this to be so true, each
individual would have to formulate his own code of
morality. But as individuals vary in taste, temper-
ament, and inclinations, it follows that morality
would vary according to individuals. Now it can-
not be denied that individuals, in general terms, vary
according to propinquity and environment. Thus mor-
ality, separated from religion, would also vary until
it became nothing more than mere expediency. It
would then be more or less elastic according to the
laxity or strictness of the individual teacher, who in turn
would be governed by the views of the community of
which he formed a part.

No doubt it was felt necessary to make some conces-
sions to American Roman Catholics, individually the
strongest religious denomination in the United States,
though collectively they form but some twenty per cent-
of the population of the country. So also must it have
been deemed expedient to show some consideration for
the practically ninety nine per cent of the population of
the civilized tribes of the Philippine Islands. The govern-
ment accordingly graciously consented to permit reli-
gious instruction to be given in the school houses during

321

some hour not taken up by other branches of instruction.
This, apparently fair, was in reality a penance to the
scholars. The use of the privilege meant that those
who took religious instruction had to be kept in school for
longer hours than those who did not. For this reason the
concession to the dominant religion of the Philippines,
apparently fair as has already been said, was in reality
more than likely to become one of the most powerful
weapons against it. It could not but predispose the mind
of a child to look upon religious teaching as an extra and
irksome task, considered unnecessary by the educational
authorities and quickly noted to be but grudgingly con-
ceded to the parish priest.

A system ignoring any and all religions in the pri-
mary instruction of children may be very apposite to the
United States. There, owing to the great number of re-
ligious beliefs as well as to their widely varying tenets,
it would obviously be impossible in a common public
school to recognize or teach any one particular creed.
But such a condition did not then, nor does is it now ob-
tain in the Philippines, where practically the whole civ-
ilized population is of one belief. And because of their
convictions, there are many parents who, though by no
means in afluent circumstances, prefer to send their
children to the Catholic schools, where they have to pay
for their tuition, rather than to the public schools where
they get it free. This is for no other reason than that,
in the former, religion is taught and in the latter it is
not (11).

. If the theory of an "active competition" would be
beneficial to the Church, it is not quite clear why 'it
would not be equally beneficial to the public schools of
the Philippines. From the above, however, it ap-
pears that in the opinion of the Director of Educa-
tion, as well as in that of the Commission as a whole,

(11) In Mindanao and the Jolo Archipelago, the public schools
attended by the Moros were placed in the hands of a Syrian Turic,
who had the Koran taug-ht as part of the curriculum.

41

322

this is not the case. In the public schools, a rig-
orous uniformity of precept and practice is insisted upon
as absolutely necessary. The authorities alone have any
thing and everything to say, not only as to what shall be
taught but, more especially, in the case of religion of
any kind, as to what shall not. Neither the scholars,
who attend the schools, nor their parents, who pay taxes
for their support, are allowed any voice in deciding what
even any part of the curriculum shall be or who shall
teach it.

It might be urged that, as the teachers from the
United States had, as has already been said, no particu-
lar religion, it would be a hardship on them to teach some-
thing in which they did not believe. But this would be
to shift the argument from an essential consideration to
one of relatively minor importance. The great question
here is, is it in keeping with the blatant profession^ of
liberty and uplift, as made by many Americans in these
Islands, to keep five or six millions of Catholics from
Jiaving what they want in their own school curriculums?
By what right are Filipino Catholics deprived of what
they conscientiously believe to be an integral part of
■education? Who are paying for their schools?

The ground taken and acted up to by the American
members of the Civil Government in reference to the Cath-
olic Church in the Philippines, may practically be cov-
-ered by the statement that, while they disclaim hostil-
ity to the Catholic Church in general, they are enemies
of, and hostile to, the regular religious orders, in other
words, the Friars. They personally have no objection,
in the abstract, to allowing the Church to remain
unmolested in the Philippines, but they have no inten-
tion of allowing the religious orders to do so, if they can
prevent it without having recourse to positive and
direct measures. This is the position in a nut shell.

When it is taken into consideration that the religious
orders are as much a part of the Catholic Church, not
only in the Philippines but in every other part of tl^e

323

world, as the stones of an arch are a part of that
structure, the ambiguity, not to say sophistry, of any
such position as the above is manifest. It is on a par
with insisting on the removal of one or more of the stones
of the arch, and at the same time disclaiming any desire
or intention of injuring the fabric itself as a whole, or of
causing its downfall. As an argument, a proposition so
absurd on its very face might be advanced to children,
but it is hardly worth the consideration of persons who
have arrived at the age of discretion. Any one who
asks reasoning and reasonable beings to accept it, is
simply offering an insult to their intelligence.

To sum up the religious orders, their members were
hardy and adventurous pioneers of Christianity. In the
evangelization of the Philippines, by persuasion and
teaching, they did more for Christianity and civilization
than any other missionaries of modern times.

Of undaunted courage, they have ever been to the
front when calamities threatened their flocks. In the
pursuit of their calling they have witnessed and record-
ed some of the most dreadful convulsions of nature, vol-
canic eruptions, earthquakes, and destructive ty-
phoons. In epidemics of plague and cholera they have not
been dismayed, nor have they ever in such cases aban-
donedtheirflocks. Whenever an enemy attacked thelslands
they were the first to face the shot. Only fervent faith
could have enabled these men to bear the soul- trying sol-
itude and absence of real companionship, to endure the
hardships, and to overcome the dangers that encompas-
sed them.

They performed wonders in advancing the agricul-
tural and industrial development of the country They
encouraged every good trait in the natives, and when
the latter responded to the unselfish efforts lavished
upon them, they always found themselves in most friend-
ly, harmonious, and helpful relations with their pre-
ceptors.

324

The friars did much, in fact did all that could be
done for education, having founded schools for both
sexes, training colleges for teachers, the University of
Santo Tomas in Manila, and other institutions.

Hospitals and asylums attest their charity. They
were formerly, and even lately, the protectors of the
poor against the rich, and of the native against the
Spaniard. They consistently resisted the enslavement
of the natives. They restrained the constant inclination
of the natives to wander way into the woods and to re-
vert to primitive savagery, by keeping them in the towns,
or, as they said, "under the bells".

It is difficult to see why the Commission and the
Civil Government chose to accept the statements of the
Progresistas (12) and insurrectos in regard to the Cath-
olic Church especially as represented by the religious
orders, and to assume that the Filipino people, as a
body, were bitterly opposed to the religious orders.
Possibly it was thought that they ought to be. On
impartial investigation, however, it is clear that prior
to the outbreak of the Katipunan rebellion against
Spain in 1896, although some opposition existed, yet
it was confined entirely to the Tagalog provinces of
Luzon and was kept alive by the Progresista Party
and the recalcitrant tenants of the estates of the re-
ligious Orders. A large number of these tenaats had
been worked on by members of the "Progresista Party",
till they not only refused to pay the rent for the lands

(12) It may be possible that, in order to conform to the gene-
ral policy outlined by the administration at home, the Olvil
Government considered itself bound to take the desires of the Pro-
gresista party into consideration . But to carry the doctrine of com-
plying with the wishes of Filipino political parties to its logical
conclusion, it would be necessary for the United States to abandon
the Islands, for from February 4th, 1899, when hostilities first
broke out, to the present writing (January, 1907), there has been
a steady, armed opposition to the occupation by the United States.
At one time, it required the presence of over 60,000 American
troops to overcome that opposition.

325

they held, but claimed the lands themselves. This re-
fusal culminated in the agrarian troubles of Calamba
and Santa Rosa in 1888-90. The trouble makers were
championed by Dr. Jose Rizal, whose family were ten-
ants of Dominican lands, and had been lifted up out of
poverty and obscurity to a condition that was by no
means to be despised. One of the conditions of the
lease the Rizals first obtained was that, before paying
any rent, they were to be allowed to harvest five crops.

The Progresista Party, ashasbaen stated elsewhere,
was composed of all classes of agitators from Spain and
the Philippines. At its outset its leaders in the Archi-
pelago were principally hungry adventurers from the
former country. Their real object was the search for a
royal road to fortune. They were the "get-rich-quick"
schemers of their day in the Islands. Renegades as they
were, and having evil designs on Church properties, they
were therefore anxious to get rid of the regular orders.
They saw that these stood in the way, not only of the
secularization and consequent general spoliation of the
temporalities of the Catholic Church, but also of a
future general exploitation of the natives in the name of
progress. They know well that these orders in former
days had often stood between the natives and the rapa-
city of corrupt Spanish officials.

The ground taken by the Progresistas in refe-
rence to the regular orders and the secular clergy,
when divested of all circumlocutions and ambiguities,
can briefly be stated as follows;— anyone provoking
a dispute with a member of the religious orders had
to be very careful how he stood: otherwise it might
involve him in a dispute with the whole order, which
as a body was likely to support their individual mem-
ber, if they could consistently do so. A conflict with
a secular clergymen, however, belonging to no order
or association, meant a conflict with practically a single
individual, who would have to contend single handed
against the whole Progresista Party. The latter's oppo-

326

sition to the religious orders was therefore at least lo-
gical. The presence in the Islands of these Orders was
a continual menace to the Progresista hopes, and was
also unfavorable to the aspirations of the recalcitrant
tenants. And yet collectively the Progresistas and the
tenants did not represent any considerable part of the
population. On the other hand, the Progresistas had
in the Islands no other organized political party, in the
proper sense of the word, to oppose them.

It is at least interesting to note that,, in reference
to the supposed hatred of the religious orders, or friars,
by the Filipino people, Manuel Xerez Burgos stated that
it did not exist in the Philippines, or at any rate that
this hatred was awakened only by the Katipunan in
1891 (13).

The intervention of the United States in-the affairs
of the Philippines, in 1898, practically obliterated the
Progresista Party. It drove the bolder and more violent
native members into armed resistance to the American
occupation. Others more timid plotted in the cities and
pueblos, or kept the field forces supplied with informa-
tion, to say nothing of arms, ammunition, money, and
provisions. The most cautions and far-seeing among
them allied themselves ostensibly with the Americans,
as they had allied themselves with Spain or the Filipino
republic under Aguinaldo. These then went to form the
leaders of the "Federal", "Nationalist", and other more
or less important political parties that sprang up. The
Spanish Progresistas, who had in reality founded the
party, withdrew, some to Spain and some to private life
in the Islands.

About the time the Civil Government assumed the
reins of power, there came into existence with it a numer-

(13) Dr. Burgos must be referring to some other society, as
the "Liga Filipina" was founded in May, 1892, and the Katipunan
in July, 1893.

See statement of Manuel Jerez Burgos before Philippines Com-
mission, Sept. 7th, 1899.

327
ous class of self-selected alleged political leaders. These
owed their existence as well as their standing with the
people at large, possibly more to the support they
were supposed to receive from the Civil Govern-
ment than to any real or imaginary talents or merits
of their own. They were largely such members of the
old Progresista Party or ex-insurgent leaders, who,
when they found that further resistance was for the
time being useless, had cast in their lot with the Amer-
ican Civil Government. As a reward for so doing they
were appointed governors of provinces, presidentes or
mayors, and consej ales, councillors or aldermen, of cities
and pueblos. There were other offices and sinecures, too,
convenient as a means of buying off open or secret op-
posers of the civil government, without regard to any spe-
cial fitness they possessed for the posts they were selected
to fill. It was these office holders and aspirants to office
who were formed into what was known as the Federal
party under the leadership of T. Pardo de Tavera.

As many of these persons, at the time of the insurrec-
tion against Spain (1896), as well as during Aguinaldo's
resistance to American occupation in 1898 and the follow-
ing years, had been very active in the spoliation of
the churches and Church property, it is easy to appre-
ciate how small was their dosire to see the members of
the religious orders return to the parishes from which
they themselves had expelled them. Neither would they
countenance any plan by which the regular priests
might remain in parishes from which they had not as
yet been driven out. Nor again could they conceal the
aversion they had to seeing such priests replaced even by
secular clergymen appointed by the American Bishops to
fill the vacancies thus created. The reasons for all this
were that, in the first place, they feared they might pos-
sibly be forced to disgorge what they had already taken;
in the second, that they would be denied further oppor-
tunities of enriching themselves at the expense of the
Church. It is consequently no wonder that they did all

328

in their power to bring into existence and to keep alive
an artificial sentiment, ostensibly against the religious
orders, but in reality against the Roman Catholic
Church, in accordance with the program of the old Pro-
gresista Party.

The Civil Government, for reasons of its own, ap-
parently found it expedient to accept the ex-parte state-
ments of the persons forming the Federal party, in ref-
erence to the feelings of the people and the general situ-
ation. Consequently it deprecated the retui^n of the
members of the religious orders to their former parish-
es. As a reason for its attitude, it alleged to them that
it would be dangerous for them to go back. To the
American public at home, it allowed it to be intimated
that it would be necessary to maintain a large armed'
force to prevent mob violence being done to the regular
priests, (13) were they allowed to return or remain.

(13) As a matter of fact, in the few parishes in which the
members of the religious orders had remained or in those to which
they had returned, for in a number of instances they did return,
and that at the request of the parishioners themselves who were
alleged to be so bitterly opposed to them, there was little or no
disturbance.

Editor's note:— One could make an interesting collection of
instances in which, during the past ten years, opposition to the
"friars" has publicly been manifested in some part or another of
the country. Many Americans imagine, almost fondly, one may
say, that such manifestations are what they purport to be, But in
many cases, as when American bishops were stoned, or when the
Belgian Fathers, or others of recent arrival in the Islands were
similarly treated, or as when the Italian Bishop ofLipa was instal-
led amid some insults and attempted rowdyism, or as wten quite
recently the defenceless women of a purely charitable sisterhood
were stoned, insulted, and practically mobbed in the streets of
Manila itself, not to cite numerous other examples, the demonstra-
tions were certainly not anti-friar, but were more probably, apart
from their savage brutality, evidences of race hatred, and even
of anti- American sentiment. To get at the real animus of most of
the so-called anti-friar agitation, one has but to read certain native
papers. The undisguised glee with which they handle a bit of
clerical scandal, when they can lay hands on it, does not argue

329

The presidentes of the towns and their consejales
had grown to believe that, individually and collectively,
the members of the religious orders, or for the matter of
that, any Catholic clergymen, were "fair game" and
would be allowed "no standing in court". They got it
into their heads, sometimes for obvious reasons, that
any opposition to a friar or priest, no matter what phase
of injustice or violence it might assume, could easily be
explained away on the ground of "popular prejudice",
or if not, it would be condoned by the Civil Government.
Whether this belief was a conclusion they drew from the
inaction or silence of the Civil Government in these
matters, or whether it was the result of any private in-
formation they might have had, is of very little impor-
tance. It is enough that this belief existed, and the Civil
Government did little or nothing to disabuse them of it.

Had the local authorities, more especially the pro-
vincial governors, who at first were the direct appointees
of the Civil Government, been convinced that a fuilure on.
their part to accord to any clergyman the same protection
accorded to anyone else in the exercise of his legal rights)
and that a failure to make an energetic and determined
effort to prevent mob violence to clergyman, whether
they were members of the religious Orders or of the sec-
much in favor of the zeal they loud ly profess for all kinds of mor-
ality especially clerical. • When along the same lines, quite the
same people exult and gloat, as they do, over the delinquencies of
Americans in private or public life, military or oflBcial, does the
average anti-friar American take those manifestations as damaging
evidence against his own countrymen? As a matter of fact, few
Americans realize just what European anti-clericalism means and
what it springs from. The first tutors of Filipino crooks, soreheads,
or ''bad eggs" as the case may be, were renegade Catholics of
Spain or of Spanish descent. There is not much ventured or
hazarded in the opinion that those same tutors never dreamt that
their teaching would ultimately lead to the results it served to
being about. It may not be wholly unwise for certain Americans
of the present to look somewhat askance at the^ "anti-friar"
demonstrations of the day. There may be more anti-American
and anti-white man sentiment there than is realized.

42

330

ular clergy, would meet with, prompt punishment, there
is not the shadow of a doubt that the alleged opposition
to the members of the religious Orders, at least so far
as collective or individual demonstrations threatening
mob violence to their persons or property is concerned,
would have ceased.

Complaint after complaint was made through the
Bishops as well as through other channels about the
threats of mob violence and the actual maltreatment of
Catholic clergymen at the hands of the mobs and rio-
ters in various parts of the Islands. Complaints were
made as well of the failure of the local authorities to-
take notice of these disturbances, or to extend any pro-
tection or to give any redress to the victims of them.
Yet such complaints, instead of receiving immediate sat-
isfaction, were in many cases laid aside or shelved.

At length, however, the turning point was reached.
It was a case in which ' 'the other man's ox was gored".
"About the end of 1902, or the beginning of 1903, a Pro-
testant missionary, who had been established in the prov-
ince of Cavite, was assaulted by the inhabitants of one
of the barrios of Cavite in the province of the same
name. The place where he was holding his service was
stoned and he was driven out of the town. In this case
the action of the Civil Government was prompt, energetic
and decisive. The local authorities were severely re-
buked. The missionary was reinstated and the inhab-
itants of the pueblo informed that, if necessary, force
would be used to protect him in the future, and" that
any person taking part in any further demonstration of
a like nature would be severely ptmished (14).

(14) The decisive action of the Civil Government in the Cavite
case, while it showed no disposition to fail to accord protection to
Roman Catholic clergymen, was very promptly taken by the local
authorities' as an indication that, no matter what,'action it might take
or leave untaken in so far as Catholic clergymen were concerned,
it was at least determined to tolerate no interference with clergy-
men of the Protestant denominations.

331

As a result of this case, one of the Catholic Societies
of Manila, composed almost exclusively of Americans,
approached the Civil Government which, in common con-
sistency, could no longer put off action on the com-'
plaints that came before it of assaults of a like nature upon
persons of the Catholic priests, or the failure of the
local authorities to afford Catholics protection or redress.
As soon as the provincial governors found this to be
the case, the opposition of the populace ceased. As a
proof of this, it is sufficient to state that at the present
time many members of the religious orders, in many
cases at the request of the parishioners themselves, liave
returned to, and are peacefully in charge of the parishes
from which they had been driven out and to which their
return was thought to be fraught with so much danger.

This was more particularly felt in the remoter par-
ishes, especially among the Non- Christian tribes in the
Cordillera of Luzon and the Islands of Mindoro and Min-
danao, where the members of the regular orders were
used as missionaries as well as rectors of parishes.

The fact that there are as many, if not more native
secular clergymen in the Islands now, might be urged
as a reason for sending them as missionaries to these
parishes and for dispensing with the services of the reg-
ular orders. But for the benefit of non- Catholic read-
ers be it said that, as a rule, missionaries of the Ro-
man Catholic Church to the heathen in all parts of the
world are members of the regular orders or congrega-
tions. This is a part of the duty of nearly all of them,
whereas the administration of regularly established par-
ishes, whose parishioners are already civilized and fixed,
generally falls to the lot of the secular clergymen.

It might also be urged that once a country or district
is ecclesiastically organized by the missionaries and
the parishes established, they should be left to the
administration of the secular clergymen and the mis-
sionaries should seek other fields for their labors. This,
however, is a matter to be decided by the bishops of

332

their various dioceses, according to the dictates of neces-
sity or expediency.

Many anti-friar writers, with a prodigious show of
zeal for the obser\'ance of canon law, cited the Council
of Trent as forbidding the regular orders to hold par-
ishes. In doing so, however, they forgot that this pro-
hibition only applied to countries whose inhabitants
were all Christians canonically organized. As there were
then and still are large numbers of Filipinos belonging
to various wild tribes, such as the Igorotes, Ifugaos,
Negritos, and others in Luzon, or to the Moros in Minda-
nao,' who were then and still are pagans, the whole of
the Archipelago was classed as being ''in partibus inflde-
lium;" and because such was the case, this particular
prohibition of the Council of Trent was inoperative in
the Philippines. (15)

(15) Editor's note:— The first missionaries in the Philippines
exercised their spiritual jurisdiction in virtue of very ample fac-
ulties granted by various popes, especially those of Adrian VI,
May 10, 1522. When the Council of Trent legislation on the organ-
ization and government of parishes was promulg'ated in 1564,
many practical difficulties were experienced by the regulars in. the
Philippines in conforming to the new discipline, which the bishops
"de las Indias" were beginning to enforce. A modification of the
law was obtained for his Spanish subjects by Philip II from Pope
Pius V, Jan. 15, 1568. This was subsequently confirmed by Greg-
ory XtV, 1591.

By the provisions granted by these popes, all regulars in the
Indies, (of course in good standing in their orders), were author-
ized freely and lawfully to exercise the office of parish priest, to
preach, and to administer the sacraments to the faithful, (in
other respects conforming to the Tridentihe decrees); but all was
to be„done with the permission of their superiors, obtained in their
provincial chapters. They were also authorized to hear confes-
sions of the laity without previous permission or faculties of the
bishops, and these were enjoined not to make any changes in
monasteries of regulars who were engaged in the care of souls.

As this privilege of holding parishes was granted "on account
of a lack of diocesan priests", it was valid throughout the history
of the church in the Philippines and is still valid today, not only
in the archipelago, but in other parts of the world. The reason
for granting the privilege then is still strongly in evidence at the
present time.

333

Apart from certain disgruntled Filipino politicians,
the persons who malie arguments of this matter are, as
a rule, those Protestants who are always on the alert to
find something to "protest" against. Probably the most
of them do not know what a friar is and are not aware
of the fact that in the United States about a third of the
Roman Catholic clergymen are members of the regular
orders or associations, Augustinians, Benedictines, Capu-
chins, Cistercians, Carmelites, Dominicans, Francis-
cans, Jesuits, Premonstratensians, and about thirty
five or forty different societies or congregations, all
approved by the Holy See. A great many members
of these are, within the strict meaning of the word,
"friars", and they lawfully administer parishes in almost
every diocese of the United States.

The Civil Government must have been aware or was
at least in a position to ascertain with certainty, that the
majority of the remoter parishes, more especially among
the savage tribes, as well a large number in the more
civilized districts, had theretofere been administered
by members of the religious orders. It also knew, or it
could have known, that there was not a sufficient number
of secular clergymen, either Filipinos or foreigners, to
replace the regulars, prevented directly or discouraged
indirectly from returning to their parishes. It could
easily have realized that by the absence of their priests,
these parishes were bound to suffer, so far as religious
teaching or administration were concerned. As the Civil
Government made no pretense of even offering to assist
or encourage the incoming of other priests to administer
them, it looked very much as though an indirect effort
were being made to starve out the faith in these parishes,
so to speak, and thus to cause Catholicism, from want of
religious teaching, to die a natural death in the country.
In the meantime, like Pontius Pilate, it washed its
hands of the consequences in the waters of an artificial
situation resulting from a manufactured public senti-
ment.

334

Whether the general line of action, or rather of inac-
tion, pursued by the the Civil Government in its dealings
with the Catholic Church in the Philippines, originated
in the agnosticism that doubts, or in the atheism that de-
nies the necessity of any and all religious beliefs and teach-
ings, is a matter of little moment. But the logical con-
clusion that it leads up to is obvious, so obvious, indeed,
that one may safely say that, had this line not been
entered upon and followed out by the Civil Government
with a view to breaking up the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, it was utterly lacking in logic, consistency,
and common sense.

Be this as it may, however, there is no getting be-
yond the fact that, where a vast majority of the people
are of one religious belief, as is the case in the Philip-
pines and the governing powers are of others, the saying,
"he that is not with me is against me", applies in all its
rigor. Therefore, in the face of the considerations set
forth in this paper, it is submitted that to the question,
"Is the Insular Government as represented by the Civil
Commission hostile to the Catholic Church in the Philip-
pines, Islands?", the only logical answer must necessa-
rily be, "yes, it is", and this because the members of the
Civil Commission, either as individuals or as a body,
have not been friendly to it.

FINIS.

INDEX,

Abuses by Spaniards, complaints of 189.

Adult, Filipino, characteristics of 6.

Ag-itators, political, 64, 114, 188, 296.

"(See also Katipunan, Progresistas and Secret Societies).

Aglipay, Gregorio, 311, 315.

Aglipayan Schism, 92,, 307.

Agrarian troubles, 121, 324, etc.

Aguinaldo, Emilio, on education of Filipinos, 49
called to Katipunan by Bonifacio, 81

and revolution, 47, 128, 130, 135, 139, 150, 161, 177, 218, 260,
story of capture of 265, etc.

Agustin, Basilic, Governor-General, 148.

American Civil Government, 277, etc.
See also Government, civil, etc.

Anderson, General, 49, 157, 168, 172.

Annexation of Philippines, 280, 285.

Anti-american sentiment coincident with present anti-friar feel-
ing, 328.

Apolinario de la Cruz, fanatic, 95, 105.

Asamblea Consultiva of 1898, 149, 169.

Barbarism in treatment of priests at Imus, 131, 259.

See. also title Treatment, inhuman, etc., and note, Simeon

Villa, 265.
Bathalism, the religion of the Katipunan, 91.
Biac-na-bato negotiations, etc., 113, 138, 141, 283.
Blanco, Governor General, weakness of, 127, 132, 133.
Blood pact, Katipunan, 79.
Bonifacio, Andres, 75, 81, 116, 127.
Bridges, Spanish, 46.
British merchants in Philippines, 43.

view of on Philippine commerce, 44.

Calderon, Felipe Gonzalez, on curriculum, 49.

against religious orders, 308.
Catholic Church, in Philippines, American and English writers
"' on, 103.

and civil government, 291 (see also Civil Govt.)

classification of parishes, 302.

division of, sought by Commission, 318.

fees and stipends, 294.

336

hierarchy, salaries of, 297, 301.

Kafcipunan supposed to be masonic uprising against, 82.

not protected by authorities, 392.

manner of holding temporalities, 292.

opposed by Progresistas, 118, (See also Katipunan, Secret Socie-
ties, Agitators Civil Government, Commission.)

opposed by new political parties, 327.

property rights of, 292.

properties held by sound legal titles, 297.
,, transferred legally 297.
,, siezed, 307, 313.
,, case of Bishop of Nueva Segovia, 315.

ridiculed by Worcester, 305.

statistics of, 299.

witnesses against, character of, 306.
Catholic clergy, seculars and regulars, 292, 302.
Catholic schools preferred, 321.
Catholic Society protests to Commission, 331.
Cavite revolt of 1872, 106.

accusations against friars, concerning 109.

ascribed by Legarda to native priests, 110.

principals in, 112.
Cedula personal, representing poll tax, 52.
Centeno, Don Jos4, anticlerical, 120.
Children, Filipino, 5.
Church, Independent of Philippines, 92, 311, 312.

(See also Aglipay)
Codes, civil and penal, 36.
Coghlan, Capt , U. S. N., 158.
"Colorum", fanatical society, 99.
Commercial policy, Spain's, 43.
Commission, Philippine, appointed, 304.

attitude of towards Church, 304, 318, 324.

See also Government, Civil etc.
"Committee of Propaganda" revolutionary society, 37.
"Compromisarios", revolutionists, 76.
Concubinage, 19.
Congress of Filipinos at Malolos, 232.

Gen. Otis on, 247.
Confiscation of Church property demanded by agitators, 296..
Consuls, American, help agitators, etc., at Manila, Hongkong, and

Singapore, 136, 137, 147, 151 etc., 162, 192, 209, 286.
Council of Trent legislation on parishes explained, 332.
Cruelties, alleged, of Spain 52, 60.

Compared with cruelties of other countries, 53, 60.
Cuba, covetedby U. S., 203 etc.

337
Dewey, Admiral, 137, 152 etc., 158, 163, 173, 214.

Roosevelt on his assignment to Asiatic fleet, 137.
Dress of Filipinos, 22.
Drunkenness among Filipinos rare, 14.

Education, 48, 324.

establishments, 319.

of Filipinos, various testimonials, 49.

public school system of present, 319.
Eligibility of natives to places of trust, 57.
Expansionists, 257,
Expenditures, Spanish annual estimate of, 50.

comparison between 1897 and 1908, 50.
Expense of living in Spanish times, 58.

Pees and stipends. Church, examples of, 294.
Filipino arms, sources of, 168.
as a laborer, 10,
,, ,, student, 11, 115.
,, ,, soldier, 12.
,, musican, 22.
disposition of 8.
flag, 154, 156,
home-abiding, 64.
not heavily taxed, 50.
Ford, Lt. J. D.,, U. S. N., on education of Filipinos, 49.
Foreman, author, character of, 305.
French merchants in Philippines, 44.
Friars, and parishes in U. S., 333.

charges against mostly general, vague, and unspecified, 298.
opposed by Commission, 322 (See.also Commission, Government,
Katipunan).

opposed by secret-societies. 114
opposed by new political partieSj 327.

opposed by present opponents of Americans and other foreign-
ers, 328.

relation of to revolt of '96, 185, 190, 192.
spirit of feeling against, 300, 325, 328.
truth about, 323 etc.,

(See also religious orders. Catholic Church.)
Funds, distributed by Spaniards as indemnities to rebels, 142, 143, 151.
used against Spain, 145.

share of as "spoils of war" asked from Americans, 222.
Fund, war, of Filipinos in '97, 140.
Funston, Gen. Frederick, 201.

in capture of Aguinaldo, 268 etc.

43

- 338
Gambling, Filipino, 22.
German merchants in Philippines, 44.
Gil, Padre Mariano, discovers conspiracy of '96, 127.
Government authorities, opinion of about "Salvadoristas, " 93.
Government, colonial, critics of, 37.

,, ,, English and Spanish compared, 38 etc*

,,of Philippines under Spain, 32.
"Government, Tag-alog, of the Philippines", 91.
Government, Civil, of the Philippines, 278. ,

attitude towards non-Catholic organizations, 315, 330.

and complaint of Catholic Society, 331.

and Federal Party 328.

and the Progresistas, 324.

hostility of to Church and clergy shown, 311, 314, 316, 322. 329, 333.

in case of Protestant minister, 330.

.in relation to Catholic Church, 292.
Grande Island affair and Capt. Coghlan, 158.
Green, Gen. F. V., arrives with volunteers, 171;
"Guardia de Honor", secret society, 87.

opposed to Katlpunan, 88.

Hawaian republic, 202, 281.

Higgins, Horace L., on revolution of, 96, 128..

Homes, Filipino, 26.

Hospitality Filipino, 9.

Illegitimate births. 19.
■ lloilo, proposed surrender of by Spaniards, 239.

negotiations for occupation of, 241 etc.

merchants of on situation 249.

Gen. Miller's expedition to, 244.
Imperialism, 254.
Imperialistic policy, 203, 206.
Improvements, Spanish, 45, 48.

effects of from 1881 to 1896, 49.
Imus, siege of 1q uprising of '96, 130.
laoompetency of revolutionists for self-goverment, 259.
Independence of Filipinos, 258, 283, 288.
Inhumanity of Katipuneros, 131, 156, 159, 176, 215, 265.
Initiation, Katlpunan, 79, 80.
Intervention, American, avowed cause of, 304

effect of, 326.

Jaudenes, General, and surrender of Manila, 176.

"Jingoes" in Republican Party on Philippines, 136, 207; 257, 284,

Judiciary in Philippines under Spain, 35.

339
Junta revolutionary in Hongkong, 121, 136, 13S, 141, 14t. 116.

(See also Consuls American).
Katipunan, 77.

activities of, 141, 142, 145, 150.

and American opinion, 82.

and Bathalism, 91.

and General Blanco, 132.

and Japan, 83.

hoodwinks Spanish authorities, 150.

initiation into, 79, 80.

in revolution of '96, 128.

kidnapping by, 224.

masonic form of, 79.

new, members of, 91,

newest, 97.

origin and original members of, 78.

members become Federalists and Nationalists, 85.

power of over members, 85.

present influence, 86.

program and work of, 81, ll4, 141, 160, 173, 212.

religion of, 91.

revived, 90.
King, Gen. Chas., on Filipinos, 49.

Lachambre's division, 135.
Lands, Church, how acquired. 293.
Leaders in intrigues, motives of, 114.

,, political, rewarded, 327.
Legarda, Benito, on friars, in 1896, 127.
"Liga Filipina," 74, 77, 122.

supreme council of, 75.
Light-houses, 46.

Lodges, masonic, of Filipinos 71, 76.
Lodge, first masonic, in Cavite, 69.
Luna, Gen. Antonio, 260.
"Lungao," new god of fanatics of 1807, 104.
Lynchings, public in U. S. 59.

Mabini, Apolinario, 75, 113, 167.
Malolos, capital of Filipino Republic, 232.
Manifestos of Filipinos, 147, 155.
Manila, negotiations for surrender of, 176.

fall of, 184.

port of, harbor worki?,'47.
Marriages, Filipino, 17.
Masons, English and American, 72.

340
Masonry, Filipino, statement of Jos^ A. Ramos, 71-

and the Katipunan, 82.
,, ,, Cavite revolt. 111.

first lodge of at Cavite, 69.

Latin, character of, 73.

(See also Secret Societies, Katipunan) ,
Mc Arthur,' Gen., 224.
Merchants, foreign, doings of, 190.
Merritt, General, 178 etc., 223, 228.
Mestizas, 24.
Mestiza dress, 25.
Military forces, Spanish, in Islands, 193.

government, American, and Church properties, 308

mutiny at Cavite, 107.
Miller, Gen. Marcus L.., 201, 244.
Moors, expulsion of from Spain, 54.
Moral influence of Spain, 56.
Morality and religious teaching 319, 320.,
Morayta, Don Manuel, introduced masonry

into Philippines for purposes of revolution, 71.

Natives, recommended for of See by University of Santo Tomas, 188.

Nautical school, 49.

Oath, Katipunan, 80.

Opinion, classes of public, on Spanish war, 255.

Ori6n, Katipunero work at 160.

Otis Gen., 201, 228 etc.

"Pacto de sangre," blood pact,, of Katipunan, 79.

ParaHaque, engagement at, 161.

Parents, Filipino, traits of, 16.

Parties new political, 326,

Parish priests, perquisites of, 292, 294.

Parishes, classification of, 302.

lawfully managed by regulars, 332.

statistics of 299, 300.
•Paterno, Pedro A., 113, 135, 139, 148.
Peace Commislon at Paris, 238 etc.

testimony taken about Church property, 297.
Peculations, story of Spanish Gov. General's palace, 51.
Phelan, Lt. H. du R., interview with Visayans, 253.
Pilar, Marcelo H. del, obtains charters for Filipino

Masonic lodges 71, 74.

Pio del, 236
Polavieja, Governor, 84, 133.
Policy, foreign, of U. S., 202.

imperialist 203, 206.

341

Policies, Anglo-Saxon and Spanish compared^ 55.

Population of Philippines at different epochsj 299.

Port of Manila, harbor works, 47.

Presidents, American on Cuba, etc., 207.

Privileges of natives, 52.

Priests, difference between secular and regular, 292, 302:

hostility to foreign, i. e., white, 300.

native, their attitude in revolution, 120.

native, efforts of Church to get, 301.

their state, 292, 331-

(See also Clergy, religious orders, friars)
Proclamation, first of Revolutionists' Government, 167.
"Progresistas, " elements composing 112, 325.

and the Commission, 324.

and the people, 118.

(See also Church, religious orders).
Public schools, system introduced, 319 etc.

Recoleto priests, barbarously treated at Imus, 131.
Reforms, Spanish, 45, 107.

Regidor, Manuel and Antonio, agitators, 106, 112.
Regular clergy, their state, 292.

(See also religious orders, friars, etc.)
Religion, Filipino, 14.

of the Katipunan. 91.
Religious orders and Holy See in regard to

parishes, 332.

advantages of their organization, 293. ~-

Cavite uprising blamed on, 109.

fraudulent petition against, 120.

movement against, 106.

opposed by Commission, 322 Progresistas, 219, 324, 325.

return of to parishes, 328, 331.

time of their coming to Islands, 299.

truth about, 323,

(See also Clergy, Friars).
Religious instruction permitted in public schools, 320.

teaching and morality, 319 etc.
Republican party, leaders x)f on Philippines, 280.

policy demanded of, 136.
Revenues, Church, sources of 294.
Revolution of 1896, 126 etc.

causes of, 185 etc.
Revolutions and Revolts, Filipino, 103.

two religious, 1807, 1801, 194.
Revolutionists, incompetency of for self-government, 259.

342
Rios, Gen, Diego de los, at Iloilo, 239 etc.
Rivera, Gov. -General Primo de, 135,il38, 14-2
Rizal, Jos6, .74, 75, 115, 325.
and Gov. Blanco, 126.
,, Gov. Despujols, 121 ete.
,, Gov. Polovieia, 126.
at Dapitan, 124.

fomented agitation by his books, 121.
principal witnesses against,- 129.
Roads, 46, 47.
Roosevelt on Dewey^s assignment to Asiaticfleet, 137;

Salvador de la Cruz, fanatic, 94
''Salvadoristas" secret society 93.
"Sangleyes" or Chinese mestizos, 113.
"Santa Iglesia,'' secret society, 88, 93, 95.
San Jos^ College case, 308.
San Lazaro Hospital case, 308.
Schism, Aglipayan, 312 etCi ■

and Taft, 312.
Schools, etc. 48 etc., 319, 320.

curriculum, how determined, 321 etc.

(See also education).
Secret Societies, "Colorum," 99.

first organized in Pilippines, 69.

"Guardia de Honor," 87.

main cause of revolution of 96. 191.

meaning of to natives, 65. •

"Salvadoristas," 93.

"Santa Iglesia," 88, 93, 95. ' ■,

"Sociedad de Intereses ITilipinos," 97.

" ,, de la Paz"' 97. :

(See also Katipunan, Masonry)
Segovia, Lazaro in capture of Aguinaldo, 268.
Social intercoursa among Filipinos, 16.
Society, Filipino 15.

games, etc., 32.
"Solidaridad, " revolutionary paper ciroulateji gratis, 74, 111.
Spain, rights of in relation to Church, 292. ,
.Spaniards, class of, after opening of Suez canal,. 42, 187,- 189.
Spanish administration of Philippines, 32.

authorities hoodwinked by Katipuneros,. 150. ,

war, 136 etc.

Taft, Governor and Aglipay, 312.
Taxes and tax collectors, 36.

poll, 52. •. :

343
Titles to Church property perfect, 297
Torres, Pantaleon, Katipunero, 90.
Trade, Balance of, from 1885 to 1896, 58.
Treatment, inhuman, of friars and others, 131.

156, 159, 176, 176, 215, 265 (note 20).
Troubles arising from antifriar feeling, 300.

. University of Santo Tomas, on appointments of natives to office, 188

Vehicles, public in Manila, 21.
Venereal diseases, increase of, 20.
Villa, Simeon, 265.

War of Conquest, 201.

succesive events of, 262 etc.
War, Spanish, 136 etc.
Waterworks, Manila, 47
Wheeler, Gen. Jos , on Spanish regime, 33.
wildman, Consul-General, and Aguinaldo, 152, 170.

(See also Consuls).
Women, Filipino, 5, 18, 20.

gamblers, 22.

manners, of 21.

public, 20.
Worcester, Dean C, his book, 305.

ridicules Catholic Church, 305.

theory of in respect to religion in Islands. 316.

sources of his work, 305.
Writers, English and American on Filipinos, 26.