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COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAW OF
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES,
AS ADMINISTERED IN
ENGLAND AND IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
BY
CHARLES FISK BEACH,
COUNSELLOR AT LAW.
IN TWO TOLUMES.
VOL. I.
ST. LOUIS:
CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL COMPANY.
1897.
Copyright 1S97,
BY
Central Law Journal Company.
fit. Louis, Xo.: Printed by Central Law Journal Company.
TO THE
MEMOEY OF MY FATHEE,
Fisk Beach, Esquire,
LATE OF HUNTER, NEW YORK,
THIS WORK,
IN FILIAL REVERENCE AND AFFECTION,
IS DEDICATED.
PREFACE.
In presenting this work to the legal profession the author
regards it as a fortunate circumstance that no lawyer will
look for an apology for its appearance. Its raison d' etre
will be recognized both by the bench and the bar. The older
English and American treatises, which, for a very consider-
able period, maintained their position as the authorities on
this branch of the law, no longer answer the demand.
The works on this subject which have more recently ap-
peared, both in England and this country, though of value
so far as relates to the topics which they discuss, are so
brief and fragmentary in their character as to be, not alto-
gether satisfactory to the profession.
With regard to the plan of this work, and of the method
of its execution, very little need be said. By common
consent the subject is one of the most complicated and
obscure which is presented by modern jurisprudence. The
subtle and abstruse character of many of the problems
which it presents, with the conflicting decisions which are
an inevitable consequence, invests the study of the law of
trusts with no little difficulty, and awakens a sense of re-
sponsibility, as well as of embarrassment, in the treatment
of the subject.
In the preparation of these volumes it has been the purpose
of the writer to treat the whole subject of trusts, express
and implied, public and private. And while, in a degree,
conscious of the magnitude of the work he has under-
taken, and not altogether insensible to the audacity which
it reveals, and of his inadequacy to the task, it is be-
lieved that no subject of importance has been omitted.
VI PREFACE.
The statements of equitable principles and the citations
by which they are supported, include the most recent phases
of the subject and the latest cases that, at the time of
writing, had been reported. To what extent the idea of
the writer has taken form in the execution of his work the
profession will decide.
A feature of these volumes* by which they are dis-
tinguished from the older works on this subject, consists of
the numerous expositions of equitable doctrines by the great
Lord Chancellors of England, and by the most eminent of
Americans jurists. Their commentaries on the rules under-
lying their decisions are taken from the reported opinions,
commencing with an early period, and coming down to a
very recent date. They are the mature and well considered
opinions of the ablest of the English and American jurists,
and they relate to the decisions of the courts of last resort, or
of the lower courts sustained by the higher. These state-
ments are the law of to-day, and it is believed that they are
in such form as to be of special value, alike to the jurist and
to the advocate.
In bringing these sentences to a close the writer gladly
avails himself of the opportunity afforded, of acknowledg-
ing his obligation for the assistance rendered him in this
work by Edward Franklin White, Esq., of the Indianap-
olis bar. For the pertinent and valuable illustrations of
equitable rules, presented by the notes, and for the
numerous citations, the student of these volumes is in-
debted, in the main, to his legal and critical acumen, and to
his conscientious industry in the prosecution of the work.
The writer is indebted to him also for valuable suggestions
in regard to the text.
The writer would be unjust to himself if he were to fail
to acknowledge the numerous courtesies of the members of
the Supreme Court of Indiana during the progress of
his work.
Charles Fisk Beach.
Indianapolis, Ind., June 8th, 1897.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
VOLUME I.
The
* 1.
2.
INTRODUCTION',
rise and progress of trusts
CHAPTER I.
What is a trust?
Different kinds of trusts
Page.
CHAPTER II.
CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS — • THE SETTLOR — THE TRUSTEE ■
PROPERTY — THE BENEFICIARY.
WHO MAY BE A SETTLOR?
§ 3. The State and its officers as settlors
4. Trusts by corporations
5. Rights of married women
6. Trusts created by infants
7. Trusts by lunatics
8. Aliens and non-residents as settlors
9. Rights of bankrupts and insolvents
10. Creation of trusts in general
Page.
9
9
10
11
13
13
14
14
CHAPTER IH.
§ 11.
12.
THE CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS CONTINUED.
WHO MAY BE A TRUSTEE?
The sovereign or State ....
Corporations as trustees ....
Page.
16
17
Vlll
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME I.
§ 13. The subject continued
14. Unincorporated associations
15. Civil officers in their official capacity
16. Married women
17. The subject continued
18. Infants as trustees
19. Aliens and non-residents . '
20. Eights of lunatics
21. Bankrupts and insolvents
22. Beneficiaries as trustees
23. In general
24. Rules of court in appointing .
Page.
20
21
22
23
24
26
2S
29
29
29
30
31
CHAPTER IV.
THE CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS CONTINUED.
THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF A TRUST.
§ 25. Property that may be assigned
26. Choses in actions, etc.
27. Property under a foreign jurisdiction
28. Lands under a foreign jurisdiction .
29. The subject continued
30. Property not the subject of a trust .
Page.
33
34
34
35
3C
38
CHAPTER Y.
THE CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS CONTINUED.
WHO MAT BE A CESTUI QUE TRUST?
§ 31. The sovereign or State as a beneficiary
32. Rights of corporations
33. Infants as cestuis que trust
34. Rights of aliens ....
35. Au insane person as cestui que trust .
36. In general .....
Page.
40
41
41
42
43
44
CHAPTER VI.
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
37. How created
38. The subject continued
39. Formalities required .
40. The subject continued
41. Declaration of trust
42. The subject continued
Page.
45
46
4S
51
54
56
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME I.
]X
43. The same subject
44. Insufficient declaration
45. The same subject
46. Declaration of trust by answer in chancery
47. The subject continued
48. Imperfect gift not a trust
49. Imperfect gift continued
50. Trusts in writing not changed by parol
51. Trusts of personal property .
52. The subject continued
53. Trusts in bank deposits
54. Bank deposits continued
55. Certainty as to beneficiary
56. Sufficient designation
57. Notice to parties
Page.
58
61
63
66
66
67
68
70
72
74
76
80
83
85
87
CHAPTER VII.
EXPRESS TRUSTS CONTINUED.
■ 58. Executory trusts .....
59. Executory trusts distinguished from executed trusts
60. Executory trusts in marriage contracts
61. The subject continued
62. The same subject
63. Executory trusts in wills
64. Trusts in wills continued
65. Trusts in marriage articles and wills distinguished
66. The subject continued
67. Precatory trusts
68. Precatory trusts continued
69. The subject continued
70. The same subject
71. The same
72. Necessity of probate of wills
73. The subject continued
74. The same subject
75. A devise not converted into a trust by parol
76. Settlement on wife and children
77. The subject continued
78. Voluntary trust — when executed
79. Voluntary agreement — when enforced
80. An equitable interest transferable
81. Power of revocation
82. The subject continued
83. Powers in trust
84. Powers in trust continued
85. Modern legislation
Page.
89
83
97
100
103
105
108
111
113
116
119
123
127
131
138
141
143
144
145
148
151
154
155
157
161
165
167
168
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME I.
CHAPTER VIII.
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
IMPLIED TRUSTS IN GENERAL — RESULTING TRUSTS •
TRUSTS.
IMPLIED TRUSTS IN GENERAL.
§ 86.
87.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
Introductory .
Determined by intention
From the settlement of estates
The subject continued
Maintenance of children
Implied trusts from partnerships
From relation of agent and principal
The subject continued
Implied trusts from contracts
The subject continued
From contracts for sale
From marriage contracts
Notice of equitable title
The subject continued
From purchase under foreclosure sale
The same subject
Implied trusts from partial interest
From distribution of gift
From joint tenancy
For confiding party .
The subject continued
From relation of guardian
For judgment creditors
From other assignments
Implied trusts from annuities
Implied trusts from mistake
Proved by parol
Other implied trusts .
• CONSTRUCTIVE
Page.
171
174
176
179
183
1S5
1S9
191
194
196
198
201
202
205
206
208
211
214
215
217
220
221
224
225
227
229
231
235
CHAPTER IX.
IMPLIED TRUSTS CONTINUED.
RESULTING TRUSTS — DIVISION FIRST.
TRUSTS RESULTING TO GRANTOR.
Page.
§ 114. Introductory ..... .236
115. Resulting trust from legaFwithout equitable estate . 238
116. The subject continued ..... 240
117. The same subject ... .241
118. Partial trust to donor . . 242
119. The subject continued . . • 243
120. The same subject ...... 246
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME I.
XI
121. Distinguished from a charge
122. From failure of express trust
123. From trusts for persons not in esse .
124. From indefiniteness of declared trust
125. From an illegal trust .
126. The subject continued
127. From lapse of trust
128. In favor of donee
129. The subject continued
130. From trust for sale of realty
131. From voluntary conveyance
132. The subject continued
133. The same subject
134. Proof by parol
135. The subject continued
136. From misunderstanding
137. The subject continued
138. The same subject
139. From conveyance to a wife or child
140. From the relation between the parties
141. The subject continued
142. The same subject . .
143. From undue influence in general
144. The subject continued
145. The same subject
146. Resulting trusts from gifts by will
147. From equitable conversion of property
148. The subject continued
149. The same subject
Page.
247
249
251
252
254
256
258
260
260
261
262
264
266
269
270
271
273
276
278
281
285
288
290
293
294
295
298
300
303
CHAPTER X.
IMPLIED TRUSTS CONTINUED.
RESULTING TRUSTS — DIVISION SECOND.
TRUSTS RESULTING TO PAYOR.
150. Introductory ......
151. Resulting trust from title in the name of another
152. For partial interest .
153. The subject continued
154. From tenancy in common
155. The subject continued
156. From partnership purchase
157. From purchase by trustee
158. The subject continued
159. Resulting trust from purchase by an agent
160. From title in the name of wife or child
161. The subject continued
Page.
305
306
312
316
318
322
323
325
327
330
334
337
Xll
TABLE OP CONTENTS VOLUME I.
i 162. Presumption of advancement
163. The subject continued
164. The same subject
165. From conveyance in the name of a mother
166. From husband as trustee of wife
167. The subject continued
168. The same subject
169. From purchase by a mother in the name of a child
170. Conveyance by one in loco parentis
171. From conveyance for defrauding creditor
172. Established by parol
173. Parol proof continued
174. Parol evidence in rebuttal
175. The subject continued
176. Parol evidence of advancement
177. Resulting trusts in personalty
178. When a resulting trust arises
179. Modern legislation
CHAPTER XI.
IMPLIED TRUSTS CONTINUED.
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS — DIVISION FIRST.
TRUSTS FROM CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD.
180. Introductory .....
181. Fraud as the basis of the constructive trust
182. Application of equitable principle .
183. From illegal acquisition of property by trustee
184. From illegal disposition of property by trustee
185. The subject continued
186. Rule not applicable to dry trustee .
187. From renewal of lease
188. From illegal acts of executors and administrators
189. The subject continued
190. From illegal acts of directors of corporation
191. The subject continued
192. From the relation of agent to his principal
193. The subject continued
194. From relation of attorney and client
195. The subject continued
196. From fiduciary relations in general
197. From purchase with notice .
198. The subject continued
199. Limitations of the rule
200. Consideration must be valuable
201. Conditions of notice ....
202. How notice to be given
203. Characteristics of notice
Page.
338
340
342
344
344
346
348
349
352
354
355
359
361
363
365
363
369
371
Page.
375
379
381
381
3S6
389
394
396
399
403
405
410
412
416
418
422
426
431
434
437
439
441
443
445
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME I.
Xlll
204. The subject continued
205. Notice to purchasers at executor's sales
206. The subject continued
207. The same subject
208. Barred by continued acquiescence
209. Barred by statute of limitation
CHAPTER XII.
IMPLIED TKUSTS CONTINUED.
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS — DIVISION SECOND.
TKUSTS FROM ACTUAL FRAUD.
j 210. From misrepresentation
211. Misrepresentation continued
212. The subject continued
213. Effect upon a third person .
214. From fraud by concealment
215. The subject continued
216. The same subject ....
217. The same .....
218. From fraudulent promise
219. The subject continued
220. Trusts from ignorance or mistake .
221. From a fraudulent preventing of an act
222. From preventing a devise
223. From procuring a devise by fraud .
224. The subject continued
225. From fraud in procuring conveyance
226. The subject continued
227. From fraudulent preventing of competition
228. From pretense of buying for another
229. From possession of money belonging to another
230. From fraudulent appropriation or conversion of property
231. The subject continued.
232. From fraudulent inducements to marriage
233. The subject continued
234. The same subject ....
235. From conveyance of property on the point of marriage
236. The subject continued
237. From immoral or illegal contracts
228. From suppression of legal instrument
239. Equity relieves only where equity is practiced
240. The subject continued
CHAPTER XIH.
TRUSTS FROM EQUITABLE LIENS.
241. Introductory .....
242. Trust from a vendor's lien
Page.
448
453
455
458
461
66
Page.
471
479
482
4S3
486
489
493
496
498
501
504
506
507
509
513
518
522
526
527
528
531
535
538
541
544
547
550
553
558
560
562
Page.
566
XIV
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME I.
243. The subject continued
244. Waiver of vendor's lien
245. Lien from executory contracts
246. Trust from vendee's lien
247. Application and extent of the doctrine
248. The principle involved
249. The subject continued
250. Trust from creditor's lien
251. From voluntary conveyance by trustee
252. From trust in absence of trustee
253. From dissolution of corporation
254. Trusts from partnership debts
255. Trust from deposit of title deeds
256. Trustee from wrongful possession .
257. Creditor as trustee for surety
258. Bank as trustee for equitable owner of deposit
259. Equitable lien from repairs and improvements
260. Statutory lien from repairs and improvements
Page.
573
579
5S2
584
5S6
5S9
592
593
594
595
596
59S
600
603
604
604
605
CHAPTER XIV.
TRUSTS ARISING FROM POWERS.
Page.
§ 261. Introductory ....... 610
262. A power in trust arising from an invalid express trust . 614
263. From failure of donee to execute the power . . 619
264. From defective execution of power . . . 622
265. From death of donee ..... 623
266. The subject continued ..... 624
267. The parties in interest ..... 626
268. The subject continued ..... 628
269. The same subject ...... 630
270. The word "relations" construed .... 632
271. The subject continued ..... 634
272. The same subject . . . . . .636
273. The term "representatives" construed . . . 637
274. Delegation of powers ..... 639
275. Eule of distribution prescribed by donor . . . 640
276. Whether distribution shall be per stirpes or per capita . 642
CHAPTER XV.
TRUSTS FOR MARRIED WOMEN.
277. Introductory . . . . .
278. Separate estate of wife in equity
279. Limitations of wife's equitable estate
2S0. The subject continued
281. Transmutation of separate estate property
Page.
644
G47
650
653
656
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME I.
XV
§ 282. The wife's statutory separate estate
283. Restraint on alienation
284. The subject continued
285. Restraint upon anticipation .
28G. Form of words required
287. Doctrine of restraint continued
288. Devolution of wife's separate estate at her death
289. The married woman's equity to a settlement
290. The amount of wife's settlement
291. Property subject to wife's settlement
292. How the equity to a settlement may be lost
293. The mode of the settlement .
294. Rights of children under the married woman's settlement
295. Order of court for maintenance
296. The husband as trustee for the wife
297. The husband as agent for the wife
298. Liability for contracts and for debts
299. The subject continued
300. Limitations on her liability .
301. The doctrine as modified in this country
302. The subject continued
303. Application of the American doctrine
304. Gifts from husband
305. The rights of the wife in her savings
306. Rights of wife in her pin money
307. Voluntary separation of husband and wife
308. The consideration required .
309. The subject continued
310. Illegal executory agreements
311. Property rights of wife under separation
312. Termination of contract
Page.
658
661
664
666
668
670
672
074
677
679
680
682
083
084
685
687
689
693
696
698
701
702
711
714
716
718
721
723
724
724
725
CHAPTER XVI.
TRUSTS FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
§ 313. The charitable trust defined .
314. Trusts for religious purposes
315. Trusts for purposes of education . ,
316. Trusts for purposes of general benevolence
317. Trusts for the benefit of the public .
318. Origin of charitable trusts .
319. Jurisdiction of equity ....
320. The doctrine in the United States .
321. The subject continued
322. Characteristics of the trust for charitable purposes
323. The subject continued ....
324. The cy pres doctrine .....
325. The subject continued
Page.
727
730
733
734
736
738
741
745
751
753
756
759
762
XVI
TABLE OF CONTENTS^-VOLUME I.
§ 326. The same subject ....
327. The same .....
328. The disposition of charitable corporations
329. The subject continued.
330. Power of the court to change a charitable scheme
331. The cy pres doctrine in America
332. Cypres under the royal prerogative
333. The legislature as parens palrice
334. Corporations as trustees for charitable gifts
335. Gifts to charitable corporations
336. The subject continued
337. Charitable gifts to non-existing corporations
338. Abuse of charitable trusts
339. Breach of ecclesiastical trust
340. The subject continued
341. The same subject ....
342. The same .....
343. The English doctrine
344. The marshalling of testator's assets
345. Gifts in contravention of law, or of public policy
346. The subject continued
347. Charitable trusts to be administered in a foreign country
348. Barred by statute of mortmain
349. Objects not subject to change
350. Personal distinguished from official trust .
351. Perpetuities and accumulations
352. The subject continued
353. The statute of limitations
Page.
764
766
769
771
772
775
777
778
781
782
7S5
786
787
788
791
794
796
800
802
804
80S
810
812
SI 5
818
819
821
822
CHAPTER XVII.
TRUSTS FOE INFANTS.
354. Introductory ....
355. Equitable conversion of infant's estate
356. The maintenance of infants .
357. The subject continued
358. Where maintenance will not be directed
359. Order for maintenance without suit
360. Order in restraint of removal
Page.
826
827
830
832
837
841
842
361. Order for maintenance of infants beyond the jurisdiction 844
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME II.
XV11
VOLUME II.
CHAPTER XVIII.
APPOINTMENT, SUBSTITUTION, RESIGNATION AND REMOVAL OF TRUS-
TEES.
Page.
848
850
S52
853
856
i 362. Introductory ....
363. Appointment of trustees
364. Appointment of trustees continued
365. The executor as trustee
366. The subject continued
367. The executor of an executor as trustee
368. Appointment under a power
369. The subject continued
370. The same subject
371. Where the appointing power fails .
372. The subject continued
373. The same subject
374. Trustee de son tort
375. Acceptance of trust .
376. Acceptance of trust continued
377. Proof of acceptance .
378. The subject continued
379. Disclaimer of trust
380. Disclaimer continued
381. Disclaimer by parol .
382. Devolution of trust estate under disclaimer
383. How a trustee may be released
384. The subject continued
385. The same subject
386. Resignation and removal
387. Eesignation and removal continued
388. Removal of trustees of charities
389. Delegation of appointing power
390. The vesting order
863
865
868
870
873
875
876
877
879
882
883
886
8S9
891
894
896
897
899
900
903
905
907
CHAPTER XIX.
THE RELATION OF TRUSTEES TO THE TRUST ESTATE.
§ 391. Introductory ......
392. The legal title of trust estate
Page.
910
911
xvm
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME II.
i 393. The legal title continued
394. The subject continued
395. The same subject
396. Determined by intention of settlor
397. Effect of power in trust
398. Effect of charge on realty
399. For preserving contingent remainders
400. The trust estate for married women
401. The subject continued
402. Enlargement of trust estate in equity
403. Trustees for rents and profits
404. The subject continued
405. Limitation of estate executed by statute
406. Limitation in wills and deeds
407. The trust estate in personalty
Page.
913
910
918
921
923
926
929
930
933
935
938
939
940
941
943
CHAPTER XX.
THE RELATION OF TRUSTEES TO THE TRUST ESTATE CONTINUED.
§ 408. The legal estate at common law
409. Responsibility of trustee as holder of legal title
410. Protection of legal title
411. Protection of title continued
412. Right of trustee to possession of trust estate
413. Possession of trust estate continued
414. The subject continued
415. The same subject ....
416. Dower in trust estate
417. Liability of trust estate to escheat
418. Conveyance of estate subject to trusts
419. The trust estate in assignees
420. Trust estate in bankrupt trustee
421. The subject continued
422. Beneficial interest of bankrupt trustee
423. Merger of equitable and legal estates
424. Trustees as joint tenants
425. Presumption in regard to conveyance
426. The doctrine of presumption continued
Page.
945
946
949
951
953
956
959
961
962
965
968
969
971
973
975
977
979
980
982
CHAPTER XXI.
CONCERNING THE POWERS OF TRUSTEES.
§ 427. Introductory ...
428. General powers
429. Special powers
430. Discretionary powers
431. Discretionary powers continued — class first
Page.
986
988
991
994
997
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME II.
XIX
432. Discretionary powers continued — class second
433. Discretionary powers continued — class third
434. Discretionary powers continued — class fourth
435. Discretionary powers continued. . '
430. The execution of a power
437. Limitation of the power to execute a trust
438. Power on refusal of trustee .
439. The power to assign the trust estate
440. Powers of trustees as survivors
441. Powers of new trustees
442. Executors as trustees
443. Powers of co-trustees as such
444. Powers of feme covert, or infant, as trustees
445. Power to make repairs and improvements
446. Power to lease trust estate
447. Power to insure trust property
448. Power to borrow money
449. Power of sale
450. Power of sale by implication
451. Power of sale continued
452. Power to consent to a marrhige
453. The subject continued
454. The same subject
455. The power to compromise
456. The power to arbitrate
457. Power to satisfy incumbrances
458. Power to confess judgment .
459. Power to bring suit
460. Power to act through agents
461. Power to employ an attorney
462. Power to convey for public uses
463. Power to apply to the court for instructions
Page.
999
1001
1005
1006
1009
1011
1013
1014
1016
1018
1020
1021
1022
1024
1027
1028
1031
1033
1036
1038
1040
1043
1045
1046
104S
1050
1051
1053
1055
1057
1058
1060
CHAPTER XXII.
THE POWER TO SELL THE TRUST ESTATE.
§ 464. Introductory .
465. In what manner conferred
466. Form of words required
467. Power to sell by implication
468. Limitations of power
469. The subject continued
470. Limitations in regard to exchange
471. Power of sale by consent of parties
472. Consent of parties continued
473. Power of sale by order of court
474. How the power of sale is to be executed
475. The rule in case of a contingency .
Page.
1063
1066
1067
1070
1072
1074
1075
1077
1080
1081
1082
1085
XX
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME II.
§ 476. Power of sale in survivor
477. Power of sale for payment of debts
478.- Sale by tenant for life • .
479. Incidents of the sale .
480. Manner of conducting public sale
481. Adjournment of public sale .
482. Conditions of sale
483. Sale without notice
484. Restraint upon power of sale
485. Where a trustee may be required to sell th
486. Conveyance of the trust estate
487. How a sale by a trustee may be avoided
Page.
. 1087
,
. 1090
1091
1091
1095
1098
1100
1102
1104
e trust estate
1105
,
1103
1108
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.
511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.
CHAPTER XXIII.
THE GENERAL DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS OP TRUSTEES.
Introductory ....
To reduce the trust estate into possession
To assume the control of personalty
Duty to obey the directions of the instrument
Duty to act in good faith ....
The duty of joint action
The duty of joint action continued
The subject continued ....
Responsibility of co-trustees in regard to checks
The rule in its application to public trusts
To act in accordance with the instructions of the court
Duty to exercise diligence and care
The duty of trustees touching the exercise of discretion
ary powers .
To preserve and to protect the trust estate
The subject continued
To collect outstanding claims
To pay debts and charges
Primarily from personal property
The subject continued
Duty to collect rents and profits
Duty to make repairs
With respect to insurance and taxes
The subject continued
To renew leases
The subject continued
To convert and invest trust property
The subject continued
The use of trust funds
The mixing of trust and private funds
Duty to dispose of property liable to waste
Page.
1111
1113
1116
1118
1119
1121
1124
1126
1128
1130
1130
1133
1135
1138
1140
1143
1145
1147
1150
1151
1152
1155
1157
1159
1162
1164
1168
1169
1172
1175
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME II.
XXI
Page.
§ 518. Concerning the purchase of trust property from benefi-
ciaries ;...... 1178
519. Concerning the giving of information . . . 1181
520. Purchasing at his own sale ..... 1182
521. Duty to deposit money in bank .... 1187
522. To be prepared to render an account of his trusteeship . 1190
523. To distribute trust property .... 1193
524. The subject continued ..... 1195
CHAPTER XXIV.
THE INVESTMENT Or TRUST FUNDS.
525. Introductory .....
526. The general rule ....
527. The general rule continued
528. Permissible securities
529. Investments under a discretionary power
530. The rule in England ....
531. The rule in the United States
532. The subject continued
533. Statutory regulations
534. Investment of trust funds for charitable purposes
535. The change of investments .
536. Investments for the accumulation of the income
Page.
1197
1198
1200
1201
1204
1206
1209
1212
1213
1216
1217
1218
CHAPTER XXV.
THE LIABILITIES OF TRUSTEES.
Page.
537. Introductory ....... 1221
538. The general rule ...... 1223
539. Limitations of the rule ..... 1226
540. Liability in breach of trust ..... 1227
541. Liability as co-trustee ..... 1229
542. The right of contribution ..... 1231
543. Liability for co- trustees ..... 1233
544. The subject continued ..... 1236
545. Liability of co-trustees as determined by their bond . 1238
546. The subject continued ..... 1240
547. Liability of trustee on covenants .... 1241
548. Liability of trustee in delegation of powers and duties . 1243
549. The subject continued ..... 1247
550. For loss from insufficient security .... 1248
551. Liability of a father as trustee for a son . . . 1252
552. For delay in investment of trust funds . . . 1253
553. The measure of liability ..... 1256
XX11
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME II.
CHAPTER XXVI.
SIMPLE, PASSIVE OR DRY TRUSTS.
§ 554. Introductory .....
555. Introductory continued
556. Subject to legal rules
557. Where an active trust becomes passive
558. Liability to creditors
559. Liability to creditors continued
560. The rule in married women's separate estate
561. The devolution of the trust estate .
562. The trust estate as affected by statute
563. For preserving contingent remainders
CHAPTER XXVII.
Page.
1260
1263
1265
1266
1268
1270
1274
1276
1277
12S0
TRUSTS FOR SPENDTHRIFTS.
§ 564. Introductory ....
565. Created under statutory provisions
566. Discretionary powers of trustees
567. Liability for debts of beneficiary
568. The subject continued
569. Conditional limitation
570. The subject continued
571. Liability for family of beneficiary .
572. Spendthrift trust for women
573. Trust for settlor
574. Spendthrift trust for insolvent
575. Liability of guardian
576. Effect of a decree creating a spendthrift trust
577. Where a spendthrift trust fails
Page.
1281
1283
1286
12S9
1297
1301
1303
1304
1306
1308
1311
1312
1313
1314
CHAPTER XXVHI.
TRUST FOR PAYMENT OF DEBTS AND LEGACIES.
§ 578. Introductory ....
579. The rule under a will
580. Claims of creditors as a charge on realty
581. Order of procedure .
582. How the trust estate vests
583. Creation of trust by deed
584. The trust deed continued
585. Devisees as executors
586. The collection of debts
587. The rule in conversion of assets
5S8. The right to employ collectors
589. Power of trustees to compound and settle debts
Page.
1317
1319
1321
1324
1326
1327
1329
1333
1334
1337
1339
1341
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME II.
XX1U
590. Claims of creditors for interest
591. The mode of raising money
592. Payment of legacies
593. The payment of legacies continued
594. The rule relating to the surplus
595. Duty of bankrupt trustee touching his own indebtedness
Page.
1346
1347
1351
1354
1357
1458
CHAPTER XXIX.
TRUSTS UNDER ASSIGNMENT FOR CREDITORS.
596. Introductory .
597. Formalities required
598. Eeservation by the assignor
599. The subject continued
600. The preferment of creditors
601. Assets of creditors
602. The rule in England .
603. Assent to direct assignments
604. Where assent will be presumed
605. The manner of assent
606. What property passes under assignment
607. Fraudulent trusts under assignments
608. The subject continued
609. Acceptance of assignee
610. Powers and duties of assignee
611. The subject continued
612. Liability of assignees
613. Bight of creditors under an assignment
614. The right to enforce a trust
615. Property of debtor as affected by liens
616. Assignments by corporations
617. Partnership assignment
618. Partnership assigments continued
619. Assignment ®f realty
620. The order of distribution
Page.
1360
1361
1365
1368
1370
1375
1377
1380
1381
1382
1384
1387
1390
1392
1394
1397
1399
1403
1406
1407
1410
1413
1416
1418
1420
CHAPTER XXX.
TRUSTEE FOR TENANT FOR LIFE AND REMAINDER- MAN.
621. Powers and duties of trustees
622. Tenant for life as constructive trustee
623. Where the tenant for life is entitled to possession
624. Tenant for life as new trustee
625. Payment of charges by tenant for life
626. Repairs and improvements ....
627. Liability for current charges
628. Rights in perishable property
Page.
1424
1426
1427
1430
1431
1433
1435
1436
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME II,
CHAPTER XXXI.
mortgages and trust
TRUSTS UNDER POWER OF SALE MORTGAGES AND DEEDS
§ 629. Introductory .
630. Origin and character of powers
631. The validity of powers of sale
632. Limitations of power of sale in
deeds .....
633. Who may exercise the power of sale
634. The subject continued
635. Delegation of power of sale .
636. The subject continued
637. Possession as a condition of the right to sell
638. The revocation or suspension of the power
639. The subject continued
640. Injunction to restrain sale
641. The duty of a trustee
642. Notice of sale
643. How notice shall be given
644. The subject continued
645. Time and place of sale
646. The manner of sale
647. Whether the estate shall be sold
648. Adjournment of sale .
649. Who may purchase at a sale
650. The subject continued
651. The same subject
652. Statutory regulations
653. Sale at an inadequate price
654. The rights of the purchaser
655. Subsequent purchaser without notice
656. The setting aside of a sale
657. The subject continued
658. The right of redemption
659. The right of redemption continued
660. The power of sale a cumulative remedy
661. Cumulative remedy continued
OP TRUST.
Page.
1440
1442
1444
1446
1449
1452
1453
1455
1457
1459
1463
1464
1468
1471
1475
1478
1479
1483
1485
1488
1490
1492
1495
1497
1498
1500
1504
1505
1508
1509
1512
1514
1517
CHAPTER XXXII.
PERPETUITIES AND ACCUMULATIONS.
§ 662. Introductory .....
663. Accumulations for charities .
664. Accumulations for the payment of portions
665. The subject continued
666. Interest on portions .
667. Advancement by portions
Page.
1520
1523
1524
1527
1529
1530
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME II.
XXV
CHAPTER XXXHI.
EQUITABLE AND STATUTORY LIMITATIONS.
§ 668. The rule in general
669. Where the rule is operative
670. Breach of trust
671. Concerning stale claims
672. Bar from acquiescence
Page.
1533
1535
1538
1541
1543
CHAPTER XXXIV.
TRUST COMPANIES AS TRUSTEES.
673. Introductory
674. Powers and liabilities in general
675. The subject continued
676. Claim of beneficiary for interest
677. Claim for compensation
678. Accumulations by trust companies
Page.
1546
1548
1551
1553
1554
1555
CHAPTER XXXV.
THE CESTUI QUE TRUST.
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES — DIVISION FIRST.
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES IN RELATION TO THE TRUSTEE.
679. Introductory ....
680. Right to judicial construction of the trust
681. Right to maintenance
682. Right to an accounting
683. The subject continued
684. Right to the enforcement of the trust
685. Execution of the trust by the court
686. Right to an injuction
687. Right to the removal of the trustee
688. When a receiver will be appointed
689. Trust property appropriated by trustee
690. Personal liability of trustee
691. Liability of trustee for unreasonable acts
692. Liability of trustee for mismanagement
693. Liability of co-trustee
694. Loss by act of cestui que trust
695. Acquiescence by cestui que trust
696. Acquiescence by lapse of time
697. Waiver of claim by cestui que trust
698. The right to protect the trust estate
699. Claim of beneficiary to an advancement
Page.
1556
1559
1561
1563
1566
1567
1570
1573
1574
1576
1578
1581
1584
1585
1587
1589
1591
1594
1596
1599
1600
XXVI
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME II.
§ 700. Priority of beneficiaries' claim in case of insolvency . 1602
701. The subject continued ..... 1606
702. Partition of trust estate ..... 1611
703. Eight of beneficiary not in esse .... 1613
704. Eight to bring an action ..... 1616
705. Eight to terminate the trust .... 1617
706. The subject continued ..... 1620
CHAPTEE XXXVI.
THE CESTUI QUE TRUST CONTINUED.
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES — DIVISION SECOND.
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES IN RELATION TO THIRD PERSONS.
§ 707.
708.
709.
710.
711.
712.
713.
714.
715.
The right to follow the trust fund .
The subject continued
The identification of the trust property
The subject continued
The right of assignment
The right to alienate the trust estate
Eight to mortgage the trust estate
Eight to the quieting of a title
Liabilities of the cestui que trust
Page.
1624
1628
1630
1633
1635
1638
1641
1642
1643
§ 716.
717.
718.
719.
720.
721.
722.
723.
724.
725.
CHAPTEE XXXVII.
APPLICATION OF THE PURCHASE MONEY
Introductory ,
The rule in general .
Modifications of the general rule
The rule in trusts for the payment of debts
The rule relating to personalty
The rule in case of breach of trust .
The sale or pledge of stock by the trustee
Statutory provisions
Period of equitable relief
The rule in England .
CHAPTEE XXXVIII.
Page.
1645
1646
1649
1652
1655
1656
1659
1661
1663
1663
COSTS AND ATTORNEY S FEES.
726. Introductory ....
727. The rule in England .
728. The rule in the United States
729. Lien on the trust property for costs
730. Where a lien will not attach
731. Costs in defending an action
732. Costs in case of breach of trust
733. In case of unreasonable expenses
Page.
1666
1667
1671
1674
1675
1677
1678
1681
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME II.
XXV11
CHAPTER XXXIX.
THE COMPENSATION OF TRUSTEES.
734. The common law rule
735. The rule in the United States
736. The compensation determined
737. Fidelity required
738. Determined by the instrument
739. Where determined by the court
740. Compensation of new trustee
741. Eeimbursement for necessary expenditures
742. Tor employment of assistants
743. Compensation as executor and trustee
744. Compensation as solicitor
745. Compensation as solicitor continued
746. In trading with trust funds .
747. Lien of trustee for compensation
748. Waiver of compensation
Page.
1682
1684
1687
1691
1696
169S
1700
1701
1704
1705
1708
1710
1713
1714
1715
CHAPTER XL.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN TRUST CASES.
749. Introductory .
750. Jurisdiction in trust cases
751. Jurisdiction continued
752. Extent of equity jurisdiction
753. The reforming of the instrument
754. Parties to trust suits .
755. Parties to trust suits continued
756. The averments of a bill
757. The amendment of the bill .
758. The decree of the court
Page.
1717
1718
1721
1724
1727
172S
1731
1735
1739
1742
CHAPTER XLI.
THE DETERMINATION OP THE TRUST.
§ 759. Introductory .....
760. Determination by the limitations of the trust
761. By agreement of parties
762. Presumption from lapse of time
763. By the act of the trustee
764. On request of the beneficiary
Page.
1744
1746
1747
1749
1750
1752
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages : Vol. 1, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Abbey v. Deyo (44 N. T. 343), 689.
Abbey v. Taber (58 Hun, 602; 11 N. T.
Supl. 548), 322.
Abbot v. American Co. (33 Barb. 578),
390, 391, 1022, 1185.
Abbott v. Baltimore, etc. Packet Co. (4
Md. Ch. 310), 1689.
Abbott, Ex parte (1 Deacon, 338), 655.
Abbott, Bx parte (55 Me. 680), 865, 866,
902.
Abbott v. Foote (146 Mass. 333), 961.
Abbott v. Gibbs (1 Bq. Cas. Abr. 358),
1652.
Abbott v. Massie (3 Ves. 148), 893.
Abeggr. Bishop (142 N. Y. 286), 1374.
Abel v. Heathcote (4 Bro. Ch. 278, 3
Ves. 98), 1075.
Abell». Howe (43Vt.),442.
Abercrombie v. Bradford (16 Ala. 560) ,
1376.
Aberdeen v. Saunderson (8 Sm. & M.
670), 1217.
Aberdeen Ey. Co. v. Blaikie (1 Mac-
queen, 461), 405.
Aberman Iron Works v. Wickens (L.
R. 4Ch. 101), 585.
Abernathy v. Abernathy (8 Fla. 243),
905.
Abney v. Kingsland (10 Ala. 355), 354.
Abney v. Miller (2 Atk. 597), 397.
Aborn v. Padelford (17 E. 1. 143; 20 Atl.
Eep. 297), 499.
Abraham v. Newcombe )2Sirn. 566), 681,
684.
Abrahams v. Tappe (60 Md. 317), 659.
Academy v. Adams (65 N. H. 225), 749.
Academy v. King (12 Mass. 646) , 1548.
Academy of Visitations. Clemens (50
Mo. 167), 748, 756, 759, 763, 776.
Acherly v. Vernon (1 P. Wms. 783),
363, 837, 839.
Acker v. Phcanix (4 Paige, 305), 161.
Acker v. Priest (61 N. W. Rep. 235), 63,
342.
Ackerman v. Ackerman (9 C. E. Green,
585), 517.
Ackerman v. Emmott (4 Barb. 526),
1202, 1212.
Ackerman v. Vreeland (14 N. J. Eq. 23),
1438.
Ackroyd v. Smithson (1 Bro. Ch. 437),
259, 269, 299.
Acland v. Gaisford (2 Madd. 32), 198,
200.
Acton v. Acton (1 Ves. 267), 717.
Acton v. Waddington (46 N. J. Eq. 16),
670, 572,576,579.
Acton v. White (1 S. & S. 429), 669.
Acton v. Woodgate (2 Myl. & K. 495),
1317, 1318, 1378, 1379.
Adair v. Brimmer (74 N. T. 539), 1118,
1138, 1203, 1210.
Adair v. Shaw (1 Sen. & Lef. 262), 432,
695, 1127, 1234.
Adams v. Adams (L. E. 45 Ch. D. 426),
1303.
Adams v. Adams (79 111. 517) , 263.
Adams v. Adams (64 N. H. 224), 852.
Adams v. Adams (6 Q. B. 866), 942.
Adams v. Adams (21 Wall. 185), 50, 596,
852.
Adams v. Adams (22 Vt. 50), 296.
Adams v. Brackett (5 Met. 280), 1145,
1150, 1322, 1355.
Adams v. Bradley (12 Mich. 346), 525.
Adams v. Broke (1 T. & C. Ch. 627) , 1080.
Adams v. Burns (96 Mo. 361; 10 S. W.
Rep. 26), 232.
Adams v. Clifton (1 Euss. 297), 393,
1056,1217,1244,1598.
Adams v. Collier (122 U. S. 382), 1109.
Adams v. Gamble (12 Ir. Ch. 102), 662.
Adams v. Guerard (29 Ga. 651; 76 Am.
Dec. 624), 912.
Adams, In re (15 Abb. N. Cas. 61),
1395.
XXX
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Adams, In re (L. B. 27 Ch. D. 394),
138.
Adams & Kensington, In re (L. E. 27
Oh. D. 409), 121, 122.
Adams v. Jarvis (4 Bing. 66), 488.
Adams i. Jones (39 Ga. 479), 480.
Adams v. Kable (6 B. Mon. 884; 44 Am.
Dec. 772), 499.
Adams v. La Bose (75 Ind. 471) , 912.
Adarnsi). Law (17 How. 417), 912.
Adam9 v. Lambard (80 Cal. 426), 500,
533, 1257, 1583.
Adams v. Leavens (20 Conn. 73), 1117.
Adams v. Mackey (6 Rich. Eq. 75), 665,
704, 710.
Adams v. Nelson (31 Wkly. L. Bull.
46), 1203.
Adams v. Nicholas (IMills, 90; 2 Whart.
17), 78.
Adams v. Paynter (1 Coll. 532), 864, 866,
897.
Adams®. Perry (43 N. T. 487), 750, 752,
912,916, 919.
Adams v. Sayre (76 Ala. 609), 1492.
Adams v. Taunton (5 Madd. 435), 892,
895, 897, 1013.
Adams' Female Acad. v. Adams (65 N.
H. 225), 995.
Adamson v. Armitage (19 Ves. 416), 654,
655.
Adamson v. Lamb, (3 Blackf. 446), 93.
Addison v. Bruckmyer (4 Sandf. Ch.
531), 1409.
Addison J). Topp (67 L. T. 96), 1336,1339.
Adeyi). Arnold (2 De G.,M. & G. 433;
16 Jur. 1123), 881.
Adkins v. Hudson, (11 Ind. 372), 912.
Adleru. Sewell (20 Ind. 598), 949.
Adlingtoni). Cann (3 Atk. 151), 140, 850.
Adnam v. Cole (6 Beav. 353), 732.
jEtnalns. Co. v. Broadinax (48 Fed.
Bep. 892), 705.
Aggas i>. Pickerell (3 Atk. 225), 1536.
Agnew, Appeal of (12 Atl. Bep. 160),
721.
Agnew v. Fetterman (4 Pa. St. 62), 1320.
Agr'l Assn. v. Brewster (51 Tex. 257),
232,309, 358.
Aguilarj). Aguilar (5 Madd. 414), 693.
Aherne v. Aherne (L. B. 9 Ir. 144) , 166.
Ahearne i>. Hogan, (1 Dr. 310), 426.
Ahrenda. Odiorne (118 Mass. 261), 570,
578, 591.
Aiken v. Bridgeford (81 Ala. 295), 1513.
Ainsliet). Medlycott (9 Ves. 19), 13,472,
473.
Airey v. Hall (12 Jur. 1043; 3 Sm. &
Gifi. 315), 152, 1564,1565.
Aislabiei). Kice, (3 Madd. 256; 8 Taunt.
459) , 1046.
Aitchlson v. Dixon (L. E. 10 Eq. 589),
674, 680.
Alanlzc. Casenave (91 Cal. 41; 27 Pac.
Eep. 521), 217, 603.
Albany F. Ins. Co. v. Bay (4N. T. 9),
11, 664, 1073.
Albany's Case (1 Eep. Ill), 1067.
Albemarle v. Earl of Bath (3 Ch. Cas.
55), 273.
Alberger v. Nat. Bk. of Commerce (123
Mo. 313; 27 S. W. Eep. 657), 407,1372.
Albertson, In re (113 N. T. 434), 1425.
Albrecht v. Pell (11 Hun, 127), 1746,1747.
Albrecht v. Wolf (58 111. 186), 76.
Albright v. Albright (91 N. Car. 220),
996.
Albrights. Oyster (140 U. S. <93; 11 S.
Car. 916), 240.
Alcoek v. Sloper (2 Myl. & K. 699) , 1437.
Alden v. Goldie (82 III. 350), 1482.
Alden v. Gregory (2 Eden, 285), 464,1540.
Alden v. Johnson (63 Iowa, 124; 18 N.
W. Bep. 696), 108.
Alden v. Wilkins (117 Mass. 216), 1479.
Alderson, Ex parte (1 Madd. 53), 34.
Aldrich v. Aldrich (12 R. I. 141), 111,
1119.
Alexander v. Alexander (2 Ves. 643),
996, 1005, 1089, 1244, 1341.
Alexander i>. Bouton (55 Cal. 15), 704.
Alexander v. Central E. Co. (3 Dill.
487), 1515.
Alexander, Ex parte (2 Mont. & Ayr.
492), 382.
Alexander v. Hooks (84 Ala. 605) , 587.
Alexander v. Homer (1 McCrary, 634),
1730.
Alexander, In re (13 Ir. Ch. 137), 1047,
1048, 1343.
Alexander v. Kelso (3 Baxt. 311), 1342.
Alexander j). Merrick (121 111. 606), 560.
Alexander?). Meservey (35 S. Car. 417),
1498.
Alexander v. Mills (L. E. 6 Ch. 124),
1080.
Alexander v. Schreiber (13 Mo. 27),
1107.
Alexander v. Warrance (17 Mo. 230),
363, 964.
Alexander v. Wellington (2 Buss. &
Myl. 35), 38.
Alexander v. Williams (1 Hill, 522),
1537.
Alexandria Canal Co. v. Swann (5 How.
83), 1048.
Allday v. Fletcher (1 De G. & J. 82),
674, 680.
Allegheny County v. Lecky (6 S. & E.
166; 9 Am. Dec. 418), 1130.
Allen v. Addlngton (7 Wend. 9), 492.
TABLE OF CASES.
XXXI
[The references are to pagea: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Allen v. Arme (1 Vern. 365), 273.
Allen v. Backhouse (2 Vea. & B. 66),
1068,1073,1090, 1526.
Allen v. Bennett (8 Sm. & M. 672), 570.
Allen v. Bryant (1 Ired. Eq. 195), 1179.
Allen v. Chambers (4 Ired. Eq. 125), 66.
Allen v. Chatfleld (3 Minn. 435), 395,
1490.
Allen v. Coater (1 Beav. 202), 836.
Allen v. Craft (109 Ind. 476; 9 N. E.
Eep. 919), 612.
Allen v. Davis (4 De G. & Sm. 133), 294.
Allen v. Dewitt (3N.T. 276) , 618.
Allen v. Drake (109 Mo. 628), 160.
Allen v. Fuller (118 Mass. 402) , 707.
Allen v. Gaillard (1 S. Car. 279), 1215.
Allen v. Gardner (7 R. I. 22), 1369.
Allen v. Gillette (127 U. S. 589), 1184.
Allen v. Graves (3 Bush, 491), 1215, 1218.
Allen v. Harris (L. E. 27 Ch. D. 333),
996.
Allen v. Henderson (49 Pa. St. 333), 116.
Allen v. Hlghtower (21 Ark. 316), 688.
Allen v. Imlett (Holt, 641), 949.
Allen v. Jaekson (122 111. 567; 13 N. E.
Eep. 840), 416, 431, 1180.
Allen n. Jackson (L.E.I Ch. D. 399),
1041.
Allen v. Maddock (11 Moore P. C. 201),
142.
Allen v. Randolph (4 Johna. Ch. 693),
993, 1047, 1343.
Allen v. Rumph (2 Hill Eq. 1), 101, 103,
104.
Allen v. Russell (78 Ky. 112), 1625, 1627.
Allen v. Sayer (2 Vern. 368), 1536.
Allen v. Walker (L. R. 5 Eq. 187), 686.
Allen v. Wlthrow (110 U. S. 119), 76,
76.
Allen v. Wooley (1 Green Ch. 209), 1637.
Allerton v. Allerton (50 N. Y. 570), 476.
Alley v. Lawrence (12 Gray, 373), 1010,
1079, 1082, 1083, 1084, 1092.
Allfrey v. Allfrey (Macn. & G. 87), 287.
Allhuesen v. Whittell (L. R. 4 Eq. 295),
1146, 1435.
Ailing ». Munson (2 Conn. 691), 993,
1049.
Ailing v. Wenzell (29 111. App. 511), 411.
Allis v. Billings (6 Met. 415), 13.
Allison v- Porter (27 Ohio St. 136), 709.
Allmon v. Pigg (82 111. 149), 515.
Almond v. Russell (5 Ired. Eq. 183),
1120.
Almond v. Wilson (75 Va. 613), 317.
Alaop v. Mather (8 Conn. 548) , 1210.
Altimus v. Elliott (2 Pa. St. 62), 1146.
Alvin v. Lord (39 N. H. 136), 708.
Ambrose v. Ambrose (1 P. Wms. 321),
307, 338.
American Academy v. Harvard Col-
lege, (12 Gray, 582), 734, 748, 763, 776.
American Bible Soc. v. Marshall (15
Ohio St. 537), 750.
American Bible Soc. v. Wetmore (17
Conn. 181), 21, 747.
American Mortgage Co. v. McCall (96
Ala. 200), 1515.
Ames v. Ames (15 E. 1. 12), 1034, 1072.
Ames v. Armstrong (106 Mass. 15), 1122,
1127,1233, 1238,1240.
Ames v. Downing (1 Bradf. 321), 1025.
Ames v. Foater (42 N". H. 381), 708.
Ames' Ironworks v. West (24 Fed. Eep.
313), 1594.
Ames v. Port Huron Co. (11 Mich. 39),
390, 414.
Ames v. Scudder (11 Mo. App. 168), 995.
Ames c.Taylor (L. R. 25 Ch. D. 72),
1710.
Amherst Colleger. Eitch (10 Misc. Eep.
503; 31 N. Y. Supl. 885), 510.
Amory v. Green (13 Allen, 413), 1061.
Amory v. Lawrence (3 Cliff. 323), 434,
442.
Amory v. Lord (9N.T. 403), 31, 616.
Amory v. Lowell (104 Mass. 265), 1192.
Amory v. Meredith (7 Allen, 397), 1011.
Amplett v. Parke (2 R. & M. 227), 25,
242.
Ancaster v. Mayer (1 Bro. Ch. 454),
1322.
Anderson v. Anderson (31 N. J. Eq.
560), 1038, 1069.
Anderson v. Briacoe (12 Bush, 344),
1298.
Anderson v. Burdsell (6 Gratt. 405),
461, 465.
Anderson v. Crist (113 Ind. 65), 52, 940.
Andersons. Dawson (15 Ves. 532), 11,
666, 697, 1009.
Anderson v. Donnell (66 Ind. 150) 575.
Anderaon v. Earle (90 S. Car. 460), 858,
859,889.
Anderson v. Elworth (3 Giff. 154), 294.
Anderson, Inre (.ID. & G. 29) , 902.
Anderson v. Jones (10 Ala. 401), 309.
Anderson v. Mather (44 N. Y. 229), 826.
Andersons. Nesbitt (2 Rawle, 114), 230.
Anderson v. Northrop (30 Fla. 612; 12
So. Rep. 318), 860, 1534.
Anderson v. Roberts (18 Johns. 513),
435.
Anderson v. So. Omaha Land Co. (35
Neb. 785; 53 N. W.Rep. 785), 332.
Anderson v. Spencer (51 Miss. 869), 685.
Andersons. Tomkins (1 Brock. 456),
1415, 1419.
Anderson v. Turner (3 A. K. Marsh-
131) , 1037, 1038.
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Anderson v. Van Allen (12 Johns. 343),
4G0.
Andiugv. Ridley (11 Jur. (N S.) 475),
517.
Andrew v. Bible Soc. (4 Sand. 156), 21.
Andrew v. Clark (2 Ves. 162), 245, 260.
Andrew d. Trinity Hall (9 Ves. 525), 893.
Andrew v. Wrigley (4 Bro. Ch. 124), 465,
467, 1663.
Andrews v. Andrews (28 Ala. 432), 153.
Andrews v. Andrews (8 Conn. 79), 100.
Andrews v. Andrews (110 111. 223), 731,
743, 819.
Andrews v. Andrews (12 Ind. 348), 230.
Andrews v. Bishop (5 Allen, 490), 1325.
Andrews v. Cape Ann Bank (3 Allen,
313), 59.
Andrews v. Durant (18 N. Y. 496), 1404.
Andrews, Ex parte (2 Rose, 410), 1029,
1030, 1031, 1155, 1538.
Andrews, lnre (1 Johns. Ch. 99), 825.
Andrews v Harriott (4 Cow. 517) , 812.
Andrews v. Hobson (23 Ala. 219), 152,
393, 17S0.
Andrews v. Jones (10 Ala. 400), 286, 675,
678, 683.
Andrews v. Powis (2 Bro. P. C. 604),
842.
Andrews v. Sparhawk (13 Pick. 393),
462, 1653.
Andrews s. Welling (84 Hun, 40), 1607.
Andrust). Coleman (82 111. 26; 25 Am.
Rep. 289), 574.
Anewalt's Appeal (42 Pa. St. 414), 304,
987.
Angellti. Dawson (3 T. & C. 317), 992.
Angell v. Jewett (58 111. App. 596), 988.
Angellti. McCullough (12 R. I. 47), 710.
Angier v. Angier (Gilb. Eq. 152), 722.
Angus v Angus (West'sRep. 23), 35.
Ankeney v. Hannon (147 U. S. 118; 13 S.
Ct. 206), 710.
Anketel v Converse (17 Ohio St. 11; 91
Am. Dee. 115), 577.
Annandaleu. Harris (2 P. ffms, 432),
560.
Annesley, In re (Amb. 78), 330.
Annesley v. Simeon (4Madd. 390; , v,no.
Annisi;. Wilson (15 Colo. 236; 25 Pao.
Rep. 304) 341.
Ancaster v. Mayor (1 Bro. Ch. 454), 1525.
Anon. (Carth. 15), 215.
Anon. (1 Ch. Cas. 267), 763.
Anon. (Jacob, 265), 842.
Anon. (Loflt, 492), 1102.
Anon. (4Madd. 473), 1564.
Anon. (6Madd. 10), 1573.
Anon. (Moseley, 96), 1652.
Anon. (1 P. Wms. 327), 641.
Anon. (1 Palk. 154), 1347.
Anon. (Sel. Oh. Cas. 67), 1632.
Anon. (4 Sim. 359), 1571.
Anon. (5 Sim. 322), 904.
Anon. (lVern. 162), 593.
Anon. (12Ves. 5), 842, 1576.
Analey v. Pasahro (22 Neb. 662) , 578.
Anson v. Potter (L. R. 13 Oh. D. 141),
1665.
Anson v. Somerset R. Co. (85 Me. 79; 26
Atl. Rep. 996), 895.
Anstice v. Brown (6 Paige, 448), 257, 363.
Austruthem. Adair (2 Myl. & K. 513),
682.
Anthej). Helde (85 Ala. 236; 4 So. Rep.
380), 197, 313.
Anthony v. Rees (2 Cromp. & J. 75), 913,
919, 1072.
Antones v. Eslava (9 Port. 527), 750.
Antrim v. Buckingham (2 Freem. 168),
24.
Antrobus v. Smith (12 Ves. 39), 146, 147,
151.
App v. Lutheran Congregation (66 Pa.
St. 201), 793.
Appeal of Agnew (12 Atl. Rep. 160) , 721.
Appeal Germania Sav. Bank (95 Pa. St.
329), 710.
Appeal of Korchling (144 Pa. St. 215, 22
Atl. Rep. 808), 710.
Appeal of York County Bane (32 Pa.
St. 446), 600.
Apples). Allen (3 Jones Eq. 120), 652,
671, 672, 1275.
Appleby v. Duke (1 Hare, 303), 975.
Appleton v. Boyd (7 Mass. 131) , 216, 217,
322.
Appleton v. Rowley (L. R. 8 Eq. 139) ,
672, 1264, 1277.
Arbuthnot v, Norton (5 Moor. P. C. 219),
38.
Archer v. Hudson (7 Beav. 551), 218, 289,
354.
Archer v. Hudson (15 L. J. Ch. 211),
286.
Archer v. Zeh (5 Hill (N. Y.), 203), 944.
Ardillw. Savage (llr. Eq. 79), 897.
Ardis v. Printup (39 G i. 648), 101.
Arglasseu. Muschamp (1 Vern. 75), 35.
Arkansas Valley, etc. Co. v. Eicholtz
(45 Kan. 164) , 411.
Arkwright, Ex parte (3 M. D & De G.
129) , 600.
Arkwright v. Newbold (L. R. 17 Ch. D.
301), 475.
Arlin v. Brown (44 N. H. 102), 579.
Arline«. Miller (22 Ga. 330), 600.
Armfleld v. Armfield (1 Freem. Ch. 311),
99.
Armitage v. Rector (62 Miss. 600), 1390.
Armor v. Alexander (10 Paige, 571) , 398.
Armour-Cudahy Co. v. First Nat. Bank
(11 So. Rep. 28), 1634.
TABLE OF CASES.
XXX1U
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1T53 ]
Armstrongs. Armstrong (8 Ir. Eq. 1),
293.
Armstrongs. Armstrong (L. R. 18 Eq.
541), 1118, 1528.
Armstrong s. Byrne (1 Edw. Ch. 79),
1369, 1402.
Armstrong s. Campbell (3 Terg. 201),
414,461,462, 1533,1537.
Armstrong v. Huston (8 Ohio, 552),
390.
Armstrongs Morrill (14Wall. 138), 877,
889, 1118, 1228, 1392.
Armstrong s. Park (9 Humph. 196), 895.
Armstrongs. Peirse (3 Burr. 1898), 1559.
Armstrongs. Ross (20 N. J. Eq. 109),
576, 708.
Armstrong s. Sanford (7 IVIinn. 49),
1465, 1468.
Armstrong s. Stovall (26 Miss. 275), 665,
707.
Armstrong s. Toler (11 Wheat. 268),
555, 565.
Armstrongs. Walkup (12 Gratt. 608),
1253, 1255.
Armstrong v. Zane (12 Ohio St. 287),
1666, 1678.
Armstrong's Estate (6 Watts, 236), 1688.
Arnett v. Glenn (52 Ark. 253), 689.
Arnolds. Arnold (41 S. Car. 291; 19 S. E.
Rep. 670), 135.
Arnolds. Bright (41 Mich. 207), 473.
Arnolds. Brown (24 Pick. 96; 35 Am.
Dec. 296), 383,1171.
Arnold v. Chapman (1 Ves. Sr. 108), 255,
259, 802.
Arnolds. ChequeBank (L. R. ICom. P.
DiV. 578), 1634.
Arnold s. Cord (16 Ind. 177), 218, 231, 500,
518.
Arnold s. Gilbert (3 Sandf. Ch. 531),
1119.
Arnold s. Grimes (2 Iowa, 1), 1408.
Arnold, In re (L. R. 37 Ch. D. 637), 803.
Arnold s. Patrick (6 Paige, 310), 163.
Arnolds. Stevens (24 Pick. 106), 984.
Arnolds. Woodhaws (L. It. 16 Eq. 29),
667.
Arnot s. Biscoe (1 Ves. 96), 495.
Arnwines. Carroll (4 Halst. Ch. 620),
1640.
Arran s. Tyrawley (1 B. & B. 106), 1540.
Arricks. Durham (79 Mo. 174), 576.
Arringtons. Cherry (10 Ga. 429), 1077.
Arrington s. Roper (3 Tenn. Ch. 572),
710.
Arrowsmith s. Van Harlinger (Coxe,
26), 401.
Arthur s. Arthur (19 Ir. Eq. 511), 654.
Arthur Average Ass'n, In re (L. R. 10
Ch. D, 542), 560.
Arthur v. Cole (56 Md. 100; 40 Am. Rep.
310), 181.
Arthur s. Commercial Bank (9 Sm. <fe
&M. 394; 48 Am. Dec. 719), 10, 1411.
Arthur v. Master in Equity (1 Harp. Eq.
47), 1176.
Arundell s. Phipps (10 Ves. 144), 645.
647.
Arzbacher s. Mayer (53 Wis. 380), 1297.
Asay s. Hoover (5 Pa. St. 35), 971.
Asche s. Asche (113 N". Y. 232), 110, 1752.
Asches. Bowen (lOPhila. 96), 52, 671.
Ashbrooke s. Roberts (82 Ky . 298), 575.
Ashbunham s. Thompson (13 Ves. 402),
387, 1255.
Ashburner s. Parrish (81 Pa. St. 52),
558. ■
Ashburton s. Ashburton (6 Ves. 6), 830,
1169.
Ashby v. Blackwell (2 Eden, 299), 1194.
Ashby s. Palmer (1 Meriv. 296), 259,
299.
Ashcraft s. Little (4 Ired. Eq. 236), 655,
656.
Ashley v. Bailey (2 Ves. 368), 443.
Ashley s. Cunningham (16 Ark. 168),
452.
Ashley s. Robinson (29 Ala. 112; 65 Am.
Dec. 371), 71.
Aahs' Appeal (80 Pa. St. 497), 1308.
Ashfon s. Ashton (1 Coll. Jur. 402),
113.
Ashton s. Ashton (1 Ves. 264), 717.
Ashton v. Atlantic Bank (3 Allen, 217),
457, 1649, 1660, 1731.
Ashton s. Dalton (2 Coll. 565), 600.
Ashton s. Langdale (4 Eng. L. & Eq.
80), 40, 737.
Ashton s. Thompson (32 Minn. 25), 286,
289.
Ashton s. Wood (L. R. 6 Eq. 419), 249.
Ashurst s. Ashurst (13 Ala. 781), 1686.
Ashursts. Givens (5 Watts & S. 329),
42, 913, 919, 921, 1295, 1305.
Ashurst s. Mason (L. R. 20 Eq. 225),
1231.
Ashursts. Martin (9 Port. 566), 1818.
Ashurst's Appeal (10 P. P. Smith, 290),
392, 406, 411, 468.
Ashurst's Appeal (77 Pa. St. 464), 1273,
1307.
Ashwell s. Lomi (L. R. 2 P. & D. 477),
296.
Ashworth s. Outram (L. R. 5 Ch. D.
423), 712.
Askew v. Rooth (L. R. 17 Eq. 426), 656.
Askew v. Sanders (84 Ala. 356), 1508.
Aspinwall s. Jones (117 Mo. 209), 398.
Aspinwall s. Petvin (1 Sim. & Stu. 550),
178.
XXXIV
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Association v. Lowdermilk(50Md. 175),
1649.
Association v. McAllister (153 Mass.
293; 26 N. E. Rep. 862), 1031.
Aster v. Wells (4 Wheat. 466), 443.
Aston's Estate (5 Whart. 228), 1205, 1253,
1288.
Astley v. Essex (L. R. 6 Oh. 898), 1118.
Astley v. Miller (1 Sim. 298), 979, 1432.
Atcherly v. Vernon (10 Mod. 531), 654.
Atcheapn v. Lemann (9 Wick. 584 ; 23 L.
T. 302), 663.
Atchison v. Lindsey (6 B. Mon. 86) , 1726.
Atherton v. Worth (1 Dick. 375), 1380.
Athol Machine Co. v. Puller (107 Mass.
437), 707.
Atkins v. Delmage (12 Ir. Eq. 2), 419.
Atkins v. Kron (1 Ired. Oh. 58; Sired.
207), 28, 257.
Atkins v. Withers (94 N. Oar. 581), 431.
Atkinson v. Atkinson (8 Allen, 15),
827.
Atkinson v. Beall (33 Ga. 153), 675.
Atkinson, In re (2 DeG.,M. & G. 140),
1116.
Atkinson v. Jordan (5 Ohio, 247), 1331,
1369, 1373.
Atkinson v. Rochester Print. Co. (114
N. Y. 168), 1607.
Atkinson v. Tomlinson (1 Ohio St. 237),
226.
Atkinson v. Ward (47 Ark. 633), 533,
1257.
Atlantic Bank v. Merchants' Bank (10
Gray, 532), 530, 1634.
Atlantic Delaine Co. v. James (94 U. S.
207), 477.
Atlee v. Hawe (L. R. 9 Ch. D. 337), 813.
Atterbury v. Wallis (8 De G., M. & G.
454), 443, 494.
Attorney-General v. Alford (4 DeG.,M.
&G 843), 1194, 1257.
Attorney-General v. Andrew (3 Ves.
633) , 771.
Attorney-General v. Aspinwall (2 Myl.
&Cr. 613), 10.
Attorney-General v. Baliol College (9
Mod. 411), 608.
Attorney-General v. Barbour (121 Mass.
568), 879, 900.
Attorney-General v. Bedford (10 Beav.
505), 782.
Attorney-General v. Bedford (2 Ves.
505; 5 Sim. 578), 782.
Attorney-General v. Bentham (1 Ves.
543), 985.
Attorney-General v. Berryman (1 Dick.
168), 756.
Attorney General v. Beverly (6 De G.,
M. &G. 256), 823.
Attorney-General v. Bishop of Chester
(IBro. Ch. 444), 763.
Attorney-General v. Bishop of London
(3Bro. Ch. 171), 765.
Attorney-General v. Bishop of Worces-
ter (9 Hare, 328), 775.
Attorney -General v. Black (11 Ves. 191).
785.
Attorney General v. Boucherett (25
Bear. 116), 788.
Attorney-General v, Boultbee (2 Ves.
Jr. 387), 759,765, 767, 771.
Attorney General v. Bowyer (3 Ves.
714), 763, 774, 819,970.
Attorney General v. Brewery Co. (1
Merfv. 498). 822, 1537.
Attorney-General v. Brewers Co. (1 P.
Wms. 376), 1679.
Attorney-General v. Brickdale (8 Beav.
223), 1125.
Attorney-General v. Briggs (164 Mass.
661; 42 N. E. Rep. 118), 776.
Attorney-General v. Bristol (2 J. & W.
321; Shelford, 498), 822, 823, 824.
Attorney-General v. Brown (1 Swans,
265), 737.
Attorney-General v. Brown;s Hospital
(17 Sim. 137), 782.
Attorney-General v. Buckland (1 Ves.
231), 166,641.
Attorney-General v. Bunce (L. E. 20 Eq.
483), 732.
Attorney-General v. Bund (L. R. 6 Eq.
663), 767.
Attorney-General v. Bushby (24 Beav.
299), 737.
Attorney -General v. Cains, Coll. (2 Keen
165), 18, 906.
Attorney-General v. Catharine Hall
(Jac. 392), 782.
Attorney-General v. Chester (1 Bro.Ch.
444), 810, 819.
Attorney-General v. Christ's Hospital
(3 Myl. &K. 344), 823.
Attorney-General v-, Clark (1 Beav.
474), 904,906,1004.
Attorney-General v. Clarke (Amb. 422),
735.
Attorney -General v. Clare Hall (3 Atk.
675) , 785.
Attorney -General v. Clarendon (17 Ves.
499), 18, 426, 782, 785, 788, 906.
Attorney-General v. Clergy Soo. (8
Rich. Eq. 190), 750
Attorney-General©. Clifton (32 Beav.
596), 906.
Attorney-General v. Combe (2 Oh. Cas.
13), 763.
Attorney-General v. Comber (2 S. & S.
\ 93), 254, 735.
TABLE OF CASES.
XXXV
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Attorney-General v. Cooper (1 Bro. Ch.
439), 906.
Attorney-General v. Coopers' Co. (3
Beav. 29), 756, 772.
Attorney-General v. Coventry (7 Bro.
P. C. 236), 78S, 822.
Attorney-General v. Craven (21 Beav.
392), 765, 771.
Attorney-General v. Cunning (2 T. & C.
Ch. 139), 907, 1123, 1130.
Attorney-General v. Curran (1 J. & W.
229), 904.
Attorney-General v. Daugars (33 Beav.
621), 906.
Attorney-General v. Dedham School
(23 Beav. 350), 782, 785.
Attorney-General v. Dixie (2 Myl. & K.
342), 772, 782,947.
Attorney-General v. Downing (Wilmot,
1; Dick. 14; Ami). 560), 819.
Attorney -General v. Doyler (2 Eq. Ca.
Abr. 194), 896.
Attorney-General v. Drapers' Co. (2
Beav. 508), 756, 772.
Attorney-General v. Drummond (1 Con.
& Laws. 210; 1 Dr. & W. 353), 798, 801,
1575.
Attorney -General v. Dulwich College
(4 Beav. 255), 782.
Attorney-General v. Dyson (2 S. & S.
628), 904.
Attorney-General v. Eastlake (11 Hare,
205), 737.
Attorney-General v. Exeter (Jac. 448),
822, 1536,1541.
Attorney-General v. Fed. St. Meeting
House (3 Gray, 1), 942, 1639.
Attorney-General v. Fishmongers' Co.
5 Myl. &Cr. 11), 741, 823.
Attorney-General v. Fletcher (5 L. J.
Ch. 75), 778.
Attorney-General v. Floyer (2 Vern.
748), 873.
Attorney -General v. Foundling Hos-
pital (2 Ves. Jr. 47), 18, 782, 788.
Attorney-General v. Garrison (101
Mass. 223), 748, 817, 1575.
Attorney General v. Gaunt (3 Swanst.
148), 781.
Attorney-General v. Geary (3 Meriv.
613), 1025, 1026.
Attorney-General v. Gill (2 P. Wms.
369) , 819.
Attorney-General v. Gladstone (13 Sim.
7), 770.
Attorney-General v. Gly (1 Atk. 356),
1038.
Attorney-General v. Glyn (12 Sim. 84),
765, 771.
Attorney-General v. Gower (Barn. 150),
1569.
Attorney-General v. Graves (Amb. 168),
802.
Attorney-General v. Green (2 Bro. Ch.
492), 759, 765.
Attorney General v. Guise (2 Vern.
266) , 757.
Attorney-General v. Haberdashers' Co.
(1 Ves. Jr. 295), 772.
Attorney-General v. Hall (W. Eel. 13),
819.
Attorney-General v. Hamilton (1
Madd. 214), 1075.
Attorney-General v. Hankey (L. R. 16
Bq. 140), 768, 770.
Attorney-General v. Hartley (2 J. & W.
382), 817.
Attorney-General v. Heells (2 S. & S.
67), 737.
Attorney-General v. Hewer (2 Vern.
387), 733.
Attorney-General v. Hicks (3 Bro. Ch.
166), ".64, 771.
Attorney-General v. Hickman (2 Eq.
Cas. Ab. 193), 755, 756.
Attorney -General v. Holland (2 T. & C.
683), 1234.
Attorney -General v. Hurst (2 Cox, 364),
772.
Attorney-General v. Hutton (7 Ir. Eq
Eep. 612) , 793, 801.
Attorney -General v. Illinois Agr. Col-
lege (85111. 516), 1625.
Attorney-General v. Ironmongers' Co.
2 Beav. 313; 2 Myl. & E. 676; 1 Cr. &
P. 220), 18, 756, 765, 766, 772.
Attorney-General v. Jackson, (11 Ves.
365), 754, 755.
Attorney-General v. Jolly (1 Rich. Eq .
99; 2 Strobh. Eq. 379), 750.
Attorney-General v. Eohler (9 H. L.
Cas. 654), 1194.
Attorney-General v. Landerfield (9
Mod. 286), 18.
Attorney -General v. Laws (8 Hare, 32),
732, 765.
Attorney-General v. Lepine (2 Swanst.
181; 19 Ves. 309), 811.
Attorney-General v. Liverpool (1 Myl.
&Cr. 210), 1573.
Attorney-General v. Locke (3 Atk. 165),
782.
Attorney-General «. London (3 Bro.
Ch. 171; 1 Ves. Jr. 243), 764, 771,811,
817,906.
Attorney-General v. Lonsdale (1 Sim.
105), 737.
Attorney-General v. Magdalen Colle6e
(10 Beav. 402), 782.
XXXV 1
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Attorney-General v. Magdalen College
(18 Bear. 239), 1540.
Attorney -General v. Magdalen College
(6H. L. Cas. 189), 823.
Attorney -General s. Mansfield (2 Russ.
520), 817.
Attorney-General s. Margaret Profes-
sors (lVern. 55), 733.
Attorney-General s. Mayor of Bristol
(2 J. &W. 321), 772.
Attorney-General s. Mayor of Dublin
(1 Bligh (N. S.), 312), 741, 744.
Attorney General v. Mayor of Newbury
1.3 Myl. &K. 647), 824.
Attorney-GeDeral s. Mayor of Norwich
(2 Myl. &Cr. 406), 1739.
Attorney-General v. Mayor of Stratford
(Barnard Ch. 36), 824.
Attorney-General s. Meeting House (2
Gray, 1),824.
Attorney-General v. Meyrick (2 Ves.
46), 970.
Attorney-Generals. Merchant (L. R. 3
Eq.424), 772.
Attorney-Generals. Middloton (2 Ves.
327), 742, 782, 788.
Attorney-General v. Milner (3 Atk. 115),
1528.
Attorney -Generals. Minister (36 N. T.
452), 929.
Attorney-General s. Minshull (4 Ves.
14), 765.
Attorney-General s. Moore (19 N. J.
Eq. 503), 749, 782, 788.
Attorney-General v. Morgan (2 Russ.
306) , 1242.
Attorney -Generals. Mosely (2 De G. &
Sm. 398), 1119, 1537.
Attorney-General s. Murdoch (2 Kay &
J. 571), 1680.
Attorney-General s. Nichol (16 Ves.
343), 985.
Attorney -General s. Northumberland
(L. R. 7Ch. D. 745), 736.
Attorney-General s. Norwich (2 Myl.
&Cr. 406), 1703.
Attorney-General s. Oglander (3 Bro.
Ch. 166), 759, 764.
Attorney -Generals. Old South Soc. (13
Allen, 474), 784, 823.
Attorney-Generals. Owen (10 Ves. 560),
1003, 1027.
Attorney-Generals. Parker (126 Mass.
216), 734, 745.
Attorney-General s. Payne (27 Beav.
168), 823, 824.
Attorney-General s. Pearson (3 Meriv.
353; 7 Sim. 290), 732, 79S, 801.
Attorney -General v. Piatt (Finch, 221),
763.
Attorney-Generals. Power (1 B. & B.
145), 757.
Attorney-General s. Price (17 Ves. 371),
632, 637, 735.
Attorney-General s. Purmont (S Paige,
620), 469.
Attorney-General s. Pyle (1 Atk. 435),
765.
Attorney-General s. Ref. Prot. Dutch
Church (33 Barb. 303) , 824.
Attorney-Generals. Ritchfleld (5 Ves.
825), 873.
Attorney-General s. Rochester (5 De
G.,M. &G. 822), 823, 824.
Attorney-General s. St. Cross' Hosp.
(17 Beav. 435), 782.
Attorney-Generals. St. John's Hosp.
(HJur. (N. S.) 629), 824.
Attorney-General s. St. John's Hosp.
l2DeG.,J. &S. 621), 18.
Attorney-General v. St. John's Hosp.
(L. R. 1 Ch. 92), 764, 773, 774.
Attorney-General s. Sand (Hard. 495),
2,41,42.
Attorney-General v. Scott ^Talb. 139),
963.
Attorney-General v. Scott (1 Ves. 413),
639, 965, 1056, 1089, 1130.
Attorney-General s. Shore (1 Myl. &
Cr. 394; 12 Sm. 426), 866.
Attorn ey-Ge neral v. Shore (11 Sim. 592;
16 Sim. 210), 798, 905.
Attorney-General s. Shore (7 Sim. 309),
1575.
Attorney-General s. Skinner Co. (2
Russ. 407), 742.
Attorney-General s. Shearman (2Beav.
104), 1130.
Attorney-General s. Smythies i.2 Myl.
& Cr. 135), 782.
Attorney-General s. Solly (2 Sim. 518),
1255.
Attorney General s. Soule (28 Mich.
153), 734, 751, 756.
Attorney-General s. Southmolton (14
Beav. 357), 181.
Attorney-General s. South Sea Co. (.4
Beav. 453), 788.
Attorney-General s. Stafford (Barn. 33),
18.
Attorney-Generals. Stamford (1 Pb.Hl.
737), 906.
Attorney-General s. Stephens (3 Myl.
&K. 347), 625, 906.
Attorney-Generals. Stephney (10 Ves.
22), 731.
Attorney-General s. Stewart (L. R. 14
Eq. 17), 756, 764, 774.
Attorney-General s. Sturge (19 Beav.
597), 811.
TABLE OF CASES.
xxxvu
[The references are to page9: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753 ]
Attorney-General v. Syderfen (1 Vern.
224; 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 96; 2 Freem.
261), 778.
Attorney-General v. Tancred (Amb.
351; 1 Wm. Black. 90; 1 Eden, 10),
733, 742.
Attorney-General v. Tompkins (Amb.
217), 802.
Attorney-General v. Tonna (4 Bro. Ch.
103), 772.
Attorney-General v. Tonner (2 Ves. Jr.
295), 772.
Attorney-General v. Trinity Church (9
Allen, 422), 748, 772.
Attorney -General v. Tyndal (2 Eden,
211), 802.
Attorney-General v. Utlca Ins. Co. (2
Johns. Ch. 384), 18, 788.
Attorney-General v. Vint (3 De G. &
Sra. 705), 765.
Attorney-General v. Wax Chandlers'
Co. (L. R. 6 H. L. Cas. 1), 788.
Attorney-General v. Wax Chandlers'
Co. (L. E. 8 Eq. 452; L. E. 5 Ch.
503), 772.
Attorney-General v. Wallace (7 B. Mon^
611), 746, 748.
Attorney-General v. Wansay (15 Ves.
232), 759, 772.
Attorney-General v. Weymouth (Amb.
20), 256.
Attorney-General v. Whitohurch (3
Ves. 143), 765.
Attorney-General v. Whiteley (11 Ves.
251) , 772.
Attorney-General v. Whorwood (1 Ves.
636), 18.
Attorney-General v. Winchelsea (3
Bro. Ch. 373), 772, 865.
Attorney-General v. Wilson (16 Sim.
210), 801.
Attorney-General v, Wilson (1 Cr. & P.
1), 10, 1230, 1588.
Attorney-General v. Wilson (3 Myl. &
K. 362), 770, 771, 772.
Attorney-General v. Wyville (28 Beav.
464), 1679.
Attndge v. Billings (57 111. 489), 827.
Atw&terv. Einman (Harr. 243), 1515.
Atwcll v. Atwell (L. E. 13 Eq. 23), 304.
Atwood v. Fisk (101 Mass. 363), 560, 562.
Atwood v. Lamprey (3 P. Wms. 127),
529.
Atwood v. Vincent (17 Conn. '575), 579.
Aubin v. Holt (2 Kay & J. 66), 660.
Aubrey v. Middleton (2 Eq. Cas. Abr.
479), 1355.
Aubry v. Doyl (1 Ch. Cas. 180), 180.
Aubuchon v. Bender (44 Mo. 560), 1424,
1744.
Augue's Estate (2 Fhila. 137), 1210.
Auguisola v. Arnaz (51 Cal. 435), 1719.
Augusta v. Walton (77 Ga. 517), 19, 111.
Augustlni v. Academy (55 Ala. 493),
1242.
Auley«. Osterman (65 Wis. 118), 1414.
Aultman & Taylor Co. v. Frasure (95
Ky. 429; 26 S. W. Eep. 5), 706.
Aultman v. Obermyer (6 Neb. 260), 708.
Austin v. Austin (L. E. 4 Ch. 1). 233),
995.
Austin v. Belt (20 Johns. 442), 1333, 1366,
1369, 1404.
Austin v. Brown (6 Paige, 448), 43..
Austin v. Moore (7 Met. 116), 1240.
Austin v. Shaw (10 Allen, 552), 1122.
Austin v. Spragne Mfg. Co. (14 E. I.
464), 1440.
Austin v. Taylor (1 Eden, 361) , 8, 90, 94.
Austin v. Underwood (37 111. 438), 588.
Austin v. Wilson (21 Ind. 252), 1663
Australian, etc. Co. v. Mounsey (4 Kay
& J. 733), 1032.
Autenreith, In re (3 Dem. 200) , 959, 1057,
1138.
Aveling v. Knipe (19 Ves. 441), 216, 216.
Averill v. Loucks (6 Barb. 470), 1367.
Averly v. Averly (1 Mete. 117), 993.
Avery v. Avery (90 Ky. 613; 14 S. W-
Rep. 693), 889.
Avery v. Clark (87 Cal. 619; 22 Am. St.
Eep. 272), 574.
Avery v. Cleary (132 U. S. 604), 1541.
Avery v. Osborn (Barn. 34), 1679.
Avery v. Vansickle (35 Ohio St. 270), 709.
Ayer®. Ayer (16 Pick. 327), 59, 647. 652,
930,932.
Ayeru. City of Bangor (85 Me. 611; 27
Atl. Eep. 523), 19,1173.
Ayer v. Eitter (29 S. Car. 136), 912, 1279.
Ayers v. Meth. Church (3 Sand. 351),
21.
Ayers v. Weed (16 Conn. 291), 892.
Aylettu. Ashton (lMyl. & Cr. 105), 645.
Ayliff v. Murray (2 Atk. 59), 977, 1683.
Alward v. Kearney (2B.&B. 463), 287.
Aymar v. Roff (3 Johns. Ch. 4"1), 625.
Aynesworth t>. Halderman (2Duv.665),
327.
B.
Babbitt v. Babbitt (26 N. J. Eq. 44), 183,
996, 1004.
Babeoek v. Dill (43 Barb. 577), 1404.
Babcoek v. Hubbard (56 Conn. 284),
1058, 1712.
Back v. Andrew (2 Vern. 120), 335.
Baekes' Will, In re (9 Misc. Eep. 504;
30 N. T. Rupl. 394), 731,807.
Backhaus v. Backhaus (70 Wis. 518),
904
XXXV1I1
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Backus v. Burke (48 Minn. 260; 51 N.
W. Rep. 284), 1450.
Bacon v. Bacon (55 Vt. 243), 995.
Bacon v. Bacon (5 Ves. 334), 1006, 1057,
1128, 1140, 1244, 1341.
Bacon v. Chiles (10 Pet. 223), 392.
Bacon v. Markley (46 Ind. 116), 478.
Bacon v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins.
Co. (131 U. S. 258) 1508.
Bacon v. Ransom (139 Mass. 117; 29 N.
E. Rep. 473), 135.
Bacon v. Rives (106 U. S. 99), 1535.
Bacon's Appeal (57 Pa. St. 504), 944,
1267.
Bacon's Estate (6 Phila. 335), 932.
Baeotu. Hey ward (5 S. Car. 441), 948,
993, 1047, 1343, 1344.
Badder v. Harris (2 Dow. & Ry. 76),
926.
Badger v. Badger (2 Wall. 87), 464.
Badger v. Williams (1 D. Chip. 137),
556.
Badgett v. Keating (31 Ark. 400), 977,
1557.
Badgley v. Voltrain (68111. 25), 151.
Bagbyu. Waters (7 Ohio St. 359), 226.
Bagenal v. Bagenal (6 Bro. P. C. 81),
1529.
Baggota. Meux (lPhill. Ch. 627; 1 Coll.
Ch. 138), 651, 663, 667, 668, 669.
Baggottu. Sawyer (25 S. Car. 405), 1544.
Bagnall v. Carleton (L. R. 6 Ch. D.
371), 494.
Bagshaw t>. Spencer (2 Atk. 582), 91.
Bagshaw v. Spencer (1 Coll. Jur. 402),
112.
Bagshaw v. Spencer (1 Ves. 151), 114,
919, 920, 937, 942, 1326, 1327.
Bahin v. Hughes (L. R. 31 Ch. D. 390),
1022, 1588.
Baier v. Beberlch (6 Mo. App. 537),
377.
Bailey v. .Sltna Ins. Co. (10 Allen, 350),
395.
Bailey v. Bailey (2 Del. Ch. 95), 864, 867.
Bailey v. Bailey (28 Hun, 603), 618.
Bailey v. Bailey (97 N. T. 460) , 1746.
Bailey v. Bailey (8 Ohio, 239), 141.
Bailey v. Bailey (16 R. I. 251; 14 Atl.
Rep. 917), 1562, 1600, 1602.
Bailey v. Bailey (67 Vt. 494; 32 Atl. Rep.
470), 1564.
Bailey v. Bergen (67 N. T. 346), 1400.
Bailey v. Eklns (2 Dick. 632), 881.
Bailey, Ex parte (15 R. I. 60), 1013.
Bailey, Ex parte (13 R. I. 543), 1159, 1192.
Bailey v. Glover (21 Wall. 342), 1540,
1541.
Bailey v. Gould (4 T. & C. Ex. 221; 8
Hare, 216), 1029, 1155.
Bailey v. Hammond (7 Ves. 590), 985.
Bailey v. Hemenway (147 Mass. 326),
313.
Bailey v. Hollister (26 N. T. 112) , 962.
Bailey v. Inglee (2 Paige, 279; 4 Paige,
23), 1231, 1625.
Bailey, In re (58 How. Pr. 446), 1421.
Bailey v. Irvine (72 Ala. 505), 75.
Bailey v. Manfg. Co. (32 Kan. 73), 1364.
Bailey v. Mills (27 Tex. 434), 1368.
Bailey j). Pearson (29 N. H. 77), 708.
Bailey v. Powell (2 Vern. 361), 245.
Bailey «. Stiles (1 Green Ch. 223), 337,
559.
Bailey v. Timberlake (74 Ala. 221), 1510.
Bailey v. Watkins (Sugd. Law of Prop.
726), 426, 430.
Bailey v. Wilson (1 Dev. & Bat. 182),
432.
Baillie v. MeKerven (35 Beav. 177), 600.
Bain v. Buff (76 Va. 371), 711.
Bain v. Lescher (11 Sim. 397), 654.
Balnbridge u. Blair (3 Beav. 421), 1576.
Bainbridge v. Blair (1 De G. & S. 164),
904.
Baines v. McGhee (1 Sm. & M. 208), 456,
1656.
Bainham v. Manning (2 Vern. 242), 660.
Bairdti. Brookin (86 Ga. 709; 12 S. E.
Rep. 981), 1614.
Baird's Appeal (3 W. & S. 459), 980.
Baird's Case a W. & S. 288), 855.
Bakeman v. Montgomery (1 McCart.
106), 452.
Baker v. Baker (22 Minn. 262), 334, 349,
372, 373.
Baker v. Baker (31 Pac. Rep. 355), 57.
Baker v. Bait (2 Moore P. C. 317) 297.
Bakers. Bliss (39 N. T. 76), 456, 460,
1659.
Baker v. Bradley (7 De G., M. & G. 597),
668.
Baker v. Brown (146 Mass. 369; 15 K". E.
Rep. 783), 1283, 1294, 1312.
Baker v. Carter (1 T. & C. 255), 1591.
Baker v. Compton (52 Tex. 462), 578.
Baker v. Crookshank (1 Whart. Dig.
370), 1091.
Baker v. Disbrow (3 Redf. 348), 1203,
1210, 1218.
Baker v. Evans (1 Wins. Eq. 109), 152.
Baker v. Fales (16 Mass. 487), 789.
Baker v. Faris (61 Mo. 389), 556.
Baker v. Gregory (22 Ala. 544; 65 Am.
Dec. 366),698,704.
Baker v. Halligan j.75 Mo. 435), 1487.
Baker v. Harder (6 Thomp. & C. 442),
699, 709.
Baker v. Hollabaugh (15 Ark. 322), 66.
Baker In re (35 Hun, 272), 1692.
TABLE OF CASES.
XXXIX
("The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
•« .Tr»rrl«n (1% XT Hnr 1 ifil 551 T*oU(TYir>T« 11 Williams Cfl Md. 935
Baker v. Jordan (73 N. Car. 145), 551
553.
Baker v. Leathers (3 Ind. 558), 352, 366.
Baker v. Lorillard (4 N. Y. 257), 830.
Baker v. Read (18 Beav. 398), 392, 404.
Baker v. Reel (4 Dana, 158), 178.
Baker v. Riddle (1 Bald. 394), 96.
Baker v. Springfield & W. Mo. Ry. (86
Mo. 75), 327.
Baker v. Tibbetts (162 Mass. 468; 39 N.
E. Rep. 350), 1247.
Baker u.Updike (155 111. 54; 39 N. E.
Rep. 587), 581.
Baker v. Vining (30 Me. 121; 50 Am.
Dec. 617), 308, 357,362.
Baker i.Wa'l (59 Mo. 265), 935.
Baker v. Washington (3 Stew. & P.
142), 956.
Baker j. Whiting (3 Sunm. 475), 193,
392, 398,413, 415, 461, 1535, 1536.
Baker's Appeal (9 Harris, 76), 600.
linker's Appeal (120 Pa. St. 83) , 1171.
Bakewell v. Ogden (2 Bush, 265), 1082,
1084,
Balehen«. Scott (2 Ves. Jr. 678), 882.
Baldridgew. Walton (1 Mo. 620), 1490.
Baldwin v. Allison (4 Minn. 25;, 392,
Baldwin v. Campfield (4 Halst. 891),
258, 279, 2S0.
Baldwins. Hatchett (56 Ala. 461), 1217.
Baldwin v. Humphrey (44 N. Y. 609 1, 50,
154, 979.
Baldwin v. Hunter (44 N, Y. 609), 60.
Baldwin v. Johnson (Saxt. 441), 1E5
Baldwin v. Lyons (19 Abb. Pr. 32), 1413.
Baldwins. Peet (22 Tex. 708), 1385.
Baldwin v. Porter (12 Conn. 473), 884.
Bales v. Perry (51 Mo. 449), 996, 1055,
1096, 1243, 1453, 1455, 1456, 1470.
Balfour v. Welland (16 Ve3. 151), 1330,
1654, 1665.
Ball v. Carew (13 Pick. 28), 392.
Ball*;. Coults (1 Ves. & B. 305,, 717.
Ball*. Harris (4 Myl. & Cr. 264; 8 Sim.
485), 1073, 1091.
Ball v. Montgomery (2 Ves. 191), 682,
6S5.
Ball v. Smith (2 Vern. 675), 246.
Ballbeck v. Donaldson (6 Am. L. Reg.
148) , 241.
Ballard v. Carter (5 Pick. 112), 971.
Ballard v. Lippman (32 Fla. 481; 14 So.
Rep. 154), 660.
Ballentine v. Frelinghuysen (38 N. J.
Eq, 266), 1037.
Ballin v. Dillaye (35 How. Pr. 219\ 699.
Ballou, In re (11 R. I. 369), 902.
Calls v. Strutt (1 Hare, 146), 990.
BffiowD. Farmers' Mut. F. Ins. Co. (77
Mich 540.576.
Baltimore v. Williams (6 Md. 235), 159.
Baltimore Turnpike Case (5 Binn. 481),
1130.
Baltimore, etc. Turnpike Co. v. Moale
(71 Md. 353), 575.
Baltimore, etc. Tel. Co. v. Interstate
Tel. Co. (54 Fed. Rep. 50), 210.
Bamber v. Schoolfield (160 U. S. 149),
1372.
Bampton v. Blrchall (5 Beav. 67), 1536.
Barnwell v. Cawdor (3 Madd. 453), 1324.
Bancroft v. Cousen (13 Allen, 50), 532,
1647.
Bancroft v. Cosby (71 Cal. 94; 16 Pac.
Rep. 504), 574, 580.
Band a. Fardell (7 De G., M. &G.628),
1249.
Band v. Hendrie (49 Iowa, 4021 , 536.
Banfieldtf. Wiggin (58 N. H. 155), 1301.
Bangor v. Beal (86 Me. 129; 26 Atl. Rep.
1112), 734, "748.
Bangor v. Masonic Lodge (73 Me. 428;
40 Am. Rep. 369), 748.
Bangs v. Hall (2 Pick. 372), 462.
Bangs v. Stephenson (63 Mich. 661),
1542.
Bank v. Batton (1 Rob. 527), 103.
Bank v. Bell Silver Co. (8 Mont. 32),
1515.
Bank v. Deming (17 Vt. 366; , 1384.
Banks. Eames (4 Abb. App. Dec. 83),
1404.
Bank j). King (57 Pa. St. 202,, 1603.
Bank v. Lanahan (48 Md. 336), 1109.
Bank v. MeKnight (2 Mo. 42), 1032.
Bank v. Macy (4 Ind. 362), 396.
Bank v. Ottoman Co. (L. R, 2 Eq. 366),
1570.
Bank v. Payne (25 Conn. 444), 444.
Bank v. Payne (86 Ky. 446), 1653.
Bank v. Prater (64 Ga. 609), 434.
Bank v. Root (3 Paige, 478), 1404.
Bank v. Russell ^2 Dill. 215), 1630.
Bank v. Rutlaud (.28 Vt. 470), 38.
Bank v. Seton ;1 Pet. 299), 460.
Bank v. Snively (23 Md. 253), 197, 313
Bank v. Tyrrell (5 Jur. (N. S.) 527),
409.
Bank v. Tyrrell (27 Beav. 273; 10 H. L.
Cas. 26), 419.
Bank Comrs. v. Bank of Buffalo (6
Paige, 503;, 406.
Bank of America v. Bank (101 U. S. 240),
711.
Bank of America v. Pollock (4 Edw.
215), 333,529.
Bank of Commerce v. Russell (2 Dill.
215), 1632.
Bank of Greensboro v. Chambers (30
Graft. 202), 601, 605
xl
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol.
Bant ot Louisville s. Gray (84 Ky. 665),
712,
Bank of Metropolis v. Guttschlick (14
Pet. 31), 88.
Bank of Orleans s. Torrey (7 Hill, 260),
403, 416.
Bank of Republic s. Baxter (31 Vt. 101),
492, 494.
Bank of Shelby s. James (95 Tenn. 8;
30 S. W. Rep. 1038), 710.
Bank of U. S. v. Benning (4 Cranch C.
C. 81), 1108.
Bank of U. S. s. Beverly (10 Pet. 532;
1 How. 134), 9:8, 1145, 1319.
Bank of U. S. s. Carrington (7 Leigh,
676), 47, 269, 308.
Bank of U. S. s. Davis (2 Hill, 451), 443,
476.
Bank of U. S, s. Huth (4 B. Mon. 423).
1411.
Banks v. Judah (8 Conn. 145), 333, 414,
416.
Banks s- May (3 A. K. Marsh. 435), 151.
Banks s. I. ice (45 Pac. Rep. 515), 1580.
Bankss. Sutton (2 P. Wms, 700), 653,
963.
Banks s. Wilkes (3 Sandf. Ch. 99), 1234,
1236.
Bannerman v. Weaver (8 Md . 617),
1042.
Banning s. Sibley (3 Minn 389), 1360.
Bannon s. Comcgys (69 Md. 411), 1740.
Baptist Association s. Hart (4 Wheat.
1; 3 Pet. App. 481', 22, 250, 759, 812.
Baptist Church s. Pennsylvania, etc.
Society (15 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 332),
1264.
Baptist Ch. s. Presbyterian Ch. (18 B.
Mon. 635) , 747
Baptist Ch. s. Shively (67 Md. 493; 1 Am.
St. Rep. 412), 87.
Baptist Soc. v. Hazen (100 Mass. 322),
940, 949.
Barber v. Barber (18 Yes. 286), 1536.
Barbers. Bowen (47 Minn. 118; 49 Sf.
W. Rep. 684), 1179.
Barber s. Cary (1 Kern. 397), 1017, 1086.
Barber, Jnre (L. R. 11 Ch. D, 442), 680.
Barber, In re (L. R. 39 Ch. D. 187), 869.
Barbour s. Johnson (21 D. C, 40), 214.
Barclays. Collett (4 Bing. (X. Cas )
660), 1427.
Barclay v. Goodloe (83 Ky . 493), 878.
Barclay j). Russell (3Ves. 424), 966.
Barcrofts. Lessieur (48 Mo. 418), 1620,
1747, 1752.
Bardstown, etc. R. Co. s. Metcalfe (4
Mete. 199; 81 Am. Dec. 521), 1054.
Bardswells. Bardswell (9 Sim. 319), 52,
1.28.
I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Baring, In re (L. R. (1893) 1 Ch. 61),
1162.
Barker v. Barker (14 Miss. 131), 328.
Barker s. Barker (14 Wis. 131), 221, 334,
632, 1183, 1582.
Barker v. Devonshire (3 Meriv. 3101,
1033, 1072, 1652.
Barker s. Greenwood (4 Mees. & W.
429), 913, 917, 919, 920, 923, 938, 939, 940.
Barker, In re (6 Wend. 509), 957, 962.
Barker s. Marine Ins. Co. (2 Mason,
369), 883, 413, 414.
Barker s. Peile (2 Dr. & 8m. 340), 902.
Barkers. Richardson (1 Y. & J. 362),
961.
Barker s. Wood (9 Mass. 419), 748.
Barkley s. Donnelly (112 Mo. 661; 19
S W. Rep. 303), 748, 814.
Barkley s. Dosser (15 Lea, 529), 918, 954.
Barkley s. Lane (6 Bush, 587), 52, 75.
Barksdale v. Hall (13 Rich. Eq. 180),
1215.
Barkworth s. Young (4 Drew. 1), 61,98.
Barley s. Evelyn (16 Sim. 29(J), 256.
Barleys. Waltord (9 Q. B. 197), 475.
Barlows. Barlow (47 Kan. 676; 28 Pac.
Rep. 607), 345.
Barlow v. Loomis (19 Fed. Rep. 677),
1745.
Barnard s. Adams (58 Fed. Rep. 313),
788.
Barnard s. Bagshaw (3 De G., J. & S.
355), 1233.
Barnard s. Duncan (38 Mo. 170), 1100.
Barnard s. Ford (L. R. 4 Ch. 247), 675,
682.
Barnard s. Gantz (140 N. T. 249), 1745.
Barnard v. Hawks (111 N. Car. 333; 16 S.
E. Rep. 329), 195.
Barnard v. Hunter (Jur. (N. S.) 1213),
419.
Barnard v. Jewett (97 Mass. 87), 369.
Barnard v. Stone (159 Mass. 224; 34 N.E.
Rep. 272), 1623.
Barnebee s. Beckley (43 Mich. 613),
1686.
Barnes s. Addy (L. R. 9 Ch. D. 123), 204,
534, 877, 1246.
Barness. Barnes Q04 N. Car. 613), 721.
Barnes s. Brown (SON. Y. 627), 412.
Barnes v. Dow (59 Vt. 530), 1295.
Barnes s. Fisher (9 Mo. App. 674), 1408.
Barues v. Gay (7 Iowa, 26) , 964.
Barnes s. Grant (26 L. J. (X. S.) Ch. 92),
130.
Barnes s. Kirkland (8 Gray, 512) , 893.
Barnes v. McClintock (3 Penn. & W. 67;
23 Am Dec. 62), 443, 449.
Barness. Monroe (95 Mich. 612; 55 N.
W. Rep. 431), 1S9.
TABLE OF CASES.
xli
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Barnes v. Taylor (37 N. J. Eq. 259), 49,
233.
Barnes v. Taylor (30 N. J. Eq. 7), S77.
Barnesley v. Powell (1 Ves. 289), 508.
Barnettti. Bamber (81 Pa. St. 247), 398.
Barnett v. Dougherty (32 Pa. St. 371),
234, 503.
Barnettr. Riser (63 Ala. 347), 574.
Harnett v. Salyers (Ky, L. Eep. 405), 570.
Barnett». Sheffield (1 DeO., M. & G.
371), 1118.
Barnett's Appeal (46 Pa. St. 392), 917,
919,921,943.
Barney v. Douglass (19 Vt. 98), 957, 1117.
Barneys. Earlo (13 Ala. 106), 439.
Barneys. Griffin (2 N. i\ 365) 1368.
Barney, In re (L. R. (1892) i Ch. 265),
877.
Barneys. Parsons (54 Vt. 623; 41 Am.
Rep. 858), 1135, 1214.
Barney v. Saunders (16 How. 545), 1102,
1134, 1198, 1253, 1256, 1684, 16r>2.
Barnitz's Appeal, (9 Watts, 300), 855.
Barnum «. Mayor (62 Md. 275; 50 Am.
Rep. 219), 18, 19, 753.
Barnum v. Young (10 Neb. 309), 708.
Barr v. Cubbage (52 Mo. 404), 327, 1582.
Barr v. Fawkes (2 Hem. & M. 60), 248,
248.
Barr D.Lewis (71 Miss. 727; 15 So. Rep.
796), 1244.
Barr«. N. Y., etc. R. R. Co. (125 N. Y.
2C3; 52 Hun, 553), 411, 412.
Barr v. O'Donnell (76 Cal. 469; 9 Am. St.
Rep. 242), 51, 503.
Barr v. Weld (24 Pa. St. 84), 749, 787.
Barrack v. McOullock (3 Kay & J. 110),
656, 715.
Barrett;. Wilder (30 Beav. 442), 1194.
Barrel! v. Hanrick (42 Ala. 71), 218.
Barrell v. Joy (16 Mass. 221), 47, 61,
16S9.
Barrett v. Bamber (81 Pa. St. 247), 204,
3S8, 420, 532, 534, 1092.
Barrett v. French (1 Conn. 354; 6 Am.
Dee. 241), 910.
Barrett!;. Hartley (12 Jur. (N. S.) 426),
1683.
Barrett v. Hartley (L. E, 2 Eq. 787),
1710.
Barrett v. Lewis (106 Ind. 120), 571, 575,
590.
Barrett v. Marsh (126 Mass. 213), 119.
Barribeau v. Brant (17 How. 43), 216.
Barrickw. Horner (78 Md. 253; 27 Atl.
Rep. 1111), 1448, 1451.
Barrington v. O'Brien (1 Ball & B. 180),
1529.
Barrington's Estate, In re (1 John. &
H. 142), 1C26.
Barriolhet ». Fisch (63 Cal. 462), 13C5.
Barrough v, Greenough (3 Ves. 152),
497, 506, 517.
Barrow v. Barrow (24 Vt. 375), 270, 357,
651, 678, 686, 713, 715, 723.
Barrow v. Barrow 5 De G., M. &G.
782), 678.
Barrow v. Watkins (24 Beav. 1), 41, 42,
43, 965, 966.
Barr's Trusts (4Kay&J. 219), 1117.
Barry v. Barry (1 Md. Ch. 20), 1715.
Barry v. Butlin (2 Moore P. C. 480), 297.
Barry, Ex parte (L. R. 17 Eq. 113), 972.
Barry v. Lambert (98 N. Y. 305), 75.
Barry v. Merchants' Exc. Co. (1 Sand.
Ch. 280), 10.
Barry v. Whitney (3 Sandf. 696), 419
Barry's Appeal (103 Pa. St. 130), 111.
Bartholomew v. Leach (7 Watts, 472),
3S3, 414, 415.
Bartlett!;. Bartlett (16 Gray, 277), 266.
Bartlett t>. Bartlett (13 Mo. 456), 340,
354.
Bartlett^;. Bartlett (15 Neb. 593), 503.
Bartlett v. Drew (57 N. Y. 587), 284, 224,
386, 388.
Bartlett v. Glasscock (4 Mo. 62), 449.
Bartlett v. Hamilton (46 Me. 435), 15E2.
Bartlett, In re (163 Mass. 50; 40 N. E.
Rep. 899) , 734, 737.
Bartlett v. Hodgson (1 T. R. 42), 881,
1226.
Bartlett v. King (12 Mass. 543), 759.
Bartlett v. Nye (4 Met. 378), 748.
Bartlett v. Pickersgill (1 Eden, 515),
307, 358.
Bartlett v. Sutherland (2 Cush. 401),
1040.
Bartlett;;. Teah (1 McCrary, 176; lFed.
Rep. 76S), 1440.
Bartlett v. Van Zandt (4 Sandf. Oh . 396),
680.
Bartlett v. Verner (56 Ala. 580) , 435.
Barton v. Barton (2 Vern. 357), 1043.
Barton v. Briscoe (Jac. 603), 671.
Barton's Estate (1 Pan. Eq. 24), 1212.
Bartram v . Whichcote (6 Sim. 86), 1077.
Barwell v. Barwell (34 Beav. 371) , 1541.
Barwicu v. English Joint Stock Bank
(L. R. 2Eq. 259), 476,484.
Bascomb v. Albertsou (34 N. Y. 584),
255, 750, 752, 776, 812, 821.
Bascomb v. Beckwith (L. R. 8Eq. 100),
492.
Baskin v. Baskln (4 Lans. 90), 1190.
Bason v. Harden (72 N. Car. 287), 1400.
Bass v. Seott (2 Leigh, 359), 911, 931,
1171.
Bassetta. Beam (36 Pac. Rep. 501), 660,
705.
xlii
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages : Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753 ]
Bassett v. Craft (129 Mass. 518), 898.
Bassett v. Pereival (1 Cox, 268), 1525.
Bassett v. Shoemaker (46 N. J. Eq. 538;
19 Am. St. Hep. 435), 1183, 1185.
Bastard v. Proby (2 Cox, 6), 107, 113.
Batchelder v. Sargent (47 N. H. 262),
708.
Bateheller v. Searle (2 Vern. 730), 247.
Bate v. Hooper (5 DeG.,M. & G. 338),
1167.
Bate v. Newton (1 Vern. 464), 273.
Bateman v. Bateman (1 Atk. 421),
928.
Bateman ». Davis (3 Madd. 98), 1079,
1137.
Bateman v. Ross (1 Dow. 235), 724, 725,
726.
Bates v. Bates (134 Mass. 110; 45 Am.
Bep. 305), 748, 755.
Bates v. Childers (4 N. Mex. 347; 20
Pac. Rep. 164), 570,576.
Bates v. Hurd (65 Me. 180) , 50, 60, 880.
Bates, In re (118 111. 524), 1408.
Bates v. Norcross (14 Pick. 224), 595.
Bates v. Scales (12 Ves. 402), 1205, 1253,
1255.
Bates v. Simmons (62 Wis. 69), 1362,
1392.
Bates v. Underbill (3 Redf. 348), 1210.
Bath v. Bradford .'2 Ves. 588), 1347.
Bath v. Montague (3 Ch. Cas. 55; 2
Freem. 193), 1009.
Bath S. Car. Paper Co. v. Langley (23
S. Car. 129!, 1151.
Batstoueu. Salter (L. R. 19 Eq. 250; L.
R. 10 Ch. App. 431), 343, 350.
Battersea v. Farrington (1 Swanst.
106), 99.
Battle v. Petway (5 Ired. 576; 44 Am.
Dee. 59), 912, 1114, 1622.
Battinger v. B'jdenbeeker (63 Barb.
404; 69 Barb. 395), 42.
Batton v. Watson : 13 Ga. 63) , 560.
Batts v. Scott (37 Tex. 59), 1464.
Bauerman v. Radenius ;7 T. R. 670),
961.
Baugh v. Price (1 G. Wils. 320), 606.
Baum v. Grigsby (21 Cal. 172; 81 Am.
Dec. 153), 574,580.
Baumani. Street (76111. 526), 706.
Buumbaugha. Baumbaugh (11 S. & R.
193), 1066.
Baumgardner v. Guessfield (38 Mo. 36),
197, 212, 309, 359.
Bausman v. Eads (46 Minn. 148), 1508.
Bausman v. Kelly (38 Minn. 197 j, 1451.
Bayard v. Farmers', etc. Bank (52 Pa.
St. 232) , 456, 460, 1649, 1659.
Bayard v. Hoffman i,4 Johns. Ch. 45),
256
Bayles v. Baxter (22 Cal. 575), 3C9, 357,
363.
Bay ley v, Boulcott (4 Russ. 345), 151.
Bayley v. Cummings (10 Ir. Eq. 410),
895, 1013.
Bayley v. Greenleaf (7 Wheat. 46), 241,
589.
Bayley v. Mansell (4 Madd. 226), 864,
865, 866, 907, 974, 1005, 1243.
Bayles v. Staats (5N. J. Eq. 513), 904.
Bayley v. Williams (4 Gift. 638), 295.
Baylies v. Payson (5 Allen, 473) , 1660.
Baylis v. Newton (2 Vern. 28), 366,
Baylor v. Hopf (81 Tex. 637; 17 S. W.
Rep. 230), 231.
Baynardu Wooley (29 Beav. 593), 600,
1232, 1234.
I Bayne v. United States (93 U. S. 642),
531, 1625.
Baxti. Palmer (56 L. J. Ch. 318), 1681,
1701.
Baxter v. Maxwell (115 Pa. St. 469), 688.
Baxters. Wales (12 Mass. 365), 470.
Bazemore v. Davis (55 Ga. 504), 607,
1625.
Beach v. Beach (2 Hill, 260; 38 Am. Dec.
6841,722.
Beach v. Beach (14 Vt. 28; 39 Am. Dec.
204), 949, 950, 956, 1054, 1115, 1265.
Beach v. Dyer (93 111. 295), 435, 486, 520.
Beach v. Miller (130111. 162), 411.
Beaden v. King (9 Hare, 499), 392.
Beadle v. Beadle (40 Fed. Hep. 315), 852.
Beadle *>. Beadle (2 McCrary Ch. 586),
398.
Beal v. Beal (Pr. Ch. 405), 1530.
Beal v. Burehstead (10 Cush. 623), 37.
Beal v. Harmon (38 Mo. 435), 402.
Beal v. Harrington (116 111. 103), 571,
574,588.
Beal v. Storm (26 N. J. Eq. 372), 656,
675, 708.
Beale v. Coon (2 Watts, 183) 960.
Beale v. Knowles (45 Me. 479), 706.
Beales v. Spencer (2 W. C. C. 65), 655.
Beall v. Fox (4 Ga. 404), 747, 818.
Deall v. State (9 Ga. 367), 1130.
Beals v. Cobb (51 Me. 318), 706.
Beam v. Bridges (108 N. Car. 276; 13 S.E.
Rep. 113), 348.
Bean v. Boothby (57 Me. 295), 706
Bean v. Farnam (6 Pick. 269), 993, 1049,
1050, 1344.
Bean v. Hockman (31 Barb. 78), 1522.
Bean v. Simpson (4 Shep. 49), 1117.
Bean v. Smith (1 Mason, 272), 435.
Beauland v. Bradley (3 Sm. & G 339),
293.
Beans v. Bullitt (57 Pa. St. 222), 1360.
Bear v. Bear (33 Pa. St. 525), 710.
TABLE OF CASES.
xiiii
[The references' are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Bear v. Heasley (98 Mich 279; 67 N. W.
Rep. 270), 791, 791, 797.
Bear v. Koenigstein (16 Neb. 65), 197,
903, 313.
Beard v. Redolph (29 Wis. 136), 711.
Beardslee v. Horton (3 Mich. 660), 1053.
Beardsleyw. Selectmen (53 Conn. 489;
55 Am. Rep. 152), 717, 763.
Beasleyp. Watson (41 Ala. 234), 834,
839.
Beasly v. Magrath (2 Sch. & Let. 35),
286, 287.
Beaston v. Farmers' Bank (12 Pet. 102),
1423.
Beatieu. Butler (21 Mo. 313; 64 Am.
Dec. 234), 1094, 1095, 1460.
Beatson v. Beatson (12 Sim. 281), 88, 162.
Beattien. Dickinson (33 Ark. 205), 585.
Beattier. Johnston (1 Phil. 17), 847.
Beatty ». Clark (20 Cal. 11), 396, 987,
988.
Beatty v. Knowles (4 Pet. 152), 19, 21.
Beatty v. Marine Ins. Co. (2 Cranch,
127), 21.
Beatyi*. Curson (L. R. 7Bq. 194), 1257.
Beaubienw. Poupard (Harr. Ch. 206),
400.
Beaufort v. Collier (6 Humph. 487),
1622.
Beaumont v. Boultbee (5 Ves. 485),
1537.
Beaumont v. Carter (32 Beav. 586), 6S1.
Beaumont v. Meredith (3 Ves. & B. 181),
1570.
Beaumont v. Oliveira (L. R. 6 Eq. 534;
4Ch. D. 309), 734, 737.
Beaumont v. Salisbury (19 Beav. 198),
923, 942.
Beavan v. Oxford (6 De G.,M. & G. 176),
1117.
Beaver v. Beaver (117 N. T. 428), 54.
Beaver v. McKinley (50 Kas. 602; 32
Pac. 363), 223, 341.
Becks. Beck (43 N. J. Eq. 39), 269.
Beckett v. Bledsoe (4Ind. 256), 230.
Beckett v. Cordley (1 Bro. Ch. 358), 27,
406.
Beck v. Graybill (4 Casey, 66), 308.
Becks. Haas (111 Mo. 264; 31 Mo. App.
183), 1055.
Beck v. Kantrowicz (3 Kay & J. 230),
409.
Beckford v. Beckford (Lofft. 490), 354.
Beckford s. Close (6 Sim. 184), 1536.
Beckford v. Tobin (1 Ves. Jr. 307), 353,
839.
Beckford v. Wade (17 Ves. 87), 461, 463,
465, 467, 1536.
Beckley v. Newland (2 P. Wms. 182),
33.
Beckman v. Stanley (S Nev. 257), 708.
Beck's Estate (133 Pa. St. 51 ; 19 Am. St.
Rep. 623), 1290, 1295.
Beekwith v. St. Phillip's Parish (69 Ga.
561), 747, 818, 819.
Bedel v. Scroggins (40 Pac. Rep. 954),
58.
Bedell v. MeCleUan (11 How. Pr. 172),
1465.
Bedford Charity, In re (5 Sim. 578), 782.
Bedford v. Burton (106 U. S. 341), 710.
Bedford v. Graves (1 S. W. Rep. 534),
372.
Bedilian v. Seaton (3 Wall. Jr. 279), 514.
Bedlngfleld, In re (3 Rep. 483; (1893) 2
Ch. 332), 1077.
Beebe v. Knapp (23 Mich. 53), 475.
Deech v. Keep (18 Beav. 285), 152.
Beech v. Lord St. Vincent (3 De G. & S.
678), 1527.
Beecheru. Major (2 Dr. & Sm. 431), 312,
362, 369.
Beecheru. Wilson (84 Va. 813; 6 S. E.
Rep. 209), 371.
Beekman v. Beekman (21 Atl. Rep.
567), 158.
Beeman v. Beeman (88 Hun, 14; 34 N.
T. Supl. 484), 62.
Beekman v. Bonsor (23 ST. T. 298; 80
Am. Dec. 269), 616, 750, 752, 776, 857,
878, 1746.
Beekman v. People (27 Barb. 273), 618.
Beeler v. Dunn (3 Head, 87), 836.
Boer, Goods of (15 Jur. 160), 859.
Beers v. Narramore (61 Conn. 13; 22
Atl. Rep. 1061), 150.
Beeson v. Beeson (9 Pa. St. 279), 390, 393,
401,427,1592,1597.
Begble v. Crook (Bing. ST. Oas. 70; 2
Scott, 128), 892, 894.
Begole v. Hazzard (81 Wis. 274, 51 N.
W. Rep. 325), 72,373.
Beivley v. Carter (L. R. 4 Ch. 230), 1080.
Belcher©. Belcher (38 N. J. Eq. 126),
1037, 1070.
Belchier v. Parsons (Amb. 219), 1122,
1123, 1135, 1140, 1244, 1341.
Belding v. Willard (56 Fed. Rep. 699),
831.
Belfordrc. Crane (16 N. J. Eq. 265; 84
Am. Dec. 153), 339, 354, 70S .
Belknap v. Belknap (5 Allen, 468) 904,
973.
Belknap v. Belknap (128 Mass. 14), 1744.
Belle. Bell (LI. & G. t. Plunk. 66), 1536.
Bell v. Barnett (2 J. J. Marsh. 516), 607.
Beilu. Blair (65 Miss. 191), 576.
Bell v. Cureton (2 Myl. & K. 511), 1317.
Bell v. Ellis (33 Cal. 620), 495.
Bells. Hallenbeck (Wright, 751), 354.
xliv
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753 '
Bell u. Henderson (6 How. (Miss.) 311),
482.
Bell u. Howard (9 Mod . 302) , 282.
Bell!;. Kellar (13 B. Mon. 331), 664, 706.
Bell v. Palmer (6 Cow. 128), 987.
Bell v. Turner (47 L. J. Ch. 75), 1681.
Bell v. Twilight (22 N. H. 500), 1460.
Bell v. Watkins (82 Ala. 512; 60 Am.
Dec. 756), 704.
Bell v. Webb (2 Gill. 164), 392, 404.
Bellamy v. Bellamy (6 Fla. 62), 390, 563.
Bellamy-!). Sabine (2 Phil. 425), 485.
Bellamy v. Thornton (103 Ala. 404; 15
So. Rep. 831), 829.
Bellas v. McCarthy (10 Watts, 13), 443,
451.
Bellasis v. Compton (2 Vern. 294), 73,
362.
Bellasis v. Uthwatt (1 Atk. 426), 1528.
Bell Co. v. Alexander (22 Tex. 360; 73
Am. Dec. 268), 749.
Bellinger v. Shafer (2 Sandf. Ch. 293),
1025.
Bellows v. Rosenthal (31 Ind. 116), 706.
Bellow v. Russell (IB. &B. 107), 418.
Bell's Case (22 Beav. 35), 476.
Belmont v. O'Brien (12 N". T. 394), 168,
619, 871, 872, 969, 1088, 1744.
Belote i>. White (2 Head, 703), 1536.
Beloved Wilkes' Charity, Inre (3 Maen,
&G. 440), 1119.
Belsayv. Engle (107 111. 182), 107.
Benbow v. Davies (11 Beav. 369), 975.
Benbow v. Moore (114 N. Car. 263; 19
S. B. Rep. 156), 347.
Benbow v. Townsend (1 Myl. & Cr.
506), 73,362.
Benbury i>. Benbury (2 Dev. & Bat. Eq.
233), 881, 1225.
Bence v. Gilpin (L. R. 3 Ch. 76), 882.
Bench d. Biles (4Madd. 187), 1855.
Bench v. Sheldon (14 Barb. 66) , 491, 495.
Bendall v. Bendall (24 Ala. 295; 60 Am.
Dec. 469),16S8, 1678, 1690.
Bendheimi). Morrow (73 Hun, 90; 25 X.
Y. Supl. 900), 1126, 1196.
Benford v. Daniels (13 Ala. 667), 1686,
1690.
Benger d. Drew (1 P. Wms. 780), 359.
Bengough v. Waik' r (15 Ves. 607), 1529.
Benham v. Rowe (2 Cal. 387), 1191.
Benkendorf d. Vincenz (52 Mo. 441),
1586.
Benkert v. Jacoby (36 Iowa, 273), 108.
Benn i>. Dixon (10 Sim. 636), 1168.
Bennet v. Batchellor (3 Bro. Ch. 28; 1
Ves. Jr. 63), 244.
Bennet!?. Hayter (2 Beav. 81), 763.
Bennet d. Hutson (33 Ark. 762), 238.
Bennet d. Walker (1 West. 130), 436.
Bennett v. Austin (SIN. Y. 308), 431,
877.
Bennett v. Bennett (L. R. (1893) 2 Ch.
413), 1710.
Bennett v. Bennett (L. R. 10 Ch. D.
476), 338, 331.
Bennett v. Bedford Bank (11 Mass. 421),
98, 103.
Bennett i>. Brundage (8 Minn. 432),
1099.
Bennett v. Camp (54 Vt. 36), 334,339.
Bennett v. Colley (5 Sim. 181; 2 Myl. &
K. 235), 1159, 1161, 1536, 1598.
Bennett v. Dollar Sav. Bank (87 Pa. St.
382), 503,525.
Bennett v. Davis (2 P. Wms. 318), 25,
180, 661, 686, 965, 976.
Bennett v. Dillingham (2 Dana, 436) , 675.
Bennett, Ex parte (18 Beav. 339) , 405.
Bennett, Ex parte (10 Ves. 381), 382, 383,
384,399,426, 606.
Bennett Female Sem. v. Whitney (46
Minn. 353; 49 ST. W. Rep. 58), lt-7.
Bennett v. Gaslight & Coke Co. (52 L.
J. Ch. 98), 1160,
Bennett v. Harper (36 W. Va. 546; 15 S.
E. Rep. 143), 496.
Bennetti). Honeywood (Amb. 208), 632,
1000, 1001.
Bennett d. Houldsworth (L. R. 6 Ch. D.
671) , 1529.
Bennetti). Judson (21 N. T. 138), 475, 476,
481.
Bennett v. Mayhew (1 Bro. Ch. 2.32; 2
Bro. Ch. 287), 325, 326.
Bennett d. Robinson (10 Watts, 348),
1043.
Bennett v. St. Louis Car Roofing Co. (19
Mo. App. 349), 411.
Bennett v. Shipley (82 Mo. 448), 676, 590.
Bennett v. Stanton (2 Ala. 181), 488.
Bennett i>. Union Bank (5Humph. 612),
1446.
Bennett v. Van Syckle (4 Duer, 462) 398.
Bennett v. Wilmington Star Co. (119
III. 9), 560.
Bennett ti. Wyndham (23 Beav. 521),
1526.
Bennetti). Wyndham (4 De G., F. & J.
259), 738,1781.
Benninger!). Cowin (2Zab. 257), 475.
Benson v. Benson (I P. Wms. 414), 881.
Benson v. Heathorn (1 T. & C. 325), 193
406, 411.
Benson D. Wright (4Md. Ch. 278), 111.
Bent!). Priest (10 Mo. App. 562), 1171.
Bentham v. Wittshire (4 Madd. 44)
1037.
Bentley v. Grifflu (5 Taunt. 356), 724.
Bentley v. McKay (15 Beav. 12), 155.
TABLE OF CASES.
xlv
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Bentleyti. Shrieve (4Md. Ch. 412), 950,
1058,1139.
Benton, Ire re (92 Iowa, 202; 60 N. W.
Rep. 614), 846.
Benyonu. Gollins (1 Bro. Oh. 186 n.; 2
Bro. Ch. 323), 1421.
Benyon v. Nettlesold (3 Macn. & G. 94),
560, 663.
Benzlen v. Lenoir (1 Car. L. R. 504),
432, 461.
Berdoe v. Dawson (34 Beav. 603), 286.
3eresford v. Armagh (13 Sim. 643), 657.
Bergen v. Bennett (1 Caines Oas. 1; 2
Am. Dec. 281), 392, 394, 927, 928, 1461,
1490, 1497.
Bergen v. Rennall (1 Caines Cas. 16),
1066.
Bergen v. Udall (31 Barb. 1), 283.
Bergengren v. Aldrich (139 Mass. 259),
987, 1028.
Bergerti. Clark (79Pa. St. 340), 710.
Bergern. Duff (4 Johns. Ch. 368), 1055,
1C88, 1243.
Bergh v. Wentz (73 Pa. St. 369), 525.
Berkhampstead School, Ex parte (2 V.
&B. 138), 782.
Berkley v. Ryder (2 Ves. 535), 1401.
Berley v. Taylor (5 Hill, 577), 88.
Bernal v. Bernal (3 Myl. & Cr. 559), 735.
Bernal v. Donegal (11 Ves. 46) , 842.
Bernard v. Minshall (1 Johns. 276), 123,
130.
Berneya. Sewell (1 J. & W. 649), 842.
Bernstein, Inre (3Redf. 20), 890.
Berrien v. McLane (1 Hoff. Ch. 428),
206, 423, 427.
Berrien v. Thomas (65 Ga. 61), 987, 1083,
1092.
Berrien's Estate (16 Abb. Pr. (N. S.)
23), 1345.
Berrisford v. Milward (2 Atk. 49), 542.
Berry v. Briant (2 Drew. &Sm. 1), 183.
Berry v. Catts (42 Me. 445), 1364.
Berry v. Norris (1 Drew. 302), 24, 73.
Berry v. Planters' Bank (3 Tenn. Ch.
69), 562.
Berry v. Skinner (30 Md. 567), 1451, 1460,
1461.
Berry v. Teel (12 R. I. 267), 710.
Berry v. Wiedman (40 W. Va. 36; 20 S.
E. Rep. 817), 344,347.
Berry v. Williamson (11 B. Mon. 251),
93.
Berryhill's Appeal (35 Pa. St. 245), 1598,
16J1, 1692.
Berryman v. Trustees (14 Bush, 755),
656.
Bertie v. Falkland (3 Ch. Cas. 129), 1043
Berwick v. Murray (7 De G , M. & G.
813), 1255.
Besant v. Wood (L. R. 12 Ch. D. 605),
719, 720, 725.
Besley, Estate of (18 Wis. 455), 857.
Best v. Campbell (62 Pa. St. 478), 364.
Best v. Stanford (1 Salk. 154), 299.
Bestor v. Wather (60 111. 138), 656.
Bethea v. McColl (5 Ala. 312), 1661, 1686,
1690.
Bethell v. Abraham (L. R. 17 Eq. 24; L.
R. 29 Ch. D. 889), 1204, 1205, 1206, 1528.
Bethune v. Dougherty (30 Ga. 70), 1394.
Bottle j). Wilson (14 Ohio, 257), 721.
Betta v. Betts (18 Ala. 688) , 787.
Betts v. Betts (4 Abb. N. Cas. 317), 1746.
Betts v. Sykes (82 Ala. 378), 573.
Betts v. Union Bank (1 Harr. & G. 175),
103.
Betts v. Woods (37 N. T. 317), 409.
Bevins v. Thayer (115 Mass. 89), 1503.
Bevisu. Berlin (63 Ind. 129), 1663.
Bibb v. Bunter (79 Ala. 351; 22 Cent. L.
J. 394) , 48, 197, 270, 313, 358.
Bibbi). Smith (1 Dana, 580), 151.
Blbby v. Thompson (32 Bear. 646). 183.
Bickel's Appeal (86 Pa. St. 204), 30H.
Bickfordu. Boston, etc. R. R. Co. (21
Pick. 109), 1736.
Bickleyj;. Guest (1R. &M. 440), 1067.
Bicknellu. Bicknell (31 Vt. 498), 601.
Bicknell v. Field (8 Paige, 440), 38.
Bicknell v. Gouch (3 Atk. 588), 1540.
Bidault v. Wales (20 Mo. 54C), 487.
Biddle v. Jackson (3 De G. & J. 544) , 674,
681.
Biddle v. Whitehill (135 U. S. 621), 1532.
Biddle's Appeal (80 Pa. St. 258), 111,960,
1068, 1673, 1684, 1688.
Biddle's Appeal (83 Pa. St. 340; 24 Am.
Rep. 183), 1699, 1703.
Biddle's Appeal (129 Pa. St. 26), 1696.
Bidwell v. Whitney (4 Minn. 76), 1466,
1468.
Bifleld v. Taylor (1 Beat. 91), 1731.
Bigelowti. Bigelow (6 Ham. 97), 461.
Bigelow v. Heaton (6 Hill. 43), 495.
Bigelow v. Stringer (40 Mo. 195), 1368.
Biggs v. Williams (66 ST. Car. 427), 1054.
Bigler v. Waller (14 Wall. 297), 1503.
Bigley v. Jones (114 Pa. St. 510), 197,
307, 320.
Bignold's Settlement, In re (L. R. 7 Ch.
223), 869, 901.
Bill v. Cureton (2 Myl. & K. 603), 273,
278.
Billagei). Souther (9 Hare, 540), 292,
294.
Blllinghursts. Vickers (1 Phillim. 187),
297.
Billings v. Clinton (6 S. Car. 90), 232,
858, 369.
xlvi
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-S47; Vol. II, pp. 848-1733.]
Billings v. Marsh (153 Mass. 311; 10 L.
E. A. 764), 973.
Billings v. Southie (9 Hare, 534), 426.
Billings v. Southie (10 Eng. L. & Eq.
37), 431.
Billingslea v. Moore (14 Ga. 370), 893.
Billlngton v. Welch (5 Binn. 132), 478.
Bills v. Bills (80 Iowa, 269), 139.
Bingamore*. Hyatt (1 Sm. & M. Oh.
437), 453.
Bingham v. Bingham (lVes. 126), 377.
Bingham v. Clanmorris (2 Moll. 253),
892.
Bingham v. Maxey (15 111 295), 455.
Bingham's Appeal (64 Pa. St. 345), 1011.
Binloni;. Stone (2 Freem. 169), 26, 27.
Binks v. Eokeby (2 Mad. 238), 1652.
Binney v. Plumley (5 Vt. 500; 26 Am.
Dec. 313), 958, 1053.
Binsse v. Paige (1 Abb. App. Dec. 139) ,
1711.
Biolley's Estate (1 Tuck. 422), 847.
Birch v. Blugrave (Amb. 202), 264.
Birch v. Cropper (2 De G. & S. 255), 900.
Birch v. Ellames (2 Anst. 427), 432.
Birch, In re (17 Beav. 358), 1046.
Birch v. Wade (3 V. & B. 198), 123, 627,
631, lOfiO.
Birchall, In re (L. E. 40 Ch. D.436), 888,
889.
Blrchardv. Scott (39 Conn. 63), 734, 756,
737, 770.
Bird, In re (L. E. 16 Eq. 203) , 1128.
Bird v. Graham (1 Ired. Eq. 196), 1538.
Bird v. Harris (L. E. 9 Eq. 204), 243, 244.
Bird i>. Johnson (18 Jux. 976), 1638.
Bird v. Mayberry (33 Beav. 351), 183.
Bird's Trusts, In re (L. E. 3 Ch. D. 214),
104.
Birdsalli). Cropsey (29 Neb. 679; 44 N.
W. Eep. 857), 570.
Bird^eye v. Butterfleld (34 Wis. 52),
474.
Birkett, In re (L. E. 9Ch. D. 576), 735.
Birksu. Micklewait (33 Beav. 409; 34 L.
J. Ch. 362), 1233, 1670.
Birmingham v. Kirwin (20 Sch. & Lef .
443), 1357.
Biscoe v. Jackson (L. K. 35 Ch. D. 460),
7G8.
Biscoo v. Perkins (IV. & B. 455), 920,
940.
Bishop v. Chamberlain (49 Hun, 133),
1402.
Bishop v . Curtis (17 Jur. 23), BG6.
Bishop v. Hart (28 Vt. 71), 1360.
Bishop v. rtalcomb (10 Conn. 444), 1117.
Bishop v. Houghton (1 E. D. Smith,
566), 1400, 1406.
Bishop v. Lcighton (2 Vern. 376), 872.
Bishop v. Little (3 Greenl. 405), 470.
Bishop v. Wall (L. E. 3 Ch. D. 194), 666,
697.
Bishop of Cloyne«. Toung (2 Ves. 61,)
174, 244, 260.
Bitter v. Calhoun (8 S. W. Rep. 523),
1454.
Bitzerw. Bobo (39 Minn. ,18; 38 K. W.
Eep. 609), 223. 307.
Bitzer v. Hahn (14 S. & E. 238), 840.
Bixler v. Taylor (3 B. Mon. 362), 880.
Bize v. Dixon (1 T. E. 2S5), 529.
Bizzell v. Mix (60 Ala. 281), 199.
Black v. Cavlness (2 Tex. Civ. App.
118; 21 S. W. Eep. 635), 203, 211.
Black v. Creighton (2 Moll. 554), 1570.
Black v. Jones (1 A. K. Marsh. 312),
543.
Black v. Scott (2 Brock. 326), 299.
Black v. Smith (4 MeArthur, 338), 1457.
Blackbornw. Edgerly (1 P. Wms. 600),
2S2.
Blackburne's Appeal (39 Pa. St. 160),
1400, 1402.
Blackburn v. Blackburn (110 ST. Car.
488), 852.
Blackburn v. Clark (85 Tenn. 506), 560.
Blackburn, Ex parte (1 J. & W. 297),
1016.
Blackburn v. Gregson (1 Bro. Ch. 420;
ICox Ch. 90), 571, 589.
Blackburn v. Stables (2 V. &B.369),
101, 107, 113, 114.
Blacket v. Langlands (Sel. Cas. Ch.
51; Gilb. 58), 438.
Blackie v. Clark (15 Beav. 600), 294, 426,
485.
Blackley v. Fowler (31 Cal. 326), 395.
Blacklow v. Lawes (2 Hare, 48), 656,
1085.
Blackman v. Striker (21 M. Y. Supl.
552), 1607.
Blackmore v. Shelby (6 Humph. 437),
290.
Blackstone Bank v. Davis (21 Pick. 43),
1638,1640.
Blackwell v. Barnett (52 Tex. 326), 1516.
Blackwood v. Burrows (2 Conn. &
Laws. 559), 10S0, 1102, 1596, 1597.
Blagge v. Miles (1 Story, 445), 1011.
Blagraveu. Blagrave (4 Excheq. 570),
923, 930, 942, 1268.
Blagrave v. Eouth (2 Kay & J. 509),
424.
Blair v. Bass (4 Blackf . 550), 353.
Blair v. Bromley (2 Phil. 239), 485, 1540.
Blair v. Nugent (9Ir. Eq. 400), 1536.
Blair v. Owles (1 Munf. 38), 443.
Blair v. Smith (114 Ind. 114), 14.
Blaisdell v. Fowle (120 Mass. 447), 5S2.
TABLE OF CASES.
xh
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp.
-1753.]
Blaisdell v. Stevens (16 Vt. 179), 995,
1108.
Blake v. Buffalo Creek R. E. Co. (56 N.
Y. 485), 1574.
Blake v. Banbury (1 Ves. Jr. 194; 4
Bro. Ch. 21), 955, 956, 1428, 1430.
Blakew. Collins (69 Me. 156), 852.
Blake v. Hall (67 N. H. 373), 708.
Blake v. Pegram (109 Mass. 541), 1689,
1708.
Blake v. Quash (3 McCord, 340), 984.
Blake v. Traders' Nat. Bank (145 Mass.
13; 12 N. E. Rep. 414), 1238.
Blakelyv. Brady (2 Dr. & W. 311), 153.
Blakely v. Calder (15 K. T. 617), 1066.
Blakeley's Appeal (7 Pa. St. 449), 1362.
Blakely's Appeal (66 Pa. St. 187), 562.
Blakemore v. Shelby (8 Humph. 439),
286.
Blakeslee v. Mobile Life Ins. Co. (57
Blakey, In re (33 Atl. Bep. 518), 995.
Ala. 205), 652, 665.
Blanchard v. Blanohard (4 Hun, 288),
168.
Blanchard v. Blood (2 Barb. 352), 651,
686.
Blanchard v. Chapman (22 111. App.
341), 123.
Blanchard, In re (3 De G., F. & J. 131),
869.
Blanchard v. McDougall (6 Wis. 167),
201.
Blanchard v. Tyler (12 Mich. 339), 441.
Blanchard v. VVaite (28 Me. 59), 1021,
1022.
Blanchet v. Foster (2 Ves. 264), 546, 551.
Bland v. Bland (14 S. W. Bep. 423),
1296, 1298.
Bland, Ex parte (2 Bose Cas. 91), 566.
Bland v. Lloyd (24 La. Ann. 603), 286.
Bland v. Tally (50 Ark. 76), 503.
Blaney v. Blaney (1 Cush. 107), 1150.
Blandford v. Fackerel (4 Bro. Ch. 394),
733.
Blank v. German (5 W. & S. 36), 1364.
Blann D.Bell (2 De G., M. & G. 775),
1166.
Blanton v. Mayes (58 Tex. 422), 1069,
1092.
Blasdell v. Locke (52 N". H. 238), 81, 83.
Blasdell v. Stevens (16 Vt. 179), 1583.
Blatch v. Wilder (1 Atk. 420), 180, 1033,
1036, 1072.
Blatchford v. Wooley (2 Dr. & Sm. 204),
1592.
Blauvelt v. Ackerman (20 N. J. Eq.
141), 1171, 1183, 1565, 1690, 1692, 1698.
Bledso v. Games (30 Mo. 448), 576.
Bleeker v. Bingham (3 Paige, 246),
105.
Blennerhassett v. Day (2 Ball & B. 104),
382,465,467,1540.
Blevins v. Rogers (32 Ark. 258), 574.
Blewitta. Thomas (2 Ves. Jr. 669), 1536,
Blight v. Ewlng (26 Pa. St. 135), 1067.
Blight v. Schneck (10 Pa. St. 285;51A:n.
Dec. 478), 1103, 1341.
Blini;. Hay (2 Tyler (Vt.) 304; 4 Am.
Dec. 738), 1122.
Blin v. Pierce (20 Vt. 25), 960.
Blinkhorne «. Feast (2 Ves. 30), 27, 243.
Bliss v. Am. Bible Soc. (2 Allen, 334),
748, 756, 759, 763, 775, 1667, 1678.
Bliss 13. Fosdick (24 N. Y. Supl. 939), 58.
Bliss v. Matteson (45 N. Y. 22), 409.
Bliss v. Pierce (20 Vt. 25), 29.
Blithe's Case (2 Freem. 92), 24.
Blockley u. Blockley (L. R. 29 Ch. D.
250), 1531.
Blockley v. Fowler (21 Cal. 326), 1490,
1491.
Blodgett v. Hildreth (103 Mass. 484), 51,
307,361.
Blogg v. Johnson (L. B. 2 Ch. 225), 1225.
Blood v. Kane (130 N. Y. 517), 977.
Bloom v. Nogle (4 Ohio St. 56), 226, 601.
Bloom v. Eensselaer (15 III. 505), 1443,
1444, 1497.
Bloom v. "Wolfe, (50 Iowa, 286), 1031,
1242.
Bloomar, In re (2 De G. & J. 88), 29.
Bloomer v. Waldron (3 Hill, 361), 1073,
1082.
Bloomfleldw. Eyre (8 Beav. 250), 603,
877.
Blore v. Sutton (3 Meriv. 237) , 622.
Blouin v. Phanenf (81 Me. 176), 52.
Blount v. Robeson (3 Jones Eq. 73) 15J7.
Blount v. Walker (31 S. Car. 13), 912,
916.
Blount v. Washington (108 N. C. 230; 12
S. E. Rep. 1008), 72, 149.
Bloxham v. Hooker (19 Fla. 163), 861.
Bloze, In re (1 Macn. & G. 488), 1490.
Blue v. Marshall (3 P. Wms. 381), 993,
1047, 1343.
Blue v. Patterson (1 Dev. & B. Eq. 457) ,
1538, 1720.
Blundell v. Blundell (L. R. 40 Ch. D.
370), 877.
Blundell, Inre (30 Beav. 360), 731.
Blunden v. Barker (1 P. Wms. 639; 10
Mod. 451), 282.
Blunn v. Roger (71 Tex. 668; 9 S. W.
Rep. 595), 313, 1558.
Blythe v. Easterling (20 Tex. 565), 832.
Blythe v. Fladgate (L. R. (1891), 1 Ch.
337), 877.
Boardman v. ^Etna Ins. Co. (128 U. S.
240), 652.
xlviii
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Boaidman ». Moaman (1 Bro. Cli. 68)
1235.
Board of Charities v. Kennedy (34 W.
N. 0. 83), 1306.
Board of Education v. Edson (18 Ohio
St. 221; 98 Am. Dec. 114), 756.
Board of Foreign Missions v. Culp (151
Pa. St. 467; 25 Atl. Eep. 117; 31 W. X.
C. 135), 731, 749.
Board of Supervisors v. Thompson (39
111.566), 1721.
Boarman v. Graves (23 Miss. 283), 102,
707.
Boatmen's Sav. Bank v. Collins (75 Mo.
280), 708.
Boaz v. Boaz (36 Ala. 334) , 905.
Bjbb v. Bobb (80 Mo. 411; 4 S. W. Eep.
511), 1728.
Bock v. Martin (11 N. Y. Supl. 569), 322.
Boddy v. Dawes (1 Keen, 362), S37.
Boddy v. Esdaille (1 Car. & P. 62), 972.
Bodeman v. American Tract Soc. (9
Allen, 445), 763.
Bodenham v. Hoskyns (2 De G., M. &
G. 903), 1634.
Bodine v. Edwards (10 Paige, 504), 373.
Bodingtonw. Castelli (1 Ell. &B1. 879),
972,975.
Bodman v. Vandenbendy (1 Vern. 179),
438.
Boeckler v. McGowan (9 Mo. App. 373),
708.
Boehlert v. McBride (48 Mo. 505), 1185.
Bogardus v. Trinity Church (4 Sand.
Ch. 758), 20.
Bogartv. Van Velsor (4 Edw. Ch. 718),
1228.
Bogert v. Halght (9 Paige, 297) , 1368 .
Bogertv. Hertell (4 Hill, 492), 250, 258,
262, 1037.
Boggs v. Alger (4 Rich. Eq. 408), 1216.
Boggs v. Eyder (4 Rich. Eq.. 408), 1213.
Boggs v. Varner (6 Watts & S. 469), 443,
444.
Bogle v. Bogle (3 Allen, 158), 974, 1675,
1676, 1679.
Boh anon i'. Strepsly (2 B. Mon. 433),
1537.
Bohart v. Atkinson (14 Ohio, 228), 390.
Sohmj. Bohm (9 Colo. 100), 426, 431,
503.
Bohon v. Barrett (79 Ky. 383), 118, 124,
130.
Bolaseau v. Boisseau (79 Va. 73), 828.
Boker v. Orookshank (1 Phila. 193),
1360.
Bold p. Hutchinson (5 De G., M. & G.
568), 104.
Bolland, Ex parte (L. II. 17 Eq. 115), 201,
653. ■>
Bolles v. Carll (12 Minn. 113), 1465.
Bolles v. Munnerlyn (83 Ga. 727), 659.
Bolles v. State Trust Co. (27 N. J. Eq.
30H),977.
Boiling v. Carter (9 Ala. 770), 452.
Bolton v.Bolton (3 Swanst. 414),146, 161.
Bolton v. Jenks (6 Rob. 166), 1066, 1067.
Bolton v. Johns (5 Barr, 145), 440.
Bolton v. Powell (14 Beav. 275), 1538.
Bolton v. Prentice (2 Str. 1214), 685.
Bolton v. Williams (14 Bro. Ch. 297; 2
Ves. Jr. 138), 693.
Bomar v. Gist (25 S. Car. 340), 1084.
Bomarv. Mullins (4 Rich Eq. 80), 1625.
Bond v. Barksdale 4 (Desaus. 526), 456,
1656.
Bond v. Bond (7 Allen, 1), 1248.
Bond v. Brown (1 Harp. Eq. 270), 465.
Bond v. Hays (12 Mass. 35), 529.
Bond v. Hopkins (1 Sch. & Let. 413),
467.
Bond V. Lockwood (33 111. 212,, 829, 1340.
Bond v. Ramsey (89 111. 29), 455.
Bond v. Ziegler (1 Ga. 324; 44 Am. Dee.
656), 455, 456, 1072, 1656.
Bond's Case (2 Ch. Cas. 165), 1529.
Boneti. Cooke (McClel. 168), 1230.
Bone v. Pollard (24 Beav. 288), 215, 320.
Bonham v. Newcomb (2 Vent. 365), 146.
Bonifant v. Greenfield (Cro. Eliz. 80),
894.
Bonithon v. Hockmore (1 Vern. 316),
330, 1683.
Bonnell v. Holl (87 111. 71), 574.
Bonner v. Bonner (17 Beav. 86), 682.
Bonner v. Holland (68 Ga. 718) , 1583.
Bonner v. Young (63 Ala. 35), 1533.
Bonney v. Redgard (1 Con. Ch. Cas.
145), 467.
Bonney v. Ridgard (1 Cox, 146; 1 Bro.
Ch. 130), 455, 1655, 1663.
Bonsall's Case (1 Rawle, 266), 828, 1582.
Bonsoru. Kinnear (2 Gifl. 195), 127, 627.
Booker v. Anderson (35 111. 66), 1110.
Booker v. Booker (32 Ala. 473) , 704.
Bool v. Mix (17 Wend. 119; 31 Am. Dec.
285), 11.
Boone v . Barnes (23 Miss. 136), 440, 595.
Boone v. Chiles (10 Pet. 177), 327, 388,
436,445,466, 523,1537.
Boone v. Citizens' Savings Bank (84 N.
Y. 83; 38 Am. Dec. 498), 1266.
Boone v. Clarke (3 Cranch C. C. 389),
1023.
Booraem v. Wells (19 N. J. Eq. 87),
1082, 1086.
Booth v. Ammerman (4 Bradf. 129),
1159, 1192, 1438.
Booth v. Baptist Church (120 N. Y. 215;
29 N. E. Rep. 238), 820.
TABLE OF CASES.
xlix
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.1
Booth v. Blundell (19 Ves. 52S), 1526.
Booth v. Booth (1 Bear. 125), 857, 884,
885, 1004, 1235, 1544, 1591.
Booth v. Carter (L. R. 3 Eq. 757), 732.
Booth v. Clark (17 How. 327), 34.
Booth v. Field (2 B. & Ad. 556), 937, 938.
Booth v. Grant (107 N. Car. 395), 1367.
Booth v. Purser (1 Ired. Eq. 37), 987.
Booth v. Viekars (1 Coll. 6), 638.
Booth v. Warrington (4 Bro. P. C. 163) ,
1540.
Bootle v. Blundell (1 Merlv. 193), 1324.
Boozer v. Teague (27 S. Car. 348; 3 S. E.
Rep. 651), 349, 369.
Borders. Conklln (77 Cal. 331), 503.
Borku. Martin (132 N. Y. 280; 30 N. E.
Eep. 684; 11 N". T. Supl. 569), 372,
1035.
Borstu. Corey (16 Barb. 136), 100.
Borst v. Nalle (28 Gratt. 423), 269.
Bosehetti v. Power (8 Beav. 98), 1570.
Bosio, Estate of (2 Ashm. 437), 1143.
Boskowitz v. Davis (12 Nev. 449), 197,
309, 313.
Bostocka. Blakeney (2 Bro. Ch. 653),
386, 1026, 1434.
Bostoek v. Floyer (L. R. 1 Eq. 28; 33
Beav. 603) , 949, 1056, 1193, 1194, 1257.
Boston Franklinite Co. v. Condit (19 N.
J. Eq. 394), 1038, 1089.
Boston, etc. Trust Co. v. Mixter (146
Mass. 100), 1094.
Bostwick, In re (4 Johns. Ch. 100), 841,
1563.
Bostwick v. Atkins (3 Comst. 53), 287,
1024.
Bostwick v. Dickson (65 Wis. 693), 1533.
Bosvil v. Brander (1 P. Wms. 459), 679.
Boswelli). Cunningham (32 Fla. 277;
13 So. Eep. 354), 192.
Boswellw. Dillon (6Ir. Eq. 389), 110.
Boswellw. Dillon (1 Dru. 291), 92, 96.
Bosworth, Inre (58 L. J. Ch. 432), 1191,
1567.
Boteler v. Allington (1 Bro. Ch. 72),
946, 1266.
Botsford v. Burr (2 Johns. Ch. 405),
197, 266, 269, 270, 307, 313, 816, 355, 862,
370, 371.
Bottomley v. Fairfax (IP. Wms. 331),
1346.
Bottorf v. Comner (1 Blackf. 287), 588.
Botts v. Ballman (1 Teates, 584), 984.
Boudinot v. Bradford (2 Dallas, 268),
246.
Boughton v. Boughton (1 Atk. 625), 273.
Boughton ». Lankley (1 Eq. Ca. Abr.
383;2Salk.679),938.
Bouldinw. Alexander (15 Wall. 131), 789,
792, 796.
Bouldln v. Reynolds (58 Md. 495), 24.
Boulton v. Beard (3 De G., M. & G. 608),
1118.
Boulton, Ex parte (1 De G. & J. 163),
111G.
Bound v. S. Car. Ry. Co. (50 Fed. Rep.
854), 996, 1120.
Bourlandc. Kipp (55 111. 376), 1451.
Bourne v. Bourne (2 Hare, 35), 300,302.
Bourne v. Mole (4 Beav. 177), 1571.
Boursett v. Savage (L. R. 2 Eq. 134),
327, 433.
Bovery v. Smith (1 Vera. 149), 432, 434,
445.
Bovey Lumber Co. v. Tucker (48 Minn.
223), 1513.
Bowditch v. Andiew (8 Allen, 339), 184,
1619, 1621, 1733, 1753.
Bowditch v. Banuelos (1 Gray,220), 864,
897,900, 901, 902,907.
Bowdoin College v. Merritt (54 Fed.
Rep. 55), 1643.
Bowe v. Arnold (31 Hun, 256), 1403.
Bowen v. Bowen (19 Mo. 399), 1338.
Bowen v. Chase (94 U. S. 912), 1638.
Bowen v. Hughes (5 Wash. St. 442; 32
Pae.Rep. 98;, 230.
Bowen v. Kirwan {temp. Sugd. 44; 3 V.
&B. 117), 480.
Bowen v. Warner (1 Pin. 600), 201.
Bowers' Appeal (68 Pa. St. 126) , 710.
Bowers v. City of Toronto (11 Moore,
P. C. Cas. 463), 412.
Bowers v Clark (Phill. 501), 722.
Bowers v. Evans (71 Wis. 133; 36 N. W.
Rep. 629), 1603.
Bowers v. Hechtman (45 Minn. 238),
1473.
Bowers v. Johnson (18 Miss. 169), 484.
Bowers v. Eeesecker (14 Iowa, 301),
964.
Bowers v. Matthews (4 Ired. Eq. 258),
111.
Bowers v. Oyster (3 Penr. & W. 239),
601.
Bowers v. Seeger (8 W. & S. 222), 1022,
1125.
Bowers v. Smith (10 Paige, 200), 106, 246,
1560.
Bowes v. East London Water Co. (Ja-
cobs, 324), 988, 1003, 1027.
Bowes v. Strathmore (2 Bro. Ch. 351 ».),
650.
Bowie v. Barry (3 Md. Ch. 359), 198.
Bowie v. Berry (1 Md. Ch. 452), 964.
Bowkerr. Hunter (IBro. Ch. 328), 245.
Bowkeru. Pierc<3 (130 Mass. 262), 1214,
1338,1691,169/.
Bowler v. Curler (21 Nev. 158; 26 Pac.
Rep. 226), 220.
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Bowles v. Bowles (80 Ky. 629), 1408.
Bowles v. Drayton (1 Desaus. 489), 1219.
Bowles v. Rogers (6 Ves. 95), 976.
Bowles j). Stewart (1 Sen. & Let. 209),
492,494,559.
Bowles v. Trapp (139 Ind. 55; 38 ST. E.
Bep. 406), 706.
Bowles v. Weeks (14 Sim. 691), 865, 866.
Bowling v. Stevens (2 Car. & P. 337),
475.
Bowman v. Ash (36111. App. 115), 1444,
1498, 1499.
Bowman v. Bates (2 Bibb, 47; 4 Am.
Dec. 677), 492, 493.
Bowman v. Pinkham (71 Me. 295), 1118.
Bowman v. Kaineteaux (1 Hoff. Ch.
150), 1402.
Bowman v. Wathen (1 How. 189), 463.
Bowman's Appeal (3 Watts, 369), 828,
1682.
Bowra v. Wright (4 De G. & S. 265), 26.
Boxu. Stanford (13 Sm. &M. 93; 51 Am.
Dec. 142), 234.
Boxford, etc. Soc. v. Harriman (126
Mass. 321), 734, 745.
Boyce v. Corbally (Plunkett, 102), 1014.
Boycet). Sikes (97Mo. 356), 852.
Boyce v. Stanton (15 Lea, 346), 377.
Boycot v. Colton (1 Atk. 553), 1529.
Boydw. Blankman (29 Oal. 19; 87 Am.
Dec. 146), 1184.
Boyd v. Brincken (65 Oal. 427), 388, 434.
Boyd v. Boyd (L. R. 4 Eq. 305), 1530,
1531, 1602.
Boyd v. Boyd (3 Gratt. 113), 1237.
Boydi). Ellis (11 Iowa, 97), 1444.
Boyd v. Hawkins (2 Dev. Eq. 329), 1689.
Boyd v. Hawkins (2 Bat. &Dev. Eq.
207), 383. 390, 414.
Boyd v. Hawkins (2Ired. Eq. 304), 1184.
Boyd v. Haynie (83 Tex. 7), 1369.
Boyd v. McLean (1 Johns. Ch. 582), 232,
265, 269, 307, 355, 358, 388, 533.
Boyden v. Moore (11 Pick. 362), 1362.
Boyd v. Oglesby (23 Gratt. 674), 1690.
Boyd's Sureties v. Ogleshy (23 Gratt.
674), 1344.
Boyer i>. Cockrell (3 Kan. 282), 452, 912.
Boyer Independent School District v.
King (45 N. W. Eep. 908), 1581.
Boyer v. LIbey (88 Ind. 235), 223, 308.
Boyes, Jure (L. B. 26 Ch. D. 531), 510,
613.
Boykin v. Ciples (2 Hill. Eq.200; 29 Am.
Dec. 67), 25, 61, 686.
Boynton v. Champlin (42 111. 57), 574.
Boynton v. Housler (73 Pa. St. 453), 525.
Boynton v. Hubbard (7 Mass. 112), 545,
517.
Boynton v. Reese (8 Pick. 329), 445.
Boynton v. Richardson (31Beav. 340),
1679.
Boynton v. Squires (85 Hun, 128; 32 N.
T. Supl. 467), 709.
Brabrook v. Boston Bank (104 Mass.
228), 81, 151, 153.
Brace v. Reid (3 Greene (Iowa), 422),
1736, 1738.
Brace v. Roney (18 111. 67), 263.
Bracken v. Miller (4 Watts & S. 102) ,
443, 1627.
Brackenbury v. Brackenbury (2 J. &
W. 391), 160.
Brackenridge v. Holland (2 Blackf.
377; 20 Am. Dec. 123), 383, 390, 391,
394, 401, 1178.
Bradbury v. Barding (36 Conn. 577), 473.
Bradby v. Whitchurch (W. N. (1868)
81), 994.
Bradford?). Belfleld (2 Sim. 264), 872,
980,996, 1005, 1018, 1244, 1451.
Bradford v. Bodfish (39 Iowa, 681), 834,
839.
Bradford v. Green way (17 Ala. 747; 52
Am. Dec. 203), 664, 704.
Bradford v. Harper (25 Ala. 337), 574.
Bradford v. Johnson (44 Tex. 381), 711.
Bradford!). King (18 R. I. 743; 31 Atl.
Rep. 166), 1449, 1451.
Bradford v. MeConihay (15 W. Va. 732) ,
1498.
Bradford v. Marvin (2 Pla. 41), 574.
Bradford!). Monks (132 Mass. 405), 1004.
Bradishi). Gibbs (3 Johns. Ch. 523), 24,
286, 651, 686, 72.
Bradley v. Bailey (64 N. W. Rep. 758),
1373.
Bradley v. Bischel (81 Iowa, 80), 1414.
Bradley v. Bosley (1 Barb. Ch. 152),
588.
Bradley v. Bradley (119 Mo. 68) , 359.
Bradley v. Chester Valley R. R. Co.
(36 Pa. St. 141), 1442, 1444, 1460, 1569.
Bradley v. Curtis (79 Ky . 327), 689.
Bradley v. Franklin Co. (65 Mo. 638),
1642.
Bradley v. Luce (99 111. 231), 1582.
Bradley v. McBride (1 Hill Ch. 387),
469.
Bradley v. Norton (33 Conn. 157), 1386.
Bradley v. Plexoto (3 Ves. 324), 1638.
Bradley v. Westcott (13 Ves. 445), 666,
697.
Bradner v. Faulkner (24 N. T. 472),
1438.
Bradshawv. Cruise (4 Heisk. 260), 987,
1176.
Bradshaw v. Ellis (2 Dev. & Bat. 20),
928.
Bradshaw v. Fane (3 Drew. 636), lf77.
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753."
Bradstreet v. Clark (12 Wend. 664),
1462.
Bradstreet v. Butterfield (129 Mass.
339), 898, 902.
Bradwell v. Weeks (1 Johns. Ch. 206),
42.
Bradwin v. Harper (Ambl. 374), 1732.
Brady v. Dilley (27Md.570), 959, 1057,
1673, 1689.
Brady v. Mayor of Brooklyn (1 Barb.
584), 1048.
Brady v. Parker (4 Ired. Eq. 430), 71.
Braiuan <i. Stiles (2 Pick. 460; 13 Am.
Dec. 445), 110, 178, 704, 1294, 1269, 1640.
Bramet. McGee (46 Ala. 170), 704.
Bramhalli>. Ferris (14 N. Y. 44; 67 Am.
Dec. 113), 184,702,1269, 1296,1297, 1638,
1640, 1746.
Branch v. Griffin (99 N. Car. 173; 6 S.
E. Eep. 393), 1614.
Branch Bank v. Steele (10 Ala. 195),
443.
Brandlyn v. Ord (1 Atk. 571), 438, 445.
Brandon v. Brandon (L. J. 31 Ch. 47),
978.
Brandon v. Brandon (3 Swanst.) 319)
633.
Brandon v. Carter (119 Mo. 572; 24 S.
W. Rep. 1035), 8S8, 890.
Brandon v. Robinson (18 Ves. 429), 667,
668, 1263, 1270, 1289, 1290, 1301, 1302, 1638,
1640, 1644.
Brandt v. Mickel (28 Md. 436) , 655.
Brandt's Appeal (8 Watts, 198), 1352.
Brannan v. Durkin (76 Md. 451; 25 Atl.
Rep. 481), 338.
Brannan v. Oliver (2 Stew. 47), 405.
Brannin v. Brannin (18 N. J. Eq. 212),
221,525.
Bras bridge v. Woodroffe (2 Atk. 69),
245.
Brasbeara. West (7 Pet. 608), 1117, 13S5.
Brassey v. Chalmers (4 De G., M. & G.
582; 16Beav.) 223), 1016, 1077.
Braswell v. Morehead (1 Busb. Eq. 26),
1437.
Brathwaite v. Brathwaite (1 Vern. 334),
1528.
Bratt v. Bratt (21 Md. 578), 576.
Brattle St. Church v. Grant (3 Gray,
143), 819, 1303.
Bratton v. Lowery (39 S. Car. 383; 17 S.
E. Rep. 832), 710.
Bratton v. Massey (15 S. Car. 277),
722.
Bratton v. Rogers (62 Miss. 281), 309.
Brantigam v. Escher (2 Dem. 269), 1667.
Bray v. Carter (115 N. Car. 16; 20 S. E.
Eep. 161), 709.
Bray v. West (9 Sim. 429), 892.
Braybrooke v. Inskip (3 Ves. 417), 897,
970, 1654.
Brazier v. Clark ( 5 Pick. 105), 979, 1239,
1240.
Breckenbach v. Wlnkhaus (67 How. Pr.
512), 1367.
Breckenridgev. Churchill(3 J. J. Marsh.
15), 462.
Breedon v. Breedon (1 Russ. & Myl.
416), 1665.
Breed's Will, In re (L. R. 1 Ch. D. 226),
1602.
Breen v. Gillett (115 N. T. 10; 12 Am.
Dec. 764), 1122.
Breit v. Yeaton (101 111. 242), 1507, 1532.
Brendel v. German Ref. Cong. (33 Pa.
St. 415), 749.
Brennan v. Wilson (71 N". Y. 502; 4 Abb.
N. C. 279), 1021, 1394, 1750.
Brennan v. Winkler (37 S. Car. 457; 16
S. E. Eep. 190), 750.
Brent v. Bank of Washington (10 Pet.
596), 1423.
Brereton v. Brereton (2 Ves. 87), 995,
997, 1005.
Bresnihan v. Sheehan (125 Mass. 11),
530.
Bressleru. Kent (61111. 426), 10,665.
Breton's Estate, In re (L. R. 17 Ch. D.
416), 70.
Brett v. Forcer (3 Atk. 403), 682.
Brettell, Ex parte (6 Ves. 576), 970.
Brevard v. Neily (2 Sneed, 164), 1394.
Brewer v. Boston Theater (104 Mass.
378), 478, 698.
Brewer v. Hardy (22 Pick. 376; 33 Am.
Dec. 747), 910.
Brewer v. Swirles (2 Sm. & Gif. 219),
1223, 1592.
Brewer v. University (110 N. Car. 26; 14
S. E. Rep. 644), 734,753.
Brewer v. Winchester (2 Allen, 389),
1460.
Brewster jj. Galloway (4 Lea, 558), 1171.
Brewster v. McCall (15 Conn. 274),
747.
Brewster v. Power (10 Paige, 562), 373.
Brewster v. Striker (1 E. D. Smith, 321),
922, 1267.
Brewster v. Striker (2 N. Y. 19), 917, 919,
927, 937, 941.
Brico!;. Stokes (11 Ves. 324), 1005, 1127,
1217, 1218, 1233, 1234, 1248, 1543, 1591.
Brickell v. Batchelder (62 Cal. 623), 1515.
Brickell v. Earley (115 Pa. St. 473), 271,
368.
Brickenden v. Williams (L. R. 7 Eq.
310), 620, 999.
Brickenkamp v. Rees (69 Mo. 426), 1096,
1455.
Hi
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages : Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Bridenbecker v. Lowell (32 Barb. 10),
333.
Bridget. Abbott (3 Bro. Ch. 224), S38.
Bridge v. Bridge (16Beav. 315), 88, 152,
155.
Bridge v. Beadon (L. R. 3 Eq. 664), 1117.
Bridge v. Brown (2 Y. & C. 181), 832, 841,
1025, 1154.
Bridge v. Ward (35 Wis. 687), 1298.
Bridgem. Biee (1 J. &W.74), 947.
Bridgersa. Howell (27 S. Car. 425), 14,
354.
Bridges v. Hindes (16 Md. 101), 1364.
Bridges v. Longman (24 Beav. 27), 1074,
1446.
Bridges v. Wood (4 Dana, 610), 655.
Bridgman, In re (1 Dr. &Sm. 164), 868.
Bridgman v. QUI (24 Beav. 302), 823,
1591.
Bridgman v. Green (2 Ves. 627), 158, 277,
292, 506.
Bridgman v. Prince (33 Me. 174) , 1049.
Briers v. Hackney (6 Ga. 419), 1594, 1598.
Brier, In re (L. E. 26 Ch. D. 238), 949,
1340, 1341.
Briggs ji. Briggs (135 Mass. 306), 1488,
1506.
Brlggs v. Davis (20 N. T. 15; 75 Am.
Dec. 363), 1105.
Briggs v. Dorr (19 Johns. 95), 1049.
Briggs v. French (1 Sumn. 504), 38.
Briggs v. Holcombe (3 Bich. Eq. 15),
1690.
Briggs v. Jones (L. B. 10 Eq. 92), 600.
Briggs v. Lifeboats (11 Allen, 157), 17.
Briggs v. Penny (3 De G. & Sm. 525),
143, 254, 851.
Briggs v. Penny (3 Macn. &G. 646), 62,
125, 128.
Briggs v. Sharp (L. E. 20 Eq. 317), 180.
Bright v. Boyd (1 Story, 478) , 607, 608.
Bright v. Bright (8B.Mon. 197), 148.
Brightu. Knight (35W. Va. 40; 13 S. E.
Bep. 63), 370,502.
Bright u. Larcher (3 De G. & J. 148),
1355.
Bright v. Ligerton (2 De G., F. & J.
606), 1544,1596.
Bright v. North (2 Ph. 220), 988.
Brill v. Wright (112 ST. Y. 129), 1354.
Brinckerhofl v. Lansing (4 Johns. Ch.
64), 496.
Brinckerhofl v. Vansciven (4 N. J. Eq.
251), 676.
Brinckerhofl v. Wemple (1 Wend. 470),
1266.
Bringhurst v. Cuthbert (6 BInn. 398),
943, 956.
Brinkleyti. Willis (22 Ark. 1), 1537.
Brlnkman v. Jones (44 Wis. 498), 450.
Brinsden v. Williams (8 Rep. 574;
(1894), 3 Ch. 185), 426.
Brlntonn. Lulham (53 L. T. (N. S.) 9),
1161.
Brinton's Estate (10 Pa. St. 408), 1679.
Brisbane «. Stoughton (17 Ohio, 482),
1515.
Briscoe v. Briscoe (7 Ir. Eq. 129), 104.
Brison i>. Brison (75 Cal. 525; 7 Am. St.
Rep. 189), 232, 269, 600, 518.
Brison v. Brison (90 Cal. 823; 27 Pac.
Rep. 186), 220, 862.
Brlsson v. Brisson (27 Cal. 186), 25.
Bristol n. Bristol (53 Conn. 242), 747.
Bristol v. Hungerford (2 Vern. 645), 243.
Bristom. Bristor (101 Ind. 47), 667.
Bristorw. Tasker (135 Pa. St. 110), 159.
Bristow v. Lane (21 111. 194), 76.
Bristow v. McCall (16 S. Car. 645), 912.
Bristow v. Skirrow (L. R. 10 Eq. 1),620,
999.
British Bank Co. v. Charnwood Ry. Co.
(L. R. 18 Q. B. D. 715), 484.
British Museum v. White (2 Sim. & St.
594), 734, 737.
Brittlebanku. Goodwin (L. R. 5 Eq.
545), 1257, 1536.
Britton v. Johnson (2 Hill Ch. 430),
406.
Britton v. Lewis (8 Rich. Eq. 271), 396.
Britton v. Lorenz (45 N. Y. 52; 3 Daly,
23), 1362.
Broach v. Smith (75 Ga. 159), 578.
Broad v. Bevan (1 Buss. 511), 119.
Broadbent v. Barrow (L. R. 29 Ch. D.
660) , 768.
Broadhurst v. Balguy (1 Y. & C. Ch.
16),1C05, 1217, 1598.
Broadman v. iKtna Ins. Co. (128 U. S.
240_), 647.
Broadrupn. Woodman (27 Ohio St. 653),
46, 61.
Broadway Nat.Bk. v. Adams (133 Mass.
170), 156, 1270, 1273, 1293, 1637, 1644.
Brock v. Barnes (40 Barb. 621), 286, 419.
Brock v. Brock (90 Ala. 86; 8 So. Rep.
11), 145,234.
Brock v. Phillips (2 Wash. 68), 455.
Brocken v. Miller (4 W. & S. 102), 445.
Brodern. Conklin (77 Cal. 330; 19 Pac.
Rep. 513), 1731, 1738.
Broderick v. Broderick (1 P. Wms. 239),
282,491,494.
Broderick v. Waltham, etc. Bank (109
Mass. 149) , 1634.
Brodleu. Barrie (3Meriv. 696), 842.
Brogden, In re (L. R. 38 Ch. D. 546),
1115,1335,1342.
Bromfleld, Ex ~>arte (1 Bro. Ch. 516),
828.
TABLE OP CASES.
liii
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.;
Bromfleld, Ex parte (1 Ves. Jr. 453), 299.
Brouson e. Kinsie (1 How. 321), 1442.
Bronson e. Wanzer (86 Mo. 408), 576.
Brooke. Badley (L. E. 2 Ch. App. 672),
256.
Brook e. Bradley (L. B. 4 Bq. 106), 813.
Brook e. Brook (3 Sm. & G. 280), 167,
614.
Brook e. Chappell (34 Wis. 405), 517.
Brooke e. Brooke (25 Beav. 342), 11, 656,
716.
Brooke e. Berry (2 Gill, 83), 484.
Brooke e. Bulksley (2 Ves. 498), 432, 434,
595.
Brookings e. White (49 Me. 479), 706.
Brookman e. Hales (2 V. &B. 45), 258,
399.
Brooks e. Brooks (1 Beav. 531), 26.
Brooks e. Hatch (6 Leigh, 534), 34.
Brooks e. Haynes )L. E. 6 Eq. 25), 861.
884.
Brooks e. Jones (11 Met. 84), 922, 941.
Brooks e. Marbury (11 Wheat. 78), 1318,
1329, 1381,1383,1394.
Brooks e. Martin (2 Wall. 70), 185, 663.
Brooks v. Nichols (17 Mich. 38), 1385.
Brooks e. Shelton (54 Miss. 353), 309.
Brooksbank e. Smith (2 Y. & C. 58),
470.
Brophy e. Belamy (L. E. 8 Ch. 798), 831,
1008,1119.
Brothers e. Brothers (7 Ired. 150), 390,
1184.
Brothers v. Porter (6 B. Mon. 106), 216,
217.
Brotherton e. Hult (2 Vern. 574), 443.
Brotherton e. Weathersby (73 Tex.
471), 47.
Brouard e . Dumaresque (3 Moo. P. C.
457), 1484.
Brougham e. Poulett (19 Beav. 119),
857.
Broughton v. Lane (113 N. Car. 16; 18
S. JE. Eep. 85), 696.
Brower e. Buxton (101 N. Car. 419),
1467.
Brower v. Callender (105 U. S. 88), 904.
Brower e. WItmeyer (121 Ind. 83), 574.
Brown, In re (L. E.23 Ch. D. 889), 948.
Brown, In re (L. E. 10 Eq. 349) , 1013.
Brown, In re (45 Mich. 326), 1287.
Brown e. Bamford (11 Sim. 131), 669.
Brown e. Bontee (10 Sm. &M. 26S), 977.
Brown e. Brabb (67 Mich. 17), 1409.
Browne. Brown (L. E. 29 Ch. D. 88C),
1204.
Brown e. Brown (31 Gratt. 502), 101.
Brown v. Brown (154 111. 35; 39 K". B.
Eep. 983), 429.
Brown e. Brown (12 Md. 87), 107, 851.
Brown e. Brown (L. R. 3 P. & M. 202),
726.
Brown e. Brown (86 Tenn. 277; 6 S. W.
Eep. 869), 1523.
Brown e. Brown (3 T. & C. 395), 907.
Brown e. Buckton (2 Sim. (N. S.) 91) ,
1526.
Brown v. Burbank (64 Cal. 99), 287.
Brown v. Carter (111 N. Car. 183) , 139.
Brown e. Castles (11 Cush. 348), 477, 481,
489.
Brown v. Cave (23 S. Car. 251), 313.
Browne. Chamberlain (9Fla. 464), 1362.
Brown e. Cheney (59 Barb. 628), 307.
Brown e. Cherry (56 Barb. 635 ; 38 How.
Pr. 352; 38 Am. Dec. 433), 1054.
Browne. Clark (3 Ves. 166), 665,678.
Brown e. Combs (29 N. J. Eq. 36), 51,52.
Brown v. Concord (33 ST. H. 286), 749.
Brown e. County of Buena Vista (5
Otto), 161,464.
Brown e. Cowell (116 Mass. 461), 1172,
1178, 1181, 1184.
Brown v. Curry (19 Ala. 805), 1427.
Brown v. De Tastet (Jacobs, 296), 194,
196, 1710, 1713.
Brown v. Dwelly (45 Me. 52), 414.
Brown v. Dysinger (1 Eawle, 408), 525.
Brown v. East (5 Mon. 405), 586.
Brown v. Elton (2 P. Wms. 202), 678.
Brown v . Terrell (83 Ey. 417), 570.
Brown v. Foote (2 Tenn. Ch. 255), 653,
666,671.
Browne. French (125 Mass. 410; 28 Am.
Eep. 254), 1200, 1214.
Brown v. Gelatley (L. E. 2 Ch. App.
751), 1437.
Brown v. Gilman (4 Wheat. 255), 241.
Brown v. Goodyear (88 Ind. 672), 495.
Brown v. Guthrie (27 Tex. 610), 364,1367.
Browne. Harris (25 Barb. 136), 944.
Brown e. Harris (7 Tex. Civ. App. 664;
27 S. W. Eep. 45), 1035, 1264.
Brown v. Hartford Ins. Co. (11 Law
Eep. (N. S.), 926), 1030.
Brown e. Heathcote (1 Atk. 160), 1408.
Browne. Higgs (4 Ves. 708; 7 Ves. 279;
8 Ves. 570), 34, 130, 165, 258, 613, 620,
627, 637, 643, 893, 997, 998, 1000, 1106.
Brown e. Hobson (3 A. E. Marsh. 381),
1040.
Brown v. How (Barn. 354), 1559.
Brown e. Humnel (6 Pa. St. 86), 781.
Brown e. Johnson (17 Ala. 241), 654, 655.
Brown e. Jones (1 Atk. 158), 240.
Browne. Eelsey (3 Cush. 243), 755, 763.
Browne. Kennedy (33 Beav. 133), 419.
Brown e. Knox (6 Mo. 3( 2), 1369.
Brown e. Lake Superior Iron Co. (134
U. S. 530), 660.
liv
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Brown e. Lambert (33 Gratt. 263), 328,
987, 1257.
Brown e. Leads (107 Mass. 364), 489.
Browne. Litton (1 P. Wms. 140), 196,
1683, 1710, 1713.
Brown e. Lynch (1 Paige, 147), 219, 510,
625.
Brown e. Lyon (17 Ala. 659), 1318, 1369.
Brown e. McDonald (1 Hill Ch. 297),
Brown v. Meeting St. Baptist Soc. (9
E. I. 171), 787.
Brown v. Meigs (11 Hun, 203), 1012.
Brown v. Miller (63 Mich. 413), 721.
Brown v. Minturn (2 Gall. 657), 1380,
1383.
Brown e. Montgomery (20 N. Y. 287; 75
Am. Dec. 404), 492, 494.
Brown v. Mulling (24 Miss. 209), 836.
Browne. Oakshott (12 Beav. 252), 1564,
1567.
Brown e. Panooast (34 N. J. Eq. 324),
734, 749, 755.
Brown e. Payne (Sty. 147), 860.
Brown e. Petney (3 111. 468) , 359.
Browne. Pocock (2 R. & M. 210; 5 Sim.
663), 649.
Browne. Pocock (6 Sim. 257), 167, 614,
624, 1000.
Brown e. Ramsden (3 Moore, 612), 919.
Brown v. Kicketts (4 Johns. Ch. 303),
1255.
Brown e. Sansome (1 Macn. & G. 327),
1255.
Brown e. Sansome (1 McClel. & T. 427),
1219.
Brown e. Savage (4 Drew. 635; 5 Jur.
1020), 1181, 1182.
Brown e. Selwin (Oas. t. Talb. 240), 247,
693.
Brown e. Simpson (4 Kan. 76), 578.
Brown v. Smith (116 Mass. 108), 1503.
Brown v. Stead (5 Sim. 535), 978.
Brown e. Stoughton (14 Sim. 369), 820.
Brown e. Strait (19 111. 89), 76.
Brown e. Temperly (3 Russ. 263), 837.
Brown e. Terrell (83 Ky. 417), 575.
Brown e. Thompson (31 S. Car. 436),
688.
Brown e. Turner (113 Mo. 27; 20 S. W.
Rep. 660), 341.
Browne. Vanlier (7 Humph. 239), 577.
Brown e. Volkening (64 K. Y. 76),
449.
Brown e. Whiteway (8 Hare, 156)), 923,
924,930,942, 1268.
Brown e. Williamson (36 Pa. St. 338),
921, 1288, 1296, 1610.
Brown v. Wright (39 Ga. 96), 1214.
Brown e. Wright (4 Yerg. 57), 1721.
Brown & Manzanares Co. e. Sampson
(44111. App. 308), 706.
Browne e. Bedford (4Dem. 304), 832.
Browne e. Browne (J Harr. & J. 430),
617.
Browne e. Cavendish (1 Jon. & La. 637),
153, 1379.
Browne e. Doane (86 Ga. 32; 12 S. E.
Rep. 179), 501.
Brownell e. Stoddard (42 Neb. 177; 60
N. W. Rep. 380), 336.
Browning v. Hart (6 Barb. 91), 1390.
Browning e. Headley (2 Rob. 342), 678.
Browning e. Pumphrey (SI Tes. 163;
l&S. W. Rep. 870), 268.
Brown's Trusts, Inre (L. R. 5 Eq. 88),
1117.
Brownson v, Roberts (5 Redf. 676), 1697.
Broyles v. Nowlin (59 Tenn. 19;), 204,
388, 402, 533.
Brubakere. Huber (13 Pa. Co. Ct. 78),
1289.
Bruce e. Lorillard (62 Hun, 416), 1687.
Bruce e. Roney (18 111. 67), 308.
Bruce v. Rogers (8 Sen. & Let 395), 480.
Bruce v. Tilson (25 N. Y. 197), 1667.
Bruch e. Lantz (2 Rawle, 392; 21 Am.
Dec. 458), 392, 1178, 1633.
Brudenell e. Boughton (2 Atk. 272), 139,
1355.
Bruene. Gillett (115 N. Y. 10; 12 Am.
St. Rep. 764; 4 L. R. A. 529), 1230,
1235.
Bruin e. Knott (1 PhiU. 572), 834.
Brummel e. McPherson (5 Russ. 264),
40.
Brumnete. Weaver (2 Ore. 168), 710.
Brundage e. Deardorf (55 Fed. Rep.
839), 798.
Brandy v. Mayfleld (15 Mont. 201; 38
Pac. Rep. 1067), 186.
Brune e. Martyn (8 B. & Cr. 497), 926,
942.
Brunnenmeyer v. Buhre (32 111. 183), 782,
796,1722.
Brunsden e. Woolredge (Amb. 507),
166,637,641.
Brunskille. Caird (L. R. 16 Eq. 493),
1118, 1154.
Brunson e. Henry (140 Ind. 455; 39 N.
E. Rep. 256), 178.
Brunson v. Hunter (2 Hill Ch. 490), 128,
130.
Brush v. Blanchard (19 111. 31), 957.
Brush e. Kinsley (14 Ohio 20) , 577.
Brush v. Scribner (11 Oonn. 388), 439.
Brush v. Ware (15 Pet. 93), 454.
Bruyere v. Pemberton (12 Ves. 386), 387.
Bryan e. Bradley (10 Conn. 474), 910.
Bryan e. Duncan (11 Ga. 67), 1178.
TABLE OF CASES.
lv
[The references are to pages : Vol. 1, pp. 1-847 ; Vol . II, pp . 848-1753.]
Bryan, In re (L. R. 14 Ch. D. 516), 675.
Bryan v. McNaughton (38 Kan. 98), 418.
Bryan v. Milby (6 Del. Ch. 208; 24 Atl.
Rep. 333), 125.
Bryan v. Primm (IBreese, 33), 473.
Bryan v. Reynolds (5 Wis. 200), 555.
Bryant;. Weems (29 Ala. 423; 65 Am.
Dec. 405), 922, 923, 925,931, 941,1268.
Bryant v. Craig (12 Ala. 354), 1214.
Bryant v. Duncan (11 Ga. 67), 656.
Bryant v. Hendricks (5 Iowa, 256), 309.
Bryant v. Packett (3Hayw. 252), 461.
Bryant v. Russell (23 Pick. 540), 1120,
1331.
Bryant v. Thompson (59 N. Y. 545), 1746.
Bryant v. Thompson (128 ST. Y. 426),
1746.
Brydges v. Phillips (6 Ves. 570), 1322.
Brydgesu. Watton (IV. & B. 134), 893.
Bryn v. Godfrey (4 Ves. 10), 506.
Buchan v. Sumner (2 Barb. Ch. 169),
567.
Buchanan v. Buchanan (38 S. Car. 410;
17 S. E. Rep. 218), 523.
Buchanans. Deshon (1 Har. & G. 280),
28.
Buchanan j>. Hamilton (5 Ves. 722), 9,
900,904,1575.
Buchanan v. Harrison (1 J. & H. 662),
256, 978.
Buchanan v. Hart (31 Tex. 647), 906.
Buchanans. Turner (26 Md. 1),664.
Buck v. Ashbrook (59 Mo. 200), 681.
Buck v. Paine (50 Miss. 648) , 450.
Buckt>. Pike (11 Me. 9), 307,370.
Buck v. Swazey (36 Me. 41), 315, 369.
Buck v. Uhrich (16 Pa. St. 499), 334.
Buckeridge v. Glasse (1 Cr. & P. 126),
326,880,905, 1591,1598.
Buckfordc. Wade (17Ves. 97), 364.
Buckhout w. Hunt (16 How. Pr. 407),
1334.
Buckinghamshire?;. Drury (2 Eden, 60),
12, 27.
Buckinghamshire v. Hobart (3 Swanst.
199), 978.
Buckland v. Conway (16 Mass. 393),
1048.
Buckle v. Levy (70 Cal. 250), 704.
Buckles v. Lafferty (2 Rob. 292), 400.
Buckley v. Buckley (11 Barb. 43), 1355.
Buckley v. Royal Nat. Lifeboat Inst.
(L. R. 41 Ch. D. 168; L. R. 43 Ch. D.
27), 813.
Buckley v. Wells (33 N. T. 518), 687, 688.
Buckley v. Wheeler (52 Mich. 1), 14.
Buckley v. Wilford (2 CI. & Pin. 102),
419, 420, 508.
Buckley's Appeal (35 W. N. C. 105\
1303, 1304.
Buekner v. Coldecott (28 Miss. 575),
1537.
Buckworth v. Buckworth (1 Cox, 80),
834, 1561, 1563.
Budd v. Busti (1 Harr. 69), 579.
Budd v. Hiler (27 N. J. L. 43), 899, 1054.
Budge v. Gnmmow (L. R. 7 Ch. App.
720), 947,949,1137,1250'.
Buel v. YeWerton (L. R. 13 Eq. 131),
894.
Buell v. Buckingham (16 Iowa, 284),
411, 1178, 1411.
Buell v. Underwood (65 Ala. 285), 1451.
Buettner v. Frazer (1U0 Mich. 179; 58
N. W. Rep. 834), 797.
Buffalo County, etc. Bank v. Sharpe
(40 Neb. 123; 58 N. W. Rep. 734), 708.
Buffalo R. R. Co. v. Lampson (47 Barb.
533), 374.
Buffalow v. Buffalow (5 Dev. & Bat.
Eq. 241), 425.
Buffjrc. Bradford (2 Atk. 220), 245.
Buford w. Caldwell (3 Mo. 477), 484.
Buford v. Guthrie (14 Bush, 677), 1178,
1639.
Buford v. McKee (1 Dana, 107), 150, 153.
Bugden v. Tylee (21 Beav. 545), 1564,
1566.
Buggins v. Yates (9 Mod. 122), 125, 242.
Bulkley v. De Peyster (26 Wend. 21),
877.
Bulkley v. Eglinton (19 Jur. 994), 900.
Bulkley v. Whitcomb (121 N. Y. 107),
412.
Bulkley v. Wilford (2 CI. & Fin. 177; 8
Bligh, 111), 419, 511, 513, 514.
Bull v. Bull (8 Conn. 47; 20 Am. Dec.
86), 130, 131, 747, 1000, 1320.
Bull v. Coe (77 Cal. 54; 11 Am. St. Rep.
235), 704.
Bull K.Harris (18 B. Mon. 195), 1415.
Bull, lure (45Barb. 334), 1038.
Bull v. Kentucky Nat. Bank (14 S. W.
Rep. 425), 1298.
Bullard v. Attorney-General (153 Mass.
249), 1060, 1132.
Bullard v. Chandler (149 Mass. 532; 14
Am. St. Rep. 442), 748, 1060.
Bullard v. Goffe (20 Pick. 252), 912.
Bullard v. Town of Shirley (153 Mass.
659), 731.
Bullock v. Grimstead (95 Ky. 261; 24 S.
W. Rep. 867), 706.
Bullock?;. Stones (2 Ves. 521), 838.
Bullpin v. Clark (17 Ves. 365), 693, 697.
Bulmeru. Hunter (L. J. 38 Ch. 543), 98.
Bulweru. Astley (lPh. 422), 1435.
Bumgarner v. Coggswell (49 Mo. 259),
1126.
Bumpus v. Bumpus (59 Mich. 95), 560.
lvi
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Bumpus v. Platner (1 Johns. Ch. 213),
445.
Bunbury v. Bunbury (1 Beav. 318), 36.
Bundy v. Bundy (38 N. Y. 410), 31.
Bundy v. Cocke (128 U. S. 188), 660.
Bunn v. Todd (115 N. Oar. 138; 20 S. E.
Eep. 869), 205.
Bunn v. Vaughn (5 Abb. Pr. (N. S.)
271), 944.
Bunn v. Winthrop (1 Johns. Ch. 329),
76,105,152,159, 160,
Bunnell v. Witberow (29 Ind. 123), 552.
Bunner v. Storm (1 Sandf. Ch. 357),
1092.
Buntin v. French (16 N. H. 592), 579.
Bunting v. Sargent (L. E. 13 Ch. D.
330), 813.
Bunton v. King (80 Iowa, 506; 45 N. W.
Eep. 1050), 1629.
Burbank v. Burbank (152 Mass. 254),
748.
Burbank v. Whitney (24 Pick. 146; 35
Am. Dec. 312), 21, 22, 748, 812, 924.
Burchw. Breckenridge (16B. Mon. 482;
63 Am. Dec. 553), 664, 698, 700.
Burchi;. Burch (19 Ga. 174), 861.
Burchardu. Dunbar (82 111. 453), 699.
Burden v. Amperse (14 Mich. 91; 90 Am.
Dec. 225), 707, 713.
Burdett v. Spilsbury (6 Man . & G. 386) ,
1009.
Burdgeu. Bolin (106 Ind. 176), 14.
Burdick v. Garrlck (L. K. 5 Ch. 241),
1255, 1257.
Burdick v. Goddard (11 E. I. 516),
908.
Burdon v. Burdon (1 Ves. & B. 170), 1710.
Buren v . B uren (79 Mo . 538) , 335 .
Burford v. Lenthal (2 Atk. 551) , 742.
Burgesu. Greene (64 Ala. 509), 573.
Burgess v. Burgess (1 Coll. 367), 694.
Burgess v. Buggies (146 111. 506) , 1512.
Burgess v. Wheate (1 Eden, 223), 3, 16,
41, 42, 263 264, 298, 432, 966, 1277, 1572.
Burgin v. Burgin (1 Ired. Law, 453),
1368.
Burham v. James (1 Speer Eq. 375),
1537.
Burkart v. Bucher (2 Binn. 465), 454.
Burke D.Adair (23 W. Va. 139), 1093,
1509.
Burke v. Andrews (91 Ala. 360; 8 So.
Ecip. 369), 239.
Burke, Ex parte (4 Sandf. Ch. 617), 831,
1561.
Burke v. Jones (2 V. & B. 275), 11G0,
1347.
Burke o. Eoper (79 Ala. 142), 733,749.
Burke v. Valentine (52 Barb. 412), 928,
940.
Burke's Estate (1 Par. Sel. Cas. 470),
1381.
Burkleji. Leary (70 Cal. 250), 1542.
Burks v. Burks (7 Bast. 353), 204, 309,
388, 534.
Burleigh v. Clough (52 N. H. 267), 106,
108, 926.
Burleigh v. White (64 Me. 23), 340.
Burley v. Russell (ION. H. 184), 3S1.
Burling v. Newlands (112 Cal. 476; 44
Pac. Eep. 810), 1567.
Burlingame v. Hobbs (12 Gray, 367),
1724.
Burmeaterw. Norris (6 Exc. 796), 1032.
Burnt. Carvalho(4Myl. & Cr. 690), 34,
88.
Burnaby v. Griffin (3 Ves. 206), 102.
Burnetts. Deniston (5 Johns. Ch. 15),
1479.
Burnett v. Hawpe (25 Gratt. 481), 667,
711.
Burnett v. Whitehead (2 P. Wms. 645),
603.
Burneyp. McDonald (15 Sim. 6), 41, 42,
43.
Burnham v. Barth (89 Wis. 362), 1605,
1607.
Burnham v. San Francisco Fuse Mnfg.
Co. (76 Cal. 26), 660.
Burns v. Dawson (66 Ala. 476), 704.
Burns v. Middleton (104 111. 411), 1498,
1499.
Burns v. Eoss (71 Tex. 516; 9 S. W. Eep.
468), 309.
Burns v. Taylor (23 Ala. 255), 574.
Burnes v. Thayer (115 Mass. 89), 1491.
Burnsidew. Wayman (49 Mo. 356), 155,
1852.
Burr v. Barden (61 111. 389), 1490, 1492.
Burr v. Bigler (16 Abb. Pr. 177), 960, 959,
1139.
Burri>. Carbondale (76111. 455), 1542.
Burr v. McDonald (3 Gratt. 215), 1411.
Burru. McEwen (Baldw. 164), 959, 1029,
1057, 1138, 1139, 1157.
Burr v. Sherwood (3 Bradf . 86) , 680.
Burr v. Sim (1 Whart. 252), 262, 927, 928,
940, 1013, 1087.
Burr v. Smith (7 Vt. 241), 744, 750, 762,
776.
Burrell v. Egremont (6 Beav. 205), 979.
Burrlllj). Boardman (42 N. T. 254; 3
Am. Eep. 694), 84, 750, 752.
Burrill v. Shiel (2 Barb. 457), 895, 1123,
1218.
Burritt v. Slllman (13 N. T. 93; 64 Am.
Dec. 532), 857, 877.
Burrough v. DeCoults (70 Cal. 361), 163.
Burrough v. Elton (11 Ves. 29), 280.
Burroughs v. Bunnell (70 Md. 18), 993.
TABLE OF CASES.
lvii
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Burroughs v. Burroughs (70 Md. 18),
1032.
Burroughs ». Gaither (66 Md. 171; 7
Atl. Eep. 243), 1571, 1720.
Burrow v. Phillcox (5 Myl. & Or. 72),
166, 167, 253, 614, 624, 627, 998.
Burrows v. Gore (6 H. L. Cas. 907), 1537.
Burrows v. Lehndorff (8 Iowa, 96), 1364.
Burrowsc. Lock (10 Ves. 475), 539, 1181.
Burrows v. Wells (5 De G., M. & G.
253), 1564.
Burrus v. Eoulhac (2 Bush, 39), 575.
Burt v. Wilson (28 Oal. 632), 239, 574.
BurtiS'y. Dodge (IBarb. Ch. 77), 1687.
Burtnetttf. First Nat.. Bank (38 Mich.
630), 1634.
Burton v. Hastings (2 P. Wms. 535;
Gilb. Eq. 113), 102, 105.
Burton i>. Henry (90 Ala. 281), 573.
Burtons. Wookey (6 Madd. 367), 194,
390, 1683.
Burton's Estate (1 Pars. 24), 1210.
Burtt's Estate (1 Drew. 319), 1015.
Burwell©. Carwood (2 How. 560), 1031.
Busby v. Mitchell (23 S. Oar. 476), 987.
Bush v. Allen (5 Mod. 63), 178, 652, 930.
Bushi). Bush (1 Strobh. Eq. 377), 1569.
Bush v. Bush (3 Strobh. Eq. 301), 440,
442.
Bush v. Bush (2 Duv. 269), 1081.
Bush v. Lathrop (22 N. Y. 549), 460.
Bush v. Lindsey (44 Cal. 121), 862.
Bush v. Sherman (80 111. 160), 1184, 1451,
1456, 1478, 1493, 1507, 1509.
Bushu. Stanley (122 111. 406; 13 N. E.
Eep. 249), 307, 308,1743.
Bush v. Walker (6 S. W. Eep. 717), 209.
Bushongtf. Taylor (82 Mo. 660), 1070.
Bush's Appeal (33 Pa. St. 85), 672, 1622.
Butcher v. Musgrove (2 Beav. 491), 38.
Butler v. Boston, etc. E. Co. (24 Hun,
99), 1221.
Butler B.Butler (L. K. 7 Ch. D. 116),
1250.
Butler v. Butler (21 Kan. 521), 653.
Butlers). Carter (L. E. 5 Eq. 276), 1114,
1138, 1536, 1538.
Butler v. Cumpston (L. E. 7 Eq. 16), 694,
698.
Butler v. Duncomb (1 P. Wms. 448),
1073, 1529.
Butler, Ex parte (1 Atk. 213), 972.
Butler v. Freeman (Amb. 302), 826,827.
Butler v. Gazzam (81 Ala. 491; 1 So.
Eep. 16), 1077.
Butler v. Godley (1 Dev. 94), 977.
Butler v. Gray (L. E. 5 Ch. App. 26),
166,641.
Butler v. Green (16 N. T. Supl. 888),
85.
Butler v. Haskell (4 Desaus. Eq. 664),
383, 390,393,480,1595.
Butler v. Hyland (89 Cal. 575; 26 Pac.
Eep. 1108), 72, 287, 503, 852.
Butlers. Ladue (12 Mich. 173), 1518.
Butler v. Merchants' Ins. Co. (14 Ala.
777), 29, 339, 366, 367,369.
Butlers. Shoemaker (32 Pac. Eep. 265),
311.
Butler v. Sprague (66 N. T. 392), 1634.
Butler v. Weeks (12 Misc. Eep. 192; 33
N. Y. Supl. 1090), 55.
Butler's Appeal (26 Pa. St. 63), 489.
Buttanshaw v. Martin (Johns. 89), 671.
Butterneld v. Barnham (19 Minn. 85),
1508.
Butterneld v. Okie (36 N. J. Eq. 482),
570, 576.
Butterfleld's Will, In re (133 N. Y. 473),
907.
Buttrick v. Holden (13 Met. 355), 449.
Butts v. Wood (38 Barb. 188), 405, 410.
Byrchall v. Bradford (6 Madd. 16), 1205,
1253, 1591.
Byrd v. Bradley (2 B. Mon. 239), 1368.
Byrd v. Clarke (52 Miss. 623), 1490.
Byrne v. Byrne (113 Cal. 294; 45 Pac.
Eep. 636), 1579.
Byrne v. Norcott (13 Beav. 336), 1205,
1253, 1679.
Byrne v. Southouse (3 Bro. Ch. 107),
1219.
Buxton v. Buxton (1 Myl. & Cr. 80), 1338.
Buxton v. Monkhouse (Coop. 42), 842.
Bybee v. Smith (88 Ky. 648), 576.
Bybee v. Thorp (4 B. Mon. 313), 836.
Byam v. Byam (19 Beav. 58), 671, 1086.
Byersv. Danley (27 Ark. 77), 363.
Byers v. McCartney (62 Iowa, 339), 750,
756.
Byers v. Wackman (16 Ohio St. 440), 308,
356.
Byington v. Moore (62 Iowa, 470), 417.
Byne v. Blackburn (26 Beav. 41), 183.
Byrchell ti. Bradford (6 Madd. 236), 386,
857.
Byrn v. Godfrey (4 Ves. 10), 517.
Byrne v. Carew (13 Ir. Eq. 1), 721.
Byrne v. Gunning (75 Md. 30; 23 Atl.
Eep. 1), 1067.
Byron v. Eayner (25 Md. 424), 396.
c.
Cable v . Cable (146 Pa. St. 451) , 1616.
Cable v. Minneapolis Stock Yards Co.
(47 Minn. 417), 1513.
Oadbury v. Duval (10 Pa. St. 267), 1530,
1653.
Cadman v. Horder (18 Ves. 11), 628.
lviii
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Cadogan v. Ewart (7 Ad. & El. 136), 926,
927.
Cadogan v. Kemmett (Oowp. 432), 98,
1389.
Oaflrey v. Darby (6 Ves. 488), 1144.
Caflrey v. McMlohael (64 N. Car. 507),
836.
Cage v. Oassidy (23 How. 109), 38.
Cagney v. O'Brien (83 111. 72), 513.
Cagwinu. Buerkle (55 Ark. 5; 17 S. W.
Eep. 266), 251,1701.
Cain v. Cox (23 W. Va. 594), 72.
Cairns v. Chaubert (9 Paige, 164), 1341,
Cainesu. Grant (5Binn. 119), 216, 321.
1434, 1438, 1687.
Cairns v. Colborn (104 Mass. 247), 367,
368.
Cake's Estate, In re (157 Pa. St. 457; 27
Atl. Eep. 773), 1016, 1172.
Caldecott v. Brown (2 Hare, 144) 1026,
1434.
Calder v. Moran (49 Mich. 14), 75.
Caldwell i;.Boyd (109 Ind. 447), 1172,
1641.
Caldwell v. Brown (36 111. 103), 1083.
Caldwell v. Caldwell (7 Bush, 515), 231,
269, 355.
Caldwell v. Carrington (9 Pet. 86), 432,
434, 595.
Caldwell v. Coates (78 Pa. St. 312), 1400,
1403.
Caldwell v. Lowden (3 Brewst. 63) , 953.
Caldwell v. McVicker (12 Ark. 746), 1342.
Caldwell v. Sigourney (19 Conn. 37), 390,
414.
Caldwell v. Taggart (4 Pet. 190), 1729.
Caldwell v. Williams (1 Bailey Eq. 175),
151.
Caldwell v. Williams (1 Ind. 405), 1384.
Calhoun v. Burnett (40 Miss. 599), 328,
1581.
Calhoun v. Calhoun (41 Ala. 369), 829,
836.
Calhoun v. Ferguson (7 Rich. Eq. 165),
1438.
Calhoun v. King (5 Ala. 523), 1576, 1577.
Calhoun's Estate (6 Watts, 185), 1057,
1200, 1341.
Calkins v. Cheney (72 111. 462), 818.
Calkins v. Long (22 Barb. 97), 726.
Callaghan v. O'Brien (136 Mass. 378),
1479.
Callan's Estate, In re (,L. R. 7 Ir. 102),
1309.
Callen v. Wilson (127 TJ . S. 640 ; 8 Sup. Ct.
1301), 1492.
Callender v. Keystone Mut. Life Ins. Co.
(23 Pa. St. 471), 1667,1678.
Callisti. Folsoin (6 Gill & J. 70), 1537.
Callis v. Rideout (7 Gill & J. 1), 1721.
Calloway v. Gilmer (36 Ala. 354), 401.
Calloway v. People's Bank (34 Fed. Rep.
154), 1445.
Calmes, Ex parte (1 Hill Ch. 112), 1169,
1215.
Calver v. Calver (3 Stookt. 215), 390, 414.
Calvert v. Davis (5 Gill & J. 301), 424.
Calvert v. Sebbon (4 Beav. 222), 893.
CamberwellBlg. Soo. v. Holloway (L.
R. 13Ch.D.754),477.
Cambridge Valley Bank v. Delano (48
Barb. 326), 479.
Camden v. Hiteshaw (23 W. Va. 236),
711.
Camden v. Murray (L. E. 16 Ch. D. 161),
827.
Camden Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v.
Ingham (40 N. J. Eq. 3), 1554.
Cameron t>. Adams (31 Mich. 426), 1514.
Cameron v. Austin (65 Wis. 652; 27 N. W.
Eep. 622), 201.
Cameron v. Lewis (56 Miss. 76), 419.
Cameron v. Mason (7 Ired. Eq. 180),
578.
Cameron v. Ward (8 Ga. 245), 231, 600,
618, 425.
Oamley v. Waterhouse (80 Tex. 340),
577.
Gammanno. Cammann (2 Dem. 211),
1688.
Camoys v. Best (19 Beav. 414), 864.
Camp v. Camp (2 Ala. 636), 488.
Camp v. Cleary (76 Va. 140), 1301, 1302.
Camp v. Crocker (54 Conn. 21), 747.
Campbell v. Bainbridge (L. E. 6 Eq. 269,
653, 1681.
Campbell v. Baldwin (2 Humph. 248) ,
677.
Campbell v. Campbell (8 Fed. Eep. 460),
1170.
Campbell v. Campbell (2 Jones Eq. 364,
503.
Campbell v. Campbell (21 Mich. 428),
309.
Campbell v. Campbell (70 Wis. 311), 66,
372.
Campbell v. Day (16 Vt. 366), 1117.
Campbells. Foster i.35 N. T. 361), 228,
1297.
Campbell v. French (3 Ves. 321), 682.
Campbell v. Golden (79 Ky. 644), 832.
Campbell v. Hamilton (4 Wash. C. C.
93), 960.
Campbell v. Johnson (1 Sandf . Ch. 148),
403, 604, 1184.
Campbell v. Low (9 Barb. 591), 618, 1641.
Campbell v. McLain (23 Leg. Int. 26; 51
Pa. St. 200), 427, 1598.
Campbell v. McLean (1 P. F. Smith,
200), 417.
TABLE OF CASES.
lix
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp, 848-1753.]
Campbell v. Miller (38 Ga. 304; 95 Am.
Dee. 389), 947, 1136, 1140, 1198.
Campbell v. Mullett (2 Swanst. 551),
224.
Campbell v. Peira. Life Ins. Co. (2
Whart. 64), 383, 390, 394, 414.
Campbell v. Powers (37 111. App. 308; 28
N. E. Eep. 1062), 319.
Campbell?). Preston (22 Gratt. 396),946,
956, 1114.
Campbell v. Badnor (1 Bro. Ch. 171),
811.
Campbell v. E. E. Co. (1 Woods, 376),
1731.
Campbell v. Bankin (28 Ark. 401), 574.
Campbell v. Sheldon (13 Pick. 8), 142,
1742.
Campbell v. Tagge (30 Iowa, 307) 1093.
Campbell v. Upton (113 Mass. 67), 1048.
Campbell v. Walker (5 Ves. 678), 382,
392, 399, 1541.
Campbell v. Wallace (10 Gray, 162), 142.
Campbell v. Watson (8 Ohio, 500), 1731,
1732.
Campbell v. Wilson (3 Bast, 301), 985.
Campbell, In re (1 Dem. 415), 1706.
Campbell's Policies, In re (L. E. 6 Ch.
D. 686), 653.
Campbell's Trusts, In re (31 Beav. 176),
26,1023.
Campe v. Home (158 Pa. St. 608; 27 Atl.
Eep. 1106), 660.
Canal Bank v. Hudson (111 U. S. 66),
607.
Canby v. McLear (13 Bank Eeg. 22),
676, 680.
Candler v. Tillett (22 Beav. 263), 1126,
1236.
Cane v. Allen (2 Dow. 289), 399, 418, 423.
Canfleld v. Bostwick (21 Conn. 650) , 1357,
1690,1698.
Canfleld v. Monger (12 Johns. 347), 1462.
Canns. Cann (51 L. T. 779), 1189.
Cannells. Buckle (2 P. Wms. 243), 12,
647.
Cannon v. Peebles (2 Ired. Law, 449),
1368.
Canoys. Troutman (7 Ired. 155), 1721.
Canty v. Sanderford (37 Ala. 91), 704.
Cape v. Bent (3 Hare, 245), 872.
Capehart v. Biggs (77 N. Car. 261), 1468,
1474.
Capel v. Wood (4 Euss. 500), 1159.
Caperton v. Landcraft (3 W. Va. 540),
1574.
Caple v. McCollum (27 Ala. 461), 309,358,
527.
Caplingers. Stokes (Meigs, 175), 223.
Caplin's Will, In re (2 Dr. &Sm. 527; 34
L.J. Ch. 578), 627, 631, 632.
Capen v. Eichardson (7 Gray, 364), 270.
Capron v. Attleboro Bank) (11 Gray,
492), 396.
Oardwell v. Cheatham (2 Head, 14),
1647.
Cardwell v. Perry (82 Ky. 129), 706.
Carey v. Abbott (7 Ves. 490), 731, 778.
Carey v. Askew (2 Bro. Oh. 68), 839.
Carey v. Boyle (53 Wis. 574; 66 Wis.
145), 578, 589.
Carey v. Brown (62 Cal. 373), 1110, 1504,
1625, 1732.
Carey v. Callen (6B. Mon. 44), 357, 358.
Carey v. Eyre (1 De G., J. & S. 149), 432.
Carey v. Goodlinge (3 Bro. Ch. 110),
245.
Carey v. Hoxie (11 Ga. 648), 1729.
Carey v. Mackey (82 Me. 516), 121, 726.
Carey v. Smith (11 Ga. 539), 660.
Cargill v. Bower (L. E. 10 Ch. D. 502),
1234.
Carhart v. Harshaw (45 Wis. 340; 30 Am.
Eep. 752), 14.
Carley v. Wilkins (6 Barb. 657), 475.
Carlisle v. Tuttle (30 Ala. 613), 847.
Carlisle's Estate, In re (34 W. N. C. 62),
816.
Carlyon v. Tinscott (L. E. 20 Eq. 348),
1118.
Carman, In re (3 Eedf . 46), 1706.
Carmlchael v. Hughes (6 Eng. L. &
Eq. 71), 834.
Carmichael v. Trustees (3 How. (Miss.)
84), 20.
Carmings v. Flower (7 Sim. 523), 837.
Carnwright v. Gray (127 N. Y. 462), 227.
Carothers v. Eussell (53 Iowa, 346), 566.
Carpenter v. American Ins. Co. (1
Story, 57), 476.
Carpenter v. Cameron (7 Watts, 51,
1067.
Carpenter v. Carpenter (58 Hun, 608;
12 N. Y. Supl. 189), 182.
Carpenter v. Carpenter (27 N. J. Eq.
502), 681.
Carpenter v. Carpenter (12 E. I. 544; 34
Am. Eep. 716), 947, 1057, 1134, 1138,
1141, 1244, 1341.
Carpenter v. Cushman (105 Mass. 417),
52.
Carpenters. Davis (72111. 14), 66.
Carpenter, In re (131 N. Y. 86), 944.
Carpenter, In re (45 Hun, 552), 1400.
Carpenter v. Leonard (5 Minn. 155), 707.
Carpenters. Marnell (3 B. & P. 41), 29,
972, 975.
Carpenter v. Miller (3 W. Va. 174), 254.
Carpenters. Mitchell (50 111. 470), 665.
Carpenter v. Eobinson (1 Holmes; 67),
1110.
lx
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Carpenter's Appeal (2 Grant Oas. 381),
1146.
Carre. Atkinson (L. E. 14 Bq. 397), 639.
Carr e. Bob (7 Dana, 417), 1538.
Carre. Brand (85 Vt. 597), 111.
Carr v. Burlington (1 P. Wms. 229),
1346.
Carr e. Dole (18 Me. 358), 1379.
Carr, Ex parte (3 V. & B. Ill), 539.
Carre. Hertz (33 Atl. Rep. 194), 1021.
Carr e. Hilton (1 Curtis, 390), 456, 460,
1540, 1659.
Carr e. Hobbs (11 Md. 285), 576.
Carre. Holliday (IDev. &Bat. 344), 13.
Carre. Houser (46 Ga. 477), 426, 430.
Carre. Living ;28Beav. 644), 183, 184.
Carr e. Richardson (157 Mass. 576; 32 N.
E. Rep. 958), 954.
Carr e. Taylor (10 Ves. 574) , 97.
Carre. Van Holsen ^26 Hun, 316), 1403.
Carrick e. Errington (2 P. Wms. 361),
255.
Carrico e. Farmers', etc. Nat. Bank (33
Md. 235), 575.
Carrie e. Gamming (26 Ga. 691), 614.
Carrier's Appeal (79 Pa. St. 239), 1688,
1695.
Carrigane. Drake (36 S. Car. 354; 15 S.
Car. 339), 710,914,1279.
Carrlngton e. Manning (13 Ala. 611),
1320.
Carroll e. Connett 1.2 J. J. Marsh. 195),
861.
Carroll e. Benick (7 Sim. & M. 799), 105.
Carroll e. Stewart (4 Bich. 2001, 1038.
Carroll e. Van Bensalaer (Harr. Ch.
225), 576.
Carr's Trusts, In re (L. R. 12 Eq. 609),
674.
Carson e. Blakey (6 Mo. 2731 , 1444.
Carson e. Carson (6 Allen, 397)., 863, 855,
856, 885.
Carson e. Carson (1 Ired. Eq. 329), 111,
124.
Carson e. Carson (Phill. Eq. (N. Oar.)
67), 624.
Carson v. Carson (1 Wins. 24), 42.
Carson e. Murray (3 Paige, 483), 721, 728.
Carson e. Phelps (14 Am. L. Reg. 100),
76.
Oarswell v. Lovett (8 Ga. 36), 1622.
Cartan e. David (18 Nev. 310), 708.
Carter e. Abshire (48 Mo 300) , 1092, 1470,
1486, 1487.
Carter e. Balfour (19 Ala. 814), 744, 750,
777.
Carter e.'Barnardiston (1 P. Wms> 505),
1326.
Carter e. Bennett (6 Fla. 214), 1635, 1637.
Carter e. Burr (46 N. J. Eq. 134), 1172.
Carter e. Carter (22 Miss. 61), 723.
Carter e. Carter (Mos. 370), 622.
Carter e. Carter (10 B. Mon. 327), 882,
884, 885.
Carter e. City of Portland (4 Ore. 339),
450.
Carter e. Cutting (5 Mumf. 223), 1255,
1690.
Carter e. Harris (4 Band. 199), 414,416.
Carter e. Home (1 Eq. Abr. 7), 194.
Carter e. Hough (86 Va. 668), 1753.
Carter, In re (41 W. B. 140), 1437.
Carter e. McManus (15 La. Ann. 641),
430.
Carter e. Manufacturers' Nat. Bank (71
Me. 448; 36 Am. Bep. 341), 1628.
Carter e. Montgomery (2 Tenn. Ch. 216) ,
309.
Carter e. Palmer (8 CI. & F. 657), 488.
Carter e. Palmes (1 Dr. & W. 722), 331.
Carter e. Eolland (11 Humph. 333), 955,
987, 1176.
Carter e. Seabright (26 Beav. 376), 1701.
Carter e. Taggart (1 De G., M. & G. 286) ,
678, 682.
Carter e. Wolf (13 Gratt. 301), 753.
Carteret e. Carteret (2 P. Wms. 134),
1266.
Carthewe. Enraght (26 L. T. Bep. 834),
166.
Cartwrighte. Dickinson (88 Tenn. 478;
12 S. W. Rep. 103), 1411.
Cartwrighte. Hollis (5 Tex. 152), 711.
Cartwrighte. Shepherd (17 Beav. 301),
853.
Cartwrighte. Wise (14 III. 417), 341,367.
Carver e. Eads (66 Ala. 190), 673.
Carver e. Grove (68 Ind. 371), 689.
Carvill e. Carvill (2 Ch. E. 301), 180.
Cary e. Abbot (7 Ves. 490), 757.
Gary e. Cary (2 Sch. & Lef. 189), 128, 130.
Cary e. Houghtaling (1 Hill, 311 ; 37 Am.
Dec. 323), 472, 495.
Cary e. Whitney (48 Me. 616), 950.
Oasborne e. Scarf (1 Atk. 609), 965.
Casburnee. Casburne (2 J. & W. 194),
963.
Case e. Abeel (1 Paige, 403), 387.
Case e. Beauregard (99 U. S. 119), 599.
Casee. Bougbton (11 Wend. 106), 475.
Case e. Carroll (35 N. T. 388), 207, 423.
Case e. Case (2S Mich. 49), 163.
Case e. Codding (38 Cal. 191), 197, 212,
309, 319.
Casee. James (29 Beav. 512), 432.
Case e. James (3 De G., F. & J. 2561 , 1138.
Casee. Kelly (133 U. S. 21), 1064.
Casee. Seger (4 Wash. St. 492; 80 Pae.
Rep. 646), 325.
Case of Queen's College (Jac. 1), 785.
TABLE OF CASES.
lxi
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Casey v. Casey (14 111. 112), 1184.
Casey v. Molntlre (45 Minn. 626), 1476.
Oashman v. Henry (5 Abb. N. 0. 234; 44
N. T. Ct. 101; 44 N. Y. 108), 698.
Oaskell v. Lathrop (63 Ga. 96), 436.
Cass v. Woods (30 L. T. 670), 1612.
Cassadyn. Wallace (102 Mo. 575; 15 S.
W. Rep. 138), 1450,1509.
Cassagne v. Marvin (1 N. T. Supl. 590),
1558.
Oassard v. Hinman (6 Bosw. 9), 484.
Cassellv. Boss (33111. 245; 85 Am. Dec.
270), 987, 1052, 1085, 1101.
Cassel's Case (3 Watts, 443), 1688.
Cassidy v. Cook (99 111. 385), 1470, 1486.
Castle v. Lewis (78 N. Y. 131), 1403.
Castners. Walrod (83111. 171), 365.
Cate v. Cate (87 Tenn. 41), 577.
Cater v. Eveleigh (4 Desaus. Eq. 19; 6
Am. Dec. 596), 710.
Oatbcart v. Eobinson (5 Pet. 277), 98.
Catherwood v. Oatherwood (65 Ind.
576), 372.
Catherwood v. Watson (65 Ind. 576), 346.
Catherwood'B Estate (29 W. ST. C. 344) ,
1301.
Catlin v. Eagle Bank (6 Conn. 233), 10,
1411.
Caton v. Bideout (1 Macn. & G. 597), 657,
662.
Cator v. Pembroke (1 Bro. Ch. 301),
585.
Cauley v. Lawson (5 Jones Eq. 132), 100.
Caulk v. Fox (13 Fla. 148), 652, 653, 705.
Caulkins v. Bolton (98 N. T. 511), 863.
Caum. Poster (1 J. & H. 30), 721.
Oavendar v. Cavendar (114 U. S. 464),
904, 1569, 1575.
Cavendish v. Fleming (3 Munf. 198),
1690.
Cavendish v. Mercer (5 Ves. 195), 837.
Cavin v. Gleason (105 N. T. 256; 11 N. E.
Eep. 504), 1607, 1610, 1611, 1612.
Cawdori*. Lewis (1 T. & C. 427), 608.
Cecil v. Butcher (2 J. & W. 573), 88.
Cecil v. Langdon (E. L. 28 Ch. D. 1),
871.
Cecil Bank v. Snively (23 Md. 253), 308.
Central Ins. Co. v. National, etc. Ins.
Co. (14 N. T. 91), 207.
Central Nat. Bank v. Connecticut Mut.
Life Ins. Co. (104 U. S. 54), 1625.
Central Nat. Bank v. Sellgman (138 N.
Y. 435), 1374.
Central By. Co. v. Kisch (L. K. 2 H. L.
Cas. 120), 488.
Central Trust Co. v. Burke (1 Ohio N.
P. 169) , 30.
Oernes v. Irving (31 Vt. 606), 951, 1115.
Cerney v. Pawlott (66 Wis. 262), 335.
Chadbourn v. Chadbourn (9 Allen, 173),
993, 1049, 1344.
Chadbournes. Coe (10 U. S. App. 83),
1730.
Chadwick v. Burrows (42 Hun, 39), 1369.
Chadwick v. Chadwick (59 Mich. 87), 59,
281,862, 1534.
Chadwick v. Felt (35 Pa. St. 305), 197,
313.
Cnadwick's Appeal (7 Atl. Eep. 178),
1557, 1622, 1718.
Chaf ee v. Fourth Nat. Bank (71 Me. 514),
1383.
Chaffln v. Hull (49 Fed. Eep. 524), 1144.
Challen v. Shippam (4 Hare, 655), 1205,
1253.
Chalmers. Bradley (1 J. &W. 51), 393,
461, 465, 897, 974, 1536, 1537.
Chalmers v. Barry (1 J. & W. 68), 864.
Chalmers v. Hack (19 Me. 124) , 37.
Chamberlain v. Agar (2 V. <Ss B. 259), 66,
497, 513.
Chamberlain v. Brockett (L. R. 8 Ch,
206), 768.
Chamberlain v. Chamberlain (2 Freem.
34), 500, 606, 513.
Chamberlain v. Chamberlain (43 N. Y.
437), 811.
Chamberlain v. Crane (1 N. H. 64),
912.
Chamberlain a. Edgar (2 V. & B. 262),
606.
Chamberlains. Estey (55 Vt. 378), 960,
1057, 1679, 1680.
Chamberlain v. Harrod (5 Greenl. 429),
383.
Chamberlain v. Lancey (60 Me. 230),
1736.
Chamberlain v. Murrin (92 Mich. 361),
52 N. W. Eep. 640), 707.
Chamberlain v. Stearns (111 Mass. 267),
254.
Chamberlains. Taylor (105 N. Y. 185),
618.
Chamberlain v. Thompson (10 Conn.
243; 26 Am. Dec. 390), 920, 937, 941.
Chambers v. Crabbe (34 Beav. 457), 286,
548.
Chambers, Ex parte (IE. & M. 577), 837,
1563.
Chambers v. Goldwin (9 Ves. 267), 1683.
Chambers v. Mauldin (4 Ala. 477), 956,
1266.
Chambers v. Minchin (7 Ves. 196), 1005,
1122, 1127, 1234, 1244.
Chambers v. Perry (17 Ala. 726), 826,
1130.
Chambers^. St. Louis (29 Mo. 543), 19,
748, 1217.
Chambers v. Smith (30 Ala. 368), 1236.
lxii
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages : Vol
Chambers v. Taylor (2 Myl. &Cr. 376),
940.
Chambersburg Ins. Co. v. Smith (11
Pa. St. 120), 1054.
Chambliss v. Smith (30 Ala. 366), 503,
525.
Champion v. Brown (6 Johns. Ch. 398;
10 Am. Dee. 343), 437, 577, 581.
Champion v. Bigby (1 Buss. & M. 539;
392,418,419,465.
Champlin v. Champlin (136 111. 309; 26
N. E. Eep. 526), 160, 344.
Champlin v. Champlin (3 Edw.Ch.671),
996.
Champlin o. Champlin (1 Hon*. 578),
723.
Champlin v. Haight (10 Paige, 282), 1661.
Champlin v. Laytin (18 Wend. 407), 441.
Champney v. Davy (L. E. 11 Ch. D.
949), 813.
Chandler v. Ferris (1 Harr. 454), 424.
Chandler v. Johnson (39 Ga. 85), 656.
Chandler v. Moulton (33 Vt. 245), 391,
414.
Chandler v. Eider (102 Mass. 268), 1037,
, 1038.
Chandler v. Sehoonover (14 Ind. 324),
1662.
Chandler v. Simmons (97 Mass. 508),
827.
Chaney». Smallwood (1 Gill, 365), 603,
877.
Chanet v. Villepouteaux (3 McCord,
29), 1040.
Chapin v. First Univ. Soc. (8 Gray,
580), 21, 910, 913, 918, 949, 1038, 1123.
Chapin & Gould v. Wabash Mfy. Co.
(43Ill.App. 446), 1630.
Chapin v. Marvin (12 Wend. 538), 1042.
Chapin v. School Dist. (35 N. H. 445),
18,20,734, 749,788, 1547.
Chapin v. Weed (Clarke Ch. 464), 427,
1184.
Chaplin v. Chaplin (3 P. Wms. 234), 963,
1148, 1528.
Chaplin v. Givens (lEiceEq. 132), 879,
883, 884, 889.
Chaplin v. McAfee (3 J. J. Marsh. 613),
309.
Chapline v. Moore (7 T. B. Mon. 160),
839.
Chapman v. Beardsley (31 Conn. 115),
579.
Chapman v. Blisset (Talb. 145), 920.
Chapman v. Blisset (Forr. 145), 923.
Chapman v. Chapman (55 Ark. 542), 574.
Chapman v. County of Douglas (107 U.
S. 357), 237.
Chapman v. Gibson ;3 Bro. Ch. 229),
622.
. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Chapman v. Glassell (13 Ala. 50; 48 Am.
Dec. 41), 912.
Chapman v. Gray (8 Ga. 341), 721.
Chapman v. Lee (64 Ala. 483), 199, 573.
Chapman v. Liggett (41 Ark. 292), 574.
Chapman v. Peebles (84 Ala. 283), 573.
Chapman v. Tanner (1 Vern. 267), 571.
Chapman v. West (17 N. T. 125) , 452.
Chapman and Barker's Case (L. E. 3
Eq. 361), 962.
Chappelli;. Gould (42 Md. 466), 1505.
Chappell v. Missionary Soc. (3 Ind.
App. 356; 29 N. E. Rep. 924), 731.
Charitable Corp. v. Sutton (2 Atk. 405),
1056, 1683.
Charles v. Charles (8 Conn. 79), 100.
Charles v. Charles (8 Gratt. 4S6), 100.
Charles v. Coker (2 8. Oar. 123), 655.
Charles v. Dubose (69 Ala. 367), 386, 390.
Charles v. Jones (L. E. 33 Ch. D. 80),
1669.
Charleston o. Caulfleld (19 S. Car. 201),
1515.
Charlton's Appeal (34 Pa St. 474), 1144.
Charter v. Stevens (3 Denio, 33), 1487.
Chase v. Bradley (26 Me. 531) , 1344.
Chase v. Chapin (130 Mass. 128), 59, 73.
Chase v. Chase (2 Allen, 101), 34, 37, 101,
124, 130, 142, 228, 229, 612, 846, 1742.
Chase v. Cheney (58 111. 509), 789, 796.
Chase v. Davis (65 Me. 102), 908, 999.
Chase v. Dunham (1 Paige, 572), 1739,
Chase v. Lockerman (11 Gill & J. 185;
35 Am. Dec. 277), 1120, 1150, 1205, 1228,
1253, 1322, 1324, 1325, 1689.
Chase v. Palmer (25 Me. 342), 678.
Chase v. Peck (21 N. T. 581), 576, 586,
601.
Chase v. Perley (148 Mass. 289), 75.
Chase «. Plummer (17 Md. 165), 127,
133.
Chaser. Tuttle (65 Conn. 455; 3 Am. St.
Eep. 64), 1411, 1412.
Ohastain v. Smith (30 Ga. 96), 189, 333,
414.
Chatterton v. Young (2 Tenn. Ch. 768),
710.
Ohauncey v. Graydon (2 Atk. 616), 1044.
Chautauqua Co. Bank v. White (6 N.
T. 237; 67 Am. Dec. 442), 280, 1576.
Chawner's Will, Inre (L. E. 8 Eq. 569),
1118, 1132, 1446.
Cheatham v. Huff (2 Tenn. Ch. 616),
666.
Cheatham v. Eowland (92 N. Oar. 340),
989, 1025, 1026, 1365.
Chedworth v. Edwards (8 Ves. 46), 326,
1174, 1536.
Cheever v. Wilson (9 Wall. 108), 667,
711.
TABLE OF CASES.
Ixiii
[The references are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 818-1753.]
Cheney v. L. B. & U. By. Co. (68 111.
570), 1683.
Cherokee Lodge v. White (63 Ga. 742),
705.
Cherry v. Greene (115 111. 592), 1084.
Cherry v. Jarratt (25 Miss. 221), 1058,
1690.
Chertsey Market, In re (6 Price, 261; 6
H. L. Cas. 189), 782, 768, 823, 1591,
1653.
Cheshire^). Cheshire (2 Ired. Eq. 569),
1437, 1625.
Cheshire v. Payne (16 B. Mon. 618), 101.
Chesley v. Chesley (49 Mo. 540), 1094,
1095, 1486.
Cheslyn v. Dalby (2 T. & C. 194), 419.
Chesman v. Cummings (142 Mass. 395;
15 N. E. Rep. 786), 1619,1753.
Chester v. Chester (L. E. 12 Eq.. 444),
813.
Chester v. Dickerson (53 Barb. 349),
476.
Chester v. Greer (5 Humph. 26), 396,
681.
Chester v. Urwieh (23 Beav. 407), 511,
513, 517.
Chesterfield, In re (L. It. 24 Ch. D. 643),
1437.
Chesterfield v. Janssen (2 Ves. 155),
379, 399, 1698.
Chesterfield Mfg. Co. v. Debon (6 Pick.
7; 16 Am. Dec. 367), 1625.
Chestnuts. Gann (76 Tex. 150), 865.
Chestnut v. Strong (1 Hill Ch. 124),
853.
Chestnuts. Tyson (105 Ala. 149; 16 So.
Eep. 723), 1242,1243.
Chetwood v. Brittan (1 Green Ch. 450),
67.
Cheuvete v. Mason (4 Green (Iowa),
231), 688.
Chews. Chew (28 Pa. St. 17), 928.
Chews. Ellingwood (86 Mo. 260), 1411.
Chicago, etc. Land Co. s. Peck (112 111.
408), 674.
Chicago & Alton R. R. Co. s. Glenney
(118 111. 487), 560.
Chicago &E. I. R. R. Co. v. Hay (119
111.493), 1533.
Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. s. Kennedy (70
111. 350), 449.
Chichester s. Coventry (L. E. 2 H. L.
92), 1528.
Chidgly v. Harris (16 Mees. & W. 617),
883.
Child s. Brace (4 Paige, 309), 1184.
Child v. Child (20 Beav. 50), 1102, 1203.
Child v. Pearl (43 Vt. 224), 713.
Child s. Thorley (L. R. 16 Ch. D. 151),
529.
Childers v. Childers (3Kay& J.310; IDe
G. & J. 485), 66, 72.
Childers v. Wooler (2 El. & E. 287), 475.
Childes s. Davies (1 Sin. & Gif. 475),
1525.
Childress v. Monette (54 Ala. 317), 1514.
Ohilds v. Jordan (106 Mass. 322), 73, 980.
Childss. Updike (9 Ohio St. 333), 1344.
Chiles v. Gallagher (67 Miss. 413), 406.
Chili First Presb. Soc. s. Bowen (21
Hun, 389), 62.
Chillingworth v. Chambers (21 Law
Mag. & Rev. 51; 13 Eep. 787), 1022,
1141.
Chilton s. Brooks (71 Md. 445), 1498, 1499,
1500.
Chipchase v. Simpson (16 Sim. 485),
656.
Chippendale, Ex parte (4 De G., M. & G.
19), 1032, 1033, 1701.
Chisholm v. Chisholm (4 Rich. Eq. 226),
839.
Chisholm v. Newton (1 Ala. 371) , 960.
Chisholm v. Starke (3 Call, 25), 1437.
Chittenden v. Brewster (2 Wall. 191),
1402.
Chitty v. Parker (2 Ves. Jr. 271), 299, 302.
Choate v. Tighe (10 Heisk. 621), 577.
Chollarii. Temple (39 Ark. 238), 704.
Cholmondeley v. Cholmondeley (14
Sim. 590), 128.
Cholmondeley v. Clinton (1 J. & W.
151), 461, 464, 465, 467.
Chorpening's Appeal (32 Pa. St. 315; 72
Am. Dec. 789), 1171, 1183.
Chouteau v. Suydam (21 N. T. 179), 1344,
1345.
Chowning v. Cox (1 Rand. 306), 1470.
Christian v. Yancey (2 Patt. & H. 240),
879.
Christies. Bishop (1 Barb. Ch. 105), 441,
442.
Christie, In re (133 ST. Y. 473; 31 N. E.
Rep. 515), 907.
Christie v. Ovington (L. E. 1 Ch. 279),
1261, 1264.
Christmas v. Mitchell (3 Ired. Eq. 535),
1627.
Christophers. Christopher (64 Md. 583),
571,575.
Christophers v. White (10 Beav. 523),
1058.
Christ's Church, In re (L. E. 1 Ch. 126),
782.
Christ Church v. Phillips (5 Del. Ch.
429), 797.
Christ's Hospital v. Budgin (2 Vern.
120), 335, 354.
Christ's Hospital v. Grainger (1 Macn.
&G. 460), 7, 819.
lxiv
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Christy v. Courtenay (13 Beav. 96), 339,
S66.
Christy v. McKee (94 Mo. 241), 676.
Christy v. McBride (2 111. 75), 1135, 1215,
1244, 1340.
Church v. Church (25 Pa. St. 278), 388,
746, 777.
Church v. Cole (36 Ind. 35), 308.
Church v. Kidd (3 Hun, 254), 415.
Church v. Marine Ins. Co. (1 Mason),
341), 383, 413, 416.
Church «. Euland (64 Pa. St. 442), 218,
445, 497, 800, 511.
Church v. Smith (39 Wis. 492), 585.
Church v. Sterling (16 Conn. 388), 189,
193,206,333,413,414,532.
Church v. Stewart (27 Barb. 553), 949,
1122.
Church v. Wiley (2 Hill Ch. 584), 35.
Church's Appeal (7 Atl. Eep. 751), 1720.
Churcher v. Martin (L. K. 42 Ch. D. 312),
813.
Church Extension, etc. v. Smith (52 Md.
362), 753.
Churchill v. Corker (25 Ga. 479), 943.
Churchill v. Dibben (9 Sim. 447), 715.
Churchill v. Hobson (1 P. Wms. 241),
1128.
Churchill v. Hobson (2 Vern. 241), 1122.
Churchill v. Speake (1 Vern. 251), 353.
Churchman v. Indianapolis (110 Ind.
259), 1535.
Church of Holy Cross v. Wachter (42
Barb. 43), 1356.
City of Rochester, In re (HON. T. 159),
1746.
Clack v. Holland (19 Beav. 262), 1117.
Cladfleld v. Cox (1 Sneed, 330), 1117.
Claflin Co. v. Arnheim (87 Hun, 236), 1374.
Claflin v. Iseman (23 S. Car. 416), 1367.
Claggett v. Hardy (3N.H. 148) , 854.
Clanricarde v. Henning (30 Beav. 175),
392, 424, 1596.
Clapp v. Byrnes (3 Hun App. 284; 38 ST.
T. Supl. 1063), 612.
Clapp V. Emery (98 111. 523), 63, 76, 386,
681.
Clapp v. Ingraham (126 Mass. 204),
698.
Clare v. Bedford (13 Vin. 536), 27.
Clare v. Ormond (Jac. 120), 1564.
Clark v. Anderson (10 Bush, 99), 111.
Clark v. Anderson (13 Bush, 111), 959,
1058, 1215, 1673.
Clark v. Becher (4 Price, 346), 1574.
Clark v. Blackington (110 Mass. 369),
1184.
Clark v. Burnham (2 Story, 1), 363.
Clark v. Cantwell (3 Head, 202), 230.
Claik v. Clark (108 Mass. 522), 82.
Clark v. Clark (8 Paige, 152; 35 Am.
Dec. 676), 1236, 1438.
Clark v. Clark (20 Ohio St. 128), 709.
Clark v. Clark (43 Vt. 685), 197, 308, 313,
316.
Clark v. Clark (1 So. Rep. 835), 521.
Clark v. Condit (18 N. J, Eq. 358), 1444.
Clark v. Craig (29 Mich. 398), 1401.
Clark v. Danvers (1 Ch. Cas. 310), 307.
Clark v. Denton (36 N, J. Eq. 419),
613.
Clark v. Deveaux (IS. Car. 172), 287,
1569,1574.
Clark v. Field (13 Vt. 460), 546.
Clark v. Flannery (96 Ga. 782; 22 S. E.
Eep. 386), 1033.
Clark v. Fosdick (118 N. T. 7; 6 Lawv-
Eep. 132), 721, 726, 1053.
Clark t\ Hall (7 Paige, 385), 583.
Clark v. Hopkins (7 Johns. 556), 984.
Clark v. Hoyt (8 Ired. Eq. 222), 1685.
Clark v. Hunt (3 J. J. Marsh. 553), 680.
Clark, In re (17 Eng. L. &Eq. 699), 832.
Clark, Inre (119 N. T. 427), 863.
Clark v. Iselin (21 Wall. 360), 1634.
Clark v. Jacobs (56 How. Pr. 519), 686
Clark v. Lee (14 Iowa, 425), 516.
Clark v . Leupp (38 N. T. 328)), 111.
Clark v, McGeigham (25 N. J. Eq. 423),
103.
Clark v. Maguire (16 Mo. 302), 987.
Clark v. Martin (49 Pa. St. 299), 521.
Clark v. Montgomery (23 Barb. 464),
839.
Clark v. Piatt (30 Conn. 282), 1684, 1686,
1698.
Clark v. Powell (62 Vt. 442), 1021.
Clark v. Pratt (30 Conn. 551), 1690.
Clark v. Pratt (15 Ore. 304), 1535.
Clark v.&t. Louis, Alton, etc. E. E. (58
How. Pr.21), 1210.
Clark v. Saxon (1 Hill Ch. 69), 24, 1427,
1437.
Clark a. Stanton (24 Minn. 232), 1398.
Clark v. Stilson (36 Mich. 482), 586.
Clark v. Tennison (33 Md. 85) , 978.
Clark v. Tipping (4 Beav. 594), 677.
Clark v. Valentino (41 Ga. 143), 705.
Clarke. Viles (32 Me. 32), 706.
Clark v. Wilson (77 Ind. 176), 904, 1184,
1405.
Clark v. Wilson (63 Miss. 129), 1440.
Clark v. Wilson (56 Miss. 753), 1503.
Clarke v. Abbott (Barnard, 461), 970.
Clarke v. Berkley (2 Vern. 720), 1044.
Clarke v. Cordis (4 Allen, 466), 993, 1047,
1342,1345.
Clarko v. Depe-w (1 Casey, 609) , 440.
Clarke v. Garfield (8 Allen, 4'/7), 1102,
1198,1200, 1202,1214.
TABLE OF CASES.
Ixv
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.1
Claikei). Haokerthorn (3 Yeates, 269),
432, 485.
Clarke v. Hayes (9 Gray, 426), 1034,1105.
Clarke v. Lott (11 111. 105), 151.
darker. Mix (15 Conn. 152), 1364.
Clarke v. National Bank (47 Mo. 17),
708.
Clarke v. I'arker (19 Ves. 11), 884, 885,
995, 997, 999, 1014, 1043, 1045, 1046.
Clarke v. Periam (2 Atk. 833), 560.
Clarke v. St. Louis, etc. E. Co. (58 How.
21), 1203.
Clarke v. The Eoyal Panopticon (4
Drew. 26; 27 L.J. Ch. 207), 1446.
Clarke v. Turner (Freem, 199), 643.
Clarke v. Windham (12 Ala. 798), 655.
Clarke's Charities, In re (L. B. 1 Ch. D.
497), 768.
Clarkson v. Creeley (35 Mo. 95), 1110.
Clarkson v. De Peyster (1 Hopk. 425),
38".
Clarkson v. Hanway (2 P. Wma. 204),
480.
Clack v. Holland (19 Beav. 262), 1116.
Clausseni;. De Franz (1 Clarke, 226), 334.
Clavering v. Clavering (2 Vern. 473),
160.
Clavering v. Clavering (Hill. 1704; Pr.
Ch. 235), 273.
Clay v. Clay (7 Bush, 95), 1533.
Clay v. Edwards (84 Ky. 548; 2 S. W.
Eep. 147), 1239.
Clay v. Hart (7 Dana, 17) , 387, 1040.
Clay, In re (29 W. E. 6) , 1036,
Clay v. Pennington (8 Sim. 359), 832,
841.
Clay v. Selah Valley Co. (45 Pac. Eep.
141), 868.
Clay v. Willis (1 B. & C. 364), 1442.
Clay County v. Society (104 U.S. 579),
1542.
Clayton v. Johnson (36 Ark. 406) , 1369.
Clayton's Case (1 Meriv. 572), 1633.
Cleaver v. Green (107 111. 67), 1498, 1499.
Clegg v. Edmondson (8 De G., M. & G.
787), 364, 398.
Clegg v. Eishwick (1 Macn. & G. 294),
398, 399.
Cleghorn v. Love (24 Ga. 590), 1121,1257,
1726.
Clemenee v. Steere (1 E. I. 272), 1434.
Clemens v. Caldwell (7B. Mon. 171), 904,
905, 1575.
Clemens j>. Clemens (60 Barb. 366), 888,
893, 894.
Clement v. Hyde (50 Vt. 716; 28 Am. Eep.
522), 734, 750.
Clement's Appeal (49 Conn. 519), 1171.
Clements v. Hall (2 De G. &. J. 173), 398.
Clemsouv. Davidson (5 Binn. 392), 34.
Clendening v. Conrad (91 Va. 410; 21 8.
E. Kep. 818) , 846.
Clergy Orphan Corporation, In re (L.
E. 18 Eq. 280) , 1132.
Clergy Society, In re (2 Kay & J. 615),
732.
Clermont v. Tasburgh (1 J. & W. 112) ,
564.
Cleveland v. Hallett (6 Cush. 403), 918,
922, 924, 936, 941, 942, 999, 1267.
Cleveland r. Pollard (37 Ala. 556), 1172.
Cleveland v. State Bank (16 Ohio St.
236) , 1075.
Clevenger v. Eeimar (3 W. & S. 487), 419.
Clevenstein's Appeal (15 Pa. St. 495),
655, 656.
Click v. Click (1 Heisk. 607), 309.
Clifford v. Clifford (60 L. T. 650), 721.
Clifford v. Farmer (79 Ind. 629), 1425.
Clifton v. Anderson (47 Mo. App. 35),
660.
Clifton v. Halg (4 Desaus. 330), 28.
Clifton v. Lombe (Amb. 519), 130.
CHnefelter v. Ayers (16 111. 329), 1322,
1324.
Clippenger v. Hepbaugh (5 W. & S. 315),
650.
Clissold, Be (10 L. T. (N. S.) 642), 30.
Clitherallt\Ogilve (1 Desaus. 258), 480.
Clive v. Carew (1 Johns. & H. 205), 1593.
Clominger v. Summitt (2 Jones' Eq.
513), 391.
Clopton v. Sholson (53 Miss. 466), 933,
1031.
Closs v. Bopp (23 N. J. Eq. 270), 312.
Cloud v. Calhoun (10 Eich. Eq. 358), 88,
878.
Cloud v. Ivie (28 Mo. 579), 313.
Cloud v. Kansas Loan & T. Co. (52 Mo.
App. 318), 1450.
Clough v. Bond (3MyI. & Cr. 496), 1006,
1056, 1102, 1113, 1129, 1140, 1205, 1244,
1253, 1341, 1586.
Clough v. Clough (5 Ves. 710), 1528.
Clough v. Lambert (10 Sim. 174), 722.
Clowdsle'y v. Pelham (1 Vern. 41), 127.
Cluff v. Clnff (L. E. 2 Ch. D. 222), 813.
Clulow's Trusts, In re (28 L. J. Ch. 696),
1527.
Clute v. Bool (8 Paige, 83), 184, 1297.
Clutev Gould (28 Hun, 348), 1687, 1706.
Clutton, Ex parte (17 Jur. 988), 30, 876,
1431.
Coaks v. Boswell (H. L. 11 App. Cas.
232), 495.
Coal, etc. Co. In re (L. E. 20 Eq. 114) ,494.
Coates, Inre (L. E. 34 Ch. D. 370), 864,
871, 907.
Coates v. Woodward (13 111. 654), 174,
263, 1722.
JXV1
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Coatney v. Hopkins (14 W. Va. 338), 653,
664, 665.
Coats v. Robinson (10 Mo. 757), 665.
Cobb r. Edwards (117 N. Car. 244; 23 S.
E. Eep. 241), 208, 317, 428.
Cobb v. Fant (36 S. Car. 1; 14 S. E. Rep.
959) , 74.
Cobb r. Knight (74 Me. 253), 73, 75, 159.
Cobb v. Riddle (14 Pa. St. 444), 1067.
Cobb v. Tramrnill (30 S. W. Rep. 482),
430.
Coburn v. Anderson (131 Mass. 513), 111,
127.
Cochran v. Fillans (20 S. Car. 237), 847.
Cochran v. Paris (11 Gratt. 356), 995, 997,
999, 1006, 1119, 1569.
Cochran v. Richmond, etc. Ry. Co. (91
Va. 339; 21 S. E. Rep. 664), 1673.
Cochrane v. Schell (140 N. Y. 516; 35 N.
E. Rep. 971), 33, 105.
Cock v. Goodfellow (10 Mod. 480), 1204,
1206.
Cocke v. Minor (26 Gratt. 246), 1092.
Cockell v. Bacon (16 Beav. 158), 1515.
Cocker v. Quayle (1 R. & M. 535), 1102,
1223, 1591.
Dec. 568) , 950, 1139.
Cockerellu. Barber (1 Sim. 23; 5 Russ.
585), 893.
Cockerell v. Cholmeley (1 R. & M. 424),
622.
Cockey v. Leister (12 Md. 124; 71 Am.
Cocking v. Pratt (1 Ves. 400) , 504.
Coekrell v. Armstrong (31 Ark. 580) , 52.
Cockrell v. Cholmeley ( 1 Russ. & Myl.
425), 393.
Cockrill v. Armstrong (31 Ark. 580), 127,
128.
Cockroft v. Sutcliffe (L. J. 25 Ch. 313),
1677, 1680.
Cocks v. Barlow (5 Redf. 406), 81.
Codgell v. Codgell (3 Desaus. 387),
840.
Codman v. Rodgers (10 Pick. 119), 1534.
Codwise v. Gelton (10 Johns. 507), 1333.
Coe's Trusts, Inre (4 Kay & J. 199), 1119.
Coffee v. Crouch (28 Mo. 106), 1629.
Coffee v. Ruffln (4 Colw. 487) , 1178.
Coffin v. Argo (134 111. 276; 24 ST. E. Rep.
1068), 193.
Coffin v. Bramlitt (42 Miss. 194; 97 Am.
Dec. 449), 987, 1216.
Coffin v. Cottle (4 Pick. 454) , 993, 1049.
Cogbill v. Boyd (77 Va. 450), 1175, 1221.
Coggeshall v. Pelton (7 Johns. Ch. 294),
730, 737.
Coggeshall v. Potter (1 Holmes, 75),
1409.
Coggswell v. Griffith (23 Neb. 334), 1625.
Cogney v. O'Brien (83 111. 72), 510.
Cogswell v. Cogswell (2 Edw. Ch. 238),
198, 1025, 1253, 1434.
Cohen v. Morris (70 Ga. 313), 1402, 1405.
Cohen v. Shyer (1 Tenn. Ch. 195) , 836.
Cohen v. State Bank (29 Fla. 655), 1421.
Conn n. Ward (32 W. Va. 34) , 1577.
Cohoes Co. v. Goss (13 Barb. 137), 1451.
Coitu. Comstock (51 Conn. 352), 87, 747,
756.
Colborn a. Shay (17111. App. 294), 1395,
1408.
Colchester v. Lowten (1 V. & B. 226), 10,
Coldwell v. Renfrew (33 Vt. 213) , 664.
Cole v. Bradley (49 Me. 388), 525.
Cole v. Littlefleld (35 Me. 439), 130, 183,
228.
Cole v. Mlllerton Iron Co. (59 Hun, 217),
411.
Cole v. Millerton Iron Co. (133 N. T. 164;
59 Hun, 217), 1413.
Cole v. Mills (10 Hare, 179), 1656.
Cole v . Eobinson (1 Salk. 244), 247.
Cole v. Scott (2 Wash. 141), 442.
Cole v. Stokes (113 N. Car. 270), 1181.
Cole v. Turner (4 Russ. 376) , 1355.
Cole v. VanRiper (44 111. 58), 552, 665.
Cole v. Wade (16 Ves. 43), 166, 167, 631,
633, 872, 896, 897, 901, 980, 995, 997, 1005,
1014, 1015, 1122.
Cole Silver Min. Co. v. Virginia, etc.
Co. (1 Sawy. 685), 1730.
Colebrooke's Case (6 Ves. 622), 899.
Coleman v. Burr (93 N. T. 17; 45 Am.
Rep. 160) , 709.
Coleman v. Coike (6 Rand. 618; 18 Am.
Dee. 767), 877.
Coleman v. Eastman (5 Paige, 561), 420.
Coleman v. McKinney (3 J. J. Marsh.
246), 1085.
Coleman v. Parrott (13 S. W. Rep. 525;
32 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 1), 1553.
Coleman v. Ross (46 Pa. St. 180) , 1666,
1668, 1678.
Coleman v. Sarel, (1 Ves. Jr. 50), 146.
Coleman v. Semmes (66 Miss. 321), 657.
Coleman v. Seymour (1 Ves. 210), 839.
Coleman v. Wooley (10 B. Mon. 320),
664, 706.
Coles v. Allen (64 Ala. 98), 223, 532.
Coles v. Courtier (L. R. 34 Ch. D. 136),
1436.
Coles v. Trecothiek (9 Ves. 234), 382, 395,
413, 1178, 1180.
Coles v. Withers (33 Gratt. 186) , 682.
Colesbury v. Dart (58 Ala. 573), 327.
Coleson v. Blanton (3 Hayw. 162), 956.
Coleswith v. Brangwin (Pr. Ch. 823),
245.
Colgrave v. Manley (6 Madd. 72 ; 2 Russ.
238), 1159, 1161.
TABLE OF CASES.
JXV11
[The references are to pages: Vol
Collar v. Collar (86 Mich. 507; 49 N. W.
Rep. 561), 199.
Collard v. Hare (2 R. & M. 675), 465.
College v. Willingham (13 Rich. Eq.
195) , 1696, 1716.
Oolley, In re (L. R. 1 Eq. 496), 1528.
Collier v. Fallon (1 Turn. & Rus. 459), 38.
Collier v. Grimsey (36 Ohio St. 17), 1013,
i:40.
Collier v. McBean (34 Beav. 426), 927.
Collier v. Munn (41 N. Y. 143), 1711.
Collier v. Walters (L. R. 17 Eq. 265), 937.
Collins v. Bath (7 Serg. & R. 155), 1434.
Collins v. Carlisle (7 B. Mon. 14), 130,
138, 167, 614, 627, 1000.
Collins v. Collins (6 Bans. 368), 377.
Collins v. Corson (30 Atl. Rep. 862), 318.
Collins v. Dixon (72 Ga. 475) , 827.
Collins v. Evans (5 Q. B. 820), 475.
Collins v. Hare (IDow.&C. 139), 292.
Collins?;. Hope (20Ohio, 492), 517.
Collins v. Hopkins (7 Iowa, 463), 1460.
Collins v. Hoxie (9 Paige, 817) , 42.
Collins, In re (12 N. B. R. 379). 1409.
Collins v. Phillips (91 Iowa, 210; 59 N.
W. Rep. 40) , 61.
Collins v. Rainey (42 Ark. 531), 417.
Collins v. Randolph (19 Ala. 616) , 654.
Collins v. Rudolf (19 Ala. 616) , 704.
Collins v. Severson (2 Del. Ch. 324), 995.
Collins v. Smith (1 Head, 251), 390, 1215.
Collins v. Underwood (33 Ark. 265), 704.
Collins v. Wassell (34 Ark. 17), 665, 704.
Collins v. Williamson (94 Ga. 635; 21 S.
E. Rep. 140) , 428.
Collins v. Williamson (94 Ga. 635; 21 S.
E. Rep. 140), 221, 428.
Collinson v. Collinson (3 De G., M. & G.
409), 366.
Collinson v. Lister (7 De G., M.&G.634),
456, 1659.
Collinson v. Patrick (2 Keen, 123), 152.
Collis v. Blackburn (9 Ves. 470) , 837.
Collis v. Collis (2 Sim. 365), 1102, 1203,
1571.
Collis v. Robins (1 De G. & 8m. 139),
1319.
Colllster v. Loud (2 Mich. 309), 1368.
Collcombv. Caldwell (16 N. Y. 484; 24
N. Y. 505), 136S, 1419.
Collyerc. Burnett (Taml. 79), 811.
Collyn v. Dudley (T & R. 421), 1130.
Colman v. Lyne (4 Rand. 454) , 465.
Colman v. Sarel (3 Bro. Ch. 12), 151.
Colman v- Satterfleld (2 Head, 259), 688.
Colmore v. Tyndell (2 Y. & J. 605), 942.
Colonial, etc. Mortgage Co. v. Stevens
(3N. Dak. 265; 55 N. W. Rep. 578),
660.
Colton v. Colton (2 Beav. 67) 638.
. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Colton v. Colton (127 U. S. 300), 120, 130.
Colton v. Fields (28 111. App. 354), 1180,
1422.
Colt v. Lasnier (9 Cow. 320), 1657.
Colton v. Stanford (82 Cal. 351; 16 Am.
St. Rep. 137), 1120.
Coltrane v. Worrall (30 Gratt. 434), 1171.
Columbia Bridge Co. v. Kline (Bright,
N. P. 320), 18.
Columbian Ins. Co. v. Lawrence (2 Pet.
25; 10 Pet. 510), 1029.
Colvin v. Currier (22 Barb. 371), 702.
Colyear v. Mulgrave (2 Keen, 81) , 151.
Colyer v. Finch (5 H. L. Cas. 906), 1036.
Combe v. Brazier (2 Desaus. Eq. 431),
750, 1119.
Combes v. Brooks (L. R. 12 Eq. 61), 868.
Combs v. Little (3 Green Ch. 310; 40
Am. Dec. 207) , 499.
Comb's Case (9 Coke, 75), 1056.
Comer v. Comer (24 111. App. 526; 120 111.
420; 11 N. E. Rep. 848), 75, 1668.
Com. Bank v. Brewer (71 Ala. 571), 1368.
Com. Ex. Ins. Co. v. Babcock (42 N. Y.
613; 1 Am. Rep. 601), 709.
Commercial Nat. Bank v. Armstrong
(39 Fed. Rep. 684) , 1580.
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Scam-
mon (126 111. 355; 9 Am. St. Rep. 607),
1184.
Commeyer t. United Ger. Ch. (2 Sand.
Ch. 186), 28.
Commrs. v. Archbold (11 Ir. Eq. 187),
904.
Commissioners v. Johnson (36 N.J. Eq.
211) , 1055.
Comrs. of Donations v. De Clifford (1
Dr. &. W. 254), 819.
Com. Roads v. MoPherson (1 Spear,
218), 19.
Commissioners v. Walker (6 How.
(Miss.) 143; 38 Am. Dec. 433), 9, 950.
Common Council of Richmond v. State
(5Ind. 334), 747.
Commonwealth v. Canal Commission-
ers (9 Watts, 470), 1130.
Commonwealth v. Cornish (13 Pa. St.
288), 794.
Commonwealth v. Duffleld (2 Jones,
280) , 1011.
Commonwealth v. Martin (5 Muni. 117),
43.
Commonwealth v. Maysville, etc. R.
Co. (21 S. W. Rep. 342), 239.
Commonwealth v. Meteer (16 S. & R.
416), 892.
Commonwealth v. Pauline Home (141
Pa. St. 573), 788.
Commonwealth v. Richards (131 Pa. St.
209), 721.
lxviii
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Commonwealth v. Shelby (13 S. & E.
348), 1194, 1324.
Commonwealth v. Staufier (10 Pa. St.
360), 1042, 1043.
Compton v. Bearoroft (2 Bro. Ch. 158),
842.
Compton v. Bunker Hill Bank (96 111.
30), 562.
Compton v. Collinson (2 Bro. Ch. 377),
24, 720.
Compton v. Pierson (28 N. J. Eq. 229),
708.
Comstock v. Farnham (2 Mass. 96) 1117.
Comatock v. Michael (17 Neb. 288), 1445.
Conant v. Kendall (21 Pick. 36), 1313.
Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co. (1 Pet. 386),
1423.
Conden v. Clerke (Hob. 33) , 634.
Condon v. Barr (49 N. J. L. 53), 709.
Condon n. Maynard (71 Md. 601), 1498,
1600.
Congdon v. Cahoon (48 Vt. 49), 1721.
Cong. Ch. v. Smithwick, In, re (1 W. N.
196), 1123,1130.
Coningham v. Melliah (Pr. Ch. 31), 261.
Conkey v. Dickinson (13 Met. 53), 856,
858.
Oonklln v. Carson (11 111. 503), 1368.
Conklin v. Davis (63 Conn. 377; 28 Atl.
Eep. 637), 106, 747.
Conklin v. Egerton (21 Wend. 430), 1037.
Conklin v. Washington University (2
Md. Ch. 498), 1081.
Conkllng v. Davies (14 Abb. N. Cas.
499), 1744.
Conlin v. Cantrell (61 How. Pr. 313), 699,
709.
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Smith
(117 Mo . 261 ; 22 S. W. Bep . 623) , 420.
Connecticut River Sav. Bank v. Albee
(64 Vt. 571; 25 Atl. Rep. 487), 79, 158.
Connell v. Cole (89 Ala. 381 ; 8 So. Rep.
72), 1615.
Connell v. Ferguson (5 Coldw. 406), 1176.
Connally v. Lyons (82 Tex. 664; 18 S. W.
Rep. 799), 1224.
Connelly v. Connelly (7 Moore P. C.
438), 1044.
Connelly v. Fisher (3 .Tenn. Ch. 382),
492.
Conner v. New Albany (1 Blackf. 88; 12
Am. Dec. 211), 952.
Conners v. Holland (113 Masa. 50), 1460.
Connitt v. Ref. Church (54 N. Y. 651),
796.
Connolly!). Belt (5 Cranch, 405), 1341,
1455.
Connolly v. Keating (102 Mich. 1; 60 N.
W. Rep. 289) , 357.
6onnoru. Follansbeo (59N.H 125), 359.
Connor, In re (2 Jon . & La . 456) , 42.
Connor v. Lewis (16 Me. 268), 198, 369.
Conor v. Edwards (36 S. Car. 563 ; 15 S.
Car. 706), 710.
Conover v. Hoffman (1 Bosw. 214) , 1016.
Conover u. Stothoff (38 N. J. Eq. 55),
1647, 1661.
Conrad v. Douglas (59 Minn. 498; 61 N.
W. Rep. 673) , 64.
Conrad v. Lindley (2 Cal. 173), 191.
Conroe v. Birdsall (1 Johns. Cas. 127),
381.
Conry v. Caulfleld (2 B. & B. 272), 1538.
Constable v. Hardenbergh (4 Hun App.
143) , 1366.
Constant v. Matteson (22 111. 546), 1569,
1690, 1701.
Constant v. Servosa (3 Barb. 128), 1073.
Conteeu. Dawson (2 Bland, 264), 1218.
Continental Nat. Bank v. Weems (69
Tex. 489; 5 Am. St. Rep. 85), 1607.
Converses. Blumrich (14 Mich. 109; 90
Am. Dec. 230) , 576.
Converse v. Noyes (66 N. H. 670; 22 Atl.
Rep. 556), 361, 1638.
Conway i. Conway (3 Bro. Ch. 267), 1529.
Conway, Ex parte (4 Ark. 304), 1411.
Conway v. Penton (L. E. 40 Ch. D. 512),
1154, 1435.
Conway v. Kinsworthy (21 Ark. 9), 364.
Conway v. Smith (13 Wis. 126), 711.
Conyers v. Ennis (2 Mason, 236), 487.
Conybeare, Ex parte (1 W. R. 458), 30,
876.
Conynghamv. Conyngham (1 Vee.522),
882, 883, 884, 889.
Cood ii. Cood (33 Beav. 314), 35.
Cooki;. Addiaon (L. E. 7 Eq. 466), 1174,
1257.
Cook v. Arnham (3 P. Wms. 287), 1536.
Cook v. Barr (44 N. Y. 158) , 48, 51.
Cook v. Basley (123 Mass. 396) , 1479.
Cook v. Berlin Woolen Mills (43 Wis.
423), 1183.
Cook v. Brand (27 Tex. 457), 348.
Cook v. Bronaugh (8 Eng. 190), 442.
Cooki). Crawford (13 Sim. 91), 867, 872,
895, 980, 1013, 1018.
Cook v. Dawson (29Beav. 123), 1325, 1446.
Cook v. Dealy (22 Beav. 196), 238.
Cook v. Dillon (9 Iowa, 407), 946.
Cook v. Duckenfleld (2 Atk. 563), 254,
788.
Cook v. Dyer (47 Mo. 214), 095.
Cook v. Ellington (6 Eq. 371), 129.
Cook v. Fearn (27 M. R. 211) , 104.
Cook v. Fountain (3 Swanst. 566), 160,
173,180, 264,268-
Conk v. Fryer (1 Hare, 498), 880.
Couk v. Husbands (11 Md. 492) , 664.
TABLE OF CASES.
Ixix
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp, 848-1753.]
Cook v. Hutchinson (1 Keen, 50), 238,
243, 260, 161.
Cook, In re (L. R. 4 Ch. D. 464), 1013.
Cook v. Lamotte (15 Beav. 234), 163, 274,
277, 279, 292, 294, 425.
Cook v. Lowry (95 IT. Y. 103), 1692, 1693.
Cook v. Nathan (16 Barb. 342), 505.
Cook v. Patrick (135 111. 499 ; 26 N. E. Rep.
658), 336.
Cook v. Piatt (98 N. T. 35), 618.
Cook o. Sherman (20 Fed. Rep. 167),
1178.
Cook v. Tunis (18 Wall. 341), 2625, 1634.
Cook v. Walker (15 Ga. 459), 108.
Cook v. Walker (2 Vern. 676), 245.
Cook i>. Wiggins (10 Ves. 191) , 724.
Cook v. Williams (1 Green Ch. 209), 461.
Cooke v. Castner (9 Cush. 266), 476, 484.
Cooke v. Cooper (18 Ore. 142), 1504.
Cooke, Ex parte (8 Ves. 353), 1309.
Cooke, Ex parte (L. R. 4 Ch. D. 123), 204,
329,434,534,972, 1187.
Cooke, In re (L. R. 4 Ch. D. 454), 1008.
Cooke v. Platte (98 ST. Y. 35), 616.
Cooke v. Salton (2 S. & S. 154), 980, 983.
Cooke's Contract, In re (L. R. 4 Ch. D.
454), 10S8.
Cookley v. Chamberlain (8 Abb. Pr.
(N. S.) 437; 38 How. Pr. 488; Sweeney
682), 698.
Cookson i7. Reay (5 Beav. 22), 1623.
Cookson «. Richardson (69111. 137), 204,
386, 388, 414, 419, 533.
Cookson v. Toole (59 111. 515), 665, 705.
Cooley v. Brayton (16 Iowa, 10), 452.
Cooley v. Cooley (22 Ga. 178), 678, 6S0.
Coolidge v. Curtis (1 Bond, 232) , 225, 226.
Coombs v. Jordan (3 Bland, 284), 1351.
Coombs v. Little (4 ST. J. Eq. 310; 40 Am.
Dec. 207), 620.
Coon v. Brook (21 Barb. 646), 664, 709.
Coon v. Rigden (4 Colo. 275), 705.
Cooney v. Woodburn (33 Md. 320) , 672.
Coonrodn. Coonrod (6 Ohio, 114), 987.
Coons v. North (27 Mo. 73), 1502.
Coope v. Arnold (4 De G. , M. & G. 585) ,
91.
Coope v. Lowerre (1 Barb. Ch. 45) 869.
Cooper v. Alger (51 N. H. 172), 708.
Cooper v. Cartwright (1 Johns. 679),
978.
Coopers. Cockrum (87 Ind. 443), 308.
Cooper v. Cooper (61 Miss. 676), 1583.
Cooper v. Cooper (1 Halst. Ch. 9), 977.
Cooper v. Day(lRich. Eq. 36), 1221,
1401, 1560.
Cooper v. Hornsby (71 Ala. 62), 1514.
Cooper v. Kynock (L. R. 7 Ch. App.
398), 926, 942, 943.
Cooper v. Lee (75 Tex. 114), 1534.
Cooper v. McClure (16111. 435), 877, 1569,
1718.
Cooper v. McDonald (L. R. 16 Eq. 258),
1529.
Cooper v. McDonald (L. R. 7 Ch. D.
288), 669, 1277.
Cooper v. Martin (L. R. 3 Ch. App. 47),
623.
Cooper v. Martin (4 East, 76), 837.
Cooper v. Merritt (30 Ark. 686), 586.
Cooper v. Reilley (2 Sim. 560), 38.
Cooper v. Skeele (14 Iowa, 678), 270, 357.
Cooper v. Thornton (3 Bro. Ch. 186),
184.
Cooper v. Weston (1 N. Y. Supl. 601),
1616, 1737.
Cooper v. Wyatt (5 Madd. 489), 1291.
Cooper's Estate (30 W. N. C. 532), 1338.
Coos Bay Wagon Co. v. Crocker (6
Sawy. 574; 4 Ted. Rep. 577), 577.
Cope v. Clark (18 W. R. 279), 1692.
Cope v. Cope (2 Salk. 449), 1324.
Copeland v. Johnson Mfg. Co. (47 Hun,
235), 411.
Copeland v. Merc. Ins. Co. (6 Pick.
196) , 382, 389, 414, 415.
Copeland v. Summers (138 Ind. 219; 35
N. E. Rep. 514), 87,88,161.
Copeman v. Gallant '(1 P. Wms. 314),
29,972.
Coppage v. Gregg (127 Ind. 359; 26 N. E.
Rep. 903), 211.
Coppardu. Allen (2DeG., J. &S. 173),
1232.
Coppedge v. Threadgill (3 Sneed, 577),
675.
Coppin v. Eernyhough (2Bro. Ch. 291),
399, 1159.
Coquardti. Chariton Co. (14 Fed. Rep.
203), 1005.
Corbaley v. State (81 Ind. 62), 839.
Corbet v. Corbet (L. R. 7 Eq. 456), 128.
Corbet v. Laurens (5 Rich. Eq. 301),
608, 1434.
Corbet v. Tottenham (1 B. & B. 59), 832,
841.
Corbett v. Brock (20 Beav. 524), 292.
Corbettn. Daly (82Mich. 600;46 N. W.
Rep. 671), 372.
Corbin v. French (4 Ves. 418) , 638.
Corbin v. Wilson (2 Atk. 207), 839.
Corbin v. Wilson (2 Ashm. 208), 837,
839, 1561.
Corbitu. Smith (7 Iowa, 60), 71.
Corcoran v. Corcoran (119 Ind. 138; 12
Am. St. Rep. 390), 714.
Cordal's Case (Coke, 96a), 1326.
Cordel v. Noden (2 Vern. 148), 244.
Corder v. Morgan (18 Ves. 344), 1442,
1460.
lxx
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Cordes v. Adrian (1 Hill Oh. 154), 1437.
Cordova Coal Co. v. Long (91 Ala. 638),
673.
Cordova v. Hood (17 Wall. 1), 241, 672.
Cordova, In re (4 Eedf . 66), 1553.
Cordova v. Lee (14 S. W. Rep. 208), 57.
Cordwell's Estate, In re (L. E. 20 Eq.
644) , 676, 678.
Cordwill v. Mackrill (2 Eden, 344), 104.
Corey v. Gertchen (2 Madd. 40), 1223.
Corley v. Stafford (IDeG. & J. 238),
419, 514.
Coolies v. Howland (26 N. J. Eq. 311),
576, 580.
Cormerais v. Genella (22 Cal. 116),
1615, 1517.
Corn v. Sims (3 Mete. 391), 1408.
Cornford v. Elliott (L. B. 27 Ch. D. 318;
L. R. 29 Ch. D. 947), 813.
Cornell, In re (110 N. Y. 351), 1113, 1135,
1401.
Cornell v. Newkirk (144 111. 241), 1507.
Cornfooke v. Fowke (6Mees. & W.368),
481.
Corning v. Christ Church (33 N. Y. St.
Eep. 766), 19.
Corning v. Gould (16 Wend. 631), 984.
Corning v. Greene (23 Barb. 33), 1054.
Corning v. White (2 Paige, 577), 1331,
1332, 1408.
Cornish v. Wilson (6 Gill, 318), 1320, 1356.
Cornthwaite v. Frithe (4 De G. & S.
552), 1317.
Cornwell v. Orton (126 Mo. 355; 27 S. W.
Eep. 536), 1265.
Cornwise v. Bourgum (2 Ga. Dec. 15),
1218.
Corporation Sons of Clergy v. Mose (9
Sim. 610), 785.
Corrothers v. Harris (23 W. Va. 177),
1607.
Corse v. Leggett (25 Barb. 394), 48.
Corson v. Murray (3 Paige, 483), 723.
Cortelyon v. Van Brundt (2 Johns. 357),
952.
Cory v. Gertschen (2 Madd. 40), 27.
Corya v. Corya (119 Ind. 593) , 1189.
Cosley v. Ferguson (3 J. J. Marsh. 264),
1298.
Cosser v. Eadford (1 De G., J. & S. 585),
1257.
Costabadiei>. Costabadle (5 Hare, 410),
997, 1001.
Costeker v. Harrox (3 Y. & C. 530), 1571.
Goster v. Coster (9 Sim. 697), 678.
Coster v. Griswold (4 Edw. Ch. 377), 38.
Coster v. Lorillard (14 Wend. 265) , 31.
Coster v. Murray (5 Johns. Ch. 522; 20
Johns. 52), 461, 1537.
Cotham v. West (1 Beav. 381), 988
Cothay v. Lydenham (2 Bro. Ch. 391),
1196.
Cott v. Lasnier (9 Cow. 320), 456.
Cottam v. Eastern R. E. Co. (1 J. & H.
243), 1128, 1234.
Cotteenv. Missing (1 Madd. 176), 151,
156.
Cotterell v. Hampson (2 Vern. 5), 9.
Cotterell v. Long (20 Ohio, 464), 1442.
Cotterell v. Purchase (Cas. t. Talb. 63),
1540.
Cottington v. Fletcher (2 Atk. 155), 66,
67, 2 2, 358.
Cottman v. Grace (112 N. Y. 299), 1524.
Cottle v. Harold (72 Ga. 830), 309.
Cottle v. Payne (3 Day, 289), 984.
Cotton v. Hart (1 A. E. Marsh. 56), 453.
Cotton v. Holliday (59 111. 176), 193.
Cotton v. Wood (25 Iowa, 45), 237, 335,
339, 366, 456.
Cottrell v. Cottrell (12 Jur. 285), 1241.
Coughlin v. Seago (53 Ga. 250), 932.
Coulman, In re (L. R. 30 Ch. D. 186), 632.
Coulter v. Robinson (24 Miss. 278; 57
Am. Dec. 168) , 922,. 925, 942.
County v. Herrington (50 111. 239), 365.
Courcier v. Ritter (4 Wash. 549) , 987.
Course v. Humphrey (26 Beav. 402; 5
Jur. (N. S.) 616), 1679.
Coursey v. Morton (132 N. Y. 556), 1363,
1391.
Court v. Robarts (1 CI. & F. 64), 1219.
Courtenay v. Courtenay (3 Jon. & La.
513), 890.
Courtier, In re (L. R. 34 Ch. D. 136), 1154.
Courtney v. Rumley (I. R. 6 Eq. 112),
1058. .
Courtney v. Taylor (6 M. & Gr. 861), 881.
Cousins v. Wall (3 Jones Eq. 43), 231,
500, 518, 525.
Coutanti). Catlin (2 Sandf. Ch. 485),
1678.
Coutts V. Acworth (L. E. 8 Eq. 558) , 163,
272, 274, 277, 293.
Covar v. Cantelon (25 S. Car. 35) 1729.
Covenhoven v. Shuler (2 Paige, 122) ,
1437.
Coventry v. Attorney-General (7 Bro.
P. C. 235), 1675.
Coventry v. Coventry (1 Keen, 758), 897,
902.
Coventry v. Coventry (2 P. Wms. 229),
27, 622.
Coventry v. Higgins (8 Jur. 182), 1043,
1044.
Coverts. Rogers (38 Mich. 363), 1411.
Coverdale v. Aldrich (19 Pick. 391) , 1387.
Covington v. Gillott (1872, W. N. 275),
683.
Cowan v. Lakey (80 N. Y. 345), 198.
TABLE OF CASES.
lxxi
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Cowan's Appeal (24 P. F. Smith, 329),
288.
Cowan's Estate, In re (4 Pa. Dist. Eep.
435) , 776.
Cowbry v. McMichael (19 Ala. 751), 941.
Cowdrey v. Turner (85 Hun, 461), 1447.
Cowee v. Cornell (75 N. T. 91; 31 Am.
Eep. 428), 285, 287.
Cowen v. Einaldo (82 Hun, 479; 31 N. T.
Supl. 554), 106.
Cowery-n. Day (5 Jur. (N. S.) 1199), 425.
Cowles v. Marble (37 Mich. 168), 1518.
Cowley v. Hartstonage (1 Dow. 361),
1119.
Cowling v. Douglas (4 Ala. 206), 1750.
Cowman v. Colquhon (60 Md. 127), 969.
Cowman v. Harrison (10 Hare, 234), 52.
Cowper v. Cowper (2 P. Wms. 719) , 558.
Cowper v. Stoneman (68 L. T. 18 ; 3 Eep.
242), 1248, 1587.
Cowperthwaite v. First Nat'l Bank (102
Pa. St. 397), 500,520, 525.
Cox v. Ambrose (1 P. Wms. 321) , 358.
Cox v. Arnsman (76 Ind. 210), 221, 239.
Cox v. Bennett (1891, 1 Ch. 617), 667.
Cox v. Blanden, (1 Watts, 533; 26 Am.
Deo. 83), 1109.
Coxp. Cox (1 Kay & J. 261), 1075.
Cox v. Cox (Peck. 443) , 397, 401.
Cox v. Cox (5 Bleh. Eq. 365), 219, 525.
Cox v. Dolman (2 DeG., M. & G. 592),
820, 1538.
Cox v. Fenwick (3 Bibb, 183), 569.
Cox, In re (L. E. 7 Ch. D. 204), 813.
Cox v. John (32 Ohio St. 532) , 399.
Coxu. Sprigg (6Md. 274), 152.
Cox v. Walker (26 Me. 504) , 949, 950, 1122,
1265.
Coid. Williams (6 Jones Eq. 150), 995.
Cox v. Wood (20 Ind. 54), 575.
Coykendall v. Butherford (1 Green Ch.
360), 1013.
Coyle v. Davis (20 Wis. 564), 231, 500, 518,
625.
Coyote, etc. Co. v. Buble (8 Ore. 284),
231, 500, 518.
Coysegame, Ex parte (1 Atk. 192), 680,
976.
Cozine v. Graham (2 Paige, 177), 61,
67.
Cozzens' Estate, In re (2 Con. Surr. 622;
15 N. Y. Supl. 771), 1022, 1237.
Crabb v. Crabb (1 Myl. & K. 511), 850.
Crabb v. Toung (92 N. T. 56), 1113, 1120,
1228.
Craekett v. Bethune (1 J. & W. 122), 386,
1217, 1255.
Oraddockt). Stewart (6 Ala. 77), 1242.
Cradock v. Owen (2 Sm. & GIf. 241), 966,
1277
Cradock jj. Piper (1 Macn. & G. 664),
1709.
Craft v. Lathrop (2 Wall. Jr. 103), 38.
Crafts v. Dougherty (69 Tex. 477; 6 S.
W. Eep. 850), 570, 1454.
Craigdaillie v. Aikman (1 Dow. P. C.
1), 796, 801.
Craig v. Craig (3 Barb. Ch. 116) , 147, 896,
901,974, 1036, 1038,1072.
Craig v. Hobbs (44 Ind. 363), 478.
Craig v. Hone (2 Edw. 554), 30, 31.
Craig v. Leslie (3 Wheat. 563), 43, 267,
262, 299, 300.
Craig v. Phillips (L. E. 3Ch. D. 722), 494.
Craig v. Eadford (3 Wheat. 694), 28.
Craig v. Secrist (54 Ind. 419), 734, 747.
Craig v. Ward (3 Keyes, 393), 476.
Craig jj. Zimmerman (87 Mo. 475), 445.
Cram v. Mitchell (1 Sandf. 251), 390, 416,
1184.
Cramer v. Hoose (93 111. 503) , 213, 313.
Cramer v. Watson (73 Ala. 127), 1514.
Crampton v. Prince (83 Ala. 246; 3 Am.
St. Eep. 718; 3 So. Rep. 519), 573,
582.
Crandalli). Grow (41 N. J. Eq. 482), 560.
Crane v. Crane (4 Gray, 323) , 949.
Crane v. Drake (2 Vera. 616), 455,1655.
Crane v. Hearn (26 N. J. Eq. 378), 1122.
Crane v. Palmer (8 Blackf . 120) , 589.
Crane v. Eeeder (21 Mich. 25), 967.
Cransonj). Cranson (4 Mich. 230), 553.
Cranston v. Crane (97 Mass. 415), 1103,
1453, 1456, 1459, 1460.
Cranston v. Johnson (5 Ves. 278) , 35.
Cranston v. Plumb (54 Barb. 59), 724.
Crassen v. Swoveland (22 Ind. 428), 450.
Crauford v. Hunter (8 T. E. 13), 1029.
Crave v. Decker (22 Hun, 453), 1021.
Craven v. Craddock (W. N., 1868, p. 29),
1119.
Crawford v. Cresswell (55 Ala. 497), 829.
Crawford v. Glnn (35 Iowa, 543), 1569.
Crawford, In re (113 N. T. 560), 1706.
Crawford v. Manson (82 Ga. 118), 316.
Crawford v. Eussell (62 Barb. 97), 544.
Crawford v. Thompson (142 Pa. St. 551;
21 Atl. Eep. 994), 348.
Crawford's Appeal (61 Pa. St. 52), 96,
156.
Crawford's Trusts, In re (2 Drew. 230),
638.
Crawshay v. Collins (1 Jac. & Walk.
279), 194, 196.
Creagh v. Blood (3 Jon. & La. 133), 977.
Creagh v. Wilson (2 Vern. 572), 1043,
1044.
Creath v. Sims (5 How. 192), 562.
Creatonp. Creaton (3 Sm. & Gif. 386),
927, 937. 1327.
Ixxii
TABLE OP CASES.
[The references are to pages • Vol
Creed v. Lancaster Bank (1 Ohio St. j
1),308,354,362, 363,369.
Creigh v. Henson (10 Gratt. 231), 1537.
Creighton v. Klngle (3 S. Car. 77), 457,
969, 1215, 1660.
Crerar v. Williams (145 111. 625; 34 N. E.
Rep. 467), 737, 747.
Cresinger v. Welsh (15 Ohio, 193), 1024.
Cressman's Appeal (42 Pa. St. 147; 82
Am. Dec. 498), 55.
Cressonu. Ferree (70 Pa. St. 446), 1012,
1092.
Cresson's Appeal (30 Pa. St. 437), 749.
Cresswell a. Cresswell (L. R. 6 Eq. 69),
732, 813, 935.
Cresswell v. Dewell (4 Gift 460), 1223,
1591, 1596.
Creuze v. Hunter (2 Cox, 242), 844, 1346.
Crevelling v. Fritts (34 N. J. Bq. 134),
987.
Crewe v. Dicken (4 Ves. 100), 895, 896,
974, 1005, 1013, 1089, 1123, 1243, 1341.
Crichton v. Crichton (L. R. (1895) 2 Ch.
D. 853), 1562.
Cricket i). Dolby (3Ves. 10), 354, 839, 840.
Cridland's Estate (132 Pa. St. 479), 934.
Crippen v. Morss (49 N. T. 63), 1059.
Crise's Estate, In re (7 N. T. Supl. 202) ,
65.
Crisp v. Crisp (65 Md. 422), 753.
Crispin v. Dubois (-4 Barb. 393), 424, 426,
431.
Crispins. Taylor (2 Hill Ch. 434), 405.
Crissman v. Crissman (23 Mich. 218), 73.
Crist v. Hovis (12 N. J. Eq. 84), 878.
Crocheron v. Jacques (3 Edw. Ch. 207),
50.
Crocker v. Crocker (31 N. Y. 507; 88 Am.
Dec. 291) , 1627.
Crocker i>. Dillon (133 Mass. 91), 864, 856.
Crocker v. Lowenthal (83 111. 579), 878,
879, 883.
Crocker v. Robertson (8 Iowa, 404),
1442,1515.
Crockett v. Crockett (1 Hare, 451), 183.
Crockett v. Crockett (2Phill. 553), 229.
Crockett v. Doriot (85 Va. 240), 711.
Croft v. Adam (12 Sim. 639), 167, 614, 625.
Croft v. Powell (1 Comyns, 603), 1442.
Croft v. Slee (4 Ves. 60), 11.
Crotton v. Ormsby (2 Sen. & Let. 583),
432.
Cromie v. Bull (81 Ky. 646), 996, 1120,
1198, 1228.
Cromies v. Louisville, etc. Soc. (3
Bush, 365), 747.
Crommelin v. Crommelin (3 Ves. 227),
1043, 1044.
Crompe r. Barrow (4 Ve9. 681) , 640.
Crompton v. Vasser (19 Ala. 259), 151.
I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Crook v. Glenn (30 Md. 55), 1536.
Crook v. Ingoldsby (2 Ir. Eq. 375), 864,
868, 878.
Crooks. Rindskopf (34 Hun, 457), 1389,
1404.
Crooke v. King's Co. (97 N. T. 421), 612,
1746, 1747.
Crooks v. Crooks (34 Ohio St. 610), 651,
686.
Crop v. Norton (2 Atk. 75), 307, 314,
399.
Cropley v. Cooper (19 Wall. 174), 299.
Cropper's Case (1 De G., M. & G. 147),
1033.
Cropster v. Griffith (2 Bland, 5), 27.
Cropsy v. McKinney (30 Barb. 47), 722.
Crosby v. Hillyer (24 Wend. 280), 1392,
1393.
Crosby v. Houston (1 Tex. 203), 909.
Crosland v. Hall (6 Stew: 111), 481.
Crosley, Jure (L. R. 35 Ch. D. 266), 1540.
Cross v. Allen (141 U. S. 528; 12 S. Ct.
Rep. 710), 1498.
Cross v. Bevan (2 Sim. 53), 1563.
Cross v. Lewis (4 Dowl. & Ry. 239; 2 B.
&C. 688), 984.
Cross v. Nat. Fire Ins. Co. (132 N. T.
133), 33.
Cross v. Peters (1 Me. 376), 487.
Cross v. Petree (10 B. Mon. 413), 1222.
Cross v. Smith (7 East, 258), 1142, 1221.
Crossman, In re (20 How. Pr. 350), 894,
1038.
Cross' Estate, In re (1 Sim. (N. S.) 260),
238.
Crouse v. Frothingham (97 N. T. 105),
1407.
Crow v. Ballard (1 Ves. Jr. 220; 3 Bro.
Ch. 117), 393,413, 480.
Crowley «. Crowley (7 Sim. 427), 1168.
Orowther, Inre(L. R. (1895) 2 Ch. 56;
13 Rep. 496), 988.
Croxton v. May (L. R. 9 Eq. 404), 674,
682, 684.
Croxall's Estate, In re (162 Pa. St. 579;
29 Atl. Rep. 790), 736.
Orowther v. Crowther (23Beav. 305),
1536.
Croxall v. Sherrard (5 Wall. 268), 181,
912,914,946, 1277,1557.
Crozier 71. Crozier (2 Con. & Laws. 311),
113.
Crozier v. Hoyt (97 111. 23), 626.
Cruger v. Cruger (5 Barb. 227), 698.
Crugert;. Halliday (11 Paige, 314), 888,
889, 890, 896, 897, 899, 974, 1736, 17j)0.
Cruger v. Jones (18 Barb. 467), 992,
1105, 1752.
Cruikshank v. Duffin (L. R. 13 Eq. 555),
1446.
TABLE OF CASES.
Ixxiii
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
«_ Mnnre IM V_ .T. H!n. 4361. 1049. Curd ?j. Williams (18 S. W. Ret).
Crura v. Moore (14 N. J. Eq. 436), 1049,
1050.
Crumb, Ex parte (2 Johns. Ch. 489), 826.
Cruse v. Axtell (50 lad. 49) , 735, 747.
Cruse v. Barley (3 P. Wins. 20), 252, 258,
259, 2C9, 301.
Crutcherti. Hoard (4 Bush, 360), 525, 526.
Crutehfleld, Ex parte (S Yerg. 336), 827.
Crutchfield v. Haynes (14 Ala. 49), 1051.
Cruwys v. Colman (9 Ves. 319), 52, 127,
627,632,637, 1000.
Cuff v. Hall (Uur. (ST. S.) 973), 1099,
1085.
Cull, In re (L. E. 20 Eq. 561), 1680.
Culley, Ex parte (L. E. 9 Ch. D. 307),
1138.
Cullingworth v. Lloyd (2 Beav. 385),
663.
Culpepper v. Aston (2 Ch. Cas. 115),
242, 1081, 1652.
Culrossa. Gibbons (130 N. T. 447), 1744.
Cumberland v. Codrington (3 Johns.
Ch. 261), 153, 1146, 1325.
Cumberland v. Graves (9 Barb. 695),
1746, 1749.
Cumberland Coal Co. v. Hoffman (18
Md. 456), 405.
Cumberland Coal Co. v. Sherman (30
Barb. 553), 207,390,391,405,408, 414,
1243.
CummiDg v. Landed Bank, etc. Co.
(22 Can. S. C. Eep. 246), 1230.
Cummlng n. Williamson (1 Sandf. Ch.
17), 664, 1032, 1073.
Cummings v. Corey (58 Mich. 494), 1297.
Cummings v. Fulham (13 Vt. 134), 1117-
Cummings v. Moore (61 Miss. 184), 576.
Cummins v. Carricks (2 S. W. Kep.
490), 1036.
Cummins v. Cummins (3 Jon. & La.
64), 881, 882, 884, 885.
Cunard v. Atl. Ins. Co. (1 Pet. 448), 326.
Cunliffe v. Brancker (L. E. 3 Ch. D.
393), 929.
Cunliffe v. Cunliffe (Amb. 686), 128.
Cunning v. Eobins (39 N. J. Eq. 46), 358.
Cunningham v. Bell (83 N. Car. 328),
308, 346.
Cunningham v. Freeborn (11 Wend.
240; 1 Edw. Ch. 256), 1376, 1379, 1380,
1407.
Cunningham, Inre(h. E. (1891) 2 Ch.
567), 1261.
Cunningham v. McKindley (22 Ind.
149) , 1533, 1534, 1537.
Cunningham v. Moody (1 Ves. 174), 963.
Cunninghams. Pell (5 Paige Ch. 607),
1224, 1233, 1588.
Cunningham v. Schley (6 Gill, 208),
1100.
Curds. Williams (18 S. W. Eep. 634),
602.
Curdy v. Berton (79 Cal. 420; 2 Am. St.
Eep. 157), 508, 510, 513.
Curling v. Austin (2 D. & S. 129),
1034,1072.
Curling v. Cuttleworth (6 Bing. 121),
1442.
Curnick i>. Tucker (L. E. 17 Eq. 320),
123.
Curran v. Green (18 E. I. 329; 27 Atl.
Eep. 596), 30,876.
Curran's Appeal (4 Pa. St. 331), 787.
Currant v. Jago (1 Coll. 262), 353.
Currie v. Hart (2 Sandf. Ch. 353), 1367.
Currier v. Green (2 N. H. 225), 394.
Curry v. Curry (87 Ky. 667; 9 S. W. Eep.
831), 398.
Curry v. Hill (18 W. Va. 370), 1486, 1487.
Curson v. African Co. (1 Vern. 121;
Skinner, 84), 697.
Curtin v. Blair (26 Miss. 309 ; 59 Am. Dec.
259), 449.
Curtin v. Curtin (58 Hun, 607; UN. T.
Supl. 938), 373.
Curre v. Bowyer (5 Beav. 6), 304.
Curtis v. Chandler (6 Madd. 123), 897,
902,1062.
Curtis v. Engel (2 Sandf. Ch. 287), 664,
698.
Curtis v. Eulbrook (8 Hare, 28), 1037.
Curtis v. Hitchcock (10 Paige, 399), 441.
Curtis v. Hutton (14 Ves. 537), 810.
Curtis v. Leavitt (15 N. T. 9), 563, 1368,
1412.
Curtis v. Lukin (5 Beav. 147), 1159, 1161.
Curtis v. Price (12 Ves. 82), 920, 925, 942.
Curtisv. Smith (60 Barb. 9), 37,905,1742.
Curtis v. Smith (6 Blatchf. 537), 142, 847,
897, 902, 1743.
Curtis' Estate, In re (37 N. T. Supl. 586;
15 Misc. Eep. 545), 1688, 1707.
Curtiss v. Brown (29 111. 201), 1742.
Curtst). Cissna (7 Biss. 260), 414.
Cusacki' Cusack (5Bro. P, C. 116), 90,
101, 102.
Cusan v. Hinman (16 Bosw. 8), 415.
CushiDgji. Blake (30 N. J. Eq. 689), 91,
102, 114,1264,1277.
Cushingn. Danforth (76 Me. 114), 417.
Cushmans. Bonfleld (139111. 219; 28 N.
E. Eep. 937), 222, 1258.
Cushman v. Coleman (92 Ga. 772; 19 S. E.
Eep. 46), 915.
Cushman v. Stone (69 111. 516), 1094.
Cushney v. Henry (4 Paige, 344), 60, 250.
Custance v. Cunningham (13 Beav. 363),
242, 292, 294.
Cuthbert v. Chauvet (136 N. T. 326),
1715, 1750, 1751.
Ixxiv
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Cutler ©. Ammon (65 Iowa, 281), 575.
Cutler ©. Boyd (60 L. T. 859), 1193.
Cutler ©. Butler (25 N. H. 343), 665.
Cutler©. Griswold (Walk. Ch. 437), 354.
Cutler ©. Hardy (48 Cal. 868), 616.
Cutler ©. Howe (8 Mass. 257), 470.
Cutler, In re (14 Beav. 220) , 678.
Cutler ©. Johnson (8 Mass. 266) , 470.
Cutler ©. Tuttle (19 N. J. Bq. 549), 256,
308, 312, 313, 354, 370, 662.
Cutting ©. Cutting (20 Hun, 371), 944.
Cutts ©. Salmon (5 Bng. L. & Eq. 95),
206.
D.
Dabney ©. Manning (3 Ohio, 321), 928,
940.
Da Costa ©. De Pas (Amb. 228; 2Swanst.
487; 1 Dick. 258; 1 Vern. 251), 757,
810.
Da Cunha, Goods of (1 Hag. 237), 847.
D'Adhemar ©. Bertrand (35 Beav. 19),
1431.
Dages ©. Lee (20 W. Va. 584), 711.
Daggett ©. White (128 Mass. 398), 879.
Daggs ©. Bwell (3 Woods, 844), 203.
D'Aguilar v. Drlnkwater (2 V. & B. 225),
1046.
Dailey v. City of New Haven (60 Conn.
314; 22 Atl. Rep. 945), 596, 903.
Dailey ©. Kastell (56 Wis. 444), 379.
Dailey ©. Newhaven (60 Conn. 314), 19.
Dakin ©. Deming (6 Paige, 95) , 1687.
Dalbiac©. Dalbiac (16 Ves. 116), 657.
Dale & Co., Esc parte (L. K. 11 Ch. D. 772),
1626.
Dale ©. Hamilton (2 Phill. Ch. 266) 60.
Dale v. Robinson (51 Vt. 20; 31 Am. Kep.
669), 664, 711.
Dallas ©. Heard (32 Ga. 104), 664, 705.
Dalston ©. Coatsworth (1 P. Wms. 731),
658.
Da'lton ©. Dean (2 Bro. Ch. 634), 244.
Dalton ©. Jones (51 Miss. 585), 836.
Daley v. Desbouverie (2 Atk. 261), 1041,
1045, 1046.
Daly u.Bernsteln (28 Pac. Rep. 764),
880.
Dalzell©. Crawford (1 Pars. Eq. 57),
1653.
Dambman v. Schulting (75 N. T. 55),
490.
Dame ©. Aunas (Dyer, 219), 1079.
Dameron©. Eskridge (104 N. Car. 621),
1451.
Dameron ©. Jamison (4 Mo. App. 299),
492.
Dames v. Treadwell (L. R. ISCh.D.
531), 653.
Dana ©. Bank of U. S. (5 Watts A S.
224), 10, 1411.
Dana©. Dana (154 Mass. 491; 28 N. E.
Rep. 9C5), 241.
Dana j). Harrington (4 Minn. 433), 1098,
1109, 1489.
Dana v. Goodfellow (51 Minn. 375; 63 N.
W. Rep. 656), 209.
Dana ©. Lull (17 Vt. 390), 1368.
Dana ©. Murray (122 N. Y. 604; 26 N. E.
Rep. 21), 612.
Dana v. Newhall (13 Mass. 498), 445.
Dance ©. Dance (56 Md. 433), 576, 580.
Dance ©. Goldingham (L. R. 8Ch. App.
902), 1101, 1118,1138.
Dance ©. Seaman (11 Gratt. 778), 1369.
Dandridge ©. Minge (4 Rand. 397), 1322.
Daniel ©. Daniel (6 B. Mon. 230), 956,
1266.
Daniel©. Davidson (16 Ves. 249), 595.
Daniel v. Eain (5 Lea, 258), 1690.
Daniel v. Hill (52 Ala. 430), 286.
Daniel v. Mitchell (1 Story, 172), 472.
Daniel v. Newton (8 Beav. 485), 845.
Daniel v. North (11 East, 374), 984.
Daniel©. Sorrel (9 Ala. 436), 435.
Daniel v. Wharteuby (17 Wall. 639),
107.
Daniels©. Daniels (9 Colo. 133), 721.
Daniels v. Davidson (16 Ves. 249), 432.
Daniels, Ex parte (14 R. I. '500), 1415,
1418.
Daniels v. Memphis (11 Humph. 582),
1217.
Danser v. Warwick (33 N. J. Eq. 133),
73.
Danville Sem. v. Mott (136 111. 289), 788.
Darby v. Darby (2 Atk. 399), 654.
Darby v. Gilligan (37 W. Va. 59; 16 S. E.
Rep. 607), 1673, 1674, 1702.
D'Arcy©. Blake (2 Sch. &Lef. 387), 963,
1277.
Darcy ©. Kelly (153 Mass. 433), 746, 748.
Darke ©. Martyn (1 Beav. 525), 1102,
1129, 1203.
Darke ©. Williamson (25 Beav. 622), 992,
1101.
Darley ©. Darley (3 Atk. 399), 146, 651,
686, 932.
Darley ©. Singleton (Wightw. 25), 480.
Darling©, Harmon (47 Minn. 166; 49 N.
W. Rep. 686), 1258.
Darling©. Potts (118 Mo. 506; 24 S. W.
Rep. 461), 1186.
Darling©. Rogers (22 Wend. 483), 1362.
Darlington v. McCool (1 Leigh, 36),
151.
Darlington ©. Putney (Cowp. 260), 1009.
Darnaby©. Watts (13 Ky. Law Rep.
457), 1022, 1230.
TABLE OF OASES.
lxxv
[Tho references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Darnall v. Smith (26Gratt. 878), 711.
D'Arnay v. Chesneau (13 Mees. & W.
809), 975.
Darrah v. McNair (1 Ash. 240), 144, 967.
Darrenberger v. Haupt (10 Nev. 43),
708.
Dart v. Bagley (110 Mo. 42 ; 19 S. W. Rep.
311), 1477.
Dart v. Houston (22 Ga. 506), 1719, 1721.
Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4
Wheat. 518), 9,19, 21, 781.
Darwin v. Upton (2 Saund. 175), 985.
Daseomb v. Marston (80 Me. 223), 734,
935, 948,956.
Dashielrc. Attorney-General (5 Har. &
J. 392 ; 6 Har. & J. 1 ; 9 Am. Dec. 572) ,
22, 83, 254, 255, 753, 808.
Dashwood v. Bulkeley (10 Ves. 230),
1045, 1046.
Dashwood v. Blwall (2 Oh. Cas. 56),
1173.
Da Silvan. Turner (166 Mass. 407; 44 N.
E. Rep. 532), 1447, 1477.
Daubeney v. Cockburn (1 Meriv. 638) ,
435.
Daugars v. Rivaz (28 Beav. 233), 782.
Daughaday v. Paine (6 Minn. 443), 576.
Davant v. Guerard (1 Spear, 242), 958,
Davenport v. Coltman (12 Sim. 588),
258.
Davenport v. Farrar (1 Scam. 314), 946.
Davenport v. Lawrence (19 Tex. 317),
1690.
Davenport v. Lowry (78 Ga. 89), 1542.
Davenport v. McCole (28 Ind. 495), 1400.
Davenport v. Murray (68 Mo. 198), 576.
Davenport Plow Co. v. Lamp (80 Iowa,
722; 45 N. W. Rep. 1049), 1603.
Daversu. Dewes (3 P. Wms. 40), 245.
Davey v. Durrant (1 De G. & J. 536), 606,
1073, 1471, 1472, 1475, 1483, 1484.
Davidson v. Coon (125 Ind. 497), 1352.
Davidsons. Foley (2Bro. Ch. 203), 242.
Davidsons. Kemper (79 Ky. 5), 1289,
1301.
Davidson v. Moore (14 S. Car. 251), 1215.
1260.
Davie v. Hooper (6Bro. P. C. 61), 1528.
Davies ». Cooper (5Myl. & Cr. 270), 495.
Daviesu. Davies (L. R. 36 Ch. D. 364),
810.
Davits v. Davies (4 Beav. 54), 90, 92,
101, 102, 105.
Davies v. Hodgson (25 Beav. 177), 1194.
Davies v. Jones (L. R. 24 Ch. D. 190),
1072.
Davies v. London, etc. Ins. Co. (L. R.
8Ch. D. 469), 295.
Davies v. Otty (33 Beav. 640), 67.
Davies v. Ridge (3 Esp. 101), 1048.
Davies v. Thornycroft (6 Sim. 426), 6',9.
Davies v. Topp (IBro. Ch. 524), 1324.
Davilla v. Davilla (2 Ver. 724), 100.
Davis v. Atkinson (5 T. R. 434), 686.
Davis v. Beardham (1 Ch. Cas. 30),
437.
Davis v. Bemis (40 N. Y. 453), 476.
Davis v. Bigler (62 Pa. St. 241), 453.
Davis v. Cain (1 Ired. Eq. 304), 110.
Davis v. Chambers (7 De G., M. & G.
386), 1529.
Davis v. Charles River R. R. (11 Cush.
506), 949, 951.
Davis v. Chicago Dock Co. (129 111. ISO),
1395, 1408.
Davis v. Christian (15 Gratt. 11), 1650.
Davis v. Coburn (128 Mass. 377), 73, 1718.
Davis v. Davis (88 Ga. 191; 14 S. E. Rep.
194), 240.
Davis v. Davis (3 Binn. 432), 246.
Davis v. Davis (1 Hem. &M. 255), 1000.
Davis v. Davis (43 Ind. 561), 651, 686.
Davis v. Drew (6 N. H. 399), 1313.
Davis v. Dunne (46 Iowa, 684), 285.
Davis v. Dysart (20 Beav. 405), 1428.
Davis v. First Nat. Bank (5 Neb. 242; 25
Am. Rep. 484), 708.
Davis v. Hamlin (108111. 39; 48 Am. Dec.
541), 416, 1718.
Davis v. Harkness (1 Gilm. 173), 836.
Davis 4). Harman (21 Gratt. 194), 1135,
1209.
Davis v. Hess (103 Mo. 31), 1481.
Davis v. Hodgson (25 Beav. 187), 1592.
Davis v. Hoover (112 Ind. 423), 858, 1072.
Davis v. Howcote (1 Dev. & B. Eq. 460),
1085.
Davis v. Inhabitants of Barnstable (154
Mass. 224), 737.
Davis, In re (L. R. 13 Eq. 163), 620, 990.
Davis v. Jenkins (L. R. 6 Ch. D. 728),
697.
Davis v. Jenkins (3 V. & B. 156), 801.
Davis v. Jennings (3 Tenn. Ch. 241),
710.
Davis v. Lamb (30 Mo. 441), 576.
Davis v. London, etc. Co. (L. R. 8 Ch.
D. 469), 563.
Davis v. Marlborough (1 Swanst. 79),
38.
Davis v. Marlborough (2 Swanst. 139),
282.
Davis v. McNeil (1 Ired. Eq. 344), 1123.
Davis v. Newton (6 Met. 637), 678.
Davis v. Ney (125 Mass. 590; 28 Am. Dec.
272) , 956.
David v. Park (103 Mass. 501), 477.
Davis v. Prout (7 Beav. 488), 654.
Davis v. Richardson (10 Yerg. 290), 10S.
Davis v. Ridge (3 Esp. 101), 993.
Ixxvi
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Davis v. Seovern (130 Mo. 303; 32 S. W.
Kep.986),52B.
Davis v. Simpson (B Har. & J. 147; 9
Am. Deo. 500), 383, 389, 390, 401, 1184.
Davis v. Smith (88 Ala. 696), 573.
Davis v. Smith (5 Ga. 274), 607.
Davis v. Smith (75 Mo. 219), 708.
Davis v. Tingle (8 B. Mon. 359), 381,
1592.
Davis v. Wetherell (11 Allen, 19), 270,
370.
Davis v. Wheeler (23 S. W. Kep. 435),
577.
Davis v. Wilkerson (48 Miss. 585), 707.
Davis v. Williams (85 Tenn. 646), 923,
1268.
Davis v. Yerby (1 Sm. & M. 508), 860.
Davis' Appeal (60 Pa. St. 118), 828.
Davis' Trusts, Be (L. B. 12 Eq. 214), 30.
Davoue v. Fanning (2 Johns. Ch. 252),
330, 382, 384, 390, 397, 398, 400, 401, 872,
1037, 1039, 1186, 1732.
Davy v. Hooper (2 Vern. 665), 623.
Dawes v. Betts (12 Jur. 709), 1107.
Dawson v. Clark (18 Ves. 254), 243.
Dawson v. Clark (15 Ves. 416), 244.
Dawson v. Coffey (12 Ore. 513), 1405.
Dawson v. Dawson (Bice, 243), 596, 900.
Dawson v. Dawson (1 Dev. Eq. 93), 161,
152, 160.
Dawson v. Dawson (1 Chev. 148), 143.
Dawson v. Glrard Ins. Co. (27 Minn.
411), 576.
Dawson o. Hayden (67 111. 52) , 1108.
Dawson, In re (3 Bradf. 130), 846.
Dawson v. Jay (3 DeG., M. & G. 764),
826.
Dawson n. Massey (IB. & B. 219), 286,
287.
Dawson v. Small (L. B. 18 Eq. 114), 735.
Dayi>. Arundel (Hard. 510), 438.
Day v. Brown (2 Ohio, 315), 1031.
Dayi>. Chatfleld (1 Vern. 200), 861.
Day v. Both (18 N. Y. 448), 73, 333, 944,
956.
Day v. Thwaites (3 Ch. Cas. 69), 1009.
Deaderick v. Cantrell (10 Yerg. 263; 31
Am. Dee. 678), 1123, 1218, 1230, 1235,
1588.
Deakin's Case (2 Bland, 398), 987, 988.
Deans. Adler (30 MJ. 147), 744.
Dean v. Cozzins (7 Eobt. 178), 904.
Dean i!. Dalton (2Bro. Ch. 634), 244.
Dean v. Dean (7 T. B. Mon. 304), 861.
Dean v. Dean (1 Stockt. 425), 66.
Dean v. Dean (6 Conn. 285), 72, 309, 679.
Deani>. Hodges (35 Minn. (140), 411.
Dean, Inre (86 N. Y. 399), 1135.
Dean v. Long (122 111. 447 ; 14 X . E . Eep.
34), 916, 1614.
Dean v. Scott (67 Iowa, 273) , 575.
Deane v. Gunter (19 Ala. 731), 971.
Deareu. Soutten (L. B. 9 Eq. 151), 685.
Dearingw. Adams (37 Me. 265), 858.
Dearie v. Hall (3 Euss. 1), 175, 1116.
Dearmondw. Dearmond (10 Ind. 191),
553.
Dearnley v. Chase (136 Mass. 288), 1479.
De Barante v. Gott (6 Barb. 592), 50.
De Baun v. Van Wagoner (56 Mo. 347),
708.
Debenham v. Ox (1 Ves. 276), 555.
De Bruhl v. Mass (54 Tex. 464), 578.
DeCampc. Dobbins (29 N. J. Eq. 36),
731, 734, 749.
De Carrier v. De Caloune (4 Ves. 577),
842.
De Caters v. Le Roy De Chaumont (3
Paige, 178), 383, 1184.
De Chambrun v. Cox (60 Fed. Bep. 471;
9 C. C. A. 86), 1180.
Deckard v. Case (5 Watts, 22), 1415, 1418.
Decker v. Directors of the Poor (21 W.
N. C. 401), 1306.
De Couche v. Savetier (3 Johns. Ch.
216), 461,463, 1533, 1536.
Deegan v. Capner (44 N. J. Eq. 339), 1121,
1228.
Deerhurstu. St. Albans (5 Madd. 260),
114.
Deering v. Adams (37 Me. 265), 855, 856,
884, 928, 937,940.
Deering v. Boyle (8 Kan. 528; 12 Am.
Eep. 480), 699, 706.
Deering v. Tucker (65 Me. 284), 1747.
De Everett v. Crafts (6 S. W. Bep. 815),
1737.
Deeze, Exparte (1 Atk. 228), 566.
Deg v. Deg (2 P. Wms. 414), 325, 358,
881.
De Garcia v. Lamson (4 Ves. 433), 811,
812.
Degge, Exparte (4 Bro. Ch. 235), 830.
Degmanu. Degman (34 S. W. Bep. 523),
621.
De Graw v. Clason (11 Paige, 136), 1297.
Dehart v. Dehart (3 N. J. Eq. 473),
1729, 1732.
Dehon v. Foster (4 Allen, 545), 37.
De Hourmelin v. Sheldon (1 Beav. 79;
4Myl. &Cr. 525), 967.
Deibert's Appeal (78 Pa. St. 296), 910,
913.
Deiblerw. Barwick (4Blackf. 339), 569.
De Jarnette v. De Giverville (56 Mo.
440), 1460.
De Jarnette v. De Jarnette (41 Ala.
708), 1102, 1204, 1215.
DeKlynu. Watkins (3 Sandf. Ch. 185),
35, 36.
TABLE OF CASES.
lxxvii
[The references are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Jelacour, In the goods of (9 Ir. Eq. 86),
861.
Delafields. White (19 Abb. N. C. 104),
619.
De la Garde s. Lampriere (6 Beav.
344), 682, 683, 684.
Delane s. Delane (7 Bro. P. C. 279),
364.
Delane s. Moore (14 How. 253), 464.
Delaney, Estate of (49 Cal. 76), 616.
Delaney s. Van Aulen (84 N. Y. 16), 616.
Delaplalne v. Lewis (19 Wis. 476), 879.
Delartney v. Barker (2 Stark. 539) , 972.
Delashmut s. Tran (44 Iowa, 613) , 14.
Delassuss. Poston (19 Mo. 425), 576.
De la Touche's Settlement, In re (L. B.
10 Eq. 599), 104.
De Laureneel s. De Boom (48 Cal. 581),
60, 516.
Delbert's Appeal (83 Pa. St. 452), 956.
De Leon s. Higuera (15 Oal. 483), 521.
Deloney s. Hutchinson (2 Band. 183),
216.
Deloraine s. Browne (3 Bro. Ch. 633),
393.
Delraine s. Brown (19 Conn. 421), 1540
Demaree s. Driskill (3 Blackf. 115), 354.
Demarests. Wyncoop (3 Johns. 147),
436, 445, 1508.
DeManneyille s. Crompton (1 V. & B.
369), 539, 1004, 1005, 1217, 1218.
De Mannville «. De Mannville (10 Ves.
Deming s. Colt (3 Sandf. 284), 1415.
52), 825, 843, 844.
De Montmorency s. Devereaux (7 CI.
& Fin. 188), 419.
Dempsters. West (69111. 613), 1508.
Den s. Hammell (18 N. J. L. 73), 1183.
Den s. Hillman (7 N. J. L. 180), 1183.
Den s. MeKnight (6 Halst. 385), 327, 392,
401,432, 538,595.
Den s. Obert (20 N. J. 394), 951
Den s. Sparks (1 Dev. & Bat. 389), 887.
Den s. Troutman (7 Ired. 155), 1108.
Den v. Vanness ;5 Halst. 102), 978.
Den s. Wright (2 Halst. 175), 401, 1184.
Denechaud s. Berrey (48 Ala. 591), 665.
Denhams. Millions (70 Ala. 596), 1172.
Denike v. Denike (13 Misc, Bep 381; 34
N. T. Supl. 250), 180, 215.
Denmead s. Denmead (62 Md. 321),
1716
Denne v. Judge (11 East, 288), 894.
Denning v. Kane (7 N. Y. Supl. 704), 372,
373, 377.
Denning s. Ware (22 Beav. 184), 151.
Dennis ». McCagg (32111. 419), 413, 525
1180.
Dennis v. Williams (40 Ala. 633), 574.
Denison v. Gibson (24 Mich 187), 707.
Dennlson s. Goehring (7 Barr, 179), 93,
149, 152, 159, 363.
Denny s. Allen (lPlck. 147), 1689.
Denny s. Hancock (L. E. 6 Ch. 1),
492.
Denny s. Steakly (2 Heisk. 156), 580.
Dents. Bennett (7 Sim. 539; 4 Myl. &
C. 268), 291, 293, 426, 431, 480, 514.
Dents. Dent (30 Beav. 363), 608, 1026,
1027, 1155, 1435.
Denton s. Denton (8 Jur. 388; 7 Beav.
388), 956, 1424, 1427, 1428, 1430.
Denton s. Denton (17 Md. 403), 944.
Denton s. Donner (23 Beav. 286), 419.
Denyer s. Druce (1 Tainl. 32) , 756, 770.
Dentons. Sanford (103 N. Y. 607), 1120,
1201, 1228.
Denver Brick Co. s. McAllister (6 Colo.
261), 1515.
De Pereda s. De Mancha (L. B. 19 Ch. D.
451), 842.
Depew v. Waddington (6 Whart. 220),
439.
De Peyster s. Clendening (26 Wend. 21),
877.
De Peyster s. Clendening (8 Paige, 295),
111, 596, 855, 856, 858, 885, 1522.
De Peyster s. Ferress (11 Paige, 13), 895,
979, 1122.
De Peyster s. Gould (13 N. J. Eq. 474),
232, 270, 308, 357.
DePeyster's Case (4 Sandf. Ch. 514),
1687.
Derbishire s. Home (3 DeG.,M. &G.
563), 1233, 1592.
Derby s. Derby (4 E. I. 414), 749, 763, 776.
Derby s. Weyricil (8 Neb. 174; 30 Am.
Bep. 827), 14.
Derlnger v. Deringer (5 Houst. 416),
1549, 1550.
De Bow s. Fay (3 Edw. Ch. 44), 206.
Derrys. Derry (74 Ind. 560), 204, 223,
372, 373, 388, 532.
De Euyter s. Trustees (3 Barb. Ch. 119),
1412.
Desbody s. Boyville (2 P. Wms. 547),
1042.
Desponds. Walbridge (15 N. Y. 374),
219.
Destrehan s. Eeudder (11 Mo. 484), 1444.
De Tessier, In re (L. E. (1893) 1 Ch. 153),
1154.
De Themmines s. De Bonneval (5 Buss.
288), 757, 806, 811, 812.
DeThiessier s. De Thiessier (L. E.
(1893) 1 Ch. 153; 1 Ch. App. 153),
1435.
Detroit s. Dean (106 U. S. 537), 597.
Detwiler v. Detwiler (30 Neb. 338; 46 N.
W. Eep. 624), 344.
Ixxviii
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol.
Detwiler v. Hartman (37 N. J. Eq. 348),
749, 755.
Detwold, In re (L. E. 40 [Ch. D. 685),
1811.
Devaynes». Robinson (24 Beav. 86),
1073, 1257, 1566, 1567.
Deveaux v. Barnwell (1 Desaus. 499),
636.
Devecmon v. Shaw (70 Md. 219), 987.
De Vendal v. Molone (25 Ala. 272), 440.
Devenish v. BaiDes (Pr. Ch. 4), 500, 513.
Devinw. Hendershott (32 Iowa, 192),
945.
Devinney v. Norris (8 Watts, 314), 424.
De Visme, In re (2 De G., J. & S. 17), 349,
351.
De Visme v. Mellish (5 Ves. 529) , 633.
Devlin v. Egleson (79 Iowa, 269) , 570.
Devoy v. Devoy (3 Sm. & Giff. 403; 5 W.
E. 222), 335, 352, 367.
DeVriesi). Conklin (22 Mich. 355), 659.
Devriesu. Hiss (72 Md. 560), 917.
Dewall v. Craig (2 Wheat. 45), 1242.
Dewdney, Ex parte (15 Ves. 496), 425.
De Weever v. Eockport (6 Beav. 391),
845.
Dewey v. Cross (7 Wall. 299), 406.
Dewey v. Dewey (46 How. Pr. 441), 1507.
Dewey v. Long (25 Yt. 564), 308.
Dewey v. Moyer (72 N. Y. 70), 377.
Dewey v. Euggles (25 N. J. Eq. 35), 1072.
Dewhurst v. Wright (29 Fla. 223 ; 10 So.
Eep. 682), 302.
Dewitt v. Polin (L. R 14 Eq. 251) , 831,
988.
De Wolf v. Lawson (61 Wis. 469), 820.
De Wolf v. Pratt (42 111. 198), 562.
De Wolfe v. Swayne (49 Conn. 282), 1368.
Dexter v. Arnold (3 Sumn. 152), 465.
Dexter v. Harris (2 Mass. 537), 460.
Dexter v. Harris (2 Mason, 536), 478.
Dexter v. Gardner (7 Allen, 243), 748.
Dexter v. Shepard (117 Mass. 480), 1488,
14S9, 1491.
Dey v. Dey (26 ST. J. Eq. 182), 388, 389,
434.
Deyerv. Arnold (37 Ark. 17), 704.
Dialu. Dial (21 Tex. 529), 1736, 1737.
Diamond v. Lawrence Co. Bank (37 Pa.
St. 363), 452.
Dias v. Bouchaud (10 Paige, 445), 1423.
Dibrell v. Carlisle (51 Miss. 785) , 992, 1349,
1516, 1641.
Diceon9on v. Talbot (L. E. 6 Ch. 32),
491, 494.
Dick, In re (C. A. (1891) 1 Ch. 423), 1209,
1218.
Dick v. Hamilton (1 Deady, 322), 710.
Dick v. Pitchford (1 Di T. & Bat. Eq. 576) ,
912,942,1269, 1302,1644.
I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Dickel v. Smith (24 S. E. Eep. 564),
1704.
Dickenson v. Dickenson (2 Murph.
279), 72.
Dickenson v. Teasdale (1 De G., J. &
S. 52), 1538.
Dickermau v. Abrahams (21 Barb. 551),
664.
Dickersonv. Carroll (76 Ala. 377), 571,
573.
Dickerson v. Rogers (114 N. T. 406),
709.
Dlckerson's Appeal (7 Pa. St. 255), 993,
1052.
Dickerson's Appeal (115 Pa. St. 198), 73,
1744.
Dickinson v. Codwise (1 Sandf. Ch.
214), 1184.
Dickinson v. Conniff (65 Ala. 581), 1025.
Dickinsons. Davis (43 N. H. 647), 334,
339.
Dickinson v. Dickinson (2 Murph. 279),
71.
Dickinson v. Hoomes (8 Gratt. 353), 36.
Dickinson v. Lee (102 Mass. 559), 489.
Dickinson, In re (111 N. Car. 108; 15 S.
E. Eep. 1025), 831.
Dickinson v. Player (C. P. Coop. (1837-
38) p. 178), 1206.
Dickinson v. Trout (8 Bush, 442) , 1216.
Dickinson's Appeal (152 Mass. 184),
1200, 1202.
Dlckison v. Ogden (89 Ky. 162), 1298.
Dickson v. Lockyer (4 Ves. 42), 455, 1655.
Dickson v. Montgomery (1 Swan, 348),
750.
Dickson v. United States (125 Mass.
311), 737.
Diebert's Appeal (78 Pa. St. 296), 919.
Dieffendorf v. Canajobarie Church (20
Johns. 12), 796, 797.
Diefendorf v. House (9 How. Pr. 243),
365.
Diefendorf v. Spraker (10 N. Y. 246),
890, 1394.
Dietel v. Home S. & L. Assn. (59 Minn.
211; 60 N. W. Rep. 1100), 1158.
Diffenderfer v. Winder (3 Gill & J. 311),
1121, 1255, 1689.
Digbyf). Legard (3 P. Wms. n.),259.
Dikeman v. Norrie (36 Cal. 94) , 197, 213,
313.
Dillard v. Crocker (Speer Ch. 20), 308,
441, 442.
Dillard v. Dillard (3 Humph. 41), 354,
369.
Dillard v. Dillard (21 S. E. Rep. 669),
997.
Dillayev. Commercial Bank (51 N. Y.
345), 327, 457, 460, 993, 1660.
TABLE OF CASES.
lxxix
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-S47; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Dillayes. Greenough (46 N. T. 445),
111, 155.
Dlller s. Brubaker (52 Pa. St. 498), 1598.
Dillinger v. Llewelyn (3 De G., F. & J.
617), 161.
DUIinger's Appeal (35 Pa. St. 357), 721,
722.
Dillon v. Ooppin (4 Myl. & Or. 646), 147,
151, 152.
Dillon s. Jones (6 Ves. 290), 560.
Dillon s. Stevens (62 Mo. App. 479),
895.
Dllts v. Stevenson (17 N. J. Eq. 407),
708.
Dimes s. Soott (4 Russ. 195), 1167.
Dimmock s. Atkinson (3 Bro. Oh. 195) ,
681, 684.
Dimmock s. Bixby (20 Pick. 368), 1132,
1402.
Dimmock s. Hallett (L. R. 2 Ch. App.
21), 473.
Dimpfels. Ohio E. Co. (110 U. S. 209),
597.
Dinn s. Grant (5 De G. & S. 451), 585.
Dinsmore s. Biggert (9 Barr, 123), 942.
Dinsmore Oil Co. s. Dinsmore (64 Pa.
St. 43), 409.
Dipples s. Corles (11 Hare, 133) , 157.
Disbrows. Henshaw (8 Cow. 351), 825.
Disher s. Disher (1 P. Wins. 204), 151.
Dlsmukess. Terry (Walker, 197), 355,
357.
District No. 3«. Macloon (4 Wis. 79),
201.
Dixs. Ackers (30 Ind. 431), 1053.
Dixon s. Bentley (50 N. J. Eq. 87; 25
Atl. Hep. 194), 919.
Dix s. Burford (19 Beav. 409), 857.
Dix s. Cobb (4 Mass. 508), 1117.
Dixs. Dummerston (19 Vt. 262), 1048.
Dixs. Bead (1 S. & S. 237), 893.
Dixon s. Caldwell (15 Ohio St. 412),
327.
Dixon s. Dixon (23 N. J. Eq. 316), 723.
Dixon s. Dixon (3 Bro. Ch. 510), 985.
Dixon s. Dixon (L. E. 9 Ch. D. 587), 681,
1257, 1590.
Dixoa v. Gayfere (17 Beav. 433), 1623.
Dixon s. Hill (5 Mich. 404) , 441.
Dixon v. Homer (9 Met. 420), 893.
Dixon s. Homer (12 Cush. 41), 900.
Dixon s. Muckleston (L. E. 8 Ch. App.
155), 600.
Dixon s. Olmius (1 Cox Ch. 414), 497,
500, 507, 513, 654.
Dixon s. Eawson (5 Ohio St. 224), 226.
Dixon s, Saville (1 Bro. Ch, 326), 963,
1277.
Doball s. Stevens (3 B. & C. 623), 474.
Dobbin s. Walton (37 Ga. 614), 1411.
f
Dobbins s. Blanchard (94 Ga. 500; 21 S.
E. Rep. 215), 705.
Dobbins s. Hubbard (17 Ark. 196), 704.
Dobson v. Land (8 Hare, 216), 1029, 1030,
1031, 1493.
Dobson s. Leadbetter (13 Ves. 2«n) , 327,
438.
Dob9on s. Racey (3 Sandf. 61), 390, 392,
395, 398, 414, 465, 1440, 1490. '
Dobson's Case (12 Jur. (N. S.) 60), 962.
Dockray s. Dockray (2 E. I. 547), 1369.
Dockers. Somes (2 Myl. & K. 655), 383,
1170.
Docksey v. Docksey (2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 506;
3 Bro. P. C. 39), 238.
Docwra, In re (L. E. 29 Ch. D. 693), 1263.
Dod s. Dod (1 Amb. 274) , 101.
Dodd, Exparte (Ph. Eq. 97), 1614.
Dodd v. Wakeman (26 N. J. Eq. 484), 500,
518,525,1171.
Dodge v. Brewer (31 Mich. 227), 1512.
Dodge v. Cole (97 111. 338), 388, 532.
Dodge v. Doub (8 Gill, 16), 1422.
Dodges. Evans (43 Miss. 570), 576.
Dodge v. Morse (129 Mass. 423), 1062,
1132.
Dodge v. Pond (23 ST. Y. 63), 302, 750,
752.
Dodge v. Williams (46 Wis. 70; 50 N. W.
Eep. 1103) , 734, 751, 783, 786.
Dodkins. Brunt (L. E. 6 Eq. 680), 695.
Dodds v. Tuke (L. E. 25 Ch. D. 617),
1675, 1701.
Dodson ii. Ball (60 Pa. St. 492; 100 Am.
Dec. 586), 917,921, 943, 956, 1264, 1622.
Dodson v. Hay (3 Bro. Ch. 405), 113, 963,
965.
Dodson v. Simpson (2 Rand. 294), 456,
1659.
Doe v. Brigg (2 Taunt. 109), 917, 938, 939.
Doe v. Cafe (7 Excheq. 675), 927, 1327.
Doe v. Cavan (5 T. E. 567; 6 Bro. P. C.
175), 1010.
Does. Claridge (6Mon. & S. 657), 923,
927, 930, 1327.
Does. Davies (1Q. B. 430), 926.
Does. Edlin (4 Ad. &EI. 582; 31 E. C. L.
143), 919. 920, 1327.
Doe s. Ewart (7 Ad. &E1. 636), 920, 1326.
Does, field (2 B. & Ad. 564), 922, 942,
1327.
Doe v. Gillard (5 Barn. & Aid. 785), 1072.
Doe s. Harris (16 M. & W. 517) , 61, 880.,
882, 883.
Doe s. Harvey (3 Ind. 104), 401.
Doe s. Haselwood (6 Ad. & B. 167), 1072.
Doe s. Henry (3 Ind. 104), 392.
Doe s. Hicks (7 T. R. 433), 923, 925, 942,
1267.
Does. Hilder (2B. & A. 782), 980, 983.
lxxx
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pagea: Vol. 1, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Does. Homfray (6 Ad. & El. 206), 913,
919, 935.
Doe v. Howland (7 Cow. 277), 937.
Doe v. Ironmongers (3 East, 533), 919.
Doe v. Kier (4 Man. & By. 101), 1009.
Doeo. Ladd (77 Ala. 223), 907.
Doe v. Nichols (1 Barn. & C. 336), 912,
917, 943.
Doe v. Oliver (14 Barn. & Or. 181) , 914.
Doe v. Passingham (6 B. & 0. 305), 912,
914,1427.
Doe v. Phelps (9 Johns. 169), 984.
Doe v. Pratt (6 Ad. & E. 180) , 1072.
Doe v. Price (16 Mees. & W. 603), 969.
Doe v. Robertson (11 Wheat. 332), 968.
Doeo. Bobinson (24 Miss. 688), 1005.
Doe v. Boutledge (2 Oowp. 705), 98, 912,
917.
Doe v. Simpson (5 East. 162), 925, 935,
942, 1267.
Doe v. Smeddle (2 B. & Aid. 126), 940.
Doe v. Smith (6 B. & O. 112), 892.
Doe v. Smith (2 Taunt. 112), 939.
Doe v. Smith (9 D. & B. 136), 892.
Doe v. Sybourn (7 T. R. 2), 980, 983, 984.
Doe«. Walbank (2 B. & Aid. 554), 927,
1327.
Doe v. Walker (12 M. & W. 591), 142.
Doet). Willan (2 B. &Ald. 84), 927, 942,
1327.
Doe v. Williams (2 Mees. &W. 74), 1327.
Doe v. Woodhouse (4 T. R. 89), 935.
D'Oechsner v. Scott (24 Beav. 239),
669.
Doge v. Cole (97 111. 338), 221.
Doggett v. Hart (5 Fla. 215), 951.
Doggett v. Lane (12 Mo. 215), 430.
Doggett v. White (128 Mass. 398) , 859.
Dohoney v. Womaek (1 Tex. Civ. App.
354; 19 S. W. Eep. 883), 505.
Dolan v. Baltimore (4 Gill, 394), 1073.
Dolbear v. Norduft (38 Minn. 197), 1451.
Dolder v. Bank of England (10 Ves.
352), 1572.
Doll v. Johnson (3 Allen, 364), 866.
Dolman v. Nokes (22 Beav. 402), 492.
Dolson v. Kerr (5 Hun, 643), 1385.
Dolton v. Hewen (6 Mad. 14), 1652.
Dominicki!. Michael (4Sandf. Ch. 374),
12.
Dominick v. Sayre (3 Sandf. 555), 624.
Donaghe v. Tarns (81 Va. 132), 232, 271,
358.
Donahue v. Quackenbush (64 N. W.
Eep. 141), 210.
Donald v. Plumb (8 Conn. 453), 978.
Donaldson v. Donaldson (Kay, 711), 15,
88, 152, 156.
Donaldson v. State Bank (IDev. 103),
440.
Doncaster v. Doncaster (3 Kay & J- 26),
107.
Donegan v. Hentz (70 Ala. 437), 573.
Donelson v. Posey {l'i Ala. 752), 1697.
Donley v. Bullock (7 Ired. Eq. 102),
1154.
Donlin v. Bradley (119 111. 412), 197, 307,
308.
Donmett v. Bedford (3 Ves. 149), 1291.
Donnington v. Mitchell (1 Green's Ch.
243), 672.
Donogh's Appeal (86 Pa. St. 306), 730.
Donohuea. Chase (130 Mass. 137), 1479.
Donovan's Appeal (41 Conn. 551), 705.
Donovan v. Donovan (85 Mich. 63), 576.
Donovan v. Van De Mark (78 N. T. 244),
54, 183, 616.
Dooley v. Wolcott (4 Allen, 406), 450.
Doomer v. Packhurst (3 Atk. 134), 607.
Doran v. Doran (99 Cal. 311; 33 Pac.
Rep. 929), 266.
Doran v. Simpson (4 Ves. 665), 455, 1655.
Dorance v. Scott (3 Whart. 306; 31 Am.
Dec. 509), 710.
Dorland v. Dorland (2 Barb. 65), 1036.
Dormer v.Portescue (3 Atk. 130), 603.
Dormer v. Thurland (2 P. Wms. 606),
1009.
Dornford v. Dornford (12 Ves. 127), 387,
1219.
Dorr v. Lorlng (147 Mass. 530), 1523.
Dorrw. Petri (Walk. Eq. 145), 828.
Dorr v. Wainwright (13 Pick. 328), 854,
879, 885.
Dorrance v. Scott (3 Whart. 309), 1290.
Dorrington v. Mitchell (2 N. J. Eq.
243), 673.
Dorsett v. Frith (25 Cal. 537), 1120.
Dorsey v. Banks (88 Iowa, 595; 55 N. W.
Eep. 674), 1083.
Dorsey v. Clark (4 H. & J. 551), 308.
Dorsey v. Dorsey (3 Har. &J. 410; 6
Am. Dec. 506), 427, 1184.
Dorsey v. Garey (30 Md. 489), 1718.
Dorsey v. Thompson (37 Md. 26), 905.
Doswell v. Anderson (1 Patt. & H. 185),
184.
Doswell v. Buchanan (3 Leigh, 362),
442, 443.
Dothage v. Stuart (35 Mo. 251), 606.
Dotterer v. Pike (60 Ga. 29), 388, 435.
Doty v. Mitchell (9 Sm. &. M. 435), 665.
Dougherty v. Sprinkle (88 N. Car. 300),
709.
Dougherty v. Van Nostrand (1 Hoff.
Ch. 68), 398.
Dougherty's Estate (5 W. N. C. 556),
807.
Doughter v. Vandever (5 Del. Ch. 51),
750.
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Doughty v. Bethune (7 Ga. 90), 1392.
Doughty v. Bull (2 P. Wins. 320), 258.
Douglas v. Archbutt (2 De G. & J. 148) ,
1683.
Douglas v. Oruger (80 N. Y. 15), 1105,
1751.
Douglass. Price (4 Eich. Eq. 322), 369.
Douglas v. Russell (4 Sim. 524), 34.
Douglass v. Congreve (1 Keen, 410),
922.
Douglass v. Oulverwell (L. J. 31 Ch.
65), 419.
Douglass v. Lucas (63 Pa. St. 11), 364.
Dousmanv. Wisconsin Milling Co. (40
Wis. 418), 478.
Dove v. Everard (IE. & M. 281; Taml.
376), 882.
Dover v. Buck (6 Gift 57), 393.
Dover, Ex parte (5 Sim. 500), 857.
Doveru. Ehea (108 N". Oar. 88; 13 S. E.
Eep. 164), 232,240.
Dow v. Dawson (1 Ves. 331), 1117.
Dow v. Dow (63 Hun, 628; 18 N. Y. Supl.
222), 901.
Dow, In re (6 N. B. E. 10), 1409.
Dow v. Jewell (18 N. H. 340; 45 Am. Dec.
371), 197, 308, 363.
Dow v. Memphis Ey. Co. (23 Blatehf.
84), 959, 1057.
Dow v. Platner (16 N. Y. 562), 1385.
Dowdsi. Tucker (41 Conn. 198), 497, 500,
508,511,513,517.
Dowell 17. Burlington, etc. E. Co. (62
Iowa, 629) , 1342.
Dowell v. Caldwell (2 McCord Ch. 43),
839.
Dowling v. Belton (1 Elan. * Eel. 462; 2
Freem. 114), 820.
Dowling v. Eeeley (72 Ga. 567), 426.
Dowling v. Hudson (17 Beav. 248), 1652.
Dowling v. Tyrell (2 E. & M. 343), 840.
Dowman v. Bust (6 Band. 587) , 1352, 1355,
1647.
Down v. Worrall (1 Myl. & K. 561), 620,
770, 1122.
Downe v. Lewis (3 Bro. Ch. 257), 1324.
Downer v. Downer (9 Vt. 231) , 996.
Downes v. Bullock (25 Beav. 62), 1598.
Downes ». Grazebrook (3 Meriv. 208),
383, 977, 1081, 1100, 1490, 1491.
Downes v. Harper Hospital (101 Mich.
555; 60 N. W. Eep. 42), 784.
Downes v. Jennings (32 Beav. 290), 100,
377,548, 553.
Downey v. BisseU (4 Fed. Eep. 55),
105.
Downey v. Bullock (7 Ired. Eq. 102),
1025, 1176.
Downing v. Marshall (23 N. Y. 360; 80
Am. Dec. 290), 616, 1671.
Downing v. Marshall (37 N. Y. 380), 959,
1058.
Downing v. Townsend (Amb. 592), 150.
Downs v. Hopkins (65 Ala. 588), 1514.
Dowse v. Gorton (L. E. (1891) App. Cas.
191), 1701.
Doxey v. Doxey (2 Vern. 677), 247.
Doyle v. Blake (2 Sch. & Lef. 229), 861,
878, 882, 884, 889,894, 1135, 1248.
Doyle v. Doyle (1 Dana, 536), 309.
Doyle v. Murphy (22 111. 502; 74 Am.
Dec. 165), 369.
Doyle v. Kelly (75 111. 574), 705.
Doyle v. Sleeper (1 Dana, 531), 354.
Doyle v. Whalen (87 Me. 414; 32 Atl.
Hep. 1022), 776.
Doyley v. Attorney-General (2 Eq. Cas.
Ab. 194; 4 Vin. Ab. 485), 620, 629, 631.
D'Oyley v. Loveland (1 Strobh. 45),
1108.
Dozierv. Freeman (47 Miss. 647), 681,
950, 959, 1139.
Draiser v. Brereton (15 Beav. 221), 155.
Drais v. Hogan (50 Cal. 121), 705.
Drake v. Collins (5 How. (Miss.) 253),
492, 493.
Drakes. Crane (127 Mo. 85; 29 S. W.
Eep. 990), 1216.
Drake v. Glover (30 Ala. 382), 704.
Drake v. Eamsey (5 Ohio, 251), 1024.
Drakes. Sherburne (57 Ark. 563; 22 S.
W. Eep. 430), 432.
Drake v. Storr (2 Freem. 205), 647.
Drakes. Trefusis (L. E. 10 Ch. App.
363), 1154.
Drake v. Whitmore (5 De G. & Sm.
619), 1073.
Drakeford v. Wilks (3 Atk. 539), 506, 513,
517.
Draoe v. Gunter (19 Ala. 731), 889, 896,
1228.
Drapers Co. v. Davis (2 Atk. 295), 425.
Drayson v. Pocock (4 Sim. 283), 1081.
Drayton, In re (4McCordCh. 46), 861.
Dresser v. Dresser (46 Me. 48), 128.
Dressier, Ex parte (L. E. 9 Ch. D. 252),
1138.
Drew v. Wakefield (5* Me. 291), 250,
256.
Driblera. Barwick (4 Blackf. 339), 675.
Drlnkwater v. Combe (2 S. & S. 340),
978, 1432.
Drohan v. Drohan (1 B. & B. 185), 1003,
1027.
Drosier v. Brenton (15 Beav. 221), 1202.
Drosten v. Mueller (103 Mo. 624), 852.
Druce v. Denison (6 Ves. 403), 197.
Druekera. Wellhouse (82 Ga. 129), 1414.
Druid Park, etc. Co. v. Oetlinger (53
Md.46), 50, 626,907.
Ixxxii
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Drummer v. Chippenham (14 Ves. 252),
18.
Drummond v. Drummond (37 L. J. (N.
S.)Ch. 811; 17 W. R. 6), 35.
Drummond v. Tracy (1 Johns. 608), 225,
874.
Drury v. Conner (1 Har. & G. 220), 603,
877.
Drury v. Cross (7 Wall. 299), 409.
Drury v. Drury (2 Eden, 39), 12.
Drury v. Hooke (1 Vern. 412), 545.
Drury v. Natick (10 Allen, 1G9), 748.
Dryden v. Frost (3 Myl. & Cr. 670), 443.
Dubless v. Flint (4 Myl. & Cr. 602), 1570.
Dublin Case (38 N. H. 577), 18, 749, 788,
789.
Dubois v. Hull (43 Barb. 26), 577.
Dubose v. Dubose (7 Ala. 235), 1367,
1358.
Dubs j). Dubs (31 Pa. St. 149), 652, 672,
964, 1276, 1277, 1622.
Duciea. Ford (138 U. S. 587; 11 S. Ct.
Eep.417),524.
Duckworth v. Trafford (18 Ves. 283),
842.
Dudley v. Bosworth (10 Humph. 9), 335,
339,363,367.
Dudgeon v. Corley (2 Dr. & W. 158),
1679.
Dudleys. Batcheller (53 Me. 403), 232,
340, 368, 369.
Dudley©. Dickson (14 N. J. Eq. 252),
576.
Dudley v. Llttlefleld (21 Me. 418), 439.
Duff v. Hutchinson (57 Hun, 152), 562.
Duffle v. Clark (64 N. W. Rep. 57), 14, 429.
Duffleld v. Smith (2 Vern. 258), 1528.
Duffleldu. Wallace (2 S. &R. 521), 532.
Dufford v. Smith (46 N. J. Eq. 216; 16
Atl. Rep. 1052), 1198, 1692.
Duffy v. Calvert (6 Gill, 487), 908, 1647,
1648.
Duffy v. Durant Land Imp. Co. (78
Hun, 314; 29 N. T. Supl. 165), 1082.
Duffy's Trust, In re (28 Beav. 386), 686.
Dundas' Appeal (UP. F. Smith, 325),
402.
Dugas v. Guilbeau (16 La. Ann. 581),
430, 1183.
Dugan v. Cureton (1 Atk. 31), 473.
Dugan v. Gittings (3 Gill, 161), 469.
Dugan v. Vattier (3 Blackf . 245), 441.
Dugans, In re (12 Pa. Co. Ct. 591; 2 Pa.
Dist. 194), 899.
Duggan v. Kelly (10 Ir. Eq. 295) , 1045.
Dugger v. Taylor (60 Ala. 504), 574.
Duguid v. Edwards (32 How. Pr. 254),
1607.
Du Hourmelln v. Sheldon (1 Beav. 79;
4 Myl. & Cr. 525), 28, 41, 42, 43.
Duke». Balme (16 Minn. 306), 576.
Duke of Cumberland v. Codrington (3
Johns. Ch. 261), 88.
Duke v. Fuller (9 N. H. 536; 32 Am. Dec.
392), 749.
Dukes v. Spangler (35 Ohio St. 119), 652.
Dulany v. Middleton (72 Md. 67; 19 Atl.
Rep. 146), 1523.
Dumas, Ex parte (2 Ves. 582; 1 Atk. 232),
204, 972, 976.
Dumboldu. Rowley (113 Ind. 353), 14.
Dummerw. Pitcher (2 Myl. & K. 262),
339, 369.
Dumoneelj). Dumoncel (13 Ir. Eq. 92),
41, 42.
Dumond v. Magee (4 Johns. Ch. 315),
678.
Dunaway v. Robertson (95 111. 419), 562.
Dunbar v. Foreman (40 8. Car. 490; 19
S. E. Rep. 186), 710.
Dunbar v. Meyer (43 Miss. 679), 707.
Dunbar v. Soule (129 Mass. 284), 23, 596.
Dunbar v. Tredenick (2 Ball & B. 317),
393, 432.
Duncan v. Duncan (19 Ves. 394), 683.
Duncan v. Findlater (6 01. & Fin. 894),
788.
Duncan v. Forrer (6 Binn. 193), 216.
Duncan v. Graffln (26 N. J. Eq. 228),
1719,1725.
Duncan v. Jandon (15 Wall. 165), 204,
388, 456, 460, 532, 1625, 1660.
Duncan v. Johnson (2 Eng. 190), 442.
Duncan v. Simmons (2 Stew. & P. 356),
1539.
Duncan v. Wallace (114 Ind. 169), 1352.
Duncan's Appeal (43 Pa. St. 670), 550,
551, 552.
Duncht). Kent (1 Vern. 319), 455, 1350,
1652, 1664.
Ducommon's Appeal (17 Pa. St. 268),
1127, 1234.
Dundas v. Biddle (2 Pa. St. 160), 24.
Dundas v. Blake (11 Ir. Eq. 138), 1320.
Dundee©. Morris (3Macq. 134), 735.
Dunham v. Packing Co. (100 Mich. 75.
68 N. W. Rep. 627), 1599.
Dunham v. Presley (120 Mass. 285), 562.
Dunicau. Coy (24 Mo. 167), 280.
Dunkley©. Dunkley (2 DeG.,M.&G.
390), 678.
Dunklin v. Wilkins (5 Ala. 199), 39.
Dunlap v. Burnett (5 Sm. & M. 702),
576.
Dunlap v. Hawkins (59 N. T. 342), 374.
Dunlap v. Wright (11 Tex. 597), 1453.
Dunlap's Appeal (14 Atl. Rep. 262),
1688.
Dunlop v. Dunlop (4 Desaus. 305), 1322,
1324.
TABLE OF CASES.
lxxxiii
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp, 848-1753.]
Dunlopv. Hepburn (1 Wheat. 179; 3
Wheat. 231), 28.
Dunn v. Bank of Mobile (2 Ala. 152),
666.
Dunn v. Dunn (1 S. Car. 350), 1102.
Dunn v. Simpson (6 Binn. 478) , 309.
Dunn v. Sargent (101 Mass. 336) , 657,680.
Dunne v. Dunne (3 Sm. & Gif. 22), 608,
1026.
Dunning v. Ocean Nat. Bank (6 Lans.
298), 857, 893, 896, 1037.
Dunnage v. White (1 J. & W. 563), 250.
Dunscomb v. Dunscomb (1 Johns. Ch.
527), 1253, 1255.
Dunsmoorw. Furstenfeldt (88 Oal. 522),
1408.
Dunstan v. Outhouse (64 Mich. 419),
576.
Dunster v. Glengall (3 Ir. Eq. 47), 1116.
Duntoni;. Sharpe (70 Miss. 850), 1455.
Dunwoodieu. Reed (3 S. &R. 435), 1280.
Dupleix v. Roe (1 Anst. 86), 873.
Dupont, Ex parte (1 Harp. Ch. 5), 28.
Dupre v. Rein (56 How. Pr. 2228) , 722.
Dupre v. Thompson (4 Barb. 280), 152.
Dupree v. Estelle (10 S. W. Rep. 93),
209.
Durr v. Bowyer (2 McCord, 368), 678.
Durant v. Davis (10 Heisk. 522), 577.
Durante. Mass. Hosp. etc. Co. (2 Low-
ell, 575), 228.
Durante. Smith (159 Mass. 229; 34 N. E.
Rep. 190), 135.
Durant v. Titley (7 Price, 577), 720, 721.
Durden v. Whetstone (92 Ala. 480; 9 So.
Rep. 176), 1494, 1509.
Duren v. Getchell (55 Me. 241), 706.
Durfee v. McClurg (6 Mich. 223), 707.
Durfeeu. Pavitt (14 Minn. 422), 372, 373.
Durham, etc. Soc.Jm re (L. R. 12 Eq.
516), 600.
Durland v. Durland (83 Hun, 174; 31 N.
T. Supl. 596), 56, 226.
Durlingjj. Hammer (29 N. J. Eq. 220),
223.
Dnrmt. Fish (46 Mich. 312), 1486.
Durnford v. Lane (1 Bro. Ch. 106), 12.
Durour v. Motteaux (1 Ves. 320), 301.
Durrant v. Ritchie (4 Mason, 45), 10
912,915.
Durst v. Benton (47 K. T. 167; 2 Lans-
137), 476.
Duryeap. Bliven (47 Hun, 638), 721.
Dutch Church v. Mott (7 Paige, 77),
744,788,980,983.
Dutilh v. Coursault (5 Cranch, 349), 214.
Dutton v. Poole (2 Lev. 211), 497, 500.
Dutton v. Thompson (L. R. 23 Ch. D.
278), 293, 294.
Duval v. Bibb (4 II. &M. 113), 241.
Duval v. Duval (153 111. 49; 38 N. E.
Rep. 944), 186.
Duval v. Marshall (30 Ark. 230), 309, 369.
Duvall v. Craig (2 Wheat. 45), 1721.
Duvall v. Farmers' Bank (4 Gill & J.
283), 678.
Duvall v. Wilson (9 Barb. 487), 147, 153. .
Duval's Appeal (38 Pa. St. 118), 1074,
1688.
Duysdale v. Mace (5 De G., M. & G.
103), 492.
Dwight v. Blackmar (2 Mich. 330; 57
Am. Dec. 130), 1184.
Dwight v. Newell (3 N. T. 185), 568.
Dwinelu. Veazie (36 Me. 509), 1107.
Dyer v. Dyer (34 Beav. 504), 828.
Dyer v. Dyer (2 Cox, 93), 174, 306, 307,
310, 338, 368.
Dyert>. Dupin (5 Whart. 584), 984.
Dyerti. Hargrave (10 Ves. 506), 488.
Dyer v. Homer (22 Pick. 263), 176.
Dyer, In re (6 Paige, 634), 825.
Dyer«. Jacoway (42 Ark. 186), 404.
Dyeri;. Keeper (51 111. 525), 714.
Dyer v. Leuch (91 Cal. 191; 27 Pac. Rep.
598), 870.
Dyer v. Martin (5 111. 146), 569, 574.
Dyer v. Shurtlefl (112 Mass. 166; 17 Am.
Rep. 77), 396, 1184,1473.
Dyer v. Waters (46 N. J. Eq. 484; 19 Atl.
Rep. 129), 1570, 1617.
Dyer's Appeal (107 Pa. St. 446), 51, 65,
178.
Dyett v. Central Trust Co. (140 N. T.
54; 35 N. E. Rep. 341), 915, 1215.
Dyett v. North Am. Coal Co. (20 Wend.
570; 7 Paige, 9; 32 Am. Dec. 598), 664.
Dyke v. Randall (2 De G., M. & G. 409),
100.
Dyke's Estate, Znre(L. R. 7 Eq. 337),
622.
Dykes v. McVay (67 Ga. 502), 1108.
Dyot's Estate (2 W. & S . 557) , 1692.
E.
Eager v. Barnes (31 Beav. 579), 1234.
Eagle Fire Co. v. Lent (lEdw. Ch. 301;
6 Paige, 635), 11, 12.
Eales v. England (Pr. Ch. 200; 2 Vern.
467), 127.
Earnest. Mayo (6111. App. 334), 1408.
Earnest. Sweetser (101 Mass. 78), 685.
Earl v. Dresser (30 Ind. 11), 847.
Earl v. Huntingdon (3 P. Wms. 309),
1636.
Barle v. Earle (93 N. T. 104), 878, 879,
1236, 1746.
Earle v. Wood (8 Cush. 437), 745.
Earle's Trusts, In re (4 Kay & J. 673),
142.
Ixxxiv
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753]
Early v. Law (42 S. Car. 330; 20 S. K.
Rep. 136), 661, 710.
Earnest's Appeal (106 Pa. St. 3X0), 339.
Earp's Appeal (75 Pa. St. 119), 910, 1308.
Easly v. Dye (14 Ala. 158), 1003, 1027, 1028-
East v. Pugh (71 Iowa, 162), 445.
'Eastbrooke v. Scott (3 Ves. 461) , 539.
Easterbrook v. Tillinghast (5 Gray, 17),
250.
Easterly v. Keney (36 Conn. 18), 111,
1269, 1297.
Eastland v. Jordan (3 Bibb, 186), 1298.
Eastham v. Eoundtree (56 Tex. 110),
354.
Eastman v. Plumer (46 N. H. 464), 191.
East Norway Church v. Halvorson, (42
Minn. 503), 797, 798.
Easton v. Carter (5Exc. 8), 884.
Easton v. Landor (67 L. T. 833), 1679,
1680.
East River Co. v. Henchman (1 Ves. Jr.
289) , 190, 333.
East River Town Co. v. Cothran (81
Ga. 351), 1081.
Eastwood, Inre (48 L. T. 395; L. R. 23
Ch. D. 134), 995.
Easton v. Hunt (20 Ind. 457), 1444.
Eaton v. George (42 N. H. 375), 434,435.
Eaton v. Nason (47 Me. 132), 706.
Eaton v. Smith (2 Beav. 236), 867, 872,
873, 896, 997, 1018.
Eaton v. "Witts (L. R. 4 Eq. 151), 119.
Eaves v. Hickson (30 Beav. 136), 1140,
1194, 1598.
Eberhardt v. Perolin (49 N. J. Eq. 570),
133.
Eberman v. Reitzal (1 W. & S. 181), 566.
Eberstein v. Welletta (134 111. 101; 24 N.
E. Eep. 967), 1542.
Eberts v. Eberts (55 Pa. St. 110), 286,287.
Ebrand». Dancer (2 Ch. Cas. 26; 1 Eq.
Abr. 382) , 27, 174, 312, 353, 368.
Eck v. Hatcher (58 Mo. 235), 449.
Eckerly v. McGhee (85 Tenn. 661), 710.
Eddy v. Baldwin (23 Mo. 588), 309, 334.
Eddy v. Capron (4 R. I. 394), 556.
Eddy v. Hartshorne (34 N. J. Bq. 419),
130.
Eddy v. Roberts (17 111. 606), 76.
Ede v. Knowles (L. R. 29 Ch. 172), 600.
Eden v. Foster (2 P. Wms. 326), 781,
782.
Edes v. Brereton (West, 348), 827.
Edgell v. Haywood (3 Atk. 358), 1355.
Edgeworth v. Edgeworth (16 Ir. Ch.
348), 717.
Edgington v. Williams (Wright, 439),
354.
Edlck v. Crim (10 Barb. 445), 475.
Edminster v. Higging (6 Neb. 266), 578.
Edmonds v. Crenshaw (Harp. Eq. 232),
1058, 1236, 1240.
Edmonds v. Peake (7 Beav. 239), 1006,
1341.
Edmondson v. Dyson (2 Kelly, 307), 96,
107, 116.
Edmunds' Appeal (68 Pa. St. 24), 931.
Edward v. Blanksmlth (35 Ga. 213), 452.
Edwards v. Binsrbam (28 W. E. 89), 104.
Edwards v. Cheyne (L. E. 13 App. Cas.
385), 658.
Edwards v. Culbertson (111 N. Car.
342; 16 S. E. Eep. 233), 541.
Edwards v. Dewar (34 W. R. 62; 54 L. J.
Ch. 1049), 1674.
Edwards v. Edwards (39 Pa. St. 369),
308, 316, 352, 362.
Edwards v. Freeman (2 P. Wms. 435),
1525, 1529.
Edwards v. Grove (2 De G., F. & J.
222), 625.
Edwards, 7nre(L. R. 9Ch. 97), 653.
Edwards v. Jones (1 Myl. & Cr. 226),
151, 152.
Edwards v. Lewis (3 Atk. 538) , 397, 399.
Edwards v. McLeay (2 Swanst. 287),
491.
Edwards v. Meyrick (2 Hare, 60), 399,
419, 421, 422.
Edwards v. Rogers (87 Ala. 568) , 271.
Edwards v. Trumbull (50 Pa. St. 509),
601.
Edwards v. Tuck (3 De G., M. & G, 40),
1525.
Edwards v. University (1 Dev. & Bat.
Eq. 325), 461.
Edwards' Appeal (47 Pa. St. 144), 304.
Edwards v. Roberts (7 Sm. & M. 644),
465.
Edwards' Estate (12 Phila. 85), 860.
Eedes v. Eedes (11 Sim. 569), 679, 862.
Egberts. Brooks (3 Harr. 112), 1690.
Egbert v. Butler (21 Beav. 560), 1427.
Egerton v. Brownlow (4 H. L. Cas. 1),
92,97, 107,810.
Ehlen v. Ehlen (63 Md. 267), 904.
Ehlen v. Mayor ot Baltimore (76 Md.
676; 25 Atl. Rep. 917), 1590.
Ehrenfeldt's Appeal (101 Pa. St. 186),
794.
Ehrisman v. Sener (162 Pa. St. 577),
1301.
Eichelberger v. Barnitz (1 Teates, 307),
394.
Eidsellc. Hammersley (31 Beav. 255),
1079.
Eidsforth v. Armstead (2 Kay & J. 333),
1033, 1072.
Eiglebergert). Klbler (1 Hill Ch. 113),
468.
TABLE OF CASES.
lxxxv
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Eilenberger s. Protective Mut. Fire
Ins. Co. (89 Pa. St. 464), 484.
Eisenlord v. Snyder (71 N. Y. 45), 709.
Eitelgorge v. Mutual, etc. Building
Assn. (69 Mo. 55), 987.
Elands. Baker (29Beav. 137), 1073.
Eland v. Eland (1 Beav. 235; 4Myl. &
Or. 420), 1350, 1662.
Eland v. Medland (L. R. 41 Ch. D. 476),
1250, 1335.
Elbridges. McClure (2 Yerg. 84), 580.
Elders. Jones (85 111. 354), 705.
Eldredge v. Green (17 B. 1. 17), 1562.
Eldredge s. [Knott (Cowp. 215), 981,
985.
Eldridge v. Preble (34 Me. 148), 706.
Eldredge v. Smith (5 Shaw, 484), 396.
Elibank s. Montolieu (5 Ves. 737; 1
Lead. Cas. Eq. 623), 674, 678, 679, 683.
Elkhart Co. Lodge s. Orary (98 Iud.
238; 49 Am. Eep. 746), 558.
Elkins v. East India Company (1 P.
Wms. 395), 380, 387.
Eilenberger v. Griffey (55 Ark. 268),
1485.
Ellerman s. Wurz (14 S. W. Eep. 333),
1448.
Ellicott s. Ellicott (6 Gill & J. 35), 1694.
Ellieott v. Chamberlain (38 N. J. Eq.
604), 426, 431, 1171.
Ellig s. Nagle (9 Cal. 683), 1120, 1712.
Elliott s. Armstrong (2 Blackf. 198),
308, 355,363,978, 1638.
Elliott v. Cordell (5 Madd. 149), 680.
Elliotts. Elliott (2 Ch. Ca. 231), 27.
Elliott s. Gower (12 E. I. 79), 710.
Elliott s. Horn (10 Ala. 348) , 354.
Elliott s. Howell (78 Va. 297), 828.
Elliott s. Lawhead (43 Ohio St. 171),
709.
Elliott s. Merriman (1 Lead. Cas. Eq.
40; 2 Atk. 41), 1650, 1652, 1658, 1663.
Elliott v. Poole (3 Jones Eq. 17), 391.
Elliott v. Sparrell (114 Mass. 404),
856.
Elliotts. Wood (53 Barb. 285), 395, 1444,
1483, 1497.
Ellis s. Am. Mortgage Co. (36 S. Car.
45;15S. E. Eep. 267), 710.
Ellis v. Boston, etc. E. E. Co. (107
Mass. 13), 894, 909.
Ellis v. Ellis (15 Ala. 296), 133, 135.
Ellis v. Ellis (12 Pick. 178), 1689.
Ellis s. Essex Merimack Bridge (2
Pick. 243), 854.
Ellis, Exparte (1 Atk. 101), 972.
Ellis s. Fisher (3 Sneed, 231; 65 Am.
Dee. 52), 922,923, 935,941.
Ellis s. Martin (170 Pa. St. 129), 1401.
Ellis v. Nimmo (Ellis &G. 333), 146, 148.
Ellis s. Selby (1 Myl. & Cr. 286), 83, 241,
253.
Ellis s. Ward (137111. 509), 1633.
Ellis s. Woods (9 Eich. Eq. 19) , 651, 686,
687.
Ellison s. Ellison (6 Ves. 656), 146, 162,
155, 160, 1575.
Ellison v. Elwin (13 Sim. 309), 680.
Ellison s. Wilson (13 S. &E. 330), 260.
Ellison's Trusts, In re (2 Jur. (N. S.)
62), 888.
Ellmaker s. Ellmaker (4 Watts, 89),
100.
Ellsworth v. Lockwood (42 N. Y. 89),
1486, 1506.
Elmendorf s. Lansing (4 Johns. Ch.
562), 1236.
Elmendorf s. Taylor (10 Wheat. 168),
465, 1535.
Elmes s. Sutherland (7 Ala. 262), 1318.
Elmley s. McAulay (3 Bro. Ch. 220), 455,
1655.
Elmsley s. Young (2 Myl. & K. 780), 642.
Elstner v. Fife (32 Ohio St. 358) , 878.
Elton s.jHarrison (2 Swanst. 276m.), 1037.
Elve v. Boyton (L. E. (1891) 1 Ch. 501),
1209.
Elwells. Chamberlain (31 N. Y. 619),
476, 486.
Elwin v. Elwin (8 Ves. 547) , 299.
Elwood v Northrup (106 N. Y. 172), 830.
Elworthy v. Bird (2 S. & 8. 372), 720, 722,
723.
Ely v. Blair (16 B. Mon. 230), 1364, 1413.
Ely v. Cook (18 Barb. 612), 1368.
Ely v. Stewart (2 Md. 408) , 477.
Emerson v. Atwater (7 Mich. 12), 1171.
Emerson s. Bingham (10 Mass. 197),
487.
Emerson s. Galloupe (158 Mass. 146; 32
N. E. Eep. 1118), 64.
Emerson s. Knower (8 Pick. 63) , 1364.
Emerson v. Wiley (10 Pick. 310), 984.
Emery s. Batchelder (78 Me. 233), 1201.
Emery s. Chase (5 Me. 232), 910.
Emery s. Grocock (6 Madd. 54), 980, 983,
985.
Emery s. Hill (1 Euss. 112), 811.
Emigrant Industrial Sav. Bank s.Eoche
(93 N. Y. 374), 1387.
Emleys. Davidson (L. E. 19 Ch. D.
156), 813.
Emmert v. Hays (89 111. 11), 705.
Emmet s. Clarke (3 Gift. 32), 900.
Emmons s. Cairns (3 Barb. 243), 1438.
Emmons v. Hawn (75Ind. 356) 1490.
Emmons s. Moore (85 111. 304), 492.
Emmons s. Van Zee (78 Mich. 171),
1447.
Emonds v. Termehr (60 Iowa, 92), 1628.
lxxxvi
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Enekinga. Simmons (28 Wis. 272), 1462,
1490.
England^. Downs (2 Beav. 522), 548,549.
England v. Slade (4 T. R. 682), 980, 983,
984.
Englarn. Offutt (70 Md. 78; 14 Am. St.
Eep. 332), 1625, 1626, 1630.
Englei>. Burns (5 Coll. 470), 497.
Englefield v. Engelfleld (2 Vern. 236),
1529.
English v. Miller (2 Rich. Eq. 320), 38.
English v. Moneypenny (26 W'kly Law
Bui. 250), 1179.
Enloe v. Miles (12 Sm. & M. 147), 1098.
Ennas v. Frauklin (2 Brev. 398), 967.
Enneauu. Rieger (105 Mo. 659), 327.(
Ennis v. Leach (1 Ired. Eq. 416), 1107.
Ennisonv. Risque (9 Bush, 24), 575.
Enos v. Hunter (9 111. 211), 232, 368.
Ensleyn. Ballentine (4 Humph. 233),
309.
Entwistle v. Davis (L. R. 4 Eq. 272), 813.
Enyeartw. Kepler (118 Ind. 37), 714.
Episcopal Church v. Wiley (2 Hill Ch.
584), 36.
Epley v. Witherow (7 Watts, 163), 449,
451, 460.
Equitable Trust Co. v. Fisher (106 111.
189), 987, 1502, 1505.
Erickson v. Quinn (47 N. T. 410), 1540.
Erickson v. Raferty (79 111. 209), 449.
Erickson v. Smith (79 Iowa, 374), 575,
587.
Erickson^. Willard (1 N. H. 217), 124,
130.
Erisman v. Directors (47 Pa. St. 509),
1008.
Ernest v. Croysdill (2 DeG., F. & J. 175),
204, 433,534.
Erratu. Barlow (14 Ves. 202), 836, 837.
Errington v. Chapman (12 Ves. 20), 836,
839.
Erskine's Trusts, Inre (1 Kay * J. 302),
678.
Ervinr. Blake (8 Pet. 18), 560.
Ervin's Appeal (16 Pa. St. 256), 1085.
Escheator v. Smith (4 McC. 452), 28, 931,
1109.
Eshelmanw. Lewis (49 Pa. St. 410), 189,
206, 333.
Eshelman's Appeal (74 Pa. St. 42), 1688.
Eskridgea. McClure (2 Yerg. 84), 577.
Espin v. Pemberton (3 De G. & J. 647),
443.
Espey v. Lake (10 Hare, 260) 286, 287.
Essex County v. Durrant (14 Gray, 447),
951, 1114.
Estabrookw. Earle (97 Mass. 302), 707.
Estabrook v. Scott (3 Ves. 456) , 563.
Estate of Besley (18 Wis. 455) 857.
Estate of Bosio (2 Ashm. 437), 1143.
Estate of Delaney (49 Cal. 76), 616.
Estate of Hoffen (70 Wis. 522), 751.
Estep v. Hutchinson (14 S. & R. 435),
1066.
Esterbrook v. Tlllinghast (5 Gray, 171),
748.
Etches v. Etches (3 Drew. 441), 1638.
Eton v. Smith (2 Beav. 236), 1005.
Eubank v. Poston (5 Mod. 285), 570.
Eubank v. Preston (8Mon. 292), 441.
European Bank, In re (L. R. 5 Ch. App.
358), 433.
European &N. Am. Ry. Co. v. Poor (59
Me. 277), 405.
Eutaw Place Bapt. Church v. Shively
(67 Md . 493 ; 1 Am . St. Rep. 412) , 753 .
Evan v. Corp. of Avon (29 Beav.
144), 10.
Evangelical Association's Appeal (35
Pa. St. 316), 749.
Evans v. Battle (19 Ala. 378), 151.
Evansu. Bear (L. R. 10 Ch. 76), 1236.
Evans v. Becknell (6 Ves. 173), 472, 984,
1116, 1427.
Evans v. Brown (Wightw. 102), 480.
Evans v. Carrington (2 DeG., F. & J.
481), 494.
Evans v. Coventry (5 De G., M. & G.
911), 1576.
Evans v. Davies (7 Hare, 498), 42.
Evans v. Edmonds (13 C. B. 777), 475.
Evans v. Ellis (5 Denio, 643) , 206, 419,
423.
Evans v. Enloe (70 Wis. 345), 578.
Evans' Estate (2 Ashm. 470), 1230.
Evans v. Evans (1 Hagg. Consistory
Rep. 36), 718.
Evans v. Goodlet (1 Blackf. 339; 12 Am.
Dec. 258), 575.
Evans v. Inglehart (6 Gill & J. 192),
1438.
Evans v. John (4 Beav. 35), 878, 883.
Evans v. Knorr (1 Rawle, 66), 652.
Evans v. Lamar (21 Ala. 333), 1376.
Evans v. Llewellyn (1 Cox, 333; 2 Bro.
Ch. 120), 282, 295.
Evans v. McKee (12 Pa. St. 89; 25 Atl.
Rep. 148), 239.
Evans v. Massey (1 Y. & J. 196) , 1561.
Evans v. Root (7 N. Y. 189; 57 Am. Dec.
512) , 987.
Evans v. Russell (31 Leg. Int. 125), 276,
278.
Evans v. Tweedy (1 Beav. 55), 1319,
1320.
Evarts v. Nason (11 Vt. 122), 1537, 1690,
1698.
Evelyn v. Evelyn (2 P. Wms. 669), 1324,
1525, 1529.
TABLE OP CASES.
lxxxvii
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1758 ]
Evelyn v. Templar (2 Bro. Oh. 12), 146.
Everdson v. Mayhew (65 Oal. 163), 184.
Everett v. Everett (48 N. Y. 218), 372,
373.
Everett v. Henry (67 Tex. 402), 1185.
Everett v. Prythergch (12 Sim. 367),
904.
Everett v. Jloby (104 N. Car. 479) , 662.
Everitt v. Everitt (29 N. T. 39), 616, 618.
Everitt v. Everitt (L. E. 10 Eq. 405),
162,274,277,286,293.
Everly v. Harrison (167 Pa. St. 355; 31
Atl. Eep. 668), 429.
Eversfleld v. Eversfield (4 Har. & J.
12), 1716.
Everton v. Tappen (5 Johns. Ch. 497) ,
398.
Everts v. Agnes (4 Wis. 343), 438, 440,
443, 594.
Everts?;. Everts (80 Mich. 222), 943.
Evertson v. Mile (6 Johns. 138), 475.
Evertson v. Tappan (5 Johns. Oh. 409),
329, 330.
Every v. Eold (2 Oh. Rep. 1), 1628.
Evroy v. Hicholas (2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 489),
27.
Ewell v. Tidwell (20 Ark. 136), 297.
Ewer v. Corbett (2 P. Wms. 148), 455,
1655.
Ewing v. Buckner (76 Iowa, 467), 852.
Ewing v. Jones (130 Ind. 247; 29 N. B.
Eep. 1057), 149.
Ewing v. Osbaldiston (2Myl. & Cr. 63),
685.
Ewing v. Shannahan (113 Mo. 188; 20 S.
W. Eep. 1065), 164.
Ewing v. Smith (3 Desaus. 417; 5 Am.
Dee. 557), 11, 665.
Ewing v. Warner (47 Minn. 446), 1750.
Ewing v. Wilson (132 Ind. 223), 162.
Exeter v. Odiorne (1 N. H. 232), 913, 918,
919,940.
Ex parte Abbott (1 Deacon, 338) , 655.
Exparte Abbott (55 Me. 580), 865, 866, 902.
Ex parte Alderson (1 Madd. 53), 34.
Ex parte Alexander (2 Mont. & Ayr.
492), 382.
Ex parte Andrews (2 Rose, 410), 1029,
1030, 1031, 1155, 1538.
Ex parte Arkwrigbt (3M..D. & De G.
129) , 600.
Ex parte Bailey (15 R. I. 60), 1013, 1159,
1192.
Ex parte Barry (L. E. 17 Eq. 113), 972.
Ex parte Belchier (Amb. 219), 1123.
Ex parte Bennett (18 Beav. 339), 405.
Ex parte Bennett (10 Ves. 381), 382, 383,
3S4, 399, 426, 606.
Ex parte Berkhampstead School (2 V. <Sfc
B. 138), 782.
Ex parte Blackburn (1 J. & W. 297),
1016.
-Ea: parte Bland (2 Rose Cas. 91), 566.
Ex parte Bolland (L. R. 17 Eq. 115), 201,
653.
Ex parte Boulton (1 De G. & J. 163),
1116.
Ex parte Brettell (6 Ves. 576), 970.
Ex parte Bromfluld (1 Bro. Ch. 616), 828.
Ex parte Burke (4 Sandf. Oh. 617), b31.
Ex parte Butler (1 Atk. 213), 972.
Ex parte C&\meB (1 Hill Ch. 112), 1169,
1215.
Ex parte Carr (3 V. & B. Ill), 539.
Ex parte Chambers (1 R. & M. 577), 837,
1563.
Exparte Chilton (17 Jur. 988), 30, 31, 876,
1431.
Exparte Chippendale (4De G., M. & G.
19), 1032,1033, 1701.
Exparte Conway (4 Ark. 304), 1411.
Exparte Conybeare (1 W. R. 458), 30,
876.
Exparte Cooke (8 Ves. 353), 1309.
Exparte Oooke (L. E. 4 Oh. D. 123), 204.
329, 434,534,972, 1187.
Ex parte Coysegame (1 Atk. 195), 680,
976.
Ex parte Oulley (L. E. 9 Oh. D. 307),
1138.
Exparte Crumb (2 Johns. Oh. 489), 825.
Exparte Orutchrleld (3 Yerg. 336), 827.
Ex parte Vale & Co. (L. E. 11 Ch. D.
772), 1626.
Exparte Daniel (14 R. I. 500), 1415, 1418.
Exparte Deeze (1 Atk. 228), 566.
Exparte Degge (4 Bro. Ch. 235), 830.
Exparte Dewdney (15 Ves. 496) , 465.
Exparte Dodd (Ph. Eq. 97), 1614.
Exparte Dover (5 Sim. 600), 867.
Exparte Dressier (L. R. 9 Oh. D. 252),
1138.
Ex parte Dumas (1 Atk. 232), 204, 972,
976.
Ex parte Dupont (1 Harp. Ch. 5), 28.
Exparte Ellis (1 Atk. 101), 972.
Ex parte Fearon (5 Ves. 633), 517.
Ex parte Gadsden (3 Eich. 468), 923,
1268.
Exparte Garner (2 Ves. 671), 681.
Exparte Gennys (1 Mont. & Mac. 258),
29, 972, 976.
Exparte Grace (1 Bos. & P. 376), 399.
Ex parte Granger (2 Dea. 4 Ch. 459),
465.
Ex parte Graves (2 Jur. (N. S.) 651) , 1114.
Ex parte Green (1 Jac. & W. 253), 836,
841,932,988,1563.
Ex parte Greenhouse (1 Madd. 92), 897,
1575.
Ixxxviii
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Exparte Greenville Academy (7 Rich.
470), 902, 1130.
Exparte Griffin (2 Gill & J. 116), 1122,
1123, 1128.
Ex parte Gi\mstone (Amb. 706), 829.
Exparte Haigh (11 Ves. 403) , 600.
Exparte Hansom (12 Ves. 349), 976.
Exparte Hardcastle (29 W. E. 615), 1174.
Exparte Hasell (3 T. & O. 617), 461.
Exparte Hays (3 De G. & Sm. 485), 845,
1563.
Exparte Herbert (13 Ves. 188), 976.
Exparte Hill (32 L. J. Cb. 154), 412.
Exparte Holtbausen (L. R. 9 Cb. 722),
600.
Exparte Hooper (1 Meriv. 7), 600.
Exparte Houghton (17 Ves. 253), 369.
Ex parte Hughes (6 Ves. 616), 382, 426,
606, 899.
Ex parte Hunt (1M. D. & De G. 139) , 600.
Ex parte Hussey (2 Whart. 330), 902.
Ex parte Inge (2 R. &M. 590), 785.
Exparte James (8 Ves. 337), 334, 383, 384,
385, 399, 423, 1163, 1178, 1180.
Ex parte Jewett (16 Ala. 409), 829.
Exparte Jordan (4 Del. Cb. 615), 1168,
1742.
Exparte Jortin (7 Ves. 340), 772.
Exparte Kay (1 Md. 199), 654.
Ex parte Kebble (11 Ves. 606), 836, 837,
838, 841.
Ex parte Kent (3 Bro. Ch. 88), 832, 841,
1563.
Exparte Kensington (2 V. &B. 79), 600.
.Eic .parte Kilgore (120 Ind. 94), 1239.
Ex parte K i Hick (3 Mont. D. & De G.
480), 654.
Exparte Kirby Hospital (16 Ves. 314),
906.
Exparte Kuntz (1 Bailey, 489), 596, 902.
Exparte Lacey (6 Ves. 625), 332, 333, 382,
399, 426, 899, 1180.
Exparte Lakin (4Russ. 307), 832,841.
Exparte Langston (17 Ves. 230), 600.
Ex parte ~Lmd\ey (32 Ind. 36"), 747, 756.
Ex parte Liquorish (L. R. 25 Q. B. Div.
176), 1708.
Expiarte Livingston (34 N. T. 55), 902.
Exparte McBurnie (1 De G., M. & G.
446), 99.
Ex parte Marsh (1 Atk. 159), 99, 972.
Exparte Moldant (3 D. & C. 351), 1632.
Exparte Molesworth (4 Russ. 308), 832,
84 j.
Ex parte Morgan (10 Ves. 101), 970.
fcporte Morgan (12 Ves. 6), 426.
Ex parte Mountfort (15 Ves. 445), 832,
841, 1363.
Ex parte Myerscough (1 J. & W. 152),
832,841, 842, 1563.
Exparte Newhall (2 Story, 360), 14.
Ex parte Norris (L. R. 4 Ch. App. 280),
1587.
Exparte Norton (8 DeG., M. &G. 2581,
680.
Ex parte Ogle (L. R. 8 Ch. App. 711),
1114, 1138, 1342.
Exparte Orde (Jacobs, 94), 845.
Exparte Painter (2Deac. & Cb. 584), 29.
Exparte Payne (2 Y. & C. 636) , 128.
Exparte Phelps (9 Mod. 357), 974, 1575.
Ex parte Phillips (2Dea. 334), 1124.
Exparte Phillips (19 Ves. 122), 827, 828,
830.
Ex parte Pollard (3 Mont. & Ayr. 340),
35.
Exparte Potts (1 Ash. 340), 905, 1575.
Exparte Pugb (1 Drew. 202), 678.
Ex parte Pye (18 Ves. 140), 76, 153, 155,
851.
ErcpartePyke (L. R. 8 Ch. D. 469), 563,
590.
Exparte Ray (1 Madd. 199) , 653.
Ex parte Rees (3 V. &B. 11), 9>2.
Exparte Reynolds (5 Ves. 707), 384, 392,
426, i)05, 1575.
Ex parte Rigby (19 Ves. 463), 639, 1022,
1122.
Exparte Romney (L. R. 14 Eq. 230), 768.
Exparte Rnffin (6 Ves. 119), 599.
Exparte Salter (2 Dick. 769; 3 Bro. Cb.
500), 832, 841, 1563.
Ex parte Schouler (134 Mass. 426), 907,
1004.
Exparte Sergison (4 Ves. 149), 26, 970.
Exparte Shank (1 Atk. 234), 566.
Exparte Shaw (8 Sim. 159), 970.
Exparte Smith (1 Dea. 191;M. & A. 506),
1124.
Exparte South (3 Swanst. 393), 34.
Ex parte Starkie (3 Sim. 339), 832, 841,
1563.
Ex parte Stephens (L. R. 3 Ch. D. 807),
1309.
Exparte Swift (1 R. & M. 575), 836.
Exparte Thistlewood (1 Rose, 2')0), 480.
Exparte Thomas (Ambl. 146) , 832, 841.
Ex parte Town (2 Mont. & Ayr. 29),
382.
Exparte Townsend (1 Moll. 139), 1244.
Exparte Trenhobm (19 S. Car. 126), 237,
308, 350.
Exparte Truston (154 Mass. 596) , 1619.
Ex parte Turner (9 Mod. 418) , 1652
Exparte Turner (1 Bailey Ch. 395), 696,
905.
Exparte Wallop (4 Bro. Ch. 90), 511.
Exparte Whitbread (19 Ves. 209), 600.
Exparte Whitehead (L. R. 14 Q. B. Div.
419), 712.
TABLE OF CASES.
lxxxix
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753]
Ex parte Whitfield (2 Atk. 315), 832, 841,
1563.
Ex parte Wiggins (1 Hill (S. Car.) Eq.
354), 383, 390, 394.
Ex parte Williams (18 S. Oar. 299), 1627.
Ex parte Wilkinson (3 Mont. & Ayr.
145), 857.
Ex parte Wrangham (2 Ves. Jr. 609),
785.
Ex parte Wright (19 Ves. 255), 600.
Ex parteYovng (SGill, 287), 1689.
Exton v. Scott (6 Sim. 3 ), 76.
Eykyn's Trusts, Inre(L. R. 6 Ch. D.
118), 339.
Eyre v. Dolphin (2 Ball & B. 290), 399,
1164.
Eyreti. Fitton (1 Sugd. Pow. 155), 1009.
Eyre v. Maraden (2 Keen, 564). 1525.
Eyre v. Shaftesbury (2 P. Wms. 119),
744, 827, 927, 928.
Eyrieh v. Capital State Bank (67 Miss.
60), 1634.
Eyrick v. Hetrick (13 Pa. St. 494), 29, 50,
88, 878, 879, 921, 1268, 1295.
Eyster's Appeal (16 Pa. St. 372), 1210.
Eystrau. Capelle (61 Mo. 578), 708.
Eytonw. Eyton (IBro. P. C. 153), 559.
Ezzelli>. Watson (83 Ala. 120), 1490.
F.
Fabertf. Police (10 S. Oar. 376), 912.
Faekleru. Ford (24 How. 322), 195.
Faddist'. Woollomes (10 Kan. 56), 706.
Fadnessf. Brandenborg (73 Wis. 257),
751, 789, 796.
Fagg's Case (1 Vern. 62), 327.
Fahnestock's Appeal (104 Pa. St. 46),
1134, 1210, 1212,1694.
Fairbanks v. Lamson (99 Mass. 533), 731,
748.
Fairchildii. Edson (77 Hun, 298; 28 N.
T. Supl. 401), 815.
Fairer i'. Park (L. E. 3 Ch. D. 309), 1528.
Fairfax v. Hunter (7 Crunch, 603), 967.
Fairfield v. Lamson (50 Conn. 601; 47
Am. Eep. 669), 747.
Fairfax v. Hopkins (2 Cranch, 0. C.
134), 1093, 1095, 1488.
Fairhurst v. Lewis (23 Ark. 435), 368.
Fairman v. Bovin (29 III. 75), 386, 1121.
Fairmanj;. Green (10 Ves. 45), 634, 837,
83S, 841, 1563.
Falk». Turner (101 Mass. 494), 154, 160,
218, 426, 431.
Falkner «. Davis (18Gratt. 651), 1106.
Falkner v. Equitable Soc. (4 Drew.
352), 1100.
Falkner v. Wynford (9 Jur. 1006), 624.
Fallv. Simmons 6 Ga. 274), 1692.
Fallen, In re (1 McOart. 147) , 26.
Fallis v. Keys (35 Ohio St. 265), 709.
Fallon v. McAlonem (15 E. I. 223), 710.
Fallon v. Worthington (13 Colo. 559;
16 Am. St. Rep. 231), 574.
Fambro v. Gantt (12 Ala. 305), 456, 1656.
Fane v . Fane (1 Vern . 30) , 144 .
Fanning v Kerr (7 Iowa, 450), 1443, 1515.
Fargason v. Edgington (49 Ark. 207),
445.
Farls v. Dunn (7 Bush, 276), 355.
Farley v. Briant (32 Me. 475), 506.
Farley v. Eller (29Ind. 322), 1444.
Farley v. Skipper (Whythe, 135) , 36, 43,
216.
Farmer v. Arundel (2 Black, 824) , 529.
Farmer v. Farmer (39 N. J. Eq. 211),
285,287,709.
Farmers' Nat. Bank v. King (57 Pa. St.
202), 1604.
Farmers' Bank v. Beaston (7 Gill & J.
421 ; 28 Am. Dec. 226), 950, 1139.
Farmers' Bank v. Payne (25 Conn. 444),
444.
Farmers' Loan Co. v. Maltby (8 Paige,
563), 443.
Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. Chk;. & A. Ey.
Co. (27 Fed. Eep. 146), 14.
Farmers' Loan, etc. Co. v. San Diego
Street-Car Co. (45 Fed. Rep. 518),
411.
Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Brewer
(27 Conn. 600), 1641.
Farmers* & Merchants' Bank v. Downey
(53Cal. 466), 411.
Farmers' Nat. Bk. v. Moran (30 Minn.
167), 923, 1268.
Farmers' & T. Bank v. Kimball Milling
Co. (IS. Dak. 237; 47 N. W. Rep.
404), 21,5, 4C6, 1629.
Farmers' & Traders' Bank v. Martin
(33 S. W. Eep. 565), 1398.
Farnam v. Brooks (9 Pick. 220), 291, 383,
427, 1178, 1534, 1537.
Farnham v. Clements (51 Me. 426), 7,
500, 503, 520, 525.
Famsworth v. Childs (4 Mass. 637), 453,
478.
Farquharson v. McDonald (2 Heisk.
404), 1385.
Farquharaonj). Nugent (6 Dem. 296),
1687.
Farm. Gilreath (23 S. Car. 502), 101.
Farr v. Newman (4 T. E. 629), 972.
Farm. Sherman (11 Mich. 93), 707.
Farran v. Beshour (9 Colo. 291), 705.
Farrance v. Viley (9 Eng. L. & Eq. 219) ,
832.
Farrant v. Blanchard (1 De G., J. & S.
107), 1544, 1598.
xc
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Farrar v. Parrar (L. R. 40 Ch. D. 395),
1491.
Farrar v. Payne (73 III. 82), 1628.
Farrar v. Winterton (5 Beav. 1), 303.
Farrarsw. Cheney (2 Vern. 384), 436.
Farr<?lly v. Ladd (10 Allen, 127), 162, 980.
Farrell v. Lloyd (69 Pa. St. 239), 334, 359,
374.
Farringer v. Ramsey (2 Md. 365), 308.
Farrington v. Barr (36 N. H. 86), 232,264.
Farritigton v. Duval (108 S. Car. 944),
309.
Farrington v. Knightly (1 P. Wms. 544),
215, 260.
Farris v. Farris (29 S. W. Rep. 618), 313.
Farrows. Commonwealth Ins. Co. (18
Pick. 53), 1030.
Farthing v. Shields (106 N". Car. 295), 709.
Farwcll v. Cramer (38 Neb. 61; 66 N. W.
Rep. 71B) , 660.
Fast v MtPherson (98 111. 496), 1180.
Fatherlee v. Fletcher (31 Miss. 265),
339.
Fatjo v. Swasey (111 Cal. 628; 44 Pac.
Rep. 225), 905.
Faucetti'. Currier (109 Mass. 79), 707.
Faulkner v. Daniel (3 Hare, 21"), 979.
Faulkner j). Davis (18 Gratt. 651), 626,
1573.
Faulkner v. Nat'l Sailors' Home (155
Mass. 458; 29 N. E. Rep. 645), 748.
Fauroteu. Carr(108Ind. 123), 14.
Fausler v. Jones (7Ind. 277), 1559.
Fausett v. Carpenter (2 Dow. &C1.232),
976.
Fawcett v. Fawcett (1 Bush , 511), 390.
Fawcett v. Whitebouse (1 Russ. & Myl.
132), 194.
Faxon v. Durant (9 Mete. 339), 1385.
Fay v. Bradley (1 Pick. 194), li 20.
Fay v. Davis (113 Mass. 255), 721.
Fay v. Fay (1 Cush. 93), 111,928,940.
Fay v. Fay (29 Atl. Rep. 356), 208.
Fay v. Fay (2 Hayw. 131) , 47.
Fay i'. Fay (50 N. J. Eq. 260; 24 Atl.
Rep. 1036), 327.
Fay v. Grant (53 Hun, 44) , 1365.
Fay v. Haven (3 Met. 109), 1743.
Fay v. Taft (12 Cush. 448), 178.
Feamster v. Feamster (35 W. Va. 1; 13
S. E. Rep. 53), 891.
Fearns v. Young (10 Ves. 184), 330, 1058,
1167.
Fearon v. Aylesford (L. R. 14 Q. B.
Div. 792), 720, 721, 725.
Fearon, Ex parte (5 Ves. 633), 517.
Fears v. Brooks (12 Ga. 200), 11, 651, 655,
664, 667, 668,688, 1274.
Featherston v. Richardson (63Ga.501),
1569.
Featherstonea. West (6 Ir. Rep. Eq.
86) , 1688.
Featherstonehaugh v. Fenwick (17
Ves. 298), 194, 196, 398, 399.
Feeney v. Howard (79 Cal. 625; 12 Am.
St. Rep. 162), 218, 603.
Feistal v. King's College, (10 Beav.
491), 38.
Feizel v. First German Soc. (9 Kan.
592), 789, 9s7, 1119.
Felch v. Hooper (119 Mans. 52), 198.
Feigner v. Hooper (80 Md. 262; 30 Atl.
Rep. 911), 1268.
Felkner v. Tighe (39 Ark. 357), 586.
Felix v. Patrick (145 U. S. 317), 1736.
Fell v. Brown (2 Bro. Ch. 276), 36.
Fellowes v. Gwydyr (1 Sim. 63; 1 Russ.
&M. 82), 528.
Fellows v. Heermans (4 Lans.238), 618.
Fellows v. Mines (119 Mass. 541), 735,
748.
Fellows v. Mitchell (IP. Wms. 83), 1122,
1127, 1175, 1234, 1591.
Fellows v. Tann (9 Ala. 999) , 651, 667, 668,
1274.
Felthainv. Clark (1 De G. & Sm. 307),
1116.
Feltham v. Turner (23 L. T. 345), 1219.
Fulton v. Le Breton (92 Cal. 457; 28 Pac.
Rep. 4U0),504.
FeltonK. Smith (84 Ind. 485), 230.
Fennern. Taylor (2 R. & M. 190), 681,
684.
Fenwick v. Green well (10 Beav. 412),
623.
Fenwickii. Potts (8 De G., M. & G.
506) , 924.
Ferebeew. Proctor (2 Dev. & Bat. 432;
llrert. Eq. 143), 1066.
Fergus v. Wilmarth (17 111. App. 98),
1115.
Fergusons. Bell (17 Mo. 347), 1024.
Ferguson v. Epes (77 Va. 4BI), 1215.
Fergusons. Franklin (6 Murf . 305), 28,
1109.
Ferguson v. Livingstone (9 Ir. Eq.202),
1536.
Fergusons. Reed (45 Tex. 574), 711.
Ferguson v. Soden (111 Mo. 208; 19 S. W.
Rep. 727), 708.
Ferguson v. Tadman (1 Sim. 530), 199.
Fergusons. Williamson (20 Ark. 272),
525.
Fernstler». Seibert (114 Pa. St. 196),
794.
Ferrariaa. Vasconvellos (31111. 46), 789,
796, 797.
Ferras v. Charry (2 Vern. 384), 432, 446.
Ferrleri). Ferrier (II Ir. Rep. 66), 1664.
Ferris v. Adams (23 Vt. 136), 556.
TABLE OF CASES.
XC1
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Ferris v. Van Vechten (73 N. Y. 113),
532, 1635.
Ferry v. Liable (31 N. J. Eq. 566), 53, 59,
1009, 1031, 1073.
FersontJ. Sanger (1 Woodb. & M. 147),
484.
Fesmire's Estate (134 Pa. St. 676; 19
Am. St. Eep. 676), 1127, 1134, 1234,
1237.
Festing v. Allen (12 Mees. & W. 279),
929.
Festorazzi v. St. Joseph's Church (104
Ala. 327; 18 So. Eep. 394), 807.
Fettiplace v. Gorges (1 Ves. Jr., 46; 3
Bro. Ch. 8), 661.
Fickett v. Cohn (1 ST. T. Supl. 436), 1563.
Fidelity Insurance Co.'s Appeal (115
Pa. St. 157), 1542.
Fidler v. Higglns (21 N. J. Eq. 138),
828.
Fiedler v. Day (2 Sandf. 594), 1389.
Field v. Arrowsmith (3 Humph. 442; 39
Am. Dec. 185), 88, 393, 696, 880, 897,
900.
Fields). Colton (7 Brad. 379), 1215.
Field v. Donoughmore (1 Dr. & War.
227), 1329,1330,1370.
Field v. DrewTheological Sem. (41 Fed.
Eep. 371), 731,750.
Field v. Evans (15 Sim. 372), 667.
Field v. Field (9 Wend. 401), 789, 796.
Field v. Hopkins (L. E. 44 Ch. D. 524),
1708.
Field v. Lonsdale (13Beav. 78), 352.
Field v. Mayor (2 Seld. 179; 67 Am. Dec.
435), 34.
Field v. Moore (7 De G., M. & G. 691; 35
Eng. L. & Eq. 498), 12, 13.
Field v. Pickett (29 Beav. 568), 1355.
Field v. Eidgley (116 111. 424), 1408.
Field v. Romero (41 Pac. Eep. 517), 1388.
Field v. Sehieflelin (7 Johns. Ch. 160;
11 Am. Dec. 441), 440, 455, 1627, 1650,
1655, 1657, 1658.
Field v. Soule (4 Buss. 112), 645, 693, 697.
Field v. Wilbur (49 Vt. 157), 1025.
Fielden v. Ashworthy (L. E. 20 Eq.
410), 632.
Fielding v. Winwood (16 Ves. 90), 622.
Fillers. Tyler (91 Va. 458; 22 S. E. Eep.
236), 711.
Finch v. Finch (15 Ves. 43), 174, 307,
339.
Finch v. Finch (10 Ohio St. 501), 100.
Finch v. Hollingsworth (21 Beav. 112),
627, 631, 633.
Finch, In re (Clarke, 538), 828.
Finch, Inre (L. E. 23 Ch. D. 657), 712.
Finch v. Marks (76 Va. 207), 711.
Finch v. Eagland (2 Dev. Eq. 137), 1696.
Finch j). Shaw (19 Beav. 500; 5 H. L.
Cas. 9ii5), 443.
Finch v. Wluchelsea (1 P. Wins. 277),
151.
Finch's Case (4 Inst. 86), 71, 72, 977.
Finch's Estate, In re (26 Pitts. Leg. J.
142), 864.
Finden v. Stephens (2 Ph. 142), 125, 136.
Pindlay v. Eiddle (3 Binn. 162), 93, 116.
Findlay v. Trigg (83 Va. 539), 857.
Findley v. Wilson (3 Litt. 390), 1121,
1257.
Findley v. Findley (11 Gratt. 434), 100.
Fink v. Fink (12 La. Ann. 301), 753.
Finlay v. Merriman (39 Tex. 56) , 1198.
Finlaysonw. Finlayson (17 Ore. 347; 11
Am. St. Eep. 836), 1728.
Finley v. Brent (87 Va. 103), 789, 793.
Finley a. Dickerson (29 111. 9), 1368.
Finley v. Hunter (2 Strob. Eq. 218), 810.
Finnr. Hohn (21 How. 481), 949.
Finnell v. Higgenbotham (29S. W. Eep.
362), 1607.
Finney v. Cochran (1 Watts & S. 118),
1537.
Finney v. Fairhaven Ins. Co. (5 Met.
192), 1022, 1030.
Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Bay (4 Barb. 407),
651, 686.
Firestone v. Firestone (49 Ala. 128),
193.
Firmin v. Pulham (2 De G. & S. 99), 1680.
First Bapt. Soc. v. Hazen (100 Mass.
322), 910.
First Cong. Soc. v. Atwater (23 Conn.
34), 19, 21.
First Congregational Soc. v. Trustee
(23 Pick. 148), 1722.
First Con. Presbyterian Church v. Con-
gregational Soc. (23 Iowa, 667), 789,
796.
First Mass. Turnpike Co. v. Field (3
Mass. 201), 470.
First Nat'l Bank v. Bache (71 Pa. St.
213), 605,1627.
First Nat'l Bank v. Caldwell (4 Dill.
304), 602.
First Nat'l Bank v. Campbell (2 Colo.
Ct. App. 271 ; 30 Pac. Eep. 357) , 332.
First Nat'l Bank v. Hackett (61 Wis.
335), 1414.
First Nat'l Bank v. Haire (36 Iowa, 443),
706.
First Nat'l Bank v. Hummel (14 Colo.
259 ; 20 Am . St. Rep . 257) , 1625.
First Nat'l Bank v. Michigan Trust Co.
(63 N. W. Eep. 64), 1033.
First Nat'l Bank v. Mt. Tabor Town-
ship (52 Vt. 87; 36 Am. Eep. 734),
1130.
XC11
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
First Nat'l Bank v. Ocean Nat'l Bank
(60 N. Y. 278), 1134.
First Nat'l Bank v. Salem, etc. Mills
Co. (39 Fed. Rep. 8), 577.
First Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Salisbury
(130 Mass. 310), 1121.
First Parish, etc. v. Cole (3 Pick. 232),
19.
First Presby. Soc. v. Bowen (21 Hun,
389), 125.
Fish v. Howland (1 Paige, 208), 241, 579.
Fish, In re (L. B. (1893) 2 Ch. 413), 1190.
Fish v. Miller (Hot. Ch. 267), 286.
Fishw. Wilson (15 Tex. 430), 1537.
Fishback v. Green (87 Ky. 107), 500, 518,
520.
Fishback v. Gross (112 111. 205), 170, 497,
500, 518, 1158.
Fishburnei). Smith (34 S. Car. 336 ; 13 S.
E. Rep. 626), 1494.
Fishery. Appollinaris Co. (L. R. 10 Ch.
App. 297), 720.
Fisher v. Boody (1 Curtis, 206), 485.
Fishers. Budlong (10 R. I. 625), 489.
Fishery. Fields (10 Johns. 196), 460, 918,
922,937, 941,942,1267.
Fisher v. Forbes (22 Mich. 454), 263, 374.
Fisher v. Hall (41 N. Y. 416), 159.
Fisher v. Johnson (5 Ind. 492), 589.
Fisher i>. Knox (13 Pa. St. 622; 53 Am.
Dec. 503), 957, 1117.
Fisher v. Moolicb (13 Wis. 321), 201.
Fisher v. Murray (1 E. D. Smith, 341),
1415.
Fisher v. Schlosser (41 Ohio St. 147),
553.
Fishers. Shropshire (147 U. S. 133), 575.
Fisher v. Taylor (2 Rawle, 33), 228, 921,
1288, 1295.
Fisher v. Tucker (1 McCord Ch. 169),
461.
Fishers. Wlster (154 Pa. St. 65; 25 Atl.
Rep. 1015), 1267, 1622.
Fishers. Worth (lBusb. Bq. 63), 1331.
Fisher's Will, In re (1 W. R. 505), 90S.
Fisk v. Attorney-General (L. R. 4 Eq.
521), 735, 764, 765.
Fisk v. Brunette (30 Wis. 102), 1159.
Fisk v. Mills (104 Mich. 433; 62 N. W.
Rep. 559), 707.
Fisk v. Patton (7 Utah, 399; 27 Pac. Rep.
1) , 406.
Fisk v. Potter (2 Keyes, 64) , 241, 572, 593.
Fisk v. Sarber (6 Watts & S. 18), 397,403,
427.
Fisk!). StubbS (30 Ala. 335), 904,1575.
Fitch v. Ayer (2 Conn. 143), 655.
Fitch v. Cornell (1 Sawy. 156), 606.
Fitch, Inre (3Redf. 457), 847.
Fitch v. Weber (6 Hare, 146), 262.
Fitch v. Weatherbee (110 111. 475), 1440.
Fitch v. Workman (9 Mete. 617), 1402,
1405.
Fite v. Beasley (12 Lea, 328), 750, 755.
Fitzell i>. Leaky (72 Cal. 477), 574.
FItzer!). Fitzer (2 Atk. 611), 722.
Fitzgerald v Forristal (48 111. 228), 176.
Fitzgerald, In re (L. R. 37 Ch. D. 18),
1317.
Fitzgerald v. Jones (1 Munf . 150), 1690.
Fitzgerald v. Pringle (2 MoU. 634), 1204.
Fitzgerald!). Topping (48 N. Y. 438),
1105.
Fitzgerald v. Vestal (4 Tweed. 258), 34.
Fitzgerald v. Wynne (lApp. D. C. 107),
1225.
Fitzgibbon i>. Scanlon (1 Dow. 261), 397.
Fitzpatrick v. Fitzgerald (13 Gray, 400),
949.
Fitzpatrick v. Flanagan (106 U. S. 655),
600.
Fitzpatrick v. Waring (L. R. 11 Ir. R.
35) , 1003, 1027.
Fitzpatrick's Appeal (49 Pa. St. 241),
185.
Fitzroy v. Howard (3 Russ. 225), 1159.
Fitzsimmons v. Joslin (21 Vt. 129; 52
Am. Dec. 46), 476, 484, 492, 494.
Fitzsimmons v. Ogden (7 Cranch,2),
435.
Flack v. Hohne (1 J. & W. 416), 842.
Fladong v. Winter (19 Ves. 200), 981.
Flagg!>. Ely (1 Edw. Ch. 206), 1210.
Flagg D.Mann (2 Sumn. 487), 194, 197,
328,443,1442,1582.
Flagler v. Schoeflell (40 Hun, 178), 1362.
Flamank, In re (L. R. 40 Ch. D. 461),
658.
Flanders v. Clark (1 Ves. 9), 108, 625.
Flanders v. Thompson (3 Woods C. C.
9), 532.
Flann v. Wallace (103 N. Car. 296) , 709.
Flannagan v. Nolan (1 Moll. 86), 1679.
Flarty v. Odium (3 T. R. 681), 38.
Fleeming v. Howden (L. R. 1 H. L. Sc.
372), 976.
Fleet v. Dorland (11 How. Pr. 489), 1434.
Fleetwood, In re (L. R. 15 Ch. D. 594),
510, 513.
Fleming v. Culbert (46 Pa. St. 498), 1535,
1537.
Flemings. Donohoe (5 Ohio, 255), 46,
366.
Flemings. Faron (12 Ga. 544), 401, 403.
Fleming v. Gilmer (35 Ala. 62), 1536.
Fleming v. Holt (12 W. Va. 143) 1501.
Fleming v. Wilson (6 Bush, 610) 1690.
Fletcher t>. Ashburner (1 Bro. Ch. 501),
238, 257, 299.
Fletcher v. Fletcher (4 Hare, 67) 76, 152.
TABLE OF CASES.
XC1U
[Tbe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Fletchers. Green, (33 Beav. 426), 1130,
1223, 1232, 1S88, 1592.
Fletcher v. Peck (6 Cranch, 133), 435,
445.
Fletcher v. Morey (2 Story, 555), 1408.
Fletchers. Walker (3 Mad. 73), 1205,
1254.
Flinn v. Barber (61 Ala. 530), 574.
Fllnn v. Barber (64 Ala. 193), 586.
Flinn v. Davis (18 Ala. 132), 108.
Flint v. Bell (27 Hun, 155), 1406.
Flint v. Clinton Co. (12 N. H. 430), 50,
878,879, 880, 884, 1411.
Flint v. Hughes (6 Beav. 342), 125.
Flint v. Selden (13 Mass. 448), 264.
Flint v. Warren (16 Sim. 124), 262.
Flint, etc. Co. v. Auditor-General (41
Mich. 635), 1440.
Flint, etc. E. Co. v. Dewey (14 Mich.
477), 405.
Flitcroff s Case (L. R. 21 Ch. D. 519,
597.
Flournoy v. Johnson (7B. Mon. 683),
1298.
Flower i>. Bolingbroke (1 Str. 639), 981,
985.
Flower v. Elwood (66 111. 438), 1456.
Flower v. Metropolitan Board (L. B.
27 Ch. D. 592), 1124.
Floyd ii. Barker (1 Paige, 480), 255.
Floyd v. Buckland (2 Freem. C. C. 268) ,
219.
Floyd v. Davis (98 Cal. 591; 33 Pac. Rep.
746), 1673, 1681, 1702.
Floyd v. Gilham (6 Jones Eq. 183),
856.
Floyd v. Johnson (2 Litt. 109; 13 Am.
Dec. 255), 987,1055.
Floyd v. Smith (9 Ohio St. 134), 1369.
Floyer v. Banks (L. E. 8 Eq. 115) , 608.
Floyer i;. Sberrard (Amb. 18), 480.
Flukeu. Fluke (16N. J. Eq. 478), 1036,
1074,1569,1623.
Flynn v. Messenger (28 Minn. 208; 41
Am. Eep. 279), 707.
Flyntu. Hubbard (57 Miss. 471), 350.
Fogarty v. Sawyer (23 Cal. 570), 1453.
Fogartyj;. Sawyer (17 Cal. 589), 1442,
1444, 1515.
Fogg v. Middleton (Eiley Ch. 193),
152.
Foley v. Brownell (IBro. Ch. 274), 114,
1291.
Foley v. Hill (2 H. L. Cas. 28), 1724.
Foley v. Parry (2 Myl. & K. 138), 128, 129,
996.
Foley v. Wontner (2 J. & W. 245), 801,
909.
Folgerw. Peterkin (39 La. Ann. 815),
668.
Foljambev. Willoughby (2S. &. S. 165),
1529.
Follansbe v. Kilbreth (17 111. 522; 65
Am. Dec. 691), 189, 333, 414, 1594.
Follettv. Tyrer (14 Sim. 125), 672, 965,
1277.
Folsom v. Haas (9 Ohio Cir. Ct. Eep.
473), 816.
Fonda u.Jones (42 Miss. 792), 569.
Fontaine v. Thompson (80 Va. 229), S7.
Fontaine v. Pellet (1 Ves. Jr. 337), 1025,
1154.
Fontaine v. Ravenel (17 How. 379), 743,
745, 747,770,777,778,812.
Foo9e v. Whitmore;(82 N. Y. 405; 37 Am-
Eep. 572), 137.
Foote v. Bruggerhoff (66 Hun, 406), 1687.
Foote v. Bryant (47 N. T. 544), 232, 269,
270, 321, 355.
Foote v. Colvin (3 Johns. 216), 174, 307,
532.
Foote v. Foote (58 Barb. 258), 220.
Forbes v. Ball (3Meriv. 436), 128, 632.
Forbes v. Eden (L. E. 1 H. L. Do. App.
668), 797.
Forbes v. Halsey (26 N. T. 53), 390, 391,
400.
Forsteru. Hoggart (15 Q. B. 155), 1442.
Forbes v. Hume (72 L. T. 66), 1685.
Forbes v. Lathrop (137 Mass. 525), 156.
Forbes v. Moffatt (18 Ves. 390), 978.
Forbes v. Peacock (11 Sim. 152), 1037,
1066,1350, 1646, 1662.
Forbes v. Ross (2 Bro. Ch. 430; 2 Cox,
113), 329, 330, 3S7, 1203, 1204, 1255.
Forbes v. Scammell (13 Cal. 242), 1363,
1376, 1417.
Forcey's Appeal (106 Pa. St. 508), 111.
Ford v. Belmont (7 Eob. 97), 1067.
Ford v. Dangerfield (8 Rich. Eq. 95),
256.
Ford v. Ford (80 Mich. 42) , 1521.
Ford, In re (32 Beav. 621), 678.
Ford D.Lewis (10B. Mon. 127), 255.
Ford v. Peering (1 Ves. Jr. 76), 1427.
Ford v. Smith (1 McAr. 692), 574.
Ford v. Tynte (2 H. & M. 324) 1529.
Forden v. Finney (4 Euss. 428), 685.
Fordyce v. Bridges (2 Phill. Ch. 497),
167, 614, 620.
Fordyce v. Willis (3 Bro. Ch. 687), 72.
Fordham v. Speight (23 W. E. 7c2), 130.
Forests. Bacon (2 Conn. 633), 1318.
Forkerc Brown (30 N. Y. Supl. 827),
411.
Forman v. Marsh (11 N. Y. 544), 828, 830.
Forney's Estate, In re (161 Pa. St. 209;
28 Atl. Eep. 1086; 34 W. N. C. 301),
1279.
Forrest v Elwes (4 Ves. 497), 380, 1218.
XC1V
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753]
Forrest v. Forrest (13 W. E. 3S0), 352.
Forrester v. Moore (68 Hun, 526), 307.
Forresters. Moore (77 Mo. 651), 307,
1509.
Forrester v. Seoville (51 Mo. 263), 1509.
Forscht's Estate (2 Pa. Dist. Rep. 294),
136.
Forshaw v. Higginson (3 Jur. (N. S.)
476; 8 DeG.,M. &G. 827), 890, 991,
992, 993, 1047, 1101, 1336.
Forshaw v. Welsby (30 Beav. 243), 162,
163, 274, 295.
Forster v. Abraham (L. E. 17 Eq. 351),
1431.
Forster v. Blackstone (1 Myl. & K. 297),
1116.
Forsterc. Cockerell (9 Bligh, 332; 3 01.
& F. 456), 1116.
Forster v. Hale (3 Ves. 696), 48, 60.
Forsyth v. Eathbone (34Barb. 408), 944.
Forsythe v. Clarke (3 Wend. 637), 185,
307, 369, 370.
Fort v. Delafleld (3 Edw. 31), 877.
Fortescue v. Barnett (3 Myl. & K. 36),
153, 604, 1117.
Fortescuev. Gregor (5 Ves. 553), 622
Fortescue v . Lyon (55 Ala. 440), 1033.
Forth v. Norfolk (4 Madd. 503), 1268.
Forward v. Armstead (12 Ala. 124),
151.
Foss v. Foss (15 Ir. Ch. 215), 717.
Foss v. Harbottle (3 Hare, 401), 409.
Foscue v. Foscue (2 Ired. Eg. 321), 1537.
Foscue ». Lyon (65 Ala. 440), 1120, 1138,
1214, 1215.
Fosdick v. Delafield (2 Redf . 392), 862.
Fosdlck v. Fosdick (15 E. I. 130), 721.
Fosdick v. Town of Hempstead (125 N.
T. 581; 21 Am. St. Rep. 753), 750, 752.
Foss v. Crisp (20 Pick. 121), 28.
Foster v. Abraham (L. E. 17 Eq. 351),
30.
Foster v. Ambler (24 Fla. 519; 6 So.
Eep. 263), 435, 1628.
Foster v. Boston (133 Mass. 143), 1458,
1459.
Foster j>. Craig (2 Dev. &Bat. Eq. 209),
1036.
Foster *>. Crenshaw (3 Munf. 514), 1322.
Foster d. Davis (46 Mo. 268), 1140.
Foster v, Dawber (1 Dr. & S. 172), 892.
Foster v. Dawber (8 VV. E. 646) , 888.
Foster v. Deacon (3 Madd. 394), 199.
Fosters. Denison (90hio, 124), 911.
Fosters. Dey (27 N. J. Eq. 599), 1657.
Foster v. Elsley (30 W. E. 596), 1058.
Fosters Foster (2Bro. Ch. 616), 387.
Foster v. Foster (133 Mass. 179), 156,
1271, 1282, 1637.
Foster v. Goree (4 Ala. 440), 909.
Foster v. Hale (3 Ves. 707; 5 Ves. 315),
47.
Foster v. Hodgson (19 Ves. 180), 1536.
Foster, In re (15 Hun, 387), 1210.
Fosters. Lowell (4 Mass. 308), 1362.
Fosters. Marriott (Amb. 668), 399.
Foster v. Mix (20 Conn. 395), 957, 1117.
Foster v. Mullanphy, etc. Co. (92 Mo.
79), 1719.
Foster v. Munt (1 Vern. 473), 244.
Foster v. Sinkler (4 Mass. 460) . 1117.
Foster v. Trustees (3 Ala. 302), 309, 369.
Foster v. V. S. Ins. Co. (11 Pick. 85),
1022.
Foster v. Wilber (1 Paige, 537), 860.
Foster v. Young (35 Iowa, 27), 1242.
Foster's Will, In re (15 Hun, 387), 902,
1102.
Fothergill v. Fotherglll (Freem. 256),
146.
Foueh v. Wilson (60 Ind. 64; 28 Am.
Eep. 651), 675.
Fouche v. Brower (74 Ga. 251), 1411.
Founereau v. Poyntz (IBro. Ch. 474).
247.
Fountain v. Anderson (33 Ga. 337), 1649.
Fountains. Pellet (1 Ves. Jr. 337), 1436.
Fourdrin v. Gowdy (3 Myl. & K. 383),
41,42,967.
Fowey's Charities, In re (4 Beav. 225),
906.
Fowbes v. Pascoe (L. E. 10 Ch. App.
343), 343.
Fowle v. Merrill (10 Allen, 350), 395.
Fowleu. Toney (13 Mass. 90), 707.
Fowler v. Bowery Sav. Bank (113 K.
Y. 450), 1584.
Fowler v. Colt (25 N. J. Eq. 202), 1201.
Fowler v. Fowler (33 Beav. 616), 755.
Fowler j). Fowler (3 P. Wms. 355), 717.
Fowler v. Garlike (IE. &M. 232), 53, 83,
253.
Fowler v. Hunter (3 Y. & J. 506) , 1000.
Fowler, In re (L. R. 16 Ch. D. 723), 1153,
1154.
Fowler, In re (2 Buss. 449), 904.
Fowler v. Insurance Co. (20 Hun, 195),
1031.
Fowler v. Jacob (62 Md. 326) , 707.
Fowler v. Jones (1 Ch. Cas. 262), 928.
Fowler v. Lewis (36 W. Va. 112; 14 S.
E. Eep 447), 1500, 1608.
Fowler v. Reynal (3 Macn. & G. 500),
1102, 1217, 1218.
Fowler v. Rust (2 A. K. Marsh. 294),
575.
Fowler v. True (76 Me. 43) , 1630.
Fowler's Appeal (125 Pa. St. 388; 17 Atl.
Rep. 431), 1558.
Foxj). Buckley (L. R. 3C11.D.511), 1427.
TABLE OF CASES.
XCV
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Fox v. Cook (11 Pa. St. 211), 1537.
Fox v. Fox (27 Beav. 301), 62.
Fox v. Gibbs (86 Me. 87; 29 Atl. Rep.
940), 748.
Fox v. Heath (16 Abb. Pr. 163) , 1404.
Fox v. Kerper (51 Ind. 148), 1663.
Fox v. Lowndes (L. E. 19 Eq. 453), 813.
Fox v, Hackreth (2 Bro. Ch. 400; 1 Cox,
310; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 92), 203, 384,
399, 413, 486, 491, 498, 1184.
Fox v. Scott (Phila. 151), 934.
Fox v. Storrs (75 Ala. 267), 922, 1267.
Fox v. Tay (89 Cal. 339; 23 Am. St. Rep.
474), 1122,1230,1231.
Fox, Will o£ (52 N. T. 530; 11 Am. Rep.
751) , 1072.
Frail v. Ellis (17 Eng. L. &Eq. 457), 596.
Fraker v. Houck (36 Fed. Rep. 403),
1508.
Frames. Kenney (2 A. K. Marsh. 145),
462.
Frampton v. Frampton (4 Beav. 287),
722,723, 726.
Francis v. Brooking (19 Beav. 347),
578.
Francis v. Clemow (1 Kay, 435), 1355.
Francis v. Evans (69 Wis. 115; 33 N. W.
Rep. 93), 1603, 1605.
Francis v. Francis (5 De G., M. & G.
108), 1102, 1130,1204.
Francis v. Gower (5 Hare, 39), 1319.
Francis v. Ross (17 How. Pr. 564), 698.
Francis v. Wells (2 Colo. 660), 574.
Francisco v. Aguirre (94 Cal. 181), 1408.
Franciscus v. Reigert (4 Watts, 108),
914, 930.
Franco v. Bolton (3 Ves. 368) , 660.
Franey v. Smith (125 N. Y. 44) , 1393.
Franklin v. Armfleld (2 Sneed, 305), 750,
1524.
Franklinc. Firth (3 Bro. Ch. 433), 1255.
Franklin v. Franklin (1 Swanst. 17),
339.
Franklin v. Hosier (4 B. & Aid. 341),
566.
Franklin v. Mclntire (23 111. 91), 263.
Franklin v. Osgood (2 Johns. Ch. 79),
1013, 1110, 1462.
Franklin v. Philadelphia (13 Pa. Co.
Ct. Rep. 241; 2 Pa. Dist. Rep. 435),
737, 819, 820.
Franklin Sav. Bank v. Taylor (131 111.
376; 23 St. E. Rep. 397), 1079.
Franklin's Estate (150 Pa. St. 437; 24
Atl. Bep. 626), 19.
Frank's Appeal (59 Pa. St. 190) , 398, 419.
Franks j). Williams (37 Tex. 24), 59.
Frary«. Booth (37 Vt. 78), 664.
Frastr v. Child (4E. D. Smith, 153), 5D0,
518.
g
Fraser v. Davie (11 S. Car. 56), 1002,
1121.
Fraser v. Page (82 Ky. 73), 1002, 1060,
1131,1132.
Fraser d. Plgott (1 Tounge, 354), 512.
Fraysert;. R. & A. R. R. Co. (81 Va.
388), 1117.
Frazee v. Frazee (79 Md. 27; 28 Atl.
Rep. 1105), 660.
Frazer v. Bevill (11 Gratt. 9), 1437.
Frazer v. Child (4 E. D. Smith, 153), 525.
Frazer v. Davie (11 S. Car. 56), 1061.
Frazer v. Frazer (2 Leigh, 642), 626.
Frazer v. Moor (Bunb. 54), 1536.
Frazer v. Murdoch (L. R. 6App. Cas.
855), 1701.
Frazier v. Brown low (3 Ired. Eq. 237; 42
Am. Dee. 165), 709.
Frazier v. Center (1 McCord Eq. 270), 11.
Frazier «>. Erie Bank (8 W. &S. 18), 1634.
Frazier v. Frazier (2 Leigh, 642), 256.
Frazier v. St. Luke's Church (147 Pa.
St. 256; 29 W. N. C. 337; 23 Atl. Rep.
442), 906.
Frazier j). Vaux (1 Hill Eq. 203), 1692.
Frazier v. Western (1 Barb. Ch. 220),
99.
Freake v. Cranefeldt (4 Myl. & Cr. 499),
1319, 1320.
Frear v. Hardenberg (5 Johns. 272), 607.
Freeking^. Rolland (33 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 501), 699.
Frederick v. Haas (5 Nev. 389), 232, 309,
358.
Freedley's Appeal (60 Pa. St. 349), 918.
Freeland v. Pearson (L. R. 3 Eq. 658),
627.
Freeman v. Cook (6 Ired. Eq. 373), 1400,
1402, 1582.
Freeman v. Fairlie (3 Meriv. 43), 1564.
Freeman v. Flood (16 Ga. 528), 667.
Freeman v. Freeman (9 Mo. 772), 651,
686.
Freeman v. Freeman (2 Pars. Eq. 81),
75.
Freeman v. Hartman (45 111. 59), 552,
553.
Freeman v. Harwood (49 Me. 195), 391,
1184.
Freeman, Inre (W. N. (1887) 210), 1710.
Freeman v. Kelly (1 Hoff. 90), 369.
Freeman v. Prendergast (94 Ga. 369; 21
S. E. Rep. 837), 898, 1019.
Freeman v. Tatham (5 Hare, 329), 66.
Freer ji. Lake (116 III. 662), 57.
Freke v. Calmady (L. R. 32 Ch. D. 408),
1435.
Frelick v. Turner (26 Miss. 393), 836.
French v. Braintree Mfg. Co. (23 Pick.
216), 984.
XCV1
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages : Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
French v. Currier (47 N. H. 99), 1136,
1214.
French v. Davidson (3 Madd. 396), 997,
999, 1005, 1008.
French v. Hatch (28 N. H. 331), 361.
French v. Hobson (9 Ves. 103), 1596.
French, In re (L. E. 15 Eq. 68), 1131.
French v. St. George (1 Dr. & W. 417),
1159.
French v. Sheplar (83Ind. 266), 223.
French tf. Townes (lOGratt. 513), 1364.
French v. Vining (102 Mas8. 132), 486.
French v. Waterman (79 Va. 617), 711.
Frenzeln. Miller (37 Ind. 1),489.
Frerea. Winslow (L. E. 45 Oh. D. 249),
1601.
Frey v. Frey (17 N. J. Eq. 71), 1253, 1254.
Freydenhall v. Baldwin (103 111. 325},
1408.
Freye v. Porter (1 Oh. Ca. 138; 1 Mod.
300), 1043.
Frey vogle v. Hughes (56 Pa. St. 228),
672, 921, 943, 1622.
Frichu. Newnham (2Vern. 216), 558.
Frick v. Taylor (94 Ga. 683; 21 S. E. Eep.
713), 432.
Frickett v. Durham (109 Mass. 422), 369.
Fridge v. Buhler (6 La. Ann. 272), 1342.
Friedburgr. Parker (50 Oal. 103), 705.
Friedlander v. Johnson (2 Woods C. C.
675), 388,534.
Friends. Michaelis (15 Abb. N. Cas.
364), 1403, 1405.
Friers. Peacock (Pinch, 245), 759.
Frierson v . Blanton (1 Baxt. 272), 1515.
Frierson v. Branch (30 Ark. 453), 962,
1383, 1600.
Frith v. Cameron (L. E. 12 Eq. 169),
1154.
Frith v. Cartland (2 H. & M. 417), 976,
1538, 1634.
Frith v. Osborne, In re (L. E. 3 Ch. D.
618), 1076.
Froneberger v. Lewis (79 N. Car. 426),
399, 1490.
Frost v. Beckman (1 Johns. Ch. 288),
439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 478, 694.
Frost v. Belmont (6 Allen, 152), 555, 597.
Frost v. Frost (63 Me. 390), 59.
Frue v. Loring (120 Mass. 507) , 530, 1724.
Fry v . Feamster (36 W. Va. 454; 15 S. &.
Eep. 253), 74.
Fry v. Fry (27 Beav. 146), 1029.
Fry v. Fry (27 Beav. 144), 1155.
Fry v. Hammer (50 Ala. 52), 704.
Fryu. Tapson (L. E. 28 Oh. D. 268),
1245.
Fryer, In re (3 Kay & J. 317), 1127, 1234.
Fudge v. Dura (51 Mo. 266), 1135, 1140,
1142.
Fuller v. Bennett (2 Hare, 394), 443.
Fuller w. Dame (18 Pick. 472), 566.
Fuller v. Knight (6 Beav. 205), 973.
Fuller v. O'Neill (69 Tex. 345 ; 5 Am. St.
Eep. 69), 996, 1005, 1096, 1455.
Fuller v. Wilson (3 Ad. & El. 58), 476,
484.
Fuller v. Wilson (3Q. B. 58), 484.
Fulton v. Andrew (L. E. 7 H. L. Cas.
449), 296,297.
Fulton v. Eoosevelt (6 Johns. Oh. 174),
472.
Fulton Bank v. Benedict (1 Hall, 480),
443.
Fulton Bank i>. Oanal Co. (4 Paige, 127),
443, 444.
Funk v. McEeynolds (33 111. 496), 1516.
Funke's Estate (9 Pa. Co. Ct. 113), 110.
Furbish v. Hall (8 Me. 315), 1048.
Furman v. Coe (1 Calne's Cas. 96), 1140.
Furman v Fisher (4 Coldw. 626; 94 Am.
Dec. 210), 50, 88, 878, 1382.
Furnessw. Union Nat. Bank (46 111.
App. 522, 147 III. 670), 1408.
Furrow rc. Ohapin (13 Kan. 107), 706.
Fuss v. Fuss (24 Wis. 256), 97.
Fussell v. Hennessey (14 E. I. 650), 66.
Futteru. Johnson (6. Beav. 424), 1571.
Fyler v. Fyler (3 Beav. 650), 1217, 1691.
Fyson v. Pole (3 T. & Col. 266), 1536.
G.
Gabb v. Prendergast (3 Eq. E. 648),
42.
Gabertw. Olcott (86 Tex. 121; 23 S. W.
Eep. 985), 407, 1035,1072.
Gable v. Miller (10 Paige, 627; 4Lawy.
Ed. 1182; 2 Dana, 492), 782.
Gabriels. Sturgis (6 Hare, 97; 10 Jur.
(N. S.) 215), 975.
Gadsden, Ex parte (3Eich. 468), 923, 1268.
Gadsden v. Whaley (14 S. Oar. 210), 53,
73.
Gafl v. Greer (88 Ind. 122), 796.
Gaflee's Trusts, In re (1 Macn. & G. 541),
653, 667, 668, 671, 1274.
Gaflney's Estate, In re (146 Pa. St. 49; 23
Atl. Eep. 63), 79.
Gafney v. Kennison (64 N. H. 354), 735,
748.
Gage v. Gage (83 Hun, 362; SI N. T.
Supl. 903), 311,322.
Gage v. Gates (62 Mo. 417), 708.
Gage v. Lister (2 Bro. P. C. 4), 656.
Gaillard v. Pardon (McMull. Eq. 358),
104.
Gaines v. Chew (2 How. 619), 309.
Gaines v. Gaines (9 B. Mon. 295) , 685.
Gaines v. Poor (3 Met. 508), 721.
TABLE OF CASES.
XCV11
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-817; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Gainor v. Gaiuor (26 Iowa, 337), 101, 652,
553.
Gainsborough s. Whateombe Co. (L. J.
54 Ch. 991), 995.
Gainuss. Cannon (42 Ark. 503), 72.
.Gaither s. Gaither (3 Md. Ch. 158), 517.
Galavan s. Dunne (L. E. 7 Ir. 144), 201.
Galbralth s. Elder (9 Watts, 81), 398,
419, 423.
Galbraith s. Tracy (163 111. 54; 38 ST. E.
Eep. 937), 623.
Gale v. Bennett (Anib. 681), 636.
Galea. Gale (19Barb. 249), 379, 495.
Galea. Lindo (1 Vern. 475), 645.
Gale s. Mensing (20 Mo. 461 ; 64 Am. Dec.
197), 1108.
Gale v. Wells (12 Barb. 84), 286.
Gallaghers. Gallagher (69 Wis. 461; 61
N. W. Bep. 1104), 661.
Gallagher s. Mars (50 Cal. 23) , 574.
Gallagher's Appeal (48 Pa. St. 121), 1355.
Gallands. Galland (36 Cal. 265) , 685.
Gallation v. Cunningham (8 Cow. 361),
286, 392.
Gallation s. Erwin (1 Hopk. Ch. 48),
286.
Gallego v. Attorney-General (3 Leigh,
450; 24 Am. Dec. 650), 85, 753, 812.
Gallego v. Gallego (2 Brock. Ch. 286),
678.
Gallery s. Nat'I Exchange Bank (41
Mich. 169), 411.
Galloway s. Hamilton (1 Dana, 576), 588.
Galusha v. Galusha (116 X. T. 635), 721.
Gamble v. Dabney (20 Tex. 69), 895, 1283,
1294.
Gamble s. Gibson (59 Mo. 585), 1215.
Gamble s. Tripp (75 Md. 252; 23 Atl.
Eep. 461), 85, 753.
Gambril s. Gambril (3 Md. Ch. 259),
1434.
Gandy s. Babbitt (56 Ga. 640), 1033.
Gandy s. Gandy (L. E. 7 Probate Div.
168; 30 Ch. D. 57), 719, 721, 725.
Gangwere's Estate, In re (14 Pa. St. 419),
163.
Gannett v. Albree (103 Mass. 372), 562.
Gannon v. White (2 Ir. Ch. 207), 156.
Garbuts. Bowling (81 Mo. 214), 721.
Gardenhire v. Hinds (1 Head, 402), 922,
923, 941, 1268.
Gardners. Adams (12 Wend. 297), 39.
Gardner v. Armstrong (31 Mo. 535),
1651.
Gardners. Astor (3 Johns. Ch. 53), 977,
978.
Gardner s. Brown (21 Wall. 36), 884,
885.
Gardner s. Gardner (1 Gifl. 126), 651,
657, 680, 689.
Gardners. Gardner (7 Paige, 112), 664,
698, 709.
Gardner v. Gardner (3 Mason, 178), 459,
1145, 1323, 1350, 1653, 1654.
Gardners. Gardner (22 Wend. 526), 694.
Gardners. Heyer (2 Paige, 11), 42, 612.
Gardners. Hooper (3 Gray, 404), 964.
Gardner, Inre (140 N. Y. 122; 35 N. E.
Eep. 439), 135.
Gardner s. Merritt (32 Md. 78), 81, 151.
Gardners. Ogden (22 N. T. 327), 390, 413,
425, 1462.
Gardner v. Eowe (2 Sim. & S. 346; 6
Euss. 258), 29, 60.
Gardner v. Sheldon (Vaughan, 263),
178.
Gardner s. Terry (99 Mo. 523), 1466.
Gardner Bank s. Wheaton (8 Greenl.
373), 355.
Gardner's Trusts, In re (L. E. 10 Ch.29),
904.
Garfield s. Hatmaker (15 N". Y. 475),
339, 371, 372, 373.
Garfoot s. Garfoot (1 Ch. Ca. 35; 2
Freem. 176), 180.
Garland s. Garland (50 Miss. 694), 724,
726.
Garland s. Garland (87 Va. 758; 24 Am.
St. Eep. 682), 1295.
Garland s. Pamplin (32 Gratt. 305), 711.
Garlands. Watson (74 Ala. 323), 1456,
1490.
Garllcks. James (12 Johns. 146), 967.
Garlicks. Strong (3 Paige,440), 713.
Garmstones. Gaunt (1 Coll. 577), 1526.
Garner s. Dowling (11 Heisk. 48), 859,
879.
Garner, Ex parte (2 Ves 671), 681.
Garner v. Frederick (18 Ind. 507), 1385.
Garners. Garner (1 Desaus. 443), 102,
116.
Garner s. Garner (Bnsb. Eq. 1), 596.
Garners. G. L. I. Co. (110 N. Y. 266),
1745.
Garners. Hannyngton (22 Beav. 627),
1428.
Garner v. Moore (3 Drew. 277), 1156.
Garnett s. Armstrong (2 Con. & Laws.
458), 978.
Garnett s. Macon (3 Brock. 185), 1653.
j Garnett s. Mason (6 Coll. 361), 456, 1322,
1657.
Garnisss. Gardner (1 Edw. Ch. 128),
1171, 1205, 1253, 1256.
Garnsey s. Gardner (49 Me. 167), 604.
Garnsey s. Gothard (90 Cal. 603), 61.
Garnsey s. Mundy (24 N. J. Eq. 243; 13
Am. L. Beg. 345), 161, 271, 275, 278,
1744.
Garr v. Drake (2 Johns. Ch. 542), 825.
XCV111
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-175:1.]
Garrard v. Lauderdale (3 Sim. 1; 2 R.
& M. 451), 151, 152, 175, 1317, 1328, 1330,
1378.
Garrard j). E. E. Co. (29 Pa. St. 154), 456,
460, 1659.
Garrard v. Tuck (8 0. B. 231), 823.
Garratts. Oullum (Bull. N. P. 42), 973.
Garrett v. Burlington Plow Co. (70
Iowa, 697 ; 09 Am. Eep . 461) , 411.
Garrett v. Garrett (1 Strobh. Eq. 96),
308, 333, 632, 1625.
Garrett-i). Pritty (2 Vern. 293; 3 Meriv.
120), 1041.
Garrick v. Taylor (29 Beav. 79; 4 De G.,
F. & J. 159), 312, 362, 369.
Garrow v. Davis (15 How. 277), 39.
Garrow s. Davis (10 N. T. Leg. Obs.
225), 189, 190.
Garson v. Green (1 Johns. Ch. 308), 241,
569, 570.
Garth v. Baldwin (2 Ves. 646), 913, 917,
919, 938, 1327.
Garth v. Townsend (L. E. 7 Eq. 220),
623.
Garthen v. Myrick (9 Md. 143), 390,
414.
Gartln v. Penick (5 Bush, 110; 9 Am. L.
Eeg. 210), 796, 797.
Gartland v. Mayott (2 Vern. 105; 2
Ereem. 105), 871,
Gartshore v. Challe (10 Ves. 9) , S26 .
Gartsideti. Gartside (113Mo. 348; 20 S.
W. Eep. 669), 34, 870, 9C1, 904.
Garvay v. McDevitt (72 N. T. 556), 616.
Garveru. Miller (16 Ohio St. 627), 722.
Garvey v. Owens (12 N. T. Supl. 349; 35
N. T. St. Eep. 133), 1029, 1154, 1155,
1167, 1159.
Garvin v. Watkins (29 Fla. 51; 10 :So.
Eep. 818), 705.
Garvin v. Williams (44 Mo. 476; 60 Mo.
206), 286, 287,290, 297.
Gary v. Colgin (11 Ala. 514), 1109.
Gascoigne v. Thwlng (1 Vern. 866), 256 ,
359.
Gashe v. Toung (51 Ohio St. 376; 38 N.
E. Eep. 20), 194.
Gaskell v. Chambers (26 Beav. 360), 405,
412.
Gaskell v. Green (152 Mass. 626), 596,
876.
Gaskell v. Harmon (11 Ves. 498), 1144,
1145.
Gaskell v. Gaskell (2 Tou. & Jer. 602),
82.
Gaskill v. Gaskill (7 R. I. 478), 884, 885.
Gasquoine v. Gasquoine (L. E. (1894) 1
Ch. 470), 1236.
Gass v. Gass (1 Heisk. 613), 309.
Gassr. Ross (3 Sneed, 211), 753.
Gass v. Wilhite (2 Dana, 170; 26 Am.
Dec. 440), 731, 748,807,810.
Gassettw. Grouts (4 Met. 486), 103.
Gassomn. Donaldson (18 B. Mon. 231),
452.
Gast v. Porter (13 Pa. St. 533), 1085.
Gaston v. Frankum (De G. & Sm. 561;
16 Jur. 507), 693.
Gates v. Card (93 Tenn. 334), 360.
Gates v. McLean (70 Cal. 49), 191.
Gathercoleu. Bedel (65 N. H. 211), 1383.
Gaullaher v. Gaullaher (5 Watts, 200),
618.
Gaunt v. Taylor (2 Beav. 346; 4 Jur.
166), 1679.
Gauseu. Hale (2 Ired. Eq. 241), 91, 92,
101, 103, 104.
Gautiir v. Doug. Manf. Co. (13 Hun,
514), 434, 442.
Gaw's Estate (34 Leg. Int. 66), 1210.
Gay v. Edwards (30 Miss. 218), 1537.
Gay v. Hancock (1 Eand. 72), 1470.
Gaylordr. City of Lafayette (115 Ind.
423), 61, 91, 95.
Gaylord v. Knapp (16 Hun, 87), 577.
Gazzamu. Poyntz (4 Ala. 374), 1318.
Geary v. Page (9 Bosw. 290), 59, 82.
Geek, Inre (69 L. T. 819), 736.
Geddy v. Butler (3 Munf . 345) , 887.
Gedgei). Traill (1 Buss. & Myl. 281), 280.
Gee v. Geo (2 Sneed, 395), 370.
Gee v. Hicks (Eich. Eq. Cas. 5), 1696.
Gee v. McMillan (14 Ore. 268), 577.
Gee v. Thrailkill (45 Kan. 173), 71.
Geiss v. Beall (3 Wis. 367), 1171, 1183,
1184, 1696.
Gelzer v. Gelzer (1 Bailey Eq. 387),
100.
Gen. Exch. Bank v. Homer (L. E. 9Eq.
4S0),494.
Genet v. Beekman (45 Barb. 382), 1297.
Genett v. Tallmadge (1 Johns. Ch. 664),
828.
Gennys, Ex parte (1 Mont. &Mac. 258),
972, 976.
Gent v. Harris (10 Hare, 383), 678.
Gentry?;. Law (4 Nev. 97), 484.
Gentry v. McReynolds (12 Mo. 533), 715.
Georges. Bank of England (7 Price,
646), 73,174.
George v. Braddock (45 N. J. Eq. 757;
14 Am. St. Eep. 754), 734, 749, 809.
George v. Cutting (46 K. H. 132), 708.
George v. Howard (7 Price, 661), 242.
Georges. Johnson (6 Humph. 36), 489.
Georges. Eichardson (Gilm. 230), 480.
Georges v. Chancie (1 Ch. Cas. 125),
993, 1047, 1343.
Georgetown College v. Browne (34 Md.
450) , 1549.
TABLE OF CASES.
XC1X
[The references are to page9: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Germanla Sav. Bank, Appeal of (95 Pa.
St. 329), 710.
German Milling Oo. v. Norwich Tarn
Co. (22Beav. 143), 1033.
German Mining Oo. Inre (4 De G., M.
&G. 19), 1701.
German Eef. Church v. Seibert (3 Pa.
St. 291), 797.
Gernert v. Albert (160 Pa. St. 95; 28 Atl.
Eep. 576), 1114.
GerOew. Winter (1 Halat. Ch. 655), 1038.
Gerrard v. Buckley (137 Mass. 475), 1613.
Gerrard©. Gerrard (2 Vern. 458), 1526.
Gerrish©. New Bedford, etc. for Sav-
ings (128 Mass. 159), 59, 73, 81, 83.
Gerry ©. Howe (130 Mass. 350), 151, 153.
Gerry ©. Stimson (60 Me. 186), 264, 370.
Gessner ». Palmateer (89 Cal. 89), 574,
585.
Gest v. Mock (2 N. J. Eq. 108), 1623.
Gest©. Williams (4 Del. Oh. 65), 655.
Getman ©. Getman (1 Barb. Ch. 499),
270.
Gettins v. Scudder (71 111. 86), 1029, 1138,
1157.
Geyer v. Mobile Bank (21 Ala. 414), 552.
Ghiselin©. Ferguson (4Har. & J. 522),
576.
Ghormleyo. Smith (139 Pa. St. 584; 23
Am. St. Eep. 215), 1310.
Ghost ©. Waller (9Beav. 497), 1115.
Giacometti v. Prodgers (L. E. 14 Eq.
253; 8 Ch. 338), 674, 678, 682.
Gibbens v. Curtis (8 Gray, 392), 1037.
Gibbes ©. Jenkins (3 Sandf . Ch. 130),
398.
Gibbons v. Hoag (95 111. 45), 464,1490,
1491.
Gibboney ©. Kent (82 Va. 383), 1542.
Gibbs v. Cunningham (1 Md. Ch. 44),
1095, 1110.
Gibbs ©. Daniel (4 Gift. 1), 419.
Gibbs ©. Glamis (11 Sim. 584), 1317.
Gibbs ©. Guild (L. E. 8 Q. B. Div. 296).
1540.
Gibbs©. Harding (L. E. 8 Eq. 490), 720-
Gibbs ©. Marsh (2 Met. 243), 167, 619, 614,
908,999, 1013.
Gibbs ©. Ougier (12Ves. 418), 259.
Gibbs v. Eumsey (2 V. & B. 294), 254, 255,
259.
Glblin ©. McMullen (L. E. 2 P. O. 327),
1134.
Gibson ©. American Loan Co. (58 Han,
443; 12 N T. Supl. 444), 901, 903.
Gibson v. Armstrong (7 B. Mon. 481),
240, 796.
Gibson ©, Barbour (100 N. Oar. 192),
1490, 1492
Gibson v. Carter (3 Ala. 421), 653.
Gibson v. Clark (1 J. & W. 162), 985.
Gibson ©. Crehore (5 Pick. 146), 1689.
Gibson v. Deims (82 111. 304), 66, 503, 525.
Gibson©. D'Esle (2T. & C. Ch. 542), 491.
Gibson ©. Foote (40 Miss. 792), 7, 47.
Gibson ©. Gains (28 S. W. Eep. 781),
1070.
Gibson ©. Gibson (15 Mass. 106), 100.
Gibson ©. Hutohins (43 S. Car. 287; 21
S. E.Bep. 250), 710.
Gibson ©. Jones (6 Leigh, 370) , 1470.
Gibson ©. Jeyes (6 Ves. 266), 286, 382, 418,
419, 509, 1174, 1180, 1184.
Gibson ©. McCall (1 Eieh. 174), 750.
Gibson v. McCormlck (10 Gill & J. 65),
1322.
Gibson ©. Mountfort (1 Ves. 485), 922,
927,937,941, 1072.
Gibson ©. Eees(50Ill. 383), 1378, 1382,
1406.
Gibson v. Eussell (2 T. & C. 115), 292,293,
426, 431.
Gibson ©. Winter (5 B. & Ad. 96), 949.
Gibson's Case (1 Bland Ch. 138; 17 Am.
Dec, 257), 696, 1005,1093, 1096, 1694,
1701, 1706.
Gibson's Estate (34 W. N. C. 360), 1280.
Giddings ©. Eastman (6 Paige, 561), 383.
Giddings v. Giddings (3 Buss. 241) , 399.
Giddings v. Palmer (107 Mass. 269), 414,
598,
Giffen v. Taylor (139 Ind. 573; 37 N. E.
Eep. 392), 302.
Giflord v. Choate (100 Mass. 343), 106,
108.
Gifford v. Maully (For. 109), 881.
Gil v. Davis (12 La. Ann. 219), 556.
Gilbert -ai. Bennett (10 Sim. 361), 183.
Gilberts. Carter (10 Ind. 16), 525.
Gilbert v. Chapin (19 Conn. 342), 131,
132, 134.
Gilbert v. Cooley (Walk. 494), 1503.
Gilbert v- Gilbert (39 Iowa, 657), 992,
1349.
Gilbert v. Gilbert (1 Keyes, 159), 374.
Gilbert v. Lewis (1 De G., J. & S. 38),
664.
Gilbert v. McEachem (38 Miss. 460), 836.
Gilbert v. Overton (2 H. & M. 110), 15,
33, 88, 156.
Gilbert v. Sutllffe (3 Ohio St. 129), 1402,
1692.
Gilbert v. Welde (75 Ind. 657), 988, 1188,
1202.
Gilchrist v. Brown (165 Pa. St. 275; 30
Atl. Eep. 839), 214, 318.
Gilchrist v. Cator (1 De G. & Sm. 188),
678.
Gilchrist©. 8tevenson (9 Barb. 9), 160,
1231, 1394, 1750.
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Giles v. Baremore (5 Johns. Oh. 552),
984.
Giles v. Giles (1 Keen. 685), 512.
Giles v. Little (104 V . S. 291), 105.
Glllv. Carmine (55 Md. 339), 1402.
Gillu. Logan (11 B. Mon. 233), 918, 941.
Gill v. State (39 W. Va. 479; 20 S. E. Eep.
568), 711.
Glllan v. Morrison (1 De G. & S. 421) ,
1033.
Gillaur v. Taylor (L. E. 16 Eq. 581), 735.
Gillespie v. Burlinson (28 Ala. 551), 654,
656.
Gillespie v. Smith (29 111. 473; 81 Am.
Deo. 328), 1006, 1096, 1110, 1341.
Gillett v. Gillett (9 Wis. 194), 1183.
Gillett v. Stanley (1 Hill, 121), 12.
Gillette. Wiley (126111. 310), 286.
Gillett v. Wray (1 P. Wms. 284), 1043.
Gillette v. Peppercorn (3 Beav. 78),
416.
Gilliland v. Breden (63 Pa. St. 393), 862,
1303.
Gilliland v. Crawford (4 Ir. Eq. 36),
1025, 1152.
Gilliland v. Gilliland (96 Mo. 522; 10 S.
W. Eep. 139), 334, 339.
Gillon v. Turnbull (1 McCord Ch. 148),
840.
Gllman v. Brown (1 Mason, 192), 569,
570, 678, 588, 691.
Gilman v. Des Moines Valley E. E. Co.
41 Iowa, 22), 1690.
Gilman v. Hamilton (16 111. 225), 452,
747, 759, 763, 776, 1625.
Gilman v. Kay (2 Hayw. 108), 967.
Gilman v. McArdle (99 N. T. 451), 73,
170, 807.
Gilman v. Eedington (24 N. T. 9), 616.
Gilman, C. & S. Ey. Co. v. Kelly (77 HI.
426), 406.
Gilmore v. N. A. L. Co. (Peters C. C.
461), 98.
Gilmore v. Tuttle (32 N. J. Eq. 611),
1138.
Gilmor's Estate, In re (158 Pa. St. 186;
27 Atl. Eep. 845), 61.
Gllpatrick v. Glidden (81 Me. 137; 10
Am. St. Eep. 245), 513, 514.
Gilruth v. Decell (72 Miss. 232; 16 So.
Eep. 250), 185.
Gindrat v. Montgomery Gas Light Co.
(82 Ala. 596; 60 Am. Eep. 769), 1010,
1084, 1104.
Girardc. Philadelphia (7 Wall. 1), 781.
Girard Ins. Co. v. Chambers (46 Pa. St.
485), 913, 919, 1288.
Girard Life, etc. Co. v Mellor (156 Pa.
St. 679; 2? Atl. Eep. 662), 65.
Girault v. Adams (64 Md. 1), 707.
Gisborn'!!. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co.
(142 U. S. 326), 1026.
Gisborne v. Gisborne (L. E. 2 App. Cas.
300), 995,1008,1178.
Gist v. Cattel (2 Desaus. 53), 461.
Gtvens v. Davenport (8 Tex. 451). 1053.
Gladden v. Stoneman (1 Madd, 143),
1576.
Gladding v. Tapp (5 Mod. 56), 238.
Gladstone v. Hadwen (1 M. & S. 526), 29,
972.
Glaisteru. Hewer (8 Ves. 199), 335.
Glanys, Ex parte (1 Mont. & Mac. 258),
29.
Glaser v. Priest (29 Mo. App. 1), 28.
Glass v. Gebbert (58 Pa. St. 266), 1537.
Glass v. Hulbert (102 Mass. 40; 3 Am.
Eep. 418), 510.
Glenn v. Allison (58 Md. 527), 1031.
Glenn v. Fisher (6 Johns. Ch. 33), 678,
840.
Glenn v. Glenn (47 Ala. 204), 664.
Glenn v. McKim (3 Gill, 366), 1237.
Glenn v. McNeal (3 Md. Ch. Dec. 349),
1388.
Glenn jj. Randall (2 Md. Ch. 221), 308.
1388.
Glenny, In re (L. R. 25 Ch. D. 611), 864.
Glenorchy v. Bosville (1 Lead. Cas. Eq.
1),8, 90, 96, 103.
Gliddana. Taylor (16 Ohio St. 509), 689.
Glover v. Alcott (11 Mich. 407), 689, 707.
Glover v. Glover (1 McMull. Ch. 153),
869.
Glover v. Monckton (3 Bing. 13; 11 E.
C. L.9),920, 926, 937.
Glover v. Stamps (73 Ga. 209; 54 Am.
Eep. 870), 1559.
Glyn v. Locke (3 Dr. & W. 11), 1350.
Gnash v. George (68 Iowa, 492), 575.
Godard v. Carlisle (9 Price, 169), 419.
Goddard v. Brown (12 E. I. 31), 111, 1092,
1119, 1138.
Goddard v. Carlisle (9 Price, 183), 289.
Goddard v. Snow (1 Russ. 485), 101.
Goddard v. Weaver (1 Woods, 257) , 1409.
Godden v. Crowhurst (10 Sim. 487), 1291.
Godden v. Kimmell (9 Otto, 211), 464,
1535.
Godfrey v. Dixon (Godb. 275), 41, 42.
Godfrey v. Faulkner (L. E. 23 Ch. D.
483), 1113.
Godfrey v . Enzo (3 P. Wms. 186), 972.
Godfrey v. Godfrey (11 W. E. 554), 128.
Godfrey v. Harben (L. E. 13 Ch. D.216),
697.
Godfrey v. Megahan (38 Neb. 748; 67 N.
W. Eep. 284), 660, 708.
Godfrey v. Stock (116 Mo. 403), 1514.
Godfrey v. Watson (3 Atk. 517), 330.
TABLE OF CASES.
CI
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1763.]
Godolphins. Godolphin (1 Ves. 25), 24.
Godsall s. Webb (2 Keen, 99) , 88.
Godwin v. Whitehead £95 Ala. 409; 11 So.
Rep. 65), 1679.
Godwin s. Whitehead (88 Va. 600), 1545.
Goelz v. Goelz (167 111. 33), 341.
Goe'9 Estate (146 Pa. St. 431), 1290.
Goff s. Hankins (Hind. App. 456; 39 N.
E. Eep. 294), 660.
Gogherty v. Bennett (37 N. J. Eq. 87),
308, 348.
Going w.Emery (16 Pick. 107; 26 Am.
Dec. 645), 748, 777, 1037, 1072.
Going s. Orns (8 Kan. 85), 706.
Golden v. Bressler (105 III. 419), 865, 908,
1013, 1088.
Golden v. Oann (1 De G., F. & J. 146),
654.
Goldsberry s. Gentry (92 Ind. 193),
220.
Goldsborough s. Ringgold (1 Md. Ch.
239), 1093.
Goldsmid v. Goldsmid (19 Ves. 368),
1046.
Goldsmith v. Goldsmith (6 Misc. Rep.
12; 25 ST. T. Supl. 993), 50.
Goldsmiths. Goldsmith (145 N. Y. 313;
39 N". E. Rep. 1067), 428.
Goldsmith s. Ladson (2 D. O. 220) , 660.
Goldsmith v. Russell (5 De G., M. & G.
555), 98.
Goldsmith s. Stetson (30 Ala. 164), 1631,
1632.
Goldthwaite v. Ellison (12 So. Rep. 812;
99 Ala. 497), 1607, 1608.
Goldtree s. Thompson (79 Cal. 613),
1621.
Gomez v. Bank (4 Sandf, 106), 307.
Gomez v. Gomez (147 N. Y. 195; 41 N. E.
Rep. 420), 1027.
Gompertz v. Kensit (L. R. 13 Eq. 369),
1130, 1671.
Goncelier v. Foret (4 Minn. 13), 1721.
Gonihan v. Stephenson (24 Wis. 75),
492.
Goochs. Relief Association (109 Mass.
558), 748.
Goodbar Shoe Co. v. Montgomery (19
So. Rep. 196), 1371.
Good s. Harris (2 Ired. Eq. 630), 654.
Good v. MePherson (5 Mo. 126), 788.
Good v. Moulton (67 Cal. 537), 704.
Goodale s. Mooney (60 N. H. 528; 49 Am.
Rep. 334), 735, 748.
Goodale v. New England Ins. Co. (25
N. H. 186), 1029,1157.
Goodall s. Harris (2 P. Wms, 560), 826.
Goodard v. Snow (1 Rnss. 485), 54S.
Goode v. Comfort (39 Mo. 313), 1110, 1469,
1470.
Goode v. Lowery (76 Tex. 160; 8 S. W.
Rep. 73), 1586.
Goode s. MePherson (51 Mo. 126), 770.
Goodell v. Buck (67 Me. 514), 1607, 1631.
Goodell s. Union Ass'n (29 N. J. Eq. 32),
731, 749,756,811.
Goodfellow s. Burchett (2 Vern. 298),
1529.
Goodin v. Cin. & W. C. Co. (18 Ohio St.
139; 98 Am. Dec. 95), 411.
Gooding s. Gibbs (17 How. 274), 959,
1057, 1138.
Goodhill v. Brigham (1 B. & P. 189),
1009.
Goodhue s. Barnwell (Rice Eq. 198),
604, 877.
Goodline s. Barnwell (Rice Eq. 198),
1537.
Goodman s. Kendall (56 Kan. 439),
1372.
Goodrich v. City of Milwaukee (24 Wis.
422) , 616, 916.
Goodrich s. Downs (6 Hill, 438), 1367,
1368, 1374.
Goodrich v. Pendleton (3 Johns. Ch.
387), 1537.
Goodrich v. Procter (1 Gray, 567), 1068,
1069, 1090, 1349, 1350, 1652, 1654.
Goodright v. Hodges (1 Watk. Cop. 227;
Lofft. 230), 362.
Goodright v. Wells (Doug. 771), 977.
Goodtitleu. Alker (lBurr. 133), 952.
Goodtitleu. Jones (7 T. R. 47), 949, 980,
983, 984, 1266.
Goodtitlei). Knott (Coop. 43), 927.
Goodtitle v. Whitby (1 Burr. 228), 926.
Goodwin v. Bank (48 Conn. 564), 1649.
Goodwins. Crowel (56 Ga. 566), 556.
Goodwin v. Goodwin (69 Mo. 617), 111.
Goodwin v. Howe (62 How. 134), 1203,
1210.
Goodwin v. Kerr (80 Mo. 276), 1391, 1392.
Goodwin v. Mix (38 HI. 115), 1095, 1100,
1400, 1408.
Goodwins. Richardson (11 Mass. 461),
322.
Goodwright v. Wells (Doug. 771), 30.
Gordon v. Bell (50 Ala. 213), 574.
Gordon v. Cannon (18 Gratt. 388), 1364,
1369.
Gordon v. Clapp (111 Mass. 22), 530.
Gordon v. Coolidge (1 Sumn. 537), 1394.
Gordon v. Finlay (3 Hawks, 239), 401.
Gordons. Gordon (2 Swanst. 400), 491,
494.
Gordon v. Green (10 Ga. 534), 73, 1362.
Gordon, Inre (L. R. 6 Ch. D. 631), 888.
Gordon s. Matthews (30 Md. 235), 1692.
Gordon v. Preston (1 Watts, 365; 26 Am.
Dec. 175), 10.
cu
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753. J
©ordon v. Small (53 Md. 550), 1533.
Gordon v. West (8 N. H. 444), 1434, 1689.
Gore v. Brazier (3 Mass. 541), 435.
Gore v. Brazier (4 Mass. 354), 1322.
Gore a. Carl (47 Conn. 291), 70S.
Gore v. Knight (2 Vern. 535), 656, 715.
Gore v. Learoyd (140 Mass. 524), 239.
Gore's Settlement, In re (W. ST. (1876),
p. 79), 1602.
Gorham v. Daniels (23 Vt. 600), 911.
Goring v. Nash (3 Atk. 186), 146, 149,
151.
Goskinv. Rogers (L. B. 2Eq. 284), 804.
Gosling v. Carter (1 Ooll. 644), 1036, 1037,
1652.
Gosling v. Gosling (Johns. 265), 1618.
Gosman v. Cruger (69 N. Y. 87; 25 Am.
Rep. 141), 709.
Goss v. Cahill (42 Barb. 216), 688.
Goss v. Singleton (2 Head, 67), 878, 894,
1636.
Gossen v. Ladd (77 Ala. 224), 922, 1267.
Gossom v. McFarran (79 Ky. 236), 1078.
Gothard v. Flynn (25 Miss. 58), 601,
602.
Gott v. Cooke (7 Paige, 538), 997.
Gott v. Culp (46 Mich. 265), 829.
Gough v. Butt (16 Sim. 45), 167, 614, 620,
1536.
Gough v. Etty (20 L. T. 358), 1679.
Gough v. Manning (26 Md. 347), 1042.
Gough v. Offley (5 De G. & Sm. 653),
1560.
Gough v. Smith (W. ST. (1872) p. 18) |
1128.
Gould v. Chappell (42 Md. 466), 947, 1135.
Gou:d v. Gould (29 How. 458), 721.
Gould D.Gould (3N. T. Supl. 608), 311.
Gou 1 d v, Gould (3 Story, 516) , 461 , 465 .
Goulds. Hays (25 Ala. 426), 1686, 1690,
1698.
Gould v. Hill (18 Ala. 84), 655, 656.
Gould i'. Lamb (11 Met. 84), 922, 941, 942,
1069, 1267, 1348.
Gould v. Mather (104 Mass. 283), 1013.
Gould v. Okedon (4 Bro. P. C. 198), 282,
480.
Gould v. Robertson (4 De G. & S. 509),
1317.
Gould v. Taylor Orphan Asylum (46
Wis. 106), 751.
Goulder v. Oamm (1 De G., F. & J. 146) ,
669.
Gouldsworth v. Knight (11 Mees. &. W.
337), 1124.
Governor v. Campbell (17 Ala. 566), 1318,
1376.
Governor v. Gridley (Walk. 328), 20.
Governor v. Woodworth (63 111. 254),
1054.
Govlnu. De Miranda (76 Hun, 414; 27 K.
T. Supl. 1049) , 61, 64.
Gower v. Andrus (59 Cal. 119), 398.
Gower ». Eyre (Coop. 156), 1026.
Gower v. Mainwaring (2 Ves. 87), 166,
641, 759.
Gower v. Mead (Pr. Oh. 2), 1324.
Gowing v. Rich (1 Ireci. 553), 354.
Gowlandu. DeFari* (17 Ves. 20), 282.
Grabowski's Settlement, In re (L. R. 6
Eq. 12), 1257.
Grace, Ex parte (1 Bos. & P. 376), 399.
Gracey v. Davis (3 Strobh. Eq. 58), 1332.
Graeme v. Cullen (23 Gratt. 266), 1457.
Graft v. Bonnett (31 N. T. 9; 68 Am. Dec.
236), 1297, 1637.
Grafl v. Castleman (5 Rand. 195; 16 Am.
Dec. 648), 456, 1171, 1172, 1657.
Graham v. Austin (2 Gratt. 273), 1123,
1158.
Graham v. Berkenhead Ry. Co. (2Macn.
& G. 146), 1543.
Graham v. Davidson (2 Dev. & B. Eq.
165), 1123, 1230, 1236.
Graham v. Donaldson (5 Watts, 471),
364.
Graham v. Fitts (53 Miss. 307), 1094, 1509.
Graham v. Graham (16 Beav. 550), 853,
867.
Graham v. Graham (1 Ves. Jr. 275), 174.
Graham, In re (13 Ir. Ch. 137), 393.
Graham, In re (L. R. 10 Eq. 5.-10) , 842.
Graham v. King (50 Mo. 22; 11 Am. Rep.
401), 996, 1033, 1055,1096,1243,1453,
1470.
Graham v. Lambert (5 Humph. 595),
152.
Graham v. Long (66 Pa. St. 373), 25.
Granberry v. Granberry (1 Wash. 246),
893, 894.
Granger, Ex parte (2 Dea. & Ch. 459),
465.
Granger v. Gt. Western Ry. Co. (5 H.
L. Cas. 72), 476.
Grant v. Dyer (2 Dow. 93), 1046.
Grant v. Grant (34 Beav. 623), 712.
Grants. Heverin (77 Cal. 263; 19 Pac.
Rep. 493), 369, 1558.
Grants. Hook (13 S. & R. 269), 1350,
1655.
Grant, In re (2 Story, 312), 14.
Grant, In re (14 W. R. 191), 683.
Grant v. Lynam (4 Russ. 292), 167, 614,
632, 637, 1000.
Grant v. McLaren (23 Can. Sup. 310),
905.
Grant v. Mills (2 V. & B. 306), 432, 976.
Grant v. Phcenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. (121
U. S. 105), 1516.
Grant v. Pride (1 Dev. Eq. 269), 1689.
TABLE OF CASES.
cm
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Grant v. Sutton (90 Va. 771 ; 19 S. E. Eep.
784), 661.
Grant v. Whittlesey (42 Tex. 320), 711.
Granthem v. Hawley (Hob. 132), 33.
Grantland v. Wright (5 Munf. 295), 1241.
Grant Co. v. Colonial Mort. Co. (3 S.
Dak. 390; 53 ST. W. Eep. 746), 1465.
Granville v. Beaufort (1 P. Wms. 114) ,
246.
Granville v. McNeale (7 Hare, 156), 872,
1013, 1018.
Grapengether v. Ferjervary (9 Iowa,
163; 74 Am. Dec. 518), 675.
Grattan v. Grattan (18 111. 171) , 825.
Graves v. Blondwell (7 Me. 90), 1367.
Graves v. Coutant (31 N. J. Eq. 763), 570,
576.
Graves v. Dolphin (1 Sim. 66), 1291, 1638.
Graves v. Dugan (6 Dana. 331), 370.
Graves, Mx parte (2 Jur. (N. S.) 651),
1114.
Graves v. Graves (3 Y. & J. 170) , 359.
Graves v. Graves (3 Mete. 167), 372, 374.
Graves v. Graves (29 N". H. 142), 212, 267.
Graves v. Long (87 Ky. 441), 1398.
Graves v. Pinchback (47 Ark. 470; 1 S.
W. Eep. 682), 1564, 1583.
Graves v. Reed (12 S. W. Eep. 550), 1644.
Graves v. Strahan (8 De G., M. & G.
291), 1102.
Graves v. Waterman (63 N. Y. 657), 392,
1178, 1179.
Graver's Appeal (50 Pa. St. 189), 1175,
1667, 1678.
Gray v. Bell (4 Watts, 410), 1406.
Gray v. Dougherty (25 Cal. 266), 1667,
1678.
Gray v. Partners' Exch. Bank (105 Cal.
60; 38 Pac.Eep. 519), 400, 460.
Gray v. Pox (1 N. J. Eq. 259), 1102, 1198,
1211, 1213.
Gray v. Gray (1 Ch. Cas. 296), 1324.
Gray v. Gray (11 Ir. Ch. 218) , 130.
Gray v. Gray (13 Neb. 453), 339, 340.
Grayi>. Graydon (2 Atk. 16), 1046.
Gray v. Haig (20 Beav. 219), 1175.
Gray v. Henderson (71 Pa. St. 368), 1037.
Gray v. Hill (10 S. & E. 436), 1318, 1329.
Gray v. Holland (9 Ore. 513). 710.
Gray v. Hook (4 N. Y. 449), 556.
Gray v. Lynch (8 Gill, 403), 894, 979, 1016.
1089, 1100, 1213.
Gray v. Mansfield (1 Ves. 379), 413, 426.
Gray v. Mathias (5 Ves. 286), 560.
Gray v. May (16 Ohio, 66), 1600.
Gray v, Obear (64 Ga. 231), 1291.
Gray v. Perry (51 Ga. 180), 15S2, 1634.
Gray v. Eeamer (11 Bush, 113), 1236.
Gray v. Eobb (4 Heisk. 74), 655, 666.
Gray v. Eump (20 Hill Eq. 6), 91.
Gray v. Shaw (14 Mo. 341), 1095, 1109,
1470.
Gray v. Siggers (L. E. 15 Ch. D. 74), 1178,
1437.
Gray v. Ulrich (8 Kan. 112), 1625.
Gray v. Viers (33 Md. 18), 1(97.
Gray v. Worst (129 Mo. 122; 31 S. W.
Eep. 585), 1482.
Graydon v. Hicks (2 Atk. 18), 244, 1043.
Great Falls Mfg. Co, v. Worster (23 N.
H. 470), 38.
Greave v. Atkinson (68 Miss. 598; 10 So.
Eep. 73), 345.
Greaves v. Mattison (T. Jones, 201),
1528.
Grecet'. Helm (91 Mich. 450; -51 N. W.
Eep. 1106), 1345.
Greedy v. Lavender (13 Beav. 62), 682.
Greeley v. Percival (21 Fla. 535), 1396.
Green v. Allen (5 Humph. 170), 750, 770.
Green v. Ball (4 Bush, 586) , 500, 620.
Greer v. Baughman (13 Md. 257), 232.
Green v. Belchler (1 Atk. 505), 839.
Green v. Biddle (8 Wheat. 1), 607, 688,
1434.
Green v. Blackwell (31 N. J. 37), 897.
Green v. Blair (9 Wis. 352), 402.
Green v. Bogue (158 U. S. 478; 15 S. Ct.
Eep. 975) , 525,
Green v. Brooks (81 Cal. 328), 198, 1565.
Green v. Carlill (L. E. 4 Ch. D. b82),
657.
Green v. Cates (73 Mo. 122), 72.
Greer v. Chester (62 Hun, 329; 131 N. Y.
629), 1762.
Green v. Claiborne (83 Va. 386), 1073.
Green v. Collins (6 Ired. 139), 254.
Green v. Dennis (6 Cow. 304), 18.
Green v. Dietrich (114 111. 636), 358.
Green v. Ekins (2 Atk. 476), 838.
Green v. Engelman (39 Mich. 460), 1466.
Green, Ex parte (1 J. & W. 253), 832, 836,
841, 988, 1563.
Green v. Polgham (1 Sim. 398), 33.
Green v. Pox (12 B. Mon. 190), 1690.
Green v. Gaston (56 Miss. 748), 1515.
Green v. Goodal (1 Cold. 404), 549.
Green v. Green (4 Eedf. 357), 859, 879.
Green v. Green (14 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 492) ,
286.
Green v. Green (2 Jon. & La. 529) , 1079.
Green v. Haig (20 Beav. 152 n.), 1564.
Green v. Hamburg (2 Brock. 403), 1056.
Green v. Howard (1 Bro. Ch. 33), 166,
641.
Green, In re (2DeG., F. & J. 121), 1132.
Green v. Lowe (3 Bro. Ch. 218), 1324.
Green v. McBeth (12 Bich. Eq. s!54),
1092.
Green v. Marsden (1 Drew. 646), 52, 128.
CIV
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Green v. Miller (6 Johns. 39; 5 Am. Dec.
184), 1122.
Green v. Mumf ord (4 B. I. 313) , 961, 1061.
Green v. NIson (23Beav. 630), 380.
Green v. Otte (1 S. & S. 250), 678, 682.
Green v. Otter (3B. Mon. 102), 1559.
Green v. Pledger (3 Hare, 171), 1670.
Green v. Putney (1 Md. Oh. 262), 907,
1057, 1673, 1689.
Green v. Binteln (2 Dem. 243), 1036.
Green v. Butherford (1 Ves. 468), 18, 785.
Green v. Sergeant (23 Vt. 466), 401.
Green v. Slayter (4 Johns. Ch. 46), 478.
Green v. Spicer (1 Buss. & Myl. 395),
1269, 1638.
Green v. Sprague Manfg. Co. (52 Oonn.
330), 1384.
Green v. Sutton (50 Mo. 186), 1264.
Green v. Trieber (3 Md. 11), 1360, 1367.
Green v. White (7 Blackf. 242), 452.
Green v. Winter (1 Johns. Ch. 26; 7 Am.
Dec. 475), 329, 330, 413, 950, 1025, 1152,
1153, 1171, 1402, 1687, 1711.
Greene v. Beatty (Coxe, 142), 961.
Greene v. Covilland (10 Cal. 317), 191.
Greene v. Cramer (2 Con. & Law. 64), 99.
Greene v. Dennis (6 Conn. 293), 22.
Greene v. Smith (17 E. I. 28), 987,1193.
Greenfell v. Dean (2 Beav. 550), 38.
Greenfield v. Bates (5 Ir, Ch. 219), 419.
Greenfield's Estate (14 Pa. St. 489), 75,
152, 292, 416, 418.
Greenfield's Estate (24 Pa. St. 232), 431,
1694.
Greenhill v. Greenhill (2 Vera, 679; Pr.
Ch. 320), 298, 1529.
Greenhouse, Ex parte (1 Madd. 92), 897,
1575.
Greenland^. Waddell (116 N. T. 234; 15
Am. St. Eep. 409), 858.
Greenlaw v. King (5 Lond. Jur. 18),
207.
Greenleaf v. Mumf ord (50 Barb. 343; 35
How. 148), 1403.
Greenleaf v. Queen (1 Pet. 138), 1093,
1096.
Greeno v. Bernard (18 Kan. 518), 678.
Greenough v. Wells (10 Cush. 571) , 613.
Greensboro Bank v. Chambers (30 Gratt.
202; 32 Am. Eep. 661), 653, 667, 711.
Greenslade v. Dare (20 Beav. 285), 13.
Green Tree Brew. Co. v. Dold (45 Mo.
App. 603), 188.
Greenville Academy (7 Bich. Eq. 470),
18, 902, 1130.
Green well v. Greenwell (5 Ves. 194), 834,
836, 837, 839, 1561.
Greenwood v. Borland (4 Met. 330), 900.
Greenwood v. Coleman (34 Ala. 115), 922,
923, 926, 941, 943, 1268.
Greenwood v. Wakeford (1 Beav. 576) ,
890, 897, 902, 1233.
Greenwood's Appeal (92 Pa. St. 181),
377.
Greer v. Baughman (13 Md. 257) , 358.
Greer v. Chester (131 N. T. 629), 110.
Greer v. Edgerly (18 S. W. Eep. 531),
187.
Greetham v. Colton (34 Beav. 615), 1664.
Gregg v. Coates (23 Beav. 337), 181.
Gregg v. Irish (6 Pa. St. 211), 749.
Gregor v. Duncan (2 Desaus. 639) , 480.
Gregory v. Gregory (Cowp. 201; Jac.
631), 465, 467.
Gregory v. Henderson (4 Taunt. 773),
938.
Gregory v. Smith (9 Hare, 708), 123, 125.
Gregory v. Stetson (133 U. S. 686), 1729.
Gregorys. Van Vleck (21 Tex. 40), 711.
Gregory v. Winston (23 Gratt. 102) , 552.
Grenfell v. Girdlestone (2 Y. & C. 662),
981.
Gresley v. Mousley (4 De G. & J. 78),
419.
Greswold v. Marsham (2 Ch. Ca. 170),
978.
Grevenor v. Hallum (Amb. 645) , 259.
Greville v. Brown (7 H. L. Cas. 689),
1355.
Grey v. Grey (Finch, 338; 1 Ch. Ca. 296),
27.
Grey v. Grey (2 Swanst. 597), 307, 366,
368, 369.
Grider v. Payne (9 Dana, 190), 383.
Gridley v. Westbrook (23 How. 503),
1023.
Gridley v. Weygant (23 How. 500), 1023.
Gridly v. Andrews (8 Conn. 1), 1352.
Grier v. Grier (L. E. 5 H. L. 688), 101.
Grieveson v. Kirsopp (2 Keen, 653), 624,
626, 629, 631.
Grifanu. Banks (37 N. T. 621), 722.
GrifHn v. Blanchard (17 Cal. 70), 388,
434, 435, 993.
Griffln v. Brady (39 L. J. Ch. 136), 1680.
Grimn v. Cammaek (36 Ala. 695; 7£ Am.
Dec. 344) , 674.
Griffin v. Earle (34 S. Car. 246; 13 S. E.
Eep. 473), 710.
Griffin, Ex parte (2 Gill & J. 116), 1122,
1123, 1128.
Griflln v. Fleming (72 Ga. 697), 1434.
Griffln v. Ford (1 Bosw. 123) , 1003, 1027.
Griffin v. Graham (1 Hawks, 96), 111,
753, 770, 1524.
Griffln v. Griffln (18 N. J. Eq. 104), 601.
Griffin, In the goods of (2 Ir. Eq. 320),
861.
Griffln v. Macaulay (7 Gratt. 476), 1127,
1151, 1234, 1237.
TABLE OF CASES.
cv
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Griffin v. Marine Co. (52 111. 131), 1099,
1495, 1488, 1490.
Griffin v. Marquardt (17 N. T. 28), 1408.
Griffin v. Rogers (38 Pa. St. 382), 1360.
Griffith v. Bird (22 Gratt. 73), 834.
Griffith v. BucMe (2 Vern. 13), 90, 92,
101, 102.
Griffith v. Godey (113 U. S. 89) , 377.
Griffith v. Griffith (5 B. Mon. 113), 25, 50,
654.
Griffith v. Griffith (1 Hon*. Oh. 153), 449,
452.
Griffith v. Griffith (9 Paige, 315), 443,
445.
Griffith v. Hamilton (12 Ves. 310) , 260.
Griffith v. Hood (2 Ves. 452), 645.
Griffith v. Ricketts (7 Hare, 307) , 1317.
Griffith v. Rogers (Pr. Ch. 231) , 246.
Griffith v. State (2 Del. Ch. 421), 750.
Griffith-Boscawen v. Scott (L. R. 20 Ch.
D. 358), 1001.
Griffiths v. Evans (5 Beav. 241), 128,
129.
Griffiths, In re (1 Low. Dec. 431), 1409.
Griffiths v. Porter (25 Beav. 236), 1194,
1234,1244, 1591.
Griffiths v. Pruen (11 Sim. 2C2), 893.
Griffitts v. Cope (17 Pa. St. 96), 749.
Griffittsi). Ricketts (7 Hare, 307), 1329.
Griffiths v. Robins (3 Madd. 191), 293,
431.
Grigby v. Cox (1 Ves. 517), 645.
Griggs v. Cocks (4 Sim. 438), 204, 534.
Griggs v. Sturgis (5 Hare, 93), 975.
Griggs v. Veghte (47 N. J. Bq. 179), 1002,
1066, 1131.
Grill v. Lomax (89 Ala. 420), 492.
Grimball v. Cruse (70 Ala. 534), 959, 1057,
1674, 1686.
Grimes v. Harmon (35 Ind. 198; 9 Am.
Rep. 690), 747, 777, 789, 796, 797.
Grimes Dry Goods Co. v. Malcolm (17
Sup. Ct. Rep. 150), 1728.
Grimshaw v. Walker (12 Ala. 101), 1369,
1373.
Grimsley v. Grimsley (79 Ga. 397; 5 S. E.
Rep. 760) , 1743.
Grimstone v. Carter (3 Paige, 421), 446.
Grimstone, Exparte (Amb. 706), 829.
Grinnan v. Long (22 W. Va. 693) , 1571.
Grissell v. Leather (68 L. T. 522) , 1436.
Grlsson v. Hill (17 Ark. 483), 749, 1524.
Grist v. Forehand (36 Miss. 69), 847.
Griswold v. Butter (3 Conn. 227), 1314.
Griswold v. North Storington (5 Conn.
367), 1048.
Griswold v. Perry (7 Lans. 103), 1085,
1105.
Griswold©. Wandler (5 N. H. 492), 1255.
Gritton v. McDonald (3 Met. 252), 575.
Groesbeck v. Seeley (13 Mich. 329), 263
309, 374.
Groff v. National Bank of Commerce
(50 Minn. 234; 52 N. W. Rep. 934), 1472.
Groff v. Rohrer (35 Md. 327), 339.
Groom v. Booth (1 Drew. 548), 1665.
Groom v. Thompson (16 S. W. Rep. 369),
1567.
Groome v. Belt (171 Pa. St. 74), 1596.
Groomee. Lewis (23 Md. 137; 87 Am.
Dec. 563), 950.
Groome's Estate, In re (94 Cal. 69; 29
Pac. Rep. 487), 324.
Groover j>. Rush (27 Tex. 231), 47.
Gross v. Moore (68 Hun, 412; 22 N. Y.
Supl. 1019), 87.
Gross v. Reddig (45 Pa. St. 4C6) , 689.
Grossman Cruger (7 Hun, 60), 699.
Grosvenor v. Allen (9 Paige, 74), 436.
Grosvenora. Day (Clarke, 109), 1503.
Grothe's Appeal (13 Pa. St. 585; 26 W. N.
C. 265), 989.
Grothe's Estate (135 Pa. St. 586), 1296.
Groton v. Ruggles (17 Me. 137), 863, 885.
Groton v. Waldborough (11 Me. 306), 556.
Grouch v. Hazelburst Lumber Co. (16
So. Rep. 496), 194, 536.
Grover v. Diflenderfer (11 Gill & J. 15),
678.
Grover v. Fox (36 Mich. 461), 1487, 1505.
Grover v. Grover (3 Md. Ch. Dec. 349),
1388.
Grover v. Radcliff (63 Md. 496), 657.
Groves v. Clark (IKeen, 138), 684.
Groves v. Fulsome (16 Mo. 543) , 218.
Groves v. Gordon (3 Brev. 245), 967.
Groves v. Groves (3 T. & J. 170) , 256, 270,
307, 358, 363,364.
Groves v. Perkins (6 Sim. 576), 684.
Groves' Trusts, In re (3 Gift. 675), 678.
Gruhn v. Richardson (128 111. 178), 574.
Grumball v. Patton (70 Ala. 626) , 111.
Grumley v. Webb (44Mo. 444; 100 Am.
Dec. 304), 398, 413, 877, 1184.
Gschwend v. Estes (51 Cal. 134) . 1400.
Gude v. Worthington (3 De G. & S. 389),
167, 614, 625, 626.
Guerrant v. Fowler (1 Hem. & M. 4) , 36.
Guerrero v. Ballerino (48 Cal. 118), 403.
GuidOttv. Guidott (3 Atk.2 54), 298, 299.
Guilds. Guild (16 Ala. 121), 35, 36, 678.
Guion v. Melvin (69 N. Car. 242), 902.
Guion v. Pickett (42 Miss. 77), 865, 867,
907, 987.
Guion v. Williams (65 Hun, 605; 7 N. T.
Supl. 786), 55.
Guishaberu. Hairman (2 Bush, 320), 655.
Gulick v. Bailey (5 Halst. 87), 656.
Gulick v. Bruere (42 N. J. Eq. 639; 9 Atl.
Rep. 719), 853.
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Gulieku. Gulick (39N. J. Eq. 401), 75.
Gully v. Crego (24 Beav. 185) , 128.
Gully v. Hull (31 Miss. 20), 667, 669.
Gully v. Ray (18 Ky. 113), 964.
Gumbert, Appeal of (110 Pa. St. 496),
259.
Gundry v. Pinniger (14 Beav. 94), 631.
Gunn v. Blair (9 Wis. 352), 1676.
Gunnell v. Coekerill (79 111. 79) , 1504.
Gunter v. Williams (40 Ala. 561) , 704 .
Gunther v. Gunther (23 Beav. 571),
978.
Gunther, Inre (3 Dem. 386), 847.
Guphill v. Ford (7 Ired. 418), 1260.
Guphillw. Isbell (1 Bailey, 230; 19 Am.
Dec. 675), 951,956, 1114.
Gutoh v. Fosdick (48 N. J. Eq. 353), 1533.
Guth v, Guth (3Bro. Ch- 614), 720, 723.
Guthrie v. Field (21 Ark. 379) , 364.
Guthrie v. Gardner (19 Wend. 414), 307,
334, 339, 354, 357, 366.
Guy v. Peakes (18 Ves. 196) , 685.
Guyer v, Maynard (6 Gill & J. 420), 928,
940, 1067.
Guyton v. Shane (7 Dana, 498), 1123.
Gwilliams v. Rowell (Hard. 204), 180.
Gwynn v. Gwynn (27 S. Oar. 525), 258.
Gwynne v. Heaton (1 Bro. Ch. 1), 282,
480.
Gyett ^.Williams (2 Johns. & H. 429) ,
1355.
H.
Haackw. Weicker (118 N. T. 67), 917,
1092.
Haavenu. Hoass (60 Minn. 313; 62 Mo.
110), 310.
Habergham v. Vincent (2 Ves. Jr. 209),
141, 142, 143, 242, 977, 1009.
Habrisi). Oarstarphen (69 N. Car. 416),
403.
Hackett v. Metcalfe (6 Bush, 352), 706.
Haekett v. Reynolds (4 R. I. 512), 602.
Hackney v. Butts (41 Ark. 393), 418.
Hackney v. Vrooman (62 Barb. 650), 73,
93.
Haddelsey ». Adams (22 Beav. 276), 113,
924, 929.
Hadden v. Chora (8 B. Mon. 70), 748,
1559.
Haddix v. Haddix (5 Litt. 202), 383.
Haddow v. Lundy (59 N. Y. 320), 1634.
Hadley v. Beedom (L. R. (1895) 1 Q. B.
646), 1380.
Hadley v. Clinton, etc. Co. (13 Ohio St.
502; 82 Am. Dec. 451), 489, 492.
Hadley v. Hopkins Academy (14 Pick.
240), 748, 777, 785, 788.
Hadley v. London Bank of Scotland (3
DeG.,J. &S. 63), 585.
Hadley's Trust, In re (5 De G. & S. 67 ; 9
Eng. L. &Eq. 67), 867, 891.
Hadow v. Hadow (9 Sim. 438) , 184, 229.
Hafner v. Irwin (1 Irtd. Law, 490), 1369.
Hagan v. Piatt (48 ST. J. Eq. 206), 1425.
Hagann. Varney (147111. 281; 35 N. E.
Rep. 219), 106.
Haggarty v. MeCanna (25 N. J. Eq. 51),
1025.
Haggarty v. Lauterman (30 N. J. Eq.
37), 1036, 1072.
Haggerty v. Main (56 Md. 526), 464.
Haggerty v. Palmer (6 Johns. Ch. 437),
1408.
Haglar v. MeCombs (66 N. Car. 345),
1715.
Hahnw. Hutchinson (159 Pa. St. 133; 28
Atl. Rep. 167), 108, 1301.
Haigh, Ex parte (11 Ves. 403), 600.
Haigh v. Kaye (L. R. 7 Ch. 469), 218, 255,
263, 312.
Haighta. McVeigh (69111. 624), 705.
Haight v. Pearson (11 Utah, 51; 39 Pac.
Rep. 479), 423.
Haigoodjj. Wells (1 Hill Eq. 69), 1175.
Haines v. Allen (78Ind. 100), 737.
Haines v. Mead (52 N. Y. 332) , 170.
Haines v. O'Connor (10 Watts, 315), 364.
Hale v. Baker (60 Tex. 217), 585.
Hale v. Everett (59 N. H. 9), 789, 790,
797.
Hale v. Hale (146 111. 227; 33 N. E. Rep.
858), 42, 918.
Hale v. Hale (137 Mass. 168), 1037.
Hale v. Lamb (2 Eden, 292), 146.
Halew. Marquette (69 Iowa, 376), 155.
Hale v. Marsh (100 Mass. 465), 108.
Hale v. Sheldrake (60 L. T. 292), 1257.
Haleyburton v. Kershaw (3 Desaus. .
105), 1322.
Halfordu. Stains (16 Sim. 488), 238.
Hall v. Bumstead (20 Pick. 2), 1320.
Hall v. Boyd (6 Pa. St. 270), 1127,1234.
Hall j). Carter (2 Atk. 368), 1529.
HallD. Christy (8 Neb. 264), 708.
Hall v. Click (5 Ala. 363), 569.
Hall v. Congdon (56 N. H. 270), 308, 361.
Hallr. Cushing (9 Pick. 395), 853, 856,
858,895,893,1020,1192.
Hall v. Dennison (17 Vt. 311), 1357, 1368.
Hdll v. Dewes (Jacobs, 189), 980.
Hall v. Doran (13 Iowa, 368), 364, 368.
Hall ii. Dotson (55 Tex. 520), 711.
Hall u. Franck (11 Beav. 519), 1124.
Hall v. Gould (79 111. 16), 1488.
Hall v. Hall (L. R. 8 Ch. App. 436), 158,
273, 293.
Hall v. Hall (50 Conn. 104), 579.
Hall v. Hall (L. R. 14 Eq. 365), 163, 272,
274.
TABLE OF CASES.
CVH
[The.references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Hall i). Hall (107 Mo. 101; 17 S. W. Eep.
811), 356.
Hall v. Hallett (1 Cox, 134), 400, 1667,
1678.
Hall v. Harris (3 Ired. Eq. 289), 1722.
Hall v. Hurt (2 J. & H. 76), 1526.
Hall v. Linn (8 Colo. 264), 521, 522.
Hall v. MeDuff (24 Me. 311). 603.
Hall v. Marston (17 Mass. 575), 1363.
Hall v. May (3 Kay & J. 585), 872, 1018.
Hall v. Naylor (18 N. T. 688; 75 Am. Dec.
269) , 492.
Hall v. Otis (77 Me. 122), 1630.
Hall v. Palmer (3 Hare, 532), 560.
Hall v. Short (81 N. Car. 273), 709.
H-illu. Simmons (2 Rich. Eq. 12(1), 1592.
Hall v. Sprigg (7 Mar. (La.) 243), S09.
Halli>. Timmons (2Eieh. Eq. 120), 381.
Hall v. Waterhouse (W. N. (1867) 11) ,
243.
Hall v. Williams (120 Mass. 344), 1269,
1294.
Hall V. Young (37 N. H. 134), 308, 371.
Hall's Appeal (133 Pa. St. 351) ,1114.
Halle v. Einstein (34 Pla.589;16So. Eep.
554), 660, 705.
Hallett v. Collins (10 How. 174), 282, 465.
Hallett v. Hallett (2 Paige, 15), 1732.
Hallett's Estate, In re (L. R. 13 Cta. D.
696), 204, 434, 534, 1625.
Hallett v. Thompson (5 Paige, 583), 1274,
1640.
Hailey v. Ball (66 111. 250), 705.
Halliday v. Hudson (3 Ves. 211), 242.
Hallman's Estate (13 Phila. 562), 1183.
Halloek v. De Minn (2 Thomp. & C.
351), 699.
Hallows v. Lloyd (L. R. 39 Ch. D. 666),
1195, 1196.
Halsey v. Convention (75 Md. 275; 23
Atl. Eep. 781), 734, 753.
Halsey v. Van Amringe (6 Paige, 12),
1687.
Halsey v. Whitney (4 Mason, 206), 1318,
1329, 1368, 1375, 1376.
Halsley v.FuUz (76 Va. 671), 562.
Haltou v. Foster (L. E. 3 Ch. App. 507),
632.
Haltum v. Corse (2 Barb. Ch. 506), 111.
Halsted v. Meeker (3 Greeu Ch. 136),
1212, 1213.
Halstead v. Bank of Kentucky (4 J. J.
Marsh. 654), 327,445.
Halstead v. Westervelt (41 N. J. Eq.
100), 1298.
Ham v. Ham (68 N. H. 70), 1124.
Ham v. Van Orden (84 N. T. 287), 34.
Hamblet v. Steen (66 Miss. 474), 639.
Hambleton v. Darrington (36 Md. 434),
110.
Hamblin v. Foltz (70 Tex. 132), 570, 577.
Hamblin v. Warnecke (50 Tex. 203),
1183.
Hambriek v. N. E. Mtge. Sec. Co. (100
Ala. 651 ; 13 So. Eep. 778), 1494.
Hambroke v. Simmons (4 Euss. 25), 78.
Hamer v. Sharpe (L. E. 19 Eq. 108), 1040.
Hamer v. Sldwny (124 N. T, 550; 21 Am.
St. Eep. 693; 27 N. E. Eep. 256), 52, 56,
67.
Hamer v. Tllsley (Johns. 486) , 1026.
Hamersley v. Lambert (2 Johns. Ch,
509), 42.
Hamil v. White (3 J. &.L. 695), 103.
Hamilton v. Bishop (STerg. 33; 29 Am.
Dec. 101), 651,654, 686.
Hamilton v. Brooks (51 Tex. 142), 711.
Hamilton v. Buchanan (112 N". Car. 463;
17 S. E. Rep. 159), 370, 428.
Hamilton v. Crosby (32 Conn. 342), 1092.
Hamilton v. Cummings (1 Johns. Cb.
517), 564.
Hamilton v. Denny (1 B. & B. 199), 60S.
Hamilton v. Downer (162 111. 651; 38 N.
E. Eep. 733), 63.
Hamilton v. Foot (6 Ir. Eq 572), 256.
Hamilton v. Fowlks (16 Ark. 340), 596.
Hamilton v. Fry (2 Moll. 458), 897.
Hamilton v. Halpin (68 Miss. 99), 1458,
1509.
Hamilton v. Houghton (2 Bligh, 169),
1330, 1346, 1347.
Hamilton v. Lubukee (51 111. 415), 1440,
1456, 1480, 1502, 1505.
Hamilton v. Mohun (1 P. Wms. 118; 1
Salk. 158) , 290.
Hamilton v. Mound City, etc. Ins. Co.
(3Tenn. Ch. 124; 6 Lea, 402), 327, 626,
Hamilton v. Royse (2 Sob.. & Let. 377; 2
Sudg. V. & P. 277), 444.
Hamilton v. Steele (22 W. Va. 348), 352.
Hamilton v. Wright (9 CI. & Fin. Ill),
399, 1683.
Hamilton's Estate (74 Pa. St. 69), 816.
Hamlin v. Hamlin (19 Me. 141), 964.
Hammersley v. DeBill (12C1. &Fiu. 45),
98, 542.
Hammersley v. Smith (4 Whart. 126),
671, 672, 934.
Hammett v. Strickland (99 Ala. 616; 13
So. Eep. 573), 581.
Hammond v. Corbett (61 N. H. 312),
708.
Hammond v. Granger (128 Mass. 272) ,
900.
Hammond v. Hammond (2 Bland, 306),
1213.
Hammond v. Hicks (1 Vera. 432), 1536.
Hammond v. Hopkins (143 U. S. 224),
1183.
CV1H
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Hammond v. Hudson Elver, etc. Co. (20
Barb. 378), 1404.
Hammond v. Messenger (9 Sim. 327),
1538.
Hammond v. Pennock (5 Lans. 358),
480.
Hammond v. Peyton (34 Minn. 629), 576.
Hammond v. Putnam (110 Mass. 235),
987.
Hammond w. Stanton (4 E. I. 65), 1183.
Hamnett's Appeal (72 Pa. St. 337), 223.
Hamrick v. Hogg (1 Dev. 350), 488.
Hampden v. Hampden (1 Bro. P. C.
252), 559.
Hampden's Charities, In re (L. R. 18
Ch. D. 310), 760.
Hampdon v. Eice (24 Conn. 350), 747.
Hampsonu. Pall (64 Ind. 382), 223, 308.
Hampton v. Spencer (2 Vern. 288) , 67.
Hanbury v. Kirkland (3 Sim. 265), 1217,
1235.
Hanbury v. Spooner (SBeav. 630), 803.
Hance v. Frome (39 N. J. Eq. 324), b52.
Hanchetti;. Briscoe (22Beav. 496), 662.
Hancock v. Minot (8 Pick. 29), 1145, 1150,
1322, 1324.
Hancock Bank v, Joy (41 Me. 56S), 706.
Hancox v. Meeker (95 N. Y. 528), 1687.
Hand v. "Winn (52 Miss. 788), 1440.
Handicku. Wilkes, (1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 393),
90.
Handley v. Wrightson (60 Md. 198), 124,
128, 130.
Handlin v. Davis (81 Ky. 34), 399, 1170.
Handly v. Snodgrass (9 Leigh, 484), 1205,
1253.
Hands v. Hands (1 T. E. 439), 652, 624,
629.
Handy v. Snodgrass (9 Leigh, 484), 1255.
Hanford Oil Co. v. First Nat. Bank (126
111. 584), 1397.
Hanley v. Pearson (L. R. 13 Ch. D. 549),
104.
Hanna v. Spotts (5 B. Mon. 862; 43 Am.
Dec. 132), 286.
Hannah v. Carrlngton (18 Ark. 104),
1460.
Hannahs v. Hammond (28 Abb. N. Cas.
317; 19 N. Y. Supl. 883), 1589.
Hannay v. Basham (L. E. 23 Ch. D. 195),
1681.
Hanner v. Moulton (138 U. S. 486), 1542.
Hannibal, etc. E. Co. v. Green (68 Mo.
177), 1108.
Hanning v. Mueller (82 Wis. 235), 852,
912, 916, 1278.
Hannis' Estate, In re (11 Pa. Co. Ct.
94), 149.
Hannon v. Madden (10 Bush, 664) , 706.
Hanson v. Berthelson (19 Neb. 433), 72.
Hanson u. Bdgerly (29 ST. H. 343), 489,
492, 494.
Hanson, Ex parte (12 Ves. 349), 976.
Hanson v. Keating (4 Hare, 1) , 676, 679.
Hanson v. Meyer (6 East, 614), 566.
Hanson v. Millett (55 Me. 184), 706.
Hanson v. Worthington (12 Mil. 418),
855, 858, 859, 882, 883, 884, 885, 944, 956.
Hanson v. Wright (88 Tenn. 501), 929.
Hapgood ». Fisher (34 Me. 407; 66 Am.
Dec. 663), 103.
Hapgood v. Jennison (2 Vt. 294), 1690.
Hapgood v. Parkin (L. E. 11 Eq. 74),
1057.
Haygood». Justices (20 Ga. 845), 1668,
1678.
Happy v. Morton (33 111. 398), 789, 796,
1738.
Harbin v. Darby (28 Beav. 325), 1709.
Harcastlew. Fisher (24 Mo. 70), 1364.
Harcourtti. Seymour (2 Sim. 45), 1623.
Hardin v. Darwin (66 Ala. 55), 309.
Hardcastle Exparte (29 W. E. 615), 1174.
Harden v. Parsons (1 Eden, 149), 1102,
1594.
Harden v. State (32 Kan. 637), 688.
Harden v. Wagner (22 W. Va. 356), 1577.
Hardenberg v. Manning (4 Dem. 437),
1334.
Hardenburgh v. Blair (30 N. J. Eq. 42),
111, 1298.
Harder v. Harder (2 Sandf . 17), 174, 357.
Hardin v. Baird (6 Litt. 340), 162.
Hardin v. Darwin (66 Ala. 55), 335, 339,
349, 366.
Hardinu. Osborne (60111. 98), 1369.
Hardin v. Osborne (94 111. 671) , 1408.
Harding v. Cox (1 Vern. 227) , 528.
Harding v. Fuller (141 111. 308), 1054.
Harding?;. Glyn (1 Atk. 469), 127,167,
253, 614, 625, 629, 637, 1008.
Harding v. Hardrett (temp. Finch, 9),
441.
Harding v. Larned (4 Allen, 426) 828,
1102, 1198, 1202.
Hardingham v. Nichols (3 Atk. 304),
827, 438,442.
Hardman v. Bowen (39 N. Y. 196), 1362.
Hardman v. Ellames (2Myl. &K. 732).
439.
Hardwicke v. Hamilton (121 Mo. 465;
26 S. W. Eep. 342), 1477), 1498.
Hard wick b. Mynd (1 Aust. 109), 1056,
1652.
Harkwicke v. Vernon (4 Ves. 411; 14
Ves. 510), 333, 1564.
Hardy v. Brier (91 Ind. 91), 478.
Hardy v. Holly (84 N. Car. 661), 652, 653,
664, 665, 697.
Hardy v. Beeves (4 Ves. 479), 1636.
TABLE OF CASES.
CIX
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Hardy v. Skinner (9 Ired. 191), 1367.
Harford i!. Spurrier (1 Madd. 539), 200.
Harford's Trusts, In re (L. E. 13 Ch. D.
135), 904.
Hargrave©. King (5 Ired. Bq..430), 391.
Hargreaves v. Michell (6 Madd. 326),
1536.
Hargroves v. Batty (19 Ga. 230), 1625.
Hargroves v. Chambers (30 Ga. 580),
1400.
Hargroves v. Meray (2 Hill S. (Car.)
722.
Hargroves' Trusts, In re (8 Ir. Eg.. 256),
166, 625.
Harker v. Eeilley (4 Del. Ch. 72), 250.
Harland v. Binks (15 Q. B. 7:3), 1329.
Harland ». Trigg (1 Bro. Ch. 142), 123,
222), 125, 128.
Harland's Accounts (5 Eawle, 323), 1699.
Harley v. Platts (6 Eich. L. 315), 912, 917,
943.
Harlin v. Nation (126 Mo. 97; 27 S. W.
Eep. 330), 1499.
Harlow v. Cowdery (109 Mass. 183),
1753.
Harlow v. Dehon (111 Mass. 195), 1535.
Harmon v. Garland (1 Mackey, 1), 705.
Harmon ». James (7 Ind. 263), 93.
Harmood v. Oglander (8 Ves. 127), 977,
1324.
Harmun v. Spear (lYeates, 553), 1350.
Harnehall v. Orndorff (35 Md. 340), 396.
Harnett v. Maitland (16 Mees. & W. 257),
1026.
Harney v. Donohue (97 Mo. 141), 327.
Harney v. Butcher (15 Mo. 89; 55 Am.
Deo. 131), 1053.
Harnickell v. Orndorff (35 Md. 341), 1451.
Harpending v. Dutch Church (16 Pet.
492), 20.
Harper v. Archer (28 Miss. 212), 334.
Harper v. Ely (56 111. 179), 1445.
Harper v. Hayes (2 Gift. 210), 947, 1094,
1138.
Harper v. Perry (28 Iowa, 60), 206, 423.
Harper v. Phelps (21 Conn. 257), 133,
136.
Harper v. Wilkins (65 Miss. 215), 570.
Harper's Appeal (64 Pa. St. 315), 1152.
Harper's Appeal (111 Pa. St. 243), 1697.
Harrer v. Wallner (20 111. 197), 705.
Harrington v. Bigelow (11 Paige, 349),
660.
Harrington v. Brown (5 Pick. 519), 391,
401.
Harrington v. Keteltas (92 N. T. 40),
1116.
Harrington v. Price (3 B. & Ad. 170),
1427.
Harrington v. Slade (22 Biro. 166), 452.
Harris v. Barnett (3 Gratt. 339), 71, 72,
198.
Harris v. Barnett (25 Miss. 183), 62.
Harris v. Bp. of London (2 P. Wms.
136), 247.
Harris v. Bratton (34 S. Car. 259; 13 S.
E. Eep. 447), 65.
Harris v. Carney (10 Humph. 349), 527.
Harris v. Garter (3 Stew. 233), 452.
Harris©. Catlin (53 Tex. 8), 1454.
Harris v. Du Pasquier (26 L. T. (N. S.)
689; 20 Wr. 668), 254.
Harris v. Ply (7 Paige, 421), 1352, 1356.
Harris v. Hanks (25 Ark. 517), 574.
Harris v. Harbeson (9 Bush, 397) , 656.
Harris v. Harnie (37 Ark. 348), 574.
Harris v. Harrell (117 Ind. 94), 706.
Harris v. Harris (29 Beav. 107), 29, 904,
1136, 1206.
Harris v. Harris (7 Ired. Ill; 53 Am.
Dec. 393), 664,709.
Harris v. Harrison (78 N. Car. 202), 654.
Harris v. Iugledew (3 P. Wms. 91),
1355.
Harris, In re (L. E. 15 Ch. D. 561), 813.
Harris v. Jackson (17 S. W. Rep. 441),
1078.
Harris v. Lloyd (Turn. & R. 310), 512.
Harris v. Mclntire (118 111. 275), 307, 308,
313, 993.
Harris v. Martin (9 Ala. 895), 1686, 1690,
1699.
Harris v. Morris (4 Esp. 41), 685.
Harris v. Mott (14 Beav. 169), 672.
Harris v. Norton (16 Barb. 264), 441, 442.
Harris v. Petty (66 Tex. 514; 1 S. W.
Eep. 525), 1077.
Harris v. Eoof (10 Barb. 489), 557.
Harris v. Sheldon (16 Atl. Eep. 828),
1693.
Harris v. Sumner (2Pick. 122), 1367.
Harris v. Tremenhere (15 Ves. 34), 418.
Harris v. Truman (L. E. 7 Q. B. Div.
340 ; L. E. 9 Q. B. Di v . 264) , 972, 976.
Harris v. Tyson (24 Pa. St. 347), 489,
493.
Harris v. Union Bank (1 Coldw. 152),
309.
Harris v. Williams (44 Tex. 124), 711.
HarrisburgBank v. Tyler (3 Watts &
S. 373), 359, 532.
Harrison v. Boswell (10 Sim. 382), 1536.
Harrison v. Bray (92 N. Car. 488), 1468.
Harrison v. Bridgeton (16 Mass. 16),
1217.
Harrison v. Forth (Pr. Ch. 51), 445.
Harrison v. Harrison (2Atk. 121), 380.
Harrison v. Harrison (2 Gratt. 1) , 124.
Harrison v. Harrison (2 Hem. &M. 237),
144.
ex
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Harrison v. Harrison (36 N. T. 543), 111,
G16.
Harrison v. Harrison (2 Eol. Eccl. 406),
893.
Harrison v. Howard (1 Ired. Eq. 407),
71.
Harrison v. Hoyle (24 Ohio St. 254), 789,
793.
Harrison v. Mocks (10 Ala. 185), 426,
1050, 1051, 1115, 1215, 1358, 1402.
Harrison ji. Naylor (3 Bro. Ch. 108; 2
Cox, 274), 114, 1528.
Harrison v. Randall (9 Hare, 407) , 992.
Harrison v. Roberta (6 Fli. 711), 1493.
Harrison v. Rovan (4 Wash. 202), 1722.
Harrison v. Rowley (4 Ves. 212) , 893.
Harrison*;. Sterry (5 Cranch, 289), 1415.
Harrison v. Union Trust Co. (144 K. Y.
326; 39 N. E. Rep. 353), 905.
Harrison v. Warner (1 Blackf. 385),
1679.
Harrison's Trusts, In re (22 L. J. Ch.
69), 905.
Harrison's Will (1 B. Mon. 351), 424.
Harrnld v. Lane (55 Pa. St. 268) , 308, 416.
Harry v. Glover (2 Hill Eq. 515) , 1222.
Hart v. Crane (7 Paige, 37), 1395, 1402,
1403.
Hart v. Czapski (11 Lea, 151), 847.
Hart v. Denham (W. N. 1871, p. 2), 1576.
Hart v. Hart (L. R. 18 Ch. D. 670), 725.
Hart«. Middlehurst (3 Atk. 371), 102,
105.
Hart j). Seymour (147 111. 598; 35 N. E.
Rep. 246), 62, 84, 1279.
Hart v. Ten Eyck (2 Johns. Ch. 108),
387, 1120, 1136, 1174, 1175, 1228.
Hartjj. Tribe (18 Beav. 215; 19 Beav.
149), 128, 130, 228, 229,845.
Hartford First Bapt. Church v. With-
erell (3 Paige, 296), 789.
Hartly v. Hurle (5 Ves. 545) , 656, 932.
Hartman v. Dowdel (1 Rawle, 279), 553,
976.
Hartman v. Evans (38 W. Va. 669; 18 S.
E. Rep. 810), 1470.
Hartman's Appeal (90 Pa. St. 206), 902.
Harton v. Harton (7 T. R. 652), 923, 924,
930.
Hartopp v. Hoare (3 Atk. 50), 973.
Hart's Appeal (32 Conn. 620), 1538.
Harvard College v. Alderman (104 Mass.
470) , 1434.
Harvard College v. Amory (9 Pick.
446), 1198, 1200, 1214, 1338.
Howard College v. Society (3 Gray 280),
748, 817.
Harvey v. Ashley (3 Atk. 607), 12,542.
Harvey v. Aston (1 Atk. 361), 1041, 1043,
1045, 1528.
Harvey v. Cubbedge (75 Ga. 792), 1411.
Harvey v. Gardner (41 Ohio St. 646) , 46,
878, 879.
Harvey v. Harvey (98 Mass. 118), 312.
Harvey p. Harvey (2 P. Wms. 21), 836,
837, 839, 1529.
Harvey v. Harvey (4 Beav. 215), 1732.
Harvey v. Harvey (5 Beav. 134) , 1159.
Harvey v. Kelley (41 Miss. 490; 93 Am.
Deo. 267), 576.
Harvey v. Ledbetter (48 Miss. 95), 309.
Harvey v. Mount (8 Beav. 434), 2'i2, 293.
Harvey v. Pennypacker (4 Del. Ch. 445),
66, 358.
Harvey v. Varney (98 Mass. 118), 176.
Harwoodrc. Oglander (8 Ves. 127), 30.
Harwoodr. R. R. Co. (17 Wall. 78), 365.
Harwoodi). Tooke (2 Sim. 192), 33.
Harwood v. Tracy (118 Mo. 631 ; 24 S. W.
Rep. 214), 874.
Hasell, Ex parte (3 T. & C. 617) , 461.
Haskell v. Freeman (1 Wins. 34), 250.
Haskell v. House (3 Brev. 242), 1066,
1067.
Ha=kell v. Scott (56 Ind. 564), 575.
Haskinsv. Alcott (13 Ohio St. 210), 14,
1383.
Haskitt v. Elliott (58 Ind. 493), 484.
Hassanclever v. Tucker (2 Binn. 525),
1355.
Hassard v. Rowe (11 Barb. 24), 1025.
Hassel v. Hassel (2 Dick. 256), 1365.
Hasseyo. Wilke (55 Cal. 525), 435.
Hasshagen v. Hasshagen (80 Cal. 515),
65.
Hastie v. Aiker (67 Ala. 313), 1534.
Hastier. Hastle (L. R. 2 Ch. D. 304),
653.
Hastings v. Baldwin (17 Mass. 558),
1357.
Hastings v. Cutler (24 N. H. 481), 448.
Hastings v. Drew (76 N. T. 9), 204, 224,
368,537,597.
Hastings v. O'Donnell (40 Cal. 148), 4<is,
492.
Hastings v. Orde (11 Sim. 205), 277, 278,
934.
Hatch v. Bas?ett (52 N.T. 359), 1746, 1747.
Hatch v. Dwight (17Mas«. 289),!<84.
Hatch v. Hatch (9 Ves. 292) , 259, 2s6, 2S9,
296, 427, 552.
Hatcher v. Winters (71 Mo. 30), 1367.
Hatfield v. Montgomery (2 Port. 58),
465.
Hathaway v. Fall River Nat'l BaDk (131
Mass^H), 1408.
Hathaway v. Leaman (8 Bush, 391), 667.
Hathaway v. New Baltimore (48 Mich.
251), 751.
Hathaway v. Taine (34 N. Y. 103), 198.
TABLE OF CASES.
CX]
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Hathornw. Maynard (65 Ga. 168), 1628.
Hattat's Estate, In re (18 W. E. 416), 30,
876.
Hatton v. May (L. E. 3 Ch. D. 148), 1271.
Hatton v. Weems (12 Gill & J. 83), 1175,
1702.
Hauer's Estate (140 Pa. St. 420), 657, 658.
Haughton v. Harrison (2 Atk. 329), 354.
Hausern. Shore (5 Ired. Eq. 357), 1647,
1650, 1653.
Havens v. Healey (15 Barb. 301), 1638.
Havens, Inre (6 Dem. Surr. 456), 139.
Havers v. Havers (Barn. 23), 1576.
Haverstick u. Trudel (51 Cal. 431), 1718.
Havlland v. Bloom (6 Johns. Ch.178),
678.
Hawes v. Chaille (129 Ind. 435), 574.
Hawes v. Oakland (104 U. S. 460), 597.
Hawes v. Wyatt (3 Bro. Ch. 156), 203.
Hawken v. Bourne (8 Mees. & W. 703) ,
1032.
Hawker u. Hawker (3 B. & Aid. 537; 5
E. C. L. 386), 919, 927, 937.
Hawkes v. Hubback (L. E. 11 Eq. 5),
651, 668, 1274.
Hawkins v. Allen (L. E. 10 Eq. 246), 813.
Hawkins v. Alston (4 Ired. Eq. 137),
1099.
Hawkins v. Gordon (2 Sm. &Gif. 451),
73.
Hawkins v. Hawkins (50 Cal. 558), 478.
Hawkins v. Hawkins (1 Dr. & Sm. 75),
328, 15S2.
Hawkins v. Hawkins (1 Hare, 543), 1732.
Hawkins v. Kemp (3 East, 410), 867, 893,
894, 895, 1009, 1013, 1056, 1082, 1089.
Hawkins?;. Luscombe (2 Swanst. 375),
924, 930.
Hawkins v. Obeen (2 Ves. 659), 970.
Hawkins v. Palmer (16 S. W. Eep. 274),
326.
Hawkins v. Eoss (100 Ala. 459; 14 So.
Eep. 278), 660, 704.
Hawkins v. Skeggs (10 Humph. 31),
1043.
Hawkins v. Thurman (1 Idaho, 698),
674.
Hawkins' Appeal (32 Pa. St. 263), 286,
288.
Hawkins' Trusts, In re (33 Beav. 570),
893.
Hawks v. Sailors (87 Ga. 234; 13 S. E.
Eep. 638), 66,145.
Hawley v. Bullock (29 Tex. 216), 440.
Hawley v. Cramer (4 Cow. 730), 206, 392,
393, 395, 399, 400, 419, 423, 461, 465.
Hawley v. Gear (17 S. W. Eep. 914), 343.
Hawley, In re (104 N. T. 250), 1687.
Hawley v. James (5 Paige, 318 ; 16 Wend.
61), 183, 250, 258, 380, 390, 596, 616, 895,
964, 969, 996, 1055, 1056, 1060, 1096, 1103,
1244, 1322, 1324, 1522, 1696, 1701, 1746.
Hawley ». Martins (7 Johns. Oh. 174),
394.
Hawley v. Singer (5 Dem. 82), 1687.
Hawley v. Tesch (88 Wis. 213; 59 N. W.
Kep. 670), 1109.
Hawpe v. Smith (25 Tex. Sup. 448), 455.
Hawtayna v. Bourne (7 Mees. &, W. 695),
1032.
Hawthorn v. Boot (6 Bush, 501), 1728,
1747.
Haxton v. McClaren (132 Ind. 235; 31 N.
E. Kep. 48), 1253, 1582, 1744.
Hay v. Doane (11 N. J. Eq. 84), 1401,
1402.
Hay v. Master (6 Sim. 568), 119.
Haydel v. Hurck (6 Mo. App. 267), 1009,
1425.
Hayden v. Bucklin (9 Paige, 612), 452.
Hayden v. Connecticut Hospital (64
Conn. 320; 30 Atl. Eep. 50), 735, 747.
Hayden v. Marmaduke (19 Mo. 403),
1002, 1060, 1062.
Haydock v. Haydock (34 N. J. Eq. 570),
292.
Hayes v. Alliance Ins. Co. (L. E. 8 Ir.
149), 70.
Hayes, Ex parte (13 Jur. 765; 3 De G. &
Sm. 485), 1563.
Hayes v. Erey (54 Wis. 503), 1609.
Hayes v. Ho«tetter (125 Ind. 60), 1368.
Hayes v. Kershaw (1 Sandt. Ch. 258),
150, 152.
Hayso. Kindersley (2 Sm. & Gif. 197),
712.
Hayes v. Kingdome (1 Vera. 33), 215.
Hayes ». Oatley (L. E. 14 Eq. 1), 1118.
Hayes v. Pratt (147 U. S. 657; 13 Sup. Ct.
Eep. 503), 787, 890.
Hayes' Appeal (123 Pa. St. 110), 660.
Hayne d. Herman (97 Cal. 259; 32 Pac.
Eep. 171), 427.
Haynes®. Brooks (116 N. T. 487), 1418.
Haynes v. Sherman (117 N. T. 433), 1522.
Hays, Ex parte (3 De G. & Sm. 485), 845.
Hays v. Gloster (88 Cal. 560; 26 Pac.
Eep. 367), 13, 621, 522.
Hays ». Hollis (8 Gill, 369), 363.
Hays v. Horine (12 Iowa, 61; 74 Am.
Dec. 518), 575.
Haysw. Jackson (6 Mass. 153), 144, 246,
1322, 1324, 1560.
Hays v. Quay (68 Pa. St. 263) , 362.
Hays' Will, In re (9 Hare, 221) , 876.
Haytan v. Wolfe (Cro. Jac. 614; Palm..
156; Hutt. 30), 869.
Hayter, In re (32 W. E. 326) , 1191.
Hayter v. Trego (5 Euss. 113), 770.
Hayward v. Ellis (13 Pick. 276), 302.
CX11
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Hay ward v. tnnn (82111. 385), 1535.
Haywardtf. Pile (L. E. 5 Ch. 214), 1118.
Haywood v. Cope (26Beav. 140), 492.
Haywood v. Ensley (8 Humph. 460), 47,
527, 1720.
Haywood v. Craven (2 N. Car. 557),
256.
Hazard v. Dillon (34 fed. Rep. 485),
1564, 1734, 1737.
Hazell v. Currie (L. R. 2 Ch. 449). 1571.
Hazletine v. Pourney (120 111. 493), 1101,
1108, 1616.
Hazletine v. Moore (21 Hun, 355), 577.
Heacock v. Coatsworth (1 Clarke, 84),
413.
Head v. Egerton (1 Vern. 246), 438.
Head v. Head (3 Atk. 550), 685, 722.
Head v. Miller (45 Minn. 446) , 14U9.
Head v. Providence Ins. Co. (2 Cranch,
127), 19, 21.
Head». Quilliam (92 Ga. 220; 18 S. E.
Rep. 543), 1078.
Head v. Temple (4 Heisk. 34), 652, 653,
666, 710, 1073.
Headrick v. Yount (22 Kan. 344), 455.
Heald v. Heald (56 Md. 300), 1060, 1131.
Heald's Petition (2 Foster, 265), 100.
Healey v. Alston (25 Miss. 190), 977.
Healy v. Rowan (5 Gratt. 414) , 12.
Heard v. Eldredge (109 Mass. 258; 12
Am. Rep. 687), 1193.
Heardu. Hall (16 Pick. 458), 1242.
Heard v. Marsh (12 Cush. 580), 1122.
Heard v. Sill (26 Ga. 302), 1000.
Heardson v. Williamson (1 Keen, 33),
923, 1268.
Hearle v. Greenbank (1 Ves. Sr. 304),
11, 24, 27, 661, 839, 874, 927, 965.
Hearst v. Pujol (44Cal. 230), 49, 50, 234,
879.
Heartley v. Nicholson (L. R. 19 Eq. 233),
70.
Heath v. Bishop (4 Rich. Eq. 46; 55 Am.
Dec. 654), 1269, 1270, 1291, 1640, 1644.
Heath v. Chapman (2 Drew. 417), 731.
Heath v. Erie Ry. Co. (8 Blatchf. 347),
1589.
Heath v. Henley (1 Ch. Cas. 26), 1536.
Heath v. Knapp (4 Pa. St. 228), 971.
Heath v. Perry (3 Atk. 101), 839.
Heath v. Van Cott (9 Wis. 625), 699.
Heath v. Webster (40 Mich. 457), 1231.
Heathcote v. Hulme (1 J. & W. 122),
1255.
Heathman v. Rogers (153 111. 143), 1410.
Heathcote v. Paignon (2 Bro. Ch. 167),
480.
Heath's Appeal (100 Pa. St. 1), 525.
Heatley v. Finster (2 Johns. Ch. 15),
441,452.
Heatley v. Thomas (15 Ves. 696), 645,
697, 1009.
Heburn v. Warner (112 Mass. 271; 17
Am. Rep. 86), 698, 707.
Heck v. Clippenger (5 Pa. St. 385), 654.
Hecker v. Oosgrove (4 Russ. 562), 409.
Heckert's Appeal (24 Pa. St. 482), 960,
1686, 1688, 1698.
Heckman v. Messenger (49 Pa. St. 465),
1385.
Hedgman, In re (L. R. 8 Ch. D. 156),
733.
Hedrick v. Tuckwiller (20 W. Va. 489),
867.
Heermans v. Burt (78 N. T. 259), 616.
Heermans v. Ellsworth (64 N. Y. 159),
453.
Heermans v. Robertson (64 N. Y. 332),
616.
Heffernanr. Adams (7 Watts, 116), 1011.
Hegartyv. King (L. R. 7 Ir. 18), 297.
Hegeman v. Moor (131 N. Y. 462), 227.
Hegenmyer v. Marks (37 Minn. 6; 5 Am.
St. Rep. 808), 494.
Hellman v. Messmer (75 Cal. 166; 16
Pac. Rep. 766), 190, 307, 333.
Heiskell v. Powell (23 W. Va. 717), 269,
308.
Heiskell v. Trout (31 W. Va. 810; 8 S. E.
Rep. 557), 264.
Heiss v. Murphy (40 Wis. 276) , 751, 756.
Heist v. Baker (49 Pa. St. 9), 578.
Heister v. Green (48 Pa. St. 9) , 578.
Helen v. Yerger (61 Miss. 44), 1508.
Helfenstine v. Garrard (7 Ohio, 275),
911.
Helfenstein's Estate (77 Pa. St. 328),
151.
Helfrich v. Obermeyer (15 Pa. St. 113),
1362.
Hellman, In re (L. R. 2 Eq. 363), 1132.
Hellman v. McWilliams (70 Cal. 449), 73,
160, 1750.
Hellnera. Imbrie (6 S. & R. 401), 327.
Helm v. Gilroy (28 Ore. 517), 1409.
Helm v. Weaver (69 Tex. 143), 570.
Helms v. Ohadbourne (45 Wis. 60), 449.
Hemeway v. Gates (5 Pick. 522), 461.
Hemmer v. Cooper (8 Allen, 334), 481.
Hemmings v. Munckley (1 Bro. Ch.
303), 1043, 1045.
Hemming v. Neil (62 L. T. 649), 1193.
Hemmje v. Meinen (20 N. Y. Supl. 619),
815.
Hemphill v. Hemphill (99 N. Car. 442),
52.
Hemphill's Appeal (18 Pa. St. 303), 948,
1202, 1209, 1212, 1213, 1253.
Hempstead v. Hempstead (2 Wend.
109), 307.
TABLE OF CASES.
CX111
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Henchman v. Attorney-General (3 Myl.
&K. 485), 965, 966.
Hendershott v. Henry (63 Iowa, 744),
706.
Henderson s. Burton (3 Ired. Eq. 259),
578.
Henderson s. Dodd (IBail. Eq. 138),
1627.
Henderson v. Downing (24 Miss. 106),
1367.
Hendersons. Galloway (8 Humph. 692),
1103.
Henderson s. Grammar (66 Cal. 332),
. 227.
Hendersons. Griffin (5 Pet. 151), 912.
Henderson s. Henderson (113 N. T. 1),
614.
Henderson s. Hill (9 Lea, 25), 1267.
Henderson s. Hoke (1 Dev. & Bat. Eq.
119), 308,1722.
Henderson s. Hunter (59 Pa. St. 335),
749,789,930.
Henderson s. Pierce (108 Ind. 462), 1361.
Henderson s. Rothschild (L. E. 33 Ch.
D. 744), 1317.
Henderson s. Sherman (47 Mich. 267),
1692.
Henderson v. Vaulx (10 Terg. 30), 1437.
Henderson s. Winchester (31 Miss.
290), 860.
Henderson s. Zachary (80 Ga. 98;4 S.
E Rep. 883), 1644.
Henderson's Appeal (31 Pa. St. 502),
1360.
Hendricks v. Isaacs (117 N. T. 411; 15
Am. St. Rep. 524), 709.
Hendricks s. Robinson (2 Johns. Ch.
307) , 1380.
Hendrixs. Nunn (46 Tex. 141), 377, 518.
Hen ike s. Heineman (90 Wis. 478; 63 N.
W. Rep. 1047), 1607.
Hennequins. Naylor (24 N. Y. 139), 492,
495.
Hennershotz's Estate (16 Pa. St. 435),
260.
Hennessey s. Bray (33 Beav. 96), 603,
876, 1223, 1229.
Hennessey v. Walsh (65 N. H. 515), 309.
Hennessey s. Western Bank (6 W. & S.
300), 1362.
Henninger v. Boyer (10 Pa. Co. Ct. 506),
180.
Henriod v. Newsbaumer (69 Mo. 96), 286,
327.
Henriques s. Bensusan (20 W. R. 350) ,
1317.
Henrys. Blackburn (32 Ark. 445), 704.
Henrys. Doctor (9 Ohio, 49), 902.
Henry s. Milham (1 Green, 266), 1049.
Henry s. Morgan (2 Binn. 497), 444, 1266.
Henry s. Raiman (25 Pa. St. 354), 419,
420, 421, 423.
Henrys. Strong (L. R. 39 Oh. D. 443),
1271.
Henry County s- Winnebago, etc. Co.
(52111. 454), 1625.
Henry Watson Soc. s. Johnson (58 Md.
139), 753.
Hen9chels. Manners (120 111. 660), 231,
500, 518.
Henshall s. Feredy (29 L. T. (N. S.) 46),
277, 278.
Henson s. Eennard (3 Strob. Eq. 371),
152.
Henson v. Westscott (82 111. 224), 674.
Henson v. Wright (88 Tenn. 601), 920,
1561, 1638, 1641.
Henvell v. Whittaker (3 Russ. 343), 1333.
Hepburn v. Hepburn (2 Bradf. 74), 1025.
Hepburn's Appeal (65 Pa. St. 468), 665,
671, 672.
Herbert, Ex parte (13 Ve9. 188), 976.
Herbert s. Hanrick (16 Ala. 681) , 1109.
Herbert v. Herbert (57 How. Pr. 333),
989, 1025.
Herbert s. Schofield (9 N. J. Eq. 492),
576.
Herbert s. Stevenson (3 Dem. 236), 863.
Herbert s. Webster (L. R. 15 Ch. D. 610),
668.
Herbert's Case (3 P. Wms. 116), 827.
Hereford v. Adams (7 Ves. 324), 735.
Heriot's Hospital v Ross (12 CI. & Fin.
507; 5 Bell App. Cas. 37), 788.
Hermstead's Appeal (60 Pa. St. 423),
1692.
Hern s. Nichols (1 Salk. 289), 484.
Herndon s. Pratt (6 Jones Eq. 326), 1636.
Heme v. Meers (1 Vern. 465), 480.
Herons. Heron (2 Atk. 160), 218, 282.
Heron v. Heron (Finch Pr. Ch. 163;
Preem. 248), 358.
Heron s. Newton (9 Mod. 11), 245.
Herring v. Wickham (29 Gratt. 628),
653.
Herring's Case (36 N. J. Eq. 359), 1176.
Hersey s. Turbot (3 Casey, 418), 452.
Hertell s. Bogert (9 Paige, 57), 455, 1655.
Herzshizers. Florence (39 Ohio St. 516),
709.
Hesse s. Briant (6 De G. , M. & J. 623) ,
419.
Hesss. Singler (114 Mass. 56), 107, 120,
253.
Hess s. Voss (52 111. 481), 206, 423.
Hesketh v. Murphy (35 K. J. Eq. 23),
735, 749, 763.
Hess' Appeal (112 Pa. St. 168), 75.
Hester v. Hunnicutt (104 Ala. 282; 16
So. Rep. 162), 673.
CX1V
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages : Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Hester v. Wilkinson (6 Humph. 216; 44
Am. Deo. 303), 955, 987, 1144, 1175, 1222.
Heth v. Richmond R. Co. (4 Gratt. 482;
50 Am. Deo. 88), 988.
Hetzel v. Barber (6 Hun, 540), 1036.
Hetzel v. Hetzel (69 N. Y. 1), 1012.
Heu=>er v. Harris (42 111. 425), 747, 756,
759, 760.
Heustis v. Kennedy (23111. App. 42),
688.
Heustis v. Rivers (103 Mass. 398), 517.
Heveningham v. Heveningham (2
Vern. 355), 1528.
Hewes v. Dehon (3 Gray, 205), 1145, 1147,
1322, 1324, 1325.
Hewett v. Hewell (2 Eden, 332), 166, 625,
641.
Hewitt, In re (94 Oal. 376; 29 Pac. Rep.
775), 814.
Hewitt v. Phelps (105 U. S. 393), 990,
1031.
Hewitt v. Towashend (31 Md. 336; 100
Am. Dec. 63), 987.
Hewitt v. Wright (IBro. Ch. 503), 299,
301.
Hewlett v. Cutler (137 Mass. 285), 1369.
Hext v. Porcher (1 Strobh. Bq. 170),
1400.
Hexter v. Loughrey (6111. App. 362),
1406.
Heyer v. Burger (Hoff. Ch. 1), 724, 726.
Heyer v. Deaves (2 Johns. Ch. 154),
996, 1005, 1243.
Heyman v. European, etc. Co. (L. R. 7
Eq. 154), 494.
Heysham v. Heysham (1 Cox, 179), 836.
Heyward v. Cuthbert (4 Desaus. 445),
1561, 1563.
Heywood v. Waring (4 Camp. 291), 566.
Hibbard v. Lamb (Amb. 309), 900, 1016.
Hibbert v. Cooke (1 S. &S. 552), 607,
1026, 1154, 1434, 1435.
Hibbert v. Hibbert (3 Meriv. 681), 1058.
Hibb's Estate (143 Pa. St. 217), 1296.
Hickey v. Behrens (75 Tex. 488), 1482.
Hickey v. Burt (7 Taunt. 48), 961.
Hickey v. Thompson (52 Ark. 234), 688.
Hickley's Estate (58 Cal. 457), 750.
Hickman^. Messenger (49 Pa. St. 465),
1367.
Hickman v. Stewart (69 Tex. 255), 1178.
Hicknkji. Scribner (3 Johns. Cas. 311),
1729.
Hickok v. Wood (41 Fed. Rep. 19), 1587.
Hicks v. Chapman (10 Allen, 463), 827.
Hicks v. Hicks (3 Atk. 274), 1255.
Hicks v. Lovell (64 Cal. 20; 49 Am. Rep.
679), 191.
Hlcksonu. Fitzgerald (IMoll. 14), 888.
Hidden v. Hidden (103 Mass. 56), 1169.
Hidden 0. Jordan (21 Cal. 99), 231, 500,
518, 1152.
Hiern v. Mill (13 Ves. 120), 455.
HIgbee v. Higbee (123 Mo. 287; 27 S. W.
Rep. 619), 343.
Higdon v. Higdon (57 Miss. 264), 352.
Higgenbottom v. Peyton (3Rich.Eq.
398), 73, 75, 1362.
Higginbotham v. Hohn (19 Ves. 83),
1309.
Higgins v. Curtiss (82 111. 28), 1184, 1185.
Higgins*;. Higgins(14Abb. N. Cas. 13),
349.
Higgins v. Kendall (73Ind. 522), 575.
Higgins v. Johnson (20 Tex. 389), 348.
Higgins v. Whitson (20 Barb. 141),
1402.
Higgins' Estate, In re (15 Mont. 474;
39 Pac. Rep. 606), 1020.
High v. Batte (lOYerg. 335), 327, 441,
588.
High v. Worley (55 Ala. 196), 304.
Highberger v. Stiffler (21 Md. 338), 292.
Hileman v. Bonslaugh (1 Harris, 351),
116.
Hill v. Anderson (5 S. & M. 216), 27.
Hill v. Bank (45 N. H. 300), 339, 369.
Hill v. Barge (12 Ala. 687), 424.
Hill v. Bishop of London (1 Atk. 620),
241,243.
Hill v. Chapman (2 Bro. Ch. 231), 836.
Hill v. Coke (L. R. 6 H. L. Cas. 265),
636.
Hill v. Cook (1 V. & B. 173), 243.
Hill v. Cornwall's, etc. (26 S. W. Rep.
640), 160.
Hill«. Den (54 Cal. 6), 52, 1118.
Hill v. Eldred (49 Cal. 398), 603.
Hill, Exparte (32 L. J. Ch. 164), 412.
Hill v. Fogg (41 Mo. 562) . 597.
Hill v. Frazier (22 Pa. St. 320) , 1184.
Hill f. Gray (1 Starkie, 352) , 481.
Hill v. Hill (2 Hayw. 298), 144.
Hill v. Hill (3 V. & B. 183) , 353, 839.
Hlllv. Josselyn (13 Sm. & M. 597), 1122,
1130.
Hill v. Myers (43 Pa. St. 170) , 198.
Hill v. Paul (8 CI. & Fin. 295), 38.
Hill v. Pine River Bank (45 N. H. 300),
708.
HillK. Pollard (132 Ind. 588; 32 N. E.
Rep. 564), 324.
Hill v. Pritchard (Kay, 394), 1080.
Hill v. Eeardon (2 Russ. 608), 34.
Hill v. Simpson (7 Ves. 152), 455,456,
1173.
Hill v. Spencer (Amb. 641), 560.
Hill v. Spurgeon (L. R. 29 Ch. D. 348),
1669.1671.
Hill n. State (2 Ark. 604), 980.
TABLE OF CASES.
cxv
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Hillary v. Waller (12 Ves. 239), 980, 981,
983, 985.
Hiller v. Ellis (72 Miss. 701), 1372.
Hillman v. Westwood (L. R. 3 Eq. 142),
900.
Hill's Trusts, In re (L. E. 16 Ch. D. 173),
813.
Hills v. Downton (5 Ves. 564), 622.
Hillyar.l v. Miller (10 Pa. St. 326), 749,
821.
Hillyer v. Bennett (3 Edw. Ch. 544), 27.
Hilton v. Kenworthy (3 East, 653), 928.
Hinchclifle v. Hinchcllfle (3 Ves. 516),
1628.
Hinchcllfle t>. Westwood (2 De G. &
Sm. 216), 638.
Hinder. Blake (3 Beav. 234), 1328, 1571.
Hinde v. Vattier (1 McLean 110), 453,
460.
Hindleyv. Westmeath (6B. & Cr. 200),
686, 721.
Hindman v. Dill (11 Ala. 689), 1368.
Hindmarsh v. Southgate (3 Buss. 324),
2*7, 1223.
Hindson v. Wetherill (5 De G., M. & G.
301), 296,396, 424,614.
Hinckley v. Hinckley (79 Me. 320; 9 Atl.
Bep. 897), 1727, 1744.
Hinckley v. McLarens (1 Myl. & K. 27),
632, 642.
Hinckley v. Williams (1 Cush. 490; 48
Am. Dec. 642) , 950, 1139.
Hinckley's Estate (58 Cal. 457), 756.
Hine v. Stephens (3? Conn. 504), 1048.
Hinesc. Light (83 Iowa, 738; 49 N. W.
Bep. 105), 188.
Hiness). Perkins (2 Heisk. 395), 585.
Hines». Spruille (2 Dev. & B. Eq. 93),
1320.
Hlnes v. State (10 Sm. & M. 529), 847.
Hinklea. Wanzer (17 How. 353), 33, 334.
Hinkson v. Williams (41 N. J. L. 35), 660,
709.
Hinson v. Williamson (74 Ala. 180), 1236.
Hinton v. Fox (3 Litt. 381), 462.
Hinton v. Hinton (2 Ves. 633), 976.
Hinvesa Hinves (3 Hare, 609), 1177.
Hinxman v. Paynder (5 Sim. 546), 128.
Hlntze v. Stingel (1 Md. Ch. 283), 1110.
Hippie v. Bice (28 Pa. St. 406), 565.
Hirsh v. Auer (146 N. Y. 13; 40 N. E.
Bep. 397), 74.
Hiscock v. Norton (42 Mich. 320), 570,
676, 590.
Hitch v. Leworthy (2 Hare, 205), 1005,
1244.
Hitch v. Stonebreaker (125 Mo. 128; 28
Mo. App. 443), 874.
Hitchcock v. Bank of U. S. (7 Ala. 386),
856.
Hitchcock v. Clendenen (12 Beav. 534),
682.
Hitchcock v. Eiely (41 Conn. 611), 706.
Hitner's Appeal (54 Pa. St. 110), 726.
Hitz v. Nat. Life Ins. Co. (3 Me-
Arthur, 170), 1498.
Hix v. Gosling (1 Lea, 560), 665.
Hoag^. Hoag (35 N. T. 469), 1393, 1749,
1750.
Hoare v. Harris (11 111. 24), 1107, 1241.
Hoare v. Osborne (L. E. 1 Eq. 585), 731,
765.
Hoare ». Peck (6 Sim. 51), 1536.
Hoare's Case (20 Beav. 226), 993, 1032,
1033.
Hoare's Trusts (4 Gifl. 254), 104.
Hobartu. Andrews (21 Pick. 526), 1724.
Hobart v. Suffolk (2 Vern. 644) , 242, 261.
Hobbs v. Harlan (10 Lea, 268; 43 Am.
Bep. 309), 830.
Hobbs v. Hull (1 Cox, 445), 721, 722.
Hobbs v. Norton (1 Vern. 136), 4-36.
Hobba v. Wayet (L. E. 36 Ch. D. 256),
1701.
Hobday v. Peters (28 Beav. 140; 6 Jur.
(N. S.) 794), 425, 1592.
Hobridge v. Gillespie (2 Johns. Ch.
30), 329.
Hobson v. Bell (2 Beav. 17), 1101.
Hochstadteru. Hays (11 Colo. 118), 705.
Hoekenberry v. Carlisle (5 W. & S. 348),
419.
Hocker v. Gentry (3 Met. 463), 304.
Huckley v. Mawbey (1 Ves. Jr. 143),
624.
Hodgdon v. Davis (6 Dak. 21) , 1450, 1473.
Hodge v. Hawkins (1 Dev. & Bat. 564),
1219, 1689.
Hodges. Twitehell (33 Minn. 389), 398.
Hodgensu. Hodgens (4 CI. & F. 323; 11
Bllgh (N. S.), 62), 682, 683, 684.
Hodges v. Blagrave (18 Beav. 404),
1242.
Hodges v. Cobb (8 Rich. 50), 688.
Hodgf s v Gill (9 Baxt. 378), 1460.
Hodges v. Hodges (1 Esp. 441), G85.
Hodges v. Howard (5 R. 1. 149), 231, 500,
618, 525.
Hodges, In re (L. B. 7 Ch. D. 754), 1119.
Hodges, In re (63 Vt. 661* 22 Atl. Rep.
725), 1180.
Hodges v. McDufl (76 Mich. 303), 1690.
Hodges v. New England Screw Co. (1
R. I. 321), 405.
Hodges v. Tenn., etc. Ins. Co. (8 N. T.
416), 219.
Hodge's Estate, In re (66 Vt. 70; 28 Atl.
Rep. 663) , 1203.
Hodgkinson v. Hodgkinson (L. R.
(1895) 2 Ch. 190) , 1677.
cxvi
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Hodgson v. Barrett (33 Ohio St. 63),
1408.
Hodgson v. Bibby (32 Beav. 221), 1596.
Hodgson v. Hodgson (2 Keen, 704), 661.
Hodgson v. Mason (8 Ind. 121), 366.
Hodgson v. Williamson (L. R. 15 Ch.
D. 87), 698.
Hodgson's Settlement, In re (9 Hare,
117), 875, 908.
Hodkinson v. Quinon (1 Johns. & H.
303), 1036.
Hodle v. Healey (lVes. &B. 539), 1536.
Hodson v. Cash (1 Jur. (N. S.) 864),
1679.
Hoel v. Coursey (26 Miss. 511), 230.
Hoes v. Van Hoesen (1 Comst. 122),
1352.
Hoey v. Kenney (25 Barb. 396), 621, 624.
Hoffen, Estate of (70 Wis. 622), 751.
Hoffmann v. Cumberland, etc. Co. (16
Md. 507), 386, 390, 393.
Hoffman v. Mackall (5 Ohio St. 124),
1441.
Hoffmann. Treadwell (39 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 188), 699.
Hogan». Strayhom (65 N. Car. 285), 160,
238.
Hogeu. Brewer (3 Gill & J. 153), 1322,
1324.
Hoge v. Hoge (1 Watts, 163; 26 Am. Dec.
52), 218, 416, 496, 500, 507, 508, 513, 517,
618.
Hogeboom u. Robertson (41 Neb. 795;
60 N. W. Rep. 2), 342, 360.
Hoggti. Dower (36 W. Va. 200; 14 S.E.
Rep. 995), 711.
Hogg v. Willkins (1 Grant Cas. 67), 503.
Hoghton v. Hoghton (15 Beav. 278),
163, 218, 286, 294.
Hoit v. Russell (56 N. H. 559), 1453, 1492,
1493.
Hoittti. Webb (36 N. H. 158), 390, 391,
401, 1184.
Hokraeder v. Lieby (4 Ohio St. 602), 226.
Holbrooke. Bliss (9 Allen, 69), 961.
Holbrook v. Brooks (33 Conn. 347), 827.
Holbrook v. Connor (60 Me. 578), 474.
Holbrook v. Finney (4 Mass. 568), 1066.
Holbrook v. Harrington (16 Gray, 102),
853, 857.
Holcomb v. Coryell (1 Beav. 289), 905.
Holcomb v. Holcomb (3 Stockt. 281),
400, 401, 1038, 1123.
Holcombe v. Holcombe (13 N. J. Eq.
415), 1058,1673, 1701.
Holden v. Fletcher (6 Cush. 235), 1535.
Holden, In re (126 N. Y. 589; 27 N. E.
Rep. 1063) , S90.
Holden, Inre (L. R. 20 Q. B. Div. 43),
1675.
Holden v. New York, etc. Bank (72 N.
Y. 286), 204,388,1636.
Holden v. Strickland (116 N. Car. 185;
21 S. E. Rep. 684), 156.
Holden v. Webber (29 Beav. 117), 413.
Holder v. Durbin (11 Beav. 694), 865, 907.
Holders. Nunnelly (2 Coldw. 288), 232.
Holdrldge v. Gillespie (2 Johns. Ch. 30),
398, 1164.
Holdship v. Patterson (7 Watts, 547),
228, 921, 1269, 1290, 1295, 1640, 1644.
Holdsworth v. Davenport (L. R. 3 Ch.
D. 185), 813.
Holdsworth j). Goose (29 Beav. Ill),
1079.
Holdsworth v. Shannon (113 Mo. 508),
1480, 1507.
Hoiladay v. Davis (5 Ore. 40), 1736.
Holland v. Alcock (108 N. Y. 312), 85, 731,
733, 751,752,753, 807.
Holland v. Anderson (38 Mo. 55), 477.
Holland v. Farthing (2 Tex. Civ. App.
155; 2S. W. Rep. 67), 47.
Holland v. Holland (L. R. 4 Ch. App.
449), 881, 1225.
Holland v. Peck (2 Ired. Eq. 255), 753.
Holland v. San Francisco (7 Oal. 361),
1217.
Holland-Keene v. Potter (3 Levinze,
412), 545.
Holley v. Adams (16 Vt. 206), 147.
Holley v. Huntington (21 Minn. 325),
707.
Holley v.S.Q. (4 Edw. Ch. 284) , 1706.
Holliday v. Coleman (2 Munf. 162),
1437.
Hollingshead v. Simms (51 Cal. 158), 377.
Hollisv. Drew. Theolog. Sem. (96 N.
Y. 166), 750,752.
Holiisv. Francois (6 Tex. 196; 51 Am.
Dec. 760), 711.
Hollis-i). Hollis (1 Md. Ch. 479), 308.
Hollis v. Hollis (84 Me. 96), 1481.
Hollis v. Seminary (95 N. Y. 166), 815.
Hollis' Case (2 Ventr. 345), 1536.
Hollister v. Loud (2 Mich. 309), 1385.
Holloway v. Headington (8 Sim. 324),
147, 148.
Holloway v. Wlllard (1 Madd. 414), 98,
99.
Holl's Appeal (133 Pa. St. 351), 921.
Holman v. Loynes (4 De G., M. &G. 270),
421.
Holman v. Patterson (29 Ark. 357),
574.
Holman's Appeal (24 Pa. St. 174), 1322.
Holmes v. Coates (152 Mass. 226; 34 N.
E. Rep. 190), 736, 748, 783.
Holmes v. Oogbill (7 Ves. 606), 1009, 1010.
Holmes v. Dring (2 Cox, 3), 1102.
TABLE OF CASES.
CXVU
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Holmes ». Gllman (138 N. Y. 369), 1581,
1607, 1609.
Holmes v. Godson (8 De G., M. & G.
152), 109.
Holmes v. Holmes (28 Vt. 765), 680.
Holmes v. Lysaght (2 Bro. P. C. 261),
1042, 1043.
Holmes v. Mead (52 N. Y. 332), 750, 752.
Holmes v. Penney (3 Kay & J. 90), 1301.
Holmes v. Turners Falls Co. (150 Mass.
535), 1451, 1486, 1503.
Holmes' Appeal (77 Pa. St. 50), 492.
Holroyd v. Marshall (2 Giff. 382), 34.
Holt v. Agnew (67 Ala. 368), 426.
Holt v. Bancroft (30 Ala. 195), 1364.
Holt v. Holt (1 Ch. Cas. 190) , 384.
Holthaus v. Hornbostle (60 Mo. 439),
651, 686.
Holthausen, .Kr parte (L. R. 9 Ch. 722),
600.
Homeopathic Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Marshall (32 N. J. Eq. 103), 664,708.
Homtru. Fish (1 Pick. 435), 470.
Homer v. Homer (107 Mass. 82), 532.
Homert. Perkins (124 Mass. 431), 489.
Homer v. Shelton (2Met. 194), 1438.
Hon v. Hon (70 Ind. 135), 73, 372, 373, 503.
Hones. Medcraft (IBro. Ch. 261), 1357.
Hone v. Van Schaick (20 Wend. 564; 7
Paige, 221), 1522.
Honors. Honor (1 P. Wms. 123), 103.
Honored. Bakewell (6 B. Mon. 67; 43
Am. Dec. 147), 580.
Honore v. Hutchings (8 Bush, 687), 197,
320.
Hooberry v. Harding (10 Lea, 392), 1294.
Hood v. Adams (124 Mass. 481) , 1506.
Hood v. Fahnestock (1 Pa. St. 470), 327,
432, 434.
Hood v. Fahnestock (8 Watts, 489), 443,
444.
Hood v. Haden (82 Va. 588), 858.
Huod v. Oglander (34 Beav. 513), 1638.
Hood v. Phillips (3 Beav. 513), 978.
Hood-Barrsa. Cathcart (1894, 2 Q. B.
559), 667.
Hoodless v. Reid (112 Ind. 105), 1473,
1475, 1498, 1500.
Hooker v. Axford (33 Mich. 454), 508, 511,
514.
Hooley v. Greve (9 Abb. N. Cas. 8; 9
Daly, 104), 1569.
Hooper v. Armstrong (69 Ala. 343), 573.
Hooper v. Baillie (118 N. Y. 413), 1416.
Hooper v. Bradbury (133 Mass. 303),
1C8, 128, 130.
Hooper v. Dundas (10 Barr, 75), 1041.
Hooper, Ex parte (lMeriv. 7), 600.
Hooper v. Eyles (2 Vern. 480), 358.
Hooper v. Goodwin (18 Ves. 156), 259.
Hooper v. Holmes (11 N. J. Eq. 122), 73,
75.
Hooper v. Hooper (9 Cush. 122) , 820.
Hooper v. Eoyster (1 Munf. 119), 839,
1253.
Hooper v. Scheiner (23 How. 235), 949.
Hoot v. Sorrell (11 Ala. 386), 715.
Hooton v. Ransom (6 Mo. App. 19),
708.
Hooven v. Burdelts (153 111. 672), 1408,
1422.
Hoover v. Johnson (47 Minn. 434), 1513.
Hope v. Carnegie (L. R. 1 Ch. App. 320),
35.
Hope «.Hope (4 De G., M. & G. 328).
826.
Hope D.Hope (8 De G., M. &, G. 731),
725.
Hope v. Johnson (2 Yerg. 123), 928, 940.
Hopgood v. Parkin (L. R. 11 Eq. 74),
1245, 1257.
Hopkins v. Carey (23 Miss. 58), 346.
Hopkins v. Gallatin Co. (4 Humph.
403), 1411.
Hopkins v. Garrard (6 B. Mon. 67), 596.
Hopkins v. Glunt (111 Pa. St. 287), 118.
Hopkins v. Granger (52 111. 502), 1718.
Hopkins v. Hopkins (4Strobh. Eq. 207),
1537.
Hopkins v. Hopkins (1 Atk. 591), 850,
929.
Hopkins v. Hopkins (Cas. t. Talb. 44),
242.
Hopkins, In re (L. R. 19 Ch. D. 61),
1576.
Hopkins v. Miller (92 Ala. 513), 573.
Hopkins v. Myall (2 Russ. & M. 86), 11.
623.
Hopkins v. Turnpike Co. (4 Humph.
403), 10.
Hopkins v. Upshur (20 Tex. 89; 70 Am.
Dec. 375), 749, 1720.
Hopkins v. Ward (6 Munf. 38), 951.
Hopkinson v. Burghley (L. R. 2 Ch.
447), 1564.
Hopkinson v. Dumas (42 N. H. 296), 308,
388, 977.
Hopkinson?;. Ellis (10 Beav. 169), 256.
Hopkirku. Randolph (2 Brock. 132), 99.
Hopneru. Appleby (5Maion, 71), 565.
Hopper v. Conyers (L. R. 2 Eq. 549),
1632.
Hoppers. Hopper (79 Md. 400; 29 Atl.
Rep. 611), 1186.
Hoppes v. Cheek (21 Ark. 685), 1110.
Horde v. Suffolk (2 Myl. & K. 59), 1001.
Horderw. Horder (24 Kan. 392; 33 Am.
Rep. 167), 722.
Horlocki;. Horlock (2 De G., M. & G.
644), 668.
CXV111
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages- Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Horn v. Jones (28 Cal. 194), 452.
Horn v. Keteltas (42 How. Pr. 152), 71.
Horn v. Lockhart (17 Wall. 570), 1215.
Hornby v. Matcham (16 Sim. 325), 558.
Horndorf v. Horndorf (13 Misc. Rep.
343; 36 N. E. Kep. 869), 168, 612.
Home v. Barton (G. Coop. 257), 113.
Home v. Barton (19 Ves. 398) , 90, 102.
Home v. Lyeth (4 H. & J. 434), 93, 116.
Horner v. Graves (7 Bing. 754; 20 E. 0.
L. 310) , 810.
Horner v. Swann (1 T. & E. 430), 1067.
Hornesby v. Finch (2 Ves. Jr. 78), 244.
Hornsby v. Lee (2 Madd. 16), 680.
Horry v. Glovers (2 Hill Eq. 615), 1427.
Horsey v. Hough (38 Md. 130), 1110, 1498.
Horsfall D.Thomas (1 H. & C. 90), 488.
Horton a. Brocklehorst (29Beav. 504),
1564.
Horton v. Handvil (41 N. J. Eq. 57), 492.
Horton v. McCoy (47 N. Y. 27), 827, 828,
830.
Horton v. Smith (8 Ala. 73), 435.
Horton v. Smith (4 Kay & J. 630), 978.
Horwitz v. Norris (49 Pa. St. 213), 111.
Horwood v. West (1 Sim. & St. 387), 128.
Hosacka. Rogers (9 Paige, 463), 1667,
1663, 1678, 1687.
Hosea v. Jacobs (98 Mass. 65), 748, 763.
Host ord v. Merwin (5 Barb. 51) , 153, 321.
Hosie, In re (7 Nat. Bk. Beg. 601), 1630.
Hosklnst;. Hoskins (Pr. Oh. 263), 246.
Hosklnsv. Wall (77 N. Car. 249), 578.
Hosmer v. Campbell (98 111. 572), 1505.
Hosmer». Sargent (8 Allen, 97), 1488,
1490.
Hostetteru. Hollinger (117 Pa. St. 606),
1535.
Hotchkissp. Third Nat. Bank (127 N.
Y. 329), 495.
Hotchkiss v. Elting (36 Barb. 38) , 618.
Hotchkys, In re (L. R. 32 Ch. D. 408),
1154.
Hotham's Trusts, In re (L. R. 12 Eq. 76)
1118, 1132, 1154.
Hotopv. Neidiz (17 Abb. Pr. 332), 1364.
Hottel v. Mason (16 Colo. 43), 1565.
Houck v. Houck (5 Barr. 273), 1037.
Hough v. Harvty (71 111. 72), 1690, 1711.
Hough, In re (4De. G. &Sm. 371), 930.
Hough v. Richardson (3 Story, 659), 465,
472, 483, 489.
Houghtaling v. Hills (59 Iowa, 289), 495.
Houghton v. Davis (23 Me. 28), 1331.
Houghton v. Davenport (74 Me. 590),
533.
Houghton, Ex parte (17 Ves. 251), 307,
369.
Houghton v. Hapgood (13 Pick. 154),
9:4.
Houghton v. Koenig (18C. B. 235), 972.
Houldsworth v. Glasgow Bank (5 App.
Cas. 817), 476, 484.
House v. Harden (52 Miss. 874), 721.
House v. McCormkk (57 N. Y. 310), 252.
House v. Way (12 Jur. 959), 1168.
Household, In re (L. R. 27 Ch. D. 553),
1154.
Housel v. Cremer (13 Neb. 298), 1408.
Houser v. Shore (3 Mason, 393), 1350.
Houston v. Brian (78 Ga. 181; 1 8. E.
Rep. 252), 1728.
Houston v. Dickson (66 Tex. 79), 577.
Houston v. Embry (1 Sneed, 480), 656.
Houston v. Farris (93 Ala. 588), 145.
Houston «. Nowland (7 Gill & J. 480),
1376.
Houston Nat. Bank v. Ackerman (70
Tex. 315), 570.
Hovenden v. Annesley (2 Sch. & Let.
630), 462, 467, 1536, 1540.
Hoveyu. Blakeman (4 Ves. 608), 1127,
1235.
Hovey v. Blanchard (13 N. H. 145), 443.
Hovey v. Hobson (53 Me. 451), 1314.
How v. Waldron (98 Mass. 281) , 111.
Howard v. Aiken (3 McCord, 467), 1537.
Howard v. Am. Peace Soc. (49 Me. 288),
748, 763, 776, 855, 885.
Howard v. Ames (3 Met. 308), 1491.
Howard ». Bryant (9 Gray, 239), 680.
Howard v. Carpenter (11 Md. 202), 622.
Howard v. Carusi (109 U. S. 725), 106, 108.
Howards. Crawford (15 Ga. 423), 818.
Howards. Davis (6 Tex. 174), 907,1494.
Howard v. Digby (2 CI. & F. 634; 8
Bligh (N. S.), 224), 657, 717, 718.
Howard v. Fay (138 Mass. 104), 1736,
1738.
Howard v. F. I. Church of Balto. (18
Md. 451), 556.
Howard©. Fulton (79 Tex. 231; 14 S. W.
Rep. 1061), 1482.
Howard v. Gould (28 Vt. 523; 67 Am.
Dec. 728), 492,494.
Howard v. Henderson (18 S. Car. 184),
912.
Howard v. Howard (52 Kan. 469), 10.
Howard v. Jemmett (S Burr. 1368), 972.
Howard v. Moffatt (2 Johns. Ch. 206),
683.
Howard v. Papera (1 Madd. 86), 1576.
Howard v. Patterson (72 Me. 57), 1566.
Howard v. Rhodes (IKeen, 581), 897,
904, 974.
Howard v. Sav. Bank (40 Vt. 597), 152.
Howards. Seattle Nat. Bank (10 Wash.
St. 280; 38 Pae. Rep. 1040; 39 Pac.
Rep. 100), 225.
Howard v. Slmpkins (70 Ga. 322), 705.
TABLE OF CASES.
CX1X
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Howard v. Singleton (94 Ky. 336; 22 S.
W. Eep. 337), 831.
Howard v. Thornton (50 Mo. 291), 996,
1005, 1033,1055,1243.
Howard Fire Ins. Co. v. Chase (5 Wall.
509), 1021, 1157.
Howard Ins. Co. v. Halsey (4Seld.271),
443.
Howarth, In re (L. R. 8 Ch. 415), 831.
Howarth v. Mills (L. B. 2 Eq. 3S9), 42.
Howarth, In re (L. E. 8 Ch. App. 415),
988.
Howathc. Dowell (6 Jar. (N. sT) 1360),
111.
Howbert v. Heyl (47 Kan. 58; 27 Pac.
Eep. 116), 831.
Howden v. Rogers (IV. &B. 133), 842.
Howe v. Chesley (56 Vt. 7-27), 711.
Howe v. Dartmouth (2 Lead. Cas. Eq.
262; 7 Ves. 137), 1165, 1175.
Howo v. Harding (76 Tex. 17; 18 Am.
St. Rep. 17), 577.
Howe v. Howe (1 Vern. 415), 307.
Howe, In re (1 Paige, 214) , 19, 20, 1648.
Howe v. Sanlord Fork & T. Co. (44 Fed.
Rep. 231), 411.
Howe v. Stortz (27 W. Va. 555), 711.
Howe v. Van Schaick (20 Wend. 564),
616.
Howe v. Wildes (34 Me. 566), 706.
Howe v. Wilson (91 Mo. 45; 60 Am. Rep.
226), 748.
Howell v. Baker (4 Johns. Ch. 120), 206,
413,417,423, 1171.
Howell v. Howell (3 Ired. 522), 1437.
Howell v. Howell (15 Wis. 55)', 1533.
Howell v. Howell (15 N. J. Eq. 75), 308.
Howell v. Moores (127 111. 67), 1723.
Howell v. Pool (92 N. Car. 450), 1490.
Howell v. Price (1 P. Wms. 291), 1324.
Howell v. Ransom (11 Paige, 538), 419.
Howell v. Silving (1 McCarter, 84), 401.
Hower v. Geesaman (12 S. & R. 251),
956, 1266.
Howittu. Blodgett (61 Wis. 376), 1396.
Howland, In re (2 Nat. Bk. Reg. 114),
699.
Howland v. Shurtlefl (2 Met. 26), 981.
Howse v. Chapman (4 Ves. 642), 737.
Hoxie v. Carr (1 Sumn. 174), 185, 307,
324,325,357,598,1729. ,
Hoxie v. Hoxie (7 Paige, 187), 118, 180.
Hoyt v. Jaques (129 Mass. 286), 1073.
Hoyt v. Latham (143 U. S. 553; 12 S. Ct.
Eep. 568), ,1179.
Hoyt». Pawtucket Sav. Inst. (110 111.
399), 1507.
Hoyt v. Sheldon (3Bosw. 267), 453.
Hoyti>. Smith (28 Conn. 471), 1740.
Hoyt v. Sprague (103 0. S. 613), 828, 847.
Hoyt v. Swift (13 Vt. 129; 37 Am. Dec.
586), 950, 1139.
Hubbard v. Burrlll (41 Wis. 365), 204,
230, 388, 435, 532, 534, 536.
Hubbard v. Fisher (25 Vt. 539), 1686,
1690, 1698, 1714.
Hubbard v. German Oath. Cong. (34
Iowa, 31), 173.
Hubbard v. Goodwin (3 Leigh, 492), 43,
257, 968.
Hubbard v. Jarrell (23 Md. 66), 1453,
1466.
Hubbard v. Lloyd (6 Cush. 522), 856.
Hubbard v. McNaughton (43 Mich.
220), 1369, 1383.
Hubbard v. Say re (17 So. Rep. 17), 660.
Hubbard v. U. S. Mortgage Co. (14 111.
App. 40), 1722.
Hubbell v. Currier (10 Allen, 333), 435.
Hubbell v. Medbury (53 N. T. 98), 386.
Hubbell v. Meigs (50 ST. T. 480), 474.
Hubbell v. Sibley (5 Lans. 51), 1476, 1497,
1506.
Huber v. Donoghue (49 N. J. Eq. 125),
1619, 1623.
Huber's Appeal (80 Pa. St. 357) , 1295.
Huckabeeti. Billingsley (16 Ala. 414; 50
Am. Dec. 183), 950, 1012, 1582.
Huckaby v. Jones (2 Hawks, 120), 256.
Hudgins v. Morrow (47 Ark. 515), 1498
Hudson v. Hudson (1 Atk. 461), 247, 593
Hudson v. Wadswortb. (8 Conn. 363),
1437.
Hudson v. Wallace (1 Rich. Eq. 1), 398.
Hudson ». White (17 E. I. 519; 23 Atl.
Eep. 57), 174, 356.
Hudnall v. Wilder (4 McCord 294; 17
Am. Dec. 744), 1627.
Enffn. Thomas (IT. B. Mon. 158), 65.
Huff v. Wright (39 Ga. 41), 705.
Hufbrauer v. Jackson (91 Ga. 298; 18
S. E. Eep. 298), 1035.
Hufnagle v. Blackburn (137 Pa. St. 633;
20 Atl. Eep. 869), 502.
Hughes v. Caldwell (11 Leigh, 342), 971.
Hughes v. Edwards (9 Wheat. 489), 28,
465.
Hughes v. Ellison (5 Mo. 463), 1415.
Hughes, Ex parte (6 Ves. 616), 382, 426,
606, 899.
Hughes v. Garth (Amb. 421), 327, 438.
Hughes v. Hall (5Munf. 431), 36.
Hughes v. Hamilton (19 W. Va. 366),
711.
Hughes v. Hatchett (55 Ala. 539), 685.
Hughes v. Hughes (87 Ala. 652), 1170.
Hughes v. Kay (20 Beav. 395), 1130, 1671.
Hughes v. Peters (1 Cold. 67), 710.
Hughes v. Science (Amb. 3C2), 826,827.
Hughes v. Stubbs (1 Hare, 478), 851.
cxx
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Hughes s. Tabb (78 Va. 313), 1649.
Hughes s. Turner (2 Myl, & K. 688), 1011.
Hughes v. Wells (9 Hare, 749; 13 Eng.
L. & Eq. 389), 17, 596, 657, 681, 697.
Hughes s. Wilson (128 Ind. 491; 26 N. E.
Rep. 50), 71.
Hughes v. Wynne (1 Myl. & K. 20), 1347.
Hughlettt s. Hughlett (5 Humph. 474),
1122, 1230.
Huguenin v. Basely (14 Ves. 273; 13 Ves.
107), 158, 163, 274, 277, 282, 426, 427, 431,
506, 511, 713, 842.
Huling v. Fenner (9 R. I. 410), 636.
Hull v. Chaffln (54 Fed. Rep. 437), 386.
Hull i). Hull (24 N. Y. 647), 1746, 1750.
Hull s. King (38 Minn. 349), 1508.
Hull v. Noble (40 Me. 459), 449.
Hull v. Putnam (152 Mass. 123; 25 N. E.
Rep. 40), 44.
Hullman v, Honcomp (5 Ohio St. 237),
750.
Hulkes s. Barrow (Taml. 264), 1159.
Hulkes, In re (35 W. R. 194), 1193.
Hulmes. Tenant (1 Bro. Ch.16; lLead.
Cas. Eq. 679), 645, 661, 697, 899.
Humane Fire Company Appeal (88 Pa.
St. 389), 749.
Humbers s. Ky. Central Lunatic
Asylum (30 S. W. Rep. 964), 1028.
Humbert v. Trinity Church (24 Wend.
587), 20, 469.
Humbertson s. Humbertson (IP. Wms.
332), 93.
Hume s. Beale (17 Wall. 78), 365, 1535,
1594.
Hume, In re (L. R. 35 Ch. D. 457), 869.
lomei. Rundell (2 S. & S. 174), 1530.
Humes s. Scruggs (4 Otto, 28), 99.
Humewells. Lane (11 Met. 163), 71.
Hummers. Schott (21 Md. 307), 576.
Humphrey s. Copeland (54 Ga. 643), 706.
Humphrey s. Morse (2 Atk. 408), 891.
Humphreys. Richards (2 Jur. (N. S.)
432), 656, 662, 715.
Humphrey v. West (40 Mich. 597), 521.
Humphreys s. Burleson (72 Ala. 1) , 403.
Humphreys s. Butler (51 Ark. 351) , 533,
570.
Hun v. Cary (82 N. T. 65; 87 Am. Rep.
646), 1113, 1134, 1198, 1230.
Hune v. Dixon (37 Ohio St. 66), 577.
Hungates. Hungate (Toth. 120), 307.
Hunnewells Lane (11 Met. 163), 73.
Hunsden s. Cheney (2 Vern . 150) , 542.
Hunt s. Bank (2 Dev. Eq. 60), 1647, 1651.
Hunts. Bass (2 Dev. Eq. 292; 24 Am.
Dec. 274), 400, 414, 1034, 1095.
Hunt s. Bateman (10 Ir. Eq. 371), 1319.
Hunts. Crawford (3 Pa. St. 426), 952,
1109, 1266.
Hunt v. Dunn (74 Ga. 124) , 449.
Hunts. Elliott (80 Ind. 245), 73.
Hunt, Ex parte (1 M., D. & De G. 139) ,
600.
Hunt s. Fowler (121 HI . 269), 735, 747, 756,
763.
Hunt v. Friedman (63 Cal. 510), 178.
Hunt s. Gontrum (80 Md. 64; 30 Atl.
Rep. 620), 1224.
Hunt s. Hamilton (9 Dana, 90), 296.
Hunts. Hunt (4DeG., F. & J. 221), 720.
Hunts.Hunt (5L. T. 778), 721, 726.
Hunt s. Hunt (14 Pick. 374), 978.
Hunt, In re (141 Mass. 515), 1200, 1202.
Hunt S.Johnson (44 N. Y. 27), 713, 714.
Hunt s. Makemson (56 Tex. 9), 578.
Hunt s. Matthews (1 Vern. 408), 548, 558,
659.
Hunt s. Moore (6 Cush. 1), 363.
Hunt v. Roberts (40 Me. 187), 231, 500,
503, 518, 525.
Hunt s. Rousmanier (8 Wheat. 174), 505,
1462.
Hunt s. Rowland (28Iowa, 349), 562.
Hunts. Suttle (42 Fed. Rep. 91), 1542.
Hunt s. Townshend (31 Md. 336; 100 Am.
Dec. 63), 954, 993, 1052, 1082, 1084,
1092.
Hunt s. White (24 Tex. 643). 1283.
Hunt's Appeal (141 Mass. 515), 1188.
Hunters. Anderson (152 Pa. St. 386),
1089.
Hunters. Atkins (3 Myl. & K. 113), 293,
418, 419, 431.
Hunters. Bilyen (30111. 246), 71.
Hunters. Carroll (64 N. H. 572), 660.
Hunsden s. Cheney (2 Vern. 150) , 496.
Hunters Lawrence (11 Gratt. Ill), 403,
455, 1655.
Hunters. Macray (Cas. t. Talb. 196),
842.
Hunter s. Nolf (71 Pa. St. 282), 556.
Hunters. Sternbridge (12 Ga. 192), 124,
130.
Hunter v. Stoneburner (92 111. 75), 1611.
Hunter s Sumrall (3 Litt. 62), 44.
Hunterdon Freeholders s. Henry (41 X.
J. Eq. 388), 1298.
Huntington s. Gilmore (14 Barb. 243),
78.
Huntley s. Denny (65 Vt. 185; 26 Atl.
Rep. 486), 180.
Huntley s. Huntley (6 Ired. Eq. 514),
724.
Huntley s. Huntley (8 Ired. Eq. 250),
596, 1538.
Hurd v. Case (32 111. 45), 1515.
Hurlbut s. Carter (21 Barb. 221), 1411.
Hurley s. Estes (6 Neb. 386), 1440, 1445.
Hur9ts. Harper (14 Hun, 283), 71.
TABLE OF CASES.
CXX1
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Hurst v. McNeill (1 Wash. C. C. 70), 912.
Hurst v. Marshall (75 Tex. 452; 13 S. W.
Eep. 33), 1648.
Hurti). Kelley (43 Mo. 238), 1444.
Hurton v. Hurton (7 T. E. 652), 652.
Hurtt v. Fisher (1 Harr. & D. 88), 1222,
1400.
Husband v. Davis (1 C. B. 645), 1124.
Husband v. Epling (81 111. 172; 25 Am.
Eep. 273), 705,706.
Husband v. Pollard (2 P. Wms. 467), 149.
Huskisson v. Bridge (4 De G. & 8m.
245), 119.
Huson v. Wallace (1 Eich. Eq. 2), 401.
Hussi*. Eice (17 S. W. Eep. 869), 706.
Hussey v. Coffin (1 Allen, 354), 1575.
Hussey, Ex parte (2 Whart. 330), 902.
Huston v. Cassidy (2 Beas. 228), 390.
Huston v. Seeley (27 Iowa, 183), 1515.
Hutcheson v. Hammon (3Bro.Ch. 128),
258.
Hutcbins v. Baldwin (7 Bosw. 236), 1040.
Hutchins v. Brooks (31 Miss. 430), 455.
Hutchins «. Colby (43 N. H. 139), 687.
Hutcbins v. Commercial Bank (91 Va.
68;20S. E. Eep. 950), 661.
Hutchins v. Dixon (11 Md. 29), 655.
Hutcbins v. George (44 N. J. Eq. 126),
749.
Hutchins v. Heywood (50 N. H. 495), 912,
913, 919, 1268, 1269.
Hutchins v. Johnson (12 Conn. 376; 30
Am. Dec. 622), 993, 1048.
Hutchins v. Van Vechten (140 N. Y. 115;
36 N. E. Eep. 446), 49.
Hutchinson v. Bacon (46 Tex. 414), 343.
Hutchinson v. Crammond (3 Bro. Ch.
128), 1044.
Hutchinson v. Hutchinson (4 Desaus.
Eq. 77), 189, 221, 333.
Hutchinson v. Hutchinson (84 Hun, 492;
32 N. T. Supl. 390), 145.
Hutchinson v. Hutchinson (13 Ir. Eq.
632) , 620, 627.
Hutchinson v. Lord (1 Wis. 286; 60 Am.
Dec. 381), 1135, 1136, 1227.
Hutchinson v. Murchie (74 Me. 187),
1409.
Hutchinson v. Tindall (2 Green Cb.
357), 47, 66,72.
Hutchinson v. Underwood (27 Tex. 255),
711.
Hutton v. Duey (3 Barr, 100), 721, 723.
Hutton v. Weems (12 Gill & J. 83), 1101.
Huxley v. Eice (40 Mich. 73), 377.
Huyler». Atwood (26 N. J. Eq. 504), 708.
Hyde v. Kitchen (69 Hun, 280; 23 N. Y.
Supl. 573), 79.
Hydev. Warren (46 Miss. 13), 1442, 1444,
1460, 1510.
Hyde v. Woods (94 U. S. 523), 1269, 1640,
1644.
Hyden v. Hyden (6 Baxt. 406), 232, 358.
Hylton v. Brow (2 Wash. 167), 607.
Hylton v. Hylton (2 Ves. Sr. 548), 286,
287,288, 289,290,1594.
Hyman v. Devereaux (63 N. Car. 624),
1036.
Hyndman v. Hyndman (19 Vt. 9), 1490,
1491.
Hynsbaw v. Morpeth Corp. (Duke
Char. Uses, 242), 743.
Hyslop v. Clarke (14 Johns. 458), 1369,
1389.
Iddings v. Bruen (4 Sandf. Cb. 223), 395,
1184.
Ide v. Clarke (5 Ohio Cir. Ct. 239), 131.
Mev. Ide (5 Mass. 500), 109.
Idle v. Cooke (1 P. Wms. 77), 940.
Iglehart v. Arminger (1 Bland, 619),
676.
Ihmsen's Appeal (43 Pa. St. 431), 1210,
1212, 1213.
Her v. Griswold (83 Iowa, 442; 49 N. W.
Eep. 1023), 523.
lies v. Martin (69 Ind. 114), 1118.
Ilgenfritz v. Ilgenfritz (116 Mo. 429; 22
S. W. Eep. 186), 150,339.
Illlg's Appeal (170 Pa. St. 500; 32 Atl.
Eep. 1097; 37 W. N. C. 211), 1308.
Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank v. First
Nat. Bank (15 Fed. Eep. 858), 1609.
1630, 1632.
Imboden v. Atkinson (23 Ark. 622),
396.
Imboden v. Hunter (23 Ark. 622; 79 Am.
Dec. 116), 1184, 1691, 1696.
Imlay v. Huntington (20 Conn. 162), 93,
664, 705.
Imperial M. Credit Assn. Case (L. E. 3
Eq. 361), 962.
Inchest). Hill (106 Mass. 575), 1748, 1753.
Incbiquin v. French (1 Cox, 1), 852, 1324.
Incledon v. Northcote (3 Atk. 433), 837,
839, 1529, 1621.
Incorporated Society v. Eicbards (1
Conn. & Laws. 58; 1 Dr. & W. 258),
742, 743, 822.
Indiana, etc. Co. v. Bates (14 Ind. 8),
223.
Indiana, I. &I. E. E. Co. v. Swannell
(54111. App. 260), 164S.
Indianapolis, etc. Ey. v. McLaughlin
(77 111. 275), 705.
Inge, Ex parte (2"R. &M. 590), 785.
Ingersoll v. Cooper (5 Blackf. 420), 958,
1053, 1266.
cxxu
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages; Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Ingersoll's Will, In re (66 Hun, 671; 14
N.T. Supl. 22), 1S5.
Ingham v. Burrell (31 Kan. 333), 1559.
Ingham v. Ingham (2 Atk. 88) , 1056.
Ingham v. Lindeman (37 Ohio St. 218),
960, 1058.
Ingle v. Culbertson (43 Iowa, 265), 1481,
1503.
Ingle v. Jones (43 Iowa, 286), 1481.
Ingle v. Partridge (32 Beav. 661), 996,
1005, 1115,1214,1571.
Ingleby , In re (L. R. 13 Ir. 326) , 895.
Ingles v. Patterson (36 Wis. 373), 201.
Inglis v. Sailors' Snug Harbor (3 Pet.
99), 22, 23, 84, 759, 770, 811, 819.
Ingraham v . Baldwin (12 Barb. 9), 12.
Ingraham v. Baldwin (9 N. T. 45), 1314.
Ingraham v. Grigg (13 Sm. & M. 22),
1411.
Ingraham v. Maine Bank (13 Mass.
20S), 1634.
Ingraham v. Meade (3 Wall. Jr. 32),
•634, 635.
Ingraham v. Postell (1 McOord Oh. 98),
840.
Ingraham v. Wheeler (6 Conn. 277),
1369.
Ingram v. Ingram (2 Atk. 88), 1089.
Ingram v. KIrkpatrick (6 Ired. Eq.
463; 61 Am. Dee. 436), 88, 160, 1376,
1689.
Ingram v. Wyatts (1 Hogg. Ecc. 388),
297.
Inhab. of Freeport v. Bartol (3Greenl.
340), 52.
Innis v. Templeton (95 Pa. St. 262; 40
Am. Eep. 643), 710.
Inre Adams (15 Abb. N". Cas. 61), 1395.
In re Adams (L. R. 27 On. D. 394), 138.
Inre Adams and Kensington (L. R. 27
Ch. D. 409), 121, 122.
Inre Albertson (113 N. Y. 434), 1425.
In re Alexander (13 Ir. Oh. 137), 1047,
1048,1343.
In re Anderson (1 LI. & G. 29), 902.
In re Andrews (1 Johns. Ch. 99), 825.
Inre Annesley (Amb. 76), 330.
In re Arnold (L. R. 37 Ch. D. 637), 803.
In re Arthur Average Assn. (L. R, 10
Ch.D. 642), 560.
In re Atkinson (2 De G., M. & G. 140),
1116.
Inre Autenreith (3 Dem. 200), 959, 1057,
1138.
In re Backes' Will (9 Misc. Rep. 504; 30
N. Y. Supl. 394), 731, 807.
In re Bailey (58 How. Pr. 446), 1421.
In re Baker (35 Hun, 272), 1692.
In re Ballou (11 R. I. 369) , 902.
In re Barber (L. R. 11 Ch. D. 442) , 680.
In re Barber (L. R. 39 Ch. D. 187), 869.
In re Baring (L. R. (1893) 1 Ch. 61), 1162.
In re Barker (6 Wend. 509), 957, 962.
In re Barney (L. R. (1892) 2 Ch. 265), 877.
In re Barrlngton's Estate (1 Johns. & H.
142), 1026.
In re Bartlett (163 Mass. 50; 40 N. E.
Rep. 899), 734, 737.
In re Bates (118 111. 524), 1408.
In re Beddoe (L. R. (1893) 1 Oh. 547),
1678.
In re Bedford Charity (5 Sim. 578), 782.
In re Bedingfleld (3 Rep. 483; (1893) 2Cu.
332), 1077.
In re Beloved Wilkes' Charity (3 Macn.
& G. 440), 1119.
In re Bennett's Estate (38 N. T. Supl.
945; 16 Misc. Rep. 199), 1562.
In re Benton (92 Iowa, 202; 60 N. W.
Rep. 614), 846.
In re Bernstein (3 Redf . 20) , 890.
Inre Blgnold's Settlement (L. R. 7 Ch.
223) , 869, 904.
In re Birch (17 Beav. 358), 1046.
/m re Birchall (L. R. 40 Ch. D.436), 888,
889.
In re Bird (L. R. 16 Eq. 203), 1128.
Inre Bird's Trusts (L. R. 3 Oh. D. 214),
104.
Inre Birkett (L. R. 9 Oh. D. 576), 735.
/rcreBlakey (33 Atl. Rep. 518), 995.
In re Blanchard (3 De G.,F. & J. 131)
869.
In re Bloomar (2 De G. & J. 88), 29.
In re Bloye (1 Macn. & G. 488), 141-0.
Jra re Blundell (30 Beav. 360), 731.
Inre Bond (L. R. 4 Ch. D. 238), 253.
In re Bostwiek (4 Johns. Ch. 100), 841,
1563.
JnreBosworth (58 L. J. Ch. 432), 1191,
1567.
Inre Boyes (L. E. 26 Ch. D. 531), 510,
513.
Inre Breed's Will (L. R. 1 Ch. D. 226),
1602.
In re Breton's Estate (L. R. 17 Oh. D.
416), 70.
In re Bridgman (1 Dr. & Sm. 164), 868.
In re Brier (L. K. 26 Ch. D. 238), 949,
1340,1341.
Inre Brogden (L. R. 38 Ch. D. 546), 1115,
In re Brown (L. R. 23 Ch. D. 889), 948.
1335, 1342.
In re Brown (L. E. io Eq. 349), 1013.
In re Brown (45 Mich. 326), 1287.
In re Brown's Trusts (L. R. 5 Eq. 88),
1117.
In re Bryan (L. R. 14 Ch. D. 516), 675.
In re Bull (45 Barb. 334), 1038.
Z«reBurke (4 Sandf. Ch. 617), 1561.
TABLE OF CASES.
CXX1U
[Tbe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753]
In re Butterfield's Will (133 N. Y. 473),
907.
In re Cake's Estate (157 Pa. St. 457; 27
Atl. Rep. 773), 1016, 1172.
In re Oallagtaan (L. R. 28 Ch. D. 186),
843.
Inre Callan's Estate (L. R. 7 Ir. 102),
1309.
In re Campbell (IDem. 415), 1706.
In re Campbell's Policies (L. R. 6 Ch.
D. 686), 653.
In re Campbell's Trusts (31 Beav. 176),
26, 1023.
In re Caplin's Will (2 Dr. & Sm. 527; 34
L. J. Ch. 578), 627, 631, 632.
In re Carlisle's Estate (34 W. N. C. 62),
816.
In re Carman (3 Redf . 46), 1700.
In re Carpenter (131 N. T. 86; 45 Hun,
552), 944, 1400.
In re Carr's Trusts (L. R. 12 Eq. 609), 674.
Inre Carter (41 W. R. 140), 1437.
Inre Chawner'3 Will (L. R. 8 Eq. 569),
1118, 1132,1446.
Inre Chertsey Market (6 Price, 261; 6
H. L. Cas. 189), 782, 788, 823, 1591.
In re Chesterfield (L. R. 24 Ch. D. 643),
1437.
Inre Christie (133 N. T. 473; 31 N. E.
Rep. 515), 907.
In re Christ's Church (L. R. 1 Ch. 126),
7S2.
Inre City of Rochester (110 N. Y. 159),
1746.
In re Clark (119 N. T. 427), 863.
In re Clark (17 Eng. L. & Eq. 599), 832.
Inre Clarke's Charities (L. R. 1 Ch. D.
497), 768.
In re Clay (29 W. R. 5), 1036.
In re Clergy Orphan Corporation (L. R.
18 Eq. 280), 1132.
In re Clergy Society (2 Kay & J. 615),
732.
In re Clissold (10 L. T. (N. S), 642), 30. .
Inre Clulow's Trusts (28 L. J. Ch. 696),
1527.
In re Coal, etc. Co. (L. R. 20 Eq. 114),
494.
In re Coates (L. R. 34 Ch. D. 370), 864,
871, 907.
In re Coe's Trusts (4 Kay & J. 199) , 1119.
In re Colley (L. R. 1 Eq. 4'J6), 1528.
In re Collins (12 N. B. R. 379), 1409.
In re Colne Co. (1 De G., F. &J. 53),
1136.
JnreCong. Ch. v. Smlthwick (1 W.N.
196), 1123, 1130.
Inre Connor (2 Jon. & La. 456), 42.
Jnre Cooke (L. R. 4 Ch. D. 454), 1013,
1080, 1088
In re Cordova (4 Redf. 66), 1553.
In re Cordwell's Estate (L. R. 20 Eq.
644), 675, 678.
In re Cornell (HON. T. 351), 1113, 1135,
1101.
Inre Cotton's Trustees (L. R. 19 Ch. D.
624), 1623.
In re Coulman (L. R. 30 Ch. D. 186),
632.
In re Courtier (L. R. 34 Ch. D. 136), 1154.
Inre Cox (L. R. 7 Ch. D. 204), 813.
In re Cowan's Estate (4 Pa. Dist. Rep.
435), 776.
In re Cozzens' Estate (2 Con. Sur. 622;
15 N. T. Supl. 771), 1022, 1237.
Inre Crawford (113 N. T. 560), 1706.
In re Crawford's Trusts (2 Drew. 230),
638.
In re Crosley (L. R. 35 Ch. D. 266), 1540.
i» re Crossman (20 How. Pr. 350), 894,
1038.
In re Cross' Estate (1 Sim. (N. S.) 260),
238.
In re Crowther (L. R. (1895) 2 Ch. 156;
13 Rep. 496), 988.
In re Croxall's Estate (162 Pa. St. 579;
29 Atl. Rep. 790)., 736.
In re Cull (L. R. 20 Eq. 561), 1680.
In re Cunningham (L. R. (1891) 2 Ch.
567), 1261.
Inre Curtiss' Estate (37 N.T. Supl. 586;
15 Misc. Rep. 545), 1688, 1707.
In re Cutler (14 Beav. 320) , 678.
In re Davis (L. R. 13 Eq. 163), 620, 999.
In re Davis' Trusts (L. R. 12 Eq. 214),
30.
In re Dawson (3 Bradf. 130), 846.
In re Dean (86 N. Y. 399), 1135.
In re De La Touche's Settlement (L. R.
10 Eq. 599), 104.
In re De Tessier (L. R. (1893) 1 Ch . 153) ,
1154.
In re Detmold (L. R. 4Ch. D. 585), 1311.
JrereDeVisine (2DeG., J. &S. 17), 349,
351.
Jnre Dick (C. A. (1891) 1 Ch. 423), 1209,
1218.
In re Dickinson (111 N. Car. 108; 15 S. E.
Rep. 1025), 831.
In re Docwra (L. R. 29 Ch. D. 693), 1262.
In re Dow (6 N. B. R. 10), 1409.
In re Drayton (4 McCord Ch . 46) , 861 .
Inre Duffy's Trust (28 Beav. 386), 680.
In re Dugan's Estate (12 Pa. Co. Ct. 591;
2 Pa. Dist. 194), 899.
Jnre Durham, etc. Soc. (L. R. 12 Eq.
516), 600.
In re Dyer (5 Paige, 534), 825.
Inre Dyke' * Estate (L. R. 7 Eq. 337),
622.
cxxiv
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Inre Eastern E. R. Co. (120 Mass. 412),
901.
In re Eastwood (48 L. T. 395; L. E. 23
Oh. D. 134), 995.
In re Edwards (L. E. 9 Co. 97), 653.
In re Ellison's Trusts (2 Jur. (N. S.)
62), 888.
In re Erskine's Trusts (1 Kay & J. 302),
678.
In re European Bank (L. E. 5 Ch. App.
358), 433.
In re Eykyn's Trusts (L. E. 6 Oh. D.
118), 339.
In re Fesmire's Estate (134 Pa. St. 67; 19
Am. St. Eep. 676), 1237.
In re Ford (32 Beav. 621), 678.
In re Forney's Estate (161 Pa. St. 209;
28 Atl. Eep. 1086; 34 W. N. 0. 301),
1279.
In re Foster's Will (15 Hun, 387), 902,
11C2, 1210.
In re Fowey's Charities (4 Beav. 225),
906.
In re Fowler (L. R. 16 Ch. D. 723), 1153,
1154.
In re Fowler (2 Euss. 449), 904.
In re Finch (Clarke, 538), b28.
In re Finch (L. E. 23 Ch. D. 657), 712.
In re Finch's Estato (26 Pitts. Leg. J.
142), 864.
In re Fish (L. E. (1893) 2 Ch. 413), 1190.
In re Fisher's Will (1 W. R. 605), 908.
In re Fitch (3 Eedf. 457), 847.
In re Fitzgerald (L. E. 37 Ch. D. 18),
1317.
In re Flamank (L. E. 40 Oh. D. 461), 658.
In re Fleetwood (L. R. 15 Ch. D. 594),
510, 513.
In re Freeman (W.N. (1887) 210), 1710.
In re French (L. R. 15 Eq. 68), 1131.
In re Frith & Osborn (L. R. 3 Ch. D.
618), 1076.
In re Fryer (3 Kay & J. 317), 1127, 1234.
In re Gaflee's Trusts (1 Macn. & G. 541),
651, 653, 667, 668, 671, 1274.
In re Gaflney's Estate (146 Pa. St. 49; 23
Atl. Eep. 163), 79.
Inre Gangwere's Estate (14 Pa. St. 419),
163.
In re Gardner (140 N. Y. 122; 35 N. E.
Rep. 439), 135.
In re Gardner's Trusts (L. R. 10 Ch. 29),
904.
In re Geek (69 L. T. (N. S.) 819), 736.
In re German Mining Co. (4 Be G., M. &
G. 19), 1701.
In re Gilmor's Estate (158 Pa. St. 186; 27
Atl. ltep. 845), 61.
Inre Glenny (L. E. 25 Ch. D. 611), 864.
In re Gordon (L. R. 6 Ch. D. 531), 888.
In re Gore's Settlement ( .'. IT. (1876) p.
79). 1602.
7n re Grabowski's Settlement (L. E. 6
Eq. 12) ,1257.
In re Graham (L. E. 10 Eq. 530), 842.
In re Graham (13 Ir. Ch. 1371, 993.
In re Grant (14 W. E. 191), 683.
In re Grant (2 Story, 312) , 14.
In re Green (2DeG., F. & J. 121), 1132,
In re Griffiths (1 How. Dec. 431), 1409.
J« re Groome's Estate (94 Cal. 69; 29
Pac. Eep. 487), 324.
In re Grove's Trusts (3 Gift. 575), 678.
In re Gunther (3 Dem. 386), 847.
In re Hadley's Trust (5 De G. & S. 67; 9
Eng. L. & Eq. 67), 867, 894.
In re Hallett's Estate (L. E. 13 Ch. D.
696), 204, 434, 634, 1625.
In re Hampden's Charities (L. E. 18 Ch.
D. 310), 760.
In re Hannis' Estate (11 Pa. Co. Ct. 94),
149.
Inre Harford's Trusts (L. R. 13 Ch. D.
135), 904.
In re Hargrove's Trusts (8 Ir. Eq. 256),
166, 625.
In re Harris (L. E. 15 Ch. D. 561), 813.
In re Harrison's Trusts (22 L. J. Ch.69),
905.
In reHattat's Trusts (18 W. E, 416), 30,
876.
/» re Hawkins' Trusts (33 Beav. 570),
893.
In re Hawley (104 N. T. 250), 1687.
7» re Havens (6 Dem. Surr. 45S), 139.
In re Hays' Will (9 Hare, 221), 876.
In re Hayter (32 W. R. 26), 1191.
In re Head's Trustees (L. R. 45 Ch. D.
310), 1104.
In re Hedgman (L. R. 8 Ch. D. 156),
733.
In re Heliman (L. E. 2 Eq. 363), 1132.
In re Hewitts (94 Cal. 376; 29 Pac. Eep.
•775), 814.
In re Higgins' Estate (15 Mont. 474; 39
Pac. Eep. 506), 1020.
In re Hill's Trusts (L. R. 16 Ch. D. 173),
813.
In re Hoare's Trusts (4 Giff. 254, 104.
Inre Hodges (L. R. 7 Ch. D. 754), 1119.
In re Hodge's Estate (63 Vt. 661; 22 Atl.
Eep. 725), 1020, 1180, 1258.
In re Hodge's Estate (66 Vt. 70; 28 Atl.
Rep. 663), 1203.
In re Hogdson's Settlement (9 Hare.
117), 875.
In re RoMen (126 N. T. 589; 27 N. E.
Eep. 106), 690.
In re Holden (L. R. 20 Q. B. Div. 43),
1675.
TABLE OF CASES.
CXXV
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
In re Hopkins (L. R. 19 Ch. D. 61), 1576,
1577.
fcnHosle (7 Nat. Bk. Reg. 601), 1630.
In re Hotehkys (L. R. 32 Ch. D. 408),
1154.
In re Hotham's Trusts (L. R. 12 Eq. 76),
1118, 1132, 1154.
In re Hough (4 De G. & Sm. 371), 930.
In re Household (L. R. 27 Ch. D. 553),
1154.
In re Howarth (L. R. 8 Ch. 415), 831, 988.
In re Howe (1 Paige, -214) , 1548.
Jra re Howland (2 Nat. Bk. Reg. 114),
699.
Inre Hulkes (35 W. R. 194), 1193.
In re Hume (L. R. 35 Ch. D. 457), 869.
In re Hunt (141 Mass. 515), 1202.
In re Ingersoll's Will (66 Hun, 571; 14
N.Y. Supl. 22), 135.
Inre Ingleby (L. R. 13 Ir. 326), 895.
In re Isabella Denby (3 De G., F.& J.
350), 894.
In re Jackson (L. R. 21 Ch. D. 786), 827,
829.
Inre Jackson (32 Hun, 200), 1706.
In re Jackson's Will (L. R. 13 Oh. D.
189), 629.
Inre Jaueway (4 Nat. Bk. Reg. 100),
1630.
In re Jeane's Estate (34 W. N. C. 190; 3
Pa. Dist. Rep. 314), 737.
Inre Jeffrey's Trusts (L. R. 14 Eq. 136),
166, 620, 632, 999.
In re Jones (4 Sandf. Ch. 615), 974,
1750.
In re Jones' Will (L. R. 2 Ch. D. 362),
653.
Inre Kavanagh (L. R. 27 Ir. 495), 1206.
Inre Kaye (L. R. 1 Ch. 387), 24, 905.
Inre Keleman Q26N. Y.'73), 513.
In re Kellogg (7 Paige, 265), 1687.
In re Kerr's Trusts (L. R. 4 Ch. D. 600),
636.
In re Kershaw (L. R. 6 Eq. 322), 1132,
1602.
In re Kilvert's Trusts (L. R. 12 Eq. 183;
7Ch. D. 170), 732, 763.
In re Kincaid's Trusts (1 Drew. 326),
678.
Inre Kinike's Estate (155 Pa. St. 101; 25
Atl. Rep. 1016), 749.
In re Kirkpatrick (22 N. J. Eq. 463),
1553.
In re Knight (27 Beav. 49), 1135.
In re Knight's Estate (159 Pa. St. 500;
28 Atl. Rep. 303; 34 W. N. C. 6), 733,
809, 816.
Inre Knight's Will (L. R. 26 Ch. D. 82),
30.
In re Knowles (18 L. T. 809), 1131.
In re Laflerty's Estate (17 Pa. Co. Ct.
401; 5 Pa. Dist. Rep. 75), 1689, 1693,
1698.
In re Lamotte (L. R. 4 Ch. D. 325), 869.
In re Langdale (L. R. 10 Eq. 39), 1131.
J«»eLarken (W. N. (1872) 85), 1132.
In re Latymer's Charity (L. R. 7 Eq.
363), 733, 772.
In re Lebanon Trust, etc. Co. (166 Pa.
St. 622), 1607.
In re Leinster (L. R. 21 Ir. 152) , 1436.
In re Leinann's Trusts (L. R. 22 Ch. D.
633), 869,904.
In re Lewin's Trusts (20 Beav. 378), 678,
682.
In re Lewis (3 Misc. Rep. 164), 1762.
In re Lewis (81 N. T. 421), 1118, 1396,
1397, 1399.
In re Lewis' Estate (156 Pa. St. 337; 27
Atl. Rep. 35), 660.
In re Lewis' Estate (11 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep.
661), 786.
In re Litchfield (1 Atk. 87), 1067, 1244.
In re Long (17 W. R. 218), 1132.
In re Longendale Cotton Spinning Co.
(L. R. 8Ch.D. 150), 35.
In re Lord Ranelagh's Will (L. R. 26
Ch. D. 590), 1161.
In re Lumley (L. R. (1894), 3 Ch. 135),
667.
In re Lush's Trusts (L. R. 4 Ch. 591),
675, 682.
In re Lynall's Trusts (L. R. 12 Ch. D.
211), 813.
In re McAlpine (15 N. T. St. Rep. 532),
1706.
In re McOarter (94 N. Y. 558), 1680.
In re McGillivray (138 N. Y.308;33N.E.
Rep. 1077), 901.
In re Mcintosh's Estate (158 Pa. St.
628; 27 Atl. Rep. 1044), 106.
ZrareMcKenna (13 Ir. Ch. 239), 201, 392,
1596.
In re McLaughlin (L. R. 1 Ir. 421), 1042.
In re Mackenzie's Trusts (L. R. 23 Ch.
D. 750) , 1209.
In re Mackintosh (L. J. 42 Ch. 208),
1132.
In re Madrid Bank (L. R. 2 Eq. 216),
494.
In re Maguire (L. R. 9 Eq. 632), 732, 763,
768.
In re Mais (16 Jur. 608), 905.
In re Manchester Royal Infirmary (L.
R. 43 Ch. D. 420), 1216.
In re Mann (32 Minn. 60), 1368.
/Mi-eMarsden's Estate (166 Pa. St. 213;
31 Atl. Rep. 46), 670.
In re Marshall's Estate (138 Pa. St. 260 ;
22 Atl. Rep. 90) , 612.
CXXV1
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol.
In re Martens (16 Misc. Rep. 245), 1687.
In re Martin (L. R. 34 Oh. D. 618), 869.
In re Martin (L. R. 21 Q. B. Div. 29),
973.
In re Martin's Estate (39 N". T. Supl.
189; 16 Misc. Rep. 245), 1685.
Zn re Mason (L. R. 10 Ch. 273), 869, 904.
In re Mason (98 N. T. 527), 1687, 1706.
In re Mayfield (17 Mo. App. 684), 904,
1575.
In re Mechanics' Bank (2 Barb. 446),
900, £04,1123.
In re Mehafiey's Estate (20 Atl. Rep.
1056 , 139 Pa. St. 216) , 1288, 1289, 1290.
In re Mellow's Trusts (L. R. 6 Oh. D.
127), 675.
In re Meserole (36 Hun, 298), 1687.
In re Mitchell's Estate (L. R. 6 Ch. D.
655), 813.
In re Morgan (L. R. 18 Ch. D. 93), 600.
In re Morrison (16 Sim. 42), 845.
Inre Morse's Settlement (21 Beav. 174),
103, 104.
In re Murton's Trusts (L. R. 10 Ch. 272),
869.
ZrcreNaglee's Estate (52 Pa. St. 154),
1076.
Inre National Finance Co. (L. R. 3 Ch.
App. 791), 1701.
IiireNeedham (1 Jon. & La. 34), 878,
879.
ZrereNesmith (140 N. Y. 609; 35 N. E.
Ri-p. 942; 71 Hun, 139; 24 X. Y. Supl.
627), 1026,1434.
In re Nether Scowey Vicarage (L. R. 17
Eq. 156), 1154.
In re Kiles (113 N. Y. 547), 1231, 1544.
ZnreNorris (L. R. 27 Ch. D. 333), 864,
871.
Inre North Shore Ferry Co. (63 Barb.
556), 962.
In re Nyee's Estate (5 W. & S. 256), 1202,
1210.
InreOden (1 Conn. (N. Y.) 94), 1003,
1025, 1028, 1608.
In re O'Hara (95 N. Y. 403), 508, 518.
In re Old's Estate (176 Pa. St. 160; 33 Atl.
Rep. 1022), 991.
Z««Orde (L. R. 24 Ch. D. 271), 869.
Zrcj-eOrmsby (IB. &B. 189),ir,S3.
Z»reOverend, etc. Co. (L. R. 3Eq. 576),
494.
In re Owens (3 Pa. Dist. Rep. 328), 161.
In re Owthwaite (L. R. (1891) 3 Ch. 494),
1029.
In re Page (L. R. (1893) 1 Ch. 304), 1191.
Tn re Pearson (L. R. 5Ch. D. 962), 869.
In re Pearson (21 W. R. 401), 1132.
In re Pepper's Estate (154 Pa. St . 331 ; :5
Atl. Rep. 1058), 7S6.
1, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
In re Permanen t Bldg: Soc. (L. R. 43 Ch
U. 431), 1209, 1216.
In re Perry (2 Cart. 655), 883.
In re Petrank's Estate (79 Iowa, 410),
906.
In re Peyton's Trusts (L. R. 7 Eq. 463),
1118, 1132.
In re Phelps' Settlement (L. R. 31 Ch.
D. 351), 869.
In re Phene's Trusts (L. R. 6 Eq. 347),
166,626,641.
In re Plioanix Life Assurance Co. (2
John. & Hem. 229), 962.
In re Polly Hodge's Estate (63 Vt. 661),
1597.
In re Porter (26 L. J. Ch. 482), 26.
In re Potter (L. R. 7 Eq. 487), 678.
In re Potts (1 Ash . 340) , 900, 1176.
Inre Prison Charities (L. R. 16 Eq. 129),
770.
Zra « Pumphrey (L. R. 22 Ch. D. 255),
1677.
In re Queen's College (5 Russ. 64), 785.
In re Randall's Estate (29 N. Y. Supl.
1019), 1179.
In re Renshaw's Trusts (L. R. 4 Oh. 783),
868.
In re'Richards (L. R. 8 Eq. 119), 625.
In re Richardson (9 N. Y. Supl. 638)
1346.
In re Rickard (31 Beav. 244), 755.
In re Roberts (L. R, 43 Ch. D. 62), 1708.
In re Robinson (3 Johns. Ch. 43), 1687.
In re Robinson (37 X. Y. 261), 877, 903.
Inre Robinson (61 L. J. Ch. 17), 732.
Inre Robinson's Estate (26 Pitts. Leg.
J. 404),12S9.
In re Robinson's Estate (L. R. 12 Ch. D.
188), 675.
In re Roche (1 Conn. & Law. 306), 864,
868, 904.
In re Roe (119 N. Y. 509) , 1033, 1064, 1C65.
In re Rogers (1 Dr. & S m . 338) , 1132 .
In re Ryder (11 Paige, 185), 835, 837.
Inre St. John's Church (3 Ir. Eq. 336),
771.
Inre Salmon (L. R. 42 Ch. D. 351), 1250.
In re Sanderson's Trusts (3 Kay & J.
497), 1301, 163S.
In re Sarah Knight's Will (L. R. 26 Cfl.
D. 82), 1670.
In re Schell (53 N. Y. 263), 1696.
In re Schneider's Estate (71 Hun, 62; 24
N. Y. Supl. 540), 863.
Inre Schoonover (5 Paige, 559), 893.
Z»i«Schouler f 134 Mass. 426), 731, 748,
755.
In re Schwartz's Estate (2 Rawle, 222),
603.
In re Soott (5 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 378), 1345.
TABLE OF CASES.
CXXV11
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
In re Security, L. , I. & A. Co. (31 Hun,
36;95N. T. 654), 1687.
In re Seipe's Estate (11 Pa. Co. Ct. Kep.
27), 1619.
In re Selleck (111 N. Y. 284), 1687.
In re Seymour's Estate (62 Hun, 531; 17
N. T. Supl. 91), 901.
ZnreShafto's Trust (L. R. 29Ch.D.247),
871.
In re Shaw's Trusts (L. R. 12 Eq. 124),
1118, 1131.
In re Shelmerdine (33 L. J. Ch. 474), 26.
In re Sherwood (3 Beav. 338), 1683.
In re Shields (53 L. T. 5), 68.
Inre Shields' Estate (14 Phila. 307), 1201.
In re Ship Warre (8 Price, 269), 34.
In re Simpson (1 J. &H. 89), 1131.
In re Skingley (3 Macn. & G. 221), 181.
Inre Slevin (L. R. (1991) 2 Ch. 236), 768.
Inre Smith (131 N. Y. 239), 1746.
In re Smith's Charities (L. R. 20 Ch. D.
516), 773.
In re Sparrow (L. R. 5 Ch. 662), 869, 947,
1057, 1135, 1341.
In re Spott's Estate (156 Pa. St. 281; 27
Atl. Rep. 132), 710.
In re Stanger (35 Fed. Rep. 238), 271.
In re State Road (60 Pa. St. 330), 1130.
/k « Stenberg (L. R. (1895)2 Ch.D.433),
1581.
In re Stevenson (3 Paige, 420), 1394.
Inre Stone (138 Mass. 476), 1753.
In re Storie's Gift (2 De G., F. & J. 529),
817.
In re Strickland's Estate (63 Hun, 625;
17 N. Y. Supl. 304), 819.
In re Sturdevant's Estate (23 Atl. Rep.
826), 705.
In re Stuyvesant (3Edw. Ch. 229), 904.
In re Suggitt's Trusts (L. R. 3 Ch. 215),
675, 678, 682.
In re Sykes' Trusts (2 Johns. & H. 415) ,
696.
In re Taylor (18 Beav. 165), 1058.
In re Taylor Orphan Asylum (36 Wis.
534), 1183.
Inre Taylor's Settlement (9 Hare, 596,)
259.
In re Tempest (L. R. 1 Ch. 487), 31, 1431.
In re Terry's Will (19 Beav. 580), 123.
In re Thomas (1 Hun, 473), 828.
In re Thompson (L. R. 45 Ch. D. 161),
813.
In re Thompson's Estate (33 Barb. 334),
1549.
In re Thompson's Estate (1 N. Y. Supl.
213), 1684, 1703.
In re Thompson's Estate (10 Pa. Co. Ct.
Rep. 472), 1619.
Inre Thorp (Davies, 290), 1205,1253, 1254.
Jnj-eTIbbs (17 W. R. 304), 1132.
In re Tierney's Estate (2 Pa. Dist. Rep.
524), 736.
In re Tilden (44 Hun, 441), 1687.
In re Todd (19 Beav. 582), 682.
In re Tottenham (16 Ired. Eq. 118), 399.
In re Trethowan (L. R. 5 Ch. D. 559),
600.
In re Tryon (7 Beav. 496), 975.
In re Tucker (L. R. (1894) 1 Ch. 724; L.
E. (1894) 3 Ch. 429), 1209.
In re Turner (10 Barb. 552), 630, 1092.
In re Turner (2 De G., F. & J. 527), 930.
In re Tyler (L. R. (1891) 3 Ch. 252), 820.
In re Uniacke (1 Jon. & La. 1), 879.
In re University College (2 Phill. 521),
785.
In re Valentine (3 Dem. 563), 1055.
In re Vandeibilt (20 Hun, 520), 1746, 1751.
Inre Vandervoort (1 Redf. Sur. 270),
1082.
In re Van Home (7 Paige, 46), 287.
In re Van Home (18 R. I. 389) 28 Atl.
Rep. 341), 1071.
Inre Van Wyck (1 Barb. Ch. 565), 902,
1040, 1123.
J««Vicker's Trusts (L. R. 3 Ch. D.
112), 869.
In re Wadsworth (2 Barb. Ch. 387), 904,
1123.
In re Walker (1 LI. & Goodl. 324), 684,
685.
In re Walker & Hughes (L. R. 24 Ch. D.
698), 871.
Inre Walker's Will (63 Hun, 627; 17 N.
Y. Supl. 666), 815.
Inre Ware (L. R. 45 Ch. D. 269), 637,
638.
Inre Waring (12 Eng. Law & Eq. 280),
12.
In re Waring (99 N. Y. 114), 1055.
In re Watmough's Trusts (L. R. 8 Eq.
272) , 813.
In re Watts' Settlement (9 Hare, 106),
869.
In re Waugh (25 W. R. 555), 1436.
In re Way's Trusts (10 Jur. 837;2DeG.,
J. &S. 365), 160.
In re West of England Banks (L. R. 11
Ch. D. 772), 1604.
In re Weston (91 N. Y. 511), 1200) 1338.
In re Whitcomb's Estate (86 Cal. 265; 24
Pac. Rep. 1028), 135.
In re Whitecar's Estate (147 Pa. St. 368;
23 Atl. Rep. 675), 1258.
Inre Whitehead (3 Dem. 227), 1055.
In re White's Estate (163 Pa. St. 388; 30
Atl. Rep. 194; 35 W. N. C. 105), 1288.
In re White's Trusts (Johns. 656), 167,
614, 620, 621, 624, 630, 632.
cxxvm
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
In re White's Trusts (L. R. 33 Ch. D.
449), 768.
In re Whittaker (L. E. 21 Ch. D. 657),
712.
In re Whittaker (4 Johns. Ch. 378), 825.
In re Willetts (112 N. T. 289), 1706.
In re Wilkinson (41 L. J. Ch. 392; L. E.
13 Eq. 634), 1515.
In re Williams (L. E. 5 Ch. D. 735), 735.
In re Williams' Settlement (4 Kay & J.
87), 868.
In re Will of O'Hara (95 N. T. 403), 516.
In re Wilson (4 Pa. St. 430), 1419.
In re Wilson's Estate (2 Pa. St. 325),
853.
In re Woodburn's Will (1 De G. & J.
333), 1118, 1266.
In re Woods (24 Pitts. Leg. Obs. 222),
870.
In re Worcester Corn Exchange Co. (3
DeG., M. AG. 180), 1032.
In re Young's Estate (137 Pa. St. 433; 21
Atl. Rep. 93), 365.
Insurance Co. v. Chase (5 Wall. 509),
1029, 1030.
Insurance Co. v. Deale (18 Md. 26; 79
Am. Dee. 673), 808, 339, 367.
Insurance Co. i'. Smith (11 Pa. St. 120),
960.
Insurance Co. v. Wayne Co. Bank (60
Mich. 116), 707.
Inwood v. Twyne (Amb. 417; 2 Eden,
148), 827, 829.
Ioor v. Hodges (Speers, 593), 912, 917,
943, 956.
Iowa Seed Co. v. Dorr (70 Iowa, 481; 30
N. W. Rep. 866), 1386.
Ireland v. Ireland (84 N. Y. 321), 616,
996,1007.
Ireland v. Potter (16 Abb. Pr. 218; 25
How. Pr. 175), 1694.
Irish v. Antioch College (126 111. 474),
1508, 1541.
Irvin v. Garner (50 Tex. 48), 680.
Irvine v. Dunham (111 U. S. 327), 904,
1569.
Irvine v. Irvine (9 Wall. 617), 12, 27,1023.
Irvine v. Marshall (20 How. 558), 191,
309, 361.
Irvine v. Muse (10 Heisk. 477), 577.
Irvine v. Eobertson (3 Rand. 549), 465.
Irvine v. Sullivan (L. E. 8 Eq. 673), 128,
130,213.
Irving v. De Kay (9 Paige, 621), 111.
Irwin v. Harris (6 Ired. Eq. 221), 398.
Irwin v. Ivera (7 Ind. 308), 233.
Irwin's Appeal (35 Pa. St. 294), 1236.
Isaac v. Defriez (Amb. 695; 17 Ves. 373),
630, 735.
Isaac v. Emory (64 Md. 333), 753.
Isaac v. Wall (L. E. 6 Ch. Div. 706),
1433.
Isaacs v. Beth Hamedash Soc. (1 Hill,
469) , 1048.
Isaacson v . Harwood (L. R. 3 Ch. App.
225), 881.
Isabella Denby, In re (3 De G. , F. & J.
350), 894.
Isham v. Del. L. & W. Ey. Co. (11 N. J.
Eq. 227), 1086, 1750.
Isom v. First Nat. Bank (52 Miss. 902),
1582, 1584.
Ithell v. Beane (1 Ves. 215), 1652.
Iverson v. Saulsbury (65 Ga. 724), 1628.
Ives v. Allyn (12 Vt. 589), 142.
Ives v. Ashley (97 Mass. 198), 392, 403.
Ives v. Davenport (3 Hill, 373), 618,
1082.
Ives v. Harris (7 R. I. 413), 665.
Ivey v. Coleman (42 Ala. 410), 1690.
Ivie». Ivie (1 Atk. 431), 1427.
Ivory v. Burns (66 Pa. St. 300), 61, 922,
923.
Ivy v. Gilbert (2 P. Wms. 13), 1068,
1090, 1526.
Ivy ti.Eogers (Dev. Eq. 58), 461.
Izard v. Izard (Bail. Eq. 228), 1332.
Izod v. Izod (32 Beav. 242), 167, 614, 625.
J.
Jaekrnant;. Ringland (4 W. & S. 283),
308.
Jack's Appeal (94 Pa. St. 367), 1210.
Jacks v. State (44 Ark. 61), 1649, 1651.
Jackson v. Adams (7 Wend. 367), 28,
452.
Jackson v. Andrews (7 Wend. 152), 452.
Jackson v. Babcock (16 N. Y. 249), 1066.
Jackson v. Bank (10 Pa. St. 61), 1583.
Jackson v. Bateman (2 Wend. 570), 371.
Jackson v. Bates (14 Johns. 391), 1013,
1040.
Jackson v. Blodgett (5 Cow. 202), 1049.
Jackson v. Brooks (8 Wend. 426) , 984.
Jackson v. Bull (10 Johns. 19), 108.
Jackson I). Burr (9 Johns. 104), 1066.
Jackson v. Burtis (14 Johns. 391), 1013.
Jackson v. Caldwell (1 Cow. 622), 441.
Jackson t). Cary (16 Johns. 304), 914.
Jackson v. Clark (7 Johns. 225), 1098.
1109, 1489.
Jackson v. Cleveland (15 Mich. 94), 263,
264.
Jackson v. Davenport (18 Johns. 300),
1462.
Jackson v. Delaney (13 Johns. 537; 7
Am. Dec. 493), 971, 1639.
Jackson v. Dominick (14 Johns. 435),
1505.
TABLE OF CASES.
CXX1X
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1758.]
Jackson p. Dunlap (1 Johns. Cas. 114),
601.
Jackson v. Feller (2 Wend. 465), 174,
352, 363.
Jackson v. Fish (10 Johns. 456) , 912, 940.
Jackson v. Forrest (2 Barb. Ch. 576),
374.
Jackson v. Given (8 Johns. 673), 436.
Jackson v. Golden (4 Cow. 266), 1452.
Jackson v. Gurnsey (16 Johns. 189), 713.
Jackson v. Hartwell (8 Johns. 422), 18,
1548.
Jackson v. Hathaway (15 Johns. 1447),
952, 953.
Jackson v. Henry (10 Johns. 185), 436.
Jackson v. Hill (25 Ark. 223), 675.
Jackson a. Hobhouse (2Meriv.483),667,
668.
Jackson v. Hubbard (36 Conn. 10), 705.
Jackson v. Hyde (91 Oal. 463), 227, 1701.
Jackson, In re (L. E. 21 Ch. I>. 786), 827,
629.
Jackson, Jure (32 Hun, 200), 1706.
Jackson v. Jackson (1 Gratt. 143), 886.
Jackson v. Jackson (3 N. J. Eq. 96), 1697,
1716.
Jackson v. Jackson (2 Pa. St. 212), 183.
Jackson v. Jackson (91 U. S. 125), 237,
339, 340, 352.
Jackson v. Jackson (9 Ves. 597), 216.
Jackson v. Jansen (6 Johns. 73), 1085.
Jackson v. Ketcham (8 Johns. 479), 452.
Jackson v. Lamb (7 Cow. 431), 984.
Jackson v. Landers (134 Ind. 529; 34 N.
E. Rep. 323), 319.
Jackson v. Leek (19 Wend. 339), 443.
Jackson v. Lignon (3 Leigh, 161), 1085.
Jacksonc. MeChesney (7 Cow. 360), 436.
Jackson v. Matsdorf (11 Johns. 91) , 307,
334, 357.
Jackson v. Mills (13 Johns. 463), 307.
Jackson v. Moore (6 Cow. 706), 197, 313,
357, 370.
Jackson v. Moore (13 Johns. 513), 979,
980.
Jackson v. Morse (16 Johns. 197), 198,
307.
Jackson v. Nowling (69 Ind. 188), 706.
Jackson v. Parker (9 Cow. 73), 1366.
Jackson v. Parkhurst (4 Wend . 369) , 601.
Jackson v. Pierce (2 Johns. 226), 980, 983.
Jackson v. Phillips (14 Allen, 556), 729,
745, 748, 755, 756, 758, 759, 761, 763, 765,
775,777,778,805, 1524.
Jackson v. Post (15 Wend. 588), 99.
Jackson v. Pratts (10 Johns. 381) , 984.
Jackson v. Eobins (16 Johns. 537) , 920, 937.
Jackson v. Eowe (4Euss. 514), 438.
Jackson v. Schauber (7 Cow. 187; 2
Wend. 12), 928, 940, 1066.
Jackson v. Sharp (9 Johns. 163), 443.
Jackson v. Stanley (87 Ala. 270), 573.
Jackson v. Sternberg (1 Johns. Cas.
153), 307, 357.
Jackson «. Talbot (L. E. 21 Ch. D. 789),
1435.
Jackson v. Van Denberg (8 Cow. 260),
460.
Jackson v. Van Dolfsen (4 Johns. 43),
385, 392.
Jackson v. Van Zandt (12 Johns. 169),
1066.
Jackson v. Walsh (14 Johns. 407), 392,
393.
Jackson j). Warren (32111. 331), 452.
Jack v. Weienett (115111. 105), 1408.
Jackson v. West (22 Md. 71), 707.
Jackson v. Winslow (9 Cow. 13), 443.
Jackson v. Wood (88 Mo. 76), 363, 1509.
Jackson v. Woolsey (11 Johns. 446), 392,
984.
Jackson's Appeal (8 Atl. Eep. 870),
1719.
Jackson's Will, In re (L. E. 13 Ch. D.
189), 629.
Jacksonville Nat. Bk. v. Beesley (159
111. 120; 42 ST. E. Rep. 164), 317.
Jacob v. Lucas (1 Beav. 436), 1116.
Jacobs v. Amyatt (1 Madd. 376 n.), 680.
Jacobs v. Averill (1 Mod. 376), 655.
Jacobs v. Jacobs (99 Mo. 427), 1345.
Jacobs v. Pou (18 Ga. 346), 1538.
Jacobs v. Eemsen (36 N. Y. 668), 1368.
Jacobus v. Jacobus (20 N. J. Eq. 49),
996.
Jacobus v. Munn (38 N. J. Eq. 622), 1171,
1696.
Jacomb v. Harwood (2 Ves. 268), 455,
1655.
Jacot v. Emmet (11 Paige, 142), 1255.
Jacubsu. Rylance (L. E. 17 Eq. 341),
(856, 1257, 1590
Jaffa v. Meyers (33 La. Ann. 406), 715.
Jaffreyc. Brown (29 Fed. Eep. 476),
495.
James v. Allen (3 Meriv. 17), 83.
James v. Cowing (82 N. T. 449; 17 Hun,
256), 432, 595, 1092, 1118,
James v. Dean (11 Ves. 383; 15 Ves. 236),
397, 399.
James, Ex parte (8 Ves. 337), 334, 383,384,
385, 399, 423, 1163, 1178, 1180.
James v. Falk (50 N. J. Eq. 468; 26 Atl.
Eep. 138), 58.
James v. Frierson (1 N. C. C. 375; 1 T. &
C. 370) 882,883,884.
James u. Holmes (8 Jur. (N. S.), 553;
31 L. J. Ch. 567), 292, 431.
James v. Holmes (4De G., F. & J. 470),
312.
cxxx
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages : Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
James ®. James (55 Ala. 525), 1184.
James ®. James (41 Ark. 301), 336, 352,
364.
James v. James (81 Tex. 373), 724, 726.
James r. Johnson (6 Johns. Oh. 417),
977.
James®. Lock (L. E. 1 Ch. App. 125),
70.
James ®. May (L. B. 6 H. L. 328), 1701.
James v. Mayrant (4 Desaus. Eq. 19;
6 Am. Dec. 596), 704, 710.
, James ®. Mechanics' Nat. Bank (12 E.
I. 490), 1408.
James ®. Morey (2 Cow. 246), 977, 978.
Jameson ®. Smith (4 Bibb, 307), 928, 940.
Jamison v. Brady (6 S. & E. 467), 25, 661,
654, 686.
Jamison v. Glasscock (29 Mo. 191), 386,
391, 417, 1171, 1184.
Jamison ®. Lindsay (1 Bailey, 79), 1678.
Janeway, In re (4 Nat. Bk. Eeg. 100),
1630.
Jansen ®. Ostrander (1 Oow. 670), 19.
Jaques®. M. E. Church (17 Johns. 548;
8 Am. Dec. 447), 664, 667, 698, 701, 702,
709.
Jaques v. Weeks (7 Watts, 261), 449, 451,
460.
Jarman ®. Wilkerson (7 B . Hon . 293) ,
706.
Jarnagln v. Frank (59 Miss. 393), 860.
Jarrett®. Andrews (7 Bush, 311), 829.
Jarvis v. Babcock (5 Barb. 139), 125,
618.
Jarvis ®. Dutcher (16 Wis. 327), 603.
Jarvis®. Prentice (19 Conn. 273), 654.
Jasper v. Hazen (1 N. Dak. 75), 1720.
Jaudon ®. Nat. City Bank (8 Blatch.
430), 456, 457, 1657,1659.
Jaycox®. Caldwell (51 N. T. 395), 714.
Jeane's Estate, In re (34 W. N. C. 190; 3
Pa. Dist. Eep. 314), 737.
Jeans v. Cooke (24 Beav. 521), 366.
Jee v. Thurlow (2 B. & Cr. 646), 720.
Jeffereys ®. Jeflereys (1 Cr. &Ph. 138),
147, 148, 151.
Jefferson v. Cotheal (7 Wend. 72), 1030.
Jefferson ®. Tyrer (9 Jur. 1083), 1013.
Jeffrey ®. Bigelow (13 Wend. 618), 476,
484.
Jeffrey's Trusts, Be (L. E. 14 Eq. 136),
166,620,632, 999.
Jeffries ®. Beekman (86 Mo. 350), 1369.
Jeffrys ®. Small (1 Vern. 217), 216.
Jenckes ®. Cook (9 E. I. 520), 221, 625.
Jencks ®. Alexander (11 Paige Ch. 619),
339, 354,373,1506.
Jenison ®. Graves (2 Blackf. 440), 232,
308, 355.
Je kins ®. Doolittle (69111. 415), 377.
Jenkins ®. Eldredge (3 Story, 294), 48,
391, 416, 477, 497, 500, 1692.
Jenkins ®. Frink (30 Cal. 586) , 185, 309,
532.
Jenkins v. Hills (6 Ves. 654), 1323, 1350,
1654.
Jenkins ®. Jenkins (Wllles, 656), 936.
Jenkins ®. Lester (131 Mass. 357), 35, 142,
1743.
Jenkins ®. McConico (17 Ala. 213), 664.
Jenkins ®. Milford (1 J. & W. 629), 955,
1425.
Jenkins ®. Pierce (98 111. 646), 1505.
Jenkins ®. Plombs (6 Mod. 181), 1141.
Jenkins v. Pye (12 Pet. 241), 238, 282,
361.
Jenkins ®. Storffer (3 Teates, 163), 1037.
Jenkins v. Walter (8 G. & J. 218; 29 Am.
Dec. 539), 1188, 1201.
Jenks v. Backhouse (1 Blnn. 91) , 979.
Jenne ®. Baring (L. E. (1893) 1 Ch. 61),
1243.
Jenne v. Marble (37 Mich. 318), 707.
Jenney ®. Gray (5 Ohio St. 45), 688.
Jenney ®. Jenney (24 Vt. 324), 553.
Jennings v. Coleman (59 Ga. 718) , 92.
Jennings ®. Davis (31 Ark. 268), 687.
Jennings ®. Davis (31 Conn. 134),*705.
Jennings v. Davis (5 Dana, 127), 1054.
Jennings®. Jordan (L. E. 6 App. Cas.
698), 560.
Jennings v. Moore (2 Vern. 609), 432.
Jennings v. Shacklett (30 Gratt. 765),
364.
Jennison®. Hapgood (7 Pick. 8), 386,
393, 404.
Jenz v. Gugel (26 Ohio St. 527), 709.
Jernee®. Bentley (49 N. J. Eq. 684; 27
Atl. Eep. 340), 1258.
Jerome v. Bohm (40 Pac. Eep. 570), 71.
Jerrard ®. Saunders (2 Ves. Jr. 454),
327, 435, 438, 594.
Jervis v. Lawrence (L. E. 22 Ch. D. 202),
813.
Jervis®. White (6 Ves. 738; 7 Ves. 413;
8 Ves. 313), 842.
Jervoise v. Duke (1 Vern. 20), 1041, 1045.
Jervolse v. Northumberland (1 J. & W.
559), 94, 107,113.
Jervoise ®. Silk (Coop. 52), 834, 1561,
1663.
Jesser v. Gifford (4 Burr. 2141), 985.
Jesson v. Jesson (2 Vern. 255), 1528.
Jessup ®. Hulse (21 N. Y. 168), 1389.
Jessup ®. 111. Cent. E. Co. (43 Fed. Eep.
483), 411.
Jevon ®. Bush (1 Vern. 343), 26, 993,
1047, 1048, 1343.
Jewett, Ex parte (16 Ala. 409), 829.
Jewett®. Miller (ION. Y. 402), 390, 391.
TABLE OF CASES.
CXXX1
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Jewett v. Palmer (7 Cow. 65), 441.
Jewett». Woodward (lJEdw. Ch. 199),
1687.
Jewson v. Moulson (2 Atk. 417), 976.
Jobson v. Palmer (L. K. (1893), 1 Ch. 71),
1247.
Jocelyn ». Nott (44 Conn. 55), 820.
Jodrell v. Jodrell (9 Beav. 45), 11, 715.
Jodrell v. Jodrell (14 Beav. 367), 183.
Joel v. Mills (3 Kay & J. 458), !l291.
John v. Barnes (21 W. Va. 498), 1650.
John v. Bennett (39 Barb. 237), 399.
Johns «. Bolton (12 Pa. St. 339), 1360.
Johns v. Herbert (2 App. D. C. 485),
1205.
Johns v. James (L. E. 8 Ch. D. 744),
1317.
Johns v. Norris (22 N. J. Eq. 110), 562.
Johns v. Smith (56 Miss. 727), 1742.
Johns v. Williams (66 Miss. 350; 6 So.
Rep. 207), 1568, 1616.
John Shillito Co. v. McConnell (130Ind.
41), 1362.
Johnson v. Ames (11 Pick. 173), 1535.
Johnson a. Atchison (90 Mo. 49), 1496.
Johnson v. Ball (5 De G. & Sm. 85), 143,
263,517,851.
Johnson v. Beard (93 Ala. 96; 9 So. Eep.
535), 1449.
Johnson v. Bennett (39 Barb. 237), 392,
405.
Johnson v. Billups (23 W. Va. 685), 183,
184.
Johnson v. Blackman (11 Conn. 342),
333, 402, 414.
Johnson v. Bloodgood (1 Johns. Cas.
61), 1049.
Johnson v. Clark (3 Rich. Eq. 305), 143.
Johnson v. Clark (5 Ark. 321), 1442.
Johnson v. Clarkson (3 Rich. Eq. 305),
810,851.
Johnson v. Coleman (3 Jones Eq. 290),
832.
Johnson v. Cummings (16 N. J. Eq. 97;
84 Am. Dec. 142), 708.
Johnson v. Deloney (35 Tex. 42), 50, 60.
Johnson v. Dorsey (7 Gill, 269), 1093,
1110.
Johnson v. Dougherty (10 Ga. 273), 1376.
Johnson v. Dougherty (18 N. J. Eq.
406), 223,256,431, 532.
Johnson v. Farnam (56 Ga. 144), 1369.
Johnson v. Fessenmeyer (25 Beav. 88;
3DeG.&J. 13), 423.
Johnson v. Freeth (6 Sim. 423), 649.
Johnson v. Fuquay (1 Dana, 514), S56.
Johnson v. Gallagher (3 De G., F. & J.
494), 647, 648, 656, 690, 698.
Johnson v. Haynes (68 N. Car. 514),
836.
Johnson v. Holifleld (79 Ala. 423; 58 Am.
Rep. 596), 749, 755.
Johnson v. Hubbell (2 Stockt. 332), 517.
Johnson v. Humphrey (14 S. & R. 394) ,
1537.
Johnson v. Hunt (81 Ky. 321), 556.
Johnson v. Johnson (6 Ala. 90), 286,
1180.
Johnson v. Johnson (7 Allen, 197; 83
Am. Dec. 676), 910.
Johnson v. Johnson (2 Hill Eq. 277),
456, 1123, 1230, 1657.
Johnson v. Johnson (88 Ky. 275; 11 S.
W. Rep. 5), 1552.
Johnson v. Johnson (1 J. & W. 472), 682,
683, 976.
Johnson v. Johnson (16 Minn. 512), 339,
340.
Johnson v. Johnson (51 Ohio St. 446; 38
N. E. Rep. 61), 176, 179.
Johnson v. Johnson (27 S. Car. 309),
1445, 1463.
Johnson v. Johnson (92 Tenn. 559; 23 S.
W. Rep. 114), 750.
Johnson v. Kay (8 Hump. 142), 405.
Johnson v. Kendall (20 N. H. 304), 991,
1339.
Johnsons. Kennett (3 Myl. & K. 624),
1350, 1351, 1652.
Johnson v. Landers (L. R. 7 Eq. 228),
674, 678.
Johnson v. Lawrence (95 N. T. 154),
1706.
Johnson v. Lewis (2 Strobh. Eq. 157),
1151.
Johnson v. Longmire (39 Ala. 143), 750.
Johnsons;. McAllister (30 Mo. 327), 1368.
Johnson v. McGrew (42 Iowa, 555), 575.
Johnson v. Matsdorf (11 Johns. 91), 366.
Johnson v. Mayne (4 Iowa, 180), 750.
Johnson v. Milksopp (2 Vern. 112), 1324.
Johnson v. Newton (11 Hare, 168), 1187,
1196, 1205, 1253.
Johnson v. Nunnerly (30 Ark. 153), 574.
Johnson v. Packer (1 Nott. & M. 1), 1701.
Johnson v. Patterson (2 Woods, 543,
1409.
Johnson v. Payne, etc. Bank (56 Mo.
App. 25), 1179.
Johnson v. Pengnet (17 Hun, 540), 709.
Johnson v. Peterson (6 Jones Eq. 12),
553.
Johnsons;. Prairie (91 N. Car. 159), 672.
Johnson v. Quarles (46 Mo. 423), 232,
309, 363.
Johnson v. Richardson (44 Ark. 365),
358.
Johnson v. Robertson (34 Md. 165), 1503.
Johnson v. Rogers (15 Nat'l Bank Reg.
1), 1404.
cxxxu
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Johnson v. Roland (2 Baxt. 203), 878,
893.
Johnson v. Ronald (4 Munf . 77), 47.
Johnson v. Sergeant (45 Miss. 332), 1341.
Johnson v. Shrewsbury, etc. Ry. (3 De
G., M.&G.914), 560.
Johnson v. Smith (27 Mo. 591), 1538.
Johnson v. Smith (1 Ves. 315), 13.
Johnson v. Stark County (24 111. 75),
1542.
Johnson v. Stillings (35 Me. 427), 706.
Johnson v. Telford (3 Russ. 477), 1701.
Johnson v. Townsend (30 S. W. Rep.
71), 577.
Johnson v. Twist (2 Ves. 166), 245.
Johnson v. Vaill (1 McCart. 423), 688.
Johnsons. Webster (4 De G., M. & G.
474), 978.
Johnson v. Whitewell (7 Pick. 71), 1388.
Johnson v. Williams (4 Minn. 260), 1467,
1468, 1482.
Johnson's Appeal (9 Pa. St. 416), 884,
1575.
Johnson's Appeal (103 Pa. St. 373), 1362.
Johnson's Estate (9 W. & S. 107), 1143,
1144.
Johnston v. Eason (3 Ired. Eq. 330),
1093, 1095, 1107, 1488, 1490.
Johnston v. Harvey (2 P. & W. 82),
1310.
Johnston v. Haynes (68 N. Car. 514),
829.
Johnston v. Johnston (138 111. 385; 27
N. E. Rep. 930), 232.
Johnston v. Redd (59 Ga. 621), 97.
Johnston v. Rowlands (2 De G. &Sm.
356), 132.
Johnston v. Spicer (107 N. T. 198), 1277.
Johnston v. Vaill (4 N. J. Eq. 423), 708.
Johnston v. Zane (11 Gratt. 652), 1271.
Johnstone v. Beattie (10 CI. & Fin. 42),
827.
Johnstone v. Lumb (15 Sim. 308), 672.
Joiners. Cowing (17 Hun, 266), 327.
Joiner v. Perkins (69 Tex. 300), 580.
Jolliffe v. Baker (L. R. 11 Q. B. 820),
475.
Jones v. .ffitna Ins. Oo. (14 Conn. 501),
705.
Jones v. Arkansas, etc. (38 Ark. 17),
411.
Jones v. Bacon (68 Me. 34), 106.
Jones v. Badley (L. R. 3 Ch. App. 362),
617.
Jones v. Bamford (21 Iowa, 217), 443.
Jones v. Boulter (1 Cox, 288), 99.
Jones v. Bush (4 Harr. 1),912, 914.
Jones v. Caldwell (97 Pa. St. 42), 967.
Jones v. Chennell (L. R. 8 Ch. D. 492),
1251, 1670.
Jones v. Clifton (101 U. S. 225; 17 Am.
L. Reg. 713; 2 Flip. 191), 99, 651, 686,
713, 722.
Jones v. Cole (2 Bail. 330), 956, 957.
Jones v. Conway (4 Yeates, 109), 470.
Jones w. Craigmiles (114 N. Car. 613; 19
S.E. Rep. 638), 709.
Jones v. Dawson (19 Ala. 672), 1434, 1701.
Jones v. Degge (84 Va. 685), 711.
Jones v. Deyer (16 Ala. 221), 993, 1049.
Jones v. Dexter (130 Mass. 380), 186,
431.
Jones v. Dougherty (10 Ga. 273), 904,
1380, 1568, 1576, 1577.
Jones v. Floyd (117 HI. 597), 1598.
Jones v. Foxall (15Beav. 392), 1255.
Jones v. Gibbons (9 Ves. 410), 1117.
Jones v. Graham (36 Ark. 383), 403.
Jones v. Habersham (107 U. S. 174), 734,
745, 747, 756, 783, 786, 787, 815, 819,
1524.
Jones ii. Haddock (41 Ala. 262), 327, 538.
Jones v. Hagler (95 Ala. 629; 10 So. Rep.
345) , 1458.
Jones v. Harris (9 Ves. 486), 693.
Jones v. Haversham (3 Woods, 443; 107
U. S. 174), 731.
Jones v. Higgins (L. R. 2 Eq. 53S), 1545,
1592.
Jones v. Hubbard (6 Munf. 261), 527.
Jones v. Hudson (23 S. Car. 494), 1591.
Jones, In re (4 Sandf. Ch. 615), 974, 1750.
Jones v. Jones (3 Bro. Ch. 80), 956.
Jones v. Jones (56 Ga. 325), 578.
Jones v. Jones (53 Mo. App. 207), 1186.
Jones v. Jones (13 N. J. Eq. 236), 1036.
Jones v. Jones (8 Misc. Rep. 660; 30 N.
Y. Supl. 177), 901,997.
Jones v. Kearney (1 Dr. & W. 167), 381.
Jones v. Knauss (31 N. J. Eq. 323), 1121.
Jones v. Langhorne (3 Bibb, 453), 1298.
Jones v. Langton (lEq. Ca. Ab. 392),
90,101,102.
Jones v. Leonard (78 Hun, 290; 28 N. Y.
Supl. 906), 106.
Jones v. Lewis (2 Ves. 241), 947, 1140,
1221.
Jones v. Lewis (1 Cox, 199), 1266, 1679.
Jones v. Lock (L. R. 1 Ch. App. 25), 67,
151.
Jones v. Lockard (89 Ala. 575), 573.
Jones v. McDougall (32 Miss. 179), 231,
600,525.
Jones*. McKee (3 Pa. St. 496; 6 Pa. St.
425), 497,600,513.
Jones v. McNeil (1 Bail. Eq. 235), 1750.
Jones v. Mack (53 Mo. 147), 1503.
Jones v. Maffett (5 S. & R. 623), 894.
Jones v. Martin (6 Bro. P. C. 437; 5 Ves.
266), 506.
TABLE OF CASES.
CXXX111
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Jones ®. Mason (L. B. 39 Ch. D. 534),
1435.
Jones ®. Matthie (11 Jur. 804), 1505.
Jones v. Mitchell (1 S. & S. 290), 255, 266,
259.
Jones ®. Moore (42 Mo. 413), 1093.
Jones U.Morgan (1 Bro. Ch. 206), 94,
1277.
Jones v. Mossop (3 Hare, 572), 976.
Jones v. Newell (78 Hun, 290), 1746.
Jones ®. Newhall (115 Mass. 244), 530,
1724.
Jones ®. Oberchain (10 Gratt. 259), 713.
Jones v. Owens (47 L. T. 62) , 1336, 1346.
Jones ®. Parsons (2 Hawkes, 269), 1537.
Jones ®. Phillips (82 Ala. 102), 1739.
Jones ®. Price (11 Sim. 657; 10 L. J. (N.
S.) Ch. 195), 1087, 1350, 1652.
Jones ®. Powell (6 Beav. 488), 1704.
Jones ®. Pullen (115 N. Car. 465), 1508.
Jones v. Eagland (4 Lea, 539), 577.
Jones ®. Eeese (65 Ala. 134), 704,977,
1271.
Jones ®. Benshaw (130 Pa. St. 327), 749.
Jones v. Roberts (9 Beav. 419), 424.
Jones v. Say & Sele (8 Vin. 262), 927, 930.
Jones ®. Scott (1 Buss. & Myl. 255; 4 CI.
& Fin. 382), 1151, 1319, 1320.
Jones ®. Selby (Pr. Ch. 300), 78.
Jones ». Sergeant (45 Miss. 332), 1005,
1006, 1096.
Jones v. Shaddock (41 Ala. 362), 432, 595,
1625.
Jones ®. Shipley (90 Mo. 307; 2 S. W.
Eep. 400), 1568.
Jones v. Simpson (9 Pa. St. 416) , 905.
Jones v. Smith (33 Miss. 215), 1171.
Jones ®. Stanley (2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 685),
441.
Jones ®. Stockett (2 Bland, 409), 889, 896,
974, 1058, 1062, 1133, 1228, 1673, 1678.
Jones ®. Stohwasser (L. E. 16 Ch. D.
577), 1173.
Jones v. Storm (90 Iowa, 369; 57 N. W.
Eep. 892), 335.
Jones ®. Strong (6 Ired. 367), 956, 1266.
Jones®. Suffolk (IBro. Ch. 528), 1046.
Jones v. Tainter (15 Minn. 512), 1461.
Jones w. Thomas (2 T. & C. 498), 382, 419,
422.
Jones v. Torin (6 Sim. 255), 623, 624.
Jones v. Tucker (2 Meriv. 533), 1011.
Jones ® Turberville (2 Ves. Jr. 13), 981,
985.
Jones v. Wait (4 Macn. & G. 1107), 721.
Jones ®. Waite (5Bing. N. Cas. 341; 35
E. C. L. 130), 724.
Jones ®. Westcome (Pr. Ch. 316), 246.
Jones ®. Williams (Ambl. 652), 730, 737.
Jones®. Williams (24 Beav. 47), 600.
Jones v. Witter (13 Mass. 304), 1117.
Jones' Appeal (3 Grant, 169), 865, 885.
Jones' Appeal (5 Grant, 19), 1037.
Jones' Appeal (57 Pa. St. 369), 666.
Jones' Appeal (8 W. & S. 142; 42 Am.
Bee. 281), 1135,1236.
Jones' Will, In re (L. R. 2 Ch. D. 362), 653.
Joor®. Williams (38 Miss. 546), 538.
Joralemon ®. Van Eeper (44 N. J. Eq.
299), 858.
Jordan, Ex parte (4 Del. Ch. 615), 1168,
1742.
Jordan ®. Garner (101 Ala. 411), 360.
Jordan®. Money (5 H. L. Cas. 186),
392, 468, 1543, 1545.
Jordan ®. Winner (45 Iowa, 65), 575.
Jortin®. S. E. By. Co. (3DeG.,M. &G.
270), 419.
Jortin, Ex parte (7 Ves. 340), 772.
Joslin ®. Brewitt (Bunb. 112), 245.
Jonrolomon ». Massengill (86Tenn. 82),
922, 1267, 1294.
Joy ®. Campbell (1 Sch. & Let. 328), 563,
1122,1230, 1235.
Joyce ®. De Moleyns (2 J. & H. 374),
600.
Joyce ». Gunnels (2 Eich. Eq. 259), 1426.
Joyce®. Haines (33 N. J. Eq. 99), 656.
Joyce ®. Joyce (2 Moll. 276), 907.
Joyner v. Oonyers (6 Jones Eq. 78), 401.
Joyner ®. Farmer (78 N. Car. 196) , 1490.
Jubber®. Jubber (9Sim. 503), 183, 223.
Judah v. Judd (5 Day, 534), 1117.
Judd v. Mosely (30 Iowa, 425), 218.
Judd ®. O'Brien (21 N. T. 186), 1477.
Judd ®. Warner (2 Dem. 104), 1203, 1210.
Judge ®. Booze (47 Mo. 544), 1099, 1470,
1498.
Judge of Probate v. Jackson (58 N. H.
458), 1694.
Judge of Probate v. Mathes (60 N. H.
433), 1102.
Judson v. Corcoran (17 How. 614), 957,
1117.
Judson ®. Gibbons (5 Wend. 226), 855,
858, 877, 882, 887, 892.
Jaler®. Juler (29 Beav. 34), 144.
Julian v. Eeynolds (8 Ala. 680), 392, 405.
Justis ®. English (30 Gratt. 565), 656,664,
615, 711.
Juvenal v. Jackson (2 Harris, 519), 443.
Juzan®. Toulmin (9 Ala. 662; 44 Am.
Dec. 448), 847, 1120.
K.
Kain v. Gibboney (101 U. S. 362), 744,
745, 747, 753, 756.
Kalbfleisch®. Kalbfleisch (67 N. Y. 354),
1356.
cxxxiv
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.
Kane ®. Bloodgood (7 Johns. Oh. 90; 11
Am. Deo. 417), 461, 465, 467, 1534, 1535,
1537.
Kane ®. Fond duLac (40 Wis. 495), 1048.
Kane ®. Gott (24 Wend. 641 ; 35 Am. Deo.
641), 260, 616, 944.
Kane ®. Kane (L. E. 16 Ch. D. 207), 653.
Kane ®. O'Connors (78 Va. 76), 232,
358.
Kane County ». Herrlngton (50111. 232),
308.
Kanes' Estate (9Phila. 339), 931.
Kankakee Woolen Mill Co. ®. Kampe,
(38 Mo- App. 229), 411.
Kann'a Estate (69 Pa. St. 219), 827.
Kantrowitz v. Prather (31 Ind. 92; 99
Am. Dec. 687), 698, 706.
Karr ®. Karr (6 Dana, 3), 1219.
Karr ®. Washburn (56 Wis. 303), 72.
Kase ®. Painter (77 111. 543) , 705.
Kauflelt ®. Bower (7 S. & R. 64), 578, 591.
Kaufman ®. Rogers (9 W. & S. 323; 42
Am.- Dec. 323), 1582.
Kavanaugh, In re (L. B. 27 Ir. 495),
1206.
Kavanaugh ®. O'Neill (53 Wis. 101), 711.
Kay, Exparte (1 Md. 199), 654.
Kay ®. Scates (37 Pa. St. 31; 78 Am. Dec.
399), 96, 912, 934.
Kaye, In re (L. E. 1 Ch. 387), 24, 905.
Kaye ®. Powel (1 Ves. Jr. 408), 1424.
Kayser ®. Maugham (8 Colo. 232), 231.
Kean ®. Kean (18 S. W. Bep. 1032), 1299.
Kean i. Kean, (19 S. W. Rep. 184), 864.
Keane ®. Deardon (8 East, 242), 937, 940,
1326.
Keane ®. Eobarts (4 Madd. 332), 1248.
Kearney v. Kearney (17 N. J. Eq. 59),
1025, 1152.
Keat v. Allen (2 Vern. 588), 645, 546.
Keate ®. Phillips (L. E. 18 Ch. D. 560),
600.
Keates ®. Burton (14 Ves. 434), 999, 1000.
Keates ®. Cadogan (2 Eng. L. & Eq.
326; IOC. B. 591), 481.
Keating v. Vaughn (61 Tex. 518), 1364.
Keaton ®. Cobb (1 Dev. Eq. 439), 352.
Keaton ®. Greenwood (8 Ga. 97), 1537.
Keaton ®. McGwier (24 Ga. 217), 1738.
Kebble, Ex parte (11 Ves. 604), 836, 837,
838,841.
Keble ®. Thompson (3 Bro. Oh. 112),
1102.
Kee ®. Kee (2 Gratt. 116), 857, 1342, 1696.
Kee®. Vasser (2 Ired. Eq. 553), 715.
Keech v. Sanford (Sel. Oas in Ch. 61;
Lead. Cas. in Equity, 44), 397, 398,
1160.
Keefer v. Schwartz (47 Pa. St. 508), 1011.
Keeler®. Keller (11 N. J. Eq. 458), 1729.
Keeley ®. Smith (L. R. 44 Ch. Div. 654),
1045.
Keeling v. Brown (5 Ves. 359), 1353.
Keen v. James (39 N. J. Eq. 627; 51 Am.
Rep. 29), 494.
Keen v. Walbank (2 B. & Ad. 554), 937,
938.
Keenan v. Missouri Ins. Co. (12 Iowa,
106), 444.
Keene v. Deardon (8 East, 248) , 929, 982.
Kehoe v. Kehoe (22 Am. L. Reg. 656),
807.
Kehoe v. Taylor (31 Mo. App. 588), 1398,
1399.
Kehr ®. Smith (20 Wall. 31), 99, 103, 722.
Keighler v. Savage Manf . Co. (12 Md.
383), 393, 413.
Kelley ».,Monck (3 Eidg. 205), 1041, 1044.
Keim ®. Lindley (30 Atl. Sep. 1063), 639,
1040.
Keiser v. Gannon (95 Mo. 217), 1498,
1509.
Keisteru. Howe (3 Ind. 268), 980.
Keister v. Scott (61 Md. 507), 1619, 1650.
Keith v. Horner (32 111. 624), 574.
Keith v. Kellam (35 Fed. Rep. 243), 414,
494, 1184.
Keith ®. Purvis (4 Desaus. 114), 219, 525,
526.
Keithburg ®. Frick (34 III. 421), 1542.
Kekewick v. Manning (1 Hare, 464, 1 De
G., M. & G. 176), 15, 76, 88, 153,156, 160.
Kekewick ®. Marker (3 Macn. & G. 310) ,
1118.
Keleman, In re (126 N. T. 73), 513.
Kellam v. Allen (52 Barb. 605), 936.
Kellaway v. Johnson (5 Beav. 319), 1223,
1592.
Keller v. Keller (45 Md. 269), 346.
Kellers. Kunkell (56 Md. 569), 237, 308.
Keller v. Phillips (39 N. T. 351), 726.
Kellet v. Eathbun (4 Paige, 102), 1255.
Kellett v. Kellett (1 B. & B. 643; 3 Dow.
P. C. 248), 242, 260.
Kelley v. Jenness (50 Me. 455) , 308, 369.
Kelley v. Euble (11 Ore. 75), 577.
Kelley v. Turner (74 Ala. 513), 704.
Kellogg j>. Carrico (47 Mo. 157), 1095.
Kellogg v. Curtis (69 Me. 212), 448.
Kellogg®. Hale (108111. 164), 912,916.
Kellogg, In re (7 Paige, 265), 1687.
Kellogg v. Wood (4 Paige, 578), 1051.
Kellum®. Smith (33 Pa. St. 158), 526.
Kelly v. Drew (12 Allen, 107), 689.
Kelly®. Duffy (31 Ohio St. 437), 1385.
Kelly®. Hart (61 Mo. 463), 15C7.
Kelly ». Jefferis (13 Mont. 170; 32 Pac.
Eep. 753), 660.
Kelly ®. Johnson (28 Mo. 249), 309, 370.
Kelly v. Karsner (72 Ala. 110), 72, 573.
TABLE OF CASES.
cxxxv
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847 ; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Kelly v. Kendall (118 111. 650), 560.
Kelsal v. Bennett (1 Atk. 522), 438.
Kelsey v. Kelley (63 Vt. 41), 711.
Kelsey v. Snyder (118 111. 544), 362.
Kelsey v. Western (2 Comst. 500), 1322.
Kelso v. Robertson (51 Ark. 397), 714.
Kemp v. Burn (4 Gift. 848), 1191, 1564,
1679.
Kemp v. Carnley (3 Duer, 1), 1415.
Kemp v. Oolman (1 Salk. 156), 546.
Kemp v. Kemp (85 N. Car. 491), 681, 637.
Kemp v. Kemp (5 Ves. 849), 999.
Kemper v. Campbell (44 Ohio St. 210),
560.
Kempton v. Packman (7 Ves. 176), 398.
Kenady v. Edwards (134 U. S. 117), 893,
11(8.
Kenan v. Hall (8 Ga. 417), 1692.
Kendall v. Bates (35 Me. 357), 993, 1049.
Kendall v. Granger (5 Beav. 300), 254.
Kendall v. Mann (11 Allen, 15), 270, 307,
370.
Kendall v. Marsters (2 DeG.,F. & J.
200), 397.
Kendall v. New England Carpet Co. (13
Conn. 383), 1690.
Kendig v. Dean (97 U. S. 423), 1730.
Kendrick v. Eggleston (56 Iowa, 128),
575.
Kennard v. Sax (3 Ore. 263), 710.
Kennedy v. Badgett (19 S. Car. 591),
1619.
Kennedy v. Baker (59 Tex. 150), 1535.
Kennedy v. Browne (3 Ridg. 518), 606.
Kennedy v. Daly (1 Sen. & Lef. 355), 432,
434, 1538.
Kennedy v. Dunn (45 Cal. 330), 1341.
Kennedy v. Dunn (58 Cal. 339), 1005,
1096, 1496, 1498.
Kennedy v. Edwards (134 IT. S. 117), 865.
Kennedy v. Fury (1 Dall. 76), 952.
Kennedy v. Georgia State Bank (8 How
586), 464.
Kennedy v. Green (3 Myl. & K. 718), 479.
Kennedy v. Kennedy (2 Ala. 571), 1178.
Kennedys. Kennedy (57 Mo. 76), 1509.
Kennedy v. Kingston (2 J. & W. 431) ,
641, 999.
Kennedy v. Nunan (52 Cal. 326) ,'1268,
1291, 1298.
Kennedy v. Stalnsby (2 Ves Jr. 66), 245.
Kennedy v. Taylor (20 Kan. 558), 372,
374.
Kennedy v. Ware (1 Barr, 445), 147, 553.
Kennedys. Winn (80 Ala. 166), 878, 883.
Kennedy's Appeal (4 Pa. St. 149), 1688,
1699.
Kennellu. Abbott (4 Ves. 802), 511.
Kenrick v. Beauclerk (3 Bos. & P. 178),
919, 927, 1267.
Kensal v. Bennett (1 Atk. 522), 327.
Kensington, Ex parte (2 V. & B. 79)
600.
Kent?. Ohalfant (7 Minn. 487), 399.
Kent v. Dunham (142 Mass. 216; 56 Am.
Kep. 667), 748.
Kent, Ex parte (3Bro. Ch. 600), 841, 1563.
Kent, Ex parte (3 Bro. Ch. 88), 832.
Kentv. Freehold Land, etc. Co. (L. R.
4Eq.588), 409.
Kent v. Gerhard (12 R. I. 92; 34 Am. Rep.
612), 577, 579.
Kent v. Hutchlns (50 N. H. 92), 1679.
Kent v. Jaekson (14 Beav. 384), 1543,
1545.
Kent v. Plumb (57 Ga. 207), 705, 1033.
Kentish v. Kentish (3 Bro. Ch. 257),
1355.
Kenton Ins. Co. v. McClellan (43 Mich.
564), 707.
Kenton v. Kenton (20 Mo. 530), 392.
Kepw. Bank of N. Y. (10 Johns. 63), 29.
Kepler v. Davis (80 Pa. St. 153), 403.
Kepler v. Erie Dime Sav. Bank (101 Pa.
St. 602), 1408.
Kercheisv. Schloss (49 How. Pr. 284),
1362.
Kerehnerc. Kempton (47 Md. 549), 707.
Kerfoot v. Billings (160 111. 663), 1487,
1508.
Kerivan v. Cullen (4 Ir. Ch. 322), 292.
Kerlins. Campbell (15 Pa. St. 500), 240.
Kern v. Chalfant (7 Minn. 487), 1490.
Kern v. Pfaff (44 Mo. App. 27), 708.
Kerns v. Swope (2 Watts, 78), 451.
Kerr v. Dougherty (79 N. T. 827), 815.
Kerr v. Dungannon (1 Dm. & War. 509),
381, 382.
Kerr v. Hill (27 W. Va. 576), 1569.
Kerr v. Kerr (84 Va. 154) , 560.
Kerr v. Kitchen (17 Pa. St. 433), 1034,
1105.
Kerr v. Laird (27 Miss. 544) , 1255.
Kerr v. Trego (47 Pa. St. 292), 794.
Kerr v. Verner (66 Pa. St. 326), 989.
Kerrison v. Stewart (93 U. S. 155), 1731.
Kerr's Trust, In re (L. R. 4 Ch. D. 600),
636.
Kershaw, Inre (L. R. 6 Eq. 322), 1132,
1602.
Kershaw v. Kalow (1 Jur. (N. S.) 974),
1466.
Kettleby v. Attwood (1 Vern. 298), 298.
Kettlewellu. Watson (L. R. 21 Ch. D.
685), 451.
Keys. Bradshaw (2 Vern. 102), 545.
Key v. Jennings (66 Mo. 356), 307.
Key City, The (14 Wall, 653), 365.
Keyes v. Keyes (11 Heisk. 425) , 725.
Keys v. Bush (2 Paige, 311), 1364, 1405.
CXXXV1
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Keys v. Carleton (141 Mass. 45), 164, 158,
161, 163.
Keyser v. Mitchell (67 Pa. St. 473), 1288,
1290, 1295.
Kiah v. Grenier (56 ST. T. 220), 616.
Kibbe v. Hamilton Ins. Co. (11 Gray,
163), 484.
KIbbett v. Lee (Oh. Oas. 90; Hob. 312),
1009.
Kidney v. Coussmaker (1 Ves. Jr. 436),
1355.
Kidwell v. Kirkpatrick (70 Mo. 214), 656,
657.
Kiefer v. German American-Seminary
(46 Mich. 636), 763, 776.
Kiehnn. Bestor (30 111. App. 467), 1408,
1409.
Kightley v. Kightley (2 Ves. Jr. 328) , 1355.
Kilbee v. Sneyd (2 Moll. 186), 1056, 1128.
Kilby v. Goodwin (2 Del. Oh. 61), 652
664.
Kildare v. Eustace (1 Tern 439), 16, 36.
Kiley v. Brewster (44 111. 186), 958, 1457.
Kilter v. Roger* (19 Minn. 32), 477.
Kilgore, Ex parte (120 Ind. 94), 1239.
Kilgore's Appeal (8 Atl. Eep. 441), 1696.
Killam v. Allen (52 Barb. 605), 616, 917,
918.
Kill ick, Ex parte (3 Mont. D. & De G.
480) , 654.
Killick v. Flesney (4Bro. Oh. 161), 397.
Killinger v. Hartman (21 Neb. 297), 1741.
Kilpatrick v. Johnson (15 N. Y. 322), 820,
821.
Kllpini;. Kilpin (1 Myl.AR.520),335,354,
850.
Kilroy v. Wood (42 Hun, 636) , 1297.
Kilvert's Trusts, In re (L. R. 12 Eq. 183;
7Ch. D. 170), 732,763, 764.
Kim v. Weippert (46 Mo. 532), 665, 708.
Kimball v. Fenner (12 N. H. 248), 440.
Kimball v. Ives (17 Vt. 430), 1537.
Kimball v. Moody (27 Ala, 130), 1723.
Kimball v. Morton (5 N. J. Eq. 26; 43
Am. Dec. 621), 73, 75.
Kimball v. Reding (31 N. H. 352; 64 Am.
Dec. 333) , 1120, 1136, 1202, 1214, 1222.
Kimberu. Barber (L. E. 8 Ch. App. 56),
190, 414.
Kimbrough v. Lane (11 Bush, 556), 556.
Kimbrough v. Nelms (104 Ala. 654; 16
So. Rep. 619), 180, 347.
Kimmel v. MeRight (2 Barr, 38), 354.
Kimmel v. Smith (117 Pa. St. 397), 500,
518, 520.
Kincaid's Trusts, Inre(l Drew. 326),
678.
Kinder v. Miller (Finch, Pr. Oh. 172),
358.
King v. Bell (28 Conn. 593), 452.
King v. Bellord (1 Hem. & M. 343), 27,
874.
King v. Bronson (122 Mass. 122), 1498.
King v. Coggan (6 East, 431), 966.
King v. Cotton (2 P. Wms. 674), 553.
King v. Cushman (41 111. 31), 398, 1701.
King v. Delaval (3 Burr. 1436; 1 W.
Black. 412), 844.
King v. Dennison (IV. &B. 275), 26,
241,243,248,259,261.
King v. Donnelly (5 Paige, 46), 50, 596,
878, 895, 900, 1394.
King v. Duntz (11 Barb. 192), 1109.
King«. Ferguson (2 Nott. & McC. 588),
1279.
King v. Hamilton (16 Hi. 190), 185.
King v. Hargadine (60 Ark. 1), 1366.
King v. Holland (Al. 16; Styl. 21), 41, 42.
King v. Isley (116 Mo. 155; 22 S. W. Rep.
635) , 232, 358.
King©. Johnson (8 Mod. 214), 844.
King v. King (37 Ga. 205), 1134, 1198.
King v. King (3 Johns. Oh. 552), 1202.
King v. King-Harmon (6 Ir. R. Eq.
440), 103.
King v. Lawrence (14 Wis. 238), 859,
862, 980.
King v. Mitchell (8 Pet. 326), 251, 252,
261.
King v. Pardee (6 Otts, 90), 364.
King v. Parker (9 Cush. 71), 941, 942.
Kingi). Phillips (8Bosw. 603), 495.
King v. Phillips (16 Jur. 1080), 891.
Kingzi. Remington (36 Minn. 15; 29 N.
W. Rep. 352), 414, S52, 1184.
Kingti. Roney (5 Ir. Ch. 64), 622.
King v. St. Catharine's Hall (4 T. R.
233), 785.
King v. Savery (5 H. L. Cas. 627), 418.
King v. Smith (21 Beav. 522), 292.
King v. Stow (6 Johns. 323), 1122.
King v. Talbot (50 Barb. 453), 947, 948,
1113, 1135, 1200, 1210, 1255.
King v. Townshend (141 N. T. 358 ; 36 N.
E. Rep. 513), 1278.
King v. Whiton (15 Wis. 684), 1075.
Kingu. Wilder (75111. 275), 263.
Kingu. Wise (43 Cal. 628), 426, 430, 1120.
King v. Woodhull (3 Edw. Ch. 79), 893.
Kingdon v. Bridges (2 Vern. 67), 335.
Kingham v. Lee (15 Sim. 401), 25, 181,
874.
Kingman v. Winchell (20 S. W. Rep.
296), 1269, 1315.
Kingsbury v. Burnside (58 111. 328; 11
Am. Rep. 67), 7, 50, 60, 67, 517.
Kingsbury v. Powers (131 111. 182), 1566.
Kingstone v. Lorton (2 Hog. 166), 128.
Kinike's Estate, In re (155 Pa. St. 101;
25 Atl. Rep. 1016), 749.
TABLE OF CASES.
CXXXVH
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1763.]
Einkead v. McKee (9 Bush, 536), 789.
Kinloch v. I'On (1 Hill Eq. 190; 26 Am.
Dec. 196), 1115.
Einmouth v. Brigham (5 Allen, 270),
1200, 1214.
Einnan v. Gurnsey (64 How. Pr. 253),
1035.
Einnard v. Einnard (5 Watts, 108),
1437.
Einnard v. Thompson (12 Ala. 487),
1318, 1376.
Einnebrew v. Einnebrew (35 Ala. 628),
151, 153.
Einnersley v. Williamson (L. J. (N. S.)
Ch. 788; 18 W. R. 1016), 181.
Einney v. Heatley (13 Ore. 35), 1686.
Einney v. Einney (86 Ey. 10), 87, 731,
746, 748, 763.
Einseyt;. Bennett (37 S. Oar. 319; 15 S.
E. Rep. 965), 503.
Einsley v. Abbott (19 Me. 430), 216, 217,
322.
Einsly v. State (71 lad. 32), 839.
Einterrc. Jencks (48 Pa. St. 466), 133.
Einter v. Jones (122 Ind. 148), 614, 989,
1066, 1106.
Eintzllng v. McElrath (5 Pa. St. 467),
488.
Eip v. Bank (10 Johns. 63), 1632, 1746,
1749.
Eip v. Eip (6 Stew. 216), 647, 652.
Eipp v. Deniston (4 Johns. 23), 1127,
1234.
Eirby v. Bozette (115 N. Car. 165; 21 S.
E. Rep. 697), 660.
Eirby v. Ingersoll (I Doug. 499), 1416.
Eirby v. Miller (4 Coldw. 3), 666.
Eirch v. Lozier (63 Hun, 607; 18 N. T.
Supl. 334), 1179.
Eiricke v. Branshey (2Eq. Ca.Ab. 508),
243.
Eirk v. Pauline (7 Vin. 86), 654, 932.
Eirk v. Webb (Finch Pr. Ch. 84), 358.
Eirkby Hospital, Ex parte (15 Ves. 314),
906.
Eirkham v. Boston (67 111. 599), 574.
Kirklandu. Cox (4111. 400), 111,920, 949,
951, 1114.
Eirkland v. Narramore (105 Mass. 31),
893.
Eirkman v. Bank of Greensboro (77 N.
Car. 394), 709.
Kirkpatrick v. Beauford (21 Ark. 268),
687.
Eirkpatrick v. Clark (132 111. 342; 22 Am.
St. Rep. 531), 951, 956, 1054, 1114.
Eirkpatrick v. Davidson (2 Eelly, 297),
73, 309.
Eirkpatrick, In re (22 N. J. Eq. 463)
1553.
Eirkpatrick v. McDonald (11 Pa. St.
387), 75, 152,532, 961.
Eirkpatrick v. Rogers (7 Ired. Eq. 44),
1355.
Eirkpatrick v. Taylor (43 111. 207), 147.
Eirkwood v. Thompson (2 Hen.&M.
392), 1493.
Eirten v. Spears (44 Ark. 166), 1107.
Elrwan v. Daniel (5 Hare, 493), 50, 1317.
Eisler v. Eisler (2 Watts, 323), 27 Am.
Dec. 308), 223, 308, 500, 520, 525, 532.
Eissam v. Dierkes (49 N. Y. 602), 1079,
1083, 1087.
Eitchen v. Bedford (13 Wall. 413), 203.
Eitson v. Farwell (132 Ind. 327), 495.
Kittle's Estate (156 Pa. St. 415), 1338.
Eittredge v . Warren (14 N. H. 509) , 1383.
Elenke v. Eoeltze (75 Mo. 239), 708.
Eleunderu. Fenske (53 Wis. 118), 414.
Klinew. McDonnell (62Hun,177;16 N.T.
Supl. 649), 371.
Eline v. Ragland (47 Ark. Ill ; 14 S. W.
Rep. 474), 212, 346.
Eline v. Vogel (90 Mo. 245), 560, 1498.
Eline's Appeal (39 Pa. St. 463) , 348.
Elump v. Gardner (114 N. Y. 153), 1416.
Enaggsu. Mastin (9 Ean. 632), 660, 706.
Enapp v. Bailey (79 Me. 195), 447, 448.
Enapp v. Enapp (L. R. 12 Eq. 238), 1528,
1530.
Enapp v. MeGowan (96 N. Y. 75), 1368,
1369.
Enapp v. Noyes (Amb. 662), 1042.
Enapp v. Smith (27N. Y. 277), 687, 688.
Enatchbull v. Hallett (L. E. 13 Ch. D.
696), 1175, 1604, 1626, 1634.
Eneeland v. Cowles (4 Chand. 49), 1368.
Enefler v. Shreve (78 Ey. 297), 1298.
Enight v. Boughton (11 CI. & F. 513), 62.
Enightu. Bowyer (23 Beav. 609; 2 De
G. & J. 421), 33, 419, 424, 823, 1538, 1595.
Enight v. Brown (7 Jur. (N. S.) 894),
1311.
Enight v. Cameron (14 Ves. 289), 1043.
Enight v. Gould (2 Myl. & E. 295), 1016.
Enight, In re (27 Beav. 49), 1135.
Enight v. Enight (L. R. 18 Eq. 487), 675,
682.
Enight v. Enight (3 Beav. 172), 118, 119,
121, 123.
Enight v. Enight (2 S. & S. 490), 840.
Enight v. Enight (35 W. Va. 40; 13 S. E.
Rep. 63), 209.
Enight v. Loomis (30 Me. 204), 853,855,
860.
Enight v. Majoribanks (2Macn.& G.
10; 2 Hall &T. 308), 395.
Enight v . Packer (12 N. J. Eq. 214), 1367.
Enight v. Waterman (36 Pa. St. 268),
1367.
CXXXV111
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Knight v. Yarborough (Glim. 27), 625.
Knight's Estate, In re (159 Pa. St. 500; 28
Atl. Rep. 303; 34 W. N. 0. 6), 733, 809.
Knight's Will, In re Sarah (L. E. 26 Ch.
D. 82), 1670.
Kniskern v. Lutheran Church (1 Sandf.
Ch. 439), 789, 798, 799,800.
Knoch v. Van Bernuth (145 N. T 643; 40
N. E. Eep. 398), 1253.
Knott!). Cottee (16 Beav. 77), 131, 1219,
1255.
Knouff v. Thompson (16 Pa. St. 357), 354.
Knower v. Central Nat. Bank (124 N. Y.
552, 27 K. E. Eep. 247), 1388.
Knowles, Inre (18 L. T. 809), 1131.
Knowles v. Knowles (86111. 1), 1679.
Knowles v. McCamly (10 Paige, 346), 664,
698, 709.
Knowles v. Eobin (20 Iowa, 101), 452.
Knowltonu. Brady (17 N. H. 458), 1102,
1134, 1202, 1214, 1255.
Knox v. Bigelow (15 Wis. 415), 1679.
Knox v. Childersburg Land Co. (86 Ala.
180), 660, 704.
Knoxsj.Gye (L. E. 5 H. L. Cas. 656),
198, 224, 379.
Knox v. Jordan (5 Jones Eq. 175), 709.
Knox j). Knox (59 Wis. 172; 18 N. W.
Eep. 155), 117, 123, 128.
Knox v. McCain (13 Lea, 197), 1515.
Knox v. McParran (4 Col. 586), 355, 369.
Knuckolls v. Lea (10 Humph. 577), 483.
Knye v. Moore (1 S. & S. 61), 560, 1117.
Kock v. Both (150111. 212; 37 N. E. Eep.
317), 574.
Koebera. Sturgls (2 Beav. 588), 680.
Koechllng's Appeal of (144 Pa. St. 215;
22 Atl. Eep. 808), 710.
Koehlor v. Iron Co. (2 Black (U. S.) , 715 ;
17 Law Ed. 339), 411.
Koenig's Appeal (57 Pa. St. 352), 252, 922,
923,942, 1268, 1307.
Koester v. Burke (81 111. 436), 1108.
Kohinoor Laundry Co. v. Lockwood
(141 Ind. 140; 40 N. E. Eep. 677), 660.
Kohn v. Collison (27 Atl. Eep. 834), 660.
Koontz v. Nabb (16 Md. 549), 707.
Kopp v. Gunther (95 Cal. 63; 30 Pac.
Eep. 301), 159.
Kornegay v. Spicer (76 N. Car. 95), 1467.
Kornegay v. Styron (105 N. Car. 14; 11
S. E. Eep. 153), 581.
Korns v. Shaffer (27 Md. 83), 1490, 1491.
Kost v. Bender (25 Mich. 515), 474.
Koster v. Miller (149 111. 195; 37 N. E.
Eep. 46), 336.
Kraemer v. Deusterman (37 Minn. 469;
35 N. W. Eep. 297), 189, 333, 417.
Kraft v. Smith (117 Pa. St. 365; 11 Atl.
Eep. 370), 625.
Kramer v. McOaughey (11 Mo. App. 426),
75.
Krause v. Means (12 Kan. 335), 607.
Krecker v. Shirley (163 Pa. St. 534; 30
Alt. Eep. 440; 35 W N. C. 165), 794,
797)
Kremelburg v. Kremelburg (52 Md.
563), 726.
Kreitz v. Frost (55 Barb. 478), 1668, 1678.
Krinen. Welpitt (3 Sim. 533), 837.
Krouskop v. Shoutz (51 Wis. 209), 699,
711.
Krugji. McGilllard (76 Ind. 28), 1361.
Krupp v. Scholl (10 Pa. St. 193), 553.
Kruse v. Prindle (8 Ore. 158), 1364.
Krusea. Stevens (47 111. 112), 400, 1184.
Kruss v. Eobertson (154 111. 394; 40 N.
E. Eep. 343), 798.
Kuhn v. Newman (26 Pa. St. 227), 672.
Kuhn v. Stansfleld (28 Md. 210; 92 Am.
Dec. 641), 681, 707.
Kuker v. Mclntire (43 S. Oar. 117; 20 S.
E. Eep. 976), 710.
Kunst, Ex parte (1 Bail. Eq. 489), 596,
902.
Kuntzleman's Estate (136 Pa. St. 142;
20 Am. St. Eep. 909), 934, 935.
Kurtz v. Bank of Columbia (2 Craneh
C. C. 701), 203.
Kutz's Appeal (40 Pa. St. 90), 1533, 1537.
Kygeri). Eyley (2 Neb. 20), 1440.
Kyle v. Barnett (17 Ala. 306), 1210.
Kyleo. Fait (6 Gratt. 44), 441, 442, 579.
Labareen. Colby (99 Mass 559), 707.
Labouisse v. Eope Co. (43 La Ann, 245),
575.
Lacey, Ex parte (6 Ves. 625), 332, 382, 391,
399, 426, 899.
Lacey v. Hole (37 Pa. St. 360), 398.
Lacey v. Wilson (4 Munf. 313), 445.
Lackland v. Smith (5 Mo. App. 153),
1310.
Laclede Bank v. Keeler (109 111. 385),
1498.
Lacon v. Allen (3 Drew. 579), 600.
Lacon v. Lacon (2 Atk. 395), 1536.
Ladd». Ladd (8 How. 30), 1009.
Ladd v. Smith (107 Ala. 506; 10 So. Eep.
836), 1239.
Lade v. Holford (Bull, N. P. 110), 980,
983, 984.
Lade ».Lade (1 Wils. 21), 307.
Lade v. Shepherd (2 Str. 1004), 952.
Lafette v. Lawson (25 Ga. 305), 101.
Laffer v. Naglee (9 Cal. 662) , 398.
Lafferty v. Turley (3 Sneed, 157), 392,
1638.
TABLE OF CASES.
CXXX1X
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Lafierty's Estate, In re (17 Pa. Co. Ct.
401; 5Pa. Dist. Rep. 75), 1689, 1693,
1698.
Lafort v. Carpenter (91 Hun, 76; 36 N.
T. Supl. 168), 1629.
Lagow». Badollet (lBlackf. 416), 575.
La Grange Co. Com. v. Rogers (55 Ind.
299), 747.
Lahey v. Kortright (132 N. Y. 450; 30
N. E. Rep. 989), 1019.
Lahy v. Holland (8 Gill, 445; 50 Am. Dec.
705), 1054.
Laldlaw v. Organ (2 Wheat. 178), 472,
487, 488, 493.
Laing v. McKee (13 Mich. 124; 87 Am..
Dec. 738), 231.498,518.
Laird v. Bass (50 Tex. 412), 749.
Lakei). Albert (37 Minn. 453), 1053.
Labeu. Craddock (1 Eq. Ab. 291; 3 P.
Wms. 158), 600.
Lake v. De Lambert (4 Ves. 592), 24, 26,
905.
Lake v. Frier (11 III. App. 576), 59,71,
852.
Lake v. Gibson (1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 291 ; 3 P.
Wms. 168), 215, 216, 320.
Lake v. Lake (Amb. 126), 238.
Lakin, Exparte (4 Russ. 307), 832, 841.
Lakin v. Sierra Buttes Gold Mining Co.
(25 Fed. Rep. 337) , 377.
Lallance v. Fisher (29 W. Va. 513), 1101,
14S9, 1498, 1509.
Lalorj). McCarthy (24 Minn. 417), 1486.
Lamar v. Mlcou (112 U. S. 452), 1212, 1213,
1214.
Lamar v. Pearre (82 Ga. 354; 14 Am. St.
Rep. 168), 1106.
Lamar v. Simpson (1 Rich. Eq. 71), 40.
Lamar v. Wright (31 S. Car. 60), 600,
518, 520.
Lambo. Cain (129 Ind. 486; 14 L. R. A.
518; 29 N. E. Rep. 13), 795, 797.
Lamb v. Eames (L. R. 10 Eq. 267), 111,
120, 253.
Lamb v. Goodwin (10 Ired. 320) , 1507.
Lamb v. Laughlin (25 W. Va. 300) 1411.
Lamb v. Milnes (5 Ves. 519), 655.
Lamb v. Orton (1 Dr. & Sm. 125), 88, 156.
Lamb v. Pierce (113 Mass. 72), 450.
Lamb's Appeal (58 Pa. St. 142), 1218.
Lambert v. Lambert (L. R. 39 Cb. D.
626), 674.
Lambert u. Lambert (2 Bro. P. C. 18),
685.
Lambert v. Newman (56 Ala. 623), 449.
Lambert v. Parker (Coop. 143), 837.
Lamberts. Peyton (8H. L. Cas. l),101,
102.
Lambert v. Stees (47 Minn. 141; 49 N. W.
Rep. 662), 192.
Lambert «. Thwaites (L. R. 2 Eq. 151),
620,624,626,627,999.
Lamberton v. Pereles (87 Wis. 449; 23
L. R. A. 826), 157, 1636.
Lamleec. Hanman (2 Vern. 499), 642,
645,546.
Lammer v. Stoddard (103 N. T. 672),
1535.
Lamoreauxu. Van Rensalear (1 Barb.
Ch. 34), 1025.
L'Amoureux v. Crosby (2 Paige, 422 ; 22
Am. Dee. 655), 13.
Lamotte, In re (L. R. 4 Ch. D. 325), 869.
Lampert v. Lampert (1 Ves. Jr. 21),
645.
Lamplugh v. Lamplugh (1 1'. Wms.
112), 27, 174,336.
Lanabanu. Latrobe (7 Md. 268), 1383.
Lancashire v. Lancashire (1 De G. &
Sm. 288; 2 Phill. 664), 896, 1017.
Lancaster Charities (7 Jur. (N. S.) 96),
907.
Lancaster v. Dolan (1 Rawle, 231; 18
Am. Dec. 625), 665, 921, 933, 1074.
Lancaster!). Thornton (2 Burr. 1027),
940.
Lance v. Gorman (136 Pa. St. 200; 20
Atl. Rep. 792; 27 W. N. C. 45), 204.
Lance v. Norman (2 Ch. Rep. 41), 548.
Lanchester v. Thompson (5 Madd. 4),
1732.
Land Co. v. Chisholm (71 Tex. 623),
1542.
Land Credit-Co. v. Fermoy (L. R. 8 Eq.
12; L. R. 5 Ch. 763), 406, 1233.
Landis v. Saxton (105 Mo. 486) , 1535.
Landis v. Scott (32 Pa. St. 495), 1151.
Landis v. Wooden (1 Ohio St. 160), 1721.
Landis' Appeal (102 Pa. St. 467), 794.
Landon v. Hutton (50 N. J. Eq. 600; 25
Atl. Rep. 953), 150, 153.
Landrum v. Union Bank (6 Mo. 48),
1453, 1455, 1498.
Lane v. Bishop (65 Vt. 575), 661.
Lane v. Debenham (11 Hare, 188), 873),
1088.
Lane v. Dighton (Amb. 409), 204, 265,
325,326, 534, 1632.
Lane v. Ewing (31 Mo. 75), 47, 152.
Lane o. Holmes (55 Minn. 379; 57 X. W.
Rep. 132) , 1503.
Lane D.Lane (80 Me. 570; 16 Atl. Rep.
323), 334, 339, 367.
Lane v. Lewis (4 Dem. 468), 904.
Lane v. Ludlow (2 Paine, 591), 586.
Laneu. Royster (118 N. Car. 159; 24 S.
E. Rep. 703), 1703.
Lane's Appeal 24 Pa. St. 487), 1686.
Lanesborough v. Kilmaine (2 Moll. 403),
438.
cxl
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.'
Lang v. Everling (3 Misc. Eep. 530; 23
N. T. Supl. 329), 150.
Lang v. Stansel (106 Ala. 389 ; 17 So. Rep.
519), 1447.
Langdale, In re (L. R. 10 Bq. 39), 1131.
Lange v. Eopke (5 Sand. 363), 617, 1522.
Langford v. Auger (4 Sim. 313), 970.
Langford n. Byre (IP. Wms. 740), 1009.
Langford v. Gascoyne (11 Ves. 333),
1122, 1230, 1240, 1591.
Langford v. Mahoney (2 Conn. & L. 327 ;
2 Dr. & War. 110), 1058, 1701.
Langham v. Sanford (17 Ves. 435), 144,
238.
Langley v. Brown (2 Atk. 202), 504.
Langley v. Fisher (9 Beav. 90), 1538.
Langley v. Hawke (5 Madd. 46), 1576.
Langmead's Trusts (7 De G., M. & G.
353), 1652.
Langsdale v. Smith (16 Otto, 392), 464.
Langsdale v. Woolen (99 Ind. 576), 72.
Langstaff v. Taylor (14 Ves. 262), 425.
Langston, .Ex parte (17 Ves. 230), 600.
Langston v. Olivant (G. Coop. 33), 1204.
Langton v. Horton (1 Hare, 549), 34.
Langworthy v. Chadwick (13 Conn. 42),
1437.
Lanier v. Mcintosh (117 Mo. 608), 1504.
Lanning v. Streeter (67 Barb. 33), 1403.
Lanoy v. Athol (2 Atk. 444), 1528.
Lansdale v. Smith (106 U. S. 391), 1542.
Lansing v. Goelet (9 Cow. 345), 1497.
Lansing v. Lansing (45 Barb. 182), 884,
885.
Lansing v. Woodworth (1 Sandf. Ch.
43), 1368.
Lantsberry v. Collier (2 Kay & J. 709),
1012.
Lantzu. Worth ington (4 Pa. St. 153},
1098.
Lape v. Jones (15 S. W. Eep. 658), 1673.
Lapish v. Wells (6 Me. 176), 488.
Larco v. Casanueva (30 Cal. 560), 392,
1109.
Large's Appeal (54 Pa. St. 383), 302.
Larimer v. Kelly (10 Kan. 298), 706.
Larkin, In re (W. N. (1872) p. 85), 1132.
Larkins v. Rhodes (5 Port. 196), 197, 270,
313.
Larkins v. Rhodes (8 S. & R. 484), 355.
Larmonti. Knight (140111. 232; 29 N. E.
Eep. 1116; 30 N, E. Eep. 318), 427.
Lamed v. Welton (40 Cal. 349), 1021.
Larrowe v. Beam (10 Ohio, 498), 437.
Laskey v. Perrysburgh (35 Ohio St.
519), 1009.
Lasley v. Lasley (1 Duv. 117), 904, 1718.
Lass v. Sternberg (50 Mo. 124), 1496.
Lasselle v. Burnett (1 Blackf. 150),
453.
Latham v. Henderson (47111. 185), 212,
308, 316.
Latham v. Myers (57 Iowa, 519), 839.
Lathrop v. Bampton (31 Cal. 17; 89 Am.
Dec. 141),204,327,328,388, 1582, 1583,
1607, 1625.
Lathrop J). Banble (106 Mo. 470; 17 S. W.
Eep. 584), 901, 904, 1575.
Lathrop v. Brown (65 Ga. 312), 1464.
Lathrop v. Smalley (23 N. J. Eq. 192),
1212, 1213, 1220, 1679, 1690, 1692, 1699.
Lathrop v. Wightman (5 Wright, 297),
392.
Latimer v. Hanover (1 Bland, 51), 1220.
Latimer v. Hanson (1 Bland, 51), 884,
889, 1132.
Latimer, In re (L. E. 7 Eq. 353), 772.
Latimer v. Logwood (27 S. W. Rep.
960), 310.
Latrobe, etc. Assn. v. Fritz (152 Pa. St.
224; 34 W. N. C. 330; 25 Atl. Rep.
658), 710.
Latrobe v. Baltimore (19 Md. 13), 961.
Latrobe v. Tiernan (4 Md. Ch. 474),
1122, 1236.
Latshaw's Appeal (122 Pa. St. 142), 1613.
Lattier v. Rachals (12 La. Ann. 695),
1049.
Latymer's Charity, In re (L. R. 7 Eq.
353), 733.
Lauer v. Brunson (21 S. Car. 41), 1690.
Laughlin v. Fairbanks (8 Mo. 367), 1117.
Laurel County Ct. v. Trustees (93 Ky.
379; 20 S. W. Rep. 258), 1133,1230.
Laurens v. Jenney (1 Spear, 356), 96,
929, 939.
Laurens v. Lucas (6 Rich. Eq. 217), 1649,
1653.
Laury v. McGee (3 Head, 267), 161.
Lauterman v. Abernathy (47 111. 437),
151.
Lavender v. Abbott (30 Ark. 172), 574,
580.
Lavender v. Stanton (6 Mad. 46), 1665.
Law v. Butler (44 Minn. 482), 576.
Lawn. Grant (37 Wis. 548), 485, 489, 493.
Lawless^. Shaw (1 D. &G. 154; 5 CI. &
F. 129 ; 1 LI. & G. 164) , 1058.
Lawley v. Hooper (3 Atfe. 279), 380.
Lawlor v. Henderson (10 Ir. R. Eq. 150),
633.
Lawrence v. Bank (35 N. T. 320), 1403.
Lawrence v. Beverly (2 Keble, 841), 298.
Lawrence v. Davis (3 McLean, 177),
1380,1381.
Lawrence v. Cooke (104 N. T. 632), 139.
Lawrence v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. (3
Kern. 200), 1442, 1462, 1484.
Lawrence v. Garner (1 N. Y. Supl.
534), 1700.
TABLE OF CASES.
cxli
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.'
Lawrence v. Gayetty (78 Cal. 131; 12
Am. St. Rep. 29), 217.
Lawrence v. Maggs (1 Eden, 453), 1160.
Lawrence v. Smith (163 111. 149; 46 N. E.
Eep. 259), 1523.
Lawrence v. Stratton (6 Cush. 163), 445.
Lawrence Co. v. Leonard (83 Pa. St.
206), 111.
Lawrence's Estate (136 Pa. St. 354; 26
W.N. C. 537), 1523.
Lawrie v. Banks (4 Kay & J. 142), 943.
La wry v. Spaulding (73 Me. 31), 308.
Laws v. Laws (76 Va. 527), 237, 308.
Lawson v. Copeland (2Bro. Ch. 157),
1217.
Lawson v. Hurst (153111. 232; 38 N. E.
Eep. 629), 429, 497.
Lawson v. Kolbenson (61 111. 407), 789.
Lawson v. Lawson (7Bro. P. C. 521),
246.
Lawson v. Lawson (117 111. 98), 72.
Lawson v, Morrison (6 Dana, 471), 964.
Lawthorn v. Carter (11 Bush, 7), 981.
Lawton v. Elwes (L. E. 34 Ch. D. 675),
1708, 1709.
Lawton v. Ford (L. E. 2 Eq. 97), 1536.
Lawton v. Sager (11 Barb. 349), 163.
Lawyers. Cipperly (7 Paige, 281), 789.
Lay v. Brown (13 B. Mon. 295), 675.
Lay v. Lay (10 S. Car. 208), 860.
Layardn. Maud (L. E. 4 Eq. 397), 600.
Laytin v. Davidson (29 Hun, 622), 1706.
Layton v. Layton (1 Sm. & Gif. 179),
678.
Lazarus v. Bryson (3 Binn. 54), 383, 390,
393, 394, 405, 414, 416.
Lean. Clarksdale Bank & Trust Co. (72
Miss. 317; 16 So. Eep. 431), 707.
Leach v. Duvall (8 Bush, 201), 553.
Leach v. Leach (18 Pick. 68), 398.
Leach v. Leach (13 Sim. 304), 183,184,
229.
Leach v. Thomas (27 111. 467), 105.
Leach v. Wilson County (68 Tex. 353),
1533.
Leadbrooke v. Bleaden (16 Jur. 630),
888.
Leaheyn. Witte (123 Mo. 207; 27 S. W.
Eep. 402), 218, 385.
Leake v. Benson (27 Gratt. 157), 711.
Leake v. Leake (5 Ir. Eq . 366) , 946,
Leake v. Eobinson (2 Meriv. 384), 838.
Leake v. Watson (58 Conn. 332; 20 Atl.
Eep. 343), 890, 1572, 1630.
Learn. Chouteau (23 111. 39), 370.
Learn. Matthews (Wright, 374), 415.
Learned v. Foster (117 Mass. 89), 1508.
Learned v. Geer (139 Mass. 31), 1506.
Learned v. Tritsch (6 Colo. 432), 231,
355.
Learned v. Welton (40 Cal. 349), 1090,
1126.
Learoyd v. Whitely (L. E. 12 App. Cas.
727), 1135, 1248.
Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont (L. E. 9
Eq. 345), 810.
Leavitt n. Beime (21 Conn. 1), 228, 705,
999, 1271, 1301.
Leavens v. Butler (8 Port. 38), 1016.
Leavitt ». Leavitt (47 N. H. 329), 103.
Leavitt v. Pell (25 N. Y. 474), 1074.
Leavitt v. Wooster (14 N. H. 551), 1145,
1150, 1322.
Leay craft v. Hedden (3 Green Ch. 512),
11,664,668.
Leazuren. Hillegas (7 S. & E. 321), 20.
Lebanon Trust, etc. Co. In re (166 Pa.
St, 622), 1607.
Le Breton v. Pierce (2 Allen, 8), 1625.
Lechmere v. Carlisle (3 P. Wms. 222),
152, 299.
Lechmere v. Charlton (15 Ves. 193),
1528.
Lechmere v. Lavie (2 Myl. & K. 197), 62,
125, 130.
Ledford v. Smith (6 Bush, 129), 575.
Ledge v. Morse (16 Johns. 199), 363.
Ledlie v. Vrooman (41 Barb. 112), 698.
Ledwith v. Ledwith (1 Dem. 154), 1553.
Ledyardu. Butler (9 Paige, 132), 435.
Ledyard's Appeal (51 Mich. 623), 1721.
Lee v. Browder (61 Ala. 288), 358.
Lee v . Brown (4 Ves. 362) , 1601 .
Lee v. Clary (38 Mich. 223), 1451.
Lee v. Coh i ck (49 Mo . App . 188) , 708.
Lee v. Fox (6 Dana, 171), 223.
Lee v. Lee (55 Ala. 590), 826, 1202.
Lee v. Lee (L. E. 15 Eq. 204), 1665.
Lee v. Muggeridge (1 V. & B. 118), 666,
697.
Leer. Patten (34 Fla. 149; 15 So. Eep.
775), 310.
Lee v. Priaeux (3 Bro. Ch. 381), 651, 686.
Leen. Eandolph (2 Hen. & M. 12), 696,
895, 900.
Lee v. Sankey (L. E. 15 Eq. 204), 1122.
Lee v. Stuart (2 Leigh, 76), 12.
Leen. Tannenbaum (62 Ala. 501), 704.
Leen. Tiernan (Add. 348), 1627.
Lee v. Wilcox (6 Ves. 606), 985.
Lee ©.Wilson (L. R. (1892) 1 Ch.8«). 1192.
Leech v. Leech (1 Ch. Cas. 248), 146.
Leed v. Beene (23 L. T. 26), 1536.
Leedham v. Chawner (4 Kay &U. 458),
1701.
Leedomv. Lombaert (80 Pa. St. 381),
1257.
Leeds v. Amherst (2 Phill. 123; 20 Beav.
239),468,1175,1543, 1545.
Leeds v. Munday (3 Ves. 348), 970.
cxlii
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Leeds v. Wakefield flO Gtray, 614), 1079,
1086.
Leeperu. Taylor (111 Mo. 312; 19 S. W.
Eep. 955), 150, 1702.
Leesu. Nuttall (1 Russ. &M.53; lTaml.
282; 2 Myl. & K. 819), 193, 330, 383, 389,
391, 412.
Leet v. McMaster (51 Barb. 236), 1506.
Le Fevre v. Toole (84 N. Y. 95), 1357.
Leffler v. Armstrong (4 Iowa, 482; 68
Am. Dec. 672), 880, 1093, 1444.
Le Fort v. Benton (3 Edw. Oh. 33), 603.
Lefroy v. Flood (4 Ir. Ch. 1) , 128.
Legard v. Johnson (3 Ves. 359), 686, 722,
723.
Le Gendre v. Byrnes (44 N. J. Eg. 372;
14Atl. Eep. 621), 413.
Leger v. Bonaffe (2 Barb. 475), 1408.
Legg». Goldwire (Cas. temp. Talb. 20),
104.
Legg v. Mackrell (1 Glff. 166), 888.
Leggett v. Dubois (6 Paige, 114), 43, 267,
363, 967.
Leggett v. Grimmett (86 Ark. 498), 864,
866, 874.
Leggett v. Hunter (25 Barb. 81; 19 N. T.
445), 893, 894, 999, 1019, 1022, 1034, 1065.
Leggett v. Perkins (2 N. T. 297), 616,916,
919.
Leggett v. Reed (1 Car. & P. 16), 724.
Leggett v. Sutton (18 S. W. Rep. 125),
332.
Leggett v. Wall (2 A. K. Marsh. 149),
441.
Legh v. Legh (1 B. & P. 447), 961, 1049.
Lehman v. Collins (69 Ala. 127), 601.
Lehman v. Lewis 1,62 Ala. 129), 270, 358.
Lehman v. Rothbarth (159 111. 270 ; 42 N .
E. Rep. 777), 1564, 1685, 1693.
Leigh v.Barry (3 Atk. 584), 1122, 1127,
1234.
Leigh v. Harrison («9 Miss. 923; 11 So.
Rep. 604), 1288, 1292.
Leigh v. Leigh (15 Ves. 100), 633.
Leigh v. Macauley (1 Y. & C. 260), 433.
Leiehton v. Sheldon (16 Minn. 243),
707.
Leinster, In re (L. R. 21 Ir. 152), 1436.
Leiper». Hoffman (26 Miss. 615), 309.
Lei9enringw. Black (5 Watts, 303), 390.
Leitch v. Hollister (4 N. Y. 211), 1368.
Leltchv. Wells (48 N. Y. 585; 48 Barb.
637) , 402, 452.
Leland v Manning (4 Hun, 7), 1345.
Lemaat. Sherman (117 111. 567), 873.
Leman v. Whitely (4 Russ. 423), 72, 176,
503.
Lemann's Trust, In re (L. R. 22 Ch. D.
633), 869, 904.
Lemmon v. Hall (20 Md. 168), 1689.
Lemmond v. Peoples (6Ired. Eq. 137),
255.
Lemon v. Jennings (52 Ga. 452), 993,
1052.
Lempster v. Pomfret (1 Ambl. 154; 1
Dick. 238), 1427.
Lench v. Lench (10 Ves. 516), 204, 326,
358, 359, 534, 536, 1632.
Lenehan v. McCabe (2Ir. Eq. 342), 443.
Le Neve v. Le Neve (Amb. 436; 3 Atk.
646; 1 Ves. 64), 431, 433, 596.
Lengenfelter v. Rltchings (58 Pa. St.
485), 431.
Lenox v. Reed (12 Kan. 223), 1440.
Lent v. Howard (89 N. Y. 169), 618, 1198,
1760.
Lentilhon v. Moffatt (1 Edw. Ch. 451),
1369.
Leonard v. Barnum (34 Wis. 105), 493.
Leonard v. Diamond (31 Ind. 636), 917,
920, 924, 930.
Leonard v. Gascoyne (11 Ves. 333) , 1643.
Leonard v. Green (30 Minn. 496), 355.
Leonardo. Green (34 Minn. 137), 370.
Leonard v. Leonard (2 B. &B. 171), 491,
494.
Leonard v. Leonard (14 Pick. 280), 1314.
Leonard v. Putnam (51 N. H. 247), 847.
Lepage v. McNamara (5 Iowa, 124), 750,
777.
Lerow ». Wilmarth (9 Allen, 382), 1029,
1157.
Leslie v. Baillie (2 Y. & C. Ch. 91) , 1194.
Leslie v. Blrnie (2 Russ. 114), 801.
Leslie v. Duke of Devonshire (2Bro.
Ch. 187), 254.
Leslie v. Guthrie (1 Bing. 697), 34, 975.
Leslie v. Leslie (52 N. J. Eq. 332; 31 Atl.
Rep. 170), 62.
Lester v. Frazer (Ripley Ch. 76; 2 Hill,
Ch. 529), 12.
Lester v. Hodgson (L. R. 4 Eq. 30), 75. i
L'Estrange v. L'Estrange (1 Eng. L. &
Eq. 153), 38.
Letcher v. Letcher (4 J. J. Marsh. 590),
197, 309, 313, 316, 355.
LeTouche v. Lucan (7 CI. & Fin. 672),
1317.
LeVasseur v. Scratton (14 Sim. 116),
680.
Lever v. Andrews (7 Bro. P. C. 288), 307.
Levering v. Heighe (2 Md. Ch. 81), 12.
Levering v. Levering (3 Md. Ch. 365),
12.
Levet v. Needham (2 Vern. 138), 238, 243,
836.
Levi v. Earl (30 Ohio St. 147), 702, 709.
Levi v. Evans (57 Fed. Rep. 677), 1071.
Levy v. Bank U. S. (1 B inn. 27), 629.
Levy v. Brush (45 N. Y. 689), 502, 525.
TABLE OF CASES.
cxliii
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
vy v. Chicago Nat. Bank (158 111. 88),
1408.
Levy v. Levy (33 N. Y. 97; 40 Barb. 585),
17, 21,83, 750, 752,812.
Lewark v. Carter (117 Ind. 206), 1739.
Lewellin v. Oobbold (1 Sin. & G. 376),
548, 551.
Lewin'a Trusts, Inre (20 Beav. 378), 678,
682.
Lewis v. Alienby (L. E. 10 Bq. 668), 735.
Lewis v. Bacon (3 Hen. & Munf. 89),
1320.
Lewis v. Baird (3 McLean, 56), 878, 879,
882.
Lewis v. Beatty, (32 Miss. 52), 576.
Lewis v. Bldg. & Loan Assn. (70 Ala.
• 276) , 309.
Lewis v. Citizens' Nat. Bank (95 Ky.
79;23S. W. Rep. 667), 141.
Lewis v. Darling (16 How. 10), 1355.
Lewis v. Duane (141 N. Y. 302; 36 N. E.
Eep. 322) , 53.
Lewis v. Elrod (38 Ala. 17), 656.
Lewis d. Ereke (2Ves. 511), 1529.
Lewis v. Hillman (3 H. L. Cas. 607; 18
Eng. L. & Eq. 34), 104, 416, 1184, 1533,
1535, 1559.
Lewis, In re (3 Misc. Eep. 164), 1752.
Lewis, In re (81 N. Y. 421), 1118, 1396,
1397, 1399.
Lewis v. James (8 Humph. 537), 964.
Lewis v. Johns (24 Cal. 98), 688.
Lewis v. Jones (4B. & C. 506), 489.
Lewis v. Knox (2 Bibb, 453), 556.
Lewis v. Lewis (2 Ch. E. 77), 71, 72.
Lewis v. Lewis (1 Cox, 162), 1530.
Lewis v. Lewis (33 Pac. Eep. 38), 312.
Lewis v. Maddocka (8 Ves. 150; 17 Ves.
48), 201,204,326, 534,535.
Lewis v. Marshall (1 McLean, 16; 5 Pet.
496), 469.
Lewis v. Matthews (L. E. 8 Eq. 277),
893.
Lewis v. Maxwell (L. E. 8 Eq. 277), 893.
Lewis v. Mohr (97 Ala. 366; 11 So. Eep.
765), 206, 345.
Lewis v. Nelson (1 McCart. 94), 36.
Lewis v. Nobbs (L. E. 8 Ch. D. 591),
1128, 1236.
Lewis v. Phillips (17 Ind. 108), 441.
Lewis «. Pjtmau (104 Mo. 281), 1264.
Lewis v. Eeed (11 Ind. 239), 1022, 1140.
Lewis v. Eees (3 Kay & J. 132), 942.
Lewis v. Eiegler (105 Mo. 604), 502.
Lewis v. Robinson (10 Watts, 315), 364.
Lewis v. Simon (72 Tex. 470), 1388.
Lewis v. Starke (10 Sm. & M. 268), 977,
978.
Lewis v, Taylor (96 Ky, 556; 29 S. W.
Eep, 444), 208.
Lewis v. Thornton (6 Munf. 87) , 1322.
Lewis v. Trask (L. E. 21 Ch. D. 862), 1680,
1681.
Lewis v. Wells (50 Ala. 198), 1502.
Lewis v. Woods (4 Daly, 243), 698.
Lewis v. Yale (4 Fla. 418), 664, 705.
Lewis v. Ziegler (105 Mo. 604; 16 S. W.
Eep. 862), 219.
Lewis' Appeal (67 Pa. St. 166), 562.
Lewis' Estate, In re (166 Pa. St. 337; 27
Atl. Eep. 35), 660.
Lewis' Estate, In re (11 Pa. Co. Ct. 561),
786.
Lexington Ins. Co. v. Page (17 B. Mon.
412; 66 Am. Dec. 165), 1569.
Llddard v. Liddard (28 Beav. 266) , 127,
128.
Lidderdale v. Montrose (4 T. E. 248), 38.
Liebes v. Stefley (32 Pac. E. p. 261), 660.
Liebman v. Harcourt (2 Meriv. 513),
326, 535.
Liesenring v. Black (5 Watts, 303), 414,
417.
Life Association v. Siddall (3De G., F.
& J. 68), 603, 674, 876, 1223, 1240, 1248,
1540, 1591, 1595, 1598.
Liggett v. Wall (2 A. K. Marsh. 149), 387,
432,434, 695.
Light v. Scott (88 111. 239), 154, 159, 175.
L ght i>. Zeller (144 Pa. St. 570). 346.
Liquorish, Ex parte (L. E. 25 Q. B. Div.
176), 1708.
Lill v. Brant (6 Brad. 366), 1363, 1364,
1368.
Lill v. Neafie (31 111. 101), 904.
Liley v. Hay (1 Hare, 580), 166. 641.
Lillard v. Turner (16 B. Mon. 482; 63 Am.
Dec. 553), 664, 706.
Lillia v. Airey (1 Ves. Jr. 277), 693.
Lime Eock Bank v. Plimpton (17 Pick.
159; 28 Am. Dec. 286), 1188, ll>-9.
Lincoln v. Aldrich (141 Mass. 344), 1002,
1062, 1131.
Lincoln v. Allen (4 Bro. P. C. 553), 1255.
Lincoln?;. Purcell (2 Head, 143; 73 Am.
Dee. 196), 992.
Lincoln v. Howe (51 Mo. 671), 708.
Lincoln v. Winsor (9 Hare, 158;, 1058.
Lindeman v. Ingham (36 Ohio St. 1),
1387.
Lindley v. Cross (31 Ind. 106; 99 Am.
Dec. 610) , 706.
Lindley, Ex parte (32 Ind. 367), 747, 756.
Lindsay v. Harrison (8 Ark. 302), 671,
672.
Lindsay v. Pleasants (4 Ind. Eq. 3«1),
262.
Lindsays. Smith (78 N. Car. 328), 556.
Lindsell v. Thacker (12 Sim. 178), 654,
970.
]
cxliv
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Lindsey v. Llndsey (1 Desaus. 150),
1538.
Lindsey v. Sinclair (24 Mich. 380), 263.
Lindsley v. O'Reilly (50 N. J. L. 636; 7
Am. St. Kep. 802; 15 All. Eep. 379),
1072, 1108.
Lines v. Darden (5 Fla. 51), 129.
Lines v. Lines (142 Pa. St. 149; 24 Am. St.
Eep. 487), 1726, 1744.
Lingan v. Henderson (1 Bland, 228), 462.
Lingard v. Bromley (1 Ves. &B. 113),
1232, 1233.
Lingen v. Sowray (1 P. Wms. 172), 298.
Liningw. Peyton (2 Desaus. 375), 1351,
1649, 1651, 1652, 1654.
Link v. Link (90 N, Car. 235), 47, 1736,
1738.
Linker v. Smith (4 Wash. C. C. 224), 548.
Linn v. Wright (18 Tex. 317), 1364.
Linsley v. Sinclair (24 Mich. 380), 373.
Linton v. Boly (12 Mo. 567), 1069.
Linton v. Hyde (2 Madd. 94), 175.
Lion v. Brutiss (20 Johns. 487), 1066.
Lippincott v. Evens (35 N. J. Eq. 533),
1298.
Lippincott v. Leeds (77 Pa. St. 420), 710.
Lippincot v. Lippincot (19 N. J. Eq.
121), 1036, 1037.
Lippincott v. Warder (14 Serg. & R.
118), 1437.
Lipscomb v. Nichols (6 Colo. 290), 197,
309, 313.
Lipse v. Spear (4 Hughes, 535), 1122.
Liptrotv. Holmes (1 Ga. 390), 942.
Lissa v. Posey (64 Miss. 352) , 576.
List v. Rodney (S3 Pa. St. 483) , 252.
Lister v. Hodgson (L. R. 4 Eq. 30), 151,
153.
Lister v. Lister (6 Ves. 631), 392.
Lister v. Pickford (11 Jur. (N. 8.) 649).
535.
Litchfield v. Baker (2 Beav. 471), 1166.
Litchfield v. Ballou (114 U. S. 190; 5 S.
Ct. Rep. 820), 1579.
Litchfield v. Cudworth (15 Pick. 23),
382, 401, 414.
Litchfield, In re (1 Atk. 87), 1057, 1244.
Litchfield v. White (7 ST. T. 438; 67 Am.
Dec. 534;3Sandf. Ch. 546), 947, 1135,
1140, 1227, 1368, 1370, 1401.
Littell v. Grady (68 Ark. 584), 1506.
Littell s. Jones (56 Ark. 139; 19 S. W.
Rep. 497), 1454.
Littell v. Wallace (80 Ky. 252), 1034.
Little v. Bennett (5 Jones Eq. 156), 124.
Little v. Birdwell (21 Tex. 597), 1042.
Littler. Chadwick (151 Mass. 109; 7 L.
R. A. 570), 974,1607.
Little v. Neil (1 S. W. Rep. 592; L. J. 31
Oh. 627), 620, 1000.
Little v. Wilford (31 Minn. 173), 751.
Littlefleld v. Story (3 Johns. 425), 1049.
Littlejohn®. Gordon (32 Miss. 235), 575.
Littlejohn v. Turner (73 Wis. 113; 40 N.
W. Rep. 621), 1383.
Little Rock & F. S. Co. v. Page (35 Ark.
304), 411.
Little Rock B. R. Co. v. Huntington
(120 U. S. 160), 1470.
Livermore v. Aldrich (6 Cush. 431), 174,
266,307,355,358,361.
Livesy's Appeal (106 Pa. St. 201), 111.
Livingstone, Ex parte (34 N. T. 55), 902.
Livingstone v. Livingstone (2 Johns.
Ch. 539), 25,334, 645,647.
Livingstone v. Livingstone (6 Johns.
Ch. 497; 10 Am. Dec. 353), 24. • >
Livingstone v. Livingstone (3 Johns.
Ch. 148), 1150, 1322, 1324, 1325, 1326.
Livingstones. Murray (68 N. Y. 485; 36
How. Pr. 102), 1037, 1688.
Livingstone v. Neeley (10 Johns. 374),
454.
Livingstone v. Newkirk (3 Johns. Ch.
312), 1147, 1322, 1324, 1325.
Livingstone v. Peru Iron Co. (2 Paige,
390), 473, 492, 493.
Livingstone v. Wells (8 S. Car. 347), 1257.
Livingstone's Case (9 Paige, 442) , 1687.
Llewellyn v. Mackworth (3 Eq. Cas.
Abr. 579), 1536.
Lloyd v. Atwood (3 De G. <Sb J. 660), 393,
1138, 1248, 1598.
Lloyd v. Banks (L. R. 4 Eq. 222; L. R. 3
Ch. 488), 1117.
Lloyd v. Branton (3 Meriv. 117), 1041.
Lloyd v. Brooks (34 Md. 139), 151.
Lloyd v. Carter (17 Pa. St. 216), 174, 308,
357.
Lloyd v. Fulton (1 Otto, 479), 99.
Lloyd v. Hart (2 Pa. St. 473), 828.
Lloyd v. Inglis (1 Desaus. 333), 71, 72.
Lloyd v. Lynch (28 Pa. St. 419) , 358, 440.
Lloyd v. Passingham (16 Ves. 70) , 842.
Lloyd v. Pughe (L. R. 8 Ch. App. 88), 712.
Lloyd v. Read (1 P. Wms. 607), 312, 352,
366, 369.
Lloyd v. Rowe (20 N. J. L. 680) , 1690.
Lloyd v. Smith (13 Sim. 457), 1734.
Lloyd v. Spillett (2 Atk, 151), 242, 307.
Lloyd v. Taylor (2 Dall. 223), 1037, 1038.
Lloyd v. Williams (1 Madd. 450) , 682, 683.
Loader v. Clark (2 Macn. & G. 382) , 494,
598.
Lobdell v. Baker (1 Mete. 193), 475,476.
Lobdell v. Hayes (4 Allen, 187), 964.
Lochenour v. Lochenour (61 Md. 595),
334, 339.
Lock v. Bagler (L. R. 4 Eq. 122), 115.
Lock v. Barber (62 Ind. 577), 918.
TABLE OF CASES.
cxlv
[The references are to page9: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Lock v. Gilmore (133 111. 139), 1058.
Lock v. Lock (2Vern. 666), 1159.
Locke v. Bennett (7 Cush. 445), 1724.
Locke v. Farmers' L. & Trust Co. (140
N. Y. 135; 35 N. E. Rep. 578), 106,
1744, 1746.
Locke v. Foote (4 Sim. 132), 834.
Locked. Lomas (5DeG. &Sm. 326), 1664.
Locke v. Stearns (1 Mete. 560), 476, 4S4.
Lockett v. Hill (1 Woods, 560), 1462,1490,
1491.
Lockhart «. Cameron (29 Ala. 355), 680.
Lockhart v. Canfleld (49 Miss. 470), 951.
Lockhart v. Northington (1 Sneed, 318),
1037.
Lockhart v. Reilley (1 De G. & J. 476; 25
L. J. Ch. 697), 1213, 1233, 1588.
Lockhart v. Wyatt (10 Ala. 231), 1367.
Lockwood v. Canfleld (20 111. 126), 1562.
Lockwood v. Fenton (1 Sm. & Gif. 73),
847.
Lockwood v. Nelson (16 Ala. 295), 1376.
Lockwood v. Slevin (26.1nd. 124), U02.
Locton v. Locton (2 Freem. 136), 180.
Loeb v. Pierpont (58 Iowa, 469), 1416.
Loebenthal v. Raleigh (36 N. J. Eq.
172), 1032.
Loftin v. Whitboard (92 111. 461), 346,
349.
Logan v. Birkett (lMyl. & K. 220), 720.
Logan v. Deshay (1 Clarke Ch. 209),
1352.
Logan D.Eva (144 Pa. St. 312; 22 Atl.
Rep. 757), 213.
Logan v. Fairlee (Jacobs, 193), 845.
Logan v. Johnson (72 Miss. 185; 16 So.
Rep. 231), 370.
Logan v. Phillips (18 Mo. 22), 100.
Logan v. Thrift (20 Ohio St. 62), 709.
Logsdon v. Roberts (3 T. B. Mon. 255),
993, 1049.
Lomai v. Lomai (11 Ves. 48), 837.
Lomaxw. Pendleton (3 Call, 538), 1205,
1253.
Lomazt. Ripley (3 Sm. & Gif. 48), 66,
517,851.
London v. Martin (79 Hun, 229), 1374.
London, etc. Bank v. Lempriere (L. R.
4 P. C. 572), 694, 697.
Loney v. Courtenay (24 Neb. 480), 660,
561.
Long?;. Casson (4 Rich. Eq. 60), 1637.
Long a. Dennis (4 Burr, 2052), 1041.
Long v. Fox (100 111. 43), 1582.
Long, In re (17 W. R. 218), 1132.
Long v. Long (62 Md. 33), 1268.
Long?). Long (79 Mo. 644), 1469.
Long v. McKay (84 Me. 199; 24 Atl. Rep.
815), 340.
Long v. Majestra (1 Johns. Ch. 306), 280.
Longs. Norcom (2Ired. Eq. 354), 832.
Longa. Ovenden (L. R. 16 Ch. D. 691),
640.
Long v. Steiger (8 Tex. 460), 309.
Long v. Stewart (5 Ves. 800), 380.
LongB. White (5 J. J. Marsh. 226), 651,
686.
Longdendale, etc. Co., In re (8 Ch. Div.
150), 35.
Longley v. Hall (11 Pick. 120), 1686, 1689.
Longmore v. Broom (7 Ves. 124), 627,
631, 999.
Longmore i>. Elcum (2 T. & C. 369), 183,
229.
Longwith v. Butler (8 111. 32), 1442, 1443,
1444, 1506.
Lonsdale v. Becket (4 De G. & S. 73),
864, 867.
Lonsdale v. Church (3 Bro. Ch. 41), 190.
Loomis v. Brush (36 Mich. 40), 651, 686,
714.
Loomis j>. Davenport & St. P. Ry. (3
McCrary, 489), 688.
Loomis v. Griffin (78 Iowa, 487; 43 N. W.
Rep. 290), 1384.
Loomis v. Loomi9 (2 Vt. 201), 1117.
Loomis v. McClintock (10 Watts, 274),
1085, 1092.
Loomis v. Riley (24 Iowa, 307), 452.
Loomis v. Satterthwaite (26 S. W. Rep.
68), 1179.
Loomis v. Spencer (2 Paige, 153), 29.
Lord v. Bunn (2 Y. & C. 98), 1302.
Lord v. Godfrey (4 Madd. 459), 1005.
Lorda. Wightwick (4 De G.,M. & G.
803) , 1118, 1223.
Lord Keepers. Wyld (lVern. 139), 441.
Lorentz v. Lorentz (14 W. Va. 809), 334.
Lorenz v. Orlady (87 Pa. St. 226), 14.
Lorillard v. Coster (5 Paige, 172), 1060.
Lorillard'3 Case (14 Wend. 265), 616.
Loringu. Brodie (134 Mass. 453), 1010,
1073.
Loring v. Coolidge (99 Mass. 191), 111.
Loring v. Elliott (16 Gray, 568), 101,
243.
Loring v. Hunter (8 Yerg. 31), 93, 116.
Loring v. Loring (100 Mass. 34), 69, 124,
183, 228, 229.
Loring v. Palmer (118 U.S. 321), 59.
Loring v. Salisbury Mills (125 Mass. 138;
97 Am. Dec. 107), 987, 1092, 1171.
Loring v. Stineman (1 Met. 207), 989.
Lorings v. Marsh (6 Wall. 337), 745, 770.
Lotbropr. Smalley (23 N. J. Eq. 192),
1376, 1575.
Lott v. Wycoff (2 Comst. 357), 106f
Lotze v. Hoerner (25 W. L. B. 3i; , 267.
Loud v. Loud (4 Bush, 461), 721.
Loudi;. Winchester (64 Mich. 23), 989.
cxlvi
TABLE OF CASES.
[The referenced are to pages: Vol, I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Lough v. Michael (37 W. Va. 679; 17 8.
B. Rep. 181), 579.
Lougheed v. Dykeman's Baptist Ch.
(129 N. Y. 211; 29 N. E. Rep. 249), 731,
786.
Xioughmiller v. Harris (2 Heisk. 559),
1110.
Loughridgo v. Bowland (52 Miss. 546),
449.
Louisiana Nat. Bank v. Knapp (61 Miss.
485), 576, 688.
Louisville, N. A. &C. Ry. Co. v. Hub-
bard (116 Ind. 193; 18 N. E. Rep.
611), 1685.
Louisville, etc. It. Co. v. Sumner (106
Ind. 55; 55 Am. Rep. 719), 556.
Lounsbury v. Purdy (11 Barb. 490), 29.
Lounsbury v. Purdy (16 Barb. 376, 18 N.
Y. 515),307,357, 373.
Lovat v. Knipe (12 Ir. Eq. 124), 397, 419.
Love v. Gage (8 Beav. 472) , 144.
Love v. Lea (2 Ired. Eq. 627), 286.
Love j). Morris (13 Ga. 165), 1701.
Love v. Sierra Nevada Mining Co. (32
Cal.653),622.
Lovell V. Brlggs (2 N. H. 218), 383, 389,
394.
Loveland v. Clark (11 Colo. 265), 1457,
1498.
Loveland v. Fisk (18 Colo. 201; 32 Pac.
Rep. 276), 188.
Lovell v. Minot (20 Pick. 116), 1200, 1214.
Loveman ». Taylor (85Tenn. 1), 899.
Loveredge v. Cooper (3 Russ. 30), 1116.
Lovesy v. Smith (L. R. 15 Ch. D. 655),
104, 494.
Lovettt). Thomas (81 Va. 245), 1198.
Low v. Bouverie (L. R. (1891) 3 Ch. 82),
1182.
Low v. Burchard (8 Ves. 133), 480.
Lowd. Carter (IBeav. 426), 335.
Low v. Harmony (72 N. Y. 408), 616.
Low v. Manners (5 B. & Aid. 967), 1044.
Low v. Perkins (10 Vt. 532; 33 Am. Dec.
217), 1122.
Lowe v. Convention (35 Atl. Rep. 87),
995.
Lowe v. Matson (140 111. 112; 35 111. App.
602), 1408.
Lowe v. Morris (13 Ga. 165), 1684, 1686,
1690.
Lowe v. Suggs (87 Ga. 577; 13 S. E. Rep.
565), 874, 898.
Lowells. Boston, etc. R. R. Co. (23
Pick. 32) , 563.
Lowery v. Peterson (75 Ala. 109), 585.
Lowndes v. Lowndes (15 Ves. 301), 354,
839,840.
Lowne's Appeal (1 Grant Cas. 373), 1058,
1667, 1678, 1712.
Lowry v. Akers (50 Minn. 341), 1513.
Lowry v. Bank (4 Cir. Md., 6 West Law
J. 121), 460.
Lowry v. Dufferin (1 Ir. Eq. 281), 622.
Lowry v. Fulton (9 Sim. 115), 861, 877,
882,883,1205,1254.
Lowry v. Mayo (41 Minn. 388), 1452.
Lowry v. Zero (3 Barb. Ch. 407), 218.
Lowson v. Copeland (2 Bro. Ch. 157),
1145, 1151.
Lowther v. Bentinck (L. R. 9 Eq. 166),
1601.
Lowther v. Charlton (2 Atk. 242), 445.
Lowther v. Lowther (13 Ves. 102), 384,
413, 415.
Loyd v. McCaffery (46 Pa. St. 410), 1311.
Lucas v. Daniels (34 Ala. 188), 1534.
Lucas v. Donaldson (117 Ind. 140), 858.
Lucas v. James (7 Hare, 410), 492.
Lucas v. Jones (L. R. 4 Bq. 73), 813.
Lucas v. Lockhart (10 Sm. & M. 466),
124,130, 137,183, 228.
Lucas ». Lucas £1 Atk. 270), 651, 686.
Lucas v. S. & E. R. Co. (32 ,Pa. St. 458),
1364.
Luce v. Burchard (78 Hun, 537), 1746.
Lucenau. Crawford (3 B. & P. 75), 1029.
Lucenati. Lucena (5 Beav. 146), 622.
Lucht v. Behrens (28 Ohio St. 231), 1210.
Luckenback v. Brickensteine (5 W. &
S. 145), 1408.
Luckraftu. Pridham (L. R. 6 Ch. D.
205), 813.
Lueo v. De Toro (91 Cal. 405), 852.
Ludington's Petition (5 Abb. N. Oas.
307), 1360.
Ludwig v. Highley (5 Barr, 132), 29.
Luigl v. Luchesi (12 Nev. 306), 1034.
Luke v. South Kensington Hotel Co.
(L. R. 11 Ch. D. 121), 1123.
Luken's Appeal (47 Pa. St. 356), 1688.
Lumley, In re (1894, 3 Ch. 135), 667.
Lumsden v. Buchanan (4 Macq. H. L.
Cas. 950), 962.
Lund v. Blanshard (4 Hare, 290), 1055.
Lund v. Lund (41 N. H. 355), 1255, 1689.
Lundy v. Hanson (16 Colo. 267; 26 Pac.
Rep. 816), 337.
Lupton v. Lupton (2 Johns. Ch. 614),
840, 1322, 1324, 1S52.
Luscumb v. Ballard (5 Gray, 403), 884,
886.
Lush v. Wilkinson (5 Ves. 387) , 98.
Lush's Trusts, In re (L. R. 4 Ch. 591),
675, 682.
Lusk v . Lewis (32 Miss. 297), 250, 256.
Luther v. Bianconi (10 Ir. Eq. 203), 1159.
Luttrellti. Olmius (14 Ves. 290; 11 Ves.
638), 506,
Lux v . Hlff (47 111. 425), 183
TABLE OF CASES.
cxlvii
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Luxor i'. Wilgens (7 Bush, 206), 1215.
Lyean v. Miller (56 Mo. App. 79), 1673,
1702.
Lyddon v. Lyddon (14 Ves. 558), 1530.
Lydon v. Moss (4 De G. & J. 104), 393.
Lyford v. Thurston (16 X. H. 399), 264,
270, 308, 327, 357, 388, 433.
Lyles. Burke (40 Mich. 499), 50.
Lyman v. Ins. Co. (2 Johns. Ch. 630), 72.
Lyman v. Parsons (26 Conn. 493), 999.
Lynall's Trusts, Inre (L. R, 12 Ch. D.
211), 813.
Lynch v. Cox (11 Harris, 265), 308, 357.
Lynch v. Eotan (39 111. 14), 825.
Lynde v. Davenport (57 Vt. 597), 1747.
Lyne's Exr. v. Course (1 Pa. St. Ill),
665.
Lynn v . Gephart (27 Md. 547) , 301 .
Lynn v. Lynn (135 111. 18; 25 X. E. Rep.
634), 96.
Lyou v. Home (L. R. 6 Eq. 655), 292.
Lyou v. Lyon (8 Ired. Eq. 201), 392, 405.
Lyon v. Lyon (1 Tenn. Ch. 225), 369.
Lyon v. Maclay (1 Watts, 275), 1536, 1538.
Lyon v. Mitchell (36 X. Y. 235), 538.
Lyon v. Richmond (2 Johns. Ch. 51) , 505.
Lyon v. Sanford (5 Conn. 544), 1T29.
Ljont. Taylor (49111. App. 639), 1180.
Lyons v. Bodenhamer (7 Kan. 455) , 433.
Lyons v. Byrd (2 Hen. & M. 22), 1690.
Lysaght v. Ed-wards (L. K. 2 Ch. D. 499),
583.
Lyse v. Kingdom (1 Call, 538), 1205, 1253,
1266, 1587.
Lysney v. Selby (Ld. Raym. 1118), 474.
Lystcr v. Dolland (1 Ves. Jr. 434), 216.
Lythe v. Uird (3 Jones, 222), 489.
M.
MoAdams v. Logan (3 Bro. Ch. 320), 872.
McAfee v. Ferguson (9 B. Mon. 475),
553.
McAllisters. Barry (2 Hayw. 290), 473.
McAllister v. Burgess (161 Mass. 269; 37
N. E. Rep. 173), 731, 748, 783.
McAllister v. Commonwealth (30 Pa.
St. 536), 1173, 1582, 1583.
McAllister v. Montgomery (3 Hayw.
94), 216.
McAllisters. Plant (54 Miss. 106), 1515,
1516.
McAlpine ». Burnett (23 Tex. 649), 578.
McAlpine, Inre (15 X. Y. St. Rep. 532),
1706.
McAlpine v. Potter (126 X. Y. 285), 1687.
McAnally v. Heflin (17 So. Rep. 87), 660.
McArthuru. Gordon (126 X. Y. 597; 27
X. E. Rep. 1C33), 68, 149, 1609.
McArthur v. Scott (113 U. S. 340), 1732.
McAuleys. Wilson (1 Dev. Eq. 276; 18
Am. Dec. 5o7), 753, 777.
McAuley's Appeal (77 Pa. St. 397), 794.
McBeew. Sollis (1 Strobh. Eq. 90), 441.
McBrayers. Carricker (64 Ala. 50), 992,
1342.
McBride v. Mclntire (91 Mich. 40; 51 X.
W. Rep. 1113), 878, 882.
McBride v. Smith (54 Pa. St. 245), 921,
922,923,925, 933,941,1268.
McBlalri). Gibbs (17 How. 237), 563.
McBurnie, Ex parte (1 De G., M. & G.
446), 99.
McCabe v. Fowler (84 N. Y. 314), 1135.
McCabe v. Hussey (2 Dow. & C. 440),
292.
MeCabe's Appeal (22 Pa. St. 427), 14.
McCahillu. McCahill (71 Hun, 221; 25 X.
Y. Supl. 219), 62.
McCahill v. McCahill (11 Misc. Rep.
238; 32 X. Y. Supl. 836), 213, 312.
McCaleb v. Critchfield (5 Hei9k. 288),
675,682.
McCall v. Harrison (1 Brock. 126), 693.
McCall v. Hinckley (4 Gill, 128), 1369.
MeCalls. Mash (89 Ala. 487) , 1490, 1492,
1512.
McCall v. Peachy (3 Munf . 288), 1690.
McCallies. Walton (37 Ga. 611), 1411.
McCammon v. Detroit, L. & N . Co. (103
Mich. 104; 61 X. W. Rep. 273), 1478.
McCammon v. Pettit (3 Sneed, 246), 232,
358.
McCampbell v. Brown (48 Fed. Rep,
795), 1723.
McCampbell v. McCampbell (5 Litt. 95),
1322.
McCandless' Estate (61 Pa. St. 9), 1537.
McOants v. Bee (1 McCord Eq. 383; 16
Am. Dec. 610), 398, 1178, 1183.
McCarogher v. Wheldon (L. R. 3 Eq.
236), 1528.
McC irroll v. Alexander (48 Miss. 621),
197, 309, 313.
McCartee v. Orphan Asylum Soc. (9
Cow. 437; 13 Am. Dec. 516), 912.
McCartee v. Teller (2 Paige, 511), 12.
McCarter, In, re (94 X. Y. 558), 1680.
McCarter's Estate (94 X. Y. 558), 1679.
McCarthy v. Blevins (5 Yerg. 195; 26
Am. Dec. 262), 33.
McCarthy v. Decaix (2 Russ. & Myl.
615), 1598.
McCa' thy v. McCarthy (9 Ir. Eq. 620),
292.
McCartin v. Traphagen (43 X. J. Eq.
323), 897,904, 1589.
McCartney v. Bostwick (32 X. Y. 53),
307, 354, 372, 374, 596, 1405, 1718.
McCarthy v. McCarthy (74 Ala. 546), 59.
cxlviii
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
McCarty v. Goold (IB. &B. 387), 38.
McCarty v. Pruett (4 Ind. 226), 675.
McCarty v. Williams (69 Ala. 174), 573.
McCaskill v. Lathrop (63 Ga. 96), 1628.
McCaslin v. State (44 Ind. 151), 585.
McCaughal v. Eyan (27 Barb. 376), 618.
McCausland's Appeal (38 Pa. St. 466),
1688.
McCawi). Galbrath (7 Rich. (Law) 74),
43, 966.
McCbesney v. Brown (25 Gratt. 393),
664, 665.
McCIain v. McClain (57 Iowa, 167), 503.
McClanacban v. Henderson (2 A. K.
Marsb. 388), 397.
McCleary v. McLain (2 Ohio St. 368),
873.
McCleary v. Menke (109 111. 294) , 847.
McClellan ». McClellan (65 Me. 600), 48,
60,60,880.
McClellan v. Scott (24 Wis. 81), 477.
McClellan v. Coffin (93 Ind. 456), 575.
McClelland v. McClelland (7 Baxt. 310),
847.
McClintic v. Ocheltree (4 W. Va. 249),
11.
McClintock v. Loisseau (31 VT. Va. 865),
335.
McCloskey v. Gleason (56 Vt. 264; 48
Am. Eep. 770), 1135, 1692.
McClure v. Doak (6 Baxt. 364), 369.
McClure i;. Lewis (72 Mo. 314), 480.
McClure v. Miller (1 Bail. Ch. 107),
392.
McClure v. Steele (14 Rich. Eq. 105),
1215.
McClurg n. Terry (21 N. J. Eq. 225),
546.
McCollister v. Willey (52 Ind. 3S2), 223.
McComas v. Long (85 Ind. 549), 1625.
McComb v. Barcelona, etc. Assu. (134
N. Y. 594), 411.
McConkey's Appeal (13 Pa. St. 259),
1011.
McConneaughey v. Bogardus (106 III.
321), 1481.
McConnell v. Lindsey (131 Pa. St. 476) ,
655,659,710.
McConnell v. Sherwood (84 N. Y. 582),
1404.
McCook v. Harp (81 Ga. 229), 1121, 1228.
McCordti. Ochiltree (8 Blaekf. 15), 747,
755, 826.
McCorker v. Brady (1 Barb. Ch. 329),
895,900, 913,918,919.
McCormick v. Atkinson (78 Va. 8), 1391.
McCormick v. Blum (4 Tex. Civ. App.
9;22S. W. Eep. 1054), 711.
McCormick v. Garnett (5 De U., M. &
G. 278), 682.
McCormick v. Grogan (4 Eng. & Ir.
App. 82), 138,253, 513.
McCormick v. Ocean City Assn. (45 N.
J.. Eq. 561), 977.
McCormick v. Malin (5 Blackf. 509),
480.
McCormick v. Lawton (3 Neb. 449), 708.
McCormick v. Wheeler (36 111. 115) ,
444.
McCorn v. McCorn (100 N. Y. 511), 1256.
McCoy i'. Grandy (3 Ohio St. 463), 607.
McCoy v. McCoy (29 Vt*. Va. 794), 1542.
McCoy v. Monte (90 Ind. 441), 912.
McCoy v. Scott (2 Rawle, 222), 603, 877.
McCrary r. Clements (94 Ga. 778; 22 S.
E. Eep. 675), 221, 222.
McCrary i'. Foster (1 Iowa, 271), 333.
McCrea v. Purmort (16 WeDd. 460; 30
Am. Dec. 103), 462, 469, 1405, 1722.
McCready v. Guardians (9 S. & E. 94;
11 Am. Dec. 667), 1130.
McCready v. Lansdale (58 Miss. 877),
1005, 1341.
McCreary v. Bomberger (11 Pa. Co. Ct.
68), 1265.
McCreary v. Burns (17 S. Car. 45), 138.
JlcCreary v. Casey (50 Cal. 349), 309, 313.
McCreightu. Foster (L. E. 5 Ch. App.
604), 200, 585.
McCroy v. Grandy (92 Ga. 319; 18 S. E.
Eep. 65), 705.
MeCue v. Gallagher (23 Cal. 51) , 363.
McCulloch r. Cowher (5 W. & S. 427),
600, 518,520,526.
MeCullough v. Ford (96 III. 439), 705.
McCullough v. MeCullough (44 S. J. Eq.
313; 14 Atl. Eep. 123), 1201, 1579, 1727.
McCullough v. Sommerville (8 Leigh,
415), 1415,1419.
McCullough's Appeal (2 Jones, 197),
1043.
McCullumu. Cox (IDall. 139), 960.
McCully v. McCully (78 Va. 159), 197,
313.
McDaniel v. Grace (15 Ark. 465), 98.
Mc-David v. Adams (77 111. 155), 705.
McDermot v. Kealy (3 Euss. 264), 837.
McDermot v. Lorillard (1 Eclw. Ch. 273),
1094.
McDermott v. Garland (1 Mackey, 496),
705.
McDermott v. Strong (4 Johns. Ch.687),
1333, 1721.
McDolei;. Purdy (23 Iowa, 277), 575.
McDonalds. Carr (160111. 264; 37 N. E.
Eep. 225), 339.
McDonald v. Elyton Land Co. (78 Ala.
382), 573.
McDonald v. Hooker (57 Ark. 632; 22 S.
W. Eep. 655), 71.
TABLE OF CASES.
cxlix
[The references are to pages : Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
McDonald v. Irvine (L. R. 8 Ch. D. 101),
1177.
McDonalds. Lord (2Robt. 7), 415.
McDonald v. Mass. Gen. Hospital (120
Mass. 432; 21 Am. Rep. 529), 735, 745,
748.
McDonald v. McDonald (21 Can. S. C.
Rep. 201), 208.
McDonald v. McDonald (1 Bligh, 315),
1536.
McDonalds. McDonald (92 Ala. 537),
1004, 1621, 1736.
McDonald v. McDonald (24 Ind. 68),
197,221,223, 313.
McDonalds. Morton (1 Mass. 543), 1314.
McDonalds. Sims (3Kelley, 383), 1537.
McDonald v. Snow (109 111. 40), 1507.
McDonald v. Starkey (42 III. 442), 1744.
McDonald v. Vinson (56 Miss. 497), 1515,
1518.
McDonnell. Murphy (Fox & S. 279),
722.
McDonnell v. Harding (7 Sim. 178), 1205,
1254.
McDonogh v. Murdoch: (15 How. 367),
18, 19, 309, 745, 819.
McDonougli v. O'Neill (113 Mass. 92),
204,388,533.
McDonough Will Case (15 How. 367),
1217.
McDougal v. Cares (38 Ala. 320), 895.
McDougal v. People's Sav. Bank (62
Miss. 663) , 704, 707.
McDougald v. Dougherty (11 Ga. 570),
1331. ,
McDowell v. Caldwell (2 McCord Ch. 43 ;
16 Am. Dec. 635), 829, 836.
McDowell v. Goldsmith (2 Md. Ch. 370),
469, 1537.
McDowell u.Milroy (69111. 500), 206, 423.
McEachin v. Stewart (106 N. Car. 336),
388, 534, 1201, 1213.
McElhenney's Appeal (46 Pa. St. 347),
959, 1058, 1688, 1699.
McElroy v. McElroy (113 Mass. 509), 52,
92, 243, 922, 923.
McEvoy v. Appleby (27 Hun, 44) , 1297.
McEweni). Crombie (L. R. 25 Ch. D.
175), 1681.
McFadden v. Jenkins (1 Hare, 458), 76,
155, 157.
McFadden v. Jinkyns (1 Hare, 461; 1
Phill.157), 73,88.
McFarland v. Bates (45 Kan. 1), 1414.
McFarland v. Birdsall (14 Ind. 126),
1368, 1369.
McFarland v. La Force (119 Mo. 585; 25
S. W. Rep. 530), 232, 369.
McFerrand v. Taylor (3 Cranch, 281),
473.
McGaughey v. Brown (46 Ark. 25),
403, 1533.
McGill v. Doe (9 Ind. 306), 953.
McGillivray, In re (138 N. Y. 308; 33 N.
E. Rep. 1077), 901.
McGinn v. Sehaeffer (7 Watts, 412), 1183,
1738.
McGinity v. McGinity (6 Pa. St. 38), 365.
McGivney v. McGivney (142 Mass. 156),
364, 1545.
McGlade's Appeal (99 Pa. St. 338), 816.
McGlaughlin v. McGlaughlin (24 Pa.
St. 22), 1355.
McGourkey v. Toledo, etc. Ry. Co. (146
U. S. 536; 36 Law Ed. 1079), 411.
McGovern v. Knox (21 Ohio St. 647), 197,
308, 313, 349.
McGowan v. McGowan (14 Gray, 121),
307, 314, 369, 371, 497, 500.
McGready«. Harris (54 Mo. 137), 1109,
1461.
McGregor v. Gardner (14 Iowa, 326), 416.
McGinnisw. Watson (41 Pa. St. 9), 793,
794.
McGuire a. Devlin (158 Mass. 63; 32 N.
E. Rep. 1028), 108.
McGu ire v. McGowan (4 Desaus. 491),
308, 363, 383, 389,394.
McGuire v. Ramsey (9 Ark. 518), 232,
309.
McGuire v. Van Pelt (55 Ala. 344),
1451, 1460, 1463.
McHarry v. Schenek (88 111. 357), 1453,
1505.
McHardy v. Hitchcock (11 Beav. 73),
1570.
McHenryj). Davis (L. R. 10 Eq. 88), 645,
695.
Mcllwaine v. Gether (3 Whart. 575),
1041.
Mcllwaine'!;. Smith (42 Mo. 45; 97 Am.
Dec. 295), 1270,1640.
Mclntire v. Benson (20 111. 50(J), 1227,
1388, 1389, 1390.
Mclntire v. Hughes (4 Bibb, 186), 148.
Mclntires;. Knowlton (6 Allen, 565), 688.
Mclntire v. Skinner (4 Greene, 89), 47.
Mclntire's School v . Zanesville (9 Ohio,
203), 750, 756,759, 781.
Mclntire Poor School v. Zanesville,
etc. Co. (9 Ohio, 217) , 19, 125, 180.
Mcintosh's Estate, In re (158 Pa. St. 528;
27 Atl. Rep. 1044), 106.
Mclntyrea. Mclntyre (123 Pa. St. 329),
138.
McKay v. Green (3 Johns. Ch. 66), 1322,
1324.
McKaiseyti. Thorpe (61 Tex. 652), 203. .
McKeeu. Griggs (51 N. J. Eq. 178; 26
Atl. Rep. 158), 428.
cl
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
McKee u. Jones (6 Pa. St. 425), 600, 507,
508.
McKee v. Judd (2 Kerr, 622), 399.
McKee u. Lamon (159 U. 8. 317; 16 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 11), 317.
McKeeu. MeKinley (33 Pa. St. 92), 672.
McKee v. Reynolds (26 Iowa, 589), 721.
McKee v. Weeden (37 N. Y. Supl. 465; 1
App. Div. 583), 1688.
McKenna's Estate, In re (13 Ir. Ch. 239),
201, 392, 1596.
McKennan v. Phillips (6 Whart. 571; 37
Am. Dec. 438), 651, 686.
McKenziev. Summer (114 N. Car. 425;
19 S. E. Rep. 375), 914, 1278.
McKeogh v. McKeogQ (4 Ir. R. Eq. 338),
101,553.
McKesson v. Stanton (50 Wis. 297; 36
Am. Rep. 850), 711.
McKim v. Aulbach (130 Mass. 4S4; 39
Am. Dec. 473), 1123, 1230, 1240, 1241.
McKim v. Duncan (4 Gill, 72), 1689.
McKim v. Handy (4 Md. Ch. 228), 872.
McKim v. Vorhies (7 Cranch, 279), 38.
MeKinney v. Pinkard (2 Leigh, 149),
480.
McKinnon v. McDonald (4 Jones Eq. 1;
72 Am. Dec. 674), 718.
McKinnon v. Stuart (20 L. J. Ch. 49), 1378.
McKnight v. Bright (2 Mo. 110), 576.
McKnight v. Taylor (1 How. 161), 495,
1541.
McKnight v. Walsh (23 N. J. Eq. 136),
834, 1690, 1092, 1694, 1698.
McKnight v. Walsh (24 N. J. Eq . 498),
1220, 1561, 1563.
McLain v. School Director (51 Pa. St.
196), 749.
McLanahan v. McLanahan (6 Humph.
99), 47.
McLanc v. Johnson (43 Vt. 48), 221.
McLaue v. Paschal (47 Tex. 365), 1140,
1464.
McLarren v. Brewer (61 Me. 402), 532.
McLaughlin v. Barnum (31 Md. 425),
608.
McLaughlin v. Fulton (104 Pa. St. 161),
371, 1G25.
McLaughlin v. Hanley (12 R. I. 61), 119S.
McLaughlin, In re (L. R. 1 Ir. 421), 1042.
McLaughlin v. VanKeuren (21 N. J. Eq.
379), 1742.
McLauriej). Patlow(53Ill. 340), 61,66, 67,
852.
McLaurlnv. Falrley (6 Jones Eq. 375),
47.
McLean v. Button (19 Barb. 450), 159.
McLean v. Freeman (70 N. T. 81), 1746,
1747.
McLean v. Longlands (5 Ves. 71), 712.
McLean v. McLean (3 Hun, 395; 62 N. Y.
627), 1750.
McLean v. Pressley (56 Ala. 211), 1518.
McLeans;. Wade (41 Pa. St. 266), 749.
McLellan v. McLean (2 Head, 684), 617.
McLellan v. Nelson (27 Me. 129), 706.
McLellan v. Turner (15 Me. 436), 108.
McLellan's Appeal (26 Pa. St. 463), 1397,
1398.
McLennan v. Sullivan (13 Iowa, 821),
309.
McLenore v. Good (1 Harp. Eq. 272), 1437.
McLeodu. Drummond (14 Ves. 861; 17
Ves. 169), 456, 460, 1657, 1663.
McLeod v. Evana (66 Wis. 401), 1603.
McLeod v. First Nat. Bank (42 Miss. 99),
327,538, 1582, 1625.
McLeroth v. Bacon (5 Ves. 167), 633.
McLoskey v. Reid (4 Bradf. 334), 847.
McLoud v. Roberts (4 Hen. & M. 443),
1322, 1324.
McLownie v. Thomas (39 111. 291), 574.
McLure v. Lancaster (24 S. Car. 273; 58
Am. Rep. 259), 657.
McLure v. Ripley (2 Macn. & G. 274), 494.
McMahon v. Harrison (2Seld. 443), 869.
McMahon v. Macy (51 N. Y. 161), 71.
McMahon v. Smith (47 Conn. 221), 556.
McMeekin v. Edmonds (1 Hill Eq. 293),
1333.
McMichael v. Jarvis (78 Tex. 671), 677.
McMichael v. Kilner (76 N. Y. 36), 492.
McMillan v. Baxley (112 N. Car. 678),
1491.
McMillan v. Peacock (57 Ala. 127), 651,
665, 686.
McMulleni;. Lank (4 Houst. 648), 1064.
Mcilullin v. Beatty (56 Pa. St. 389), 665.
McMullini>.McMullin (8 Watts, 236), 252.
McMurray v. MoMey (39 Ark. 309), 193,
417.
McMurray v. Montgomery (2 Swan, 324),
1123, 1230.
McNab v. Whitbread (17 Beav. 299), 125.
McNair's Appeal (4Rawle, 155), 456, 1657.
McXair v, Craig (38 S. Car. 100), 1563.
McNairu. Pope (100 N. Car. 404), 520, 1498.
McNamara v. Garrity (106 111. 384), 197,
308, 314, 315.
McNeal v. McNeal (161 Pa. St. 109; 34 W.
N . C. 259 ; 28 Atl. Rep . 997) , 710.
J McNeeSf. Swaney (50 Mo. 38S), 1444,1490.
j McNew v. Booth (42 Mo. 192) , 1509.
I McNielf. Baird (6Munf. 316), 492.
| McNeil v. Gates (41 Ark. 264), 1185.
j McNeil v. Miller (29 W. Va. 480), 579.
I McNeill v. Arnold (17 Ark. 151), 680.
j McNeills. Cahill (2 Bhgh, 229), 563.
I McNeills. Davis (17 So. Rep. 10D.704.
| McNeill v. Magee (5 Mason, 269), 435.
TABLE OF CASES.
cli
[The references are to pages r Vol. I, pp. 1-817; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
McNeillie v. Acton (4 De G., M.& G. 744),
456, 457, 1638.
McNish v. Guerard (4 Strobh. Eq. 66),
920, 931.
McPherson «. Hansen (2 Beas. 299), 452.
McPherson v. Israel (5 Gill & J. 60),
1689.
McPlierson v. Rollins (107 N. Y. 316),
1744.
McPherson v. Sanborn (88 111. 150) , 1456.
McPherson v. Snowden (19 Md. 197), 115.
McQueen v. Farquhar (11 Ves. 467), 1654.
McEaec. Mean9 (34 Ala. 349), 130.
McKaney v. Huff (32 Ga. 681) , 525.
McEaney v. Johnson (2 Fla. 520), 956,
957, 958, 1266.
McRees' Aduir. v. Means (34 Ala. 350),
108.
McReynolds v. Anderson (69 Iowa, 208) ,
828.
McRoberts v. Mondy (19 Mo. App. 26),
789.
McTighe v. Dean (22 N. J. Eq. 81), 1570.
MeVay v. McVay (43 N. J. Eq. 47), 61.
McVey v. Oantrell (70 N. T. 295; 26 Am.
Rep. 605) , 709.
McVey v. Quality (97 111. 93), 388, 434.
McVity v. Stanton (10 Misc. Rep. 105, 30
N. Y. Supl. 934) , 227.
McVVhorter v. Agnew (6 Paige, 111),
1012.
MeWhorter v. Benson (Hopk. Ch. 28),
16S7.
McWhinnie v. Martin (77 Wis. 182; 46 N.
W. Rep. 118), 200. 201.
McWilliams v. Nissley (2 S. & R. 509, 7
Am. Dec. 654), 34.
Maas v. Goodman (2 Hill, 275), 1408.
Mabary v. Doilarbido (98 Mo. 198), 327.
Maberly v. Turton (14 Ves. 499), 166,
625,641,088.
Maberly v. Wetherell (14 Ves. 499), 829.
MacArthur v. Gordon (5 N. Y. Supl. 513),
1558.
Maccubin v. Cromwell (7 Gill & J. 157),
47, 61, 877, 879, 8S2, 893, 1122, 1231, 17.J8.
MacGregor v. MacGregor (9 Iowa, 65),
1228, 1582.
Machem v. Machem (28 Ala. 374), 680.
Machir v. Burroughs (14 Ohio St. 519),
666, 709.
Mackason's Appeal (42 Pa. St. 330; 82
Am. Dec. 517), 1273, 1310.
Mackay v. Coates (70 Pa. St. 350), 950,
959, 1139.
Mackay v. Commercial Bank (L. R. 5 P.
C. 394), 476, 4S4.
Mackay v. Douglas (L. R. 14 Eq. 106),
491,494.
Mackay v. Martin (26 Tex. 2251,525.
Mackenzie's Trusts, In re (L. R. 23 Ch.
D. 750), 1209.
Mackey v. Cairns (5 Cow. 547) , 1389.
Mackie v. Mackie (5 Hare, 70), 1168.
Mackie «. Cairns (5 Cow. 547), 1367.
Mackinnon v. Stewart (3 Sim. 88), 1317.
Mackintosh, In re (L. J. 42 Ch. 208),
1132.
Mackintosh v. Townshend (16 Ves. 330),
810, 811.
Maekreth v. Symmons (15 Ves. 329; 1
Load. Cas. Eq. 447,432, 437), 569,571,
589.
Mat-lay v. Love (23 Cal. 367) , 705.
Macnab v. Whitbread (17 Beav. 299),
128.
Macy v. Shurmer (1 Atk. 389), 128.
Macyti. Williams (83 Hun, 243; 31 N. Y.
Supl. 620), 80, 1054.
Madden «. Barnes (45 Wis. 135; 30 Am.
Rep. 703), 578, 580.
Maddison v. Andrew (1 Ves. Jr. 57),
352.
Maddox v. Allen (1 Met. 495), 1536.
Maddox v. Eberhart (38 Ga. 681), 1097.
Maddox v. Maddox (1 Ves. 61), 413.
Maddox v. Maddox (11 Gratt. 804), 1041,
1043, 1044.
Madisonc. Andrew (1 Ves. 58), 362.
Madison Academy v. Board of Educa-
tion (26 S. W. Rep. 187), 1028.
Madoc v. Jackson (2 Bro. Ch. 588), 624.
Madrid Bank, In re (L. R. 2 Eq. 216),
494.
Maffittf. Rynd (69 Pa. St. 30), 73, 76.
Magdalen v. Atty.-Gen. (6 H. L. Cas.
202), 1524.
Magfe v. Cowperthwaite (10 Ala. 966),
1686, 1690.
Magee v. Magee (51 111. 500), 589.
Magill v. Brown (Bright, N. P. 350), 21
22, 807, 810.
Magistrate of Dundee v. Morris, (3
Macq. 134), 733.
Magniac v. Thompson (7 Pet. 348), 98.
Magoffin v. Patton (4 Rawle, 119), 839.
Magruder v. Peter (11 Gill & J. 217), 576,
1036, 1039.
Maguire v. Allen (1 B. & B. 75), 842.
Maguire, In re (L. R. 9 Eq. 632), 732, 763,
768.
Maguire v. Page (23 Mo. 188), 521.
Maguire v. Scully (Hog. 113; 1 Beat.
370, 2 Hy. 113), 102,105.
Maguire v. Smock (42 Ind. 1), 555.
Magwood v. Johnston (1 Hill Ch. 228),
663, 710.
Mahan v. Mahan (7 B. Mon. 582), 148.
Maher v, Farwell (97 111. 671), 1507.
Mahey v. Davidson (2 Ves. 319), 190.
clii
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Mahon v. Savage (1 Sen. & "Let. Ill), 632,
633, 637, 641, 1000, 1001.
MahODe v. Reeves (11 Ala. 345), 488.
Mahoney v. Hunter (30 Ind. 250), 87S.
Mahoney v. Mackubin (52 Md. 366),
1500.
Mahoney i>. Mackubin (51 Md. 268), 1711.
Mahony v. Hunter (30 Ind. 246) , 885.
Mahorner v. Foreheimer (18 So. Eep.
570) , 1366.
Mahorner v. Harrison (21 Miss. 53), 309.
Manuring. Harding (28 N. H. 128), 475.
Maiben v. Bobe (6 Fla. 418) , 705.
Maine Baptist Miss. Con. v. Portland
(65 Me. 92), 731-748.
Mais, In re (16 Jur. 608), 905.
Maitland d. Backhouse (16 Sim. 58), 286.
Maitland ». Baldwin (70 Hun, 267; 24 N.
T. Supl. 29) , 74.
Maitland v. Wilson (3 Atk. 814), 438.
Major v. Herndon (78 Ky. 123) , 127.
Major v. Lansley (2 Buss. & M. 355), 11,
651, 686.
Major v. Symmes (19 Ind. 121) , 699.
Majoribanks v. Hovenden (6 Ir. Eq.
238), 623.
Majors d. Herndon (78 Ky. 128), 144.
Majors v. Bverton (89 111. 56), 652, 714.
Makepeace v. Rogere (11 Jur. (N. S.)
215), 1536.
Malcolm v. Fullerton (2 T. E. 648), 529.
Malcolm d. O'Callaghan (4 Myl. & Cr.
399), 649.
Malcolm v. O'Callaghan (2 Madd. 354),
1043, 1044.
Malcolm v. O'Callaghan (3 Myl. <Sb Cr.
52), 1681.
Maiden i>. Merrill (2 Atk. 8) , 435.
Malim v. Barker (3 Ves. 150), 128.
Malim i>. Keighley (2 Ves. Jr. 333), 117,
128.
Malin v. Malin (1 Wend. 625), 256, 357,
460.
Mallabar!). Mallabar (Cas. t. Talb. 80),
247, 301.
Mallet d. Smith (6Eich. Eq. 22), 1040.
Mallory v. Vanderheyden (3 Barb. Ch.
10; IN. Y. 452), 664.
Malmesbury v. Malmesbury (31 Beav.
407), 104.
Malone v. O'Connor (Lloyd & Gould,
465), 128, 130.
Maloney d. Kennedy (10 Sim. 254), 672,
715.
Maloney v. Webb (112 Mo. 576; 20 S. W.
Bep. 683), 1498.
Maloy v. Sloans (44 Vt. 311), 320, 323.
Malzy v. Edge (2 Jur. (N. S.) 80), 882.
Mant. Ricketts (13 L. J. Ch. 194), 1537.
Man v. Warner (4 Whart. 455), 1320.
Manahan v. Gibbons (19 Johns. 427),
1234.
Manby v. Bewicke (3 Kay & J. 342), 1538.
Mance v. Mance (28 111. App. 587), 309.
Manchester^. Tibbetts (121 N. T. 219;
18 Am. St. Rep. 816), 709.
Manchester Royal Infirmary, In re (L.
R. 43 Ch. D. 420) , 1216.
Mandevillen. Solomon (33 Cal. 38), 369.
Mandlebaum v. McDonnell (29 Mich.
78; 18 Am. Rep. 61), 1298.
Manes v. Durrant (2 Rich. Eq. 404), 548,
553.
Mangey v. Hungerford (2 Eq. Abr. 156),
717.
Mangles v. Dixon (18 Eng. L. & Eq.
82), 1116.
Manhattan Brass, etc. Co. v. Thomp-
son (56 N. T. 80), 709.
Manhattan Bank d. Walker (130 U. S.
257), 1721.
Manice v. Manice (43 N. T. 303), 616,
1746.
Manly v. Slason (21 Vt. 271 ; 52 Am. Dec.
60), 569, 678,580.
Mann v. Ballet (1 Vern. 44), 824, 1237.
Mann v. Huston (1 Gray, 250) , 1396.
Mann, In re (32 Minn. 60), 1368.
Mann v. Mann (1 Johns. Cb. 234), 71.
Mannerback's Estate (133 Pa. St. 342),
1290, 1295.
Manners v. Library Co. (93 Pa. St. 165;
39 Am. Rep. 741), 749, 763, 776, 807, 809.
Manning v. Albee (11 Allen, 520; 14
Allen, 7) 477, 481.
Mannings. Baker (8 Md. 44), 839.
Mannings. Cox (7 Moore, 617), 961.
Manning v. Elliott (92 N. Car. 48), 1466.
Mannings. Frazier (96 111. 279), 574.
Manning!). Hayden (5 Sawy. 360), 206,
415, 423.
Manning!). Manning (79 N. Car. 300; 28
Am. Rep. 354), 709.
Manning v. Manning (1 Johns. Ch, 527),
1256, 1687.
Manning!;. Pippen (86 Ala. 357; 11 Am.
St. Rep. 46), 145, 231, 500, 618.
Manning d. Powning (L. R. 4 Ch. App.
365), 1033.
Manning v. Spooner (3 Ves. 114), 1324.
Manningford i>. Toleman (1 Coll. 670),
600.
Mannix v. Purcell (46 Ohio St. 102; 19
N. E. Rep. 572; 15 Am. St. Rep. 562),
750, 1025, 1152.
Mansell i>. Mansell (2 Wms. 678), 204,
327, 432, 433, 534, 594, 1009, 1079.
Mansfield v. Alwood (84 III. 497), 1138,
1152.
Mansfield d. Shaw (3 Madd. 100), 1576.
TABLE OF CASES.
cliii
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 84S-1753.]
Manson v. Felton (13 Pick. 206), 403.
Mant v. Leith (15 Beav. 526) , 11.
Mantoni). Titsworth (18 B. Mon. 582),
1537.
Manz v. Oakley (120 N. T. 84), 1234.
Mapp v. Elcock (2 Phill. 793; 3 H. L.
Cas. 492), 243.
Mapps v. Sharpe (32 111. 13), 395, 1490,
1491.
Maraman v. Maraman (4 Met. (Ky.) 84),
713.
March v. Russell (2 Myl. & Cr. 31), 1248.
Mareiliat v. Marclliat (125 Ind. 472), 222,
223.
Marcotte v. Hartman (46 Minn. 202; 48
N. W. Hep. 767), 1508.
Marey v. Dunlap (5 Lans. 365), 562.
Marcy's Account (24 N. J. Eq. 451), 1692.
Marden v. Chase (32 Me. 329) , 910.
Marder, Luse & Co. v. Filkins (51 111.
App. 587), 1410.
Margaran v. Christie Orange Co. (19
So. Rep. 637), 860.
Markey v. Langley (92 U. S. 142), 995.
Markey «. Markey (13 ST. T. Supl. 925),
83.
Markhamc. Cooke (3 Burr. 1684; 1W,
Black. 543), 935.
Markley v. Singleton (11 Rich. 393), 654.
Marlattt). Warwich (18 N. J. Eq. 108; 19
N. J. Eq. 439), 500, 520, 562.
Marlborough v. Godolphin (2 Ves. 61),
999.
Marlborough v. St. John (5 De G. & 8m.
181), 1026.
Marlow v. Barlew (53 Cal. 456), 704.
Marlowe. Pitfleld (1 P. Wms. 558), 1033.
Marples v. Bainbridge (1 Madd. 317),
1011.
Marques v. La Baw (82 Ind. 650), 1201.
Marr v. Play (2 Murph. 85), 892.
Marriott v. Givens (8 Ala. 694), 1515.
Marriott v. Marriolt (1 Str. 666), 517.
Marriott v. Turner (20 Beav., 557), 262.
Marryatt v. Marryatt (6 Jur. (N. S.) 672),
881.
Marryatt v. Townley (1 Ves. 105), 105,
114, 115.
Marsden v. Kent (L. R. 5 Ch. D. 598), 1338.
Marsden's Estate, In re (166 Pa. St. 213;
31 Atl. Rep. 46), 870.
Marsley v. Banner (4 Mad. 419), 1205.
Marsh v. Alford (5 Bush, 392), 706.
Mar=h v. Berrier (6 Ired. Eq. 524), 828.
Marsh, Ex parte (1 Atk. 153), 972.
Marsh, Ex parte (1 Atk. 159), 99.
Marsh v. Marsh (48 Ala. 677) , 349.
Marsh v. Marsh (3 Jur. (M. S.) 790), 735.
Marsh v. Marsh (10 B. Mon. 360), 1145,
1150, 1322.
Marsh v. Oliver (1 McCart. 259), 1538.
Marsh v. Railway Co. (64 II . 414), 556.
Marsh v. Renton (99 Mass. 132), 111.
Marsh v. Turner (4 Mo. 253), 569, 676.
Marsh v. Wheeler (2 Edw. 156) , 238, 259.
Marsh v. Whitmore (21 Wall. 183), 411.
Marshallu. B. & O. R. R. (16 How. 314),
555.
Marshall v. Bonfleld (2 Mad. 166), 114.
Marshall v. Caldwell (41 Cal. 611), 191.
Marshall v. Christmas (3 Humph. 248),
570.
Marshall v. Collett (1 Y. & C. 238), 504.
Marshall v. Crowther (L. R. 2 Ch. D.
199), 1146,1435.
Marshall v. Fowler (16 Beav. 249), 678.
Marshall v. Frank (8 Pr. Ch. 480;Aust.
14), 438.
Marshall v. Gingell (L. R. 21 Ch. D. 790),
929.
Marshall v. Hall (26 S. E. Rep. 300), 1578.
Marshall v. Holloway (2 Swanst. 436),
836, 838.
Marshall v. Lovelass (Cam. & ST. 217), 28.
Marshall v. Marshall (27 W. R. 399), 720.
Mars h all v. Moore (2 T. B. Mon. 69) , 1057,
1244.
Marshall v. Rash (87 Ky. 116; 12 Am. St.
Rep. 467; 7 S. W. Rep. 829), 1289, 1296,
1644.
Marshall v. Rutton (8 T. R. 845), 722.
Marshall v. Sladdin (7 Hare, 428), 875.
Marshall v. Sladen (4 De G. &Sm. 468),
955, 1680.
Marshall v. Stephens (8 Humph. 159; 47
Am. Dec. 601), 665, 955, 1179.
Marshall's Estate, Inre (138 Pa. St. 260;
22 Atl.-Rep. 90), 612.
Marston v. Brittenham (76111. 611), 1472,
1475, 1476.
Marston v. Marston (21 N. H. 491) , 78.
Marston v. Rowe (43 Ala. 271), 1053.
Martens, Inre (16 Misc. Rep. 245), 1687.
Martin u. Aliter (420hlo St. 94), 1441, 1442.
Martin v. Bank (31 Ala. 115) , 369.
Martin v. Barth (4 Colo. App. 346; 36
Pac. Rep. 72), 1482, 1499.
Martini;. Blight (4 J. J. Marsh. 491) , 525.
Martin v. Cauble (72 Ind. 67), 575,
Martin v. Clark (116 111. 654), 1108, 1595.
Martin v. Foster (7 De G., M. & G. 98),
674, 681.
Martin v. Fry (17 S. & R. 426), 1150, 1322,
1324.
Martin v. Funk (75 N. T. 134), 77, 78, 151.
Martina. Greer (16a. Dee. 109), 1625.
Martin, Inre (L. R. 34 Ch. D. 618), 869.
Martin, Inre (L.R. 21 Q.B. Div. 29), 973.
Martin v. Jackson (3 Casey, 504), 444.
Martin v. Jackson (27 Pa. St. 506), 1537.
cli
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Martin v. Lacon (L. E. 30 Ch. D. 544; L.
E. 33 Ch. D. 332), 813.
Martin v. Lamb (L. J. 58 Ch. 432), 1192.
Martin v. Martin (5 Bush, 47), 374.
Martin v. Martin (16 B. Mon. 8), 231, 500,
618, 526.
Martini;. Maugham (14 Sim. 232), 762,
769,820, b22, 1524.
Martina. McCanless (68 Miss. 810; 10
So. Eep. 72), 831.
Martin v. McCord (5 Watts, 493; 30 Am.
Dec. 342), 749.
Martin t>. Mitchell (2 J. & W. 425), 1080.
Martin v. O'Bannon (35 Ark. 62) , 574.
Martin v. Paxson (66 Mo. 260), 893, 1483.
Martini;. Eaborn (42 Ala. C48), 1210.
Martin v. Uebow, (1 Bro. Ch. 154), 245.
Martini). Sedgwick (9Beav. 333), 1116.
Martini). Smith (1 Dillon, 95), 1540.
Martini;. Southgate (28 Me. 41), 996.
Martini). Wynkoop (12 Ind. 266), 390,
417.
Martinet'. Robinson (78 Hun, 115), 1416.
Martinez v. Lindsay (91 Ala. 334; 8 So.
Rep. 787), 1449, 1451.
Martin's Appeal (23 Pa. St. 433), 1034,
1105.
Martin's Estate, In re (39 N. Y. Supl.
189; 16 Misc. Rep. 245), 1684.
Martinson ». Clowes (L. R. 21 Ch. D.
857), 1491, 1492.
Marts v. Brown (56 lad. 386), 847.
Marvin d. Smith (56 Barb. 600; 46N.Y.
671), 924, 1746.
Mars d. Davis (56 Miss. 745), 1515.
Marx v. McGlynn (88 ST. Y. 357), 111,
618.
Mar> land v. Bank of Maryland (6 Gill
& J. 205), 10.
Maryland Fire Ins. Co. v. Dalrymple
(25 Mu. 243; 89 Am. Dec. 779), 388,
3%, 1718.
Maryland Grange Agency v. Lee (72
Md. 161; 19 Atl. Rep. 534), 1296, 1562.
Mason d. Bank of Commerce (90 Mo.
452; 3 S. W. Eep. 206), 1070.
Mason v. Bauk of Commerce (16 Mo.
App., 275 ; 00 Mo. 452) , 1649,
Mason v. Chambers (4 J. J. Marsh. 402),
34.
Mason d. Commerce Bank (90 Mo. 452),
1218.
Mason v. Crosby (1 W. & M. 343), 472,
480.
Mason v. Day (Pr. Ch. 319), 829.
Matoa d. Gardner (3 Mason, 178), 1322.
Mason t). Hartford, etc. R. R. Co (10
Fed. Eep. 334), 1740.
Mason, Inre (L. E 10 Ch. 273), 869, 904.
Mason, In re (98 N. Y. 527), 1687, 1706.
Masons). Jones (2 Barb. 229), 111, 951,
1115.
Mason d. Jones (2 Barb. 248), 997.
Mason v. Martin (4 Md. 125), 1100, 1184.
Mason v. Mason (33 Ga. 435) 1536, 1538.
Mason v. Mason (4 Sandf. Ch. 631), 997.
Masoni). Mason (2 Sandf. Ch. 433), 977.
Mason v. M. E. Church (27 N. J. Eq. 47),
111, 734, 749, 757.
Mason d. Morley (34 Beav. 471), 3374.
Mason v. Muncaster (9 Wheat. 445),
789, 797.
Mason v. Pomeroy (151 Mass. 164; 24 N.
E. Eep. 202), 1031.
Mason v. Walt (5 111. 132), 1005, 1341.
Mason v. Waite (17 Mass. 660), 1625.
Masons. Whitthorne (2 Coldw. 242),
949.
Mass. Gen. Hospital d. Amory (12
Pick. 445), 899, 900.
Massey v. Rowen (L. R. 4 H.L. Cas.288),
653.
Massey v. Banner (1 J. & W. 241), 947,
1135.
Massey v. Banner (4 Madd. 413), 1173,
1254.
Massey v. Davis (1 Ves. Jr. 317), 333, 413.
Massey d. Greenhow (2Patt. &H. 255),
451, 453.
Massey v. Massey (2 Hill Ch. 492), 1690.
Massey v. McElwaine (2 Hill Eq. 426),
432, 595.
Massey i>. O'Dell (10 Ir. Eq. 22), 1536.
Massey v. Parker (2 Myl. & K. 174), 649,
664.
Massien. Watts (6 Cranch, 148), 35, 36,
192, 413.
Massy v. Davis (1 Ves. Jr. 289), 415.
Master s. De Croismar (11 Beav. 184),
41,42, 43.
Master v. Fuller (4 Bro. Ch. 19; 1 Ves.
613), 697.
Masters v. Masters (1 P. Wms. 421), 1357.
Mastin v. Barnard (33 Ga. 520), 865, 907.
Materne v. Horwitz (101 N. Y. 469), 556.
Mather v. Bennett (21 N. H. 204), 1537.
Mather v. Morton (16 Jur. 309; 21 L. J.
Ch. 15), 10S1.
Mathews v, Heyward (2 S. Car. 239), 204.
Mathiasi). Mathias (3Sm. & Gif. 552),
1701.
Mathiei). Edwards (2 Coll. 480), 1081.
Mathie v. Edwards (2 Coll. 465), 1505.
Mathlsi). Stufflebeam (94111. 481), SOS.
Mathison v. Clarke (3 Drew. 3), 1058.
Matson v. Ally (41 111. App. 72), 411.
Matthew d. Brise (14 Beav. 341), 286,
1056, 1205, 1245, 1253.
Matthews v. Dragaud (3 Desaus. 26),
389, 398, 1183,
TABLE OF CASES.
civ
[The references are to page9: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Matthews *. Hey wood (2 S. Car. 239),
388, 532, 560, 827, 1215.
Matthewa v. Keble (L. E. 1 Eq. 467; L.
E. 3Ch. 691), 820, 1526.
Matthews v. Leaman (24 Ohio St. 615),
46.
Matthews *. McPherson (65 N. Oar. 189),
949, 951, 955, 1114, 1559.
Matthews *. Matthews (104 Ala. 303; 16
So. Eep. 91), 831.
Matthews *. Ward (10 Gill & J. 443), 912,
922, 949, 967, 980, 983, 1265.
Matthews*. Warden (10 Gill & J. 443),
946.
Matthewson's Oase, Mrs. (L. E. 3 Eq.
71), 656, 698.
Mattix *. Wend (19 Ind. 151), 575.
Mattox *. Todd (19 Ind. 130) , 477.
Mattocks *. Moulton (84 Me. 545), 1120,
1135, 1199, 1228.
Mattoon *. Cowing (13 Gray, 387), 857.
Maudlin *. Armistead (14 Ala. 702), 859,
895.
Maughlin *. Tyler (47 Md. 546), 1369.
Maughs v. Dixon (1 Macn. & G. 437 ; 3 H.
L. Cas. 702), 494.
Maught ». Getzendanner (65 Md. 527;
57 Am. Eep. 352), 753.
Maul *. Eeder (51 Pa. St. 377), 431, 451,
1598.
Mauldin v. Armstead (14 Ala. 702) , 979,
980, 1318, 1376.
Maulding *. Coffin (6 Tex. Civ. App.416;
25 S. W. Eep. 480), 1512.
Maupin *. Delaney (5 Dana, 589; 30 Am.
Dec. 699), 829.
Maupin *. Evans (47 Mo. 304), 449, 450.
Maure *. Harrison (1 Eq. Ab. 93), 1317.
Maurer's Appeal (86 Pa. St. 380) , 665.
Maurice*. Maurice (43 N. T. 203), 919.
Mauser *. Dix (8 De G., M. & G. 703),
1074, 1075.
Mavrich *. Grier (3 Nev. 52 ; 93 Am. Dec.
373), 992.
Maxfleld ». Burton (L. E. 17 Eq. 15),
600.
Maxon *. Scott (55 N. T. 247), 709.
Maxwell *.Barringer (110 N. Car. 76; 14
S.E. Eep. 516), 67, 1109.
Maxwell *. Campbell (45 Ind. 361), 847.
Maxwell *. Finnie (6 Coldw. 434), 904.
Maxwell v. Kennedy (8 How. 222), 463.
Maxwell *. Maxwell (109 111. 588), 339,
341, 367.
Maxwell ». Newton (65 Wis. 261), 1497,
1498.
Maxwell v. Wettenhall (2 P. Wms. 26) ,
1346.
Maxwell's Estate, In re (83 Iowa, 590; 50
N. W. Eep. 56), 214.
May *. Le Olaire (11 Wall. 217), 530, 1635.
May 17. Nabors (6 Ala. 24), 369.
May *. Taylor (6 M. & G. 261), 951, 1054,
1260.
Mayberry v. Neeley, (5 Humph. 337) ,
652.
Maybury «. Brien (15 Pet. 38), 963.
Mayd v. Field (L. E. 3 Ch. D. 587), 697,
698, 1528.
Mayer *. Foulkrod (4 Wash. 349), 993,
1047, 1342.
Mayer *. Galluchat (6 Eieh. Eq. 1),
1058.
Mayer *. Gould (1 Atk. 615), 1591.
Mayer v. Mordecai (1 S. Car. 383), 1215.
Mayes v. Hendry (33 Ark. 240), 574.
Mayfleld, In re (17 Mo. App. 684), 904,
1575.
Mayfleld *. Kilgour (31 Md. 241), 955,
1025, 1114.
Mayham v. Coombs (14 Ohio, 428) , 577.
Mayhew *. Middleditch (1 Bro. Ch. 162),
1529.
Maynard*. Cleaver (149 Mass.- 307) , 157,
1637.
Maynard*. Cleveland (76 Ga. 62), 993,
1047, 1172, 1343, 1345.
Mayo v. Farrar (112 ST. Car. 66) , 697.
Mayo v. Hutchinson (57 Me. 546), 706.
Mayo v. Snead (78 Ky. 634), 1387.
Mayor v. Davenport (2 Sim. 227), 881.
Mayor v. East India Co. (1 Moore, P.
C. 273), 811.
Mayor, etc. v. Attorney-General (5 H.
L. Cas. 1),772.
Mayor, etc. v. Meserole (26 Wend. 136),
618.
Mayor*. Horner (Cowp. 108), 981.
Mayor of Coventry v. Attorney-General
(2Madd. Ch. 77; 2 Bro. P. C. 235), 18.
Mayor of Coventry v. Attorney-General
(7 Bro. P. C. 235), 905.
Mayor v. Williams (6 Md. 235), 445.
Mazelin v. Eouyer (8 Ind. App. 27; 35
N. E. Eep. 303), 901.
Meachamw. Steele (93111. 135), 912, 1470.
Meacham v. Sternes (9 Paige, 398), 993,
1047, 1343, 1400, 1687, 1695.
Meacher v. Young (2 Myl. & K. 490), 833,
835.
Mead v. McLaughlin (42 Mo. 198), 1032.
Mead v. Merritt (2 Paige, 404), 37.
Mead v. Orrery (3 Atk. 235), 432, 440, 456,
1173, 1657.
Meade*. Bunn (32 N. T. 275), 477.
Meador*. Meador (3Heisk. 662), 601.
Meakings v. Cromwell (2 Sandf. Ch.
512; 1 Seld. 136), 43, 1016, 1037, 1039.
Means*. Dowd (128 U. S. 273), 1367.
Meath*. Porter (9Heisk. 224), 1110.
clvi
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages : Vol. 1, pp. 1-847; Vol. n, pp. 848-1753.]
Mebane [v. Mebane (4 Ired. Eq. 131; 44
Am. Dec. 102), 1269, 1291, 1302, 1640,
1644.
Mebane v. Mebane (66 N. Car. 334), 1054.
Mechanics' Bank v. Edwards (1 Barb.
272), 978.
Mechanics' Bank, In re (2 Barb. 446),
900, 904, 1123.
Mechanics' Bank v. Seton (1 Pet. 299),
202, 203, 434.
Medbury v. Watson (6 Met. 259) 481.
Medeker v. Bonebrake (108 U. S. 66),
714.
Medford v. Levy (31 W. Va. 649; 2 Lawy.
Eep. 368), 562.
Medler's Case (Hob. 225), 1691.
Medlicott v. O'Donell (1 B.&B. 166),
1540.
Medworthu. Pope (27Beav. 21), 42.
Meecham w. Steele (93 111. 135), 913, 916,
919.
Meek«. Briggs (87 Iowa, 610; 54 N. W.
Eep. 456), 921.
Meek i;.Kettlewell (1 Hare, 476; 1 Phill.
342), 88, 152, 157, 851.
Meek v. Perry (36 Miss. 190), 286, 288,
403.
Meeker v. Saunders (6 Iowa, 61), 1364.
Meeting St. Baptist Soc. v. Hall (8 E. I.
234), 731, 749, 756, 759, 941.
Megargeev. Naglee (64 Pa. St. 216), 935,
1307.
Meggison v. Moon (2 Ves. Jr. 630), 128.
Menaffey's Estate, In re (20 Atl. Eep.
1056; 139 Pa. St. 216), 1288, 1289, 1290.
Mehan v. Williams (12 Wright, 238), 444.
Meier v. Meier (105 Mo. 411), 1447, 1480,
1482.
Meigs v. Dimock (6 Conn. 458), 579.
Meigs v. Meigs (15 Hun, 453), 82.
Meikel v. Borders (129 Ind. 629; 29 N. E.
Rep. 29), 831.
Meiley v. Butler (26 Ohio St. 535), 709.
Melcker v. Derkum (44 Mo. App. 650),
676.
Melick «. Pidcock (44 N. J. Eq. 525; 6
Am. St. Rep. 901), 912.
Melick v. Varner (41 Neb. 105; 59 N. W.
Rep. 521), 660.
Melick v. Voorhees (24 N. J. Eq. 305),
987,1402.
Melleru. Stanley (2 De G., J. & S. 183),
166.
Mellicott v. O'Donnell (1 B. & B. 156),
465.
Mellingw. Leak (32 Eng. L. &Eq. 442),
1539.
Mellish v. Melllsh (1 S. & S. 145), 289.
Mellish's Estate (1 Pars. Eq. 486), 1595.
Mellon's Appeal (32 Pa. St. 121), 1408.
Mellor». Lees (2 Atk. 495), 1164.
Mellow's Trusts, In re (L. E. 6 Ch. D.
127), 675.
Melson v. Doe (Leigh, 408), 108.
Memphis, etc. R. R. Co. v. Scruggs (50
Miss. 284), 1048.
Memphis, etc. R. E. Co. v. Woods (88
Ala. 630; 16 Am. St. Eep. 81), 411.
Menard v. Crowe (20 Minn. 148), 1480.
Mendenhall v. Leivy (45 Mo. App. 20),
708.
Mendes v. Guedella (2 Johns. & H. 259),
1124, 1234.
Meneea v. Johnson (12 Lea, 561), 710.
Menken v. Brinkley (94 Tenn. 721; 31 S .
W. Eep. 92), 1310.
Mennard v. Welford (1 Sm. & Gif. 426),
869, 905.
Mercantile Trust, etc. Co. v. Pickerell
(99 N. Car. 139; 5 S. E. Eep. 417), 1714.
Mercer v. Stark (1 Sm. & M. 479), 52, 356.
Mercer's Co. v. Attorney-General (2
Bligh (N. S.), 165), 772.
Merchant v. Merchant (2 Bradf. 432),
78.
Merchant Tailors' Co. v. Attorney-
General (L. E. 11 Eq. 35; 6 Ch. 512),
181, 771, 772.
Merchant v. Thompson (34 N. J. Eq.
73) , 708.
Merchant v. Woods (27 Minn. 396), 1505.
Merchants' Bank v. Jeffrey (21 W. Va.
504), 1721.
Merchants' Bank v. McClelland (9 Colo.
608), 1053.
Merchants' Bank v. Bawls (21 Ga. 334),
1049.
Merch ants' Bank v. State Bank (10 Wall.
604), 530.
Merchants* Line v. Wagoner (71 Ala.
581), 597.
Mercier v. Hemme (50 Oal. 606), 377,388,
434, 435.
Mercier v. Mercier (50 Ga. 646), 517.
Mercier v. People (25 Wend. 97; 35 Am.
Dec. 653), 724, 726,844.
Meredith v. Heneage (1 Sim. 543), 119,
122,123,128,253, 261.
Meredith v. Ladd (2 N. H. 196), 556.
Merewether v. Shaw (2 Cox, 124), 541.
Merket v. Smith (33 Kan. 66), 1583.
Merlin v. Blagrave (25 Beav. 125), 1193,
1194.
Merrettw. Poulter (96 Mo. 237), 518, 520,
525.
Merriam v. Boston, etc. K. E. (117 Mass.
241), 707.
Merriam v. Eassam (14 Allen, 616), 1539.
Merrick's Estate (2 Ashm. 485) , 1253.
Merrick v. Marshall (66 Me. 435), 1409.-
TABLE OF CASES.
clvii
.The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Merrill ». Allen (38 Mich. 487), 576.
Merrill v. Brown (12 Pick. 216) , 96.
Merrill v. Bullock (105 Mass. 486) , 655,
656.
Merrill v. Englesby (28 Vt. 157), 1384.
Merrill v. Farmers' L. & T. Co. (24 Hun,
297), 1056, 1244.
Merrill v. Norfolk Bank (19 Pick. 32),
1634.
Merrills. Smith (37 Me. 394), 706.,
Merrimann. Munson (134 Pa. St. 114),
1296,1301.
Merriman v. Russell (39 Tex. 285), 1171.
Merritt v. Brown (21 N. J. Eq. 401), 500,
518, 520.
Merritt v. Corties (71 Hun, 612; 24 N. Y.
Supl.561),998.
Merritt v. Farmers' Ins. Co. (2 Edw.
547), 971.
Merritt v. Jenkins (17 Ela. 593), 1158,
1192.
Merritt v. Lambert (10 Paige, 357), 418.
Merritt v. Lyon (3 Barb. 110), 715.
Merritt v. Merritt (62 Mo. 150), 1344.
Merritt v. Wills (8 Ind. 171), 575.
Merry v. Abney (1 Ch. Cas. 3S) , 432.
Merry v. Eyves (1 Eden, 1), 1529.
Mersey Docks v. Gibbs (11 H. L. Cas.
686; L. E. 1 H. L. Cas. 93), 788.
Mershon v. Duer (40 H. J. Eq. 333),
308.
Mertens v. Jolliffe (Amb. 313), 445, 454.
Mertin v. Jordan (60 Me. 531), 474.
Mescall v. Tully (91 iDd. 96), 233.
Meserole, In re (36 Hun, 298), 1687.
Mesgrett v, Mesgrett (2 Vern. 580), 1045,
1046.
Mesickfl. Mesick (7 Barb. 120), 1236.
Messeena v. Carr (L. R. 9 Eq. 260), 1118.
Messenger v. Clark (5 Exch. 392), 715,
716.
Mestaer v. Gillespie (11 Ves. 626), 218,
497, 506, 617, 976.
Metcalfe. Cook (2 B. I. 355), 665.
Metcalfe v. Pulvertoft (1 V. & B. 184),
842.
Metcalfe v. Shaw (3 Campb. 22), 723.
Meth. Church v. Clark (41 Mich. 730),
616, 751, 756.
M. E. Church v. Garvey (53 111. 401),
1070.
M. E. Church v. Jaques (1 Johns. Ch.
65), 435.
M. E. Church v. Jaques (1 Johns. 450),
532.
M. E. Church v. Jaques (3 Johns. Ch.
77), 657.
M. E. Church v. Remington (1 Watts,
218; 26 Am. Dec. 61), 21, 22, 731, 762,
807, 810.
M. E. Church v. Shulze (61 Ind. 511),
1070.
M. E. Church v. Warren (28 Md. 338),
753.
Methodist Church v. Wood (5 Ohio,
283), 987.
Metropolitan Nat. Bank v. Campbell
Commission Co. (77 Fed. Rep. 705),
1579.
Metropolitan Bank v. Taylor (53 Mo.
444), 665.
Metropolitan Bank v. Taylor (62 Mo.
338), 708.
Meureu. Meure (2 Atk. 265), 113, 114.
Meux v. Bell (1 Hare, 73), 88, 1116.
Meuxii. Maltby (2Swanst. 277), 36.
Mewburn v. Bass (82 Ala. 626), 1514.
Mews v. Mews (15 Beav. 529), 712, 714,
715.
Meyer v. Jefferson Ins. Co. (5 Mo. App.
245), 1488, 1490.
Meyer v. Knechler (10 Mo. App. 371),
1462.
Meyer v. Montrion (4 Beav. 346) , 1571.
Meyers. Tighe (151 Mass. 354; 24 N. E.
Rep. 49), 1287.
Meyer v. Tesser (32 Ind. 294), 562.
Meyers v. Estell (48 Miss. 372) , 1517.
Meyers v. Funk (56 Iowa, 52), 481.
Meyers v. Paxton (4 Tex. Civ. App. 29;
23 S. W. Rep. 284), 582.
Meyers v. Rahte (46 Wis. 655), 711.
Meyers' Estate (8 Pa. Co". Ct. 374), 903.
Michelle. Michell (4 Beav. 549), 1S28.
Miehelmore v. Mudge (2 Giff. 183), 680.
Mich. Air Line Ry. Co. v. Mellen (44
Mich. 321), 387, 388, 532.
Mickleyw. Thomas (22 Barb. 652), 491.
Michoudn. Girod (4 How. 503), 390, 398,
401, 403,405, 412, 415, 416, 466, 823, 1184,
1490.
Middlebrook v. Merchants' Bank (3
Keyes, 135), 962.
Middlesex Banking Co. v. Lester (64 N.
W. Rep. 168), 1486.
Middleton v. Cater (4 Bro. Ch. 409),
259.
Middleton v. Dodson (13 Ves. 268), 1003.
Middleton v. Dodswell (13 Ves. 269),
842, 1027, 1576, 1578.
Middleton v. Middleton (1 J. &W. 96),
379,497, 500,506,511, 513.
Middleton v. Spicer (1 Bro. Ch. 201), 40,
245, 966.
Middleton,v. Taber (24 S. E. Rep. 282),
1373, 1387.
Midmer v. Midmer (26 N.J. Eq. 299),
364.
Mikel v. Mikel(5Rich. Eq. 220), 1135,
1141.
clviii
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Milbank v. Jones (127 N. T. 370), 852.
Miles v. Bacon (4 J. J. Marsh. 468), 1358,
1701.
Miles v. Durnford (2 Sim. (N. S.) 234),
455, 467, 1655.
Miles v. Erwin (2 McCord Oh. 524),
419, 427.
Miles v. Fisher (10 Ohio St. 1), 943.
Miles v. Harford (L. R. 12 Ch.D. 691), 93.
Miles v. Knight (12 Jur. 666), 1067.
Miles v. Leigh (1 Atk. 574), 1352.
Miles v. Neave (1 Cox, 159), 892.
Miles v. Thome (38 Cal. 335), 49.
Miles v. Wheeler (43 111. 123), 400, 1180.
Miles v. Wistar (5 Blnn. 477) , 839, 840.
Mill v. Hill (3H. L. Cas. 828), 1242.
Millard's Case (Freetn. 43), 438.
Millard v. Clark (80 Hun, 141; 29 N. T.
Supl. 1012), 79.
Millard v. Eyre (2 Ves. Jr. 94), 900, 904.
Millard v. Hathaway (27 Cal. 119), 270,
309,357, 1638.
Milledge®. Lamer (4 Desaus. 622), 143.
Miller v. Albertson (73 Ind. 343), 706.
Miller v. Antle (2 Bush, 407), 525.
Millers. Argyle (5 Leigh, 460), 1470.
Miller v. Atkinson (63 N. Car. 537), 753,
756.
Miller v. Beverleys (4 Hen. & M. 415),
1683.
Miller u.Beverly (1 Hen. &M. 322), 964.
Miller u. Bingham (1 Ired. Bq. 423; 36
Am. Dec. 58), 652, 672, 1276, 1559.
Miller v. Birdsong (7 Baxt. 631), 213,
313, 404.
Miller v. Blose (30 Gratt. 744), 232, 339,
362, 358, 364, 369.
Millers;. Brown (47 Mo. 504; 4 Am. Rep.
345), 708.
Miller v. Carleton (2 Tex. Civ. App.
382; 21 S. W. Rep. 605), 522.
Miller v. Chittenden (2 Iowa, 315), 750,
1624.
Miller v. Congdon (14 Gray, 114), 858,
1020.
Miller v. Conklln (17 Ga. 430), 1369.
Miller v. Davidson (8 111. 518; 44 Am.
Dec. 715), 1170.
Miller v. Davis (50 Mo. 572) , 307, 312.
Miller v. Gable (2 Denio, 492), 796, 798,
800, 806.
Millers. Handy (33 La. Ann. 160), 715.
Miller v. Harwell (3 Murph. 195), 1321.
Miller v. Holcombe (9 Gratt. 665), 1402.
Miller v. Hollingsworth (36 Iowa, 16S),
706.
Miller v. Huddleston (3 Maen. & G. 613),
1436.
Miller v. Hull (4 Dem. 104), 1109, 1488.
Miller v. Johnson (27 Md. 6), 707.
Miller v: Knight (1 Keen, 129), 902.
Miller v. Lerch (1 Wall. Jr. 210), 18, 20.
Miller v. McDonald (72 Ga. 20) , 1464 .
Millers. Mclntire (6 Pet. 61), 465,1535.
Miller v. Meech (8 Pa. St. 417), 167,612,
884, 885, 928, 1016, 1089.
Miller d. Miller (L. R. 13 Eq. 263), 1437.
Miller v. Mitchell (1 Bailey, 437) , 392.
Miller v. Newton (23 Cal. 654), 659,664,
705.
Miller v. Porter (53 Pa. St. 292), 749, 814.
Miller v. Priddon (1 De G., M. & G. 335),
900.
Miller v. Proctor (20 Ohio St. 444) , 1135,
1210, 1222.
Millers. Purchase (5S. Dak. 232; 58 N.
W. Rep. 256), 661.
Miller v. Race (1 Burr. 457), 973.
Miller v. Redwine (75 Ga. 130), 992,1349.
Miller v. Sawbridge (29 Minn. 442), 478.
Miller v. Simonds (6 Mo. App. 33), 282,
2£5.
Miller v. Smythe (92 Ga. 154; 18 S. E.
Rep. 46), 1028.
Miller v. Stetson (32 Ala. 161), 1368.
Miller v. Stokely (5 Ohio St. 194), 232,
358.
Miller v. Stump (3 Gill, 304), 964.
Miller©. Thatcher (9 Tex. 482), 47.
Miller v. Voss (62 Ala. 122), 651, 655, 664,
686, 704.
Miller v. Watt (70 Ga. 385), 688.
Miller v. Williams (5Md. 226), 715.
Miller v. Williamson (5 Md. 219), 665,
718.
Miller v. Wood (116 ST. T. 361), 1540.
Milligan v. Phipps (153 Pa. St. 208 ; 31 W.
N. C. 561, 21 Atl. Rep. 1121). 710.
Milligan v. Pleasants (74 Md. 8; 21 Atl.
Rep. 695), 1557, 1562.
Millikin D.Ham (36 Ind. 166), 223,308.
Million v. MoRae (9 Mo. App. 344), 1498.
Mills v. Banks (3 P. Wms. 1), 1068, 1073,
1075.
Mills v. Banks (3 P. Wms. 7), 1526.
Mills w.Barber (4 Day, 428), 1419.
Mills County v. Burlington Ry. Co. (47
Iowa, 66), 993, 1046, 1342.
Mills v. Farmer (lMerlv. 55), 754, 755,
767,763.
Mills v. Goodsell (5 Conn. 475), 383, 289,
390.
Mills v. Hoffman (26 Hun, 594), 1210.
Mills v. Levy (2 Edw. Ch. 183), 1369.
Mills v. Mills (40 N. Y. 543), 555.
Mills v. Mills (63 Fed. Rep. 611), 1181.
Mills v. Newberry (112 111.123; 64 Am.
Rep. 213), 747, 763.
Mills v. Osborne (7 Sim. 30), 1102, 1204.
Mills v. Post (7 Mo. App. 519), 1607.
TABLE OF CASES.
clix
[TJhe references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Mills v. Richards (34 Miss. 77), 722.
Mills v. Robarts (1 R. & M. 655), 837.
Mills v. Swearingen u(67 Tex. 269; 3 S.
W. Rep. 268), 1201, 1605.
Mills v. Taylor (30 Tex. 7), 1082, 1084.
Millspaugh v. Putnam (16 Abb. Pr. 380),
69.
Milner. Kleb (44 N. J. Eq. 378; 14 Atl.
Rep. 616) , 1040.
Mllner v. Calmer (2 P. Wms. 640), 678.
Milner v. Edwards (7 Busb, 394) , 713.
Milner v. Freeman (40 Ark. 62), 339, 366,
367.
Milner v. Harewood (18 Ves. 274), 1164.
Milner v. Lord Harewood (18 Ves. 259),
12.
Milner v. Mills (Mosley, 123), 298.
Milner v. Slater (8 Ves. 295), 1324.
Milnes v. Busk (2 Ves. 488), 657.
Mllroy v. Lord (4 De G., F. & J. 264), 69,
76.
Milsington v. Mulgrave (3 Mad. 491; 5
Madd. 471), 1002, 1169, 1161.
Milwaukee Prot. Home v. Becker (87
Wis. 409; 58 N. W. Rep. 774), 815.
Miner v. Beekman (50 N. T. 337), 607,
608.
Miner v. Pearson (16 Kan. 27), 660, 706.
Minertzhagen v. Davis (1 Coll. 335), 900.
Minet v. Stokes (4 T. R. 561), 529.
Minet u.jVulliamy (1 Russ. 113), 811.
Minford v. Hench (3 Stockt. 15), 393.
Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v. Beebe,
(40 Minn. 7), 1551, 1552.
Minor v. Rogers (40 Conn. 512), 78.
Minor v. Wicksteed (3 Bro. Ch. 627),
1352.
Minors v. Battison (L. B. 1 App. Cas.
428), 167, 614.
Minot v. Baker (147 Mass. 348), 748, 760,
763.
Minot v. Boston Asylum (7 Mete. 417) ,
763.
Minot v. Mitchell (30 Ind. 228), 526.
Minot v. Prescott (14 Mass. 496), 1086.
Minot v. Tilton (64 N. H. 371; 10 Atl.
Rep. 682), 1728, 1732.
Mint urn j'. Seymour (4 Johns. Ch. 495),
151, 152.
Minuse v. Cox (5 Johns. Ch. 441; 9 Am.
Dec. 313), 1093, 1103, 1108, 1667, 1678.
Mirehouse v. Scaife (2 Myl. & Cr. 695),
1355.
Missouri Hist. Soc. v. Academy (94 Mo.
459), 734, 748.
Mitchell v. Adams (1 Ired. L. 298), 859.
Mitchell v. Bogan (11 Rich. 686), 1444.
Mitchell v. Bunch (2 Paige, 606), 37.
Mitchell v. Coglazier (106 Ind. 4"?4), 191.
Mitchell v. Holmes (1 Md. Ch. 287), 1698.
k
Mitchell v. Kendall (45 Me. 234), 1407.
Mitchel v. Kingman (5 Pick. 431), 13.
Mitchell v. Kintzer (5 Pa. St. 216; 47 Am.
Dec. 408) , 380.
Mitchell v. McDougal (62 111. 498), 489.
Mitchell v. Mitchell (42 N. E. Rep. 465),
128.
Mitchell v. Mitchell (147 Ind. 113), 134.
Mitchells;. Moore (95 U. S. 690), 1173.
Mitchell v. Morse (77 Me. 423; 1 Atl.
Rep. 141), 106.
Mitchell v. Murphy (43 Fed. Rep. 425),
1S9.
Mitchells. Nixon (2Ir. Eq. 155), 868.
Mitchell v. O'Neill (4 Nev. 504), 359.
Mitchell!;. Pitner (15 Ga. 319), 902.
Mitchell v. Reed (61 N. T. 123), 398.
Mitchell v. Reynolds (1 P. Wms. 181),
810.
Mitchells. Rice (6 J. J. Marsh. 625),
884.
Mitchell v. Richmond (164 Pa. St. 566;
30 Atl. Rep. 486), 710.
Mitchell v. Skinner (17 Kan. 563), 372,
374.
Mitchell v. Smith (32 Iowa, 484), 706.
Mitchell v. Winslow (2 Story, 630), 34,
1408.
Mitchell v. Worden (20Barb. 253), 495.
Mitchell's Estate, In re (L. R. 6 Ch. D.
655), 813.
Mitchum v. Mitchum (3 Dana, 260) , 403.
MUford v. Mitford (9 Ves. 87), 97, 976,
1408.
Mitford v. Reynolds (1 Phill. 185), 17, 23,
40, 730, 737, 811.
Mize v. Bates Co. Bank (60 Mo. App.
358), 75, 157.
Moalea. Buchanan (11 Gill & J. 314),
1054.
Mocatta v. Murgatroyd (1 P. Wms. 193),
496, 978.
Modrellti. Riddle (82 Mo. 31), 66,358.
Moens v. Hayworth (10 M. & W. 157),
487.
Moffatti;. Strong (10 Johns. 12), 108.
Moffltt v. McDonald (11 Humph. 457),
333, 532.
Moggridgec. Thackwell (7 Ves. 36), 735,
738, 754, 755, 756, 757, 759, 762, 765, 777,
778.
Mohr». Mamierre (101 U. S. 417), 831.
Mohru. Porter (51 Wis. 497; 8 N. W.
Rep. 364), 831.
Moirj;. Brown (14 Barb. 39), 895, 1364,
1393, 1394.
Moke v. Norrie (14 Hun, 132), 30, 31, 876.
Moldant, Ex parte (3 D. & C. 351), 1632.
Moleu. Mole (IDick. 310), 837.
Molew. Smith (Jacobs, 490), 978.
clx
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-817; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Mole v. Smith (1J. & W. 645), 842.
Molesworth, Ex parte (4 Russ. 308), 832,
841.
Mollan v. Griffith (3 Paige, 402), 1322,
1324.
Moloney v. Kernan (2 Dr. & W. 31), 434,
438.
Molony v. L'Estrange (1 Beat. 413), 393.
Monelli). Monell (5 Johns, Ch. 283; 9
Am. Dec. 298), 825. 1123, 1230, 1234.
Monroe v. Allaire (2 Oaines Cas. 192),
383, 389.
Monro v. Collins (94 Mo. 33), 204.
Monroe v. James (4 Munf. 195), 884, 885.
Monroe v. May (9 Kan. 466), 706.
Monroe v. Trenholm (112 N. Car. 634),
697.
Montacute v. Maxwell (1 P. Wms. 618),
98.
Montague v. Dawes (94 Mass. 397), 1438,
1453.
Montagues. Dawes (14 Allen, 369), 395,
1506.
Monteflore v. Brown (7 H. L. Cas. 241),
1317.
Montefiori v. Monteflori (1 Wm. Black.
362;lBro. Ch. 548), 538, 542.
Montesquieu v. Sandys (18 Ves. 313),
289, 418, 422, 423.
Montforil v. Cadogan (17 Ves. 485; 19
Ves. 635;2Meriv. 3), 50, 880, 881, 1159,
1161, 1591.
Montgomery v. Agr'l Bank (10 Sm. &
M. 566), 665.
Montgomery v. Barrow (19 La. Ann.
169), 1098.
Montgomery v. Clarke (2 Atk. 378), 842.
Montgomery v. Com. Bank (1 Sm. & M.
632), 1411.
Montgomery v. Craig (128 Ind. 48; 27 N.
E. Rep. 427), 71, 233.
Montgomery v. Dorion (7 N. H. 475),
28.
Montgomery v. Givhan (24 Ala. 568),
829.
Montgomery v. Johnson (11 Ir. Eq.
476), 883.
Montgomery v. Kirksey (26 Ala. 172),
1367.
Montgomery v. McElroy (3 W. & S.
370), 1352.
Montgomery v. Miller (131 Mo. 595),
1500, 1507,1511.
Montgomery v. Noyes (73 Tex. 207),
647,652.
Montgomery v. Sprankle (31 Ind. 113),
706.
Montpelier v. E. Montpelier (27 Vt. 704;
29 Vt. 12), 905, 1217.
Moody v. Farr (33 Miss. 192), 949.
Moody v. Fulmer (3 Grant, 17), 855.
Moody v. Gay (15 Gray, 457), 38.
Moody v. Matthews (7 Ves. 174), 397,
398.
Moody v. Noyes (45 Pac. Rep. 732), 988.
Moody v. Paschal (60 Tex. 483), 1364.
Moody v. Sitton (2 Ired. Eq. 382), 1409.
Moody v. Van Dyke (4 Binn. 31) , 401.
Moore v. Anders (14 Ark. 628; 60 Am.
Dec. 651), 585.
Moore v. Bennett (2 Ch. Cas. 246), 455.
Moore v. Brackin (27 111. 23), 419, 425.
Moore v. Burke (4 Fost. & F. 258), 474.
Moore v. Burnette (11 Ohio, 334), 949,
1265.
Moore v. Burrows (34 Barb. 173), 198.
Moore v. Campbell (102 Ala. 445; 14 So.
Rep. 780), 145.
Moore v. Copeley (165 Pa. St. 294; 35 W.
N. C. 563; 30 Atl. Rep. 829), 710.
Moore v. Cottingham (90 Ind. 243), 24.
Moore v. Crofton (Jon. & La. 442), 147.
Moore v. Demond (5 R. 1. 130), 1010.
Moore v. Felkel (7 Fla. 44), 1690.
Moore u.Frowd (3Myl. & Cr. 50), 1683.
Moore v. Fuller (6 Ore. 274), 710.
Moore v. Hamilton (4 Fla. 112), 1102,
1198, 1204.
Moore v. Hegeman (72 N. Y. 376), 616
Moore v. Hilton (12 Leigh, 2), 393.
Mooreu. Holeomb (3 Leigh, 604), 241.
Moore v. Hussey (Hob. 95), 24.
Moored. Ingram (91 N. Car. 376), 578.
Moore v. Jones (13 Ala. 295), 655.
Moore v. Mandlebaum (8 Mich. 433),
390.
Moore v. Mayhow (1 Ch. Cas. 34; 2
Freem. 175), 438.
Moore v. Moore (30 L. T. (N. S.) 752),
68.
Moore v. Moore (L. R. 18 Eq. 474), 70,
82.
Moore v. Moore (5 N. Y. 256), 414.
Moore v. Moore (4 Sandf. Ch. 37), 414,
417.
Moore v. Moore (47 Barb. 257), 616.
Moore v. Moore (1 Call, 57), 668.
Moore v. Moore (14 B. Mon. 208), 675.
Moore v. Moore (57 L. T. 568), 720, 726.
Moore v. Moore (4 Dana, 354; 29 Am.
Dec. 417), 748.
Moore v. Moore (4 Dana, 354), 763, 776.
Moore v. Moore (12 B. Mon. 651), 828.
Moore v. O'Branum (14 Ohio St. 177),
1344.
Moore v. Pickett (62 111. 158), 50.
Moore v. Ry an (31 Mo . App. 474) , 1490.
Moore v. Shepard (2Duv. 125), 1538.
Moore v. Sehultz (13 Pa. St. 98; 53 Am.
Dec. 446), 912, 932, 1012.
TABLE OF CASES.
clxi
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Hoore v. Simonson (27 Ore. 117; 39 Pac.
Rep. 1105), 179.
Moore v. Stinson (144 Mass. 694), 59.
Moore a. Superior Court (86 Cal. 495; 25
Pae. Eep. 22), 875.
Moore a. Thompson (40 Mo. App. 195),
1490.
Moore v. Tlsdale (5 B. Mon. 362), 500, 520.
Moore v. Williams (55 N. Y. Super. 116),
372.
Moore a. Williams (62 Hun, 65; 16 N. Y.
Supl. 403), 407.
Moore v. Williams (115 N. Y. 586; 5 L. E.
A. 654), 969.
Moore v. Worthy (56 Ala. 163), 580.
Moore v. Zabriskie (18 N. J. Eq. 51),
1690, 1094,1699.
Moorehead v. Metropolitan Nat'l Bank
(38 N. J. Eq. 493), 1421.
Moorman v. Arthur (90 Va. 465; 18 S. E.
Eep. 869), 179,205, 371.
Moorman v. Crockett (90 Va. 185; 17 S.
E. Eep. 875), 868.
Moosea. Moose (85 N. Y. 59), 1036.
Mora v. Manning (8 Ir. Eq. 218), 1593.
Moran a. Morau (120 Mo. 344) ; 25 S. W.
Eep. 185), 226, 360.
Moran v. Somes (154 Mass. 200; 28 N. E.
Eep. 526), 335.
Moran v. Wheeler (26 S. W. Eep. 297),
582.
Mordaunt v. Hooper (Amb. 311), 842.
Mordecai a. Parker (3 Dev. 425), 949,
1C53, 1265.
More v. Ellis (Bunb. 505), 723.
More?;. Mjyhew (1 Ch. Cas. 34), 441.
More a. More (2 Atk. 157) , 827.
Moreland v . Myall (14 Bush, 474), 706.
Morell a. Dickey (1 Johns. Ch. 153), 846,
847.
Morely v. Ward (11 Ves. 581), 387.
Morey v. Herrick (18 Pa. St. 123), 197, 497,
607.
Morgan v. Bogue (7 Neb. 429), 1369.
Morgan a. Boone (4 Mon. 297), 390.
Morgana. Clayton (61 III. 35), 231, 269,
335.
Morgan a. Dinges (23 Neb. 271 ; 8 Am. St.
Eep. 121), 489.
Morgan v. Elford (L. E. 4 Ch. 352), 494.
Morgan, Ex parte (12 Ves. 6), 426, 970.
Morgan a. Fisher (82 Va. 417), 1542.
Morgan a. Hannas (49 N. Y. 667), 1711.
Morgan, In re (L. E. 18 Ch. D. 93), 600.
Morgan v. Johnson (87 Ga. 383), 1628.
Morgan a. Kiney (38 Ohio St. 610), 1408.
Morgan v. Matteson (L. E. 10 Eq. 476),
70,76,77,151, 155.
Morgana. Milman (10 Hare, 279; 3 De
G., M.&G.24), 622.
Morgan a. Morgan (1 Atk. 488), 289, 603.
Morgan v. Morgan (6 Madd. 408), 672,
965.
Morgana. Morgan (HBeav. 72), 1167.
Morgana. Morgan (10 Ga. 297), 1534.
Morgan a. Morgan (4 Dem. 353), 1695.
Morgan v. Newells (2 Harr (Del.) 224),
308.
Morgan a. Eogers (19 Fep. Eed. 596),
1386.
Morgan a. Stephens (3 Gifi. 226), 877.
Morgan a. Swansea (L. E. 9 Ch. D. 585),
575, 1261.
Morgana. Wattles (69Ind. 260), 403.
Morgan's Estate (8 Pa. Co. Ct. 260), 902.
Moriarty v . Mart in (3 Ir. Ch . 31) , 126 .
Moricea. Bp. of Durham (9 Ves. 390;
10 Ves. 521), 85, 254.
Moritz a. Lavelle (77 Cal. 10; 11 Am. St.
Eep. 229), 1736.
Morlass a. Franklin (1 Swanst. 17), 174.
Morleya. Croxon (L. E. 8 Ch. D. 156),
813.
Morley a. Morley (2 Ch. Cas. 2), 947,
1140.
Morley a. Morley (L. J. 25 Ch. 1),978,
1432.
Morley a. Eennaldson (12 Eep. 158), 1042.
Morley v. Rennaldson (2 Hare, 570),
1041, 1044.
Mormon Church v. United States (136
U. S. 1),747, 779,780, 807.
Morningstar v. Hardwick (3 Ind. App.
431; 29 N. E. Rep. 929), 706.
Mornington a. Keane (2 De G. & J. 292),
202.
Morrant a. Gough (7 B. & Cr. 206), 1267.
Morrel v. Cowan (L. E. 6 Ch. D. 166),
697.
Morret a. Parke (2 Atk. 54), 329, 413.
Morris' Appeal (88 Pa. St. 368), 1408.
Morris a. Joseph (1 W. Va. 266; 91 Am.
Dec. 386), 416, 876, 1171.
Morris v. Harris (19 Ohio St. 15), 1686.
Morris a. Kent (2 Edw. Ch. 175), 893.
Morris a. Livie (1 Y. & Coll. 350), 973.
Morris a. McKnight (1 N. Dak. 266; 47
N. W. Eep. 375), 1450, 1452.
Morris v. Morris (33 Gratt. 51) , 626.
Morris a. Morris (2 McCart. 239), 839.
Morris v. Morris (9 Heisk. 815), 1221.
Morris a. Mowatt (2 Paige, 587), 1322,
1324.
Morris a. Nixon (1 How. 118), 416.
Morris a. Eippey (4 Jones, 533), 1721.
Morris a. Va. State Ins. Co. (90 Va. 370;
18 S. E. Eep. 843), 1455, 1477, 1481.
Morris a. Wallace (3 Pa. St. 319; 45 Am.
Dec. 642), 1210, 1583.
Morris a. Way (16 Ohio, 478), 18,20.
clxii
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Morrison s. Arbutnnot (8 Bro. P. C.
247), 540, S46.
Morrison v. Bean (15 Tex. 267), 1516.
Morrison s. Beirer (2 W. & P. 81), 749.
Morrison s. Bowman (29 Cal. 337), 1034.
Morrison s. Herrington (120 Mo. 665; 25
S. W. Rep. 568), 208, 360.
Morrison, In re (16 Sim. 42) , 845.
Morrison s. Kinstra (55 Miss. 71), 707,
949.
Morrison s. Kelly (22 111. 610; 74 Am.
Dec. 169), 864, 874.
Morrisons. Moot (6 Eng. L. & Eq. 14;
9 Hare, 241), 33.
Morrisons. Morrison (4 Kay & J. 458),
1701.
Morrison s. Thistle (67 Mo. 596), 708.
Morrow s. Goodchaux (41 La. Ann. 711),
715.
Morrow v. Saline Co. Com. (21 Kan.
484), 1138, 1198.
Moraes. Byam (55 Mich. 594), 1486.
Morse s. Dearborn (109 Mass. 693), 475.
Moreen. Morrill (82 Me. 80), 995.
Morse s. Morse (85 N. T. 53) , 51.
Morses. Palmer (12Ves. 353), 393.
Morses. Royal (12 Ves. 355), 259, 282,
383, 384, 392, 399, 426, 46'i, 467, 981, 965,
1178, 1180, 1540, 1541, 1543.
Morse's Settlement, In re (21Beav. 174),
103, 104.
Mortimers. Ireland (6 Hare, 198), 872.
Mortimers. Moflatt (4 Hen. & M. 603),
1437.
Mortimers. Watts (14 Beav. 616), 1159.
Mortlock s. Buller (10 Ves. 2a2), 947,
1012, 1078, 1107, 1118.
Morton s. Adams (1 Strobh. Eq. 72),
987.
Mortons. Barrett (22 Me. 261; 39 Am.
Dec. 576), 912,913, 916, 918, 919, 920,
1667, 1674, 1678.
Morton s. Hall (118 Mass. 511), 1479.
Morton s. Hallett (L. R. 15 Ch. D. 143) ,
895.
Morton s. Naylor (1 Hill, 583), 34.
Morton s. Nelson (31 N. E. Rep. 168),
372.
MorvMles. Fowle (144 Mass. 109), 731,
748, 1124.
Morys. Michael (18 Md. 227), 11.
Mosbys. Johnson (86 Va. 429; 10 S. E.
Rep. 425), 1470.
Mosbys. Steele (7 Ala. 299), 14.
Mosely s. Marshall (22 N. Y. 200), 955,
1114.
Mosely s. Mosely (87 N. Car. 67), 65.
Mosely r. Mosely (86 Ala. 289; 5 So. Rep.
732), 2:54, 503.
Mosely s. Mosely {temp. Finch, 53), 643.
Moseley s. Partee (5 Helsk. 26), 710.
Moses s. Johnson (88 Ala. 517), 199, 585.
Moses s. McFarlan (2 Burr. 1012), 529.
Moses s . Moses (50 Ga . 9) , 1214.
Moses s. Murgatroyd (1 Johns. Ch. 119),
88, 153, 979, 1317, 1328, 1667,1678.
Moses s. Thomas (26 N. J. L. 124), 1385.
Moshers. Kittle (101 Mich. 345; 69 N. W.
Rep. 497), 707.
Moshiers. Meek (80 111. 79), 574.
Mosman v. Bender (80 Mo. 579), 1217.
Mosss. Bainbridge (6 De G., M. &G.
292), 424.
Moss s. Moss (95 111. 449) , 346, 532.
Mosteller s. Mosteller (40 Kan. 658), 307.
Mostyn v. Mostyn (W. N. (1878) 150),
1529.
Motley v. Sawyer (34 Me. 540), 706.
Motts. Ackerman (92 N. T. 653), 858.
Motts. Buxton (7 Ves. 201), 913, 918,920.
Mott s. Clarke (9 Barr, 399), 445.
Mott s. Harrington (12 Vt. 199), 419.
Mott s. Maris (2 Wash. C. C. 196), 1423.
Mott s. Maris (29 S. W. Rep. 825), 1447.
Moulton r. Holmes (57 Cal. 337), 1342.
Mounces. Byars (16 Ga. 469), 578, 596,
602.
Mountford s. Cadogan (17 Ves. 487), 883.
Mountford s. Keene (19 W. R. 708), 272.
Mountford v. Scott (3 Madd. 34), 443.
Mountfort, Ex parte (15 Ves. 445), 832,
841, 1563.
Mountstuart v. Mountstuart (6 Ves.
363), 842.
Mt. Zion Bapt. Church s. Whitmore
(83 Iuwa, 138), 789, 795, 796.
Mousley s. Carr (4 Beav. 49), 1255.
Movans. Hays (1 Juhns. Ch. 339), 47,
72.
Mowry s. Sanborn (68 N. Y. 153), 1483.
Moyer's Appeal (14 All. Rep. 253), 362.
Moyer s. Moyer (21 Hun, 67), 415, 1560.
Moyle s. Moyle (2 Russ. & M. 715), 877,
1205, 1254, 1256.
Moyse s. Gyles (2 Vern. 385), 215, 320.
Muckleston s. Brown (6 Ves. 52), 66,
245,258,513.
Muckenfuss s. Heath (1 Hill Ch. 182),
1690.
Mucklow s. Fuller (Jacobs, 198), 857,
861, 883, 885, 1235.
Muggenridges. Stanton (1 De G., F. &
J. 107), 656.
Muir s.Cross (10 B. Mon. 277), 575.
Muldrow v. Fox (2 Dana, 79), 1016, 1089.
Mulford v. Bowman (1 Stockt. 797), 390.
Mulford v. Mench (3 Stockt. 16), 414.
Mulford s. Mlneh (UN. J. Eq. 16; 64
Am. Dec. 472), 1183, 1595.
Mulford v. Shirk (26 Pa. St. 473), 1385.
TABLE OF CASES.
clxiii
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 648-1763.]
Mulhallen v. Marum (3 Dr. & War. 317),
286.
Mulhern v. MeDavitt (16 Gray, 404), 834,
837.
Mull v. Bowles (129 Ind. 343; 28 N. E.
Eep. 771), 191, 852.
Mullens v. Miller (L. K. 22 Ch. D. 194),
476.
Muller v. Bayley (21 Gratt. 621), 711.
Muller». Buyck (12 Mont. 354), 1736.
Mulligans. Mitchell (3Myl. & Cr. 72; 1
Myl. &K. 446), 801.
Mullin v. Beatty (56 Pa. St. 3S9) , 710.
Mull ins v . Mullins (86 Hun, 421 ; 29 N . T.
Supl. 961), 53,106.
Mumford v. Murrays (6 Johns. Ch. 1),
1255, 1333.
Mumma v. Brinton (77 Md. 197; 26 Atl.
Eep. 184), 831.
Mumma v. Mumma (2 Vern. 19) , 27.
Muinma v. Potomac Co. (8 Pet. 281),
597.
Munch v. Cockrell (9 Sim. 339), 1205,
1233, 1598.
Munch v. Cockerell (5 Myl. & Cr. 179),
1123, 1644.
Munch v. Shabel (37 Mich. 166), 372,
373.
Mundy v. Howe (4Bro. Ch. 223), 833,
835.
Mundy v. Vawter (3 Gratt. 518), 1034,
1069, 1071, 1091, 1350.
Muun v. Burges (70111. 604), 1180, 1184,
1453, 1456, 1493, 1738, 1739,
Munroe v. Allaire (2 Caines Cas. 183),
384, 395.
Munroe «, Eastman (31 Mich. 283), 449.
Munroe v. Pritchett (16 Ala. 789), 487.
Munson v. R. E. Co. (103 N. T. 58; 8 N.
E. Eep. 355), 411.
Munson v. S. G. & C. E. Co. (103 N. T.
58), 412.
Muntorf v. Muntorf (2 Eawle, 180), 1679.
Muntzw. Brown (11 La. Ann. 472), 1210.
Murdoch's Case (2 Bland, 461; 20 Am.
Dec. 381), 395, 396, 1098.
Murdock v, Finney (21 Mo. 138), 957,
1117.
Murdock v. Hughes (7 Sm. & M. 219),
532, 1537.
Murdock v. Johnson (7 Coldw. 605),
1092, 1107, 1348.
Murless v. Franklin (1 Swanst. 17), 307,
366, 368,
Murphy v. Carlin (113 Mo. 112; 20 S. W.
Eep. 786), 123, 128.
Murphy v. Dellam (1 Bland, 629) , 753.
Murphy v. Doyle (29 L. E. Ir. 333), 1206.
Murphy v. Grice (2 Dev. & B. Eq. 199),
1559.
Murphy v. Moore (4 Ired. Eq. 118), 956,
957.
Murphy v. Murphy (12 Ohio St. 407),
100.
Murphy v. Nathans (63 Pa. St. 508), 349.
Murphy v. Peabody (63 Ga. 522), 309,
362.
Murray v. Ballou (1 Johns. Ch. 666),
388, 432, 434, 441, 452, 460, 595, 1647.
Murraj v. Barlee (3 Myl. & K. 209), 645,
690, 693, 697.
Murray v. Coster (20 Johns. 576), 465.
Murray v. Drake (46 Cal. 645), 621.
Murray v. Elibank (13 Ves. 1; 14 Ves.
496), 682.
Murray v. Elibank (10 Ves. 84; 1 Lead.
Cas. Eq. 494), 683.
Murray v. Feinour (2 Md. Ch. 418), 1213.
Murray v. Finster (2 Johns. Ch. 155),
452.
Murray v. Gouverneur (2 Johns. Cas.
411; 1 Am. Dec. 177), 607.
Murray v. Jayne (8 Barb. 612), 219.
Murray v. Lyllburn (2 Johns. Ch. 441),
204, 388, 452, 633, 536, 1583.
Murray v. Murray (5 Johns. Ch. 60),
224.
Murray v. Palmer (2 Sch. & Lef. 474),
282, 393,394,480.
Murray v. Parker (19 Beav. 305), 103.
Murray v. Sell (23 W. Va. 473), 308.
Murray v. Vanderbilt (39 Barb. 140), 395,
405.
Murry v. Sell (23 W. Va. 475), 269.
Murthwaite v. Jenkinson (2 Barn. & Cr.
357), 920, 927.
Murton's Trusts, In re (L. E. 10 Ch.
272), 869.
Muscogie Lumber Co. v. Hyer (18 Fla.
698; 43 Am. Eep. 332), 1684.
Muse v. Sawyer (T. E. 204), 856.
Musham v. Musham (87 111. 80), 198, 388,
434.
Musselman v. Eshelman (10 Barr, 394),
393, 401, 404.
Mussey v. Mussey (2 Hill Ch. 496), 1537.
Mussey v. Noyes (26 Vt. 462), 1360, 1361,
1364.
Musson v. Trigg (51 Miss. 172), 659, 666,
707.
Mussoorie Bank v. Eaynor (L. B, 7 App.
Cas. 321), 125, 138.
Musters v. Wright (2 De G. & Sm. 777),
672,
Mutual Accident Assn. v. Jacobs (141
111. 261; 33 Am. St. Eep. 302), 1607.
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Boggs (121111.119),
1738.
Mutual Life Ins, I . v. Fife (47 Pac.
Eep. 27), 1407.
clxiv
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wood! (51 Hun,
640; 4 N. Y. Supl. 133), 869, 892.
Muzzy v. Reardon (57 N. H. 378), 708.
Myer's Appeal (2 Barr. 463), 416.
Myer's Appeal (62 Pa. St. 104), 1696.
Myers v. Estell (48 Miss. 404) , 1440.
Myers v. Jackson (135 Ind. 136; 34 N. E.
Rep. 810), 1280.
Myers v. James (2 Lea, 159), 710.
Myers v. McGavock (39 Neb. 843; 58 N.
W. Eep.622),831.
Myers v. Myers (1 Casey, 100), 363.
Myers v. Myers (1 Ball. Eq. 24), 678.
Myers v. Meyers (2 McCord Eq. 214; 16
Am. Dec. 648), 1025, 1152, 1171.
Myers v. Ross (3 Head, 59) , 443 .
Myers?;. Wade (6 Rand. 444), 839.
Myers v. Zetelles (21 Gratt. 759), 1201.
Myerscough, Ex parte (1 J. & W. 152),
832, 841, 842, 1563.
N.
Nagle's Appeal (1 Harris, 260), 262.
Nagle's Estate (52 Pa. St. 154; 12 Pbila.
25), 875, 1692.
Naglee's Estate (52 Pa. St. 164), 995, 1076.
Nail v. Punter (5 Sim. 555), 1591.
Naili>. Spiegel (33 Ark. 63), 574.
Naill v. Maurer (25 Md. 539), 100.
Nailoru. Goodall (L. J. 47 Ch. 53), 1122.
Nairn v. Majoribanks (3 Russ. 582),
1026, 1434.
Naldred v. Gilham (1 P. Wms. 577) , 158.
Naltner v. Dolan (108 Ind. 500), 1189,
1583.
Nance v. Busby (91 Tenn. 303; 18 S. W.
Rep. 874), 760, 787, 792.
Nance v. Nance (1 S. Car. 209), 1198,
1215.
Nandick v. Wilkes (1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 393;
Gilb. Eq. 114) , 101, 102.
Nanneyc. Williams (22Beav. 452), 163,
610, 514,
Nantes v. Corrock (9Ves. 182), 289,427,
645.
Nant-y-Glo, etc. Co. v. Grave (L. R.
12 Ch. D. 738), 534.
Nantzu. McPherson (7 Munf. 599), 440.
Napier v. Elam (6 Terg. 108), 473.
Napier v. Napier (1 Dr. & War. 407), 678.
Narcissa v. Wathon (2 B. Mon. 241),
1184.
Nash v. Coates (S B. & A. 839), 923, 925,
929, 942.
Nash v. Mitchell (71 N. T. 200; 27 Am.
Rep. 38), 699, 709.
Nashtf. Palmer (5 Maule v. Selw. 380),
540.
Nash v. Smith (17 Ves. 29), 243.
I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp.
-1753.]
Nashville Trust Co. v. Bank (91 Tenn.
336), 1408.
Nathans ». Morris (4 Whart. 388),
1688.
National Bank v. Barry (125 Mass. 20),
681.
National Bank v. Carpenter (101 U. S.
567) , 1740.
National Bank v. Gilmer (116 N. Car.
684; 23 S. E. Rep. 333), 370.
National Bank v. Hamilton (34 N. J.
Eq. 158), 686.
National Bank v. Insurance Co. (104 U.
S. 54), 1603, 1604.
National BaDk v. Lake Shore R. R. Co.
(21 Ohio St. 232), 697.
National Bank v. Smith (24 Atl. Rep.
273), 1653.
National Bank v. Smith (43 Conn. 327),
705.
National Bank of Australia v. Cherry
(L. R. 3 P. C. 299), 600.
National Exchange Bank v. Jackson
(33 S. W. Rep. 277), 1466.
National Exchange Bank v, Sutton (147
Mass. 131), 995.
National Exchange Co. v, Drew (2
Macq. 103), 476, 484.
National Finance Co., In re (L. R. 3 Ch,
App. 791), 1701.
National Fire Ins. Co. v. Loomis (11
Paige, 431), 1497.
National Mahaiwe Bank v. Barry (125
Mass. 20), 530.
National Park Bank v. Halle (30 111.
App. 17), 1750.
National Webster Bank v. Eldredge
(115 Mass. 424), 909.
Nau v. Brunette (79 Wis. 664), 1472.
Navarre v. Button (1 Vin. Ab. 185),
1536.
Navigation Co. v. Green (3 Dev. L.
434), 860.
Naylern. Wetherall (MS.), 201.
Naylortf. Arnitt (1 R. &M. 501), 940, 955,
1003, 1027.
Naylorw. Winch (1 S. & S. 555), 377,
394,
Neal v. Patten (47 Ga. 73), 1055, 1244.
Neale«. Haythorp (3 Bland, 551), 308,
357.
Neale v. Neale (9 Wall. 1), 1740.
Nearpass v. Newman (106 N. Y. 47), 969,
1744.
Neate v. Marlborough (3 Myl. & Cr.
407), 568.
Needham, Inre(.l Jon. & La. 34), 878,
879.
Needles v. Martin (33 Md. 609), 254, 753,
756.
TABLE OF CASES.
cTxv
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Needless. Needles (7 Ohio St. 432; 70
Am. Dee. 85), 680,
Neely v. Rood (54 Mich. 134), 1630, 1632.
Neely «. Torian (IDev. & Bat. 410), 527.
Neese v. Riley (77 Tex. 348), 570.
Neff's Appeal (57 Pa. St. 91), 1135, 1140,
1144, 1200, 1222.
Negley v. Lindsay (67 Pa. St. 216; 5 Am.
Rep. 426), 1248.
Neil v. Keese (5 Tex. 23), 174, 197, 532.
Neil v- Kinney (11 Ohio St. 58), 577.
Neil v, Morley (9 Ves. 478), 13.
Neilson v. Blight (1 Johns. Cas. 205), 88,
153, 1318, 1328.
Neilson v- Lago w (12 How. 98) , 41, 43, 920,
941, 943. 1267.
Nelson v. Board, etc. (105 Ind. 287), 1535.
Nelson v. Carrington (4 Munf . 332), S87.
Nelson v. Cornwall (1 Gratt. 174), 1538.
Nelson v. Cowing (6 Hill, 336), 484.
Nelson v. Davis (35 Ind. 474), 920,940,
941.
Nelson v. Dunn (15 Ala. 602), 1376.
Nelson v. Hagerstown Bank (27 Md.
51), 304, 1255.
Nelson v. Hayner (66 111. 487), 399.
Nelson v. McDonald (80 Wis. 605; 60 N.
W. Rep. 893), 711.
Nelson v. Oldfleld (2 Vern. 76), 513.
Nelson v. Ratlifl (18 So. Rep. 487) , 399.
Nelson v. Sims (23 Miss. 383; 57 Am.
Dec. 144), 449.
Nelsons. Vinson (9 Houst. 27; 32 Atl.
Rep. 225), 705.
Nelson v. Worrall (20 Iowa, 664), 231,
500,518,625.
Nesbitt», Loekman (34 N. T. 169), 206,
286, 423.
Nesbit v. Murray (5 Ves. 149), 245.
Nesbitt v. Treddenick (1 Ball & B. 46),
397, 399, 1164.
Nesmith, Jure (140 N. T. 609; 35 N. E.
Rep. 942; 71 Hnn, 139; 24 N. Y. Supl.
527), 1026.
Nethersole v. Indigent-Blind School
(L. R, UEq. 1),813
Nether Stowey Vicarage, In re (L. R.
17 Eq. 156), 1154.
Neves v. Scott (9 How. 197; 13 How.
268), 91, 93, 97, 101, 103, 104, 116.
Neville v. Saunders (1 Vern. 415), 913,
919, 930.
Neville v. Wilkinson (1 Bro. Ch. 543),
473, 539, 542.
New v. Bonaker (L.;R. 4 Eq. 655), 23,
733, 768, 812.
New v. Jones (1 H. & Tw. 632; 9 Jar.
Prec. 338), 1058.
New Albany & S. R. R. v. Huff (19 Ind.
444), 1368.
Newberry v. Newberry (28 Ala. 691),
1690.
New Brunswick v. Canada Ry. Co. (1
Dr. &Sm. 363), 409.
New Brunswick, etc. Co. v. Conybeare
(9H. L. Cas. 711), 488.
Newburn v. Bass (82 Ala. 622), 1510.
Newcombe v. Brooks (16 W. Va. 32),
1183.
Newcomb v. Williams (9 Met. 534), 856,
893, 1020.
Newcomen v. Hassard (4 Ir. Ch. 268),
662.
Newell v. Cochran (41 Minn. 374; 43 N.
W. Rep. 84), 1564.
Newell v. Grant Locomotive Works (50
111. App. 612), 1408.
Newell v. Hill (2 Mete. 180), 1362.
Newell v. Morgan (2 Harr. 225), 354.
Newell v. Newell (14 Kan. 202), 377, 519.
Newell v. Randall (32 Minn. 171; 50 Am.
Rep. 662), 495.
Newells v. Morgan (2 Harr. 225), 308,
354.
Newenham v. Pemberton (1 De G. &
Sm. 644), 678.
New England Trust Co. v. Eaton (140
Mass. 532), 1062, 1201, 1425.
Newhall, Ex parte (2 Story, 360), 14.
Newhall v. Jones (117 Mass. 252), 403.
Newhall v. Wheeler (7 Mass. 189), 922,
940, 941, 1267, 1638.
New Havens T. M. Institute v. New
Haven (60 Conn. 32; 22 Atl. Rep.
447), 737, 820.
Newhouse v. Godwin (17Barb. 236), 424.
Newkirk v. Place (47 N. J. Eq. 477; 21
Atl. Rep. 124), 60, 72.
Newland v. Attorney-General (3 Meriv.
684), 737.
Newland v. Champion (1 Ves. 105), 455,
1655.
Newland v. Newland (1 Jones, 463), 108.
Newland v. Paynter (4 Myl. & Or. 408),
651, 656.
Newlin v. Freeman (4 Ired. Eq. 312),
664.
Newman v. Barton (2 Vern. 205), 593,
594.
Newman v. De Lorimer (19 Iowa, 244),
946.
Newman v. Early (3 Tenn. Ch. 714), 364.
Newman v. Jackson (12 Wheat. 570),
1094.
Newman v. James (12 Ala. 29), 655.
Newman v. Jones (Finch, 58), 1591.
Newman v. Montgomery (5 How. 742),
956, 1266.
Newman v. Payne (4 Bro. Ch. 350; 2
Ves. Jr. 200), 418, 419, 425.
clxvi
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Newman v. Samuels (17 Iowa, 528),
1440.
Newman v. Warner (1 Sim. 457), 896.
New Orleans v. Baltimore (15 La. Ann.
625), 1690.
New Orleans v. McDonogjh (12 La. Ann.
240), 763.
Newport v. Bryan (5 Ir. Ch. 119), 881.
Newport v. Cook (2 Ashm. 332), 832, 837,
839, 1561.
Newsom v. Board, etc. (103 Ind. 526),
1535.
Newsome v. Flowers (30 Beav. 461),
906, 1538.
Newstead v. Johnstone (2 Atk. 46), 244,
246.
Newstead v. Searles (1 Atk. 265), 443.
Newton v. Askew (11 Beav. 145), 160,
1564.
Newton v. Bennett (1 Bro. Ch. 359),
330, 386, 1036, 1037.
Newton v. Bronson (13 N. Y. 687; 67
Am. Dec. 89), 36, 996, 1005, 1055, 1056,
1244.
Newton v. Chappie (L. E. 27 Ch. D.
584), 1709.
Newton v. Marsden (2 Johns. & H. 356),
1043.
Newton v. Newton (L. B. 6 Eq. 135; 4
Ch. 143), 435, 600.
Newton v. Payne (2Ves. 199), 427.
Newton v. Pelham (1 Eden , 514) , 66.
Newton v. Porter (69 N. Y. 136), 204,
387,388,434, 531,534, 681.
Newton v. Preston (Finch, Pr. Ch.
103) , 358.
Newton v. Eeld (4 Sim. 141), 649.
Newton v. Taylor (32 Ohio St. 399), 204,
220, 388.
New York Bible Soc. v. Endlong (30
Abb. N. Cas. 139; 25 N. Y. Supl. 68),
731.
New York Cent'l Ins. Co. v, National
Ins. Co. (20 Barb. 468), 443, 444.
New York Dry Dock Co. v. Stillman
(30 N. Y. 174), 619.
N. Y. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ely (2 Cow. 678),
19, 21.
New York Ins. Co. v. Boulet (24 Wend.
505), 1405, 1722.
New York Security Co. v. Saratoga
Gas Co. (34 N. Y. Supl. 890), 898.
New York Steam Co. v. Stern (46 Hun,
206), 1749.
Neyland v. Bendy (69 Tex. 711), 35S.
Nichols v. Allen (130 Miss. 211; 39 Am.
Rep. 445), 253, 254, 746, 748.
Nichols v. Campbell (10 Gratt. 561),
858, 859, 895,980.
Nichols v. Crisp (Amb. 769), 246.
Nichols v. Eaton (91 U. S. 716), 228,
1269, 1272, 1292, 1640, 1644.
Nichols v. Glover (41 Ind. 23) , 575, 680.
Nichols v. Hodges (1 Pet. 562), 1689.
Nichols v. Levy (5 Wall. 531), 1640, 1644.
Nichols v. McCarthy (53 Conn. 299; 7
Atl. Rep. 24), 1737.
Nichols I). McKwen (17 N. Y. 22), 1389.
Nichols v. Nichols (149 Pa. St. 172; 24
Atl. Rep. 194), 344.
Nichols v. Otto (132111.91), 1490, 1492,
1506, 1507.
Nichols v. Palmer (5 Day, 47), 721, 723.
Nichols v. Peak (12 ST. J. Eq. 69), 389,
1651.
Nichols v. Pinner (18 N. Y. 295; 23 N. Y.
264), 492, 495.
Nichols v. Rogers (139 Mass. 146), 995,
1736, 1738.
Nichol v. Wentworth (4Denio, 385), 941.
Nichol's Appeal (157 Mass. 20), 1121,
1228.
Nicholls v. Leeson (3 Atk. 573), 529.
Nicholls v. Postlewaite (2 Dall. 131),
1355.
Nicholls v. Thornton (16111. 113), 308.
Nicholson v. Halsey (1 Johns. Ch. 422),
977.
Nicholson v. Squire (16 Ves. 259), 827.
Nicholson v. Tuttin (2 Kay & J. 23),
1317, 1329, 1381.
Nicholson v. Woodsworth ( 2 Swanst.
369), 892.
Nickell v. Handley (10 Gratt. 336), 228,
912,913,916,919,1297.
Nickell v. Miller (10 Gratt. 336), 668.
Nickerson v. Bowly (8 Met. 424), 253.
Nickerson v. Nickerson (127 IT. S. 688),
64.
Nickley v. Thomas (22 Barb. 652), 495.
Nicol V. NiCOl (L. R. 30 Ch. D. 143),
726.
Nicol v. Nicol (L. R. 31 Ch. D. 624), 719,
721, 725.
Nicoll v. Miller (29 111.' 323; 81 Am. Dec.
311), 878.
Nicoll v. Mumtord (4 Johns. Ch. 522),
598, 1318, 1329, 1376, 1380.
Nicoll v. Ogden (29 111. 384; 81 Am.
Dec. 311), 91, 94,987.
Nicoll v. Walworth (4 Denio, 385), 951,
1226, 1546.
Nigntingale v. Gouldbourn (2 Phill. 694;
6 Hare, 484), 17, 23, 40,737.
Nightingale v. Hidden (7 R. I. 132), 910,
964.
Nightingale v. Lawson (1 Bro. Ch. 443),
1159.
Nightingale v. Nightingale (13 R. I.
113), 160,1622.
TABLE OF CASES.
clxvii"
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Niles i>. Hall (64 Vt. 453; 25 Atl. Rep.
479), 661.
Niles, In re (113 N. T. 547), 1231, 1544.
Niles «. Eansford (1 Mich. 336), 1451,
1491, 1504.
Niles v. Stevens (4 Denio, 399), 1013, 1055,
1089.
Nimmsv. Com. (4 Hen. &M. 57; 4 Am.
Dec. 488), 1698.
Nims v. Bigelow (45 N. H. 343), 708.
Niver v. Crane (98 N. Y. 40), 370, 374.
Nix v. Bradley (6 Eich. Eq. 43), 669.
Nixon v. Eoae (12 Gratt. 425), 664, 665,
667, 894.
Nixon v. Sheldon (L. E. 39 Ch. D. 50),
1437.
Nixon's Appeal (63 Pa. St. 277), 269, 308,
355, 370.
Noble v. Andrews (37 Conn. 346), 926.
Noble v. Hogg (36 S. Car. 322; 15 S. E.
Eep. 359), 1203.
Noble v. Meymott (14 Beav. 471), 887.
Noble v. Moses (74 Ala. 604), 283.
Noble v. Moses (81 Ala. 530; 60 Am. Rep.
175), 286.
Noble v. Turner (65 Md. 519), 1542.
Noble v. Willock (L. R. 8 Ch. 778), 666,
697.
Noble's Appeal (39 Pa. St. 425), 1742.
Noe«. Kern (93 Mo. 367; 3 Am. St. Rep.
544), 130.
Noeti. Roll (134 Ind. 115; 33 N. E. Rep.
905), 342.
Noel v. Bewley (3 Sim. 103), 980.
Noelu. Eobinson (lVern. 94), 593, 594.
Noel v. White (1 Wright, 814), 413.
Nokesv. Seppings (2 Phil. 19), 1571.
Nolen v. Gwyn (16 Ala. 725), 440.
Nopsons. Horton (20 Minn. 268), 1512,
1513.
Norbury v. Calbeck (2 Moll. 461), 1679.
Norcum v. D'Oench (17 Mo. 98), 1017, 1086,
1264.
NordholtB. Nordholt (87 Cal. 552; 22
Am. St. Rep. 268), 500, 518.
Norman v. Burnett (25 Miss. 183), 52.
Norman v. Cunningham (5 Gratt. 72),
328, 1582.
Ntfrinan v. Hill (2 Patt. & H. 676), 1092.
Norris j;. Chambers (29 Beav. 246), 35.
Norris, Esc parte (L. R. 4 Ch. App. 280),
1587.
Norris v. Fraser (L. R. 15 Eq. 318), 517.
Norris v. Hassler (22 Fed. Eep. 401),
1725.
Norris v. Hero (22 La. Ann. 665) , 1187.
Norris, In re (L. R. 27 Ch. D. 333), 864,
871
Norris v. Johnston (5 Pa. St. 287), 1288,
1295.
Norris v. Le Neve (3 Atk. 37), 330, 465.
Norris v. Norris (1 Cox, 183), 1667, 1678.
Norris v. Tarrin (1 Dall. 147), 529.
Norris v. Thompson (4 0. E. Green, 307),
749, 1067, 1748.
Norris v. Wright (14 Beav. 29), 1202.
Norris' Appeal (71 Pa. St. 106), 1692.
North v. Barnum (12 Vt. 269), 1537.
North v. Crompton (1 Ch. Ca. 196; 2
Vera. 253), 238.
North v . Pardon (2 Ves. 495), 244, 260.
North v. Phllbrook (34 Me. 537), 918,
943.
North v. Platte County (29 Neb. 447; 45
N.W. Rep. 692), 1542.
North v. Valk (Dud. Eq. 212), 258, 262.
Northern v. Carnegie (4 Drew. 5j7),
242.
Northern, etc. E. E. Co. v. Keighler (29
Md. 572), 1689.
North Adams Soc. v. Pitch (8 Gray,
421) , 748.
Northampton Bank ». Bailiet (8 W. &
S. 311; 42 Am. Dec. 297), 957, 1117.
North Baltimore Bldg. Assn. v. Cald-
well (25 Md. 420; 90 Am. Dec. 67),
1184.
North Carolina E. R. v. Wilson (81 N.
Car. 223), 904,1592.
North Carolina University v. Bank (96
N. Car. 280), 1534.
North Dakota Elevator Co. v. Clark (3
N. Dak. 26;53N. W. Rep. 175), 1630.
North Hempstead v. Hempstead (2
Wend. 109), 19.
North Hudson E. Co. v. Booraem (28
N. J. Eq. 450), 608.
North River Bank v. Aymar (3 Hill,
362), 444, 476.
Northrop v. Cooper (23 Kan. 432), 1481.
Northrupw. Hale (73 Me. 66), 161.
North Shore Perry Co., In re (63 Barb.
656), 962.
Northwestern Guaranty Co. v. Smith
(15 Mont. 101; 35 Pac. Rep. 224), 831.
Northwestern, etc. Ins. Co. v. Allis (23
Minn. 337), 707.
Norton v. Burge (35 Conn. 250), 452.
Norton, Exparte (8 De G., M. & G. 258),
680.
Norton v. Hixon (25 111. 371;79Am. Dec.
338), 1718, 1721.
Norton v. Johnstone (L. R. 30 Ch. D.
649), 1436.
Norton v, Kearney (10 Wis. 443), 1364.
Norton v. Ladd (22 Conn. 203), 1537.
Norton v. Leonard (12 Pick. 152), 912,
913, 916, 918, 922, 923.
Norton v. Mallory (3 Thomp. & C. 640),
334.
clxviii
TABLE OF CASES.
[Tlie references are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Norton v. Norton (2 Sandf. 296), 923,625,
941, 1268.
Norton v. Palmer (7 Cush. 523), 1743.
Norton^. Phelps (54 Miss. 471), 993, 1031,
Norton v. Eay (139 Mass. 230), 1720.
Norton v. Eellley (2 Eden, 286), 292, 427.
Norton v. Storer (8 Paige, 222), 373.
Norton v. Turvlll (2 P. Wms. 144), 693,
1536.
Norvell v. Hedrlek (21 W. Va. 523), 1034.
Norvellv. Johnson (5 Humph. 489), 577.
Norway v. Norway (2 Myl. & K. 278),
888, 892.
Norwood v. Harness (98 Ind. 134), 1201.
Nossa. Tracy (1 P. Wms. 288; 2 Vera.
700), 506.
Nottldge v. Prince (2 Gifi. 246), 292.
Nourse v. Finch (1 Ves. Jr. 344), 238,
246.
Nourse v. Henshaw (123 Mass. 96), 707.
Nowland v. Nelligan (1 Bro. Ch. 489),
128.
Noyes v. Blakeman (6 N. T. 567; 3
Sandf. 531), 702, 940, 1701.
Noyes v. Carter (23 S. E. Rep. 1), 1366.
Noyes v. Landon (59 Vt. 569) , 494.
Noyes v. Turnbull (136 N. Y. 639; 7 N. Y.
Supl. 114), 1231.
Nugent v. Cloon (117 Mass. 219), 999,
1004.
Nugentu. Gifford (2 Atk. 463), 440, 1173.
Nugent v. Vetzera (L. E. 2 Eq. 704), 826,
847.
Nurse v. Craig (2 N. R. 148; 5 B. & P.
153), 724.
Nurse v. Yerworth (3 Swanst. 608), 978.
Nutt v. Coddington (34 Fla. 77; 15 So.
Rep. 667), 705.
Nutter v. Pouch (86 Ind. 451) , 589.
Nutters. King (152 Mass. 355), 1384.
Nutter ii. Vickery (64 Me. 490), 853, 857.
Nyce's Estate (5 W. & S. 245), 1102, 1202,
1210.
Nysewander v. Lowman (124 Ind. 584),
574.
o.
Oakes v. Strachey (13 Sim. 414), 1168.
Oakes v. Turquand (L. R. 2 H. L. Cas.
325), 489.
Oakland Sav. Bank v. Wilcox (60 Cal.
126), 427.
Oates v. Cooke (3 Burr. 16), 178, 922,
936, 942.
Oatman v. Barney (46 Vt. 594) , 969, 1054.
O'Bannon v. Musselman (2 Duv. 523),
996.
Obee v. Bishop (1 De G., F. & J. 140),
881, 1225, 1596.
Oberlin College v. Fowler (10 Allen,
545), 402.
Obermlllerp. Wylie (36 Fed. Rep. 641),
52,61, 1571,1612.
Obert v. Bordine (20 N. J. L. 394), 1266.
Obert v. Hammill (3 Harr. 74), 401.
Obert v. Obert (2 Stockt. Ch. 98; 1 Beav.
423), 392.
Obertheir v. Strand (33 Tex. 522), 309.
O'Brien v. Lewis (4 Giff. 221), 419.
O'Brien v. Oswald (45 Minn. 59), 1468.
O'Brien, Petition of (11 R. I. 419), 710.
O'Brien v. Tysen (L. R. 28 Ch. D. 272),
813.
O'Callaghan v. Cooper (5Ves. 126), 1045.
Ocean Ins. Co. v. Polleys (13 Pet. 157),
565.
Ocean Nat. Bank v. Olcott (46 N. Y.
12), 374.
Ockleston v. Heap (1 De G. & S. 640),
872.
O'Connell v. Ackerman (62 Md. 337),
1403.
O'Connell v. Hansen (44 Pac. Rep. 887),
1372.
O'Connell v. Kelly (114 Mass. 97), 1479.
O'Conner v. Gilford (117 N. Y. 275), 1116.
O'Connor v. Haslam (5 H. L. Cas. 177),
1150.
O'Connor v. Irvine (14 Cal. 435; 16 Pac.
Rep. 236), 190, 333.
O'Connor!;. Waldo (83 Hun, 489; 31 N.
Y. Supl. 1105), 1015.
O'Daily v. Morris (31 Ind. Ill), 706.
O'Day v. Van Sant (3 Mackey, 196),
1103.
Odell v. Odell (10 Allen, 1), 748, 755, 1753.
Odell's Estate, In re (1 Conn. (N. Y.)
94; 2 N. Y. Supl. 752), 1003, 1025, 1028,
1698.
Odessa Tramways Co. v. Mendel (L. E.
8Ch. D. 235), 663.
O'Donnell v. White (18 R. I. 669; 29 Atl.
Rep. 769j,319.
O'Driscoll v. Fishburne (1 Nott. & McC.
77), 861.
O'Fay v. Burke (8 Ir. Ch. 225), 622.
O'Ferralli;. O'Ferrall (LI. & Goold, 79),
1159.
Oflen v. Harman (1 De G., F. & J. 263),
1081.
Ogden ii. Barker (18 Johns. 87), 665.
Ogden v. Guice (66 Miss. 330) , 702, 704,
707.
Ogden v. Kip (6 Johns. Ch. 160), 1576.
Ogden v. Murray (39 N. Y. 202), 1687.
Ogden's Appeal (70 Pa. St. 601; 29 Leg.
Int. 165), 671, 919, 933.
Oglander v. Oglander (2 De G. & S. 381),
865, 866, 907.
TABLE OF CASES.
clxix
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 818-1753.]
Ogle, Ex parte (L. R. 8 Ch. App. 711),
1114, 1138, 1342.
Ogle v. Ogle (41 Ohio St. 359), 577.
Oglesby v. Bingham (69 Miss. 975; 13
So. Rep. 852), 576.
O'Halloran v. Fitzgerald (71 III. 53),
1118.
O'Hara v. Dudley (14 Abb. N. Cas. 71;
95 N. T. 403), 1522,1524.
O' Hara v. Jones (46 111. 288), 1408.
O'Hara v. MoConnell (93 U.S. 150), 1732.
O'Hara, Will of (95 N. T. 403), 89, 516,
518.
Ohio Life Ins. Co. v. Ledyard (8 Ala.
866), 440.
Ohio Oo. v. Winn (4 Md. Ch. 253), 1058.
Ohmero. Boyer (89 Ala. 273; 7 So. Rep.
663), 1557.
O'Keefe v. Calthorpe (1 Atk. 18), 904,
908, 909, 974.
Oleott v. Bynum (17 Wall. 44), 307, 314,
1486.
Oleott v. Rice (69 Fed. Rep. 199), 210,
407.
Oleott v. Tioga R. R. Co. (27 N. Y. 546),
393, 395, 1462.
Oldham v. Carleton (2 Cox, 400), 244.
Oldham v. Jones (5 B. Mon. 458), 414,
416.
Oldham v. Litchford (2 Freem. Ch. 284;
2 Vern. 506), 496, 500, 606, 508, 513, 617.
Old South Soc. v. Crocker (119 Mass.
26; 20 Am. Rep. 310), 181, 731, 748.
Old's Estate, In re (176 Pa. St. 156; 34
Atl. Rep. 1022), 991.
Olds v. Marshall (93 Ala. 138; 8 So. Rep.
284), 178, 502.
Ollnu. Bate (98111. 53), 562.
Oliphant v. Hendrie (1 Bro. Ch. 571),
811.
Oliver v. Grimball (14 S. Car. 556), 665.
Oliver v. Oliver (3S.J. Eq. 368), 996.
Olivers. Pyatt (3 How. 332), 327, 328,
365, 432, 460, 532, 537, 538, 595, 1056,
1535, 1578, 1681, 1625.
Olivers. Wilson (8 Price, 172), 606.
Olliffet). Wells (130 Mass. 221), 263, 748.
Olmstead v. Herrlck (1 E. O. Smith,
310), 1227.
Ommaney v. Butcher (1 Turn. & Russ.
260), 243.
Omrod v. Huth (14 Mees. & W. 651), 475.
Onderdonk v. Mott (34 Barb. 106), 830.
Onealc. Mead (1 P. Wms. 693), 1324.
O'Neill. Salmon (25 How. Pr. 251), 1389,
O'Neill v. Beck (69 Ind. 239), 1385.
O'Neill v. Cole (4 Md. 107) , 653.
O'Neill v. Farr (1 Rich. 80), 424.
O'Neill v. Greenwood (64 N. W. Rep.
511), 56.
O'Neill v. Henderson (15 Ark. 235; 60
Am. Dec. 568), 883, 1064.
O'Neill j). Vanderburgh (25 Iowa, 104),
1092.
Ononany v. Butcher (1 Turn. & Russ.
260) , 83.
Onslow v. Wall is (1 Maen. & G. 506; 1
Hall & T. 513) , 965, 966, 1277.
Ontario Bank v. Mumford (2 Barb. Ch.
596), 29.
Orange Nat. Bank v. Traver (7 Fed.
Rep. 150; 7 Sawy. 210), 699, 710.
Ord v. Noel (5 Madd. 438), 947, 1107, 1118.
Orde, Exparte (Jacobs, 94), 845.
Orde, Inre (L. R. 24 Ch. D. 271), 869.
Ordway v. Bright (7 Heisk. 681), 656.
O'Reilly v. Alderson (8 Hare, 101), 869,
875.
Orman v. Bowles (18 Colo. 463; 33 Pac.
Rep. 109), 831.
Orme v. Wright (3 Jur. 19), 1492, 1505.
Ormerod u. Dearman (13 W. N. C. 85),
665.
Ormiston v. Oleott (22 Hun, 270; 84 N.
T. 339), 1198, 1201, 1210, 1234, 1237.
Ormond v, Anderson (2 B. & B. 369), 219.
Ormond v. Hutchison (13 Ves. 47), 1536.
Ormsbeeti. Davis (5 R. I. 446), 1415.
Ormsby, Inre (IB. &B. 189), 1683.
Orr v. Hodgson (4 Wheat. 453) , 28.
Orr v. Pickett (3 J. J. Marsh. 276) , 527.
Orru. Rode (101 Mo. 387), 1032, 1446.
Orrett v. Corser (21 Beav. 52), 1358.
Ortmannti. Plummer (52 Mich. 76), 576.
Orton v. Knab (3 Wis. 576) , 358.
Osbaldiston v. Simpson (13 Sim. 513),
563.
Osborn v. Brown (5 Ves. 527), 1042.
Osborn v. Morgan (9 Hare, 433), 676.
Osborne v. Endicott (6 Cal. 149), 232, 309.
Osborne v. Gordon (86 Wis. 92 ; 56 N. W.
Rep. 334), 999.
Osborne v. Rowlett (L. R. 13 Ch. D.
774), 895.
Osborne v. Williams (18 Ves. 379), 563.
Osborne & Co. v. Graham (46 Mo. App.
28), 708.
Osborne's Succession (40 La. Ann. 615),
570.
Osburn's Appeal (130 Pa. St. 359), 626.
Oscanyan v. Arms Co. (103 U. S. 261),
658.
Osgood v. Eaton (62 N. H. 512), 309.
Osgood^. Franklin (2 Johns. Ch.20; 7
Am. Dec. 613), 441,470, 480,927, 1015,
1087, 1090, 1623.
Osmond v. Fitzroy (3 P. Wms. 131), 282,
292.
Ostermanr. Baldwin (6 Wall. 116), 47.
Oswald v. Hoover (43 Md. 360), 707.
clx>
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848 1753.]
Oswalds. Leigh (1 T. E. 271), 981.
Oswalt v. Moore (19 Ark. 257), 704.
Oswego Starch Factory v. Lendrum C57
Iowa, 573; 42 Am. Eep. 53), 495.
Otis v. Beckwith (49 111. 121), 88.
Otis v. Gregory (111 Ind. 504), 574.
Otis v. McMillan (70 Ala. 46), 1514.
Otley v. Gilby (8 Beav. 602), 1191, 1564.
Otway v. Hudson (2 Vera. 583), 298.
Ould v. Washington Hosp. (95 U. S.
312), 181, 735, 743, 746, 756, 819.
Ouryu. Saunders (77 Tex. 278; 1SS. W.
Eep. 2030), 343.
Outcalt v. Van Winkle (1 Green Oh.
516), 976.
Outon v. Eodes (3 A. K. Marsh. 432), 556.
Overend, etc. Co., In re (L. E. 3 Eq.
576), 494.
Overfield v. Overfield (30 S. W. Eep.
994), 834.
Overly v. Overly (1 Mete. 117), 1049.
Overman's Appeal (88 Pa. St. 276), 1295.
Overseers v. Bank of Va. (2 Gratt. 544),
1634.
Overstreet v. Bate (1 J. J. Marsh. 370),
461, 1537.
Overstreet v. Manning (67 Tex. 430), 203.
Overton v. Banister (3 Hare, 603), 27,
562.
Overton v. Lacy (6 B. Mon. 13), 216.
Owen v. Bryant (L. J. 21 Ch. 860), 42.
Owen v. Campbell (58 N. W. Eep. 603),
1036.
Owen v. Cawley (36 N. T. 604), 699.
Owen v. Homan (4 H. L. Cas. 997), 645,
693, 697.
Owen v. Ohio Cent. E. E. (20 Fed. Rep.
10), 1054.
Owen v. Owen (1 Atk. 496), 909.
Owen v. Peebles (42 Ala. 338), 1205, 1253,
1255.
Owens v. Dickenson (Or. & P. 48), 645,
694, 697.
Owens, In re (3 Pa. Dist. Eep. 328), 161.
Owens v. Johnson (8 Baxt. 265), 710.
Owens v. Miss. Soc. (14 N. T. 380; 67
Am. Dec. 160), 21, 752.
Owens v. Walker (2 Strob. Eq. 289), 831.
Owens v. Williams (Arab. 734), 399.
Owings' Case (1 Bland, 370), 518.
Owings v. Myers (3 Bibb, 279), 452.
Owings v. State (22 Md. 116), 1689.
Ownes v. Ownes (23 N. J. Eq. 60), 11, 42,
152, 155, 156, 162, 312.
Owthwaite, In re (L. E. (1891), 3 Ch.
494), 1209.
Oxendon v. Compton (2 Ves. Jr. 69),
299, 830.
Ozley v. Ikelheimer (26 Ala. 332), 655,
664, 704.
Pace v. Pace (73 N. Car. 119), 1291, 1302.
Pace v. Pierce (49 Mo. 393), 956, 957.
Pacific Nat. Bank v. Windram (133
Mass. 175), 1309.
Packard v. Kingman (67 N. W. Eep.
551), 1031.
Packard v. Marshall (138 Mass. 301), 917,
918.
Packard v. Putnam (57 N. H. 43), 60.
Paddock v. Strobridge (29 Vt. 470) , 494.
Paddon v. Richardson (7 De G., M. &G.
563), 1233.
Padfleld v. Padfleld (72 111. 322), 91, 95.
Paff v. Kenney (1 Bradf . 1), 1637.
Page v. Adam (4Beav. 269), 1350.
Page v. Boynton (63 N. H. 190), 1673,
1703.
Page v. Broom (3 Beav. 36; i Euss. 6),
175, 1242.
Page v. Cooper (16 Beav. 400), 1073, 1074._
Page v. Heineberg (40 Vt. 81), 815.
Pageu. Home (HBeav. 227), 292, 293.
Page, In re (L. E. (1893) 1 Ch. 304), 1191.
Page v. Leapingwell (18 Ves. 463), 255.
Page v. Lever (2 Ves. Jr. 450), 438.
Page v. Naglee (6 Cal. 241), 1170.
Page v. Olcott (28 Vt. 465), 1402, 1738.
Page v. Page (8 ST. H. 187), 266, 270, 308,
335, 355, 360, 361, 362, 370.
Page v. Page (2 P. Wms. 489; 1 Ves. Jr.
66), 245.
Paget v. Pease (23 Abb. N. Cas. 290),
1055.
Page v. Stephens (23 Mich. 357), 960.
Page v. Summers (70 Cal. 121), 69.
Page v. Way (3 Beav. 20), 1291.
Paget v. Ede (L. E. 18 Eq . 118), 35.
Paine «.Forsaith (86 Me. 357; 30 Atl.
Eep. 11), 1619.
Paine v. France (26 Md. 46), 560.
Paine v. Hall (18 Ves. 475), 506, 514.
Paine v. Irwin (16 Hun, 390), 396.
Paine v. Lake Erie, etc. E. E. Co. (31
Ind. 283), 662.
Paine v. Meller (6 Ves. 352), 200.
Painter, Ex parte (2 Deac. & Ch. 584),
29.
Painter v. Henderson (7 Barr, 48) , 393,
401.
Pairo v. Vickery (37 Md. 467), 259, 1121.
Palairet v. Carew (32 Beav. 664), 1680.
Palmers. Bate (6 Moore, 28; 2Brod. &
Bing. 673), 38.
Palmers. Dunham (6 N. T. Supl. 262),
1612.
Palmer v. Hendrie (28 Beav. 341), 1453.
Palmer v. Jones (1 Vera. 144), 330.
Palmer v. Meyers (43 Barb. 609), 1417.
TABLE OF CASES.
clxxi
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Palmer v. Meyers (29 How. Pr. 8; 1 Am.
Lead. Oas. 448), 1415.
Palmer s. Neave (llVes. 167), 539.
> Palmer s. Newell (8 De G., M. & G. 74),
1529.
Palmer s. President, etc. Bank (17 R.I.
627;24Atl. Rep. 109), 736.
Palmer s. Rankins (30 Ark. 771), 704,
Palmers. Simmonds (2 Drew. 221), 52,
128.
Palmer s. Sterling (41 Mich. 218), 576.
Palmers. Williams (24 Mich. 328), 441,
1082, 1084.
Palmer s. Young (96 Ga. 246), 1453, 1495.
Palmer s. Young (1 Vera. 276), 194, 399.
Palmetto Lumber Co. s. Risley (25 S.
Car. 309), 377, 411.
Pane«. Birch (2Atk. 623), 972.
Papillons. Voice (2 P. Wilis. 471), 93,
107.
Papyss. Mansfield (3 Myl. & Cr. 359),
153.
Pardee v. Lindley (31 111. 174), 1456.,
Parfitts. Lawless (L. R. 2 P. &D. 462),
296.
Paruams. McCrary (6 Rich. Eq. 140),
468.
Parhams. Randolph (4 How. (Miss.)
435), 477, 484.
Paris v. Cobb (5 Rich. Eq. 432), 1537.
Parish s. Balkum (40 Ala. 285). 152. 1747.
Parish s. Murphree (13 How. 92), 103.
Parish s. Stone (14 Pick. 198), 147.
Park i?. Cheek (4Coldw. 20), 912.
Parker s. Allen (14 N. Y. Supl. 265), 157,
161, 164, 890.
Parkers?. Brooke (9 Ves. 583), 397, 651,
654, 655, 6S6, 1453.
Parker v. Carter (4 Hare, 413), 965.
Parkers. Clarke (30Beav. 64), 600.
Parker s. Converse (5 Gray, 336), 667,
908, 943.
Parkers. Coop (60 Tex. Ill), 369.
Parkers. Crittenden (37 Conn. 145), 445.
Parker s. Poy (43 Miss. 260; 65 Am. Rep.
484), 449.
Packer s. Gillian (10 Yerg. 394), 436,
1657.
Parkers. Glover (42 N. J. Eq. 559), 1210.
Parkers. Grant (1 Johns. Ch. 630), 489.
Parkers. Gwynn (4 Md. 423), 1689.
Parker s. Hall (2 Head, 641), 1536.
Parker s. Housefield (2 Myl. & K. 419),
600.
Parker s. Jackson (4 Hare, 413), 965.
Parkers. Johuson (37 N. J. Eq. 366),
1055, 1701, 1*705.
Park rs. Jones (67 Ala. 234), 1625, 1627.
Parkers. Kane (4 Wi9. 1; 65 Am. Dec.
2-,3),449,431.
Parker
Parker
256)
Parker
271.
Parker
Parker
Parker
Parker
Parker
267,
Parker
Parker
Parker
Parker
s. Kelly (10 Sm. ill, 184), 960.
s. Lechmere (L. R. 12 L'h. D.
,712.
s.Logan (82 Va. 441), 232, 269,
s. McBee (61 Miss. 134), 576.
s. McMillan (55 Mich. 265), 252.
s. Murch (64 Me. 54), 107.
s. Osgood (3 Allen, 487), 450.
s. Parker (5 Ohio C. Ct. 491),
s. Portls (14 Tex. 166), 950, 1139.
v. Ricks (8 Joues, 447), 78.
s. Sears (117 Mass. 513) , 1013, 1040.
s. Snyder (31 N. J. Eq. 164), 232,
Parker s. Straat (39 Mo. App. 616), 1400,
15S7, 1616.
Parker's Estate (64 Pa. St. 307), 1(195.
Parkess. Whito (11 Ves. 209), 394,657,
667, 1541, 1591.
Parkham s. Randolph (4 How. 435), 473.
Parkhurst s. Van Courtland (14 Johns.
15), 218.
Parkins v. Thompson (3 ST. H. 144), 414,
416.
Parkinson v. Hanbury (1 Dr. & Sm.
143; 2 DeG., J. &S. 455), 396.
Parkinson's Appeal (8 Casey, 455), 259.
Parkist v. Alexander (1 Johns. Ch. 394),
333, 413, 416, 987.
Parks s. Parks (9 Paige, 107), 931,938,
1746.
Parks v. Parks (56 Ala. 326), 533.
Parlett v. Guggenheimer (67 Md. 542),
562.
Parmenter s. Walker (9 R. I. 225), 1490,
1491.
Farmers. Parmer (74 Ala. 285), 1514.
Parmlees. Sloan (37 Ind. 482), 232, 358.
Parmleys. Walker (102 111. 617), 1480,
1498, 1499.
Parnall s. Parnall (L. R. 9 Ch. D. 96),
125.
Parnell s. Lyon (IV. & B. 479), 1043,
1044.
Parnham s. Hurst (8 Mees. & W, 743),
975.
Parr v. Eliason (1 East, 92), 435.
Parrett v. Palmer (8 Ind, App. 356; 35
N. E. Rep. 713), 660.
Parry s. Kelly (52 Cal. 334), 704.
Parry s. Warrington (6 Madd. 155),
1253.
Parry s. Wright (1 S. & S. 369; 6 Russ.
542), 978.
Parshall's Appeal (65 Pa. St. 233), 426,
430.
Parson s. Moses (16 Iowa, 440), 607.
Parsons s. Baker (18 Ves. 476), 128, 130.
clxxii
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Parsons s. Boyd (20 Ala. 112), 956, 957,
1089, 1266 .
Parsons s. Lyman (5 Blatchf . 170) , 884.
Parsons v. Lyman (20 N. T. 103), 812.
Parsons s. MeLane (64 N. H. 478), 708.
Parsons s. Mills (1 Mass. 431; 2 Mass.
80), 1020.
Parsons s. Parsons (9 N. H. 321), 976.
Parsons s. Rolf e (66 N. H. 620; 27 Atl.
Rep. 172), 708.
Parsons s. Spencer (83 Ky. 305), 706,
1296, 1298, 1644.
Parsons s. Winslow (16 Mass. 361), 1025,
1026, 1153.
Partee s. Thomas (11 Fed. Rep. 769),
1020.
Partiidges. Gopp (1 Eden, 167), 98.
Partridge s. Havens (10 Paige Ch. 618),
307, 357.
Partridge s. Stocker (36 Vt. 108; 84 Am.
Dec. 664), 711.
Partridge s. Wells (30 N". J. Eq. 176)j
1535.
Paschal s. Acklin (27 Tex. 173), 28, 749,
777.
Paschal s. Harris (74 N. Car. 335), 1510.
Faske s. Ollat (2 Phillim. 323), 292, 297.
Pasley s. Freeman (37 R. S. 51; Big.
Lead. Cas. Tort. 1), 477.
Passaic Bank s, Waddell (1 Hun, 128),
699.
Passinghams. Sherburne (9 Beav. 424),
876.
Patapsco Guano Co. s. Morrison (2
Woods, 395), 1073.
Patrick s. Littell (36 Ohio St. 79 ; 38 Am.
Rep. 652), 699, 709.
Patrick s. Sherwood (4 Blatchf. 112),
1434.
Patten s. Herring (9 Tex. Civ. App.
640; 29 S. W. Rep 388), 1283, 1294, 1311.
Patten s. Moore (32 N. H. 382), 440, 441,
594, 595.
Patten a. Patten (75111. 346), 183,705.
Patten s. Pearson (57 Me. 428), 1490.
Patten s. Stewart (26 Ind. 395), 1098.
Pattersons. Brown (32 N. Y. 81), 452.
Patterson s. Caldwell (124 Pa. St. 454),
1295.
Patterson s. Devlin (1 McMull. F.q.
459), 1438.
Patterson s. Johnson (113 111. 559), 880,
1159.
Patterson s. Lawrence (83 Ga. 703; 10 S.
E. Rep. 355), 1737.
Patterson v. Lawrence (90 111. 174; 32
Am. Rep. 22), 705.
Patterson s. Leavitt (4 Conn. 50; 10 Am.
Dec. 98), 1122.
Pattersons. Linder (14 Iowa, 414), 575.
Patterson s. Murphy (11 Hare, 88), 155,
160.
Patterson s. Patterson (45 N. H. 164),
708.
Patterson s. Patterson (1 Halst. Ch.
389), 685.
Patterson s. Pullman (104 III. 80), 1559.
Patterson s. Scott (IDeG., M. & G.
631), 1353.
Patterson s. Woolen (L. R. 2 Ch. D.
586),16S0.
Patterson's Appeal (104 Pa. St. 369),
987.
Pattisons. Horn (1 Grant Cas. 301), 503.
Patton s. Beecher (62 Ala. 579), 49, 145,
234, 264.
Patton s. Chamberlain (44 Mich. 5), 61,
67.
Patton v. Kinsman (17 Iowa, 428) , 706.
Patton s. Merchants' Bank (13 W. Va.
587), 664, 665.
Patton v. Patton (3 B. Mon. 161), 839.
Patton s. Randall (1 J. & W. 189), 1037.
Patton v. Rankin (68 Ind. 245; 94 Am.
Rep. 254), 706.
Patton s. Thompson (2 Jones Eq. 285),
402.
Paul s. Chouteau (14 Mo. 580), 309.
Pauls. Compton (S Ves. 380), 128.
Pauls. Fulton (25 Mo. 156), 388, 443, 1627.
Pauls. Hadley (23 Barb. 521), 492.
Paul s. Heweston (2 Myl. & K. 434), 1009.
Paul s. Squibb (12 Pa. St. 296), 4o0, 403.
Paul v. York (1 Tenn. Ch. 547), 827.
Paulain s. Paulain (76 Ga. 420), 489.
Paulk v. Wolf (34 Ala. 541), 704.
Paullo s. Wallis (68 Minn. 192; 59 N. W.
Rep. 909), 1477.
Pauluss. Latta (93 Ind. 34), 1628.
Paup s. Mingo (4 Leigh, 163), 144.
Pavey s. Am. Ins. Co. (56 Wis. 221), 72.
Pawlet s. Delavel (2 Ves. 666) , 686.
Pawlett s. Attorney-General (Hardr.
465), 432.
Pawletts. Witter (3 P. Wms. 100), 1217.
Pawson v. Brown (L. R. 13 Ch. D. 202),
255.
Paxson v. Potts (2 Green Ch. 191), 1352.
Paxton s. Stewart (80 Va. 873), 632.
Payne s. Avery (21 Mich. 524), 576.
Paynes. Ballard (23 Miss. 88), 1537.
Paynes. Barnes (100 Mass. 470), 1073.
Payne s. Compton (2 Y. & C. 457), 435.
Payne, Exparte (2 Y. & C. 636), 128.
Paynes. Hathaway (3 Vt. 212), 1633.
Paynes. Hutchison (32 Gratt. 812), 652.
Paynes. Little (26 Beav. 1), 657.
Payne s. Morris (5 S. E. Rep. 568), 1719.
Paynes. Patterson (77 Pa. St. 134), 503.
Payne s. Rogers (Doug. 407), 961.
TABLE OF CASES.
clxxiii
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Payne v. Sale (2 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 460),
941.
Payne v. Stone (7 Sm. & M. 367), 1025.
Payne v. Twyman (68 Mo. 339), 651, 686.
Peabody v. Flint, (6 Allen, 52), 478.
Peabody v. Mattocks (88 Me. 164; 33 Atl.
Rep. 900), 1672.
Peabody v. Tarbell (2 Cush. 232), 307,
357.
Peacock v. Black (Halst. Eq. 535), 465.
Peacocks. Evans (16Ves. 512), 282.
Peacock v. Monk (2 Ves. 190), 661, 693,
717.
Peak v. Ellicott (30 Kan. 156; 1 Pac.
Rep. 499), 1603, 1604.
Peake v. LaBaw (21 N. J. Eq. 269), 664.
Pearce v. Gardner (10 Hare, 290) , 10S5.
Pearce v. Loman (3 Ves. 139), 1045, 1528.
Pearce v. McClenaghan (5 Rich. 178),
993.
Pearce v. Olney (20 Conn . 544) , 38.
Pearce v. Pearce (22 Beav. 248), 603, 867,
876, 897, 1223, 1229.
Pearce v. Savage (45 Me. 90), 920, 926.
Pearce j!. Slocombe (3 Y. & C. 84), 1347.
Pearce v. Twitchell (41 Miss. 344), 1053.
Pearl v. Hewey (70 Mo. 160), 576.
Pearlc. McDowell (3 J. J. Marsh. 65S;
20 Am. Dec. 199), 13, 1314.
Pearpoint v, Graham (4 Wash. C. O.
232), 1364, 1417.
Pearse u. Green (1 J. & W. 140), 1664.
Pearson v. Concord R. R. Co. (62 N. H.
537; 13 Am. St. Rep. 590), 411.
Pearson v. Darrington (32 Ala. 270),
1690.
Pearson v. East (36 Ind. 27), 525.
Pearson, In re (L. R. 5 Ch. D. 962), 869.
Pearson, Inre (21 W. R, 401), 1132.
Pearson v. Jamison (1 McLean, 199),
1005, 1096.
Pearson v. Morgan (2 Bro. Ch. 389), 473,
492.
Pearson v. Newson (28 Beav. 598), 423.
Pearson v. Pearson (125 Ind. 341), 233.
Pearson v. Pulley (1 Ch. Cas. 102), 1536,
Pearson-Gee v. Pearson (1895, W. N.
90), 1209.
Pease v. Kelley (3 Ore. 417), 577.
Pease v. Pattison (L. R. 32 Ch. D. 154),
768.
Peatfleld v. Benn (17 Beav. 522), 876.
Peay v. Peay (2 Rich. Eq. 409), 964,
Peck v, Archart (95 111. 113), 445.
Peck v. Brummagin (31 Cal. 447), 349.
Peck v. Culberson (104 N. Car. 426), 578.
Pecku, Henderschott (14 Iowa, 40),688_
Peck v. Henderson (7 Terg. 18), 10B6.
Peck n. Jenness (7 How. 612), 667
Peckv. Merrill (26 Vt 680), 1364
Peck v. Walton (26 Vt. 82), 711.
Peck v. Ward (18 Pa. St. 506), 710.
Peckens v. Oliver (29 Ala. 528), 704.
Peekham v. Newton (15 R. I. 321; 4 Atl.
Rep. 768), 746, 749, 1201, 1203, 1214.
Peekham v. Taylor (3 Beav. 250), 73.
Pedesclaugh v. Legare (32 La. Ann.
380) 575.
Peebles v. Reading (8 S. & R. 492), 219,
357, 364, 432, 434, 465, 525.526, 595.
Peebles' Appeal (15 S. & R. 39), 884.
Peed!;. McEee (42 Iowa, 689), 556.
Peek v. Gurney (L. R. 13 Eq. 79), 494.
Peel v. Met. Board of Police (44 Barb.
91; 5 Am. L. Reg. 98), 215.
Peer v. Peer (3 Stockt. 432), 366, 368.
Peet v. Spencer (90 Mo. 384; 2 S. W. Rep.
434), 1408.
Pegues v. Pegues (5Ired. Eq. 418), 527.
Pelen v. Lent (5 Bosw. 715), 698.
Pelhamw. Anderson (2 Eden, 296), 735.
Pell v. De Winton (2 De G. & J. 17), 900,
1664.
Pell v. Mercer (14 R. I. 412), 735, 749.
Pelley v. Bascombe (33 L. J. Ch. 100; 34
L. J. Ch. 233), 1538.
Pelley v. Maddin (21 Vin. Ab. 498), 307.
Pelton v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. (77
N. T. 605), 198.
Pelzerw. Campbell (15 S. Car. 581), 710.
Pembroke v. AUenstown (21 N. H. 107) ,
308.
Pembroke^. Berghden (3 Ch. Rep, 115;
2 Vern. 52), 298.
Pender p. Pitman (84 N. Car. 372), 1468.
Pendleton v. Fay (2 Paige, 202), 3b9, 456,
460, 1659.
Pendleton v. Kinney (65 Conn. 222i; 32
Atl. Rep. 331, 819.
Penfleld v. Skinner (11 Vt. 296), 750.
Penfold v. Bouch (4 Hare, 271) , 1266.
Penfold «. Mould (L. R. i Eq. 562), 76,
151, 684.
Penman v. Slocum (41 N. T. 53), 409.
Penn v. Lord Baltimore (1 Ves. 444), 35.
Penn v. Whitehead (17 Gratt. 603; 94
Am. Dec. 478), 664, 665, 711.
Penn v. Young (10 Bush, 626), 706.
Pennell v. Deflell (4 De G., M. & G. 372),
433,535,1628,1634.
Pennell's Appeal (2 Pa. St. 216), 168S.
Pennies. Hildreth (81 Cal. 127), 191.
Penningtonc. Beechey (2 8. & S. 282),
439.
Pennington v. Smith (69 Fed. Rep. 188),
1579.
Pennock v. Coe (23 How. 117), 34.
Pennock's Appeal (14 Pa. St. 446), 404.
Pennock's Estate (20 Pa. St. 268), 118,
133.
C1XX1V
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Pennoyer v. Sheldon (4 Blatchf. 316),
250, 1067.
Pennsylvania Co. v. Foster (35 Pa. St.
134), 659, 665.
Penn Ins. Co. v. Austin (42 Pa. St. 257),
1073,1074,1628.
PennaR. E. Co.'s Appeal (125 Pa. St.
189), 1541.
Penny v. Cook (19 Iowa, 538), 1099, 1118.
Penny v. Davis (3 B. Mon. 313), 88, 878,
879, 882, 883.
Penny v. Turner (2 Phill. Ch. 493), 167,
614,620,627,631.
Penny v. Wise (3 B. Mon. 313), 878, 879.
Pentland v. Stockes (2 B. & B. 75), 1536.
People v. Baeon (99 N. Y. 275), 1393,
People v. Chalmers (60 N. T. 154 ; 1 Hun,
683), 1360.
People v. City Bank of Rochester (96 N.
T. 32), 1603, 1606, 1611,
People v. Donohue (24 N. Y. Supl. 437),
30, 876.
People v. Houghtallng (7 Cal. 348), 369,
603, 877.
People v. Kendall (25 Wend. 399), 381, 472.
People u. Mercien (8 Paige, 47; 3 Hill,
399) , 844.
People v. Norton (9N.T. 176), 604.
People v. Powers (29 N. Y. Supl. 950),
109.
People v. Steele (2 Barb. 397), 796, 797.
People v. Tebbetts (4 Cow. 364), 962.
People v. Township (11 Mich. 222), 411.
People v. Utica Ins. Co. (15Johns. 358; 8
Am. Dec. 243), 19,21,
People v. Webster (10 Wend. 554) , 24, 25,
874.
Peoples. Wilson (22 Barb. 117), 825.
People's Bank v. Bogart (81 N. Y. 101),
489, 492.
People's Bank v. Dening (131 Pa. St.
252), 647, 652.
People's Trust Co. v. Smith (82 Hun,
494; 31 N. Y. Supl. 519), 815.
Pepper v. Lee (53 Ala. 33), 651, 655, 686.
Peppercorn v. Wayman (5 De G. & S.
230), 892, 896.
Pepper's Estate, Inre (154 Pa. St. sen i 25
Atl. Rep. 1058), 786.
Peralta v. Castro (6 Cal. 354), 66.
Percy v. Milladon (3 La. 568), 405.
Perin v. Cary (24 How. 465), 20, 730, 744,
745, 750, 777, 1217, 1524.
Perin v. McGibben (53 Fed. Rep. 86),
831.
Perin v. McMicken (15 La. Ann. 154), 19.
Perkins v. Elliott (23 N. J. Eq. 626), 647,
652, 664, 708.
Perkins v. Hays (Cook, 170), 462.
Perkins v. Hays fS Gray, 405), 126a, i_«>4.
Perkins v. Hitchcock (49 Me. 468), 1402.
Perkins v. Lewis (41 Ala. 649), SH.
Perkins v. McGavoek (3 Hay w. 265), 173,
889, 890, 896, 1228.
Perkins v. Moore (16 Ala. 9), 856, 885.
Perkins v. Nichols (11 Allen, 542), 368.
Perkins v. Parker (1 Mass. 117), 1117.
Perkins v. Perkins (1 Tenn. Ch. 537),
652.
Perkins' Appeal (108 Pa. St. 314; 56 Am.
Rep. 208), 9£9, 1058, 1688, 1712.
Perkinson v. Hanna (7 Blaokf. 400), 441.
Perkyns v. Bayntun (1 Bro. Ch. 375),
330, 387, 1255.
Permanent Bldg. Soc.,7n re (L. R. 43
Ch. D. 431), 1209, 1216.
Perrin v. Lyon (9 East, 170), 1045.
Perrin v. Probate Judge (49 Mich. 342),
663.
Perrinew. Newell (49 N. J. Eq. 57; 23
Atl. Rep. 492), 960, 1058, 1641, 1675.
Perrineu. Vreeland (33 N. J. Eq. 102),
1120, 1228.
Perring v. Trail (L. R. 18 Eq. 88), 735,
813.
Perry v. Board of Missions (102 N. Y.
99), 668.
Perry v. Carmlehael (95 111. 519), 854,
856.
Perry v. De Wolf (2 R. 1. 103), 861, 893.
Perry v. Dixon (4 Desaus. Eq. 504), 383,
390.
Perry v. Grant (10 R. I. 334), 577.
Perry v. Head (1 A. K. Marsh. 47), 309,
333.
Perry, In Goods of (2 Curt. 655), 850, 861.
Perry, In re (2 Curt. 655) , 883.
Perry v. Knott (4Beav. 179), 1233.
Perry v. Maxwell (2 Dev. Eq. 488), 1689.
Perry v. Phillips (4 Ves. 107; 17 Ves.
173), 325, 326.
Perry a. Vezina (63 Iowa, 25), 1385.
Perry v. Whitehead (6 Ves. 544), 354.
Perry v. Wooton (5 Humph. 524), 1221.
Person v. Quiggle (57 Pa. St. 247), 1598.
Personeaut*. Blakely (14111. 15), 414.
Personneau v. Personneau (1 Desaus.
521), 1218.
Persons v. Persons (25 N. J. Eq. 250),
366, 367, 368.
Persons v. Snook (40 Barb. 144), 1522.
Persona. Warren (14 Barb. 488), 29.
Petchu, Tutim (ISMees. & W 110), 33.
Peter v. Beverly (10 Pet. 532), 60,299,
1013, 1015, 1017, 1037, 1039, 1066, 1087,
1462.
Peterborough R. Co. v. Wood (61 N. H.
418), 412.
Peterborough Sav. Bank v. Hartshorn
(33 Atl. Rep. 730J,1386.
TABLE OF CASES.
clxxv
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Peterman's Appeal (7G Pa. St. 279), 1385
Peters v. Tunnell (43 Minn. 473; 19 Am.
St. Eep. 262), 576,587.
Peterson v. Boswell (137 Ind. 211; 36 N.
E. Eep. 845), 233.
Peterson v. Chemical Nat. Bk. (27 How.
Pr. 602; 2 Eobt. 608), 857.
Peterson's Appeal (88 Pa. St. 397), 987.
Petit v. Petit (107 N. T. 677), 721, 726.
Petit v. Smith (IP. Wms. 7), 238, 245,
247.
Petition of O'Brien (11 K. I. 419), 710.
Petranek's Estate, In re (79 Iowa, 410),
906.
Petrain v. Kiernan (23 Ore. 455; 32 Pac.
Eep. 158), 318.
Petre v. Espinasse (2 Myl. &K. 496),
273, 278.
Petrie v. Badenoch (102 Mich. 45; 60 N.
W. Eep. 449), 1178.
Petrie v. Clark (11 S. & E. 377), 440, 456,
457, 1656, 1659, 1662.
Pettingill i>. Pettingill (60 Me. 411), 853,
855, 885.
Pettiton v. Hippie (90 111. 420), 562.
Pettus v. Wallace (29 Ark. 476), 962,1600.
Petty v. Booth (19 Ala. 633), 654.
Pettyjohn v. Liebscher (92 Ga. 149; 17
S. E. Eep. 1007), 1186.
Petzholdr. Petzhold (53 Minn. 39; 54
N. W. Eep. 933), 310.
Pewterers' Co. v. Christ's Hospital (1
Vera. 161), 819.
Peybody v. Tarbell (2 Cush. 232), 270.
Peynado v. Peynado (82 Ey. 5), 18, 746,
748.
Peyton v. Bladwell (1 Vera. 240), 545
Peyton v. Bury (2 P. Wms. 626), 980,
1046.
Peyton©. Enos (16 La. Ann. 135), 1183.
Peyton's Trusts, In re (L. R. 7 Kq. 463),
1118, 1132.
Pfeifer v. Dargan (14 S. Car. 44), 1369.
Pfeifferu. Lyttle (58 Pa. St. 386), 355.
Phalan v. Louisville Safety Vault &
Trust Co. (10 S. W. Eep. 10), 1553.
Phalens. Clark (19 Conn. 421), 470.
Pharisu. Leachman (20 Ala. 663), 1630.
Phayre v. Peree (3 Dow. 29), 432, 535.
Phelps v. Curtis (80 111. 109) , 1367.
Phelps, Ex parte (9 Mod. 357), 974, 1575.
Phelps v. Harris (51 Miss. 789), 1076,
1119.
Phelps v. Harris (101 U. S. 370), 1076.
Phelps v. Jackson (31 Ark. 272), 377, 388.
Phelps v. Phelps (72 111. 545; 22 Am.
Eep. 149), 101.
Phelps v. Pond (23 X. Y. 69), 820.
Phelps v. Seeley (22 Gratt. 573), 50, 60,
232.-
I
Phelps v. White (L. E. 7 Ir. 160), 475,
477.
Phelps' Settlement, In re (L. E. 31 Ch.
D. 351), 869.
Phene v. Gillan (B Hare, 6), 877.
Phene's Trusts, Z»re(L. E. 5 Eq. 346),
626, 641.
Phettiplace v. Sayles (4 Mason, 312),
282.
Philadelphia v. Elliott (3 Eawle, 170) ,
749.
Philadelphia v. Pox (64 Pa. St. 169),
749, 756, 759.
Philadelphia v. Girard (45 Pa. St. 9; 84
Am. Dec. 470), 20, 96, 762, 763, 776.
Philadelphia Nat. Bank v. Dowd (38
Fed. Eep. 172), 1607, 1630.
Philadelphia & E E. Co. v. Lehigh, C.
& N. Co. (36 Pa. St. 204), 1089.
Philanthropic Soc. v. Kemp (4 Beav.
581), 804.
Philbroobe v. Delano (29 Me. 410), 72,
239, 264, 578.
Phillippl v. Phillippi (115 U. S. 151),
1536.
Phillips v. Anderson (2 Sneed, 520),
836.
Phillips v. Annesley (2 Atk. 58; 1 Bro.
Ch. 105), 839.
Phillips v. Bank of Lewiston (6 Harris,
394), 1117.
Phillips v. Bury (1 Eaym. 5; Comf. 265;
Holt, 715; 2 Show. 360; 4 Mod. 106;
Skin. 447), 785.
Phillips v. Bustard (1 B. Mon. 348),
1686, 1690.
Phillips??. Brydges (3Ves. 126), 30, 977.
Phillips v. Crammond (2 Wash. C. C.
441), 43, 185, 187,363, 532.
Phillips v. Duke of Bucks (1 Vera. 227),
528.
Phillips v. Eastwood (D. & G. t. Sugd.
289), 1030.
Phillips v. Edwards (33 Beav. 440), 1080.
Phillips v. Everar'd (5 Sim. 102), 1241.
Phillips, Ex parte (19 Ves. 122), 827, 828,
830.
Phillips v. Frye (14 Allen, 38) , 147.
Phillips v. Garth (3 Bro. Ch. 64), 624.
Phillips v. Graves (20 Ohio St. 391; 5
Am. Eep. 675), 659, 709.
Phillips v. Harrow (61 N. W. Eep. 434),
734, 736, 738, 750.
Phillips v. Hassell (10 Humph. 197), 675.
Phillips v. Hollingsworth (21 Beav.
112), 624.
Phillips v. Homfray (L. E. 6Ch. App.
770), 489, 492.
Phillips v. James (2 Drew. & S. 404), 101,
102.
clxxvi
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Phillips ©. Jones (3 De G., J. & S. 72),
105.
Phillips v. Lamar (27 Ga. 227; 73 Am.
Dec. 731), 1187.
Phillips ©. Medbury (7 Conn. 668), 1042,
1043.
Phillips ©. Meyers (82 111. 67; 26 Am.
Kep. 295), 721, 722.
Phillips ©. Mullings (7 Ch. App. 244),
163, 272, 277, 293, 294.
Phillips ©. Munnings (2 Myl. & Cr. 309),
867, 1536.
Phillips©. Overflew (100 Mo. 466; 13 S.
W. Sep. 706), 307, 532, 1630, 1747.
Phillips ©. Phillips (1 Ch. Cas. 292), 593.
Phillips ©. Phillips (1 Myl. & K. 661),
242, 261.
Phillips ©. Phillips (112 N. T. 197), 120,
128.
Phillips ©. Prevost (4 Johns. Ch. 205),
435.
Phillips ». Schall (21 Mo. App. 38),
690.
Phillips v. Sinclair (20 Me. 269), 462.
Phillips ©. So. Park Commrs. (119 111.
626), 72.
Phillips©. Stewart (59 Mo. 491), 1498.
Phillips ©. Thompson (1 Johns. Ch.
131), 198,219, 1686,1690.
Phillips v. Ward (51 Mo. 295), 949, 1053.
Phillips' Acad. ©. King (12 Mass. 546),
18, 20.
Phillips' Appeal (80 Pa. St. 472), 1308.
Phillipson ©. Carey (32 Beav. 628), 163.
Phillipson©. Gatty (7 Hare, 516), 1205,
1263, 1543, 1545.
Phillipson©. Kerry (32 Beav. 628), 274,
294.
Philomath College ©. Wyatt (27 Ore.
390; 37 Pac. Eep. 1022), 793.
Philpott ©. Elliott (4 Md. Ch. 273) , 71.
Philpott v. Penn (91 Mo. 38), 358, 363.
Phipard ©. Phipard (55 Hun, 433) , 55.
Phippen ©. Durham (8 Gratt. 457), 1369.
Phoenix j). Livingstone (101 N. Y. 451),
1687, 1706, 1707.
PhcenixBank ©. Sullivan (9 Pick. 410),
1384.
Phoenix Ins. Co. ©. Abbott (127 Mass.
561), 698.
Phoenix Life Assur. Co., In re (2 Johns.
&Hem. 229), 962.
Phosnix Mut. L. Ins. Co. ©. Grant (3 Mc-
Arthur, 42), 1515, 1516.
Phrene's Trusts, In re (L. B. 5 Eq. 347),
166.
Phyf e ©. Warden (5 Paige, 268) , 398.
Piatt ©. Oliver (2 McLean, 267), 185, 416.
Piatt ©. Vattier (9 Pet. 405; 1 McLean,
M6), 461,464,467,1541.
Pickard ©. Anderson (L. B. 13 Eq. 608),
1102.
Pickard ©. HIne (L. E. 6 Oh. 274), 645,
656,694, 697, 698.
Pickard ©. Eoberts (3 Madd. 364), 676.
Pickens©. Doris (20 Mo. App. 1), 1283.
Pickering v. Coates (10 Phila. 65), 52,
671.
Pickering ©. Dawson (4 Taunt. 779), 477.
Pickering©. Langdon (22 Me. 213), 924.
Pickering v. Pickering (4 Myl. & Cr.
303), 1168, 1177.
Pickering ©. Shotwell (10 Pa. St. 27), 18,
21, 22, 596, 749, 762.
Pickering ©. Stamford (2 Ves. Jr. 280) ,
1540, 1541.
Pickering©. Vowles (1 Bro. Ch. 198),
397, 1164.
Picket ©. Johns (1 Dev. Bq. 123), 723.
Pickett v. Foster (149 U. S. 609; 13 S. C.
Eep. 998), 179.
Pickett ©. Jones (63 Mo. 196), 1461, 1460.
Pickett ©. Loggon (14 Ves. 214), 394, 470,
480.
Pickett ©. School Dlst. (25 Wis. 551), 411.
Pickstock ©. Lyster (3 Maule & Selw.
371), 1380.
Picquet©. Swan (4 Mason, 456), 11, 25, 98.
Pidlock ©. Bishop (3 B. & C. 605), 472,
487, 492.
Piedmont, etc. Co. ©. Piedmont Foun-
dry, etc. Co. (11 So. Eep. 332), 504.
Pierce ©. Brady (23 Beav. 64), 1116.
Pierce ©. Burroughs (58 N". H. 302), 1434.
Pierce ©. Fort (60 Tex. 464), 47.
Pierce©. Grimby (77 Mich. 273), 1447,
1502.
Pierce©. Hower (124 Ind. 626; 42 N. E.
Eep. 223), 347.
Pierce ©. McKeehan (3 Pa. St. 136), 357.
Pierce ©. McKeehan (3 W. & S. 280), 183,
969.
Pierce©. O'Brien (129 Mass. 314), 1383.
Pierce ©. Eed Bluff Hotel (31 Cal. 160),
444.
Pierce ©. Thornely (2 Sim. 167), 976.
Pierce ©. Waring (1 P. Wms. 121), 286,
287.
Pierce ©. Weaver (65 Tex. 44), 749, 866,
870.
Piercy ©. Eoberts (1 Myl. &K. 4), 1638.
Pierson ©. Armstrong (1 Iowa, 282; 63
Am. Dec. 440), 1638.
Piersoa ©. David (1 Iowa, 29), 575.
Pierson©. Garnet (2 Bro. Ch. 38), 119,
128, 130.
Pierson v. Lunn (25 N. J. Eq. 390), 708.
Pierson ©. Manning (2 Mich. 445), 1368,
1392.
Pierson v. Shore (1 Atk. 480), 397.
TABLE OF CASES.
clxxvii
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848 1753.]
Pierson v. Thompson (1 Edw. Ch. 212),
788.
Piety v. Stace (4 Veg. 620), 330, 387, 1255.
Pike v. Baldwin (68 Iowa, 26a), 992, 1319.
Pike v. Fay (101 Mass. 134), 474.
Pike v. Fitzgibbon (L. E. 17 Ch. D. 454),
645, 668, 692, 696, 697.
Pilcher v. Flinn (30 Ind. 202), 1540.
Pilcher v. McHenry (14 Lea, 77), 111.
Pilkington v. Bailey (7 Bro. P. 0. 526),
72.
Pilkington ». Boughey (12 Sim. 114),
128, 255.
Pillars v. MeConnell (141 Ind. 670; 40 N.
E. Kep. 689), 428.
Pillers v. Edwards (1894, W. N. 212),
667.
Pilling v. Armitage (12Ves. 78), 608.
Pillow v. Shannon (3 Terg. 308), 440.
Pillow tf. Wade (31 Ark. 678), 934.
Pilmore v. Hood (6 Scott, 827), 479.
Pirn v. Downing (11 S. & E. 66), 1202,
1236.
Pinchain v. Collard (13 Tex. 333), 578.
Pinckard v. Pinckard (24 Ala. 250), 1690.
Pinckard v. Wood (8 Gratt. 140), 456.
Pindall v. Trevor (30 Ark. 249), 204, 388,
414, 434, 533.
Pine v. Cooper (17 Beav. 187), 1436.
Pink v. De Tuisey (2 Madd. 157), 999.
Pinkard v. Pinkard (2 Ala. 649), 151.
Pinkston v. Brewster (14 Ala. 315), 1402,
1537.
Pinkston v. Semple (92 Ala. 569; 9 So.
Eep. 329), 1284, 1285, 1313, 1314.
Pinneyti. Fellows (15 Vt. 625), 47, 61,
197, 308, 362, 371.
Pinney v. Newton (66 Conn. 141; 33 At!.
Eep. 591), 859,1205.
Pinnock v. Clough (16 Vt. 508), 48, 369.
Pinson v. Gilbert (57 Ala. 35), 1257.
Pinson v. Ivery (1 Terg. 297), 461, 1537.
Pinson v. McGeehee (44 Miss. 229), 852.
Pintarda. Goodloe (Hempst. 520), 690.
Piper v. Hoard (107 N. T. 73; 1 Am. St.
Rep. 789), 542,543,877.
Piper v. Moulton (72 Me. 155), 734,748,
755.
Pipher v. Lodge (4 S, & E. 315), 392.
Pippenji. Wesson (74 N. Car. 437), 709.
Pistor v. Dunbar (1 Aust. 107), 1056, 1057.
Pitcairn v. Ogbourne (2 Ves. 375), 546.
Pitcher i;. Helliar (2 Dick. 580), 842.
Pitcher v. Rigby (9 Price, 79), 425.
Pitkin v. Pitkin (1 Conn. 307), 1210.
Pitney v. Everson (42 N. J. Eq. 361),
1706.
Pitney v. Leonard (1 Paige, 461), 453.
Pitt v. Jackson (2 Bro. Ch. 51), 672, 965.
Pitt v. Pelham (2 Freem. 134), 180.
Pitt v. Petrovey (12 Ired. 16), 414.
Pitt ii. Pitt (22 Beav. 294), 978.
Pitt v. Eaymond (2 Atk. 434), 1148.
Pittman v. Pittman (107 N. Car. 169; 12
S. E. Eep. 61), 63.
Pitts v. Parker (42 Miss. 247), 576, 585.
Plank v. Schermerhorn (3 Barb. Ch.
644), 99, 865, 1367, 1394.
Plants. Plant (44 N. J. Eq. 18), 308.
Planters' Bank v. Bass (2 La. Ann.
430), 1054.
Planters' Merchant Bank v. Clark (7
Ala. 765), 1366.
Planters' Bank v. Prater (64 Ga. 609),
388, 1632.
Platamore v. Staple (Coop. 250), 264.
Piatt v. Iron Exchange Bank (83 Wis.
358), 1053.
Piatt v. Preston (3 Fed. Eep. 894), 1409.
Player v. Nichols (1 B. & Or. 142), 923,
926, 942, 1267.
PlayJair v. Cooper (17 Beav. 187), 1435.
Pleasanton's Appeal (99 Pa. St. 362),
1120, 1210.
Pleasant's Appeal (77 Pa. St. 356), 1210,
1217.
Pleasants v. Glasscock (1 Sm. & M. 17),
88.
Plimpton v. Fuller (11 Allen, 139), 1150.
Ploughboy, The (1 Gall. 41), 460.
Plum «. Studebaker Bros. Co. (89 Miss.
162), 1510.
Plumb v. Cooper (121 Mo. 668), 360.
Plumb v. Fluitt (2 Aust. 432), 453.
Plume & Atwood Co. v. Caldwell (136
111. 163), 1408.
Plumer v. Eead (2 Wright, 46), 416.
Plunket v. Carew (1 Hill Ch. 169), 1408.
Plymouth v. Jackson (15 Pa. St. 44),
1217.
Plympton «. Dispensary (106 Mass. 544),
1434.
Plympton v. Fuller (11 Allen, 140), 1324.
Plympton v. Plympton (6 Allen, 178),
1218.
Poad v. Watson (37 Eng. L. & Eq. 112),
924.
Poage v. Bell (8 Leigh, 604), 956, 1053.
Pocock v. Attorney-General (L. E. 3Ch.
D.342), 735.
Pocock v. Eedington (5 Ves. 794), 386,
1004, 1102, 1203, 1204, 1255.
Podmore v. Gunning (5 Sim. 485), 608,
511, 513.
Poe v. Paxton (26 W. Va. 607), 571, 578,
585, 590.
Poehlman v. Kennedy (48 Cal. 201),
1364.
Poillon v. Martin (1 Sandf . Ch. 569), 413,
425, 426.
clxxviii
TABLE OF CASES.
[Tbe references are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Poindexter s. Cold (86 N. H. 656; 22 Atl.
Rep. 860), 1312,1313.
Poindexter s. Jeffries (15 Gratt. 363),
675.
Pole v. Pole (1 Ves. 76; 2 Dr. & Sm. 420) ,
27, 1426.
Polls s. Tiee (28 N. J. Eg.. 432), 1692.
Pollard s. Cleveland (43 Ala. 102), 704.
Pollard, Ex parte (3 Mont. & Ayr. 340) ,
35.
Pollard s. Lathrop (12 Colo. 171), 1694.
Pollard s. Merrill (15 Ala. 169), 656.
Pollard Union Nat. Bank (4 Mo. App.
408), 1745.
Pollexfen v. Moore (3 Atk. 273), 437,
893.
Polley v. Johnson (52 Kan. 478; 35 Pac.
Rep. 8), 266.
Polly Hodeie's Estate, In re (63 Vt. 661),
1597.
Pomeroy s. Manhattan Life Ins. Co.
(40111. 398), 659, 705.
Pomfret s. Windson (2 Ves. Sr. 487), 1529,
1536.
Pomroys. Lewis (14 R. I. 349), 884.
Pond s. Carpenter (12 Minn. 430), 664,
707.
Pond s. Hine (21 Conn. 619), 883, 892.
Pond s. Skeen (2 Lea, 126), 675, 682.
Ponder v. MeGruder (42 Ga. 242), 949,
1053.
Pool v. Dial (10 S. Car. 440), 993, 1046, 1138,
1342.
Pool s. Harrison (18 Ala. 515), 269.
Pools. Pass (IBeav. 600), 956,1058,1357.
Pooler. Bate (11 Hare, 33), 1041.
Pooler. Munday (103 Mass. 174), 1221,
1544.
Pooley s. Quilter (4 Drew. 189), 394, 395.
Poors. Considine (6 Wall. 458), 262.
Poor s. Williams (38 Miss. 546), 327.
Poor of Chelmsford s. Mildmay (Duke,
83), 782.
Pope s. Bank (56 Vt. 284), 79.
Popes. Brandon (2 Stew. 401), 1411.
Pope s. Elliott (8 B. Mon. 56), 1269, 1644.
Pope s. Earnesworth (146 Mass. 329),
1591.
Pope s. Matthews (18 S. Car. 444), 1210.
Pope s. Pope (10 Sim. 1), 125, 134.
Popes. Whitcomb (3 Meriv. 689), 622,
624, 629, 632, 633, 1001.
Pope's Exrs. s. Elliott (3 B. Mon. 56),
228.
Popham s. Bamfleld (1 Vern. 79), 927,
1326.
Popham v. Brook (5 Russ. 8), 431, 541.
Porch s. Eries (18 N. J. Eq. 204), 708.
Porcher v. McDaniels (12Rich. Eq. 349),
665.
Port s. Russell (36 Ind. 60; 10 Am. Rep.
5), 411.
Porter s. Bank of Rutland (19 Vt. 410),
62, 107, 651, 686.
Porters. Doby (2 Rich. Eq. 49), 91, 93,
116, 913.
Porter s. Dubuque (20 Iowa, 440), 575.
Porter, In re (25 L. J. Ch. 482), 26.
Porter s. Morris (2 Harr. 509), 960.
Porter s. Moores (4 Heisk. 25), 1122,
1230.
Porter s. Schofield (55 Mo. 303), 1034,
1072, 1090.
Porter v. Staten (64 Miss. 421), 689.
Porters. Trail (30 ST. J. Eq. 186), 1549,
1550.
Porters. Wakefield (146 Mass. 25), 707.
Porter s. Woodruff (36 N. J. Eq. 174),
570, 576.
Porterfleld s. Taylor (60 Tex. 264), 677.
Portland s. Topham (11 H. L. Cas. 55),
1007.
Portland, etc. Steamboat Co. v. Locke
(73 Me. 370), 1630.
Portlocks. Gardner (1 Hare, 594), 461,
465, 823.
Portsmouth s. Eellows (5 Madd. 450),
1575.
Posey s. Cook (1 Hill, 413), 96, 913, 914,
920.
Post s. First Nafl Bank (138 111. 659; 28
N. E. Rep. 978), 705.
Post s. Hover (33 N. T. 602), 246, 616,
1560.
Post s. Williams (6 Ind. 219) , 489.
Postlethwait's Appeal (68 Pa. St. 477),
1283.
Potter s. Chapin (6 Paige, 649) , 596.
Potters. Chapman (Arab. 98), 1119.
Potter s. Cummings (18 Me. 55), 1342.
Potters. Gardner (12 Wheat. 198), 1653.
Potter, In re (L. R. 7 Eq. 487), 678.
Potters. Page (54 Pa. St. 465), 1368.
Potters. Pearson (60 Me. 220), 405.
Potter s. Potter (64 Vt. 298; 23 Atl. Rep.
856), 337.
Potter s. Sanders (6 Hare, 1), 432.
Potter s. Sheets (5 Ind. App. 506; 32 N.
E. Rep. 811), 706.
Potters. Smith (36 Ind. 231), 222.
Potter s. Thornton (7 R. I. 252), 749, 777,
819.
Potter's Appeal (56 Conn. 1; 7 Am. St.
Rep. 272), 494.
Pottow s. Ericker (6Exc. 570), 942.
Potts s. Blackwell (4 Jones Eq. 67), 160.
Potts, In re (1 Ash. 340), 900, 906, 1176,
1575.
Poulets. Poulet (1 Vern. 204), 1528.
Poulett s. Hood (L. R. 5 Eq. 115), 1132.
TABLE OP CASES.
clxxix
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Poulter v. Shackel (L. K. 39 Ch. D.
471), 675.
Poultney v. Wells (1 Ait. 180), 1217.
Pounder v. Ash (44 Neb. 672; 63 N. W.
Rep. 48), 798.
Powell v. Attorney-General (3 Meriv.
48), 254, 735.
Powell v. Bradlee (9 G. & J. 274), 487.
Powell v. Burrus (55 Miss. 105), 1690.
Powell v. Evans (5 Ves. 839), 1144, 1203.
Powell v. Glen (21 Ala. 468), 941.
Powell v. Hankey (2 P. Wins. 82), 657.
Powell v. Hopkins (38 Md. 1), 1466.
Powell v. Hulkes (L. E. 33 Ch. D. 552),
1194,1195.
Powell v. Knott (16 Ala. 364), 895, 979,
980.
Powell v. Knowler (2 Atk. 224), 563.
Powell v. Knox (14 Ala. 702) , 861.
Towell v. Merritt (1 Sm. & Gif. 381), 966.
Powell v. Monson, etc. Co. (3 Mason,
347), 307,313,355.
Powell v. Murray (2 Edw. Ch. 644; 10
Paige, 256), 396, 461, 465, 664.
Powell v. Powell (1 Freem. Ch. (Miss.)
358), 309.
Powell v. Price (2 P. Wins. 535), 104,
105.
Powell v. Tuttle (3 N. T. 396), 1097, 1341.
Powell v. Wright (7 Beav. 444), 1732.
Powers v. Andrews (84 Ala. 289), 1513,
1614.
Powers v. Budy (45 Neb. 208; 63 N. W.
Rep. 476), 798.
Powers v. Cassidy (79 X. T. 602; 35 Am.
Rep. 550), S3, 254.
Powers v. Graydon (10 Bosw. 659), 1369.
Powers v. Kueckhoff (41 Mo. 425; 97
Am. Dec. 281), 987, 1094, 1095, 1109,
1110.
Powers v. Powers (8 Misc. Rep. 628; 29
N. Y. Supl. 950), 53.
Powers v. Provident Inst. (124 Mass.
377), 82.
Powers v. Russell (26 Mich. 179), 707.
Powers v. Skinner (34 Vt. 274), 556.
Power's Appeal (125 Pa. St. 175; 11 Am.
St. Rep. 882), 1541.
Powis v. Corbett (3 Atk. 556), 1324.
Powlettc. Herbert (1 Ves. Jr. 297), 386.
Pownal v. Myers (16 Vt. 408), 1108.
Powys v. Blagrave (4DeG., M. & G.
458), 1026.
Powys v. Mansfield (3 Myl. & Cr. 359),
353.
Poythress v. Poythress (16 Ga. 406),
1576.
P'Pool v. Thomas (8 S. W. Rep. 198) , 358.
Prall v. Hamil (28 N. J. Eq. 66), 1658.
Prance v. Sympson I'Kay, 680), 1536.
Prankerd v. Prankerd (1 S. & 8. 1), 174,
307,366.
Prather v. McDowell (8 Bush, 46), 1066,
1108.
Prather v. Weisinger (10 Bush, 117), 966.
Pratt v. Ayer (2 Chand. 265), 48, 67.
Pratt v. Barker (1 Sim. 1; 4 Russ. 507),
426, 431.
Pratt v. Clark (57 Mo. 189), 576, 590.
Pratt v. Colt (2 Freem. Ch. 139), 1268.
Pratt v. Flamer (7 Har. & J. 10) , 42.
Pratt v. Harvey (L. R. 12 Eq. 544), 813.
Pratt v. Hoag (5 Duer, 631), 452.
Pratt v. Mathew (22 Beav. 528), 42.
Pratt v. Philbrook (33 Me. 17), 482.
Pratt v. Rice (7 Cush. 209), 1036.
Pratt v. Sladden (14 Ves. 193), 244.
Pratt v. Taliaferro (3 Leigh, 419), 262.
Pratt jj. Thornton (28 Me. 365; 48 Am.
Dec. 492), 1025, 1050, 1051, 1125, 1184.
Pratt v. Timmins (1 B. & Aid. 530), 926.
Pratt v. Van Wyck (6 Gill & J. 495), 576,
588.
Pray v. Hegeman (98 N. Y. 35), 170, 1521.
Pray's Appeal (34 Pa. St. 100), 948, 1212,
1253.
Preacher's Aid Soc. v. England (106 111.
125), 919, 920.
Preacher's Aid Soc. v. Rich (45 Me. 552),
756, 759.
Premier Steel Co. v. Yandes (139 Ind.
307; 38 N. E. Rep. 849), 10.
Prendergast v. Prendergast (3 H. L.
Cas. 195), 1119, 1168.
Presbyterian Church v. Disbrow (23
L'g. Int. 245), 133.
Presbyterian Cong. v. Johnston (1 W.
&S. 56), 952.
Presbyterian Corp. v. Wallace (3 Rawle,
109), 1075.
Prescott v. Moore (64 Me. 422), 862.
Preseott v. Norris (32 N. H. 101), 563.
Preseott v. Pitts (9 Mass. 376), 885.
Presley v. Davis (7 Rich. Eq. 105), 1537.
Presley v. Stribling (24 Miss. 257), 956,
1721.
Preston v. Ellington (74 Ala. 133), 573.
Preston v. Tubbin (1 Vern. 286), 443.
Prevo*>. Walters (4 Scam. 35), 263, 308,
1628.
Prevost v. Clarke (2 Madd. 458), 119, 128.
Prevost v. Gratz (1 Pet. C. C. 364), 238,
241, 391, 394, 403, 532.
Prevost v. Gratz (3 Wash. C. C. 434),
1688.
Prevost v. Gratz (6 Wheat. 481), 365, 389,
399, 464, 465, 469, 823, 1533, 1535, 1537,
1595.
Prewett v. Buckingham (28 Miss. 92),
1537.
clxxx
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages : Vol. I, pp. 1-847 ; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Prlbbleu. Hall (13 Bush, 61), 651, 686.
Price v. Berrington (3 Maen. & G. 486) , 13.
Price v. Blakemore (6 Beav. 507), 1091.
Price v. Bury (3 Drew. 41), 600.
Price v. Evans (26 Mo. 30), 390.
Price v. Fritzell (44 Md.'521), 1367.
Price v. Gamble (IStockt. 2.18), 402.
Price v. Haynes (37 Mich. 487), 1361.
Price v. Hewitt (8 Exch. 145), 3S1.
Prices. Kane (112 Mo. 412; 20 S. VV.
Rep. 609), 25, 268, 303, 338.
Price v. Lovett (4 Eng. L. & Eq. 110),
38.
Price v. Maxwell (28 Pa. St. 23), 729, 734,
749.
Price v. M. E. Church (4 Ohio, 515), 987,
1070.
Price v. Morris (5 McLean, 4), 402.
Prfee v. MulforU (107 N. T. 303), 1535.
Price v. Palmer (23 Hun, 507), 568.
Price v. Price (4 Beav. 505) , 152.
Price v. Price (lDeG.,M. &G..308), 294.
Price v. Price (12 L. T. 636), 1257.
Prices. Ralston (2Dj11. 60), 1607.
Prices. Reeves (38C.il. 457), 434.
Price v. Seydel (46 Iowa, 696) , 706.
Price v. Sisson (13 N. J. Eq. 166), 1277.
Price v. Strange (6 Madd. 149) , 638.
Price v. Thompson (84 Ky. 219), 431,
1184.
Price v. Truesdell (28 N. J. Eq. 204), 88.
Price's Appeal (54 Pa. St. 472), 1540,
1541.
Prichardu. Parrar (116 Mass. 213), 1184.
Prlchardp. Thompson (95 N. Y. 76), 34,
87.
Prichardu. Wilson (10 Jur. (N. S.) 330),
1465.
Frlckett v. Sibert (71 Ala. 194), 573.
Pricketts. Wells, (117 Mo. 502; 24 S. W.
Rep. 52), 793.
Prlddy v. Rose (3 Meriv 102), 38, 175.
Pride v. Bubb (L. R. 7 Ch. 64), 652.
Pride v. Fooks (2 Beav. 430), 1681.
Prideauxu. Lonsdale (1 De G., J. &S.
433), 274.
Priessinger v. Sharp (14 N. Y. Supl. 372),
1105.
Priest v. Cone (51 Vt. 499; 31 Am. Rep.
695), 711.
Priest v. Parrott (2 Ves. 160), 560.
Priest v. Tindall (24 Beav. 244), 1232.
Priest v. Uppleby (L. R. 42 Ch. D. 351),
1252.
Primrose v. Bromley (1 Atk. 89), 881.
Prince v. Guillemot (1 Rich. Eq, 187),
1332.
Prince v. Heylin (1 Atk. 494), 1636.
Prince v. HIne (27 Beav. 345), 1679.
---'-"" Adams (10 Cush. 129), 798.
Princeton Loan & T. Co. v. Munson (60
111. 371), 1472.
Pring«. Pring (2 Ves. 99), 244.
Pringlo v. Allen (1 Hill Ch. 135), 1438.
Pringle v. Dorsey (3 S. Car. 509), 776.
Pringleu. Dunn (37 Wis. 449; 19 Am.
Rep. 772), 450.
Prlntup v. Trammell (25 Ga. 243) , 1031.
Priori;. Talbot (10 Cush. 1), 853, 856,879,
1020.
Prison Charities, In re (L. R. 16 Eq. 129),
770.
Pritchard v. Ames (Turn. & R. 222),
655.
Pritchard v. Brown (4 K. H. 397), 355.
Pritchard v. Thompson (95 N. Y. 76; 47
Am. Rep. 9), 750,752.
Probasco v. Johnson (2 Disn. 96), 601.
Proby v. Landor (28 Beav. 604), 517.
Proctor v. Heyer (122 Mass. 525), 1061.
Proof v. Hinds (Cas. temp. Talb. Ill),
425.
Proprietors v. Frye (5 Greenl. 38), 1048.
Proprietors, etc. v. Grant (3 Gray, 142),
1303.
Proseus v. Mclntire (5 Barb. 425), 256,
854.
Prosser v. Edmonds (1 Y. & C. 4S1), 39.
Protestant-Episcopal Soc. v. Gaittier
(62 Fed. Rep. 422), 753.
Protestant, etc. Soc. v. Churchman (80
Va. 718), 753.
Proudfoot v. Hume (4 Brev. 476), 1671.
Proudleyt*. Fielder (2 Myl. & K. 57),
672.
Prouty v. Clark (73 Iowa, 55), 576, 479.
Prouty v. Edgar (6 Iowa, 353), 1108, 1109,
1617.
Providence Inst. v. Carpenter (18 R. I.
287; 27 Atl. Rep. 337), 82.
Provost v. Aubery (Amb. 336), 810,
817.
Provost v. Provost (70 N. Y. 141), 616,
1746, 1747.
Prow v. Prow (133 Ind. 340; 32 N. E.
Rep. 1121), 336.
Prudden v. Lindsley (29 N. J. Eq. 615),
1059.
Pryce v. Byrn (5 Ves. 681) , 465.
Pryon v. Mood (2 McMull. 293), 912, 917.
Pryor v. Baker (133 Mass. 460), 1487.
Pryor v. Hill (4 Bro. Ch. 139), 680.
Puckett v. Puckett (21 Ore. 370; 28 Pac.
Rep. 65), 213.
Pugh v. Bell (1 J. J. Marsh. 399), 356, 432,
461, 1170.
Pugh v. Currie (5 Ala. 446), 186, 216.
Pugh, Ex parte (1 Drew. 202), 678.
Pugh v. Pugh (9 Ind. 132), 632.
Pugh v. Vaughn (12 Beav. 517), 1424.
TABLE OF CASES.
clxxxi
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 818-1763.]
Pullen v. Ready (2 Atk. 587;1 Wils.21),
1042, 1528.
Pullen v. Reinhard (1 Whart. 520),
921.
Pullen v. Sergeant (2 Ch. Rep. 300),
860.
Pulpress v. African Church (48 Pa. St.
204), 1119.
Pulteney v. Darlington (1 Bro. Ch. 223),
298.
Pulvertoft v. Pulvertoft (18 Vea. 84),
153.
Pumphrey, In re (L. R. 22 Ch. D. 255),
1677.
Purcell v. Buckley (12 Ir. Eq. 124), 419.
Purcell v. McNamara (14 Ves. 91), 292,
413.
Purcell v. Purcell (4 Hen. & Munf. 607),
685.
Purdew v. Jackson (1 Russ. 1), 680.
Purdie v. Whitney (20 Pick. 25), 999,
1069, 1349.
Purdue v. Montgomery Bldg. Asan. (79
Ala. 478), 655.
Purdy v. Lynch (145 N. T. 462; 40 N. E.
Rep. 232; 70 Hun, 272; 25 N. T. Supl.
585), 10, 1057,1237,1238.
Purdy v. Purdy (3 Md. Ch. 547), 313.
Purnell v. Vaughn (77 N. Car. 268),
1468.
Puraley v. Hapea (22 Iowa, 21), 1093.
Puryear v. Puryear (16 Ala. 486), 704.
Pusey v. Clemaen (9 S. & R. 204), 1688.
Pushman v. Filliter (3 Ves. 7) , 127.
Putnam v. Bricknell (18 Wis. 335), 713.
Putnam v. Mercantile Ins. Co. (5 Met.
386), 1029.
Putnam v. New York L. Ins. Co. (42 La.
Ann. 739), 715.
Putnam v. Ritchie (6 Paige, 390), 608,
825, 1025, 1120.
Putnam v. Story (132 Mass. 205) , 111.
Putnam v. Tennyson (50 Ind. 466), 706.
Putnam Free School v. Fisher (30 Me.
5:3), 1016, 1037.
Puzeyn. Seiner (9 Wis. 370), 1178, 1181,
1183.
Pybus v. Smith (3 Bro. Ch. 340), 667, 668,
939.
Pye v. Daubuz (2 Dick. 759), 600.
Pye, Ex parte (18 Ves. 140) , 76, 77, 153,
851.
Pye v. George (2 Salk. 680; 1 P. Wms.
681), 327,433, 460,694.
Pye, Ex parte (L. R, 8 Ch. D. 754), 560,
663.
Pym v. Lockyer (5 Myl. & Cr. 29), 354.
Pyot v. Pyot (1 Ves. 338), 634.
Pyott's Estate (160 Pa. St. 441), 1338.
Pyron v. Mood (2 McMull. 288) , 856.
Q.
Quackenbush v. Leonard (9 Paige Ch.
334) , 313.
Quarles v. Lacy (4 Murf . 251), 383, 389,
394, 1092, 1470.
Quarles v. Quarles (2 Munf. 321), 840.
Quarterly Meeting v. White Lick, etc.
(89 Ind. 163), 796.
Queen's College, Case of (Jac. 1), 785.
Queen's College, In re (5 Russ. 64), 785.
Quesenbury v. Barbour (31 Gratt.* 491),
1109.
Quinn v. Shields (62 Iowa, 129; 49 Am.
Rep. 141), 52.
Quinn's Estate (144 Pa. St. 444), 1622.
R.
Rabb v. Flenniken (29 S. Car. 278; 7 S. E.
Rep. 597), 1734.
Rabbitt ». Gaither (67 Md. 94), 553.
Rachfield v. Careless (2 P. Wms. 157) ,
244.
Rackham v. Siddall (16Sim.297;lMacn.
& G. 607), 603, 876, 1223, 1229.
Radbourn v. Jervis (3 Beav. 450), 1357.
Radclifi v. Radford (96 Ind. 482), 349.
Radford a. Carwill (13 W. Va. 572), 653,
664, 665, 667, 668, 711.
Rafferty v. Mallony (3 Bissell, 362), 399.
Raganu. Walker (1 Wis. 627), 309.
Ragsdale v. Ragsdale (68 Miss. 92; 8 So.
Rep. 315), 72.
Rahn v. McElrath (6 Watts, 151), 1357.
Raiford v. Raiford (6 Ired. Eq. 490),
1689.
Raikes v. Ward (1 Hare, 449), 184, 229.
Railroad Co. v. Brown (43 Mo. 294),
1498.
Railroad Co. v. Durant(95U. S. 576),
1535.
Railroad Co. v. Magnay (25 Beav. 586),
411.
Railroad Co. v. Mathers (71 111. 592; 104
111. 257), 656.
Railroad Co. v. Ryan (11 Kan. 602), 556.
Railroad Co. v. Saunders Co. (16 Neb.
123; 19 N. W. Rep. 698), 1542.
Railway Co. v. Spangler (44 Ohio St.
471), 556.
Railway Co. v. Taylor (6 Colo. 1), 556.
Ralnsbotham v. Senior (L. R. 8 Eq.
575), 827.
Rainsfordti. Rainsford (Rice Eq. 343),
1215.
Rainwater v. Stevens (16 Mo. App.
644), 1385.
Rakestrawu. Brewer (2 P. Wms. 511),
398.
clxxxii
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Rakestraw v. Hamilton (14 Iowa, 147),
575.
Raleigh v. Fitzpatrlck (43 N. J. Eq.
501), 1573.
Ralston «. Telfair-(2 Dey. Eq. 255), 254.
Ramage v. Ramage (27 S. Car. 39), 256,
309.
Ramage v. Towles (85 Ala. 688; 5 So.
Rep. 342), 581.
Barney v. Green (18 Ala. 771), 1437.
Rammelsberg v. Mitchell (29 Ohio St.
22), 1119.
Ramsay v. Ellis (3 Desaue. 78), 1690.
Ramsay v. Joyce (1 McMull. Ch. 236),
548.
Ramsdell v. Ramsdell (21 Me. 288), 108,
924.
Ramsey v. Marsh (2 McCord, 252; 13
Am. Dec. 717), 912, 938.
Randall v. Bookey (2 Vern. 425; Pr. Ch.
162), 245, 260, 1326.
Randall v. Constans (33 Minn. 329), 619.
Randall v. Dusenberry (63 ST. Y. 645),
1025.
Randalls. Errington (10 Ves. 423), 384,
392, 393, 466, 1178, 1180, 1598.
Randall v. Hearle (1 Aust. 124), 128.
Randall v. Morgan (12 Ves. 74), 47.
Randalls. Payne (IBro. Ch. 55), 1045.
Randall v. Phillips (3 Mason, 378), 217,
323.
Randall v. Randall (37 Mich. 573), 722,
723.
Randall v. Russell (3 Meriv. 194), 1438.
Randall's Estate, In re (29N. Y. Supl.
1019), 1179.
Randle v. Gould (8 Ell. & Bl. 457),
720.
Randolph v. Allen (73 Fed. Rep. 23 ; 19
C. C. A. 353), 1449, 1579.
Randolph v. East Birmingham Land
Oo. (104 Ala. 355; 16 So. Rep. 126),
1203, 1252.
Ranger v. St. Western Ry. Co. (5 H. L.
Cas. 72), 484.
Rankin v. Allison (64 N. Car. 673), 1064.
Rankin v. Bancroft (114 111. 441), 904.
Rankin v. Harper (23 Mo. 579), 309, 334.
Rankin v. Loder (21 Ala. 380), 1318, 1329,
1369, 1376, 1377.
Rankin v. Patton (65Mo. 378), 285, 293.
Rankin v. Porter (7 Watts, 387), 413,416.
Rankin v. Rankin (36 111. 293; 87 Am.
Dec. 216), 1033, 1036, 1069.
Rankin v. West (25 Mich. 195), 707.
Rannelsi). Gerner (80 Mo. 474), 1314.
Ransom v. Brown (63 Tex. 188), 585,
Ransom v. Ransom (31 Mich. 301), 263.
Ransomev. Burgess (L. R. 3Eq.773),
834, 835.
Raphael v. Boehm (11 Ves. 92; 13 Ves.
407), 330, 1219.
Raphael v. McFarlane(18Can. Sup. Ct.
183), 224.
Rasleigh v. Masters (1 Ves. Jr. 204),
299, 1667, 1678.
Ratcliff v. Huntley (5 Ired. Eq. 545), 724.
Ratclifla. Sangston (18 Md. 383), 894,
1394.
Ratclifl v. Winch (17 Beav. 216), 993,
1047, 1343.
Rathbun v. Colton (15 Pick. 471), 606.
Rathbun v. Platner (18 Barb. 272), 1356.
Ravanel s.lSmith (1 McCord Oh. 134),
59.
Ravenhill v. Dansey (2 P. Wms. 179),
1529.
Rawdon v. Blatchtord (1 Sand. 344),
492.
Rawe v. Chichester (Amb. 715; 1 Bro.
Ch,198«.),397,399.
Rawlings«. Adams (7 Md. 64), 964.
Rawlings' Estate (13Phila. 337), 1201.
Rawlins v. Wlckham (3 DeG. &J. 304),
475.
Eawson s. School Dist. (7 Allen, 125),
181.
Ray v. Adams (3 Myl. & H. 237), 128.
Ray j). Com. Durham Co. (HON. Car.
169; 14 S. E. Rep. 646), 182, 1427.
Ray v. Doughty (4Blackf. 116), 860.
Ray, Ex parte (1 Madd. 199), 653.
Ray v. Ferrell (127 Md. 570), 191.
Ray v. Pung (5 B. & A. 561), 964.
Ray v, Simmons (11 R. I. 266; 15 Am. L.
Reg. 701), 75, 76, 80.
Raymondw. Holden (2Cush. 268), 949.
Raymond v. Rochester, etc. Co. (82
Hun, 239; 27 N. Y. Supl. 1), 110, 1752.
Raymond v. Webb (Loflt. 66), 1081.
Rayner«. Mowbray (3 Bro. Ch. 234),
624.
Rayner v. Pearsall (3 Johns. Ch. 578),
455, 1005, 1055, 1056, 1057, 1129, 1244,
1341, 1655.
Raynham Cong. Soc. v. Trustees (23
Pick. 148), 1724.
Rea v. Copeland (47 Mo. 83), 1496.
Rea v. Williams (Sudg. V. & P. 697), 215.
Read v. Hufl (40 N. J. Eq. 229), 367.
Read v. Patterson (44 N. J. Eq. 211; 6
Am. St. Rep. 877), 614, 995, 1008, 1120.
Read v. Robinson (6 W. & S. 331), 878,
879.
Read v. Snell (2 Atk. 643), 330.
Read v. Steadman (26 Beav. 495), 144, 243,
246, 1560.
Read v. Truelove (Amb. 417), 883, 889.
Read v. Williams (125 N. Y. 560; 21 Am.
St. Rep. 748), 614, 752.
TABLE OF CASES.
ClXXXUl
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847, Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Beade v. Livingstone (3 Johns. Ch.
601), 98, 100, 103.
Ready v. Ham (46 Miss. 422), 1054.
Beady v. Keasby (14 Mich. 215), 47.
Rector St. James' Church v. Hunting-
ton (82 Hun, 125; 31 N..T. Supl. 9),
797.
Redd v. Jones (30 Gratt. 123), 286.
Reddick v. Jones (6 Ired. 107), 439.
Redding v. Rice (171 Pa. St. 301; 35 Atl.
Bep. 330), 1042.
Rede v. Oakes (10 Jur. (N. S.) 1246),
1100.
Bedford v. Gibson (12 Leigh, 332), 570.
Redgrave v. Hurd (L. E. 20 Ch. D. 1),
475, 477.
Bedhead v. Parway Driving Club (7
Misc. Bep. 275), 1180.
Eedington«. Eedington (3 Eidge, 106;
IB. &B. 131), 362,366, 368, 1432.
Redman v. Bedman (1 Vern. 347), 548,
544, 545.
Eedwoodw. Eiddick (4Munf. 222), 1537.
Beeceii. Allen (10 111. 236; 48 Am. Dec.
336), 919, 956, 1108, 1114, 1115.
Eeece v. Tyre (1 De G. & Sm. 279), 1538.
Beech v. Kennegall (1 Ves. 123; Amb.
67), 219, 497, 500, 606, 508, 513, 1679.
Eeed v. Allerton (3 Bobt. 567), 1228.
Beed D.Baltimore Trust, etc. Co. (72
Md. 531), 1549.
Eeed v. Beazlty (lBlackf. 97), 721, 722.
Eeed?;. Devaynes (3 Bro. Ch. 95), &93.
Reed v. Dickey (2 Watts, 459), 432, 435.
Reedi>. Gordon (35 Md. 183), 912.
Eeed v. Huff (40 R . J . Eq. 229) , 334 .
Beedu. Marble (11 Paige, 409), 1118.
Eeed v. Norris (2 Myl. & Cr. 361), 331,
333, 390, 414.
Reedu. O'Brien (7 Beav. 32), 156.
Eeed v. Pacific Ins. Co. (1 Met. 166),
1030.
Eeed v. Painter (129 Mo. 674; 31 S. W.
Eep. 919), 279.
Reed v. Peterson (91 111. 288), 1180.
Eeed v. Reed (32 111. App. 21; 135 111.
482; 25 N. E. Eep. 1095), 183, 279, 322.
Eeed v. Robinson (« W. & S. 338), 151.
Reed v. Sands (37 Barb. 185), 1408.
Reed v. Warner (5 Paige Ch. 650), 193,
331,389, 415,1171.
Eeed«. Whitney (7 Gray, 533), 964.
Eeeder v. Barr (4 Ohio, 458), 454.
Reederu. Nay (95 Ind. 164), 580.
Reeds w. Wakefield (10 Gray, 514), 1017.
Reedsell v. Watson (2 Dev. Eq. 430),
656.
Reedy v. Millizen (155 111. 636), 1478.
Beehling v. Ryers (94 Pa. St. 316),
282.
Rees, Ex parte (3 V. & B. 11), 902.
Bees v. Wallace (113 111. 689), 414, 1718.
Bees v. Waters (9 Watts, 90), 553.
Bees v. Williams (2 Mees. & W. 749),
938.
Beese v. Burts (39 Ga. 565), 585.
Eeese v. Kinkead (18 Nev. 126), 576.
Eeese v. Murman (5 Wash. St. 373; 31
Pac. Bep. 373), 319.
Beese Silver Mining Co. v. Smith (L.
E. 4H. L. Cas. 64), 475.
Beeside u.Peter (35 Md. 222), 1081,1093,
1100.
Eeeve v. Attorney-General (3 Hare,
191), 770.
Reeve v. Attorney-General (2 Atk. 223),
928,940.
Eeeve v. Parkins (2 J. & W. 390), 1573.
Eeeve v. Eeeve (1 Vern. 219), 1528.
Beeves v. Baker (18 Beav. 372), 52, 132.
Beeves v. Brayton (36 S. Car. 384; 16 S.
E. Eep. 658), 912, 1279.
Beeves v. Bryee (4 Ves. 698), 635.
Beeves v. Brymer (6 Ves. 519), 981, 985.
Beeves v. Dougherty (7 Terg. 222),
462.
Beeves v. Heme (5 Vin. Abr. 343; PI.
41) , 1043.
Beeves v. Tappan (21 S. Car. 1), 861.
Refeld v. Ferrell (27 Ark. 534), 574.
Reformed Church v. Bradford (8 Cow.
457), 796.
Beformed Dutch Church v. Veeder (4
Wend. 494), 941.
Eegby v. Connol (L. E. 14 Ch. D. 482),
560.
Eegina v. Burdett (4 B. & Aid. 161), 982.
Regina v. Commissioners (15 Q. B.
1012), 952.
Eehden v. Wesley (29 Beav. 213), 1188,
1231.
Beickhoff v. Brecht (51 Iowa, 633), 420,
532.
Beid v. Atkinson (5 Ir. Eq. 373), 123, 125,
253.
Beid v. Blackstone (14 Gratt. 363), 128.
Beid v. Burns (13 Ohio St. 49), 521.
Reidw. Fitch (11 Barb. 399), 174, 373.
Beid v. Gordon (35 Md. 184), 946, 1066.
Reid v. Lamar (1 Strobh. Eq. 27), 665.
EeidD. Morrison (12 S. & R. 18), 964.
Reid v. Mullins (48 Mo. 344), 1109.
Eeid v. Reid (30 Beav. 388), 31, 876, 900.
Eeidt). Beid (12Eich. Eq. 213), 47.
Eeid v. Reid (L. R. 31 Ch. D. 402), 1621.
Reid v. Shergold (10 Ves. 370), 623, 666,
697, 1009.
Reid v. Stevens (38 S. Car. 519; 17 S. E.
Rep. 358), 710.
Reid v. Vanersdale (2 Leigh, 560) , 151.
clxxxiv
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Eeidy v. Small (154 Pa. St. 505; 26 Atl.
Rep. 602), 13, 164.
Relfet>. Com. Ins. Co. (5 Mo. App. 123),
1412.
Eeifl v. Eshelman (52 Md. 582), 1362.
Reiffl v. Horst (52 Md. 255), 53.
Reifi v. Horst (55 Md. 42), 1362.
Eeilley v. Phillips (4 S. Dak. 604), 1462.
Eeilley v. Whipple (2 S. Car. 277), 852.
Eeinhard v. Bank of Ky. (6 B. Mon.
252), 1376.
Eeitz v. Eeitz (80 N. T. 638), 372, 373,
415.
Eelf v. Eberley (23 Iowa, 467), 1540.
Eelfe v. Eelfe (34 Ala. 500), 199.
Eeller v. Equitable Ins. Co. (28 Ind.
170), 477.
Remington v. Campbell (60 111. 516),
370.
Remington v. Harrison Co. Court (12
Bush, 148), 1048.
Remington v. Rozell (106 Pa. St. 407),
1542.
Renew v. Butler (30 Ga. 954), 1184.
Eenlck v. Butterfield (11 Foster, 70),
391, 392, 393, 401,414, 1184.
Rennell v. Deffell (4DeG.,M. &G. 372),
386.
RennleV Ritchie (12 CI. & F. 204), 651,
667, 668, 669.
Rennie v. Young (2 De G. & J. 142),
1643, 1545.
Renshaw's Trusts, Jnrc(L. E. 4 Ch.
783), 868.
Rensselaer & S. R. Co. v. Miller (47 Vt.
146), 1702.
Renz v. Stoll (94 Mich. 377; 54 N. W.
Rep. 276), 64.
Reorganized Church, etc. v. Church of
Christ (60 Fed. Eep. 937), 311, 793.
Eepp v. Eepp (12 Gill & J. 341), 576.
Revelln. Hussey (2B. &B. 287), 200. .
Revett v. Harvey (1 S. & S. 502), 286, 287,
289, 426.
Rex v. De Mannvllle (5 East, 221), 844.
Rex v. Inhabitants (5 B. & Ad. 469), 1060.
Rex v. Newman (1 Lev. 284), 733.
Rex ». Robinson (Wrightw. 393), 1291.
Rexi>. Simpson (3 Burr. 1467), 974.
Eex v. Portington (1 Salk. 162), 778.
Eex v. Wilson (5 M. & E. 140), 892.
Reynelltt. Sprye (8 Hare, 222; 1 De. G.,
M. & G. 660), 481, 554, 563.
Reynolds' Appeal (28 Conn. 47), 1385.
Reynish v. Martin (3 Atk. 330), 1041.
Reynold v. Bank of Virginia (6 Gratt.
174), 1331, 1362, 1569.
Reynolds v. Brandon (3 Helsk. 593), 653,
666, 1002, 1062, 1131.
Reynolds v. Caldwell (80 Ala. 232), 358.
Reynolds v. Denslow (80 Hun, 369; 30
N. T. Supl. 76), 167,618.
Reynolds, Ex parte (5 Ves. 707), 384, 392,
426, 905, 1575.
Reynolds v. Hennesay (17 R. 1. 154), 577.
Reynolds v. Hennessey (15 E. I. 215),
1535.
Reynolds i>. Jones (2 S. & S. 206), 595,
969.
Reynolds v . Eeynolds (30 Kan. 91), 309.
Eeynolds v. Ruckman (35 Mich. 80), 449.
Eeynolds v. Stansford (16 Tex. 291), 103.
Reynolds v. Stark Co. (5 Ohio, 204), 10.
Eeynolds v. Sumner (126 111. 58; H N. E.
Eep. 661; 18 N. E. Rep. 334), 232,269,
1535, 1586.
Eeynolds v. Wltte (13 S. Car. 5; 36 Am.
Eep. 678), 484.
Eheau. Tucker (56 Ala. 450), 197, 213,
316, 369.
Ehett v. Mason (18 Gratt. 641), 112, 624.
Rhoades v. Rhoades (43 111. 239), 837, 1742.
Rhode Island, etc. Co. v. Olney (14 E.
I. 449), 746.
Rhodes «. Bates (L. E. 1 Ch. App. 256),
292, 294, 426.
Rhodes v. Cook (2 S. & S. 448), 282.
Ehodes v. Gibbs (39 Tex. 432), 711.
Ehodes v. Green (36 Ind. 11), 308, 441.
Rhodes v. Sanderson (36 Cal. 414), 395.
Rhodes v. Sparks (6 Pa. St. 473), 665.
Rhyner v. Frank (105 111. 326), 574.
Ehymer's Appeal (93 Pa. St. 142), 807.
Ribonc. Railroad Companies (16 Wall.
446), 1730.
Rice v. Barnard (20 Vt. 479), 600.
Rice v. Barrett (102 s. T. 161), 1522.
Riceti. Bixler (1 W. &S. 445), 300.
Eice v. Burnett (I Spear Eq. 590; 42 Am.
Dec. 336) , 917, 932, 943, 1267.
Eice v. Cleghorn (21 Ind. 80), 392.
Rice v. Columbus, etc. E. Co. (32 Ohio
St. 380), 709.
Ricet). Hoffman (35 Md. 344), 707.
Eice v. Eice (65 N. W. Eep. 103), 240.
Rice *. Eice (36 Ted. Rep. 858) , 573, 579.
Rlee». Tonnele (4 Sand. Ch. 571), 841,
1561, 1563.
Rice's Case (42 Mich. 528% 847.
Rich v. Cockell (9 Ves. 369), 651, 661, 686,
712.
Rich v. Rich (12 Minn. 468), 707.
Rich j). Whitfield (L. E. 2Eq. 583), 304.
Richards v. Ames (T. & R. 22), 654.
Richards v. Chambers (10 Ves. 680), 666,
697.
Richards v. Delbrldge (L. R. 18 Eq. 11),
60, 255.
Richards v. Holmes (18 How. 143), 1098,
1489, 1497.
TABLE OF CASES.
clxxxv
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Richards v. Finnegan (45 Minn. 208),
1480, 1481.
Richards v. Gledstanes (3 Gift. 298),
443.
Richards, In re (L. R. 8 Eq. 119), 625.
Richards v. Levin (16 Mo. 696), 1368.
Richards v. McDanlel (1 McCord, 352),
967.
Richards v. Perkins (3 T. & C. 299),
1576.
Richards v. Shingle, etc. Oo. (71 Mich.
56), 576.
Richardson v. Bowman (40 Miss. 782),
576.
Richardson v. Chapman (7 Bro. P. 0.
318), 643.
Richardson v. Oole (2 Swan, 100), 987.
Richardson v. Day (20 S. Car. 412), 369.
Richardson v. England (4 Myl. & Cr.
171) , 1570, 1571.
Richardson v. Farwell (49 Minn. 210; 51
N. W. Rep. 915) , 831.
Richardson v. Frederitze (35 Mo. 266),
1054.
Richardson v. Green (46 Ark. 270), 574.
Richardson v. Herron (39 Hun, 537),
1404.
Richardson v. Hutchins (68 Tex. 81),
1257.
Richardson, In re (9 N. T. Supl. 638),
1346.
Richardson v. Jenkins (1 Drew. 477),
881.
Richardson v. Jones (3 Gill & J. 163),
383.
Richardson v. Knight (69 Me. 385), 855,
857, 885, 1215.
Richardson v. Linney (8 B. Mon. 571),
286, 290.
Richardson v. Louisville, etc. R. Co. (85
Ala. 659), 715.
Richardson v. McPherson (74 Ind. 158),
575.
Richardson v. Mellish (2 Bing. 229; 9 E.
C. L. 252), 610.
Richardson v. Mounce (19 S. Oar. 477),
308.
Richardson r. Richardson (L. R. 3 Eq.
686), 70, 76, 77, 151.
Richardson v. Rogers (45 Mich. 591) ,
1412.
Richardson v. Seever (84 Va. 259), 52.
Richardson v. Smallwood (Jae. 562), 98,
103.
Richardson v. Spencer (18 B. Mon. 450),
1170.
Richardson v. Stodder (100 Mass. 528),
69, 659, 912, 922, 931, 941, 1267.
Richardson v. Sylvester (L. R. 9 Q. B.
34), 473.
Richardson v. Woodbury (43 Me. 206),
230, 971.
Richeson v. Ryan (IB 111. 13), 979, 980,
1055.
Richmond v. Davis (103 Ind. 449), 18, 819,
1524.
Richtmeyer ». Richtmeyer (50 Barb.
55), 1725.
RIckard, In re (31 Beav. 244), 753.
Rickerti. Streit (33Gratt. 663), 829.
Rickett's Appeal (12 Atl. Rep. 60), 1185.
Kicketts v. Bennett (4 C. B. 686), 1032.
Rickettsi). Harvey (106 Ind. 664), 556.
Kicketts v. Montgomery (15 Md. 46),
390,391, 393,414,1184.
Riddell v. Johnson (26 Gratt. 152), 514.
Riddle v. Beattie (77 Iowa, 168), 66.
Riddle v. Cutter (49 Iowa, 547), 159, 1728.
Riddle v. Mandeville (5 Cranch, 329),
593.
Riddle v. Whitehill (135 U. S. 621), 1535.
Ridenourw. Wherrett (30 Ind. 485), 878,
879, 882.
Rider v. Kidder (10 Ves. 360), 174, 307,
312, 335, 362, 369.
Rider v. Mason (4 Sandf. Ch. 351), 1297.
Ridgely v. Gettings (2 Har. & G. 58), 1715.
Ridgley v. Johnson (11 Barb. 627), 890,
896, 1090, 1122, 1123, 1126.
Ridgway v. Lanphear (99 Ind. 251), 107.
Ridley v. Hettman (10 Ohio, 624), 462.
Rldout v. Dowding (1 Atk. 419), 240.
Ridout v. Lewis (1 Atk. 269), 717.
Riehl v. Evansville Foundry Assn. (104
Ind. 70), 191,533.
Rietzell v. Miller (25 111. 67), 1049.
Rife v. Geyer (59 Pa. St. 393; 98 Am.
Dec. 351), 184,940,943,956,1267,1288,
1290, 1295, 1638, 1640, 1644.
Rite's' Appeal (110 Pa. St. 232), 1744.
Rigby, Ex parte (19 Ves. 463), 639, 1022,
1122.
Rigdenw. Vallier (3 Atk. 735; 2 Ves.
258), 215, 320.
Riggsu. Murray (2 Johns. Ch. 576; 15
Johns. 571), 713,1367.
Riggs v. Swann (6 Jones Eq. 131), 47
Right v. Cuthell (5 East, 491), 1122.
Right v. Smith (12 East, 455), 938.
Rike v. Floyd (6 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 80),
797.
Rikerw. Leo (133 N. T. 519;30N. E. Rep.
598), 751.
Riley v. Garnet (3 De G. & Sm. 629), 927.
Riley v. Kepler (94 Kan. 308), 455.
Riley v. Pierce (50 Ala. 93), 704,
Rinchey v. Strieker (28 N. T. 45; 31 N.
T. 140), 1403.
Rineharta. Harrison (Bald. 177), 299.
Rindle, Inre (2 Edw. 265), 27.
clxxxvi
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Ring v. Campbell (6 Tex. Civ. App.
714; 26 S. W. Eep. 295), 711.
Ringgold w. Bryan (3 Md. Ch. 488), 576,
596.
Ringgold v. Ringgold (1 Har. & G. 11;
18 Am. Dec. 250), 987, 1075, 1184, 1588,
1598, 1685, 1689.
Ringo v. Binn9 (10 Pet. 268) , 333, 413.
Ringo v. Real Estate Bank (13 Ark.
663), 1412.
Rio Grande R. Co. v. Armendaiz (5
Tex. Civ. App. 449; 23 S. W. Rep.
568), 1180.
Riordann. Banor (10 Ir. Eq. 469), 510,
513.
Ripley v. Gelston (9 Johns. 201), 529.
Ripley v. Seligman (88 Mich. 177; 50 N.
W. Eep. 143), 195.
Ripley v. Waterworth (7 Ves. 425) , 258.
Ripple v. Ripple (1 Rawle, 386), 1352.
Rippon v. Norton (2 Beav. 63), 1269,
1636.
Rische v. Diesselhorst (26 S. W. Rep.
762), 418.
Rishtont>. Cobb (9 Sim. 615), 512, 1044.
Risk v. Risk (9 8. W. Rep. 712), 403.
Risley v. Indianapolis, B. & W. R. R.
Co. (62 N. Y. 240), 412.
Ritchie v. Jadd (137 III. 453; 27 N. E.
Rep. 682), 1476.
Rittenhousen. Hicks (23 Weekly Law
Bull. 269), 934.
Rltter's Appeal (59 Pa. St. 9), 159, 160.
Rittson v. Stordy (3 Sm. & Gift. 230) , 41,
43, 965, 966.
RItzer v. Haber (14 S. & R. 237), 839.
Rivett's Case (Moore, 890), 763.
Rixs. Smith (8 Vt. 55), 1537.
Rizerr. Perry (58 Md. 112), 753.
Roach v. Caflara (85 Cal. 436; 25 Pac.
Rep. 22), 75, 234, 1631.
Roach v. Garvan (1 Ves. 160), 836.
Roach v. Hudson (8 Bush , 410) , 525.
Roanoke Brick & Lime Co. v. Simmons
(20 S. E. Rep. 955), 579.
Roarty v. Mitchell (7 Gray, 243), 958,
1459.
Roarty j). Smith (31 Atl. Rep. 1031), 914.
Robard v. Cooke (36 L. T. 504; 25 W. R.
555), 1122.
Robards v. Wortham (2 Dev. Eq. 173),
1150, 1324.
Robbti. Voss(154U. S. 13;15S. Ct. Rep.
4) , 1067.
Robb's Appeal (41 Pa. St. 45), 333, 532,
1688.
Robblns v. Bates (4 Cush. 104), 393.
Robbins v. Butcher (104 N. Y. 575), 1368.
Robbins v. Butler (24 111. 3S7), 1172.
Robbins v. Emery (1 Sm. & M. 297), 865.
Robbins v. Robbins (89 X. Y. 251), 307,
369, 373.
Roberdeau v. Rous (1 Atk. 543), 35.
Roberts v. Anderson (3 Johns. Ch. 377;
18 Johns. 513), 435, 453.
Roberts' Appeal (92 Pa. St. 407), 61.
Roberts' Appeal (85 Pa. St. 84), 352.
Roberts v. Bedell, (61 Barb. 37), 1534.
Roberts v. Broom (1 Harr. (Del.) 57),
1635.
Roberts v. Butler (24 111. 387), 390.
Roberts v. Cary (84 Hun, 328), 1746.
Roberts v. Corbin (26 Iowa, 315), 1408.
Roberts v. Croft (2 De G. & J. 1), 600.
Roberts v. Dixwell (1 Atk. 607), 109, 672,
965, 1277.
Roberts v. Fleming (53 III. 598), 444.
Roberts v. Fleming (53 111. 196), 1490,
1493.
Roberts, In re (L. R. 43 Ch. D. 52), 1708.
Roberts v. Kingsley (1 Ves. 238), U4.
Roberts v. Lloyd (2 Beav. 376), 88.
Roberts v. Mansfield (38 Ga. 452), 328,
1582,
Roberts v. Mosely (51 Mo. 284), 880, 935.
Roberts v. Mosely (64 Mo. 507) , 327, 878.
882, 1118, 1184.
Roberts v. Press (66 N. W. Rep. 756),
1372.
Roberts v. Roberts (Daniel, 143), 160.
Roberts v. Roberts (3 P. Wms. 66), 540.
v. Roberts (1 J. & W. 251), 974.
Roberts v. Stevens (84 Me. 325), 1295.
Roberts v. Tift (60 Ga. 566), 1742.
Roberts v. Tunstall (4 Hare, 251), 392,
393.
Roberts v. Walker (105 Mo. 604), 358.
Roberts v. Ware (40 Cil. 634), 370.
Roberts v. Watkins (46 L. J. Q. B. 552),
696.
Roberts v. West (15 Ga. 122), 664, 705,
1622.
Roberts v. Wilcoxen (36 Ark. 366) , 704.
Robertson v. Bruner (24 Miss. 242), 707.
Robertson v. Bullions (11 N. Y. 243; 9
Barb. 126), 18, 797, 1547.
Robertson v. Collier (1 Hill Eq. 373),
1438.
Robertsons. Duncan (87 N. Car. 191),
1535.
Robertson v. Dunn (87 N. Car. 191), 1534.
Robertson v. Flight (33 Beav. 268), 896.
Robertson v. Gaines (2 Humph. 381),
884, 885, 1037, 1040, 1090.
Robertson v. Haines (2 Humph. 367),
1089.
Robertson v. Johnson (36 Ala. 197), 115.
Robertson v. Macklln (3 Hayw. 70), 364.
Robertson v. McGroch (11 Paige, 640),
891,893.
TABLE OF CASES.
clxxxvii
[The references are to pages : Vol
Robertson v. Norris (4 Jur. (N. S.) 155),
1511.
Robertson v. Norris (1 Gift. 421), 1491,
1540.
Robertson v. Paul (16 Tex. 472), 1463.
Robertson v. Robinson (65 Ala. 610),
556.
Robertson v. Sayre (6 N. T. Supl. 649),
310.
Robertson v. Skelton (12 Beav. 260), 200.
Robertson v. Sublett (6 Humph. 313),
1569.
Robertson v. Wilburn (1 Lea, 628), 665,
704, 710.
Robeyt;. Smith (131 Ind. 342; 30 N. E.
Rep. 1093), 1444.
Robinett's Appeal (36 Pa. St. 174), 1692.
Robins v. Deshon (19 Ind. 204), 980.
Robins v. Embry (1 Sm. & M. 207), 1364,
1369.
Robins v. Embry (1 Sm. &M. 632), 1411.
Robinson v. Allen (11 Gratt. 785), 1000.
Robinson v. Amateur Assn. (14 S. Car.
148), 1491,1498.
Robinson v. Appleton (124 111. 276; 15 N.
T. 761), 580, 583.
Robinson v. Brems (90 111. 351), 705.
Robinson v. Briggs, (1 Sm. & Gif. 184),
418.
Robinson v. Buck (71 Pa. St. 386), 552.
Robinson v. Oleator (15 Ves. 526), 1530.
Robinson v. Codman (1 Sumn. 128),
964.
Robinson v. Cox (9 Mod. 263), 560.
Robinson v. Crowder (4 McCord, 519),
1415.
Robinson v. Cullom (41 Ala. 693), 395,
1491.
Robinson v. Dart (Dud. Eq. 128), 665.
Robinson r. Denson (3 Head, 395), 517.
Robinson v. Fidelity, etc. Safety Vault
Co. (11 S. W. Rep. 806), 1078.
Robinson v. Grey (9 East, 1), 913, 917,
919, 930.
Robiuson v. Hardcastle (2 T. R. 241),
640.
Robinson v. Harkin (L. R. (1896), 2 Ch.
415; 74 L. T. 777), 1141.
Robinson v. Hook (4 Mason, 151-), 392,
461, 1436, 1535.
Robinson v. Huffman (15 B. Mon. 80),
688.
Robinson, In re (61 L. J. Ch. 17), 732.
Robinson, In re (37 ST. T. 261), 877, 903.
Robinson, In re (3 Johns. Ch. 43), 1687.
Robinson v. Keteltas (4 Edw. Ch. 67),
1003.
Robinson v. Kettlewell (4 Edw. Ch.
67) , 1027, 1028.
Robinson v. Leflore (59 Miss. US), 309.
I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 8481753.]
Robinson v. London Hosp. (10 Hare,
19) , 262.
Robinson v. Lowater (17 Beav. 601; 6
De G., M. & G. 272), 1036, 1654.
Robinson v. Mauldin (11 Ala. 977), 33,
960, 1569.
Robinson i>. Miller (IB, Mon 93), 964.
Robinson v. Nye (21 111. 592), 1227.
Robinson v. O'Neal (56 Ala. 541), 655,
665.
Robinson v. Ostendorff (38 S. Car. 66; 16
S. E. Rep. 371), 1278.
Robinson v. Pebworth (71 Ala. 240), 827.
Robinson v. Pelt (3 P. Wms. 261; 2
Lead. Cas. in Eq. 238), 330, 877, 1683.
Robinson v. Preston (4 K. & J. 505) , 215,
216, 320.
Robinson v. Rapelye (2 Stew. (Ala.)
86), 1318, 1369.
Robinson v. Ridley (6 Madd. 2), 607,
608.
Robinson v. Ring (72 Me. 140), 151.
Robinson v. Robinson (45 Ark. 481), 367.
Robinson v. Robinson (1 De 6., M. &
G. 256), 1205, 1253, 1255, 1257, 1258.
Robinson v. Robinson (17 Ohio M. 480),
280.
Robinson v. Robinson (11 Beav. 371),
1213.
Robinson v. Ryan (25 N. Y. 320), 1503.
Robinson v. Smith (6 Madd. 194), 130.
Robinson v. Smith (3 Paige, 222), 405,
409, 410.
Robinson v. Taylor (2 Bro. Ch. 589), 243.
Robinson v. Tiekell (8 Ves. 449), 184.
Robinson v. Urquhart (12N. J. Eq. 523),
603.
Robinson v. Wheelwright (6 De G., M.
&G. 535), 668.
Robinson's Estate, In re (L. R. 12 Ch'
D. 188), 675.
Robinson's Estate, In re (26 Pitts. Leg.
J. 404), 1289.
Robles v. Clarke (25 Cal. 317), 363.
Robson v. Harwell (6 Ga. 689) , 73.
Roby v. Bismarck Nat. Bank (4 N. D.
116; 59 N. W. Rep. 719), 677.
Roby v. Colehour (135111. 300; 25 N. E.
Rep. 777), 208, 222,502.
Roby v. Ridehalgh (7 De G., M. & G.
104), 1544, 1591.
Rocchi v. Schwabaeher (33 La. Ann.
1364), 489.
Roehti. Callen (6 Hare, 535), 1536.
Roche v. George (93 Ky. 609; 20 S. W.
Rep. 1039), 55,72.
Roche v. Parnsworth (106 Mass. 509),
396.
Roche v. Hart (11 Ves. 58), 1255, 1667,
1678.
clxxxviii
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Roche, In re (1 Conn. & Laws. 306), 864,
868, 904.
Roche v. O'Brien (1 B. & B. 330), 393,
1540, 1598.
Rochester v. Buford (5 J. J. Marsh. 32),
1721.
Rochford v. Fitzmaurice (1 Conn. &
Laws. 158), 113.
Rochford v. Hackman (9 Hare, 475),
1268, 1289,1291.
Rocke v. Hart (11 Ves. 58), 387.
Rockford v. Fitzmaurice (2 Dr & W. 18;
4Ir. Eq. 375), 90,102,107.
Rockwell v. Hobby (2 Sandf. Ch. 9),
601.
Rockwell v. Morgan (2 Beasl. 348), 828.
Rodbard v. Cooke (36 L. T. 604; 25 W.
R. 555), 1230.
Roddy v. Williams (3 Jon. & La. 1), 492,
494.
Roden v. Murphy (10 Ala. 804), 960, 961.
Rodgers v. Ludlow (3 Sandf. Ch. 104),
931.
Rodgers v. Marshall (17 Ves. 294), 146.
Rodman v. Munson (13 Barb. 63), 1082.
Rodman v. Nathan (45 Mich. 607), 1400.
Rodman v. Saunders (44 Ark. 504),
574.
Roe, In re (119 N. Y. 509), 1033, 1064, 1065.
Roe v. Read (8 T. R. 118), 956, 970, 1115.
Eoe ». Tranmarr (3 Smith Lead. Cas,
1780),, 914.
Boean«. Walker (1 Wis. 527), 263, 1442.
Roger's Appeal (11 Pa. St. 36), 828.
Rogers v. Barton (39 Minn. 39), 1518.
Rogers v. Benton (39 Minn. 39), 1503.
Rogers v. Boyd (33 Ala. 175), 704.
Rogers v. Colt (21 N. J. L. 704), 1638.
Rogers v. Dill (6 Hill, 415), 830.
Rogers v. Donellan (11 Utah, 108; 39
Pac. Rep. 494), 318.
Rogers v. Fales (5 Barr, 104), 716.
Rogers v. Hale (4 Watts, 359), 440.
Rogers v. Higgins (48111. 211), 665.
Rogers, In re (1 Dr. & 8m. 338), 1132.
Rogers v. Jones (8 N. H. 264) , 449.
Rogers L. Wks.u. Kelly (19 Hun, 399), 60.
Rogers v. Macaulay (22 Minn. 262), 372,
374.
Rogers v. McLean (31 Barb. 304), 847.
Rogers v. Murray (3 Paige, 390), 369,
370.
Rogers v. St. T. Life Ins. & Trust Co. (1
N. Y. Supl. 271), 1554.
Rogers v. Paco (75 Ga. 436), 1106.
Rogers v. Pell (89 Hun, 159), 1412.
Rogers v. Place (36 Ind. 577), 478.
Rogers a. Rogers (111 N. Y. 228; 18N.
E. Rep. 636; 18 Hun, 409), 30, 31, 992,
1349, 1672 .
Rogers v. Rogers (87 Mo. 257), 218,
358.
Rogers v. Rogers (3 P. Wms. 193), 260,
261.
Rogers v. Rogers (1 Hopk. 615), 382,401,
417.
Rogers v. Rogers (4 Paige, 516), 723.
Rogers v. Rogers (53 Wis. 36; 40 Am.
Rep. 756), 852.
Rogers v. Rogers (3 Wend. 503), 1320,
1321.
Rogers v. Rogers (1 Paige, 188), 1322,
1321, 1325.
Rogers v. Rogers (3 Paige) 379, 1404,
1731.
Rogers v. Ross (4 Johns. Ch. 388; 8 Am.
Dec. 576), 1576.
Rogers v. Skillicorne (Amb. 189), 1652,
1654.
Rogers v. Smith (4 Barr, 93), 665.
Rogers v. Southern (2 Keen, 698), 353,
837,840.
Rogers v. Thomas (2 Keen, 8), 254.
Rogers v. Tyler (144 111. 652; 32 N. E.
Rep. 393), 1081.
Rogers v. Vaughan (31 Ark. 72), 1599.
Rogers v. Ward (8 Allen, 387; 85 Am.
Dec. 710), 698, 704, 707.
Rogers v. Watson (81 Tex. 400) , 1450.
Rogers v. White (1 Sneed, 69), 937, 1266.
Roggenkamp v. Roggenkamp (68 Fed.
Rep. 605), 311.
Roller. Gregory (11 Jnr. (N". S.) 97; 4
De G., J. & S. 576), 204, 378, 534, 1540.
Rolffes. Budder (Bunb. 187), 686.
Rollers Spelman (13 Wis. 26), 263.
Roller v. Spillmore (13 Wis. 29), 521, 523,
1183.
Rollins v. Shaver Wagon, etc. Co. (80
Iowa, 380; 45 N. W, Rep. 1037), 10.
Rolt v. White (3 De G., J. & S. 360),
491.
Romney, Exparte (L. R. 14 Eq. 230), 768.
Rona v. Meir (47 Iowa, 607), 108.
Roofer v. Harrison (2 Kay & J. 86),
1116.
Rook v. Worth (1 Ves. 461) , 828.
Rooke v. Worrell (11 Sim. 216), 1357.
Rooney v. Michael (84 Ala. 585), 660, 704.
Roosevelt v. Ellithorp (10 Paige, 415),
1678, 1679.
Roosevelt v. Land & River Imp. Co. (3
Hun App, Div. 563), 1205.
Roosevelt v. Mark (6 Johns. Ch. 266),
1320.
Root v. Blake (14 Pick. 271), 307.
Root v. Wheeler (12 Abb. Pr. 294), 1475.
RoperCurzon v. Roper-Curzon (L. R.
11 Eq. 452), 1602.
Roper v. McCook (7 Ala. 318), 674.
TABLE OF CASES.
clxxxix
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-
Vol. II, pp. 848-1758.]
Roper v. Eadclifle (9 Mod. 187), 242.
Eose v. Bates (12 Mo. 80), SCO, 520.
Rose v. Gibson (71 Ala. 35) , 237, 309.
Eose v. Hay den (85 Kan. 106), 414.
Eose v. Mynott (7 Serg. 30) , 427.
Eose v. Porter (141 Mass. 309), 118, 137.
Eose v. Eose (4 Abb. App. 108), 750, 752.
Eose v. Watson (10 H. L. Cas. 672), 585.
Eoseboom v. Mosher (2 Denio, 661), 884,
885, 892.
Eoseboro v. Eoseboro (50 Tenn. 314) ,
829, 832.
Eoseman v. Qanovan (43 Cal. 110), 492,
495.
Eosenberger's Appeal (26 Pa. St. 67),
1597.
Eosenberg v. Eosenberg (40 Hun, 91),
1744, 1745.
Rosenheim v. Hartsock (90 Mo. 357),
708.
Bosenthal v. Scott (41 Mich. 632), 1385.
Eoshi's Appeal (69 Pa. St. 462), 789, 790,
794.
Boss v. Adams (13 Bush, 370), 575.
Boss v. Crocket (14 La. Ann. 823) , 905.
Boss v. Drake (37 Pa. St. 373), 304.
Boss v. Eliz. & Som. E. B. Co. (1 Green.
Ch. 422), 473.
Eoss v. Ewer (3 Atk. 156) , 11.
Boss v. Hegeman (2 Edw. Ch. 373), 197.
Eoss v. Hendrin (110 N. Car. 403; 15
S. E. Eep. 4), 344.
Ross v. Horton (2 Cush. 591), 444.
Eoss v. Parks (93 Ala, 153; 8 So. Eep.
368), 433.
Boss i>. Eoss (12 Beav. 89) , 1573.
Eoss v. Singleton (1 Del. Ch. 149; 12
Am. Dec. 86), 705.
Eoss v. Southwestern E. B. Co. (53 Ga.
644), 847.
Ross v. Whitson (6 Serg. 50), 569, 577.
Bossett v. Pish (11 Gratt. 492), 1470.
Bothermaler v. Myer (4 Desaus. 255),
893.
Bothwellji, Dawes (2 Black, 613), 193,
225,525.
Rothwell v. Eothwell (2 S. & S. 217),
1571, 1572.
Bottman v. Barthing (22 Neb. 375), 789,
793, 797.
Eott v. White (3 De G , J. & S. 360), 494.
Bonsillon v. Rousillon (L. It. 14 Ch. D.
351), 710.
Boutledge v. Dorril (2 Ves. Jr. 357), 640.
Bowan v. Chute (13 Ir. Ch. 168), 201.
Bowan v Kirkpatrick (14 111. 12), 1340.
Bowan v. Lamb (4 Greene (Iowa), 168),
1628.
Bowbotnam v. Dunnett (L. R. 8 Ch. D
430), 617.
Rowe v. Dawson (1 Ves. 331), 34.
Eowe v. Bentley (29 Gratt. 756), 1257.
Eowe v. Jaeksou (2 Dick. 604), 684.
Roweu. White (16 N. J. Eq. 411), 1438.
Rowlands. Witherden (3 M. & G. 568),
1057, 1115, 1244.
Rowley v. Adams (2 H. L. Cas. 725),
115), 1337.
Rowley v. Towsley (53 Mich. 329), 1257.
Rowleys. Unwin (2 Kay & J. 138), 657,
1593.
Rowon v. Lamb (4 Green, 468), 396.
Rowth B.Howell (3 Ves. 565), 1145.
Rowton v. Rowton (lHen.& M. 92),
964.
Roy«. Gibbon (4 Hare, 65), 1571.
Boys. Garnett (2 Wash. 9), 912,914.
Roy v. McPherson (11 Neb. 197), 354,
532.
Royall v. McKenzie (25 Ala. 363), 993,
1048, 1122, 1230, 1236, 1343.
Royal Wheel Co. v. Fielding (31 Hun,
274), 1392.
Royce v. Adams (123 N. T. 402; 25 N. E.
Rep. 386), 873, 895.
Royster v. Johnson (73 N. Car. 474),
1686.
Rozell v. Vansyckle (11 Wash. St. 79;
39Pac. Rep. 270), 429.
Ruby j). Barnett (12 Mo. 5), 1264.
Rubey v. Watson (22 Mo. App. 428),
1408.
Rudd v. Hagan (86 Ky. 159), 1296, 1298.
Ruffln, Ex parte (6 Ves. 119), 599.
Ruffln v. Harrison (81 N. Car. 208), 856.
Ruffles v. Alston (L. R. 19 Eq. 539), 675.
Rumery v. McCullough (54 Wis. 565),
1419.
Rundle v. Rundle (2 Vern. 252), 362.
Runn v. Vaughan (3 Keyes, 345), 962.
Rundlett v. Dole (1.0 N. H. 438), 1364.
Runnels v. Jackson (1 How. (Miss.)
358) , 309.
Runyon v. Coster (14 Pet. 122), 20.
Ruppler v. Alston (L. R. 19 Eq. 539),
726.
Rupp's Appeal (100 Pa. 84. 53), 414.
Rush County Com. v. Dinwiddie (139
Ind. 128; 37 N. E. Rep. 795), 737, 747.
Rushu. Dilbs (43 Hun, 282), 688.
Rush v. Good (14 S. & R. 226), 1400.
Rush v. Lewis (21 Pa. St. 72), 910.
Rush v. Vought (55 Pa. St. 437), 715.
Bush's Estate (12 Pa. St. 375), 1201.
Rush's Estate (1 Pars. 24), 1210.
Rushworth's Case (Freem. 33), 399.
Rusk v. Lewis (32 Miss. 297), 810.
Rusku. Newell (25 111. 211), 1625.
Russ v. Mebius (10 Cal. 355), 2^0, 335.
Russell v. Allen (10 Paige, 243), 360, 373.
cxc
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Eussell v. Allen (107 U. S. 172; 5 Dill.
235), 734, 744, 745, 747, 748, 755, 777, 819,
1524.
Eusaell v. Clark (7 Cranch, 69), 388, 389,
434, 593, 1559.
Eussell v. Dodson (6 Baxt. 16), 577.
Eussell v. Grinnell (105 Mass. 425), 1084,
1269, 1294,
Eussell v. Haddock (3 Gilm. 233), 439.
Eussell v. Jackson (10 Hare, 204), 255,
805, 851.
Eussell v. Kellet (3 Sm. & G. 264), 735.
Eussell v. Kirkbride (62 Tex. 455), 577.
Eussell v. Lane (1 Barb. 519), 1049.
Eussell v. Lasher (4 Barb. 233), 1331,
1404.
Eussell v. Lode (1 Iowa, 566) , 309.
Eussell v. Marchbanks (49 Ark. 117),
313.
Eussell v. People's Savings Bank (39
Mich. 671; 33 Am. Eep. 444), 707.
Eussell v. Peyton (4 111. App. 473), 1138.
Eussell v. Plaice (18 Beav. 21; 11 Jur.
124; 19 Jur. 445), 457.
Eussell o. Biehards (11 Me. 371), 109S,
1488.
Eussell v. Eussell (1 Bro. Oh. 269), 600.
Eussell ii, Eussell (36 N. T. 581; 93 Am.
Dee. 540), 1073, 1105.
Eussell v. Smythies (1 Cox, 215), 299.
Eussell v. St. Aubyn (L. E. 2 Ch. D.398),
1529.
Eussell v. Switzer (63 Ga. 711), 52.
Eussell v. Todd (7 Blaekf . 239) , 588.
Eussell v. Whiteley (59 Mo. 196), 1503.
Eussell's Appeal (75 Pa. St. 269) , 163.
Russell's Case (5 Eep. 27), 27.
Eussell's Patent (2 De G. & J. 130) , 33.
Eussieu. Brazzell (128 Mo. 93; 30 S. W.
Eep. 526), 798.
Bussum v. Wauser (53 Md. 92), 1451.
Euston v. Euston (2 Yeates, 54), 1160,
1322, 1324.
Eutgers v. Kingsland (3 Halst. Ch. 178),
445.
Euth v. Oberbrunner (40 Wis. 238), 761,
916.
Eutherford v. Williams (42 Mo. 18),
1490,1491, 1493.
Eutland v. Brister (53 Miss. 683), 576.
Rutland v. Eutland (2 P. Wms. 213),
260.
Rutledger. Smith (1 McCord Ch. 119),
47, 62, 59.
Eutledge v. Smith (1 Busb. Eq. 283),
942.
Eyalln. Bolls (1 Ves. 348; 1 Atk. 165), 34,
972, 973, 1117.
Eyall v. Eyall (1 Atk. 59), 270, 326, 1632.
Eyan v. Bibb (46 Ala. 323), 949, 956, 1054.
Eyan v. Doyle (31 Iowa, 53), 327,432,638,
595.
Ryan v. Dox (34 N. T. 312), 198, 218, 231,
321, 500, 518, 525, 626.
Eyan v. Gilliam (76 Mo. 132), 1467.
Eyan v. Newcomb (125 111. 91), 1516,
1518.
Ryan v. Porter (61 Tex. 106), 749.
Eycroft v. Christy (3 Beav. 238), 88, 157,
160,655.
Eyden v. Jones (1 Hawks, 477), 401.
Ryder v. Beckerton (3 Swanst. 80), 1205,
1253, 1591.
Eyder v. Hulett (44 Minn. 353), 1487.
Byderu. Hulse (33 Barb. 264; 24 N. T.
372), 687.
Eyder, In re (11 Paige, 185), 835, 837.
Ryder v. Sisson (7 R. I. 341) , 992.
S.
Saagaru. Wilson (4 S. & W. 102), 399,
1342.
Saake v. Donner (3 Pa. DIst. Eep. 170),
661.
Sabel v. Slingluff (62 Md. 132), 675.
Saberton v. Skeels (1 Russ. & Myl. 687),
638.
Sabin v. Heape (27 Beav. 553), 1036.
Sacia v. Berthoud (17 Barb. 15), 456, 1657,
1663.
Sacketts. Wray (4 Bro. Ch. 483), 666.
Sackville-West v. Holmesdale (L. E. 4
H. L. 343), 90, 91, 92, 93, 107.
Saddington v. Kinsman (1 Bro. Ch. 51),
976.
Sadler v. Hobbs (2 Bro. Ch. 114), 1123,
1127, 1234.
Sadler's Appeal (87 Pa. St. 154), 433.
Sadlierti. Fallon (4 R. I. 290), 1376.
Safford v. Hinds (39 Barb. 625), 374, 413,
414.
Safford v. Eantoul (12 Pick. 233), 47.
Sagitary v. Hyde (2 Vern. 44), 98.
St. George v. Wake (1 Myl. & K. 610),
549, 653.
St. George Church Soc. v. Branch (120
Mo. 226; 25 S. W. Eep. 218), 310.
St. James' Church v. Church of Re-
deemer (45 Barb. 356), 1172, 1228.
St. John's Church, In re (3 Ir. Eq.. 335),
771.
St. John's College v. State (15 Md. 330),
781.
St. John's College v. Toddlngtou (1
Burr. 200) , 782.
St. John v. St- John (11 Ves. 256), 720.
St. Leger's Appeal (34 Conn. 434), 514.
St. Louis v. Priest (88 Mo. 612), 996,
1033.
TABLE OF CASES.
CXC1
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
St. Louis &S. F. Ky. Oo. v. Johnston
(133 U. S. 566), 494.
St. Louis Union Soc. v. Mitchell (26 Mo.
App. 206), 1625, 1628.
St. Luke's Hospital v. Barclay (3
BlatcM. 269), 1574.
St. Paul v. Dudley (15 Ves. 173), 978, 1432.
St. Paul's Church v. Atty.-Gen. (164
Mass. 188; 41 N. E. Rep. 231), 748, 819.
St. Paul Trust Co. v. Kittson (6i Minn.
40S; 65 N. W. Eep. 74), 1553, 1554.
Sale v. Crutchfleld (8 Bush, 636), 608.
Sale v. McLean (29 Ark. 612), 309.
Saleii. Moore (1 Sim. 534), 123, 128, 253.
Salem, etc. Flour Mills v. Stayton
"Water, etc. Co. (33 Fed. Eep. 146),
1613.
Salem India Rubber Co. v. Adams (23
Pick. 256), 477.
Saline v. Gilraan (1 N. H. 193), 847.
Salisbury v. Bigelow (20 Pick. 174), 159,
1012, 1034.
Salisbury v. Clark (61 Vt. 453) , 66, 503 .
Salisbury v. Colt (27 N. J. Eq. 492), 1201.
Salle v. Graft (7 Rich. Eq. 34), 390.
Salleev. Chandler (26 Mo. 124), 1171.
Salmon v. Bennett (1 Conn. 525), 98.
Salmons. Cutts (4 De G. & Sm. 129),
393, 395, 418.
Salmon v. Downs (55 Tex. 464), 578.
Salmon v. Hoffman (2 Cal. 138; 56 Am.
Dec. 322), 574.
Salmon, In re (L. E. 42 Ch. D. 351), 1250.
Salmon v. McEoany (23 Hun, 89), 699.
Salsbury v. Black (119 Pa. St. 207 ; 4 Am.
St. Eep. 631), 500, 503, 520.
Salt v. Chattaway (3 Beav. 576), 259.
Salter v. Bird (108 Pa. St. 436), 503.
Saltern. Cavanagh (1 Dr. & Wal. 668),
242.
Salter, Ex parte (2 Dick. 769; 3 Bro. Ch.
500), 832, 841,1563.
Saltern v. Melhuish (Amb. 247), 558.
Saltmarsh v. Barrett (29 Beav. 474; 3
DeG., F. &J. 279), 246.
Saltmarsh v. Barrett (31 Beav. 349) , 1193,
1255.
Saltmarsh v. Beene (4 Port. 283; 30 Am.
Dec. 525), 382, 390, 405, 427, 1101, 1170,
1184.
Saltonstall v. Sanders (11 Allen, 446),
748, 755.
Salusbury v. Denton (3 Kay & J. 529),
167, 614, 620, 621, 632, 637.
Salusbury v. Powers (36 Hun, 14), 618.
Salwayv. Salway (2 E. & M. 218), 1056,
1115, 1138.
Sammes v. Eickman (2 Ves. Jr. 36), 1667,
1678.
Sample v. Coulson (9 W. & S. 62), 359.
Sampson v. Alexander (66 Me. 182), 706.
Sampson v. Mitchell (125 Mo. 217; 28 8.
W. Eep. 26S), 1158.
Samuel v. Holladay (1 Woolm. C. C.
400) , 1445.
Samuel v. Salter (3 Mete. 259) , 1298.
Sanchez v. Dow (23 Fla. 445), 1534.
Sanders v. Forgasson (59 Tenn. 249), 286.
Sanders v. Morrison (7 T. B. Mon. 54),
1089.
Sanders 17. Eicbards (2 Coll. 568), 1446.
Sanders v. Sogers (1 S. Car. 452), 1215.
Sanders v. State (49 Ind. 228), 1201.
Sanderson v. Broadwell (82 Cal. 132), 66.
Sandersons. Jones (6 Fla. 430; 63 Am.
Dec. 217), 705.
Sanderson v. Walker (13 Ves. 603), 392.
Sanderson v. White (18 Pick. 328 ; 29 Am.
Dec. 591), 748, 755,788,819.
Sanderson Trust, In re (3 Kay & J. 90),
1301, 1638.
Sandford v. Sandford (139 U. S. 642; 11
Sup. Ct. Eep. 666), 519.
Sandfoss v. Jones (35 Cal. 481), 600, 518,
521.
San Diego v. S. D. & C. E. R. Co. (44
Cal. 106), 411.
Sands v. Megee ( 8 Sim. 130), 1013.
Sanford v. Hardy (23 Wend. 260), 474,
481, 484.
Sanford v. Howard (29 Ala. 684), 1242.
Sanford v. Kane (24 111 . App. 504 ; 127 111.
591), 1444.
Sanford v. Lackland (2 Dill. 6), 1640.
Sanford v. Weeden (2 Heisk. 70), 359.
Sangston v. Gaither (3 Md. 40) , 1360.
Sangston v. Hack (52 Md. 173), 859, 879.
Sannoner v. King (49 Ark. 299), 14.
Sappington v. Bolen (12 Mo. 567) , 1350.
Saratoga Co. Bank v. Pruyn (90 N. Y.
250), 709.
Sargent v. Baldwin (60 Vt. 17), 158, 160
174, 1744.
Sargent v. Bourne (6 Met. 32) , 999.
Sargent v. Burdett (96 Ga. 111;22S.E.
Eep. 667), 243.
Sargent v. French (54 Vt. 384) , 711.
Sargent v. Howe (21 111. 148), 1440, 1443.
Sargent v. Kansas M. R. Co. (48 Kan.
672), 411.
Sargent v. Sargent (103 Mass. 297), 111.
Sargent v. Webster (13 Mete. 497), 1411.
Satterwhite v. Littlefleld (13 Sm. &M..
307), 1690.
Saunders v. Bournford (Finch, 424),
978.
Saunders v. Dehew(2Vern.27; 2Freem.
Ch. 123), 327, 432, 433.
Saunders v. Harris (1 Head, 185), 88,
550.
m
cxcu
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Saunders v. Richard (35 Fla. 28; 16 So.
Rep. 679), 880, 1181.
Saunders v. Rodway (22 L. J. Ch. (N.
S.)230), 720.
Saunders v. Schmaelzle (49 Cal. 59), 979,
995, 1106, 1107.
Saunders v. "Webber (39 Cal. 290), 996,
1005.
Saunderson «. Stearns (6 Mass. 37), 854,
885.
Savage v. Burnham (17 ST. T. 561),' 616,
944, 1522.
Savage v. Carroll (1 B. &B. 265), 326.
Savage v. Foster (9 Mod. 37), 27.
Savage v. Gould (60 How. Pr. 234), 904.
Savage v. O'Neill (44 N. Y. 298), 714.
Savage v. Sherman (87 N. Y. 277), 1687.
Savage v. Williams (15 La. Ann. 250),
430.
Savery v. King (35 Eng. L. &Eq. 100; 5
H. L. Cas. 627), 393, 419.
Savings Bankw. Scott (10 Neb. 83), 708.
Savings Institution v. Mankin (23 Me.
360), 1568.
Sawyer v. Cheney (59 Ga. 368), 1668,
1678.
Sawyer v. Hoag (17 Wall. 610), 406.
Sawyer v. McAdie (70Mich. 386), 1383.
Sawyer's Appeal (16 N. H. 414), 334, 855,
884.
Saxon v. Barksdale (4 Desaus. 526), 456,
1657.
Say v. Barnes (4 S. & R. 112 ; 8 Am. Dee.
679), 286.
Say & Sele v. Jones (1 Eq. Cas. Ab.
308), 1326.
Sayles v. Smith (12 Wend. 57; 27 Am.
Dec. 117), 1098, 1489.
Saylors v. Saylors (3 Heisk. 531), 1760.
Sayre v. Frederick (ICE. Green, 205),
359.
Sayre v. Hughes (L. R. 5 Eg. 376) , 350.
Sayre v. Townsend (15 Wend. 647), 314.
Scales v. Maude (6 De G., M. &, G. 43),
152.
Scanlan v. Scanlan (134 111. 630), 1400.
Scarborough u. Bonnan (4Myl. & Cr.
377) , 668.
Scarf v. Aldrich (97 Cal. 360; 32 Pac.
Rep. 324), 831.
Scawen v. Blunt (7 Ves. 294), 97.
Scawin v. Scawiu (I Y. & 0. 65), 354,
367.
Scbaeffer v. Sleade (7Blackf. 183), 487,
489.
Schaffer v. Lavretta (57 Ala. 14), 956,
1267.
Schaffer v. Wadsworth (106 Mass. 19),
1748.
Schafroth v. Ambs (46 Mo. 114), 708.
Scheddaw. Sawyer (4 McLean, 181), 192,
414.
Scheere v. Scheerer (109 111. 11), 308.
Scheferllng v. Huffman (4 Ohio St. 241),
97.
Schell, In re (53 N. Y. 263), 1696.
Schellu. Merklee (75 Hun, 74; 26 N. Y.
Supl. 1021), 783.
Schell's Estate (3 Pa. DIst. Rep. 738; 15
Pa. Co. Ct. 372), 1306.
Schenck v. Dart (22 N. Y. 420), 1687.
Schenck u. Schenck (16 N. J. Eq. 174),
857, 859, 862, 895, 980, 1236.
Scherinerhorn v. Barbydt (9 Paige, 29),
1145,1148,1322,1324,1325.
Schettleru. Smith (41 N. Y. 328), 616.
Schiffelin v. Steward (1 Johns. Ch. 620),
330, 387, 394, 1171, 1205, 1253.
Schifferrc. Adams (13 Colo. 682), 574.
Schiffer v. Dietz (83 N. Y. 300), 489,492,
494.
Schlaefferi>. Corson (52 Barb. 510), 189,
204, 223, 333, 388, 532.
Schlessinger v. Mallard (70 Cal. 326),
907.
Schley v. Brown (70 Ga. 64), 1109.
Schley v. Lyon (6 Ga. 530), 92, 912, 917,
943, 956.
Schlichter v. Keiter (156 Pa. St. 119; 27
Atl. Rep. 45), 791, 794.
Schluter v. Bowery Sav. Bank (117 N.Y.
126), 11.
Schmidt v. Gatewood (2 Rich. Eq. 162),
500, 520.
Schmidt v. Spencer (87 Mich. 121; 49 N".
W. Rep. 479), 707.
Schnabelf. Betts (23 Fla. 178), 705.
Schneider's Estate, Inre (71 Hun, 62; 24
N.Y. Supl. 540), 863.
Schnorr v. Schroeder (46 Hun, 148),
1354.
Schnorr's Appeal (67 Pa. St. 138), 789,
792.
Sehoch v. Birdsall (48 Minn. 441; 51 N.
W. Rep. 382), 1478.
Schoff v. Bloomfield (8 Vt. 472), 1048.
Scholefield v. Templar (Johns. 155),
484.
School v. MeCully (11 Rich. 424), 1075.
School Directors v. Dunkelberger (6
Pa. St. 29), 952.
School Diet. v. First Nat'l Bank (102
Mass. 174), 949, 1188, 1189, 1582, 1583.
School Trustees v. Kirwin (25 111. 73),
681, 1607,1625,1631,1632.
Schoolfleld v. Johnson (11 Fed. Rep.
297), 1364.
Schooner Tilton, The (5 Mass. 492),
383.
Schoonover, In re (5 Paige, 559), 893.
TABLE OP CASES.
cxcm
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 8*8-1753.]
Schouler, Inre (134 Mass. 426), 731, 748,
755, 907, 1004.
Schroeder v. Jones (27 Cal. 280), 234.
Schulters v. Johnson (38 Barb. 80), 1356.
Schulting v. Schulting (41 N.J. Eq. 130),
992.
Schultz v. McLean (25 Pac. Bep. 427; 93
Cal. 329), 624.
Schultz v. Mayor (103 N. T. 307), 374.
Schultz v. PulTer (11 Wend. 363), 1116,
1145.
Schumann v. Peddecord (50 Md. 560) ,
1362.
Schuster v. Schuster (93 Mo. 438), 334.
Schuttu. Large (6 Barb. 373), 445.
Schwartz's Estate (14 Pa. St. 42), 877,
1067.
Schwartz's Estate (2 Rawle, 222), 603.
Schwarz v. Wendell (Walk. (Mich.)
267), 1178, 1184, 1686, 1698.
Schweiker v. Husser (146 111. 399 ; 34 N.
E. Eep. 1022), 797.
Schweikert's Estate (40 Leg. Int. 394),
1280.
Scoby v. Blanchard (3 X. H. 170), 355.
Scott v. Beecher (4 Price, 350), 1571,
1576.
Scott i'. Ourle (9B. Mon. 17), 806.
Scott v. Davis (4 Myl. & Cr. 87), 394.
Scott v. DePeyster(l Edw. Ch. 613),
405, 410.
Scott v. Dorsey (1 Harr. & J. 227), 1689.
Scott v. Edes (3 Minn. 387), 1383.
Scott v. Fox (14 Md. 38S), 660.
Scott v. Freeland (7 Sm. & M. 403; 45
Am. Dec. 310), 286, 390, 393, 40.', list.
Scott v. Gamble (9N. J. Eq. 218),. 401,
1183.
Scott v. Haddock (11 Ga. 258), 1634, 1596.
Scott v. Hastings (4 Kay & J. 633), 1117.
Scott, In re (5 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 378),
1346.
Scott v. Mann (33 Tex. 721), 396.
Scott v. Moore (1 Wins. Eq. 98), 105.
Scott v. Xesbitt (14 Ves. 438), 35, 606.
Scott v, Nevins (6 Duer, 672), 1297.
Scott v . Orbison (21 Ark. 202), 570, 574.
Scott v. Otis (25 Hun, 33), 709.
Seott v. Band (118 Mass. 215), 529, 530.
Scott v. Rowland (82 Va. 484), 647, 652.
Scott v. Schufeldt (5 Paige, 43), 489.
Scott v. Scott (1 Cox, 381), 539, 542.
Scott v. Searles (7 Sm. & M. 498; 45 Am.
Dec. 317), 1742.
Scott v. Sierra Lumber Co. (67 Cal. 71),
1092.
Scott v. Spashett (3Macn. & G. 599),
678.
Scott v. Surnam (Wllles, 402), 29, 971.
Scott v. Taylor (61 Ga. 506) , 232.
Scott v. Thompson (21 Iowa, 599), 431.
Scott v. Thorpe (1 Edw. Ch. 612), 28.
Scott v.Tyler (2 Bro. Ch. 487; 2 Dick.
718), 390, 455, 456, 1041, 1043, 1655.
Scott v. Umbarger (41 Cal. 410), 403, 434,
435.
Scott v. Ward (35 Ark. 480), 704.
Scriven v. Tapley (2 Eden, 337), 683.
Scroope v. Scroope (1 Ch. Ca. 27), 27.
Scrope v. Offley (1 Bro. P. C. 198) , 282.
Scruggs v. Driver (31 Ala. 274), 1123.
Scrutchrleld v. Santer (119 Mo. 615; 24
S. W. Bep. 137), 307,344.
Scudder v. Crocker (1 Cush. 323) , 1689.
Scudder v. Van Amburgh (4 Edw. 29),
452.
Sculthorp v. Burgess (1 Ves. Jr. 91),
268.
Seaburn v. Seaburn (15 Gratt. 423), 753.
Seaford v. Smith (6 Bush, 129), 569.
Seagram v. Knight (L. B. 2 Ch. App.
630), 988, 990.
Seagram v. Knight (L. R. 3 Eq. 398), 392.
Seagrave v. Kirwan (Beatty, 157), 509,
513.
Seagrave v. Seagrave (13 Ves. 439), 724.
Seal v. Duffy (4 Pa. St. 274) , 1394.
Sealer. Pheifler (77 Ala. 278), 1514.
Seale v. Seale (1 P. Wms. 290), 114.
Seaman v. Ascherman (51 Wis. 678; 8
N. W. Eep. 818), 201.
Seaman v. Cook (14 111. 501), 212, 308, 532.
Searw. Ashwell (3 Swanst. 411), 146.
Search v. Ellicott (18 Atl. Eep. 863),
1549.
Searle v. Law (15 Sim. 99), 155.
Sears j). Chapman (158 Mass. 400), 775.
Sears v. Choate (146 Mass. 385; 15 N. E.
Eep. 786), 156, 157, 1620, 1637, 1753.
Sears v. Cunningham (122 Mass. 538),
253.
Sears v. Dillingham (12 Mass. 358), 884.
Sears v. Hardy (120 Mass. 524), 253.
Sears v. Livermore (17 Iowa, 297; 85
Am. Dec. 564), 1093.
Sears v. Eussell (8 Gray, 86), 922, 936,
941, 1267.
Sears v. Shafer (6 N. T. 268), 292.
Sears v. Smith (2 Mich. 243), 576.
Seaver v. Lewis (14 Mass. 83), 1145, 1148,
1322, 1325.
Seavinga. Brinkerhoff (5 Johns. Ch.
329) , 1360.
Seay v. Hesse (123 Mo. 450 ; 24 S . W. Eep.
1017), 660.
Sebastian v. Johnson (72 111. 283; 22 Am.
Eep. 144), 1056, 1244.
Seborn v. Beckwith (30 W. Va. 774),
992.
Sebringu. Sebring (43 X. J. Eq. 61), 1542.
CXC1V
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Second Cong. 8oc. v. First Cong. Soc.
(14 N. H. 315), 749.
Second Cong. Soc. v. Waring (24 Pick.
309), 950.
Second Nat'l Bank v. Miller (63 N. T.
639), 709.
SecurityCo.ii. Cone (64 Conn. 579; 31
Atl. Rep. 7), 1019, 1287.
Security L. I. & A. Co., In re (31 Hun,
36;95N. T. 654), 1687.
Sedan. Huble (75 Iowa, 429; 9 Am. St.
Eep. 495), 731, 760.
Sedam v. Williams (4 McLean, 54), 88.
Sedgwick v. Cleveland (7 Paige, 287),
129.
Sedgwick v. Stanton (14 N. Y. 289), 654,
555.
Sedgwick v. Taylor (84 Va. 820; 6 S. E.
Eep. 226), 1592, 1593.
Seedbouset;. Broward (34 Fla. 509; 16
So. Eep. 425), 706.
Seeger v. Seeger (21 N. J. Eg.. 90), 1037.
Seeleyj). Hills (49 Wis. 473), 996, 1005,
1248.
Seers v. Hind (1 Ves. Jr. 294), 287.
Segarjj. Edwards (11 Leigh, 213), 413.
Segond v. Garland (23 Mo. 647), 665.
Seibert's Appeal (19 Pa. St. 49), 837, 840.
Seibert's Appeal (83 Pa. St. 462), 1267.
Seibold v. Christman (75 Mo. 308), 367.
Seichrist's Appeal (66 Pa. St. 237), 416,
625.
Seidler's Estate (6 Phila. 85), 1210.
Seller u.Mohn (37 W. Va. 607; 16 S. E.
Eep. 4%), 188, 269.
Seip v. Grinnan (36 S. W. Eep. 349),
1493, 1499.
Seipe's Estate, In re (11 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep.
27), 1619.
Selby v. Alston (3 Ves. 339), 30, 977.
Selby v. Cooling (23 Beav. 418), 1074,
1444.
Selby v. Stanley (4 Minn. 65), 576.
Seldena. Vermilyea (3 N.Y.625; IBarb.
58), 614,864, 1746,1747.
Seldner v. McCreary (76 Md. 287; 23 Atl.
Eep. 641), 1649,1662.
Seley v. Wood (10 Ves. 71), 260, 261.
Self v. Chesley (49 Mo. 540), 1470.
Sellw. West (125 Mo. 621; 28 S. W. Eep.
969), 178.
Selleck, In re (111 N. Y. 284), 1687.
Sellew's Appeal (36 Conn. 196), 996.
Sells v. Eosedale, etc. Co. (17 So. Eep.
236) , 10.
Selsey v. Rhodes (1 Bligh (ST. S.), 1),465.
Semphlllj;. Hayley (Pr. Ch. 662), 1041.
Senter v. Lambette (69 Tex. 259), 671, 578.
Sen till v. Robeson (2 Jones Eq. 510),
965.
Sepallne«. Twithy (Sel. Cas. Ch. 76),
559.
Sergeant u. Kuhn (2 Pa. St. 393), 1066.
Sergesonn. Sealey (2 Atk. 413), 830.
Sergison, Ex parte (4 Ves. 147), 26, 970.
Settembre v. Putnam (30 Cal. 490), 309,
532.
Sewall v. Roberts (115 Mass. 262), 1744.
Sewall v. Roberts (154 Mass. 596), 168.
Seward v. Jackson (8 Cow. 406) , 99.
Sewell v. Baxter (2 Md. Ch. 448), 363.
Sewell a. Crewe-Eead (L. E. 3 Eg. 60),
813.
Sewell v. Denny (10 Beav. 315), 238.
Sexton v. Hollis (26 S. Car. 231), 308.
Sexton v. Wheaton (8 Wheat. 229), 99,
103.
Seymour v. Freer (8 Wall. 202), 185, 186,
299, 300, 1535, 1537, 1625.
Seymour v. McKinstry (106 N. Y. 230),
677.
Seymour's Estate In re (62 Hun, 531; 17
K. Y. Supl. 91), 901.
Seys v. Price (9 Mod. 220), 828.
Shackelford v. Bank (22 Ala. 238), 1364.
Shaeklettu. Polk (51 Miss. 378), 707.
Shacklett v. Ransom (54 Ga. 350), 1097.
Shaefler v. Sleade (7 Blackf . 178) , 491.
Shaaffer's Appeal (101 Pa. St. 45), 1385.
Shaffnerr. Shaffner (145 Pa. St. 163; 22
Atl. Rep. 822), 502.
Shaftesbury v. Marlborough (2 Myl. &
K. Ill) , 1073.
Shafto v. Adams (4 Gin". 492), 33.
Shafto's Trusts, In re (L. R. 29 Ch. D.
247), 871.
Shales v. Shales (2 Freem. 252), 366.
Shall v. Biscoe (18 Ark. 142), 674.
Shalleross v. Oldham (2 Johns. & H.609),
426.
Shalleross v. Wright (12 Beav. 505), 261,
262.
Shank, Ex parte (1 Atk. 234), 566.
Shankland's Appeal (47 Pa. St. 113), 228,
914, 919, 1269, 1288, 1290, 1295, 1644.
Shannon v. Bradstreet (1 Sch. & Let.
62), 622, 623.
Shannon v. Canny (44 N. H. 592), 708.
Shannon v. Frost (3 B. Mon. 253), 793,
795, 797.
Shapland v. Smith (1 Bro. Ch. 76), 919,
923.
Shapleigh v. Pillsbury (1 Me. 271), 748.
Sharp v. Goodwin (SI Cal. 319), 388, 1118,
1138.
Sharp v. Leads (31 Beav. 491), 274, 293.
Sharp v. Pratt (15 Wend. 610), 1013, 1016,
1040, 1089.
Sharp v. St. Sauveur (L. E. 7 Ch. App.
343), 304.
TABLE OF CASES.
CXCV
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Sharp v. Sharp (2 B. & Ala. 404), 865, 867,
872, 873, 907, 980.
Sharpe v. MePike (62 Mo. 307), 708.
Sharpen. Eockwood (78 Va. 24), 1215.
Sharpe •». San Paulo E. Co. (L E. 8 Ch .
597), 1228.
Sharpsteen v. Tillon (3 Cow. 651), 1085.
1092.
Shartel's Appeal (64 Pa. St. 25), 1594,
1598.
Shattuck v. Cassidy (3 Edw. Ch. 152),
35, 36.
Shattuck i'. Shattuek (L. E. 2 Eq. 182),
656,695,698, 1592.
Shaw v. Borrer (1 Keen, 559), 1350.
Shaw». Boyd (5 S. &E. 312), 12.
Shaw v. Bunney (L. J. 34 Ch. 257; 11 Jur.
99; 2 De G., J. & S. 468), 396.
Shaw v. Burney (1 Ired. Eq. 148), 151.
Shaw v. Canfleld (86 Mich. 1; 48 N. W.
Eep. 873), 989,1122.
Shaw v. Del., etc. E. Co. (3 Stockt. 229),
160.
Shawc. Deveemon (81 Md. 215; 31 Atl.
Eep. 709), 1258.
Shaw, Ex parte (8 Sim. 1S9) , 970.
Shaw v. Foster (L. E. 5 H. L. Cas. 321),
585.
Shaw v. Galbriath (7 Pa. St. 112), 943.
Shaw v. Glen (37 N. J. Eq. 32) , 1408.
Shawtt. Hussey (41 Me. 495), 108.
Shaw, In re (L. E. 12 Eq. 124), 1131.
Shaw v. Lawless (5 CI. & Fin. 129), 123,
131.
Shaww. Norfolk Co. E. E. Co. (5 Gray,
171), 1731.
Shaw v. Bead (47 Pa. St. 96), 335, 339.
Shaw v. Ehodes (1 Myl. & Or. 135), 1525,
1527.
Shaw v. Shaw (86 Mo. 594), 327.
Shaw v. Spencer (100 Mass. 382; 1 Am.
Eep. 115), 107, 204, 386,388,456,460,
532, 1171, 1659, 1660, 1661.
Shaw v. Spooner (9 N. H. 197), 556.
Shaw v. Weigh (2 Str. 798), 919, 936, 937,
1072.
Shaw v. Wright (1 Eq. Oa. Ab. 176), 922,
1326.
Shaw's Trusts, In re (L. E. 12 Eq. 124) ,
1118.
Sheafe v. O'Neill (1 Mass. 256), 967.
Sheddon v. Goodrich (8 Ves. 481), 258.
Shee v. Hale (13 Ves. 404), 1291.
Sheedy v. Eoach (124 Mass. 472), 254.
Sheet's Estate (52 Pa. St. 257) , 884, 885.
Shelby v. Burtis (18 Tex. 644), 711.
Shelbys. Shelby (Cook, 182), 461.
Shelby v. Tardy (84 Ala. 327; 4 So. Eep.
276) , 309, 313.
Sheldon v. Cox (2 Eden, 228), 443.
Sheldon v. Donner (2 Vern. 310), 1068,
1090.
Sheldon v. Harding (44 111. 68), 7, 370.
Sheldon v. Nixon (L. E. 39 Ch. D. 50),
1437.
Sheldon v. Sheldon (13 Johns. 220) , 1184.
Sheldon v. Sheldon (3 Wis. 699), 197,
313, 1534.
Sheldon v. Town of Stockbridge (67 Vt.
299; 31 Atl. Eep. 414), 734, 736, 738,
750.
Sheldon v. Wildman (2 Oh. Cas. 26),
1536.
Shelly v. Edlin (4 Aid. & El. 582), 938.
Shelmerdine, In re (33 L. J. Ch. 474), 26.
Shelton v. A. & T. Co. (82 Ala. 315), 307.
Shelton v. Hadlock (62 Conn. 143; 25
Atl. Eep. 403), 705.
Shelton v. Homer (5 Mete. 462), 390, 401,
928, 1013, 1016, 1040.
Shelton v. Johnson (4 Sneed, 672), 452.
Shelton v. Jones (4 Wash. St. 692; 30
Pac. Eep. 1061), 578.
Shelton v. Lewis (27 Ark. 190), 204, 223,
388, 532, 533.
Shelton v. Ordinary (32 Ga. 266), 827.
Shelton v. Pendleton (18 Conn. 417),
724.
Shelton v. Watson (16 Sim. 543), 107.
Shepard v. Richardson (145 Mass. 32),
1442.
Shepard v. Shepard (7 Johns. Ch. 56),
713.
Shepardson v. Stevens (71 111. 646) , 449.
Shepheard v. Beetham (L. E. 6 Ch. D.
592), 803, 813.
Shepherd v. McEvers (4 Johns. Ch.
136; 8 Am. Dec. 561), 50, 88, 460, 882,
8S9, 896, 1228.
Shepherd v. Nottidge (2 J. & H. 766),
128.
Shepherd v. White (11 Tex. 346), 309,
334, 339.
Sheppard v. Smith(2Bro. P. C. 372),
1679.
Sheratzu. Nicodemus (7 Yerg. 9), 570.
Sherburne v. Morse (132 Mass. 469), 307.
Sheridan v. Joyce (1 Jon. & La. 401),
1634.
Sheriffs. Neal (6 Watts, 534), 416, 500.
Sherley v. Congress, etc. Eefinery Co.
(2 Edw. Ch. 505), 577.
Sherley v. Sherley (31 S. W. Eep. 276),
356.
Sherman v. Dodge (28 Vt. 26), 911.
Sherman v. Lainer (39 N. J. Eq. 249),
1172.
Sherman v. Leman (137111. 94; 27 N. E.
Eep. 57), 1674, 1701.
Sherman v. Parish (53 N. T. 483), 1233.
CXCV1
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages : Vol. I, pp. 1-847 ; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Sherman v. Robinson (L. R. 15 Ch. D.
548), 1701.
Sherman v. Sandell (106 Cal. 373; 39 Pac.
Rep. 797), 233.
Sherman v. Sherman (4 Allen, 392), 1363.
Sherman v. Sherman (20 D. C. 330), 427.
Sherman v. Turpin (7 Cold. 382), 710.
Sherrard v. Harborough (Amb. 165), 242.
Sherratt v. Bentley (1 Russ. & M. 655),
892.
Sherrill v. Shuf ord (6 Ired. Eq. 228) , 1689,
1692.
Sherrington v. Tates (12 Mees. & W.
855), 1408.
Sherry v. Sansberry (3 Ind. 320), 286,
288.
Sherwood v. Andrews (2 Allen, 79), 159.
Sherwood, In re (3 Beav. 338), 1683.
Sherwood v. Reade (7 Hill, 431), 1109,
1122.
Sherwood v. Saxton (63 Mo. 68), 1470,
1471, 1587.
Sherwood v. Sutton (5 Mason, 143), 465,
470.
Shibla v. Ely (2 Halst. Ch. 183), 177, 1537.
Shields v. Barrow (17 How. 130), 1729,
1730.
Shields v. Dyer (86 Tenn. 41), 1519.
Shields, In re (53 L. T. 5), 68.
Shields v. McAuley (37 Fed. Rep. 302),
513, 852.
Shields' Estate, In re (14 Phila. 307), 1201,
1210.
Shilabara. Winding (1 Chev. (S. Car.)
218), 1363.
Shine v. Gough (1 B. & B. 444), 608.
Shine v. Hill (23 Iowa, 264), 1095.
Shine v. Croueher (1 De G., F. & J. 518),
1181.
Shipbrooke v, Hinehinbrook (16 Ves.
479), 1127, 1128, 1234.
Shipham v. Graves (41 Mich. 675), 14.
Shipp v. Hettrick (63 N. Car. 329), 1205,
1253.
Shipton v. Rawlins (4 Hare, 619), 1233.
Shipway v. Ball (L. R. 16 Ch. D. 376),
675,681,684.
Shirley v. Ferrers (1 Bro. Ch. 41), 1346.
Sbirleyr. Shirley (7Blackf. 452), 686.
Shirley v. Shirley (9 Paige, 363), 25, 65,
668, 681, 686, 1275, 1622.
Shirley v. Shattuck (28 Miss. 26), 960,
1058.
Shitz v. Dieffenbach (3 Pa. St. 233),
601.
Shively v. Parker (9 Ore. 500), 435.
Shockley v. Fisher (75 Mo. 498), 1393, 1394,
1411.
Shoe v. Ziegler (159 Pa. St. 461; 28 Atl.
Rep. 298), 636.
Shoemaker v. Smith (11 Humph. 81),
197, 310, 313, 371.
Shoemaker v. Walker (2 S. & R. 554),
' 964.
Shonk v. Brown (61 Pa. St. 320), 651, 665,
686.
Shook v. Shook (19 Barb. 653), 979, 1122.
Shore v. Shore (4 Drew. 510), 1436.
Shores. Wilson (9 CI. & Fin. 355), 798.
Shorer v. Shorer (10 Mod. 39), 298.
Short v. Battle (52 Ala. 456), 656, 665, 704.
Shortu. Moore (10 Vt. 466), 678.
Shorts. Porter (44 Miss. 635), 1031.
Short v. Wilson (13 Johns. 533), 1748.
Shorter v. Frazer (64 Ala. 74), 573.
Shorter v. Nelson (4 Lans. 117), 699, 709.
Shortzc. Cnangst (3 W. & S. 45), 979,
1089.
Shotwell v. Harrison (30 Mich. 179), 449.
Shotwell v. Jefferson Ins. Co. (5 Bosw.
247), 198.
Shotwell v. Mott (2 Sand. Ch. 46), 21.
Shovelton i>. Shovelton (32 Beav. 143),
128.
Show v. Conway (7 Pa. St. 136), 1679.
Shrewsbury sj.Hornby (5 Hare, 406), 806.
Shrewsbury v. Shrewsbury (3 Bro. Ch.
120; 1 Ves. Jr. 227), 978, 1068, 1090.
Shryockti. Waggoner (28 Pa. St. 431),
29, 328, 904, 973, 1288, 1629.
Shueyc. Latta (90 Ind. 136), 1201, 1202,
1213.
Shulman v. Fitzpatriok (62 Ala. 571), 704.
Shuitz v. Hansbrough (33 Gratt. 567),
1470.
Shuitz v. Hoagland (85 N. T. 464) , 1391.
Shuitz v. McLean (26 Pac. Rep. 427),
1738.
Shuitz v. Sutter (3 Mo. App. 137), 1411.
Shumway v. Cooper (16 Barb. 556), b28.
Shurman's Appeal (3 Casey, 64), 402.
Shyer v. Lockhard (2 Tenn. Ch. 365),
1394.
Sibley v. Lefflngwell (8 Allen, 584), 450.
Sickmanu. Abernathy (14 Colo. 174; 23
Pac. Rep. 446), 1384.
Sidle v. Walter (5 Watts, 389) , 359.
Sidmouth v. Sidmouth (2 Beav. 447),
183, 335, 339, 367, 368, 369.
Sidney v. Ranger (12 Sim. 118), 422.
Sidwell v. Wheaton (114 111. 267), 574.
Slemon v. Schurck (29 ST. T. 598), 223,
321, 372, 373, 388.
Siemon v. Wilson (3 Edw. Ch. 39), 291.
Siggers v. Evans (5 111. & B. 367; 32 Eng.
L. & Eq. 139), 1317, 1329, 1380, 1392.
Sigourney v. Munn (7 Conn. 11), 136,
216.
Sileoxu. Harper (32 Ga. 639), 811.
Sillick v. Mason (2 Barb. Ch. 79), 1297.
TABLE OF CASES.
CXCV11
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Silman v. McArdle (99 N. T. 451; 52 Am.
Rep. 41), 956.
Silvers v. Canary (114 Ind. 129) , 858.
Silvers v. Potter (48 N. J. Eq. 539; 22
Atl. Eep. 584), 71.
Silverthorn v. McKinster (12 Pa. St. 67),
403.
Silvens v. Porter (74 Pa. St. 448), 710.
Silvery v. Hodgdon (52 0al. 363), 75.
Simmons v. Burrell (8 Misc. Eep. 388;
28 ST. T. Supi. 625), 783, 815.
Simmons v. Curtis (41 Me. 373), 1361.
Simmons v. Drury (2 Gill & J. 32), 1352.
Simmons v. Edwards (16 M. & W. 838),
99.
Simmons v. Hargood (1 Keen, 9), 654.
Simmons -v. Oliver (74 Wis. 633; 43N.
W. Eep. 561), 1200, 1202.
Simmons v. Simmons (6 Hare, 352),
653.
Simms v. Bichardson (2 Litt. 229),.440.
Simon s. Sevier Assn. (54 Ark. 58), 1412.
Simonds v. Palles (2 Jon. & La. 489),
1329.
Simpsons. Bathurst (L E. 5 Ch. 193),
1080.
Simpsons. Cook (24 Minn. 180), 1522.
Simpson s. Gowdy (19 Ind. 292), 1222,
1400.
Simpson, In re (1 J. & H. 89) , 1131.
Simpson s. Jones (2 Euss. & M. 365) , 12.
Simpson s. Eoberts (35 Ga. 180), 1385.
Simpson v. Simpson (4 Dana, 140), 723.
Simpson s. Simpson (107 N. Car. 552),
1490.
Simpsons. Welcome (72 Me. 496; 39 Am.
Eep. 349), 731, 748.
Sims v. Hundley (2 How. (Miss.) 896),
1444.
Sims s. Lively (14 B. Mon. 433), 1350, 1653.
Sims s. Marryatt (17 Q. B. 281), 33.
Sims s. Eenwick (25 Ga. 58), 847.
Simss. Eicketts (35 Ind. 192), 713.
Sims s. Sims (2 Stockt. Ch. 158), 1322.
Simss. Smith (11 Ga. 198), 72, 73, 1637.
Sims s. Walker (8 Humph. 603), 517.
Sinclair s. Jackson (8 Cow. 543) , 980, 983,
996, 1005, 1022, 1038, 1055, 1090, 1103,
1122, 1123, 1243.
Sing Bow s. Sing Bow (30 Atl. Eep. 867),
429.
Singer Mnfg. Oo. s. Chalmers (2 Utah,
542), 1453.
Singleton s. Love (1 Head, 357), 304.
Singletons. Lowndes (90 S. Car. 465),
1215, 1692, 1695.
Singleton v. Scott (11 Iowa, 589), 996,
1005, 1057, 1093, 1096, 1110.
Singstacks. Harding (4 Har. & J. 186;
7 Am. Dec. 669), 1184.
Sinking Fund Com. s. Walker (6 How.
(Miss.) 143; 38 Am. Dec. 433), 596.
Sinnetts. Herbert (L. R. 12 Eq. 201; 7
Ch.23),813.
SInnott s, Walsh (L. E. 5 Ir. 27), 166,
827.
Slpe s. Earman (26 Gratt. 563), 1367.
Sismey v. Eley (17 Sim. 1), 560.
Sisson s. Shaw (9 Ves. 288) , 988.
SIter s. McClanahan (2 Gratt. 280) , 1172.
Sltwell v. Bernard (6 Ves. 620), 299, 1144.
Six s. Shauer (26 Md. 415), 707.
Skillmans. Skillman (2 Iowa, 388), 401.
Skingley, Inre (3Macn. & G. 221), 181.
Skinner v. Harrison Tp. (116 Ind. 142),
596.
Skinners. James (69 Wis. 605), 372, 912,
916.
Skinner s. Merchants' Bank ( 4 Allen,
290), 530, 1634.
Skinners. Smith (134 N. T. 242; 31 N. E.
Eep. 911), 412.
Skipwith v. Cunningham (8 Leigh, 271;
31 Am. Dec. 642), 1360, 1369, 1750.
Skitts. Whitmore (Freem. 280), 358.
Skrines. Walker (3 Eich. Eq. 262), 133.
Slack v. Slack (26 Miss. 290), 366, 367.
Slade v. Von Vechten (11 Paige, 21),
397.
Slaney v. Watney (L. E. 2 Eq. 418), 893.
Slannings. Styles (3 P. Wms. 334), 651,
686, 717.
Slanters. Favorite (107 Ind. 291), 1201.
Slater v. Oriental Mills (18 E.I. 362; 27
Atl. Eep. 443), 1609, 1629.
Slattery v. Mason (151Mass. 266;21 Am.
St. Eep. 448; 23 N. E. Eep. 843), 1282,
1294.
Sledge v. Clopton (6 Ala. 689), 1171.
Slee v. Manhattan Co. (1 Paige, 57),
1442, 1497.
Sleight v. Slawson (3 Kay & J. 296),
1536.
Slevin v. Brown (3 Mo. 176), 912, 917, 923,
925, 941, 944,989.
Slevin, In re (L. E. (1891) 2 Ch. 236), 768.
Sloan v. Cadogan (Sug. V. & P. 26), 153,
156.
Sloan v. Coolbaugh (10 Iowa, 31), 1468.
Sloan v. Frothingham (65 Ala. 593), 1507.
Slocum v. Marshall (2 Wash. C. C. 397),
52, 285, 358.
Slocum v. Wooley (43 ST. J. Eq. 453),
503.
Sloos. Law (3 Blatch. 459), 390, 1021,
1122, 1130, 1170, 1567.
Sloper v. Cottrell (6 El. & Bl. 504), 88.
Small v. Ayleswood (9 B. & Cr. 300),
880.
Small v. Marwood (9 B. & Cr. 360) , 1329.
cxcvm
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1763.]
Small v. Small (16 S. Car. 64), 585.
Small v. Stagg (95 111. 39), 574.
Small v. Warwood (4 M. &. E. 190), 892.
Small v. Wing (2Bro.P. C. 66), 1526.
Smart v. Prujean (6 Ves. 560), 142,143.
Smedley v. Varley (23 Beav. 359), 419.
Smeltzer v. Goslee(172 Pa. St. 298), 1288,
1315.
Smethurst v. Hastings (L. E. 30 Ch. D.
490), 1113, 1251.
Smiley v. Wright (2 Ohio, 512) , 964.
Smiths. Acton (26 Beav. 210). 1536.
Smith v. Anderson (L. E. 15 Ch. D. 247,
276), 848.
Smith v. Attersoll (1 Euss. 266), 61, 852.
Small v. Atwood (2 Y. & J. 517), 1596.
Smith v. Babcock (2 W. & M- 246), 472.
Smith v. Baker (1 Atk. 385), 307.
Smith v. Barnes (L. E. 1 Kq. 65), 433.
Smith v. Black (115 U. S. 308), 1455, 1457,
1497, 1498.
Smith v. Bolden (33 Beav. 266), 1679.
Smith v. Boquet (27 Tex. 507), 349, 414.
Smith v. Bowen (35 N. T. 83), 167, 327,
433, 614, 618.
Smith v. Bromley (Doug. 696), 563.
Smith v. Brotherline (63 Pa. St. 461),
425.
Smith v. Burnham (3 Sumn. 466), 315,
357, 532.
Smith v. Burns (25 Miss. 422), 1213.
Smith v. Byers (41 Ga. 439), 1136.
Smith v. Calloway (7 Blackf. 86), 1537.
Smith v. Camelford (2 Ves. Jr. 712), 307.
Smith v. Campbell (19 Ves. 400), 633.
Smith v. Chadwlek (L. E. 20 Ch. D. 27),
473, 479.
Smith v. Clay (3 Bro. Ch. 639), 461, 465,
467.
Smith v. Cook (L. E. (1891) App. Cas.
297), 225, 1317.
Smith v. Countryman (30 N. T. 655),
474, 489.
Smith v. Cowdery (2 S. & S. 358), 1043,
1044.
Smith v. Crawford Co. St. Bank (61 N.
W. Eep. 378), 429.
Smith v. Darby (39 Md. 278), 159.
Smith v. Davis (49 Am. Dec. 470), 286.
Smith v. Davis (49 Md. 470), 403.
Smith v. Davis (90 Cal. 25; 27 Pac. Eep.
26), 852, 874.
Smith v. Death (5 Madd. 317), 1067.
Smith v. Deeson (14 So. Eep. 40), I486,
1487.
Smith v. Drake (23 N. J. Eq. 302), 400,
405, 607, 1183, 1535.
Smith v. Eekford (18 S. W. Eep. 210),
72.
Smith v. Evans (Amb. 633), 1526.
Smith v. Field (6 Dana, 364), 840.
Smith v. Finch (8 Wis. 246), 201.
Smith v. Ford (48 Wis. 115), 52, 616, 916.
Smith v. French (2 Atk. 243), 1591, 1592.
Smith v. Gaines (39 N. J. Eq. 546), 1054,
1734.
Smith v. Gibson (15 Minn. 66), 1025, 1152.
Smith v. Goodman (149 111. 75), 1408.
Smith v. Greeley (30 Atl. Eep. 413) , 1003.
Smith v. Guyon (IBro. Ch. 186), 1652.
Smith v. Harrington (4 Allen, 566), 1619,
1748, 1753.
Smith ii. High (85 N". Car. 23), 578.
Smith v. Howe (31 Ind. 233), 706.
Smith v. Howell (3 Stockt. 122), 363.
Smith v. Hurst (22 L. J. Ch. 289), 1378.
Smith v. Iliffe (L. E. 20 Eq. 666), 104.
Smith, In re (131 N. T. 239), 1746.
Smith v. Jeffreys (16 So. Eep. 377), 206,
433.
Smith v. Lansing (22 N. T. 620), 417.
Smith v. Kane (2 Paige, 303), 678.
Smith v. Kay (7 H. L. Cas. 750), 291, 431.
Smith v. Kearney (2 Barb. Ch. 533), 626.
Smith v. Keating (6 M., G. & S. 136), 1377,
1379.
Smiths. King (16 East, 283), 27.
Smith v. Kinney (33 Tex. 283), 1750.
Smith v. Kittredge (21 Vt. 238), 147.
Smith v. Knowles (2 Gratt. 413) , 723, 878,
880, 883.
Smith v. Lampton (8 Dana, 73), 1215.
Smith v. Longmire (24 Hun, 267), 1403.
Smith «. Los Angeles, etc. Assn. (78
Cal. 289), 411.
Smiths. Lowther (36 W. Va. 300; 13 S.
E. Eep. 999), 1464.
Smith v. Lucas (L. E. 18 Ch. D. 531),
653.
Smith v. Lyne (2 T. & C. 345), 160.
Smith v. Lytle (27 Minn. 184), 437.
Smith v. McAtee (27 Md. 420; 92 Am.
Dec. 641), 707.
Smith v. McGeehee (14 Ala. 404), 1171,
1712.
Smiths. Matthews (3 De G., F. & J.
139), 47, 51, 62,60, 674.
Smiths. Maxwell (1 Hill Eq. 101), 103,
104.
Smith v. Metcalfe (1 Head, 402), 922, 923.
Smith v. Mitchell (12 Mich. 180), 1385.
Smith v. Moore (4 N. J. Eq. 485; 5 N. J.
Eq. 649), 860.
Smith v. Moore (37 Ala. 330), 1270,1291,
1640.
Smith v. Mundee (3 Kan. 172), 578.
Smith v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. (14 Allen,
336), 142, 1742.
Smith v. Nelson (18 Vt. 511), 793, 795.
Smith v. Obear (87 Mich. 62), 715.
TABLE OF CASES.
CXC1X
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Smith v. Oliver (31 Ala. 139), 905.
Smith v. Painter (5 S. & R. 223; 9 Am.
Dec. 344), 1629.
Smith v. Palmer (7 Hare, 225), 638.
Smith v. Patton (12 W. Va. 541), 213, 232,
308, 313, 352, 358, 864, 688.
Smith v. Pedigo (33 N. E. Rep. 77), 793,
797.
Smith v. Porter (1 Binn. 209), 1320.
Smith v. Powell (5 Tex. Civ. App. 373;
23 S. W. Eep. 1109), 711.
Smith v. Poythress (2 Fla. 92), 705.
Smith v. Provin (4 Allen, 516), 396.
Smith j). Putnam (61 N. H. 632), 411.
Smith v. Ramsay (1 Gilm. 343), 185.
Smith v. Rathburn (22 Hun, 150), 1236.
Smith v. Richards (13 Pet. 26), 379, 472,
479.
Smiths. Ricords (52 Mo. 581), 1634.
Smith v. Robertson (89 N. T. 555), 1746.
Smith v. Rowland (13 Kan. 245), 678.
Smith v. Sackett (5 Gilm. 535), 263, 308.
Smith v. Skeary (47 Conn. 47), 1411.
Smiths. Smith (21 Beav. SS5),25, 874.
Smith «. Smith (Halst. 515), 101.
Smith v. Smith (11 Allen, 423), 184.
Smith v. Smith (85 111. 189), 197.
Smiths. Smith (144 Ind. 299; 33 N. E.
Rep. 35), 36^.
Smith v. Smith (6 N. J. Eq. 515), 552, 653.
Smith v. Smith (3 Giff. 121), 678.
Smiths. Smith (80 Ind. 267), 706.
Smith v. Smith (3 Atk. 304), 826.
Smiths. Smith (6B. & C. 112), 892.
Smith v. Smith (1 McCord Eq. 134), 852.
Smith v. Smith (11 Com. B. (N. S.) 121),
920.
Smith v. Smith (4 Johns. Ch. 281), 1102,
1253, 1738.
Smith v. Smith (103 E. C. L. 121), 1327.
Smith v. Speer (7 Stew. 336; 14 Cent. L.
J. 16), 82.
Smith v. Spengler (83 Mo. 408), 1408.
Smith v. Starr (3 Whart. 63; 31 Am. Dec.
498), 300,934,1622, 1623.
Smiths. Strahan (16 Tex. 314), 309, 334.
Smith v. Thomas (8 Baxt. 417), 1159.
Smith v. Thompson (2 McArthur, 291) ,
647, 664.
Smith v. Thompson (2 Swans. 386), 1327.
Smith v. Tower (69 Md. 77; 9 Am. St.
Rep. 398), 1273, 1296, 1299; 1300.
Smith v. Townshend (27 Md. 368; 92 Am.
Dec. 637), 1170, 1178.
Smith v. Walter (49 Mo. 250), 327,432, 434,
538, 595.
Smith v. Westcott (17 R. I. 366), 879.
Smith v. Wheeler (1 Ventr. 128), 892,893,
894.
Smith v. White (L. R. 1 Eq. 626), 562.
Smith v. Willett II R. I. 528), 1383.
Smith v. Wilmington Coal Co. <83 111.
498), 1215.
Smith v. Winn (27 S. Car. 591), 612.
Smith v. Wildman (37 Conn. 384), 995,
1122, 1123.
Smith v. Williams (43 Conn. 409), 705.
Smith v. Wise (132 N. T. 172), 1368.
Smith v. Zaner (4 Ala. 99) , 26.
Smith's Appeal (11 Wright, 128), 444.
Smith's Appeal (30 Pa. St. 397), 829.
Smith's Appeal (104 Pa. St. 381), 1386.
Smith's Charity, In re (L. R. 20 Ch. D.
616), 773.
Smith's Estate (8 Pa. Co. Ct. 539), 56.
Smitheal v. Gray (1 Humph. 491; 34
Am. Dec. 664), 309, 352.
Smithers v. Hooper (23 Md. 273), 304.
Smoot v. Richards (8 Tex. Civ. App.
146), 988.
Smoot v. Richards (27 S. W. Rep. 967),
1215.
Smyth v. Griffin (13 Sim. 245), 560.
Smyth v. Oliver (31 Ala. 39) , 369, 704.
Snelgrove v. Snelgrove (4 Desaus. 286),
440.
Snellt). Dwight (120 Mass. 9), 562.
Snell v. Elam (2 Heisk. 82), 223.
Snelling v. Lamar (32 S. Car. 72; 17
Am. St. Rep. 835), 912, 931, 1622.
Snelling v. McCreary (14 Rich. Eq. 291),
1213, 1215.
Snelling v. Utterback (1 Bibb, 609; 4
Am. Dec. 661), 71, 365.
Snelson v. Franklin (6 Munf. 210), 492.
Snider v. Johnson (25 Ore. 328 ; 35 Pac.
Rep. 846), 337, 360.
Snider v. Willey (33 Mich. 483), 556.
Snows. Booth (8 De G., M. & G. 69),
1537.
Snow v. Teed (L. R. 9 Eq. 622), 630, 632,
637.
Snowden v. Dunlevy (11 Pa. St. 522), 13.
Snowdon v. Dale (6 Sim. 624), 1269, 1291,
1315, 1638, 1639.
Snowhill v. Snowhill (2 Green's Ch. 20),
828.
Snyder v. Greaves (21 Atl. Rep. 291),
1490.
Snyder v. McComb (39 Fed. Rep. 292),
61, 1121.
Snyder v. Noble (94 Pa. St. 286), 710.
Snyder v. Snyder (10 Barr, 423), 654.
Snyder v. Webb (3 Cal. 83), 659.
Snyder's Appeal (92 Pa. St. 604) , 52, 671.
Snyder's Appeal (64 Pa. St. 67), 1688.
Soar v. Foster (4 Kay & J. 152), 340, 369.
Socher's Appeal (104 Pa. St. 609), 513.
Society, etc. v. Hartland (2 Paine, 536),
912.
cc
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Society Most Precious Blood v. Moll
(51 Minn. 277; 63 N. W. Eep. 648),
751.
Sooiety of Orphan Boys v. New Orleans
(12 La. Ann. 62) ,753.
Society Prop. Gospel v. Attorney-Gen-
eral (3 Euss. 142), 770, 81L
Sockett v. Wray (4 Bro. Ch. 483), 697.
Soggins v. Heard (31 Miss. 426), 1537.
Sohier v. Burr (127 Mass. 221), 735, 745,
748, 755.
Sohier v. Eldredge (103 Mass. 346), 111,
607, 989, 1025, 1152.
Sohier v. Trinity Church (109 Mass. 19),
181.
Sohier v. Williams (1 Curt. 479), 1017,
1079, 1086.
Solomon v. Carr (25 S. Car. 112), 1542.
Solomon v. Solomon (83 Ala. 394), 1542.
Somersc. Overhulzer (67 Cal. 237), 197,
212, 313.
Somerset v. Poulett (62 L. J. Ch. 720; 68
L. T. 613), 1203.
Somerset v. Poulet (L. B. (1894) 1 Ch.
231), 1590.
Somerville v. Johnson (36 N. J. Eq.
211), 1054.
Sonley v. Clockmakers' Co. (1 Bro. Ch.
81), 20, 21, 83, 596.
Somes v. Skinner (16 Mass. 348), 286.
Soohanw. Philadelphia (33 Pa. St. 9),
749.
Sorrell v. Clayton (42 Tex. 188), 711.
Sorry v. Bright (1 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 113),
266.
Sortore v. Scott (6 Lans. 271), 1569.
Soule v. Ludlow (3 Hun, 503; 6 T. & C.
24), 1506.
Soules v. McLean (7 Wash. 451; 35 Pac.
Eep. 364), 187.
South v. Alley ne (5 Mod. 101), 178, 930.
South, Ex parte (3 Swanst. 393), 34.
Southampton v. Hertford (2 V. & B. 54),
820.
Southards. Piper (36 Me. 84), 706.
Southard v. Plummer (36 Me. 64), 688.
Southard v. Pope (9 B. Mon. 264), 499.
Southcot v. Watson (3 Atk, 229), 245,
246.
Southern Marble Co. v. Steagall (90 Ga.
236; 15 S. E. Eep. 806), 831.
Southern Pac. E. Co. v. Doyle (11 Fed.
Eep. 253), 1440.
Southhouse v. Bate (2 V. & B. 396), 250.
South Scituate Sav. Bank v. Boss (11
Allen, 443), 1070.
South Sea Co v. Wymondsell (3 Pr.
Wms. 143), 469,1536, 1540.
Southwell v. Ward (Taml. 314), 865, 907.
Southwortha. Kimball (58 Vt. 337), 711.
Souverbrige ». Arden (1 Johns. Ch. 240),
76,157.
Sowarsby v. Lacey (4 Mad. 179), 1666.
Sowdenv. Sowden (1 Oox, 165), 327.
Spafford v. Warren (47 Iowa, 47), 706.
Spaflord v. Weston (29 Me. 140), 451.
Spalding v. Shalmer (1 Vern. 301), 1091,
1654.
Spangler's Estate (21 Pa. St. 335), 1685.
Sparhawk v. Buell (9 Vt. 41), 834.
Sparhawk v. Cloon (125 Mass. 266), 156,
1269, 1294, 1640.
Sparks v. Hess (16 Cal. 186), 567, 674, 583,
684.
Sparrow, In re (L. E. 5 Ch. 662), 869.
Spaulding v. Backus (122 Mass. 653),
961.
Spaulding v. Strong (37 N. T. 135), 1369.
Spaulding v. Wakefield (53 Vt. 660; 38
Am. Eep. 708), 1135, 1693.
S. P. Copper Mining Co. v. Beach (13
Beav. 478), 1241.
Speakman v. Tatum (45 N. J. Eq. 380),
1729, 1742.
Speakman v. Tatum (48 N. J. Eq. 136),
1114.
Speakman's Appeal (71 Pa. St. 25),
710.
Spear v. Evans (51 Wis. 42), 1533.
Spear v. Grant (16 Mass. 9), 597.
Spear v Spear (8 Eich. Eq. 184), 1102,
1204, 1213.
Spear v. Tinkham (2 Barb. Ch. 211), 1255,
1438.
Spear v. Tinsley (55 Ga. 89), 836.
Spear v. Tucker (2 Barb. Eq. 211), 1437.
Speck v. Gurnee (25 Hun, 644), 709.
Speight v. Gaunt (L. E. 22 Ch. D. 727; L.
E. 9 App. Cas. 1), 1141, 1247.
Speight, In re (L. E. 22 Oh. D. 739; h.
E. 9 App. Cas. 19), 947, 1057, 1135,
1341.
Speidel v. Henrici (120 U. S. 377), 234,
1533, 1534, 1535, 1542.
Spence v. Spence (12 Com. B. (N. S.)
199), 920, 1327.
Spence v. Whittaker (3 Port. 327), 1686,
1690.
Spencer v. Hawkins (4 Ired. Eq. 288),
1091, 1108, 1350.
Spencer v. Lee (19 W. Va. 179), 1109.
Spencer v. Spencer (11 Paige, 152), 1236,
1588.
Spencer v. Spencer (3 Jones Eq. 404),
553.
Spencer v. Topham (28 L. T. 56), 419.
! Spencer's Appeal (80 Pa. St. 317), 1181.
I Sperling v. Eochfort (16 Ch. D. 18), 258.
' Spessard v. Eohrer (9 Gill, 262), 920,
937.
TABLE OF CASES.
CC1
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Speyer v. Desjardins (144 111. 641; 32 N.
E. Rep. 283), 324.
Spieer v. Ayer (2N. Y. Sup. Ot. 626),
280, 1405.
Spieer v. Spieer (16 Abb. Pr. (N. S.)
112), 517.
Spieer v. Spieer (24 Beav. 365) , 682.
Spieer v. Spieer (21 Ga. 200), 969.
Spicerj). Waters (65 Barb. 237), 442.
Spickernell v. Hotham (1 Kay, 669),
1538.
Spiers v. Purcell (2 U. 0. 624), 47.
Spies v. Price (91 Ala. 166; 8 So. Bep.
405), 234.
Spiudler v. Atkinson (3 Md. 409; 66 Am.
Dec. 755), 403, 1025.
Spink v. Lewis (3 Bro. Ch. 355), 258.
Splrett v. Willows (L. H. 1 Ch. 620; L.
R. 4Ch. 407), 675, 678, 682.
Spokane v. first Nat. Bank (68 Fed.
Rep. 982; 16 C. C. A. 85), 1578, 1608.
Sponable v. Snyder (7 Hill, 427), 444.
Spooner v. Lovejoy (108 Mass. 529),
253.
Spooner v. Payne (lOEng. L. & Eq.
207), 38.
Sporle v. Burnaby (10 Jur. 1142), 1193,
1194.
Spotts' Estate, In re (156 Pa. St. 281; 27
Atl. Rep. 132), 710.
Sprague!). Edwards (48 Cal. 239), 1083.
Sprague v. Shields (61 Ala. 428), 655,
705.
Sprague v. Sprague (13 R. I. 701), 1277.
Sprague v. Thurber (17 R. I. 451), 852.
Sprague v. Tyson (44 Ala. 338), 704.
Spratley v. Griffiths (2 Bro. Ch. 179),
480.
Spratt v, Baldwin (33 Miss. 581), 1690.
Spring v. Biles (1 T. R. 435) , 632.
Springs. Hight (22 Me. 408), 339.
Springy. Hight (16 N. J. Eq. 265), 354.
Spring v. Pride (10 Jur. (N. S.) 646; 4 De
G., J. & S. 395), 419, 669, 1180.
Spring v. Wood worth (4 Allen, 326),
826.
Springers). Arundel (64 Pa. St. 218), 671,
934.
Springers. Berry (47Me. 330), 24, 706.
Springers. Springer (114 111. 550), 197,
308.
Springers. Walters (34 Pa. St. 328), 578.
Springett v. Dashwood (2 Gifl. 521),
1190, 1564.
Springett v. Jennings (L. R. 10 Eq. 488),
813.
Springfield, etc. R. Co. v. Stewart (51
Ark, 285), 574.
Springfield Co. v. Donovan (120 Mo.
423; 25 S. W. Rep. 536), 1477.
Sproul v. Atchison Nat. Bank (22 Kan.
336), 652.
Sprowl, Succession of (21 La. Ann.
544), 1690.
Spurgeon v. Collier (1 Eden, 65), 652.
Spurlock v. Sproule (72 Mo. 503), 1096.
Spurr v. Scovill (3 Cush. 578), 36.
Spurrier v. Hancock (4 Ves. 667), 200.
Squibb ii. Wynn (1 P. Wms. 381), 633.
Squire v. Dean (4 Bro. Ch. 326), 657.
Squire v. Harder (1 Paige, 4*4), 363.
Squire's Appeal (70 Pa. St. 268), 413, 417.
Squires v. Ashford (23 Beav. 132), 680.
Staats v. Bergen (17 N. J. Eq. 654), 1178.
Staees. Gage (L. R. 8 Ch. D. 451), 1080.
Stack v. O'Hara (90 Pa. St. 477), 794.
Stackhouse v. Barneston (10 Ves. 465),
466, 1597.
Stackhouse v. Jersey (1 J. <& H. 721),
600.
Stackpole v. Beaumont (3 Ves. 95),
1041, 1043, 1045.
Stackpole v. Howell (13 Ves. 417), 893.
Stacy v. Elph (1 Myl. & K. 195), 882, 886,
889,891,892,896, 1016.
Stafford v. Buckley (2 Ves. 179), 1066.
Stafford v. Piddon (23 Beav. 386), 1267.
Stafford v. Stafford (1 De G. & J. 193),
1167, 1S43.
Stafford v. Wheeler (93 Pa. St. 462), 232.
Stafford!). VanRensalaer (9 Cow. 316),
569, 677.
Staggt). Beckman (2Edw. Ch. 89), 1678.
Stainforth v. Staiuforth (2 Vern. 460),
1529.
Staley v. Hamilton (19 Fla. 275) , 705.
Staley v. Howard (7 Mo. App. 377), 708.
Stall v. Cincinnati (16 Ohio St. 170),
1033.
Stall v. Macallister (9 Ohio, 19), 1109.
Stallings v. Freeman (2 Hill Ch.), 405.
Stallings v. Thomas (55 Ark. 326; 18 S.
W. Rep. 184), 1450, 1452.
Stambaugh's Estate (135 Pa. St. 585; 19
Atl. Rep. 1058), 1282, 1290, 1312.
Stammers v. Macomb (2 Wend. 454),
724.
Stampe v. Cooke (1 Cox, 236), 633.
Stamper v. Barker (5 Madd. 134), 13.
Stamps v. Case (41 Mich. 267) , 1364.
Stanger, In re (35 Fed. Rep. 238), 271.
Standard Wagon Co. v. Nichols (41
Hun, 261), 1408.
Standlshu. Babcock (52 N. J. Eq. 628),
1580, 1628.
Stanes v. Parker (9 Beav. 385), 975.
Stanford v. Roberts (6 Ch. App 306),
1428.
Stanhope v. Thacker (Pr. Ch. 436), 1526.
Stanley v. Brannon (6 Black, 193), 339.
ecu
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Stanley v. Colt (5 Wall. 119), 167, 181,
610, 787.
Stanley v. Lennard (1 Eden, 95), 8, 90.
Stanleys. McGauran (L. K. lllr. 160),
477.
Stanley v. Stanley (16 Ves. 491), 926.
Stanley i>. Stanley (L. R. 7 Ch. D. 589),
491, 494, 1593.
Stanley's Appeal (8 Pa. St. 431), 286, 287,
1173, 1210.
Stanton v. Hall (2 E. & M. 176), 680.
Stanway v. Styles (2 Eq. Abr. 246),
717.
Stapleton v. Stapleton (14 Sim. 186),
155,851.
Stapp v. Toler (3 Bibb, 450), 1184.
Stark v. Canady (3 Litt. 399) , 809.
Stark v. Starr (1 Sawy. 15), 606, 607.
Starke v. Etbridge (71 N. Oar. 240),
1489.
Starker. Oleson (44 Neb. 646), 988, 990.
Starke v. Starke (3 Rich. 438), 1537.
Starkey v. Brooks (1 P. Wms. 391), 241,
260.
Starkie, Ex parte (3 Sim. 339), 832, 841,
1563.
Starkweather v. Am. Bible Soc. (72111.
50; 22 Am. Rep. 133), 747.
Starkweather v. Smith (6 Mich. 377),
707.
Starling's Ex. v. Price (16 Ohio St. 31),
107, 118, 127.
Starr v. Ellis (6 Johns. Ch. 393), 978.
Starr v. Hamilton (1 Deady, 265) , 710.
Starr v. Moulton (97 111. 525), 1110.
Starr b. Starr (1 Ohio, 321), 47,72.
Starr v. Vanderheyden (9 Johns. 253),
427.
Starr v. Wright (20 Ohio St. 97), 12.
State v. Adams (4 Mo. 570), 781.
State v. Ansmus (35 S. W. Rep. 1021),
905.
State v. Bank of Maryland (6 Gill & J.
295), 1411.
State v. Boeppler (63 Mo. App. 151),
1401.
State v. Brown (68 N. Car. 554), 856.
State v. Bryce (7 Ohio, 414), 9.
States. Campbell (5 S. Dak. 636; 60 N.
W. Rep. 32), 1500.
State n. Cheston (51 Md. 352), 854.
State v. Cincinnati (16 Ohio St. 170),
1072, 1653.
State v. Collier (72 Mo. 13), 556.
State v. Eltlng (29 Kan. 397), 656.
State v. Frazier (134 Ind. 648; 32 N. E.
Rep. 636), 706.
State v. Gorman (4 Houst. 624), 705.
State v. Greensdale (106 Ind. 364), 1201.
State v. Griffith (2 Del. Ch. 392), 750.
State v. Guilford (15 Ohio, 593), 1123,
1236, 1589.
State v. Hunt (40 Mo. App. 616), 903, 904.
State v. Jones (53 Mo. App. 207), 1186.
State v. Kock (47 Mo 582) , 979.
States. Martins (18 Mo. App. 468), 839.
State v. Mayor of Mobile (5 Port. 279),
19, 21.
State v. Mayor of Orange (32 N. J. 49),
952.
States. Meagher (44 Mo. 356; 100 Am.
Dec. 298), 1135, 1140, 1141, 1142.
State v. Netherton (20 Mo. App. 414),
1003, 1060, 1131, 1132.
State v. Nichols (10 Gill & J. 27), 856,
884, 885.
State v. Piatt (4 Harr. 154), 1691.
State v. Prewltt (20 Mo. 165), 748, 760.
State v. Purdy (36 Wis. 213), 656.
State v. Reeder (5 Neb. 203), 967.
State v. Roche (94 Ind. 372) , 839.
State v. Roudebush (114 Ind. 347; 16 N.
E. Rep. 636), 1719.
State v. Rush (20 Wis. 212), 23, 431.
State v. Stebbins (1 Stew. 299), 21.
State v. Tolan (33 N. J. L. 195), 1666,
1678.
State v. Warren (28 Md. 338), 250, 756.
State Bank a. Chappelle (40 Mich. 447),
1503, 1518.
State Bank v. Hastings (15 Wis. 75), 38.
State Road, In re (60 Pa. St. 330), 1130.
Staunton v. Hall (2 R. &M. 175), 165.
Stead v. Clay (2Beav. 365), 663.
Steagall v. Steagall (90 Va. 73; 17 S. E.
Rep. 756), 427.
Steamboat Co. ». Locke (73 Mo. 370),
1608.
Stearly's Appeal (3 Grant's Cas. 270),
908.
Stearns v. Godfrey (16 Me. 158), 1302.
Stearns v. Hubbard (8 Greene, 320), 66.
Stearns v. Palmer (10 Met. 32), 922, 941,
942, 950, 1267.
Stebbins v. JenDings (10 Pick. 172), 789.
Stedman v. Frieder (20 N. T. 437), 1210.
Steed v. Enowles (79 Ala. 446) , 704.
Steedman v. Poole (6 Hare, 193), 669.
Steele v. Babcock (1 Hill, 527), 329, 383.
Steele v. Kinkle (3 Ala. 352), 465.
Steele v. Steele (1 Ired. Eq. 452), 651, 655,
686.
Steele v. Steele (64 Ala. 438), 1321.
Steele v. Waller (28Beav. 466), 155.
Steen v. Steen (25 Miss. 513), 860.
Steereu. Steere (5 Johns. Ch. 1), 47,61,
62, 71, 72, 307, 355, 370.
Stehman's Appeal (5 Pa. St. 413), 1692.
Steib v. Whitehead (111 111. 247), 1271,
1296.
TABLE OF CASES.
CC111
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Steines v. Franklin Co. (48 Mo. 165),
1542.
Steinharta. Cunningham (130 N.Y.292;
29 N. E. Eep. 100), 168.
Steinlein v. Halstead (52 Wis. 289), 1364.
Steinmanu. Ewing (43 Pa. St. 63), 710.
Stell's Appeal (10 Pa. St. 149) , 1127, 1234.
Stenberg, In re (L. E. (1895) 2 Ch. D. 433),
1581.
Stent v. Eobinson (12 Ves. 461), 354.
Stephens. Swan (9 Leigh, 404), 28.
Stephen's Appeal (38 Pa. St. 9), 578.
Stephens v. Beall (22 Wall. 338), C99,
1495, 1496.
Stephens v. Clay (17 Colo. 489; 30 Pac.
Eep. 43), 1501.
Stephens v. Crawford (1 Ga. 574), 818.
Stephens, Ex parte (L. E. 3 Ch. D. 807),
1309.
Stephens v. Howard (32 N. J. Eq. 244),
834.
Stephens v. Laudle (3 Hayw. 221), 461.
Stephens v. Lowry (2 N. C. C- 87), 1001.
Stephens v. Miller (24 N. J. Eq. 358),
1217.
Stephens v. Olive (2 Bro. Ch. 90), 720,
722.
Stephens v. Shannon (43 Ark. 464), 574.
Stephens, Succession of (19 La. Ann.
499), 847.
Stephenson v. Axson (1 Bailey Eq. 274),
840.
Stephenson v. Brown (3 N. J. Eq. 503),
647.
Stephenson v. Heathcote (1 Eden, 38),
1324.
Stephenson v. January (49 Mo. 466),
1094.
Stephenson v. McClintock (141 111.604;
31 N. E. Eep. 310), 212.
Stephenson v. Osborne (41 Miss. 119; 90
Am. Dee. 358), 723, 726.
Stephenson v. Short (92 N. T. 433; 1 Am..
& Eng. Corp. Cas. 607), 750, 752, 815.
Sterling v. Commonwealth (5 W. & S.
162), 1305.
Sterner v. Gage (55 N. H. 175; 20 Am.
Eep. 191), 1140.
Sterrett's Appeal (2 Pa. St. 419), 1240.
Sterry v. Arden (1 Johns. Ch. 261; 12
Johns. 536), 435, 478.
Stettheimer v. Tone (114 N. Y. 601), 956.
Stevens v. Austin (7 Jur. (N. S.) 873),
895.
Stevens v. Bagwell (15 Ves. 139), 38.
Stevens v. Bateman (1 Bro. Ch. 22), 480.
Stevens v. Bell (6 Mass. 339) , 1364.
Stevens v. Clay (17 Colo. 489; 30 Pac.
Rep. 43), 1488.
Stevens v. Ely (1 Dev. Eq.. 497), 255, 256.
Stevens i>. Fuller (8 N. H. 464), 488.
Stevens v. Gage (55 N. H. 175), 1142.
Stevens v. Gregg (10 Gill & J. 143), 1322,
1324, 1352.
Stevens v. Orman (16 Fla. 9), 489.
Stevens v. Eobertson (37 L. J. Ch. 499),
1137.
Stevens v. Shannahan (160 111. 330), 1451.
Stevens v. Shippen (28 N. J. Eq. 487),
734, 749,756,811.
Stevens v. Stevens (70 Me. 92), 334, 340.
Stevens v. Stevens (80 Hun, 514; 30 N".
T. Supl.625), 1203, 1434.
Stevens v. Wilson (18 N. J. Eq. 447)'
308.
Stevenson v. Orapnell (114 111. 19; 28 N.
E. Eep. 379), 233.
Stevenson v. Dane (166 Mass. 163; 44 N.
E. Eep. 128), 1494.
Stevenson, In re (3 Paige, 420), 1394.
Stevenson v. Lesley (70 N. T. 512), 616.
Stevenson v. Mayor (L. E. 10 Q. B. 81),
1072.
Stevenson v. Maxwell (2 Sandf. Ch. 284),
1687.
Stevenson's Estate (4 Whart. 98), 1688.
Stewards. Welch (84 Me. 308; 24 Atl.
Eep. 860), 212.
Stewarts. Brown (2S. &R. 461), 308.
Stewart v. Brown (112 Mo. 171), 1489.
Stewart v. Chadwlck (8 Iowa, 463), 388.
Stewart v. Duffy (116 111. 47), 414.
Stewart v. Green (5 Ir. Eq. 470), 7.
Stewarts. Ives (1 Sm. & M. 197), 569,576.
Stewart v, Kirkland (19 Ala. 162), 34, 1117.
Stewart v. Kissam (11 Barb. 271), 1120,
1228.
Stewart v. Lewis (16 Ala. 734), 829.
Stewart v. Noble (Vern. & Scriv. 528),
1346, 1347.
Stewarts. Pettus (10 Mo. 755), 894, 979,
1089.
Stewart v. Rutherford (4 Jones, 483) , 390.
Stewarts. Sanderson (L. R. 10Eq.26),
1136, 1205.
Stewart v. Spencer (1 Curt. 157), 1394.
Stewart v. Stevens (10 Colo. 440) , 231.
Stewart v. Stewart (7 Johns. Ch. 229),
672, 674.
Stewart v. Stewart (6 CI. &Fin. 911), 504.
Stewart v. Stout (38 W. Va. 478; 18 S. E.
Eep. 726), 661.
Stewart v. Walker (72 Me. 146), 108.
Stewart v. Wood (63 Mo. 252), 580.
Stewart v. Wyoming Eancb Co. (129 U.
S. 383), 489, 490.
Stewart's Appeal (110 Pa. St. 410), 1338.
Stewart's Estate (140 Pa. St. 124), 1338.
Stlckney v. Evans (127 Mass. 202), 1473,
1478.
CC1V
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848 1753.]
Stickneys. Sewell (1 Myl. & Cr. 814),
1102, 1130, 1204.
Stlkeman s. Dawson (1 De G. & S. 321) ,
27.
Stileman s. Ashdown (2 Atk. 480), 27,
354.
Stiles s. Cooper (3 Atk. 692), 498, 622.
Stiles ii. Guy (4 T. & C. 571), 867.
Stiles v. Guy (16 Sim. 230) , 1116.
Stiles v. Stiles (lLans. 90), 828.
Still s. Griffith (27 Ga. 504), 578.
Stilley s. Folger (14 Ohio, 610), 100.
Stilwell s. Adams (29 Ark. 346), 704.
Stillwell v. Leavey '(84 Ky . 379), 1535.
Stillwells. Wilkinson (Jacobs, 280), 480,
642.
Stimpson v. Fries (2 Jones Eq. 156),
1364.
Stine v. Wilkinson (10 Mo. 75), 1093, 1108,
1109, 1171.
Stiners. Stiner (58 Barb. 643), 528.
Stinson s. Pepper (47 Fed. Kep. 676),
1511.
Stock v. Moyse (12 Ir. Oh. 246), 202.
Stock v. Vining (25 Beav. 236), 104.
Stookard v. Stockard (7 Humph. 306;
46 Am. Dec. 79), 1750.
Stockbridge v. Stockbridge (99 Mass.
244), 920, 924, 930.
Stocken s. Dawes (6 Beav. 371), 1710.
Stocken s. Stocken (4 Sim. 152; 2 Myl.
&K. 489; 4 Myl. & K. 95), 833, 835.
Stockton s. Ward (11 How. 232), 417.
Stocks s. Dobson (4 De G., M. & G. 11),
1116.
Stoddard ji. Hart (23 N. T. 556), 219.
Stoffel v. Schroeder (62 Mo. 147), 1607.
Stokers. Yelby (11 Ala. 327), 956,1115,
1266.
Stokes «. Frazier (72 111. 428), 1718, 1722.
Stokes s. Middleton (28 N. J. L. 32), 920.
Stokes s. Payne (68 Miss. 614; 38 Am.
Rep. 340), 1073.
Stokes v. Phelps' Mission (47 Hun, 570),
411.
Stoll s. Milne (L. R. 25 Ch. D. 710), 1701.
Stondemeiers. Williamson (29 Ala. 558),
1242.
Stone v. Bishop (4 01iff.593),82, 151, 1266.
Stone s. Oarr (3 Esp. 1), 837.
Stone s. Covell (29 Mich. 359), 475.
Stones). Denny (4 Met. 161), 484.
Stone v. Framingham (109 Mass. 303),
817.
Stone s. Griffin (3 Vt. 400) , 596, 750.
Stones. Hackett (12 Gray, 227) j 96, 147,
152, 159, 160, 956, 1745.
Stone, In re (138 Mass. 476), 1753.
Stones. King (7R.I. 358), 159.
Stone v. Lidderdale (2 Anst. 633), 38.
Stone s. Littlefleld (151 Mass. 485; 24 N.
E. Rep. 592), 1192, 1434, 1599.
Stones. Stone (3 Jur. (N. S.) 708), 367.
Stone s. Stone (L. R. 5 Oh. 74), 1257.
Stones. Theed (2Bro. Ch. 248), 1159".
Stone s. Welling (14 Mich. 514), 441.
Stonehouse v. Evelyn (3 P. Wms. 252),
250.
Stonor v. Curwen (5 Sim. 269), 90, 101,
102, 113.
Stoolfoos v. Jenkins (12 S. & R. 399), 381,
1592.
Stopford v. Canterbury (11 Sim. 82),
834.
Storers. Lane (1 Tex. Civ. App. 260; 20
S. W. Rep. 852), 501.
Storrs v. Barker (6 Johns. Ch. 166),
542.
Storrs v. Flint (46 N. T. Sup. Ct. 498),
993.
Story v. Livingstone (13 Pet. 359), 1728.
Story s. Palmer (46 Jr. J. Eq. 1; 18 Atl.
Rep. 363), 31, 110, 1572, 1611.
Story s. Winsor (3 P. Wms. 279), 438.
Story s. Winsor (2 Atk. 630) , 441.
Stotc s. Milne (L. R. 25 Ch. D. 710), 1135.
Stottnoff v. Reed (32 N. J. Eq. 213), 1257.
Stouflers. Olaggett (32 Atl. Rep. 284),
1214.
Stout v. Stout (44 N. J. Eq. 479), 1523.
Stovers. Flack (41 Barb. 162), 369, 374.
Stows. Kimball (28111. 93), 334.
Stow s. Yarwood (20 111. 497) , 1408.
Stowe v. Bowen (99 Mass. 194), 1127,
1234.
Stowe s. Chapin (51 Hun, 640; 4N. Y.
Supl. 496), 1297, 1738.
Stowell s. Grider (48 Ark. 220), 704.
Stowell v. Hastings (59 Vt. 498; 8 Atl.
Rep. 738), 1264.
Strange v. Fooks (4 Gift. 408), 1598.
Strange s. Smith (Amb. 261), 1046.
Stratford v. Powell (1 B. & B. 25), 114.
Strathmores. Bowes (2Bro. Ch. 345; 2
Cox, 33; 1 Ves. Jr. 22), 101, 548, 553.
Stratton s. Cal. Land & Timber Co. (86
Cal. 353; 24Pac. Rep. 1065), 191, 433.
Stratton s. Dialogue (16 ST. J. Eq. 70),
308.
Stratton s. Grimes (2 Vera. 357), 1041,
1043.
Stratton v. Murphy (1 Ir. Eq. 361), 606.
Stratton s. Payne(3Bro. P. C. 257),
247.
Stratton s. Physio Medical Coll. (149
Mass. 508), 748.
Streatfleld v, Streatfleld (Cas. t. Talbot
176), 101,102.
Streeters. Ilsley (151 Mass. 291), 1479.
Streitz s. Hartman (26 Neb. 33), 1627.
TABLE OF CASES.
CCV
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1 847; Vol. II, pp. 8181753.]
Stretch v. Gowdy (3 Tenn. Ch. 565),
1690.
Stretch v. Watkins (IMadd. 253), 837,
1561.
Stribblehill v. Brett (2 Vern. 445), 545.
Strickland v. Aldrldge (9 Ves. 516), 66,
506, 513.
Striker v. Mott (2 Paige, 387; 22 Am.
Dec. 646), 919.
Strimpfler v. Roberts (18 Pa. St. 283),
174, 308, 358, 359, 364.
Stringfellow v. Ivey (73 Ala. 209), 573,
587.
Stringham v. Brown (7 Iowa, 33), 1468.
Strode v. Blackburne (3 Ves. 225), 1427.
Strode v. Churchill (2 Litt. 75), 97.
Strodes v. Patton (1 Brock. 228), 1049.
Strohmo. Good (113 Ind. 93), 574.
Strong v. Ehle (86 Mich. 42), 576.
Strong v. Gregory (19 Ala. 146), 654.
Strong v. Ingraham (6 Sim. 197), 1357.
Strong v. Messenger (148 111. 431; 36 N.
Bep. 617), 336.
Strong v. Strong (126 111. 301), 574.
Strongs. Willis (3Fla. 124; 52 Am. Dec.
364), 889, 1228, 1394.
Stronghills. Austey (1 De G., M. & G.
635), 1073, 1085, 1652.
Strother v. Law (54 111. 413), 1456, 1460.
Stroud v. Barnett (3 Dana, 394), 1150,
1322, 1324.
Stroud v. Gwyer (6 Jur. (N. S.) 719),
1006, 1067, 1141, 1244, 1341.
Stroud v. Pace (36 Ark. 100) , 574.
Stroup v. Stroup (140 Ind. 179; 27 L. E.
A. 523), 1279.
Strutters v. Pearee (51 N. T. 357), 398.
Struves. Childs (63 Ala. 473), 1465.
Styer v. Freas (15 Pa. St. 339) , 1085.
Styles v. Guy (1 Macn. & G. 431), 885,
1102, 1235.
Styles v. Guy (1 H. & Tw. 328), 1543,
1545.
Stuark v. Kirkwall (3 Madd. 387), 693,
694, 695, 697.
Stuart v. Bute (9 H. L. Oas. 440), 826.
Stuarts. Carson (1 Desaus. 6U0), 1322,
1324.
Stuart v. Harrison (52 Iowa, 511), 575.
Stuart v. Kissam (2 Barb. 494), 647.
Stubbs v. Roth (2 Ball & B. 548), 399.
Stubbs v. Sargon (2 Keen, 255; 2 Beav.
496; 3 Myl. & Cr. 507), 52, 53, 243, 254,
681, 684.
Stnlts v. Brown (112 Ind. 379; 2 Am.
St. Rep. 190), 585.
Stump u. Gaby (2 De G., M. &G. 623),
393, 421, 1597.
Stump v. Gaby (5 De G., M. & G. 306),
396.
Sturdevant's Estate, In re (23 Atl. Rep.
826), 705.
Sturgeon v. Burrell (1 111. App. 537),
1718.
Sturgis v. Champneys (5 Myl. & Cr. 97),
678,679.
Sturgis v. Corp. (13Ves. 190), 669.
Sturgis v. Morse (3 De G. & J. 1), 1538.
Sturtevant v. Sturtevant (20 N. Y. 39;
75 Am. Dec. 371), 71.
Stuyvesant, Inre (3Edw. Ch. 229), 904.
Suarez v. DeMontiguy (1 Hun App.
494; 37 N. T. Supl. 503), 987.
Suarez v. Pumpelly (2 Sandt. Ch. 336),
851, 864, 1005.
Succession of Clay (34 La. Ann. 1131),
575.
Succession of Osborn (40 La. Ann. 615;
4 So. Rep. 580), 682.
Suddeth v. Knight (14 So. Rep. 475), 587.
Suessenguth v. Bingenheimer (40 Wis.
370), 475.
Sugdenc. Crossland (3 Sm. & G. 192),
. 890, 897.
Sugg v. Tillman (2 Swan, 208), 1385.
Suggitt's Trusts, Inre (L. R. 3 Ch. 215),
675, 678, 682.
Sullivan v. Blackwell (28 Miss. 737), 286.
Sullivan v. Howard (20 Md. 191), 1204.
Sullivan v. Latimer (35 S. Car. 422; 14
S. E. Rep. 933; 38 S. Car. 158), 864,
907, 1179.
Sullivan v. Portland & K. R. R. Co. (94
U. S. 906), 1535.
Sullivan v. Smith (15 Neb. 476), 1391,
1395, 1417, 1420.
Sullivan v. State (121 Ind. 342), 1342.
Sullivan v. Sullivan (21 Law R. 531),
282.
Sullivan v. Sullivan (86 Tenn. 376), 231;
269, 369.
Sullivan v. Winthrop (1 Sumn. 1),353,
840.
Sumner v. Newton (64 Wis. 210), 1620,
1747, 1752.
Sumner v. Sessoms (94 N. Oar. 371),
1490.
Sumrall v. Chaffin (48 Mo. 402), 1479,
1486.
Sunday School v. Davis (63 Conn. 377;
28AtI. Rep. 537), 731.
Sunderland v. Sunderland (19 Iowa,
325), 364.
Sunnyside, etc. Co. v. Reltz (35 N. E.
Rep. 541), 96.
Supervisors v. Schenck (5 Wall. 772),
1542.
Supples. Lawson fAmb. 729), 632, 1000.
Suteru. Hilliard (132 Mass. 412; 42 Am.
Rep. 334), 735, 748.
CCV1
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Suter v. Ives (47 Md. 520) , 1635.
Suters. Matthews (115 Mass. 253), 1724.
Sutherland v. Bradner (39 Hun, 134),
1368.
Sutherland v. Brush (7 Johns. Cb. 17),
1234.
Sutpnen v. Fowler (9 Paige, 280), 35, 36.
Sutter v. First Eef. Dutch Church (42
Pa. St. 503), 793, 794.
Sutton v. Oraddock (1 Ired. Eg.. 134),
1437.
Sutton v. Jones (15 Ves. 587), 394.
Sutton v. Sharp (1 Huss. 146), 1255.
Sutton v. Sutton (80 Ga. 178; 12 Am. St.
llep.249),647.
Sutton v. Sutton (7 Gratt. 234), 1107,
1348.
Sutton v. Wilder (L. E. 12 Eq. 373; 41 L.
J. Ch. 30), 1057, 1193, 1194, 1257.
Suydam v. Martin (Wright, 384), 432.
Swain v. Duane (48 Oal. 358), 655.
Swaine v. Denby (L. E. 14 Oh. D. 326),
1613.
Swale v. Swale (22 Beav. 584), 1576.
Swan v. Benson (31 Ark. 728), 574.
Swan v. Emerson (129 Mass. 289), 1501.
Swan v. Frick (34 Md. 27), 151.
Swan v. Ligan (1 McCord Ch. 232), 440,
594, 1437.
Swan v. Scott (11 S. & E. 155), 565.
Swarthoutv. Curtis (5N.T. 301; 55 Am.
Dec. 345), 460, 1105.
Swartwout v. Burr (1 Barb. 495), 29.
Swartz v. Swartz (4 Barr, 453), 416.
Swartzerv. Gillette (1 Chand. 207), 560.
Swartzwalter's Account (4 Watts, 77),
1692.
Swasey v. Am. Bible Soc. (57 Me. 526),
748, 756.
Swasey v. Antram (24 Ohio St. 87), 709.
Sweazy v. Kamner (61 Iowa, 642), 706.
Sweezy v. Thayer (1 Duer, 286), 828.
Sweigert v. Berk (8 S. & E. 304), 1082.
Sweeney®. Bixler (69 Ala. 539), 199.
Sweeney v. Sampson (5 Ind. 465), 747.
Sweeney v. Sheridan (37 J. & S. 587),
1405, 1722.
Sweeney v. Smith (15 B. Mon. 325; 61
Am. Dec. 188), 706.
Sweet v. Dean (43 111. App. 650), 280.
Sweet v. Jacocks (6 Paige Ch. 355; 31
Am. Dec. 252), 193, 413, 417, 1184.
Sweet v. Jeffries (67 Mo. 420), 1171.
Sweet v. Southcote (2Bro. Ch. 66), 445.
Sweetapple v. Bindon (2 Vern. 536),
114, 298, 963, 965.
Sweeting v. Sweeting (L. J. 33 Ch. 211),
965, 1277.
Swift v. Beneficial Society (73 Pa. St.
362), 735.
Swift v. Castle (23 111. 209), 665.
Swift v. Davis (8 East, 354), 366.
Swift v. Easton Beneficial Soc. (73 Pa.
St. 362), 749.
Swift, Exparte (1 E. & M. 575), 836.
Swift v. Hart (35 Hun, 129), 1405, 1406.
Swift v. Jewsbury (L. E. 9 Q. B. 244),
476.
Swift v. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (18 Vt. 313),
1029.
Swift v. Swift (34 Beav. 266; 11 Jur. (N.
S.) 458), 725.
Swift v. Winterbottom (L. E. 8 Q. B.
244), 484.
Swift's Appeal (87 Pa. St. 502), 987.
Swin v. Francis (L. E. 3 App. Cas. 106),
476, 484.
Swinburne v. Swinburne (28 N. T. 563),
204, 374, 388, 434, 534, 636.
Swinfen v. Swinfen (29 Beav. 211), 1188,
1196.
Swink v. Snodgrass (17 Ala. 653), 456,
1657.
Swinn v. Bush (23 Mich. 99), 492.
Swinnock v. De Crispe (Freem. 87),
988.
Swinton v. Egleston (3 Eich. Eq. 201),
259.
Swissholm's Appeal (56 Pa. St. 475),
426, 430.
Switzer v. Skiles (3 Gilm. 529; 44 Am.
Dec. 723), 193,413.
Switzer v. Switzer (12 Gratt. 680), 723.
Swope u. Chambers (2 Gratt. 319),
856.
Swoyer's Appeal (5 Pa. St. 377), 1092,
1102, 1204.
Sykes v. Beadon (L. E. 11 Ch. D. 170),
555, 560, 563.
Sykes v. Betts (87 Ala. 537; 2 So. Eep.
648), 587.
Sykes v. Sheard (2 De G., J. & S. 6; 33
Beav. 114; L. J. 33 Ch. 181), 1017,
1079, 1080, 1086.
Sykes' Trusts, In re (2 Johns. & H. 415),
696.
Sylvesteru. Wilson (2T. E. 444), 919.
Symes v. Hughes (L. E. 9 Bq. 474),
255.
Symonds v. Wilkes (11 Jur. (N. S.) 65
669.
Symons v. Eutter (3 Vern. 227), 299.
Sympson v. Turner (1 Eq. Ca. Abr.
383), 912, 917, 929.
Synge». Hale (2 B. & B. 499), 115.
Synnot v. Simpson (5 H. L. Cas. 241),
1317.
Sypher v. McHenry (18 Iowa, 232), 1170.
Syracuse Sav. Banks. Holden (105N.
Y. 415), 617.
TABLE OF CASES.
CCV11
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1763.]
T.
Tabb v. Archer (3Hem. &M. 399;3 Am.
Deo. 657), 12.
Tabor s. Brooks (L. B. 10 Ch. D. 273),
995, 1119, 1178.
Taft s. Diomed (16 B. I. 584), 51.
Tagg s. Bowman (99 Pa. St. 376), 1171.
Tagg s. Tenn. Nat. Bank (9 Heisk.
479), 484.
Taggarts. Muse (60 Miss. 870), 707.
Tainter s. Clark (13 Met. 220), 748, 1013,
1016, 1037, 1066.
Taits. Lathbury (L. E. 1 Eq. 174), 1069.
Talt s. Leithead (Kay, 658), 87.
Taits. Northwick (4Ves. 618), 1346.
Taites. Swinestead (26 Beav. 525) , 1013.
Talbot v. Marsbfleld (L. E. 3 Ch. 622),
1118, 1138, 1191, 1564, 1566, 1567, 1573.
Talbot s. Eadnor (3 Myl. & K. 524), 893,
1062, 1193, 1194.
Talbotts. Armstrong (14 Ind. 254), 589.
Talbotts. Barber (11 Ind. App. 1; 38 N.
E.Eep. 487), 63, 356.
Talbotts. Mansfield (L. E. 4 Eq. 661),
997.
Talbott s. Todd (5 Dana, 199) , 462.
Taloott v. Hess (31 Hun, 282), 1364.
Taliaferro s. Taliaferro (6 Ala. 404), 369.
Tallinger s. Mandeville (113 N. T. 427;
28 Am. L. Eeg. 471), 721.
Tallman v. Jones (13 Kan. 438), 706.
Tallman v. Tallman (3 Misc. Eep. 465;
23 N. T. Supl. 374), 731.
Taney's Appeal (97 Pa. St. 74), 847.
Tankard s. Tankard (84 N. Car. 286),
434, 500, 520, 525.
Tanner s. Elworthy (4 Beav. 487), 399.
Tanner s. Hughes (53 Pa. St. 289), 982.
Tanner s. Skinner (11 Bush, 120), 49, 60,
880.
Tapley s. Butterfield (1 Met. 515) , 1419.
Tappan s. Ailsworth (13 E. I. 585), 328.
Tappan s. Deblois (45 Me. 122), 748, 756.
Tappan v. Bicannio (16 N. J. Eq. 89),
1742.
Tappan's Appeal (52 Conn. 412), 747.
Tappenden s. Eandall (2B. & P. 467),
564.
Tarbaek v. Marbury (2 Ves. 510), 713.
Tarbets. Twinning (1 Teates, 432), 655.
Tarbuck s. Woodcock (3 Beav. 289) , 1679.
Tarpley s. Poage (2 Tex. 139), 309.
Tarrs. Williams (4Md. Ch. 68), 665.
Tarrant s. Backus (63 Conn. 277; 28 Atl.
Eep. 46), 900.
Tartts. Clayton (109 111. 579), 1475, 1509.
Tate s. Bush (62 Miss. 145) , 576.
Tate s. Connor (2 Dev. Eq. 244), 1538.
Tate v. Williamson (L. E. 1 Eq. 528), 494.
Tatge s. Tatge (34 Minn. 272), 59.
Tatham s. Vernon (29 Beav. 604), 92, 151.
Tatums. Holliday (59 Mo. 422), 1486,
1509.
Tatums. McLellan (56 Miss. 352), 1025,
1181.
Taunton s. Morris (L. E. 8 Ch. D. 453),
675, 678, 680.
Taylor v. Agricultural Association (68
Ala. 229), 1503.
Taylor©. Albert (23 S. W. Eep. 962), 1612.
Taylor v. Atwood (47 Conn. 498), 379.
Taylor s. Benham (5 How. 233), 43, 947,
971, 1103, 1108, 1222, 1462.
Taylor s. Brown (55 Mich. 482), 403.
Taylor s. Bryn Mawr College (34 N. J.
Eq. 101), 787,811.
Taylor s. Calvert (138 Ind. 67;87N. E.
Eep. 531), 222, 1186.
Taylor v. Cartwright (L. E. 14 Eq. 167),
1138, 1257.
Taylor v. Cussen (90 Va. 40; 17 S. E.
Eep. 721), 661, 711.
Taylor v. Davis (110 U. S. 330), 848.
Taylor v. Dickinson (15 Iowa, 483), 1123,
1457.
Taylors. Duesterberg (109 Ind. 165), 14.
Taylor v. Fleet (1 Barb. 471), 474.
Taylor v. Poster (22 Ohio St. 255), 608.
Taylor v. Franklin Sav. Bank (50 Fed.
Eep. 289), 992, 1349.
Taylor v. Galloway (1 Ham. 232), 1016,
1076.
Taylor v. George (2 V. & B. 378), 128, 130.
Taylor v. Glanville (3 Madd. 176), 897,
1667, 1678.
Taylors. Hawkins (8 Ves. 209), 1173.
Taylor v. Haygarth (14 Sim. 8; 8 Jur.
185), 965, 966, 1277.
Taylor v. Henry (48 Md. 560), 93, 151, 159.
Taylors. Hite (61 Mo. 142), 828, 1135.
Taylor v. Hopkins (40 111. 442), 1055,
1096, 1244, 1256.
Taylors. Huber (13 Ohio St. 288), 1620,
1748.
Taylor, Inre (18 Beav. 165), 1058.
Taylors. Jaques (106 Mass. 291), 556.
Taylor s. Johnson (63 N. Oar. 381), 304.
Taylors. Johnston (L. E. 19 Ch. D. 603),
294.
Taylor v. Kelly (103 Cal. 178; 37 Pac.
Eep. 216), 524.
Taylors. King (6Munf. 358; 8 Am. Dec.
746), 949, 1108.
Taylors. Kleier (26 S. W. Eep. 3), 1077.
Taylors. Lindsay (14 E. I. 518), 1277.
Taylor s. McKinney (20 Cal. 618), 574.
Taylors. Mason (9 Wheat. 350), 1043.
Taylor s. Meads (4 De G., J. &B. 596),
650, 652.
CCV111
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Taylor s. Miles (19 Ore. 550; 25 Pac. Eep.
143), 280, 370.
Taylor s. Millington (4 Jar. (N. S.) 204),
1114.
Taylor D.Mississippi Mills (47 Ark. 247),
495.
Taylor s. Morris (1 Corast. 341), 1040.
Taylors. Mosely (57 Miss. 644), 204, 388,
534.
Taylor s. Plumer (3 M. & S. 562), 203, 204,
326, 532, 534, 972, 1627.
Taylor s. Poniea (32 W. E. 335) , 1079.
Taylor s. Popiiam (13 Ves. 59), 427.
Taylor s. Pownal (10 Leigh, 183), 154.
Taylors. Pugh (1 Hare, 608), 548, 653.
Taylors. Eeid (103 111. 349), 1445.
Taylors. Eoberts (3 Ala. 83), 1236.
Taylors. Eoot (48 N. T. 687), 1666, 1678,
Taylor s. Salmon (2 Mee. & Cromp. 139;
4 Myl. & Or. 139) , 193. 330, 331, 391, 414.
Taylors. Sayles (57 N. H. 465), 49.
Taylor s. Shelton (30 Conn. 122) , 688.
Taylors. Stibbert (2 Ves. Jr. 437), 432,
478.
Taylor s. Taylor (1 Atk. 386), 27, 174, 362.
Taylor s. Taylor (3 De G., M. & G. 190),
261.
Taylors. Taylor (8 How. 183), 282, 285.
Taylor s. Taylor (9 111. 303), 341, 366, 367.
Taylors. Taylor (L. E. 20 Eg. 297), 1430,
1630, 1602.
Taylors. Taylor (74 Me. 582), 1399.
Taylor s. Taylor (57 Miss. 644), 336.
Taylor s. Taylor (13 N. Y. Supl. 55), 335,
336.
Taylor s. Tibbetts (13 B. Mon. 184), 893.
Taylors. Trustees (34 N. J. Eq. 101),
734, 749.
Taylors. Von Sehraeder (107 Mo. 206),
358.
Taylor s. Watkins (13 So. Eep. 811), 88,
865.
Taylor s. Wheeler (2 Vern. 564), 976.
Taylor's Settlement, In re (9 Hare, 596),
259.
Teagues. Fox (L. E. (1893) 1 Ch. 292),
1437.
Teakle s. Bailey (2 Brock. 44), 414, 416.
Tebbetts v. Tilton (31 N. H. 273), 308.
Tebbitts. Tebbitt (1 De G. &Sm. 506),
104.
Tebbs s. Carpenter (1 Madd. 300), 330,
387, 1056, 1162, 1217.
Tedder v. Steele (70 Ala. 347), 573.
Tee s. Ferris (2 Kay & J. 357), 851.
Teegardens. Lewis (35 N. E. Eep. 24),
13,44.
Teller s. Bishop (8 Minn. 226), 687.
Tempest s. Camoys (L. E. 21 Ch. D.
571), 995, 1007.
Tempest, In re (L. E. 1 Ch. 487), 31, 1431.
Temple s. Hammock (52 Miss. 360), 1612.
Temple s. Hawley (1 Sand. Ch. 153), 12.
Temple s. Williams (4 Ired. Eq. 39), 183.
Templetons. Brown (86 Tenn. 60), 686.
Tennant s. Elliott (1 B. & P. 3), 663.
Tennant s. Stoney (1 Eich. Eq. 222; 44
Am. Dec. 213), 656, 656.
Tennant s. Trenchard (L. E. 4 Ch. App.
547), 1178.
Tenney s. Porter (61 Ark. 329; 33 S. W.
Eep. 211), 1629.
Tenney s. Simpson (37 Kan. 363; 41 Kan.
661), 51, 62, 313.
Terrett s. Crombie (6 Lans. 82), 445.
Terrill s. Hope (2 Atk. 558), 654.
Terrill s. Matthews (L. J. 11 Ch. 31),
1127, 1234.
Terrill s. Murry (4 Terg. 104), 461.
Terry s. Butler (43 Barb. 396), 1364.
Terry v, Hammonds (47 Cal. 35), 699, 705.
Terry s. Keaton (68 Ala. 667), 674.
Terry's Will, In re (19 Beav. 580), 123.
Tessier s. Wyse (3 Bland, 185), 1322.
Teveau v. Ball (1 McCord Ch. 458), 1690.
Tevis s. Armstrong (71 Tex. 59), 1542,
Thachers. Pray (113 Mass. 291), 1188.
Thaekara s. Mentzer (100 Pa. St. 151),
1290, 1296.
Thacker s. Tracy (8 Mo. App. 318), 1093.
Thackwell s. Gardiner (5 De G. & Sm.
58), 623, 661.
Thatchers. Candee (3 Keyes, 157), 888,
890, 896, 897, 1394.
Thatcher s. Churchill (118 Mass. 108),
73, 478.
Thatchers. Oorder (2 Keyes, 157), 889.
Thatcher s. Omans (3 Pick. 521), 912.
Thatcher v. St. Andrew's Church (37
Mich. 264), 878, 893, 1108, 1746.
Thayer s. Gould (1 Atk. 615), 1591.
Thayer s. Swift (Harr. (Mich.) 430), 1121.
Thayer s. Wellington (9 Allen, 283), 142,
143, 253, 254, 893.
Thayer s. Wendell (1 Gall. 37), 1031.
Thebaud s. Schermerhorn (61 How.
Pr. 200; 30 ST. Y. 303; 30 Hun, 332),
159, 1746, 1747.
Thelluson s. Woodford (4 Ves. 329), 762,
1520.
Thickness s. Vernon (2 Freem. 84), 216.
Thiebauds. Tait (138 Ind.238; 36 N. E.
Eep. 525), 1158.
Third Nat. Bank s. Gas Co. (36 Minn.
75), 1627.
Third Nat. Bank v. Guenther (123 N. Y.
668; 20 Am. St. Eep. 780), 709.
Third Nat. Bank s. Stillwater Gas Co.
(36 Minn. 76), 1625.
Thistlewood, Exparte (1 Eose, 290), 480.
TABLE OF CASES.
CC1X
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Thomas s. Am. Freehold Land, etc. Co.
(47 Fed. Rep. 550), 1721.
Thomas®. Brinsfield (7Ga. 154), 1537.
Thomas s. Brownville, etc. Ry. Co. (109
U. S.522), 411.
Thomas s. Oaulkett (57 Mich. 392), 556.
Thomas s. Chicago (55 111. 403), 339.
Thomas s. Dering (1 Keen, 729), 1119.
Thomas s. Evans (105 N. T. 606), 560.
Thomas v. Everhard (6 Hurl. & N. 448),
726.
Thomas, Ex parte (Ambl. 146), 832, 841.
Thomas s. Folwell (2 Whart. 11), 665,
921.
Thomas s. Harkness (13 Bu9h, 23), 651,
686.
Thomas s. Harvie (10 Wheat. 146), 469.
Thomas s. Howell (L. R. 18 Eq. 198), 813.
Thomas, In. re (1 Hun, 473), 828.
Thomas s. James (82 Ala. 723), 987.
Thomas s. Jameson (77 Cal. 91), 313.
Thomas s. Jenks (5 Rawle, 221), 1361,
1371.
Thomas s. Jones (84 Ala. 302), 1490.
Thomas s. McCann (4 B. Mon. 601), 484.
Thomas s. Merry (113 Ind. 88), 75.
Thomas s. Scruggs (10 Terg. 401), 1006,
1123, 1215, 1231, 1341, 1589.
Thomas s. Standiford (49 Md. 181), 346,
358,532.
Thomas s. Stone (Walk. Ch. 117), 441.
Thomas s. Thomas (2 Kay & J. 79), 1536.
Thomas s. Thomas (62 Miss. 531), 313.
Thomas s. Thomas (24 Ore. 251; 33 Pac.
Rep. 565), 577.
Thomas s. Walker (5 Humph. 93), 309,
532.
Thomas s. White (3 Litt. 177), 461.
Thomas s. Wood (1 Md. Ch. 296), 259.
Thomas' Appeal (30 Pa. St. 378), 601.
Thomasons. Brown (43 Ind. 202), 1663.
Thompson s. Ballard (70 Md. 10), 111.
Thompsons. Blackstone (6 Beav. 470),
1107.
Thompsons. Blair (3 Murph. 583), 462,
1637.
Thompson s. Bowman (6 Wall. 316),
1420.
Thompson s. Branch (Meigs, 390 ; 33 Am.
Dee. 153), 65.
Thompson s. Brown (4 Johns. Ch. 619),
1120, 1134, 1136.
Thompson v. Clendening (1 Sand. Ch.
387), 1522.
Thompsonr. Conant (52 Minn. 208; 53
N. W. Rep. 1145), 1278.
Thompson s. Corly (27 Beav. 649), 735.
Thompsons. Corrie (57 Md. 197), 675.
Thompson s. Finch (8 De G.,M. & G.
560; 22 Beav. 316), 1235, 1588, 1595, 1696.
Thompson s. Ford (7 Ired. 418), 956.
Thompson s. Fry (51 Hun, 296), 1384.
Thompson s. Garwood (3 Whart. 287),
1011.
Thompson s. Gilliland (Add. 296), 1627.
Thompsons. Gilman (17 Vt. 109), 606.
Thompson s. Gordon (3 Strobh. 196),
78.
Thompsons. Grant (4Madd. 447), 970.
Thompson s. Griffin (1 Cr. & P. 326),
832, 835.
Thompson s. Harrison (2 Bro. Oh. 164;
1 Cos, 146), 539, 1697.
Thompson s. Hartline (16 So. Rep. 711),
428.
Thompson s. Heywood (129 Mass. 401),
1488, 1503, 1506.
Thompson s. Holman (28 Grant Ch.
(Ont.)35),1492.
Thompson s. Houze (48 Miss. 444), 1515,
1516.
Thompson s. Hudson (L. R. 2 Ch. 225),
1118.
Thompson, In re (L. R. 45 Ch. D, 161),
813.
Thompson v. Leach (Ventr. 198), 878,
892.
Thompson s. McDonald (2 Dev. & Bat.
Eq. 463), 1108.
Thompson s. McGaw (2 Watts, 161),
1641.
Thompson s. McKissick (3 Humph.
631), 133.
Thompsons. Marley (102 Mich. 476; 60
N.. W. Rep. 976), 215, 510.
Thompson s. Marshall (21 Ore. 171),
1440, 1444.
Thompson s. Mills (30 Ind. 532), 713.
Thompsons. Munger (15 Tex. 523), 455.
Thompson s. Murray (2 Hill Eq. 204;
29 Am. Dec. 68), 24.
Thompson v. Newlin (3 Ired. Eq. 338),
256.
Thompson s. Norris (20 N. J. Eq. 522),
777.
Thompson s. Parker (83 Ind. 96), 1368.
Thompsons. Peake (7 Rich. 353), 1721.
Thompson s. Perkins (3 Mason, 232),
204, 387, 388.
Thompson s. Sav. Inst. (8 Atl. Rep.
97), 1603, 1604.
Thompson s. Scott (1 111. App. 641),
705.
Thompson v. Simpson (1 Dr. & W.
489), 1540.
Thompson s. Smith (106 N. Car. 357),
709.
Thompsons. Spiers (13 Sim. 469), 1116.
Thompson s. Thompson (1 Jones, 430),
964.
ccx
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753. j
Thompson v. Thompson (2 B. Mon.
161), 904,1575.
Thompson v. Thompson (30 Neb. 489;
46 N. W. Eep. 638), 239.
Thompson v. Thompson (18 Ohio St.
73), 65.
Thompson v. Thompson (18 So. Eep.
247), 181.
Thompson v. Thompson (16 Wis. 91),
377, 1025.
Thompson v. Thompson (1 Yerg. 100),
47.
Thompson v. Wheatley (5 Sneed & M.
499), 388.
Thompson's Appeal (22 Pa. St. 16),
1607, 1609, 1630, 1633.
Thompson's Estate, In re (33 Barb.
334), 1649.
Thompson's Estate, In re (1 N. T. Supl.
213), 1684, 1703.
Thompson's Estate, In re (10 Pa. Co.
Ot. Eep. 472), 1619.
Thomsons. Thomson (7 Ves. 470), 560.
Thorn v. Newman (3 Swanst. 603), 978.
Thornberr. Sheard (12 Beav. 589), 282.
Thornber v. Wilson (3 Drew. 245; 4
Drew. 350), 732.
Thornburg v. Buck(13Ind. App. 446;
41 N. E. Eep. 85), 73.
Thornburg v. Jones (36 Mo. 514), 1109.
Thorndell v. Morrison (25 Pa. St. 326),
710.
Thornton v. Boyden (31 111. 200), 1092,
1099,1103, 1488.
Thornton v. Howe (31 Beav. 14), 809.
Thornton 11. Irwin (43 Mo. 153), 395,
1490, 1496.
Thornton v. Knox (6 B. Mon. 74), 569,
670 575,680.
Thornton v. Ogden (32 N. J. Eq. 723),
283.
Thornton v. Winston (4Leigh, 162), 887,
892.
Thorpe v. Oullen (1 Glim. 616), 392.
Thorpe v. Dunlap (4 Heisk. 674), 1408.
Thorpe v. Holdsworth (L. E. 7 Eq. 139),
600.
Thorpe, In re (Davies, 290), 1205, 1253,
1254.
Thorpe v. McOullum (1 Gilm. 614), 390,
401, 1184.
Thorpe v. Owen (5 Beav. 224), 73, 76,
155.
Thorwarth v. Armstrong (20 Minn. 464),
1480.
Thrasher v. Bentley (1 Abb. N. Oas.
39), 1350.
Thrasher v. Doig (18 Fla. 809), 705.
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton (91 Va.
42; 22 S. E. Eep. 162), 360.
Thrnpp v. Collett (26 Beav. 125), 804, 805.
Thruxton v. Attorney-General (1 Vern.
340), 1009.
Thnrber v. Blanck (50 N. Y. 80), 1403.
Thurber v. Larogue (105 N. Car. 301),
313, 335, 709, 714.
Thnrman v. Stoddard (63 Ala. 336), 574.
Thursby v. Thursby (L. E. 19 Eq. 395),
1437.
Thurston v. Dickinson (2 Eich. Eq.
317), 1434.
Thurston, Petitioner (154 Mass. 596),
158.
Thurston v. Prentiss (1 Mich. 193) , 1491.
Thurston v. Thurston (6 R. I. 296), 1034,
1434.
Thynn ». Thynn (1 Vern. 296), 219, 497,
506, 608, 513.
Thynn \v. Glengall (2 H. L. Cas. 131),
1528.
Tibbetts v. Weaver (5 Strobh. 144),
1408.
TIbbitts v. Tibbltts (19 Ves. 650), 128.
Tibbs, Inre (17 W. E. 304), 1132.
Tldd v. Lister (3 De G., M. & G. 857; 10
Hare, 140; 5 Madd. 429), 680, 954, 955,
956, 1425, 1429, 1430.
Tiernan v. Molliter (71 Mo. 512), 1419.
Tiernan v. Poor (1 Gill & J. 217) , 151.
Tiernan v. Thurman (14 B. Mon. 277),
569, 575.
Tierney v. Moody (3 Bing. 3), 919.
Tierneyu. Wood (19 Beav. 330), 88.
Tierney's Estate, In re (2 Pa. Dist. Eep.
524), 736.
Tiers v. Tiers (98 N. Y. 568), 1522.
Tiifany v. Clarke (58 N. Y. 632; 1 N. Y.
Sup. Ct. Add. 9), 31, 400.
Tiffin v. Longman (15 Beav. 276), 631.
Tittv. Mayo (61 Ga. 246), 1642.
Tilden v. Eiske (4 Dem. 357), 904.
Tilden v. Green (130 N. Y. 29;29N. E.
Eep. 1033), 53, 84, 751, 752.
Tilden, In re (44 Hun, 441), 1687.
Tilfordv. Torrey (63 Ala. 120), 204, 388,
532.
Tilley v. Massengill (7 Lea, 353), 1294.
Tilley v. Wolstenholme (7 Beav. 424),
1018.
Tilllnghast v. Bradford (5 R. I. 205),
1269, 1270, 1291, 1302, 1640, 1644.
Tilllnghast v, Ohamplin (4 R. I. 215 ; 67
Am. Dec. 610), 449.
Tilllnghast v. Coggeshall (7 R. I. 383),
93,96,105,964,965,988.
Tilllnghast v. Merrill [(45 N. E. Rep.
375), 1172.
Tillman v. Shaekleton (16 Mich. 447),
723.
Tillman v. Divers (31 Pa. St. 42), 387.
TABLE OF CASES.
CCXI
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Tilton v. Tilton (9 N. H. 386), 66.
Tilly v. Tilly (2 Bland, 436), 1002, 1060,
1131.
Timan v. Leland (6 Hill, 237), 1049.
Timson v. Eamsbottom (2 Keen, 35),
1116.
Tindal ». Drake (51 Ala. 674), 912.
Tinkom v. Purdy (5 Johns. 345), 1098,
1188.
Tinnan v. McOane (10 Tex. 248), 1537.
Tinsley v. Tinsley (52 Iowa, 14), 307,
575.
Tisdale v. Tlsdale (2 Sneed, 596; 64 Am.
Dec. 775), 1183.
Tishomingo Sav. Inst. v. Duke (1 So.
Rep. 165), 1506.
Tison v. Mattair (8 Fla. 107), 705.
Titchenell v. Jackson (26 W. Va. 460),
59.
Titcomb v. Currier (4 Cush. 591), 1107.
Titcomb v. Morrill (10 Allen, 15), 268.
Titleyo. Wolstenholme (7 Beav. 424),
872.
Todd v. Ames (60 N. Y. 454), 709.
loddv. Bncknan (2 Fairf. 41), 1358.
Todd v. Cannon (8 Humph. 512), 1742.
Todd v. Grove (33 Md. 188), 286, 292.
Todd, Inre (19 Beav. 582), 682.
Todd v. Johnson (51 Iowa, 192), 1444.
Todd v. Johnson (50 Minn. 608) , 1513.
Todd v. Lee (15 Wis. 369), 699, 711.
Todd v. Moore (1 Leigh, 457), 404.
Todd v. Moorehouse (L. R. 19 Eq. 67) ,
350.
Todd v. Munson (53 Conn. 579), 231, 1736.
Todd v. Todd (1 S. & R. 453), 1322.
Toker v. Toker (3 De G., J. & S. 487; 31
Beav. 629), 158.
Tolar v. Tolar (1 Dev. Eq. 456), 152, 159,
160.
Toller v. Carteret (2 Vern. 494), 35.
Tolles v. Wood (99 N. T. 618; 16 Abb. N".
Cas, 1), 1297.
Tolleson v. Blackstock (95 Ala. 510; 11
So. Bep. 284), 145.
Tollett v. Tollett (2 P. Wms. 489; 1
Lead. Cas. Eq. 227), 622.
Tolson v. Sheard (L. E. 6 Ch. D. 19),
1138.
Tolson v. Tolson (10 Gill & J. 159), 124.
Toman v. Dunlop (18 Pa. St. 72), 1280.
Tomkinsw. Ppwell (6 Leigh, 676), 327.
Tomkinsv. Tomkins (18 N. J. Eq. 303),
834.
Tomlinson v. Matthews (98 111. 178), 183.
Tomlinson©. Smallwood (15 N. J. Eq.
286), 1401.
Tomlinson v. Steers (3 Meriv. 210), 978.
Tompkins v. Hunter (149 N. T. 117),
1374.
Tompkins v. Mitchell (2 Band. 428), 216,
569, 679.
Tompkins v. Moseman (5 Redf. 402),
1055.
Tompkins v. Tompkins (18 S. Oar. 1),
1234.
Tompkins v. Wheeler (16 Pet. 118), 1381.
Tompkins v. Williams (2B. & Aid. 84),
938.
Toms v. Owen (62 Fed. Bep. 421), 125.
Tomso. Williams (41 Mich. 552), 616.
Tongue v. Morton (6 Harr. & J. 21), 452.
Tooke v. Hollingsworth (5 T. R. 226),
972.
Tooke v. Newman (75 111. 215), 1673.
Tool Co. v. Morris (2 Wall. 45), 557.
Toombs v. Consolidated Poe Mining Co.
(15Nev. 444), 676.
Tophamw. Portland (IDe G., J. & S.
517), 1007, 1008.
Toronto Trust Co. v. Chicago By. Co.
(123 N. Y. 37), 918.
Torran v. Bolton (L. E. 14 Eq. 124), 585.
Torre v. Torre (1 Sm. & G. 518), 103.
Torrence v. Shedd (156 111. 194; 41 N. E.
Eep. 95), 213.
Torrey v. Bank oj Orleans (9 Paige,
649), 207, 330, 390, 415, 1184, 1496.
Tottenham, In re (16 Ired. Eq. 118),
399.
Tourville v. Naish (3 P. Wms. 387), 441.
Towers v. Hagner (3 Whart. 67), 715.
Towlea. Ambs (123111. 401), 1101.
Towle v. Wadsworth (147 111. 80;30N.
E. Eep. 602), 319.
Towlert;. Towler (142 N. T. 371;36N.
E. Rep. 869), 168,612.
Towns. Ammidown (20 Pick. 535), 853,
884, 980, 1020.
Town v. Bank (2 Doug. 530), 1411.
Town, Ex parte (2 Mont. & Ayr. 29), 382.
Town v. Jaquith (6 Mass. 46), 1122.
Town v. Eublee (51 Vt. 62), 1384.
Townley v. Bedell (6 Ves. 194), 734.
Townley v. Sherborne (Bridg. 35), 1124,
1233.
Town of Hampden v. Eice (24 Conn.
357), 737.
Town of Solon v. Williamsburgh Sav.
Bank ( 114 N. T. 122), 560.
Townsend«. Allen (59 Hun, 622; 13 N.
Y. Supl. 73), 149, 164,
Townsend v. Barber (1 Dick. 356), 1126.
Townsend v. Brothers (18 Ala. 301),
1377.
Townsend v. Champernown (1 Y. & J.
538) , 930.
Townsend, Ex parte (1 Moll. 139), 1244.
Townsend v. Kendall (4 Minn. 412), 826,
847.
ccxu
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Townaend v. Matthews (10 Ma. 251),
654, 655.
Townsend v. Backhaul (143 N. X. 516;
38 N. E. Eep. 731), 53.
Townsend v. Townsend (1 Giff. 201),
1219.
Townsend v. Townsend (156 Mass. 454),
1003.
Townsend v. Wescott (2 Beav. 340), 98.
TownBend v. Wilson (1 B. & A. 608), 980,
1122, 1451.
Townsend v. Windham (2 Ves. 392), 34,
99, 717.
Townshend u. Prommer (125 N. Y. 446;
26 N. E. Eep. 805), 611, 617, 918, 919.
Townshend v. Townshend (1 Bro. Ch.
554), 461,462,467,1536.
Townshend v. Westacott (2 Beav. 340),
354.
Townson v. Harrison (L. R. 43 Oh. D.
55), 1436.
Townson v. Tickell (3 B. & Aid. 31), 878,
892, 893,894,1016.
Tracey v. Gravois R. Oo. (13 Mo. App.
296; 84 Mo. 210), 1701.
Tracey v. Sackett (1 Ohio St. 65; 59
Am. Dec. 610), 521.
Tracy v. Colby (55 Cal. 67), 431.
Tracy v. Keith (11 Allen, 214), 704, 707.
Tracy v. Kelley (52 Ind. 535), 204, 388,
532.
Tracy v. Talmage (14 N. T. 162), 563.
Tracy v. Tracy (15 Barb. 503), 1354, 1355.
Trafford v. Ashton (1 P. Wms. 416),
1526, 1529.
Trafford v. Boehm (3 Atk. 440), 1206,
1253.
Trafford o. Wilkinson (3 Tenn. Ch. 701),
364.
Transylvania Univ. v. Clay (2 B. Mon.
386), 1211, 1218.
Traphagen v. Burt (67 N. T. 30), 372,
374.
Traphagan v. Levy 45 N. J. Eq. 448),
1002,1060,1131.
Trapnellc. Brown (19 Ark. 49), 219,525,
527.
Trapnelltf. Conklyn (37 W. Va. 242; 16
S. E. Rep. 570), 661.
Trappers. Meredith (L. R. 9 Eq. 229),
1269.
Trash i>. White (3 Bro. Ch. 291), 984.
Trash v. Wood (4 Myl. & Or. 324), 1277.
Trask v. Donaghue (1 Aik. 370), 877, 885,
894.
Travell v. Danvers (Finch, 380), 904.
Travers v. Travers (L. R. 14 Eq. 275),
246, 1560.
Travis v. Illingworth (2 Dr. & Sm. 344;
L. J. 34 Ch. 665), 867, 868, 871, 900.
Travis v. Lee (58 Hun, 605), 709.
Treadwell v. Cordis (5 Gray, 341), 856,
1002, 1013, 1016, 1060.
Treadwell v. Salisbury Mfg. Co. (7
Gray, 393 ; 66 Am. Dec. 490), 1062.
Treat v. Stanton (14 Conn. 455), 1266.
Treat's Appeal (30 Conn. 113) , 747, 777.
Trecothick v. Austin (4 Mason, 16),
461, 1535, 1631, 1632.
Tufts v. King (18 Pa. St. 157), 449.
Tregonwell v. Sydenham (3 Dow. 194),
242, 248, 249.
Trelawney v. Booth (2 Atk. 307), 258.
Trembles v. Harrison (IB. Mon. 140),
28.
Tremmelt). Klieboldt (75 Mo. 255), 1264.
Tremper v. Burton (18 Ohio, 418), 335,
339, 366.
Trench v. Harrison (17 Sim. Ill), 307,
359.
Trenbolm, Ex parte (19 S. Car. 126), 237,
308,350.
Trent v. Harding (10 Ves. 495; 7 East,
95; IB. & P. 116), 178, 922, 930, 942.
Trent v. Trent (1 Dow. 102), 1352.
Trenton Banking Co. v. Woodruff (2 N.
J. Eq. 117) , 647, 651, 652, 686.
Trescott v. Trescott (lMcCord Ch. 417),
860.
Trethowan, In re (L. R. 5 Ch. D. 659),
600.
Trevanion v. Morse (3 Ves. 32), 438.
Trevelyan v. Charter (9 Beav. 140; 4L.
J. Ch. 209), 392, 393, 419, 426.
Treves v. Townsend (1 Bro. Ch. 384),
1255.
Trevor v. Trevor (2 Myl. & K. 675), 978.
Trevor a. Trevor (1 P. Wms. 622), 90,
101, 102, 103, 105.
Trew v. Perpetual Trustees Co., (11
Rep. 423), 1042.
Trezevant v. Howard (5 Desaus. 87), 43.
Trexler v. Miller (6 Ind. 248), 297.
Tribble v. Oldham (5 J. J. Marsh. 137),
570.
Trim v. Brightman (168 Pa. St. 395; 31
Atl. Rep. 1071), 736.
Trimble v. Doty (16 Ohio St. 118), 280.
Trimbles. Rels (37 Pa. St. 448), 710.
Trimmer v. Bayne (7 Ves. 520; 9 Ves.
209), 238, 437,1532.
Triplett v. Roinne (33 Gratt. 651), 711.
Trist v. Child (21 Wall. 441), 556.
Troll v. Carter (15 W. Va. 567), 231, 377,
500, 518, 621, 523.
Trollope v. Linton (1 Sim. & Stn. 477),
12.
Trotter v. Blocker (6 Port. (Ala.) 269),
44,1062,1131, 1402, 1678.
Trotter j). Ervin (27 Miss. 772), 676.
TABLE OF CASES.
CCXU1
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Trotters. Smith (59 111. 244), 206, 423.
Trough's Estate (75 Pa. St. 115), 151.
Troup's Case (29 Beav. 363), 993, 1032,
1033.
Trout 17. B. K. Co. (33 Gratt. 645), 1117.
Trowelltf. Carraway (10 Heisk. 104), 78.
Trower v. Knlghtley (6 Madd. 134),
1012, 1013.
Troy v. Haskell (33 N. H. 533), 20.
Troy v. Troy (1 Busb. Eq. 85), 1034.
Truebody v. Jacobson (2 Oal. 269), 570,
574.
Truell v. Tyson (21 Beav. 439), 1085.
Truesdell v. Calloway (6 Miss. 605), 432.
595.
Trull v. Bigelow (16 Mass. 406), 435, 445.
Trull v. Trull (13 Allen, 407), 1203.
Trulock v. Peeples (3 Kelly, 446), 445.
Trust Co. v. Sedgwick (97 U. S. 304), 24.
Trustees v. Beatty (28 N. J. Eq. 570),
749, 756,811.
Trustees v. Bradbury (11 Me. 118), 1217.
Trustees v. Chambers (3 Jones Eq. 253),
753.
Trustees v. Clay (2 B. Mon. 386), 1203.
Trustees v. Northampton (10 Allen,
498), 997.
Trustees v. Wheelan (59 Barb. 585),
197.
Trustees v. Whitney (3 N. E. Bep. 513),
819.
Trustees, Emory & Henry College v.
Shoemaker (92 Va. 320; 23 S. E.
Eep. 765), 1719.
Truston, Ex parte (164 Mass. 596), 1619.
Trutch v. Lamprell (20 Beav. 116), 1005,
1129, 1130, 1234.
Tryon v. Huntoon (67 Cal. 325), 309, 361,
362.
Tryon, In re (7 Beav. 496), 975.
Tuck v. Bucholz (43 Iowa, 415), 286.
Tucker v. Andrews (13 Me. 124), 648,
552, 553.
Tucker v. Burrow (2 H. & M. 515), 339,
362, 366.
Tucker v. Gest (46 Mo. 339), 708.
Tucker v. Grundy (83 Ky . 540), 895.
Tucker v. Hadley (52 Miss. 414), 576.
Tucker, Inre (L. E. (1894) 1 Ch. 724; 3
Ch. 429), 1209.
Tucker v. Johnson (16 Sim. 341), 924, 926,
930.
Tuckers). Moreland (10 Pet. 71), 11, 12,
27.
Tucker v. Phipps (3Atk. 359), 377, 558.
Tucker v. Seamans' Aid Soc. (7 Met.
188), 21, 748, 756, 763.
Tucker v. Silver (9 Iowa, 261), 946.
Tucker v. State (72 Ind. 242), 988, 1202,
1215.
Tucker v. Tucker (5 Barb. 99), 111.
Tucker v. Tucker (4 B. & Ad. 745), 960.
Tucker v. Tucker (1 McCord Ch. 176),
1537.
Tucker v. Tucker (33 N. J. Eq. 235),
1202,1203, 1210,1213.
Tucker v. Tucker (6 N. T. 408), 1072.
Tucker's Appeal (75 Pa. St. 354), 266,
652, 653.
Tudball v. Medlicott (59 L. T. (N. S.)
370; 36 W. E. 886), 1116.
Tufts v. Copen (37 W. Va. 623; 16 S. E.
Eep. 793), 711.
Tuigg v. Treacy (104 Pa. St. 493), 794.
Tullett v. Armstrong (1 Beav. l;4Myl.
& Cr. 377), 648, 651, 652, 653, 667, 668,
670,671,698, 1274.
Tullitta. Tullitt (Amb. 370), 829, 830.
Tullock v. Hartley (1 Y. & C. 144), 35.
Tunnardji. Littell (23 ST. J. Eq. 264), 232,
370.
Tunno, Ex parte (1 Bail. Eq. 395), 905.
Tunno v. Trezevant (2Desaus. 264), 103.
Tunstall v. Boothby (10 Sim. 452), 38.
Tunstali v. Trappes (3 Sim. 286), 443.
Tupper». Fuller (7 Eich. Eq. 170), 1192,
1434.
Tupplew. Viers (14 Iowa, 515), 575.
Turkesw. Eeis (14 Abb. N. Cas. 26), 577.
Turley v. Massengill (7 Lea, 353), 1269.
Turley v. Turley (11 Ohio St. 173), 1523.
Turnbull v. Pomeroy (140 Mass. 117),
1689.
Turner v. Corney (5 Beav. 517), 996,
1005, 1056, 1244, 1564.
Turner v. Cutkrell (94 N. Car. 239), 1468.
Turner v. Debell (2 A. K. Marsh. 384),
461.
Turner, Ex parte (9 Mod. 418), 1652.
Turner, Ex parte (1 Bailey Ch. 395), 596.
Turners. Flagg (6 Ind. App. 563; 33 N.
E. Eep. 1104), 834.
Turner v. Hallowell Sav. Ins. (76 Me.
527), 106.
Turners. Harvey (1 Jacobs, 178), 489,
495, 947.
Turner v. Horner (29 Ark. 440), 574.
Turner v. Hoyle (95 Mo. 337), 1649, 1657.
Turner, In re (10 Barb. 552), 830, 1092.
Turner, Inre (2 DeG., F. & J. 527), 930.
Turner v. Jaycox (40 N. T. 270) , 1364.
Turner v. Kelly (70 Ala. 85), 655.
Turner v. King (2 Ired. Eq. 132; 38 Am.
Dec. 679), 499.
Turners;. Letts (7 DeG., M. & G. 243),
600.
Turner v. Marriott (L. E. 3Eq. 744),
585.
Turner v. Maule (5 Eng. L. A Eq. 222;16
Jur. 761), 865, 869,904, 907.
CCX1V
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol.
Turner v. Nye (7 Allen, 176), 147.
Turners. Ogden (1 Cox, 316), 732.
Turner v. Pettigrew (6 Humph. 438),
223, 532, 1625.
Turner v. Russell (10 Hare, 204), 255.
Turner v. Turner (44 Ark. 25), 1701.
Turner*?. Turner (20 Beav. 560), 681.
Turners. Turner (4 Sim. 434), 837,841.
Turner v. Wardle (7 Sim. 80), 881.
Turner v. Watkins (31 Ark. 429), 1440.
Turner v. Williams (7 Terg. 172), 1255.
Turpie v. Lowe (4 Ohio Oir. Ot. 599), 195.
Turquand v. Marshall (L. B. 6 Eq. 112),
1138.
Turton v. Turton (6 lid. 375), 655.
Tuttle v. Gilmore (36 N. J. Eq. 618), 1201,
1202, 1226, 1227.
Tuttle v, Howe (14 Minn. 145; 100 Am.
Dec. 205), 707.
Tuttle v. Jackson (6 Wend. 213), 446.
Tuttle v. Morris (81 N. Y. 91), 560.
Tuttle v. Eobinson (33 N. H. 118), 1689.
Twaddle's Appeal (5 Pa. St. 15), 1210,
1212.
Tweedy v. Urquhart (30 Ga. 446), 864,
874.
Twin Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury (91 U. S.
587), 411, 412.
Twinnlg's Appeal (97 Pa. St. 36), 159.
Twiselton v. Griffith (1 P. Wms. 310),
282.
Twitchell v. Bridge (42 Vt. 68), 475.
Twitcbell v. Drury (25 Mich. 393), 604.
Twopenny v. Payton (10 Sim. 487), 1291.
Tylden v. Hyde (2 S. & S. 238), 1037.
Tylee v. Webb (6 Beav. 552; 14 Beav.
14), 443.
Tyler v. Black (13 How. 230), 480.
Tyler v. Deblois (4 Mason, 131), 856.
Tylers. Herring (67 Miss. 169; 19 Am.
St. Eep. 263), 951, 958, 1005, 1067, 1094,
1114, 1458.
Tyler, In re (L. E. (1891) 3 Ch. 252), 820.
Tyler v. Jewett (82 Ala. 93), 560.
Tylers. Lake (2 Euss. & M. 183), 655.
Tyler v. Mayre (95Cal. 160), 895.
Tyler v. Tyler (3 Beav. 563), 1593.
Tylers. Tyler (25 111. App. 333), 51, 57.
Tynan v. Warren (31 Atl. Eep. 596), 227.
Tyrrell v. Bank of London (27 Beav.
273), 413.
Tyrrel v. Hope (2 Atk. 658), 932, 976.
Tyrrell v. Morris (1 Dev. & Bat. 559),
455.
Tyrrell's Case (Dyer, 155a), 912.
Tyrwhitt v. Tyrwhitt (32 Beav. 244), 978,
1433.
Tysons. Latrobe (42 Md. 325), 1073.
Tyson s. Mickle (2 Gill, 376), 1093,1097,
1100.
I, pp. 1-847; Vol.11, pp. 848-1753.]
Tyson v. Passmore (2 Pa. St. 1221, 44 Am,
Dec. 181), 877.
Tyson s. Tyson (54 Md. 35), 657.
Tytcher s. Byles (1 T. E. 435), 1000.
u.
Udall s. Kenney (3 Cow. 50), 480.
Udell v. Atherton (7 Hurl. & N. 172), 476,
484.
Uhlerw. Maulfair (23 Pa. St, 481), 1370.
Uhler v. Semple (5 C. E. Green, 291),
474.
Uhrig v. Horstman (8 Bush, 172), 706.
Ullman s. Mace (115 N. Car. 24; 20 S. E.
Eep. 166), 709.
Ulrich v. Beck (1 Harris, 631; 4 Harris,
499), 443.
Underhill v. Harwood (10 Ves. 209), 480.
Underwood v. Bank (141 Mass. 305; 4 N.
E. Eep. 822), 1753.
Underwoods. Curtis (127 N. T. 523), 63.
Underwood v. Dugan (139 U. S. 380), 1542.
Underwood v. Stevens (1 Meriv. 714),
1128, 1217, 1223, 1591.
Underwoods. Sutcliffe (77 N. T. 51),
372, 374.
Ungers. Deiter (32 Ohio St. 210), 577.
Ungless v. Tuff (L. E. 30 Ch. 784), 1136.
Uniacke, Inre (1 Jon. &La. 1), 879.
Uniacke W.Giles (2 Moll. 257), 151.
Union Bank v. Baker (8 Humph. 447),
369.
Union Bank v. Ellicott (6 Gill & J. 363),
10, 1411.
Union Canal Co. v. Toung (1 Whart.
410), 440, 442.
Union College v. Wheeler (59 Barb. 585),
307.
Union Co. v. Sprague (14 E. I. 452), 1440.
Union M. E. Church v. Wilkinson (36
N. J. Eq. 141), 749.
Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell (95 111.
267; 35 Am. Eep. 166), 59, 61, 880.
Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Slee (123 111.
57), 1512.
Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spaids (99
111. 249), 1668.
Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. White (106
111. 67), 1440.
Union Nat. Bank v. Goetz (138 111.127;
27 N. E. Eep. 907), 29, 1607..
Union Pac. Ey. v. Artist (60 Fed. Eep.
365; 9 0. C. A. 14), 736.
Union Pac. E. E. Co. v. McAlpine (129
U. S. 305), 1625.
Union Trust Oo. v. Trumbull (163 111.
146), 1408.
Unitarian Soo. v. Woodbury (14 Me.
281), 47.
TABLE OF OASES.
CCXV
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. n, pp. 848-1753.]
United States v. Atherton (102 U. S.
872), 1738, 1741.
United States v. Bank of North Carolina
(6 Pet. 29), 1423.
United States v. Bank of U. S. (8 Bob.
(La.) 262), 1388, 1411, 1420.
United States v. Clark (1 Paine, 629),
1423.
United States v. Pox (94 U. S. 315; 52 N.
Y. 530), 737, 745, 815.
United States v. Gillespie (9 Fed. Bep.
74), 1718, 1720.
United States v. Hooe (3 Cranch, 73),
1423.
United States v. Howland (4 Wheat.
108), 1423.
United States v. Hoyt (1 Blatchf . 332),
224, 1383.
United States v. Inh. Waterborough
(Davies, 154), 202,203.
United States v. McLellan (3 Sumn.
345), 1423.
United States v. Mott (1 Paine, 188) , 1360.
United States v. Manroe (5 Mason, 672),
1422.
United States v. State Bank (96 U. S.
30), 530, 531, 1625.
United States v. U. P. By. Co. (11
Blatchf. 385), 174.
United States Bank v. Beverly (10 Pet.
532; 1 How. 134), 940.
United States Bank v. Lee (13 Pet. 107),
473.
United States Ins. Co. v. Schriver (3
Md. Ch. 381), 441.
United States Trust Co. v. Bocae (116
N. T. 120), 992, 1032.
United States Trust Co. v. Stanton (139
N. T. 531; 34 N. E. Rep. 1098), 1224.
Unity, etc. Bank Assn. v. King (25 Beav.
72), 608.
University ». Garrow (1 De G. & J. 72),
735.
University College, In re (2Phill. 521),
785.
Updegraff v. Commonwealth (11 S. & R.
394), 733, 809.
Upham v. Varney (15 N. H. 462), 96, 912,
941.
Upham v. Wyman (7 Allen, 499), 961.
Uppington v. Bullen (2 Dm. & War.
184), 382, 418.
Upshawv. Hargrove (6 Sm. & M. 292),
440, 569, 595.
Upson v. Badeau (3Bradf. Surr. 13),
1221.
Urann v. Ooates (109 Mass. 581), 49, 880,
1684, 1689.
Urch v. Walker (3 Myl. & Cr. 702), 50,
862, 882.
Urmey v. Wooden (1 Ohio St. 160; 59
Am. Dec. 615), 750.
Urquhart v. King (7 Ves. 225), 245.
Urquhart v. Leverett (69 Ga. 92), 449.
Urquhart v. Macpherson (L, E. 3 App.
Cas. 831), 1540.
Usher v. MoBratney (3 Dillon, 385), 555.
Utica Ins. Co. v. Lynch (11 Paige, 520),
1682, 1583.
Utterson v. Maire (4 Bro. Ch. 270 ; 2 Ves.
Jr. 95), 455, 1655.
Uvedale v. Ettrieh (2 Ch. Ca. 130), 974.
Uzzell v. Mack (4 Humph. 319; 40 Am.
Dec. 648), 577.
Uzzle«. Wood (1 Jones Eq. 226), 160.
Vaccaro v. Cicalla (89 Tenn. 63), 1058.
Vachell v. Jefferies (Prec. Ch. 170), 245,
Vail v. Durant (7 Allen, 408), 1635.
Vailv. Foster (4 N.Y. 12), 241,580.
Vail v. Jacobs (62 Mo. 130), 1453, 1455,
1488, 14C8, 1500.
Vaill v. Knapp (49 Barb. 299), 38.
Vaill v. Mey (71 Ind. 159), 706.
Vaill v. Vaill (49 Conn. 52), 655.
Vaill v. Vaill (4 Paige, 317), 111, 917, 919.
Valentine v. Bell (66 Vt. 280; 29 Atl.
Bep. 251), 661.
Valentine v. Decker (43 Mo. 583), 1376.
Valentine, In re (3Dem. 563), 1055.
Valentine v. Biohardt (126 N. Y. 272; 27
N. E. Bep. 255; 14 ST. Y. Supl. 483),
619,523.
Valentine v. Schreiber (3 Hun App.
235; 38 K. Y. Supl. 417), 617, 1069.
Valentine v. Valentine (3 Barb. Ch.
438), 1687.
Valette v. Tedens (122 III. 607; 14 N. E.
Bep. 52), 417,431.
Valle v. Bryan (19 Mo. 423), 532.
Vallette v. Bennett (69 111. 632), 1033,
1072, 1119.
Van Aken v. Gleason (34 Mich. 478),
1516.
Van Alen v. American Nat. Bank (52 N.
Y. 1), 1632, 1634.
Vanbever v. Vanbever (30 S. W. Rep.
983), 526.
Van Bokkelin v. Tinges (58 Md. 57),
1649.
Van Bracklin v. Fonda (12 Johns. 468) ,
487.
Van Bramer v. Hoffman (2 Johns. Ch.
200), 840.
Van Buren v. Chenango Co. Ins. Co.
(12 Barb. 672), 1006, 1341.
Van Buskirk v. Ins. Co. (14 Conn, 145),
1117
CCXVl
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 818-1753.]
Vance v. Campbell (1 Dana, 229), 1042.
Vance v. Kirk (29 W. Va. 344; 1 S. E.
Eep. 717), 1587, 1625.
Vance©. Nogle (70 Pa. St. 176), 651,686.
Vance v. Vance (21 Me. 364), 100.
Van Cott v. Prentice (104 N. Y. 45 ; 10 N.
E. Eep. 251), 69, 163, 227,852,1744,
1746.
Vandenberg v. Palmer (4 Kay & J. 204) ,
81, 155.
Vanderbilt, In re (20 Hun, 520), 1746,
1751.
Vandergncht v. De Blaquiere (5 Myl. &
Cr. 229), 697.
Vanderheyden v. Vanderheyden (2
Paige, 288), 1687.
Vanderpool v. Gorman (140 N. Y. 563),
1412, 1413.
Vandersheyden v. Crandall (2 Denio,
9), 913,920,940, 1066.
Vandervolgen v. Yates (3 Barb. Ch.
242), 913.
Vandervoort, In re (1 Redf. Sur. 270),
1082.
Vandever's Appeal (8W. & S. 405; 42
Am. Dec. 305), 1122, 1125.
Vandoren v. Todd (2 Groen Ch. 397),
576.
VanDuynu. Van Duyn (McCart. Ch.
49), 122.
Van Duzer v. Van Duzer (6 Paige, 366) ,
826.
Van Dyke v. Johns (1 Del. Ch. 93; 12
Am. Dec. 76), 1184.
Vane v. Eegden (L. E. 5 Ch. 653), 1446.
Vane v. Vane (L. E. 8 Ch. 383), 491, 494.
Van Epps v. Van Deusen (4 Paige, 64),
678, 976.
Van Epps v. Van Epps (9 Paige, 327),
330, 390,394, 416, 1171.
Van Henson v. Badcliffe (17 N. Y. 580),
1408.
Van Home v. Campbell (104 N. Y. 287;
3 H. E. Eep. 316), 105, 108, [619.
Van Home v. Fonda (5 Johns. Ch. 388),
194, 197, 198, 328, 329, 382, 398, 862, 884,
1051, 1164.
Van Home v. Harrison (1 Dall. 137),
940.
Van Horn, In re (7 Paige, 46), 287.
Van Home, In re (18 E. I. 389; 28 Atl.
Eep. 341), 1071.
Van Houten v. Dutch Church (17 N. J.
Eq. 126), 782,1070.
Van Houten v. McKelway (17 N. J. Eq.
126), 1718, 1721.
Van Meters. Darrah (115 Mo. 153; 22 S.
W. Eep. 30), 1461,1462.
Vanmeterv. McFadden (8B.Mon. 436),
601.
Vann v. Barnett (2 Bro. Oh. 158), 842,
1573.
Vanners v. Jacobus (17 N. J. Eq. 153),
1002, 1060, 1072.
Van Nest v. Yoe (1 Sand.Ch. 4), 1404.
Vannoy v. Martin (6 Ired. Eq. 169; 51
Am. Dec. 418), 497.
Van Eossum v. Walker (11 Barb. 237),
1368.
Van Eyn v. Vincent (1 McCordCh. 814),
461.
Vansiltart v. Vansiltart (2DeG. &J.
249), 725.
Van Syckle v. Dalrymple (5 Stew. Eq.
233), 269.
Van Syckle v. Kleine (34 N. J. Eq. 332),
308.
Van Vechten v. Van Vechten (8 Paige,
104), 1522.
Van Vleet v. Slanson (35 Barb. 317), 1364.
Van Vrouker v. Eastman (7 Mete. 167),
1434.
Van Waggoner v. Moses (26 N. J. L.
570), 1385.
Van Winkle v. Van Houten (2 Green
Ch. 172), 1355.
Van Wyck, In re (1 Barb. Ch. 565), 902,
1040, 1123.
Van Wyck v. Seward (18 Wend. 376), 99.
Vanzants. Dayies (6 Ohio St. 52), 256.
Varick v. Briggs (6 Paige, 326), 327, 436.
Varick v. Edwards, (11 Paige, 289; 1
HoflCh. 383), 34,1537.
Varners. Gunn (61 Ga. 54), 1108.
Varner's Appeal (80 Pa. St. 140), 651,
686.
Varney v. Stevens (22 Me. 331), 1434.
Varnun v. Meserve (8 Allen, 15S), 396,
1462.
Vason v. Beale (58 Ga. 500), 1172.
Vattier v. Hlnde (7 Pet. 252), 435, 441,
442.
Vaughan v. Barclay (6 Whart. 392), 35,
36, 1742.
Vaughan v. Buck (13 Sim. 404), 680.
Vaughan v. Farmer (90 N. Car. 607),
1037.
Vaughan v. Marable (64 Ala. 60), 1516.
Vaughan v. Noble (30 Beav. 34), 1173.
Vaughan v. Northrup (15 Pet. 1), 1743.
Vaughan v. Powell (65 Miss. 402), 951,
958, 1114, 1458.
Vaughan v. Thomas (L. E. 33 Ch. D. 187),
732, 765.
Vaughan v. Vanderslegen (2 Dr. 363),
381, 1592.
Vaux v. Nesbit (1 McC. Ch. 362), 28.
Vaus v. Parke (7 W. & S. 19), 913, 919,
920, 1288, 1295.
Veal v. Veal (89 Ky . 314), 1736.
TABLE OF CASES.
CCXVU
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Veasey v. Doton (3 Allen, 381), 481, 488.
Veasie v. Williams (8 How. 134), 461,
465.
Veazie v. Forsaith (76 Me. 172), 995, 1026,
1192.
Veazie v. Williams {3 Story, 631), 489.
Vecbte v. Brownell (8 Paige, 212), 146
Veil v. Mitchell (4 Wash. 105), 1625, 163S
Venable v. Cofiman (2 W. Va. 319), 777,
789.
Venable v. East India Co. (2 Exc. 633),
884, 893.
Venable s v. Morris (7 T. E. 342), 942.
Ventres v. Cobb (105 111. 33), 1444, 1469,
1505.
Verdin v. Slocum (71 N. T. 345), 616.
Verner v. Winstanley (8 Sch.&Lef.393),
480.
Verney v. Verney (Ami). 88; 1 Ves. 428),
1159.
Vernon o. Board of Police (47 Miss. 181),
987.
Vernon, Ex parte (2 P. Wms. 549), 307.
Vernon v. Morton (8 Dana, 247), 1367.
Vernon v. Vernon (Amb. 4), 127.
Vernon v. Vernon (53 N. T. 351), 616.
Verona v. Peckham (66 Barb. 103), 1248.
Verplank v. Caines (1 Johns. Oh. 67),
355.
Verplank v. Ins. Co. (1 Edw. Ch. 84), 405,
410.
Verplank v. Storry (12 Johns. 536), 98.
Very v. Russell (65 ST. H. 646), 1490, 1491,
1492.
Vesey v. Jameson (1 Sim. & St. 69), 83,
263.
Vestal v. Sloan (76 N. Car. 127), 1171,
1172.
Vestry, etc. v. Barksdale (1 Strobh. Eq.
197), 1716.
Vetterlein v. Barnes (124 U. S. 169),
1728.
Vez v. Emery (5 Ves. 142), 1222.
Vick v. McDaniel (3 How. 337), 259.
Vicker's Trusts, In re (L. E. 3 Ch. D.
112), 869.
Vidal v. Girard (2How. 187), 18, 19,20,22,
596, 733, 734, 737, 742, 744, 745, 749, 763,
777, 809, 1547.
Viele v. Blodgett (49 Vt. 270), 204, 377,
388,434,435,633, 1628.
Vigrassn. Binfleld (3 Madd. 62), 1102,
1571.
Villardu. Eobert (2 Strob. Eq. 40; 49
Am. Dec. 654), 829.
Villa Kica Lumber Co. v. Paratain (92
Ga. 370; 17 S. E. Rep. 340), 705.
Villars v. Beaumont (1 Vern. 99), 158,
273.
ViUiers v. Villiers (2 Atk. 72), 919, 942.
Villines v. Norfleet (2 Dev. Eq. 167),
1594.
Vincent v. Beshopre (5 Exc. 683), 1009.
Vincent v. Godson (1 Sm. & G. 384), 881.
Vinera.Cadell (3Esp. 88), 972.
Viney v. Abbott (109 Mass. 300), 153,164,
158, 160.
iret v. Viret (L. E. 17 Ch. D. 365 n.),
653.
Vlser v. Bertrand (14 Ark. 271) , 704.
Vlzonneau v. Pegram (2 Leigh, 183), 11,
664, 665.
Voesslng v. Voessing (4 Eedf . 360), 839.
Vogt v. Tichener (48 N . H. 242), 708.
Volans v. Carr (2 De G. & Sm. 242), 845.
Voltzi). Voltz (75 Ala. 555), 286.
Von Hesse v. Mackaye (136 N. T. 114),
1744.
Von Trothar v. Bamberger (15 Colo. 1;
24 Pac. Eep. 883), 231, 433.
Voorhees v. Presbyterian Church (8
Barb. 136) , 390, 416, 618.
Voris v. Sloan (29 111. 201), 1742.
Vose v. Grant (15 Mass. 505), 597.
Vose v. Trustees (2 Woods, 647), 951,
1115, 1138.
Voyleu. Hughes (2 Sm. & Gif. 18), 166,
1117.
Vreeland v. Ryno (26 ST. J. Eq. 160), 708.
Vreeland v. Van Horn (2 Green, 137),
1591.
Vreeland v, Vreeland (16 N. J. Eq. 512),
708.
Vysea. Foster (L. E. 8 Ch. App. 309),
1173, 1257.
Vyvyan vr Vyvyan (30 Beav. 65), 1598.
w.
Wackerbath v. Powell (Buck. 495), 1128.
Wadd v. Hazleton (137 N. Y. 215; 33 N.
E. Rep. 143; 17 N. T. Supl. 410), 62,
879, 881.
Waddell v. Carlock (41 Ark. 623), 574.
Waddington v. Banks (1 Brock. 97),
241.
Waddy v. Hawkins (4 Leigh, 458), 1690.
Wade v. Am. Colon. Soc. (7 Sm. & M.
663; 45 Am. Dec. 324), 750, 1721.
Wade v. Harper (3 Yerg. 483), 396, 426,
1183.
Wade v. Paget (1 Bro. Ch. 363), 622.
Wadeti. Pettibone (11 Ohio St. 57; 14
Ohio, 557), 206, 383, 389, 392, 417,423.
Wade v. Wilson (33 W. R. 610), 1429.
Wadham v. Am. Home, etc. Soc. (12 N.
Y. 415), 664.
Wadsworth v. Connell (104 111. 369), 987,
1119.
Wadsworth v. Hodge (88 Ala. 500), 689.
ccxvm
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. 1, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Wadsworth, In re (2 Barb. Ch. 387) , 904,
1123.
Wadsworth s. Sherman (14 Barb. 169),
1314.
Watford v. Holmes County (44 Miss.
679), 1516.
Wager v. Wager (88 N. Y 153), 105.
Wager s. Wager (89 ST. Y. 16U, 246, 1560.
Waggener v. Waggener (3 B. Mon. 347),
984.
Wagner v. Baird (7 How. 233), 463.
Wagstaifs. Read(2Ch. Cas. 34), 438.
Wagstafl s. Smith (9 Ves. 520), 661, 938.
Wagstaffe v. Lowerre (23 Barb. 224),
1687.
Wahsatch Min. Co. s. Jennings (5 Utah,
243), 411.
Wailes s. Cooper (24 Miss. 208), 449.
Wainfords. Heyl (L. B. 20 Eq. 321) , 698,
1224.
Wainwright v. Hardesty (1 Sim. 294),
663.
Wainwright s. Waterman (1 Ves. Jr.
311), 625,999.
Wait s. Maxwell (5 Pick. 217), 1314.
Waites. Harwood (2 Atk. 159), 326.
Wake s. Tinkler (16 Bast, 36) , 958.
Wakefield Trust Co. s. Whaley (17 B.
I. 760; 24 Atl. Rep. 780), 1312.
Wakeman s. Dalley (51 N. Y. 27), 473,
474.
Wakeman s. Dodd (27 N. J. Bq. 564),
1183, 1187.
Wakeman s. Grover (4 Paige, 24; 11
Wend. 187), 1331, 1369, 1377, 1389, 1731,
1733.
Wakeman s. Hazleton (3 Barb. Ch. 148),
1057.
Wakeman s. Skinner (3 Barb. Ch. 148),
1222.
Walchs. Wallinger (2 Buss. &Myl. 78;
Taml.425), 624.
Walden s. Gridley (36111. 523), 455.
Walden s. Karr (88 111. 49), 59, 76, 852.
Walden s. Skinner (101 U. S. 577), 1560.
Waldo s. Caley (16 Ves. 206), 1001.
Waldo v. Cummings (45 111. 421), 987.
Waldo s. Waldo (7 Sim. 261), 988.
Waldrom v. Waldrom (76 Ala. 285), 829,
839.
Waldron s. Cloper (1 Drew. 193), 1116.
Waldron v. McComb (1 Hill, 111), 1073.
Waldron v. Wilcox (13 E. I. 518), 1367.
Waldrop s. Leaman (30 S. Car. 428), 1121,
1228.
Waldy s. Gray (L. E. 20 Eq. 238), 600.
Wales s. Bowdish (61 Vt. 23; 17 Atl. Eep.
1000), 1283,1295, 1312.
Wales v. Newbould (9 Mich. 45), 220,346,
414.
Walet s. Haskins (68 Tex. 418; 2 Am.
St. Eep, 501), 1542.
Walford s. Herrington (86 Pa. St. 39),
520.
Walford s. Liddell (2 Ves. 400), 1536.
Walker s. Armstrong (21 Beav. 174), 103.
Walker w. Beal (3 Cliff. 155), 724, 726.
Walker s. Beal (9 Wall. 743), 1692.
Walker v. Beals (106 Mass. 109), 1748.
Walker s. Brungard (13 Sm. & M. 723),
396, 866, 870, 1069.
Walker v. Carleton (97 HI. 682), 1507,
1508.
Walker s. Carroll (65 Ala. 61), 573.
Walker s. Crowder (2 Ired. Eq. 478),
839.
Walker s. Daly (80 Wis. 222; 49 N. W.
Eep. 812), 204.
Walker s. Denne(2Ves. Jr. 170), 299,
966.
Walker v. Blledge (65 Ala. 51) , 348, 349.
Walker v. Fawcett (7 Ired. 44), 950.
Walker v. Geisse (4 Whart. 252) , 439.
Walker v. Hall (34 Pa. St. 483), 133.
Walker v. Hill (22 N. J. Eq. 519), 500,
518, 562.
Walker v. Hunter (17 Ga. 364), 424.
Walker, In re (1 LI. &Goold, 324), 684,
685.
Walker v. Miller (11 Ala. 1076), 1408.
Walker v. Preswick (2 Ves. 622), 437.
Walkers. Beamy (36 Pa. St. 410), 710.
Walkers. Sedgwick (8 Cal. 398), 574.
Walker v. Shore (19 Ves. 387), 1061.
Walkers. Smallwood (Amb. 676), 1081,
1323, 1652.
Walkers. Smith (29 Beav. 394), 296,514.
Walker s. Smith (8 Yerg. 238), 462.
Walker s. Smyser (80 Ky. 620), 1569.
Walker v. Strewe (70 Ala. 167), 573, 580.
Walker s. Symonds (3 Swanst. 81),
1101, 1124, 1203, 1248, 1544, 1564, 1591,
1598.
Walker v. Taylor (4 L. T. 849), 1659.
Walkers. Walker (2 Atk. 98), 513.
Walker s. Walker (25 Ga. 420), 747, 777,
818.
Walker v. Walker (5 Madd. 424), 995,
997, 999, 1005, 1119.
Walker v. Walker (101 Mass. 169), 286.
Walkers. Walker (16 S. &R. 379), 1537.
Walker v, Walker (1 Ves. 53) , 100.
Walker s. Walker (9 Wall. 743), 719,
720, 723.
Walker v. Wetherell (6 Ves. 474), 829.
Walkers. Whitney (23 Pick. 313), 178.
Walker & Hughes, In re (L. E. 24 Ch. D.
698), 871.
Walker's Appeal (140 Pa. St. 124), 959,
1057.
TABLE OF CASES.
CCX1X
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753]
Walker's Estate (9 S. & R. 223), 1688.
Walker's Will, In re (63 Hun, 627; 17 N.
Y. Supl. 666), 815.
Wall s. Bright (1J. & W. 494), 200, 586.
Wall v. Town (45 111. 493), 395.
Wallace ». Anderson (16 Beav. 533),
1636.
Wallace©. Auldjo (1 De G., J. & S. 643),
674, 682.
Wallace v. Auldjo (2 Dr. & 3m. 216),
678.
Wallace s. Berdell (97 N. T. 13), 159, 163,
1745, 1746.
Wallace s. Bowen (28 Vt. 638), 334, 339,
366.
Wallace v. Brown (41Ind. 436), 1662.
Wallace v. Campbell (53 Tex. 229), 1294.
Wallace v. Coston (9 Watts, 137), 665.
Wallace s. Duffield (2 S. & B. 621), 308,
333, 536.
Wallace v. Ellerbe (Rich. Eq. 49), 1690.
Wallace v. Finberg (46 Tex. 35), 711.
Wallaces. Holmes (9 Blatchf. 65), 827.
Wallace s. Jones (93 Ga. 419; 21 S. E.
Rep. 89), 831.
Wallace v. Marshall (9 B. Hon. 148), 370.
Wallace v. Monroe (22 111. App. 602), 689.
Wallace s. Pruitt (1 Tex. Civ. App. 231;
20 S. W. Rep. 728), 55.
Wallace s. Wainwright (87 Pa. St. 263),
49,52, 1362.
Wallace s. Wallace (82 111. 535), 102, 652,
653, 665.
Waller s. Armistead (2 Leigh, 11; 21
Am. Dec. 694), 286, 652.
Waller s. Arnold (71 111. 350), 1505.
Waller s. Janney (102 Ala. 447; 14 So.
Rep. 876) , 573.
Waller s. Jones (107 Ala. 331 ; 18 So. Rep.
277), 303, 1703.
Wallers. Ray (48 Ala. 468), 1690.
Wallgrave s. Tebbs (2 Kay & J. 313),
497,851.
Wallingford s. Allen (10 Pet. 594), 713.
Wallis s. Loubat (2 Denio, 607), 418.
Wallis s. Thornton (2 Brock. 422), 1237.
Wallop, Ex parte (4 Bro. Ch.90),511.
Wall St. M. E. Church s. Johnson (140
Ind. 445; 39 N. E. Rep. 251), 871.
Walmesley v. Booth (2 Atk. 30), 418,
425.
Walpole s. Conway (Barn. 153), 1528.
Walrath v. Abbott (75 Hun, 445 ; 27 N. Y.
Supl. 629), 677.
Walraven s. Lock (2 Patt. & H. 549), 47.
Walrouds. Walroud (Johns. 18), 721.
Walsh v. Gladstone (14 Sim. 2; 1 Phill.
290), 770, 864,868, 896.
Walsh v. McBride (72 Md. 45), 406,575.
Walsh v. Trevanion (16 Sim. 178), 103.
Walsh v. Wallinger (2 R. &M. 78), 641,
1000.
Walsh s. Walsh (1 Drew. 64), 845.
Walsh s. Wason (L. R. 8 Ch. 482), 675,
682.
Walters. Dixon Crucible Co. (47 N. J.
Eq. 342), 709.
Walters. Logan (5B. Mon. 516), 1038.
Walter v. Mounde (19 Ves. 425), 632.
Walters. Thorn (22 Beav. 547), 396.
Walter s. Walter (10 Neb. 123), 828.
Walters s. Woodbridge (L. R. 7 Ch. D.
504), 1701.
Walters s. Woolridge (26 W. R. 470),
1058.
Walthall s. Rives (34 Ala. 9), 1493.
Walton s. Cody (1 Wis. 420), 1515.
Walton s. Eollansbee (131 111. 147), 925,
1106, 1108.
Walton s. Hargraves (42 Miss. 18), 569.
Walton v. Stewart (61 Hun, 625; 129 N.
Y. 667), 1736.
Walton v. Walton (14 Ves. 318), 238, 241.
Walwyns. Coutts (3Meriv. 707; 3 Sim.
14), 175, 1317, 1218.
Walwyn s. Lee (9 Ves. 26), 438.
Wamburzee v. Kennedy (4 Desaus. 479),
461, 1537.
Wanchford v. Fotherly (Freem. Ch.
201), 101.
Wangford v. Wangford (Freem. (K.
B.) 520), 859.
Wankf ord v. Wankf ord (1 Salk. 308) , 861.
Wansford v. Wansford (1 Salk. 302), 247.
Warburton v. Camp (55 N. Y. Super. Ct.
290), 55.
Warburton v. Farn (16 Sim. 325), 1080.
Warbass v. Armstrong (10 N. J. Eq.
263), 1679, 1693.
Wards. Amory (1 Curtis, 419), 676.
Ward s. Arch (12 Sim. 472), 823, 1536.
Ward v. Armstrong (84 111. 151), 174. 190,
309, 333, 1180.
Wards. Arredondo (Hopk. 213), 36.
Ward s. Barrows (22 Ohio, 241), 1085,
1092.
Ward v. Brown (87 Mo. 468), 424.
Ward s. Butler (2 Moll. 533), 861, 862,
883, 885.
Ward v. Carter (1 Eng. Eq. Cas. 26), 206.
Ward s. Dudley (2 Bro. Ch. 31S; 1 Cox,
438), 1525.
Ward s. Funsten (86 Va. 359; 10 S. E.
Rep. 415), 1561, 1693.
Ward s. Harvey (11 Ind. 741), 1534.
Ward v. Lamson (6 Pick. 358), 1384.
Ward S.Lewis (4 Pick. 518), 1402.
Ward s. Morgan (5 Coldw. 407), 624.
Ward s. Morrison (25 Vt. 593), 1117.
WardB. Peck (114 Mass. 121), 530, 1724.
ccxx
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1763.]
Ward v. Peloubet (2 Stockt. Ch. 306),
124.
Ward v. Smith (3 Sandf. 592), 392,401,
404. 406.
Ward v. Spivey (18 Fla. 847), 434, 621.
Wardw. VanBokkelen (1 Paige, 100),
469.
Ward v. Ward (36 Ark. 586), 704.
Ward v. Ward (73 Oal. 13; 14 Pae. Rep.
604), 309.
Ward v. Ward (59 Conn. 188; 22 Atl.
Rep. 149), 355.
Ward v. Ward (2 H. L. Cas. 784), 988,
992,1101.
Ward v. Ward (L. R. 14 Cb. D. 506), 675.
Ward». Ward (19 So. Rep. 354), 1493,
1498.
Warden v. Eden (2 Johns. Cas. 121),
1049.
Warden v. R. R. Co. (103 U. S. 651), 411.
Wardell v. Wardell (4 Bro. Ch. 286),
1528.
Warden v. Jones (2 De G. &J. 76), 652.
Warden v. Richards (11 Gray, 277),
1013, 1016.
Wardens, etc. v. Attorney-General (164
Mass. 188; 41 N. E. Rep. 231), 784.
Wardle v. Cloxton (9 Sim. 524), 655.
Wardouru. Berisford (1 Vern. 452), 558.
Wardwell v. McDowell (31 111, 364), 887,
892, 1013, 1016, 1089.
Ware v. Cann (10 B. & Cr. 433), 1638.
Ware v. Curry (67 Ala. 274), 573.
Ware v. Egmont (4 De G., M. &. G. 460),
448.
Ware, In re (L. R. 46 Ch. D. 269), 637,
638.
Ware v. McCandlish (11 Leigh, 623), 112.
Ware v. Mallard (L. J. 21 Ch. 355), 132.
Ware v. Murphy (Rice, 54), 1279.
Ware v. Polhill (11 Ves. 278), 827.
Ware v. Richardson (3 Md. 505; 56 Am.
Dec. 762), 647, 652, 912, 922, 929, 932,
933), 941, 1268.
Ware v. Sharp (1 Swan, 489), 666.
Warfleld v. Brand (13 Bush, 77), 853.
Warfleld v. Ross (38 Md. 85), 1110.
Waring v. Coventry (2 Myl. & K. 406),
976.
Waring v. Darnall (10 Gill & J. 126), 991,
1339.
Waring, In re (12 Eng, L. & Eq. 280), 12.
Waring, In re (99 X. Y. 114), 1055.
Waring v. Lewis (53 Ala. 630), 1628,
Waring v. Waring (2 Bland, 673), 1322.
Waring v. Waring (10 B. Mon. 331), 934.
Warlandw. Oolwell (10 R. I. 369), 935,
950.
Warley v. Warley (1 Bail. Eq. 398), 1324.
Warnack v. Harlow (96 Cal. 298), 1628.
Warnecke v. Lembca (70 111 . 91 ; 22 Am.
Rep. 85), 858, 1456.
Warneford v. Thompson (3 Ves. 513),
1066.
Warner v. Bates (98 Mass. 274), 126, 128.
Warner v. Daniels (1 W. & M. 90), 472,
480, 484.
Warner i>. Dove (33 Md. 679), 707.
Warner v. Insurance Co. (109 U. S.
369), 1032.
Warner v. Jacob (L. R. 20 Ch. D. 220),
1467.
Warners. Mower (11 Vt. 385), 1411.
Warner v. Peck (11 R. I. 431), 710.
Warner v. Sprigg (62 Md. 14), 918.
Warner v. Van Alstyne (3 Paige, 513),
577.
Warner?;. Warner (132 Ind. 213; 31 N.
E. Rep, 466), 343.
Warner v. Whittaker (6 Mich. 133), 441.
Warner v. Winslow (1 Sandf. Ch. 430),
441, 442.
Warr v. Warr (Pr. Ch. 214), 1529, 1630.
Warrallw. Harford (8Ves. 1),1058.
Warre, In re Ship (8 Price, 269), 34.
WarrelPs Appeal (23 Pa. St. 44), 1253.
Warrens. Adams (19 Colo. 516), 360.
Warren v. Perm (28 Barb. 334), 671, 677,
590, 1408.
Warren v. Freeman (85 Tenn. 613), 710.
Warren v. Hofer (13 Ind. 167), 847.
Warren v. Leland (9 Mass. 265), 1098,
1488.
Warren v. Rudall (1 Johns. & H. 1), 893.
Warren v. Steere (112 Pa. St. 634), 361.
Warren v. Swett (31 N. H. 332), 449,
478.
Warren v. Warren (1 Bro. Ch. 305),
1528.
Warren-Searf, etc. Co. v. Dunn (40 N.
Y. Supl. 209), 1580.
Warrick v. Warrick (3 Atk. 291), 102,
104.
Warriner v. Rogers (L. R. 16 Eq. 340),
77, 151.
Warter v. Hutchinson (5 Moon, 143 ; 1
B. & C. 121), 920, 923, 926, 937, 942,
1526.
Warwick v. Hull (102 111. 280), 161, 1515.
Warwick v. Lawrence (43 N. J. Eq. 179;
3 Am. St. Rep. 299), 709.
Warwick v. Warwick (3 Atk. 291), 443.
WashabaughK. Hall (4S. Dak. 168; 56
N. W. Rep. 82), 830.
Washburn v. Sewell (9 Met. 280), 20, 21,
763, 810.
Washington v. Emery (4 Jones, 32),
1218.
Washington Bank v. Lewis (22 Pick.
24), 443.
TABLE OF CASES.
CCXX1
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Washington v. Louisville, etc. R. R.
Co. (136 111. 49; 26 N. E. Rep. 653),
1342.
Wasson v. English (13 Mo. 176), 1184.
Wasson j>. Garrett (58 Tenn. 477), 1138,
1222, 1402.
Wasson v. Millsap (77 Iowa, 762), 706.
Waterbury v. Fisher (5 Colo. App. 362;
35Pac. Rep. 846), 356.
Waterfleld v. Wilber (64 Mich. 642) , 576.
Waterman v. Alden (42111. App. 294;
32N. E. Rep. 972), -868.
Waterman v. Allen (144 111. 90), 857, 870.
Waterman v. Baldwin (68 Iowa, 255),
992, 1074.
Waterman v. Dutton (6 Wis. 265), 1419.
Waterman v. Spaulding (51 111. 425),
1084, 1092, 1097.
Waters v. Bailey (2 T. & C. 218), 399.
Waters v. Collins (3 Dem. 374), 1746.
Waters v. Faber (2 Dem. 290), 1706.
Waters v. Groom (11 CI. & Fin. 684),
395.
Waters v. Hutton (85 Tenn. 109; 1 S. W.
Rep. 787), 1064.
Waters v. Tazewell (9Md. 291), 651, 667,
668, 1275, 1622.
Waters v. Thorn (22Beav. 547), 393, 419,
423, 424.
Watkins v. Cheek (2 S. & S. 205), 1652.
Watkins v. Frederick (11 H. L. Cas.
354), 924.
Watkins v. Holman (16 Pet. 25), 35, 36.
Watkins v. Jones (28 Ind. 12), 223.
Watkins v. Reynolds (123 N. Y. 211),
1746.
Watkins v. Specht (7 Cold. 585), 923, 936,
941, 979, 1536.
Watmongh's Trusts, In re (L. R. 8 Eq.
272), 813.
Watson v. Atwood (25 Conn. 313), 477.
Watson v. Bagaley (12 Pa. St. 164),
1364.
Watson v. Brickwood (9 Ves. 447),
1324, 1325.
Watson v. Butcher (37 Hun, 391) , 1368.
Watson v. Garvin (54 Mo. 353), 796.
Watsons. James (15 La. Ann. 386), 1073.
Watson v. Jones (13 Wall. 679), 789, 791,
795, 797, 798.
Watson v. Le Row (6 Barb. 481), 354, 373.
Watson v. Marshall (17 Beav. 363), 678,
684.
Watson v. Mayrant (IRieh. Bq. 449), 178.
Watson v. Murray (54 Ark. 499;16 S. W.
Rep. 293), 212.
Watson v. Pearson (2 Excheq. 594), 920,
922, 931, 942, 1013, 1037.
WatsoD v. Pinckney (46 N. Y. St. Rep.
245), 145.
Watson v. Planters' Bank (22 La. Ann.
14), 478.
Watson v. Saul (5 Jur. (N. S.) 404) ; 1
Gift. 188), 823, 1538.
Watson v. Sawyer (15 La. Ann. 386),
1075.
Watson v. Sherman (84 111. 263), 1453,
1494.
Watson v. Thompson (12 R. I. 466), 223,
532.
Watson v. Thurber (11 Mich. 457), 707.
Watson v. Toone (5 Madd. 54), 1540.
Watson v. Wells (5 Conn. 468), 443, 579.
Watson v. Young (30 S. Car. 144), 503.
Watt v. Ball (1 P. Wms. 108), 963.
Watt v. Grove (2 Sch. & Let. 492), 413.
Watts v. Bullas (1 P. Wms. 60), 146.
Watts v. Burnett (56 Ala. 341), 478.
Watts v. Cresswell (9 Vin. 536), 27.
Watts «. Gantt (42 Neb. 869; 61 N. W.
Rep. 104), 708.
Watts v. Girdleston (6 Beav. 188), 1102,
1205, 1217, 1253.
Watts v. Howard (7 Met. 478), 111, 1025,
1152.
Watts v. Symes (16 Sim. 646), 978.
Watt's Appeal (18 Pa. St. 370), 411.
Watt's Settlement, In re (9 Hare, 106) ,
869.
Waugh, In re (25 W. R. 555) , 1436.
Waugh v. Riley (8 Met. 290), 28.
Wayman v. Jones (4 Md. Ch. 500), 1121,
1236.
Wayne v. Hanham (9 Hare, 62), 1515.
Wayne v. Middleton (2 Ga. 383), 1073,
1075.
Way's Trust (10 Jur. 837; 2 De G., J. &
S. 365), 156, 160.
Weakly v. Watkins (7 Humph. 356), 660,
562.
Weare v. Linnell (29 Mich. 224), 263,
372, 373.
Weaver v. Brown (87 Ala. 533), 573.
Weaver v. Fisher (110 111. 146), 1564,
1718.
Weaver v. Van Aiken (71 Mich. 69; 38
N. W.Rep. 677), 1569.
Weaver v. Van Aiken (77 Mich. 588), 882,
1736.
Weavers. Wabash, etc. Canal Co. (28
Ind. 112), 1053.
Webb v. District (7 Watts & S. 401), 29.
Webb v. Gay (74 N. Car. 447), 709.
Webb v. Haefler (53 Md. 187), 1481.
Webbu. Hoselton (4 Neb. 308; 19 Am.
Rep. 638), 708, 1440, 1446.
Webb v. Jones (1 Cox, 245), 1324.
Webb v. Ledsaur (1 Kay & J. 365) , 1124.
Webb». Lewis (45 Minn. 285; 47 N. W.
Rep. 803), 1442, 1448.
ccxxn
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol, 1, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Webb v . Lugar (2 T. & C. 247) , 399.
Webb ©. Lymington (8 Ves. 322), 1427.
Webb ©. Neal (5 Allen, 575), 19.
Webb v. Rorke (2 Seh. & Let. 661),
380.
Webb ©. Sadler (L. E. 14 Bq. 533; L. K.
8Ch. App. 419), 304, 640.
Webb ©. Shaftesbury (6 Madd. 100), 830,
1169.
Webb ©. Shaftesbury (7 Ves. 487), 900,
974, 1004, 1178, 1573, 1683, 1705.
Webb©. Webb (Barn. 86), 1352.
Webb ©. Woods (2 Sim 267), 111, 123, 128,
132, 184.
Webb's Case (1 Roll. Abr. 609), 83.
Webber ©. Curtis (104 111. 309), 1475, 1506.
Webber v. Farmer (4 Bro. P. C. 170),
542, 545.
Weber ©. Ueberroth (13 Atl. Eep. 194),
1558.
Weber ©. Weber (9 Reporter, 632), 82.
Webster ©. Bailey (31 Mich. 36), 477.
Webster v. Coddington (16 Sim. 177),
1006.
Webster ©. Cooper (14 How. 488), 912,
916, 925, 940, 941, 1267.
Webster ©. Helm (93 Tenn. 322, 24 S. W.
Rep. 480), 661, 711.
Webster ©. Hildreth (33 Vt. 457; 78 Am.
Dec. 632) , 711.
Webster©. King (33 Cal. 148), 419.
Webster ©. MeCullougn (61 Iowa, 496),
575.
Webster ©. Morris (66 Wis. 366; 57 Am.
Rep. 278), 87, 128, 734, 751, 819, 1524.
Webster ©. Newbold (41 Pa. St. 482),
1538.
Webster ©. Soutaey (L. R. 36 Ch. D.
9), 735, 813.
Webster t>. Vandeventer (6 Gray, 429),
890, 896, 897, 979, 1394.
Webster©. Webster (1 Sm. & Gift. 489;
23 Eng. L. & Eq. 216) , 720.
Webster v. Webster (4 De G.,M. & G.
437), 725.
Webster©. Wiggin (31 Atl. Rep. 824),
736, 738, 749.
Wedderburn ©. Wedderburn (22 Beav.
84), 1710, 1714.
Wedderburn ©. Wedderburn (2 Keen,
749; 2 Myl. & Cr. 41), 286, 461, 823,
1598.
Wedgwood ©. Adams (6 Beav. 600), 1242.
Weeks ©. Cornwell (104 N. Y. 325), 618,
992, 1068, 1349.
Weeks©. Hobson (150 Mass. 377), 748),
775.
Weeks©. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co. (78
Wis. 501), 204.
Weeks ©. Sego (9 Ga. 199), 669.
Weems©. Masterson (80 Tex. 45;15S.
W. Rep. 690), 831.
Weiland v. Townsend (33 N. J. Eq. 393),
907.
Weinberg ©. Rempe (15 W. Va. 829),
711.
Weinrich ©. Wolf (24 W. Va. 299), 308.
Weir ©. Bell (L. E. 3 Ex. D. 238), 476,
484.
Weir ©. TannehlU (2 Yerg. 57) , 1331.
Weisbrod ©. R. R. Co. (18 Wis. 35), 688.
Weisel ©. Cobb (118 N. Car. 11; 24 S. E.
Rep. 782), 1689.
Weiss ©. Dill (3 Myl. & K. 27), 1068, 1704.
Weiss ©. Heitkamp (121 Mo. 23_; 29 S.
W. Rep. 709), 269.
Weisser©. Dennison (6 Seld. 68), 444.
Welch ©. Allen (21 Wend. 147), 918, 942.
Welch ©. Baxter (45 La. Ann. 1062), 816.
Welch ©. Brown (50 N. J. Eq. 387; 26
Atl. Rep. 568), 1695.
Welch ©. Burris (29 Iowa, 186), 834, 839.
Welch v. Fisk (139 Ind. 637; 38 N. E.
Rep. 403), 706.
Welch ©. Mandeville (1 Wheat. 233), 960.
Welche v. Welche (14 Ala. 77), 652.
Weid ©. Rees (48 111. 428), 1456, 1505.
Weller©. Suggett (3Redf. 249), 847.
Weller ©. Weller (2 Madd. 160), 999.
Welles ©. March (30 N. Y. 344), 1413, 1415.
Welles ©. Middleton (1 Cox, 125), 418,
419.
Weliesley ©. Wellesley (2 Bligh (N. S.),
135), 831.
Wellesley ©. Wellesley (4 Myl. & Cr. 661),
720.
Wellford©. Chancellor (5Gratt. 39), 193,
413.
Wells ©. Andrews (60 Miss. 373) , 847.
Wells «. Caywood (3 Colo. 487), 705.
Wells ©. Chapman (4Sandf. Ch. 312), 960.
Wells ©. Foster (8 M. & W. 149), 38.
Wells v. Francis (7 Colo. 396), 434.
Wells v. Harter (56 Cal. 3421, 674.
Wells ©. Heath (10 Gray, 25), 819.
Wells ©. Heddenberg (30 S. W. Eep. 702),
582.
Wells©. Lewis (4 Met. (Ky.) 269), 1013,
1014.
Wells ©. McCall (64 Pa. St. 207), 184, 652,
665, 667, 671, 933, 934, 935, 1276, 1622,
1638.
Wells ©. Robinson (13 Cal. 133), 414.
Wells v. Smith (44 Miss. 296), 586.
Wells©. Stout (9 Cal. 494), 721,722,724,
725, 726,
Wells ©. Thorman (37 Conn. 318), 705.
Wells©. Wells (47 Barb. 416), 1452, 1486.
Wells, Fargo & Co. ©. Robinson (13 Cal.
133), 387,388,534.
TABLE OF CASES.
CCXX111
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848 1753.]
Wells, Fargo & Co. ©. Walsh (87 Wis.
67; 57 N . W. Rep. 969), 142.
Welman©. Welman (L. E. 16 Ch. D.
579) , 104.
Welsh ©. Coley (82 Ala. 363; 2 So. Rep.
733), 1453, 1456.
Welsh v. Usher (2 Hill Eq. 167; 29 Am.
Dec. 63), 602.
Welston©. Hildreth (39 Vt. 457), 688.
Welton ©. Palmer (39 Cal. 456), 1083.
Wemyss©. White (159 Mass. 484; 34 N.
E. Rep. 718), 1004, 1637.
Wendell ©. Crandall (1 Comst. 492), 1066.
Wendell v. French (19 N. H. 210), 1689,
1713.
Wendell ©. Van Rensalaer (1 Johns. Ch.
344), 419.
Wentworth ©. Lloyd (32 Beav. 469; 10
H. L. C. 589), 330.
Werin ©. Dillon (27 Miss. 494), 413.
Wescott ©. Edmunds (68 Pa. St. 34) , 1267.
West v. Berry (1 R. & M. 440), 1067.
West ©. Erissey (2 P- Wms. 349), 102, 104,
105.
West ©. Fritz (109 111. 425), 909, 918, 922,
1084, 1106, 1267.
West v. Knight (1 Ch. Cas. 135), 763.
West ©. Moore (14 Vt. 447), 381.
West v. Raymond (21 Ind. 305), 419.
West ©. Shuttleworth (2 Myl. & K. 684),
731.
West v. Skip (1 Ves. Sr. 239), 224, 598.
West v. Sloan (3 Jones Eq, 102), 1538.
West v. Snodgrass (17 Ala. 549), 1369.
West v. West (75 Mo. 204), 827.
Westbrook ©. Comstock (Walker, 314),
825.
Westcott v. Adams (68 Pa: St. 34), 944.
Westcott ©. Cady (5 Johns. Ch. 334), 1437.
Westerfleld ©. limmer (82 Ind. 369), 370.
Westerfleld ©. Westerfleld (1 Bradf.
198), 1688.
Westerman©. Westerman (25 Ohio St.
500), 552, 709.
Western Bank ©. Addie (L. R. 1H.L.
Scotl. 145), 484.
Western R. R. Co. ©. Nolan (48 N. T.
517), 949, 956, 959, 1057, 1138.
Westerrelt ©. Hot (2 Sandf. 98), 443.
Westfall ©. Singleton (1 Wash. (Va.)
227), 398.
Westgate ©. Handlin (7 How. Pr. 372),
1488, 1489.
Westmeath ©. Westmeath (1 Dow. &
CI. 619), 725.
Westmeath v. Westmeath (Jacob, 126),
720, 721, 722.
Westmoreland v. Holland (10 W. R.
302), 1135, 1222.
Westoby v. Day (2 Ell. & Bl. 605), 972.
West of England Bank, In re (L. R. 11
Ch. D. 772), 1604.
Weston v. Barker (12 Johns. 276), 153,
1318.
Weston, In re (91 N. T. 511), 1200, 1338.
Weston v. Jenkins (128 Mass. 562), 1192.
Weston©. Stewart (2Fairf. 137), 1049.
Wetherby©. St. George (2 Hare, 624),
1645.
Wethered ©. Wethered (2 Sim. 183), 33,
34.
Wetherell ©. Hough (52 N. J. Eq. 683;
29 AM. Rep. 692), 828.
Wetherell ©. O'Brien (140 111. 146; 33
Am. St. Rep. 221), 1607, 1610.
Wetherill ©. Wetherill (18 Pa. St. 265),
1011.
Wetmore ©. Hegeman (88 ST. T. 69),
1053.
Wetmore ©. Parker (7 Lans, 121), 19.
Wetmore v. Parker (52 N. T. 450), 31,
820,1058. ,.-
Wetmore v. Parker (92 N. T. 76), 1105. ,.
Wetter v. Fisk (3 Pick. 74), 470.
Wetzel v. Chaplin (3 Bradf. 386), 153.
Wetzleru. Fitch (52 Cal. 638), 862.
Weygant v. Bartlett (102 Cal. 224; 36 •
Pac. Rep. 417), 311.
Whale v. Booth (4 T. R. 625), 1627.
Whaley v. Drummond (1 Sugd. Pow.
257), 1009.
Whaley©. Norton (1 Vern. 482), 560.
Whaley v. Whaley (71 Ala. 159), 1628.
Whallen v. Scott (10 Watts, 237) , 1368.
Whalley v. Whalley (lMeriv. 436), 1540.
Whalley v. Whalley (3 Bligh, 1), 470.
Wharton v. May (5 Ves. 27), 427.
Wheatley v. Badger (7 Pa. St. 469), 855,
857, 858.
Wheatley v. Boyd (7 Excheq. 20), 980.
Wheatley v. Martin (6 Leigh, 62), 1049.
Wheatley v. Purr (1 Keen, 561), 76, 77,
152,153,851.
Whedbee v. Stewart (40 Md. 414), 1369.
Wheedon v. Lee (3 T. R. 41), 926.
Wheeler©. Billings (72 Fed. Rep. 301;
18 C. C. A. 573), 1568.
Wheeler v. Bingham (3 Atk. 364), 1041.
Wheeler©. Brown (26 III. 369), 1569.
Wheeler ©, Kidder (105 Pa. St. 270) , 335.
Wheeler ©. Kirtland (23 N. J. Eq. 18),
312, 354, 370.
Wheeler ©. Love (21 Tex. 583), 578.
Wheeler©. Newhall (7 Mass. 189), 913,
918.
Wheeler ©. Perry (18 N. H. 307), 1002,
1060, 1215.
Wheeler v. Reynolds (67 N. Y. 227), 486,
503,618,526.
Wheeler©. Sage (1 Wall. 518), 560, 662.
CCXX1V
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Wheeler v. Sexton (34 Fed. Eep. 154)
1445.
Wheeler v.
Wheeler v.
747.
Wheeler v
Wheeler v
1044.
Wheeler v
Wheete v.
Whelan v.
Sheers (Mosely, 288), 244,245.
Smith (9 How. 55), 53, 745,
v. Sumner (4 Mason, 206), 1384.
v. Warser (1 S. & S. 304), 1043,
Whedon (9 How. 293), 1404.
Hall (17Ves. 86), 1012.
Eeilly (3 W. Va. 597), 864,865,
Wheldaler. Partridge (5 Ves. 388), 258,
299.
Whelen's Appeal (70 Pa. St. 410), 277,
1688.
Whetselr. Eoberts (31 Ohio St. 603),
677.
Whetstone v. Bury (2 P. Wms. 146), 912,
929.
Whichoote v. Lawrence (3 Ves. 740),
383,389,392,393,427.
Whichcote v. Lyle (28 Pa. St. 73), 12.
Whicker v. Hume (7 H. L. Cas. 124, 1
De G,, M. & G. 506), 733, 811.
Whipple v. Giles (55 N. H. 139), 708.
Whiston v. Rochester (7 Hare, 532), 782.
Whitakerr. Gavit (18 Conn. 522), 1362,
1363.
Whitakerr. Hall (1 Glyn & J. 213), 677.
Whitaker v. Kershaw (L. R. 45 Ch. D.
320), 1701.
Whitbread, Ex parte (19 Ves. 209), 600.
Whltbread v. Jordan (1 Y. & C. 303), 600.
Whitbread v. Smith (3 De G., M. & G.
727), 1145, 1435.
Whitchurch^. Bevis (2 Bro. Ch. 665),
219.
Whitcomb v. Minchin (5 Madd. 91) , 1491.
Whitcomb's Estate, In re (86Cal. 265; 24
Pac, Rep. 1028), 135.
White v. Albertson (3Dev. 241) , 956, 957.
White r, Attorney-General (4 Ired. Eq.
19; 44 Am. Dec. 92), 753.
Whiter. Banks (21 Ala. 705), 1384.
Whiter. Barker (1 Bing. N. Cas. 573),
919
Whiter. Barton (18Beav. 192),-882.
Whiter. Baugh (2 R. &M. 215; 9Bligh,
181; 3 CI &F. 44), 1115.
White v. Baylor (10 Ir. Eq. 53), 943.
White v. Blackmore (8 Lea, 49), 585.
White v. Briggs (L. J. 15 Ch. 182), 132.
White v. Briggs (2 Phill. Ch. 583), 52, 128,
130.
White v. Casenave (1 Har. & J. 106), 576
Whiter Carpenter (2 Paige Ch. 217),
307, 314, 362, 370.
White r. Carter (2 Eden, 366), 96.
Whiter. Cook (73 Ga. 165), 1653.
White v. Crawford (10 Mass. 183) , 984.
White r. Cuddon (8 CI. & Fin. 766), 947.
White v. DInkins (19 Ga. 189), 1033.
White r. Ditson (134 Mass. 351), 748.
White v. Downs (40 Tex. 225), 578.
White r. Drew (42 Mo. 561), 334, 532.
White r. Evans (4 Ves. 21), 244, 246.
White v. Farley (81 Ala. 563; 8 So. Rep.
215), 266.
White r. Fisk (22 Conn. 31), 747, 777.
White r. Fitzgerald (19 Wis. 480), 616,
912, 916.
White v. Foster (102 Mass. 375), 450.
White r. Franklin Bank (22 Pick. 184),
564, 565.
White r. Gouldin (27 Gratt. 491), 675,
678.
Whiter. Hale (2 Cold. 77), 750.
White r. Hildreth (32 Vt. 465), 688, 711.
White r. Howard (52 Barb. 294), 111,1066,
1067.
Whiter. Hudson (17 R. I. 519; 23 Atl.
Rep. 57), 176.
White r. Jones (92 N. Oar. 388), 578.
White r. Lincoln (8 Ves. 363), 1564.
White r. Lupton (15 Ves. 432), 1174.
White r. McDermott (7 I. R. C. L. 1),
895, 1014.
Whiter. McKeon (92 Ga. 343; 17 S. E.
Kep. 283), 815, 864.
White r. McNett (33 N. T. 271), 769.
White r. More (54 Illj. App. 606), 1408.
White r. Moses (21 Cal. 34), 607.
White v. Moss (67 Ga. 89), 403.
White r. Nutts (1 P. Wms. 61), 200.
White r. Palmer (4 Mass. 147), 1314.
White r. Parker (1 Bing. N. Cas. 573),
940.
White r. Parker (8 Barb. 48), 286, 827.
White r. Parnether (1 Knapp, 228), 462.
Whiter. Prentiss (3 T. B. Mon. 449),
1339.
White r. Savery (60 Iowa, 515), 1515.
White v. Sawyer (16 Gray, 589), 477, 484.
White r. Sheldon (4 Nev. 280), 232.
White r. Stephens (77 Mo. 452), 1454,
1460.
White r. Thomas (8 Bush, 662), 1289.
White v. Trotter (14 Sm. & M. 30; 63
Am. Dec. 112), 1184.
White r. Watkins (23 Mo. 427), 1097,
1122.
White v White (6 Beav. 221), 907.
Whiter. White (IBro. Ch. 12), 696, 738.
765, 757.
White r. White (7 Gill & J. 208), 36, 37.
Whiter. White (16 Gratt 264), 662.
White r. White (L. R. 15 Eq. 247), 104.
White r White (L R. (1893) 2 Ch. 41),
731, 784.
TABLE OF CASES.
CCXXV
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
White v. White (1 Md. Ch. 53), 1537.
White v. White (21 Vt. 250), 924.
White v. White (30 Vt. 342), 184, 1269,
1295, 1640, 1644.
Whito v. White (2 Vera. 43), 1324.
White». White (4 Ves. 33), 1159.
Whiter. White (5 Ves. 556), 1591.
White v. White (7 Ves. 423), 632, 637,
735.
White v. Williams (1 Paige, 502), 577,
680.
White v. Williams (3 V. & B. 72), 144.
White's Estate, In re (163 Pa. St. 388; 30
Atl. Rep. 194; 36 W.N. C. 105), 1288.
White's Trusts, In re (Johns. 656), 167,
614, 620, 621, 624, 630, 632.
White's Trusts, Inre (L, E. 33 Ch. D.
449), 768.
Whiteborn v. Hines (1 Munf . 659) , 426.
Whitecar's Estate, In re (147 Pa. St.
368; 23 Atl. Rep. 575), 1258.
Whitecomb v. Jacob (Salk. 160), 531,
1632.
Whitehead v. Bradley (87 Va. 676; 13 S.
E. Rep. 195), 829, 831.
Whitehead, Ex parte (L. R. 14 Q. B.
Div. 419), 712.
Whitehead v. Helen (76 N. Car. 99),
1490, 1491, 1493.
Whitehead, In re (3 Dem. 227), 1055.
Whitehead v. Murat (Bunb. 183), 842.
Whitehead v. Whitehead (85 Va. 870),
1227, 1690.
Whitehill v. Shaw (33 S. W. Rep. 886),
1367.
Whitehurst v. Harker (2 Ired. Eq. 292),
167, 614.
Whitely v. Ogle (47 ST. J. Eq. 67; 20 Atl.
Rep. 284), 335, 339.
Whitely v. Stewart (63 Mo. 363), 708,
White School House v. Post (31 Conn.
240), 603, 861,877.
Whiteside v. Cannon (23 Mo. 457), 665,
708.
Whiteside v. Taylor (105 111. 496), 1180.
Whitfield, Exparte (2 Atk. 315), 832,841,
1563.
Whitfordo. Doggett (84111. 144), 705.
Whitings;. Beebe (7Eng. 564), 452.
Whiting v. Beckwlth (31 Conn. 596),
705.
Whitings. Dewey (15 Pick. 428), 1242.
Whiting v. Gould (2 Wis. 552) , 66, 67, 263,
603, 1736.
Whiting v. Whiting (4 Gray, 236), 59,
130, 167, 228, 229, 614, 979.
Whitman v. Bowden (27 S. Car. 53), 492,
494, 1711.
Whitman v. Fisher (74 111. 147), 1718,
1721.
Whitmore v. Learned (70 Me. 276), 232,
358.
Whitmore v. Turquand (1 John. & H.
296), 1573.
Whitemore v. Weld (1 Vera. 328), 27,
1223.
Whitney v. Kelley (67 Me. 377), 1379.
Whitney©. Smith (L. R. 4 Ch. 513), 1136.
Whitridge v. Parkhurst (20 Md. Ch. 62),
517.
Whitson v. Whitson (53 N. T. 479), 1688.
Whittaker «. Hill (96 ST. Car. 2), 1468.
Whittaker, In re (4 Johns. Ch. 378),
825.
Whittaker, In re (L. R. 21 Ch. D. 657),
712.
Whittaker v. Whittaker (52 N. T. 368),
147.
Whitten v. Jenkins (34 Ga. 297), 651, 686.
Whitten v. Whitten (3 Cush. 191), 339,
340, 650.
Whittlesey v. Hughes (39 Mo. 13), 996,
1055, 1243.
Whitton v. Russell (1 Atk. 448), 497, 500,
606.
Whyte v. Meade (2 Ir. Eq. 420), 292.
Wickershamw. Crittenden (93 Cal. 17),
1170.
Wickershann v. Ricker (58 Fed. Rep.
282), 1096.
Wickes v. Clark (8 Paige, 165), 99.
Wickess. Slaughter (49 Ark. 235), 1344.
Wickham v. Bath (L. R. 1 Eq. 17), 813.
Wickham v. Berry (55 Pa. St. 70), 919,
956, 1114.
Wickiser v. Cook (85 111. 68), 286.
Wickliffe v. Bell (1 Bush, 427), 452.
Wickliffe v. Lexington (11 B. Mon. 161),
1537.
Wickliffe. Robinson (18111. 145), 1180.
Wickmano. Robinson (14 Wis. 493; 80
Am. Dec. 789), 586.
Wicks v. Mitchell (9 Ean. 80), 706.
Wicks v. Westcott (59 Md. 270), 1453, 1605.
Wideners. Pay (51 Md. 273), 1686, 1698,
1700.
Widgery v. Tepper (L. R. 7 Oh. D. 423) ,
680.
Widmore v. Woolredge (Amb. 636), 166,
641.
Wigg v. Nicholl (L. R. 14 Eq. 92), 804.
Wiggs. Wigg (1 Atk. 382; 2 Sngd. V. &
P. 274), 180, 327, 432, 442, 638, 595.
Wiggins, Ex parte (1 Hill (S. Oar.) Eq.
354), 383, 390, 394.
Wightwlcks. Lord (6 H. L. Cas. 234),
1141, 1169.
Wigsell v. Wigsell (2 S. & 8. 364), 978.
Wilbornv. Ritter (16 S. W. Rep, 360),
230.
CCXXV1
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Wilbur v. Almy (12 How. 180), 1021, 1038,
1090, 1121.
Wiltmrn v. McOalley (63 Ala. 436), 667,
704.
Wilburns. Spofford (4 Sneed, 705), 47,
1016. 1460.
Wilcockss. Hannyngtom (5 Ir. Ch. 38),
155.
Wilcox v. Abraham (6 Ohio, 172), 142.
Wilcox v. Fitzhugh (12 Barb. 235), 1314.
Wilcox v. Gilchrist (85 Hun, 1 ; 32 N. Y.
Supl. 608) , 83.
Wilcox v. Quinby (62 Hun, 620; 16 N. T.
Supl. 699), 903.
Wilcox v. Smith (26 Barb. 316), 1334, 1341.
Wilcox v. Wheeler (47 N. H. 488), 925.
Wilcox v. Wilcox (47 N". H. 488), 923,941,
1268.
Wileoxons. Osborn (77 Mo. 621), 1503.
Wilde v. Gibson (1 H. L. Cas. 605), 484,
489,491.
Wilde v. Bawllngs (1 Head, 34), 1369.
Wildeman v. Mayor, etc., Baltimore (8
Md. 551), 254.
Wilder v. Brooks (10 Minn. 50; 88 Am.
Dec. 49), 707.
Wilder v. Ranney (95 N. T. 7), 1122.
Wilder v. Richie (117 Mass..382), 707.
Wilder, Succession of (22 La. Ann. 219),
13.
Wllderman v. Baltimore (8 Md. 551),
663.
Wildey v. Robinson (85 Hun, 362; 32 N.
Y. Supl. 1018), 874.
Wilding v. Bolder (21 Beav. 222), 30, 31,
876.
Wiles v. Gresham (2 Drew. 258), 1152.
Wiles v. Gresham (5 De G., M. & G. 770),
993, 1047, 1048, 1138, 1342, 1343.
Wiles v. Wiles (3 Md. 1; 56 Am. Dec.
733), 675, 678.
Wiley v. Collins (11 Me. 193), 1383.
Wiley v. Gray (36 Miss. 510), 681.
Wiley v. Morris (39 N. J. Eq. 97), 111.
Wiley v. Smith (3 Kelly, 559), 91, 93, 116.
Wilhelms. Falmer (6 Pa. St. 296), 29,
532, 993, 1052.
Wilkes v. Holmes (9 Mod. 485; 16 Ves.
237), 1009.
Wilkes v. Rogers (6 Johns. 566), 829, 1561,
1563.
Wilkes v. Steward (G. Coop. 6), 1102,
1204.
Wilkins v. Anderson (11 Pa. St. 399), 432,
434, 435.
Wilkins v. Fowkes (9 Hare, 692), 292.
Wilkins v. Frye (1 Meriv. 268; 2 Rose,
375), 1100, 1118.
Wilkins v. Gordon (11 Leigh, 647), 1470.
Wilkins v. Hogg (3 Gift. 116), 1226.
Wilkins v. Stevens (1 Y. & C. 431), 359.
Wilkinson v. Barber (L. R. 14 Eq. 96),
735,813.
Wilkinson v. Bauerle (41 N. J. Eq. 635),
1411, 1412.
Wilkinson ». Charlesworth (10 Beav.
324), 680.
Wilkinson v. Cheatham (45 Ala. 341),
704.
Wilkinson v. Dodd (40 N. J. Eq. 123),
1140.
Wilkinson s. Duncan (23 Beav. 469),
1166.
Wilkinson, Ex parte (3 Mont. & Ayr.
145) , 857.
Wilkinsons. Holloway (7 Leigh, 277),
419.
Wilkinson, In re (41 L. J. Ch. 392; L. R.
13 Eq. 634), 1615.
Wilkinson v. Lindgren (L. R. 5 Ch. 570),
731.
Wilkinson v. Malin (2 Tyr. 544), 1130.
Wilkinson v. May (69 Ala. 33), 673, 912.
Wilkinson v. Parry (4 Russ. 272), 864,
898, 899, 1005, 1244, 1591.
Wilkinson v. Stone (128 111. 129) , 1470.
Wilkinson ^.Wilkinson (1 Head, 305),
688.
Wilkinson v. Wilkinson (2 S. & S. 236),
1704.
Wilkinsons. Wilkinson (1Y. & C. 657),
42.
Wilks v. Ferris (2 Johns. 335), 1368.
Wilks v. Groom (3 Drew. 684), 1196.
Willardw.BoggS (56111. 163), 1445, 1502.
Willards. Eastham (15 Gray, 328; 77
Am. Dec. 366) , 698, 700, 701, 704, 707.
Willard v. Reas (26 Wis. 640) , 578.
Willards. Taylor (8 Wall. 557), 191.
Willard v. Willard (56 Pa. St. 119), 368,
370.
Willats v. Busby (5 Beav. 193), 1732.
Willett v. Blanford (1 Hare, 253), 1173.
Willetts, Jure (112 ST. Y. 289), 1706.
Willetts v. Vandenburgh (34 Barb. 424),
1404.
Willett's Estate (2 N. Y. Supl. 665), 1678,
1681, 1691.
Williams v. Allen (32 Beav. 650), 1591.
Williams v. Allison (33 Iowa, 278), 108.
Williams v. Avery (38 Ala. 115), 103, 655.
Williams v. Bagley (L. R. 1 H. L. Cas.
200), 563.
Williams v. Bailey (L. S. 2 Eq. 731), 726.
Williams v. Baldridge (66 Ala. 338), 704.
Williams v. Bankhead (19 Wall. 113),
1730.
Williams v. Bayley (L. R. 1 HI. 200), 295.
Williams v. Brown (14 111. 200), 308.
Williams v. Campbell (46 Miss. 61), 987.
TABLE OP CASES.
CCXXV11
[The references are to pages : Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Williams®. Ohitty (3 Ves. 551), 13.
William9 ®. Coade (10 Ves. 50C), 260, 258.
Williams ®. Conrad (30 Barb. 424), 885.
Williams ®. Cook (1 Greenl. Ch. 209),
1537.
Williams ®. Cook (9 Jnr. (N. S.) 658), 681.
Williams u.Corbet (8 Sim. 349), 1058.
Williams ®. Cushing (34 Me. 370), 854,
855, 858, 884, 885.
Williams ®. Evans (164 111. 98; 39 N. E.
Eep. 698), 160.
Williams, Ex parte (18 S. Car. 299), 1627.
Williams v. First Presb. Soe. (1 Ohio
St. 478), 465, 911, 918, 941, 943, 1639,
1594.
Williams v. Fitch (18 N. T. 546), 508, 510,
513.
Williams v. Frost (27 Minn. 255), 1417.
Williams v. Gibbs (20 How. 535), 607.
Williams ». Haskins (66 Vt. 378; 29Atl.
Eep. 371), 75, 88.
Williams v. Hayward (117 Mass. 532),
707.
Williams ®. Hollingsworth (1 Strobh.
Eq. 103; 47 Am. Dec. 627), 308, 334,
532.
Williams®. Holmes (4 Rich. Eq. 475),
1268.
Williams ®. Hugunin (69 111. 214; 18 Am.
Eep. 607), 698, 705.
Williams v. Hutchinson (3 Comst. 312),
837.
Williams, In re (L. R. 6 Ch. D. 735), 735.
Williams v. Jones (2 Swan, 620), 108.
Williams ®. JoDes (10 Ves. 78), 238, 244.
Williams ®. Kershaw (5 CI. & Fin. Ill),
254.
Williams v. Kershaw (1 Keen, 274 ra.),
802.
Williams ». King (43 Conn. 569), 705, 892.
Williams ®. Lonsdale (3 Ves. 752), 1277.
Williams v. MeCarty (74 Ala. 295), 573.
Williams v. McConico (36 Ala. 22), 913,
920.
Williams ». McGrade (13 Minn. 46), 707.
Williams ®. McKinney (34 Kan. 514), 9
Pac. Rep. 265), 128.
Williams ®. Mattocks (3 Vt. 189), 1055,
1244.
Williams ®. Maull (20 Ala. 721), 655, 657.
Williams ®. Mead (20 Ala. 720), 654.
Williams v. Nelson (23 Pick. 141), 984.
Williams v. Nixon (2 Beav. 472), 853, 857,
884, 885, 1122, 1124, 1128, 1230, 1234.
Williams ®. Ormiston (38 Ohio St. 296),
709.
Williams ®. Otey (8 Humph. 563; 47 Am.
Rep. 632), 1016, 1060, 1090, 1110, 1348,
1400, 1653.
Williams ®. Parry (4 Russ. 272), 897.
Williams v. Powell (1 Ired. Eq. 460), 286.
Williams «. Reed (3 Mason, 405) , 1248.
Williams ®. Rice (60 Mich. 102), 570.
Williams ®. Roberts (92 Ga. 29; 18 S. E.
Rep. 515), 689.
Williams ®. Roberts (5 Ohio, 35) , 569,
577.
Williams ». Simmons (79 Ga. 649), 570.
Williams ®. Smith (91 N. T. 297), 81.
Williams v. Smith (10 R. I. 280) , 959, 989,
1025, 1057, 1152.
Williams v. Spurr (24 Mich. 335), 489,
493.
Williams v. Stoers (6 Johns. Ch. 353),
846.
Williams ®. Stratton (10 3m. & M. 418),
602.
Williams ». Teachey (85 N. Oar. 402),
1451.
Williams®.
Williams i
442.
Williams®.
Williams ®.
Williams v. '
. Thorn (70 N. T. 270), 1297.
, Thorn (11 Paige, 459), 434,
. Turner (7 Ga. 348), 632.
. Taylor (4 Port. 234), 1237.
, Van Tuyl (2 Ohio St. 336),
Williams v. Vreeland (29 N. J. Eq. 417),
497,500,508,510,513.
Williams®. Wager (64 Vt. 326; 24 Atl.
Rep. 765), 318.
Williams®. Washington (40 S. Car. 457;
19 S. E. Rep. 1), 1470.
Williams®. Waters (14 Mees. & W. 166),
652, 912, 922, 933.
Williams®. Wilbur (67 Ind. 42), 706.
Williams ®. Williams (32 Beav. 370), 335,
339, 366.
Williams ®. Williams (1 Duvall, 221),
1017,1018.
Williams®. Williams (16 Lea, 164), 1201.
Williams®. Williams (9 Mod. 299), 1729.
Williams®. Williams (8 N. X. 525), 83,
752, 820.
Williams ®. Williams (65 Wis. 300), 1215.
Williams®. Williams (1 Sim. (N. S.)
358), 52, 121, 123.
Williams «. Winsor (12 R. I. 9), 1408.
Williams ». Woodard (2 Wend. 492),
1073.
Williams ®. Worthington (49 Md. 572; 33
Am. Rep. 286), 130.
Williams ®. Young (17 Cal. 403), 574.
Williams' Appeal (73 Pa. St. 249) , 517.
Williams' Appeal (83 Pa. St. 377), 1308.
Williams' Appeal (101 Pa. St. 474) , 1404.
Williams' Settlement, In re (4 Kay & J.
87), 868.
Williamson ®. Allison (2 East, 446) , 477.
Williamson v. Beckman (8 Leigh, 20),
11.
ccxxvm
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Williamson©. Berry (8 How. 555), 825,
830.
Williamson ©. Branch Bank (7 Ala.
906), 456, 1657,1659.
Williamson v. Brown (15 N. T. 354) , 445,
453.
Williamson v. Cline (40 W. Va. 194; 20 S.
E. Rep. 917), 661, 711.
Williamson «. Curtis (3 Bro. Oh. 96),
1350, 1654.
Williamson ©. Dodge (5 Hun, 498), 699.
Williamson ©. Farwell (L. R. 35 Ch. D.
128), 640.
Williamson ©. Morton (2 Md. Ch. 94),
456,1657,1659.
Williamson v. Nealey (81 Me. 447), 1409.
Williamson ©. Nichol (47 Ark. 254), 904.
Williamson ©. R. R. Co. (53 Iowa, 126),
656.
Williamson ©. Stone (128 111. 129), 1471.
Williamson ». Suydam (6 Wall. 723),
902.
Williamson v. Wickersham (2 Coll. 52),
902.
Williamson ©. Williamson (6 Paige,
298), 1438.
Williamson v. Tager (91 Ky. 282; 16 S.
W. Rep. 660), 60.
Williman©. Holmes (4 Rich. Eq. 475),
923, 925, 930, 941.
Willlngham ©.Long (47 Ga. 540), 607.
Wlllington i>. Adam (1 V. & B. 445) , 142.
Willink ©. Vanderveer (IBarb. 599),
373.
Willis v. Cooper (1 Dutch. 137), 977.
Willis ©. Kibble (1 Beav. 559), 1683.
Willis v. Kymer (L. R. 7 Ch. D. 181), 167,
614.
Willis ©. Lucas (1 P. Wins. 472), 178.
Willis ©. Satterfleld (20 S. W. Rep. 155),
88.
Willis ©. Sharp (113 N. T. 586; 21 ST. E.
Rep. 705), 1031.
Willis ©. Valletta (4 Mete. 186), 444, 479.
Willis ©. Willis (2 Atk. 71), 256, 307, 359.
Willis1 Appeal (22 Pa. St. 380), 948, 1102,
1202.
Will Of Fox (52 N. T. 530; 11 Am. Rep.
751), 1072.
Will of O'Hara, In re (95 K. Y. 403), 508,
516, 518.
Wllmot©. Jenkins (IBeav. 401), 857.
Wilson ©. Allen (1 J. & W. 611), 980, 983.
Wilson ©. Bennett (5 De G. & 6m. 476),
895, 1015.
Wilson v. Bird (28 N. J. Eq. 352), 562.
Wilson©. Boswell (2 Dick. 635), 842.
Wilson ©. Brookshire (126 Ind. 497),
222.
Wilson ©. Buchanan (7 Gratt. 340), 103.
Wilson ©. Campbell (20 S. W. Rep. 609),
267.
Wilson ©. Castro (31 Cal. 420), 309.
Wil9on ©. Central Bridge Co. (9 R. I.
690), 1183.
Wilson ©. Cheshire (1 McCord,233),P12.
Wilson ©. Clapham (1 J. & W. 38), 198.
Wilson ©. Darlington (1 Cox, 172), 1525.
Wilson v. Denison (Amb. 82), 1005,
1130.
Wilson ©. Dent (3 Sim. 385), 67.
Wilson©. Duguid (L. R. 24 Ch. D. 244),
629, 630, 632.
Wilson ©. Edmonds (24 N. H. 517), 1427,
1434.
Wilson v. Eggleston (27 Mich. 260), 499.
Wilson ©. Ely (6 N. J. Eq. 181), 1427.
Wilson ©. Foreman (1 Dick. 593), 326.
Wilson ©. Forsyth (24 Barb. 105), 1404.
Wilson©. Goodman (4 Hare, 54), 1233.
Wilson ©. Green (49 Iowa, 251), 1533.
Wilson ©. Halliley (1 R. & M. 590) , 1068,
1090.
Wilson ©. Herbert (41 N. J. L. 45; 32
Am. Rep. 243), 660, 709.
Wilson ©. Hunter (14 Wis. 683), 1419.
Wilson, In re (3 Pa. St. 430), 1419.
Wilson ©. Ivat (2 Ves. 166), 260.
Wilson©. John's Island Church (2 Rich.
Eq. 192), 1569.
Wilson ©. Jones (46 Md. 349), 707.
Wilson ©. Leroy (1 Brock. 437), 565.
Wilson ©. Lord (4 De G., F. & J. 264), 70.
Wilson ©. Lyon (51 111. 166), 574, 582.
Wilson ©. McCullough (19 Pa. St. 77), 12.
Wilson©. McDowell (78111. 514), 263.
Wilson ©. Maddison (2 T. & C. 372), 184.
Wilson ©. Moore (1 Myl. & K. 126), 1231,
1536, 1587.
Wilson ©. Mushett (3 B. & Ad. 743), 725.
Wilson ©. Peake (3 Jur. 155), 1219.
Wilson ©. Pennock (27 Pa. St. 238), 896.
Wilson ©. Piggot (2 Ves. Jr. 351), 622.
Wilson©. Russ (17 Fla. 696), 918, 1576,
1642.
Wilson ©. South Park Commissioners
(70 111. 46), 1092, 1108.
Wilson ©. Tappan (6 Ohio, 172), 141, 142.
Wilson ©. Towle (36 N. H. 129), 864, 865,
866, 870, 996.
Wilson ©. Troup (2 Cow. 196; 7 Johns.
Ch. 25), 392, 1451, 1452, 1596.
Wilson ©. Turner (L. R. 22 Ch. D. 521),
614.
Wilson ©. Wilson (3 Blnn. 559), 144, 1688.
Wilson ©. Wilson (3 Gill & J. 20), 1689.
Wilson ©. Wilson (2 Keen, 251), 906.
Wilson©. Wilson (14 Sim. 405; 1 H. L.
Cas. 538), 721, 722.
Wilson ©. Wilson (15 Sim. 487), 103.
TABLE OF CASES.
CCXX1X
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Wilson & Co. v. Smith (8 How. 763), 530.
Wilson's Appeal (41 Pa. St. 94), 1058.
Wilson's Appeal (115 Pa. St. 95), 1127,
1204, 1234.
Wilson's Estate, In re (2 Pa. St. 325), 34,
853.
Wilt v. Franklin (1 BInn. 502), 878.
Wiltman's Appeal (28 Pa. St. 376), 287.
Wilton v. Devine (20 Barb. 9), 339.
Wilton v. Harwood (23 Me. 131), 603.
Wilton v. Hill (25 L. J. Ch. 156), 1692.
Wilts v. Homey (59 Md. 584), 232.
Winansv. Winans (99 Mich. 74; 57 N.
W. Bep. 1088), 325.
Winch v. Brutton (14 Sim. 319), 52, 132.
Winch v. Keeley (1 T. E. 619), 972, 1049.
Wincaelsea v. Noroliffe (1 Vern. 434),
594.
Winchester v. Baltimore B. E. Co. (4
Md. 231), 443, 444.
Winchester v. Machen (75 Md. 538),
1623.
Winchester Electric Light Co. v. Veal
(44 N". E. Eep. 353), 1172.
Winders. Dif£enderier"(2 Bland, 156),
987, 1220, 1686.
Windham «. Litchfield (22 Conn. 226),
1740.
Winebrenner v. Colder (43 Pa. St. 244),
789, 794.
Wing v. Goodman (75 111. 159) , 574.
Wing v. Hayford (124 Mass. 249), 1498.
Wingertw. Gordan (66 Md. 106), 707.
Wingerter v. Wingerter (71 Cal. 105),
377.
Wingfield v. Rhea (73 Ga. 477), 705.
Winkfield v. Brinkman (21 Kan. 682),
398, 532.
Winn v. Albert (2 Md. Ch. 169), 67.
Winn v. Crosby (52 How. Pr. 174), 1400.
Winn v. Dillon (27 Miss. 494), 416, 1184.
Winn v. Fenwick (11 Beav. 438), 627,
631.
Winn v. Lippincott Inv. Co. (125 Mo.
528, 28 S. W. Eep. 998), 581.
Winn v. Sanford (148 Mass. 39; 1 Lawy.
Eep. 572), 721.
Winona & St. P. R. E. Co. v. St. Paul &
S. C. E. E. (26 Minn. 179), 388.
Winpenny i>. French (18 Ohio St. 469),
558.
Winslow v. Cummings (3 Cush. 368), 21,
22,596,755,762,763, 775.
Winslow v. Gilbreath (50 Me. 90), 706.
Winslow v. Missouri Pac. B. E. Co. (4
Minn. 317), 1731.
Winslow v. Tighe (2 Ball & B. 195),
399.
Wlnson v. Lombard (18 Pick. 57), 487.
WlnBor®. McLellan (2 Story, 492), 1408.
Winston v. Jones (6 Ala. 550), 1033, 1036,
1037, 1072.
Winters. Fain (47 Ark. 493), 574.
Winters v. Rush (34 Cal. 136), 1053.
Winthropv. Atty.-Gen. (128 Mass. 258),
864, 866, 996, 1002, 1005, 1060, 1131.
Wisconsin v. Marine Bank v. Filer (83
Mich. 496), 576.
Wise v. Fuller (29 N. J. Eq. 257), 474.
Wise v. Wise (2 Jon. & La. 412), 88, 878,
879.
Wisner v. Barrett (4 Wash. 0. C. 631),
461.
Wiswallt). Stewart (32 Ala. 433), 390.
Wiswell v. First Cong. Soc.(14 Ohio St.
31), 1060.
Wiswell v. Boss (4 Port. 321), 852,1318,
1460.
Witham v. Brooner (63 111. 344), 910, 912,
938.
Withers v. Hickman (6B. Mon. 294), 832.
Withers v. Weaver (10 Pa. St. 391), 151.
Withers v. Withers (Amb. 151), 307.
Withers v. Teadon (1 Rich. Eq. 324),
112, 167, 180, 614, 1000.
Withington v. Withington (16 Sim.
104), 865, 869.
Withy v. Mangles (4 Beav. 358), 622,
642, 643.
Witman v. Norton (6 Binn. 395), 1355.
Witsell v. Charleston (7 S. Car. 88), 667.
Witt v. Carroll (37 S. Car. 388; 16 S.
Car. 130), 710.
Wlttman v. Lex (17 S. & E. 88), 744, 749,
762,777.
Witter. Wolfe (16 S. Car. 256), 308.
Witts v. Dawkins (12 Ves. 601), 669.
Witts v. Horney (59 Md. 584), 358.
Witz v. Gray (116 N. Car. 48; 20 S. E.
Eep. 1019), 660, 709.
WItzell«. Chaplin (3 Bradf . 386), 82.
Woerther v. Backhoff (12 Mo. App.
586,) 1507.
Woerz v. Eademacher (120 N. T. 62; 23
N. E. Eep. 1113), 372, 373, 618.
Wolf v. Duvall (13 S. W. Eep. 728), 688.
Wolf v. Washburn (6 Cow. 261), 948,
1144.
Wolfe v. Bate (9 B. Mon. 208), 1752.
Wolford v. Harrington (74 Pa. St. 311;
15 Am. Eep. 548), 193, 218, 525.
Wollaston v. Tribe (L. E. 9 Eq. 44), 163,
271, 293.
Wolleyn. Jenkins (23 Beav. 53), 1012.
Wolterbeek v. Barrow (23 Beav. 423),
103.
Womaek v. Austin (1 S. Car. 421), 286,
1215.
Womble v. Battle (3 Ired. 182), 578.
Wood v. Amory (105 N. Y. 281), 492.
ccxxx
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Wood v. Arch (12 Sim. 472), 1537.
Wood v. Auburn, etc. B. E. Co. (8 N.
Y. 160) , 1048.
Wood v. Augustine (61 Mo. 46), 1502,
1629.
Wood v. Boots (60 Mo. 646), 827.
Wood v. Burnham (6 Paige, 518; 26
Wend. 19), 91, 92, 93, 115, 959, 1057,
1138, 1139, 1266.
Wood v. Ohapin (13 N. T. 509), 445.
Wood v. Ohetwood (44 N. J. Eq. 66),
709.
Wood v. Cone (7 Paige, 472), 262.
Wood v. Cox (1 Keen, 317; 2 Myl. & Or.
684), 49, 53,61, 128, 129, 213, 243, 248,
249, 261.
Wood v. Downes (18 Ves. 127), 289, 393,
418,419,424.
Wood v. Dimmer (3 Mason, 308), 597.
Wood«. Ellis (85 Va. 471; 7 S. E. Eep.
852), 582.
Wood v. Garnett (6 Leigh, 271), 1255.
Wood v. Goodridge (6 Cush. 117 ; 52 Am.
Dec. 771), 1073, 1075.
Wood v. Griffin (46 N. H. 230), 1434.
Woods. Hammond (16 E. I. 98), 111.
Wood v. Hardisty (2 Coll. 642), 881.
Wood v. Irwin (163 Pa. St. 416) , 14.
Wood v. Keyes (8 Paige, 365), 262.
Wood i!. Kice (103 Mo. 329), 992.
Wood v. McCann (6 Dana, 366) , 556.
Wood v. Mann (1 Sumn. 507), 435,436,
441, 442.
Wood v. Mather (38 Barb. 475 ; 44 N. Y.
249), 830, 913, 916, 919.
Wood v. Matterson (10 Beav. 644), 988.
Wood v. Myrick (17 Minn. 408), 1227.
Wood v. Orford (52 Cal. 412), 704.
Wood v. Paget (1 Bro. Ch. 363) , 977.
Woods. Paine (66 Fed. Eep. 807), 736.
Wood v. Perkins (57 Fed. Eep. 258),
266.
Wood v. Perry (1 Barb. 114), 398.
Wood v. Polk (12 Heisk. 220), 666.
Wood v. Eabe (96 N. Y. 426; 48 Am. Eep.
640), 218, 431, 503.
Woods. Eedley (27 Miss. 119), 1031.
Wood s. Sparks (1 Dev. & Bat. 396), 885,
893, 1039, 1089.
Wood v. Stafford (50 Miss. 370), 1625,
1634.
Wood v. Stone (8 Price, 613), 904.
Woods;. Sullens (44 Ala. 686), 57.4.
Wood v. Thomas (L. E. (1891) 3 Ch. 482),
1437.
Wood v. Truax (39 Mich. 628), 830.
Wood s. Tunnicliff (74 N. T. 738), 1049,
1344.
Wood v. Veal (5 B. & Aid. 456), 984.
Woods. Wallace (24Ind. 226), 1641.
Wood s. Weightman (L. B. 13 Eq. 434),
1257.
Wood s. Wheeler (106 N. Car. 513), 709.
Wood s. White (4 Myl. & Cr. 460), 1011,
1012, 1068, 1071.
Wood s. Wood (3 Ala. 756), 826, 1534.
Wood s. Wood (18 Hun, 360), 659.
Wood v. Wood (83 N. T. 675), 655.
Wood u.Wood (5 Paige, 696; 28 Am.
Dec. 461), 825, 913, 917, 919, 1218, 1522.
Wood's Appeal (86 Pa. St. 346), 1688.
Woodalls. Kelly (85 Ala. 368; 7 Am. St.
Eep. 57), 570, 573.
Woodbridge v. Perkins (3 Day, 364),
1117.
Woodbridge v. Watkins (3 Bibb, 350),
1040.
Woodburn's Will, i»re(lDeG. & J.
333), 1118, 1266.
Woodbury s. Bowman (14 Me. 161), 88.
Woodcock s. Eenneck (4 Beav. 190; 1
Phi 11. 72), 624, 627.
Wooden v. Kerr (91 Mich. 188), 882.
Woodnn v. Phoebus (30 Fed. Eep. 289),
1720.
Woodford v. Charnley (28 Beav. 99),
156.
Woodhouse v. Meredith (1 J. & W. 204),
413.
Woodhull v. Eosenthal (61 N. T. 382),
607.
Woodlee v. Burch (43 Mo. 231), 396.
Woodman v. Good (6 S. W. & P. 169),
1176, 1437.
Woodman v. Morrel (Freem Ch. 33),
307.
Woodman v. Neal (48 Me. 266), 688.
Woodman v. Wampler (69 Ind. 88),
706.
Woodmeston v. Walker (2 E. & M. 147),
649, 651,671, 686.
Woodruffs. Cook (2Edw. Oh. 259), 400.
Woodruffs. Howe (88 Cal. 1B4), 411.
Woodruff v. Jabine (15 S. W. Eep.
830) , 497.
Woodruff v. Marsh (63 Conn. 125; 26
Atl. Eep. 846), 734,820.
Woodruff v. N. T., etc. E. Oo. (129N.
T. 482), 1058.
Woodruff©. Pleasants (81 Va. 37), 1523.
Woodruff v. Eobb (19 Ohio, 212), 1440,
1443.
Woodruff v. Snedecor (68 Ala. 442),
1113, 1133,1673,1690.
Woodruff v. Ward (35 N. J. Eq. 467),
1213.
Woodrum ». Kirkpatrick (2 Swan, 218),
654.
Woods v. Bailey (3 Fla. 41), 574.
Woodsy. Dille (11 Ohio, 455), 67.
TABLE OF CASES.
CCXXX1
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Woods, In re (24 Pitts. Leg. Obs. 222),
870.
Woods v. Woods (1 Myl. & Cr. 401) , 183.
Woodside v. Hewell (107 Cal. 141; 42
Pac. Rep. 152), 317, 319.
Woodson v. Perkins (5 Gratt. 345), 711.
Woodward ». Halsey (1 Sugd. Pow.
255), 1009.
Woodward v. Jaggers (48 Ark. 248),
1533.
Woodward v. James (115 N. Y. 356) , 616,
1746.
Woodward v. Marshall (22 Pick. 468),
1364, 1368.
Woodward v. Schatzell (3 Johns. Ch.
412), 37.
Woodwards. Seaver (38N. H. 29), 708.
Woodward ». Sibert (82 Va. 441), 271.
Woodward v. Woodward (41 N. J. Eq.
225), 562.
Woodward v. Wright (82 Cal. 202; 22
Pac. Eep. 1115) , 1025, 1064, 1152, 1157.
Woodworth v. Spring (4 Allen, 321), 847.
Wooldridge v. Irving (23 Fed. Rep.
676), 1385, 1404.
Wooldridge v. Jacobs (79 Ky. 250),
1398.
Wooldridge v. Planters' Bank (1 Sneed,
, 297), 908.
Woolf v. Pate (9 B. Mon. 210) , 961 .
Woolforke v. Sullivan (23 Ala. 548),
1344.
Woolmer's Estate (3 Whart. 477), 256.
Woolsey v. Brown (11 Hun, 54), 699.
Woolsey ». Scarborough (3 Atk. 392),
443.
Woolston's Appeal (51 Pa. St. 456), 103.
Woolewine v. Woodrum (19 W. Va. 67) ,
1501, 1650.
Woonsocketlnst. v. American Worsted
Co. tl3R. 1.255), 1451.
Wooten v. Bellinger (17 Fla. 300), 674,
687.
Wooten v. Burch (2 Md. Ch. 199), 1438.
Wooters v. Hollingsworth (58 Tex.
374), 578.
Worcester Corn Exchange Co., In re
(3 De G., M. & G. 180), 1032.
Worley v. Worley (18 Beav. 58), 853, 857.
Worlingv. Allie (13 S. Y. Supl. 791),
1222.
Worman v. Worman (L. R. 43 Ch. D. 26),
1144.
Wormleyw. Wormley (8 Wheat. 422),
390, 414, 441, 442, 460, 595, 987, 988, 1181,
1361, 1647.
Wormouth v. Johnson (58 Cal. 621), 309.
Worralw. Marlar (1 P. Wms. 459), 976.
Worrall v. Jacob (3 Meriv. 266), 720, 722.
Worrall v. Munn (5 N. Y. 229), 163.
Worrall v. Harford (8 Ves. 8), 1671, 1701.
Worrell's Appeal (23 Pa. St. 44), 1210,
1212, 1213.
Worth v. Mc Aden (1 Dev. & Bat. 209),
855, 858, 859, 861, 884, 885, 1127, 1234.
Worthen v. Griffith (59 Ark. 562), 1371.
Worthington v. Curtis (L. R. 1 Ch. D.
419), 663.
Worthington v. Evans (IS. &S. 165),
1014, 1045, 1046.
Worthington v. Rich (77 Md. 265; 26 AM.
Rep. 403), 954.
Worthy v. Johnson (8Ga. 236; 52 Am.
Dec. 399), 1107.
Worthy v. Johnson (10 Ga. 358; 54 Am.
Dec. 393), 1054.
Wragg v. Comptroller-General (2 De-
saus. Eq. 520), 578.
Wrangham, Ex parte (2 Ves. Jr. 609),
785.
Wray v. Steele (2 V. & B. 388), 307, 313,
315.
Wren v. Kirton (11 Ves. 377), 1173.
Wrenn v. Bradley (2 De G. & Sm. 39),
1044.
Wrenn v. Followell (52 Ark. 76), 1534.
Wright v. Arnold (14 B. Mon. 643; 61
Am. Dec. 172), 286, 381, 1592.
Wright v. Atkyns (17 Ves. 255), 123,
128.
Wright v. Atkyns (19 Ves. 300), 634.
Wright v. Brown (67 N. Y. 1), 493.
Wright v. Brown (44 Pa. St. 224), 665,710,
921.
Wright v. Cain (93 N. Car. 301), 47.
Wrights. Campbell (27 Ark. 637), 1184.
Wright v. Campbell (82 Tex. 388), 677.
Wright v. Chard (4 Drew. 673), 692.
Wright a. Comley (14 111. App. 561),
829.
Wright v. Dame (22 Pick. 55), 432, 434,538,
595, 1718.
Wright v. Delafleld (23 Barb. 498), 942.
Wright v. Douglas (3 Barb. 69), 949,
1265.
Wright v. Douglas (3 Seld. 569), 48.
Wright v. Dresser (110 Mass. 51), 707.
Wright v. Duffield (2Baxt. 218), 586.
Wright, Ex parte (19 Ves. 255), 600.
Wright i>. Fisher (65 Mich. 279; 8 Am.
St. Rep. 886), 1542.
Wright v. Freeman (5 Harr. & J. 477),
984.
Wrights. Henderson (7 How. (Miss.)
639), 1357.
Wright v. Henderson (12 Tex. 43), 1440.
Wright v. Jones (105 Ind. 211 , 10"
Wright v. King (Harr. Ch.l2),358.
Wright v. Linn (9 Pa. St. 433), 749.
Wright v. Linn (16 Tex. 34), 1388.
CCXXX11
TABLE OF CASES.
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
Wright v. Miller (8 N. Y. 10; 59 Am.
Dec. 438), 152, 183, 228, 229, 1424.
Wright ©. Morley (11 Ves. 12), 680.
Wright v. Pearson (1 Eden, 119), 94.
Wright v. Pearson (1 Edw. Oh. 125), 913,
919.
Wright ©. Proud (13 Ves. 137), 282, 289,
292, 419, 426, 427.
Wright ©. Rindskofl (43 Wis. 344), 556.
Wright v. Eoss (36 Cal. 432), 1170.
Wright ©. Sampter (127 111. 167), 66.
Wright ©. Shumway (1 Biss. 23), 603.
Wright©. Snowe (2 De G. &Sm.321),
27,381,1223, 1592.
Wright v. Smith (23 N. J. Eq. 106), 392,
1182.
Wright v. Trustees M. E. Church (1
Hon*. Ch. 202), 28, 744.
Wright ©. Verplank (8 De G.,M. &G.
133; 2 K. & J. 1), 218, 259, 286.
Wright©. Wakeford (17 Ves. 459), 1009,
1079, 1082.
Wright ©. Wilken (2 Best & Sm. 232),
181.
Wright©. Wright (2 Johns. & H. 647),
671.
Wright©. Wright (2 MeCord Ch. 185),
1255.
Wright's Appeal (12 Pa. St. 256), 1352.
Wrigley ©. Swainson (3 De G. & Sm.
458), 549.
Wrigley ©. Sykes (21 Beav. 237), 1036.
Wroe v. Seed (4 Gifl. 425), 1190, 1564.
Wurt ©. Page (4 C. E. Green, 365), 304.
Wyatt ©. Sharratt (3 Beav. 498), 1571.
Wyatt ©. Wallis (1 Coop. 154), 1253.
Wych ©. East India Co. (3 P. Wms. 309),
1536, 1538.
Wych ©. Packington (3 Bro. Ch. 44),
238, 243.
Wycoff ©. Wycoff (44 N. J. Eq. 56), 1171.
Wykham ©. Wykham (18 Ves. 396), 920,
927, 942.
Wykoff ©. Wykoff (3 W. & S. 481), 1025.
Wyle ©. Burke (40 Mich. 499), 616.
Wyllie v. Ellice (6 Hare, 505), 603, 604,
877.
Wylly ©. Collins (9 Ga. 223), 664.
Wylson ©. Moore (1 Myl. & K. 337),
1656.
Wyman ©. Hooper (2 Gray, 141), 431.
Wyman©. Woodbury (86 Hun, 277; 33
N. Y. Supl. 217), 135.
Wyman's Appeal (13 N. H. 18), 1342,
1344.
Wynch©. Grant (2 Drew. 312; 18 Jur.
1010), 881, 1225.
Wyncoop ©. Wyncoop (12 Ind. 206), 403.
Wynn ©. Sharer (23 Ind. 573), 333.
Wynne ©. Hawkins (1 Bro. Ch, 179), 125.
Wynne©. Humbertson (27 Beav. 421),
1664, 1565, 1567.
Wynn v. Lee (5 Ga. 217), 956,-957.
Wynne ©. Warren (2 Heisk. 118), 1102,
1136, 1204, 1215.
Wyse ©. Dandrldge (35 Miss. 672; 72 Am.
Dec. 149), 1627.
Wyse ©. Smith (4 Gill & J. 295) , 1322.
Wythes ©. Lee (3 Drew. 396), 685.
Yale v. Dederer (18 N. Y. 265; 72 Am.
Dec. 503; 22 N. Y. 450; 78 Am. Dec.
216; 68 N. Y. 329), 664, 699, 702, 703,
709.
Yarborough ©. Leggett (14 Tex. 677),
1049.
Yarbrough ©. West (10 Ga. 471), 151.
Yard ©. Pittsburgh, etc. B. Co. (131 Pa.
St. 206), 1745.
Yardley ©. Eaub (5 Whart. 123), 715.
Yard's Appeal (64 Pa. St. 95), 1524.
Yarnall's Appeal (70 Pa. St. 340), 116,
925, 934.
Yaryan v. Shriner (26 Ind. 364), 575.
Yates ©. Compton (2 P. Wms. 308), 928,
1066.
Yates ©. Dodge (123 111. 50), 1408, 1410.
Yates ©. Lyon (61 ST. Y. 344), 1418.
Yates v. Yates (9 Barb. 324), 618, 812.
Yazell ©. Palmer (81 HI. 82), 705.
Yeakle v. Litchfield (13 Allen, 417; 90
Am. Dec. 207), 1721.
Yeakle ©. Nace (2 Whart. 123), 984.
Yeap Cheah Neo ©. Ong Cheng Neo (L.
E. 6 P. C. 381), 253.
Yeates ©. Compton (2 P. Wms. 358), 258.
Yeates ©. Groves (1 Ves. Jr. 280), 34.
Yeates ©. Prior (6 Eng. 68), 483.
Yeatman ©. Savings Inst. (95 U. S. 764),
1409.
Yeldell ©. Quarles (Dud. Eq. 56), 678.
Yeomans©. Bell (79 Hun, 215; 29 N. T.
Supl. 502), 681.
Yerger v. Jones (16 How. 37), 455, 1625,
1655.
Yerkes ©. Richards (170 Pa. St. 346; 32
Atl. Rep. 1089; 37 W. N. C. 69), 991.
Yetter ©. Fitts (113 Ind. 34), 574.
Yingling©. Miller (77 Md. 104; 26 Atl.
Rep. 491), 753, 816.
Yonge ©. Eurse (3 Jur. (N. S.) 603), 1044.
York Building Co. ©. Mackenzie (8 Bro.
P. C. 42), 384, 606.
York County Bank, Appeal of (32 Pa.
St. 446), 600.
York ©. Eaton (2 Freem. 23), 215, 216.
York & North Midland By. Co. ©. Hud-
son ( 16 Beav. 485), 406.
TABLE OF CASES.
CCXXXlli
[The references are to pages: Vol. I, pp. 1-847; Vol. II, pp. 848-1753.]
rt ii. Rmiblna (24 111. 3261. 1453. Younahusband v. Glsborne (1 Co:
Youartw. Hopkins (24111. 326), 1453
Youde v. Cloud (L. K. 18 Eq 634), 1114,
1138.
Young v. Boardtuan (97 Mo. 181), 327.
Young v. Bradley (101 U. S. 782), 922,
1267.
Young v. Combe (4 Ves. 101) , 387, 1255.
Young, Ex parte (8 Gill, 287), 1689.
Young v. Fox (37 Fed. Bep. 385), 1164.
Young ji. Grafi (28111. 20), 10.
Young v. Harris (36 Ark. 162), 574.
Young v. Hughes (32 N". J. Eq. 372). 492,
494, 1040.
Youngv. Jones (9 Humph. 551), 715.
Young d. Maeklay (3Md. Ch. 56), 1537.
Young v. Miles (10 B. Mon. 290), 955,
1114, 1426.
Young v. Morrison (109 N. Car. 520), 1447.
Young v. Patterson (165 Pa. St. 423; 30
Atl. Rep. 1011; 36 W. N. C. 100), 1225.
Young ». Peachy (2 Atk. 254), 160, 218,
282.
Young v. Roberts (15 Beav. 658) , 1451.
Young v. Smith (9 Bush, 421), 706,1700.
Young v. Van Benthuysen (30 Tex. 762),
1082, 1092.
Young v. Waterpark (13 Sim. 199), 823,
1536.
Young v. Wilton (10 Ir. Eq. 10), 1319.
Young v. Young (4 Cranch C. C. 499),
904.
Young v. Young (87 Me. 44; 32 Atl. Rep.
782), 1285.
Young «. Young (97 N. Car. 132; 2 S. E.
Rep. 78), 1734.
Young v. Young (3 Jones Eq. 216), 655.
Young v. Young (7 Coldw. 461), 665,
710.
YoungD. Young (80 N. Y. 422), 70, 151.
Young's Estate, In re (137 Pa. St. 433; 21
Atl. Rep. 93), 365.
Younger v. Welham (3 Swanst. 180),
1130.
Younghusband v. Glsborne (1 Coll. Ch.
400), 1291, 1638.
Youngman v. Elmira Railroad Co. (65
Pa. St. 278), 1516.
Yount v. Morrison (109 N. Car. 520)
1449.
Youst v. Martin (3 S. & R. 423), 443.
Z.
Zabriskle v. Morris R. Co. (33 N. J. Eq.
22), 919, 920.
Zacharias v. Zacharias (23 Pa. St. 452),
1535, 1537.
Zambaco v. Cassavetti (L. R. 11 Eq.
439), 993, 1343.
Zane v. Kennedy (73 Pa. St. 182), 1074,
1075.
Zane's Estate (4Whart. 179), 855.
Zane's Will (Brightly, 350), 777.
Zeback v. Smith (3 Binn. 69), 1013, 1016,
1039, 1066.
Zeisweiss v. James (63 Pa. St. 465), 252,
732, 749, 756, 809.
Zeller v. Eckert (4 How. 289), 1537.
Zimmer v. Settle (124 N. Y. 37; 21 Am.
St. Rep. 638), 724, 726.
Zimmerman v. Anders (6 W. &S. 218),
749.
Zimmerman v. Frailey (70 Mi 561),
1201, 1269.
Zimmerman v. Kinkle (108 N. Y. 282),
1105.
Zimmerman v. Willard (114 111. 364),
1389.
Zinek v. Walker (2 W. Bl. 1154), 973.
Zoueh v. Parsons (3 Burr. 1794), 11,
1024.
Zuck v. Culp (59 Oal. 142) , 234.
Znlieta's Claim (L. R. 9 Eq. 270), 1033.
Zwinglew. Wilkinson (94 Tenn. 246; 28
S. W. Rep. 1096), 577.
THE LAW
or
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES.
INTRODUCTION.
The Rise and Progress of Trusts. — An adequate his-
tory of the origin and development of trusts would be
altogether too voluminous to appear in an ordinary treatise
on that subject. We can only present some of the more
salient points. The uses of the earlier English law, which
were essentially, though not in all respects, identical with
the trusts of a later period, were derived from the fidei com-
missum of the Romans. This term, which means "a thing
committed to one's faithfulness," was used by the Romans
to designate a trust, because under the earlier Roman law
the discharge of duty by the hceres fiduciarius, or trustee,
depended wholly upon his faith or honor. The cestui que
trust, or beneficiary, was called, the fidei-commissarius. In
the time of Justinian some progress had been made in the
direction of holding the hceres fiduciarius to a proper ac-
countability. Justinian says: "The Emperor Augustus was
the first who brought them," i. e., fiduciary bequests,
"under judicial cognizance. But we have since endeavored
to exceed that prince, and at the instance of that most ex-
1 INTRODUCTION.
cellent man, Tribonian, the qusestor of our palace, we
have enacted, etc."1
In their adoption, at an early period, by the English
courts, "the origin of trusts, or rather the adaptation of
them to the English law," says the late Mr. Lewin, "may
be traced, in part at least, to the ingenuity of fraud. By
the interposition of a trustee the debtor thought to with-
draw his property out of the reach of his creditor, the free-
holder to intercept the fruits of tenure from the lord of
whom the lands were held, and the body ecclesiastic to
evade the restrictions directed against the growing wealth
of the church by the statutes of mortmain. Another in-
ducement to the adoption of the new device was the natural
anxiety of mankind to acquire that free power of alienation
and settlement of their estates, which, by the narrow policy
of the common law, they had hitherto been prevented from
exercising."2
Originally, in England, as under the Roman law, the
only security for the faithful execution of a trust was
the integrity and honor of the trustee. But in the reign
of Richard II., John "Waltham, Bishop of Salisbury and
Lord Keeper, originated the writ of subpoena, under which
the trustee was liable to be summoned into chancery and
compellable to answer upon his oath any charge or com-
plaint of his cestui que trust.3
1 Inst, of Justinian, Lib. II, tit. in which uses were at first de-
23, §§ 1, 2, 12; 2 Pomeroy's Equity clared, and of the difficulty of
Jurisprudence, § 976; 2 Story's obtaining evidence of the object of
Equity Jurisprudence, § 965; the parties and the extent of the
Tiedeman on Heal Property, § 438; beneficial interest, by the ordinary
2 Washburn on Real Property, 384- proceedings of a court of law, it has
386 ; Spence's Equitable Jurisdic- been said that John Waltham, who
.tion, 439-442. was Bishop of Salisbury, and Chan-
2 1 Lewin on Trusts, p. 1 : "The cellor to King Kichard the Second,
•parents of uses and trusts were by a strained interpretation of the
fraud and fear, and a court of con- statute of West. 2, devised the writ
science was the nurse." Atty.-Gen. of subpoena, returnable in the court
v. Sands, Hard. 491. of chancery only." 1 Sanders on
31 Lewin on Trusts, p. 1: "In Uses and Trust?, *15; 3 Black-
consequence of the secret manner stone's Commentaries, 52.
INTRODUCTION. 3
After a somewhat extended trial of the statute of Richard
II. , it appeared that the evils to which this law had given
rise were more numerous and more aggravated than those
which it had remedied. In consequence the legislature again
took up the subject and put an end to uses, so far as related
to their fiduciary character, by enacting that "when any
person stood seized of any hereditaments to the use, con-
fidence or trust of any other person, or of any body-politic,
such person or body-politic as had any such use, confidence
or trust, should be deemed in lawful seizin of the heredita-
ments in such like estates as they had in use, trust or confi-
dence."1
During the reigns of Charles I. and Charles II., under
the chancellorship of Lord Nottingham, a farther advance
was made by the English courts, and trusts were estab-
lished on "the broad foundation of conformity to the course
of common law." "In my opinion," said Lord Mansfield,
"trusts were not on a true foundation till Lord Nottingham
held the great seal ; but by steadily pursuing, from plain
principles, trusts in all their consequences, and by some
assistance from the legislature, a noble, rational and uni-
form system of law has since been raised, so that trusts are
now made to answer the exigencies of families and all pur-
poses, without producing one inconvenience, fraud or pri-
vate mischief which the statute of Henry VIII. meant to
avoid. The forum where they are adjudged is the only dif-
ference between trusts and legal estates."2
Since the reorganization of the English courts in 1875
"equitable estates and rights are to be noticed and acted
upon in all the courts ; and where there is any conflict be-
tween the rules of equity and the rules of common law, the
rules of equity are to prevail."3
The system of trusts which, even in England, encountered
strong opposition and had a very slow development, was
1 27 Hen. VIII., ch. 10. 3 1 Lewin on Trusts, oh. 1, § 6.
2 1 Lewin on Trusts, *9 ; Burgess See also 1 Perry on Trusts, §§ 5,
v. Wheate, 1 Eden, 223. 6, 7, 8, 298, 299, 300.
4 INTRODUCTION.
much later in obtaining recognition in this country, but
it has come into a wide use, and its value and importance are
universally recognized. The statute of uses is still in force
in many of the States of the American Union, and modern
legislation recognizes trusts and makes provision for their
organization, government and duration, and in some of the
States provides also for their administration. But in this
country, as in England, trusts are still subject to the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of courts of equity, or to the powers of
equity of the common law courts.
CHAPTEE I.
DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF TRUSTS.
§ 1. What is a Trust? | § 2. Different Kinds of Trusts.
§ 1. "What is a Trust. — Numerous definitions of the
trust have been given, all of which, in a greater or less de-
gree, are open to criticism. The best only approximate the
full and true idea. Sir Edward Coke's definition of a use,
adopted by the late Mr. Lewin, has been followed by some
American writers: "A confidence reposed in some other,
not issuing out of the land, but as a thing collateral an-
nexed in privity to the estate of the land, and to the person
touching the land, for which cestui que trust has no remedy
but by subpoena in chancery."1 The trust has been defined
also as "a right of property, real or personal, held by one
party for the benefit of another."2 Mr. Justice Story de-
fines a trust as "an equitable right, title or interest in prop-
erty, real or personal, distinct from the legal ownership
thereof."3 An English writer defines a trust as "an equi-
table obligation, either expressly undertaken or constructively
imposed by the court, under which the obligor, who is called
a trustee, is bound to deal with certain property over which
he has control, and which is called the trust property, for
the benefit of certain persons, who are called the benefici-
aries or cestuis que trust, of whom he may or may not him-
self be one."* The definition of Lord Coke is in a degree
ox
1 Coke Litt. 272b ; 27 Am. & 3 Story's Equity Jurisprudence, §
Eng. Enc. of Law, ch. 1 ; 1 Lewin 964.
on Trusts, *13; 1 Perry on Trusts, 4 Underhill on Trusts and Trus-
§ 13. tees, art. 1. "In its most general
2 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, tit. sense, a trust is confidence reposed
Trust. in a person that he will act in cer-
6 DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF TRUSTS. [§ 2.
misleading, as it is applicable to trusts in real estate only,
certainly not, as has been noted, to trusts of choses in ac-
tion, "the equities attaching to which are, generally speak-
ing, not merely collateral." Besides, this definition is in a
degree out of date, even in England. The court of chan-
cery is no longer in being, and the chancery division of the
high court, though it is the proper court in which to seek
the enforcement of a trust, has not exclusive jurisdiction.
It has been remarked also that these definitions, each and
all of them, are definitions of the beneficial interests or
property of persons in whose favor a trust is created, rather
than of a trust in itself.1
§ 2. Different Kinds of Trusts. — In general, trusts are
either simple or special. In a simple trust, property is con-
veyed to a trustee without specific directions in regard to
his duties. The law determines the obligations of the
trustee and protects the rights of the cestui que trust. If
the trust consists of real estate, the trustee may be required
to execute such conveyances as the beneficiary may desire.2
In a special trust, by the terms of its creation some special
or particular duties are required of the trustee. He is not
simply a holder of property, but undertakes to discharge
certain active duties.3 Special trusts are again divided into
ministerial and discretionary . The former are such as re-
tain matters for the benefit of or beneficial right or title to land
another; but, technically, it signi- or other property, held for another
fies a holding of property, subject person in whom resides the legal
to a duty of employing it or apply- title or ownership, recognized and
ing its proceeds according to direc- enforced by chancery courts."
tions given by the person from Black's Law Dictionary, tit. Trust.
whom it was derived." Abbott's See also Willis on Trustees, ch. 1,
Law Dictionary, tit. Trust. "A p. 2; 4 Kent's Commentaries, 304.
trust in its simplest elements is a 1 Underhill on Trusts and Trus-
confidence resposed in one person, tees, art. 1.
who is termed the trustee for the 2 Flint on Trusts and Trustees, §
benefit of another who is called the 3 ; 1 Lewin on Trusts, *18 ; 1 Perry
cestui que trust; and it is a confidence on Trusts, § 18 ; Underhill on
respecting property, which is thus Trusts, 7.
held by the former for the benefit s 1 Perry on Trusts, § 18; 1 Lewin
of the latter." Burrill's Law Die- on Trusts, *18.
tionary, tit. Trust. "An equitable
§ 2.] DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF TRUSTS. 7
quire only the ordinary measure of intelligence and under-
standing which every agent is supposed to possess, and the
latter imply the exercise of a certain measure of judgment
and prudence.1 There is also what is termed a mixture of
trust and power . By this is meant "a trust of which the
outline only is sketched by the settlor, while the details are
to be filled up by the good sense of the trustee. The exer-
cise of such a power is imperative, while the mode of its exe-
cution is a matter of judgment and discretionary." Trusts
are either public or private. A private trust is one that is
created for the benefit of individuals or of families. Public
trusts are such as exist for the benefit of the public. In
this class are included all public charities, or other objects
relating to the public good. Private trusts are limited in
their duration, while public trusts may continue for an in-
definite period.2 With reference to the conditions of their
formation, trusts are divided into express trusts and implied
trusts, implied trusts including resulting trusts and con-
structive trusts. Express trusts, which are sometimes
called direct trusts, are created by instruments or by parol,
in which the terms employed expressly designate the per-
sons, the property and the object of the trust.3 Implied
trusts are trusts authorized by an instrument which, without
expressing it in terms, implies the purpose of the maker to
create a trust. This implication is determined by the court.4
Resulting trusts are such as the courts presume to follow from
certain business transactions, independently of any declara-
tion of a trust. Constructive trusts are trusts that are
created by construction of equity, without reference to any
intention of the parties, either expressed or implied. With
reference to the act of the settlor express trusts are said to
1 1 Lewin on Trusts, *18. v. Foote, 40 Miss. 792; Sheldon v.
2 1 Lewin on Trusts, *20 ; Christ's Harding, 44 111.68; Fainham v.
Hospital v. Grainger, 1 Mao. & Clements, 51 Me. 426; Kingsbury
G-ord. 460; Stewart v. Green, 5 Ir. v. Burnside, 58 111. 328; s. c, 11
R.Eq.470; 1 Perry on Trusts, §§ 22, Am. Rep. 67.
23. 4 1 Perry on Trusts, § 25 ; 1 Lewin
31 Perry on Trusts, § 24; Flint on Trusts, *130.
on Trusts and Trustees, § 5 ; Gibson
8 DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF TRUSTS. [§ 2.
be either executed or executory. An executed trust is "a
trust in which the estates and interest in the subject-matter
of the trust are completely limited and defined by the in-
strument creating the trust."1 An executory trust is "a
trust in which the limitations of the estate are not perfected
and declared by the settlor, but only an agreement made for
the subsequent creation of a trust, or certain instructions,
or heads of settlement indicated, from which the trustee is,
subsequently, to model, perfect and declare the trust."2
1 Bispham's Principles of Equity, 366 ; Lord Glenorchy v. Bosville,
31. 1 White & Tudor's Lead. Cas. Eq.,
2 Underbill on Trusts and Trus- 1 ; Stanley v. Lennard, 1 Eden,
tees, 137; Austin v. Taylor, 1 Eden, 95.
CHAPTER II.
THE CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS — THE SETTLOR — THE
TRUSTEE— THE PROPERTY— THE BENEFICIARY.
WHO MAY BE A SETTLOR?
§ 3. The State and its Officer as
Settlors.
4. Trusts by Corporations.
5. Rights of Married Women.
6. Trusts Created by Infants.
7. Trusts by Lunatics.
§ 8. Aliens and Non-residents
as Settlors.
9. Rights of Bankrupts and
Insolvents.
10. Creation of Trusts in Gen-
eral.
§ 3. The State and its Officers as Settlors. — In Eng-
land the sovereign may create a trust conveying his private
property. In the United States the sovereignty which
originally belonged to the British crown is vested in the
people as an organization. Acting in their organized ca-
pacity,1 or as the State, they may, by legislation, or through
State officers, duty authorized, create a trust. They may
appoint trustees and convey property. Such trustees are
amenable to the courts of equity.2 The State has no power
to remove the trustees of a private corporation, or to ap-
point their successors.3
§ 4. Trusts by Corporations. — Corporations may alien-
ate their property, appoint trustees and determine in what
manner the vjroperty shall be used. In the exercise of this
■Commissioners v. Walker, 6 5; Buchanan v. Hamilton, 5 Yes.
How. (Miss.) 143; s.c.,38Am.Dec. 722.
433. 3 gtate v. Bryce, 7 Ohio, 414;
2 Cotterel v. Hampson, 2 Vera. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4
Wheat. 51S.
10 CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS. [§ 5.
right they are, of course, subject to the terms and condi-
tions of their charters, and to the laws by which their oper-
ations are regulated.1
§ 5. Rights of Married "Women. — Under the earlier
English law a feme covert was able to create a trust of real
estate only by the consent of her husband, unless the prop-
erty had been settled to her separate use.2 But under the
Married Woman's Property Act of 1882, a woman who
was married after December 31, 1882, and also a woman
married previous to that date, with regard to property ac-
quired after 1882, can create a trust of real estate with-
out the concurrence of her husband, and without the
formalities of the Fines and Recoveries Act.3 In the
United States the common law gave the husband almost
absolute control of the property of the wife. But by recent
legislation in many of the States, the disabilities of married
women have, to a great extent, been removed, and they
have been enabled to make contracts and wills in relation to
property held by them in their own right.4 As a rule, a
married woman, by joining her husband in a deed duly exe-
cuted, can convey her property to trustees or make a mort-
gage with power of sale.5 In many of the States a feme
covert can dispose of her separate personal estate only in
1 Rollins v. Shaver Wag. & Car. Stark Co., 5 Ohio, 204; Angell on
Co., 80 Iowa, 380; S. C, 45 N. Corp., §191; Union Bank v. EUi-
W. Rep. 1037; Sells v. Rosedale cott, 6 Gill & J. 363; Arthur v.
Grocery & Commission Co. (Miss. Com. Bank, 9 Smedes & M. 394;
1895), 17 South. Rep. 236; Col- s. c, 48 Am. Dee. 719; Purdy v.
Chester v. Lowten, I Ves. &B. 226; Lynch, 145 N. T. 462; Premier
Atty.-Gen. v. Wilson, 1 Craig & P. Steel Co. v. Tandes, 139 Ind. 307;
1; Atty.-Gen. v. Aspinwall, 2 s. c, 38 N. E. Rep. 849.
Hylne & C. 613; Evan v. Corp. of 2 1 Lewin on Trusts, ch. 3, § 1.
Avon, 29 Beav. 144, Barry v. Her- 3 1 Lewin on Trusts, ch. 3, § 2.
chants' Exc. Co , 1 Sand. Ch. 280; 4 Flint on Trusts and Trustees,
Dana v. Bank of U. S., 5 Watts & ch. 2, § 10; 1 Perry on Trusts, ch.
S. 224 ; Maryland v. Bank of Mary- 2, § 32.
land, 6 Gill & J. 205; Catlin v. 5 Durrant v. Ritchie, 4 Mason,
Eagle Bank, 6 Conn. 233; Hopkins 45; Howard v. Howard, 52 Kan.
v. Turnpike Co., 4 Humph. 403; 469; Young v. Graff, 28 111. 20.
Gordon v. Preston, 1 Walis, SS5; See Bressler v. Kent, 61 111., where
s. c, 26 Am. Dec. 175; Reynolds v. this case is overruled.
§ 6.] CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS. 11
the manner prescribed by the instrument of settlement.1
In other States she cannot convey her personal estate at all,
unless the power of alienation is conferred by the instru-
ment of settlement, but she may dispose of it by will.2
"Where a trust is created, the trustee must see to it that his
acts are in strict accordance with the power conferred by
the instrument of settlement, or he may become personally
liable for airy property of which he has disposed.3 Where
a married woman has a right to sell her separate personal
estate, she may also sell the income derived from it,4 an
annuity from lands,5 her savings from her separate estate,6
or from an allowance for her maintenance in case of a sepa-
ration.7 Savings from money given her by her husband
for personal and household expenses belong to the husband.8
In a recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals it
was held that a married woman may constitute herself a
trustee, and that where the trust funds had remained in that
State the trust could be enforced, notwithstanding she had
removed to New Jersey, where a feme covert cannot be a
trustee.9
§ C. Trusts Created by Infants. — Under recent decis-
ions such trusts are voidable, though they are valid unless
avoided.10 Not only trusts but all other acts and contracts
1 Boss v. Ewer, 3 Atk. 156; Al- 6 2 Story's Equity Jurisprudence,
bany Ins. Co. v. Bay, 4 Corns. 9
Hopkins v. Myall, 2 Russ. & M. 86
Williamson v. Beckman, 8 Leigh
20; Fears v. Brooks, 12 Ga. 200
Leaycraft v. Hedden, 3 Green Ch
512; Ewing v. Smith, 3 Desaus
§1375; Frazier v. Center, 1 Mc-
Cord Eq. 270; Picquet v. Swan, 4
Mason, 455.
1 Brook v. Broek, 25 Beav. 342.
8 Jodrell v. Jodrell, 9 Beav. 45;
Story's Equity Jurisprudence, §
417; s. c, 5 Am. Dec. 557; Croft 1375a.
v. Slee, 4 Ves. 60; Anderson v. 9 Schluter v. Bowery Sav. Bank,
Dawson, 15 Ves. 532. 117 N". Y. 125.
2 Mory v. Michael, IS Md. 227. 10 1 Perry on Trusts, § 52 ; 1 Lewin
3 Hopkins v. Myall, 2 Buss. & M. on Trusts, *32; Co. Litt. 248a;
86; Mant v. Leith, 15 Beav. 526; Haerle v. Greenbank, 1 Ves. Sr.
McClintic v. Ocheltree, 4W. Va. 304; Owens v. Owens, 8 Green C.
249. E. 60; Zouch v. Parsons, 3 Burr.
4 Vizonneau v. Pegram, 2 Leigh, 1794; Bool v. Mix, 17 Wend. 119,
183. s. c, 31 Am. Dec. 285; Eagle Fire
5 Major v. Lansley, 2 Russ. & M. Ins. Co. v. Lent, 6 Paige, 635;
355. Tucker v. Moreland, 10 Peters, 71 ;
12 CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS. [§ G.
of infants are subject to their rejection or confirmation on
coming of age.1 The modern doctrine is, that an act or
contract of an infant is not essentially void, unless it is ob-
viously and necessarily prejudicial to his interests. If his
interests are in doubt it is only voidable, but if the act is
a discharge of duty or plainly for his own benefit it is bind-
ing.2 Courts of equity give an infant the same power of
avoidance over the equitable as over the legal estate. Dur-
ing his life no one but himself can call his act in question.3
But if he dies without having avoided the trust the court will
investigate it and see that no advantage is taken of his act.4
The same rule now applies to a marriage settlement by a
female infant. A deed executed by her in consideration of
a marriage does not bind her real estate, unless on coming
of age and after the death of her husband she confirms
the act.5 The marriage settlement of a male infant will
follow the same rule, except that after he is of age he
can confirm his act before the death of his wife.6 The re-
cent decisions give the female infant the right to bar herself
of dower and of an interest in her husband's estate by
accepting a jointure before marriage.7 She is also bound
G-illett v. Stanley, 1 Hill, 121; s. c, Michael, 4 Sand. 374; Levering v.
2 Kent, 204. Levering, 3 Md. Ch. 365; Shaw v.
12 Kent's Commentaries, 235; Boyd, 5 S. &K. 312; Wilson v. Mc-
Tucker v. Moreland, 10 Pet. 58, 71 ; Cullogh, 19 Pa. St. 77; Healy v.
Irvine v. Irvine, 9 Wall. 617. Rowan, 5 Grat. 414; In re Waring,
2 Cruise, Dig. by Greenleaf, p. 12 Eng. L. & Eq. 280; Field v.
15, note and authorities cited; Moore, 7 De G., M. &G. 691; s. a,
Eagle Fire Co. v. Lent, 1 Edw. Ch. 35Eng. L. & Eq. 498; Lee v. Stuart,
301; s. c, 6 Paige, 635. 2 Leigh, 76; Durnford v. Lane, 1
3 Ingraham v. Baldwin, 12 Barb. Brown Ch. 106; Harvey v. Ashley,
9 ; Flint on Trusts and Trustees, § 3 Atk. 607 ; Tabb v. Archer, 3 Hem.
11; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 33. & M. 399; s. C, 3 Am. Dec. 657;
41 Lewin on Trusts, p. *25; 1 Lester v. Frazer, Eipley Ch. 76;
Perry on Trusts, § 33; 4 Cruise, s. C, 2 Hill Ch. 529; Cannell v.
Dig. p. 130; Starr v. Wright, 20 Buckle, 2 P. Wms. 243.
Ohio St. 97. e Levering v. Heighe, 2 Md. Ch.
6 Milner v. Lord Harewood, 18 81 ; Whichcote v. Lyle's Ex'rs, 28
Ves. 259; Trollope v. Linton, 1 Pa. St. 73.
Sim&Stu. 477; Simpson v. Jones, " Drury v. Drury, 2 Eden, 39;
2 Buss. & My. 365 ; Temple v. Haw- Buckinghamshire v. Drury, 2Eden,
ley, 1 Sand. Ch. 153; Dominick v. 60; McCartee v. Teller, 2 Paige, 611.
§§ 7-8.] CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS. 13
by a settlement of her personal estate that would otherwise
vest in the husband.1 "It is now settled in England by
statute that a male infant over twenty years of age and a
female over seventeen may make a valid marriage settlement
of their real and personal estates under the sanction of the
court of chancery."2
§ 7. Trusts by Lunatics. — In this, as in other respects,
the acts of a lunatic are voidable either by himself or by his
proper representatives, but a trust created by a lunatic will
be valid until it is avoided. If it is a reasonable and fit act
a court of equity will not set it aside,3 nor will it interfere
in the case of a bona fide purchaser who has acted without
any notice of his lunacy.4 But after an inquisition by which
he is declared a lunatic, all contracts made by him, until he
is restored by the court to the control of his property, are
void.5
§ 8. Aliens and Non-residents as Settlors. — As an alien
may exercise all right of ownership over personal property,
he can, of course, create a trust in regard to it.6 But a trust
in real property, created by an alien, is subject to the inter-
position of the State, unless, as in England, there has been
1 Field v. Moore, 7 De Gex, M. & fearing insanity, which was hered-
G. 691 ; Ainslie v. Medlyeott, 9 Ves. itary, executed a voluntary deed
19; Stamper v. Barker, 5 Madd. of trust of all his estate to his
134; Williams v.Chitty, 3 Ves. 551; daughter, who was his only child,
Johnson v. Smith, 1 Ves. 315 ; Sue- upheld, Eeidy v. Small, 154 Pa.
cession of Wilder, 22 La. Ann. 219. St. 505.
2 1 Perry on Trusts, ch. 2, § 35; * Carr v. Holliday, 1 Dev. & B.
18 and 19 Vic., ch. 43, 1855. 344; Price v. Berrington, 3 Macn.
8 Mitchel v. Kingman, 5 Pick. & G. 486 ; Greenslade v. Dare, 20
431; Snowden v. Dunlavey, 11 Pa. Beav. 285.
St. 522 ; Neil v. Morley, 9 Ves. 478 ; 5 L'Amoureux v. Crosby, 2 Paige,
Pearl v. McDowell, 3 J. J. Marsh. 422; s. c, 22 Am. Dec. 655; Pearl
658; 1 Story's Equity Jurispru- v. McDowell, 3 J. J. Marsh. 658; s.
dence, § 228; Allis v. Billings, 6 c, 20 Am. Dec. 199.
Met. 415; Teegarden v. Lewis 62 Kent's Commentaries, 1-36;
(Ind.), 35N. E. Rep. 24; Hays v. 1 Lewin on Trusts, *26; Hill on
Gloster, 88 Cal. 560; s. c, 26 Pac. Trusts, 27; 27 Am. & Eng. Enc. of
Rep. 367. A man seventy-three Law, § 10, p. 22.
years of age, of intemperate habits,
14 CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS. [§§ 9-10.
special legislation to the contrary.1 A trust by an alien in
real estate is valid until office found.2 A State legislature
cannot prohibit the creation of a trust by a non-resident
citizen of the United States, at least in personal property.
The circuit court of the United States for the district of
Indiana recently held invalid a statute of Indiana prohibit-
ing the appointment of a non-resident trustee.3
§ 9. Rights of Bankrupts and Insolvents. — In England
all the property owned by a bankrupt at the commencement
of his bankruptcy vests in his trustee, but any surplus that
may remain after the payment of his debts belongs to him,
and of this he may create a trust.4 Under the United States
bankrupt laws it has been held that only such property as
was owned by the bankrupt at the date of the assignment
vested in his assignee, and that he may create a trust of
any property acquired subsequent to that act and before the
date of the certificate of discharge.5 As the property of an
insolvent that is exempt from execution does not pass to an
assignee it may be the subject of a trust.6
§ 10. Creation of Trusts in General. — Any person who
is competent to make a will or a contract may create a trust.
Any person who may legally hold property, whether real
1 Naturalization Act of 1870. ham v. Graves, 41 Mich. 675; Has-
2 1 Lewin on Trusts, *20; 1 Perry kins v. Alcott, 13 Ohio St. 210.
on Trusts, § 36. 6 Taylor v. Duesterberg, Adm.,
3 Farmers' L. & T. Co., Trustees, 109 Ind. 165; Faurote v. Carr, 180
v. Chi. & A. Ry. Co., 27 Fed. Kep. Ind. 123; Burdge v. Bolin, 106
146. Ind. 175 ; Dumbould v. Kowley, 113
41 Lewin on Trusts, ch. 3, § 1, Ind. 353; Blair v. Smith, 114 Ind.
*26; Hill on Trustees, 47. 114; Buckley v. Wheeler, 52 Mich.
6 In re Grant, 2 Story, 312 ; Mosby 1 ; Derby v. Weyrich, 8 Neb. 174;
v. Steele, 7 Ala. 299 ; Ex parte New- S. C, 30 Am. Kep. 827 ; Bridgers v.
hall, 2 Story, 360 ; 1 Perry on Trusts, Howell, 27 S. Car. 425; Sannoner
§37. In general, under State laws v. King, 49 Ark. 299; Carhart v.
for the regulation of voluntary as- Harshaw, 45 Wis. 340; S. C, 30
signments, property acquired sub- Am. Rep. 752; Delashmut v. Trau,
sequent to the act of assignment 44 Iowa, 613; Duffle v. Clark (1895),
does not pass to the assignee. Mc- 64 N. W. Kep. 57; Wood v. Irwin,
Cabe's Appeal, 22 Pa. St. 427 ; Lo- 163 Pa St. 416.
renz v. Orlady, 87 Pa. St. 226 ; Ship-
§ 10.] CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS. 15
or personal, may create a trust for the disposal of it. If
his right to hold or control property is limited, his right to
create a trust is limited to the same extent.1
1 Underhill on Trusts and Trus- 28 ; Kekwich v. Manning, 1 Hare,
tees, 91 ; Bacon on Uses, 66 ; 1 Lewin 4G4 ; Donaldson v. Donaldson, Kay,
on Trusts, *21 ; Gilbert v. Overton, 711.
2 H. & M.. 110 ; 1 Perry on Trusts, §
WHO MAY BE
A TKUSl
§ 11.
The Sovereign or State.
§ 18.
12.
Corporations as Trustees.
19.
13.
The Subject Continued.
20.
14.
Unincorporated Associa-
21.
tions.
22.
15.
Civil Officers in Their Offi-
23.
cial Capacity.
24.
16.
Married Women.
17.
The Subject Continued.
CHAPTER III.
THE CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS CONTINUED.
Infants as Trustees.
Aliens and Non-residents.
Eights of Lunatics.
Bankrupts and Insolvents.
Beneficiaries as Trustees.
In General.
Rules of the Court in Ap-
pointing.
§ 11. The Sovereign or State. — In England the sover-
eign may be a trustee, but as in all other countries there b
a difficulty in executing the decrees of courts against the
sovereign power. The subject may have a right and at the
same time be altogether without a remedy against the sover-
eign. In such cases he can appeal to the king by a petition
of right, and it is to be assumed that his rights will be re-
garded. By a recent statute, if trust property vests in the
crown by escheat, the king is enabled to grant it to trustees
for the purpose of executing the trust.1 It is further pro-
vided that property held in trust shall not escheat or be
forfeited to the crown by any failure or forfeiture of the
trustee, and that in such cases trust property shall be sub-
ject to the control of the court of chancery for the use of
the parties beneficially interested, and that new trustees
139 and 40 Geo. III., ch. 88. Vern. 439; Wilkes' Case Law,
See also, Burgess v. Wheate, 1 54; Sander's Uses and Trusts,
Eden, 255; Kildare v. Eustace, 1 *388.
§ 12.] CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS. 17
shall be appointed.1 It is held that under these statutes an
equity may be enforced against the sovereign. In this
country the United States and each of the States may be
trustees. They have the legal right to accept and to exe-
cute trusts for any purpose.2 But there is the same difficulty
in this country as in England in enforcing the judgments
and decrees of -courts against the sovereign power. It is
plain that neither the United States nor any State can be
sued unless under some statute authorizing such an act.3
In this country, as in England, a citizen may have an un-
questioned right but no legal remedy against a violation of
it by the State. In such a case he can only petition the
legislature, either national or State, but it is always to be
assumed that his right will be respected. A trust accepted
by a State must be executed by the legislature, by the ap-
pointment of officers or agents for the discharge of the
duties involved. The legislature may appoint, either
directly or through the chief executive, an agent to prose-
cute its claim to trust property, and in this manner congress
may prosecute a claim in the courts of a foreign country.
An instance of the exercise of this right by the United
States was the prosecution of its claim to the bequest of
James Smithson, of London, in trust for the establishment
of the Smithsonian Institute.4 The Court of Appeals of
New York held that the United States is inc netent
to take as a devisee for purposes of general charity.5
§ 12. Corporations as Trustees. — Under the early Eng-
lish law, corporations could not be seized of lands to the use
of another, and could not be oompelled to execute a trust.
In consequence they could not be trustees.6 But this
doctrine was long since abandoned, and in England as
1 13 & 14 Vic. ch. 60, §§ 15, 46, « Briggs v. Lifeboats, 11 Allen
47; 4 & 5 Wm. IV., ch. 23. (Mass.), 157.
2 Hughes v. Wells, 9 Hare, 749; 4 U. S. Statutes 1836, ch. 252,
s. c, 13 Eng. L. & Eq. 389 ; Mitford vol. 5, p. 64.
v. Reynolds, 1 Phill. 185 ; Nightin- 6 Levy v. Levy, 33 N. Y. 97.
gale v. Gouldbourn, 2 Phill. 594 ; 6 Bacon on Uses, 57 ; 1 Cruise
s. c., 5 Hare, 484; 1 Perry on Dig., p. 340 ; Sugden, V. & P. p.
Trusts, §41. 417.
2
18
CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS.
[§ 12.
well as in this country it has long been settled that a cor-
poration may be a trustee in the same manner as an individ-
ual.1 Corporations of all kinds may take and hold estates
as trustees for any purpose not inconsistent with their own
character, and the courts will hold them responsible for the
faithful execution of the trust.2 If there is misapplication
of a trust fund, or any failure to discharge the obligations
resting upon it, or a refusal to obey the order of the court,
the corporation may be deprived of the trust and another
trustee may be appointed, or the remedy may be sought by
distringas* sequestration or injunction.3 In deciding any
question relating to the powers of corporations as trustees,
it is to be borne in mind that, as a rule, they can exercise
1 Green v. Rutherford, 1 Yes.
Sr. 468; Atty-Gen. v. Foundling
Hospital, 2 Ves. Jr. 46; Atty-
Gen. v. Lauderfield, 9 Mod. 286;
Atty-Gen. v. Clarendon, 17 Ves.
499; Miller v. Lerch, 1 Wall. Jr.
210; Columbia Bridge Co. v. Kline,
Bright. X. P. 320; Robertson v.
Bullions, 11 X. Y. 243; Morris v.
Way, 16 Ohio, 47S; Phillip's Acad-
emy v. King, 12 Mass. 541;
Chapin v. School District, 35 X. H.
445. "Although it was in early
times held that a corporation could
not take and hold real and personal
estate in trust, upon the ground
that there was a defect of one of
the requisites to create a good
trustee, namely, the want of confi-
dence in the person, yet that doc-
trine has long since been exploded
as unsound and too artificial, and
it is now held that where a corpo-
ration has a legal capacity to take
real and personal estate, then it may
take and hold it upon trusts in the
same manner and to the same ex-
tent as a private individual may
do." Justice Story in Vidal v.
Girard's Executors, 2 How. 187.
2 Atty.-Gen. v. St. John's Hosp.,
2 DeG., J. & Sm. 021 ; Atty.-Gen.
v. Foundling Hosp., 2 Ves. Jr. 46;
Atty.-Gen. v. Clarendon, 17 Ves.
499; Atty.-Gen. v. Cains Coll., 2
Keen, 165; Atty.-Gen. v. Lauder-
field, 9 Mod. 286; Drummer v.
Chippenham, 14 Ves. 252; Green
v. Rutherforth, 1 Ves. 468; Atty.-
Gen. v. Whorwood, 1 Ves. 536;
Atty.-Gen. v. Stafford, Barn. 33;
Atty.-Gen. v. Iron Mongers' Co.,
2 Beav. 313 ; Jackson v. Hartwell,
8 Johns. 422; Trustees Phillips
Academy v. King, 12 Mass. 546;
Atty.-Gen. v. Utica Ins. Co., 2
Johns. Ch. 384; Vidal v. Girard, 2
How. 187 ; Miller v. Lerch, 1 Wall.
Jr. 210; Greenville Acad., 7 Rich.
Eq. 476 ; McDonogh v. Murdock,
15 How. 367 ; Green v. Dennis, 6
Cow. 304; Dublin Case, 38 X. H.
577.
3 Mayor of Coventry v. Atty.-
Gen., 2 Madd. Ch. 77 ; S.C., 2Bro. P.
C. 235; 6 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cases,
203 ; Barnum v. Baltimore, 62 Md.
275; Peynado v. Peynado, 82 Ky.
5 ; Richmond v. Davis, 103 Ind. 449 ;
Green v. Rutherforth, 1 Ves. 468;
Pickering v. Shotwell, 10 Pa. St.
27 ; Atty.-Gen. v. Foundling Hosp.,
2 Ves. Jr. 46.
§12.]
CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS.
19
such powers only as are conferred by their charters or by
the acts of their incorporation.1 It has been held that they
cannot act as trustees in a matter in which they have no in-
terest, or one that is inconsistent with or repugnant to the
object for which it was organized.2 But if the trusts are in
harmony with the general purposes of the corporation, or
if they are collateral to them and germane to the idea on
which the corporation was created, as in cases where the
trusts relate to objects which will promote the general pur-
poses of the corporation, the trust may be accepted, and if
accepted the court will enforce the execution of the trust. 3
Counties, cities, towns and parishes may hold property in
trust for the establishment and support of colleges,4 for the
benefit of the poor,5 for the support of schools,6 or for any
other educational or charitable object that is not contra-
vened by the conditions of its charter.7 It has also been
held that overseers of the poor, supervisors of a count}',8
commissioners of roads in South Carolina,9 trustees of the
1 Dartmouth College v. Wood-
ward, 4 Wheat. 638 ; N. Y. Fire Ins.
Co. V.Ely, 2 Cow. 678; Beatty v.
Knowler, 4 Pet. 152; People v.
Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. 358;
S. c, 8 Am. Dec. 243; Head v.
Providence Ins. Co., 2 Cranch, 127 ;
1 Perry on Trusts, § 44; State v.
Mobile, 5 Port. 279.
2 Matter of Howe, 1 Paige, 214 ;
Jackson v. Hartwell, 8 Johns. 422.
It has been held that a municipal
corporation cannot, in the absence
of statutory authority, take and
hold lands in trust for religious
purposes, Corning v.Christ Church,
33 If. Y. St. Pep. 766, nor can a
city accept a trust for the estab-
lishment and maintenance of a
county poor house. Augusta v.
Walton, 77 Ga. 517.
3 Vidal v. Girard, 2 How. 188-
190; McDonogh v. Murdoch, 15
How. 367; First Congl. Soc. of
Southington v. Atwater, 23 Conn.
34 ; Wetmore v. Parker, 7 Lansing,
121.
4 Vidal v. Girard, 2 How. 188-
190; Wetmore v. Parker, 7 Lan-
sing, 121. See also Perin v. Mc-
Micken, 15 La. Ann. 154.
5 McDonogh v. Murdock, 15 How.
367; Webb v. STeal, 5 Allen, 575;
Mclntire Poor School v. Zanesville
Canal Co., 9 Ohio, 217.
6 First Parish in Sutton v. Cole,
3 Pick. 232.
7 Chambers v. City of St. Louis
(1860), 29 Mo. 543; Barnum v.
Baltimore, 62 Md. 275; Ayer v.
City of Bangor, 85 Maine, 511. See
also Dailey and Doolittle v. City
of New Haven, 60 Conn. 314;
Franklin's Estate, 150 Pa. St. 437;
S. C, 24 Atl. Rep. 626.
8 ISTorth Hempstead v. Hemp-
stead, 2 Wend. 109; Jansen v.
Ostrander, 1 Cow. 670.
9 Com. Eoads v. McPherson, 1
Spear, 218.
20 CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS. [§ 13.
poor in Mississippi, and also trustees of the school fund,1
are corporations sub modo, and that as such they may hold
and execute trusts as within the scope of their official
duties.
§ 13. The Subject Continued. — In the case of Morris
v. Way, it was held by the Supreme Court of Ohio
that a bank may receive a deed and hold land in trust to
secure a debt due to it.2 One corporation may hold
property for another corporation or for an individual.3
In a case where a legacy was given to a church in trust
to pay the income to the donor's housekeeper during
her life, and after her death to devote it to the pur-
poses of the church, it was held that the corporation might
properly execute the trust, on the ground that where prop-
erty is given to a corporation, partly for its own use and
partly for the use of another, the power of the corporation
to accept and hold property for its own use carries with it,
as a necessary incident, the power to execute that part of
the trust which relates to others.4 The right of a corpora-
tion to hold land committed to it either by grant or bequest,
and whether in trust or otherwise, for which its charter
makes no provision, can be called in question only by the
State. As against third persons its title is clear.5 Where a
corporation cannot hold the legal title to property it cannot
be compelled to execute a trust in it.6 But if a trust is
otherwise valid, it will not be held void for that reason.
The court will appoint a competent trustee and order a con-
JGovenorv. Gridley, Walk. 328; gas, 7 S. & R. 321; Bogardus v.
Carmichael v. Trustees, etc., 3 Trinity Church, 4 Sand. Oh. 758;
How. (Miss.) 84. Perm v. Cary, 24 How. 465; Troy
2 Morris v. Way, 16 Ohio, 478. v. Haskell, 33 ST. H. 533; Philadel-
3 Phillip's Academy v. King, 12 phia v. Girard, 45 Pa. St. 9 ; Chapin.
Mass. 546. v. School District, 35 N. H. 445;
4 In the matter of Howe, 1 Paige, Harpending v. Dutch Church, 16
214. Pet. 492; Bogardus v. Trinity
5 Humbert v. Trinity Church, 24 Church, 4 Sand. Ch. 758 ; Angell &
Wend. 587; Runyan v. Coster's Ames on Corporations, §§ 151-155.
Lessee, 14 Pet. 122; Washburn v. 6 Sonley v. Clockmaker's Co., 1
Sewell, 9 Met. 280; Miller v.Lerch, Bro. Ch. 81; Vidal v. Girard, 2
1 Wall. Jr. 210; Leazurev. Hille- How. 188.
§ 14.] CONSTITUTION OF TKUSTS. 21
veyance of the property to Mm, Where a testator gave
land to a corporation, that could not legally accept it, in
trust to sell and apply the proceeds to persons competent
to take, on account of the statute of mortmain, it was held
that though the devise was void at law, yet in equity it was
a valid trust, and that the heir was a trustee to the uses de-
clared in the will.1 Whether a corporation has power to
act as trustee in any special case must be determined by
the conditions of its charter and by the laws of the State
under which it does business.2
§ 14. Unincorporated Associations. — For purposes
suitable to their character, unincorporated associations
may become trustees.3 This is recognized as especially
fit in the case of religious and charitable organizations.4
A legacy to the Seamen's Aid Society to go to the treas-
urer for the time being for the benefit of the society
was sustained.5 Where a testator left a sum of money
to each of four benevolent societies, two of which were
unincorporated, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts held the bequest to be valid.6 If the members of
1 Sonley v. Clockmaker's Co., 1 Met. 280; Burbank v. "Whitney, 24
Bro. Ch. 81; Winslow v. Cum- Pick. 146; s. C, 35 Am. Dec. 312;
mings, 3 Cush. 358. This is con- Shotwell v. Mott, 2 Sand. Ch. 46.
trary to law in New York, in rela- See also Methodist Church v. Kem-
tion to charitable bequests. Ayers ington, 1 "Watts, 218; s. c, 26 Am.
v. Methodist Church, 3 Sand. 351; Dec. 61.
Andrew v. Bible Soc, 4 Sand. 156 ; i Tucker v. Seaman's Aid Society,
Levy v. Levy, 40 Barb. 5S5; s. c, 7 Met. 1S8; Pickering v. Shotwell,
33 N" . Y. 97. But these cases are 10 Barr. 27 ; Magill v. Brown
governed by a statute. Bright. N". P. 350 ; Am. Bible Soc.
2 Dartmouth College v. "Wood- v. Wetmore, 17 Conn. 1S1 ; First
ward, 4 Wheat. 636 ; Head v. Provi- Congl. Soc. v. Atwater, 23 Conn,
dence Ins. Co., 2 Cranch, 127; 34. See also Owens v. Miss. Soc.
Beatty v. Marine Ins. Co., 2 Johns, of M. E. Church, 14 ST. Y. 380; s.
109; People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 c, 67 Am. Dec. 160; "Winslow v.
Johns. 358 ; State v. Mayor of Cummings, 3 Cush. 358.
Mobile, 5 Porter, 279; State v. 5 Tucker v. Seaman's Aid Society,
Stebbins, 1 Stew. 299; Beaty v. 7 Met. 188; First Cong. Soc. of
Knowler, 4 Pet. 152 ; Xew York Southington v. Atwater, 23 Conn.
Fire Ins. Co. v. Ely, 2 Cow. 678. 56.
8 Chapin v. First Univ. Soc, 8 6 Burbank v. "Whitney, 24 Pick.
Gray, 580; "Washburn v. Sewell, 9 146; "Washburn v. Sewall, 9 Met.
22 CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS. [§15.
the societies are so numerous as to create a difficulty in re-
gard to the administration of the trust, the court will ap-
point a trustee.1 A bequest to "The Marine Bible Society"
was held to establish a charitable trust, although it was an
unincorporated association, and had been disbanded. The
court appointed a trustee to execute the trust.2 In Penn-
sylvania essentially the same view has been sustained.3
On the contrary, the Supreme Court of the United States,
in the case of the Trustees of the Philadelphia Baptist
Association v. Hart's Executors, held that "the association,
not being incorporated at the testator's decease, could not
take this trust as a society." In answer to the quaere: How
far this principle would govern in the courts of the United
States ? it was held that "it was unnecessary to enter into this
inquiry, because it could only arise where the attorney-
general is made a party." The decision is generally un-
derstood as local and special in its application, rather than
as establishing a principle of law.4 In the later cases this
court has upheld the received doctrine.5
§ 15. Civil Officers in Their Official Capacity. — In the
case of Inglis v. The Sailors' Snug Harbor, where the chan-
cellor of the State of New York, the mayor and recorder of
the city of New York, and a number of other officers desig-
nated by their official titles only, were appointed by the
testator to take charge of the erection of suitable build-
ings for a hospital and to conduct the affairs of the institu-
tion, it was held that the naming of the trustees by their
official titles was equivalent to giving them proper names,
and that in the execution of the trust they were to act, not
in their official, but in their private and individual capacity.
It was held, also, that an executory devise to a corporation
280 ; Methodist Church v. Kerning- 3 Pickering v. Shotwell, 10 Barr.
ton, 1 Watts, 218; Greene v. Den- 27; Magill v. Brown, Bright. N. P.
nis,6Conn. 293; Dashiell v. Atty.- 350; M. E. Church v. Remington,
Gen., 5 Harr. & Johns. 392. 1 Watts, 218.
1 Burbank v. Whitney, 24 Pick. i Baptist Assn. v. Hart, 4 Wheat.
146. 1 ; Inglis v. Sailors' Snug Harbor,
2 Winslow v. Cummings, 3 Cush. 3 Pet. 114.
358. 6 Vidal v. Girard, 2 How. 187.
§ 16.] CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS. 23
to be created in futuro was valid, and that in the mean-
time the estates in the hands of the heir would be held
charged with the trusts.1 In a recent case the testator
bequeathed a sum of money in trust for the establish-
ment of a free school in the city of New Bedford, and
named certain persons and "the mayor of the city" a
board of trustees to execute the provisions of his will. A
codicil provided that the fund was to be paid over to the
city for educational purposes if two-thirds of the trustees
6hould be of opinion that they could not administer it as the
testator intended. It was held that while the trustees held
the fund the city took no interest in it, and that the per-
son who was "the mayor of the city" at the time of the
testator's death, and not the mayor at the time the trustees
were appointed, was entitled to be appointed trustee.2 In
England a bequest to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, at
the time in office, for the benefit of the State, was sus-
tained,3 and it was held that the Governor-General of India
might take in trust for the city of Decca.4 In a case in
which a British subject bequeathed a sum of money to the
President and Vice-President of the United States and the
Governor of the State of Pennsylvania, for the time being,
for the establishment of a college in the State of Pennsyl-
vania, the persons named having declined to act, it was held
that the trust failed ; and as it could not be carried into
effect cy pres, in a foreign country, that the gift fell into
the residue.5 The comptroller of a bank ma}' be a trustee
of the securites held by him for the several banks, but the
State is not liable, as a trustee, for his acts.6
§ 16. Married Women. — All women, married or un-
married, who are capable of holding and of disposing of
property, may be trustees. A married woman may accept
trust funds conveyed to her by will, by gift, by deed, or by
1 Inglis v. Sailors' Snug Harbor, 4 Mitford v. Reynolds, 1 Phill.
3 Pet. 99. 185.
2 Dunbar v. Soule, 129 Mass. 284. 6 New v. Bonaker, L. E., 4 Eq.
3 Nightingale v. Goulbourn, 2 Ca. 655.
Phill. 594; s. C, 5 Hare, 4S4. 6 State v. Rush, 20 Wis. 212.
24 CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS. [§17.
operation of law. If an estate, involving a trust, comes to
a married woman in any legal manner, her coverture can-
not be pleaded as a bar to her acceptance and execution of
the trust.1 In a case in which the legal title to land came
by descent to a married woman, and the law required that
a deed executed by her should be acknowledged, as executed,
voluntarily, and she refused so to acknowledge it, she was
compelled to do it by the court.2 It was the theory of the
common law that the promotion and preservation of do-
mestic tranquility and happiness required that the proprie-
tary interest of the wife should be vested in her husband,
and that separate interests were very liable to be antago-
nistic to those of the husband. But a /erne covert is not less
competent to be a trustee than she was before her marriage,
and the policy of the common law has, in recent years, been
very much modified by legislation and by the courts of
equity.3 In most of the States a married woman may ac-
cept almost an}' kind of trust, and it is immaterial whether
the trust is committed to her before or after her marriage.4
§ 17. The Subject Continued. — The relations of the
feme covert to the husband involve numerous difficulties
in the holding and execution of trusts, and in many instances
the courts refuse to appoint married women as trustees.6
Notwithstanding these difficulties, a married woman may be
a trustee in all ordinary cases. She may even be' a trustee
1 Clarke v. Saxon, 1 Hill Ch. 69; Freeman, 91; Compton v. Collin-
Berry v. Norris, 1 Duv. 302. son, 2 Bro. C. C. 377; Moore v.
2 Dundas v. Biddle, 2 Barr, Hussey, Hob. 95 ; Dundas v. Bid-
160. die, 2 Pa. St. 160; Godolphin
3 CokeLitt. 112a, 187b; Lord An- v. Godolphin, 1 Ves. 23; Moore v.
trim v. Buckingham, 2 Freeman, Cottingham, 90 Ind. 243; Trust
168; Blithe's Case, Id. 91; Godol- Co. v. Sedgwick, 97 U. S. 304
phin v. Godolphin, 1 Yes. 23 ; Bouldin v. Reynolds, 58 Md. 495
Bradish v. Gibbs, 3 Johns. Ch. 523; Springer v. Berry, 47 Me. 330
Thompson v. Murray, 2 Hill Ch. People v. "Webster, 10 Wend. 554
214; Sugden on Powers, 144-155. Livingston v. Livingston, 6 Johns
4 Lord Antrim v. Buckingham, Ch. 497; S. c, 10 Am. Dec. 353
'2 Freeman, 168; Hearle v. Green- Thompson v. Murray, 2 Hill Bq.
bank, 1 Ves. 304; Lakev.DeLam- (S.Car.)204; s. C, 29 Am. Dec.
hert, 4 Ves. 592; Blithe's Case, 2 > In re Kaye, L. K., 1 Ch. 387.
$ 17.] CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS. 25
for her husband.1 In a recent case the Supreme Court
of Missouri held that where a wife purchased land with
her husband's money, taking the title in her own name,
but declaring at the time that the land was bought for
her husband, and that she held the title thereto in trust
for him, such land will be impressed with a trust in his
favor, and he will be entitled to a decree vesting title in
him.2 On the trial of an action by a husband to compel
his wife to convey certain property to him, he testified that,
several years before, being about to be absent for several
years, and wishing to provide for her in case of his death,
he had conveyed to her, instead of making a will, certain
lands, induced by his confidence in her, that she promised
to reconvey same to him in the event of his return, and that
he intended that she should receive a beneficial interest
therein in case he should die before returning. The lawyer
who drew the deed swore that he stated to her the reasons
why her husband was about to make the deed, and that she
promised to reconvey to him on his return. It was held suffi-
cient to support a finding that plaintiff was induced to make
such deed by his confidence in his wife, and that he made it
with the distinct understanding that in the event of his re-
turn she would reconvey the property to him, and that she
was to receive a beneficial interest therein only in case he died
before returning.3 So far as relates to the legal capacity,
there is nothing to prevent a married woman from adminis-
tering a discretionary trust.4 But in some of the States
she can create a trust in her absolute property only by join-
ing her husband in conveying it, or in executing a declara-
tion of trust.5 In some of the States a married woman
cannot be the guardian of minors. But in Massachusetts it
1 Shirley v. Shirley, 9 Paige, 363 ; 2 Price v. Kane, 112 Mo. 412 ; s.
Livingston v. Livingston, 2 Johns, c, 20 S. W. Rep. 609.
Ch. 541; Bennett v. Davis, 2 P. s Brisson v. Brisson, 27 Cal. 186.
Wms. 316; Griffith v. Griffith, 5 B. i Smith v. Smith, 21 Beav. 385;
Monr. 116 ; Picquet v. Swan, 4 People v. Webster, 10 Wend. 554 ;
Mason, 455; Boykin v. Ciples, 2 Kingham v. Lee, 15 Sim. 401;
Hill Ch. 200; Jamison v. Brady, Drummond v. Tracy, 1 Johns. 608.
6 S. & E. 467. 5 Graham v. Long, 65 Pa. St. 373.
26 CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS. [§ 18.
is provided by statute that a married woman ma)' be ex-
ecutrix, administratrix, guardian or trustee, and may bind
herself and the estate without the joining of her husband,
with the same effect as if she were sole, and a woman may
continue to hold the trust to which she has been appointed,
notwithstanding her subsequent marriage.1 Some embar-
rassing questions in regard to the administration of trusts
by women, single as well as married, have arisen, with vari-
ant decisions by the courts.2
§ 18. Infants as Trustees. — Assuming a lack of judg-
ment and of business capacity, the courts will not make
an infant a trustee, but in any instrument creating a trust
an infant may be named as a trustee, and the estate will
pass to him.3 If he is deemed incapable of discharging the
duties of a trustee, the courts will make provision for the
due execution of the trust.4 If he is recognized by the
courts as a trustee, he cannot set up a claim to an interest
in the estate as a beneficiary.5 If he is removed and another
trustee appointed in his place, he retains the right to assume
the trust at his majority.6 An infant cannot perform any
act as a trustee that requires the exercise of judgment and
discretion. Acts that are simply ministerial are voidable
only, but acts involving the exercise of prudence and dis-
1 1 Perry on Trusts, § 51, note. order shall have the same effect as
2 Brooks v. Brooks, 1 Beav. 531. if the Infant trustee or mortgagee
In re Campbell's Trusts, 31 Beav. had been twenty-one years of age,
176. and had duly executed a convey-
3 King v. Denison, 1 Ves. & Bea. ance or assignment of the lands in
275; Lake v. De Lambert, 4 Ves. the same manner for the same es-
592n; Binion v. Stone, 2 Freeman, tate." Trustee Act, 1850, See. 7.
169 ; Jevon v. Bush, (1 Vern. 343 ; 4 Ex parte Sergison, 4 Ves. 149,
Bowra v. "Wright, 4 De Gex & and note. In matter of Fallen, 1
Smale, 265. "That where any McCarter, 147.
infant shall be seized or pos- 6 Lake v. De Lambert, 4 Ves.
sessed of any lands upon any trusts, 596n ; King v. Denison, 1 Ves. &
or by way of mortgage, it shall be B. 275; Jevon v. Bush, 1 Vern. 343.
lawful for the court of chancery to 6 Godefroi, The Law of Trusts
make any order vesting such lands and Trustees, 12; In re Porter, 25
in such person or persons, in such L. J. Ch. 482; In re Shelmerdine,
manner and for such estate as the 33 L. J. Ch. 474.
said court shall direct, and the
§ 18.] CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS. 27
cretion are absolutely void.1 If a power relating to his own
estate is given to an infant, he must be authorized by the
deed to execute it during his minority, or his act will be
void.2 An infant trustee cannot give a valid security for
the proper use or safety of a trust fund, and the court can-
not require him to make satisfaction for a breach of trust.3
But he will be held responsible for deliberate perversion of
the funds, or for any acts involving intentional fraud.4 An
estate charged with a trust may come to an infant by de-
vise or by operation of law. A father purchased land and
took the conveyance in the name of his son, who was five
years of age. The court held that the land deeded to the /
son was charged with a resulting trust for the father.5 On
account of the essential unfitness of making an infant a
trustee, and of the inconvenience connected with the execu-
tion of a trust by him, the courts assume a strong presump-
tion that property conveyed to an infant is intended for his
benefit, as an advancement or otherwise, and they will not
treat it as a trust unless the purpose to make it such is
clearly set forth in the instrument by which it is con-
veyed.6
1 1 Lewin on Trusts, *38; Irvine Hill v. Anderson, 5 S. & M. 216
v. Irvine, 9 Wall. 617 ; Tucker v. Hillyer v. Bennett, 3 Edw. Ch. 544
Moreland, 10 Pet. 58; Coke Litt. Overton v. Banister, 3 Hare, 503
172a, 264b; Cropster v. Griffith, 2 Stikeman v. Dawson, 1 De G. &
Bland, 5; Hearle v. Greenbank, 3 Srn. 321; Savage v. Foster, 9 Mod.
Atk. 695; Russell's Case, 5 Eep. 37, Wright v. Snowe, 2 De G. &
27a; King v. Bellord, 1 Hem. & M. Sm. 321.
343. 5 Binion v. Stone, 2 Freem. 169.
2 Coventry v. Coventry, 2 P. 6 Lumplugh v. Lumplugh, 1 P.
Wms. 229; 1 Sugden on Powers Wms. 112; Matter of Eindle, 2
(6th ed.), 213-220. Edw. 265; Blinkhorne v. Feast, 2
3Whitmore v. Weld, 1 Vern. Ves. 30; Mamma v. Mumma, 2
328; Hindmarsh v. Southgate, 3 Vern. 19; Grey v. Grey, Finch,
Russ. 324; Russell's Case, 5 Rep. 338; s. c, 1 Ch. Ca. 296; Smith v.
27a. King, 16 East, 283; Taylor v. Tay-
4Evroy v. Nicholas, 2 Eq. Ca. lor, 1 Atk. 386; Elliott v. Elliott, 2
Ab. 489 ; Cory v. Gertchen, 2 Mad. Ch. Ca. 231 , Stileman v. Ashdown,
40; Buckingham v. Drury, 2 Eden, 2 Atk. 480; Ebrand v. Dancer, 2
71, 72; Overton v. Banister, 3 Hare, Ch. Ca. 26; Pole v. Pole, 1 Ves.
503; Watts v. Cresswell, 9 Vin. 415 ; 76; Scroope v. Scroope, 1 Ch. Ca.
Clare v. Bedford, 13 Vin. 536; 27.
Beckett v. Cordley,! Bro. Ch. 358;
28 CONSTITUTION OF TEDSTS. [§ 19.
§ 19. Aliens and Non-residents. — It is well settled that
aliens and non-residents can take and hold property as
trustees to the same extent that they can hold the legal title
thereto, i. e., in case of real estate until office found.1 It
is held that they cannot take by act of law.2 Touching the
question whether an alien can take by devise, there is a con-
flict of authority.3 An alien cannot plead his alienage to
defeat any trust that may be charged upon the lands that
come to him, nor in bar of any contract made by him
relating to the purchase of lands.4 An alien may be an in-
corporator in the organizing of a corporation, and may be
made a trustee for it, and it has been held that if an alien
trustee sold and conveyed the trust estate, the sale would
not be set aside.6 An alien may take a mortgage on real
estate as security for a debt, and in default of payment he
may obtain a decree of foreclosure and sale of the land in
satisfaction of the debt.6 In England, by a recent statute,
an alien has the same rights in regard to the holding and
conveying of real estate as a citizen.7 In this country aliens
have the same right as citizens to control personal prop-
erty.8
1 1 Perry on Trusts, §§ 36, 55; an alien would not vest title in him.
Jackson v. Adams, 7 Wend. 367; Du In the affirmative : Vaux v. Nesbit,
Hourmelin v. Sheldon, Mylne & C. 1 McC. Ch. 352; Clifton v. Haig, 4
525; Marshall v. Lovelass, Cam. & Des. 330; Stephen v. Swan, 9
N. 217. In Texas a different rule : Leigh, 404. In these cases it was
Paschal v. Acklin, 27 Tex. 173. held that a devise would vest the
"With regard to personal property title in an alien, subject to escheat,
the rights of aliens are the same as on office found,
that of citizens : Hughes v. Ed- * Scott v. Thorpe, 1 Edw. Ch.
wards, 9 Wheat. 489. 512 ; Dunlop v. Hepburn, 1 Wheat.
2 Wright v. Trustees M. E. 179; s. c, 3 Wheat. 231; Waugh v.
Church, 1 Hoff. Ch. 202; Bu- Riley, 8 Met. 290.
chanan v. Deshon, 1 Har. & G. 5 Commeyer v. United German
280; Orr v. Hodgson, 4 Wheat. Churches, 2 Sand. Ch. 186; Fergu-
453; Smith v. Zaner, 4 Ala. 99; son v. Franklin, 6 Munf. 305; Es-
Foss v. Crisp, 20 Pick. 121 ; Mont- cheator v. Smith, 4 McC. 452; 61a-
gomery v. Dorion, 7 N". H. 475; Ex ser v. Priest, 29 Mo. App. 1.
parte Dupont, 1 Harp. Ch. 5; Trem- -Hughes v. Edwards, 9 Wheat,
bles v. Harrison, 1 B. Monr. 140. 489.
3 In the negative : Craig v. Rad- 7 33 Vic. ch. 14.
ford, 3 Wheat. 594; Atkins v. Kron, ° Hughes v. Edwards, 9 Wheat.
2 Ired. Ch. 58, held that a devise to 489.
§§ 20-21-22.] CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS. 29
§ 20. Rights of Lunatics. — Lunatics cannot, by a
direct act, accept a conveyance of property, and they can-
not execute trusts requiring the exercise of judgment and
discretion, but an estate may come to a person non compos
mentis by descent or by devise, and he may take by pur-
chase or grant, even though unable to accept the convey-
ance by his own act. Without this an acceptance will be
assumed by the courts from lapse of time or from the ac-
ceptance of the deed by the cestui que trust.1 Since a luna-
tic is incapable of any act that will bind himself or the
other parties to a trust which may be vested in him, the
trust must be executed for him by his guardian or by the
court, or by a competent person appointed for that pur-
pose.2 An habitual drunkard may be a trustee, but if his
habits unfit him for the discharge of his duty he will be
removed by the court.3
§ 21. Bankrupts and Insolvents There is nothing in
the condition of a bankrupt or insolvent to disqualify him
from acting as a trustee. A trust estate held by a person
of either class does not pass to his assignee, and a certifi-
cate of discharge in bankruptcy does not release a bankrupt
from any fiduciary obligation. As the estate is held in
trust for the beneficiary, it is not liable for his personal in-
debtedness.4
§ 22. Beneficiaries as Trustees. — It is the general
impression that it is at least inexpedient to make a trustee
1Eyrickv.Hetrick,13Pa.St.494; Mont. & Mac. 258; Ex parte Pain-
In re Bloomar, 2 De G. & Jon. ter, 2 Deac. & Ch. 584; Shryock v.
88. Waggoner, 28 Pa. St. 431 ; Harris
2 Loomis v. Spencer, 2 Paige, v. Harris, 29 Beav. 107 ; Lounsbury
153; Swartwout v. Burr, 1 Barb. v. Purdy, 11 Barb. 490; Gardner v.
495; Person v. Warren, 14 Barb. Howe, 2 Sim. & St. 346; Copeman
488. v. Gallant, 1 P. Wms. 314; Ontario
3 Webb v. Deitrich, 7 Watts & Bank v. Mumford, 2 Barb. Ch. 596 ;
S. 401. Bliss v. Pierce, 20 Vt. 25; Ludwig
4 Scott v. Surnam, Willes, 402 ; v. Highley, 5 Barr, 132 ; Wilhelm
Butler v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 14 v. Falmer, 6 Barr, 296; Kep v.
Ala. 798; Carpenter v. Marnell, 3 Bank of New York, 10 Johns. 63;
B. & P. 41; Gladstone v. Hadwen, Union Nat. Bank of Chicago v.
1 M. & S. 526; Ex parte Glanys, 1 Goetz, 27 X. E. Kep. 907.
30 CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS. [§ 23.
of the cestui que trust.1 But in many instances it is diffi-
cult to avoid it, and where it appears necessary the court
will make such an appointment. In New York it has re-
cently been held that where a valid trust has been created,
the life beneficiary of the trust estate may afterwards be ap-
pointed trustee by an order of the court ;2 and that "a cestui
que trust is not absolutely prohibited from occupying the
relation of trustee for his own benefit, and especially is this
so where he is but one of several trustees."3
§ 23. In General. — It may be said, in general, that any
person who is capable of taking the legal title to property,
or of taking a beneficial interest in it, may take the same in
trust for other persons. While almost any person is capa-
ble of holding property in trust, a trustee should be a per-
son capable of executing a trust in such a manner as to sub-
serve the interests of the beneficiary, and he should have
his residence within the jurisdiction of the court of equity
in which the estate is located. A trust will not fail on ac-
count of the naming of an incompetent person as trustee,
or a person who refuses to accept the trust. Any lack of
this character will be supplied by the court. In the ap-
pointment of trustees the court will have regard, as a rule,
to the wishes, expressed or implied, of the testator or other
person by whom the trust is created. A person will be
Foster v. Abraham, L. K. 17 Week. K. 416; Be Davis' Trusts,
Eq. 351; Wilding v. Bolder, 21 L. B. 12 Eq. 214; Be Knight's
Beav. 22. Will, 26 Ch. Div. 82. Opposed see
2 People v. Donohue (1893), 24 Craig v. Hone, 2 Edw. 554; Good-
X Y. Supl. 437. wright v. Wells, Doug. 771, Selby
3 Moke v. Norrie, 14 Hun, 132; v. Alston, 3 Ves. 339; Philips v.
Rogers v. Kogers, 111 N. Y. 228. Brydges, 3 Ves. 126; Harwood v.
Cestuis que trust and relatives ought Oglander, 8 ves. 127, The rela-
not to be appointed, but as there is tions of debtor and creditor, and
often great difficulty in obtaining trustee and beneficiary, may, if
proper trustees, the court occa- agreed to, co-exist in the same
sionally relaxes its rules in this re- transaction, between the same par-
spect. Brett's Lead. Cas. Mod. ties, if there is no inherent incom-
Eq. 12; Ex parte Clutton, 17 Jur. patability (1895), Central Trust
988; Ex parte Conybeare, 1 Week. Co. v. Burke, 1 Ohio N. P. 169;
E. 458; Be Clissold, 10 Law T. (1ST. Curran v. Green (1S93), 18 K. I.
S.) 642; Be Hattat's Trusts, 18 329; S. c, 27 Atl. Pep. 596.
4j 24.] CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS. 31
sought who will be likely to execute the trust in an impar-
tial and conscientious manner, having regard alike to the
interests of all concerned, and not to the interests of one
as against those of another.1 Members of a religious order
may not be excluded from holding the position of a trustee
if circumstances seem to demand their appointment. As a
rule it is not desirable to make a cestui que trust or near
relatives a trustee. Personal interest, or a very deep inter-
est in one or more of the parties concerned, is a temptation
to a breach of trust, but there is no law to forbid such ap-
pointment, and there may be circumstances under which
they may be admissible and absolutely necessary.2
§ 24. Rules of the Court in Appointing-. — Certain rules
for their guidance in the appointment of trustees have
been widely recognized by the courts of equity. In the
case, In re Tempest, Lord Justice Turner presents the fol-
lowing concise and lucid statement of the principles which
are the basis of these rules: "First, the court will have
regard to the wishes of the persons by whom the trust has
been created, if expressed in the instrument creating the
trust, or clearly to be collected from it. I think this rule
may be safely laid down, because if the author of the trust
has in terms declared that a particular person, or a person
filling a particular character, should not be trustee of the
instrument, there cannot, I apprehend, be the least doubt
that the court would not appoint to the office a person
whose appointment was so prohibited ; and I do not think
that upon a question of this description any distinction can
be drawn between express declaration and demonstrated in-
tention. The analogy of the course which the court pur-
1 In re Tempest, L. R. 1 Ch. 487; Rogers, 18 Hun, 409; s. c, 111 1ST.
1 Perry on Trusts, §§ 39, 40. Y. 22S; Amory v. Lord, 9 N. Y.
2 Wilding ■ v. Bolder. 21 Beav. 403; Tiffany v. Clark, 58 ST. Y. 632.
222; Ex parte Olutton, 17 Jur. 988; For contrary holdings see Craig v.
In re Tempest, L. R. 1 Ch. 485; Hone, 2 Edw. Ch. 554; Coster v.
Story v. Palmer, 46 1ST. J. Eq. 1; Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265, 354, 380;
Reid v. Reid, 30 Beav. 388 ; Cocks Wetmore v. Parker, 52 ~8. Y.
v. Barlow, 5 Redf. 406; Moke v. 450; Bundy v. Bundy, 38 N. Y.
Norrie, 14 Hun, 128; Rogers v. 410.
32 CONSTITUTION OF TEUSTS. [§ 24.
sues in the appointment of guardians affords, I think, some
support to this rule. The court in those cases conforms to
the wishes of the parents, however informally they may be
expressed. Another rule which may, I think, be safely laid
down, is this: That the court will not appoint a person to
be a trustee with a view to the interest of some of the per-
sons interested under the trust, in opposition either to the
wishes of the testator or to the interests of other of the
cestuis que trust. I think so for this reason : That it is of
the essence of the duty of every trustee to hold an even
hand between the parties interested in the trust. Every
trustee is in duty bound to look after the interests of all,
and not of any particular members of his cestui que trust.
A third rule which may be safely laid down is, that the
court, in appointing a trustee, will have regard to the ques-
tion whether his appointment will promote or impede the
execution of the trust, for the very purpose of the appoint-
ment is that the trust may be better carried into execu-
tion."1
1 Beach on Modern Equity Juris- and the "Powers and Duties of
prudence, § 237. See generally the Trustees," in 26 L. T. 183, 210,218,
series of articles on the "Appoint- 255; Gartside v. Gartside (1892),
ment and Removal of Trustees," 113 Mo. 348.
CHAPTER IV.
HE CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS CONTINUED.
THE SUBJECT-MATTER OP A TRUST.
§ 25. Property that May Be As-
signed.
26. Choses in Actions, etc.
27. Property Under a Foreign
Jurisdiction.
28. Lands Under a Foreign
Jurisdiction.
29. The Subject Continued.
30. Property not the Subject
of a Trust.
§ 25. Property that May Be Assigned. — The rule is,
that any sort of property, whether real or personal, that
it is possible to assign at law, may be made the subject of
a trust.1 Law writers enumerate, as kinds of property that
may be conveyed in trust, the grantor's equitable interest,2
a reversion,3 a contingent interest,4 a recipe for a medi-
cine,5 the copyright of a book,6 a patent right,7 a trade
secret,8 and growing crops.9 Any property of this charac-
ter may be the subject of a trust, unless there is some statu-
tory requirement that prohibits the settlor from conveying
it, or, — if it is real property, — the tenure under which it is
held is inconsistent with the trust proposed.10
1 1 Lewin on Trusts, *47 ; Knight
v. Bowyer, 23 Beav. 609; s. C, 2
De Gex & J. 421 ; Hinkle v. Wan-
zer, 17 How. 353.
2 Cross v. Natl. Fire Ins. Co., 132
N. Y. 133; Cochrane v. Schell, 140
N. Y. 516; Gilbert v. Overton, 2
Hem. & M. 110; Knight v. Bow-
yer, 23 Beav. 609.
3 Shafto v. Adams, 4 Giff . 492.
* Wethered v. Wethered, 2 Sim.
183; Beckley v. Newland, 2 P.
Wms. 182; Harwood v. Tooke, 2
Sim. 192.
6 Green v. Folgham, 1 Sim. 398.
6 Sims v. Marryatt, 17 Q. B.
281.
i Russell's Patent, 2 De Gex & J.
130.
s Morrison v. Moat, 6 Eng. L. &
Eq. 14; S. C, 9 Hare, 241.
8 Petch v. Tutim, 15 Mees. & W.
110; Grantham v. Hawley, Hob.
132; McCarthy v. Blevins, 5 Yerg.
195; s. c, 26 Am. Dec. 262; Rob-
inson v. Mauldin, 11 Ala. 977.
10 Underbill on Trusts and Trus-
tees, 63; Hill on Trustees, *44.
34 CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS. [§§ 243-27,
§ 26. Choses in Actions, etc. — Though it was not per-
mitted at common law, yet, in equity, choses in actions,1 ex-
pectancies,2 possibilities,3 a naked power or authority,*
property not in the possession of the settlor and not owned
by him at the time, and property not even in esse,5 may be
assigned to a trustee.
§ 27. Property Under a Foreign Jurisdiction — No
question will be raised in regard to personal property, as it
follows the person. If the court has jurisdiction over the
parties it has jurisdiction over the property, and can en-
force a trust or any other obligation in equity.6 But if the
property is beyond the jurisdiction of the court, some prac-
tical difficulties may arise touching the execution of the de-
crees of the court.7 "When the trust is created by a judi-
cial decree in another State, as by probate of a will in New
York, the trustee is accountable in the courts of that State;
and where the will has not been proved or recorded in the
State of the former, nor any letters testamentary or of ad-
ministration or trusteeship have been issued there, the trus-
tee cannot be compelled to execute the trust, though resid-
ing in the State of the former ; such is the settled law of
Massachusetts."8 A case of this character is not to be
1 Morton v. Xaylor, 1 Hill, 583; ton v. Horton, 1 Hare, 549; Mo-
Ex parte South, 3 Swans. 393; Williams v. Xisley, 2 Serg. & E.
Yeates v. Groves, 1 Ves. Jr. 280; 509; s. c, 7 Am. Deo. 654; Stewart
Burn v. Carvalho, 4 Mylne & C. v. Kirkland, 19 Ala. 1(>2; Brooks v.
690; Row v. Dawson, 1 Ves. Sr. Hatch, 6. Leigh, 534; In re Ship
331; Clemson v. Davidson, 5 Binn. Warre, 8 Price, 269; Wilson Est.
392; Townsend v. Windham, 2 Ves. 2 Barr. 325; Pennock v. Coe, 23
6; Ex parte Alderson, 1 Madd. 53; How. 117; Leslie v. Guthrie, 1
Ryall v. Rolles, 1 Ves. 348. Bing. (X. Car.) 697; Hinkle v.
2Wethered v. Wethered, 2 Sim. Wanzer, 17 How. 353; Holroyd v.
183; Douglasv. Russell, 4 Sim. 524; Marshall, 2 Giff. 382; Mitchell v.
Langton v. Horton, 1 Hare, 549; Winslow, 2 Story, 630.
Fitzgerald v. Vestal, 4 Tweed, 258. 6 Hill v. Reardon, 2 Russ. 608;
3 Ham v. Van Orden, 84 X. Y. Hill on Trustees, *44; Chase v.
287; Varish v. Edwards, 1 Hoff. Chase, 2 Allen, 101; Mason v.
Ch. 383. Chambers, 4 J. J. Marsh. 402;
* Brown v. Higgs, 8 Ves. 570. 1 Lewin on Trusts, *39.
5 Field v. Mayor, etc., 2 Selden, 7 Booth v. Clark, 17 How. 327.
179; s. c, 57 Am. Dec. 435; Lang- s 1 Perry on Trusts, §70; Jenkins
§ 28. J CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS. 35
identified with one in which the trust is created by instru-
ment between the parties, with a decree of the court.1
§ 28. Lands Under a Foreign Jurisdiction. — Where
the parties are within the jurisdiction of the court it will en-
force natural equities and compel the fulfilling of contracts,
provided there is no insuperable obstacle to the execution of
the decree.2 In an English case Lord Eldon "allowed a
consignee to have a lien upon the application of general
principles for proper advances upon estates in the West
Indies.3 So the court has enforced specific performance of
articles between parties for ascertaining the boundaries of
their estates abroad;4 has compelled a person entitled to an
estate in Scotland to give effect to an equitable mortgage
by deposit of deeds of the Scotch estate, though by the
law of Scotland a deposit of deeds created no lien;5 has di-
rected an account of the rents and profits of lands abroad;6
has ordered an absolute sale7 and foreclosure of a mort-
gage, 8and has relieved against a fraudulent conveyance of
an estate abroad,9 and prevented a defendant, by injunc-
tion, from taking possession."10 In a general sense, at
v. Lester, 131 Mass. 357, and cases 314; Drummond v. Drummond, 37
there cited. L. J. (ST. S.) Ch. 811; s. C, 17 W.
1 Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch, 148, R. 6.
160. 5 Ex parte Pollard, 3 Mont. &
2 Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. 25; Ayr. 340; reversed Mont. & Chit.
Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch, 160; De 239. But see Norris v. Chambers,
Klyn v. Watkins, 3 Sandf. Ch. 185 ; 29 Beav. 246.
Guild v. Guild, 16 Ala. 121; Sut- 6 Koberdeau v. Rous, 1 Atk. 543.
phen v. Fowler, 9 Paige, 280 ; 7 Ibid. 544.
Vaughan v. Barclay, 6 Whart. 392; 8 Toller v. Carteret, 2 Vera. 494;
Church v. Wiley, 2 Hill Ch. 584; Paget v.Ede, 18L. R.Eq. IIS. And
Hughes v. Hall, 5 Muni. 431; Shat- see Be Longdendale Cotton Spin-
tuck v. Cassidy, 3 Edw. Ch. 152. ning Co., 8 Ch. Div. 150.
3 Scott v. Nesbitt, 14 Ves. 438. 9 Arglasse v. Muschamp, 1 Vern.
4 Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. 75.
444, and Belt's Suppt. And see I0 Cranstown v. Johnston, 5 Ves.
Roberdeau v. Rous, 1 Atk. 543
Angus v. Angus, West's Rep. 23
Tullock v. Hartley, 1 Y. & C. Ch
Cas. 144; Cood v. Good, 33 Beav
278. And see Bunbury v. Bunbury,
1 Beav. 318; Hope v. Carnegie, 1
L. R. Ch. App. 320.
36 CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS. [§29.
least, this doctrine prevails in this country. Chief Justice
Marshall says: "Upon the authority of these cases, and
others which are to be found in the books, as well as upon
general principles, this court is of opinion that in case
of fraud, of trust, or of contract, the jurisdiction of a
court of chancery is sustainable wherever the person
be found, although lands not within the jurisdiction of
that court may be affected by the decree."1 If the land
is within the jurisdiction of the court, while the parties
are not, a specific performance of contracts cannot be
enforced.2 This doctrine, however, has been materially
modified by more recent decisions. It has been held that
if the court has jurisdiction over the property it has the
right to compel the performance of the contract by a de-
cree vesting title in conformity with the rights of the par-
sies.3
§ 29. The Subject Continued. — There are cases in
which it has been held that a court of equity has juris-
diction of a trust, though both the property and the
trustee were beyond its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court
of Massachusetts has held that the court has power to
regulate and control the administration of trust estates, cre-
ated by the wills of citizens of that State, and which have
been proved and established by the State courts, though
the residence of both the trustee and of the cestui que trust
were out of the commonwealth ; Chief Justice Bigelow said :
"The residence of the trustee and cestui que trust out
1 Farley v. Shippen, Wythe, 135; Hall, 5 Muni. 431 ; Vaughan v.
Massiev.Watts,6Cranch.l60; Kil- Barclay, 6 Whart. 392; Watkins v.
dare v. Eustace, 1 Vera. 419; Ward Holman, 16 Pet. 25; Guild v. Guild,
v. Arredondo, Hopk. 213 ; De Klyn 16 Ala. 121 ; White v. White, 7 Gill
v. Watkins, 3 Sand. Ch. 185; Guer- & J. 208. See Lewis v. Nelson, 1
rant v. Fowler, 1 Hen. & M. 4; McCarter, 94.
Shattuck v. Cassidy, 3 Edw. Ch. 2 Spurr v. Scoville, 3 Cush. 578;
152 ; Newton v. Bronson, 3 Kerr, Meux v. Maltby, 2 Swanst. 277 ;
587 ; Sutphen v. Fowler, 9 Paige, Fell v. Brown, 2 Bro. Ch. 276.
280; Episcopal Church v. Wiley, s Fry on Specific Performance,
2 Hill Ch. 584; Dickinson v. p. 50; 22 Am. & Eng. Enc. L., 919,.
Hoomes, 8 Grat. 353; Hughes v. 920.
§ 29.] CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS. 37
of the commonwealth does not take away the power
of this court to regulate and control the proper admin,
istration of trust estates which are created by wills made
by citizens of this State, and which have been proved
and established in the courts of this commonwealth.
• The legal existence of the trust takes effect and validity
from the proof of the will, and the right of the trustee to
receive the trust fund is derived from the decree of the pro-
bate court. If the trustee is unfaithful, or abuses his trust,
that court has jurisdiction to remove him, in concurrence
with this court, on the application of those beneficially in-
terested in the estate."1 A trustee holding property by a
direct conveyance can sue in any court which has jurisdic-
tion of the parties or the property, but he can seek reap-
pointment as trustee only in the State over which the juris-
diction of the court extends.2 If the parties are present a
court may make a decree in personam. It is sufficient if
the person against whom the decree is made, is found and
served within the jurisdiction. In the case of Mead v.
Merritt, before the court of chancery of the State of New
York, Chancellor Walworth said: "Where a party is
within the jurisdiction of this court, so that on a bill prop-
erly filed here this court has jurisdiction of his person,
although the' subject-matter of the suit majr be situated else-
where, it may, by the ordinary process of injunction and
attachment for contempt, compel him to desist from com-
mencing a suit at law, either in this State or any foreign
jurisdiction. And it may in the same manner compel
him to execute a conveyance, or release, in such form as
may be necessary to transfer the legal title to the property,
according to the laws of the country where the same is
situated, or which will be sufficient in law to bar an action
in any foreign tribunal."3
1 Chase v. Chase, 2 Allen, 101; Woodward v. Schatzell, 3 Johns.
Curtis v. Smith, 60 Barb. 9. Ch. 412; Mitchell v. Bunch, 2
2 Curtis v. Smith, 6 Blatch. 537. Paige, 606; Chalmers v. Hack, 19
3 Mead v. Merritt, 2 Paige, 404; Me. 124; Dehon v. Foster, 4 Allen,
White v. White, 7 Gill & J. 208; 545; Beal v. Burchstead, 10 Cush.
38
CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS.
[§30.
§ 30. Property not the Subject of a Trust. — There
are certain choses in actions, interests, rights, claims, etc.,
that cannot be assigned in equity. In some instances this
is prohibited by statute, and in others it has been decided
to be against public policy to permit assignments of them.
It has been held that an army officer cannot assign or pledge
his commission or his pay ;J a judge cannot assign his sal-
ary,2 and a pension given for the honorable support of the
dignity of a title cannot be assigned,3 but a pension or an-
nuity conferred for services rendered in the past may be
assigned.4 The principle on which these decisions are
based seems to be that where a salary, a pension or an an-
nuity is given by the State, it is a matter in which the State
has an interest. It is designed to maintain the dignity of
the State, or to enable the person on whom it is conferred
to render the State efficient service. On this ground such
officers are not permitted to deprive themselves of the ade-
quate support which the State provides. Other matters
523; Moody v. Gay, 15 Gray, 457;
Bank v. Rutland, 28 Vt. 470; Cage
v. Cassidy, 23 How. 109; Great
Falls Mfg. Co. v. Worster, 23 N.
H. 470; Pearce v. Olney, 20 Conn.
544; Story's Equity Jurisprudence,
§§ 899, 900; Briggs v. French, 1
Sumn. 504. But where courts of
different States have concurrent
jurisdiction, the parties may exer-
cise their choice. McKim v. Vor-
hies, 7 Cranch, 279; English v.
Miller, 2 Rich. Eq. 320; Coster v.
Griswold, 4 Edw. Ch. 377; Craft
v. Lathrop. 2 Wall. Jr. 103; Bick-
nell v. Field, 8 Paige, 440; Vaill v.
Knapp, 49 Barb. 299.
1 Collier v. Fallon, 1 Turn. &
Rus. 459. And see L"Estrange v.
L'Estrange, 1 Eng. L. & Eq. 153;
Stone v. Lidderdale, 2 Anst. 533;
Priddy v. Rose, 3 Mer. 102 ; Tun-
stall v. Boothby, 10 Sim. 540;
Flarty v. Odium, 3 T. R. 681;
Lidderdale v. Montrose, 4 T. E.
248.
2 Arbuthnot v. Norton, 5 Moore,
P. C. C. 219; Cooper v. Reilley, 2
Sim. 560; Palmer v. Bate, 6 Moore,
28; s. c.,2Brod. &Bing.673; Hill
v. Paul, 8 CI. & Fin. 295. In State
Bank v. Hastings, 15 Wis. 75, it
was held that a judge could assign
his salary.
3 Davis v. Marlborough, 1 Swanst.
79; McCarthy v. Gould, 1 Ball. &
Beatt. 387 ; Price v. Lovett, 4 Eng.
L. & Eq. 110; Greenfell v. Dean,
2 Beav. 550; Wells v. Foster, 8 M.
& W. 149; Spooner v. Payne, 10
Eng. L. & Eq. 207.
4 Alexander v. Wellington, 2 Bus.
& My. 35; Tunstall v. Boothby, 10
Sim. 452; Feistal v. King's Col-
lege, 10 Beav. 491; Butcher v.
Musgrove, 2 Beav. 550; Stevens v.
Bagwell, 15 Ves. 139.
§ 30. J CONSTITUTION OF TEUSTS. 39
not subject to be assigned in trust are a right to file a bill
in equity for a fraud committed upon the assignor, or to sue
for a tort and a naked expectancy arising from a peculiar
position.1
1 Prosser v. Edmonds, 1 Y. & C. Story's Equity Jurisprudence, §§
481; Dunklin v. Wilkins, 5 Ala. 1040-1055; 3 Lead. Cas. in Eq. pp.
199; Gardner v. Adams, 12 Wend. 279-3S0 (3d Am. Ed.); Garrowv.
297; McKee v. Judd, 2 Kerr, 622; Davis, 15 How. 277.
CHAPTEE V.
THE CONSTITUTION OF TEUSTS CONTINUED.
WHO MAY BK CESTUI QUE TRUST.
§ 31. The Sovereign or State as
a Beneficiary.
32. Eights of Corporations.
33. Infants as Cestuis Que
Trust.
§ 34. Eights of Aliens.
35. An Insane Person as Cestui
Que Trust.
36. In General.
§ 31. The Sovereign or State as a Beneficiary. —
Under the recent decisions of the English courts the
sovereign may take personal property as cestui que trust
in the same manner as a private person,1 and there are
no instances in which the court of chancery has refused
to decree the execution of a trust in real estate in
favor of the crown, whether found of record or other-
wise. Essentially the same rule is followed in this coun-
try. Unless there are statutes by which it is pro-
hibited, property, whether real or personal, may be
assigned to trustees for the benefit of the State or of
the United States, in the same manner as for individuals.
In the case of Lamar v. Simpson, relating to a conveyance
of land in fee to one of the solicitors of the State by
name, to himself, "his heirs and assigns, for the State
of South Carolina," it was held to vest the legal title in
the State.2 It has been held that a deed to trustees, in
trust, to sell, the proceeds to be devoted to the payment of
1 Middleton v. Spicer, 1 Bro. Ch. 185; Ashton v. Langdale, 4 Eng.
201 ; Brummel v. McPherson, 5 L. & Eq. SO.
Euss. 2G4; Nightingale v. Goul- 2 Lamar v. Simpson, 1 Eieh. Ch.
bourne, 5 Hare, 4S4; s. C, 2 Phill. 71.
594; Mitford v. Reynolds, 1 Phill.
$§ 32-33. J CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS. 41
a debt which the grantor owed to the United States, is
valid, notwithstanding the statute which forbids the pur-
chase of land on account of the United States, unless au-
thorized by act of Congress.1
§ 32. Bights of Corporations. — In regard to real es-
tate the rights of corporations as beneficiaries are limited
by the conditions of their charters, and by the statutes to
which they are subject. Where they are not competent to
hold the legal title to real estate they cannot be cestuls que
trust in it.2 Corporations may be beneficiaries in personal
property to the same extent as individuals.3 Unincor-
porated associations may be cesluis que trust of personal
property, and an authorized agent, secretary or treas-
urer may direct the trustee in the administration of his
trust.4 In unincorporated trusts for benevolent purposes it
is not necessary that the beneficiaries should be capable of
taking the legal title. In many instances, as in a trust
created for the benefit of the poor, for education, for the
support and promulgation of the gospel and many other
charitable purposes, the beneficiaries are constantly chang-
ing, and at the creation of the trust are altogether un-
known. But such trusts are valid, and the courts of equity
will protect the rights of the beneficiaries, and, so far as
may be necessary, provide for their administration.5
§ 33. Infants as Cestuis Que Trust. — A trust may be
created for the benefit of children in esse at the time of the
creation of the trust, or that may be born in the future. A
devise to a father in trust for accumulation for the benefit
1 >TeiIson v. Lagow, 12 How. 107 ; v. McDonald, 15 Sim. 6; Rittson
3 Stat, at Large, 568, May 1, 1820. v. Stordy, 3 Sm. & Gif. 230; Attor-
2 Hill on Trustees, *52; 1 Lewin ney-General v. Sands, Hard. 495
on Trusts, *36. Fourdrin v. Gowdy, 3 M. & K. 383
3 Hill on Trustees, *52 ; 1 Lewin Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Eden, 188
on Trusts, *36. Du Hourmelin v. Sheldon, 1 Beav.
4 Dumoncel v. Dumoncel, 13 Ir. 79; s. C, 4 My. & Cr. 525; Master
Eq. 92; Vin. Ab. Alien, a. 8; God- v. De Croismar, 11 Beav. 184.
frey v. Dixon, Godb. 275 ; Barrow B Post, Chapter on Charitable
v. Watkin, 24 Beav. 1 ; King v. Hoi - Trusts.
land, Al. 16 ; s. c, Styl. 21 ; Burney
42 CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS. [§ 34.
of his children, lawfully begotten at the time of the father's
death, was held to be good, although at the time of the
creation of the trust he had no children.1 An illegitimate
child, born or in ventre sa mere, may be a beneficiary,2 but
a trust for illegitimate children that may be thereafter
begotten, is held as against good morals, and will not be
enforced by the courts.3 No trust will be enforced by a
court of equity that is founded upon a fraudulent transac-
tion, that is malum in se, that is malum prohibitum, that is
immoral, or that is contrary to public policy.4
§ 34. Rights of Aliens. — The rights of an alien to
personal property will be protected by the courts to the
same extent as those of a citizen.5 As beneficiary of a trust
in real estate he can maintain his right against all par-
ties except the State. At any time the State can claim
and appropriate the equitable interest.6 This is the rule
in regard to a naked trust, but if the trust is executory,
the court will not disturb the right of the beneficiary.
Where a testator directed the sale of certain lands and the
1 Ashurst v. Givens, 5 Watts. & s Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 1 Y. &
S. 329; Carson v. Carson, 1 Wins. C. Ch. Cas. 657; Medworth v.
(X. Car.) 24. It is no objection to Pope, 27 Beav. 21; Howarth v.
a decree authorizing the sale of Mills, L. R. 2 Eq. 389; Pratt v.
lands held in trust for minors, that Mathew, 22 Beav. 528.
the beneficiaries of the trust may i Ownes v. Ownes, 8 C. E. Green,
include some persons not yet born, 60; Battinger v. Budenbecker, 63
where such persons will take as Barb. 404; s. c, 69 Barb. 395.
grandchildren of the creator of the 5 Bradwell v. Weeks, 1 Johns,
trust, and his other grandchildren Ch. 206; Hamersley v. Lambert, 2
who are also beneficiaries are Johns. Ch. 508.
made parties to the suit, since the 6 Dumoncel v. Dumoncel, 13 Ir.
unborn grandchildren are repre- Eq. 92 ; Viner's Abridgment, Alien,
sented by those who are alive, a. 8; Attorney-General v. Sands,
Hale v. Hale (1893), 146 111. 227; Hard. 495; Godfrey v. Dixon, Godb.
S. C.,33N. E. Rep. 858. 275; King v. Holland, Al. 16; S. C,
2 Pratt v. Flamer, 7 Har. &J.10; Styl. 21; Barrow v. Wadkin, 24
Gabb v. Prendergast, 3 Eq. R.648; Beav. 1; Burney v. McDonald, 15
Gardner v. Heyer, 2 Paige, 11 ; Col- Sim. 6; Fourdrin v. Gowdy, 3 M. &
lins v. Hosie, 9 Paige, 81; In re K. 383; Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Eden,
Connor, 2 Jones & Lat. 456 ; Owen 1S8; Master v. De Croismar, 11
v. Bryant, 21 L. J. Ch. 860; Evans Beav. 184; Da Hourmelin v. Shel-
v. Davies, 7 Hare, 498. don, 1 Beav. 79.
§ 35.] CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS. 43
division of the proceeds among a number of persons, a part
of whom were aliens, the court treated that as done at the
time of the testator's death which he had ordered to be
done, and held that it was a devise of mere personalty.
On this ground it refused to allow the crown to elect
to keep the funds in land in order to work a forfeit-
ure.1 Where an agent, in collecting a debt for an alien, took a
deed of real estate in trust, the land to be sold and the pro-
ceeds paid to the alien creditor, the heirs of the agent, hav-
ing sold the land, were ordei'ed to pay the proceeds to the
principal.2 But in a case in which an alien bought lands,
paying the price in money, but took the deed in the name
of a citizen as trustee, it was held that the land was a trust
for the State.3 The courts will not permit lands belonging
to an alien and liable to escheat to be sold for the payment
of debts, in order that he may take the legacy out of the
personalty,4 and they will not decree a resulting trust in
favor of an alien.5
§ 35. An Insane Person as Cestui Que Trust. —
Where property is devised to trustees with power to
"pay over any of the income, or of the principal, if nec-
essary, from time to time, for the education or wants"
of the cestui que trust, he being an insane person, testator
requesting "that from the income of said property and
from the principal, if necessary, there shall be expended
liberally, from time to time, whatever may be neces-
sary to add to his comfort or to contribute to the gratifi-
cation of his wishes and tastes," the cestui que trust may
1 Rittson v. Stordy, 3 Sm. & Gif. 2 McCaw v. Galbrath, 7 Rich.
240; Burney v. MacDonald, 15 i^Law) 74; Austin v. Brown, 6
Sim. 14; Du Hourmelin v. Shel- Paige, 448.
dcm ; 1 Beav. 79 ; 4 My. & Or. 525 ; 3 Hubbard v. Goodwin, 3 Leigh,
Master v. De Croismaf, 11 Beav. 492.
184; Barrow v. Wadkin, 24 Beav. i Trezevant v. Howard, 5Des.87.
1; Craig v. Leslie, 3 Wheat. 563; 5 Leggett v. Dubois, 5 Paige Ch.
Austin v. Brown, 6 Paige, 448; 114; Phillips v. Crammond, 2
Neilson v. Lagow, 12 How. 107; Wash. C. 0. 441; Taylor v. Ben-
Commonwealth v. Martin, 5 Munf. ham, 5 How. 233, 270; Farley v.
117; Meakings v. Cromwell, 1 Sel- Shippen, Wythe, 135.
den, 136.
44 CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS. [§36.
be supported from the income of the fund, though sufficient
other property was given to him for his support.1
§ 36. In General. — The rule is that equity follows the
law, and that persons who are capable of holding the legal
title to property are capable of taking the equitable title as
beneficiaries through the agency of a trustee.2
1 Hull v. Putnam (1890), 152 of the donor. Teegarden v. Lewis
Mass. 123; S. c, 25 jST. E. Rep. 40. (Ind., 1893), 35 N". E. Rep. 24.
Where money is received as a gift 2 HillonTrustees,*52; lLewinon
from a person of unsound mind, Trusts, *35; Sanderson Uses, 370;
the law implies that it is held by Trotter v. Blocker, Porter, 269.
the donees for the use and benefit
CHAPTEE VI.
EXPRESS TKUSTS.
37.
How Created.
§ 49.
The Subject Continued.
38.
The Subject Continued.
50.
Trusts in Writing not
39.
Formalities Required.
Changed by Parol.
40.
The Same Subject.
61.
Trusts of Personal Prop-
41.
Declaration of Trusk
erty.
42.
The Subject Continued.
52.
The Subject Continued.
43.
The Same Subject.
53.
Trusts in Bank Deposits.
44.
Insufficient Declaration.
54.
The Subject Continued.
45.
The Subject Continued.
55.
The Beneficiary to be
46.
Declaration of Trust by An-
Named.
swer in Chancery.
56.
Sufficient Designation.
47.
The Subject Continued.
57.
Notice to Parties.
48.
Imperfect Gift not a Trust.
§ 37. How Created. — With reference to the manner
of their creation, all trusts fall into one or the other of two
classes, designated as express and implied. Express trusts
are such as are created by the deliberate or intentional act
of the settlor, and implied trusts are trusts which, without
such voluntary act, arise out of the transactions of the par-
ties by operation of law. Formerly, at common law, a
trust, whether the estate consisted of real or of personal
property, or of both, might be created by parol. The
earlier mode of conveying land was by what was known as
a feoffment. But even the formalities of this method of
conveyance were not essential. It was sufficient that the
land was conveyed by livery of seizin in the presence of
witnesses who were freeholders of the vicinity. By this act
the estate in freehold was vested in the feoffee, and the pos-
session was transferred to him. Lord Chief Baron Gilbert
states the law as follows: "At common law a use might
have been raised by words upon a conveyance that passed
46 EXPRESS TRUSTS. [§ 38.
the possession by some solemn act, as a feoffment; but
where there was no such act, then, it seems, a deed declara-
tory of the use was necessary ; for, as a feoffment might be
made at common law by parol, so might the uses be declared
by parol. But when a deed was necessary for passing the
estate itself it was also requisite for the declaration of the
uses. Thus a man could not covenant to stand seized to
uses without a deed ; but a bargain and sale by parol has
raised a use without."1 At the present time decisions on
this point are of interest to the profession in this country,
chiefly as a matter of history.
§ 38. The Subject Continued. — In most of the States
the adoption of the statute of frauds makes it nec-
essary that all conveyances of lands, or of interests in real
estate of any sort, should be by deed, duly acknowledged
and recorded. But questions relating to this point may
arise in regard to conveyances made prior to the adoption
of the statute of frauds in those States in which it is now
in force, and also where it is not in force, in regard to con-
veyances of a recent elate. In Ohio in a recent case it was
said that: "Previous to the enactment of the statute
of frauds of this State, a trust might be created in real
estate by parol, and established by parol evidence, and
there is nothing in our statute which prevents the establish-
ment of an express trust in lands hy evidence of the same
kind. By the seventh section of the English statute of
frauds, it is required that all declarations or creations of
trusts of lands shall be manifested and proved by some
writing signed by the party who is by law enabled to de-
clare the trust, but this section, and the eighth and ninth
sections, of that statute in relation to trusts, are omitted
from our statute, and express trusts are allowed to be
proved by parol evidence as well as resulting trusts which
arise by operation of law, and are unaffected by the stat-
ute."2 In some other States the seventh section of the
1 Gilbert on Uses, 270; Adling- 646; Fleming v. Donahoe, 5 Ohio,
ton v. Cann, 3 Atk. 141. 256; Broadrup v. Woodman, 27
' Harvey v. Gardner, 41 Ohio St. Ohio St. 553; Matthews v. Leaman,
* 38.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
47
statute of frauds has not been adopted, and where that i-;
the case trusts in real estate may be proved by parol. Of
these are Virginia,1 Tennessee,2 North Carolina3 and Texas.4
These, however, are the exceptions. In most of the States
the statute of frauds is in force. The seventh section of
this statute provides that "declarations, or creations of trusts,
or confidences of any lands, tenements or hereditaments,
shall be manifested and proved by some writing signed by
the party who is by law enabled to declare such trust, or by
his last will in writing, or else they shall be utterly void
and of none effect." It is to be observed that this statute
does not require that the trust shall be created in writing,
but simply that it shall be manifested and proved by some
writing. The end for which the statute of frauds was
enacted was answered by this provision.5 There is a degree
of uncertainty in regard to the construction to be put upon
the language of the statutes of some of the States, as the
words of the seventh section have been somewhat modified.
In some instances there was an apparent intention to sub-
stitute the words "created and declared" for the words of
24 Obio St. 615. See also Starr v.
Starr, 1 Ohio, 321 ; Ready v. Keasby,
14 Mich. 215; Mclntire v. Skinner,
4 Greene, 89.
1 Bank of United States v. Car-
rington, 7 Leigh, 576; Walraven
v. Lock, 2 Patt. & H. 549.
2'Wilburn v. Spofford, 4 Sneed,
705 ; Haywood v. Ensley, 8 Humph.
460; Thompson v. Thompson, 1
Yerg. 100; McLanahan v. McLan-
ahan, 6 Humph. 99.
3 Fay v. Fay, 2 Hayw. 131 ; Riggs
v. Swann, 6 Jones Eq. 131 ; Shel-
ton v. Shelton, 5 Jones Eq. 292;
McLaurin v. Fairley, 6 Jones Eq.
375; Link v. Link, 90 X. Car. 235;
Wright v. Cain, 93 N". C. 301.
4 Pierce v. Fort, 60 Tex. 464
Miller v. Thatcher, 9 Tex. 482
Groover v. Rush, 27 Tex. 231
Osterman v. Baldwin, 6 Wall. 116
Spiers v. Purcell, 2 U. C. 624
Brotherton v. Weathersby, 73 Tex.
471; Holland v. Farthing, 2 Civ.
App. Tex. 155.
5 Brown on Statute of Frauds
(4th ed.), p. 582; Foster v. Hale, 3
Ves. Jr. 707; S. c, 5 Ves. 315;
Smith v. Matthews, 3 De G. F. &
J. 139; Randall v. Morgan, 12 Ves.
74; Unitarian Society v. Wood-
bury, 14 Me. 281 ; Steere v. Steere,
5 Johns. Ch. 1 ; Movan v. Hays, 1
Johns. Ch. 339; McCubbin v.
Cromwell, 7 Gill & J. 157 ; Barrell
v. Joy, 16 Mass. 221; Pinney v.
Fellows, 15 Vt. 525; Rutledge v.
Smith, 1 McCord Ch. 119; John-
son v. Ronald, 4 Muni. 77; Hutch-
inson v. Tindall, 2 Green Ch. 357;
Lane v. Ewing, 31 Mo. 75 ; Safford
v. Rantoul, 12 Pick. 233; Gibson v.
Foote, 40 Miss. 7S8; Reid v. Reid,
12 Rich. Eq. 213.
48
EXPRESS TEUSTS.
[§ 39:
the original statute, "manifested and proved."1 The pres-
ent tendency seems to be to construe the statute of frauds
and the statutes of the States that have somewhat modified
the seventh section of the statute of frauds as meaninc
manifested and proved in the ordinary sense, as distin-
guished from created and declared.2 In Maine, there has
been a recognition of the doctrine that "the change of
phraseology in the revision of the statutes from created and
manifested to created and declared wrought a change of the
law, so that, under the local statute, an express trust
need not be created by writing; it is sufficient that it
be subsequently declared by a writing signed by the party
charged with the trust." Although the statute pro-
vides that there can be no trust concerning lands, ex-
cept trusts arising or resulting by implication of law,
unless created or declared by some writing, signed by the
party or his attorney, it was held : 1. That "some writing"
means any writing, however informal, from which the ex-
istence and terms of the trust can be understood, whether
intended by the signer as such or not; that letters, memo-
randa or other writing of a party, delivered or left by him
and found among his papers, are sufficient. 2. Also, that
where the facts are contained in several writings, one may
be signed and the others refeiTed to.3
§ 39. Formalities Required. — It is necessary, not only
that the trust estate should be conveyed in a legal manner
to the alleged trustee, or that it should be held by him as
such, but also that there should be, in addition to this, a
clear and unequivocal setting forth in writing of the in-
tention to create a trust. This evidence may come from
the settlor who intends to create the trust, or it may come
from the trustee to whom the land is conveyed, but it can-
not come from the beneficiary. The grantor may declare
1 Bibb v. Hunter, 79 Ala. 351
Pinnock v. Clough, 16 Vt. 508
Jenkins v. Eldredge, 3 Story, 294
2 Pratt v. Ayer, 2 Chand. 265
Corse v. Leggett, 25 Barb. 394
Wright v. Douglas, 3 Seld. 5S9;
Forster v. Hale, 3 Ves. Jr. 696;
Cook v. Barr, 44 N. Y. 158.
3 McClellan v. McClellan, 65 Me.
500, construing R. S., ch. 73, § 11.
§39.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
49
his purpose to create a trust in the deed, or in the will in
which the land is conveyed or devised to the trustee, or he
may declare it in an instrument altogether separate and dis-
tinct from the conveyance,1 or he may, by such instrument,
declare himself a trustee, and that he holds the land in
trust, naming the beneficiary, without any conveyance of
the legal title.2 Where the purpose of the grantor to create
a trust is not set forth in the instrument by which the
estate is conveyed, it may be adequately declared and
proved by the testimony of the trustee to whom it is con-
veyed, or who is the holder of the legal title. This decla-
ration may be made at the time of the conveyance or at a
' In an action to have it declared
that defendant held certain land in
trust for the joint benefit of him-
self and H, plaintiff's testator, it
appeared that, a few years after
the property was conveyed to de-
fendant, he executed a power of
attorney to H's law partner, au-
thorizing him to sell the land, and
at the same time wrote to the at-
torney that the proceeds of sale
would belong to H and defendant
jointly. After H's death, there
was found in his safe a paper un-
signed, but wholly in defendant's
writing, describing the property as
it was in the deed, and stating that
the deed said "nothing about our
being entitled to 600 inches."
There were also in evidence letters
from defendant to H and his son
about the property and taxes
thereon, and a letter to a tenant
thereon, in which he said: "Al-
though the title of the whole prop-
erty is. in me, there is another
party who has an interest." It was
held that the evidence was suffi-
cient to establish the trust; laws
I860, ch. 322, providing that a trust
in land may be proved by any
writing subscribed by the party
declaring the trust. Hutchins v.
4
Van Vechten (1S94), 140 X. Y.
115; s. C, 35 X. E. Kep. 446.
2 Patton v. Beecher, 62 Ala. 579.
In this case it was held that "parol
trusts in opposition to the terms of
a written instrument can be en-
forced only on clear and precise
allegation, supported by plain and
convincing proof, and a closer cor-
respondence between the pleadings
and proof is required in such case
than in OTdinary causes, for the
reason that they are raised and en-
forced in opposition to the terms
of a written instrument." Wallace
v. Wainwright, 87 Pa. St. 263;
Hearst v. Pujol, 44 Cal. 230, 235;
Miles v. Thof ne, 38 Cal. 335 ; Tay-
lor v. Sayles, 57 X. H. 465 ; Barnes
v. Taylor, 27 X. J.Eq. 259; Tanner
v. Skinner, 11 Bush, 120. A mem-
orandum signed by a decedent not
addressed to any person found
among his papers, a sufficient dec-
laration of trust with respect to
certain land constituting him a
trustee. Urann v. Coates, 109
Mass. 581. The grantor may de-
clare the trust by an instrument
separate from the conveyance to
the trustee. Wood v. Cox, 2 Myl.
& C. 684.
50
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§ 39.
later date, and though it must be done in writing no par-
ticular form of words is required.1 The acceptance of the
trust by the trustee may be direct and positive by his exe-
cuting the conveyance or other instrument, or by his assent
to the will, or it may be inferred from his management of
the property. In the absence of any declaration or other
evidence he is presumed to accept the trust.2 A trustee is
bound only as he accepts the trust, but the trust is not in-
validated by his failure or refusal. While his disclaimer
frees him from any obligation to execute the trust, the
rights of the beneficiary are in no sense dependent upon his
acceptance. A court of equity will never suffer an express
trust, in regard to which there is no question, to fail for
lack of a trustee.
1 A distinct written statement
specifying the terms of the trust
and the parties to it, subscribed by
the trustee, whether addressed to
or delivered to the cestui que trust
or not, or whether intended to be
evidence of the trust or not when
made, is a . sufficient declaration.
Bates v. Hurd, 65 Me. ISO. It is
sufficient that a trust is declared
by a writing subscribed by the
trustee subsequent to the convey-
ance. McClellan v. McClellan, 65
Me. 500. Letter written by the
trustee and the lands mentioned in
the letter as affected by the trust
may be identified by evidence of
the surrounding circumstances.
Moore v. Pickett, 62 111. 158. See
also on letter by trustee, Kingsbury
v. Burnside, 58 111. S10; Johnson
v. Deloney, 35 Tex. 42; Phelps v.
Seeley, 22 Gratt. 573. Grantees de-
claring themselves trustees by
written agreement : Baldwin v.
Humphrey, 44 N. Y. 609. A trust
being presumed from the circum-
stances, and afterwards acknowl-
edged by the trustee, his contract
with cestuis que trust, his brothers,
was enforceable. Goldsmith v.
Goldsmith, 6 Misc. Eep. 12; s. c,
25 N". Y. Supl. 993.
2 Montford v. Cadogan, 17 Ves.
485; s. c, 19 Ves. 635, 638; Urch
v. Walker, 3 Myl. & C. 702; Kir-
wan v. Daniel, 5 Hare, 493; Eyrick
v. Hetrick, 13 Pa. St. 489; Flint v.
Clinton Co., 12 X. H. 430; Lyle v.
Burke, 40 Mich. 499; Hurst v.
Pujol, 44 Cal. 230. Whether the
want arises from the fact that no
trustee was named, or from the
trustee's refusal to act, or from
other cause, the court will appoint
a trustee or will treat the person in
whom the legal title is vested as a
trustee. King v. Donnelly, 5
Paige, 46; Cushney v. Henry, 4
Paige, 344; Shepherd v. McEvers,
4 Johns. Ch. 136 ; s. C, 8 Am. Deo.
561 ; Crocheron v. Jacques, 3 Edw.
Ch. 207; De Barante v. Gott, 6
Barb. 492; Griffith's Adin'r v.
Griffith, 5 B. Monr. 113; Furman
v. Fisher, 4 Cold. 626; s. c, 94
Am. Dec. 210; Peter v. Beverly, 10
Pet. 532; Druid Park, etc. Co. v.
Oettinger, 53 Md. 46; Adams v.
Adams, 21 Wall. 185.
§ 40.] EXPRESS TRUSTS. 51
§ 40. The Subject Continued. — In those States, as
New York, Michigan, etc., in which the creation of trusts in
real estate is, to a great extent, regulated by statute, no form-
alities relating to the instrument by which the trust is mani-
fested are prescribed.1 It is not necessary that the purpose
of the trust should be set forth in the words of the statute ; it
is sufficient if the intention of the settlor is made plain by the
instrument.2 It is not necessary that the terms and conditions
of a trust should all be contained in one paper. They may
be embodied in two or more papers, provided they are
so drawn as to indicate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
they all relate to the same transaction, and, taken together,
clearly set forth the nature and objects of the trust.3 In
most of the States it is not necessary that the writing should
be inter partes. In California an express trust in real es-
tate can be created only by an instrument subscribed by the
party creating the trust.4 Formerly, it was required in New
York that such trusts should be created by deed or convey-
ance, subscribed by the party, and the only proof of them
was such deed or conveyance.5 At present the rule in New
York is in accord with that which generally prevails in the
other States.6 But while no form of words is prescribed,
or is essential, the instrument by which the creation of a
trust is manifested must be properly executed, and it must
set forth with sufficient clearness and definiteness the inten-
tion to create a trust. The writing must show, not only
that a trust of legal estate was created, but it must indicate
also the nature and terms of the trust. The declaration
1 "Imperfect Declaration of establish the trust, they mustiden-
Trust," 22 Sol. J. & Rep. 852; tify the property and disclose the
Dyer's Appeal, 107 Pa. St. 446; terms of the trust. Taft v. Diomed,
Morse v. Morse, 85 X. Y. 53; Gay- 16 R. I. 584, 589; Blodgett v.
lord v. City of Lafayette, 115 Ind. Hildreth, 103 Mass. 484; Smith v.
423; Taft v. Diomed, 16 R. I. 584
Brown v. Combs, 29 X. J. Eq. 36
Steere v. Steere, 5 Johns. Ch. 1
Matthews, 3 De G. F. & J. 139, 152.
4 Cook v. Barr, 44 X. Y. 156;
Barr v. O'Donnell, 76 Cal. 469; s.
Tyler v. Tyler, 25 111. App. 333. c, 9 Am. St. Rep. 242; Civ. Code,
2 Morse v. Morse, 85 N. Y. 53; § 852; Code Civ. Proc. § 1971.
Cook v. Barr, 44 X. Y. 156. 5 Cook v. Barr, 44 N. Y. 156; 2
3 Tenney v. Simpson, 37 Kan. Rev. Stat. 135, § 6.
579. Where letters are relied on to 6 Laws 1860, ch. 322, p. 547.
ir2
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§40.
must show the conveyance of the trust estate; it must
designate with sufficient definiteness the property of which
it is composed; it must point out the beneficiary, or the
beneficiaries, for whose benefit the trust is created; it must
indicate the proportion of the trust estate to which each is
entitled, if there be more than one, and the manner in
which the trust is to be administered. If the language is
in any degree equivocal, or if it is so vague and indefinite
as to leave any of the essential elements of the trust in un-
certainty, there is a failure of the trust.1 It has been said
1 It does not follow that the
grantee, devisee, or legatee takes
the property absolutely free from
the trust in such case. Knight v.
Boughton,ll Clark & F. 513 ; Briggs
v. Penny, 3 Macn. & G. 546; Smith
v. Matthews, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 139 ;
Williams v. Williams, 1 Sim. (N.
S.) 358; Reeves v. Baker, 18 Beav.
372 ; Stubbs v. Sargon, 2 Keen, 255 ;
Cruwys v. Colman, 9 Ves. 319;
Steere v. Steere, 5 Johns. Ch. 1;
s. c, 9 Am. Dec. 256; Carpenter
v. Cushman, 105 Mass. 417 ; Porter
v. Bank of Rutland, 19 Vt. 410;
Inhab. of Freeport v. Bartol, 3
Greenl. 340; Brown v. Combs, 29
X. J. L. 36; Rutledge v. Smith, 1
McCord, Eq. 119; Norman v. Bur-
nett, 25 Miss. 1S3; Harris' Ex'rs
v. Barnett, 3 Gratt. 339 ; Mercer v.
Stark, 1 Smed. &M.Ch.479; Bark-
ley v. Lane's Ex'r, 6 Bush, 587;
Slocum v. Marshall, 2 Wash. C. C.
397 ; Russell v. Switzer, 63 Ga. 711 ;
Hill v. Den, 54 Cal. 6; Smith v.
Ford, 48 Wis. 115; Chili First
Presb. Soc. v. Bowen,21 Hun, 389;
Wallace v. Wainwright, 87 Pa. St.
263. Express words not necessary,
intention to be construed from
whole instrument. Cockrell v.
Armstrong, 31 Ark. 580. Where a
deed to A expressly creates a trust
in favor of B, the habendum clause
and the covenants do not necessa-
rily limit the interest of the cestui
que trust, nor give any beneficial
interest to the grantee, A. McEl-
roy v. McElroy, 113 Mass. 509;
Obermiller v. Wylie, 36 Fed. Rep.
641 ; Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N. Y.
550; s. C, 21 Am. St. Rep. 693;
Blouin v. Phaneuf, 81 Me. 176;
Hemphill v. Hemphill, 99 N. Car.
442; Anderson v. Crist, 113 Ind.
65; Quinn v. Shields, 62 Iowa, 129;
S. c, 49 Am. Rep. 141; Tenney v.
Simpson, 37 Kan. 579; Richardson
v. Seever's Adm'r, 84 Va. 259,
270. In Pennsylvania an express
trust cannot be created in behalf of
a woman unless she is married, or
unless it is created in contempla-
tion of her marriage. Snyder's
Appeal, 92 Pa. St. 504; Pickering
v. Coates, 10 Phila. 65; Ash v.
Bowen, 10 Phila. 96. No trust will
be created where the property to
be the subject-matter is left uncer-
tain. Bardswell v. Bardswell, 9
Sim. 319; Winch v. Brutton, 14
Sim . 319 ; Fox v. Fox, 27 Beav. 301 ;
Lechmere v. Lavie, 2 Myl. & K.
197; Cowman v. Harrison, 10 Hare,
234; Palmer v. Simmonds, 2 Drew.
221; Green v. Marsden, 1 Drew.
646; White v. Briggs, 2 Phill. Ca.
583; Sir William Grant in Cruwys
v. Colman, 9 Ves. 319, 323, "that
three things are indispensable to
create a valid trust: 1. Sufficient
§40.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
53
that: "It sometimes happens that an express trust arises,
not from any definite words, but from the entire disposi-
tions contained in the will, deed or other instrument, or
from a construction of all of its terms."1
words to raise it; 2. A definite
subject; and 3. A certain or ascer-
tained object." It is a well settled
rule that terras must not be so
vague, uncertain and indefinite
that a court of equity cannot
clearly ascertain either the ob-
jects or the persons who are
to take. Where this appears the
trust will fail and the property will
fall into the general fund of the
author. Power v. Cassidy, 79 N.
Y. 602, 609; S. C, 35 Am.Eep. 550 ;
Fowler v. Garlike, 1 Kuss. & M.
232; Stubbs v. Sargon, 2 Keen, 255;
3 Myl. & C. 684; Wood v. Cox,
2 Myl. & 0. 684; Wheeler v. Smith,
9 How. 55, 95. Certainty as to
beneficiary, see case of the "Tilden
Trust." Tilden v. Green, 130 K.
Y. 29.
1 A testator's directions to his
executors to continue his business
creates a trust. Ferry v. Liable,
31 N". J. Eq. 566. Trust by receiv-
ing and investing money with ver-
bal declarations. Clapp v. Emery,
98 111. 523. Trust by receiving
money with verbal directions.
Eeiff v. Horst, 52 Md. 255. A per-
son verbally declares himself a
trustee. Gadsden v. Whaley, 14
S. Car. 210. A devise in trust dur-
ing the minority and "for the ben-
efit" of certain children creates an
express trust to collect the rents of
the premises devised. Mullins v.
Mullins (1894), 86 Hun, 421; s. C,
29 N. Y. Supl. 961. A statement in
a will that the "devise is made on
the trust and confidence reposed
in" the devisee "that he will dis-
pose of the said property" in a
certain manner creates a trust.
People v. Powers (1894), 8 Misc.
Rep. 628; s. C, 29 N. Y. Supl. 950.
The owner of land conveyed it to
her grandsons, taking a mortgage
securing an annuity to herself, and
also providing that the grantees
should pay a certain sum to her
granddaughters after her death.
She regarded the whole transac-
tion as of a testamentary nature,
and expressed a purpose to control
the property and to make what
changes she pleased. The mort-
gage was afterwards released and
a new one taken, with substantially
the same provisions, and this was
repealed several times, with sev-
eral conveyances and reconvey-
ances, until a final release was
made leaving the title in the grand-
sons. The granddaughters were
ignorant of all these transactions
until the grantor's death, twenty-
six years after the first mortgage.
It was held that there was no trust
created in favor of the granddaugh-
ters. 22 ST.Y. Supl. 878, affirmed;
Townsend v. Rackham (1894), 143
N. Y. 516; s. c, 38 N. E. Kep. 731.
A mortgage to secure the mort-
gagee on his indorsements for the
mortgagor, and his agreement to
protect the mortgagor and his
property against the enforcement
of prior judgments, is not a trust,
and after its foreclosure the mort-
gagor has no right to an account-
ing or redemption. 23 N. Y. S.
433, affirmed; Lewis v. Duane
(1894), 141 N". Y. 302; s. c, 36 X.
E. Hep. 322. To create a valid
trust under the statute of uses and
trusts (2 R. S., 728, § 55), it is not
necessary that the trust should be
54 EXPRESS TRUSTS. [§ 41.
§ 41. Declaration of Trust. — A trust will be enforced
only on adequate evidence of a sufficient declaration. Such
evidence is unequivocal proof that a trust has been created.
It must be made plain that the act which constituted the
creation of the trust was completed ; that it did not end in
a mere intention. This is necessary, whatever may be the
nature of the trust. There must be evidence of a declara-
tion of trust in terms, or of words or acts which either
created a trust de facto, or indicated, beyond a reasonable
doubt, the purpose to create a trust.1 The courts will not
interpose to perfect an inadequate or incomplete creation of
a trust. This evidence must be furnished by the settlor or
by the trustee, and it may be given in terms, or it may be
involved in their acts relating to it. The payment of in-
terest on property not delivered is a sufficient declaration of
trust. Defendant who was one of two trustees and had
the active management of the estate, stated to his cotrus-
tee that he would invest certain moneys of the estate then
in his hands in a certain mortgage owned by defendant in-
dividually, and afterwards he informed his cotrustee that
he had assigned the mortgage to the estate, which state-
ment was communicated to the cestui que trust. Afterwards
defendant accounted to the estate for the interest received
on such mortgage, and for more than ten years actually paid
such interest to the cestui que trust. It was held that there
was a sufficient declaration of trust as to such mortgage to
make it a part of the trust estate, though it was never in
fact assigned, but remained in the individual name of the
stated in the very words of the tion of trust or circumstances
statute ; it is sufficient if a purpose which show beyond reasonable
within the statute is clearly em- doubt that a trust was intended to
braced in the language used, for be created. It would introduce a
the execution of which the trustee dangerous instability of titles, if
may be clothed with the legal title, anything less was required, or if a
Donovan v. Van De Mark, 78 N . voluntary trust inter vivos could be
Y. 244; s. c, 18 Hun, 200. reversed, established in the absence of ex-
1 In a recent case before the press words, by circumstances
Court of Appeals of the State of capable of another construction,
Xew York, Mr. Justice Andrews or consistent with a different in-
said: "To constitute a trust there tention." Beaver v. Beaver, 117
must be either an explicit declara- N. Y. 428.
§ 41. J
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
55
trustee.1 The indorsement of bonds by a testator with a
corresponding entry in his ledger was regarded as a suffi-
cient declaration of trust. On the death of testator certain
coupon bonds were found in his box in a safe deposit vault,
in an envelope bearing in testator's handwriting the in-
dorsement: "13 bonds, $1,000 each, held for Tom Kelly
Smith." Tom Kelly Smith was testator's nephew. Tes-
tator had opened a ledger account showing that these bonds
i Butler v. Weeks (1895), 12
Misc. Rep. 192; s. c, 33 N. Y.
Supl. 1090. An instrument signed
by T and recorded, reciting that
"VV is a joint and equal owner with
him in certain land, and authoriz-
ing and empowering him to sell
and convey one-half of the same,
and apply the proceeds to his own
use, is good as an acknowledgment
or declaration of trust, and admis-
sible in evidence. Wallace v.
Pruitt (1895), 1 Tex. Civ. App. 231;
s. c, 20 S. W. Rep. 728. The
holder of a tontine insurance pol-
icy made payable to himself and
his estate, in a writing attached to
the policy recited that the policy
was for his children's benefit, and
in case of his death before its ma-
turity the proceeds should be di-
vided equally between them. He
also afterwards declared, in the
presence of the children, that the
policy was for them. It was held to
create a valid trust in favor of the
children. Phipard v. Phipard, 55
Him, 433. A parol agreement made
in connection with a written as-
signment of a claim, to the effect
that a certain sum of the proceeds
of the claim should be paid to a
certain person. It was held to create
a trust for the benefit of such person
in the assignment of the claim.
Warburton v. Camp, 55 N. Y.
Super. Ct. 290; Roche v. George,
93 Ky. 609; s. C, 20 S. W. Rep.
1039. A declaration of trust was
held to exist where an heir assigned
interest in an estate to children
and afterwards claimed the whole
estate. Cressman's Appeal, 42 Pa.
St. 147; s. c, 82 Am. Dec. 498.
There was evidence that plaintiff's
husband, since deceased, had the
management of her money, and
had invested part of it in stock cer-
tificates ; that the stock certificates
had been originally made out in
his name, as trustee for plaintiff,
and her name afterwards erased,
leaving one of the certificates in
her husband's name individually,
and the other in his name as
trustee, the rules of the companies
being such that certificates of
stock could not be issued in trust
without inconvenience; that the
dividends had been deposited to
plaintiff's credit; that after her
husband's death the certificates
were found in his vault, in an en-
velope with other certificates be-
longing to plaintiff; that on the
envelope was indorsed plaintiff's
Dame in her husband's handwrit-
ing, and a. further indorsement
signed by him setting forth the
contents of the envelope, including
the certificates in question, and
directing his executor to transfer
them to plaintiff. It was held that
the evidence established that the
certificates were held in trust for
plaintiff, by her husband. Guion
v. Williams (1889), 55 Hun, 605; s.
C, 7 X. Y. Supl. 786.
56 EXPRESS TRUSTS. [§ 42.
were "bought for and are the property of my nephew, * *
and belong to him, T. S.," and had also credited and
charged interest, collected and paid out. It was held that
testator made himself trustee for his nephew, and not having
revoked the trust in his lifetime, on his death the bonds
passed to the nephew.1
§ 42. The Subject Continued. — In a recent case in
the Supreme Court of New York, where an instrument
executed by a husband recited that he assigned to his wife
certain bonds theretofore deposited by him in a bank, and
directed the bank to deliver the bonds to his wife in the
event that she should survive him, but declared that the
assignment should not take effect unless he should die be-
fore his wife, it was held that a valid trust in favor of
the wife was created.2 In another late case in the same
court, where in a suit against an executor it appeared
that the testator said to his nephew, a little boy, "If you
will not drink any liquor, will not smoke, will not play
cards or billiards, until you are twenty-one, I will give you
$5,000 that day;" to which the nephew replied that he
would try to carry it out ; that he would do it, and on com-
ing of age the nephew wrote, "I have lived up to the con-
tract," and, "I believe, according to agreement, there is due
me $5,000," and the uncle answered: "I had the money in
the bank the day you were twenty-one years old that I in-
tended for you, and you shall have the money certain,"
but "I do not intend to interfere with this money in any
way until I think you are capable of taking care of it.
* * * You can consider this money on interest," it
was held that the evidence showed neither an explicit dec-
laration nor an intention to create a trust in favor of the
nephew.3 This case went to the Court of Appeals,
where it was reversed, the court of last resort stating the
1 Smith's Estate (1891) (Pa. Him, 174; s. c, 31 N. Y. Supl.
Orph. Ct.),8 Pa. Ct. K. 539. See 596.
also O'Neill v. Greenwood (Mich.) 3 Hamer v. Sidway (1890), 57
.(1895), 64 N. W. Rep. 511. Hun, 229; s. C, 11 X. Y. Supl. 182.
2Durland v.. Durland (1895), S3
§42.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
57
facts as follows : Where an uncle who is indebted to his
nephew for money due on the latter's twenty-first birthday,
writes the nephew that he had the money in bank that he
intended for him, and that the latter should certainly have
it, adding that he would not interfere with the money until
he thought the nephew capable of taking care of it, the re-
lation of the parties is thereby changed from debtor and
creditor to trustee and beneficiary.1 A conveyance of land
to a relative without consideration, but an oral agreement
to reconvey on demand creates a trust, enforceable in
equity, though the object of the conveyance was to
prevent the property from being seized to satisfy a fine
against the grantor, for which the land could not be legally
taken.2
iHamer v. Sid way (1891), 124
ST. T. 538; s. C, 27 M". E. Kep. 256.
2 Cordova v. Lee (1891), 14S.W.
Eep. 208. The owner and mort-
gagor of land conveyed it to the
mortgagee upon, the latter's prom-
ising to pay over the surplus after
three years. It was held to create a
trust enforceable in equity, the
mortgagee having sold before the
expiration of three years, and the
land having increased in value.
Freer v. Lake, 115 111. 662. A
father who was afraid of compli-
cations which might arise from
differences with his wife, trans-
ferred to his son a quantity of
personal property, taking from the
son an agreement to surrender it
on demand. It was held to create a
trust enforceable in equity. Tyler v.
Tyler, 25111. App. 333." Where it
was expressly declared on the back
of a deed that defendant held the
land conveyed thereby for the
joint benefit of himself and plaint-
iff's intestate, and that it was "to
stand as security" for certain notes
and for the balance of the purchase
money paid by plaintiff's intestate,
and that the profits realized above
these sums should be equally di-
vided between defendant and plaint-
iff's intestate. Such declaration
created a trust in the land for the
benefit of plaintiff's intestate. Max-
well v. Barringer (1892), HON". Car.
76; s. c, 14 S. E. Rep. 516. Under
Civil Code, § 852, subd. 1, provid-
ing that no trust in relation to real
property is valid unless created
and declared "by a writen instru-
ment subscribed by the trustee,"
such a trust is sufficiently declared
by a deposition of the trustee made
in an action wherein the question
of the creation of such trust was
involved, and by which it appears
that he so held the property in
question. Baker v. Baker (Cal.,
1892), 31 Pac. Rep. 355. A certifi-
cate of stock, with a valid transfer
thereof, was delivered to one F
and received by him for the pur-
pose of applying ,the proceeds to
the use of charitable corporations,
the names of which were not then
stated to him. On the next day
the donor gave F a written state-
ment of the purposes for which he
was to use the stock, referring
therein to a list, which was given
58
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§43.
§ 43. The Same Subject. — In a recent and well con-
sidered case in the Court of Errors and Appeals of
New Jersey, where the owner of a policy of life in-
surance, being also executor of an estate, and indebted
to it for securities which he had converted to his own
use, placed the policy among the papers of the estate,
and with it a letter stating that the policy was col-
lateral for the payment of his indebtedness, and after-
wards informed those interested in the estate that he
had disposed of some of its securities, but had secured
the estate by substituting this policy, and that he held
it for the benefit of the estate, and subsequently he testified
that, after placing the policy among the estate's papers,
he did not regard it as his individual property, but held it
in trust for the estate, it was held that a declaration of
trust in favor of the estate was proven, and that in equity
the policy belonged to the estate.1 Delivery of property
to him at the same time, of the
charitable corporations to be ben-
efited. It was held that a valid
and irrevocable trust was cre-
ated. Bliss v. Fosdick, 24 N. Y.
Supl. 939. Defendant gave de-
ceased a note for money which
he owed her, by which he prom-
ised to pay $400 for her funeral
expenses or to return it to her on
demand. During her last sickness
deceased handed the note to de-
fendant, saying: "Here is some-
thing for you." It was held that an
express trust to expend the money
after her death for her funeral ex-
penses was created. Bedel v.
Scoggins (Cal., 1895), 40 Pac.
Bep. 954. G, the grantee of a farm,
shortly after death of the grantor,
executed and recorded an instru-
ment reciting "that, because of
certain real estate duly conveyed
to me by" the grantor, "I do * * *
hereby consider myself * * *
holden and firmly bound to appro-
priate * * * for the comforta-
ble support of L," a son of the
grantor of unsound mind, "during
his life, all the rents, after deduct-
ing necessary expenses, of said real
estate ; or if said real estate should
be sold, the proper maintenance in
board and clothing shall be a, first
lien upon said real estate during
the life of said L. The subscriber
to this bond distinctly asserts that
its obligations on him are limited
to the rents of said real estate, or
to the interest on the purchase
money, should said real estate be
sold." It was held that theinstru-
ment constituted a declaration of
trust, and it is not material that the
declaration' was not contempora-
neous with the deed to G. Mc-
Arthur v. Gordon (1891), 126 N.
Y. 597; s. c, 27 N. E. Bep. 1033,
modifying and affirming S. C, 4
N. Y. Supl. 584.
1 James v. Falk, 50 N. J. Eq. 468;
s. c, 26 Atl. Bep. 138. Property
given in following language in
will : "I give to my wife my per-
§43.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
59
and consideration not essential. Where the payee, at the
time of the execution of the notes, announced her intention
to hold them for the benefit of the maker's children, there
sonal property for her benefit and
the support of my son whilst she
remains unmarried." It was held
sufficient declaration of a trust dur-
ing widowhood. Loring v. Loring,
100 Mass. 34. See also Whiting v.
Whiting, 4 Gray, 236; Andrews v.
Cape Ann Bank, 3 Allen, 313. Also
sufficient where land was con-
veyed "in trust for B, wife of
C, and her heirs and assigns for-
ever." Moore v. Stinson, 144
Mass. 594; Ayer v. Ayer, 61 Pick.
327; Kichardson v. Stodder, 100
Mass. 528. Facts appeared on face
of the instrument. Loring v. Pal-
mer, 118 U. S. 321. Declaration of
trust sufficient in an agreement to
prospect for benefit of all and hold
mine for joint benefit. Page v.
Summers, 70 Cal. 121. To recon-
vey. Walden v. Karr, 88 111. 49.
Where a trustee wrongfully con-
veys the trust estate, and subse-
quently receives a reconveyance of
it, he holds the estate after regain-
ing title as trustee, subject to the
original trust. Frost v. Frost, 63
Me. 390. A declaration to grand-
son, that he had deposited money
in a savings bank, sufficient to
make grandfather trustee for
grandchild. Gerrish v. New Bed-
ford Inst, for Savings, 128 Mass.
159. Likewise deposit in one's
own name for another. Mills-
paugh v. Putnam, 16 Abb. Pr. 3S0.
See also Geary v. Page, 9 Bosw.
290. Also an agreement to sell
and apply proceeds. Franks v.
Williams, 37 Tex. 24. The fidu-
ciary relation and terms of trust
must be disclosed. Tatge v. Tatge,
34 Minn. 272. Trust may be fre-
quently inferred from the facts and
circumstances of a particular case.
Chadwick v. Chadwick, 59 Mich.
87. Are binding, though without
consideration and voluntary. Van
Cott v. Prentice, 104 jST. Y. 45. An
express trust was created, where
grantor conveyed "upon trust and
confidence," and for "sole use,
profit and benefit of," etc. Mc-
Carthy v. McCarthy, 74 Ala. 546.
A written acknowledgment of trust,
created by parol, held sufficient.
Eutledge v. Smith, 1 McCord (S.
Car.) Ch. 119; Eavanel v. Smith, 1
McCord (S. Car.) Ch. 134. In a
written proposition creditor, after
requesting reconveyance, stated :
"I shall consider myself honorably
bound, if anything can be made
out of the property during the
next three years, more than the
interest, taxes, etc., to give Mrs.
Lake benefit of it." Such propo-
sition accepted by debtor a valid
declaration of trust. Lake v.
Freer, 11 111. App. 576. A decla-
ration of purchase of land in trust
for another upheld as a valid de-
claration of trust, notwithstanding
an entire want of consideration.
Titchenell v. Jackson, 26 W.
Va. 460. A testator, by a di>. action
to continue his business, creates a
trust estate. Ferry v. Laible, 31
N. J. Eq. 566. A conveyance ab-
solute in form may be shown to
have been in trust by subsequent
declarations assented to and acted
upon. Chace v. Chapin, 130 Mass.
128. Notice given in writing by a
grantee held a sufficient declara-
tion of a trust. Union Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Campbell, 95 111. 267; s. c,
35 Am. Rep. 166.
60 EXPRESS TRUSTS. [§ 43.
is a declaration of trust, and the title to the notes is trans-
ferred regardless of the failure to deliver possession or
want of consideration for the assignment.1 In a case in
the Court of Chancery of New Jersey, where an absolute
conveyance of land made by complainant to her daughter
was alleged to have been in trust for complainant, it ap-
peared that the ,deed was without consideration, and com-
plainant continued to receive the rents and profits. The
daughter, while alleging the conveyance to be absolute,
conceded that the deed was made to her for her mother's
protection. In reply to the request of the mother that
the land be reconveyed, the daughter wrote that she had
made her will, devising the land to her mother ; that she
"could not touch a dollar" contrary to the mother's wishes;
that she had always considered the transfer of the land
sacred, and that she would have the deed made out, and that
her mother should have the land. It was held that the trust
was sufficiently established.2
1 Williamson v. Yager, 91 Ky. statement by a party declaring
282; s. c, 16 S. W. Bep. 660. himself a trustee. Tanner v. Skin-
2 Newkirk v. Place, 47 N. J. Eq. ner, 11 Bush, 120. The testator,
477; s. C, 21 Atl. Pep. 124. Let- after making a will in which he
ters, memoranda, recitals, held devises all his property absolutely,
sufficient. Forster v. Hale, 3 Ves. writes a letter to the legatee, stat-
Jr. 696; Smith v. Matthews, 3 De ing the trusts on which testator
Gex, F. &J. 139; Gardner v. Howe, intended to devise estate, and ex-
2 Sim. & St. 346; s. C, 5 Kuss. 258; plaining how legatee was to exe-
Dale v. Hamilton, 2 Phil. Ch. 266. cute the trust, and during lifetime
A receipt by a bank that money of testator legatee accepts in writ-
deposited was in trust for specified ing the terms of the trust, and
purpose, a valid declaration. Eog- promises to execute it faithfully,
ers L. Works v. Kelly, 19 Hun, a trust is sufficiently declared in
399. A clear and distinct written the letter. De Laurencel v. De
statement, setting forth the terms Boom, 48 Cal. 581. Letter of
of the trust and the parties to it, trustee. Kingsbury v. Burnside,
subscribed by the trustee, whether 58 111. 310 ; Johnson v. Delo-
addressed to or delivered to the ney, 35 Tex. 42; Phelps v. Seeley,
beneficiary or not, when once made 22 Gratt. 573. Grantees declaring
is a sufficient declaration. Bates themselves trustees by a written
v. Hurd, 65 Me. 180. Sufficient agreement. Baldwin v. Hunter,
that it be subsequently declared by 44 1ST. Y. 609 ; Packard v. Putnam,
a writing signed by the party 57 N. H. 43. After signature and
charged with the trust. McClellan acknowledgment, "iV. B. D.
v. McClellan, 65 Me. 500. Explicit Burns' half to be for the use of
§44.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
61
§ 44. Insufficient Declaration. — While it is well settled
that a person, sui juris, acting intelligently and deliber-
ately, may dispose of his property by gift, the expression,
whether orally or in writing, of an intention to make a
gift, even though the particulars of his plan may be defi-
nitely and expressly stated, will not be construed as a
declaration of trust. A voluntary promise to make a gift
is nudum pactum, and cannot be enforced. One who signs
and acknowledges a paper declaring that he holds for
another's benefit certain property theretofore owned by him-
self, but retains custody of the paper, does not thereby create
himself a trustee for the person named.1 In an action by a
husband against his wife to establish a trust in favor of the
Mary Ann Burns after the decease
of her parents, etc.," it was held
nota bene was part of deed and a
sufficient declaration of a trust for
Mary Ann. Ivory v. Burns, 56 Pa.
St. 300. An answer in chancery
by a defendant may be a sufficient
declaration of a trust to answer
requirements of statute of frauds.
Patton v. Chamberlain, 44 Mich.
5; Broadrup v. Woodman, 27 Ohio
St. 553; McLaurie v. Partlow, 53
111. 340; Cozine v. Graham, 2
Paige, 177; McCubbin v. Crom-
well, 7 Gill & J. 157; McVay v.
McVay, 43 N. J. Eq. 47; Garnsey
v. Gothard, 90 Cal. 603. May be
declared by an instrument separate
from the conveyance to the trus-
tees. Wood v. Cox, 2 Myl. & C.
684; Smith v. Attersoll, 1 Russ.
266. The deposition of the trustee,
subscribed and sworn to by him,
held a sufficient manifestation and
proof of it in writing. Pinney v.
Fellows, 15 Vt. 525; Barkworth v.
Young, 4 Drew, 1. A receipt held
sufficient declaration. Roberts'
Appeal, 92 Pa. St. 407. Statements
contained in a pamphlet may be
sufficient to declare a trust in lands
held by a deed absolute. Barrell
v. Joy, 16 Mass. 221. May also
be made by owner stating that
he holds the property in trust.
Obermiller v. Wylie, 36 Fed. Rep.
641; Doe v. Harris, 16 M. & W.
517; Union Mat. Life Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 95 111. 267; s. c, 35
Am. Rep. 166; Snyder v. McComb,
39 Fed. Rep. 292. See also "In-
tention to Create a Trust," 7 Alb.
L. J. 166.
1 Govin v. De Miranda (1894) , 76
Hun, 414; s. C, 27 N. Y. Supl.
1049. Mortgages and judgments
standing in the name of J, found
in a wallet in his possession at the
time of his death, labeled "E" on
the inside and outside, will not, in
the absence of any evidence that
her money was invested in them,
be adjudged to have been held by
J in trust for her. In re Gilmor's
Estate (1894), 158 Pa. St. 186; s.
C, 27 Atl. Rep. 845. The indorse-
ment of notes and mortgages to a
trustee "for the use of" another
does not pass the legal title, to the
beneficiary, though the nature of
the trust is not stated. Collins v.
Phillips (1894), 91 Iowa, 210; s.
c, 59 ST. W. Rep. 40. Deceased
asked one C to draw an assign-
62 EXPRESS TRUSTS. [§ 44.
husband and his two children in certain realty vested in the
wife, it appeared that the premises were paid for by plaint-
iff, who was a lawyer, and who directed that the deed be
made to his wife. Plaintiff testified that his wife said to
him (he being in poor health at the time) that it would be
a good thing, if anything happened to him, for her and the
children to have a home, and that the title had better be
taken in her name. He assented. Without her knowledge
he obtained the deed and recorded it ; afterwards he gave
the deed to his wife, saying: "You keep that. If anything
happens to me you are to take care of it for yourself and
the children ; and' as long as I live I will pay the taxes and
insurance, so there will be no expenses." It was held that
the evidence was not sufficient to establish a trust in favor
of the husband, and that, as the children were not parties,
their right, if any, would not be determined in the action.1
A father deeded land to several children, taking back mort-
gages to himself, containing the condition that after his
death a certain amount of the mortgage debts should be
paid to his other children. It was held that there being no
consideration for the condition, and no declaration of trust
at the time, no trust was created.2
ment of a bond and mortgage to veys an absolute title to the
plaintiff, declaring his intention to grantees named. Hart v. Seymour
give them to plaintiff. Deceased, (1894), 147 111. 598; s. a, 35 N. E.
after receiving the assignment, Eep. 246.
bond and mortgage from C, kept i McCahill v. McCahill, 71 Hun,
them a month and then delivered 221; s. c, 25 1ST. Y. Supl. 219. .
them, with other papers, to C — 2 Beeman v. Beeman, 88 Hun,
the assignment being signed but 14; s. C., 34 JJ\ Y. Supl. 484. A
not acknowledged — directing C to writing intended as a will, but
deposit them in the bank, where which is imperfectly executed, is
they remained at his death. It was not a declaration of trust unless it
held that there was no declaration clearly declares that the title to
of trust. Wadd v. Hazelton (1893), the land has been hold in trust by
137 N. Y. 215; s. c, 33 X. E. Rep. the would-be testator for the
143. A deed conveying land to devisee named. Leslie v. Leslie
three grantees, "trustees of the (1895). 52 N. J. Eq. 332; s. C., 31
Norwood Land & Building Asso- Atl. Rep. 170. An agreement by
ciation," and "to their heirs and a mortgagee, with the wife of the
assigns forever," does not of itself mortgagor, that if she will join in
create a trust, b\ii prima facie con- the mortgage, and not contest the
§45.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
03
§ 45. The Same Subject. — A promise by a devisee to pay
a debt of the testator out of bis devise or its proceeds, is not
sufficient to impress the devised property with a trust for
the payment of such debt.1 Fifteen days after the making
foreclosure, or redeem from the
sale, lie will purchase the land,
and on reselling the same will re-
pay her a certain portion of the
proceeds, does not sreate a "trust
concerning land" (Rev. St. 1894, §
3391; Rev. St. 1881, § 2969), nor is
it a conveyance of a trust in "goods
or choses in action" (Rev. St. 1894,
§ 6631; Rev. St. 1881, § 4906), so as
to render it enforceable, unless in
writing. Talbott v. Barber (1894) ,
11 Ind. App. 1; s. c, 3S N. E.
Rep. 487. In an equity action to
have defendant declared a trustee
for the plaintiff's benefit in respect
to certain land conveyed by plaint-
iff to one P, and devised by the
latter to defendant, the evidence
relied on to support the alleged
trust consisted of two unsealed
paper writings, one signed by P
and the other by defendant, de-
claring that the subscribers held
the land in trust for plaintiff, and
were willing to execute title to him.
These writings were made after
conveyance to P, and were en-
tirely voluntary. Held, that they
were not in themselves sufficient to
create a valid trust, and that as
plaintiff would, therefore, be com-
pelled to resort to the original
transaction to make out his case, it
was error to exclude testimony
offered by defendant to show that
the conveyance to P was in-
tended to defraud the creditors of
plaintiff. Pittman v. Pittman
(1890), 107 N. Car. 159; s. c, 12 S.
E. Rep. 61. A statement by a hus-
band after selling land conveyed to
him by warranty deed, that the
proceeds of the sale belong to his
wife and that he intends to buy a
farm for her therewith, will not
create in her favor a trust in the
land bought with such proceeds.
Acker v. Priest (1895) (Iowa), Gl
N. W. Rep. 235. Where several
trusts are created and among them
oae or more which render the dis-
position illegal, and these can be
separated without doing injustice
or defeating the will of the testa-
tor, that which is illegal, or which
added to the others, render the
whole illegal, may be cut off
and the others may stand, thus
giving the intention of the testator
effect as far as possible. Under-
wood v. Curtis, 127 N. Y. 523.
1 Hamilton v. Downer (1895), 152
111. 651; S. C, 38 N. E. Rep. 733.
In an action to establish a trust it
appeared that complainant deeded
certain land to W, who deeded to
B, subject to mortgages to the
amount of two-thirds of its value.
Complainant's daughter testified
that her mother had a conversation
with AV in the forenoon ; that in
the afternoon B came to the house
and her mother said to him : "Here
is everything that belongs to the
the property. You see that I get
them all back," and he said: "I
will take the papers and do you
the favor; and I will have a new
deed made out, and deed it back
to you, whenever you want it."
Another witness stated that B ad-
mitted he held the property in
trust; that in a letter "he wrote me
that promise was alright;" that
he lost considerable by complain-
ant's husband, "and something to
the effect that he got even with
64 EXPRESS TRUSTS. [§ 45.
of a deed by decedent, the grantee therein wrote decedent
that he would hold the property in trust for him, and sub-
ject to his order; and a few days before decedent's death
such grantee again wrote him, asking for detailed arrange-
ments as to what should be done with the property, and
suggesting that he deed it back to decedent. Before this
decedent had written a letter to said grantee, that in case of
decedent's death the property should be deeded to inter-
vener, and gave the letter to the latter, who retained it till
decedent's death. It was held that the property was held in
trust for decedent, and not for intervener, the letter di-
recting a conveyance to the latter being purely testamen-
tary in character.1 One who signs and acknowledges a paper
declaring that he holds for another's benefit certain property
theretofore owned by himself, but retains the custody of the
paper, does not thereby create himself a trustee for the per-
son named.2 A banking firm was agent to receive stock sub-
scriptions for the A corporation, which subscriptions they
were at liberty to use as other deposits until the stock was
issued. While holding such deposits the}T prepared a decla-
ration that certain securities, part of their general assets,
him now." Held, that there was purchase, but led them to believe
insufficient evidence of a declara- that the purchase had been made
tion of the trust to take the case under the agreement with them,
out of the statute of frauds ; Long, Defendant prepared in his own
J., dissenting. Eenz v. Stoll, handwriting and exhibited to
(1893), 94 Mich. 377; s. c, 54 1ST. plaintiffs a form of agreement for
"W. Kep. 276. subscribers to a syndicate, in which
1 Conrad v. Douglas (1894), 59 defendant's name appeared as one
Minn. 498; s. c, 61 N". W. Rep. of the syndicate, but the paper
673. was not otherwise signed; and
2 Govin v. De Miranda (1895), 9 later he refused to carry out its
Misc. Kep. 684; s. c, 30 BT. Y. conditions, and destroyed the
Sup. 550. Plaintiffs and defendant paper. Held, that the paper pre-
orally agreed to purchase certain pared by defendant, being a mere
lands, plaintiffs each to furnish one- form of an agreement, did not
quarter and defendant one-half of constitute a declaration of a trust
the purchase money, and to form a for himself and plaintiffs. Emer-
syndicate for its development, son v. G-alloupe (1S93), 158 Mass.
Defendant negotiated for the pur- 146; s. c, 32 X. E. Rep. 1118. See
chase in his own right, informing Nickerson v. Nickerson, 127 U. b
plaintiffs that he had made the 688.
§45.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
65
were "held as collateral security against" such deposits,
which paper, without their signature, they placed, together
with the securities, in an envelop indorsed, "subscribers to
the A corporation collaterals," which they deposited in a tin
box in a safe deposit company. It Mas held that this was in-
sufficient to create a trust in favor of such creditors.1 In
an action to establish a parol trust in personal property, it
appears that twenty-three 3'ears prior to the suit plaintiff's
mother, desiring to divide a sum of money among her chil-
dren, delivered certain portions of it to some of them in
person, and directed defendant to take the shares of plaint-
iffs, invest it for them and pay them only the interest. No
demand was made by plaintiffs upon defendant for the
principal or interest of their shares for a series of years,
although two of them were in needy circumstances, and had
frequently requested pecuniary assistance from defendant.
The testimony of plaintiffs was vague and uncertain, and
the details of the original transaction were stated in three
different ways. It was held that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to establish the trust.2
1 Girard Life Ins. Annuity &
Trust Co. v. Mellor (1894), 156 Pa.
St. 579; s. c, 27 Atl. Kep. 662.
2 Harris v. Bratton et al. (1890),
34 S. Oar. 259; s. C, 13 S. E. Rep.
447. A grant to a son-in-law for
the purpose of advancing daughter
in life held insufficient, there be-
ing nothing to indicate an inten-
tion to separate the legal estate
from the beneficial interest.
Thompson v. Thompson, 18 Ohio
St. 73; Mosely v. Mosely, 87 N.
Car. 69. A stipulation that the
grantee of land was not to alienate
without consent of wife, and that
if not sold it shall descend to the
heirs of their bodies, does not cre-
ate a trust for the use of the wife.
Huff v. Thomas, 1 T. B. Mon. 158.
Letters were written admitting
trust but not naming beneficiaries
nor defining nature of trust. Held,
5
insufficient to create. Dyer's Ap-
peal, 107 Pa. St. 446. A written
acknowledgment that money was
to be invested for the benefit of the
daughter of the person who paid
the money, and the interest to be
paid to her for the support of her-
self and children when payor de-
cided that she needed it. Held,
not a, sufficient declaration of a
trust to prevent him from collect-
ing and using the money himself.
Matter of Crise's Estate (Surr.
Ct.), 7N. Y. Sup. 202. Where no
consideration shown, a written
acknowledgment by one person
that another is entitled to certain
land it was held that no trust was
created. Thompson v. Branch,
Meigs, 390; s. c, 33 Am. Dec. 153;
Hasshagen v. Hasshagen, 80 Cal.
515. For cases where declaration
of trust was held insufficient, see
66 EXPRESS TRUSTS. [§§ 46-47.
§ 46. Declaration of Trust by Answer in Chancery.
— The admission of a trust by a defendant, in an answer
in chancery, is a sufficient declaration of the trust to an-
swer the requirements of the statute of frauds. A defend-
ant is required to answer a bill in which a parol trust is al-
leged, and a general demurrer will not be sustained.1 If
his answer contains an admission, either in terms or by im-
plication, of the trust, it will be regarded as an adequate
declaration and proof of the trust.2 If the statute of frauds
is not pleaded in bar he will be regarded as having waived
his right to avail himself of its benefits.3 But if, while ad-
mitting the trust in his answer, the defendant sets up the
statute of frauds in bar, a declaration of trust will not be
inferred.4 If the claim is set up that the trust is proven by
the answer, the entire answer must be taken into the ac-
count. The claim must be sustained by the answer as a
whole, and not by one clause separated from the others.5
§ 47. The Subject Continued. — In the case of Patton v.
Chamberlain, before the Supreme Court of Michigan, opin-
ion by Mr. Justice Cooley, the other justices concurring:
Lands held in parol trust by a father for his daughter were
exchanged for others, which he convej7ed to his brother on
like trust. Creditors of the father sought to reach it. It was
generally, Fussell v. Hennessy, 14 Fletcher, 2 Atk. 155 ; Childers v.
K.I. 550; Campbell V.Campbell, 70 Childers, 3 K. & J. 310; S. C, 1
Wis. 311; Gibson v. Deims, 82 111. De G. & J. 485.
304; Kiddle v. Beattie, 77 Iowa, 2 Til ton v. Tilton, 9 N". H. 386
168 ; Harvey v. Permypacker, 4 Allen v. Chambers, 4 Ired. Eq. 125
Del. Ch. 445; Salisbury v. Clark, Whiting v. Gould, 2 Wis. 552
61 Vt. 453; Modrell v. Kiddle, 82 McLaurie v. Partlow, 53 111. 340
Mo. 31; Hawks v. Sailors, 87 Ga. Baker v. Hollabaugh, 15 Ark. 322
234; Saunderson v. Broadwell, 82 Hutchinson v. Tindall, 2 Green
Cal. 132; Wright v. Sampter, 127 Ch. 357.
111. 167. 3 Carpenter v. Davis, 72 111. 14.
1 JIuckelston v. Brown, 6 Yes. 4 Whiting v. Gould, 2 Wis. 552;
52; Newton v. Pelham, 1 Eden, Dean v. Dean, 1 Stockt. 425.
514; Lomax v. Ripley, 3 Sm. & s 1 Lewin on Trusts, 56 ; Freeman
Giff. 48; Chamberlain v. Agar, 2 v. Tatham, 5 Hare, 329; Hampton
V. & B. 259; Strickland v. Al- v. Spencer, 2 Vern. 288 ; Stearns v.
dridge, 9 Ves. 516; Peralta v. Hubbard, 8 Greenl. 320.
Castro, 6 Cal. 354; Cottington v.
§ 48.] EXPRESS TRUSTS. G7
held that the equities of the daughter were equal to those
of the creditors, and she would be protected against their
claims. The admission of the trust by the brother, in an
answer in chancery, is a sufficient declaration of the trust
in writing to answer the requirements of the statute of
frauds.1 Where a trust is alleged in a bill, the presump-
tion will be that it was legally created. Hence, the evidence
that it rests on parol only must be made to appear from the
bill, or the demurrer will not be sustained.2 If the bill
simply omits to state that the evidence of the trust will be
given in writing, a demurrer will be overruled. In the case
of Davies v. Otty, before the English Court of Chancery,
Sir John Romilly, Master of the Rolls, said: "I am clearly
of the opinion that when the plaintiff says by his bill, I
purchased an estate in the name of A B, and he is a
trustee for me, and I can prove that he is a trustee, the de-
fendant cannot demur to the bill on the ground that the
plaintiff does not state that when he comes to prove his
case at the hearing he has some writing to establish it.
The plaintiff, no doubt, must prove his case at the hearing,
and he may then produce a letter, or something else in
writing, to establish the facts which he alleges by his bill.3
§ 48. Imperfect Gilt not a Trust j.n many cases the
question whether there is a sufficient declaration of trust is
found to be simply the question whether the act of the
donor is a declaration of trust, or only an imperfect gift.
If it is simply an imperf ect i gift a court of equity will not
interpose to make it a declaration of trust. If a grantor
wishes to make himself a trustee, his intention must be ex-
U'atton v. Chamberlain, 44 Ch. 450; Winn v. Albert, 2 Md.
Mich. 5; Cottington v. Fletcher, Ch. 169; Kingsbury v. Burnside,
2 Atk. 155; Wilson v. Dent, 3 Sim. 58111.310.
3S5; Hampton v. Spencer, 2 Vern. 2 Cozine v. Graham, 2 Paige, 177.
2S8; Pratt v. Ayer, 3 Chand. 3 Davies v. Otty, 33 Beav. 540.
(Wis.) 265;' McLaurie v. Partlow, i Jones v. Lock, L. R. 1 Ch.
53 111. 340; Whiting v. Gould, 2 App. 25; Beaver v. Beaver, 117 X.
Wis. 552; Woods v. Dille, 11 Ohio, Y. 421;_ "Voluntary Settlements,"
455; Cozine v. Graham, 2 Paige, 11 Irish L. J. 413.
177; Chetwood v. Brittan. 1 Green
68 EXPRESS TKUSTS. [§ 40.
pressed in some writing of such a character as to leave no
ground for a reasonable doubt in regard to it. In the case
of Moore v. Moore, before the English Court of Chancer}',
Vice-Chancellor Hall said: "I do think it very impor-
tant to keep a clear and definitie distinction between cases
of imperfect gift and cases of declaration of trust, and that
one should not extend beyond what the authorities have
already established; declarations of trust, so as to supple-
ment and supply what, according to decisions of the highest
authority, would otherwise be imperfect gifts."1 In the
more recent case, In re Shield, Pethybridge v. Burrow,
before the same court, stated as follows : Some time be-
fore his death a testator informed his daughter's companion,
F. P., that he intended to give her a debenture bond for
£1,000 in the M. S. & L. Ey. Co. Shortly afterwards he
signed the following memorandum: "I wish to communi-
cate to my executors that I have to-day given to Miss F. P.
my £1,000 debenture bond of the M. S. & L. R3'. Co., but
as I shall require the annual dividends to meet my neces-
sary expenses, I retain the document in my possession for
my lifetime, requesting you on my decease to hand it over
to Miss F. P., and communicate to the secretary of the
railway company at the Manchester office, relative to the
transfer of the said bond being entered in their books.
Given under my hand this 9th day of February, 1882. As
witness my hand. G. S. P. 8. — You will find the bond
in my deed box attached to this memorandum." After the
testator's death a certificate of debenture stock for £1,000
in the M. S. & L. Ry. Co. was found with the memo-
randum in the deed box. It was held that the memoran-
dum was an ineffectual attempt to assign the debenture
stock, and did not amount to a good declaration of trust,
and that F. P. had no interest in the debenture stock.2
§ 49. Imperfect Gift Continued. — Whatever may be
the intention of the donor, a voluntary gift is made a de-
claration of trust, only as there is an actual transfer of the
1 Moore v. Moore, 30 L. J. Rep. 2 Be Shields, Pethybridge v.
(N. S.) 752. Burrows, 53 L. T. Rep. 5.
^ 49. J EXPEESS TRUSTS. 69
property, or "as the donor absolutely parts with his interest.
It is not a perfect gift, and as such a declaration of
trust, until he has parted with his interest or property
rights in it. In the case of Richards v. Deldridge, before
the English Court of Chancery, Sir George Jessel, Mas-
ter of the Rolls, said: "The principle is a very simple
one. A man may transfer his property without considera-
tion, in one or two ways : he may either do such acts as
amount in law to a conveyance or assignment of the prop-
erty, and thus completely divest himself of the legal owner-
ship, in which case the person who by those acts acquires
the property takes it beneficially, or on trust, as the case
may be; or the legal owner of the property may, by one or
other of the modes recognized as amounting to a valid de-
claration of trust, constitute himself a trustee, and without
an actual transfer of the legal title may so deal with the
property as to deprive himself of its beneficial ownership,
and declare that he will hold it from that time forward on
trust for the other person. It is true that he need not use
the words, 'I declare myself a trustee,' but he must do
something which is equivalent to it, and use expressions
which have that meaning ; for, however, anxious the court
may be to carry out a man's intention, it is not at liberty
to construe words otherwise than according to their proper
meaning.1 Where there is a consideration, an expression
1 Richards v. Delbridge, L. K. property to the persons for whom
18 Eq. 11. In Milroy v. Lord, 4 he intends to provide, and the pro-
De 6. F. & J. 264, 274, a case fre- vision will then be effectual; and
quently cited, it was said by Lord it will be equally effectual if he
Justice Turner : '-I take the law transfers the property to a trustee
of this court to be well settled that, for the purposes of the settlement,
in order to render a voluntary set- or declares that he himself holds it
tleraent valid and effectual, the intrust for those purposes ; and if
settlor must have done something the property be personal the trust
which, according to the nature of may, as I apprehend, be declared
the property comprised in the set- either in writing or by parol; but
tlement, was necessary to be done in order to render the settlement
in order to transfer the property binding, one or the other of these
and render the settlement binding modes must, as I understand the
upon him. He may, of course, do law of this court, be resorted to,
this by actually transferring the for there is no equity in this court
70
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§50.
of a purpose to transfer property, or an agreement to
transfer will be treated as evidence of a contract, and will
be enforced by the court, but this rule is not applicable to
voluntary gifts.1
§ 50. Trusts in "Writing not Changed by Parol. —
Where a trust is created in writing and the language of the
instrument is unequivocal, the courts will not listen to a
contradiction of the expressed intention by parol. Where
a husband purchases land and takes the title in his wife's
name, though he pa}^s for it with his own money, evidence
of a parol agreement between them, creating an express
trust in the land of which he is the beneficiary, is inadmissi-
ble in an action brought by him after his wife's death
to perfect an imperfect gift.'' It
was further observed that if the
decision of Lord Romilly, in Mor.
gan v. Malleson, L. E. 10 Eq. 475,
and Vice-Chancellor Wood in Rich-
ardson v. Richardson, L. R. 3 Eq.
686, in which cases the words used
were words of present transfer,
were right, "there never could be
a case where an expression of a
present gift would not amount to
an effectual declaration of a trust,
which would be carrying the doc-
trine on that subject too far." See
also, opinion of Rapallo, J., in
Young v. Young, 80 N". Y. 422.
1 Young v. Young. 80 X. Y. 422.
See also Moore v. Moore, L. R. 18
Eq. 474, 482; Heartley v. Nichol-
son, L. R. 19 Eq. 233; Hayes v.
Alliance Insurance Co., L. R. 8
Ir. 149; James v. Lock, L. R. 1
Ch. App. 125. In re Breton's Es-
tate, L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 416. In the
latter case a husband wrote and
signed three papers and banded
them to his wife, by which he
purported to give her certain fur-
niture, plate and other articles.
He afterwards made his will, and
after certain dispositions of his
property, which had nothing to do
with the articles in question, he
gave the residue of his estate to his
wife for life, with remainder to
other persons. Hall, V. C, re-
viewed the previous authorities,
and decided that the furniture,
etc., did not belong to the wife
absolutely, but formed part of the
husband's estate. The law, he
said, was laid down in Wilson v.
Lord, 4 De G., J. & F. 264, that it
must be plainly shown that it was
the purpose of the settlement or
the intention of the settlor to con-
stitute himself a trustee, and that
in the case under consideration it
was clear that was not intended.
"It was not," he observed, "the
purpose or meaning of the husband
in writing those letters to consti-
tute himself a trustee for his wife.
I can well understand in such a
case a husband saying to his wife,
'I mean to give you this as your
own, but when you ask me to be a
trustee for you I must respectfully
decline. I do not want to be in-
volved in a trust of that kind or in
any trust.' "
§50.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
71
against her heirs.1 While a trust in lands, created by
parol, must, in an attempt to enforce the trust, be mani-
fested by writing duly signed, it is competent after the
trust has been terminated by a conveyance of the property
by the trustee to the beneficiaries, to prove the trust by
parol evidence, as against creditors of the trustee, who
allege that such conveyance was fraudulent as to them.2
Where lands are held under an absolute deed of warranty,
parol evidence cannot be introduced to establish an express
trust in such lands.3 Where it is plain from the nature of
1 Montgomery v. Craig, 128 Ind.
48; s. C, 27 N. E. Rep. 427;
Hughes v. Wilson, 128 Ind. 491; s.
c, 26 1ST. E. Eep. 50; Gee v.
Thrailkill, 45 Kan. 173; Steere v.
Steere, 5 Johns. Ch. 1; S. C, 9
Am. Dec. 256; Dickinson v. Dick-
inson, 2 Murph. 279; Lloyd v.
Inglis, 1 Desaus. 333; Lewis v.
Lewis, 2 Ch. 77; Finch's Case, 4
Inst. 86; Harris v. Barnett, 3 Gratt.
339; Lake v. Freer, 11 111, App.
576; Mann v. Mann, 1 Johns. Ch.
234; Sturtevant v. Sturtevant, 20
N. Y. 39; s. c, 75 Am. Dec. 371;
Ashley's Adm'r v. .Robinson, 29
Ala. 112; s. C, 65 Am. Dec. 371.
See also Jerome v. Bohm (Colo.),
40 Pac. Rep. 570; Holland v.
Farthing (Tex.), 21 S. W. Rep.
67. A daughter indorsed and de-
livered to her father, at his request,
promissory notes owned by her, on
his declaring to her that this was
necessary in order to secure the
property for her, and upon no
other consideration. The father
made a will by which, after several
bequests, he gave the residue of
his property to his executor, and
ordered the said notes to be de-
livered to him in trust to invest
said property and notes in stock,
and to receive and pay over the
income thereof to his daughter
during her life, and to pay the
principal, at her decease, to such
person as she might by her last
will direct, and in default of such
will and directioa, to pay the same
to her heir or heirs at law, to have
and to hold the same forever; and
by a codicil he gave several lega-
cies, to be paid after the decease of
his daughter. He died insolvent,
and the money due on said notes
was claimed for his creditors.
Held, on a bill in equity, brought
by the daughter against the father's
executor, that the notes were
holden by the father in trust for
her use and benefit, that his cred-
itors had no claim upon them, and
that the daughter had the right to
terminate the trust, if she so
elected, and to have the trust prop-
erty restored to her by the execu-
tor. Hunnewell v. Lane, 11 Met.
163.
2 Silvers v. Potter, 48 N. J. Eq.
539; S. C, 22 Atl. Rep. 584.
3 McDonald v. Hooker, 57 Ark.
632; s. C, 22 S. W.Rep. 655; Cor-
bit v. Smith, 7 Iowa, 60 ; Hurst v.
Harper, 14 Hun, 283; Horn v.
Keteltas, 42 How. Pr. 152; McMa-
hon v. Macy, 51 N. Y. 161 ; Snell-
ingv. Utterback, 1 Bibb, 609; s. c,
4 Am. Dec. 661; Hunter v. Bilyeu,
30 111. 246; Harrison v. Howard, 1
Ired. Eq. 407; Brady v. Parker, 4
lred. Eq. 430; Philpott v. Elliott,
72
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§51.
the instrument that there is an intention to make the holder
of the legal estate the holder of the beneficial estate also, a
trust cannot be raised by parol.1 Parol proof will not be
heard to engraft an express trust on a conveyance already
executed, where the instrument is absolute in its terms,2
and subsequent declarations, whether oral or in writing,
will not avail for that purpose.3 Where there is a valuable
consideration, if it can be shown that it came from the
grantor, a trust cannot be established by parol.4 Where
lands are held in a secret trust with a view to defrauding
o
creditors, a subsequent trust by parol for the benefit of
creditors will be sustained.5 In a parol trust which is of
such a nature that the beneficiary cannot enforce it the
courts will protect the trustee in its execution, if he elects
to do so, and as far as possible they will protect the bene-
ficiary in his reception of the benefits of the trust.6
§ 51. Trusts of Personal Property. — An owner of
personal property may sell or otherwise dispose of it with-
4 Md. Ch. 273; Lyman v. Ins. Co.,
2 Johns. Ch. 630.
1 Lewis v. Lewis, 2 Ch. E. 77;
Finch's Case, 4 Inst. 86; Childers
V. Childers, 3 K. & J. 310; s. C, 1
De G. & J. 482 ; Leman v. Whitley,
4Kuss. 423; Fordyce v. Willis, 3
Bro. Ch. 587; Lloyd v. Inglis, 1
Des. 333; 1 Lewin, 42, 5th ed.;
Gilbert on Uses, 56, 57 ; Pilkington
v.Bailey, 7 Bro. P. C. 526; Sims v.
Smith, 11 Ga. 198; Harris v. Bar-
nett, 3 Gratt. 339; Dickenson v.
Dickenson, 2 Murph. 279; Steere
v. Steere, 5 Johns. Ch. 1 ; Gainus
v. Cannon, 42 Ark. 503; Dean v.
Dean, 6 Conn. 285; Hutchinson v.
Tindall, 2 Green Ch. 257; Starr v.
Starr, 1 Ohio, 321 ; Movan v. Hays,
1 Johns. Ch. 343; Philbrook v.
Delano, 29 Me. 410. See also New-
kirk v. Place (1891), 47 N. J. Eq.
477 ; S. C, 21 Atl. Hep. 124 ; Blount v.
Washington, 108 M. Car. 230; s. C,
12 S. E. Kep. 1008; Begole v. Haz-
zard (1892), 81 Wis. 274; s. c, 51
ST. W. Kep. 325; Koche v. George's
Ex'r (1893), 93 Ky. 609; s. c, 20
S. W. Kep. 1039; Smith v. Eok-
ford, 18 S. W. Rep. 210: Butler v.
Hyland, 89 Cal. 575; s. c, 26 Pac.
Rep. 1108; Ragsdale v. Ragsdale,
68 Miss. 92; s. c, 8 So. Rep. 315.
2 Kelly v. Karsner, 72 Ala. 110;
Lawson v. Lawson, 117 111. 98;
Phillips v. So. Park Commrs., 119
111. 626 ; Hansen v. Berthelson, 19
Neb. 433; Green v. Cates, 73 Mo.
122; Cain v. Cox, 23 W. Va. 594;
Pavey v. Am. Ins. Co., 56 Wis. 221.
3 Phillips v. So. Park Commrs.,
119 111. 626.
i 1 Lewin, 42, 5th ed. ; Gilbert on
Uses, 56, 57 ; Starr v. Starr, 1 Ohio,
321 ; Philbrooke v. Delano, 29 Me.
410.
5 Langsdale v. Woolen, 99 Ind.
575.
6 Karr v. Washburn, 56 Wis. 303.
§ 51.] EXPRESS TRUSTS. 73
out a contract in writing, and he has a right to make it the
subject of a trust in the same manner. Any property that
he can transfer by parol he can convey in trust by parol.1
The statute of frauds relates exclusively to real estate, and
has no application to personal property. On this point the
decisions of the courts of the United States are in entire
harmony- with those of England. Money secured by mort-
gages and other charges on real estate is not included in
the statute, and may be the subject of a parol trust.
Where A took a mortgage in the name of B, declaring that
the principal sum should be for the benefit of B, and re-
ceived the interest during his life; this being personal
estate is not within the clause in the statute of frauds relat-
ing to resulting trusts, or the doctrine of resulting trusts
under that statute ; but the property after the death of A
will belong to B by force of the parol declaration.2 When
one takes the legal title of land for which another pays the
purchase money without any fraudulent intent, and subse-
quently sells the same, agreeing verbally to hold the pro-
ceeds in trust, a trust is created in the proceeds of the sale.3
1 Hooper v. Holmes, 3 Stockt. 122; 115 Pa. St. 198; Gilman v. McAr-
Kobsonv. Harwell, 6 Gii. 589; Day die, 99 N. Y. 451; Gadsden v.
v. Roth, 18 N. Y. 448; Higgen- Whaley, 14 S. Car. 211; Hellman
bottom v. Peyton, 3 Rich. Eq. 398; v. MoWilliams, 70 Cal. 449; Hon
Kirkpatrick v. Davidson, 2 Kelly, v. Hon, 70 Ind. 135; Hunt v.
297; Gordon v. Green, 10 Ga. 534; Elliott, 80 Ind. 245; Cobb v.
Kimball v. Norton, 1 Halst. Ch. 31. Knight, 74 Me. 253; Patterson v.
See McFadden v. Jinkyns, 1 Hare, Mills, 69 Iowa, 755 ; Cobb v.
461; s. C, 1 Phill. 157; Thorpe v. Knight, 74 Me. 253; Danser v.
Owens, 5Beav. 224; George v. Bank Warwick, 33 N. J. Eq. 133.
of England, 7 Price, 646; Hawkins 2 Benbow v. Townsend, 1 Mylne
v. Gordon, 2 Sm. & Gif . 451 ; Peck- & K. 506.
ham v. Taylor, 3 Beav. 250; Simms 3 Thornburg v. Buck (1895), 13
v. Smith, 11 Ga. 195; Hunnewell Ind. App.446; s. c, 41 N. E. Rep.
v. Lane, 11 Met. 163; Crissman v. 85; Bellasis v. Compton, 2 Vern.
Crissman, 23 Mich. 218; Berry v. 294; Benbow v. Townsend, 1
Norris, 1 Drew, 302; Davis v. Co- Mylne & K. 506; Hackney v.
burn, 128 Mass. 377; Thatcher v. Brooman, 62 Barb. 650; Childs
Churchill, 118 Mass. 108; Gerrish v. Jordan, 106 Mass. 322. Where
v. New Bedford Inst, for Savings, a member of a mutual benefit
128 Mass. 159; Chase v. Chapin, association has a new certifl-
130 Mass. 128; MafBt v. Rynd, 69 cate issued in favor of another
Pa. St. 30; Dickerson's Appeal, person, under a parol agreement
74 EXPRESS TRUSTS. [§ 52.
The New York statute provides that trust estates may be
created for the following purposes: "(3) To receive the
rents and profits of lands, and apply them to the use of
any person" during life or for a short term. The statute
further makes the provisions in regard to real estate applica-
ble to personal property. It was held that a devise to
trustees of certain money, to invest the same and pay over
the income as provided, creates an express trust, clothing
the trustees with the legal title.1 A deed of personalty,
where there is no obstacle to making it, is valid and cannot
subsequently be annulled. A deed executed by a father to
his two daughters upon certain trusts, described the prop-
erty conveyed as all his furniture, live stock, grain, farm-
ing implements, etc., and "all debts, claims and rights of
recovery which * * * (grantor) now possesses, and any
and all other personal estate of any and every description
whatsoever." It was held that the description included all
money possessed by the grantor at the time the deed was
executed and delivered, and that any subsequent attempt
to dispose of the same by will or otherwise would be in-
operative.2
§ 52. The Subject Continued. — If a person who
desires to procure an insurance on his life for the benefit
of his children, makes a parol contract with another by
that the latter shall apply the pro- reference made to the profits then
ceeds to a certain purpose, a trust accumulated as a matter separate
is created which attaches to the and distinct from the stock. Seld,
proceeds when they come into such that the trustee took not only the
person's hands. Hirsh v. Auer stock, but the accumulated profits
(1S95), 146 ST. Y. 13; s. c, 40 N. also, to be received and held by
E. Rep. 397. The owner of bank him as part of the corpus of the es-
stock, on which profits had already tate, on the bank's going into
accumulated, and were held by the liquidation and distributing its as-
bank, transferred the stock in trust sets. Cobb v. Fant (1892), 36 S.
to pay "the dividends, income, is- Car. 1; s. c, 14 S. E. Rep. 959.
sues and profits," equally between 1 Maitland v. Baldwin (1893), 70
her daughters for their lives, with Hun, 267; s. c, 24 N". Y. Supl. 29;
remainder over. The shares of 1 Rev. Stat., p. 729, § 55.
stock on their face were worth $100 2 Fry v. Feamster (1892), 36 W.
each, and nothing was said in the Va. 454; s. c, 15 S. E. Rep. 253.
deed as to their actual value, nor
§52.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
75
which the former is to pay the premiums and the policy is
to be made payable to the latter, who is to hold it in trust
for the children, and collect and hold the proceeds in trust
for them, a court of equity will enforce the trust ; and if
the trustee is an improper person to receive the money and
execute the trust, the court will remove him and appoint
another.1 In the creation of a trust in personalty, as well
as in real estate, the language employed must be definite
and positive. The property which is to be the subject-mat-
ter of the trust must be clearly and definitely described ;
the purposes of the trust must be plainly indicated, and as
well the person or persons who are to be the beneficiaries.
Ambiguous or vague and indefinite expressions will not be
held to create a trust. In addition to this, the proof of the
trust must be unequivocal.2 The declaration of a purpose
to create a trust is of no value, and a promise to make a
1 Silvey v. Hodgdon, 52 Cal. 363;
Cobb v. Knight, 74 Me. 253 ; Kra-
Hl<3I v. McCaughey, 11 Mo. App.
426. A valid trust arises as against
ewy orie, excspi the donor's cred-
itors, where an owner of the bank
stock surrenders his certificate,
and has it reissued to himself as
trustee for the benefit of his chil-
dren, and such trust remained un-
revoked at his death. Mize v.
Bates Co. Bank (1895), 60 Mo.
App. Rep. 358. A trust in per-
sonal property may be created by
parol, and it is valid, though with-
out consideration and unknown to
the beneficiary. "Williams v. Has-
kins' Estate (1894), 66 Vt. 378; s.
c, 29 Atl. Rep. 371. B deposited
in a savings bank certain moneys
in his own name as trustee for R,
his step- daughter. B gave the
book to R, who returned it to B, in
whose control it remained. In a
suit against the administrator of B,
claiming the deposit as trust funds,
held that trust was completely
constituted. Ray v. Simmons, 11
R. I. 266. Where, by reason of the
statute of frauds, a verbal declara-
tion of trust in land would be void,
yet such declaration would be up-
held when the proceeds arising
from the sale are made the subject
of the trust. Hooper v. Holmes,
11 N\ J. Eq. 122; Kimball v. Mor-
ton, 5 ST. J. Eq. 26; s. O., 43 Am.
Dec. 621 ; Barkley v. Lane"s Ex'r, 6
Bush, 587; Higgenbottom v. Pey-
ton, 3 Rich. Eq. 398; Mafflt v.
Rynd, 69 Pa. St. 380; Lester v.
Hodgson, L. R. 4 Eq. 30; Calder
v. Moran, 49 Mich. 14; Hess' Ap-
peal, 112 Pa. St. 168; Thomas v.
Merry, 113 Ind. 88. See generally
Chase v. Perley, 148 Mass. 289;
Roach v. Caffara, S5 Cal. 437;
Barry v. Lambert, 98 N. Y. 305 :
Comer v. Comer, 24 111. App. 526;
Freeman v. Freeman, 2 Pars. Eq.
(Pa.) 81; Greenfield's Estate, 14
Pa. St. 489; Gulick v. Gulick, 39
N. J. Eq. 401 ; Kirkpatrick v. Mc-
Donald, 11 Pa. St. 387.
2 Bailey v. Irwine, 72 Ala. 505;
Allen v. Withrow, 110 U. S. 119.
76 EXPRESS TRUSTS. [§ 53.
donation at some future time, where there is no considera-
tion, at best is only an imperfect gift, and will not be up-
held as a trust.1 Where one accepts notes of another in
trust to pay such person's debts, and and agrees with the
creditor either to turn over the notes to him, or when col-
lected to pay him the money, and enters upon the perform-
ance of the undertaking, there will arise an obligation on
his part to execute the trust faithfully, and an action lies
in favor of the creditor for a failure to do so. He makes
himself a trustee for the creditor, even though he receives
no compensation.2 To constitute a trust in personal prop-
erty it is enough if the owner unequivocally declares, either
orally or in writing, that he holds it in prcesenti in trust for
another.3
§ 53. Trusts in Bank Deposits. — The cases relating
to bank deposits, and especially to deposits in savings
banks, are very numerous, and they are not in entire har-
mony. In this treatise no effort is made to reconcile decis-
ions that are in conflict, either real or apparent, but the
cases either presented or cited will afford a general if not
exhaustive view of the subject and enable the thoughtful
student to reach a sound conclusion. The courts of the
1 Allen v. Withrow, 110 U. S. 119. 3 Kay v. Simmons, 11 K. I. 266;
2 Walden v. Karr, 88 111. 49; s. C, 15 Am. L. Keg. (N". S.) 701;
Eddy v. Roberts, 17 111. 506; Ex parte Pye, 18 Ves. Jr. 140 ; Mil-
Brown v. Strait, 19 111. 89; Bristow roy v. Lord, 4 De G., F. & J. 264;
v. Lane, 21 111. 194; Albrecht v. Richardson v. Richardson, Law
Wolf, 58 111. 186. A son was au- Rep. 3 Eq. 68G; Kekewich v. Man-
thorized by his mother to collect ning, 1 De G., M. & G. 176; Mor-
and invest her money for her, he gan v. Malleson, L. R. 10 Eq. 475;
to retain, as his compensation, all Penfold, v. Mould, L. R. 4 Eq. 562;
the profits arising from the estate Wheatley v. Purr, 1 Keen, 551, and
in excess of a certain per cent., note; McFadden v. Jenkins, 1
which he was to pay over to his Hare, 458 ; affirmed on appeal, 1
mother. He did keep the money Phillips, 153; Thorpe v. Owen, 5
together, and invested it, from Beav. 224; Exton v. Scott. 6 Sim.
time to time, and spoke of and 31; Fletcher v. Fletcher, 4 Hare,
treated it as his mother's money. 67; Carson's Admr. v. Phelps, 14
This was held sufficient to show a Am. L. Reg. (>T. S.) 100; Souver-
trust, and that the son was acting bridge et ux. v. Arden et al., 1
as a trustee, and not as a borrower. Johns. Ch. 240 ; Bunn v. Winthrop
Clapp v. Emery, 98 111. 523. et nl., 1 Johns. Ch. 329.
§ 53. J EXPRESS TRUSTS. 77
State of New York and of some other States have held that
the declaration of trust may be completed though the pass-
book is retained by the depositor. It is assumed that he
retains it as trustee, and that in the control of the funds
which he continues to exercise he acts not as the proprietor
but as a trustee. In the case of Martin v. Funk, before
the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, which has
been frequently quoted, and is of special value, as it covers
a number of very important points, the doctrine of the
New York courts is fully and clearly stated. S deposited
in a savings bank a sum of money belonging to her, declar-
ing at the time that she wanted the account to be in trust
for plaintiff. The account was so entered, and a pass-book
given to S containing an entry, in substance, that the ac-
count was with her in trust for plaintiff. A deposit was
made in the same manner in trust for K. Plaintiff and K
were sisters, and distant relations of S. S retained posses-
sion of the pass-books, and the money remained in bank,
with its accumulated interest, except that she drew out one
year's interest, until her death. Plaintiff and K were igno-
rant of the deposits until after that event. In an action to
obtain possession of the pass-books, and to recover the de-
posits, it was held that the transaction was a valid and suffi-
cient declaration of trust, and passed the title to the
deposits. S, constituting herself a trustee, that the reten-
tion of the pass-books, which were simply the vouchers for
the property, must be deemed to have been as trustee, and
was not inconsistent with the completeness of the gift, nor
was notice to the cestuis que trust necessary.1 The view
here presented appears to be sustained by the English
courts. In delivering the opinion in this case Mr. Justice
Church quotes Lord Chief Justice Turner with approval as
follows: "I take the law of this court to be well settled,
that in order to render a voluntary settlement valid and
1 Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134; 475; Warriner v. Kogers, L. K. 16
Hill on Trustee**, 130; Kichardson Eq. 340; Pye's Case, 18 Ves. 140;
t. Richardson, L. K. 3 Eq. 684; Wheatley v. Purr, 1 Keen, 551.
Morgan v. Malleson, L. B. 10 Eq.
78
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§ S3.
effectual the settlor must have done everything, which ac-
cording to the nature of the property comprised in the set-
tlement is binding upon him. He may, of course, do this by
actually transferring the property to the person for whom
he intended to provide, and the provision will then be effect-
ual, and it will be equally effectual if he transfer the prop-
erty to a trustee for the purposes of the settlement, or de-
clare that he himself holds it in trust for those purposes,
and if the property be personal, the trust may, I apprehend,
be declared either in writing or by parol."1 The following
recent cases are in the same direction : Decedent, plaint-
iff's father, deposited in plaintiff's name in a savings bank,
money saved by her while a little child, and from time to
time deposited other moneys on such account. The pass-
books were often shown to plaintiff, and the deposit was
1 Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 138.
A widow with a considerable estate
and no children deposited in a
savings hank $250 in her own name
as trustee for W. W was a hoy 13
years of age, whose parents were
near neighbors and friends, and
who was accustomed to do errands
for her, being almost daily at her
house for the purpose, she often
giving him presents in return.
Shortly after making the deposit,
she told the boy's parents that she
had deposited that amount in the
savings bank for their son, and
again alluding to it, remarked that
W would need it for his education.
She kept the bank book herself,
and two years thereafter drew out
a. part of the money, and a year
later the balance with accrued in-
terest, signing receipts in her own
name, and appropriating the
money to her own use. She died
four years later, leaving a will in
which no allusion was made to the
deposit, and nothing was given to
W. It was found by the court be-
low that at the time she made the
deposit she intended to make a gift
of the sum to W, to take effect
either then or at some future time.
Held, that she made a complete
gift at the time of the deposit, and
could not afterwards revoke it.
[Two judges dissenting.] And
held that the trust was to be re-
garded upon the facts as only for
W's minority, and that upon his
becoming of age the legal title
would vest in him without any
further act to end the trust.
Whether a legal title to the money
did not instantly vest in W upon
the donor's drawing out and ap-
propriating it in violation of the
trust. Quere: Minor v. Roger, 40
Conn. 512; Thompson v. Gordon,
3 Strobh. 196; Trowell v. Carra-
way, 10 Heisk. 104; Marston v.
Marston, 21 N. H. 491 ; Adams v.
Nicholas, 1 Miles, 90 ; s. C, 2 Whart.
17 ; Huntington v. Gilmore, 14 Barb.
243 ; Jones v. Selby, Prec. in Ch.
300; Merchant v. Merchant, 2
Bradf. 432; Parker v. Picks, 8
Jones, 447; Hambrokev^ Simmons,
4 Russ. 25.
§ 53. J EXPRESS TRUSTS. 79
often mentioned in the family as plaintiff's, and decedent
often said it was to be plaintiff's at his death. The savings
bank ceased to do business, and decedent transferred the
deposit to another bank, "subject to the control" of him-
self, and made further deposits in such bank. Afterwards,
without the knowledge of plaintiff, he invested the amount
of the deposits in a mortgage, to which he attached a writ-
ing, stating that the mortgage was purchased with money
which plaintiff had in the savings bank to her credit, and
that he put it in the mortgage "so that she can realize more
interest," and "at my death this is to go to her." It
was held sufficient to establish a trust in plaintiff's
favor, as the words "subject to the control" of de-
cedent did not mean that he retained ownership, but sim-
ply that he retained the management of the. money.1
V deposited money in a savings bank, and took a bank book
in her name in trust for H, and the account was so entered
by the bank. She afterwards made other deposits which
were entered in the book and credited to the same account
by the bank, retaining possession of the book; and the
money, with its accumulated interest, remained in the bank
until after her death. It was held that the transactions con-
stituted an irrevocable trust in favor of H, and that plaintiff,
as his administrator, was entitled to the moneys in ques-
tion.2
1 ilillard v. Clark (1894), 80 Hud, taxable, withdrew a part of it, and
141; s. C, 29 1ST. Y. Supl. 1012. deposited it in his own name as
2 Hyde v. Kitchen, 69 Hun, 2S0; trustee for C, and a pass-book con-
S. c, 23 N. Y. Supl. 573. G- de- taining such an entry was issued lo
posited $560 in d, bank in his name him, which he retained until his
as trustee for M, as shown by the death. Shortly after making such
bank book and the books of the deposit he declared that he made
bank. The bank book was in the it as trustee for C, and from time
possession of M at G's death. Held, to time he deposited other money
that in the absence of rebutting evi- thereto as trustee, and drew money
dence, there was sufficient to create from it, which he receipted for as
a trust in favor of M. In re Gaff- trustee. Held, that such transac-
ney's Estate (1892), 146 Pa. St. 49; tions constituted a complete, vol-
s. c, 23 Atl. Eep.163. S, who had untary trust for C's benefit. Pope
over $2,000 in bank, on being in- v. Bank, 56 Vt. 284, distinguished;
formed by the cashier that any Connecticut Eiv. Sav. Bk. v. Albee
amount on deposit over $2,000 was (1893), 64 Vt. 571; s. C, 25 Atl.
80
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§ 54.
§ 54. Bank Deposits Continued — Some decisions of
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts are not in accord with
the preceding. In the leading case, Brabrook v. Boston
Five Cents Savings Bank, we have the following : A B de-
posited in a savings bank a sum in his own name and a like
sum in the name of "A B, trusteee for C D," who was his
daughter, and always retained the pass-books in his own
possession. In a suit by the daughter, after his death,
against the bank for the sum deposited by him as trustee
for her, parol evidence was offered to show that both de-
posits were his money, and that one was made in his daugh-
ter's name because the amount of both exceeded the sum
which the law allowed the bank to hold for a single depositor.
It was held that the evidence was admissible, notwithstand-
ing that a by-law of the bank, assented to by A B, provided
that any depositor might designate at the time of deposit
for whose benefit the same was made, and should be bound
by such condition; and that upon the facts the plaintiff
Rep. 487. The fact that a deposit
in bank was made in the name of
the depositor "in trust" for another
is not conclusive as to the intent to
create a trust, but the surrounding
circumstances may be shown as
bearing on the intent. Macy v.
Williams, 83 Hun, 243; s. C.,31N.
Y. Supl.620. B deposited in a sav-
ings bank certain moneys in his own
name as trustee for R. B gave the
bank book to R, who returned it to
B, in whose control it remained.
B was childless. R was his step-
daughter. It was in evidence that
B was a man of few words, and
that he treated R as his daughter.
In an equity suit by R against the
administrator of B, claiming the
depo.-it as trust funds held by B for
R, held, that the trust was com-
pletely constituted. Held, further,
that the trust being constituted,
the fact that it was voluntary was
no reason for refusing relief. Ray
v. Simmons, 11 R. I. 2t>6. U,
plaintiff's intestate, in 1850, de-
posited a sum of money in a sav-
ings bank which was credited to
an account then opened wilh her
in trust for S J U, her daughter.
The bank issued a pass-book, in
which the account was entered, as
with her, in trust for her said
daughter. This deposit was sub-
sequently drawn out.- In 1874 U,
having sold a house and lot, de-
posited $2,000 to the credit of said
account, which was entered in said
pass-book. She also, at the same
time, deposited $25 to the credit of
an account, with her in trust, for a
granddaughter, receiving another
pass-book therefor, and on the
same day she deposited the balance
of the purchase money received to
her own credit in another savings
bank. U retained the pass-book
until her death. In an action to
determine the title to the deposit
held, that the transaction disclosed
an intention to create a trust for
§ 54. j
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
81
could not recover.1 In delivering the opinion in this case
Mr. Justice Wells said: "If the act of transfer be com-
plete on the part of the donor, subsequent acceptance by
the donee, before revocation, will be sufficient. But there
must be some act of delivery out of the possession of the
donor, for the purpose and with the intent that the title
shall thereby pass." In support of this view he cites Min-
the benefit of the daughter, and
that the latter was entitled to the
fund. Also held, the fact that prior
to the second deposit the daughter
was married, and so bore a different
name at that time, and that the
name was not changed in the ac-
count, did not affect the question,
as the deposit was clearly made for
her benefit. Also held, the fact
that U drew the interest on the
deposit did not change or affect the
character she had given to it as a
trust fund, nor did the fact that she
had offered to loan the money,
after the deposit was made, or that
she, in the first place, proposed to
deposit the whole purchase money
in the bank when the balance was
deposited. Williams v. Smith et
ah, 91 N. Y. 297. In an action by
the executor of A against a savings
bank to recover money deposited
by A, it appeared that, after de-
positing in his own name and on
his own account all that he was
allowed to by the rules of the bank,
A made three other deposits as
trustee, one of which was in trust
for his only son by name, and the
others in trust for his two grand-
children by name; that for these
deposits he took separate bank
books containing entries of the
same, which, after his death, were
found among his effects, having
never been delivered to the persons
named, or to any one else for them,
and that A continued, during his
lifetime, to collect, receipt for and
use as his own all dividends de-
clared upon these deposits. A by-
law of the bank provided that "no
person shall receive any part of the
principal or interest, without pro-
ducing the original books, in order
that such payments may be entered
thereon," and another by-law pro-
vided that "any depositor, at the
time of making his deposit, may
designate the person for whose
benefit the same is made, which
shall be binding on his legal repre-
sentatives." The son and grand-
children of A, who appeared as
claimants of the money under the
Statute of 1876, ch. 203, § 19, offered
to prove, in addition to the facts
above stated, that A had said to
each of them, at different times,
"that he had put this money in
bank for them ; that he wanted to
draw the interest during his life-
time, and that after he was gone
they were to have the money."
Held, that the evidence offered was
admissible, and that upon all the
evidence a jury would be justified
in finding that A had fully consti-
tuted himself a trustee for the
claimants, Gerrish v. Sew Bed-
ford Inst, for Savings, 128 Mass.
159 (Gardner v. Merritt, 32 Md.
78 ; Vandenberg v. Palmer, 4 K. &
J. 204), although there may have
been no delivery of the bank book.
Blasdell v. Locke, 52 1ST. H. 238.
1 Brabrook v. Boston Bank, 104
Mass. 228.
82
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§54.
chin v. Merrill, 2 Edw. Ch. 333. In a later case before the
same court this doctrine was sustained. In Clark v. Clark,
Chief Justice Chapman said: "The case of Brabrookv.
Boston Five Cents Savings Bank is decisive of this case."1
This position appears to be sustained by the decision of the
United States Circuit Court for the District of Massachu-
setts. In the case of Stone v. Bishop it was held that
mere deposit of money in a savings bank, with entry in the
pass-book in the form shown in this case, that it was in
trust for the alleged cestui que trust, without notice to the
supposed cestui que trust, is not sufficient to show that the
money deposited passed to him, especially when he knew
nothing of the deposit until after the decease of the deposi-
tor, and the appointment of an administrator.2 But if the
i Clark v. Clark, 108 Mass. 522;
Powers v. Provident Inst., 12-1
Mass. 377 ; Stone v. Bishop, 4 Cliff.
593; Weber v. Weber (N, Y.), 9
Reporter, 632; Geary v. Page, 9
Bosw. 290; Meigs v. Meigs, 15
Hun, 453. See also contra, Witzell
v. Chaplin, 3 Bradf. 386. See also
Gaskell v. Gaskell, 2 You. & Jer.
502; Moore v. Moore, L. P. 18 Eq.
474.
2 Stone v. Bishop, 4 Cliff. 593.
The transfer of a bank depositor,
of her account, to the names of
herself and a third person, with
the understanding that the money
is to remain hers during life, sub-
ject to her own control, and on her
death to be the property of the
third person, to be applied to re-
ligious and charitable uses, does
not create a valid trust in the third
person, since the death of the de-
positor is a condition precedent to
the complete transfer to the donee ;
and hence, on the depositor's death,
the money belongs to her adminis-
trator. Providence Inst, for Sav. v.
Carpenter (1S94), 18 K. I. 2S7; S.
c.,27Atl. Rep. 337. In 1S74, a de-
positor in a savings bank, Rachel
Speer, ordered the following entry
to be made in her account: "Frank
B. Smith, hatter, Danbury, Conn.,
son of Joseph Smith and Cornelia,
to be drawn by Rachel ; after her
death, by Frank." In 1870 she
directed the following entry to be
made in her pass-book in another
savings bank : "This account is in
trust for Frank B. Smith," and
signed it with her name. She kept
both pass-books in her possession,
and drew the dividends and part of
the deposits down to 1878, when
she became insane. Complainant
is her nephew, and understood
that, although the funds were de-
posited in trust for him, he was to
have no part thereof until Rachel's
death. Held, that he had no claim
to be protected, during Rachel's
lifetime, against her or her guard-
ian drawing the funds. Smith v.
S*>eer, 7 Stew. 336; s. C, 14 Cent.
L. J. 16, note. Defendant M and
plaintiff cohabited, and were
known as man and wife for four
years, though they were never
married. During that period
§55.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
83
depositor informs the person in whose favor the deposit is
made, and states to him that it is to be his after the de-
positor's death, a trust will be recognized by these courts.1
This will be held, although the pass-book has not been de-
livered.2 A deposit of money to be accounted for at the
death of the depositor will not be recognized as creating a
trust. A deposit of money with defendant, "in trust to be
accounted for at the death of" one B, does not comply
with the rule that, in order to constitute a valid trust, the
instrument by which it is sought to be created must show a
sufficient intention to create a trust and a beneficiary that is
named or can be ascertained.3
§ 55. Certainty as to Beneficiary. — It is the rule
that the beneficiary must be plainly designated in order
to the creation of a valid trust. A trust without a benefi-
ciary that is in a condition to demand its enforcement is
void.4 The cestui que trust need not be designated by name,
plaintiff, on making a deposit in a
savings bank, requested the secre-
tary "to put M's name upon the
book," and on his asking "if she
wanted it in trust for him to draw,"
and telling her that if she put it in
trust she would have control of it
as long as she lived, and on her
death it would go to M, she said
that that was what she wanted,
and he then wrote, after her name
on the pass-book, the words, "In
trust for M." Held, that no trust
in favor of M was established, as
plaintiff did not intend to create a
trust, but to make a species of tes-
tamentary dispositiou of the funds
in M's favor, and that such inten-
tion having been communicated
immediately by her to M, and un-
derstood by him, her subsequent
delivery of the book to him was no
evidence of an assignment of the
fund to him. Markey v. Markey
(1895), 13 X. Y. Supl.925.
1 Gerrish v. New Bedford Inst.,
128 Mass. 159.
2 Blasdell v. Locke, 52 N. H. 238.
3 Wilcox v. Gilchrist (1895), 85
Hun, 1; s. c, 32 1ST. Y. Supl. 608.
4 Levy v. Levy, 33 N. Y. 97, 107.
"If there is a single postulate of
the common law established by an
unbroken line of decisions, it is
that a trust without a certain bene-
ficiary, who can claim its enforce-
ment, is void, whether good or bad,
wise or unwise." Ibid. Webb's
Case, 1 Rol. Abr. 609; Sanders on
Uses, 58, 389; Wilmott's Opinions,
22; Sbeppard's Touchstone, 589;
Sonley v. Clockmakers' Company,
1 Bro. Ch. 81;. Ononany v.
Butcher, 1 Turn. & Buss. 260;
James v. Allen, 3 Merivale, 17;
Vesey v. Jameson, 1 Sim. & St. 09;
Fowler v. Garlike, 1 Buss. & Myl.
232; Ellis v. Selby, 1 Myl. & Craig,
286; Williams v. Williams, 4 Seld.
540; Dashiell v. The Attornev-
84
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§55.
but the designation must be definite and certain. This de-
mand cannot be answered by empowering the trustee to
designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries. In the case of
Gallego's Executors v. The Attorney-General, before the
Virginia Court of Appeals, Mr. Justice Tucker said: "In
the eye of the law the intervention of a trustee does not
remove a single difficulty. There is not more necessity for
a properly defined grantee in a deed than for a ceslui que
trust, capable of taking and so defined and pointed out,
that the trust will not be void for uncertainty. In short,
there cannot be a trust without a cestui que trust; and if it
cannot be ascertained who the cestui que trust is,, it is the
General, 5 Har. & John. 400.
Where a gift to a charitable use is
so indefinite as to be incapable of
being executed by a judicial de-
cree, it is invalid. A clause in the
will of T gave to his executors a
sum specified, in trust, to distribute
the same "among*such incorpo-
rated societies under the laws of
the State of New York or the State
of Maryland, having lawful au-
thority to receive and hold funds
upon permanent trusts for chari-
table or educational uses," as said
executor, or the survivors of them,
might select, and in such sums as
they should determine. In an ac-
tion for the construction of the
will, held that said clause was void
because of indefiniteness and un-
certainty in the designation of the
recipients of the testator's bounty.
Prichard v. Thompson, 95 N. Y.
76. A deed of trust for an unin-
corporated joint stock company,
under the company name, is not
void for want of a beneficiary
capable of taking, but the benefi-
ciaries are the shareholders in the
company, since a joint stock com-
pany is in effect a copartnership.
Hart v. Seymour, 147 111. 598 ; s. C,
35N. E. Rep. 246. A certain desig-
nated beneficiary is essential to the
creation of a valid trust, and where
power is given to trustees to select
a beneficiary, the class of persons
in whose favor the power may be
exercised must be designated by
the testator with such certainty
that the court can ascertain who
were the objects of the power.
Tilden v. Green, 130 N. Y. 29; S.
c, 29 1ST. E. Rep. 1033. Testator,
by his will, directed that his exec-
utors should procure the incorpo-
ration of an institution to be known
as the "Tilden Trust," and if they
should deem it expedient, should
convey to it his residuary estate;
otherwise to apply such estate to
charitable purposes. Held, that
there was no executory devise to
the Tilden Trust, as it took only by
the discretion of the trustees. In-
glis v. Sailors' Snug Harbor, 3 Pet.
99, and Burrill v. Boardman, 43 N.
Y. distinguished; Tilden v. Green,
130 1ST. Y. 29; s. c, 29 N. E. Eep.
1033. A bequest to trustees, with
direction to pay over the fund "to
some Presbyterian institution in
Baltimore, as they may determine,
for charitable or religious pur-
poses," is void because of the in-
definiteness of the beneficiary.
§ 56. ] EXPRESS TRUSTS. 85
same thing as if there were none."1 The fact that a trustee
has been appointed, that he has been empowered to desig-
nate the beneficiary, that he is competent, and that he is
willing to execute the trust, will not answer the demand.
Compliance with these conditions will not give validity to
the trust.2 Notwithstanding, then, if there has beenno proper
designation of a beneficiary, the property which is the sub-
ject-matter of the trust, or which has been conveyed to the
trustee, will revert to the settlor, or in case of his death to
his legal heirs. In the case of Morice v. The Bishop of
Durham, before the English High Court of Chancery, Sir
William Grant, Master of the Rolls, said: "There can be
no trust over the exercise of which this court will not as-
sume a control, for an uncontrollable power of disposition
would be ownership, and not trust. If there be a clear
trust, but for uncertain objects the property, that is, the
subject of the trust, is undisposed of, and the benefit of
such trust must result to those to whom the law gives the
ownership in default of disposition by the former owner.
This doctrine does not hold good with regard to trusts for
charity. But every other trust must have a definite object.
There must be somebody in whose favor the court can
decree performance."3
§ 56. Sufficient Designation. — As before said, it is not
necessary that the cestui que trust should be designated by
name. Where the trustee or trustees have been empowered
to select the beneficiary or beneficiaries, and the class of
persons for whose benefit the power is to be exercised has
been designated, with sufficient certainty by the grantor, to
enable the court to decide any question that may arise in
regard to it, the trust will be sustained. This doctrine has
an illustration in the leading case of Power v. Cassidy, be-
Gamble v. Tripp (1892),75Md.25; beneficiaries. Butler v. Green
s. c, 23 Atl. Rep. 461. A devise (1891), 16 5T. Y. Supl. 888.
or bequest in trust for such char- 1 Galligo's Exr's v. Atty.-Gen., 3
itable uses as the majority of the Leigh, 466.
executors and trustees may select 2 Holland v. Alcock, 108 NY. 312.
and appoint is void in New York, 3 Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 9
because of the indefiniteness of the Ves. 400.
86 EXPRESS TRUSTS. [§ 56,
fore the Court of Appeals of New York. This case derives
no aid from the exceptional rule in regard to trusts for
charitable purposes, as that rule is not in force in that
State. Nevertheless a liberal view in regard to a sufficient
designation of a beneficiary is taken by that court. "In
that case there was a bequest of a fund to the executors in
trust, to be divided by them among such Roman Catholic
charities, institutions, schools or charities in the City of
New York as a majority of the executors should decide, and
in such proportions as they might think proper. The court
held that, giving full force and effect to the rule, that the
object of the trust must be certain and well defined ; that
the beneficiaries must be either named or capable of being
ascertained within the rules of law applicable to such cases,
and that the trusts must be of such a nature that a court of
equity can direct their execution, and making no exception
in favor of charitable uses, the bequest should be upheld
as coming within the general rule ; that the clause designa-
ted a certain class of objects of the testator's bounty, to
which he might have made a valid, direct bequest, and that
by conferring power upon his executors to designate the
organizations which should be entitled to participate, and
the proportion which each should take, he did not impair
the legality of the provision so long as the organization re-
ferred to had an existence recognized by law, and were
capable of taking and could be ascertained ; that the evi-
dence showed that, at the time of the execution of the will
and of the testator's death, there were in the City of New
York incorporated institutions of the class referred to in
the will, and that a portion of these had been designated
by a majority of the executors ; that none but incorporated
institutions could lawfully have been selected ; and that
even if the executors had failed to make a selection or ap-
portionment, the court would have had the power to decree
the execution of the trust, there being no difficulty in deter-
mining what institutions came within the class designated
by the testator."1 It will be observed that in this case the
1 Beach on Mod. Eq. Jur., § 152.
§ 57. J EXPRESS TRUSTS. 87
designation of the cestuis que trust was sufficiently definite
to enable the court to enforce the trust by a judicial decree.
In a subsequent case before the same court, similar in some
respects but distinguished from it in this regard, the trust
was not sustained.1 Testatrix gave the residue of her
estate to her executor "to be distributed according to in-
structions given to him" by her. The only evidence of
such instructions was to the effect that he was to dispose of
the property, as he chose, so that her brother and sisters
could get none of it. It was held that the trust was void for
indefiniteness of the beneficiaries.2 Where a testamentary
trust is attacked as void for indefiniteness of the benefi-
ciaries, it cannot be objected that such a construction will
allow the estate to go to the next of kin, whereas the trust
was intended to be created for the purpose of preventing
them from inheriting it.3
§ 57. Notice to Parties. — The giving of notice by
the settlor to the trustee and the beneficiary may be of
importance in the settlement of the question whether
there has been a complete and valid creation of a trust,
but it is not essential to the validity of a trust that has
been properly created.4 The validity of a trust deed can-
1 Prichard v. Thompson, 95 N". same day the testator drew a check
Y. 76; Matter of Will of O'Hara, on a plain sheet of paper for £900,
95 N. Y. 403, 408 ; Kinney v. Kin- payable to B, to whom he owed
ney's Ex'r, 86 Ky. 610; Baptist £200, and wrote on the same sheet :
Church v. Shively, 67 Md. 493; s. "A £200, B £200, executorship fund
c, 1 Am. St. Eep. 412; Webster v. £500. The check was presented and
Morris, 66 Wis. 366; Coit v. Com- paid before the testator's death,
stock, 51 Conn. 352; Fontaine's Held, that this was not a donatio
Adm'r v. Thompson's Adm'r, 80 mortis causa, but a complete trust
Va. 229. of £200 in A's favor; and that it
2 Gross v. Moore, 68 Hun, 412 ; s. was not necessary that he should
C, 22 N. Y. Supl. 1019. have any notice of it previously
3 Gross v. Moore, 68 Hun, 412; s. to the testator's death. Tate v.
C, 22 N. Y. Supl. 1019. Leithead, Kay, 658. It is not neces-
4 A man in bis last illness, a few sary that an infant accept a trust
days before his death, made a cod- made for his benefit as the law ac-
icil to his will, giving certain bene- cepts it for him. Copeland v. Sum-
fits to his son-in-law A, and ap- mers (1893), 138Ind. 219; s.c.,35N.
pointing B his executor. On the E. Rep. 514. An action by a person
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§57.
not be questioned from the fact that the grantor executed
it without consulting the beneficiaries.1 Where one of the
beneficiaries in a deed of trust of chattels procured the exe-
cution of such deed, and accepted it, the deed is not in-
valid because the other beneficiary had no knowledge of it.2
A. trust in personal property may be created by parol and
it is valid, though without consideration and unknown to
the beneficiary.3
to enforce a trust is a sufficient ac-
ceptance by him. Copelandv. Sum-
mers (1893) , 138 Ind. 219 ; s. c, 35 ST.
E. Rep. 514. It is not necessary, to
the validity of a trust deed that
the trustee should accept the deed,
or even that he should know of it.
Delivery of a trust deed to a wit-
ness to be recorded is a .sufficient
delivery. Cloud v. Calhoun, 10
Rich. Eq. 358. It is a well settled
doctrine in equity, that where a
trust is created for the benefit of a
third person without his knowledge
at the time, he may afterwards
affirm it and enforce its perform-
ance. Woodbury v. Bowman, 14
Me. 161; Neilson v. Blight, 1
Johns. Cases, 205; Moses v. Mur-
gatroyd, 1 Johns. Ch. 119; Duke
of Cumberland v. Codrington, 3
Johns. Ch. 261; Shepherd v.
McEvers, 4 Johns. Ch. 136; Bank
of Metropolis v. Guttschlick, 14
Pet. 31; Sedam v. Williams, 4
McLean, 54; Ingram v. Kirkpat-
rick, 6 Ired. Eq. 463; s. C, 51 Am.
Dec. 436; Price v. Truesdell, 28 N.
J. Eq. 204; Donaldson v. Donald-
son, Kay, 711; Burn v. Carvalho,
4 M. & Cr. 690; Roberts v. Lloyd,
2 Beav. 376 ; Sloper v. Cottrell, 6
El. & Bl. 504; Gilbert v. Overton,
2 Hem. & Mill. 110; Kekewich v.
Manning, 1 De G. M. & G. 176;
Tierney v. Wood, 19 Beav. 330;
Lamb v. Orton, 1 Dr. & Sm. 125;
Meux v. Bell, 1 Hare, 73 ; Otis v.
Beckwith, 49 111. 121 ; Saunders v.
Harris, 1 Head, 185; Furman v.
Fisher, 4 Coldw. 626; s. C, 94 Am.
Dec. 210; Penny v. Davis, 3 B.
Monr. 313; Eyrick v. Hetriok, 13
Pa. St. 493; Wise v. Wise, 2 Jones
& L. 412; Beatson v. Beatson, 12
Sim. 281; Meek v. Kettlewell, 1
Hare, 476; s. C, 1 Phill. 342; Ry-
croft v. Christy, 3 Beav. 238; God-
sail v. Webb, 2 Keen, 99; Bridge v.
Bridge, 16 Beav. 315; Cecil v.
Butcher, 2 J. & W. 573; McFadden
v. Jenkyns, 1 Phill. 153; Field v.
Arrowsmith, 3 Humph. 442; s. C,
39 Am. Dec. 185; Pleasants v.
Glasscock, 1 Smed. & M. Ch. 17;
Berley v. Taylor, 5 Hill, 577.
1 Taylor v. Watkins (Miss., 1894),
13 So. Rep. 811.
2 Willis v. Satterfield (Tex.)
(1892), 20 S. W. Rep. 155.
s Williams v. Haskin's Estate, 66
Vt. 378; s. C, 29 Atl. Rep. 371.
CHAPTEE VII.
EXPRESS TRUSTS CONTINUED.
§ 58.
Executory Trusts.
§ 72
59.
Executory Trusts Distin-
guished from Executed
73
Trusts.
74
60.
Executory Trusts in Mar-
riage Contracts.
75
61.
The Subject Continued.
76
02.
The Same Subject.
63.
Executory Trusts in "Wills.
77
64.
Trusts in Wills Continued.
78
65.
Trusts in Marriage Articles
and in Wills Distin-
79
guished.
80
66.
The Subject Continued.
67.
Precatory Trusts.
81
68.
Precatory Trusts Continued.
82
69.
The Subject Continued.
83
70.
The Same Subject.
84
71.
The Same.
85
Necessity of Probate of
Wills.
The Subject Continued.
The Same Subject.
A Devise Not Converted
into a Trust by Parol.
Settlement on Wife and
Children.
The Subject Continued.
Voluntary Trusts — When
Executed.
Voluntary Agreement.
An Equitable Interest Trans-
ferable.
Power of Revocation.
The Subject Continued.
Powers in Trust.
Powers in Trust Continued.
Modern Legislation.
§ 58. Executory Trusts. — Of the cases arising under
this department of the law of trusts, by far the most nu-
merous and familiar, as has frequently been noted, are those
growing out of marriage contracts and of wills. To a great
extent marriage settlements are agreements in regard to the
disposal of property which, from the nature of the case,
are in a degree indefinite or imperfect, and are to be com-
pleted when the marriage shall have been consummated.
And in the drawing of wills, in many instances, it is almost
of necessity that in committing property to the care of
trustees for a number of beneficiaries, something should be
left for them to do in order to the completion or perfection
i)0 EXPEES8 TRUSTS. [§ 58.
of the trust. Out of these circumstances arise a large pro-
portion of the cases relating to executory trusts.1 An ex-
ecutory trust is a trust in which the limitations of the trust
estate are not completed or fully declared by the settlor in
the instrument creating it, but in which instructions are
given to the trustee, and an outline of organization indi-
cated from which he is expected to perfect and declare it.2
An instrument by which an executory trust is created is
not, by the definition, a completed expression of the intent
or purpose of the grantor, but a writing in which another
person is instructed and empowered to put his intent or
purpose into execution. "It is of the essence of an execu-
tory trust," as has been said, "that it should not be fully
expressed or declared in the instrument creating it, but that
it should require some further deed or instrument for its
complete legal expression. Thus an executory trust may
be created by a testamentary gift of property to trustees,
with a direction that it shall be settled in strict settlement
upon A and the issue of his body, in which case a court of
1 In Sackville-West v. Viscount purpose of the instrument has been
Holmesdale, L. R. 4 H. L. 343, 553, held, in such cases, sufficient to in-
Lord Hatherly, L. C, said: "The dicate the intent of the parties to
larger number of cases to which be that the property should be
the principle has been applied con- limited in what is called 'strict
sists of cases on marriage articles, settlement.'" See also Handick
where the articles direct a more v. Wilkes, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 393;
formal conveyance to be made, and Rockf ord v. Fitzmaurice, 2 Dr. &
themselves express the limitations War. 18; s. c.,4Ir. Eq.375; Cusaek
in an informal manner, the more v. Cusaek, 5 Bro. P. C. 116; Home
frequent instances being those of a v. Barton, 19 Ves. 398; Davies v.
limitation to the intended husbund Davies, 4 Beav. 54; Griffith v.
for life, with a subsequent remain- Buckle, 2 Vern.13; Jonesv. Lang-
der to the heirs male of his body, ton, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 392; Stonorv.
or to his issue or the like, which Curwen, 5 Sim. 269; Trevor v.
limitation, if introduced literally Trevor, 1 P. Wms. 622 ; "Construc-
into the formal settlement, would, tion of Marriage Settlements," 19
by the operation of the rule in Sol. J. & Rep. 689.
Shelley's Case, at once vest an es- 2 TJnderhill on Trusts and Trus-
tate of inheritance in the husband, tees, 137; Austen v. Taylor, 1
which he could formerly, by fine Eden, 366; Lord Glenorchy v.Bos-
and recovery, and now by deed, ville, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 1; Stanley
put an end to, thus destroying the v. Lennard, 1 Eden, 95.
very object of the settlement. The
§58.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
01
equity would put a meaning upon the words 'strict settle-
ment,' and direct a conveyance of the property accord-
ingly."1 In the case of Stamford v. Hobart, Lord Cowper
1 Lord Westbury in Sackville-
West v. Viscount Holmesdale,
L. R. 4 H. L. 543; Coope v.
Arnold, 4 De G., M. & G. 585;
Bagshaw v. Spencer, 2 Atk. 582;
Neves v. Scott, 9 How. 197; Gause
v. Hale, 2 Ired. Eq. 241 ; Gray v.
Eump, 20 Hill Eq. 6; Wiley v.
Smith, 3 Kelly, 559; Wood v. Burn-
ham, 6 Paige, 518; s. c, 26 Wend.
19; Cushing v. Blake, 30 N. J. Eq.
689; Padfield v. Padfield, 72
111. 322. "Where, however, prop-
erty has been conveyed upon a
trust, the precise nature of which
is imperfectly declared, or where
the donor reserves the right to de-
fine or appoint the trust estate
more particularly, although it may
be apparent that the creator of the
trust has, in a general way, mani-
fested his purpose ultimately, at a
time and in a manner thereafter to
be determined, either by himself
or by the trustee, to bestow the
property upon a person named, the
trust is incomplete and executory.
Gaylord v. City of Lafayette, 115
Ind. 423. Whether the trust is
perfectly executed or not is a
question of fact in each case, to be
determined by the purposes and
objects which the settlor had in
view, as manifested in the writing,
and from the situation and relation
of the parties, and of the property
which is the subject of the sup-
posed trust. Gaylord v. City of
Lafayette, 115 Ind. 423. Execu-
tory trusts are exempted from the
operation of the rule in Shelley's
Case. The test of an executory
trust is that the trustee has some
duty to perform, for the perform-
ance of which it is necessary that
the title be regarded as abiding in
him. Porter v. Doby (S. Car.), 2
Kich. Eq. 49. A trust is said to be
executory or directory, where the
objects take, not immediately un-
der it, but by means of some
further act to be done by a third
person, usually him in whom the
legal estate is vested, as where a
testator devises real estate to trus-
tees, in trust to convey it to certain
uses, or directs money to be laid
out in lands to be settled to certain
uses, which are expressed in im-
perfect or informal terms. In
these cases the direction to convey
or settle is considered merely in
the nature of instructions or heads
of settlements, which are to be ex-
ecuted, not by a literal adherence
to the terms of the will, which
would render the direction to settle
nugatory, but by formal limita-
tions adapted to give effect to the
purposes which the author of the
trust appears to have had in view.
In short, the intention of the author
of the trust is to be carried into
effect, so far as possible. Jarman
on Wills, vol. 2, ch. 36, *1190.
'•Where the beneficiary is not yet
clothed with such equitable title,
but has a mere right to have some
act done, which will vest in him
such equitable title, then the trust
is called executory." Nicoll v. Og-
den, 29 111. 384; s. c , 81 Am. Deo.
311. Where property is conveyed
in trust for the use of a married
woman, free from the debts of her
husband, for her natural life, the
beneficiary to have the possession
and use of the house and lot, with
the rents and profits of the same,
for the benefit of herself and family,
92
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§58.
explained an executory trust as follows: "In matters ex-
ecutory, or in cases of articles in a will directing a convey-
ance, where the words of the articles or will are improper
or informal, the court will not direct a conveyance accord-
ing to such improper or informal expressions, but will order
the conveyance or settlement to be made in a proper and
legal manner, so as may best answer the intent of the
parties."1 In a definition of a trust, which has been often
quoted, Lord Cairnes said: "An executory trust is not a
trust which remains to be executed, for in this sense all
trusts are executory at their creation, but a trust which is
to be executed by the preparation of a complete and formal
the trustee to have power to sell
and reinvest with the consent of the
beneficiary, remainder to her chil-
dren, an executory trust is created,
and the property is not subject to
levy and sale at law. Johnston v.
Redd, 59 Ga. 621. See also Jen-
nings v. Coleman, 59 Ga. 718. Lord
Chancellor Sugden, in Boswell v.
Dillon, 1 Drury, 291, defines an ex-
ecutory trust as follows: "Every
trust is, it is true, in a certain sense,
executory. Where, however, there
is a trust, the nature and extent of
which is ascertained, we are not in
the habit of calling it an executory
trust. By the term, an executory
trust, when used in its proper
sense, we mean a trust in which
some further act is directed to be
done. Executory trusts, in this
way, may be divided into two
classes : one in which, though
something is required to be done,
for example, a settlement to be ex-
ecuted, yet the testat r has acted
as his own conveyancer, as it is
called, and defined the settlement
to be made, and the court has
nothing to do hut follow out and
execute the intentions of the party,
as appearing on the instrument.
Such trusts, though executory, do
not differ from ordinary limita-
tions, and must be construed ac-
cording to the principles applicable
to legal estates depending upon
the same words. The other species
of executory trust is where the
testator, directing a further act,
has imperfectly stated what is to
be done. In such cases the court
is invested with a larger discretion,
and gives to the words a more lib-
eral interpretation than they would
have borne if they had stood by
themselves . ' ' Where property was
conveyed to trustees for certain
specified objects, as stated in the
trust deed : Held, that where there
was something to be done by the
trustee to accomplish the objects
of the trust, the same was not exe-
cuted but executory, Schley v.
Lyon, 6 Ga. 530 ; McElroy v. Mc-
Elroy, 113 Mass. 509; Wood v.
Burnham, 6 Paige, 513; S. C, 26
Wend. 9; Tatham v. Vernon, 29
Beav. 604 ; Gause v. Hale, 2 Ired.
Eq. 241; Davies v. Davies, 4 Beav.
54; Griffith v. Buckle, 2 Vern. 13;
Egerton v. Earl Brownlow, 4 H. L.
Cases, 1, 210; ''Executory Trusts,"
15 Sol. J. & Rep. 54, 76.
1 Sackville-Westv v. Viscount
Holmesdale, L. R. 4 H. L. 553.
§ 59.] EXPRESS TRUSTS. 93
settlement, carrying into effect, through the operation of
an apt and detailed legal phraseology, the general intention
compendiously indicated by the settlor."1 An instrument
creating an executory trust may express the intention of
the settlor with a greater or less degree of clearness, and
his instructions to his trustee may be more or less explicit
and intelligible. But if they are clearly deducible from the
writing, whatever may be its form, it will be upheld by the
court.2
§ 59. Executory Trusts Distinguished from Exe-
cuted. Trusts. — In placing a construction upon an instru-
ment creating an executory trust, a court of equity will
have primary regard to the wishes of the author. The
first inquiry will be, What disposition of his property did
he intend to make in this writing? And the answer to
this question will be sought, not in giving a rigid construc-
tion to particular words or expressions, but in the general
tenor or drift of the document. His language will be con-
strued, not in its legal or technical, but in its vernacular
sense, and if his purpose is within the limits of legality
the court will order the execution of the trust.3 But in an
executed trust the limitations of the equitable interest are
complete and final, and if technical words or terms are em-
ployed in the instrument by which the trust is created, they
will be construed by the court in their technical and legal
1 Ut supra. 570; Hill on Trustees, *328; Un-
2 Lord Colonsay, in Sackville- derhill on Trusts and Trustees,
West v. Viscount Holmesdale, L. 143; Dennison v. Goehring, 7
R. 4 H. L. 570; Humbertson v. Barr, 177; 4 Kent's Cotnmen-
Humbertson, 1 P. Wins. 332; Miles taries, 218; Wood v. Burnham,
v. Harford, L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 691
Adamson v. Lamb, 3 Blackf. 446
Harrnon v. James, 7 Ind. 263
Hackney v. Vrooman, 62 Barb. 650
6 Paige, 518'; s. C, 26 Wend. 19;
Home v. Lyeth, 4 H. & J. 434;
Porter v. Doby, 2 Rich. Eq. 49;
Wiley v. Smith, 3 Kelly, 559; Lor-
Taylor v. Henry, 48 Md. 550; Til- ing v. Hunter, 8 Yerger, 31 ; Lessee
linghast v. Coggeshall, 7 R. I. 383; of Findlay v. Riddle, 3 Binn. 152;
2 Story's Equity Jurisprudence, Berry v. Williamson, 11 B. Mon.
793, 983; 2 Pomeroy's Equity Ju- 251; Neves v. Scott, 9 How. (U. S.)
risprudence, § 1001. 211 ; Imlay v. Huntington, 20 Conn.
3 Sackville- West v. Viscount 162; Papillon v. Voice, 2 P. Wms.
Holmesdale, L. R. 4 H. L. 565, 471.
94
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§59.
sense.1 "The distinction between executed and executory
trusts depends upon the manner in which the trust is de-
clared. Where the limitations and trusts are fully and per-
fectly declared, the trust is regarded as an executed trust.
It is only where the limitations are imperfectly declared,
1 Beach's Modern Equity Juris-
prudence, §§ 156, 157, 158. It is
now clearly established, as laid
down by Lord Talbot, in Lord
Glenorchy v. Bosville, that a court
of equity, in cases of executed
trusts, will construe the limitation
in the same manner as similar legal
limitations. If, for instance, an
estate is vested in trustees and their
heirs in trust for A for life, without
impeachment of waste, with re-
mainder to trustees to preserve
contingent remainders, with re-
mainder in trust for the heirs of
A's body, the trust being an exe-
cuted trust, A, according to the
rule in Shelley's Case, which is a
rule of law, will be held to take an
estate tail. See Wright v. Pearson,
1 Eden, 119; Austen v. Taylor, 1
Eden, 361 ; Jones v. Morgan, 1
Bro. Ch. 206; Jervoise v. Duke of
Northumberland, 1 J. & W. 559.
In cases, however, of executory
trusts, where, according to Lord
Talbot's observation in Lord
Glenorchy v. Bosville, something is
left to be done, viz.; the trusts are.
left to be executed in a more careful
and a more accurate manner, a court
of equity is not, as in cases of exe-
cuted trusts, bound to construe
technical expressions with legal
strictness, but will mold the trusts
according to the intent of those
who created them. 1 Lead. Cas. in
Bq. *19. The distinction illustrated
in the principal case, between ex-
ecuted and executory trusts, is well
settled in this country, in its con-
nection with the rule in Shelley's
Case. The American courts, how-
ever, have never undertaken to de-
cree a strict settlement, upon a
mere general intention, in marriage
articles, or executory trusts, to
make provision for children. But
the distinction between executed
and executory trusts, here, has
gone to the extent of arresting the
application of the rule in Shelley's
Case, in regard to executory trusts,
and causing the person answering
the description of issue, heirs of
the body, or heirs, to take as pur-
chasers, according to the language
of the instrument as it stands. For
this purpose a trust will, in the
American courts, be considered as
executory, whenever a conveyance
is to be made by the trustees, or,
in case of personal property, when-
ever a delivery is to be made by
the trustees at successive periods
of time to the persons respectively
entitled under the will or article;
and the rule in regard to such ex-
ecutory trusts is, that wherever the
intention appears to be that the
first taken should have only an
estate for life, the remaindermen
will take as purchasers, unless
there is something else in the in-
strument to control that construc-
tion. 1 Lead. Cas. in Eq. 36.
Caton, C. J., in Nicoll v. Ogden,
29 111. 384, said : ;'There is a well
settled distinction between what
are called executed and executory
trusts, founded no doubt, to some
extent, upon artificial reasons, and
as is usual where such is the case,
not always of the most easy appli-
§59.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
95
and the intent of the creator is expressed in general terms,
leaving the manner in which his intent is to be carried into
effect, substantially in the discretion of the trustee, that a
court of equity regards the trust as an executory trust, and
will direct the trust to be executed upon a construction dif-
ferent from that which the instrument would receive in a
cation. Its purpose and advantage
is perhaps more generally to enable
the courts to avoid the rule in
Shelley's Case, for the purpose of
giving effect to a devisor, grantor
or donor. In one sense all trusts
are executory, or to be executed;
that is, something has to be done
to perform the trust that the cestui
que trust may enjoy the benefits of
the trust to which he is entitled.
As where one holds a legal title in
trust for the benefit of another in
whom is already vested the equi-
table title, with the right to be
clothed with the legal title. But
where the beneficiary is not yet
clothed with such equitable title,
but has a mere right to have some
act done, which will vest in him
such equitable title, then the trust
is called executory." A trust may
be said to be executed when it has
been perfectly and explicitly de-
clared in a writing duly signed, in
which the terms and conditions
upon which the legal title to the
trust estate has been conveyed, or
is held, and the final intention of
the creator of the trust in respect
thereto, appear with such cer-
tainty that nothing remains to be
done, except that the trustee, with-
out any further act or appointment
from the settlor, carry into effect
the intention of the donor as de-
clared. Gaylord v. City of Lafa-
yette, 115 Ind. 423. In determin-
ing whether a trust is an executed
or only an executory one, the in-
tention of the parties at the time
of creating it is an important and
controlling element and equity,
discarding unmeaning and useless
forms, will look to the substance of
the act done and the intention with
which it was done and carry out
that intention. Padfield v. Padfield,
72 111. 322. The rule in Shelley's
Case applies only where the estate
to the, ancestor and to the heirs is of
the same kind; it applies to legal
estates and to trusts executed, but
not to trusts executory where it is
the intention of the testator that it
shall not apply; it applies to per-
sonal as well as real property.
Where the testator leaves some-
thing to be done by the trustee as
to convey, it is an executory trust.
Edmondson v. Dyson (Ga.), 2
Kelly, 307. "These inquiries (what
is an executory in contradistinc-
tion to an executed trust?) are
among, if not the most obtruse,
complicated and least understood,
of all that belong to a science
abounding in subtle distinctions."
Nisbet, J., in Edmondson v. Dyson,
2 Kelly, 307. The right to dispose
of or change the terms of an ex-
ecuted trust by will, does not exist.
Padfield v. Padfield, 72 111. 322. A
devises lands to trustees to pay
debts and legacies, and then to
settle the remainder on her son B
and the heirs of his body with re-
mainders over, and directs that
special care should be taken in the
settlement, that it should never be
in the power of her son to dock the
in tail. Decreed the son should be
96 EXPRESS TRUSTS. [§59.
court of law."1 In the leading case of Glenorchy v. Bos-
ville, the settlor devised real estate to trustees in trust for
his granddaughter, to be conveyed to her in case of her
marriage in compliance with certain conditions imposed in
the will. In this event the estate was to pass to her use
for life, with remainder to the use of her husband for life,
with remainder to the issue of her body, with remainders
over. It was held that though the granddaughter would
have taken an estate tail had it been an immediate devise,
and as such an executed trust, yet that the trust in this
case being executory, was to be executed in a more careful
and more accurate manner, and that a conveyance to the
granddaughter for life, remainder to her husband for life,
with remainder to the first and every other son, with re-
mainder to the daughter's, would best serve the testator's
intent.2 Touching this distinction the words of Lord St.
Leonard's have been frequently and very fittingly quoted:
"A court of equity considers an executory trust, as distin-
guished from a trust executing itself, and distinguishes the
two in this manner : Has the testator been what is called,
and very properly called, his own conveyancer? Has he
left it to the court to make out, from general expressions,
what his intention is, or has he so defined that inten-
only tenant for life without im- Brown, 12 Pick. 216; Posey v.
peachment of waste, and should Cook, 1 Hill, 413; Crawford's Ap-
not have an estate tail conveyed to peal, 61 Pa. St. 52; Stone v.
him. Leonard v. Corns. Sussex, 2 Hackett, 12 Gray, 227 ; Baker v.
Vera. 525. Devise to trustees of Biddle, 1 Bald. 394; Laurens v.
money to be laid out in land, and Jenney, 1 Spears (S. Car.), 356;
to be settled as counsel should ad- Sunnyside Coal & Coke Co. v.
vise, In trust for A and his issue in Keitz (Ind. App.) (1895), 35 y. E.
tail male, to take in succession and Kep. 541 ; Lynn v. Lynn (1895), 135
priority, and the interest of the 111. IS; s. c, 25 N. E. Eep. 634;
money till laid out to be paid to A, Kay v. Scates, 37 Pa. St. 31; S. C,
his sons and issue; held that A 78 Am. Dec. 399; City of Phila-
should only have an estate for life delphia v. Girard's Heirs, 45 Pa.
in the lands to be purchased, with St. 9; s. c. 84 Am. Dec. 470; Til-
remainder to his first and other linghast v. Coggeshall, 7 R. I. 383.
sons, etc. "White v. Carter, 2 ! Cushing v. Blake, 30 X J. Eq.
Eden, 366; Boswell v. Dillon, 689.
Sugd. Dec, 1 Drury, 291; Upham 2 Glenorchy v. Bosville, 1 Lead,
v. Varney, 15 N. H. 462; Merrill v. Cas. in Eq. 1.
§ 60. J EXPRESS TRUSTS. 97
tion that you have nothing to do but to take the limitations
he has given to you and to convert them into legal
estates?"1
§ 60. Executory Trusts in Marriage Contracts. — In
their effect marriage settlements are limited to rights of
property. The terms of the conjugal relation having been
determined by law, the personal rights and obligations of
husband and wife cannot be changed or regulated by con-
tract. But any agreement between persons legally compe-
tent to make a contract, settling their rights of property as
a condition of marriage, will be binding. And if that is the
intention of the parties, such contracts may be so drawn as
to include and dispose of property acquired after marriage,
as well as of that which was in possession at the time of
the contract.2 In those States in which marriage settle-
ments are regulated by statute, contracts should be drawn
with reference to their provisions. But if a contract is
valid in the State in which it is made, and the parties re-
move to another State, the validity of the contract will not
be impaired by the statutes of that State, even though it is
not in accordance with their provisions.3 A State may,
however, require that a marriage contract shall be recorded
in order to be binding, even though made in another State.4
In order that a marriage settlement relating to real estate
may be binding, it must be valid under the law of the State
1 Egerton v. Earl Brownlow, 4 present and future, that, as a mat-
H. L. Cases, *210. te'r of contract, will be held equally
2 Neves v. Scott, 9 How. 196; valid everywhere, unless, under
Carr v. Taylor, 10 Ves. 574; Mit- the circumstances, it stands pro-
ford v. Mitford, 9 Ves. 87 ; Scawen hibited by the laws of the country
v. Blunt, 7 Ves. 294 ; Druce v. where it is sought to be enforced.
Denison, 6 Ves. 403. It will act directly on movable
3 Scheferling v. Huffman, 4 Ohio property everywhere. But as to
St. 241 ; Fuss v. Fuss, 24 Wis. 256; immovable property in a foreign
Justice Story in his Conflict of territory, it will, at most, confer
Laws, § 184, speaking of con- only a right of action, to be en-
tracts between husband and wife, forced according to the jurispru-
says: "Where there is a marriage dence rei sitae."
between parties in a foreign coun- 4 Strode v. Churchill (Ky.), 2
try, and an express contract re- Litt. 75.
specting their rights and property,
7
98
EXPEESS TRUSTS.
[§ «0.
in which the land is situated.1 A marriage settlement de-
signed and framed with a view to defrauding creditors, will
be void as against them,2 but binding upon the parties.3
1 McDaniel v. Grace, 15 Ark.
465.
2 Bulmer v. Hunter, 38 L. J. Ch.
543; Goldsmith v. Russell, 5 De
G. M. & G. 555.
3 Barkworth v. Young, 4 Drew.
1 ; Hammersley v. De Biel, 12 CI. &
Fin. 45; Montacute v. Maxwell, 1
P. Wins. 618; Sagitary v. Hyde, 2
Vern. 44; Cathcart v. Robinson,
5 Pet. 277. To render an ante-
nuptial settlement void as to cred-
itors, both parties must concur in
the fraud. Magniac v. Thompson,
7 Pet. 348. In Verplank v.
Sterry, 12 Johns. 536, Justice Spen-
cer said : 'Tf the person making
the settlement is insolvent, or in
doubtful circumstances, the settle-
ment comes within the statute of
13th of Elizabeth, ch. 5. But if
the grantor be not indebted to such
a degree, as that the settlement
will deprive the creditors of an
ample fund for the payment of
their debts, the consideration of
natural love and affection will sup-
port the deed, although a voluntary
one, against his creditors; for, in
the language of the decisions, it is
free from the imputation of fraud."
To the same effect are Salmon v.
Bennett, 1 Conn. 525; Townsendv.
Wescott, 2 Beav. 340, 345. See also
ISTewland on Contracts, ch. 23, pp.
384, 385; 1 Fonblanque's Equity,
B. I., ch. 4, § 12, note (a);
1 Story's Equity Jurisprudence, §
363, note 1. A deed to wife or
child, in consideration of love and
affection, is not always void as to
creditors. The grantor being in
good circumstances and the gift
reasonable, the fact of a small in-
debtedness will not render settle-
ment fraudulent. Hinde's Lessee v.
Longworth, 11 Wheat. 199. Sub-
sequent creditors cannot impeach
a deed made in favor of wife and
children, the maker at the time
not being in debt, on the sole
ground of its being voluntary. It
must be shown to have been fraudu-
lent or made with a view to subse-
quent debts. Reade v. Livingston,
3 Johns. Ch. 501; Bennett v.Bed-
ford Bank, 11 Mass. 421 ; Richard-
son v. Smallwood, Jac. 552. The
want of valuable consideration for
a deed may be a badge of fraud, it
is not conclusive evidence and may
be met and rebutted, as that gran-
tor was in prospeious circum-
stances, indebted in only a small
amount, and that the gift was a
reasonable one according to his
station in life, and left enough for
the payment of his debts. Ver-
plank v. Sterry, 12 Johns. 536;
Partridge v. Gopp, 1 Eden, 167;
Gilmore v. N. A. L. Co., Peter's
C. C. 461; Cadogan v. Kennett,
Cowp. 432; Doe v. Routledge,
Cowp. 705; Lush v. Wilkinson, 5
Ves. 387 ; Holloway v. Willard, 1
Madd. 414. In Reade v. Living-
stone, 3 Johns. Ch. 505, the court
uses this language : "The inclina-
tion of my mind is strongly in
favor of the policy and wisdom of
the rule, which absolutely disables
a man from preferring by any ar-
rangement whatever, and with
whatever intention by gifts of his
property, his children to his cred-
itors." A postnuptial settlement
not disproportionate to the hus-
band's means, taking his debts and
his situation into consideration, is
valid. Picquet v. Swan, 4 Mass.
$60.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
99
But it is well settled that marriage is a good and sufficient
consideration, and the courts will encourage it and treat it
as meritorious in its character.1 An antenuptial settle-
ment, then, in the absence of fraud, is valid, not only be-
tween the parties, but as well against creditors.3 If the
provisions of the settlement are not disproportionate to the
circumstances of the parties the contract will be binding,
even though it should appear that the indebtedness* of the
husband was known to each of the parties at the time that
it was made.3 The validity of a settlement made after
marriage, even though it is made in fulfillment of an agree-
ment entered into by the parties before marriage, will be
determined by the rule in regard to voluntary conveyances
in the case of a person in debt, but if the antenuptial con-
tract was in writing, and without a fraudulent purpose, it
443 ; Hopkirk v. Randolph, 2 Brock.
Marsh. 132. A marriage settle-
ment while husband is heavily in-
debted is invalid. Kehr v. Smith,
20 Wall. 31. Mere indebtedness of
the husband at the time will not
alone make the settlement void; it
must be shown that he was insolv-
ent, or that the settlement had a
tendency to impair the rights of
creditors. Lloyd v. Fulton, 1 Otto,
479; Humes v. Scruggs, 4 Otto, 28;
Jones v. Clifton, 17 Am. L. Reg.
713. See also Holloway v. Willard,
1 Madd. 414; Jones v. Boulter,
1 Cox, 288, 294, 295 ; Townshend v.
Windham, 2 Ves. 10; Plank v.
Schermerhorn, 3 Barb. Ch. 644;
Wickes v. Clark, 8 Paige, 165;
Seward v. Jackson, 8 Cow. 406;
Van Wych v. Seward, 18 Wend.
376; Jackson v. Post, 15 Wend.
588; Frazier v. Western, 1 Barb.
Ch. 220; 1 Story Equity Ju-
risprudence, § 365; Willard's
Equity Jurisprudence, 230 to 237.
In Battersea v. Farrington, 1 S wan-
ton.! 06, it was considered as a point
fully established that a voluntary
settlement, without fraud by a hus-
band not indebted, in favor of his
wife and children, was good against
subsequent creditors. In this case
no creditor attempted to impeach
the settlement, though the suit had
been pending five years; nor was
there any suggestion that the hus-
band was indebted at the time of
the settlement. It was further
held, that a recital in a postnup-
tial settlement of antenuptial arti-
cles, was conclusive against all per-
sons claiming under the settlement,
but not evidence against creditors,
without other distinct proof; be-
cause such a doctrine would give
to every trader a power of excluding
his creditors, by a recital in a deed
to which they are not parties.
1 Ex parte Marsh, 1 Atk. 159 ;
Greene v. Cramer, 2 Con. & Law
Ch. 54.
2 Simmons v. Edwards, 16 M. &
W. 838; Sexton v. Wheaton, 8
Wheat. 229.
3 Ex parte McBurnie, 1 De G. M.
& G. 446; Armfield v. Armfield
(Miss.), 1 Freem. Ch. 311.
100
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§61.
will be good against creditors.1 The right of dower may
be barred by an antenuptial contract. If a woman who is
competent to make a contract agrees before marriage to
accept any provision in lieu of her dower, the contract will
amount in equity to a valid jointure, and will bar her right
to dower.2
§ 61. The Subject Continued — A secret conve}7ance
of her property by a woman during her engagement may
be set aside by her husband after marriage as a violation of
his marital rights.3 But in order to secure a decree in his
favor the husband must show not only that the conveyance
1 Reade v. Livingstone, 3 Johns.
Ch. 481; Borst v. Corey, 16 Barb.
136 ; Finch v. Finch, 10 Ohio St. 501.
2 Walker v. Walker, 1 Ves. Sr.
53; Davilla v. Davilla, 2 Vern. 724;
Dyke v. Randall, 2 De G., M. & G.
409; Stilley v.Folger, 14 Ohio, 610;
Findley v. Findley, 11 Gratt. 434;
Charles v. Charles, 8 Gratt. 486 ;
Selleck v. Seljeck, 8 Conn. 85,
note; Andrews v. Andrews, 8 Conn.
79; Murphy v. Murphy, 12 Ohio
St. 407;Heald's Petition, 2 Foster
(N. H.), 265; Cauley v. Lawson, 5
Jones' Eq. 132; Gelzer v. Gelzer, 1
Bailey Eq. 387. A liberal con-
struction will be indulged in sup-
port of antenuptial settlements
made as a substitute for dower. If
the provision is ample, tbey will
be upheld, without any nice dis-
crimination between legal and
equitable jointures. Logan v.
Phillips, 18 Mo. 22. In Naill v.
Maurer, 25 Md. 539, Mr. Justice
Cochran, discussing this, question
said : "Her power to bind herself
by such a contract, in equity, must
be admitted, and we do not doubt
that this contract constitutes an
equitable bar to the claim sought
to be enforced by this bill. The
authorities on this point are full
and conclusive. In Dykes v. Ran-
dall, 13 L. & E. Rep. 404, the Lord
Chancellor, in distinguishing an
equitable from a legal bar of dower,
says, that as to an adult it may de-
pend upon contract, and "that
there is no doubt you may bar any
possibility; you may deal with
your rights in this court, of what-
ever nature they may be, by con-
tract fairly entered into." In the
case of Cauley v. Lawson, 5 Jones
Eq. Rep. 132, an agreement be-
tween parties contemplating mar-
riage, "that neither, after the death
of one, should claim anything, be-
longing to the other before mar-
riage," was held sufficient in
equity to bar the right of dower;
and so, also, in Findley v. Findley,
11 Gratt. 434, it was said that par-
ties, when about to contract the
relation of husband and wife, "may
by agreement vary or wholly waive
the right of property which would
otherwise result from the mar-
riage." See also Ellmaker v. Ell-
maker, 4 Watts, 89; Vance v.
Vance, 21 Me. 364; Gibson v. Gib-
son, 15 Mass. 106, where an oppo-
site position is taken.
3 Downes v. Jennings, 32 Beav.
290.
§61.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
'101
was made during their engagement, but also that at the
time of the marriage he had no knowledge of the transac-
tion.1 In England it has been held that a wife has no simi-
lar right as against her husband, but in this country it has,
uniformly, been held that the right of the wife in this re-
gard is identical with that of the husband.2 Where an
effort is made by a husband to enforce an agreement made
by a third person, as the father of the wife, it must be
shown that this was one of the elements of the marriage
engagement. It need not be shown that this was the only,
nor that it was the chief consideration that led to the en-
gagement, but simply that it was a part of the marriage
covenant.3 In determining the sense of marriage articles
it is always to be assumed that the object of the agreement
is to make provision for the issue of the marriage. The
courts will not give such a construction to the language of
the instrument as to enable the husband to defeat the ob-
ject of the settlement.4 "A covenant to settle estates to
1 Strathmore v. Bowes, 1 Ves. Jr.
22. "The chancellor will not draw
nice distinctions in regard to the
time at which the information of
the conveyance is communicated to
the intended husband — it is suffi-
cient if it be before the marriage
ceremony takes place." Cheshirev.
Payne, 16 B. Mon. 618; Goddard
v. Snow, 1 Russ. 485.
2McKeogh v. McKeogh, 4 Irish
Eep. Eq. 338; Gainor v. Gainor,
26 Iowa, 337; Smith v. Smith (N.
J.), Halst. 515.
3 Wanchford v. Fotherly, Freem.
Ch. 201; Heves v. Scott, 9 How.
196; s. c, 13 How. 268.
4 Allen v. Kumph, 2 Hill Eq. 1;
Gause v. Hale, 2 Ired. Eq. 241;
Dodv. Dod, 1 Amb. 274; Phillips
v. James, 2 Drew & S. 404; Nau-
dick v. Wilkes, 1 Eq. Ch. Abr. 393;
s. c, Gilb. Eq. Kep. 114; Blackburn
v. Stables, 2 V. & B. 369; Jones v.
Langton, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 392;
Cusack v. Cusack, 5 Bro. P. C.
(Toml. Ed.) 116; Griffith v. Buckle,
2 Vern. 13; Stonor v. Curwen, 5
Sim. 268, 269; Davies v. Davies, 4
Beav. 54; Lambert v. Peyton, 8
H. L. Cases, 1 ; Grier v. Grier, L.
R. 5 H. L. 688 ; Streatfleld v. S treat -
field, Cas. temp. Talb. 176; Trevor
v. Trevor, 1 P. Wms. 622; Lafette
v. Lawson, 25 Ga. 305; Ardis v.
Printup, 39 Ga. 648; Phelps v.
Phelps, 72 111. 545; s. C, 22 Am.
Kep. 149; Brown v. Brown, 31
Gratt. 502; Loring v. Eliot, 16
Gray, 568; Farr v. Gilreath, 23 S.
Car. 502. Where these technical
terms are used in an agreement for
a settlement in view of marriage,
the court will infer from the nature
of the agreement that the parties
contemplated provision for the issue
of the marriage, which should not
be liable to immediate destruction
by the act of the parties, and will
direct the settlement to be made in
102 EXPRESS TRUSTS. [§ 61.
the use of the husband for life, with remainder to wife for
life, with remainder to their heirs male, and the heirs of
such heirs male, is always to be construed to mean that the
settlement shall be so drawn as to give life estates only to
the husband and wife successively."1 A, in consideration
of an intended marriage, covenanted with trustees to settle
an estate to the use of himself for life, without impeach-
ment of waste, remainder to his intended wife for life, re-
mainder to the use of the heirs male of him on her body to
be begotten, and the heirs males of such heirs males issu-
ing, remainder to the right heirs of the said A forever.
Lord Macclesfield said that upon articles the case was
stronger than on a will ; that articles were the only minutes
or heads of the agreement of the parties, and ought to be
so modeled, when they came to be carried into execution,
as to make them effectual ; that the intention was to give
A only an estate for life ; that if it had been otherwise the
settlement would have been vain and ineffectual, and it
would have been in A's power, as soon as the articles were
made, to have destroyed them, and his Lordship, therefore,
held that A was entitled to an estate for life only, and that
such a manner as will prevent the effectual provision. Garner v. Gar-
destruction of the limitation over ner, 1 Desaus. *443.
to the issue. But this doctrine of 1 Nandick v. Wilkes, Gilb. Eq.
the court is applicable only so long Rep. 114 ; Burton v. Hastings, Gilb.
as the agreement for settlement re- Eq. Rep. 113; Hart v. Jliddlehurst,
mains a matter of contract. Cush- 3 Atk. 371 ; Maguire v. Scully, 2
ing v. Blake, 30 X. J. Eq. 6S9. If, Hy. 113 ; Burnaby v. Griffin, 3 Yes.
then, the prima facie presumption 206; Home v. Barton, 19 Ves. 3 US;
in marriage settlements is, that Phillips v. James, 2 De G. & Sin.
they are made for the benefit of the 404; Rockford v. Fitzmaurice, 2
issue of the marriage, it should re- Dr. & W. IS; Warrick v. Warrick,
quire clear language in the deed to 3 Atk. 291; West v. Erissey, 2
overcome the presumption. Wal- P. Wms. 349; Jones v. Langton,
lace v. Wallace, 82 111. 535. Were 1 Eq. Cas. Ab. 392; Trevor v.
they [marriage settlements] to put Trevor, 1 P. Wms. 622; Streatfield
the children completely in the v. Streatfield, Cas. temp. Tald.
power of the parents, there would 176; Cusack v. Cusack, 5 Bro.
be no object at all in the marriage P. C. (Tom. Ed.) 116; Griffith
settlements. Marriage is the high- v. Buckle, 2 Yern. 13; S toner v.
est consideration; provision for the Curwen, 5 Sim. 268; Davies v.
issue is the immediate object of the Davies, 4 Beav. 54; Lambert v.
settlements, and is intended as an Peyton, 8 H. L. Cas. 1.
§ 62. j EXPRESS TRUSTS. 103
his eldest son took by purchase as tenant in tail. The de-
cision was affirmed on appeal in the House of Lords.1 A
voluntary convej^ance by a person not indebted at the time,
in favor of wife and children, cannot be impeached by sub-
sequent creditors upon the mere ground of being voluntary.
It must be shown to have been fraudulent, or made with a
view to future debts.2 To avoid a postnuptial settlement
insolvency need not be proved. It is enough if property
sufficient to impair the means of the grantor, so as to hin-
der his creditors, is conveyed.3
§ 62. The Same Subject. — There are circumstances
under which the court will go beyond the mere act of con-
struing marriage articles in accordance with the intent of
the parties. Where it is plain that a marriage settlement,
completed after the marriage, is not in accordance with the
intention of the parties, a court of equity will rectify the
evil. It will correct and reform the instrument in such a
manner as to render it a true expression of their purpose in
the agreement.4 But if the settlement is completed before
1 Trevor v. Trevor, 1 Eq. Cas. Wilson v. Buchanan, 7 Gratt. 340;
Abr. 387; S. C, 1 P. Wins. 622; 5 Kehr v. Smith, 20 Wall. 31. See
Bro. P. C. (Tom. Ed.) 122; Lord Sexton v. Wheaton, 1 Am. Lead.
Glenorchy v. Bosville, 1 White & Cases, for a very full presentation
Tudor Lead. Cas. Eq, *21. of the authorities on this question.
2Reade v. Livingston, 3 Johns. 4 Neves v. Scott, 9 How. 197;
Ch. 501; Richardson v. Small wood, Cause v. Hale, 2 Ired. Eq. 241;
Jac. 552; Bennett v. BedfordBank, Smith v. Maxwell (S. Car.), 1 Hill
11 Mass. 421; Williams v. Avery, Eq. 101; Allen v. Rumph, 2 Hill
38 Ala. 115; Betts v. Union Bank Eq. 1; Hamil v. White, 3 J. & L.
of Maryland, 1 Harris & Gill, 175, 695; Wilson v. Wilson, 15 Sim.
203; Gassett v. Grouts, 4 Mete. 486; 487; Walsh v. Trevanion, 16 Sim.
Tunno v. Trezevant, 2 Desaus. 178; Murray v. Parker, 19 Beav.
264. 305; In re Morse's Settlement, 21
3 Parish v. Murphree, 13 How. 92 ; Beav. 174 ; Torre v. Torre, 1 Sm. &
Sexton v. Wheaton, 8 Wheat. — ; G. 518; Walker v. Armstrong, 21
Hapgood v. Fisher, 34 Me. 407; s. Beav. 174; Wolterbeek v. Barrow,
C, 56 Am. Dec. 663; Clarke v. Mc- 23 Beav. 423; King v. King-Har-
Geiham, 25 N. J. Eq. 423; Leavitt m0n, 6 Irish R. Eq. 446. In this
v. Leavitt, 47 N. H. 329; Wool- last case a settlement was reformed
ston's Appeal, 51 Pa. St. 456; Rey- by making the trusts of a term pro-
nolds v. Stansford, 16 Tex. 291; vide a portion for a daughter, the
Bank v. Batton (Va.), 1 Rob. 527; only issue of the marriage, of the
104
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§62.
marriage, and is not in accord with the original articles, the
court will assume that it is a new agreement, taking the
place of the articles, and that the intention of the parties
is expressed by the instrument.1 But if it is plain that the
settlement was intended to be in accordance with the arti-
cles, and as a matter of fact is not, the court will reform
the instrument.2 But while this will be done between par-
ties to the articles and mere volunteers, it will not be done
against a purchaser.3 It is well settled in this country that
amount stated in the articles for
one younger child. Vice-Chancel-
lor Malins in Welman v. Welman,
L. B. 15 Ch. Div. 579, says: "It is
the rule of this court that where a
marriage settlement or any other
contract is in au improper form,
and not in accordance with the in-
tention of the parties, then the in-
tion of the parties shall be carried
out by putting the instrument into
that form which will effectuate
the intention." The settlement,
whether made in pursuance of
articles or not, may be rectified by
the uncontradicted testimony of
the plaintiff alone. Smith v. Iliffe,
L. E. 20 Eq. 666; Cook v. Fearn,
27 W. E. 211; Edwards v. Bing-
ham, 28 W. E.89; White v. White,
L. E. 15 Eq. 247; Hanley v. Pear-
son, L. E. 13 Ch. Div. 549 ; Welman
v. Welman, L. E. 15 Ch. Div. 570;
Lovesy v. Smith, L. E. 15 Ch. Div.
655. In order to get the legal estate,
in some cases of rectification, a re-
conveyance is directed by decree,
as in Malmesbury v. Malmesbury,
31 Beav. 407, but a settlement will
sometimes be rectified by a decree
merely, without the parties being
put to the expense of a fresh deed.
Tebbitt v. Tebbitt, 1 De G. & Sm.
506; Stock v. Vining, 25 Beav.
235; White v. White, L. E. 15 Eq.
247; Hanley v. Pearson, L. E. 13
Ch. Div. 545. The court will now
rectify a settlement upon a peti-
tion. In re Morse's Settlement, 21
Beav. 174; In re Hoare's Trusts, 4
Giff. 254; Lewis v. Hillman, 3 Ho.
Lo. 607; In re Bird's Trusts, L. E.
3 Ch. D. 214; In re De la Touche's
Settlement, L. E. 10 Eq. 599.
1 Legg v. Goldwire, Cas. temp.
Talbott, 20; West v. Ehrissey, 2 P.
Wins. 349; Eoberts v. Kingsley, 1
Ves. 23S; Symonds v. Wilkes, 11
Jur. (S. S.) 659; Luders v. Anstey,
4 Ves. 501.
* 2 Honor v. Honor, 1 P. Wms. 1 23
West v. Erissey, 2 P. Wms. 349
Eoberts v. Kingsley, 1 Ves. 238
Powell v. Price, 2 P. Wms. 535
Gaillard v. Paidon, 1 McMull. Eq,
358; Neves v. Scott, 9 How. 197
Gause v. Hale, 2 Ired. Eq. 241
Smith v. Maxwell, 1 Hill Eq. 101
Allen v. Eumph, 2 Hill Eq. 1
Briscoe v. Briscoe, 7 Ir. Eq. 129
Bold v. Hutchinson, 5 De G., M. &
G. 568.
3 West v. Erissey, 2 P. Wms.
349; Warrick v. Warrick, 3 Atk.
291; Powell v. Price, 2 P. Wms.
535. A settlement, however, will be
decreed against purchasers with
notice of the articles. In the case
of Davies v. Davies, it was con-
tended for the mortgagee upon the
authority of Lord Northington in
Cordwill v. Mackrill, 2 Eden, 344,
that he was not bound to take
notice of an equity arising out of a
§ 63. J EXPRESS TRUSTS. 105
no distinction is to be made in regard to descent of prop-
erty between sons and daughters, and this doctrine has
been maintained in England to this extent, that under the
general term "heirs" or "issue," daughters are included
and take as purchasers, and that the word "children" in-
cludes grandchildren.1 But where other provision has been
made for children, and it is plain that it is not intended
that they shall take as purchasers of the estate under the
settlement, then the rule in Shelley's Case will be enforced
and the parent or parents may dispose of the whole estate.2
§ 03. Executory Trusts in "Wills. — In general, ques-
tions relating to wills and to the settlement of estates of de-
cedents belong to the probate courts, or to other courts
invested with power to act as such, but the proper adminis-
tration of the trust of an executor, or of a trustee of a de-
cedent's estate, will be enforced by a court of equity. A
court of equit}r will construe a will, and if a trust has been
created, it will direct and enforce the execution of the
trust.3 In the construction of executory trusts created by
mere construction of words which v. Price, 2 P. ffms. 535; Carroll v.
were uncertain, and that the mort- Eenick, 7 Sm. & 51. 799; Tilling-
gagee might well suppose that the hast v. Coggeshall, 7 B. I. 383.
mortgagor was entitled to charge 3 Wager v. Wager, 88 N. Y. 153;
the estate. However, Lord Lang- Bowers v. Smith, 10 Paige, 200;
dale, M. B., held, that the posses- Downey v. Bissell, 4 Fed. Eep. 55;
sion of the articles gave to the Van Home v. Campbell, 104 X. Y.
mortgagee a sufficient notice of the 287 ; s. c, 3 N. E. Eep. 316 ; Giles v.
title of the plaintiff. Davies v. Little, 104 U. S. 291. A trust for
Davies, 4 Beav. 54. See also Bunn the receipt of the rents and profits
v. Winthrop, 1 Johns. Ch. 336; of land for the payment of annui-
Bleekerv. Bingham, 3 Paige, 246. ties is valid under the statute of
1 Scott v. Moore (N. C), 1 Wins, uses and trusts. Cochrane v. Schell,
Eq. 98; Hart v. Middlehurst, 3 Atk. 140 N. Y. 516; s. c, 35 N. E. Eep.
371 ; Burton v. Hastings, 2 P. Wms. 971. Land was conveyed to a mar-
535; s, C, Gilb. Eq. 113; Maguire ried woman and her heirs in trust
v. Scully, 2 Hog. 113; s. c.,1 Beat, for the use of herself and her hus-
370; West v. Erissey, 2 P. Wms. band during their lives, and, upon
349; Trevor v. Trevor, 1 P. Wms. the death of both, "to convey said
622; Marryat v. Townley, 1 Ves. property in fee-simple, by good
105; Phillips v. Jones, 3 De G., J. and sufficient deed," to her chil-
<fc S. 72. dren. Held, the trust being im-
2 Fearne's Con. Eem. 103; Powell posed on both the woman and her
106
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§63.
devise there is no inherent presumption in favor of one
class of heirs as against another. The claim of each and
all is, simply, that of volunteers under the bounty of the
testator, and the court will be guided solely by the language
heirs was valid and capable of exe-
cution by deed from her heirs after
the death of herself and her hus-
band. Hagan v. Varney, 147 111.
281; s. C, 35 X. E. Rep. 219. A
devise of land to trustees em-
powering them in case of neces-
sity from sickness of any of the
beneficiaries, or in case any of
them should desire a collegiate or
classical education, to use the in-
come of the land, creates a valid
and active trust in such land. In
re Mcintosh's Estate, 158 Pa St.
528; s. a, 27 Atl. Rep. 1044. Where
a testator gave funds to the "trus-
tees" of a certain church in trust
for the poor of the church, though
the trustees named were inca-
pable, as such, to take and hold the
fund, it would not affect the valid-
ity of the gift, as they might hold
it as individuals described by the
name of the office. Conklin v.
Davis, 63 Conn. 377; s. c, 28 Atl.
Rep. 537. A devise in trust during
the minority and "for the benefit
of" certain children, creates an ex-
press trust to collect the rents of
the premises devised. Mullins v.
Mullins (1S94), 79 Hun, 421; s. c,
29X.Y. Supl. 961. Aprovision ina
bequest in trust, th.it the trustee
may apply such portion of the
trust fund to his personal use as he
may find necessary, does not abol-
ish the trust. Jones v. Leonard, 78
Hun, 290; s. c, 28 X. Y. Supl. 906.
Testator executed a formal declara-
tion of trust as to certain stock
standing in his name "in trust to
myself or to any custodian in whose
hands the certificates of stock may
be deposited by me or by my
order," or "may come without
actual transfer;" reserved the right
of revocation ; placed the papers in
a sealed envelope, indorsed as "be-
longing to the trust;" placed the
envelope in his safe-deposit box;
and executed his will, in which he
appointed trustees to carry out the
trust after his death. By the terms
of the trust the net income of the
stock was to be divided into four
separate parts. Each part was to
be paid to a specified beneficiary
for life, and at the death of each
beneficiary "the portion allotted"
to such beneficiary was to go for-
ever to a specified one of four cor-
porate beneficiaries. Held, that
testator made a valid declaration
of trust, gave to the beneficiaries
the entire beneficial interest in the
stock, and held the legal title in
trust from the execution of the
deed, and that the reservation of the
power of revocation was consist-
ent with his intent to hold the
legal title as trustee. 21 X. Y.
Supl. 524, reversed; Locke v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. 140 X.
Y. 135; s. C, 35 X. E. Rep. 578.
See also Cowen v. Rinaldo, 82 Hun,
479; s. a, 31 X. Y. Supl. 554; Gil-
ford v. Choate, 100 Mass. 343; Jones
v. Bacon, 68 Me. 34; Howard v.
Carusi, 109 U. S. 725; s. C, 3 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 575; Burley v. Clough, 52
X. H. 267 ; Mitchel v. Morse (18S4),
77 Me. 423; s. c, 1 Atl. Rep. 141;
Turner v. Hallowell Sav. Inst., 76
Me. 527; "Jurisdiction of Courts
of Equity Over Wills" by Augustus
A. Levey, 31 Alb. L. J. 225.
§ 63. J EXPRESS TRUSTS. 107
of the will, unless it is obvious from the will itself that the
giving to the words of the instrument their proper legal
meaning and effect would conflict with the intention of the
testator.1 It is only where something is left incomplete and
executory by the creator of the trust, that equity would
mould or modify the words in order to give effect to the
intentions of the party. For if the limitations of the trust
estate are definitely and finally declared by the instrument
itself, that will be an executed trust, and it must be carried
into execution as strictly and as literally as if it were a lim-
itation of the legal interest.2 In the case of McKenna v.
Devlin, where the plaintiff's father left small legacies to
them, and gave the bulk of his property to his wife, in
trust for the benefit of his minor children, nothing was ever
done under the will, and the widow and children lived to-
gether as one family, the former being recognized as the
head, and, with the children's consent, managing and con-
trolling all her husband's estate. The business left by him
was continued by the family, each child aiding therein when
old enough. There was no agreement as to board and lodg-
ing, and all were supported from the business. Plaintiffs,
two of the daughters, worked partly at the store and partly
at home, till they were married, on the understanding that
they should derive pecuniary profit from the successful con-
duct of the business. The profits of the business not
needed for support were invested, and the estate increased
greatly in value after the father's death. It was held that
1 Blackburn v. Stables. 2 V. & B. 54; Brown v. Brown, 12 Md. 87;
370; 2 Story's Equity Jurispru- Ridgway v. Lanphear, 99 Ind. 2.">1.
dence, § 1058 et seq.; Jarrnin, Pow. 2 Hill on Trustees, *333; Jervoise
Dev.442 etseq.; Egertonv. Brown- v. Duke of Northumberland, 1 J. &
low, 4 H. L. Cas. 1; Jervoise v. W. 570; Daniel v. Whartenby, 17
Northumberland, 1 J. & W. 559; Wall. 639; Belslay v. Engle, 107 111.
Rochfort v. Fitzmaurice, 2 Dr. & 182; Shaw v. Spencer, 100 Mass.
W. 28; Doncaster v. Doncaster, 3 382; s. c, 1 Am. Rep. 115 ; Wright
K. & J. 26; Sackville - West v. v. Jones, 105 Ind. 21; Porter v.
Holmesdale, L. R. 4 H. L. 543; Rutland Bank, 19 Vt. 410; Papillon
Starling's Ex'r v. Price, 16 Ohio v. Voice, 2 P. Wins. 470; Shelton
St. 31; Edmondson v. Dyson (Ga.), v. Watson, 16 Sim. 543; Bastardy.
2 Kelly, 307; Hess v. Singler, 114 Proby, 2 Cox, 6.
Mass. 50; Parker v. Murch, 64 Me.
108 EXPRESS TEUSTS. [§ 64.
the widow was a trustee, for her children and herself, of
the property left by the husband, and increased by the
services of the family after his death.1 Though a will in
terms declares a devise of a life estate to testator's hus-
hand, to be "in trust," yet where no trust is specified, and
the absolute control of the entire income is vested in the
husband, to use and dispose of as he may see fit, without
liability to account to any one, he must be deemed the ab-
solute owner of the income as long as he lives; and a
further provision in the will, exempting the income from
liability for any of his debts, present or future, is void as
being an attempt to free the absolute owner of an estate
from the claim of his creditors.2
§ 6t. Trusts in Wills Continued. — Where there is an
absolute right of disposal, whether by deed or by will, and
whether the property be real or personal, any subsequent
limitation is repugnant and void. The rule is the same
whether by the terms of the devise over the first taker has
the right to dispose of the land only by deed, in his life-
time, or whether he has the right to dispose of it by deed
or will. In either case the devise over is void, whether the
property be real or personal.3 In Ide v. Ide, Judge Parsons
iMcGuire v. Devlin (1893), 158 Williams v. Allison, 33 Iowa, 278;
Mass. 63; s. C, 32 N. E. Rep. 1028. Howard v. Carusi, 109 U. S. 725;
2 Hahn v. Hutchinson, 159 Pa. Shaw v. Hussey, 41 Me. 495; Stew-
St. 133 ; S. c, 28 Atl. Rep. 167. art v. Walker, 72 Me. 146 ; Burleigh
3 Van Home v. Campbell, 100 N\ v. Clough, 52 N. H. 267; McLellan
Y. 287; s. c, 3 N. E. Rep. 316; v. Turner, 15' Me. 436; Hale v.
Jackson v. Bull, 10 Johns. 19; Mof- Marsh, 100 Mass. 465; Girford v.
fatt v. Strong, 10 Johns. 12; Flan- Choate, 109 Mass. 343; Hooper v.
ders v. Clark, 1 Ves. Sr. 9; Melson Bradbury, 133 Mass. 303. In the
v. Doe, 4 Leigh, 408 ; Cook v. Wal- case of Howard v. Carusi, 109 U.
ker, 15 Ga. 459; Flinn v. Davis, 18 S. 725, the Supreme Court of. the
Ala. 132; McRees' Adm'r v. Means, United States held that a devise to
34 Ala. 350 ; Ramsdell v. Ramsdell, a person, "to be held, used and en-
21 Me. 288; Newland v. Newland, joyed by him, his heirs, executors,
1 Jones, 463 ; Williams v. Jones, 2 administrators and assigns forever,
Swan, 620; Davisv. Richardson, 10 with the hope and trust, however,
Yerg. 290; Alden v. Johnson, 63 that he will not diminish the same
Iowa, 124; s. c, 18 N". W. Rep. to a greater extent than may be nec-
696; Rona v. Meier, 47 Iowa, 607; essary for his comfortable support
Benkert v. Jacoby, 36 Iowa, 273; and maintenance, and that at his
§ 64. J EXPRESS TRUSTS. 109
said: "Whenever, therefore, it is the clear intention of
the testator that the devisee shall have an absolute property
in the real estate devised, a limitation over must be void,
because it is inconsistent with the absolute property sup-
posed in the first devisee."1 A statement in a will that the
"devise is made on the trust and confidence reposed in"
the devisee "that he will dispose of the said property" in a
certain manner, constitutes a trust.2 Sir T S, by will,
directs his trustees to convey a full fourth part of all his
freehold lands, etc., to the use of his daughter, Priscilla,
for life, and so as she alone, or such person as she shall ap-
point, take and receive the rents and profits thereof, and so
as her husband is not to intermeddle therewith ; and from
and after her decease, in trust for the heirs of the body of
the said Priscilla forever. This being an executory trust,
the wife took an estate for life only, and the husband, there-
fore, not entitled to be tenant by the curtesy.3 A testator
devised his property to trustees, and the will contained the
following passages, among others: "The said sum I will
shall be taken from my real, freehold and personal prop-
erty;" the residue "to be divided between them by my
i
death the same, or so much thereof leave, or without selling or devis-
as he shall not have disposed of by ing the same — in all such cases the
devise or sale, shall descend" to remainder over is void as a remain-
certain other parties named in the der, because of the preceding fee,
will, in certain proportions fully and it is void by way of executory
set out therein, confers an estate in devise, because the limitation is in-
fee-simple, with an absolute power consistent with the absolute estate
of disposition in the person to or power of disposition expressly
whom the devise is made, and the given, or necessarily implied by
limitation over is void. Chancellor the will. 4 Kent's Commentaries,
Kent in his great Commentaries, 270. "This is, in terms, a disposi-
after stating that a valid executory tion of real estate in favor of other
devise must be indestructible by devisees, in the event of the pri-
the first devisee, add: '-If, there- marydevisee dying intestate; and I
fore, there be an absolute power of think such a disposition is repug-
disposition given by the will to the nant and void." Lord Justice Tur-
first taker, as if an estate be devised ner in Holmes v. Godson, 8 De G-.,
to A in fee, and if he dies possessed M. & Q. 152.
of the property without lawful 1T.dev. Ide, 5 Mass. 500.
issue, the remainder over, or re- 2 People v. Powers (1894), 8 Misc.
mainder over of the property which Kep. 628; s. C, 29N. Y. Supl. 950.
he, dying without heirs, should 3 Roberts v. Dixwell, 1 Atk. 607.
110 EXPRESS TRUSTS. [§ 64.
said trustees, share and share alike, at such time and in such
manner as to my said trustees shall seem most expedient,
subject to this limitation," etc.; shares of the sons were,
in certain events, to go to survivors, "subject, however, to
such jointure as my said sons, or any of them, may settle
on any wife," etc. ; premises were devised to the son carry-
ing on the testator's business "at such reasonable rent as
my trustees shall think proper;" "I further will my trus-
tees shall lend out, at interest," certain sums bequeathed
in the way prescribed ; a small annuity was given to }Y B,
"to be paid to him by my said trustees out of the issues,"
etc. A codicil bequeathed other property "to be divided
equally among, etc., agreeable to the real intention of my
will." It was held that the provisions of this will did not
constitute executory trusts.1 Testator created a separate use
trust for the benefit of his daughter, who was not then
married or contemplating marriage, but who afterwards
married in testator's lifetime. Testator died, the daughter
and her husband surviving him. It was held that the trust
was void, not having been made in contemplation of marriage,
and that the daughter was entitled absolutely to the fund
discharged of the trust.2 Testator bequeathed all his prop-
erty, real and personal, to his wife for life, and authorized
his executors, out of any moneys that might come into
their hands, to pay all taxes and interest, etc., or incum-
brances on the real estate, and to sell and dispose of any of
the real estate. It was held that the will created a trust as
to the personal property, which could not be divested or ex-
tinguished during the lifetime of the widow.3
1 Boswell v. Dillon, 6 Ir. Eq. 389. should fall to the share of one child
2 Funke's Estate (1891), 9 Pa. Co. should be deposited in the hands
Ct. Rep. 113. of the others in trust for him, and
s Raymond v. Rochester Trust & power was also given to sell the
Safe Deposit Co., 82 Hun, 239; s.c, real estate, the trust was held to
27 N. Y. Supl. 1 ; Greer v. Chester, extend to the realty as well as the
75 Hun, 329; affirmed, 131 N. Y. personalty. Braman v. Stiles, 2
629 ; Asche v. Asche, 113 N". Y. Pick. 460. See also Davis v. Cain
232. Where a testator gave the (K. C), 1 Ired. Eq. 304;. Story v.
residue of his estate to his children Palmer, 46 N J. Eq. 1; Hamble-
with the direction that whatever ton v. Darrington, 36 Md. 434;
§65.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
Ill
§ 65. Trusts in Marriage Articles and in "Wills Dis-
tinguished The essential distinction relates to the means
of ascertaining the intention of the creator of the trust. In
Benson v. Wright, 4 Md. Ch. 278;
Carson v. Carson, 1 Ired. Eq. 329;
Grumball v. Patton, 70 Ala. 626 ;
Thompson v. Ballard, 70 Md. 10.
A testator appointed his wife ex-
ecutrix, providing that all the real
estate, after the wife's death, should
pass to the trustees of a certain
academy and their successors, "the
annual product by them to be ap-
propriated to the erection of a poor
house in said county and for the
support of its inhabitants forever."
It was held that not until the death
of the wife could the trustees of
the academy take the trust, and
that the trust thereafter devolved
upon their successors in office for-
ever. Augusta v. Walton, 77 Ga.
517. See also Mason v. M. E.
Church, 27 H. J. Eq. 47; Forcey's
Appeal, 106 Pa. St. 508; Wiley v.
Morris, 39 N. J. Eq. 97; Barry's
Appeal, 103 Pa. St. 130; Clark v.
Leupp, 38 X. Y. 228; Dillaye v.
Greenough, 45 K. Y. 445; Lambe
v. Eames, L. E. 10 Eq. 267; Ho-
wath v. Dowell,6 Jur. (N. S.)1300;
Webb v. Wools, 2 Sim. 267. The
courts will favor a construction
creating trust rather than an arbi-
trary power, and in a case of a be-
quest of certain shares of stock to
the testator's brother, "in trust for
the use and benefit of my two
brothers, A and B, to be appropria-
ted to each of their sole uses and
benefits at his discretion," it was
held that the trustee had a discre-
tion over the appropriation, but
not an option to appropriate or
not. Aldrich v. Aldrich, 12 E. I.
141. See also Bacon v. Bacon, 55
Vt. 243 ; How v. Waldron, 98 Mass.
381; Kirkland v. Cox, 94 111. 400;
Irving v. De Kay, 9 Paige, 521 ; De
Peyster v. Clendening, 8 Paige, 295 ;
Goddard v. Brown, 12 E. I. 31.
Where an executor was directed to
pay all the income derived from
the estate to A, after paying the
necessary expenses accruing there-
on, the estate, consisting princi-
pally of realty, and A, being a non-
resident, it was held under the
New York statute to create an
active trust in the executor to re-
ceive the rents and profits of the
land and apply them to the use of
A during his life. Marx v. Mc-
Glynn, 88 X. Y. 357. For further
cases upon the question of trusts in
rents, profits, etc., see also Sohier
v. Eldredge, 103 Mass. 345 ; Sargent
v. Sargent, 103 Mass. 297; Haltum
v. Corse, 2 Barb. Ch. 506; Watts v.
Howard, 7 Met. 478; Hardenburgh
v. Blair, 30 X. J. Eq. 42; Horwitz
v. Norris, 49 Pa. St. 213; Livesey's
Appeal, 106 Pa. St. 201 ; Lawrence
Co. v. Leonard, 83 Pa. St. 206;
Thompson v. Ballard, 70 Md. 10;
Marsh v. Eenton, 99 Mass. 132;
Easterley v. Keney, 36 Conn. 18;
Clark v. Anderson, 10 Bush, 99;
Loring v. Coolidge, 99 Mass. 191;
Goodwin v. Goodwin, 69 Mo. 617;
Biddle's Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 258;
Pilcher v. McHenry, 14 Lea, 77;
Wood v. Hammond, 16 E. I. 98;
Mason v. Jones, 2 Barb. 229; White
v. Howard, 52 Barb. 294; Vaill v.
Vaill, 4 Paige, 317; Tucker v.
Tucker, 5 Barb. 99; Harrison
v. Harrison, 36 N. Y. 543 ; Griffin v.
Graham, 1 Hawks. 96; Bowers v.
Matthews, 4 Ired. Eq. 258 ; Coburn
v. Anderson, 131 Mass. 513; Carr
v. Branch, 85 Va. 597; Fay v. Fay,
1 Cush. 93; Putnam v. Story, 132
112 EXPRESS TRUSTS. [§ 65.
marriage articles it will be assumed, as has been shown,
that there is a purpose to provide for the issue of the mar-
riage, and a court of equity will not put upon an instru-
ment of this character such a construction as to frustrate
the obvious intent of the parties. But in wills, from the
nature of the case, there can be no similar presumption.
The intention of the testator must be learned from the in-
strument itself, and in deciding any point relating to it the
court will have regard, not to particular words or phrases,
but to the import of the document as a whole. The mean-
ing is to be ascertained from the general tenor or drift of
the writing. In Blackburn v. Stables, Sir William Grant,
Master of the Rolls, said: "I know of no difference be-
tween an executory trust in marriage articles and in a will,
except that the object and purpose of the former furnish
an indication of intention, which must be wanting in the
latter. When the object is to make a provision by the set-
tlement of an estate for the issue of the marriage, it is not
to be presumed that the parties meant to put it in the
power of the father to defeat that purpose and to appropri-
ate the estate to himself. If, therefore, the agreement is
to limit an estate for life, with remainder to the heirs of the
bod}-, the court decrees a strict settlement in conformity to
the presumable intention ; but if a will directs a limitation
for life, with remainder to the heirs of the body, the court
has no such ground for decreeing a strict settlement. A
testator gives arbitrarily what estate he thinks fit. There
is no presumption that he means one quantity of interest
rather than another, an estate for life rather than in tail or
in fee. The subject being mere bounty, the intended ex-
tent of that bounty can be known only from the words in
which it is given ; but if it is clearly to be ascertained from
anything in the will that the testator did not mean to use
the expressions, which he has employed, in their strict
proper technical sense, the court, in decreeing such settle-
ment as he has directed, will depart from his words in order
Mass. 205; Ware v. McCandlish, 11 Rich. Eq. 324; Bhett v. Mason, 18
Leigh, 623; Withers v. Yeadon, 1 Gratt. 541.
§ 66. ] EXPRESS TRUSTS. 113
to execute his intention; but the court must necessarily
follow his words, unless he has himself shown that he did
not mean to use them in their proper sense, and have never
said that merely because the direction was for an in tail,
that they would execute that by decreeing a strict settle-
ment."1
§ 66. The Subject Continued The expressions "heirs
of the body" and "issue" are not of the same technical or
legal import. The words "heirs of the body" are con-
strued by the courts as words of limitation, whereas the
word "issue" is a term of purchase. In some instances
the courts have ordered a strict settlement from the use of
the term "issue," where, had the expression "heirs of the
body" been employed, the estate would have been con-
strued as an estate tail.2 In the construction of the lan-
guage of a will, as there is no a priori presumption that
"heirs of the body" are intended by the testator as words
of purchase, if the trust be to "A and the heirs of his
body," or to "A and the heirs of his body and their heirs,"
or to "A for life, and after his decease to the heirs of his
bod}r, ' ' the legal and ordinary construction will be adopted,
and A will be tenant in tail. So where the estate was
directed to be settled on the testator's "daughter and her
children, and if she died without issue," the remainder
1 Blackburn v. Stables, 2 V. & B. provided for, the intention to pro-
369. A misapprehension having vide for such issue, and, in short,
arisen as to the position of Lord all the consideration that belongs
Chancellor Eldon on this question peculiarly to them, afford prima
in the case of Jervoise v. Duke of facie evidence of intent, which
Northumberland, 1 Jac. <fc Walk, does not belong to executory trusts
Ch. 540, he repeatedly refers to under wills."
the false position attributed to him 2 Ashton v. Ashton, cited in Bag-
and says: "So, again, that I may shaw v. Spencer, 1 Coll. Jur. 402;
not be misunderstood, if it is sup- Meure v. Meure, 2 Atk. 265; Home
posed that I said there was no dif- v. Barton, G-. Coop. 257; Dodson
ference between marriage articles v. Hay, 2 Bro. Ch. 405; Stonorv.
and executory trusts, and that they Curwen. 5 Sim. 264; Crozier v. Cro-
stood percisely upon the same zier, 2 Con. & Laws. 311 ; Kochford
grounds, I never meant to say so. v. Fitzmaurice. 1 Con. &Laws. 158;
In marriage articles, the object of Bastard v. Proby, 2 Cox, 0; Had-
such settlement, the issue to be delsey v. Adams, 22 Beav. 276.
114 EXPRESS TRUSTS. [§66.
over, the court said, that by an immediate devise of the
land in the words of the will, the daughter would have
been tenant in tail, and in the case of a voluntary devise
the court must take it as they found it, though upon the
like words in marriage articles it might have been other-
wise.1 In New Jersey it has been held that in one respect
there is a difference between marriage articles and a devise
by will. When technical terms are used in an agreement
for a settlement, in view of marriage which, under the arti-
ficial rule in Shelley's Case, would create an estate in fee
or in tail, the court will infer, from the nature of the agree-
ment, that the parties contemplated provision for the issue
of the marriage, which should not be liable to immediate
destruction by the act of the parties, and will direct the
settlement to be executed in such a manner as will prevent
the destruction of the limitations over to the issue. But
this doctrine is applicable only so long as the agreement for
a settlement remains a matter of contract. If the parties
have themselves completed the settlement by a deed com-
plete in itself, so that it requires only to be obeyed and ful-
filled by the trustee according to the provisions of the set-
tlement, the trust will be construed in the same manner as
other trusts for the same purposes.2 In the case of Deer-
hurst v. The Duke of St. Albans, Sir J. Leach said: "You
are guided to the meaning of articles by the plain object of
consideration in them, the issue of the marriage ; but you
know nothing of the motive and object of a will but what
you collect from the language of it.3 In putting a con-
1 Harrison v. Naylor, 2 Cos, 274; 3Lord Deerhurst v. Duke of St.
Bagshaw v. Spencer, 1 Ves. 151, Albans, 5 Madd. 260. Iu Stratford
per Lord Hardwieke; Marshall v. v. Powell, 1 Ball & Beatty, 25,
Bonsfield, 2 Mad. 166 ; Marryatt v. Lord Manners says : As to the ques-
Townsley, 1 Ves. 104, per Lord tion raised by the defendants,
Hardwieke; Blackburn v. Stables, Bowen and son, I think myself
2 V. & B. 370, per Sir W. Grant; bound by the opinion of Lord
Seale v. Seale, 1 P. Wms. 290; Thurlow, delivered in Foley v.
Meure v. Meure, 2 Atk. 266, per Burnell, 1 Bro. Ch. Cas. 274, until
Sir J. Jekyll; Sweetapple v. Bin- it is overruled. There appears to
don, 2 Vern. 536. to me to be a manifest distinction
2 Gushing v. Blake, 30 N. J. Eq. between the case of wills and mar-
689. riage articles. In the latter every
§66.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
115
struction upon the language of wills, where the words, taken
in their ordinary sense, would create a joint tenancy, the
court has no authority, as it has, in construing marriage
articles, to execute the trust by giving a tenancy in com-
mon. But where a testator has indicated a purpose to pro-
vide for his children, or where another, as a grandfather
putting himself in loco parentis, intends to make provision
for his grandchildren, the court has given the same con-
struction as in marriage articles completed by settlement
after marriage. But in these cases there were attending cir-
cumstances that indicated a tenancy in common.1
person is considered as a purchaser,
who is a party to them ; in a will
none of the parties mentioned in it
are so; in marriage articles, they
are all purchasers, to effectuate the
intention of the parties, whereas
in wills the intention of the testa-
tor is alone to be considered."
1 JIarryatt v. Townsley, 1 Ves.
102 ; Synge v. Hales, 2 B. & B. 499 ;
Lock v. Bagley, L. K. 4 Eq. 122;
JlePherson v. Snowden, 19 Md.
197 ; Allen v. Henderson, 49 Pa. St.
333; Robertson v. Johnson, 36 Ala.
197. Where the testator died pre-
vious to the adoption of the revised
statutes, devised his estate to his
executors as trustees to receive the
rents and profits thereof for the use
of his children for the term of six
years and then to divide the same
among his children or their issue
then living and to give conveyance
therefor: and directed that in
each deed or conveyance to any of
the test ator's children there should
be inserted a clause limiting the
grant or interest to be conveyed
to the grantee for life, with re-
mainder over to the right heirs of
such grantee, their heirs and
assigns forever : Held, that the ex-
ecutors or trustees were bound to
convey the shares of the several
children of the testator, in such a
manner as to give the first taker an
estate for life only, with remainder
to such persons as might be his
legal heirs at the time of his
death, according to the provisions
of the revised statute abolishing
the rule in Shelley's Case. The
rule in Shelley 'sCase is not applica-
ble to the case of an executory
trust, which is to be carried into
effect by a conveyance from trus-
tees of the legal estate, and where
it is apparent from the will or in-
strument creating the trust that
the testator or donor only intended
to give a life estate to the first taker
and that the heirs of such first
taker should have remainder in fee
as purchasers, and in such a case
the court of chancery will direct
such a conveyance to be made as will
most effectually carry the testator's
intention into effect, so far as it can
be done consistently with legal
rules. Wood v. Burnham, 6 Paige,
513. It appears to me manifest
that courts of equity, whether with
or without sufficient foundation for
the act in principle, will take to
themselves jurisdiction in case of
wills, from the fact that the testa-
tor has directed a conveyance to be
made by a trustee; will from that
116
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§67.
§ 07. Precatory Trusts. — Of the many questions grow-
ing out of the construction of wills and the administration
of decedents' estates, perhaps the most difficult to settle are
those relating to precatory words. It is still a question
fact derlare a trust executory in
contradistinction to executed; will
defeat in such a case the rule in
Shelley's Case in favor of the in-
tention of the testator, by decree-
ing a conveyance in pursuance of
his intention. Edmondson v.
Dyson, 2 Kelly, 324. See also
Wiley v. Smith, 3 Kelly, 551 ; Neves
v. Scott, 9 How. 197; s. c, 13 How.
268. This doctrine has received re-
cognition in Tennessee in Loring v.
Hunter, 8 Yerg. 4; in South Caro-
lina in Garner v. Garner, 1 Desaus.
437; Porter v. Doley, 2 Rich. Eq.
49; in Maryland in Horner v.
Lyeth, 4 H. & J. 431; in Pennsyl-
vania in Findlay v. Kiddle, 3
Binney, 139. In Yarnall's App.,
70 Pa. St. 340, Justice Agnew re-
marks : "In regard to wills the
cases show that technical phrases,
as well as forms of expression de-
cided in other cases are not per-
mitted to overturn the intent of
the testator, when that intent is
clearly ascertained to be different
in the will under examination by
the court. This broad principle
needs no citation to support it, for
it is founded on the universal rule
that the intention of the testator
is the guide for the interpretation
of wills. The rule in Shelley's
Case is only an apparent not a real
exception of this statement. It
sacrifices a particular intent only
to give effect to the main intent of
the testator. All authorities are
agreed that this rule has no place
in the interpretation of wills, and
takes effect only when the enterpre-
tation has been first ascertained.*'
Mr. Fearne, Contingent Remain-
ders, p. *188, says: "Nothing can
be better founded than Mr. Har-
grave's doctrine, that the rule in
Shelley's Case is no medium for
finding out the intention of the
testator; that, on the contrary, the
rule supposes the intention already
discovered and not to be a super-
added succession to the heirs, gen-
eral or special, of the donee for
life; by making such donee the
ancestor terminus or stirps from
which the generation of posterity
or heirs is to be accounted, and
that whether the conveyance has
or has not so constituted an estate
of freehold, with a succession
grafted on it, is a previous ques-
tion which ought to be adjusted be-
fore the rule is thought of; that to
resolve that point, the ordinary
rules for interpretating the lan-
guage of wills ought to be resorted
to ; that when it is once settled
that the donor or testator has used
words of inheritance according to
their legal import, has applied
them intentionally to comprise the
whole line of heirs, of the tenant
for life, and has really made him
the terminus or ancestor, by refer-
ence to whom the succession is to
be regulated, then comes the
proper time to inspect the rule in
Shelley's Case." In Hileman v.
Bonslaugh, 1 Harris, 351-2, Gibson,
C. J., expresses the same thought
in fewer words. He says: "The
rule operates only on the iatention
of the testator, when it has been
ascertained, not on the meaning
of the words used to express it.
The ascertainment is left to the
ordinary rules of construction pe-
§ 6 7. J EXPRESS TRUSTS. 117
whether there are any general rules for the interpretation
of precatory words that admit of a universal application.
In England, the affirmative has been maintained, but even
there the present tendency is in the opposite direction.
On this point, as in other questions relating to wills, the
courts will be governed by the intention of the testator, no
informality or use of an improper term or word will pre-
vent the creation of a trust, where it is plain that the course
to be pursued by the donee is indicated by the will, and no
precatory words will avail to create a trust, where it is clear
that this was not the intention of the testator. The diffi-
culty relates to the construction to be put upon precatory
words and expressions. In the earlier English cases the
courts recognized some positive rules for their guidance in
the settlement of questions of this nature. In the case of
Malim v. Keighly, Sir Richard Pepper Arden, Master of
the Rolls, said: "I will lay down the rule as broad as
this: wherever any person gives property, and points out
the object, the property, and the way in which it shall go,
that does create a trust, unless he shows clearly that his
desire expressed is to be controlled by the party, and that
he shall have an option to defeat it. The word 'recom-
mend' proves desire, and does not prove discretion. If a
testator shows his desire that a thing shall be done, unless
there are plain express words, or necessary implications
that he does not mean to take away the discretion, but in-
tends to leave it to be defeated, the party shall be considered
as acting under a trust."1 In the more recent case of
culiar to wills, but where this is erty, will make such devisee or
ascertained — is found to be within legatee a trustee lor the persons in
the rule — tihen there is but one whose favor such expressions are
way; it admits of no exceptions." used, provided the testator has
1 Malim v. Keighley, 2 Ves. 334. pointed out with clearness and
In Knox v. Knox, 59 Wis. 172; S. certainty the objects of the trust,
C, 18 N. W. Rep. 155, it was held and the subject-matter to which it
that words of entreaty, recommen- is to attach. The will construed
dation or wish, addressed by a tes- in this case provided as follows:
tator to a devisee or legatee, even "I give, devise and bequeath unto
where occurring subsequent to an my wife, Mary Ann Knox, her heirs
absolute disposition of the prop- and assigns forever, all my real
118
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§67.
Knight v. Knight, before the Rolls Court, Lord Langdale,
M. R., said: "As a, general rule, it has been laid down
that where property is given absolutely to any person, and
the same person is, by the giver, who has power to com-
mand, recommended, or entreated, or wished to dispose of
that property in favor of another, the recommendation, en-
treaty or wish shall be held to create a trust. First, if the
words are so used, that upon the whole they ought to be
construed as imperative ; secondly, if the subject of the
recommendation or wish be certain ; and, thirdly, if the
objects or persons intended to have the benefit of the
recommendation or wish be also certain."1 In many cases
the application of this rule involves no difficulty, but in
others it is by no means so simple a matter. In his opin-
ion in the case cited Lord Langdale himself said: "I
must admit that in the endeavor to apply these rules and
principles to the present case I have found very great diffi-
culty; that in the repeated consideration which I have
and personal estate, money, tax
certificate of sale, goods, chattels,
and all my worldly substance, of
every nature and kind whatever,
of which I may die seized or
possessed, having full confidence in
my said wife, and hereby request
that at her death she will divide
equally, share and share alike, in
equal portions as tenants in com-
mon, between my sons and daugh-
ters, Thomas M. Knox, Jr., et al., all
the proceeds of my said property,
real and personal, goods and
chattels hereby bequeathed."
Many of the decisions are some-
what difficult to reconcile from
their diversity in construing prec-
atory words, but it will be noted
that this springs from the differ-
ence in the order of expression and
the surroundings, which are
scarcely ever the same in two tes-
tators. Hence, necessity evoked
the rule that "every case must de-
pend upon the construction of the
particular will under considera-
tion. The legal right to provide
for the disposition of his property
according to his own wish is un-
questionable, and the only impor-
tant point involved in the construc-
tion-of this will is, has the testa-
tor by his words, viewed in their
express and implied senses and
according to all the light that the
contexture of his will affords,
shown how and for whom he de-
sired his property disposed of after
his death. Bohon v. Barrett, 79
Ky. 383. See also Starling"s Ex.
v. Price, 16 Ohio St. 31 ; Eedfield on
Wills, 434; Hoxie v. Hoxie, 7
Paige, 187; Hopkins v. Glunt, 111
Pa. St. 287; Pennock's Estate, 20
Pa. St. 268; Pose v. Porter, 141
Mass. 309.
1 Knight v. Knight, 3 Beav. 172.
See subject "Precatory Trusts," 20
Cent; L. J. 63.
§<J8.J
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
119
given to the subject, I have found myself, at different
times, inclined to adopt different conclusions, and that the
result to which I have finally arrived has been attended
with much doubt and hesitation."1 But this case is not
altogether peculiar. There are numerous others in which
similar difficulties are encountered.
§ 68. Precatory Trusts Continued. — In the recent de-
cisions of the English courts there is a manifest change in
the direction of the current of opinion on this point. In
the case of Lambe v. Eames, before the Court of Appeal
in Chancery, Sir William Milbourne James, L. J., said:
"In hearing case after case cited, I could not help feeling
that the officious kindness of the Court of Chancery in in-
terposing trusts, where, in many cases, the father of the
family never meant to create trusts, must have been a very
cruel kindness indeed. I am satisfied that the testator in
this case would have been shocked to think that any person
i Knight v. Knight, 3 Beav. 175.
A testatrix gave property to her
daughter and "entreated" her son-
in-law, the daughter's husband, if
he should not have any children
by her daughter, and should survive
her, that he would leave any part
of the property that came to him,
to the testatrix's other children
and grandchildren at his decease ;
and it was held a contingent
trust for the testatrix's other chil-
dren and grandchildren was creat-
ed by the will. Prevost v. Clarke,
2 Madd. 458. A testator gave bis
residuary personal estate, in trust
for A for life, subject to certain
annuities, and the residue, after
the payment of the annuties, he
gave to A, his executor, adding,
"and it is my dying request to A,
that if he shall die without leaving
issue at his death, the said A do
dispose of what fortune he shall
receive under this my will, to and
among the descendents of my late
aunt, A C, his grandmother, in
such manner and proportion as he
shall think proper." It was held
to create a trust for the descend-
ents in the described event. Pier-
son v. Garnet, 2 Bro. Ch. 38. In
Broad v. Bevan, 1 Puss. 511, the
testator "ordered and directed"
his son J, to whom he gave all
his real and personal estate, to
take care and provide for the tes-
tator's daughter A during her life.
It was held that the daughter was
entitled to a provision out of the
residue in addition to an annuity
of five pounds, which was be-
queathed to her. In most cases
however, where there is an abso-
lute gift in the first instance to the
donee, mere precatory words will
not annex a trust to the gift. Mere-
dith v. Heneage, 1 Sim. 543; Hay"
v. Master, 6 Sim. 568; Huskisson
v. Bridge, 4 De G. & Sm. 245 ; Eaton
v. Witts, L. P. 4 Eq. 151; Barrett
v. Marsh, 126 Mass. 213.
120
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§ 68.
calling himself a next friend could file a bill in this court,
and, under pretense of benefiting the children, have taken
the administration of the estate from the wife."1 In the
case, In re Adams and the Kensington Vestry, Lord Justice
Colton, referring to the above, said: "Undoubtedly, to
my mind, in the later cases, especially Lambe v. Eames and
In re Hutchinson and Tenant, both the Court of Appeal and
the late Master of the Rolls showed a desire, really, to find
out what, upon the true construction, was the meaning of
the testator, rather than to lay hold of certain words which
in other wills had been held to create a trust, although on
the will before them they were satisfied that that was not
the intention. I have no hesitation in saying myself that I
think some of the older authorities went a great deal too
far in holding that some particular words appearing in a will
were sufficient to create a trust. Undoubtedly confidence,
if the rest of the context shows that a trust is intended,
may make a trust, but what we have to look at is the whole
1 Lamb v. Eames, L. R. 6 Ch.
App. 598. The existing state of
the law on this question as re-
ceived in England, and generally
followed in the courts of the sev-
eral States of this Union, is well
stated by Gray, C. J., in Hess v.
Singler, 114 Mass. 56, 59, as follows:
"It is a well settled doctrine of
courts of chancery that a devise or
bequest to one person, accompanied
by words expressing a, wish, en-
treaty or recommendation that he
will apply it to the benefit of
others, may be held to create a
trust, if the subject and the objects
are sufficiently certain. Some of the
earlier English decisions had a
tendency to give to this doctrine
the weight of an arbitrary rule of
construction. But by the Inter
■ cases in this, as in all other ques-
tions of the interpretation of wills,
the intention of the testator as
gathered from the whole will
controls the court. In order to
create a trust it must appear that
the words were intended by the
testator to be imperative ; and when
property is given absolutely and
without restriction, a trust is not
to be lightly imposed upon mere
words of recommendation and con-
fidence." Colton v. Colton, 127
U. S. 300. The primary question
in every case is the intention of
the testator, and whether in the
use of precatory words he meant
merely to advise or influence the
discretion of the devisee, or him-
self to control or direct the dispo-
sition intended. In such a case we
must look at the whole will, so far
as it bears upon the inquiry, and
the use of the words "I wish" or
"I desire" is by no means conclu-
sive. They serve to raise the
question, but not necessarily to de-
cide it. Phillips v. Phillips, 112
ST. Y. 197.
§68.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
121
of the will which we have to construe, and if the confidence
is that the donee will do what is right as regards the dis-
posal of the property, I cannot say that that is, on the
true construction of the will, a trust imposed upon her.
Having regard to the later decisions, we must not extend
the old cases in any way, or rely upon the mere use of airy
particular words, but, considering all the words which are
used, we have to see what is their true effect and what was
the intention of the testator as expressed in his will."1
l In re Adams and Kensington,
L. K. 27 Ch. Div. 409, 410. "But it
is not every wish or expectation
which a testator may express, nor
every act which he may wish his
successors to do, that can or ought
to be executed or enforced as a
trust in this court; and in the in-
finite variety of expressions which
are employed, and of cases which
thereupon arise, there is often the
greatest difficulty in determining
whether the act desired or recom-
mended is an act which the testa-
tor intended to be executed as a
trust, or which this court ought to
deem fit to be, or capable of being
enforced as such. In the construc-
tion and execution of wills, it is
undoubtedly the duty of this court
to give effect to the intention of
the testator whenever it can be
ascertained ; but in cases of this
nature, and in the examination of
the authorities which are to be
consulted in relation to them, it is
unfortunately necessary to make
some distinction between the inten-
tion of the testator and that which
the court has deemed it to be its
duty to perform ; for of late years
it has frequently been admitted by
judges of great eminence that, by
interfering in such cases, the court
has sometimes rather made a will
for the testator than executed the
testator's will according to his in-
tention ; and the observation shows
the necessity of being extremely
cautious in admitting any, the
least, extension of the princi-
ple to be extracted from a long
series of authorities, in respect of
which such admissions have been
made." Knight v. Knight, 3 Beav.
172. Lord Cranworth in Williams
v. Williams, 1 Sim. (K. S.) 369,
says: "The point really to be
decided in all these cases is
whether, looking at the whole con-
text of the will, the testator has
meant to impose an obligation on
his legatee to carry his express
wishes into effect, or whether,
having expressed his wishes, he
has meant to leave it to the legatee
to act on them or not at his dis-
cretion. In some of the cases it
has been said that the points to be
inquired into are, first, whether the
subject-matter to which the prec-
atory words apply, is clear; and
secondly, whether the favored ob-
jects are distinctly ascertained :
and when these two requisites con-
cur, that is, when there is no doubt
as to the property to which or the
persons to whom, the precatory
words refer, then it would seem
sometimes that such words are as
obligatory as words creating an
express trust. I confess that this
reasoning has never carried con-
viction to my mind. I doubt if
122
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§ 68-
Lord Lindley, of the same court, after quoting from the
Privy Council the following words: "Passing to the
merits of the case, their Lordships are of the opinion that
the current of decisions, now prevalent for many years in
the Court of Chancery, shows that the doctrine of precatory
trusts is not to be extended," adds: "I am very glad to
see that the current is changed, and that beneficiaries are
not to be made trustees, unless intended to be by the testa-
tor."1 These views are sustained by the late decisions of
the English courts. In the case of Curnick v. Tucker,
where the testator appointed his wife executrix and gave
there can exist any formula lor
bringing to a direct test the ques-
tion whether words of request, or
hope or recommendation, are or
not to be construed as obligatory.
It may be very safe, in general, to
say that when there is uncertainty
as to the subject matter, or as to
the objects in whose favor the re-
quest or hope or recommendation
is expressed, then precatory words
cannot have been intended to be
absolutely binding. But the con-
verse of the proposition is by no
meaDS equally true. The subject-
matter of the bequest, and the ob-
jects of the testator's bounty, may
be perfectly ascertained, and yet
the context may show that words
of hope or request or recommenda-
tion were not intended to interfere
with the absolute discretion of the
legatee."
1 In re Adams and Kensington
Vestry, L. K. 27 Ch. Div. 411. In
Meredith v. Heneage, 1 Sim. 542,
the Lord Chief Baron, in deliver-
ing his opinion, said: 'T hope to
be forgiven if I entertain a serious
doubt whether in many, or perhaps
most of the cases, the construction
was not adverse to the real inten-
tion of the testator. It seems to
me v>ry singular that a person,
who really meant to impose the
obligations established by the
cases, should use a course so cir-
cuitous and a language so inappro-
priate, and also obscure, to express
what might have been conveyed in
the clearest and most usual terms,
terms the most familiar to the tes-
tator himself, and to the profes-
sional, or any other person who
might prepare his will. In con-
sidering these cases it has always
occurred to me that if I had my-
self made such a will as has gen-
erally been considered imperative,
I should never have intended it to
be imperative, but on the contrary,
a mere intimation of my wish that
the person to whom I had given
my property should, if he pleased,
prefer those whom I proposed to
him, and who, next to him, were
at the time the principal objects of
my regard." See also Van Duyn
v.VanDuyn (N. J.), MoCarter Ch.
49. In this case the court says :
"In the absence of any adjudicated
case or settled rule of construction
in this State, the court feels at lib-
erty to adopt such rule of construc-
tion as seems best calculated to
effectuate the intention of the tes-
tator."
§69.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
123
her all his property, landed and personal, of every descrip-
tion, for her sole use and benefit, in the full confidence that
she would so dispose of it among all their children during
her lifetime, and at her decease doing equal justice to all
of them, it was held that the wife took a life interest, with
a power of appointment among the children as she may
think fit.1
§ 69. The Subject Continued. — The American decis-
ions, in regard to precatory words in wills, are in entire ac-
cord with the later cases before the English courts. It is
well established that if the objects of the assumed trust are
made plain by the will ; if the property is clearly indicated ;
if the relations of the testator and the supposed beneficiary
are such as to create a strong presumption in favor of the
trust, and the words are such as to make it plain that they
were designed to control the conduct of the donee, a trust
will be sustained by the courts.2 In the leading case of
1 Curnick v. Tucker, L. R. 17 Eq.
320. See also Webb v. Wools, 2
Sim. (N. S.) 267. A testator's
will, in which the greatest part of
his estate was devised to his wile,
contained the following clause:
"It is my wish and desire that my
wife continue to provide for the
care, comfort and education of T J
M, now aged five years, who has
been raised as a member of my
family since his infancy, and to
make suitable provision for him in
case of her death, provided that he
continue to be a dutiful child to
her, and shows himself worthy of
such consideration." Held, that
the condition being performed by
T J M, the precatory words in the
will were sufficient to charge the
property therein devised with a
trust in his favor. Murphy v. Car-
lin, 113 Mo. 112.
2 Knox v. Knox, 59 Wis. 177, 178.
The early English cases are clear
that the objects or persons in
whose favor the words of. recom-
mendation, request or entreaty are
given, must be sufficiently certain
and distinct to enable the courts to
carry out the trust or none will be
created. Williams v. Williams, 1
Sim. (jfST. S.) 358; Reid v. Atkin-
son, 5 Ir. Eq. 373; Gregory v.
Smith, 9 Hare, 708; 'Bernard v.
Minshall, Johns. 276; Wright v.
Atkyns, 17 Ves. 255; In re Terry's
Will, 19 Beav. 580; Meredith v.
Heneage, 1 Sim. 542; Sale v.
Moore, 1 Sim. 534; Knight v.
Knight, 3 Beav. 148; Shaw v. Law-
less, 5 CI. & Fin. 129. In the case
of Harland v. Trigg, 1 Bro. Ch.
142, a testator gave to his "brother
forever, hoping he will continue
them in the family,'''' Lord Thur-
low held that no trust was created.
"I take the rule of law to be that
two things must concur to consti-
tute these devises, the terms and
the object. Hoping is in contra-
diction to a direct devise; but
124
EXPRESS TEISTS.
[§69.
Warner v. Bates, Chief Justice Bigelow said: "We see
no sufficient grounds for calling in question the wisdom or
policy of the rule of construction uniformily applied to
wills in the courts of England and in most of the United
States, that words of entreaty, recommendation or wish,
whenever there are annexed to
such words precise and direct ob-
jects, the law has connected the
whole together, and held the words
sufficient to raise a trust, but then
the objects must be distinct.
Where there is a choice it must be
in the power of the devisee to dis-
pose of it either way. If he had
sold these leaseholds the family
could not have taken them from
the vendee, or if he had given
them to any one part of the family,
the others would have no remedy."
These decisions were followed in
the early American cases and in
some later ones on the ground that
the construction of a will depends
upon the intention of the testator,
and that when this intention is
plain it should not fail, because
the means employed are not as
certain and direct as they might
have been. Harrison v. Harrison,
2 Gratt. 1 ; Erickson v. Willard, 1
N. H. 217; Ward v. Peloubet, 2
Stockt. Ch. 305; Hunter v. Stern-
bridge, 12 Ga. 192; Carson v. Car-
son, 1 Ired. Eq. 329; Little v. Ben-
nett, 5 Jones Eq. 156; Lucas v.
Lockhart. 10 Smed. & M. 466. In
Tolson v. Tolson, 10 Gill & J. 159,
a testator devised property to his
seven sons with a request that they
should take care of their brother
John and his family. It was held
that the word "family" was not
sufficiently accurate to designate
the persons intended by the testa-
tor, but that the failure of the will,
in that respect, did not affect the
trust in favor of John. See also
Chase v. Chase, 2 Allen, 101 ; Lor-
ing v. Loring, 100 Mass. 340. In
Bobon v. Barrett, 79 Ky. 582, Judge
Hargissays: "The authorities, both
English and American, are con-
clusive, and in the main harmoni-
ous, that a trust will be created by
such precatory words as "hope,"
"wish," "request," etc., if they be
not so modified by the context as
to amount to no more than mere
suggestions, to be acted on or not,
according to the caprice of the im-
mediate devisee, or negatived by
other expressions indicating a con-
trary intention, and the subject
and object be sufficiently certain."
In Georgia, it is provided by stat-
ute that precatory or recommenda-
tory words will create a trust if
they are sufficiently imperative to
show that it is not left discretionary
with the party to act or not, and if
the subject-matter of the trust is
defined with sufficient certainty,
and if the object is also certainly
defined, and the mode in which the
trust is to be executed. Ga. Code,
§ 2318. In Handley v. Wrightson,
60 Md. 198, the will contained this
clause: "With a special request
that at her death she give the said
lands to be equally divided between
her near relatives and mine." The
son having died without issue, and
the wife of the testator having sub-
sequently died without making dis-
position of the property by deed or
will, it was held: 1st. That by the
terms of the devise to his wife a
trust was created in the testator's
lands for the benefit of the near
§69.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
125
addressed by a testator to a devisee or legatee, will make
hini a trustee for the person or persons in whose favor such
expressions are used, provided the testator has pointed out
with clearness and certainty the objects of the trust, and the
subject-matter on which it is to attach, or from which it is
relatives of his wife and himself.
2d. That no legal uncertainty at-
tached to the term "near relatives"
as used by the testator, they being
those who would take under the
statute of distributions. Generally
on the subject, certainty of the
subject-matter, see Pope v. Pope,
10 Sim. 1 ; Flint v. Hughes, 6 Beav.
342; Bnggins v. Yates, 9 Mod. 122;
MacNab v. Whitbread, 17 Beav.
299; Wynne v. Hawkins, 1 Bro. Ch.
179; Finden v. Stephens, 2 Ph.
142; Lechmere v. Lavie, 2 M. <& K.
197; Parnall v. Parnall, L. R. 9
Ch. Div. 96; Mussoorie Bank v.
Raynor, L. R. 7 App. Cas. 321.
Where a deed of trust provided
that upon the death of A the trus-
tees should hold one-half of the
premises granted to and for the
u-e of C, D and E, their heirs aDd
assigns, subject to certain charges;
and in case of the death of any of
the persons named before that of
the grantor, then such lapsed share
to go to the lawful issue then liv-
ing of such deceased person, or if
there was no such issue, to the
right heirs of the grantor, it was
held that the trust was void for
uncertainty. Jarvis v. Babcock, 5
Barb. 139. See generally, as to
certainty in the objects or benefici-
aries, Moriarty v. Martin, 3 Ir. Ch.
31; Harland v. Trigg, 1 Bro. Ch.
142; Briggs v. Penny, 3 M. & G.
554; Reid v. Atkinson, 5 Ir. Eq.
373; Gregory v. Smith, 9 Hare,
708; First Presbyterian Soc. v.
Bowen, 21 Hun, 389; Mclntire
Poor School v. Zanesville, etc.
Canal Co.. 9 Ohio, 203. Testatqr
devised his whole estate to his
wife, and requested that if she
should not require the whole of
the estate as a support, she would
will the remainder at her death to
the children of testator's brother.
Held, there being no certainty as to
the existence of a remainder, that
no precatory trust arose in favor
of children. Devise to wife was
absolute. Bryan v. Milby (1891),
6 Del. Ch. 208; s. C, 24 Atl. Rep.
333. "It is not, and cannot be,
questioned that words of recom-
mendation, entreaty, wish or re-
quest, addressed by a testator to a
devisee or legatee, will ordinarily
make him a trustee for the person
or persons in whose favor such ex -
pres^ons are used, unless the
actual intention appear different,
But it is settled by the authorities
that, in order to the creation of
such a trust enforceable in equity,
three conditions must concur : (1)
There must be such certainty of
the subject-matter as to be capable
of execution by the court; (2)
there must be certainty as to the
beneficiaries or objects of the in-
tended trust; and (3) the express
wish, request or desire of the tes-
tator must be imperative in its
character, and not be left so de-
pendent upon the discretion of the
general devisee as to be incapable
of execution without superseding
or controlling that discretion."
The late Justice Jackson, Toms v.
Owens, 52 Fed. Rep. 421.
126 EXPRESS TRUSTS. [§ 09.
to arise and be administered. The criticisms which have
sometimes been applied to this rule by text-writers and in
judicial opinions will be found to rest mainly on its applica-
tions in particular cases, and not to involve a doubt of the
correctness of the rule itself as a sound- principle of con-
struction. Indeed, we cannot understand the force or
yalidity of the objections urged against it, if care is taken
to keep it in subordination to the primary and cardinal rule
that the intent of the testator is to govern, and to apply
it only where the creation of a trust will clearly subserve
that intent. It may sometimes be difficult to gather that
intent, and there is always a tendency to construe words as
obligatory in furtherance of a result which accords with a
plain moral duty on the part of a devisee or legatee, and
with what it may be supposed the testator would do if he
could control his action. But difficulties of this nature,
which are inherent in the subject-matter, can always be
readily overcome by bearing in mind, and rigidly applying
in all such cases the test, that to create a trust it must
clearly appear that the testator intended to govern and con-
trol the conduct of the party to whom the language of the
will is addressed, and did not design it as an expression or
indication of that which the testator thought would be a
reasonable exercise of a discretion which he intended to re-
pose in the legatee or devisee. If the objects of the sup-
posed trust are certain and definite; if the property to
which it is to attach is clearly pointed out ; if the relations
and situation of the testator, and the supposed cestuis que
trust, are such as to indicate a strong interest and motive
on the part of the testator in making them partakers of his
bounty; and above all, if the recommendatory or precatory
clause is so expressed as to warrant the inference that it
was designed to be peremptory on the donee, the just and
reasonable interpretation is that a trust is created which is
obligatory, and can be enforced in equity as against the
trustee by those in whose behalf the beneficial use of the
gift was intended."1 The Supreme Court of Ohio has well
1 Warner v. Bates, 98 Mass. 274.
§ 70.] EXPRESS TRUSTS. 127
expressed the rule applicable in this determination, where
it is said: "The question thus made, like all others arising
upon the construction of a will, is one of intention on the
part of the testator, and this intention is to be gathered,
not -necessarily alone from the phraseology of a particular
clause to be construed, but from the whole will, including
codicils, if any, and all these viewed in the light cast upon
them by the relations and circumstances of the testator of
the estate, and of the objects of his bounty. Such inten-
tion, when ascertained, if not in contravention of law and
public policy, is to govern ; and in searching for such in-
tention, courts ought not to permit themselves to be en-
slaved by mere technical rules of construction."1 The
negative rule is stated by Mr. Justice Story in his Equity
Jurisprudence as follows : "Wherever the objects of the
supposed recommendatory trust are not certain or definite,
wherever the property to which it is to attach is not certain
or definite, wherever a clear discretion or choice to act or
not to act is given, wherever the prior dispositions of the
property import absolute and uncontrollable ownership, in
all such cases courts of equity will not create a trust from
words of this character."2
§ 70. The Same Subject. — "Words expressive of a
"wish," a "request," an "entreaty," a "recommenda-
tion," a "confidence," etc., etc., are precatory words.
Words of this character will be deemed sufficient to create
a trust, provided the context indicates that that was the in-
tention of the testator. , Among others the following prec-
atory words and .expressions have been held to indicate the
purpose of the writer to create a trust: "Will,"3 "will
1 Starling's Ex'r v. Price, 16 Ohio Beav. 266; Clowdsley v. Pelharn,
St. 31. 1 Vera. 41 ; Vernon v. Vernon.
2 2 Story's Equity Jurisprudence, Amb. 4; Cruwys v. Coleman, 9
§1070. * Ves. 319; Cockrill v. Armstrong,
3 Eales v. England, Pr. Ch. 200; 31 Ark. 580; Major v. Herndon, 78
S. c, 2 Vera. 467; Harding v. Ky. 123; Coburn v. Anderson, 131
Glyn, 1 Atk. 469; Pushrnan v. Fil- Mass. 513; Chase v. Plummer, 17
liter, 3 Ves. 7; Bonsor v. Kinnear, Md. 165.
2 Gift. 195; Liddard v. Liddard, 28
128
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§ 70.
and desire,"1 "wish and request,"2 "beg,"3 "beg and
request,"4 "entreat,"5 "most heartily beseech,"6 "recom-
mends,"7 "hope,"8 "belief,"9 "confide,"10 "have the full-
est confidence,"11 "well assured,"12 "do not doubt,"13 "trust
and confide,"14 "full assurance and confident hope,"15 "last
wish,"16 "dying wish" or "request,"17 "well knowing,"18
i Birch v. Wade, 3 V. & B. 198;
Forbes v. Ball, 3 Meriv. 437 ; Cock-
rill v. Armstrong, 31 Ark. 580;
Liddard v. Liddard, 28 Beav. 266;
Murphy v. Carlin, 113 Mo. 112; s.
C, 20 S. W. Kep. 786; Handley v.
Wrightson, 60 Md. 198.
2 Foley v. Parry, 2 M. & K. 138
Cook v. Ellington, 6 Jones Eq. 371
Godfrey v. Godfrey, 11 W. K. 554
Liddard v. Liddard, 28 Beav. 266
Hooper v. Bradbury, 133 Mass. 303
Phillips v. Phillips, 122 If. T. 197
Williams v. McKinney, 34 Kas. 514
S. C, 9 Pac. Bep. 265; Branson v
Hunter, 2 Hill Ch. 490; Mitchell v
Mitchell, 42 K. E. Kep. 465.
3 Corbet v. Corbet, I. K. 7 Eq.
456.
4 Green v. Marsden, 1 Dr. 646.
5 Prevost v. Clarke. 2 Madd.
458; Meredith v. Heneage, 1 Sim.
553.
6 Meredith v. Heneage, 1 Sim.
553.
i Horwood v. West, 1 Sim. & St.
387; Tibbitts v. Tibbitts, 19 Ves.
656; Paul v. Compton, 8 Ves. 380;
Malim v. Keighley, 2 Ves. Jr. 333,
529; Malim v. Barker, 3 Ves. 150;
Meredith v. Heneage, 1 Sim. 543;
Kingston v. Lorton, 2 Hog. 166;
Cbolmondeley v. Cholmondeley,
14 Sim. 590; Hart v. Tribe, 18
Beav. 215; Meggison v. Moore, 2
Ves. Jr. 630; Sale v. Moore, 1 Sim.
534; Ex parte Payne, 2 Y. & Coll.
636 ; Randal v. Hearle, 1 Aust. 124 ;
Lefroy v. Flood, 4 Ir. Ch. 1; Cun-
liffe v. Cunliffe, Amb. 686; Web-
ster v. Morris, 06 Wis. 366.
8 Harland v. Trigg, 1 Bro. Ch.
142; Paul v. Compton, 8 Ves. 380.
9 Cary v. Cary, 2 Sch. & Lef. 189;
White v. Briggs, 2 Phill. 583; Paul
v. Compton, 8 Ves. 380.
10 Griffiths v. Evans, 5 Beav. 241;
Shepherd v. Nottidge, 2 J. & H.
766.
11 Shovelton v. Shovelton, 32
Beav. 143; Wright v. Atkyns, 17
Ves. 255; Webb v. Wools, 2 Sim.
267; Palmer v. Simmonds, 2 Dr.
225; Warner v. Bates, 98 Mass.
274; Gully v. Crego, 24 Beav. 185;
Keid"s Adm'r v. Blackstone, 14
Gratt. 363; Dresser v. Dresser, 46
Me. 48; Knox v. Knox, 59 Wis.
172; Blanchard v. Chapman, 22
111. App. 341.
12 Macey v. Shurmer, 1 Atk. 389;
Kay v. Adams, 3 M. & K. 237;
Gully v. Crego, 24 Beav. 185.
13 Parsons v. Baker, 18 Ves. 476;
Taylor v. George, 2 Ves. & B. 378;
Malone v. O'Connor, Lloyd &
Gould, 465; Sale v. Moore, 1 Sim.
534.
14 Wood v. Cox, 1 Keen, 317; s.
C, 2 Myl. & Cr. 684; Pilkingtonv.
Boughey, 12 Sim. 114; Irvine v.
Sullivan, L. K. 8 Eq. 673.
15 Macnab v. Whitbread, 17 Beav.
299.
16 Hinxmanv. Poynder, 5 Sim. 546.
17 Godfrey v. Godfrey, 11 W. K.
'554; Pierson v. Garnet, 2 Bro. Ch.
38.
18 Briggs v. Penny, 3 McN. & G.
546; Bardswell v. Bardswell, 9
Sim. 323; Nowland v. Nelligan, 1
Bro. Ch. 489.
§ 70.] EXPRESS TRUSTS. 129
"trusting and wholly confiding."1 These words and ex-
pressions differ widely in their significance and force, and
their relations to the context will, of course, determine the
construction of the court. The recent cases illustrating
the doctrine are not very numerous, but the diligent student
will find a decision that is applicable to almost any question
with which he may be confronted. In a case where a tes-
tator, by one clause of his will, gives and bequeathes to his
"beloved and only daughter" all of his estate, both real
and personal, during her natural life, and at her death
directs the property to be equally divided between the chil-
dren of the tenant for lif e ; and by another clause expresses
his "will and desire" to be, that should either of his grand-
sons arrive at the age of twenty-one, or any of his grand-
daughters marry, previous to the time of final distribution,
then that such grandson, or such granddaughter, shall re-
ceive a portion of the estate as a loan, to have the manage-
ment and receive the benefit of the same until the final
distribution shall take place, when the property thus loaned
shall return to the estate to be equally divided. It was
held that the will did not create a trust for the benefit of
the grandchildren, but merely vested a power in the daugh-
ter (the tenant for life) to be exercised at her discretion.2
In Foley v. Parry, where testator gave his real and personal
estates to his wife, for life, remainder to his great nephew,
F W, son of his late nephew, and expressed it to be his
particular wish and request that his wife, together with F
Ws grandfather, should superintend and take care of his
education, so as to fit him for any respectable profession or
employment. It was held that F W was entitled to be
maintained and educated, during his minority, in the man-
ner described, out of the income of the testator's estates.5
In the case of Erickson v. Willard, where E T devised all
her estate to J W and appointed him her executor, in the
will was the following clause : "I desire that the said J W
'"Wood v. Cox, 1 Keen, 317; s. 2 Lines v. Darden, 5 Fla. 51.
C., 2 Myl. & Cr. 684; Griffiths v. 3 Foley v. Parry, 5 Sim. 138.
Evans, 5Beav. 241.
9
130
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§ 70.
should, at his discretion, appropriate a part of the. income
of my estate aforesaid, not exceeding $50 a year, to the
support of the widow of M E," etc. It was holden that
this clause, coupled with other expressions, rendered the
devise to J W a trust to the above amount, which a court
of law could enforce.1
'Erickson v. Willard, 1 N. H.
217. Various other expressions
have been construed as words of
command, and therefore creating
a trust : "Will and declare," Gray
v. Gray, 11 Ir. Ch. 218 ; "in the full
belief," Fordhara v. Speight, 23
W. R. 782; "not doubting," Par-
sons v. Baker, 18 Ves. 476 ; Taylor
v. George, 2 Ves. & B. 378; Malone
v. O'Connor, L. & G. 465; "order
and direct," White v. Briggs, 2
Phillim. 583; "authorize and em-
power," Brown v. Higgs, 4 Ves.
708; "absolutely trusting," Irvine
v. Sullivan, L. R. 8 Eq. 673; "of
course he will give," Robinson v.
Smith, 6 Madd. 194; Lechmere v.
Lavie, 2 Myl. & K. 197; "in con-
sideration he has promised to
give," Clifton v. Lombe, Amb.
519; "under the firm conviction,"
Barnes v. Grant, 26 L. J. (N. S.)
Ch. 92; "convinced," Hart v.
Tribe, 18 Beav. 215; "it is my
wish," Brunson v. Hunter, 2 Hill
Ch. 490; McRae v. Means, 34 Ala.
349, Hooper v. Bradbury, 133
Mass. 303; "to dispose of and
divide among my children," Col-
lins v. Carlisle, 7 B. Mon. 14;
"with full confidence that they
will," Bullv. Bull, 8 Conn. 47; "I
desire that he should appropriate
not exceeding fifty dollars per
year," Erickson v. Willard, 1 N.
H. 217; "to her discretion I in-
trust the education and mainte-
nance of my children out of the
profits of the estate," Lucas v.
Lockhart, 10 Smed. & M. 466; "I
allow my son to support her off
my plantation during her life,"
Hunter v. Stembredge, 12 Ga. 192;
"request," Eddy v. Hartshorne, 34
N. J. Eq. 419; Bohon v. Barrett,
79 Ky. 378; "of course the legatee
will give," Robinson v. Smith, 6
Madd. 194; Clifton v. Lombe, 1
Amb. 519; "in the full faith," Noe
v. Kern, 93 Mo. 367; s. c, 3 Am.
St. Rep. 544; "order and direct,"
White v. Briggs, 2 Phillim. 583;
Cary v. Cary, 2 Sch. & Lef. 189;
"request," Pierson v. Garnet, 2
Bro. Ch. 38,226; Bernard v. Min-
shall, 1 Johns. 276 ; Eddy v. Harts-
home, 34 N. J. Eq. 419; Williams
v.Worthinton, 49 Md. 572; s. C.,33
Am. Rep. 286; Colton v. Colton,
127 U. S. 300; "with a special re-
quest," Handley v. Wrightson, 60
Md. 198; "under the firm convic-
tion," Barnes v. Grant, 26 L. J. Ch.
92; s. c, 2 Jur. (N.S.) 1127; "I al-
low my son to give her support,"
Hunter v. Stembredge, 12 Ga. 192;
"to pay the income yearly to son,"
Cole v. Littlefield, 35 Me.439 ; Chase
v. Chase, 2 Allen, 101 ; Whiting v.
Whiting, 4 Gray, 240. Where a tes-
tator, after making provision for
certain relatives, and giving the
use of the estate in question to his
wife during her life, disposed of
the residue of his estate thus: "All
the rest and residues of my estate,
both real and personal, I give and
bequeath to my two brothers A and
B, whom I appoint my executors,
with full confidence that they will
settle my estate according to my
§71.
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
131
§ 71. The Same. — Words that are merely expressive of
friendship, good-will or kind regard, or that express confi-
dence in the fairness, justice or kindness of the donee, or
that commend other persons to his benevolence, are held
will, and that they will dispose of
such residue among our brothers
and sisters and their children as
they shall judge shall be most in
need of the same ; this to be done
according to their best discretion,"
it was held on a bill in chancery,
between different classes of persons
claiming under the will: 1, that a
trust was created by the will in fa-
vor of the brothers and sisters and
their children; 2, that A and B and
their children were not objects of
the testator's bounty, and took no
beneficial interest under the will;
3, that the estate given vested, on
the testator's death, in A and B, as
trustees, for the use of their broth-
ers and sisters and their children,
to be by them enjoyed after the
death of the widow, and conse-
quently the after-born children,
and those who became needy there-
after, could not take; 4, that the
devise was not void, on the ground
of the total uncertainty of the per-
sons of the devisees, as a rule was
given by which those persons might
be designated, namely, the most
needy of the brothers and sisters
and their children ; and 5, that the
executors having died, without hav-
ing exercised the power, it is com-
petent to a court of chancery to ex-
ercise it. Bull v. Bull, 8 Conn. 47.
The doctrine in this case was dis-
tinctly disapproved in the later
Connecticut cases. See Gilbert v.
Chapin, 19 Conn. 342. Testator by
the second clause of his will devised
to his wife "all my property of
whatever kind, real and personal,
with power to sell and convey, or
pay debts or use in any way as
she may choose." By the eighth
clause he provided : "In case my
wife survives me, I desire that she
have entire control of my estate,
and divide and pay to our children
only when and as she may desire."
Held, that the property devised was
charged in the hands of testator's
wife with a trust in favor of their
children, though the will of the
testator creating the trust was ex-
pressed in precatory terms. Ide v.
Clark, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 239.
Lord Cottenham, in Knott v. Cot-
tee, 2 Hare, gave his view of the
construction to be put upon these
expressions in the following lan-
guage: "I have had frequent op-
portunities of considering the effect
of words of recommendation. One
was in a recent case in this court,
where the question was whether a
recommendation by the testator,
that a certain person should be em-
ployed as receiver and manager of
his property, gave that person any
legal interest. Another case was
that of Shaw v. Lawless (5 CI. &
Fin. 129), where the House of
Lords laid it down as a rule, which
I have since acted upon, that,
though 'recommendation' may in
some cases amount to a direction
and create a trust, yet, that being a
flexible term, if such a construction
of it be inconsistent with any posi-
tive provision in the will, it is to
be considered as a recommenda-
tion, and nothing more. In that
case, the interest supposed to be
given to the party recommended
was inconsistent with other powers
which the trustees were to exer-
cise ; and those powers being given
132
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§71.
not to create a trust. Testator gave whatsoever property
or effects he might die possessed of, after his debts were
paid, or might become entitled to, to his wife, and ap-
pointed her sole executrix of his will. "And my reason for
in unambiguous terms it was held,
that as the two provisions could
not stand together, the flexible
term was to give way to the inflexi-
ble term." So in Webb v. Wools,
2 Sim. (N. S.) 267, in such cases it
was laid down as a rule of con-
struction that where the latter
words of a sentence in a will go to
cut down an absolute gift, con-
tained in the first part of the sen-
tence and are opposed to such gift,
the court will, if it can, give effect
to the absolute gift. So likwise in
Johnston v. Kow lands, 2 De G . & Sm .
356; White v. Briggs, L. J. 15 Ch.
182 ; Winch v. Brutton, 14 Sim. 379 ;
Finden v. Stephens, 2 Phill. 142 ;
Reeves v. Baker, 18 Beav. 372. In
case of Ware v. Mallard, L. J. 21
Ch. 355, a bequest by a testator of
all his property to his wife, her ex-
ecutors and assigns, for her sole
benefit, in full confidence that she
would appropriate the same for the
benefit of his children, was held to
be a gift of an estate for her life
with a power of appointment in fa-
vor of her children, and a gift to
them, in default of appointment, as
joint tenants. See Lawless v. Shaw,
1 Lloyd v. Goold, 154. In the
United States, in support of the
now accepted English rules of con-
struction, the cases have not been
numerous, yet in nearly all the
States where the question has been
raised the English cases have been
followed. In Gilbert v. Chapin, 19
Conn. 351, Church, C. J., says: "It
is said that precatory language, or
words of recommendation, are ex-
pressive of a testator's will and in-
tention, and that such will, when-
ever and however declared, courts
are bound to declare and carry into
effect. It is true that such forms
of expression declare a wish — a
preference — but not a will in its
appropriate sense. They express
an intention, or rather a desire, not
absolutely, but with a qualification
or condition, that such desire shall
nevertheless be subject to the fu-
ture discretion and action of the
devisee, and the distinction between
this and an imperative direction,
which, in legal parlance, is a will,
is very intelligible and clear. But
in this devise we have something
more than the language of recom-
mendation understood according
to its legitimate definition, to sat-
isfy us that nothing imperative was
intended in behalf of the children
of the devisor; for he proceeds be-
yond this, and, by words the most
appropriate, leaves the whole time
and manner of distribution to the
final control of his wife. We need
make no inquiry after the motives
of the testator, although it is not
difficult to perceive them. We may
think it unnatural, or at least un-
usual, that a father should, under
any circumstances, disinherit his
young children, who could have
given him no occasion of offense.
And it would be almost equally
strange if he had intended to leave a
destitute wife. He intended neither ;
but rather, in a prudent way, to
provide for them all. He supposed
the interests of his children would
be safe if committed to the care of
their surviving parent, who had
motives equally strong as his own
to promote and protect them."
§71.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
133
so doing is the constant abuse of trustees which I daily wit-
ness among men, at the same time trusting that she will,
from the love she bears to me and our dear children, so
husband and take care of what property there may be for
their good, and should she marry again, then I wish she
Harper v. Phelps, 21 Conn. 257, fol-
lowed and approved this view. See
also Thompson v. McKissick, 3
Humph. 631 ; Ellis v. Ellis, 15 Ala.
296; Skrine v. "Walker, 3 Rich. Eq.
262. In the case of Pennook's Es-
tate, 20 Pa. St. 268, Judge Low-
rie traced the origin of the rule
in the earlier English cases to a
misapplication of the provisions of
the Roman law in regard to lega-
cies, founded on different princi-
ples, and which had never been
adopted in Pennsylvania. The
court's conclusion was that words
in a will expressive of desire, rec-
ommendation and confidence are
not words of technical, but of com-
mon parlance, and are not prima
facie sufficient to convert a devise
or bequest into a trust; but that
such words might amount to a dec-
laration of trust when it appeared,
from other parts of the will, that
the testator intended not to com-
mit the estate to the devisee or the
legatee, or the ultimate disposal of
it to his kindness, justice or discre-
tion. See also in support, Walter
v.Hall, 34 Pa. St. 483; Kinter v.
Jenks, 48 Id. 466; Presbyterian
Church v. Disbrow, 23 Legr Int.
245 ; Eberhardt v. Perolin, 49 1ST. J.
Eq. 570; Chase v. Plummer, 17
Md. 165. In a recent case before
the Supreme Court of Indiana it
was held that an absolute devise in
fee of certain land to the testator's
wife is not limited or charged with
any trust by a subsequent provision
in the will, that it is the testator's
"request and wish" that she will
make such provision by will or
otherwise, that at her death a
specified son of the testator may
share equally in the property
willed to her with the testator's
other children. In delivering the
opinion in this case Mr. Chief Jus-
tice Hackney said : "The conflict
of opinion as to the effect of words
of this character is almost bewil-
dering. Confusion has arisen from
the idea that the 'wish of a testator,
like the request of a sovereign, is
equivalent to a command,' regard-
less of other rules of construction
and of other expressions of the
testator in positive conflict with the
notion of a command. In the re-
cent case of Orth v. Orth, supra,
we cited many cases where expres-
sions of hope, confidence, entreaty,
wish and request were held not to
create a trust. In addition to the
authorities there cited we quote
from Beach on Wills, p. 404, the
doctrine of precatory trusts as we
understand and approve it. 'Preca-
tory trusts have not been invariably
regarded with favor in England,
and in recent case a disposition
has been evinced to qualify the rule
or apply it with caution; also
among the American States the
courts of South Carolina, New Jer-
sey, New York and Conecticut,
appear disposed to construe the
doctrine with strictness; while in
Pennsylvania the English rule has
been declared to form no part of
the common law of that State,
precatory words being construed
by its courts to amount to a decla-
134 EXPRESS TRUSTS. [§71.
may convey to trustees, in the most secure manner possible,
what property she may then possess for the benefit of the
children, as they may severally need or deserve, taking jus-
tice and affection for her guide." And at the conclusion of
his will he gave the capital of his business to his wife,
trusting that she would deal justly and properly to and by
all their children. It was held that no trust was created
for the children.1 In the case of Gilbert v. Chapin, where
the testator, by his will, disposed of his estate thus:
"After the payment of- my just debts, I give, devise and
bequeath all my estate, real and personal, to my wife A, to
her and her heirs forever, recommending to her to give the
same to my children at such time and in such manner as she
shall think best." The testator, at his death, left two
children. A, his widow, was afterwards married to B, had
issue by him, made her will, and thereby gave all her estate
(after payment of certain claims) to the children of her
first husband, and then died, B surviving her. In an action
of ejectment brought by those children to recover the es-
tate so devised against B, who was in possession, claiming
as tenant by the curtesy, it was held that A, under the
will of her first husband, took an absolute estate in fee-
simple, and not merely an estate in trust for his children,
and consequently that B had a life estate in the premises as
tenant by the curtesy.2 The testator gave to each of his
ration of a trust, only when it ap- an intention to create a trust.'"
pears from other parts of the "will Mitchell v. Mitchell (1895), 147
that the testator intended not to Ind. 113, 120.
commit the ultimate disposal of 1 Pope v. Pope, 10 Sim. 3.
the estate to the kindness, justice, 2 Gilbert v. Chapin, 19 Conn. 342.
or discretion of the devisee or "Where a testatrix bequeaths to
legatee. And in other States the each of two legatees a certain sum
judges show a decided leaning unconditionally, "as their absolute
against the doctrine. Although property," and then adds: "I re-
the modern tendency is very de- quest the said [legatees] to use said
cidedly toward a restriction of this fund thus given to further what
doctrine, when cases arise in which is called the "Woman's Rights
both the subject and the object of Cause," but neither of them is un-
the trust are clearly defined in the der any legal responsibility to
precatory words or clauses, the any one or to any court to do
court will consider it evidence of so," no trust is created and
§71.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
135
brothers and his sister $10,000; to each of his nephews
and nieces, of whom there were thirty-five, $5,000, and to
each of his nephews and nieces in the second degree, of
whom there were one hundred and twelve, $1,000. He
then devised to C, a favorite niece living with him at the
making of the will, and continuing with him until his death,
the bequest is valid. Bacon v.
Kansom, 139 Mass. 117; s. c, 29 N.
E. Kep. 473. Testator devised his
farm to his grandchildren in fee,
and after declaring when it should
be divided, " admonished " and
"charged" his grandchildren that
the gift was made "in the hope
and upon the trust that they will
provide for their parents during
their lives." Held, to raise no trust
in favor of the parents. Arnold v.
Arnold (1893), 41 S. Car. 291; s. c,
19 S. E. Eep. 670. A provision by
which testatrix disposed of the resi-
due of her estate and "requested"
the residuary legatee "to give as I
may direct or sell what remains,"
does not create a precatory trust,
where she fails to direct, by a sub-
sequent testamentary instrument,
to whom the property is to be
given. Wyman v. Woodbury, 86
Hun, 277; s.c, 33 N. Y. Sup. 217.
In a bequest to testator's wife, the
precatory words : "I expect and
desire that my said wife will not
dispose of any of said estate by will
in such a way that the whole that
might remain at her death shall go
out of my family and blood rela-
tion," do not qualify wife's estate
nor create a trust, being merely
testator's desire. In re Gardner
(1894), 140 N.Y. 122; s.c. ,35N.E.
439. "I give and bequeath to him
the said sum of $1,000, and the
same is to him and his heirs and
assigns forever, for the uses and
purposes before stated, and I rely
upon him to carry out the wishes
and purposes that I have herein
before indicated, and that those
interested in my estate will co-op-
erate in carrying on the work that I
by this bequest desire to promote."
Held, that the bequest was to the
executor absolutely, and was valid.
Inre Ingersoll's Will (1891) , 66 Him,
571; s.c, 14 N". Y. Sup. 22. The
word '-recommend" held only in-
tended as advice, and not as a lim-
itation of the estate, and no trust
was created in favor of Harvard
College. In re Whitcomb's Estate
(1891), 86 Cal. 265; s. C, 24 Pac.
Kep. 1028. A will containing the
following clause, "I hereby will
and bequeath unto my beloved wife,
Catharine M. Ellis, my whole es-
tate, real and personal, after the
payment of my just debts, recom-
mending to her, at the same time,
to make some small allowance, at
her convenience, to each of my
brothers and sisters, say to each
one thousand dollars," does not
create a trust in favor of the broth-
ers and sisters of the testator. Ellis
v. Ellis, 15 Ala. 296. A request that
"my dear husband assign by will
what of this property I now leave
him, he has not expended, to such
of my relatives as he in his judg-
ment may think need it," gives the
husband absolute title, free from
any trust in favor of the relatives.
Durant v. Smith (1893), 159 Mass.
229; s.c.,34]Sr.E.Rep.l90. Where
a testator made a bequest to his
son, stating therein that "it is my
request and desire" that in case
136 EXPRESS TRUSTS. [§71.
a dwelling house in the City of New Haven, to be furnished
from his estate in a manner suitable for her family's use,
and an annuity of $2,000, from a trust fund created by the
will, during her life, for the support of herself and of her
nephews and nieces whom she had then under her care,
and of such other persons as she from time to time might
wish and request to be members of her family. M, one of
the testator's nieces in the second degree, who had spent
some time in his family during his lifetime, received aid
from him in support and tuition, being afterwards in feeble
health and destitute condition, though not under C's care
nor a member of her family, brought a bill in chancery
against C to obtain from her a portion of such annuity.
It was held that the disposition of the annuity was left by
the will entirely to the discretion of C, which it was not
within the power of a court of equity to control.1 In a re-
cent case before the Court of Appeals of the State of New
York, where the will of F disposed of his property as fol-
lows: "I * * * give and bequeath all my property,
real and personal, to my beloved wife, Mary, only request-
ing her, at the close of her life, to make such disposition
of the same among my children and grandchildren as shall
seem to her good." It was held that the gift to the wife
was absolute; that the concluding words, being merely
words of suggestion, not of direction or command, did not
create a trust. Referring to the words of the will, Mr.
Justice Danforth said: "They are not words of obliga-
tion, and impose none. They are mere words of sugges-
tion, involving no direction or command. By executing
the alleged trust she would defeat the gift. The plaintiff
reads it as if the testator said: 'I will give you all of my
estate, but at the close of your life you are to distribute all
of it among my children and my grandchildren,' and so
said son has no children, he should cient to create a trust for the chil-
carry out his promise made prior to dren of the sister or to reduce the
the making of this will, and be- bequest to a life estate. Forscht's
queath the estate received thereby Estate, 2 Pa. Dist. Reports, 294.
to the children of his sister, etc., 1 Harper v. Phelps, 21 Conn. 256.
the words of the will are not suffi-
$71.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
137
the wife would get nothing. The question, as an original
one, seems too plain for argument, and susceptible of one
answer only, and that in favor of the defendant. In my
opinion the provision is at most a mere recommendation of
the children and grandchildren to the favorable considera-
tion of the devisee, and does not create a legal obligation
of any kind upon her in their favor. Indeed, the peculiar
and qualified language used, 'only requesting,' etc.,
seems also to indicate that the omission to provide for them
was deliberate and intentional, and that they may have been
so referred to under an impression of the testator, or the
writer of the will, that unless, in some manner, they ap-
peared to be in the mind of the testator at the time of its
execution the will would, as to them, be invalid. Such an
impression would be justified by the statutes of some of the
States of the Union, and from some one of these the testa-
tor or his scrivenei may have gathered it. But for what-
ever reason inserted they do not, in our opinion, create a
trust."1
1 Foose v. Whitmore, 82 N". T.
405; s. c, 37 Am. Rep. 572. A tes-
tator, by his will, gave to his two
younger sons all his estate, real or
personal, in fee-simple. The will
then provided as follows: "In
making this disposition of my
property I assume that my eldest
son will understand and appreciate
my reasons for giving whatever
property I may have at my decease
to his younger brothers; and that
they on their part will not fail to
do for him and his family all that
in the circumstances the truest fra-
ternal regard may require them to
do." Held, that the will did not
create a trust for the benefit of the
testator's eldest son and his family;
and that the devisees took an es-
tate in fee-simple. Rose v. Porter,
141 Mass. 309. L, by the first
clause of his will, devised his whole
estate, real and personal, to his
wife during her widowhood; by
the fourth clause he declared that
"during my wife's widowhood she
is to have the entire use, profits
and control of my estate, and to
her discretion do I intrust the edu.
cation and maintenance of my chil-
dren during that time;" and this
clause further proceeded to pro-
vide for the maintenance and edu-
cation of the children "out of the
profits" of his estate, in case of the
death or marriage of his widow.
Held, that the language of the
will imperatively commanded that
the children should be educated and
supported, and set apart a specific
fund for that purpose ; the widow,
therefore, took the estate coupled
with this trust, and in consequence
it was not liable while the children
lived, to be sold to satisfy judg-
ments against the widow. Lucas
v. Lucas, 10 Smed. & M. 466. Hus-
138
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§72.
§ 72. Necessity of Probate of Wills. — Under the stat-
ute of frauds all devises of real estate are required to be in
writing. They must be signed by the testator, or by some
other person in his presence and by his direction, and they
band devises his estate after the
payment of debts "wholly to his
wife, and to be disposed of by her
and divided among my children at
her discretion." Held, that the
wife took an estate for life, with
full power to give to the children,
or appropriate it to their use at her
discretion; and she dying the chil-
dren of the testator take that undis-
posed of by their mother under the
will. Collins v. Carlisle, 7 B. Mon.
14. C 'made a will leaving his
whole property, real and personal,
to G, whom he also appointed his
executor. When about to die, C
sent for G, and in a private inter-
view told him of the will, and on
G's asking whether that was right
said he would not have it other-
wise. C then told G where the
will was to be found, and that with
it would be found a letter. This
was all that was known to have
passed between the parties. The
letter named a great many persons
to whom C wished sums of money
to be given and annuities to be
paid; but it contained several ex-
pressions as to G carrying into
effect the intentions of the testator
as he "might think best," and this
sentence, "I do not wish you to act
strictly on the foregoing instruc-
tions, but leave it entirely to your
own good judgment to do as you
think I would if living, and as the
parties are deserving, and as it is
not my wish that you should say
anything about this document,
there cannot be any fault found with
you by any of the parties should
you not act in strict accordance
with it." G paid money to some
of the parties mentioned in the let-
ter, but not to all. Held, that in
this case there was not any trust
created binding on G. McCormick
v. Grogan, 4 Bng. & Irish App. 82.
Where a testator employed these
words: "I desire that the land
and other property remaining shall
continue in the possession of my
beloved wife L, during her life,
believing she will make use of it to
the best advantage for the benefit
of our children, as well as her own
comfort," it was held that no trust
was created. McCreary v. Burns,
17 S. Car. 45. So where the will
provided that devisee "may leave
the same to her children." Mcln-
tyre v. Mclntyre, 123 Pa. St. 329.
To the same effect was Mussoorie
Bank v. Kaynor, L. K. 7 App. Cas.
321, where the testator gave to his
widow the whole of his property,
"feeling confident that she will act
justly to our children when no
longer required by her." In re
Adams, L. K. 27 Ch. Div. 394, recent-
ly determined in England, where
the testator gave all his real and
personal estate "unto the absolute
use" of his wife, her heirs, execu-
tors, administrators and assigns,
"in the full confidence that she
would do what was right" as to the
disposal thereof, between his chil-
dren, either in her lifetime or by
will after her decease, it was held
that the widow took an absolute
interest in the property, free from
any trust in favor of the children.
So where a testator made provision
for a society, but provided that, if
it should prove ineffective, the
property was to go to certain per-
§ 72. J
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
139
must be attested or subscribed iu his presence by at least
three witnesses. In England, by more recent legislation,
wills, whether of real or personal estate, must be executed
and attested with the special formalities there prescribed.
The rule of the English courts is expounded by the late
Mr. Lewin as follows: "To trace the operations of these
enactments we must bear in mind that the absolute owner
of property combines in himself both the legal and equitable
interest, and where the legislature enacts that no devise or
bequest of property shall be valid without certain ceremo-
nies, a testator cannot, by an informal instrument, affect
the equitable any more than the legal estate, for the one is
a constituent part of the ownership as much as the other.
Thus, a person cannot, but by will duly signed and attested,
give a sum of money originally and primarily out of land,
for the charge is part of the land and to be raised out of it
by sale or mortgage.1 And if a testator, by will duly signed
sons "absolutely and in fee;" the
bequest to such persons being "in
the confident belief" that they
would apply the property in ac-
cordance with his "wishes ; but it
is intended to be unconditional and
free from any legal trustor obliga-
tion qualifying their absolute title,"
it was held that no trust was
created. In re Havens, 6 Dem.
Surr. 456. The will of C. after a
gift of his residuaiy estate, to his
daughter, the defendant, and "to
her heirs and assigns forever,"
contained this provision : "I com-
mit my granddaughter * " to the
charge and guardianship of my
daughter. * * * I enjoin upon
her to make such provision for
said grandchild out of my resid-
uary estate * * in such manner
and at such times and in such
amounts as she may judge to be
expedient and conducive to the
welfare of said grandchild and her
own sense of justice and Christian
duty shall dictate." It was held
that no trust was created, but that
defendant took an absolute title,
the provision to be made to plaint-
iff being left wholly to her discre-
tion as to the amount and manner
of the provision and the time when
it should be made, the exercise of
which could not be interfered with
by the court. Lawrence v. Cooke,
104 N. Y. 632. See Bills v. Bills,
80 Iowa, 269 ; Brown v. Carter, 111
N. Car. 183.
1 1 Lewin on Trusts, § 66 (2d Am.
Ed.). In the case of Brudenell v.
Boughton, 2 Atk. 272, Lord Chan-
cellor Hardwicke says : "This bill
is brought by Mrs. Brudenell and
her husband to have the legacies
given to her under the first will,
raised out of the testator's real es-
tate. This must depend upon the
construction of the statute of frauds
and perjuries, and the consequences
of the law arising upon it. It is
very certain no devise of lands can
be made but with such solemnity
accompanying the execution of it,
140 EXPRESS TRUSTS. [§ 72.
and attested, give lands to A and his heirs upon trust, but
without specifying the particular trust intended, and then,
by a paper not duly signed and attested as a will or codicil,
declare a trust in favor of B, the beneficial interest under
the will is a part of the original ownership, and cannot be
passed by the informal paper, but will descend to the heir-
at-law.1 Again, if a legacy be bequeathed by a will in
writing to A upon trust, and the testator by parol express
an intention that it shall be held by A upon trust for B,
such a direction is, in fact, a testamentary disposition of
the equitable interest in the chattel, and therefore void by
the statute which imposes the necessity of a written will.
If it be said that such expression of intention, though void
as a devise or bequest, may yet be good as a declaration of
trust, and, therefore, that where the legal estate of a free-
hold is well devised, a trust may be engrafted upon it by a
single note in writing, and where a personal chattel is well
bequeathed, a trust of it, as excepted from the seventh sec-
tion of the statute of frauds, may be raised by a mere parol
declaration, the answer is that a wide distinction exists be-
tween testamentary dispositions and declarations of trust.
The former are ambulatory until the death of the testator,
but the latter take effect, if at all, at the time of the exe-
cution. 'The deed,' observes Lord Loughborough in a
similar case, 'is built on the will ; if the will is destroyed
the deed I should consider absolutely gone ; the will with-
as is directed by this act ; and it is ocation of a sum of money charged
equally clear, where a sum of by a will upon lands, they must
money is given originally and pri- both be revoked in the same man-
marily out of land, a will with that ner."
charge must be equally executed : Adlington v. Cann, 3 Atk. 151.
with the same solemnity, because "As to freehold lands, a man can
it is considered in this court as part no more dispose of a trust or equi-
of the land, since it can only be table interest, than he can of the
raised by sale or disposition of part legal estate in those lands, under
of the land, and this is analogous the statute of frauds, without these
to the rule of law that a devise of solemnities. Neither can he re-
rents and profits is a devise of the voke a trust or equitable interest in
land itself. The rule is likewise the freehold lands any more than he
same as to revocations of a devise can devise it without these solemni-
of lands; and with respect to a rev- ties." Ibid.
§ 73. J EXPRESS TRUSTS. 141
out the deed is incomplete, and the deed without the will is
a nullity.'1 And Mr. Justice Butler observed: 'A deed
must take place upon its execution or not at all ; it is not
necessary for a deed to convey an immediate interest in
possession, but it must take place as passing an interest to
be conveyed at the execution ; but a will is quite the re-
verse, and can only operate after death.'2 We may,
therefore, safely assume, as an established rule, that if the
intended disposition be of a testamentary character and not
to take effect in the testator's lifetime, but ambulatory
until his death, such disposition is inoperative, unless it be
declared in writing in strict conformity with the statutory
enactments regulating devises and bequests."3
§ 73. The Subject Continued. — In this country, in
most of the States at least, the transfer of an interest,
either legal or equitable, in the property of a testator, can-
not be proved by a will unless it has been duly proved,
allowed and recorded in a court of probate having jurisdic-
tion in the case.4 And where a will has been proved and
admitted to record, before it can be used to effect the title
to property in another State it must there be recorded.5
In the case of Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Walsh, where a for-
eign testator devised land in Wisconsin to his executor in
trust to pay debts, it was held that the title to the land
was not affected by the provision of the will, and a creditor
would have no interest in the land till the foreign will pro-
bated in the State of testator's domicile should be made
effective as to the lands owned by him by compliance with
the statutes. The creditor cannot, in such a case, main-
tain an action to compel the executor to have the will
1 Habergham v. Vincent, 2 Ves. Nat. Bank (1893), 95 Ky. 79; s. c,
Jr. *209. 23 S. W. Kep. 667.
2 Habergham v. Vincent, 2 Ves. 3 1 Lewin on Trusts, § 66 (2d Am.
Jr. *209. Where a testamentary Ed.).
trustee purchases property with the 4 Bailey v. Bailey, 8 Ohio, 239;
trust funds, and takes a deed as Wilson's Exr. v. Tappan, 6 Ohio,
trustee, the character of the trust 172.
is determined by the will, and not 5 Wilson's Exr. v. Tappan, 6 Ohio,
by the deed. Lewis v. Citizens' 172; Bailey v. Bailey, 8 Ohio, 239.
142
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§73.
probated or allowed in this State, because he himself has
the same right as the executor to procure such allowance.1
A court of equity will enforce a trust arising under the
will of a foreign testator, even where the will was proved
and allowed under the law of the State where it was made,
only as a certified copy of the will has been filed in the
Probate Court having jurisdiction where the remedy is
sought. In the case of Campbell v. Wallace, before the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, it was held that
this court has no jurisdiction in equity to enforce a trust
arising under the will of a foreigner, which has been
proved and allowed in a foreign country only, and no cer-
tified copy of which has been filed in the Probate Court
here.2 But a will cannot be admitted to record in a Probate
Court unless it has first been proved and allowed in the
State where it was made.3
1 Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Walsh
(1894), 87 Wis. 67; s. c, 57 N. W.
Rep. 969; Wilcox v. Abraham, 6
Ohio, 172. A will made and ap-
proved in another State, cannot be
read in evidence in our courts on
the trial of a title derived under it
to lands in this State, unless a copy
of such will is riled and recorded
in the probate court in this State.
Where such will was admitted as
evidence, and plaintiff claims and
makes title through the devisee,
the verdict must be set aside, not-
withstanding it may appear that
the plaintiff might have claimed
through the heir-at-law, as the
deposition which proved him to be
heir, also proved that his ancestor
did not die intestate, but made a
will. Ives v. Allyn, 12 Vt. 589.
2 Campbell v. Wallace, 10 Gray,
162; Wilson v. Tappan, 6 Ohio,
172; Ives v. Allyn, 12 Vt. 589;
Campbell v. Sheldon, 13 Pick. 8.
3 Habergham v. Vincent, 2 Ves.
Jr. 228; Willington v. Adam, 1 V.
&B.445; Doev. Walker, 12 M.&W.
591, 600; In re Earle's Trusts, 4 K.
& J. 673; Smart v. Prujean, 6 Ves.
560; 1 Williams' Executors, 289,
290, and notes; Allen v. Maddock,
11 Moore P. C. 201 ; Croker v. Hert-
ford, 4 Moore P. C. 339, 363;
Thayer v. Wellington, 9 Allen,
283. Gray, C. J., in Jenkins v.
Lester, 131 Mass. 357, says: "The
trust on which the property is held
by her having been created by a
judicial decree of a court of
another State having jurisdiction
of the matter, she is accountable in
the courts of that State for the due
execution of the trust; and by the
decisions and the settled practice
of this court the trust cannot be
enforced in this commonwealth,
although the trustee personally re-
sides here. Campbell v. Sheldon,
13 Pick. 8 ; Campbell v. Wallace,
10 Gray, 162; Chase v. Chase, 2
Allen, 101, 104; Smith v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 14 Allen, 336, 442.
See also Curtis v. Smith, 6 Blatchf.
C. C. 537, 550, 551; Same v. Same,
60 Barb. 9."
§ 74. J EXPRESS TRUSTS. 143
§ 74. The Same Subject. — The statutes of the various
States relating to the proving, allowing and recording of
wills by a Probate Court are not to be understood as in
conflict with the decisions concerning documents not em-
bodied in a will, but to which it contains a reference. It is
a well established rule that a testator, in making a will,
may refer to a document not contained in the will in such a
manner as to incorporate it in, and to make it a part of the
will. But the paper must be in existence at the time of
the execution of the will, and the reference to it must be
so clear, express and positive as to admit of no reasonable
doubt in regard to it. In the leading case, Habergham v.
Vincent, it was held that where a testator refers expressly
to a paper already written, and describes it sufficiently, it
is as if incorporated in the will. In his opinion Mr. Justice
Wilson said: "I believe it is true, and I have found no case
to the contrary, that if a testator in his will refers expressly
to any paper already written, and has so described it that
there can be no doubt of the identity, and the will is exe-
cuted in the presence of three witnesses, that paper,
whether executed or not, makes part of the will, and such
reference is the same as if he had incorporated it, because
words of relation have a stronger operation than any
other."1 Papers of this character should be proved and
recorded with the will as an essential part of it. Papers
referring to a will, but drawn after the will was executed,
must be executed in the same manner as a will, and they
must be probated as a codicil or as a revocation of the will,
or they will be wholly without effect.2 There is some con-
flict and uncertainty in the decisions concerning papers to
1 Habergham v. Vincent, 2 Ves. refer to deeds and other instru-
Jr. 204, 228 ; Milledge v. Lamar, 4 ments, or monuments, or existing
Desaus. Eq. 622 ; Smart v. Prujean, facts, to which reference may be
6 Ves. 560. In Thayer v. Welling- had in construing his will."
ton, 9 Allen, 290, Justice Dewey 2 Briggs v. Penny, 3DeG. &Sm.
says: "A testator may refer ex- 547; Johnson v. Ball, 5 DeG. &
pressly to a paper already exe- Sm. 85; Dawson v. Dawson, 1
cuted, and describe it with such Chev. 148; Thayer v. Wellington,
particularity as to incorporate it 9 Allen, 283 ; Johnson v. Clark, 3
virtually into the will, or he may Kieh. Eq. 305.
144 EXPRESS TRUSTS. [§75.
which there is reference in wills. Just how far documents
not signed and attested, though in existence at the execu-
tion of the will, can be probated, and just what effect they
will have upon the will, seems not to be fully settled. Each
case must be decided by itself, and any case may be found,
in some respects, unlike any other, and may involve ques-
tions not readily answered. It has been held that where
an absolute devise is qualified by other words in the will
itself, showing the intention of the testator that others
should share the property, the devisee holds in trust.1
§ 75. A Devise not Converted into a Trust by Parol. —
We have seen that a trust created in writing cannot be
changed by parol. The principle applies to wills. At
common law a court will not hear parol evidence to
change a devisee under a will in writing into a trustee.2
Under the earlier English law a person appointed executor
in a will held the title to all the personal property, and
after paying all debts and legacies he was entitled to take
the surplus beneficially, and parol evidence was not suffi-
cient to convert him into a trustee for the heirs or next of •
kin.3 But under the statute of 11 Geo. IV. and 1 Wm, IV.,
ch. 40, and by the statutes of all the States of the Ameri-
can Union, an executor is made prima facie a trustee for
the next of kin.4 In a recent case where testator directed
1 Majors v. Herndon, 78 Ky. 128. to his daughter, Martha A. Sailors,
2 Fane v. Fane, 1 Vern. 30. donated out of the $500, at and be-
3 Laugham v. Sandford, 19 Ves. fore the sealing and delivery of
641; White v. Williams, 3 Ves. & these presents," and conveying the
B. 72. premises to the son-in-law with
i Juler v. Juler, 29 Beav. 34; warranty title, vests the title in
Bead v. Steadman, 26 Beav. 495 ; him for his own use, no other use
Love v. Gage, 8 Beav. 472; Harri- being declared. No trust results
son v. Harrison, 2 Hem. & Mill, in favor of the daughter, and while
237; Hill v. Hill, 2 Hayw. 298; parol evidence would be admissi-
Paup v. Mingo, 4 Leigh, 163 ; Hays ble in a proceeding to reform the
v. Jackson, 6 Mass. 153 ; Darrah v. deed if it does not execute the in-
MaNair, 1 Ash. 240; Wilson v. Wil- tention of the parties, such evi-
son, 3 Bin. 559. A deed from a dence is not admissible upon the
father-in-law, made in considera- trial of an action of ejectment
tion of $500, "less $200 for the love brought by a daughter against a
and affection the said White bears person in possession of the land.
§ 7(i.] EXPRESS TRUSTS. 145
that his real estate be sold after the death of his wife,
and the proceeds divided among his children, the children
brought a suit against the widow, alleging that their father
was a real estate dealer, and, for business reasons, was in
the habit of causing property purchased b}' him to be con-
veyed to his wife, on the understanding and promise on
her part that she would hold the same to the use of him-
self and of his and her children after his death, and asked
that certain pieces of property so conveyed to his wife be
adjudged a part of his estate. It was held that any such oral
promise was void and no trust attached to the property so
conveyed to his wife.1 In Alabama, under the Code of
1886, providing that no trust concerning lands except such
as result by implication or construction of law, can be cre-
ated unless by instrument in writing, a parol promise made
to deceased by his executors to convey certain land after
his death to complainant cannot be enforced.2 In Alabama
a bill to enforce a parol trust in land devised by will can-
not be maintained under the Code, § 1845, which declares
that no trust concerning lands, except such as results by
implication or construction of law, or which may be trans-
ferred or extinguished by operation of law, can be created
unless by instrument and writing, signed by the party creat-
ing it.3
§ 76. Settlement on Wife and Children. — The rela-
tions of a wife and children to a husband and father con-
Hawks v. Sailors (1891), 87 Ga. of the Code, which declares that
234; s. C, 13 S. E. Hep. 638. 'no trust concerning lands except
1 Watson v.Pinckney (1892), 46 3ST. such as results by implication or
Y.St. Rep. 245; s. c, 19N. Y. Supl. construction of law, or which may
790; Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 84 be transferred or extinguished by
Hun, 492; s. C, 32 X. Y. Supl. 390. operation of law, can be created,
2 Tolleson v. Blackstock (1S92), unless by instrument in writing
95 Ala. 510; s. c, 11 So. Hep. 2S4. signed by the party creating or de-
3 Moore v. Campbell (1894), 102 claring the same, or his a sent or at-
Ala. 445; s. c, 14 So. Rep. 780; torney lawfully authorized thereto
Patton v. Beecher, 62 Ala. 579; in writing,' has been correctly con-
Brock v. Brock, 90 Ala. 86 ; Hous- strued, but declares a healthy prin-
ton v. Farris, 93 Ala. 588 ; Manning ciple of law for the suppression of
v. Pippen, 95 Ala. 537. "We are fraud and perjury." Moore v.
not only satisfied that section 1815 Campbell, 102 Ala. 445.
10
141) EXPRESS TRUSTS. [§ 7(i.
stitute what is termed a meritorious consideration. Such
a consideration is simply the natural and moral obligation,
or a consequence of such obligation involved in the conju-
gal and parental relation. A consideration growing out of
the ties of consanguinity, of marriage, or of the various forms
of family affection and of the natural and moral obligations
involved, has been recognized by courts of equity from an
early period of English history. Under the statute of
uses a covenant to stand seised to the use of a stranger in
consideration of esteem or affection for him Avas held to be
void for lack of a consideration, and a covenant in consid-
eration of blood or of marriage, to stand seised to the use
of a relative and a stranger, vested the whole use in the
relative and was inoperative in relation to the stranger.1
As an outgrowth of this early doctrine and usage it has
been more recently maintained that a voluntary post-nup-
tial settlement in favor of a wife or a child, though execu-
tory in all respects, is to be sustained on the ground of a
meritorious consideration.2 In the leading case, Ellis v.
Nimmo, it was held that a post-nuptial agreement, in
writing, by which a father undertook to make a provision
for a child, will be specifically executed, being a contract
founded on a meritorious consideration.3 In his opinion
Lord Chancellor Sugden said: "The question is, whether
an agreement for a meritorious consideration resting in
fieri, is such a contract as a court of equity will enforce."
Referring to this and similar cases he says: "In all such
cases, however, the court requires a sufficient consideration,
and I find a provision for a wife or child is held a meritori-
ous consideration, proper to call into action the power of
a court of equity in aid of a defective execution or sur-
1 Sanders' Uses, 96-101; 2 Black- v. Lamb, 2 Eden, 292; Coleman v.
stone's Commentaries, 338. Sarel, 1 Vcs. Jr. 50; Evelyn v.
2 Fothergillv. Fothergill,Freem. Templar, 2 Bro. Ch. 12; Antrobus
250; Watts v. Bullas, 1 P. Wms. v. Smith, 12 Ves. 39; Bodgers v.
00; Bolton v. Bolton, 3 Sev. 414; Marshall, 17 Ves. 294; Sear v.
Goring v. Xash, 3 Atk. 186; Bon- Ashwell, 3 Swanst. 411; Ellison v.
ham v. Xeweornb, 2 Vent. 365; Ellison, 6 Ves. 656.
Leech v. Leech, 1 Ch. Cases, 210; s Ellis v. Ximmo, Ellis & Goold,
Darloy v. Darley, 3 Atk. 399; Hale temp Sug. 333.
§ 7ij,] EXPRESS TRUSTS. 147
render. Now, in my opinion, it makes no difference
whether that power is required to aid a defective surrender
or to enforce an agreement resting in fieri."1 The cases
cited in opposition to this decision are not parallel and have
no direct bearing on the question decided in Ellis v. Nimmo.2
In the subsequent case of Moore v. Crofton, referring to
Ellis v. Nimmo, Lord Sugden said: "I think it not decided
upon sound principles of equity, but I am aware that the
opinion of the profession is otherwise."3 In more recent
English cases other elements have entered into and influ-
enced, if they have not determined the decisions. In the
case of Antrobus v. Smith, a case of father and daughter,
both had died previous to the trial and it appeared that
the father had expressed his intention not to carry the
gift into execution. But Sir William Grant, M. R., seems
to take the ground that a man cannot be compelled to per-
fect a gift, even in favor of a child.4 Touching this point
Mr. Justice Story says: "In cases between different volun-
teers a court of equity will, generally, not interfere, but
will leave the parties where it finds them as to title. It
will not aid one against another, neither will it enforce a
1 Vt supra. tion." They are collected in the
2 Dillon v. Coppin, 4 Myl. & Cr. note to Ellison v. Ellison, 1 White &
646; Holloway v. Headington, 8 T. Lead. Cas. in Eq. (Am. Ed.),
Sim. 324; Jefferys v. Jeffereys, 1 199. In Stone v. Hackett, 12 Gray,
Cr. & Ph. 138. 227, it is said that "it is certainly
3 Moore v. Crofton, Jon. & La. T. true that a court of equity will lend
442. no assistance toward perfecting a
4 Antrobus v. Smith, 12 Ves. 46; voluntary contract or agreement
Holloway v. Headington, 8 Sim. for the creation of a trust, nor re-
325; Judge Hoar, in Phillips v. gard it as binding so long as it re-
Frye, 14 Allen, 38, after reviewing mains executory." See Whittaker
the English authorities, says : "In v. Whittaker, 52 N. Y. 368; Duvall
the United States, while the Ian- v. Wilson, 9 Barb. 4S7; Kirkpatrick
guage of Lord Eldon, in Ellison v. v. Taylor, 43 111. 207; Turner v.
Ellison, has sometimes been quoted Nye, 7 Allen, 176; Smith v. Kitt-
in support of the proposition that redge, 21 Vt. 238; Holley v. Adams,
a meritorious consideration is sum- 16 Vt. 206; Kennedy's Exrs. v.
cient, the decisions would seem to Ware, 1 Barr, 445; Craig v. Craig,
confine the application of the rule 3 Barb. Ch. 116 ; Parish v. Stone,
to covenants under seal, which in 14 Pick. 198.
themselves import a cohsidera-
148 EXPRESS TRUSTS. [§ 77.
voluntary contract. It has been said that there are ex-
ceptions, and that they stand upon special grounds;
such as the interference of courts of equity in favor of settle-
ments upon a wife and children for whom the party is under
a natural and moral obligation to provide.1 But although
the doctrine in favor of such exceptions has been main-
tained by highly respectable authority, yet it must be now
deemed entirely overthrown by the weight of more recent
adjudications in which it has been declared that the court
will not execute a voluntary contract, and that the principle
of the court to withhold its assistance from a volunteer
applies equally, whether he seeks to have the benefit of a
contract, a covenant or a settlement."2
§ 77. The Subject Continued. — From the authorities
heretofore cited it appears that in England there has not
been entire uniformity in the position of the courts, but it
may be affirmed that an executory agreement based on a
consideration, simply meritorious, will not be executed by
the English courts as against the settlor. But it is equally
plain that, at the present time, the courts of this country
are inclined to give claims of this character more favorable
consideration. In the case of Bright v. Bright before the
Kentucky Court of Appeals, Chief Justice Marshall said:
"It is true a court of equity will enforce a written obliga-
tion by the father to convey land to his son on the ground
that proximity of blood is a sufficient consideration to raise
a use."3 In Dennison v. Goehring, Chief Justice Gibson
said: "Natural affection, though not a valuable, is a mer-
itorious consideration ; on the foot of which an agreement
by a father to secure a provision for his child has been en-
forced in equity, by reason of the obligation of parents to
1 1 Fonblanque's Equity, B. 1, Jeffereys, 1 Craig & Ph. 138, 141 ;
ch. 4, § 25 and note (c) ; Id. B. 1, Holloway v. Headington, 8 Sim.
ch. 5, § 2; Atherly on Marriage 325.
Settlements, ch. 3, pp. 131 to 139; * Bright v. Bright, 8 B. Mon.
1 Fonblanque's Equity, B. 4, ch. 1, 197. See Mahan v. Mahan, 7 B.
§ 7 and note (v) ; Ellis v. Simmo, Mon. 582; Mclntire v. Hughes, 4
Lloyd & Goold, 348. Bibb, 186.
2 Lord Cottenham in Jeffereys v.
§77.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
149
provide for their offspring."1 In a recent case it was held
that to raise an equity, in virtue of meritorious considera-
tion, sufficient to induce the enforcement between volun-
teers of a gift or an incomplete trust not supported by
valuable consideration, but which was fully intended and
partially carried into effect by a deceased parent in behalf
1 Dennison v. Goehring, 7 Barr.
179; Husband v. Pollard, cited 2
P. Wms. 467 ; Goring v. Nash, 3
Atk. 186. The personal conven-
ience of the settlor is a good con-
sideration for the execution of a
deed of trust, both at common law
and by implication from Code Civil
Proc. N. Y. § 2463, in which the
right of a party to convey prop-
erty in trust for his own benefit is
expressly recognized by the pro-
vision that the article in reference
to special proceedings "shall not
apply to any money, thing in ac-
tion, or other property held in
trust for a judgment debtor, where
a trust has been created by, or the
fund so held in trust has proceeded
from, a person other than the judg-
ment debtor." TownseDd v. Al-
len, 59 Hun, 622 ; s.C, 13N.Y.Sup.
73. Under2Rev. St.U. Y. p. 134, §
67, providing that no trust shall be
created unless by operation of law,
or by deed or conveyance in writ-
ing, subscribed by the party creat-
ing it, but that a declaration of
trust may be proved by any writ-
ing subscribed by the party declar-
ing it, an undelivered but recorded
instrument, by which the owner of
land declares that it is to be
charged with the maintenance of
another, creates a valid trust
though there is no consideration
for it. McArthur v. Gordon,
26 N. B. Rep. 459, 801; s. c, 26 N.
E. Rep. 801; 126N.Y. 597; 27N.E.
1033. Under a trust-deed provid-
ing that, upon the grantor's death,
the land conveyed in trust "shall
descend" to his "legal representa-
tives," upon such decease the
property will descend to his beirs-
at-law. Ewing v. Jones (1892),
130 Ind. 247; s. c, 29 X. E.
Rep. 1057. When a person has re-
ceived a deed of land, and paid a
consideration therefor, her parol
promise, made after the delivery
of the deed, to carry out an agree-
ment between her husband and the
grantor that she should convey or
devise the land, subject to a life
estate in her and husband, to the
grantor's wife and children, is
without consideration, and insuffi-
cient to create a trust in favor of
the grantor's wife and children.
Blount v. Washington, 108 X. Car.
230; s. c, 12 S. E. Rep. 1008. A
will devised property in trust for
the testator's married daughter,
and provided that her share "is
not to be subject to or under the
control of her present or any fu-
ture husband, nor liable in any
way for any debts that may be con-
tracted by him." Held, that this
created a trust for the sole and
separate use of such daughter. In
re Hannis' Est. (Pa. Orph. Ct.), 11
Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 94. A bequest of
an estate in trust with one- third of
the income to testator's wife, one-
third to a daughter, and one-third
to a son, the trustee, which pro-
150
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§ 77.
of a child or children, the case must plainly appear to be
within a single and well defined purpose of the parent to
execute the natural parental duty to support and maintain
his child or children, which cannot be defeated without
obvious injustice.1 It appears to be accepted that where the
instrument creating an executory trust is under seal it will
be executed and sustained. But if the rule is maintained
it will be limited to provisions for a wife and children.
Brothers and sisters, and even parents, will be excluded,
and of course more distant relatives.2 But where the set-
tlor had sold the estate which he had previously settled
upon a wife or child, or had contracted debts not otherwise
provided for, the equity of a wife or child claiming as a
vides that on the death of the wife
her one-third shall be divided be-
tween the son and daughter; on
the death of the daughter her
share to go to her children; on the
death of the son, one-third to his
widow so long as she shall remain
unmarried, and two-thirds to his
children, but if the widow re-
marry, the entire share of the son
to his children — creates a valid
trust estate so long as the three
original legatees live, but is void
as to the remainder over after their
decease. Beers v. Narramore
(1891), 61 Conn. 13; s. C, 22 Atl.
Rep. 1001.
i Landon v. Hutton (1893), 5
Dickenson, 500. A declaration by
a son that land conveyed to him by
his father and mother is held in
trust for them for life, is valid, al-
though based on a voluntary con-
sideration only, where it is under
seal, recites a valuable considera-
tion and is made under circum-
stances showing that it was ex-
ecuted in consideration of the pre-
vious conveyance to him. Leeper
v. Taylor (1892), 111 Mo. 312; s. c,
19 S.W. Rep. 955. Testator gave his
wife all his property for life, if she
should remain his widow so long,
on condition that she should, out
of the income, maintain his chil-
dren during their minority; the
will expressly stating that the de-
vise was intended to be in lieu of
dower. Held, not to create a trust
estate for testator's children, but a
life estate in the widow, "charged"
with the children's support. Lang
v. Everling, 3 Misc. Rep. 530; s.
c, 23 X. Y. Sup. 329. Where land
is bought by a husband, and at his
direction the deed is made to the
wife, and there is no agreement
that the property is to be held in
trust for the husband, he is pre-
sumed to have intended the land as
a provision for and settlement on
his wife, for her own benefit. II-
genfritz v. Ilgenfritz (1893), 110
Mo. 429; s. C, 22 S. W. Rep. 186.
See also Allen v. Drake (1S91), 109
Mo. 628.
2 Downing v. Townsend, Amb.
592; Buford's Heirs v. McKee, 1
Dana, 107 ; Hayes v. Kershaw, 1
Sandf. Ch. 258.
§ 78.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
151
beneficiary on the ground of meritorious consideration,
would not be sustained or enforced against either purchasers
or creditors.1
§ 78. Voluntary Trust — When Executed. — Where
something remains to be done by the settlor in order to the
completion of a voluntary trust, he will not be compelled to
complete it. An intention to create a voluntary trust and an
agreement to do so are not a trust, but simply an imperfect
gift, and that will not be enforced by a court of equity.2
A testamentary document that must be proved in a Probate
Court in order to render it effective, but is so far incom-
plete that it cannot be sustained as a last will and testament,
is not sufficient to create a trust.3 In order to the perfect-
1 Bolton v. Bolton, 3S\vanst. 414,
note; Goring v. Nash, 3 Atk. 186;
Garrard v. Lauderdale, 2 B. & M.
154, 453; Finch v. Winchelsea, 1 P.
Wms. 277.
' Lloyd v. Brooks, 34 Md. 139;
Swan v. Frick, 34 lid. 27; Jefferys
v. Jeffreys, Cr. & Ph. 13S ; Bayley v.
Boulcott, 4 Kuss. 345; Colyeir v.
'llulgrave, 2 Keen, 81; Dipple v.
Corles, 11 Hare, 133; Jones v. Lock,
L.R. 1 Ch. 25 ; Caldwell v. Williams,
1 Bailey, Eq. 175 ; Cotteen v. Mis-
sing, 1 Madd. 176; Denning v.
Ware, 22 Beav. 184; Tatham v.
Vernon, 29 Beav. 604 ; Uniacke v.
Giles, 2 Molloy, 257; Morgan v.
Malleson, L. R. 10 Eq. Cas. 475;
Lanry v. McGee, 3 Head, 267;
Lister v. Hodgson, L. R. 4 Eq. 30;
Dillinger v. Llewelyn, 3 De G., F.
& J. 517; Colman v. Sarel, 3 Bro.
Ch. 12 ; Antrobus v. Smith, 12 Ves.
39; Edwards v. Jones, lMyl. & Cr.
226 ; Dillon v. Coppin, 4 My 1. & Cr.
647; Penfould v. Mould, L. R. 4
Eq. 562; Disher v. Disher, 1 P.
Wms. 204; Crompton v. Vasser, 19
Ala. 259; Kinnebrew v. Kinne-
brew, 35 Ala. 62S ; Evans v. Bat-
tle, 19 Ala. 378; Pinkard v. Pink-
ard, 2 Ala. 649 ; Keid v. Vanars-
dale, 2 Leigh, 560; Minturn v. Sey-
mour, 4 Johns. Ch. 49S; Acker v.
Phoenix, 4 Paige, 305; Dawson v.
Dawson, 1 Dev. Eq. 93 ; Banks v.
May, 3 A. K. Marsh. 435; Bibb
v. Smith, 1 Dana, 580; Darlington
v. McCool, 1 Leigh, 36; Tiernan v.
Poor, 1 Gill & J. 217; Forward v.
Armstead, 12 Ala. 124; Gardner
v. Merritt, 32 Md. 78 ; Lauterman
v. Abernathy, 47 111. 437; Shaw
v. Burney, 1 Ired. Eq. 148; Clarke
v. Lott, 11 111. 105 : Reed v. Robin-
son, 6 W. & S. 338; Tarbrough v.
West, 10 Ga. 471 ; Badgley v. Vol-
train, 68 111. 25; Robinson v. Ring,
72 Me. 140; Nortrup v. Hale, 73
Me. 66 ; Taylor v. Henry, 48 Ho.
550 ; Brabrook v. Boston Five Cent
Savings Bank, 104 Mass. 22S ; Ger-
ry v. Howe, 130 Mass. 350 ; Mar-
tin v. Funk, 75 N". Y. 134; Young
v.Young, 80 N. Y. 422; Withers,
v. Weaver, 10 Pa. St. 391 ; Helfen-
stein's Estate, 77 Pa. St. 328;
Trough's Estate, 75 Pa. St. 115;
Stone v. Bishop, 4 Cliff. C. C. 593.
3 Warriner v. Rogers, L. R. 16 "
Eq. 340; Richardson v. Richard -
L. R. 3 Eq. 686; Morgan v. Malle-
son, L. R. 10 Eq. 475.
152
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§ 78.
ing of a trust the donor must make himself a trustee.
Where there is evidence that this has been done, and that
nothing further remains for the settlor to do in regard to
it, it is an executed trust and will be enforced by a court
of equity. If the trust is perfected it is not necessary that
there should be a conveyance of the property, nor that
there should be any consideration.1 It is not necessary
1 Ellison v. Ellison, 6 Ves. 662 ;
Edwards v. Jones, 1 Myl. & Cr.
226; Wheatley v. Purr, 1 Keen,
551; Garrard v. Lauderdale, 3
Sim. 1; Collinson v. Patrick, 2
Keen, 123; Dillon v. Coppin, 4
Myl. & Cr. 647 ; Meek v. Kettlewell,
1 Hare, 469; Fletcher v. Fletcher,
4 Hare, 74; Price v. Price, 4 Beav.
598; Bridge v. Bridge, 16 Beav.
315; Wright v. Miller, 4 Seld. 9;
Airey v. Hall, 3 Sm. & Gif. 315;
Scales v. Maude, 6 De G., M. & G.
43; Donaldson v. Donaldson, 1 Kay,
711 ; Beech v. Keep, 18 Beav. 285;
Tolar v. Tolar, 1 Dev. Eq. 456;
Dennison v. Goehring, 7 Barr. 175;
Minturn v. Seymour, 4 Johns. Ch.
498; Lechmere v, Carlisle, 3 P.
Wms. 222; Bunn v. Wintrop, 1
Johns. Ch. 329; Andrews v. Hob-
son, 23 Ala. 219; Kirkpatrick v.
McDonald, 1 Jones, 387; Green-
field's Estate, 2 Harr. 489 ; Fogg v.
Middleton, Kiley, Ch. 193; Hayes
v. Kershaw, 1 Sandf . Ch. 261 ; Har-
din v. Baird, 6 Litt. 340; Dawson
v. Dawson, 1 Dev. Eq. 93, 396;
Ownes v. Ownes, 23 N. J. Eq. 60;
Lane v. Ewing, 31 Mo. 75; Cox v.
Sprigg, 6 Md. 274 ; Dupre V.Thomp-
son, 4 Barh. 280; Henson v. Kin-
nard, 3 Stroh. Eq. 371; Graham v.
Lambert, 5 Humph. 595 ; Howard
v. Savings Bank, 40 Vt. 597 ; Baker
"v. Evans, 1 Wins. Eq. (N. Car.)
109. Justice Bigelow, in the case
•of Stone v. Hackett, 12 Gray, 230,
discusses the principle involved in
these words: "The key to the so-
lution of the question raised in this
case is to be found in the equitable
principle, now well established and
uniformly acted upon by courts of
chancery, that a voluntary act or
conveyance of property in trust
when fully completed and exe-
cuted, will be regarded as valid,
and its provisions will be enforced
and carried into effect against all
persons except creditors or bona
fide purchasers without notice. It
is certainly true that a court of
equity will lend no assistance to-
wards perfecting a voluntary con-
tract or agreement for the creation
of a trust, nor regard it as binding
as long as it remains executory.
But it is equally true that if such
an agreement or contract be exe-
cuted by a conveyance of property
in trust, so that nothing remains to
be done by the grantor or donor to
complete the transfer of title, the
relation of trustee and cestui que
trust is deemed to be established,
and the equitable rights and inter-
ests arising out of the conveyance,
though made without considera-
tion, will be enforced in chancery.'*
The leading case in which this
principle is declared and acted on
is Ellison v. Ellison, 6 Ves. 656, in
which Lord Eldon decreed the en-
forcement of a trust which in its
creation was wholly voluntary and
without consideration. This has
been followed by many other cases
in which the same principle has
been recognized. Pulvertoft v.
$™.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
153
that the beneficiary should know anything of the creation
of the trust at the time of the act, provided that it is accepted
and ratified when it comes to his knowledge.1 If it can
be shown that there is a mistake, or an accident, or that
there has been fraud in any form connected with the trans-
action, the trust will not be enforced.2
Pulvertoft, 18 Ves. 84, 99; Ex
parte Pye, 18 Ves. 140; Sloan
v. Cadogan, Sugd. Vend. & Pur.
(11th Ed.)' 26; Fortescue v. Bar-
nett, 3 Myl. & K. 36; Wheat-
ley v. Purr, 1 Keen, 551 ; Blakely
v. Brady, 2 Dru. & Walsh, 311;
Browne v. Cavendish, 1 Jon. & Lat.
637; Kekewich v. Manning, 1 De
G., M. & G. 176. "The last named
case contains a full discussion of
all the authorities, and a clear
statement of the doctrine on the
subject. The application of the
principle established by these au-
thorities is entirely decisive of the
rights and duties of the parties to
this suit. * * * No further act was
to be done by the original owner
of the shares to consummate the
plaintiff's title." See also: Gerry
v. Howe, 130 Mass. 350; Kinne-
brew v. Kinnebrew, 35 Ala. 628. In
the last named case there is a very
able presentation of the authorities
upon the question. In the course
of his opinion Chief Justice Walker
observes: "The only consideration
of the instrument in this case is af-
fection for a grandson. Whether
or not affection of the husband for
his wife and of a parent for his child
is such a consideration as will in-
duce the enforcement of executory
trusts, and place the beneficiaries
of such trusts in a more favorable
position than that of mere volun-
teers, is one of the mooted ques-
tions of the law. After referring
to authorities bearing upon the
question, we shall leave it unde-
cided. 2 Story's Equity Jurispru-
dence, §§ 981, 983 ; Hill on Trustees,
top 129, marg. 83, note 1; 1 Lead.
Cas, in Eq. (top 283), marg. 191,
top 243-47 ; Duvoll v. Wilson, 9 Barb.
487; Buford v. McKee, 1 Dana,
107 ; Adams, Equity, 97 ; Andrews v.
Andrews, 28 Ala. 432; Doe v. Mc-
Kinney, 5 Ala. 719 ; Ex parte Pye,
18 Ves. 140; Papys v. Mansfield, 3
Myl. & Cr. 359. If affection be a
sufficient consideration to support
such a trust, it must be confined to
the relation of husband and wife,
or parent and child. The authori-
ties do not authorize the extension
of the principle to collateral kin-
dred or more remote descendants
than children."
1 "I adopt it as a maxim, that
when a trust is created in any
manner, even without the knowl-
edge of the cestui que trust, he may
affirm it and enforce the trust;"
Eadcliff, J., in Neilson v. Blight,
1 Johns. Cas. 209. See also Weston
v. Barker, 12 Johns. 276; Moses v.
Murgatroyd, 1 Johns. Ch. 119;
Cumberland v. Codrington,3 Johns.
Ch. 261; Hosford v. Merwin, 5
Barb. 51; Wetzel v. Chaplin, 3
Bradf. 386; Brabrook v. Boston
Five Cent Savings Bank, 104 Mass.
231 ; Viney v. Abbott, 109 Mass. 300.
2 Lister v. Hodgson, L. R. 4 Eq.
30. An incomplete voluntary trust,
resting in fieri, will not be en-
forced in equity. Landon v. Hutton,
50 N. J. Eq. 500; s. c.,25 Atl. Rep.
953.
154
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§79.
§ 79. Voluntary Agreement — When Enforced. — The
efficacy of an agreement or contract to create a trust de-
pends mainly upon the consideration. If there is a valid
consideration, a mere informality in the instrument, or in
the manner of creating the trust, will not invalidate the
contract. "Where the trust is not perfectly executed by
the instrument a court of equity will enforce it as a con-
tract if there is no adequate basis for completing the trust.1
1 Taylor v. Pownal, 10 Leigh, 183 ;
Baldwin v. Humphrey, 44 N". Y.
609. "It is immaterial whether
there was any other consideration
than appears upon the face of
the indenture; for even if the
settlement was purely voluntary,
the case falls within this doc-
trine, now well established in
equity, that a voluntary settlement,
completely executed, without any
circumstances tending to show
mental incapacity, mistake, fraud
or undue influence, is binding and
will be enforced against the settlor
and his representatives, and cannot
be revoked except so far as a power
of revocation has been reserved in
the deed of settlement." Vineyv.
Abbott, 109 Mass. 300, 302. A mar-
ried woman, for the purpose of
preventing her husband from in-
fluencing her to dispose of her real
estate, conveyed it to her brother
as trustee, in trust, to pay over the
income to her during her life, and
after her decease to pay over and
account for the same to her chil-
dren. The trustee was also given
the power to sell the real estate, at
his discretion, and at any time
after the death of the settlor to con-
vey the same to her children, and
if not conveyed during the lifetime
of the children, then to convey the
same to their issue. In considera-
tion of her executing the deed her
brother lent her ®600. No fraud
or imposition was practiced upon
her, and the deed was carefully
read to her. At the time of exe-
cuting the deed the contingency of
her surviving her husband was not
in her mind or in that of her ad-
visers. The trustee sold the real
estate and invested the proceeds.
Held, that she was not, on her hus-
band's death, entitled to have the
trust set aside. Keys v. Carleton,
141 Mass. 45. Where a woman, in
contemplation of marriage, in-
dorsed certain notes held by her,
on her children, to one son, and,
by a separate Instrument in writ-
ing, declared him to be her attor-
ney and trustee to retain the cus-
tody and complete control of such
notes, and directed him to keep the
same, and whenever, in his judg-
ment, her wants required the in-
terest on the notes, or any part
thereof, that he collect, in equal
amounts, from the makers, what-
ever sum was necessary for her
wants, and pay the same to her, and,
upon her death, to return the notes
to the makers, it was held, that the
instrument was not only a power
of attorney, but also created a com-
plete trust, which she could not re-
voke at pleasure, and that it made
the son not only trustee for her
own benefit but also for the benefit
of the makers of the note. Light
v. Scott, 88 111. 239. See "also Falk
v. Turner, 101 Mass. 494.
§ 80. J EXPRESS TRUSTS. 155
If it is plain that a trust is intended and there is a valuable
and legal consideration, and if the instrument is of such a
character as to leave the court in no doubt in regard to the
terms and conditions of the trust, and the parties who are
to receive the beneficial interest, the trust will be enforced.
If no beneficiary is named or properly designated the
omission will be fatal to the agreement, however clear and
definite the instrument maybe in other respects;1 but if
no trustee is named and the instrument is not otherwise de-
fective, it will be reformed by the court and a trustee will
be appointed.2 But a mere agreement to create a trust, or
an agreement altogether without a valuable consideration,
will not be enforced. If the trust is perfected, if the set-
tlor has in due form made or declared himself to be a
trustee, he has vested the beneficial interest in the propertj-
in the cestui que trust, and has put it in his power to claim
the property in a court of equity. But in order to this
the instrument must be duly executed and declared, and it
must be plain that it was the intention of the settlor that
it should be binding and that his action in the matter should
be final.3
§ 80. An Equitable Interest Transferable. — Where
the subject of a trust is an equitable interest the beneficiary
1 Dillage v. Greenough, 45 N. Y. ance being effectually made, the
438; Ownes v. Ownes, 8 C. E. equitable interest will be enforced
Green, 60. Lord Eldon, in Ellison by this court."
v. Ellison, uses this language: "I 2 Burnside v. Wayman, 49 Mo
take the distinction to be that if 356.
you want the assistance of the 3 Thorpe v. Owen, 5 Beav, 224
court to constitute you cestui que Wilcocks v. Hannyngton, 5 Ir. Ch
trust, and the instrument is volun- 3S; Ex parte Pye, 18 Ves. 140.
tary, you shall not have that assist- Draiser v. Brereton. 15 Beav. 221
ance for the purpose of conitituting Vandenberg v. Palmer, 4 Kay & J
you cestui que trust; as, upon a cov- 204; Bridge v. Bridge, 16 Beav
enant to transfer stock, etc. ; if it 315; Stapleton v. Stapleton, 14
rests in covenant, and is purely Sim. 186; Searle v. Law, 15 Sim.
voluntary, this court will not exe- 99; Steele v. Waller, 28 Beav. 466;
cute that voluntary contract. But Patterson v. Murphy, 11 Hare, 88 :
if the party has completely trans- Bently v. McKay, 15 Beav. 12 ;
ferred the stock, etc., though it is Morgan v. Malleson, L. R. 10 Eq.
voluntary, yet the legal convey- 475; McFadden v. Jenkins, 1 Hare.
156 EXPRESS TRUSTS. [§ 80.
may create a new trust by assigning his interest to a new
trustee. An equitable interest is capable of being trans-
ferred, and the relation of trustee and cestui que trust
having been duly established, the transfer may be made
without reference to the settlor. As the right of the bene-
ficiary to transfer his interest will not be questioned,, and
as there is nothing to be done by the settlor in order to
give validity to his act, the settlor is in no sense a party to
the transfer.1 In the case of Kekewich v. Manning, Lord
Justice Knight Bruce gave the following illustration of
this doctrine: "Suppose stock or money to be legally
vested in A, as a trustee for B for life, and subject to B's life
interest for C absolutely, surely it must be competent to
C in B's lifetime, with or without the consent of A, to
make an effectual gift of C's interest to D byway of mere
bounty, leaving the legal interest and legal title unchanged
and untouched. Surely it would not be consistent with
natural equity or with reason or expediency to hold the
contrary, C being sui generis and acting freely, fairly and
with sufficient advice and knowledge. If so, can C
do this better or more effectually than by executing an as-
signment to D ? It may possibly be thought necessary to
the complete validity of such a transaction that notice
should be given to A. Upon that we do not express an
opinion."2 If the beneficiary prefer to do so he may
471; Ownes v. Ownes, 8 C. E. Mass. 266; Forbes v. Lathrop,
Green, 60 ; Crawford's Appeal, 61 137 Mass. 525 ; Sears v. Choate, 146
Pa. St. 52. Mass. 395; Holden v. Strickland,
1 Sloan v. Cadogan, Sugd. Ven. 116 1ST. Car. 185; s. c, 21 S. E. Eep.
& Pur. App. 26; Voyle v.Hughes, 2 684. "It is settled in this common-
Sm. & Gif. 18; Lambe v. Orton, 1 wealth that a testator who makes
Dr. & Sm. 125; Way's Settlement, a gift of income to a beneficiary
2 De 6., J. & Sm. 365; Gilbert v. may provide that it shall not be
Overton, 2 Hem. & M. 110; Wood- alienable in advance by him, or be
ford v. Charnley, 28 Beav. 99 ; subject to be taken by his creditors.
Reed v. O'Brien, 7 Beav. 32; Bridge But in order to give such a quali-
v. Bridge, 16 Beav. 315; Gannon v fled estate instead of an absolute
White, 2 Ir. Ch. 207; Donaldson one, the language of the testator
v. Donaldson, 1 Kay, 711; Cotteen must be such as to clearly import
v. Missing, 1 Mad. 176. an intention to do so. Broadway
2 Kekewich v. Manning, 1 De G., Nat. Bk. v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170;
M.&G.188;Sparhawkv.Cloon,125 Foster v. Foster, 133 Mass. 179;
§81.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
157
create a new trust conveying his interest to the old trustee
to be held for his own benefit. In an English case A B,
the cestui que ti'ust of money in the hands of a trustee, by
deed without consideration, directed part of the dividends
to be paid by him for the maintenance of an infant, a
stranger to A B, and covenanted to indemnify him and
agreed to allow the same out of the dividends of the trust
fund. The trustee accepted the new trust and acted upon
the deed. It was held that there was a valid executed trust
created which A B could not revoke.1 It has been held
that a mere expectancy in an equitable interest is not such
a trust as a court will enforce, and that in consequence a
voluntary assignment of it will not be sustained. This
view is based on the fact that what is only in expectancy
is in some degree at least in fieri.2
§ 81. Power of Revocation. — In the creation of an
express trust the settlor may, by an explicit provision, re-
tain the power of revocation.3 A completed trust in which
Sears v. Choate, 146 Mass. 395."
Maynard v. Cleaver, 149 Mass. 307.
An assignment may be made of the
income arising out of personal
property held in trust for the sup-
port of a person during life, where
there is no statute restricting it and
no restriction on the assignment in
the will creating the trust, espe-
cially where the assignment is to
the wife of the assignor on her
agreement to maintain and educate
their children. Lamberton v. Pe-
reles (1894), 87 Wis. 449; s. c, 23
L. K. A. 826.
1 Eycroft v. Christy, 3 Beav. 238 ;
McFadden v. Jenkyn, 1 Hare, 458 ;
S. c, 1 Phil. 153.
2 Meek v. Kettlewell, 1 Hare, 464,
affirmed in 1 Phil. 342.
3 A reserved right of revocation
is not inconsistent with the crea-
tion of a valid trust. Mize v. Bates
County Nat. Bank, GO Mo. App. R.
358. '"A voluntary settlementfairly
made is always binding in equity
upon the grantor, unless there be
clear and decisive proof that he
never parted nor intended to part
with the possession of the deed;
even if he retains it, the weight of
authority is decidedly in favor of
its validity, unless there be other
circumstances besides the mere
fact of his retaining it, to show that
it was not intended to be absolute."
Chancellor Kent, in Souverbye v.
Arden, 1 Johns. Ch. 240. In a case
where a grantor had created a trust
to protect her property against in-
cumbrance or sale by herself, it
was held that the trust would not
be set aside merely because she had
reserved no power of revocation.
Parker v. Allen, 14 N". Y. Supl.
265. If a married woman, with the
purpose of placing her property
beyond her husband's control, vol-
untarily conveys it to the trustee to
hold in trust for her during life,
158
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§81-
this power is not expressly retained cannot be revoked ex-
cept by the consent of the beneficiary, or beneficiaries, if
and upon her death, according to
her appointment by will, and re-
serves to herself no power of revo-
cation, and fails to make such an
appointment for her issue, her chil-
dren have a beneficial interest in
the trust fund, and she is not enti-
tled, without such children's con-
sent, to have the trust terminated,
even after obtaining a divorce from
her husband. Thurston, petitioner,
154 Mass. 596. See also Keys v.
Carleton, 141 Mass. 45; Viney v.
Abbott, 109 Mass. 300; Sewall v.
Roberts, 154 Mass. 596. Lord
Chancellor Nottingham, in Villars
v. Beaumont, 1 Vern. 99, a case de-
cided in 1682, used this language :
"If a man will improvidently bind
himself by a voluntary deed, and
not reserve a liberty to himself by
a power of revocation, this court
will not loose the fetters he hath
put upon himself, but he must lie
down under his own folly ; for if
you relieve in such a case you must
consequently establish this propo-
sition, viz. : That a man can make
no voluntary disposition of his es-
tate but by his will only, which
would be absurd." See also Nal-
dred v. Gilham, 1 P. Wms. 577;
Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. 273 ;
Bridgman v. Green, 2 Ves. 627 ;
Hall v. Hall, L. K. 8 Ch. 430 ; Toker
v. Toker, 3 De G., J. & S. 487. A
devisee made an agreement with
the executor by which he directed
him "to pay or have expended
yearly or yearly invested * * * to
my children, * " * the amount
held for him under the will," and
released the executor from all his
right and interest in the estate.
Held, that the agreement created a
trust for the benefit of the children
and the devisee, not having re-
served the power of revocation,
cannot revoke it. Beekman v. Hen-
drickson (N. J.) (1891), 21 Atl.
Rep. 567. An executed voluntary
settlement understandingly made
and not affected by fraud, accident
or mistake, is valid and binding,
and beyond the power of altera-
tion, unless the power of revoca-
tion is reserved. Sargent v. Bald-
win, 60 Vt. 17. S, who had
over §2,000 in bank, on being in-
formed by the cashier that any
amount on deposit over $2,000 was
taxable, withdrew a part of it and
deposited it in his own name as
trustee for C, and a pass-book con-
taining such entry was issued to
him, which he retained until his
death. Held, that testimony re-
garding S's declarations in respect
to the deposit, made after the trust
therein in C's favor had been
created, was properly excluded in
a contest between C and the ad-
ministrator of S for the possession
of such deposit, since a voluntary
trust, when created, cannot be an-
nulled by acts or declarations of
the party creating it, in the absence
of a power of revocation reserved
by him for that purpose. Conn.
Riv. Sav. Bk. v. Albee, 64 Vt. 571;
S. C, 25 Atl. Rep. 487. A volun-
tary conveyance was accepted by
the grantee by a written instru-
ment reciting that the grantor had
conveyed the land to him in trust,
which trust he accepted and agreed
to carry out according to the terms
of the grantor's will, made the
same day. In this will the grantor,
after a declaration of trust to take
effect after his death, to which the
acceptance of the trust by defend-
§81.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
159
ant referred, expressly stated that
"the said trust property so con-
veyed as aforesaid forms no portion
of my estate herein by this, my last
will disposed of." Held, that the
conveyance was not a part of the
will liable to be annulled by its
revocation, and cannot be declared
to have created a naked trust, or
be avoided for want of considera-
tion. Kopp v. Gunther (1892) , 95
Cal. 63; s. c, 30 Pac. Eep. 301.
Eccleston, J., in Baltimore v. Will-
iams, 6 Md. 235, says: "We think
that unless under some peculiar
circumstances, when a deed con-
veys land in trust for such uses as are
declared or set out in a will already
made, neither the deed nor the will
is revocable, if no power of revo-
cation is reserved in the deed. And
where a deed conveys land in trust
for such uses as the grantor may
afterwards appoint by will or deed,
if the appointment be by will, then
the will may be revoked and new
uses declared. But if this power is
executed by such an instrument as
may properly be considered a
deed, and not a testamentary paper,
then the appointment cannot be
revoked, provided the deed exe-
cuting the power reserves no au-
thority to revoke." "The party
Who makes a voluntary deed,
whether of real or personal estate,
without reserving the power of al-
tering or revoking it, has no power
to disturb it, and as against him-
self it is valid and binding both in
equity and at law." Stone v. King,
7 R. I. 358. See also Salisbury v.
Bigelow, 20 Pick. 174; Bunn v.
Winthrop, 1 Johns. Ch. 329; Bris-
torv. Tasker, 135 Pa. St. 110; The-
baud v. Schernmerhorn, Gl How.
Pr. 200; Light v. Scott, 88 111. 239;
Smith v. Darby, 39 Md. 27S ; Den-
nison v. Goehring, 7 Barr, 175;
Tolar v. Tolar, 1 Dev. Eq. 4G0;
Stone v. Hackett, 12 Gray, 227;
Cobb v. Knight, 74 Me. 253 ; Tay-
lor v. Henry, 48 Md. 561; Bitter's
Appeal, 59 Pa. St. 9; Sherwood v.
Andrews, 2 Allen, 79; Wallace v.
Berdell, 97 N. Y. 13; Fisher v.
Hall, 41 N. Y. 416; McLean v.
Button, 19 Barb. 450; Riddle v. Cut-
ter, 49 Iowa, 547. Where a married
woman and her husband conveyed
by indenture, containing no power
of revocation, certain property to
a trustee, upon trust to pay the in-
come thereof to the married woman
for life, for her sole and separate
use, and after her death, upon trust
to grant and convey the property
to a son of said married woman by
a former husband, a court of equity
will not, on the joint application of
the married woman, her husband
and the ultimate beneficiary, de-
cree cancellation of the deed of
trust, and order the subjects of said
trust, or any part thereof, to be
transferred to the ultimate benefi-
ciary. The married woman being
under disability will be protected
from undue influence which may
be brought to bear by her husband
to destroy the trust created for
her use. Twinning's Appeal, 97
Pa. St. 36. A woman in 1851, in
in view of marriage, conveyed
her estate to a. trustee, who was
to hold and care for the trust
property, pay the rents and income
to her or her designated agent,
make sales at her request and con-
vey the trust property to her if she
survived her husband. In case of
her death the trustee was to hold
to the use of her testamentary ap-
pointees, and if she died intestate
to the use of her heirs-at-Iaw. The
trust took effect and the marriage
took place. In 18S0, her husband
being alive, she, wishiffg to hold
her estate freed from the trust,
filed a bill in equity to terminate
160
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§81.
there is more than one.1 And if the trust has been fully-
established by the acceptance of the beneficiary it cannot
be revoked except by the consent of all the parties in in-
terest.2 The settlor cannot revoke it by destroying the
deed or other instrument by which it was created; he can-
not revoke it by creating a second trust, and it will not be
revoked by any accident by which the property is revested
in the settlor.3 In all cases of this character the first com-
pleted trust will be sustained and the court will declare the
settlor a trustee.4 In case any of the parties are not in
being, or are non sui juris, the trust cannot be revoked in
any manner.5 Where a person conveys real and personal
property in trust for his own use during life, and for a re-
ligious object after his death, and makes due delivery to
the trustees of the personal property and of the deed of the
realty, the fact that he regains possession of the land and
afterwards regains possession of the personalty does not affect
the validity of the trust.6 In a case where a father
the trust and to have the trust es-
tate conveyed to her : Held, that a
married woman was sufficiently
protected by existing statutes, and
that the complainant was entitled
to the relief prayed for. Nightin-
gale v. Nightingale, 13 K. I. 113.
1 Ingram v. Kirkpatrick, 6 Ired.
Eq. 463; Sargent v. Baldwin, 60
Vt. 17 ; Potts v. Blackwell, 4 Jones
Eq. 67; Hogan v. Strayhorn, 65 N.
Car. 285.
2Hellman v. Williams. 70 Cal.
449.
3 Tolar v. Tolar, 1 Dev. Eq. 456 ;
Dawson v. Dawson, 1 Dev. Eq. 93,
396; In re "Way's Trust, 10 Jur.
837 ; s. c, 2 De G., J. & 8m. 365 ;
Bitter's Appeal, 59 Pa. St. 9; By-
croft v. Christy, 3 Beav. 238 ; New-
ton v. Askew, 11 Beav. 145;
Brackenbury v. Brackenbury, 2
J. & W. 391; Clavering v.
Clavering, 2 Vern. 473; Keke-
wich v. Manning, 1 De G., M. & G.
176; Cook v. Fountain, 3 Swanst.
565 ; Young v. Peachy, 2 Atk. 254
Roberts v. Roberts, Daniel, 143
Bunn v. Winthrop, 1 Johns. Ch
329 ; Stone v. Hackett, 12 Gray, 227
Falk v. Turner, 101 Mass. 494
Viney v. Abbott, 109 Mass. 302.
The interest of a beneficiary is not
divested by a deed of revocation
executed by the donor in anticipa-
tion of a settlement with his cred-
itors, and destroyed by him on fail-
ure to effect such settlement. Hill
v. Cornwall's Assignee (Ky.)
(1894), 26 S. W. Bep. 540.
i Ellison v. Ellison, 6 Ves. 656
Paterson v. Murphy, 11 Hare, 88
Gilchrist v. Stevenson, 9 Barb. 9
Smith v. Lyne, 2 Y. & Col. 345
Uzzle v. Wood, 1 Jones Eq. 226.
5 Shaw v. Del. & C. B. E. Co., 3
Stockt. 229.
6 Williams v. Evans, 154 111. 98;
s. C, 39 N. E. Bep. 698.
§ 8 2. J EXPRESS TRUSTS. 161
conveyed land to his son, who executed a contract to pay
to the other children certain sums on the father's death,
the contract was delivered to the father but not to the chil-
dren. At the same time the father made a will, which re-
ferred to the contract, and left the children the sums which
the son had agreed to pay them. It was held that considering;
the conveyance, contract and will as one transaction, on
the execution of the contract of the conveyance and con-
tract the title to these sums of money passed from the
father and vested in the children, an irrevocable trust being
created in the son, and on the father's death the money
did not become assets of his estate.1 The fact that a di-
rection in the trust deed as to the disposition of the grantor's
property after her death was not explained to her and that
she regarded it as a will, subject to a modification by a sub-
sequent will, and that the effect of such provision is to
disinherit the children of a deceased child contrary to the
grantor's intention, is no ground for setting aside the trust,
but the deed will be so modified as to harmonize with the
grantor's intention.2 Where a deed is executed without
any reserve or power to revoke, a new deed by the trustee
thereunder, declaring different trusts and reserving a power
of revocation not joined in by a beneficiary under the first
deed, a non sui juris, is ineffectual to disturb the rights
created by the first deed.3
§ 82. The Subject Continued. — It is well established
that where there has been no mistake, no fraud or undue
influence and the power of revocation is not reserved in
the creation of a trust, the settlor is bound by his act. The
fact that some point of importance has been overlooked or
forgotten will not serve to afford him relief. Where the
trust has been created and declared in due form it is too
late to correct mistakes.4 In the case of Wallace v. Ber-
1 Copeland v. Summers, 138 Ind. i Keys v. Carleton, 141 Mass. 45,.
219 ; s. c, 35 ST. E. Rep. 514. 50. In Garnsey v. Mundy, 24 X. J.
2 Parker v. Allen, 14 N". Y. Supl. Eq. 243, a case where the instru-
265. ment was executed under advice
3 In re Owens, 3 Pa. Dist. Eep. honestly given, but the effects were
328. not understood by the grantor,
H
162
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§82.
dell, before the New York Court of Appeals, it was held
that where a trust deed is actually delivered to the grantee
the rights of the cestui que trust attach, and the effect of
the delivery cannot be impaired by any mental reservation
on the part of the grantor, or oral condition repugnant to
Chancellor Runyon says : "Recent
cases, however, have narrowed the
doctrine, and have held not only
that the absence of a power of rev-
ocation throws on the person seek-
ing to uphold the settlement the
burden of proving that such power
was intentionally .excluded by the
settlor, and that in the absence of
such proof the settlement may be
set aside, but that equity will set
aside the settlement on the appli-
cation of the settlor, where it ap-
pears that he did not intend to
make it irrevocable, or where the
settlement would be unreasonable
or improvident for the lack of pro-
vision for revocation. In Everitt
v. Everitt (1870), L. R. 10 Eq. 405,
a case almost precisely similar in
its facts to that under considera-
tion, a voluntary settlement was
set aside on the application of the
donor. The court said : 'It is very
difficult indeed for any voluntary
settlement made by a young lady,
so soon after she attained twenty-
one, to stand if she afterwards
change her mind and wishes to get
rid of the fetters which she has been
advised to put upon herself.' * * *
Forshaw v. Welsby, 30 Beav. 243,
was a case where a voluntary set-
tlement was made by one in ex-
tremis, on his family. It con-
tained no power of revoca-
tion in case of the settlor's
lecovery. On his recovery it
was set aside on his application
■ on the ground that it was not exe-
■ cuted with the intention that it
ishould be operative in case of his
recovery from his illness. * * * The
testimony of all the parties to the
transaction,the grantor, her mother
and uncle, has been taken in the
cause. It satisfies me that the deed
was not 'the pure, voluntary, well
understood act of the grantor's
mind' — (Lord Eldon in Huguenin
v. Basely) — "but was unadvised
and improvident, and contrary to
the intention of all of them. The
fact that the infant children of the
grantor are beneficiaries under the
deed will not prevent the court
from setting it aside." "The rule,
as it has long existed, and, as af-
firmed by the courts of England
and America, is that where there
is a voluntary gift of the entire es-
tate of the donor, a reservation of
the principal interest by him, and
no power of revocation, the instru-
ment will be held ineffective
against its author, unless it ap-
pears that there was an intention
to make it irrevocable." Ewingv.
Wilson, 132 Ind. 223; Farrelly v.
Ladd, 10 Allen, 127; Beatson v.
Beatson, 12 Sim. 281. In such a
case a reconveyance will be de-
creed, even where settlement was
made to defraud creditors. Ownes
v. Ownes, 23 N. J. Eq. 60. A mar-
ried woman, for the purpose of
preventing her husband from in-
fluencing her to dispose of her real
estate, conveyed it to her brother
as trustee, in trust to pay over the
income to her during her life, and
after her decease to pay over and
account for the same to her chil-
dren. The trustee was also given
§82.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
163
the terms of the deed attached to the delivery.1 But if
there is no proper delivery of the deed or other in-
strument, by which the trust is created, to the trustee, the
trust will not be sustained. In a case before the Supreme
Court of California, where the deed was deposited with
the trustee for safekeeping with the understanding that it
was not a formal and final delivery, and that it should be
returned for cancellation on demand, and where, with the
consent of the beneficiary, the deed was surrendered to the
settlor and destroyed by him, it was held that there was no
trust.2 Where a power of revocation is reserved the power
must be exercised or the trust will be effectual.3 Where
an aged man addicted to drink, and with an hereditary tend-
ency to insanity, created a trust in all his property, whereby
the power to sell the real estate, at
his discretion, and, at any time
alter the death of the settlor, to
convey the same to her children,
and if not conveyed during the
lifetime of the children, then to
convey the same to their issue. In
consideration of her executing the
deed, her brother lent her $600.
JSTo fraud or imposition was prac-
ticed on her, and the deed was
carefully read to her. At the time
of executing the deed, the contin-
gency of her surviving her husband
was not in her mind or in that of
her advisers. The trustee sold the
real estate and invested the pro-
ceeds. Held, that she was not, on
her husband's death, entitled to
have the trust set aside. Keys v.
Carleton, 141 Mass. 45. In Coutts
v. Acworth, L. E. 8 Eq. 558, this
doctrine as understood and applied
in England is thus stated: "The
party taking a benefit under a vol-
untary settlement or gift, contain-
ing no power of revocation, has
thrown upon him the burden of
proving that there was a distinct
intention on the part of the donor
to make the gift irrevocable. And,
where the circumstances are such
that the donor ought to be advised
to retain a power of revocation, it
is the duty of the solicitor to insist
upon the insertion of such a power,
and the want of it will in general
be fatal to the deed." See also
Wollaston v. Tribe, L. E. 9 Eq.
44;J3allv. Hall, L. E. 14 Eq. 365;
Houghton v. Houghton, 15 Beav.
278; Cooke v. Lamotte, 15 Beav.
234; Huguenin v. Basely, 14 Ves.
293 ; Phillipson v. Carey, 32 Beav.
628 ; N~anney v. Williams, 22 Beav.
452; Phillips v. Mullings, 7 Ch.
App. 244; Forshaw v. Welsby, 30
Beav. 243. In re Gangwere's Es-
tate, 14 Pa. St. 419; Russell's Ap-
peal, 75 Pa. St. 269; Case v. Case,
26 Mich. 49.
i Wallace v. Berdell, 97 N. Y. 14.
See also Worrall v. Munn, 5 N". Y.
229, 238 ; Lawton v. Sager, 11 Barb.
349; Arnold v. Patrick, 6 Paige,
310, 315.
2 Burroughs v. De Couts, 70 Cal.
361.
3 Van Cott v. Prentice, 104 JST. Y.
45.
164 EXPRESS TRUSTS. [§ 82.
he was to receive the entire income and the trustee only
a small commission, and reserved to himself only the right
of testamentary disposition, the trust thus created must be
deemed irrevocable, in the absence of any showing of fraud
practiced on him to persuade him to execute the instrument.1
A trust created by the grantor to secure her property
against its incumbrance or disposition by herself will not be
set aside merely because she reserved to herself no power
for its revocation.2 A quitclaim deed from the trustee to
the donor of the trust will not revoke the trust, though
made solely for that purpose, since a completed trust with-
out reservation of power to revoke can only be revoked by
the consent of all the beneficiaries.3 An instrument which
settles personal property in trust for the use and benefit of
the grantor during his life, and directs that the trustees
after his death shall pay over the residue of the trust sub-
ject to the next of kin of the grantor, will not be construed
as ambulatory, nor as a mere deed of contingency or tes-
tamentary disposition of personalty, and as such revoked
by a subsequent will of the grantor which disposes of his
personal estate, but recognizes the existence of the deed
and manifests a belief in the efficacy of its provisions.4
1 Reidy v. Small, 154 Pa. St. 505; old man in a lucid interval, in ter-
S.C., 26 Atl. Rep. 602. "True there is ror of impending hereditary in-
no clause of revocation, nor was the sanity, all the more probable be -
absence of it explained, because it cause of vicious personal habits,
was the clearly denned purpose of from its very purpose should be ir-
Reidy to execute an irrevocable revocable. A power of revocation
trust. It was not technically a would defeat the object of the
spendthrift trust, for the settlor trust; such a settlor would period-
was in no danger of squandering ically create and periodically re -
his estate by the common spend- voke the trust, and the revocation
thrift habits. We can well under- would in all probability be for the
stand why a clause of revocation accomplishment of the act which,
should be put in the ordinary in his wiser mood, he sought to
spendthrift and drunkard deed of guard against by the deed." Ibid.
trust. Reformation may wholly do 2 Parker v. Allen (1890), 14 N.Y.
away with the necessity for the Supl. 265.
trust, in which case the right of 3Evving v. Shannahan (1893), 113
the settlor to the full enjoyment of Mo. 188; s. c, 20 S. W. Rep. 1065.
his property would be unques- 4 Townsend v. Allen, 59 Hun,
tioned. But a trust created by an 622; s. C, 13 N. Y. Supl. 73.
§ 83. J EXPRESS TRUSTS. 165
§ 83. Powers in Trust. — Strictly a "power" is a right
or the authority by which one person is enabled and per-
mitted to perform some act for another. A power in
trust is the authority under which a person conveys or dis-
poses of an interest in real property, which he does not
himself hold and of which the legal title is in another per-
son. It is in this regard that it is distinguished from a
trust proper. The title is vested, not in the trustee or the
person exercising the power, but in a third person, and the
trustee simply holds the right to dispose of the property
for the benefit of the beneficiary or beneficiaries. A power
may be exercised apart from a trust, or power in trust.
Where there is no trust the person acting under a power is
invested with complete discretion as to whether he will or
will not execute it. In the exercise of that discretion he
is not subject to the control of a court of equity. If he
fails to execute the power the court will not relieve the
parties for whose benefit he was invested with it. But
where the power is in trust, and has been accepted, though
the conditions under which he was vested with it may give
him some discretion in regard to the manner in which it
shall be executed, he has no discretion as to whether he
will execute it at all. A power in trust is so closely allied
to a proper trust as to confer upon the beneficiary an
equitable right — a right of such a nature that to a certain
extent it will be protected by a court of equity. A power
in trust implies a fiduciary obligation; and whether he may
exercise a discretion in regard to the manner of his dis-
posal of the property or his discharge of the trust, depends
upon the conditions and limitations of the instrument by
which he was invested with the power.1 Where the prop-
1 Brown v. Higgs, 8 Ves. 561, nature and qualities of a trust, that
570. "But there are not only a if the person who has that duty
mere trust and a mere power, but imposed upon him does not dis-
there is also known to this court a charge it the court will, to a cer-
power which the party, to whom tain extent, discharge the duty in
it is given, is intrusted and required his room and place." Lord Eldon,
to execute ; and with regard to that in Brown v. Higgs, 8 Vesey, 570.
species of power the court considers "A disposition of this kind con-
it as partaking so much of the tains a mixture of trust and power.
166
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
[§83.
erty is to be divided among a number of persons, and the
trustee is invested with a discretion in regard to the amount
that each shall receive, and he exercises the power, the
court will not interfere Avith the manner in which it is done ;
but if he fails to execute the trust the court, in enforcing
the power, will make an equal distribution of the property
among all the beneficiaries.
The trust must be exercised for re-
lations and kindred of some de-
scription or other. The power of
selection belongs to those to whom
the testator has thought right to
confide it. * * * If there is any
person entitled to exercise the
power, the trust will be for those
of the relations and kindred whom
such person shall select. If the
power is extinct the trust is for those
who answer the description of rela-
tions and kindred according to the
construction this court may put
upon the word." Sir William Grant,
in Cole v. "Wade, 16 Ves. 43. See
Burrow v. Phillcox, 5 Myl. & Cr.
72; Heller v. Stanley, 2 De G., J. &
Sm. 183, 191; Carthew v. Enraght,
26 L. T. Rep. (ST. S.) 834; He Jef-
frey's Trusts, L. R. 14 Eq. 136. In re
Hargrove's Trusts, 8 Ir. Eq. 256
and cases there cited ; Aherne v.
Aherne, L. R. 9 Ir. 144; Sinnott v.
Walsh, L. K. 5 Ir. 27. In Gower v.
Malnwaring, 2 Ves. 87, Mainwar-
ing executed a trust deed, by which
the trustees were to give the resi-
due of his real and personal estate
among his 'friends and relations,'
where they should see most neces-
sity and as they should see most
equitable and just. Two of the
trustees being dead and the third
refusing to act, Lord Hardwicke,
held that the word "friends" meant
"relations," within the statute of
distributions. '-What differs this,"
says Lord Hardwicke, "from the
cases mentioned is this, that there
is a rule laid down for the trust.
Wherever there is a trust or power
(for this is a mixture of both),
whether arising on a legal estate or
reserved to be exercised by trustees
barely according to their discre-
tion, I do not know the court can
put themselves in the place of those
trustees to exercise that discretion.
Where trustees have the power to
distribute, generally, without any
object pointed out or rule laid down,
the court interposes not unless in
case of a charity, which is differ-
ent, the court exercising a discre-
tion as having the general govern-
ment and regulation of charity.
But here is a rule laid down (and
the word 'friends' is synonymous
with 'relations,' otherwise it is ab-
surd). The trustees are to judge
on the necessity and occasion of
the family, the court can judge of
such necessity of the family. That
is a judgment to be made on facts
existing, so that the court can make
the judgment as well as the trus-
tees, and when informed by evi-
dence of the necessity can judge
what is equitable and just on this
necessity." See also Hewett v.
Hewett, 2 Eden, 332 ; Widmore v.
Woolredge, Amb. 636; Brunsden
v. Woolredge, Amb. 507; Atty.-
Gen. v. Buckland, 1 Ves. 231
Green v. Howard, 1 Bro. Ch. 33
Maberly v. Turton, 14 Ves. 499
Liley v. Hay, 1 Hare, 5S0; Butler
v. Gray. L. R. 5 Ch. App. 26, 31 ; In
re Phene's Trusts, L. R. 5 Eq. 347.
§84.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
167
§ 84. Powers in Trust Continued. — In some of the
States, as New York and certain others that have followed
the Legislature of that State, express trusts, with certain
specified exceptions, have been abolished. But dispositions
of property in the form of a trust, and not valid under
the statute as a trust proper, may be valid as a power in
trust.1 In a case where a testator devised all his estate to
his wife for life, and provided at her death it should go to
his executors, in trust to convert the whole into cash and
divide the proceeds equally among several persons or their
children; and that if, during the lifetime of testator's
wife, the executors should deem it best to convert the
estate into cash they should do so, and pay the income to
the wife for life. It was held that a valid power in trust
was created under the statute, providing that a devise
of land to trustees who are not also empowered to re-
ceive the lands shall vest no estate in them, but the
trust shall be valid as a power.2 Where a will bequeaths
1 Harding v. Glyn, 1 Atk. 469;
Grant v. Lynam, 4 Russ. 292 ; Bur-
rough v. Philcox, 5 Myl. & Cr. 72 ;
Penny v. Turner, 2 Phill. Ch. 493;
Fordyce v. Bridges, 2 Phill. Ch.
497; Gough v. Bull, 16 Sim. 45;
Cole v. Wade, 16 Ves. 27, 42;
Brown v. Pocock, 6 Sim. 257;
Croft v. Adam, 12 Sim. 639 ; Izod
v. Izod, 32 Beav. 242; In re White's
Trusts, Johns. 656 ; Brook v. Brook,
3Sm. & G. 280; Willis v. Kymer,
L. K. 7 Ch. Div. 181; Minors v.
Battison, L. R. 1 App. Cas. 428;
Salisbury v. Denton, 3 Kay & J.
529; Gude v. Worthington, 3 De
G. & S. 389; Whiting v. Whiting,
4 Gray, 236, 240 ; Miller v. Meech,
8 Pa. St. 417 ; Smith v. Bowen, 35
K. Y. 83; Whitehurst v. Harker, 2
Ired. Eq. 292 ; Withers v. Yeadon,
1 Eich. Eq. 324; Collins v. Car-
lisle, 7 B. Mon. 13 ; Gibbs v. Marsh,
2 Met. 243. "The distinction be-
tween a power and a trust is marked
and obvious. Powers," as Chief Jus-
tice Wilmot observed, "are never
imperative; they leave the act to
be done at the will of the party to
whom they are given. Trusts are
always imperative and are obliga-
tory upon the conscience of the
party intrusted." Stanley v. Colt, 5
Wall. 119; Sugden on Powers, 588.
2 Reynolds v. Denslow, 80 Hun,
359;s.c.,30N.Y.Supl. 76. "While
it is true that all express trusts are
abolished except those enumerated
in section 55 of the statute, yet
that statute has not stripped the
owners of property of the power to
impress upon their estates limita-
tions possessing the characteristics
of trusts. Trust limitations, if law-
ful, may be effectuated as powers
in trust. The statute does not
enumerate or define the acts which
may be done under a power, as in
the case of trusts; and they are
practically unlimited. Powers may
be created for any lawful purpose,
by any language which indicates
168 EXPRESS TRUSTS. [§ 85.
property to persons absolutely, and directs the executor
to invest it for the benefit of the legatees, no trust is
created, but the executors are given a power in trust.1
A deed reserved to the grantor the power to devise, by last
will, an undivided one-third part of said premises unto any
hereafter taken wife of him, the party of the first part, for
and during the term of her natural life, or (at his option)
to give and grant, by deed, to said hereafter taken wife, or
to any person in trust for her, the same premises, for and
during the term of her natural life." It was held that the
reservation was a right which the grantor might exercise or
not, at his pleasure, and was not a special power in trust
which equity could enforce.2 A testator devised all his
estate to two persons "upon the uses and trusts following,
viz. : At the time of my death should my daughters or either
of them be unmarried, I give and bequeath to such of
them as may be unmarried the sum of $5,000." The will
also contained other bequests, and a residiary bequest to
testator's wife. The two persons aforesaid were made
executors of the will, which also contained this clause: "I
give to my said trustees, executor and executrix full power
and authority to sell any or all of my real estate at public
or private sale and invest the proceeds thereof, or to let or
sell the same, as they may deem best." It was held that
under the statute which provides that a devise of land to
executors or trustees to be sold, where the trustees are
not also empowered to receive the rents and profits, shall
vest no estate in the trustees, the provisions of the will did
not create a valid express trust.3
§ 83. Modern Legislation During a period compara-
tively recent, the Legislatures of several of the States have
an intention to bestow them, and 1 Horndorf v. Horndorf (1895) , 13
to do any act which the grantor Misc. Rep. 343; s. c, 36 K. E.
might himself lawfully perform. Rep. 869.
The cases of Blanchard v. Blanch- 2 Towler v. Towler, 142 N. Y.
ard, 4 Hun, 288, and Belmont v. 371; S. c, 36 N. E. Rep. 869.
O'Brien, 12 N". Y., are authority for 3 Steinhart v. Cunningham, 130
the foregoing statement." Ibid. N. Y. 292; s. c, 29 N. E. Kep. 100;
4 Rev. St. (8th Ed.) p. 2438, § 56. 2 Rev. St. (8th Ed.) p. 243S, § 56.
§85.]
EXPRESS TRUSTS.
169
given special attention to the law regulating trusts. In
some instances the statutes are voluminous, and are minute
and specific in their enactments. In most of the States
trusts in real estate are now regulated by statute. In New
York trusts in real estate are permitted only for the follow-
ing purposes: 1, to sell lands for the benefit of creditors;
2, to sell, mortgage or lease lands for the benefit of legatees,
or to satisfy any charge thereon ; 3, to receive the rents
and profits of real estate and to apply them to the use of a
person for his life, or for a shorter period; 4, to accumulate
rents and profits for such time as is permitted by law.1 In
Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, California and North and
South Dakota recent legislation has been of a similar
character.2 Where trustees are not empowered to receive
rents and profits, a devise of lands to them to be sold or
mortgaged vests no estate in the trustee, but the trust is
valid as a power.3 And where a trust is created for any
other purpose than those above enumerated no estate vests
1 Rev Stat., part 2, title 2, ch.
l,Art. 2, Sec. 55. Sections 46-49
provide that in passive trusts "by
will or deed, the whole estate
passes directly to the henficiary.
Sec. 60. In all these express
trusts the whole estate is vested
in the trustee, the beneficiary
takes no estate in the land,
hut only the right to enforce
a performance hy the trustee. Sec.
63. In the third and fourth classes
the beneficiary cannot assign, or in
any manner dispose of his interest.
Sec. 65. The trustee is also unable
to convey his interest if the trust is
expressed in the instrument from
which he derives his interest. A
further provision makes express
trusts not valid under the statute,
valid and effectual as powers in
trust. Sections 1-21 provide that
the power of alienation cannot be
suspended by a trust or other dis-
position longer than during two
lives in being at the time when the
trust or other disposition com-
mences. Trusts of personal prop-
erty are not restricted except that
they are subject to limitations con-
cerning the suspension of the
power of alienation. Michigan, 2
Comp. Laws 1871, p. 1331; How-
ell's Stats., 1882, ch. 214; Wis-
consin, 2 Taylor's Rev. Stats. 1872,
p. 1129, Sec. 11; 1 Sanborn &
Berryman Stats. 1889, Sec. 2081;
Minnesota, Kelly's Stats. 1S91, Sec.
4013, and California Civ. Code,
Sections 847, 857, 863, 869, 867, 879
have followed the general lines of
the ITew York statute and broad-
ened its effects by allowing in some
instances a larger number of ob-
jects of express trusts. See 1 Stim-
son, Am. Stat. Law, 234.
2 Supra.
3 Rev. Stat., pt. 2, tit. 2, ch. 1, art.
2, sec. 56.
170 EXPEESS TRUSTS. [§ 85.
in the trustees, but where the trust authorizes or directs the
performance of any act which may be lawfully performed
under a power, it will be sustained as a power in trust.1
Under the statute of New York the absolute power of
alienation cannot be suspended for a longer period than that
of two lives in being at the time of the creation of the
trust.2 A trust of personalty is not included in the statute
of uses and trusts, and a trust of this character may be
created in New York for any purpose not essentially illegal.3
But trusts in personalty are within the statute forbidding
accumulations except for minors.4
JRev. Stat., pt.2, tit. 2,ch. 1, art. 3 G-ilman v. McArdle, 99 N. Y.
2, sec. 58. 451 ; Haines v. Mead, 52 N. Y. 332.
2 Eev. Stat., pt. 2. tit. 2, ch. 1, art. * Pray v. Hegeman, 98 N. Y. 35.
2, sec. 58.
CHAPTER VIII.
IMPLIED TKUSTS.
IMPLIED TKUSTS IK GENERAL— RESULTING TRUSTS— CON-
STRUCTIVE TRUSTS.
87.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
IMPLIED TRUSTS IN GENERAL.
Introductory.
Determined by Intention.
From the Settlement of Es-
tates.
The Subject Continued.
Maintenance of Children.
Implied Trusts from Part-
nerships.
From Relation of Agent
and Principal.
The Subject Continued.
Implied Trusts from Con-
tracts.
The Subject Continued.
From Contracts for Sale.
From Marriage Contracts.
Notice of Equitable Title.
The Subject Continued.
§ 100. From Purchase under Fore-
closure Sale.
101. The Same Subject.
102. Implied Trusts from Partial
Interest.
103. For Distribution of Gift.
104. From Joint Tenancy.
105. For Confiding Party.
106. The Subject Continued.
107. From Relation of Guardian.
108. For Judgment Creditors.
109. From Other Assignments.
110. Implied Trust from Annu-
ities.
111. Implied Trusts from Mis-
take.
112. Proved by Parol.
113. Other Implied Trusts.
§ 86. Introductory. — Implied trusts are trusts which
are not created by the deliberate act of a settlor, and
in expressis verbis, but arise out of the terms and limita-
tions of instruments or parol agreements inter vivos, or
grow out of the construction of wills and the settle-
ment of estates. An implied trust is created, not by
the acts of the parties concerned, but by the decree of a
court of equity. And this decree is either based upon the
intention of the parties, as it appears from a memorandum
172 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 86.
of agreement or from other evidence, either written or
parol, relating to a business transaction ; or it is rendered
as a necessary consequence of the operation of law. Im-
plied trusts may be established independently of, or in op-
position to the known intention of the party in possession
of the property in question. In the establishment of trusts
of this class the end sought is the separation of the legal
and equitable estates. The legal title is held by the trustee
for the benefit of the equitable owner, who is regarded as
the real owner, and as such rightfully receives the legal
title by conveyance. A fundamental distinction between
express and implied trusts is, that the former, presumably,
are created by the voluntary, or free and deliberate act of
the parties, that they are in accordance with equity and that
by the terms of their creation they are permanent in their
operation ; while in the latter, from the nature of the case,
the element of permanency is absent, and that of rightful-
ness, so far as relates to the intention of the responsible
party, and of freedom of action as well, may be altogether
lacking. The essential idea of an implied trust involves a
certain antagonism between the cestui que trust and the
trustee, even where the trust has not arisen out of fraud,
nor out of any transaction of a fraudulent or immoral char-
acter. -. The remedy sought by the beneficiary, in his ap-
plication to a court of equity, is the termination of the
trust, by a decree of the court ordering a conveyance to
himself of the legal title. Implied trusts include, not only
resulting and constructive trusts, but in addition to these,
many of a general character that cannot be included under
either of these terms. The cases are numerous in which
there is neither a presumable intention to create a trust nor
any element of fraud entering into the transaction where
an implied trust will be established. "Where it is plain
from the instrument embodying the covenant into which
the parties have entered, or from the history of the case
drawn from other sources that the intention in regard to
the disposal of the property will be best answered by a
trust, the court will decree a trust and order a conveyance
§86.J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
173
of the property. Precatory trusts, or trusts from precatory
words, which have sometimes been erroneously included
in this class, are express trusts, not trusts by implication.
Indeed, the creating of a trust from precatory words, by
implication of law, is the very thing which a court of
equity will absolutely refuse to do. The simple question
in regard to precatory words, which a court of equity is
called to decide, is, Did the testator create a trust? Is it
plain from the instrument, taken as a whole, that that is
what he intended to do ? If this question is answered in the
affirmative, then it is decided that he created an express
trust ; but if it is answered in the negative, then it is decided
that he created no trust at all. And where that is
the case, the court will not create a trust for him. The court
will not do for him, or for his heirs, what he did not
intend to do for himself. It has been maintained as a rule
that a trust is never implied and that courts of equity will
not decree a trust, except in case of absolute necessity.1
1 In Cook v. Fountain, 3 Swanst.
591, 592, Lord Nottingham made a
classification of trusts and stated
the principles governing in cases
of implied trusts, to-wit: "All
trusts are either first express trusts
which are raised and created by
act of the parties, or implied trusts
which are raised or created by act
or construction of law. Again,
express trusts are declared either
by word or writing; and these
declarations appear either by di-
rect and manifest proof or violent
and necessary presumption. These
last are commonly called presump-
tive trusts, and that is when the
court upon consideration of all
circumstances, presumes there was
a declaration either by word or
writing, though the plain and di-
rect proof thereof be not extant.
In the case in question, there is no
pretense of any proof that there
was a trust declared either bv word
or in wiiting, so the trust if there
be any, must either be implied by
law or presumed by the court.
There is one good, general and in-
fallible rule, that goes to both
these kinds of trusts. It is such a
general rule as never deceives; a
general rule to which there is no
exception, and that is this : The
law never implies, the court never
presumes a trust but in case of ab-
solute necessity. The reason of
this rule is sacred, for if the chan-
cery do once take liberty to con-
strue a trust by implication of law,
or to presume a trust unnecessa-
rily, a way is opened to the Lord
Chancellor to construe or presume
any man in England out of his es-
tate. And so at last every case in
court will become casus pro amico."
"The cases in which trusts by im-
plication have been enforced are
usually those in favor of third par-
ties, the presumed objects of the
174
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§87.
But the courts of this country have not carried the doctrine
to that extent. "The more correct exposition of the gen-
eral rule would seem to be that a trust is never presumed,
or implied as intended by the parties unless, taking all the
circumstances together, that is the fair and reasonable in-
terpretation of the acts and transactions."1 By an express
provision all implied trusts are excepted from the require-
ments of the statutes of frauds.2
§ 87. Determined by Intention. — In the decision of
questions in which implied trusts of a general character
are involved, as in those relating to some other classes of
trusts, a court of equity will have regard to the inten-
tion of the responsible party. "Where it appears that a
person having the right to dispose of property is inclined
or manifests a purpose to do it for the benefit of another,
donor's bounty and not in favor of
the donor himself. The presump-
tion is much slighter in the latter
case than in the former." U. S. v.
Union Pacific, etc. E. Co., 11
Blatchf. 385, 405.
1 2 Story's Equity Jurisprudence,
§ 1195.
2 Section 8 of the statute, 29
Car. II, ch. Ill, is as follows:
Provided always that where any
conveyance shall be made of any
lands or tenements by which a trust
or confidence shall or may arise or
result by the implication or con-
struction of law or be transferred
or extinguished by an act or oper-
ation of law, then and in every
such case said trust or confidence
shall be of the like force and effect
as the same would have been if
this statute had not been made,
anything hereinbefore contained
to the contrary notwithstanding.
See Browne, Statute of Frauds, (4th
Ed.), p. 582. In all cases in which a
presumption arises by the mere
implication of law, there parol evi-
dence may be admitted to rebut it,
and where such evidence is used
to rebut a presumption there parol
evidence may be used also to con-
firm it. Bishop of Cloyne v.
Young, 2 Ves. 61. See also Gra-
ham v. Graham, 1 Ves. Jr. 275;
George v. Bank of England, 7
Price, 646; Eider v. Kidder, 10
Ves. 360; Finch v. Finch, 15 Ves.
43; Dyer v. Dyer, 2 Cox, 93; Mor-
lass v. Franklin, 1 Swanst. 17;
Prankerd v. Prankerd, 1 Sim. &
Stu. 1 ; Lamplugh v. Lamplugh, 1
P. Wms. Ill, and cases cited in
note ; Taylor v. Taylor, 1 Atk. 386
Ebrand v. Dancer, 2 Ch. Ca. 26
Jackson v. Feller, 2 Wend. 465
Coates v. Woodward, 13 111. 654
Livermore v. Aldrich, 5 Cush.431
Neil v. Keese, 5 Tex. 23 ; Stimpfler
v. Eoberts, 6 Har. 283; Lloyd v.
Carter, 5 Har. 216; Foote v. Col-
vin, 3 Johns. 216; Harder v. Har-
der, 2 Sandf. 17; Eeid v. Fitch,
11 Barb. 399; Ward v. Armstrong,
84 111. 151 ; Hudson v. White, 17
E. I. 519; S. C, 23 Atl. Eep. 57.
§ 87.] IMPLIED TRUSTS. 175
clearly indicated, and there is no legal obstacle, the
court will execute that purpose through the medium of a
trust. It will not be deterred from giving relief to one
who has an equitable claim by any informality of an instru-
ment, or other evidence in which the idea of a trust is im-
plied. A trust will not be decreed by implication of law
unless it is plainly demanded by the equity of the case,
but where that is not in question, no defect in the form or
method of the transaction will prevent a court of equity
from affording relief by creating a trust. Very numerous
cases of implied trusts, of a general character, arise where
money or other propertj7, especially real estate, is conveyed
by one person to another to be held or to be disposed of
for the benefit of a third party. In such cases, though
there is is no formal creation or declaration of a trust, the
idea of a trust is essentially involved in the transaction.
The person receiving the property receives it, not for his
own benefit, but for that of a third person. And, this
may be true where there has been no agreement to that
effect.1 Where, from any cause, there is a failure to dis-
pose of property so received for the benefit of a cestui que
trust, an implied trust will be decreed in favor of the per-
son by whom the property was originally held.2 In the
recent case of Hudson v. "White, before the Supreme Court
of Rhode Island, plaintiff, as heir, sought to hold an inter-
est in real estate by establishing a trust therein in favor of
her deceased father. It appeared that the father had
money and purchased the land in question, but as he was
in business in California, and had unsettled claims against
him in Rhode Island, and his second wife could more easily
manage the property, it was deeded to her for the benefit
of the father and his family ; that the wife had no money,
and always spoke of and considered the land as belonging
1 4 Kent Com. 3d Ed. *307; Com. Lord Lauderdale, 3 Sim. 1; s. c,
Dig. Chancery, 4 W. 5. 2 Kuss. & Myl. 451; Dearie v.
2 Linton v. Hyde, 2 Madd. 94; Hall, 3 Kuss. 1 ; "Walwyn v. Coutts,
Priddy v. Kose, 3 Meriv. 102 ; Page 3 Meriv. 707 ; s. c, 3 Sim. 14 ; Light
v. Broom, 4 Kuss. 6; Leman v. v. Scott, 88 111. 239.
Whitely, 4 Kuss. 427 ; Garrard v.
170 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 88.
to the father ; and that defendants, before purchasing, had
notice of plaintiff's claim thereto. It was held that plaint-
iff was entitled to relief.1
§ 88. From the Settlement of Estates. — Where it is
essential to the carrying into effect of the provisions of a will
a trust by implication of law will be decreed. Though no
trust is created by the will, the court will have regard to
the intention of the testator as that is gathered from
the entire document. In the recent case of Johnson v.
Johnson, before the Supreme Court of Ohio, where a will
gave the widow a life estate in the property of decedent,
with power to sell or otherwise dispose of so much of it as
should be necessary to her support, what remained at her
death to go to the remainder-men designated in the will, it
was held that by the provisions of the will the widow was a
quasi trustee for those in remainder, and that the interest of
the brothers and sisters of the testator in the unconsumed
property was a vested right which could not be destroyed
by the act of the widow in disposing of the property by
gift to a third party, or otherwise than for her support or
the benefit of the estate, and that a third party acquiring
said estate by gift or fraud to the injury of the vested
rights of those in remainder, and with knowledge of the
provisions of the will, holds the property and all proceeds
of it as trustee for the remainder-men, and as such is liable
to account to them in equity.2 A testator bequeaths to his
1 White v. Hudson (1891), 17 K. Mass. 118. See also Dyer v.
I. 519; s. C, 23 Atl. Rep. 57. "In Homer, 22 Pick. 253; Fitzgerald v.
this commonwealth a long series Forristal, 48 111. 228.
of cases has established the rule 2 Johnson v. Johnson (1895), 51
that a transfer either of real or Ohio St. 446; s. C, 38 N. E. Kep.
personal property, made with a 61. Deborah, the wife of Ely, was
view to defraud the creditors of the executrix of Shibla's will, and,
the grantor, although the grantee as such, held this money in trust,
has participated in this intent; is Her being by the will entitled to
good between the parties and void the use of it during her life does
as against creditors only, or, to not destroy the trust character in
speak accurately, is voidable by which she, as executrix, held the
creditors at their election. If no money. John Ely, her second hus-
creditors intervene the conveyance band, having after his intermar-
stands." Harvey v. Varney, 98 riage with her, received a part of
§ 88. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 177
wife an annuity to be paid to her by the trustee named in
the will ; the remainder of his estate of every kind, after
payment of his debts, he bequeathes and devises to his
daughters, their heirs and assigns, and if all of them
should die under age and without issue he gives and be-
queathes all the estate given to them, and with which said
trustees shall be chargeable, to his wife, if living, her heirs
and assigns ; and the purposes for which the annuity is
given to his wife are to enable her to live comfortably and
support and educate her said children, and if in any one
year the annuity, in the judgment of the trustees, shall be
insufficient for those purposes, he shall pay her an addi-
tional sum for that year; and if she shall marry the
trustee shall not pay her the annuity thereafter accruing
unless the husband shall give bond to each of the children
who may then be living and under age, conditioned for
their support and education, and if such bond should not
be given or its conditions should not be performed, the
trustee shall appropriate so much of the funds in his hands
as he shall judge proper for the support and education of the
children ; and so soon as either of the children shall come
of age, such child shall be entitled to the payment or pos-
session of her devise or legacy, reserving a fund sufficient
for the payment of the annuity, or otherwise compounding
for the same as the trustee shall be able to do ; and the
testator appoints the defendant to be trustee under the
will, and executor thereof; and the executor is directed
and empowered, at his discretion, to sell a particular parcel
of the testator's real estate. The greater part of testator's
this money, was bound by the not only against him who is right-
same trust. Sch. & Lef. 270. He fully possessed of the trust prop-
must be held to have become pos- erty as trustee, but also against
sessed in right of his wife of such one who comes into possession of
of the assets of the testator of the property bound by the trust
whose will she was executrix as he with notice of the trust. lb. 262.
received from her, and, as husband And on his death his assets are
of the executrix, he was rightfully chargeable in equity for the money
possessed, the money was in the so received by him. Shibla v. Ely,
hands of both as trustees. And if 2 Halst. Ch. 183.
this was not so trusts are enforced,
12
178
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§88.
property was real estate, and his personal estate was not
sufficient to discharge his debts. It was held that the real
estate was devised to the trustee by implication, and that
the widow's remedy was against him for the recovery of
her annuity.1
i Walker v. Whitney, 23 Pick.
313. "The intention of the testa-
tor is to he collected from the
whole will, and if its appears that
the will cannot be carried into ef-
fect without implying a devise, it
will be implied by law. But the
intention must be clear, and the
implication necessary, according
to the language and import of the
will. A doubtful intention is not
sufficient. These rules of construc-
tion are reasonable, and are well
established by the cases cited. 13
Hen. VII., 17, 22; Gardner v. Shel-
don, Vaughan, 263 ; Oates v. Cooke,
3 Burr. 1G, 81; Willis v .Lucas, 1 P.
Wins. 472; Aspinwall v. Petvin, 1
Sim. & Stu. 550; Trent v. Hanning,
7 East. 97; Bush v. Allen, 5 Mod.
63; South v. Allen, Ibid. 98; Coin.
Dig. Estate by Devise, n. 12,"
Ibid. See also Braman v. Stiles, 2
Pick. 400; Baker v. Keel, 4 Dana,
158; Watson v. Mayrant, 1 Kich.
Cli. 449; Fay v. Taft, 12 Cush.
448. Where one conveys land to
his son in fraud of creditors, no
trust results in favor of the other
heirs of the grantor on his death,
though the claims of the creditors
are barred by limitations. Sell v.
West (1894), 125 Mo. 621; s. C, 28
S. W. Hep. 969; Hunt v. Fried-
man, 63 Cal. 510; Dyer's Appeal,
107 Pa. St. 446. Where land is
conveyed to the grantor's son, who
gives a mortgage to secure pay-
ment of the price to other children
of the grantor after her death, a
trust is created in favor of such
other children, which, if accepted
by them, cannot be altered without
their consent. Brunson v. Henry
(1894), 140 Ind. 455; S. C, 39 N. E.
Eep. 256. Plaintiff's father had con-
veyed land to her for a valuable
consideration by deed with war-
ranty. The land was afterwards
sold under a judgment against the
father, and then redeemed by de-
fendant with money furnished by
the father, and title was taken in
defendant's name, but without the
father's consent. Held, that the
land after redemption was held in
trust for the father, and that all
his interest inured to plaintiff by
virtue of the covenants of warranty
in the deed to her. Olds v. Mar-
shall (1S90), 93 Ala. 138; s. c, 8
So. Rep. 284. To prove that cer-
tain land was purchased by an ad-
ministrator with trust funds, three
witnesses for plaintiffs testified
that the administrator at the time
of and after the purchase (25 years
before the suit) declared that he
made it as an investment of funds
of the estate; but their evidence
was contradictory in many details,
and it seemed improbable that the
administrator had funds belonging
to the estate at that time. The
administrator subsequently took
the bankrupt act, and in a schedule
attached to his petition in the
bankruptcy proceedings stated that
he purchased the land with funds
of the estste, and that he held it in
trust for the heirs, his grandchil-
dren. No steps were taken to en-
force this trust, and the adminis-
trator subsequently treated the
§ 89.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
179
§ 89. The Subject Continued. — Where a testator
charges his real estate with the payment of debts or leg-
acies, or directs it to be sold, the direction will be treated
by the court as implying a declaration of trust and enforces
land as his own, and made it the
chief basis of credit to secure a
favorable commutation of his wife's
dower interest. Held, that the
trust was not established. Moor-
man v. Arthur (,1894), 90 Va.
455; s. c, 18 S. E. Rep. 869. A
widow having a life estate, with
power to sell or dispose of the
property for her support, is a quasi
trustee for those having a remain-
der interest in what is uncomsumed
at her death, and she cannot divest
their interest by giving the prop-
erty to a third person, but such
person takes as trustee for the re-
mainder-man. Johnson v. Johnson
(1894), 51 Ohio St. 446; s. C, 3SX.
E. Eep. 64. An executrix and life
tenant, in possession of lands of
which her testator owned the
equitable title, who buys in the
outstanding legal title, supposing
it to be necessary for the protec-
tion of the estate, paying therefor,
out of her own moneys, a sum
wholly disproportionate to the
value of the land, holds the legal
title so purchased in trust for' the
remainder-men. Moore v. Simon-
son(1895)27 Ore. 117 ; s. C, 39 Pac.
Eep. 1105. Defendant bought a
plantation which had been mort-
gaged but at the time, the mort-
gage stood as cancelled on the
records of the parish clerk's office.
A suit was afterwards brought by
the public administrator to enforce
the mortgage, defendant being
made a party, but the suit was not
prosecuted. Subsequently defend-
ant was appointed public adminis-
trator, and during his incumbency
the 10 years in which mortgages
are required to be reinscribed ex-
pired without reinscription, and
the mortgage thereby became null
as to all persons not parties to it,
including defendant. Held, that
his appointment as public admin-
istrator did not place him in any
fiduciary relation to the descend-
ants of the mortgagee as to make it
his duty to have the mortgage re-
inscribed in proper time. Pickett
v. Foster, 149 U. S. 509; s. C, 13
S. C. Eep. 998. In an action by
P's heirs to establish a trust in 225
acres of land, of which P's hus-
band died seised, as having been
bought with her money and her
land, it appeared that her brother
C once owned the land, and con-
veyed it to her husband for $800
expressed consideration; that the
deceased father of A, and the other
complainants, and P and C, left
land which was partitioned among
them, each receiving 112J^ acres,
for which they did not execute
deeds or releases to each other,
each simply taking possession of
his tract ; that A deeded her share to
C, and it was included in the deed
by C to P's husband ; that prior to
such deed C was in possession of
the land conveyed thereby, and
thereafter was in possession of the
tract allotted to P, claiming it as
his until he sold it or until his
death; that from that time until
her death P owned some interest
in the land left by her father, and
partitioned among his children, as
her husband recognized ; and that
the other heirs except A and C re-
180
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 89.
its execution.1 In many cases where conditions are ap-
pended to a devise of an estate, the conditions' will not be
construed as working a legal forfeiture upon failure to
observe them, but they will be treated as a trust that is en-
forceable by a court of equity. In the leading case of
Stanley v. Colt, before the Supreme Court of the United
States, it was held that the conditions or limitations in a
tained the tracts originally allotted
to them. There was evidence that
P exchanged with C the tract al-
lotted to her. Held, that the evi-
dence was sufficient to entitle
plaintiffs to the relief asked. Kim-
brough v. Nelms (1894), 104 Ala.
554; s. C, 16 So. Eep. 619.
1 Pitt v. Pelham, 2 Freem. 134;
Locton v. Locton, 2 Freem. 136;
Blatch v. Wilder, 1 Atk. 420; Car-
vill v. Carvill, 2Ch. R.301; Gwill-
iams v. Rowell, Hard. 204; Gar-
foot v. Garfoot, 1 Ch. Ca. 35; S.C.,
2 Freem. 176; Cook v. Fountain, 3
Swanst. 529; Bennett v. Davis, 2
P. Wms. 318; "Wigg v. Wigg, 1
Atk. 382; Mclntire Poor School v.
Zan. Canal Co., 9 Ham. 203; With-
ers v. Yeadon, 1 Kich. Ch. 324;
Hoxie v. Hoxie, 7 Paige, 187 ; Auby
v. Doyl, 1 Ch. Cas. 180; Briggs v.
Sharp, L. K. 20 Eq. 317. Where an
executrix pays to its guardian a
minor's share under the will, and
such guardian afterwards repays it
to the executrix, who receives it
knowing that it is a trust fund
which the guardian holds, she be-
comes trustee de son tort, and holds
the fund subject to the same rules
and remedies as other trustees.
Huntley v. Denny (1893), 65 Vt.
185; S. C, 26 Atl. Rep. 486. Under
Rev. St. 111. ch. 59, § 9,which makes
void all trusts in lands, excepting
resulting, implied and constructive
trusts, unless the trust is declared
by some writing signed by the
trustee, or by his last will, land
conveyed to a son by his mother on
an oral agreement to hold it for life,
and then divide it between said son
and his sisters, becomes the abso-
lute property of the mother.
Champlinv. Champlin (1891), 136
111. 309 ; s. c, 26 N. E. Rep. 526. An
administrator sold lots belonging
to the estate, and took notes inpay-
ment, which he charged to him-
self in his administration account,
and the purchaser afterwards fail-
ing to pay the notes, the adminis-
trator took to himself from the
purchaser a conveyance of the lots.
Held, insufficient to warrant a de-
cree against the administrator, de-
claring him a trustee for the heirs
and directing him to convey the
lots to the heirs as having been
purchased with the funds of the
estate. Henninger v. Boyer, 10 Pa.
Co. Ct. Rep. 506. The executrix of
a will devising property to her
children, with a power of sale in
her, sold it and invested the pro-
ceeds in her own name. Afterwards
she conveyed the property so pur-
chased to one of her children for a
nominal consideration, on his oral
agreement that he would divide it
equally with the others. Held, that
the statute of frauds could not be
invoked as a defense to an action
by the other children to enforce
such agreement. Denike v. Den-
ike, 31 N". Y. Supl. 250.
§89.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
181
devise to a church or ecclesiastical society that the estate is
not to be sold, but to be leased, and the rents paid over to
the church or ecclesiastical society ; that the leases are not
to exceed thirty years ; that the estate is not to be divided ;
and that it is to be managed by trustees who are appointed
in the will, and by their successors, are not conditions
annexed to the estate, a. breach of which or any of them
will work a forfeiture, defeat the devise and let in the heir.
These limitations create a trust which those who take the
estate are bound to perform ; and, in case of a breach, a
court of equity will interpose and enforce performance.1
In a recent case before the Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina it was held that where a deed purports to convey only
a life estate, and there is nothing to indicate that the
grantor intended to convey a greater estate, the purchase
of the reversion by the executor of the grantee after his
1 Stanley v. Colt, 5 Wall. 119. See
also Croxall v. Shererd, 5 "Wall.
286; Ould v. Washington Hospital,
etc. 95 U. S. 312; Old South So. v.
Crocker, 119 Mass. 26; s.c, 20 Am.
Sep. 310; Arthur v. Cole, 56 Md.
100; s. c, 40 Am. Eep. 310. "The
words 'upon condition' are appro-
priate words for creating a condi-
tion, but they do not of necessity
create such an estate. * * If it is
such an estate, in this case, the
forfeiture would be to the grantors
or their heirs. But the grantors
were merely a committee who had
taken their title in trust for the so-
ciety ; and if it were to come back
to their heirs by forfeiture it must
be held by them in trust for the so-
ciety, and would thus merely be
turned into a trust estate. There-
fore nothing could be gained by a
forfeiture, or by treating it as an
estate on condition. Taking into
consideration the title of the grant-
ors, the purposes of the grant, and
the fact that the expression is 'in
trust nevertheless, and upon con-
dition always,' the fair construc-
tion of the instrument is that the
parties intended the title to be in
trust, and that the words 'upon
condition' were not used in their
technical sense. These words do
not always create a condition. "'
Sohier v. Trinity Church, 109 Mass.
19. See also Eawson v. School
Dist. in Uxbridge, 7 Allen, 125;
Merchant Tailors Co. v. Attorney-
General, L. E. llEq. 35; Attorney-
General v. Southmolton, 14 Beav.
357, 361 ; Wright v. Wilken, 2 Best
& Sm. 232; Be Skingley, 3 Mao. &
G. 221 ; Gregg v. Coates, 23 Beav.
33; Kingham v. Lee, 15 Sim. 396;
Kinnersley v. Williamson ,L. J. (N.
S.) Ch. 788; s. C, 18 W. E. 1016.
Where the next of kin have con-
verted personalty of the estate to
their own use a trust,, in invitum,
arises in favor of a surviving hus-
band of decedent, and equity has
jurisdiction to compel the trustees
to account. Thompson v. Thomp-
son (1895) (Ala.), 18 So. Eep.
247.
182
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 89.
death does not make the executor a trustee for the devisees
under the will, as to the title so acquired since the testator's
estate terminated with his death.1 Where money is paid
by a wife toward the purchase of land, the title of which
is in the husband, for the promotion of her own interest
or for the protection of her right of dower, no trust is
implied and no lien established. A case in illustration is
as follows : A husband bought a homestead, giving his
notes in part payment. At the death of his wife's father
the latter held the notes. The wife had the executor apply
on the notes a part of her share of the estate, and the
husband paid the balance. On the death of the wife, it was
held that there was no evidence to show that he received
the money to keep for her and her children, nor to establish
1 Rayv. Com. Durham Co. (1892),
HON. Car. 169; s. a, 14S.E.Kep.
646. A will gave testator's estate
to his children, equally, and the
personal estate to his widow for
her life, and at her death to her
children. Testator had eight chil-
dren, of whom one died before
him, and another son a few days
after him, both of them intestate
and leaving children. The real
property consisted of two farms
and some dock property. There
was a mortgage on each of the
farms. Two of the sons were ex-
ecutors. They refused to pay in-
terest accruing on the mortgages,
and procured the mortgagees to
foreclose them ; and at the sales
both farms were purchased by a
daughter of testator, at prices little
more than the amounts of the re-
spective mortgages thereon, and
much less than the value of the
property. The purchase money
for one farm was furnished by the
executors from the funds of the
estate on a new mortgage of the
property to them as executors ; and
for the other the greater part was
paid by a new mortgage to the
mortgagee, who had foreclosed.
The purchaser immediately con-
veyed to her mother, testator's
widow, a life estate in one farm,
and executed deeds to the five
other surviving children of testator,
conveying to them five-sixths of
the property in equal undivided
parts. Thereafter the executors
brought suit for partition of the
dock property, and at the sale
thereunder one of them purchased
the property for much less than its
value and immediately executed a
deed conveying five-sixths thereof
to the other surviving children of
testator in equal undivided parts.
The children of the two deceased
sons of testator, several of whom
were infants, were thus deprived of
their share in testator's real estate.
Held, that the six surviving chil-
dren of testator were liable as
trustees of. the children of the two
deceased sons, as to one-fourth of
such real estate, and one-fourth of
the net rents profits, and income
derived by such surviving children
from the property. Carpenter v.
Carpenter, 58 Hun, 608; S. c, 12
2ST. Y. Supl. 189.
§90.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
18c
a trust in the land in their favor, and that, under a bill filed
for that purpose, no lien could be enforced on the theory
that she paid the money to protect her contingent right of
dower.1
§ 90. Maintenance of Children. — Where property is
left to a parent, or to one standing in loco parentis for the
benefit of himself and his children, oris placed at his dis-
posal for his own use and benefit and for the maintenance
and education of his children, without reference to the
precise form of the expression, it is held that a trust by
implication is involved.2 In the case of Wilson v. Maddi-
1 Reed v. Reed, 32 111. App. 21,
affirmed in Reed v. Reed, 135 111.
482; s. a, 25 N. E. Rep. 1095. See
also Patten v. Patten, 75 111. 440 ;
Tomlinson v. Matthews, 98 111. 178 ;
Lux v. Hoff, 47 111. 425 ; Maxwell
v. Maxwell, 109 111. 588; Temple v.
Williams, 4 Ired.Eq. 39; Sidmouth
v. Sidmouth, 2 Beav. 417.
2 Carr v. Living, 28 Beav. 644;
Berry v. Briant, 2 Drew. & Sm. 1;
Longmore v. Elcum, 2 Y. & C. Ch.
Cas. 369; Bird v. Mayberry, 33
Beav. 351 ; Crockett v. Crockett, 1
Hare, 451 ; Bibby v. Thompson, 32
Beav. 646; Woods v. Woods, 1
Myl. & Cr. 401 ; Gilbert v. Bennett,
10 Sim. 371; Jubber v. Jubber, 9
Sim. 503; Leach v. Leach, 13 Sim.
304; Lucas v. Lockhart, 10 S. & M.
468; Donovan v. Vandemark, 78
N. Y. 244; Jackson v. Jackson,
2 Pa. St. 212; Pierce v. Mc-
Keehan, 3 W. & S. 280; Hawley v.
James, 5 Paige, 318; Wright v.
Muller, 8 N". Y. 10; S. C, 59 Am.
Dec. 4%; Johnson v. Billups, 23
W. Va. 685 ; Babbitt v. Babbitt, 26
N. J- Eq. 44; Loring v. Loring, 100
Mass. 340; Cole v. Littlefield, 35
Ee. 439. InByne v. Blackburn, 26
Beav. 41, a contrary view was taken
where property was given to a
stranger as trustee instead of the
parent, and it was held that no
trust was created for children. The
view has no support in the later
decisions, notably Carr v. Living,
28 Beav. 644. To put an end to
litigation between a husband and
wife the husband conveyed prop-
erty to trustees, upon trust to pay
his wife £3,700 a year, or so much,
as she should "order or require."
The wife was, out of that sum, to
keep up an establishment for her-
self and children upon such a scale,
as she should think fit; and the
husband was to have the benefit of
it under certain restrictions. But
if she should not require the whole
for the purposes aforesaid, the sur-
plus was to be paid to the husband.
Held, that so long as she kept up.
the establishment she was not lia-
ble to account for the surplus in
her hands. Held, also, that this was
like the case of guardians of in-
fants and committees of lunatics,
having allowances made to them
for maintenance, and who are not
accountable for their expenditure,
so long as they properly maintain
those committed to their care.
Jodrell v. Jodrell, 14 Beav. 367. As
to rights and duties of such trustees
charged with maintenance of chil-
dren, see Woods v. Woods, 1 Myl.
184
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§90.
son, relating to the construction of a will, it was held,
first, that a bequest of £30 a year from "the interest of
the testator's funded money in the Bank of England" did
not amount to a bequest of so much stock as would pro-
duce that annual sum, but constituted an annual charge of
£30 upon the funded property for the life of the legatee;
secondly, that a bequest of £30 a year to A, together with
their children, B, C and D, for their joint maintenance,
was a bequest of that annual sum to the mother and her
children, as joint tenants, for the life of the longest liver
of them.1 In re Fitzpatrick's Appeal, where a testator be-
queathed one-third of his personal estate to his wife abso-
lutely, and the residue, real and personal, to a trustee in
trust for the payment of debts, etc., and then to receive
and pay over one-third of the net income of the real estate
to his wife, during her natural life, for her sole and sepa-
rate use, and the residue of the net income of real and
& Cr. 409; Webb v. Wools, 2 Sim.
(N.S.) 272 ;Eaikesv. Ward, 1 Hare,
449; Robinson v. Tickell, 8 Ves.
449; Leach v. Leacb, 13 Sim. 304;
Cooper v. Thornton, 3 Bro. Ch.
186; Carrv. Living, 28 Beav. 644;
Hadow v. Hadow, 9 Sim. 438 ; Bow-
ditch v. Andrew, 8 Allen, 339;
Chase v. Chase, 2 Allen, 101 ;
Smith v. Smith, 11 Allen, 423. A
widow occupant of town lots, mar-
ried again, and on her death in-
testate, leaving a minor child, her
husband took from the county-
judge, who had received a patent
from the United States, a certificate
in his own name, and afterwards
sold the lots so occupied. Held,
that the widow"s interest was her
separate property, vesting, on her
■death, in her husband and child as
tenants in common, and that to the
extent of the child's interest the
husband held the legal title in trust,
and a purchaser with notice took
subject to the trust. Everdson v.
Mayhew, 65 Cal. 163. Where a
trust for the maintenance of chil-
dren is established their interest in
the fund cannot be reached by
creditors' bill or trustee process
against the parent or other party
charged with such maintenance.
Clute v.Bool, 8 Paige, 83; White
v. White, 30 Vt. 342; Doswell v.
Anderson, 1 Patt. & H. (Va.) 185;
Bramhall v. Ferris, 14 1ST. T. 44; S.
c, 67 Am. Deo. 113; Wells v.
McCall, 64 Pa. St. 207; Eife v.
Ueyer, 59 Pa. St. 393; s. C, 98
Am. Dec. 351. "Such a trust is not
void for uncertainty; as by the
support of a man and wife is meant
such support as is proper and
suitable to them in their station in
life; and the amount required to
furnish such support can be ascer-
tained with reasonable certainty."
Johnson v. Billup=, 23 W. Va. 685.
1 Wilson v. Maddison, 2 Y. & C.
372.
§ 91.] IMPLIED TRUSTS. 185
personal to pay over to her for the support, maintenance
and education of his children until the youngest should ar-
rive at the age of twenty-one years, when the personal
estate should be divided among them ; and, afterwards,
provided that after her decease the trust and limitations
created by the will should cease and determine, it was
held that the testamentary trust expired at the death of
the widow, though it occurred during the minority of the
children, and that the balance in the hands of the trustee
must be paid to their guardian.1
§ 91. Implied Trusts from Partnerships. — Where two
or more persons are conducting business as partners, and the
business is managed by one of the partners with the consent of
the others, and having entire control, his relations to the other
members of the firm become fiduciary. He may be re-
quired to render an account of the business as trustee for
his copartners, and he cannot refuse to account for the profits
of the business, or to make an equitable division with the other
partners on the ground of the illegal character of the original
contract between the parties.2 Where there was an agree-
ment to purchase lands as a speculation, the lands to be
sold within five years and the net proceeds to be equally
divided between the party furnishing the money and the
one who purchased the land, it was held that the partner
who furnished the money and held the title held it as trus-
tee, and was accountable to his partner for a division of
the profits according to the contract.3 It is a well estab-
1 Fitzpatrick's Appeal, 49 Pa. St. 380. The application of one part-
241. ner of a, trust fund in payment of
2 Brooks v. Martin, 2 Wall. 70; his share of the capital stock of the
King v. Hamilton, 16 111. 190; Pi- partnership without the knowledge
att v. Oliver, 2 McLean, 267; Phil- of his copartner does not impose
lips v. Crammond, 2 "Wash. 441 ; on the firm assets a trust in favor
Jenkins v.Frink, 30 Cal. 586; Bald- of the cestui que trust. Gilruth v.
win v. Johnson, Saxt. (1ST. J. Eq.) Decell (1894), 72 Miss. 232; s. c,
441;Pugh v. Currie, 5 Ala. 446; 16 So. Eep. 250.
Hoxie v. Carr, 1 Sumn. 174; For- 3 Seymour v. Freer, 8 Wall. 202.
sythe v. Clooke, 3 "Wend. 637 ; In May, 1835, an agreement was en-
Smith v. Kamsay, 1 Gilm. (111.) tered into between A and B which
343; Jones v. Dexter, 130 Mass. provided on the part of A that he
186
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 91..
lished principle of equity that if a receiver, executor, factor
or trustee lay out the money which he holds in his fiduciary
character in the purchase of real property, and takes the
conveyance to himself, the person who is entitled to the
should devote his time and best
judgment to the selection and pur-
chase of land, to an amount not ex-
ceeding $3,000, in certain designa-
ted States and territories, or in such
of them as he might find most ad-
vantageous to the interest of B ;
that the purchases should be made
during the then existing year, and
that the contracts of purchase
should be made and the conveyan-
ces taken in the name of B, and on
the part of B that he should fur-
nish the $3,000; that the lands pur-
chased should be sold within live
years afterward, and that of the
profits made by such purchase and
sale one-half should be paid to A,
and be in full for his services and
expenses. Under this agreement
lands having been purchased by A,
and the title taken in B : Held, that
B took the legal title in trust for
the purposes specified; that is, to
sell the property within the time
limited, and, after deducting from
the proceeds the outlay, with in-
terest and taxes, to pay over to A
one-half of the residue, and that to
this extent B was trustee and A the
cestui que trust. Seymour v. Freer,
8 "Wall. 202. If the owners of a
part interest In a mining claim
procure a, patent in their name
without the knowledge of their co-
owner, they become trustees for
him. Brundy v. Mayfield (1895),
15 Mont. 201; s. a, 38 Pac. Eep.
1067. The proceeds of a sale of
real estate will not be decreed to
be a trust fund in the hands of the
husband, upon the ground that he
acted as agent for his wife, where
he has deeded the real estate to
her without consideration, and the
property has been subsequently
sold, and the proceeds of the sale
have gone into his hands without
objection on her part, and have
been used in his business and in
support of his family with her con-
sent. Duval v. Duval, 153 111. 49;
s. c, 38 X. E. Rep. 941. As a re-
sult of a suit brought by K again-t
G for a division or sale of land
jointly owned by them, it was sold
for $3,900. Shortly thereafter G
induced plaintiff to make an ad-
vance bid of $590 and it was then,
sold to him; he, together with G as
his surety, executing notes there-
for. Thereafter. and on the same
day G and plaintiff executed writ-
ten agreements, which after re-
citing that plaintiff had purchased
the land and that G had become
his surety for the price, provided
that plaintiff was to pay B half the
purchase money, except that G
should pay B the amount due him
by reason of the advanced bid;
that, as fast as plaintiff paid B, he
should be released from the pay-
ment of the corresponding amounts
coming to G, and on the comple-
tion of the payment they should
jointly own the land, G to have a
three-fourths interest and plaintiff
a one-fourth interest. After plaint-
iff made half of the payments he
became unable to make the others,
and G refused to make them, and
after his death his administrator
also refused. Thereafter, the suit
for division or sale having been re-
vived in the name of G's adminis-
§91.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
187
money may follow the property and treat the purchase as
made for his benefit and the purchaser as his trustee.1 In
trator the land was ordered sold to
satisfy the purchase price, less the
amount which had been paid R.
The purchase was made for the
benefit of G's heirs and his estate
paid the part going to R, and
thereupon a deed' was made to
them, who soon after sold the
property at a large advance. Held,
that plaintiff was entitled to a one-
fourth part of the proceeds, less
the part paid to R from the estate ;
a trust relation, including the sure-
tyship, having been established
between plaintiff and G by reason
of the purchase by plaintiff and
his contract with G. Greer v. Ed-
gerly (1892) (Ky.), 18 S. W. Rep.
531.
1 Phillips v. Crammond, 2 Wash.
441. S, who had an option on
lands of K, entered into an agree-
ment with L and K, whereby L
was to furnish the money to buy
the lands at $15 per acre, and S
and K were to have an interest in
the profits. The lands were to be
sold as lots; and the contention of
S was that a partnership was to
exist between the three, whereby,
after taking out all expenses, S and
K were to each have a quarter of
the profits. L claimed that the
partnership was to exist but two
years, and that the property then
unsold was to belong to him ab-
solutely. The lands were con-
veyed to L, who appointed S and
K agents to sell. The papers re-
cited the agreement between the
parties, but they were silent as to
the disposition of the land unsold.
S, and his wife and daughter, tes-
tified that L requested that the title
should be put in him, to facilitate
sales ; he to hold as trustee for the
partnership. Several purchasers
testified that L spoke of S as part
owner and partner. During the
two years only a small part was
sold, not amounting to the cost of
the improvement, which were
mostly on the part unsold. All of
the expenses, however, including
taxes for all the land, were charged
to the partnership. K, apparently
against interest, testified for L, but
stated that the land was worth $30
per acre. Held, that L held all the
land in trust. Soules v. McLean
(1893), 7 Wash. 451; s. c, 35 Pac.
Rep. 364. Plaintiff, incorporated
for the purpose of conducting a
female seminary, proposed to pur-
chase and improve a certain lot, to
belong to the subscribers in pro-
portion to their subscription. De-
fendant, one of the subscribers,
purchased the lot and took title in
his own name, paying therefor out
of the proceeds of a mortgage ex-
ecuted thereon. The subscriptions
of the stockholders were all paid
up, and used in improving the lot.
Thereafter defendant purchased the
entire stock of the corporation,
and was authorized by the stock-
holders to sell and dispose of the
property. Held, that no trust at-
tached to the property in defend-
ant's hands in favor of plaintiff.
Bennett Female Sem. v. Whitney
(1891), 46 Minn. 353; 'S. C.,49]Sr.
W. Rep. 58. F, acting for C and
others, entered into an agreement
by which L was to convey to F
certain land upon payment at a
stipulated time, the agreement con-
taining a provision that the con-
sideration named in it was merely
an option for the purchase, and
that it was to be void upon default
188
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§91.
a partnership for the purchase of real estate plaintiff ad-
vanced half the purchase money for certain land, the title
being taken in the name of defendant, who was to convey
a half interest to plaintiff. Defendant, her divorced hus-
band, and their son testified that the father gave the son
$2,500 in Texas, and that the latter carried the money
about his person from Texas to this State and gave it to
his mother, and out of this money she repaid the advances
made by plaintiff. The son was a dissolute gambler, and
after he left Texas his father wrote a letter from which it
appears that the son left Texas with $30 instead of $2,500.
The father' s explanation of this letter was not satisfactory.
It was held that a decree establishing title to half the land
in plaintiff was sustained by the evidence.1 In the recent
of such payment at such time.
Before the time for payment C as-
signed part of his interest to
plaintiff, to which assignment F
assented, acknowledging that he
held, as trustee for C, an interest
in the agreement. Default having
been made in payment L declared
the agreement void, and subse-
quently a company was formed
with L and F as officers, which
company purchased from L this
same land, and in its sale realized
large sums. Held, in an action by
plaintiffs for an accounting, and
that the deed to the company be
declared in trust for him to the
extent of his interest, that the
complaint was promptly dismissed.
Loveland v. Fisk (1893), 18 Colo.
201 ; s. C, 32 Pac. Rep. 276.
1 Hines v. Light (1891) , 83 Iowa,
738; s. c, 49 ST. W. Eep. 105.
Defendant was manager for the
plaintiff brewing company in Kan-
sas City, where it had a sales
depot, his duty being to procure
customers and collect claims, with
power to advance funds to custo-
mers. To secure <i debt of $1 .000
owning by an insolvent saloon
keeper, he bought out his business,
and took an assignment of his un-
expired leasehold interest in the
saloon building, assuming the debt
to plaintiff as the consideration.
He put a partner in charge, who
ran the business in his own name,
defendant's connection being kept
secret. To such concern defendant
loaned $500 of plaintiff's money,
which was shortly repaid. De-
fendant gave none of his time to
the business. After plaintiff ac-
quired knowledge of the circum-
stances, it accepted payment of all
the indebtedness from defendant's
partner. Held, that a trust did not
result in favor of plaintiff in such
purchase. Green Tree Brewing
Co. v. Dold, 45 Mo. App. 603;
Seiler v. Mohn, 37 W. Va. 507 ; s. C,
16 S. E. Kep. 496. A deed from B,
M and P to Joseph Pennock for a
tract of land contained a recital:
"and whereas, the said land is in-
tended to be for a residence for M
and his family, and the said Joseph
Pennock pay ,3 toward the purchase
money $1,200, and Isaac Pennock
§ 92. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 189
case of Seiler v. Mohn it was held that where the plaintiff
enters into an executory contract for the purchase of a
tract of land, takes possession of the same, erects build-
ings, and makes valuable improvements thereon, but before
the title is conveyed, or any part of the purchase money
paid, he agrees with defendants that, if they will pay the
purchase money, they may share equally in the property
in its improved condition in the proportion of one-third
each, and in pursuance of such contract defendants do pay
the purchase money, and take the deed therefor to them-
selves, a trust as to one-third of the property arises in
favor of plaintiff.
§ 92. From Relation of Agent and Principal. — It is
well established that an agent in makinsr contracts for his
principal, whether of purchase or of sale, must act with
sole reference to his interests. He cannot even provide for
any collateral benefit for himself. And if in any manner
such an object is attained, the property secured will be held
in trust for his principal. This rule applies to agents of any
and every class. It includes all persons who sustain a fi-
duciary relation of any sort.1 In the case cited before the
N * * pays $500, and Archibald knowledge or consent of the latter,
Paull * * * pays $500." The he will be adjudged to hold the
conveyance was to Joseph Pen- title as trustee for his principal,
nock, "in trust as well for the and if sold and transferred by him
said Isaac M. Pennock and Archi- the proceeds in his hands will be
bald Paull as for himself, in the impressed with a similar trust,
proportions the amount paid by and the court will compel him to
each bears to the whole purchase account therefor. Kraemer v. Deus-
money." These persons put M terman, 37 Minn. 469; s. c, 35
into possession for no defined N. W. Kep. 297; Schlaeper v.
period. Held, that there was no Corson, 52 Barb. 510. An agent
implied trust in favor of M and his employed to purchase for an-
family, and his possession was that other, whether he be actually
of a mere tenant at will ; Mitchell or constructively an agent, cannot
v. Murphy, 43 Fed. Rep. 425. purchase for himself, but is a
1 Garrow v. Davis, 10 N. Y. Leg. trustee for his employer. Church
Obs. 225. If an agent, employed v. Sterling, 16 Conn. 3S8; Follans-
to purchase lands for his principal, bee v. Kilbreath, 17 111. 522 ; Hutch-
and with his money, upon the pur- inson v. Hutchinson, 4 Desaus. Eq.
chase thereof,takes the title thereto 77; Chastain v. Smith, 30 Ga. 96;
in his own name, without the Eshelman v. Lewis, 49 Pa. St. 410;
190 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 92.
United States Circuit Court, Judge Ware, in his opinion,
said: "It is a general rule of law that an agent shall not
be allowed, when contracting for his principal, to provide
for himself any emolument in pecuniary advantage from the
contract bej^ond the compensation which he receives from
his employer. An agent to sell cannot be a buyer, or be
in any way interested in the purchase of what he sells, nor
can he, when contracting for his principal, stipulate for any
individual or collateral advantage to himself. If he does
he is deemed to take and hold it as a trustee for his princi-
pal. It is a rule which applies to all persons standing in a
fiduciary relation to the parties for whom they are acting,
founded in a wise public policy, and which courts of equity
are in the habit of enforcing with wholesome rigor. The
most entire good faith is a legal obligation. If it were
otherwise, an agent would be under the temptation of sac-
rificing the interest of his principal for some collateral
benefit to himself, and the law, therefore, wisely closes the
door against the temptation, and holds that all such ben-
efits of a pecuniary value which the agent may make in his
own interest shall enure for the benefit of his principal." a
In a recent case, where land was purchased for a land com-
pany by an agent, and part payment made by the agent
and by the manager of the company, with the company's
funds, it was held that these facts did not raise an implied
trust in the land in favor of the company as against the
vendor, who had dealt with the vendee and the manager in
Heilman v. Messmer (1888), 75 Cal. He afterwards discovered that A
166; s.C, 16Pac. Rep.766; O'Con- was in fact owner of the shares,
nor v. Irwine ^1887), 74 Cal. 435; having just bought them at £2 a
S. c, 16 Pac. Pep. 236; Ward v. share. Held, that on the facts as
Armstrong, 84 111. 151. A, be- stated A was an agent for B, and
ing aware that B wished to ob- A ordered to pay back to B the
tain shares in a certain company, difference between the price of the
represented to B that he, A, could shares. Kimber v. Barber, L. K.
procure a certain number of shares 8 Ch. App. 56.
at £3 per share. B agreed to pur- 1 Garrow v. Davis, 10 N. Y. Leg.
chase at that price, and the shares Obs. 230. See also East Kiver Co.
were thereupon transferred, in part v. Henchman, 1 Ves. 2S9; Mahey
to him and part to parties named v. Davidson, 2 Ves. 319; Lonsdale
by him, and he paid A £3 a share, v. Church, 3 Bro. Ch. 41.
§ 93. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 191
their individual capacities only, without knowledge either
of their relation to the company, or of the fact that the
money paid on the contract belonged to the company, and
who had, in good faith and for value, obtained from them
a release of all their rights to the land after a default in
the payment of the third instalment.1 In a suit to declare
a trust in plaintiff's favor in land conveyed to her father,
since deceased, it was shown that her father acted as her
agent in managing her money; that shortly before he
bought the land he called in several of her loans, stating
that he desired to invest the money in land for her, and
that at the time he bought it he said to several persons that
it was bought for her and with her money. It was held
that this was sufficient to warrant finding an agreement to
hold the land in trust for plaintiff, and rendering judgment
quieting her title thereto.2
§ 93. The Subject Continued. — The relations of an
agent to his principal, as above stated, have been sustained
in their application to the purchase of public lands by the
Supreme Court of the United States. In the case of Irvine
v. Marshall, it was held by that court that an "agent who
has entered the land for himself and obtained a patent in
his own name, becomes a trustee for his principal, and can-
not hold the land under such entry otherwise than as such
trustee."3 In the recent case of Lambert v. Stees, before
1 Stratton v. California Land & R Irvine v. Marshall, 20 How.
Timber Co., 86 Cal. 353; s. c, 24 558. "If under these circumstan-
Pac. Rep. 1065; Conrad v. Lindley, ces a locator, finding that the en-
2 Cal. 173 ; Greene v. Covilland, 10 try he has made cannot be sur-
Cal. 317 ; Marshall v. Caldwell, 41 veyed, instead of withdrawing it or
Cal. 611; Eastman v. Plumer, 46 amending it so as to render itsus-
N". H. 464; Willard v. Taylor, 8 ceptible of being carried into exe-
Wall. 557; Hicks v. Lovell, 64 Cal. cution, secures the adjoining land
20; s. c, 49 Am. Rep. 679; Gates for himself , and shows other land
v. McLean, 70 Cal. 49; Pennie v. to the surveyor, which the location
Hildreth, 81 Cal. 127. cannot be construed to compre-
2 Mull v. Bowles, 129 Ind. 343 ; hend, it appears to this court to
s. c, 28 ST. E. Rep. 771; Mitchell v. be a breach of duty which
Colglazier, 106 Ind. 464; Riehl v. amounts to a violation of the im-
Evansville, etc. Assn., 104 Ind. 70; plied contract, and subjects him to
Ray v. Ferrell, 127 Ind. 570. the action of the party injured. If
192 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§93.
the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ejectment for land
claimed by plaintiff through L, his father, who had located
land warrants thereon and received patents, defendant
claimed through P, claiming that the land warrants had
been entered in his own name by L, but in reality in trust
for P. Several witnesses, who were uncontradicted, tes-
tified to facts showing that P had given land warrants to L,
who was an attorney, to locate for him ; that L had said he
had land warrants to locate for P, and it did not appear that
any warrants were entered in P's name. It also appeared
that during thirty-eight years, for more than half of which
a claimant under P was in possession of the land, no claim
was made under L. It was held that the evidence required
a finding that L had located the warrants as agent and
trustee for P.1 A person who redeems land that has been
sold for taxes, assuming to act as agent, will be held by a
court of equity to have acted in that capacity, and if he
takes advantage of such act of redemption to obtain a title
to the property in his own name, and eventually secures
the perfecting of the title, he will be held responsible as
agent for the person in whom the title was vested at the
time of the sale, holding the property as trustee for him.2
the location be sustainable, and the such land arises in favor of the
locator, instead of showing the principal, which may be estab-
land really covered by the entry, lished by parol, as provided by
shows other land, and appropriates McClel. Dig. p. 214, § 2, and Rev.
to himself the land actually en- St. §1951. Boswell v. Cunninghma,
tered, this appears to the court to 32Fla. 277; s. c, 13 So. Rep. 354.
be a species of mala fides, which 2 Schedda v. Sawyer, 4 McLean,
will in equity convert him into a 181. Stimpson gave a deed of re-
trustee for the party originally en- lease of his interest, as a tenant in
titled to the land. In either case, common, in certain premises to
the jurisdiction of the court of the Baker. At the time of this convey-
State in which the person is found ance Whiting was in possession,
is sustainable." Chief Justice and seizin of the premises, claim-
Marshall in Massie v. Watts, 6 ing them in his own right by vir-
Cranch, 162. tue of a purchase under a tax sale.
1 Lambert v. Stees, 47 Minn. 141 ; Whiting was one of the tenants in
S. C, 49 N. W. Rep. 662. Where common of the premises, and was
an agent employed to purchase the agent of Stimpson and the
land for his principal purchases other proprietors. Meld, that the
for himself, an implied trust as to purchase of Whiting must be
§ 93. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 193
As agent he is entitled to the repayment of the sum which
he has advanced in the redemption of the land, and having
received this his act will be held to have been for the bene-
fit of his principal.1 Again, this principle applies to the
purchase of any outstanding title or interest in property ex-
posed to sale. A person who, by agreement, sustains the
relation of agent to others holding an interest in the same
property, or who by his act assumes to sustain such a rela-
tion, makes himself liable as an agent, and if he makes pur-
chases as a trustee, the other parties interested may, if
they so elect, take the benefit of his investment.2 The re-
lation of tenants in common is governed by the same rule
as that of agent and principal. Where two or more devisees
or tenants in common hold under an imperfect title, and
one of them buys in the outstanding title, such purchase
will inure to their common benefit upon repayment of the
purchase money. It is not necessary to the operation of
this rule that the interests of the parties should be equal.
It applies to the husband of a tenant in common as fullv as
to one of the immediate co-tenants.3 All that is done by one
tenant in common is to be done for the interests of all the
co-tenants, and in conformity to their rights, until an ad-
verse claim is openly set up and and established by compe-
tent proofs.4
deemed a trust for the benefit of 2 Ibid.
Stimpson and his grantee, Baker, 3 Ibid. See also Cotton v. Holli-
to the extent of their interests ; that day, 59 111. 176 ; McMurray v. Mob-
he ought to be decreed to convey ley, 39 Ark. 309 ; Firestone v. Fire-
the legal title to the premises, after stone, 49 Ala. 128; "Wellford v.
being satisfied of all just claims, Chancellor, 5 Gratt. 39; Wolford
which he had against them for v. Herrington, 74 Pa. St. 311;
taxes, for the purchase money laid Church v. Sterling, 16 Conn. 3S8;
out in the tax sale ; for his expen- Switzer v. Skiles, 3 Gilm. 529; s.
ditures and improvements upon c, 44 Am. Dec. 723; Keed v. War-
them, and also for his reasonable ner, 5 Paige Ch. 650 ; Lees v. Nut-
services as agent in the premises, tall, 1 Russ. & Myl. 54; Sweet v.
deducting all sums of money re- Jaeocks, 6 Paige Ch. 355; Benson
ceived by him in the premises for v. Heathorn, 1 Y . & C. 325 ; Taylor
"stumpage," or otherwise. Baker v. Salmon, 4 Myl. & Cr. 133.
v. Whiting, 3 Sumn. 475. * Baker v. Whiting, 3 Sumn. 476.
1 Rothwell v. Dewees, 2 Black, Where an employee takes money
613- and property of his employer,
194 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 94.
§ 94. Implied Trusts from Contracts. — Where two or
more persons enter nito a contract, in writing, to purchase
lands on joint accounts a fiduciary relation is established.
If, in violation of the agreement one of the parties pur-
chases the property on his own account, his purchase will be
held to be in trust for the joint account of all the parties to the
contract. And if the purchase is made in accordance with
the terms of the contract, none of the parties can be ex-
cluded from a participation in the common profits or bene-
fits arising from the purchase. Any private or personal
benefit that one of the parties may derive from the trans-
action will convert him into a trustee for the benefit of all
the others.1 Where a contract for the purchase of lands has
such defects that, as a contract, it cannot be enforced, it
may, nevertheless, constitute a basis for the establishment
of a trust. In the recent case of Fackler v. Ford, before
the Supreme Court of the United States, it was held that
an instrument may have the distinguishing characteristics
of a contract and be open to objections which prevent its
enforcement as such; still, if it possess the essential
elements of a trust, the trust may be enforced. Where A
entered into a contract with B, by which the latter agreed
to buy certain land and convey the same to A, and A,
having paid a portion of the contract price, B purchased
the land as agreed, but refused to convey to A, it was held
without being entitled to treat it Ves. 298; Palmer v. Young, lVern.
as his own, and uses it to buy a lot 276 ; Carter v. Home, 1 Eq. Abr. 7,
and build a house thereon, an im- pi. 13; Van Home v. Fonda, 5
plied trust will be declared in la- Johns. Ch. 3S8, 407 ; Fawcett v.
vor of the employer. Grouch v. Whitehouse, 1 Russ. & Myl. 132;
Hazlehurst Lumber Co. (Miss.) Burton v. "Wookey, 6 Madd. 367.
(1S94), 16 So. Rep. 496. Where an Profits made by continuing to deal
agent acquires property for a con- with what once was joint stock
si deration furnished by his princi- after the dissolution of the partner-
pal, taking title in his own name, ship must be accounted for; the
be holds it in trust for his princi- party whose property has been ex-
pal. Gashe v. Young (1894), 51 posed to responsibility and proba-
'Ohio St. 376; s. c, 38 ST. E. Rep. ble loss must participate in the
30. actual profits. Crawshay v. Col-
JFlagg v. Mann, 2 Sumn. 487; lins, Uac. & Walk. 279; Brown v.
Featherstonehaugh v. Fenwick, 17 De Tastet, Jacobs' Rep. 296.
§ 94. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 195
that, even though as urged by counsel, a decree for specific
performance of the contract could not be rendered, on ac-
count of objections raised, there was, nevertheless,
an implied trust in favor of A which the court had the
power to enforce.1 In another recent case of a similar
character, where, pursuant to a written contract between
complainant and one B, by which complainant was to
locate pine land in the name of B, B to furnish the money
and land warrants, and in consideration thereof complain-
ant was to receive from B a quarter part of all the land so
located, B became possessed of a large tract of such land.
It was held that the contract having been fully performed
by each party, except giving complainant his deed, B held
the quarter interest in trust for complainant.2 This doc-
trine has a further illustration in a recent case in which
plaintiff, being the owner of certain real estate about to be
sold at a sheriff's sale, agreed with defendant that de-
fendant should purchase the same, take a deed therefor, and
hold the same for himself and plaintiff as equal owners,
and that defendant should pay himself therefor out of
certain of plaintiff's property in defendant's possession,
to be converted into money for that purpose. Defendant
purchased the property, took title to himself, paid himself
for plaintiff's share out of plaintiff's converted effects,
and then conveyed the purchased premises to his brother
without consideration. It was held that a trust arose in
plaintiff's favor from these facts, and that he was entitled
to a conveyance of one undivided half of the premises.3
1 Fackler v. Ford, 24 How. 322. fendants were to buy the stock in
Plaintiff, to facilitate the formation their own names made no differ-
of a certain company, advanced ence. Barnard v. Hawks, 111 1ST.
money to defendants to buy stock Car. 333; s. c, 16 S. E. Rep. 329.
in a certain other company, the un- 2 Eipley v. Seligman (1891) , 88
derstanding being that defendants Mich. 177; s. c, 50 N. W. Rep.
were to transfer the stock to plaint- 143.
iff, who was to hold same until the 3 Turpie v. Lowe, 4 Ohio Cir. Ct.
money should be repaid by the Rep. 599. "An examination of
company. Held, not to constitute a the authorities shows, we think,
loan merely to defendants, but a conclusively, that it is not neees-
trust; and the fact that the de- sary that the actual money paid
196 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§95.
§ 95. The Subject Continued. — The fiduciary relation
established betwen two parties to a contract to purchase
lands on their joint account is essentially that of tenant in
common, and the rule in the latter case will apply to the
former. In the case of Featherstonehaugh v. Fenwick,
where one partner had secretly for his own benefit obtained
a renewal of a lease of the premises where the joint trade
was carried on, Sir William Grant decided that the lease
was a trust for the benefit of the partnership. He said:
"It is clear that one partner cannot treat privately and
behind the backs of his co-partners for a lease of the
premises, where the joint trade is carried on, for his indi-
vidual benefit. If he does so treat and obtain a lease in
his own name, it is a trust for the partnership."1 In the
leading case of Flagg v. Mann, before the Circuit Court of
the United States, Mr. Justice Story, referring to Cicero's
celebrated maxim of general justice, said: "That maxim
is but an exposition of the doctrine that if a purchase is
made by parties so interested by mutual agreement, neither
party can rightfully exclude the other from what was in-
tended to be for the common benefit ; and that if one of
the parties by private intrigue seeks to obtain without con-
tract, but in violation of his good faith to his co-tenants or
partners, a private benefit to himself in things touching
the common right, it is a fraud which shall turn him into
a trustee for the benefit of all. Hence it is that, in cases
of partnership, a contract made by one partner is deemed
to be made for the benefit of all, for there is an implied
must be handed over at the time by dies leaving money on board; the
the cestui que trust; but if the pur- mate becomes captain and im-
chase is made on his credit, or the proves the money, he shall, on al-
trustee has in his hands money or lowance made him for his care in
property of the cestui que trust the management of such money,
which is at the time devoted account for the profits, and not the
or pledged to the payment, the interest only. Brown v. Litton
trust arises." Ibid. See also 1 Perry (1711), 1 P. Wins. 140. See also
on Trusts, § 135 ; Browne, Stat, of Crawshay v. Collins, 15 Ves. 218 ;
Frauds, § 87; 1 Spence's Equitable s. c;, 1 Jaq. & Walk. 267; Brown
Jurisdiction, 451, 454. v. De Tastet, 1 Jac. 284; Sigourney
1 Featherstonehaugh v. Fenwick, v. Munn, 7 Conn. 11.
17 Ves. 298. Captain of a ship
§95.J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
197
obligation to act for the common benefit.1 In the same
case Justice Story quotes Chancellor Kent, in Van Home
v. Fonda,2 a case of a similar character, as follows: "I
will not say, however, that one tenant in common may not
in any case purchase an outstanding title for his exclusive
benefit. But where two devisees are in possession under an
imperfect title, derived from their common ancestor (the
very case before him), there would seem naturally and
equitably to arise an obligation between them, resulting
from their joint claims and community of interest that one
of them should not affect the claim to the prejudice of the
other, etc. It is not consistent with good faith, nor with
the duty, which the connection of the parties as the claim-
1 Flagg v. Munn, 2 Sumn. 521.
In the leading case of Keech v.
Sandford, 1 Lead. Cas. in Eq.
(White & Tudor. 4th Am. Ed.) 48,
62, Lord King uses this language :
"I must consider this as a trust lor
an infant, for I very well see, if a
trustee on a refusal to renew might
have a lease to himself, few trust
estates would be renewed to the
cestui que trust use. Though I do
not say there was fraud in this
case, yet he (the trustee) should
rather have let it run out than to
have had the lease to himself.
This may seem hard that the trus-
tee is the only person of all man-
kind who might not have the lease,
but it is very proper that the rule
should be very strictly pursued,
and not in the least relaxed ; for it
is very obvious what would be the
consequences of letting trustees
have the lease on refusal to renew
to cestui que use." See also Lar-
kins v. Rhodes, 5 Port. (Ala.) 196;
Rhea v. Tucker, 56 Ala. 450; Bibb
v. Hunter, 79 Ala. 351; Anthe v.
Heide (1887), 85 Ala. 236; s. c, 4
So. Rep. 380; Dikeman v. Morrie,
36 Cal. 94; Case v. Codding, 38
Cal. 191; Somers v. Overhulzer, 67
Cal. 237; Letcher v. Letcher, 4 J.
J. Marsh. (Ky.) 590; Lipscomb v.
Nichols, 6 Colo. 290; Honore v.
Hutchings, 8 Bush, 687; Smith v.
Smith, 85 111. 189; McNamara
v. Garrity, 106 111. 384; Springer v.
Springer, 114 111. 550; Donlin v.
Bradley, 119 111. 412; McDonald v.
McDonald, 24 Ind. 68; Bank v.
Snively, 23 Md. 253; McCarroll v.
Alexander, 48 Miss. 621 ; Baum-
gardner v. Guessfield, 38 Mo. 36;
Bear v. Koenigstein, 16 Neb. 65;
Boskowitz v. Davis, 12 Nev. 449;
Dow v. Jewell, 18 N. H. 340; s. c,
45 Am. Dec. 371 ; Botsford v. Burr,
2 Johns. Ch. 405; Ross v. Hege-
man, 2 Edw. Ch. 373; Trustees v.
Wheeler, 59 Barb. 585; Jackson v.
Moore, 6 Cow. 706 ; McG-overn v.
Knox, 21 Ohio St. 547; Morey v.
Herrick, 18 Pa. St. 123; Chad-
wick v. Felt, 35 Pa. St. 305;
Bigley v. Jones, 114 Pa. St.
510; Shoemaker v. Smith, 11
Humph. 81; Sheldon v. Sheldpn, 3
Wis. 699; McCully v. McCully, 78
Va. 159; Clark v. Clark, 43 Vt.
685; Pinney v. Fellows, 15 Vt. 525;
Neill v. Keese, 13 Tex. 187.
2 Van Home v. Fonda, 5 Johns.
Ch. 388, 407.
198 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 96.
ants of a common subject created, that one of them should
be able, without the consent" of the other, to buy in an
outstanding title and appropriate the whole subject to him-
self and thus undermine and oust his companion. It
would be repugnant to a sense of refined and accurate
justice. It would be immoral because it would be against
the reciprocal obligation to do nothing to the prejudice of
each other's equal claim, which the relationship of the
parties as joint devisees created. Community of interest
produces community of duty, and there is no real differ-
ence, on the ground of policy and justice, whether one co-
tenant buys up an outstanding incumbrance, or an adverse
title, to disseize and expel his co-tenant. It cannot be tole-
rated when applied to a common subject in which the
parties had equal concern, and which created a moral obli-
gation to deal candidly and benevolently with each other,
and to cause no harm to their joint interests."1
§ 96. From Contracts for Sale. — In a contract for the
sale of real estate for a valuable consideration the vendor,
by implication, makes himself a trustee for the purchaser
and makes himself accountable for the use of the property.
In order to the validity of the transaction the contract must
be in writing, in compliance with the requirements of the
statute of frauds.2 The fiduciary character of the relation
1 Van Home v. Fonda, 5 Johns. 77 N. Y. 605; Musham v. Musham,
Ch. 388,407. "If a trustee or execu- 87 111. 80; Feleh v. Hooper, 119
tor compound debts or mortgages, Mass. 52 ; Bowie v. Barry, 3 Md.
or buy in for less than is due, he Ch. 359; Knox v. Gye, L. R. 5 H.
shall not take the benefit of it to L. Cas. 656; Green v. Brooks, 81
himself, for when he takes a trust Cal. 328; Coffin v. Argo (1890), 134
he is to take it for his cestui que 111. 276; s. c, 24 N. E. Kep. 1068;
trust. He cannot be permitted to Moore v. Burrows, 34 Barb. 173;
raise in himself an interest oppo- Hathaway v. Paine, 34 1ST. Y. 103;
site to that of the party for whom Cogswell v. Cogswell, 2 Edw. Ch.
he acts. This is a fundamental 238; Shotwell v. Jefferson Ins. Co.,
doctrine of equity." 2 Fonbl. B. 5 Bosw. 247-257 ; Harris v. Barnett,
II, ch. 7, § 7. 3 Gratt. 339 ; Hill v. Meyers, 43 Pa.
2 Jackson v. Morse, 16 Johns. St. 170; Phillips v. Thompson, 1
197; Connor v. Lewis, 16 Me. 268; Johns. Ch. 131; Ryan v. Dox, 34
Coman v. Lakey, 80 N. Y. 345; N. Y. 312; Acland v. Gaisford, 2
Peltonv. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., Madd. 32; Wilson v. Clapham, 1 J.
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
199
§96.]
of vendor and vendee is so firmly established that, under
an executory contract of sale, the vendor will be held re-
sponsible to the vendee for any injury to the estate
while in his possession, either from deliberate waste
or from the neglect of proper care and atten-
tion.1 On the other hand, any injury to the estate
that results from the ordinary use, or wear, or from acci-
dent as by fire or water, will be at the expense of the ven-
& w. 38. 39 ; Ferguson v. Tadman,
1 Sim. 530; Foster v. Deacon. 3
Madd. 394. Where heirs convey
land pursuant to a parol agreement
that the grantee shall sell the same
and pay the proceeds to them pro
rata, a parol trust only attaches to
the money received if the land is
sold, and, if confirmed by the
grantee after the sale, may be en-
forced in law; but the right to
have the agreement carried out
dies with the grantee, and lands so
held descend to his heirs unincum-
bered by any trust, as such parol
agreement is void under the statute
of frauds. Collar v. Collar, 86 Mich.
507; s. C, 49 N.W. Rep. 551. Com-
plainant and his mother employed
H to buy land for them, and fur-
nished the money for the first pay-
ment, H taking the contract of
sale in bis name. Subsequently
they paid the balance of the price,
whereupon a deed was made to H
by the vendor, with the knowledge
and consent of complainant and
his mother. The title was put in
H for the sake of convenience, he
agreeing to convey to the com-
plainant and his mother when re-
quested. Meld, that under How.
St. § 5569, providing that "when a
graDt for a valuable consideration
shall be made to one person and
the consideration thereof shall be
paid by another, no use or trust
shall result in favor of the person
by whom such payment shall be
made," the person furnishing the
money had no rights in property
as against H's creditors, and a, sale
under execution against H would
not be enjoined. Barnes v. Mun-
roe (1893), 95 Mich. 612; s. c, 55
N.W. Rep. 431.
1 Moses v. Johnson, 88 Ala. 517.
When a vendor of real estate enters
into an executory agreement to
convey title on the payment of the
purchase money he sustains, in
substance, the same relation to the
vendee as a mortgagee does to a
mortgagor. Each has a legal title
which, in the absence of stipula-
tions for possession, will maintain
an action of ejectment. Each can re-
tain his legal title against the other
party until the purchase money,
or mortgage debt, is paid, unless
he permits the other to remain in
undisturbed possession for twenty
years. And yet each is at last but
a trustee of the legal title for the
mortgagee or vendee if the pur-
chase money, or mortgage debt, as
the case may be, is paid or season-
ably tendered. The same mutual
rights and remedies, legal and
equitable, and the same limitation
to the right of recovery obtain in
the one relation and in the other.
Relfe v. Relfe, 34 Ala. 500; Bizzell
v. Mix, 60 Ala. 281; Chapman v.
Lee, 64 Ala. 483; Sweeney v. Bix-
ler, 69 Ala. 539.
200 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§96.
dee, and if damage is incurred that requires an imme^
diate expenditure it will be made at the vendee's ex-
pense.1 But when, for any reason, the estate becomes
more valuable, the increase of value will inure to the benefit
of the purchaser.2 While the contract for sale renders
the vendor a trustee, it is to be borne in mind that he is a
trustee sub modo only, and that he cannot be required to give
possession until the purchase money has been paid, or there
has otherwise been a full compliance with the terms of the
contract.3 But where the purchaser has fulfilled his part
of the contract he may enforce the trust against a subse-
quent purchaser from the vendor, if he has made the pur-
chase subject to notice of the contract for sale.4 The
payment of a part of the purchase money by the vendee
may render the contract binding upon the vendor. In a
recent case before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin it was
held that paying part of the purchase money under a
verbal contract for the sale of land, taking possession
thereof and making valuable improvements thereon, is a
part performance of the contract by the vendee, within the
meaning of the statute, which provides that the statute of
frauds shall not be construed to abridge the power of
courts of equity to compel specific performance of agree-
ments relating to the sale of land where such agreements
have been partly performed. In his opinion on this case
Mr. Justice Taylor said: "This court, as well as nearly all
other courts, has held that equity will enforce a verbal
contract for the sale of real estate where there has been a
part performance of such contract on the part of the
vendee, and our statute, after declaring the nullity of such
verbal contract, expressly provides that nothing in the
statute shall be construed to abridge the powers of courts
1 Robertson v. Skelton, 12 Beav. 3 Wall v. Bright, 1 J. & W. 494;
260. McCreight v. Foster, L. E. 5 Ch.
2 Harford v. Punier, 1 Madd. App. 604; Acland v. Gaisford, 2
539; Spurrier v. Hancock, 4 Ves. Madd. 32.
667; Paine v. Heller, 6 Ves. 352; * McWhinnie v. Martin (1890), 77
White v. Nutts, 1 P. Wms. 61; Wis. 182; s. c, 46 N. W. Eep. 118.
Eevell v. Hussey, 2 B. & B. 287.
§ 97. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 201
to compel the specific performance of such agreements.
What is such a part performance of a verbal contract as
will take it out of the statute, and will justify a court of
equity in decreeing a specific performance of such contract,
has been frequently considered by this court, and it is held
that the payment of any considerable part of the purchase
money, and entering into possession of the purchased
premises and making improvements thereon, are sufficient
to take the case out of the statute and justify the enforce-
ment of the contract."1
§ 97. From Marriage Contracts. — A marriage contract
creates an implied trust to the extent of the obligation as-
sumed. Where a person engages to settle, on his mar-
riage, all the personal estate that he shall acquire during
coverture, such estate will be subject to a trust from the
time that it comes into his possession ; and if the property
is converted into money and invested in real estate the trust
will follow the purchase.2 If the contract simply binds
him to settle the estate of which he shall die seized, he is
at liberty to dispose of any part or of the whole during
his lifetime.3 But if the covenant requires him to settle
all the real and personal estate of which he shall be pos-
sessed at the time of his death, the trust will include all
the estate, whether real or personal, of which he has power
to dispose of by will.4 If the contract requires the payment
1 Rev. Stat. Wis. (1 Sanb. & B. L. R. 7 Ir. 144; Ex parte Bolland,
1334), § 2305; McWhinnie & Mar- L. R. 17 Eq. 115.
tin (1890), 77 Wis. 182; s. c, 46 N. 3 Rowan v. Chute, 13 Ir. Ch. 168;
W. Rep. 122. See also Bowen v. Be McKenna, 13 Ir. Ch. 239; Nay-
Warner, 1 Pin. 600; Blanchard v. ler v. Wetherall, 12 Jan., 1831, af-
MoDouga.ll, 6 Wis. 167; District firmed 23 Jan., 1833 (MS.)- Where*
No. 3 v. Maeloon, 4 Wis. 79; Fisher the covenant was to settle all the
v. Moolick, 13 Wis. 321; Ingles v. real and personal estate which he
Patterson, 36 Wis. 373; Smith v. should be seized or possessed of at
Finch, 8 Wis. 245; Cameron v. the time of his death, and it was
Austin, 65 Wis. 652; s. c, 27 5T. declared that the covenant bound
W. Rep. 622; Seaman v. Ascher- all the real and personal estate
man, 51 Wis. 678-682; s.c.,8N. which he bad power to dispose of
W. Rep. 81S. by will. 1 Lewin on Trust, *141.
* Lewis v. Maddocks, 8 Ves. 150; A Supra.
S. c, 17 Ves. 48; Galavanv.Dunne,
202 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§98.
or the securing of an annuity, and by the terms of the eon-
tract the annuity is made a charge on one class or kind of
property, it will not constitute a claim against other prop-
erty of which the covenantor may be seized.1
§ 98. Notice of Equitable Title. — It is a principle of
equity so well settled as not to be called in question, that
where property changes hands any person coming into
possession of trust property, under notice of the trust, by
this act becomes himself a trustee to the extent of the
property acquired, and is placed under obligation to exe-
cute the trust. So far as relates to all persons chargeable,
or responsible, proper notice of a trust carries with it all
the consequences of a full declaration of trust. The trust
will adhere as long as the identity of the property can be
established. Where the property is in money the identity
relates, not to the bank bills, nor to the pieces of coin of
which it consists, but to the fund or the sum in question.
As long as it can be treated with notice of the trust so
long the trust will be operative. It is well established that
notice to the agent is notice to the principal.2 In the case
of the United States v. The Inhabitants of Waterborough,
before the District Court of the United States, Judge
Ware, in his opinion, said: "Where property of any de-
scription is transferred from one to another, which is
affected by a trust, or upon which any lien exists in favor
of a third person, and the person to whom it is transferred
has notice of the fact, the trust or lien will follow it into
his hands. The assignee will be bound by the trust. The
property will be subject to the lien to the same extent as
•before the transfer was made and the possession changed.
The assignee will merely succeed to the rights of the as-
signor, and will be subject to the same duties and liabilities
with respect to the property. This is not only a principle
of natural justice, but one that is familiarly enforced by
1 Countess of Mornington v. Pet. 299; United States Y. In-
Keane, 2 De G. & J. 292; Stock v. habitants of Waterborough, Davies,
Moyse, 12 Ir. Ch. 246. 154.
2 Mechanics' Bank v. Seton, 1
§98.J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
203
courts of equity in a great variety of cases. 1 Story 'sEq. Jur.
§ 533. If this is a rule with respect to specific property,
as real estate or chattels, it is no less just that it should be
applied to money, so long as its identity is preserved ; and
its identity as money is preserved so long as it can be fol-
lowed and distinguished from all other money, not regard-
ing the individual coins or pieces of money, but so long as
it can be followed as a separate and independent fund or
value, distinguishable from all other funds."1 It has been
held that a legal title obtained by a purchaser from one who
had secured the legal title with notice of equitable, and
where notice of the prior equitable title was given, will not
be disturbed if the purchaser was encouraged by the holder
of the equitable title to pay the purchase money.2 "Where
1 United States v. Inhabitants of
Waterborough, Davies, 154. "This
principle was acted upon by the
Court of King's Bench, in the ease
of Taylor et al. v. Sir Thomas
Plummer, 3 Maul. & Selw. 562,
after a very full and elaborate ar-
gument. Sir Thomas Plummer
had placed in the hands of a
broker £22,000, to be invested for
him in exchequer bills. Part was
invested, and the bills delivered.
The residue the broker invested in
American stocks and bullion, in-
tending to abscond with them,
thus converting the money to his
own use. He was arrested, and
the stocks and bullion obtained.
It was contended that the property
having been wrongfully converted
by the bankrupt to his own use, it
became incorporated into the gen-
eral mass of the bankrupt's prop-
erty, and passed to his assignees
as part of the assets of the bank-
ruptcy. But the court decided that
the money having gODe into the
hands of the broker covered with
a trust,not withstanding any change
it had undergone in form, that it
remained affected by the trust,
and the lien of the owner con-
tinued as long as the property was
capable of being identified and
distinguished from all other prop-
erty. The argument that the owner
loses his right to follow his prop-
erty after it has been tortiously
converted into another form, is
unfounded in principle and unsup-
ported by authority." Ibid.
2 Kurtz v. Bank of Columbia, 2
Cranch, Cir. Ct. 701 ; Everett v.
Kail way, 67 Tex. 430 ; Overstreet
v. Manning, 67 Tex. 660 : JIcKamey
v. Thorpe. 61 Tex. 652. Inasmuch
as plaintiff paid no new consider-
ation, but accepted an absolute
conveyance from O in satisfaction
of his pre-existing debt, he was
substituted to C's position as trustee
for intervener, even though he had
no notice of intervener's interest.
Black v. Caviness, 2 Tex. Civ. App.
118; s. c, 21 S. W. Kep. 635. See
also Fox v. Mackreath, 1 Lead.
Cas. Eq. 188, 212, 237; Mechanics'
Bk. of Alexandria v. Seton, 1 Pet.
299 ; Daggs v. E well, 3 Woods, 344 ;
Kitchen v. Bedford, 13 Wall. 413;
204
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§98.
a title is procured by proceedings that are illegal and void
the purchaser will hold the legal title as trustee for the
rightful owners. In a case where inquiry would have dis-
closed the fact that plaintiffs, heirs of the rightful owners
of a land claim, had never parted with their interests, and
that the patentee procured his claim by virtue cf void pro-
bate proceedings upon the estate of the original claimants,
where the court neither had jurisdiction of the party nor the
charged subject-matter, a purchaser under such title will be
as trustee of the legal title for the benefit of plaintiffs.1
Taylor v. Plumer, 3 Maule & S.
562, 574, 576 ; Ex parte Dumas, 1
AM*. 232, 233; Lane v. Dighton,
.Amb. 409, 411, 413 ; Lench v. Lench,
10 Ves. 511, 517 ; Lewis v. Madocks,
17 Ves. 48, 51, 58; Griggs v. Cooks,
4 Sim. 438; Ernst v. Croysdill, 2
DeG.,F.&J.175; Barnes v. Addy,
L. K. 9 Ch. 244; Ex parte Cooke,
L. E. 4 Ch. Div. 123; In re Hal-
lett's Estate, L. K. 13 Ch. Di v. 696 ;
Rolfe v. Gregory, 4 DeG., J. & S.
576; Mansell v.Mansell, 2 P. Wins.
678; Swinburne v. Swinburne, 28
N. T. 568; Schlaefier v. Corson, 52
Barb. 510; Lathrop v. Bampton,
31 Cal. 17; s. c, 89 Am. Dec. 141;
Hastings v. Drew, 76 N. Y. 9,
16; Bartlett v. Drew, 57 N. Y.
587; Holden v. New York, etc.
Bank, 72 X. Y. 286; Newton v.
Porter, 69 N. Y. 136-140; Tay-
lor v. Mosely, 57 Miss. 544;
Burks v. BurKs, 7 Baxt. 353;
Broyles v. Nowlin, 59 Tenn. 191 ;
Tilford v. Torrey, 53 Ala. 120;
Pindall v. Trevor, 30 Ark. 249;
McDonough v. O'Neill, 113 Mass.
92; Tracy v. Kelley, 52 Ind. 535;
Cookson v. Richardson. 69 111. 137;
Monro v. Collins, 94 Mo. 33; Mur-
ray v. Lyllburn, 2 Johns. Ch. 441 ;
Hubbard v. Burrill, 41 Wis. 365;
Viele v. Blodgett, 49 Vt. 270; New-
ton v. Taylor, 32 Ohio St. 399;
Derry v. Derry, 74 Ind. 560 ; Bar-
rett v. Bamber, 81 Pa. St. 247
Shaw v. Spencer, 100 Mass. 382
Shelton v. Lewis, 27 Ark. 190
Matthews v. Heyward, 2 S.Car. 239
Thompson v. Perkins, 3 Mason, 232
Duncan v. Jandon, 15 Wall. 165.
Land purchased by plaintiff out of
her separate estate was conveyed
to her husband by a deed duly re-
corded. About two years after-
wards he conveyed the same to a
third party, who, on the same day,
conveyed to plaintiff, both deeds
being duly recorded. Subsequently
defendant purchased the land at
an execution sale, based on judg-
ments recovered against plaintiff's
husband while the record title was
in him. Held, that possession of
the premises by plaintiff's tenants,
at the time of sheriff's sale was
not constructive notice to defend-
ant of the equitable rights of
plaintiff, and that a notice given
at the sheriff's sale that the prop-
erty was "the sole and separate
property" of plaintiff was refer-
able alone to the deed to her after
entry of the judgments against
her husband. Lance v. Gorman
(1S90), 136 Pa. St. 200; s. C, 20
Atl.Rep.792; s. c, 27 W. N. C.45.
1 Walker v. Daly, 80 Wis. 222 ;
s. c, 49 N. W. Bep. 812; Weeks v.
Milwaukee, etc. B.Co., 78 Wis. 501 ;
s. c, 47 Wis. 737. "Courts of
§99.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
205
§ 99. The Subject Continued. — Where an adminis-
trator of an estate disposes of property without notice the
proceeds of the sale will be held in trust for the benefit of
the estate. In a recent case where an heir, who was also
administrator, having exhausted decedent's personal estates
sold devised lands to an innocent purchaser more than two
years after the granting of letters, it was held that the
proceeds of the sale are a trust fund in his hands for the
payment of decedent's debts.1 In a case where land pur-
chased by an administrator with money of his decedent
was sold, to pay the administrator's private debts, to pur-
chasers with notice, a trust in the land arose to the widow
and children of the decedent as if there had been no conver-
sion, and not to the administrator or creditors of the es-
tate.2 Where land is sold belonging to another, both the
equity * * * can follow the
real owner's property and pursue
his real ownership into whatever
form it may be changed or trans-
mitted, even into the hands of
third parties, so long as the prop-
erty or fund into which it has been
converted can be traced, until it
goes into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value and without
notice." Farmers' & T. Bank v.
Kimball Milling Co. (1890), 1 S.
Dak. 237; S. C, 47 ST. W. Hep. 404.
iBunn v. Todd (1894), 115 ST.
Car. 138; s. C, 20 S. E.Kep. 277.
2 Moorman V.Arthur (1894), 90
Va. 455; S. c, 18 S. E. Eep. 869. 1
Lomax's Digest, 200, thus summar-
izes and considers the doctrine of
implied trusts, in reference to
cases extracted from the great va-
riety of trusts : ll(l) Implied trusts
arising out of the equitable con-
version of land into money, or
money into land. (2) Where an
estate is purchased in the name of
one person and the consideration
is paid by another. (3) Where a
conveyance of land is made with-
out any consideration or declara-
tion of uses. (4) Where a convey-
ance is made of land in trust de-
clared as to part, and the convey-
ance is silent as to the residue. (5)
Where a conveyance of land is
made upon such trust as shall be
appointed, and there is a default of
appointment. (6) Where an es-
tate is conveyed on particular
trusts, which fail of taking effect.
(7) Where a purchase is made by
a trustee with trust money. (8)
Where a purchase of real estate is
made by partners with partnership
funds. (9) Where a renewal of a
lease is obtained by trustee or oth-
er person standing in some confi-
dential relation. (10) Where pur-
chases are made of outstanding
claims upon an estate by trustees,
or some of the tenants thereof,
connected by privity of estate with
others having an interest therein.
(11) Where fraud has been com-
mitted in obtaining a conveyance.
(12) Where a purchase has been
made of land without a satisfaction
of the purchase money to the ven-
206
IMPLIED TKUSTS.
[§ 100.
person who sells the property and the person Avho receives
the proceeds from him with notice of the owner's title are
liable to the owner as trustees by implication of law.1
§ 100. From Purchase under Foreclosure Sale. —
Where property is purchased at a foreclosure sale by a
person holding any position of trust or confidence with re-
spect to the property sold, he will be held to have pur-
chased it as trustee for the equitable owner. An agent
who purchases on his own account the property of his
principal, or an attorney who purchases the property of
his client, does so in violation of the implied obligation
resting upon him in this relation.2 In the case of Case v.
Carroll, before the New York Court of Appeals, Mr.
Justice Morgan said: "There are two grounds upon which
the plaintiff' s complaint may be sustained, either by consid-
ering the defendant as the plaintiff' s agent in the purchase
of the mortgaged premises, or as occupying the position
dor. (13) Where a joint purchase
has been made by several, and
payments of the purchase money
to the vendor have been made by
some beyond their proportion."
i Smith v. Jeffreys (Miss.) (1894),
16 So. Rep. 377. An admission in
the bill of the payment of value by
persons who had purchased from
her vendee the portion so sold to
him, renders it necessary for com-
plainants to further allege that
such purchasers had no notice of
the equities on which reliance is
now had for relief, and the absence
of such an averment in the bill ren-
ders it demurrable. Lewis v. Mohr
(1892), 97 Ala. 366 ; s. C, 11 So. Rep.
765. To declare a trust in favor of
complainants, as heirs of the mar-
ried woman, in the portion resold
by her, would involve the anomaly
of a double payment of the same
claim — to her in her lifetime by
her vendee, and to complainants
thereafter by those claiming under
such vendee; and this anomaly is
not relieved by the tact that such
payment was made directly to her
vendor on his claim for the de-
ferred installment of the purchase
money for the whole tract, as this
was as much a payment to her as if
she had personally received the
money. Ibid.
2 Manning v. Hayden, 5 Sawy.
360; Harper v. Perry, 28 Iowa, 60;
Berrien v. McLane, 1 Hoff. Ch.
428; Cutts v. Salmon, 5 Eng. L. &
Eq. 95 ; Ward v. Carter, 1 Eng. Eq.
Cas. 26 ; De Row v. Pay, 3 Ed. Ch.
44; Trotter v. Smith, 59 111. 244;
Howell v. Baker, 4 Johns. Ch. 120;
Hess v. Voss, 52 111. 481 ; Wade v.
Pettibone, 11 Ohio, 60; Nesbitt v.
Lockman, 34 N. Y. 169; McDowell
v. Milroy, 69 111. 500; Hawley v.
Cramer, 4 Cow. 730; 1 Lead. Cas.
Eq. 203; Evans v. Ellis, 5 Denio,
643; Eshelman v. Lewis, 49 Pa.
St. 410; Church v. Sterling, 16
Conn. 388.
§ 100. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 207
of an attorney or counsel. The result is the same whether
he is considered in one relation or the other. It is a set>
tied principle of equity that no person who is placed in a
situation of trust or confidence in reference to the subject
of sale can be. a purchaser of the property on his own ac-
count, and this principle is not confined to a particular
class of persons, such as guardians, trustees or solicitors,
but it is a rule of universal application to all persons com-
ing within its principle, which is, that no party can be per-
mitted to purchase an interest. where he has a duty to per-
form inconsistent with the character of a purchaser. In
Cumberland Coal Co. v. Sherman, 30 Barb, ijo'3, this prin-
ciple was applied to a case of mere agency. It is not
necessary for a party seeking to avoid a contract on this
ground to show that an improper advantage has been gained
over him. It is at his option to repudiate or to affirm the
contract, irrespective of any proof of actual fraud. So an
agent who discovers a defect in the title of his principal to
lands cannot misuse it 1?o acquire a title for himself, but will be
held a trustee for his principal.1 In a case in Canada where
testator died in 1846, leaving land to defendant, which was
sold in 1849 under a judgment against testator's executors
on a note made by plaintiff and indorsed for his accommo-
dation by testator. Plaintiff purchased at the execution
sale and sold the land in 18-33 to his brother. In 18(55 the
land was sold under execution against the brother, and
again bought by plaintiff. It was held that the sale in 1849,
being for his own debt, plaintiff, on buying the land, became
trustee for defendant, and this trust continued on his sec-
1 Case v. Carroll, 35 M". Y. 388; confined to a particular class of
Central Ins. Co. v. Natl. Protection persons, such as guardians, trus-
Ins. Co., 14 N. Y. 91; Story on tees, or solicitors; but was a rule
Agency, § 211 ; Cumberland Coal of universal application to all per-
Co. v. Sherman, 30 Barb. 553; Tor- sons coming within its principle,
rey v. Bank of Orleans, 9 Paige, which is that no party can be per-
649, 662; Hawley v. Cramer, 4 mitted to purchase an interest
Cow. 736; Lord Cottenham in where he has a duty to perform
Greenlaw v. King, 5 Lond. Jur. 18, inconsistent with the character of
held that the principle was not purchaser.
208
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 101.
ond purchase in 1853. 1 In its essential features this prin-
ciple applies to a partition sale of a decedent's estate.
Where the evidence shows that defenda-nt purchased land
at a partition sale of his father's estate in trust for himself
and his brother, of whom complainants are the widow and
children, and that this trust relation was never changed, it
is proper to declare a trust in the land in favor of com-
plainants, and to order an accounting by defendant.
§ lOl. The Same Subject — Where land is sold under
a mortgage that covered a part only of the tract, and there is
1 McDonald v. McDonald, 21
Can. S. C. Rep. 201: Fay v. Fay
(N. J.) (1894;, 29 Atl. Rep. 356.
Where one who is interested as
partner of the owner of land in the
profits of its sale, and who is also
the attorney and legal adviser of
such owner, buys in the latter's
title, at execution sale, he holds the
title so acquired in trust for him-
self and his partner. Roby v. Cole-
hour (1890) , 135 111. 300; s. C, 25
N. E. Rep. 777. Evidence of the
grantor in a deed of trust that the
purchaser at the sale under the deed
purchased it for him, and of the
purchaser to the same effect, is
sufficient to sustain a finding that
the purchaser held title in trust for
such grantor. Morrison v. Her-
ringtou (1894), 120 Mo. 665; s. C, 25
S. W. Rep. 568. A father conveyed
land to his daughter's husband, in
trust for her and her children.
The husband commenced suit to
sell the land for the purpose of in-
vesting the proceeds in lands to
which he had a deed. The father
and daughter consented to the sale
if the husband would make the
land to be acquired subject to the
trust in favor of the wife and chil-
dren. The sale was ordered and
made, and the proceeds were used
to pay off the incumbrances on the
land held by the husband, but no
deed of the latter land was made
by him. The husband for 22 years
openly held and claimed the land
as trustee for his wife and children,
and listed it for taxation as trust
property and insured the buildings
thereon for the benefit of bis wife
and children. When about to
move from the State he leased it
as trustee, and appointed a person
agent for his wife and children to
look after it. A judgment debtor
of the husband, living in the neigh-
borhood, sold the property on
execution, and became the pur-
chaser. At the execution sale the
agent appointed for the wife and
children announced that the prop-
erty was held by the husband in
trust. 'Held, that the execution
sale was subject to the trust. Lewis
v. Taylor (1895), 96 Ky. 556; S. C,
29 S. W. Rep. 444. A trust is raised
where one purchases at judicial
sale, having at the time of bidding
or previously agreed, by parol or
otherwise, that he would buy it,
and hold it subject to the right of
the other to repay the purchase
money and demand a conveyance.
Cobb v. Edwards (1895), 117 N.
Car. 244 ; s. c, 23 S. E. Rep. 241.
§ 101. j
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
209
no redemption, the purchaser will hold as a trust that por-
tion only which was covered by the mortagage. A grantor
of land covenanted to save the grantee harmless by reason
of a mortgage on that and other land. The mortgage was
afterwards foreclosed by a sale of all the mortgaged land
as one parcel. The grantee purchased and took an
assignment of the certificate of sale and there was no re-
demption. It was held that the grantor was not entitled to
have the land other than that conyeyed by him assigned to
him on reimbursing the grantee with the amount paid for the
certificate with interest.1 In a similar case a railroad com-
1 Dana v. Goodfellow (1892) , 51
Minn. 375; s. c, 53 N. W. Kep.
656. Where an action to charge
defendant with a, resulting trust
in land is based upon an alle-
gation that defendant bought the
land at a judicial sale for the
children and heirs-at-law of
a certain person, among whom
were plaintiffs, testimony of one of
the children that there was an un-
derstanding between him and de-
fendant that the latter should bid
in the property for another of the
children, will not sustain a decree
for plaintiffs. Knight v. Knight
(1891), 35 W. Va.40; s. c, 13 S. E.
Eep. 63. Where a brother re-
deemed his sister's land sold on
foreclosure, representing that it
was for her benefit, and afterwards
rented it with her consent, and
stated to several persons that he
had redeemed it for her, and paid
taxes on it out of the wages of her
son, whom he employed : Meld, that
she might redeem for the amount
of his advances. Bush v. Walker
(188S) (Ky.),6S. W. Eep. 717. A's
land was sold under a deed of
trust. By agreement with B, A
was to furnish what money he
could, and B was to buy in the
property, and hold it for a few
14
months, when A was to have the
lot on the payment of $100 over
and above B"s expenditures. A
furnished B with some money and
B bought in the property, taking
the title in his wife's name. After-
wards he refused to convey, on
being tendered the amount, deny-
ing the agreement and trust, and
asserting that the money for the
purchase was furnished by his
wife. On this evidence the finding
that B held by an implied trust
was sustained. Dupree v. Estelle
(1888) (Tex.), 10 S. W. Rep. 93.
A purchaser at a foreclosure sale
of the property, rights and interest
of an insolvent railway company,
filed a bill alleging that several
parcels of real estate, the title to
which was taken in the names of
the defendant director's predeces-
sors, were paid for by the com-
pany and held in trust for it, and
praying for a conveyance thereof
to him. It appeared that the sev-
eral tracts lay along the line of the
road and were conveyed to direc-
tors of the company absolutely, in
consideration of their personal
notes; that in some instances the
persons were described as trus-
tees; that in one instance the com-
pany agreed to establish a depot
210 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 101.
pany, owning an extensive telegraph system, caused the in-
corporation of a telegraph company by its officials, furnished
its entire capital stock, and in the name of such telegraph
company contracted with complainant. For breach of such
contract complainant recovered judgment against the tele-
graph company. The railroad company sold the entire
telegraph plant, received all the consideration and left the
telegraph company insolvent, and without assets of any
kind. It was held that the money realized by the railroad
company from such sale was in its hands a trust fund properly
applicable to the payment of such judgment.1 The principle
involved in the decisions of the preceding cases, in its esen-
tial features, is applicable to the' sale of personalty under
an execution, or under the foreclosure of a mortgage. A
7 © ©
receiver who purchases, at execution sale, property in his
hands as receiver, holds in trust for the owner of the prop-
erty the title acquired by him, and has no further interest
in the property than a lien on it to secure the amount
on the sale.2 In a recent case plaintiff's bill alleged that,
pending proceedings by him to foreclose a mortgage on
personalty, the mortgagor, TT, transferred all of it to a
on the land if conveyed to such disabilities of a trustee were im-
persons, trustees under a. certain posed upon him by his appoint-
agreement; that there were entries ment as receiver, and the taking
in the books of the company tend- possession of all of the plaintiff's
ing to show that some of the notes property as such. As such quasi
given by such persons were paid trustee he was bound to protect the
by the company, though no evi- trust property in every reasonable
dence of the facts relating to such manner. He was not bound to ad-
entries was given by persons fa- vance his own money to discharge
miliar with them ; and that some the lien of the judgment, but, hav-
years after the purchases the pur- ing voluntarily purchased the
chasers conveyed to the company property at the execution sale, he
lands admitted to be held in trust could not profit by it, and what-
for it and claimed by them to be ever title he acquired to the land
all that were so held. Meld, that by the sale to him he held in trust
no trust was established. Olcott for the plaintiff, subject to the pur-
v. Kice, 69 Fed. Rep. 199. poses for which the receiver was
1 Baltimore, etc. Tel. Co. v. In- appointed, and his equitable claim
terstate Tel. Co. 54 Fed. Kep. 50. to be reimbursed for the amount,
2 Donahue v. Quaekenbush including interest, advanced by
(1895) (Minn.), 64 N. W. Rep. him to protect the property by
141. "The duties, obligations and purchasing it at such sale."' Ibid.
§ 102. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 211
third person for a certain sum, which, was paid to defendant,
0, who in consideration thereof agreed to indemnify the
purchaser against all liens on the property, but that O
had refused on demand to pay plaintiff's debt, and had
appropriated the money to his own use ; that plaintiff had
for a long time forborne to forclose, induced by the mort-
gagor's representations that he was about to sell for a good
price, and that he would pay the debt; and it prayed that
0 be declared a trustee of the money received by him for
plaintiff's benefit. It was held that the complaint shows
plaintiff entitled to the relief prayed, and is not demurrable.1
§ 102. Implied Trusts from Partial Interest. — Where
two or more persons unite in the purchase of real estate,
or in the raising of a fund for such purchase, and the title
is taken in the name of one of the parties only, an implied
trust arises in favor of each of the others to the extent of
their equitable interest. Intervener and C purchased lands
and took title in C's name, the purchase price being $300.
Thereafter C, with intervener's assent, borrowed from
plaintiff $300 by trust deed on the land and paid the pur-
chase money. Intervener and C subsequently agreed to
sell to defendant for $300 profit. Defendant failed to raise
the money, and C thereafter conveyed to plaintiff in satis-
faction of his $300 loan, not yet due, and without inter-
vener's knowledge, plaintiff agreeing at the time to convey
to defendant for the same price that the latter had formerly
agreed to pay to intervener and C, which agreement plaint-
iff performed. It was held that the original conveyance
to C made him a trustee for intervener to the extent of a
half interest, subject to the incumbrance created by the
trust deed.2 A woman put her own earnings and those of
her minor son into a fund with which she purchased a
house and lot for a home for them. The deed was taken
in the name of the son, without her knowledge or consent.
She was an ignorant woman, unacquainted with legal forms.
1 Coppage v. Gregg, 127 Ind. 2 Black v. Caviness, 2 Tex. Civ.
359; s. c, 26 N. E. Rep. 903. App. 118; s. c, 21 S. W. Kep. 635.
212
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 102.
She lived in the house and the son lived with her. It was
held that the evidence showed an implied trust in her for a
half interest in the land, since her intention that the son
should share the home with her constituted a waiver of her
right to the entire title.1 In a recent case in which a suit
was brought by a sister to establish an implied trust in land
of which her brother died seized, the evidence showed that
said land was bought partly with money belonging to their
deceased father's estate, and partly earned by the brother
and sister in cultivating the land before it was purchased ;
that the sister did more than the brother towards earning:
said money, and that the brother frequently admitted that
the sister had the same interest in the land that he had. It
was held that there was an implied trust for the benefit of
the sister in half of the land.2 The same doctrine applies
1 Watson v. Murray, 54 Ark. 499 ;
s. c, 16 S. W. Kep. 293; Case v.
Codding, 38 Cal. 191; Somers v.
Overhulser, 67 Cal. 237 ; Kline v.
Ragland, 47 Ark. 111.
2 Stephenson v. McClintock, 141
111. 604; s. c, 31 N. E. Rep. 310.
See also Seaman v. Cook, 14 111.
501 ; Latham v. Henderson, 47 111.
185; Graves v. Graves, 29N.H.
142 ; Baumgartner v. Greenfield, 38
Mo. 36. A purchaser of land gave
the vendor a mortgage to secure
notes payable to the vendor for
one-half of the price, and other
notes indorsed by the vendor as
surety, payable to decedent, who
advanced one-half of the purchase
money. About twelve years there-
after the vendor took possession of
the land from the purchaser, and
foreclosed the mortgage for con-
dition broken and assigned to de-
fendant the mortgage and notes
payable to himself. Defendant
having knowledge of decedent's
equities, and the mortgage being
expressly excepted from the oper-
ation of the covenants in a war-
ranty deed given by the vendor to
defendant at the same time. There-
after, in an action by decedent
against the vendor as surety on
one of the notes, the same being
barred by way of compromise,
judgment was allowed to be taken
for part of the amount due thereon,
and a written agreement was
made that decedent's right to en-
force the balance against the prop-
erty should not be impaired. Held,
that defendant would be consid-
ered as holding the property in
trust for the benefit of decedent's
estate in the proportion which the
amount due such estate bears to
the whole amount due on the
mortgage, and that he should pay
such proportion of the debt and a
like proportion of the rents and
profits received by him in excess
of his disbursements. Steward v.
Welch, 84 Me. 308 ; s. C, 24 Atl.Kep.
860. In ejectment the issue was
whether plaintiff had purchased
the land in question at foreclosure
sale, subject to an implied trust in
§ 102.J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
213
also to partial interests in personal property. In a recent
case plaintiff purchased a one-half interest in defendant's
stock and ranches in Colorado, and took charge of the
business. Defendant came to Oregon, and afterwards it
was agreed to exchange the property in Colorado for that
in controversy. While plaintiff was yet in Colorado the
exchange was made, and without his consent the Oregon
property was conveyed to defendant alone, and was opera-
ted in his name. It was held that an undivided one-half
interest in the property was held by defendant in trust for
plaintiff.1 Where the language of a will is construed by
the court as raising a partial trust, the devisee, or the legatee,
is adjudged the beneficial owner of the property in ques-
tion, subject to the payment of the interests of the other
parties named, and the surplus will not result to the heir
or next of kin, but will belong to the devisee or legatee.2
wife's evidence showed that she
had inherited a separate estate
worth $1,750 during coverture;
that she loaned $600 of it to her
sister, who invested it in land ; that
on a sale of this property she re-
ceived $1 ,200 from the sister to repay
the $600 and other loans ; that she
gave this $1,200 to her husband
with directions to buy the land in
dispute, and to take the title in her
name; that the husband, unknown
to her, took the title in his own
name ; and that plaintiff, when he
purchased at foreclosure sale, knew
that the wife had a separate estate,
a portion of which was invested in
the property in question. Held,
that the evidence was sufficient to
justify a finding by the jury that
the wife had established an im-
plied trust in the land to the ex-
tent of $600. Logan v. Eva, 144
Pa. St. 312; s. c, 22 Atl. Eep. 757.
*Puckett v. Puckett (1891), 21
Ore. 370; s. c, 28 Pac. Kep. 65.
See also Dikeinan v. Norrie, 36
Cal.94; Miller v. Birdsong, 7 Baxt.
531 ; Cramer v. Hoose, 93 111. 503;
Smith v. Patton, 12 W. Va. 541;
Khea v. Tucker, 56 Ala. 450.
2 Wood v. Cox, 1 Keen, 317; s.
c, 2 Myl. & Cr. 684; Irvine v. Sul-
livan, L. E. 8 Eq. 673. A married
woman to whom is conveyed by
deed absolute in form land for the
purchase of which her husband
has a contract, upon an oral agree-
ment by her to hold it for the use
of herself and their infant chil-
dren, takes it subject to an implied
trust, which the children may en-
force. McCahill v. McCahill, 11
Misc. 258; S. C, 32 N.Y. Supl.
836. Grantees of either party,
with notice of a contract binding
one party to convey a part of a
tract of land to the other in con-
sideration of his procuring title for
the former to an undivided inter-
est in the whole tract, are charge-
able with a trust in favor of the
other party or his grantees. Tor-
rence v. Shedd, 156 111. 194; s. C,
41 N". E. Eep. 95. Deceased exe-
cuted a mortgage to his mother to
214
IMPLIED TEUSTS.
[§ 103.
In a contention between two litigants, where there are other
claimants in the case, it is not necessary to make all or any
of the other claimants parties to the suit. The person
who receives the sum awarded for the entire claim will
hold it as a trustee for the benefit of all the parties who are
entitled to a share of the fund.1
§ 103. For Distribution of Grift. — Where a fund is
given to one or more persons to be by them distributed
among a number of beneficiaries, by their acceptance of the
fund the persons receiving it become, by implication of
law, trustees for the beneficiaries designated. They re-
ceive the fund in trust, and bind themselves to distribute
it in accordance with the terms of the gift. And where
there is a failure to execute the trust according to the
secure the sum of $1,200. Subse-
quently he procured a release from
his mother upon the agreement
that the mortgaged property should
be sold, and the proceeds reinves-
ted for the mother's benefit. De-
ceased sold the property and de-
posited the proceeds, $1,348.25, in
bank in his own name, he having
already there a deposit of $247.80.
Against the whole account deceased
afterward drew the sum of $809.68,
$700 of which he reinvested in his
mother's name. Held, that a trust
would be impressed upon the bal-
ance of deceased's account in bank
to repay so much of the money of
the mother, therein deposited as
deceased had not reinvested for her
benefit. In re Maxwell's Estate
(1891), 83 Iowa, 590; s. c, 50 N.
W. Eep. 56. Where a wife pays
part of the purchase money for
land deeded to her husband it is
not necessary, to the existence of
a resulting trust in her favor, that
her money should go "into the land
at the inception of the husband's
title" by actual payment at that
time, but it is sufficient if it be
paid as installments or incum-
brances fall due, pursuant to a
contract under which the title is
acquired, and on agreement that
she is to recover title to so much
as she pays for. Gilchrist v. Brown
(1895), 165 Pa. St. 275; s. C, 30
Atl. Rep. 839.
1 Dutilh v. Coursault, 5 Cranch,
C. C. 349. A lease to defendant
with option of purchase was, with
his knowledge, interlined so as to
make plaintiff a colessee, and sub-
sequently acknowledged by de-
fendant and recorded. The par-
ties jointly occupied the land, and
plaintiff made valuable improve-
ments thereon. Defendant pur-
chased the land, taking a deed in
his own name. Held, that such
purchase inured to the benefit of
plaintiff also, who was entitled,
on payment of one-half the pur-
chase price, to compel a convey-
ance of a half interest, defendant
being estopped to assert that
plaintiff took no interest under the
lease. Barbour v. Johnson, 21 D
C. 40.
§ 104.] IMPLIED TRUSTS. 215
obligations assumed in its acceptance, the execution Mill be
enforced by a court of equity. Any person who is desig-
nated as a beneficiary in the instrument by which the fund
is conveyed, may institute proceedings against the fund-
holders for the recovery of his proportion of the fund.1
§ 104. From Joint Tenancy. — Under the law of
England a joint tenancy gives to the survivor an exclusive
interest in the joint estate. Where two or more persons
unite in the purchase of real estate, paying equal sums and
the title being taken in the names of the parties, the sur-
vivor or survivors succeed to the ownership of the entire
property.2 And where the title is to the parties and to
their heirs the course of the property will be the same.
The court will order a conveyance to the survivor or sur-
vivors.3 In the case of Lake v. Gibson the Master of the
Rolls, in his opinion, said: "Where twp or more purchase
lands and advance the money in equal proportions, and
take a conveyance to them and their heirs, that is a joint
tenancy, that is a purchase by them jointly of the chance
of survivorship, which may happen to the one of them as
well as the other ; but where the proportions of the money
are not equal, and this appears in the deed itself, this
makes them in the nature of partners, and however the
1 Peel t. Metropolitan Board of ted after his death to all his chil-
Police, 44 Barb. 91; s. C, 5 Am. dren and heirs-at-law, is void under
Law. Keg. (N.S.) 98. Equity will the statute of frauds. Thompson
enforce a trust constituted by a v. Marley, 102 Mich. 476; s. c, 60
conveyance by a mother to a son ST. W. Bep. 976.
of property, the legal title of which 2 Hayes v. Kingdome, 1 Vern. 33
was in her, but which had been York v. Eaten, 2 Freem. 23
purchased with funds belonging to Thickness v. Vernon, 2 Freem. 84
her children as heirs of their Robinson v. Preston, 4 K. & J.
father, under an understanding 505 ; Bone v. Pollard, 24 Beav. 288
that the grantee would secure to Lake v. Gibson, lEq. Ca. Abr. 291
each heir his fair share of the Anon. Carth. 15 ; Bea v. Williams
property. Denike v. Denike Sugd. V. & P. (14th Ed.) p. [697]
(Brooklyn City Ct.), 13 Misc. 381; Moyse v. Gyles, 2 Vern. 385; Avel-
s. c, 34 N. Y. Supl. 250. A parol ing v. Knipe, 19 Ves. 441 ; Rigden
agreement by a daughter to whom Vallier, 3 Atk. 735.
lands are conveyed by her father, 3 Aveling v. Knipe, 19 Ves. 441.
to hold them in trust tobedistribu-
216 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 104.
legal estate may survive, yet the survivor shall be consid-
ered but as a trustee for the others, in proportion to the
sums advanced by each of them, so if two or more make a
joint purchase, and afterwards one of them lays out a
considerable sum of money in repairs or improvements
and dies, this shall be a lien on the land, and a trust for the
representatives of him who advanced it; and that in all
other cases of a joint undertaking or partnership, either in
trade, or any other dealing, they were to be considered as
tenants in common, or the survivors as trustees for those
who were dead."1 But even in England courts of equity
are very reluctant to enforce this law, and where it is not
plainly in violation of authority they will avoid the diffi-
culty by treating a joint tenancy as a tenancy in common.2
In the comparatively recent case of Robinson v. Preston, in
which the decision of the court was adverse to a joint
tenancy, the Vice Chancellor, Sir W. Page Wood, in his
review, said: "The law is settled as to the advancement of
moneys in the names of two or more persons in the pur-
chase of property; if invested in unequal shares, the pur-
chasers remain tenants in common of the purchased prop-
erty; if in equal shares and the matter on the
face of it purports to be a joint tenancy, then it is
considered by this court to be a joint tenancy, and no
equity is supposed to intervene by which it can be reduced
to a tenancy in common."3 In this country there are very
1 Lake v. Gibson, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 2 Band. 183 ; Pugh v. Currie, 5 Ala.
291; S. C, 3 P. Wins. 158; York v. 446; McAllister v. Montgomery, 3
Eaton, 2 Freem. 23; Jackson v. Hayw. 94; Duncan v. Forrer, 6
Jackson, 9 Ves. 597n; Jeffrys v. Binn. 193; Sigourney v. Munn, 7
Small, 1 Vern. 217 ; Lyster v. Dol- Conn. 11 ; Overton v. Lacy, 6
land, 1 Ves. Jr. 434; Farley v. Ship- B. Mon. 13.
pen, "Wythe, 135 ; Appleton v. 3 Robinson v. Preston, 4 K. & J.
Boyd, 7 Mass. 131 ; Kinsley v. Ab- 505. Sir William Grant in Aveling
bott, 19 Me. 430; Caines v. Grant, v. Knipe, 19 Ves. 443, uses this lan-
5 Binn. 119. guage : "There isa case of Edwards
2 Tompkins v. Mitchell, 2 Hand. v. Fashion where two daughters of
428 ; Bobinson v. Preston, 4 K. & a mortgagee for a term of years,
J. 505; Brothers v. Porter, 6 B. taking under the will the residue
lion. 106; Barribeau v. Brant, 17 of his personal estate, including
How. 43; Deloney v. Hutchinson, the mortgage, equally to be divi-
§ 105.] IMPLIED TRUSTS. 217
few cases in which the doctrine of a joint tenancy will be
upheld. In many of the States it is abolished by statute,
except in case of executors, trustees and others, where such
a method is essential to the proper execution of the
trust involved. In the case of Randall v. Phillips, before
the Circuit Court of the United States, Mr. Justice Story
presiding, it was held that where there is a joint tenancy in
a mortgage, the surviving mortgagee will' be held a trustee
for the representatives of the deceased mortgagee. It was
held further that a mortgage to four persons constitutes
no proof that the parties intended a joint tenancy in the
mortgage.1 In Rhode Island, by a statute of 1798, all
deeds, etc., made to two or more persons are held to be
tenancies in common, unless the words clearly and mani-
festly show an intention to create a joint tenancy.2
§ 105. Fop Confiding Party. — Where a person takes
advantage of the confidential relation which he sustains
toward another, or of the confidence reposed in him by
another to gain possession of property by fraud, the court
will declare a constructive trust. But where one sustaining
such relation makes use of it to promote his own inter-
ests, even though a charge of fraud could not be sustained,
a trust by implication of law will be decreed. The confi-
dence reposed in him makes him a trustee. It is not
necessary to prove or to allege any fraudulent act or pur-
pose.3 In a recent case in which, in an action to have
ded between them, afterwards pur- the equity of redemption like-
chased the equity of redemption wise." Where land is purchas-ed
to them and their heirs ; it was by several and joint deed received
held under the circumstances that a trust results in favor of each to
there was no survivorship ; but it the extent of the consideration
is not stated as a general principle paid by each. Brothers v. Porter,
that articles of agreement must of 6 B. Mon. 106.
necessity Import a tenancy in com- 1 Randall v. Phillips, 3 Mason,
mon when in words it is a joint 378. See also Appleton v. Boyd,
tenancy. That case proceeds on 7 Mass. 131 ; Kinsley v. Abbott, 19
the ground that the purchase was Me. 430.
founded on the mortgage; and the 2 Ut supra.
daughters being tenants in com- 3 Alaniz v. Casenave, 91 Cal. 41 ;
mon of the mortgage they were s. C, 27 Pac. Kep. 521; Lawrence
held to be tenants in common of v. Gayetty, 78 Cal. 131; s. c, 12
218
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 105.
defendant declared a trustee for plaintiff as to certain
property, on the ground that plaintiff had an equity of
redemption therein, plaintiff testified that defendant
agreed to buy in the property for her ; that she relied on
his promises, and did not try to induce any one else to act
for her. Another witness testified that defendant ex-
pressed a willingness to let go the property when he was
paid, and other witnesses testified that defendant said he
would buy the property for plaintiff. This evidence was not
contradicted by any witness save defendant. It was held
that defendant was a trustee for her use, and that he could
not take advantage of the statute of frauds, as the agreement
was not that defendant should convey land to plaintiff, the
legal title to which was then in him, but that he should bid
in the mortgaged property, and hold it for her benefit.1 In
Am. St. Rep. 29; Feeney v. How-
ard, 79 Cal. 525; s. C, 12 Am. St.
Rep. 162. In the case of Wood v.
Rabe, 96 N". Y. 426, s. c, 48 Am.
Rep. 640, where a son was induced
by the parol promise of his mother
to confess a judgment in her favor
and allow her under it to purchase
a piece of his real property, Jus-
tice Andrews said: "It was on
the part of the son the case of a
confidence induced, not by the bare
promise of another, but by the
promise and the confidential rela-
tions conjoined. The confidence,
in fact, has its spring and origin in
the relation, and that relation was
a controlling ingredient moving
his action. It would be a gross
wrong to permit that confidence to
be betrayed, and we are of the
opinion that the statute of frauds
cannot be invoked as a bar to re-
lief. The principle that when one
uses a confidential relation to ac-
quire an advantage which he ought
not in equity and good conscience
to retain, the court will convert
him into a trustee, and compel him
to restore what he has unjustly ac-
quired, or seeks unjustly to retain,
has frequently been applied to
transactions within the statute of
frauds." See also Church v. Ru-
land, 64 Pa. St. 442; Barrell v.
Hanrick, 42 Ala. 71, 72; Hoge v.
Hoge, 1 Watts, 163; Wolford v.
Harrington, 74 Pa. St. 311 ; s. c,
15 Am. Eep. 548; Arnold v. Cord,
16 Ind. 177; Young v. Peachy, 2
Atk. 254; Falk v. Turner, 101
Mass. 496; Haigh v. Kaye, L. R. 7
Ch. 469; Heron v. Heron, 2 Atk.
160; Ryan v. Dox, 34 N". Y. 307;
Archer v. Hudson, 7 Beav. 551;
Hoghton v. Hoghton, 15 Beav.
278; Wright v. Verplank, 8 De G.,
M. & G. 133.
iLeahey v. Witte (1894), 123
Mo. 207; s. c, 27 S. W. Rep. 402;
Mestaer v. Gillespie, 11 Ves. 62G;
Browne on. Statute of Frauds, Sees.
96 and 96a; Judd v. Mosely, 30
Iowa, 425 ; Rogers v. Rogers, 87
Mo. 257; Groves v. Fulsome, 16
Mo. 543; Ryan v. Dox, 34 N. Y.
307; Parkhurst v. Van Courtland,
14 Johns. 15, 35; Lowry v. Zero, 3
§ 105. j
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
219
another recent and instructive case where on the trial of an
action by a husband to compel his wife to convey certain
property to him he testified that, several years before,
being about to be absent for several years, and wishing to
provide for her in case of his death, he had conveyed to
her, instead of making a will, certain lands, induced by
his confidence in her; that she promised to reconvey same
to him in the event of his return ; and that he intended
that she should receive a beneficial interest therein in case
he should die before returning. The lawyer who drew the
deed swore that he stated to her the reasons why her hus-
band was about to make the deed, and that she promised to
reconvey to him on his return. It was held sufficient to sup-
port a finding that plaintiff was induced to make such deed by
Brown, 19 Ark. 49 ; Ormond v. An-
derson, 2 Ball & Beatty, 369.
Plaintiff in order to repay money
advanced by her attorney, on his
advice, consented to a partition
sale of real estate left by the hus-
band. Defendant, in whose family
she had been employed as a do-
mestic some seven years previ-
ously, and on whose advice she
was accustomed to rely, bought
the property at public sale for
$118, about one-half of its value.
She claimed defendant was to bid
it in for her if it sold for less than
$200, but he denied this, and his
evidence was corroborated by her
attorney. She did not know de-
fendant bought the property until
the present suit was brought. Her
attorney was present and managed
the sale and no collusion between
him and defendant was shown.
Held, that no confidential relation
existed between the parties, and
that defendant could not be
deemed a trustee of the property
for plaintiff. Lewis v. Ziegler
(1891), 105 Mo. 601; S. c, 16 S. W.
Rep. 862.
Barb. Ch. 407, 413; Phillips v.
Thompson, 1 Johns. Ch. 131; Mur-
ray v. Jayne, 8 Barb. 612 ; Hodges
v. Tenn. Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 8
ST. T. 416; Despond v. Walbridge,
15 N. Y. 374; Brown v. Lynch, 1
Paige, 147 ; Whithchurch v. Bevis,
2 Bro. Ch. 565; Cox v. Cox, 5
Rich. Eq. 365; Floyd v. Buckland,
2 Freem. C. C. 268; Thynn v.
Thynn, 1 Vern. 296 ; Eeech v. Ken-
nygate, 1 Ves. Sr. 125 ; Stoddard v.
Hart, 23 JST. Y. 556. "Can it be
tolerated that a creditor shall,
at a sale of his debtor's prop-
erty, lull him to sleep and keep
off other purchasers by an agree-
ment under which he buys in
the land for a small sum much
below the value, and then that he
should declare that the agreement
was void under the statute of
frauds, and that the other party
should have no benefit from the
agreement, whilst he reaped all
the fruits? Surely not. Courts of
justice would be blind indeed if
they could permit such a state of
things." Keith v.Purvis, 4 Desaus.
114, 121. See also Peebles v. Bead-
ing, 8 S. & R. 492; Trapnell v.
220 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 106.
his confidence in his wife, and that he made it with the
distinct understanding, that in the event of his return she
would reconvey the property to him, and that she was to
receive a beneficial interest therein only in case he died
before returning.1 The same rule will apply in a case of
conveyance without consideration. Where one without
consideration conveys land to another standing in a confi-
dential relation with him, with the understanding that he
shall hold it for the benefit of the grantor, equity will
raise a trust by implication of law, which may be estab-
lished by parol ; and the statutes providing that no trust
concerning lands shall be created except by act or operation
of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing, etc., will not
apply.2
§ 106. The Subject Continued. — It is well established
as a rule of equity that where confidence and trust are re-
posed by one person in another, and the latter accepts the
trust, or engages to act upon the confidence reposed, acourt of
equity will convert him into a trustee, whenever it is nec-
essary to the execution of justice between the parties,
or to the protection of the interests of the party, exer-
cising the confidence.3 Where a defendant in execution,
1 Brison v. Brison, 90 Cal. 323 ; if no actual fraud had been alleged,
S. C, 27 Pac. Rep. 186. Same v. the failure to make a finding upon
Same, 75 Cal. 525; s. C, 7 Am. St. the issue of actual fraud is imma-
Kep. 189. "In view of these prin- terial. If such finding had been
ciples, the failure of the court to made in favor of the defendant, it
make a finding upon the issue of would not have impaired the ef-
actual fraud is not a ground for va- feet of the finding upon the issue
eating its decision, unless a finding of constructive fraud, and if made
upon that issue in favor of the de- against her it would have only
fendants would have the effect to given additional support to the
modify or overcome its other find- judgment." Brison v. Brison, 90
ings. Inasmuch as it was held Cal. 329. See also G-oldsberry v.
upon the former appeal in this Gentry, 92 Ind. 193; Newton v.
case that the plaintiff was entitled Taylor, 32 Ohio St. 399 ; "Wales v.
to the relief sought by him, upon Newbould, 9 Mich. 45.
the ground of constructive fraud 2 Bowler v. Curler, 21 Nev. 158;
arising out of the breach by the s. c, 26 Pac. Hep. 226.
defendant of the confidential rela- 3 Foote v. Foote, 58 Barb. 258.
tions existing between them, even One who bids off land at a sheriff s
§ 107. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 221
or the heirs of a decedent rely upon a person, in whom
they repose confidence, to purchase the property in which
they are interested at the execution sale for them, and in
consequence do not themselves attend the sale or otherwise
bid for the property, and the person trusted purchases for
his own benefit, a court of equity will make such person a
trustee for the person or persons so confiding in him, and
the statute of frauds cannot be pleaded in bar.1
§ 107. From Relation of Guardian. — Where a father
assumes to act as guardian for a minor son, buying real
property and taking the title in himself, as guardian for
the son, he becomes by this act trustee for the minor son,
holding the title to the land for his benefit. In a recent
case in Georgia it was held that, where a father causes a
deed to land, for which he has himself paid the purchase
money, to be made to himself, as guardian of his minor
son, for whom he is neither a testamentary nor (because of
his not having given bond as such ) a statutory guardian, the
legal effect of such conveyance is the creation of a trust in
the land in favor of the minor son, and the position of the
father with reference to this estate is really that of a
trustee, and not, technically, that of guardian.2 In his
sale on a parol agreement with the 2 McCrary v. Clements (1895), 94
execution debtor, who is in posses- Ga. 778; s. c, 22 S. E. Rep. 675.
sion under a bond for title, with "Where the whole transaction,
none of the purchase money paid, including the agreement, amounts
that he will advance the money to substantially nothing more
and take the sheriff's conveyance than the creation and verbal ac-
to himself for the benefit of the knowledgment of what in equity
debtor, and who discourages bid- constitutes a resulting trust, or a
ding by another by stating that he trust created by implication of
is bidding for such debtor, holds law, it is not within the statute of
the title as trustee for such debtor, frauds, and the agreement may be
Collins v. Williamson, 94 Ga. 635 ; provedby oral evidence. Especially
S. C, 21 S. E. Eep. 140. is this so when to exclude the evi-
1 Brannin v. Brannin, 18 N. J. dence and permit the grantee to
Eq. 212; Hutchinson v. Hutchin- appropriate the estate would re-
son, 4 Desaus. Eq. 77 ; Doge v. suit in the perpetrating of a fraud.
Cole, 97111.338; Barker v. Barker, McDonald v. McDonald, 24 Ind.
14 Wis. 131 ; Jenckes v. Cook, 9 R. 68; Cox v. Arnsmann, 76 Ind. 210.
I. 520 ; McLane v. Johnson, 43 Vt. In such a case the trust results
48. from the payment of the purchase
222 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 107.
opinion in this case Mr. Justice Atkinson said: "While
the present plaintiff was yet a minor, his father purchased
the premises in dispute, and caused them to be conveyed to
himself, as guardian of the plaintiff. As a matter of fact,
he was neither a testamentary guardian of the plaintiff, nor
the guardian of his property under the statute. While he
was the natural guardian of the person of the plaintiff, he
had never given bond so as to constitute himself a guardian
of the property of the plaintiff. Not being a guardian of
the plaintiff at all, the plaintiff himself being then an in-
fant, in order to make the instrument operative it is nec-
essary to treat the conveyance as creating a trust, by means
of which the legal title was vested in the parent and the
beneficial interest in the minor son. By the terms of our
Code no formal words are necessary to create a trust estate,
and whenever a manifest intention is exhibited that
another person shall have the benefit of the property con-
veyed, the grantee shall be declared a trustee. As we have
seen this parent was in no sense, legally or technically
speaking, a guardian of the plaintiff's property. He did
take the legal title. The beneficial interest was vested in
the son. We think, therefore, that the effect of the trans-
action was the creation of a trust, and the nomination of
the parent to be a trustee."1 In a similar case of recent
money, or by implication or con- SeealsoCuahmanv.Bonfield(1891),
struction of law upon the whole 139 111.219; s. c, 28 N. E. Kep.
transaction, rather than from the 937 ; Koby v. Colehour (1890), 135
parol agreement, which is to be 111.300; s. C, 25 N. B. Kep. 777;
regarded as in the nature of an ac- Potter v. Smith, 36 Ind. 231 ; Wil-
knowledgment of the trust." Mar- son v. Brookshire, 126 Ind. 497.
ciliat v. Marciliat, 125 Ind. 472- 1 McCrary v. Clements (1895), 94
475. Where a guardian, with his Ga. 778; S. c, 22 S. E. Rep. 675.
own money, purchased land on Under JEtev. Stat. Ind. 1881, § 2976,
sale under a judgment, on which providing that when a conveyance
he held a sabsequent mortgage for to one and the price paid by another
his ward, he will be deemed to no trust results unless the title was
have purchased it for the ward's so taken without consent, or "it
benefit, subject to his right to be shall be made to appear that by
reimbursed for the money paid by agreement, without any fraudulent
him. Taylor v. Calvert (1S94), 138 intent, the person to whom the
Ind. 67; s. c, 37 N. E. Rep. 531. conveyance was made was to hold
§ 107. J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
223
date it was held that, where a father, acting generally in
the interests of his minor child, but without having been
appointed tutor, and being indebted to the estate of his
deceased wife, of whom the minor was the sole heir, sub-
scribed for certain shares in a commercial or joint stock
company on behalf of the minor, and caused the shares to
the land in trust," a finding that a
conveyance taken in the name of a
father, with whom his son, a single
man, was then living and working,
did not create a trust, though the
price was paid by the son, will not
be disturbed where it does not ap-
pear that there was satisfactory
evidence that the father ever ac-
knowledged the trust, and it does
not appear who took possession,
or that the son asserted ownership
during the lifetime of the father.
Marciliat v. Marciliat, 125 Ind. 472;
s. C, 25 N. E. Kep. 597. See also
Indiana, etc. Co. v. Bates, 14 Ind.
8; Watkins v. Jones, 28 Ind. 12;
McDonald v. McDonald, 24 Ind.
68; Millikin v. Ham, 36 Ind. 166;
McCollister v. Willey, 52 Ind. 382;
Hampson v. Fall, 64 Ind. 382;
Deny v. Derry, 74 Ind. 560 ; Boyer
v. Libey, 88 Ind. 235. No implied
trust can result in favor of the
grantor in a deed from a father to
a son where such deed expresses a
valuable consideration, and con-
tains an habendum clause and the
usual covenant of warranty. Beav-
ers v. McKinley, 50 Kas. 602; s. c,
32 Pac. Kep. 363. A guardian of an
infant having purchased real estate
chiefly with the money of his ward,
he, however, contributing a por-
tion and having taken the title in
his own name, an implied trust
results in respect to the property
in favor of the infant, who may
claim afterwards not merely a lien
as security for the money, but a
proportionate share of the estate.
In such a case, the guardian hav-
ing died, the court had juris-
diction to declare and enforce the
trust by a transfer of the legal
title. Bitzer v. Bobo (1888), 39
Minn. 18; s. C, 38 N. W. Kep.
609; Turner v. Pettigrew, 6
Humph. 438; Caplinger v. Stokes,
Meigs, 175. Property purchased
by a guardian with funds belong-
ing to his ward's estate, and the
title to which was taken in the
guardian's name, will, at the op-
tion of the ward, be declared to be
held in trust for him. A pur-
chaser of property, so held in
trust, at a sale under an execution
against the trustee, tjhe purchaser
having notice of the facts creating
the trust, will be decreed to iiold
it as trustee. Durling v. Hammar,
20 N. J. Eq. 220; Johnson v.
Dougherty, 18 N. J. Eq. 406; Sie-
mon v. Schurck, 29 S". Y. 598.
Where a guardian uses the money
of his ward in the purchase of
lands the ward is entitled to the
results of the purchase, whether
the guardian purchased for him-
self or his ward, and whether he
use the money merely as agent,
and not as guardian. Shelton v.
Lewis, 27 Ark. 190; Schaeffer v.
Corson, 52 Barb. 510; Hamnetts'
Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 337; Watson v.
Thompson, 12 R. I. 466. But see
Lee v. Fox, 6 Dana, 171 ; Kisler v.
Kisler, 2 Watts, 323; Snell v.
Elam, 2 Heisk. 82; Coles v. Allen,
64 Ala. 98; French v. Sheplor, 83
Ind. 266.
224 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 108.
be entered in the books of the company as held "in trust,"
this created a valid trust in favor of the minor without any
acceptance by or on behalf of the minor being necessary.1
§ 108. For Judgment Creditors. — Where a debtor
makes an assignment of his property for the benefit of his
creditors an implied trust arises in their favor. Where
this is done without the knowledge of the creditors the
assignor is regarded as simply directing the manner in
which his property shall be disposed of for his own benefit
in the payment of his debts. In the case of the United
States v. Hoyt, where H made an assignment of his
property, in trust to pay any judgment which the United
States might recover against him and the sureties on his
official bond as collector of customs, and after the recovery
of such judgment the plaintiffs in it filed a bill for an ac-
count by the trustees and the application of the trust funds
to the payment of the judgment, it was held that a trust
in favor of the plaintiffs was created by the assignment by
implication of law and that the bill was properly filed.2 In
this case the right of the plaintiffs to the property, as
beneficiaries under the implied trust, did not attach to it
until the filing of their bill. That was their just act in the
acceptance of the trust and in the setting up of their claims
under it. If the trustees had disposed of any part of the
property, with the consent of the assignor and his sureties,
prior to the filing of the bill by the plaintiffs, they would
not have been required to account to the plaintiffs for the
part of the property so expended.3 An assignment of this
1 Eaphael v. MoFarlane, 18 Can- v. Drew, 57 K. Y. 587 ; West v.
ada Sup. Ct. Eep. 183. Skip, 1 Ves. Sr. 239; Campbell v.
2 United States v. Hoyt, 1 Mullett, 2 Swanst. 551; Knox v.
Blatchf. 332. The property of Gye, L. K. 5 H. L. Cas. 656.
every corporation is to be regarded 3 United States v. Hoyt, 1 Blatchf.
as a trust fund for the payment of 332. A bank to which a note is
its debts; the creditors of the cor- assigned with the consent of the
poration have a lien thereon and owner, who has previously as-
may follow it into the hands of the signed it to another to secure a
directors or stockholders. Hastings debt, under an agreement that the
v. Drew, 76 N. Y. 9; Murray v. bank shall collect the money due
Murray, 5 Johns. Ch. 60; Bartlett on the note, pay such debt and
§ 109. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 225
nature will exclude any prior claims that may be set up by
the heirs of a deceased member of an insolvent firm. In
the case of Kothwell v. Dewees, before the Supreme Court
of the United States, it was held that, where the surviving
partner of an insolvent firm assigned certain lots of ground
belonging to the firm for the benefit of its creditors, the-
heirs of the deceased partner cannot be made parties to a
suit involving the title to the lots, on the ground of any
relation of trust or confidence subsisting between them and
the assignee.1 Where an assignment is made in favor of
creditors, by an insolvent firm, with instructions to dis230se
of the property or continue the business as should be
deemed best for the creditors, and the trustees having
elected to continue the business found the profits more
than sufficient to pay the debt, it was held that there was
no implied trust in the surplus in favor of the assignors.2
§ 109. From Other Assignments. — It has been decided
that under the statute of Ohio, relating to this matter, as-
signments made for the sole benefit of the assignees or trans-
ferees will not be disturbed, but if they are made trustees
for other parties the property will be held in trust for the
benefit of all the creditors.3 In the case cited it was held
other specified debts, and pay ors in ratable proportions, accord-
over the balance to the owner, be- ing to the amounts of their re-
comes a trustee by accepting the spective debts, subject, neverthe-
note, and is liable for converting less, to the provisions thereinafter
the same to its own use and bene- contained,and the creditors granted
fit. Howard v. Seattle Natl Bk. a release of the debts. The deed;
10 Wash. 280; s. C, 38 Pac. Rep. contained a provision empowering
1040; s. c, 39 Pac. Pep. 100. the trustees to pay off or make ar-
1 Eothwell v. Dewees, 2 Black, rangements with creditors under
613. By a deed of assignment ex- £30. The profits of the business
ecuted by a firm in favor of their were more than sufficient to pay
creditors, after a recital of the ina- the creditors in full. Held, that
bility of the firm to pay their debts there was no implied trust of the
in full, the business was assigned surplus for the assignors. Smith
to trustees, upon trust either to v. Cooke (1891), 1 L. P. App. Cas.
carry on or sell the same, and 297.
after payment of costs to pay and 2 Smith v. Cooke (1891), 1 L. P.
divide the residue of the profits App. Cas. 297.
and proceeds of sale unto and s Coolidge v. Curtis, 1 Bond, 232.
among all and singular the credit- "After a very careful examination.
15
226
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 109.
that no trust can be implied from the fact that an assign-
ment has been made by an insolvent debtor, provided that
the facts indicate no intention other than the bona fide in-
demnification of the surety; nor if the property assigned
be more than enough to indemnify such surety, is he a
trustee within the meaning of the above statute, although
he may be liable to the creditors for the surplus after pay-
ing the debts for which he was contingently bound.1 In
of the subject in all its bearings,
we are unanimously of the opinion
that our statute requires us to hold
that, when any valuable interest of
the insolvent debtor is transferred
by any species of conveyance, bind-
ing the recipient, either expressly
or by necessary implication, to ac-
count in chancery, to any creditor
of the assignor, the statute enlarges
the trust, and makes it inure to the
benefit of all his creditors, and
distributes the fund to all, in pro-
portion to their respective de-
mands. * * * To bring a case
within the operation of the law
there must be a transferor convey-
ance of property, or some valuable
interest belonging to the insolvent
debtor, in view of his insolvency,
to be held by the person taking it,
for the benefit of someone or more
of the creditors of the debtor, other
than himself." Hokraeder v. Lieby,
4 Ohio St. 602. See also Ohio au-
thorities : Atkinson v. Tomlinson,
1 Ohio St. 237; Bloom v. Nogle, 4
Ohio St. 56; Dixon v. Kawson, 5
Ohio St. 224; Bagly v. Waters, 7
Ohio St. 359. In an action to
establish plaintiff's title to shares
of stock held by J's wife and for-
merly held by J, it appeared that
J transferred the shares to plaint-
iff, his brother; and that after-
wards, in an action by a creditor
of J plaintiff, J and two others
testified that plantffi paid J $5,-
000 for the stock. On the trial of
plaintiff's action J did not testify,
but plaintiff and another brother
testified that plaintiff paid J $5,-
000 for the stock. Other reliable
evidence, however, showed that
plaintiff did not have such sum of
money; that J, though without
stock, continued his relations with
the company after the transfer as
before; that plaintiff, as treasurer,
and his successor, paid J monthly
dividends on the stock for six
years, until suit was brought; and
that plaintiff, with J's consent,
transferred the stock to another,
who transferred it to J's wife.
Held, that the stock had been
assigned to plaintiff in trust
for J. Moran v. Moran (1894),
120 Mo. 344; s. C, 25 S. W. Rep.
185.
1 Coolidge v. Curtis, 1 Bond, 222.
An assignment by a husband to his
wife of specified bonds in the pos-
session of a bank with a direction
to the bank to deliver them to his
wife in case she survives him, cre-
ates a valid trust in favor of the
wife. Durland v. Durland, 83 Hun,
174; s. c, 31 N. Y. Supl. 576. The
holder of the legal title to land, un-
der a trust as to a moiety thereof,
cannot acquire the equitable inter-
est of the cestui que trust by a parol
agreement that the latter shall re-
linquish the same on the former's
paying certain claims against both,
§ 110. j IMPLIED TRUSTS. 227
the recent case of Jackson v. Hyde, before the Supreme
Court of California, it was held that a conveyance of land
by a grantor holding a certificate of purchase from the
State vests the title to the land in the grantee, of which
the certificate is merely evidence, and entitles the grantee
to an assignment of the certificate ; and a subsequent as-
signee of the certificate of purchase who had notice of the
previous conveyance of the land by the assignor, and who
acquires a patent to the land by and through the certificate
of purchase, holds the legal title thereto in trust for the
grantee of his assignor. It was also held that in an action
to enforce such trust the judgment in favor of the grantee
should properly charge him with the payment to the subse-
quent assignee of the grantor, of the amount expended by
the latter in procuring the patent.1
§ HO. Implied Trusts from Annuities. — Where an an-
nuity is created for the benefit of a husband and wife, and
for the support of their children, the sum to be paid to
the husband, or in the event of his death to the wife, should
she survive him, the husband receives the annuity in trust by
implication for the benefit of t-he parties for whom the an-
nuity was created. In the recent case of Durant v. Massa-
chusetts Hospital Life Ins. Co., W deposited with a trust
company a sum of money in trust to pay the income
thereof during the life of his son and his son's wife, to his son
or his son's wife for their support and the support and educa-
tion of their .children. Both principal and annuity were de-
clared inalienable and not subject to the debts or control of the
son or his wife. The son having become bankrupt, it was held
under the New Jersey Statute of Henderson v. Grammar, 66 Cal.
Frauds, § 4, providing that grants 332. Bonds intended for the re-
and assignments of any trust shall demption of certain certificates,
be in writing. Tynan v. Warren coming into the possession of an
(1895) (N". J. Ch.), s. c, 31 Atl. assignor of certificate, are im-
Rep. 596 ; Carnwright v. Gray, 127 pressed with a trust for the benefit
S". Y. 93; Hegeman v. Moon, 131 of the assignee. McVity v. Stan-
ly Y. 462; Van Cott v. Prentice, ton, 10 Misc. Kep. 105; s. c, 30 N".
104 N. Y. 45. Y. Supl. 934.
1 Jackson v. Hyde, 91 Cal. 463;
228 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 110.
that the son took as a subtrustee, and that his assignee
did not take any interest in the annuity, and that although
he would have some benefit therefrom no aliquot part could
be set apart for the use of the creditors.1 In the leading
case of Chase v. Chase, it was held that under a will cre-
ating a trust fund, with directions to pay the income yearly
to the testator's son "for the support of himself and his
family and the education of his children," the income,
when received by the son, is taken in trust, and his wife
and children can enforce its due appropriation in part for
their benefit in equity.2 In his opinion in this case Chief
Justice Bigelow said: "The only question arising on the
construction of the will is whether the income of the trust
fund when received by the son is held absolutely by him to
be disposed of at his discretion, or whether he takes it in
trust so that the wife and children can seek to enforce its
due appropriation in part for their benefit in a court of equity.
We cannot doubt that the latter is the true construction ;
otherwise itwould be in the power of the son to defeat the pur-
pose of the testator by depriving his family of the sujDport
and education which Avas expressly provided for by the will.
1 Durant v. Mass. Hospital Life he gave her £4,000 "to be used for
Ins. Co., 2 Lowell, 575; Whiting v. her own and the children's benefit
Whiting, 4 Gray, 236; Chase v. as she should, in her judgment and
Chase, 2 Allen, 101; Loring v. conscience, think fit." This (as
Loring, 100 Mass. 340; Cole v. Lit- was held) gave the widow a dis-
tlefield, 35 Me. 439 ; Wright v. cretion as to the application of the
Miller, 8 N. Y. 9; Lucas v. Lock- income between the three objects,
hart, 10 Sm. & M. 466 ; Nichols v. which the court would not control,
Eaton, 91 U. S. 716; Fisher v. if bona fide exercised. Soon after
Taylor, 2 Kawle, 33; Holdship v. the testator's death the maternal
Patterson, 7 Watts, 547; Shank- relations of the boy removed him
land's Appeal, 47 Pa. St. 113; from the widow's custody. The
Leavitt v. Bierne, 21 Conn. 1; widow married again and ap-
Nickell v. Handley, 10 Gratt. 336 ; pointed one-eighth of the capital
Pope's Exrs. v. Elliott, 8 B. Mon. to the boy, and the remainder to
56; Campbell v. Foster, 35 N. Y. her own child. The court, not-
361. withstanding the opposition of the
2 Chase v. Chase, 2 Allen, 101. widow, who offered to take the
A testator constituted his widow boy back, directed £30 a year to be
guardian of his two children, then allowed out of the income of the
living with him (one a boy, being £4,000 for his education. Hart v.
the child of another woman), and Tribe, 19 Beav. 149.
§ 111. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 229
The adjudicated cases recognize the rule that where income
arising from the property is left to a person for the
maintenance of children he will be entitled to receive it for
that purpose, only so long as he continues properly to
maintain them. It can make no difference in the applica-
tion of the principle that the person who is to receive the
income also takes a beneficial interest in it for his own sup-
port. He is not thereby authorized to appropriate the
whole of it to his own use, and deprive the other benefici-
aries of the share to which they are equitably entitled."1
It will be observed that in this case there is a trust en-
grafted upon a trust. The property is conveyed by an
express trust to the trustee for the benefit of the cestui que
trust and his family, but by implication of law he be-
comes a subtrustee for his wife and children. By the
decree of the court they acquire a beneficial interest in the
trust estate.
§ 111. Implied Trusts from Mistake. — It is well estab-
lished that where a mistake is made in the conveyance of
an estate a court of equity will afford relief. Where,
through a mistake, more or less land is conveyed than
was provided for in the agreement, the party holding the
surplus will hold it as trustee by implication of law for the
benefit of the equitable owner. In a case before the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin a mother, with minor children,
being sick conveyed land to defendant (who was her mother)
in pursuance of an understanding that defendant should take
the title in trust for such children ; but by mistake the
trust was not expressed in the deed, for which no consid-
eration was paid ; and afterwards defendant conveyed the
land to bona fide purchasers and received the proceeds of
sale. It was held that such proceeds in defendant's hands
1 Chase v, Chase, 2 Allen, 101; Ward, 1 Hare, 445; Crockett v.
Hadow v. Hadow, 9 Sim. 438 ; Jub- Crockett, 2 Phill. 553 ; Whiting v.
her v. .lubber, 9 Sim. 438; Long- Whiting, 4 Gray, 236; Loring v.
more v. Elcum, 2 Y. & Coll. 363; Loring, 100 Mass. 340; Wright v.
Leach v. Leach, 13 Sim. 304; Hart Miller, 8 N". Y. 9.
v. Tribe, 19 Beav. 149 ; Eaikes v.
230
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 111.
are charged with a trust in favor of the children.1 In
Indiana it has been held that a deed drawn by mistake for
a different interest from that intended to be conveyed may
be corrected, if the mistake be clearly proved. A deed of gift
is no exception to the rule. If a party by such mistake holds
a greater estate than belongs to him, and convey it to an
innocent purchaser, receiving the consideration, he may be
treated as a trustee for the real owner.2 In a recent case a
deed conveying land to B alone recited that the considera-
tion was paid by B and S in money and certain lands, and
another deed executed on the same day by B and S con-
veyed lands owned by S to the grantor in the first deed.
It was held that in an action by S to recover her portion of
1 Hubbard v. Burrell, 41 Wis. 365.
Where, through a mistake of an
executor and without paying for it,
a purchaser obtained more land
than he was entitled to, he was
held by implication to hold the
surplus land as trustee for those
beneficially interested. Anderson
v Nesbit, 2 Bawle, 114. See also
Clark v. Cantwell, 3 Head, 202;
Richardson v. Woodbury, 43 Me.
206 ; Felton v. Smith, 84 Ind. 485.
2 Andrews v. Andrews, 12 Ind.
348 ; Beckett v. Bledsoe, 4 Ind. 256.
Where G was the owner of certain
lots of land, and by his will di-
rected them to be sold by his ex-
ecutors, which was done, and B
became the purchaser, who sold
them toE B, and received payment
therefor from E B, who died with-
out receiving a deed for the lots,
but a deed to them was afterwards
made to E, the administratrix and
wife of E B ; but H, being in pos-
session of the lots, claimed them
by virtue of a purchase from per-
sons who derived their title from
the heirs of E B. Held, that E, in
equity, is regarded as a trustee,
holding the title of the lots for the
benefit of the heirs of E B. Hoel
v. Coursey, 26 Miss. 511. Where an
administratrix buys land for her-
self on her own credit, a trust does
not result in favor of the estate by
virtue of the subsequent inad-
vertent application of some of the
funds of the estate in part pay-
ment of the price, but such a trust
can arise, if at all, only at the time
the title vests. Bowen v. Hughes,
5 Wash. St. 442; S. c, 32 Pac. Kep.
98. Where a husband agreed that
money received by his wife from
her father's estate, and also money
received by her for taking care of
her invalid sister, should remain
her separate estate, and that he
would receive and invest the same
for her benefit in the tract of land
in controversy and did so invest it,
and desired that the deed should
be made to her, but by mistake the
deed was made to himself, after
his death, in a proceeding by heirs
for a division of his estate and
for the allotment of dower to
the widow, the court properly
allowed her a lien on the land for
the purchase price. Wilborn v.
Bitter (1891) (By.), 16 S. W. Kep.
360.
§ 112. j
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
231
the land conveyed to B a charge that "if you believe by a
preponderance of proof" that in the purchase of the land
a tract owned by S was deeded as part of the considera-
tion ; that it was agreed between B and S that S was to
have an interest in the land purchased ; that by mistake
the name of S was omitted from the deed — "then you will
find for S" — correctly stated the law as to the weight of
the evidence, and it was unnecessary to prove that the
trust relied on by S must be proved with clearness and
certainty.1
§ 112. Proved by Parol. — It is a rule of equity, that
facts from which a trust by implication of law may arise
may be established by parol evidence. Under the statute of
frauds an express trust in real estate must be created or de-
clared in writing, and unless so created or declared is void;
but trusts by implication of law are not within the statute,
and the facts on which such trusts are decreed may be
proved by parol.2 But the rule is well established that, in
"Baylor v. Hopf, 81 Tex. 637; s.
C, 17 S. W. Rep. 230. '-It is true
Mrs. Hopf alleges that her name
was omitted in the deed through
inadvertence or mistake, or some
other cause to her unknown. This
allegation would not require of her
that strict proof that is necessary
to establish a parol trust in land,
because the trust is evidenced by
the deed and it would be implied.
If the value of her land does not
appear from the deeds the burden
of proof would be upon her to
show such value, in order to show
what part of the purchased estate
would equitably belong to her; but
this burden would only be such as
is ordinarily assumed by plaintiff in
making his case. The burden was
upon her, as upon every plaintiff,
to make out her case, to establish
her equitable claim to the land and
the amount as alleged, but not as a
parol trust." Ibid.
2 Von Trotha v. Bamberger, 15
Colo. 1 ; Learned v. Tritsch, G Colo.
432; Kayser v. Maugham, 8 Colo.
232; Stewart v. Stevens, 10 Colo.
440; Todd v. Munson, 53 Conn. 579;
Hunt v. Roberts, 40 Me. 187;
Hodges v. Howard, 5 K. I. 149;
Laing v. McKee, 13 Mich. 124; s.
C, 87 Am. Dec. 738; Manning v.
Pippen, 86 Ala. 357 ; S. C, 11 Am.
St. Rep. 46 ; Henschel v. Manners,
120 111. 660; Hidden v. Jordan, 21
Cal. 99-102; iSTclson v. Worrall, 20
Iowa, 469 ; Coyle v. Davis, 20 Wis
564; Martin v- Martin, 16 B. Mon
8; Jones v. McDougall, 32 Miss
179; Cousins v. Wall, 3 Jones Eq
43; Arnold v. Cord, 16 Ind. 177
Cameron v. Ward, 8 Ga. 245
Coyote, etc. Co. v. Ruble, 8 Ore
284; Troll v. Carter, 15 W. Va. 567;
Ryan v. Dox, 34 N. Y. 307, and
cases discussed; Sullivan v. Sulli-
van, 86 Tenn. 376; Caldwell v.
Caldwell, 7 Bush, 515; Morgan v.
232
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 112.
order to impress an implied trust upon the holder of the
legal title to real estate by parol testimony, it must be of
such a character as to leave the court without any ground
ior doubt in regard to it.1 Where this characteristic is ab-
Clayton, 61 111. 35; Foote v. Bry-
ant, 47 N. Y. 544 ; Brison v. Brison,
75 Cal. 525; s. c, 7 Am. St. Kep.
189; Reynolds v. Summer, 126 111.
56; s. c, 9 Am. St. Rep. 521; Par-
ker v. Logan, 82 Va. 441.
1 McFarland v. La Force (1894),
119 Mo. 585 ; S. C, 25 S.W. Rep. 530 ;
Allen v. Logan, 96 Mo. 591; s. c,
10 S. W. Rep. 149; Adams v.
Burns, 96 Mo. 361 ; s. c, 10 S. W.
Rep. 26; King v. Isley, 116 Mo.
155; s. C, 22 S. W. Rep. 635, and
oases cited; Smith v. Patton, 12
W. Va. 541 ; McCammon v. Pettit,
3 Sneed, 246; Parker v. Snyder, 31
1ST. J. Eq. 164; Miller v. Blose, 30
Gratt. 744; Kane v. O'Connors, 78
Va. 7G; Wilts v. Horney, 59 Md.
584; Agricultural Assn. v. Brew-
ster, 51 Tex. 257; Dudley v. Batch-
eller, 53 Me. 403; Billings v. Clin-
ton, 6 S. Oar. 90; Donaghev. Tarns,
81 Va. 132; Hyden v. Hyden, 6
Baxt. 406; Whitmore v. Learned,
70 Me. 276; Enos v. Hunter, 9 111.
211 ; Jenison v. Graves, 2 Blackf.
440; Frederick v. Haas, 5 Nev.
389; White v. Sheldon, 4 jSTev.
280; Greer v. Baughman, 13 Md.
257; Phelps v. Seely, 22 Gratt.
5S9; Tunnard' v. Littell, 23 N. J.
Eq. 264; Miller v. Stokely, 5 Ohio
St. 194; Johnson v. Quarles,46Mo.
423; Holder v. Nunnelly, 2 Coldw.
288; Parmlee v. Sloan, 37 Ind.
482 ; Farrington v. Barr, 36 N. H.
86; Stafford v. Wheeler, 93 Pa. St.
462; DePeysterv. Gould, 13 ST. J.
Eq. 474-480; Scott v. Taylor, 64
Ga. 506; Osborne v. Endicott, 6
Cal. 149; McGuire v. Ramsey, 9
Ark. 518. See also the leading case,
Boyd v. McLean, 1 Johns. Ch.582,
where Chancellor Kent, after an
examination of English and Ameri-
can authorities on this question, ad-
mitted parol evidence as competent.
Where the husband buys property
and has it conveyed to his wife un-
der a verbal agreement that she
shall deed it to him, but she dies
without doing so, and he brings
suit against his infant daughter,
the wife's sole heir, to have the ti-
tle decreed in himself, he is incom-
petent as a witness to the transac-
tion between himself and wife, un-
der Rev. St. 111. 1874, ch. 51, § 2, de-
claring that, in actions by or
against the representatives of a de-
cedent, the survivor shall not give
evidence of transactions with the
decedent. The objection to the
competency of plaintiff as a wit-
ness is not waived by the failure of
the infant defendant's guardian ad
litem to object to his testimony.
Johnston v. Johnston (1891), 138
111. 385; s. c, 27 N. E. Rep. 930.
Plaintiff's father conveyed land to
defendant upon a parol trust to
pay certain judgments which were
afterwards discharged with the
proceeds of other land, which the
father had intended to convey to
the plaintiff, with the understand-
ing with the defendant that he
should convey the land held in
trust by him to plaintiff. Held,
that the agreement to convey to
the plaintiff not being in writing
was void under the statute of
frauds. Dover v. Rhea, 108 ST. C. 88 ;
s. c, 13 S. E. Rep. 164. Under Rev.
St. 1894, § 3391, requiring trusts
§ 112. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 233
sent, or the agreement comes within the provisions of the
statute of frauds, it will be held unenforceable and void. In
a recent case before the Supreme Court of Indiana, P and
wife, being desirous to make a settlement of their property
on their children E and W, and to save the costs of guard-
ianship for W, who was a minor, entered into a parol agree-
ment with E, whereby the title to the whole of certain real
estate should be vested in E, she to have an undivided one-
half interest in fee, and that she should hold the other un-
divided one-half in trust and for the use and benefit of her
brother, W, until such time as he should arrive at the age
of twenty-one years, and then at his request she should, by
proper deed, convey the same to him, which she then and
there orally promised and agreed with her father and
mother and with said W to do. It was held that such trust
agreement comes within the inhibition of the statute, being
simply in parol and is not enforceable.1 But where a parol
agreement relates to a trust which was originally in per-
sonal property, and was subsequently converted into real
estate, it will beheld to be not within the statute of frauds.
not implied by law to be created Irwin v. Ivers, 7 Ind. 308; Meseall
in writing, signed by the donor, a v. Tully, 91 Ind. 96 ; Pearson v.
parol trust in the absolute grantee Pearson, 125 Ind. 341; Montgom-
of realty to convey half of it to a ery v. Craig, 128 Ind. 48. Lands con-
younger brother, then a minor, on veyed by an absolute deed pur-
his demand when of age is void, porting on its face to convey an
Peterson v. Boswell, 137 Ind. 211; absolute estate in fee may be im-
s. c, 36 N. B. Rep. 845. Where a pressed with a trust by clear and
deed is placed in the hands of a convincing oral testimony showing
grantee with a parol agreement the terms of the trust, where the
that under certain circumstances it trust was created and its terms
shall be delivered back and be of agreed upon at the time of execu-
no effect, the trust arising is an ex- tion of the deed, or the deed was
press one, and not being in writing, executed in pursuance of a previ-
signed by the party declaring the ous agreement ; but such convey -
trust, is void by the provisions of ance cannot be turned into a deed
Pev. St. 111. 1874, ch. 59, § 9. Ste- in trust by oral declarations of the
venson v. Crapnell, 114 111.19; s. parties thereto, made after its exe-
c, 28 N". E. Eep. 379. cution. Sherman v. Sandell, 106
1 Kev. Stat. 1881, § 2969; Peter- Cal. 373; s. c, 39 Pac. Eep. 797.
son v. Boswell (1893) , 137 Ind. 211 ;
234 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 112.
Where a partner went to Europe on account of ill health,
and the other partner continued the partnership business,
remitting a stated sum quarterly, and permitting the balance
of the absent partner's share to accumulate, after the lat-
ter' s death abroad, the partnership business was not wound
up, but was continued by the survivor. With a part of the
accumulated profits belonging to deceased the surviving
partner purchased land in his own name. It was held that
the fact that the trust in regard to the land was not declared
in writing, as required by the Code, will not defeat the trust
therein. The trust, being originally created in personal
property, was provable by parol ; and the character of the
trust in this respect was not changed by the fact that, by
the acts of the trustee and by operation of law, it now af-
fects real estate.1 A vendee who is put in possession
and pays part of the price, and, being unable to complete
the payments, procures the money from another to whom
the land is conveyed by the vendor, under a verbal agree-
ment that it be conveyed to the vendee upon his payment
of the sum advanced, can enforce the agreement, notwith-
standing the Code provides that trusts concerning lands can
only be created by instrument in writing signed by the
party declaring or creating the same.2
Civil Code Cal. § 852. Roach last yielded to his persuasion,
v. Caffara, 85 Cal. 436; s. C, 25 Held, on a bill to declare a trust
Pac. Rep. 22; Schroeder v. Jones, based on an oral promise that if
27 Cal. 280; Hearst v. Pujol, 44 the husband, who was going
Cal. 230; Zuck v. Culp, 59 Cal. abroad, "returned home a sober
142; Speidel v. Henrici, 120 U. S. man, free from his habits of dissi-
377. pation, she would return to him,
2 Code Ala. § 1845; Spies v. and live with him as his wife,"
Price (1890), 91 Ala. 166; s. C, 8 and the deed should become "null
So. Kep. 405; Moseley v. Moseley, and void, and of no effect," that
86 Ala. 289; s. c, 5 So. Kep. 732; the promise was within the statute
Patton v. Beecher, 62 Ala. 579 ; of frauds, as creating a trust other -
Barnett v. Dougherty, 32 Pa. St. wise than in writing, and its
371 ; Box v. Stanford, 13 Sm. & M. breach was not a fraud against
93; s. c, 51 Am. Dec. 142. A which equity can relieve. Brock
husband conveyed land to his wife, v. Brock, 90 Ala. 86; s. C, 8 So.
who had left him for hisintemper- Kep. 11, and authorities cited and
ance. The idea was his own, and fully discussed,
she refused the deed until she at
§ 113. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 235
§ 113. Other Implied Trusts. — The preceding exposi-
tion of the law of implied trust of a general character is
not presented as exhaustive of the subject. As was well said
by the late Mr. Lewin: "It would be endless to pursue
implied trusts through all their ramifications ; a subject so
extensive that years might be passed in the study of equi-
table jurisprudence without exhausting so ample a field."1
But as it would be endless, so also it would be altogether
unnecessary and unimportant. The general principles by
which courts of equity are governed in their administration
of the law of trusts and trustees have been presented with a
degree of fullness which will prove sufficient, perhaps for
all practical purposes. It will be observed that the treat-
ment here given is somewhat more extended than that of
preceding text-writers. Though we have not, in all re-
spects, followed the classification of trusts given by those
who have gone before us in this department of legal study
— having excluded one important class as not properly fall-
ing under the head of implied trusts — we have nevertheless
found matter for a chapter of some length relating to this
subject. It is hoped that it may be found sufficiently com-
plete to meet the wants of the profession.
1 1 Lewin on Trusts. 141.
CHAPTER IX.
IMPLIED TRUSTS CONTINUED.
RESULTING TRUSTS— DIVISION FIRST.
TRUSTS RESULTING TO
GKANTOK.
114.
Introductory.
§ 131.
From Voluntary Convey-
115.
Resulting Trust from Legal
ance.
without Equitable Es-
132.
The Subject Continued.
tate.
133.
The Same Subject.
116.
The Subject Continued.
134.
Proof by Parol.
117.
The Same Subject.
135.
The Subject Continued.
118.
Partial Trust to Donor.
136.
From Misunderatanding.
119.
The Subject Continued.
137.
The Subject Continued.
120.
The Same Subject.
138.
The Same Subject.
121.
Distinguished from a
139.
From Conveyance to a
Charge.
Wife or Child.
122.
Prom Failure of Express
140.
From the Relation between
Trust.
the Parties.
123.
From Trusts for Persons
141.
The Subject Continued.
non esse.
142.
The Same Subject.
124.
From Indefiniteness of De-
143.
From Undue Influence.
clared Trust.
144.
The Subject Continued.
125.
From an Illegal Trust.
145.
The Same Subject.
126.
The Subject Continued.
146.
Resulting Trust from Gift
127.
From Lapse of Trust.
by Will.
128.
In Favor of Donee.
147.
From the Equitable Con-
129.
The Subject Continued.
version of Property.
130.
From Trust for Sale of
148.
The Subject Continued.
Realty.
149.
The Same Subject.
§ 114. Introductory. — Resulting trusts are that class of
implied trusts, or trusts arising by operation of law, in
which from the supposed intention of the parties or from
the nature of the transaction the beneficial interest results
or reverts to the equitable owner. The term "resulting,"
as applied to trusts by operation of law, is employed by
text-writers and sometimes also by the courts in an in-
definite and general sense, and in consequence there is
§ 114. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 237
some diversity in the definitions given. A definition may-
be sufliciently accurate as applied to one class or kind of
resulting trusts, while it fails as an explanation of result-
ing trusts as a whole, and as distinguished from trusts of
other general classes. Perhaps no more accurate definition
has been given, as far as it goes, than that of Mr. Burrill
in his Law Dictionary. A resulting trust is "a trust raised
by implication for the benefit of a party granting an estate.
Various kinds of trusts are ranked under this head in the
books, such as trusts raised by implication for the benefit
of a person who advances the purchase money of an estate,
etc. But these are rather implied than resulting trusts,
properly so called; the term resulting, in strictness, im-
parting a going back or reverting of an estate to the party
from whom it proceeded."1 Mr. Anderson gives the fol-
lowing: "A resulting trust arises by operation of law
whenever a beneficial interest is not to go along with the
legal title, as where a conveyance is taken in the name of
one person and the consideration is advanced by another."2
"One that arises from the operation or construction of
equity, and in pursuance of the rule that trusts result to
1 Tit. Resulting Trust, Burrill's of the parties and the nature of
Law Directory. See also 1 Ste- the transantion." Bouvier's Law
phens' Commentaries, 347; 2 Dictionary, tit. Resulting Trust.
Crabb's Eeal Property, 558, § 177a ; "A resulting trust arises where a
Cruise's Dig. tit. XII., ch. 1, §§ 46, trust is created which does notdis-
61; 1 White's Eq. Cases, 138, and pose of the property. * * * As
notes ; 4 Kent's Commentaries, 305, a general rule, where in a convey -
306; 2 Crabb's Eeal Property, 571, ance or will the legal estate is
§ 1796. given to a person, but no trust is
2 Tit. Trust, Anderson's Diction- expressed, and an intention can be
ary of Law, 1058. See also Jack- collected that the grantee or dev-
son v. Jackson, 91 U. S. 125; Chap- isee should not take the beneficial
man v. County of Douglas, 107 U. interest (as where a person pur-
S. 357; Eose v. Gibson, 71 Ala. 40; chases property in the name of
Cotton v. Wood, 25 Iowa, 45; Kel- another), the interest will result to
ler v.Kunkell, 56 Md. 569; Ex parte the grantor, purchaser, etc. ; simi-
Trenholm, 19 S. Car. 126, 135; larly, if part of the beneficial in-
Laws v. Laws, 76 Va. 527. "A terest is disposed of, the residue
trust raised by implication or con- will result." Eapalje & Lawrence
struction of law, and presumed to Law Dictionary, tit. Trust, 1299.
exist from the supposed intention "One that arises by implication of
238 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 115.
the party frora whom the consideration moves."1 These
definitions are all correct, but they all fail, as from their
brevity they must necessarily do, in completeness and com-
prehensiveness. The department of trusts is ordinarily
divided into two classes : First, those in which the trust
estate reverts to the donor or grantor, and, secondly, those
in which it reverts to the party paying consideration. This
division will be recognized in the following exposition of the
law of resulting trusts.
§ 115. Resulting Trust from Legal 'without Equitable
Estate. — Where the owner of both the legal and equitable
estates makes a conveyance of the legal estate, but does
not intend to convey the equitable estate, a trust will result
in his favor. If the intention of the person making the
conveyance is not expressed or clearly implied in the in-
strument of conveyance, it is a matter to be determined by
the court. It may appear from the circumstances of the
transaction, or it may be proved by other evidence either
in writing or by parol.2 But this is a point to be established.
And the onus probandi is on the party seeking to establish
the trust. If there is no positive evidence that it was the
intention not to convey the equitable estate, no trust will
result to the grantor, even where the conveyance is volun-
tary.3 In the recent case of Thompson v. Thompson, T, a
law, or by the operation and con- Amb. 126; Gladding v. Yapp,
struction of equity, and which is 5 Mod. 56; Langham v. Sanford,
established as consonant to the 17 Ves. 435 ; Walton v. Walton, 14
presumed intention of the parties Ves. 318 ; Nourse v. Finch, 1 Ves.
as gathered from the nature of the Jr. 344 ; Petit v. Smith, 1 P. Wms.
transaction." Black's Law Die- 7; Hogan v. Staghorn, 65 Car. 279;
tionary, tit. Resulting Trust, 1037. Fletcher v. Ashburner, 1 Bro. Ch.
1 Tit. Eesulting Trust, Whar- 501 ; Be Cross' Estate, 1 Sim.
ton*s Law Dictionary, 662. (N. S.) 260; Cooke v. Dealy, 22
2 Barnes v. Taylor, 27 JST. J. Eq. Beav. 196; Halford v. Stains, 16
265 ; Cook v. Hutchinson, 1 Keen, Sim. 488 ; Sewell v. Denny, 10
50; Docksey v. Docksey, 2 Eq. Ca. Beav. 315; Wych v. Packington,
Abr. 506; s. c, 3 Bro. P. C. 39; 3 Bro. Ch. 44; Levet v. Needham,
North v. Crompton, 1 Ch. Ca. 196; 2 Vera. 138.
s. c, 2 Vern. 253; Williams v. 3 Prevost v. Gratz, 1 Pet. C. C.
Jones, 10 Ves. 77; Trimmer v. 364; Jenkins v. Pye, 12 Pet. 241;
Bayne, 7 Ves. 520; Lake v. Lake, Bennett v. Hutson, 33 Ark. 762;
§ 115. J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
239
man nearly eighty years of age, was desirous of obtaining
a loan on land, but the agent objected on the ground of his
age, and suggested that the land be convey to J, a son of
T, a man about forty years of age, who could procure the
loan and give the security. It was held that the convey-
ance to J was not absolute, but to enable him to effect the loan ;
and J would be compelled to reconvey subject to the secu-
rity for the loan.1 Where a conveyance is made for a re-
Cox v. Arnsmann, 76 Ind. 210; Burt
Wilson, 28 Cal. 632 ; Gore v. Lea-
royd, 140 Mass. 524 ; Philbrook v.
Delano, 29 Me. 410. Land bought
by a son with his own money,
and with the father's acquiescence,
on an execution of the father,
though for less than it is worth
and less thaa the execution, does
not leave in the father an equita-
ble title by reason of a resulting
trust, which heirs can reach after
his death, as such a trust could re-
sult only in case of fraud or pay-
ment of the purchase money by
the father. Evans v. McKee (1892),
12 Pa. St. 89; s. c, 25 Atl. Eep.
148. Certain legatees filed their
bills to have a resulting trust in
their favor declared in land con-
veyed to the widow and executrix
of their testator, on the ground
that she had paid for it in funds
belonging to the estate. The hus-
band of one of the plaintffs, who
had assisted the widow in the pur-
chase of the land, testified that she
bought it with such funds, while
the brother of plaintiffs, who had
no interest in the suit, testified that
she bought it with her own money.
The records of the Probate Court
showed that in settlement as ex-
ecutrix, to which plaintiffs were
parties, the widow claimed the
land as her own and was allowed
rent therefor; and it was shown
that she had money of her own at
the time of the purchase, enough
to have paid for the land. Held,
that the evidence was not sufficient
to establish the trust. Burke v.
Andrews, 91 Ala. 360; s. c, 8 So.
Eep. 369.
1 Thompson v. Thompson (1890),
30 Xeb. 489; s. C, 46 W. Eep. 638.
Where the grantee in a deed pays
the consideration with his own
funds, an oral agreement entered
into, before the purchase binding
him to lease the land for a term of
one thousand years to a railroad
company at an annual rental does
not bring the company within the
rule that payment of the consider-
ation by a person other than the
one to whom the deed is made cre-
ates a resulting trust in favor of
the person making the payment;
and the railroad company cannot be
considered as the equitable owner
of the land, within the mean-
ing of the statute, exempting land
owned by it from taxation. Com-
monwealth v. Maysville, etc. E.
E. Co (1895) (Ky.), 21 S. W. Eep.
342. Plaintiff's father conveyed
land to defendant upon a parol
trust to pay certain judgments,
which were afterwards discharged
with the proceeds of other land,
which the father had intended to
convey to plaintiff, with the un-
derstanding with defendant that he
should convey the land held in
trust by him to plaintiff. Held,
240
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ H6.
liable consideration it is not permissible to introduce evi-
dence to establish a resulting trust.1
§ 116. The Subject Continued. — Where there is an
agreement to convey land for a consideration, the amount
to be determined by the price at which the vendee is able
to sell it, a resulting trust arises to the grantor, to con-
tinue until the land is sold. The grantee becomes a
trustee for the grantor, answerable to all the equitable
rules to which he would have been subject had the instrument
under which he held the land in express terms empowered and
that a trust in the land conveyed
to defendant resulted to plaintiff's
father, and went to his heirs.
There being no transfer of the le-
gal title contemporaneous with the
parol understanding that defend-
ant should convey to plaintiff, no
trust resulted in her favor. Dover
v. Rhea, 108 N. Car. 88; s. c, 13
S. E. Rep. 164. Where the vendee
of land, at the time of taking title
thereto, procures a third person to
advance a portion of the purchase
money and become his surety on
a note for the balance, and depos-
its the deed with him as security
for the repayment of the money
advanced, and as indemnity
against loss by reason of the sure-
tyship, and a few days thereafter
executes and delivers to such per-
son his note at twelve months,
bearing interest from date, for the
whole amount of such purchase
money, no resulting trust is created
in behalf of such third person.
Davis v. Davis, 88 Ga. 191 ; s. c, 14
S. E. Rep. 194. Suit having been
brought by a devisee to set aside a
will, an agreement was made by
all the devisees under which it was
to be dismissed, and for the pur-
pose of making an equal division
of the property it was agreed that
D., on account of advancements to
the other devisees, should bid in
certain land for the benefit of his
minor children. D., being adminis-
trator, and therefore unable to bid
at the sale, the land was bid in by
S. for D.'s children, and an absolute
deed was made to him by D. D.
entered into possession for his
children. Subsequently S., without
consideration, conveyed the land
to G., who brought ejectment
against D., and recovered judg-
ment, on which he agreed not to
issue execution until D. could pros-
ecute a suit to test his rights to the
property. Held, that G. held the
land under a resulting trust for D.'s
children, and should be enjoined
from causing execution to issue on
the judgment in ejectment. Al-
bright v. Oyster, 140 U. S. 493, 515;
s. c, 11 S. C. Rep. 916.
1 Gibson v. Armstrong, 7 B.
Mon. 481 ; Ridout v. Dowding, 1
Atk. 419; Kerlin v. Campbell, 15
Pa. St. 500; Brown v. Jones, 1
Atk. 158. Where a mortgage is
assigned without consideration,
and with the understanding that
the beneficial interest is to remain
in the assignor, a trust vests in fa-
vor of the assignor which, on his
death, passes to his estate. Rice
v. Rice (1895) (Mich.), 65 K. W..
Rep. 103.
§ 117.]
IMPLIED TEUSTS.
241
required him to sell the land for the benefit of the grantor.1
Where a vendor of an estate receives the purchase money,
but retains the legal title, he becomes by operation of law
a trustee for the vendee, and as such he is not at liberty to
make any use of the estate that would be inconsistent with
his fiduciary relation.2 Where there is a conveyance that
upon its face is absolute, a trust in favor of the grantor
will not result from proof that he continued to retain pos-
session of the property, and that no money was paid by
the grantee.3
§ 117. The Same Subject. — No rule has been estab-
lished by courts of equity for determining where the con-
veyance of the legal title carries with it the equitable inter-
est. Each case is to be decided upon its own merits, and
as far as possible the intention of the maker is to be learned
from the general tenor and drift of the instrument.4 The
presumption depends upon the circumstances. Where the
conveyance is to a wife or child it will be presumed, in the
1 Prevost y. Gratz, 1 Pet. C. C.
364. Land was conveyed to plaint-
iff's brother, who made the bar-
gain and determined the form of
conveyance therefor, but their
father was to pay, and did in fact
pay, for the same, and kept pos-
session, and took the rents and
profits thereof, during life. Held,
that this created a resulting trust
in favor of their father, and plaint-
iff was entitled to a share of such
land as a part of his father's estate.
Dana v. Dana, 154 Mass. 491 ; s. c,
28 N. E.Eep. 905.
2 Waddington v. Banks, 1 Brock.
97; Duval v. Bibb, 4 H. & M. 113;
Moore v. Holcombe, 3 Leigh,
604. The vendor of real property
who has not taken a separate se-
curity for the purchase money, has
a lien for it, on the land, as against
the vendee and his heirs. This
lien is defeated by an alienation to
a bona fide purchaser, without
16
notice; nor can it be asserted
against creditors holding under a
bona fide conveyance from the ven-
dee. Bayley v. Greenleaf, 7
Wheat. *46. Where a deed upon
its face shows that the purchase
money is unpaid, a purchaser from
the grantee takes subject to the
vendor's lien unless it has been
waived. Cordova v. Hood, 17
Wall. 1. See also Fish v. How-
land, 1 Paige, 20; Vail v. Foster,
4 N. Y. 12 ; Fisk v. Potter, 2 Keyes,
64; Brown v. Gilman, 4 Wheat.
255 ; Garson v. Green, 1 Johns. Ch.
308.
3 Ballbeck v. Donaldson, 6 Am.
Law Reg. (0. S.) 148.
4 Walton v. Walton, 14 Ves. 318;
Ellis v. Selby, 1 Myl. & K. 298 ; Hill
v. Bishop of London, 1 Atk. 620;
Starkey v. Brooks, 1 P. Wms. 391 ;
King v. Dennison, 1 Ves. & B.
279.
242 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 118.
absence of any positive evidence, that an equitable interest
was intended. In a case where testator devised lands to
his wife and her heirs, to be sold for the payment of debts
and legacies in addition to the personal estate, and the per-
sonal estate proving sufficient to pay all the claims, it was
held that a resulting trust in the land arose to the heir.1
The heirs of an estate are not to be deprived of a beneficial
interest in it on any vague or uncertain evidence of the in-
tention of a testator. It has been maintained that a trans-
fer of propertj' carries with it a presumption that the
grantor intended to benefit the grantee by conveying a
beneficial interest, but if there is no conclusive evidence
of such an intention it will be held that a trust results to
the grantor. The circumstances that a conveyance is to an
heir, undoubtedly creates a strong presumption that it was
the purpose of the grantor to convey a beneficial interest.
But as against evidence of a positive character to the con-
tray, such presumption will have no weight.2 Where there
is ground for doubt, a trust will result to the heir unless
there is positive proof that it was the intention of the tes-
tator to convey the beneficial interest.3
§ 118. Partial Trust to Donor. — Where an express
trust is created in a part of an estate, and there is no dis-
posal of the remainder, it will be presumed that the crea-
tion of the partial trust was the sole object of the settlor,
and a resulting trust in a portion of the estate not so disposed
of will arise in his favor, or in that of his representatives.4
1 Buggiiis v. Yates. 9 Mod. 122. Dow. 211 ; Hopkins v. Hopkins,
2 George v. Howard, 7 Price, 661 ; Cas. temp. Talb. 44.
distance v. Cunningham, 13 Beav. 4 Lloyd v. Spillett, 2 Atk. 150
363; Salter v. Cavanagb, 1 Dra. & Cottington v. Fletcher, 2 Atk. 155
Walsh, 668; Phillips v. Phillips, 1 Northern v. Carnegie, 4 Drew. 587
Myl. & K. 661 ; Halliday v. Hudson, Culpepper v. Aston, 2 Ch. Cas. 115
3 Ves. 211; Kellett v. Kellett, 3 Roper v. Radcliffe, 9 Mod. 187
Dow. 248; Amplett v. Parke, 2 R. Sherrard v. Harborough, Amb
& M. 227. 165 ; Hobart v. Suffolk, 2 Vern. 644
3 Habergham v. Vincent, 2 Ves. Halliday v. Hudson, 3 Ves. 210a
Jr. 225; Lloyd v. Spillett, 2 Atk. Killett v. Killett, 3 Dowl. P. C
151; Tregonwell v. Sydenham, 3 248; Davidson v. Foley, 2 Bro. Ch
§ 119. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 243
In the case of McElroy v. McElroy, A, by a deed of war-
ranty, with covenants to the "grantee, his heirs and as-
signs," and in consideration of one dollar paid by B( his
brother), "trustee of" C (another brother), and of "the love
and affection" he bore to C, conveyed a parcel of land to B,
"it being my intention" "to convey" to B "in trust for"
C, to have and to hold to the said grantee, his heirs and
assigns, to his own and their use and behoof forever." It
was held that upon the death of C a trust resulted to the
grantor.1
§ 119. The Subject Continued. — Under the early English
law many cases of this character came before the courts
from gifts to executors for the payment of debts and lega-
cies. In such cases, after the payment of debts and lega-
cies, the executor was entitled, both at law and in equity, to
any surplus, unless it was expressly disposed of by the will.
Courts of equity were always slow to enforce this law, and
they were fruitful in expedients for raising a resulting trust
in favor of the next of kin or heir-at-law. And in the
time of William IV. it was provided by legislative enact-
ment that executors should be held as trustees of any re-
mainder, unless the will provided in plain terms that they
should take the beneficial interest.2 In this country the
203; Levet v. Needham, 2 Vera. v. Sargeon, 2 Keen, 255 ; Ommaney
138; Kiricke v. Bransbey, 2 Eq. v. Butcher. 1 Turn. & Russ. 260,
Cas. Abr. 50S ; Bobinson v. Taylor, 270 ; Cook v. Hutchinson, 1 Keen,
2 Bro. Ch. 5S9; Mapp v. Elcock, 2 42, 50; Wood v. Cos, 2 Myl. & Cr.
Phill. 793; s. c, 3 H. L. Cas. 492; 684 ; 2 Story, Equity Jurisprudence,
Bead v. Steadman, 26 Beav. 495; § 1196a. But also fee Sargent v.
Dawson v. Clark, 18 Ves. 254; Burdett (1895), 96Ga. Ill; s. c, 22
Wych v. Packington, 3 Bro. Ch. S. E. Bep. 667.
44; Bristol v. Hungerford, 2 Vern. 2 I Will. IV., ch. IV. Testa-
645; Hill v. Cook, 1 Ves. & B. 173; tor bequeated all his property to
Nash v. Smith, 17 Ves. 29 ; Hall v. two persons, whom he appointed
Waterhouse, W. N". (1867) p. 11 ; executors (one being a neighbor-
Bird v. Harris, L. B. 9 Eq. 204; ing farmer, the other a surgeon
Loring v. Elliott, 16 Gray, 568. called in during his last illness to
1 McElroy v. McElroy, 113 Mass. make the will) "in and for the
509. See also Hill v. Bishop of consideration of" paying over the
London, 1 Atk. 618 ; King v. Den- rents and profits to his wife for
nison, 1 Ves. & B. 260, 279; Stubbs life. Held, that the executors did
244
IMPLIED TEUSTS.
[§ 119.
rule of the earty English courts was never recognized, and at
present, as in the past, the law as now administered in
England has prevailed. In a comparatively recent English
not take beneficially, but that the
estate, subject to the widow"s life
interest, was undisposed of. Bird
v. Harris, L. K. 9 Eq. *204. Mr.
Fonblanque, in a most learned and
exhaustive note in 2 Fonblanque*s
Equity, B. 2, ch. 5, § 3,
note (K), has collected and
arranged most of these dis-
tinctions. "The cases," he says,
"upon the subject are numer-
ous and not easily reconcilable. I
will, however, endeavor to extract
the several rules which have gov-
erned their decision: (1) As the
exclusion of the executor from the
residue is to be referred to the pre-
sumed intention of the testator
that he should not take it benefi-
cially, an express declaration that
he should take as trustee will of
course exclude him (Pring v.
Pring, 2 Ver. 99; Graydon v.
Hicks, 2 Atk. 18; Wheeler v.
Sheers, Mosely, 28S, 301; Dean v.
Dalton, 2 Bro. Ch. 634; Bennet
v. Bachelor, 3 Bro. Ch. 28; s. C, 1
Ves. Jr. 63) ; and the exclusion of
one executor as a trustee will con-
sequently exclude his co-executor,
(White v. Evans, 4 Ves. 21), unless
there be evidence of a contrary in-
tention. Williams v. Jones, 10
Ves. 77; Pratt v. Sladden, 14 Ves.
193; Dawson v. Clark, 15 Ves. 416.
And see Dalton v. Dean to show
that a. direction to reimburse the
executors their expenses is suffi-
cient to exclude them. 2 Bro. Ch.
634. (2) Where the testator ap-
pears to have intended by his will
to make an express disposition of
the residue, but by some accident
or omission such disposition is not
perfected at the time of his death,
as where the will contains a resid-
uary clause, but the name of
the residuary legatee is not in-
serted, the executor shall be ex-
cluded from the residue. Bp. of
Cloyne v. Young, 2 Ves. 91 ; Lord
North v. Pardon, 2 Ves. 495;
Hornesby v. Finch, 2 Ves. Jr. 78;
Oldham v. Carleton, 2 Cox R. 400.
(3) Where the testator has by his
will disposed of the residue of his
property, but by the death of the
residuary legatee in the lifetime of
the testator, it is undisposed of at
the time of the testator's death.
Nichols v. Crisp, Amb. 769;
Bennet v. Bachelor, 3 Bro.
Ch. 28. (4) The next class of
cases in which an executor shall
be excluded from the residue is
where the testator has given him a
legacy expressly for his care and
trouble; which, as observed by
Lord Hardwicke, in Bp. of Cloyne
v. Young, 2 Ves. 97, is a very stroDg
case for a resulting trust, not on
the foot of giving all and some,
but that it was evidence that the
testator meant him as a trustee for
some other, for whom the care and
trouble should be, as it could not
be for himself. Foster v. Munt, 1
Vern. 473; Rachfield v. Careless, 2
P. Wnis. 157; Cordel v. Noden, 2
Vern. 148 ; JSTewstead v. Johnstone,
2 Atk. 46. (5) Though the objec-
tion to the executor's taking part
and all has been thought a very
weak and insufficient ground for
excluding him from the residue,
as the testator might intend the
particular legacy to him in case of
the personal estate falling short,
yet it has been allowed to prevail ;
and it is now a settled rule in
§ 119.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
245
case, where there was a gift of residue to an executor to
enable him to carry into effect the purposes of the will, it
was held, on demurrer, that the executor took no beneficial
equity that if a sole executor has a
legacy generally and absolutely
given to him (for if given under
certain limitation, which will here-
after be considered, it will not ex-
clude), he shall be excluded from
the residue. Cook v. Walker, cited
2 Ver. 676; Joslin v. Brewitt,
Bunb. 112 ; Davers v. Dewes, 3 P.
Wms. 40 ; Farrington v. Knightly,
1 P. Wms. 544 ; Vachell v. Jeff eries,
Prec. Ch. 170; Petit v. Smith, 1 P.
Wms. 7. Nor will the circum-
stance of the legacy being specific
be sufficient to entitle him. Kan-
dall v. Bookey, 2 Vera. 425 ; South-
cot v. Watson, 3 Atk. 229 ; Martin
v. Kebow, 1 Bro. Ch. 154; Nesbit
v. Murray, 5, Ves. 149. Nor will the
testator's having bequeated lega-
cies to his next of kin vary the
rule. Bailey v. Powell, 2 Vern.
361; Wheeler v. Sheers, Mosely,
288 ; Andrew v. Clark, 2 Ves. 162 ;
Kennedy v. Stainsby, E. 1755,
stated in a note, 1 Ves. Jr. 66. For
the rule is founded rather on a
presumption of intent to exclude
the executor, than to create a
trust for his next of kin, and there-
fore if there be no next of kin, a
trust shall result to the crown.
Middleton v. Spicer, 1 Bro. Ch.
201. (6) Where the testator ap-
pears to have intended to dispose
of any part of his personal estate.
Urquhart v. King, 7 Ves. 225. (7)
Where the residue is given to the
executors as tenants in common,
and one of the executors dies,
whereby his share lapses, the next
of kin, and not the surviving execu-
tors, shall have the lapsed share.
Page v. Page, 2 P. Wms. 489 ; s. c, 1
Ves. Jr. 66, 542. With respect to
co-executors, they are clearly
within the three first stated
grounds on which a sole executor
shall be excluded from the residue,
and as to the fourth ground of ex-
clusion it seems now to be settled
that a legacy given to one executor
expressly for his care and trouble
will, though no legacy be given to
his co-executor, exclude. White v.
Evans, 4 Ves. 21. As to the fifth
ground of exclusion of a sole exec-
utor, several points of distinction
are material in its application to
co-executors. A sole executor is
excluded from the residue by the
bequest of a 'legacy, because it
shall not be supposed that he was
intended to take part and all. But
if there be two or more executors,
a legacy to one is not within such
objection, for the testator might
intend a preference to him pro
tanto. Colesworth v. Brangwin,
Prec. Ch. 323 ; Johnson v. Twist,
cited 2 Ves. 166; Buffor v. Brad-
ford, 2 Atk. 220. So where several
executors have unequal legacies,
whether pecuniary or specific, they
shall not be thereby excluded from
the residue. Brasbridge v. Wood-
roffe, 2 Atk. 69; Bowker v. Hun-
ter, 1 Bro. Ch. 328; Blinkhorn v.
Feast, 2 Ves. 27. But where equal
pecuniary legacies are given to
two or more executors, a trust
shall result for those on whom in
case of intestacy the law would
have cast it. Petit v. Smith, 1 P.
Wms. 7 ; Carey v. Goodlinge, 3 Bro.
Ch. 110; Muckleston y. Brown,
6 Ves. 64. But see Heron v. Newton,
9 Mod. 11. Query: Whether
distinct specific legacies, of equal
value, to several executors will ex-
246
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 120.
interest.1 In a recent case before the New York Court of
Appeals, it was held that an executor is alwaj's a trustee
of the personal estate of the testator, and can be called to
account therefor as such in a court of equity, although no
express trust be created by the will. Any person claiming
an interest in the personalty, either as legatee under the
will, or as entitled to it under the statute of distributions,
may, when the executor claims such interest in his own
right, bring suit against him to settle the construction and
ascertain the validity of the provisions of the will, so far
as executor's interest is concerned, and to enable him to
obtain from the executors such portion of the estate as he
is either legally or equitably entitled to.2
§ 120. The Same Subject. — Where a creditor ap-
points a debtor as his executor a legal consequence of the
act is that the debt is extinguished, not to be revived;
but if the debtor is made administrator there will be no
elude them? It now remains to
consider in what cases an executor
shall not be excluded from the
residue. Upon which it may be
stated as a universal rule that a
court of equity will not interfere
to the prejudice of the executor's
legal right, if such legal right can
be reconciled with the intention of
the testator, expressed by or to be
collected from, his will. And there-
fore even the bequest of a legacy
to the executor shall not exclude
if such legacy be consistent with
the intent that the executor shall
take the residue ; as where a gift to
the executor is an exception out of
another legacy. Griffith v. Rogers,
Prec. Ch. 231 ; Newstead v. John-
stone, 2 Atk. 45; Southcot v. Wat-
son, 3 Atk. 229. Or where the ex-
ecutorship is limited to a particu-
lar period, or determinable on a
contingency, and the thing be-
queathed to the executor upon such
contingency taking place is be-
queathed over. Hoskins v. Hos-
kins, Prec. Ch. 263. Or where the
gift is only a limited interest, as
for the life of the executor. Lady
Granvill v. Duchess of Beaufort, 1
P. Wms. 114; Jones v. Westcome,
Prec. Ch. 316; Xourse v. Finch, 1
Ves. Jr. 356. Or where a wife is
executrix, and the bequest is of
her paraphrenalia. Lawson v.
Lawson, 7 Bro. P. C. 521 ; Ball v.
Smith, 2 Vein. 675. See Bondinot
v. Bradford, 2 Dallas, 268; Davis v.
Davis, Ex., cited3Binn;3 Woodde-
son, Lee. 59, pp. 495 to 503."
1 Barr v. Fewkes, 2 Hem. & M.
60.
2 Wager v. Wager, S9 X. Y. 161
Bowers v. Smith, 10 Paige, 200
Hayes v. Jackson, 6 Mass. 153
Post v. Hover, 33 N. Y. 602
Nichols v. Crisp, Amb. 769 ; Bead
v. Stedman, 26 Beav. 495; Salt-
marsh v. Barrett, 29 Beav. 474; S.
C, 3 De G., F. & J. 279; Travers v.
Travers, L. R. 14 Eq. 275.
§ 121. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 247
extinguishment of the debt, but a suspension of the right
of recovery by action during the life of the debtor, and at
his death his representative would be chargeable at the suit
of the administrator de bonis non of the first intestate.1
The ground of the distinction is that the power of the ad-
ministrator, as such, is conferred by law while the executor
possesses such rights and interests as are granted by the
testator.2 It is to be understood, however, that this is
simply the legal aspect of the case, and that in equity an
executor indebted to his testator will be required to account
to the residuary legatee or next of kin, as the case may be.3
Where a testator left his estate to his two executors as
tenants in common, and one of them was indebted to the
testator, it was held that this debt was not released, but
must be divided between the executors. It was held far-
ther that parol evidence to show that the testator intended
to release the debtor, and had given instructions for that
purpose to the attorney who drew his will, was not ad-
missible.4
§ 121. Distinguished From a Charge. — A partial trust,
or a trust charged, with debts, is not to be confounded with
a trust for the payment of debts. In the former there
1 Hudson v. Hudson, 1 Atk. 461. 4 Brown v. Selwin, Cas. temp.
If a debtor be made executor, the Talb. 240; Dosey v. Doxey, 2
debt is totally extinguished; other- Vern. 677; Batcheller v. Searle, 2
wise, if he be appointed adminis- Vern. 730; Petit v. Smith, 1 P.
trator, for it is no extinguishment Wms. 9; Mallabar v. Mallabar,
of the debt, but a, suspension of Cas. temp. Talb. 80; Harris v.
the action and his representative Bishop of Lincoln, 2 P. Wms. 136 ;
chargeable at the suit of the ad- Stratton v. Payne, 3 Bro. P. C.
ministrator de bonis non, etc., of 257; Cole v. Robinson, 1 Salk. 244.
the first intestate. The rights of But if it is doubtful out of what
executors and administrators de- fund a legacy given by a testator
pend on different foundations, the is to arise, or where there is an
latter arising from the ordinary, ambiguity with respect to the sub-
the former from the testator. Ibid, ject to which the words of the will
See also 3 Wooddeson, Lee. 59, pp. (though clear in themselves) are
300, 301 ; Wansford v. Wansford, 1 to be applied, it would seem parol
Salk. 302, 304. evidence is admissible to explain
2 Hudson v. Hudson, 1 Atk. 461. and remove the doubt. Pounereau
3 3 Wooddeson, Lee. 59, pp. 300, v. Poyntz, 1 Bro. Ch. 474.
301.
248 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 121.
is a devise of the beneficial interest subject to the obliga-
tions imposed by the charge ; in the latter there is a de-
vise for a specified purpose, and that is the sole end of the
trust. In consequence, any interest in the trust estate not
exhausted by the limitations of the devise will constitute a
resulting trust for the heirs of the estate.1 The principle
here involved is stated by Vice Chancellor Sir W. Page
Wood in the following concise language: "First, a gift to
A to enable him to do something which is to depend on his
own choice is a beneficial gift; secondly, where the per-
formance of a trust is the general purpose of the gift, the
trustee cannot take the surplus beneficially ; thirdly, where
nothing more than a charge is created by the will, the donee
does take the surplus for his own benefit."2 In the leading
case of King v. Dennison this doctrine is expounded by
Lord Chancellor Eldon in a very lucid and instructive man-
ner. See note, infra.3 In the case of Tregonwell v. Syden-
ham it was held that wherever land, or any interest in land,
which would descend to the heir-at-law, is devised for pur-
poses which the law will not permit to take effect, the heir-
1 King v. Dennison, 1 Ves. & B. devise of an estate of inheritance
272 ; Wood v. Cox, 2 Myl. & Cr. for the purpose of giving the dev-
6S4; Tregonwell v. Sydenham, 3 isee the beneficial interest, sub-
Dow. 194, 210. ject to a particular purpose, the
2 Barrs v. Fewkes, 2 Hem. & M. latter is a devise for a particular
64, 66. purpose, with no intention to give
3 King v. Dennison, 1 Ves. & B. him any beneficial interest. Where,
260, 272. In the leading case of therefore, the whole legal interest
King v. Dennison, 1 Ves. & B. is given for the purpose of satisfy-
272, the court uses this language : ihg trusts expressed, and those
"I will here point out the nicety trusts do not in their execution
of distinction as it appears to me, exhaust the whole, so much of the
upon which this court has gone, beneficial interest as is not ex-
it I give to A and his heirs all my hausted belongs to the heir; but
real estate, charged with my debts, were the whole legal interest is
that is a devise to him for a par- given for a particular purpose,
ticular purpose, but not for that with an intention to give to the
purpose only. If the devise is devisee of the legal estate the
upon trust to pay my debts, that is beneficial interest, if the whole is
a devise for a particular purpose, not exhausted by that particular
and nothing more, and the effect purpose, the surplus goes to the
of those two modes admits just devisee.''
this difference. The former is a
§ 122. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 249
at-law shall have the benefit of the interest so devised as
undisposed of, whether the testator intended that he should
have it or not; for there is this distinction between the case
of a devisee and that of an heir-at-law, that the devisee
takes by force of the intent of the testator, and can only
take what is given him by the will ; whereas the heir-at-law
takes whatever is undisposed of, not by force of intent, but
by the rule of law.1
§ 122. From Failure of Express Trust Where an
express trust has been created for some particular object,
and the trust estate conveyed either by devise or by deed,
the trust failing from whatever cause, a resulting trust
arises in favor of the grantor. This may occur where
property is left in trust to be disposed of in accordance with
instructions to be subsequently given, but which for any
reason are not left by testator. In an English case a testa-
tor made a bequest as follows: "I give to the trustees of
Mount Zion Chapel, where I attend, £3,500, and appoint as
trustees to the same A and G ; and I direct that their receipt
shall be a sufficient discharge to my executors, and the
money to be appropriated according to statement appended. ' '
There was no statement appended. It was held that the
gift was not intended to be for A and Gr beneficially ; that
the court could not presume a charitable object in the be-
quest; and, if not charitable, that the object was so in-
definite that the gift must fail.2 A trust of this character
1 Tregonwell v. Sydenham, 3 eral sums to be given to them re-
Dow. 194. "A testatrix, by her spectively, and concluded with a
will, bequeathed all her personal declaration that such was the tes-
estate to C, whom she appointed tatrix's wish. Held, upon appeal,
one of her executors, for his own that C took the personal estate for
use and benefit forever, trusting his own use absolutely, subject
and wholly confiding in his honor, only to the payment of the legacies
that he would act in strict con- specified in the testamentary paper,
formity with her wishes. After- and three other sums, which by
wards, on the same day, she exe- his answer C admitted that the
cuted a testamentary paper, which testatrix had directed him, and
contained a list of a number of per- which he submitted to pay." Wood
sons by name, and, among others, v. Cox, 2 Myl. & Cr. *6S4.
the name of the person who was 2 Ashton v. Wood, L. E. 6 Eq.
her sole next of kin, with the sev- 419; Stonehouse v. Evelyn, 3 P.
250 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 122.
may arise where, from the nature of the case, the express
trust becomes inoperative, or does not admit of execution.
In a case in Massachusetts a testator devised real estate in
trust to apply the income to the maintenance of a pastor or
elder in a church, in the town where the testator resided, of
a certain faith and practice, so long as the members of that
church, or their successors, should maintain the visibility of
a church in such faith and order. Afterwards, the only two
members of the church, at a meeting called by public notice,
voted and resolved that they would no longer endeavor to
maintain the appearance of a visible church, and declared
the church dissolved and extinct. It was held that the
church was thereby dissolved and ceased to be a visible
church, and that the trustee held the estate as a resulting
trust for the testator's heirs-at-law.1 AVhere real estate is
directed to be sold, and a part of the produce is to be ap-
plied to a purpose which fails and the residue of the produce
is given over, the heir, and not the residuary devisee, will
take the sum intended for the particular purpose. "Where
the real estate is not directed to be sold and the residuary
gift is not of the produce, but of the corpus of the estate,
then if a gift, intended for a particular purpose which fails,
is to be considered as an exception from the residuary gift,
Wms. 252; Dunnage v. White, 1 the ministry, " the association be-
J. & W. 563; Southouse v. Bate, 2 ing an incorporated body at the
Ves. & B. 396; Drew v. Wakefield, testator's death it was held could
54 Me. 291; Lusk v. Lewis, 32 not take this trust as a society.
Miss. 297; Cushney v. Henry, 4 Baptist Association v. Hart's Exr.,
Paige, 345 ; Haskell v. Freeman, 1. 4 Wheat. 1. Where an express
Wins. 34; Pennoyer v. Sheldon, 4 trust is created to lease lands, and
Blatchf. 316; Bogert v. Hertell, 4 receive the rents and profits
Hill, 492 ; Williams v. Coade, 10 thereof, for the payment of annu-
Ves. 500 ; Harker v. Reilley, 4 Del. ities and other charges thereon,
Ch. 72. See also State v. Warren, there is a resulting trust, as to the
28 Md. 338. Where a citizen of surplus rents and profits, in favor
Virginia made a bequest to "The of the person who is presumptively
Baptist Association that for ordi- entitled to the next eventual estate
nary meets at Philadelphia annu- in such lands. Hawley v. James,
ally, which I allow to be a perpet- 5 Paige, *318.
ual fund for the education of 1 Easterbro6k v. Tillinghast, 5
youths of the Baptist denomination Gray. 17.
who shall appear promising for
§ 123.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
251
the heir will take ; if it is to be considered a charge upon
the devised estate, the residuary devisee will be entitled to
the benefit of the failure.1
§ 123. From Trusts for Persons Not in Esse. — Where
real estate is devised in trust for persons not in being at the
time of the execution of the trust and from the nature of
the case cannot subsequently come into existence, a resulting
trust arises in favor of the heirs-at-law.2 Where property is
1 Cook v. Stationers' Company, 3
Myl. & K. 292. A grantor deeded
land to another as trustee for a
building company, upon condition
that the latter would within a
stated time erect a depot, plat the
land into lots, and erect suitable
buildings. The grantor was to re-
ceive half the proceeds for the sale
of the lots, except such as the com-
pany should build upon, and, if
the conditions were not performed,
the conveyance was to be void.
Where the depot was to be erected,
or what buildings were to be
deemed suitable, was nowhere
specified. The land adjoined a
small town and was north of a rail-
road, which had just been com-
pleted. The people north and
south of the track were each striv-
ing to draw the town to their side,
and it was considered that the es-
tablishment of the depot would
give a controlling advantage. The
depot, a store-house and a dwell-
ing were completed but the rail-
road refused to accept the depot,
and the building company soon
after stopped all work. No further
improvements were made. The
south side secured the depot and
the town followed. Held, that the
object of the trust having failed,
the land which was conveyed to
the company by the trustee includ-
ing the lots built on was held in
trust for the grantor. Cagwin v.
Buerkle, 55 Ark. 5; s. c, 17 S. W.
Rep. 266.
2 King v. Mitchell, 8 Pet. 326.
There is no doubt that the words
"in trust" in a will may be con-
strued to create a use, if the inten-
tion of the testator, or the nature
of the devise requires; but the
ordinary sense of the term is de-
scriptive of a, fiduciary estate or
technical trust, and the sense
ought to be retained until the
other sense is clearly established
to be that intended by the testator.
In the present case there are strong
reasons for construing the words
to be a technical trust ; the devise
looked to the issue of a person not
then in being, and, of course, if
such issue should come in esse, a
long minority must follow; during
this period, is was an object with
the testator, to uphold the estate
in the father, for the benefit of his
issue; and this could be better ac-
complished by him, as a trustee,
than as a guardian. If the estate
to the issue were a use, it would
vest the legal estate in them as
soon as they came in. esse; and if
the first born children should be
daughters it would vest in them,
subject to being divested by the
subsequent birth of a son, a trust
estate would far better provide for
these contingencies than a legal
estate; there is then no reason for
deflecting words from their ordi-
252 IMPLIED TEUSTS. [§ 123
left in trust for children, who are to be put in possession on
coming of age, and the children die during their minority, a
trust arises in favor of the heirs of testator. A deed of
trust in fee-simple for the benefit of the grantor's wife, re-
required the trustees to pay the rents and profits to the wife
during her life, and to permit her, if she chose, to occupy
the premises. And on the wife's death the rents and profits
were to be paid to her children until they came of age,
when the trustee was to deed the land to them. The wife
outlived her children and all her grandchildren but two.
It was held that on her death these were entitled to the
property as heirs-at-law of the grantor.1 In a case where
one has two sons, A and B, and three daughters, and de-
vises his lands to be sold to pay his debts ; and as to the
moneys arising by sale after debts paid, he gives £200
thereout to his eldest son, A, at twenty-one, the residue to
his four younger children equally. A, the eldest, dies be-
fore twenty-one, this £200 shall go to the heir of the
testator.2
§ 124. From Indefinlteness of Declared Trust. — Where
the limitations of an express trust, as set forth in the in-
strument by which it is created, are so vague and indefinite
as to leave a court of equity in doubt in regard to the in-
tention of the grantor, a trust will result to the grantor, or,
in case of his death, to his heirs. In a recent case a testator
nary meaning. King v. Mitchell, because there was no devisee com-
8 Pet. 326. See also McMullin petent to take at the time, and the
v. McMullin, 8 Watts, 236; Koe- possibility that there might he such
nig's Appeal, 57 Pa. St. 352; Poor a corporation during the particular
v. Considine, 6 Wall. 458. A clause estate for life was too remote,
in a will directed that upon the Zeisweiss v. James, 63 Pa. St. 465.
death of the devisees for . life the J Parker v. McMillan, 55 Mich,
real estate should go to "The In- 265; House v. McCormiek, 57 N.
fidel Society of Philadelphia, here- Y. 310, 321.
after to he incorporated, and to he 2 Cruse v. Barley, 3 P. Wms. *20.
held and disposed of by them for There is no limitation of time, in
the purpose of building a hall for law, as to the possibility of the
the free discussion of religion, birth of issue ; so held, where the
politics, etc." Held, that the re- feme, tenant for life, had attained
mainder limited to a corporation the age of 75 years. List v. Eod-
thereafter to be created was void ney, 83 Pa. St. 483.
§ 124. ] IMPLIED TRUSTS. 253
devised the residue of his estate to A "to distribute the
same in such manner as, in his discretion, shall appear best
calculated to carry out wishes which I have expressed to
him, or may express to him, ' ' and appointed A his executor,
it was held that the devisee took no beneficial interest in the
devise; that the trust on its face was too indefinite to be
carried out; that it could not be established against the
heirs or next of kin of the testator by evidence of oral com-
munications made to A by the testator, whether before or
after the execution of the will, showing that the trust was
for charitable purposes ; but that the heirs or next of kin
took by way of resulting trust.1 In the leading case of
Nichols v. Allen, before the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, where a will, after several bequests to indi-
viduals and to charitable corporations, contained the fol-
lowing clause: "After the payment of the foregoing lega-
cies, and all expenses and charges in the settlement of my
estate, should there be any surplus, I give and bequeath the
same to my executors and the survivor of them, or their
successors, if any such should be appointed to administer
on my estate, to be by them distributed to such persons,
societies, or institutions, as they may consider most deserv-
ing." By a separate clause two persons were appointed
executors. It was held that the executors took the bequest
in trust; that the trust was not a charitable one, and was
too indefinite to be carried into effect; and that the next of
kin took by way of resulting trust.3 The principles on
1 Olliffe v. Wells, 130 Mass. 221; dith v. Heneage, 1 Sim. 542;
Thayer v. Wellington, 9 Allen, 283 ; Lambe v. Eames, L. K. 10 Eq. 267 ;
Johnson v. Ball, 5 De G. & Sm. Sale v. Moore, 1 Sim. 534; Reid v.
85; Sears v. Hardy, 120 Mass. 524, Atkinson, Ir. R. 5 Eq. 373; In re
441, 542. Bond, 4 Ch. Div. 23S; Spooner v.
2 Nichols v. Allen, 130 Mass. 211; Lovejoy, 108 Mass. 529; Hess v.
Nickerson v. Bowly, 8 Met. 424, Singler, 114 Mass. 56; Sears v.
431; Vezey v. Jamson, 1 Sim. & Cunningham. 122 Mass. 538; Hard-
Stu. 69; Fowler v. Garlike, lKuss. ing v. Glyn, 1 Atk. 469; Burrough
& Myl. 232; Ellis v. Selby, 1 Myl. v. Philcox, 5 Myl. & Cr. 72, 91, 93.
& Cr. 286, 296; Yeap CheahXeo v. "There is a recent English case
Ong Cheng Neo, L. R. 6 P. C. singularly in point, a testator by
381, 389, 390; McCormick v. his will directed his trustees to pay
Grogan, L. R. 4 H. L. 82; Mere- the following legacies: 'To the
254
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 125.
which this decision was based are stated by Chief Justice
Gray, in his usual lucid and convincing manner, as follows :
Two general rules are well settled : First, where a gift or
bequest is made in terms clearly manifesting an intention
that it shall be taken in trust, and the trust is not sufficiently
defined to be carried into effect, the donee or legatee takes
the legal title only, and a trust results by implication of
law to the donor and his representatives, or to the testator's
residuary legatees or next of kin ; second, a trust which,
by its terms, may be applied to objects which are not char-
itable in the legal sense, and to persons not defined by name
or by class, is too indefinite to be carried out."1
§ 125. From an Illegal Trust. — Where a trust is created
by a will, the words of the testator leaving no doubt in re-
gard to his intention, and the devise is illegal and conse-
quently void, the devisee holds the property under a result-
Cancer Hospital, £100; to the
Brompton Hospital for diseases of
the chest, £100 ; to the Lord Mayor
of Dublin for the time being, £100,
for such objects as he shall deem
most deserving; to the Blind
Asylum, New Kent Road, £100 ; to
Mrs. Gladstone of No. 11 Carlton
House Terrace, to be applied as
she thinks proper in charity, £200;
and the residue of my estate I be-
queath to my trustees for such ob-
jects as they consider deserving,
whether in increase of the before-
mentioned ones or otherwise.'
Vice Chancellor Wickens, a most
accomplished equity judge, held
that the bequest to the Mayor of
Dublin and the residuary gift could
not be held to be limited to char-
itable objects, but failed altogether.
Harris v. Du Pasquier, 26 L. T. (N.
S.) 689; s. c, 20 Weekly Bep.G6S."
Nichols v. Allen, 130 Mass. 219.
A devise to trustee for "the educa-
tion of free colored persons in the
city of Baltimore" was held void
for uncertainty in Needles v. Mar-
tin, 33 Md. 609. See also Dash-
iellv. Atty.-Gen.,5 H. & J. 392;
Wildeman v. Mayor, etc. Balti-
more, 8 Md. 551; Carpenter v.
Miller, 3 W. Va. 174. But see also
Powers v. Cassidy, 79 N. Y. 602 ;
Gibbs v. Rumsey, 2 Ves. & B. 294;
Ralston v. Telfair, 2 Dev. Eq. 255;
Green v. Collins, 6 Ired. 139 ; Cook
v. Duckenfield, 2 Atk. 563 ; Powell
v. Atty.-Gen., 3 Meriv. 48; Atty.-
Gen. v. Comber, 2 Sim. & Stu. 93;
Rogers v. Thomas, 2 Keen, 8.
1 Nichols v. Allen, 130 Mass. 211 ;
s. c, 39 Am. Rep. 445; Briggs v.
Penny, 3 De G. & Sm. 525, and 3
Macn. & Gord. 546; Thayer v.
Wellington, 9 Allen, 283; Sheedy
v. Roach, 124 Mass. 472 ; Morice v.
Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves. 390, and
10 Ves. 521 ; Chamberlain v. Stearns,
111 Mass. 267 ; James v. Allen, 3
Meriv. 17 ; Leslie v. Duke of Devon-
shire, 2 Bro. Ch. 187 ; Stubbs v.
Sargon, 3 Myl. & Cr. 507 ; Kendall
v. Granger, 5 Beav. 300 ; Williams
v. Kershaw, 5 CI. & Fin. 111.
§ 125. J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
255
in«- trust for the heirs of the testator, and, in the absence
of any heir, for the State. In a case before the Court of
Appeals of the State of New York it was held that a bequest
by a New York testator to such persons as the judges of
another State may appoint after his death to receive it, is
ineffectual for any purpose if unlawful in the State of his
domicile. Such a bequest to persons unknown, for the
general purpose of founding, establishing and managing in
another State an institution for the education of females, is
void under the laws of New York1 As a rule, where a
trust has been created for an illegal purpose, as for eluding
creditors, the court Avill not interfere, but it will do so
where for any reason the illegal purpose fails of accom-
plishment.3 Where property is conveyed without consid-
eration, with a view to defrauding creditors, no trust will
result. A court of equity will not relieve a grantor of an
embarrassment in which he has voluntarily placed himself
with a fraudulent intention.3
1 Bascom v. Albertson, 34 X. Y.
584; Richards v. Delbridge, L. R.
18 Eq. 11; Pawson v. Brown, L.
R. 13 Ch. Div. 202; G-ibbs v. Eum-
sey, 2 Ves. & B. 294; Carrick v.
Errington, 2 P. Wms. 361 ; Arnold
v. Chapman, 1 Ves. Sr. 108; Page
v. Leapingwell, 18 Ves. 463; Jones
v. Mitchell, 1 Sim. & St. 290; Cook
v. Stationers' Co., 3 Myl. & K.262;
Pilkington v. Boughey, 12 Sim.
114; Russell v. Jackson, 10 Hare,
204; Dashiell v. Atty.-Gen., 6
Har. & J. 1; Stevens v. Ely, 1
Dev. Eq. 497 ; Lemmond v. Peo-
ples, 6 Ired. Eq; 137; Turner v.
Russell, 10 Hare, 204.
2 Symes v. Hughes, L. R. 9 Eq.
474; Haighv. Kaye, L. R. 7 Ch.
469; Pawson v. Brown, 13 Ch. 202.
3 Ford's Exr's v. Lewis, 10 B.
Mon. 127. Testator who died in
1836, bequeathed certain slaves to
J R, "in trust nevertheless and
for this purpose only, that the said
J R do permit and surfer said
slaves to apply their time and labor
to their own proper use and be-
hoof without the intermeddling or
interference of any person or per-
sons whomsoever, further than
may be necessary for their pro-
tection under the laws of this State,
which now exist or may be passed
hereafter." The rest and residue
of his estate he also bequeathed to
J R, "upon trust nevertheless a'nd
for this purpose only."' that said
slaves be permitted to use and en-
joy the same forever, without the
interference of J R or any other
person, further than may be nec-
essary to secure said slaves in the
full use and enjoyment thereof;
and he appointed J R executor,
who duly proved the will. Testa-
tor left no next of kin. On bill
filed by the escheator against the
administrator of J R, held, that the
will declared a trust in favor of the
256 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 126.
§ 126. The Subject Continued. — Where real estate is
purchased and the purchase money paid by a father, but by
his direction the conveyance is made to the son for the pur-
pose of defrauding his creditors, no trust will result to the
father in consideration of the payment of the purchase
money ; but as between the father and son and those claim-
ing under the father such conveyance is absolute, and vests
in the son the entire legal and equitable estate.1 From the
naked fact that a father has purchased land and taken the
title in a minor child the court will presume an advance-
ment for the child, not a trust in favor of the father ; but as
it is altogether a matter of intention, it is permissible for
the father to offer proof that the purchase was not intended
as an advancement.3 Where an alien, for the purpose of
evading the law of the State prohibiting him from taking
and holding real property, purchases land and takes a con-
veyance thereof in the name of a third person without any
written declaration of trust, a resulting trust will not arise
in favor of the purchaser, as equity will never raise a re-
sulting trust in fraud of the rights of the State or of the laws
slaves, which was unlawful and C. E. Green, 406; Gascoigne v.
void, and, there being no next of Thwing, 1 Vern. 366; Willis v.
tin to claim, that the whole prop- Willis, 2 Atk. 71 ; Groves v. Groves,
erty bequeathed escheated to the 3 Y. & J. 170; Halin v. Malin, 1
State. Where the words of a will Wend. 625; Vanzant v. Davies, 6
are not merely those of advice or Ohio St. 52.
request, but declare a trust which 2 Proseus v. Mclntyre, 5 Barb,
is void or unlawful, the legatee 425; Ramage v. Rarnage, 27 S. Car.
holds the property for the next of 39; Baldwin v. Campfield, 4 Halst.
kin, and if there be none, then for 891 ; Frazier v. Frazier, 2 Leigh,
the State. Ford v. Dangerfield, 8 642; Woolmer's Estate, 3 Whart,
Rich. (Eq. 95. See also Stevens 477; Floyd v. Barker, 1 Paige, 4S0;
V. Ely, 1 Dev. Eq. 493; Haywood Atty.-Gen. v. Lord Weymouth,
v. Craven, 2 1ST. Car. 557; Huckaby Amb. 20; Jones v. Mitchell, 1 S. &
v.Jones, 2 Hawks. 120; Vanzant S. 294;Hopkinson v. Ellis, lOBeav.
v. Davies, 6 Ohio St. 52; Thomp- 169; Barley v. Evelyn, 16 Sim.
son v. Newlin, 3 Ired. Eq. 338; 290; Brook v. Badley, L. R. 2 Ch.
Sorry v. Bright, 1 Dev. & Bat. Eq. App. 672; Hamilton v. Foot, 6 Ir.
113. Eq. 572; Buchanan v. Harrison, 1
1 Proseus v. Mclntyre, 5 Barb. J. & H. 662; Lusk v. Lewis, 32
425; Cutler v. Tuttle, 19 N. J. Eq. Miss. 297; Drew v. Wakefield, 54
549; Bayard v. Hoffman, 4 Johns. Me. 291.
Ch. 45; Johnson v. Dougherty, 3
§ 126.] IMPLIED TRUSTS. 257
of the land. A resulting trust is the mere creature of equity,
and it cannot therefore arise where the parties have declared
an express trust, which is evidenced by a written declaration
of such express trust. The law never casts either a legal
or an equitable estate upon a person who has no right to
hold it, although such estate may, for the benefit of the
State, be vested in an alien, until office found by an express
contract or conveyance.1 But where the legal title to land,
owned by aliens under a statute prohibiting them from
taking and holding real estate, is taken by an agent in his
own name and converted into money, such agent, or in case
of his death, his heirs will hold the proceeds of the sale
as trustees for the alien owners of the property. Where an
attorney, who was employed to collect a partnership debt
due to a firm, the members of which were> aliens, compro-
mised the debt by taking lands therefor, but on account of
the alienage of the creditors, and without any direction
from them, took the conveyance in his own name to enable
him to sell the land and convert it into money, and wrote to
them informing them what he had done and promising to
sell the land for them as soon as purchasers could be found,
but died before any sale of the land had been made, and
his heirs after his death sold the land, supposing it to be
their own, it was held that the proceeds of such sale in the
hands of the heirs was personal property belonging to the
co-partnership firm, and that the personal representative of
the last surviving partner was entitled to recover such pro-
ceeds as part of the co-partnership effects.2
i Leggettv. Dubois, 5 Paige, 114; trust for her benefit. Hubbard v.
Atkins v. Kron, 5 Ired. Eq. 207. Goodwin, 3 Leigh, 492.
Land is purchased by or for an 2 Anstice v. Brown, 6 Paige, 448 ;
alien, and paid for by him or with Craig v. Leslie, 3 "Wheat. 563. In
money furnished by him, hut the the case of Fletcher v. Ashburner,
conveyance is taken to a citizen, 1 Bro. Ch. 497, the Master of the
upon trust that he shall hold for Rolls says that "nothing is better
the benefit of the alien and his established than this principle,
heirs. Held, this trust estate of that money directed to be em-
the alien can only he so acquired ployed in the purchase of land, and
by him for the commonwealth, land directed to be sold and turned
and a court of equity will com- into money, are to be considered
pel the trustee to execute the as that species of property into
17
258 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 127.
§ 127. From Lapse of Trust. — Where a testator directs
his real estate to be converted into personalty for a specified
purpose, and the purpose fails, there is a lapse of the ex-
press trust and a resulting trust arises in favor of his heirs.
If land is directed to be sold for a specific purpose and the
purpose fails, the proceeds will go to the heirs ; or if, after
the purpose is accomplished, a surplus remains undisposed
of, a trust will arise pro tanto in favor of the heirs.1 In the
case of Hawley v. James it was held that a court of equity
considers money directed by a testator to be invested in
land, and land directed to be sold and turned into money,
as of that species of property into which it is directed to be
converted for all the valid purposes of the will. But where
the object of the conversion is illegal, or fails, either wholly
or in part, there is a resulting use or trust in so much of the
property as is not legally or effectually disposed of in favor
of the heirs or distributees, who would have been entitled
to the same if the conversion thereof had not been directed
by the will of the testator.2 In Ackroyd v. Smithson, tes-
tator gave several legacies and ordered his real and per-
wbioh they are directed to be con- Ch. 128 ; Muckleston v. Brown, 6
verted, and this in whatever man- Ves. 52, 63 ; Davenport v. Coltman,
ner the direction is given." He 13 Sim. 588; Sperling v. Rochfort,
adds: "The owner of the fund, or 16 Ch. Div. 18; Cruse v. Barley, 3
the contracting parties, may make P. Wms. 22 ; Gwynn v. Gwynn, 27
land money, or money land. The S. Car. 525. Testatrix gave a leg-
cases establish this rule univer- acy to a charitable institution
sally." See also Doughty v. Bull, which was dissolved during her
2 P. Wms. 320; Yeates v. Comp- lifetime. Held, that the legacy
ton, 2 P. "Wms. 358 ; Trelawney v. lapsed and fell into the residue and
Booth, 2 Atk. 307. could not be applied cy-pres. Fisk
-1 Williams v. Coade, 10 Ves. 501; v. Atty.-Gen., L. E. 4Eq. 521. Re-
Xorth v. Yalk, Dud. Eq. 212; Bo- newal of a college lease by tenant
gert v. Hertell, 4 Hill, 492 ; Whel- for life, with a power of appoint-
dale v. Partridge, 5 Ves. 388, 39.7 ; ment, in her own name and at her
Amplete v. Parke, 2 Buss. & Myl. own expense, has not the effect of
221 ; Marsh v. Wheeler, 2 Edw. an appointment in her favor. And
156; Brown v. Biggs, 7 Ves. 279b; by the death of her. appointee
Sneddon v. Goodrich, S Ves. 4S1 ; therefore in her lifetime a result-
Jtipley v. Waterworth, 7 Ves. 425. ing trust by lapse for the represent-
2 Hawley v. James, 5 Paige, 317 ; atlve of the author of the power.
Spink v. Lewis, 3 Bro. Ch. 355; Brookman v. Hales, 2 Ves. & B.
Hutcheson v. Hammond, 3 Bro. 45.
§ 12 7. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 259
sonal estate to be sold, his debts and legacies paid, and the
residue to certain legatees in the proportion of their lega-
cies. Two of the residuary legatees died during the life
of testator. These shares are lapsed, and so far as they
are constituted by personal estate shall go to the person
next of kin, and so far as they are constituted of real estate
to the heir-at-law.1 In a case where a real estate is di-
rected to be sold and the testator wills that a sum of £1,000,
or any other sum of money, shall be applied to a particular
purpose, and the residue of the produce of sale only is
given to A, and the particular purpose fails, either by lapse
or because it is void at law, then the heirs and not A will
take the £1,000, or other sum of money, because the whole
is real estate at the death of the testator, and A can take
no more of that estate than is expressly given to him,
namely, the residue of the real estate after deducting the
£1,000 or other sum.2 It has been held that lapse of time
where it has been long and is unexplained, and death of
parties, are sometimes ground for refusing relief, especially
where in the meantime other parties have acquired rights,
or there are other circumstances from which the court can
see that injustice might be done by interference, but in
questions of this kind each case must depend upon its own
circumstances.3
1 Ackroyd v. Smithson, 1 Bro. is a grant for that special purpose,
Ch. 437; Gibbs v. Ougier, 12 Ves. and when the purpose fails the
418; Hooper v. Goodwin, 18 Ves. the land reverts to the donor.
156; Ashbyv. Palmer, lMeriv. 296. Appeal of Gumbert, 110 Pa. St.
2 Cooke v. Stationers' Co., 3 Myl. 496.
& K. 262; Cruse v. Barley, 3 P. » Pairo v. Vickery, 37 Md. 467;
Wms. 20 ; Digby v. Legard, 3 P. Hatch v. Hatch, 9 Ves. 292 ; Morse
Wms. n.; Hutcheson v. Hammond, v. Eoyal, 12 Ves. 355; "Wright v.
3 Bro. Ch. 128; Middleton v. Ca- Vanderplank, 8 De G., M. & G.
ter, 4 Bro. Ch. 409; Arnold v. 133; Vick v. McDaniel, 3How.337;
Chapman, 1 Ves. Sr. 108; Gibbs v. Marsh v. Wheeler, 2 Edw. Ch.
Eumsey, 2 Ves. & B. 294; Jones v. 156; Swinton v. Egleston, 3 Bich.
Mitchell, 1 Sim. & Stu. 290; Greve- Eq. 201 ; Pool v. Harrison, IS Ala.
nor v. Hallum, Amb. 645; King v. 515. See also In re Taylor's Set-
Dennison,lVes. &B.260. A grant tlement, 9 Hare, 596, 604; Salt v.
of land to church societies, for the Chattaway, 3 Beav. 576 ; Thomas
use and purpose of a church and v. Wood, 1 Md. Ch. 296; Parkin-
church yard and a burying place, son's Appeal, 8 Casey, 455; Ellison
260 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 128.
§ 128. In Favor of Donee. — Where a part of an estate
is conveyed on a declared trust, and the donee is heir to
the remainder of the estate or to a portion of it, the gift
of a part will not deprive him of his interest in the re-
mainder. A resulting trust may arise to the donee to the
extent of his equitable interest in the remainder of the es-
tate.1 In the case of Farrington v. Knightly, executor
has an express legacy, and so has the next of kin, and
there is no disposition of the surplus. By the decree of
the court the surplus is distributed.2 Where real estate is
devised to an executor who is not an heir, and has no bene-
ficial interest in the estate, with directions to sell and pay
the debts of testator, and the legacies for which he has
provided in his will, including £100 to the children of the
executor, but nothing to the executor, it was held that with
regard to the surplus the executor was trustee for the heirs-
at-law.3
§ 129. The Subject Continued. — If it is plain from
the instrument, taken as a whole, that it was the intention
to benefit the donee, no resulting trust will arise in favor of
donor or of his heirs. In a case where a testator made
his wife his sole heiress and executrix of all his real and per-
sonal estate, designating her as his "dearly beloved wife,"
to sell and dispose thereof at her pleasure for the payment
of his debts and legacies, and gave his brother, who was
his heir and next of kin, £5, it was held that the wife took
the residue for her own use and not as trustee for the heir-
at-law.4 In this case it was the opinion of the chancellor
that the language of tenderness and affection employed by
v. Wilson, 13 S. & R. 330 ; Kane v. Sr. 166 ; Bishop of Cloyne v. Young,
Gott, 24 Wend. 641. 2 Ves. Sr. 100; North v. Purdon, 2.
1 Hennershotz's Estate, 16 Pa. Ves. Sr. 493.
St. 435. 3 Randal v. Bookey, 2 Vera. 425;
2 Farrington v. Knightly, 1 P. Starkey v. Brooks, 1 P. Wms. 390;
Wms. 545; Rutland v. Rutland, 2 Killett v. Killett, 1 B. & B. 543;
P. Wms. 213; Andrew v. Clark, 2 s. c, 3 Dowl. P. C. 248.
Ves. Sr. 162; Seley v. Wood, 10 4 Rogers v. Rogers, 3 P. Wms.
Ves. 71; Griffith v. Hamilton, 12 193; Cook v. Hutchinson, 1 Keen,
Ves. 310; Wilson v. Ivat, 2 Ves. 42.
§ 130. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 261
the testator indicated his purpose to benefit the executrix,
not simply to lay upon her a burden. Other language
that plainly indicates an intention to convey to the donee
a beneficial interest beyond what is conveyed in terms will
be held inconsistent with a resulting trust. The relation-
ship of the parties, expressions of regard or affection,
and any other circumstances which presumably have a
bearing upon the question of intention will be considered
by the court in cases of this character.1 In the case of
Seley v. Wood, Sir "William Grant, Master of the Eolls,
said: "My opinion upon this will is that the executors are
to be considered trustees of the residue for the next of
kin. The words by which the executors are appointed
strongly indicated an intention to impose a burden, not to
confer a benefit ; to give them the office of executors, and
not a beneficial interest in the estate."2
§ 130. From Trust for Sale of Realty. — If a testator
devises his real estate in trust to executors to be sold and
the proceeds to be devoted to a special object, and for any
reason the object fails, the estate will result to the heirs;
or, if such subject is answered and a surplus remains, it
will be held in trust for the heirs.3 In a case where the tes-
tatrix devised and bequeathed her real and personal estate
in trust, as to the real estate, for sale as soon after her de-
1 Wood v. Cox, 2 Myl. & Cr. 692*; applied accordingly; he then be-
Meredith v. Heneage, 1 Sim. 555; queathed all the residue of hisper-
Cook v. Hutchinson, 1 Keen, 42 ; sonal estate to the same trustees
Hobart v. Suffolk, 2 Vern. 644 ; upon trust for his sons and daugh-
King v. Dennison, '1 V. & B. 274; ters in equal proportions. One of
Eogers v. Eogers, 3 P. Wms. 193; the sons died in the testator's life-
Coningham v. Mellish, Pr. Ch. 31. time. It was held that tbe share
2 Sely v. Wood, 10 Ves. 72 ; King of the deceased son in the produce
v. Dennison, 1 V. & B. 275 ; King v. of the real estate was to be deemed
Mitcbell, 8 Pet. 349. real estate, and as undisposed of by
3 Taylor v. Taylor, 3 De G-., M. & the will, and that it went to the
G-. 190. A testator devised real heir-at-law of the testator. The
estate to trustees upon trust to sell, decision of Sir J. Leach, in Phil-
and as to the moneys to arise by lips v. Phillips, 1 Myl. & K. 649,
such sale directed that they should overruled. Ibid. See also Shall-
sink into and be deemed part of the cross v. Wright, 12 Bear. 505.
residue of his personal estate and be
262 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 131.
cease as conveniently could be, and declared that the trustees
should stand possessed of the proceeds of the sale as a
fund of personal and not real estate, for which purpose
such proceeds or any part thereof should not, in any event,
lapse or result for the benefit of her heir-at-law ; and after
giving legacies the testatrix directed her trustees to pay
and apply the residue of her estate and effects as she
should, by any codicil to that, her will, direct or appoint.
The testatrix made no codicil. It was held that the heir-
at-law was entitled to the proceeds of the real estate undis-
posed of by will,1 A testator devised his real estate to A
and B in trust to sell and pay off all incumbrances thereon,
and stand possessed of the residue "as part of his personal
estate." He bequeathed his personal estate to the same
persons in trust to convert, and with the produce thereof
and of the sale of his real estate to pay his debts, etc.,
and the legacies, and to pay the residue to whom he should
give the same by codicil. He made no gift of the residue.
It was held, first, that the incumbrances were payable out of
the real estate ; secondly, that the debts and legacies were
payable pari passu out of the mixed fund, composed of
the produce of realty and personalty ; and, thirdly, that of
the surplus the part arising from realty belonged to the
heir, and that from the personalty to the next of kin.2
§ 131. From Voluntary Conveyance. — Whether a vol-
untary conveyance carries with it the equitable title depends
upon the intention of the grantor. If there is no consid-
eration, either expressed or implied, in the instrument, it
will be presumed that the estate is held by the grantee in
trust for the grantor. But it is admissible to introduce ev-
1 Fitch v. Weber, 6 Hare, 145; v. Hertell, 4 Hill, 492; Marriott v.
Shallcross v. "Wright, 12 Beav. 505 ; Turner, 20 Beav. 557; Craig v.
Flint v. Warren, 16 Sim. 124. Leslie, 3 Wheat. 577, 578, 579;
2 Shallcross v. Wright, 12 Beav. Pratt v. Taliaferro, 3 Leigh, 419,
505; Robinson v. London Hos- 423; Burr v. Sim. 1 Whart. 252;
pital, 10 Hare, 19; Ackroyd v. Lindsay v. Pleasants. 4 Ired. Eq.
Smithson, 1 Bro. Ch. (Perkins' 321, 323; Nagle's Appeal, 1 Harris,
Ed.) 514, 515, notes; North v. 260; Wood v. Cone, 7 Paige, 472;
Valk, C. W. Dud. Eq. 212; Bogert Wood v. Keys, 8 Paige, 365.
§131.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
263
idence of the intention in the conveyance.1 In itself the
absence of consideration, though there may be proof to
that effect, will not raise a resulting trust in favor of the
grantor. In order to do that it must appear, either from
the instrument or from evidence from other sources, that
it was the intention not to convey the equitable title, or
that there was some misunderstanding in regard to the con-
veyance, or that there was some mistake or error in the
execution of the instrument.2 The right of the legal and
equitable owner of property to dispose of it according to
his pleasure is not to be questioned, provided there is no
1 Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Eden, 206,
207 ; 2 Blackstone's Commentaries,
330.
2 Jackson v. Cleveland, 15 Mich.
94. In Michigan, under the stat-
utes, no trust results in favor of
him who furnishes the considera-
tion and procures the deed to he
made, unless it appears on the
face of the deed, and such a trust
cannot be raised by parol. Groes-
beck v. Seeley, 13 Mich. 329;
Fisher v. Forbes, 22 Mich. 454;
Lindsey v. Sinclair, 24 Mich. 380 ;
Weare v. Linnell, 29 Mich. 224;
Ransom v. Eansom, 31 Mich. 301.
See contra, following Illinois and
Wisconsin citations: Adams v.
Adams, 79 111. 517; Wilson v. Mc-
Dowell, 78111.514; King v. Wilder,
75 111. 275; Prevo v. Walters, 4
Scam. 35; Smith v. Sackett, 5
Gilm. 535; Coates v. Woodworth,
13 111. 654 ; Franklin v. McEntyre,
23 111. 91; Brace v. Eoney, 18 111.
67; Rogan v. Walker, 1 Wis. 527:
Whiting v. Gould, 2 Wis. 552 ; Rol-
ler v. Spelman, 13 Wis. 26. The
plaintiff conveyed an estate to the
defendant by a deed, in which
the conveyance was expressed
to be absolute in considera-
tion of a sum of money paid by
the defendant, but no purchase
money actually passed, and the
plaintiff alleged that he conveyed
the estate to the defendant as a
trustee for him. The defendant, in
his answer, admitted that he gave
no consideration for the estate,
but stated that the plaintiff made
the conveyance, fearing an adverse
decision would be made against
him in a suit then pending in
chancery ; and that it was under-
stood that the defendant should
account to the plaintiff for the
rents until he could make arrange-
ments for paying the purchase
money, and if no such arrange-
ments could be made that he should
reconvey the estate. The defend-
ant claimed to hold the estate dis-
charged of any trust, and claimed
the benefit of the statute of frauds.
Held, first, that there was no suf-
ficient averment that the transac-
tion was an illegal one; secondly,
that the statute of frauds could
not be pleaded in answer to
the plaintiff's claim, and that as
the evidence did not establish the
existence of any such agreement
as was alleged by the defendant,
the defendant must reconvey the
estate to the plaintiff. Haigh v.
Kaye, L. R. 7 Ch. App. 469.
264 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 132.
attempt to dispose of it in such a manner as to conflict with
any public interest, or with the rights of other persons
having equitable claims upon the estate. In Michigan it
has been held that a voluntary deed, intentionally and de-
liberately made, is good against the grantor and his heirs, and
can only be avoided by creditors, or others having superio r
equities to the grantee.1
§ 132. Tlie Subject Continued. — There is not entire
harmony in the decisions on this subject. In Maine it has
been held that evidence of the object and purpose for which
a conveyance was made is not admissible to convert the
deed, purporting to be an absolute conveyance, into one of
any trust not expressed therein.2 On this point Chief Jus-
tice Appleton said : "It is well settled that courts of equity
will order cancelled, or set aside, or delivered up, deeds or
other legal instruments, fraudulent, fictitious, and void,
which are a cloud upon the title to real estate. But the
same reason which justifies the court to compel the cancel-
lation of a deed, or a release of supposed rights acquired
under it, will authorize the prevention of such fictitious and
fraudulent titles coming into existence. It is better to pre-
vent the creation of a fictitious or fraudulent title than to com-
peLits cancellation or its release after it had been created.3
1 Jackson v. Cleveland, 15 Mich. Flint v. Selden, 13 Mass. 448.
94. A trust cannot be executed Where it has been found by a court
where no intent appears to create that a trust was created in favor
it, except by operation of law, and of a religious society, and that
cannot result by operation of law the alleged trust was void
but for those for whom it might for uncertainty, the trust will
have been declared by the party result to the individuals who con-
creating it. Burgess v. Wheate, 1 tributed the purchase money and
Eden, 177, 207. not to the grantor, and are entitled
2 Gerry v. Stimson, 60 Me. 186; to have the property sold and the
Philbrook v. Delano, 29 Me. 410. proceeds distributed in proportion
3 Gerry v. Stimson, 60 Me. 186. to the amount contributed by each.
"Where the conveyance is expressed Heiskell v. Trout, 31 "W. Va. 810;
to be for a valuable consideration, s. c, 8 S. E. Rep. 557. See also
parol evidence cannot be received Patton v. Beecher, 62 Ala. 580
to show that the purchaser was in- Cook v. Fountain, 3 Swanst. 585
tended to be merely a trustee for Lyford v. Thurston, 16 N. H. 399
the vendor. Hill on Trustees, 112; Birch v. Blugrave, Amb. 202
Farrington v. Barr, 33 N. H. 86; Platamore v. Staple, Coop. 250.
§ 132. J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
265
On the other hand, the authorities, as a whole, are very
clear in maintaining the opposite view. In the leading case
of Boyd v. McLean it was held that if A purchased land
with his own money, but the deed is taken in the name of
B, a trust results by operation of law to A ; and the fact
whether the purchase was made with the money of A, on
which the resulting trust is to arise, may be proved by parol,
it not being within the statute of frauds. And this parol
evidence is admissible, not only against the face of the deed
itself, but in opposition to the answer of the trustee deny-
ing the trust, and that, it seems, after the death of the
nominal purchaser. Such evidence, however, is to be re-
ceived with great caution.1
1 Boyd v. McLean, 1 Johns. Oh.
582. Chancellor Kent, in the above
case, says: "The point raised is,
whether such a resulting trust
be within the statute of frauds, and
whether the fact on which the
trust arises may be shown by pa-
rol proof, in opposition to the lan-
guage of the deed, and even in op-
position to the defendant's answer.
There are several writers who have
discussed this point. Sugden says,
that the parol proof is clearly ad-
missible; but that it seems doubt-
ful whether it be admissible
against the answer of the trustee,
denying the trust. Sanders is of
the opinion that if the considera-
tion money is expressed in the
deed to be paid by the grantee, pa-
rol proof cannot be admitted, after
the death of the nominal purchaser,
to prove the resulting trust; but
Sugden says, there is no reason or
authority for that distinction, and
that it may be received after, as
well as before, his death. Koberts
goes further, and denies that a con-
fession of the trust, by the nominal
purchaser, can be proved at all by
the parol evidence of a third per-
son. If I were to be governed by
the weight of these different opin-
ions, I should place reliance upon
Sugden as being the most accu-
rate and perspicuous writer. But,
on a question of importance, and
leading to so much discussion, I
have felt it to be a duty to look
into all the cases; and the conclu-
sion in my mind is, that I am bound
by authority to receive the proof.
If the point were res Integra, I
should be inclined to agree with
Sir Thomas Clarke, in Lane v,
Dighton (Amb. 409), that such
evidence is too dangerous in its
consequences; but this objection
comes too late, as the rule appears
to be well established, and as he
observed when he was obliged to
bow to the authorities, 'I must not
be wiser than my predecessors.' "
Where-the consideration in a deed
is expressed to be paid by the
grantee, parol evidence is never-
theless admissible to show the pay-
ment thereof by a third person, in
order to establish a resulting trust
in his favor. A trust, resulting by
implication of law from the pay-
ment of the purchase money of an
estate, which is conveyed to an-
other person, being a mere matter
266
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 133.
§ 133. The Same Subject. — It is well established that
courts of equity will relieve a grantor from a voluntary and
self-imposed trust where it appears that the end for which
the trust was created has been answered, and there is no
evidence that there is any other reason for its continuance.
In a recent case husband and wife conveyed her property
in trust for her separate use for life, so that it should not
be liable for her present or any future husband's engage-
ments, and after her death for such persons and uses as
she, by her will, should appoint, and in default of appoint-
ment, for the persons who would be entitled to her "real
and personal estate under the intestate laws of the place
where she may be domiciled" at her death. The husband
having died, it was held that the wife was entitled to a con-
veyance from the trustee of the trust estate.1 It has been
of equitable presumption, may be
rebutted by evidence of other cir-
cumstances, which negative such
presumption. Livermore v. Al-
drich, 5 Cush. 431 ; Page v. Page, 8
jST. H. 187; Botsford v. Burr, 2
Johns. Ch. 405.
1 Tucker's Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 354.
Jurisdiction to enforce a trust is
not defeated by the fact that the
trust agreement was oral, where
conveyances to respondent execu-
ted the verbal agreement in part.
Wood v. Perkins, 57 Fed. Rep. 258.
Where land is conveyed on a parol
trust to reconvey to grantor's wife,
and the grantee acknowledges the
trust by making such conveyance,
the equitable title will be regarded
as never having been transferred,
but as still the property of the
grantor, as regards his creditors.
Polley v. Johnson (1893), 52 Kan.
478; S. c, 35 Pac. Kep. 8. There
can be no trust in land conveyed
by deed absolute without fraud.
Civil Code § 852, providing that
such a trust can only be created by
writing. Dorun v. Doran, 99 Cul.
311; s. C, 33 Pac. Kep. 929. A
debtor conveyed an estate to his
father without consideration, and
to prevent its being attached by
his creditors, and immediately
afterwards, at the verbal request of
some of his father's other children,
and with the knowledge, but with-
out any consent of his father,
agreed that the estate should be
held in trust for one of the broth-
ers, who was a creditor of the
grantor. Held, that no trust was
thereby created which could be en-
forced against the father, or against
his heirs after death. Bartlett v.
Bartlett, 14 Gray, 277. An oral
agreement by the purchaser of land
on execution to bid it in on account
of the judgment debtor, the pur-
chaser using his own money for
that purpose, is void under the
Code Ala. 1876, § 2199, providing
that no trust concerning land, ex-
cept such as results by implication
or operation of law, can be created
unless in writing. White v. Far-
ley, 81 Ala. 563; s. c, 8 So. Kep.
215.
§ 133. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 267
held that where a conveyance is made without any consid-
eration as a matter of fact, there is no resulting use or trust
inf avor of the grantor, if a consideration is stated in the deed,
orif ause is expressly limited in the deed of the whole prop-
erty. The receipt of a consideration, admitted in a deed,
cannot be contradicted for the purpose of raising a resulting
trust for the grantor. And where a use is expressly limited
in a deed in favor of the grantee, no other use or trust will
be implied in favor of the grantor that is in conflict with it.
On this point Mr. Justice Story has said: "This distinc-
tion, however, is to be observed in cases where a considera-
tion, though purely nominal, is stated in the deed. If no
uses are declared the grantee will take the whole use, and
there will be no resulting use for the grantor, because the
payment even of a nominal consideration shows an intent
that the grantee should have some use, and no other being
specified, he must take the whole use. But where a par-
ticular use is disclosed, then the residue of the use results to
the grantor, for the presumption that the grantor meant to
part with the whole use is thereby repelled."1 Where the
1 Story, Equity Jurisprudence, § trust in such land in favor of her
1199. See also Graves v. Graves, heirs as against the otherwise per-
29 N. H. 129; 4 Kent's Com- feet claim to such land as home-
mentaries, 305. A executed a power stead by the second wife and widow
of attorney to a person to col- of decedent. Wilson v. Campbell
lect money and pay it over to a (1892) (Ky.), 20 S. W. Rep. 609.
bank, with directions to the bank Husband and wife entered into a
to account for the same to B which parol contract whereby the wife
the bank did. Held, that B thereby agreed to purchase lands then oc-
became the debtor of A, and not a cupied by them in right of the wife,
trustee for his benefit, and that A she to make the first payment
had no claim to priority of satis- thereon, and hold the same in
faction of his debt out of the estate trust for the husband, to the ex-
of B, in the hands of a receiver tent that he might thereafter pay
thereof. Lotze v. Hoerner, 25 the purchase money thereof; the
Week. L. Bnl. 31. Parol evidence husband, however, not binding
that land held by a decedent in his himself to make any such pay-
own name at the time of his death ments. It did not appear with cer-
was purchased with his first wife's tainty that any payments had been
money and that there was an agree- made by the husband. Held, that
ment between them that she knew a trust in such property would not
that the deed thereto was taken in be declared in favor of the hus-
his name, is ins-ufllcient to secure a band. Parker v. Farker, 5 Ohio
268
IMPLIED TEUSTS.
[§ 133.
consideration recited in a deed is altogether inadequate, as
where a deed was made with a consideration of five shillings,
a resulting trust will arise in favor of the grantor.1 In
Massachusetts, under the statute, a voluntary conveyance,
absolute in form, even though aided by an oral agreement
of the grantee to hold the property for the benefit of the
grantor, will not give a resulting trust which can be
enforced.3
Cir. Ct. 491. Where a husband
conveys land to a trustee for the
sole and separate use of his wife,
and the deed contains no sugges-
tion of a trust in his favor, or
power of revocation, parol evidence
that the wife declared such prop-
erty to belong to her husband, and
that she would reconvey it to him
whenever he asked her to do so, is
insufficient to establish a trust tn
such property in his favor. Price
v. Kane, 112 Mo. 412; s. C, 20 S.
"VV. Rep. 609. The administrator
of L purchased in 1852, a land cer-
tificate, on which he received a
patent. In 1867 he died, and the
land passed to defendants in 1884.
In March, 1887, an action was com-
menced by the heirs of L, alleging
that the land certificate was pur-
chased for the benefit of L's estate
and in default of appearance by
plaintiffs judgment was rendered
in accordance with defendants' an-
swer, praying that the cloud on
plaintiffs' claim be removed from
their title, and no appeal was ta-
ken. In January, 1888, plaintiffs
brought a petition in the nature of
a bill of review and to try title,
and the former judgment was va-
cated. Held, that a charge on the
second trial, that the proof must
be explicit and "free from doubt,"
that the money of the estate of L
was paid "at the time the purchase
was made, or prior thereto," to
create the trust in the administra-
tor, and that a trust may be estab-
lished by a written memorandum,
which must be explicit and "free
from doubt or conjecture," will
not serve to reverse a judgment in
favor of defendants, plaintiffs'
claim being stale. Browning v.
Pumphrey (1891), 81 Tex. 163;
s. c, 16 S. W. Rep. 870.
1 Sculthorp v. Burgess, 1 Ves.
Jr. 91.
2 Titcomb v. Morrill, 10 Allen, 15.
It may therefore be stated as the
clear result of the authorities, that
where a person, being a stanger in
blood to the donor, and a fortiori,
if connected with him by blood, is
in possession of an estate under a
voluntary conveyance, duly execu-
ted, the mere fact of his being a
volunteer will not of itself create
any presumption that he is a trus-
tee for the grantor; but he will be
considered entitled to the enjoy-
ment of the beneficial interest, un-
less that title is displaced by suffi-
cient evidence of an intention on
the part of the donor to create a
trust; and, as was observed by the
Lord Chancellor in the case of
Cook v. Fountain 3 Swanst. 590,
he need not bring proofs to keep his
estate, but the plaintiff must bring
proofs to take it from him. Hill
on Trustees, *107 (4th Am. Ed.).
§ 134. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 269
§ 134. Proof by Parol. — It is well established that a
resulting trust may be proved by parol, and also that parol
evidence may be offered in rebuttal of such proof. Where
relief is sought in a court of equity the facts on which a
claim to a resulting trust is based may be established by
parol. It will be presumed that the instrument by which
property is conveyed is to be taken in its literal sense.
Where the conveyance is absolute and a consideration is
recited, the presumption will be that the grantee takes the
equitable as well as the legal title, and where relief is sought
by a resulting trust the burden of proof is upon the party
setting up the claim. But while the transaction out of which
a trust arises may be proved by parol, the trust itself must
be based upon the acts or relations of the parties as proved,
and not merely upon their declarations, or upon parol agree-
ments.1 If a written contract is shown to be valid it is not
admissible to introduce parol evidence to establish a result-
ing trust.2 But in a recent case it was held that parol evi-
dence is admissible against the face of a deed itself, to show
all the facts out of which a resulting trust arises.3 In Ken-
dall v. Mann it was held that a resulting trust in land in
favor of a third person may be established by parol evidence,
although the deed recites that the consideration was paid
by the grantee, and it was in fact paid by him, provided
that it was distinctly agreed before the purchase that the
sum paid should be considered as a loan from the grantee
1 Foote v. Bryant, 47 N. T. 544; impose a resulting trust on the
Nixon's Appeal, 63 Pa. St. 277; land. Weiss v. Heitkamp (1895),
Morgan v. Clayton, 61 111. 35; 127 Mo. 23; s. c, 29 S. W. Rep.
Caldwell v. Caldwell, 7 Bush, 515; 709.
Brison v. Brison, 75 Cal. 525; Beck 2 Beck v. Beck, 43 ST. J. Eq. 39;
v. Beck, 43 N". J. Eq. 39; Sullivan Van Syckle v. Dalrymple, 5 Stew,
v. Sullivan, 86 Tenn. 376; Parker Eq. 233, 826.
v. Logan, 82 Va. 441 ; Reynolds v. 3 Sellers v. Mohn, 37 W. Va. 507 ;
Sumner, 126 111. 56; s. C, 9 Am. s. c, 16 S. E. Rep. 496; Boyd v.
St. Rep. 521. A contemporaneous McLean,] Johns. Ch. 582; Bots-
parol agreement on the part of a ford v. Burr, 2 Johns. Ch. 405;
grantee to hold the land conveyed Bank v. Carrington, 7 Leigh, 566;
in trust cannot be shown, in the Borst v. Nalle, 28 Gratt. 423 ;
absence of fraud, on refusal of the Murry v. Sell, 23 W. Va. 475 ;
grantee to fulfill the agreement, to Heiskell v. Powell, 23 W. Va. 717.
270 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 135.
to such third person, but the proof upon this point must
be clear.1
§ 135. The Subject Continued. — If an instrument is
not clear in regard to the real purchaser, or if there is a
question in regard to the payment of the purchase money,
it is admissible to show the facts by parol testimony. If
the consideration recited in the instrument is fictitious, or
nominal, it may be proved by parol.2 This is a vital point.
It has been well said : "The whole foundation of the trust
is the payment of the money, and that must be clearly
proved."3 And while it is the presumption that a deed, or
other instrument, speaks the truth, a court of equity will
hear such parol evidence as may be necessary to establish
the facts of any case. In view of the danger of disturbing
a well attested instrument by parol evidence, the courts
have almost universally sustained the rule that the presump-
tion in favor of the truth of a written conveyance must pre-
vail unless rebutted by evidence absolutely clear and con-
vincing.4 Where an instrument is imperfectly executed,
1 Kendall v. Mann, 11 Allen, 15 ; tion, the courts have generally up-
Davis v. Wetherell, 11 Allen, 19; held the rule, that the presumption
Page v. Page, 8 ST. H. 187; Capen arising from the conveyance must
v. Richardson, 7 Gray, 364; Get- prevail, unless overcome by evi-
man v. Getman, 1 Barb. Ch. 499. dence full, clear and satisfactory.
*■ De Peyster v. Gould, 2 Green While the verbal declarations or
Ch. 474; Peybody v. Tarbell, 2 admissions of the grantee are ad-
Cush. 232; Barrow v. Barrow, 24 missible against him, they should
Vt. 375; Lyford v. Thurston, 16 N. be closely scrutinized, and unless
H. 399; Millard v. Hathaway, 27 they are plain and consistent, or
Cal. 119; Cooper v. Skeele, 14 corroborated by circumstances, are
Iowa, 578 ; Groves v. Groves, 3 Y. regarded as an insufficient basis
& J. 163; Eyall v. Eyall, 1 Atk. 59. for a decree establishing a trust."
3 Chancellor Kent in Botsford v. Bibb v. Hunter, 79 Ala. 351 ; s. C,
Burr, 2 Johns. Ch. 409. 22 Cent. L. J. 394, and very
■•Bibb v. Hunter (1885), 79 Ala. full note of W. W. Thornton; Lar-
351. "The burden of removing kins v. Ehodes, 6 Por. 195 ; Lehman
the presumption, that the convey- v. Lewis, 62 Ala. 129. In the case
ance speaks the truth, rests on the of Foote v. Bryant, 47 N. Y. 544,
complainant. Appreciating the Church, C. J., said: "The gen-
danger of having deeds or other eral principles of equity and good
solemn writings displaced by parol conscience applied to certain situ-
evidence, easy of fabrication, and ations and acts of the parties are
sometimes incapable of contradic- used to raise presumptions of in-
§ 136. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 271
or is so indefinite as to leave a court in doubt in regard to
the intention of the grantor in a voluntary conveyance, no
relief will be granted. Such conveyances, especially where
made to strangers, are always open to suspicion. But
where there is evidence of deception, or unjust dealing,
equity will fasten a trust upon the party guilty of the fraud,
or misrepresentation.
§ 136. From Misunderstanding. — Where there is evi-
dence that in a voluntary conveyance the grantor misunder-
stood the effect of his act a court of equity will interpose.
In the leading case of Garnsey v. Mundy, before the Court
of Chancery of the State of New Jersey, it was held that
a voluntary deed of trust, reserving no power of revoca-
tion, made with a nominal consideration and without legal
advice as to its effect, and where there was evidence that
its effect was misunderstood by the grantor, was set aside
and a reconveyance ordered. The fact that the grantor's
infant children were the beneficiaries under the trust deed
was not sufficient to prevent the relief.1 A voluntary con-
veyance is valid if the person making it acts deliberately,
and with a full understanding of the legal effect of the
transaction, but where the circumstances are such that the
grantor ought to be advised to retain a power of revoca-
tion, it is the duty of an attorney to insist upon the inser-
tion of such a power, and to explain to thegrantorthat, as a
rule, the failure to insert it will be fatal to the conveyance.2
tentions, and to impress property estate dependent solely upon mere
with trusts, and to clothe one party verbal or parol conversations or
with the character and obliga- agreements." See also Brickell v.
tions of a trustee, and another with Earley, 115 Pa. St. 473; Parker v.
the rights and privileges of a cestui Logan, 82 Va. 376 ; Woodward v.
que trust for the purpose of secur- Sibert, 82 Va. 441 ; Be Stanger, 35
ing honesty and fair dealing among Fed. Kep. 238 ; Edwards v. Eogers,
mankind, and to prevent fraud and 87 Ala. 568 ; Donaghe v. Tarns, 81
injustice. The statute referred to Va. 132.
was never intended to interfere J Garnsey v. Mundy, 24 N. J. Eq.
with the application of these equi- 243; s. c, 13 Am. L. Keg. (N. S.)
table and benign principles; but 345.
it was designed to prevent fraud 2 Wollaston v. Tribe (1869), L.
and perjuries by prohibiting the E. 9Eq.44. In the case cited Lord
creation of trusts relating to real Eomily, Mas°ter of the Eolls, said :
272 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 136.
In the absence of a power of revocation in the instrument
the parties claiming the benefit of the conveyance must
show that the donor was properly advised in regard to the
effect of omitting it, and that the omission was an intelli-
gent and deliberate act. In the case of Hall v. Hall it was
held that a voluntary settlement should contain a power of
revocation, if it does not the parties who rely upon it
must prove that the settlor was properly advised when he
executed it ; that he thoroughly understood the effect of
omitting the power, and that he intended it to be excluded
from the settlement. If that is not established, and the
court sees from the surrounding circumstances that the
settlor believed the instrument to be revocable, it will, even
after the lapse of nearly twenty years and the death of the
settlor, interfere and give relief against it.1 This case sub-
sequently came before the Lord Chancellor and the Court
of Appeal in Chancery, and the decree was reversed, but
the principle maintained by the lower court was modified
rather than denied. The case was decided with reference
to the facts, rather than to the equitable principles in-
"In this case I do not think the tends to carry it into execution;
settlement can stand as it is at but the lady seems to me not to
present. It is a case in which a have known or understood what
lady married at not a very early she was doing." The party taking
age. She had some [independent a benefit under a voluntary gilt
fortune, and that is settled in this containing no power of revocation,
way : first on herself for life for has thrown upon him the burden
her separate use without power of of proving that there was a dis-
anticipation, then on her husband tinct intention on the part of the
for life, then on the children of the donor to make the gift irrevocable,
marriage and those of any future And, where the circumstances are
marriage, and if she had no chil- such that the donor ought to be
dren then on her nephews and advised to retain a power of revo-
nieces. The husband is dead ; cation, it is the duty of the solic-
there was no issue of the marriage ; itor to insist upon the insertion of
and the lady has not married again, such power, and the want of it will
so that the only part of the settle- in general be fatal to the deed,
ment which is now subsisting is Coutts v. Acworth, L. K. 8Eq. 558.
purely voluntary, and not within 1 Hall v. Hall, L. K. 14 Eq. 365.
the consideration of the marriage. See also Mountford v. Keene, 19
Of course, a voluntary gift is per- W. E. 708; Phillips v. Mullingst
fectly good if tne person who L. K. 7 Ch. 244, 247.
makes it knows what it i*, and in-
§ 137. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 273
volved. It was held that the absence of a power of revo-
cation, and the fact that the attention of the settlor was
not called to that absence, do not make a voluntary settle-
ment invalid ; they are merely circumstances to be consid-
ered in deciding on the validity of a voluntas settlement.1
On this point Lord Chancellor Selborne, in his opinion,
said: "The absence of a power of revocation in a volun-
tary deed, not impeached on the ground of any undue in-
fluence, is, of course, material, where it appears that the
settlor did not intend to make an irrevocable settlement,
or where the settlement itself is of such a nature, or was
made under such circumstances, as to be unreasonable and
improvident, unless guarded by a power of revocation. I
do not, however, see on what principle the absence of
such a power can be considered material in a case like the
present, from which both of these elements are absent.2
§ 137. The Subject Continued. — In the more recent de-
cisions of the English courts the weight of authority sus-
tains the view that the absence of a power of revocation
in a voluntary conveyance from the misapprehension of
the grantor is simply a circumstance to be considered by
the court in connection with the other facts relating to the
1 Hall v. Hall, 8 Ch. App. 436. liberty to himself by a power of
2 Hall v. Hall, 8 Ch. App. 440. revocation, this court will not loose
In the very early case of Villiers v. the fetters he hath put upon him-
Beaumont, 1 Vern. 99, where one self, but he must lie down under
William Beaumont, a short time his own folly, for if you would re-
before his death, by a little scrap lieve in such a case, you mnstcon-
of paper at an ale house settled a sequently establish this proposi-
trust upon his cousins to the intent lion, viz. : That a man can make
to pay his debts and gave the sur- no voluntary disposition of his es-
plus to them, and after this being tate, but by his will only, which
dissatisfied with the settlement would be absurd." See also Allen
which he had delivered to a cred- v. Arme, 1 Vern. 365 ; Bate v.
itor makes a will in writing devis- Newton, 1 Vern. 464; Clavering v.
ing his term to a half brother. Clavering, Hil. 1704; s. c, Pr.
The question was, whether the Ch. 235; Albemarle v. Earl of
deed or will should prevail. The Bath, 3 Ch. Cas. 55; Boughton v.
Lord Chancellor said: "There is Boughton, 1 Atk. 625; Petre v.
no color in this case. H a man will Espinasse, 2 Myl. & K. 496 ; Bill v.
improvidently bind himself up by Cureton, 2 Myl. & K. 503.
a voluntary deed, and not reserve a
18
274
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 137.
case. In an English case it was held that the absence from
a voluntary settlement of a power of revocation reserved
to the settlor is, in determining the validity of the impeached
settlement, only a circumstance to be taken into account in
connection with the other circumstances of the case. The
absence in the like case of advice given to the settlor as to
the insertion of a power of revocation stands on the same
footing.1 In his opinion in the case Lord Justice Turner
said: "I think it is going too far to say that no voluntary
settlement can be valid unless the settlor is advised that
there should be a power of revocation inserted in it. What
the court has to be satisfied of in these cases, as I appre-
hend, is this, that the settlement, whether containing or
not containing a power of revocation, is the free, deter-
mined act of the party making it ; and the absence of ad-
vice as to the insertion of a power of revocation is a cir-
cumstance, and a circumstance merely, to be weighed in
connection with other circumstances of the case."2
1 Toker v. Toker, 3 De G., J. &
S. 487; Hugunin v. Basley, Lead.
Cas. in Equity, 406; Cook v. La-
motte, 15 Beav. 241 ; Sharp v.
Leach, 31 Beav. 491; Phillipson v.
Kerry, 32 Beav. 628. A settlement
on his family by a person in ex-
tremis, and not containing a power
of revocation set aside, the court
being of opinion that it was exe-
cuted in expectation of his imme-
diate death, but not with the in-
tention that it should be operative
in case of his recovery. Forshaw
Welsby, 30 Beav. 243. See Woll-
aston v. Tribe, L. B. 9 Eq. 44;
Coutts v. Ackworth, L. K. 8 Eq.
558; Prideaux v. Lonsdale, 1 De
G., J. & S. 433 ; Hall v. Hall, L. K.
14 Eq. 365.
2 Toker v. Toker, 3 DeG.,J.&
S. 491; Everitt v. Everitt, L. E. 10
Eq. 405. "The circumstances un-
der which a voluntary deed was
executed may be shown, with a
view to impeaching its validity,
and if it appears that it was fraud-
ulent or improperly obtained,
equity will decree that it will be
given up and cancelled. In (he
present case there is no room for
doubt that the grantor was induced
by those in whom she very justly
placed confiden ce andby whose bet-
ter judgment she was willing to be
guided to execute a voluntary deed
whose effect she and they not only
did not understand, but on the
other hand misapprehended, and
which so far from being according
to their intentions was, in two very
important respects, at least, admit-
tedly precisely the reverse. It was
irrevocable, but they all supposed it
was revocable, and intended that it
should be so. It deprived the
grantor of the power of sale, but
they all supposed that she would
have that power, and intended that
she should have it. * * * It
$ 137. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 275
The decision of the English Court of Appeal, in Hall v.
Hall, ut supra, has not been followed by the American
courts. The leading case of Garnsey v. Mundy, noticed
in a preceding section,1 which is in accord with the earlier
English decisions, is sustained by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in Evans v. Russell. In this case the com-
plainant, prior to her marriage, executed a settlement con-
veying her property in trust to pay the income to herself
for life, with power to appoint the capital by will among the
children of the marriage, and in default of issue, to and among
her sisters and brother, and in default of appointment to
them in certain proportions. The deed contained no power
of revocation, nor of testamentary appointment after the
cesser of the marriage in her lifetime, and nothing was said at
the time as to the omission of these powers, except that
the complainant was informed that she could make her will
as she pleased. It was held that she was entitled to a re-
conveyance by the trustee: 1. The sisters and brother
were mere volunteers. 2. While the omission of counsel to
advise the insertion of a power of revocation will not of
itself be ground to set aside a voluntary conveyance, yet
its absence, and the failure to advise upon it, are circum-
stances of weight, when joined to others, tending to show
that the act was not done with a deliberate will. 3. The
mistake being a mixed one of law and fact, equity will re-
lieve. 4. In the absence of a certain intent to make the
gift irrevocable, the omission of a power to revoke is prima
facie evidence of mistake, and as against one, sui juris,
casts upon the donees the burden of supporting the settle-
ment. The rule announced in Toker v. Toker, 3 De G., J.
& S. 487, adopted; Wallaston v. Tribe, L. E. 9 Eq. 44;
Phillipson v. Kerry, 32 Beav. 628, recognized.2 In his
satisfies me that the deed was not lor Runyon in G-arnsey v. Mundy,
'the pure, voluntary, well-under- 24 N". J. Eq. 243; s. C, 13 Am. L.
stood act of the grantor's mind1 Reg. (N. S.) 345.
(Lord Eldon in Huguenin v. 1 Garnsey v. Mundy, 24 N. J. Eq.
Basely), but was unadvised and 243; s. c, 13 Am. L. Eeg. (1ST. S.)
improvident, and contrary to the 345.
intention of them all." Chancel- 2 Evans v. Russell, 31 Leg. Int.
276 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 138.
opinion on this case Chief Justice Agnew said: "In the
absence of a certain intent to make the gift irrevocable the
omission of a power to revoke is prima facie evidence of a
mistake, and casts the burden of supporting the settlement
upon him who, without consideration or motive to benefit
him or protect the donor, claims a mere gratuity against
one who is sui juris and capable of taking care of his own
estate."1
§ 138. The Same Subject. — Misapprehension in re-
gard to the legal effect of the instrument is not the only
point that a court of equity will consider relating to an error
or mistake on the part of a donor. It is admissible to prove
all the circumstances attending the execution of the instru-
ment of a voluntary conveyance, and if it appears that any
part of the transaction was misunderstood, or was not un-
derstood, or that there was fraud, or deception of any sort,
so that the intention of the grantor was not expressed in the
instrument, a court of equity will afford relief. In Cooke
v. Lamotte it was held that whenever a person obtains, by
voluntary donation, a benefit from another, he is bound, if
the transaction be questioned, to prove that the transaction
was righteous, and that the donor voluntarily and delib-
erately did the act, knowing its nature and effect. The
above rule is not confined to the cases of attorney and
client, parent and child, etc., but is general. A nephew,
125. "This mistake is not one conscious that a case was left un-
simply of law. That would be so provided for, which might happen,
if the settlor, in full view of all the and in which event the settlor would
clauses and provisions in the deed, desire to make a provision agree-
would interpret them for himself ably to her wishes and will. The
as being in law adequate to confer settlement provided for her niar-
a power of revocation upon him, riage and the survivorship of her
when in truth the law would not intended husband, with and with-
so expound the instrument. But out issue by her, and for the result
in a case such as this the mistake of these contingencies; but it failed
is one of fact, so mixed with the to provide for the case of Mr.
legal effect of the writing equity Evans dying first without issue by
will u»e the mistake of fact as a her."' Ibid.
means of relief. The mistake here 1 Evans v. Russell, 31 Leg. Int.
was in not perceiving and being 126.
§ 138.]
IMPLIED TKUSTS.
277
who was provided for b}r his aunt's will, obtained a post-
obit bond from her. It was set aside, he not having proved
that she knew that the effect of the bond was to make her
will irrevocable.1 In another English case, where a lady in
her sixty-ninth year executed, at the instance of her relatives
and without independent advice, a voluntary settlement con-
taining no power of revocation, and under the impression
that the deed had the effect of a will, it was held, affirming
the decision of the Master of the Rolls, that the deed must
be set aside.2 In his opinion in this case, Lord Justice
James said : "In Hall v. Hall it had been decided by a full
court of appeal that the mere absence of a power of revo-
cation was not fatal to a voluntary deed, where the deed
was the deliberate act of the settlor and the settlor knew
1 Cooke v. Lamotte, 15 Beav.
234; Couttsv. Acworth, L.R.SEq.
558; Everitt v. Everitt, L. K. 10
Eq. 405 ; Phillips v. Mullings, L. R.
7 Ch. App. 244. "The case is this :
A female infant "being entitled to
choses in action, a settlement was
made of them, on her marriage, in
trust for her husband for life, and
after his decease, in trust for her
for life, and after the decease of
the survivor, in trust for the chil-
dren of the marriage, and if there
should be no child, then in trust
for such persons as she should ap-
point hy her will with the ultimate
trust for her next of kin ; and the
marriage having heen put an end
to, and there being no issue, the
question is whether the lady is
still hound hy the settlement. I
am of opinion that she should not
he bound by it." Shadwell, V. C,
in Hastings v. Orde, 11 Sim. 205.
2Henshall v. Feredy, 29 L. T.
Rep. (N. S.) 46; Huguenin v.
Basely, 14 Ves. 273 ; Bridgman v.
Green, 2 Ves. 627. Equity will re-
lieve against a mistake of fact, su-
perinduced by mistake of law;
though not where the mistake is of
law only. "Where a ferae sole, as
guardian, had trust funds in pos-
session, and afterwards conveyed
her real estate to a trustee to man-
age for her use and benefit, paying
over to her the net proceeds, who
after accepting the conveyance
died, and his sons, the administra-
tors, in mistake of their duty as
such, executed their bond to the
ward for the amount due him by
his guardian, their mistake in the
execution of the bond is relievable
against in equity. Gross v. Leber,
47 Pa. St. 520. The principle that
for a mistake in law equity will
not relieve against a deed, etc.,
will not bar relief, if the party has
acted upon a want of proper
knowledge which he could not ob-
tain, though vigilant in his search ;
nor where necessary information
has been refused and with-
held; nor where unconscionable
advantage of circumstances where-
by his will was coerced, and by
undue pressure he had done what
otherwise he would not. Whelen's
Appeal, 70 Pa. St. 410.
278
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 139.
what he was doing, and executed the deed with full knowl-
edge of its effect. But here the deed was executed by a
lady of weak mind, without any independent legal advice.
Her brother first suggested the notion to her, and he in-
structed the solicitor who prepared the deed. The solicitor
did not see the lady, or give her any advice. It might be
that she knew that the document executed by her was not
a will, but he imagined that the document had the effect of
a will. This case was as exactly within the rule as to the
absence of a power of revocation avoiding a voluntary set-
tlement as Hall v. Hall was outside of it.1"
§ 139. From Conveyance to a Wife or Child. — Where
there is a conveyance to a wife or child, the presumption
1 Henshall v. Feredy, 29 L. T. (JST.
S.) 46. In a learned note to G-arn-
aey v. Mundy, in 13 Am. L. Keg.
345, George Tucker Bispham has
collected and discussed the leading
cases hearing on thig question.
From these decisions he deduces
the following conclusions :
"First. Where there is a deliber-
ate gift, with full knowledge of the
consequences of the act, made by a
person sui juris, the absence of a
power of revocation is not prima
facie enough to set the instrument
aside. The absence of motive is
immaterial, if an intent to make an
irrevocable gift is apparent. And
(it is submitted) , that this intent is
sufficiently proved, in the first in-
stance, whenever a person of sound
mind and sui juris executes an in-
strument of whose contents he has
been informed. Thus if a person
of perfect mental capacity, and un-
der no disability, were deliberately
to execute a gift to an entire stran-
ger, with a full knowledge of the
contents of the instrument, and
without the slightest evidence of
fraud or mistake, it would seem
reasonable that an intent on the
part of the settlor to make an ir-
revocable gift of his property
should be presumed. Second.
Even in the absence of a certain
and definite intent to make an
irrevocable gift, the omission of
a power of revocation will not, of
itself, be enough to set the instru-
ment aside, if there exists a motive
for making and sustaining an ir-
revocable gift, e. g., where the
settlement is made for the purpose
of the settlor's guarding against his
own extravagance or dissipation, as
in Petre v. Espinasse, 2 Myl. & K.
496, and Bill v. Cureton, 2 Myl.
& K. 503. Third. But where the
deliberate intent to make an irrevo-
cable gift does not appear, and
where no motive for such a gift is
shown, the absence of a power of
revocation is prima facie evidence
of mistake. The rule is the same
when the motive has failed, as was
the case in Hastings v. Orde, 11
Sim. 205, and Evans v. Russell, 31
Leg. Int. 125. Fourth. It is the
duty of the solicitor who prepares
the settlement to see that the irrev-
ocable nature of the instrument
is fully understood by the settlor.
See May on Voluntary Alienations,
452."
§ 139. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 279
will be, in the case of a wife, that it is not in trust, but a
provision for her support, and in that of a child that it is
an advancement. This doctrine has an illustration in the
leading case of Cook v. Hutchinson, in which, by a deed
between a father and son, reciting that the father was de-
sirous of settling the property therein comprised so as to
make the same a provision for himself during his life, and
for his wife and her children by him after his decease, he
released and assigned the same, and every part thereof, to
the son, upon the trusts thereinafter mentioned concerning
the same. The father proceeded to declare the trusts as to
part of his property in favor of his wife, a daughter and a
niece, but no trust was declared as to the surplus. It was
held that the surplus did not result to the grantor, but be-
longed to the son ; and, the father having been maintained
by the son for fifteen years, a bill filed after the son's
death by the father, and revived upon the father's death by
his representative, was dismissed with costs as to that part
of it which sought an account of interest.1 But, while the
presumption is that of an advancement, it is admissible to
introduce evidence of a trust. And where it appears that
the object of the conveyance was to defraud creditors, or to
delay the payment of debts, a resulting trust will be so de-
creed. This is a general principle to which a conveyance
to a wife or child is not an exception.2 A case in illustra-
1 Cook v. Hutchinson, 1 Keen, on a sale of her land. He used the
43. money with his own in providing
2 Baldwin v. Campfield, 4 Halst. for the family and in his business
Ch. 891. Where a widow invested of buying and selling stock. She
the proceeds of a policy, payable lived with him until her death,
to herself and children jointly, in sixteen years afterwards, but never
a mortgage payable to herself asked for an accounting, nor in
alone, and afterwards married, ev- any way treated him as her trustee,
idence that the mortgage was sat- agent or debtor. Held, that there
isfied by her husband in his name was no evidence to establish a
during her lifetime is sufficient to trust in favor of her children in
raise a resulting trust in favor of land purchased by the husband
the children against him. Eeed v. with the proceeds of his business.
Painter (1895), 129 Mo. 674; s.c, 31 Eeed v. Eeed (1890), 135 111. 482;
S. W. Eep. 919. A wife indorsed to s. c, 25 N. E. Eep. 1095. The
her husband, notes she had received mere fact that the consideration of
280 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 139.
tion is that of Spicer v. Ayers, before the Supreme Court
of New York. Plaintiffs, in their complaint, stated that A
was in his lifetime indebted to them ; that he caused to be
conveyed to defendant, his wife, real estate paid for by
him, and conveyed to her, through a third person, other
real estate owned by him, and afterward, at his own ex-
pense, improved said estate; that the conveyances were
made and accepted with the intent to defraud his creditors,
and that A died insolvent and defendant was appointed his
administratrix and had no personal property of deceased to
pay plaintiff's debt, and that deceased left no other real
estate, and asked that the conveyances be set aside and that
plaintiff's debt be charged upon said real estate. It was
held that the complaint contained sufficient facts to consti-
tute a cause of action, and a demurrer, upon the ground
that it did not, would not lie. It was held, also, that the
conveyance to defendant of the lands paid for by A, created
a trust in favor of the creditors of A, and an equity action
would lie to enforce the trust. It was held, also, that de-
fendant, being both the administratrix of the deceased and
the party holding the fraudulent title, and the estate being
insolvent, a creditor at large could maintain an action in
equity for relief.1
a conveyance to a wife is furnished through H, and no trust results in
by the husband raises nopresuinp- plaintiff's favor in that or the land
tion of a resulting trust. Sweet v. for which it was exchanged. Tay-
Dean, 43 111. App. 650. Plaintiff lor v. Miles, 19 Ore. 550; S. C, 25
who was largely indebted, and Pac. Bep. 143.
feared that his creditors would : Spicer v. Ayer, 2 K. Y. Sup.
seize his property, conveyed all Ct. 026; Gedge v. Traill, 1 Buss. &
his land to H to hold until plaintiff Myl. 281; Burrough v. Elton, 11
should have paid his debts, and Ves. 29; Long v. Hajestra, 1 Johns,
then reconvey to him. After the Ch. 300; Chautauqua Co. Bk. v.
debts were paid, the land was con- White, 6 N. Y. 236; Baldwin v.
veyed to plaintiff's wife, at hi-5 re- Campfleld, 4 Halst. Ch. 600 ; Brown
quest. Plaintiff and his wife then v. McDonald, 1 Hill Ch. 297;
joined in conveying this land in Dunica v. Coy, 24 Mo. 167; Buss v.
exchange for another tract, title to Mebius, 16 Cal. 350; Bobinson v.
which was also taken in the \vife"s Bo'uinson, 17 Ohio St. 480; Trim-
name. Held that, as to the first ble v. Doty, 16 Ohio St. 118; 1 Bev.
.land, the transaction was only a St. 747, §§ 51, 52 (N. Y.). In a case
conveyance by plaintiff to his wife where a father turned over valua-
§ 140.] IMPLIED TRUSTS. 281
§ 140. From the Relation Between the Parties. — It is
well established that wherever a controlling influence is ex-
ercised by one person over another, and advantage is taken
of such influence to secure donations, whether of money or of
other property, a court of equity will afford relief. This is
done on the ground of public policy, or what is otherwise
termed public utility, and the basis on which such relief is
granted is a general principle and applicable to all the inti-
mate relations in which one person exercises a controlling
or undue influence over another. As is fit, equity guards
with special vigilance the rights of a child in his relations to
a parent. This is true especially where a donation is made
by a child to a parent very soon after attaining his majority.
The conveyance of property to a parent by a child is not
held as prima facie void. On this point, in the case of
Jenkins v. Pye, before the Supreme Court of the United
States, it was held that to consider a parent disqualified to
take a voluntary deed from his child without consideration,
on account of their relationship, is opening a principle at
war with all filial, as well as parental duty and affection,
and acting on the presumption that a parent, instead of
wishing to promote the interest and welfare, would be seek-
ing to overreach and to defraud his child. Whereas the pre-
sumption ought to be, in the absence of all proof tending to
a contrary conclusion, that the advancement of the interest
of the child was the object in view, and to presume the ex-
istence of circumstances conducing to that result; such a
presumption harmonizes with the moral obligations of a
parent to provide for his child, and is founded upon the
same benign principle that governs cases of purchases made
by parents in the name of a child. The natural and rea-
sonable presumption in all transactions of this kind is that
ble property to his son to use in would be deprived of the neces-
business for the advantage of both, saries of life, and turned into the
and it was provided that the father streets, it was held that the aver-
was to become a member of the ment of these facts stated a trust
son's family, and afterwards the enforceable in equity. Chadwick
son treated his father as a menial, v. Chadwick, 59 Mich. 87.
and it became probable that he
282
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ HO.
a benefit was intended the child, because in the discharge
of moral and parental duty.1 But while it is held that
a conveyance of this character is not absolutely void,
courts of equity will examine with special care the circum-
stances under which such conveyances are made, in order
to ascertain whether any undue influence was exercised in
obtaining the conveyance. In another leading case before
the Supreme Court of the United States a deed from a fe-
male child, just of age and living with her parents, made to
a trustee for the benefit of one of those parents, founded
on no real consideration, executed under the influence of
misrepresentations by the parents, and containing in its
preamble a recital of false statements, was ordered to be
set aside and the property reconveyed to the grantor.2 In
1 Jenkins v. Pye, 12 Pet. 239. If
the transaction between parent and
child is reasonable and entered
into with good faith, equity will
not interfere, as in Blackborn- v.
Edgerly, 1 P. Wins. 600, 606, where
a son in good circumstances gave
his father a bond to pay him an
annuity of £120 for his life. Lord
Macclesfield held that, as it ap-
peared to have been the free act of
the son, and what he thought him-
self obliged in honor to do, and
there being no proof to impeach
it, it ought not to be set aside in
equity. A deed will not be set
aside on the ground of fraud, un-
less it be proved beyond a reason-
able doubt. Phettiplace v. Sayles,
4 Mason, 312. A deed to a parent
by a child, just come of age is,
prima facie valid, and the burden
of proving undue influence or
fraud is on the party attacking it.
Sullivan v. Sullivan, 21 Law Rep.
531 ; Eeehling v. Byers, 94 Pa. St.
316; Thomber v. Sheard, 12 Beav.
589.
2 Taylor v. Taylor, 8 How. 183.
See also Morse v. Royal, 12 Ves.
371 ; Wright v. Proud, 13 Ves. 137 ;
Murray v. Palmer, 2 Sch. & Lef.
474; Osmond v. Fitzroy, 3 P. Wms.
131 ; Rhodes v. Cook, 2 Sim. & Stu.
448 ; Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves.
273; s. C, 2 Eden, 2S6; Davis v.
Duke of Marlborough, 2 Swanst.
139; Gowland v. DeFaria, 17 Ves.
20; Peacock v. Evans, 16 Ves. 512;
Evans v. Llewellyn, 1 Cox, 333; s.
C, 2 Bro. Ch. 120; Gwynne v.
Heaton, 1 Bro. Ch. 1; Bell v. How-
ard, 9 Mod. 302; Young v. Peachy,
2 Atk. 254; Heron v. Heron, 2 Atk
160 ; Blunden v. Barker, 1 P. Wms
639; s. C, 10 Mod. 451; Broderick
v. Broderick, 1 P. Wms. 239
Scrope v. Offiey, 1 Bro. P. C. 276
Gould v. Okeden, 4 Bro. P. C. 19S
Twisleton v. Griffith, 1 P. Wins
310. In the case of Hallett v. Col-
lins, 10 How. 174, where releases
for an inadequate consideration
were obtained, from heirs just
come of age, who were poor and
ignorant of their rights, were set
aside. In Miller v. Simonds, 5 Mo.
App. 33, a gift of valuable prop-
erty was made by a motherless girl
of twenty-three to her father who
had been her guardian. The court
on proof that her habits of submis-
140.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
283
his opinion in this case Mr. Justice Daniel said: " In the
case of Jenkins v. Pye this court refused to adopt the rule
which they said had in the argument been assumed as the
doctrine of the English chancery, viz., that a deed from a
sion to her father remained un-
changed, set aside the deed, treat-
ing her legal term of disability
as extended. Transactions of a
business nature between a father
and his unmarried daughter, whose
guardian he had been until she
had attained her majority, and
who then continued to reside in
his household as a member of his
family will be scrutinized with
watchful jealousy by a court of
equity, and will not be permitted
to stand, when it appears that, by
the exercise of undue influence,
the father obtained an improper
benefit or advantage, and his fail-
ure to make a full disclosure of all
material facts affecting his deal-
ings with her, as between other
persons occupying a fiduciary re-
lation toward each other, would au-
thorize the court to set aside such
transactions, at the option of the
daughter seasonably expressed.
Noble v. Moses, 74 Ala. 604.
"Where a daughter, immedi-
ately upon her arrival at
lawful age, makes a voluntary
conveyance for the benefit of
her father, the transaction will
be examined by the court with the
most jealous scrutiny and suspi-
cion. The person relying upon
the conveyance must show affirm-
atively, not only that the one who
made it understood its nature and
effect, and executed it voluntarily,
but that such will and intention
was not in any degree the result of
misrepresentation and mistake,
and was not induced by the exer-
tion of selfish purposes, and for his
own exclusive benefit, of the influ-
ence or control which the father
possessed over his daughter.
There is no law against a child be-
stowing upon a parent any prop-
erty, of which she may be the
owner, because she loves him, and
desires to promote his interests.
But there is an inflexible principle
both of public policy and private
justice which forbids a parent mak-
ing use of his influence, or his
child's affection, to impose upon
her mind a purpose of bounty to
him. If the design to make the
gift originated in the mind of the
child, or at least was unsuggested
by any agency of the parent, the
act is as unimpeachable in law as
it may be laudable in morals. But
if the mind of the donor was
brought to a purpose preconceived
by the parent for his own sole ad-
vantage, by an influence which the
donor could not escape, in the cir-
cumstances in which she was
placed, and which is deliberately
used to effect such purpose, then
that influence or its exercise will
be held to have been undue and
improper. In all dealings between
parent and child, under such cir-
cumstances, the most scrupulous
good faith, — uberrima fides, — must
be observed; and the weaker party
must be put upon an equal footing
with the stronger, by a complete
disclosure of all material facts, and
the abnegation, as far as possible,
of any control or dominion, as well
as of all mere selfish projects or
attempts." Bergen v. Udall, 31
Barb. 1. In the case of Thornton v.
Ogden, 32 N. J. Eq. 723, a convey-
ance by an unmarried woman to her
284
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 140.
child to a parent should, upon considerations of public
policy arising from the relations of the parties, be deemed
void. They deny, indeed, that this is the just interpretation
of the English decisions relied on, but declare that all the
brother with whom she resided,
executed in the confidence that the
"brother would deal justly with her,
was set aside for great inadequacy
of consideration. "In this class of
cases there is often found some in-
termixture of deceit, imposition,
overreaching, inconscionable ad-
vantage or other mark of direct
and positive fraud. But the prin-
ciple on which courts of equity act
in regard thereto stands independ-
ent of any such ingredients upon a
motive of public policy; and it is
designed in some degree as a pro-
tection to the parties against the
effects of overweening confidence
and self-delusion, and the infirmi-
ties of hasty and precipitate judg-
ment. These courts will, there-
fore, often interfere in such cases
where, but for such peculiar rela-
tions they would wholly abstain
from granting relief, or grant it in
a very modified and abstemious
manner. * * It is undoubtedly
true, that it is not upon feelings
which a, delicate and honorable
man must experience, nor upon
any notion of discretion, to pre-
vent a voluntary gift or other act
of a man whereby he strips him-
self of his property, that courts of
equity have deemed themselves at
liberty to interpose in cases of this
sort. They do not sit or affect to
sit in judgment upon cases as cus-
todes morum, enforcing the strict
rules of morality. But they do sit
to enforce what has not inaptly
been called a technical morality.
If confidence is reposed it must be
faithfully acted upon, and pre-
served from any intermixture of
imposition. If influence is ac-
quired, it must be kept free from
the taint of selfish interests, and
cunning, and overreaching bar-
gains. If the means of personal
control are given, they must be al-
ways restrained to purposes of
good faith and personal good.
Courts of equity will not, therefore,
arrest or set aside an act or con-
tract merely because a man of more
honor would not have entered into
it. There must be some relation
between the parties which compels
the one to make a full discovery to
the other, or to abstain from all
selfish projects. But where such
relation does exist, courts of equity
acting upon this superinduced
ground, in aid of general morals,
will not suffer one party standing
in a situation of which he can
avail himself against the other, to
derive advantage from that cir-
cumstance. * * The natural and
just influence which a parent has
over a child renders it peculiarly
important for courts of justice to
watch over and protect the inter-
ests of the latter ; and therefore all
contracts and conveyances, where-
by benefits are secured by children
to their parents are objects of jeal-
ousy, and if they are not entered
into with scrupulous good faith,
and are not reasonable under the
circumstances, they will be set
aside, unless third persons have
acquired an interest in them."
Story Equity Jurisprudence, §§
307, 308, 309. In Kempton v.
Ashbee, L. K. 10 Ch. Cas. 15, two
bonds issued by a young woman
living at the time with her mother
§ 141.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
285
leading cases they have examined are accompanied with
some ingredients showing undue influence exercised by the
parent, operating upon the fears or hopes of the child, and
showing reasonable grounds to presume that the act was
not perfectly free and voluntary on the part of the child.
But the court, whilst they deny that a deed from a child to
a parent should prima facie be held absolutely void, as un-
equivocally declare that 'it is undoubtedly the duty of courts
of equity carefully to watch and examine the circumstances
attending transactions of this kind, when brought under
review before them, to discover if any undue influence has
been exercised in obtaining the conveyance.' 'n
§ 141. The Subject Continued. — The principles of
equity, by which courts are governed in the decision of cases
between a parent and child, apply, and with increased force,
to the relations of guardian and ward. A voluntary con-
veyance from a ward to a guardian is not absolutely void.2
and stepfather, — one, at the age of
twenty-one, as surety for her step-
father's debt, and the other at the
age of twenty-nine, to secure the
amount of a judgment recovered
on the first bond,— were set aside
as against her, on the ground that
she had acted in the transaction
without independent advice, one
of the justices observing that the
court had endeavored to prevent
persons subject to influence from
being induced to enter into trans-
actions without advice of that kind.
See also Davis v. Dunne, 46 Iowa,
684; Eankin v. Patton, 65 Mo. 378;
Miller v. Simonds, 72 Mo. 669.
1 Taylor v. Taylor, 8 How. 183,
200. "The grantor, a young lady,
who from her birth had not, but
upon one occasion left the roof of
her father, — bound to him by the
strong ties of filial affection, — ac-
customed to repose in his advice
and opinion the most unbounded
confidence and to consider his re-
quest ever as equivalent to a com-
mand,— is informed by him that a
certain portion of her property had
been conveyed to Mm by her
mother, but that the same, from
some legal objection, had failed to
take effect. She is then requested
to confirm this title, and at the
same time is assured by her father,
that his design in obtaining this
confirmation is to promote her in-
terest as well as his own. She re-
flects upon the proposal, and in-
fluenced by the double motive of
promoting her own interest and
that of her father, and of fulfilling
the intentions of her dead mother,
she makes the conveyance. * * *
A transaction attended by such
circumstances will naturally excite
the suspicions of a court of eq-
uity." Justice Washington in Slo-
cum v.Marshall, 2 Wash. C.C. 400.
2 Farmer v. Farmer, 39 N. J. Eq.
211 ; Oowee v. Cornell, 75 N . Y. 91 ;
s. c, 31 Am. Rep. 428; Nesbit v.
286
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 141.
But courts of equity will regard transactions of this char-
acter with very great jealousy, and where it is clear that a
controlling influence is exerted, they will not be sustained
unless it is shown that the conveyance promotes the inter-
ests of the ward.1 Conveyances, or contracts of any sort,
between a guardian and ward, are treated by the courts with
greater severity than those between a parent and child, be-
Lockeman, 34 ST. Y. 167; Brock v.
Barnes, 40 Barb. 521; Hatch v.
Hatch, 9 Ves. 292 ; Bradish v. Gibbs,
3 Johns. Ch. 523; Hylton v.Hylton,
2 Ves. Sr. 548, 549 ; Dawson v. Mas-
sey, 1 Ball. & B. 219, 226; Mulhal-
len v. Marum, 3 Dru. & War. 317;
Beasly v. Magrath, 2 Sch. & Lef . 35 ;
Archer v. Hudson, 15 L. J. Ch. 211 ;
Everitt v. Everitt, L. K. 10 Eq. 405 ;
Walker v. Walker, 101 Mass. 169 ;
Gallation v. Cunningham, 8 Cow.
361; Gallation v. Erwin, 1 Hopk.
Ch. 48 ; White v. Parker, 8 Barb.
48; Henrioid v. STeusbaumer, 69
Mo. 96; Scott v. Freeland, 7 Sm.
& M. 409; s. c, 45 Am. Dec. 310;
Sullivan v. Blackwell, 28 Miss. 737 ;
Meek v. Perry, 36 Miss. 190 ; Wright
Y.Arnold, 14 B. Mon. 638; s. C,
61 Am. Dec. 172; Hanna v. Spotts,
5 B. Mon. 362; s. C, 43 Am. Dec.
132; Blackmorev.Shelby,8Humph.
439 ; Williams v. Powell, 1 Ired.
Eq. 460; Love v. Lea, 2 Ired. Eq.
627 ; Waller v. Armistead, 2 Leigh,
11; S. C., 21 Am. Dec. 594; Smith
v. Davis, 49 Am. Dec. 470. The
rule applies to purchases made by
guardians of wards' property at
judicial or other public sales.
Such sales are in most cases held
voidable. Redd v. Jones, 30 Gratt.
123 ; Sanders v. Forgasson, 59 Tenn.
249 ; Green v. Green, 14 N. Y . Sup.
Ct. 492; Walker v. Walker, 101
Mass. 169; Bland v. Lloyd, 24 La.
Ann. 603.
1 Ashton v. Thompson, 32 Minn.
25 ; Hoghton v. Hoghton, 15 Beav.
278, 299; Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Ves.
266; Fish v. Miller, Hoff. Ch. 267;
Chambers v. Crabbe, 34 Beav. 457;
Garvin v. Williams, 44 Mo. 465;
Todd v. Grove, 33 Md. 188; Ber-
doe v. Dawson, 34 Beav. 603; Dan-
iel v. Hill, 52 Ala. 430; Pierce v.
Waring, 1 P. Wms. 121; Revett v.
Harvey, 1 Sim. & S. 502; Maitland
v. Backhouse, 16 Sim. 58; Wed-
derburn v. Wedderburn, 4 Myl. &
Or. 41 ; Espey v. Lake, 19 Hare, 260 ;
Matthew v. Brise, 14 Beav. 341;
Wright v. Verplank, 8 De G., M.
&G. 133; s. c.,2K. & J. 1; Wic-
kiser v. Cook, 85 111. 68; Tuck v.
Bucholz, 43 Iowa, 415; Garvin v.
Williams, 44 Mo. 476; Somes v.
Skinner, 16 Mass. 348; Gale v.
Wells, 12 Barb. 84; Eberts v. Eb-
erts, 55 Pa. St. 110; Hawkins' Ap-
peal, 32 Pa. St. 263 ; Sherry v. Sans-
berry, 3 Ind. 320 ; Waller v. Arm-
istead, 2 Leigh, 11; s. c, 21 Am.
Dec. 594; Williams v. Powell, 1
Ired. Eq. 460; Womack v. Austin,
1 S. Car. 421 ; Andrews v. Jones, 10
Ala. 400; Johnson v. Johnson, 5
Ala. 90; Eichardson v. Linney, 7
B. Mon. 571; Wright & Arnold, 14
B. Mon. 513; Noble v. Moses, 81
Ala. 530; s. C, 60 Am. Rep. 175;
Stanley's Appeal, 8 Pa. St. 431;
Say v. Barnes, 4 Serg. & R. 112; S.
c, 8 Am. Dec. 679; Gillettv. Wiley,
126 111. 310; Voltz v. Voltz, 75 Ala.
555.
§ 141.] IMPLIED TRUSTS. 287
cause it is presumed that the regard and affection belonging
to the family relation will be absent in this case. While
the relation continues no conveyance or contract will be up-
held. All property received by the guardian from the ward
will be held as trustee for the ward. And if the guardian-
ship has terminated, but the guardianship accounts remain
unsettled, or the property of the ward is still in possession
of the guardian, this will be deemed a strong reason for de-
claring the contract or conveyance void.1 In his opinion, in
Hylton v. Hylton, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke well said:
"The rule of the court as to guardians is extremely strict,
and in some cases does infer some hardship, as where there
has been a great deal of trouble, and he has acted fairly
and honestly, that yet he shall have no allowance ; but the
court has established that on great utility, and on necessity,
and on this principle of humanity that it is a debt of hu-
manity that one man owes to another, as every man is liable
to be in the same circumstances. Undoubtedly, if after
the ward, or cestui que trust, comes of age, and after act-
ually put into possession of the estate, he thinks fit, when
sui juris and at liberty, to grant that or any other reason-
able grant by way of reward for care and trouble, when
done with eyes open, the court could never set that aside;
but the court guards against doing it at the very time of
accounting and delivering up the estate, as the terms, for
the court will not suffer them to make that the terms of
doing their duty."2 In continuing his opinion the distin-
1 Bostwick v. Atkins, 3 Comstock, son assuming the functions of a
53; Clark v. Devereaux, 1 S. Car. guardian. Revett v. Harvey, 1
172 ; Cowee v. Cornell, 75 ST. Y. 99 ; Sim. & St. 502 ; Allfrey v. Allfrey,
Farmer v. Farmer, 39 N. J. Eq. 211 ; 1 Mac. & G. 87, 98 ; Espey v. Lake,
Eberts v. Eberts, 5 P. F. Smith, 10 Hare, 260, 262; Beasley v. Ma-
119; Pierce v. Waring, 1 P. Wms. grath, 2 Sch. & Lef. 31; Wiltman's
121 ; Dawson v. Massey, 1 Ball. &B. Appeal, 28 Pa. St. 376; Brown v.
219, where a lease granted to a Burbank, 64 Cal. 99; Butler v. Hy-
guardian, and Aylward v. Kearney, land, 89 Cal. 575.
2 Ball. & B. 463, where leases 2 Hylton v. Hylton, 2 Ves. 548.
granted to guardian's son were set See also In re Van Home 7 Paige,
aside. It is not essential that a 46; Garvin v. Williams, 44 Mo. 465;
legal guardianship should exist. Stanley's Appeal, 8 Barr, 431;
The principle applies to any per- Cowan's Appeal, 24 P. F. Smith,
288 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 142.
guished jurist further said : ' 'Where a man acts as guardian ,
or trustee in nature of a guardian, for an infant, the court
is extremely watchful to prevent that person's taking any ad-
vantage immediately upon his ward, or cestui que trust com-
ing of age, and at the time of settling account or delivering
up the trust, because an undue advantage may be taken.
It would give an opportunity, either by flattery or force, by
good usage unfairly meant, or by bad usage imposed, to
take such advantage ; and, therefore, the principle of the
court is of the same nature with relief in this court on the
head of public utilitjs as in bonds obtained from young
heirs, and rewards given to an attorney pending a cause and
marriage-brocage bonds. All depend upon public utility ;
and, therefore, the court will not suffer it, though, perhaps
in a particular instance, there may not be an actual unfair-
ness."1
§ 142. The Same Subject. — Where the circumstances
are such that a ward after comma; of age has not been alto-
gether free in his relations to his guardian, a gift will be
set aside after a considerable lapse of time. In a case
where a guardian obtained from his ward, soon after
she came of age, a conveyance of property in considera-
tion of her great friendship, kindness and regard for him,
the care taken of her by him, etc., etc., and of ten shil-
lings to his brother, who was the attorney that prepared
the deed and one of the attesting witnesses, and who after-
wards became her husband. She continued to live with
her guardian for about four years after the conveyance,
when she married her guardian's brother; and sixteen
years after her marriage, upon the death of her guardian,
she and her husband filed a bill to be released against the
conveyance. The relief was granted, the conveyance
being set aside upon grounds of public policy. In his
opinion Lord Eldon held that "as to the four years pre-
ceding her marriage she was to all intents and purposes a
329; Hawkins' Appeal, 8 Casey, 1 Hylton v. Hylton. 2 Ves. 54S,
2l>5 ; Meek v. Perry, 36 Miss. 190 ; 549.
S berry v. Sansberry, 3 Ind. 320.
§ 142. j
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
289
■ward till the month of June preceding the marriage, when she
was taken out of the custody of her guardian by Thomas
Hatch.1 But where the relation of guardian and ward has
i Hatch v. Hatch, 9 Ves. 294;
Ashton v. Thompson, 32 Minn. 26.
Where there has been a continuous
management of the ward's prop-
erty by the guardian after the ward
has attained majority, the same
principles must be applied to the
accounts subsequent as to the ac-
counts during the period of minor-
ity. Mellish v. Mellish, 1 Sim. &
S. 145; Morgan v. Morgan, 1 Atk.
4SS ; Goddard v. Carlisle, 9 Price,
183. And this jealous watchful-
ness which, from the relations of
the party are so open to fraud, has
been extended to cases where all
accounts relative to the guardian-
ship was previously settled, and
the connection was at an end ; but
the impeached transactions ap-
peared to have grown out of the
influences arising from the former
relation. Wright v. Proud, 13 Ves.
138; Wood v. Downes, 18 Ves. 127 ;
Revett v. Harvey, 1 Sim. & S. 507.
See also Montesquieu v. Sandys, 18
Ves. 313 ; Wood v. Downes, 18 Ves.
127 ; Hylton v. Hylton, 2 Ves. Sr.
548 ; Nantes v. Corrock, 9 Ves. 182.
A niece, two months after she came
of age, and after her guardian had
fully accounted to her, entered into
a voluntary security for her uncle,
by whom she had been brought
up, and who was considered by the
court as standing in loco parentis.
The court set it aside. Where a
transaction takes place between a
parent and child, just after the child
has attained twenty-one, and prior
to what may be called a complete
"emancipation" without any bene-
fit moving to the child, the pre-
sumption is that an undue influence
has been exercised on the part of
19
the child, and a party seeking to>
maintain such a transaction must
show that that presumption is ade-
quately rebutted. Though courts
of equity do not interfere to pre-
vent an act, even of bounty between
parent and child, yet they will see
that the child is placed in such a
position as will enable him to formt
an entirely free and unfettered
judgment, independent altogether
of any sort of control. Archer v.
Hudson, 7 Beav. 551. A solicitor
who advanced money to an infant
for the subsistence of himself and.
his family, and acted as his confi-
dential adviser, is in the nature of
a guardian to him ; and an account
settled between them within a
month after the infant came of age,,
and without the latter having any
assistance, was opened, notwith-
standing the vouchers had been
delivered up. Eevett v. Harvey, 1
Sim. & S. 502. "It is generally-
true that a purchase by a guardian.
from his ward, during his minority,
will not be permitted to stand.
The nature of the important and
delicate relation resting between
these forbids that they should deal
with each other. But the case is
very different when the property
of the ward is sold under the order
or decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction for his benefit. In suck
case the guardian may purchase ;
and although his conduct will be
watched with jealousy, yet if it be
manifest that he has acted fairly,
with the utmost good faith, and
the transaction is free from any im-
putation of a design on his part to
gain a benefit to himself, to th&
prejudice of the interests of his
290 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 143.
terminated, where the ward has been put in full possession
of his property after an equitable settlement of accounts,
and the circumstances are such as to preclude the presump-
tion of undue influence, an appropriate gift from a ward
»to a former guardian will be sustained.1" On this
point Lord Chancellor Eldon said: "There may not be a
more moral act, one that would do more credit to a young
man beginning the world, or afford a better omen for the
future than, if a trustee having done his duty, the cestui
que trust taking it into his fair, serious and well informed
consideration were to do an act of bounty like this. But
the court cannot permit it, except quite satisfied that the act
>s of that nature, for the reason often given; and recollect-
ing that in discussing whether it is an act of rational Con-
es o
sideration, an act of pure volition, uninfluenced, that in-
quiry is so easily baffled in a court of justice, that instead of
the spontaneous act of a friend, uninfluenced, it may be
the impulse of a mind misled by undue kindness or forced
by oppression."2
§ 143. From Undue Influence in General. — The prin-
ciple upon which equity gives relief in the case of control-
ling influence, on the part of a parent or guardian, is ex-
tended to all cases in which an undue influence is exerted
ward, such purchase will be held there had been no surprise, held
valid. "' Blackmore v. Shelby, 6 that the covenant to make such re-
Hmrjph. 437. See also Elrod v. lease should be set aside, as it
Lancaster, 2 Head, 576. seemed to be extorted from the
1 Hylton v. Hylton, 2 Ves. 549 ; Duke by one who had a power over
Hatch v. Hatch, 9 Ves. 296 ; Kich- the young lady as a parent, which
ardson v. Linney, 7 B. Mon. 571; ought not to have been made use
Garvin v. "Williams, 50 Mo. 206. of in that manner; that it was as if
2 Hatch v. Hatch, 9 Ves. 296. In the mother should say "You shall
the case of the Duke of Hamilton not have my daughter unless you
v. Lord Mohun, 1 P.Wms. 118, in release all accounts," and that to
the marriage articles entered into tolerate such an agreement would
was one by which it was agreed be paving a way to guardians to
that he should, within two days sell infants under their wardship ;
after the marriage, release his in- and the greater the fortune was
tended wife's mother, who was her the greater would be the tempta-
guardian, of all accounts of the tion to treat in this manner with the
mesne profits of the estate. Lord guardian.
Chancellor Cowper, admitting that
§ 143. J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
291
by one person to incline another to a voluntary conveyance
of property. Where a spiritual or medical adviser, an ex-
ecutor, an administrator, the directors of a corporation, or
any other persons, whether standing in any fiduciary or
quasi fiduciary relation, or simply sustaining that of a
relative or of a friend or neighbor, from any cause or in
any manner exerts an undue influence in securing to them-
selves a voluntary conveyance of property, they will hold
it under a resulting trust as trustees for the grantor.1 In
the familiar case of Lyon v. Home, where A, a widow,
aged seventy-five, within a few days after first seeing B,
who claimed to be a "spiritual medium," was induced from
her belief that she was fulfilling the wishes of her deceased
husband, conveyed to her through the medium of B, to
adopt him as her son and transfer £24,000 to him ; to
make her will in his favor, afterwards to give him a further
sum of £6,000; and also to settle upon him, subject to
her life interest, the reversion of £30,000 (these gifts
Brooks, 9 Pick. 220, states the law
as follows: "We understand the
law to be, that no degree of phys-
ical or mental imbecility, which
leaves the party legal competency
to act, is of itself sufficient to avoid
a contract or settlement with him ;
but if advantage is taken of his
weakness to draw from him a con-
tract or settlement which is unfav-
orable, by misrepresentation, im-
position or undue influence, such
contract or settlement cannot be
upheld in a court of equity." So
McCoun, V. C, says : "A man may
exhibit weakness and folly in en-
tering into a contract, and in dis-
posing of his property. He may
bind himself perfectly, where
fraud is not practiced upon him,
although he be a man of great
abilities, if he have sufficient ability
to keep himself above the reach of
a commission of lunacy." Siemon
v. Wilson, 3 Edw. Ch. 39.
1 Smith v. Kay, 7 H. L. Cas.
750. "In Dent v. Bennett, 7 Sim.
539, the Vice Chancellor declared
an agreement between a medical
adviser and his patient for a large
sum to be paid by the latter after
his death for past and future serv-
ices null and void. It was held to
be a glaring abuse of confidence,
and the Vice Chancellor enforced
with spirit and energy the doc-
trine, that wherever we find rela-
tion of employer and agent exist-
ing in situations in which, of
necessity, much confidence must •
be placed by the employer in the
agent, then the case arises for
watchfulness on the part of the
court that the confidence shall not
be abused." 2 Kent's Commen-
taries (5th Ed.), 483, n. a. For a
masterly exposition of the law in
such a case see the later opinion of
Lord Chancellor Cottenham, in
Dent v. Bennett, 4 Myl. & Cr. 268.
Parker, C. J., in Farnam v.
2[)2 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 143.
being made without consideration and without a power of
revocation). It was held that the relation proved to exist
between them implied the exercise of dominion and influ-
ence by B over A's mind, and consequently that as B had
failed to prove that these voluntary gifts were the pure,
voluntary, well understood acts of A's mind, they must be
set aside.1 Thus, where a man exerts an undue influence
over a woman to whom he is about to be married, or where
an elder sister controls a younger, equity will afford relief. 2
Where a person whose mind is enfeebled by age or disease
has been placed in such circumstances as to fall under the
special influence of another, his rights will be protected by
a court of equity. If he makes a voluntary conveyance,
or other gift, to any person who is exerting an undue influ-
ence over him, such person will hold the property as his
trustee. An act of that character will be sustained in
equity only as there is conclusive evidence that the nature
of the act was understood by the donor, and that the con-
veyance was not made under the influence of the donee.3
1 Lyon v. Home, L. K. 6 Eq. 655 ; Collins v. Hare, 1 Dow. & C. 139 ;
Norton v. Keilly, 2 Eden, 286; Cooke v. Lamotte, 15 Beav. 234;
Xottidge v. Prince, 2 Giff. 246; Wilkins v. Fowkes, 9 Hare, 592;
Kerivan v. Cullen, 4 Ir. Ch. 322; Custance v. Cunningham, 13 Beav.
MacCabe v. Hussey, 2 Dow. & C. 363; King v. Smith, 21 Beav. 522.
440. As to the validity of gifts 3 Haydock v. Haydock, 34 N". J.
from nuns to their convents, see Eq. 570. "The presumption against
Whyte v. Meade, 2 Ir. Eq. 420; the validity of the gift is not lim-
McCarthy v. McCarthy, 9 Ir. Eq. ited to those instances where the
620. relation of parent and child, guard-
2 Page v. Home, 11 Beav. 227, ian and ward, or husband and wife,
235, 236 ; Corhett v. Brock, 20 Beav. exists, but in every instance where
524; James v. Holmes, 31 L. J. (N. the relation of donor and donee is
S.) 567. As to influence of an elder one in which the latter has acquired
over a younger sister, see Harvey a dominant position. The parent by
v. Mount, 8 Beav. 439. See also age may come under the sway of
the following cases where deeds his children." lb. Highbergerv.
upon proof of undue influence, in- Stiffler, 21 Md. 338. See also Todd
dependent of the fiduciary relation, v. Grove, 33 Md. 188 ; Rhodes v.
were set aside: Osmond v. Bates, L. K. 1 Ch. App. 256; Bil-
Fitzroy, 3 P. Wms. 129 and note; lage v. Souther, 9 Hare, 540; Gib-
Bridgman v. Green, 2 Ves. 627; son v. Kussell, 2 Y. & C. 115; In re
Wright v. Proud, 13 Ves. 136; Greenfield's Estate, 14 Pa. St. 505;
Purcell v. McNamara, 14 Ves. 91; Sears v. Shafer, 6 N. Y.268; Pashe
§ 144. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 293
§ 144. The Subject Continued. — Where there is noth-
ing in the peculiar relations of the parties to create a pre-
sumption of controlling or undue influence the onus pro-
bandi passes to the other side. A voluntary conveyance
will be set aside only as undue influence is proved against
the donee.1 No rule of universal application has been es-
tablished on this point. What amounts to an undue influ-
ence is a question for the court to decide in each case of
this general character. This is true, especially, where the
donor, from age or infirmity, is liable to imposition and
acts without the advice of professional counsel, or that of
a disinterested third person. In Beanland v. Bradley it
was held that where a person, by a deed eight days before
his death, grants a benefit to his grandson and son-in-law
there is no such confidential relation as to induce this court
to presume fraud.2 On the contraiy, in the case of An-
derson v. Elsworth, in some respects similar to the above,
in which a voluntary deed whereby an aged and infirm,
though not incapable donor, made an immediate gift of her
whole property, without power of revocation and without
v. Ollat, 2 Phillim. 323; EanMn v. cording to the circumstances in
Patton, 65 Mo. 376. each particular case. Griffiths v.
1 Hunter v. Atkins, 3 Myl. & K. Robins, 3 Madd. 191 ; Dent v. Ben-
113. Gift by deed subject to a nett, 4 Myl. & Cr. 273; Harvey v.
power of appointment by the donor, Mount, 8 Beav. 439 ; Page v. Home,
from a person upwards of ninety 11 Beav. 227 ; Dutton v. Thomp-
years of age to a confidential agent, son, L. B. 23 Ch. Div. 278. The
who had for many years been in statement of a consideration where
habits of friendship with the donor, there is none, as in Hawes v. Wyatt,
without the intervention of a dis- 3 Bro. Ch. 156; Gibson v. Bus-
interested third person, the solic- sell, 2 Y. &C. 204; Sharp v. Leach,
itor who drew the deed being the 31 Beav. 491 — the absence of a
solicitor of the person who took power of revocation: Coutts v.
the benefit under it, declared void Acworth, L. R. 8 Eq. 558; "Wollas-
at the Bolls, but supported under ton v. Tribe, L. R. 9 Eq. 44 ; Everett
all the circumstances on appeal, v. Everett, L. B. 10 Eq. 405 — the
lb. improvidence of the transaction,
2 Beanland v. Bradley, 2 Sm. & Harvey v. Mount, 8 Beav. 439—
Giff. 339; Toker v. Toker, 31 Beav. furnish a probable but not always
629. No general rule can be laid conclusive test. Phillips v. Mul-
down as to what amounts to undue lings, L. B. 7 Ch. App. 244 ; Hall v.
influence. That will be always a Hall, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 430; Arm-
question for the court to decide ac- strong V.Armstrong, 8 Ir. Eq. 1.
294 IMPLIED TEUSTS. [§ 145.
sufficient evidence that she fully understood the effect of
the instrument, "was set aside after her death at the instance
of the heir-at-law.1
§ 145. The Same Subject. — It may be regarded as an
established rule that where one person gains an important
advantage over another by securing a voluntary conveyance,
or where the transaction indicates palpable improvidence
on the part of the grantor, the persons securing the benefit
will be required to prove that the conveyance was consist-
ent with honesty and fair dealing, and in the absence of
such evidence the conveyance will be set aside.2 In cases
of this character the question whether the donor acted
under competent and disinterested advice will be regarded
as a material point. If he had such advice, the question
of age or business capacity will be treated as of less im-
portance.3 In the absence of any fiduciary relation or of
undue influence, an infant will be allowed to make a dona-
tion of personal property if he has it in possession.4 A
conve3rance or an agreement procured through an undue
influence arising from an appeal to the fears of the grantor,
as where there was a threat to bring disgrace and ruin
upon a son by procuring his indictment for forgery, will
be set aside. In Bayley v. Williams, before the English
High Court of Chancery, it was held that the assent which
is necessary to the validity of an agreement in this court
must be an assent uninfluenced by any power which the
one party may have of operating on the fears of the-
other ; therefore, where an agreement was executed by the
one party the plaintiff, under a threat of another that
the plaintiff's son would otherwise be indicted for forgery,
1 Anderson v. Elworth, 3 Giff. 363; Billage v. Southee, 9 Hare,
154; Phillipson v. Kerry, 32 Beav. 534; Allen v. Davis, 4 De G. & Sm.
628 ; Rhodes v. Bate, L. R. 1 Ch. 133 ; Price v. Price, 1 De G., M & G.
App. 252; Dutton v. Thompson, L. 308; Phillips v. Mullings, L. R. 7
K. 23Ch.Div. 278. Ch. App. 244.
2 Hoghton v. Hoghton, 15 Beav. 3 Rhodes v. Bate, L. R. 1 Oh.
296; Blackiev. Clark, 15 Beav. 600; App. 252.
Cooke v. Larnotte, 15 Beav. 243; * Taylor v. Johnston, L. R. 19 Ch.
Custance v. Cunningham, 13 Beav. Div. 603-608.
§146.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
295
it was set aide with costs. Where the plaintiff's main and
influencing purpose for entering into the agreement was to
relieve his son from exposure, disgrace and ruin, the inter-
vention of other circumstances or collateral advantages to
himself are not enough to sustain the agreement in this
court.1 Where a person in the immediate prospect of death
makes a voluntary conveyance, but not intending that it
shall be in effect in the event of his recovery, it will be set
aside on his recovery, though there was no proof of undue
influence if the instrument contained no power of revoca-
tion.2
§ 146. Resulting Trusts from Gifts by Will The
rules of equity in relation to voluntary conveyances, as set
forth in the preceding sections, by which undue influence
is presumed from the intimate or confidential relations of
1 Bayley v. Williams, 4 Giff . 638.
This case was affirmed in the House
of Lords in "Williams v. Bayley, L.
E. 1 H. L. Cas. 200. A father ap-
pealed to under these circum-
stances to take upon himself a civil
liability, with a knowledge that
unless he does so his son will be
exposed to a criminal prosecution,
with a moral certainty of convic-
tion, even though that is not put
forward by any party as the motive
for the agreement, is not a free and
voluntary agent, and the agree-
ment he makes under such circum-
stances is not enforceable in equity.
Williams v. Bayley, L. E. 1 H. L.
Cas. 200. See also Davies v. Lon-
don«& Provincial Marine Ins. Co.,
L. E. 8,Ch. Div. 469 ; Evans v. Llew-
ellyn, 1 Cox, 333-340.
- Forshaw v. Welsby, 30 Beav.
243. "Judging from their state-
ments, I think that the common
belief of the plaintiff himself, of
his physician and of all of his
family, was that he had but a few
days to live, and that this deed was
prepared and executed in contem-
plation of that event. But when
a man in that state of health sends
for his solicitor and tells him to
prepare a settlement of the whole
of his property, and that solicitor
says : 'I know this man's mind so
well that I am certain he will de-
sire to change it, and that he will
endeavor to upset the whole
thing,' it would be but a matter of
ordinary duty to introduce into
that settlement a power of revoca-
tion, that if by chance he should
recover his health he may have the
opportunity of exercising his free
and uncontrolled judgment over
that settlement of his property,
which he thought it necessary to
make when he considered himself
in articulo mortis. In the absence,
therefore, of any undue influence,
in the absence of any pressure on
the part of his friends or relations,
of which there is no evidence, still
this is a deed which cannot stand
in its present form." Eomilly, II.
E., in Forshaw v. Welsby, 30 Beav..
243.
296 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 146.
the parties, have been held not to be applicable to gifts by
will.1 A devise to a spiritual or medical adviser, or even
to an attorney, who has drawn the will of his client, will
be sustained if there is no evidence of mistake or misap-
prehension, or of undue influence.2 It was formerly held
as a rigid rule that where a testator, who was competent
to make a will, had the instrument read over to him and
thereupon completed the execution of it, all farther in-
vestigation was excluded. But in the recent case of Ful-
ton v. Andrew, before the House of Lords, this rule was
disapproved. In that case it was held that those who take
a benefit under a will, and have been instrumental in pre-
paring or obtaining it, have thrown upon them the onus of
showing the righteousness of the transaction. There is
no unyielding rule of law (especially where the ingredient
of fraud enters into the case) that, where it has been
proved that a testator, competent in mind, has had a will
read over to him and has thereupon executed it, all farther
inquiry is shut out.3 In the recent case of Hegarty v.
1 Parfltt v. Lawless, L. K. 2 P. & Natural influence exerted by one
D. 462; Ashwell v. Lorai, L. K. 2 who possesses it, to obtain a bene-
P. & D. 477. The plaintiff, a Ko- fit for himself is undue inter vivos,
man Catholic priest, had resided so that gifts and contracts inter
with the testatrix and husband as vivos between certain parties will
chaplain, and for a part of the time be set aside, unless the party bene-
as confessor. He was confessor at fited can show affirmatively that the
the time the will in dispute was other party could have formed a
made. There was no evidence that free and unfettered judgment in
the plaintiff had interfered in the the matter; but such natural influ-
making of such will, or that he had ence may be lawfully exercised to
procured the gift of the residue obtain a will or legacy. The rules,
to himself, or that he had brought therefore, of courts of equity in re-
such gift about by coercion or do- lation to gifts inter vivos are not ap-
minion, exercised over the testa- plicable to the making of wills,
trix against her will, or by impor- Parfltt v. Lawless, L. R. 2 P. & D.
tunity not to be resisted. More- 462.
over, it was not shown that even 2 Hindson v. Wetherill, 5 De G.
in the common affairs of life, in M. & G. 301, reversing same case
^business, or in anything else, the 1 Sm. & G-if. 604; Walker v. Smith,
testatrix was under the plaintiff's 29 Beav. 394.
control or dominion. Held, that s Fulton v. Andrew, L. E. 7 H.
there was no evidence to go to a L. Cas. 449; Adams v. Adams, 22 Vt.
jury on an issue of undue influence. 50; Hunt v. Hamilton, 9 Dana, 90;
§ 146.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
297
King it was held that any person propounding a will pre-
pared by himself, without assistance of a third person, and
under which he takes a benefit, is bound to give clear and
convincing evidence that the testator knew and approved
the clause under which he took a benefit, and that this
principle applied even in the case of a near relative of the
testator, and in the absence of such evidence, probate of
that portion of the will may be refused and granted of
the remainder.1 There is no obvious reason for which the
Ewell v. Tidwell, 20 Ark. 136;
Trexler v. Miller, 6 Ind. 248 ; Barry
v. Butlin, 2 Moore, P. 0. 480, 482;
Baker v. Bait, 2 Moore, P. C. 317.
"In the well-known case of Barry
v. Butlin, before the judicial com-
mittee of the privy council, Mr.
Baron Parke, delivering the opin-
ion of the judicial committee, said
this : (1) : 'The rules of law ac-
cording to which cases of this na-
ture are to be decided do not ad-
mit of any dispute so far as they
are necessary to the determination
of the present appeal, and they
have been acquiesced in on both
sides. These rules are two : the
first, that the onus probandi lies in
every case upon the the party pro-
pounding a will, and he must sat-
isfy the conscience of the court that
the instrument so propounded
is the last will of a free and capa-
ble testator. The second is, that
if a party writes or prepares a will
under which he takes a benefit,
that is a circumstance that ought
generally to excite the suspicion of
the court, and calls upon it to be
vigilant and zealous in examining
the evidence in support of the in-
strument, in favor of which it
ought not to pronounce unless the
suspicion is removed, and it is ju-
dicially satisfied that the paper pro-
pounded does express the true will
of the deceased. These principles,
to the extent that I have stated, are
well established. The former is
undisputed ; the latter is laid down
by Sir John Nicholl in substance
in Paske v. Ollatt, 2 Phillim. 323;
Ingram v. Wyatts, 1 Hogg. Ecc.
388, and Billinghurst v. Vickers, 1
Phillim. 187, 193, and is stated by
that very learned and experienced
judge to have been handed down
to him by his predecessors, and
this tribunal has sanctioned and
acted upon in the recent case of
Bakerv.Balt,2Moore,P.C. 317.' "
Lord Cairns in Fulton v. Andrew,
L.E. 7H. L. Cas.461.
1 Hegarty v. King, L. K. 7 Ir. 18 ;
Garvin v. Williams, 44 Mo. 476;
S. c, 50 Mo. 206. "The same princi-
ple which vitiates a contract with
an incapacitated person is ex-
tended in equity to avoid benefits
obtained by trustees from their
cestuis que trustent, or by other per-
sons sustaining a fiduciary charac-
ter from those in regard to whom
that character exists. This rule is
constantly acted upon in the Uni-
ted States. It is applied to execu-
tors, administrators, guardians, as-
signees in bankruptcy, attorney,
trustees and in general to all per-
sons standing in any fiduciary po-
sition. And where even any per-
son stands in relation of special
confidence toward another, so as
to acquire an habitual influence
298
IMPLIED TEUSTS.
[§ 147.
rules of equity in relation to gifts, inter vivos, with refer-
ence to the presumption of undue influence, should not be
applied with regard to the execution of wills, and the tend-
ency of the recent decisions appears to be in that direc-
tion.
§ 147. From the Equitable Conversion of Property. —
By this term is meant an equitable change of real estate
into personalty, or of personalty into real estate, with
reference to the descent or other disposal of property.
This change is recognized by courts of equity in conso-
nance with the common doctrine that where there is an
agreement to do a thing, and the thing ought to be done,
it will be treated for certain purposes as though it were al-
ready done.1 In accordance with this maxim real estate
over him, he cannot accept from
him a personal benefit without ex-
posing himself to the risk, propor-
tioned in a degree to the nature of
their connection, of having it set
aside as unduly obtained. Equity
not only views gifts and contracts
which are made or take place be-
tween parties occupying a confiden-
tial relation, with a jealous eye, but
it goes further and forbids any per-
son standing in a fiduciary posi-
tion from making any profit in
any way, at the expense of the
party whose interest he is bound
to protect without the fullest and
most complete disclosure." Lead-
ing Cases in Equity, *641, conclu-
sion of note to Huguenin v. Base-
ley.
1 Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Eden,
186, 194, 195 ; Pulteney v. Darling-
ton, 1 Bro. Ch. 223. Mr. Fonblan-
que's notes (1 Fonbl. Eq. B. I, ch.
6, § 9, note) (£) contains a marshal-
ing of the authorities upon which
these principles are based. It is as
follows: "The rule equally applies
to money devised to be laid out in
land. The authorities to show that
money, agreed or directed to be
laid out in land, is to be considered
as land, are very numerous. The
force of the rule is particularly
evinced by those cases in which it
has been held that the money
agreed or directed to be laid out
so fully becpmes land, as, first, not
to be personal assets. Earle of
Pembrobe v. Beighden, 3 Ch. Kep.
115; s. c, 2Vern. 52; Lawrence v.
Beverly, 2 Keble, 841, cited also
in Kettleby v. Attwood, 1 Vern.
298, 741 ; secondly, to be subject to
the courtesy of the husband,
though not to the dower of the
wife: Sweetapple v. Bindon, 2
Vern. 536; Otway v. Hudson, 2
Vern. 583 ; thirdly, to pass as land
by will, if subject to the real use
at the time the will was made :
Milner v. Mills, Mosely, 123;
Greenhill v. Greenhill, 2 Vern.
679; S. C, Prec. Ch. 320; Shorerv.
Shorer, 10 Mod. 39 ; Lingen v. Sow-
ray, 1 P. Wms. 172; Guidott v.
Guidott, 3 Atk. 254; fourthly, not
to pass as money by a general be-
quest to a legatee, but it will by a
particular description, as so much
§147.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
299
devised to be converted into money for any legitimate pur-
pose is treated as money, and money bequeathed to be in-
vested in land is treated as land.1 Where land is devised
to a single person, subject to an equitable conversion, he
may elect, before the conversion of the property, to take
either the land or the money. But in case of his death
without an election, the property will descend to his heirs
in the same manner that it would have done had the trust
money to be laid out in land :
Cross v. Addenbroke; Fulham v.
Jones, cited in a note to Lechmere
v. Earl ol Carlisle, 3 P. Wms. 222 ;
or by a bequest of all the testator's
estate in law and equity : Kashleigh
v. Masters, 1 Ves. Jr. 204. But
equity will not consider money as
land unless the covenant or direc-
tion to lay it out in land be express.
Symons v. Kutter, 3 Vera. 227;
Curling v. May, M. 8 G. II., cited
in Guidott v. Guidott, 3 Atk. 255.
And as money agreed or directed
to be laid out in land shall in gen-
eral be considered as land, so laDd
agreed or directed to be sold shall
be considered and treated as
money. Gilb. Lex. Pretoria, 243.
But see Ashby v. Palmer, 1 Meriv.
296. As to from what time the
conversion shall be supposed, see
Sitwell v. Bernard, 6 Ves. 520; El-
win v. Elwin, 8 Ves. 547 ; and the
creditors of the bargainer may
compel the heir to convey the land.
Best v. Stanford, 1 Salk. 154. But
it must not be understood that
where a testator directs his real es-
tate to be sold for purposes which
are answered out of the personal es-
tate, the next of kin may insist
upon the real estate's being sold;
for there is no equity between the
next of kin and the heir; but the
general principle is that the heir
takes all that which is not for a de-
fined and specific purpose given by
the will. Chitty v. Parker, 2 Ves.
Jr. 271 ; Ex parte Bromfield, 1 Ves.
Jr. 453; Oxenden v. Lord Comp-
ton, 2 Ves. Jr. 69; Walker v.
Denne, 2 Ves. Jr. 170 ; Lord Comp-
ton v. Oxenden, 2 Ves. Jr. 361. But
see Wheldale v. Partridge, 8 Ves.
235. And where the testator was
entitled to a fund, as money or
land, his real and personal repre-
sentatives shall take it as money or
as land, according as the testator
would have taken it. See Ackroyd
v. Smithson, and the cases there
cited, 1 Bro. Ch. 503. See also
Hewitt v. Wright, 1 Bro. Ch. 86,
as to Lord Thurlow's opinion that
money, resulting to the heir as be-
ing produced by sale of real estate
undisposed of, is to be considered
as personal estate of the heir, and
as such would go to the executor.
Russell v. Smythies, 1 Cox, 215.
But if the use and possession were
not united it would still be consid-
ered as land. Rashleigh v. Mas-
ters, 1 Ves. Jr. 201; Wheldale v.
Partridge, 8 Ves. 235."
1 Fletcher v. Ashburner, 1 Bro.
Ch. 497; Cruse v. Barley, 3 P.
Wms. 22, and note; Peter v. Bev-
erly, 10 Pet. 533; Seymour v.
Freer, 8 Wall. 202 ; Craig v. Leslie,
3 Wheat. 563 ; Rinehart v. Harri-
son, Bald. 177; Beading v. Black-
well, Bald. 166; Black v. Scott, 2
Brock. 326; Cropley v. Cooper, 19
Wall. 174.
300 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 148.
been executed in his lifetime. In the case of Craig v.
Leslie, before the Supreme Court of the United States, it
was held that equity considers land directed in wills or
other instruments to be sold and converted into money, as
money, and money directed to be employed in the purchase
of land, as land. Where the whole beneficial interest in
the land or money, thus directed to be employed belongs
to the person for whose use it is given, a court of equity
will permit the cestui que trust to take the money or the
land at his election, if he elect before the conversion is
made. But in case of the death of the cestui que trust,
without having determined his election, the property will
pass to his heirs or personal representatives, in the same
manner as it would have done if the conversion had been
made and the trust executed in his lifetime.1 Where real
estate is devised charged with debts or legacies, it will be
treated as converted into personalty, so far as relates to
the charge, but unless a different course is indicated in the
instrument the estate will retain its character as realty, so
far as it is not affected by the charge, until there is an actual
conversion.2
§ 148. The Subject Continued. — Where real estate is de-
vised to a number of heirs, the estate to be converted into
money and divided according to the terms of the will, and
one or more of them die during the lifetime of the testator,
or before they become entitled to a share of the property,
a resulting trust arises in favor of the heir-at-law. In a
case where F B devised her real and personal estate to
trustees, in trust, to sell, to pay debts and legacies, and to
pay the residue to five persons, to be equally divided be-
tween them, share and share alike, orie of the residuary
legatees died in the lifetime of the testatrix, and it was held
that a resulting trust arose in the share of the legatee who
died, in the real estate, in favor of the heir-at-law of the
i Craig v. Leslie, 3 Wheat. 553 ; 3 Whart. 62 ; Kioe v. Bbder, 1 W.
Seymour v. Freer, 8 Wall. 202; & S. 445.
Hawley v. James, 5 Paige, 318; 2 Bourne v. Bourne, 2 Hare, 35,
S. c, 16 Wend. 61 ; Smith v. Starr, 38.
§ 148.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
301
testatrix.1 The principle on which decisions of this char-
acter are based is that the heir takes all the real estate and
all the property to which the character of realty attaches
in equity, and of which no other definite and positive dis-
i Cruse v. Barley, 3 P. Wms. 22.
The note of Mr. Cox to this case is
as follows : "The several cases on
this subject seem to depend upon
this question, whether the testator
meant to give to the produce of the
real estate the quality of personalty
to all intents, or only so far as re-
spected the particular purposes of
the will. Mallabar v. Mallabar,
Cas. temp. Talb. 79; Durour v.
Motteaux, 1 Ves. 320, are cases of
the former kind; of the latter are
Cruse v. Barley, Arnold v. Chap-
man, 1 Ves. 108; Digby v. Legard,
before Lord Bathurst, Trln. Term,
1774, where E B devised her real
and personal estate to trustees, in
trust, to sell, to pay debts and leg-
acies, and to pay the residue to
five persons to be equally divided
between them, share and share
alike; one of the residuary lega-
tees died in the lifetime of the tes-
tatrix; the court at the hearing
and afterwards upon a rehearing
held that there was a resulting
trust, as to the share in the real
estate of the residuary legatee, who
died in the testatrix's lifetime for
the benefit of the heir-at-law. Keg.
Lib. A. 1773, fol. 495, and 1774 fol.
325. Ackroyd v. Smithson before
Lord Thurlow, March 4th, 1780.
Christopher Holdsworth by will
gave several pecuniary legacies,
and then devised all his real and
personal estate to trustees in trus-
tees to sell the same and convert
the same and every part thereof
into ready money, and out of the
produce to pay his debts and the
above mentioned legacies, and to
pay the surplus (if any) unto the
said several legatees in proportion
to their respective legacies ; two of
the legatees died in the lifetime of
the testator. Lord Chancellor ap-
proved of the case of Digby v.
Legard, and declared that the
shares in the real estate of the two
residuary legatees who died in the
testator's lifetime resulted to the
heir-at-law. Eeg. Lib. A. 1779,
fol. 668. But notwithstanding that
such interest results to the heir, as
being a part of the real estate un-
disposed of, it may yet be personal
estate of the heir, and pass as such
by a residuary bequest. Hewitt v.
Wright, 1 Bro. Ch. 90." The incli-
nation of courts of equity, in de-
termining as to the conversion of
realty into personalty, or person-
alty into realty, is not generally to
change the quality of the prop-
erty, unless there is some clear act
or intention by which a definite
character, either as money or land,
has been unequivocally fixed upon
it throughout. If this intention do
not clearly appear, the property
retains its original character, there
being no equity between the heir
and next of kin in such cases.
Lynn v. Gephart, 27 Md. 547. A
testator devised his real estate to
his wife for life, remainder to two
devisees in fee. The widow peti-
tioned the Orphans' Court, that the
land might be sold under the Act
of April 3, 1851, § 1. The devisees
(one, a minor by his guardian)
requested that the sale be made
and the land was sold. Held, that
the sale converted the land into
personalty. The proceeds retained
the character of land during the
302
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 148.
position has been made.1 Unless there is something in the
instrument by which the quality of the estate is unequivo-
cally fixed, courts of equity will not interfere to change the
character of the property as it was left by the testator.
In a case where testatrix directed her real estate to be sold,
and all her estate to be converted into money for the pur-
poses of her will, the will was satisfied without touching
the realty. It was held that there was no equity for the
next of kin against the heir.2
widow's life for the purposes of the
will, but for no other purpose, but
on her death were to be distribu-
ted as money. Even after conver-
sion it would descend as money,
although for other purposes it was
realty. Where a conversion of
land into money has taken place
for a specific purpose, after the
purpose has been subserved the
proceeds descend as money.
Large's Appeal, 54 Pa. St. 383. If
a person charges his real property
with the payment of his debts, un-
less there is a clear indication that
it shall be converted out and out
it retains its character of realty, so
far as the charge does not extend,
until it is actually converted.
Bourne v. Bourne, 2 Hare, 38.
1 Chitty v. Parker, 2 Ves. 271.
Where a testator authorizes his ex-
ecutors to sell real estate, and it is
apparent from the general provis-
ions of the will that he intended
such estate to be sold, the doctrine
of equitable conversion applies,
although the power of sale is not
in terms imperative. Dodge, Exr.,
v. Pond, 23 N. Y. 63.
2 Chitty v. Parker, 2 Ves. Jr. 271.
Act Cong. June 15, 1880, providing
that "persons who have heretofore
under any of the homestead laws
entered lands properly subject to
such entry, or persons to whom the
right of those having so entered
for homesteads, may have been at-
tempted to be transferred by bona
fide instrument in writing," may
make cash entry of the land, does
not include a person to whom such
right of the entryman has been
transferred subsequent to such
statute; and where such a, trans-
feree has entered the land with his
own money, and for his own bene-
fit, but in the name of the entry-
man, it not appearing that he dealt
with the government officers as
such transferee, a court of equity
will not declare or enforce a re-
sulting trust in favor of such trans-
feree or his grantee. Dewhurst v.
Wright (1892), 29Fla.223; s. C, 10
So. Bep. 682. Where the owner of
land conveys it without considera-
tion, under an agreement by the
grantee to sell it, and to reconvey
on demand any portion of it not
sold, and the grantee, after ob-
taining the deed, refuses to recon-
vey, or to account for the part sold,
there is a resulting trust, though
there was no fraud by the grantee
before procuring the deed. Giffen
v. Taylor (1894), 139 Ind. 573;
s. c, 37 N. E. Kep. 392. One re-
deeming another's property from
a tax sale, with means furnished
by himself, under an agreement by
that other to repay when able, will
be considered a trustee for that
other, and the fact that certificates
§ 149. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 303
§ 149. The Same Subject. — The intention of a testator
in regard to the equitable conversion of an estate is not al-
ways clearly indicated in the instrument. If not plainly
expressed, it is to be gathered from the general tenor of
the will, and from the circumstances which have a bearing
upon the case. Questions are liable to arise which involve
nice and difficult principles of equity. In Farrar v. The
Earl of Winterton, where a testatrix devised real estate,
and afterwards sold it, and the purchase was not completed
until after her death, it was held that the purchase money
belonged to the personal representative, and not to the
devisees of the testatrix, notwithstanding her lien on the
estate for the purchase money, and notwithstanding the 1
Vict. ch. 26, § 23, which directs: "That no conveyance,
or other act, made or done subsequently to the execution of
a will of, or relating to any real or personal estate therein
comprised, except an act by which such will shall be re-
voked, as aforesaid, shall prevent the operation of the will
with respect to such estate, or interest in such real or per-
sonal estate, as the testator shall have power to dispose of
by will at the time of his death."1 In a similar case, where
of transfer are taken in his own which alone she had a right to dis-
name will be treated as having pose; and though she had a lien
been done merely to secure reim- upon the land and might have re-
bursement. Waller v. Jones 1^1895) fused to convey till the money was
(Ala.), 18 So. Rep. 277. paid, yet that lien was a mere se-
1 Farrar v. Earl of Winterton, 5 curity, in or to which she had no
Beav. 1. Lord Langdale, Master right or interest, except for the
of the Bolls, in Farrar v. Earl of purpose of enabling her to obtain
Winterton, 5 Beav. 1, 8, says : "The the payment of the money. The
question whether the devisees can beneficial interest in the land which
have any interest in that part of she had devised was not at her dis-
the purchase money which was position, but was by her act wholly
unpaid, depends on the rights and vested in another, at the time of
interests of the testatrix at the time her death ; and the case is clearly
of her death. She had contracted distinguishable from cases in
to sell her beneficial interest. In which testators, notwithstanding
equity she had alienated the land, conveyances made after the dates
and instead of her beneficial inter- of their wills, have retained estates
est in the land she had acquired a or interests in the property which
title to the purchase money. What remain subject to their disposi-
was really hers in right and equity tion."
was not the land but the money, of
304
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 149.
A contracted to sell an estate, the contract was valid at his
death, but the purchaser lost his right to a specific per-
formance, by subsequent laches, it was held that the estate
belonged to the next of kin, and not to the heir-at-law.1
1 Curre v. Bowyer, 5 Beav. 6.
By a marriage, settlement lands
were conveyed to trustees to the
use of all the children equally, and
his, her and their heirs and assigns,
with a power of sale, and a direc-
tion that the proceeds should be
laid out in the purchase of other
lands, or on government or real se-
curities, which, when purchased,
should be made liable to the same
trusts, estates and limitations as
were declared of the trust prem-
ises. The lands were sold and the
proceeds invested on mortgage.
Held, that the proceeds of the sale
must be treated as personalty and
not as realty. Atwell v. Atwell,
L. B. 13 Eq. 23. See also Nelson
v. Hagerstown Bank, 27 Md. 51 ;
Sharp v. St. Sauveur, L. E. 7 Ch.
App. 343; Webb v. Sadler, L. B.
14 Eq. 533; s. C, 1,. E. 8 Ch. App.
419; Eich v. Whitfield, L. E. 2 Eq.
583; Singleton v. Love, 1 Head,
357 ; Edwards' Appeal, 47 Pa. St.
144; Anewalt's Appeal, 42 Pa. St.
414; Wurtv. Page, 4 C. E. Green,
365; Green v. Johnson, 4 Bush,
164; Hocker v. Gentry, 3 Met. 463;
Smithers v. Hooper, 23 Md. 273;
Boss v. Drake, 37 Pa. St. 373;
High v. Worley, 33 Ala. 196; Tay-
lor v. Johnson, 63 N. Car. 381.
CHAPTEE X.
IMPLIED TKUSTS CONTINUED.
RESULTING TRUSTS
-DIVISION SECOND.
TRUSTS RESULTING TO
PAYOR.
§150.
Introductory.
§ 166.
From Husband as Trustee
151.
Resulting Trust from Title
of Wife.
in the Name of Another.
167.
The Subject Continued.
152.
For Partial Interest.
168.
The Same Subject.
153.
The Subject Continued.
169.
From Purchase by a
154.
From Tenancy in Common.
Mother in the Name of
155.
The Subject Continued.
a Child.
156.
From Partnership Pur-
170.
Conveyance by One in Loco
chase.
Parentis.
157.
From Purchase by Trustee.
171.
From Conveyance for De-
158.
The Subject Continued.
frauding Creditors.
159.
Resulting Trust from Pur-
172.
Established by Parol.
chase by an Agent.
173.
Parol Proof Continued.
160.
From Title in the Name of
174.
Parol E viden ce in Reb u ttal.
Wife or Child.
175.
The Subject Continued.
161.
The Subject Continued.
176.
Parol Evidence of Ad-
162.
Presumption of Advance-
vancement.
ment.
177.
Resulting Trusts in Per-
163.
The Subject Continued.
sonalty.
164.
The Same Subject.
178.
When a Resulting Trust
165.
From Conveyance in the
Arises.
Name of a Mother.
179.
Modern Legislation.
§ 150. Introductory. — Trusts of this class are such as
arise where the title is taken in the name of one person and
the purchase money is paid by another. It is an estab-
lished doctrine in equity, both in England and in this
country, that where property is purchased and the legal
title is taken in the name of A, while the consideration
comes from B, a trust results in favor of B, and A simply
20
306 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 151.
holds the legal title as his trustee. But a trust results in
favor of B only as the purchase price is actually paid by
him, or as he assumes an obligation to pay at, or before,
the time of the conveyance, and as a part of the transac-
tion. And npt only the time of payment, but the exact
amount of the purchase money paid, must be clearly estab-
lished. Where there is any indefiniteness or uncertainty
on either of these points, no trust will result. But, in ad-
dition to these, it must appear, either that it was the inten-
tion of the person paying the purchase money to retain the
equitable interest, or that the execution of the instrument,
by which the property was conveyed, was the result of
some misunderstanding, accident or mistake. These points
must be made clear beyond a reasonable doubt. But,
where they are established, equity will afford relief through
a resulting trust. This doctrine is succinctly and effectively
set forth in the oft-quoted words of Lord Chief Baron
Eyre: "The clear result of all the cases, without a single
exception, is that the trust of a legal estate, whether free-
hold, copyhold, or leasehold, ; whether taken in the names
of the purchaser and others jointly, or in the name of
others without that of the purchaser; whether in one name
or several, whether jointly or successive, results to the man
who advances the purchase money ; and it goes, on a strict
analogy to the rule of the common law, that where a feoff-
ment is made without consideration, the use results to the
feoffor."1 As the rules of equity by which trusts of this
class are governed differ somewhat with reference to the
different relations which exist between the parties to the
conveyance, it will be a matter of convenience to present
them under two heads : First, purchase in the name of a
stranger, and, secondly, purchase in the name of a near
relative.
§ 151. Resulting Trust from Title in the Name of
Another. — Where one person purchases an estate, paying
1Dyer v. Dyer, 2 Cos, 92; s. c, 1 White & Tudor Lead. Cas. in
Eq. 314.
§ 151.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
307
the purchase money and takes the legal title in the name
of another, who is a stranger, a resulting trust arises in
favor of the purchaser. The grantee holds the legal title
in trust for the grantor. This comes of the well estab-
lished principle that the person who pays the purchase
price of an estate takes the equitable title. As a principle
of equity this is not now open to controversy.1 The cases
1 Botsford v. Burr, 2 Johns. Ch
404; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 5, § 1
Forrester v. Moore, 68 Hun, 526
Bigley v. Jones, 114 Pa. St. 510
Hellman v. Messmer, 75 Cal. 166
Doulin v. Bradley, 119 111. 420
Harris v. Mclntire, 118 111. 275
Bush v. Stanley, 122 111. 406 ; Tins-
ley v. Tinsley, 52 Iowa, 14; Shel-
tonv. A. & T. Co., 82 Ala. 315;
Mosteller v. Mosteller, 40 Kas. 658;
Bitzer v. Bobo, 39 Minn. 18. . See
also Price v. Kane (1892) , 112 Mo.
412; s. c, 20 S. W. Rep. 609; Phil-
lips v. Overfleld (1890), 100 Mo.
466; s. C, 13 S. W. Hep. 705;
Serutchfield v. Santer (1894), 119
Mo. 615; s. c, 24 S. W. Rep. 137;
Miller v. Davis (.1872), 50 Mo. 572;
Key v. Jennings (1S77), 66 Mo.
356; Forrester v. Moore (1883), 77
Mo. 651; Dyer v. Dyer, 2 Cox, 92;
s. c, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 314; Willis
v. Willis, 2 Atk. 71 ; Crop v. Nor-
ton, 2 Atk. 75 ; Lloyd v. Spillett, 2
Atk. 150; Eider v. Kidder, 10 Ves.
360; Ex parte Houghton, 17 Ves.
251; s. c, Redington, 3 Ridg. 106,
177; Howe v. Howe, 1 Vern. 415;
Prankerd v. Prankerd, 1 S. & S.
1 ; Withers v. Withers, Amb. 151 ;
Lever v. Andrews, 7 Bro. P.
C.288; Wray v. Steele, 2 V. & B.
388; Lade v. Lade, 1 Wils. 21;
Groves v. Groves, 3 Y. & J. 170;
Woodman v. Morrel, Freem. Ch.
Cas. 33; Ex parte Vernon, 2 P.
Wms. 549; Ambrose v. Ambrose, 1
P. Wms. 321 ; Trench v. Harrison,
17 Sim. Ill; Hungate v. Hungate,
Toth. 120; Murless v. Franklin, 1
Swanst. 17; Finch v. Finch, 15
Ves. 50 ; Grey v. Grey, 2 Swanst.
597;'PelIy v. Maddin, 21 Vin. Ab.
498; Smith v. Camelford, 2 Ves.
Jr. 712; Clark v. Danvers, 1 Ch.
Cas. 310; Smith v. Baser, 1 Atk.
385; Bartlett v. Pickersgill, 1
Eden, 515; Olcott v. Bynum, 17
Wall. 44; Peabody v. Tarbell, 2
Cush. 232; Livermore v. Aldrich,
5 Cush. 435; Root v. Blake, 14
Pick. 271; McGowan v. McGowan,
14 Gray, 121 ; Kendall v. Mann, 11
Allen, 15; Blodgett v. Hildreth,
103 Mass. 4S4 ; Sherburne v. Morse,
132 Mass. 469 ; Powell v. Monson,
etc. Mfg. Co., 3 Mason, 362; Hoxie
v. Carr, 1 Sumn. 187; Jackson v.
Sternberg, 1 Johns. Cas. 153 ; Boyd
v. McLean, 1 Johns. Ch. 582;
Steere v. Steere, 5 Johns. Ch. 1;
Partridge v. Havens, 10 Paige Ch.
61S; White v. Carpenter, 2 Paige
Ch. 218; Jackson v. Matsdorf, 11
Johns. 91; Jackson v. Mills, 13
Johns. 463; Jackson v. Morse, 16
Johns. 197; Forsythe v. Clarke, 3
Wend. 637; Botsford v. Burr, 1
Johns. Ch. 408; Guthrie v. Gard-
ner, 19 Wend. 414 ; Gomez v. Bank,
4 Sandf. Sup. Ct. 106; Brown v.
Cheney, 59 Barb. 628; Lounds-
berry v. Purdy, 18 N. Y. 515;
McCartney v. Bostwick, 32 N". Y.
53; Robbins v. Bobbins, 89 N. Y.
251; Foote v. Colvin, 3 Johns. 218;
Hempstead v. Hempstead, 2 Wend.
109 ; Union College v. Wheeler, 59
Barb. 585; Buck v. Pike, 11 Me.
308
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 151.
arising under this rule are very numerous, and the decisions
of the court are uniform and conclusive. This doctrine of
9; Baker v. Vining, 30 Me. 121;
s. c, 50 Am. Deo. 617; Lawry v.
Spaulding, 73 Me. 31; Kelley v.
Jenness, 50 Me. 455 ; Page v. Page,
8X. H. 187; Lyford v. Thurston,
16 X. H. 399; Dow v. Jewell, 18 X.
H. 310; Hall v. Young, 37 X. H.
184; Pembroke v. Allenstown, 21
X. H. 107; Tebbetts v. Tilton, 31
X. H. 273; Hopkinson v. Dumas,
42 X. H. 296; Hall v. Congdon, 56
X. H. 270; Pinney v. Fellows, 15
Vt. 525; Dewey v. Long, 25 Vt.
564; Clark v. Clark, 43 Vt. 685;
De Peyster v. Gould, 2 Green Ch.
4S0; Howell v. Howell, 15 ST. J.
Eq. 75; Stratton v. Dialogue, 16 IN".
J. Eq. 70; Cutter v. Tut'tle, 19 X.
J. Eq. (4 C. E. Green) 549; Van
Syckle v. Kleine, 34 X. J. Eq. 332;
Mershon v. Duer, 40 X. J. Eq. 333;
Plant v. Plant (1888), 44 X. J. Eq.
18; Stevens v. Wilson, 18 X. J. Eq.
447; Stewart v. Brown, 2 S. & B.
461 ; Jackman v. Ringland, 4 W. &
S. 149; Strimpfler v. Roberts, 18
Pa. St. 283; Wallace v. Duffield, 2
S. & B. 521; Edwards v. Edwards,
39 Pa. St. 369; Lloyd v. Carter, 5
Harris, 216; Kisler v. Kisler, 2
Watts, 323; Beck v. Graybill, 4
Casey, 66; Lynch v. Cox, 11 Har-
ris, 265; Harrold v. Lane, 55 Pa.
St. 268 ; Nixon's Appeal, 63 Pa. St.
279; Xewells v. Morgan, 2 Hair.
225; Bickels' Appeal, 86 Pa. St.
204; Creed v. Lancaster Bank, 1
Ohio St. 1; Williams v. Van Tuyl,
2 Ohio St. 336; McGovern v. Knox,
21 Ohio St. 547; Byers v. Wack-
man, 16 Ohio St. 410; Elliott v.
Armstrong, 2 Blackf. 198; Jenison
v. Graves, 2 Blackf. 444; Khodes
v. Green, 36 Ind. 11; Milliken v.
Ham, 36 Ind. 166; Church v. Cole,
36 Ind. 35; Hampson v. Fall, 64
Ind. 382; Smith v. Sackett, 5Gilm.
534; Prevo v. Walker, 4 Scam. 33;
Bruce v. Koney, 18 111. 67; Sea-
man v. Cook, 14 111. 501; Williams
v. Brown, 14 111. 200; Xicholls v.
Thornton, 16 111. 113; Latham v.
Henderson, 47 111. 185; Kane
County v. Herrington, 50 111. 232;
Mathisv. Stufflebeam, 94 111. 481;
Scheerer v. Scheerer, 109 111. 11;
Donlin v. Bradley, 119 111. 412;
McXamara v. Garrity, 106 111. 384;
Springer v. Springer, 114 111. 550;
Harris v. Mclntire, 118 111. 275;
Bush v. Stanley, 122 111. 406;
Cooper v. Cockrum, 87 Ind. 443;
Boyer v. Libby, 88 Ind. 235;
Gogherty v. Bennett, 37 X. J. Eq.
87; Morgan v. Xewells, 2 Harr.
(Del.) 224; Dorsey v. Clark, 4 H.
& J. (Md.) 551; Hollis v. Hollis, 1
Md. Ch. 479; Glenn v. Randall, 2
Md. Ch. 221; Farringerv. Ramsey,
2 Md. 365; Cecil Bank v. Snively,
23 Md. 253; Xeale v. Haythrop, 3
Bland, 551 ; Insurance Co. v. Deal,
18 Md. 26; s. C, 79 Am. Dec. 673;
Kellar v. Kunkel, 46 Md. 565 ; Bank
of U. S. v. Carrington, 7 Leigh,
566; Law v. Law, 76 Va. 527
Weinrich v. Wolf, 24 W. Va. 299
Smith v. Patton, 12 W. Va. 541
Murray v. Sell, 23 W. Va. 473
Heiskell v. Powell, 23 W. Va. 717
Henderson v. Hoke, 1 Dev. & Bat.
Eq. 119; Cunningham v. Bell, 83
X. Car. 328; Dillard v. Crocker,
Speer's Ch. 20; Williams v. Hol-
lingsworth, 1 Strobh. Eq. 103;
s. c, 47 Am. Dec. 527; Garrett v.
Garrett, 1 Strobh. Eq. 96; Mc-
Guire v. McGowan, 4 Desaus. 491;
Witte v. Wolf, 16 S. Car. 256; Ex
parte Trenholm, 19 S. Car. 126;
Bichardson v. Mounce, 19 S. Car.
477; Sexton v. Hollis, 26 S. Car.
§ 151.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
309
the courts of equity is conformed to the rule of the com-
mon law, that where a feoffment is made without consid-
231; Ramage v. Ramage, 27 S.
Car. 39 ; Kirkpatrick v. Davidson,
2 Kelly, 297 ; Murphy v. Peabody,
63 Ga. 522; Foster v. Trustees, 3
Ala. 302; Anderson v. Jones, 10
Ala. 401; Caple v. McCollum, 27
Ala. 461 ; Bates v. Kelly, 80 Ala.
140; Lewis v. Bldg. & L. Assn., 70
Ala. 276; Rose v. Gibson, 71 Ala.
35; Shelby v. Tardy, 84 Ala. 327;
Harden v. Darwin, 66 Ala. 55;
Powell v. Powell, 1 Freem. Ch.
(Miss.) 134; Cottle v. Harold, 72
Ga. 830; Runnels v. Jackson, 1
How. (Miss.) 358; Mahorner v.
Harrison, 21 Miss. 53; Leiper v.
Hoffman, 26 Miss. 615 ; Harvey v.
Ledbetter, 48 Miss. 95 ; Brooks v.
Shelton, 54 Miss. 353; Bobinson v.
Leflore, 59 Miss. 14S; Bratton v.
Rogers, 62 Miss. 281 ; McCarroll v.
Alexander, 48 Miss. 128 ; Gaines v.
Chew, 2 How. 619 ; McDonough's
Exrs. v. Murdock, 15 How. 367;
Hall v. Sprigg, 7 Mar. (La.) 243;
Ensley v. Ballentine, 4 Humph.
233 ; Smithead v. Gray, 1 Humph.
491; Gass v. Gass, 1 Heisk. 613;
Click v. Click, 1 Heisk. 6.07 ; Burks
v. Burks, 7 Baxt. 353; Thomas v.
Walker, 5 Humph. 93; Harris v.
Union Bank, 1 Cold. 152; Perry v.
Head, 1 A. K. Marsh. 47 ; Letcher
v. Letcher, 4 J. J. Marsh. 592;
Doyle v. Doyle, 1 Dana, 536 ; Stark
v. Canady, 3 Litt. 399 ; Chaplin v.
McAfee, 3 J. J. Marsh. 513; Groes-
beck v. Seeley, 13 Mich. 329;
Campbell v. Campbell, 21 Mich.
428; Kagan v. Walker, 1 Wis. 527;
Irvine v. Marshall, 7 Minn. 286;
McLennan v. Sullivan, 13 Iowa,
521; Tinsley v. Tinsley, 52 Iowa,
14; Bryant v. Hendricks, 5 Iowa,
256; Paul v. Chouteau, 14 Mo. 5S0;
Rankin v. Harper, 23 Mo. 579;
Eddy v. Baldwin, 23 Mo. 588;
Kelly v. Johnson, 28 Mo. 249;
Baumgartner v. Guessfleld, 38 Mo.
36; Johnson v. Quaiies, 46 Mo.
423; Russell v. Lode, 1 Iowa, 566;
McGuire v. Ramsey, 9 Ark. 518;
Sale v. McLean, 29 Ark. 612 ; Du-
val v. Marshall, 30 Ark. 230; Tarp-
ley v. Poage, 2 Tex. 139; Long v.
Steiger, 8 Tex. 460; Obertheir v.
Strand, 33 Tex. 522 ; Burns v. Ross
(18S8), 71 Tex. 516; s. c, 9 S. W.
Rep. 468; Shepherd v. White, 11
Tex. 346; Reynolds v. Reynolds,
30 Kas. 91; Smith v. Strahan, 16
Tex. 314; Dean v. Dean, 6 Conn.
285 ; Bear v. Koenigstein, 16 Neb.
65; Lipscomb v. Nichols, 6 Colo.
290 ; Frederick v. Haas, 5 Nev. 389 ;
Boskowitz v. Davis, 12 Nev. 446;
Bayles v. Baxter, 22 Cal. 575; Os-
borne v. Endicott, 6 Cal. 149; Mil-
lard v. Hathaway, 27 Cal. 119; Case
v. Codding, 38 Cal. 191; Wilson v.
Castro, 31 Cal. 420; Jenkins v.
Frink, 30 Cal. 586; Settembre v.
Putnann, 30 Cal. 490; Wormouth
V.Johnson, 5S Cal. 621; Ward v.
Ward (1887), 73 Cal. 13; s. c, 14
Pac. Rep. 604; Osgood v. Eaton,
62 N. H. 512 ; Farrington v. Duval,
10 S. Car. 944; Mance v. Mance, 2S
111. App. 5S7; Tryon v. Huntoon,
67 Cal. 325; Carter v. Montgomery,
2 Tenn. Ch. 216; Ward v. Arm-
strong, 84 111. 151; McCreary v.
Casey, 50 Cal. 349; Dunn v. Simp-
son, 6 Binn. 478; Agrl. Assn. v.
Brewster, 51 Tex. 257.; Hennessey
v. Walsh, 55 N. H. 515. For the
authorities under the statutes in
force substantially abolishing this
class of resulting trusts in New
York, Michigan, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Minnesota, Wisconsin and
Kansas, see § 179.
310
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 151-
eration a use results to the feoffor.1 Indeed, as has been
said, the principle has its basis in the natural presumption
1 Dyer v. Dyer, 2 Cox, 92, 93 ;
s. c, 1 White & Tud. Lead. Cas. in
Eq. 314; 2 Sudg. on Vend. ch.
15, § 2, pp. 134, 135. G, being the
owner of a bounty land warrant,
gave it to defendant for the pur-
pose of entering with it the land
called for, for the benefit of G.
Defendant entered the land with
such warrant in his own name, and
took a patent thereto, without the
consent of G. G took possession of
the land at or soon after such en-
try, and he and his alienees, for
many years thereafter, with the
knowledge of defendant, exercised
acts of ownership over the same,
and defendant, during all that
time, asserted no adverse claim or
right therein. Held, that defend-
ant held the title to the land in
trust for G and his alienees. Lee
v. Patten (1894), 34 Fla. 149; s. c,
15 So. Rep. 775. B and another,
members of a church society, ad-
vanced money to build a church,
and took mortgages on the prop-
erty. After the church was com-
pleted, they agreed with the soci-
ety that if other debts were paid
they would donate the amount due
them. The society then incorpo-
rated, and B and such other each
subscribed to the stock to the
amount due him. Afterwards such
corporation, by an agreement with
the rector, wardens and vestry of
such church, also incorporated,
turned over all its property to the
latter for the free use of the parish,
and it was so used until the build-
ing and personal property were
destroyed by fire. After the fire
such corporation sold its property,
and distributed its assets among
the stockholders. The amount
due B was retained by the treas-
urer because of diverse claims
thereto. Held, that the stock is-
sued to B was his individual prop-
erty, and was not held in trust for
the rector, wardens and vestry.
St. George's Church Soc. v.
Branch, 120 Mo. 226; s. C, 25 S.
W. Rep. 218. Under Gen. St. 1894,
§ 4280, prohibiting resulting trusts
in favor of a third person paying
the consideration for a convey-
ance, where plaintiff in purchasing
school land directed the certificate
of sale to be made in the name of
defendant without the latter's
knowledge, no trust in the land re-
sulted in plaintiff's favor. Haaven
v. Hoaas (1895), 60 Minn. 313; S.
c, 62 N. W. Rep. 110. Where
one who has located land assigns
his certificate of location, and af-
terwards take a patent for the land,
his assignee becomes the equita-
ble owner thereof. Latimer v.
Logwood (1S93) (C. C. App.
Tex.), 27 S. W. Rep. 960. In
an action to enforce a resulting
trust in favor of plaintiff in land
conveyed to another, and for which
plaintiff had paid, the want of con-
sent to such conveyance must be
expressly alleged. Petzhold v.
Petzhold (1893), 53 Minn. 39; S. C,
54 N. W. Rep. 933. 1 Rev. St. p.
728, § 51, providing that where a
grant is made to one person, and
the consideration is paid by an-
other, no trust shall result, but the
title shall vest in the grantee, does
not apply where the two persons
expressly agree that the title to
land purchased by them shall be
taken in the name of one for the
benefit of both. Robertson v.
Sayre, 6 X. Y. Supl. 649, distin-
§ 151. j
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
311
that one who purchases property, and pays the purchase
price, does it for his own benefit rather than for that of an-
other, and that the conveyance to a third person is a niat-
guished ; Gould v. Gould, 3 1ST. Y.
Supl. 608, explained; Gage v.
Gage (1894), 83 Hun, 362; S. C, 31
N. Y. Supl. 903. Land was con-
veyed to an individual in his own
name, but it was shown that he
was a bishop in a certain religious
body; that money was raised by
its members to purchase land
whereon to build a temple, and
given to him for that purpose ; that
for many years the land in ques-
tion had been known as the "Tem-
ple Lot;" that it had been dedi-
cated with religious services by the
head of the order ; and that, when
the grantee left the State, he exe-
cuted what purported to be a de-
claration of trust on such land in
favor of the church. Held, that
the original grant was impressed
with a trust in favor of the church.
Reorganized Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter Day Saints v.
Church of Christ, 60 Fed. Rep.
937. Where a purchaser of prop-
erty has the title made to another
as a matter of convenience — such
other conveying it to him on the
same day — such other is not the
purchaser's trustee, as to the land,
though the latter conveyance is
delivered back to him by the pur-
chaser, and destroyed, with the
purchaser's consent, since, on the
delivery of the deed to the pur-
chaser, the legal title passed, and
the subsequent destruction thereof
could not affect the title. Wey-
gant v. Bartlett (1894), 102 Cal.
224; s. c, 36 Pac. Rep. 417. In an
action to establish a trust in land
in plaintiff's favor on the ground
that it was purchased with her
property by defendant who took
title in his own name, a finding of
the lower court that no trust re-
sulted, made on conflicting evi-
dence as to whether plaintiff or
defendant furnished the purchase
money, will not be disturbed on
appeal. Butler v. Shumaker,
(1893) (Ariz.), 32 Pac. Rep.
265. Where the purchaser in a
contract for the sale of lands died,
leaving a widow and minor son,
and his father, with the widow's
consent, took possession of the
lands, sold the personalty, paid the
debts, and, after paying the bal-
ance due for the lands, took the
title in his own name, he, or one
purchasing from him with notice
of the fact, took the title in trust
for the minor son, though the
balance of the price was paid out
of his own funds. Roggenkamp
v. Roggenkamp (1895), 68 Fed.
Rep. 605. Where real estate is
conveyed to one person for a con-
sideration paid by another, no
trust can arise in favor of any one,
not a creditor of the person pay-
ing, unless the conveyance is made
to the grantee named, without the
consent of the person paying the
money. Petzhold v. Petzhold
(1893), 53 Minn. 39; s. C, 54 N. W.
Rep. 933. In an action to compel
defendants to convey to plaintiffs
certain lots, plaintiff introduced
evidence that he had a conversa-
tion with one of the defendants in
which the latter agreed to attend
to purchasing the lots for him;
that defendants notified him of the
appraised value of the lots, and re-
quested him to send them money
to pay for them; that a few days
later they telegraphed to him,
312 IMPLIED TEUSTS. [§ 152.
ter of convenience and of agreement between the parties
for some subordinate purpose. This principle applies
where security is taken in the name of another person. If
A takes an obligation in the name of B for money due to
himself, and the money is paid, B will hold it as a
trustee for A.1 But in cases under this rule the party
seeking relief must furnish conclusive proof that he has
actually paid the purchase price, or that an absolute obli-
gation executed by him was accepted instead of the pur-
chase money.2 This doctrine, as above stated, applies to
personalty as well as to real property, as where one person
takes a transfer of stock of merchandise, or of other per-
sonal property, advancing the money for the purchase and
taking the title in the name of another or putting the prop-
erty into the possession of another.3
§ 152. For Partial Interest — The rule as above stated
applies to that class of cases in which the consideration
proceeds from two or more persons, who make a joint pur-
chase and a joint payment of the purchase money. In
"send money at once to purchase or being extinguished by implica-
your lots," and in response he sent tion or operation of law." Mc-
$300; that the next day they in- Cahill v. McCahill, 11 Misc. Rep.
formed him, "we got two of your 258 ; s. c, 32 N". Y. Supl. 836.
lots at the appraised value," and 1 Ebrand v. Dancer, 2 Ch. Cases,
charged him with $165, their cost 26; s. c, 1 Eq. Abr. 382, pi. 11;
price; and that they afterwards 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 101; Lloyd v.
took a mortgage on the lots Read, 1 P. Wins. 607; Eider v.
to secure a sum which he owed Kidder, 10 Ves. 366.
them. Held, that plaintiff prima 2 Cutler v. Tuttle, 19 K. J. Eq.
facie established a resulting trust 549; Ownes v. Ownes, 8 C. E.
in the two lots. Lewis v. Lewis Green, 60 ; Harvey v. Harvey, 98
(1893) (Idaho), 33 Pac. Rep. Mass. 118; Wheeler v. Kirtland, 23
38. Where the purchaser of N. J. Eq. 18; Closs v. Bopp, 23 N".
land causes it to be conveyed to J. Eq. 270; Miller v. Davis, 50 Mo.
another, under an agreement that 572; Haigh v. Kaye, L. R. 7 Ch.
the grantee will hold it in trust for App. 469.
a third person, the statute of frauds 3 James v. Holmes, 4 De G., F.
does not affect the right of such & J. 470; Beecher v. Major, 2
third person to establish a trust in Drew. & Sm. 431; Garrick v. Tay-
the property for his benefit, as by lor, 29 Beav. 79; Rider v. Kidder,
its terms it is not to be construed 10 Ves. 365.
'•to prevent ;iny trust from arising
§ 152. j
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
313
cases of this kind, as in those of the preceding class, the
governing equitable principle is that those who pay the
purchase money for an estate take for themselves the bene-
ficial interest and the equitable title. Where two or more
persons unite in the purchase of an estate, and the title is
taken in the name of one, a trust arises in favor of the
others to the extent of their interest.1 But in cases of
this character a trust will arise only where a partial interest
is that of a definite or aliquot part of the estate, as one-
third, one-half, or of a definite number of acres of the
1 Cutler v. Tuttle, 19 N. J. Eq.
549 ; Powell v. Monson, etc. Co., 3
Mason, 347, 364; Larkins v.
Rhodes, 5 Port. (Ala.) 196; Wray
v. Steele, 2 Ves. & B. 388; Case v.
Codding, 38 Cal. 191; Dikeman v.
Norrie, 36 Cal. 94; McCreary v.
Casey, 50 Cal. 349; Miller v. Bird-
song, 7 Bast. 531; Cramer v.
Hoose, 93 111. 503; Smith v. Pat-
ton, 12 W. Va. 541 ; Khea v. Tucker,
56 Ala. 450; Smith v. Smith, 85111.
189; Thurberv. La Rogue, 105 N.
Car. 301; Brown v. Cave, 23 S.
Car. 251 ; Bailey v. Hemenway, 147
Mass. 326 ; Thomas v. Jameson, 77
Cal. 91; Bear v. Koenigstein, 16
Neb. 65; Tenney v. Simpson, 37
Kan. 353; s. c, 41 Kan. 561 ; Harris
v.Mdntire, 118 111. 275; Blum v.
Rogers, 71 Tex. 668; Thomas v.
Thomas, 62 Miss. 531 ; Bibb v. Hun-
ter, 79 Ala. 351 ; Shelby v. Tardy
(1888), 84 Ala. 327; s. c, 4 So.
Rep. 276; Anthe v. Heide, 85 Ala.
236; s. c, 4 So. Rep. 380; Russell v.
Marchbanks (1887), 49 Ark. 117;
s. c, 4 S. W. Rep. 200; Somers v.
Overhulzer, 67 Cal. 237 ; Lipscomb
v. Nichols, 6 Colo. 290; Letcher v.
Letcher, 4 J. J Marsh. 590; Shel-
don v. Sheldon, 3 Wis. 699; Mc-
Cully v. McCully, 78 Va. 159;
Clark v. Clark, 43 Vt. 685; Pinney
v. Fellows, 15 Vt. 525 ; McGovern
v. Knox, 21 Ohio St. 547; Quack-
enbush v. Leonard, 9 Paige Ch.
334; Shoemaker v. Smith, 11
Humph. 81; Jackson v. Moore, 6
Cow. 706; Botsford v. Burr, 2
Johns. Ch. 405; Boskowitz v. Da-
vis, 12 Nev. 449; Cloud v. Ivie, 28
Mo. 579; Bank v. Snively, 23 Md.
253; Purdy v. Purdy, 3 Md.
Ch. 547; McCarroll v. Alexander,
48 Miss. 621; McDonald v. Mc-
Donald, 24 Ind. 68; Chadwick v.
Felt, 35 Pa. St. 305. Defendant,
one of several heirs, was allowed
by all to become purchaser at a
sale of land owned jointly, the
purchase being understood to be
for the benefit of all, and there-
after he conveyed it to one who
furnished him the purchase money,
the grantee agreeing to reconvey
on payment of the full amount
thereof. Before the time for re-
demption expired plaintiffs, the
other heirs, offered to redeem their
share, but the grantee refused to
accept less than tfee whole amount
due; and defendant refused to re-
deem his share, and, by collusion
with such grantee, prevented re-
demption within the time allowed,
but thereafter paid up in full, and
obtained a reconveyance. Held,
that equity would allow plaintiffs
to redeem their share of the land.
Farris v. Farris (1895) (Ky.), 29
S. W. Rep. 618.
314
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 152.
land purchased. Thus, where two persons purchased forty
acres of land under a verbal agreement between themselves
that one was to pay one-fourth of the price for ten acres
off a certain side of the tract, and he paid his fourth of
the purchase money, which, in effect, was used directly in
the purchase of the entire tract, and the other took a deed
to himself for the whole, it was held that a trust resulted
by operation of law in favor of the party so bargaining
for the one-fourth as to his part of the tract, and that the
statute of frauds had no application to the case.1 The
1 McNamara v. Garrity, 106 111.
384; Sayre v. Townsend, 15 Wend.
647; McGowan v. McGowan, 14
Gray, 119; Olcott v. Bynum, 17
Wall. 44. In White v. Carpenter,
2 Paige Ch. 217, 240, Chancellor
Jones says: "But though there
may be a trust of a part only of the
estate by implication of law, it
must be of an aliquot part of the
whole interest in the property.
The cestui que trust, to whom the
trust results, must become by the
operation of law upon the estate a
tenant in common with the grantee,
of the whole interest vested in him
by the grantor, there can be no re-
sulting trust of the whole estate to
a given extent of the value of it,
leaving the residuum, if any, of the
value, to the grantee. * * *
When an estate results by implica-
tion of law, the title and legal es-
tate of the whole or of some aliquot
part of the whole, must vest in the
party to whom it results. * * *
The principle is, that the whole
consideration for the whole estate,
or for the moiety; the third or
some definite part of the whole
must be paid to be the foundation
of a resulting trust; and that the
contribution or payment of a sum
of money generally for the estate,
when such payment does not raise
a trust by operation of law for him
who pays it ; and the reason of the
distinction obviously is, that
neither the entire interest in the
whole estate, nor in any given part
of it, could result from any such a
payment to the party who makes
it, without injustice to the grantee
by whom the residue of the con-
sideration is contributed." In the
important case of McGowan v.
McGowan, 14 Gray, 119, Judge
Hoar says : "When a part of the
purchase money is paid by one,
and the whole title is taken by the
other, a, resulting trust pro tanto
may, under such circtmstances, be
created. But in the latter case we
believe it to be well settled that
the part of the purchase money
paid by him in whose favor the re-
sulting trust is sought to be en-
forced, must be shown to have been
paid for some specific part, or dis-
tinct interest in the estate; for
some aliquot part, as it is some-
times expressed; that is, for a spe-
cific share, as a tenancy in com-
mon, or joint tenancy, of one-half,
one quarter, or other particular
interest, as a life estate or tenancy
for years, or remainder, in the
whole; and that a general contri-
bution of a sum of money towards
the entire purchase is not suffi-
cient." "Then there is the case of
Crop v. Norton, 2 Atk. 74, where
§ 152.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
315
statute of limitations will not be a bar to the enforcement
of a claim of this character, as where two persons pur-
chased a tract of land, each to have a certain portion
thereof, and one of them took a deed for all, giving back
a mortgage to the vendor to secure the price, which mort-
gage was afterwards discharged by the money of both the
purchasers so that a resulting trust was created against the
one taking the deed. The other took possession of his
part and made lasting and valuable improvements on the
same, and continued in the undisputed possession for more
than twenty years, during which time he paid his share of
the taxes, and for some years leased his part to his co-
purchaser, in whose name the title rested, who paid rent.
It was held, on bill filed by the one so occupying his land
to compel the other to convey to him, that the statute of
limitations was no bar to the equitable relief sought.1
Lord Hardwicke is reported to
have said, 'That where a purchase
is made, and the purchase money
is paid hy one, and the conveyance
is taken in the name of another,
there is a resulting trust for the
person who paid the consideration.
But this is where the whole con-
sideration moves from such per-
son. But I never knew it, where
the consideration moved from sev-
eral persons, for this would intro-
duce all the mischiefs, which the
statute of frauds was intended to
prevent. Now, if this language was
meant to apply to all joint pur-
chases, where definite proportions
of the estate were to be purchased
for each party, one-fourth, one-
third, or one-half, each paying his
proportion of the purchase money
accordingly, it cannot be main-
tained ; and the doctrine was over-
turned in Wray v. Steele, 2 Ves. &
B. 388, by the Vice Chancellor, Sir
Thomas Plumer. But if the lan-
guage was used, as I conceive it
was, with reference to the case
then before Lord Hardwicke,
where there was a mixture of con-
siderations of different natures,
and no such definite proportions of
the estate to be purchased and held
by each party were ascertained,
and no definite proportions of the
purchase money to be paid by each
were fixed, then, in my judgment,
there is no ground to sustain the
doctrine. How, under such cir-
cumstances, would it be possible to
say, what interest or trust in the
property each was to take? Surely
it would be too much to say that
it was to depend upon the future
valuation of the property, or the
future contributions made by the
parties respectively toward the
purchase, or the possible values of
the interests in other property con-
tributed by each." Story, J., in
Smith v. Burnham, 3 Sumn. 466.
1 McSTamara v. Garrity, 106 111.
384. For cases where courts have
been liberal in construing these
trusts, see Buck v. Svvazey, 35 Me.
41. In this case the value of the
316 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 153.
§ 153. The Subject Continued. — Where any fraud is
practiced or attempted by a person having a partial interest
in an estate, in connection with the purchase, no trust will
result in his favor. A court of equity will not afford relief
from any disastrous consequences of his dishonest and un-
lawful act. W A purchased a tract af land at a judicial
sale ostensibly for himself, but really and_ fraudulently in
behalf of D F, who was ultimately to pay the purchase
money, and then direct a conveyance to himself. A decree
had been rendered in another suit against D F, as executor
of H A F, and was satisfied by W A W, his surety. W A
W thereupon sought to subject the said land as D F's
property to the lien of the decree, and the whole tract was
ordered to be sold. It was held that W A, having been
guilty of a fraud, could not claim a resulting trust in the
land by way of security for any money paid by him for D
F on the said pretended and fraudulent purchase, nor
could W A share pro rata with WAWin the proceeds.
The law does not so far countenance fraudulent contracts
land was $1,025.50, the plaintiff ad- by her through her husband of
vancing one-sixth of the purchase $1,700 of the purchase money
money, and afterwards in order to worked a resulting trust in her fa-
make cash payment a further sum vor to the extent of seventeen un-
of $50. He claimed the resulting divided 35ths of the premises, and
trust in the land to the extent of she is entitled to have the trust
one-sixth of its value, and in addi- deed set aside and cancelled, and
tion to the extent of one hundred then to have at her election, either
two thousand and fifty-firsts (100- a quitclaim conveyance from her
2,051). The court decreed a trust father in fee-simple, covering 17-
in the land in his favor in both of 35ths of the premises, so as to be a
these proportions. See also Clark tenant in common with him, he
v. Clark, 43 Vt. 685 ; Ehea v. holding 18-35ths, or to leave him
Tucker, 56 Ala. 450; Latham v. sole owner and recover of him
Henderson, 47 111. 185; Botsford v. $1,700, with a lien (by decree) upon
Burr, 2 Johns. Ch. 405. Where the premises for its payment,
the only material question of fact Crawford v. Manson, 82 Ga. US.
is, whether the money left by the For cases where the amounts paid
fatter with the husband of the were uncertain and the courts pre-
daughter was an executed gift to sumed them to be equal, see
her, or whether it was a temporary Shoemaker v. Smith, 11 Humph,
loan to the husband, it was held 81 ; Edwards v. Edwards, 39 Pa.
that if the money was an executed St. 369 ; Letcher v. Letcher, 4 J. J.
gift to the daughter, the payment Marsh. 590.
§ 153. j
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
317
as to protect the perpetrator to the extent of his invest-
ment.1
i Almond v. Wilson, 75 Va. 613.
The purchaser at a judicial sale of
the land of intestate was W, the
husband of one of the four heirs of
intestate. J, another heir, was
guardian of the two remaining
heirs, E and C. C testified that he
heard J ask W to buy it at the sale,
and that he agreed to purchase it
and hold it till "we" could redeem
it. Another testified that during
the bid W asked another person
not to bid, as he was bidding for E
and J. Another testified that he
heard W say that his wife and J
had asked him to buy the land for
them, and he was going to do so.
Another testified (that W said he
would be willing for the heirs to
have it back if they would pay his
money and interest. Others testi-
fied to declarations of W, that he
had bought it for them and turned
it over to J to rent; the rents to
be paid to him till the debt for the
purchase money was discharged.
Held, sufficient to show an under-
standing that the land was to be
bought for heirs according to their
interest. Cobb v. Edwards (1895),
117N.Car.244; s. C.,23S. E. Kep.
241. After services had been ren-
dered by various parties in pressing
an Indian claim for money against
the United States, the tribe entered
into a new contract with various
parties, agreeing to give them 30
per cent, of any amounts obtained,
with a stipulation that they should
adjust upon principles of equity
and justice all claims by persons
who had previously rendered serv-
ices in prosecuting the claim. Held,
that money received by the con-
tractors as compensation consti-
tuted a trust fund for the persons
described who could sue in equity
to enforce their claims, though not
mentioned by name in the stipula-
tion. McKee v. Lamon, 159 U. S.
317 ; s. c, 16 S. Ct. Eep. 11. There is
no resulting trust in favor of the
wife in land purchased by the hus-
band, on his credit, though part of
the purchase price was paid with
money subsequently borrowed from
her. Woodside v. Hewell (1895),
107 Cal. 141; s. c, 42 Pac. Kep.
152. A man bought land, paid
part of the price with his own
money, and gave his notes for the
balance. Before he bought he had
orally agreed with his wife that
she was to have an interest in the
land and was to pay part of the
deferred payment, which she after-
ward did. Held, that she did not
have a resulting trust, since her
money did not enter into the origi-
nal purchase. Jacksonville Nat'I
Bank v. Beesley (1895) , 159 111. 120 ;
s. c.,42jST. E.Bep. 164. Sixpersons
purchased land, paying equal por-
tions of the purchase price, and tak-
ing the deed in the name of one of
them, K, who executed an in-
strument stating that he held it in
trust for all, which was not re-
corded. Subsequently a partition
was made, whereby K, with the
consent of plaintiff and H, others
of the co-tenants, conveyed one-
half the land to the other three
parties, and they in turn conveyed
to him their interest in the other
portion, which he was to hold in
trust for plaintiff and H. K,
plaintiff, and H paid equal por-
tions of the bonus paid by them in
the partition. Held, that there was
a resulting trust in favor of plaint-
iff in the portion conveyed to K as to
318
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 154.
§ 154. Prom Tenancy in Common. — In England the
rule in regard to the purchase of property in the name of
two or more person is as follows : Where the money is
a one-third interest therein. Rogers
v. Donellan (1895), 11 Utah, 108;
s. c . , 39 Pac. Rep. 494. Where a wife
pays part of the purchase money
lor land deeded to her husband, it
is not necessary to the existence of
a resulting trust in her favor, that
her money should go "into the
land at the inception of the hus-
hand's title" by actual payment at
that time, but it is sufficient if it
be paid as installments or incum-
brances fall due, pursuant to a
contract under which the title is ac-
quired, and on agreement that she
is to recover title to so much as she
pays for. Gilchrist v. Brown, 165
Pa. St. 275; s.c, 30 Atl. Rep. 839.
Where a part of the price of land
is paid, and the balance is secured
to be paid, by one person, and the
conveyance is made to another, a
trust results in favor of the person
making such payment. Williams
v. Wager, 64 Vt. 326; S. c, 24 Atl.
Rep. 765. In a suit to enjoin an
action at law for the recovery of a
certain lot and to establish a trust
in favor of plaintiff, there was evi-
dence that with money left by
plaintiff's deceased mother in a
bank, in the name of plaintiff's
sister, their father purchased, in
the latter's name, a certain lot ;
that this lot was exchanged by the
father for four lots, to one of which
he retained title; that he after-
wards conveyed such lot to a con-
tractor to pay for a dwelling on
one of the other three (the lot in
dispute) ; that plaintiff had occu-
pied the lot ever since the house
was erected, several years prior to
bringing this suit; that it was the
understanding of the father and
plaintiff from the statements of
the sister that plaintiff was to have
the property in dispute as her
share in the division of the money
left by their mother; and that de-
fendants obtained title since the
occupancy by plaintiff by mesne
conveyances from the sister. Held,
that a decree for plaintiff was
proper. Petrain v. Kiernan (1893),
23 Ore. 455; s. c, 32 Pac. Rep. 158.
A resulting trust arises in favor of
those paying a portion of the pur-
chase price of land conveyed to one
paying the remainder. Rogers v.
Donellan (1895), 11 Utah 108; s. C,
39 Pac. Rep. 494. A resulting trust
is raised by operation of law in fa-
vor of one who, in fulfillment of a
parol agreement, paid part of the
price of land which was conveyed
to another, and not by virtue of
the agreement under which he
paid it. Collins v. Corson (1894)
(N\ J. Ch.), 30 Atl. Rep. 862. The
quantum of interest held by the
cestui que trust of a resulting trust
in land, established by operation
of law from evidence of a parol
agreement under which he paid
part of the price thereof, is the
proportion which the amount so
paid by him bears to. the whole
price. Collins v. Corson (1894)
(N. J. Ch.), 30 Atl Rep. 862. In
an action to enforce a resulting
trust in land of which defendants'
ancestor died seized, the evidence
showed that plaintiff advanced
more than half of the considera-
tion paid for the land, and that the
decedent many times admitted that
plaintiff had a half interest in the
land. Held, that the evidence jus-
tified a judgment for plaintiff for a
§ 154. J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
319
paid in unequal shares the purchasers are tenants in com-
mon of the property purchased ; but if the money is in-
vested in equal shares, and the instrument indicates a joint
tenancy, it will be held by a court of equity to be a joint
tenancy, and that there is no ground on which it can be
reduced to a tenancy in common. Thus, where sums of
stock were purchased in the joint names of two sisters, and
a balance to their joint account at their banker's, it was
held, under the circumstances, to belong to them as tenants
in common, notwithstanding they had contributed equally,
half interest in the land. Eeese v.
Murnan, 5 Wash. St. 373; s. c, 31
Pac. Kep. 373. A resulting trust
will not be declared in favor of one
who paid no part of the purchase
money, and whose claim of joint
purchase on money advanced by
defendant as an alleged loan to
him rests upon his own testimony,
which is denied by defendant, and
the statements of a witness as to
an admission alleged to have been
made three years before by the de-
fendant. Towle v. Wadsworth
(1892), 147 111. 80; s. C, 30 N. E.
Kep. 602. A contribution of money
toward the entire purchase of land
is not sufficient to create a resulting
trust in favor of the contrib-
utor, unless the contribution is
shown to have been paid for
some specific part of the land.
O'Donnell v. White (1894), 18 R. I.
659; s. c, 29 Atl. Kep. 769. To au-
thorize the imposition of a result-
ing trust on land in proportion to
the consideration furnished by
plaintiff, the evidence must show
the precise amount paid by him, as
well as the total consideration.
Woodside v. Hewel (1895), 107
Cal. 141; s. c, 42 Pac. Kep. 152.
A bill alleging that defendant pro-
cured an assignment of a leasehold
interest to himself alone, when
only entitled to one-half therein,
under a prior contract with plaint-
iff to jointly purchase the same,
but which does not allege what de-
fendant paid for the lease, or that
plaintiff had contributed, or offered
to contribute, anything toward the
purchase, does not make out a
case for equitable relief. Campbell
v. Powers, 37 111. App. 308 ; s. C, 28
N. B. Rep. 1062. Intervener's peti-
tion alleged that all testatbr's
property except $300 to be invested
in land for his sons, A, T and C,
was left to his widow for life, re-
mainder over to interveners, his
daughters ; that A took possession
of the estate; that he purchased
land for himself with the money
bequeathed him, and paid T a sum
in satisfaction of this bequest ; that
with money of the estate he pur-
chased an 80 acre tract and also a
50 acre tract, the former purchase
being in compliance with the be-
quest to 0 ; that C , died before at-
taining majority; that the purchase
of the 50 acre tract was without
the knowledge and consent of the
intervenors. Held, not to state
facts sufficient to establish in in-
tervener's favor an implied trust
in the 50 and 80 acre tracts men-
tioned. Jackson v. Landers (1S93) ,
134 Ind. App. 529; s. c, 34 K. E.
Rep. 323.
320
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 154.
the court ]ooking (inter' alia) to whence the sums were de-
rived, viz., rents of lands of which the two were tenants
in common.1 In its essential features this rule is followed
by courts of equity in this country. The English rule in
regard to joint tenancy is the rule at law, and unless there
are modifying circumstances the law will be followed by
equity. But wherever the circumstances afford a basis for
it, courts of equity will sustain a tenancy in common and
decree a trust in favor of the heirs of a decedent. In
Caines v. Grant, before the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
1 Kobinson v. Preston, 4 Kay &
J. 505; Lake v. Gibson, 1 Eq. Abr.
p. 290 a, pi. 3; Moyse v. Gales, 2
Vern. 385; Rigden v. Vallier, 2
Ves. 258; 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 102;
Bone v. Pollard, 24 Beav. 283;
Honore v. Hutchings, 8 Bush, 687;
Maloy v. Sloans, 44 Vt. 311. "A
man having a mortgage for years
makes his will, and thereby devises
all his personal estate, of what
nature soever, to his executors in
trust, for the payment of his debts,
and afterwards devises the residue
and overplus of his said personal
estate to his two daughters, equally
to be divided between them, and
dies," (among the assets was a
mortgage, and) "the debts being
satisfied, the daughters contract
with the mortgagor for the pur-
chase of the equity of redemption
and inheritance of the mortgage
premises to them and their heirs;
and articles are executed on both
sides accordingly, and a bill
brought by the daughters for a
specific execution of those articles,
and a decree obtained for that pur-
pose; then one of the daughters
makes her will, and thereby de-
vises her moiety, share and inter-
est in the said premises to the
plaintiff, who brought this bill to
be relieved against the proceedings
of the other daughter, who claimed
the whole inheritance by survivor-
ship as a joint tenancy, and had
ejected the plaintiff; and the ques-
tion was, whether this purchase of
the inheritance were a joint ten-
ancy or a tenancy in common?
The Master of the Rolls decreed it
to be a tenancy in common, for so
was the mortgage devised to the
two daughters whereon this pur-
chase of the equity of redemption
and inheritance was founded ; and,
therefore, they having several and
distinct interests as tenants in com-
mon in the mortgage, and paying
an equal proportion for the pur-
chase of the equity of redemption
and inheritance, should have that
in the same manner; and, there-
fore, the devise good." Edwards v.
Fashion, Prec. Ch. 332. The lands
of a decedent were sold by order
of court in proceedings in parti-
tion, and purchased by the hus-
band of one of the heirs entitled
to participate, who paid the pur-
chase money, except such portion
as his wife was entitled to receive;
this she released to the master who
made a deed to the husband alone.
Held, that a trust resulted in favor
of the wife to the extent of her in-
terest in said real estate. Bigley
v. Jones, 114 Pa. St. 510.
§ 154. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 321
vania, where A and B take out a warrant to survey 200
acres of land, pay the purchase money in equal propor-
tions, and obtain a survey. Before a patent is granted A.
dies. It was held that B has no right of survivorship, but that
A's estate descends to his heir. Where two or more take
out a warrant, pay the purchase money and obtain a sur-
vey, they hold as tenants in common, unless the contrary
is set forth ; and either of them may require that the pat-
ent shall be made in that way.1 In a case before the
Supreme Court of the State of New York, J pur-
chased lands for himself and brother jointly, the brother
paying his part of the consideration, but took the conveyance
in his own name. At another time, their father, desiring-
to convey certain lands to J and his brother jointly, con-
veyed to J upon the promise of J that he would convey to
his brother. Both conveyances were so made without the
knowledge or consent of the brother. It was held that a
trust was thereby created in favor of the brother in the
undivided one-half of the land conveyed, which trust was
not defeated by the provisions of the statute relating to
uses and trust.2
1 Caines v. Lessee of Grant, 5 themselves of it, and have laid
Binn. 119. Braekenridge, J., in hold of any words for that purpose.
Caines v. Lessee of Grant, says : Many distinctions have been
"The law as it stands at this day raised in equity, as where persons
on this head in England is pre- are in trade and have joint debts
cisely as laid down in an equity due to thetn, the courts say it.
case which I cannot cite, viz. : could not be the agreement. So if
'Great doubts have been enter- two people join in lending money
tained by judges, both at law and upon a mortgage, equity says it
in equity, as to words creating a could not be the intention that the
joint tenancy ; and it is clear the interest should survive. From the
ancient law was in favor of a joint nature of the contract, the inten—
tenancy, and that law still prevails, tion of severance may appear.' "
Unless there are some words to 2 Cipperly v. Cipperly, 4 Thomp.
sever the interest taken, it is at this & C. (N. Y. Sup. Ot.) 342;
momenta joint tenancy, notwith- Foote v. Bryant, 47 X. Y. 544;
standing the leaning of the courts Sieman v. Schurck, 29 N. Y. 598;
lately in favor of a tenancy in Ryan v. Dox, 34 N. Y. 307 ; Hos-
common. For the courts seeing ford v. Merwin, 5 Barb. 51. IRev.
the inconvenience wherever they Stat. p. 728, §§ 51, 52, providing:
could find any intention of sever- that where a grant is made to one
ance, have been desirous to avail person, and the consideration is,
21
322
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 155.
§ 155. The Subject Continued. — Where two persons
advance or loan money in equal sums and take a mortgage
as security for the notes executed in payment, the land is
held by the two mortgagees, until foreclosure, as joint ten-
ants ; and, if one of them dies during this period, the sur-
vivor will be entitled to the possession of the notes and the
mortgage, but he will hold one-half of the money received
in payment of the notes, or mortgage, as a trustee for the
heirs of decedent.1 It is held that the transaction, as a
loan or advance of money, precludes the presumption of a
joint tenancy.2 In a case before the Circuit Court of the
United States, Mr. Justice Story presiding, where, by the
statute of Rhode Island, 1798, all deeds, etc., to two or
more persons are held to be tenancies in common, unless
the words clearly and manifestly show an intention to create
paid by another, no trust shall re-
sult, but the title shall vest in the
grantee, does not apply where the
two persons expressly agree that
the title to land purchased by them
shall be taken in the name of one
for the benefit of both. Gage v.
Gage, 83 Hun, 362; s. C, 31 N". Y.
Sup. 903. Where one of several
tenants in common of land pur-
chases the same at a master's sale
thereof, in partition, upon a parol
agreement with his co-tenants to
hold the same in trust for them,
and uses their releases to the mas-
ter for their'share in the proceeds
in payment of the purchase money,
without actually paying any
money, a trust results in favor of
the co-tenants. Fay v. Fay (1892),
50 N. J. Eq. 260 ; S. C, 24 Atl. Rep.
1036. Where, upon a purchase of
land, title is taken in the name of
a third party, who advances the
price, the conveyance is but a pur-
chase money mortgage, and does
not come within 1 Kev. Stat. 1ST. Y.
p. 728, § 51, abolishing trusts in
favor of one paying the considera-
tion when the grant is made to an-
other. Abbey v. Taber, 58 Hun,
602; s. C, 11 N. Y. Supl. 548. One
who furnishes money with which
another person pays a note which
he had given in part payment for
land previously bought by him,
does not thereby acquire a result-
ing trust in the land. Reed v.
Reed (1890), 135 111. 482; s. C, 25
N". E. Rep. 1095. The payment
and discharge by one of the co-
tenants of an incumbrance on his
undivided share in the land, so as
to vest a clear title in the grantee,
raises an equity in the cotenant's
favor entirely independent of the
statute of uses, and is not a pay-
ment of consideration within the
meaning of the cited section. Bock
v. Martin (1890), 11 N. Y. Supl.
569.
1 Kinsley v. Abbott, 19 Me. 430.
See also Appleton v. Boyd, 7
Mass. 131; Goodwin v. Richardson,
11 Mass. 469.
2 Story's Equity Jurisprudence,
§ 1206.
§ 156. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 323
a joint tenancy, it was held that a mortgage to four
persons afforded no proof that the parties intended a
joint tenancy in the mortgage. It was held, farther, that
in equity, where there is a joint tenancy in a mortgage, the
surviving mortgagee will be held a trustee for the repre-
sentatives of the deceased mortgagee.1 Where A and B
unite in the purchase of land, and A pays the whole of the
purchase price, but takes the title jointly in his own name
and in that of B, on his agreement to pay one-half of the
money, a trust will result to B only as he fulfills his agree-
ment to pay one-half the purchase price, and, in addition,
reimburses A for permanent improvements, payment of
taxes, etc., subsequently to the purchase. In a recent case,
where it was conceded that the orator paid the entire pur-
chase money for a piece of land, but took the conveyance
jointly to himself, and his sister, on her agreement to pay
him one-half of the same, and that he paid the taxes on the
premises, and permanently improved them by erecting
buildings and clearing up the land, it was held that she was
not entitled to have half the land set off to her, without
paying half of the purchase money, and for half the im-
provements ; and an accounting was ordered ; and that the
defendants' suit at law for a partition be perpetually en-
joined if the defendants should fail to pay the sum found
due the orator, within the time and in the manner ordered
by the court of chancery.2
§ 156. From Partnership Purchase. — The principle of
equity by which joint purchases by two or more individuals
is governed, applies to purchases for partnership purposes,
or on partnership account. In the leading case of Hoxie v.
Carr, before the Circuit Court of the United States, Mr.
Justice Story, in his opinion, said: "In cases, therefore,
where real estate is purchased for partnership purposes and
on partnership account, it is wholly immaterial, in the view
of a court of equity, in whose name or names the purchase
1 Kandall v. Phillips, 3 Mason, 2 Maloy v. Sloan, 44 Vt. 311. See
378, 384. ante, Sec. 104.
324
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 156.
is made and the conveyance is taken, whether in the name
of one partner or of all the partners ; whether in the name
of a stranger alone or of a stranger jointly with one part-
ner. In all these cases, let the legal title be vested in
whom it may, it is in equity deemed partnership property,
not subject to survivorship, and the partners are deemed
the cestuis que trust thereof. A court of law may, nay,
must, in general, view it only according to the state of the
legal title, and, if the legal title is vested in one partner or
in a stranger, a bona fide purchaser of real estate from him,
having no notice either express or constructive of its being
partnership property, will be entitled to hold it free from
any claim of the partnership. But if he has such notice,
then, in equity, he is clearly bound by the trust, and he takes
it cum oneri, exactly like every other purchaser of a trust
estate."1 A number of important principles are illustrated
1 Hoxie v. Carr, 1 Sumn. 182,
183. Where a partner files on land
and afterwards makes a parol
agreement that the land shall be-
long to the partnership, such
agreement not being in writing as
required by Civil Code, § 852, does
not create any trust or vest in his
partners any estate in the land.
/« re Groome's Estate, 94 Cal. 69;
s. C, 29 Pac. Kep. 487. Where, in
pursuance of an agreement of part-
nership for dealing in lands, land
is bought, and title taken in the
name of one of the partners, and
payment therefor is made out of a
loan secured by mortgage on
the land, a resulting trust arises
in favor of the partnership.
Speyer v. Desjardins (1892), 144
111. 641; s. c, 32 N. E. Kep. 283.
Plaintiff and defendant agreed to
purchase land, the conveyance to
be made to the latter's wife in
trust for them, and plaintiff gave
defendant government bonds to be
used in payment for the land. The
owner of the land refusing to ac-
cept the bonds in payment, defend-
ant obtained cash from his wife,
and made the payment therewith,
and afterwards sold the bonds for
his wife, and realized the full value
thereof. Held, that defendant and
his wife could not defeat plaintiff's
right to declare a trust in the land,
on the ground that neither the
bonds nor their proceeds went in
payment for the land. Hill v. Pol-
lard, 132 Ind. 5S8; s. c, 32 N. E.
Hep. 564. In such case, where de-
fendant, under an arrangement
with plaintiff, paid for the land
part of the money that plaintiff
was to pay, and was subsequently
repaid by plaintiff, the payment
must be regarded as a payment by
plaintiff. Hill v. Pollard, 132 Ind.
588; s. C, 32 N. E. Eep. 564. Un-
der How. St. § 5569, providing that
no trust shall result in favor of the
person paying the consideration
for land who has the title conveyed
to another, where a partner causes
the title to land purchased by the
firm to be conveyed to his wife
§ 157. ] IMPLIED TRUSTS. 325
by this instructive case. In the absence of fraud and
breach of trust, property purchased with partnership funds
does not of necessity become partnership property, if that
is not the intention of the parties. But the circumstance
that the payment for property purchased has been made
out of the partnership funds, especially if the property be
necessary for the ordinary operations of the partnership,
and be actually so emplo3red, in the absence of controlling
circumstances, will be decisive that it was intended to be
held as partnership property.1
§ 157. From Purchase by Trustee. — Where trustees in
the discharge of their duty, or where they are apparently act-
ing in good faith, purchase an estate with trust funds and
take the title in their own name, without any declaration of
trust, a resulting trust arises in favor of the beneficiaries.
It is a case of purchase by one and title taken in the name
of another. It is really a purchase by the beneficiary,
and the title is taken in the name of the trustee.
Or if the purchase is regarded as the act of the trustee,
he pays the purchase money as such, i. e., as the
representative of the beneficiary, and takes the title in
his own name, not as a trustee, but as an individual. In
such a case a court of equity will presume, in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, that the transaction was in dis-
charge of his duty, rather than a violation of it, and will
decree a resulting trust in favor of the beneficiary.2 Thus
where a man, in a marriage contract, has covenanted to pay
a sum of money to trustees to be invested in land for the
benefit of the wife, but, instead of doing so, purchases
and copartner, he cannot claim his the partners. Case v. Seger, 4
partnership interest against his Wash. St. 492: s. c, 30 Pac. Rep.
wife's estate as a resulting trust in 646.
his favor. Winans v. Winans' Est. 1 Hoxie v. Carr, 1 Sumn. 173.
(1894), 99 Mich. 74; s. C, 57 N". W. 2 Deg v. Deg, 2 P. Wms. 414;
Eep. 1088. Where land is bought Lane v. Digh ton, Amb. 409; Perry
for partnership purposes with part- v. Phillips, 4 Ves. 107; s. c, 17
nership funds and title is taken in Ves. 173 ; Bennett v. Mayhew, cited
the name of one of the partners, 1 Bro..Ch. 232; 2 Bro. Ch\ 287.
an implied trust arises in favor of
326
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 157.
land to the amount of the money he has engaged to pay,
and takes the title in his own name, a trust will arise for
the benefit of the wife. It will be presumed that the pur-
chase is in fulfillment of his covenant. Thus, in Sowden v.
Sowden, where, on marriage, the husband covenants to pay
to trustees the sum of £2,000, at least to be by them laid
out in land in the county of D, and settled to the uses of
the marriage ; the husband never pays the money to the
trustees, but, soon after the marriage, purchases land in
the county of D, and takes the conveyance to himself in
fee, and then dies intestate, without making any settlement.
These lands will be considered as purchased by the hus-
band in pursuance of his covenant, and be liable to the
trust of the settlement.1 In any transaction of this char-
acter there must be conclusive evidence that the estate was
purchased with trust funds. Where this appears a trust
will arise, even though the purchase was not authorized by
the trust.2
1 Sowden v. Sowden, 1 Cox, 165 ;
s. c, 1 Bro. Ch. 582; Lench v.
Lench, 10 Ves. 516;, Gartshore v.
Chalie, 10 Ves. 9; Lewis v. Mad-
ocks, 17 Ves. 58; Perry v. Phillips,
17 Ves. 173; Waite v. Horwood, 2
Atk. 159 ; Savage v. Carroll, 1 B. &
B. 265. Trustees in the plaintiff's
marriage settlement, lent part of
the trust moneys in their hands to
the husband, when in full trade
and in credit, upon his bond. He
purchased an estate and took the
conveyance to himself in fee-sim-
ple. He afterwards became bank-
rupt and the estate so purchased,
with other estates and effects,
were conveyed and assigned to his
assignees. The estate so purchased
was held to be purchased with the
trust money, and ordered to be
conveyed to new trustees upon the
trusts in the settlement, in part of
the bond debt, and the trustees to
prove the remainder of the debt
under the commission. Wilson v.
Foreman, 1 Dick. 593. A trustee
and another person bought land
together. The trustee used trust
funds in paying for the land, but
his cotenant paid more than half
the purchase price. Afterwards
the trustee's creditors levied on
and sold his interest in the land.
Held, that the trustee's successor
could not, after such sale, subject
any part of the land to the pay-
ment of the trust fund. Hawkins
v. Palmer (1891) (Ky.), 16 S. W.
Rep. 274.
2 Taylor v. Plumer, 3 M. & Selw.
562; Bennett v. Mayhew, cited 1
Bro. Ch, 232; 2 Bro. Ch. 287; Lane
v. Dighton, Amb. 409 ; Buckeridge
v. Glasse, 1 Cr. & P. 126; Cunard
v. Atlantic Ins. Co. 1 Pet. 448;
Chedworth v. Edwards, 8 Ves. 46;
s. c, 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 128; Eyall
v. Eyall, 1 Atk. 59; S. C, Amb.
412, 413; Liebman v. Harcourt, 2
Meriv. 513; "Lord Ched worth) v.
Edwards, 8 Ves. p. 46; but in a
§ 158.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
327
§ 158. The Subject Continued. — Where a trustee has
purchased an estate with trust funds, in violation of his
trust, the property will still belong to the beneficiary and
be subject to a trust his favor. In the leading case of
Oliver v. Piatt, it was held that in cases of trust, where
the trustee has violated his trust by an illegal conversion
of the trust property, the cestui que trust has a right to
follow the property into whosesoever hands he may find it,
not being a bona fide purchaser for a valuable considera-
tion without notice.1 It was held farther : Where a trustee
subsequent case, MS., Lord Eldon
said he had consulted with Lord
Ellenborough, and thought he had
gone too far." 1 Mad. Ch. Pr.
128, note (e).
'Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How. 332;
Mansell v. Mansell, 2 P. Wms. 679;
Saunders v. Dehew, 2 Vern. 27;
S. c, 2 Freem. Ch. 123; Boursett
v. Savage, L. K. 2 Eq. 134; Pye v.
George, 2 Salk. 680; Lyford v.
Thurston, 16 N. H. 399; Barr v.
Cubbage, 52 Mo. 404; Smith v.
Bowen, 35 ST. Y. 83; McLeod v.
First JSTat'l Bank, 42 Miss. 99;
Jones v. Haddock, 41 Ala. 262;
Poor v. Williams, 38 Miss. 546;
Byan v. Doyle, 31 Iowa, 53 ; Hood
v. Fahnestock, 1 Pa. St. 470; "Wigg
v. Wigg, 1 Atk. 382; Liggett v.
Wall, 2 A. K. Marsh. 149 ; Aynes-
wortb. v. Halderman, 2 Duv. 655;
Lathrop v. Bampton, 31 Cal. 17;
Smith v. Walter, 49 Mo. 250 ; Joiner
v. Cowing, 17 Hun, 256; Den v.
McKnight, 6 Halst. 385. A bona
fide purchaser for value without
notice is protected. Fagg's Case,
1 Vern. 52; Jerrard v. Saunders, 2
Ves. 457 ; Boone v. Chilier, 10 Pet.
177; Varick v. Briggs, 6 Paige,
325; High v. Batte, 10 Yerg. 335;
Halstead v. Bank of Kentucky, 4 J.
J. Marsh. 554 ; Dixon v. Caldwell,
15 Ohio St. 412; Dillaye v. Comm.
Bank, 51 N. Y. 345; Colesbury v.
Dart, 58 Ala. 573; Hamilton v.
Mound City Mut. Life Ins. Co., 3
Tenn. Ch. 124; Heilner v. Imbrie,
6 Serg. & R. 401; Tomkins v.
Powell, 6 Leigh, 576; Harding-
ham v. Nichols, 3 Atk. 304; Kensal
v. Bennett, 1 Atk. 522; Hughes v.
Garth, Amb. 421 ; Dobson v. Lead-
better, 13 Ves. 230; Roberts v.
Moseley (1877), 64 Mo. 507; Baker
v. Springfield & West Mo. K. B.
(1885), 86 Mo. 75; Shaw v. Shaw
(1885), 86 Mo. 594; Henroiod v.
Neusbaumer (1878), 69 Mo. 96;
Harney v. Donohoe (1888), 07 Mo.
141 ; Mabary v. Dollarhide (18S9),
98 Mo. 198; Young v. Boardman
(1888), 97 Mo. 181; Enneau v.
Bieger (1891), 105 Mo. 659. It i* a
clearly established principle in
that jurisprudence, that whenever
the trustee has been guilty of a
breach of the trust, and has trans-
ferred the property by sale or
otherwise to any third person, the
cestui que trust has a full right to
follow such property into the
hands of such third person, unless
he stands in the predicament of a
bona fide purchaser, for a valuable
consideration, without notice. And
if the trustee has invested the trust
property, or its proceeds, in anjr
other property into which it can be>
distinctly traced, the cestui que
trust has his election either to fol-
328
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 158.
has, in violation of his trust, invested the trust property
or its proceeds in any other property, the cestui que trust
has his option, either to hold the substituted property liable
to the original trust, or to hold the trustee himself per-
sonally liable for the breach of the trust. The option,
however, belongs to the cestui que trust alone, and is for his
henefit and not for the benefit of the trustee.1 Where atrustee
low the same into the new invest-
ment, or to hold the trustee per-
sonally liable for the breach of the
trust. This right or option of the
■cestui que trust is one which posi-
tively and exclusively belongs to
.him, and it is not in the power of
the trustee to deprive him of it by
any subsequent repurchase of the
trust property, although in the
latter case the cestui que trust may,
if he pleases, avail himself of his
own right, and take back and hold
the trust property upon the original
trust ; but he is not compellable so
to do. The reason is, that this
"would enable the trustee to avail
himself of his own wrong; and if
he had made a profitable invest-
ment of the trust fund, to appro-
priate the profit to his own benefit,
and by a repurchase of the trust
fund to charge the loss or deterio-
ration in value, if any such there
lad been, in the meantime, to the
account of the cestui que trust;
■whereas the rule in equity is that
all the gain made by the trustee,
by a wrongful appropriation of the
trust fund, shall go to the cestui que
trust, and all the losses shall be
"borne by the trustee himself. The
option, in such case, to take the
new or the original fund is, there-
fore (as has been already sug-
gested), exclusively given to the
cestui que trust, and is given to him
for the wisest purposes and upon
the soundest public policy. It is
to aid in the maintenance of right
and in the suppression of meditated
wrong. Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How.
333, 400. An executor or trustee
cannot buy in a mortgage, judg-
ments or other debts of the testa-
tor, or cestui que trust, for his own
benefit; nor can he deal or traffic
with the estate for his own emolu-
ment. Van Home v. Fonda, 5
Johns. Ch. 389, 409.
1 Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How. 332
Brown v. Lambert, 33 Gratt. 263
Tappan v. Ailsworth, 13 E. I. 585
Flagg v. Mann, 3 Sumn. 475, 486
Calhoun v. Burnett, 40 Miss. 599
Roberts v. Mansfield, 38 Ga. 452
Lathrop v. Bampton, 31 Cal. 17
Norman v. Cunningham, 5 Gratt.
72 ; Hawkins v. Hawkins, 1 Dru. &
Sm. 75; Calhoun v. Burnett, 40
Miss. 599; Barker v. Barker, 14
Miss. 131. C, a trustee, employed
a broker, who had notice of the
trust, to sell out consols and invest
the proceeds in railway stock. The
broker sold the consols for cash,
bought railway stock to the same
amount for the settling day, and
received the price of the consols in
a check, which he paid into his
account at the bankers. He
stopped payment before the set-
tling day, and went into liquida-
tion. C claimed so much of the
broker's balance at his banker's as
was attributed to the price of con-
sols. The registrar disallowed the
claim, holding that the relation
between broker and customer was
similar to that between banker and
§ 158.J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
329
makes a contract, or makes any use of the trust estate for
his own benefit, and a benefit accrues, he will be held re-
sponsible to that extent to the cestui que trust. Whatever
he may gain in that manner he will hold as a trustee for the
person in whom the beneficial interest is vested. This will
be decreed on the well established principle of equity, that
whatever is done by a trustee with trust funds is done for
the benefit of the cestui que trust. For example, if he
should purchase an obligation or a claim against the bene-
ficiary at a discount, he will hold the amount of the dis-
count as a trustee for the cestui que trust.1 The New York
Court of Chancery has held that a trustee cannot act for
his own benefit in a contract on the subject of the trust; so
customer, and that 0 was only a
general customer. Held, on ap-
peal, that as the price of the con-
sols was known by the broker to
be trust money, it could be fol-
lowed, and that the claim must
therefore be allowed. Held, by
James, L. J, and Bramwell, J. A,
that, apart from the question of
trust, the position of a broker is
not that of a banker, but of an
agent into whose hands money is
put to be applied in a particular
way, and that money paid to him
can therefore be followed by the
customer. Ex parte Cooke, L. R.
4 Ch. D. 123. In equity, if trustees,
by an unauthorized use of the
trust funds, purchase a judgment,
the cestui que trust may elect either
to stand as the equitable owner of
it, or to consider the purchase a
wrong, and call the trustees to ac-
count for the funds thus misap-
plied; in which latter case the
judgment will be regarded as be-
longing to the assignees of their
own right.. Steele v. Babcock, 1
Hill, 527. If a mortgagee, execu-
tor, trustee, tenant for life, etc.,
having a limited interest, gets any
advantage by being in possession,
or otherwise, in obtaining a new
lease, he is not allowed to retain it
for his own benefit, but must hold
it for the mortgagor, or cestui que
trust. Where the plaintiff assigned
the lease of a farm to secure the
payment of a debt due to the de-
fendant, and the parties, after-
wards, entered into an agreement,
by which the plaintiff, in consid-
eration of a sum of money ex-
pressed, but not, in fact, paid,
agreed to give up to the defendant
one-half of the farm, and the de-
fendant entered into possession of
the premises, and surrendered the
lease to the landlord, and took a
new lease for an extended term of
years ; it was held that the plaintiff
was entitled to redeem the whole
premises, and, on such redemp-
tion, to have the entire benefit of
the new lease. Hobridge v. Gil-
lespie, 2 Johns. Ch. 30.
1 Morret v. Parke, 2 Atk. 54 ; Van
Home v. Fonda, 5 Johns. Ch. 409 ;
Evertson v. Tappan, 5 Johns. Ch.
514; Green v. Winter, 1 Johns. Ch.
26; Forbes v. Ross, 2 Bro. Ch. 430;
Ex parte Cooke, L. B. 4 Ch. Div.
123.
330 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 159.
a trustee who purchases a mortgage or a judgment, which
was a lien on the trust estate at a discount, is not allowed
to turn such purchase to his own advantage. A trustee
cannot demand a compensation for services beyond what is
founded on the positive agreement of the parties. And
where a trustee, who was a counselor-at-law, was to be al-
lowed for "all his advances and responsibilities," it was
held that, though he was entitled to a liberal indemnity for
his expenses and responsibilities incurred in the due and
faithful execution of his trust, yet he was not entitled to a
counsel fee, as a general retainer, nor for anything more
than what is understood in the language of a court of
equity to be "just allowances."1 Where a trustee in a will
which directed money to be lent at such rate of interest
as they should think reasonable, by consent of his co-
trustees keeps it at four per cent., ordered to pay five, and
the executors to pay the costs of taking the accounts as to
that interest.2
§ 159. Resulting Trust from Purchase by an Agent. —
The principle of equity presented in the preceding sec-
tions is applicable in this regard to the relations of an
agent to his principal, and also to other persons sustaining
fiduciary relations. Where an agent is employed to pur-
chase an estate, and takes the title in his own name, he
thereby becomes a trustee for his principal.3 If he is em-
1 Green v, Winter, 1 Johns. Ch
27 ; Norris v. Le Neve, 3 Atk. 37
Palmer v. Jones, 1 Vern. 144
Bonithon v. Hockmore, 1 Vern
316; Godfrey v. Watson, 3 Atk
517; Bead v. Snell, 2 Atk. 643
13 Ves. 407, 590; Tebbs v. Carpen-
ter, 1 Madd. 300 ; Davoue v. Fan-
ning, 2 Johns. Ch. 252; Evertson
v. Tappan, 5 Johns. Ch. 514;
Schiffelin v. Stewart, 1 Johns. Ch.
625.
In the matter of Annesley. a luna- 3 Lees v. Nuttall, 1 Russ. & Myl.
tic, Amb. 78; Fearns v. Young, 10 53; s. c, 1 Tamlyn, 282; Torrey v.
Ves. 184; Robinson v. Pett, 3 P. Bank of New Orleans, 9 Paige, 619;
Wms. 249 Van Epps v. Van Epps, 9 Paige,
2 Forbes v. Ross, 2 Bro. Ch. *431 ; 327 ; Taylor v. Salmon, 2 Mees. &
Newton v. Bennet, 1 Bro. Ch. 359 ; Cromp. 139; s. C, 4 Myl. & Cr.
Piety v. Stace, 4 Ves. 620 ; Perkyns 139 ; Wentworth v. Lloyd, 32 Beav.
v. Bayntun, 1 Bro. Ch. 375; Ra- 469; s. C, 10 H. L. Cas. 589.
phael v. Boehm, 11 Ves. 92; s. C,
§ 159.J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
331
ployed to purchase an account or other claim, and makes
the purchase at a discount, he will be held a trustee for his
principal to the amount of the reduction secured.1 Per-
sons acting as sureties, and making purchases of the securi-
ties of their principal, are governed by the same rule in this
regard as agent and principal. It has been held that a
surety who compounds a debt for which his principal and
himself have become jointly liable, and takes an assignment
of that debt to a trustee for himself, can only claim against
his principal the amount which he has actually paid.2 In
1 Keed v. Warner, 5 Paige, 650.
An agent who is employed to pur-
chase an estate, or to transact any-
particular business cannot pur-
chase the estate for himself, or
act for his own benefit in rela-
tion to the subject-matter of such
agency, to the injury of the person
by whom he is employed. Eeed v.
Warner, 5 Paige, 650.
2 Reed v. Norris. 2 Myl. & Or.
361. In Taylor v. Salmon, 4 Myl.
& Cr. 134, where a decree was
made for the specific performance
of a lease to the plaintiff, accord-
ing to the terms of an agreement
entered into between the two de-
fendants, it appearing that one of
the defendants, who resisted tjhe
decree and claimed the benefit of
the agreement for himself, acted
as agent of the plaintiffs in nego-
tiating the lease from his code-
fendant so that his own intention
was immaterial ; and the court be-
ing satisfied, moreover, upon the
evidence, that the real object and
understanding of the contracting
parties was an agreement for a
lease for the benefit of plaintiff.
In this case Lord Cottenham says :
"If Salmon, at the time when he
entered into the agreement with
Lord Dunalley, was acting as the
agent for the plaintiff Taylor, in
negotiating for the lease, it is not
material whether, at that moment,
he intended that the agreement
should be for the benefit of the
plaintiff or for his own; because,
in either case, the plaintiff would
be entitled, as against him, to the
benefit of the contract." A B, a
barrister, who had filled the situa-
tion of confidential and advising
counsel to C D for several years,
and had there acquired an inti-
mate knowledge of his estates and
liabilities, was held to be incapa-
ble, even after the relationship had
ceased for some time, of purchas-
ing outstanding securities affecting
his client's estates, especially as
the validity of those very securi-
ties had been impeached, and such
impeachment was known to A B,
he having been repeatedly con-
sulted by C D in reference to a
compromise respecting those se-
curities, with the then holders of
them. Carter v. Palmes, 1 Dru. &
W. 722. As to a purchase by a
trustee of the trust property, the
rule is it shall not prevail. Plaint-
iff, employed as agent of a syndi-
cate to purchase lands for it,
claimed to have advanced $10,000
towards the purchase of the lands,
with the understanding that he
was to own a proportionate share
of them. The evidence of the pay-
ment of any such sum was vague
332
IMPLIED TEUSTS.
[§ 159.
his opinion in this case Lord Chancellor Cottenham said :
"Why is an agent precluded from taking the benefit of
purchasing a debt which his principal was liable to dis-
charge ? Because it is his duty, on behalf of his employer,
to settle the debt upon the best terms he can obtain ; and
if he is employed for that purpose, and is enabled to pro-
and uncertain. Plaintiff knew that
the syndicate proposed issuing three
series of bonds, and that if, after
the payment of the bonds, any por-
tion of the trust estate remained un-
disposed of, it was to be distribu-
ted among the bondholders of the
third series ; yet he made no claim
to any portion of the bonds, and
failed to sign the bond subscription
list for the amount claimed to have
been advanced by him. Held, that
the evidence failed to establish a
trust in favor of plaintiff. Ander-
son v. South Omaha Land Co., 35
Xeb. 7S5; s. c, 53 N. W. Kep. 7S5.
To establish a resulting trust in
mining claims and interests ac-
quired by an alleged agent of the
claimant in his own name, the
claimant must make definite proof
that the interest was acquired by
his money, paid at the time, and
traceable directly into the prop-
erty ; and general evidence of sup-
port, and of agreements and pay-
ments made before and after the
acquisition of title, is inadmissible,
unless they are connected with the
acquisition and its prerequisite
payment, or the transaction itself
establishes a resulting trust. First
Xat'l Bank v. Campbell (1892), 2
Colo. Ct. App. 271; s. c, 30 Pac.
Kep. 357. Plaintiff sought to es-
tablish a resulting trust, claiming
that he had employed defendant
at a per diem to purchase lands for
him ; that defendant had taken the
title in his own name; and that
when he had objected to this de-
fendant promised to transfer it on
demand. Afterwards, when re-
quested, defendant refused. Plaint-
iff took possession of the land soon
after its purchase, made valuable
improvements and paid for it with
his own money. Several witnesses
testified that they had bought lots
of plaintiff, and that defendant
had admitted to them that plaintiff
had paid him for his services in
making the purchase, and that the
land belonged to him. Defendant
contended that he purchased the
land for himself and denied making
such admission. There was evi-
dence that plaintiff had said that
the land belonged to defendant;
and when asked the price of the
lots he had referred them to the
defendant. Held, that the evidence
failed to establish the said trust.
Leggett v. Sutton (1892) (Ark.),
18 , S. "W. Eep. 125. As to a
purchase by a trustee of the trust
property the rule is that it shall
not prevail under any circum-
stances, unless the connection ap-
pear satisfactorily to have been
dissolved (a transaction to be
viewed with great jealousy from
the opportunity of acquiring
knowledge as trustee), or by uni-
versal consent. But as against
him it shall stand; as, if more can-
not be obtained. The rule applies
to all agents, and most strictly to
assignees in bankruptcy from their
great power. Ex parte Lacey, 6
Ves. 625.
§ 159.] IMPLIED TRUSTS. 333
cure a settlement of the debt for anything else than the
whole amount, it would be a violation of his duty to his
employer, or, at least, would hold out a temptation to vio-
late that duty, if he might take an assignment of the debt,
and so make himself a creditor of his employer to the full
amount of the debt which he was employed to settle. Does
not the same duty devolve on a surety ? He enters into an
obligation and becomes subject to a liability upon a con-
tract of indemnity. The contract between him and his
principal is that the principal shall indemnify him from
whatever loss he may sustain by reason of incurring an
obligation together with the principal. It is on a contract for
indemnity that the surety becomes liable for the debt. It is
by virtue of that situation, and because he is under an
obligation as between himself and the creditor of his prin-
cipal, that he is enabled to make the arrangement with that
creditor. It is his duty to make the best terms he can for
the person in whose behalf he is acting. His contract with
the principal is indemnity."1 An executor is subject to
the same equitable rule. He cannot buy the debts of the
estate for his own benefit.2
1 Reed v. Norris, 2 Myl. & Cr. Ves. Jr. 289; Massey v. Davis, 1
361, 374. See also Kraemer v. Ves. Jr. 317; Ringo v. Binns, 10
Deusterman, 37 Minn. 469; s. c, Pet. 268; Johnson v. Blackman,
35 5T. W. Rep. 276; Schlaefer v. 11 Conn. 342; Banks v. Judah, 8
Corson, 52 Barb. 510; Heilman v. Conn. 145; Church v. Sterling, 16
Messmer, 75 Cal. 166; s. c.,16Pac. Conn. 388. The owner of a mining
Rep. 766; Eshleman v. Lewis. 49 claim sold for taxes requested an-
Pa. St. 410; Pollansbee v. Kil- other to buy it in, and furnished
breath, 17 111. 522 ; Hutchinson v. purchase money therefor. The
Hutchinson,4Desaus. Bq. 77; Chas- agent purchased in his own name,
tain v. Smith, 30 G-a. 96; Ward v. Held, that these transactions crea-
Armstrong, 84 111. 151; Wynn v. ted a resulting trust in the owner's
Sharer, 23 Ind. 573; Robb's App. favor, although the agent made no
41 Pa. St. 45; Bank of America v. express promise to act as such.
Pollock, 4 Edw. 215; Day v. Roth, O'Connor v. Irvine, 74 Cal. 435;
18 N. Y. 448; Bridenbecker v. s. c, 16 Pac. Rep. 236.
Lowell, 32 Barb. 10; Moffit v. Mc- 2 Ex parte Lacey, 6 Ves. 625. See
Donald, 11 Humph. 457; Parkistv. also Perry v. Head, 1 A. K. Marsh.
Alexander, 1 Johns. Ch. *394; 46; Garrett v. Garrett, 1 Strobh.
Hardwicke v. Vernon, 4 Ves. 411; Eq. 96; McCrory v. Foster, 1 Iowa,
East India Co. v. Henchman,! 271; Wallace v. Duffield, 2 S. & R.
334 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 160.
§ 160. From Title in the Name of Wife or Child —
Where an estate is purchased, and the title taken in the
name of a wife or child, it will be an open question whether
a resulting trust arises in favor of the purchaser. The
presumption is against him. But evidence may be intro-
duced to show either that there was some deception, acci-
dent or misapprehension in the execution of the instrument
of conveyance, or if it is clear that the purchaser acted
intelligently and deliberately in taking the title, that it was
his intention to retain the equitable interest. But proof of
this character must be such as to leave no reasonable ground
for doubt, and it must relate to facts that were antecedent
to the purchase, or that occurred in connection with it. If
they transpire subsequently to the purchase or to the con-
veyance it must appear that they entered into and were a
part of the transaction, t Where the husband pays the con-
sideration of the purchase of lands, and has the convey-
ance made to his wife, the presumtion is that a gift or set-
tlement was intended, and a resulting trust will not arise
in his favor from such payment. The proof which shall
in such cases overcome the presumption of a gift to the
wife must be of facts antecedent to or contemporaneous
with the purchase, or else immediately afterwards, so as to
be in fact part of the same transaction f^and it must be
equally satisfactory and explicit with the proof required to
establish a resulting trust.1 Where a conveyance is taken
521 ; Buck v. Uhrich, 16 Pa. St. Livingstone v. Livingstone, 2
499 ; Barker v. Barker, 14 Wis. 131 ; Johns. Ch. 539 ; Kankin v. Harper,
Williams v. Hollingsworth, 1 23 Mo. 579; Eddy v. Baldwin, 23
Strobh. Eq. 103; White v. Drew, Mo. 588; Shepherd v. White, 10
42 Mo. 561; Stow v. Kimball, 28 Tex. 72; Guthrie v. Gardner, 19
111. 93 ; Claussen v. Le Franz, 1 Wend. 414 ; Smith v. Strahan, 16
Clarke, 226; Harper v. Archer, 28 Tex. 314; Lorentz v. Lorentz, 14
Miss. 212 ; Seaman v. Cook, 14 111. W. Va. 809 ; Lochenour v. Loche-
501 ; Ex parte James, 8 Ves. 336. nour, 61 Ind. 595 ; Gilliland v. Gil-
1 Reed v. Huff, 40 N. J. Eq. 229
Sawyer's Appeal, 16 N. H. 414
Dickinson v. Davis, 43 N. H. 647
Wallace v. Bowen, 28 Vt. 638
Stevens . v. Stevens, 70 Me. 92
Jackson v. Matadorf, 11 Johns. 91
liland, 96 Mo. 522; Schuster v.
Schuster, 93 Mo. 438; Baker v.
Baker, 22 Minn. 262; Norton v.
Mallory, 3 Thomp. & C. 640; Far-
rell v. Lloyd, 69 Pa. St. 239; Lane
v. Lane, 80 Me. 570; Bennett v.
§ 160.J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
335
in the name of a son it is admissible to show that the bene-
ficial interest was retained by the purchaser. In a recent
case where a complaint to establish a trust alleged that P
paid the purchase price to certain land, and it was agreed
Camp, 54 Vt. 36; Whiteley v.
Ogle, 47 N. J. Eq. 67; Wheeler v.
Kidder, 105 Pa. St. 270 ; McClintock
v. Loisseau, 31 W. Va. 865; Thur-
ber v. La Boque, 105 1ST. Car. 301 ;
Cerney v. Pawlott, 66 Wis. 262;
Cotton, v. Wood, 25 Iowa, 43 ; Dud-
ley v. Bosworth, 10 Humph. 9;
Buss v. Mebius, 16 Cal. 350; Page
v. Page, 8 N. H. 187 ; Tremper v.
Burton, 18 Ohio, 418; James v.
James, 41 Ark. 301; Hardin v.
Darwin, 66 Ala. 55; Buren v.
Buren, 79 Mo. 538; Shaw v. Bead,
47 Pa. St. 96; Taylor v. Taylor, 57
Miss. 544; Lamplugh v. Lamplugh,
1 P. Wms. ill ; Sidmouth v. Sid-
mouth, 2 Beav. 447; Williams v.
Williams, 32 Beav. 370; Kilpin v.
Kilpin, 1 Myl. & B. 520; Devoy v.
Devoy, 3 Sm. & Gift. 403; Kingdon
v. Bridges, 2 Vern. 67; Christ's
Hospital v. Budgin, 2 Vern. 683
Back v. Andrew, 2 Vern. 120
Glaister v. Hewer, 8 Yes. 199
Eider v. Kidder, 10 Ves. 367 ; Low
v. Carter, 1 Beav. 426. Under Pub.
St. Mass., ch. 141, § 1, providing
that no trust concerning lands, ex-
cept such as results by implication
of law, shall be created unless by
written instrument, signed by the
party declaring the trust, an oral
agreement between the husband
and wife, that land conveyed to
her by him should be held in trust
for their children, is invalid. Mo-
ran v. Somes (1891), 154 Mass. 200;
s. c, 28 N. E. Bep. 526. In an ac-
tion by a husband to compel a con-
veyance to him by his wife of real
property alleged to have been pur-
chased by her with his money, he
testified to confession by her to him
that she had taken the money from
his safe, and an employe testified
that he had seen her take money
from the safe nearly every day he
was on duty. The wife denied the
confessions, as well as the taking
of the money; and proof of her
deposits in and drafts on various
savings bank showed a probability
that she paid for the property out
of money belonging to herself.
Held, that the evidence for plaintiff
was not sufficiently clear and well
sustained to deprive the wife of the
effect of the absolute deed to her.
Taylor v. Taylor (1890), 13 N".
Y. Supl. 55. Where prop-
erty is purchased by a husband
with the proceeds of the sale of
crops raise and stock fed on land
in part belonging to his wife, there
having been no agreement or ex-
pectation that the husband should
render compensation for the use of
the land, there is no resulting trust
in favor of the wife in the property
purchased. Jones v. Storms (1894),
90 Iowa, 369; s. c, 57 K. W. Bep.
892. A childless widower, who
had long been estranged from his
own family, and whose most inti-
mate associates were the relatives
of his late wife, bought various
pieces of land and made various
mortgage loans with his own
money, but had the deeds and
notes run to different relatives of
his wife, whose agent he claimed
to be, though they knew nothing
of the transactions at the time. He
kept the deeds unrecorded, but al-
ways paid taxes in the names of
336
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 160..
between him and his son, without fraudulent intent, that
the deed for the land was to be made to the son, who was
to hold the land in trust for his father, it was held that
the complaint was not demurrable, as the trust sought to
be established did not fall within the statute forbidding
the creation of an express parol trust in land, but was
expressly authorized by a section which provides for a re-
sulting trust in favor of the purchaser of land in such
cases.1
the grantees. He used as his own
all money received by him from
rents, but frequently expressed his
intention that the property should
go to such grantees at his death.
Held, in a suit brought by his heirs,
that he had only a resulting trust
for life, with remainder to said
grantees. Cook v. Patrick (1891),
135 111.499; s. C, 26 N. E. Rep.
658. In an action by judgment
creditors to subject land conveyed
by the debtor to his wife, the wife
testified that when the land was
bought by her husband, 20 years
before, she furnished a portion of
the purchase money. There was
no evidence of any agreement or
intention that the money should be
repaid, or that the wife should
have either a lien on or interest in
the land. Held, insufficient to es-
tablish in her favor either a lien
for the money so furnished or a
resulting trust in the land.
Brownell v. Stoddard (1894), 42
Neb. 177; s. c, 60 1ST. "W. Kep. 380.
In a suit to declare a resulting trust
in land after the death of the holder
of the legal title, who exercised un-
disputed ownership for more than
20 years, evidence that he obtained
part of the purchase money from
the complainants (his sisters), and
that he made admissions to the ef-
fect that they had an interest in
the land, are insufficient to estab-
lish a trust, where the evidence is
indefinite, and somewhat contra-
dictory. Strong v. Messenger
(1893), 148 111. 431; s. C, 36 1ST. E.
Kep. 617. In an action by a hus-
band against his wife to compel
the conveyance to him by her of
land alleged to have been pur-
chased by her with his money,
evidence of additions and repairs
made by the wife with money ob-
tained on mortgage of the prop-
erty, while the husband resided
with her thereon, is admissible to
show his acquiescence in her title ;
and the cost of such additions and
repairs is also pertinent. Taylor
v. Taylor (1890), 13 N. Y. Supl. 55.
A bill by the heirs of a married
woman, to establish a resulting
trust in land purchased by her hus-
band, alleged that the land was
bought with the proceeds of prop-
erty bought with money which her
children had earned, and put into
her possession, but did not allege
that this money belonged to her,
or that she claimed the property.
Held, that the bill was not suffi-
cient to support a decree for com-
plainants. Kosterv. Miller (1S94),
149 111.195; s. c, 37 N\ E. Rep.
46.
1 Prow v. Prow (1892), 133 Ind.
340; s. e., 32 1ST. E. Rep. 1121.
Plaintiff and her two daughters.
E and H, bought a home, plaintiff
§ 161. j
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
337
§ 161. The Subject Continued. — Where a husband fur-
nishes the purchase money for buying an estate, but the
purchase is made by the wife and the title is taken in her
name, she will hold the property as a trustee for the hus-
paying the purchase money, ex-
cept small contributions from the
daughters' earnings. The title
was taken in the name of E, who,
against her will, as she testified,
conveyed one-half to H, and the
other half to plaintiff. Plaintiff
and E testified that the purchase
was by and for plaintiff only ; that
E negotiated for the purchase and
took the title in her name because
plaintiff could not speak nor write
English; and that she, with her
family, occupied the property as a
residence for eight years, during
which she paid the taxes and in-
surance. H testified that she and
E bought the property, and was
somewhat corroborated, and she
introduced a lease to plaintiff, but
both E and plaintiff denied that
they knew of or authorized it.
Meld, that a decree that H held the
title to half the property under a
resulting trust for plaintiff was
proper. Lundy v. Hanson (1891) ,
16 Colo. 267 ; S, C, 26 Pac. Rep. 816.
Where the testimony was conflict-
ing as to whether land was bought
with a mother's or her son's
money, whether the bond for a
deed was taken in her name for
herself or to protect his interests
as a minor, and whether she di-
rected the deed to be made to him
or to her, and the evidence showed
that at her request the bond for a
deed was never recorded, that the
deed was made to the son, and that
she delayed over 20 years before
she demanded a deed to herself in
accordance with his bond, a trust
on behalf of the mother is not es-
tablished. Snider v. Johnson
22
(1894), 25 Ore. 328; s. c, 35 Pac.
Rep. 846. Plaintiff's father, an
invalid, resided with her family on
the understanding between plaint-
iff and her husband that whatever
came from the care of her father
should be hers. At the father's
death, plaintiff's husband pre-
sented a claim to his administra-
tor which included plaintiff's
claim, and the entire account was
allowed in the husband's name, it
being agreed between them that
on payment the wife should have
her claim. Before payment the
husband died. Held, that the pre-
sentation and allowance of the
claim in the name of the husband
created, as between husband and
wife, a trust for the latter, and his
estate had no right therein. Pot-
ter v. Potter's Admr. (1892), 64
Vt. 298; S. C, 23 Atl. Rep. 856.
Defendants, sons of intestate,
claimed a lot owned by their father
as against any interest therein of
plaintiff, their sister, alleging that
they had furnished them money to-
pay for it, and, therefore, a trust
resulted to them. The evidence
showed that the sons gave their
earnings to their mother, who,
with her husband, and plaintiff,
her daughter, performed house-
hold services for the whole family.
The mother negotiated for the
land, and, by consent of all, the
deed was made to the father. It
was not affirmatively shown that
the father possessed no means at
the time of the purchase, but that
about two years before the pur-
chase, when he came to this coun-
try, plaintiff sent him $100, and
338 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 162.
band, especially if she have recognized this relation. In a
recent case where a wife purchased land with her husband's
money, taking the title in her own name, but declaring at'
the time that the land was bought for her husband, and
that she held the title thereto in trust for him, such land
will be impressed with a trust in his favor, and he will be
entitled to a decree vesting title in him.1
§ 162. Presumption of Advancement. — The relation of
husband and father involves the obligation to provide for
those toward whom this relation is sustained. Under or-
dinary circumstances this obligation is not only legal, but
equitable. A presumption arises, then, on this ground, that
where a purchase is made, and the title to an estate is taken
in the name of a wife or infant child, it is intended as a
gift or an advancement. This presumption will apply also
to purchases made by a husband in the joint names of him-
self and of his wife, or of himself and a child. In the ab-
sence of any evidence relating to the purchase and convey-
ance, no trust will result to the purchaser. In his opinion,
in the case of Bennett v. Bennett, Sir George Jessel, Master
of the Rolls, said: "The doctrine of equity, as regards
presumption of gifts, is this, that where one person stands
in such a relation to another that there is an obligation on
that person to make a provision for the other, and we find
either a purchase or investment in the name of the other,
or in the joint names of the person and the other, of an
amount which would constitute a provision for the other,
the presumption arises of an intention on the part of the
person to discharge the obligation to the other ; and, there-
fore, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that pur-
chase or investment is held to be in itself evidence of a gift.
In other words, the presumption of gift arises from the
moral obligation to give."2 In a recent case it was held
one of the defendants sent him a kin (1892), 76 Md. 451; S. C, 25
passage ticket. Defendants made Atl. Rep. 481.
no claim against their sister until 1 Price v. Kane, 112 Mo. 412;
16 years after the deed to their s. c, 20 S. W. Rep. 609.
father. Held, that no resulting 2 Bennett v. Bennett, L. R. 10 Ch.
trust was shown. Brannan v. Dur- Div. 474, 476 ; Dyer v. Dyer, 2 Cox,
§ 162. J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
339
that where a husband pays the purchase money of land, and
has the land conveyed to his wife, the presumption is that
the husband intended to make a gift to his wife, and not to
create a resulting trust, and this presumption must prevail,
unless it is rebutted by convincing evidence.1 In Ilgenfritz
v. Ilgenfritz it was held that where land is bought by a
husband, and at his direction the deed is made to the wife,
and there is no agreement that the property is to be held in
trust for the husband, he is presumed to have intended the
land as a provision for and settlement on his wife, for her
own benefit.2
92; s. c, 1 Lead. Cas. in Equity,
*236 ; s. c, 1 Watk. Cop. 216 ; Finch
v. Finch, 15 Ves. 50 ; Franklin v.
Franklin, 1 Swanst. 17, 18; Grey v.
Grey, 2 Swanst. 597; s. c, Cas.
temp. Finch, 340; Sidmouth v. Sid-
mouth, 2 Beav. 454; Christy v.
Courtenay, 13 Beav. 96 ; Williams
v. Williams, 32 Beav. 370; Tucker
v. Burrow, 2 H. & M. 515, 524
Fatherlee v Fletcher, 31 Miss. 265
Shaw v. Read, 47 Pa. St. 96
Thomas v. Chicago, 55 111. 403
Wilton v. Devine, 20 Barb. 9
Tremper v. Burton, 18 Ohio, 418
Dickinson v. Davis, 44 N. H. 647
Miller v. Blose, 30 Gratt. 744 ; Dud-
ley v. Bosworth, 10 Humph. 12
Butler v. Ins. Co., 14 Ala. 777
Shepherd v. White, 10 Tex. 72
Stanley v. Brannon, 6 Black, 193
Where the husband makes an in-
vestment, such as money or stock,
in the names of himself and his
wife, it is an advancement for the
benefit of the wife absolutely if
she survives her husband, but if he
survives her, then it reverts to him
as joint tenant with his wife. In
re Eykyn's Trusts, L. R. 6 Ch. D.
118; Dummer v. Pitcher, 2 Myl. &
K. 262.
iWhitelyv. Ogle (1890), 47 N.
J. Eq, 67; s. c, 20 Atl. Bep. 284;
Maxwell v. Maxwell, 109 111. 588;
Milner v. Freeman, 40 Ark. 62;
Hardin v. Darwin, 66 Ala. 55;
Lochenour v. Lochenour, 61 Ind.
595; Gray v. Gray, 13 Neb. 453;
Gilliland v. Gilliland (1888), 96
Mo. 522; s. c, 10 S. W. Eep. 139;
Johnson v. Johnson, 16 Minn. 512;
Whittenv. Whitten, 3 Cush. 191;
Cotton v. Wood, 25 Iowa, 43;
Spring v. Hight, 22 Me. 408; Lane
v. Lane (1888), 80 Me. 570; s. C,
16 Atl. Kep. 323; Insurance Co. v.
Deal, 16 Md. 26; Groff v. Bohrer,
35 Md. 327 ; Dickinson v. Davis, 43
N. H. 647; Hill v. Bank, 45 N". H
300; Belford v. Crane, 16 N. J. Eq
265; Wilton v. Devine, 20 Barb. 9
Guthrie v. Gardner, 19 Wend. 414
Jencks v. Alexander, 11 Paige Ch
619; Garfield v. Hatmaker, 15 N". Y
475; Earnest's Appeal, 106 Pa. St
310; Wallace v. Bo wen, 28 Vt. 638
Jackson v. Jackson, 91 U. S. 122
Bennett v. Camp, 54 Vt. 36. Where
a woman buys land, pays for it
with her own money, and takes a
deed in the name of a man with
whom she is cohabiting, but to
whom she has not been legally
married, a resulting trust arises in
her favor, since the parties are in
fact strangers to one another. Mc-
Donald v. Carr (1894), 150 111. 264;
S. C, 37 N. E. Rep. 225.
2 Ilgenfritz v. Ilgenfritz (1893),
340
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 1153.
§ 163. The Subject Continued. — The principle of equity
set forth in the preceding section applies where a wife
makes the purchase and takes the title in her own name,
but paj's for it with money furnished by her husband. In
a recent case it was held that where a husband furnishes his
wife money with which to buy land, and she takes the title
in her own name, the presumption is that the wife holds
the title, not in trust for her husband, but for her own ben-
efit; and the burden is upon the husband to establish a
trust in favor of himself by proof full, clear, and convinc-
ing.1 Where a husband and wife unite in the purchase of
land, and the title is taken in the name of the wife, the
purchase will be held as an advancement. In Goelz v.
Goelz, where land was bought by a son, and was paid for
with money furnished partly by his mother and partly by
his father, title being taken in her name, the father knew
that the title Avas vested in her and made no objection for
116 Mo. 429; S. C, 22 S. W. Rep.
786.
l Long v. McKay, 84 Me. 199 ;
S. C, 21 Atl. Rep. 815; Stevens v.
Stevens, 70 Me. 92; Dudley v.
Batchelder, 53 Me. 403; Burleigh
v. White, 64 Me. 23; Jackson v.
Jackson, 91 U. S. 122; Johnson v.
Johnson, 16 Minn. 512; Whitten v.
Whitten, S Cush. 191; Gray v.
Gray, 13 Neb. 453; Bartlett v.
Bartlett, 13 Neb. 456. In Soar v.
Foster, 4 Kay & J. 152, where Har-
ris, having married his deceased
wife's sister, purchased stock in
the joint names of himself and his
"said wife Rachel," it was held
that the transaction could not be
an advancement, since legally the
woman was only his mistress.
Wood, V. C, in disposing of the
case, uses this language: '-Then
how does the inference arise that
the purchase was intended as a
provision for the defendant? Not
upon the ground of his being under
a moral obligation to provide for
the defendant, for that argument
would be equally applicable, if, in-
stead of an invalid marriage of this
description, the case had been one
of bigamy by a person represent-
ing himself as unmarried. In such
a case there would be a clear
moral duty incumbent upon the
person supposed to provide for a
woman whom he had so grossly
deceived. The same argument
would apply to a case of mere co-
habitation without any form of
marriage whatever. Any moralist
would say that a man was bound
to make provisions for the woman
with whom he had so cohabited.
But it would be impossible for this
court to hold, if in either of the
cases supposed an investment had
been made by the man, in the
names of himself and the woman,
that upon the mere ground of his
being under such moral obligation,
the purchase could be presumed
to have been intended by him as a
provision or advancement.-'
$ 163. J
IMPLIED TKTJSTS.
341
several years, and until he learned that she was about to
dispose of the property. It was held that there was no re-
sulting trust in his favor, the presumption being that he in-
tended the transaction to be a settlement on her.1 Where
a father conveys land to a son, the deed reciting a valuable
consideration and containing an habendum clause with the
usual covenant of warranty, no trust will result in favor of
the father. In a recent case, where a father conveyed land
which had been taken under the homestead law to his minor
son, at a time when he was not in debt, by a warranty deed
in the usual form, with an habendum clause, for the ex-
pressed consideration of $1,000, and the son afterwards
reconveyed the same land to his father, taking from the
latter a note for $1,500, and the father afterwards mort-
gaged the land for a like sum to go into business, it was
held that the conveyance from the father to the son was not
in trust for the benefit of the former, and that the recon-
veyance from the son to the father was not made in pur-
suance of any trust.2
1 Goelz v. Goelz, 157 111. 33 ; Max-
well v. Maxwell, 109 Til. 58S; Cart-
wright v. Wise, 14 111. 417 ; Taylor v.
Taylor, 4 Gilm. 303. The purchase
of land by a parent in the name of a
child, or by a husband in the name
of his wife, will, prima facie, be
presumed to be an advancement or
settlement and not a trust. This
latter presumption may be either
supported or rebutted by proof of
antecedent or contemporaneous
acts or facts or by proof of any
act or facts so soon after the pur-
chase as to be fairly considered a
part of the transaction. G-oelz v.
Goelz, 157 111. 33.
2 Beavers v. McKinley, 50 Kas.
602; s. C, 32 Pac. Kep. 363. A
father who conveys land to his in-
fant daughter, her heirs and as-
signs forever, by deed, reciting
that the same is to be held in trust
by her grandfather until she be-
comes of age, cannot prove by
parol that he intended a resulting
trust to himself in case of his
daughter dying before attaining
her majority. Annis v. "Wilson, 15
Colo. 236; s. c, 25 Pac. Eep. 304.
A resulting trust is not created
where a husband builds a house on
his own land with money contribu-
ted by his wife under an agree-
ment with her that the house is to
be her property. Brown v. Tur-
ner (1892), 113 Mo. 27; S. C, 20 S.
W. Bep. 660. In an action to es-
tablish a trust in plaintiff's favor in
land which he had, 30 years before,
caused to be conveyed to his daugh-
ter (defendant's mother) , plaintiff
could not remember why the land
was conveyed to his daughter, but
"guessed" it was for convenience.
The evidence showed that, after
the daughter's death, plaintiff, as
guardian for defendants, petitioned
342 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 164,
§ 164. The Same Subject. — The rule under which a
conveyance to a wife or child is presumed to be an advance-
ment applies, in the absence of any modifying circumstance,
to the relations of a husband or wife to a son-in-law. Where
land is conveyed to a son-in-law in the distribution of an
estate there will be no trust in favor of the daughter as his
wife. In a recent case it- was held that where a wife's
father, with her consent, for the purpose of making an
equal distribution of his property among his children,
causes land to be conveyed to her husband by a deed of
general warranty, the land is not charged with any trust in
favor of the wife.1 In another similar case it was held
that, in the absence of any showing that a son-in-law was
guilty of a breach of trust or confidence in taking title to the
land in his own name, where convej'ance was made to such
son-in-law by a father as an advancement to his daughter,
no trust results to the daughter under the statute, which
creates an implied trust where the alienee, in violation of
some trust, has purchased the estate with money not his
own.2 It may appear, from the circumstances connected
for leave to mortgage the land in the consent of the person paying
question, wherein he alleged under the purchase money, and the
oath that the land belonged to de- placing of the title in the son-
fendants, and in other ways reco"g- in-law was not done with
nized defendants' interest therein, the consent of the daughter. lb.
Held, that plaintiff could not re- A testatrix, both before and after
cover. Hogeboom v. Robertson she made her will, purchased sums
(1S94), 41 Neb. 795; s. C.,60 N. W. of stock in the names of herself
Rep. 2. and the son of her daughter-in-
1 Acker v. Priest (1894) (Iowa), law. By her will she gave the res-
61 N. W. Rep. 235. idue of her estate to her daughter-
2Noe v. Roll (1895), 134 Ind. in-law for life, and after her death
115; s. c, 33 N. E. Eep. 905. A to the son and daughter of the
conveyance of land by a father to daughter-in-law. Held, that under
his son-in-law, as an advancement the circumstances the sums of stock
for his daughter, does not create so purchased were a gift to the son
an implied trust in the land in of the daughter-in-law; that in
favor of the daughter, as against such a case the evidence of the son
the sonMn-law's creditors and and his wife was admissible, and
heirs, under Rev. Stat. 1881, § 2976, could not be disregarded as re-
which provides that a trust shall butting the presumption of a re-
result where a conveyance is taken suiting trust; and that, coupled
in the name of the alienee without with the circumstances under
§ 164. ]
IMPLIED TEUSTS.
343
with a conveyance of this character, that it was not de-
signed to be an advancement, and in such a case a trust will
result, as in a recent case in which it was in evidence that
a person purchased land with his own money, but had it
conveyed to his son-in-law; that the latter never claimed
any interest in it, or in any way controlled it, but that the
property was always in the possession and under the man-
agement and control of the purchaser during his lifetime,
and thereafter of his children ; that the purchaser stated
that his object in purchasing and improving the land was
that his four children should each finally own a fourth of it ;
and the fact that the son-in-law executed a bond at the in-
stance of the purchaser to convey a fourth of the land to
each of the children, is sufficient to establish a resulting
trust, in the absence of any opposing evidence other than
an unexplained recital in the bond, that the conveyance
should be made when the son-in-law should secure a patent
to certain land.1
which the stock was purchased, it
was sufficient to rebut the presump-
tion ; and that on the facts that the
testatrix had not place herself in
loco parentis to the son of her
daughter-in-law, or to the other
residuary legatee, and that both
these facts would have to be proved
to make the gift an ademption of
the residuary bequest. Fowkes v.
Pascoe, L. R. 10 Ch. App. 343.
Stock was transferred by a lady
into the names of herself, her
daughter and the daughter's hus-
band; the dividends on the stock
were received by the son-in-law
and paid over to the transferor
'during her life. The daughter pre-
deceased her mother, and the son-
in-law survived her. Held, that
there was no resulting trust,
and that the son-in-law was en-
titled to the stock. Batstone v.
Salter, L. R. 19 Eq. 250. Where a
father who had intended to convey
certain lands to a daughter as an
advancement, conveys the same to
a son upon the son's agreement to
convey to the daughter other land
of which he was the owner; and
the daughter leaves the consum-
mation of this agreement to her
husband, who, instead of having
the conveyance made to her, takes
it to himself, equity will decree Vs.e
title to be in trust for the wife. "War-
ner v. Warner (1892), 132 Ind. 213;
s. c, 31 1ST. E. Rep. 466. A con-
veyance of land by a father to his
daughter's husband, in considera-
tion of love and affection for her,
creates no trust in favor of her or
her heirs. Higbeev. Higbee (1S94),
123 Mo. 287; s. c, 27 S. W. Rep.
619.
JHawley v. Geer (1891) (Tex.),
17 S. W. Rep. 914; Oury v. Saun-
ders, 77 Tex. 278; s. c, 13 S. W.
Rep. 2030; Hutchinson v. Bacon,
46 Tex. 414.
344 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§§ 165-1G6.
§ 165. From Conveyance in the Name of a Mother. —
Where land was bought and paid for by a son and the title
taken in the name of his mother, it was held that a result-
ing trust arose in favor of the son.1 But where a title is
taken in the name of a mother, with a view to defrauding
creditors, a trust will not be enforced as against them, as
in a recent case where D bought certain lots, paying for
them with his own means, and by his direction the deed
therefor was made to his mother. It was held that a trust
in said lots resulted in favor of D, but, if the title was thus
directed to be made for the purpose of defrauding the cred-
itors of D, he being insolvent and contemplating bank-
ruptcy, could not enforce such trust by action, but, when
the legal title was afterwards acquired by him, it was re-
ceived free of any equitable claim of other heirs of his
mother, she being deceased.2
§ 166. From Husband as Trustee of Wife. — Where a
husband purchases land with money belonging to his wife
in her separate interest, and takes the title in his own
name, a resulting trust will be decreed in her favor, unless
she intended to make him a gift of the money.3 On this
x Champlin v. Champlin (1891), absence of any agreement to the
136111.309; s. C.,26N.E.Rep. 526. contrary. Ross v. Hendrix, 110
2Detwiler v. Detwiler (1890) , 30 N. Car. 403; s. c, 15 S. E. Rep. 4.
Neb. 338; S. C, 46 N. W. Rep. In an action to establish a resulting
t>24. trust in land in complainants as
3 Berry v. Wiedman (1894), 40 W. heirs of a married woman, the bill
Va. 36; s. c, 20 S. E. Rep. 817; alleged that the purchase had been
Scrutchfield v. Santer (1S94), 119 made by her husband ashertrus-
Mo.615; s. C, 24 S. W. Rep. 137. tee; that a cash payment of one-
Where deeds were interchanged be- third of the purchase price had
tween tenants in common in an been made by him with funds be-
amicable partition of the common longing to her statutory separate
estate, and no portion thereof was estate ; that the vendor then exe-
•deeded to her husband, he took the cuted to her husband, as such trus-
.same as trustee for his wife. Nich- tee, a bond for title, conditioned
-ols v. Nichols (1892), 149 Pa. St. to make title to her, or to her hus-
172; s. C, 24 Atl. Rep. 194. Where band as her trustee, on payment of
land is bought with the separate the price; that her husband, as her
property of a married woman by trustee, resold a part of the land
her husband, and title taken in his to a third person before the second
name, a trust results to her in the installment became due; and that
§ 166.]
IMPLIED TEUSTS.
345
point the onus probandi is on the husband, or on those
claiming under him. In Greaves v. Atkinson it was held
that prior the adoption of Code, on the purchase of lands
by the husband in his own name, with funds of the wife, a
resulting trust arose in her favor to the same extent, and
under the same circumstances, that it would have arisen in
favor of any other person furnishing the purchase money.1
Where land is conveyed to a husband, in the settlement of
an estate of Avhich one share is to go to his wife and the re-
mainder to other heirs, and the wife pays the claims of the
other heirs, a resulting trust arises in her favor. In a re-
cent case, where a wife, upon the partition of her father's
estate, agrees to take a certain tract as her share, and has
the title conveyed to her husband under an agreement with
the money received on such resale
was applied to the payment of such
second installment. Held, that, as
the husband, under the law as it ex-
isted at the time of these transac-
tions, had the power to deal with
his wife's separate estate as her
trustee, with her consent, the hill
must he construed as if it affirma-
tively alleged such consent ; such
a construction being the one most
unfavorable to complainants. Lewis
v. Mohr (1892), 97 Ala. 306; s. c,
11 So. Rep. 765. So construed, the
bill shows a purchase of the land
by the married woman herself ; the
payment by her of one- third of
the purchase money, whereby she
acquired an inchoate equity in the
entire tract; a resale by her
of this inchoate equity in a
part of the tract; the receipt by
her of the cash payment made by
her vendee, and its application by
her to the payment of the second
installment due her vendor for the
whole tract ; and hence there is n'o
ground for the declaration of a
resulting trust in her favor, or in
favor of her heirs, as the essential
fact to raise such a trust — payment
by one with conveyance to another
— is wholly lacking. Lewis v.
Mohr (1892), 97 Ala. 366; s. c, 11
So. Rep. 765. A husband and wife,
the latter of whom had property
and the former of whom had none,
and was nearly blind, agreed to
come to Kansas and procure land,
which should belong to the wife.
They settled on government land
under the homestead laws, the
entry being made in the husband's
name, but the wife furnished all
the money for expenses and im-
provements. Final proof was made
in the husband's name, under an
agreement that the property should
be the wife's, and that he should
convey to her when the patent was
issued, she agreeing to furnish him
a home on the land during his life.
About a month after final proof had
been made the husband died, with-
out having conveyed to the wife.
Held, that the wife was entitled to
the land as against the husband's
heirs. Barlow v. Barlow, 47 Kan.
676; s. c, 28 Pac. Rep. 607.
1 Greaves v. Atkinson (1890) , 68
Miss. 598; s.c.,10 So. Rep. 73.
346
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 167.
him that he is to hold it for her benefit, and she and her
husband enter into a recognizance at the time of the par-
tition to pay the other heirs their shares of the value of the
tract, and a year afterwards these payments are made out
of the wife's inheritance, a resulting trust in the land in
favor of the wife will be declared against a judgment cred-
itor of the husband, who had actual notice of the partition,
and the fact that the husband took the title for the benefit
of ,his wife.1
§ 167. The Subject Continued. — Where a partial pay-
ment in a purchase of land is made by a wife with her sep-
arate funds, a trust, pro tanto, arises in her favor, though
the husband takes the title in his own name and gives his
notes for the payment of the amount of the purchase money
that remains unpaid.2 Where land was purchased with a
wife's money and a deed taken in the husband's name with-
out her knowledge or consent, the cash payment was made
by her ; and though the husband alone signed the notes and
i Light v. Zeller (1891), 144 Pa.
St. 570. "Having thus furnished,
to the extent above stated, the con-
sideration of the land in contro-
versy at the time the legal title
became vested in her husband for
her benefit, Mrs. Light is justly
and equitably entitled to a corre-
sponding interest in the property.
As established by the verdict the
agreement between her and her
husband, made immediately before
the allotment, was that the land
should be taken for her, and that
her "inheritance" or interest in
the valuation money should be ap-
plied as it was. The agreement
was carried out in good faith, and
it would be most unjust and iniqui-
tous to permit a volunteer relative,
cognizant of all the facts and cir-
cumstances, to deprive the bene-
ficial plaintiff of what in fact rep-
resents her interest in her father's
estate. As I view the facts, which
the verdict of the jury, by neces-
sary implication, has clearly es-
tablished, it would be little short
of judicial robbery to permit him
to do so. No court of justice would
allow the husband to repudiate the
agreement under which he ac-
quired the legal title for the bene-
fit of his wife, and at her expense.
The plaintiffs in error, with notice
of her interest in the land, cer-
tainly stand in no better position."
Sterrett, J., in Light v. Zeller, 144
Pa. St. 606.
2 Kline v. Kagland, 47 Ark. Ill ;
S. C, 14 S. W. Rep. 474; Cunning-
ham v. Bell, 83 ]ST. Car. 328;
Thomas v. Standiford, 49 Md. 181 ;
Loftin v. Whitboard, 92 111. 461;
Moss v. Moss, 95 111. 449 ; Cather-
wood v. Watson, 65 Ind. 576; Kel-
ler v. Keller, 45 Md. 269; Hopkins
v. Carey, 23 Miss. 58; Wales v.
Newbould, 9 Mich. 45, 64.
§ 167.J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
347
a mortgage for the balance of the price, the notes were paid
by the wife with her own money. Before making such
payments she ascertained that the deed had been taken in
his name, and frequently asked him to deed the land to her.
It was held that, as between husband and wife, the latter
was the equitable owner.1 Where a purchase is made by a
husband with the money of his wife, she will not lose her
interest by mere lapse of him, especially where her money
has been used in making improvements and there has been
an apparent recognition of her claim. In a recent case it
was held that where the husband purchases property with
.his wife's money, taking the title in his name, mere lapse
of time is not sufficient to establish a gift on her part as
against his heirs, if he permitted her to suppose that she
owned it, and make improvements from her separate estate.2
» Pierce v. Hower (1894) , 124 Ind.
626; s. c, 42 N. E. Rep. 223. A
testator dying in 1860 gave a legacy
to a married niece to be paid out
of the proceeds of the sale of
land. The proceeds were not re-
ceived till after the adoption of
Const. 1868, art. 10, § 5, wbich
created married women's separate
estates. Eeld, that where the hus-
band reduced such chose in action
to possession, invested it in land and
took title in himself, without a
special agreement to invest and
holdfor the benefit of the wife, there
was no resulting trust in favor of
the wife. Benbow v. Moore (1895) ,
114 N. Car. 263; s. C.,19 S. E.Rep.
156. In an action by P"s heirs to
establish a trust in 225 acres of land,
of which P's husband died seized,
as having been bought with her
money and her land, it appeared
that her brother C once owned the
land, and conveyed it to her hus-
band for $800 expressed considera-
tion ; that the deceased father of A
and the other complainants, and P
and C, left land which was parti-
tioned among them, each receiving
112% acres, for which they did not
execute deeds or releases to each
other, each simply taking pos-
session of his tract; that A deeded
her share to C, and it was included
in the deed by C to P's husband;
that prior to such deed C was in
possession of the land conveyed
thereby, and thereafter was in pos -
session of the tract allotted to P,
claiming it as his until he sold it
or until his death; that from that
time until her death P owned some
interest in the land left by her
father, and partitioned among his
children, as her husband recog-
nized; and that the other heirs,
except A and C, retained the tracts
originally allotted to them. There
was evidenced that P exchanged
with C the tract allotted to her.
Held, that the evidence was suf-
ficient to entitled plaintiffs to the
relief asked. Kimbrough v. Nelms
(1895), 104 Ala. 554; S. C, 16 So.
Rep. 619.
2 Berry v. Wiedman (1894) (W.
Va.), 20 S. E. Rep. 817. Where a
348
IMPLIED 1 BUSTS.
[§ 168.
§ 168. The Same Subject Where a wife has a joint
title in lands with her husband, the lands having been par-
tially paid for with her money, she can enjoin an action at
law by the creditor of her husband, only by making proof
of her interest. In Alabama it has been held that a decree
in chancery against the husband, declaring a trust in favor
of the wife in lands purchased and partly paid for with
moneys belonging to her, and vesting the title in her to the
extent of her moneys so used, is not evidence against a
creditor of the husband, who was not made a party to the
suit, and whose debt was created before the bill was filed ;
consequently, when the wife seeks to enjoin an action at
law by the creditor, founded on a purchase at execution
sale on his judgment, she must prove the investment of her
moneys in the land, without the aid of the decree.1 But in
a case of this character the declarations of the husband, in
disparagement of his own title, admitting that his wife had
husband receives his wife's money,
and agrees to waive his marital
rights, and to invest it for her in
certain land, which he afterwards
buys with the money, taking title
in his own name, a trust results in
favor of the wife as against the col-
lateral heirs of the husband. Beam
v. Bridges (1891), 108 N. Car. 276;
s. c, 13 S. E. Kep. 113. A result-
ing trust cannot be established in
favor of a widow in lands which
for nearly thirty years have stood
in the name of her husband, where
it appears that the original agree-
ment for the purchase was in his
name; that at that time he claimed
that he was buying it for himself,
and paying for it with his own
money; that he directed the deed
to be made in his own name ; that
the purchase price was $6,300,
while the money she had received
from her father's estate was only
$2,500; and where it does not ap-
pear that there was any direction
on the part of the wife that the
deed be put in her name, or that
the husband had agreed with her
that it should be so placed. Craw-
ford v. Thompson (1894), 142 Pa.
551; s. c, 21 Atl. Rep. 994.
1 Walker v. Elledge, 65 Ala. 51.
Where 'the deed to land articled
for in the name of husband and
wife, was, by her direction, made
in his name, and he paid the pur-
chase money, the presumption
is that he paid it for himself.
Kline's Appeal, 39 Pa. St. 463. So
where the wife, against the will of
her husband and without his
knowledge, took title to an estate
for which her husband paid, it was
held to raise a resulting trust in
his favor. Gogherty v. Bennett,
37 ST. J. Eq. 87. And land pur-
chased with community property
and tide taken in the name of the
wife, the presumption of advance-
ment does not arise. Higgins v.
Johnson, 20 Tex. 389; Cook v.
Brand, 27 Tex. 457.
§ 169.] IMPLIED TRUSTS. 349
an equitable interest in lands which he had partly paid for
with her moneys, made while negotiating an exchange of
the lands, are admissible evidence for the wife, against a
subsequent purchaser at execution sale against the husband.1
The equitable interest of a wife in land of which the title
is in her husband, is not lost by the sale or exchange of the»t
land by the husband. In the case above cited it was held
that where a tract of land, bought by the husband with
money belonging to the wife, is sold and exchanged by him
for another tract, the exchange does not affect her right to
pursue her money and fasten a trust on the lands received
in the exchange.2
§ 169. From Purchase by a Mother in the Name of a
Child Touching the question whether a trust will arise in
favor of a mother who purchases an estate in the name of
a child, the decisions are not in entire accord. In the ear-
lier English decisions the doctrine that a mother is not under
obligation to provide for a child, and that, in consequence,
a trust arises in such a case in favor of the mother, or of
her representative, seems to be favored. In the case, In re
De Visme, where a married woman, having separated from
her husband, invested in the names of her son and daughter
moneys arising from savings of her separate estate, the
mother died, appointing her daughter her executrix. The
son having become lunatic, a transfer to the daughter, as
executrix, was ordered on petition without a bill.3 A sim-
1 Walker v. Elledge, 65 Ala. 51
Loftin v. Whitboard, 92 111. 461
Radcliff v. Radford, 96 Ind. 482
Peck v. Brummagin, 31 Cal. 447
in the absence of contrary proof,
presumed to be an advancement;
the mother is not the purchaser,
and the payment of the purchase
Smith v. Boquet, 27 Tex. 507; Har- money creates no resulting trust in
din v. Darwin, 66 Ala. 55 ; Baker her. Murphy v. Xathans, 46 Pa.
v. Baker, 22 Minn. 262; Higgins v. St. 508. In Boozer v. Teague, 27
Higgins, 14 Abb. N. C.13;McGov- S. Car. 348; s. C, 3 S. E. Kep. 551,
ern v. Knox, 21 Ohio St. 547. it was held that no trust resulted
2 Walker v. Elledge, 65 Ala. 51; to a mother who gave her son an
Marsh v. Marsh, 43 Ala. 677. absolute deed to a tract of land, on
••In the matter of De Visme, 2 the parol promise of the son to pay
De G., J. & S. *17. The purchase two notes which the mother had
by a mother of real estate for, and given the vendor for two-thirds of
in the name of, her daughter, is, the purchase money, she having
350 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 169.
ilar view seems to be held by some of the courts of this
country. In Flint v. Hubbard it was held that if a son, to
whom his mother has intrusted money to complete the pur-
chase of a tract of land for her, takes title in his own name,
and then exchanges it for other land, with her consent, he
holds the newly-acquired land as trustee for her benefit.1
On the contrary, other English and American cases pre-
sume an advancement. In Batstone v. Salter, stock, which
had been acquired by a lady as the survivor of her husband,
who had transferred into their joint names, was transferred
by her into the names of herself, her daughter, who had
recently married, and her daughter's husband; and the
dividends of the stock were enjoyed by the transferor during
her life. The daughter predeceased her mother, and the
son-in-law survived them both. It was held, affirming the
decision of Hall, V. C, that there was no resulting trust,
and that the son-in-law was entitled to the fund.2 In an-
other case a widowed mother, after making her will in favor
of her two daughters, transferred East India stock, which
had stood in her own name, into the names of herself and
the unmarried daughter, and died. It was held that there
was a presumption of intended benefit to the unmarried
daughter, which was unrebutted, and that the stock belonged
absolutely to her.3 In Hamilton v. Steele this view, with-
paid the other one-third, and notes transfer was to a married daughter
were subsequently paid by the and her husband, then if the ob-
mother. The court says : "We ject of the donor at the time when
have not deemed it necessary to the transfer is made is ascertained,
say anything as to the claim that it can make no difference whether
there was a resulting trust in favor the daughter and her husband sur-
of Mrs. Teague, for the reason that vived the mother, or, as in this
under the case of Ex parte Tren- case, the husband only survived
holm, 19 S. Car. 126, it is too plain the mother." lb. See also Todd
for argument that such a claim v. Moorehouse, L. K. 19 Eq. 67.
cannot be sustained." 3 Sayre v. Hughes, L. K. 5 Eq.
1 Flynt v. Hubbard, 57 Miss. 471. *376. The doctrine of equity as
2 Batstone v. Salter, L. R. 10 Ch. regards presumption of gifts is
App. 431. "Whatever presump- this, that where one person stands
tion there is in favor of an unmar- in such a relation to another that
ried daughter in the case of a there is an obligation on that per-
transfer to her, the same presump- son to mate a provision for the
tion arises in this case, where the other, and we find either a pur-
§ 169.J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
351
out being expressly stated, is apparently upheld. After
stating the doctrine where the parties are strangers, it is
added : But if the person in whose name the conveyance
is taken is a near relative of the person who advances the
purchase money, the presumption is that the consideration
chase or investment in the name of
the other, or in the joint names of
the person and the other, of an
amount which would constitute a
provision for the other, the pre-
sumption arises of an intention on
tbe part of the person to discharge
the obligation to the other; and,
therefore, in the absence of evi-
dence to the contrary, that pur-
chase or investment is held to be
in itself evidence of a gift. In
other words, the presumption of
gift arises from the moral obliga-
tion to give. Bennett v. Ben-
nett, L. B. 10 Ch. Div. 474, 476.
Jessell, M. E., in BeDnett v. Ben-
nett, uses this language : "In
Sayre v. Hughes, the vice chancel-
lor says this : 'It has been argued
that a mother is not a person
bound to make an advancement to
her child, and that a widowed
mother is not a person standing in
such a relation to her child as to
raise a presumption that in a trans-
action of this kind a benefit was
intended for the child. But the
case of a stranger who stands in
loco parentis seems not so strong as
that of a mother.' That is not the
question; there is no rule upon the
point of strength, but the question
is one of equitable obligation.
Then the vice chancellor proceeds :
'In the case of Be De Visme (2 De
6. , J. & S. 17), it was said that a
mother does not stand in such a re-
lationship to a child as to raise a
presumption of benefit for the
child. The question in that case
arose on a petition in lunacy, and
it seems to have been taken for
granted that no presumption of
benefit arises in the case of a
mother. But maternal affection,
as a motive of bounty, is, perhaps,
the strongest of all, although the
duty is not so strong as in the
ease of a father, inasmuch as it is
the duty of a father to advance his
child. That, however, is a moral
obligation, not a legal one.' That
is not quite right; it is a moral ob-
ligation known to courts of equity.
All the Court of Appeal decided
was that there was no such moral
obligation in the case of a mother
as the court could take notice of as
such. That being so, the argu-
ment of the vice chancellor falls to
the ground. The only question In
such cases is whether the pre-
sumption is a presumption of law.
I may say I should have had no
hesitation in deciding Sayre v.
Hughes in the same way as the
vice chancellor did, having regard
to the evidence, though I should
not have arrived at the same con-
clusion irrespective of the evi-
dence. We then arrive at this con-
clusion, that in case of a mother —
this is, the case of a widowed
mother — it is easier to prove a gift
than in the case of a stranger; in
the case of a mother very little ev-
idence beyond the relationship is
wanted, there being very little ad-
ditional motive required to induce
a mother to make a gift to her
child."
352 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 170.
advanced was intended as a gift or advancement, and no re-
sulting trust will arise in such case.1
§ 170. Conveyance by One in Loco Parentis. — Where
property has been conveyed by one in loco parentis there is
a presumption of an advancement. But an advancement
will be established only as the relation is clearly proved. It
must be shown that the person conveying the property
has assumed the obligation involved in this relation. Upon
the evidence touching this point the decisions turn. Where
a testator, standing in loco parentis to defendant, bought
shares in his name, but retained the certificates, though he
allowed defendant to receive the dividends, defendant swore
that he believed testator always intended that the shares
should pass ultimately to him for his own benefit. It was
held that there was no proof of an advancement. Testator
subsequently , expressly and in terms, gave the shares to
defendant, and also gave him the key of the box in which
were the certificates of sixty -four shares. Defendant, with
his consent, took out fourteen of the certificates; but left
the rest. The only evidence was that of defendant himself.
It was held that there was no gift of the remaining fifty
shares.2 In a recent case, where a grandfather had placed
himself in loco parentis toward his illegitimate grandson
during the life of his father, it was held that in itself that
act did not raise a presumption that a purchase in the name
of the grandson was intended as an advancement.3 But in
Ebrand v. Dancer, where the grandfather takes bonds in the
names of his children, being infants, the father being dead.
'Hamilton v. Steele, 22 W. Va. Jackson v. Feller, 2 Wend. 465;
348. Smith v. Patton, 12 "W. Va. 541;
2 Forrest v. Forrest, 13 W. JR. Field v. Lonsdale, 13 Beav. 78;
380; Devoy v. Devoy, 3 Sin. &Giff. Maddison v. Andrew, 1 Ves. Jr.
403; s. c, 5 W. E. 222. 57.; Edwards v. Edwards, 39 Pa.
3 Tucker v. Burrow, 2 Hem. & St. 369, 377; Smitheal v. Gray, 1
M. 515; Robert "s. Appeal, 85 Pa. Humph. 491; S. C, 34 Am. Dec.
St. 84; Jackson v. Jackson, 91 U. 664; Keaton v. Cobb, 1 Dev. Eq.
S. 122; Lloyd v. Read, 1 P. Wms. 439; Baker v. Leathers, 3 Ind. 558;
607; Miller v. Blose, 30 Gratt. 744; James v. James, 41 Ark. 301.
Higdon v. Higdon, 57 Miss. 264;
§ 170.
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
353
There is a difference in the case where the father is dead
and where he is alive ; for where the father is dead, the
grandchildren are in the immediate care of the grandfather,
and if he take bonds in their names, or make leases to them,
it shall not be judged trusts, but provision for the grand-
child, unless it be otherwise declared at the same time, and
decreed accordingly on that reason, though there were
other matters.1 In Currant v. Jago, where one who had
placed himself in loco parentis, invested certain moneys in
a savings bank and in a private bank, in the name of his
wife's nephew, it was held, under the circumstances of the
case, that the moneys were intended for the advancement
of the nephew, and upon the death of the nephew intestate
during his minority the moneys so invested were decreed
to be paid to his administrator.2
1 Ebrand v. Dancer, 2 Cas. Ch.
26.
2 Currant v. Jago, 1 Coll. 262.
Justice Story in Sullivan v. Win-
throp, 1 Sumn. 1, 14, uses this lan-
guage: "The same doctrine,
which applies to parents, is also
applied to testators placing them-
selves in loco parentis; though per-
haps upon the cases the distinction
is sometimes very nice, if not evan-
escent, as to what constitutes the
assumption of such a relation.
Acherly v. Vernon, 1 P. Wms. 783,
and Churchill v. Speake, 1 Vern.
251, are supposed to have pro-
ceeded upon this ground; as Beck-
ford v. Tobin, 1 Ves. 307, and Hill
v.Hill, 3 Ves. & B. 183, most as-
suredly and satisfactorily did. But
the exception is not allowed in
favor of a legatee standing in the
relation of a wife or natural child,
or grandchild, or the relation of a
wife or natural child or grand-
child, or niece as such, any more
than in favor of a stranger, unless
there can be farther engrafted upon
it a parental relation assumed by
23
the testator." A testator may be-
come bound to the parish for the
support of an illegitimate child of
his son, and, having made weekly
payments until his death, was re-
garded as standing in loco parentis^
so that a legacy to her drew inter-
est from the period of the testator's,
death. Rogers v. Southern, %
Keen, 698. It was held by Lord_
Cottenham, after a mature consid-
eration of the authorities, that a.
person may stand in loco parentis
to a child, although the child lives-
with and is maintained by its
father; and the proper definition-
of a person in loco parentis to a
child is a person who means to-
put himself in the situation of th&
lawful father of the child, with
reference to the father's office and
duty of making a provision for the
child. Powys v. Mansfield, 3
Myl. & Cr. 359, In a very impor-
tant case upon other topics, a
grandfather was considered to
have placed himself in loco parentis:
to certain grandchildren, although,
their father was living, with whom.
354
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 171.
§ 171. From Conveyance for Defrauding Creditors. —
Where a person purchases property and takes the title in
the name of a wife or child, or of any person for whom he
may be under obligation to provide, with a view to putting
it out of the reach of his creditors, either the conveyance
will be void, or a trust will result to the grantor for the
benefit of his creditors. And though the intention is to
make the conveyance an advancement, without any fraud-
ulent purpose, the effect of it will be the same. Where
property conveyed to a wife is purchased with money to
which creditors are entitled, the property will be subject to
their claims.1 Wherever the intention is clearly fraudulent
and creditors suffer in consequence of the conveyance, a trust
will result for their benefit.2 But where the grantor is not in
debt at the time of the conveyance, a trust will not arise in
favor of subsequent creditors, unless it appears that the con-
veyance was made with a view to contracting debts and de-
frauding creditors.3 The process of reaching property con-
they resided, and by whom part of
their expenses was defrayed. Pym
v. Lockyer, 5 Myl. & Or. 29. See
also Archer v. Hudson, 7 Beav
551 ; Haughton v. Harrison, 2 Atk
329 ; Crickett v. Dolby, 3 Ves. 10
Stent v. Robinson, 12 Ves. 461
Lowndes v. Lowndes, 15 Ves. 301
Perry v. Whitehead, 6 Ves. 544
Scawin v. Seawin, 1 Y. & C. 65
Kilpin v. Kilpin, 1 Myl. & K. 556
Kimmel v. McRight, 2 Barr, 38
Beckford v. Beckford, Loff t, 490.
1 Bridgers v. Howell, 27 S. Car.
425, 431 ; Creed v. Lancaster Bank,
1 Ohio St. 1 ; Dillard v. Dillard, 3
Humph. 41; Christ's Hospital v.
Budgin, 2 Vern. 684: Townshend
v. Westacott, 2 Beav. 340; Stile-
man v. Ashdown, 2 Atk. 477
Guthrie v. Gardner, 19 Wend. 414
Jencks v. Alexander, 11 Paige, 619
Spring v. Hight, 16 N. J. Bq. 265
Newells v. Morgan, 4 Harr. 225
Demaree v. Driskill, 3 Blackf. 115
Kimmel v. McRight, 2 Pa. St. 38
Doyle v. Sleeper, 1 Dana, 531
Watson v. Le Row, 6 Barb. 481
Bartlett v. Bartlett, 13 Neb. 456
Proseus v. Mclntyre, 5 Barb. 424
Elliot v.Horn, 10 Ala. 348; Bel-
ford v. Crane, 16 N. J. Eq. 265;
Gowing v. Rich, 1 Ired. 553; East-
ham v. Roundtree, 56 Tex. 110.
2 Roy v. McPherson, 11 Neb. 197;
Watson v. Lerow, 6 Barb. 487;
Newell v. Morgan, 3 Harr. 225;
Bell v. Hallenbeck, Wright, 751;
Edgington v. Williams, Wright,
439 ; Wheeler v. Kirtland, 23 N. J.
Eq. 1; Abney v. Kingsland, 10 Ala.
355; Cutter v. Griswold, Walk.
Ch. 437; McCartney v. Bostwick,
32 N. Y. 53; Kimmel v. McRight,
2 Barr, 38.
3 Creed V. Lancaster Bank, 1
Ohio St. 1; Cutler v. Tuttle, 19 N.
J. Ch. 556; Dillard v. Dillard, 3
Humph. 41; Knouff v. Thompson,
16 Pa. St. 357.
§ 172.J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
355
veyed with a view to defrauding creditors differs in the differ-
ent States. In Pennsylvania and Massachusetts an execution
will reach the property in the hands of the trustee ; in some
other States it can be reached only through a court of equity.
In Minnesota land purchased by a husband and deed taken in
the name of a wife is not subject to a trust in his favor.
Unless a fraudulent intent is disproved, the wife holds the
property in trust for creditors.1
§ 172. Established by Parol. — As heretofore noted, the
operation of the statute of frauds is limited to the creation
and declaration of express trusts. By an express provision,
an exception is made of trusts arising by operation of law.2
1 Leonard v. Green, 30 Minn. 496.
2 1 Brown on Statute of Frauds,
582, Sees. 7 and 8; Boyd v. Mc-
Lean, 1 Johns. Ch. 582 ; Botsford
v. Burr, 2 Johns. Ch. 405 ; Liver-
more v. Aldrich, 5 Cush. 435;
Verplank v. Gaines, 1 Johns. Ch.
57; Page v. Page, 8 N. H. 187;
Scoby v. Blanchard, 3 K. H. 170;
McGinity v. McGinity, 6 Pa. St.
38; Peiffer v. Lyttle, 58 Pa. St.
386; Foote v. Bryant, 47 X. Y.
544; Snelling v. Utterback, 1 Bibb,
609; Blair v. Bass, 4 Blackf. 550;
Elliott v. Armstrong, 3 Blackf.
199; Jennison v. Graves, 3 Blackf.
441 ; Pritchard v. Brown, 4 N. H.
397; Gardner Bank v. Wheaton, 8
Greenl. 373; Powell v. Monson &
Brim. Mnfg. Co., 3 Mason, 347;
Learned v. Fritch, 6 Coll. 432;
Knox v. McFarran, 4 Col. 586;
Morgan v. Clayton, 61 111. 35;
Caldwell v. Caldwell, 7 Bush, 515;
Faris v. Dunn, 7 Bush, 276 ; Byers
v. Wackman, 16 Ohio, 80, 440;
Nixon's Appeal, 63 Pa. St. 277;
Letcher v. Letcher, 4 J. J. Marsh.
590; Pugh v. Bell, 1 J. J. Marsh.
399; Dismukes v. Terry, Walker,
197 ; Larkins v. Rhodes, 5 Porter,
195; Peebles v. Reading, 8 S. &
R. 484; Steere v. Steere, 5 Johns.
Ch. 1. Plaintiff and defendant,
sister and brother, came to Con-
necticut from Ireland in 1854.
Plaintiff went into service and ac-
cumulated several thousand dol-
lars, and in 1882 opened a corre-
spondence with her brother who
had returned to Ireland, with a
view to purchasing a home, in
which they, together with their in-
sane sister, should live. They
purchased a lot and built a house
on it, the entire purchase money
and that expended for the building
being paid by plaintiff; defendant
contributing nothing thereto except
to supervise the building of the
house. The property was con-
veyed to plaintiff and defendant
jointly. Thereafter, differences hav-
ing arisen between them, defendant
threatened to sell or mortgage his
interest. Held, in an action to have
defendant's holding declared to be
in trust for plaintiff, that it was
error for the court to refuse to ad-
mit testimony offered by plaintiff
to show that it was expressly
agreed between defendant and her
that the title taken by him should
be as trustee for her. Ward v.
Ward, 59 Conn. 188; s. c, 22 Atl.
Rep. 149. Plaintiff, as heir, sought
356
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 172.
In most of the States this exception has been adopted by
statute, and it has been held that a failure to adopt is not
to hold an interest in real estate by
establishing a trust therein in favor
of her deceased father. It ap-
peared that the father had money
and purchased the land in ques-
tion ; but as he was in business in
California, and had unsettled
claims against him in Rhode Is-
land, and his second wife could
more easily manage the property,
it was deeded to her for the benefit
of the father and his family ; that
the wife had no money, and al-
ways spoke of and considered the
land as belonging to the father;
and that defendants, before pur-
chasing, had notice of plaintiff's
claim thereto. Held that, since
plaintiff's claim was based on
transactions out of which, by oper-
ation of law, the trust results, the
statute of frauds does not apply,
and such transactions may be
proved by parol. Hudson v. White
(1891), 17 K. I. 519; s. c, 23 Atl.
Eep. 57. Defendant purchased
lands with funds belonging to him
and a brother, and had the deed
executed in the name of his son.
Defendant remained in possession
of the land. In an action by the
son to recover the land, defendants
asked the court to charge that the
evidence failed to show such a de-
livery of the deed to or for the
benefit of the son as was necessary
to vest the title in him. Held that,
though an instruction as to a re-
sulting trust should have been
given, the instruction asked was
properly refused; for, if defendant
wished to submit the theory that
by such conveyance a trust resulted
to him, the instruction omitted the
vital fact of the intent of the pur-
chaser. Hall v. Hall (1891), 107
Mo. 101; s. c, 17 S. W. Rep. 811.
In an action by the heirs of the
beneficiary against the devisees of
an alleged trustee to enforce the
trust, it appeared that the land
was purchased by the alleged
trustee, who took a deed to him-
self with the intention of after-
wards giving it to his son, plaintiff's
father, but no deed was ever made
to the son, nor the intention of
making it ever reduced to writing,
that the property was afterwards
devised to defendant. Held, that
the alleged trust cannot be en-
forced, it being void, under the
statute of frauds. Sherley v.
Sherley (1895) (Ky.), 31 S. W.
Rep. 275. An agreement by a
mortgagee, with the wife of the
mortgagor, that if she will join in
the mortgage, and not contest the
foreclosure or redeem from the
sale, he will purchase the land,
and, on reselling the same, will pay
her a certain portion of the pro-
ceeds, not void as against provis-
ions of the statute of frauds. Tal-
bott v. Barber (1894), 11 Ind. App.
1; s. C, 38 N. E. Rep. 487. A
memorandum describing lots pur-
chased by two person?, and the
receipt of part of the price by one
of them from the other, and de-
claring a trust and the taking of title
in one or both, is sufficient under
the statute. Waterbury v. Fisher
(1894) 5 Colo. App. 362; s. C, 38
Pac. Rep. 846. Under How. St. §
5569, providing that where a grant
shall be made to one person, and
the consideration paid to another,
no trust shall result to the other,
and § 5571, providing that such
section shall not apply where the
grantee has taken an absolute con-
§ 172. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 357
material, that it follows in natura rerum.1 Accordingly
it is well established that a resulting trust may be proved
by parol. The party seeking relief may prove the acts and
declarations, out of which it is claimed that a trust arises,
by parol evidence. This may be done even in opposition
to the recitals of the instrument of conveyance. The vital
points are the payment of the consideration and the inten-
tion of the parties in regard to the beneficial interest. The
party setting up a claim to a trust must show that he paid
the purchase money, or that it was paid by another in his
interest, and that it was the intention that the equitable in-
terest should be retained by him. This he may do, though
the deed recites that the consideration was paid by the
grantee.2 All the facts on which the claim is based must
be distinctly set forth in the bill, and though they may be
denied under oath in the answer, it is admissible to establish
them by parol evidence. In Boyd v. McLean it was held
that if A purchases land with his own money, but the deed
is taken in the name of B, a trust results, by operation of
law, to A, and the fact whether the purchase was made
with the money of A, on which the resulting trust is to
arise, may be proved by parol, it not being within the stat-
ute of frauds. And this parol evidence is admissible, not
only against the face of the deed itself, but in opposition
veyance in his name without the Smith v. Burnham, 3 Sumn. 438;
knowledge or consent of the one Malin v. Malin, 1 Wend. 626 ; Har-
paying the consideration, a trust der v. Harder, 2 Sandf. Ch. 17
may be shown by parol evidence Pierce v. McKeehan, 3 Barr, 136
that the person paying the consid- Lloyd v. Carter, 17 Pa. St. 216
eration did not know of or consent Peebles v. Heading, 8 S. & E. 484
to the conveyance being taken ab- Millard v. Hathaway, 27 Cal. 119
solutely in the name of the other. Baker v. Vining, 30 Me. 121, 126
Connolly v. Keating, 102 Mich. 1; Carey v. Callen's Exr., 6 B. Mon
s. c, 60 N. W. Pep. 289. 44; Jackson v. Moore, 6 Cow
1 Hoxie v. Carr. 1 Sumn. 187. 706, 726; Jackson v. Sternbergh, 1
2 Barron v. Barron, 24 Yt. 375; Johns. Cas. 153, 155; Jackson v.
De Peyster v. Gould, 2 Green Ch. Matsdorf, 11 Johns. 91; Guthrie v.
474; Cooper v. Skeele, 14 Iowa, Gardner, 19 Wend. 414; Partridge
578; Bay lesv. Baxter, 22 Cal. 575; v. Havens, 10 Paige, 618, 626;
Lyford v. Thurston, 16 N. H. 399 ; Lounsbury v. Purdy, 16 Barb. 376 ;
Dismukes v. Terry, Walk. 197; Lynch v. Cox, 11 Cush. 265 ; Neale
Peabody v. Tarbell, 2 Cush. 232; v. Hagthrop, 3 Bland, 551, 584.
358
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 172.
to the answer of the trustee, denying the trust, and that, it
seems, after the death of the nominal purchaser. Such ev-
idence, however, is to be received with great caution.1 In
an early English case it was held that the recitals of a deed
in regard to the payment of purchase money cannot be dis-
proved by parol evidence, and this was followed by other
decisions in the same direction.2 But the doctrine, as above
illustrated, has long been settled.3 But evidence intro-
duced to set aside the recitals of a deed must be clear,
definite and positive. Vague, indefinite or general state-
ments in regard to the funds employed in the purchase,
will not avail against the instrument of conveyance.4 Noth-
1 Boyd v. McLean, 1 Johns. Ch.
582.
2 Kirk v. Webb, Finch Pr. Ch.
84; Heron v. Heron, Finch Pr. Ch.
163; s. C, Freem. 248; Skitt v.
Whitmore, Freem. 280; Kinder v.
Miller, Finch Pr. Ch. 172; Hooper
v. Eyles, 2 Vern. 4S0; Newton v.
Preston, Finch Pr. Ch. 103; Cox
v. Bateman, 2 Ves. 19; Ambrose v.
Ambrose, 1 P. Wms. 321; Deg v.
Deg, 2 P. Wms. 414.
3 Lench v. Lench, 10 Ves. 517;
Bartlett v. Pickersgill, 1 Eden,
515; Groves v. Groves, 3 Y. & J.
163; Livermore v. Aldrich, 5 Cush.
435; Connor v. Follansbee, 59 N.
H. 125.
4 Cunning v. Robins, 39 N. J. Eq.
46; Brickell v. Early, 115 Pa. St.
473 ; Parker v. Snyder, 31 N. J. Eq.
164; Slocumb v. Marshall, 2 Wash.
C. C. 397; Newton v. Preston, Pr.
Ch. 103; Wright v. King,Harr. Ch.
12;Enos v. Hunter, 4 Gilm. 211;
Carey v. Callen, 6 B. Mon. 44;
Cottington v. Fletcher, 2 Atk. 155;
Ambrose v. Ambrose, 1 P. Wms.
321 ; Hyden v. Hyden, 6 Baxt. 406 ;
Thomas v. Sandford, 49 Md. 181 ;
Johnson v. Richardson, 44 Ark.
365; Harvey v. Pennybacker, 4
Del. Ch. 445; Green v. Dietrich,
114 111. 636; Witts v. Homey, 59
Md. 584; Philpott v. Penn, 91 Mo.
38 ; Rogers v. Rogers, 87 Mo. 257 ;
Modrell v. Riddle, 82 Mo. "31; Ca-
ple v. McCollum, 27 Ala. 461;
Bibb v. Hunter, 79 Ala. 351; Ney-
land v. Bendy, 69 Tex. 711 ; Orton
v. Knab, 3 Wis. 576; Strimpfler v.
Roberts, IS Pa. St. 283; Smith v.
Patton, 12 W. Va. 541 ; McCammon
v. Pettit, 3 Sneed, 246; Parker v.
Snyder, 31 N. J. Eq. 164; Miller v.
Blose, 30 Gratt. 744; Kane v.
O'Connors, 78 Va. 76; Agricul-
tural Association v. Brewster, 51
Tex. 257; P'Pool v. Thomas
(1888) (Ky.), 8 S. W. Rep. 198
Reynolds v. Caldwell, 80 Ala. 232
Dudley v. Bachelder, 53 Me. 403
Billings v. Clinton, 6 S. Car. 90
Lee v. Browder, 51 Ala. 288; Leh
man v. Lewis, 62 Ala. 129
Donaghe v. Tarns, 81 Va. 132
Whitmore v. Learned, 70 Me. 276
Lloyd v. Lynch, 28 Pa. St. 419
Parmelee v. Sloan, 37 Ind. 482 ; Mil
ler v. Stokely , 5 Ohio St. 194 ; Greer
v. Baughman, 13 Md. 257; Fred-
erick v. Haas, 5 Xev. 389 ; Roberts v.
Walker (1890), 101 Mo. 597; Lewis
v. Zeigler (1891), 105 Mo. 604;
Taylor v. Von Schraeder (1891),
107 Mo. 206; King v. Isley (1893),
§ 173. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 359
ing special, or peculiar, is requiredin regard to this evidence.
It must simply be such as to leave no ground for a reason-
able doubt. But any evidence that would be admissible in
any ordinary case, even though it be circumstantial evidence,
may be introduced to prove this point.1 Proof of a bare
admission of one that he purchased property for another,
without any particulars in regard to the agreement or the
passing of the purchase money, will not be held sufficient
to secure a resulting trust.2
§ 173. Parol Proof Continued. — It is a well estab-
lished principle that where trust funds are invested in lands
by a trustee, the money can be followed into the land in
which it has been invested^ and it is admissible to establish
the fact by parol evidence. In his opinion in Lench v.
Lench, Sir William Grant, Master of the Rolls, said:
"Whatever doubts may formerly have been entertained
upon the subject, it is now settled that money may be fol-
lowed into the land in which it is invested, and a claim may
be supported by parol evidence."3 This principle is based
116 Mo. 155; Bradley v. Bradley Vern. 366; Sayre v. Frederick, 1
(1893), 119 Mo. 58; McFarland v. C. E. Green, 205; Farrell v. Lloyd.
La Force (1894), 119 Mo. 585. Dif- 69 Pa. St. 239; Brown v. Petney,
ferent judges have employed dif- 3 111. 468; Baumgartner v. Guess-
ferent language in declaring the field, 38 Mo. 36; Benger v. Drew,
character and weight of the evi- 1 P. Wms. 780.
dence which is necessary and sufH- 2 Sidle v. Walter, 5 Watts, 389 ;
cient to establish a resulting trust. Sample v. Coulson, 9 W. & S. 62;
The result of all the attempts to Harrisburg Bank v. Tyler, 3 Watts
define the rule as to the amount of & S. 373.
parol proof necessary in such cases 3 Lench v. Lench, 10 Ves. 517;
is, that the conscience of the court Trench v. Harrison, 17 Sim. 111.
should be fully satisfied that the In an action by a divorced wife
facts relied on to support a trust against her former husband to es-
are true and sufficient to create the tablish a trust in land held by him,
trust. Sanford v. Weeden, 2 Heisk. it appeared that when the parties
70. were married defendant had no
1 Willis v. Willis, 2 Atk. 71 ; Wil- property; that defendant rented a
kins v. Stevens, 1 Y. & C. 431; farm of his father, and that this
Strimpfler v. Roberts, 18 Pa. St. farm was afterwards conveyed ta
283; Mitchell v. O'SFeill, 4 Nev. defendant: that plaintiff had joined
504; Graves v. Grave-?, 3 Y. & J. with defendant in the execution of
170; Gascoigne v. Thwing, 1 trust deeds to secure loan>. de-
360
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 173.
on the fact that a purchase by a trustee, with trust funds,
is practically a purchase by the cestui que trust, and that,
in consequence, a trust results in his favor by operation of
law. In Eussell v. Allen it was held that where a trustee
applies the trust fund in his hands to the purchase of real
estate, and takes a conveyance of the premises in the name
of a third person, there is no resulting trust in favor of such
trustee for h'is own benefit, nor is there a resulting trust in
favor of his general creditors, under the provisions of the
Tevised statutes. But there is a resulting trust in favor of
the owners of the trust fund which has been thus misapplied
by the trustee.1 In a recent case, where a trustee of lands
for her separate use for life, which at her death were to go
to her heirs in fee-simple, sold the same, the heirs convey-
ing their interests by deed, and with the money purchased
scribing the land as defendant's;
that in former litigation between
them plaintiff had spoken of the
land as defendant's and asked to
be allowed a part thereof; that
while the parties lived together
plaintiff allowed defendant to re-
ceive a large amount of money
that she had Inherited, but there
was no direct evidence that this
money went into the land in ques-
tion. Held, insufficient to entitle
plaintiff to a decree. Throck-
morton v. Throckmorton (1895),
'91 Va. 42; s. c, 22 S. E. Pep.
162. In an action to establish
a trust in plaintiff's favor in land
which he had, thirty years be-
fore, caused to be conveyed to
his daughter (defendant's mother),
plaintiff could not remember why
the land was conveyed to his
■daughter, but "guessed" it was for
•convenience. The evidence showed
that, after the daughter's death,
plaintiff, as guardian for defend-
ants, petitioned for leave to mort-
gage the land in question, wherein
he alleged under oath that the land
belonged to defendants, and,
in other ways recognized defend-
ants' interest therein. Held, that
plaintiff could not recover. Hoge-
bqom v. Robertson, 41 Neb. 795;
s. c, 60 N. W. Eep. 2. In a case
in which it was established by pa-
rol evidence that P bought land
and took a deed in the name of L,
and L advanced the purchase money
and took the notes of P for the
same,and agreed to convey the land
to P, on being repaid the money
advanced, and interest. It was
held that the money thus advanced
by L might be considered as a loan
to P, and the land as purchased
with the money of P so as to raise
a resulting trust. Page v. Page, 8
K. H. 186. See also Plumb v.
Cooper, 121 Mo. 668; Warren v.
Adams, 19 Colo. 515; Morrison v.
Harrington, 120 Mo. 665; Snider v.
Johnson, 25 Ore. 328; Moran v.
Moran, 120 Mo. 344; Jordan v.
Garner, 101 Ala. 411; Gates t.
Card, 93 Tenn. 334.
1 Kussell v. Allen, 10 Paige, 243.
j 174. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 361
other lands, the heirs consenting thereto, with the oral un-
derstanding that the property bought should remain in trust
for them, but the deed of purchase failed to mention the
trust, it was held that, though the oral agreement was
ineffectual to create a trust under the statute which pro-
vides that no trusts concerning lands, excepting such as
may arise by implication of law, shall be created, unless
by an instrument signed by the party creating it, yet the
ownership of the money used in purchasing the land could
be shown by parol evidence, and a resulting trust thereby
established.1
§ 174. Parol Evidence in Rebuttal. — As the acts and
declarations which seem to constitute the basis for a result-
ing trust may be proved by parol, so the presumption on
which a claim to a trust is set up may be rebutted by parol
evidence showing that the presumption is not in accord
with the intention of the parties at the time of the trans-
action. The essential point at issue is the question of in-
tention, and this may be proved by parol in rebuttal as well
as in the support of the presumption. Where the presump-
tion that a trust resulted to one at the time of purchasing
a lot of land, arising from the payment of the purchase
money, may be overcome by parol evidence of his intention
otherwise at the time of the purchase, declarations made
afterwards, and not bearing upon his intention at the time
of the purchase, cannot affect the title.2 It is admissible
1 Converse v. Noyes (1891) 66 N. school at $8 per month, to assist in
H. 570; s. C, 22 Atl. Rep. 556; defraying the expenses of his jour-
Page v. Page, 8 2ST. H. 187 ; Hall v. ney. Without her knowledge he
Congdon, 56 ST. H. 279 ; French v. bought land taking title in her
Hatch, 28 IT. H. 331 ; Blodgett v. name. He informed her of the
Hildreth, 103 Mass. 484. fact, and asked for a power of at-
2 Warren v. Steer, 112 Pa. St. torney from her, to take possession
634; Jenkins v. Pye, 12 Pet. 241; of , lease, or sell all lands she had
Tryon v. Huntoon, 67 Cal. 325; or might have hereafter have in
Page v. Page, 8 ST. H. 187,195; California. She accordingly exe-
Irvine v. Marshall, 7 Minn. 286; cuted and returned the power of
Livermore v. Aldrich, 5 Cush. 431. attorney. It was held that these
A was about to go to California, facts could be shown by parol, and,
His favorite sister furnished him being shown, were sufficient to re-
with $100, earned by teaching but the presumption of a trust.
362
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 174.
to present parol evidence to rebut the presumption of a
trust as to part of an estate where it prevails in regard to
the remainder. In Benbow v. Townsend it was held that
where land is purchased with the money of A in the name
of B, the resulting trust to A may be rebutted as to part of
the land, or part of the interest in the land.1 In a convey-
Tryon v. Huntoon, 67 Cal. 325.
The presumption that the party
furnishing the purchase money for
land becomes its equitable owner,
is rebutted by proof that the
money was loaned to the taker
of the legal title. Moyer's Appeal
(1888) (Pa. St.), 14 Atl. Rep. 253.
Where a person purchases prop-
erty with his own funds and places
the title in the name of a stranger,
the legal presumption is that he
made such purchase for his own
use, and that the property is held
in trust for him. * * * This is,
however, a mere abstract presump-
tion that may be rebutted by cir-
cumstances or evidence going to
show a different intention, and
each case has to be determined by
the reasonable presumptions aris-
ing from all the acts and circum-
stances connected with it; so that
it may happen, that where property
is thus purchased and placed in
the name of a stranger, the pre-
sumption that the law will draw,
taking all the circumstances into
consideration, will be that the
property was intended for and
vested absolutely in the person
whose name it is placed. Creed v.
Lancaster County Bank,.l Ohio St.
1. Woodward, J., in Edwards v.
Edwards, 39 Pa. St. 369, says:
"The presumption may be rebutted
also by the declarations of the pur-
chaser, made at the time of and in
such immediate connection with
the purchase as to be part of the
res gestae. It is important that
this rule in regard to declarations
be received with the limitations
here stated. * * * If a pur-
chaser declare that he pays his
money for the benefit of the nom-
inee in the deed, " * * let it
tell against him. The legal effect
of his act without the declaration
would have been to give him an
equity, but any man of common
sense may qualify the legal effect
of his conduct by an accompanying
declaration. But what do declara-
tions before or after the purchase
signify? If before they cau import
mo more than an intention, which,
because it is mere mental purpose,
may be changed. If after, they
operate to divest an equitable es-
tate, and, therefore, are unworthy
to be received."
1 Benbow v. Townsend, 1 Myl. &
K. 506 ; Taylor v. Taylor, 1 Atk.
386; Eider v. Kidder, 10 Ves. 364;
Lane v. Dighton, Amb. 409; Pin-
ney v. Fellows, 15 Vt. 525; Good-
right v. Hodges, 1 Watk. Cop. 227 ;
S. C, Lofft, 230; Madison v. An-
drew, 1 Ves. 58; Bellasis v. Comp-
ton, 2 Vera. 294; Garrick v. Tay-
lor, 29 Beav. 79; s. c, 4 De G., F.
& J. 159; Beecher v. Major, 2 Dr.
& Sm. 431; Redington v. Reding-
ton, 3Ridg. 106; Rundle v. Run-
die, 2 Vern. 252 ; Baker v. Tining,
30 Me. 126; Page v. Page, 8 N. H.
189; Botsford v. Burr, 2 Johns.
Ch. 405; White v. Carpenter, 2
Paige, 217 ; Kelsey v. Snyder, 118
111. 544; Murphy v. Peabody, 63
Ga. 522; Hays v. Quay, 68 Pa. St.
§ 175. J IMPLIED TKTJSTS. 363
ance to a stranger the presumption is in favor of a result-
ing trust to the grantor, and where evidence is offered in
rebuttal of this presumption, with a view to the establishing
of a claim to a beneficial interest on the part of the grantee,
the evidence must be such as to leave no ground for a rea-
sonable doubt.1
§ 175. The Subject Continued. — Where it appears from
parol evidence that there was a definite understanding at the
time of the purchase that the grantee was to have the
equitable interest, as well as the legal title, it is not admis-
sible for the purchaser to put a different construction upon
his act at a subsequent time and to set up a claim to a re-
sulting trust. Any subsequent agreement between the
parties would not constitute a basis for a resulting trust
from the transaction.2 Where there is an express trust de-
clared at the time of the transaction no resulting trust will
arise, and if the transaction embodies stipulations incon-
sistent with the trust it will not be decreed.3 A resulting:
trust will not be enforced after a great lapse of time, or re-
peated laches on the part of a person claiming as cestui que
trust, especially where the nominal purchaser has been a
long time in undisputed possession. No rule of universal
application has been established, but each case must be de-
cided on its own merits, or with reference to the circum-
stances in evidence. Where facts of importance have been
263; Byers v. Danley, 27 Ark. 77; 12; 2 Sudg. V. & P. 139 (9th ed.) ;
McCuev. Gallagher, 23 Cal. 51; Philpott v. Penn, 91 Mo. 44; John-
Bayles v. Baxter, 22 Cal. 375; son v. Quarles, 46 Mo. 423; Jack-
Smith v. Howell, 3 Stockt. 122 ; son v. Wood, 88 Mo. 76.
Ledge v. Morse, 16 Johns. 199 ; 2 Hunt v. Moore, 6 Cush. 1
Squire v. Harder, 1 Paige, 494; Groves v. Groves, 3 Y. & J. 172
Myers v. Myers, 1 Casey, 100 ; Phil- Kobl'es v. Clarke, 25 Cal. 317
lips v. Crammond, 2 Wash. C. C White v. Sheldon, 4 Neb. 280.
441; Elliott V.Armstrong, 2 Blackf. s Clark v. Burnham, 2 Story, 1
199 ; McGuire v. McGowen, 4 Dennison v. Goehring, 7 Barr, 175
Desaus.487; Hays v. Hollis, 8 Gill, Mercer v. Stark, 1 Sm. & M. 479
369; Sewell v. Baxter, 2 Md. Ch. Dow v. Jewell, 21 N. H. 470; Ans-
448; Creed V.Lancaster Bank, 1 tice v. Brown, 6 Paige, 448; Leg-
Ohio St. 1; Jackson v. Feller, 2 gett v. Dubois, 5 Paige, 114 ; Alex-
Wend. 465. ander v. Warrance, 17 Mo. 230.
1 Dudley v. Bosworth, 10 Humph.
364
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
;§ 175.
concealed by a trustee from the cestui que trust, evidence of
such concealment will receive consideration by the court.
In James v. James it was held that courts will not enforce
a resulting trust after great lapse of time, or laches on the
part of the supposed cestui que trust. To warrant a court
of equity in enforcing a stale trust, notonlymust the trust be
clearly established, but the facts must have been fraudulently
and successfully concealed by the trustee from the knowl-
edge of the beneficiary.1 In Hume v. Beale's Exr., before
1 James v. James, 41 Ark. 301 ;
Delane v. Delane, 7 Bro. P. C. 279;
Clegg v. Edmondson, 8 De G., M.
& G. 787 ; Groves v. Groves, 3 Y.
& J. 172; Peebles v. Reading, 8
Serg. & R. 484 ; Graham v. Donald-
son, 5 Watts, 471 ; Haines v. O'Con-
nor, 10 Watts, 315; Lewis v. Rob-
inson, 10 Watts, 315 ; Strimpfler v.
Roberts, IS Pa. St. 283 ; Robertson
v. Macklin, 3 Hayw. 70; Buekford
v. Wade, 17 Ves. 97; McGivney v.
MeGivney, 142 Mass. 156, 160
Smith v. Patton, 12 W. Va. 541
Midmer v. Midmer, 26 N. J. Eq
299 ; King v. Pardee, 6 Otto, 90
Jennings v. Shacklett, 30 Gratt
765; Miller v. Blose, 30 Gratt. 744
Newman v. Early, 3 Tenn. Ch. 714
Trafford v. Wilkinson, 3 Tenn. Ch
701; Hall v. Doran, 13 Iowa, 36S
Brown v. Guthrie, 27 Tex. 610
Best v. Campbell, 62 Pa. St. 478
Douglass v. Lucas, 63 Pa. St. 11
Sunderland v. Sunderland, 19 Iowa
325 ; Badger v. Badger, 2 Wall. 87
"In Conway v. Kinsworthy, 21 Ark.
9, the holder of an unlocated do-
nation claim executed a sealed in-
strument, which was duly acknowl-
edged and recorded, reciting that
he had sold his claim and cove-
nanting to make the vendees a deed
after the issue of his patent. Here
■was an express trust. Three or
four years after the patent was
issued, and shortly afterwards he
sold and conveyed the lands to an-
other person, through whom by
sundry mesne conveyances they
finally came to the hands of Kins-
worthy. Thirteen years after this
sale and conveyance Conway, who
had succeeded to the rights of the
three original cestuis que trustent,
filed his bill in chancery to estab-
lish and quiet his title to one-third
of the lands. And this court held
that he was barred of all relief
by his own supineness, neglect and
unexplained acquiescence in the
adverse right of others. * * *
In Guthrie v. Field, 21 Ark. 379,
foreclosure of a mortgage after the
lapse of fourteen years was refused,
the mortgagee never having got
possession." James v. James, 41
Ark. 301, 304. In general, length
of time is no bar to a trust, clearly
established to have once existed;
and where fraud is imputed and
proved, length of time ought not
to exclude relief. But as length of
time necessarily obscures all hu-
man evidence, and deprives par-
ties of the means of ascertaining
the nature of the original transac-
tion, it operates, by way of pre-
sumption, in favor of innocence
and against imputation of fraud.
The lapse of forty years, and the
death of all the original parties,
deemed sufficient to presume the
discharge and extinguishment of a
§ 176.] IMPLIED TRUSTS. 365
the Supreme Court of the United States, it was held that
if a cestui que trust, after becoming sui juris, has, with full
knowledge of a breach of a trust, for a long time acquiesced
in it, equity will not relieve him. Accordingly, a bill by
cestui que trusts was dismissed, where all the grounds of
action had occurred between twenty and thirty years, and
the alleged breach of trust had taken place thirty-seven
years before the bill was filed, and the trustee was dead.1
In Oliver v. Piatt, before the same court, it was held that
lapse of time is no bar to a subsisting trust in real property.
The bar does not begin to run until knowledge of some
overt act of an adverse claim or right, set up by the trustee,
is brought home to the cestui que trust. The lapse of any
period less than twenty years will not bar the cestui que
trust of his remedy in equity, although he may have been
guilty of some negligence, where the suit is brought against
his trustee, who is guilty of the breach of trust, or others
claiming under him with notice.2
§ 176. Parol Evidence of Advancement. — Whether an
estate conveyed to a wife, a child, or other near relative, or
to one toward whom the grantor has assumed the obligation
of one in loco parentis, is to be regarded and treated as an
advancement, is simply and solely a question of intention.
trust, proved once to have existed, father to her husband for the ex-
by strong circumstances ; by anal- pressed consideration of $5,000.
ogy to the rule of law which, after Several witnesses testified to decla-
a lapse of time, presumes the pay- rations made four or five years after
ment of a debt, surrender of a deed the conveyance by thefather and the
and extinguishment of a trust husband, that the former had "left
where circumstances require it. $1,000 in the land" as plaintiff's
Prevost v. Gratz, 6 Wheat. 481. share of his estate, and that the
1 Hume v. Beale's Exr., 17 Wall, latter had paid only $4,000 for it,
336; Harwood v. R. R. Co., 17 and plaintiff was charged in her
Wall. 78; Diefendorf v. House, 9 father's books with an advancement
How. Pr. 243; The Key City, 14 of #1,000. Held, that the evidence
Wall. 653. was insufficient to warrant a decree
2 Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How, 333; of resulting trust in the land in
Harris v. Mclntyre, 118 111. 275 ; plaintiff's favor as upon payment
Castnerv.Walrod, 83111. 171; Kane of $1,000 of the purchase money.
County v. Herrington, 50 111. 239. In re Young's Estate, 137 Pa. St.
Land was conveyed by plaintiff's 433; s. C, 21 AM. Rep. 93.
366
IMPLIED TKUSTS.
[§ 176.
It is the question whether the grantor intended to convey
the beneficial interest as a gift, or to convey the legal title
and to retain the equitable interest. And this question may
be settled by parol evidence. It is admissible to offer in
evidence any facts antecedent to or contemporaneous with
the conveyance, that have a bearing upon the question of
the intention of the grantor. Where there is a presump-
tion either for or against an advancement, proof may be
presented to rebut or to establish it.1 And any facts re-
lating to a time immediately subsequent to the purchase, if
they are shown to be a part of the transaction, may also be
offered in evidence.2 Though it is not necessarily con-
1 Bay lis v. Newton, 2 Vern. 28;
Christy v. Courtenay, 13 Beav. 96 ;
Shales v. Shales, 2 Freem. 252;
Murless v. Franklin, 1 Swanst. 19 ;
Tucker v. Burrow, 2 Hem. & M.
524; Gollinson v. Collinson, 3 De
G., M. & G. 409; Lloyd v. Read, 1
P. Wms. 607; Grey v. Grey, 2
Swanst. 600; Williams v. Williams,
32 Beav. 370; Bedington v. Red-
ington, 3 Ridg. 177 ; Prankerd v.
Prankerd, 1 S. & S. 1; Swift v.
Davis, 8 East, 354; Taylor v. Tay-
lor, 4 Gilm. 303 ; Milner v. Free-
man, 40 Ark. 62; Dudley v. Bos-
worth, 8 Humph. 12; Slack v.
Slack, 26 Miss. 290 ; Peer v. Peer,
3 Stockt. 432; Persons v. Persons,
25 N. J. Eq. 250; Butler v. M. Ins.
Co., 14 Ala. 777; Johnson v. Mats-
dorf , 11 Johns. 91 ; Harden v. Dar-
win, 60 Ala. 55; Guthrie v. Gard-
ner, 19 Wend. 414; Fleming v.
Donohoe, 5 Ohio, 255 ; Tremper v.
Burton, 18 Ohio, 418; Baker v.
Leathers, 3 Ind. 558 ; Hodgson v.
Macy, 8 Ind. 121; Cotton v.
Wood, 25 Iowa, 43; Farley v.
Blood, 30 N. H. 354; Wallace v.
Bowen, 28 Vt. 638. Complainant
agreed to buy certain land, and
took the abstract and a purchase
money mortgage to his lawyer for
examination. In the mortgage
the wife's name was put first, and
complainant signed both the
mortgage and the note it secured,
writing his name each time after
that of his wife. He then gave the
lawyer a checkfor the residue of the
purchase money, and told him to
go with the wife and close the mat-
ter. The lawyer did so, receiving
a deed to the wife, and filing it for
record. Complainant afterwards
spoke of the property as his wife's.
Held, in a suit by complainant to
establish a resulting trust in the
land, that the facts did not rebut
the presumption that complainant
bought the land as an advance-
ment for his wife. Smith v. Smith
(1893), 144 111. 299; s. c, 33 N. E.
Rep. 35. Where A purchased
real estate, taking title in the name
of his wife "to save costs and
trouble, and to have the legal title
in his then wife in case the hus-
band should die," it was a trust in
his favor, and not an advancement.
Cotton v. Wood, 25 Iowa, 43.
2 Murless v. Franklin, 1 Swanst.
17; Swift v. Davis, 8 East, 354, n.
(a) ; Jeans v. Cooke, 24 Beav. 521 ;
Redington v. Redington, 3 Ridg.
196; Prankerd v. Prankerd, 1 S. &
§ 176. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 367
elusive evidence, the declarations of the purchaser, either
before the purchase or at the time of the conveyance, may
be presented to show his intention.1 Where a purchase is
made by a parent in the name of a child, the contempo-
raneous acts and declarations of the parent are evidence to
show that the child shall take as trustee only ; but the sub-
sequent acts and declarations of the parent are inadmissible
for that purpose. Moneys were invested in the funds by a
father in the name of his son, the dividends of which were
received by the father during his life, under a power of
attorney from the son; it was held, after his death, that
this was an advancement, and that the funds belonged to
the son.2 It has been held that the transfer by a father
of stock into the joint names of himself, his wife and child,
is presumed to be an advancement ; but this presumption
may be rebutted by the evidence upon oath of the trans-
feror that no trust was intended, but that the transfer was
made under a misapprehension of its legal effect.3 Decla-
rations of the grantor made subsequently to the transaction
are not evidence in his own favor, but they may be offered
S. 1 ; Robinson v. Robinson, 45 admissible to rebut the presump-
Ark. 481. tion. Ins. Co. v. Deal, 18 Md. 26.
1 Grey v. Grey, 2 Swanst. 597; See also Maxwell v. Maxwell, 109
Scawen v. Scawen, 1 N. C. C. 65; 111. 588; Lane v. Lane (1888), 80
.Cartwright v. Wise, 14 111. 417; Maine, 570; s. c, 16 Atl. Rep. 323.
Cairns v. Colburn, 104 Mass. 247. 3 Devoy v. Devoy, 3 Sm. & Giff.
2 Sidmouth v. Sidmoutb, 2 Beav. 403 ; Stone v. Stone, 3 Jur. (N. S.)
447; Milner v. Freeman, 40 Ark. 708. B. S. transferred a sum of
62 ; Butler v. M. Ins. Co., 14 Ala. stock into the names of her three
777 ; Seibold v. Christman, 75 Mo. infant children jointly with her
308 ; Persons v. Persons, 25 N. J. own but not as a gift or provision
Eq. 250; Taylor v. Taylor, 9 111. for them, nor with the intention in
303; Slack v. Slack, 26 Miss. 287. any way to deprive herself of the
The proof in such cases will over- ownership thereof, or the benefit
come the presumption of a gift to of the same, but solely to prevent
the wife must be of facts antece- another party obtaining the same,
dent to or contemporaneous with On bill filed by E. S. the court de-
the purchase, or else immediately clared that the three infant chil-
afterwards, so as to be in fact part dren were trustees jointly with the
of the same transaction. Read v. plaintiff, in trust for the plaintiff,
Huff, 40 N. J. Eq. 229. But dec- and that the plaintiff was abso-
larations of the husband made two lutely entitled to the fund. Stone
years after the conveyance are in- v. Stone, 3 Jur. (X. S.) 708.
368
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 177.
in evidence by the wife or child if they are an admission
that the conveyance was an advancement and not a trust.1
The subsequent declarations of the grantee may be put in
evidence against him, but not in his favor.2 Testimony of
this character must be definite and unequivocal. Whether
relating to acts or declarations, there must be no vagueness
or uncertainty in the statements.3
§ 177. Resulting Trusts in Personalty. — The princi-
ples of equity to which resulting trusts in real estate are
subject are equally applicable to personal property. Where'
stocks, bonds, mortgages, or other personal effects, are
purchased by one person and the title taken in the name
of another, a trust results to the person paying the pur-
chase money. But some exceptions to the application of
these principles have been sustained by the courts.* It
1 Kedington v. Redington, 3
Kidg. 106; Sidmouth v. Sidmouth,
2 Beav. 455.
2 Murless v. Franklin, 1 Swanst.
20; Willard v. Willard, 56 Pa. St.
119.
8 Cairns v. Colburn, 104 Mass.
247; Cartwright v. Wise, 14 111.
417 ; Grey v. Grey, 2 Swanst. 597 ;
Peer v. Peer, 3 Stockt. 432; Hall v.
Doran, 13 Iowa, 368; Perkins v.
Nichols, 11 Allen, 542; Fairhurst
v. Lewis, 23 Ark. 435 ; Persons v.
Persons, 25 N. J. Eq. 250. "It is
the established doctrine of a court
of equity, that this resulting trust
may be rebutted by circumstances
in evidence. The cases go one step
further, and prove that the cir-
cumstance of one or more of the
nominees being a child or children
of the purchaser, is to operate by
rebutting the resulting trust, and
it has been determined in so many
cases, that the nominee, being a
child, shall have such operation as
a circumstance of evidence, that we
should be disturbing landmarks if
we suffered either of these propo-
sitions to be called in question,
namely, that such circumstance
shall rebut the resulting trust, and
that it shall do so as a circum-
stance of evidence. I think it
would have been a more simple
doctrine if tne children had been
considered as purchasers for a
valuable consideration. Natural
love and affection raised a use at
common law. Surely, then, it will
rebut a trust resulting to the father.
This way of considering it would
have shut out all the circumstances
of evidence which have found their
way into many of the cases, and
would have prevented some very
nice distinctions, and not very easy
to be understood. Considering it as
a circumstance of evidence, there
must be of course evidence admit-
ted on the other side. Thus it was
resolved into a question of intent,
which was getting into a very wide
sea, without very certain guides."
Lord Chief Baron Eyre in Dyer v.
Dyer, 2 Cox, 98 ; s. c, 1 Lead. Case
in Eq. (White & Tud.) *239.
4 Ebrand v. Dancer, 2 Ch. Cas.
§178.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
369
has been held that a resulting trust cannot be set up in
such perishable articles as whisky and brandy, and that
a trust cannot be created out of a felony by following
stolen articles, as bank notes, through changes of form.1
A resulting trust will not arise from a claim of title to land
where the claim is not well founded.2
§ 178. When a Resulting Trust Arises. — In theory a
trust results at the very moment at which the instrument
of conveyance becomes operative, or as it is sometimes
expressed in technical language, eo instanti. It arises from
the acts and declarations of the parties, and in the passing
of the legal title to the grantee the trust results. It can-
not arise out of any parol agreements, or from any pay-
ments of money subsequent to the conveyance, unless they
are so connected with it as to be an essential part of the
transaction.3 In Rogers v. Murray, it was held that where
26; s. C, lEq. Abr. 382; Rider v.
Kidder, 10 Ves. 363; 2 Mad. Ch.
Pr. 101 ; Lloyd v. Bead, 1 P. Wms.
607; Ex parte Houghton, 17 Ves.
253 ; Beecher v. Major, 2 Dr. & Sm.
431; Sidraouth v. Sidmouth, 2
Beav. 447; Garrick v. Taylor, 29
Beav. 79; s. c, 4 De G.,F. & J.
159; Creed v. Lancaster Bank, 1
Ohio St. 1 ; Kelley v. Jenness, 50
Me. 455; Soar v. Foster, 4 Kay &
J. 152; Bobbins v. Bobbins, 89 N.
Y. 258; Stover v. Flack, 41 Barb.
162; Grant v. Heverin (1888), 77
Cal. 263; s. c, 19 Pac. Bep. 493;
Smyth v. Oliver, 31 Ala. 39; May
v. Nabors, 6 Ala. 24; People v.
Houghtaling, 7 Cal. 348 ; Martin v.
Bank, 31 Ala. 115; Doyle v. Mur-
phy, 22 111. 502; s. c, 74 Am. Dec.
165.
1 Union Bank v. Baker, 8 Humph.
447; Lyon v. Lyon, 1 Tenn. Ch.
225.
2 Mandeville v. Solomon, 33 Cal.
38. The same rule extends to ad-
vancements. Dummer v. Pitcher,
24
2 Myl. & K. 262 ; Butler v. Ins. Co.,
14 Ala. 777; Hill v. Bank, 45 K.
H. 300; Dillard v. Dillard, 3
Humph. 41 ; Douglas v. Price, 4
Rich. Eq. 322.
3 Frickett v. Durham, 109 Mass.
422; Dudley v. Batchelder, 53 Me.
403; Sogers v. Murray. 3 Paige,
390 ; Connor v. Lewis, 16 Me. 275 ;
Pinnock v. Clough, 16 Vt. 500;
Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 6 Ala.
404; McGowan v. McGowan, 14
Gray, 119 ; Barnard v. Jewett, 97
Mass. 87; Freeman v. Kelly, 1
Hoff. 90; Foster v. Trustees, 3 Ala,
302; Forsyth v. Clark, 3 Wend
637; Knox v. McFarran, 4 Colo
586; Back v. Swazey, 35 Me. 51
Sullivan v. Sullivan, 86 Tenn. 376
McClure v. Doak, 6 Baxt. 364,
Bhea v. Tucker, 56 Ala. 450; Du-
val v. Marshall, 3 Ark. 230 ; Parker
v. Coop, 60 Tex. Ill ; Bichardson
V.Day, 20 S. Car. 412; Boozer v.
Teague, 27 S. Car. 349; Billings v.
Clinton, 6 Bich. (S. Car.) 90; Mil-
ler v. Blose, 30 Gratt. 744 ; Davis
370
IMPLIED TEUSTS.
[§ 178.
there is a resulting trust under a conveyance it must arise
at the time of the execution of the deed. After the legal
title has passed to the grantee by the execution of the
deed, a resulting trust cannot be raised by the subsequent
application of the funds of a third person for the im-
provement of the property, or for the payment of the
purchase money, so as to divest the legal estate of the
grantor.1 But where a trust was created by the convey-
ance, it was held that the subsequent payment of a
mortgage, to which the trust was subject, extended its
operation.2 Where certain funds in the hands of an agent,
v. Wetherell, 11 Allen, 19; For-
syth v. Clark, 3 Wend. 657; Steere
v. Steere, 5 Johns. Ch. 1 ; Botsford
v. Burr, 2 Johns. Ch. 408; Jackson
v. Moore, 6 Cow. 706; White v.
Carpenter, 2 Paige, 218; Niver v.
Crane, 98 N. Y. 40; Page v. Page,
8 N. H. 187; Buck v. Pike, 2 Fairf.
9; Graves v. Dugan, 6 Dana, 331;
Wallace v. Marshall, 9 B. Mon.
148; Gee v. Gee, 2 Sneed, 395;
Kelly v. Johnson, 28 Mo. 249; Wil-
lard v. Willard, 56 Pa. St. 119;
Nixon's Appeal, 63 Pa. St. 279;
Cutler v. Tuttle,. 19 N. J. Eq. 561 ;
Sheldon v. Harding, 44 111. 68;
Westerfleld v. Kimmer, 82 Ind.
369; Tunnard v. Litteil, 23 ST. J.
Eq. 264; Wheeler v. Kirtland, 23
N. J. Eq. 13; Gerry v. Stimson, 60
Me. 186; Kendall v. Mann, 11 Al-
len, 15; Remington v. Campbell,
60111. 51G; Lear v. Chouteau, 23
111. 39; Roberts v. Ware, 40 Cal.
634; Logan v. Johnson (1894), 72
Miss. 185; s. C, 16 So. Rep. 231.
To raise a resulting trust in land
irom the payment of the purchase
money, the payment or advance
must be made before or at the time
of the purchase. Bright v. Knight
(1891), 35 W. Ya. 40; S. C, 13 S.
E. Rep. 63. To establish a, parol
trust in land in favor of a person
whose money is alleged to have
gone into the purchase and im-
provement of the land, the evi-
dence must show the existence of
the facts constituting the trust at
the time of the transmission of the
legal title. Natl Bank v. Gilmer
(1895). 116N. Car. 684; s. C, 23S.E.
Rep. 333. A parol agreement by a
purchaser of land, made "after"
the purchase, to hold such land in
trust for another, and to allow him
to have the land on payment of
the amount bid by such pur-
chaser, is void as within the stat-
ute of frauds. Hamilton v. Buch-
anan (1893\ 112 N. Car. 463; s. C,
17 S. E. Rep. 159. Evidence that
the wife afterwards recognized the
land held by her as belonging to
her husband is not sufficient to es-
tablish a resulting trust in his fa-
vor, as such trust arises, if at all,
at the time of the transaction out
of which it grows and not after-
wards. Taylor v. Miles, 19 Or. 550;
S. c, 25 Pac. Rep. 143. To estab-
lish a resulting trust the evidence
must prove the fact of payment by
the beneficiary beyond a reason-
able doubt. Logan v. Johnson
(1S94), 72 Miss. 185; s. c, 16 So.
Rep. 231.
1 Rogers v. Murray, 3 Paige,
390.
2 Leonard v. Green, 34 Minn. 137.
3 179. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 371
at the time of a purchase, are his only reliance for pro-
curing the title, he cannot defeat the trust by showing
that he has acquired a merely inceptive, equitable interest
by the payment of a small amount of his own money at
the purchase.1 Where there is an agreement to deliver a
note or other consideration for land, and it is recognized
as a part of the transaction by which the land is conveyed,
it may be delivered at a time subsequent to the purchase.
Although a note given by one for the consideration on a
conveyance of lands to another was not delivered till the
day after the delivery of the deed, if it appears that the
deed was delivered in expectation of receiving the note,
and the note was delivered to close the transaction, the
two may be regarded as contemporaneous, for the purpose
of creating a resulting trust allowed by statute in favor
of creditors of a person paying the consideration for a
grant to another.2 But this will be determined by the cir-
cumstances of the case. In another recent case it was held
that a resulting trust must arise at the time of the execu-
tion of the conveyance, and payment subsequent to the
purchase will not, by relation, attach a trust to the original
purchase.3
§ 179. Modern Legislation. — In a number of the States,
including New York, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Ken-
tucky, Indiana and Kansas, resulting trusts are now regu-
lated by statute. In these States resulting trusts in lands
are practically abolished. Where property is conveyed to
one person and the purchase money is paid by another, no
1 McLaughlin v. Fulton, 104 Pa. s Moorman v. Arthur (1894), 90
St. 161, 170. Va.455; s. C, 18 S. E. Kep. 869. A
2 Kline v. McDonnell, 62 Hun, resulting trust must arise at the time
177 ; s. c, 16 N. Y. Supl. 649 ; Bots- of the execution of the conveyance,
ford v. Burr, 2 Johns. Ch. 405 ; Payment of the purchase money at
McGowan v. McGowan, 14 Gray, the time of the purchase is indis-
122; Garfield v. Hatmaker, 15 N. pensable. A subsequent payment
Y. 475 ; Shoemaker v. Smith, 11 will not by relation attach a trust
Humph. 81 ; Hall v. Young, 37 5T. to the original purchase. Beecher
H. 134; Pinney v. Fellows, 15 Vt. v. Wilson, 84 Va. 813; s. c, 6 S.E.
525; Jackson v. Bateman, 2 Wend. Kep. 209.
570.
372
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 179.
trust results to the person by whom the payment is made,
but the title vests in the alienee. To this there is an ex-
ception in the case of the judgment creditors of the grantor.1
1 Rev. Stat. N. Y. 728, § 51 ; Rev.
Stat. Wis. § 2071 ; McCartney v.
Bostwick, 32 X. Y. 52; Garfield v.
Hatmaker, 15 N". Y. 475; Everett
V.Everett, 48 X. Y. 218; Skinner
v. James, 69 Wis. 605 ; Campbeil
v. Campbell, 70 Wis. 311 ; Reitz v.
Reitz, 80 N. Y. 538; Siemon v.
Schurek, 29 ST. Y. 598; Moore v.
Williams, 55 N. Y. Super. 116;
Woerz v. Rademacher, 120 N. Y.
62; Denning v. Kane, 7N". Y. Supl.
704; Traphagen v. Burt, 07 N. Y.
30; Underwood v. Sutlifie, 77 N.
Y. 51 ; Mitchell v. Skinner, 17 Kan.
563; Kennedy v. Taylor, 20 Kan.
558; Graves v. Graves, 3 Mete. 167;
Bedford v. Graves (1890) (Ky.), 1
S. W. Rep. 534; Weare v. Linnell<
29 Mich. 224; Munch v. Shabel, 37
Mich. 166; Derry v. Derry, 74 Ind.
560; Hon v. Hon, 70 Ind. 135; Cath-
erwood v. Catherwood, 65 Ind.
576; Baker v. Baker, 22 Minn. 202;
Rogers v. Macaulay, 22 Minn. 262 ;
Durfee v. Pavitt, 14 Minn. 422.
How. St. Mich. §6042, provides
that the "executor or administra-
tor making the sale * * * shall
not, directly or indirectly, pur-
chase, or be interested in the pur-
chase of, any part of the real es-
tate so sold; and all sales made
•contrary to this section shall be
void." Section 5569 provides that
"when a, grant for a valuable con-
sideration shall be made to one per-
son, and the consideration therefor
shall be paid by another, no use or
trust shall result in favor of the
person by whom such payment
shall be made, but the title shall
vest in the person named as the
alienee in such conveyance, sub-
ject only to the provisions of the
next section," which (Sec. 5570)
provides that such conveyance
shall be presumed fraudulent as
against creditors of the person pay-
ing the consideration, and that,
such fraudulent intent not being
disproved, a trust shall result in
favor of the creditors. Held that,
where a person buys property be-
longing to an estate, at a sale or-
dered by court, under an agree-
ment that the administratrix shall
have it on repaying such amount,
such sale is void, but there is no
resulting trust in favor of the heirs.
Corbett v. Daly, 82 Mich. 500; s.C,
46 ST. W. Rep. 671. 3 Rev. Stat. ST.
Y. (7th Ed.) p. 2181, § 51, which
provides that where a grant for a
"valuable consideration" shall be
made to one person, and the "con-
sideration therefor shall be paid by
another," no use or trust shall re-
sult in favor of the person by whom
such payment shall be made, but
the title shall vest in the per-
son named as the alienee in such
conveyance, has no application to
a mere naked grant, made without
valuable consideration, by tenants
in common to a third person under
an agreement that he should con-
vey the land as directed by the co-
tenants, and pay to them all the
moneys which should come to his
hands. Bork v. Martin, 11 N. Y.
Supl. 569. An agreement for a joint
purchase of land, title 1o be taken
by one of the parties, being in pa-
rol, was void under Rev. Stat.
1891, ch. 59, § 9, which declares that
creations of trusts in land shall be
in writing, or else shall be utterly
void. Morton v. Nelson (1892)
(III.), 31 ST. E. Rep. 168. Rev.
§ 179.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
373
Such a conveyance will be presumed fraudulent, as against
the creditors at the time at which the consideration was
paid. In such cases the burden of proof is on the grantee.
He must rebut this presumption, or he will be held as a
trustee for the creditors of the person paying the consid-
eration.1 But where the alienee has paid nothing, and has
taken the title with the understanding that it is for the
benefit of the person paying the purchase money, his claim
to the property will not be sustained in a court of equity.2
Stat. § 2302, requiring a, trust in
lands to be created or declared in
-writing, does not render void a
trust created by a parol agreement
that land conveyed by a deed ab-
solute shall be held for the benefit
of another, but only voidable at
the election of the grantee ; and the
minor cestui que trust has an equi-
table interest, which gives him the
legal right to redeem from a tax
sale, pursuant to a statute authori-
zing such redemption. Begole v.
Hazzard (1892), 81 Wis. 274; S. C,
51 N. "W. Eep. 325. At a sale on
foreclosure, plaintiff paid part of
the consideration, and procured
the title to be conveyed to his
brother's wife, without her knowl-
edge. After discovering the fact,
she conveyed the property to her
husband who knew all the facts.
The mother of plaintiff, with his
brother, had a life estate in the
property, under the will of her de-
ceased husband, of which they
were executors, and the purchase
was made to save for her a life es-
tate after the foreclosure; the
agreement being that plaintiff
should pay the money needed, and
that the balance should be secured
by mortgage on the same and
other property which plaintiff had
previously conveyed to his'brother.
Such mortgage was given by the
brother and his wife, and was
afterwards paid by plaintiff. Held,
that the case was not within the
provision of 1 Rev. Stat. N. Y., p.
728, § 51, forbidding resulting
trusts upon a grant to one on a
consideration paid by another; and
that plaintiff was entitled to a con-
veyance of the property, as a spe-
cific performance of the agreement
by his brother and wife to convey
to him on request. Pratt, J., dis-
senting. Curtin v. Curtin, 58 Hun,
607; s. c, 11 N. Y. Supl. 938.
1 Garfield v. Hatmaker, 15 N. Y.
475 ; Everett v. Everett, 48 ST. Y.
218.
2 Bobbins v. Bobbins, 89 N. Y.
251; Linsley v. Sinclair, 24 Mich.
380 ; Bodine v. Edwards, 10 Paige,
504 ; Brewster v. Power, 10 Paige,
562; Willink v. Vanderveer, 1 Barb.
599; Hon v. Hon, 70 Ind. 135;
Derry v. Derry, 74 Ind. 560 ; Munch
v. Shabel, 37 Mich. 166; Weare v.
Linnell, 29 Mich. 224; Norton v.
Storer, 8 Paige, 222 ; Reid v. Fitch,
11 Barb. 399 ; Lounsbury v. Purdy,
16 Barb. 376; S. c, 18 K. Y. 515;
Beitz v. Beitz, 80 N. Y. 538 ; Sie-
mon v. Schurck, 29 N. Y. Super.
116; Woerz v. Bademacher, 120 1ST.
Y. 62; Denning v. Kane, 7 1ST. Y.
Supl. 704; Jencks v. Alexander, 11
Paige, 619; Watson v. Lerow, 6
Barb. 481; Bussell v. Allen, 10
Paige, 250; Baker v. Baker, 22
Minn. 262; Durfee v. Pavitt, 14
374 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 179.
Under the statute of Kentucky the person paying the pur-
chase price can maintain an action, in the absence of fraud,
for the recovery of the amount paid. In Martin v. Martin
it was held that if a conveyance is made with intent and to
the effect of delaying creditors, it is fraudulent, and in
such cases, both parties being in fault, or in pari delicto,
the courts hesitate to grant either relief and refuse to have
anything to do with the case.; but if no fraud is perpetrated
upon the creditors, then this principle does not apply, and
the party receiving the conveyance must hold it according
to the original trust, or he must pay for it.1 But the rule
that the title shall vest in the alienee is operative only where
the conveyance is made with the consent of the party pay-
ing the purchase price. If the title is taken without his
consent, as where an agent buys property with the money
of his principal and without his knowledge takes the title
in his own name, or if there is an oversight, a fraud or a
mistake in the conveyance, a trust will result to the equitable
Minn. 422; Kogers v. McCauley, 22 l Martin v. Martin, 5 Bush, 47.
Minn. 384; Swinburne v. Swin- 21 Rev. Stat. N. Y. 728, § 53
burne, 28 N. T. 568; Stover v. Niver v. Crane, 98 N. Y. 40
Flock, 21 Barb. 162; Safford v. Schultz v. Mayor, 103 N. Y. 307
Hinds, 39 Barb. 625; Graves v. Jackson v. Forest, 2 Barb. Ch. 576
Graves, 3 Mete. 167 ; Kennedy v. McCartney v. Bostwick, 32 1ST. Y.
Taylor, 20 Kan. 558 ; Mitchell v. 53 ; Ocean Nat'l Bank v. Alcott, 46
Skuiner, 17 Kan. 563; Underwood N. Y. 12. The later New York de-
v. Sutliffe, 77 N. Y. 51 ; Traphagen cisions hold that only judgment
v. Burt, 67 N. Y. 30; Buffalo B. R. creditors can reach the land by or-
Co. v. Lampson, 47 Barb. 533; Gil- dinary creditor's suits afterhaving
bert v. Gilbert, 1 Keyes, .159 ; Far- exhausted their legal remedies
rell v. Lloyd, 69 Pa. St. 239; Groes- against the debtor. Ocean Nat'l
beck v. Seeley, 13 Mich. 329; Bank v. Olcott, 46 N. Y. 12; Dun-
Fisher v. Forbes, 22 Mich. 454. lap v. Hawkins, 59 N. Y. 342.
CHAPTEE XI.
IMPLIED TRUSTS CONTINUED.
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS— DIVISION FIRST.
TRUSTS FROM CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD.
■ 180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
Introductory.
Fraud as the Basis of the
Constructive Trust.
Application of Equitable
Principle.
From Illegal Acquisition
of Property by Trustee.
From Illegal Disposition of
Property by Trustee.
The Subject Continued.
Rule not Applicable to Dry
Trustee.
From Renewal of Lease.
From Illegal Acts of Ex-
ecutors and Administra-
tors.
The Subject Continued.
From Illegal Acts of Di-
rectors of Corporations.
The Subject Continued.
From the Relation of Agent
to His Principal.
The Subject Continued.
§ 194. From Relation of Attorney
and Client.
195. The Subject Continued.
196. From Fiduciary Relations
in General.
197. From Purchase with Notice
198. The Subject Continued.
199. Limitations of the Rule.
200.. Consideration must be Val-
uable.
201. Conditions of Notice.
202. How Notice is to be Given.
203. Characteristics of Notice.
204. The Subject Continued.
205. Notice to Purchasers at
Executor's Sale.
206. The Subject Continued.
207. The Same Subject.
208. Barred by Continued Ac-
quiescence.
209. Barred by Statutes of Lim-
itation.
§ 180. Introductory. — That class of implied trusts
that are designated as constructive trusts are such as arise
by operation or construction of law, out of the fraudulent
acts or declarations of persons who, in some sense, sustain
a fiduciary relation. In most instances they are established
in opposition to the purpose or intention of the parties
376
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 180.
or of the person holding the legal title to the property in
question. They include all cases of that class in which
there is an illegal or fraudulent holding, or disposition of
trust property, to the working of injustice and pecuniary
injury to the equitable owner.1 Courts of equity will
1 Washburn on Real Property,
447; 2 Pomeroy Equity Jurispru-
dence, 1044; Perry on Trusts, § 166.
"A constructive trust is raised by a
court of equity, wherever a per-
son, clothed with a fiduciary char-
acter, gains some personal ad-
vantage by availing himself of his
situation as trustee; for as it is im-
possible that a trustee should be
allowed to make a profit by his of-
fice, it follows that so soon as the
advantage in question is shown to
have been acquired through the
medium of a trust, the trustee, how-
ever good a legal title he may
have, will be decreed in equity to
hold for the benefit of his cestui que
trust.'''' 1 Lewin on Trusts. *180.
"Constructive trusts arise where
the trustee or any other person
holding a fiduciary position, by
fraud, actual or constructive,
makes an illegal disposition of the
trust property, to the injury of the
cestui que trust or beneficiary."
Tiedeman on Equity Jurispru-
dence, 312. "Wherever the cir-
cumstances of a transaction are
such that the person who takes the
legal estate in property cannot also
enjoy the beneficial interest, with-
out necessarily violating some es-
tablished principle of equity, the
■court will immediately raise a con-
structive trust, and fasten it upon
the conscience of the legal owner,
;SO as to convert him into a trustee
.for the parties who, in equity, are
entitled to the beneficial enjoy-
ment." Hill on Trustees, *U4.
Constructive trusts are those which
arise purely by construction of
equity and are entirely independ-
ent of any actual or presumed in-
tention of the parties. Bouvier
Law Dictionary, tit. Trust. A con-
structive trust is : "A trust raised
by construction of law, or arising
by operation of law, as distin-
guished from an express trust."
Black Law Dictionary, tit. Con-^
structive Trust. "Such trust as is
imposed by construction of law,
from reasons of equity and justice,
and independently of the intentions
of the parties : as, a vendor's or
vendee's lien for purchase money
unpaid or prematurely paid; the
renewal of a lease by a trustee in
his own name ; and, perhaps, a per-
manent improvement unavoidably
made to an estate by the legal pos-
sessor. A trust which arises
from actual or legal fraud, as,
where a person occupying a fidu-
ciary relation gains an advantage
to himself personally. Also called
a trust ex malejicio." Anderson's
Dictionary of Law, tit. Trust, Con-
structive. "An exhaustive analy-
sis would show, I think, that all
instances of constructive trusts,
properly so called, may be referred
to what equity denominates fraud,
either actual or constructive, as an
essential element and as their final
source. Even in that single class
where equity proceeds upon the
maxim that an intention to ful-
fill an obligation should be im-
puted, and assumes that the pur-
chaser intended to act in pursuance
of his fiduciary duty, the notion of
§ 180. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 377
afford relief through a constructive trust wherever the
legal title to property has been obtained, or is held in
violation of right, or of any obligation to the person holding
the equitable interest. Wherever it is shown that a fraud,
either actual or constructive, has been committed in the
acquisition or disposition of property, equity will raise a
constructive trust in favor of the person defrauded, unless
such a trust would be in conflict with the rights or interests
of an innocent third person.1 Trusts of this class have
been designated as trusts in invilum, and an essential
characteristic is expressed by this term. Without it there
is no constructive trust in the strict and technical sense.
All trusts that are properly denominated constructive trusts
arise out of acts or declarations which are held and treated
by courts of equity as fraudulent, either in an actual or
constructive sense. In cases, apparently or really of
this class, in which courts of equity presume an
intention to discharge with fidelity the fiduciary obligation,
fraud is not imputed, simply because the ends of justice
fraud is not invoked, simply be- Ch. 220; Beach v. Dyer, 93 111. 295;
cause it is not absolutely necessary Baier v. Berberich, 6 Mo. App.
under the circumstances; the ex- 537; Dewey v. Moyer, 72 N. Y. 70,
istence of the trust in all cases of 76 ; Lakin v. Sierra Buttes Gold-
this class might be referred to con- mining Co., 25 Fed. Rep. 337;
structive fraud. This notion of Boyce v. Stanton, 15 Lea, 346;
fraud enters into the conception in Palmetto Lumber Co. v. Risley, 25
all its possible degrees. Certain S. Car. 309 ; Wingerter v. Winger-
species of the constructive trusts ter, 71 Cal. 105; Huxley v. Bice
arise from actual fraud; many oth- 40 Mich. 73; Troll v. Carter, 15 W
ers spring from the violation of Va. 567 ; Phelps v. Jackson, 31 Ark
some positive fiduciary obligation ; 272 ; Hendrix v. Nunn, 46 Tex. 141
in all the remaining instances there Veile v. Blodgett, 49 Vt. 270
is, latent perhaps, but none the ]STewell v. Newell, 14 Kan. 202
less real, the necessary element of Jenkins v. Doolittle, 69 111. 415
that unconscientious conduct which Greenwood's Appeal, 92 Pa. St
equity calls constructive fraud. 2 181 ; Barnes v. Taylor, 30 JST. J. Eq
Pomeroy Equity Jurisprudence, 7; Hollinshead v. Simms, 51 Cal
§1044. 158; Mercier v. Hemme, 50 Cal
1 Downes v. Jennings, 32 Beav. 606 ; Denning v. Kane, 7 ST. Y
290; Tucker v. Phipps, 3 Atk. 359, Supl. 704; Thompson v. Thomp-
360; Naylor v. Winch, 1 S. & S. 555, son, 16 Wis. 91 ; Collins v. Collins,
564; Bingham v. Bingham, 1 Ves. 6 Lans. 368; Griffith v. Godey, 113
Sr. 126; Bailey v. Stiles, 1 Green U. S. 89.
378 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 180.
are answered without it. If, in fact, no fraud has been
committed, the trust raised is an implied trust in a general
sense, but not properly a constructive trust.1 Writers of
text books have divided constructive trusts into two or
three general classes;2 but as all strictly constructive
trusts arise from fraud, such divisions are not altogether
natural and obvious. In the exercise of their equity juris-
diction the courts of England and of the United States
administer a power in this direction that is of great efficacy
and importance. In very numerous instances, through the
establishment of a constructive trust, they protect the
rights of the equitable owner and administer justice by
making the legal owner of an estate a trustee in his favor.
They apply a remedy where the offender is beyond the
reach of a court of law. The application of the principle
of equity involved is general. It extends to property of
all kinds and classes, real and personal. Attention has
frequently been called to the distinction between the true
or express trust, and a trust arising by operation or con-
struction of law. The latter is really a trust by a figure
of speech. But the person who becomes a trustee by a
decree of a court of equity, for the object intended, an-
swers the ends of justice as fully as though he were a veri-
table trustee.3
1 2 Pomeroy Equity Jurispru- against him as they would be en-
dence, § 1044. titled to against an express trustee
2 Perry on Trusts, 168 ; 2 Pome- who had fraudulently committed a
roy Equity Jurisprudence, 1044; broach of trust." Lord Westbury
Beach Modern Equity Jurispru- inKolfe v. Gregory, 4 De G., J. &
dence, 226; 10 American & English S. 576, 579. "The advantage of
Encyclopedia, § X. correcting by familiar practice an
3 Story's Equity Jurisprudence, inaccurate use of a word, although
1265. "When it is said that the that use may be found in treatises of
person who fraudulently receives reputation, I remember to have seen
or possesses himself of trust prop- singularly illustrated in a case that
erty is converted by this court into occurred some years ago in a court of
a trustee, the expression is used law when the court was told that in
for the purpose of describing the an agreement for the sale of a house
nature and extent of the remedy the vendor was trustee for the pur-
against him, and it denotes that chaser, and the judges were called
the parties entitled beneficially upon to apply a rule which is quite
have the same rights and remedies right as between a complete trustee
§ 181. j
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
379
§ 181. Fraud as the Basis of the Constructive Trust.
As the constructive trust arises out of fraud in some
form, it is pertinent to inquire what kind and degree of
fraud is regarded by courts of equity as the proper ground
for establishing it. No complete and accurate definition
has been given. Some general principles have been enun-
ciated by the courts, but none are exhaustive. Mr.
Justice Story gives the following: "Fraud, indeed, in the
sense of a court of equity, properly includes all acts,
omissions and concealments which involve a breach of
legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence justly reposed,
and injurious to another, or by which an undue and uncon-
scientious advantage is taken of another. And courts of
equity will not only interfere in cases of fraud to set aside
acts done, but they will also, if acts have by fraud been
prevented from being done by the parties, interfere and
treat the case exactly as if the acts had been done."1 But
by declaration and the cestui que
trust, but quite wrong where the
vendor is called a trustee only by a
metaphor, and by an improper use
of the term, and it required some
trouble to convince them that
though the vendor might be called
a trustee he was a trustee only to
the extent of his obligation to per-
form the agreement between him-
self and the purchaser. In like
manner here, the surviving partner
may be called a trustee for the dead
man, but the trust is limited to the
discharge of the obligation, which
is liable to be barred by lapse of
time, as between the express trustee
and the cestui que trust time will
not run ; but the surviving partner
is not a trustee in that full and
proper sense of the word. It is
most necessary to mark this again
and again, for there is not a more
fruitful source of error in law than
the inaccurate use of language.
The application to a man who is
improperly, and by metaphor only,
called a trustee, of all the conse-
quences which would follow if he
were a trustee by express declara-
tion— in other words, a complete
trustee — holding the property ex-
clusively for the benefit of the cestui
que trust, well illustrates the re-
mark made by Lord Mansfield, that
nothing in law is so apt to mislead
as a metaphor." Knox v. G-ye, L.
K. 5 H. L. Cas. 656, 675.
1 Story's Equity Jurisprudence,
§ 187. See also Chesterfield v.
Janssen, 2 Ves. 155, 156; Middle-
ton v. Middleton, 1 Jac. & Walk.
96; Taylor v. Atwood, 47 Conn.
498, 503; Gale v. Gale, 19 Barb.
249, 251; Smith v. Richards, 13
Pet. 26; Dailey v. Kastell, 56 Wis.
444, 452. "It is utterly impossible
to formulate any single statement
which shall accurately define the
equitable conception of fraud, and
which shall contain all of the ele-
ments which enter into that con-
ception; these elements are so
various, so differentmnder the dif-
380 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 181.
while it is a very simple thing to say what does constitute
fraud, of which equity will take cognizance, it has not
been regarded as prudent to set bounds beyond which a
court will not go. The wisdom of Lord Hardwicke on this
point has received universal recognition. In his opinion
in Lawley v. Hooper, he said: "The court very wisely
hath never laid down any general rule beyond which it
would not go, lest other means of avoiding the equity of
the court should be found out. Therefore, they always
determine upon the particular circumstances of each case,
and wherever they have the least tincture of fraud in any
of these oppressive bargains, relief hath always been given. "1
New cases of this character are always liable to arise. And
while the definitions may not cover the case, and the authori-
ties may not be exactly in point, the principle of equity
out of which the constructive trust arises will always be
applied. In Webb v. Eorke, Lord Chancellor Eedesdale
said: "Cases cannot always be found to serve as direct
authority for subsequent cases; but if a case arises of
fraud, or presumption of fraud, to which even no principle
already established can be applied, a new principle must be
established to meet the fraud, as the principles on which
former cases have been decided have been from time to time
established, as fraud contrived new devices, for the possibility
will always exist that human ingenuity, in contriving fraud,
will go beyond any cases which have before occurred."2
ferent circumstances of equitable sought to be deprived, by unjusti-
cognizance, so destitute of any fiable means, of what he is entitled
common bond of unity that they to." Sir John Komilly in Green v.
cannot be brought within any gen- STison, 23 Beav. 530, 535. Positive
eral formula." 2 Pomeroy's Equity fraud is defined by Judge Cooley,
Jurisprudence, § 873. "All deceit- in Cooley on Torts, 474, as "decep-
ful practices in depriving or en- tion practiced in order to induce
deavoring to deprive another of his another to part with property or to
known right, by means of some surrender some legal right, and
artful device or plan contrary to which accomplishes the end de-
the plain rules of common honesty signed."
is fraud." Mitchell v. Kintzer, 5 l Lawley v. Hooper, 3 Atk. 279.
Pa. St. 216; s. c, 47 Am. Dec. 408. 2 Webb v. Eorke, 2 Sch. & Lef.
"Fraud implies a willful act on the 661, 666.
part of one, whereby another is
§§ 182-183.] IMPLIED TRUSTS. 381
§ 182. Application of Equitable Principle. — If it has
not appeared practicable to courts of equity to give an ac-
curate and exhaustive definition of fraud, it has also not
been found either necessary or important. Without refer-
ence to technical definitions or arbitrary rules, they will
investigate the charges of fraud xand apply the remedies
which equity provides. Where it appears that property
has been acquired, or is held by fraud, equity converts the
holder of the legal title into a trustee for the equitable
owner. Whatever may be the circumstances of each case,
and though it may be altogether without precedent, the
principles of equity will be applied as a remed}'. In what-
ever form the fraud appears the equitable remedy will be
so applied as to meet the demands of righteousness and
justice. In many cases where a fraud would be protected
by a statute or by the technical rules of the common law,
equity administers justice by compelling the person holding
the legal title to convey the property in question to the
equitable owner.1
§ 183. From Illegal Acquisition of Property by Trustee.
— Where a trustee purchases the property of his cestui que
trust equity will treat the sale as void and set it aside. In
his possession of the property under the sale he will be held as
a constructive trustee for the beneficiary. The rule is that
where any person sustains such a relation to the equitable
owner as to give him a definite knowledge of the value of the
property, and to place him under obligation to obtain the
best price for it that it will command, he cannot be a pur-
chaser in his own interest. This rule applies not only to
trustees, but as well to all persons acting as agents for
trustees, to auctioneers, to assignees, and to all other per-
sons who are under an obligation to the equitable owner.2
People v. Kendall, 25 Wend. 367; Stoolfoos v. Jenkins, 12 S. &
399; Conroe v. Birdsall, 1 Johns. B. 399; Wright v. Snow, 2 De G. &
Cas. 127; Price v. Hewitt, 8 Exch. S. 321; Hall v. Timmons, 2 Kieh.
145; Burley v. Eussell, 10 N. H. Eq. 120; Wright v. Arnold, 4 B.
184; West v. Moore, 14 Vt. 447; Mon. 643; Davis v. Fingle, 8 B.
Vaughan v. Vanderslegen, 2 Dr. Mon. 539.
363; Jones v. Kearney, 1 Dr. & W. 2 Kerr v. Lord Dungannon, 1 Dru.
382
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 183.
This principle will be rigidly applied even where there is no
evidence that the trustee has taken any advantage of his
position to advance his own interest. Such transactions
are regarded as essentially evil in their consequences. The
beneficiary is not bound to show that the trustee has ad-
vanced his own interests in the purchase, and the court will
not necessarily presume this. In any case of purchase by
a trustee, whether at public or private sale, the transaction
will be declared void at the petition of the cestui que trust,
and the property will be held by the purchaser in trust for
his benefit.1 In a case of this character Lord Chancellor
& War. 509 ; Ex parte Bennett, 10
Ves. 3S1; Ex parte Lacy, 6 Ves.
625 ; Ex parte Alexander, 2 Mont.
& Ayr. 492 ; Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Ves.
266; Uppington v. Bullen, 2 Dm.
& War. 184; Ex parte Town, 2
Mont. & Ayr. 29; Jones v. Thomas,
2 You. & Coll. 498; Ex parte
Hughes, 6 Ves. 616. Lord Chan-
cellor Sugden in Kerr v. Dungan-
non, 1 Dru. & War. 541, uses this
language : "Now can a trustee for
others, under a will, an agent with
payment for his services, come
into a court of equity after the
death of the tenant for life, for an
absolute term of sixty- one years?
It was a fraudulent transaction ; he
was not at liberty to take from his
employer, for whom he was agent,
trustee and receiver, such a lease ;
no man knowing that he is dealing
with a person, who has only a lim-
ited interest, can justify the taking
a lease beyond that interest, so as
to enable him to deceive a fair
purchaser. I consider this lease in
equity, aye, and beyond equity, as
marked with fraud, and in that
view I must dismiss the plaintiff's
bill. But I do not put the inva-
lidity of the lease on the sole
ground, that this lessee was agent,
receiver and trustee, a party may,
if he choose, grant a beneficial in-
terest to his agent, yet the agent
must show that the dealing with
his employer was fair; if the em-
ployer chooses, he may make him
a present, but the agent must show
that the principal had the same
knowledge as he had." "That
a person chosen as an arbi-
trator, should buy up the unascer-
tained claims of any of the parties
to the reference; that he should
purchase an interest in those rights,
upon which he was to adjudicate,
could not be endured. It would
indeed be to corrupt the fountain,
and it would not only contaminate
the award, but it would pervade
and vitiate every other transaction
of Judge Davy relative to this
property." Blennerhassett v. Day,
2 Ball & B. 104, 116. This court
will not support a deed, where an
attorney is the purchaser, his cli-
ent, the vendor, and the consider-
ation is untruly stated. Upping-
ton v. Bullen, 2 Dru. & War. 184.
1 Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 234,
248; Campbell v. Walker, 5 Ves.
678; Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns.
Ch. 252 ; Rogers v. Rogers, 1 Hop-
kins, 515; Van Horn v. Fonda, 5
Johns. Ch. 388; Saltmarsh v.
Beene, 4 Porter, 283 ; Litchfield v.
Cudworth, 15 Pick. 23, 31; Cope-
land v. Merc. Ins. Co., 6 Pick. 198;
§ 183.J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
383
Eldon, in his opinion, said: "It is now settled, and is my
opinion, that it is not necessary, in order to undo a sale to
a trustee, to show that he has made any advantage in the
article of the purchase. Lord Hardwicke, in Whelpdale
v. Cookson, 1 Ves. 9, intimated an opinion that a trustee
might buy at a sale by auction . I do not take that to be the law
at this day. The ground is that his duty requires him, while
he remains in that situation, to carry to the sale, even at the
expense of the cestui que trust, all the information that is
necessary to enable him to bring the estate to sale as advan-
tageously for the cestui que trust as if he were selling that
estate, his own, for his own benefit."1 This view, in its
Grider v. Payne, 9 Dana, 190;
Richardson v. Jones, 3 Gill &
Johns. 163; Haddix v. Haddix, 5
Litt. 202; De Caters v. LeRoyDe
Chamont, 3 Paige, 178; Bracken-
ridge v. Holland, 2 Black, 377 ; Ar-
nold v. Brown, 24 Pick. 96; Perry
v. Dixon, 4 Desaus. Eq. 504; But-
ler v. Haskell, 4Desaus. Eq. 654;
Davis v. Simpson, 5 Har. & Johns.
147; Boyd v. Hawkins, 2 Bat. &
Dev. Eq. 207 ; Wade v. Pettibone,
11 Ohio, 577; Mills v. Goodsell, 5
Conn. 475; Giddings v. Eastman, 5
Paige, 561 ; Campbell v. Penn. Life
Ins. Co., 2 Whart. 64; Bartholo-
mew v. Leach, 7 Watts, 472; Steele
v. Babcock, 1 Hill, 527 ; Lees v.
Xuttall, 1 Buss. & M. 53; s. c, 2
Myl. & B. 819; Monroe v. Allaire,
2 Caines' Cas. 192; Farnam v.
Brooks, 9 Pick. 202; Docker v.
Somes, 2 Myl. & K. 655; Chamber-
lain v. Harrod, 5 Greenl. 429;
Church v. Marine Ins Co., 1 Mason,
341; Barker v. Marine Ins. Co., 2
Mason, 369; The Schooner Tilton,
5 Mas. 492, 480; Quarles v. Lacy, 4
Murf . 251 : McGuire v. McGowan,
4 Desaus. 486; Ex parte Wiggins, 1
Hill (S. C), Eq. 354; Lazarus v.
Bryson, 3 Binn. 54; Lovell v.
Briggs, 2 N. H. 218 ; Whichcote v.
Lawrence, 3 Ves. 740; Morse v.
Boyal, 12 Ves. 372; Downes v.
Grazebrook, 3 Meriv. 208 ; Exparte
James, 8 Ves. 337, 348.
1 Ex parte Bennett, 10 Ves. *381,
*393. "H that be the principle with
reference to the duty, a court of
equity supposes to be imposed upon
him, the inevitable consequence is,
that, until by contract he shall do,
what all the cases admit he may,
but what it may be difficult to de-
termine he has done effectually,
shake off the character of trustee,
and put himself in circumstances,
in which he shall be no longer the
person intrusted to sell, he shall
not buy for himself. Why? The
reason is, that it would not be
safe, with reference to the admin-
istration of justice in the general
affairs of trust, that a trustee should
be permitted to purchase; for hu-
man infirmity will in very few in-
stances permit a man to exert
against himself, that providence,
which a vendor ought to exert in or-
der to sell to the best advantage ;
and which a purchaser is at liberty
to exert for himself, in order to pur-
chase at the lowest price." Lord
384
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 183.
entire length and breadth, has been sustained by the Amer-
ican courts. In Davoue v. Fanning, before the Court of
Chancery of the State of New York, it was held that if a
trustee, or person acting for others, sells the trust estate
and becomes himself interested in the purchase, the cestui
que trusts are entitled, as of course, to have the purchase
set aside and the property re-exposed to sale, under the di-
rection of the court, and it makes no difference in the ap-
plication of the rule that a sale was at public auction, bona
fide, and for a fair price, and that the executor did not
purchase for himself, but a third person, by previous ar-
rangement, became the purchaser, to hold in trust for the
separate use and benefit of the wife of the executor, who
was one of the cestui que trusts, and had an interest in the
land under the will of the testator.1 This principle has
Eldon in Ex parte Bennett, 10 Ves.
381, 393.
1 Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns
Ch. 232; Holt v. Holt, 1 Ch. Cas
190; Fox v. Mackreath, 2 Bro. Ch
400; Ex parte Reynolds, 5 Ves
707 ; Ex parte James, 8 Ves. 337
Randall v. Errington, 10 Ves. 423 ;
Morse v. Royal, 13 Ves. 355; Low-
ther v. Lowther, 12 Ves. 95; Jack-
son v. Van Dalfsen, 5 Johns. 43;
Munroe v. Allaire, 2 Caines' Cas.
183. In the case of Davoue v. Fan-
ning, Chancellor Kent reviews with
great ability all the decisions hear-
ing on this question. In referring
to the case of The York Build-
ing Company v. Mackenzie, 8 Bro.
P. C, he says: "The case is a com-
plete vindication of the doctrine I
am now to apply. * * * The
respondent here was the common
agent in that cause, and he pur-
chased for himself, at the upset
price, no person appearing to bid
more, and the sale was confirmed by
the court; and in the course of
eleven years' possession he had ex-
pended large sums for building and
improvement. There was no ques-
tion of the fairness and integrity of
the purchase. * * * The ap-
pellants contended that the com-
mon agent was under a disability
to purchase, arising from his office;
- that the rule was founded in reason
and nature, and prevailed wher-
ever any well regulated adminis-
tration of justice was known; that
the disability rested on the princi-
ple which dictated that a person
cannot be both judge and party,
and serve two masters ; that he who
is intrusted with the interest of
others, cannot be allowed to make
the business an object to himself,
because from the frailty of nature,
one who has power will be too
readily seized with the inclination
to serve his own interest at the ex-
pense of those for whom he is in-
trusted ; that the danger of temp-
tation does, out of the mere neces-
sity of the case — work a disqualifi-
cation; nothing less than incapac-
ity being able to shut the door
against temptation, where the dan-
ger is imminent, and the security
§ 183. J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
38:
been applied to the case of trustees, solicitors or other per-
sons who had ceased to sustain this relation. Their previous
fiduciary positions forbid them to purchase of a former
beneficiary. In Ex parte James, Lord Eldon, in his opinion,
said: "With respect to the question now put, whether I
will permit Jones (solicitor to assignee of bankrupt), to
give up the office of solicitor, and to bid, I cannot give that
permission. If the principle is right that the solicitor can-
not buy, it would lead to all the mischief of acting up to
the point of the sale, getting all the information that may
be useful to him, then discharging himself from the char-
acter of solicitor, and buying the property. Infinite mis-
chief would be the consequence in a number of cases."1
against discovery great; that the
wise policy of the law had, there-
fore, put the sting of disability
into temptation, as a defensive
weapon against the strength of the
danger which lies in the situation ;
that the parts which the buyer and
seller have to act, stand in direct
opposition to each other in point
of interest; and this conflict of in-
terest is the rock, for shunning
which the disability has obtained
its force, by making that person,
who has the one part intrusted to
him, incapable of acting on the
other side. * * The counsel for
the respondent admitted the gen-
eral principle and contented them-
selves with denying its application,
holding that the common agent
was not to be considered, in that
case, and in respect of that sale, in
the character of seller or trustee.
But the House of Lords thought
otherwise, and set aside the sale,
ordering the purchaser to account
for the rents and occupation in the
meantime, with a liberal allowance
to him for his permanent improve-
ments. This decision certainly
carried the doctrine to its full ex-
tent, and it may be considered as a
25
high and authoritative sanction
given to the reasoning which ac-
companied the appeal."
1 Ex parte James, 8 Ves. 337, 352-
In an action to have defendant de-
clared a trustee for plaintiff as to
certain property, a petition al-
leging that plaintiff had an equity
of redemption in the property;
that at her solicitation defendant
agreed to buy it in for her; that he
consented to do so before the sale;
that he bought it at a great sacri-
fice; that she relied on his prom-
ises; and that after the purchase
he denied her rights, — sufficiently
shows fraud, and states a good-
cause of action. Leahey v. Witte
(1894), 123 Mo. 207; s. c, 27 S. W.
Rep. 402. Defendant, while acting
as confidential agent in charge of
property, acquired information of
a defect in his principal's title, and
her intention to acquire the out-
standing title, or to contest its
validity, but secretly purchased
such title in the name of another,
and by his connivance caused the
tenants of the property to attorn to
the person to whom the outstand-
ing title had been conveyed. Held*
that he would not be allowed tot
386 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 184.
§ 184. From Illegal Disposition of Property by Trus-
tee— Where a trustee is guilty of a breach of trust in the
sale of trust property, he will be held responsible to the
cestui que trust for all the consequences of his act. If, in-
stead of investing the property in a safe and judicious man-
ner, he takes the responsibility of disposing of it in such a
manner as to promote his own interest, he will not be suf-
fered to derive any benefit from the transaction. In
Pocock v. Reddington, Sir Eichard Pepper Arden, Master of
the Rolls, in his opinion, said: "The rule upon this sub-
ject is that, where an executor or trustee, instead of execut-
ing the trust, as he ought, by laying out the property either
in well secured real estates or upon government securities,
takes upon him to dispose of it in another manner, the
cestuis que trust may call him to an account either way,
having an option to make him replace it, or, if it is for their
benefit, to affirm his conduct and take what he has sold it
for, they may take that and charge him" with legal inter-
est ; or, if he has made more than the interest, the bene-
ficiaries may charge him with that amount. "The trustee
has made nothing, but has lost the whole." The bene-
ficiaries cannot take it both ways ; they must take either
the interest or the proceeds of the transaction.1 Where a
profit by his purchase, but would Ves. 800; Crackett v. Bethune, 1
be treated in equity as holding the Jac. & Walk. 122; Jennison v.
title for his principals. Hull v- Hapgood, 7 Pick. 8; Charles v.
Chaffin (C. C. A.), 54 Fed. Kep. Dubose, 29 Ala. 3G7; Fairman v.
437. Nor will the heirs of an at- Bavin, 29 111. 75; Jamison v. Glass-
torney who was jointly interested cock, 29 Mo. 191; Hoffman v. Curn-
with defendant in the purchase, berland, etc. Co., 16 Md.507; Hub-
and conducted all the negotiations bell v. Medbury, 53 N. Y. 98; Ken-
with full knowledge of his rela- nellv. Deffell,4De G.,M.&.G.372,
tions, stand in any better position. 388; Clapp v. Emory, 98 111. 523,
Hull v. Chaffin (C. C. A.), 54 Fed. 531; Cookson v. Richardson, 69
Kep. 437. 111. 137 ; Bartlett v. Drew, 57 N. Y.
1 Pocock v. Eedington, 5 Ves. 587 ; Shaw v. Spencer, 100 Mass.
794, 800; Harrison v. Harrison, 2 382; Pocock v. Kedington, 5 Ves.
Atk. 121 ; Bostock v. Blakeney, 2 794, 800 ; Ekins v. The East India
Bro. Ch. 653; Byrchell v. Brad- Company, 1 P. Wins. 395; Newton
ford, 6 Madd. 235; Forrest v.Elwes, v. Bennett, 1 Bro. Ch. 359,369;
4 Ves. 497 ; Powlett v. Herbert, 1 Bostock v. Blakeney, 2 Bro. Ch.
Ves. Jr. 297 ; Long v. Stewart, 5 653. For cases where executors as
§ 184. J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
387
trustee disposes of land held in trust, his grantee will take
the land subject to a constructive trust in favor of the ben-
eficiary, unless he has had no notice, either actual or con-
structive, and has paid a valuable consideration.1 Where a
trustees have been charged with
interest, see Ekins v. The East
India Company, 1 P. Wms. 395;
Perkins v. Bayntun, 1 Bro. Ch.
375; Foster v. Foster, 2 Bro. Ch.
616; Forbes v. Eoss, 2 Bro. Ch.
430; s. c, 2 Cox, 113; Seers v.
Hind, 1 Ves. Jr. 294; Young v.
Combe, 4 Ves. 101 ; Piety v. Stace,
4 Ves. 620; Kocke v. Hart, 11 Ves.
58; Mosley v. Ward, 11 Ves. 581;
Dorniord v. Dornford, 12 Ves. 127 ;
Bruyere v. Pemberton, 12 Ves. 386 ;
Ashburnhain v. Thompson, 13 Ves.
402. In Tebbs v. Carpenter, 1 Madd.
290, it is entirely settled, that if an
executor acts with regard to his tes-
tator's property in any other way
than his trust requires, he cannot
be a gainer by it, any gain must be
lor the benefit of the cestui que
trust, and any loss must be re-
placed by him, as to the rate at
which they are to be charged, the
cases seem to establish a distinc-
tion between negligence and cor-
ruption in executors. If an execu-
tor suffers the trust moneys to lie
idle, he is chargeable with simple
interest only. If he uses the funds
he is chargeable with compound
interest. Schiefflin v. Stewart, 1
Johns. Ch. 620; Clay v. Hart, 7
Dana, 17 ; Clarkson v. De Peyster,
1 Hopk. 425. As to duties of
trustees to keep trust funds sepa-
rate from their own, see Case v.
Abeel, 1 Paige, 403 ; Hart v. Ten
Eyck, 2 Johns. Ch. 10S. Where
township bonds were delivered by
a railroad company to one of its
directors to pay for depot build-
ings which he had erected and
agreed to convey, but did not do
so, the court held that he was a
trustee of the bonds, or if they had
been sold, of their proceeds for the
benefit of the railroad company.
Mich. Air Line Ky. Co. v. Mellen,
44 Mich. 321. So where a factor
sold the goods of his principal,
taking negotiable securities in
payment, and before these fell due
failed, and assigned the securities
to his assignee, for the benefit of
creditors, and the latter recovered
the money on them, the assignee
was held by the court to be the
trustee of the fund for the princi-
pal. Thompson v. Perkins, 3
Mason, 232. The owner of nego-
tiable securities stolen, and after-
wards sold by the thief, may follow
and claim the proceeds in the hands
of the felonious taker, or of his
assignees with notice, and this
right continues and attaches to
any securities or property in which
the proceeds are invested, so long
as they can be traced and identi-
fied, and the rights of a bona fide
purchaser do not intervene. The
law will raise a trust in invitum out
of the transaction in order that the
substituted property may be sub-
jected to the purposes of indemnity
and recompense. Newton v. Por-
ter, 69 N. Y. 133. In Wells, Fargo
& Co. v. Robinson, 13 Cal. 133, a
confidential agent having beea in-
trusted by his principal with money
to buy land, appropriated the
money to his own use and invested
it in bonds. After the death of the
agent, his administrator was held
to hold the bonds in trust for the
principal.
1 Tillman v. Divers, 31 Pa. St.
388
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 184.
purchaser has notice of the trust at the time of the pur-
chase, he becomes a trustee for the equitable owner, not-
withstanding he has paid the consideration ; and if the money
is converted into other property, the property will be sub-
ject to the trust as long as it can be traced.1 In Russell v.
Clarke, before the Supreme Court of the United States,
Chief Justice Marshall, in his opinion, said: "It is settled
in this court that the person for whose benefit a trust is
created, who is to be the ultimate receiver of the money,
42; Hopkins v. Duman, 42 N. H.
304; Thompson v. Wheatley, 5
Sined. & M. 499; McEachin v.
Stewart, 106 N. Car. 336 ; Winona &
St. P. R. R.v. St. Paul & S. C. R. R.,
26 Minn. 179; Griffin v. Blancher,
17 Cal. 70; Boyd v. Brineken, 55
Cal. 427; Sharpe v. Goodwin, 51
Cal. 219; Mercier v. Hemme, 50
Cal. 427; Russell v. Clark's Exrs.,
7 Cranch, 69; Siemon v. Schurck,
29 ]ST. Y. 598 ; Newton v. Porter,
69 N. Y. 133 ; Swinburne v. Swin-
burne, 28 N. Y. 568 ; Musham v.
Musham, 87 111. 80; Dotterer v.
Pike, 60 Ga. 29; Sbryock v. Wag-
goner, 28 Pa. St. 430; Church v.
Church, 25 Pa. St. 278; Boone v.
Cbiles, 10 Pet. 177; Lyford v.
Thurston, 16 N. H. 408; Stewart v.
Chadwick, 8 Iowa, 463; Paul v.
Fulton, 25 Mo. 156; McVey v.
Quality, 97 111. 93; Dey v. Dey, 26
N. J. Eq. 182; Viele v. Blodgett,
49 Vt. 270; Murray v. Ballou, 1
Johns. Ch. 566 ; Pbelps v. Jackson,
31 Ark. 272; Planters' Bank v.
Prater, 64 Ga. 609.
1 Murray v. Ballou, 1 Johns. Ch.
566; Hubbard v. Burrell, 41 Wis.
365 ; Burks v. Burks, 7 Baxt. 353 ;
Broyles v. Nowlin, 59 Term. 191 ;
Tillford v. Torrey, 53 Ala. 120;
Pindall v. Trevor, 30 Ark. 249;
Friedlander v. Johnson, 2 Woods
C. C. 675; McDonongh v. O'Neill,
113 Mass. 92; Tracy v. Kelly, 52
Ind. 535; Cookson v. Richardson
69 111. 137; Dodge v. Cole, 97 III
338; Derry v. Derry, 74 Ind. 560
Wells v. Robinson, 13 Cal. 133, 140
Lathrop v. Bampton, 31 Cal. 17
Schlaeffer v. Corson, 52 Barb. 510
Hastings v. Drew, 76 N. Y. 9, 16
Bartlett v. Drew, 57 N. Y, 587
Holden v. N. & Erie Bank, 72
N. Y. 286; Taylor v. Mosely, 57
Miss. 544 ; Mich., etc. R. R. v. Mel-
len, 44 Mich. 321 ; Murray v. Lyl-
burn, 2 Johns. Ch. 441,443; Boyd
v. McLean, 1 Johns. Ch. 5S2; Bar-
rett v. Bamber, 81 Pa. St. 247;
Newton v. Taylor, 32 Ohio, 399;
Duncan, v. Jandon, 15 Wall. 165;
Thompson v. Perkins, 3 Mason,
232; Matthews v. Heywood, 2 S.
Car. 239 ; Shelton v. Lewis, 27 Ark.
190; Shaw v. Spencer, 100 Mass.
382. The doctrine that persons
holding fiduciary relations are in-
competent to purchase the property
held by them in trust, "is not con-
fined to a particular class of per-
sons, such as guardians, trustees,
or solicitors, but is a rule of uni-
versal application to all persons
coming within the principle that
no party can be permitted to pur-
chase an interest where he has a
duty to perform inconsistent with
the character of a purchaser."
Md. Fire Ins. Co. v. Dalrymple, 25
Md. 243.
§ 185.] IMPLIED TRUSTS. 389
may sustain a suit in equity to have it paid directly to him-
self."1 In Dey v. Dey it was held that if a trustee commits
a breach of trust in the assignment of a bond and mortgage,
and the assignee is a party to the breach of trust, or if there
is any fraud or collusion between them ; or if the assignee
knows, or is sufficiently informed when he accepts the bond
and mortgage, that the trustee has in contemplation a breach
of trust and intends to misapply the money, the assignee
will be decreed to have taken the bond and mortgage in
trust for the beneficiaries under the trust.2
§ 185. The Subject Continued. — It is well established
as a principle of equity, and the application is general,
that where a trustee becomes interested in any manner in
property which he holds in trust, and of which it is his
duty to dispose, the sale will be set aside. This principle
has a clear and comprehensive statement in the words of
Mr. Chancellor Kent, as follows : "It may be here observed,
as a general rule applicable to sales, that where a trustee
of any description, or any person acting as agent for
others, sells a trust estate and becomes himself interested,
either directly or indirectly, in the purchase, the cestui que
trust is entitled, as of course, in his election, to acquiesce
in the sale or to have the property re-exposed to sale, under
the direction of the court, and to be put up at the price
bid by the trustee ; and it makes no difference in the ap-
plication of the rule, that the sale was at public auction
bona fide and for a fair price. A person cannot act as
agent for another and become himself the buyer. He
cannot be both buyer and seller at the same time, or con-
1 Russell v. Clark, 7 Cranch, 97 ; Copeland v. Merc. Ins. Co., 6 Pick.
Whichcote v. Lawrence, 3 Ves. 740. 196 ; Reed v. Warner, 5 Paige, 650 ;
See also Quarles v. Lacey, 4 Muni. Prevost v. G-ratz, 1 Peter C. C.
251; McGuire v. McGowan, 4 367; s. c, 6 Wheat. 481; Monroe
Desaus. 486; Davis v. Simpson, 5 v. Allain, 2 Caines' Cas. 192; Mat-
Har. & J. 147; Wade v. Pettibone, thews v. Dragaud, 3 Desaus. 26.
11 Ohio, 57; Mills v. Goodsell, 5 2 Dey v. Dey, 26 ST. J. Eq. 182;
Conn. 475 ; Lovell v. Briggs, 2 K. Nichols v. Peak, 1 Beas. 69 ; Pen-
H. 218; Lees v. Nuttall, 1 Russ. & dleton v. Pay, 2 Paige, 202.
M. 53; s. c., 2 Myl. & R. 819;
390 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 185.
nect his own interest in his dealings as an agent or trustee
for another. It is incompatible with the fiduciary relation
emptor emit quam minimo potest, venditor vendit, quam
maximo potest. The rule is founded on the danger of im-
position and the presumption of the existence of fraud,
inaccessible to the eye of the court. The policy of the rule is
to shut the door against temptation, and which, in the cases
in which such a relationship exists, is deemed to be of itself
sufficient to create the disqualification. This principle,
like most others, may be subject to some qualification in
its application to particular cases, but as a general rule it
appears to be well settled in the English and in our Ameri-
can jurisprudence.1 It is to be borne in mind that cases in
1 4 Kent's Comm. (13th ed.) *438. Manf. Co., 12 Md. 383, 416; Gar-
See also Davoue v. Fanning, 2 then v. Myrick, 9 Md. 143; Kick-
Johns. Ch. 252; Perry v. Dixon, 4 etts v. Montgomery, 15 Md. 46, 51;
Desaus. Eq. 504; Scott v. Freeland, Beeson v. Beeson, 9 Barr, 279, 284;
7 Sm. & M. 409; Boyd v. Hawkins, Abbott v. American Co., 33 Barb.
2 Dev. Eq. 207 ; Davis v. Simpson, 578 ; Forbes v. Halsey, 26 N". Y. 53 ;
5Harr. & J. 147; Ex parte Wig- Martin v. Wynkoop, 12 Ind. 266;
gins, 1 Hill (S. Car.) Ch. 354; But- Roberts v. Butler, 24 111. 387; Col-
ler v. Haskell, 4 Desaus. 654; Les- lins v. Smith, 1 Head, 251, 257;
see of Lazarus v. Bryson, 3 Binn. Salle v. Graft, 7 Rich. Eq. 34; Mul-
54; Campbell v. Penn. L. Ins. Co., ford v. Bowman, 1 Stockt. 797;
2 Whart. 53 ; Brackenridge v. Hoi- Hoitt v. Webb, 36 N. H. 158;
land, 2 Blackf . 377 ; Armstrong v. Torrey v. Bank of Orleans, 9
Huston, 8 Ohio, 552; Bohart v. At- Paige, 650; Van Epps v. Van
kinson, 14 Ohio, 228; Thorp v. Mc- Epps, 9 Paige, 238, 241; Cram v.
Cullum, lGilm. 614; Mills v. Good- Mitchell, 1 Sandf. 251, 256; Dob-
sell, 5 Conn. 475; Gardner v. Og- son v. Racey, 3 Sandf. 61; Voor-
den, 22 N. Y. 327; Cumberland Co. hees v. Presbyterian Church, 8
v. Sherman, 30 Barb. 553; Hoffman Barb. 136, 142; Ames v. Port
Co. v. Cumberland Co., 16 Md. Huron Co., 11 Mich. 39; Huston v.
456; Moore v.Mandlebaum, 8 Mich. Cassidy, 2 Beas. 228; Calverv. Cal-
433; Stewart v. Rutherford, 4 ver, 3 Stockt. 215; Fawcettv. Faw-
Jones (X. Car.), 483; Bellamy v. cett, 1 Bush, 511; Leisenring v.
Bellamy, 6 Fla. 62, 115; Price Black, 5 Watts, 303, 304; Shelton
v. Evans, 26 Mo. 30 ; Charles v. v. Homer, 5 Mete. 462, 467 ; Cald-
Dubose, 29 Ala. 367; Wiswall v. well v. Sigourney, 19 Conn. 37, 51;
Stewart, 32 Ala. 433; Michoud v. Wormley v. Wormley, 8 Wheat.
Girod, 4 How. 503, 556 ; Hawley v. 422, 441 ; Jewett v. Miller, 10 X. Y.
James, 5 Paige, 318; Morgan v. 402; Brothers v. Brothers, 7 Ired.
Boone, 4 Mon. 297; Reed v. Nor- 150; Saltmarsh v. Beene, 4 Port.
ris, 2 Myl. & Cr. 361 ; Scott v. Tyler, 283; Sloo v. Law, 3 Blatch. 459;
Dickens, 725; Keighler v. Savage Burton v. Wooley, 6 Madd. 367.
§ 185.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
391
which a trustee has become interested, in a pecuniary
sense, in the sale of property which he has sold as a trustee,
the sale, though voidable, is not absolutely void, and that
the beneficiary or equitable owner must seek a remedy
within a reasonable time.1 What will be deemed a reason-
Where a person stands in the situ-
ation of a trustee for others, and
bound as such to protect the gen-
eral interests of those for whose
benefit the trust was created, in re-
gard to the subject of the sale, he
is equally incapacitated from pur-
chasing for his own benefit, at a
sale under an adverse proceeding,
and at a judicial sale, as at his own
sale, under his powers as trustee.
Ricketts v. Montgomery, 15 Md. 46 ;
Freeman v. Harwood, 49 Me. 195;
Elliott v. Poole, 3 Jones Eq. 17 ;
Chandler v. Moulton, 33 Vt. 245;
Jewitt v. Miller, 10 N. Y. 402 ; Hoitt
V. Webb, 36 N. H. 159 ; Martin v.
Wyncoop, 12 Ind. 266 ; Jamison v.
Glasscock, 29 Mo. 191. So an agent,
trustee or other person, holding a
fiduciary relation, who is under a
disability to buy for himself, can-
not buy for another. Martin v.
Wyncoop, 12 Ind. 266; Bracken-
ridge v. Holland, 2 Blackf. 377;
Renick v. Butterfield, 11 Poster,
70; The Cumberland Coal Co. v.
Sherman, 30 Barb. 553. Nor can he
acquire title through a, purchase,
made by another for his benefit.
Abbott v. American Ins. Co., 33
Barb. 278; Forbes v. Halsey, 26 ST.
Y. 53. "Where one, by parol,
agrees to procure a lease for him-
self and others, and procures that
lease in his own name, he is a
trustee for those for whom lie
agreed to act and the statute has
no application." Hargrave v.
King, 5 Ired. Eq. 430. See also
Clominger v. Summilt, 2 Jones
Eq. 513; Lees v. Nuttall, 1 Russ. &
Myl. 53; Taylor v. Salmon, 4 Myl.
& Cr. 134; Jenkins v. Eldridge,
Story, 181, 293. "It" [the rule
that a purchase by a trustee for
sale from his cestui que trust, al-
though he may have given an ad-
equate price, and gained no ad-
vantage, shall be set aside at the
option of the cestui que trust, un-
less the connection between them
most satisfactorily appears to have
been dissolved, and unless all
knowledge of the value of the
property acquired by the trustee
has been communicated to his ces-
tui que trust] "is founded upon
this : that though you may sec, in
a particular case, that the trustee
has not made advantage, it is ut-
terly impossible to examine upon
satisfactory evidence, in the power
of the court, by which I mean in
the power of the parties, in ninety -
nine cases out of a hundred,
whether he has made an advantage
or not. Suppose a trustee buys an
estate, and, by the knowledge ac-
quired in that character, discovers
a valuable coal mine under it, and,
locking that up in his own breast,
enters into a contract with the
cestui que trust; if he chooses to
deny it, how can the court try that
against that denial? The proba-
bility is, that a trustee who has
once conceived such a purpose
will never disclose it, and the cestui
que trust will be effectually de-
frauded." Lord Eldon in Ex parte
Lacey, 6 Ves. 627.
1 Prevost v. Gratz, 1 Peters C.
C. 268; Harrington v. Brown, 5
392
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 185.
able time has not been definitely determined, but in each case
it depends upon the circumstances and the discretion of the
Pick. 519 ; Denn v. McKnight, 6
Halst. 585; Wilson v. Troup, 2
Cowen, 196 ; s. c, 7 Johns. Ch. 25 ;
Jackson v. Woolsey, 11 Johns.
446; Gallatin v. Cunningham, 8
Cowen, 361 ; Hawley v. Cramer, 4
Cowen, 718; Hayward v. Ellis, 13
Pick. 276; Ball v. Carew, 13 Pick.
28; Wbiehcote v. Lawrence, 3 Ves.
740; Thorpe v. Cullen, 1 Gilm,
615, 627; Baldwin v. Allison, 4
Minn. 25; Ives v. Ashley, 97 Mass.
198; Doe v. Henry, 3 Ind. 104;
McClure v. Miller, 1 Bail. Ch. 107;
Lister v. Lister, 6 Ves. 631 ; Ex
parte Reynolds, 5 Ves. 707; San-
derson v. Walker, 13 Ves. 603;
Larco v. Casaneuava, 30 Cal. 560;
Graves v. Waterman, 63 N. Y. 657 ;
Brucn v. Lantz, 2 Kawle, 392;
Wright v. Smith, 23 X. J. Eq. 106;
Julian v. Reynolds, 8 Ala. 680;
Lyon v. Lyon, 8 Ired. Eq. 201 ;
Randall v. Errington, 10 Ves. 423.
No one but the cestuis que trust,
that is, the persons interested in
the property or in the sale of it,
can apply to be relieved against
the purchase by the trustees; and
a stranger cannot avoid the sale.
Jackson v. Van Dolfsen, 5 Johns. 43,
48 ; Jackson v. Walsh, 14 Johns. 407,
415 ; Wilson v. Troup, 2 Cowen, 196,
238; Hawley v. Cramer, 4 Cowen,
719, 744; Rice v. Cleghorn, 21 Ind.
80; Remick v. Butterfield, 11 Fos-
ter, 70, 89; Lathrop v. Wightman,
5 Wright, 297. Acquiescence for a
long time in an improper sale will
disable a person from coming into
a court of equity to set it aside.
Morse v. Royal, 12 Ves. 355;
Campbell v. Walker, 5 Ves. 681;
Champion v. Rigby, 1 Russ. & Myl.
539; Roberts v. Tunstall, 4 Hare,
251; Beaden v. King, 9 Hare,
499, 532; Baker v. Read, 18 Beav.
398; Marquis of Clanricarde v.
Henning, 30 Beav. 175 ; Seagram
v. Knight, L. R. 3 Eq. 398; In re
McKenna's Estate, 13 Ir. Ch. Rep.
239. The cestui que trust must ap-
ply to chancery within a reason-
able time after he has knowledge
of the facts which impeach the
sale, or he will be presumed to
have acquiesced ; such reasonable
time depends upon the circum-
stances of the case and the sound
discretion of the court. Wade v.
Pettibone, 11 Ohio, 57; s. c, 14
Ohio, 557. See on question of
length of time Bergen v. Bennett,
1 Caines' Cas. 1, 20; Hawley v.
Cramer, 4 Cowen, 719, 743; Dob-
son v. Racey, 3 Sandf . 61 ; John-
son v. Bennett, 39 Barb. 237; Bell
v. Webb, 2 Gill, 164, 170; Ward v.
Smith, 3 Sandf. 592, 596; Robinson
v. Hook, 4 Mason, 151 ; Kenton v.
Kenton, 20 Mo. 530; Pipher v.
Lodge, 4 Serg. & R. 315; Miller v.
Mitchell, 1 Bailey, 437 ; Bacon v.
Chiles, 10 Pet. 223 ; Baker v. Whit-
ing, 3 Suinn. 486 ; Ashurst's Ap-
peal, 10 P. F. Smith (Perm.), 290,
316; Jordan v. Money, 5 H. L.
Cas. 185. There is no absolute
rule as to the time and circum-
stances which operate to shorten or
extend the time. Lafferty v. Tur-
ley, 3 Sneed, 157; Obert v. Obert,
2 Stockt. Ch. 98; s. c, 1 Beas. 423.
And in considering lapse of time
it only commences to run from the
discovery of the circumstances
giving the title to relief. Trevel-
yan v. Charter, 9 Beav. 140; S. C,
L. J. 4 Ch. (N. S.) 209; The Mar-
quis of Clanricarde v. Henning, 30
Beav. 175. "To fix acquiescence
upon a party it should unequivo-
§ 185.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
393
court. In one case eleven years were held to be a reason-
able time.1 In another instance relief was denied after
<jally appear that he knew the fact
upon which the supposed acqui-
escence is founded, and to which
it refers." Sir Wm. Grant, M. E.,
in Kandall v. Errington, 10 Ves.
428. See also Chalmer v. Bradley,
1 Jac. & W. 51 ; Trevelyan v. Char-
ter, 9 Beav. 140 ; Savery v. King, 5
H. L. Cas. 624,667; Whichcote
v. Lawrence, 3 Ves. 740; Lessee of
Lazarus v. Bryson, 3 Binn. 54, 58;
Painter v. Henderson, 7 Barr, 48,
50; Beeson v. Beeson, 9 Barr, 279;
Jennison v. Hapgood, 7 Pick. 1;
S. c, 10 Pick. 77; Kennick v. But-
terfield, 11 Foster, 70, 89 ; Mussel-
man v. Eshelman, 10 Barr, 394;
Scott v. Freeland, 7 Sm. & M. 410,
419,420; Field v. Arrowsmith, 3
Humph. 442, 446 ; Moore v. Hilton,
12 Leigh, 2, 28; Hoffman v. Cum-
berland Coal Co., 16 Md. 456; An-
drews v. Holson, 25 Ala. 219;
Bicketts v. Montgomery, 15 Md.
46; Minford v. Mench, 3Stockt. 15.
Where property has been resold to
bonafide purchasers without notice
the original sale cannot be set
aside, and remedy will only be
personal against trustee for an ac-
count of profit, if he made any.
Lessee of Lazarus v. Bryson, 3
Binn. 54; Jackson v. Walsh, 14
Johns. 407; Hawley v. Cramer, 3
Cowen, 719, 744; Bobbins v. Bates,
4Cush. 104. A cestui que trust may
confirm an invalid sale, so that he
cannot afterwards have set it aside.
Morse v. Palmer, 12 Ves. 353 ; Do-
ver v. Buck, 5 Giff. 57; Roche v.
O'Brien, 1 Ball & B. 353. In order
to constitute a valid confirmation,
a person must be aware that the
act he is doing will have the effect
of confirming an impeachable
transaction. Adams v. Clifton, 1
Buss. 297; Murray v. Palmer, 2 S.
& L. 486; Dunbar v. Tredennick,
2 Ball &B. 317; Lydon v. Moss, 4
De G. & J. 104; Lloyd v. Atwood,
3 De G. & J. 650 ; Waters v. Thorn,
22 Beav. 547 ; Stump v. Gaby, 2 De
G., M. & G. 623; Salmon v. Cutts,
4 De G. & Sm. 129; Molony v.
L'Estrange, 1 Beat. 413 ; Cockrell v.
Cholmeley, 1 Buss. & Myl. 425.
The act of confirmation must be
free from coercion. Crowe v. Bal-
lard, 3 Bro. Ch. 139; Woods v.
Downes, 18 Ves. 128; Roberts v.
Tunstall, 4 Hare, 257; Boche v.
O'Brien, 1 Ball & B. 330. Good
faith is the paramount and vital
principle of the law governing the
relation of principal and factor,
the latter cannot purchase for him-
self the property of his principal
consigned to him for sale to others,
except with the knowledge, con-
sent and approbation of the prin-
cipal, upon a free, full and frank
disclosure of every circumstance
connected with the transaction,
and a total absence of all fraud
and concealment. Keighlerv. Sav-
age Manf. Co., 12 Md. 3S3. The
mortgagee of a chattel may, it
seems, purchase at public sale and
hold it for his own benefit and free
from any equity of redemption.
If otherwise, the purchase is good
at law, and is in equity not void, but
voidable only at the election of the
mortgagor. The purchase cannot
be impeached in a suit to which
the mortgagor is not a party. 01-
cott v. Tioga E. E. Co., 27 N". Y.
546.
1 Butler v. Haskell, 4 Desaus.
702. See also Crow v. Ballard, 1
Ves. Jr. 220; s. C, 3 Bro. Ch. 117;
Deloraine v. Browne, 3 Bro. Ch.
394 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 18(5.
sixteen years.1 But length of time will in no case afford a
presumption of acquiescence in a sale unless it appears that
the beneficiary has had notice that the trustee was the pur-
chaser.2
§ 186. Rule not Applicable to Dry Trustee. — Where a
trustee is appointed, not to sell the property, but to pre-
serve contingent remainders and to pay the rents and profits
to the beneficiary, the rule in regard- to the purchase of
trust property by trustee is held not to apply.3 The rigid
rule is that a trustee shall not profit by any transaction in
which he may be engaged relating to trust funds. It would
seem to follow, then, that where there is no opportunity
to promote his own interest by the sale he is . under no
temptation to be guilty of fraud, and, in consequence,
should not be forbidden to purchase. The necessity of
modifying this rule was recognized by Lord Chancellor
Eldon, in Coles v. Trecothick, where, in his opinion, he
says: "Where there is a trustee, made so under such an
instrument as this, the whole execution of the trust de-
volved upon the cestui que trust, and he takes all upon him-
self, with the auctioneer, if not chosen, at least approved
by him; makes surveys, settles the plans, modes of sale
and prices, and, therefore, has all knowledge, what is the
proper price. If any case can exist for relaxing the rule by
633; Pickett v. Loggon, 14 Ves. 4 Munf . 251 ; McGuire v. McGowan,
214; Murray v. Palmer, 2 Sch. & 4 Desaus. 486: Currier v. Green, 2
Lef. 474. N. H. 225; Lovell v. Briggs, 2 N.
1 Bergen v. Bennett, 1 Caines' H. 218; Ex parte Wiggins, 1 Hill
Cas. 1. "What shall be termed a Eq. 354; Braokenridge v. Holland,
reasonable time is not susceptible 2 Blackf. 377; Lazarus v. Bryson,
of a definite rule, but must, in a 3 Binn. 54; Eichelberger v. Bar-
degree, depend upon the circum- nitz, 1 Yeates, 307; Hawley v.
stances of the particular case, and Martins, 7 Johns. Ch. 174; Camp-
be guided by sound discretion in bell v. Penn. Life Ins. Co., 2
the court." Ibid. 19. Whart. 53.
2 Prevost v. Gratz, 1 Pet. C. C. 3 Parker v. White, 11 Ves. 209,
370; Van Epps v. Van Epps, 9 226; Campbell v. Walker, 5 Ves.
Paige, 237; Scott v. Davis, 4 Myl. 678; Pooley v. Quilter, 4 Drew.
& Cr. 87; Schieffelin v. Stewart, 1 1S9; Sutton v. Jones, 15 Ves. 587;
Johns. Ch. 620; Quarles v. Lacy, Naylor v. Winch, 1 S. & S. 567.
§ 186.] IMPLIED TRUSTS. 395
consent of the parties, this is that case."1 At a later period
a more positive position was taken by the English courts.
In Pooley v. Quilter, Vice Chancellor Sir Richard Torin
Kindersley, in his opinion, said: "The naked rule that a
trustee can, under no circumstance, purchase from his cestui
que trust, cannot be maintained. Take the case of a trustee to
preserve contingent remainders ; he may clearly purchase.
So, if an estate is vested in A in fee in trust for B in fee, it
is quite obvious that B may sell to A. A solicitor is not
absolutely precluded from purchasing from a client, but in
such a case the court looks at the transaction with great
jealousy. Perhaps the strongest case that could be put
for applying the naked rule would be that of assignees,
because they have the greatest means of knowledge in
dealing with the creditors, and of availing themselves of their
position as trustees or assignees. But still, where the
creditor, or the party dealing with the assignee, is adult,
where no undue influence has been exercised, there is no
reason why a creditor may not deal with an assignee, or
why, in other words, an assignee is disqualified from deal-
ing with a creditor."2 It appears that a mortgagee may
purchase of the mortgagor under a foreclosure sale, but if
the mortgage contain a power of sale the mortgagee becomes
a trustee of the power of sale for the mortgagor, and in
that case neither he nor his agents, auctioneers or attorneys
can purchase, either for themselves or for others. The
result of such a purchase would be to make them con-
structive trustees.3 The pledgee of stock cannot be a
1 Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 234, Robinson v. Cullom, 41 Ala. 693;
248; Munroev. Allaire, 2 Caines' Wall v. Town, 45 111. 493; Dobson
Cas. 183; Salmon v. Cutts, 4 De v. Kacey, 4 Seld. 216; Waters v.
6. & Sin. 131. Groom, 11 CI. & Fin. 684; Mapps
2 Pooley v. Quilter, 4 Drew. 189. v. Sharpe, 32 111. 13; Murray v.
s Iddings v. Bruen, 4 Sandf. Ch. Vanderbilt, 39 Barb. 140 ; Blackley
223 ; Murdock's Case, 2 Bland, 461 ; v. Fowler, 31 Cal. 326; Olcott v.
Knight v. Majoribanks, 2 Mao. & Tioga K. R. Co., 27 N. Y. 546;
G. 10; s. c, 2 Hall & T. 308; Elliott v. Wood, 53 Barb. 285;
Rhodes v. Sanderson, 36 Cal. 414; Thornton v. Irwin, 43 Mo. 153;
Montague v. Dawes, 14 Allen, 369; Bailey v. Mtns, Ins. Co., 10 Allen,
Allen v. Chatfield, 3 Minn. 435; 350; Fowle v. Merrill, 10 Allen,
396
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 187.
purchaser even at a broker's board.1 Where a beneficiary
devises property to his trustee there is no presumption
against the act.2 A cestui que trust may purchase the trust
property or other property of the trustee, and as against
the trustee the purchase will be held good.3 But a sale to
a beneficiary, in which an investment of the trust fund is
involved, or any transaction in regard to it, may be set
aside at the petition of the beneficiary.4
§ 187. From Renewal of Lease. — Where a lease is
among the interests of a trust estate, and a trustee takes a
renewal in his own name, he will be held as a constructive
350; Smith v. Provin, 4 Allen, 516;
Woodlee v. Burch, 43 Mo. 231;
Dyer v. Shurtleff, 112 Mass. 165;
Scott v. Mann, 33 Tex. 721 ; Imbo-
den v. Atkinson, 23 Ark. 622; Var-
nnra v. Meserve, 8 Allen, 158;
Beatty v. Clark, 20 Cal. 11 ; Kowon
v. Lamb, 4 Green, 468. A trustee
may buy the equity of redemption
in property on which he holds a
mortgage as trustee. Eldredge v.
Smith, 5 Shaw, 484; Britton v.
Lewis, 8 Rich. Eq. 271. The power
of sale is a power coupled with an
interest, and is irrevocable, and
can be executed after the death of
the mortgagor. Varnum v. Mes-
erve, 8 Allen, 158; Harnehall v.
Orndorff, 35 Md. 340; Capron v.
Attleboro Bank, 11 Gray, 492. A
second mortgagee may purchase
under a power of sale contained in
a prior mortgage. Parkinson v.
Hanbury, 1 Dr. & Sm. 143; s. C,
2 De G., J. & S. 455 ; Shaw v. Bun-
ney, L. J. 34 Ch. 257; 11 Jur. (ST.
S.) 99; 2 De G., J. & S. 468; Kirk-
wood v. Thompson, 11 Jur. (N. S.)
3S5; s. c, 2DeG., J. & S. 613. It
is stated in Woodlee v. Burch, 43
Mo. 231, that the administrator of
the mortgagee may purchase. Al-
though no trustee can himself
purchase, yet a plaintiff, creditor
or mortgagee, may purchase at a
sale made by a trustee; and the
purchase money, after deducting
all commissions, expenses and
costs, may be discounted from or
applied to the discharge of so
much of the debt, when adjusted,
then due to such purchaser. Mur-
dochs Case, 2 Bland, 461.
1 Maryland Ins. Co. v. Dalrym-
ple, 25 Md. 242; Baltimore Ins.
Co. v. Dalrymple, 25 Md. 269;
Byron v. Rayner, 25 Md. 424. As
to character of notice required, see
Roche v. Farnsworth, 106 Mass.
509; Dyer v. Shurtleff, 112 Mass.
165. Where land is devised to one
charged with the payment of an-
nuity to another for life, the dev-
isee does not stand in the position
of trustee for the annuitant, and
he may purchase the annuity.
Powell v. Murray, 2 Edw. 638.
2 Stump v. Gaby, 5 De G., M. &
G. 306; Hindson v. Wetherill, 5
De G., M. & G. 301. See also
Walter v. Thorn, 22 Beav. 547.
s Walker v. Brungard, 13 Sm. &
M. 723; Bank v. Macy, 4 Ind. 362.
4 McCants v. Bee, 1 McCord Ch.
(S. Car.) 382; Wade v. Harper, 3
Yerg. 4S3; Chester v. Greer, 5
Humph. 26; Paine v. Irwin, 16
Hun, 390.
§ 187. j
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
397
trustee for the beneficiary. In the leading case of Keech
v. Sanford, rendered famous as "The Rumford Market
Case," A being possessed of a lease of a market bequeathed
it to B in trust for an infant. B, before the expiration of
the term, applied to the lessor for a renewal for the bene-
fit of the infant. The lessor refused to grant such renewal,
whereupon B got a lease made to himself. It was held
that B was trustee of the lease for the infant, and must as-
sign the same to him and account for the profits, but that
he was entitled to be indemnified from the covenants con-
tained in the lease.1 The principle on which this decision
1 Keech v. Sandford, Sel. Cas. in
Ch. 61; s. c, White &Tud. Lead.
Cas. in Eq. *44. This case known
as the Bumford Market Case, is the
leading authority on the doctrine
of constructive trusts arising upon
the renewal of a lease by a trustee
or executor in his own name and
for his own benefit. Of it Chan-
cellor Kent, in Davoue v. Fanning,
2 Johns. Ch. 252, 258, says: "I
doubt whether we shall find the
rule and the policy of it laid down
with more clearness, strictness and
good sense. This decision has
never been questioned ; and that a
trust results on the renewal of an
infant's lease, has since been re-
garded as a familiar point." See
Fitzgibbon v. Scanlon, 1 Dow. 261,
269; Kawe v. Chichester, Amb.
715; s. C, IBro. Ch. 198n.;2Dick.
480; Pickering v. Vowles, 1 Bro.
Ch. 198; Pierson v. Shore, 1 Atk.
480;Nesbittv. Tredennick, 1 Ball
&B. 46; Abney v. Miller, 2 Atk.
597 ; Edwards v. Lewis, 3 Atk. 538 ;
Killick v. Flexney, 4 Bro. Ch. 161;
Moody v. Matthews, 7 Ves. 174;
James v. Dean, 11 Ves. 383 ; Parker
v. Brooke, 9 Ves. 583 ; Lovatt v.
Knipe, 12 Ir. Eq. 124; Kendall v.
Marsters, 2 De G., F. & J. 200;
McClanachan's Heirs v. Hender-
son, 2 A. K. Marsh. (Ky."> 388, 389;
Cox v. Cox, Peck, 443, 450. "Where
an executor or guardian renews a
lease, though with his own money,
such renewal shall be deemed to
be in trust for the person benefi-
cially interested in the old lease."
Galbraith v. Elder, 8 Watts, 81, 94.
"In chancery, the principle is one
never departed from, and is as
binding as any axiom of the com-
mon law; that he who takes upon
him a trust, takes it for the benefit of
him for whom he is intrusted, but not
to take any advantage for himself.
A trustee shall never be permitted
to raise in himself an interest op-
posite to that of his cestui que trust.
* * * If a trustee or executor
obtain the renewal of a term in
trust, such renewal shall be for the
benefit of the trust. Nor will the
circumstance of the lessor having
refused to renew to the cestui que
trust, he being an infant, differ the
case. There cannot well be a
stronger proof of the inflexibility of
the rule than this ; he may decline
to accept the lease ; but if he does,
though the lessor would not grant
the benefit to the infant, if his
trustee chooses to take it, it enures
to the benefit of the infant." Fisk v.
Sarber, 6 Watts & S. 18, 31, 35.
398 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 187.
was rendered is set forth by Lord Chancellor King in the
following words: "I must consider this as a trust for the
infant, for I very well see if a trustee, on the refusal to
renew, might have a lease to himself, few trust estates
would be renewed to cestui que use. Though I do not say
there is a fraud in this case, yet he [the trustee] should
rather have let it run out than to have had the lease to
himself. This may seem hard, that the trustee is the only
person of all mankind who might not have the lease ; but
it is very proper that the rule should be strictly pursued,
andnotinthe least relaxed; for it is very obvious what would
be the consequences of letting trustees have the lease on
refusal to renew to cestui que use."1 This doctrine has
been sustained in its entire length and breadth by the
American courts. In Davoue v. Fanning, Mr. Chancellor
Kent said, with reference to this case: "If we go through
all the cases I doubt whether we shall find the rule and the
policy of it laid down with more clearness, strictness and
good sense. This decision has never been questioned; and
that a trust results on the renewal of an infant's lease has
since been regarded as a familiar point."2 This rule is of
1 Keech v. Sandford, 1 Lead. Cas. 59 Cal. 119; King v. Cushman, 41
in Eq. *44. See also Kakestraw v. III. 31 ; Winkfield v. Brinkham, 21
Brewer, 2 P. Wrns. 511; Moody v. Kan. 682; Curry v. Curry (1888), 87
Matthews, 7 Ves. Jr. 174; Feather- Ky. 667; S. C, 9 S. W. Kep. 831;
stonebaugh v. Fenwick, 17 Ves. Leaehv. Leach, 18 Pick. 68; Grum-
298; Clements v. Hall, 2 De G. & ley v. Webb, 44 Mo. 444; IrWin v.
J. 173 ; Clegg v. Edmondson, 8 De Harris, 6 Ired. Eq. 221 ; Hudson v.
G., M. <fc G. 7S7; Clegg v. Fish- Wallace, 1 Kich. Eq. 1; Matthews v.
wick, 1 Macn. & G. 294; Baker v. Dragaud, 3 Desaus. 25; Galbraith
Whiting, 3 Sumn. 475; Mitchell v. v. Elder, 9 Watts, 81; Lacey v.
Reed, 61 N. Y. 123; Struthers v. Hale, 37 Pa. St. 360; Frank's Ap-
Pearce, 51 N". Y. 357; Bennett v. peal, 59 Pa. St. 190; Barnett v.
Van Syckle, 4 Duer, 462; Wood v. Bambes, 81 Pa. St. 247; Davoue v.
Perry, 1 Barb. 114; Gibbes v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. 252; Hol-
Jenckins, 3 Sand. Ch. 130; Dough- drige v. Gillespie, 2 Johns. Ch. 30;
erty v. Van Nostrand, 1 Hoff. Ch. Aspinwall v. Jones, 117 Mo. 209;
68 ; Armor v. Alexander, 10 Paige, Westfall v. Singleton, 1 Wash.
571; Phyfe v. Wardell, 5 Paige, (Va.) 227; Hodge v. Twitchell, 33
268 ; Everton v. Tappen, 5 Johns. Minn. 389 ; Beadle v. Beadle, 2 Mc-
Ch. 497; Van Home v. Fonda, 5 Crary Ch. 586.
Johns. Ch. 388, 407; Lafferv. Nag- 2 Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns,
lee, 9 Cal. 662;Gowerv. Andrew, Ch. 258.
§ 188. J
IMPLIED TKUSTS.
399
general application. It includes all persons holding a
partial interest in an estate, all joint tenants, or partners,
tenants for life, mortgagees and devisees charged with
debts, legacies or annuities.1 Where the trustee, executor
or other person sells the right to renew a lease, he must
account for the price received to the person holding the
beneficial interest. The agent of a trustee is subject to the
same rule.2 It has been held also that a trustee cannot
purchase property not included in the trust estate, if his
purchase will diminish the value of the fund of which he
is trustee.3 It is a well established principle of equity
that a trustee must not put himself in any position in
which his private and personal interests will conflict with
his duty to the beneficiary.4 This rule applies also to the
attorney of the trustee, and to any other third person who
conducts the business and shares the profits of it.5
§ 188. - From Illegal Acts of Executors and Adminis-
trators.— All persons acting as trustees or agents in the
1 Eawe v. Chichester, Amb. 719;
Coppin v. Fernyhough 2 Bro. Ch.
291; Eyre v. Dolphin, 2 Ball & B.
290; Foster v. Marriott, Amb. 668;
James v. Dean, 11 Yes. 383; s. C,
15 Ves. 236; Kempton v. Pack-
man, 7 Ves. 176 : Giddings v. Gid-
dings, 3 Buss. 241; Brookman v.
Hales, 2 V. & B. 45; Waters v.
Bailey, 2 Y. & C. Ch. 218; Tanner
v. Elworthy, 4 Beav. 487 ; Crop v.
Norton, 9 Mod. 233; Rushworth's
Case, Freem. 33 ; Xesbitt v. Treden-
nick, 1 B. & B. 46; Clegg v. Ed-
mondson,8De G., M. & G. 787;
Clegg v. Fishwick, 1 Macn. & G.
249, 299; Ex parte Grace, 1 Bos. &
P. 376; Featherstonehaughv. Fen-
wick, 17 Ves. 298; Palmer v.
Young, 1 Vern. 276; Winslow v.
Tighe, 2 Ball & B. 195; Webb v.
Lugar, 2 Y. & C. 247; Stubbs v.
Both, 2 Ball & B. 548; Be Totten-
ham, 16 Ired. Ch. 118.
2 Owens v. Williams, Amb. 734;
Edwards v. Lewis, 3 Atk. 538.
3 Prevost v. Gratz, 1 Pet. 66. 367;
S. C, 6 Wheat. 4S1; Hawley v.
Cramer, 4 Cow. 117; Edwards v.
Meyrick, 2 Hare, 60; Hamilton v.
Wright, 9 CI. & Fin. Ill; Fox v.
Mackreth, 2 Bro. Ch. 400; s. C, 1
Cos, 310; John v. Bennett, 39
Barb. 237; Handlin v. Davis, . 81
Ky. 34; Kent v. Chalfant, 7 Minn.
487 ; Rafferty v. Mallony, 3 Bissell,
362. See also Froneberger v. Lewis,
79 N". Car. 426.
4 Chesterfield v. Jansen, 2 Yes.
138; Ex parte Lacy, 6 Yes. 625;
Campbell v. Walker, 5 Yes. 678;
s. c, 13 Ves. 138; Cane v. Allen,
2 Dow. 289; Slade v. Van Vechten,
11 Paige, 21; Michoud v. Girod,
4 How. 503; Dobson v. Racey, 3
Sandf. 51; Morse v. Royal, 12 Yes.
355; Ex parte James, 8 Yes. 337
Ex parte Bennett, 10 Ves. 3S1
Saagar v. Wilson, 4 S. & W. 102
Nelson v. Hayner, 66 111. 487.
5 Cox v. John, 32 Ohio St. 532.
400
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 188.
settlement of estates are held by courts of equity to a very
rigid accountability in the discharge of their fiduciary obli-
gations. It is well established that all persons sustaining
this relation are absolutely prohibited from purchasing at
any sale of property with which they have been intrusted,
and what they cannot do directly they are not permitted to
do through a third person.1 This rule is so rigidly en-
1 Paul v. Squibb, 12 Pa. St. 296;
Davone v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch.
252; Tiffany v. Clark, 1 N. Y.
Sup. Ct. Add. 9; Smith v. Drake,
23 N. J. Eq. 302; Kruse v. Stevens,
47 111. 112; Miles v. Wheeler, 43
111. 123; Forbes v. Halsey, 26 N.
Y. 53; Hunt v. Bass, 2 Dev. Eq.
292; Buckles v. Lafferty, 2 Bob.
292; Beaubien v. Poupard, Harr.
Ch. 206 ; Hawley v. Cramer, 4 Cow.
717; Woodruff v. Cook, 2 Edw.
Ch. 259. To render a person re-
ceiving, at the request of an ad-
ministrator, money belonging to
the estate, in satisfaction of a per-
sonal debt of the administrator, a
trustee for the estate, it is neces-
sary that the administrator should
be in default to the estate. Gray
v. Farmers' Exch. Bank (1894),
105 Cal. 60; S. C, 38 Pac.Kep.519.
An' executor, authorized to pur-
chase real estate for investment
under the directions of the will of
his testator, cannot sell his own
land to himself as executor, for
such a purpose. It is inconsistent
with the faithful execution of his
trust that J C should sell property
belonging to himself as an individ-
ual to J C as an executor. Such
sale may be affirmed, or disaf-
firmed,, by the cestui que trust; or
if he is an infant, then the court,
when the question is directly or
indirectly presented, will deal with
the conveyances as it shall consider
best and most advantageous for the
infant. Holcomb v. Exr. of Hol-
comb, 3 Stockt. 281. An executor
shall not be permitted either im-
mediately or by means of a trustee,
to be the purchaser from himself
of any part of the assets but shall
be considered a trustee for the per-
sons interested in the estate, and
shall account for the utmost extent
of advantage made by him of the
subject so purchased. Hall v. Hal-
lett, 1 Cox, 134. The recognition
of this principle is not limited to
the courts of England and of the
United States. It is distinctly set
forth by Mr. Kobert Joseph
Potheir, the famous French jurist,
whose name has greater weight
both in this country and in Great
Britain than that of any other for-
eign authority. His view is quoted
with approval by Mr. Justice
Wayne, as follows: "Nous ne
pouvons acheter, ni par nous-memes,
ni par personnes interposees, les
choses que font partie des biens dont
nous avons V administration; ainsi un
tuteur ne peut acheter les choses qui
appartiennent a son mineur; un ad-
ministrateur ne peut acheter aucune
chose de Men dont il a V 'administra-
tion." Tr. du Gontrat de Vente,
part 1, n. 13. Touching the uni-
versal application of this rule the
same writer continues as follows:
"The rule of the civil law, without
qualification, is adopted in the
codes of Holland. Quae vero de
tutoribus cauta, ea quoque in cura-
toribus, procuratoribus , testamento-
rum ezecutoribus, aliisque similibus%
§ 188.J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
401
forced that where the estate which they hold in trust, or
any part of it, is exposed for sale, even though it be by
order of the court and at public auction, they are not per-
mitted to purchase, and though the estate, or any portion
of it, is seized by a creditor and sold at auction, an executor
or administrator cannot be a bidder. In the famous case of
Michoud v. Girod, before the Supreme Court of the United
States, it was held that a person cannot legally purchase,
on his own account, that which his duty or trust requires
him to sell on account of another, nor purchase on account
of another that which he sells on his own account. He is
not allowed to unite the two opposite characters of buyer
and seller. This rule applies to a purchase by executors at
open sale, although thejr were employed by the will to sell
the estate of their testator, for the benefit of heirs and lega-
tees, a part of which heirs and legatees they themselves
were. A purchase so made by executors will be set aside.1
qui aliena gerunt negotia, probanda
sunt." Voet., Lib. 18, tit. l,n. 9; 2
Burges' Comm. 463. In Spain, the
rule was enforced without relaxa-
tion and with stern uniformity.
Judge MeCaleb cites in his opinion
from the Novissima Recopilacion,
the rule in the following words :
"5To man, who is testamentary
executor or guardian of minors,
nor any other man or woman, can
purchase the property which they
administer, and whether they pur-
chase publicly or privately the act
is invalid, and on proof being made
of the fact, the sale must be set
aside." Michoud v. Girod, 4 How.
560.
1 Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 503;
Huson v. Wallace, 1 Rich. Eq. 2,
4, 7; Holcomb v. Holcomb, 3
Stockt. 281 ; Davoue v. Fanning, 2
Johns. Ch. 252; Rogers v. Rogers,
1 Hopk. Ch. 515; Ward v. Smith, 3
Sandf. 592, 596; Harrington v.
Brown, 5 Pick. 519, 521; Litchfield
v. Cudworth, 15 Pick. 24, 31 ; Shel-
20
ton v. Homer, 5 Mete. 462, 467;
Fleming v. Faron, 12 Ga. 544;
Lessee of Moody v. Van Dyke, 4
Binn. 31, 43; Painter v. Henderson,
7 Barr, 48, 50; Musselman v. Esh-
elman, 10 Barr, 394; Beeson v.
Beeson, 9 Barr, 279; Hoit v. Webb,
36 ST. H. 158; Remich v. Rutter-
field, 11 Foster, 70; Skillman v.
Skillman, 2 Iowa, 3S8; Howell v.
Silving, 1 McCarter, 84 ; Joyner v.
Conyers, 6 Jones Eq. 7S; Calloway
v. Gilmer, 36 Ala. 354; Doe v.
Harvey, 3 Ind. 104; Scott v. Gam-
ble, 1 Stockt. Ch. 235; Mulford v.
Bowen, 1 Stockt. Ch. 797; Thorp
v. McCullum, 1 Gilm. 615, 625;
Cox v. Cox. Peck, 443, 450; Brack-
enridge v. Holland, 2 Blackf . 377,
380; Gordon v. Finlay, 3 Hawks,
239, 242; Ryden v. Jones, 1 Hawks,
477, 504; Davis v. Simpson, 5Harr.
& J. 147; Den v. McKnight, 6
Halst. 385; Den v. Wright, 2 Halst.
175; Obert v. Hammill, 3 Harr. 74,
81 ; Arrowsmith v. Van Harlinger's
Exrs., Coxe, 26; Green v. Ser-
402 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 188.
In his comments on this rule Mr. Justice Wayne said : "In
New York there has been no relaxation of it since the de-
cision in the case of Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. 252.
It is a critical and able review of the doctrine as it had been
applied by the English courts of chancery from an early
day, and has been received, with very few exceptions, by
our State chancery courts as altogether putting the rule
upon its proper footing. Indeed, it is not too much to say
that it has secured the triumph of the rule over all qualifi-
cations and relaxations of it in the United States, to the
same extent that had been achieved for it in England by
that great chancellor, Lord Elclon. Davoue v. Fanning
was the case of an executor for whose wife a purchase had
been made by one Hedden, at public auction, bona fide,, for
a fair price, of a part of the estate which Fanning admin-
istered, and the prayer of the bill was that the purchase
might be set aside and the premises resold. The case was
examined with a special reference to the right of an executor
to buy any part of the estate of his testator, and it was
affirmed, and we think rightly, that if a trustee, or person
acting for others, sells the trust estate and becomes himself
interested in the purchase, the centuis que trust are entitled,
as of course, to have the purchase set aside and the prop-
erty re-exposed to sale under the direction of the court, and
it makes no difference in the application of the rule that a
sale was at public auction, bona fide, and for a fair price,
and that the executor did not purchase for himself, but that
a third person, by previous arrangement with the executor,
became the purchaser, to hold in trust for the separate use
and benefit of the wife of the executor, who was one of the
geant, 23 Vt. 46G; Johnson v. 545; Leitch v. Wells, 48 Barb. 637;
Blaekman, 11 Conn. 343, 347; Shu- Dundas' Appeal, 14 P. F. Smith,
man's Appeal, 3 Casey, 64; Price 325,332. The same principle ap-
v. Gamble, 1 Stockt. 218; Price v. plies to the agent of the executor
Morris, 5 McLean, 4; Green v. or administrator. It also applies
Blair, 9 Wis. 352. A sale even to a to guardians. Scott v. Freeland,
near relative will be closely scruti- 7 Sin. & M. 410, 418; Patton v.
nized and if not entire fair and Thompson, 2 Jones Eq. 285; Beal
adequate will be set aside. Ober- v. Harmon, 38 Mo. 435; Broyles v.
lin College v. Fowler, 10 Allen, Novvlin, 59 Tenn. 191.
§ 189.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
403
cestuis que trust, and who had an interest in the land under
the will of the testator. The inquiry, in such a case, is not
whether there was or was not fraud in fact. The purchase
is void and will be set aside at the instance of the cestui que
tmst, and a resale ordered, on the ground of the temptation
to abuse, and of the danger of imposition inaccessible to
the eye of the court.1
§ 189. The Subject Continued. — To such an extent is
the rule carried that where an executor united with the
widow of decedent in a purchase of a portion of the estate,
the purchase was held invalid.2 Under a power to sell,
with no directions in regard to the manner of its execution,
a parol sale by two of three executors, subsequently ratified
by a third, is held to be valid, and where a stranger pur-
chases at such sale an executor may become a purchaser
from him, provided there is no mala fides in the original
sale.3 Where there is any evidence of fraud on the part of
1 Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 503,
556; Humphreys v. Burleson, 72
Ala. 1 ; Newhall v. Jones, 117 Mass.
252; Morgan v. Wattles, 69 Ind.
260; McGaughey v. Brown, 46 Ark.
25; Ives v. Ashley, 97 Mass. 198;
White v. Moss, 67 Ga. 89 ; Jones v.
Graham, 36 Ark. 383; Taylor v.
Brown, 55 Mich. 482; Meek v.
Perry, 36 Miss. 190; Hunter v.
Lawrence, 11 Gratt. Ill; Kepler v.
Davis, 80 Pa. St. 153; Habris v.
Carstarphen, 69 N. Car. 416; Smith
v. Davis, 49 Md. 470; Manson v.
Felton, 13 Pick. 206; Fleming v.
■ Teran, 12 Ga. 394; Spindler v. At-
kinson, 3 Md. 410; "Wyncoop v.
Wyncoop, 12 Ind. 206. A contrary
rule was held in Prevost v. Gratz,
1 Pet. C. C. 364; Fisk v. Sarber, 6
Watts & S. 18; Campbell v. John-
son, 1 Sandf. Ch. 148; Bank of
Orleans, 7 Hill, 260. If a person
procures himself to be appointed
administrator of an estate, and at a
sale of the property of the estate
purchases the same through a third
person, who pays no money, and
agrees to hold the title for the ad-
ministrator, the sale is a fraud on
the heirs, and such third person
and all who buy from him with
notice hold the property in trust
for the heirs. Scott v. Umbarger,
41 Cal. 410; Guerrero v. Ballerino,
48 Cal. 118. The acts of one, who
without administering on the es-
tate, assumes its management, are
to be treated as the acts of a duly
constituted administrator, and
where the acts of the latter raise a
constructive trust the acts of the
former have the same effect. Risk
v. Risk (18S8), 9 S. W. Rep. 712.
2 Paul v. Squibb, 12 Pa. St. 296;
Mitchnm v. Mitchum, 3 Dana, 260.
8 Silverthorn v. McKinister, 12
Pa. St. 67. Where a widow, before
appointment of any administrator,
took and used assets of the estate
in partially paying for land pur-
chased by her, giving her note for
404 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 189.
an executor relating to a pureha.se of an estate, or of any
part of it, or where it appears that he has taken any ad-
vantage of his position as an executor to make a favorable
purchase, the sale will be held void, as of course, or he will
be required to account for the property and for any profits
that may have come of the transaction. But where there
is no evidence of unfair dealing in the purchase of property
belonging to an estate by an executor, the act will ordinarily
be held not void, but voidable, and such sale may be con-
firmed by all the parties interested in the estate. In Pen-
nock's Appeal it was held that one of several administra-
tors may bid at a sale of real estate, made by them under
an order of the Orphans' Court, subject, in the event of a
sale to him, to the power of disaffirmance by heirs or cred-
itors. Other bidders have no right to disaffirm the act
where the bidding was in good faith.1 Acquiescence, for a
considerable period, by all the heirs, in a purchase by an
executor, will confirm the sale.2 Where an executor pur-
chases real estate at his own sale and subsequently conveys
the property to a third person, his vendee will be charged
with notice of the defect of the title, as this will appear
the remainder with surety, who made by an agent of the widow,
afterwards paid it, taking from the wbo, though an administratrix,
widow a title bond of the vendor, had a right to purchase, subject to
who also executed to him a deed, the disaffirmance in the heirs or
Held, that the surety held the land creditors. The other bidders had
in trust for the benefit of the cred- no right to disaffirm her act; and
itors and distributees of the dece- her bids, made through her agent,
dent, subject to the prior lien in were in good faith. The argument
his own favor to the extent of the would have been more plausible
sum paid by him, which might be had she been utterly incapacitated ;
setoff by rents of the land accru- but as a sale to her would have been
ing after his deed, he to be liable voidable and probably confirmed,
for any excess thereof over that there is no room to say she was not
sum. Miller v. Birdsong, 7 Baxt. a bona fide bidder. Ibid.
531. See also Dyer v. Jacoway, 42 2 Hawley v. Cramer, 4 Cow.
Ark. 1S6. 719; Jennison v. Hapgood, 7 Pick.
iPennock's Appeal, 14 Pa. St. 1; Todd v. Moore, 1 Leigh, 457;
446. The objection to the sale of Bell v. Webb, 2 Gill, 164; Mussel-
the tract designated as letter C is man v. Eshelman, 10 Barr, 394;
not sustained. The bids alleged to Ward v Smith, 3 Sandf. Ch. 592;
have been spurious on it were Baker v. Bead, 18 Beav. 398.
§ 190. J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
405
from the deed.1 Where a testator conveys an estate to a
third person, takes back a deed from him, and then sells
the property, the purchaser will not be charged with notice
from the transaction.2
§ 190. From Illegal Acts of Directors of Corporations.
— The relation which the directors of a corporation sustain
to the members or stockholders has been determined by the
decisions of the courts. In the case of Gaskell v. Cham-
bers, in which the directors of a company, on the transfer
of its business to another company, received from the latter
a large sum for compensation, the particulars of which they
withheld from the members, it was held that they were
trustees of the money for the members, and they were or-
dered, on an interlocutory application, to pay it into court.3
1 Lazarus v. Bryson, 3 Binn. 59
Potter v. Pearson, 60 Me. 220
Ward v. Smith, 3 Sandf. Ch. 592
Smith v. Drake, 23 N. J. Eq. 302.
2 Johnson v. Bennett, 39 Barb.
237. In Alabama it is held that
an executor or administrator may
purchase at his own sale, provided
it be fairly and for full value.
Brannan v. Oliver, 2 Stew. 47;
Saltmarsh v. Beene, 4 Porter, 283,
295; Julian v. Reynolds, 8 Ala. 680,
683. These cases all apply to per-
sonal estate. So, in like manner,
in South Carolina the rule as to
personal estate seems to be that of
Alabama. Stallings v. Freeman,
2 Hill Ch., where the cases are
collected. See also Britton v. John-
son, 2 Hill Ch. 430, 434; Crispin v.
Taylor, 2 Hill Ch. 434. The rule
is the same in North Carolina.
Lyon v. Lyon, 8 Ired. Eq. 201. An
administrator may sell the goods
of his intestate at private sale and
repurchase them, but such trans-
action would not be sustained un-
less entirely free from all suspicion
of fraud. In Johnson v. Kay,
Admr., 8 Humph. 142, the court
uses this language: "It is a well
established principle of equity
that an executor or administrator
will not be permitted, under any
circumstance, to derive a personal
benefit from the manner in which
he transacts the business, or man-
ages the assets of the estate. Any
profit thus derived is considered
as so much increase of the trust
fund in his hands, and as belong-
ing to the estate."
3 Gaskell v. Chambers, 26 Beav.
360; Ex parte Bennett, 18 Beav.
339; Cumberland Coal Co. v. Hoff-
man Steam Coal Co., 18 Md. 456;
Cumberland Coal Co. v. Sherman,
30 Barb. 553; Aberdeen B. Co. v.
Blaikie, 1 Macqueen, 461 ; Michoud
v. Girod, 4 How. 544; Hodges v.
New England Screw Co., 1 K. I.
321 ; Verplanck v. Ins. Co., 1 Edw.
Ch. 84 ; Percy v. Milladon, 3 La.
568; Bobinson v. Smith, 3 Paige,
222 ; Murray v. Vanderbilt, 39 Barb.
237 ; Flint, etc. K. E. Co. v. Dewey,
14 Mich. 477 ; European v. N. Am.
Eailw. Co. v. Poor, 59 Me. 277;
Scott v. De Peyster, 1 Edw. Ch. 513 ;
Butts v. Wood, 38 Barb. 188; Ash-
406
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 190,
This view has been fully sustained by the American courts.
In the Cumberland Coal Co. v. Sherman, before the Su-
urst's Appeal, 60 Pa. St. 290;
Dewey v. Cross, 7 Wall. 299; Saw-
yer v. Hoag, 17 Wall. 610; Bank
Comm'rs v. Bank of Buffalo, 6
Paige, 503; Land Credit Co. v.
Fermoy, L. K. 8 Eq. 12; York &
North Midland R. Co. v. Hudson,
16Beav. 485; Benson v. Heathorne,
6 Y. & C. 326; Giltnan, C. & S. B.
, R. Co. v. Kelly, 77 111. 426; Chiles
v. Gallagher, 67 Miss. 413 ; Walsh v.
McBride, 72 Md. 45. Where one,
as trustee for the stockholders of a
corporation, purchases land for
their benefit, and, with their con-
sent, conveys tbe same as such
trustee absolutely to another, with
the understanding that it was to
be for their use and benefit, a re-
sulting trust is created, and, if
such trustee disposes of any part
of the land and converts the pro-
ceeds to his own use, he may be
removed from such trust, at the
instance of any stockholder. Fisk
v. Patton (1891), 7 Utah, 399; s. C,
27 Pac. Rep. 1. Comp. Laws Dak.
§ 3920, provides that one who
gains a thing by fraud, accident,
mistake, undue influence, the vio-
lation of a trust, or other wrongful
act, is an involuntary trustee of
one who would otherwise have had
it. Held, that where the president
and cashier of plaintiff bank fraud-
ulently divert the funds and assets
of the bank, and invest them in
mill machinery, fixtures, real
estate and appurtenances of de-
fendant corporation, of which they
were at the time president and
secretary, defendant holds such
property impressed with a trust in
favor of the bank to the extent of
the bank funds and assets that can
be traced into such corporate prop-
erty, unless defendant can show
that it acquired such funds and
assets in good faith, and for a val-
uable consideration. Farmers' &
Traders' Bank v. Kimball Milling
Co. (1890), 1 S. Dak. 388; s. c, 47
N". W. Rep. 402. The facts that
bank officers were the general
officers of a milling company from
its organization, and during the
time the bank funds, property and
assets were being diverted and in-
vested in the milling company's
property by them, is sufficient
presumption of knowledge on the
part of the milling company of
the fraudulent acts of such bank
officers. Farmers' & Traders'
Bank v. Kimball Milling Co.
(1890), 1 S. Dak. 388; s. C, 47 X.
W. Rep. 402. The president and
secretary of a company, organized
for the purpose of acquiring pro-
prietary rights in an alleged
newly-discovered process of re-
fining sugar by means of electric-
ity, induced certain stockholders '
of the company to take 96 addi-
tional shares of the stock at £60
per share, for the sole purpose of
raising a fund to purchase the
secret of such process. Plaintiff's
assignors took 57 of these addi-
tional shares on this representation
and no other. The whole fund
arising from the 96 shares — $28,108
— was deposited in bank and dis-
bursed in various ways, except the
sum of $10,000, which passed into
the hands of a receiver of the
company. After the deposit of
the fund in bank, the refining
process in question was discovered
to be a fraud. Held, that the $10,-
000 in the hands of the receiver of
the company constituted a trust
§ 190.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
407
preme Court of the State of New York, it was held that a
director of a corporation is the agent or trustee of the
for the benefit of the takers of the
additional shares of stock of the
company, and that plaintiff, as-
1 signee of the right of action of the
holders of 57 of those shares, was
entitled to the whole fund, the
holders of the residue of the 96
shares making no claim thereto.
Moore v. Williams, 62 Hun, 55;
s. C, 16 N. Y. Supl. 403. After
the donation of town lots by a rail-
road company to the bishop of a
Catholic clmrch, it executed a
general mortgage on all the prop-
erty, and such mortgage was fore-
closed and a receiver appointed.
Held, that a reconveyance by the
bishop to the purchaser at the
foreclosure sale, as the successor
in interest of the railroad company,
in consideration of the moral obli-
gation resting on him to restore
the lots to the company because
they had not been used for the
benefit of the church, vested the
legal title in such purchaser and
the equitable interest in the rail-
road company, and a judgment
creditor of the railroad company
has the right to subject the prop-
erty to his claim. Gabert v. Olcott
(1893) (Tex. Civ. App.), 22 S. W.
Eep. 286. Declarations and repre-
sentations made by the president
and secretary of a stock company
to induce stockholders of the com-
pany to take additional stock of
the company in order to raise a
fund for a specific purpose, will, in
the event of the subsequent disso-
lution of the company before an
application of such fund to the
purpose in question, create a trust
therein for the benefit of the stock-
holders whose money created such
fund, and who have a right of ac-
tion to recover the same. 11 N.
Y. Supl. 798, reversed; Moore v.
Williams, 62 Hun, 55; s. C, ION.
Y. Supl. 403. Mere insolvency of
a corporation does not of itself
transform its assets into a trust
fund for the equal benefit of all its
creditors. Alberger v. Nat'l Bank
of Commerce (1S94), 123 Mo. 313;
s. c, 27 S. W. Eep. 657. A pur-
chaser at a foreclosure sale of the
property, rights and interest of an
insolvent railway company filed a
bill alleging that several parcels of
real estate, the title to which was
taken in the names of tbe defend-
ant directors' predecessors, were
paid for by the company and held
in trust for it, and praying for a
conveyance thereof to him. It
appeared that the several tracts lay
along the line of the road, and-
were conveyed to directors of the
company absolutely, in considera-
tion of their personal notes; that
in some instances the persons were
described as trustees; that in one
instance the company agreed to
•establish a depot on the land if
conveyed to such persons, trustees
under a certain agreement ; that
there were entries in the books of
the company tending to show that
some of the notes given by such
persons were paid by the company,
though no evidence of the facts
relating to such entries was given
by persons familiar with them;
and that some years after the pur-
chases the purchasers conveyed to
the company lands admitted to be
held in trust for it, and claimed by
them to be all that were so held.
Held, that no trust was established.
Olcott v. Eice, 69 Fed. Eep. 199.
408 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 190.
stockholders, and as such has duties to discharge of a fidu-
ciary nature toward his principal, and is subject to the ob-
ligations and disabilities incidental to that relation. In his
opinion in this case, Mr. Justice Davies, after referring to
the rule by Avhich the relations of trustees, agents, execu-
tors, etc., to the estates which they control are governed,
as illustrated in the leading case of Michoud v. Girod, said:
"It is thus seen that the rule by which agents or trustees
are prohibited and rendered incapable of purchasing or
dealing with the property of their cesluis que trust, is one
of universal application, justified by a current of strong and
high authorities, and is adhered to with stern and inflexible
integrity."1 To these words he added: "Nay, the rule,
as applicable to managers of corporations, should in no par-
ticular be relaxed. Those who assume the position of di-
rectors and trustees assume also the obligations which the
law imposes on such a relation. The stockholders confide
to their integrity, to their faithfulness, and to their watch-
fulness, the protection of their interests. This duty they
have assumed, this the law imposes on them, and this those
for whom they act have a right to expect. The principals
are not present to watch over their own interests, they can-
not speak in their own behalf, they must trust to the fidelity
of their agents. If they discharge these important duties
and trusts faithfully, the law interposes its shield for their
protection and defense. If they depart from the line of
their duty, and waste, or take themselves, instead of pro-
tecting, the property and interests confided to them, the
law, on the application of those thus wronged or despoiled,
promptly steps in to apply the corrective and restores to
the injured what has been lost by the unfaithfulness of the
agent. This right of the cestui que trust to have the sale
vacated and set aside, where his trustee is the purchaser, is
not impaired or defeated by the circumstance that the trus-
tee purchases for another."2 Directors who willfully abuse
3 Cumberland Coal Co. v. Sher- below value, of a railroad, with its
man, 30 Barb. 553, 569. franchises, rolling stock, etc., un-
2 Cumberland Coal Co. v. Sher- der a decree of foreclosure, set
maD, 30 Barb. 553, 570. A sale far aside as fraudulent against credit-
§ 190. j
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
409
their trust, or in any manner misapply the funds of the
company so that a loss is sustained, are personally liable as
trustees to the extent of the loss, and they are also liable
if they suffer the corporate funds to be lost or wasted by
gross negligence and inattention to the duties of their
ors ; the sale having been made un-
der a scheme between the directors
of the road and the purchasers, by
■which the directors escaped liabil-
ity on indorsements which they
had made for the railroad com-
pany, and the purchasers held to
be trustees to the creditors com-
plainant, for the full value of the
property purchased, less a sum
which the purchasers had actually
paid for a large heir claim, pre-
sented as for its apparent amount
but which they had bought at a
large discount. Interest on the
balance, from the day of purchase
to the day of final decree in the
suit to be added. But because the
full value of the property sold was
not shown with sufficient certainty,
the case was sent back for ascer-
tainment of it by a master. Drury
v. Cross, 7 Wall. 299. Any agree-
ment made by one creditor for
some advantage to himself over
other creditors, who unite with
him in a composition of their debts,
in ignorance of such agreement, is
fraudulent and void. The direc-
tors of a corporation are trustees
of its stockholders, and in a certain
sense of its creditors, and any
agreement to influence the action
of such directors for the benefit of
others, and to the prejudice of the
company, is void. Bliss v. Matte-
son, 45 N. Y. 22. "The bill of the
defendant, Daniel Wood, was pre-
sented, audited and ordered to be
paid at a meeting of the board of
directors of the company, on the
5th day of July, 1859, when but
three of the five directors who
composed the board were present;
the defendant, Daniel Wood, being
one of those present, and his father,
William Wood, and John Cornwall,
another kinsman, being the other
two. This board, as thus consti-
tuted, had no authority to enter-
tain the bill in question, or to do
anything in relation to it. Daniel
Wood, being the claimant, was dis-
qualified from acting, because he
could not deal with himself, and
without him there was no quorum
of the directors, and they had no
authority to transact business. The
relation existing between Daniel
Wood and the corporation was
that of trustee and cestui que trust.
This being the case I am disposed
on this ground alone to think that
the action of these directors was
void." Betts v. Woods, 37 K. Y.
317. See also Robinson v. Smith,
3 Paige, 322; Penman v. Slocum,
41 N. Y. 53 ; Hecker v. Cosgrove, 4
Euss. 562; Beck v. Kantrowicz, 3
Kay & J. 230 ; Foss v. Harbottle, 3
Hare, 401, 489; Bank v. Tyrrell, 5
Jurist (ST. S.), 527; Dinsmore Oil
Co. v. Dinsmore, 64 Pa. St. 43,
49; Kent v. Freehold Land &
Brickmaking Co., L. R. 4 Eq. 588.
A want of candor and frankness in
the statement of any material fact
in a prospectus is a fraud against
which equity will relieve. The
New Brunswick v. Canada By. Co.,
1 Drew. & Sm. 363; Kent v. The
Freehold Land & Brickmaking Co.,
L. E. 4Eq. 588.
410 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 191,
trust.1 Stockholders can maintain an action in their own
behalf, and in behalf of the other stockholders, against
directors who have been guilty of an abuse of their trust
for the amount of the injury sustained.2 In Verplanck v.
Mercantile Ins. Co. it was held that where there is a fraud-
ulent purchasing of stock of a company by its officers with
the funds of the company, the remedy is not against the
latter in its corporate character, but against the directors
by whom the fraud may be committed, or through whose
management the loss has been sustained.3 But directors
cannot be held personally liable as between themselves and
the stockholders of the company, unless there has been
either fraud or negligence.4
§ 191. The Subject Continued. — Where the directors
of a corporation procure the issue of stock to themselves
in such a manner as to promote their own interests at the
expense of the stockholders, or where they make contracts
in which they are personally interested, they will be re-
quired to account for their profits as constructive trustees.
In a recent case it was held that in an action against di-
rectors of a railroad company for an accounting as trustees
under a constructive trust, the complaint states a cause of
JBobinson v. Smith, 3 Paige, 4 Scott v. DePeyster, 1 Edw. Ch.
222. "And they are equally liable 512. Directors of a corporate com-
if they suffer the corporate funds pany, in appointing a secretary, do
or property to be wasted or lost by not become sureties for his fidelity
gross negligence and inattention to and good behavior. If they select
the duties of their trust. Inde- persons to fill subordinate situa-
pendent of the provisions of the re- tions who are known to them to be
vised statutes which were passed unworthy of trust or notoriously of
after the filing of this bill this bad character, and a loss by fraud
court had jurisdiction, so far as the or embezzlement ensues, in such a
individual rights of the corporators case a personal liability rests upon
were concerned, to call the direc- them, but not otherwise. Direc-
tors to account, and compel them tors have a right to repose confi-
to make satisfaction for any loss dence in their secretary, in every-
arising from a fraudulent breach of thing within the scope of his du-
trust, or the willful neglect of a ties. Directors are not to be held
known duty." Ibid. 231. personally liable, as between them -
2 Butts v. Woods, 38 Barb. 182. selves and a stockholder, unless
3 Verplanck v. Mercantile Ins. there has been negligence or
Co., 1 Edw. Ch. 83. fraud." Ibid.
§ 191.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
411
action against defendants where it alleges that they caused
the company to issue to them for their personal benefit a
large amount of its capital stock at less than its par and
market value, from the sale of which defendants derived
large profit, and that defendants caused the company to
enter into a construction contract, in which defendants
were personally interested, and from which they derived a
profit.1 From the foregoing it will be seen that directors
i Forker v. Brown (1894), 30 N.
Y. Supl. 827; McGourkey v. To-
ledo, etc. By. Co., 146 U. S. 536;
S. C.,36 Lawy. Ed. 1079; Munson
v. R. R. Co., 103 N. Y. 58 ; s. c, 8
N. E. Rep. 355; Koehler v. Iron
Co., 2 Black, 715; s. c, 17 Lawy.
Ed. 339; Wardell v. R. R. Co., 103
U. S. 651; Memphis, etc. R. R.
Co. v. Woods, 88 Ala. 630; s. C, 16
Am. St. Rep. 81 ; Port v. Russell,
36Ind. 60; s. C, 10 Am. Rep. 5
Pickett v. SchoolDist, 25 Wis. 551
People v. Township, 11 Mich. 222
San Diego v. S. D. & C. R. R. Co.,
44 Cal. 106 ; Buell v. Buckingham , 16
Iowa, 2S4; Bennett v. St. Louis Car
Roofing Co., 19 Mo. App. 349;
Copeland v. Johnson Mfg. Co., 47
Hun, 235; Smith v. Los Angeles
etc. Assu., 78 Cal. 289; Little Rock
&P. S. Co. v. Page, 35 Ark. 304;
Ashurst's App., 60 Pa. St. 290;
Watts' Appeal, 18 Pa. St. 370 ; Dean
v. Hodge, 35 Minn. 146; Beach v.
Miller, 130 111. 162, 291 ; Twin Lick
Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U. S. 587;
Garrett v. Burlington Plow Co., 70
Iowa, 697; s. c, 59 Am. Rep. 461
Marsh v. Whitmore, 21 Wall. 183
R. R. Co. v. Magnay, 25 Beav. 586
Benson v. Heathom, 1 Y. & C. 326
Thomas v. Brownville, etc. Ry.
Co., 109 U. S. 522; Farmers' &
Merchants' Bank v. Downey, 53
Cal. 466 ; Gallery v. Nat'l Exchange
Bank, 41 Mich. 169; Pearson v.
Concord R. R. Co., 62 ST. H. 537;
S. c, 13 Am. St. Rep. 590; Goodin
v. Cin. & W. C. Co., 18 Ohio St.
169; s. c, 98 Am. Dec. 95; Jones
v. Arkansas, etc., 38 Ark. 17; Mat-
son v. Ally, 41 111. App. 72; Sar-
gent v. Kansas M. R. Co., 48 Kan.
672; McComb v. Barcelona, etc.
Assn., 134 N. Y. 594; Wahsatch
Min. Co. v. Jennings, 6 Utah, 243,
385 ; Robinson v. Jewett, 116 5T. Y.
40; Palmetto Lumber Co. v. Risley,
25 S. Car. 309; Ailing v. Wenzell,
27 111. App. 511; Smith v. Putnam,
61 N. H. 632; Kankakee Woolen
Mill Co. v. Kampe, 38 Mo. App.
229; Arkansas Valley, etc. Co. v.
Eicholtz, 45 Kan. 164; Woodruff v.
Howes, 88 Cal. 184; Jessup v. 111.
Cent. R. Co., 43 Fed. Rep. 483;
Howe v. Sanford Fork& T. Co., 44
Fed. Rep. 231; Cole v. Millerton
Iron Co., 59 Hun, 217. A court of
equity will not permit the directors
of a corporation, who are not only
trustees for the stockholders, but
also for creditors, to dispose of the
corporate property to themselves
or for their individual benefit.
Farmers' Loan, etc. Co. v. San
Diego Street Car Co., 45 Fed. Rep.
518. Corporations having common
officers and trustees cannot enter
into valid contracts with each
other. Stokes v. Phelps Mission,
47 Huni 5'0 ; Barr v. New York,
etc. R. Co., 52 Hun, 555. A treas-
urer of a corporation has no au-
thority to pay himself a claim he
412 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 192.
of corporations, no less than trustees, executors or other
agents, are required to exercise fidelity and to use diligence
and prudence in the administration of their trust, and that
all profits and advantages which they may derive from the
use of funds intrusted to their care are held for the benefit
of the equitable owners of such funds. They are trustees,
and as such may be called to account for the use of all
property which has been committed to their care and con-
trol.1
§ 192. From the Relation of Agent to His Principal.
• — This is a fiduciary relation, and the principles of equity,
by which the relation of a trustee to his beneficiary is gov-
erned, apply to the relation of an agent to his principal. It
is well settled that any person sustaining a fiduciary relation
toward another, in regard to property, is bound to make
use of all the knowledge, to improve all the opportunities,
to exercise all the powers and rights, of every description,
that he has derived from his fiduciary position or has ac-
quired by means of it, for the benefit of his cestui que trust.
And, on the same principle, he may not avail himself of
these advantages to promote his own interests.2 The rule
holds against it, unless the claim tion with or to its trustees, in good
has been approved and its payment faith, in ease no public or private
authorized by the corporation, interest is harmed thereby. Such
Peterborough R. Co. v. Wood, 61 contracts are not void but voidable
N\ H. 418. A director of a corpo- at the election of those who are af-
ration cannot buy up its outstand- fected by the fraud." Skinner v.
ingdebtsfor his own benefit, know- Smith, 134 N. Y. 242; s. C, 31 N.
ing it to be insolvent, and intend- E. Rep. 911. See also Twin Lick
ing thus to get an advantage over Oil Co. v. Morburry, 91 U. S. 587,
other creditors, and hold the debts 589; Kisley v. Indianapolis B. &
purchased for their full amount as W. R. R. Co., 62 N. Y. 240; Barnes
an offset to his liability for the v. Brown, 80 X. Y. 527, 536; Mun-
corporate debts; and he has no son v. S. G. & C. R. Co., 103 N. Y
equitable claim upon the fund be- 58, 73; Barr v. 1ST. Y., etc. R. R.
yond the amount which he actually Co., 125 N. Y. 263, 270.
paid. Bulkley v. Whitcomb, 121 1 Gaskell v. Chambers, 26 Beav.
X. Y. 107. "But this rule is not 360; Bowers v. City of Toronto, 11
broad enough to condemn as void Moore, P. C. Cas. 463 ; Ex parte
on the ground of public policy all Hill, 32 L. J. Ch. 154.
contracts and transfers executed by ° Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 503;
a purely private business corpora- Lees v. STuttall, 1 R. &M. 53; S. C,
§ 192.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
413
is inflexible that in every case in which a person is either
actively or constructively an agent for others, all the profits
and emoluments secured by him in the business inure to
Taml. 282; Church v. Marine Ins.
Co., 1 Mason, 341; Crowe v. Bal-
lard, 3 Bro. Ch. 120; Barker v. Ins.
Co., 2 Mason, 3G9; Massey v.
Davies, 2 Ves. Jr. 318 ; Woodhouse
v. Meredith, 1 Jac. & W. 204; Pur-
cellv. McNamara, 14 Ves. 91; Watt
v. Grove, 2 Sch. & Lef. 492; Low-
ther v. Lowther, 13 Ves. 102;
Morretv. Paske, 2 Atk. 53; Coles
v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 246 ; Gray v.
Mansfield, 1 Ves. 379 ; Fox v. Mack-
reth, 2 Bro. Ch. 400; s. c, 1 Lead.
Cas. in Eq. 92; Squires' Appeal, 70
Pa. St. 268; Safford v. Hinds, 39
Barb. 625; Dennis v. McCoy, 32
111. 429; Parkist v. Alexander, 1
Johns. Cb. 394; Green v. Winter,
1 Johns. Ch. 27; Tyrrell v. Bank
of London, 27 Beav. 273. Accord-
ing to these doctrines, if the appel-
lants, without the knowledge and
assent of their principal, purchased
or took to their own account, goods
intrusted to them for sale, or, with
the knowledge and assent of their
principal, purchased its goods, the
principal not being fully and thor-
oughly advertised of every fact and
circumstance in the possession of
the agents, such sales are invalid.
Whether there were any purchases
made by the appellants unattended
by these indicia of perfect good
faith, is a proper subject of inquiry
for the court to which this cause
will be remanded. Keighler v.
Savage Manf. Co., 12 Md. 383, 417.
See also Howell v. Baker, 4 Johns.
Ch. 118, 120; Sweet v. Jacocks, 6
Paige, 355; Heacock v. Coates-
worth, 1 Clarke, 84, 8G; Massie v.
Watts, 6 Cranch, 14S, 170; Kingo
v. Binns, 10 Pet. 270; Rankin v.
Porter, 7 Watts, 387; Church v.
Sterling, 16 Conn. 389, 400; Segar
v. Edwards, 11 Leigh, 213; Wel-
ford v. Chancellor, 5 Gratt. 39;
Switzer v. Sidles, 3 Gilm. 529;
Baker v. Whiting, 3 Sumn. 475.
So an agent employed to obtain
information with a view to a pur-
chase of real or personal property
cannot buy for himself to the ex-
clusion of his principal. Werin v.
Dillon, 27 Miss. 494; Noel v. White.
1 Wright, 814. A purchase by the
clerk of an attorney or broker of
the property which has been placed
in the hands of his employer for
sale may be set aside, although
there is no actual fraud. Poillon
v. Martin, 1 Sandf. Ch. 569; Gard-
ner v. Ogden, 22 N. Y. 327. If an
agent employed by his principal
to obtain another to do work for
him, for instance, as a subcon-
tractor, it would be fraud cogniza-
ble in equity if the agent entered
into a contract at a preposterous
price, in order that he and the sub-
contractor might divide the profits
to accrue from it. Holden v.
Webber, 29 Beav. 117, 120. An
agent who for a certain remunera-
tion undertook to collect the rents
and exercise control over the prop-
erty of his principal while the lat-
ter was absent, and relied entirely
on his discretion, judgment, and
integrity, had no right to interfere
with the title to the property, or
place himself in an attitude of an-
tagonism to the interests of his
principal. By purchasing the
property under such circumstances
he made himself liable as a trustee
in relation thereto for the benefit of
his principal. Grumley v. Webb,
44 Mo. 444; Le Gendre v. Byrnes
414
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 192.
the benefit of the employer.1 The principle of equity in-
volved in this relation, as established by the English courts,
has been fully maintained by the courts of this country.
In the leading and celebrated case of Michoud v. Girod
this principle is stated by Mr. Justice Wayne, as follows :
"The rule of equity is, in every code of jurisprudence with
which we are acquainted, that a purchase by a trustee or
agent of the particular property of which he has the sale,
or in which he represents another, whether he has an inter-
est in it or not, per interpositam personam, carries fraud
(1888), 44 N. J. Eq. 372; s. C, 14
Atl. Rep. 621 ; King v. Remington
(1886), 36 Minn. 15; s. c, 29N.W.
Rep. 352; Wales v. Newbould, 9
Mich. 45; Rupp's Appeal, 100 Pa.
St. 531.
1 Giddings v. Eastman, 5 Paige,
561; Campbell v. Penn. Life Ins.
Co., 2 Whart. 64; Bartholomew v.
Leach, 7 Watts, 472; Keith v. Kel-
lam, 35 Fed. Rep. 243; Rose v.
Hayden, 35 Kan. 106; Pindall v.
Trevor, 30 Ark. 249; Cookson v.
Richardson, 69 111. 137; Follansbee
v. Kilbreath, 17 111. 522; Stewart
v. Duffy, 116 111. 47; Wells v. Rob-
inson, 13 Cal. 133; Chastain v.
Smith, 30 Ga. 96; Church v. Ster-
ling, 16 Conn. 388; Kleunder v
Penske, 53 Wis. 118; Oldham v
Jones, 5 B. Mon. 458; Smith v
Boquet, 27 Tex. 507; Safford v
Hynds, 39 Barb. 625; Brown v
Dwelley, 45 Me. 52; Kimber v
Barber, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 56; Tay-
lor v. Salmon, 4 Myl. & Cr. 134
Reed v. Morris, 2 Myl. & Cr. 374
Garthen v. Myrich, 9 Md. 143
Ricketts v. Montgomery, 15 Md
46, 51 ; Ames v. Port Huron Co., 11
Mich. 39; Mulford v. Mench, 3
Stockt. 16; Calver v. Calver, 3
Stockt. 215 ; Fawcett v. Fawcett, 1
Bush, 511; Campbell v. Penn. Life
Ins. Co., 2 Whart. 53, 63; Leisen-
ring v. Black, 5 Watts, 303,304;
Litchfield v. Cudworth, 15 Pick.
24, 31 ; Caldwell v. Sigourney, 19
Conn. 37, 51; Pitt v. Petrovey, 12
Ired. 16; Boyd v. Hawkins, 2 Dev.
Eq. 195, 207 ; Wormley v. Worm-
ley, 8 Wheat. 422 ; Cumberland v.
Sherman, 30 Barb. 553 ; Remick v.
Butterfleld, 11 Foster, 70; Teakle
v. Bailey, 2 Brock. 44, 51; Banks v.
.Tudah. 8 Conn. 146, 157 ; Barker v.
Marine Ins. Co., 2 Mason, 309;
Church v. Marine Ins. Co., 1 Ma-
son, 341, 344; Copelaud v. Mer-
cantile Ins. Co., 6 Pick. 198, 204;
Personeau v. Bleakley, 14 111. 15;
Armstrong v. Campbell, 3 Yerg.
202, 236; Hunt v. Bass, 2 Dev. Eq.
292, 295; Lazarus v. Bryson, 3
Binn. 54, 58; Carter v. Harris, 4
Rand. 199, 204 ; Parkins v. Thomp-
son, 3 ST. H. 144; Chandler v.
Moulton, 33 Vt. 245; Moore v.
Moore, 4 Sandf. Ch. 37. An agent
for the collection of successive
mortgages, who acquires a title
under a foreclosure of one of the
earlier of them, holds this as a
constructive trustee for the later
mortgages. Rees v. Wallace, 113
111. 589; Moore v. Moore, 5 N. Y.
256 ; Dobson v. Racey, 8N.Y. 216.
See also Schedda v. Sawyer, 4
McLean, 181; Curts v. Cissna, 7
Biss. 260; Banks v. Judah, 8 Conn.
145; Johnson v. Blackman, 11
Conn. 342.
§ 192. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 415
on the face of it."1 The following sound and impressive
words in exposition of this principle are from the same pen :
"The general rule stands upon our great moral obligation
to refrain from placing ourselves in relations which ordina-
rily excite a conflict between self-interest and integrity. It
restrains all agents, public and private ; but the value of the
prohibition is most felt, and its application is more fre-
quent, in the private relations in which the vendor and pur-
chaser may stand toward each other. The disability to
purchase is a consequence of that relation between them
which imposes on the one a duty to protect the interest of
the other, from the faithful discharge of which duty his
own personal interest may withdraw him. In this conflict
of interest the law wisely interposes. It acts not on the
possibility that in some cases the sense of that duty may
prevail over the motives of self-interest, but it provides
against the probability in many cases, and the danger in all
cases, that the dictates of self-interest will exercise a pre-
dominant influence and supersede that of duty. It, there-
fore, prohibits a party from purchasing, on his own ac-
count, that which his duty or trust requires him to sell on
account of another, and from purchasing on account of an-
other that which he sells on his own account. In effect, he
is not allowed to unite the two opposite characters of
buyer and seller, because his interests, when he is the
seller or buyer on his own account, are directly con-
1 Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 503, property as the agent of another,
553; Baker v. Whiting, 3 Sumn. or upon a trust and confidence that
475; Massy v. Davis, 1 Ves. Jr. he will acquire it for the benefit of
289;Batholomewv. Leach, 7 Watts, such other, equity will imply a
472; Lear v. Matthews, Wright, trust in favor of the latter, and
374; Copeland v. Ins. Co., 6 Pick, compel the purchaser to account
196 ; Eeed v. Warner, 5 Paige. 650 ; to him accordingly. Such a trans-
Lowther v. Lowther, 13 Ves. 103; action is not within the statute of
Cusan v. Hinman, 6 Bosw. 8; Mc- frauds, and, therefore, the trust
Donald v. Lord, 2 Robt. 7 ; Reitz need not be in writing. Manning
v. Reitz, 80 N". Y. 538 ; Torrey v. v. Hayden, 5 Sawy. 360 ; Church v.
Bank of Orleans, 9 Paige, 649; Kidd, 3 Hun, 254; Ryan v. Dox,
s.c, 7 Hill, 260. Where a person 34 N. Y. 307; Moyer v. Moyer, 21
acquires the legal estate in real Hun, 67.
416
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 193.
flicting with those of the person on whose account he
buys or sells."1
§ 193. The Subject Continued. — It is a well established
rule of equity that an agent cannot take any advantage of
his own incapacity or neglect of duty. Where an agent al-
lowed the property of his principal to be sold for taxes,
and at the tax sale bought it, taking the title in his own
name, he was held as a constructive trustee for his princi-
pal, although at the time of the purchase the relation of
principal and agent had terminated.2 The rule against a
purchase from principal by an agent is not absolute, but if any
advantage is taken, as the result of his own knowledge,
where the principal is in ignorance, or is imperfectly in-
formed, he will be held as a trustee, or the transaction will
be avoided, at the option of the principal.3 Where an
1 Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 503,
555. A sheriff selling land on ex-
ecution cannot be a purchaser di-
rectly, or through the medium of
a third person who purchases in
secret trust for him. Lessee of
Lazarus v. Bryson, 3 Binn. 54, 58;
Carter v. Harris, 4 Rand. 199, 204;
Parkins v. Thompson, 3 N. H. 144.
See generally Greenfield's Estate,
2 Harris, 489; Sheriff v. Neal, 6
Watts, 534; Plurner v. Reed, 2
Wright, 46; Hoge v. Hoge, 1 Watts,
163 ; Swartz v. Swartz, 4 Barr, 353 ;
Harrold v. Lane, 3 Pa. St. 268;
Jenkins v. Eldridge, 3 Story, 181;
Morris v. Nixon, 1 How. 118; Sei-
christ's App., 66 Pa. St. 237; Gil-
lette v. Peppercorn, 3 Beav. 78;
Voorhees v. Church, 8 Barb. 136;
Van Epps v. Van Epps, 9 Paige,
237; Cram v. Mitchell, 1 Sandf.
251; Davis v. Hamlin, 108 111. 39;
Allen v. Jackson, 122 111. 567.
2 Morris v. Joseph, 1 W. Va. 256.
3 Lewis v. Hillman, 3 H. L.
Cas. 629; Winn v. Dillon, 27 Miss.
494; Parkist v. Alexander, 1 Johns.
Ch. 394; Bank of Orleans v.Torrey,
7 Hill, 260; s. C, 9 Paige, 653;
Myers' App. 2 Barr, 463 ; McGre-
gor v. Gardner, 14 Iowa, 326 ; Clark
v. Lee, 14 Iowa, 425; Banks v.
Judah, 8 Conn. 146; Oldham v.
Jones, 5 B. Monr. 467; Teakle v.
Barley, 2 Brock. 44; Church v. Ins.
Co., 1 Mason, 341 ; Piatt v. Oliver.
2 McLean, 267; s. c, 3 How. 353;
Rankin v. Porter, 7 Watts, 387. '"I
am not aware of any principle of
law or equity, and certainly there
is nothing in the code of good
morals, which could authorize the
paramour, under such circumstan-
ces, to claim the whole benefit of
this conveyance, which was not
intended for his use but for the use
of the infant offspring of his guilt
and infamy. It is a settled princi-
ple of equity that where a person
undertakes to act as an agent for
another he cannot be permitted to
deal in the matter for that agency
upon his own account and for his
own benefit. And if he takes a
conveyance in his own name of an
estate which he undertakes to obtain
for another, he will in equity be
§ 193. J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
417
agent, acting under specific instructions, or in a matter re-
lating to' the proper duties of his agency, buys property
and takes the title in his own name, he will be held as a
trustee ex malejicio.1 In a case where a partner, C, obtained
a lease in the name of his father, where his copartner, D,
had a right to expect him to procure the lease for the firm,
it was held that the father of C was a constructive trustee
for the two partners.2 Where an agent was employed to
negotiate for certain lands, and, in violation of his agree-
ment, purchased for himself and his partner, it was held
that the purchase money furnished by the agent will be
considered as a loan only, and while the agent and his part-
considered as holding it in trust
for his principal." Chancellor
Walworth in Sweet v. Jacocks, 6
Paige, 355, 363.
1 Squires' Appeal, 70 Pa. St. 268
McMurray v. Mobley, 39 Ark. 313
Vallette v. Tedens, 122 111. 607
Byington v. Moore, 62 Iowa, 470
Collins v. Rainey, 42 Ark. 531
Kraemer v. Deusterman, 37 Minn.
469. A person who assumes to act
as agent in redeeming lands sold
for taxes is held to have acted in
that capacity, and if he shall take
advantage of such act to obtain
a title in his own name, for the
land, and by a subsequent pro-
cedure to perfect the title he is re-
sponsible in the character he at
first assumed, and will be held to
answer to those in whom the title
was vested. Schedda v. Sawyer, 4
McLean, 181. It will make no dif-
ference in the application of the
principle that the agent is also a
judgment creditor, and effects the
sale through an execution issued
on the judgment, and not in his
character as agent, because the ac-
ceptance of the agency puts him
under an obligation to postpone
his interest to that of the principal
and do nothing that can prejudice
27
the latter. Jameson v. Glasscock-.
29 Mo. 191 ; Rogersv. Rogers, Hop-
kins Ch. 515; Martin v. Wynkoop,,
12 Ind. 266. In Smith v. Lansing,
22 N. Y. 520, it is held that a trus-
tee, agent or other person acting irt
a fiduciary capacity, who is liable;
as a surety or guarantor for the
debt on account of which the sale
is made, may buy the property and
hold it as a counter security, sub-
ject to the right of the principal or
cestui que trust to redeem on tend-
ering an indemnity against the
obligation incurred for his benefit.
An agent employed to collect a.
debt cannot buy the property of
the debtor at a sale under an exe-
cution issued in the course of the
agency for less than the amount of
the debt because his interest as a.
buyer might induce him to force a.
sale to the injury of his principal.
Moore v. Moore, 4 Sandf. Ch. 37;
Liesenring v. Black, 5 Watts, 303;
Campbell v. McLain, 1 P. F.
Smith, 200; Howell v. Baker, 4
Johns. Ch. 118; Wade v. Pettibone, .
11 Ohio, 57; s. c, 14 Ohio, 557;.
Stockton v. Ward, 11 How. 232.
2 Cushing v. Danforth, 76 MaineE,
114.
418 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 194.
ner may hold the title to the property purchased as security
for the money advanced, neither of these parties can hold
the land adversely to the principal merely because the prin-
cipal has not advanced the purchase money, when, at the
time of the employment of the agent, the amount of the
purchase money could not be known, and where neither the
agent, nor his partner, ever presented to the principal any
statement of the purchase money, or expenses, or ever
made any demand therefor.1 Where there is simply a parol
agreement and no money paid by the principal this rule will
not apply. In a recent case it was held that where A con-
tracts by parol to purchase land for B, but afterwards pur-
chaser for himself, B pajing none of the consideration, no
trust results in B. It is a mere violation of a parol agree-
ment, for which equity will not decree A a trustee for B.2
§ 194. From Relation of Attorney and Client. — Attor-
neys are officers of the court, and, as such, enjoy special
privileges and are subject to peculiar obligations. There
are provisions for summary proceedings both against them
and in their favor. In their dealings with their clients they
are subject, both at law and in equity, to strong and peculiar
restraints. Even at law, a judgment obtained by an attor-
ney against his client will be sustained only as security for
what is actually due, and the court will decide what claims
shall be allowed and what shall be disallowed.3 The general
1 Bryan y. HcNaughton, 38 Kan. Bellow v. Russell, 1 B. & B. 107;
98. Champion v. Rigby, 1 Russ. & M.
2 Hackney v. Butts, 41 Ark. 393. 539; Cane v. Allen, 2 Dow. 289;
Where one who orally agrees to Hunter v. Atkins, 3 Myl. &K. 135;
procure a lease for himself and an- Harris v. Tremenhere, 15 Ves. 34;
other procures it solely on his own Wells v. Middleton, 1 Cox, 112;
credit, and takes title in his own Robinson v. Briggs, 1 Sm. & Gift, f
name, no trust results unless such 184; King & Savery, 5 H. L. Cas.
other changes his position, or 627; Salmon v. Cutts,4DeG. &Sm.
takes some action that he would not 131 ; Wood v. Downes, 18 Ves. 120 ;
have taken except in reliance on Montesquieu v. Sandys, 18 Ves. 302;
the agreement. Rische v.Diessel- Walmesley v. Booth, 2 Atk. 30;
horst (1894) (Tex. Civ. App.) , 26 TJppington v. Buller, 2 Dr. & W.
S. W. Rep. 762. 184; Greenfield's Estate, 2 Harris,
3 Newman v. Payne, 2 Ves. Jr. 489; Merritt y. Lambert, 10 Paige,
199; Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Ves. 277; 357; Wallis v. Loubat, 2 Denio,
§194.
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
419
principle sustained by very numerous decisions is that while
the relation between the attorney and client continues the at-
torney shall derive to himself no benefit or advantage from any
contracts, negotiations or other business transactions of his
client, nor receive anything from his bounty.1 In the case
607; West v. Eaymond, 21 Ind.
305 ; Henry v. Kaiman, 25 Pa. St.
354 ; Atkins v. Delmage, 12 Ir. Eq. 2 ;
Websterv. King,33Cal. 148 ; Frank's
Appeal, 59 Pa. St. 190; Lovat
v. Knipe, 12 Ir. Eq. 124; Purcell v.
Buckley, 12 Ir. Eq. 124; Howell v.
Eansom, 11 Paige, 538; Miles v.
Erwin, 2 MoCord Ch. 524; Mott v.
Harrington, 12 Vt. 199 ; Hawley v.
Cramer, 4 Cow. 717; Barry v.
Whitney, 3 Sandf. 696; Evans v.
Ellis, 5 Denio, 640; Waters v.
Thorn, 22 Beav. 547 ; Bank v. Tyr-
rell, 27 Beav. 273; s. c, 10 H. L.
Cas. 26; Brown v. Kennedy, 33
Beav. 133; Smedley v. Varley, 23
Beav. 359; O'Brien v. Lewis, 4
Gift. 221; Corley v. Stafford, 1 De
G. & J. 238; Brock v. Barnes, 40
Barb. 521 ; Douglass v. Culverwell,
L.J. 31 Ch. 65, 543; Gresley v.
Mousley, 4 DeG. &J. 78; Spring
v. Pride, 10 Jur. (ST. S.) 646; Bar-
nard v. Hunter, 2Jur. (N.S.) 1213;
Jortinv.S.E. Ey. Co.,DeG.,M. &
G. 270; Hesse v. Briant, 6 De G.,
11. & J. 623 ; Cameron v. Lewis, 56
Miss. 76 ■; Buckley v. Wilford, 2 CI.
& Fin. 102, Galbraith v. Elder, 8
Watts, 81, 94, 100; Clevinger v.
Eeimar, 3 W. & S. 487, 493 ; Hock-
enberry v. Carlisle, 5 W. & S. 348,
350; Moore v. Brecken, 27111. 23.
1 Cheslyn v. Dalby, 2 Y. & C. Ch.
194; Hunter v. Atkins, 3 Myl. & K.
113; Welles v. Midleton, 1 Cox,
125; Wright v. Proud, 13 Ves. 137;
Wood v. Downes, 18 Ves. 120 ; Ed-
wards v. Myrick, 2 Hare, 68 ; God-
ard v. Carlisle, 9 Price, 169 ; De
Montmorency v. Devereaux, 7 CI.
& Fin. 188; Savery v. King, 35 Eng.
L. &Eq. 100; S. C, 5 H. L. Cas.
627, 656, 665 ; Champion v. Eigby,
1 Euss. & M. 839; Gibbs v. Daniel,
4 Giff . 1 ; Gibson v. Jeyes, 6. Ves.
266 ; Trevelyan v. Charter, 9 Beav.
140 ; Spencer v. Topham, 28 L. T. 56 ;
Denton v. Donner, 23 Beav. 285;
Greenfield v. Bates, 5 Ir. Ch. Eep.
219 ; Knight v. Bowyer, 23 Beav.
609; Galbreathv. Elder, 8 Watts,
81 ; Champion v. Eigby, Tam. 421 ;
Newman v. Payne, 2 Ves. 200;
Bulkly v. Wilford, 2 CI. & Fin. 102 ;
Jones v. Thomas, 2 Y. & Coll. 498;
Carter v. Palmer, 1 Dr. & W.
722; Mott v. Harrington, 12 Vern.
199; Jones v. Thomas, 2 Y. & Coll.
498 ; Wendell v. Van Eenssalear, 1
Johns. Ch. 344; Miles v. Ervin, 1
McCordCh.547; Wilkinson v. Hol-
loway, 7 Leigh, 277. Defendant,
an attorney, agreed with the
owner of land to bring suit for it,
he to receive a share of the land if
he won ; and to secure him she gave
him a quitclaim deed for that
amount, he further agreeing, in
case of success, to pay her a certain
amount from his share. Not hav-
ing the means to carry on the suit
alone, he agreed with another at-
torney to carry on the suit, he to
furnish another attorney to assist.
In accordance with the terms of
this agreement, he reconveyed to
the landowner, and she conveyed
to the new attorney, and made a
similar agreement with him. It
was understood that he was to con-
vey a certain interest to defendant,
and that defendant was to pay the
420 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 194.
of Henry v. Kaiman it was held that an attorney-at-law,
who has been employed professionally to sustain a title to
land, cannot, either before or after the cause is ended, or
during the continuance or after the termination of the re-
lation of counsel and client, while the client holds or after
he has conveyed his interest, purchase for himself the op-
posing or any outstanding title, but such a purchase will
enure to the benefit of the client or his vendee.1 In his
opinion in this case, Chief Justice Lewis offers the follow-
ing pertinent and well considered comments : "It is a mis-
take to suppose that the attorney is at liberty to violate the
professional confidence reposed in him by his client the
moment the relation of counsel and client terminates. The
necessities of the client compel him to repose unlimited
confidence in his counsel. When he is in jeopardy, either
of life, liberty, property, or character, he is obliged to
repose confidence in his professional adviser in order that
he may be properly defended. If he is threatened with a
lawsuit about his land, he is compelled to exhibit his title
papers to his counsel, and to disclose to him every supposed
defect in them, in order that imperfections may be reme-
died and preparations made to sustain the title. So if the
life or liberty of the client be in danger from legal proceed-
ings against him, unlimited confidence in his counsel is so
necessary that he cannot safely go to trial without it. As
landowner out of his share the Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Smith
amount which had been agreed (1893), 117 Mj. 261; s. C, 22 S. W.
upon in the first contract. Though Rep. 623.
defendant was not attorney of rec- 1 Henry v. Kaiman, 25 Pa. St.
ord, he assisted the others and con- 354. An attorney employed to
suited with them. He also corre- foreclose a, mortgage, who pur-
sponded with the landowner, in- chases the property at a sale is a
forming her of progress and re- trustee. Keickhoff v. Brecht, 51
ceiving letters showing that she Iowa, 633. The rule is applied
placed reliance in him. Held, that with special strictness where the
defendant occupied a fiduciary re- client is illiterate. Cookson v.
lation toward the landowner, so Kichardson, 69 111. 137. See also
that all gains acquired by him by Coleman v. Eastman, 5 Paige, 561 ;
means of his position, whether Barrett v. Bamber, 81 Pa. St. 247;
through deed of an adverse interest Buckley v. Wilford, 2 CI. & Fin.
ov otherwise, belonged to her. 102.
§ 194. J
IMPLIED. TRUSTS.
421
the necessities of litigation compel confidence on the one
side, the policy of the law requires fidelity on the other.
The policy which enjoins good faith requires that it never
should be violated. The reasons for requiring it at all de-
mand that it shall be perpetual. Occasions may arise
where an upright counselor may feel himself bound to
withdraw from his client's cause, but no circumstances
whatever can justify him in betraying the trust reposed
under the highest obligation of professional honor. "Where
fidelity is required the law prohibits everything which pre-
sents a temptation to betray the trust. The orison which
deprecates temptation is the offspring of infinite wisdom,
and the rule of law in accordance with it rests upon the
most substantial foundations. The purchase by an attor-
ney of an interest in the thing in controversy, in opposition
to the title of his client, is forbidden, because it places him
under temptation to be unfaithful to his trust. Such a
purchase, therefore, enures to the benefit of his client."1
1 Henry v. Kaiman, 25 Pa. St.
354, 358. "The general rule of law
applicable to all trustees and per-
sons In fiduciary position, is that
no person in such position may
take advantage of the confidence
reposed in him. The sound policy
upon which the rule is based is
nowhere more apparent than in
transactions between parties, stand-
ing in the relation of solicitor
and client, or counsel and client.
Whatever may be urged in defense
of the rule in other cases, may be
here urged with even greater ef-
fect, for the relation is one of great
confidence, giving to 'the adviser
more than ordinary influence over
the client. Hence it is that the
law is exceedingly suspicious of
all transactions between the par-
ties. The rule which thus subjects
transactions between solicitor and
client to other and stricter tests
than those which apply to ordinary
transactions is not an isolated rule,
but a branch of a rule applicable
to all transactions between man
and man, in which the relation be-
tween the contracting parties is
such as to destroy the equal footing
on which such parties should
stand." Wigrams, V. C, in Ed-
wards v. Meyrick, 2 Hare, 68. The
case of Holman v. Loynes, 4De G.,
M. & G. 270, decided in 1854, by
Lord Chancellor Cramworth and
Lord Justice Turner, is interesting
and instructive. They set aside at
the suit of the heir-at-law of the
vendor, two purchases of real es-
tate by the defendant. The de-
fendant, an attorney, was engaged
in the sale of his client's property
by auction; only one of the lots
was then sold. In 1848 the first
sale to the defendant took place,
the second in 1850. The consider-
ation for the first purchase was
stated to be £600, that for the sec-
422
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 195.
§ 195. The Subject Continued. — The rule which pro-
hibits an attorney from purchasing of his client is not abso-
lute. There are circumstances under which such a purchase
ond £208. Only £260 was paid, the
residue being made up by two an-
nuities, one for £40 the other for
£26 for the vendor's life. These
annuities fairly represented an
equivalent for the residue of the
consideration, according to the
value of such an annuity on the
average life of a person of the ven-
dor's age, according to the govern-
ment annuity tables. But the ven-
dor's life was not a good average
life, and this fact was either known
to the defendant or easily within
his knowledge. As a matter of
fact the vendor died in about a
third of the time for which the an-
nuities had been calculated. The
Lord Chancellor raised two ques-
tions for solution: Did the rela-
tion of attorney and client subsist
at the time of the transaction?
Was there any neglect of duty on
the part of the defendant? His
Lordship answered both questions
in the affirmative. Tbere was a
manifest neglect of duty on the
part of the defendant in not en-
deavoring to get a higher annuity
for the vendor. This he could
have done by reason of the ven-
dor's intemperate habits. Lord
Justice Turner entered very elab-
orately into an examination of the
meaning and application of the
phrase "attorney in hoc re." After
a summary of the authorities upon
the point the judgment of Lord
Eldon, in Montesquieu v. Sandys,
18 Ves. 313, of Sir James Wigram,
in Edwards v. Meyrick, 2 Hare, 60,
and of Lord Abinger in Jones v.
Thomas, 2 Y. & C. 498, the con-
clusion drawn by his Lordship was
that the cases in which it had been
hitherto held that an attorney
might deal with his client as a
stranger might do, were not cases
in which the attorney had been
concerned in any previous at-
tempted sale, or in which any con-
fidence as to sale had been reposed
in him as attorney, or cases in
which the attorney had acquired,
or had had the means of acquiring,
any peculiar knowledge as to the
property, the subject of the sale to
him. '-The result of them, stated
favorably to defendant, and with-
out reference to the important ob-
servations upon the subject of in-
fluence made by Sir James Wig-
ram, in Edwards v. Meyrick, can-
not be put higher than this — that
an attorney may deal with a client
as a stranger where the circum-
stances are not such as to put him
under the duty of advising the
client." Where a solicitor, the
party to a suit, had the conduct of
a, sale decreed by the court, and
purchased at the sale under a
feigned name, the sale was set
aside though confirmed by an order,
and the estate was again offered,
for sale at the price given by the
defendant. If there was no higher
bidder the defendant was to be
held to his purchase. Sidney v.
Ranger, 12 Sim. 118. A purchase
by a solicitor from his client may
be set aside, though the purchase
is confirmed by the client's will.
"I do not impute fraud or the exer-
cise of undue influence to B in this
transaction," says the Master of
the Rolls, "but I rest my decision
on the ground that he has, incau-
tiously, involved himself in a trans-
action which throws on him the
§ 195.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
423
will be sustained. The rule is that as long as the relation
continues, or the influence acquired under the relation con-
tinues, all contracts are at least avoidable. But it has been
held that where the purchase is of property altogether dis-
connected from that which is the subject of litigation the
rule will not apply. In his opinion in Montesquieu v. San-
dys, Lord Chancellor Eldon said: "There is no authority
establishing, nor was it ever laid down, that an attorney
cannot purchase from his client what was not in any degree
the object of his concern as attorney ; the client making the
proposal, himself proposing the price, no confidence asked
or received in that article, and both ignorant of the value.
Under such circumstances he is not the attorney in hoc re;
and, therefore, not being under any duty as attorney to
advise against the act, he may be the purchaser."1 So,
burthen of proving the correctness
of it, which he has failed in doing."
Waters v. Thorn, 22 Beav. 547.
Where an attorney, employed by
plaintiff to buy certain land for
him, purchased the land for him-
self, with his own money, by rep-
resenting that the purchase was
for plaintiff, and upon tender to
the attorney of the purchase money
and compensatioa for his services,
an enforceable trust resulted in
plaintiff's favor. Haight v. Pear-
son (1895), 11 Utah, 51; s. c, 39
Pac. Rep. 479.
1 Montesquieu v. Sandys, 18 Ves.
*302, 313. The client has the op-
tion to accept or avoid a sale. See
Case v. Carroll, 35 N. Y. 388;
Wade v. Pettibone, 11 Ohio, 60;
McDowell v. Milroy, 69 111. 500 ;
Manning v. Hayden, 5 Sawy. 361 ;
Berrien v. Lane, 1 Hoff. Ch. 428;
Howell v. Baker, 4 Johns. Ch. 120 ;
Xesbitt v. Lockman, 34 1ST. Y. 109;
Hawley v. Cramer, 4 Cow. 730;
Evans v. Ellis, 5 Denio, 643; Har-
per v. Perry, 28 Iowa, 60 ; Hess v.
Voss, 52 111. 481 ; Trotter v. Smith,
59 111.244; Cane v. Lord Allen, 2
Dow. 294; Ex parte James, 8 Ves.
352 ; Galbraith v. Elder, 8 Watts,
81 ; Henry v. Baiman, 25 Pa. St.
354. A solicitor may insist on and
maintain a mortgage from his
client for what is justly due to
him. Johnson v. Fessenmeyer, 25
Beav. 88; s. C, 3 De G. & J. 13;
Pearson v. jSTewson, 28 Beav. 59S.
Where the relation of client and
attorney is dissolved, and the par-
ties are no longer under its influ-
ence, they are to be regarded as
other persons. And the same
principle applies where the trans-
action is totally disconnected with
the relation, and concerns objects
not dependent on that relation. 1
Story's Equity Jurisprudence, §
313; Howell v. Baker, 4 Johns.
Ch. 126, 127. If a solicitor, pur-
chasing from his client, institute a
suit against third parties to enforce
his right, the objection to the
transaction on the ground of its
being a purchase by a solicitor
424
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 195.
also, where the relation has terminated and no influence
from it can be supposed to remain, the rule will not be en-
forced.1 In Hindson v. Weatherill it was held that the
considerations applicable to a gift inter vivos from a client
to his solicitor are not universally applicable to a testament-
ary disposition, and that the circumstance of a solicitor
preparing a will for a client, containing dispositions in his
own favor, does not of itself take away the right of the so-
licitor to be for his own benefit a devisee or legatee.2 So a
conveyance to an attorney that is voidable in equity may be
confirmed by the client in his will.3 The rule does not
apply where an attorney has been consulted in regard to
some point in the litigation, but is not employed or trusted
with the management of the case.* Where there was an
agreement that the fees of the attorney should be charged
against the estate if recovered, and there was no evidence of
undue influence, the contract was sustained.5 The rule will
not be enforced after a considerable lapse of time.6 The
irom his client cannot be main-
tained by such third parties.
Knight v. Bowyer, 23 Beav. 609.
1 Wood v. Downes, 18 Ves. 127.
"The case of Wells v. Middleton is
an extremely strong case ot this
kind. It was admitted that the
transaction was liable to no objec-
tion as between man and man ; but
it was overturned upon this great
principle, the danger from the in-
fluence of attorneys or counsel
over clients, while having the care
of their property, and, whatever
mischief may arise in particular
cases, the law with the view of
preventing public mischief says
they shall take no benefit derived
under such circumstances. It is
not denied in any case that if the
relation has completely ceased, if
the influence can be rationally
supposed also to cease, a client
may be generous to his attorney or
counsel as to any other person;
but it must go so far. Ibid.
2 Hindson v. Weatherill, 5 De G.,
M. & G. 301; O'Neill v. Farr, 1
Kich. (S. Car.) 80; Harrison's
Will, 1 B. Hon. 351 ; Walker v.
Hunter, 17 G-a. 364; Newhouse v.
Godwin, 17 Barb. 236; Chandler v.
Ferris, 1 Harring. 454, 464; Calvert
v. Davis, 5 Gill & J. 301, 302; Hill
v. Barge, 12 Ala. 687; Crispin v.
Dubois, 4 Barb. 393; 1 Story's
Equity Jurisprudence, 313.
3 Stump v. Gaby, 2 De G., M. &
G. 623. But see Waters v. Thorn,
22 Beav. 447.
4 Devinney v. Norris, 8 Watts,
314.
" Moss v. Bainbridge, 6 De G.,
M. & G. 292; Blagrave v. Kouth, 2
Kay & J. 509.
6 Clanricarde v. Henning, 30
Beav. 175 ; Ward v. Brown, 87 Mo.
468; Jones v. Roberts, 9 Beav. 419;
i 195-J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
425
rule in the case of attorneys is applied to all persons who
stand in the relation of confidential advisers, though not
attorneys in the technical sense, and who, as such, are in a
condition to obtain such information as will enable them to
take advantage in a bargain or purchase.1 In Hobday v.
Peters, where a mortgagee consulted a solicitor, who turned
her over to his clerk to assist her gratuitously, the clerk,
by reason of information derived during such employment,
bought up the mortgage for less than half the amount. It
was held that he was a trustee of the benefit for the mort-
gagee.2 It has been held, also, that where the clerk of a
broker, employed to make sale of land, who has access to
the correspondence between his principal and the vendor,
stands in such a relation of confidence to the latter that, if
he becomes the purchaser, he is chargeable as trustee for
the vendor and must reconvey or account for the value of
the land.3
Draper's Co. v. Davis, 2 Atk. 295;
Pitcher v. Rigby, 9 Price, 79;
Langstaff v. Taylor, 14 Ves. 262;
Newman v. Payne, 4 Bro. Ch. 350;
8. C, 2 Ves. Jr. 200; Walmesley v.
Booth, 2 Atk. 28; Proof v. Hinds,
Cas. temp. Talb. Ill; Smith v.
Brotherline, 63 Pa. St. 461 ; Moore
v. Brackiu, 27 111. 23.
1 Hobday v. Peters, 28 Beav. 140 ;
S. c, 6 Jur. (N. S.) 794; Cowery
v. Day, 5 Jur. (N. S.) 1199; Buffa-
low v. Buffalow, 5 Dev. & Bat. Eq.
241; Poillon v. Martin, 1 Sandf.
Ch. 569; Gardner v. Ogden, 22 N.
Y. 327.
2 Hobday v. Peters, 28 Beav. 349 ;
Cooke v. Lamotte, 15 Beav. 240.
"Lord Cottenham considered that
it extended to every case in which
a person obtains, by donation, a
benefit from another to the preju-
dice of that other person, and to
his own advantage, and that it is
essential in every such case, if the
transaction should be afterwards
questioned, that he should prove
that the donor voluntarily and de-
liberately performed the act, know-
ing its nature and effect. It is not
possible to draw the rule tighter,
or to make it more stringent."
Bomilly, M. R., in Cooke v. La-
motte, 15 Beav. 240.
8 Gardner v. Ogden, 22 N. Y.
327; Poillon v. Martin, 1 Sandf.
Ch. 569. "He should have rebuked
his clerk for taking advantage of
his position in the office, to make
such bargains with the clients of
his principal. Instead of advising
the clerk to re-exchange, because
the complainant was eccentric and
litigious, he should have required
him to do it instantly because
the transaction was abhorrent to
equity and good faith. Instead of
buying the bond and mortgage
himself, after Martin, by his hol-
low offer to re-exchange, had
caused the client to clutch with a
more tenacious grasp his glittering
prize, he should have exerted his
just influence upon both to have
426
IMPLIED TKUSTS.
[§ 196.
§ 196. From Fiduciary Relations in General. — The
principle by which the relation of trustee and beneficiary,
agent and principal, etc., is governed, as illustrated in the
preceding sections, applies also to all persons sustaining a
fiduciary relation in any form. The ground of the rule is
the opportunity to take advantage, or the ability to exert
an undue influence. Wherever either of these facts appears,
the burden of showing that the transaction is fair and equi-
table is upon the person sustaining the fiduciary relation.
In all cases of this kind where a conveyance is not set aside,
as of course, proof of fair dealing must be presented by the
interested party, or it will not be sustained by a court of
equity.1 In this class of cases belong those pertaining to
cancelled the transaction. I do
not see how the principle of law,
which prohibits attorneys and
counsel from deriving a benefit
from bargains made with their
clients, while having the care of
their property, can be maintained
if the purchase of this bond and
mortgage by Mr. Williams were to
be upheld." Poillon v. Martin, 1
Sandf. Ch. 569, 575. A solicitor
who, as agent for a trustee and
with full notice of the trusts, re-
ceives from such trustee a check
representing trust moneys intended
for investment on a mortgage,
which is an improper security, and
pays such check into his own
banking account, and, next busi-
ness day, pays the mortgage money
to the mortgagor by his own check
for the same amount, is not liable
as a constructive trustee. Semble,
the case would be the same if notes
were given the solicitor instead of
a check. Brinsden v. Williams, 8
Reports, 574; s. c. (1894), 3 Ch.
185.
1 Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves.
273; s. c, 3 White v. Tud. Lead.
Cas. in Eq. 462; Gray v. Mans-
field, 1 Ves. 379; Trevelyan v.
Charter, 9 Beav. 140; s. c, 11 CI.
& Fin. 714; Rhodes v. Bate, L. R.
1 Ch. App. 252; Pratt v. Barker, 1
Sim. 1 ; Gibson v. Russell, 2 Y. &
C. 104; Dent v. Bennett, 4 Myl.
& Cr. 269; Shallcross v. Old-
ham, 2 Johns. &H. 609; Whitebom
v. Hines, 1 Munf. 559; Blackie v.
Clark, L. J. 22 Ch. 377 ; Billings v.
Southee, 9 Hare, 534; Ahearnev.
Hogan, 1 Dr. 310; Wright v.
Proud, 13 Ves. 136; Revett v.
Harvey, 1 S. & S. 502; Holt v.
Agnew, 67 Ala. 368; Crispell v.
Dubois, 4 Barb. 393; Swissholm's
Appeal, 56 Pa. St. 475; Falk v.
Turner, 101 Mass. 494; Ex parte
Hughes, 6 Ves. 617; Morse v.
Royal, 12 Ves. 372; Ex parte Mor-
gan, 12 Ves. 6 ; Ex parte Lacey, 6
Ves. 625; Ex parte Reynolds, 5
Ves. 707; i?x parte Bennett, 10 Ves.
381 ; Attorney-General v. Claren-
don, 17 Ves. 500 ; Bailey v. Wat-
kins, Sugd. Law of Prop. 726;
Parshall's Appeal, 65 Pa. St. 233;
Ellicott v. Chamberlin, 38 N. J. Eq. ,
604; Bohm v. Bohm, 9 Colo. 100;
Dowling v. Feeley, 72 Ga. 557;
Carr v. Houser, 46 Ga. 477 ; King
v. Wise, 43 Cal. 628; Wade v. Har-
per, 3 Yerg. 383 ; Harrison v. Mocks,
§ 196. J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
427
husbands or wives, guardians, assignees, stewards, clergy-
men in their relations to their parishioners, medical advis-
ers, partners, joint contractors, receivers, confidential ad-
visers, and all other persons sustaining relations of this
general character.1 It has been held that the mere fact
10 Ala. 185 ; Saltmarsh v. Beene, 4
Porter, 283; Chapin v. Weed, 1
Clark, 264; Dorsey v. Dorsey, 3 H.
& J. 410 ; Beeson v. Beeson, 9 Barr,
284; Fisk v. Sarber, 6 W. & S. 18;
Campbell v. McLain, 23 Leg. Int.
26; S. C, 51 Pa. St. 200; Oakland
Savings Bank v. Wilcox, 60 Cal.
126.
i Wright v. Proud, 13 Ves. 136 ;
Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. 273;
s. c, 3 Lead. Cas. in Eq. 462 ; Kose
v. Mynott, 7 Yerg. 30 ; Berrien v.
McLane, 1 Hoff. Ch. 421 ; Farnam
v. Brooks, 9 Pick. 212; Starr v.
Vanderheyden, 9 Johns. 253; Miles
V. Brvin, 1 McCord Ch. 524;
Whichcote v. Lawrence, 3 Ves.
740; Newman v. Payne, 2 Ves. 199;
Nantes v. Corrock, 9 Ves. 182;
Hatch v. Hatch, 9 Ves. 292 ; Norton
v. Keilly, 2 Eden, 286; Wharton
v. May, 5 Ves. 27; Taylor v.
Popbam, 13 Ves. 59. Where land
is conveyed by a husband to his
wife, who orally agrees to hold it
subject to a trust, a subsequent
failure by her to observe the trust
will raise a presumption of fraud
on her part in obtaining the con-
veyance which will establish a con-
structive trust in favor of the ben-
eficiaries in the agreement. Hayne
v. Herman (1893), 97 Cal. 259;
s. c, 32 Pac. Rep. 171. A married
woman, on her death bed, at her
husband's solicitation, and on his
representation that if she would
place in him her title to certain
real estate, formerly her separate
property, which had been sold un-
der a decree, but which she was
entitled to redeem under a certifi-
cate of purchase and a contract, he
would comply with the contract,
and hold the property acquired for
the benefit of her children, trans-
ferred her interest to him. His
agreement was by parol, and the
wife's action was rendered neces-
sary by the fact that in case of her
death the property might be lost,
by reason of inability of her chil-
dren to comply with the contract.
After her death, the husband, with
money obtained from a loan upon
the property and from the wife's
estate, paid the amount due upon
the contract, and obtained a deed
of the property to himself. Held,
that the husband held the title in
trust for his wife's children, by
construction of law, and the statute
of frauds had no application. Lar-
mon v. Knight (1892), 140 111. 232;
s. C, 29 N. E. Rep. 1116; 30 N. E.
Rep. 318. An agreement that a
husband shall buy real estate in
his wife's name, she to make a will
devising it to him, is enforceable
in equity against the wife's heirs
as trustees of a constructive trust.
Sherman v. Sherman, 20 D. C.
Rep. 330. When a married woman's
father buys land for her, and pays
therefor, and her husband, by col-
lusion with other persons, procures
the title to be conveyed to him in-
stead of to his wife, a resulting
trust arises in her favor' as against
her husband's creditors. Steagall v.
Steagall (1S93), 90 Va. 73; s. c, 17
S. E. Rep. 756. The fact that a ward
can sue at law to recover funds
428
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 196.
that a donee was an attending physician, while there was no
evidence of any specially confidential relation, does not
used by her guardian in the pur-
chase of land in his own name does
not defeat her right to enforce a
resulting trust in such land.
Thompson v. Hartline (1894)
(Ala.). 16 So. Hep. 711. TLiough
a resulting trust will be created in
favor of the ward where a guardian
purchased land with money be-
longing partly to his ward, and
takes title to himself, the party
seeking to establish the trust must
clearly and distinctly show that the
land was purchased with the ward's
money. Pillars v. McConnell(18951 ,
141 Ind. 670; S. C, 40 X. E. Rep.
689. A mother under pressing cir-
cumstances conveyed to her son her
house and lot, he giving no other
consideration than a verbal prom-
ise to hold the premises for the
benefit of the mother and the other
children, and to give the latter
shares therein. The arrangement
also provided that the son should
receive the rents and profits, and
pay off a mortgage on the prem-
ises. The contract was complied
with until sometime after the
mother's death, when the son sold
the premises, and with the pro-
ceeds bought property which he
claimed as his own, repadiating
the agreement with his mother.
Held, that the confidential relations
of the parties and the circum-
stances made such act a fraud upon
the other children, and a trust
would be impressed on the prop-
erty and its proceeds intheirfavor.
Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 145 X. Y.
313; s. a, 39X. E. Rep. 1067. A
trust is raised where one purchases
at judicial sale, having at the time
of bidding or previously agreed, by
parol or otherwise, that he would
buy it and hold it subject to the right
of the other to repay the purchase
money and demand a conveyance.
Cobb v. Edwards (1895), 117 X. C.
244; s. a, 23 S.E. Rep. 241. Where
a person pays off incumbrances on
the land of another, taking title in
fee thereto in his own name, and
such person had been for many
years the personal friend of the
owner, and he advised her as to all
her business affairs, and the value
of the property was largely in ex-
cess of the amount paid to remove
the incumbrances, he must be held
to have acted as her trustee, and
the deed must be constated a mort-
gage to secure him for the money
paid out by him in clearing off the
incumbrances. McKee v. Griggs
(1893), 51 X. J. Eq. 178; s. c, 26
Atl. Rep. 158. The mere fact that
a person bids in at a sheriff's sale
land belonging to his brother, who
is insane, establishes no trust
therein in favor of the brother by
reason of such relationship, in the
absence of circumstances to show
that he actually occupied a posi-
tion of trust to his brother, or took
a fraudulent advantage of his in-
firmity. Hamilton v. Buchanan
(1893), 112 X. Car. 463; S. C, 17
S. E. Rep. 159. One who bid off
land at a sheriff's sale, under a pa-
rol agreement with the vendee to
buy for his benefit, holds as trustee
for the latter, and on being tend-
ered the amount of his bid, and
all other moneys advanced may be
compelled to convey. Collins v.
Williamson, 94 Ga. 635; s. c, 21
S. E. Rep. 140. Where a person
old and ignorant, under represen-
tations by the grantee in whom he
had implicit confidence, thatit was
§ 19-6.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
429
the best course to pursue to avoid
liability on a false claim, conveys
land, receiving an oral assurance
from the grantee that he will re-
convey on request, the grantee
having, however, no intention to
reconvey, the agreement to recon-
vey is not within the statute of
frauds. Eozell v. Vansyckle (1895),
11 Wash. 79; s. c, 39 Pac. Rep.
270. Where a mortgagee of cattle
consents to their sale by the mort-
gagor, the latter is not a trustee of
the mortgagee, in the absence of
an agreement that the sale shall be
in the name of such mortgagee.
Smith v. Crawford County State
Bank (1895) (Iowa), 61 ST. W. Rep.
378. Complainant's interest in her
father's estate having been sold on
execution for one-third of its
value, and the time for redemption
having nearly expired, she applied
to her mother and brother to as-
sist her, and the brother thereupon
bought the certificate of sale and
took a deed in his own name. Com-
plainant swore that he agreed to
restore the land to her when he
had reimbursed himself out of it,
and her testimony was corrobora-
ted by her two sisters, and contra-
dicted by her mother and two
brothers. Held, that the evidence
sustained a decree allowing com-
plainant to redeem. Lawson v.
Hurst (1895), 153 111. 232; s. C, 38
X. E. Rep. 629. Defendant, with
the consent of the owner, who was
in failing circumstances, took pos-
session of the latter's stock of goods
under a bill of sale, and agreement
previously made between them.
Defendant afterwards sold the
stock at private sale to his brother
for a sum less than the stock was
claimed to be worth. Held, that,
if defendant agreed to account to
the seller for any surplus pro-
ceeds of sale over his claim, the
burden was on him to show that
the sale to his brother was in good
faith. Duffle v. Clark (1895)
(Mich.), 64 X. W. Rep. 57. Plaint-
iff's intestate having given defend-
ant money enough to pay a judg-
ment against her, with instructions
to do so, and he, having undertaken
to do so, but, instead thereof, hav-
ing permitted her land to be sold
on execution, and having bid it in
himself and applied that money on
the purchase price, his action was
a fraud on her, and he took no ti-
tle, though, because of the sale, he
had to pay more than he received
from her; and plaintiffs would not,
before bringing ejectment, have to
tender the excess paid by him.
Eveiiyv. Harrison (1895), 167 Pa.
St. 355 ; S. C, 31 Atl. Rep. 668. The
parties being husband and wife, in
an action by him to establish a
constructive trust in certain land
held by her, in which he alleges
the purchase money therefor be-
longed to him, the burden is on
him to show fraud on her part.
Sing Bow v. Sing Bow (1894) (X.
J. Eq.), 30 Atl. Rep. 867. An heir
and administrator of a decedent,
who receives from another heir,
his brother, who resides at a dis-
tance, a power of attorney to con-
vey his interest in the lands of the
decedent, and who thereupon sells
some of them to pay taxes on the
residue, is not in such a fiduciary
relation to his brother that he can-
not buy out his interest in the es-
tate. Brown v. Brown (1895), 154
111. 35 ; S. C, 39 X. E. Rep. 983. A
husband holding money as trustee
for his wife and her sister pur-
chased land for them, paying part
cash, and giving a note signed by
himself and wife for the balance,
which was to be paid out of the
trust money. Afterwards, though
having trust money in his hands,
430 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 196.
render a conveyance voidable.1 So, also, it was held that
the administrator of a deceased partner, though still a mem-
ber of the firm, may purchase partnership property.2 In
cases of this character the fiduciary will be required to ac-
count for trust property that may have come into his hands,
whether by purchase or in any other manner, with the
profits which have accrued from his use of such property,
and also for any gifts received in connection with his trans-
actions in regard to it.3 But even this is not the full ex-
tent to which courts of equity may go. They will take ac-
count of the intimate and confidential relations that exist,
not only between relatives, but also between friends and
neighbors. Where advantage has been taken of such rela-
tions to secure an unfair bargain, it will be set aside by
making the wrongdoer a trustee for the benefit of the in-
jured party. Contracts between persons sustaining these
relations are not void, and there is no presumption of fraud.
The onus probandi is on the person seeking relief. But the
existence of such relations will be regarded as a reason for
a careful investigation, and if it appears that there has been
injustice relief will be given. The principle of equity by
which all cases of this class are governed is very clearly and
comprehensively stated by Lord Chancellor Brougham in
his opinion in Hunter v. Atkins, as follows: "Where the
only relation between the parties is that of friendly habits,
or habitual reliance on advice and assistance, accompanied
with partial empkmnent in doing some sort of business,
care must be taken that no undue advantage shall be made
of the influence thus acquired. The limits of natural and
often unavoidable kindness, with its effects, and of undue
influence exercised or unfair advantage taken, cannot be
he allowed the vendor to foreclose 2 Savage v. Williams, 15 La.
his lien, and procured from the Ann. 250; Carter v. Mcilanus, 15
purchaser, a deed to himself. Held, La. Ann. 641 ; Dugas v. Guilbeau,
that he held the land in trust, and 15 La. Ann. 581.
it was hot subject to sale under 3 Parshall's Appeal,65 Pa.St. 233;
judgment against him. Cobb v. Swissholm's Appeal, 56Pa. St. 475;
Trammell (1895) (C. C. A. Tex.), King v. Wise, 43 Cal. 628; Carrv.
30 S. W. Kep. 482. Houser, 46 Ga. 477; Bailey v. Wat-
1 Doggett v. Lane, ]2 Mo. 215. kins, Sug. Law of Property, 726.
§ 197.] IMPLIED TRUSTS. 431
more rigorously defined. Nor is it, perhaps, advisable that
any strict rule should be laid down, any precise line drawn.
If it were stated that certain acts should be the only tests
of undue influence, or that certain things should be re-
quired in order to rebut the presumption of it, such as the
calling in a third person, how easy it would be for cunning
men to avoid the one, or protect themselves by means of
the other, and so place their misdeeds beyond the denun-
ciations of the law, and secure the fruits of them out of
its reach ! If anyone should say that a rule is thus recog-
nized, which from its vagueness cannot be obeyed because
it cannot well be discerned, the answer is at hand. All
men have the interpreter of it within their own breasts ; they
know the extent of their influence, and are conscious whether
or not they have taken advantage of it in a way which they
would feel indignant that others similarly circumstanced
should do with regard to themselves."1
§ 197. From Purchase With Notice. — It is well estab-
lished that where any person purchases trust property of a
trustee with notice of the trust, he assumes all the respon-
sibility of the person of whom he made the purchase. He
takes the place of the trustee in holding the property in
trust for the equitable owner.2 It is immaterial whether
1 Hunter v. Atkins, 3 Myl. & K. 51 Pa. St. 377 ; Falk v. Turner, 101
113,140; Pratt v. Barker, 1 Sim. Mass. 194; Price v. Thompson, 84
1; s. c, 4 Buss. 507; Billings v. Ky. 219; Valette v.Tedens (1887),
Southee, 10 Eng. L. & Eq. 37; 122 111. 607; s, c, 14 N.E. Pep. 52;
Popham v. Brooke, 5 Buss. 8 ; State v. Eusk, 21 Wis. 212 ; Atkins
Griffiths v. Bobbins, 3 Madd. 191 ; v. Withers, 94 N. Car. 581 ; Bennett
Gibson v. Russell, 2 N. C. C. 104; v. Austin, 81 N. T. 308; Tracy v.
Dent v. Bennet, 7 Sim. 539; Hu- Colby, 55 Cal. 67, 91; Jones v.
guenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. 273 ; Dexter, 130 Mass. 380 ; Wyman v.
Smith v. Kay, 7 H. L. Cas. 750; Hooper, 2 Gray, 141; Wood v.
James v. Holmes, 8 Jur. (N. S.) Eobe, 96 N. Y. 414; s. c, 48 Am.
553, 732 ; Ellicott v. Chamberlain, Kep. 640 ; Johnson v. Dougherty,
38 N. J. Eq. 604; Bohm v. Bohm, 18 1ST. J. Eq. 406; Allen v. Jackson
9 Colo. 100; Crisspell v. Dubois, 4 (1887), 122 111. 567; s. C, 13
Barb. 393; Scott v. Thompson, 21 N. E. Rep. 840.
Iowa, 599 ; Greenfield's Estate, 24 2 Le Neve v. Le Neve, Amb. 436
Pa. St. 232; Lengenfelter v.Kitch- s. C, 3 Atk. 646; 1 Ves. 64
ings, 58 Pa. St. 485; Maul v. Keder, 2 Lead. Cas. in Eq. 23, and notes
432
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 197.
the conveyance is voluntary, or for a valuable consideration.
In either case the transaction is fraudulent on the part of
Mackreth v. Symmons, 19 Ves. 349 ;
Birch v. Ellames, 2 Anst. 427; Jen-
nings v. Moore, 2 Vern. 609;
Brooke v. Bulkeley, 2 Ves. 498;
Daniels v. Davidson, 16 Ves. 249;
Ferras v. Cherry, 2 Vern. 384;
Crofton v. Ormsby, 2 Sch. & Lef.
583; Kennedy v. Daly, 1 Sch. &
Lef. 355 ; Potter v. Sanders, 6 Hare,
1 ; Merry v. Abney, 1 Ch. Cas. 38 ;
Phayre v. Peree, 3 Dow. 129; Bo-
very v. Smith, 1 Vern. 149; Mead
v. Orrerry, 3 Atk. 235; Adair v.
Shaw, 1 Sch. & Lef. 262 ; Burgess v.
Wheat. 1 Eden, 195; Pawlett v.
Atty.-Gen., Hardr. 465; Dunbarv.
Tredennick, 2 B. & B. 319; Wigg
v. Wigg, 1 Atk. 382; Mansell v.
Mansell, 2 P. Wins. 681 ; Saunders
v. Dehew, 2 Vern. 271; Grant v.
Mills, 2 V. &B. 306; "Wormley v.
Wormley, 8 Wheat. 421; Oliver v.
Piatt, 3 How. 333; Caldwell v. Car-
rington, 9 Pet. 86; Wright v.
Dame, 22 Pick. 55 ; Clarke v. Hack-
erthron, 3 Yeates, 269 ; Peebles v.
Beading. 8 Serg. & R. 495 ; Carey v.
Eyre, 1 De G., J. & S. 149; Case v.
James, 29 Beav. 512; Taylor v.
Stibbert, 2 Ves. Jr. 437; Suydam v.
Martin, Wright, 384 ; Truesdell v.
Calloway, 6 Miss. 605 ; Liggett v.
Wall, 2 A. K. Marsh. 149; Pugh v.
Bell, 1 J. J. Marsh. 403; Benzien
v. Lenoir, 1 Car. L. K. 504; Massey
v. Mcllwaine, 2 Hill Eq. 426 ; Bailey
v . Wilson, 1 Dev. & Bat. 182 ; Mur-
ray v. Ballou, 1 Johns. Ch. 566
Denn v. McKnight, 6 Halst. 385
Wilkins v. Anderson, 1 Jones, 399
Hood v. Fahnestook, 1 Barr, 470
Reed v. Dickey, 2 Watts, 459
Jones v. Shaddock, 41 Ala. 362
James v. Cowing, 17 Hun, 256
Smith v. Walter, 49 Mo. 250; Ryan
v. Doyle, 31 Iowa, 53. The assignor
of plaintiff's intestate sold land to
defendant K, receiving notes in
part payment, secured by a trust
deed on the land, and before ma-
turity assigned the notes to plaint-
iff's intestate. Thereafter K per-
mitted the land to be sold for taxes,
failed to redeem, and donated the
land, and transferred his donation
certificate to defendant S without
consideration. K continued in
possession for some months, after
such transfer, and when it was
rented called frequently to see
about the condition of the crops,
and there was other evidence that
he had the beneficial interest there-
in. Held, to show that K and S
confederated to defeat the enforce-
ment of the trust deed, and that S
must be deemed a trustee holding
the land as security for the pay-
ment of the notes. Drake v. Sher-
burne (1893), 57 Ark. 563;
s. c, 22 S. W. Rep. 430. One who,
by fraud, and without considera-
tion therefor, obtains from an illit-
erate person a conveyance of land,
the latter thinking he was convey-
ing personal property, holds the
title as trustee, and a mortgagee,
to whom he mortgages the land as
security for a pre-existing debt,
takes in subordination to the trust,
whether he had notice of the fraud
or not. Frickv. Taylor (1895), 94
Ga. 683; s. c, 21 S. E. Rep.
713. The mere fact that vendor
had knowledge of the existence of
the subcontract in which the
vendee agreed to reconvey to the
company was not sufficient to put
the vendor on inquiry, so as to
charge him with knowledge of the
company's rights when he pro-
cured the release frorn the vendee
§ 197.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
433
the trustee. If the conveyance is voluntary, the person
receiving the legal title will be charged with all the obliga-
tions to which the estate was subject before the conveyance,
and this obligation will not be effected by a notice of the
trust. As a volunteer he will suffer no injustice in receiv-
ing the estate subject to all the claims to which it is subject.
This rule applies, not only where the estate is held under an
express trust, but also where a trust has arisen by operation
of law, or has been decreed as a result of fraud. Thus,
where A has come into possession of property by fraud,
and, in consequence, has been made a constructive trustee,
and sells the property to B, who has knowledge of the
fraud and consequently has notice of the trust, B will be
held a trustee. In his relation to the property he will take
the place and assume the responsibilities of A.1 The pur-
and the company's manager. Strat-
ton v. California Land & Timber
Co.,86Cal. 353; s. c, 24 Pac. Eep.
1065. Where the legal title to land
has been acquired in pursuance of
a verbal agreement to hold the
same in trust for a specified pur-
pose, where it clearly appears that
the title has been fraudulently ac-
quired, and is still held in fraud of
the rights of another having a val-
uable interest in the premises, a
trust is created by operation of law.
VonTrotha v. Bamberger, 15 Colo.
1; S. C, 24 Pac. 883. Where per-
sons having notice of a contract to
convey land to plaintiff procure a
conveyance of the land to them-
selves, they take it subject to a
trust in his favor, and he may com-
pel them to convey him the legal
title. Ross v. Parks (1890), 93
Ala. 153; s. c, 8 So. Rep. 368.
Both the person who sells property
belonging to another and the
person who receives the proceeds
from him with notice of the own-
er's title are liable to the owner as
constructive trustees. Smith v.
28
Jeffreys (1894) (Miss.), 16 So.
Rep. 377. That the taking of a
legal estate after notice of a prior
right, makes a person male fide pui -
chaser; and not, that he is not a
purchaser for a valuable considera-
tion in every other respect. This
is a species of fraud and dolus
malus itself ; for he knew the first
purchaser had the clear right of
the estate, and after knowing that,
he takes away the right of another
person by getting the legal estate.
Le Neve v. Le JTeve, Amb. 436;
s. c, 3 Atk. 646; 2 Lead. Cas. in
Eq. *23.
1 Pye v. George, 1 P. Wms. 681;
Mansell v. Mansell, 2 P. Wms. 681 ;
Saunders v. Dehew, 2 Vern. 271;
Smith v. Bowen, 35 N, Y. 83; Ly-
ford v. Thurston, 1G N". H. 399;
Sadler's Appeal, 87 Pa. St. 154;
Lyons v. Bodenhamer, 7 Kan. 455 ;
Leigh v. Macauley, 1 T. & C. 260;
Pennell v. Deffell, 4 De G., M. &
G. 372, 3S8; Ernest v. Croydill, 2
DeG.,F.& J. 175; Smith v, Barnes,
L. R. 1 Eq. 65; Boursot v. Savage,
L. R. 2 Eq. 134; In re European
434 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [.§ 198.
chase having been made with notice of the trust, the pur-
chaser cannot bar the right of the beneficiary by acknowl-
edging or purchasing other claims, and he holds the estate
as trustee for the equitable owner and is responsible directly
to him. Any purchases that he may make, if they involve
a profit, will inure to the benefit of the cestui que trust.1
§ 198. The Subject Continued. — The rule in regard to
property purchased of a trustee with notice does not apply
in cases where it is purchased in good faith without notice
of the trust. In his opinion, in the case of Jerrard v.
Saunders, Lord Chancellor Loughborough states the rule
in the following words : "The book does not state it amiss :
'A purchaser bona fide, without notice of any defect in his
title at the time he made the purchase, may buy in a stat-
ute, or mortgage, or any other incumbrance; and, if he can
defend himself at law by any such incumbrance bought in,
his adversary shall never be aided in a court of equity for
setting aside such incumbrance; for equity will not disarm
a purchaser, but assist him, and precedents of this nature
are very ancient and numerous : namely, where the court
hath refused to give any assistance against a purchaser,
either to an heir, or to a widow, or to the fatherless, or to
Bank, L. R. 5 Ch. App. 358; Ex George, 42 N. H. 375; Dey v. Dey,
parte Cooke L. R. 4 Ch. D. 123; 26N. J.Eq. 182; Murray v. Ballou,
In re Hallitt's Estate, L. R. 13 Ch. 1 Johns. Ch. 566; Viele v. Blod-
D. 696 ; Mechanics' Bank v. Leton, gett, 49 Vt. 270 ; Wilkins v. Ander-
1 Pet. 399: Russell v. Clark, 7 son, 11 Pa. St. 399; Hood v.
Cranch, 69, 97; Caldwell v. Car- Fahnestock, 1 Pa. St. 470; Peebles
rington, 9 Pet. 86; Pindall v. Tre- v. Reading, 8 Serg. & R. 495;
vor, 30 Ark. 249; Griffin v. Blan- Tankard v. Tankard, 84 N". Car.
char, 17 Cal. 70; Price v. Reeves, 286; Newton v. Porter, 69 N". T.
38Cal.457; Scott v. Umbarger, 41 133; Swinburne v. Swinburne, 28
Cal. 410 ; Wright v. Dame, 22 Pick. ST. Y. 568.
55 ; Liggett v. Wall, 2 A. K. Marsh. 1 Brook v. Bulkeley, 2 Ves. 498
149; McVey v. McQuality, 97 111. Moloney v. Kernan, 2 Dr.&W. 31
93 ; Musham v. Musham, 87 111. 80 ; Kennedy v. Daly, 1 Sch. & Lef . 37
Bank v. Prater, 64 Ga. 609; Ward Bovey v. Smith, 1 Vern. 145; Gau-
v. Spivey, 18 Fla. 847 : Wells v. tier v. Doug. Manf. Co., 13 Hun,
Francis, 7 Colo. 396; Mercier v. 514; Williams v. Thorn, 11 Paige,
Hemme, 50 Cal. 606; Boyd v. 459; Amory v. Lawrence, 3 Cliff.
Brinckin, 55 Cal. 427; Smith v. 323.
Walser, 49 Mo. 250; Eaton v.
$ 198.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
435
creditors, or even to one purchaser against another.' "J In
this case it was held that a defendant, stating by answer a
purchase for valuable consideration without notice, shall
not be compelled to answer farther ; this court will not take
the least step against a purchaser for valuable consideration
without notice, not even to perpetuate testimony against
him.3 If a defendant submits to answer a bill of discovery,
he must make a full answer, unless the discovery may tend
to criminate himself, or he has purchased for a valuable
consideration.3 Equity extends to an innocent purchaser
protection, not only against bills of relief, but also against
bills of discovery.4 In equity he will be allowed the same
advantages which are afforded by the law, for there is
nothing- in such a case that can attach itself to his conscience
in favor of a claim against him.5 So a purchaser with no-
tice, under such an innocent purchase without notice, is
1 Jerrard v. Saunders, 2 Ves. Jr.
454, 457; Beach v. Dyer, 93 111.
295; Newton v. Newton, L. R. 6
Eq. 135; Dotterer v. Pike, 60 Ga.
29 ; Mercier v. Herame, 50 Cal. 606 ;
Clarke v. Haekethorne, 3 Yeates,
266; Reed v. Dickey, 2 Watts, 459;
Viele v. Blodgett, 49 Vt. 276; Hub-
bard v. Burrell, 41 Wis. 365; Fos-
ter v. Ambler (188S), 24 Fla. 519;
s. c, 5 So. Rep. 263; Shively v.
Parker, 9 Ore. 500 ; Eaton v. George,
42 X. H. 375; Hassey v. Wilke, 55
Cal. 525; Wilkins v. Anderson, 11
Pa. St. 399 ; Scott v. Umbarger, 41
Cal. 410; Griffin v. Blanchar, 17
Cal. 70.
2 Jerrard v. Saunders, 2 Ves. Jr.
454.
3 M. E. Church v. Jaques, 1
Johns. Ch. 65. It is a general rule
that where a defendant submits to
answer he must answer fully ; but
this rule is subject to exception
and modification, according to the
circumstances of the case; as
where the defendant objects to a
discovery because the plaintiff has
no title. Phillips v. Prevost, 4
Johns. Ch. 205, 208.
4 2 Story's Equity Jurisprudence,
1502; Maiden v. Merrill, 2 Atk. 8;
Bean v. Smith, 1 Mason, 272; An-
derson v. Roberts, 18 Johns. 513;
Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 133,
134; Daubeney v. Cockburn, 1
Meriv. 638, 639 ; Ledyard v. Butler,
9 Paige, 132; Hubbell v. Currier,
10 Allen, 333 ; Bartlett v. Verner,
56 Ala. 580; Horton v. Smith, 8
Ala. 73; Daniel v. Sorrel, 9 Ala.
436; Parr v. Eliason, 1 East, 92,
95 ; Sterry v. Arden, 1 Johns. Ch.
261,271; s.c.,12 Johns. 536; Rob-
erts v. Anderson, 3 Johns. Ch. 377,
378; s. c, 18 Johns. 513; Gore v.
Brazier, 3 Mass. 541 ; Trull v. Bige-
low, 16 Mass. 406.
5 2 Story's Equity Jurisprudence,
1504 ; 1 Ibid. 410 ; Wood v: Mann, 1
Sumn. 507; McNeil v. Magee, 5
Mason, 269; Vattier v. Hinde, 7
Pet. 252; Fitzsimmons v. Ogden,
7 Cranch, 2; Boone v. Chiles, 10
Pet. 177; Payne v. Compton, 2
Younge & C. 457. Where a bill in
436 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 198.
entitled to the same protection. Without this provision,
the title of the purchaser without notice would become un-
marketable on his hands.1 Whether the plea of a bona fide
purchaser, is good against a legal title, in particular that of
a dower, is a question touching which there is not entire
harmony among authorities. It is maintained that the
case of a doweress at least is an exception to the rule. On
this point Mr. Justice Story says: "Indeed, so highly
favored is dower that a bill for a discovery and relief has
been maintained even against a purchaser for a valuable
consideration without notice, who is perhaps generally as
much favored as anyone in courts of equity. The ground
of maintaining the bill in such a case is that the suit for
dower is upon a legal title, and not upon a mere equitable
claim to which only the plea of a purchase for a valuable
consideration has been supposed properly to apply. This
decision has often been found fault with, and in some cases
the doctrine of it denied."2 In support of this view it was
held in Larrowe v. Beam, before the Supreme Court of
Ohio, that the plea of a bona fide j)urchase is no defense
against a legal title. Where a widow is beyond seas and so
within the saving clause of the statute of limitations, equity
will not allow the staleness of her claim to be set up to bar
equity was brought to set aside a consideration, and without notice
conveyance, asserted to have been under a fraudulent grantee, would
procured by fraud, and one of the hold the estate at law against the
defendants pleaded that he was a original grantor. Wood v. Mann,
bona fide purchaser under the ] Sumn. 506.
grantee of a parcel of the premises, 1 2 Story's Equity Jurisprudence,
without notice of the asserted 1503; 1 Ibid. 410; Varick v. Briggs,
fraud, and that he had paid part of 6 Paige, 323; Bennett v. Walker, 1
the consideration money, and that West, 130; Jackson v. McChesney,
the residue was secured by mort- 7 Cow. 360; Jackson v. Henry, 10
gage. Held, that this plea fur- Johns. 185; Jackson v. Given, 8
nished no bar to the bill; that it Johns. 573; Demarest v. Wyncoop,
should have averred that the whole 3 Johns. 147 ; Farrars v. Cheny, 2
consideration of the purchase had Vern. 384; Jackson v. Given, 8
been paid before notice of the Johns. 137; Grosvenor v. Allen, 9
plaintiff's title. The above plea Paige, 74, 76, 77; Caskell v. La-
overruled absolutely, and the party throp, 63 Ga. 96.
ordered to answer generally. A 2 1 Story's Equity Jurisprudence,
bona fide purchase for a valuable § 630.
§ 199. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 437
her dower. ' As against the heir, the widow is to be en-
dowed according to the value at the time of the assign-
ment. Every subsequent purchaser Avith notice becomes
subject to the same equities as the party from whom he
purchased. In equity the vendee takes the place of the
vendor.1
§ 199. Limitations of the Rule. — While a purchaser
for a valuable consideration is favored in equity, the opera-
tion of the rule is carefully guarded. The theory is to
protect the innocent purchaser and not to aid in a fraudu-
lent transaction. A purchaser who is made a defendant in
equity must make oath in his answer that he is a bona fide
purchaser without notice ; he must set forth the particulars
of his purchase and the claim of the vendor in regard to
title. He must testify to an actual conveyance, not merely
to an agreement to convey, and he must furnish evidence
that the consideration recited in the instrument was actually
paid. It will not answer the purpose that there was an
agreement to pay, and that security for the payment was
1 Larrowe v. Beam, 10 Ohio, 498. covery, the effect of which will be
"The English authorities apply to invalidate the deeds in his pos-
peculiarly to a case which can session. Such a case will rarely
seldom arise in Ohio. There it arise in this State; the public reg-
becomes frequently necessary to istry of deeds makes evident the
institute not a petition, but a regu- true nature of the title of both
lar bill in chancery, making a parties, without the necessity of
great number of persons parties, rousing from the sleep of half a
the nature of whose title has al- century the secret imperfectious
ways been a secret. The registry which may exist in some one of
of deeds is then the exception and the deeds under which a defendant
not the rule. The consequence is claims." Ibid. 506; 2 Stoiy's
that a discovery from the defend- Equity Jurisprudence, 789; Cham-
ants themselves is indispensably pion v. Brown, 6 Johns. Ch. 403
necessary in order to remove out Davis v. Beardham, 1 Ch. Cas. 39
of the way the obstruction which Green v. Smith, 1 Atk. 572, 573
hinders the claim of the com- Smith v. Lytle, 27 Minn. 184
plainant. Under such circum- Trimmer v. Bayne, 9 Ves. 209
stances the English courts have Walker v. Preswick, 2 Ves. 622
sometimes said that if the defend- Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Ves. 329
ant will plead that he is a bona fide 336; Pollexfen v. Moore, 3 Atk
purchaser, without notice, he shall 273.
not be compelled to make a dis-
438
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 199..
given. It must appear that payment was made.1 If it is
set up that notice was given, the denial must be specific and
positive. The denial must extend to all the particulars set
forth in the bill. Any circumstances which it is claimed
constituted a notice, or indicated a fraudulent intention,
must be denied, not merely in general, but in all of the de-
tails. Any failure to make such full, prompt and positive
denial will be construed as a failure to maintain his case.2
i Marshall v. Frank, 8 Pr. Ch.
480; s. c, Anst. 14; Blacket v.
Langlands, Sel. Cas. Ch. 51; s. c,
Gilb. 58 ; Walwyn v. Lee, 9 Ves. Jr.
26; Story v. Winsor, 3 P. Wms.
279 ; Head v. Egerton, 1 Vern. 246 ;
Dobson v. Leadbetter, 13 Ves. 230;
Page v. Lever, 2 Ves. Jr. 450;
Hughes v. Garth, Amb. 421 ; Lanes-
borough v. Kilmaine, 2 Moll. 403;
Jackson v. Kowe, 4 Kuss. 514;
Trevanion v. Morse, 3 Ves. 3?, 226 ;
irandlyn v. Ord, 1 Atk. 571 ; Mil-
lard's Case, Freem. 43 ; Wagstaff
v. Kead, 2 Ch. Cas. 156; More v.
Mayhow, 1 Ch. Cas. 34; s. c, 2
Freem. 175; Day v. Crundel, Hard.
510; Hardingham v. Nichols, 3
Atk. 304; Moloney v. Kernan, 2
Dr. & War. 31 ; Maitland v. Wilson,
3 Atk. 814; Kelsal v. Bennett, 1
Atk. 522. To entitle a party to
protection as a subsequent bona
fide purchaser, he must make a lull
statement of the facts and circum-
stances of his case and of the con-
sideration paid. It is not sufficient
that a subsequent purchaser has
purchased for a valuable consider-
ation, without notice, but the con-
sideration must actually have been
paid before notice ; and if a part of
the consideration only has been
paid before notice, the purchaser
will be protected only pro tanto.
The mere averment that a party is
a purchaser for a valuable consid-
eration without notice, and that the
consideration is paid, is not suffi-
cient ; the actual consideration paid
and when and how paid must be
also stated. Everts v. Agnes, 4
Wis. 343.
2 Story v. Winsor, 3 P. Wms.
279 ; Walwyn v. Lee, 9 Ves. Jr. 26 ;
Lanesborough v. Kilmaine, 2 Moll.
403; Head v. Egerton, 1 Vern. 246;
Trevanion v. Morse, 3 Ves. 32, 226 ;
s . c . , Amb . 421 ; Jackson v. Ro we, 4
Kuss. 514; Hughes v. Garth, Amb.
421; Page v. Lever, 2 Ves. Jr. 450;
Maitland v. Wilson, 3 Atk. 814;
Hardingham v. Nichols, 3 Atk.
304; Moloney v. Kernan, 2 Dr. &
War. 31 ; Everts v. Agnes, 4 Wis.
343. "In all cases in which a party
sets up his title to relief in equity
as a bona fide purchaser, he must
deny notice, though it be not
charged. 3 P. Wms. 244 n. ; Bod-
man v. Vandenbendy, 1 Vern.
179. It is a general rule in plead-
ing, that whatever is essential to
the right of the party, and is neces-
sarily within his knowledge must
be positively and precisely alleged;
and the plaintiffs, coming in the
character of bona fide purchasers,
were bound to state affirmatively
the equity of their case; if they
will not aver the fact, that they
were purchasers without notice,
we are not bound to presume it.
The fact rests in their own knowl-
edge. In Jerrard v. Saunders, 2
Ves. Jr. 454, the defendant
§ 200. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 439
In a plea of purchase for valuable consideration without
notice, it is enough to deny notice generally in the plea,
unless facts are specially charged in the bill as evidence of
notice.1 A plea of adverse possession to a bill charging
that the defendant has in his custody documents showing
the plaintiff's title, must be accompanied by an answer
denying that charge.2
§ 200. Consideration Must be Valuable. — A general
definition only can be given of a valuable consideration;
but, in this instance, it must be something distinguishable
from a meritorious consideration, or from what in other
cases might be good and valid. The relinquishment of
any legal or equitable right, as the extinguishment of a
debt or claim, will have the same legal effect as the 'pa.y-
ment of money. In the case of Brush v. Scribner it was
held that where a promissory note, made by A and indorsed
in blank by B, was intrusted to C, who had no interest in
it, to get it discounted at the bank for A's benefit, and C
fraudulently delivered it to D, who, acting fairly and with-
out knowledge of the fraud, received it in satisfaction and ex-
tinction of a pre-existing debt against C ; in an action brought
by D against B, as indorser, it was held that D was a bona
fide holder of the note for a valuable consideration, and as
such was entitled to recover.3 But a purchase will not be
held good against the equitable interest of a cestui que trust,
pleaded a purchase for a valuable themselves when produced, the
consideration, without notice, and plaintiff is entitled to move for
Loughborough held that he was their production, although the an-
bound to deny, fully, and in the swer positively swears that they
most precise terms, every circum- form part of the defendant's title,
stance from whence notice could be and in no way assist or make out
inferred." Frost v. Beekman, 288, the title of the plaintiff. Hardman
302. v. Ellames, 2 Myl. & K. 732, 745.
i Pennington v. Beechey, 2 Sim. 3 Brush v. Scribner, 11 Conn.
&S. 282. 388; Dudley v. Littlefield, 21 Me.
2 Hardman v. Ellames, 2 Myl. & 418; Walker v. Geisse, 4 Whart.
K. 732. If a defendant in his an- 252; Eeddick v. Jones, 6 Ired. 107;
swer states the effect of documents Barney v. Earle, 13 Ala. 100; Bus-
admitted to be in his possession, sell v. Haddock, 3 Gilm. 233; De-
but for his greater certainty craves pew v. Waddington, 6 Whart.
leave to refer to the documents 220.
440
implied Trusts.
[§ 200.
unless for a valuable consideration. The payment must be
either money, or something that is a valuable consideration
in a pecuniary sense.1 But if the consideration answers
1 Everts v. Agnes, 4 Wis. 343 ;
Swan v. Ligan, 1 McCord Ch. 232;
Upshaw v. Hargrove, 6 Sm. & M.
292; Frost v. Beekman, 1 Johns.
Ch. 288; Boone v. Bains, 23 Miss.
130 ; Patten v. Moore, 32 N. H. 382.
One who claims as a purchaser
must, as a general rule, show that
the consideration was valuable and
actually paid, by calling witnesses
who were present at the transac-
tion, or other means of proof, and
cannot rely oh the recitals in the
deed or the vendor's receipt as
evidence of the payment of value,
or any other fact material to this
case. In Lloyd v . Lynch, 28 Pa. St.
419, where a defendant claimed to
be a purchaser for a valuable con-
sideration as against the plaintiff,
who sought to enforce an antece-
dent equity, the Chief Justice said
"that the defendant had given no
evidence of the payment of the
purchase money except the receipt
in the deed from his immediate
grantor. That receipt was un-
doubted evidence of payment
against the grantor, and all who
claimed under him subsequently.
It was also evidence to pass the
grantor's right, whatever it was at
the time. But it was no evidence,
whatever, of the fact of payment
against a stranger, or even against
one who derived title from the
grantor previously to the convey-
ance to the plaintiff. As it regarded
such a one, the receipt was a mere
ex parte declaration, not under oath,
and made without any opportunity
at cross-examination." See also
on this point Nolen v. Gwyn, 16
Ala. 725; De Vendal v. Malone, 25
Ala. 272; Kimball v. Fenner, 12 N.
H. 248 ; Rogers v. Hall, 4 Watts,
359; Clarke v. Depew, 1 Casey,
509; Union Canal Co. v. Toung, 1
Whart. 410, 432; Bolton v. Johns,
5 Barr, 145 ; Hawley v. Bullock, 29
Tex. 216; Snelgrove v. Snelgrove,
4 Desaus. 2S7. It is essential to
entitle the vendee to protection in
England that the purchase should
have been brought to a conclusion
by the payment of the whole of
the purchase money on the one
part, and the execution of the con-
veyance on the other; and relief
will be denied if notice be given
while the transaction is incomplete
in either particular. In this coun-
try there has been much differ-
ence of opinion. Simms v. Rich-
ardson, 2 Litt. 229; Nantz v. Mc-
Pherson, 7 Munf. 599; Bush v.
Bush, 3 Strojjh. Eq. 301; Pillow's
Heirs v. Shannon's Heirs, 3 Yerg.
308. It is also held that the trans-
fer of the assets on an estate in
payment of the personal debt of
the executor will take effect as a
sale for valuable consideration, and
vest a good title in the creditor
when he has acted in good faith,
and without knowledge of any
fraudulent or improper design on
the part of the debtor. Nugent v.
Gifford, 2 Atk. 403; Mead v. Lord
Orrerry, 3 Atk. 285 ; Petrie v. Clark,
11 Serg. & E. 377; Field v. Schief-
felin, 7 Johns. Ch. 150; Donaldson
v. State Bank, 1 Dev. 103; Ohio
Life Ins. Co. v. Ledyard, 8 Ala.
866. It is held, both in England
and this country, that actual pay-
ment is in general necessary to the
character of a purchaser for valu-
able consideration, and that giving
security or executing an obligation
§ 201.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
441
the demand in this regard, it is not essential that it should
be a full or adequate consideration. The simple fact that
the price paid was not the full value of the property will
not be sufficient to set aside the purchase. But if the in-
adequacy of the consideration is so great as to indicate that
the purchase is with a fraudulent intent it will not be sus-
tained.1 It is held that marriage is a valuable considera-
tion, but if a conveyance is made after marriage in fulfill-
ment of an antenuptial agreement, the particulars of the
contract must be clearly shown. In Lord Keeper v. Wyld,
where defendant pleaded a settlement made after the mar-
riage, in pursuance of an agreement made before marriage,
but did not show what the agreement was, it was held to be
not a good plea.2
§ 201. Conditions of Notice. — A purchaser without
notice can claim protection against the equitable owner
for payment will not be sufficient
High v. Batte, 10 Yerg. 555
Christie v. Bishop, 1 Barb. Ch. 105
Murray v. Ballou, 1 Johns. Ch. 566
Hunter v. Sumrall, 3 Litt. 62
MoBee v. Sollis, 1 Strobh. Eq. 90
Jackson v. Caldwell, 1 Cow. 622
Jewett v. Palmer, 7 Cow. 65, 265
Heatley v. Finster, 2 Johns. Ch. 15
Frost v. Beekman, 1 Johns. Ch
288; Flagg v. Mann, 2 Sumn. 486
Eubank v. Preston, 8 Mon. 292
Leggett v. Wall, 2 A. K. Marsh
149; Curtis v. Hitchcock, 10 Paige
399; Vattier v. Hinde, 7 Pet. 252
Dillard v. Crocker, 1 Speer Eq. 20
Kyle v. Tait, 6 Gratt. 44 ; Warner
v. Winslow, 1 Sandf. Ch. 430;
Champlin v. Laytin, 18 Wend. 407.
1 More v. Mayhow, 1 Ch. Cas.
34; Stoiy v. Winsor, 2 Atk. 630;
Tourville v. Naish, 3 P. Wms. 387 ;
Jones v. Stanley, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr.
685; High v. Batte, 10 Yerg. 555;
Christie v. Bishop, 1 Barb. Ch.
105; Murray v. Ballou, 1 Johns.
Ch. 566; Jackson v. Caldwell, 1
Cow. 622; McBee v. Loftes, 1
Strobh. Eq. 90 ; Patten v. Moore,
32 N. H. 382; Harris v. Norton, 16
Barb. 264; Heatley v. Finster, 2
Johns. Ch. 19; Jewett v. Palmer,
7 Cow. 65, 265 ; Perkinson v. Ilanna,
7Blackf. 400; Dugan v. Vattier, 3
Blackf. 245; Rhodes v. Green, 36
Ind. 10; Lewis v. Phillips, 17 lnd.
108; Thomas v. Stone, Walk. Ch.
117; Warner v. Whittaker, 6 Mich.
133; Dixon v. Hill, 5 Mich. 404;
Stone v. Welling, 14 Mich. 514;
Blanchard v. Tyler, 12 Mich. 339;
Palmer v. Williams, 24 Mich. 333;
Wormley v. Wormley, 8 Wheat.
421; Wood v. Mann, 1 Sumn. 506.
A trustee is not chargeable with
imaginary values, or more than he
has received, unless there is evi-
dence of gross negligence, amount-
ing to willful default. Osgood v.
Franklin, 2 Johns. Ch. 1, 27.
2 Lord Keeper v. Wyld, 1 Vern.
139; Harding v. Hardrett, temp.
Finch, 9.
442
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 201.
only as the purchase money was actually paid and the con-
veyance taken before a notice was received. Though a
definite contract may be made and security given for the
payment of the purchase money, yet if notice is received
before payment is made, the notice will convert the pur-
chaser into a trustee for the equitable owner -,1 and it is held
that, though the purchase money is actually paid,- if the
instrument of conveyance has not been duly executed before
notice is received, the purchaser will hold the property as
a constructive trustee.2 On this point Chief Justice Mar-
shall, in his opinion in Vattier v. Hinde, said: "The rules
respecting a purchaser without notice are framed for the
protection of him who purchases a legal estate and pays the
purchase money without knowledge of an outstanding
equity. They do not protect a person who acquires no
semblance of title. They apply fully only to the purchaser
of the legal estate."3 In some of the States it is held that
a partial payment of purchase money, before notice is re-
in point ; and indeed the doctrine
has passed into a common axiom of
equitable jurisprudence." Story,
J., in Wood v. Mann, 1 Sumn. 510.
See also Union Canal Co. v. Young,
1 Whart. 410; Christie v. Bishop, 1
Barb. Ch. 105; Harris v. Norton,
16 Barb. 264 ; Spicer v. Waters, 65
Barb. 237; Gantier v. Doug. Manf.
Co., 13 Hun, 514; Williams v.
Thorne, 11 Paige, 459 ; Amory v.
Lawrence, 3 Cliff. 323.
2Wiggv. Wigg, 1 Atk. 384; s.
C, 2 Sugd. V.&I\ 274.
3 Vattier v. Hinde, 7 Pet. 252
Bush v. Bush, 3 Strob. Eq. 131
Warner v. Winslow, 1 Sandf. Ch
430; Kyle v. Tait, 6 Gratt. 44
Doswell v. Buchanan, 3 Leigh
362; Abell v. Howe, 43 Vt. 403
Cole v. Scott, 2 Wash. 141 ; Frost
v. Beekman, 1 Johns Ch. 288
Cook v. Bronaugh, 8 Eng. 190
Duncan v. Johnson, 2 Eng. 190
Dillard v. Crocker, 1 Spear Eq. 20
1 Wormley v. Wormley, 8 Wheat.
421; Wood v. Mann, 1 Sumn. 506.
"It is very clear that the plea fur-
nishes no bar to the bill. In order
to make it a good bar it is necessary
that it should aver that the whole
consideration of the purchase had
been paid before the notice of the
plaintiff's title. Now, the plea
admits that part of the purchase
money has been paid, and that the
residue is unpaid. It is plain, then,
upon the unshaken doctrine of the
authorities, that the plea is bad.
Lord Kedesdale has laid down this
doctrine in full and exact terms in
his excellent work on Pleadings in
Equity. Speaking upon the sub-
ject of a plea of this sort by a pur-
chaser, he says: "It (the plea)
must aver the consideration and
actual payment of it; a considera-
tion secured to be paid is suffi-
cient." And he is fully borne out
by authority. Hardingham v.
Nicholls, 3 Atk. 304, is directly
§ 202.J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
443
ceived, gives the purchaser an interest pro tanto.1 Where
a purchaser without notice makes improvements on the
land, while he has paid the purchase money only in part,
he has a claim for the amount of his expenditures in addi-
tion to the sum that he has paid on the purchase.2
§ 202. How Notice is to be Given. — Notice of a prior
equity, or that property is held in trust, may be given to
the purchaser direct, or to any person acting in his stead,
as his attorney or agent. It is a well established rule that
notice given to an attorney or agent is a notice to his prin-
cipal.3 But the person to whom notice is given must be
employed to represent the purchaser in the transaction,
and the notice must be given at the time of the purchase,
or conveyance.4 Notice to an agent who is not employed
1 Youst v. Martin, 3 Serg. & K . 423 ;
Paul v. Fulton, 25 Mo. 156; Ulrich
v. Beck, 1 Harris, 631; s. C, 4
Harris, 499; Juvenal v. Jackson, 2
Harris, 519; Bellas v. McCarthy, 10
Watts, 13.
2Boggs v. Varner, 6 Watts & S.
469; Farmers' Loan Co. v. Maltby,
8 Paige, 563; Frost v. Beekman, 1
Johns Ch. 288 ; Everts v. Agnes, 4
Wis. 343; Doswell v. Buchanan, 3
Leigh, 361; Flagg v. Mann, 2
Sumn. 486.
3 Aster v. Wells, 4 Wheat. 466
Hovey v. Blanchard, 13 N. H. 145
Bank of U. S. v. Davis, 2 Hill, 451
Griffith v. Griffith, 9 Paige, 315
Jackson v. Winslow, 9 Cow. 13
Blair v. Owles, 1 Munf . 38 ; Barnes
v. McChristie, 3 Penn. 67; Weste-
welt v. Hoff, 2 Sanf . 98; Jackson v.
Leek, 19 Wend. 339; Jackson v.
Sharp.9 Johns.163 ; Sheldon v. Cox,
2 Eden, 228; Newstead v. Searles,
1 Atk. 265; Tunstall v. Trappes,
3 Sim. 286; Dryden v. Frost,
3 Myl. & Cr. 670; Lenehan v. Mc-
Cabe, 2 Ir. Eq. 342; Eichards v.
Gledstanes, 3 Giff . 298 ; Atterbury v.
Wallis, 8 De G., M. & G. 454;
Brotherton v. Hutt, 2 Vern. 574;
Maddox v. Maddox, 1 Ves. 61 ;
Ashley v. Bailey, 2 Ves. 368; Es-
pin v. Pemberton, 3 De G. & J.
547; Jones v. Bamford, 21 Iowa,
217; Myers v. Boss, 3 Head, 59;
The Branch Bank v. Steele, 10 Ala.
195; Fulton Bank v. Canal Co., 4
Paige, 127; Bank of U. S. v. Davis,
2 Hill, 451 ; Fulton Bank v. Bene-
dict, 1 Hall, 4S0; Washington Bank
v. Lewis, 22 Pick. 24; Watson v.
Wells, 5 Conn. 468.
4 Preston v. Tubbin, 1 Vern. 286;
Winchester v. BaltimoreK.R. Co.,
4 Md. 231 ; Hood v. Fahnestock, 8
Watts, 489 ; Bank of IT. S. v. Davis,
2 Hill, 451; Bracken v. Miller, 4
Watts & S. 102; Howard Ins. Co.
v. Halsey, 4 Seld. 271 ; Fuller v.
Bennett, 2 Hare, ' 394; Finch v.
Shaw, 19Beav. 500; s. c, 5 H. L.
Cas. 905; Tylee v. Webb, 6 Beav.
552; s. c, 14 Beav. 14; Woosley v.
Scarborough, 3 Atk. 392; Ashley v.
Bailey, 2 Ves. 36S; Warwick v.
Warwick, 3 Atk. 291; Mountford v.
Scott, 3 Madd. 34; Jackson v.
Sharp, 9 Johns. 169; New York
Cent'l Ins. Co. v. National Ins. Co.,
444
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 202.
in the business in hand will not bind his principal.1 In
Sponable v. Snyder it was held that notice to a husband, at
the time of receiving a conveyance of land to himself and
his wife, of a prior unregistered mortgage, will not operate
as notice to the wife so as to give the mortgage a prefer-
ence in respect to her title, especially where she pays the
consideration for the conveyance out of her separate estate.2
Where notice is given directly to the principal, it must be
given during the progress of the transaction, as it has
been held that he might have known the facts some time
prior to it and subsequently have forgotten them.3 Where
20 Barb. 468; Winchester v. Balti-
more R. K. Co., 4 Md. 231 ; Roberts
v. Fleming, 53 111. 598; Smith's
Appeal, 11 "Wright, 12S; Weisserv.
Dennison, 6 Seld. 68; Mehan v.
Williams, 12 Wright, 238; Far-
mers' Bank v. Payne, 25 Conn. 444;
Willis v. Valette, 4 Mete. 186;
Keenan v. Missouri Ins. Co., 12
Iowa, 106; Pierce v. Red Bluff
Hotel, 31 Cal. 160; McCormick v.
Wheeler, 36 111. 115; Martin v.
Jackson, 3 Casey, 504, 508. Al-
though in general, whatever is
known to the agent must be pre-
sumed to be known to the princi-
pal, I am inclined to think that the
better opinion is, that this rule is
confined to that class of cases,
where the knowledge of the fact
comes to the agent while he is act-
ing for his principal, in the course
of the very transaction which be-
comes the subject of the suit."
Nelson, J., in New York Ins. Co.
v. National Ins. Co., 20 Barb. 468.
Sergeant, J., in Hood v. Fahne-
stock, 8 Watts, 489, says : "It is now
well settled that if one in the
course of his business as agent, at-
torney or counsel for another, ob-
tains knowledge from which a
trust would arise, and afterwards
becomes the agent, attorney or
counsel for a subsequent purchaser
in an independent and unconnected
transaction, his previous knowl-
edge is not notice to such other
person for whom he acts. The
reason is, that no man can be sup-
posed to carry in his mind the rec-
ollection of former occurrences;
and, moreover, in the case of the
attorney or counsel,- it might be
contrary to his duty to reveal the
confidential communications of his
client. To visit the principal with
constructive notice, it is necessary
that the knowledge of the agent or
attorney should be gained in the
course of the same transaction in
which he is employed by his
client." See also Ross v. Horton,
2 Cush. 591; Henry v. Morgan, 2
Binn. 497.
1 Fulton Bank v. New York Coal
Co., 4 Paige, 127; U. S. Insurance
Co. v. Schriver, 3 Md. Ch. 381;
Bank v. Payne, 25 Conn. 444;
North River Bank v. Aymar, 3
Hill, 362; Ross v. Horton, 2 Cush.
591; Henry v. Morgan, 2 Binn.
497.
* Sponable v. Snyder, 7 Hill, 427.
3 Hamilton v. Royse, 2 Sch. &
Lef. 377 ; s. c, 2 Sugd. V. & P. 277;
Henry v. Morgan, 3 Binn. 497;
Boggs v. Varner, 6 Watts & S. 111.
§ 203. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 445
the first purchaser from the trustee was a bona fide pur-
chaser, for value, without notice, a purchaser from him,
and all subsequent purchasers, will take the property free
from any equitable claim, though they may have received
notice at the time of their purchase.1 But if, after a num-
ber of changes, the property again comes into the hands of
the original trustee, he will again become a trustee for the
defrauded beneficiary.2
§ 203. Characteristics of Notice. — A good notice may
be "actual" or "constructive," or, as has been said, "im-
plied." The distinction between these kinds of notice is
not always clearly marked, and there is sometimes ground
for a difference of opinion as to which class a particular
notice belongs. In most cases this uncertainty is not a
cause of embarrassment, as an implied or constructive notice
has the same legal effect as an actual notice. Actual notice
is a conveyance of the knowledge of the fact of the trust
to the purchaser, or to his agent or attorney who is con-
ducting the purchase for him, or it is the giving of such in-
formation as should lead him to ascertain the facts of the
case.3 Constructive notice is such information as involves
iBrandlyn v. Ord, 1 Atk. 571; Wood v. Chapin, 13 X. Y. 509;
Lowther v. Cbarlton, 2 Atk. 242; Peck v. Arehart, 95 111. 113; Far-
Lacey v. Wilson, 4 Munf. 313 ; Har- gason v. Edington, 49 Ark. 207;
rison v. Forth, Pr. Ch. 51; Sweet East v. Pugh, 71 Iowa, 162; Craig
v. Southcote, 2 Bro. Ch. 66; v. Zimmerman, 87 Mo. 475; Fer-
Fletcher v. Peek, 6 Craneh, 87; rass v. Cherry, 2 Yes. 383 ; Mertens
Boone v. Chiles, 10 Pet. 187; Ter- v. Jolliffe, Amb. 313; Demarest v.
rett v. Crombie, 6 Lans. 82; Parker Wynkoop, 3 Johns. Ch. 147. Nor is
y. Crittenden, 37 Conn. 145 ; Church a purchaser with notice affected if
v. Ruland, 64 Pa. St. 441; Trull v. his vendor had no nolice. Low-
Bigelow, 16 Mass. 406; Mott v. ther v. Carleton, 2 Atk. 242; Bum-
Clarke, 9 Barr, 399; Boynton v. pus v. Platner, 1 Johns. Ch. 213;
Reese, 8 Pick. 329 ; Griffith v. Halstead v. Bank of Kentucky, 4 J.
Griffith, 9 Paige, 315 ; Trulock v. J. Marsh. 554 ; Brocken v. Miller,
Peeples, 3 Kelly, 446. 4 Watts & S. 102 ; Fletcher v. Peck,
2 Lawrence v. Stratton, 6 Cush. 6 Craneh, 87; Rutgers v. Kings-
163; Church v. Ruland, 64 Pa. St. land, 3 Halst. Ch. 178; Dana v.
441; Schutt y. Large, 6 Barb. 373; Newhall, 13 Mass. 498.
Bovey v. Smith, 1 Yern. 149. A 3 Mayor v. Williams, 6 Md. 235.
purchaser without notice is not af- In the c ise of Williamson v. Brown,
fected by notice to his vendor. 15 N. Y. 354, 358, Selden, J., in a
446
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 203.
or implies the knowledge of the fact of the prior equitable
claim. While it is difficult to give accurate and compre-
hensive definitions or rules relating to this subject, some
decisions have been rendered that are in a high degree in-
very clear opinion points out the
line of demarcation between actual
and constructive notice. He says :
"The plaintiff's counsel contends,
that knowledge sufficient to put the
purchaser upon inquiry is only pre-
sumptive evidence of actual notice,
and may be repelled by showing
that the party did inquire with
reasonable diligence, but failed to
ascertain the existence of the un-
registered conveyance ; while on
the other hand, it is insisted that
notice which makes it the duty of
the party to inquire, amounts to
constructive notice of the prior
conveyance, the law presuming
that due inquiry will necessarily
lead to its discovery. The counsel
for the defendant cites several au-
thorities in support of his position,
and among others the cases of
Tuttle v. Jackson (6 Wend. 213),
and Grimstone v. Carter (3 Paige
421). In the first of these cases
Walworth, Chancellor, says: "If
the subsequent purchaser knows of
the unregistered conveyance, at
the time of his purchase, he cannot
protect himself against that con-
veyance; and whatever is sufficient
to make it his duty to inquire as to
the right of others, is considered
legal notice of those rights;" and
in Grimstone v. Carter the same
judge says: "And if the person
claiming the prior equity is in the
actual possession of the estate, and
the purchaser has notice of that
fact, it is sufficient to put him on
inquiry as to the actual rights of
such possessor, and is good con-
structive notice of those rights."
It must be conceded that the lan-
guage used by the learned chancel-
lor in these cases, if strictly accu-
rate, would go to sustain the doc-
trine contended for by the defend-
ants. Notice is of two kinds : Act-
ual and constructive. Actual no-
tice embraces all degrees and
grades of evidence, from the most
direct and positive proof to the
slightest circumstance, from which
a jury would be warranted in in-
ferring notice. It is a mere ques-
tion of fact, and is open to every
species of legitimate evidence
which may tend to strengthen or
impair the conclusion. Constructive
notice, on the other hand, is a legal
inference from established facts;
and like other legal presumptions
does not admit of dispute. "Con-
structive notice,1* says Judge Story,
"is in its nature no more evidence
of notice, the presumption of
which is so violent that the court
will not even allow of its being con-
troverted." A recorded deed is an
instance of constructive notice. It
is of no consequence, whether the
second purchaser has actual notice
of the prior deed or not. He is
bound to take, and is presumed to
have, the requisite notice. So, too,
notice to an agent is constructive
notice to the principal, and it-
would not in the least avail the
latter to show that the agent had
neglected to communicate the fact.
In such cases the law imputes no-
tice to the party whether he has it
or not. Legal or implied notice,
therefore, is the same as construct-
ive notice, and cannot be contro-
verted by proof. But it will be
found on looking into the cases
§ 203.] IMPLIED TRUSTS. 447
structive and valuable. In a recent case it was held that
actual notice, as applicable to conveyances, does not neces-
sarily mean actual knowledge ; it may be express or implied ;
it may be proved by direct evidence, or may be implied (in
that way proved) from indirect or circumstantial evidence;
a person may have notice or its equivalent ; may be estopped
to deny notice, — in fine, the statutory actual notice is a
conclusion of fact capable of being established by all grades
of legitimate evidence. The doctrine of actual notice im-
plied by circumstances supports the rule that, if a party
has knowledge of such facts as would lead a fair and pru-
dent man, using ordinary caution, to make further inqui-
ries, and he avoids inquiry, he is chargeable with notice of
the facts which, by ordinary diligence, he would have as-
certained. Actual notice of facts which, to a prudent man,
can only indicate notice, is proof of notice. As to what
would be a sufficiency of facts to excite inquiry, is too
difficult of definition to admit of any definite rule, each
case depending on its peculiar facts.1 In his opinion
in this case, Chief Justice Peters said: "The same facts
may sometimes be such as to prove both constructive
and actual notice, that is, a court might infer con-
structive notice, and a jury infer actual notice from the
facts. There may be cases where the facts show actual,
that there is much want of precis- upon inquiry," would seem to im-
ion in the use of these terms. They «ply that if the party is faithful in
have been not unfrequently applied making inquiries, but fails to dis-
to degrees of evidence barely suffi- cover the conveyance, he will be
cient to warrant a jury in inferring protected. The import of the
actual notice, and which the slight- terms is, that it becomes the duty
est opposing proof would repel in- of the party to inquire. If, then,
stead of being confined to those he performs that duty, is he still to
legal presumptions of notice which be bound, without any actual no-
no proof can overthrow. The use tice? The presumption of notice
of these terms by the Chancellor, which arises from proof of that de-
therefore, in Tuttle v. Jackson and gree of knowledge which will put
Grimstone v. Carter [supra] is by a party upon inquiry is, I appre-
no means conclusive. The phrase- hend, not a presumption of law,
ology uniformly used, as descrip- but of fact, and may, therefore, be
tive of the kind of notice in ques- controverted by evidence."
tion, "sufficient to put the party 1 Knapp v. Bailey, 79 Me. 195.
448 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 204.
when they do not warrant the inference of constructive
notice, as where a deed is not regularly recorded, and not
giving constructive notice, but a second purchaser sees it
on the records, thereby receiving actual notice."1 What
constitutes constructive notice it is somtimes, in a degree,
difficult to determine. On this point, Lord Chancellor
Cranworth, in his opinion in Ware v. Lord Egmont, said:
"The question, when it is sought to affect a purchaser with
constructive notice, is not whether he had the means of ob-
taining, and might by prudent caution have obtained, the
knowledge in question, but whether the not obtaining it
was an act of gross or culpable negligence. It is obvious
that no definite rule as to what will amount to gross or cul-
pable negligence, so as to meet every case, can possibly be
laid down. But I think it clear that the imputation of
gross negligence cannot fairly be fixed on a purchaser
merely because it did not occur to him, or his advisers, to
inquire whether a transaction, legally valid, and under
which there had been long enjoyment, might not have been
so conducted in its origin as to have given to third persons
equitable rights, of which there was no trace on the face of
the abstract.2
§ 204. The Subject Continued In some of the States
the recording of a deed is made an actual or legal notice to
1Knappv. Bailey, 79 Me. 195; M. & G-. 460, 473. "Where a per-
Hastings v. Cutler, 24 N. H. 481. son has actual notice of any matter
Actual notice may be proved by * of fact, there can be no danger of
direct evidence, or it may be in- doing injustice if he is held to be
f erred, or implied (that is, proved), bound by all the consequences of
as a fact from indirect evidence — that which he knows to exist. But
by circumstantial evidence. A where he has no actual notice, he
man may have notice or its legal ought not to be treated as if he had
equivalent. He may be so situated notice, unless the circumstances
as to be estopped to deny that he are such as enable the court to say,
had actual notice. We are speak- not only that he might have ac-
ing of the statutory notice required quired, but also that he ought to
under the conveyances act. A have acquired, the notice with
higher grade of evidence may be which it is sought to affect him, —
necessary to prove actual notice that he would have acquired it but
appertaining to commercial paper, for his gross negligence in the con-
Kellogg v. Curtis, 69 Maine, 212. duct of the business in question."
2 Ware v. Lord Egmont, 4 De C, Ibid.
§ 204. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 449
all subsequent purchasers, but in many instances these
statutory provisions have been considerably modified by the
decisions of the courts. "In a large number of American
cases the discussion concerning actual notice has arisen upon
an interpretation of a statutory provision which expressly
requires 'actual notice'of a prior unrecorded deed or incum-
brance in order that it may have priority over a subsequent
deed or mortgage which is first put on record. In a few of
the States the courts have interpreted the intention of the
legislature as demanding that the personal information of
the unrecorded instrument should be proved by direct evi-
dence, and as excluding all instances of actual notice estab-
lished by circumstantial evidence. In most of the States,
however, where this statutory clause is found, the courts
have defined the 'actual notice' required by the legislature
as embracing all instances of that species in contradistinc-
tion from constructive ' notice ; that is, all kinds of actual
notice, whether proved by direct evidence or inferred as a
legitimate conclusion from circumstances. Whichever view
of the statute be taken, these decisions are all useful in de-
scribing the nature of actual notice, and especially in dis-
tinguishing actual notice, proved by circumstantial evidence,
from constructive notice."1 In the case of Maul v. Rider
'2 Pomeroy Equity Jurispru- Mo. 62, 66; Barnes v. McClintOD, 3
deuce, 596, note. See also Brown Penr. & W. 67; s. c, 23 Am. Dec.
v. Volkening, 64 N. Y. 76, 82, 83; 62; Nelson v. Sims, 23 Miss. 383,
Lambert v. Newman, 56 Ala. 623, 388; s. c, 57 Am. Dec. 144; Grif-
625 ; Helms v. Chadbourne, 45 Wis. fith v. Griffith, 1 Hoff . Ch. 153 ;
60, 70;Loughridge v. Bowland, 52 Rogers v. Jones, 8 N. H. 264;
Miss. 546, 553; Eeynolds v. Buck- Trefts v. King, 18 Pa. St. 157, 160;
man, 35 Mich. 80; Erickson v. Hunt v. Dunn, 74 Ga. 124; Urqu-
Eaferty, 79 111. 209, 212; Shepard- hart v. Leverett, 69 Ga. 92; Wailes
son v. Stevens, 71 111. 646; Chi- v. Cooper, 24 Miss. 208, 228; Parker
cago, etc. B. R. Co. v. Kennedy, v. Foy, 43 Miss. 260, 266; s. c, 55
70111. 350,361; Warren v. Swett, Am. Eep. 484; Maupin v. Evans, 47
31 N. H. 332, 341 ; Hull v. Noble, Mo. 304, 306, 307 ; Eck v. Hatcher,
40 Me. 459 ; Curtis v. Blair, 26 Miss. 58 Mo. 235 ; Munroe v. Eastman,
309, 328; s. c, 59 Am. Dec. 257; 31 Mich. 283 ; Shotwell v. Harrison,
Buttrick v. Holden, 13 Met. 355, 30 Mich. 179; Parker v. Kane, 4
357; Jaques v. Weeks, 7 Watts, 261, Wis. 1; s. c, 65 Am. Dec. 283;.
274; Epley v. Witherow, 7 Watts, Tillinghast v. Champlin, 4 E.rt.
163, 167; Bartlett v. Glascock, 4 173, 215; s. c, 67 Am. Dec. 510;
29
450
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 204.
it was held that the record of a deed is notice only to those
who are bound to search for it. It is not publication to the
world at large. By reasonable diligence is meant where
there is some reason to awaken inquiry and direct diligence
Buck v. Paine, 50 Miss. 648, 655 ;
Carter v. City of Portland, 4 Ore.
339, 350 ; Pringie v. Dunn, 37 Wis.
449, 460, 461, 465; s. C, 19 Am.
Kep. 772. A very instructive and
able opinion upon this question is
that of Taylor, J., in Brinkoian v.
Jones, 44 Wis. 498, 519. He says :
"The actual notice required by the
statute is not synonymous with
actual knowledge. None of the
cases, not even those cited from
Massachusetts, hold that, in order
to charge the purchaser with act-
ual notice, it must be shown that
he had actual knowledge of the
precise claim, of the person hold-
ing the unrecorded defeasance.
We think the true rule is, that no-
tice must be held to be actual when
the subsequent purchaser has act-
ual knowledge of such facts as
would "put a prudent man upon
inquiry, which, if prosecuted with
ordinary diligence, would lead to
actual notice of the right or title in
conflict with that which he is
about to purchase." Where the
subsequent purchaser has knowl-
edge of such facts, it becomes his
duty to make inquiry, and he is
guilty of bad faith if he neglects to
do so, and consequently he will be
charged with the actual notice he
would have received if he had
made the inquiry. We are aware
that this construction of the statute
is in conflict with the later decis-
ions of the Supreme Courts of Mas-
sachusetts and Indiana, and -with
the definition given to the term
'actual notice' by Bouvier in his
Law Dictionary, 236, and by Story
in his Equity Jurisprudence, § 399
Parker v. Osgood, 3 Allen, 487
Dooley v. Wolcott, 4 Allen, 406
Sibley v. Lefflngwell, 8 Allen, 584
White v. Foster, 102 Mass. 375
Lamb v. Pierce, 113 Mass. 72
Crassen v. Swoveland, 22 Ind. 428-
434. * * * These cases all proceed
upon the theory that actual notice
and actual knowledge mean the
same thing. We prefer to give a
construction to this particular sec-
tion of our statute, which will
bring it, as far as possible, in har-
mony with all other statutes of the
State made for the protection of
purchasers of real estate. As all
other statutes relating to registry
were intended to protect only those
who purchase in good faith, and
not those who purchase in fraud of
the party holding the real title,
there is a presumption that the
adoption of this particular section
was not intended to make an ex-
ception to this just rule. * * * The
construction we are inclined to
give to this statute is abundantly
sustained by authority. The Su-
preme Courts of Iowa, Missouri,
Oregon and Maine, in which the
law of notice is the same as in
Massachusetts, hold to the rule
adopted by us in this case and do
not follow the strict construction"
given to the law in Massachusetts.
* * * In Maupia v. Emmons, 47
Mo. 304-6, the court say : 'The act-
ual notice required by the statute
is used in contradistinction to the
constructive notice given by the
record. It does not mean that
there must necessarily be direct
§ 204. j
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
451
in a channel in which it would be successful. Whatever
puts a party on inquiry amounts to notice, provided the in-
quiry becomes a duty and would lead to the knowledge of
the requsite fact by ordinary diligence and understanding.
General rumor of the fact is not sufficient to place a party
on inquiry. There must be some act or declaration from
an authentic source, which a person would be careless if he
disregarded.1 It is held that lis pendens is constructive
notice, but this depends upon the circumstances. The com-
mencement of an action by the service of a summons does
not create a lis pendens, affecting third persons not parties
to the action. To bind a purchaser pendente lite by the
judgment there must also be a bill or complaint on file at
the time of his purchase in which the claim upon the prop-
erty is set forth. The rule of lis pendens is a hard one,
not a favorite of the courts, and a party claiming the ben-
and positive evidence that the sub-
sequent purchaser knew of the ex-
istence of the deed. Any proper
evidence tending to show its facts
and circumstances coming to his
knowledge that would put a man
of ordinary circumspection upon
inquiry, should go to the jury as
evidence of such notice.1 :' In the
case of Kettlewell v. "Watson, L.*K.
21 Ch. Div. 685, 704, the principle
is stated thus : "The ground upon
which the courts have relieved
against registered conveyances, or
even against a prior legal title,
seems to be fraud. The court will
not allow a man to avail himself of
a legal estate which he, has recov-
ered, or of the right which he may
have under a registered convey-
ance, when he, at the time he took
the legal title, or at the time of the
registration of the conveyance,
knew a fact which made it uncon-
scionable for him to take the legal
estate or to effect the registration.
* * * That unconscionable act re-
quires, of course, the coincidence
in the same person of the knowl-
edge and of the act, because, if A
knows a thing, and B does some-
thing inconsistent with A's knowl-
edge, there is nothing fraudulent
in the act; but if A knows some-
thing which renders it unconscion-
able for him to do the act, and he
does it, then there is fraud. The
fraud may be in an agent, he both
knowing the fact and doing the
act, in which case it may be un-
lawful for the principal to avail
himself of the fraudulent act of his
agent; or the fraud may be in the
principal himself."
1 Maul v. Eider, 59 Pa. St. 167;
Jaques v. Weeks, 7 Watts, 267;
Massey v. Greenhow, 2 Patton &
Heath, 255, 256 ; Parker v. Kane, 4
Wis. 1; Kerns v. Swope, 2 Watts,
78 ; Jacks v. Weeks, 7 Watts, 266 ;
Epleyv. Witherow, 7 Watts, 163,
167; Bellas v. McCarthy, 10 Watts,
13 ; Spafford v. Weston, 29 Me. 140.
452
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 204.
efit of it must clearly bring his case within it. In the ab-
sence of proof, therefore, it will not be presumed that the
complaint was filed prior to the entry of judgment.1 The
following definition of an implied notice is the best, per-
haps, that has been given : "Implied notice includes neither
positive knowledge, nor information so direct and unequivo-
cal as necessarily to carry conviction to the mind of the
person notified. Neither does it belong to that class which
depends upon legal presumption. It is circumstantial evi-
dence, from which the jury, after estimating its value, may
infer notice. It differs from express notice for the reason
that the latter is supposed to be absolutely convincing in
itself, while the former merely suggests to the mind of the
person to be thereby affected the existence of the fact to
which his attention is directed, and points out the means
by which he may obtain positive and convincing informa-
i Leitch v. Wells, 48 N. Y. 585;
Hayden v. Bucklin, 9 Paige, 512;
Kingv. Bell, 28 Conn. 593; Norton
v. Burge, 35 Conn. 250, 260; Mur-
ray v. Ballou, 1 Johns. Ch. 566;
Murray v. Finster, 2 Johns. Ch.
155; Heatley v. Finster, 2 Johns.
Ch. 158; Griffith v. Griffith, 1 Hoff.
153; Jackson v. Ketcham, 8 Johns.
479 ; Harris v. Carter, 3 Stew. 233 ;
Tongue v. Morton, 6 Harris &
Johns. 21 ; Owings v. Myers, 3
Bibb. 279; Jackson v. Andrews, 7
"Wend. 152; Chapman v. West, 17
X. Y. 125; Patterson v. Brown, 32
1ST. Y. 81 ; Bakeman v. Montgomeiy,
1 McCarter, 106; MoPherson v.
Hansell, 2 Beas. 299; Hersey v.
Tnrbot, 3 Casey, 418; Pratt v. Hoag,
5 Duer, 631 ; Harrington v. Slade,
22 Barb. 16G; Gilman v. Hamilton,
16 111. 225; Ashley v. Cunningham,
16 Ark. 16S; Whiting v. Beebe, 7
Eng. 564; Norton v. Burge, 35
Conn. 250; Gassom v. Donaldson,
18 B. Mon. 231; Green v. White, 7
Blackf. 242; Loomis v. Eiley, 24
Iowa, 307; Cooley v. Brayton, 16
Iowa, 10; Jackson v. Warren, 32
111. 331. Under the foregoing de-
cisions it is settled that a, bill to
foreclose a mortgage or establish a
resulting or constructive trust is
constructive notice to purchaserg,
and to creditors, who obtain judg-
ment after the institution of the
suit. Horn v. Jones, 28 Cal. 194
Wiokliffe v. Bell, 1 Bush, 427
Knowles v. Koblin, 20 Iowa, 101
Boyer v. Cockrell, 3 Kan. 282; Ed-
ward v. Blanksmith, 35 Ga. 213.
As to the application of the doc-
trine to personal property where
the course of the decisions is that
a purchaser of goods or securities
from a trustee, pending a bill filed
to enforce the trust, is invalid and
may be set aside. Scudder v. Van
Amburgh, 4 Edvv. 29; Boiling v.
Carter, 9 Ala. 770 ; Shelton v. John-
son, 4 Sneed, 672; Leitch v. Wells,
48 Barb. 637; Diamond v. Law-
rence Co. Bank, 37 Pa. St. 353;
Murray v. Lylburn, 2 Johns. Ch.
44.
§ 205. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 453
tion. It differs, on the other hand, from constructive no-
tice, with which it is frequently confounded and which it
greatly resembles, with respect to the character of the in-
ference upon which it rests ; constructive notice being the
creature of positive law, or resting upon strictly legal infer-
ence, while implied notice arises from inference of fact."1
§ 205. Notice to Purchasers at Executors' Sales. —
An executor has no power to dispose of real estate in his
possession except as it is conferred by the will. If it is
charged with debts or legacies, and no power to sell is
conferred by the will, the executor must obtain an order
from the court to enable him to dispose of it for that pur-
pose. For this reason purchasers must look to the pro-
visions of the will, or to the order of the court. In the
case of Brush v. Ware, before the Supreme Court of the
United States, it was held that no principle is better estab-
lished than that a purchaser must look to every part of the
title, which is essential to its validity. An executor has
not, ordinarily, any power over the real estate. His
powers are derived from the will, and he can do no valid
act beyond his authority. Where a will contains no special
provision on the subject the land of the deceased descends
to his heirs ; and this right cannot be divested or impaired
by the unauthorized acts of the executor. The law requires
reasonable diligence in a purchaser to ascertain any defect
of title. But when such defect is brought to his knowl-
edge, no inconvenience will excuse him from the utmost
scrutiny. He is a voluntary purchaser, and having notice
of a fact which casts doubt on the validity of his title,
the rights of innocent persons are not to be prejudiced
1 Wade on Notice, § 8, 2d. Ed. 1 A. K. Marsh. 56; Lasselle v. Bur-
See also Farnsworth v. Childs, 4 nett, 1 Blackf. 150; Davis v. Big-
Mass. 637 ; Koberts v. Anderson, 3 ler, 62 Pa. St. 241 ; Williamson v.
Johns. Ch. 371 ; Pitney v. Leonard, Brown, 15 N. Y. 354; Heermans v.
1 Paige, 461; Bingamore v. Hyatt, Ellsworth, 64 N. Y. 159; Hoyt v.
ISm. & M. Ch. 437; Plumb v. Sheldon, 3 Bosw. 267; Massie v.
Fluitt, 2 Anstr. 432; Hinde v. Vat- Greenhow, 2 Pat. & H. 255.
tier, 1 McLean, 110 ; Cotton v. Hart,
454
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 205.
through his negligence.1
Proof of fraud or collusion on
the part of the executor or administrator in procuring the
1 Brush y. Ware, 15 Pet. 93. In
the case cited, Justice McLean
uses this language: "Why was
not the defendant bound to search
for the will? The answer given is,
that the distance was too great,
and the place where the will could
be found was not stated on the
warrant, nor on any other of the
papers. That mere distance shall
excuse inquiry in such a case
would be a new principle in the
law of notice. * * * And if
such a search had been fruitless, it
is certain that it could have been
found on the public record of wills
of New Kent County. A search
short of this would not lay the
foundation for parol evidence of
the contents of a written instru-
ment. And shall a purchaser make
a bad title good, by neglecting or
refusing to use the same amount of
vigilance? In the case of Reeder
v. Barr, 4 Ohio, 458, the Supreme
Court of Ohio held, that where a
patent was issued to Newell, as
assignee of the administrator of
Henson Keeder, deceased, it was
sufficient to charge a subsequent
purchaser with notice of the equi-
table rights of the heirs of Reeder.
It is difficult to draw a distinction,
in principle, between that case and
the one under consideration. An
administrator in Ohio has no
power, unless authorized by the
Court of Common Pleas, to sell or
convey an interest in land ; nor has
an executor in Virginia any power
over the realty, unless it be given
to him in the will. In this case,
therefore, the purchaser was as
much bound to look into the will
for the authority of the executor,
as the Ohio purchaser was bound
to look into the proceedings of the
court for the authority of the ad-
ministrator. The case of Burkart
v. Bucher, 2 Binn. 455, is also in
point. The defendant derived his
title from William Willis, to whom
a patent had issued, reciting that
the title was derived under the
will of Henry Willi?. This will
did not authorize the sale of the
premises, and the court held that
this was notice to the defendant.
So in the case of Jackson ex dem.
Livingston v. Neely, 10 Johns. 374.
Where a deed recited a letter of
attorney, by virtue of which the
conveyance was made, which was
duly deposited with the clerk of
Albany, according to the act of the
8th January, 1794, it was held to be
sufficient notice of the power, by
means of the recital, to a subse-
quent purchaser, who was equally
affected by it, as if the power itself
had been deposited. An agent re-
ceiving notes from an executor,
payable to him as executor, as se-
curity for advances by the princi-
pal to the executor on his private
account, and not as executor, af-
fects his principal with notice that
it is a dealing of an executor with
the assets, for a purpose, foreign
to the trusts he was to discharge. 2
Ball & B. 491. When a purchaser
cannot make out his title but
through a deed which leads to a
fact, he will be affected with no-
tice of that fact. Mertins v. Jol-
liffe, Amb. 311. A made a convey-
ance to B, with a power of revoca-
tion by will, a subsequent pur-
chaser is intended to have notice of
the will, as well as of the power to
revoke, and this is a notice in law,
and so in all cases where a pur-
§ 206.] IMPLIED TRUSTS. 455
decree of the court, or in the manner of conducting the
sale, makes the purchaser a constructive trustee for the
heirs or other persons interested in the provisions of the
will. So, where an executor or administrator purchases- at
his own sale, by selling to another person and taking a
deed from him, the sale will be void, or the purchaser will
hold the estate in trust for the claimants under the will.1
§ 206. The Subject Continued. — Under the common
law an executor or administrator has absolute control of
the personal estate under his charge, and, of course, may
sell and give a good title to a bona fide purchaser. In some
States there are statutory directions in regard to the dis-
posal of personal estate, including the manner in which
the sale shall be conducted. In such States purchasers
must see to it that the sale is conducted in accordance with
the requirements of the statute, or the order of the court,
or their title will not be valid.2 Where a purchaser has
notice that there is a lack of fidelity or of good faith on
the part of the executor in the sale of an estate, he will
not be allowed to profit by his purchase. Where an indi-
chaser cannot make out a title, but Iowa, 376 ; Eiley v. Kepler, 94 Ind.
by deed which leads to another 30S, 311; Bond v. Ramsey, S9 111.
fact, notice of which a purchaser 29, 33.
shall be presumed cognizant ; for 2 Eayner v. Pearsall, 3 Johns. Ch.
it is crassa negligentia, that he 578 ; Hertell v. Bogert, 9 Paige, 57
soughtnot after it. Moore v. Ben- Field v. Schieffelin, 7 Johns. Ch
nett, 2 Ch. Cas. 246. Notice of 155; Newland v. Champion, 1 Yes
letters patent in which there was a 105; Ewer v. Corbett, 2P.Wms. 148
trust for creditors, is sufficient Bond v. Zeigler, 1 Kelly, 324
notice of the trust. Dunch v. Hunter v. Lawrence, 11 Gratt. 117
Kent, 1 Vern. 319. That which Crane v. Drake, 2 Vern. 616 ; Tyr-
shall be sufficient to put the party rell v. Morris, 1 Dev. & Batt. 559
upon inquiry is notice. Hiern v. Miles v. Durnford, 2 Sim (X. S.)
Mill, 13 Ves. 120." 234; Yerger v. Jones, 16 How. 37
1 Brock v. Phillips, 2 Wash. 68, Hill v. Simpson, 7 Ves. 152; Doran
70 ; Bingham v. Maxey , 15 111. 295 ; v. Simpson, 4 Ves. 665 ; Dickson v.
Hawpev. Smith, 25 Tex. Supl. 448; Lockyer, 4 Ves. 42; Bonney v.
Walden v. Gridley, 36 111. 523 ; Kidgard, 1 Cox, 145 ; Scott v. Ty-
Hutchins v. Brooks, 31 Miss. 430; ler, 2 Dick. 725; Ulterson v. Maire,
Thompson v. Munger, 15 Tex. 523, 4 Bro. Ch. 270 ; Elmlie v. McAulay,
527; Headrick v. Yount, 22 Kan. 3 Bro. Ch. 626; Jacomb v. Har-
344, 349; Hale v. Marquette, 69 wood, 2 Ves. 268.
456
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 206.
vidual receives from an executor assets belonging to the
estate of the testator, knowing that such disposition of
them is a violation of the executor's duty, he is to be ad-
judged as conniving with the executor to work a devastavit,
and is accountable to the widow and legatees for the prop-
erty thus received.1 Where it is plain that the circum-
stances should have put the purchaser upon inquiry the
sale will be declared void, or he will be held as a construct-
ive trustee for the equitable owner.2 Where it is known
that the sale of the estate is for the purpose of paying the
debts of the executor, or to enable him to give security for
their payment, the sale will be held invalid.3 It has been
1 Sacia v. Berthoud, 17 Barb. 15.
See also Pendleton v. Fay, 2 Paige,
202 ; Pinckard v. Wood, 8 Gratt.
140; McLeod v. Drummond, 17
Ves. 152; Scott v. Tyler, Dick.
712. The purchaser or banker who
receives the property of the testa-
tor from the executor knowingly,
for purposes inconsistent with his
duties as executor, is responsible
for such property to the creditors
or the persons in interest. Colt v.
Lasnier, 9 Cow. 320. ''Common
prudence required that they should
look at the will, and not take the
debtor's word as to his right under
it. If they neglect that, and take
the chance of his speaking the
truth, they must incur the hazard
of his falsehood. It was gross
negligence not to look at the will,
under which alone a title could be
given to them. It was not neces-
sary to shut their eyes against in-
formation which, without extraor-
dinary neglect, they could not
avoid receiving." Hill v. Simp-
son, 7 Ves. 152.
2 McjSTeillie v. Acton, 4 De G., M.
& G. 744; Graff v. Castleman, 5
Hand. 204; Parker v. Gillian, 10
Yerg. 394; "Williamson v. Morton,
2 Md. Ch. 94; Saxon v. Barksdale,
4 Desaus. 526 ; McN air's Appeal,
4 Rawle, 155 ; Johnson v. Johnson,
2 Hill Eq. 277; Mead v. Orrery, 3
Atk. 235; McLeod v. Drummond,
14 Ves. 3G1; s. C, 17 Ves. 169
Field v. Schieffelin, 7 Johns. Ch
155; Colt v. Lasnier, 9 Cow. 320
Sacia v. Berthoud, 17 Barb. 15
Williamson v. Branch Bank, 7 Ala
906; Swink v. Snodgrass, 17 Ala
653 ; Garnett v. Mason, 6 Call, 361
Dodson v. Simpson, 2 Band. 294
Petriev. Clark, 11 Serg. &E. 388
Fambro v. Gantt, 12 Ala. 305 ; Bond
v. Barksdale, 4 Desaus. 526; Bond
v. Zeigler, 1 Kelly, 324; Baines v.
McGee, 1 Sm. & M. 208.
3 Shaw v. Spencer, 100 Mass. 382;
Petrie v. Clark, 11 Serg. & E. 388;
Jaudon v. Nat'l City Bank, 8
Blatch. 430 ; Pendleton v. Fay, 2
Paige, 202; Bayard v. Farmers',
etc. Bank, 52 Pa. St. 232; William-
son v. Branch Bank, 7 Ala. 906
Dodson v. Simpson, 2 Band. 294
Duncan v. JaudoD, 15 Wall. 165
Collinson v. Lister, 7 De G., M. &
G. '634; Garrard v. K. E. Co., 29
Pa. St. 154; Williamson v. Norton,
2Md. Ch. 94; McLeod v. Drum-
mond, 17 Ves. 152; Field v. Schief-
felin, 7 Johns. Ch. 155; Carr v.
Hilton, 1 Curtis, 390, 393; Baker v.
§ 206.] IMPLIED TEUSTS. 457
held that where an executor has pledged the property of an
estate under his charge for the purpose of raising money
for the use of the estate the transaction is valid, and that
where property is pledged or mortgaged as security for a
previous advance of money for such a purpose, the act
will be sustained.1 In Russell v. Plaice it has been held
that an executor or administrator may not only pledge or
mortgage the assets, but may also give to the mortgagee
of leaseholds a power of sale and to give valid receipts for
the purchase money.2 In a decision in a comparatively
recent case the opposite view seems to be upheld. Where
the husband of an executrix under such a will borrowed
money from a person in whom the legal estate of part of
the testator's real estate was vested under a satisfied mort-
gage, stating that the advance was required to carry on the
testator's business, and deposited the deeds with the lender,
on an agreement that the legal estate still subsisting in
him should be a security for the advance. It was held
that the security was invalid against the persons beneficially
interested under the will.3
Bliss, 39 K. Y. 76. In this case applied the proceeds to pay such
persons made loans to a trustee on private debts. A trustee stands on
certificates of stock, and after- a different footing from an execu-
wards sold the shares of stock to tor, or an administrator, or even a
repay the loans, were held liable guardian, in many respects. He
to the cestui que trust for the pro- presumptively holds the trust
ceeds of the shares, it appearing property for administration and
that the certificates stated that the not for sale. Jaudon v. Nat'l City
holder, naming him, held them in Bank, 8 Blatch. 430.
trust, and gave the name of the 1 Russell v. Plaice, 18 Beav. 21 ;
cestui que trust; that the transac- S. C, 11 Jur. 124; 19 Jur. 445;
tions of loan indicated that the Miles v. Durnford, 2 Sim. (1ST. S.)
trustee was not selling the shares in 234; Petrie v. Clark, 11 Serg. & K.
the ordinary course of his business 388; Creighton v. Eingle, 3 S. Car.
as trustee, but that he was borrow- 77 ; Dillaye v. Com. Bank, 51 1ST. Y.
ing money for his private use on a 345 ; Ashton v. Atlantic Bank, 3
pledge of what was in his hands Allen, 217.
as trust property; that the sale of 2 Russell v. Plaice, 18 Beav. 21.
stock was made by the lenders, s llcNeillie v. Acton, 4 De G., M.
with the knowledge that the pro- & G. *744. "There appears, there-
ceeds were to be applied to pay fore, to be no case which has gone
the private debts of the trustee to to the extent of saying that a mere
the lenders ; and that the lenders direction to continue the trade is to
458 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 207.
§ 207. The Same Subject. — The simple fact that an
executor is acting in the capacity of a trustee, and is
known to be acting as such, is not enough to put the pur-
chaser upon inquiry in regard to his right to dispose of the
estate and to give a good title. The presumption is that
an executor or administrator is in the line of his duty when
he is disposing of the property and settling up the estate.
If he has power to sell the personal estate the purchaser
will not be held as a trustee, even though the executor
devote the proceeds of the sale to his own use. In the
case of Bond v. Zeigler, it was held that an executor under a
will authorizing the sale of property of the testator to
pay debts, but without specifying the manner of sale, may
dispose of personal property of testator at private sale,
and without any previous advertisement of such intended
sale or leave of the Court of Ordinary, and the purchaser
at such private sale will acquire a good title, even as against
the creditors of the testators ; provided, that the purchase
is bona fide, and without fraud on the part of the purchaser.
The purchaser in such case is not bound to see to the proper
application of the purchase money by the executor. "What
becomes of the price is of no concern to him." Nor is he
required, before buying, to look into the accounts of the
executor to ascertain that he is faithfully administering his
trust. The law presumes this in favor of the executor.
operate as a charge of the trade whole of the estate of the testator,
debts contracted in continuing the the necessary consequence would be
trade on all the estate of the testator; that no part of the estate could in
and the question is whether, upon the meantime be applied in pay-
any fair construction, it can be so ment of any of the legacies given
considered. The consequence of by the will, and that all adminis-
it would be that all the other di- tration of the testator's estate must
rections which are contained in stop until the period when the
the will must be suspended during trade is wound up. That is a con-
the period for which the trade is struction so unreasonable that,
to be continued. If the debt con- unless there are words sufficient
traded in the course of the trade, for the purpose, it is one, in my
or the right of the executors to be opinion, to which the court would
indemnified in respect of the ex- not resort." lb. per Lord Justice
pense incurred in carrying on the Turner,
trade, is to be a charge on the
§ 207.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
459
But in all cases where the sale is infected with fraud and
covin between the executor and purchaser it is absolutely
void, and the title to the property remains unchanged.1
In another recent case before the United States Supreme
Court it was held that a person lending money to a trustee
on a pledge of trust stocks, and selling the stocks for re-
payment of the loan, will be compelled to account for them
if he have either actual or constructive notice that the
trustee was abusing his trust and applying the money lent
to his own purposes. The lender will be held to have had
this notice when the certificates of the stocks pledged show
1 Bond v. Ziegler, 1 Kelly, 324.
"Exceptions to the general power
of an executor to dispose of the es-
tate of his testator, will be found
' in those cases only where collusion
exists between the representative
and the purchaser. That an exec-
utor may waste the trust estate, is
not sufficient to invalidate the sale;
it must further appear that the pur-
chaser participated in the devas-
tavit. Fraud and covin will vitiate
any transaction; and if the pur-
chaser concerts with an executor,
by obtaining the testator's effects at
a nominal value, or at a fraudulent
undervalue, or by applying the
value to the purchase of other
effects for the behoof of the execu-
tor; or, if he knows, that, from the
face of the transaction, the execu-
tor is applying the assests to the
payment of his own debts ; in all
such cases, and all others falling
within the reason of these, not
only will the executor be liable
over for a devastivit, but the pur-
chaser buys at his peril — gets no
title, and holds the property in-
cumbered with the trust." Ibid.
"The settled distinction is that if
a trust is created for specific or
scheduled debts, the purchaser is
bound to see to the application of
the purchase money. But if the
trust is for the payment of debts
generally the purchaser is not bound
to see to the application of the pur-
chase money; and if he pays it
over to the trustee, he and the es-
tate in his hands stands discharged
from the trust. But if the pur-
chase money is unpaid, so much of
it as is necessary may be reached
in the hands of the purchaser to
execute the trust. Story, J., in
Gardner v. Gardner, 3 Mason, 178,
218. A guardian, having the legal
power to sell or dispose of the per-
sonal estate of his ward, in any
manner he may think most conduc-
ive to the purposes of his trust, a
purchaser who deals fairly has a
right to presume that he acts for
the benefit of his ward, and is not
bound to inquire into the state of
the trust, nor is he responsible for
the faithful application of the
money, unless he knew, or had suf-
ficient information at the time, that
the guardian contemplated a
breach of trust, and intended to
misapply the money; or was, in
fact, by the very transaction, ap-
plying it to his own private pur-
pose. Field v. Schieffelin, 7 Johns.
Ch. *150.
460
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 207.
on their face that the stock is held in trust, and when ap-
parently the loan was for a private purpose of the trustee,
and this fact would have been revealed by an inquiry. The
duty of inquiry is imposed on a lender lending on stocks,
where the certificate of them reveals a trust.1 But where
a trustee is clothed with full power to manage and control
the trust estate, an assignment by him of a mortgage im-
pressed with the trust to a bona fide purchaser or pledgee
cannot be impeached by the cestui que trust.1
1 Duncan v. Jaudon, 15 Wall. 156
Shaw v. Spencer, 100 Mass. 382
Petrie v. Clark, 11 Serg. & K. 377
Bayard v. Bank, 52 Pa. St. 232 ; Mc-
Leod v. Drummond, 17 Ves. 152;
Lowry v. Bank, 4 Cir. Md., 6 West
Law J. 121; The Ploughboy, 1
Gall. 41; Carr v. Hilton, 1 Curt.
390; Hinde v. Vattier, 1 McLean,
110; Dexter v. Harris, 2 Mass. 537;
Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How. 333; Bank
v. Seton, 1 Pet. 299; Wormley v.
Wonnley, 8 Wheat. 421 ; Garrard
v. K. R. Co., 29 Pa. St. 159; Jaques
v. Week, 7 Watts, 266; Epley v.
Withrow, 7 Watts, 163 ; Swarthout
v. Curtis, 5 N. Y. 301; Anderson v.
Van Allen, 12 Johns. 343; Pendle-
ton v. Fay, 2 Paige, 202 ; Baker v.
Bliss, 39 N. Y. 70. In Lowry v.
Com. and Farmers' Bank, Taney's
C. C. Dec. 310, which was a case
oi misappropriation of corporate
stock by an executor, Chief Justice
Taney held li that if a party dealing
with an executor has, at the time,
reasonable ground for believing
that he intends to misapply the
money, or is, in the very transac-
tion, applying it to his own private
use, the party so dealing is respon-
sible to the persons injured." "The
circumstance, that stock certifi-
cates issued in the name of one as
trustee, and by him transferred in
blank, are constantly bought and
sold in the market without inquiry,
is likewise unavailing. A usage to
disregard one's legal duty, to be
ignorant of a rule of law, and to
act as if it did not exist, can have
no standing in the courts. Shaw
v. Spencer, 100 Mass. 382, 394.
2 Dillaye v. Com. Bank, 51 N. Y.
345; Malin v. Malin, 1 Wend. 625;
Fisher v. Fields, 10 Johns. 195;
Murray v. Ballon. 1 Johns. Ch.
566 ; Shepherd v. McEvers, 4 Johns.
Ch. 136; Bush v. Lathrop, 22 N".
Y. 549; Jackson v. Van Denberg,
8 Cow. 260; Pye v. George, 1 P.
Wins. 188. "A bona fide purchase
of the mortgage for a full and val-
uable consideration, without any
notice, express or implied, of any
trust therein in favor of the plaint-
iff, and, consequently, without
knowledge or notice that the sale
to it was made in controvention or
in violation of such trust. Under
such circumstances it acquired a
perfect title thereto, free and dis-
charged of all trust and equities
with which it was charged in the
hands of Dillaye." Dillaye v.
Com. Bank, 51 N. Y. 345, 353. To
render a person receiving, at the
request of an administrator, money
belonging to an estate, in satisfac-
tion of a personal debt of the ad-
ministrator, a trustee for the es-
tate, it is necessary that the admin-
istrator should be in default to the
estate. Gray v. Farmers' State
§ 208.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
461
§ 208. Barred Tt>y Continued Acquiescence. — An ex-
press trust that has been recognized by all of the parties is
not invalidated by the lapse of time. But there is a limit
to the period during which a court of equity will consider
a claim to a trust on the ground of fraud. In England an
acquiescence of twenty years will bar a claim of this char-
acter, unless there is some satisfactory reason for the delay.
In Beckford v. Wade it was held that, though no time bars
a direct trust as between cestui que trust and trustee, a con-
structive trust is barred by long acquiescence, though the
true state of the fact may be easily ascertained and the
ground of original relief was clear, and even arising out of
fraud. Redemption is barred by twenty years' possession
without impediment to the mortgagor, or ten years after
impediment removed.1 In his opinion in thia ease, Sir
Bank (1895), 105 Cal. 60; s. c,
38 Pac. Rep. 519.
1 Beckford v. Wade, 17 Ves. 87.
In the case of a direct trust no
length of time bars the claim be-
tween the trustee and cestui que
trust. Cook v. Williams, 1 Green
Ch. 209; Stephens v. Landle, 3
Hayw. 221; Thomas v. White, 3
Litt. 177; Gist v. Cattel, 2 Desaus.
53; Coster v. Murray, 5 Johns. Ch.
224; Pugh v. Belt, 1 J. J. Marsh.
401; Overstreet v. Bate, 1 J. J.
Marsh. 370; Armstrong v. Campbell,
3 Yerg. 201 ; Baker v. Whiting, 3
Sumn. 47(5; Weddeburn v. Wedde-
burn, 2 Keen, 749; Shelby v.
Shelby, Cook, 182; Wambozee v.
Kennedy, 4 Desaus. 474; Pinson v.
Ivery, 1 Yerg. 297 ; Turner v. De-
bell, 2 A. K. Marsh. 384; Van
Rhyn v. Vincent, 1 McCord Ch.
314; Ivy v. Rogers, Dev. Eq. 58;
Robinson v. Hook, 4 Mason, 150;
Bigelow v. Bigelow, 6 Ham. 97;
Hemeway v. Gates, 5 Pick. 522;
Kane v. Bloodgood, 7 Johns. Ch. 90 ;
Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 16 ;
Terrill v. Murry, 4 Yerg. 104; Ben-
zien v. Lenoir, 1 Com. Law Reps.
508; Wisner v. Barnett, 4 Wash.
C. C. 631; Bryant v. Packett, 3
Hayw. 252; Fisher v. Tucker, 1
McCord Ch. 169; De Couche v.
Savetier, 3 Johns. Ch. 216; Smith
v. Clay, 3 Bro. Ch. 639; Cholmon-
deley v. Clinton, 1 J. & W. 151
Chalmer v. Bradley, 1 J. & W. 59
Portlock v. Gardner, 1 Hare, 594
Hawley v. Cramer, 4 Cow. 117
Anderson v. Burdsell, 6 Gratt. 405
Gould v. Gould, 3 Story, 516
Veasie v. Williams, 8 How. 134
Powell v. Murray, 2 Edw. Ch. 644
s. c, 10 Paige, 256; Piatt v. Vattier,
9 Pet. 405; Edwards v. University,
1 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 325 ; Ex parte
Hasell, 3 Y. & C. 617; Townshend
v. Townshend, 1 Bro. Ch. 554.
"Then as to trusts being an ex-
ception to the statute of limita-
tions. The rule holds only as' be-
tween trustees and cestui que trusts.
It is true that a trustee cannot set
up against his cestui que trust, but
this is merely the case of a trustee
by implication, and as such af-
fected by an equity; but that
462
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§•208.
William Grant, Master of the Eolls, said: "It is certainly
true that no time bars a direct trust as between cestui que
trust and trustee ; but if it is meant to be asserted that a
equity must be pursued within
some reasonable time. Both courts
of law and equity preserve an
analogy to the statute of limita-
tions.' ' To wnshend v. To wnshend,
1 Bro. Ch. 554. See also Reeves v.
Dougherty, 7 Yerg. 222; Walker
v. Smith, 8 Yerg. 238; Ridley v.
Hettman, 10 Ohio, 524; Talbot v.
Todd, 5 Dana, 199; McCrea v.
Portmore, 16 Wend. 460; Hinton
v. Fox, 3 Litt. 3S1 ; Armstrong v.
Campbell, 3 Yerg. 201; Brecken-
ridge v. Churchill, 3 J. J. Marsh.
15; Frame v. Kenney, 2 A. K.
Marsh. 145; Thompson v. Blair, 3
Murph. 583; Perkins v. Hays,
Cook, 170; Lingan v. Henderson,
1 Bland, 278; Bangs v. Hall, 2
Pick. 372 ; Andrews v. Sparhawk, 13
Pick. 393,400; Phillips v. Linclair,
20 Me. 269 ; White v. Parnether, 1
Knapp, 228, 229. In Hovenden v.
Lord Annesley, 2 Sch. & Leb. 630,
Lord Redesdale said: '-But it is
said that courts of equity are not
within the statute of limitations.
This is true in one respect. They
are not within the words of the
statute, because the words apply
to particular legal remedies; but
they are within the spirit and
meaning of the statutes, and have
always been so considered. I think
it is a mistake in point of lan-
guage to say that courts of equity
act merely by analogy to the stat-
utes; they act in obedience to
them. The statute of limitations,
applying itself to certain legal
remedies for recovering the posses-
sion of lands, for recovering of
debts, etc., equity, which in all
cases follows the law, acts on legal
titles and legal demands, accord-
ing to matters of conscience which
arise and which do not admit of
the ordinary legal remedies.
Nevertheless, in thus administering
justice according to the means af-
forded by a court of equity, it fol-
lows the law. The true jurisdic-
tion of courts of equity in such
cases is to carry into execution the
principles of law, where the modes
of remedy afforded by courts of
law are not adequate to the pur-
poses of justice, to supply a defect
in the remedies afforded by courts
of law. The law has appointed
certain simple modes of proceed-
ing, which are adapted to a great
variety of cases. But there are
cases under peculiar circumstances
and qualifications to which, though
the law gives the right to those
modes of proceeding, do not ap-
ply. I do not mean to say that in
the exercise of this jurisdiction
courts of equity may not in some
instances have gone too far, though
they have been generally more
strict in modern times. So courts
of law, fancying that they had the
means of administering full relief,
have sometimes proceeded in cases
which were formerly left to courts
of equity, and at one period this
also seems to have been carried too
far. I think, therefore, courts of
equity are bound to yield obedience
to the statute of limitations upon
all legal titles and legal demands,
and cannot act contrary to the
spirit of its provisions. I think
the statute must be taken virtually
to include courts of equity; for,
when the legislature by statute
limited the proceedings in equity,
it must be taken to have contem-
§ 208. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 463
court of equity allows a man to make out a case of con-
structive trust at any distance of time after the facts and
circumstances happened out of which it arises, I am not
aware that there is any ground for a doctrine so fatal to
the security of property as that would be ; so far from it,
that not only in circumstances where the length of time
would render it extremely difficult to ascertain the true
state of the fact, but where the true state of the fact is
easily ascertained, and where it is perfectly clear that relief
would originally have been given upon the ground of con-
structive trust, it is refused to the party who, after long
acquiescence, comes into a court of equity to seek that re-
lief."1 This doctrine, in its essential features, has been
adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States. In
Wagner v. Baird it was held that there is a defense peculiar
to courts of equity founded on lapse of time and the stale-
ness of the claim, where no statute of limitations directly
governs the case. In such cases the courts often act upon
their own inherent doctrine of discouraging, for the peace
of society, antiquated demands, by refusing to interfere
where there has been gross laches in prosecuting rights, or
long acquiescence in the assertion of adverse rights. The
rule upon this subject, originally laid down by Lord
Camden in Smith v. Clay, 3 Brown's Chancery Reports,
page 640, note, and adopted by this court in 1 Howard,
189, again asserted: Long acquiescence and laches by
parties out of possession are productive of much hardship
and injustice to others, and cannot be exercised but by
showing some actual hindrance or impediment caused by
the fraud or concealment of the party in possession which
will appeal to the conscience of the chancellor. The party
guilty of such laches cannot screen his title from the just
imputation of staleness merely by the allegation of an im-
aginary impediment or technical disability.2 The State
plated that equity followed the J Beckford v. Wade, 17 Ves. Jr.
law, and, therefore, it must be 87, 97.
taken to have virtually enacted in 2 "Wagner v. Baird, 7 How. 233 ;
the same eases a limitation for Bowman v. Wathen, 1 How. 189;
courts of equity also." Maxwell v. Kennedy, 8 How.
464
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 208.
courts, while accepting this rule in the main, put upon it a
somewhat liberal construction. In Hawley v. Cramer, be-
fore the Supreme Court of the State of New York, it was
held that if the application is not made within a reasonable
time it will be considered as a waiver or abandonment of
the right. What shall be deemed a reasonable time has
not been settled by any fixed rule, and seems to depend
upon the exercise of the sound discretion of the court under
all the circumstances of each particular case. The shortest
period which a court of equity is bound to consider an ab-
solute bar to a suit respecting real estate, in analogy to the
limitation of actions at law, is twenty years. In cases of
implied trusts in relation to personal property, or to the
rents and profits of real estate, where persons claiming in
their own right are turned into trustees by implication, the
right of action in equity will be considered as barred in six
years, in analogy to the limitations of similar actions at
222; Kennedy v. Georgia State
Bank, 8 How. 586 ; Delane v. Moore,
14 How. 253; Aid en v. Gregory, 2
Eden, 285; Prevost v. Gratz, (>
"Wheat. 481 ; Badger v. Badger, 2
"Wall. 87, 92; Brown v. County of
BuenaVista, 5 Otto, 161 ; Godden v.
Kimmell, 9 Otto, 211 ; Haggerty v.
Mam, 56 Md. 52G; Gibbons v. Hoag,
95 111. 45 ; Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10
"Wheat. 152; Langsdale v. Smith,
16 Otto, 302 ; Piatt v. Vattier, 9 Pet.
405; Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 2 J,
& W. 1. In the somewhat recent
case of Badger v. Badger, 2 "Wall.
87, the court, speaking by Mr. Jus-
tice Grier, said, that a party who
makes an appeal to the conscience
of the Chancellor "should set
forth in his bill specifically what
were the impediments to an earlier
prosecution of his claim; how he
came to be so long ignorant of his
rights, and the means used by the
respondent to fraudulently keep
him in ignorance; and how and
when he first came to a knowledge
of the matters alleged in his bill;
otherwise the Chancellor may justly
refuse to consider his case, on his
own showing, without inquiry
whether there is a demurrer or
formal plea of the statute of limita-
tions contained in the answer."
The doctrine of Lord Camden, re-
ferred to in the text, is as follows:
"That a court of equity, which
never is active in relief against con-
science or public convenience, has
always refused its aid to stale de-
mands where the party has slept
upon his rights for a great length
of time. Nothing can call forth
this court into activity but con-
science, good faith, and reasonable
diligence. Where these are want-
ing, the court is passive and does
nothing; laches and neglect are al-
ways discountenanced ; and there-
fore from the beginning of this
jurisdiction there was always a
limitation of suit in this court."
§ 208.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
465
law.1 On this point Mr. Justice Wayne, in his opinion in
Michoud v. Girod, said: "In a case of actual fraud courts
of equity give relief after a long lapse of time. In general,
length of time is no bar to a trust clearly established to
have once existed ; and where fraud is imputed and proved,
length of time ought not to exclude relief. Prevost v.
Gratz, 6 Wheat. 481. Generally speaking, when a party
has been guilty of such laches in prosecuting his equitable
title as would bar him if his title were solely at law, he will
be barred in equity, from a wise consideration of the para-
1 Hawley v. Cramer, 4 Cow. 717 ;
Dobson v. Racey, 3 Sandf . 61 ; Pow-
ell v. Murray, 2 Edw. Ch. 644;
s. c, 10 Paige, 256 ; Smith v. Clay, 3
Bro. Ch. 639; Cholmondeley v.
Clinton, 1 J. & W. 151 ; Chalmer v.
Bradley, U. & W. 59 ; Beckford v.
Wade, 17 Ves. 97; Portlock v.
Gardner, 1 Hare, 594 ; Andrew v.
Wrigley, 4 Bro. Ch. 124; Blenner-
hassett v. Day, 2 B. & B. 118;
Gregory v. Gregory, Cowp. 201 ;
Jac. 631 ; Selsey v. Rhodes, 1 Bligh
(1ST. S.), 1 ; Champion v. Rigby,l R.
&M. 539 \Ex parte Granger, 2Deac.
& Ch. 459; Collard v. Hare, 2 R. &
M. 675 ; Morris v. Neve, 3 Atk. 38 ;
Pryce v. Byrn, 5 Ves. 681 ; Moose
v. Royal, 12 Ves. 355 ; Mellicott v.
O'Donnell, 1 B. & B. 156; Ander-
son v. Burchell, 6 Gratt. 405; Col-
man v. Lyne, 4 Rand. 454; Irvine
v. Robertson, 3 Rand. 549 ; Peebles
v. Reading, 8 Serg. & R. 484
Gould v. Gould, 3 Story, 516
Hough v. Richardson, 3 Story, 659
Hallett v. Collins, 10 How. 174
Veasie v. Williams, 8 How. 134
McKnight v. Taylor, 1 How. 161
Williams v. First Pres. Soc., 1 Ohio
St. 478; Sherwood v. Sutton, 5 Ma-
son, 143; Miller v. Mclntire, 6
Pet. 61 ; Hatfield v. Montgomery, 2
Porter, 58; Bond v.Brown, 1 Harp.
Eq. 270; Edwards v. Roberts, 7
30
Sm. & M. 544; Peacock v. Black,
Halst. Eq. 535; Steele v. Kinkle, 3
Ala. 352 ; Stackhouse v. Barneston,
10 Ves. 466; Ex parte Dewdney, 15
Ves. 496; Kane v. Bloodgood, 7
Johns. Ch. 93 ; Dexter v. Arnold, 3
Sumn. 152; De Couche v. Savetier,
3 Johns. Ch. 190; Murray v. Coster,
20 Johns. 576 ; Prevost v. Gratz, 6
Wheat. 481 ; Hughes v. Edwards, 9
Wheat. 489 ; Elmendorf v. Taylor,
10 Wheat. 168. "In cases of implied
trusts in relation to personal prop-
erty, or the rents and profits of real
estate, where persons claiming in
their own right are turned into
trustees by implication, or by op-
eration of law, it is a general rule
that the right of action in equity
will be considered as barred in six
years, in analogy to the limitation
at law. And probably if the com-
mencement of this suit had been
delayed a few days longer, the com-
plainants would have lost all rem-
edy by the operation of the statute
of limitations. In cases of this de-
scription, independent of the stat-
ute of limitations, if the person en-
titled to relief against an improper
purchase acquiesce for a long time,
without making any objection, or
bringing a suit, equity will not
grant relief." Hawley v. Cramer,
4 Cow. 717, 742.
466 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 209.
mount importance of quieting men's titles, and upon the
principle of expedit, reipublicoe, ut sit finis lilium ; although
the statutes of limitations do not apply to any equitable
demand, courts of equity adopt them, or, at least, generally
take the same limitations for their guide in cases analogous
to those in which the statutes apply at law. Still, within
what time a constructive trust will be barred must depend
upon the circumstances of the case. There is no rule
in equity which excludes the consideration of circumstances,
and in a case of actual fraud we believe no case can be
found in the books in which a court of equity has refused
to give relief within the lifetime of either of the parties
upon whom the fraud is proved, or within thirty years
after it has been discovered or becomes known to the party
whose rights are affected by it."1
§ 209. Barred by Statutes of Limitation. — In some
of the States the statute of limitations includes constructive
trusts. They will be barred by the lapse of time unless the
fraud has been concealed or has recently come to light.
But courts of equity are not in all cases governed by State
legislation. In some cases a claim may be treated as stale
when it would not be barred by the statute of limitations,
and in others it will be recognized after a longer time than
is granted by the statute. In Piatt v. Vattier it was held
that lapse of time may be applied, under proper circum-
stances, to bar an equity where the statute would not bar.
This rule is applied by a court of chancery on its own prin-
ciples, which do not depend upon the statute of limitations.
1 Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 503. possession by the person who
The statute does not begin to run claims in his own right, but whose
until a discovery of the fraud prac- acts have made him a trustee by
ticed. Boone v. Chiles, 10 Pet. 223; implication. His possession en-
Aylward v. Kearney, 2B. & B.476; titles him to, at least, the same pro-
Randall v. Errington, 10 Ves. 423. tection as that of a direct trustee,
uWhat reasonable time is, within who, to the plaintiff's knowledge,
which a constructive trust can be disavows the trust, and holds ad-
enforced, depends upon the cir- versely as to whom the time rims
cumstances of the case, but there from the disavowal, because his
can be few cases where it can be possession is thenceforth adverse."
done, after twenty years' peaceable Boone v. Chiles, 10 Pet. 223.
209.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
467
The statute will operate even where there has been fraud
from the time the fraud is discovered.1 In Massachusetts
it is held that the statute of limitations operates as a bar to
a suit in equity by its own force, and not by the discretion
1 Piatt v. Vattier, 1 McLean, 146.
In the case cited Justice McLean
reviews and discusses the cases
hearing upon this question in
these words: "It is a well settled
principle, that effect will be given
to the statute of limitations in
equity the same as at law. At
first this rule was controverted and
afterwards frequently evaded, on
the ground of implied trusts, but
the modern decisions have sus-
tained the principles as above
stated. The position assumed by
the complainant's counsel, that
lapse of time can only operate
where the statute applies, is
not sustained by authority. At all
times courts of equity have, upon
general principles of their own,
even where there was no statutory
bar, refused relief to stale demands,
where the party has slept upon his
rights and acquiesced for a great
length of time." This doctrine is
fully sustained in the case of the
Marquis of Cholmondeley v. Lord
Clinton, 2 J. & W. 1, 138 to 152. In
the case of Townsendv. Townsend,
1 Brown, 551, the court, on pos-
session of thirty years by the de-
fendants, presumed that the settle- •
ment under which the complain-
ant claimed was voluntary and dis-
missed the bill. And in the case
of Andrew v. Wrigley, 4 Bro. Ch.
13S ; where an executor had sold the
testator's term, specifically de-
vised under strong circumstances
of fraud, Lord Thurlow refused re-
lief from the lapse of time, although
his decision would have been dif-
ferent if an earlier application had
been made. The same principle
was acted on in the case of Moose v.
Eoyal, 12 Ves. 373, and also in the
case of Beckford and others v.
Wade, 17 Ves. 86. Lord Kenyon
in this last case says : "Courts of
equity by their own rules, inde-
pendently of any statutes of limita-
tion, give great effect to length of
time, and they refer frequently to
the statutes of limitation for no
other purpose than as furnishing a
convenient measure for the length
of time that ought to operate as a
bar in equity to any particular de-
mand." Smith v. Clay, 3 Bro. Ch.
640 ; Bond v. Hopkins, 1 Sch. & Lef .
413, 428; Stackhouse v. Barnston,
10 Ves. 466, 467; Kane v. Blood-
good, 7 Johns. Ch. 93. In the case
of Bonney v. Redgard, 1 Con.
Ch. Cas. 145, relief was refused
from the lapse of time, though
from the face of the assignment
fraud was apparent. And in the
later case of Blennerhasset v. Day,
B. & B. 104, it was decided that :
'•Where the facts constituting fraud
are in the knowledge of the party,
and he lies by for nearly twenty-
five years, he cannot get re-
lief." The doctrine is illustrated
with consummate ability by that
distinguished judge, Lord Redes-
dale, in the case of Hovenden v.
Lord Annesley, 2 Sch. & Lef. 608.
And in the case of Gregory v.
Gregory, Cooper"s Reports, 201,
"where the time was only eighteen
years and the case on the merits
favorable for relief, yet it was re-
fused."
468 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 209.
or courtesy of the court. In Pennsylvania the statutory
limit is six years. In Ashurst's Appeal the Supreme Court
of that State held that where a person claims to hold an-
other as trustee for personal property under a constructive
trust, he must assert his claim within six years from the
time when it is alleged to have originated. There may be
cases where six years would not be allowed, as where the
party stands by and sees another dealing with the trust
property in a manner inconsistent with any trust and makes
no objection, or where rights of third parties have inter-
vened, or where the property is of a peculiar kind, and the
alleged trustee in ignorance of any intention to hold him to
account, relying on his ownership, enters on a hazardous
business or incurs responsibilities. Laches for less than
six years, aided by other circumstances, will bar a right.1
In South Carolina the time is four years. In Parham v.
McCravy, where a bill to enforce a parol trust in land and
negroes against a purchaser alleged that defendant knew
of the trust when he bought, it was held that a plaintiff was
barred by the statute of limitations, more than four years
having elapsed since the purchase. It is not enough to
prevent the bar of the statute of limitations that plaintiff
did not discover evidence by which he could establish the
fraud until within four years. It is the knowledge of the
fraud within four years which prevents the bar.1 In New
1 Ashurst's Appeal, 60 Pa. St. ute of limitations. He cannot be
290. "But what is the reasonable permitted to make the assertion
time within which a constructive afterwards. This, I think, should •
trust must be asserted. The cases be regarded as the general rule,
do not clearly define it, and per- There may be cases when even six
haps it is incapable of strict defini- years cannot be allowed, as when
tion. It must vary with the cir- a party having a right to set aside
cumstances of each case. For my- a transaction, or treat it as a trust,
self, I think it may be safely laid stands by and sees another dealing
down that when a party claims to with the property in a manner in-
hold another a trustee of personal consistent with any trust and makes
property under a constructive no objection. Ibid. See Duke of
trust, he must assert the claim Leeds v. Amherst, 2 Phill. 123;
within six years from the time Jordan v. Money, 5 H. L. Cas. 185.
when the trust is alleged to have 'Parham v. McCravy, 6 Eich.
originated, in analogy to the stat- Eq. 140; Eigleberger v. Kibler, 1
209. J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
469
York it is held that twenty years, by analogy to the statute
of limitations, is the period allowed in chancery for com-
mencing proceedings to set aside a conveyance of real estate
on the ground of fraud.1 In a case before the High Court
of Chancery of Maryland it was held that where a creditors'
bill was filed to vacate certain deeds as fraudulent as against
such creditors, and the statute of limitations was pleaded to
their claims, it was held that the question, so far as it in-
volves the existence of such claims, is of a legal nature, or
would be cognizable at law, and in such cases courts of
equity govern themselves by the same limitations as the
statute prescribes to suits in the common law courts, acting
not upon the ground of analogy, but in obedience to the
statute.2 In the State of Connecticut a somewhat more
Hill Ch. 113; Bradley v. McBride,
1 Hill Ch. 3S7. In South Sea
Company v. Wymondsell, 3 F.
Wm. 143, it is ruled that the bill
must allege that the fraud was dis-
covered within six years before ex-
hibiting it; and the fact must cor-
respond with the allegation.
1 Ward v. Van Bokkelen, 1 Paige,
100. "If the conveyance was
fraudulent, no period of time,
short of twenty years, will prevent
the persons, intended to be de-
frauded thereby, from pursuing
their remedy against the land in
the hands of the fraudulent
grantee or her heirs or devisees.
Twenty years is the shortest lim-
itation of actions at law respecting
real property in this State, and by
analogy to the statute of limita-
tions, that is the shortest period
which can bar a proceeding in this
court to set aside conveyances of
real property, on the ground of
fraud." Ibid. Effect will be given
to the statute in equity as well as
in law. Lewis v. Marshall, 1 Mc-
Lean, 16; Lewis v. Marshall, 5 Pet.
496; Humbert v. Trinity Church,
24 Wend. 587; McCrea v. Purmont,
16 Wend. 460; Thomas v. Harvie,
10 Wheat. 146. But it is not al-
ways applicable to cases of equita-
ble cognizance merely. Attorney-
General v. Purmont, 5 Paige, 620. It
is usually adopted. Humbert v.
Trinity Church, supra.
2 McDowell v. Goldsmith, 2 Md.
Ch. 370; Dugan v. Gittings, 3 Gill,
161; Prevost v. Gratz, 6 Wheat.
481. "In the case now before this
court, the plaintiffs must, in the
first place, show themselves to be
the creditors of Elizabeth Osborne,
and then that the deed they seek
to put out of their way is a fraud
upon them as such creditors. The
question, so far as it involves the
existence of their claims, is of a
legal nature, or at any rate would
be cognizable at law, and in such
cases courts of equity govern
themselves by the same limitations
as the statute prescribes to suits in
the common law courts, acting not
upon the ground of analogy, but
in obedience to the statute. Ibid.
1 Story, Equity Jurisprudence,
§529; lib. §1520.
470 IMPLIED TEUSTS. [§ 209.
liberal view of the powers of a court of equity has been
taken. In Phalen v. Clark it was held that a court of equity
has jurisdiction to relieve against every species of fraud,
and in many cases concurrently with a court of law. Gen-
erally, courts of equity consider the statutes of limitations
as obligatory upon them when they are called upon to en-
force only legal rights. But where the defendant, having
perpetrated a fraud to the injury of the plaintiff, which, if
prosecuted in due season, would have entitled him to relief,
carefully and fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff all
knowledge of the truth of the facts in question for such a
period that the statute of limitations would bar a remedy
in a court of law, it was held that the plaintiff, under these
circumstances, was not precluded from relief in equity by
lapse of time.1 Where there is extreme poverty, and ad-
vantage has been taken of the ignorance or necessity of
another, a court of equity will sometimes interpose after a
very long time.2
1 Phalen v. Clark, 19 Conn. 421; ley v. Whalley, 3 Bligh, 1. Mere
Homer v. Fish, 1 Pick. 435 ; "Wet- inadequacy of price, or any other
ter v. Fish, 3 Pick. 74 ; Jones v. inequality in the bargain, is not to
Conway, 4 Yeates, 109 ; Bishop v. be understood as constituting per
Little, 3 Greenl. 405; Sherwood v. se a ground to avoid a bargain in
Sutton, 5 Mason, 143. "If this equity. Osgood v. Franklin, 2
knowledge is fraudulently con- Johns. Ch. 1. '"Circumstances of
cealed from the plaintiff, by the extreme necessity and distress, al-
defendant, we should violate a though not accompanied by any
sound principle of law if we per- direct restraint or duress, may so
mitted the defendant to avail him- entirely overcome the free agency
self of his own fraud." First Mass. of a party as to justify the court in
Turnpike Co. v. Field 3 Mass. 201. setting aside a contract made by
2 Pickett v. Loggon, 14 Ves. 215; him, on account of some oppres-
Baxter v. Wales, 12 Mass. 365; sion, or fraudulent advantage, or
Cutler v. Howe, 8 Mass. 257; Cut- imposition, attendant upon it. 1
ler v. Johnson, 8 Mass. 266 ; Brooks- Story, Equity Jurisprudence, § 239.
bank v. Smith, 2 Y. & C. 58 ; Whal-
CHAPTER XII.
IMPLIED TRUSTS CONTINUED.
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS— DIVISION SECOND.
TRUSTS FROM ACTUAL FRAUD.
From Fraudulent Prevent-
ing of Competition.
From Pretense of Buying
for Another.
From Possession of Money
Belonging to Another.
From Fraudulent Appro-
priation or Conversion of
Property.
The Subject Continued.
From Fraudulent Induce-
ment to Marriage.
The Subject Continued.
The Same Subject.
From Conveyance of Prop-
erty on the Point of
Marriage
The Subject Continued.
From Immoral or Illegal
Contracts.
From Suppression of a
Legal Instrument.
Equity Relieves only where
Equity is Practiced.
The Subject Continued.
§ 210. From Misrepresentation. — A very large class of
cases in which courts of equity will grant relief through a
constructive trust are those which arise from positive mis-
representation or suggestio falsi. In his opinion in Evans
§210.
From Misrepresentation.
§ 227
211.
Misrepresentation Contin-
ued.
228
212.
The Subject Continued.
213.
Effect upon a Third Per-
son.
229
214.
From Fraud by Conceal-
ment.
230
215.
The Subject Continued.
216.
The Same Subject.
231
217.
The Same.
232
218.
From Fraudulent Promise.
219.
The Subject Continued.
233
220.
Trusts from Ignorance or
234
Mistake.
235
221.
From Fraudulent Prevent-
ing of an Act.
222.
From Preventing a De-
236
vise.
237
223.
From Procuring a Devise
by Fraud.
238
224.
The Subject Continued.
225.
From Fraud in Procuring
Conveyance.
239
226.
The Subject Continued.
240
472
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 210.
v. Bichncll, Lord Chancellor Eldon said: "It is a very old
head of equity that if a representation ?s made to another
person going to deal in a matter of interest upon the faith
of that representation, the former shall make that repre-
sentation good if he knows it to be false."1 This rule, in
its full force, is applied to purchases where the property is
not present, and, as it cannot be seen, is taken on the faith
of the representations of the seller. In Smith v. Richards
the Supreme Court of the United States held that whenever
a sale is made of property not present, but at a remote dis-
tance, which the seller knows the purchaser has not seen,
but which he buj-s upon the representation of the seller,
relying on its truth, then the representation in effect
amounts to a warranty ; at least, the seller is bound to make
good the representation.2 So far as relates to this point,
1 Evans v. Bicknell, 6 Ves. 173.
"The writers of the moral law hold
it to be the duty of the seller to dis-
close the defects which are within
his knowledge. But the common
law is not quite so strict. If the
defects in the article sold be open
equally to the observation of both
parties, the law does not require
the vendor to aid and assist the ob-
servation of the vendee. Even war-
ranty will not cover defects that
are plainly the objects of the senses ;
though if the vendor says or does
anything whatever, with an inten-
tion to divert the eye or obscure the
observation of the buyer, even in
relation to open defects, he would
"be guilty of an act of fraud. A de-
duction of fraud may be made, not
only from deceptive assertions and
false representations, but from
facts, incidents and circumstances
which may be trivial in themselves,
hut decisive evidence in the given
case of a fraudulent design. When,
lowever, the means of information
relative to facts and circumstances
affecting the value of the commod-
ity be equally accessible to both
parties, and neither of them does
or says anything tending to impose
upon the other, the disclosure of
any superior knowledge which one
party may have over the other, as
to those facts and circumstances, is
not requisite to the validity of the
contract. 2 Kent, Com. *484 13th
Ed. The misrepresentation must
be of something material, consti-
tuting an inducement or motive to
the other party, and on which he
placed trust, so as to be misled to
his injury. People v. Kendall, 25
Wend. 399; Cury v. Hotailing, 1
Hill, 311; Laidlaw v. Organ, 2
Wheat. 178, 195 ; Pidlock v. Bishop,
3 B. & C. 605.
2 Smith v. Bichards, 13 Pet. 26;
Daniel v. Mitchell, 1 Story, 172;
Hough v. Richardson, 3 Story, 659 ;
Warner v. Daniels, 1 W. & M. 90;
Mason v. Crosby, 1 W. & M. 343;
Smith v. Babcock, 2 W. & M. 246;
Ainslie v. Medlycott, 9 Ves. 21;
Fulton's Exrs. v. Roosevelt,5 Johns.
Ch. 174. "From the situation of
the parties, and of the country, and,
§ 2 10. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 473
it is immaterial whether the misrepresentation is intentional
or by mistake, and it is immaterial in what form the mis-
representation comes. In Ainsliev. Medlycott, Sir William
Grant, Master of the Rolls, said: "No doubt by a repre-
sentation a party may bind himself just as much as by an
express covenant. If knowingly he represents what is not
true, no doubt he is bound. If without knowing that it is
not true he takes upon himself to make a representation to
another, upon the faith of which that other acts, no doubt
he is bound, though his mistake was perfectly innocent."1
Touching this point Mr. Justice Story says : ""Where the
party either intentionally or by design misrepresents a ma-
terial fact, or produces a false impression in order to mis-
lead another, or to entrap or cheat him, or to obtain an un-
due advantage of him, in every such case there is a positive
fraud in the truest sense of the terms. There is an evil act
with an evil intent; doluin malum ad circumveniendurn.
And the misrepresentation may be as well by deeds or acts
as by words, by artifices to mislead as well as by positive
assertions."2 The main points on which courts of equity
from the form of the entry, it was Lee, 13 Pet. 107 ; Bryan v. Primm,
reasonable to presume, that this 1 Breese, 33; Napier v. Elam, 6
apology is true in point of fact; but Yerg. 108; Boss v. Eliz. & Som.
the court does not conceive that K. R. Co., 1 Green Ch. 422; McAl-
the fact will amount to a legal jus- lister v. Barry, 2 Hayw. 290; Liv-
tification of the person who has ingstone v. Peru Iron Co., 2 Paige,
made the misrepresentation. He 390.
who sells property on a description 2 The representations must be
given by himself is bound to make sufficient to produce the effect,
good that description; and if it be They should not be vague or in-
untrue in a material point, although definite. Smith v. Chadwick, L. K.
the Tariance be occasioned by a 20 Oh. Div.27; Dimmockv. Hallett,
mistake, must still remain liable for L. B. 2 Ch. App. 21, 30 ; Arnold v.
that variance." McFerrand v. Tay- Bright, 41 Mich. 207 ; Wakeraan v.
lor, 3 Cranch, 281. Dalley, 51 N. Y. 27, 30. The rep-
1 Ainslie v. Medlycott, 9 Ves. 13, resentation may be acts or con-
21 ; Dugan v. Cureton, 1 Atk. 31 ; tained in an advertisement in a
Pearson v. Morgan, 2 Bro. Ch. newspaper. Richardson v. Syl-
389, 390; Neville v. Wilkinson, 1 vester, L. R. 9 Q. B. 34; Bradbury
Bro. Ch. 543; Napier v. Elam, 6 v. Barding, 35 Conn. 577. Evi-
Yerg. 108 ; Perkins v. McGavock, dence of attending circumstances
Cooke, 415 ; Parkham v. Bandolph, may be introduced to make certain
4 How. 435; United States Bank v. the import and meaning of expres-
474
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 210.
will afford relief in cases of misrepresentation are very clearly
and comprehensively set forth in the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case already cited. It
was held that it is an ancient and well established principle
sions which, taken alone, are un-
certain and indefinite. Moore v.
Burke, 4 Fost. & F. 258. In the
matter of opinion representation,
in order to incur liability, it seems
to he enough, that with the knowl-
edge there was an intent that it
should take effect. Pike v. Fay,
101 Mass. 134, 137; Kost v. Bender,
25 Mich. 515 ; Birdsey v. Butterfield,
34 Wis. 52; Wakeman v. Dalley, 51
N. Y. 27; Holbrookv. Connor, 60
Maine, 578 ; Mertin v. Jordan, 60
Maine, 531 ; Hubbell v. Meigs, 50
ST. Y. 480. In the case of "Wise v.
Fuller, 29 N. J. Eq. 257, 262, Van
Fleet. V. C, uses this language:
"Xo definition of fraud can be
framed which will serve as a safe
test in every case. The best effort
id that direction must prove abor-
tive. Each case must be deter-
mined on its own peculiar facts. It
is not every untruthful statement
that will invalidate a contract.
Avarice is so strong in the average
man that he naturally extolls what
he desires to sell and depreciates
what he wants to buy. All bar-
gaining is conducted on the prin-
ciple that each party is at liberty
to get such advantages in the trans-
action as are allowed by the morals
of trade. A contract is rarely made
where each party strives to give the
other all the benefit to be derived
from the transaction. Gain or
profit is the fundamental object of
all traffic. Generally, mere expres-
sions of opinion, estimate or judg-
ment, even if false, do not consti-
tute fraud. It may be said, gener-
ally, an actionable misrepresenta-
tion consists in a false statement
respecting a fact material to the
contract and which is influential in
producing it. 2 Chit, on Con. 1044;
2 Parsons on Contract, 275 ; Taylor
v. Fleet, 1 Barb. 471. Statements
of value made by a vendor during
the negotiation between the parties,
although known to be excessive, do
not ordinarily constitute a warranty
or a fraud. Uhler v. Semple, 5 C.
E. Green, 291. A mere expression
of opinion as to value, although
the amount stated is known to be
excessive, is not a fraud (Sanford
v.Hardy, 23 Wend. 260; Smith v.
Countryman, 30 N. Y. 655, 681),
unless the person making it knew
at the time that in consequence of
the relations of trust and confidence
existing between himself and the
person to whom it was made, he
would rely upon it and be con-
trolled by it. Story, Equity Juris-
prudence, § 197. A purchaser is
not entitled to relief against a ven-
dor for a false affirmation of value,
it being deemed his own folly to
credit a nude assertion of that na-
ture. Besides, value consists in
judgment and estimation, in which
men necessarily differ. 1 Sugden on
Vendors, 3. But a remedy will lie
against a vendor for falsely affirm-
ing that a greater rent is paid for
the estate than is actually reserved,
for that is a fact within his own
knowledge. 76.5; Lysney v.Selby,
Ld. Baym. 1118 ; Dobell v. Stevens,
3 B. & C. 623. And so a willful
misrepresentation by a vendor af-
firming that the income from his
public house has been greater than
§ 210. J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
475
that whenever suppressio veri or suggestio falsi occur, and
more especially both together, they afford sufficient ground
to set aside any release or conveyance. The party selling
property must be presumed to know whether the represen-
in truth it was, is an actionable
fraud. Bowing v. Stevens, 2 Car.
& P. 337. The fact that a price in
excess of its market value is paid
for a thing standing, alone, is
never evidence of fraud. Mere in-
adequacy of consideration will
never substantiate a charge of
fraud. In equity, inadequacy of
value is, in general, of itself,
no ground for impeaching a
contract (Beninger v. Convin,
4Zab. 257, 259); but, with other
circumstances of suspicion it may
constitute an element of proof in
establishing fraud." See also
Suessenguth v. Bingenheimmer, 40
Wis. 370. On representations of
fact see Eedgrave v. Hurd, L. K.
20 Ch. D. 1; Arkwright v. New-
bold, L. K. 17 Ch. D. 301, 320. It
is necessary for the plaintiff who
seeks to recover for misrepresenta-
tion to show that the defendant
made the representation with actual
knowledge of its falsity, or under
circumstances showing that he
ought to have had such knowl-
edge, or without knowing whether
it was true or false. Arkwright v.
Newbold, L. E. 17 Ch. D. 301, 320;
Reese Silver Mining Co. v. Smith,
L. R. 4 H. L. Cas. 64; Eedgrave v.
Hurd, L. K. 20 Ch. D. 1 ; Jolliffe v.
Baker, L.E. 11 Q.B.Div. 255; Raw-
lins v. Wickham, 3 De G. & J. 304;
Collins v. Evans, 5 Q. B. 820, 826;
Omrod v. Huth, 14 Mees. & W.
651 ; Childers v. Wooler, 2 El. & E.
287; Barley v. Walford. 9 Q. B. 197,
208; Mahurin v. Harding, 28 5T. H.
12S;Edickv. Crim, 10 Barb. 445;
Lobdell v. Baker, 1 Mete. 193, 201;
Bennett v. Judson, 21 >T. Y. 138 ;
Evertson v. Miles, 6 Johns. 138;
Casev. Boughton, 11 Wend. 10S;
Carley v. Wilkins, 6 Barb. 557;
Evans v. Edmonds, 13 C. B. 777,
786; Phelps v. White, L. E. 7 Ir.
160, 170; Morse v. Dearborn. 109
Mass. 593, 595 ; Twitchell v. Bridge,
42 Vt. 68; Stone v. Covell, 29 Mich.
359; Beebe v. Knapp, 28 Mich. 53.
In Eedgrave v. Hurd, L. E. 20 Ch.
D. 1, 12, Jessel, M. E., uses this
language: "According to the de-
cisions of courts of equity it was
not necessary, in order to set aside
a contract obtained by material
false representation, to prove that
the party who obtained it knew at
the time when the representation
was made that it was false. It was
put In two ways, either of which
was sufficient. One way of put-
ting the case was : "A man is not
to be allowed to get a benefit from
a statement which he now admits
to be false. He is not to be al-
lowed to say, for the purpose of
civil jurisdiction, that when he
made it he did not know it to be
false ; he ought to have found that
out before he made it." The
other way of putting it was this :
"Even assuming that moral fraud
must be shown in order to set
aside a contract, you have it where
a man, having obtained a benefi-
cial contract by a statement which
he knows to be false, insists upon
keeping that contract. To do so is
a moral delinquency ; no man ought
to seek to take advantage of his
own false statements." The rule
in equity was settled, and it does
476
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 210.
tation which he makes of it is true or false. If he knows
it to be false, that is fraud of the most positive kind ; but
if he does not know it, then it can only be from gross neg-
ligence ; and, in contemplation of a court of equity, repre-
not matter on which of the two
grounds it was rested. As regards
the rule of common law there is
no doubt it was not quite so wide.
There were, indeed, cases in which
even at common law, a contract
could be rescinded for misrepre-
sentation, though it could not be
shown that the person making it
knew the representation to be false.
They are variously stated, but I
think, according to the later decis-
ions, the statement must have been
made recklessly and without care,
whether it was true or false, and
not with the belief that it was true."
A misrepresentation of a material
fact whether it be made through
mistake or design, avoids a policy
of insurance underwritten on the
faith thereof. The knowledge and
consent of the principal is not nec-
essary to make such a misrepre-
sentation by an agent fatal to the
policy. Carpenter v. American
Ins. Co., 1 Story, 57. On question
of agency seeHouldsworthv. Glas-
gow Bank, 5 App. Cas. 317; Mul-
lens v. Miller, L. R. 22 Ch. D. 194;
Bell's Case, 22 Beav. 35; Fitzsim-
mons v. Joslin, 21 Vt. 129. Where
the principal has derived a benefit
from his agent's act he will
be liable in damages for the
agent's fraud in the transaction.
Barwick v. English Joint Stock
Bank, L. K. 2 Eq. 259; Mackay v.
Commercial Bank, L. R. 5 P. C.
394; JSTat'l Exchange Co. v. Drew,
2 Macq. 103; Udell v. Atherton, 7
Hurl. & N. 172 ; Ranger v. Great
Western Ry. Co., 5 H. L. Cas. 72;
Houldsworth v. Glasgow Bank, 5
App. Cas, 317; Weir v. Bell, 3 Ex.
D. 238; Swire v. Francis, 3 App.
Cas. 106; Swift v. Jewsbury, L. R.
9 Q. B. 244; Fuller v. Wilson, 32
Ad. & El. 58. In the United States it
is firmly established that the princi-
pal is liable in damages where he
has derived benefit from his agent's
fraud. Bennett v. Judson, 21 K".
Y. 238; Davis v. Bemis, 40 N. Y.
453 ; Chester v. Dickerson, 52 Barb.
349; Elwell v. Chamberlin, 31 N.
Y. 619; Craig v. Ward, 3 Keyes,
393 ; Allerton v. Allerton, 50 Of. Y.
670; Jeffrey v. Bigelow, 13 Wend.
518; Durst v. Benton, 47 N\ Y.
167; s. C, 2 Lans. 137; Sandford
Handy, 23 Wend. 260; Lock v.
Stearns, 1 Mete. 560; Cooke v. Cast-
ner, 9 Cush. 266 ; Lobdell v. Baker,
1 Mete. 203 ; Bank of U. S. v. Davis,
2 Hill, 465; North River Bank v.
Aymar, 3 Hill, 268. "The rule is
based upon the established princi-
ple that where one of two innocent
persons must suffer by the fraud of
a third, he shall bear tbe
loss who enabled the third person
to do the injury by giving him
credit and holding him out to the
world as his agent." Davis v.
Beemis, 40 N. Y. 453, note. "If
one defendant sold only his half,
and by himself or his agent com-
mitted a fraud in so doing, he
would be answerable for the whole
injury which the fraud occasioned,
although it might exceed the value
of the whole vessel. We have,
then, the case of two principals
sued for false representations made
in the sale of property, one acting
for himself and the other acting
§2io.;
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
477
sentations founded on a mistake resulting from such negli-
gence is fraud. The purchaser confides in them upon the
assumption that the owner knows his own property and
truly represents it. And it is immaterial to the purchaser
by an agent. If the agent em-
ployed by one had been a third
person, there seems to be no doubt
that the two principals could be
jointly sued. What difference can
it make that one of the principals
acted as agent of the other!"
White v. Sawyer, 16 Gray, 589. In
all these cases it is borne in mind
that the plaintiff's right to relief
depends upon his ignorance of the
true state of facts and his belief in
the representations made. If, how-
ever, he knew or ought to have
known that the representation was
false he will fail. Pasley v. Free-
man, 37 K. S. 51; s. c, Big. Lead.
Cas. in Torts, 1 ; Camberwell Bldg.
Soc. v. Holloway, L. R. 13 Ch. D.
754 ; Atlantic Delaine Co. v. James,
94 U. S. 207; Williamson v. Alli-
son, 2 East. 446. "On the 22d
of May, 1849, this property was
advertised for sale by the president
of the Okisko Company, by order
of the board ; and in the advertise-
ment the water power is said to be
about fifteen feet fall. [It was but
fourteen feet.] Being so intimately
connected with the property, with
• such ample means of information
in regard to it, in every respect, it
cannot be supposed that he so re-
lied upon the representation of the
trustees in relation to the water
power, as that it offered any in-
ducement for him to buy, or that
he was misled by it to any extent.
This objection, therefore, cannot
avail him." Ely v. Stewart, 2 Md.
408, 416. "The gist of the action
is that the plaintiffs were im-
posed upon and deceived by the
fraud of the defendants." Pick-
ering v. Dowson, 4 Taunt. 779. If
the plaintiff has full means of ex-
amining for himself, he cannot
aver that he was imposed upon by
the false representation. Where
there is an express warranty, indeed
on the part of the defendant em-
bodied in and made part of the con-
tract of sale, and this warranty is
false, case will lie on the ground
that by means of the warranty the
buyer is lulled into security and
prevented from making an examin-
ation." Salem India Rubber Co.
v. Adams, 23 Pick. 256, 265. No
purchaser is at liberty to remain in-
tentionally ignorant of facts relat-
ing to his purchase within his
reach, and then claim protection
as an innocent purchaser. Jenkins
v. Eldredge, 3 Story, 181. It is
well settled that the plaintiff need
not inquire in the face of a plain
representation of fact, though the
truth might thereby have been ob-
tained. Phelps v. White, L. R. 7
Ir. 160; Stanley v. McG-auran, L.
R. 11 Ir. 314; Redgrave v. Hurd,
L. R. 20 Ch. D. 1, 13; Matlock v.
Todd, 19 Ind. 130; Webster v.
Bailey, 31 Mich. 36; McClellanv.
Scott, 24 Wis. 81, 87 ; Mead v. Bunn,
32X.Y.275; Holland v. Anderson,
38 Mo. 55; Kilier v. Rogers, 19
Minn. 32 ; Parham v. Randolph, 4
How. (Miss.) 435; Reller v. Equita-
ble Ins. Co., 28 Ind. 170: Brown v.
Castles, 11 Cush. 34S; Manning v.
Albee, 11 Allen, 520; s. C, 14 Al-
len, 7 ; Watson v. Atwood, 25 Conn.
313. Justice Gray, in David v.
Park, 103 Mass. 501, says: "The
478
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 210.
whether the misrepresentation proceeded from mistake or
fraud. The injury to him is the same, whatever may have
been the motives of the seller. The misrepresentations of
the seller of property, to authorize the rescinding a con-
evidence introduced tended to
show that the defendant falsely
and fraudulently stated as of his
own knowledge, and not as a mat-
ter of opinion, in the one case that
he had the interest in the patent
right which he undertook to sell,
and in the other, that the invention
was not covered by any other
patent. A distinct statement of
such a fact by a seller, knowing it
to be false, and with intent to de-
ceive the buyer, and on which the
buyer acts to his own injury, will
sustain an action of deceit, even if
the buyer might have discovered
the fraud by searching the records
of the patent office." And so like-
wise the failure to read an instru-
ment where no fraud in securing
the signature be shown will not be
ground for relief against an instru-
ment so signed. '-The fact that
she neglected to read the mortgage
and to inform herself of the trusts
upon which Churchill held the
note and mortgage, furnishes no
reason for setting it aside. No de-
ception was practiced upon her,
and the defendants accepted the
security in good faith and in the
belief, which they had the right to
hold, that the mortgage and note
were duly executed by the plaint-
iff with a full understanding of the
said trusts. ' ' Thacher v. Churchill,
118 Mass. 108. See also Hardy v.
Brier, 91 Ind. 91 ; Miller v. Saw-
bridge, 29 Minn. 442; Watson v.
Planters' Bank, 22 La. Ann. 14 :
Craig v. Hobbs, 44 Ind. 363 ; Watts
v. Burnett, 56 Ala. 341 ; Rogers v.
Place, 35 Ind. 577 ; Bacon v. Mark-
ley, 46 Ind. 116; Hawkins v. Haw-
kins, 50 Cal. 558. In the case of
Peabody v. Flint, 6 Allen, 52, it
was held that a minority of the
stockholders of a corporation may
maintain a bill in equity in behalf
of themselves' and other stockhold-
ers for conspiracy and fraud,
whereby their interests have been
sacrificed, against the corporation
and iis officers and othera who
participate therein. By unreason-
able delay, however, in bringing
their bill, they will forfeit their
title to equitable relief. See also
Brewer v. Boston Theater, 104
Mass. 378; Dousman v. Wisconsin
Milling Co., 40 Wis. 418. How-
ever, where facts exist such as
should put a party on inquiry, he is
bound to inquire, and if he neg-
lects to inquire it is at his
peril, and he is in such case charge-
able, constructively, with notice of
what he might have learned on
examination. Warren v. Swett, 31
>T. H. 332, 341. See also Green v.
Slayter, 4 Johns. Ch. 46; Farns-
worth v. Childs, 4 Mass. 639; Tay-
lor v. Stibbert, 2 Ves. Sr. 440;
Lessee of Billington v. Welch, 5
Binn. 132; Dexter v. Harris, 2
Mason, 536; Sterry v. Arden, 1
Johns. Ch. 267; Frost v. Beekman.
1 Johns. Ch. 299. And so a pur
chaser of land is chargeable with
notice by implication of every fact
affecting the title, which would be
discovered by an examination of
the deeds or other muniments of
title of his vendor, and, where he
has knowledge of any facts suffi-
cient to put a prudent man upon
<j 211.1 IMPLIED TRUSTS. 479
tract of sale by a court of equity, must be of something
material, constituting an inducement or motive to purchase,
and by which he has been misled to his injury. It must be
in something in which the one party places a known trust
or confidence in the other.1
§ 211. Misrepresentation Continued In order to con-
stitute a basis for making an offender a constructive trustee,
the misrepresentation must relate, not to a matter of judg-
ment or opinion, but to some matter of fact, and it must
relate to some fact that is material in the transaction. It
must appear that in consequence of such misrepresentation
the complainant suffered pecuniary injury. In a case in
which defendant falsely represented the patronage of a
hotel to amount to a certain sum per month, or per annum,
while in fact the amount was very much le*s, it was held
that his fraudulent representation disclosed a good cause of
action.2 In a case where a person desired to purchase land
from a party who was ignorant that he had any title to it,
or where the land was situated ; and the purchaser made
fraudulent representations as to the quantity and quality of
the land, and, also, as to a lien which he professed to have
an inquiry, which, if prosecuted duce a person to enter into the
with ordinary diligence, would contract, or would tend to induce
lead to actual notice of some rights him to do so, or that it would be a
or title in conflict with that he is part of the inducement to enter
about to purchase, the law will into the contract, the inference is,
presume he made the inquiry, and if he entered into the contract, that
will charge him with notice he he acted on the inducement so held
would have received if he had out, and you want no evidence that
made it. Cambridge Valley Bank he did so act ; but even then you
v. Delano, 48 Barb. 326. See also may show that in fact he did not
Willis v. Valette, 4 Met. (Ky.) 186 ; so act in one of two ways, either
Kennedy v. Green, 3 Myl . & K. by showing that he knew the truth
718. With regard to the proof that before be entered into the con-
the representation was acted upon, tract, and, therefore, could not rely
the remarks of Jessel, M. E., in on the misstatements; or else, by
Smith v. Chadwich, L. K. 20 Oh. showing that he avowedly did not
D. 44, are pertinent. He says : rely upon them, whether he knew
''Again, on the question of the the facts or not."
materiality of the statement, if the 1 Smith v. Richards, 13 Pet. 26-
court sees upon the face of it that 2 Pilmore v. Hood, 6 Scott, 827.
it is of such a nature as would in-
480
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 211.
for taxes which he had paid ; and finally bought the land
for a grossly inadequate price, the sale will be set aside.1
1 Tyler v. Black, 13 How. 230;
Warner v. Daniels, 1 Woodb. & M.
90; Mason v. Crosby, Id. 342;
Adams v. Jones, 39 Ga. 479 ; Ham-
mond v. Pennock, 5 Lans. 358 ; Mc-
Clure v. Lewis, 72 Mo. 314. '-There
is no case where mere inadequacy
of price, independent of other cir-
cumstances, has been held suffi-
cient to set aside a sale made be-
tween parties standing on equal
ground, and dealing with each
other without any imposition or
oppression. And the inequality
amounting to fraud must be so
strong and manifest as to shock the
conscience and confound the judg-
ment of any man of common sense. "
Chancellor Kent in Osgood v.
Franklin, 2 Johns. Ch. 1, 23. See
also Stilwell v. Wilkinson, Jacob,
280; Gwynne v. Heaton, 1 Bro. Ch.
1 ; Stevens v. Bateman, 1 Bro. Ch.
22; Floyer v. Sherrard, Amb.
18; Spratley v. Griffiths, 2 Bro. Ch.
179, n. ; Low v. Burchard, 8 Ves.
133; Underhill v. Harwood, 10 Ves:
209 ; Verner v. Winstanley, 8 Sch.
& Lef. 393; Bruce v. Rogers, 8 Sch.
& Lef. 395; Darley v. Singleton,
Wightw. 25; Evans v. Brown,
Wightw. 102; Ex parte Thistle-
wood, 1 Rose, 290; Gregor v.
Duncan, 2 Desaus. 639; Clither-
allv. Ogilve, 1 Desaus. 258, 259;
Howell v. Baker, 4 Johns. Ch.
118. The inadequacy of price
must be so great as to afford a
strong presumption of fraud, or
must be coupled with inequality in
the condition of the parties (George
v. Richardson, Gilm. 230; Butler
v. Haskell, 4 Desaus. 651 ; Udall v.
Kenney, 3 Cow. 50), or by circum-
stances showing that advantage
has been taken of the distress of
the party. McKinney v. Pinkard,
2 Leigh, 149. In Hill on Trustees,
152, it is said: "Mere inadequacy
of itself is not enough to set aside a
contract; but where the inade-
quacy is so gross that it is impos-
sible to state it to a man of com-
mon sense, without producing an
exclamation as to the inequality of
it, the court will infer, from that
fact alone, that there must have
been such imposition, or oppres-
sion, in the transaction as to amount
to a case of frand, from which it
would not suffer any benefit or ad-
vantage to be derived. Other cir-
cumstances of fraud will aid the
court." "Inadequacy of price,
where the vendor is of weak under-
standing or under the pressure of
distress, or where the vendee
stands in a, relation of confidence
to the vendor, or the latter is in the
power of the former, is sufficient to
set aside a sale. Williard's Equity
Jurisprudence, 202, 205 ; Heathcote
v. Paignon, 2 Bro. Ch. 167. See
also Heme v. Meers, 1 Vern. 465 ;
Gould v. Okedon, 4 Bro. P. C.
Toml. 193; Pickett v. Loggon, 14
Ves. 215; Murray v. Palmer, 2 Sch.
& Lef. 474; Bowen v. Kirwan, Rep.
temp. Sugden, 44; s. c, 3 Ves. &B.
117; Crowe v. Ballard, 1 Ves. Jr. 215.
Where weakness of mind and in-
adequacy of consideration unite,
though neither standing alone
would under ordinary circumstan-
ces be sufficient, the court has set
aside the conveyance. Clarkson
v. Hanway, 2 P. Wms. 204 ; Mc-
Cormick v. Malin, 5 Blackf. 509.
And so likewise where imbecility
of mind and inadequacy of consid-
eration were united with an abuse
of confidence reposed, the sale has
211.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
481
In a case before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts, Mr. Justice Gray, in his opinion, said: "This court
has repeatedly recognized and acted upon the rule of the
common law, by which the mere statements of a vendor,
either of real or personal property, not being in the form
of a warranty, as to its value, or the price which he has
given or been offered for it, are assumed to be so commonly
made by those holding property for sale in order to enhance
its price, that any purchaser who confides in them is con-
sidered as too careless of his own interests to be entitled to
relief, even if the statements are false and intended to de-
ceive."1 But where a person who sustains a confidential
relation to the opposite party is trusted as an adviser, and
confidence is placed in his opinion or judgment, makes mis-
representations of this character, they will be regarded by
a court of equity as a ground for relief.2 Equity takes
cognizance of fraud that is adapted to deceive and mislead,
where there is ordinary intelligence and prudence in busi-
been set aside. Gibson v. Jeyes, 6
Ves. 266. Where a man of shrewd-
ness and experience conveyed, to
his nephew who was ignorant, and
but just of age, in full of a debt of
$500, land worth only one half that
amount, the deed was held fraud-
ulent and set aside. Hall v. Per-
kins, 3 Wend. 626. See also case of
Seymour v. Delaney, 3 Cow. 445,
where it is held that inadequacy of
price merely, without being such
as to prove fraud conclusively, the
contract being entered into delib-
erately and fair in all its parts, is
not an objection to its being ex-
ecuted. The cases upon this point
of mere inadequacy cited and the
substance of them stated chro-
nologically by Chief Justice Savage.
A willful misrepresentation as to
the income derived from a patent
for an invention, — a half interest in
which was to be the consideration
for the land sought to be purchased
31
— held sufficient evidence of fraud
to set aside the sale. Crosland v.
Hall, 6 Stew. Ill ; Meyers v. Funk,
56 Iowa, 52.
1 Manning v. Albee, 11 Allen, 520,
522; Medbury v. Watson, 6 Met.
259, 260 ; Brown v. Castles, 11 Cush.
350; Veasey v. Doton, 3 Allen, 381 ;
Sandford v. Handy, 23 Wend. 269.
"The representations of a vendor
of real estate, to the vendee, as to
the price which he paid for it, are
to be regarded in the same light as
representations respecting value.
A purchaser ought not to rely upon
them; for it is settled that, even
when they are false and uttered
with a view to deceive, they fur-
nish no ground of action." Hem-
mer v. Cooper, 8 Allen, 334.
2 Shaeffer v. Sleade, 7 Blackf . 178 ;
Hill v. Gray, 1 Starkie, 352; Eey-
nell v. Sprye, 8 Hare, 222; s. c, 1
De G., M. & G. 6C0; Keates v. Cad-
ogan, 2 Eng. L. & Eq. 321.
482 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ '111.
ness transactions, but it is not a conservator of public
morals, and does not attempt to afford relief against all
that is to be condemned from an ethical point of view.
§ 212. The Subject Continued. — In order to secure re-
lief in equity on the ground of fraudulent misrepresentation,
it must be shown that the statements related to facts not
within the knowledge of complainant. Where the two par-
ties have the same means of knowing the facts, as where
they together go over a tract of land, or ascertain the sit-
uation of a town lot, there will be no ground for a trust.
Where one party has the same opportunity as the other to
know the facts, neither can claim deception. In a familiar
case it was held that the representation of facts of a public
and notorious character, in relation to the situation and
prospects of a town by a vendor of lots, will not constitute
a fraud upon the purchasers.1 Where there is misrepre-
sentation that would be a ground for declaring the contract
void, or of holding the guilty party as a trustee, but the
deception is detected before the contract is closed, no relief
will be given.2 Where statements in regard to property
1 Bell "v. Henderson, 6 How. probability is that the purchaser
(Miss.) 311. It is not sufficient calculated that he was making a
merely to charge fraud. The facts profitable speculation in embark-
stated must show a fraudulent in- ing with others, in rearing up a
tent. There was nothing stated in new town in that part of the State."
the advertisement to induce pur- Ibid.
chases, but what every man was 2 Pratt v. Philbrook, 33 Maine,
capable of judging for himself. 17. To avoid a, contract for mis-
Whether there was such a town, representation, it must appear that
with five hundred inhabitants, at a deception was intended and was
the head of steamboat navigation, practiced; that it was successful,
with a fair prospect of a railroad and that it operated a damage to
from thence to Pontotoc, the vendee the party deceived. Though a
could ascertain and know as well party may have been deceived by
as the trustees. The publicity of fraudulent representations, it is not
the facts, by advertisement pub- usual for courts to interfere in his
lished, no doubt, far and wide, was behalf if he had full means of as-
intended and calculated to draw certaining the truth and detecting
public attention to this town and the fraud, and yet neglected to do
its future prospects, to excite in- so. A contract made for the sale
quiry, and full canvass, for days and purchase of property, though
and week.s before the sale; and the founded upon the misrepresenta-
§ 213. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 4So
are vague and indefinite and the purchaser relies upon hi.s
own judgment, having equal opportunities of iomiing an
opinion with the seller, equity will not give him relief from
a bad bargain.1
§ 213. Effect upon a Third Person — Where a fraud
has been committed by misrepresentation, the equitable
effect upon the offender will extend to any third person
who may be interested with him in the transaction, how-
ever innocent such third person may be, unless he has sub-
sequently acquired an interest without notice. The doctrine
is that where a man has committed a fraud he shall not de-
rive any benefit from it, and no third person shall be per-
mitted t'o profit by his fraud. As an illustration of this
principle, where an agent commits a fraud in the sale or
purchase of property, his principal is not permitted to de-
rive any benefit from the transaction. The effect of the
fraud upon the agent extends to his principal, and whether
the fraudulent act of the agent was with or without the
knowledge and consent of the principal is not material.
The court acts upon the assumption that fraud by the agent
is fraud by the principal, and that the principal should be
bound by the wrong or misconduct of his own agent rather
than that a stranger should suffer, and that the principal
cannot take the benefits of a trade by his agent without
taking the burdens, and that he cannot adopt a part and
repudiate the rest where the transaction is a unit and he
tion of the seller, cannot be wholly relation thereto, is actually deceived
rescinded, for the reason of such to his injury — a court of equity
misrepresentations, if, prior to the will rescind the contract in pursu-
completion of the sale, the pur- ance thereof, although it do not
chaser had become acquainted with contain the misrepresentations;
the whole facts, and yet confirmed and it matters not, in such a case,
the bargain, lb. See also Knuckolls whether the misrepresentations be
v. Lea, 10 Humph. 577; Yeates v. the result of mistake or fraud. But
Prior, 6 Eng. 68. where a purchaser relies upon his
1 Hough v. Kichardson, 3 Story, own judgment, uninfluenced by
659. Where in a treaty for the sale any misrepresentations, and has
of property the vendor makes ma- full means of know ledge within his
terial misrepresentations, by which reach, a court of equity will not
the purchaser, having no knowl- relieve him from his bargain. .Ibid.
edge, or means of knowledge, in
484
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 213.
claims the benefits of the whole.1 In his opinion in Bennett
V. Judson, Mr. Justice Comstock said: "The principal
cannot enjoy the fruits of the bargain without adopting all
the instrumentalities employed by the agent in bringing it
to a consummation. If an agent defrauds the person with
whom he is dealing, the principal, not having authorized or
participated in the wrong, may no doubt rescind, when he
discovers the fraud, on the terms of making complete resti-
tution. But so long as he retains benefits of the dealing
he cannot claim immunity on the ground that the fraud was
committed by his agent and not by himself."2 This rule
1 Fersonv. Sanger, 1 Woodb.&M.
147 ; Warner v. Daniel, 1 Woodb. &
M. 90 ; Gentry v. Law, 4 Nev. 97 ;
Bennett v. Judson, 21 N. Y. 238;
Perham v. Randolph, 4 How.
(Miss.) 435; Bowers v. Johnson,
18 Miss. 169; Elwell v. Chamber-
lain, 31 N. T. 611, 619; Haskit v.
Elliott, 58 Ind. 493; Locke v.
Stearns, 1 Mete. 560; Kibbe v.
Hamilton Ins. Co., 11 Gray, 163;
Brooke v. Berry, 2 Gill, 83; Fitz-
simmons v. Joslin, 21 Vt. 129;
Fuller v. Wilson, 3 Ad. & El. (N.
S.) 58; Cornfoot v. Fowke, 6 M. &
Wei. 358; National Exchange Co.
v. Drew, 2 Macqu. 103; Hern v.
Nichols, 1 Salk. 289 ; British Bank
Co. v. CharnwoodRy. Co., L. R. 18
Q. B. D.715; Barwickv.Eng. Joint
Stock Bank, L. R. 2 Ex. 259; West-
ern Bank v. Addie, L. R. 1 H. L.
Scotl. 145; Mackay v. Commer-
cial Bank, L. R. 5 P. C. 394; Udell
v. Atherton, 7 Hurl. & N. 172;
Ranger v. St. Western Ry. Co., 5
H. L. Cas. 72; Fuller v. Wilson, 3
Q. B. 58; Swift v. Winterbotham,
L. R. 8Q.B. 244; Swire v. Francis,
3 App. Cas. 106; Weir v. Bell, 3
Ex. D. 238; Houldsworth v. Glas-
gow Bank, 5 App. Cas. 317; Cook
v. Castner, 9 Cush. 266; White v.
Sawyer, 16 Gray, 586.
2 Bennett v. Judson, 21 N. Y.
238, 240 ; Stone v. Denny, 4 Mete.
161 ; Buford v. Caldwell, 3 Mo. 477;
Parham v. Randolph, 4 How. 435;
Thomas v. McCann, 4 B. Mon.
601; Gentry v. Law, 4 Nev. 97;
Wilde v. Gibson, 1 H. L. Cas. 605;
Elwell v. Chamberlain, 31 N. Y.
619 ; Cassard v. Hinman, 6 Bosw.
9 ; Scholefield v. Templar, Johns.
155; Hern v. Nichols, 1 Salk. 289;
Barwick v. Eng. Joint Stock Bank,
L. R. 2 Ex. 259; Nelson v. Cowing,
6 Hill, 336 ; Jeffrey v. Bigelow, 13
Wend. 518; Sandford v. Handy, 23
Wend. 260; Haskit v. Elliott, 58
Ind. 493; Eilenberger v. Protective
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 89 Pa. St. 464;
Tagg v. Tenn. Nat'l Bank, 9 Heisk.
479; Reynolds v. Witte, 13 S. Car.
5; s. c, 36 Am. Rep. 678. If an
agent effects a sale of land of his
principal by false representations
or other fraud, without the author-
ity or knowledge of the principal,
the latter is chargeable with such
fraud in the same manner as if he
had known or authorized it. If
the vendor of land knows when he
effects the sale, that the purchaser
has been induced to buy by the
false and fraudulent representa-
tions of a third person, he is re-
sponsible for the fraud though
§ 2 1.3. J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
485
applies in its full force to misrepresentations by an individ-
ual member of a business firm.1 The company is responsible
for the acts of a partner and they cannot profit by his
fraudulent acts. But if a transaction between two parties
is on general principles fair as between them, it is not in-
valid merely because it may have been concocted and brought
about by a third party with a fraudulent intention of bene-
fiting himself.2 But where an unfair bargain is made
through the misrepresentations of a third person in no way
connected with either party, equity will not afford relief
unless the circumstances are such that the bargain may be
said to have been made through mistake.3
such third person was not Ms agent.
Law v. Grant, 37 Wis. 548. Zol-
lars, J., in 101 Ind. 293, 304, thus
states the rule : '-When a princi-
pal authorizes an agent to do a cer-
tain thing, he is answerable for
and bound by the acts and repre-
sentations of the agent in accom-
plishing that end, even though the
agent is guilty of fraud, in bringing
about the result. Having given
such authority, the principal is re-
sponsible for the fraudulent as well
as the fair means used by the
agent, if they are in the line of ac-
complishing the object of the
agency. Having put the agent in
a position where he may perpetrate
a fraud upon innocent third par-
ties, the principal will not be al-
lowed, as against such third par-
ties, to retain the fruits of the fraud
and defeat a claim for reparation
by saying that he justifies the end,
but not the means used by the
agent. Conceding that the princi-
pal is innocent of any active fraud,
yet, when a case arises that he or
an innocent third party must suffer
by the fraud of the agent, the prin-
cipal who conferred authority upon
the agent must suffer the loss
rather than the innocent third
party. This the principal may
generally avoid by submitting to a
rescission of the contract, and re-
storing what he may have received
as the fruit of the agent's bad faith.
To thus bind the principal by the
fraud of the agent is not to bind
him beyond the scope of the
agency. In such case the agent
does not exceed his authority, but
perpetrates a fraud in the exercise
of his authority to accomplish the
object of the agency, and in such
case the principal is liable for the
fraud, although he may not have
directed it, nor had knowledge of
it. The fraud of the agent be-
comes the fraud of the principal as
to third parties."
i Blair v. Bromley, 2 Phil. 239,
354.
2 Bellamy v. Sabine, 2 Phil. 425;
Blackie v. Clarke, 15 Beav. 595.
3 Fisher v. Boody, 1 Curtis, 206.
Where a conveyance is made of
land by the holder of the legal title
upon false representations made to
him by a third person which were
neither authorized nor sanctioned
by the grantee and against whom
no fraud is shown, he will not be
declared a trustee to hold the land
for the parties who have been de-
48G IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 214.
§ 214. From Fraud by Concealment. — What constitutes
fraud from concealment, or from the suppression or the
withholding of the facts connected with a contract or sale,
it is not always easy to determine. Concealment may be
wrong from a moral point of view and still not be of such
a character as to constitute an offense of which a court of
equity will take cognizance. In the leading case of Fox v.
Macreth, Lord Chancellor Thurlow said: "Suppose, for
instance, that A, knowing there to be a mine in the estate
of B, of which he knew B was ignorant, should enter into
a contract to purchase the estate of B for the price of the
estate, without considering the mine, could the court set it
aside? Why not, since B was not apprised of the mine,
and A was? Because B, as the buyer, was not obliged
from the nature of the contract to make the discovery. It
is therefore essentially necessary in order to set aside the
transaction, not only that a great advantage should betaken,
but it must arise from some obligation in the party to make
the discovery. The court will not correct a contract merely
because a man of nice honor would not have entered into
it; it must fall within some definition of fraud; the rule
must be drawn so as not to affect the general transactions
of mankind."1 After a consideration of this case, Mr.
frauded by the conveyance. Beach 18, tit. 1143, § 2. Under the Ro-
v. Dyer, 93 111. 295. See also man law warranty was implied in
Wheeler v. Reynolds, 67 N. Y. 227. all sales. Under our laws war-
1 Fox v. Mackreth, 2 Bro. Ch. ranty may he demanded. InFrench
400,420; s. C, 2 Cox, 320. Cicero v. Vining, 102 Mass. 132, 135, it
discusses the question whether a is said: "The only warranty im-
corn merchant, who arrives at plied by law in the sale of personal
Rhodes during a famine, should property is simply that the vendor
disclose the fact that other vessels has good right to make the sale;
are about to arrive with cargoes of and if the buyer desires to have
grain. Diogenes thought that the the benefit of any further assur-
fact might be justly concealed, but ance as to the property sold, he
Cicero agrees with Antipater in con- must protect himself by insisting
sidering it to be in bad faith. Po- upon such specific warranties as he
thier, the authority on the civil law, may consider necessary for that
which requires perfect good faith purpose. The law does not under-
in relation to the subject-matter, take to make contracts for the
yet agrees with Diogenes. Pothier parties, but usually leaves them, if
deVente, n. 234-5, 242; Dig. Lib. the buyer should choose to act
IU.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
487
Chancellor Kent offers the following judicious and well
considered reflections on the question involved: "From
this and other cases it would appear that human laws are
not so perfect as the dictates of conscience, and the sphere
upon his own judgment, to the
operation of the maxim caveat
emptor. But it is sometimes rather
loosely said that mere silence on
the part of the vendor, as to a
known defect, does not amount to
a fraud, but this is far from being
universally true. Deceit may some-
times take a negative form, and
there maybe circumstances in which
silerice would have all the legal
characteristics of actual misrepre-
sentation. There are cases in which
it is laid down that in the sale of
provisions for domestic use there
is an implied warranty of their
wholesomeness." See also on this
point Van Bracklin v. Fonda, 12
Johns. 468; Emerson v. Bingham,
10 Mass. 197 ; Winsor v. Lombard,
18 Pick. 57, 62. Yet it is well es-
tablished that a party to a contract
is under an obligation to commu-
nicate to his vendee all the mate-
rial facts that are or ought to be
within his own knowledge, and at
the time are not equally open
to such vendee or vendees. Moens
v. Hay worth, 10 M. & W. 157; Pid-
cock v. Bishop, 13 B. & C. 609;
Laidlow v. Organ, 2 Wheat. 195;
Cross v. Peters, 1 Me. 376; Con-
yers v. Ennis, 2 Mason, 236 ; Pow-
ell v. Bradlee, 9 G. & J. 274; Bid-
ault v. "Wales, 20 Mo. 546 ; Schaef-
fer v. Sleade, 7 Blackf . 183. It is
not considered a defense that a per-
son does not know that which he
ought to know. The party who
relies on statements has a right to
trust in the knowledge, as well as
the good faith, of the other party.
In such cases ignorance is culpable.
In Munroe v. Pritchett, 16
Ala. 789, the court says : "In
the case last cited (Juzan v.
Toulmin,9Ala. 684), it is said 'that
whether a party misrepresenting a
fact knew it to be false, or made
the assertion without any precise
knowledge on the subject, is im-
material; for the affirmation of
what one does not know, or believe
to be true, is equally in morals and
law as unjustifiable as the affirma-
tion of what is known to be posi-
tively false.' * * * I think the
conclusion may be deduced that
although in an action on the case
to recover for the consequences
resulting from a fraudulent misrep-
resentation of matter-of-fact, com-
ing within the restrictions above
laid down, the plaintiff must show
that such misrepresentations were
fraudulently made, yet it is not in-
dispensable that the party making
them should at the time have known
them to be false. It is sufficient
that he made them recklessly, not
knowing them to be true, and for
the purpose of influencing the other
party in making the purchase. The
seller who owns the land, and who
proposes selling it, must be pre-
sumed to know more about the
lines and what land is embraced
within the tract than the buyer.
In this case, whether he did or did
not, he assumed to know the fact
that certain good land which
formed an inducement to the pur-
chase was included, and he as-
serted this as a fact upon which
the purchaser relied, and might
well rely in concluding the bar-
488
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 214.
of morality is more enlarged than the limits of civil juris-
diction. There are many duties that belong to the class of
imperfect obligations which are binding on conscience, but
which human laws do not and cannot undertake directly to
gain. * * * Shall he, when
sued, say, 'I did not know that I
was telling an untruth?' ft is suf-
ficient that he misrepresented the
fact, and did not care that he did
so — in other words, that he asserted
as true, and as matter of knowl-
edge, that which was untrue, and
which he either knew nothing
ahout or knew to be untrue." See
also on this point Mahone v. Reeves,
11 Ala. 345 ; Bennett v. Stanton, 2
Ala. 181; Camp v. Camp, 2 Ala.
636. "He who affirms either what
he does not know to be true, or
knows to be false, to another's
prejudice and his own gain, is both
in morality and law guilty of false-
hood and must answer in damages."
Adams v. Jarvis, 4 Bing. 66. In
Hamrick v. Hogg, 1 Dev. 350, there
occurs this qualification of the
doctrine set forth above: "Con-
cealment ex vi termini imports a
knowledge of the thing concealed ;
for a person cannot be said to con-
ceal that which he does not know,
and silence as to a fact which the
party does not believe to exist,
cannot be said to he a fraudulent
concealment. I cannot, therefore,
agree with the judge below that
the defendant was bound to de-
clare, and was guilty of a fraud if
he did not declare, that which he
did not believe to exist, although
he had been told that it did exist."
The law, however, does not help
the negligent. The facts which a
contracting party must reveal are
those which are not equally open
to the other party. "The case
which directly meets the question
is Laidlaw v. Organ, 2 Wheat. 178.
* * * Chief Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the court
to the effect that the buyer was not
bound to communicate intelligence
of extrinsic circumstances which
might influence the price, though
it were exclusively in his posses-
sion, and that it would be difficult
to circumscribe the contrary doc-
trine within proper limits, where
the means of intelligence are equally
accessible to both parties. And the
principle has been recognized as
law wherever the case has been
quoted, though Mr. Verplank has
written a book against it. The
validity of the sale, too, depends
on the law of Louisiana, whose
jurisprudence is founded on the
Roman law, which professes to
deal with principles of morality
too subtle for administration by an
earthly tribunal. * * * The
only practicable rule for all cases
seems to be that stated by Chief
Justice Marshall, that where the
means of knowledge is equally ac-
cessible to both parties each must
judge for himself." Gibson, C. J.,
inKintzling v. McElrath, 5 Pa. St.
467. See also Lapish v. Wells, 6
Me. 175; Hastings v. O'Donnell, 40
Cal. 148; Stevens v. Fuller, 8 jST.
H. 464; Dent v. Bennett, 7 Sim.
539; Carter v. Palmer, 8 CI. & F.
657; Horsfall v. Thomas, 1 H.& C.
90; Keates v. Earl of Cadogan, 10
C. B. 591 ; N". B. Co. v. Conybeare,
9H. L.Cas. 711; Dyerv.Hargrave,
10Ves.506; Central Ry. Co., etc. v.
Kisch, L. R. 2 H. L. Cas. 120; Vea-
scy v. Doton, 3 Allen, 3S0; Lytle
§ 215.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
489
enforce. But where the aid of a court of equity is sought
to carry into execution such a contract, then the principles
of ethics have a more extensive sway, and a purchase made
with such a reservation of superior knowledge would be of
too sharp a character to be aided and forwarded in its ex-
ecution by the powers of the Court of Chancery. * * *
It is a rule in equity that all the material facts must be
known to both parties to render the agreement fair and just
in all its parts, and it is against all the principles of equity
that one party, knowing a material ingredient in an agree-
ment, should be permitted to suppress it and still call for a
specific performance."1
§ 215. The Subject Continued. — The doctrine of fraud
from concealment is expounded by Mr. Justice Story, as
follows: "The true definition then of undue concealment
which amounts to a fraud in the sense of a court of equity,
and for which it will grant relief, is the non-disclosure of
those facts and circumstances which one party is under
some legal or equitable obligation to communicate to the
v. Bird, 3 Jones, 222 ; Post v. Will-
iams, 6 Ind. 219; Hough v. Rich-
ardson, 3 Story, 659; Brown v.
Leach, 107 Mass. 364; Fisher v.
Budlong, 10 R. 1.525; Hanson v.
Edgerly, 29 N. H. 343; Smith v.
Countryman, 30 N. Y. 655; Peo-
ple's Bank v. Bogart, 81 N. Y. 101
Homer v. Perkins, 124 Mass. 431
Dickinson v Lee, 102 Mass. 559
Brown v. Castles, 11 Cush. 350
Rocchi v. Sch wabacher, 33 La. Ann
1364; Stevens v. Orman, 16 Fla. 9
Scott v. Schufeldt, 5 Paige, 43
Lewis v. Jones, 4 B. & C. 506
Harris v. Tyson, 24 Pi. St. 347
Turner v. Harvey, 1 Jacobs, 178
"Wilde v. Gibson, 1 H. L. Cas. 605
Hadley v. Clinton, etc. Co., 13 Ohio
St. 502; Frenzel v. Miller, 37 Ind.
1 ; Law v. Grant, 37 W is.548 ; Mitch-
ell v. MeDougal, 62 111. 493; Will-
iams v. Spurr, 24 Mich. 335; George
v. Johnson, 6 Humph. 36. How-
ever, courts of equity will decline
to interfere unless strong reasons
are presented for their action, and
generally will not set aside a con-
tract unless the parties to it can be
placed in the same situation which
they occupied when the contract
was entered into. Schaeffer v.
Sleade, 7 Blackf. 178; Veazie v.
Williams, 3 Story, 631; Oakes v.
Turquand, L. R. 2 H. L. Cas. 325.
1 2 Kent's Commentaries, *490,
*491 ; Parker v. Grant, 1 Johns. Ch.
630; Butler's Appeal, 26 Pa. St.
63; Phillips v. Homfray, L. R. 6
Ch. App. 770; Schiffer v. Dietz,
83 ST. Y. 300; Morgan v. Dinges,
23 Neb. 271 ; s. c, 8 Am. St. Rep.
121; Paulain v. Paulain, 76 Ga.
420; Stewart v. Wyoming Ranch
Co., 129 U. S. 383.
4'JO IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 215.
other, and which the latter has a right, not merely in foro
conscientiw, but juris el de jure, to know. Mr. Kent has
avowed a broader doctrine. 'As a general rule,' says he,
'each party is bound in every case to communicate to the
other his knowledge of material facts, provided he knows
the other to be ignorant of them , and they be not open and
naked, or equally within the reach of his observation.'
This doctrine in this latitude of expression may perhaps be
thought not strictly maintainable, or in conformity with
that which is promulgated by courts of law or equity. For
many most material facts may be unknown to one party
and known to the other, and not equally accessible, or at
the moment within the reach of both ; and yet contracts
founded upon such ignorance on one side and knowledge on
the other may be completely obligatory. Thus, if one
party has actual knowledge of an event or fact from private
sources not then known to the other party from whom he
purchases goods, and which knowledge would materially
enhance the price of the goods or change the intention of
■the party as to the sale, the contract of sale of the goods
will nevertheless be valid."1 Where a person, when asked
1 Story Equity Jurisprudence, gist of the action is fraudulently
§207. Justice Gray in Stewart v. producing a false impression upon
Wyoming Ranch Co., 128 U. S. the mind of the other party ; and if
383, 388, on this point, says : "In this result is accomplished it is
an action of deceit, it is true that unimportant whether the means of
silence as to a material fact is not accomplishing it are words or acts
necessarily as a matter of law, of the defendant, or his conceal-
equivalent to a false representa- ment or suppression of material
tion. But mere silence is quite facts not equally within the knowl-
different from concealment: aliud edge or reach of the plaintiff."
est tacere, aliud celare; a suppression Earl, J., in Dambman v. Schult-
of the truth may amount to a sug- ing, 75 X. Y. 55, very clearly
gestion of falsehood; and if with states the general doctrine as
intent to deceive, either party to a follows: "The general rule is
contract of sale conceals or sup- that a party engaged in a business
presses a material fact, which he transaction with another can corn-
is in good faith bound to disclose, mit a legal fraud only by fraudu-
this is evidence of and equivalent lent misrepresentation of facts or
to a false representation, because by such conduct and such artifice
the concealment or suppression is for a fraudulent purpose as will
in effect a representation that what mislead the other party or throw
is disclosed is the whole truth. The him off from his guard, and thus
§ 215. j
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
491
for the facts, misrepresents by concealment, silence will be
treated as a fraud. In Pearson v. Morgan, Mr. Justice
Buller said: "Fraud is a question of law and of fact; in
cases where it is a question of fact it is always considered
cause him to omit inquiry or ex-
amination which he would other-
wise make. A party buying or
selling property, or executing in-
struments, must, by inquiry or ex-
amination, gain all the knowledge
he desires. He cannot proceed
blindly, omitting all inquiry and ex-
amination, and then complain that
theother party didnotvolunteerall
the information he had. Such is the
general rule. But tbere are ex-
ceptions to this rule. Where there
is such a relation of trust and con-
fidence between the parties that
the one is under some legal or
equitable obligation to give full in-
formation to the other party, in-
formation which the other party
has a right, not merely in foro con-
cientiae. but juris et de jure, to have,
then the witholding of such infor-
mation purposely may be fraud."
While a party in whom no trust or
confidence is reposed, and between
whom and the other party no legal
relation in regard to the subject of
the purchase exists, need not dis-
close material facts within his
knowledge, which he knows such
other party to be ignorant of, he
must do nothing whatever to de-
ceive or mislead, or he will not be
protected. The plaintiff having
lost a flock of sheep, made search
and inquiry for them,withuut effect.
Subsequently the sheep were taken
up in the highway by one D, who
informed one of the defendants
thereof. The other defendant then
went to the plaintiff, and conceal-
ing from him his knowledge of the
sheep having been found, inquired
whether he had found them. Being
informed that he had not, the de-
fendant said '■he supposed he never
icould find them,'' and offered the
plaintiff $10 for the sheep, which
the plaintiff accepted, and gave
him a bill of sale thereof. The de-
fendants then went to D and
claimed the sheep and their fleeces,
and the same were delivered to
them. In an action by the plaint-
iff to recover the value of the sheep
and wool, on the ground that the
sale had been procured by fraud :
Held, that the action could not be
maintained on the ground of the
defendants' neglect to disclose the
facts within their knowledge; but
that the defendants were made
liable by the expression of a be-
lief that the plaintiff would never
find his sheep, by means of which
he was deceived and mislead."
Bench v. Sheldon, 14 Barb. 66. In
the case of Mickley v. Thomas, 22
Barb. 652, defendant sold a horse
knowing that it was balky and had
balked repeatedly. He told the
plaintiff that the horse "balked
once and was whipped up and went.'1''
The oourt held this to be a fraudu-
lent concealment. See further on
the duty to disclose: Stanley v.
Stanley, L. K. 7 Ch. D. 589; Vane
v. Vane, L. R. 8 Ch. 383; Diceon-
son v. Talbot, L. E. 6 Ch. 32;
Mackay v. Douglas, L. R. 14 Eq.
106; Bolt v. While, 3 De 6., J. & S.
360; Broderick v. Broderick, 1 P.
Wins. 240; Leonard v. Leonard, 2
Ball & B. 171 ; Gordon v. Gordon,
3 Swanst. 400; Gibson v. D'Este, 2
Y. & C. Ch. 542; Wilde v. Gibson,
1 H. L. Cas. G05; Edwards v.,Mc-
Leay, 2 Swanst. 287 ; Fox v. Mack-
492
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 215.
as a constructive fraud when the party knows the truth and
conceals it, and such constructive fraud always makes the
party liable."1 But in this case the silence of the guilty
party amounted to a misrepresentation of the facts, and it
was this circumstance that constituted the fraud and made
the party liable. In the leading case of Laidlaw v. Organ,
before the Supreme Court of the United States, Chief Jus-
tice Marshall said: "The question in this case is whether
the intelligence of extrinsic circumstances, which might in-
jure the price of the commodity, and which was exclusively
within the knowledge of the vendee, ought to have been
communicated by him to the vendor ? The court is of opin-
ion that he was not bound to communicate it. It would be
difficult to circumscribe the contrary doctrine within proper
limits, where the means of intelligence are equally accessi-
ble to both parties. But, at the same time, each party
reth, 2 Bro. Ch. 400, 420; Phil-
lips v. Homf ray, L. R. 0 Ch. 770;
Bascomb v. Beckwith, L. R. 8 Eq.
100 ; Denny v. Hancock, L. R. 6 Ch.
1; Haywood v. Cope, 25 Beav. 140;
Lucas v. James, 7 Hare, 410 ; Duys-
dale v. Mace, 5 De G., M. & G.
103; Dolman v. Nokes, 22 Beav.
402; Bowles v. Stewart, 1 Sch. &
Lef. 209, 224; Roddy v. Williams, 3
Jon. & La. 1 ; Bank of Republic v.
Baxter, 31 Vt. 101; Allen v. Ad-
dington, 7 Wend. 9, 20; Hall v.
Naylor, 18 X. Y. 588; s. c, 75 Am.
Dec. 269; Hennequin v. Naylor,
24 N. Y. 139; Nichols v. Pin-
ner, 18 N. Y. 295; Livingston
v. Peru Iron Co., 2 Paige, 390;
Brown v. Montgomery, 20 N. Y.
287; s. c, 75 Am. Dec. 404; Peo-
ple's Bank v. Bogert,81 N. Y. 101 :
s. C, 37 Am. Rep. 481; Piddock v.
Strobridge, 29 Vt. 470; Roseman v.
Canovan, 43 Cal. 110, 117; Drake
v. Collins, 5 How. (Miss.) 253;
Bowman v. Bates, 2 Bibb, 47 ; S. c,
4 Am. Dec. 077; Horton v. Hand-
vil. 41 N. J. Eq. 57; Grill v.
Lo^iax, 89 Ala. 420; Whitman v.
Bowden, 27 S. Car. 53; Wood v.
Amory, 105 N. Y. 281; Hastings v.
O'Donnell, 40 Cal. 148; Goninan v.
Stephenson, 24 Wis. 75; Hadley v.
Clinton, etc. Co., 13 Ohio St. 502;
s. c, 82 Am. Dec. 454; McMichael
v. Kilner, 76 N. Y. 36, 44; Schiffer v.
Dietz, 83 N. Y. 300; Hanson v.
Edgerly, 29 N. H. 343; Fitzsim-
mons v. Joslin, 21 Vt.129; s. C, 52
Am. Dec. 46; Rawdon v. Blatch-
ford, 1 Sand. 344; Holmes' Appeal,
77 Pa. St. 50; Swinn v. Bush, 23
Mich. 99; Snelson v. Franklin, 6
Munf. 210; McNeil v. Baird, 6
Munf. 316; Emmons v. Moore, 85
111. 304; Dameron v. Jamison, 4
Mo. App. 299; Connelly v. Fisher,
3 Tenn. Ch. 382 ; Young v. Hughes,
32 N. J. Eq. 372; Howard v. Gould,
28 Vt. 523; s. c, 67 Am. Dec. 728;
Paul v. Hadley, 23 Barb. 521.
1 Pearson v. Morgan, 2 Bro. Ch.
§ 216.] IMPLIED TRUSTS. 493
must take care not to say or do anything tending to impose
upon the other."1
§ 216. The Same Subject. — There are many cases in
which a person in negotiating for a purchase or sale of
property is not bound to communicate all the facts that are
within his knowledge. Silence is not essentially fraudu-
lent. It is a sound maxim that Aliud est lacere, aliud
celare; but another frequently cited is equally true, Fraus
est celare fraudem. Where silence misleads, and in conse-
quence of it one party is enabled to take advantage of an-
other, it is a fraud from which a court of equity will afford
relief. The distinguished Pothier said: iiOn appelle Dol
toule espece d'artifice, dont quelqu'un se sert pour en
tromper un autre."2 The definition of Labeo, the learned
Roman jurist, is to the same effect: iiDolum malum esse
omnem calliditatem, fallaciam, machinalionem ad circum-
veniendum, fallendum, decipiendum alterum, adliibitam.,,z
In Leonard v. Barnuni, Chief Justice Cole said: "An
agreement to be valid must be freely entered into by the
parties, and there must be no concealment of material facts,
and no surreptitious advantage taken by the intelligent and
strong over the unwary and ignorant."4 In Turner v.
1 Laidlow v. Organ, 2 Wheat. Dec. 661. Opposed to this view
195 ; Livingstone v. Peru Iron Co., and standing almost alone is the
2 Paige, 390; Drake v. Collins, 5 case of Bowman v. Bates, 2 Bibb,
How. (Miss.) 253; Williams v. 47; s. c, 4 Am. Dec. 677, where a
Spurr, 24 Mich. 335 ; Law v. Grant, purchaser having discovered salt
37 Wis. 548; Wright v. Brown, 67 water on the land, prevented the
N. Y. 1. "A person who knows agent of the vendor from giving in-
that there is a mine on the land of formation thereof, and concealed
another may nevertheless buy it. the discovery from the vendor by
The ignorance of the vendor is not artifice, was guilty of a fraud and
of itself fraud on the part of the was not to be permitted to retain
purchaser. A purchaser is not the purchase,
bound by our laws to make the man 2Traite des Oblig. pt. 1, ch. 1,
he buys from as wise as himself. § 1, ait. 3, n. 28, p. 19.
* * * Every man must bear the 3 Dig. Lib. IV., tit. 3, 1, 1, § 2; 1
loss of a bad bargain, legally and Story, Equity Jurisprudence, § 186.
honestly made. If not he could 4 Leonard v. Barnum, 34 Wis. 105,
not enjoy in safety the fruits of a 108. The rule is familiar and al-
good one." Black, J., in Harris v. most axiomatic, that where parties
Tyson, 24 Pa. St. 347 ; s. c, 64 Am. occupy with respect to each other
494
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
;§ 2i«.
Harvey, Lord Chancellor Elden said : "The court, in many
cases, has been in the habit of saying that where parties
deal for an estate they may put each other at arm's length.
The purchaser may use his own knowledge and is not bound
to give the vendor information of the value of his property.
* * * If an estate is offered for sale and I treat for it,
knowing that there is a mine under it, and the other party
makes no inquiry, I am not bound to give him any informa-
tion of it; he acts for himself, and exercises his own sense
and knowledge. But a very little is sufficient to affect the
application of that principle. If a word, if a single word
peculiar relations in which confi-
dence is necessarily reposed by one
party and influence is acquired by
the other, all transactions and deal-
ings between them are watched by
courts of equity with more than or-
dinary jealousy to see that such
confidence is not betrayed. Such
courts always take into account all
the circumstances and the situa-
tion of the parties dealing with
each other ; and especially is this
true where the party imposed upon
is an infant or is inops consilii. Ibid.
109. For further cases on fiduciary
relations of the parties and the duty
to disclose, information see Leonard
v. Leonard, 2 Ball & B. 171; Gor-
don v. Gordon, 3 Swanst. 400;
Bowles v. Stewart, 1 Sch. & Lef.
209,224; Eoddy v. Williams, 3 Jon.
& La. 1 ; Broderick v.Broderick, 1 P.
Wms. 239; Bolt v. White, 3 De G.,
J. & S. 360, 3G5 ; Maughs v. Dixon,
IMacn. &G. 437; s. C, 3 H. L. Cas.
702 ; Mackay v. Douglas, L. B. 14
Eq. 106 ; Dicconson v. Talbot, L. B.
6 Ch. 32 ; Vane v. Vane, L. B. 8 Ch.
383; Stanley v. Stanley, L. E. 7 Ch.
Div. 589 ; Howard v. Gould, 28 Vt.
523; s. c, 67 Am. Dec. 728; Fitz-
simmons v. Joslin, 21 Vt. 129; s. C,
52 Am. Dec. 46 ; Hanson v. Egerly, 29
N. H. 343; Paddock v. Strobridge,
29 Vt. 470; Bank of Bepublic v.
Baxter, 31 Vt. 101 ; Brown v. Mont-
gomery, 20 ST. Y. 287; S. c, 75 Am.
Dec. 404; Schiffer v. Dietz, 83 K.
Y. 300 ; Keen v. James, 39 N". J. Eq.
527; S. C, 51 Am. Bep. 29; Keith v.
Kellam, 35 Fed. Bep. 243; St. Louis
& S. F. By. Co. v. Johnston, 133 U.
S. 566. The rule extends to cases
where the relation has ceased.
Evans v. Carrington, 2 De G., F.&
J. 481 ; Tate v. Williamson, L. B. 1
Eq. 528; Gen. Exch. Bank v. Ho-
mer, L. B. 9 Eq. 4S0; Peek v. Gur-
ney, L. B. 13 Eq. 79; In re Madrid
Bank, L. B. 2Eq. 216; In re Over-
end, etc. Co., L. B. 3 Eq. 576;
Heyman v. European, etc. Co., L.
B. 7 Eq. 154; In re Coal, etc. Co.,
L. E. 20 Eq. 114; McLure v.Eipley,
2 Macn. & G. 274 ; Loader v. Clarke,
2 Macn. & G. 382; Atterbury v.
Wallis, 8 De G., M. & G. 454; Craig
v. Phillips, L. E. 3 Ch. Div. 722;
Morgan v. Elford, L. B. 4 Ch. 352;
Bagnall v. Carlton, L. E. 6 Ch. D.
371 ; Lovesy v. Smith, L. E. 15 Ch.
D. 655 ; Young v. Hughes, 32 N". J.
Eq. 372; Noyes v. Landon, 59 Vt.
569 ; Whitman v. Bowden, 27S. Car.
53; Hegenmyer v. Marks, 37 Minn.
6; s. c, 5 Am. St. Eep. 808; Pot-
ter's Appeal, 56 Conn. 1; s. c, 7
Am. St. Eep. 272.
§21fi.
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
495
be dropped which tends to mislead the vendor, that princi-
ple will not be allowed to operate."1 The equitable rule in
regard to concealment is applied with strictness to the acts
of an attorney in making a sale of an estate. In Arnot v.
Biscoe, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said: "And if the
attorney or vendor of an estate, knowing of incumbrances
thereon, treats for his client in the sale thereof without
disclosing them to the purchaser or contractor, knowing
him a stranger thereto, but represents it so as to induce the
buyer to trust his money upon it, a remedy lies against him
in a court of equity ; to which principle it is necessary f or
the court to adhere to preserve integrity and fair dealing
between man and man, most transactions being by the in-
tervention of an attorney or solicitor. I distinguish greatly
between this and not disclosing the general circumstances of
his client, with the knowledge of which he is trusted, of
which it would be improper to give notice, but otherwise
when dealing for the purchase of an estate."2 The rule in
1 Turner v. Harvey, Jacobs, 169,
178; Davies v. Cooper, 5 Myl. & Cr.
270;N"ickley v. Thomas, 22 Barb.
652; Eoseman v. Canovan, 43 Cal.
110 ; Bench v. Sheldon, 14 Barb. 66.
A person desiring credit being
asked '-how he stood" correctly
stated his means, but was silent as
to the fact that he owed two-thirds
as much as his capital : Held, fraud-
ulent. Newell v. Kandall, 32Minn.
171 ; s. c, 50 Am. Rep. 562. Fur-
ther cases of concealment where
credit is asked and obtained are :
Nicholv. Pinner, 18 N.Y. 205; s. c,
23 ]ST. Y. 264; Cary v. Houghtal-
ing, 1 Hill, 311 ; s. c, 37 Am. Dec.
323; Bigelow v. Heaton, 6 Hill, 43
Mitchell v. Worden, 20 Barb. 253
Hennequin v. Naylor, 24 S.Y. 139 ;
King v. Phillips, 8 Bosw. 603; Bell
v. Ellis, 33 Cal. 620, 626; Hotchkin
v. Third Kat'l Bank, 127 N . Y. 329 ;
Brower v. Goodyer, 88 Ind. 572;
Kitson v. Farwell, 132 111. 327; Os-
wego Starch Factory v. Lendrum,
57 Iowa, 573; s. c, 42 Am Rep. 53
Houghtaling v. Hills, 59 Iowa, 289
Jaffrey v. Brown, 29 Fed. Rep. 476
Taylor v. Mississippi Mills, 47 Ark.
247. It does not follow that be-
cause information on some material
point is offered, or is given on re-
quest, by a purchaser from a court
of chancery, that it must therefore
be given on all others as to which
it is neither offered or requested,
and concerning which there is no
implied representation in what is
actually stated. Coaks v. Boswell,
H. L. 11 App. Cas. 232.
2 Arnot v. Biscoe, 1 Ves. 95, 96;
Gale v. Gale, 19 Barb. 257. Fraud,
in the sense of a court of equity,
properly includes all acts, omis-
sions and concealments which in-
volve a breach of legal or equitable
duty, trust or confidence, justly re-
posed, and which are injurious to
another, or by which an undue and
496 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 217.
regard to a conveyance or mortgage is fully set forth in a
case before the Court of Chancery of New York, in which
it was held that where a prior incumbrancer witnesses a
subsequent conveyance or mortgage, knowing its contents,
and does not disclose his own incumbrance, but intention-
ally suffers the party dealing with Jiis debtor to remain in
ignorance, such prior incumbrancer will be postponed or
barred. The rule, however, does not apply where the prior
incumbrance is duly registered, for then the subsequent
purchaser or mortgagee is charged with notice. To affect
the right of such prior incumbrancer mere silence is not
sufficient; there must be actual fraud charged and proved,
such as false representations or denial upon inquiry or art-
ful assurance of good title, or deceptive silence when in-
formation is asked. And the burden of the charge and
proof of fraud lies on the purchaser or subsequent mort-
gagee.1
§ 217. The Same. — In a recent case, where a testator
devised a farm of 600 acres to complainant, one of his
daughters, which farm he had previously given to the hus-
band of another daughter by voluntary deed, said husband
having, during the life of testator, been made aware of the
contents of his will, and that, in order for it to be effective
to bestow any benefit upon complainant, it would be neces-
sary for him to surrender the former voluntary donation,
and that the will was made upon that condition, it was
held that the husband, having assented to such condition,
or having lain by and acquiesced without objection or re-
monstrance, thereby securing to himself and wife the whole
property designed by the testator to be divided between his
two daughters, his conduct was such as to render him a
trustee for complainant to the extent of the interest she
would have taken under the will.2 But in view of all the
unconscientious advantage is taken Vern. 150 ; Mogatta v. Murgatroyd,
of another. 1 Story, Equity Juris- 1 P. Wms. 393; Becket v. Cordley,
prudence, § 187. 1 Bro. Ch. 357.
1 Brinckerhoff v. Lansing, 4 2 Bennett v. Harper (1892), 36 W.
Johns. Ch. 64; Hobbs v. Norton, 1 Va. 54(i; s. c, 15 S. E. Rep. 143.
Vern. 136; Hunsden v. Cheyney, 2 See al-o Hoj» v. Hoge, 1 "Watts,
§217.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
497
decisions and of all the learned and able opinions on this
subject, it has been well said by Mr. George Jeremy, in
his valuable treatise on the Equity Jurisdiction of the High
Court of Chancery, that : ' 'As upon this subject every new
213; Church v.Euland, 64 Pa. St.
432; Dowd v. Tucker, 41 Conn. 198
Williams v. Vreeland, 29 N. J. Eq
417; Jones v. McKee, 6 Barr, 428
Fishbeck v. Gross, 112 111. 208
Dixon v. Olmius, 1 Cox Ch. 414
Wallgrave v. Tebbs, 2 K. & J. 313
Morey v. Herriok, 18 Pa. St. 128
McGowan v. McG-owan, 14 Gray
119; Jenkins v. Eldridge, 3 Story
181; Mestaer v. Gillespie, 11 Ves
638; Middletonv. Middieton, 1 J. &
W. 96; Beech v. Kennegall, 1 Ves.
123; Oldham v. Litchford, 2 Vern.
506;Dutton v.Poole, 2 Lev. 211;
Thynn v. Thynn, 1 Vern. 296; Bar-
rough v. Greenough, 3 Ves. 152;
Whitton v. Bussell, 1 Atk. 448;
Chamberlain v. Agar, 2 Ves. & B.
262. Complainant's interest in her
father's estate having been sold on
execution for one-third of its value,
and the time for redemption hav-
ing itearly expired, she applied to
her mother and brother to assist
her, and the brother thereupon
bought the certificate of sale, and
took a deed in his own name. Com-
plainant swore that he agreed to
restore the land to her when he had
reimbursed himself out of it, and
her testimony was corroborated by
her two sisters, and contradicted by
hermotherand two brothers. Held,
that the evidence sustained a decree
allowing complainant to redeem.
Lawson v. Hunt (1894) , 153 111. 232 ;
s. c, 38 N. E. Bep. 629. In
1877, W's lands were seized on ex-
ecution. Attached to the land was
a ferry, the rental value of which
was $2,000 a year. A son-in-law of
W's was the tenant of this ferry.
He agreed with W to bid in the
32
lands, pay his debts out of the
rents, and to hold the lands in trust
for W. With the knowledge and
approval of the son-in-law this
agreement was made known gener-
ally to those who attended the sale,
and the son-in-lawbidin for $2,230
land worth $70,000. The executors,
heirs, and devisees of W filed a bill
to enforce the trust, in which they
alleged that the son-in-law had ad-
ministered the trust until within
three years before the filing of the
bill, when he repudiated it. Held,
that there was a trust by operation
of law which was not defeated by
the statute of frauds. Woodruff v.
Jabine (1891) (Ark.), 15 S. W. Bep.
830. Tucker, J., in Engle v. Burns,
5 Call (Va.j, 470, speaks on one
phase of this topic as follows:
'•The rule laid down in the text of
1 Fonbl. 161, is that where a man
who has a title, and knows of it,
stands by, and either encourages,
or does not forbid the purchase, he
shall be bound, and all claiming
under him by it; and this seems to
be a just punishment for his con-
cealing his right by which an inno-
cent man is drawn in to lay out his
money. The rule thus laid down
supposes the party to be present at,
or conversant of, the treaty in
which the fraud is practiced, and
encouraging the purchaser, either
in express terms, or by silence and
concealment of his own title, to
proceed in the purchase. * * In
Clare v. Earl of Bedford, an infant,
nearly of full age, was bound, be-
cause he engrossed the deed. That,
says Lord Thurlow, was upon the
principle that he knew of the trans-
498 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 218.
rule may be made the origin of a new evasion, it could only
be limited by setting bounds to human ingenuity. For this
reason, and from a sense of the impolicy of attempting to
circumscribe the judicial authority upon matters of such a
nature, this court judges of every case of the kind upon its
own peculiar circumstances."1
§ 218. From Fraudulent Promise. — A numerous class
of constructive trusts arises where a person acquires the
legal title to land, or other property, under a verbal prom-
ise to reconvey, either to the grantor or to a third person,
and having obtained the title, refuses to reconvey and claims
the equitable interest in it. In Laing v. McKee it was held
that where a purchaser at tax sale, to whom owner tenders
amount of his bid with twenty-five per cent, interest for an
assignment of the certificate of sale, and who orally agrees
to make such assignment to the owner within a few days,
and received the money, but in fact obtains a deed from
the auditor-general after the owner, relying upon this
promise, has allowed the time for redemption to expire,
and refuses, upon tender of the amount of his bid with in-
terest and charges, to convey to the owner, is guilty of a
fraud upon the owner, cannot avail himself of the statute
of frauds as a defense, and will be compelled by equity to
convey to the owner.2 In a recent case it was held that
action. * * In Stiles v. Cooper, down in 1 Fonbl. 162, note n., as
3 Atk. 692, where a remainderman cited from Fox v. Mackreth, 2 Bro.
in tail had, for six or seven years, Ch. 420, is thus: If a man by the
received rent upon a lease for sixty- suppression of a truth which he
one years, made by his father, who was bound to communicate, or by
was only tenant for life ; during the suggestion of a falsehood, be
which time the tenant, at his own the cause of prejudice to another,
expense, had greatly improved the who had a right to a full and cor-
premises, the court declared that rect representation of the fact, his
when a remainderman lies by, and claim shall be postponed to that of
suffers the lessee or assignee to re- the person whose confidence was
build, and does not by his answer induced by his representation."
deny that he had notice of it (as x Jeremy Equity, 1st Am. Ed.
Phillip Engle does in this case) , all *383.
those circumstances together will 2 Laing v. McKee, 13 Mich. 124;
bind him from controverting the s. C., 87 Am. Dec. 738. Equity
lease afterwards. The rule laid will grant relief and allow a re-
§ 218.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
499
where a son induces his mother to convey property to him
by promising that he will hold it for the benefit of and will
convey it to another of her sons, but intending all the time
to claim the whole of it for himself, equity will declare him
to be a mere trustee of the legal title for the benefit of his
demption, where, a plaintiff alter
agreeing to an arbitration, pro-
ceeds, in the absence of the de-
fendant, to obtain judgment, issue
execution, purchase in the defend-
ants interest in certain property-
sold under his execution, and after
further agreeing to receive the re-
demption money on the last day
allowed for redeeming, to leave
home then for the avowed purpose
of preventing the payment, but
which was then paid to the clerk of
the court. Adams v. Kable, 6 B
Mon. 384; s. C, 44 Am. Dec. 772
See also Southard v. Pope, 9 B
Mon. 264; Turner v. King, 2 Ired
Eq. 132; s. C, 38 Am. Dec. 679
Combs v. Little, 3 Green Ch. 310;
s. c, 40 Am. Dec. 207. Where
plaintiff in execution purchases in
the land sold, not absolutely for
himself but to hold as security for
his judgment, and whatever other
sum may be found due him on a
settlement with the defendant, the
latter's suit for a redemption is not
barred by the act making void
parol contracts for the sale of land.
Vannoy v. Martin, 6 Ired. Eq. 169;
S. C, 51 Am. Dec. 418. One who,
while holding out inducements to
another whose estate is largely in-
cumbered, that he will furnish
means for him to redeem, and
thereby prevents him from looking
elsewhere, and in the meantime
purchases such incumbrances him-
self and cuts off the redemption, is
guilty of fraud and will not be al-
lowed to enforce his advantage.
Wilson v. Eggleston, 27 Mich. 260.
A bill set out that complainant's
intestate and respondent being sis-
ters, and being tenants in common,
each of an undivided half interest
in certain lands, and intestate's
half being subject to mortgages,
and it having also been attached
by a creditor and judgment ob-
tained, and intestate not having
the money to pay off the incum-
brances, respondent agreed to buy
in, and hold, manage and dispose
of, the property for intestate's ben-
efit, subject to his claim for reim-
bursments; that intestate, relying
on defendant's promises, made no
effort to get other assistance ; that
a certain tract was sold under one
of the mortgages, and conveyed by
the purchaser to the mortgagee ;
that thereafter intestate's interest
in the land which had been at-
tached was sold on execution, and
the purchaser conveyed to the
mortgagee; that thereafter, and
more than fifteen months after the
mortgage sale, respondent, "in
pursuance of said promise and ar-
rangement made with her sister,"
purchased of the mortgagee all his
interest in the land. Held, that
the bill did not disclose a trust, as
it did not show any promise by
virtue of which respondent ob-
tained the land ; or on the faith of
which intestate had parted with
any interest, since she had no title,
legal or equitable, at the time of
the purchase by respondent. Aborn
v. Padelford (1890), 17 B. I. 143;
s. C, 20Atl. Kep. 297.
500
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 218.
brother, to whom he promised to convey it.1 A trust in an
absolute devise may be established by parol proof of con-
temporaneous declarations of the testator and subsequent
declarations of the devisee in possession, that the devise
was made for the benefit of a third person upon the devisee's
suggestion and promise to hold it in trust.2 A parol agree-
ment by a mortgagee to release the mortgagor from his
personal liability, if he will convey the lands to a third per-
son, may be enforced by the mortgagor after performance
on his part.3
1Nordholtv. Nordholt, 87 Cal.
552; s. C, 22 Am. St. Rep. 268. See
alsoBrisonv. Brison, 75 Cal. 525;
S. c, 7 Am. St. Rep. 189; Adams
v. Lombard, 80 Cal. 426; Sandfoss
v.Jones, 35 Cal. 481.
2 Hoge v. Hoge, 1 Watts, 163 ;
s. c, 26 Am. Dec. 52; Jones v. Mc-
Kee, 6 Barr, 428; Devenish v.
Baines, Pree. Ch. 4; Church v.
Ruland, 64 Pa. St. 432; Dowd v.
Tucker, 41 Conn. 198; Williams v.
Vreeland, 29 N. J. Eq.. 417; Mid-
dleton v. iliddleton, 1 Jac. & W.
96; Reechv. Kennegall, 1 Ves. 123;
Dutton v. Poole, 2 Lev. 211; Jen-
kins v. Eldridge, 3 Story, 181 ; Mc-
Gowan v. McGowan, 14 Gray, 119;
Dixon v. 01 mius, 1 Cox Ch. 414;
Jones v. McKee, 6 Barr, 428; Old-
ham v. Litchfield, 1 Vern. 296;
Whitton v. Russell, 1 Atk. 448;
Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 2
Freem . 34 ; Sheriff v. Seal, 6 Watts,
534; McKee v. Jones, 6Pa. St. 425;
Ryan v. Dox, 34 N. Y. 307; S. C,
90 Am. Dec. 696.
3Coyle v. Davis, 20 Wis. 594;
Hunt v. Roberts, 40 Me. 187;
Hodges v. Howard, 5 R. I. 149;
Fraser v. Child, 4 E. D. Smith,
153; Cousins v. Wall, 3 Jones Eq.
43; Manning v. Pippen, 86 Ala.
357; s. c, 11 Am. St. Rep. 46; Bri-
son v. Brison, 75 Cal. 525; s. C. 7
Am. St. Rep. 189; Henschel v.
Mamero, 120 111. 660; Fischbeckv.
Gross, 112 111. 208; Troll v. Carter,
15 W. Va. 567; Coyote, etc. Co. v.
Ruble, 8 Ore. 284; Sandfoss v.
Jones, 35 Cal. 481, 489; Hidden v.
Jordan, 21 Cal. 92, 99, 102; Nelson
v. Worrall, 20 Iowa, 469; Arnold
v. Cord, 16 Ind. 177; Martin v.
Martin, 16 B. Mon. 8; Jones v.
McDougall, 32 Miss. 179 ; Cameron
v. Ward, 8 Ga. 245; Merritt v.
Brown, 21 N. J. Eq. 401, 404; Mar-
latt v. Warwick, 18 N. J. Eq. 108;
S. C, 19 N. J. Eq. 439; Lamar v.
Wright, 31 S. Car. 60; Dodd v.
Wakeman, 26 N\ Y. Eq. 484;
Walker v. Hill, 22 ST. J. Eq. 519;
Farnham v. Clements, 51 Me. 426;
McCulloch v. Cowher, 5 Watts &
S. 427, 430; Kisler v. Kisler, 2
Watts, 323; s. C, 27 Am. Dec. 308;
Schmidt v. Gatewood, 2 Rich. Eq.
162; Green v. Ball, 4 Bush, 586;
Moore v. Tisdale, 5 B. Mon. 352;
Rose v.Bates, 12 Mo. 30; Cowperth-
waite v. First Nat'l Bank, 102
Pa. St. 397; Kimmel v. Smith, 117
Pa. St. 183 ; Salsbury v. Black, 119
Pa. St. 207; s. C, 4 Am. St. Rep.
631 ; Tankard v. Tankard, 84 N. C.
286; Fishback v. Green, 87 Ky.107.
Plaintiff alleged that defendant,
having agreed to purchase of her
two contiguous parcels of land, in-
duced her, by paying for one par-
cel and making an oral promise to
§ 219.] IMPLIED TRUSTS. 501
§ 219. The Subject Continued — The cases of the pre-
ceding section are to be distinguished from that class in
which there is a verbal promise or agreement, but no money
is paid, and there is no fraud involved. A mere verbal
promise to convey real estate is rendered inoperative by the
statute of frauds, and in order to the establishment of a
constructive trust it must appear that the legal title was
acquired, or is held by fraud. It is not the province of
equity to compel any person to keep his verbal promises
unless there is involved an element either of fraud or of in-
justice. In a recent case, in which a verbal agreement was
entered into between the plaintiff and defendant, by which
the latter agreed to bid off in his own name and enter into
a contract for the purchase of land, and pay from his own
funds the necessary amount for that purpose, for the joint
benefit of both ; the plaintiff was to reimburse one-half of
the money so paid ; the deed to be taken in the name of
both; it was held that the defendant, having bid off the
land in his name and taken a contract thereof, but refused
to convey one-half of the contract to the plaintiff, that no
return the other in case certain administration, such application
title papers could not be produced, being of a character to discourage
to convey to him both parcels by bidders for the certificate, by show-
the same unconditional deed; that ing on its face a want of knowledge
such promise was made fraudu- that such certificate in fact be-
lently with the intent on the part longed to the estate or really ex-
of defendant of retaining both par- isted. L, the attorney of the estate,
eels absolutely; and that, though knowing such certificate was on
the condition had happened, on file in the general land office, that
which he was to return the parcel the estate had been fully adminis-
not paid for, he failed to do so on tered, and that there was no occa-
request. Held, that the allegations sion for the sale thereof, bought it
were sufficient to charge defendant in at an inadequate price, and by
with a constructive trust. Browne due process acquired title to the
V. Doane (1890) , 86 Ga. 32; s. C, land. Held, that such transactions
12 S. E. Eep. 179. An administra- on the part of the administrator
tor who had made a final settle- and L were fraudulent, and were
ment of an estate, showing a bal- sufficient to impress such land with
ance remaining in his hands after a trust in favor of the heirs of the
settling all claims against it, after- intestate, as against the heirs of L.
wards filed an application to sell Storer v. Lane, 1 Tex. Civ. App.
a land certificate belonging to the 250; s. c, 20 S. W. Eep. 852.
estate to pay alleged expenses of
502
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 219.
action would lie to compel the execution of the agreement.
Such an arrangement did not constitute a partnership be-
tween them. A party in no legal sense commits a fraud
by refusing to perform a contract void by its provisions.
He has not in that sense made a contract, and has a perfect
right, both at law and in equity, to refuse performance.1
In a case where the parties interested in a bond for the con-
veyance of real estate agreed with the defendant, by parol,
that he might have an interest in one-half of the bond by
making the first payment, and also to hold the title of the
other half of the land for security for money loaned them
to make the payments for their moiety, by giving a bond
to each of them to convey, by deed, one-quarter of the
1 Levy v. Brush, 45 N. Y. 589.
A bill by A and B, father and
daughter, to compel a conveyance
of real estate, alleged that A was
the owner of an undivided half
therein; that the same was occu-
pied by B as a millinery store ; that
on a sale of the other undivided
half, on vend. ex. against the owner
thereof, a son of A, it was agreed
between all the parties and de-
fendant, A's nephew, that the lat-
ter should purchase at the sale,
and hold it for B, deeding to her
on payment of the amount paid by
defendant, but, on a subsequent
tender of such amount, he refused to
deed to B as agreed ; that he would
not have been allowed to purchase
at the sale for the inadequate price
paid by him but for such agree-
ment. There was no allegation
that plaintiffs had any control of
the sale, that it was within their
power to purchase thereat, or make
any other arrangement in regard
to it, or that there was any other
person present prepared to pur-
chase. Meld, that the complaint
was insufficient to charge defend-
ant as a trustee ex maleficio. Shaff-
ner v. Shaffner, 145 Pa. St. 163;
s. C, 22 Atl. Rep. 822. See also
Bright v. Knight, 35 W. Va. 40;
Roby v. Colehour, 135 111. 300;
Lewis v. Riegler, 105 Mo. 604; Olds
v. Marshall, 93 Ala. 138. In an
action by a judgment debtor to en-
force a trust in land sold under ex-
ecution aginst him, evidence that
defendant had agreed to buy the
land for plaintiff, when contra-
dicted by the defendant and not
corroborated by the conduct of the
parties, is insufficient to justify a
recovery. Huffnagle v. Blackburn,
137 Pa. St. 633; s. c, 20 Atl. Rep.
869. Where a person buys land at
execution sale for the judgment
debtor, and transfers it to another,
who disowns the absolute title and
says that it belongs to the debtor,
and that he intends to allow him to
redeem it, and who afterwards does
receive an amount of money nearly,
if not quite, sufficient for that pur-
pose, the transaction is not a sale,
but a mere holding of the legal
title in trust as security for money
advanced, and, therefore, not within
the statute of fraud, although not
in writing. Curd v. Williams (1892)
(Ky.),18S. W. Rep. 634.
§ 219.J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
503
premises on being reimbursed for his advances ; and such
payment was made and the title of the land transferred to
defendant. In a suit in equity to compel performance of
said contract it was held that the court had no jurisdiction
to enforce it: 1. Here was no trust expressed by any
writing of the party sought to be charged. 2. Nor did the
plaintiff furnish the money whereby a trust could be im-
plied. 3. Nor was the title obtained by the defendant
through any fraud, as he held it by consent.1
iHunt v. Roberts, 40 Me. 187;
Wilton v. Harwood, 23 Me. 131;
Leman v. Whitley, 4 Kuss. 423;
Wheeler v. Reynolds, 66 N. Y. 227 ;
Payne v. Patterson, 77 Pa. St. 134;
Feeney v. Howard, 79 Cal. 525;
s. c, 12 Am. St. Rep. 162; Barr v.
O'Donnell, 76 Cal. 469; s. C, 9
Am. St. Rep. 242; Bohm v. Bohm,
9 Colo. 100; McClainv. McClain, 57
Iowa, 167 ; Bland v. Talley, 50 Ark.
76; Mosely v. Mosely, 86 Ala. 289;
Salsbury v. Clarke, 61 Vt. 453;
Slocum v. Wooley, 43 N". J. Eq.
453; Salter v. Bird, 108 Pa. St. 436;
Salsbury v. Black, 119 Pa. St. 200;
s. c, 4 Am. St. Rep. 631; Watson
v. Young, 30 S. Car. 144; Hon v.
Hon, 70 Ind. 135; Bartlett v. Bart-
lett, 15 Neb. 593 ; Gibson v. Decius,
82 111. 304; Parnham v. Clements,
51 Me. 426; Pattison v. Horn, 1
Grant Cas. 301 ; Hogg v. Wilkins,
1 Grant Cas. 67 ; Whiting v. Gould,
2 Wis. 552; Chambliss v. Smith, 30
Ala. 366; Campbell v. Campbell,
2 Jones Eq. 364 ; Barnett v. Dough-
erty, 32 Pa. St. 371. But see also
where the relation of confidence
exists : Wood v. Rabe, 96 N. Y.
414; s. c, 48 Am. Rep. 640; But-
ler v. Hyland, 89 Cal. 575 ; Border
v. Conklin, 77 Cal. 331 ; Alaniz v.
Casenave, 91 Cal. 41. B borrowed
a certain sum from a bank, and
gave his bond and mortgage to se-
cure the loan. He failed to pay,
and the bank proceeded to sell and
purchased the property at sheriff's
sale. B alleged that there was a
parol contract between the bank
and himself, wherein it was agreed
that the bank should sell the prop-
erty and hold it for the benefit of
B, and after the payment of his
debt, interest and cost, was to re-
turn the balance to him. Held, that
as the bank already had the mort-
gage upon which it proceeded, and
there was no new loan or evidence
of other consideration, such con-
tract was not supported by any
consideration. Held, further, that
this contract was not a parol mort-
gage, but a mere parol agreement,
the violation of which did not
make the bank a trustee for B by
reason of the purchase at the sher-
iff's sale. Bennett v. Dollar Sav-
ings Bank, 87 Pa. St. 382. Plaint-
iff executed to defendant a title
deed to certain land "to enable
him" to sell the premises, satisfy
a mortgage thereon, and account
to plaintiff for the balance. De-
fendant refused to account, and
plaintiff brought suit to compel an
accounting, alleging that the deed
was a deed of trust. Held, that
there being no written evidence of
the creation of the alleged trust,
as required by the statute of frauds,
the action could not be maintained.
Kinsey v. Bennett (1892) , 37 S. Car.
504
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 220.
§ 220. Trusts from Ignorance or Mistake. — Where a
purchaser takes advantage of the ignorance of the seller to
secure property for less than its value, or where the seller
is under a misapprehension in regard to the amount or value
of the property conveyed, equity will make the purchaser
a trustee for the seller. But, as a rule, the mistake or ig-
norance must relate to a matter of fact, not to a require-
ment of the law.1 Where a contract is made with a full
319; s. c.,15S.E.Rep. 965. Where
landis conveyed to a manufacturing
corporation in consideration of its
agreement to establish its works
tbereon and operate them for a
stated time, a resulting trust will
not be declared in the company's
property for money advanced, in
consideration of such agreement,
to purchase machinery, because of
the breach thereof, and for fraud,
where the bill alleges that the
money was expended for ma-
chinery as agreed, but does not al-
lege what machinery was bought
in which the trust is sought to be
established, or what fraud was
committed, the mere non- perform-
ance of the agreement to operate
the works for the stipulated time
not constituting fraud unless the
agreement was made with that in-
tention. Piedmont, etc. Co. v.
Piedmont Foundry, etc. Co. (1892)
(Va.),ll So. Eep. 332. Where a
corporation receives land from a
committee of citizens in considera-
tion of its erection of its works
thereon, the fact that a, portion of
the money paid for the land was
fraudulently contributed by the
city does not give the city a lien on
the land for the sum paid by it,
where the corporation bad no
knowledge of the fraud, either
actual or constructive. City of
, Trinidad v. Milwaukee & Trinidad
'etc. Co., 63 Fed. Pep. 883; s. c,
C. C. A. 479.
1 Stewart v. Stewart, 6 CI. & F.
911, 966-971; Cocking v. Pratt, 1
Ves. 400; Marshall v. Collett, 1 Y.
& C. 238 ; Langley v. Brown, 2 Atk.
202. On the execution of a trust
deed to secure a loan from the
grantee to the grantor, one F, who
had been the attornev for both par-
ties, and who acted for the grantee
in making the loan, induced the
grantee to include in the deed a
sum due from the grantor to F for
legal services, and agreed that no
part of such sum should be paid
until the loan was repaid in full. F
did not inform the grantee that his
rights might be affected by includ-
ing such sum in the deed. After-
wards the grantee, desiring to ter-
minate the trust, was advised by F
that he could not purchase at a sale
under the power contained in the
deed, but that he might do so on
foreclosure by action, and take the
land discharged of the trust. The
action to foreclose was conducted
by F, who was not made a party,
as attorney for the grantee (plaint-
iff therein), until F died. Tbe
grantee, being authorized by the
decree, purchased at the foreclos-
ure sale for less than the amount
of his loan. Held, that he took the
land discharged of any trust on ac-
count of the sum secured by the
deed to F. Felton v. Le Breton,
92 Cal. 457; s. C, 28 Pac. Eep. 490.
Defendant claimed under a quit-
claim deed from S, through whom
§ 220.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
505
knowledge of all the facts and no fraud is involved, the rule
is that equity will not relieve against a mistake of the law.
Every person is charged at his peril with a knowledge of
the law.1 But this rule admits of exceptions. In the lead-
ing case of Hunt v. Rousmanier, Chief Justice Marshall
said: "Although we do not find the naked principle that
relief may be granted on account of ignorance of law, as-
serted in the books, we find no case in which it has been
decided that a plain and acknowledged mistake in law is
beyond the reach of equity."2 But it is well established
that where one of the parties to a contract is ignorant of a
point of law involved in the transaction, and the other
party, knowing this, takes advantage of his ignorance to
secure an unfair bargain, a court of equity will afford reljef
through a constructive trust.3 But in order to secure relief
on the ground of mistake, whatever may be the character
plaintiff claimed through W. S tes-
tified that in 1864 he sold the land
to W, and thought he executed a
deed to W in 1867 ; that in 1887
defendant claimed to hold the fee-
simple title from all the heirs,
stated that no deed was of record
from S to W, and induced S to sign
the quitclaim deed in place of such
lost deed. Held, that though no
deed had been executed from S to
W, yet when the quitclaim deed to
defendant was made on the pre-
existing consideration for the pur-
pose of vesting the legal title where
S supposed it equitably belonged,
and defendant had full notice of
the rights of plaintiff, he became
constructive trustee of the legal
title for the benefit of plaintiffs.
Dohoney v. Womack (1892), 1 Tex.
Civ. App. 354; s. c, 19 S. W. Rep.
8S3.
1 Lyon v. Richmond, 2 Johns.
Ch. 51. "Every man is to be
charged at his peril with a knowl-
edge of the law. There is no other
principle which is safe and prac-
ticable in the common intercourse
of mankind. And to permit a sub-
sequent judicial decision in any one
given case, on a point of law, to
open or annul everything that has
been done, in other cases of the like
kind, for years before, under a dif-
ferent understanding of the law,
would lead to the most mischievous
consequences. Fortunately for the
peace and happiness of society
there is no such pernicious prece-
dent to be found." lb. 60.
2 Hunt v. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat.
174, 215.
3 Cook v. Nathan, 16 Barb. 342.
"We are of opinion that the evi-
dence offered should have been
received, as a defense, upon the
equitable principle that if one of
the parties is in truth ignorant of a
matter of law involved in a con-
tract, and the other knows him to
be so, and takes advantage of the
circumstance, he is guilty of fraud,
and the court will relieve." Ibid.
345.
506 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 221.
of it, the mistake must be definitely and precisely alleged
and the proof of it must be unequivocal. On this point
parol testimony is admissible.1
§ 221. From a Fraudulent Preventing of an Act. —
Where a person by fraud, undue influence, or by any man-
ner of deception prevents an act by which it was proposed to
benefit a third person, he Avill be made a trustee for such third
person to the extent of the benefit proposed. In Mestaer v.
Gillespie, Lord Chancellor Eldon, in his opinion, compares
the case under consideration to that of a devisee, who the
testator communicating his intention of charging a legacy,
tells him it is unnecessary to give himself that trouble, and
the legacy shall be paid. In that case, there is no will giv-
ing the legacy ; but this court says that he who prevented
that shall stand in this court in a very different situation
from that in which he would stand in a court of law, where
he would be a devisee without any charge ; but in this court,
having by his undertaking prevented an effectual charge,
he shall be subject to it.2 The principle of equity involved
is that if a person be fraudulently prevented from doing an
act, it will in equity be considered as if that act had been
done.3 In a case in which a person fraudulently prevented
another, who was on his deathbed, from suffering a re-
covery at law with a view that the estate might devolve
upon a third person in whom he had an interest, it was
held that the estate should be regarded as if the recovery
had been perfected, and that it was not in accord with right
that it should remain where it was.4 In a case where the
Parley v. Bryant, 32 Me. 475. 288; s. C, 2 Vern. 700; Thynn v.
2 Mestaer v. Gillespie, 11 Ves. Thynn, 1 Vern. 296 ; Reech v. Ken-
621, 638; Chamberlain v. Edgar, nigal, Amb. 67; Jones v. Martin,
2 Ves. & B. 262; Strickland v. Al- 6 Bro. P. C. 437; s. c, 5 Ves. 266
dridge, 9 Ves. 519; Chamberlaine v. Bridgman v. Green, 2 Ves. 627
Chamberlaine, 2 Freem. 34; Bryn Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. 289
v. Godfrey, 4 Ves. 10; Oldham v. Drakeford v. Walker, 3 Atk. 539
Litchford, 2 Freem. 285; Paine v. Oldham v. Litchford, 2 Vern. 504
Hall, 18 Ves. 475; Barrow v. Green- Whitton v. Russell, 1 Atk. 448
ough, 3 Ves. 152. Barrow v. Greenough, 3 Ves. 152.
3 Middleton v. Middleton, 1 Jac. 4 Luttrell v. Olmius, cited 14 Ves.
& W. 94; Noss v. Tracy, 1 P. Wms. 290; s. c, 11 Ves. 638.
§ 222. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 507
bill stated that a testator intended to republish his will, but
was prevented from so doing by the fraud of the heir-at-
law, a demurrer to so much of the bill as required him to
discover whether the testator did not intend to republish
his will was under these circumstances overruled.1 And on
the other hand, if a testator be induced to make a devise
by the promise of the devisee that it should be applied to
the benefit of another, a trust is thereby created which may
be established by parol evidence, and this is not contrary
to the statute of wills.2 In Morey v. Herrick, Mr. Justice
Bell said: "It is well settled that if one be induced to
confide in the promise of another, that he will hold in trust,
or that he will so purchase for one or both, and is thus led
to do what otherwise he would have forborne, or to forbear
what he had contemplated to do, in the acquisition of an
estate whereby the promisor becomes the holder of the
legal title ; an attempted denial of the confidence is such a
fraud as will operate to convert the purchaser into a trustee
ex maleJicio.,,'i
§ 222. From Preventing a Devise. — The jurisdiction of
courts of equity in regard to wills, both in England and in
the United States, is limited by legislation. They have no
power to prevent the probate of a will or to set aside a will
that was procured by fraud. But where the execution of a
will has been prevented by fraud, or where a fraud has been
perpetrated upon the devisee or legatee by a third person,
equity will afford relief. Where the trustee of a fund to
which he would succeed in case of intestatcy, prevents the
making of a will in favor of a third party by promising to
1 Dixon v. Olraius, 1 Cox, 413. deficient ; it was decreed that, hav-
2 Hoge v. Hoge, 1 Watts, 1U3. ing suffered his father to die in
3 Morey v. Herrick, IS Pa. St. 123, peace on a promise which had pre-
128. "In 2 Freeman, 34, where a vented him from altering- his will,
testator having settled lands on his he should pay them. What is this
sonfor life, and having discoursed case but an engagement hy the
about altering his will for fear there daughter to the mother on her
should not be enough besides to deathbed, when the codicil was
pay certain legacies to his daugh- signed, that the devise in the codi-
ter, was told by .the son that he ctl was in trust for her brother. "'
would pay them if the assets were McKee v. Jones, 425, 42S.
508
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 222.
hold the fund for the benefit of the intended legatee, the
latter may recover its value as money had and received to
his use.1 Where it is the duty of an attorney who draws a
will to give instruction to a testator in regard to the man-
ner of executing his will, and he fails to do so, he will be
held responsible for the consequences of his failure. In
Buckley v. Wilf ord it was held that an attorney is bound to
give sufficient advice to his client ; and if any advantage or
property come to him by his ignorance or the neglect of his
duty, he shall be a trustee thereof for the benefit of the
person who would be entitled thereto if the attorney had
known and done his duty.2 In a case where the personal
1 Williams v. Fitch, 18 N. Y. 546.
See also Matter of Will of O'Hara,
95 N. Y. 403; Curdy v. Berton, 79
Cal. 420; Williams v. Vreeland, 32
1ST. J. Eq. 135; Hooker v. Oxford,
33 Mich. 454; Dowd v. Tucker, 41
Conn. 197; McKee v. Jones, 6 Pa.
St. 425; Minkleston v. Brown, 6
Ves. 52; Hoge v. Hoge, 1 Watts,
163; Reech v. Kennegal, 1 Ves. Sr.
124; Oldham v. Litchford, 2Freem.
284; Thynn v. Thynn, 1 Vera. 296;
Podmore v. Gunning, 5 Sim. 485;
"Chancery Jurisdiction in Cases of
Wills Obtained by Fraud," 61 Law
Times, 21; "Wills in Favor of
Confessors,-' Leg. Obs. 83. An
aunt of the respondent, with whom
she lived, and to whom by her will
she had given all her property,
upon her deathbed desired to
change her will and give a certain
piece of real estate to a niece, and
had a codicil prepared for that
purpose. Before signing the codi-
cil she wished to secure the con-
sent of the respondent to the
change, and had him called in for
the purpose. After hearing her
he replied that she was weak, and
that she need not trouble herself
to sign the codicil, but that
he would deed the property to the
niece and carry out her wishes.
Trusting in his promise she did not
change her will. After her death
the respondent refused to convey
to the niece. On a bill in equity,
brought by her to compel him to
convey, it was held that he took
the property under a trust for her,
which a court of equity would en-
force. And held, also, that the
case was one of fraud, it being
clearly inferable from his refusal
to convey after the death of the
testatrix, that he made the promise
to her with an intention not to
perform it. The procuring of
property upon a promise which the
party at the time does not intend
to perform, is a fraud. And it
makes no difference whether the
property is real or personal. Dowd
v. Tucker, 41 Conn. 197.
2 Buckley v. Wilford, 2 CI. &
Fin. 102, 177. Lord Eldon, in the
case cited, uses this strong lan-
guage: "I should have thought it
my duty, upon the principle which
1 am now about to state, at once to
have said: 'Whether you meant
fraud, whether you knew that you
were the heir-at-law of the testa-
tor or not, you who have been
wanting in what I conceive to be
§ 223. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 509
estate was not disposed of by will drawn by the confidential
counsel (the sole executor) without informing the testator
of the legal effect of the will, it was held to be a trust for
the next of kin, for it was the bounden duty of the counsel
to have informed the testator that if he made no disposition
of his personal estate, the law, in consequence of his being
the sole executor, would entitle him to retain it for his own
benefit ; he was bound to inquire of the testator in plain
and distinct terms whether it was his will that he should
retain the personal estate for his own benefit.1
§ 223. From Procuring a Devise by Fraud. — The
limitations of courts of equity in regard to wills were set
forth in the preceding section. But while they have no
power to prevent the probate of a will, or to set it aside on
account of fraud, they may afford relief through a con-
structive trust. Where it is plain that a devise or bequest
is procured by fraud, the person holding the legal title will
be held as a trustee for the injured party. While the statute
of frauds and statutes of wills prevent the reforming or
modifying of the instrument, and the property cannot be
prevented from passing under it, equity will take cognizance
of the fraudulent act by which the devise or bequest was
the duty of an attorney, if it hap- shall ever take advantage of their
pens that you get an advantage by own ignorance, of their own pro-
that neglect, you shall not hold fessional ignorance to the preju-
that advantage, but you shall be a dice of others."
trustee of the property for the l Seagravev. Kirwan, Beatty, 157.
benefit of that person who would "Wherever a professional man is
have remained entitled to it if you called in to give his services to a,
had known what you ought as an client, whether to prepare a deed
attorney to have known; and not or will, the law imputes to him a
knowing it, because you ought to knowledge of all the legal conse-
have known it, you shall not take quences to result, and requires that
advantage of your own ignorance;' he should distinctly and clearly
for I carry it so far, 'you shall not point out to his client all those
take advantage of your ignorance.' consequences from whence a bene-
It is too dangerous to the interests fit may arise to himself, from the
of mankind that those who are instrument so prepared ; and if he
bound to advise, and who, being fail to do so a court of equity will
bound to advise, ought to be able to deprive him of it." Ibid. 166. See
give sound and sufficient advice — it also Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Ves. 266.
is too dangerous to allow that they
510 IMPLIED TEUSTS. [§ 223.
procured. It will make the devisee or the legatee a trustee
ex maleficio for the heirs of the testator. Where a testator
by his will bequeathes property in trust to a legatee with-
out specifying in the will the purposes of the trust, and at
the time of the execution of the will, or subsequently,
verbally communicates to the legatee the purposes of the
trust, arid the legatee, either expressly or impliedly, prom-
ises to perform the trust, or silently acquiesces therein,
equity will, raise a constructive trust in favor of the bene-
ficiaries intended by the testator, and will charge the legatee as
a constructive trustee for them.1 Where an attorney, advising
the devise of property to himself on the pretense that he
would only make use of it for another, but intending never-
theless to appropriate it to his own use, would be guilty of
a gross fraud and breach of confidence ; and it would be
equally a fraud if, having given the advice honestly, he
should afterwards conclude dishonestly to keep the prop-
erty; and the party who, under such attorney's advice, was
associated with him as trustee, would be in like position, and
it would be a fraud in him to appropriate that which only
by the attorney's advice, given for another person's bene-
1 Curdy v. Berton, 79 Cal. 420; (1895), 10 Misc. Kep. 503; S. C, 31
Williams v. Vreeland, 32 N. J. Eq. N. Y. Supl. 885. A father, who had
135; In re Fleetwood, L. K. 15 Ch. beenfraudulentlyinducedtoexeeute
D. 594; In re Boyes, L. K. 26 Ch. an absolute deed to his land to one
D.531; Riordan v. Banor, 10 Ir. of his children by representations
Eq. 4G9; Brown v. Lynch, 1 Paige, that such child would hold it in
147; Williams v. Fitch, 18 N. Y. trust for the other children, exe-
546; Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass. cuted another deed to such child
40; s. c, 3 Am. Kep. 418; Cogney to the land without any fraud being
v. O'Brien, 83 111. 72; ISTanney v. used. Held, that such child took
Williams, 22 Beav. 452. Where a the land free from any trust in
testator made a memorandum re- favor of the other children, since,
citing that the residuary bequest as the fraud used in the procure-
was made in order that the residu- ment of the first deed merely cre-
ary legatees might apply the prop- ated a resulting trust in favor of
erty bequeathed to certain pur- the father, the express trust being
poses, the persons intended to be void as not being in writing, the
benefited may compel the residu- second carried the father's equita-
ary legatees, as trustees ex maleficio, ble interest, Thompson v. Marley
to carry out testator's intent. Trns- (1894), 102 Mich. 476; s. C, 60 N.
tees of Amherst College v. Bitch W. Kep. 976.
§ 223.] IMPLIED TRUSTS. 511
fit, is brought within his reach.1 Where property is de-
vised to any person who engages to dispose of it according
to the directions of the testator and fails to fulfill his en-
gagement, he will be held as a constructive trustee for the
benefit of the persons named by the testator. In a case in
which a testator gave his real and personal estate to his wife
absolutely, "having perfect confidence she will act up to
those views which I have communicated to her, in the ulti-
mate disposal of my property after her decease," after
the death of the wife intestate, a bill was filed by two
natural children of the testator against his heir and next of
kin, and also against his wife's heir and administrator, al-
leging that the testator at the time of making his will de-
sired his wife to give the whole of his property, after her
death, to the plaintiffs, and that she promised and under-
took so to do, it was held that if the plaintiffs had proved
that allegation a trust would have been created as to the
whole of the property in favor of the plaintiffs.2 Where
fraud is practiced upon a testator in regard to the character
or relationship of a legatee, either by the legatee himself
or by a third person, the legatee will not be permitted to
avail himself of any benefit that may be secured by such
fraud. In a case of this character before the High Court
of Chancery of England, Sir Richard Pepper Arden, in his
opinion, said: "Under these circumstances I am warranted
to make a precedent and to determine that wherever a legacy
is given to a person under a particular character, which he
has falsely assumed, and which alone can be supposed the
motive of the bounty, the law will not permit him to avail
himself of it, and therefore he cannot demand his legacy.3
1 Hooker v. Axford, 33 Mich. s Kennell v. Abbott, 4 Ves. 802,
454; Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. 809. "A case something like this
273. occurred lately" (Ex parte "Wallop,
2 Podmore v. Gunning, 7 Sim. 4 Bro. Ch. 90), "which took up so
644; Bulkley v. Wilford, 8 Bligh much time before the Lords Com-
(N. S.), Ill; Chester v. Urwick, 23 missioners upon an application for
JSeav. 407; Middleton v. Middle- a writ de ventre inspiciendoa.ga.inat
ton, 1 J. & W. 94,96; Church v. ' a woman who had lived with Mr.
iRuland, 64 Pa. St. 432 ; Dowd v. Fellowes, and had made him be-
Tucker, 41 Conn. 197. lieve she had been brought to bed
512
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 223.
A false character attributed by a testator to a legatee will
not affect the validity of the legacy unless the false char-
acter has been acquired by a fraud which has deceived the
testator ; and where the testator and legatee have a common
knowledge of an immoral or criminal act by which the
legatee has acquired the false character, the rights of the
legatee, as such, will not be affected, it being no part of
the duty of courts of equity to punish parties for immoral
conduct by depriving them of their civil rights."1
of several children, which he was
weak enough to suppose his. It was
not a question whether they were
his children, for if so, I do not ap-
prehend the decree would have
been such as it .was. But there
were no such children. She had
shown him children as hers which
were not hers; and he gave lega-
cies to them, as her children by
him. It was held that they were
not entitled. These two things
were wanting: The testator was
not merely deceived as to their
being his children; but he was de-
ceived as to the other ingredient
of the character in which he gave
them legacies; for they were not
the children of that woman." Ibid.
COO. See also Harris v. Lloyd,
Turn. & K. 310; Gardner v. Heyer,
2 Paige, 11; Fraser v. Pigott, 1
Younge, 354.
1 Giles v. Giles, 1 Keen. 685. A
testator gave £2,000 to trustees in
trust to invest the same in govern-
ment securities, and to empower
Lady C, the widow of Sir N C, to
receive the dividends so long as
she continued single and unmar-
ried; but in case she should sell,
assign, dispose of or anticipate
such dividends, the testator re-
voked the bequest and directed
that the £2.000 should become part
of the residue of his estate, which
he gave to J C. At the date of
the will, and at the testator's death,
Lady C was married to one E, but
he had deserted her and gone
abroad, and she always called her-
self Lady C, and represented her-
self to be a single woman and the
widow of Sir N" C, and the testator
and others always considered her
so to be; it was held that she and
her husband, in her right, were
absolutely entitled to the £2,000.
Shad well, V. C, observing: '-It is
not the law where a testator makes
a gift, and as igns a reason for it,
the gift fails if the reason does not
exist. It does not appear that
there was any fraudulent assump-
tion of character on the part of
tbe plaintiff." And afterwards he
says : '-I must first remark that no
case of fraudulent representation
has been established against the
plaintiff; but it is clear, on the
evidence, that the testator supposed
that she was not a married lady at
the time he made the will; and it
seems to me that the right way is
to construe the will on that suppo-
sition. Then the bequest is this:
'I also give,' etc. Now, that, as
far as it goes, is a mere attempt to
make a condition in restraint of
marriage, and I conceive that it is
void." Kishton v. Cobb, 9 Sim.
615.
§ 224.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
513
§ 224. The Subject Continued. — Where the wishes of
a testator are made plain and there is a promise to execute
them, equity will decree a specific performance. In a case
where the evidence showed that Y, in consideration of a
legacy of $30,000 to him, promised the testator verbally to
give complainants $10,000 thereof; that V, after testator's
death, admitted the trust orally, and also executed a written
promise to that effect without deceit or misrepresentation,
it was held that specific perf ormance of such promise would
be decreed, notwithstanding a subsequent retraction of the
written promise.1 In cases of this character it is not neces-
i Williams v. Vreeland, 32 N. J.
Bq. 135. See also Keecliv. Kenni-
gate, Amb. 67; s.c.,1 Ves. Sr. 123
Walker v. Walker, 2 Atk. 98
Drakeford v. Wilks, 3 Atk. 539
Oldham v. Litchford, 2 Vein. 506
Thyhn v. Thynn, 1 Vera. 296
Devenish v. Baines, Prec. Ch. 3
Chamberlain v. Chamberlain,
Freem. Ch. 52; Middleton v. Mid-
dleton, Uac. & W. 94, 96; Ches-
ter v. Urwick, 23 Beav. 407;
Bulkleyv. Wilford,8Bligh (N. S.),
Ill ; Muckleston v. Brown, 6 Ves.
52; Strickland v. Aldridge, 9 Ves.
516 ; Chamberlain v. Agar, 2 Ves.
& B. 259; Seagrave v. Kirwan, 1
Beatty, 157; Dixon v. Olmius, 1
Cox, 414; Dowd v. Tucker, 41 Conn.
197; McCormick v. Grogan, L. B.
4H. L. Cas. 82; Podmore v. Gun-
ning, 7 Sim. 644; Williams v. Fitch,
18 N. Y. 546; Hoge v. Hoge, 1
Watts, 163, 213; s. c, 26 Am. Dec.
52; Shields v. McAuley, 37 Fed.
Eep. 302; Gilpatrick v. Glidden, 81
Me. 137; s. c, 10 Am. St. Rep. 245;
Socher's Appeal, 104 Pa. St. 609;
Curdy v. Berton, 79 Cal. 420; s. c,
12 Am. St. Eep. 157 ; In re Kele-
man, 126 N. Y. 73; Cagney v.
O'Brien, 83 111. 72; In re Fleet-
wood, L. B. 15 Ch. D. 594; Eior-
dan v. Banon, 10* Ir. Eq. 464; In re
33
Boyes, L. E. 26 Ch. D. 531. Will
of personal property only, and
proved in the spiritual court,
though gained by fraud, yet not to
be controverted in equity. But if
a party claiming under such will
comes for any aid in equity, he
shall not have it. Nelson v. Old-
field, 2 Vera. 76. A mother gave
lands equally to her son and
daughter. The son, being finan-
cially involved, persuaded his
mother to give all the lands, by
codicil, to his sister, who would
hold one-half of such devise in
trust for him, to which she, when
interrogated by her mother, as-
sented, and the codicil was so
drawn. Held, that the sister was
a trustee for her brother as to one-
half of the lands, and, also, that
subsequent parol admissions of the
sister and her husband were ad-
missible to establish the trust.
Jones v. McKee, 3 Pa. St. 496 ; S. C,
6 Pa. St. 425. Where the appel-
lants requested the court to charge
the jury that if the relation of at-
torney and client subsisted between
the testator and one of the lega-
tees at the time of making the will,
they should find the legacy void,
unless means were employed by
the intervention of a third person
514
IMPLIED TEUSTS.
[§ 224.
sary that there should be positive promises made which
there is no intention to fulfill, nor that promises made in
good faith to the testator should be subsequently violated.
If in any manner a devise is procured by fraud, equity will
as adviser or otherwise, to prevent
such relation from influencing the
testator to make the bequest, it
was held that the court committed
no error in refusing so to charge.
In such a case undue influence is
presumed, and the absence of it is
to be shown by the party sustain-
ing the legacy, but the presump-
tion is one of fact and not of law,
and may be rebutted by any proper
evidence, which satisfies the jury.
There is no rule of law that re-
quires the intervention of a third
person. St. Leger's Appeal, 34
Conn. 434. If a party writes or
prepares a will under which he
takes a benefit, that is a circum-
stance which ought generally to
excite the suspicion of the court,
and calls upon it to be jealous and
vigilant in examining the evidence
in support of the instrument, in
favor of which it ought not to pro-
nounce unless the suspicion is re-
moved, and it is judicially satisfied
that the paper propounded does
express the true will of the de-
ceased. Biddell v. Johnson, 26
Gratt. 152. See further upon the
point of attorneys as legatees,
Bulkley v. Wilford, 2 CI. & Fin.
177; s. C, 8 Bligh, 111; Paine v.
Hall, 18 Ves. 475 ; Nanney v. Will-
iams, 22 Beav. 452 ; Hooker v. Ax-
ford, 33 Mich. 453; Corley v. Staf-
ford, 1 De G. & J. 238 ; Popham v.
Brock, 4 Russ. 8 ; Dent v. Bennett,
4Myl. &Cr. 270 ; Hindson v. Weath-
erill,5DeG.,M. & G. 301; Walker
v. Smith, 29 Beav. 394; Carrie v.
Cumming, 26 Ga. 691. Where a
testator desiring that his property
should go to hiB own heirs, was in-
duced by his wife to give her some
of the personalty, and will her the
residue of his estate in form abso-
lutely, in consideration of her
promise to use it for certain pur-
poses during her life, and to trans-
fer all that remained to his heirs,
it was held that her failure to
transfer to the heirs was a fraud on
them and on the testator, and that
a constructive trust arose which
equity would enforce, notwith-
standing the statute of frauds.
Gilpatrickv. Glidden, 81 Me. 137;
s. c, 16 Atl. Eep. 464. For a case
apparently opposed to the strong
current of authority, see Bedilian
v. Seaton, 3 Wall. Jr. 279, where
the facts were, that one Seaton, a
few days before his death sent for
two friends of his to come to his
house to draw his will for him, in-
tending to leave all his property
to his natural daughter, the wife of
plaintiff. They did not arrive and
his heirs-at-law, his two brothers,
constantly asserted that his illness
was not dangerous, and that as to
the property, the daughter should
have every cent of it. The two
friends failed to arrive, and under
the circumstances no will was exe-
cuted. After the death of Seaton
his brothers conveyed one-third of
the property to plaintiff's wife.
Plaintiff filed her bill for an ac-
counting and for a conveyance of
the balance of the property. This
was refused, the court holding that
the circumstances were not such as
to constitute fraud ; that no actual
fraud was shown, and that even if
§ 224. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 515
afford relief. Where a person, even by silent acquiescence,
encourages a testator to make . a devise or bequest to him,
with a declared expectation that he will apply it for the
benefit of others, this has the force and effect of an express
promise so to apply it, as if he does not intend so to do, the
silent acquiescence is a fraud. Where the gift is to several
as joint tenants and the promise to carry out the declared
purpose of the testator is made by one of them, it is ob-
ligatory upon all. In the case of such a declared intention
and promise, if the testator has named some certain and
definite beneficiary capable of taking the provision intended,
the law fastens upon the devisee or legatee a trust which
equity, in case of his refusal to perform, will enforce on
the ground of fraud. If, however, the uses enjoined are
for the benefit of persons incapable of taking, or of a char-
acter in direct violation of the law of the State, if the devi-
see or legatee repudiates his obligations, this is a fraud upon
the testator ; if he is willing to perform, his so doing would
be both a fraud upon the law and against the heirs and next
of kin, and equity will, for their protection, in either case,
fasten a trust ex maleficio upon the devisee or legatee.
M, by her will, gave the bulk of her estate to three persons,
who were her doctor, her lawyer and her priest, absolutely
as tenants in common. It was not intended by her to give
to the persons named any beneficial interest, but her de-
sign was to devote the property to certain charitable pur-
poses; this she was advised could not be done by express
the promises made by the heirs-at- against a son, the fact that such
law had been fraudulent, it would not son desired the will to be so drawn,
present the case of a trust which ad- and failed to inform his father that
heres to land in the possession of he had compromised the judgment,
persons having notice, but only without clear proof that this in-
that of a contract of which equity fluenced his action, is not any
would compel the execution, ground for setting aside the will.
Where a testator, by his will, gave No verbal understanding between
all his property to his wife, except a testator and his wife at the time
one dollar to each of his children, of making a will giving her most
expressing a determination that of the property, as to her final dis-
none of his property should go position of it, will create a trust,
towards paying a large judgment
516 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 224.
provision in her will, but only by such an absolute gift to
individuals to whose honor she could confide the execution
of her purpose. She signed a letter of instructions, con-
temporaneous with the will, addressed to the legatees and
devisees, stating the reason for the gift and dictating the
purpose, which was in substance that during their lives and
after their deaths, by some permanent arrangement to be
made by them, the income of specified portions of the fund
should be given to indeterminate persons of their selection,
and any surplus of income to such charities as they might
select. The will was executed in reliance upon a promise
of the legatees to apply the fund faithfully and honorably
to the charitable uses so specified. In an action to establish
a trust which, failing as to the beneficiaries, should result
to the heirs-at-law and next of kin, it was held that the gift
could not be sustained as an absolute one to the persons
named, as this would be a fraud upon the testatrix that the
secret trust attempted to be created could not be enforced,
nor would equity permit it to be carried out, as it was in
violation of the statute against perpetuities, but would im-
pose a trust upon the fund for the benefit of the heirs and
next of kin, and that, therefore, the action was properly
brought.1 On this very instructive and interesting case
1 Matter of Will of O'Hara, 95 N". of another, by assurances that he
Y. 403. If the testator, after mak- being the heir or personal repre-
ing a will in which he devises all sentative, or residuary legatee, will
his property absolutely, writes a see such person paid such legacy
letter to the legatee stating the or other provision, it is treated as
trusts upon which the testator in- an estoppel upon the party, or a
tended to devise the estate, and ex- virtual fraud to refuse performance,
plaining how the legatee was to whereby a legal duty is imposed,
execute the trusts, and the legatee, and it will be enforced in a court
during the lifetime of the testator, of equity." Kedfield on Wills,
accepts in writing the terms of the Part I, p. 512. Where the resid-
trust, and promises to execute it uary legatee named in a will
faithfully, a trust is created as ex- promised the testator that he
pressed in the letter, and a court of would pay to certain persons cer-
equity will compel the legatee to tain sums as legacies, and the tes-
execute it. De Laurencel v. De tator was thus induced to omit
Boom, 48 Cal. 581. "In every case changing his will in that respect,
where one induces the testator to or adding such provisions thereto
omit a provision in a will on behalf by written' codicil. Held, these
§224.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
517
Mr. Justice Finch, in his opinion, said: "If equity will
not touch this devise by putting a trust for the heirs-at-law
and next of kin upon a fund in the hands of these legatees,
the road to an evasion of our statutes and to the tempta-
tions of necessity or greed will be left wide open. While
in such cases it has been well said that the court should act
with caution, and only upon the clearest proof of the fraud ;
yet when, as here, the facts are proved beyond reasonable
question, we ought not to hesitate. The testatrix did in-
tend an absolute devise to these legatees on the face of the
will ; but she did not intend that they should have the re-
sultant beneficial interest, and relied upon their promise to
carry their fruits elsewhere. They do not refuse to per-
facts are sufficient to establish a
trust in favor of such proposed leg-
atees, and against such residuary-
legatee, for the amounts so agreed
to he paid, and evidence of silent as-
sent as well as of express "words is
sufficient. Brook v. Chappell, 34
Wis. 405. A man living with a
woman under color of a void mar-
riage, was about to devise his
property to her, when his brother
induced him to convey the prop-
erty to him (the brother), on a
promise that he would pay the
woman an amount equal to her
dower, at her husband's death.
Held, that the brother was estopped
from denying the validity of the
marriage, and that the widow could
recover on his promise. Spicer v.
Spicer, 16 Abb. Pr. (S. S.) 112.
See further Oldham v. Litchford, 2
Freem. 284; s. C, 2 Vern. 506;
Drakeford v. Wilks, 3 Atk. 539;
Marriott v. Marriott, 1 Str. 666;
Barrow v. Greenough, 3 Ves. 152 ;
fiyrn v. Godfrey, 4 Ves. 10 ; Mes-
taerv. Gillespie, 11 Ves. 638; Ex
parte Fearon, 5 Ves. 633; Chester
v. Urwick, 23 Beav. 487 ; Norris v.
Fraser, L. B. 15 Eq. 318; Johnson
v. Ball, 2 De G. & Sm. 85; Hoge v.
Hoge, 1 Watts, 163; Browne v.
Browne, 1 Harr. & J. 430 ; Gaither
v. Gaither, 3 Md. Ch. 158; McLel-
lan v. McLean, 2 Head, 684; Dowd
v. Tucker, 41 Conn. 197; Williams'
Appeal, 73 Pa. St. 249; Proby v.
Landor, 28 Beav. 504; Kingsbury
v. Burnside, 58 111. 310. Where a
promise is made by one who takes
no benefit under a will, by which
promise the testator is induced to
give a legatee less than he intended
is a nudum pactum. Bobinson v
Denson, 3 Head, 395 ; Ackerman v
Ackerman, 9 C. E. Green, 585
Johnson v. Hubbell, 2 Stockt. 332
Heustis v. Rivers, 103 Mass. 398
Mercier v. Mercier, 50 Ga. 546
Anding v. Davis, 38 Miss. 574
Ridley v. Eidley, 11 Jur. (N". S.)
475. The evidence must be clear
and satisfactory, both as to the
promise and intended fraud, or
courts will refuse to interfere.
Sims v. Walker, 8 Humph. 503;
Whitridge v. Parkhurst, 20 Md.
Ch. 62; Collins v. Hope, 20 Ohio,
492; Lomax v. Bipley, 3 Sm. &
Giff. 48; Jones v. Badley, L. R. 3
Ch. App. 362; Rowbothamv. Dun-
nett, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 430.
518
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 225.
form. Although they deny the promise, it is quite possi-
ble that they mean to keep it. We are not authorized to
say or suspect that they will not; but if they do, they must
inevitably carry out a planned and proposed evasion of our
statutes against perpetuities."1
§ 225. From Fraud in Procuring Conveyance. — The
principles by which courts of equity are governed in afford-
ing relief, in cases where a devise or a bequest has been ob-
tained by fraud, are applicable to those in which a convey-
ance has been fraudulently procured inter vivos. Equity
will make a person a constructive trustee for property which
he has acquired by fraud, wherever it would be in conflict
with justice to permit him to hold it in his own right.2
1 Matter of Will of O'Harra, 95
N. Y. 403, 420. A brother declared
his intention to devise his estate to
his sister, whereupon his mother
dissuaded him, promising that if
he would leave his estate to an-
other sister, she (the mother)
would provide for the first intended
devisee, and corroborated her in-
tentions by promises after testa-
tor's death. Held, that she was
liable. Owings' Case, 1 Bland, 370.
A testator designed to give plaint-
iff a legacy of $5,000, but when his
will was written it was agreed be-
tween the testator and residuary
legatee, in the presence of the
scrivener, that the legacy should
be omitted, and in lieu thereof the
residuary legatee should give his
own note to the plaintiff for $5,000,
which he did subsequently. Held,
that the residuary legatee's ad-
ministrators were liable on such
notes. Gaullaher v. Gaullaher, 5
Watts, 200.
2 Hendrix v. Munn, 46 Tex. 141 ;
Jones v. McDougall, 32 Miss. 129;
Cameron v. Ward, 8 Ga. 245 ; Cous-
ins v. Wall, 3 Jones Eq. 43; Hoge
v. Hoge, 1 Watts, 163, 214; s. C.,26
Am. Dec. 52; Fraser v. Child, 4 E.
D. Smith, 153; Hodges v. Howard,
5 R. I. 149; Hunt v. Roberts, 40 Me.
187 ; Troll v. Carter, 15 W. Va. 567 ;
Coyote, etc. Co. v. Ruble, 8 Ore.
284; Sandfoss v. Jones, 35 Cal. 481,
489; Hidden v, Jordan, 21 Cal. 92,
99-102 ; Coyle v. Davis, 20 Wis. 564 ;
Nelson v. Worrall, 20 Iowa, 469 ;
Martin v. Martin, 16 B. Mon. 8;
Arnold v. Cord, 16 Ind. 177; Laing
v. McKee, 13 Mich. 124; s. c, 87
Am. Dec. 738 ; Manning v. Pippen,
86 Ala. 357; s. c, 11 Am. St. Rep.
46 ; Brison v. Brison, 75 Cal. 525 ;
S. C, 7 Am. St. Rep.l89;]M"ordholt
v. Nordholt, 87 Cal. 552; s. C, 22
Am. St. Rep. 268; Henschel v.
Mamero, 120 111. 660; Fishbeckv.
Gross, 112 111. 208; Dodd v. Wake-
man, 26 N". J. Eq. 484 ; Walker v.
Hill, 22 N. J. Eq. 519; Merritt v.
Brown, 21 N. J. Eq. 401, 404; Mc-
Cullough v. Cowher, 5 Watts & S.
427, 430; Wheeler v. Reynolds, 66
X. Y. 227; Ryan v. Dox, 34 N. Y.
307; s. c, 90 Am. Dec. 696; Lamar
v. Wright, 31 S. Car. 60; Merrett v.
Poulter, 96 Mo. 237 ; Fishback v.
Green, 87 Ky. 107; Kimmel v.
Smith, 117 Pa. St. 183. Plaintiff
§ 225.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
f>19
Where a person obtains the legal title to land by imposition
and fraud, and under such circumstances that he ought not
in equity to hold and enjoy the beneficial interest, a court
of equity, in order to administer complete justice between
the parties, will raise a trust by construction out of such
circumstances, and declare the offending party a trustee of
the legal title, and order him to hold it, or execute it, in
and defendant filed on separate and
adjoining tracts of land, and made
improvements thereon. Defendant,
without the knowledge of plaintiff,
obtained permission to amend his
declaratory statement so as to in-
clude the tract on which plaintiff
had settled and thus bought that
tract, and had it included in
his patent. Held, that the filing
having been allowed and the pat-
ent obtained on false representa-
tions that defendant was occupying
and had improved plaintiff's land,
defendant will be deemed a trustee
for plaintiff, and restrained from
bringing ejectment for the land.
Sandford v. Sandford, 139 U. S. 642 ;
S. C, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 666. Where
the defendant by false and fraudu-
lentrepresentations obtained a deed
of conveyance from the plaintiff,
but never paid anything for the
property conveyed, and the plaint-
iff afterward placed the defendant
in as good a condition as he was
before the conveyance, and in the
same condition, it is not error for
the court to hold, when asked to do
so by the plaintiff, that the defend-
ant holds the legal title of the prop-
erty conveyed in trust for the plaint-
iff, and to render judgment in favor
of the plaintiff for the title to said
property. Newell v. Newell, 14
Kan. 202. "The court directed a
money judgment against the de-
fendant for the sum of $20,063.22,
that being the value of the property
at the time of the conveyance to-
him with interest thereon from that
date with annual rests, he being a
trustee ex maleficio. * * The
principle upon which the judgment
rendered in this case must rest is
that the deed to the defendant, be-
ing void for fraud and undue in-
fluence, the title to the land, as be-
tween the plaintiff's mother and
defendant, remained in her, and de-
scended to the plaintiff at her
death. The plaintiff had a right to
call upon defendant to restore to
him the property, the possession of
which had been acquired under a
voidable conveyance. But the
fraudulent grantee, by his own act
in conveying the land to a pur-
chaser in good faith and without
notice, has prevented the plaintiff
from recovering the land; and un-
der such circumstances it is but
just and equitable that he should
restore to the plaintiff its equiva-
lent in money, not as damages but
as a substitute for the land itself.
The fraudulent conveyance which
the defendant obtained from the
owner of the land enabled him to
sell it to a purchaser in good faith,
and the money that he received
therefor, with the interest thereon,
can, for all the purposes of this case,
be considered in equity as the land:
itself. Valentine v. Richardt, 126'
N. Y. 272, 277 ; s. c, 27 N. E. Rep.
255.
520
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 225.
such manner as to protect the rights of the defrauded party.
Where a conveyance is made of land by the holder of the
legal title upon false representations made to him by a third
person, which were neither authorized nor sanctioned by
the grantee, and against whom no fraud is shown, he will
not be declared a trustee to hold the land for the parties
who have been defrauded by the conveyance.1 In the re-
cent and instructive case of Hays v. Gloster, it was held
that a trust in real and personal property may be declared
and enforced where it appears that the property was trans-
ferred to the defendant at his solicitation while the plaintiff's
mental condition was such that he was incompetent to trans-
act business, and that he was induced to transfer the prop-
erty to the defendant by the fraudulent acts and represen-
1 Beach v. Dyer, 93 111. 295. See
also Merritt v. Brown, 21 N. J. Eq.
401, 404; Farnham v. Clements, 51
Me. 426; McCullough v. Cowher, 5
W. & S. 427, 430; Kisler v. Kisler, 2
Watts, 327; s. C, 27 Am. Dee. 308;
Schmidt v. Gatewood, 2 Rich. Eq.
162; Green v. Ball, 4 Bush, 586;
Moore v. Tisdale, 5 B. Mon. 352;
Rose v. Bates, 12 Mo. 30; Walford
v. Herrington, 86 Pa. St. 39 ; Lamar
v. Wright, 31 S. Car. 60 ; Cowperth-
waite v. First Nat'l Bk., 102 Pa. St.
397 ; Kimmel v. Smith, 117 Pa. St.
183; Coombs v. Little, 4 S". J. Eq.
310; s. c, 40 Am. Deo. 207 ; Marlott
v. Warwick, 18 N. J. Eq. 108 ; s. C,
19 N. J. Eq. 439 ; Merrett v. Poulter,
96 Mo. 237 ; Tankard v. Tankard, 84
N. Car. 286; Salsbury v. Black, 119
Pa. St. 207; s. C, 4 Am. St. Rep.
631. Where one purchases land at
a judicial sale under an agreement
with the owner to allow him to re-
deem, the agreement is enforceable,
although not in writing. The pur-
chaser holds the land in trust for
the former owner, and therefore
the statute of frauds presents no
obstacle to a recovery. Fishback
v. Green, 87 Ky. 107. Where land
is purchased at an execution sale,
or a sale under a deed of trust, un-
der an oral agreement with the
debtor whose land is sold, that he
shall be allowed to redeem, a valid
trust is created which will be en-
forced. But to engraft such a
trust upon the legal title the proof
must be strong and convincing.
McKTair v. Pope, 100 ST. Car. 404.
"But even in this class of cases, so
important is it to maintain the ut-
most confidence in the efficiency of
judicial sales, the purchaser should
be protected against all pretenses
of a trust by parol, unless his male
fides be proved by the clearest and
most complete evidence. But
where such demonstrative proof
exists, and where the contract be-
tween the defendant in execution
and the purchaser is not of such a
character as to affect injuriously
the rights of creditors, then, as has
been already remarked, a court of
equity will frustrate the contem-
plated fraud by enforcing the con-
tract specifically between the par-
ties." Merritt v. Brown, 21 N. J.
Eq. 401,404.
§ 225.] IMPLIED TEUSTS. 521
tations of the defendant that he would manage the property
andreconvey it to the plaintiff after paying off the plaintiff's
debts ; that there was no further consideration, and that all
the statements and representations made by the defendant
were false and fraudulent, and were knowingly made with
the intent to deceive and defraud the plaintiff. Trusts in
real property arising from fraud, actual or constructive, are
not within that part of the statute of frauds which requires
the trust to be declared by a written instrument ; but such
trusts arise by operation of law and may be proved by parol
evidence. A promise made without any intention of per-
forming it is fraudulent. A contract may be set aside in
equity where there is imbecility or weakness of mind arising
from old age, sickness, intemperance, or other cause, and
plain inadequacy of consideration, or where there is weak-
ness of mind and circumstances of undue influence and ad-
vantage. In this case plaintiff alleged that, being so far
deranged that he was entirely incompetent to transact any
business, he was induced to convey the property to defend-
ant by his false and fraudulent representations that he
would take care of and manage it, pay off plaintiff's debts,
and then retransf er the property to plaintiff ; that there was
no other consideration ; that defendant knew the represen-
tations to be false and untrue, and made the same with in-
tent to deceive and defraud plaintiff. It was held that the
facts alleged show a trust arising from fraud under Civil
Code Cal., providing that trusts may be created by writ-
ing or "by operation of law," and parol evidence was
admissible to prove the allegations tending to establish the
fraudulent acts.1
1Hays v. Gloster, 88 Cal. 560; Drake, 46 Cal. 645; Humphrey v.
s. c, 26 Pac. Kep. 367; Troll v. West, 40 Mich. 597; Sandfoss v.
Carter, 15 W. Va. 567 ; Clark v. Mar- Jones, 35 Cal. 481 ; Keid v. Burns,
tin, 49 Pa. St. 299 ; Koller v. Spill- 13 Ohio St. 49 ; Tracey v. Sackett,
more, 13 Wis. 29; Clark v. Clark 1 Ohio St. 65; s. c, 59 Am. Dec.
(1887) (Miss.), 1 So. Kep. 835; 610. "Those who from imbecility
Hall v. Linn, 8 Colo. 264; Ma- of mind are incapable of guarding
guire v. Page, 23 Mo. 188; Ward v. themselves against fraud and im-
Spivey, 18 Pla. 847 ; De Leon v. position are under the special pro-
Higuera, 15 Cal. 483 ; Murray v. tection of the law. The rule to be
522 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 226.
§ 226. The Subject Continued. — Where an absolute
conveyance is made as a security for a debt, or for the pay-
ment of a debt, to a third party, the conveyance will be
held as not a mortgage, but as a trust for the equitable
owner. In a case where a mine was conveyed by absolute
deed, under agreement that the grantee should operate the
same and consummate a sale thereof, and from the pro-
ceeds thus accruing, first, compensate himself for services ;
second, pay a debt due himself from the grantor; third,
discharge the claims of other creditors against the grantor ;
and fourth, return the surplus, if any, to the grantor; it
was held that the transaction did not constitute a mortgage,
but was a trust in the nature of an assignment for the ben-
efit of creditors. Where, as part of the original contract
through which he becomes the absolute grantee, but is in
fact constituted merely a trustee, he agrees to execute a
declaration of trust and preserve the same for the plaintiff's
use, but fraudulently fails and refuses so to do, the terms
of such trust may be proved by parol, notwithstanding the
statute of frauds. If fraud, actual or constructive, tainted
the original contract, parol evidence is admissible notwith-
standing the statute. Equity recognizes a constructive
trust where one has obtained money through a breach of
trust or violation of fiduciary duty.1 A person who under-
collected from all the authorities I surrendered to him until the rent
take to be this : Where there is thereof was sufficient to pay the
imbecility or weakness of mind aris- debt, which was done. After-
ing from old age, sickness, intern- wards, defendant took judgment
perance, or other cause, and plain by default, and at the sale on exe-
inadequacy of consideration, or cution became the purchaser,
where there is weakness of mind Held, in an action by C's heirs,
and circumstances of undue influ- that, because of the fraud in ob-
ence and advantage, in either case taining the judgment in violation
a contract may be set aside in of his agreement, equity would de-
equity." Hays v. Gloster, 88 Cal. cree defendant to be the holder of
566. the land in trust for plaintiffs.
1 Hall v. Linn, 8 Colo. 264. After Miller v. Carlton (1893), 2 Tex.
defendant had commenced fore- Civ. App. 382; s. c, 21 S. W. Bep.
closure of his vendor's lien on land, 605. Where land belonging to a
he agreed with C, the owner, to partnership is sold on foreclosure
desist, if possession of the land was after death of all the partners, and
220.
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
523
takes to act as the agent of infants and protector of their
rights, and in that character obtains a conveyance in his
own name which was intended for their benefit, will be con-
sidered as holding the legal title in trust for them.1 While
the administrator of the last sur-
viving partner buys the certificate
of sale, and obtains a deed in his
own name, the land being worth
much more than the amount paid
by him, he holds the title in trust
for the heirs and widows of the de-
ceased partners. Galbraithv. Tracy
(1894), 153 111. 54; S. C, 38 N. E.
Rep. 937. In an action to impress
a trust on certain real estate al-
leged to have been purchased by
defendant's husband, with money
obtained by fraud and undue in-
fluence from plaintiff's deceased
mother, and conveyed to defendant
for a nominal consideration, it ap-
peared that defendant's husband
was the physician of plaintiff's
mother; that an illicit relationship
existed between them, and that she
was completely under his control
until her death. During this time
the physician bought this real es-
tate for $13,000. After the death
of plaintiff's mother it was found
that certain bonds owned by her
worth about $13,000 had disap-
peared. Held, that a trust would
be decreed in favor of plaintiff.
Valentine v. Richardt, 14 N". Y.
Supl. 483. Plaintiffs and defend-
ants entered into an agreement for
the purchase of land for $8,000 ;
G, one of the defendants, to effect
a purchase, receive title, etc., as
trustee for the purchasers. The
conveyance to G was by one W,
who was paid therefor $4,000. Be-
fore the agreement of the purchas-
ers, M, one of the defendants, had
obtained an option on the land for
$4,000. Of the $8,000 raised to
make the purchase, $4,000 was paid
by G to M. At the time of the
agreement to make the purchase,
A and S, two of the plaintiffs, knew
nothing of the option of M, but re-
lying upon the representations of
G and M, believed that . the pur-
chase was to be from W and his
price was $8,000. Held, that A and
S were entitled to relief against G
and M, though the land had in-
creased in value so that it was
fully worth $8,000, as they were
entitled to all their share of all
the advance over the actual price
paid to W, and by the fraud of
G and M were deprived of this.
Her v. Griswold, 83 Iowa, 442;
s. c, 49 N. W. Rep. 1023. In
a suit to declare a resulting trust
in land in plaintiff's favor, as heir
of a decedent, it appeared that de-
fendant purchased the land on
execution against decedent under
an agreement by which decedent
was to repay defendant the pur-
chase price, and have a reconvey-
ance; that decedent remained in
possession without paying rent for
16 years, and until his death, hav-
ing repaid a portion of the purchase
price ; that afterwards plaintiff re-
mained in possession, and paid the
balance of the amount due; that,
after the death of decedent, de-
fendant conveyed the land to his
codefendant, wrho had knowledge
of the situation. Held, that plaint-
iff was entitled to the relief sought.
Buchanan v. Buchanan (1893), 38
S. Car. 410; s. c. 17 S. E. Rep.
218.
1 Roller v. Spilmore, 13 Wis. 29.
524
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 226.
parol evidence cannot be admitted to vary or add to a deed
as a general rule, yet if a grantee in a deed has procured it
by fraud, he will be held by a court of equity to be a trustee
of the real owner, or if land is purchased with the funds of
one party, and conveyed to another, the grantee will be held
a trustee for the real purchaser, or if the scrivener of a
deed has made a mistake in drafting it, a court of equity
will correct such mistake, or a deed absolute on its face
may be shown by parol evidence to be a mortgage to secure
a loan or a precedent debt.1
1 Troll v. Carter, 15 W. Va. 567.
Where one of two adverse claim-
ants to a mining claim furnishes to
the other part of the expense of(
procuring patent, and allows him
to obtain patent in his own name
under a parol agreement to convey
a half interest in the mine to the
claimant furnishing the money,
there is no resulting trust that will
take the transaction out of the
statute of frauds, where it is not
clearly shown by the pleadings
that the money was furnished be-
fore the patent was obtained.
Ducie v. Ford, 138 U. S. 587; s. c,
11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 417. Plaintiff
verbally contracted with defendant
to join him in the purchase of cer-
tain land which defendant had
contracted to purchase by a certain
time. On plaintiff's failure to pay
his share of the money, defendant
purchased the land in his own
name. Held, that defendant could
not be compelled to convey half
the land to plaintiff on the ground
that there was a constructive trust
in favor of plaintiff. Taylor v.
Kelly (1894), 103 Cal. 178; s. c, 37
Pac. Rep. 216. In a suit to declare
a trust in plaintiffs' favor arising
out of fraud in the procurement of
a conveyance of land, the com-
plaint alleged that the title was
vested in defendant by a convey-
ance from one who held the legal
title as trustee and agent for
plaintiffs, in which conveyance
plaintiffs joined ; that the consid-
ation for the deed, which was abso-
lute on its face, was $26,000, but
that defendant agreed to pay $5,000
more thereafter, and to hold the
land in trust, and at a future time
sell it for a price satisfactory to
both parties, under plaintiffs' su-
pervision and control, and to divide
the profits with them. It was al-
leged, however, that the plaintiffs'
agent and trustee told them that
such was defendant's agreement,
and it was not alleged that defend-
ant ever made such agreement
with plaintiffs, or that he author-
ized their said agent to do so.
Held, that the complaint does not
show facts sufficient to establish a
trust on the ground of fraud.
Schultz v. McLean (1890) (Cal.),
25 Pac. Rep. 427, 430; s. C. (1892),
93 Cal. 329. In the absence of a
contract, it cannot be inferred that
the purchaser at a tax sale of land
bought it as trustee for the former
owner merely because the former
owner thereafter refunded to the
purchaser all he had paid at the
sale, and the purchaser then quit-
claimed to him part of the prop-
§ 227.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
525
§ 227. From Fraudulent Preventing of Competition. —
Where a purchaser prevents other persons from attending
a sale, or from bidding on property offerred for sale at
public auction, by fraudulent representations, he will be
held as a trustee for the equitable owner.1 A intends to be
present and to purchase land which is to be sold by the
sheriff under execution. B promises A that he Avill attend
erty. Davis v. Scovern (1895),
130 Mo. 303; s. c, 32 S. W. Rep.
986.
1 Martin v. Blight, 4 J. J. Marsh.
491. See also Ryan v. Dox, 34 N.
Y. 307; Merrett v. Poulter, 96 Mo.
237; Tankard v. Tankard, 84 N.
Car. 286; Heath's Appeal, 100 Pa.
St. 1; Seichrist's Appeal, 66 Pa. St.
237; Poach v. Hudson, 8 Bush,
410; Crutcher v. Hoard, 4 Bush,
360; Miller v. Antle, 2 Bush, 407;
Brown v. Lynch, 1 Paige Ch. 147;
Trapnall v. Brown, 19 Ark. 49;
Cox v. Cox, 5 Rich. Bq.365; Keith
v. Purvis, 4 Desaus. 114; Peebles
v. Beading, 8 Serg. & R. 492
Brown v. Dysinger, 1 Rawle, 408
Mackay v. Martin, 26 Tex. 225
McEaney v. Huff, 32 Ga. 681 ; Den-
nis v. McCagg, 32 111. 429 ; Kisler
v. Kisler, 2 Watts, 323; Farnham
v. Clements, 51 Me. 426 ; Dodd v.
Wakeman, 26 N. J. Eq. 484; Jones
v. McDougall, 32 Miss. 179; Nel-
son v. Worrall, 20 Iowa, 469 ; Coyle
v. Davis, 20 Wis. 564; Hunt v.
Eoberts, 40 Me. 187; Hodges v.
Howard, 5 E. I. 149; Cameron v.
Ward, 8 Ga. 245; Cousins v. Wall,
' 3 Jones Eq. 43; Frazer v. Child, 4
E. D. Smith, 153; Chambliss v.
Smith, 30 Ala. 366; Levy v. Brush,
45 K. T. 589; Bennett v. Dollar
Sav. Bank, 87 Pa. 382; Gibson v.
Deeius, 82 111. 304; Farnham v.
Clements, 51 Me., 426; Pearson v.
East, 36 Ind. 27; Kraft v. Smith
(1887), 117 Pa. St. 365; s. c, 11
Atl. Rep. 370; Gilbert v. Carter,
10 Ind. 16; Jenckes v. Cook, 9 R.
I. 520 ; Wolford v. Herrington, 74
Pa. St. 311 ; Ferguson v. William-
son, 20 Ark. 272 ; Adams v. Brad-
ley, 12 Mich. 346; Rothwell v.
Dawes, 2 Blackf. (N. S.) 613; Cole
v. Bradley, 49 Me. 388; Cowperth-
wait v. Carbondale Bank, 102 Pa.
St. 397 ; Boynton v. Housler, 73 Pa-
st. 453; Brannin v. Brannin, 18 N.
J. Eq. 212; Bergh v. Wentz, 73 Pa.
St. 369. A decree provided that
land held in trust should be sold
by a master; that of the proceeds
$505,000 should be paid to one
of the cestuis que trustent for ad-
vances made by him ; that half the
balance should also be paid to
him ; that the other half should be
applied to pay $83,000 to a creditor
of the other cestui que trust, and
the surplus, if any, to such other
cestui que trust. The creditor en-
tered into a secret agreement with
a third person, whereby the latter,
in consideration of the assigment to
him of such creditor's interest in
the decree, agreed to pay him, or
bid enough as against any other
purchaser to secure full payment
to him of his debt. Held, that
such agreement was not an abuse
of the process of the court, and
did not create a trust in favor of
the other parties in interest as to
the amount so agreed to be paid.
Green v. Bogue, 158 U. S. 478;
s. c, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 975.
526 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 227.
the sheriff's sale and purchase the land for him. A con-
fides in B's promise and does not in person attend the sale;
B attends, but purchases the land for himself. Chancellor
will, at suit of defendant in execution, set aside the sale as
obtained by fraudulent prevention of competition in bidding
at sale. Purchaser at a sheriff's sale, who has by fraudu-
lent management prevented other bidders attending the
sale, will not be permitted to hold property purchased by
him. In McCulloch v. Cowher it was held by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania that an agreement to withhold his
competition in the purchase of land by one who is in pos-
session without title, is a good consideration for a promise
to convey to him a part of the land by one who purchased
from the real owner.1 In a recent case defendant, before
a tax sale of land belonging to his minor nephews, verbally
agreed with their uncle to purchase the land for their ben-
efit, and at the sale defendant stated that he was purchasing
the land for them, and thereby induced others not to bid
against him, it was held that, though he was under no
legal duty to protect the interests of his nephews, he must
hold the land in trust for them.2 T had the control of sev-
eral judgments against B, upon which executions were
issued, and levied upon a house and lot, worth largely more
than the amount of the judgments ; at and before the sale
1 McCulloch v. Cowher, 5 Watts low the value, and then that he
& S. 427; Wheeler v. Reynolds, 66 should declare that the agreement
ST. Y. 227; Minott v. Mitchell, 30 was void under the statute of fraud,
Ind. 228; Kellum v. Smith, 33 Pa. and that the other party should
St. 158. "If hy the artifice of the have no henefit from the agree-
purchaser declaring he was to buy ment, whilst he reaped all the
for the owner, others were pre- fruits? Surely not. Courts of
vented from bidding, and the land equity would be blind, indeed, if
was sold at a great undervalue, this they could permit such a state of
would make him a trustee." things." Keith v. Purvis, 4 Desaus.
Peebles v.Eeading,8Serg. &E. 492. 114, 121.
"Can it be tolerated that a creditor 2 Vanbever v. Vanbever (1895),
shall, at a sale of his debtor's 97 Ky. 344; s. c, 30 S. W. Eep.
property, lull him to sleep and 983; Eyan v. Dox, 34 N". Y. 307;
keep off other purchasers by an Martin v. Martin, 16 B. Mon. 14;
agreement under which he buys in Crutcher v. Hord, 4 Bush, 360.
the land for a small sum much be-
§ 228. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 527
under the executions, T and B entered into a parol agree-
ment to prevent the sacrifice of the property, that T should
bid it in, take possession, and receive the rents and profits
until the judgments were satisfied, or otherwise paid by B ;
other persons, upon being informed of the agreement, de-
elined to bid for the property, and T purchased it for a
nominal sum. It was held that the case was excepted out
of the statute of frauds, and that it would be a fraud in the
purchaser to keep the property in violation of the agree-
ment.1
§ 228. From Pretense of Buying for Another. — Where
there is a pretense of acting as an agent for another in a
contract for the purchase of an estate, while the person
making such pretense is really acting for himself, and in
consequence of such misrepresentation the vendor is misled,
and the purchaser secures a contract when otherwise he
could not have secured it, or is enabled to make a more
favorable bargain than he could otherwise have made, the
contract will not be enforced, and where the contract has
been executed by the conveyance of the estate, the pur-
chaser will hold the property as the trustee of the vendor.
A articles for the purchase of B's estate, pretending he
1 Trapnall v. Brown, 19 Ark. 34; and the confidence which Brown
Pegues v. Pegues, 5 Ired. Eq. 418 ; reposed in Trapnall, he would
Jones v. Hubbard, 6 Munf . 261 ; have made other arrangements to
Neely v. Torian, 1 Dev. & Bat. 410; prevent the sacrifice of his prop-
Caple v. McCollum, 27 Ala. 465; erty — at least that it would have
Orr v. Pickett, 3 J. J. Marsh. 276 ; sold for something nearer its value
Haywood v. Ensley, 8 Humph. 460; than it did. Under these circum-
Harris v. Carney, 10 Humph. 349. stances, we think it would be a
In this case the property, it seems, fraud in the purchaser to keep the
was worth as much as $5,000. By property in violation of the agree-
means of the agreement between ment. That the statute, which
the parties Trapnall was enabled was designed to prevent frauds,
to purchase it, under the two exe- would be used as a shield, and a
cutions, for $176. Other persons defense in the commission of fraud,
declined bidding for the property which the courts of equity will not
on being informed of the objects tolerate. The court below did not
of the agreement. It may be in- err in treating the purchaser as a
ferred from all the facts of the trustee. Trapnall v. Brown, 19
case, that but for the agreement Ark. 39, 49.
528 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 229.
bought it for one whom B was desirous to oblige, but in
truth bought it for another, and by that means got the es-
tate at an under value. Equity will not decree an execu-
tion of these articles.1 If a fraud is practiced upon a land-
lord by one desirous of obtaining a lease of premises from
him, the lessor may in equity set aside the contract ; but
no such right accrues to another person from the fact that
he also was desirous of obtaining a lease of the same prem-
ises and had applied for one but had made no agreement
therefor, and that the other obtained the same by taking
advantage of the lessor's mistaking the lessee for him.2
But in such cases a court of equity will afford relief only
where it appears that the vendor was induced to enter into
the agreement by the fraudulent representations of the
purchaser, or that he suffered some injury on account of it.3
The rule is that where a bargain has been secured by mis-
representation, that party who has been guilty of the
fraud can obtain no aid from a court of equity.4
§ 229. From Possession of Money Belonging to
Another. — The receiving or the possession of money which
cannot be retained with a good conscience, raises a trust in
favor of the party from whom it was received or to whom
1 Phillips v. Duke of Bucks, 1 injury of him to whom he owed a
Vera. 227; Harding v. Cox, cited duty or trust. In such a case equity
in Phillips v. Duke of Bucks, lb. will compel him to give to the party
2 Stiner v. Stiner, 58 Barb. 643. injured the benefit he has obtained,
"The only ground upon which it even if no fraud is shown. But
can be held that a party obtaining where no fraud is shown, in fact,
a conveyance or lease of land may and no relation exists between the
be compelled to hold the same as parties in which either party owes
trustee for another, is where such a duty to the other, and no breach
party stood in a confidential rela- of trust or confidence is shown,
tion to the other and has used such then whatever advantage one man
relation to his own advantage, may gain over the other by a sharp
Wherever confidence exists, or is bargain, or an overbidding of an-
reposed, and one party has it in his other, cannot be interfered with."
power to sacrifice the interest of Ingraham,P. J., inStinerv. Stiner;
the party he is bound to protect, he lb. 666.
will not be permitted to hold any s Fellowes v. Gwydyr, 1 Sim. 63;
advantage that he may have ob- s. c, 1 Buss. & M. 83.
tained personal to himself, to the 4 Cadman v. Horder, 18 Ves. 11.
§ 229.J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
52ii
it equitably belongs.1 In cases of this character the ques-
tion is not whether the money received could have been col-
lected by legal process, but whether, at the present time,
it can rightfully be retained. The cases that fall into this
class are those in which money has been paid by accident,
by mistake, by fraud, and in some instances by theft.2 A
1 2 Fonblanque Equity, ch. 1, § 1.
We present entire the note in Fon-
blanque, which contains an excel-
lent statement of the principle of
our text. He says: "The receiving
of money, which consistently with
conscience cannot be retained, is
in equity sufficient to raise a trust
in favor of the party from whom,
or on whose account, it was re-
ceived; but in applying this rule
to payments by mistake, it is mate-
rial to distinguish mistakes which
proceed from ignorance of the law
from those mistakes, which are
founded on the misapprehension
of some fact. With respect to
.mistakes proceeding from igno-
rance of law, it is by no means
true that they are universally re-
lievable in equity, or in an equita-
ble action at law, as when a man,
not knowing that he was discharged
from a debt by the statute of lim-
itations, pays the debt; or, being
bound in honor and conscience to
any particular payment, makes
such payment; for, in cases in
which money is to be recovered
back merely upon principles of
equity, the governing question is,
whether the defendant can with a
safe conscience retain what he has
received? Farmer v. Arundel, 2
Black. 824 ; Moses v. McFarlan, 2
Burr, 1012; Minet v. Stokes, 4
Term Eep. 561 ; Ripley v. Gtelston,
9 Johns.. 201 ; Norris v. Tarrin, 1
Dallas, 147. See also Nichols v.
Leeson, 3 Atk. 573; Atwood v.
Lamprey, M. 1719, stated in note,
34
3 P. Wms. 127 ; Levy v. Bank U.
S.,lBinn.27. But if money which
there was no ground to claim in
conscience be paid on a mistake of
fact, it may be recovered back (2
Burr, 1010; Bize v. Dickson, 1
Term Rep. 285; Bond v. Hays, 12
Mass. 35), except where it is paid
into court, in which case it cannot.
Malcolm v. Fullerton, 2 Term Rep.
648."
2 Scott v. Rand, 118 Mass. 215 ;
Child v. Thorley, L. R. 16 Ch. D.
151. A clerk of a bank, through
fraud, using the borrowed check of
a firm, whose account (in that way
overdrawn) was more particularly
under his own supervision, with-
drew money from the bank and
deposited it to his own account at
another bank and bought stock
with it, and caused such stock to
be placed in the name of his sisters
without consideration. Held, that
the sisters were to be construed as
trustees for the bank defrauded.
Bank of America v. Pollock, 4
Edw. Ch. 215. A husband created
a trust for the purpose of provid-
ing "a comfortable support and
maintenance for his wife," who
was then under guardianship as an
insane person. The wife after-
wards was discharged from guardi-
anship, and the trustee paid over
the trust fund to the husband, who
subsequently furnished the wife
with support and maintenance.
Held, that the trust continued, not-
withstanding the discharge of the
wife from guardianship; but that
530 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 229.
bill in equity alleged an agreement between the plaintiff
and defendant that the plaintiff's shares of stock, allotted
to him on the formation of certain mining companies,
should be issued to the defendant as trustee, to be held by
him until the assessments, to become due from the plaintiff
thereon, should be paid; that the plaintiff had paid more
than was due on his shares, as shown by an account an-
nexed to the bill ; that the defendant had sold the shares
and appropriated the proceeds ; and prayed for an account
for the balance due on the overpayment of the assessments,
and for payment of the highest value of the stock since
the plaintiff became entitled to it. It was held on demurrer,
that the plaintiff had a plain, adequate and complete remedy
at law.1 It will be seen that this decision is based on a pro-
vision of the statutes of Massachusetts, and that to that ex-
tent it is exceptional. On a bill in equity by a bank to
charge land, alleged to have been paid for in part with
money known to have been stolen from the bank, with a
trust in its favor to the extent of the partial payment,
evidence that a short time before the purchase of the land
a son of the purchaser received from the thief, knowing
it to have been stolen, about the amount of the partial
payment ; that the son was a minor living at home with his
parents, and neither the purchaser nor her husband had
sufficient means to make such payment, will warrant a
decree in favor of the plaintiff.2 The owner of nego-
the husband was entitled to retain, Atlantic Bank v. Merchants' Bank,
from the accrued income of the 10 Gray, 532; Skinner v. Merchants'
trust fund, the amount expended Bank, 4 Allen, 290; Wilson & Co.
by him for the support of his wife. v. Smith, 3 How. 763. A party
Scott v. Kand, 118 Mass. 215. who, without right and with guilty
1 Frue v. Loring, 120 Mass. 507
Gordon v. Clapp, 111 Mass. 22
Jones v. Newhall, 115 Mass. 244
knowledge, obtains money of the
United States from a disbursing
office, becomes indebted to the
Ward v. Peck, 114 Mass. 121. United States, and they may re-
lational Mahaiwe Bank v. cover the amount. An action will
Barry, 125 Mass. 20; Bresnihan v. lie whenever the defendant has re-
Sheehan, Ibid. 11 ; United States v. ceived money which is the prop-
State Bank, 9G U. S. 30; Merchants' ertyof the plaintiff, and which the
Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall. 604; defendant is obliged by natural
May v. Le Claire, 11 Wall. 217; justice and equity to refund. The
$ 230. ] IMPLIED TRUSTS. 531
tiable securities stolen, and afterwards sold by the thief,
may follow and claim the proceeds in the hands of the
felonious taker or his assignee with notice ; and this right
continues and attaches to any securities or property in
which the proceeds are invested as long as they can be
traced and identified, and the rights of a bona fide pur-
chaser do not intervene. The law will raise a trust in in-
vitum out of the transaction in order that the substituted
property may be subjected to the purposes of indemnity
and recompense.1
§ 230. From Fraudulent Appropriation or Conver-
sion of Property. — Where property held in trust is fraudu-
lently or otherwise wrongfully appropriated and converted
into another form, a constructive trust will arise in favor of
the equitable owner. If a person holding money, or other
property, wrongfully makes use of it in the purchase of
lands, taking the title in his own name, or if he converts a
trust fund into personalty in another form, as in exchang-
ing one class of securities for another, he will hold the
property so acquired as a constructive trustee for the
form of the indebtedness, or the been, by the fraud or violation of
mode in which it was incurred, is duty of the trustee, diverted from
immaterial. Bayne v. United the purposes of the trust and con-
States, 93 U. S. 642. "Where a verted into other property. In
trust fund has been perverted the such a case a court of equity will
cestui que trust can follow it at law follow the trust fund into the
as far as it can be traced. The property into which it has been
United States cannot, against the converted and appropriate it for
claim of an innocent party, hold the indemnity of the beneficiary,
his money which has gone into its It is immaterial in what way the
treasury by means of the fraud of change has been made, whether
its agent. The rules of law appli- money has been laid out in land,
cable to an individual in a like or land has been turned into money,
case apply also to the United or how the legal title to the con-
States. Its sovereignty is in no verted property may be placed,
wise involved. United States v. Equity only stops the pursuit
State Bank, 96 U. S. 30. when the means of ascertainment
1 Newton v. Porter, 69 N. Y. 133; fails, or the rights of bona fide pur-
Whitecomb v. Jacob, Salk. 160. chasers for value without notice of
The doctrine is illustrated and the trust have intervened. Newton
most frequently applied in cases v. Porter, 69 N. Y. 133, 139.
of trust, where trust moneys have
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 230.
holder of the equitable interest. And if the property has
been disposed of equity will follow it wherever it may be
found, except it be in the hands of a bona fide purchaser
for value and without notice, and enforce the trust in favor
of the defrauded part}r. In an English case, where a draft
for money was intrusted to a broker to buy exchequer bills
for his principal, and the broker received the money and
misapplied it by purchasing American stock and bullion,
intending to abscond with it and go to America, and did
accordingly abscond, but was taken before he quitted
England, and thereupon surrendered to the principal the
securities for the American stock and the bullion, who sold
the whole and received the proceeds, it was held that the
principal was entitled to withhold the proceeds from the
assignees of the broker, who became bankrupt on the day
on which he so received and misapplied the money.1 In
1 Taylor v. Plumer, 3 Maule &
Selw. *562; Duffield v. Wallace, 2
Serg. & R. 521; Kislerv. Kisler, 2
Watts, 323 ; The Harrisburg Bank
v. Tyler, 3 W. & S. 373; Wilhelm
v. Folmer, 6 Barr, 296 ; Kirkpatriek
v. McDonald, 1 Jones, 393; Oliver
v. Piatt, 3 How . 401 ; Neill v. Keese,
13 Tex. 187; Valle v. Bryan, 19
Mo. 423; Moffitt v. McDonald, 11
Humph. 437; M. E. Church v.
Jaques, 1 Johns. 450; Seaman v.
Cook, 14111. 301; Garrett v. Garrett,
1 Strobh. Eq. 96 ; William v. Hol-
lingsworth, Id. 103; Foote v. Col-
vin, 3 Johns. 216; Murdock v.
Hughes, 7 Smed. & M. 219 ; Prevost
v. Gratz, 1 Pet. C. C. 364; Phillips
v. Crammond, 2 Wash. C. C. 441;
Johnson v. Dougherty, 18 N". J. Eq.
406; Robb's Appeal, 41 Pa. St. 45;
Smith v. Burnham, 3 Sumn. 435;
Thomas v. Walker, 6 Humph. 92;
Turner v. Pettigrew, 6 Humph.
438; Williams v. Turner, 7 Ga.348;
Duncan v. Jaudon, 15 Wall. 165;
Hubbard v. Burrell, 41 Wis. 365;
Pugh v. Pugh, 9 Ind. 132; Barker
v. Barker, 14 Wis. 146; Barrett v.
Bamber, 81 Pa. St. 247; McLarren
v. Brewer, 51 Me. 402; Church v.
Sterling, 16 Conn. 388; Homer v.
Homer, 107 Mass. 82 ; Shaw v. Spen-
cer, 100 Mass. 382; Matthews v.
Hayward, 2 S. Car. 239; Watson v.
Thompson, 12 R. I. 466; Schlaeffer
v. Corson, 52 Barb. 510; Ferris v.
Van Vechten, 73 N. Y. 113; Ban-
croft v. Consen, 13 Allen, 50; Shel-
ton v. Lewis, 27 Ark. 190; Mich. &
C. R. R. v. Mellen, 44 Mich. 321;
Deny v. Derry, 74 Ind. 560 ; Reick-
hoff v. Brecht, 51 Iowa, 633; White
v. Drew, 42 Mo. 561 ; Tilford v. Tor-
rey, 53 Ala. 120; Coles v. Allen, 64
Ala. 98; Moss v. Moss, 95 111. 449;
Winkfleld v. Brinkman, 21 Kan.
682 ; Roy v. McPherson, 11 Neb.
197; Thomas v. Standiford, 49 Md.
181; Tracy v. Kelly, 52 Ind. 535;
Dodge" v. Cole, 97 111. 338; Phillips
v. Overfield, 100 Mo. 466; Paxton
v. Stewart, 80 Va. 873; Flanders v.
Thompson, 3 Woods C. C. 9;
Jenkins v. Frink, 30 Cal. 586; Set-
tembre v. Putnam, 30 Cal. 490;
§ 230.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
his opinion in this case Lord Chief Justice Ellenborough
said: "If the property in its original state and form was
covered with a trust in favor of the principal, no change
of that state and form can divest it of such trust, or give
Adams v. Lambard, 80 Cal. 426;
Bovd v. McLean, 1 Johns. Ch. 582 ;
Parks v. Parks, 66 Ala. 326 ; Atkin-
son v. Ward, 47 Ark. 533; Hum-
phreys v. Butler, 51 Ark. 351 ; Mur-
ray v. Lylburn, 2 Johns. Ch. 441 ;
Shelton v. Lewis, 27 Ark. 190 ; Viele
v. Blodgett, 49 Vt. 270 ; McDonough
v. Oneill, 113 Mass. 92 ; Pindall v.
Trevor, 30 Ark. 249; Cookson v.
Richardson, 69 111. 137 ; Broyles v.
Nowlin, 59 Tenn. 191. A hook-
keeper or salesman who receives
the money of his employer by vir-
tue of his employment, receives it
in a fiduciary capacity, and if he
fraudulently appropriates it to his
own use he is guilty of a breach of
trust. "Where an agent, in violation
of his trust, uses money of his prin-
cipal in the purchase of property,
the law implies a trust in favor of
the principal, and equity will sub-
ject such property to the latter's
claim as against either a volunteer
or a fraudulent grantee. Where
two persons unite in a common un-
dertaking to defraud another, the
admissions of one are competent
against both, although there is no
direct evidence of a conspiracy.
The beneficiary cannot follow the
trust into the property purchased
by the agent and also compel pay-
ment of the money from the latter;
but he may obtain a judgment for
the sum remaining due after de-
ducting the value of the property
and in one action secure both equi-
table and legal relief. Riehlv. Ev-
ansville Foundry Assn., 104 Ind. 70.
If a trustee mingles trust money
with money of his own, and after-
wards separates from the common
fund a proper portion of it as the
property of the cestui que trust, and
with such portion of the fund pur-
chases real estate in his own name,
the trust becomes impressed upon
and attaches to the money thus set
aside and the real estate purchased
with such money. A trustee need
not purchase property with the very
dollars received from the trustfund,
nor give any notice to the cestui que
trust of the purchase, nor make any
delivery to him in order to create a
trust estate. If he uses or loses the
trust fund, he may afterwards, by
some proceeding or act of his own,
substitute his own money therefor,
and the substituted money will be
subject to the same trust that was
imposed upon the money by the
trustee used or lost. Houghton v.
Davenport, 74 Me. 590. If a confi-
dential agent, trusted by a princi-
pal with money used in trade, ap-
propriates the money to the pur-
chase of property for his own use
and benefit, and the property can be
identified as that so bought, the
agent will be held as trustee for the
owner of the money. A suit at law
to recover judgment against an ad-
ministrator, for money embezzled
by his intestate, pending which a
bill in equity was filed to recover
the property bought with the
money, and prosecuted to a decree
after judgment, was taken at law
for the amount, evidences no such
distinct and deliberate choice to
take the general claim on the es-
tate for money, in lieu of the claim
on this property, as to bar plaintiff
534
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 230.
the factor, or those who represent him in right, any other
more valid claim in respect to it than they respectively had
before such change. An abuse of trust can confer no
rights on the party abusing it, nor those who claim in
privity with him."1 To this, on another point of his ar-
gument, Lord Ellenborough adds : "In Whitecomb v. Jacob,
in chancery the doctrine was carried further. There a
factor intrusted with the disposal of merchandise for his
principal sold it, received the money and, instead of pay-
ing the money to his principal, vested the proceeds in other
goods, and died indebted in debts of a higher nature.
There it was held that those goods should be taken as the
merchant's estate, and not the factor's; and, though that
was not the case of a factor becoming a bankrupt, yet it
makes no difference whether the person claiming to repre-
sent the factor was his executor or administrator or his
."2 In a later case Lord Justice Turner said: "It
from prosecuting his equitable
claim. The doctrine of election is
applicable only when the party is
cognizant of all the facts, and then
makes a free and deliberate choice.
"Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Robinson, 13
Cal. 133. Where the defendant, a
clerk of the Superior Court, being
charged by order of court with the
investment of a fund for the bene-
fit of certain parties, loaned it to
his brother upon a third mortgage,
and took the money back in pay-
ment of a debt due him by his
brother on a prior mortgage : Held,
that in equity the fund could be
followed into his hands. When,
in addition to the foregoing facts,
it was alleged that the defendant
caused the mortgage to be fore-
closed and, in effect, bought at the
sale at a sum less than sufficient to
pay the first two mortgages : Held,
there were sufficient allegations to
raise an issue of fraud, and that
they constituted a good cause for
action. McEachin v. Stewart, 106
N. Car. 336.
1 Taylor v. Plumer, 3 Maule &
Selw. *562, *574; Lane v. Dighton,
Amb. 409, 411, 413 ; Lench v. Lench,
10 Ves. 511, 517; Lewis v. Mad-
docks, 17 Ves. 48, 51, 58; Grigg v.
Cocks, 4 Sim. 43S; Ernest v. Croys-
dill, 2 De G., F. & J. 175; Barnes
v. Addy, L. R. 9 Ch. 244; Ex parte
Cooke, L. R. 4 Ch. Div. 128; Nant-
y-G-lo, etc. Co. v. Grave,' L. R. 12
Ch. Div. 738 ; In re Hallett's Es-
tate, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 696; Rolfe v.
Gregory, 4 De G., J. & S. 576;
Mansell v. Mansell, 2 P. Wms. 678;
Swinburne v. Swinburne, 28 N. Y.
568; Friedlander v. Johnson, 2
Woods, 675 ; Taylor v. Mosley, 57
Miss. 544 ; Burks v. Burks. 7 Baxt.
353; Newton v. Porter, 69 N.Y.
133, 136, 140; Newton v. Taylor,
32 Ohio St. 399; Barrett v. Bamber,
81 Pa. St. 247; Hubbard v. Burrell,
41 Wis. 365.
2 Taylor v. Plumer, 3 Maule &
§231.
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
535
is, I apprehend, an undoubted principle of this court that,
as between cestui que trust and trustee, and all parties
claiming under the trustee, otherwise than by purchase for
valuable consideration without notice, all property belong-
ing to a trust, however much it may be changed or altered
in its nature or character, and all the fruit of such prop-
erty, whether in its original or in its altered state, con-
tinues to be subject to or affected by the trust."1
§ 231. The Subject Continued • — The doctrine of the
English courts touching the fraudulent appropriation and
conversion of trust property has been fully sustained in
this country. In a case where executors were authorized
by will to sell land devised to the testator's family, on
giving security, and they sold the land and employed the
identical money it produced in buying other land, and there
was evidence of declarations by one of the executors tend-
ing to show that the purchase was in trust for the family,
it was held that the circumstances were sufficient to raise a
Selw. 576; Lewis v. Maddocks, 17
Ves. 57, 58; Phayre v. Peree, 3
Dow. 116; Liebman v. Harcourt, 2
Meriv. 513 ; Lister v. Pickford, 11
Jur. (8. S.) 649.
1 Pennell v. Deffell, 4 De G., M.
& G. 372, 388. In this ease Lord
Turner, speaking of the prin-
ciple our text seeks to support,
said: "Several cases illustrating
the principle were cited in the ar-
gument, but perhaps it cannot be
better illustrated than by referring
to a case of familiar, almost daily,
occurrence — the case of trust
moneys employed in trade. An
executor of a deceased partner
continues his capital in the trade,
with the concurrence of the sur-
viving partners, and carries on the
trade with them. The very capital
itself may consist only of the balance
which, at the death of the partner,
was due to him on the result of the
partnership account. That capital
may have no existence but in the
stock in trade and debts of the
partnership. The stock in trade
and debts may undergo a continual
course of change and fluctuation,
and yet this court follows the trust
capital throughout all its ramifi-
cations, and gives to the benefici-
aries of the deceased partner's
estate the fruits derived from that
capital, so continually altered and
changed. We have here, I think,
the most perfect instance of the
extent to which the doctrine of
following trust property has been
carried by the court ; an instance,
too, which exemplifies the difficul-
ties with which the court has felt
bound to grapple for the purpose
of carrying out that doctrine, for
nothing can be more difficult,
nothing more inconvenient, than
to follow out such a case to its
results."
536
IMPLIED TRU&T&.
[§ 231.
trust for the family in the lands thus purchased.1 In the
leading and very instructive case of Oliver v. Piatt, before
1 Wallace v. Duffield , 2 Serg. & R .
520. S, having made a written
contract with H and others for the
purchase of 160 acres of land, on
credit, died, leaving a widow and
heirs. The widow, after her hus-
band's death, took in her own
name for the benefit of the family
a contract for 60 acres of land and
paid money upon it. At her re-
quest and without the knowledge
or consent of the other heirs, A
S, took a new contract for the
purchase of same premises in his
own name, either for the benefit of
the family or in fraud of their
rights. He subsequently took a
deed from the vendor to himself,
sold the land, and received and ap-
plied the avails to his own use and
refused to account. Held, that it
was competent for the plaintiffs
(who were all of the heirs of S,
except A S, to establish a trust in
favor of themselves, as against A
S, by parol. Swinburne v. Swin-
burne, 28 1ST. Y. 568. "Whatever
doubt may have been formerly en-
tertained upon this subject it is
now settled that money may be
followed into the land in which it
is invested ; and a claim of this sort
may be supported by parol evi-
dence. Lench v. Lench, 10 Ves.
517. Where an employe takes
money and property of his em-
ployer, without being entitled to
treat it as his own, and uses it to
buy a lot and build a house thereon,
a resulting trust will be declared
in favor of the employer. Grouch
v. Hazlehurst Lum. Co. (1894)
(Miss.), 16 So. Rep. 496. A mother
with minor children, being sick,
conveyed land to defendant (who
was her mother), in pursuance of
an understanding that defendant
should take the title in trust for
such children, but by mistake the
trust' was not expressed in the
deed, for which no consideration
was paid ; and afterwards defend-
ant conveyed the land to bona fide
purchasers, and received the pro-
ceeds of the sale. Held, that such
proceeds in defendant's hands are
charged with a trust in favor of the
children. Hubbard v. Burrel, 41
Wis. 365. An employe of a firm,
who was a son of one of the part-
ners, mortgaged land, and then
conveyed it to his wife. About the
same time he began embezzling
the firm's money, for which he was
prosecuted criminally and civilly
by the firm. The father then
loaned his son money with which to
employ counsel, and took from the
son's wife a second mortgage on
the land. Afterwards the firm ob-
tained a judgment against the son
for money appropriated. At fore-
closure sale by the first mortgagee,
the father bid in the land for the
amount due it, plus part of the sum
due on his mortgage, and after-
wards obtained a sheriff's deed to
it. Held, that the father's title was
in fee, and clear of any trust in
favor of the firm. Shoe v. Ziegler,
(1894) , 159 Pa. St. 461 ; s. c, 28 Atl.
Rep. 298. Where a trustee, pend-
ing a suit against the cestui que
trust for a breach of trust, fraudu-
lently sells the trust estate, the
cestui que trust may either disre-
gard the sale, and take the land, or
he may affirm the sale and take the
bond and mortgage, or other se-
curities given for the purchase
money. He cannot have both.
Murray v. Lylburn, 2 Johns. Ch.
§ 231.] IMPLIED TRUSTS. 537
the Supreme Court of the United States, it was held that
in cases of trust, where the trustee has violated his trust by
an illegal conversion of the trust property, the cestui que
trust has a right to follow the property into whosesoever
hands he may find it, not being a bona fide purchaser for
a valuable consideration without notice. Where a trustee
has, in violation of his trust, invested the trust property
or its proceeds in any other property, the cestui que trust
has his option either to hold the substituted property liable
to the orignal trust, or to hold the trustee himself per-
sonally liable for the breach of the trust. The option,
however, belongs to the cestui que trust alone, and is for
his benefit, and not for the benefit of the trustee.1 In his
opinion in this case Mr. Justice Story gave the following
very lucid and valuable exposition of the principle of
equity under consideration: "It is a clearly established
principle of that jurisprudence that whenever the trustee
has been guilty of a breach of the trust, and has trans-
ferred the property, by sale or otherwise, to any third per-
son, the cestui que trust has full right to follow such prop-
erty into the hands of such third person, unless he stands
in the predicament of a bona fide purchaser for a valuable
consideration without notice. And if the trustee has in-
vested the trust property or its proceeds in any other prop-
erty into which it can be distinctly traced, the cestui que
trust has his election either to follow the same into the new
investment, or to hold the trustee personally liable for the
breach of the trust. This right or option of the cestui que
trust is one which positively and exclusively belongs to him,
and it is not in the power of the trustee to deprive him of
*442. The proposition is well set- among its stockholders before its
tied, that the stock and property debts are paid, a judgment cred-
of every corporation is to be re- itor may pursue it, after the return
garded as a trust fund for the pay- of an execution unsatisfied, and
ment of its debts ; and its creditors maintain an action in the nature of
have a lien upon it, and the right a creditors' bill against a stock-
to priority of payment over any holder, to reach whatever was so
stockholder. It may be followed received by him. Hastings v.
into the hands of its directors, and Drew, 7G N. Y. 9, 16.
even when it has been divided l Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How. *333.
538 IMPLIED TRUSTS. / j 232.
it by any subsequent repurchase of the trust property, al-
though in the latter case the cestui que trust may, if he
pleases, avail himself of his own right and take back and
hold the trust property upon the original trust ; but he is
not compellable so to do. The reason is that this would
enable the trustee to avail himself of his own wrong ; and
if he had made a profitable investment of the trust fund,
to appropriate the profit to his own benefit, and by a re-
purchase of the trust fund to charge the loss or deteriora-
tion in value, if any such there had been in the meantime,
to the account of the cestui que trust. Whereas, the rule
in equity is, that all the gain made by the trustee by a
wrongful appropriation of the trust fund shall go to the
cestui que trust, and all the losses shall be borne by the
trustee himself. The option in such cases to take the new
or the original fund is, therefore, exclusively given to the
cestui que trust, and is given to him for the wisest pur-
poses and upon the soundest public policy. It is to aid in
the maintenance of right and in the suppression of medi-
tated wrong."1
to"
§ 232. From Fraudulent Inducements to Marriage. —
The rule in England is stated by Lord Chief Justice Mans-
field, in Montefiori v. Montefiori, as follows: "The law is
that where, upon proposals of marriage, third persons
represent anything material in a light different from the
truth, even though it be by collusion with the husband,
they shall be bound to make good the thing in the manner
in which they represented it. It shall be as represented to
be. And the husband alone is entitled to relief, as well as
where the fortune, etc., so misrepresented, has been specific-
ally settled on the wife. Yet no man shall set up his own
iniquity as a defense, anymore than as a cause of action."2
>■ Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How. *333, 6 Halst. 385 ; Wigg v. Wigg, 1 Atk.
*400. See also McLeod v. First 382 ; Wright v. Dame, 22 Pick, 55;
Nat'l Bank, 42 Miss. 99; Jones v. Kyan v. Doyle, 31 Iowa, 53.
Haddock, 41 Ala. 262 ; Joor v. Will- 2 Montefiori v. Montefiori, 1 Wm.
iams, 38 Miss. 546; Smith v. Wal- Black. 362; s. c, 1 Bro. Ch. 548.
ter, 49 Mo. 250 ; Denn v. McKnight, A third party knowing his repre-
§ 232. J IMPLTED TRUSTS. 539
Upon a treaty of marriage between A and B, the mother
of A being entitled to one-third of a farm and stock, of
which A was in possession, represented to the father of B
that the farm and stock belonged to A, and that A was not
indebted to anybody. The mother afterwards takes a
bond for the amount of her one-third part of the farm
and stock, etc., which were settled on the marriage. Equity
will relieve A and B against that bond as being a fraud
upon the marriage.1 In another case, in which on a treaty
of marriage between Lord Arbuthnot, then a minor, and
the daughter of Morrison, it was agreed that Morrison
should pay 50,000 marks as a portion for his daughter,
and a settlement was agreed to be made by Lord Arbuthnot
and his friends in consideration of that fortune. The
night before the execution of the articles Morrison pre-
vailed on Lord Arbuthnot privately to sign a writing, pur-
porting that the real agreement was for 40,000 marks only,
and that Morrison had agreed to the contract for 50,000,
upon the express granting of his private obligation, by
which Lord Arbuthnot bound himself to release Morrison
from 10,000 marks, part of the 50,000. When Lord Ar-
sentations to be false, where such * Scott v. Scott, 1 Cos, 366. la
representations have been relied Neville v. "Wilkinson, 1 Bro. Cb.
upon, and on the faith of same a 543, the defendant had not only
marriage has resulted, must make omitted to state his demand to the
good such representations. Bur- father on a marriage contract, but
rows v. Lock, 10 Ves. 475 ; Scott v. represented it much less than it
Scott, 1 Cox, 381 ; De Manneville v. actually was. He had done this at
Crompton, 1 Ves. & B. 355; Ex the request of his debtor, to pro-
pose Carr, 3 Ves. &B. 111. This mote the marriage of the latter;
suit may be enforced by a particeps and after the marriage had stated
criminis. Thompson v. Harrison, 1 to an agent of the family, that he
Cox, 146; De Manneville v. Cromp- had no other demands except for
ton, 1 Ves. & B. 355; Neville v. some professional services. Heaf-
Wilkinson, 1 Bro. Ch. 546 ; East- terwards claimed a li*rge sum. The
brooke v. Scott, 3 Ves. 461. .And bill was for an injunction against
so likewise no private contracts, recovery of it, and an account.
in fraud of the professed agree- Lord Thurlow held that even the
ments, entered into in consideration debtor himself might have relief,
of marriage, can be enforced. Pal- he being party to the bill with his
mer v. Neave, 11 Ves. 167; Scott v. father, and allowed an injunction
Scott, 1 Cox, 378 ; Neville v. "Wil- against suing for any debt con-
kinson, 1 Bro. Ch. 546. tracted before the marriage.
540 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 232.
buthnot came of age he brought his action to have this
obligation reduced on two grounds : 1. That it was granted
to him whilst a minor, without the consent of his guardians.
2. That it was contra fidem labularum nuptialium to elicit
such a writing clandestinely, contrary to a solemn contract
entered into in the presence of his friends. The Lords of
Sessions sustained the reason of reduction, and held the
obligation null. Against their decree Morrison appealed
to the House of Lords, where the decree was affirmed with
£80 costs.1 But as there is an essential ethical distinction
between a fraudulent and an erroneous representation, it
has been maintained that the same distinction should be
made in regard to the legal responsibility involved in the
two classes of cases. In a case not involving a question
of public policy, and in which a misstatement is made
without fraudulent intention, and in respect to a matter in
which the interested party was bound to investigate for
himself, and had the opportunity of ascertaining the facts,
relief will be refused.2 On a treaty of marriage the hus-
band applied to the brother of the wife to know the
amount of her fortune and the manner in which it was
secured. The brother represented it fairly, as he then
conceived it, and as being charged on real estate under the
father's will; and added that the husband need not ex-
amine the will or the family deeds, the facts being cer-
tainly as he represented. A recital to the same effect was
made also in the settlement, to which the brother was a
party. It afterwards turned out that the father had no
power to charge the estate by his will, but this fact was
unknown to all the family at the time of the marriage.
1 Morrison v. Arbuthnot, 8 Bro. a second wife, the son agrees with
P. Ch. 247, Taml. ed. the second wife's relations to release
a Nash v. Palmer, 5 Maule & Selw. the £1,000, and does release it ; but
380. A treats for the marriage of takes a private bond from the father
his son and in the settlement on the for the payment of this £1,000.
son there is a power reserved to the Equity will not set aside this bond
father, to jointure any wife whom because it would be injurious to the
he should marry, in £200 per an- first marriage, which, being prior
num, paying a £1,000 to the son. in time, is to be preferred. Kob-
The father treating about marrying erts v. Roberts, 3 P. Wms. 66.
§ 233.] IMPLIED TRUSTS. 541
The representation of the brother under these circum-
stances will not bind him to make it good.1
§ 233. The Subject Continued. — The rule in regard to
fraudulent inducement to marriage, as applied to third per-
sons, holds in regard to the contracting parties. In a re-
cent case defendant, by promising to marry plaintiff,
obtained from him money which she invested in lands, and
afterwards refused to marry him. It was held that defend-
ant was a trustee for the amount thus fraudulently obtained,
which was made a charge on the lands so purchased.2 Under
the operation of "this principle, equity will afford relief to
the heirs of a person who has suffered from this species of
fraud. In a recent leading and important case, plaintiff's
complaint alleged in substance that A died siezed of certain
real estate which he devised to his two sons, J and F, sub-
ject to the limitation, as to F, that if he should die without
issue his share should go to J and his heirs ; that F con-
veyed his interest to defendant, who subsequently induced
C, plaintiff's mother, to marry F by means of the false and
fraudulent representation that F had a fine property so left
to him, that if he married and had an heir the land would
go to the heir. The complaint further alleged that plaintiff
1 Merewether v. Shaw, 2 Cox, (even if she could successfully do
124. so) is precluded from denying that
2 Edwards v. Culbertson, HI N. she obtained the money under cir-
Car. 342; s. c, 16 S. E. Rep. 233. cumstances which the law de-
"Where there is nothingmore than nouncesasfraudulent, and this being
a mere promise to marry, it is plain so, it cannot be doubted that if the
that a violation of it would not en- specific money had been retained
title the plaintiff to any equitable by her, and could have been iden-
relief ; but we must infer from the titled, the plaintiff in a proper ao-
verdict that the defendant did not tion could have recovered it. If
intend to perform the promise at this is true, why may not the money
the time it was made, and that she be traced into the land and declared
intended it, as well as the addi- to be a charge thereon? This is a
tional agreement to hold the land somewhat novel question in this
in lieu of dower simply as a trick State, but in view of well settled
or contrivance by which to cheat equitable principles, as well as au-
and defraud the plaintiff of his thorities in other jurisdictions, it is
money. By submitting to the judg- believed to be unattended with any
ment and verdict, the defendant very serious difficulty." Ibid. 343.
542 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 233.
was the only child of such marriage ; that the real estate
was partitioned between J and defendant as the grantee of
F, and defendant since then has occupied and still occupies
and claims to own the part set off to him. The relief asked
was that plaintiff be declared the owner of the portion so
set off to defendant, and be placed in possession thereof.
On demurrer to the complaint, it was held that it set forth
a good equitable cause of action, and the demurrer was
properly overruled, that defendant was bound by his repre-
sentations, and must be considered as holding the property
as trustee ex mdleficio ; and so should be held to make good
the thing to plaintiff, who would have had the property had
the representations been true ; that it was immaterial that
plaintiff was not living at the time the representation was
made, as they were made in her favor and enure to her
benefit, and that the question was not affected by the fact
that plaintiff's mother was induced to agree to the marriage
by purely mercenary considerations.1 In his opinion in this
case, Mr. Justice Peckham said: "Marriage has its senti-
1 Piper v. Hoard, 107 K. Y. 73. shall be entitled to relief as well as
See also Monteflori v. Monteflori, 1 when the fortune has been specific-
Wm. Blacks. 364 ; Webber v. Far- ally settled on the wife. Atherly
mer, 4 Bro. P. C. 170; Berrisford in his work on Marriage Settle-
v. Milward, 2 Atk. 49 ; Hunsden v. ments (27 Law Library, ch. 34,
Cheney, 2 Vern. 150; Storrs v. Bar- marginal paging 484), after citing
ker, 6 Johns. Ch. 166, 173; Neville the above case, says that the prin-
v. Wilkinson, 1 Bro. Ch. 543; Ham- ciple upon which the court pro-
mersley v. De Reil, 12 CI. & F. 46 ; ceeds in such cases, when the thing
Redman v. Redman, 1 Vern. 347; is not actually made the subject of
Harvey v. Ashley, 3 Atk. 607 ; the settlement, must be this as he
Lamlee v. Hanman, 2 Vern. 499 ; conceives, that as the wife must be
Scott v. Scott, 1 Cox, 366. In Mon- presumed to agree to the marriage
tefiori v. Monteflori, cited above, as well as in expectation of the
Chief Justice Mansfield "held that present support which she and her
where there were proposals of mar- children will receive from her hus-
riage and third persons represented band, as of the provision which he
anything in a light different from may have made for them after his
the truth, even though by collusion death, that person who has been at
with the husband they shall be all concerned in raising such ex-
bound to make good the thing in pectation shall not be suffered in
the manner in which they repre- any wise to disappoint it." Piper
sented it. It shall be as represented v. Hoard, supra.
to be, and the husband alone
§ 233. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 543
mental and business side. Courts have very little to do
with the former. The whole law of marriage, as adminis-
tered by courts (so far as property interests are concerned),
is founded upon business principles, in which the utmost
good faith is required from all parties, and the least fraud
in regard thereto is the subject of judicial cognizance. To
say of plaintiff's mother, therefore, that she was too ready
to marry a man because of the money he had or necessarily
would leave to a child of the marriage, or that she was an
adventuress, induced to marry solely by fraudulent repre-
sentations as to the pecuniary condition of her husband,
does not, as I have said, furnish the least reason for refus-
ing relief to plaintiff if she be otherwise entitled to it. If
her mother had not been induced to marry by any such pe-
cuniary considerations clearly no cause of action would ex-
ist. It is because such considerations were the moving
©
ones, and were induced by the fraud of defendant, that
the plaintiff bases her right of action. There are some
anomalies in the law relative to contracts or negotiations
having marriage for their consideration, and such contracts
are based upon considerations which obtain in no other
contract. The family relations and their regulation are so
much a matter of public policy that the law in relation to
them is based on principles not applicable in other cases ;
and all business negotiations having marriage for their end
© © ©
are regarded in much the same light by our courts. Thus a
particeps criminis in the fraud has been permitted to re-
cover in his own name against one who was no more guilty
than he, when the marriage had taken place by reason of
such fraud."1
1 Piper v. Hoard, 107 1ST. Y. 73, disturbed for trifles, nor can the
77. Upon the question of the fraud cumbrous machinery of the courts
sufficient to vitiate a marriage, the be brought to bear upon impalpa-
foliowing from Schouler on Do- ble things. The law, it has been
mestic Relations, 5th Ed., § 23, is well observed, makes no provision
instructive: "As to fraud, in order for the relief of a blind credulity,
to vitiate a marriage, it should go however it may have been pro-
to the very essence of the contract, duced. Fraudulent misrepresenta-
But what constitutes this essence? tions of one party as to birth, social
The marriage relation is not to be position, fortune, good health, and
544
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 234.
§ 234. The Same Subject. — Secret contracts made by per-
sons under engagement of marriage, with parents, guardians
or other persons interested, by which such persons are to
receive any compensation or benefit in consideration of pro-
moting or of giving consent to the engagement, are treated
in equity as void. Where a parent refused his consent to
the marriage of his daughter on the ground that the in-
tended husband was in debt, and the brother of the latter
gave a bond for the debt in order to secure such consent,
and the intended husband then gave a secret counter bond
to his brother, the intended wife being privy to it, and the
marriage was consummated on the understanding that the
debt was paid, the counter bond was treated as void.1 It
temperament, cannot therefore
vitiate the contract. Caveat emptor
is the harsh but necessary maxim
of the law. Love, however, indis-
pensable in an aesthetic sense, is
by no means a, legal essential to
marriage; simply because it can-
not be weighed in the scales of jus-
tice. So, too, all such matters are
peculiarly within the knowledge of
the parties themselves, and they
are put upon reasonable inquiry."
1 Redman v. Redman, 1 Vern.
348. A most interesting discussion
of the principles governing courts
in their treatment of marriage
brokage bonds is contained in
Crawford v. Russell, 62 Barb. 97.
Potter, J., in this case, says : "The
civil law, as drawn from the code
of Justinian, allowed contracts of
this kind to be made by proxy; by
marriage brokers, matchmakers
called proxenetce, who were allowed
to receive rewards for their serv-
ices, like other brokers to a certain
limited extent. And at an early
period of the history of English
jurisprudence these proxenetce plied
their vocation in that country and
were tolerated. The policy of the
civil law seems to have been that
all aid rendered in eneouraging,
and the establishment of marriages,
was for the good of the nation, and
promotive of public morality, inas-
much as it discouraged fornication,
adultery and concubinage; that,
therefore, agencies by way of
matchmakers, brokage, proxenetce,
were productive of good, rather
than evil results. The policy of
English law was, that the effect of
such agencies and brokage was the
encouragement of influences of a
pernicious tendency by being the
occasion of many unhappy mar-
riages, the loss of moral influence
of parents over the happiness, due
nurture and education of children;
the temptation to the exercise of an
undue influence by false and seduc-
tive hopes held out to parties in-
duced by the self-interest of the
brokage agents; these were re-
garded as so corruptive in their
tendency as to receive condemna-
tion in the law tribunals, as being
totally void. The first controversy
that seems to have arisen in the
English courts upon the validity of
this character of agreements is
the famous case of Holland Keene
v. Potter, in the sixth year of the
§ 234.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
545
is a rule of equity, that where a bond or other obligation is
given to refund or return any part of a marriage portion,
without the consent of the father, it will be held void.1 An
reign of William III., reported in 3
Levinz, 412. * * And Bacon laid
down this doctrine : 'It is of such
consequence that all marriages
should proceed from free choice,
and not from any compulsion or
sinister means, and it hath heen
held that such interference was a
matter indictable.' (Bacon's Abr.
tit. Marriage and Divorce, D.) * *
But it seems that the ground upon
which the courts will interfere in
cases of this kind is not upon the
ground or idea of damage done to
the individual concerned, hut upon
considerations of public policy, and
hence 'every temptation to the
exercise of an undue influence, or a
seductive interest in procuring a
marriage should be suppressed;
since there is infinite danger that
it may, under the disguise of friend-
ship, confidence, flattery or false-
hood, accomplish the ruin of the
hopes and fortunes of most deserv-
ing persons, especially of females.'
1 Story, Equity Jurisprudence §
261. In the case of Drury v.
Hooke, 1 Vern. 412, Lord Chan-
cellor King said, "that this charac-
ter of agreements was a sort of kid-
napping into conjugal servitude,
and was in no case to be counten-
anced." Chief Justice Parsons, in
Boynton v. Hubbard, 7 Mass. 112,
said: '-These contracts are void,
not because they are fraudulent
upon either party, but are yet void
because they are a fraud upon third
persons, and because they are a
public mischief, as they have a
tendency to cause matrimony to be
contracted on mistaken principles,
and without the advice of friends,
and they are relieved against as a
35
general mischief for the sake of
the public." It would hardly seem
necessary to multiply American
authorities to sustain this proposi-
tion. The public policy of thus
protecting ignorant or credulous
persons from being the victims of
secret contracts of this sort is
therefore clear; and as Judge Story
says, "the surprise is not that the
doctrine should have been estab-
lished in a refined, enlightened and
Christian country, but that its pro-
priety should ever have been a
matter of debate." See also Keat
v. Allen, 2 Vern. 588; Stribblehill
v. Brett, 2 Vern. 445; Peyton v.
Bladwell, 1 Vern. 240.
1 Kemp v. Colman, 1 Salk. 156;
Hamilton v. Mohun, 1 Salk. 158.
"The bill was to be relieved against
a bond drawn in common form
for payment of money ; but proved
to be made on an agreement, that
the plaintiff should either marry
her servant, or should by way of
forfeiture pay him the sum of
money mentioned in the condi-
tion of the bond. The court
decreed this bond on debate to be
delivered up to be canceled, it be-
ing contrary to the nature and de-
sign of marriage, which ought to
proceed from a free choice and not
from any compulsion." Key v.
Bradshaw, 2 Vern. 102. "Any
private agreement or treaty in-
fringing the open and public
agreement of marriage is consid-
ered as fraudulent. Peyton v.
Bladwell, 1 Vern. 240; Redman v.
Redman, 1 Vern. 348; Gale v.
Lindo, 1 Vern. 475 ; Lamlee v. Han-
man, 2 Vern. 499; Keat v. Allen,
2 Vern. 588; Webber v. Farmer, 2
546 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 234.
open and public marriage contract cannot be modified by
any private agreement.1 Such an agreement is presump-
tively fraudulent or unfair to innocent persons, and on that
ground is held as essentially invalid. The rule is designed
to give stability and security to the marriage "by placing,"
as has been well said, "all parties upon the basis of good
faith, mutual confidence and equality of condition."2 Of
the same general character and subject to the same rule are
all of that class of contracts, known as marriage brokage
contracts, in which one party engages to pay another for
negotiating a marriage engagement. In a case where a
bond was given to the wife's father, in order to obtain his
consent to the marriage of his daughter, to repay part of
the portion if the daughter died without issue, where the
daughter was entitled to her portion by a collateral ancestor,
the bond was set aside as a marriage brokage bond.3 In the
leading case of Boynton v. Hubbard, before the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts, it was held that a contract made
by an heir to convcjr, on the death of his ancestor leaving
the heir, a certain undivided part of what shall come to the
heir by descent, distribution or devise, is a fraud upon the
Bro. P. C. 88; Morrison v. Arbuth- son, that the son shall pay him so
not, 1 Bro. Ch. 548 n.; Pitcairn v. much, it is void, being done by
Ogbourne, 2 Ves. 375 ; Woodhouse coercion, while he is under the
v. Shepley, 2 Atk. 535; Blanchet awe of his father. Hamilton v.
v. Foster, 2 Ves. 264. A covenant Mohun, 1 Salk. 158. A marriage
before marriage to release the ceremony though actually and
wife's guardian within two days legally performed, when it was in
after of all accounts of mesne prof- jest, and not intended to be a con-
its set aside in equity. In this tract of marriage, and it was so
case Lord Cowper used this vig- understood at the time by both
orous language: "You shall not parties, and is so considered and
have my daughter, unless you do treated by them, is not a contract
so and so, is to sell children and of marriage. Intention is neces-
matches, and these contracts with sary as in everv other contract,
the father are of the same nature MeClurg v. Terry, 21 N". J. Eq.
with brokage bonds but of more 225. See also Clark v. Field, 13
mischievous consequence as that Vt. 460.
which would happen more fre- 1 Lamlee v. Hanman, 2 Vera. 499.
queatly; and it is now a settled 1 Story, Equity Jurisprudence,
rule, that if the father on the mar- § 267.
riage of his son take a bond of the " Keat v. Allen, 2 Vera. 588.
§ 235. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 547
ancestor productive of public mischief, and void as well at law
as in equity.1 In his opinion in this case, Mr. Chief Justice
Parsons said: "Arguments drawn from considerations of
public policy have, and ought to have, great weight, both
in equity and at law. As fraud may be a public mischief
as well as a private wrong, in both cases equity will relieve
against it, and I know not that in any case the law will give
it a sanction. In a fraudulent contract, deceit may be
practiced on a party to the contract, in which case neither
at law nor equity is he bound by such contract. Or the
deceit may not be on either party to the contract, but on
third persons ; and if the deceit on third persons will oper-
ate as a public mischief, neither equity nor law will support
the contract. Thus marriage brokage bonds, which are not
fraudulent on either party, are yet void, because they are
a fraud en third persons and are a public mischief, as they
have a tendency to cause matrimony to be contracted on
mistaken principles, and without the advice of friends; and
they are relieved against as a general mischief for the sake
of the public."2
§ 235. From Conveyance of Property on the Point of
Marriage. — Where a party to a marriage engagement con-
veys property to another person, before the consummation
of the marriage, with a view to depriving the intended
husband or wife of the pecuniary rights and benefits con-
ferred by the marriage, the person to whom such property
is conveyed will be held as a constructive trustee for the
defrauded party. But the transaction will be held as
fraudulent and void only, as it is concealed from the in-
tended husband or wife. If the conveyance is made with
1 Boynton v. Hubbard, 7 Mass. contract on principle of public
112. "For although it has been policy, those principles ought to
said in chancery, that marriage have their full weight in courts of
brokage bonds are good at law, law; although to attain justice
but void in equity, yet no case has the remedy must be according to
been found at law in which those the course of the common law."
bonds have been holden good. Ibid. 118.
And we are satisfied that when 2 Boynton v. Hubbard, 7 Mass.
chancery has relieved against a 112, 118.
548 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 235.
the knowledge and consent of the interested party, or if
there is a valuable, or a good consideration, it will not be
treated as fraudulent. The following decision in England
v. Downs, contains a very clear and comprehensive state-
ment of the principle by which courts of equity are gov-
erned in such cases : If a woman entitled to property,
during the treaty of marriage, represents to her intended
husband that she is so entitled, that he will upon the mar-
riage become entitled jure mariti, and if during the same
treaty she clandestinely conveys away the property in such
manner as to defeat his marital right, and secure to herself
the separate use of it, and the concealment continues until
the marriage, a fraud is thus practiced upon the husband,
and he is entitled to relief. Direct misrepresentations, or
wilful concealment with intent to deceive the husband,
would entitle him to such relief; and if both the property
and the mode of its conveyance pending the marriage
treaty be concealed from the intended husband, there is
still a fraud practiced on him ; cases have, however, occurred
in which concealment, or rather the non-existence of com-
munication to the husband, has not been held fraudulent,
and whether fraud is made out must depend on the circum-
stances of each case.1 But in a case where a husband, be-
1 England v. Downs, 2 Beav. and in contemplation of that event
522; Lance v. Norman, 2 Ch. and without the knowledge of her
Rep. 41; Lady Strathmore v. intended husband, was a fraud
Bowes, 2 Bro. Ch. 345; s. c, 2 upon her marital rights admits not
Cox, 33; 1 Ves. Jr. 22; Goodard of a doubt. Linker v. Smith, 4
v. Snow, 1 Buss. 485; Taylor v. Wash. C. C. 224. A secret settle-
Pugh, 1 Hare, 608; Lewellin v. ment or voluntary transfer, in
Cobbold, 1 Sm. & G. 376 ; Downes whole or in part, of her property,
v. Jennings, 32 Beav. 290 ; Loader made by a woman upon third per-
v. Clarke, 2 Mac. & G. 387; Cham- sons while engaged and contem-
bers v. Crabbe, 34 Beav. 457; plating marriage, is liable to be
Tucker v. Andrews, 13 Me. 124 ; set aside in equity as a fraud upon
Black v. Jones, 1 A. K. Marsh, the marital rights of her husband,
312; Manes v. Durant, 2 Rich, at the husband's instance when he
Eq. 404; Bamsay v. Joyce, 1 Mc- learnsof it. Prima facie her trans-
Mullan"s Ch. 236; Hunt v. Mat- actions as a feme sole, with refer-
thews, 1 Vern. 408. "The secret ence to her own property, are valid
settlement made by the plaintiff's both at law and in equity; it is
wife shortly before her marriage, only because of the fraud that her
§ 235.J
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
549
fore his marriage, had sufficiently early notice that it was
intended to settle the bulk of the intended wife's property,
and nothing passed to justify a belief, on the husband's
part, that at the time of the marriage no such settlement
had been made, it was held that the husband was not
entitled to set aside a settlement which it appeared had
been made before the marriage, although he was no party
to it, and was not proved to have been actually cognizant
of any settlement having been made.1 In Bowes v. Strath-
husband can afterwards obtain re-
lief against them ; yet the English
courts have gone far in discounte-
nancing all conveyances made by
the intended wife in derogation of
the property rights of her intended
husband, where made without
notice to him. The secrecy of the
proceeding is a material element
from which fraud will be inferred."
Schouler's Domestic Relations, §
181, 5th ed. The disposition of
her property by a wife after a con-
tract of marriage, and before it
has been solemnized, is not, as a
matter of course, to be set aside be-
cause the husband was not a party,
or privy thereto, but each case is
to be determined by its own pe-
culiar circumstances. It is well
settled that if a conveyance be
made by a woman in the discharge
of the moral duty of providing for
the children of a former marriage,
it will not be considered a fraud
upon the intended husband, though
it had been concealed from him.
Green v. Goodal, 1 Cold. 404. See
also St. George v. Wake, 1 Myl. &
K. 610. "The equity which arises
in cases of this nature depends
upon the peculiar circumstances
of each case, as bearing upon the
question, whether the facts proved
do or do not amount to sufficient
evidence of fraud practiced on the
husband. It is not doubted that
proof of direct misrepresentation,
or of willful concealment with in-
tent to deceive the husband, would
entitle him to relief; but it is said
that mere concealment is not, in
such a case, any evidence of fraud,
and that if a man, without making
any inquiry as to a woman's af-
fairs and property, thinks fit to
marry her he must take her and
her property as he finds them, and
has no right to complain if, in the
absence of any care on his part,
she has taken care of herself and
her children without his knowl-
edge. England v. Downs, 2 Beav.
522, 528.
1 Wrigley v. Swainson, 3 De G.
& Sra. 458. Whether a conveyance
is a fraud or not upon the marital
rights, depends on the circum-
stances of each case, the convey-
ance of an unmarried woman, al-
though made immediately before
marriage, being prima facie good.
In this case the husband, previous
to the marriage, represented him-
self to be a man of wealth, when
in fact he was insolvent. He was
apprised of the conveyance shortly
after the marriage, and took no
steps to have it set aside. He set
up no claim to the negroes, but
recognized the right of his wife
under the conveyance. Held, that
550 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 236.
more, Lord Chancellor Thurlow said: "A conveyance by
a woman before marriage under whatever circumstances
made, and though but the moment before marriage, is
prima facie a good conveyance and can be avoided only by
a fraud. If there be a concealment on her part, there
must appear animus celandi. The question always must
be, whether the evidence be such as to raise an imputation
of fraud."1
§ 236. The Subject Continued. — - A conveyance to
trustees for her own individual use during her life and to
her children or to other heirs after her death, by a woman
under engagement of marriage, is not an exception to this
rule. In a leading case a widow possessed of real and per-
sonal estate, having entered into an engagement of mar-
riage, two days before its consummation, executed a trust
deed without the knowledge of her intended husband, con-
veying to her brothers of the half blood all her property
in trust to pay to her the income thereof during life ; and
to her heirs after her death ; in case of her death without
leaving issue, or of the decease of her issue after her death,
then to her three half brothers, and the children of a de-
ceased sister absolutely. On bill in equity filed by the
husband after the marriage, to vacate and annul the deed,
it was held that the trust deed made in contemplation of
marriage and without the consent of her intended husband,
was a fraud upon the marriage contract and therefore null
and avoid.2 In his opinion in this case Chief Justice
Lowrie said: "We feel very sure that no fraud was in-
tended here, and very probably the arrangement was very
discreet and prudent ; but it was very improper to make it
without the consent of the intended 'husband. Common
candor forbids that so important a change in his intended
wife's circumstances, and in her power over her estate,
should be made without his consent, and equity sternly
the conveyance was not a fraud l Bowes v. Strathmore, note to 2
upon the marital rights of the Bro. Ch. 351.
husband, and is valid. Saunders 2 Duncan's Appeal, 43 Pa. St.
v. Harris, 1 Head, 185. 67.
§ 236. j IMPLIED TRUSTS. 551
condemns it as a fraud upon his just expectations. This
principle of equity has stood the test of experience too long
to be open to dispute now. Nor does our Married Women's
Act of 1848 at all affect the question. It prevents the
marriage from operating as a transfer of any of the wife's
property to the husband, and saves it for herself. The
plaintiff had therefore a right to suppose that he was mar-
rying her with all her legal power over her estate. Whereas
by this arrangement it was secretly slipped into the hands
of trustees, and out of her control, just before the mar-
riage was consummated. This is not just or equitable treat-
ment of the husband. A fraud no greater than this would
avoid any other contract than that of marriage, but as this
cannot be avoided, equity avoids the contracts that are in
fraud of it. It was no ratification of the wrong done or
estoppel of his right to complain of it, that the plaintiff,
after the marriage and before knowledge of his rights,
acted as agent under the deed of trust, for no one was mis-
led by that to his inquiry."1 An obligation given by a
woman about to be married in payment of a debt, con-
tracted previously to her marriage engagement, though
without the knowledge of her intended husband will be sus-
tained in equity. But Lord Hardwicke said that: "Con-
cealment of such securities or debts is not to be encour-
aged."2 But a deed executed by a woman under engage-
1 Duncan's Appeal, 43 Pa. St. the fund absolutely to the trustee
670. and married on the following day.
2 Blanohet v. Foster, 2 Ves. Sr. The trustee was present at the
264. The trustees of a fund to wedding, hut the husband was in-
which a young lady was entitled formed neither of the existence of
in remainder, after the death of the fund nor of the deed. On a
her mother, at the request of a bill by husband and wife : Held,
needy father advanced sums of that the deed falsely representing
money amounting to £460 to en- the transaction to be an actual sale
able the father to educate her. must be set aside. Lewellin v.
Shortly after she came of age, be- Cobbold, 1 Sm. & Gif. 376. In the
ing engaged to be married, she by case ot Baker v. Jordan, 73 N. Car.
deed prepared by the father's so- 145, on the day before her mar-
licitor, reciting a contract for the riage, unknown to her intended
sale at the price of £250, for which husband, Catherine Baker con-
a receipt was indorsed, assigned veyed to her step-mother all her
552
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 236.
ment of marriage, without the knowledge of her intended
husband, without consideration, or by which the property
is given away is fraudulent and void as to the husband.1
property. It was argued that in-
asmuch as the constitution of 1808
had changed the property rights
of a husband from what they
had been at the common law, and
had declared that all property of a
married woman should remain hers
just as much as if she were a feme
sole, that, therefore, the husband
could not have been defrauded by
any conveyance made. The court
disposes of this point in these
words: ''We do not concur in this
proposition. A husband is entitled,
since the constitution of 1808, and
the marriage act, to the society of
the wife, is under an obligation to
support her and the children, and
for that purpose is entitled to her
services and to contribution from
the profits of her estate. He has
a right to live in his wife's house,
and to ride her horse, if she owns
one. Tbe plaintiff was surprised
by the fact that his wife had been
induced to give away all the estate
she owned, and to which he with
reason looked for aid in supporting
her. He was deceived, and the
question is, was he defrauded of
any right to which he was entitled
as husband? We think he was."
In Freeman v. Hartman, 45 111. 59,
Justice Lawrence remarks: "It is
a settled rule that a voluntary con-
veyance by a woman, on the eve of
her marriage, of property which
her intended husband knew her to
own, made without his knowledge,
is void against him, because in
derogation of his marital rights
and just expectations. The case
before us falls within this principle.
The deed was made but three days
before the marriage, and without
the knowledge of Hartman, the
intended husband." In all cases
the burden of proof is on the party
alleging fraud. Geyer v. Mobile
Bank, 21 Ala. 414; Freeman v.
Hartman, 45 111. 57 ; Cole v. Van
Kiper, 44111. 58; Robinson v, Buck,
71 Pa. St. 386; Bunnell v. Withe-
row, 29 Ind. 123; Gainor v. Gainor,
26 Iowa, 337 ; Tucker v. Andrews,
13 Me. 124; Smith v. Smith, 6 1ST.
J. Eq. 515; Westerman v. Wester-
man, 25 Ohio St. 500; Gregory v.
Winston, 23 Gratt. 102; Duncan's
Appeal, 43 Pa. St. 67.
1 Waller v. Armistead, 2 Leigh,
11. "The case of Hatch v. Hatch,
9 Ves. 292 (to which many others
might be added), is extremely
strong to show the readiness and
determination with which the.
courts will protect the interests of
wards, by setting aside convey-
ances made by them in favor of their
guardians shortly after they attain
their age. * * * On this ground,
the court is clearly of opinion that
the deed of gift executed by Miss
Armistead is null and void. But
there are circumstances which
make it still more apparent. The
time selected for the execution of
the deed, a few minutes only be-
fore the marriage ; the absence of
all proof of any previous intention
of Miss Armistead to execute any
such deed; the absence of proof
that she had at the time it was
executed any knowledge of its
character or object ; added to the
care with which it was concealed
from her friends, and particularly
from her intended husband, stamp
it with the foulest fraud." Ibid.
§237.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
553
A reasonable provision for the children of a former mar-
riage, if made in good faith will be sustained.1 An assign-
ment of a wife's chose in action (pending proceedings for
divorce) being voluntary, and for the mere purpose of
barring her survivorship, made by a husband who has de-
serted his wife, does not divest her title, and payment to
the assignee under an indemnity does not discharge the
obligation.2
§ 237. From Immoral or Illegal Contracts Where a
contract is made that is in violation of law, or that is in
contravention of public policy, it will not be enforced by a
court of equity. But where the parties to such a contract
are not in pari delicto, and where public policy is consid-
ered as advanced by allowing either, or at least the more
» Tucker v. Andrews, 13 Me. 128;
Freeman v. Hartman, 45 111. 57;
McAfee v. Ferguson, 9 B. Mon.
475; Manes v. Durant, 2 Rich.
Eq. 404; Gainor v. Gainor, 26
Iowa, 337; Gibson v. Carson, 3
Ala. 421 ; Dearmond v. Dearmond,
10 Ind. 191; Leach v. Duvall, 8
Bush, 201 ; Cranson v. Cranson, 4
Mich. 230; Smith v. Smith, 6 N. J.
Eq. 515; Jenney v. Jenney, 24 Vt.
324; Butler v. Butler, 21 Kan. 521 ;
Fisher v. Schlosser, 41 Ohio St.
147; O'Neill v. Cole, 4 Md. 107;
Spencer v. Spencer, 3 Jones Eq.
404; Johnson v. Peterson, 6 Jones
Eq. 12; Baker v. Jordan, 73 N.
Car. 145; Babbitt v. Gaither, 67
Md. 94; St George v. Wake, 1 Myl.
& K. 610; Strathmore v. Bowes, 1
Ves. 22 ; McKeogh v. McKeogh, 4
Ir. Eq. 338; Banks v. Sutton, 2
P. Wins. 700; Downes v. Jen-
nings, 32 Beav. 295; King v. Cot-
ton, 2 P. Wms. 674 ; Taylor v. Pugh,
1 Hure, 608.
2 Krupp v. Scholl, 10 Pa. St. 193.
"It is conceded that an assignment
by the husband, for a valuable
consideration, of the wife"s chose
in action, is equivalent to a reduc-
tion into possession, and therefore
transfers the right. Because where
the assignment is without fraud it
is an unequivocal act of dominion
by the husband, with intent to
make the subject-matter his own.
But the^e general principles must
be considered in connection with
the character and relations of hus-
band and wife as established by
nature and confirmed by law — the
one owing protection, support,
kindness; the other owing sub-
mission to all lawful commands —
and mutually bound to all gentle-
ness and courtesy. When the hus-
band, however, deserts all his duties
and his wife together, and seeks to
use principles established for a
very different purpose, merely to
defraud his wife, and strip her of
all that remained for her support,
the law assumes a different aspect,
and regards the rights of the wife
as within its protection." Ibid.
See also Hartman v. Dowdel, 1
Kawle,' 279 ; Kennedy v. Ware, 1
Barr, 445; Bees v. Waters, 9 Watts,
90.
554 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 237.
excusable of the two, to sue for relief against the transac-
tion, the relief is given to him.1 "All contracts or agree-
ments which have for their object anything which is either
repugnant to justice, or in violation /of religion or public
decency, are void. So are all contracts made in contraven-
tion of the general policy of the common law, or in direct
opposition to the provisions of an act of Parliament, for
ex turpi contractu actio non oritur is a rule both of law and
equity."2 Referring to this statement Mr. Justice Hub-
bard, in his opinion in Sedgwick; v. Stanton, said: "This
doctrine of the law is fully adopted by the courts in this
country, and is essential to the good order of society and
the just administration of public affairs. The coercive
power of the law is withheld, to compel the performance
of any contract, inter partes, which has for its object the
commission of a public offense or wrong, although not
per se criminal. The cases where the doctrine of public
policy has been applied most commonly are in respect to
contracts made in restraint of trade, of marriage, those
which affect injuriously the legislation or administration of
justice of the State, wager contracts, and contracts affect-
ing the public morals. The adjudications in this class of
cases proceed on the ground of some public injury, which
the performance of the stipulations of the parties would
be likely to produce. The aid of the law is not withdrawn
from any consideration of the rights or equities of the
parties as between themselves, but solely to prevent an in-
fringement of the public law or policy of the State."3 A
1 Reynell v. Sprye, 1 L)e G., M. statements of facts, or preparing
& G. 660. and making oral or written argu-
2 Comyns on Contracts and ments, provided all these are u.-ed,
Promises, 53. or designed to "be used, before the
3 Sedgwick v. Stanton, 14 X. Y. legislature itself or some committee
289,292. "Persons may no doubt thereof as a body ; but they cannot
be employed to conduct an appli- with propriety be employed to ex-
cation to the legislature, as well as ert their personal influence with
to conduct a suit at law; and may individual members, or to labor in
contract for and receive pay for any form privately, with such
their services in preparing docu- members out of the legislative
ments, collecting evidence, making halls. Whatever is laid before the
§ 237.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
555
contract which contravenes the polity of an Act of Con-
oress, and tends to defraud the United States, is void. If
A agrees to give B $1,000 on condition that B will forbear
to propose or offer himself to the Postmaster-General to
carry the mail on a mail route ; such agreement is against
legislature in writing, or spoken
openly in its presence, or that of a
committee, if false, in fact may be
disproved, or if wrong in argument
may be refuted, but that which is
whispered into the private ear of
individual members is frequently
beyond the reach of correction."
Selden, J., in Sedgwick v. Stanton,
10 N. Y. 289, 294. "But this is not
the true nature of the defense. The
law goes further than to annul
contracts, where the obvious and
avowed purpose is to do or cause
the doing of unlawful acts; it
avoids contracts and promises made
with a view to place one under
wrong influences, those which off er
him a temptation to do that which
may injuriously affect the rights
and interests of third persons. A
person having property, and being
of sound mind, may make a will in
favor of whom he pleases. A
common-friend may lawfully rep-
resent to him the expediency and
fitness of making a bequest in favor
of a particular individual and may
repeat that representation, both in
conversation and in writing. Writ-
ing letters at the request of another
and for his benefit would, under
ordinary circumstances, be a
proper consideration for a promise
of compensation. But any prom-
ise to pay another for soliciting a
will in his favor would be void.
Debenbam v. Ox, 1 Ves. Sr. 276.
A. man might entertain a very sin-
cere opinion, that a marriage be-
tween a certain gentleman of his
acquaintance, and a lady of con-
siderable fortune, would be highly
beneficial and contribute to the
happiness of both parties, and he
might lawfully propose this to one
or both. But any promise of re-
ward made to him to induce him
to do this, or any promise made
afterwards in consideration of such
service, would be void." Shaw, J.,
in Fuller v. Dame, 18 Pick. 472,
481. No court of law or equity
will lend its assistance in any way
towards carrying out an illegal
contract, therefore such a contract
cannot be enforced by one party to
it against the other, either directly
by asking the court to carry it into
effect, or indirectly by claiming
damages or compensation for a
breach of it, though there may be
some cases in which a party to
such a contract may recover from
a third person money paid over to
that person in pursuance of the
contract. Sykes v. Beadon, L. K.
11 Ch. Div. 170. "Questions upon
illegal contracts have arisen very
often, both in England and in this
country, and no principle is better
settled than that no action can be
maintained on a contract, the con-
sideration of which is either wicked
in itself or prohibited by law."
Chief Justice Marshall, in Arm-
strong v. Toler, 11 Wheat. 268. See
further on question of contracts to
influence legislation : Marshall v.
B. & O. B. E., 16 How. 314; Mills
v. Mills, 40 N. Y. 543; Frost v.
Belmont, 6 Allen, 152; Bryan v.
Reynolds, 5 Wis. 200; Usher v.
McBratney, 3 Dillon, 385; Maguire
556
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 237.
public policy, and no action can be maintained on it.1 In
his opinion in this case Chief Justice Ewing quoted, with
approval, the following from the opinion of the court in
Thompson v. Davies, 13 Johns. 112: "It had been urged
that the plaintiff was not bound to bid on the second exe-
cution, and was, therefore, at liberty to enter into this
agreement. That is not the test of the principle. In none
of the cases cited was the party bound to bid, but being at
liberty to bid he suffered himself to be bought off in a
way which might prevent a fair competition. The abstain-
v. Smock, 42 Ind. 1 ; Trlst v. Child,
21 "Wall. 441 ; Wood v. McCann, 6
Dana, 366; Powers v. Skinner, 34
Vt. 274; Clippenger v. Hepbaugh,
5 W. & S. 315; Gil v. Davis, 12 La.
Ann. 219; Howard v. F. I. Church
of Balto., 18 Md. 451. Contracts
of railroads as to the maintenance
of depot at a certain point are void
as against public policy. William-
son v. R. E. Co., 53 Iowa, 126;
Railroad Co. v. Ryan, 11 Kan. 602;
Railroad Co. v. Mathers, 71 111.
592; s. c, 104 111. 257; Marsh v.
Railway Co., 64 111. 414; Railway
Co. v. Taylor, 6 Colo. 1. But see
also Bestor v. Wathen, 60 111. 138 ;
Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Sumner,
106 Ind. 55; s. C, 55 Am. Rep. 719;
Band v. Hendrie, 49 Iowa, 402;
Berryman v. Trustees, 14 Bush,
755.
1 Galick v. Bailey, 5 Halst. 87.
See also Thomas v. Caulkett, 57
Mich. 392; Railway Co. v. Spang-
ler, 44 Ohio St. 471; Johnson v.
Hunt, 81 Ky. 321 ; Materne v. Hor-
witz, 101 N. Y. 469; Gorham v.
Keyes, 137 Mass. 583; Kimbrough
v. Lane, 11 Bush, 556; Lindsay v.
Smith, 78 N. Car. 328; Baker v.
Faris, 61 Mo. 389 ; Shaw v. Spooner,
9N. H. 197; Badger v. Williams,
1 D. Chip. 137; Chandler v. John-
son, 39 Ga. 85; Goodwin v. Crowel,
56 Ga. 566; Snider v. Willey, 33
Mich. 483; Wright v. Rindskoff, 43
Wis. 344; Ricketts v. Harvey, 106
Ind. 564; Taylor v. Jaques, 106
Mass. 291; Peed v. McKee, 42
Iowa, 6S9; McMahon v. Smith, 47
Conn. 221. Where a candidate for
a public office pledged himself if
elected to perform the duties of
the office for a sum less than half
the fees allowed by law, whereby
voters were induced to vote for
him and he received a majority of
the votes cast, his election was de-
clared invalid as against public
policy. State v. Collier. 72 Mo. 13;
State v. Purdy, 36 Wis. 213; Ca-
rothers v. Russell, 53 Iowa, 346;
State v. Elting, 29 Kan. 397, 399.
So, likewise, where there is an
agreement between two candidates
for the same office that one shall
withdraw, and the other if success-
ful shall divide the fees with him.
Gray v. Hook, 4 X. Y. 449 ; Hunter
v. Nolf, 71 Pa. St. 282. In general
a sale of office is against public
policy. Ferris v. Adams, 23 Vt.
136; Eddy v. Capron, 4 R. I. 394;
Groton v. Waldborough, 11 Me.
306; Robertson v. Robinson, 65
Ala. 610; Meredith v. Ladd, 2 N".
H. 198; Outon v. Rodes, 3 A. K.
Marsh. 432 ; Lewis v. Knox, 2 Bibb,
453.
§ 237.] IMPLIED TRUSTS. 557
ing from bidding upon consent, and by agreement under
the promise of a benefit for thus abstaining, is the very
evil the law intends to repress. A public auction is open
to every one, but there must be no combination among
persons competent to bid silencing such bidders, for tho
tendency to sacrifice the debtor's property is inevitable."1
In Harris v. Roof, before the Supreme Court of the State of
New York, it was held that no action will lie for services as a
lobby agent, in attending to a claim against the State before
the legislature; agreements in respect to such services
being against public policy, and prejudical to sound legis-
lation. There being no legal services to be performed, con-
sequently nothing deserved, no recovery can be had in
such a case on the ground of quantum meruit? In his opinion
in this case Mr. Justice Hand said: "Every citizen has a
right to petition the legislature, and accompany the peti-
tion with all necessary documents, and he may employ any
person to prepare them. But all petitions go to a committee
through the house, and counsel, too, can be heard on
private bills with leave of the house. But it is the duty
of every legislative body, and every member of it, to give
all proper and necessary attention to the business before it.
It is to be intended 'that the legislature always have truth
and justice before their eyes.' And it certainty would
imply a most unjustifiable dereliction of duty to hold that
the employment of individuals to visit and importune the
members is necessary to obtain justice. Such practices
would have a tendency to prevent free, honorable and cor-
rect deliberation and action of this most important branch
of sovereignty."3
1 Gulick v. Bailey, 5 Halst. 87, claimants upon public bounty or
93. justice. To enlarge such a system
2 Harris v. Eoof, 10 Barb. 489. would, to say the least, be a re-
3 Harris v. Boof, 10 Barb. 489, flection upon the ability or indus-
494. "I cannot think it good pub- try of our legislators." Ibid. 495.
lie policy to require our courts to An agreement for compensation
enforce such contracts. It can for procuring by personal influence
neither be necessary nor proper a contract from the government is
for the legislature to be surrounded against public policy and void,
by swarms of hired retainers of the Tool Co. v. Morris, 2 Wall. 45;
558 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 238.
§ 238. From Suppression of a Legal Instrument. —
Where a person is in possession of property and has sup-
pressed or destroyed the instrument which was the evidence
that the title was held by another, he will be decreed a
trustee for the benefit of the owner of the suppressed doc-
ument. Where an heir suppresses a will, a deed or other
instrument, in order to prevent the person named as devi-
see or grantee from receiving the estate conveyed by such
instrument, upon evidence of the execution of such devise
or deed equity will afford relief by putting the equitable
grantee or devisee in possession of the property. Where
the contents of a destroyed or suppressed instrument are
clearly proved the devisee or grantee named will receive all
the benefit conferred by the instrument.1 Where there has
been a spoliation or suppression of instruments which, if
they had been preserved, would have made the case plain,
the presumption will be against the party by whom such
instrument has been suppressed or destroyed, and every
reasonable presumption will be made in favor of the party
entitled to the property. A widow, before her marriage
with her second husband, assigns over the greatest part of
her estate to trustees, in trust for her children by her former
husband. Though this was without the consent of her sec-
ond husband, yet it being to provide for her children by
former husband, it is good, and husband suppressing the
Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U. S. mortgage deed and the documents
261; Ashburner v. Parrish, 81 Pa. relating to the title to the mort-
St. 52 ; Winpenny v. French, gaged estate, some of which were
18 Ohio St. 469. See contra: Lyon originals and others attested and
v. Mitchell, 36 1ST. Y. 235; Elkhart office copies, was ordered, in a
Co. Lodge v. Crary, 98 Ind. 238 ; foreclosure suit, not only to pro-
s. c, 49 Am. Rep. 746. curefresh attested and office copies,
1 Hunt v. Matthews, 1 Vera. 408 ; but to make compensation for the
Wardour v. Berisford, 1 Vera. 452, damage done to the estate by the de-
i it. 2 P. Wms. 748, 749; Dalston v. struction of the deeds, the amount
Coatsworth, 1 P. Wms. 731; Prich to be settled by the master and
v. Newnham, 2 Vern. 216; Hornby deducted from the mortgage debt,
v. Matcham, 16 Sim. 325; Tucker Hornby v. Matcham, 16 Sim. 325.
v. Phipps, 3 Atk, 360; JBarnesley v. See also Saltern v. Melhuish, Amb.
Powell, 1 Ves. 289. A mortgagee 247; Co'wper v. Cowper, 2 P. Wms.
having inadvertently burnt the 719.
§ 2'Mi. \ IMPLIED TRUSTS. 559
deed decreed to pay £800, being the sum proved to be
mentioned in the deed to be the value of the goods.1 Sup-
pression of deeds is tantamount to spoliation in respect to
presumption against the party suppressing. A principal is
answerable for the act of his agent in concealing or sup-
pressing deeds, though not done with the knowledge of the
principal. Concealment of a material facta is sufficient to
avoid a release obtained by the person whose duty it was to
make the disclosure.2 In the leading case of Bailey v.
Stiles it was held that in a case of spoliation of a will
equity has jurisdiction, and the will may be established in
this court. In order to establish a will in the Court of
Chancery all the witnesses to the will, if within the power
of the court, must be examined. But if either of the wit-
nesses be dead or insane, or without the jurisdiction of the
court, the will may be established without the evidence of
such witnesses. Under the statute of New Jersey it is
requisite, to the due execution of a will to pass real estate,
that the testator sign his name in the presence of the wit-
nesses. On a bill filed to establish a will, under a charge
of spoliation, it is not necessary to prove that the spoliation
was committed by the individual charged in the bill, or by
whom it was committed. It is enough if the fact of the
spoliation be established. On a bill filed to establish a will
devising real estate the court may grant relief either by
making an injunction perpetual, restraining the defendants
from prosecuting any suit to disturb the complainants in
the possession of their respective tracts, or by directing
a release on the part of the defendants of all their right
in said lands to be made to the complainants, or by a
decree establishing the will in all its parts. The last course
should be adopted wherever the contents of the will can be
ascertained.3
1 Hunt v. Matthews, 1 Vern. 408. 3 Bailey v. Stiles, 1 Green Ch.
2 Bowles v. Stewart, 1 Sen. &Lef. 220. Where P was charged as be-
'209; Eyton v. Eyton, 1 Bro. P. C. ing the principal actor in procuring
153; Hampden v. Hampden, 1 Bro. the destruction of a will: Held,
P. C. 252; Sepalino v. Twitty, Sel. that party attempting to set it
Cas. Ch. 76. up was not obliged to rely upon
560
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
[§ 239.
§ 239. Equity Relieves only where Equity is Prac-
ticed.— As a rule courts of equity apply the maxim: "He
who seeks equity must do equity." In general, where a
party obtains an advantage by fraud he is to be regarded as
the trustee of the party defrauded and compelled to ac-
count. But if a party seeks relief in equity he must be
able to show that on his p*t there has been honesty and
fair dealing. If he has been engaged in an illegal business
and been cheated, equity will not help him.1 It is contrary
his testimony, but might prove his
declarations as part of the res
gestae, so far as the same constitute
a part of the principal transaction,
illustrate its character, and are
contemporaneous with it. Batton
v. "Watson, 13 Ga. 63.
1 Wheeler v. Sage, 1 Wall. 518,
529. See also Hayes' Appeal, 123
Pa. St. 110, 139; Thomas v. Evans,
105 N.Y. 606, 614; Tuttle v. Mor-
ris, 81 N. Y 91, 100; Kerr v. Kerr,
84 Va. 154; Bennett v. "Wilmington
Star Co., 119 111. 9; Kelly v. Ken-
dall, 118 111. 650; Alexander v.
Merrick, 121 111. 606; Chicago &
Alton R. K. Co. v. Glenney, 118
111.487; Town of Solan v. Will-
iamshurgh Sav. Bank, 114 N. Y.
122; Hunter v. Carroll, 64 N. H.
572 ; Loney v. Courtenay, 24 Neb.
580, 584; Blackburn v. Clark, 85
Tenn. 506; Kemper v. Campbell,
44 Ohio St. 210; Crandall v. Grow,
41 N. J. Eq. 482; Burnham v. San
Francisco Fuse Mfg. Co., 76 Cal.
26; Tyler v. Jewett, 82 Ala. 93;
Bumpus v. Bumpus, 59 Mich. 95;
Jennings v. Jordan, L. R. 6 App.
Cas. 698; Carey v. Smith, 11 Ga.
539, 547; Swartzer v. Gillette, 1
Chand. 207, 209, 210; Atwood v.
Fisk, 101 Mass. 363 ; Harrington v.
Bigelow, 11 Paige, 349 ; Paine v.
France, 26 Md. 46 ;"Weakly v. "Wat-
kins, 7 Humph. 356; Aubin v.Holt,
2 K. & J. 66, 70; Johnson v.
Shrewsbury, etc. By., 3 De G., M.
& G. 914; Regby v. Connol, L. R.
14 Ch. D. 482, 491; Thomson v.
Thomson, 7 Ves. 470; Sykes v.
Beardon, L. R. 11 Ch. D. 170, 183,
197 ; In re Arthur Average Assn. , L.
R. 10 Ch. D. 542 ; Ex parte Pyke, L.
R. 8 Ch. D. 754,756,757; Hall v.
Palmer, 3 Hare, 532 ; Annandale v.
Harris, 2 P. "Wms. 432; Clarke v.
Periam, 2 Atk. 333; Robinson v.
Cox, 9 Mod. 263; Matthews v.
Hamburg, 2 Vern. 187 ; Knye v.
Moore, 1 S. & S. 61 ; Sismey v.
Eley, 17 Sim. 1; Gray v. Mathias,
5 Ves. 286 ; Hill v. Spencer, Amb.
641; Priest v. Parrott, 2 Ves. Sr.
160; Smyth v. Griffin, 13 Sim. 245;
Benyon v. Nettlesold, 3 Macn. &
Gord. 94, 102, 103 ; Whaley v. Nor-
ton, 1 Vern. 482 ; Bainham v. Man-
ning, 2 Vern. 242 ; Dillon v. Jones,
5 Ves. 290; Franco v. Bolton, 3
Ves. 368 ; Brown v. Lake Superior
Iron Co., 134 U. S. 530, 535; Erwin
v. Blake, 8 Pet. 18. Sherwood, J.,
in Kline v. Vogel, 90 Mo., at page
245, uses this language : "The true
meaning of the rule, whose fre-
quency of invocation would seem-
ingly argue a better knowledge of
its import, that 'he who seeks
equity must do equity,' is simply
this: that where a complainant
comes before a court of conscience,
invoking its aid, such aid will not
be granted except upon equitable
§ 239. J IMPLIED TRUSTS. 561
to the policy of the law to enable either party to a contro-
versy to enforce an agreement which involves a fraud. It
is the rule, — though there are exceptions to it, — that where
two parties have entered into illegal agreements, or other
transactions which are either mala proldbita or mala in se,
courts of equity, following the rule of the law with regard to
joint participators in a crime or illegal act, will refuse to
grant relief to either party. They act upon the accepted
maxim : In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis et
possidentis. In a leading case before the Supreme Court
of the United States, where a firm whose business was "a
general produce business," owned a mortgage on real estate,
which real estate itself the firm was desirous to purchase
under the mortgage and intrusted the subject generally to
one of the firm, it was held that the legal obligation of the
partner intrusted, being only to get payment of the mort-
gage, he might make an arrangement for his own benefit
with a third person, without the knowledge of his partners,
by which such third person should buy the mortgaged es-
tate, giving him, the intrusted partner, an interest in it;
terms. These terms will be im- examples, which might be cited
posed as the price of the decree it in illustration of the rule referred
gives him. The rule 'decides to, which finds its application not
nothing in itself,' for you must in questions of pleading, nor by
first inquire what are the equities what the plaintiff offers to do
which the plaintiff must do in or- .therein, but in the form and frame
der to entitle him to the relief he of the orders and decrees, both
seeks. * * * Thus, where a hus- interlocutory and final, whereby
band comes into a court of equity equitable terms are imposed as a
for relief as to any property of his condition precedent to equitable
wife, which he claims jure mariti, relief granted." The rule in
he will be obliged to submit to equity is, that he who seeks equity
the terms of the court by making must do equity. This rule will be
suitable provision for her, or else applied wherever the adverse
assistance will be denied him. So, equity grows out of the very
also, if a borrower of money on transaction before the court, or
usurious interest seeks the cancel- where it is so connected with the
lation of the instrument which subject-matter of the action as to
evidences the debt, equity refuses be presented in the pleadings and
its aid, unless upon the condition proofs, with full opportunity to
that payment be made the lender the adverse party to explain or re-
of what is bona fide due him. The fute the claims. Loney v. Court-
above are only a large number of nay, 24 Neb. 580.
36
562 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 240.
and if the mortgage debt was fully paid by such partner
into the firm account that there was no' breach of partner-
ship or other fiduciary relation in the transaction, or at
least that no other partner could recover from him a share
of profits made by a sale of the real estate, all parties alike
having been originally engaged in a scheme to get the real
estate by depreciating its value through a process of enter-
ing a judgment for a large nominal amount, and by deceiv-
ing or "bluffing off" other creditors.1 An instrument made
for the purpose of giving effect to an unlawful agreement
is tainted with the illegality of the transaction and will not
be enforced by a court of equity.2
§ 240. The Subject Continued Where relief is asked
in cases of illegal agreements, or other transactions, on the
ground that they are against public policy, an exception
will be made. Relief will be granted even though the party
seeking it is particeps criminis. But in such cases the
action is taken from regard to the public welfare, rather
than from a recognition of the claims of the party relieved.
In an important English case in which an action was brought
for the recovery of money, Lord Mansfield said: "If the
1 Wheeler v. Sage, 1 Wall, 518. 542,551; Dunaway v. Robertson,
See also Overton v. Banister, 3 95 111.419; Johns v. Norris, 22 N".
Hare, 503; Johns v. Norris, 7 C.E. J. Eq. 110; Woodward v. Wood-
Green, 102; Walker v. Hill, 7 C. E. ward, 41 N. J. Eq. 225; Duff v.
Green, 513; Blakely's Appeal, 66 Hutchinson, 57 Hun, 152; Wilson v.
Pa. St. 1S7; Weakley v. Watkins, 7 Bird, 28 N. J. Eq. 352.
Humph. 356, 357; Lewis'Appeal, 67 2 Blaisdell v. Fowle, 120 Mass.
Pa. St. 166; Wilson v. Bird, 28 N. 447; Pettiton v. Hippie, 90 111. 420;
J. Eq. 352; Creath v. Sims, 5 How. Berry v. Planters' Bank, 3 Tenn.
192; Atwood v. Fisk, 101 Mass. 303; Ch. 69; Halsley v. Fultz, 76 Va.
Marcy v. Dunlap, 5 Lans. 365; 671; Dunham v. Presley, 120 Mass.
Paine v. Lake Erie, etc. R. K. Co., 285; Snell v. Dwight, 120 Mass. 9;
31 Ind. 283; Gannett v. Albree, 103 Smith v. White, L. R. 1 Eq. 626;
Mass. 372; Meyer v. Yesser, 32 De Wolf v. Pratt, 42 111.198; Olin
Ind. 294; Hunt v. Rowland, 28 v. Bate, 98 111. 53; Marlott v. War-
Iowa, 349; Atwood v. Fisk, 101 wich, 4 C. E. Green, 439; Cutler v.
Mass. 364; Medford v. Levy, 31 W. Tuttle, 4 C. E. Green, 549, 562;
Va. 649 ; s. c, 2 Lawyers' Rep. 368 ; Compton v. Bunker Hill Bank, 96
Everett v. Roby, 104 N. Car. 479; 111. 30.
Parlett v. Gugarpuheimer, 67 Md.
§ 240.]
IMPLIED TRUSTS.
563
act is in itself immoral, or a violation of the general laws of
public policy, tliere the party paying shall not have this
action; for where both parties are equally criminal against
such general laws, the rule is : Potior est conditio defendentis.
But there are other laws which are calculated for the pro-
tection of the subject against oppression, extortion, deceit,
etc. If such laws are violated and the defendant takes ad-
vantage of the plaintiff's condition or situation, there the
plaintiff shall recover, and it is astonishing that the reports
do not distinguish between the violation of the one sort and
the other."1 The rule as set forth in the following words
1 Smith v. Bromley, Doug. 696.
See also Bellamy v. Bellamy, 6
Fla. 62, 103 ; Tracy v. Talmage, 14
N. Y. 162 ; Lowell v. Boston, etc. R.
R. Co., 23 Pick. 32 ; Prescott v. Nor-
ris, 32 N. H. 101 ; Curtis v. Leavitt,
15 N. Y. 9; McBlair v. Gibbs, 17
How. 237 ; Brooks v. Martin, 2 Wall.
81; McNeill v. Cahill, 2 Bligh, 228;
Benyon v. Nettlefold, 3 Macn. &
Gord. 94; Estabrook v. Scott, 3 Ves.
456; Exparte Pyke, L. K. 8 Ch. D.
469; Davis v. London, etc. Co., 8
Ch. D. 469; Odessa Tramways Co.
V. Mendel, L. R. S Ch. D. 235;
Worthington v. Curtis, L. R. 1
Ch. D. 419; Cullingworthv. Lloyd,
2 Beav. 385; Tennant v. Elliott,
1 B. & P. 3; Joy v. Campbell,
1 Sch. & Lef. 328; Osbaldiston
v. Simpson, 13 Sim. 513; Powell
v. Knowler, 2 Atk. 224; Williams
v. Bagley, L. R. 1 H. L. Cas.
200. In Sykes v. Beadon, L. R. 11
Ch. D. 170, 193, 197, Sir George
Jessel uses this language: ''You
cannot ask the aid of a court of
justice to carry out an illegal con-
tract; but in cases where the con-
tract is actually at an end, or is put
an end to, the court will interfere
to prevent those who have, under
the illegal contract.obtained money
belonging to other persons, on
the representations that the con-
tract was legal, from keeping that
money. * * * It does not fol-
low that you cannot, in some cases,
recover money paid over to third
persons in pursuance of the con-
tract, and it does not follow that
you cannot in other cases obtain
even from the parties to the con-
tract moneys which they have be-
come possessed of by representa-
tions that the contract was legal,
and which belong to the persons
who seek to recover them." The
rule, "7re pari delicto melior est con-
ditio possidentis,"1 preventing suit
is not universal ; admitting degrees
of guilt by concurring in the same
criminal act. Therefore, against a
private agreement, obtained by a
father from his son, in derogation
of an allowed sale of the command
of a post office packet by the for-
mer to the latter, an account was
decreed. Osborne v. Williams, 18
Ves. 379. In Reynell v. Spyre, 1
De G., M. & G. 660, 679, Bruce, L.
J., says: ''But where the parties
to a contract against public policy,
or illegal, are not in pan delicto
(and they are not always so), and
where public policy is considered
as advanced by allowing either, or
at least the more excusable of the
two, to sue for relief against the
transaction, relief is given to him,
564 IMPLIED TRUSTS. [§ 240.
reconciles most of the cases which are apparently conflict-
ing: "Where money has been paid upon an illegal con-
tract, it is a general rule that if the contract be executed,
and both parties are in pari delicto, neither of them can re-
cover from the other the money so paid ; but if the contract
continues executory, and the party paying the money be
desirous of rescinding it, he may do so and recover back
his deposit by action of indebitatus assumpsit for money
had and received, and this distinction is taken in the books,
namely, where the action is in affirmance of an illegal
contract, the object of which is to enforce the performance
of an engagement prohibited by law, clearly such an action
can in no case be maintained ; but where the action proceeds
in disaffirmance of such a contract, and, instead of endeav-
oring to enforce it, presumes it to be void and seeks to
prevent the defendant from retaining the benefit which he
derived from an unlawful act, there it is consonant to the
spirit and policy of the law that the plaintiff should re-
cover."1 This rule is quoted with approval by Mr. Justice
Wilde in White v. Franklin Bank, before the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court of Massachusetts.2 In a leading and very in-
as we know from various authori- 2 White v. Franklin Bank, 22
ties." The court has power to or- Pick. 184. "It was decided in Wa-
der a bond or other instrument to ker v. Chapman, Lofft, 342, where .
he delivered up to be cancelled, money had been paid, in order to
whether such instrument is or is procure a place in the customs, but
not void at law, or whether it be the place had not been procured;
void on the face of it, or hy matter and in an action brought hy the
shown by the proofs in the cause; party who paid the money, it was
but the exercise of this power rests held, that he should recover, be-
in the sound discretion of the court, cause the contract continued ex-
and is regulated by the circum- ecutory. * * The same distinc-
stances of each particular case, tion has been recognized in actions
Hamilton v. Cummings, 1 Johns, brought to recover back money
Ch. 517. The effect of partial mis- paid on illegal wagers where both
representation is not to alter or parties serein pari delicto. The.case
modify the agreement pro tanto, of Tappenden v. Kandall, 2 Bro.
but to destroy it entirely, and to & Pul. 4G7, was decided on that dis-
operate as a personal bar to the tinction. Heath, J., said : "It seems
party who has practiced it. Cler- to me, that the distinction adopted
mont v. Tasburgh, 1 Jac. & W. by Mr. Justice Buller between con-
112. tracts executory and executed, if
1 Comyns on Contracts, 109. taken with those modifications
§ 240.] IMPLIED TRUSTS. 565
structive case before the Supreme Court of the United
States, in which Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opin-
ion, the rule is stated as follows : "Where a contract grows
immediately out of and is connected with an illegal or im-
moral act, a court of justice will not lend its aid to enforce
it. So if the contract be in part only connected with the
illegal consideration, and growing immediately out of it,
though it be in fact a new contract, it is equally tainted by
it, but if the promise be entirely disconnected with the
illegal act, and is founded on a new consideration, it is not
affected by the act, although it was known to the party to
whom the promise was made, and although he was the Con-
triver and conductor of the illegal act. Thus where A,
during a war, contrived a plan for importing goods on his
own account from the enemy's country, and goods were
sent to B by the same vessel, A, at the request of B, be-
came surety for the payment of the duties on B's goods,
and became responsible for the expenses on a prosecution
for the illegal importation of the goods, and was compelled
to pay them ; it was held that A might maintain an action
on the promise of B to refund the money. But if the im-
portation is the result of a scheme between the plaintiff
and defendant, or if the plaintiff has any interest in the
goods, or if they are consigned to him, with his privity, in
order that he may protect them for the owner, a promise to
repay any advances made under such understanding or
agreement is utterly void."1
which he would necessarily have White v. Franklin Bank, 22 Pick,
applied to it, is a sound distinction. 189.
Undoubtedly there may be cases : Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat,
where the contract may be of a 258. aee also Eberman v. Eeitzel,
nature too grossly immoral for the 1 W. & S. 181 ; Rhodes v. Sparks, 6
court to enter into any discussion Pa. St. 473; Ormerod v. Dearman,
of it; as where one man has paid 13 W. N". C. 85; Ocean Ins. Co. v.
money by way of hire to another to Polleys, 13 Pet. 157 ; Hopner v. Ap-
murder a third person. But where pleby, 5 Mason, 71 ; Wilson v. Le
nothing of the kind occurs, I think Roy, 1 Brock. 447 ; Swan v. Scott, 11
there ought to be locus poenitentice, Serg. & K. 155; Hippie v. Kice, 28
and that a party should not be Pa. St. 406; Ogdea v. Barker, IS
compelled against his will to ad- Johns. 87.
here to the contract." Wilde, J., in
CHAPTER XIII.
TRUSTS FROM EQUITABLE LIENS.
241.
Introductory.
§ 253
242.
Trust From a Vendor's
Lien.
254
243.
The Subject Continued.
244.
Waiver of Vendor's Lien.
255
245.
Lien from Executory Con-
tracts.
256
246.
Trust from Vendee's Lien.
247.
Application and Extent of
the Doctrine.
257
248.
The Principle Involved.
258
249.
The Subject Continued.
250.
Trust from Creditor's Lien.
259
251.
From Voluntary Convey-
ance by Trustee.
260
252.
From Trust in Absence of
Trustee.
From Dissolution of Cor-
poration.
Trust from Partnership
Debts.
Trust from Deposit of Title
Deed.
Trust from "Wrongful Pos-
session.
Creditor as Trustee for
Surety.
Bank as Trustee for Equi-
table Owner of Deposit.
Equitable Lien from Re-
pairs and Improvements.
Statutory Lien from Re-
pairs and Improvements.
§ 241. Introductory. — Equitable liens are such as exist
in equity, or as arise by operation of law, in distinction from
legal or statutory liens. Liens of the latter class are es-
tablished in conformity to law, either by the agreement of
the parties, or by the usages of trade which constitute an
implied contract. Such liens are regulated and enforced
by law. In many instances a legal or statutory lien involves
the possession of the property against which it lies, and a
right to retain it until some charge upon it is satisfied, as,
e. g., the claim of an innkeeper upon the baggage of a de-
linquent guest, or the claim of a common carrier upon the
goods which he has transported, for the freight due him.1
In such cases the voluntary surrender of the property is an
1 Franklin v. Hosier, 4 Barn. & Camp. 291 ; Hanson v. Meyer, 6
Aid. 341; Ex parte Bland, 2 Rose, East, 614; Ex parte Shank, 1 Atk.
Cas. 91; Hey wood v. Waring, 4 234 -. Ex parte Deeze, 1 Atk. ""
, 228.
§ 241.] EQUITABLE LIENS. 567
abandonment, not of a claim to the payment of the debt,
but of the right or claim against the property conferred by
the lien. Strictly, the claim, whether in the form of a
statutory or equitable lien, is not a jus in re, nor a jus ad
rem. It is simply a claim or power to have such a right
established by legal process.1 This doctrine is based on the
natural right of the vendor to payment for the property
transferred to the vendee. "It has been broadly con-
tended," says Mr. Justice Story, "that, according to the
law of all nations, the absolute dominion over property sold
is not acquired by the purchaser until he has paid the price
or has otherwise satisfied it, unless the vendor has agreed
to trust to the personal credit of the buyer. For a thing
may well be deemed to be unconscientiously obtained when
the consideration is not paid. Upon this ground the Roman
law declared the lien to be founded in natural justice:
'Tamen recte dicitur, et jure gentium, id est, jure nalurali,
id effici.' And, therefore, when courts of equity estab-
lished the lien as a matter of doctrine, it had the effect of
a contract, and the lien was held to prevail, although perhaps
no actual contract had taken place. ' '2 Statutory liens will be
enforced by courts of law, or if they are of such a character as
properly to fall under the jurisdiction of a court of equity,
such court will be governed by the same rules and authori-
ties as a court of law. But the class of liens that we are
here to consider will be enforced only by courts of equity
and in accordance with equitable principles and rules.
They arise out of an equitable claim by operation of law,
and where such liens are enforced by the establishment of
a trust, the trust is governed by the same rules as other im-
plied trusts. Equitable liens are altogether distinct from
and independent of any possession of the property against
1 Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612, upon the property, but a mere
619; Buchan v. Sumner, 2 Barb, equitable right to resort to it upon
Ch. 169, 194. The lien which the failure of payment by the vendee,
vendor of real property retains, Sparks v. Hess, 15 Cal. 186.
after an absolute conveyance, for 2 2 Story, Equity Jurisprudence,
the unpaid purchase money, is not 1220.
a specific and absolute charge
568
EQUITABLE LIENS.
[§ 241.
which they constitute a charge,1 and they are enforced by a
sale of the property by order of the court.2
1 2 Story, Equity Jurisprudence,
§§ 1047, 105S, 1065, 1217.
2 Perry v. Board of Missions, 102
1ST. Y. 99, 106; Price v. Palmer, 23
Hun, 507; Dwight v. Newell, 3 N.
Y. 185. In Neate v. Duke of Marl-
borough, 3 Myl. & Cr. 407, 415,
Lord Cottenhara thus discusses this
point: "In the first place I find
Lord Redesdale not only laying it
down that it is necessary that the
judgment creditor, suing in this
court, should have issued an elegit,
but expressly saying that if that is
not done it is a ground of demur-
rer. And there was great force in
the argument at the bar, that
though his Lordship's attention
had been distinctly called to the
point, yet when a subsequent edi-
tion of his Treatise on Pleading was
published, and as I have always un-
derstood under his superintend-
ence, the same passage was pre-
served. I also find Lord Lynd-
hurst stating it as a general rule,
though that was not the point on
which the decision of the appeal
before him was to turn, that an
elegit is necessary. For myself I
never entertained the least doubt of
it; and certainly, though I have
not had particular occasion to look
into the question, if I had been
asked what the rule of the court
was, I should have at once an-
swered that when a party comes
here as a judgment creditor, for the
purpose of having the benefit of
his judgment, he must have sued
out execution upon the judgment.
And in all the authoritiesreferred to,
though in some of them it appears
to be so far taken that in the case
of a. fieri facias the creditor must go
the whole length of having a re-
turn, there is no case except the
solitary one in Dickens, which de-
cides that the suing out of the elegit
is not necessary as a preliminary
step. With respect to authority
there can be no doubt; for there is
not only the authority of Lord
Kedesdale and that of Lord Lynd-
hurst in the House of Lords, but
there is also what is stated at the
bar to be the uniform understand-
ing and practice of the profession.
The conclusion at which I arrive,
however, as to what on principle
ought to be the rule, is derived
from a consideration of the nature
of the jurisdiction which the court
exercises in such cases. That ju-
risdiction is not for the purpose oi
giving effect to the lien, which is
supposed to be created by the judg-
ment. It is true that for certain
purposes the court recognize a title
by the judgment; as for the pur-
pose of redeeming, or, after the
death of the debtor, of having his
assets administered. But the ju-
risdiction there is grounded simply
on this, that inasmuch as the court
finds the creditor in a condition to
acquire a power over the estate by
suing out the writ, it does what it
does in all similar cases ; it gives to
the party the right to come in and
redeem other incumbrances upon
the property. So again after the
debtor is dead, if under any cir-
cumstances the estate is to be sold,
the court pays off the judgment
creditor, because it cannot other-
erwise make a title to the estate;
and the court never sells the inter-
est of a debtor subject to an elegit
creditor.-' Also see generally on
the subject, "Actions to Enforce
Equitable Liens," 15 Alb. L. J. 434.
§ 242.] EQUITABLE LIENS. 5U9
§ 242. Trust from a Vendor's Lien. — The vendor's
lien is his claim upon the estate sold for the purchase money,
or for any part of the purchase money that remains unpaid.
The rule of the English Court of Chancery, which has been
adopted by a large proportion of the States of the American
Union, is stated in the case of Mackreth v. Symmons, as
follows: "Vendor's lien for purchase money unpaid against
the vendee, volunteers and purchasers with notice, or hav-
ing equitable interests only, claiming under him, unless
clearly relinquished, of which another security taken and
relied on, may be evidence, according to the circumstances ;
the nature of the security, etc. ; the proof being upon the
purchaser; and failing in part, upon the circumstances, an-
other security being relied on, may prevail as to the res-
idue."1 In his opinion in this case, Lord Chancellor Eldon
said: "The settled doctrine is that unless there are cir-
cumstances where the vendor conveys, without more,
though the consideration is upon the face of the instru-
ment, expressed to be paid, and by a receipt indorsed upon
the back, if it is the simple case of a conveyance, the money
or part of it not being paid, as between the vendor and
vendee and persons claiming as volunteers, upon the doc-
trine of this court, which, when it is settled, has the effect
of contract, though perhaps no actual contract has taken
place, a lien shall prevail in the one case for the whole con-
sideration, in the other for that part of the money which
has not been paid."2 Under this rule the vendor holds a
1 Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Ves. 291; Walton v. Hargraves, 42 Miss.
329; s. c, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 447. 18; Fonda v. Jones, 42 Miss.
2 Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Ves. 792 ; Marsh v. Turner & Lise, 4 Mo.
329; s. c, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 447. 253; Manley v. Slason, 21 Vt. 271;
See also Stafford v. Van Bensalaer, Seaford v. Smith, 6 Bush, 129;
9 Cowen, 316, 318; Tompkins v. Thornton v. Knox, 6 B. Mon. 74,
Mitchell, 2 Band. 428, 429 ; Cox v. 75; Williams v. Boberts, 5 Ohio,
Fenwick, 3 Bibb, 183, 184; Boss v. 35, 39; Tiernan v. Thurman, 14 B.
Whitson, 6 Yerg. 50; Deibler v. Mon. 277. It is for the vendee to
Barwick, 4 Blackf . 339, 340 ; Dyer show such circumstances as repel
v. Martin, 4 Scam. 148, 151; Hall the presumption or rebut the
v. Click, 5 Ala. 363,304; Stewart equity. Gilman v. Brown, 1 Mason,
v. Ives, 1 Sm. & M. 197, 206; Up- 192, 213; Garson v. Green, 1 Johns,
shaw v. Hargrove, 6 Sm. & M. 286, Ch. 308, 309 ; Tompkins v. Mitchell,
570 EQUITABLE LIENS. [§ 242.
lien whether the legal title has been conveyed, or he has
simply entered into a contract to convey, and the lien at-
taches independently of any agreement between the parties.
The rule, as accepted in the States in which the doctrine of
the English courts obtains, is clearly and comprehensively
expressed by Mr. Chancellor Kent in Garson v. Green, as
follows: "It is a well settled rule that the vendor has a
lien on the estate for the purchase money, while the estate
is in the hands of the vendee, and where there is no con-
tract, that the lien by implication was not intended to be
reserved. Prima facie the purchase money is a lien on the
land, and it lies on the purchaser to show that the vendor
agreed to rest on other security. The death of the vendee
does not alter the claim, for, as Lord Eedesdale observed
in a like case, 'the heir cannot be permitted to hold what
his ancestor unconscientiously obtained when the considera-
tion is not paid.' Taking a note for the purchase money
does not affect the vendor's lien, and if part be paid the
lien is good as to the residue, and the vendee becomes a
trustee as to that which is unpaid. "x The rule as here stated
2 Randolph, 428; Allen v. Bennett, dington, 46 N. J. Eq. 16, 20; Har-
8 8m. & M. 672, 681; Truebody v. per v. Wilkins, 65 Miss. 215; Ah-
Jacobson, 2 Cal. 269; Marshall v. rend v. Odiorne, 118 Mass. 261;
Christmas, 3 Humph. 248, 258. Williams v. Rice, 60 Mich. 102;
An acknowledgment in the body Butterfield v. Okie, 36 N. J. Eq.
of the deed or on the back of it of 482; Porter v. Woodruff, 36 X. J.
the receipt of the whole of the Eq. 174; Graves v. Coutant, 31 N.
purchase money, if in fact the J. Eq. 763; Birdsall v. Cropsey
money has not been paid, will not (1890), 29 Neb. 679; s. c, 44 N.
be a waiver or discharge of the W. Bep. 857; Barnett v. Salyers,
lien. Gilman v. Brown, 1 Mason, Ky. L. Kep. 465; Neese v. Kiley,
192, 214 ; Bedford v. Gibson, 12 77 Tex. 348 ; Osborn's Succession,
Leigh, 332, 344; Eubank v. Poston, 40 La. Ann. 615; Bates v. Childers,
5 Mon. 285, 287 ; Tribble v. Old- 4 N. Mex. 347 ; Hamblin v. Poltz,
ham, 5 J. J. Marsh. 137, 144; Sher- 70 Tex. 132; Crafts v. Daugherty,
atz v. jSTicodemus. 7 Yerg. 9; Scott 69 Tex. 477; Houston Nat'l Bank
v. Orbison, 21 Ark. 202. So, like- v. Ackerman, 70 Tex. 315 ; Helm v.
wise, if the deed contains a, recital Weaver, 69 Tex. 143 ; Devlin v.
that the consideration is paid or Egleson, 79 Iowa, 269; Brown v.
secured to be paid. Thornton v. Ferrell, 83 Ky. 417; Williams v.
Knox, 6 B. Mon. 74, 76. Simmons, 79 Ga. 649; Woodall v.
1 Garson v. Green. 1 Johns. Ch. Kelly, 85 Ala. 368; Humphreys v.
308, 309. See also Acton v. Wad- Butler, 51 Ark. 351 ; Hiscock v.
§2i2.]
EQUITABLE LIENS.
571
is fully sustained by the leading and instructive case of
Cordova v. Hood, before the Supreme Court of the United
States, as follows : "Where a deed of land shows on its face
that the consideration is yet 'to be paid,' a second pur-
chaser,— that is to say, a purchaser from the vendee, — who
has notice of the deed, takes the land in those States, of
which Texas is one, where the English chancery doctrine
of a vendor's lien prevails, subject to the vendor's lien,
unless such lien has been in some way waived. In the case
of such a deed, it is the duty of the new purchaser to in-
quire; and where inquiry is a duty, the party bound to
make inquiry is affected with all the knowledge which he
would have got had he inquired. Though it is true that
taking a note with a surety from the vendee is generally
Norton, 42 Mich. 320; "Warren v.
Fenn, 28 Barb. 334; Dickerson v.
Carroll, 76 Ala. 377; Senter v.
Lambeth, 59 Tex. 259; Christopher
v. Christopher, 64 Md. 583 ; Poe v.
Paxton, 26 W. Va. 607; Chapman
t. Tanner, 1 Vern. 267 ; Blackburn
v. Greyson, 1 Bro. Ch. 420. A ven-
dor's lien results from the trans-
action between the parties and is
manifested by all the circumstances
attending each particular case, and
if, upon looking through the trans-
action, it appears that the debt is
in fact part of the purchase price
of land acquired in the transaction
out of which the debt arose, no
other obstacle intervening, a lien
will be declared upon the land in
favor of the person to whom the
debt is due, notwithstanding the
fact that the technical relation of
vendor and vendee does not exist.
Barrett v. Lewis, 106 Ind. 120, 122.
The principle governing courts of
equity in the enforcement of the
vendor's lien is the implied agree-
ment held to exist between the
vendor and vendee, that the former
shall hold a lien in the lands sold
for the payment of the purchase
price, on the ground that a person
who has the estate of another ought
not, in conscience as between them,
to keep it and not pay the purchase
money. Beal v. Harrington, 116
111. 103, 122. In the leading case
of Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Ves.
325; s. c, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 355,
Lord Eldon said: "Upon princi-
ple without authority, I cannot
doubt that it goes upon this, that a
person having got the estate of
another, shall not, as between
them, keep it and not pay the con-
sideration; and there is no doubt
that a third person having full
knowledge that the other got the
estate without payment cannot
maintain that though a court of
equity will not permit him to keep
it, he may give it to another with-
out payment." See also ''Liens of
Vendors of Chattels for the Pur-
chase Money," by Leonard A.
Jones, 19 Cent. L. J. 24; "Ven-
dors' Liens," by C. W. Wattles, 10
Va. L. J. 515; "Vendor's Lien
After Bemedy at Law is Barred,"
by T. H. "Watts, 2 South. Law
J. 338.
572 EQUITABLE LIENS. [§ 242.
evidence of an intention to rely exclusively upon the per-
sonal security taken, and, therefore, presumptively, is an
abandonment or waiver of a lien, yet this raises only a pre-
sumption, and as a presumption only it may be rebutted by
evidence that such was not the intention of the parties.
The testimony of the vendor was received to rebut, and
being positive, was held sufficient to do so. Where a ven-
dor already has a lien, evidenced b}r a note for the payment
of all and every part of the purchase money so long as it
remains unpaid, the lien for any purchase money after-
wards, still unpaid, is not lost, by the fact of his receiving
part payment of the note before its maturity, taking a new
note, payable at the same time and in the same Avayand
place as the original note, and a destruction of such original
one."1 In a recent case before the Court of Chancery of
New Jersey, the rule is stated by Mr. Chancellor McGill,
as follows: "It is well established in this court that where
land is conveyed and the purchase money for it is not paid,
and no distinct security for the payment of that money is
taken in its stead, a constructive trust arises, and the ven-
dee is considered as the trustee of the land for the vendor
until the purchase money is paid. The vendor thus obtains
an equitable lien upon the land for the purchase money,
which is good against the vendee and his heirs, and all per-
sons taking from them as volunteers, and also against pur-
chasers from them for value, with notice that the purchase
money is unpaid, and is unenforceable only against pur-
chasers for value in good faith without such notice."2
1 Cordova v. Hood, ]7 Wall. 1. bona fide, for a valuable considera-
The extent to which the secret tion, without notice, if they have
equitable and unrecorded lien of a paid the purchase money. Facts
vendor for unpaid purchase money and circumstances that will tend
of lands sold and conveyed by him, to establish an intent on the part
exists as against other parties than of the vendor to waive the lien, or
the vendee, depends upon the facts that will give preference to other
and circumstances of eachparticu- liens acquired concurrently or sub-
lar case. It may be stated gener- sequently — fully considered. Fisk
ally that such lien does not exist v. Potter, 2 Keyes, 64.
against purchasers under a con- 2 Acton v. Waddington, 46 N. J.
veyance of the legal estate, made Eq. 16, 20.
§ 243.] EQUITABLE LIENS. 573
§ 243. The Subject Continued — The decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States relating to trusts as
arising from the vendor's lien, follow the rule of the State
from which the case is brought. They are binding in each
case only in the class of States where the rule on which the
particular decision is based prevails. In a recent case be-
fore the United States Circuit Court, in the opinion by Judge
Wales, the court said: "It has been generally understood
that the Supreme Court of the United States will not con-
sider the lien as existing in any State unless it has been previ-
ously adopted by the law or is recognized by the courts of
the State in which the land sought to be charged is situated.
It may be reasonably assumed that the court, in adopting
this course, was governed by the consideration that it had
no power to create or impose a lien growing out of the
mere relation of vendor and vendee of real property, which
had not already been recognized or established by the law
of the State. In all matters relating to the execution and
construction of deeds, wills and contracts for the sale and
disposition of real property, the courts of the United States,
in entertaining jurisdiction of controversies arising from any
of these causes, will be guided and controlled by local
laws and adjudications."1 The States in which the
English doctrine prevails are the following: Alabama,2 Ar-
^ice v. Rice (1888), 36 Fed. ner, 81 Ala. 500; McDonald v. Ely -
Rep. 858, 861. ton Land Co., 78 Ala. 382; Dk-ker-
2 Woodall v. Kelly, 85 Ala. 368; son v. Carroll, 76 Ala. 377; Will-
S. c, 7 Am. St. Rep. 57; Hopkins v. iams v. McCarty, 74 Ala. 295
Miller, 92 Ala. 513; Cordova Coal Preston v. Ellington, 74 Ala. 133
Co. v. Long, 91 Ala. 538; Waller Stringfellow v. Ivey, 73 Ala. 209
v. Janney, 102 Ala. 447; s. c, Prickett v. Sibert, 71 Ala. 194
14 So. Rep. 876; Hester v. Hun- Donegan v. Hentz, 70 Ala. 437
nicutt, 104 Ala. 282; s. c, 16 Tedder v. Steele, 70 Ala. 347
So. Rep. 162; Burton v. Henry, 90 Walker v. Strewe, 70 Ala. 107
Ala. 281 ; Jones v. Lockard, 89 Hooper v. Armstrong, 69 Ala. 343
Ala. 575; Davis v. Smith, 88 Ala. McCarty v. Williams, 69 Ala. 174
596; Weaver v.Brown, 87 Ala. 533; Wilkinson v. May, 69 Ala. 33
Jackson v. Stanley, 87 Ala. 270; Ware v. Curry, 67 Ala. 274
Chapman v. Peebles, 84 Ala. 283 ; Walker v. Carroll, 65 Ala. 61
Crampton v. Prince, 83 Ala. 246; Carver v. Eads, 65 Ala. 190
S. c., 3 Am. St. Rep. 718; Betts v. Shorter v. Frazer, 64 Ala. 74; Bur-
Sykes, 82 Ala. 378; Kelly v. Kars- ges v. Greene, 64 Ala. 509; Chap-
574
EQUITABLE LIENS.
[§ 243.
kansas,1 California,2 Colorado,3 District of Co-
lumbia,4 Florida,5 Idaho,6 Illinois,7 Indiana,8
man v. Lee, 64 Ala. 483 ; Thurman
v. Stoddard, 63 Ala. 336; Bamett
v. Riser, 63 Ala. 347 ; Plinn v. Bar-
ber, 61 Ala. 530 ; Dugger v. Taylor,
60 Ala. 504 ; Terry v. Keaton, 58
Ala. 667 ; Gordon v. Bell, 50 Ala.
213 ; Wood v. Sullens, 44 Ala. 686 ;
Dennis v. Williams, 40 Ala. 633;
Griffin v. Cammack, 36 Ala. 695;
S. c, 76 Am. Dec. 344; Bradford
v. Harper, 25 Ala. 337; Burns v.
Taylor, 23 Ala. 255 ; Roper v. Mc-
Cook, 7 Ala. 318.
1 Chapman v. Chapman, 55 Ark.
542; Springfield, etc. R. Co. v.
Stewart, 51 Ark. 285 ; Richardson
v. Green, 46 Ark. 270; Rodman v.
Sanders, 44 Ark. 504; Waddell v.
Carlock, 41 Ark. 523; Chapman v.
Liggett, 41 Ark. 292; Harris v.
Harnie, 37 Ark. 348; Young v. Har-
ris, 36 Ark. 102 ; Martin v. O'Ban-
non, 35 Ark. 62; Stroud v. Pace,
35 Ark. 100; Mayes v. Hendry, 33
Ark. 240; Nail v. Speigel, 33 Ark.
63; Blevins v. Rogers, 32 Ark. 258;
Swan v. Benson, 31 Ark. 728;
Johnson v. Nunnerly, 30 Ark. 153 ;
Lavender v. Abbott, 30 Ark. 172;
Turner v. Horner, 29 Ark. 440;
Holman v. Patterson, 29 Ark. 357 ;
Campbell v. Rankin, 28 Ark. 401 ;
Refeld v. Ferrell, 27 Ark. 534;
Harris v. Hanks, 25 Ark. 517 ; Shall
v. Biscoe, 18 Ark. 142; Scott v.
Orbison, 21 Ark. 202 ; Winter v.
Fain, 47 Ark. 493; Stephens v.
Shannon, 43 Ark. 464.
2 Civil Code, § 3046; Gessner v.
Palmateer, 89 Cal. 89; Gallagher
v. Mars, 50 Cal. 23 ; Avery v. Clark,
87 Cal. 619; S. C, 22 Am. St. Rep.
272; Bancroft v. Cosby, 74 Cal.
583; Burt v. Wilson, 28 Cal. 632;
Fitzell v. Leaky, 72 Cal. 477; Wells
v. Harter, 56 Cal. 342 ; Baum v.
Griggsby, 21 Cal. 172; s. c, 81
Am. Dec. 153; Taylor v. McKin-
ney, 20 Cal. 618; Williams v.
Young, 17 Cal. 403; Sparks v.
Hess, 15 Cal. 186; Walker v. Sedg-
wick, 8 Cal. 398; Salmon v. Hoff-
man, 2 Cal. 138; s. c, 56 Am. Dec.
322; Truebody Jacobson, 2 Cal.
269.
"Francis v. Wells, 2 Colo. 660;
Fallon v.Worthington, 13 Colo. 559;
s. c, 16 Am. St. Rep. 231; Schiffer
v. Adams, 13 Colo. 582.
4 Ford v. Smith, 1 McAr. 592.
6 Wooten v. Bellinger, 17 Fla.
300; Woods v. Bailey, 3 Fla. 41;
Bradford v. Marvin, 2 Fla. 41.
6 Hawkins v. Thurman, 1 Idaho,
598.
7 Kock v. Roth, 150 111. 212 ; s. c,
37 N. E. Rep. 317; Gruhn v. Rich-
ardson, 128 111. 178; Strong v.
Strong, 126 111. 301; Beal v. Har-
rington, 116 111. 113; Sidwell v.
Wheaton, 114 111. 267; Chicago,
etc. Land Co. v. Peck, 112' 111.
408; Rhyner v. Frank, 105 111. 326;
Manning v. Frazier, 96 111. 279;
Small v. Stagg, 95 111. 39; Henson
v. Westscott, 82 111. 224; Andrus
v.Coleman, 82 111. 26; s. c, 25
Am. Rep. 289; Moshier v. Meek,
80 111. 79 ; Wing v. Goodman, 75
111. 159; Kirkham v. Boston, 67 111.
599; Wilson v. Lyon, 51 111. 166;
Boynton v. Champlin, 42 111. 57;
McLowrie v. Thomas, 39 111. 291 ;
Keith v. Horner, 32 111.524; Dyer
v. Martin, 5 111. 146; Robinson v.
Appleton, 124 111. 276; Bonnell v.
Holt, 87 111. 71.
8 Hawes v. Chaille, 129 Ind. 435;
Nysewander v. Lowman, 124 Ind.
584; Brower v. Witmeyer, 121 Ind. ■
83; Strohm v. Good, 113 Ind. 93;
Otis v. Gregory, 111 Ind. 504; Yet-
§ 243. J EQUITABLE LIENS. 575
Iowa,1 Kentucky,2 Louisiana,3 Maryland,4 Michi-
ter v. Fitts, 113 Ind. 34; Barrett v.
Lewis, 106 Ind. 120; McClellan v.
Coffin, 93 Ind. 456; Richardson v.
MePherson, 74 Ind. 158; Higgins
T.Kendall, 73 Ind. 522; Martin v.
Cauble, 72 Ind. 67; Anderson v.
Donnell, 66 Ind. 150; Fouch v. Wil-
son, 60 Ind. 64; S. C, 28 Am. Rep.
651; Haskell v. Scott, 56 Ind. 564;
Nichols v. Glover, 41 Ind. 24;
Yaryan v. Shriner, 26 Ind. 364;
Cox v. Wood, 20 Ind. 54; Mattix v.
Wend. 19 Ind. 151; Merritt v.
Wiles, 18 Ind. 171; MeCarty v.
Pruett, 4 Ind. 226 ; Dribler v. Bar-
wick, 4 Blackf. 339; Evans "i v.
Goodlet, 1 Blackf. 246 ; s. C, 12 Am.
Dec. 258; Lagow v. Badollet, 1
Blackf. 416.
1 Prouty v. Clark, 73 Iowa, 55 ;
Dean v. Scott, 67 Iowa, 273; Tins-
ley v. Tinsley, 52 Iowa, 14; Stuart
v. Harrison, 52 Iowa, 511 ; Pierson
V.David, 1 Iowa, 29; Erickson v.
Smith, 79 Iowa, 374; Cutler v.
Amnion, 65 Iowa, 281 ; Webster v.
McCullough, 61 Iowa, 496 ; Gnash
v. George, 58 Iowa, 492 ; Kendrick
V. Eggleston, 56 Iowa, 128 ; Jordan
V. Winner, 45 Iowa, 65; Johnson v.
McGrew, 42 Iowa, 555 ; McDole v.
Purdy, 23 Iowa, 277 ; Porter v. Du-
buque, 20 Iowa, 440; Tupple v.
Viers, 14 Iowa, 515; Patterson v.
Linder, 14 Iowa, 414; Rakestraw v.
Hamilton, 14 Iowa, 147; Hays v.
Horine, 12 Iowa, 61 ; s. C, 74 Am.
Dec. 518; Grapengether v. Ferjer-
vary, 9 Iowa, 163; s. c, 74 Am.
Dec. 336 ; Pierson v. David, 1 Iowa,
23. Iowa Code of 1873, § 1940, now
provides that the lien must be re-
served in the deed in order to avail
against a conveyance by the
grantee. A vendor's lien exists by
implication of law in Iowa. Fisher
v. Shropshire, 147 U. S. 133.
2 Bybee v. Smith, 88 Ky. 648;
Brown v. Terrell, 83 Ky. 417 ; En-
nison v. Risque, 9 Bush, 24; Led-
ford v. Smith, 6 Bush, 129; Burrus
v. Roulhac, 2 Bush, 39; Gritton v.
McDonald, 3 Mete. 252 ; Tiernan v.
Thurman, 14 B. Mon. 277; Muirv.
Cross, 10 B. Mon. 277; Thornton
v. Knox, 6 B. Mon. 74; Fowler v.
Rust, 2 A. K. Marsh. 294. But the
vendor must state in his deed what
part of consideration remains un-
paid. Gen. Stat. 1883, ch. 63, art.
1, § 24. Ashbrooke v. Roberts, 82
Ky. 298; Brown v. Ferrell, 83 Ky.
417; Ross v. Adams, 13 Bush, 370.
And the lien is not chargeable upon
the lands when it has passed to a
bona fide purchaser, unless the non-
payment of the purchase money is
stated in the deed. Gen. Stats. 1873,
p. 589.
3 Pedesclaux v. Legare, 32 La.
Ann. 3S0; Succession of Clay, 34
La. Ann. 1131 ; Labouisse v. Rope
Co., 43 La. Ann. 245. The Louisi-
ana Rev. Civil Code of 1870, pro-
vides that the vendor shall have a
privilege "on the estate by him
sold, for the payment of the price,
or so much of it as is unpaid,
whether it was sold on or without
a credit," and that the privilege is
extended to the beasts and agri-
cultural implements attached to
the estate. Arts. 3249, 3250. But no
privilege has any effect against
third persons, "unless recorded in
the manner required by law in the
parish where the property to be
affected is situated." Art. 3274.
See also Louisiana Revised Laws
1884, §§ 2876, 2878.
4 Walsh v. McBride, 72 Md. 45;
Baltimore, etc. Turnpike Co. v.
Moale, 71 Md. 353; Christopher v.
Christopher, 64 Md. 583 ; Thomp-
son v. Corrie, 57 Md. 197; Dance v.
Dance, 56 Md. 433; Carrico v.
576
EQUITABLE LIENS.
gan
tana,5
[§ 243.
1 Minnesota,2 Mississippi,3 Missouri,4 Mon-
Nevada,6 New Jersey,7 New Mexico,8 New
Farmers', etc. Nat'l Bank, 33 Md.
235; Bratt v. Bratt, 21 Md. 578;
Hummer v. Schott, 21 Md. 307;
Carr v. Hobbs, 11 Md. 2S5 ; Repp
v. Kepp, 12 Gill & J. 341 ; Magru-
der v. Peter, 11 Gill & J. 217;
Pratt v. Van Wyck, 6 Gill & J.
495; Ghiselin v. Ferguson, 4 Har.
& J. 522; Wbite v. Casenave, 1
Har. & J. 10G; Ringgold v. Bryan,
3 Md. Ch. 488; Iglehart v. Armm-
ger, 1 Bland, 519. See also Mary-
land Pub. Gen. Laws 1888, art. 16,
§ 193. Power is given to the courts
to decree a sale to enforce such
lien. Rev. Code, 1S7S, p. 654.
1 Strong v. Ehle, 86 Mich. 42;
Donovan v. Donovan, 85 Mich. 63;
Wisconsin Marine, etc. Bank v.
Filer, 83 Mich. 496; Balow v.
Farmers' Mut. F. Ins. Co., 77 Mich.
540; Richards v. Shingle, etc. Co.,
74 Mich. 57; Waterfield v. Wilber,
64 Mich. 642 ; Dunston v. Outhouse,
64 Mich. 419; Ortmann v. Plum-
mer, 52 Mich. 76; Hiscock v. Xor-
ton, 42 Mich. 320; Palmer v. Ster-
ling, 41 Mich. 218; Merrill v. Allen,
38 Mich. 4S7; Payne v. Aveiy, 21
Mich. 524; Converse v. Blumrich,
14Mich.-109; s. c, 90 Am. Dec. 230;
Sears v. Smith, 2 Mich. 243; Car-
roll v. Van Rensalear, Harring.
Ch. 225.
2 Law v. Butler, 44 Minn. 4S2 ;
Peters v. Tunell, 43 Minn. 473 ; s. c,
19 Am. St. Rep. 252; Hammond
v. Peyton, 34 Minn. 529 ; Dawson
v. Girard Ins., etc. Co., 27 Minn.
411 ; Duke v. Balme, 16 Minn. 306;
Daughaday v. Paine, 6 Minn. 443;
Selby v. Stanley, 4 Minn. 65.
3 Oglesby v. Bingham, 69 Miss.
975 ; s. C, 13 So. Rep. 852 ; Bell v.
Blair, 65 Miss. 191 ; Lissa v. Posey,
64 Miss. 352; Tate v. Bush, 62
Miss. 145; Louisiana Xat'l Bank v.
Knapp, 61 Miss. 485; Cummingsv.
Moore, 61 Miss. 184; Parker v.
McBee, 61 Miss. 134; Rutland v.
Brister, 53 Miss. 683; Tucker v.
Hadley, 52 Miss. 414 ; Pitts v. Par-
ker, 44 Miss. 247 ; Dodge v. Evans,
43 Miss. 570; Harvey v. Kelly, 41
Miss. 490; S. C.,93 Am. Dec. 267
Richardson v. Bowman, 40 Miss
782; Littlejohn v. Gordon, 32 Miss,
235; Lewis v. Beatty, 32 Miss. 52
Trotter v. Erwin, 27Miss. 772 ; Dun
lap v. Burnett, 5 Smed. & M. 702
Stewart v. Ives, 1 Smed. & M. 197,
4 Christy v. McKee, 94 Mo. 241
Bronson v. Wanzer, 86 Mo. 408
Zoll v. Carnahan, 83 Mo. 35 ; Ben-
nett v. Shipley, 82 Mo. 448 ; Arrick
v. Durham, 79 Mo. 174; Pearl v.
Hewey, 70 Mo. 160; Davenport v.
Murray, 68 Mo. 198; Pratt v. Clark,
57 Mo. 189; Bledso v. Games, 30
Mo. 448; Davis v. Lamb, 30 Mo.
441 ; Delassus v. Boston, 19 Mo.
425; Marsh v. Turner, 4 Mo. 253;
McKnight v. Bright, 2 Mo. 110;
Melcher v. Derkum, 44 Mo. App.
650.
5 Montana Code Annotated, §
3930.
6 Reese v. Kinkead, 18 Xev. 126;
Toombs v. Consolidated Poe Min-
ing Co., 15 Xev. 444.
7 Acton v. Waddington, 46 N". J.
Eq. 16; Butterfleld v. Okie, 36 K.
J. Eq. 4S2; Porter v. Woodruff, 36
N. J. Eq. 174; Graves v. Coutant,
31 X. J. Eq. 763; Corlies v. How-
land, 26 X. J. Eq. 311 ; Armstrong
v. Ross, 20 N. J. Eq. 109; Dudley
v. Dickson, 14 N. J. Eq. 252; Her-
bert v. Schofield, 9 X. J. Eq. 402;
Brinckerhoff v. Vansciven, 4 X. J.
Eq. 251 ; Vandoren v. Todd, 2
Green Ch. 397.
8 Bates v. Childers, 4 N. Mex.
347; s. c, 20 Piic. Rep. 164.
§ -2i->-
EQUITABLE LIENS.
577
York,1 North Dakota,2 Ohio,3 Oklahoma,4 Oregon,6 Ehode
Island,6 South Dakota,7 Tennessee,8 Texas,9 Wiscon-
1 Seymour v. McKinstry, 106 1ST.
Y. 230; Walrath v. AbbQtt, 75 Hun,
445; s. c, 27 N. Y. Supl. 529;
Turkes v. Reis, 14 Abb. N. Cases,
26; Hazeltine v. Moore, 21 Hun,
355; Gaylord v. Knapp, 15 Hun,
87; Cbasev. Peck, 21 N. Y. 581;
Dubois y. Hull, 43 Barb. 26; War-
ren v. Fenn, 28 Barb. 333 ; Shirley
v. Congress Steam Sugar Refinery
Co., 2 Edw. Ch. 505; Warner v.
Van Alstyne, 3 Paige, 513 ; White
v. Williams, 1 Paige, 502 ; Stafford
v. Van Eensalear, 9 Cow. 316;
Champion v. Brown, 6 Johns. Ch.
398; s. c, 10 Am. Dec. 343.
2 Revised Code North Dakota
1895, § 4830. Where a vendor in a
contract for the sale of land retains
the legal Title as security for the
unpaid purchase price, he holds a
lien by virtue of the contract, and
not simply the vendor's lien that
exists in equity where the vendor
has parted with the legal title
without payment. Roby v. Bis-
marck Nat'l Bank, 4 N. D. 116;
s. c, 59 N. W.Rep. 719.
3 Ogle v Ogle, 41 Ohio St. 359;
Hume v. Dixon, 37 Ohio St. 66;
Unger v. Deiter, 32 Ohio St. 210 ;
Whetsel v. Roberts, 31 Ohio St.
503; Anketel v. Converse, 17 Ohio
St. 11; s. c, 91 Am. Dec. 115;
Neil v. Kinney, 11 Ohio St. 58;
Mayham v. Coombs, 14 Ohio, 428 ;
Brush v. Kinsley, 14 Ohio, 20;
Williams v. Roberts, 5 Ohio, 35.
4 One who sells real property
has a special or vendor's lien
thereon, independent of possession,
for so much of the price as remains
unpaid, and unsecured otherwise
than by personal obligation of the
buyer. Stat. Oklahoma, 1890, §
3314.
37
5 Pease v. Kelly, 3 Ore. 417 ;
G6e v. McMillan, 14 Ore. 268;
Coos Bay Wagon Co. v. Crocker, 6
Sawyer, 574; s. c, 4 Fed. Rep.
577; First Nat'l Bank v. Salem
Capital Flour Mills Co., 39 Fed.
Rep. 89. In Kelly v. Ruble, 11
Ore. 75, the court doubted the
existence of the lien. See also
Thomas v. Thomas, 24 Ore.
251; S. C, 33 Pac. Rep. 565.
6 Kent v. Gerhard, 12 R. I. 92;
s. c, 34 Am. Rep. 612; Reynolds
v. Hennessy, 17 R. I. 154. See also
Perry v. Grant, 10 R. I. 334.
'Dakota Civ. Code (1883), §
1801.
8 Zwingle v. Wilkinson, 94 Tenn.
246; s. c, 28 S. W.Rep. 1096; Cate
v. Cate, 87 Tenn. 41; Russell v.
Dodson, 6 Baxt. 16 ; Irvine v. Muse,
10 Heisk. 477 ; Durant v. Davis, 10
Heisk. 522; Choate v. Tighe, 10
Heisk. 621 ; Brown v. Vanlier, 7
Humph. 239; Norvell v. Johnson,
5 Humph. 489 ; Uzzell v. Mack, 4
Humph. 319; s. c, 40 Am. Dec.
648; Marshall v. Christmas, 3
Humph. 616; s. c, 39 Am. Dec.
199; Campbell v. Baldwin, 2
Humph. 248; Ross v. Whitson, 6
Yerg. 50; Eskridge v. McClure, 2
Yerg. 84; Jones v. Ragland, 4 Lea,
539.
9 Wright v. Campbell, 82 Tex.
388; Camley v. Waterhouse, 80
Tex. 340 ; McMichael v. Jarvis, 78
Tex. 671; Johnson v. Townsend
(Tex. Civ. App.), 30 S. W. Rep.
71; Davis v. Wheeler (Tex. Civ.
App.), 23 S. W.Rep. 435; Howe
v. Harding, 76 Tex. 17; s. c, 18
Am. St. Rep. 17; Hamblen v. Folts,
70 Tex. 136; Houston v. Dickson,
66 Tex. 79; Russell v. Kirkbride,
62 Tex. 455 ; Porterfield v. Taylor,
578
EQUITABLE LIENS.
[§ 243.
sin.1 In a number of other States this doctrine is not ac-
cepted. The following belong to this class, viz : Kansas,2
Maine,3 Massachusetts,4 Nebraska,5 North Carolina,6 Penn-
sylvania,7 South Carolina8 and Washington.9 In these
States the English doctrine is rejected as inconsistent with
the policy of the courts of both equity and law, under
which all transactions relating to real estate are required to
be open and subject to record. In several States the
English rule has been abolished by statute. In this class
the following are included : Georgia,10 Vermont,11 Iowa,12
60 Tex. 264 ; Senter v. Lambeth, 59
Tex. 259; Wooters v. Hollings-
worth, 58 Tex. 374; Hunt v. Ma-
kemson, 56 Tex. 9; Salmon v.
Downs, 55 Tex. 243; De Bruhl v.
Maas, 54 Tex. 404 ; Baker v. Coinp-
ton, 52 Tex. 252; Robinson v. Mc-
Whirter, 52 Tex. 201 ; White v.
Downs, 40 Tex. 22" ; McAlpine v.
Burnett, 23 Tex. 649; Wheeler v.
Love, 21 Tex. 5S3 ; Pinchain v. Col-
lard, 13 Tex. 333.
1 Evans v. Enloe, 70 Wis. 345 ;
Carey v. Boyle, 53 Wis. 574; s. c,
56 Wis. 145; Madden v. Barnes, 45
Wis. 135; S. C, 30 Am. Kep. 703;
Willard v. Keas, 26 Wis. 540.
2 Greeno v. Bernard, 18 Kan.
51S; Smith v. Rowland, 13 Kan.
245; Smith v. Mundee, 3 Kan.
172; Brown v. Simpson, 4 Kan.
76.
sphilbrook v. Delano, 29 Me.
415 ; Gilman v. Brown, 1 Mason,
219.
4 Ahrend v. Odiorne, 118 Mass.
261; s. c, 19 Am. Bep. 449; Gil-
man v. Brown, 1 Mason (U. SO,
191.
£ Ansley v. Pasahro, 22 Neb.
662; Edminster v. Higgins, 6 Neb.
265.
6 White v. Jones, 92 N. Car. 3S8
Moore v. Ingram, 91 N. Car. 376
Smith v. High, S5 X. Car. 23
Hoskins v. Wall, 77 X. Car. 249
Peek v. Culberson, 104 N". Car. 426:
Cameron v. Mason, 7 Ired. Eq. 180;
Henderson v. Burton, 3 Ired. Eq.
259; Womble v. Battle, 3 Ired.
182.
7 Heist v. Baker, 49 Pa. St. 9;
Heister v. Green, 48 Pa. St. 9;
Stephens' Appeal, 38 Pa. St. 9;
Springer v. Walters, 34 Pa. St.
328; Kauffelt v. Bower, 7 Serg. &
E. 64.
8 Wragg v. Comptroller-Gen'I,
2 Desaus. Eq. 520.
8 Where the vendor of real es-
tate retains the title until the pur-
chase money is paid, and executes
to the vendee a bond lor a deed at
a future day, no equitable lien on
the property in favor of the vendor
is created; the lien, if any, is one
of contract. Shelton v. Jones, 4
Wash. St. 692; s. c, 30 Pac. Bep.
1061.
10 Abolished by statute : Georgia
Code 1882, § 1997; Jones v. Jones,
56 Ga. 325; Broach v. Smith, 75
Ga. 159. It formerly existed:
Mounce v. Byars, 16 Ga. 469 ; Still
v. Griffith, 27 Ga. 504.
11 Was adopted by the courts in
Manly v. Slason, 21 Vt, 271; s. c,
52 Am. Dec. 60, but was abolished
by statute. Vermont Gen. Stat.
1862, ch. 65, § 33.
12 Abolished unless expressly re-
served: McClain's Statutes of
§ 244. J EQUITABLE LIENS. 579
Virginia1 and West Virginia.2 In the following States
the rule is still an open question : Connecticut,3 Delaware*
and New Hampshire.5
§ 244. "Vyaiver of Vendor's Lien. — -The claim of the
vendor depends not only upon the local legislation and the
decisions of the State courts, but also upon the circum-
stances under which the property is transferred to the
vendee. Where security is given by the vendee for the
purchase money, the acceptance of the security by the
vendor will be understood as a waiver of his lien, unless
there is an express agreement that it shall continue in ope-
ration. In New York it has been held that where a grantor
of lands has an equitable lien on the estate sold for the
payment of the purchase money, and this lien is not waived
by the grantor's taking the mere personal security of the
purchaser only, unless there is an express agreement be-
tween the parties that the equitable lien be waived. But
wherever any security is taken on the land sold, or other-
wise, for the whole or a part of the purchase money, the
equitable lien will be waived, unless there is an express
agreement that it shall be retained. So the lien is waived
where a note or bond is taken of the vendee for the pur-
chase money, in which a third person joins as security.
Likewise, if the vendee sells to a third person without
notice, the lien is lost.6 The lien of the vendor is not
Iowa (1888), § 3111; Prouty v. Chapman v. Beards! ey, 31 Conn
Clark, 73 Iowa, 55. 115; Atwood v. Vincent, 17 Conn
1 Roanoke Brick & Lime Co. v. 575; Meigs v. Dimock, 6 Conn
Simmons (Va.), 20 S. E. Rep. 955. 458; Dean v. Dean, 6 Conn. 285
Abolished by statute,Virginia Code "Watson v. Wells, 5 Conn. 468.
1873, ch. 115, §1. Was formerly * Budd v. Busti, 1 Harr. 69
recognized by the courts : Tomp- Rice v. Rice, 36 Fed. Rep. S60.
kins v. Mitchell, 2 Rand. 428 ; Kyles « Arlin v. Brown, 44 N. H. 102
v. Tail, 6 Gratt. 44. Buntin v. French, 16 N. H. 592.
2 Abolished by statute : West There are no decisions of the court
Virginia Code 1870, ch. 75, § 1. on . the subject in Arizona, Utah
Lough v. Michael, 37 W. Va. 679 ; and Wyoming.
s. c, 17 S. E. Rep. 181; Poe v. 6Fish v. Howland, 1 Paige, 20.
Paxton, 26 W. Va. 607; McNeil v. See also Acton v. Waddington, 46
Miller, 29 W. Va. 480. N. J. Eq. 16; Kent v. Gerhard, 12
3 Hall v. Hall, 50 Conn. 104; R. I. 92 ;s. C, 34 Am. Rep. 612;
580
EQUITABLE LIENS.
[§ 244.
lost and his right is not compromised by the failure or by
the death of the vendee. Where a purchaser of land pro-
cured a third person to give his note for the consideration
money, and to indemnify the maker, executed to him his
bond and mortgage on the premises, and before the note
became due the maker failed, it was held that the vendor
of the land was entitled to the benefit of the bond and
mortgage. And it was further held that the equitable
right of the vendor to the benefit of the bond and mort-
gage was good against the lien of a judgment creditor's
bill filed against the mortgagee. Taking the note of a
third person for an existing debt is not a satisfaction,
unless the creditor agrees to take it in payment. Where a
vendor of land takes the security of a third person for the
purchase money, he has no equitable lien on the land.1 In
Moore v. Worthy, 56 Ala. 163;
Manly v. Slason, 21 Vt. 271 ; s. c,
52 Am. Dec. 60; Thornton v. Knox,
6 B. Mon. 74, 75; Walker v. Struve,
70 Ala. 167 ; Lavender v. Abbott,
30 Ark. 172; Baum v. Griggsby, 21
Cal. 172; s. C, 81 Am. Deo. 153;
Corlies v. Howland, 26 N. J. Eq.
311 ; White v. Williams, 1 Paige,
502; Clark v. Hunt, 3 J. J. Marsh.
553 ; Elbridge v. McClure, 2 Yerg.
84; Denny v. Steakley, 2 Heisk.
156; Dance v. Dance, 56 Md. 433;
Madden v. Barnes, 45 Wis. 135;
S. C, 30 Am. Rep. 703; Irvin v.
Garner, 50 Tex. 48; Nichols v.
Glover, 41 Ind. 24; Honore v. Bake-
well, 6 B. Mon. 67; S. C, 43 Am.
Dec. 147; Reeder v. Nay, 95 Ind.
164; Joiner v. Perkins, 59 Tex. 300.
1 Vail v. Foster, 4 N. Y. 312. It
is a settled rule in equity, that the
creditor shall have the benefit of
any counter bonds or collateral se-
curities which the principal debtor
has given to the surety, for his in-
demnity. Such securities are re-
garded as trusts for the better se-
curity of the debt, and chancery
will compel the execution of the
trusts for the benefit of the cred-
itor. Ibid. Civil Code, Cal. § 3047,
provides that "Where a buyer of
real property gives to the seller a
written contract for the payment
of all or part of the price, an abso-
lute transfer of such contract by
the seller waives to the extent of
the sum payable under the con-
tract; but a transfer of such con-
tract in trust to pay debts, and re-
turn the surplus, is not a waiver of
the lien." Held, that where a ven-
dor indorsed and delivered a pur-
chase money note to a third per-
son, and the note not having been
paid, was transferred back to the
vendor, the lien revived on such
transfer. Bancroft v. Cosby, 71
Cal. 94; s. C, 16 Pac. Kep. 504.
A provision in a contract for
the sale of land that, if the pur-
chaser shall fail to make full pay-
ment, he shall forfeit his contract
and all payments made, is merely
a security on the land, and the
vendor does not thereby waive his
lien. Robinson v. Appleton, 124
§ 244. J
EQUITABLE LIENS.
581
taking securities, or other property, which is misrepre-
sented by the vendee, in payment or in part payment of
the purchase price of real estate, the lien of the ven-
dor is not lost. In a recent case it was held that a vendor
who takes worthless corporate stock in part payment of
the purchase price, relying on the representations of his
vendee as to the value of the stock, and takes a mortgage
on the land sold for the residue of the price, does not
thereby waive his vendor's lien for so much of the price
as is represented by the stock.1 The sale of land by order
of the court is not subject to the vendor's lien. In a recent
case it was held that where the vendors of land sold on
credit, retaining the title as security for deferred payments,
sue for a specific performance and obtain a decree for the
sale of the land, such judicial sale, when made, releases
111. 276; s. C, 15 N. E. Rep.
761. The vendor has by virtue
of his lien on the land a right to
call on the assignee of the vendee,
who has taken possession of the
land under the contract to pay the
purchase money, or surrender up
the possession of the land, or to
have it sold for the benefit of the
vendor. If a person, who has con-
tracted to sell the land to a third
person, for a valuable considera-
tion, such purchaser, if he have
notice of the equitable title of the
vendee under the contract, may be
compelled to convey the land to
him. Champion v. Brown, 6 Johns.
Ch. 402. An oral agreement at the
time the note was given that the
husband's name thereon as personal
security should not operate as a
waiver or abandonment of the ven-
dor's lien is sufficient to preserve
the lien. Ramage v. Towles, 85
Ala. 588; s. c, 5 So. Rep. 342.
When a person holding a lien on
personal property consents to its
sale, and agrees to accept notes se-
cured by a mortgage for the amount
due him, he thereby waives his
claim. Kornegay v. Styron, 105 N".
Car. 14; s. C, 11 S. E. Rep. 153.
The taking of a deed of trust on
land conveyed, as security for the
purchase price, waives a vendor's
lien therefor. Winn v. Lippin-
cott Inv. Co., 125 Mo. 528; s. c,
28 S. W. Rep. 998. The execution of
a mortgage on land sold and
the acceptance thereof is a waiver
of a vendor's lien. Baker v. Up-
dike, 155 111. 54; s. C, 39 N. E.
Rep. 587. The taking of a note with
a personal surety for the price of
land constitutes a waiver of the
vendor's lien thereon, even though
the note contained a recital that it
was given for part of the price,
where such recital was mere in-
ducement for a provision in the
note reserving to the maker the
right to pay off any lien existing
on the land. Hammett v. Strick-
land, 99 Ala. 616; s. c, 13 So. Rep.
573.
1 Yeomans v. Bell (1894) , 79 Hun,
215; s. c, 29 N. Y. Supl. 502.
582 EQUITABLE LIENS. [§ 245.
the land from the vendor's lien.1 Where a vendor, having
taken a mortgage to secure the unpaid balance of the price,
executed a waiver of the priority of his mortgage in favor
of one by whom advancements were made to the pur-
chaser, it was held that there was also a waiver of the ven-
dor's lien, which existed by act of law.2 Where the En-
glish doctrine prevails the presumption is in favor of the
vendor's lien. As between vendor and purchaser, when
no independent security for unpaid purchase money is
taken, the burden is on the purchaser to prove a waiver of
the vendor's lien.3
§ 245. Lien From Executory Contracts. — A distinc-
tion has been recognized between the vendor's lien proper
and the lien which arises in favor of a vendor out of an ex-
ecutory contract for the sale of lands. This lien may arise
from the execution of a bond for a deed, or from an ordi-
nary contract. The distinction between the two classes of
hens is clearly set forth in Sparks v. Hess, before the Su-
preme Court of California, Chief Justice Field delivering
the opinion. The court held : Where the contract of sale
of real property is unexecuted, the vendor retaining the
legal title for security until all the rjurchase money is paid,
the vendor's lien retained is different from the ordinary
lien of a vendor after conveyance executed. In the latter
1 "Wood v. Ellis (1888), 85 Va. 471; conveys part of it to the same gran-
s. c, 7 S. E. Rep. 852. Where a tees for a cash consideration, the
vendor, instead of asserting a ven- land last conveyed is released from
dor's lien, brings suit for the pur- the lien reserved in the first deed,
chase money, and attaches the land Wells v. Heddenberg (Tex. Civ.
sold, persons claiming title under App.), 30 S. W. Eep. 702. The re-
the attachment proceedings must lease of a vendor's lien, executed
depend upon the validity of such by the vendor after he has assigned
proceedings, and cannot avail the lien, is good as to a subsequent
themselves of any right which the incumbrance without notice of the
vendor had to a lien. Meyers v. assignment. Moran v. Wheeler,
Paxton, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 29; s. c, (Tex. Civ. App.), 26 S. W. Eep. 297.
23 S. W. Rep. 284. 3 Crampton v. Prince (1888), 83
2 Succession of Osborn (1888) , 40 Ala. 246 ; s. c, 3 So. Rep. 519 ; Coles
La. Ann. 615; s. c, 4 So. Rep. 5S0. v. Withers, 33 Gratt. 186; Wilson v.
Where one conveys land reserving Lyon, 56 111. 166.
a lien for the price, and afterwards
§ 245. J EQUITABLE LIENS. 583
case the vendor has parted with the legal and equitable
title, and possesses only a bare right, which is of no oper-
ative force or effect until established by the decree of the
court.. In the former case the vendor's position is some-
what similar to that of a party executing a conveyance and
taking a mortgage back. He may sue at law for the bal-
ance of his purchase money, or file his bill in equity, for
the specific performance of the contract, and take an alter-
native decree, that if the purchaser will not accept a con-
veyance and pay the purchase money, the premises be
sold to raise such money, and that the vendee pay any de-
ficiency remaining after the application of the proceeds
arising upon such sale.1 To the same import is the follow-
ing: The vendor's lien proper arises in cases where the
owner of land conveys the same by deed, thus divesting
himself of the legal title, and where some part, or all, of
the purchase price remains unpaid. In such case the
grantor retains in equity a lien for the unpaid purchase
money. The other case of lien arises or grows out of an
executory contract for the sale of lands, whether by ordi-
nary contract or bond for a deed, whatever may be its
form, and when a part or all of the purchase money re-
mains unpaid.2
1 Sparks v. Hess, 15 Cal. 186. it, as the court may make a decree,
Chancellor Walworth in Clark v. as in the case of a strict foreclos-
Hall, 7 Paige, 3S5, says: '-The ure, where the case is a proper one
vendor has a lien upon the prem- for such a decree, that if the ven-
ises sold for the unpaid purchase dee does not pay the purchase
money; and where there is a de- money within such time as may be
cree for a specific performance, if limited for that purpose by the
the vendee will not accept the con- court, he shall be barred and fore-
veyance and pay the purchase closed of his right to claim a spe-
money, the premises may be sold cific performance afterwards."
for the purpose of raising such 2 Robinson v. Appleton, 124 111.
purchase money, and if the amount 276, 2S2. Sir George Jessell, M.
produced is not sufficient to pay R., in Lysaght v. Edwards, L. R. 2
what is due, with the costs of sale, Ch. Div. 499, 506, 507, decided in
the vendee may be ordered to pay 1876, thus luminously states the
the balance; and if there is a sur- law: "It appears to me," he says,
plus it will be paid to him. Yet "that the effect of a contract of
it is not a matter of course to direct sale has been settled for more than
a sale, unless the vendor asks for two centuries ; certainly it was
584
EQUITABLE LIENS.
[§ 246.
§ 246. Trust from Vendee's Lien. — Where the legal
title remains in the vendor, and under a contract to con-
vey, or a bond for a deed, the vendee has paid a part of the
purchase price, in this act he obtains a lien on the land as
completely settled before the time
of Lord Hardwicke, who speaks of
the settled doctrine of the court as
to it. What is that doctrine? It
is that the moment you have a
valid contract for sale the vendor
becomes in equity a trustee for the
purchaser of the estate, and the
beneficial ownership passes to the
purchaser, the vendor having a
right to the purchase money, a
charge or lien on the estate for the
security of that purchase money,
and a right to retain possession of
the estate until the purchase money
is paid, in the absence of express
contract as to the time of delivering
possession. In other words, the
position of the vendor is something
between what has been called a
naked or bare trustee, or a. mere
trustee (that is, a, person without
beneficial interest) , and a mortga-
gee who is not, inequity (any more
than a vendor), the owner of the
estate, but is, in certain events, en-
titled to what the unpaid vendor
is, viz.: possession of the estate
and a charge upon the estate for
his purchase money. Their posi-
tions are analogous in another
way. The unpaid mortgagee has
a right to foreclose, that is to say,
he has a right to say to the mort-
gagor, "either pay me within a
limited time, or you lose your es-
tate," and in default of payment
he becomes absolute owner of it.
So, although there has been a valid
contract of sale, the vendor has a
similar right in a court of equity;
he has a right to say to the pur-
chaser, "either pay me the pur-
chase money or lose the estate."
Such a decree has sometimes been
called a decree for cancellation of
the contract; time is given by a
decree of the court of equity, or
now by a judgment of the high
court of justice; and if the time
expires without the money being
paid, the contract is cancelled by
the decree or judgment of the
court, and the vendor becomes
again the owner of the estate. But
that, as it appears to me, is a totally
different thing from the contract
being cancelled, because there is
some equitable ground for setting
it aside. If a valid contract is can-
celled for non-payment of the pur-
chase money after the death of the
vendor, the property will still in
equity be treated as having been
converted into personalty, because
the contract was valid at his death;
while in the other case there will
not be conversion, because there
never was in equity a valid con-
tract. Now, what is the meaning
of the term "valid contract?"
"Valid contract" means in every
case a contract sufficient in form
and in substance, so that there is
no ground whatever for setting it
aside as between the vendor and
purchaser — a contract binding on
both parties, as regards real estate,
however, another element of va-
lidity is required. The vendor must
be in a position to make a title ac-
cording to the contract, and the
contract will not be a valid con-
tract unless he has either made out
his title according to the contract
or the purchaser has accepted the
title, for however bad the title may
be the purchaser has a right to ac-
§ 246.]
EQUITABLE LIENS.
585
security for the sum paid, and for the proper performance
by the vendor of his contract or bond to convey.1 ^This, it
cept it, and the moment he has
accepted the title the contract is
fully binding upon the vendor.
Consequently, if the title is ac-
cepted in the lifetime of the ven-
dor, and there is no reason for
setting aside the contract, then,
although the purchase money is
unpaid, the contract is valid and
binding; and being a valid con-
tract, it has this remarkable effect,
that it converts the estate. So to
say, in equity, it makes the pur-
chase money a part of the personal
estate of the vendor, and it makes
the hind a part of the real estate of
the vendee ; and therefore all those
cases on the doctrine of construct-
ive conversion are founded sim-
ply on this, that a valid contract
actually changes the ownership of
the estate in equity. That being
so, is the vendor less a trustee be-
cause he has the rights which I
have mentioned? I do not see how
it is possible to say so. If any-
thing happens to the estate between
the time of sale and the time of
completion of the purchase it is at
the risk of the purchaser. If it is a
house that is sold, and the house is
burnt down, the purchaser loses
the house. He must insure it him-
self if he wants to provide against
such an accident. If it is a garden,
and a river overflows its banks
without any fault of the vendor,
the garden will be ruined, but the
loss will be the purchaser's. In
the same way there is a correlative
liability on the part of the vendor
in possession. He is not entitled
to treat the estate as his own. If
he willfully damages or injures it,
he is liable if he does not take rea-
sonable care of it. So far he is
treated in all respects as a trustee,
subject of course to his right to
being paid the purchase money and
his right to enforce his security
against the estate. With those
exceptions, and bis rights to rents,
till the day for completion, he ap-
pears to me to have no other
rights." See also Hadley v. Lon-
don Bank of Scotland, 3 De G., J.
& S. 63, 70; Shaw v. Foster, L. R.
5 H. L. Cas. 321, 333, 338,349; Me-
Creight v. Poster, L. R. 5 Ch. 604;
610; Kosev. Watson, 10 H. L. Cas.
672, 678; Wall v. Bright, 1 Jac. &
W. 494, 508; Morgan v. Swansea,
L. R. 9 Ch. D. 582, 584; Moore v.
Anders, 14 Ark. 628, 634; s. C, 60
Am. Dec. 551 ; McCaslin v. State,
44 Ind. 151; Church v. Smith, 39
Wis. 492,496; Beattie v. Dickinson,
33 Ark. 205; Ransom v. Brown, 63
Tex. 188; Hale v. Baker, 60 Tex
217; White v. Blackmore, 8 Lea
49 ; Poe v. Paxton, 26 W. Va. 607
Gessner v. Palmateer, 89 Cal. 89
Moses v. Johnson, 88 Ala. 517
Lowery v. Peterson, 75 Ala. 109
Pitts v. Parker, 44 Miss. 247 ; Wells
v. Smith, 44 Miss. 296; Reese v.
Burts, 39 Ga. 565 ; Hines v. Per-
kins, 2 Heisk. 395.
1 Aberman Iron Works v. Wick-
ens, L. R. 4 Ch. 101; Torran v.
Bolton, L. R. 14 Eq. 124; Turner
v. Marriott, L. R. 3 Eq. 744; Rose
v. Watson, 10 H. L. Cas. 672 ; Dinn
v. Grant, 5 De G. & S. 451; Ewing
v. Osbaldiston, 2 Myl. & Cr. 53,
88; Cator v. Earl of Pembroke, 1
Bro. Ch. 301; Wythes v. Lee, 3
Drew. 396, 406 ; Small v. Small, 16 S.
Car. 64; Pelkner v. Tighe, 39 Ark.
357; Stults v. Brown, 112 Ind. 379 ^
s. c, 2 Am. St. Rep. 190; Hughes
Hatchett, 55 Ala. 539; Anderson v.
586 EQUITABLE LIENS. [§ 247.
will be seen, is the counterpart of the lien of the vendor,
and it is subject to the rules and limitations by which that
is governed. The vendee's lien attaches only when there
is a failure of the vendor to fulfill the contract, while the
vendee, having fulfilled the contract on his part, is entitled
to recover the purchase money that he has paid.
§ 247. Application and Extent of the Doctrine. — The
vendor's lien attaches to real estate only and exclusively as
security for the unpaid purchase price. It may be security
for the whole or for a part of the price of the land, but the
amount of the claim thus secured must be definitely and
positively determined. It cannot be made to apply to a
claim which is in part against real estate and in part for
personal property. In Michigan it has been held that where
a person claiming to have a vendor's lien upon land has
mingled his claim for purchase money with a claim for the
price of personal property in a single judgment, in such
a manner as to render it impossible to determine how much
of the judgment represents the price of the land and how
much the value of personal property, and under this judg-
ment proceeded to execution levy and sale of the premises
in question, his lien as vendor for the unpaid purchase money
is lost.1 In a recent case before the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama the doctrine was stated, as follows: "The principle
of a vendor's lien has no application to the sale of personal
property. The debt to come within this principle must be
contracted altogether for real estate, 'and no other consid-
eration must in the slightest degree enter into it ; ' and when-
ever the contract of sale embraces both real and personal
Spencer, 51 Miss. 869; Wickman v. Code of California, §§ 3050, says:
Robinson, 14 Wis. 493; s. C, 80 '-One who pays to the owner any
Am. Deo. 789; Brown v. East, 5 part of the price of real property,
Mon. 405, 407; Shirley v. Shirley, under an agreement for the sale
7 Blaekf. 452; Cooper v. Merritt. thereof, has a special lien upon the
30 Ark. 686; Stewart v. Wood, 63 property, independent of posses-
Mo. 252; Flinn v. Barber, 64 Ala. sion, for such part of the amount
193; Wright v. Dufield, 2 Baxt. paid as he maybe entitled to re-
218 ; Clark v. Jacobs, 56 How. Pr. cover back in case of a failure of
519; Chase v. Peck, 21 N\ Y. 581 ; consideration."
Lane v. Ludlow, 2 Paine, 591. Civil » Clark v. Stilson, 36 Mich. 482.
§ 247.]
EQUITABLE LIENS.
587
property, and no data are furnished by which to ascertain
that a separate and definite price was fixed on the land,
there is an implied waiver of the vendor's lien."1 This lien
will not hold against the income from land, whether it be
from rents or from the sale of its products.2 But it at-
i Suddethv. Knight(1893) (Ala.),
14 So. Kep. 475. See also Brick-
son v. Smith, 79 Iowa, 374; Peters
v. Tunnell, 43 Minn. 473; s. C, 45
ST. W. Kep. 867; Alexander v.
Hooks, 84 Ala. 605 ; Sykes v. Betts,
87 Ala. 537; s. c, 6 So. Bep. 428;
Betts v. Sykes, 82 Ala. 378; s. c, 2
So. Bep. 648. In Stringfellow v.
Ivie, 73 Ala. 209, 214, the court
says: "The mere commingling of
the written obligation for the pay-
ment of the purchase money, of
the price of personal property sold
at the same time, and to be paid
for at the same time as the pur-
chase money of the lands, indi-
cated only that the parties ab-
stained from the ceremony of
making or taking two obligations
or evidences of debt, when one
would suffice for all their purposes,
the reduction to writing of the
fact that the one is indebted to the
other in a specific sum of money,
payable at a time certain. In such
case the parties in the conception
and consummation of the sale dis-
tinguish their relations as vendor
and vendee of real and of personal
property by fixing upon each
species of property a separate
price and value. The price and
value of each is matter of distinct
negotiation and agreement. The
note bond, or other instrument
taken for the aggregate prices, is
not a debt which is created, but
merely evidence of it, and without
impairing its dignity as evidence
there can be no inquiry into the
fact that a distinct part of the sum
expressed as owing to the vendor
was the purchase money of the
lands. The fact being ascertained,
if there be no circumstances to
repel the presumption, the lien of
the vendor upon the lands for the
payment of the price is presumed
to exist." * * * The lien ex-
ists only for the payment of the
purchase money of the lands. It
is raised and implied by a court of
equity for the protection of the
vendor, and upon its maxim that
it is unconscientious for one man
to get and keep the lands of an-
other without paying the purchase
money. But when, by the con-
tract, the vendor and vendee do
not distinguish the consideration
money from other considerations
for which the law gives no lien,
when the considerations are
blended and combined, and it is
impossible, without resorting to
conjectural inquiries, to separate
them, the presumption must be
that the vendor did not look to the
lands for payment, but relied ex-
clusively on the personal responsi-
bility of the vendee."
2 Wooten v. Bellinger, 17 Fla.
289. "Yet, though the products
may be subjected or charged in
equity, with unpaid interest, taxes,
etc., they cannot be said to be in-
cumbered so as to give a prefer-
ence to the mortgagee or vendor
claiming a lien upon the land as
against another creditor, who may
obtain an express lien upon the
crops under the statute, or by a
588 EQUITABLE LIENS. [§ 247.
taches where land is conveyed and other land taken in ex-
change, as well as where the purchase price is to be paid in
money.1 This lien is to be enforced in the first place
against the personal assets of the vendee. The land
can be sold to satisfy the claim only where the personal
property subject to execution has been found insufficient.
A vendor's lien on land for unpaid purchase money is not
an original and absolute charge on the land, but only an
equitable right to resort thereto if there be not sufficient
personal assets ; and in an action to enforce such lien, if
the complaint do not allege and the evidence show that the
vendee has no other property subject to execution, the
judgment should not direct the sale of the land except in
the event that no other property of the vendee, subject to
execution, can be found to satisfy the execution.2 Where
the equitable owner of land, the legal title being in another,
sells the same and procures a conveyance from the holder
of the legal title to be made to a third person, in trust for
the purchaser, a court of equity will regard the equitable
owner as the vendor, and he may enforce a vendor's lien
for the unpaid purchase money against the land so con-
veyed. In such case the person for whose use the land is
conveyed will be held to be the real purchaser.3 Under the
Ibid. 302. See also Gilman v. Brown, hausted his legal remedy against the
1 Mason, 221. personal estate of the vendee.
1 Louisiana National Bank v. Pratt v. Van Wyck's Exrs., 6 Gill
Knapp, 61 Miss. 485, 490. & J. 495; Bottorf v. Conner, 1
2 Nutter v. Fouch, 86 Ind. 451. Blackf. 287; Russell v. Todd, 7 Id.
"This lien is not, however, a spe- 239. On the other hand, authori-
cific and absolute charge upon the ties of equal weight treat the lien
property, hut a mere equitable as in the nature of a mortgage, and
right to resort to it upon failure of hold that it can be enforced with-
payment by the vendee. It is a out previous recourse to proceed-
right founded upon the natural jus- ings at law. Bradley v. Bosley, 1
tice of allowing the vendor to sub- Barb. Ch. 152; Galloway v. Hamil-
ject the property, with which he ton, 1 Dana, 576; Richardson v. Ba-
has parted, to the satisfaction of ker, 5 J. J. Marsh. 323; High v.
the debt which constitutes the con- Batte, 10 Yerg. 186." Sparks v.
sideration of the transfer. As it is Hess, 15 Cal. 186, 193.
a mere equitable right, some au- 3 Beal v. Harrington, 116 III. 113.
thoiities hold that it cannot be as- See also Loomis v. Davenport &
serted until the vendor has ex- St. Paul Ry., 3 McCrary, 4S9; Aus-
§ 248. J EQUITABLE LIENS. 589
statutes of Kentucky the purchase money, secured by a ven-
dor's lien, must be paid before a homestead can be allotted,1
and in Indiana a vendor's lien may be enforced against a
woman's right in virtue of her marriage.2
§ 248. The Principle Involved. — In the early English
cases the decisions are not uniform, and there is among
the ablest jurists a wide difference of opinion touching the
principle of equity, on which the vendor's lien is based.
In one class of cases it was maintained as a natural equity ;
in another the claim was based on the assumed intention
of the parties, and in another class it was held to be a con-
structive trust, arising out of the lack of conscientiousness
on the part of the vendee in holding the property without
paying the purchase price. But it has been a question
whether a lien is rightfully based on any of these
grounds. In a leading case it was argued by able counsel
that "as to the general question of the lien it is called a
natural lien ; but it certainly is not so with respect to per-
sonalty, which, if once delivered, it is conclusive, though
concealed from all mankind ; and there seems as much natu-
ral equity in the case of personalty as of realty.3 This
position was not questiond by the court. In a leading case
Lord Eldon said: "It has always struck me, considering
this subject, that it would have been better at once to have
held that the lien should exist in no case, and the seller
should suffer for the consequences of his want of caution, or
to have laid down the rule the other way so distinctly that
a purchaser might be able to know, without the judgment
of a court, in what case it would and in what it would not
exist."4 In the United States there has been a similar di-
tto v. Underwood, 37 111. 438 ; Carey Talbott v. Armstrong, 14 Ind. 254 ;
v. Boyles, 53 Wis. 574; Magee v. Carver v. Grove, 68 Ind. 371.
Magee, 51 111.500. s Blackburn v. Gregson, 1 Bro.
^ec. 9, art. 13, ch. 38, Gen. Ch. 420; s. c, 1 Cox Ch. 90, 100.
Stat. ; Bradley v. Curtis, 79 Ky. 4 Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Ves.
327. 340; s. c, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 289.
2 Nutter v. Fouch, 86 Ind. 451. Chief Justice Marshall in Bayley
See also Crane v. Palmer, 8 Blackf. v. Greenleaf, 7 Wheat. 46, 51, uses
120; Fisher v. Johnson, 5 Ind. 492; this language : "But whether the
590 EQUITABLE LIENS. [§ 248.
vergence of views. In a case before the Supreme Court
of the State of New York, Mr. Justice Potter said: "It
has become one of the best established principles of
natural equity, and the courts should ever be prompt to
maintain it in its full vigor, that estates are to be regarded
as unconscientiously obtained where the consideration is
not paid. To enforce such an equity the court began at
an early day to attach to the vendee the character of a
trustee, by implication, for the vendor, and as holding the
estate by contract, to be conveyed upon payment of the
consideration. The doctrine of an equitable lien for un-
paid purchase money was derived from the Roman civil
law, and applied as well to chattel or personal property as
to real estate."1 On the contrary, in a leading case before
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Chief Justice
Gray, in his opinion, said: "The theory that a trust arises
out of the unconscientiousness of the purchaser would con-
strue the non-performance of every promise, made in con-
sideration of a conveyance of property to the promisor,
into a breach of trust ; and would attach the trust, not
merely to the purchase money which he agreed to pay, but
lien of the vendor be established an act which exhibits the vendee
as 'a natural equity,' or from anal- as the complete owner of an estate
ogy to the principle, that in a bar- on which he claims a secret Hen.
gain and sale, the bargainor stands It would seem inconsistent with the
seized in trust for the bargainee principles of equity, and with the
unless the money be paid, still it is general spirit of our laws, that such
a secret invisible trust, known only a lien should be set up in a Court
to the vendor and vendee, and to of Chancery, to the exclusion of
those to whom it may be commu- &<ma ./Me creditors. The court would
nicated in fact. To the world the require cases in which this princi-
vendee appears to hold the estate, pie is expressly decided, before its
divested of any trust whatever; correctness can be admitted."
and credit is given to him, in the ' Warren v. Penn, 28 Barb. 333,
confidence that the property is his 334 ; See also Hiscock v. Norton,
own in equity, as well as law. A 42 Mich. 320 ; Pintard v. Goodloe,
vendor relying upon this lien, Hempst. 527; Poe v. Paxton, 26 W.
ought to reduce it to a mortgage, Va. 607 ; Barrett v. Lewis, 106 Ind.
so as to give notice of it to the 120; Bennett v. Shipley, 82 Mo.
world. If he does not, he is, in 448; Pratt v. Clarke, 57 Mo. 191;
some degree, accessory to the Phillips v. Schall, 21 Mo. App. 38.
fraud committed on the public, by
§ 248.]
EQUITABLE LIENS.
591
to the land which he never agreed to hold for the benefit
of the supposed cestui que trust."1 On the question of
the presumed intention of the parties, Chief Justice Gib-
son, of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, held the fol-
lowing : ' 'The implication that there is an intention to re-
serve a lieu for the purchase money, in all cases in which
the parties do not, by express acts, evince a contrary in-
tention,-is in almost every case inconsistent with the truth
of the fact, and in all instances without exception, in con-
tradiction of the express terms of the contract, which pur-
port to be a conveyance of everything that can pass."2
1 Ahrend v. Odiorne, 118 Mass.
261, 264; s. C, 19 Am. Rep. 449.
"Mr. Justice Story in Gilman v.
Brown, 1 Mason, 191, 221, 222, upon
a review of the English cases, con-
cluded that the right of the vendor
was not 'an equitable estate in the
land itself, although sometimes
that appellation is loosely applied
to it;' but 'a right which has no
existence, until it is established by
the decree of a court in the partic-
ular case, and is then made sub-
servient to all the other equities
between the parties, and enforced
in its own ["peculiar manner and
upon its own peculiar principle.'
The most plausible foundation of
the English doctrine would seem
to be that justice required that the
vendor should be enabled, by some
form of judicial process, to charge
the land in the hands of the vendee
as security for the unpaid purchase
money. And the restriction of the
doctrine of real estate suggests the
inference that the Court of Chan-
cery was induced to interpose by
the consideration that by the law
of England real estate could neither
he attached on mesne process, nor,
except in certain cases or to a lim-
ited extent, taken in execution for
• debt." Ibid.
2 Kauffelt v. Bower, 7 Serg. & K.
64, 70, 77. "The construction, there-
fore, which, independently of fraud
or mistake, reserves an interest
against the express language of
the parties, is unnatural and un-
just. Indeed the distinctions taken,
both as to the creation of the lien,
and those circumstances which are
held to be a waiver of it, are so
purely arbitrary, that the mind is
often puzzled to find the reason of
them. Thus the assumption, that
taking an independent security is
inconsistent with an intention to
retain the lien is merely gratuitous ;
for the parties might in all reason
just as well be supposed to have
intended the security to be cumu-
lative. It is inconsistent with nat-
ural justice, that a vendor who
publishes to the world by the terms
of his deed, that he has parted with
his whole interest, and has trusted
to the personal security of the ven-
dee, should become an object of
special protection, against the con-
sequences of his own negligence;
and that, too, at the expense of a
third person, who, in purchasing
from the vendee, even with notice
that the purchase money was un-
paid, has been guilty of nothing
positively immoral, or even uncon-
592 EQUITABLE LIENS. [§ 249.
§ 249. The Subject Continued. — From the preceding
decisions and opinions it appears that very able jurists have
held that the vendor's lien has a well established basis in
equity, and that for the best of reasons it should be upheld
and enforced by the courts. It appears also, on the other
hand, that authorities of equal weight have denied that it
has any substantial or clearly defined equitable ground. It
may be said that no topic appertaining to equity jurispru-
dence has given rise in its treatment to a greater diver-
gence of views, or to a more direct and positive conflict of
judicial decisions than that of the vendor's lien. Even at
this late day, notwithstanding all the* legal learning and
acumen that have been brought to bear upon it, numerous
questions relating to it remain unsettled by the American
courts. On the questions, where and on what equitable
principle the lien attaches, what constitutes a waiver or
abandonment of the claim, and as to the parties in whose
favor the lien arises and against whom it is operative, the
decisions, not only in the different States, but also in some
cases in the same State, are in unqualified conflict. The
formulating of a doctrine of equity that will be of universal,
or even of general application in this country, is a prac-
ticable impossibility. The decision of each and every case
must be determined, not only by the State legislation, or
the decisions of the local courts, but also by the circum-
stances under which the property is transferred.1
scionable. In practice it is never settled rules, but on the contrary,
understood with us that a lien is the existence of the lien is gener-
reserved; for it is so entirely tech- ally made to depend upon the pe-
nical that none but a lawyer would culiar state of facts and circum-
suspect that it existed." Ibid. stances surrounding the particular
1 "Tt may be remarked that the case, that is, whether or not a case
law of equity, which establishes the of natural equity is established;
right of lien in the vendor for nn- and, if so, whether it is not made to
paid purchase money of the lands yield to higher or superior equities
sold to the vendee, is an anomaly in some other person — whether the
in the law, and though it exists in party is not to be regarded as hav-
certain cases, and perhaps we may ing waived it, or as having intended
say generally as between vendor to waive or postpone it to another
and vendee, its existence depends equity — or whether by the acts or
upon, and is controlled by, no well omissions to act, or by the neglect
§ 250. J EQUITABLE LIENS. 593
§ 250. Trust from Creditor's Lien. — Equity raises a
trust in favor of a creditor against an executor and against
legatees and distributees in some cases in which the law
affords no relief. Under the common law, a testator who
appointed his debtor to be his executor, by that act ex-
tinguished his debt ; but equity revives the obligation and
holds him as trustee for the party or parties who are en-
titled to the surplus of the estate, to the extent of his debt.1
Where the legatees or distributees have received the amount
of their claims from the executor, who by mistake, but
acting in good faith, has paid their claims before the pay-
ment of the debts, the creditor may follow the assets of
the testator into their hands. Whatever they have received
from the estate they will hold as a trust fund for the pay-
ment of the debts of the testator. The legatees and dis-
tributees are in equity held as trustees for this purpose.
They are not entitled to anything beside what remains after
the debts are paid. In a case of this character the creditor
may recover of the executor by a suit at law. But in that
event the legatees and distributees would be responsible to
the executor to the amount of the debt.2 The reliance of
the creditor, however, is mainly upon the trust, as in many
instances he may hold the legatees and distributees as
trustees where the executor, having paid their claims, would
not be able to recover the amount.3 Where the assets are
of the party claiming such lien to 3 Kiddle v. Mandeville, 5 Cranch,
enforce it within a reasonable time, 329, 330 ; Anon. , 1 Vern. 162 ; New-
the right is not lost as being a su- man v. Barton, 2 Vern. 205 ; Noel
perior claim. These considerations v. Robinson, 1 Vern. 94. "A cred-
control and vary the result as equity itor shall follow the assets in equity,
demands." Fisk v. Potter, 2 Keyes, into whosoever hands they come.
64, 68. But where the executor had volun-
1 2 Story, Equity Jurisprudence, tarily paid the full legacy, and af-
1209. See also Hudson v. Hudson, terwards assets proved deficient to
1 Atk. 461 ; Brown v. Selwin, Cas. pay the other legacies, they con-
Jem;). Talbot, 240; Phillips v. Phil- ceived neither the executor, nor
lips, 1 Ch. Cas. 292; s. c, 3 any of the other legatees, should
Wooddes. Lee. 49, pp. 504, 505. compel him to refund; but if the
2 McCall v. Harrison, 1 Brock, payment had not been voluntary,
126; Eussell v. Clark's Exrs., 7 but he had recovered his legacy by
Cranch, 69, 97. decree, then he should have re-
38
594
EQUITABLE LIENS.
[§ 251.
insufficient to pay all the legacies and one has received his
full share, he will be held as a trustee for the amount that
he has received in excess of his equitable proportion.1
§ 251. From Voluntary Conveyance by Trustee. —
Where a trustee conveys trust property without a valuable
consideration and without notice of the trust, the person to
whom it is conveyed will hold it as trustee for the cestui que
trust and with all the liabilities of the trustee from whom
he received it.2 If he had notice of the trust he would be
a party to the fraud, even if he had paid the full value for
the property, and in consequence of the transaction he
would be held as a constructive trustee.3 But if there was
funded." Newman v. Barton, 2
Vera. 205.
1 Noll v. Robinson, 1 Vera. 94.
"A creditor shall compel a legatee
to refund, and so shall one legatee
another, where assets are deficient.
But whether the executor himself,
after he has once voluntarily as-
sented to a legacy, shall compel
the legatee to refund, is causa prima
impressione, and it must be allowed
that there is a great difference be-
tween a voluntary assent, and where
the executor was compelled to as-
sent. We know the common case,
if a man voluntarily pays money to
a bankrupt, after he becomes a
bankrupt, it is in his own wrong,
and he may be forced to pay it
again; but otherwise it is, if the
bankrupt recover it against him by
course of law; and a small matter
shall amount unto an assent to a
legacy ; an assent being but a right-
ful act." Ibid. "So if trustees for
an infant would, with the profits
saved out of the infant's estate, pur-
chase lands, adjoioing to infant's
estate, the court, on application,
will enable them to make such pur-
chase, and indemnify them therein,
but if they do it voluntarily, and of
their own heads, and afterwards
the infant dies within age, they are
accountable to the infant's execu-
tors for the money they shall have
so applied." Earl of Winchelsea
v. Norcliffe, 1 Vera. 434.
2 Mansell v. Mansell, 2 P. Wms.
675. But where there is tenant for
life, remainder to the first son, etc.,
and no trustees to preserve con-
tingent remainders, in such case, if
tenant for life, by fine or feoffment,
destroys the remainders, there be-
ing no trustee, there can be conse-
quently no breach of trust; and this
being the law, chancery will not
interpose ; but then, as this was a
hardship at law, to prevent which,
the method of appointing trustees
was invented, so it is reasonable
that the trustees, when they let in
this hardship by violating the
trust reposed in them, should them-
selves be liable for the same; but if
the conveyance be voluntary, or if
there be notice of the trust, such
trust shall follow the land. Pye v.
Gorge, 1 P. Wms. 128, 129.
» Patten v. Moore, 32 N. H. 382;
Swan v. Ligan, 1 McCord Ch. 232;
Everts v. Agnes, 4 Wis. 356 ; Frost v.
Beekman. 1 Johns. Ch. 288; Jerrard
§ 252. J EQUITABLE LIENS. 595
a valuable consideration without notice, he would hold the
property unaffected by a trust.1 But where a person
comes into possession of trust property, not through the
voluntary act of the trustee, but by process" of law, he will
not be subject to the trust, even though he had notice of
its existence. In obtaining possession he secures to him-
self a title higher than that of the trustee.2 The registry
of a deed of land executed and acknowledged by a grantor
who had no right to the granted premises, is not construct-
ive notice to the true owner that such conveyance has been
made. The registry of - a deed is constructive notice only
to after-purchasers under the same grantor.3
§ 252. From Trust in Absence of Trustee. — Where a
trust has been created and no trustee appointed, or where
from any cause the office has become vacant, all persons
into whose hands the trust property comes on account of
the lack of a trustee, will be treated in equity as trustees,
and required to account for it and to convey it as the court
may direct.4 Where a testator makes a devise in trust and
v. Saunders, 2 Ves. Jr. 454; Boone Neve v. Le Neve, Amb. 436; s. c,
v. Barnes, 23 Miss. 136; Upshaw v. 3 Atk. 646; Brooke v. Bulkeley, 2
Hargrove, 6 Sm. & M. 292. It is Ves. 498; Daniels v. Davidson, 16
not material if the mortgage, of Ves. 249; Wigg v. Wigg, 1 Atk.
which a purchaser had notice, is 382 ; Adair v. Shaw, 1 Sch. & Lef .
defective against a bona fide pur- 262.
chaser. If it is valid "between the 2 Reynolds v. Jones, 2 S. & S.
parties to it it will be so against 206.
him. Patten v. Moore, 32 N". H. 3 Bates v. Norcross, 14 Pick. 224,
382. 231. "It has been argued that the
1 Wormley v. Wormley, 8 Wheat, registry of the deed is presumptive
421 ; Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How. 333 ; notice ; but we think not. It is only
Caldwell v. Carrington, 9 Pet. 86; evidence of notice to after-purchas-
Wright v. Dame, 22 Pick. 55 ; Pee- ers under the same grantor. To
bles v. Reading, 8 Serg. & R. 495 ; hold the proprietors of land, t-o take
Denn v. McKnight, 6 Halst. 385 ; notice of the records of deeds, to
Murray v. Ballou, 1 Johns. Ch. 566 ; determine whether some stranger
Massey v. Mcllwaine, 2 Hill Eq. has without right made conveyance
42b ; Liggett v. Wall, 2 A. K. Marsh, of their lands, would be a most
149; Truesdell v. Calloway, 6 Miss, dangerous doctrine, and cannot be
605 ; Jones v. Shaddock, 41 Ala. sustained with any color of reason
362; Ryan v. Doyle, 31 Iowa, 53; or authority." Ibid.
James v. Cowing, 17 Hun, 256; 4 White v. White, 1 Bro. Ch. 12;
Smith v. Walter, 49 Mo. 250; Le Dodkin v. Brunt, L. R. 6 Eq. 580;
596 EQUITABLE LIENS. [§ 253.
fails to name a trustee, or the trustee named declines the
trust or fails to execute it, the heir or heirs-at-law will hold
the estate in trust, or the court may appoint other trustees.1
It is a maxim of equity that no trust can be permitted to
fail for lack of a trustee, and courts of equity have full au-
thority to supply any lack of this character.2 In North
Carolina it has been held that where a husband executed a
deed, intending thereby to secure certain property to his
wife and her children by him, he having theretofore pro-
vided for his other children by a prior marriage ; and he
afterwards, and until his death, recognized said deed as
passing the property as he intended, though the same, be-
ing made directly to the wife, was insufficient for the pur-
pose ; and that these circumstances constituted a meritorious
consideration; a court of equity will hold the husband's
representative a trustee for the widow.3 In a case in which
a trustee dies without heirs, and in consequence the legal
title would escheat to the crown or to the State, equity fol-
lows the property and executes the trust by the appoint-
ment of another trustee.4
§ 253. From Dissolution of Corporation. — The direc-
tors of a private corporation hold its stock and other prop-
Sonley v. Clockmakers' Co., IBro. Conn. 315; Skinner v. Harrison
Ch. 81 ; Ex parte Turner, 1 Bailey Tp., 116 Ind. ]42; Winslow v.
Ch. 395; King v. Donnelly, 5 Paige, Cummins, 3 Cush. 358; Gibson's
46; Hawley v. James, 5 Paige, Case, 1 Bland, 138; s. c., 17 Am.
318 ; De Peyster v. Clendening, 8 Dec. 257 ; Gaskell v. Green, 152
Paige, 295; Lee v. Randolph, 2 Mass. 526; Adams v. Adams, 21
Hen. & M. 12; Ex parte Kuntz, 1 Wall. 186; Dunbar v. Soule, 129
Bailey, 489; Dawson v. Dawson, Mass. 284; Potter v. Chapin, 6
Bice, 243; Field v. Arrowsmith, 3 Paige, 649; Pickering v. Sbotwell,
Humph. 448; Mounce v. Byars, 11 10 Pa. St. 23; Sinking Fund Com'rs
Ga. 180; Frail v.Ellis, 17 Eng. L. v. Walker, 6 How. (Miss.) 143
& Eq. 457; Kinggold v. Bryan, 3 S. C, 38 Am. Dec. 433.
Md. Ch. 488; Hamilton v. Fowlkes, 3 Garner v. Garner, Busbee Eq
16 Ark. 340 ; Hopkins v. Garrard, 6 1 ; Huntley v. Huntley, 8 Ired. Eq,
B. Mon. 67. 250.
1 Stone v. Griffin. 3 Vt. 400. * Stat. 4 and 5 Will. IV., ch. 23
2 McCartney v. Bostwick, 32 N. Hughes v. Wells, 9 Hare, 749; s. c,
Y. 53; Vidal v. Girard, 2 How. 13 Eng. L. & Eq. 389.
128; Dailey v. New Haven, 60
§ 253.]
EQUITABLE LIENS.
597
erty in trust. The primary obligation of this trust is the
payment of the corporation debts, and subsequent to that
the meeting of the claims of the stockholders. Neither of
these claims is extinguished by a dissolution of the corpo-
ration. Any property of the corporation that has not
come into the possession of a bona fide purchaser is held in
trust, first, for the payment of the debts of the corporation;
and, secondly, for the discharge of the claims of the stock-
holders.1 On this ground the stock of a bank, if the bank
is a corporation, is a trust fund for all of its debts. Hence
no stockholder can avail himself of any dividend, or appro-
priate any share of capital stock, until the debts of the cor-
poration are paid. And where the corporation is dissolved
and the property divided among the stockholders, they will
hold it in trust for the payment of the debts, if any remain
unpaid. Each would be required to contribute pro rata to
the discharge of this obligation.2 In cases of this char-
1 Mumma v. The Potomac Com-
pany, 8 Pet. 281, 286 ; Hastings v.
Drew. 76 ST. Y. 9; Hill v. Fogg, 41
Mo. 562; Vose v. Grant, 15 Mass.
505; Spear v. Grant, 16 Mass. 9;
Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason, 308;
National Bank, etc. v. Lake Shore,
etc. R. R. Co., 21 Ohio St. 232;
Flitcroft's Case, 21 Ch. D. 519,
525.
2 Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason,
308; Vosev. Grant, 15 Mass. 505,
522; Spear v. Grant, 16 Mass. 9,
15; Curson v. African Company, 1
Vern. 121; s. c, Skinner, 84. An
incorporated bank divided three-
fourths of its capital stock, before
the expiration of its charter, among
the stockholders without providing
funds which ultimately were suffi-
cient to pay its outstanding bank
notes. It was held: 1. That the
capital stock was a trust fund for
the payment of the bank notes,
and might be followed into the
hands of the stockholders. 2. That
a bill in equity for such pur-
pose might be maintained by some
of the holders of the bank notes
against some of the stockholders,
the impossibility of bringing all
before the court being sufficient to
dispense with the ordinary rule of
making all parties in interest par-
ties. 3. That in such case the de-
cree against the stockholders be-
fore the court should be only for
their contributory share of the debt,
in the proportion which the stock
held by them, bore to the whole
capital stock. 4. That the holder
of bank notes payable to bearer, is
not an assignee of a chose in action
within the eleventh section of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, limit-
ing the jurisdiction of the circuit
court. Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason,
308. See also Frost v. Belmont, 6
Allen, 152; Citizens' Loan Associ-
ation v. Lyon, 29 N. J. Eq. 110;
Merchants' Line v. Waganer, 71
Ala. 581; Dimpfell v. Ohio R. Co.,
110 TJ. S. 209; Detroit v. Dean, 106
U. S. 537; Hawes v. Oakland, 104
598 EQUITABLE LIENS. [§ 254.
acter the remedy is to be sought in a court of equity. A
court of law can afford only very inadequate relief.1
§ 254. Trusts from Partnership Debts. — The doctrine
of equity set forth in the preceding section applies to the
debts of a partnership. The property of the firm is a trust
fund and the primary obligation of the managers in their
control of it is the payment of the partnership debts.
Where the firm is insolvent the firm debts must be
paid before any part of the funds can be devoted to
the payment of the debts of any of the partners.2
"The creditors, indeed, have no lien, but they have
something approaching to a lien; that is, they have
the right to sue at law, and by judgment and execu-
tion to obtain possession of the property; and in equity
they have a right to follow it as a trust into the possession
of all persons who have not a superior title. But in the
meantime the creditors cannot prevent the partners from
transferring it by a bona fide alienation."3 In Case v.'
Beauregard, before the Supreme Court of the United
States, Mr. Justice Strong, in delivering the opinion of the
court, said : "No doubt the effects of a partnership belong
to it so long as it continues in existence, and not to the in-
dividuals who compose it. The right of each partner ex-
U. S. 450; Brewer v. Boston Thea- the knowledge of his father that
ter, 104 Mass. 378. such an application was a violation
1 2 Story, Equity Jurisprudence, of the understanding with A) to
§ 1252. pay a debt which he, with his
2 Hoxie v. Carr, 1 Sumn. 181, father as surety, was owing indi-
182; Nicoll v. Mumford, 4 Johns, vidnally to his father. And then
Ch. 522; West v. Skipp. 1 Ves. 239, his father sued A on the firm's
456. A and B, in dissolving part- note. Held, that the assets of the
nership, set off each to the other a firm set off to B were subject to no
specific part of the assets of the trust for the payment of the note,
firm, and each as to the other as- which A could enforce in equity
sumed and agreed to pay a specific against B and his father; and that
part of its liabilities. Among the the action on the note could be
liabilities assumed by B was a maintained. Giddings v. Palmer,
promissory note due from the firm 107 Mass. 269.
to his father. But instead of ap- 3 2 Story, Equity Jurisprudence,
plying his portion of assets to pay § 1253.
this note, B applied them (with
§ 254.] EQUITABLE LIENS. 599
tends only to a share of what may remain after payment of
the debts of the firm and the settlement of its accounts.
Growing out of this right, or rather included in it, is the
right to have the partnership property applied to the pay-
ment of the partnership debts in preference to those of any
individual partner. This is an equity the partners have as
between themselves, and in certain circumstances it enures
to the benefit of the creditors of the firm. The latter are
said to have a privilege or preference, sometimes loosely
denominated a lien, to have the debts due to them paid out of
the assets of a firm in course of liquidation, to the exclusion
of the creditors of its several members. Their equity, how-
ever, is a derivative one. It is not held or enforceable in
their own right. It is practically a subrogation to the equity
of the individual partner, to be made effective only through
him. Hence, if he is not in a condition to enforce it, the
creditors of the firm cannot be. But so long as the equity
of the partner remains in him, so long as he retains an in-
terest in the firm assets as a partner, a court of equity will
allow the creditors of the firm to avail themselves of his
equity, and enforce through it the application of those
assets primarily to payment of the debts due them when-
ever the property comes under its administration."1
1 Case v. Beauregard, 99 U. S. State, that the equities of creditors
119, 125. Between the partners must be worked out through the
themselves the assets of the firm medium of that of the partners,
constitute a fund for the payment When a creditor levies on the prop-
of their liabilities, and each mem- erty of a firm, his execution fixes
ber has an equity which he can en- and attaches to this right to the
force to accomplish this result, same extent that it existed in the
and of consequence a lien on the partners, and hence the preference
property to this extent provided he over a separate execution creditor
has not parted with it. But if he in the distribution. All this is pred-
has sold out, relinquished or never icable of a case of joint property
has in fact, as in this case, consum- only. But where there was no joint
mated an interest by compliance property, the rule has nothing to
with his agreement, there can be operate on. The mere name is not
no lien. Now it is well settled, enough in such case — there must
beginning with Ex parte Buffin, 6 be an equity. If that equity never
Ves. 119, and recognized ever since existed, a creditor's execution
in England, and in most of the could not attach to any right,
States in the Union, and in our amounting to a lien to have the
600
EQUITABLE LIENS.
[§ 255.
§ 255. Trust from Deposit of Title Deeds. — In Eng-
land it has long been well settled that a mere deposit of
title deeds upon an advance of money, without any form of
contract or agreement between the parties, creates an equi-
table lien.1 But Lord Eldon expressed his regret that this
doctrine had been established and his purpose not to extend
it.2 In this country a few of the States only have accepted
and established the English doctrine. In Chase v. Peck,
before the New York Court of Appeals, Mr. Justice Denio
said: "The courts of equity in this State have adopted
the general doctrines of the English chancery upon this
assets appropriated to a partner-
ship debt. Appeal of the York
County Bank, 32 Pa. St. 446, 451.
The right of partnership creditors
to claim a preference over the
creditors of the individual mem-
bers of the firm, in the distribution
of the partnership property, is
wholly dependent upon the right
of the individual partners to en-
force a lien upon the partnership
funds for the payment of the part-
nership liabilities, before individ-
ual debts ; and if the contract of
copartnership be of such a nature,
that the copartners can enforce no
such right as between themselves,
the partnership creditors can claim
no such preference. Rice v. Bar-
nard, 20 Vt. 479. See also Baker's
Appeal, 9 Harris, 76; Fitzpatrick
v. Flanagan, 106 U. S. 655.
1 Ex parte Langston, 17 Ves. 230 ;
Ede v. Knowles, 29 Ch. 172; Dixon
v. Muckleston, L. R. 8 Ch. App.
155, 162; Ex parte Arkwright, 3M.,
D. & De. G. 129 ; Lacon v. Allen, 3
Drew. 579; Ashton v. Dalton, 2
Coll. 565; Ex parte Hunt, 1 M., D.
& D. 139; Jones v. Williams, 24
Beav. 47 ; Manningford v. Toleman,
1 Coll. 670; Stackhouse v. Countess
of Jersey, 1 J. & H. 721 ; Parker v.
ClarKe, 30 Beav. 54 ; Joyce v. De
Moleyns, 2 J. & H. 374; Baillie v.
McKerven, 35 Beav. 177 ; Ex parte
Kensington, 2 Ves. & B. 79; Bay-
nard v. Wooley, 20 Beav. 583; Na-
tional Bank of Australia v. Cherry,
L. R. 3 P. C. 299; Whitbread v.
Jordan, 1 Younge & C. 303; Price
v. Bury, 2 Drew. 41, 42; Parker v.
Housefield, 2 Myl. & K. 419; Ex
parte Hooper, 1 Meriv. 7 ; Ex parte
Wright, 19 Ves. 255 ; Exparte Whit-
bread, 19 Ves. 209 ; Pye v. Daubuz,
2 Dick. 759; Russell v. Russell, 1
Bro. Ch. 269; Turner v. Letts, 7 De
G., M. & G. 243; Roberts v. Croft,
2 De G. & J. 1 ; Layard v. Maud, L.
R. 4 Eq. 397; Newton v. Newton,
L. R. 6Eq. 135; s. C, 4 Ch. 143;
Thorpe v. Holdsworth, L. R. 7Eq.
139; Briggs v. Jones, L. R. 10 Eq.
92 ; In re Durham, etc. Soc.,L. R.
12 Eq. 516; Maxfield v. Burton, L.
R. 17 Eq. 15; Waldy v. Gray, L. R.
20 Eq. 238 ; Ratcliffe v. Barnard, L.
R. 6 Ch. 652; Exparte Holthausen,
L. R. 9 Ch. 722; In re Trethowan,
L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 559; Keate v. Phil-
lips, 18 Ch. Div. 560 ; In re Morgan,
L. R. 18 Ch. Div. 93. See also
"Equitable Mortgages by Deposit
of Title Deeds," 16 Sol. J. &
Rep. 669; also 14 Cent. L. J.
426 ; 4 Kent, Commentaries, 150.
2 Ex parte Haigh, 11 Ves. 403.
§ 255.] EQUITABLE LIENS. 601
subject, as upon many others. The cases of a mortgage
created by a writing not sufficient to convey the premises,
or by a deposit of title deeds, have not been frequent with
us; but the doctrine has been applied in a few instances,
and I do not find any judgment or dictum by which it has
ever been questioned."1 In Griffin v. Griffin, the Court of
Chancery of New Jersey held: "By the law of England
and the State of New York, if a debtor deposits unrecorded
title deeds with his creditor as security for his debt, such
deposit constitutes an equitable mortgage on the land for
the debt, and this court will not compel the creditor, where
he resides or is found in this State with deeds in his pos-
session for lands in New York, so deposited in that State,
to surrender them until the debt ispaid."2 In a casebefore
the High Court of Errors and Appeals of the State of Mis-
sissippi, Chief Justice Sharkey, in his opinion, said: "A
deposit of all the title deeds, as a security for a debt created
at the time the deposit is made, is generally recognized as
constituting an equitable mortgage. Such equitable liens
have met with very decided opposition in England, though
they have been generally sustained, but it is admitted on
1 Chase v. Peck, 21 ST. Y. 587; v. Hobby, 2 Sandf. Ch. 9. See
Rockwell v. Hobby, 2 Sandf. Ch. 9; contra, Lehman t. Collins, 69 Ala.
Jacksonv.Dunlap,l Johns. Cas. 114; 127; Gothard v.Flynn, 25 Miss. 58
Jackson v. Parkhurst, 4 Wend. 369. Meador v. Meador, 3 Heisk. 562
"In absence of all other proof, the Bicknell v. Bicknell, 31 Vt. 498
evidence of an advance of money, Shitz v. Dieffenbach, 3 Pa. St. 233
and the finding of the deeds of the Thomas' Appeal, 30 Pa. St. 378
borrower in the possession of the Edwards' Exrs. v. Trumbull, 50 Pa
lender, is held to establish an St. 509; Bowers v. Oyster, 3 Penr.
equitable mortgage. In the case & W. 239 ; Probasco v. Johnson, 2
before me, the deed went into the Disn. 96; Bloom v. ISToggle, 4 Ohio
possession of the testator for some St. 45, 56 ; Vanmeter v. McFadden,
purpose. None is specifically 8 B. Mon. 435.
proved; but there is an advance of 2 Griffin v. Griffin, 18 N. J. Eq.
money proved, — an advance which 104. "Ii the owner of lands pledges
went to discharge a mortgage given his deeds, which are his property,
in truth for a part of the purchase as security for a debt, neither he
money of the land described in the nor his heirs are entitled to their
deed. The only inference is that return until the debt is paid, apart
the deed was deposited as a secu- from the doctrine of equitable
rity for such advance." Rockwell mortgage." Ibid.
602 EQUITABLE LIENS. [§ 255.
all hands that they should not be extended beyond their
present limit. Such a mortgage is in direct opposition to
the statute of frauds, in regard to which we have said that
we will create no exceptions not found in the statute. Lord
El don said that in departing from the rule of the statute there
was no rule to go by, and it was essential that those who
wished to render such securities valid should learn the util-
ity of requiring two or three lines in writing."1 These
words correctly and very forcibly indicate the attitude of
the courts in the States in which the English doctrine has
been accepted. It is recognized with at least an implied
protest. But in a later case this decision was not sustained.
In Gothard v. Flynn it was held that a person cannot by a
mere deposit of a title deed incumber his estate for a longer
term than one year.2 In Rhode Island it has been held
that the deposit of a deed conveying the legal title to an
estate as security for the amount of a mortgage upon it,
relinquished by the mortgagee to the depositor to enable
him to obtain the title from the holder of the equity of re-
demption, constitutes an equitable mortgage upon the es-
tate as between the original parties to the deposit and^those
subject to their equities, which a court of equity will estab-
lish and enforce by sale of the depositor's interest in it,
and the interest of those holding the legal title for him, or
subject to his equity, especially when necessary to prevent
gross fraud and breach of trust from being practiced by
the purchaser upon the mortgagee.3
1 Williams v. Stratton, 10 Sm. & them reduced to writing and signed
M. 418, 426. by the party to be charged in all
2 Gothard v. Flynn, 25 Miss. 58. cases required by the statute. The
"The laws on the subject of charg- courts then will be relieved from
ing or conveying real estate are the necessity of resorting to vague
plain and simple, and the fewer de- and frequently contradictory evi-
partures allowed from their plain dence, to ascertain what the con-
and obvious meaning the better for tract was between the parties."
society ; for when men know that Ibid.
the courts will only enforce those 3 Hackett v. Reynolds, 4 K. I.
contracts which have been made 512. See also Welsh v. Usher, 2
according to well established rules Hill Eq. 167,170; s.C.,29 Am. Dec.
of law, they will become more cau- 63 ; First National Bank v. Cald-
tious in making them, and having well, 4 Dill. 314; Mounce v. Byars,
§ 256. J EQUITABLE LIENS. 603
§ 256. Trustee from Wrongful Possession. — Where a
person, without having a legal right to do so, assumes the
possession and management of property, he becomes the
trustee of the equitable owner, and is accountable to him
for his execution of the trust. In New York it has been
held that where a person, administrator cum testamenlo
annexe, assumes to act as the trustee of real estate under
the will, those parties interested in the property ma}' con-
sider him, not only as a wrongdoer in possession, but as
a trustee, and charge him with neglect, have him removed,
and a proper trustee appointed.1 Where a person enters
upon and takes charge of the estate of an infant he is held
in equity to have entered as his guardian, and as such as his
trustee, and when the infant comes of age he may, by a
bill in equity, recover the rents and profits. This rule has
the same application to personalty as to real property.2
In California it has been held that where an administrator
is sued in equity by the people to compel him to pay over
to the county treasurer money collected by the intestate,
as tax collector, that he occupied the position of one
who takes possession, without authority, of property
belonging to another, and that he may be treated as a
trustee de son tort.3 Where a trustee has obtained posses-
16 Ga. 469; Jarvis v. Dutcher, 16 the rents and profits of real estate,
Wis. 327; Hall v. McDuff, 24 Me. where infants are the parties com-
311; Wright v. Shumway, 1 Biss. plainants in both cases. Believing
23; Hill v. Eldred, 49 Cal. 398; that there is no such distinction,
Bobinson v. Urquhart, 12 N. J. we determine that courts of equity
Eq. 523. have jurisdiction in such cases,"
1 Le Fort v. Benton, 3 Edw. Ch. Chaney v. Smallwood, 1 Gill, 365,
33. 371. See also Bloomfield v. Eyre,
2 Drury v. Conner, 1 Har. & G. 8 Beav. 250.
220; Chaney v. Smallwood, 1 Gill, 3 People v. Houghtaling, 7 Cal.
365; Burnett v. Whitehead, 2 P. 348; McCoy v. Scott, 2Kawle,222;
Wms. 645; Morgan v. Morgan, 1 In re Schwartz's Estate, 14 Pa. St.
Atk. 489; Dormer v. Fortescue, 3 42; Wyllie v. Ellice, 6 Hare, 505;
Atk. 130. "We are unable to dis- Pearce v. Pearce, 22 Beav. 248;
cover any sound reason to exclude Life Association v. Siddall, 3 De
the jurisdiction of courts of equity G., F. & J. 58 ; Hennessey v. Bray,
from affording similar relief in re- 33 Beav. 96 ; Kockham v. Siddall,
lation to personal estate, as it is 16 Sim. 297; s. C, 1 Macn. & G.
adjudged they have in regard to 607; White School House v. Post,
(104 EQUITABLE LIENS. [§§ 257-258.
sion of the trust estate by virtue of an appointment, neither
he nor his surety can avoid accounting for it by reason of
any irregularity in the proceedings.1
§ 257. Creditor as Trustee for Surety. — \Vhere a per-
son, as surety for the debt of another, pays the debt, in
this act he becomes entitled to any other securities for the
debt which the creditor may hold. The payment of the
debt by the surety puts him, by subrogation, in the place
of the creditor in this regard. The creditor holds the
securities as trustee for the surety. Where A sued B,
and attached property, and C became receiptor and surety
for the payment of B's debt, and, on judgment being
obtained, paid it to the officer having the execution, and
A subsequently accepted the money paid; and afterwards
C sued the judgment against B in A's name, obtained a
new judgment, and levied the execution on real estate
attached in the suit ; it was held that C had all the rights
of an assignee, and was entitled to relief in equity against
A, who had refused to convey to him the land levied
upon."2
§ 258. Bank as Trustee for Equitable Owner of De-
posit.— Where one person sells the property of another
and receives the value in money, or otherwise comes into
the possession of money belonging to another, and deposits
31 Conn. 240, 259 ; Hill on Trustees, bailiff, guardian and trustee of the
p. 173. infant at the election of the plaint-
1 The People v. Norton, 9 N". Y. iff. Where it appears that several
176; Campbell v. Johnston, 1 persons entered on and held the
Sandf. Ch. 148. It is an estab- estate of an infant, one of such
lished principle of equity that if persons cannot be sued by the in-
ODe intrude upon the estate of an fant in equity as his bailiff, guard-
infant, and take the profits thereof, ian or trustee, for an account of the
he will be treated as a guardian, rents and profits of the estate,
and held responsible therefor to without making parties to the suit
the infant in a suit in equity, the others of such persons. Wyl-
Goodhue v. Barnwell, Eice Eq. lie v. Ellice, 6 Hare, 505.
198. A party entering upon, and 2 Garnsey v. Gardner, 49 Me. 167.
taking the rents and profits of an See also Fortescue v. Barnett, 3
infant's estate, may be sued at law Myl. &K. 36; Twitchell v. Drury,
as a trespasser, or in equity as the 25 Mich. 393.
§ 259. J EQUITABLE LIENS. 605
the money in a bank to his own credit, the equitable owner
of the money, by giving notice to the bank of the facts,
with indemnity and demanding the money, makes the bank
a trustee of the money for his benefit. In a case where B
employed S to take timber from B's land, to allow B one
cent per foot, he to have a lien on the timber for the pay-
ment; S took the timber, sold it, and received a note for
it in his own name ; it was collected by a bank ; B gave
the bank notice that the proceeds were his, and not to pay
to S, and indemnified it. The bank paid S. It was held
that B could recover the amount, with interest. The lum-
ber being B's, the fund was his, and could be followed
through any transmutation so long as it could be identified.
Where notice, with indemnity, is given to a bank not to
pay money to a depositor, the payment is at the bank's
risk.1
§ 259. Equitable Lien from Repairs and Improve-
ments.— Where one of several joint owners of any real
estate, or other property, makes repairs and improvements
on such property for the common benefit of all the owners,
an equitable lien arises for the amount of money so ex-
pended. This lien may arise from a contract, either ex-
press or implied, between the parties, or it may be estab-
lished by a court of equity from the general principle of
justice involved. Where there is an attempt on the part
of one of the joint owners to escape the payment of his
proportion of the expense, equity applies the maxim, nemo
debet locupletari ex alterius incommodo ? This doctrine is
broader in equity than at law, and in equity repairs and
improvements, in many instances, will be held to constitute
not only a charge on the estate, but also an equitable lien.
It has been held that where two or more persons make a
joint purchase, and one of them expends a considerable
sum in repairs or improvements, and dies, the sum so ex-
pended will be a lien on the estate, and r. trust will arise in
'First Nat'l Bank v. Bacne, 71 2 Bouvier, Law Die. tit. Maxims;
Pa. St. 213. Jenkins' Cent. 4; Branch, Maxims.
606
EQUITABLE LIENS.
[§ 259.
favor of his representative.1 In making repairs or im-
provements a trustee must be governed, not only by the
necessities of the case, but also by the probable duration
of the trust.2 The establishment of a lien by courts of
1 Lake v. Craddock, 1 Eq. Abr.
291; s. C.,3P. Wms.ISS; 2Fonbl.
Eq. B..2, ch. 4, §2, note (g) ; Scott
v. Nesbitt, 14 Ves. 444. "It seems
that where two or more persons
purchase an estate and one, for
instance, pays all the money, and
the estate is conveyed to them
both, the one who paid the money
cannot call upon those who paid
no part of it to repay him their
shares of the purchase money, or
to convey their shares of the estate
to him; for, by payment of all the
money, he gains neither a lien nor
a mortgage, because there is no
contract for either. Nor can it be
construed a resulting trust, as
such a trust cannot arise at an after
period, and perhaps the only rem-
edy he has is to file a bill against
him for a contribution. See "Wood
v Birch, and Wood v. Norman,
Rolls, 7 and 8 March, 1S04, the
decree in which case does not,
however, authorize the observa-
tion; but the author conceives it
to follow from what fell from the
Master of the Kolls at the hearing.
Whenever, therefore, two persons
agree to purchase an estate,
it should be stipulated in the
agreement that if by the default
of either of them the other shall
be compelled to pay the whole, or
greater part of the purchase money,
the estate shall be conveyed to
him, and he shall hold the entirety
against the other and his heirs,
unless he or they shall, within a
stated time, repay the sum ad-
vanced on their account, with in-
terest in the meantime. But it
has been held that if one of two
joint tenants of a lease renew at
his own expense, and the other
party repay the full benefit of it,
the one advancing the money shall
have a charge on the other moiety
of the estate for a moiety of his
advances on account of the fines,
although such other moiety of the
estate be in strict settlement at
the time of the renewal. The case
was considered to fall within the
principle upon which mortgagees,
who renew leasehold interests,
have been decreed entitled to
charge the amount upon the lands.
Hamilton v. Denny, 1 Ball & B.
199."' Sugden on Vendors, vol. 2,
ch. 15, § 1, pp. 131, 132 (9th ed.).
- Rathbun v. Colton, 15 Pick.
471. Where the rent of a trust
estate is increased in consequence
of improvements made by the
trustee, the cestui que trust may be
put to his election, either to allow
the trustee the expense of such
improvements, or be deprived of
the increase of rent obtained
by means thereof, lb. See also
Ex parte Hughes, 6 Ves. 624; Ex
parte Bennett, 10 Ves. 400; York
Building Co. v. Mackenzie, 8 Bro.
P. C. 42; Davey v. Durrant, 1 De
G. & J. 535; Baugh v. Price, 1 G.
Wils. 320; Oliver v. Wilson, 8
Price, 172. But contra, where a
trustee has been guilty of actual
fraud, Thompson v. Gilman, 17 Vt.
109; Stratton v. Murphy, 1 Ir. Eq.
3G1 ; Kenney v. Browne, 3 Eidg.
518. Color of title necessary.
Fitch v. Cornell, 1 Sawy. 15G, 176;
Stark v. Starr, 1 Sawy. 15; Doth-
§ 259.]
EQUITABLE LIENS.
607
equity has not been limited to repairs and improvements
which Avere made by agreement, or to cases of joint
purchase. In a case in New Jersey, the purchaser
was allowed the value added to the property by
the improvements erected by him, and the debts
of his intestate, which he had paid out of the money
arising from the sale, declared void, with interest from the
date of each payment, and was charged with the rent or
occupation value of the premises from the time of the
purchase, less one-third during the life of the widow of
the intestate, who had conveyed to him her right of dower.1
In a recent case in New York it was held that where an
owner has permitted his right to satisfy a mortgage to
remain dormant for nearly thirty years, during which time
others have paid the assessments and taxes and made im-
provements, in the belief that they had title under a fore-
closure of the mortgage, equity will require, as a condition
of his regaining possession, the payment of such assess-
ments and taxes and for such improvements, in addition
to the amount of the mortgage.2 Where a tenant for life
under a will completed improvements begun by the testa-
tor, and which were of permanent value to the estate, the
expenditure was held to be a charge for which the tenant
was entitled to a lien.3 Where a person who was in legal
age v. Stuart, 35 Mo. 251; White
v. Moses, 21 Cal. 34; Woodhull v.
Rosenthal, Gl N. Y. 382, 390; Bell
v. Barnett, 2 J. J. Marsh. 51G.
1 Smith v. Drake, 23 N. J. Eq.
302. See also Canal Bank v. Hud-
son, 111 IT. S. 66, 83; Williams Y.
Gibbs, 20 How. 535; Davis v.
Smith, 5 Ga. 274; Bazemorev. Da-
vis, 55 Ga. 504, 520; Stark v. Starr,
ISawy. 15; Murray v. Gouverneur,
2 Johns. Cas. 411; S. c, 1 Am. Dec.
177; McCoy v. Grandy, 3 Ohio St.
463 ; Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 77,
81 ; Hylton v. Brow, 2 Wash. 165 ;
Willingham v. Long, 47 Ga. 540;
Krause v. Means, 12 Kan. 335;
Bright v. Boyd, 1 Story, 478; Rob-
inson v. Ridley, 6 Madd. 2; Dor-
mer v. Packhurst, 3 Atk. 134. By
the common law improvements
made on land are considered as
annexed to the freehold and pass
with it, and owner is not subjected
to the condition of paying for im-
provements which may have been
made on the land by the occupant.
2 Kent's Commentaries, 334 ; Parson
v. Moses, 16 Iowa, 440, 444 ; Frear
v. Hardenberg, 5 Johns. 272; Mc-
Coy v. Grandy, 3 Ohio St. 463,
466.
2 Miner v. Beekman, 50 X. Y.
337.
3 Hibbert v. Cooke, 1 Sim. & Stu.
552. See Sohier v. Eldredge, 103
608 EQUITABLE LIENS. [§ 260.
possession, though under a defective title, made permanent
improvements, it was held that the equitable owner was
bound to make compensation for such improvements.1
Where a real owner has information that a person in pos-
session, without notice of his title, is making improvements
and suffers the work to proceed, the improvements will
constitute an equitable lien on the estate.2
§ 260. Statutory Lien from Repairs and Improve-
ments.— In most of the States the lien, or other claim
granted by equity to persons who make expenditures on
real estate under the impression that they are improving
their own property, or making an investment for their own
benefit, is secured to this class by legislative enactments.
This end is accomplished by a variety of methods, but it
either grants the person making the expenditures a lien on
the estate, or it holds the equitable owner responsible for
the sum thus expended. In some instances, where the
equitable owner has a claim against the occupant of the
land for the use of it, or for what he has taken from it, one
claim may be an offset to the other.3
Mass. 345, 351 ; Dent v. Dent, 30 incumbrance or charge upon the
Beav. 363. But one whose title is estate, having no notice of any in-
for years, or life, cannot extend his flrmity in his title, he is entitled to
interest in the property beyond the be repaid the amount of such pay-
term by making improvements, ment by the true owner, seeking
Corbitt v. Laurens, 5 Rich. Eq. 301, to recover the estate from him.
315; Taylor v. Foster, 22 Ohio St. Bright v. Boyd, 1 Story, 478, 498.
255; Dunne v. Dunne, 3 Sm. & 2 Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1,
Gif. 22; Floyer v. Banks, L. K. 8 77, 78; Shine v. Gough, 1 B. & B.
Eq. 115. 444; Cawdor v. Lewis, 1 Y. & C.
1 Robinson v. Kidley, 6 Madd. 2; 427; Pilling v. Armitage, 12 Ves.
Atty.-Gen. v. Baliol College, 9 78; Unity, etc. Bank Assoc, v.
Mod. 411; McLaughlin v. Barnum, King, 25 Beav. 72; Miner v. Beek-
31 Md. 425; Sale v. Crutchfleld, 8 man, 50 N. Y. 337; Putnam v.
Bush, 636; ISTorth Hudson K. Co. Ritchie, 6 Paige, 390.
v. Booraem, 28 N. J. Eq. 450. 3 The following is a list of the
There is still another broad prin- States in which claims of this char -
ciple of the Roman law, which is acter are regulated by statute with
applicable to the present case. It references to the works in which
is that where a bona fide possessor the statutes may be found: Ala-
or purchaser of real estate pays bama, Code 1876, §§ 2951, 2954;
money to discharge any existing Arkansas, Dig. 18S4, §,§ 2644,2647;
§ 260.
EQUITABLE LIENS.
609
California, 3 Code and Stat. 1885,
§ 741 (Civil Proc.) ; Colorado, Code
Civ. Proc, § 240; Connecticut,
Rev. Stat. 1875, p. 2G2, § 17; Da-
kota, Code Civ. Proc, §§ 641, 642;
Georgia, Code 1882, § 2006 ; Idaho,
Rev. Stat. 1887, § 4541; Illinois,
1 Am. Stat. 1885, ch. 45, §§ 55, 61 ;
Indiana, Rev. Stat. 1881, §§ 1074,
1079; Iowa, Rev. Code 1880, §§
1976, 1981; Kansas, Comp. L. 1885,
§§ 4418, 4430; Kentucky, Gen. Stat.
1S83, ch. 80 ; Maine, Rev. Stat. 1883,
ch. 104, §§ 20, 43; Massachusetts,
Pub. Stat. 1882, ch. 173, §§ 17, 39;
Michigan, Ann. Stat. 1882, §§ 7835,
7837; Minnesota, Gen. Stat. 1878,
ch. 75, §§ 15, 19; Mississippi, Rev.
Code 1880, § 2512 ; Missouri, Rev.
Stat. 1889, §§ 464-5, 4649 ; Nebraska,
Comp. Stat. 1887, ch. 63, §§ 1, 11;
Nevada, Gen. Stat. 1885, § 3281;
New Hampshire, Gen. Stat. 1878,
ch. 232, §§ 6, 7, 8; New Jersey,
Rev. Stat. 1S77, p. 332, § 47; New
Mexico, Comp. L. 1884, § 2581;
New York, Code Civ. Proc. 1881,
§ 1531 ; North Carolina, Clark Code
Civ. Proc. §§473, 487; Ohio, Rev.
Stat. 1880, §§ 5786,5796; Oklahoma,
Stat. Okl. 1890, § 5146; Oregon,
Hill's Ann. Laws of Ore. 1887,
§ 321 ; South Carolina, Gen. Stat.
1882, §§ 1835, 1841; Tennessee,
Code' 1884, § 3992 ; Texas, Rev.
Stat. 1879, §§ 4813, 4821; Utah,
Comp. Law Utah, 1888, §§ 2761,
2774; Vermont, Laws 1880, ch. 69,
§§ 1260, 1274; Virginia, Code 1887,
§ 2753; West Virginia, Code 1884,
ch. 91, §§ 1, 15; Wisconsin, Rev.
Stat. 1878, §§3096,3100; Wyoming,
Rev. Stat. 1887, §§ 2992, 3002.
39
CHAPTEE XIV.
TRUSTS ARISING FROM POWERS.
§ 261.
Introductory.
§ 270
262.
A Power in Trust Arising
from an Invalid Expr
iSS
271
Trust.
272
263.
From Failure of Donee
Execute the Power.
to
273
264.
From Defective Execution
274
of Power.
275
265.
From Death of Donee.
266.
The Subject Continued.
276
267.
The Parties in Interest.
268.
The Subject Continued.
269.
The Same Subject.
The Word "Relations
Construed.
The Subject Continued.
The Same Subject.
The Term "Representa-
tives" Construed.
Delegation of Powers.
Rule of Distribution Pre-
scribed by Donor.
Whether Distribution shall
be per stirpes or per
capita.
§ 261. Introductory. — la a general sense, a power is
the authority given by one person to another to act for
him, or in his stead. Of powers of this class are a power
of attorney, the powers of an executor, of an administra-
tor, or of an agent. In a more technical sense, as em-
ployed to designate a conveyance or an instrument by
which authority is conferred, a power is the right or au-
thority with which one person is invested to dispose of an
estate, the title of which is in another.1 It is with powers
1 "A general power is in trust,
when any perspn or class of per-
sons, other than the grantee of such
power, is designated as entitled to
the proceeds, or any portion of the
proceeds, or other benefits to result
from the alienation." Black, Law
Die. 921. "Power. * * 2. Au-
thority conferred upon one person
to dispose of an estate vested in
another. A 'power' in a will is
never imperative; it leaves the act
to be done at the will of the party
to whom given. A 'trust' is im-
perative and obligatory upon the
conscience of the party intrusted."
Anderson, Dictionary of Law, tit.
Power. See Stanley v. Colt, 5 Wall.
168. "Equity will compel the do-
nee to execute a power where it is
coupled with a trust in which other
persons are interested; and to cor-
rect a formal defect in the manner
of execution." Bouvier, Law Die.
§ 261. J ARISING FROM POWERS. 611
of this class that trusts are connected, and out of which
trusts arise by construction of equity. In powers of this
character the authority conferred may constitute a simple
or naked power, or a power coupled with a trust. Whether
it is to be treated as the one or the other of these is to be
determined by the instrument by which the power is con-
ferred, and by any circumstances that may be clearly es-
tablished. While the theory on which this distinction is
based is sufficiently lucid, yet in practice it not infrequently
occurs that a power and a power in trust are so intimately
related, having so many points in common, as to render it
very difficult to determine to which class it shall be assigned.
"The question of trusts and powers is one hedged in with
difficulties and fraught with the risk of leading courts in
apparent opposition to previous decisions. In its discus-
sion the ingenuity of the legal mind has been exerted in
the direction of subtle distinctions, and has been influenced
by abstract propositions, and led by authors who wrote in
an atmosphere charged with technicalities and abstruse
learning. If in applying the doctrine of trusts to a given
case we are able to adhere to fundamental principles, the
more exact should be the solution ; and unless prior adju-
cations comprehend a decision of the precise question
presented they are not necessarily controlling upon the
case at bar."1 The distinction between a naked power
tit. Powers. "Powers must be dis- Kev. St. N". T.pt. 2, ch. 1, tit. 2, art.
tinguished from trusts: 'Powers 3, §§ 74, 76-79, 94, 96, provide that a
are never imperative-*-they leave power is general where it author-
the act to he done at the will of the izes the conveyance of a fee to any
party to whom they- are given, alienee whatever; that it is in trust
Trusts are alwaysimperative.'Pow- when other persons than the
ers are sometimes divided into * grantee are entitled to the proceeds
* * * (2) powers coupled with or any portion thereof; and that
a trust, or powers in the nature of every trust power is imperative un-
trusts, which the donees are bound less its execution is expressly made
to exercise; they are, therefore, to depend upon the will of the
really trusts and powers only in grantee. A will gave the executor
form." Eapalje & Lawrence, Law power to sell and convey certain
Die. tit. Power. realty on terms within his discre-
1 Townshend v. Frommer, 125 N". tion on the happening of a certain
T. 446; s. C, 26 K". E. Eep. 805. 1 contingency, provided that such
612
ARISING FROM POWERS.
[§ 261.
and a power in trust is set forth by Lord Elden, in the fol-
lowing words: "But there are not only a mere trust and a
mere power, but there is also known to this court a power
which the party to whom it is given is intrusted and re-
sale should bar all claims of testa-
trix's heirs, gave the executor no
interest in the proceeds, and di-
rected that they should be divided
among a specified class of persons.
It was held that this was a general
power in trust, and was imperative,
and operated to suspend the vesting
of the fee until the power was ex-
ecuted or the precedent estate
terminated. Dana v. Murray, 122
N. Y. 604; s. c, 26 N. E. Rep. 21. A
deed reserved to the grantor "the
power to devise, by last will, an un-
divided one-third part of said prem-
ises unto any hereafter taken wife
of him, the party of the first part,
for and during the term of her nat-
ural life, or (at his option) to give
and grant, by deed, to said here-
after taken wife, or to any person
in trust for her, the same premises,
for and during the term of her nat-
ural life." Held, that the reserva-
tion was a right which the grantor
might exercise or not, at his pleas-
ure, and was not a special power
in trust which equity wouldenforce.
Towler v.Towler,142N.Y. 371 ; s. c,
36 N. E. Rep. 869. Where a will
bequeaths property to certain per-
sons absolutely, and directs the
executors to invest it for the benefit
of legatees, no trust is created, but
the executors are given a power in
trust. Horndorf v. Horndorf, 13
Misc. Rep. 343; s. c, 34 N. Y.
Supl. 560. Under a devise in trust
for testator's children, making
them all equal at 21 years of age,
with authority to the trustees to
purchase and sell real estate as they
deem for the best interests of the
children, and to hold it in trust for
them, or give it to them, as they
think best, the discretion of the
trustees is absolute, and the exer-
cise of the power of sale is not af-
fected by the lapse of time, or the
fact that they have already soldpart
of the property and distributed the
proceeds. In re Marshall's Estate,
138Pa.St.260; s. c, 22 Atl. Rep.
90. A devise to a trustee is ineffect-
ive in a case where no power of dis-
position or control is vested in him,
and the estate vests directly in the
beneficiary. Allen v. Craft, 109 Ind.
476; s. c, 9 1ST. E. Rep. 919. Where
the deed creating a power in trust
recites that it is for the purpose of
settling differences and litigation
between the grantors, who inher-
ited the land conveyed, it will not be
presumed that a conveyance made
by the donee of the power, to his
wife for a nominal consideration,
was a valid execution of the power.
Clapp v. Byrnes, 3 Hun App. 284;
s. c, 38 N. Y. Supl. 1063. Where
the testator directed that the entire
estate should be appraised and di-
vided by his executors into two
equal shares, etc., he thereby cre-
ated a power coupled with a trust.
Smith v. Winn, 27 S. Car. 591. If
an instrument contains two pro-
visions, one creating a trust and the
other conferring a power to grant
or devise which are inconsistent
and not reconcilable and for that
reason cannot stand, the trust must
give way to the power. Crooke v.
Kings Co., 97 K. Y. 421. A testa-
tor appointed his wife and one S
executors, giving them power to
§ 261. J ARISING FROM POWERS. 613
quired to execute ; and with regard to that species of power
the court considers it as partaking so much of the nature
and qualities of a trust that if the person who has that
duty imposed upon him does not dischai'ge it, the court
will, to a certain extent, discharge the duty in his room and
place."1 A similar view is presented by a distinguished
American jurist, as follows: "A naked power is left to
the free will and election of the party to whom it is given,
to exercise it or not ; and he cannot be compelled to do
that which is left solely to his own judgment and discre-
tion. But there is a clear and well defined distinction be-
tween a mere power, where the act is left to the will of the
party to whom it is given, and powers in the nature of
trusts. In cases of the latter class the right and interests
of third parties, who are beneficially interested in the
trusts which arise and grow out of the execution of the
power, come in and can be enforced as against the party
to whom the power is given. Mere powers are never im-
perative ; trusts are always imperative and obligatory upon
the conscience of the party intrusted. Where a trust is
to be effected by the execution of a power, then the trust
and power become blended and binding upon the donee of
the power. The most familiar instance given in the books
of such a union is the case where a power is given by a
will to sell an estate, with directions to appty the proceeds
upon trusts. The power is then in the nature of a
trust."2
sell any part of his real estate. He interest extensive enough to enable
also made his wife and another him to discharge it, he is a trustee
person trustees in relation to cer- for the exercise of the power, and
tain bequests made in the will, not as having a discretion, whether
Held, that the power of sale was he will exercise it or not ; and the
absolute and not dependent on the court adopts the principle as to
trusts. Clark v. Denton, 36 N". J. trusts, and will not permit his neg-
Eq. 419. ligence, accident or other circum-
1 Brown v. Higgs, 8 Ves. 561, 570. stances to disappoint the interests
"If the power is a power, which it of those for whose benefit he is
is the duty of the party to execute, called upon to execute it." Id. 561,
made his duty by the requisition of 574.
the will, put upon him as such by z Greenough v. Wells, 10 Cush.
the testator, who has given him an 571, 576; Gibbs v. Marsh, 2 Met.
614
ARISING FROM POWERS.
[§ 262.
§ 262. A Power in Trust Arising from an Invalid
Express Trust. — In New York, Michigan, Wisconsin, Min-
nesota, California and North and South Dakota, express
trusts have been abolished, except as authorized by statute.
But where the trust is not void on other grounds, and where
243, 251 ; Sugden on Powers, ch.
6, § 3. A trust to apply the whole
or part of a fund as the trustee
may think fit for the maintenance
of children is obligatory, compel-
ling the trustee to maintain the
children, and if the funds should be
paid over to the father he could
use it for maintaining the children
though able • himself to support
them. But where the trust is to ap-
ply the whole or such part of the
fund as the trustee may think fit
for or towards the maintenance of
the children, the trust is discre-
tionary and equivalent to a power.
In such a case if the trustee does
not exercise his discretion but pays
the whole over to the father, the
father must hold the whole to the
use of his children, and cannot de-
duct the cost of their support, if he
is able to support them. Wilson
v. Turner, L. R. 22 Ch. D. 521. A
general power in trust is where an
authority is given to the grantee to
do some act, in relation to lands,
which the grantor might himself
lawfully perform; and where he is
authorized to alienate the lands in
fee, by means of a conveyance to
any alienee whatever; and where
some persons other than the gran-
tees of the power are designated
as entitled to the proceeds, or
other benefits, to result from the
alienation according to the power.
A power is irrevocable if no au-
thority to revoke it is reserved or
granted in the instrument creating
it. And it is imperative if its ex-
ecution is not made expressly to
depend upon the will of the grantee,
and if it imposes upon the grantees
a duty, the performance of which
may be compelled in equity, for the
benefit of the parties interested. A
trust to sell lands, and divide the
prDceeds among the cestuis jue trust,
as beneficiary owners, and not as
creditors, is void as a trust, but
is valid as a power in trust. Sel-
den v. Vermilyea, 1 Barb. 58. See
also Harding v. G-lyn, 1 Atk. 469;
s. c, 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. 4th Am. ed.
1833, 1848, 1857; Willis v. Kymer,
L. R. 7 Ch. D. 181 ; Minors v. Batti-
son, L. B. 1 App. Cas. 428; Salus-
bury v. Denton, 3 Kay & J. 529;
Gude v. Worthington, 3 De G. &S.
389; Brook v. Brook, 3 Sm. & G.
280; In re White's Trusts, Johns.
656; Penny v. Turner, 2 Phill. Ch.
493;Fordyce v. Bridges, 2 Phill.
Ch. 497 ; Gough v. Bult, 16 Sim.
45; Brown v. Pocock, 6 Sim. 257;
Croft v. Adam, 12 Sim. 639; Izod
v. Izod, 32 Beav. 242 ; Bui-rough v.
Philcox, 5 Myl. & Cr. 72: Grant v.
Lynam, 4 .Kuss. 292; Smith v.
Bowen, 35 N. Y. 83; Whiting v.
Whiting, 4 Gray, 236, 240 ; Chase
v. Chase, 2 Allen, 101 ; Miller v.
Meetch, 8 Pa. St. 417; Whitehurst
v. Harker, 2 Ired. Eq. 292; Withers
v. Yeadon, 1 Rich. Eq. 324; Col-
lins v. Carlisle, 7 B. Mon. 13; Gibbs
v. Marsh, 2 Met. 243 ; Kintner v.
Jones, 122 Ind. 148; Read v. Pat-
terson, 44 N. J. Eq. 211; s. c, 6
Am. St. Rep. 877; Read v. Will-
iams, 125 N. Y. 560; s. c, 21 Am.
St. Rep. 748; Henderson v. Hen-
derson, 113 K. Y. 1.
§ 262.]
ARISING FROM POWERS.
615
the intention of the settlor is plain, an express trust, void
as such under the statute, may be valid as a power intrust.1
JN. T. Rev. Stats. (8th ed.),
part 2, tit. 2, ch. 1, art. 2, abolishes
uses and trusts except as provided
in this chapter. Section 55 is as
follows: "Express trusts may be
created for any or either of the
following purposes: 1. To sell
lands for the benefit of creditors.
2. To sell, mortgage or lease lands,
for the benefit of legatees, or for
the purpose of fatisfying any
charge thereon. 3. To receive the
rents and profits of lands, and ap-
ply them to the use of any person,
during the life of such person, or
for any shorter term, subject to the
rules prescribed in the first article
of this title. 4. To receive the rents
and profits of lands, and to accu-
mulate the same, for the purposes
and within the limits prescribed in
the first article of this act." Sec-
tion 56 is as follows : "A devise of
lands to executors or other trustees,
to be sold or mortgaged, where the
trustees are not also empowered to
receive the rents and profits, shall
vest no estate in the trustees ; but
the trust shall be valid as a power,
and the lands shall descend to the
heirs, or pass to the devisees of the
testator, subject to the execution
of the power." Sec. 96, art. 3, tit.
2, provides that "every trust power,
unless its execution or non-execu-
tion is made expressly to depend
upon the will of the grantee, is im-
perative, and imposes a duty on
the grantee, the performance of
which may be compelled in equity,
for the benefit of the parties inter-
ested." Section 97. "A trust power
does not cease to be imperative,
where the grantee has the right to
select any, and exclude others of
the persons designated as the ob-
jects of the trust." Michigan.
Howell's Ann. Stat. 1882, ch. 214,
§ 5563, uses substantially the lan-
guage of the New York statute in
abolishing uses and trusts except
as modified by succeeding sections.
In addition to the express trusts
authorized by the statutes of New
York, Section 5573 authorizes an
express trust : "For the beneficial
interest of any person or persons,
when such trust is fully expressed
and clearly defined upon the face
of the instrument creating it, sub-
ject to the limitations as to time
prescribed in this title." Section
5574 is the same as section 56 of the
New York statutes, cited above.
Section 5576 is as follows : "When
an express trust shall be created
for any purpose not enumerated in
the preceding sections of this chap-
ter, no estate shall vest in the
trustee ; but the trust, if directing
or authorizing the performance of
any act which may be lawfully
performed under a power, shall be
valid as a power in trust." * *
Sections 5613, 5614 are identical
with sections 96, 97 of the New
York statute, cited above. Minne-
sota. Stat, of Minn. 1S94, ch. 43,
follows New York, and to the ex-
press trusts permitted adds: 5.
To receive and take charge of any
money, stocks, bonds or valuable
chattels of any kind, and to invest
and loan the same for the benefit
of the beneficiaries of such trust,
subject to the control of the courts
over the acts of the trustee. 6.
Authorizes any incorporated city
or village to receive money, stock,
bonds, etc., for benefit of any pub-
lic library or cemetery and admin-
ister same. The sections quoted
616
ARISING FROM POWERS.
[§ 262.
In ti recent case before the New York Court of Ap-
peals, the receiver of a bank, of which plaintiff and ten
others were trustees, sued them for waste of the bank's
funds. In settlement thereof, a contract was entered into
above from New York statutes are
also included in chs. 43 and 44.
Wisconsin. Sanborn v. Berryman
Ann. Stat. 1889, chs. 46, 47, follows
the statutes of New York and
Michigan, and in addition permits
an express trust for maintaining
and preserving any monument or
cemetery to an amount not exceed-
ing two thousand dollars. Dakota.
Comp. Laws Dak. 1887, Civil Code,
§ 2803, provides that: "In every
case where a trust is valid as a
power in trust, the real property
to which the trust relates remains
in or passes by succession to the
persons otherwise entitled, subject
to the execution of the trust as a
power in trust." The express
trusts permitted are those of New
York. North Dakota. The provis-
ions of Kevised Code, Xorth Da-
kota, chs. 27, 29, Civ. Code, are
identical with those of South Da-
kota. See also Delaney v. Van
Aulen, 84 X. Y. 16; Ireland v. Ire-
land, 84 N. Y. 321; Donovan v.
Van De Mark, 78 X. Y. 244; Heer-
mans v. Burt, 78 X. Y. 259 ; Moore
v. Hegeman, 72 X. Y. 376 ; Low v.
Harmony, 72 X. Y. 408; Garvey v.
MeDevitt, 72 X. Y. 550; Cooke v.
Platte, 9SX. Y. 35; Woodward v.
James, 115 X. Y. 356; Verdin v.
Slocum, 71 N. Y. 345 ; Stevenson v.
Lesley, 70 X. Y. 512; Provost v.
Provost, 70 X. Y. 141 ; Heermans
v. Robertson, 64 X. Y. 332; Kiah
v. Grenier, 56 X. Y. 220; Vernon
v. Vernon, 53 X. Y. 351; Manice
v. Manice, 43 X. Y. 303; Schettler
v. Smith, 41 X. Y. 328; Harrison
v. Harrison, 36 X. Y. 543; Post v.
Hover, 33 X. Y. 593; Everitt v.
Everitt, 29 X. Y. 39.; Gilman v.
Redington, 24 X. Y. 9; Downing
v. Marshall, 23 X. Y. 366; s. c,
80 Am. Dec. 290; Beekman v.
Bonsor, 23 X. Y. 298; s. C, 80 Am.
Dec. 269; Savage v. Burnham, 17
X. Y. 561 ; Amory v. Lord, 9 X. Y.
403; Leggett v. Perkins, 2 X. Y.
297; Killarn v. Allen, 52 Barb. 605;
Moore v. Moore, 47 Barb. 257;
Howe's Exrs. v. Van Schaick, 20
Wend. 564; Kane v. Gott,24Wend.
641; s. C, 35 Am. Dec. 641; Haw-
ley v. James, 16 Wend. 61 ; Loril-
lard's Case, 14 Wend. 265; Cutter
v. Hardy, 48 Cal. 568; Estate of
Delaney, 49 Cal. 76; Goodrich v.
City of Milwaukee, 24 Wis. 422;
White v. Fitzgerald, 19 Wis. 480;
Smith v.Eord, 48 Wis. 115; Wyle
v. Burke, 40 Mich. 499; Meth.
Church, etc. v. Clark, 41 Mich.
730; Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich.
552. "The revised statutes have
imposed no limitation whatever
upon the creation of trusts, in the
full sense of the term, and a valid
trust may now be created for any
and every purpose, for which it
might have been, created before the
revised statutes were adopted. The
changes made are: 1. The entire
abolition of passive trusts; and 2.
A limitation of express trusts, i. e.,
of trusts which pass an estate as
well as grant an authority. But
these changes have neither
abridged the real power of the
owner of lands in the creation of
trusts, nor the jurisdiction of equity
in compelling their execution. On
the contrary, when there is no il-
legal suspense of the power of
alienation, the real intention of the
§ 262.]
ARISING FROM POWERS.
617
between him and them by which they undertook to pay a
percentage of the bank's liabilities, and the receiver trans-
ferred to one designated by a majority of them certain real
estate of the bank, which they agreed to sell, reimburse
themselves out of the proceeds, and return the surplus to
the receiver. A conveyance reciting the contract was ex-
ecuted to him. Three days thereafter plaintiff executed an
party creating the trust will in all
cases be parried into effect. When
the trust is passive, the intention
is executed by giving to the cestui
que trust a legal estate ; when active,
by construing it as a power in
trust, if it cannot take effect as an
express trust. In the latter case
the powers and duties of the trustee
and the rights and remedies of the
beneficiary are exactly the same as
in the case of an authorized express
trust. When the trust is entire
and suspends unduly the power of
alienation, it is wholly void, but
its mere invalidity as an express
trust never operates to deprive the
beneficiary of the benefit intended."
Lange v. Ropke, 5 Sand. 363.
Executors and trustees under a
will with power to sell may, in
carrying out the provisions of the
trust, convey an easement in favor
of lands already sold, when such
conveyance appears distinctly ad-
vantageous to the estate. Vallen-
tine v. Schreiber (189G) 3 Hun App.
235 ;s. c.,38X.Y. Supl.417. A deed
purporting to be an instrument be-
tween E of the first part and C in
trust for three infant children of
C, "with power to sell and convey
or mortgage without the appoint-
ment of a guardian, of the sec-
ond party," conveyed certain
premises to the party of the
second part, "their heirs and
assigns forever.'' There was
no other reference to a trust or
power save that contained in the
first clause. Held, that the three
infants were the real beneficiaries
of the grant, that the land passed
to and vested in them, subject to
the execution of the power, which
was a general trust power to be
executed solely for their benefit,
and, therefore, that a mortgage on
the land given by C to secure a
debt of her husband was not a valid
execution of a power and was void.
Syracuse Savings Bank v. Holden,
105 N. Y. 415. A direction to a
trustee by the grantor to hold the
lands "in further trust" after her
decease, to convey them in fee-
simple to her children "living at
her decease and the surviving chil-
dren of such of them as may then
be dead," is not one of the express
trusts permitted by 1 Eev. St. N".
Y. p. 728, § 55; but, as a trust to
convey was recognized as a valid
active trust at common law, it is
valid as a power in trust, under 1
Rev. St. N. Y. p. 729, § 58, which
provides that: "Where an ex-
press trust shall be created for any
purpose not enumerated , no estate
shall vest in the trustee, but the
trust if directing or authorizing
the performance of any act which
may be lawfully performed under
a power, shall be valid as a power
in trust." Townshend v.Frommer,
125 N. Y. 446; s. c, 26 1ST. E. Rep.
805.
618 ARISING FROM POWERS. T§ 262.
instrument declaring his associates to be equalty interested
with him in all the benefits from the conveyance. It was
held that the agreement did not create an express trust to
sell land for the benefit of creditors, but that inasmuch as
plaintiff's associates joined with him in the contract and
had selected him as the grantee, the conveyance would be
deemed a power in trust within the provisions of the Revised
Statutes of New York, that "where an express trust shall
be created for any purpose" not thereinbefore enumerated,
"no estate shall vest in the trustees, but the trust, if di-
recting or authorizing the performance of any act which
may be lawfully performed under a power, shall be valid as
a power in trust," and that an exchange of the land for
other real estate was not within the purpose of the power
taken by plaintiff.1 In a late New York case, where testa-
tor devised all his estate to his wife for life, and provided
that at her death it should go to his executors, in trust to
convert the whole into cash and divide the proceeds equally
among several persons or their children ; and that, if during
the lifetime of testator's wife the executors should deem it
best to convert the estate into cash, they should do so and
pay the income to the wife for life ; it was held that a valid
power in trust was created, under Revised Statutes of New
York, providing that a devise of lands to trustees, who are
not also empowered to receive the lands, shall vest no es-
tate in them, but the trust shall be valid as a power.2 Tes-
1 Woerz v. Rademacher, 120 N. v. Ryan, 27 Barb. 376; Bailey v.
Y. 62; s. c, 23 X. E. Rep. 1113; Bailey, 28 Hun, 603; Salusbury v.
4 Rev. Stat. (8th ed.), p. 243S, § Powers, 36 Hun, 14; Fellows v.
58; Weeks v. Cornwell, 104 N". Y. Heermans, 4 Lans. 238; Allen v.
325; Cook v. Piatt, 98 X. Y. 35; Dewitt, 3 N. Y. 276; Ives v. Dav-
Smith v. Bowen, 35 N". Y. 87; enport, 3 Hill, 373.
Everitt v. Everitt, 29 N". Y. 39; 2 Reynolds v. Denslow, 80 Hun,
Hotchkiss v. Elting, 36 Barb. 38; 359; s. C, 30 X. Y. Supl. 77, SO;
Mayor, etc. v. Meserole, 26 Wend. 4 Rev. St. (8th ed.), p. 2438, § 56.
136; Yates v. Yates, 9 Barb. 324. See also Chamberlain v. Taylor,
310; Campbell v. Low, 9 Barb. 105 N". Y. 185; Weeks v. Cornwell,
591; Jarvis v. Babcoek, 5 Barb. 104 N. Y. 325; Cook v. Piatt, 98 N".
139; Vorhees v. Presbyterian Y. 35; Lent v. Howard, 89 N". Y.
Church, 17 Barb. 103; Beekman v. 169; Marx v. McGlynn, 88 N. Y.
People, 27 Barb. 273; McCaughal 357; Bailey v. Bailey, 28 N. Y.
§ 2(33.] ARISING FROM POWERS. 619
tatrix devised all her land to her executors in trust for the
"purposes hereinafter named." By a subsequent clause
she gave certain parcels to her two nieces for life, remainder
over. Finally the will empowered the executors to sell the
property whenever in their judgment they should deem it
best, and invest the proceeds and pay the income to the two
nieces, and "upon the death of either to pay her share of
the principal" as "above directed;" it was held under the
New York statute, providing that "a devise of lands to ex-
ecutors, or other trustees, to be sold or mortgaged, where
the trustees are not also empowered to receive the rents
and profits, shall vest no estate in the trustees, but the
trust shall be valid as a power, and the land shall descend to
the heirs or pass to the devisees of the testator, subject to
execution of the jjower" that the executors took only a
power in trust.1 In Minnesota it has been held that where
an absolute deed is made to a grantee, with the intention of
establishing a trust, and, as a part of the transaction, an
agreement or declaration of trust is duly executed by the
parties in interest, such deed and agreement may be con-
strued together as establishing the trust; and where the
trust is one not enumerated in the statute, and the per-
formance of some act is authorized which may be lawfully
performed under a power, it may be upheld as a power in
trust.2 "
§ 263. From Failure of Donee to Execute the Power,
— Where a power is of such a character that the donee is
authorized to dispose of the property among the individuals
of a designated class, and is clothed with some discretion
in regard to the manner of the distribution, equity will not
interfere with his execution of the power. But if the
donee for any reason fails to act and the property is not
divided, equity will interpose in favor of the beneficiaries
603; Belmont v. O'Brien, 12 N. Y. 2 Randall v. Constans, 33 Minn.
405. 329; Gen. Stat. Minn. 1878, ch. 43.
1 Delafield v. White, 19 Abb. 1ST. See also New York Dry Dock Co.
C. 104; Van Home v. Campbell, v. Stillman, 30 N". Y. 174.
100 X . Y. 287, 317.
620
ARISING FROM POWERS.
[§ 263.
by treating it as a power in trust and enforcing its execu-
tion.1 In such cases the distribution by the court will be
to all the individuals of the class designated, and in equal
1 Burrough v. Philcox, 5 Myl. &
Cr. 73, 92; Brown v. Higgs, 8 Ves.
574. In a case where the power
given is to determine the shares
and the instrument gives the fund
to a class, all of the class take in
default of appointment. But in a
case where there is no gift, but
only a power to give as the donee
of the power may think fit among
the members of a class, in case of
default in appointment; only those
take who were within the class at
the time the power was to have
been exercised, because they alone
could have taken had the power
been exercised. Lambert v.
Thwaites, L. K. 2 Eq. 151. See
also Brickenden v. "Williams, L. K. 7
Eq. 310; Bristow v. Skirrow, L. R.
10 Eq. 1; Inre Davis, L. R. 13 Eq.
163; 2)ire.Jefferys,L. R. 14 Eq. 136.
"Where no rule has been laid down
in the instrument creating the
power as to the mode in which it
is to be executed, the court, acting
upon the maxim that equality is
equity, will make an equal division
among the persons who are objects
of the power in the nature of a
trust. Thus, in Doyley v. The
Attorney-General, 2 Eq. Cas. Ab.
194; s. c, 4 Vin. Ab. 485, 486, the
testator gave property in trust for
certain purposes, and subject
thereto the trustees and the sur-
vivors of them, and the heirs and
executors of such survivors "were
to dispose of it to such of his re-
lations on his mother's side who
were most deserving, and in such
manner as they think fit, and for
such charitable uses and purposes
as they should think most proper
and convenient. The power having
devolved on the court, Sir Joseph
Jekyll, M. R., directed that one-
half of the property should go to
the testator's relatives on the
mother's side, and the other half
to charitable uses. He said the
known rule that equality is equity
was the best measure to go by.
That he had no rule of judging of
the merits of the testator's rela-
tions, and could not enter into
spirits, and, therefore, could not
prefer one to the other, but that
all should come in without dis-
tinction. In Salusbury v. Denton,
3 Kay & J. 529, a testator by will
gave a fund to be at the disposal of
his widow by her will, 'therewith
to apply a part' for a charity, "the
remainder to be at her disposal
among my relatives, in such pro-
portion as she may be pleased to
direct.' The widow died without
exercising the power of determin-
ing the proportions in which each
were to take. It was held by Sir
"W. Page Wood, V. C, that the be-
quest was not void for uncertainty,
but that the court would divide
the fund in equal moieties, and
give one of such moieties to char-
itable purposes, and the other
moiety to such of the testator's
relatives as were capable of taking
within the statute of distribution.
See also Hutchinson v. Hutchinson,
13 Ir. Eq. Rep. 632; Gough v. Bult,
16 Sim. 45, 231; Longmore v.
Broom, 7 Ves. 124; Penny v. Tur-
ner, 2 Phill. 493; Fordyce v.
Bridges, lb. 497; Be White's
Trusts, Johns. 656 : Little v. Neil,
10 W. R. (V. C. K.) 592. But see
Down v. Worrall, 1 Myl & K. 561,
and the remarks thpreon of Sir W.
§ 2(53. J ARISING FROM POWERS. 621
sums. In a recent case in New York a testator gave one-
half of his estate unto his wife, "to be held and enjoyed
by her during her natural life, and by her to be divided and
distributed by will among my relatives in such shares as
she may see fit and deem to be just." The widow enjoyed
the property during her life and died without having made
a will. It was held that as the wife did not exercise the
power of distribution, and it was a power in trust for the
benefit of third parties, the law would distribute the prop-
erty equally among the whole class among whom she might
have distributed it, and that this would enable all who were
capable of inheriting at the time of her death to take the
land, although they were aliens at the testator's death.1 In
Kentucky it has been held that as a power of appointment
must be exercised for the benefit of the parties entitled
thereto, and not with a view of benefiting the donee of the
power, a widow to whom was devised a life estate with
power to divide the remainder among the testator's children
as she thought best, could not convey to one of said chil-
dren a portion greater than those granted to the other
children, on condition that said child should assume the
payment of her debts and provide for her and her second
husband during their lives.2 The decisions of the English
courts are to the same effect. Bequest to trustees for A
for life, and if he should die childless, upon trust to apply
the sum to the benefit of such of the testator's children, or
their issue, as the trustees should think fit for the interest
and good of testator's family, with no gift in default of
ajopointment. No appointment having been made, and the
tenant for life having survived the donees of the power
and died childless, it was held that children and remoter
issue took in equal rights per capita, and that the period
for ascertaining the class was the death of the tenant for life.3
Page Wood, V. C, in Salusbury v. 3 Be White's Trusts, Johns. 656.
Denton, 3 Kay & J. 538;" 2 Lead. "The next question is, at what
Cas. in Eq., 4th ed., *968. time the class is to he ascertained.
1 Hoey v. Kenney, 25 Barb. 396. The latest period which can be sug-
2 Degman v. Degman (1895) gested is the death of the tenant
(Ky.), 34 S. W. Bep. 523. for life. This is clearly not a case
622
ARISING FROM POWERS.
[§ 264.
§ 264. From Defective Execution of Power. — Where
there is a neglect or failure to execute a naked power equity
will not afford relief, but where a person invested with a
power has begun to execute it, has attempted to execute,
or has clearly indicated his intention to execute it, equity
will complete what has been begun, or will put the purpose
of the donee into execution. An agreement to execute will
be regarded in equity as in some sort a defective execution
of a power. Where the execution of a power is interrupted
by an accident, or is defective through mistake, equity will
interpose.1 In a leading Irish case, Lord Redesdale said :
"A power is said to be not executed where nothing is done;
but a defective execution is where the power has not been
where I can hold that the discre-
tionary power extended to the rep-
resentatives of the surviving
trustees. Both trustees died, and
the power had ceased before the
death of the tenant for life. In a
case where the donee of a power
survives the tenant for life, there
would he a possible ground for
arguing that the class must be kept
in suspense long enough to let in
all who might be born while the
power was in existence. But, here,
the latest period that can be fixed
is the death of the tenant for life.
Then the question arises, whether
children who predeceased the ten-
ant for life are entitled to share.
The words of this will clearly
point to a personal enjoyment by
the objects of the power at the
death of the tenant for life ; there
is, therefore, strong reasons for
holding, on the tenor of this par-
ticular will, if not on general prin-
ciple, that none of those who pre-
deceased the tenant for life could
share in the benefits of an appoint-
ment under this power." Ibid. 659.
Where a power in the nature of a
trust gives the trustees liberty to
distribute a fund unequally they
may do so, but if the court inter-
pose on default by the trustees it
will divide the fund equally among
the objects. 2 Sugden's Powers,
650; Pope v. Whitcomb, 3 Meriv.
689 ; Hands v. Hands, cited 1 T. B.
n. 439.
1 Tollett v. Tollett, 2 P. Wms.
489; s. c, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. *227;
Coventry v. Coventry, 2 P. Wms.
222; Shannon v. Bradstreet, 1 Sen.
& Lef . 52 ; Wade v. Paget, 1 Bro.
Ch. 363; Cockerell v. Cholmeley, 1
Buss. & Myl. 424; Lucena v. Lu-
eena, 5Beav. 146; Stiles v. Cow-
per, 3 Atk. 692; O'Fay v. Burke, 8
Ir. Ch. Bep. 225; Morgan v. Mil-
man, 10 Hare, 279; s. C, 3 De 6.,
M. & G. 24, 32, 33; Lowry v. Duf-
ferin, 1 Ir. Eq. 281 ; Blore v. Sut-
ton, 3 lyieriv. 237 ; Carter v. Carter,
Mos. 370; Fortescue v. Gregor, 5
Ves. 553; Wilson v. Piggot, 2 Ves.
Jr. 351 ; In re Dykes' Estate, L. B. 7
Eq. 337; King v. Boney, 5 Ir. Ch.
64, 77; Fielding v. Winwood, 16
Ves. 90; Chapman v. Gibson, 3 Bro.
Ch. 229; Hills v. Downton, 5 Ves.
564 ; Howard v. Carpenter, 11 Md.
202, 259 ; Love v. Sierra Nevada
Min'g Co., 32 Cal. 653.
§ 265.] ARISING FROM POWERS. 623
executed according' to the terms of the power, for if it were
executed according to the terms there would be nothing to
be supplied ; but where it has been intended to execute it
and that intention is sufficiently declared, but the act de-
claring the intention is not an execution of the power in the
form prescribed, there the defect shall be supplied in
equity."1
§ 265. From Death of Donee. — Where a testator or
donor leaves property to a number of persons and empowers
a donee to divide it among them as he shall see fit, and the
donee dies without having executed the power, equity will
raise a trust in favor of the parties named. In this case
all the parties, or all the persons of the class named, will
share and share alike. If the distribution is committed to
the discretion of the donee, he may make it in favor of one
in distinction from another. But if he dies without dividing
the estate, equity will raise a trust from the power, and
under the trust the distribution will be equal. A court of
equity will not exercise discretion for a donor, but will ad-
minister justice, and where the beneficiaries stand upon an
equality, it will assume that an equal distribution is a just
distribution.2 Where a testator bequeathed a sum of
1 Shannon v. Bradstreet, 1 Sea. tion of that power the testator
&Lef. 52, 63. "Equity will not aid meant to remain capable of execu-
a defective execution of a power, tion to the moment of her death,
if the intention of the author of the can be considered in equity an at-
power would thereby be defeated, tempt in or towards the execution
In Reed v. Shergold, 10 Ves. 370, of the power.' " See also Hopkins
where a lady entitled under a de- v. Myall, 2Russ. & Myl. 86; Thaek-
vise to copyholds for life, with a well v. Gardiner, 5 De G.& Sm. 58;
power to appoint them by will, Majoribanks v. Hovenden, 6 Ir. Eq.
sold and surrendered them to a pur- 238; Cooper v. Margin, L. E. 3 Ch.
chaser, Lord Eldon held that the App. 47. "The jurisdiction of the
purchaser could not be aided in court is to supply defects occa-
equity. 'The testator,' he said, sioned by mistakes or inadvertence;
'did not mean that she should so not to supply omissions intention-
execute her power— he intended ally made." Sir W. M. James, V.
that she should give by will, or not C, in Garth v. Townsend, L. K. 7
at all; and it is impossible to hold, Eq. 220.
that the execution of an instrument 2 Cruwys v. Colman, 9 Ves. 319;
or deed, which, if it availed to any Jones v. Torin, 6 Sim. 255; Davy
purpose, must avail to the destruc- v. Hooper, 2 Vern. 665 ; Fenwick v.
624 ARISING FROM POWERS. [§ 266.
£6,000 in trust for his daughter for life, "and on her de-
cease I give the said £6,000 to the children, or their de-
scendants, of T F, in such proportions to each as my
daughter may direct. ' ' The daughter died without having
made any appointment. It was held that the children of
T F were entitled to the fund to the exclusion of their
issue.1 In a leading case before the English High Court
of Chancery, Lord Chancellor Cottenham expounded the
principle on which these cases were decided, as follows :
"When there appears a general intention in favor of a
class, and a particular intention in favor of individuals of a
class to be selected by another person, and the particular
intention fails from that selection not being made, the court
will carry into effect the general intention in favor of the
class. When such an intention appears the case arises, as
stated by Lord Eldon in Brown v. Higgs, of the power be-
ing so given as to make it the duty of the donee to execute
it ; and, in such case, the court will not permit the objects
of the power to suffer by the negligence or conduct of the
donee, but fastens upon the property a trust for their
benefit."2
§ 266. The Subject Continued. — The principle on which
equity affords relief in the case of the death of the donee
without an execution of the power, or of the failure to ex-
ecute for any reason of a kindred nature, is well expressed
by the late Mr. Lewin, as follows : "If trustees, then, have
an imperative power committed to them, and they either
Greenwell, 10 Beav. 412 ; Hockley Brownv.Pocock,6Sim.257;Grieve-
v. Mawbey, 1 Ves. Jr. 143, 149, son v. K^sopp, 2 Keen, 656 ; Walch
150; Madoc v. Jackson, 2 Bro. Ch. v. Wallinger, 2 Russ. & Myl. 78;
588; Falkner v. Wynford, 9 Jur. S. C.,Taml. 425; Dominickv. Sayre,
1006 ; Lambert v. Thwaites, L. R. 2 3 Sandf . 555 ; Hoey v. Kenney, 25
Eq. 151 ; Woodcock v. Kenneck, 4 Barb. 396; Ward v. Morgan, 5 Cold.
Beav. 190; s. c, 1 Phill. 72; Ray- 407; Rhett v. Mason, 18 Gratt. 541;
ner v. Mowbray, 3 Bro. Ch. 234; Carson v. Carson, Phill. (N. Car.)
Phillips v. Garth, 3 Bro. Ch. 64; Eq. 57.
Hands v. Hands, 1 T. R. 437, note; 1 Jones v. Torin, 6 Sim. 255.
Popev. Whitcomb, 3Meriv. 698;i?e 2 Burrough v. Philcox, 5 Myl. &
White's Trusts, 1 Johns. 656; Phil- Cr. 67, 84.
lips v. Hollingsworth, 21 Beav. 112 ;
§ 266.]
ARISING FROM POWERS.
625
die in the testator's lifetime, or decline the office, or dis-
agree among themselves as to the mode of execution, or do
not declare themselves before their death, or if from any
other circumstance the exercise of the power by the party
intrusted with it becomes impossible, the court will substi-
tute itself in the place of the trustees, and will exercise the
power by the most reasonable rule. And the court assumes
the jurisdiction of exercising the power retrospectively, and
will take up the trust, whatever difficulties or impractica-
bilities may stand in the way; for, as Lord Kenyon laid
down the rule strongly, if the trust can by any possibility
be exercised by the court, the non-execution by the trustee
shall not prejudice the cestuis que trust."1 In a case be-
1 2 Lewin on Trusts (8th ed.),
*835. See also Maberly v. Turton,
14 Ves. 499; Gude v. Worthington,
3 De G. & Sm. 389 ; Izod v. Izod, 32
Beav. 242 ; Wainwright v. Water-
man, 1 Ves. Jr. 311; Hewett v.
Hewett, 2 Eden, 332; Flanders v.
Clark, 1 Ves. 10 ; Harding v. Glyn,
1 Atk. 469 ; Croft v. Adams, 12 Sim.
639; Be Hargrove's Trusts, 8 Ir. Eq.
258; Attorney-General v. Stephens,
3 Myl. & K. 347 ; Be Kichards, L. E.
8 Eq. 119; Edwards v. Grove, 2 De
G., F. & J. 222. Where the power
is to appoint among certain per-
sons, and the donee dies without
having fully executed it, equity
will not give any share of the resi-
due to those who have already re-
ceived a portion, unless they bring
such portion into the collatiio bono-
rum. Knight v. Yarborough, Gilm.
27. By a post-nuptial settlement,
certain freehold property was con-
veyed to trustees upon trust to pay
the rents to W and his wife during
their lives, and after the decease
of the survivor upon trust to sell
and divide the proceeds amongst
all and every the children of W,
in such shares and proportions as
he should by will appoint. There
40
were seven children living at the
date of the settlement, one of whom
died before W, who died without
executing the appointment. It
was held, that the property was
vested in all the children liable to
be divested by the execution of the
power ; and the power not having
been executed, the representatives
of the deceased child were entitled
to his share. Lambert v. Thwaites,
L. K. 2 Eq. 151 .A testatrix gave a
fund to A and B, who were her ex-
ecutors in trust to place out the
same at interest and to apply the
interest thereof, or the principal,
for the benefit of Mary Ann S, in
such way as they might in their
discretion think fit, during her life,
it being the wish of the testatrix
that they should dispose of the
principal and interest, or any part,
or should withhold the whole and
let the interest accumulate and,
upon the decease of Mary Ann S,
in case the trust fund or any part
thereof, or interest, should then re-
main undisposed of, upon trusts for
other persons. A and B paid the
interest of the trust fund and £100
part of the capital, to Mary Ann
S, and died without any other ex-
62(i ARISING FROM POWERS. [§ 267.
fore the Rolls Court, property was left by bequest to
trustees, to apply the income or principal for the benefit of
S J, widow, and of her three children, in such proportions,
etc., as the trustees in their absolute discretion should
think proper ; but in case S J married again her interest
to cease. The trustees declined to act. It was held that
the fund must be divided equally between S J and her
three children.1
§ 267. The Parties in Interest. — Where, from the
death of the donee, or for any reason of a kindred nature,
the court raises a trust and executes the power, a question
may arise in regard to the class of persons entitled to share
in the distribution. The circumstances may render this a
very important and a very difficult question. It is to be
determined by the intention of the testator as it is ex-
pressed in the instrument by which the power is imparted.
The rule of the English courts is that where the power is
imperative in favor of a class, whether of children, of rel-
atives, or of other persons, and it appears that it was the
intention of the testator that the distribution or selection
should be made as early as may be convenient after his
death, the court will execute the power in favor of the class
ercise of their discretionary pow- their deserts, and A died without
ers. Held, that Mary Ann S was having made any appointment, the
entitled to the whole of the trust property became distributable as in
funds. Gude v. Worthington, 3 De case of intestacy. Frazer v. Frazer,
G. & Sm. 389. 2 Leigh, 642. A testator gave
1 Izod v. Izod, 32 Beav. 242. See £3,000 to his executors upon trusts
also Druid Park Heights Co. v. for the benefit of it during her life,
Oettenger, 53 Md. 4G; Faulkner v. and from and immediately after
Davis, 18 Gratt. 651; Smith v. Kear- her death "in trust for the benefit
ney, 2 Barb. Ch. 533; Osburn'sAp- of her children, to do that which
peal, 130 Pa. St. 359; Crozier v. they, my executors, may think
Hoy t, 97 111. 23 ; Hamilton v. Mound most to their advantage. ' ' The ex-
City Mut. L. Ins. Co., 6 Lea, 402; ecutors died in the lifetime of M.
Morriss v. Morriss, 33 Gratt. 51; Held, that the children of M. who
Grieveson v. Kirsopp, 2 Keen, 653. were living at the time of her death,
"Where property was bequeathed were entitled to the fund in equal
to A to be sold by him and the pro- shares as tenants in common. Inre
ceeds distributed among testator's Phene's Trusts, L. E. 5 Eq. 346.
next of kin, as A should judge of
§ 267'.] ARISING FROM POWERS. 627
of persons who were living at the time of the testator's de-
cease. But if the will does not necessarily point to an im-
mediate execution of the power, or if the devise or bequest
is made, not as a gift, but as a power which the donee is to
execute by will, then the court will execute the power in
favor of such members of the class mentioned, and of such
only, as are in esse at the death of the donee.1 In a case
where, by a marriage settlement, a power was given to the
wife, in case she left any child of the marriage living at her
death, to appoint amongst all and every the children ; but
if there should be no issue of the marriage living at her
death, then she was to have a general power of disposition.
She did not exercise the power and died leaving several
children. It was held that those children alone who sur-
vived her were entitled to take by implication.2 Where the
donee holds a life estate and dies during the life of the tes-
tator the same rule will govern.3 But the rule applies only
where the beneficiaries take under the power. For if the
devise or the bequest is a gift, the proportion of each to be
determined by the donee, then, in default of his execution
of the power, the court will raise a trust in favor of all the
members of the class mentioned in the instrument. They
will all share and share alike under the trust, whether in
esse at the death of the testator or of the donee.4
1 Brown v. Higgs, 4 Yes. 708 ; 3 Perry v. Turner, 2 Phill. 493 ;
Longmore v. Broom, 7 Ves. 124; Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 13 Ir.
Penny v. Turner, 2 Ph. 493 ; Hutch- Eq. Kep. 332. Husband devises his
inson v. Hutchinson, 13 Ir. Eq.Kep. estate after the payment of debts
332; Cruwys v. Colman, 9 Ves. "wholly to bis wife, and to be dis-
319; Birch v. Wade, 3 Ves. & B. posed of by her and divided among
19S; Brown v. Pocock, 6 Sm. 257; my children at her discretion."
Burrough v. Philcox, 5 Myl. & Cr. Held, that the wife took an estate
72; Bonser v. Kinnear, 2 Giff. 195; for life, with full power to give to
In re Caplin's Will, 2 Dr. & Sm. the children, or appropriate it to
527; Freeland v. Pearson, L. R. 3 their use at her discretion ; and she
Eq. 658; Sinnot v. Walsh, L. E. 5 dying, the children of the testator
Ir. 27; Woodcock v. Renneck, 4 take that undisposed of by their
Beav. 190; s. c, 1 Ph. 72; Finch v. mother under the will. Collins v.
Hollingsworth, 21 Beav. 112. Carlisle, 7 B. Mon. 13.
2 Winn v. Fenwick, 11 Beav. 4 Lambert v. Thwaites, L. R. 2
438. Eq. 151.
628
ARISING FROM POWERS.
[§ 268.
§ 268. The Subject Continued. — Where the donee is
a tenant for life under a testamentary power, which may
be executed either by deed or by will, the question whether
the parties in interest are the class in esse at the death of
the testator or at the death of the donee, is one of very
considerable difficulty. On this point it has been said by a
high authority in England: "The decisions which support
an execution of the power in favor of the class of objects
as existing at the death of the donee, and those which sup-
port an execution in favor of the class as existing at the
death of the original testator, are almost evenly balanced ;
but the apparent absence of any full consideration of the
question, and the circumstance that in some of the cases
the power, though not expressly limited to an exercise by
will, did not in terms authorize an execution by deed or
writing, and may perhaps have been viewed by the court as
testamentary, detract from their value as authorities upon
this point."1 In a recent English case it was held that
J2 Lewin on Trusts (8th ed.),
*840. Upon the question of the
difficulties of this question and
nearly balanced position of the
authorities, Mr. Lewin ohserv.es :
"Upon principle, too, as well as
upon authority, this question is
attended with difficulty. On the
one hand, the power may he prop-
erly exercised by the donee at any
time before his death, and there is
no obligation to exercise it earlier,
and if any members of the class
die before the power is exercised,
they, according to the ordinary
rule, cease to be objects of it. The
donee of the power has an un-
doubted right to postpone the exe-
cution of it until the last moment
of his life, and the only default
which the court has to supply is
the non- execution just before his
death; and that default must,
therefore, be supplied in favor of
those who were objects at the date
of the death of the donee. On the
other hand, the donee of the power
may exercise it in favor of the class
existing at the time of exercise, to
the exclusion of those who have
died before, and also, where the
power is one of selection, to the
exclusion of those who may come
into esse subsequently, but the
court cannot act arbitrarily, and
cannot show any favor, but must
observe equality toward all. Who,
then, are the objects of the power?
As it was not the duty of the donee
of the power to exercise it at one
time more than another, the only
objects of the power must be all
those who might by possibility
have tat en a benefit under it ; that
is, those living at the death of the
testator, and those who come into
being during the continuance of
the life estate; otherwise, should
all the class predecease the tenant
for life (an event not improbable
§ 268.] AKISING FROM POWEKS. 629
where a gift by will to A for life, and "at" or "after" his
decease to such persons as he shall appoint, gives A a life
interest with a power of appointment either by instrument
inter vivos or by will ; there being no rule of construction
under which a gift in such terms, unless controlled by the
context, can be held to confer a testamentary power only.
Bequest of residue to A for life, "the whole principal at
her death to be divided amongst her children, if she has
any, in such proportions as she shall think proper, and if
she dies without leaving children," then over. A died
without having exercised her power of appointment, and
having had three children, of whom one only survived her.
It was held that the three children took vested interests
liable to be divested by the exercise, either by instrument
inter vivos, or by will, of A's power of appointment; and,
accordingly, that, on A's death, the residue became divisi-
ble in equal thirds between the surviving child and the rep-
resentatives of the two deceased children.1 It is to be noted
that in this case the power is simply a power of appoint-
ment or distribution. In a later English case, where, by a
settlement dated in May, 1833, a leasehold house was as-
signed to trustees upon trust for A for life, and after her
decease for B, her husband, for life, and after the decease
of the survivor of A and B, upon trust to assign the prem-
ises unto and amongst such of the children of A and B then
living, in such manner, shares, times and proportions as A
and B jointly, or the survivor of them separately, should
by any writing appoint, and in case there should be no such
child or children, then upon trust for C for life, and after
his decease upon trust to assign the premises unto and
amongst such of his children, and in such manner, shares,
where children or some limited Ca. Ab. 195; Harding v. Glyn, 1
class of relations are the objects), Atk. 469; Pope v. Whitcombe, 3
there would be a power imperative Meriv. 689; Hands v. Hands, cited
which is construed a trust, and no 1 T. R. 437, note ; Gtrieveson v.
cestui que trust, a result which it is Kirsopp, 2 Keen, 653; Wilson v.
conceived the court would be some- Duguid, L. K. 24 Ch. D. 244.
what unwilling to adopt." *2Lewin 1Inre Jackson's Will, L. E. 13
on Trusts (8th ed.), 841. See also Ch. D. 189.
Doyley v. Attorney- General, 2 Eq.
630 ARISING FROM POWERS. [§ 269.
times and proportions as he should by any writing appoint.
A died in 1876 without leaving issue. B died in 1880. C
died 1863 without having exercised the power of appoint-
ment, having had ten children, of whom three died before
him, two after and before the death of A, and one after
the death of A and before that of B. It was held that all
the children of C took as tenants in common in equal
shares.1 In his opinion in this case, Mr. Justice Chitty
said: "The cases on relations are very peculiar. It is
now established that where there is power to appoint among
relations so as to give the donee of the power the right of
selection, the donee of the power can appoint to any rela-
tions ; but in modelling the trusts to be applied in default,
or arising from the power being coupled with the duty, the
court has found itself under the necessity of confining the
class of relations to a particular set of relations, and has
adopted the rule that relations who take in default of the
exercise of the power in that case are those who are next
of kin according to the statute ; they take as tenants in
common, but not in the shares defined by the statute."2
§ 269. The Same Subject. — In cases where an in-
tention that there should be a personal enjoyment of the
estate by the objects of the power is indicated by the will,
the object must survive the donee of the power in order
to participate ; but where no such intention appears the
rule is that all persons in whose favor the power might at
any time have been executed are objects, and that in the
distribution all have an equal claim.3 Where the donee as
tenant for life may execute the power, either by deed or
1 Wilson v. Duguid, L. R. 24 Ch. to be confined to her statutory next
D. 244. of kin, but to be capable of exten-
2 Wilson v. Duguid, L. E. 24 Ch. sion to any relative. lb. Bequest
D. 244, 251. "I think that 'next of to his wife for life, and after her
kin' cannot be confined to 'nearest death to his and her poorest rela-
of kin,' but must include the stat- tions. Held, only those who were
utory 'next of kin.'" Snow v. of kin were entitled. Isaac v. De
Teed, L. K. 9 Eq. 622. A power Friez, Amb. 595.
to an ummarried woman to ap- 3In re White's Trusts, Johns. 656,
point a fund amongst "her own 660.
family or next of kin:" Held, not
§ 269.]
ARISING FROM POWERS
631
by will, the members of the class in existence at the death
of the donee will have an exclusive interest, if they appear
from the instrument as the only objects of the power.1
Bequest to A for life ; and afterwards in an event (which
happens), the testator directed advertisements to be made
for his relations, to such only of whom as should claim
within two months he left the property, to be divided ac-
cording to the discretion of his executors. The executors
died in A's lifetime. It was held that the next of kin of
the testator, according to the statute, took equally, and
that the class was to be ascertained at the death of A, and
not at the death of the testator.2
1 Winn v. Fenwick, 11 Beav. 438.
In the case just cited Lord Langs-
dale, Master of the Kolls, says:
"The rule is that none take by
implication, upon the non-execu-
tion of a power, who cannot take
under an execution of such power.
The argument here is the converse :
that all take in default of appoint-
ment who could have taken under
an execution of the power; and
that, in this power to appoint, the
words 'all and every the chil-
dren,' are used without any limit
as to description, which would
confine the objects to such chil-
dren as should be living at the
death of Mrs. F. It must, how-
ever, be observed that the power
to appoint is to arise in the event
of her leaving one or more child
or children living at her death,
and in that event only; and
taking this, in connection with the
clause by which the property is to
revert to the settlor, in the event
of there being no issue of the mar-
riage living at her death, I think
that the true meaning of the set-
tlement is that those children only
who were living at her death are
entitled to take." See also Tiffin
v. Longman, 15 Beav. 275 ; Cole v.
Wade, 16 Ves. 27; Brown v. Higgs,
4 Ves. 708 ; Longmore v. Broome,
7 Ves. 124; Penny v. Turner, 2
Ph. 493 ; Hutchinson v. Hutchin-
son, 13 Ir. Eq. Eep. 332 ; Grieveson
v. Kirsopp, 2 Keen, 653 ; Witts v.
Bodington, 3 Bro. Ch. 95 ; Birch v.
Wade, 3 Ves. & B. 95; Finch v.
Hollingsworth, 21 Beav. 112 ; In re
Caplin's Will, 34 L. J. (N\ S.) Ch.
578; s. c.,2Dr. &Sm.527; Doyley
Attorney-General, 2 Eq. Cas. Ab.
194.
2 Tiffin v. Longman, 15 Beav. 275.
"I have always held that next of
kin are to be ascertained at the
death of the ancestor ; but the case
of a gift to 'relations' claiming at
a particular period is not the same.
I am of opinion that this is a gift
to the relations at the death of the
daughter. The obvious intention
was that on the death of the daugh-
ter, without issue, the property
was to go to the relations of the
testator then living, provided they
made their claim within two
months. The relations must be
limited to the class fixed by the
statute of distribution, if he had
died at that time." Ibid. See also
Gundry v. Pinniger, 14 Beav. 94.
Word "relations" in a will means
632
ARISING FROM POWERS.
[§ 270.
§ 270. The Word "Relations" Construed. — In England
it is well established that where a donee is invested with a
power of appointment in favor of "relations," with a
power of selection, he may appoint relations of any de-
gree. But where he has simply a power of distribution,
he must limit his appointment to relations who are within
the statute of distribution of intestate's estate. In Grant
v. Lynam, it was held that where a donor recommends or
directs that the donee at her death shall give his personal
property to such of his family, or such of his relations as
she shall think fit, the donee has a power to select the ob-
jects of her bounty amongst his relations or family, though
not within the degree of next of kin. But if the donee
does not exercise the power, the word "relations*' or the
word "family" will be construed "next of kin," unless
the special expressions of the donee have a different im-
port.1 In Lawlor v. Henderson, where a testator, after
"next of kin." Bequest of residue
to testator's wife for life, with a
direction to dispose of the residue
among his relations in such man-
ner as she should think fit. Ap-
pointment to relations, not being
next of kin, void, and the residue
decreed to be distributed among
those who were next of kin to the
testator at the time of his death.
Pope v. Whilcomb, 3 Meriv. 689.
"I give to A C £500, and it is my
will and desire that A C may dis-
pose of the same among her rela-
tions as she, by will, may think
proper."' Held, a trust for the re-
lations of A C and the £500 each
bequeathed by the will of A C to
her sister and her sister's children,
though made without reference to
the will of the first testator. Forbes
v. Ball, 3 Meriv. 436.
1 Grant v. Lynam, 4 Buss. 292;
In re Jeffery's Trusts, L. It. 14 Eq.
136; Snow v. Teed, L. K. 9 Eq.
622; ' In re Coulman, L. B. 30 Ch.
D. 180; Supple v. Lawson, Amb.
729; Spring v. Biles, 1 T. B. 435,
n. ; Cruwys v. Oolman, 9 Ves. 342 ;
Mahon v. Savage, 1 Sch.& Lef. Ill;
Forbes v. Ball, 3 Meriv. 457 ; Sal-
usbury v. Denton, 3 Kay & J. 529;
In re Caplin's Will, 34 L. J. (X. S.)
Ch. 578; s. 0., 2 Dr. & Sm. 527;
Pope v. Whitcombe, 3 Meriv. 689 ;
Walter v. Mounde, 19 Yes. 425,
427; Wilson v. Duguid, L. E. 24
Ch. D. 251; Withy v. Mangles, 4
Beav. 358; Halton v. Foster, L. E.
3Ch. App. 507; Fielden v. Ash-
worthy, L. E. 20 Eq. 410; In re
White's Trusts, Johns. 656; Hinck-
ley v. Maclarens, 1 Myl. & K. 27.
In cases of charities in favor of
"poor relations," or where the tes-
tator has himself furnished some
test by which relations extending
beyond the statute of distribution
(22 and 23 Car. II., ch. 10) may be
discovered, the court of chancery
will not confine itself, as in ordi-
nary cases, to relations within the
statute of distribution. White v.
White, 7 Ves. 423; Attorney-Gen-
§ 270. J ARISING FROM POWERS. (J33
bequeathing a legacy to his daughter, left an annuity to
his mother and sister for their lives, and directed that
upon their deaths the residue of his property should be
divided amongst his relations as his executors (his brothers)
should think fit and most worthy to receive it. At the
death of the testator, and at the death of his mother and
sister, his daughter was his sole next of kin ; it was held
that the daughter was entitled to the residue.1 In his
opinion in this case, the Master of the Rolls said: "The
word 'relations,' in gifts of this character, has received a
settled meaning, and the only point is whether the execu-
tors had, under the will, a power of selection or a simple
power of distribution. It is plain that in the latter case
they must confine themselves to the class falling within the
limits of the statute of distribution, subject, of course, to
the consideration of the period when that class is to be as-
certained. I am of opinion that the principle laid down
in Pope v. Whitcombe rules this case, and having regard
to it I think that there was no power of selection, but one
of distribution simply; and, therefore, that the entire
residue of the testator's estate has gone to his daughter,
who was the sole next of kin at his death, as well as at the
death of his mother and sister, which fact relieves this
case of the difficulty which arose in Finch v. Hollings-
worth, where the next of kin at the death of the testator,
and at the period of distribution, were different persons."2
eral v. Price, 17 Ves. 371 ; Mahon v. Cox, 236. It has been decided that
Savage, 1 Sob.. & Lef . Ill ; Bennett to take title under a devise to the
v. Honeywood, 2 Amb. 208. "first and nearest'' of the testator's
JLawlor v. Henderson, 10 Ir. E. "kindred, being male and of his
Eq. 150. name of blood," the claimantmust
2Lawlorv.Henderson,10Ir.K.Eq. be of the same name by descent;
150. See also Pope v. Whitcombe, the assumption of the name by the
3 Meriv. 689; Finch v. Hollings- nearest of blood, though a male,
worth, 21 Beav. 112; Brandon v. and a descendent by the female
Brandon, 3 Swanst. 319; Cole v. line, does not satisfy the require-
Wade, 16 Ves.47; Devisme v. Mel- ment. Leigh v. Leigh, 15 Ves.
lish, 5 Ves. 529; McLeroth v. Ba- 100,109. When the word "family"
con, 5 Ves. 167; Squibb v. Wynn, is used, not in a bequest of person-
IP. Wms. 381; Smith v. Campbell, alty, but in a devise or limitation
19 Ves» 400; Stampe v. Cooke, 1 of real estate, there are numerous
634 ARISING FROM POWERS. [§ 271.
§ 271. The Subject Continued While the English
rule has not been literally followed by the American courts,
in the main it has been sustained. In the leading case of
Ingrahani v. Meade, before the Circuit Court of the United
States for the Third District, where stocks had been loosely
settled or transferred by a father to trustees, the certifi-
cate declaring only in general terms that it was for a cer-
tain lady "and her children," it was held that a power to
appoint "among such of the children of E, and M, and in
such proportions as M may appoint, ' ' is an exclusive power ;
that is to say, M may entirely exclude certain children if
she pleases. The English equitable practice of setting
aside certain appointments as illusory, it seems, is not
known as part of the Pennsylvania jurisprudence. A
power of appointment among children in terms may in-
clude grandchildren, if in a general way grandchildren are
manifest objects of the trust. And in the case before the
court, though children alone were mentioned as entitled
to receive under appointment, yet as the issue of children
were, by the same clause, provided for in defect of ap-
pointment, it was held that the latter provision transferred
its virtue in a manner in the former one ; and that such
issue was meant to be included within the power of appoint-
ment also.1 In his opinion in this case, Mr. Justice Grier
discussed the principle involved as follows: "It is un-
doubtedly a general rule in the construction, both of wills
and deeds of settlement, that while the word 'issue' will be
construed to include grandchildren, the word 'child' or 'chil-
dren' will not receive such construction. Hence, it has
been laid down as an established rule that a power of ap-
pointment to children will not authorize an appointment to
authorities for construing this as a the testator an intention to give his
devise or limitation to the head of leaseholds to his next of kin, and his
the family, i. e., the heir-at-law. freeholds to his heirs by the same
But, it has been observed, it would testamentary donation to his "fam-
be a more obscure case to deal ily.'" Wright v. Atkyns, 19 Ves.
with, if the subjects of a gift were 300,303; Condenv. Clerke, Hob. 33.
a mixed fund, made up both of See also Pyot v. Pyot, 1 Ves. 338.
realty and personalty, and that it ' Ingraham v. Meade, 3 Wall,
would be difficult to attribute to Jr. 32.
§ 271. J ARISING FROM POWERS. 635
grandchildren. Neither will a legacy or devise to 'chil-
dren' be construed to include grandchildren. And where
there is nothing else in the deed or will to show that the
testator or donor did not use these words in a different
sense, this rule of construction should not be departed
from. But every instrument must be construed from its
whole contents taken together, in order to ascertain the
true meaning and intention of the party or parties to it.
No one isolated word or term can be seized upon and made
to absolutely control the rest of the instrument. The tes-
tator or donor may have used particular words, either in a
wider or narrower sense than that given by philologists or
judges. The word 'issue' maybe found from other clauses
to have been used to designate a child, or children, only,
and not to include grandchildren. Lord Alvanley has said
that 'children1 may mean 'grandchildren,' where there can
be no other construction, 'but not otherwise.' This dic-
tum, like many other acute dicta, must itself be construed
with some latitude, as, if taken literally, it would deny the
right of the court under any circumstances to give such
construction. But I presume that Lord Alvanley meant
no more than that this term could receive no other con-
struction, unless from the external circumstances of the
testator the devise, gift or power would fail altogether, as
in Gale v. Bennett, where it was decreed that grandchil-
dren might claim a devise 'to children,' where there were
no children, or where a more comprehensive meaning
must necessarily be given to the word to render it con-
sistent with other clauses of the instrument clearly ex-
pressed. Thus, in Deveaux v. Barnwell, grandchildren
were decreed to take under the words 'my surviving chil-
dren,' under the pressure of circumstances which showed
that such must have been the intention of the testator ;
the court saying, with Lord Macclesfield, 'if there is no
precedent it is time to make one.' But such a construction
should not be made unless a strong case of inten-
tion or necessary implication requires it."1 In a late case in
1 Ingraham v. Meade, 3 Wall, Jr. 32, 41 ; Eeeves v. Bryce, 4 Ves. 698;
636 ARISING FROM POWERS. [§ ^72.
Ehode Island it was held that the word "relations," in its
widest extent, embraces persons of every degree of con-
sanguinity, and extends to all persons who are descended
from the same common ancestors. Hence, where R6H
devised his estate as follows : "I give, devise and bequeath
unto my wife, M H, all and singular my property and es-
tate, both real and personal, for and during the term of
her natural life, with full power to devise and bequeath
the same, or any part thereof, to my relations of theHuling
family as she shall, in her discretion, select;" and his
wife, the said M H who was his cousin german, by her
will devised the estate in question to her niece, A E F, for
life, said AEF being a granddaughter of a sister of the
father of E6H, and niece of his said wife ; it was held
that the devise was a valid execution of the power confer-
red upon M H by the will of E G H.1
§ 272. The Same Subject. — Where the power is exe-
cuted by the court, the distribution must be limited to re-
lations within the statute, unless the bequest is to poor
relations for the founding of a charity, or the testator has
Gale v. Bennett, Ami). 681 ; Deveaux construction may not quadrate with
v. Barnwell, 1 Desaus. 499. "In strict rules; yet it is not repugnant
the case before tbe court, the in- to any rule, and it is well warranted,
tent is manifestly to divide the es- Suppose a testator should leave by
tate not disposed of by the wife his will all his estate to be equally
among all the testator's children. At divided among his children, and
the time of making his will all of one of them dies a few days before
them were alive ; but two of them him, leaving a large family de-
died before the testator leaving is- pending upon the bounty of the
sue. The testator never repub- grandfather, and he dies without
lished his will (though he lived altering his will; ought the grand-
some time after) nor made a new children to be left destitute, and
one. It is a strong presumption the large estate to go wholly from
that he meant that his grandchil- them perhaps to one child of t?s-
dren should stand in the place of tator and he without a family?"
their parents. To exclude them Chancellor Matthews in Deveaux
would be to defeat his express in- v. Barnwell, 1 Desaus. Eq. 497.
tent to provide equally for his 1 Huling v. Fenner, 9 K. I. 410.
children. And although a will is Illegitimate children do not take,
not consummate till the death of In re Kerr's Trusts, L. K. 4 Ch. D.
the testator, it is in many respects 600. See also Hill v. Cook, L. E.
inchoate from the execution. This 6 H. L. Cas. 265.
§ 273. 1 ARISING FROM POWERS. 637
laid down some rule by which the bequest is made to apply-
to relations without the statute.1 In Grant v. Lynam the
Master of the Rolls, referring to the case of Harding v.
Glyn, said: "The principle, therefore, of that case is,
that where the author of the power uses the term rela-
tions, and the donee does not exercise the power, there the
court will adopt the statute of distribution as a convenient
rule of construction, and will give the property to the next
of kin ; but that the donee, who exercises the power, has
a right of selection among the relations of the donor, al-
though not within the degree of next of kin."2
§ 273. The Term "Representatives" Construed. — In
a very recent case before the Chancery Division of the High
Court of Justice, it was held that in the absence of sufficient
evidence in the will to the contrary, "representatives"
must be construed in its ordinary and primary meaning of
"legal personal representatives."3 In his opinion in this
case, Sir James Sterling, Justice, said: "Now the first
question I have to consider is what is the meaning of the
words, 'or their respective representatives?' That was con-
sidered in a well-known case before Vice-Chancellor Kin-
dersley of In re Crawford's Trusts. He there laid down
that the words were to be taken, in the absence of context
to the contrary, as meaning executors or administrators of
1 White v. White, 7 Ves. 423 ; At- in failure of the person so empow-
torney-General v. Price, 17 Ves. ered, it will confine itself to rela-
371 ; Isaac v. De Friez, 17 Ves. 371, tions within the statute of distribu-
note a. Legacy to executor to be tions. Mahon v. Savage, 1 Sch. &
distributed amongst the "poor re- Lef. 111.
lations" of testator. A relation 2 Grant v. Lynam, 4 Russ. 292;
who was poor at the time of tes- Harding v. Glyn, 1 Atk. 469 ; s. c,
tator's death, but became rich be- 2 Lead. Gas. Eq. *1033: Brown v.
fore distribution not entitled. Poor Higgs, 5 Ves. 501 ; Mahon v. Sav-
relation dying before distribution age, I Sch. & Lef. Ill; Supple v.
his claim not transmissible to his Lawson, Amb. 729; Brown v. Higgs,
personal representative. Where a 5 Ves. 501 ; Cruwys v. Colman, 9
person has a power of distribution Ves. 324 ; Salusbury v. Denton, 3
among poor relations, he may dis- Kay & J. 536 ; Brunsden v. Wool-
tribute amongst all poor relations, redge, Amb. 507; Snow v. Teed, L.
however remote. But where the K. 9 Eq. 622.
court is called upon to distribute, 3 In re Ware, L. R. 45 Ch. D.269.
638
ARISING FROM POWERS.
[§ 273.
the person represented, not the next of kin. That case has
been repeatedly cited with approval and followed, and I
take it that the principles laid down in it are binding upon
me, whatever my individual opinion might have been ; but
I desire to say that, so far from feeling any doubt or desire
to differ, I find myself, having read the judgment most care-
fully, in accord with what is laid down there, and 1 cordially
assent to every word of the Vice-Chancellor's judgment."1
1 In re "Ware, L. K. 45 Ch. D.
269, 277. "It is a sound rule of
construction to understand words
in their ordinary sense, unless
controlled by a different intention
appearing upon the whole instru-
ment. The ordinary sense of legal
representatives is executors or ad-
ministrators." Sir John Leach in
Price v. Strange, 6 Madd. 149.
"Now, although the term 'repre-
sentatives' may be construed to
mean 'next of kin,1 if it appears
that the testator intended to use it
in that sense, I take it to be clear
that that is not its primary or or-
dinary legal meaning. It must be
observed that in the cases in which
that term has been construed 'next
of kin,' it has been held to mean
the persons who would be entitled
to his personal estate by virtue of
the statute of distributions, in case
he had died intestate. Such per-
sons do not, properly speaking,
represent the deceased in any respect
whatever. They are not necessarily
his representatives in respect of
blood, for the class may include
persons standing in different de-
grees of consanguinity to the de-
ceased, and even the wife will be
included, though not related at all
in blood. Nor do they represent
him in respect of his personal es-
state; for they are not the parties
against whom a creditor, or other
per- on having a demand against
the testator, must bring his action
or file his bill to recover his debt
or demand; and, although they
are entitled to receive from the
representatives of the deceased,
dying intestate, the clear surplus
of his personal estate, after pay-
ment of the funeral and testament-
ary expenses, debts and legacies,
such right is merely conferred on
them by statute, and after all is no
better right than that of a residu-
ary legatee. The conclusion is,
that the ordinary and legal mean-
ing of the term 'representatives'
is not 'next of kin,' but 'execu-
tors and administrators,' and that
is the sense in which the testator
must be considered to have used it,
unless the will affords evidence
sufficient to satisfy the court that
he intended to use it in a different
sense. Accordingly, in several
cases, the term 'representatives,'
or any other similar term, has
been held to mean executors or
administrators." In re Crawford's
Trust, 2 Drew. 230, 236. See also
Corbyn v. French, 4 Ves. 418;
Price v. Strange, 6 Madd. 149;
Saberton v. Skeels, 1 Russ. & Myl.
587; Hinchcliffe v. Westwood, 2
De G. & Sm. 216. But see for the
other construction, Booth v. Vick-
ars, 1 Coll. 6; Smith v. Palmer, 7
Hare, 225; Coltoh v. Colton, 2
Beav. 67 ; Bridge v. Abbott, 3 Bro.
Ch. 224.
§ 274. ] ARISING FROM POWERS. 639
§ 274. Delegation of Powers. — It is well established
that trustees of real estate who have been clothed with
discretionary power to sell cannot delegate such discretion
to another person. But having determined, in the exer-
cise of their discretion, to make a sale of the property,
and having fixed the price they may authorize an agent to
enter into a contract for the sale of it, on the terms which
they have prescribed.1 It will be observed that this rule
applies, not to the act by which the property is conveyed,
but to the exercise of judgment and discretion by the
donee of the power. This cannot be delegated, but hav-
ing exercised the discretion authorized by the power,
he may put his plans into execution through the instru-
mentality of an attorney, or other agent. His instructions
to such agents in regard to the manner in which their
work is to be performed is not a delegation of power, and
even where they are authorized to sign conveyances, as his
attorneys, there is no delegation of a power in the sense
in which that act is prohibited by this rule.3 In a recent
English case, where the donee of a power appointed by
will a life interest to M, an object of the power, and then
delegated to M a power to appoint a life interest to a
stranger to the power, and subject thereto, appointed the
property to the children of M, who were objects to the
power, it was held that the delegation of the power was
void, but that the subsequent appointment was good.3 In
1 Keim v. Lindley (1895) (H. J. an attorney or proxy is not, in all
Eq.), 30 Atl. Rep. 1063. '-An oases, a delegation of the trust,
examination of the authorities When the trustee has resolved in
shows that the prohibition is his own mind in what manner to ex-
against the delegation of the per- ereise his discretion, he cannot be
sonal discretion and judgment, said to delegate any part of the
But if the trustee or donee of the confidence if he merely execute
power actually exercises the dis- the deed by attorney or signify his
cretion and judgment in a reason- will by proxy." Ibid. 1074. See
able manner, and arrives at a con- also 1 Perry on Trusts, § 409; Hill
elusion, he may delegate to an- on Trustees, 541.
other the mere ministerial duty of 2 Attorney -General v. Scott, 1
carrying out that judgment. Mr. Ves. 413; Ex parte Rigby, 19Ves.
Lewin (page *258) says : "It must 463; 1 Lewin on Trusts, *258.
be noticed that the appointment of 3 Carr v. Atkinson, L. R. 14 Eq.
640 ARISING FROM POWERS. [§ 275.
a still later English case where the donee of a power of
appointment among his own children appointed to his
son for life, with remainder to the son's children as he
should appoint, and in default of such appointment, to the
son absolutely. The son died without having attempted
to exercise the power thus delegated to him ; it was held
that the ultimate limitation in favor of the son was valid
and took effect.1
§ 275. Rule of Distribution Prescribed by Donor. —
Where the discretion of the donee of a power is limited by
a rule prescribed by the donor, or by any contingency, and
for any reason he fails to execute the power, the court, in
the distribution of the property, will put itself in the place
of the donee. It will be guided by the directions of the
donor. So far as practicable, the court will administer or
execute the power in accordance with his wishes as ex-
pressed in the instrument by which the power is imparted.
In a leading case, the donor executed a trust deed under
which the trustees were to distribute the residue of the
estate among his friends and relations where they should
see most necessity, and as they should think most just. It
397. Husband and wife having, his personal estate; but if such
under their marriage settlement, a, interest should be previously de-
joint power of appointment over termined, then upon the trusts
personalty in favor of the children therein mentioned. Held, that the
of the marriage, of whom there appointment to such uses as H
were, three survivors, appointed should appoint, with consent of
one-third of the fund to trustees the trustees, was void, but that the
upon such trusts as H (one of the limitation over in default of ap-
sons), by deed, executed with the pointment by H was valid, and
consent of the father during his gave H an absolute interest in the
life, and after his death with the share, subject to the contingency
consent of the trustees of his will, of his committing a forfeiture
or by will should appoint; and in within the prescribed period. Webb
default of such appointment upon v. Sadler, L. R. 14 Eq. 533; s. c,
trust for H for life, or until bank- L. R. 8 Ch. 419.
ruptcy or assignment (such bank- n Williamson v. Farwell, L. R. 35
ruptcy or assignment being limited Ch. D. 128. See also Crompe v.
to twenty-one years after the death Barrow, 4 Ves. 681; Routledgev.
of his surviving parent), and after Dorril, 2 Ves. Jr. 357 ; Robinson v.
H's death, upon trust for his ex- Hardcastle, 2 T. R. 241; Long v.
ecutors or administrators, as part of Ovenden, L. R. 16 Ch. D. 691.
§ 275. J ARISING FROM POWERS. 641
was held that the instructions of the instrument to the
trustees constituted a rule by which the court might be
governed, and that the court could judge of the necessities
of the class named by referring it to the Master.1 In his
opinion in this case, Lord Hardwicke said: "What differs
from the cases mentioned is this, that here is a rule laid
down for the trust. Wherever there is a trust or power
(for this is a mixture of both), whether arising on a legal
estate, or reserved to be exercised by trustees barely ac-
cording to their discretion, I do not know the court can
put themselves in place of those trustees to exercise that
discretion. Where trustees have power to distribute gen-
erally according to their discretion, without any object
pointed out, or rule laid down, the court interposes not,
unless in case of charity, which is different, the court ex-
ercising a discretion as having the general government and
regulation of charity. But here is a rule laid down, and
the word 'friends' is synonymous to 'relations;' other-
wise it is absurd. The trustees are to judge on the neces-
sity and occasions of the family. That is a judgment to be
made or facts existing ; so that the court can make the
judgment as well as the trustees, and when informed by
evidence of the necessity, can judge what is equitable and
just on this necessity."2 His Lordship subsequently
directed the distribution to be made as the Master should
deem equitable and just.3
1 Grower v. Mainwaring, 2 Ves.87. gift of the property to any class,
2 Gower v. Mainwaring, 2 Ves. but only a power to a donee to
87, 89. See also Hewett v. Hewett, give it as he may think fit among
2 Eden, 332; Anon., 1 P. Wms. members of a class, those only can
327; Widmore v. Woodroffe, Amb. take in default of appointment who
636 ; Brunsden v. Woolredge, might have taken under an exer-
Amb. 507; Attorney-General v. cise of the power. In that case
Buckland, 1 Ves. 231 ; Green v. the court implies an intention to
Howard, 1 Bro. Ch. 33; Mahonv. give the property in default of ap-
Savage, 1 Sen. & Lef . Ill ; Maber- pointment to those only to whom
ley v. Turton, 14 Ves. 499 ; Liley the donee of the power might give
v. Hey, 1 Hare, 580; In re Phene's it. See Walsh v. Wallinger, 2Euss.
Trusts, L. E. 5 Eq. 347; Butler v. & Myl. 78; Kennedy v. Kingston,
Gray, L. R. 5 Ch. App. 26, 31. If 2Jac. & W. 431.
the instrument does not contain a 3 Gower v. Mainwaring, 2 Ves. 110.
41
642 ARISING FEOM POWERS. [§ 276.
§ 276. Whether Distribution Shall be Per Stirpes or
Per Capita. — It has been held that where a gift is made to
"relations," without limitation, the distribution must be
made to such relations as are within the statute, and that
it must be made per capita and not per stirpes. In Hinck-
ley v. Maclarens it was held that where the words "next of
kin" are used simpliciter in a gift over, and without any
explanatory context showing a different intention on the
part of the testator, they must be taken to mean next of
kin according to the statute of distributions.1 This de-
cision was modified in Withy v. Mangles, where Lord
Langdale, Master of the Rolls, said: "It has now been set-
tled that the expression 'next of kin,' when used simpliciter,
does not include such persons as could only take by repre-
sentation under the statute of distributions. To this ex-
tent, therefore, it has been determined that the persons
who are entitled to distribution in case of intestacy are
not for that reason only to be deemed next of kin of a
person deceased."2 To this His Lordship subsequently
1 Hinckley v. Maclaren, 1 Myl. & how far does that meaning extend,
K. 27. and where is the ground for saying
2 Withy v. Mangles, 4 Beav. 35S, they import more or less than their
366. The ease of Hinckley v. Mac- natural legal sense? If they in-
larens was first overruled in Elms- elude the representative of deceased
ley v.Young, 2 Myl. & K. 780. Lord persons, at what period does that
Commissioner Bosauquet in that representation stop? Do the words
case uses this language: "If the 'next of kin' used simply and absol-
words 'next of kin' are to be under- utely, and without reference to any
stood according to the description intestacy, or to the statute, include
of the statute, it is necessary to not merely representatives,but rep-
inquire what the description of resentatives limited by a particular
the statute is. The statute says, description afterwards to be found
'to every of the next of kindred to in the statute? I find great diffi-
the intestate, who are in equal culty in saying, even supposing
degree, and those who legally rep- this to be a case devoid of all
resent them;' so that next of kin, authority, that the words 'next of
described by the statute, are those kin,' used as they are in an instru-
in equal degree, to which the stat- ment having no reference to the
ute superadds other words, de- disposition of property in case of
scribing the representatives as dis- intestacy, and that instrument be-
tinct from the next of kin. If the ing not a will, but a deed, can pos-
words 'next of kin' have acquired sibly be construed in a different
anyparcicularmeaning,Iwouldask sense from that which the law
re.]
ARISING FROM POWERS.
643
added: "Whatever arbitrary distinctions may have been
adopted in computing collateral degrees of consanguinity,
all writers upon the laws of England appear to concur in
stating that in the ascending and descending line the par-
ents and the children are in equal degree of kindred to
the proposed person, and I think that, except for the pur-
poses of administration and distribution in cases of intes-
tacy, and except in cases where the simple expression may
be controlled by the context, the law of England does not
consider them to be in equal degree of consanguinity."1
Where the gift is of such a character as not to admit of
division, the court will execute the power if it is practica-
ble to do so.2
ascribes to them. As to the second
ground upon which Phillips v.
Garth was decided, namely, that
Thomas v. Hole, where the words
'relations' was held to mean next
of kin according to the statute, was
a case in point, it is to be observed,
that the ground upon which in
Thomas v. Hole and many other
cases the words 'relations' and
'family' have been held to import
next of kin according to the statute
is this, — that those' expressions, be-
ing in themselves vague and indefi-
nite, must of necessity receive some
limitation, and the statute has been
taken as the criterion of the lim-
itation to be imposed upon them.
The words 'next of kin' are in
themselves definite ; the word 're-
lations' is in itself indefinite;
the reason, therefore, which
applies for imposing this limita-
tion in the one case does not apply
in the other."
1 Withy v. Mangles, 4 Beav. 358,
368.
2 Brown v. Higgs, 5 Ves. 504;
Mosely v. Mosely, K. temp. Finch,
53 ; Clarke v. Turner, Freem. 199 ;
Kichardson v. Chapman, 7 Bro.
P. C. 318.
CHAPTEE XV.
TKUSTS FOR MARRIED WOMEN.
§ 277.
Introductory.
§ 295.
Order of Court for Main-
278.
Separate Estate of Wife in
tenance.
Equity.
296.
The Husband as Trustee
279.
Limitation of Wife's Equi-
for the Wife.
table Estate.
297.
The Husband as Agent for
280.
The Subject Continued.
Wife.
281.
Transmutation of Separate
298.
Liability for Contracts and
Estate Property.
for Debts.
282.
The Wife's Statutory Sepa-
299.
The Subject Continued.
rate Estate.
300.
Limitations of Her Lia-
283.
Restraint on Alienation.
bility.
284.
The Subject Continued.
301.
The Doctrine as Modified
285.
Restraint Upon Anticipa-
in this Country.
tion.
302.
The Subject Continued.
286.
Form of Words Required.
303.
Application of the Ameri-
287.
Doctrine of Restraint Con-
can Doctrine.
tinued.
304.
Gifts from Husband.
288.
Devolution of Wife's Sepa-
305.
The Rights of the Wife in
rate Estate at Her Death.
Her Savings.
289.
The Married Woman's
306.
Rights of Wife in Her Pin-
Equity to a Settlement.
Money.
290.
The Amount of Wife's Set-
307.
Voluntary Separation of
tlement.
Husband and Wife.
291.
Property Subject to Wife's
308.
The Consideration Re-
Settlement.
quired.
292.
How the Equity to a Set-
309.
The Subject Continued.
tlement May be Lost.
310.
Illegal Executory Agree-
293.
The Mode of Settlement.
ments.
294.
Rights of Children Under
311.
Property Rights of Wife
the Married Woman's
under Separation.
Settlement.
312.
Termination of Contract.
§ 277. Introductory. — The common law relating to
the property rights of married women was based upon the
Scriptural doctrine that a husband and wife are one. With
some exceptions it made them one person, as well as one
flesh. As under the domestic economy, as regulated by
§ 277. J MARRIED WOMEN. 645
the Divine precepts, the husband is "the head of the wife,"
and supreme in the household, so, under the common
law, he has absolute control of the property of the wife.
During coverture the legal existence of the wife, for most
purposes, is suspended, or becomes incorporated into and
thus one with that of the husband.1 Under this rule
neither husband nor wife can make any legal conveyance
to the other, nor enter into any legal contract between
themselves. And the rule is, that any contracts between
husband and wife, made before the union, are avoided by
the marriage. Under modern statutory enactments this
doctrine is abrogated, and the husband and wife are each
recognized as distinct persons, with individual rights and
responsibilities. They may hold separate estates, may as-
sume individual obligations, and may make contracts either
with third parties or inter se; or, by agreement, they
may have a community of business interests of the nature
of a partnership.2 But equity, while recognizing the
principles of the common law, and enforcing them to a
degree, has interposed for the relief of married women in
establishing equitable rules and precedents, which not only
go beyond but also, in many instances, are in direct con-
flict with the requirements of the law. It recognizes the
distinct personalty of the wife, and secures to her a
separate estate, free from the control or claims of the hus-
band. In many respects it secures to her the same rights
that she possessed while unmarried.3 The jurisdiction of
1Blackstone'sCommentaries,442; Lady Arundell v. Phipps, 10 Ves.
2 Story's Equity Jurisprudence, 139 ; Murray v. Barlee, 3 Myl. & K.
§ 1362. 209 ; Aylett v. Ashton, 1 Myl. & Cr.
2 2 Story's Equity Jurisprudence, 105,112; Field v. Soule, 4 Euss.
§§ 1367, 1368; Arundell v. Phipps, 112; Owens v. Dickenson, Craig &
10 Ves. 144, 149; Livingstone v. P. 48; Hulme v. Tennant, 1 Bro.
Livingstone, 2 Johns. Ch. 539 ; Grif- Ch. 18; s. c, 1 Lead. Cas. in Eq.
fithv. Hood, 2 Ves. 452; Lampert (4th Am. ed.) 679, 684; Picard v.
v. Lampert, 1 Ves. Jr. 21. Hine, L. K. 5 Ch. 274, 276, 277. In
3 McHenry v. Davis, L. R. 10 Eq. the thoroughly considered case of
88; Owen v. Homan, 4 H. L. Cas. Pike v. Fitzgibbon, L. K.17Ch.D.
997 ; Grigby v. Cox, 1 Ves. Sr. 517 ; 454, at page 461, Brett, L. J., says :
Heatley v. Thomas, 15 Ves. 596; "At common law, for reasons of
Nantes v. Corrock, 9 Ves. 182, 189; high social policy, a married woman
646
MARRIED WOMEN.
[§ 277.
equity in cases of this character was established in England
at an early period. It appears that the doctrine of the
is not allowed to make any contract
binding upon herself or upon any
property of hers; in fact the com-
mon law did not recognize that she
had any property or could do any
act binding herself. It seems to
me, after having read the cases
referred to and listened to the argu-
ments, that it is not true to say that
equity has recognized or invented
a status of a married woman to
make contracts; neither does it
seem to me that equity has ever
said that what is now called a con-
tract is a binding contract upon a
married woman. What equity
seems to me to have done is this :
it has recognized a settlement as
putting a married woman into the
position of having what is called a,
separate estate, and has attached
certain liabilities not to her but to
that estate. The decisions appear
to me to come to this, that certain
promises (I use the word 'prom-
ises' in order to show that, in my
opinion, they are not contracts),
made by a married woman and
acted upon by the persons to whom
they are made on the faith of the
fact known to them of her being
possessed at the time of a separate
estate, will be enforced against
such separate estate, as she
was possessed of at that time,
or so much of it as re-
mains at the time of judgment
recovered, whether such judgment
recovered during or after the ces-
sation of the coverture. That prop-
osition so stated does not apply to
separate estate coming into exist-
ence after the promise which it is
sought to enforce. * * It seems
to me that the days are at an end
when any court in this country
ought intentionally to make new
judicial legislation." And the
words of Cotton, L. J., page 463:
"I think that the ingenious and
able argument on the part of the
plaintiffs has proceeded on one or
two fallacies in the use of language.
As I understand their argument it is
this: tbatacourtof equity deals with
a married woman who has sepa-
rate estate as if she were a feme sole.
Now is that correct? First of all
there is one clear and absolute
distinction. Can a feme sole,
or can a man, be restrained
from anticipating, or disposing by
anticipation, of any property to
which she or he is entitled? Xo.
A married woman under coverture
can; but how and why? Simply
as regards property settled to her
separate use, and because equity
can modify the incidents of sepa-
rate estate, which is the creation of
equity; and thus the position of a
married woman having separate
property differs materially from a
feme sole. Is it true that she is re-
garded in equity as a feme sole1}
She is regarded as a feme sole to a
certain extent, but not as a feme sole
absolutely, and there is a fallacy.
She, in my opinion, is regarded as
a feme sole only as regards property,
which she is restrained from an-
ticipating; she is not as regards
persons other than her husband, in
the position of a feme sole. As re-
gards her husband no doubt she is,
as regards property settled to her
separate use (whether there is a
restraint upon anticipation or not)
treated as a feme sole, thatisto say,
she and not her husband, is the
person who alone can receive and
give a discharge for the money,
§278.]
MARRIED WOMEN.
647
separate estate of the wife was fully recognized as early as
1695.1
§ 278. Separate Estate of Wife in Equity. — In the
absence of any statutory provisions relating to the subject
the separate estate of the wife is a creature of equity.
Under the rule which equity has laid down, and which is
now well established, the married woman is regarded and
treated, in her relation to her separate estate, in most re-
in the leading case of
spects, as though she were single.
and her husband is absolutely ex-
cluded, but as regards the outside
world she is not regarded as a, feme
sole in respect of property subject
to a restraint upon anticipation.
The judgment and opinion of Lord
Justice Turner in Johnson v. Gal-
lagher shows the doctrine and prin-
ciple to be that, as regards property
settled to her separate use, and
which she has the power of dealing
with as a feme sole, she is treated,
for the purposes of assignment or
for the purposes of her general en-
gagements, as if she were a feme
sole, but as regards that property
only." See Johnson v. Gallagher,
3 De G., F. & J. 494. "A husband
and wife may contract, for a bona
fide and valuable consideration, for
a transfer of property from him to
her. It was admitted as a clear
point in the case of Lady Arundell
v. Phipps (10 Ves. 146, 1491, that a
married woman, having separate
property, may purchase, by the
sale of it, other property, even of
her husband, and have it limited
to her separate use." Livingstone
v. Livingstone, 2 Johns. Ch. 537,
539. Feme gives a bond to her in-
tended husband, that in case of
their marriage she will convey her
lands to him in fee ; they marry ;
the wife dies without issue, and
then the husband dies ; the bond
though void in law, yet is good
evidence of the agreement in equity,
and the heir of the husband shall
compel a specific performance
against the heir of the wife. Can-
nel v. Buckle, 2 P. Wms. 242. See
also "Separate Estate of Married
Women," by A. W. Dillard, 2 So..
Law Rev. 502; "Separate Estate of
Married Woman" byE. S. Mallory,
3 So. Law Rev. 454; and on the
same topic generally, articles notes
and reviews in 3 Can. Law Times,
63; 27Law. Mag. 285; 3 Va. L. J.
714; 10 Wash. L. Eep. 74; 4 Mo.
Law. Mag. 138; 4 Law Students'
Mag. (N".S.)676; 22 Leg. Obs. 465;
30 Leg. Obs. 38 ; 12 Ir. L. Times,
319; 24 Sol. J. & Rep. 702; 25 Sol.
J. & Kep. 484; Stuart v. Kissam,
2 Barb. 494; Broadman v. ^Etna
Ins. Co., 128 U.S. 240; Smith v.
Thompson, 2 MacArthur, 291 ; Peo-
ple's Bank v. Dening, 131 Pa. St.
252; Scott v. Rowland, 82 Va. 484;
Montgomery v. Noyes, 73 Tex. 207;
Trenton Banking Co. v. Woodruff,
2 X. J. Eq. 117; Stephenson v.
Brown, 3 X. J. Eq. 503 ; Kip v Kip,
6 Stew. (X. J.) 216; Perkins v.
Elliott, 23 X. J. Eq. 526; Ayer v.
Ayer, 16 Pick. 327; Ware v. Rich-
ardson, 3 Md. 506, 550; Sutton v.
Sutton, 80 Ga. 178; s. C, 12 Am.
St. Rep. 249.
1 Drake v. Storr (1695), 2 Freem.
205.
648 MARRIED WOMEN. [§ 278.
Johnson v. Gallagher, Lord Justice Turner states the
equitable principle as follows : "Before entering into the
facts of the case it may be as well to consider the nature
and extent of the rights and remedies of such creditors,
as established by the decisions of the courts of equity, or
by conclusions which may be fairly drawn from those de-
cisions. It is to be observed, in the first place, that the
separate estate, against which these rights and remedies
exist and are to be enforced, is the creature of courts of
equity, and that the rights and remedies themselves, there-
fore, can exist and be enforced in those courts only. The
courts of law recognize in married women no separate ex-
istence, no power to contract, and, except for some collat-
eral and incidental purposes, no possession or enjoyment
of property separate and apart from their husbands. They
deny to married women both the power to contract and
the power to enjoy. Courts of equity, on the other hand,
have, through the medium of trusts, created for married
women rights and interests in property, both real and per-
sonal, separate from and independent of their husbands.
To the extent of the rights and interests thus created,
whether absolute or limited, a married woman has, in
courts of equity, power to alienate, to contract and to en-
joy ; in fact, to use the language of all the cases, from the
earliest to the latest, she is considered in a court of equity
as a feme sole in respect of property thus settled or se-
cured to her separate use."1 The trust estate of the
1 Johnson v. Gallagher, 3 De G., was found, as part of such law,
F. & J. 494, 509. Lord Cottenham, that the power of alienation be-
in Tnllett v. Armstrong, 4 Myl. & longed to thewife, and wasdestruct-
Cr. 405, thus states the doctrine of ive of the security intended for it.
the wife's separate estate: "When Equity again interfered, and hy
this court first established the sep- another violation of the laws of
arate estate it violated the (exist- property supported the validity of
ing) laws of property as between the prohibition against alienation,
husband and wife; but it was In the case now under considera-
thought beneficial, and it prevailed, tion, if the after- taken husband be
It being once settled that a wife permitted to interfere with the
might enjoy separate estate as a property given or settled before
feme sole, the laws of property at- the marriage to the separate use of
tached to this new estate; and it the wife, much of the benefit and
§ 278.] MARRIED WOMEN. 649
wife, secured to her in equity, is not to be identified with
the property rights established by statutes. "In her equita-
security of the rules which have
been so established will be lost.
Why, then, should not equity in
this case also interfere? and, if it
cannot protect the wife consistently
with the ordinary rales of prop-
erty, extend its own (peculiar)
rules with respect to the separate
estate, so as to secure to her the
enjoyment of that estate, which has
been so invented fo^' her benefit?
It is, no doubt, doing violence to
the rules of property to say that
property which, being given with
qualiticationsandrestrictions which
are held to be void, belonged abso-
lutely to the woman up to the mo-
ment of her marriage, shall not be
subject to the ordinary rules as to
the interest which the husband is
to take in it ; but it is not a stronger
act to prevent the husband from
interfering with such property that
it was originally to establish the
separate estate, or to maintain the
prohibition against alienation. In
doing this I feel that I have much
to overcome, of which the obser-
vations thrown out by myself in
Massey v. Parker, 2 Myl. & K. 174,
is the only part of which I do not
feel the important weight. I have
to contend with Lord Brougham's
observations in Woodmeston v.
Walker, 2 Russ. & M. 197, and
the vice-chancellor's decisions in
Newton v. Eeid, 4 Sim. 141 ;
Brown v. Pocock, 2 Russ. & M.
210; s. c, 5 Sim. 6G3; Mal-
colm v. CTCallaghan, 4 Myl. & Cr.
399; Johnson v. Freeth, 6 Sim. 423,
n.; and Davies v. Thornycroft, 6
Sim. 420. In establishing the va-
lidity of the separate estate, with
its qualifications (which constitute
its value) — that is, the prohibition
against anticipation — I am not
doing more than my predecessors
have done for similar purposes."
Prof. Minor, in 2 Minor's Inst. 576,
thus speaks on this subject : "The
whole doctrine of the separate es-
tate of a married woman is the
creature of equity, and sets at
naught all or most of the princi-
ples of the common law touching
the marital relation, and also
touching property generally. Thus,
a wife may be enabled to dispose
of her separate estate as freely and
with less solemnity than a feme
sole, to charge it merely by impli-
cation, as a feme sole cannot do, and
may also be restrained from con-
veying or charging it at all, a re-
straint adverse to one of the most
settled doctrines of the general
law of property. In respect to the
power of alienation of a wife's
separate estate, a distinction is
made between real and personal
property. As to personal property
the jus disponendi is incident to it
in the fullest manner. The wife
may dispose of it absolutely at her
pleasure, by deed or will, as if she
were a, feme sole, unless the instru-
ment which creates the estate and
vests it in her shall impose restric-
tions, and then these restrictions
will constitute the law of the case.
In respect to real property her
power of disposition is more cir-
cumscribed. If she is not in terms
allowed, by the instrument which
clothes her with the separate es-
tate, to alien it in some designated
way, she can do so only by will,
duly executed, with the formalities
prescribed for married women.
And it seems that though permit-
ted to alien otherwise than in pur-
650 MARRIED WOMEN. [§ 279.
ble estate she is altogether relieved from the claims of the
husband under the common law. On this point Lord
Westbury, in a leading case, said: "When the courts of
equity established the doctrine of the separate use of a
married woman, and applied it to both real and personal
estate, it became necessary to give the married woman,
with respect to such separate property, an independent
personal status and to make her in equity a feme sole. It
is of the essence of the separate use • that the married
woman shall be independent and free from the control and
interference of her husband. With respect to separate
property the feme covert is, by the form of trust, released
and freed from the fetters and disability of coverture, and
invested with the rights and powers of a person who is
sui juris. * * * The violence thus done by courts of
equity to the principles and policy of the common law as
to the status of the wife "during coverture is very remark-
able, but the doctrine is established and must be consist-
ently followed to its legitimate consequences."1 But in
her relation to third persons, and in her power of control
and disposition, her freedom is not absolute. In this re-
gard she is subject to the limitations implied in the trust
under which her separate estate is held, and to such as
may be expressed in the instrument by which it is con-
veyed.
§ 279. Limitations of Wife's Equitable Estate The
separate estate of the wife as established by equity is a
trust estate, and in order that the exclusive right in it may
suance of the statute, she is not but by conveyance directly to bim-
thereby precluded from adopting self (unless where she conveys
the statutory mode. The rents and under the statute) . But a court of
profits of her separate real estate equity will not give sanction or
constitute personalty, and may be effect to a conveyance to the hns-
disposed of accordingly, unless in- band without first subjecting the
vested in lands. Where the wife wife to a privy examination, and
has the power of disposition, she adopting such other precaution as
may dispose her separate property, shall seem needful to ascertain her
as well on her husband as on a freedom of action.-'
stranger, and that not by giving it J Taylor v. Meads, 4 De G., J. &
to a third person to give to him, S. 596, 604, 605.
§279.]
MARRIED WOMEN.
651
be secured, it must be held for her use by the terms of the
conveyance, or of the instrument by which the trust is
created. If an estate is conveyed to a trustee in trust for
a married woman, or to a single woman and she subse-
quently marries, without anything in the instrument or in
the creation of the trust to indicate that it is to constitute
a separate estate, it will be subject to the common law
rights of the husband.1 The design of trusts of this char-
1 Hawkes v. Hubback, L. E. 11
Eq. 5 ; In re Gaffee's Trusts, 1 Macn.
& G. 541 ; Baggett v. Meux, 1 Phil].
Ch. 627; s. c, 1 Coll.C. C. 138;
Tullett v. Armstrong, 4 Myl. & Cr.
377; s. c, 1 Beav. 1; Kermie v.
Eitchie, 12 Cl.&F. 204; Shirley v.
Shirley, 9 Paige, 363; Waters v.
Tazewell, 9 Md. 291; Fellows v.
Tann, 9 Ala. 999, 1003; Fears v.
Brooks, 12 Ga. 195, 197; Newlands
v. Paynter, 4 Myl. & Cr. 40S ; Gard-
ner v. Gardner, 1 Giff. 126; Parker
y. Brook, 9 Ves. 583 ; Rich v. Cock-
ell, 9 Ves. 369, 375; Hamilton v.
Bishop, 8 Yerg. 33; Longv.White,
5 J. J. Marsh. 226; Freeman v.
Freeman, 9 Mo. 772; Bennett v.
Davis, 2 P. Wins. 316; Shunning v.
Styles, 3 P. Wms. 334, 337, 339;
Lucas v. Lucas, 1 Atk. 270; Ellis
v. Woods, 9Eich. Eq. 19; Boykin
v. Ciples, 2 Hill's Ch. 200 ; Whitten
v. Jenkins, 34 Ga. 297 ; Darley v.
Darley, 3 Atk. 399 ; Lee v. Prieaux,
3 Bro. Ch. 381, 385 ; Major v. Lans-
ley, 2 Buss. <fc M. 355; Woodmes-
tonv. Walker, 2 Buss. & M. 197;
McKennan v. Phillips, 6 Whart.
571; Trenton Bk. Co. v. Woodruff,
1 Green Ch. 117; Steel v. Steel,
1 Ired. Eq. 452; McMillan v. Pea-
cock, 57 Ala. 127; Miller v. Voss,
62 Ala. 122; Pepper v. Lee, 53
Ala. 33; Crooks v. Crooks, 34 Ohio
St. 610; Blanchard v. Blood, 2
Barb. 352; Varner's Appeal, 80 Pa.
St. 140; Vance v. Nogle, 70 Pa. St.
176, 179; Shonk v. Brown, 61 Pa.
St. 320; Jamison v. Brady, 6 Serg.
& E. 466; Pribble v. Hall, 13 Bush,
61 ; Thomas v. Harkness, 13 Bush,
23; Jones v. Clifton, 101 U. S. 225;
Porter v. Bk. of Eutland, 19 Vt.
410; Bradishv. Gibbs, 3 Johns. Ch.
523, 540 ; Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Bay,
4 Barb. 407; Payne v. Twyman,
68 Mo. 339; Loomis v. Brush, 36
Mich. 40; Holthaus v. Hornbostle,
60 Mo. 439; Barron v. Barron, 24
Vt. 375; City Nat'lBk. v. Hamil-
ton, 34 ST. J. Eq. 158; Davis v.
Davis, 43 Ind. 561. By a post-nup-
tial settlement a sum of money, the
property of the wife, was vested in
trustees upon trusts, which were
construed to operate as a direction
to pay the dividends to the wife for
her life, or to her appointees with-
out anticipation. Held, that the
restraint against anticipation oper-
ated during the whole life of the
wife, and was not restricted to an
existing coverture by the introduc-
tion of additional words which ap-
plied to only such existing cov-
erture. In re Gaffee's Trust, 1
Macn. & G. 541 ; s. C, 7 Hare, 101 ;
13 Jur. 74. If property be given or
settled to the separate use of a
woman unmarried when the settle-
ment or gift takes effect, and she
be prohibited against anticipating
it, it will, if not alieniated by her
when discovert, be enjoyed by her
as her separate estate, during any
652
MARRIED WOMEN.
[§ 279.
acter is to secure to the wife the exclusive use and enjoy-
ment of the estate free from the husband's control and lia-
bilities, and this must be clearly set forth in the instrument
in order that the end may be accomplished.1 The separate
estate of the , wife may include property of any kind,
whether real or personal, and she may hold either an abso-
lute or limited interest in it. It may come to her either by
coverture or covertures to which
she may afterwards be subject ; and
she will, during the existence of
such coverture or covertures, be
unable to anticipate it. Tullett v.
Armstrong, 4 Myl. & Cr. 377 ; S. c,
1 Beav. 1. Some American courts
hold that the clause against antici-
pation applies to and is valid only
during the existing coverture. See
Wells v. McCall, 64 Pa. St. 207;
Dubs v. Dubs, 31 Pa. St. 149; Ap-
ple v. Allen, 3 Jones Eq. 120. Per-
sonal property settled to the1 sep-
arate use of a married woman is
free from any right or control of
her then husband; but if she dies,
and she subsequently marries, the
estate therein vests in such second
husband upon his reducing them
to possession. Miller v. Bingham,
1 Ired. Eq. 423; s. c, 36 Am.
Dec. 58.
1 Taylor v. Meads, 4 DeG., J. & S.
604; Boardman v. ^33tna Ins. Co.,
128 U. S, 240; Scott v Rowland, 82
Va. 484; Montgomery v. ISToyes, 73
Tex. 207; Trenton Banking Co. v.
Woodruff, 2 N. J. 117; Kip v. Kip,
6 Stew. 216; Perkins v. Elliott, 23
N. J. Eq. 626; Ayer v. Ayer, 16
Pick. 327 ; Ware v. Richardson, 3
Md. 506,550; Bush v. Allen, 5 Mod.
63; Hurton v. Hurton, 7 T. R. 652;
Williams v. Waters, 14 Mees. &
Wels. 166; Mayberry v. Xeeley, 5
Humph. 337, 339; Welche's Heirs
v. Welche's Admr., 14 Ala. 77;
White v. White, 16 Gratt. 264;
He:id v. Temple, 4 Heisk. 34; Wal-
lace v. Wallace, 82 111. 530 ; Tuck-
er's Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 354; Hardy
v. Holly, 84 ]ST. Car. 661 ; Caulk v.
Pox, 13 Fla. 148 ; Warden v. Jones,
2De G. & J. 76, 84;'Spurgeon v.
Collier, 1 Eden, 55, 61 ; Dukes v.
Spangler, 35 Ohio St. 119 ; Sproul
v. Atchison Kat'l Bk., 22 Kan. 336;
Blakeslee v. Mobile Life Ins. Co.,
57 Ala. 205; Kilby v. Godwin, 2
Del. Ch. 61; Perkins v. Perkins, 1
Tenn. Ch. 537; Payne v. Hutchin-
son, 32 Gratt. 812 ; Majors v. Ever-
ton, 89 111. 56; Pride v.Bubb,L. R.
7 Ch. 64; People's Bank v. Den-
ning, 131 Pa. St. 252. Testator
devises to G K, his executors, and
to his heirs and assigns, a certain
tract of land which he purchased
of W S E with the appurtenances;
also, all the goods and chattels as-
signed to him by the said W S E,
to hold to him, the said G K, his
heirs and assigns in trust, only to and
for the sole and separate use of A
E, the wife of said W S E, and
the heirs and assigns of her, the
said A, forever, so that the same
shall not be in any manner or way
whatever subject to any of the
debts, contracts or engagements of
her husband. "I also give and be-
queath unto the said G K the sum
of one thousand dollars in trust, for
the use of her, the said A E."
Held, that the bequest of one thou-
sand dollars was not for the sole
and separate use of the wife, but
went to the husband." Evans v.
Knorr, 4 Rawle, 03.
§ 280.] MARRIED WOMEN. 653
will or by deed, and it may come either as an antenuptial
or post-nuptial agreement or settlement.1 In the provision
for a separate estate, while the object must be set forth in
unequivocal language, the form is not material. The in-
tention of the grantor will be carried out by a court of
equity wherever that is made plain, and whether the con-
veyance is direct or through trustees.
§ 280. The Subject Continued. — "While the form of
words is not essential, the intention of the grantor will be
recognized only as the language of the instrument is un-
equivocal. The term separate use will be construed as
creating a separate estate, while the word sole is held to be
less conclusive. The term sole use has been held to be ca-
pable of different constructions, and where it is used the
context may determine the view of the court. In a recent
case, where the import of the term was fully discussed, it
was held that the word "sole" in a will has not a fixed
technical meaning, throwing on the person who contests
that meaning the necessity of showing by implication that
it is not used in the particular instrument in' its strict tech-
nical sense. In a marriage settlement it may, from the
circumstances of the case, have a particular and exclusive
meaning attached to it. It is not desirable to multiply
words having the same technical meaning by introducing
one which never had such a meaning, where another already
exists with that technical meaning already appropriated to it.2
1 In re Gaffee, 1 Macn. & G. 541 : 75 Pa. St. 354; Hardy v. Holly, 84
Tullett v. Armstrong, 1 Beav. 1, 21 ; N. Car. 661 ; Caulk v. Fox, 13 Fla.
s. c, 4Myl. &Cr.377; Jure Camp- 148; Brown v. Foot, 2 Tenn. Ch.
bell's Policies, L. K. 6 Ch. D. 686; 255; Eeynolds V.Brandon, 3Heisk.
In re Jones' Will, L. E. 2 Ch. T>. 593; Herring v.Wickham, 29 Gratt.
362; Viretv. Viret, L. B. 17 Ch. D. 628; Smith v. Lucas, L. K. 18 Ch.
365 n.; Hastie v. Hastie, L. B. 2 Ch. D. 531 ; Dawes v. Tredwell, L. E.
D. 304; In re Edwards, L. E. 9 Ch. 18 Ch. D. 354; Kane v. Kane, L. E.
97; Campbell v. Bainbridge, L. B. 16 Ch. D. 207; Simmons v. Sim-
6 Eq. 269; Ex parte Bolland, L. E. mons, 6 Hare, 352, 359; Eadfsrd v.
17 Eq. 115; Greensboro v. Cham- Carwile, 13 W. Va. 572; Coatney
bers. 30 Gratt. 202 ; Head v. Tern- v. Hopkins, 14 W. Va. 338.
pie, 4 Heisk. 34; Wallace v. Wal- 2 Massy v. Bowen, L. B. 4 H. L.
lace, 82 111. 530 ; Tucker's Appeal, Cas. 288. See also Ex parte Bay, 1
654
MAERIED WOMEN,
[§ 280.
So much importance attaches to the significance of these
terms that they have been extensively discussed and
very numerous decisions have been based upon the result.
The use of each of the following expressions has been held
to establish a separate estate to the exclusion of the marital
rights of the husband: "To be at her disposal;"1 "to her
own use and benefit independent of her husband;"2 "for
her livelihood;"3 "for her own use independent of her hus-
band;"4 "to receive the rents while she lives, whether
married or single;"6 "that she receive and enjoy the
profits;"6 "to be by her laid out as she may think fit;"7
"not subject to his control ; "8 "to be delivered to her on
demand;"9 "to be paid to her semi-annually during her
lifetime, and afterwards to her children;"10 "for the use
and benefit of the wife and her heirs ;"u "her receipt to be
a sufficient discharge;"12 "to be at her own disposal in true
faith to her heirs forever;"13 "for her support;"14 "to be
for her own and her family's use during her natural life."15
Madd. 199 ; Adamson v. Armitage,
19 Ves. 416; Gilbert v. Lewis, 1
DeG., J. & S. 38.
1 Darby v. Darby, 2 Atk. 399
Terrill v. Hope, 2 Atk. 558.
2 Simmons v. Hargood, 1 Keen, 9
Dixon v. Olmius, 2 Cox, 414.
3 Parker v. Brooks, 9 Ves. 583
Petty v. Booth, 19 Ala. 633; Darby
v. Darby, 3 Atk. 399.
4 Adamson v. Armstrong, 19 Ves.
416 ; Davis v. Prout, 7 Beav. 488
Ex parte Kay, 1 Md. 199; Ex parte
Killiok, 3 Mont., D. & De G. 480
Arthur v. Arthur, 19 Ir. Eq. 511
Lindsell v. Thacker, 12 Sim. 178
Massy v. Parker, 2 Myl. & K. 181
Jamison v. Brady, 6 Serg. & R. 466
Snyder v. Snyder, 10 Barr, 423
.Tarvis v. Prentice, 19 Conn. 273
Collins v Randolph, 19 Ala. 616
Griffith v. Griffith, 5 B. Mon. 113.
5 Gillespie v. Burlinson, 28 Ala.
551 ; Brown v. Johnson, 17 Ala.
241; Williams v. Head, 20 Ala.
720.
6 Kirk v. Pauline, 7 Vin. 86;
Richards v. Ames, T. & R. 22.
7 Terrill v. Hope, 2 Atk. 558.
8 Golden v. Cann, 1 DeG., F. & J.
146.
9 Atcherly v. Vernon, 10 Mod.
531.
10 Bain v. Lescher, 11 Sim. 397.
11 Heck v. Clippinger, 5 Pa. St.
385.
u Good v. Harris, 2 Ired. Eq. 630.
13 Markley v. Singleton, 11 Rich.
393.
14 Hamilton v. Bishop, 8 Yerg.
33; Heck v. Clippinger, 5 Pa. St.
385; Strong v. Gregory, 19 Ala.
146.
15 Dixon v. Olmius, 2 Cox, 414.
Other expressions that have been
held sufficient are the following:
"Not to be sold, bartered or traded
by the husband," Woodrutn v.
Kirkpatrick, 2 Swan (Tenn.), 218;
"For her sole and exclusive use,"
Townsend v. Matthews, 10 Md. 251 ;
"For her sole and separate use,"
§ WO.]
MAEEIED WOMEN.
655
The following have been held insufficient to exclude the
husband, to-wit. : "In trust to pay to her;"1 "for her
own use, benefit and behoof;"2 "to her use and benefit,"3
or "to her use;"4 "solely for her own use;"5 "to her heirs
and assigns for her sole and separate use;"6 "to her abso-
lute use;"7 "to her and the heirs of her body, and to them
alone;"8 "to A's wife;"9 "to her and her assigns;"10 "to
Parker v.Brooke, 9 Ves. 583; Will-
iams v. Maull, 20 Ala. 721 ; Clarke
T.Windham, 12 Ala. 798; Robin-
son v. O'Neal, 56 Ala. 541 ; Swain v.
Duane, 48 Cal. 358 ; "For her own
use and benefit," 3 Ired. Eq. 236;
"For her sole use," Guishaber v.
Hairman, 2 Bush, 320; Fears v.
Brooks, 12 Ga. 195 ; Swain v. Duane,
48 Cal. 358; "Only as and for her
own separate estate, free from the
control of her husband," Wood v.
Wood, 83 N. Y. 575; "For her'sole
use and benefit," Adamson v. Ar-
mitage, 19 Ves. 415; Purdue v.
Montgomery Bldg, etc. Assoc, 79
Ala. 478; Hutchins v. Dixon, 11
Md. 29; "To her exclusive use,
benefit, and behoof," Williams v.
Avery, 38 Ala. 115; Steele v. Steele,
1 Ired. Eq. 452; "For her exclu-
sively," Gould v. Hill, 18 Ala. S4;
"For her own use and at her own
disposal," Pritchard v. Ames,Tura.
& B. 222; "For her sole and abso-
lute use," Short v. Battle, 52 Ala.
456; "To be hers and hers only,"
Ozley v. Ikelheimer, 26 Ala. 332;
"For her own use and benefit inde-
pendent of any other person,"
Williams v. Maull, 20 Ala. 721;
Brown v. Johnson, 17 Ala. 232;
Ashcraft v. Little, 4 Ired. Eq. 236 ;
"For her without any hindrance or
molestation whatever," Newman v.
James, 12 Ala. 29; "For her sole
and exclusive use," Townshend v.
Matthews, 10 Md. 251; "Which
negro I design for the benefit of A
G, and her children, and not to be
subject to any debt or debts which
the husband may contract or have
contracted," Young v. Young, 3
Jones Eq. 216. See also McConnell
v. Lindsay, 131 Pa. St. 476; Gray
v. Eobb, 4 Heisk. 74; Charles v.
Coker, 2 S. Car. 123; Turner v.
Kelly, 70 Ala. 85; Miller v. Voss,
62 Ala. 122; Pepper v. Lee, 53 Ala.
33 ; Sprague v. Shields, 61 Ala. 428 ;
Gest v. Williams, 4 Del. Ch. 55.
1 Lamb v. Milnes, 5 Ves. 519;
Staunton v. Hall, 2 Euss. & M. 175 ;
Brown v. Clark. 3 Ves. 166; Vaill
v. Vaill, 49 Conn. 52.
2 Guishaber v. Hairman, 2 Bush,
320.
3 Fears v. Brook, 12 Ga. 198;
Turton v. Turton, 6 Md. 375;
Brandt v. Mickel, 28 Md. 436.
4 Bridges v. Wood, 4 Dana, 610;
Merrill v. Bullock, 105 Mass. 486;
Clevenstein's Appeal, 15 Pa. St.
495.
5 Ex parte Abbott, 1 Deacon, 338 ;
Eycroft v. Christy, 3 Beav. 238.
6 Beales v. Spencer, 2 W. C. C.
65.
7 Tarbet v. Twining, 1 Yeates,
432; Jacobs v. Averill, 1 Mod. 376;
Tenant v. Story, 1 Eich. Eq. 22.
8 Wardle v. Claxton, 9 Sim. 524.
9 Moore v. Jones, 13 Ala. 295;
Fitch v. Ayer, 2 Conn. 143.
m Staunton v. Hall, 2 Euss. & M.
180; Tyler v. Lake, 2 Euss. & M.
183.
656 MARRIED WOMEN. [§ 281.
her and her children;"1 "sole use;-"2 "the gift not to ex-
tend to any other person;"3 "to A during her life, and
after her death to her issue;"4 "for the joint use of the
husband and wife;"5 "to pay to her to be applied to the
maintenance of herself and such children as the testator
might have at his death;"6 "and enjoy as she sees fit;"7
"to pay into her own proper hands for her own use."8
Where the wife has a separate estate in equity, the rents,
interest, profits, or whatever the income may be, belongs
to her estate and is subject to her control, and if any part
of her income is invested in other property, the property
so acquired will be held to her separate use. This rule ap-
plies, not only to personalty, but as well to her real estate.9
§ 281. Transmutation of Separate Estate Property. —
Where property is held absolutely free from the control of
the husband, it may be so managed by the wife that it will
lose its distinctive character. She may so exercise her
freedom in the control of it as to lose her property right in
it. Where a wife, acting without any undue influence on
the part of the husband, authorizes him, either in express
1 Dunn y. Bank of Mobile, 2 Ala. 15 Ala. 169; Gillespie v. Burleson,
152. 28 Ala. 551; Lewis v. Elrod, 38
2 Keedsell v. Watson, 2 Dev. Eq. Ala. 17;Harrisv. Harbeson, 9Bush,
430; Houston y. Embry, 1 Sneed, 397; Whitten v. Whitten, 3 Cush.
480. 193 ; Tennant v. Stoney, 1 Rich. Eq.
3 Ashcraft v. Little, 4 Ired. Eq. 222; s. c, 44 Am. Dec. 213.
236. 9 Humphrey v. Richards, 2 Jur.
4 Mrs. Matthewson's Case, L. R. (N". S.) 432; Newlands v. Payn-
3Eq. 71; Picard v. Hines, L. R. ter, 4 Myl. & Cr. 408 ; Gage v. Lis-
3 Ch. App. 274. ter, 2 Bro. P. C. 4 ; Gore v. Knight,
5 Shattuck v. Shattuck, L. R. 2 2 Vern. 535. See also Ordway v.
Eq. 182; Johnson v. Gallagher, Bright, 7 Heisk. 681; Askew v.
3 DeG., F. & J. 494; Gould v. Hill, Rooth, L. R. 17 Eq. 426; Muggen-
18 Ala. 86. ridge v. Stanton, 1 De G., F. & J.
6 Bryant v. Duncan, 11 Ga. 67. 107 ; Brooke v. Brooke, 25 Beav.
7 Wood v. Polk, 12 Heisk. 220. 342 ; Barrack v. McCullock, 3 Kay
8Hartly v. Hurle, 5 Ves. 545; & J. 110; Joyce v. Haines, 33 N. J.
Blacklow v. Lawes, 2 Hare, 48; Eq. 99; Justis v. English, 30 Gratt.
Clevenstein's Appeal, 15 Pa. St. 565; City Nat'l Bank v. Hamilton,
495; Chipchasev. Simpson, 16 Sim. 34 N". J. Eq. 158; Beal v. Storm,
485. See also Merrill v. Bullock, 26 N. J. Eq. 372; Kid well v. Kirk-
105 Mass. 486; Pollard v. Merrill, patrick, 70 Mo. 214.
§ 281. J MARRIED WOMEN. 657
terms or by implication, or tacitly permits him to receive
the income of her separate property and to devote it to his
own use, or to the support of the family, it thereby ceases
to be her property, and she cannot require him to refund
it.1 In a recent case it was held that a plain distinction is
drawn by the decided cases between the effect of the re-
ceipt by a husband of the corpus of his wife's separate
property and his receipt of the income thereof. While a
gift of the principal to him will not be presumed from her
mere acquiescence in his receipt and use of it, a gift of in-
come may thus be implied. A wife who permits her hus-
band to receive and use as his own the rents of her separate
property cannot, at his death, recover them from his estate
without proof of an understanding that he was to account
for them ; the presumption being that they were used in
maintaining the family and were given to the husband for
that purpose. Express or direct proof of the wife's acqui-
escence is unnecessary. It will be implied from circum-
stances, and a course of conduct consistent with it and
opposed to any other conclusion ; and it is sufficiently shown
1 Powell v. Hankey, 2 P. Wms. woman entitled for her separate
82; Milnes v. Busk, 2 Ves. 488; use to the dividends of certain
Eowley v. Unwin, 2 Kay & J. 138 ; stock standing in the names of
Parkes v. White, 11 Ves. 209 ; Squire trustees, of whom her husband was
v. Dean, 4 Bro. Ch. 326; Payne v. one, permitted these dividends for
Little, 28 Beav. 1 ; Hughes v. Wells, a number of years to be paid to the
9 Hare, 749, 773; Gardner v. Gard- husband's banker to his separate
ner, 1 Giff. 126 ; Dalbiac v. Dalbiac, account ; it appears also, by the ev-
16 Ves. 116,126; Beresfordv. Arch- idence, that he made use of these
bishop of Armagh, 13 Sim. 643 ; funds as his own property. It was
Howard v. Digby, 8 Bligh (N. S.), held, that a course of dealing was
2^1; s. c, 2 CI. & P. 634; Green v. proved, as existing between the
C*lill, L. K. 4 Ch. L»iv. S82; Cole- husband and wife, which showed
rnnn v. Seinmes, 56 Miss. 321; Kid- that the money was paid to the
well v. Kirkpatrick, 70 Mo. 214; husband as husband, and not as
Dunn v. Sargent, 101 Mass. 336; M. trustee; and that this being done
E. Church v. Jaques, 3 Johns. Ch. with the assent and acquiescence
77, 90-92; Tyson v. Tyson, 54 Md. of the wife, disentitled her from
35; Grover v. Radnliff, 63 Md. 496; claiming any part of the money as
Bristor v. Bristor, 101 Ind. 47; Mc- against the estate of her husband.
Lure v. Lancaster, 24 a. Car. 273; Caton v. Eideout, 1 Macn. & G.
s. C, 58 Am. Kep. 259; Hauers 597.
Estate, 140 Pa. St. 420. A married
42
658 MARRIED WOMEN. [§ 282.
where it appears that the receipt of the rents was with her
knowledge and could easily have been prevented by her if
she had desired to do so.1
§ 282. The Wife's Statutory Separate Estate.— The
separate estate of the wife, as treated in the foregoing sec-
tions, is purely an equitable estate. It is either vested in
a trustee de facto, or by implication it is held by the hus-
band as a quasi trustee. Such estates are subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of equity. But under the modern
legislative enactments the legal title of the married woman
to her separate estate is vested directly and exclusively in
herself, and under this title the rights and interests of the
husband conferred by the common law are excluded. But
while the statutes, in conferring upon married women the
right to hold the legal title to their separate estates, have
superseded the equitable estate, enabling them to dispense
altogether with trustees, the disabilities imposed by the
common law have not been wholly removed. In most of
the States it does not altogether remove the disability of
1 Hauer's Estate, 140 Pa. St. 420. arises immediately on each receipt
"It was said by Lord McSTaughten by the husband, and bars all claim
in Edwards v. Cheyne, L. K. 13 on the part of the wife or her rep-
App. Cas. 385, after a careful re- resentatives." In Be Flamank, L.
view of the English cases on this R. 40 Ch. Div. 461, Kay, J., said:
subject, that "the rule in equity is "It has always been held, that
clear, from the earliest times, that while a husband and wife are liv-
where the husband and wife have ing together in perfect comity, as
lived together, the wife cannot these were, the receipt by the hus-
charge the husband, or the hus- band of the separate income of the'
band's estate, as her debtor for ar- wife may be treated as a gift of that
rears of her separate income which separate income to him to be ap-
she has permitted him to receive, plied for the joint benefit of himself
The object of the rule, according and his wife, as for the mainte-
to Lord Hardwicke, was 'to pre- nance of their household and the
vent such accounts between hus- like. An express consent or ac-
band and wife, which it is impos- quiescence of the wife need not be
sible to determine according to shown. It will be implied from
their rights after the death of the circumstances and a course of life
parties.' * * Where the circum- consistent with it, and opposed to
stances are such that the wife's any other conclusion." Ibid. p.
consent or acquiescence may fairly 4:27.
be presumed, the presumption
§ 282.]
MARRIED WOMEN.
659
entering into contracts or invest them with the right to
make contracts which at law will be personally binding and
enforceable by legal actions directed against them in per-
son. These statutes, in enabling the wife to hold the legal
title of her property, do not create any equitable estate in
her favor, but in those States in which her common law
disabilities are but imperfectly removed, the jurisdiction of
equity has been enlarged by these enactments in the
committing of the matter of contracts by married women
and their enforcement against the property, rather than the
person, exclusively to courts of equity. And all cases of
this character will be determined by equitable rather than
by common law doctrines. In these States the jurisdiction
of equity is not limited to such property as is held by
trustees and constitutes an equitable estate, but extends to
all the property of which a married woman may hold the
legal title.1 In a few instances legislation has gone farther,
1 It is to be borne in mind that
the statutes creating a separate es-
tate for married women have not
had the effect of abolishing the
married woman's separate equi-
table estate, or to prevent its crea-
tion. These are still under the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the courts of
equity. The statutes enlarge her
privileges but do not take away her
common law rights. Musson v.
Trigg, 51 Miss. 172; Pomeroy v.
Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 40 111. 398 ;
Bolles v. Munnerlyn, 83 G-a. 727 ;
Snyder v. Webb, 3 Cal. 83; Penn-
sylvania Co. v. Foster, 35 Pa. St.
134; Wood v. Wood, 18 Hun, 350;
Phillips v. Graves, 20 Ohio St. 391 ;
s. c, 5 Am. Bep. 675; Miller v.
Newton, 23 Cal. 554 ; Kichardson v.
Stodder, 100 Mass. 530; McConnell
v. Lindsay, 131 Pa. St. 476 ; Abra-
hams v. Tappe, 60 Md. 317; De
Vries v. Conklin, 22 Mich. 255. The
statutes on this subject are em-
braced under the head of "Married
Women's Property Acts" in En-
gland and the several States of the
United States. Legal authors have
attempted to classify these statutes
into two classes. Each of these
classes declare the property to be
in the married woman, free from
any control or interest of the hus-
band. One class, however, con-
tains no provision authorizing her
to make contracts. The other gives
her the sole power to manage and
control, sell and convey and make
contracts in relation to it, but the
contracts are not made personally
binding on her at law. It will be
impossible to give even a synopsis
of these various statutes. These
laws in accordance with the fore-
going description are as follows :
"Married Women's Property Act
1882, 45 & 46 Vict. ch. 75 ; 7 Chit-
tey's Statutes, 1895. Alabama.
Constitution 1875, art. 10, § 6, pro-
vides that the property of any fe-
male, whether acquired before or
after marriage, shall be her sepa-
rate estate, which she may devise or
660
MAEKIED WOMEN.
[§ 282.
and has taken the separate estate of the married woman
altogether out of the jurisdiction of equity by enabling her
bequeath as if she were a feme
sole. See also Code 1886, §§ 2341-
2351 ; Rooney v. Michael, 84 Ala.
585; Knox v. Cbildersburg Land
Co., 86 Ala. 180; McAnally v.
Heflia (1895) (Ala.), 17 So. Rep.
87; Hubbard v. Sayre (1895)
(Ala.), 17 So. Rep. 17; Hawkins v.
Ross, 100 Ala. 459 ; s. c ., 14 So. Kep.
278. Arkansas. Const. 1874, art.
9, § 7 ; Dig. of Stats. 1884, § 4624,
4625; Bundy v. Cocke, 128 U. S.
188. Arizona. Rev. St. tit. 34, ch. 3,
§18; Liebesv.Steffy (1S93) (Ariz.),
32Pac. Rep.261. Connecticut. Gen.
Stats. 1888, §§ 2790-2794. JDist. Co-
lumbia. Rev. Stats. D. C. § 728;
Goldsmith v. Ladson, 20 D. C. 220.
Delaware. Laws 1874, pp. 478, 479;
Kohn v. Collison (1S93) (Del.), 27
Atl.Rep.834. Florida. McClelan's
Dig. 1891, p. 754, §§ 1, 3,4; Ballard
v. Lippman (1894), 32 Fla. 481;
s. c, 14 So. Rep. 154; Halle v.
Einstein (1895), 34 Fla. 589; s. c,
16 So. Rep. 554. • Georgia. Code
1873, §§ 1754, 1756, 1772, 1773,
1783, 5136; Const. 1877, art. 3, sec.
11. Illinois. Rev. Stats. 1889, ch. 68,
§§ 6, 7, 9. Indiana. Rev. Stats. 1S94,
§§ 6960, 6962(Rev. Stat. 1881, §§ 5115,
5117); Goff v. Hankins, 11 Ind.
App. 456; s. C, 39 N. E. Rep. 294;
Kohinoor Laundry Co. v. Lock-
wood (1895), 141 Ind. 140; s. c, 40
N. E. Rep. 677; Parrett v. Palmer,
8 Ind. App. 356; s. c, 35 N". E.Rep.
713. Idaho. Rev. Stat. § 2504; Bas-
sett v. Beam (1894) (Idaho), 36 Pac.
Rep. 501. Kansas. Gen. Stat. 1889,
cb. 62, §§3752, 3753; Miner v. Pear-
son, 16 Kan. 27; Knaggs v. ilastin,
9 Kan. 532. Kentucky. Gen. Stat.
1888, ch. 52, art. 2. §§ 1, 10. Maine.
Rev. Stats. 1883, p. 523, ch. 61, § 1,
2. Maryland. Pub. Gen. Laws,
1888, art. 45, § 1 ; Prazee v. Prazee
(1894), 79 Md. 27; s. c, 28 Atl. Rep.
1105. Massachusetts. Pub. Stats. 1882,
ch. 147, §§ 1-4, 10. Michigan. How-
ell's Stats. 1882, § 6295. Minnesota.
Stats, of Minn. 1894, ch. 69, §§ 5530,
5531. Missouri. Rev. Stat. 1879, §
3296; Seay v. Hesse (1894), 123 Mo.
450; s. c, 24 S. W. Rep. 1017.
Clifton v. Anderson (1893), 47 Mo.
App. 35, holds that in same land a
married woman cannot have both
an equitable and a statutory sepa-
rate estate. Montana. Comp. St. §
1439; Kelley v. Jefferis (1893), 13
Mont. 170; s. c, 32 Pac. Rep. 753.
Nebraska. Comp. St. 1881, p. 343,
ch. 53, §§1,2,4; Parwell v. Cramer
(1893), 38 Neb. 61; s. c, 56 ST. W.
Rep. 716; Melich v. Varner (1894),
41 Neb. 105; s. c, 59 N. TV. Rep.
521 ; Godfrey v. Megahan (1894), 38
Neb. 748; s. c, 57 ST. TV. Rep. 284.
New Hampshire. Gen. Laws, 1878,
p. 434, §§ 1, 4,12. New Jersey. Rev.
Stats. 1877, p. 636, §§ 1-4; p. 637, §
5; p. 639, §18; Hinkson v. Will-
iams, 41 KT. J. L. 35; "Wilson v.
Herbert, 41 jS". J. L. 45; s. c, 32
Am. Rep. 243. North Carolina.
Code 18S3, § 1S37; Const, art. 10, §
6; TVitz v. Gray (1895), 116 N". Car.
48; s. c, 20 S. E. Rep. 1019; Kirby
v. Boyette (1895), 116 N. Car. 165;
s. C, 21 S. E. Rep. 697. North
Dakota. Comp. Laws, § 2590; Co-
lonial, etc. Mort. Co. v. Stevens
(1893), 33ST. Dak. 265; s. C.,55N".W.
Rep. 578. Ohio. Rev. Stat. 1890, §§
3110-3117. Oregon. 2 Hill's Laws
1887, §§ 2993, 2994; Const, art. 15, §
5. Pennsylvania. "Married Women's
Property Act," Act June 3, 1887, §
1 ; Campe v. Home (1893), 158 Pa.
St. 508 ; s. c, 27 Atl. Rep. 1106 ; In re
Lewis' Estate (1893), 156 Pa. St.
§ 283.J
MARRIED WOMEN.
661
to make contracts in regard to it, and by making suck con-
tracts binding personally and at common law. In tbese
States such contracts are enforceable by ordinary proceed-
ings at law.1
§ 283. Restraint on Alienation. — The general doctrine
of the married woman's power of disposing of her separate
estate, as held at the present time in this country, differs
very materially from that of the English courts. It is now
well settled in England that a feme covert has the same con-
trol over her separate estate, and the same power of dis-
posal, that she would have as a feme sole? In the earlier
337; s. c, 27 Atl.Rep. 35; Saake v.
Dorner, 3 Pa. Dist. Rep. 170.
Shode Island. Pub. Stats. 1882, p.
422, §§ 1-7. South Carolina. Kev.
Stats. 1882, §§ 2035-2037. Instru-
ment must state that it is given
upon the faith and credit of sepa-
rate estate. Early v. Law (1894),
42 S. Car. 330; s. c, 20 S. E. Eep.
136. South Dakota. Comp. Laws,
§ 2590. Miller v. Purchase (1894),
5 S. Dak. 232; s. C, 58 N. W. Eep.
256. Tennessee. Code 1S84, §§ 3346-
3351; Webster v. Helm (1894), 93
Tenn. 322 ; s. C, 24 S. W. Kep. 488.
Texas. Kev. Stats. 1879, p. 411, §§
2851, 2854; Const, art. 16, § 15.
Vermont. Kev. Laws 1880, § 2324 ;
Laws 1884 No. 140 ; Valentine v.
Bell (1894), 66 Vt. 280; s. C, 29Atl.
Kep. 251 ; Lane v. Bishop (1894), 65
Vt. 575; ISTiles v. Hall (1893), 64 Vt.
453; s. c, 25 Atl. Rep. 479. Vir-
ginia. Code 1887, ch. 103 ; Amend-
ment of May 1, 1888, to Married
Woman's Act of 1877; Grant v.
Sutton (1894), 90 Va. 771; s. c, 19
S. E. Rep. 784; Taylor v. Cussen
(1893), 90 Va. 40; s. c, 17 S. E.
Rep. 721 ; Hutchins v. Commercial
Bank (1895), 91 Va. 68; s. C,
20 S. E. Rep. 950. West Virginia.
Const, art. 6, § 49; Kelly's Rev.
Stat. 1879, p. 773, §§1-3; Stewart
v. Stout, 38 W. Va. 478; s. c, 18 S.
E. Rep. 726 ; Trapnell v. Conklyn
(1893), 37 W. Va. 242; s. c, 16 S.
E. Kep. 570; Williamson v. Cline
(1895), 40 W. Va. 194; s. C, 20
S. E. Rep. 917. Wisconsin. 1 San-
born & Berryman's. Stats. 1889,
§§ 2340-2342; Gallagher v. Gallag-
her (1894) , 89 Wis. 461 ; s. C, 61 ST.
W. Rep. 1104.
1 California. Civ. Code, §§ 158,
162, 171, 1556. Connecticut. Gen.
Stats. 1S88, §§ 2796-2798. Colorado.
Mills' Stats. 1891, §§ 3007, 3021.
Iowa. Miller's Rev. Code 1880, §§
2202, 2213. Mississippi. Rev. Code
1880, § 1167. Nevada. 1 Comp.
Laws 1873, p. 56, § 1 ; p. 58, §§ 17,
19; Gen. Stats. 1885, §§ 499, 515,
517. New Jersey. Rev. Stats. 1877, p.
637, § 5. New York. Rev. Stats.,
8th ed., pp. 2600-2606. Ohio. Rev.
Stats. 1890, §§ 3112, 3114. South
Carolina. Rev. Stats. 1882, §§2035-
2037.
2 Peacock v. Monk, 2 Ves. 190;
Hearle v. Greenbank, 1 Ves. 301 ;
Hulme v. Tenant, 1 Bro. Ch. 16 ;
s. C, 1 Lead. Cas. in Eq. 679;
Fettiplace v. Gorges, 1 Ves. Jr. 46 ;
s. C, 3 Bro. Ch. S; Wagstaff v.
Smith, 9 Ves. 520; Rich v. Cockell,
9 Ves. 369 ; Thackwell v. Gardner,
5 De G. 58 ; Hodgson v. Hodgson,
662 MARRIED WOMEN. [§ 283.
decisions there was some conflict of authorities on this
point. In the leading case of Adams v. Gamble, before the
Irish Court of Appeal in Chancery, Lord Justice Black-
burne, referring to the authorities cited by counsel, said :
"It is not possible to reconcile all the positions to be found
in them, or the inferences which may be argued to result
from them. The opinions and views of text-writers on the
subject are, in some instances, contrary to each other; but
1 confess that * * * I had a strong opinion that, where
courts of equity enabled and entitled a married woman to
have separate property, whether real or personal, they gave
her, unless expressly prohibited, the right to dispose of it
as if she were a feme sole I have not failed to consider
every case and dictum that has been relied on to show that
a real estate in fee-simple was, from its nature, or any
other reason, to be exempted from this jus disponendi ;
but not one of them tarried a conviction to my mind that
would warrant the exclusion and exception of a fee-simple
estate, limited to the separate use of a woman during cov-
erture."1 In Atcheson v. Lemann, Lord Justice Turner
2 Keen, 704; Caton v. Kideout, 1 support to the courts of equity, it
Macn. & G-. 599; Hanchett v. Bris- was understood that the same
coe, 22 Beav. 496; Lechmere v. courts might so modify it as to se-
Brotheridge, 32 Beav. 353 ; Hum- cure the protection which was in-
phrey v.Kichards,2 Jur.(N. S.)432; tended; and, accordingly, it was
Newcomen v. Hassard, 4 Ir. Ch. intimated by Lord Thurlow that,
268. if a gift clearly expressed that the
1 Adams v. Gamble, 12 Ir. Ch. separate estate should be incapable
102, 109. "If the gift be made for of' assignment in anticipation of
her sole and separate use, without alienation, that intention would he
more, she has during coverture an carried into effect ; and his lord-
alienable estate, independent of her ship, being of that opinion, him -
husband. If the gift be made to self set the example, in a case in
her sole and separate use, without which he personally took an inter-
power to alienate, she has, during est; and from that time, now nearly
coverture, the present enjoyment a century ago, it has been usual to
ofaninalienableestate, independent introduce into wills and settlements
of her husband." Ibid. 110. "The a clause giving to women real and
doctrine with respect to this is personal estate for their separate
stated in an earlier part of the use, independently of their hus-
judgment in Tullett v. Armstrong, bands, without power of assign-
as follows : 'But as the separate ment by way of anticipaS-ion or
estate itself owed its origin and alienation ; and such clauses though
§ 283.] MARRIED WOMEN. 663
said: "It is not, therefore, as I think, necessary to decide
the point, which was so much argued at the bar, whether
JEW could by will have devised the estate under a
limitation in fee to her, for her separate use, without any
superadded power of appointment ; but I am very strongly
inclined to think she could have done so; and as at
present advised I should so decide the point if it were
necessary to decide it. It being settled that an estate in
fee may be limited to the separate use of a married woman,
thus giving her an absolute ownership, she must, I think,
have all the rights of disposition which are incident to the
ownership. The agreement of a married woman cannot
hind her personal, but can bind her real estate, settled to
her separate use, according to the cases of Stead v. Clay,
"Wainwright v. Hardesty. Upon that principle is her real
estate so settled to be bound by her agreement, and not to
be bound by her testamentary disposition. 'n In the earlier
English cases there appears to have been some distinction
made between estates held by trustees for married women
and those that were conveyed directly to them for their
their operation has been considered then details his reasons for holding
to be, as undoubtedly it is, anoma- that the prohibition may be ex-
lous, and irreconcilable with the tended to the disposition of the fee,
ordinary legal rules affecting the now it is, to my mind, as plain and
limitations of estates and the legal self-evident as any proposition can
incidents of property, have been be, that his honor held that the
repeatedly approved and carried married woman could alienate the
into effect by this court and settle- fee of her separate estate, unless
ments and provisions for families, she were expressly disabled from
to a very great extent have been doing so. On these grounds, I was
framed in reliance upon them.' In of the opinion, when the argument
confirmation of these views I shall closed, that we could not affirm the
refer to the case of Baggett v. decree under appeal. It was most
Meux [1 Phill. 627]. That was the satisfactory to me afterwards to
case of a fee-simple estate limited learn that this was the deliberate
to the separate use of a married opinion of a most able, and eminent
woman, with a clause disabling her judge, Lord Justice Turner." Ibid.
from selling or incumbering. The 111.
vice chancellor says: 'I am at a 1 Atcheson v. Lemann, 9 Wick,
loss to discover any sufficient reason 584; s. C, 23 L. T. 302; Stead v.
why that which holds good as to a Clay, 2 Beav. 365 ; Wainwright v.
life estate should not equally hold Hardesty, 1 Sim. 294.
good as to an absolute estate.' He
664
MARRIED WOMEN.
[§ 284.
separate and sole use. But this distinction was long since
abrogated, and it is now well established that they have
the same power of disposition in one case as in the other.
§ 284. The Subject Continued. — In this country the
married woman's power of disposing of her property has
been regulated in some of the States by statute. Where
this has not been done two distinct positions have been up-
held by courts of equity. In the larger number of the
States the English doctrine, without qualification, has been
adopted. In these States a married woman has full power
to dispose of her property according to her pleasure, unless
she is deprived of the power by the instrument through
which the estate was conveyed to her, or there is some lim-
itation of her power imposed by it.1 In some instances a
1 Gardner v. Gardner, 7 Paige,
112,116; Knowles v. McCamly, 10
Paige, 342, 346; dimming v. Will-
iamson,! Sandf. Ch. 17, 25; Curtis
V. Engel, 2 Sandf. Ch. 287,289;
Mallory v. Vanderheyden, 3 Barb.
Ch. 10 ; s. c, 1 N. Y. 452, 462 ; Yale
y. Dederer, 18 X. Y. 265; s. c, 22
N. Y. 450; Dickerman v. Abra-
hams, 21 Barb. 551 ; Coon v. Brook, 2
Barb. 546; Jaques v. M. E. Church,
17 Johns. 548, overruling decision
of Chancellor Kent in 3 Johns. Ch.
77; Dyett v. North Am. Coal Co.,
20 Wend. 570; s. c, 7 Paige, 9, 14;
Powell y. Murray, 2 Edw. Ch. 036,
043; Albany F. Ins. Co. y. Bay, 4
X. Y. 9; Wadham v. Am. Home,
etc. Soc, 12 N. Y. 415; Peake v.
La Baw, 21 N. J. Eq. 269, 282;
Homeopathic Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Marshall, 32 N. J. Eq. 103; Leay-
craft v. Hedden, 3 Green's Ch. 512,
551; Perkins V.Elliott, 23 N.J. Eq.
526; Imlayv. Huntington. 20 Conn.
148; Dale v. Robinson, 51 Vt. 20;
Cold well v. Renfrew, 33 Vt. 213;
Frary v. Booth, 37 Vt. 78; Kilby v.
Goodwin, 2 Del. Ch. 61; Buchanan
y. Turner, 26 Md. 1, 5; Cook y.
Husbands, 11 Md. 492; Bank of
Greensboro v. Chambers, 30 Gratt.
202; Justis v. English, 30 Gratt.
565; McChesney v. Brown's Heirs,
25 Gratt. 393 ; Penn v. Whitehead,
17 Gratt. 503; Nixon v. Rose, 12
Gratt. 425; Vigonneau v. Pegram,
2 Leigh, 183 ; Patton v. Merchants'
Bank, 13 W. Va. 587 ; Radford v.
Carwile, 13 W. Va. 572; Coatney v.
Hopkins, 14 W. Va. 33S ; Harris v.
Harris, 7 Ired. Eq. Ill; Newlin v.
Freeman, 4 Ired. Eq. 312; Hardy
Holly, 84 N. Car. 661; Fears v.
Brooks, 12 Ga. 195, 200; Wylly v.
Collins, 9 Ga. 223 ; Dallas v. Heard,
32 Ga. 604; Roberts v. West, 15 Ga.
122; Burch v. Breckenridge, 16 B.
Mon. 4S2; Lillard v. Turner, 1G B.
Mon. 374; Bell v. Kellar, 13 B.
Mon. 381; Coleman y. Wooley, 10
B. Mon. 320; Pond v. Carpenter, 12
Minn. 430; Miller v. Newton, 23
Cal. 554; Smith v. Thompson, 2
Mc Arthur (D. C), 291; Lewis v.
Yale, 4 Fla. 41S; Miller y. Voss, 62
Ala. 122; Bradford v. Greenway,
17 Ala. 797, 805; Jenkins v. Mc-
Conico, 17 Ala. 213; Ozley v.
Ikelheimer, 26 Ala. 332; Glenn v.
§ 284. j
MARRIED WOMEN.
665
distinction is made where the estate consists of real prop-
erty between the rents and profits and the corpus of the
estate. In these States the older English doctrine is ac-
cepted, under which the wife may dispose of the rents and
profits, but cannot dispose of the corpus of the estate unless
such power is imparted by the instrument of conveyance.1
In the other class of States courts of equity, following the
South Carolina decisions, have rejected altogether the En-
glish doctrine, and have denied to the married woman all
power to dispose of her separate estate, whether personal
or real, except where such power is expressly given in the
settlement or instrument of conveyance.2 Where the inter-
Glenn, 47 Ala. 204 ; Denechaud v.
Berrey, 48 Ala. 591 ; Short v. Bat-
tle, 52 Ala. 456; Robinson v.
O'Neal, 56 Ala. 541; Blakeslee v.
Moville Life Ins. Co., 56 Ala. 205;
McMillan v. Peacock, 57 Ala. 127;
Sprague v. Shields, 61 Ala. 428;
Collins v. Wassell, 34 Ark. 17;
Whitesides v. Cannon, 23 Mo. 457;
Segond v. Garland, 23 Mo. 547;
Coats v. Robinson, 10 Mo. 757;
Metropolitan Bank v. Taylor, 53
Mo. 444; Kimmv. Weippert, 46 Mo.
532.
1 Radford v. Carwile, 13 W. Va.
572; Coatney v. Hopkins, 14 W.Va.
338; Pennv. Whitehead, 17 Gratt.
503; Nixon v. Rose, 12 Gratt. 425;
Bank of Greensboro v. Chambers,
30 Gratt. 202; Justis v. English, 30
Gratt. 505 ; McChesney v. Brown,
25 Gratt. 393; Patton v. Merchants'
Bank, 12 W. Va. 5S7; Vigonneau
v. Pegram, 2 Leigh, 183.
2 Wallace v. Coston, 9 Watts. 137;
Thomas v. Fohvell, 2 Whart. 11,
16; Lancaster v. Dolan, 1 Rawle,
231; Penn Co. for Ins. v. Foster,
35 Pa. St. 134; Wright v. Brown,
44 Pa. St. 224; Rogers v. Smith, 4
Barr, 93; Lyne's Exr. v. Course,
1 Pa. St. Ill; Maurer's Appeal, 86
Pa. St. 380; Hepburn's Appeal, 65
Pa. St. 468; Wells v. McCall, 64
Pa. St. 207; Jones' Appeal, 57 Pa.
St. 369; McMullin v. Beatty, 56 Pa.
St. 389; Shonk v. Brown, 61 Pa.
St, 320; Tarr v. Williams, 4 Md.
Ch. 68; Miller v. Williamson, 5
Md. 219; Metcalf v. Cook, 2 R. I
355. But see Ives v. Harris, 7 R. I
413; Cutter v. Butler, 25 N.H. 343
Hardy v. Holly, 84 N. Car. 661
Adams v. Mackey, 6 Rich. Eq. 75
Reid v. Lamar, 1 Strobh. Eq. 27, 37
Ewing v. Smith, 3 Desaus. 417
Oliver v. Grimball, 14 S. Car. 556
Porcher v. McDaniels, 12 Rich.
Eq. 349; Migwood v. Johnston, 1
Hill's Ch. 228; Robinson v. Dart,
Dudley's Eq. 128; Doty v. Mitch-
ell, 9 Sm. & M. 435, 447; Mont-
gomery v. Agricultural Bk., 10
Sm. & M. 506, 576; Armstrong v.
Stovall, 26 Miss. 275; Musson v.
Trigg, 51 Miss. 172; Wallace v.
Wallace, 82 111. 530; Cookson v.
Toole, 59 111. 515; Carpenter v.
Mitchell, 50 111. 470; Rogers v.
Higgins, 48 111. 211 ; Cole v. Van
Riper, 44 111. 58; Swift v. Castle,
23111.209; Bressler v. Kent, 61
111. 426; Hix v. Gosling, 1 Lea,
560 ; Robertson v. Wilburn, 1 Lea,
628 ; Marshall v. Stevens, 8 Humph.
159, 173. But see Young v. Young,
666 MARRIED WOMEN. [§ 285.
est of a married woman in her separate property is simply
that of a life estate, she may hold the power of appoint-
ment over the reversion, or expectant estate; and where
she holds that power, her control of the corpus of the es-
tate is limited to the right of appointment.1
§ 285. Restraint upon Anticipation. — The object of
securing to a married woman a separate estate is to guar-
antee to her and to her children the use and enjoyment of
the income of it. For this reason it is held free from lia-
bility for the debts of the husband, and he is not permitted
to squander it, or to devote it in any manner to his own
use. But while the settlement of a separate estate upon
the wife freed her from the legal control of her hus-
band, it did not release her from the peculiar and, in many
cases, undue influence which attaches to the conjugal rela-
tion. While the husband could not directly control the
property of the wife, he controlled it indirectly through his
undue influence over her. In view of this condition, courts
of equity early gave the donor the power to limit the wife's
control of her separate estate in her own interest. The
common form of this restraint was that of alienation and
of anticipation. By the terms of the settlement or con-
veyance the wife was deprived of the power of disposing of
her estate by sale or assignment, and she was not permitted
to dispose by anticipation of the rents and profits. She
could dispose of the income of her estate only for the cur-
rent year, or as the rents and profits fell due or were col-
lected on her account. To this extent she was deprived of
the rights and powers of the feme sole, and she was limited
7 Coldw. 461; Head v. Temple, 4 483; Lee v. Muggeridge, 1 Ves. &
Heisk. 34; Gray v. Bobb, 4 Heisk. B. 118; Nixon v. Nixon, 1 Jon. &
74; Kirby v. Miller, 4 Coldw. 3; Lat. 416; Bradley v. Westoott, 13
Ware v. Sharp, 1 Swan, 489 ; Brown Ves. 445, 451 ; Eeid v. Shergold, 10
v. Foote, 2 Tenn. Ch. 255; Cheat- Ves. 370, 380; Noble v. Willock,
ham v. Huff, 2 Tenn. Ch. 616; L. E. 8 Ch. 778; Eichards v.
Eeynolds v. Brandon, 3 Heisk. 593; Chambers, 10 Ves. 580; Anderson
Machir v. Burroughs, 14 Ohio St. v. Dawson, 15 Ves. 532; Bishop v.
519. Wall, L. E. 3 Ch. D. 194.
1 Sackett v. Wrav, 4 Bro. Cb.
§ 285. j
MARRIED WOMEN.
667
in the control of her separate estate to the exercise of such
powers as were conferred by the settlement or by the con-
veyance. This device for protecting the interests of married
women originated with Lord Thurlow, and its fitness and
' usefulness have been recognized by courts of equity both in
England and in this country.1 As the rights of the married
woman to her separate estate were originally conferred
1 Pybus v. Smith, 3 Bro. Ch. 340;
Jackson v. Hobhouse, 2 Meriv. 483,
487; Baggett v. Meux, 1 Coll. C.
C. 138; s. c, 1 Phill. Ch. 627;
Tullett v. Armstong, 1 Beav. 1, 22;
s. c, 4 Myl. & Cr. 390, 405; Ken-
nie v. Ritchie, 12 CI. & F. 204; In
reGaffee, 1 Macn. & G. 541 ; Jaques
v. M. E. Church, 17 Johns. 548;
s. c, 8 Am. Dec. 447; Radford v.
Carwile, 13 W. Va. 572 ; Cheever v.
Wilson, 9 Wall. 108; Wilburn v.
MeCalley, 63 Ala. 436 ; Williams v.
Maull, 20 Ala. 721; Fellows v.
Tann, 9 Ala. 1003; Fears v. Brooks,
12 Ga. 195; Freeman v. Flood, 16
Ga. 528; Hathaway v. Leaman, 8
Bush, 391 ; Parker v. Converse, 5
Gray, 336 ; Waters v. Tazewell, 9
Md.291; Gully v.Hull, 31 Miss. 20;
Wells v. McCall, 64 Pa. St. 207;
Witsell v. Charleston, 7 S. Car. 88;
Greensboro Bank v. Chambers, 30
Gratt. 202; s. C, 32 Am. Kep. 661;
Burnett v. Hawpe, 25 Gratt. 481 ;
Nixon v. Kose, 12 Gratt. 431 ; Par-
ker v. White, 11 Ves. 209; Field v.
Evans, 15 Sim. 372; Arnold v.
Woodhaws, L. R. 16 Eq. 29. An
attempt to impose these restraints
upon alienation would, of course,
be nugatory. The wife's separate
estate is wholly a creature of equity,
and courts of equity had the right
to impose upon it any limitations
or restrictions, even though they
might contravene the established
doctrines which regulate the use
of property in general. Brandon
v. Robinson, 18 Ves. 429. The
Married Women's Property Act of
1882, 45 and 46 Vict., ch. 75, § 19,
is as follows: "Nothing in this
act contained shall interfere with
or affect any settlement, or agree-
ment for a settlement, made or to
be made, whether before or after
marriage, respecting the property
of any married woman, or shall in-
terfere with or render inoperative
any restriction against anticipation
at present attached, or to be here-
after attached, to the enjoyment of
any property or income by a
woman under any settlement,
agreement for a settlement, will
or other instrument; but no re-
striction against anticipation con-
tained in any settlement, or agree-
ment for a settlement, of a woman's
own property, to be made or en-
tered into by herself, shall have
any validity against debts con-
tracted by her before marriage,
and no settlement, or agreement
for a settlement shall have any
greater force or validity against
creditors of such woman than a
like settlement, or agreement for a
settlement, made or entered into
by a man would have against his
creditors." See Cox v. Bennett
(1891), 1 Ch. 617; Hood-Barrs
v. Cathcart (1894), 2 Q. B. 559;
irereLumley (1894), 3 Ch. 135; Pil-
lers v. Edwards (1894), W. N.
212.
668 MAEKIED WOMEN. [§ 286.
solely by equity, the power of the court to impose re-
straints of this character, or to authorize this limitation in
settlements and conveyances, has never been questioned,
and this rule is now recognized as an essential feature of
the doctrine relating to the wife's equitable estate.1
§ 286. Form of Words Required. — In the imposing
of restraint upon alienation, or upon anticipation, no form
of words has been prescribed, but the intention of the
donor must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. The
language in which the intention is set forth must be posi-
tive and unequivocal. While no technical or formal ex-
pressions are essential, there must be a plain and explicit
statement. In a leading case, before the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia, the court said: "Such re-
straint upon her power of alienation will not be implied
from her being authorized to dispose of the property in a
particular manner. Such restraint must be either expressed,
or so clearly indicated, as to be equivalent to an express re-
straint. The jus disponendi is an incident to the owner-
ship of a separate estate, and can only be taken away, or
limited, by express words, or by an intent so clear as to
be the equivalent of express words."2 The particular ap-
1 Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. 9 Ala. 999, 1003 ; Fears v. Brooks,
429; In re Gaffee, 1 Macn. & G. 12 Ga. 195; Nickell v. Miller, 10
541; s. c, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 713, Gratt. 336; "Separate Estate and
722,735,748,765, 772; Baggett v. Restraint Upon Anticipation," 2
Meux, 1 Coll. 138; s. c, 1 Phill. Leg. Bep. 141; "Alienation of
627; Bennie v. Ritchie, 12 CI. & F. Separate Estate by Anticipation,"
204; Tullett v. Armstrong, 1 Beav. 1 L. Mag. 56b.
1, 22; s. c, 4 Myl. & Cr. 390, 405; 2 Badford v. Carwile, 13 W. Va.
Pybus v. Smith, 3 Bro. Ch. 340; 572,682. See also Herbert v.Webster,
Jackson v. Hobhouse, 2 Meriv. 4S3, L. B. 15 Ch. D. 610; Moore v.
487; Pike v. Fitzgibbon, L. R. 17 Moore, 1 Call, 57; Baker v. Brad-
Ch.D. 454; Horlock v. Horlock, 2 ley, 7 De G.,M. & G. 597. "It will
De G., M. & G. 644; Robinson v. be sufficient if the trustbe to pay the
Wheelwright, 6 De G., M.&G. 535; income to such person as the wife
Hawkes v. Hubback, L. B. 11 Eq. shall, by writing, and as the same
5 ; Scarborough v. Bonnan, 4 Myl. becomes due, but not by way of
& Cr. 377; Shirley v. Shirley, 9 assignment, charge or other an-
Paige, 364; Leay craft v. Hennen, ticipation appoint. So, where the
3 1ST. J. Eq. 512; Waters v. Taze- gift is of income to her separate
w.ell, 9 Md. 292; Fellows v. Tann, use, not to be sold or mortgaged.
§ 286.
MARRIED WOMEN.
669
plication of these statements is to that class of States in
which the married woman has the power to dispose of her
property according to her pleasure, unless deprived of it by
the settlement or instrument of conveyance. Where the
power of disposition is not conferred by statute, or con-
ceded by equity, the restraint upon alienation and upon
anticipation would be held as a matter of course, unless the
power of disposition was conferred by the instrument by
which the estate was conveyed. The absence of plain and
unmistakable language, conferring the power of disposition,
creates a presumption that a married woman has no power
to dispose of her separate estate, or to anticipate the
income.
So, if the gift or trust be coupled
with a direction that the wife shall
not sell, charge, mortgage or incum-
ber the property, coupled with an-
other declaration that she shall
take it for her own sole and sepa-
rate use and benefit. So, where
the property is to be a separate,
personal and inalienable provision
during the coverture. But a direc-
tion for payment of income to a
woman, as she shall from time to
time appoint, and in default into
her proper hands for her separate
use, will not be sufficient to re-
strain her power of disposition;
nor a declaration that her receipts
shall be, or shall alone be good
discharges, unless there is also a
declaration that the receipts shall
only be a discharge after the
income becomes due, nor a direc-
tion that it shall be for her abso-
lute use, free from all marital con-
trol. Nor will it be inferred from
marriage articles by which the
property of the intended wife is
agreed to be settled to her separate
use, that it was to be with restraint
in alienation. In those States
where the English rule is followed,
however, and the right of disposal
must be derived, not as an incident
of the separate estate, but from a
clear bestowal in the conveyance,
the restraint upon alienation is in-
ferred from the want of permission
expressly conferred, or from the
general intent of the instrument."
1 Beach on Modern Equity Juris-
prudence, § 189. See Steedman v.
Poole, 6 Hare, 193; Goulder v.
Camm, 1 De G., F. & J. 146; Bag-
gett v. Meux, 1 Coll. 138; s. C, 1
Phill. 627. It is held to be a re-
straint where the deed provides
that it is to be "inalienable," or
"unassignable," or she shall have
it "without power of anticipation."
Kennie v. Kitchie, 12 CI. & F. 204
D'Oechsner v. Scott, 24 Beav. 239
Spring v. Pride, 10 Jur. (Jf.S.) 646
Brown v. Bamford, 11 Sim. 131
Cooper v. McDonald, L. R. 7 Ch
288; Gully v. Hull, 31 Miss. 20, 30
Witts v. Dawkins, 12 Ves. 501
Sturgis v. Corp, 13 Ves. 190; Acton
v. White, 1 S. & S. 429; Symonds
v. Wilkes, 11 Jur. (N. S.) 65 ; Weeks
v. Sego, 9 Ga. 199.
1 Nix v. Bradley, 6 Kich. Eq
43.
(570 MARRIED WOMEN. [§ 287.
§ 287. Doctrine of Restraint Continued. — The con-
tinuance or duration of the restraint upon alienation, or
upon anticipation, depends upon that of the separate es-
tate, or, in other words, upon coverture. Where property
is conveyed to a feme sole with the usual provision in re-
gard to a separate estate, and there is no particular mar-
riage in contemplation, the terms of the instrument impose
no restraint upon either anticipation or alienation for the
time. Notwithstanding the limitations of the instrument,
she will have power to dispose of it, or to charge it, ac-
cording to her pleasure. But if she subsequently marries,
she will then hold the property as her separate estate, and
hold it subject to the restraint imposed by the instrument
of the settlement or conveyance. The restraint is a modi-
fication of the separate estate. If there is no coverture
there is no separate estate, and there can be no limita-
tion of the right of disposition under an instrument re-
lating to property held as a separate estate during cover-
ture. Where property is conveyed to a single woman, who
subsequently marries, but survives her husband, she will
hold her estate in widowhood precisely as it was held be-
fore her marriage. The Scriptural rule applies, that the
husband being dead, "she is freed from the law of her hus-
band." It is also held that where a conveyance contains
the usual clause in restraint of anticipation or of alienation,
it will apply to a second, or to any subsequent marriage, as
fully as to the first. Before marriage, or during widow-
hood, she may alienate her property and so change the
nature of the estate as to free it from the restraint imposed
by the instrument of conveyance.1 The clause in an in-
1 Tullett v. Armstrong, 4 Myl. & been so established will be lost.
Cr. *377. Lord Cottenham, in the Why, then, should not equity in this
cited case at page 406, thus speaks : case also interfere ; and if it cannot
"In the case now under considera- protect the wife consistently with
tion, if the after-taken husband be the ordinary rules of property, ex-
permitted to interfere with the tend its own rules with respect to
property given or settled before the separate estate, so as to secure
the marriage to the separate use of to her the enjoyment of that estate
the wife, much of the benefit and which has been so invented for her
security of the rules which have benefit? It is no doubt doing vio-
§287.]
MARRIED WOMEN.
6-71
strument of convej'a-nce by which the restraint is imposed
may be so framed as to limit its operation to a single or to
a particular coverture. But in order to this the words must
be clear and unequivocal.1 The English rule has been
lence to the rules of property to
say, that property which, being
given with qualifications and re-
strictions which are held to be void,
belonged absolutely to the woman
up to the moment of her marriage,
shall not be subject to the ordinary
rules of law as to the interest which
the husband is to take in it. * * *
In eslablishing the validity of the
separate estate with its qualifica-
tion, which constitutes its value,
that is, the prohibition against an-
ticipation, I am not doing more
than my predecessors have done
for similar purposes, and I have
much satisfaction in finding myself
justified, upon the grounds I have
stated, in doing what in me lies to
dissipate the alarm which has pre-
vailed lest the separate estate
should be held not to exist at all
during the subsequent coverture,
or, what would in many cases be a
greater evil, that it should exist
without the protection of the clause
against alienation." In Pennsyl-
vania the courts have established
the rule that there can be no valid
trust for the separate use of a
woman unless she is married at the
time of its creation, or unless it is
created in expectation of an in-
tended marriage. Snyder's Appeal,
92 Pa. St. 504; Hamersley v. Smith,
4Whart. 126; Pickering v. Coates,
10 Phila. 65; Ash v. Bowen. 10
Phila. 96; Ogden's Appeal, 70 Pa.
St. 501; Wells v. McCall, 64 Pa.
St. 207 ; Springer v. Arundel, 64 Pa.
St. 218. See also for the same view
Lindsay v. Harrison, 8 Ark. 302,
311 ; Apple v. Allen, 3 Jones Eq.
120.
1 In re Gaffee, 1 Macn. & G. 541,
547; Barton v. Briscoe, Jac. 603;
Wright v. Wright, 2 Johns. & H.
647, 655; Buttanshaw v. Martin,
Johns. 89; Woodmeston v. Walker,
2 Kuss. & M. 197 ; Brown v. Foote,
2 Tenn. Ch. 255; Hepburn's Ap-
peal, 65 Pa. St. 468; Tullett v.
Armstrong, 1 Beav. 1, 22; s. C, 4
Myl. & Cr. 377, 392. The doctrine
as stated in Tullett v. Armstrong
is as follows: "If the gift be made
for her sole and separate use, with-
out more, she has, during her cov-
erture, an alienable estate inde-
pendent of her husband. If the
gift be made for her sole and sep-
arate use, withojt power to alien-
ate, she has, during the coverture,
the present enjoyment of an in-
alienable estate independent of her
husband. In either of these cases
she has, when discovert, a power
of alienation ; the restraint is an»-
nexed to the separate estate only,
and the separate estate has its ex-
istence only during coverture;
whilst the woman is discovert, the
separate estate, whether modified
by restraint or not, is suspended,
and has no operation, though it is
capable of arising upon the hap-
pening of a marriage. The re-
striction cannot be considered dis-
tinctly from the separate estate, of
which it is only a modification ; to
say that the restriction exists is
saying no more than that the sep-
arate estate is so modified. * * *
If there be no separate estate there
can be no such restriction as that
which is now under consideration.
The separate estate may, and often
does, exist without the restriction,
672 MARRIED WOMEN. [§ 288.
adopted in most of the States of this country, but in a few
of them it has been held that the restraint upon alienation
is operative only during the first marriage, or the marriage
to which the conveyance particularly related.1
§ 288. Devolution of Wife's Separate Estate at Her
Death Where a married woman who holds a separate
estate dies without having disposed of it by will, it will
devolve, subject to the limitations of the settlement or in-
strument of convej^ance, if there be such, in the same
direction as her legal estates, or her other equitable
estates. Where she has power to dispose of her prop-
erty by will, under statutory regulations, and a will
is made, that will determine its devolution. But in
the absence of statutory regulations her real estate will
descend in fee to her heirs, subject to the curtesy of her
husband, unless such curtesy is excluded by the settlement
or conveyance. Her cash in possession and her chattels,
both personal and real, will belong to the husband juri
ma rili, while her choses in action will devolve upon him as
her administrator.2 In New Jersey it has been held that
on the death of the wife the husband may administer on
her estate, and in that character take to himself, for his
but the restriction has no inde- Mitchell, 1 Green's Ch. 243 ; Cooney
pendent existence; when found, it v. Woodburn, 33 Md. 320; Apple-
is a modification of the separate ton v. Bowley, L. K. 8 Eq. 139;
estate, and inseparable from it." Maloney v. Kennedy, 10 Sim. 254;
1 Hamersley v. Smith, 4 Wharf. Johnstone v. Lumb, 15 Sim. 308;
12G; Kuhn v. Newman, 26 Pa. St. Proudley v. Fielder, 2 Myl. & K.
227 ; Dubs v. Dubs, 31 Pa. St. 149 ; 57 ; Koberts v. Dixwell, 1 Atk. 607 ;
Freyvogle v. Hughes, 58 Pa. St. Pitt v. Jackson, 2 Bro. Ch. 51 ;
228 ; Hepburn's Appeal, 65 Pa. St. Morgan v. Morgan, 5 Madd. 408 ;
468; Bush's Appeal, 33 Pa. St. S5; Follett v. Tyrer, 14 Sim. 125; Har-
McKee v. McKinley, 33 Pa. St. 92 ; ris v. Mott, 14 Beav. 169 ; Johnson
Lindsay v. Harrison, 8 Ark. 302, v. Prairie, 91 X. Car. 159.
311 ; Miller v. Bingham, 1 Ired. These common law rules con
Eq. 423; s. C, 36 Am. Dec. 58; cerning succession have been
Apple v. Allen. 3 Jones Eq. 120; greatly modified in several of the
Duke v. Duke, 81 Ky. 308. States, especially concerning the
2 Musters v. Wright, 2 De G. & rights of the husband as a successor
Sm.777; Stewart v. Stewart, 7 to his wife. The statutory regula-
Johns. Ch. 229; Donnington v. tions in each State will govern.
§ 288.J
MAEEIBD WOMEN.
(573
own benefit, juri mariti, all her personal property; and
in case he dies before he shall have fully administered
on such estate, his representatives are entitled to the
property. If letters of administration upon the wife's es-
tate are granted to the next of kin of the wife, they are
deemed as trustees only for the representatives of the hus-
band. Where the property of the wife, by marriage agree-
ment, executed before the marriage, is conveyed to trus-
tees, and no disposition is made of the property in the event
of the wife's death before the husband, — upon the death of
the wife the property will go to her husband. The rights
of the husband are not suffered to be taken away unless by
express terms, and his rights are as complete in property
placed in trust as in any other.1 The common law doctrine
1 Dorrington Y. Mitchell, 2 N. J.
Eq. 243. "The object of the pro-
vision was to free the property and
its proceeds from the control of her
husband during the coverture; and
there was no disposition of the
property in the event of her death.
She had indeed the power of ap-
pointment, and she might, with the
assent of her husband, have made
a disposition of the property to
meet that event ; but she did not
exercise the power, or appoint the
uses to which the property should
be applied after her death, and the
property remained in the same
state at her death as if no such
power of appointment had been
created. It follows, therefore, as
a plain and necessary consequence,
that the rights of her husband, at
her death, as survivor, were the
same as if no such settlement had
been made. * * * The court
cannot take away the right of the
husband to the personal estate of
his wife, when it is not taken away
by the settlement, or by the exer-
cise of the power of appointment
under it. When the settlement
makes no disposition of the prop -
43
erty, in the event of the wife's
death, and provides only for her
dominion over it during coverture,
the right of the husband, as sur-
vivor, is a fixed and stable right,
over which the court has no con-
trol, and of which he cannot be di-
vested. The settlement cannot be
extended, by construction, beyond
the just and fair import of its pro-
visions, and clearly the court can-
not create a settlement, or a dispo-
sition of property, in violation of
the jus mariti, when none has been
made by the party. There is, then,
nothing in the instrument in ques-
tion that barred the husband, in
default of an appointment by the
wife to claim and appropriate to
himself her personal estate re-
maining undisposed of at her death.
Whether he succeeds to her prop-
erty jure mariti, or as her next of
kin, as many of the books have ex-
pressed it, does not seem to be at
all material ; and any question as
to the accuracy of the expression is
rather matter of verbal criticism,
than of substantial use. The hus-
band is her next of kin, by relation,
of marriage ; and he takes in con-
674 MAKKIED WOMEN. [§ ^89.
in regard to the descent of property, and especially con-
cerning the rights of the surviving husband, has been very
materially modified by statute in many of the States.
Where changes of this character have been made, the stat-
utory regulations will of course determine the devolution.
§ 289. The Married Woman's Equity to a Settlement.
— In its origin the wife's equity to a settlement was an ap-
plication of the maxim: "He who seeks equity must do
equity." In general terms this doctrine has been stated as
follows: "Where the husband, or some person claiming
under him, is suing in equity to reach the wife's property,
and where the property is already within reach of the court,
as where it is vested in trustees, or has been paid into court,
or is in any other situation which brings it under the con-
trol of the court, the court will not grant the relief in the
first instance, nor permit the property to be removed out of
its jurisdiction and control in the second, until an adequate
provision is made for the wife, unless special circumstances
exist which defeat her right; and under a like condition of
the property, the wife may herself institute a suit and ob-
tain the relief."1 In a leading English case the equitable
sequence of being her husband, 229, 245, 246. See also Lambert v.
and by reason of that relation. It Lambert, L. E. 39 Ch. D. 026.
is in this sense only that he is 1 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurispru-
spoken of as her next of kin. "When dence, § 1114. See also Lady
the wife"snext of kin are mentioned Elibank v. Montolieu, 5 Ves.!
in settlements, the words are un- 737; s. c, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 623,
derstood to be used in the ordinary 639-669, 670-679; Duncombe v.
and popular sense, and it is evi- Greenacre, 2 De G., F. & J.
dent that the husband is not in- - 271; Life Association v. Siddall,
tended. It is sufficient in this case, 3 De G., F. & J. 271; Smith v.
to observe, that, when the wife's Matthews, 3 De G., F. & J. 139;
choses in action, or other personal Martin v. Foster, 7 De G., M. & G.
property, over which she has con- 98; Allday v. Fletcher, 1 De G. &
trol by settlement, if left undis- J. 82; Biddle v. Jackson, 3 De G.
posed of after her death, the hus- & J. 544 ; "Wallace v. Auldjo, 1 De
band who survives her must of G., J. & S. 643; Johnson v. Land-
course take it, and with as good a ers, L. E. 7 Eq. 228; Croxton v.
right and title in law as the heir May, L. E. 9 Eq. 404; Aitchison v.
takes the undevised estate of his Dixon, L. E. 10 Eq. 589; In re
ancestor." Chancellor Kent, in Carr's Trusts, L. E. 12 Eq. 609;
Stewart v. Stewart. 7 Johns. Ch. Giacometti v. Prodgers, L. E. 14
§ 289. J MARRIED WOMEN. 675
doctrine of a wife's equity to a settlement is expounded by
the court, as follows : "The Avife's equity for a settlement,
therefore, does not depend upon any right of property in
her ; and that it does not depend upon any such right of
property is the more clear when it is considered to what
limitation it is subject. The amount is discretionary in the
court, and if the wife insists upon it, she must claim it for
herself and her children, and not for herself alone, — limita-
tions which are wholly inconsistent with a right of property
in her. The right, then, being thus independent of prop-
erty, there seems to be no ground on which it can rest, ex-
cept the control which courts of equity exercise over prop-
erty falling under their dominion. It is in truth the mere
creature of a court of equity, deduced, as I conceive, orig-
inally where the husband sued, from the rule that 'he who
comes into equity must do equity ; ' and subsequently ex-
tended to suits by the trustees and the wife, probably from
the necessity of the court administering the trust, — whether
the husband thought proper to sue or not. We must con-
sider, then, where this obligation of doing equity is en-
forced by the court. It is not upon the bill filed, for the
bill may afterwards be dismissed. It is not, as I think,
upon the decree being made where the plaintiff's interest is
in reversion ; for, in such cases, the court only deals with the
Eq. 253; s. C., 8 Ch. 338; Knight v. White v. Gouldin, 27 Gratt. 491;
Knight, L. R. 18 Bq. 487; Ruffles Canby v. McLear, 13 Bank. Reg.
v. Alston, L. R. 19 Eq. 539; In re 22; Beal v. Stonn, 26 K. J. Eq.
Cordwell's Estate, L. R. 20 Eq. 372; McCaleb v. Critohfield, 5
644; Spirett v. Willows, L.R.I Heisk. 288 ; Jackson v. Hill, 25 Ark.
Ch. 520; In re Suggitt's Trusts, L. 223; Atkinson v. Beall, 33 G-a. 153;
R. 3 Ch. 215 ; In re Lush's Trusts, Sabel v. Slingluff , 52 Md. 132 ;
L. R. 4 Ch. 591; Barnard v. Ford, Moore v. Moore, 14 B. Mon. 208;
L. R. 4 Ch. 247; Walsh v. Wason, Bennett v. Dillingham, 2 Dana,
L. R. 8 Ch. 482; In re Mellow's 436; Coppedge v. Threadgill, 3
Trusts, L. R. 6 Ch. D. 127; Taun- Sneed, 577 ; Phillips v. Hassell, 10
ton v. Morris, L. R. 8 Ch. D. 453; Humph. 197; Poindexterv. Jeffries,
s. c., 11 Ch. D. 779; In re Robin- 15 Gratt. 363; Wiles v. Wiles, 3
son's Estate, L. R. 12 Ch. D. 188
Ward v. Ward, L. R. 14 Ch. D
506; In re Bryan, L. R. 14 Ch. D
516; Shipway v. Ball, L. R. 16 Ch
Md. 1 ; s. c, 56 Am. Dec. 733 ; Lay
v. Brown, 13 B. Mon. 295; Andrews
v. Jones, 10 Ala. 401; Ward v.
Amory, 1 Curtis, 419, 432; Poulter
D. 376; Pond v. Skeen, 2 Lea, 126; v. Shackel, L. R. 39 Ch. D. 471
676
MARRIED WOMEN.
[§ 289.
interest in possession. It is, I think, when the property
comes to be distributed; for then and not till then, in or-
dinary cases, does the court enforce obligations attaching
upon the property otherwise than by contract. This right
to a settlement, therefore, I take to be an obligation which
the court fastens, not upon the property, but upon the
right to receive it ; and that this is the case is, I think, the
more clear from this consideration ; if the right attaches at
all, it must attach with all its incidents. One of its inci-
dents is that the wife waiving it must waive it by her con-
sent in court ; but it is now settled that the court cannot
take her jconsent to part with her reversionary interest.1
1 Osborn v. Morgan, 9 Hare, 433.
Sir John Leach in Pickard v. Rob-
erts, 3 Madd. 364, is clear in his
enunciation of this principle. "My
opinion is," he says, "that a wife
by her consent, in a court of equity,
can only depart with that interest
which is the creature of a court of
equity — the right which she has in
a court of equity — to claim a pro-
vision by way of settlement on
herself and children out of that
property which the husband-at-
law would take in possession in her
right. Her equity arises upon his
legal right to present possession.
This principle has no application
to a remainder or reversion, where
the remainder or reversion falls
into possession, then equity arises.
If the wife, by her consent, could
pass a remainder or reversion in
personal property to her husband
she would not only part with a fu-
ture possible equity, but with her
chance of possessing the whole
property by surviving her husband ;
and to give this effect to her con-
sent would make it analogous to a
fine at law with respect to real es-
tate— a principle always disclaimed
in a court of equity. A court of
equity interferes to protect the
property of the wife against the
legal rights of the husband, and
will never lend itself as an instru-
ment to enable the husband to ac-
quire a right in the wife's personal
property, which he can by no
means acquire at law." Likewise
in Hanson v. Keating, 4 Hare, 1, 4,
Wigram, V. C, says: "The ar-
gument in this case for the defend-
ant, was founded upon the well
established rule of this court, that
a plaintiff who would have equity
must do equity, a rule by which,
properly understood, it is at all
times satisfactory to me to be
bound. But it is a rule which, as
it was used in the argument of this
case, takes for granted the whole
question in dispute. The rule, as
I have often had occasion to ob-
serve, cannot per se decide what
terms the court should impose upon
the plaintiff as the price of the de-
cree it gives him. It decides in the
abstract that the court, giving the
plaintiff the relief to which he is
entitled, will do so only upon the
terms of his submitting to give the
defendant such corresponding
rights (if any) as he also may be
entitled to in respect of the subject-
matter of the suit. "What those
§ 290.J
MARRIED WOMEN.
677
§ 290. The Amount of Wife's Settlement There is
no rule of equity by which the amount of property to be
included in the settlement of the wife shall be determined.
In each and every case the question is settled by the court,
rights are must be determined
aliunde by strict rules of law, and
not by any arbitrary determination
of the court. The rule, in short,
merely raises the question what
those terms, if any, should be. If,
for example, a plaintiff seeks an
account against a defendant, the
court will require the plaintiff to
do equity by submitting himself to
account in the same manner in
which he asks an account ; the rea-
son of which is, that the court does
not take accounts partially, and
perhaps ineffectually, but requires
that the whole subject be, once for
all, settled between the parties.
Clark v. Tipping, 4 Beav. 594, 595.
It is only (I may observe as a gen-
eral rule) to the one matter which
is the subject of a given suit that
the rule applies, and not to distinct
matters pending between the same
parties. Whitakerv. Hall, 1 Glyn
& J. 213. So in case of a bill for
specific performance, the court will
give the purchaser his conveyance,
provided he will fulfill his part of
the contract by paying the pur-
chase money; and e converso, if the
vendor were plaintiff, the court
will assist him only upon condition
of his doing equity by conveying
to the purchaser the subject of the
contract upon receiving the pur-
chase money. In this as in the
former case, the court will execute
the matter which is the subject of
the suit wholly, and not partially.
So, if a bill be filed by the obligor
in a usurious bond, to be relieved
against it, the court, in a proper
case, will cancel the bond, but only
upon terms of the obligor refund-
ing to the obligee the money actu-
ally advanced. The reasoning is
analogous to that in the previous
cases. The equity of the obligor
is to have the entire transaction
rescinded. The court will do this
so as to remit both parties to their
original positions ; it will not re-
lieve the obligor from his liability,
leaving him in possession of the
fruits of the illegal transaction he
complains of. I know of no case
which cannot be explained upon
this or analogous reasoning; and
my opinion is, that the court can
never lawfully impose merely ar-
bitrary conditions upon a plaintiff,
only because he stands in that po-
sition upon the record, but can only
require him to give the defendant,
that which by the law of the court,
independently of the mere position
of the party on the record, is the
right of the defendant in respect of
the subject of the suit. A party,
in short, does not, by becoming
plaintiff in equity, give up any of
his rights, or submit those rights
to the arbitrary disposition of the
court. He submits only to give the
defendant his rights in respect of
the subject-matter of the suit, on
condition of the plaintiff obtaining
his own. Cases may perhaps be
suggested in which a question
never can arise except against a
plaintiff; but as a general proposi-
tion it may, I believe, be correctly
stated, that a plaintiff will never,
in that character, be compelled to
give a defendant anything but
what the defendant might, as
678
MARRIED WOMEN.
[§ 290.
and it is purely and simply a matter of discretion. In the
earlier English cases it was frequently, if not generally,
held, that one-half of the estate subject to appropriation
should be settled upon the wife and children.1 But this
rule was subject to modification, and in all cases the amount
set apart was determined by the circumstances. Where the
wife and children were supported by the husband from his
own property, the proportion was smaller than where they
were dependent upon the property of the wife. But under
ordinary circumstances about one-half of the estate which
came to the husband by the wife appears to have been set-
plaintiff enforce, provided a cause
of suit arose. Lady Elibank v.
Montolieu, 5 Ves. 737; Sturgis v.
Champneys, 5 Myl. & Cr. 97, 101."
See further in support of the text,
Milner v. Calmer, 2 P. Wins. 640;
Brown v. Elton, 2 P. Wms. 202;
Wallace v. Auldjo, 2 Dr. & Sm.
216; Haviland v. Bloom, 6 Johns.
Ch. 178 ; Dumond v. Magee, 4
Johns. Ch. 315; Glen v. Fisher, 6
Johns. Ch. 33; Van Eppes v. Van
Deusen, 4 Paige, 64 ; Smith v. Kane,
2 Paige, 303 ; Davis v. Newton, 6
Met. 537; Cooley v. Cooley, 22 Ga.
178; Barron v. Barron, 24 Vt. 375;
Short v. Moore, 10 Vt. 456; Chase
v. Palmer, 25 Me. 342; Guild v.
Guild, 16 Ala. 122; Andrews v.
Jones, 10 Ala. 401; Wiles v. Wiles,
3 Md. 1; Browning v. Headley, 2
Rob. 342; Durr v. Bowyer, 2 Mc-
Cord, 368; Yeldellv. Quarles, Dud.
Eq. 56 ; Myers v. Myers, 1 Bail. Eq.
24; Gallego v. Gallego, 2 Brock.
Ch. 286 ; Grover v. Diffenderff er,
1] Gill & J. 15 ; Duvall v. Farmers'
Bank, 4 Gill & J. 283; "Wife's
Equity to a Settlement," 13 Irish
L. T. 452.
1 Newenham v. Pemberton, 1 De
G. & Sm. 644; In re Potter, L. K. 7
Eq. 487 ; Barrow v. Barrow, 5 De
G.,M. &G. 782; Sturgis v. Champ-
neys, 5 Myl. & Cr. 97 ; Gent v. Har-
ris, 10 Hare, 383 ; Taunton v. Mor-
rison, L. R. 8 Ch. D. 453; s. C, L.
R. 11 Ch. D. 779; Dunkley v.
Dunkley, 2 De G., M. & G. 390;
Gilchrist v. Cator^l De G. & Sm.
188; Scott v. Spashett, 3 Macn. &
G. 599; Brown v. Clark, 5 Ves.
166 ; Ex parte Pugh, 1 Drew. 202,
203; Carter v. Taggart, 1 De G.,
M. & G. 286,289; Layton v. Lay-
ton, 1 Sm. & Gif. 179; Spirett v.
Willows, L. K. 1 Ch. 520; In re
Suggitt's Trusts, L. E. 3 Ch. 215;
Giacometti v. Prodgers, L. R. 14
Eq. 253; s. c, 8 Ch. 338; Smith v.
Smith, 3 Giff . 121 ; In re Kincaid's
Trusts, 1 Drew. 326; In re Cutler,
14Beav. 220; Marshall v. Fowler,
16Beav. 249; Green v. Otte, 1 S.
& S. 250; In re Erskine's Trust, 1
Kay & J. 302; Coster v. Coster, 9
Sim. 597 ; Watson v. Marshall, 17
Beav. 363 ; Francis v. Brooking, 19
Beav.347; Duncombe v, Greenacre,
29 Beav. 568; Napier v. Napier, 1
Dr. & War. 407; Ex parte Pugh, 1
Drew. 202 ; In re Groves' Trusts, 3
Giff. 575; White v. Gouldine, 27
Gratt. 491 ; In re Ford, 32 Beav. 621 ;
In re Lewin's Trusts, 20 Beav. 378;
Johnson v. Lander, L. R. 7 Eq.
228; In re Cordwell's Estate, L. R.
20 Eq. 644.
§ 291. J MARRIED WOMEN. -679
tied to her exclusive use. From our point of view, as has
been suggested, this appears to be very scant justice, a very
inadequate sort of equity to the wife and children ; but at
the time at which the doctrine was first established, it
doubtless appeared to be, as it was in fact, a very long stride
in the direction of their interests.
§ 291. Property Subject to Wife's Settlement. — Under
the earlier English decisions, the property out of which a
settlement could be effected was limited to personalty. But
in the leading case of Sturgis v. Champneys the rule was
extended to real property.1 In his opinion in this case, Lord
Chancellor Cottenham said: "Hence arises the extensive
and beneficial rule of this court that he who asks for equity
must do equity; that is, this court refuses its aid to give to
the plaintiff what the law would give him, if the courts of
common law had jurisdiction to enforce it, without imposing
upon him conditions which the court considers he ought to
comply with, although the subject of the condition should
be one which this court would not otherwise enforce. If,
therefore, this court refuses to assist a husband who has
abandoned his wife, or the assignee of an insolvent hus-
band who claims against both, in recovering property of
the wife, without securing out of it for her a proper main-
tenance and support, it not only does not violate any prin-
ciple, but acts in strict conformity with a rule by which it
regulates its proceedings in other cases."2 The doctrine on
which this decision is based has since been accepted both in
England and in this country. Property subject to a wife's
settlement may include an equitable estate in fee, or an es-
tate tail which is subject to a jointure term, the estate be-
ing equitable only during the continuance of the term, and
where the settlement extends to an estate in fee it cannot
effect the possible estate of the husband by curtesy.3 In
1 Sturgis v. Champneys, 5 Myl. & 459; Lady Elibank v. Montolieu, 5
Cr. 97, 102. Ves. 737; s. c, 1 Lead. Cas. Bq.
2 Sturgis v. Champneys, 5 Myl. & 486; Sturgis v. Champneys, 5 Myl.
Cr. 97, 102. & Cr. 105; Eedes v. Eedes, 11
3 Bosvil v. Brander, 1 P. Wms. Sim. 569; Hanson v. Keating, 4
680
MARRIED WOMEN.
[§ 292.
the earlier cases there was some question in regard to the
wife's right to a settlement out of her life estate, or life
interest ; but it is now well established that she has the
same equity to a settlement out of property in which she
has a life interest only, as out of that in which she has the
absolute interest. It may be stated as a rule that the equity
of a wife to a settlement extends to any j:>roperty which
originally belonged to her, or has come to her during cov-
erture, if her claim is presented before the husband has
disposed of his right in it, either by sale or by transfer to
an assignee for a valuable consideration.1
§ 292. How the Equity to a Settlement May be Lost
Where the equity of a wife to a settlement may attach to
her property it is liable to be lost, either by her acts, or by
the husband's exercise of his rights in regard to it. Where
the husband has reduced into possession her choses in action
they are beyond the reach of this equity.2 The wife may
Hare. 6 ; Osborn v. Morgan, 9 Hare,
434; Dvmcombe v. Greenacre, 28
Beav. 472; s. c, 2 De G., F. & J.
509.
1 Elliott v. Cordell, 5 Madd. 149;
Pryor v.Hill, 4 Bro. Ch. 139; Ex
parte Coysegame, 1 Atk. 192;
Jacobs v. Amyatt, 1 Madd. 376, n.;
Squires v. Ashford, 23 Beav. 132.
See also Wilkinson v. Charles -
worth, 10 Beav. 324; Koeber v.
Sturgis, 22 Beav. 5S8; Taunton v.
Morris, L. R. 8 Ch. D. 453. See
contra: Vaughan v. Buck, 13 Sim.
404. See Tidd v. Lester, 3 De G.,
M. & G. 857, 869, 870; s. c, 10
Hare. 140; Wright v. Morley, 11
Yes. 12, 22; Stanton v. Hall, 2 Russ.
& M. 175; Be Duffy's Trust, 28
Beav. 386.
2 Purdevv v. Jackson, 1 Euss. 1 ;
In re Duffy's Trust, 28 Beav. 386;
Stanton v. Hall, 2 Russ. & II. 175,
182; Elliott v. Cordell, 5 Madd.
149. The circumstances in each
case determine largely what
amounts to the reduction by the
husband into his possession. For
illustration see following cases:
Ellison v. Elvvin, 13 Sim. 309;
Ex parte Norton, 8 De G., M. & G.
258 ; Allday v. Fletcher, 1 De G. &
J. 82; Hornsby v. Lee, 2 Madd. 16;
Le Vasseur v. Scratton, 14 Sim. 116 ;
Michelmore v. Mudge, 2 Giff. 183;
Aitchison v. Dixon, L. R. 10 Eq.
589, 597, 598 ; Widgery v. Tepper,
L. R. 7 Ch. D. 423; In re Barber,
L. R. 11 Ch. D. 442; Canby v. Mc-
Lear, 13 Bank. Reg. 22 ; Heirs of
Holmes v. Admr. of Holmes, 28
Vt.765; Dunn v. Sargent, 101 Mass.
336; Howard v. Bryant, 9 Gray,
239 ; Bartlett v. Van Zandt, 4 Sandf .
Ch. 396; Burr v. Sherwood, 3
Bradf. 85; Needles' Exr. v.
Needles, 7 Ohio St. 432; s. C, 70
Am. Dec. 85; Cooley v. Cooley, 22
Ga. 178; Machem v. Machem, 28
Ala. 374; Lockhart v. Cameron, 29
Ala. 355; McNeill v. Arnold, 17
Ark. 154. The wife will not lose
§ 292.]
MARRIED WOMEN.
681
waive her claim to an equity of settlement, and the act will
be recognized by a court of equity, unless in so doing the
rights of her children would be thereby abrogated and
they would be deprived of any substantial provision for
their support.1 By examination in court she may waive
her equity, unless she is an infant and has the property put
into the hands of her husband.2 If the wife has legally
alienated or assigned her property, she cannot claim her
equity to a settlement so far as relates to such property.3
Where the property is already effected by a settlement she
cannot sustain a claim to another, and, as a rule, when she
is otherwise well provided for, the equity will not attach
her separate estate by standing
silently by while her husband is
disposing of it; for while in the
husband's presence she is, in con-
templation of law, under his power
and coercion. Carpenter v. Car-
penter, 27 N". J. Eq. 502. She may
lose her separate property in per-
sonalty by allowing it to become
mixed with other funds, in such a
manner that it becomes impossible
to trace or identify it. See Buck
v. Ashbrook, 59 Mo. 200; Clappv.
Emery, 98 111. 531 ; JSTat'l Bank v.
Barry, 125 Mass. 20; Newton v.
Porter, 69 ST. Y. 133. So long as
it can be followed as a separate
and independent fund, distinguish-
able from any other fund, it can be
pursued. School Trustees v. Kir-
win, 25 111. 73. Where a feme covert,
who had a separate estate, pur-
chased articles of furniture with
the rents and profits of such estate,
and put them into the possession
of her husband without any agree-
ment or understanding with him
that he should hold them as her
trustee, or that the title should be
vested in any other person for her
separate use, the articles thus pur-
chased, were held to become the
property of her husband, and liable
to be sold for his debts. Shirley v.
Shirley, 9 Paige, 363. See also
Kuhn v. Stansfield, 28 Md. 210
Chester v. Greer, 5 Humph. 26
Dixon v. Dixon, L. K. 9 Ch. D
587 ; Hughes v. Wells, 9 Hare, 749
Dozier v. Freeman, 47 Miss. 647
Wiley v. Gray, 36 Miss. 510; Kemp
v. Kemp, 85 N. Car. 491.
1 Fenner v. Taylor, 2 Buss. & M.
190; Ex parte Garner, 2 Ves. 671.
2Dimmock v. Atkinson, 3 Bro.
Ch. 195; Beaumont v. Carter, 32
Beav. 586; Shipway v. Ball, L. B.
16 Ch. D. 376. Where a man mar-
ries an infant ward of the court,
without obtaining the consent of
the court, the property belonging
to her in the custody of the court
will not be paid out to her until a
settlement is made on her, even if
she should assent to such a pay-
ment. Martin v. Foster, 7 De G.,
M. & G. 98; Biddies v. Jackson, 3
De G. & J. 544. The court will
not take the consent of the infant
wife. Stubbs v. Sargon, 2 Beav.
496; Abraham v. N~ewcombe, 12
Sim. 566.
3 Williams v. Cook, 9 Jur. (N. S.)
658; Turner v. Turner, 20 Beav.
560.
682 MARRIED WOMEN. [§ 293.
to her property.1 Where the property is under a foreign
jurisdiction, in which the equity is not recognized, the
claim will not be sustained.2 The equity of a settlement
may also be barred by inequitable acts, or by gross and pal-
pable misconduct.3
§ 293. The Mode of the Settlement. — There is no
legal form to be followed in effecting a settlement in favor
of a married woman, and there are no equitable rules that
are necessarily applicable. Special circumstances may de-
termine the form of such settlement. In the absence of
special circumstances the ordinary procedure is to make
provision for the wife for her life, and to fix the devolu-
tion on her death. Ordinarily, the property will descend
to her issue, if any survive her. In default of surviving
issue the ultimate limitation should be to the survivor of
the husband or wife, as the case may be. Beyond the pro-
tection of the equity of the wife for herself and for her
children, if any survive her, the rule is that the marital
rights of the husband are not to be disturbed.4
1 Spicer v. Spicer, 24 Beav. 365; De G., M. & G., 286; ZrareSuggitt's
Green v. Otte, 1 Sim. & S. 250; Trust, L. B. 3 Oh. 215; Walsh v.
Giacometti v. Prodgers, L. B. 14 Wason, L. B. 8 Ch. 482. Where no
Eq. 253; s. C., 8 Ch. 338; Brett v. settlement had been directed during
Forcer, 3 Atk. 403 ; Pond v. Skean, the lifetime of the wife, her chil-
2 Lea, 126. dren have no independent right to
2 Campbell v. French, 3 Ves. 321, enforce her equity and claim a set-
323 ; Anstruther v. Adair, 2 Myl. & tlement after her death. Lloyd v.
K. 513; Hitchcock v. Clendinen, 12 Williams, 1 Madd. 450 ; De la Garde
Beav. 534; In re Todd, 19 Beav. v. Lampriere, 6 Beav. 344; Hod-
5S2; McCormick v. Garnett, 5 De gens v. Hodgens, 4 CI. & F.
G., M. & G. 278. 323, 372; Wallace v. Auldjo, 1 De
sInre Lewin's Trust, 20 Beav. G., J. &S.643; McCalebv. Critch-
378; Ball v. Montgomery, 2 Ves. field, 5 Heisk. 288. In cases where
191; Greedy v. Lavender, 13 Beav. a settlement under the wife's equity
62; Eedes v. Eedes, 11 Sim. 569; is ordered, provision will always
In re Lush"s Trust, L. B. 4 Ch. be made for the children of the
591 ; Barnard v. Ford, L. B. 4 Ch. marriage. Murray v. Elibank, 13
247; Bonner v. Bonner, 17 Beav. Ves. 1 ; S. C, 14 Ves. 496; John-
86; Knight v. Knight, L. B. 18 Eq. son v. Johnson, 1 Jac. & W. 472,
487. 475. And this will be the rule with
4 Croxton v. May, L. R. 9 Eq. 404 ; reference to the wife's children by
Spirett v. Willows, L.B. 1 Ch. 520; any former marriage. Croxton v.
s.C.,4Ch. 407; Carter v. Taggart, 1 May, L. B. 9 Eq. 404.
§ 294. j
MARRIED WOMEN.
683
§ 294. Bights of Children Under the Married
Woman's Settlement. — The children have no direct equity
to a settlement from the property of the mother, either
during her life or at her death. The equity is strictly, per-
sonal to the mother. But where she sets up her claim to
a settlement out of her own projjerty, the court will ex-
tend the settlement to the children, and the order will ex-
tend to the children of as many marriages as may occur.1
In the English courts it was the usage to settle any ques-
1 Lady Elibank v. Montolieu, 5
Ves. 737; s. c.,1 Lead. Cas.Eq. 486;
Murray v. Lord Elibank, 10 Ves. 84 ;
s. C., 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 494; John-
son v. Johnson, 1 J. & W. 472 ; In re
Grant, 14 W. R. 191; Howard v.
Moffatt, 2Johns.Ch.206; Andrews
v. Jones, 10 Ala. 401 ; Covington v.
Gillat, "W. N"., Dec. 2, 1872, p. 275;
Lloyd v.Williams, 1 Madd. 450;
De la Garde v. Lampriere, 6 Beav.
344; Hodgens v. Hodgens, 4 CI. &
F. 372 ; Scriven v. Tapley, 2 Eden,
337; "Settlements in Fraud of
Children," 16 L. J. 412. "The
equity of the children is not an
equity to which they are in their
own right entitled. In making the
settlement of the wife's property,
the interests of the children are
always attended to, because it-must
be supposed to be the object, and it
is the duty of the court, in carrying
that object into effect, to provide
for those whom the mother of the
children would be anxious to pro-
vide for; but as between the mother
and the children I know of no
authority for saying, that the court
has jurisdiction to take from the
mother that which the court has
given to the mother, as against the
right of the husband for the pur-
pose of creating a benefit to the
children. That the children have
no equity of their own, that it is
only the equity that they obtain
through the means of the consent
of the mother, is sufficiently clear
when I call to your lordship's rec-
ollection the fact, that if the mother,
having attained the age of twenty-
one, comes into court, and consents
that the property shall be paid over
to the husband, that the court will
permit it to be paid over with-
out reference to the interests
of the children; but in no
instance are the children permitted
to assert an independent equity of
their own; and in no instance has
that right ever been permitted
against the mother. It is against
the father that the court exercises
jurisdiction, to exclude him from
those rights which the law would
otherwise give him ; and then the
court deals with those rights as be-
tween the mother whose property
it is, and as between the
children of the marriage, in
such a way as may be thought for
the interests of the family. But
the question is, whether the chil-
dren have any right of their own
against their mother, to deprive
her of that income which is given
to her by a settlement, though not
actually executed, yet in the hands
of the master at the time when the
party thought proper to submit to
the jurisdiction of the court."
Hodgens v. Hodgens, 11 Bligh,
(U.S.), 62, 104.
684 MAEEIED WOMEN. [§ 295.
tion of this character by an examination of the wife in
open court, or, if that were impracticable, by a commis-
sion out of court. At such examinations she might, if
she chose, waive her right of settlement in favor of her
husband, and in that case the children would have no claim.1
Where the wife was under age, or, having been a ward of
the court, she had married without consent, she would not
be permitted to waive her equity to a settlement.2 Where
the wife gave her consent under any misapprehension, or
even subsequently changed her mind, she was permitted
to recall her waiver at any time before the property was
transferred to her husband.3 Where a wife has filed a
bill for the purpose of securing a settlement, and dies
pending the proceeding without having waived her right,
the claim of the children to a settlement may be enforced
by a supplemental bill.4
§ 295. Order of Court for Maintenance. — Where a
wife is deserted by the husband, or treats her so badly as
to compel her to leave her home, it is a question to what
extent equity will afford her relief. The natural equity
of such a case is too obvious to admit of any question,
but according to the English decisions the obligations of
a husband to support his wife will not be enforced by
1 Hodgens v. Hodgens, 11 Bligh husband, whether he survives the
(N. S.), 104; Fenner v. Taylor, 2 wifeornot. Croxton v. May, L.R.
Buss. & Myl. 190; Dimmock t. 9 Eq. 404.
Atkinson, 3 Bro. Ch. 195. The ex- 2 Stubbs v. Sargon, 2 Beav. 496;
tent of a wife's equity to a settle- Abraham v. Newcombe, 12 Sim.
ment is to have a provision made 566; Shipmay v. Ball, L. K. 16 Ch.
out of the fund for herself and her D. 376; Eowe v. Jackson, 2 Dick,
children by her present or any 604; Groves v. Perkins, 6 Sim. 576,
future marriage; and courts of 584; Groves v. Clark, 1 Keen, 138,
equity will not interfere with the 139 ; In re Walker, 1 Lloyd &
marital right beyond what is nee- Goold, 324, 325.
essary to give effect to the wife's 3 Watson v. Marshall, 17 Beav.
equity. Hence the form of the 363 ; Penfield v. Mould, L. R. 4 Eq.
ultimate limitation in a settlement 562.
made by the court of property sub- 4 Groves v. Perkins, 2 Dick. 604;
ject to a wife's equity is, after the De la Garde v. Lempriere, 6 Beav.
death of the wife, and failure of 344; Inre Walker, 1 Lloyd & Goold,
children of her present or any future 324, 325.
marriage, for the benefit of the
§ 296. J MARRIED WOMEN. 685
courts of equity. At least they will not direct a provision
for her separate maintenance.1 It is held that in such a
case the remedy is in an action at common law, and that
it should be brought by any person or persons who rmxy
supply her with what is essential to her support, according
to her rank and social condition. In her separation, where
the fault is not with her, she may avail herself of the
credit that comes of her relation to her husband.2 If the
wife fails to obtain relief in this manner she may apply
to the proper ecclesiastical court for a decree a mensa et
thoro, or for a restitution of conjugal rights, and as inci-
dent to this that court may make a decree for a suitable
alimony or maintenance.3 But in this country a broader
jurisdiction in cases of alimony has been asserted. It has
been held that where a husband abandons his wife, leaving
her without any adequate support, a court of equity will
give her a suitable maintenance out of his estate on the
ground that she has no adequate remedy at law.4 The
jurisdiction of equity in this case has not been generally
asserted, but to some extent the courts will afford relief in
this direction.
§ 296. The Husband as Trustee for the Wife. — It
was formerly held that in the settlement of a separate
equitable estate upon a married woman, her rights and
interests were adequately protected onty as the property was
vested in a trustee. This is still the regular and orderly
1 Ball v. Montgomery, 2 Ves. 195, 3 Ball v. Montgomery, 2 Ves. 195 ;
196; Head v. Head, 3 Atk. 550; Duncan v. Duncan, 19 Ves. 394;
Legard v. Johnson, 3 Ves. 359,361; Lambert v. Lambert, 2 Bro. P. C.
Forden v. Finney, 4 Russ. 428. But 18, by Tomlin; In re Walker, 1
see Galland v. Galland, 36 Cal. Lloyd v. Goold, 326, 327.
265. 'iPurcell v. Purcell, 4 Hen. &
2 Guy v. Peakes, 18 Ves. 196, 197 ; Munf . 507 ; Patterson v. Patterson,
Harris v. Morris, 4 Esp. 41; Hodges 1 Halst. Ch. 389; Gaines v. Gaines,
v.Hodges, 1 Esp. 441; Bolton v. 9 B. Mon. 295; 2 Story, Equity
Prentice, 2 Str. 1214; Hindley v. Jurisprudence, §§ 1423,1424; Gal-
Marquis of Westmeath, 6 B. & O. land v. Galland, 38 Cal. 265; Eames
200, 213; Eames v. Sweetser, 101 v. Sweetser, 101 Mass. 5; Clancy
Mass. 78; Deare v. Soutten, L. R. on Married Women, B. 6, ch. 9, pp.
9 Eq. 151. 549 to 567.
•686
MARRIED WOMEN.
[§ 296.
method of effecting a settlement, and it is the usage where
it is done by the advice of competent counsel. But it was
long since well established that the interposition of a
trustee is not essential to compliance with the law, or to
the protection of the rights and interests of the wife.
"Wherever property, whether personal, or real, is settled
upon a wife, either before or after her marriage, for her
separate use and enjoyment, the intention of the parties
will be executed by a court of equity without the interpo-
sition of trustees, and she will be fully protected in all of
her interests, not only against the marital rights of the
husband, but also against his creditors.1 In such cases the
legal title being in the husband, he will be held as a trustee
for the wife, and though the contract is exclusively be-
tween the husband and wife the trust will attach to the
property, and he will be held responsible as trustee to the
same extent that he would were he a stranger.2 So far as
1 Parker v. Brooke, 9 Ves. 583;
Bennet v. Davis, 2 P. Wms. 316;
Lucas v. Lucas, 1 Atk. 270; Paw-
let v. Delavel, 2 Ves. 666, 667;
Slanning v. Style, 3 P. Wms. 334,
339; Rolffe v. Budder, Bunb. 187;
Darley v, Darley, 3 Atk. 399 ; Rich
v. Cockell, 9 Ves. 375; Davis v.
Atkinson, 5 T. R. 434; Bradish v.
Gibbs, 3 Johns. Ch. 540; Shirley v.
Shirley, 9 Paige, 363; Lee v.
Prieaux, 3 Bro. Ch. 383; Wood-
meston v. Walker, 2 Euss. & Myl.
197; Major v. Lansley, 2 Russ. &
Myl. 355; G-ardner v. Gardner, 1
Giff . 126 ; McMillan v. Peacock, 57
Ala. 127; Miller v. Voss, 62 Ala.
122; Pepper v. Lee, 53 Ala. 33
Crooks v. Crooks, 34 Ohio St. 610
Pribble v. Hall, 13 Bush, 61
Thomas v. Harkness, 13 I?ush, 23
Jones v. Clifton, 101 U. S. 225
Payne v. Twyman, 68 Mo. 339
Loomis v. Brush, 36 Mich. 40
Holthaus v. Hornbostle, 60 Mo. 439
Davis v. Davis, 43 Ind. 561; City
Nat'l Bank v. Hamilton, 34 N. J.
Eq. 158; Barron v. Barron, 24 Vt.
375; Porter v. Bank of Rutland, IS
Vt. 410; Bradish v. Gibbs, 3 Johns.
Ch. 523; Firemen's Ins. Co. v.
Bay, 4 Barb. 407 ; Blanchard v.
Blood, 2 Barb. 352; Varner's Ap-
peal, 80 Pa. St. 140 ; Vance v. Nogle,
70 Pa. St. 176, 179 ; Shonk v. Brown,
61 Pa. St. 320 ; Jamison v. Brady,
6 Serg. & R. 466; s. C, 9 Am. Dec.
460; McKennan v. Phillips, 6
Whart. 571; s. c, 37 Am. Dec.
438; Trenton Bank. Co. v. Wood-
ruff, 2 N. J.Eq. 117; Steel v. Steel,
1 Ired. Eq. 452; Ellis v. Woods, 9
Rich. Eq. 19; Boykin v. Ciples, 2
Hill Eq. 200; s. c, 29 Am. Dec. 67;
Whitten v. Jenkins, 34 Ga. 297;
Fears v. Brooks, 12 Ga. 195; Ham-
ilton v. Bishop, 8 Yerg. 33; s. c,
29 Am. Dec. 101; Long v. White,
5 J. J. Marsh. 226; Freeman v.
Freeman, 9 Mo. 772; Templeton v.
Brown, 86 Tenn. 50; Allen v.
Walker, L. R. 5 Eq. 187.
2 Porter v. Bank of Rutland, 19
Vt. 410; Blanchard v. Blood, 2
§ 297.] MARRIED WOMEN. 687'
relates to the trust, it will make no difference whether the
property comes from the husband or from a stranger.
In either case, all the responsibilities of a trustee will attach
to the husband.
§ 297. The Husband as Agent for the Wife. — So far
as relates to her separate estate the married woman may
employ her husband as her agent, and they will be governed
in all respects by the equitable principles which apply to
principal and agent in ordinary cases. She may employ
hiin to manage her property, whether real or personal, and
authorize him, as her agent, to collect the rents and profits
without in any manner compromising her exclusive right in
it. The fact that he has the property of his wife in pos-
session gives him no claim to it, where it can be shown that
he has been employed as her agent. Where the property can
be identified as belonging to the separate estate of the wife,
or where the income can be traced to the property, a court
of equity will recognize and enforce her rights as the equitable
owner.1 Even where the living of the husband comes from
the wife's estate, as managed by him, this circumstance gives
him no title to it, and constitutes no basis for any claim on
the property by his creditors.2 In the leading case of Knapp
v. Smith, before the New York Court of Appeals, this doc-
trine was settled. It was held that a married woman hav-
ing obtained a separate estate under the statute, she could
manage it by the agency of her husband, or of any other
Barb. 352 ; Ellis v. Woods, 9 Rich, cantile business conducted by the
Eq. 19 husband in her name, when the
1 Ryder v. Hulse, 33 Barb. 264 ; capital is furnished by her, and he
S. c, 24 N". Y. 372. has no interest but that of a mere
2 Teller v. Bishop, 8 Minn. 226; agent. The application of an in-
Kirkpatrick v. Beauford, 21 Ark. definite portion of the income to
268; Jennings v. Davis, 31 Ark. the support of the husband does
268 ; Knapp v. Smith, 27 N". Y. 277 ; not impair the title of the wife to
Hutchins v. Colby, 43 N. H. 139. her property. JSTo interest in her
Under existing statutes a married separate estate is acquired, either
woman may manage her separate by the husband or his creditors,
property through the agency of through his voluntary services as
her husband, without subjecting it her managing agent. Buckley v.
to the claims of his creditors. She Wells, 33 1ST. Y. 518.
is entitled to the profits of a mer-
688
MARRIED WOMEN.
[§ 297.
person, and hold the profits and increase to her separate
use.1 The wife may give her husband a power of attorney
to execute a deed of her real estate in her name, or to em-
ploy other agents or attorneys in her name to act in relation
to her separate property under the statute.2 She may em-
ploy her husband to bring a suit in her name where dam-
ages to her property have been sustained.3 Where a hus-
band signs a note as the agent of his wife, he will not be
personally held, even though the wife may be or become
insolvent, but the case will be subject to the rule which
determines the relation of principal and agent.4 Where
the husband lives with his wife on her estate, cultivates the
soil and makes improvements, though without any particular
contract with her in regard to the matter, his work will not
give either to him or to his creditors any interest in the
land, or in the products or the improvements that he
has made. The title of the wife will be in no manner
affected by it.5 But where a woman, employing her hus-
1 Knapp v. Smith, 27 N. Y. 277;
Buckley v. Wells, 33 N. Y. 518.
A party who credits the husb*aud
individually may charge the wife
on discovering his agency. Miller
v. Watt, 70 Ga. 385. Where the
husband knowingly leased the
wife's real estate for the unlawful
sale of liquor, it was held that the
State had a lien thereon for the fines
imposed on the seller. Harden v.
State, 32 Kan. 637. If a wife avails
herself of the result of her hus-
band's fraud, while acting as agent
in reference to her separate prop-
erty, she is liable therefor as
though unmarried. Kush v. Dilks,
43 Hun, 282. A general power to
manage her separate estate does
not authorize the husband to bind
her by drawing bills of exchange,
the power to draw which must be
expressed. Folger v. Peterkin, 39
La. Ann. 815.
2 Weisbrod v. Chicago, etc. K. R.
Co., 18 Wis. 35; Peck v. Hender-
schott, 14 Iowa, 40; Southard v.
Plummer, 36 Me. 64.
3 Woodman v. Neal, 48 Me. 266.
4 Taylor v. Shelton, 30 Conn.
122.
5 Betts v. Betts, 18 Ala. 787; Mc-
Intire v. Knowlton, 6 Allen, 565;
Hodges v. Cobb, 8 Rich. 50; John-
son v. Vaill, 1 McCart. 423; Wil-
kinson v. Wilkinson, 1 Head, 305 ;
Allen v. Hightower, 21 Ark. 316;
Welston v. Hildreth, 39 Vt. 457;
Lewis v. Johns, 24 Cal. 98; Cheu-
vete v. Mason, 4 Green (Iowa), 231
White v. Hildreth, 32 Vt. 465
Colman v. Satterfield, 2 Head, 259
Goss v. Cahill, 42 Barb. 216; Rob-
inson v. Huffman, 15 B. Mon. 80;
Jenney v. Gray, 5 Ohio St. 45;
Brown v. Thompson, 31 S. Car.
436 ; Baxter v. Maxwell, 115 Pa. St.
469 ; Hickey v. Thompson, 52 Ark.
234; Wolf v. Duvall (1890) (Ark.),
13 S. W. Rep. 728; Heustis v. Ken-
§ 298.]
MARRIED WOMEN.
689
band as her agent, deliberately permits him to control the
property as his own, and to mix it with property which he,
in fact, owns, in such a manner that it cannot be identified
and separated from his own property, she loses her right
in it, and in relation to the husband's creditors it will be
treated as his property.1 In such cases the wife will be en-
titled to the share of the property which equitably belongs
to her. Her remedy will be in equity as a creditor. As
such she will be treated as a preferred creditor and as en-
titled to the money which she has put into the business,
with interest.2
§ 298. Liability for Contracts and for Debts. — At law
the contracts of a feme covert are void. She cannot assume
nedy, 23 111. App. 42 ; Arnett v.
Glenn, 52 Ark. 253; Wallace v.
Monroe, 22 111. App. 602; Wads-
worth v. Hodge, 88 Ala. 500; Por-
ter v. Staten, 64 Miss. 421 ; Harnb-
let v. Steen, 65 Miss. 474. It is now
well settled that a married woman
may purchase property and carry
on business on her separate ac-
count, through her husband as her
agent. The fact that the services
of the husband are given without
compensation, other than his sup-
port, which she provides out of the
income of the business, does not
impair her title to the property, or
give his creditors any interest in
the profits. The property of a
debtor belongs to his creditors,
but his time, talents and industry
are at his own disposal, and his
creditors have no claims thereto.
Whether the business is, in fact,
the wife's, and the husband merely
her agent, or the agency a mere
cover for the husband's business
to keep his property from his cred-
itors, there being evidence, how-
ever slight, tending to each con-
clusion is a question of fact to be
submitted to the jury. Abbey v.
44
Deyo, 44 N. Y. 343. A husband,
when acting as agent for his wife,
has no authority, merely by virtue
of his appointment as agent,
whether the agency be general or
special, to receive in payment of a
debt due to her real estate and take
the conveyance to himself individ-
ually, instead of to his wife ; nor
is the wife's debtor justified in ac-
cepting the bare word of the hus-
band that his wife has authorized
him to do so. Unless she has in
fact given such authority, a con-
veyance of the debtor to the hus-
band will constitute the husband a
trustee for the debtor, to hold or
dispose of the title, but will
neither discharge the debt nor
constitute him a trustee for the
creditor, unless the latter, with a
knowledge of the facts, shall ratify
the transaction. Williams v. Rob-
erts (1893), 92 Ga. 29; s. c, 18 S.
E. Rep. 515.
1 Kelly v. Drew, 12 Allen, 107
Gr.oss v. Reddig, 45 Pa. St. 406
Glover v. Alcott, 11 Mich. 407
Gardner v. Gardner, 1 Gif. 126.
2 Gliddan v. Taylor, 16 Ohio St
509.
690 MARRIED WOMEN. [§ 298.
pecuniary responsibility, or make her property liable for
any contract that she may make in regard to it. And from
her personal disability in this regard equity has not relieved
her. But the doctrine of equity that, though a married
woman cannot make herself personally liable, she may sub-
ject her separate estate to a liability for her contracts re-
lating to it, is well established. The doctrine of the En-
glish courts is stated by Lord Justice Turner in the leading
case of Johnson v. Gallagher, as follows: "Before enter-
ing into the facts of the case, it may be as well to consider
the nature and extent of the rights and remedies of such
creditors, as established by the decisions of the courts of
equity, or by conclusions which may be fairly drawn from
those decisions. It is to be observed in the first place that
the separate estate, against which these rights and reme-
dies exist and are to be enforced, is the creature of courts
of equitj', and that the rights and remedies themselves,
therefore, can exist and be enforced in those courts only.
The courts of law recognize in married women no separate
existence, no power to contract, and, except for some col-
lateral and incidental purposes, no possession or enjoyment
of property separate and apart from their husbands. They
deny to married women both the power to contract and the
power to enjoy. Courts of equhy , on the other hand, have,
through the medium of trusts, created for married women
rights and interests in property, both real and personal,
separate from and independent of their husbands. To the
extent of the rights and interests thus created, whether ab-
solute or limited, a married woman has, in courts of equity,
power to alienate, to contract, and to enjoy ; in fact, to use
the language of all the cases from the earliest to the latest, she
is considered in a court of equity as a feme sole in respect
of property thus settled or secured to her separate use. It
is from this position of married women, and from the rights
and powers incident to it, that the claims of creditors
against separate estates of married women have arisen."1
1 Johnson v. Gallagher, 3 De G., in Murray v. Barlee, 3 Myl. & K.
F. & J. 494, 509. Lord Brougham 220, 222, observes: "That at law
§ 298. j
MARRIED WOMEN.
691
In the same opinion, his Lordship quotes with approval
the following statement of the doctrine by Lord Lang-
dale, in Tullett v. Armstrong: "It is perfectly clear
that where a woman has property settled to her separate
use, she may bind that property without distinctly stating
a. feme covert cannot in any way be
sued even for necessaries, is cer-
tain. Bind herself or her husband,
by specialty she cannot; and, al-
though living with him, and not
allowed necessaries, or apart from
him, whether on an insufficient al-
lowance or an unpaid allowance,
she may so far bind him that those
who furnish her with articles of
subsistence may sue him, yet
even in respect of these she her-
self is free from all suit. This is
her position of disability, or im-
munity at law; and this is now
clearly settled. Her separate exist-
ence is not contemplated; it is
merged by the coverture in that of
her husband, and she is no more
recognized than is the cestui que
trust or the mortgagor, the legal
estate, which is the only interest
the law recognizes, being in others.
But in equity the case* is wholly
different. Her separate existence,
both as, regards her liabilities and
her rights, is here abundantly ac-
knowledged; not indeed that her
person can be made liable, but her
property may, and it may be
reached through a suit instituted
against herself and trustees. It
may be added that the current of
decision has generally run in favor
of such recognition. The princi-
ple has been supposed to be car-
ried further in Hulme v. Tenant,
than it had even been before, be-
cause there a bond, in which the
husband and wife joined, and
which, indeed, so far as the obliga-
tion of the wife was concerned, was
absolutely void at law, was allowed
to charge the wife's estate vested
in trustees to her separate use,
though such estate could only be
reached by implication; and
though, till then, the better opin-
ion seemed to be that the wife
could only bind her separate es-
tate by a direct charge upon it.
Lord Eldon repeatedly expressed
his doubts as to this case; but it
has been constantly acted upon by
other judges, and never in decis-
ion departed from by himself."
"At common law, for reasons of
high social policy, a married woman
is not allowed to make any contract
binding upon herself or upon any
property of hers; in fact the com-
mon law did not recognize that she
had any property or could do any
act binding herself. It seems to
me, after having read the cases re-
ferred to and listened to the argu-
ments, that it is not true to say that
equity has recognized or invented
a status of a married woman to
make contracts; neither does it
seem to me that equity has ever
said that what is now called a con-
tract is a binding contract upon a
married woman. What equity
seems to me to have done is this, it
has recognized a settlement as
putting a married woman into the
position of having what is called a
separate estate, and has attached
certain liabilities not to her but to
that estate. The decisions appear
to me to come to this, that certain
promises (I use the word 'prom-
ises' in order to show that in my
692
MARRIED WOMEN.
[§ 298.
that she intends to do so. She may enter into a bond, bill,
promissory note, or other obligation, which, considering
her state as a married woman, could only be satisfied by
means of her separate estate, and therefore the inference is
conclusive that there was an intention, and a clear one, on
her part, that her separate estate, which would be the only
means of satisfying the obligation into which she had en-
tered, should be bound. Again, I apprehend it to be clear
that where a married woman, having separate estate, but
not knowing perfectly the nature of her interest, executes
an instrument by which she plainly shows an intention to
bind the interest, which belongs,, to her, then, though she
may make a mistake as to the extent of the estate vested in
her, the law will say that such estate as she may have shall
opinion they are not contract?)
made by a married woman, and
acted upon by the persons to whom
they are made on the faith of the
fact known to them of her being
possessed at the time of a separate
estate, will be enforced against such
separate estate as she was possessed
of at the time, or so much of it as
remains at the time of judgment
recovered, whether such judgment
be recovered during or after the
cessation of the coverture. That
proposition, so stated, does not ap-
ply to separate estate coming into
existence after the promise which
it is sought to enforce." Pike v.
Fitzgibbon, L. K. 17 Ch. D. 454,
461. "Now by the Married "Wo-
men's Property Act, 1882, sec. 1,
sub-sec. (3), every contract en-
tered into by a married woman
shall be deemed to be a contract
entered into by her with respect to,
and to bind her separate property,
unless the contrary be shown ; and
by sub-sec. (4), every contract
entered Into by a married woman
with respect to and to bind her
separate property, shall bind, not
only the separate property which
she is possessed of or entitled to at
the date of the contract, but also,
all separate property which she
may thereafter acquire. But the
contract will not affect property as
to which there is a restraint on
anticipation. It is conceived that
if a married woman enters into a
contract and her husband dies, and
she after his death acquires prop-
erty, such* property will not be
bound by a judgment in an action
for enforcing the contract, though
instituted after the property has
been acquired." 2 Lewin on Trusts,
*762. "The doctrine (of the sep-
arate use) is now in a state of trans-
ition, and is not clearly estab-
lished in all its points, but the
modern tendency has been to es-
tablish the principle, that if you put
a married woman in the position of
a. feme sole in respect of her separate
estate, that position must be car-
ried to its full extent, short of mak-
ing her personally liable." Kin-
dersley, V. C, in Wright v. Chard,
4 Drew. 673.
§ 299.] MARRIED WOMEN. 693
be bound by her own act. But in a case where she enters
into no bond, contract, covenant, or obligation, and in no
way contracts to do any act on her part where the instru-
ment which she executes does not purport to bind or to pass
anything whatever that belongs to her, and where it must
consequently be left to mere inference, whether she in-
tended to affect her estate in any manner or way whatever,
the case is entirely different, either from the case where
she executes a bond, promissory note, or other instrument,
or where she enters into a covenant, or obligation, by which
she, being a married woman, can be considered as binding
her separate estate."1
§ 299. The Subject Continued. — It was at one time
held that the contract of a married woman was to be re-
garded as her power of appointment, and that it created
an equitable charge or lien upon her separate estate. But
the doctrine is now regarded as altogether untenable. It
is now well established that the liability of a wife's sepa-
rate property for her engagements is to be regarded as
simply an incident of her equitable estate. Her liability
is an equitable remedy for an equitable right. The rule
is stated by Lord Chancellor Cottenham, as follows : "The
view of the matter taken by Lord Thurlow, in Hulme v.
Tenant, is more correct. According to that view, the separate
property of a married woman being a creature of equity,
it follows that, if she has a power to deal with it, she has
1 Tullett v. Armstrong, 4 Beav. Turvill, 2 P. Wins. 144 ; Peacock v.
319. Where an annuity granted by Monk, 2 Ves. 193 ; as to a bill of
a covert and charged upon her sep- exchange, Stuart v. Lord Kirkwall,
arate estate, had been set aside as 3 Madd. 387; Owen v. Homan, 4 H.
void for want of compliance with L. Cas. 997; as to a promissory
the annuity acts, it was held that note, Bullpin v. Clark, 17 Ves.365;
the separate estate was not liable Field v. Sowle, 4 Russ. 112 ; an
to repay the consideration money, agreement to take a house for a
Jones v. Harris, 9 Ves. 486 ; Agui- term of years, Gaston v. Frankum,
lar v. Aguilar, 5 Mad. 414 ; Bolton De G. & 8m. 561 ; s. C, 16 Jur. 507 ;
v Williams, 4 Bro. Ch. 297; s. c, on letters giving instructions for
2 Ves. Jr. 138. See also as to her the employment of a solicitor, Mur-
liability on her bond : Lillia v. ray v. Barlee, 3 Myl. & K. 210.
Airey, 1 Ves. Jr. 277; Korton v.
694:
MARRIED WOMEN.
[§ 299.
the other power incident to property in general, namely,
the power of contracting debts to be paid out of it, and
inasmuch as her creditors have not the means at law of
compelling payment of those debts, a court of equity takes
upon itself to give effect to them, not as personal liabili-
ties, but by laying hold of the separate property as the
only means by which they can be satisfied."1 In a leading
case Lord Romilly, M. R., states the doctrine as follows:
"The principle of the courts of equity relating to this
1 Owens v. Dickinson, 1 Cr. & P.
48,54. "Now these considerations
are important, because it was part
of the argument, that a married
woman, although she can enter into
a species of contract and bind her-
self by a promissory note (for that
was the case put), yet that sbe can-
not be considered as having credi-
tors ; and, therefore, when she makes
her will and directs that her debts
are to be paid, that part of the will
cannot be carried into effect. But
all the cases suppose she can have
creditors. The holder of her prom-
issory note has her contract, which
equity considers her capable of en-
tering into, and it would be a very
strong proposition to say that when
she has by an instrument under her
hand acknowledged her debt and
promised to pay it, she is not to be
considered as creating an obliga-
tion which binds her. There is,
however, no ground for supporting
such a proposition, and it would be
interfering very much with the
rights which this court considers
are attached to the property of a
married woman to put such a con-
struction on her contract." Ibid.
See also Stuart v. Lord Kirkwall, 3
Hadd. 387; Gardner v. Gardner, 22
Wend. 526; London, etc. Bank v.
Lempriere, L. B.4 P. C. 572; But-
ter v. Cumpston, L. B. 7 Eq. 16;
Picard v. Hine, L. B. 5 Ch. App.
274. Lord Cottenham in Owens v.
Dickinson, supra, likewise observes i
'•Besides as it was argued in the
case of Murray v. Barlee, if a mar-
ried woman enters into severaL
agreements of this sort, and all the
parties come to have satisfaction
out of her separate estate, they are
paid pari passu; whereas if the in-
struments took effect as appoint-
ments under a power, they would
rank according to the priorities of
their dates. It is quite clear, there-
fore, that there is nothing in such a
transaction which has any resem-
blance to the execution of a power.
What it is, it is not easy to define.
It has sometimes been treated as a
disposing of the particular estate ;
but the contract is silent as to the
separate estate, for a promissory
note is merely a contract to pay,
not saying out of what it is to be
paid, or by what means it is to be
paid, and it is not correct accord-
ing to legal principles to say that a
contract to pay is to be construed
into a contract to pay out of a par-
ticular property so as to constitute
a lien on that property. Equity
lays hold of the separate property,
but not by virtue of anything ex-
pressed in the contract, and it is not
very consistent with correct prin-
ciples to add to the contract that
which the party has not thought fit
to introduce into it."
§ 299.] MARRIED AVOMEN. 695
subject, in my opinion, is, that, as regards her separate
estate, a married woman is &feme sole and can act as such;
but only so far as is consistent with the other principle,
namely, that a married woman cannot enter into a
contract. These principles are reconciled in this way :
equity attaches to the separate estate of the married
woman a quality incidental to that property, viz., a capacity
of being disposed of by her ; in other words, it gives her
a power of dealing with that property as she may think
fit ; but the power of disposition is confined to that prop-
erty, and the property must be the subject-matter that
she deals with; and, therefore, if she makes a contract,
the contract is nothing unless it has reference, directly or
indirectly, to that property. This is, in my opinion, the
extent of the doctrine of equity relating to the separate
estate of a married woman. It is on this principle that
every bond, promissory note and promise to pay, given by
a married woman has, for the reason I have already stated,
been held to be a charge made by her on her separate
estate; that is to say, it is a disposal of so much of her
property, the whole of which, if she pleased, she might
give away. But if equity goes beyond this, it appears to
me that it is laying down this principle that where a married
woman has sejDarate estate she may bind herself by con-
tract, exactly as if a feme sole; or, in other words, that
the possession of separate property takes away the dis-
tinction between a feme covert and a, feme sole, and makes
them equally capable to contract debts."1
1 Shattock v. Shattock, L. E. 2 feme covert being incapable of con-
Eq. 182, 188. "The result is that, tract, this court cannot subject her
in my opinion, the rule is, that the separate property to general de-
liability of the separate estate of a mands. But that as incident to
married woman is only created by the power of enjoyment of separate
something which operates as a property, she has a power to ap-
specific charge upon it, and that point it, and that this court will
this charge can be produced only consider a security, executed by
by an intention on the part of the her as an appointment pro tanto of
married woman to create such a her separate estate.' The only
charge. I adopt the expression of alteration I would wish to make in
Sir John Leads, in Stuart v. Kirk- this passage is, to strike out the
well, 3 Madd. 387, viz. : 'That a words 'appoint' and 'appointment'
696
MAEEIED WOMEN.
[§ 300.
§ 300. Limitations of Her Liability. — While equity
enforces the contract of a married woman against her
separate estate her liability may be limited by the restraint
upon anticipation, or upon alienation. Where such
restraint has been imposed by the instrument of settle-
ment or of conveyance, to that extent it will limit the
liability of her estate for her debts, or contracts. More-
over, her liability for her contracts attaches only to the
property which she had at the time at which the contract
was made, or at which the judgment was rendered that
was free from restraint. It will not attach to property
acquired subsequent to the time of entering into the en-
gagement.1 Where the separate estate of the wife consists
and put in 'dispose of and 'dis-
posal,' because it is clear it is not
an appointment; it is not intended
as an appointment in any respect.
It is quite certain it is not the ex-
ecution of a power, and there is a
constant discussion in the cases as
to what it is. It is nothing more
than this, that the married woman
has certain property, over which
she has exactly the same power of
disposition as if she were a feme sole,
and, therefore, she may dispose of
that property as she pleases; she
does not 'appoint' it in the proper
sense of the word; 'assign' would
he much nearer; but it is in point
of fact nothing more than a dispo-
sition. She disposes of the prop-
erty, and equity enforces that."
Ibid. 193.
*Pike v. Fitzgibbon, L. R. 17
Ch. D. 454, 459, 462, 463; overrul-
ing s. c, L. R. 14 Ch. D. 837;
In re Sykes' Trusts, 2 Johns. & H.
415; Roberts v. Watkins, 46 L. J.
Q. B. 552. In these States where
the separate estate itself is re-
garded as a restraint upon alien-
ation, and the wife can only dis-
pose of it when and in the manner
set forth in the instrument creating
it, it should likewise follow that
her separate property is only lia-
ble for her contracts when and to
the extent affirmatively provided in
the instrument. See also Crockett v.
Doriot, 85 Va. 240. Under the pro-
visions of a deed that the grantee
shall hold the land conveyed in trust
for a married woman during cover-
ture, and will, if requested by her in
writing during coverture, convey
the same as she shall direct, the
property can, during coverture, be
conveyed only as provided by the
deed ; and a deed executed by the
woman and her husband alone is
of no effect. Broughton v. Lane
(1893), 113 N". Car. 16; s. c., 18
S. E. Rep. 85. "That the power
of a married woman to dispose of
land held by her under a deed of
settlement is 'not absolute, but lim-
ited to the mode and manner,
pointed out in the instrument'
seems to be the settled law of this
State, whatever may be the rulings
of other courts. * * The feme
covert E B was 'not only subject to
express restrictions of the settle-
ment as to the manner of exercis-
ing such power as was granted to
her, but she was dependent upon a
§ 300.]
MARRIED WOMEN.
697
of a life interest only, with power of appointment over
the corpus, either by, deed or by will, it will be liable to
her debts as really as where her interest is absolute.1 So
far as the wife's separate estate consists of personalty it
will be subject to the decree of the court. In the earlier
cases, where the property consisted of lands, the rents and
profits only were subject to the decree of the court, unless
the claim was a specialty, and in England this is still the
rule.2 It is well established that in order to bind the
separate estate, the contract must be made on the credit
of it. But in England the intention to contract on the
credit of the separate estate will be inferred from the
nature and form of the engagement. This rule applies to
all written contracts. A written engagement in the ordi-
nary form, without making any reference to her separate
property, will be enforced against it.3 By the most recent
decisions her liability, or the liability of her separate
strict construction of its terms for
authority to make any disposition
whatever of the property embraced
in it." Ibid. See also following
Xorth Carolina cases : Hardy v.
Holly, 84 ST. Car. 661 ; Kemp v.
Kemp, 85 X. Car. 491; Mayo v.
Farrar, 112 X. Car. 66 ; Monroe v.
Trenholm, 112 X. Car. 634.
1 London Chartered Bank of Aus-
tralia v. Lempriere, L. B. 4 P. C.
572; Godfrey v. Harben, L. B. 13
Ch. D. 216; Hughes v. Wells, 9
Hare, 749 ; Mayd v. Field, L. K. 3
Ch. D. 587. If the power author-
ized an appointment by will only,
then the disposition cannot take
effect until after her death. Brad-
ley v. Wescott, 13 Ves. 445, 451 ;
Eeid v. Shergold, 10 Ves. 370, 380;
Anderson v. Dawson, 15 Ves. 532 ;
Heatley v. Thomas, 15 Ves. 596;
Eichards v. Chambers, 10 Ves. 580 ;
Sockett v. Wray, 4 Bro. Ch. 4S3;
Lee v. Muggeridge, 1 Ves. & B.
118; Xoble v. Willock, L. K. 8 Ch.
778; Bishop v. Wall, L. B. 3 Ch.
D. 194.
2 Hulme v. Tenant, 1 Bro. Ch. 16 ;
Francis v. Wigzell, 1 Madd. 145 ;
Aylett v. Ashton, 1 Myl. & Cr. 105,
112 ; Frank v. Lillienthal, 33 Gratt.
377 ; Kadf ord v. Carwile, 13 W. Va.
572.
8 Hulme y. Tenant, 1 Bro. Ch. 16 ;
Heatley v. Thomas, 15 Ves. 596;
Pike v. Fitzgibbon, L. K. 17 Ch. D.
454 ; Bullpin v. Clarke, 17 Ves. 365 ;
Stuart v. Lord Kirkwall, 3 Madd.
387; Field v. Sowle, 4 Buss. 112;
Vandergucht v. De Blaquiere, 5
Myl. & Cr. 229 ; Owen v. Homan,
4 H. L. Cas. 997; McHenry v.
Davies, L. K. 10 Eq. 88; Davis v.
Jenkins, L. K. 6 Ch. D. 728 ; Master
v. Fuller, 4 Bro. Ch. 19; s.c.,lVes.
513 ; Owens v. Dickinson, 1 Cr. & P.
48; Murray v. Barlee, 3 Myl. & K.
209; Picard v. Hine, L. It. 5 Ch.
274; Morrell v. Cowan, L. K. 6 Ch.
D. 166.
698 MARRIED WOMEN. [§ 301,
estate, is extended to her ordinary verbal agreements, and
even to her implied promises, if it is plain that they were
made on the credit of her separate estate, and where the
question is raised it is to be settled by a consideration of
all the attending circumstances. Where she has no
other means at the time out of which payment could be
made, the intention to contract on the credit of her sepa-
rate estate will be presumed by the court.1
§ 301. The Doctrine as Modified in this Country. — In
a general sense the doctrine of equity relating to a wife's
separate estate established by the English courts has been
accepted in America. It is operative in those States in
which cases of this character are subject to the system of
equity jurisprudence. In some of the States, however,
there has been a very material modification of the English
rule. In Massachusetts it has been held that a married
woman's debts will be enforced in equity against her sepa-
rate estate, or its income, to the extent to which her power
of disposal may go, where they are expressly charged upon
the separate estate, or expressly contracted upon its credit,
or where the consideration goes to its benefit or to enhance
its value.2 In his opinion in this case, Mr. Justice Hoar
1 Johnson v. Gallagher, 3 De G., v. Cruger, 5 Barb. 227; Clapp v.
F. & J. 494; Mrs. Matthewson's Ingraham, 126 Mass. 204; Phoenix
Case, L. B. 9 Eq. 781; Shattock v. Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 127 Mass. 561;
Shattook, L. E. 2 Eq. 182; Butler Kantrowitz v. Prather, 31 Ind. 98;
v. Cumpston, L. B. 7 Eq. 16; Patrick v. Littell, 36 Ohio St. 84;
Wainford v. Heyl, L.B. 20 Eq.321, Williams v. Hugunin, 69 111. 220;
324; Pieard v. Hine, L. E. 5 Ch. Bogers v. Ward, 8 Allen, 388; Heb-
274, 277; Maydv.Field, L.B.3 Ch. urn v. Warner, 112 Mass. 276;
D. 587; Hodgson v. Williamson, Burch v. Breckenridge, 16 B. Mon.
L. B. 15 Ch. D. 87. 482; s. c, 63 Am. Dec. 553; Baker
2 Willard v. Eastham, 15 Gray, v. Gregory, 22 Ala. 544; s. C, 65
328; s. c, 77 Am. Dec. 366. See Am. Dec. 366; Cashman v. Henry,
alsoHulme v. Tenant, 1 Bro. Ch. 5 Abb. N. C. 234; s. C, 44 N". Y.
16; Jaques v. M. E. Church, 17 Super. Ct. 101, note; 71 N. Y.
Johns. 548; s. c, 8 Am. Dec. 447; 108; Cookley v. Chamberlain, 8
Dyett v. ."N". A. Coal Co., 20 Wend. Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 437; s. c, 38 How.
570; S. C, 32 Am. Dec. 598; Gard- Pr. 488, 489; 1 Sweeney, 682, 683;
nerv. Gardner, 7 Paige, 112; Curtis Ledlie v. Vrooman, 41 Barb. 112;
v. Engle, 2 Sandf . Ch. 287 ; Knowles Pelen v. Lent, 5 Bosw. 715 ; Lewis
v. McCamly, 10 Paige, 343; Cruger v. Woods, 4 Daly, 243; Francis v.
§ 301.]
MARRIED WOMEN.
699
said: "The rule adopted by most of the courts of the
United States has been materially different from that es-
tablished in England ; and the general current of American
authorities supports the principle that a married woman
Boss, 17 How. Pr. 564; Ballin v.
Dillaye, 35 How. Pr. 219 ; Conlin
y. Cantrell, 51 How. Pr. 313; Pas-
saic N. Bk. v. Waddell, 1 Hun, 128 ;
Williamson v. Dodge, 5 Hun, 498 ;
Grossman v. Cruger, 7 Hun, 60;
Nash v. Mitchell, 8 Hun, 473;
Woolsey v. Brown, 11 Hun, 54;
Shorter v. Nelson, 4 Lans. 117;
Frecking v. Holland, 33 N. Y. Su-
per. Ct. 501 ; Hoffman v. Treadwell,
39 N. Y. Super. Ct. 1S8 ; Hallock v.
De Minn, 2 Thomp. & C. 351 ; Ba-
ker v. Harder, 6 Thomp. & C. 442;
Owen v. Cawley, 36 N. Y. 604 ; Sal-
mon v. McEnany, 23 Hun, 89;
Terry v. Hammonds, 47 Cal. 35, 30 ;
Burchard v. Dunbar, S2 111. 453,
454; Major v. Symmes, 19 Ind. 121 ;
Deering v. Boyle, 8 Kan. 527 ;
Heath v. Van Cott, 9 Wis. 52.") ; Todd
v. Lee, 15 Wis. 369, 378; Krouskop
v. Shontz, 51 Wis. 209 ; In re How-
land, 2 Nat. Bk. Peg. 114; Orange
Nat'l Bank v. Traver, 7 Fed. Kep.
150; Stephen v. Beall, 22 Wall. 338;
Yalev. Dederer, 18N.Y. 265; s.c,
72 Am. Dec. 503; 22 N. Y. 450;
68 N. Y. 329. "Courts of eq-
uity, however, as a consequence
of the doctrine established by them
that a married woman may have
and enjoy separate estate, enable
her to deal with it, and to alien or
incumber it, but that intention
must be manifested by her, other-
wise her separate estate will not
be held liable. Its liability for her
debts does not arise out of their
creation merely, but out of an
agreement by her either express or
implied, that it shall be liable for
their payment. It has been held by
this court, that the execution by a
feme covert of a bond or a promis-
sory note, or the indorsement by
her of a bill of exchange, should be
regarded as a sufficient indication
of her intention to charge her sep-
arate property with the payment
of the debt. In such cases, although
no reference be made to her sepa-
rate estate, the execution of the se-
curity is deemed to be an implied
agreement on her part that it shall
be liable for the demand. The ex-
tent to which her separate property
may be subjected to the demands
of creditors claiming under parol
agreement has not been determined
by this court. So far as the sepa-
rate property consists of land, it
cannot be made liable by a verbal
contract. * * But with respect
to her other separate property, con-
sisting of personalty and slaves,
where she has verbally agreed that
part of it shall be appropriated to
the payment of a debt, which she
is about to create, there seems to
be no good reason why this agree-
ment should not be regarded as
constituting a charge upon it.
Where, however, a verbal agree-
ment is made without any refer-
ence to her separate estate, then it
will not be bound, unless the cir-
cumstances are sufficient to prove
that, in fact, the understanding be-
tween her and the person with
whom she has contracted was that
it should be liable. But where there
is no express agreement, and one
arises only by implication, a court
of equity will not allow such im-
plied agreement to extend to any
700 MARRIED WQMEN, [§ 301.
has no power in relation to her separate estate, but such as
is expressly conferred in the creation of the estate ; and
that her separate estate is not chargeable with her debts or
obligations, unless where a provision for that purpose is
contained in the instrument creating the separate estate.
The decisions in the State of New York approximate more
nearly to the English rule, but with some important quali-
fications. The courts of chancery have there held that a
feme covert, with respect to her separate estate, is so far to
be regarded as a feme sole that she may dispose of it
without the consent of her trustee, unless she is specially
restrained by the instrument under which she acquires it;
that if she enters into an agreement, and sufficiently indi-
cates her intention to affect by it her separate estate, a
court of equity will apply it to the satisfaction of such an
engagement; but that her general personal engagement
will not of itself affect her separate property ; and, there-
fore, where creditors do not claim under any charge or
appointment made in pursuance of the instrument of set-
tlement, they must show that the debt was contracted either
for the benefit of her separate estate or for her own bene-
fit, upon the credit of the separate estate; and that such
estate is not to be charged upon any implied undertaking."1
In closing the opinion the court said: "And we think,
upon mature and full consideration, that the whole doctrine
of the liability of her separate estate to discharge her
general engagements rests upon grounds which are arti-
ficial, and which depend upon implications too subtle and
refined. The true limitations upon the authority of a
except that part of the estate dispose of or charge it with debts,
which, it may be inferred from the to all intents and purposes as a
circumstances, the wife intended to feme sole, except in so far as she
charge with the payment of the may be expressly limited in her
debt." Burch v. Breckenridge, 16 powers by the instrument under
B. Mon. 482; s. c, 63 Am. Dec. which she takes her interest."
553. "Where the wife"s separate Dyett v. North Am. Coal Co., 20
estate is completely distinct, and Wend. 570, 573
as here, independent of her bus- ' Willard v. Eastham, 15 Gray,
band, she seems to be regarded in 328, 332.
equity, as respects her power to
§ 302.] MARRIED WOMEN. 701
court of equity in relation to the subject are stated with
great clearness and precision in the elaborate and well-
reasoned opinion of the Court of Appeals in New York,
in the case of Yale v. Dederer : And our conclusion is that
where, by the contract, the debt is made expressly a charge
upon the separate estate, or is expressly contracted upon
its credit, or where the consideration goes to the benefit of
such estate, or to enhance its value, then equity will decree
that it shall be paid from such estate, or its income, to the
extent to which the power of disposal by the married
woman may go. But where she is a mere surety, or makes
the contract for the accommodation of another without
consideration received by her, the contract being void at
law, equity will not enforce it against her estate unless an
express instrument makes the debt a charge upon it."1
§ 302. The Subject Continued. — In the leading case
of Jaques v. The Methodist Episcopal Church, before the
New York Court of Errors, Chief Justice Spencer affirmed
that it was fully established by the decisions "that a feme
covert, with respect to her separate estate, is to be regarded
in a court of equity as a. feme sole, and may dispose of her
property without the consent or concurrence of her trustee,
unless she is specially restrained by the instrument under
which she acquires her separate estate;" and "that the
established rule in equity is, that where a feme covert, hav-
ing separate property, enters into an agreement and suf-
ficiently indicates her intention to affect by it her separate
estate, a court of equity will apply it to the satisfaction of
such an engagement."2 In the same case Mr. Justice Piatt
gave the rule as follows: "A feme covert having a sepa-
rate estate is to be regarded as a, feme sole as to her right
of contracting for and disposing of it. The jus dispo-
nendi is incident to her separate property, and follows, of
course, by implication. She may give it to whom she
pleases, or charge it with the debts of her husband, pro-
1 Willard v. Eastham, 15 Gray, 2 Jaques v. Methodist Episcopal
328, 332. Church, 17 Johns. 548, 578.
702 MARRIED WOMEN. [§ 303.
vided no undue influence be exerted over her ; and her dis-
position of it will be sanctioned and enforced by a court
of equity without the assent of her trustee, unless that
assent be expressly made necessary by the instrument cre-
ating the trust. And the specification of any particular
mode of exercising her disposing power does not deprive
her of any other mode of using that right, not expressly
or by necessary construction negatived in the devise or
deed of settlement."1 It is now well established that
where the wife's property, whether real or personal, is
made her legal or equitable separate estate by statute, and
the statute does not provide that her contracts shall con-
stitute personal liability to be enforced by ordinary legal
actions, her contracts will be enforced in equity against her
legal separate estate in the same manner as against her equi-
table separate estate.2
§ 303. Application of the American Doctrine. — On
this point there is much diversit}' of opinion and some di-
vergence in the decisions. In that class of States of which
New York is an example, where an express trust is created
for the benefit of the wife, the beneficiary taking no estate
has no power of disposition. Where this rule is operative
she cannot charge her interest by any contract, however
express or positive.3 With reference to the application of
this doctrine the States of this country may be divided into
three classes. In the first, the English doctrine in regard
to the wife's power of alienation, in its main features, is
accepted. In these States the intention to contract on the
faith and credit of the separate estate, and in consequence
to render it liable, must clearly and positively appear. It
will not be presumed by the court from the form of the en-
gagement. Under this rule the separate estate is liable for
1 Jaques v. Methodist Episcopal Y. 329 ; Ogden v. Guice, 56 Miss.
Church, 17 Johns. 548, 5S5. 330; Levi v. Earl, 30 Ohio St. 147.
2 Colvin v. Currier, 22 Barb. 371 ; 3 Noyes v. Blakeman, 6 N. Y.
Yalev. Dederer, 18 N. Y.265;s.c, 567; s. C., 3 Sandf . 531; Bramhall
72 Am. Dec. 503; 22 N. Y. v. Ferris, 14 ST. Y. 41; s. C, 67 Am.
450; 78 Am. Dec. 216; 68 N. Y. Dec. 113.
§ 303. J MAERIED WOMEN. 703
all the contracts of the wife made for the benefit of the
property, for her own benefit or for suretyship for the ben-
efit of another. But in each of these cases the intention
to charge the separate property must be unequivocally ex-
pressed. If the contract is in writing, the intention, to
make the estate liable, should be expressed in the instru-
ment, unless it is charged for the benefit of the property,
in which case the intention will be presumed.1 In the States
of the second class the English decisions are more closely
followed. The characteristic feature of the rule in these
States is that the intention to contract on the credit
of the separate estate need not be positivery expressed,
but will be presumed from the nature or form of
the engagement. The separate estate of the wife is liable
for all her contracts entered into with a view to the benefit
of the property, for her written contracts made for her own
benefit, including note's, bonds, bills of exchange, etc., and
it is not necessary that any intention to charge her estate
should be expressed in the instrument. In some of these
States, perhaps in most of them, the wife's contract for
suretyship must expressly charge her separate estate in
order to render it effective, and her verbal contract of a
general character must be shown in some manner to be
made on the credit of her separate estate. In general, no
intention will be presumed in regard to engagements of this
character. In the States of the third class the wife has no
power of disposition over the property of her separate es-
tate, except such as is given either expressly, or by necessary
implication, in the instrument by which it was created.
Her separate estate is liable for contracts made for the ben-
efit of the property, or for her own personal benefit, if, in
terms, the obligation assumed is made a charge upon it, or
the contract is made on the credit of it ; but it is not liable
for a contract of suretyship made entirely for the benefit
of another person. But no contract is enforceable unless.
made so by the express or implied permission of the instru-
1 Yale v. Dederer, IS N. Y. 265; 450, 456; 78 Am. Dec. 216; 68 N.
s. c, 72 Am. Dec. 503; 22 N. Y. Y. 329.
704
MARRIED WOMEN.
[§303.
ment creating the separate estate.1 As this classification
is necessarily indefinite and incomplete, some recent au-
thorities relating to the rules in force in the different States
are given in the notes.2
1 Willard v. Eastham, 15 Gray,
328; s. c, 77 Am. Dec. 366; Rog-
ers v. Ward, 8 Allen, 387 ; s. c, 85
Am. Dec. 710; Tracy v. Keith, 11
Allen, 214; Adams v. Mackey, 6
Rich. Eq. 75; James v. Mayrant, 4
Desaus. Eq. 19; s. C, 6 Am. Dec.
596 ; Magwood v. Johnson, 1 Hill
Eq. 228; Ogden v. Guice, 56 Miss.
330; McDougal v. People's Sav.
Bank, 62 Miss. 663; Robertson v.
Wilburn, 1 Lea, 633.
2 The following casesaredesigned
to present the rule in each State.
In part they relate to the wife's
equitable separate estate, and in
part to her legal separate estate.
But one rule applies to the two
classes of cases : Alabama. Kelly
v. Turner, 74 Ala. 513; Bell v.
Watkins, 82 Ala. 512; s. c, 60 Am.
Dec. 756; Pollard v. Cleveland, 43
Ala. 102; Sprague v. Tyson, 44
Ala. 338 ; Brame v. McGee, 46 Ala.
170; Jones v. Reese, 65 Ala. 134;
Miller v. Voss, 62 Ala. 122 ; Sprague
v. Shields, 61 Ala. 428 ; Lee v. Tan-
nenbaum, 62 Ala. 501; Shulman v.
Fitzpatrick, 62 Ala. 571; Short v.
Battle, 52 Ala. 456; Williams v.
Baldridge, 66 Ala. 338; Paulk v.
Wolf, 34 Ala. 541 ; Fry v. Hammer,
50 Ala. 52 ; Riley v. Pierce, 50 Ala.
93 ; Booker v. Booker, 32 Ala. 473 ;
Drake v. Glover, 30 Ala. 382; Gun-
ter v. Williams, 40 Ala. 561, 572;
Smyth v. Oliver, 31 Ala. 39; Canty
v. Sanderford, 37 Ala. 91 ; Rogers
v. Boyd, -33 Ala. 175; Peckens v.
Oliver, 29 Ala. 528; Ozley v. Ikel-
heimer, 26 Ala. 332; Bradford v.
Greenway, 17 Ala. 797; s. C, 52
Am. Dec. 203; Wilburn v. McCal-
ley, 63 Ala. 436 ; Steed v. Knowles,
79 Ala. 446; Wilkinson v. Cheat-
ham, 45 Ala. 341 ; Baker v. Greg-
ory, 28 Ala. 544 ; Collins v. Rudolf,
19 Ala. 616 ; Puryear v. Puryear,
16 Ala. 486; Burns v. Dawson, 66
Ala. 476; Hawkins v. Eoss (1893),
100 Ala. 459; S. C, 14 So. Rep. 278;
McNeill v. Davis (1895) (Ala.),
17 So. Rep. 101. By statute
of Feb. 28, 1887, Code 1886, §§ 2341,
2351, the wife may contract with
reference to her separate estate
only in writing, with the assent or
concurrence of her husband in
writing. Rooney v. Michael, 84
Ala. 585; Knox v. Childersburg
etc. Co., 86 Ala. 180. Arkansas
Dobbins v. Hubbard, 17 Alk. 196
Collins v. Underwood, 33 Ark. 265
Stilwell v. Adams, 29 Ark. 346
Collins v. Wassell, 34 Ark. 17
Roberts v. Wilcoxen, 36 Ark. 355
Ward v. Estate of Ward, 36 Ark
586; Scott v. Ward, 35 Ark. 480
Deyerv. Arnold, 37 Ark. 17; Henry
v. Blackburn, 32 Ark. 445; Sto-
well v. Grider, 48 Ark. 220; Viser
v. Bertrand, 14 Ark. 271; Oswalt
v.Moore, 19 Ark. 257; Chollar v.
Temple, 39 Ark. 238; Palmer v.
Rankins, 30 Ark. 771. California.
This State makes the wife person-
ally liable on her contracts where
she has a legal or statutory sepa-
rate estate. See Wood v. Orford,
52 Cal. 412; Parry v. Kelly, 52 Cal.
334; Marlow v. Barlew, 53 Cal.
456; Alexander v. Bouton, 55 Cal.
15; Bullv. Coe, 77 Cal. 54; s. C,
11 Am. St. Rep. 235; Goodv.Moul-
ton, 67 Cal. 537; Buckle v. Levy,
70 Cal. 250. The following authori-
§ 303.]
MAKEIED WOMEN.
705
ties are illustrative of the decisions
prior to the present statute : Drais
v. Hogan, 50 Cal. 121, 128; Fried-
burg v. Parker, 50 Cal. 103 ; Terry
v. Hammond, 47 Cal. 32; Miller v.
Newton, 23 Cal. 554; Maclay v.
Love, 23 Cal. 367. Colorado. This
State follows in the class of Cali-
fornia. Wells v. Caywood, 3 Colo.
487 ; Coon v. Eigden, 4 Colo. 275 ;
Farran v. Beshoar, 9 Colo. 291;
Hochstadter v. Hays, 11 Colo. 118.
Connecticut. Donovan's Appeal, 41
Conn. 551 ; Hitchcock v. Kiely, 41
Conn. 611 ; Gore v. Carl, 47 Conn.
291 ; Whiting v. Beckwith, 31 Conn.
596; Jennings v. Davis, 31 Conn.
134; Jackson v. Hubbard, 36 Conn.
10; Imlay v. Huntington, 20 Conn.
146, 175; Wells v. Thorman, 37
Conn. 318; Jonesv. iEtna Ins. Co.,
14 Conn. 501 ; Leavitt v. Bevine, 21
Conn. 1; Williams v. King, 43
Conn. 569; Smith v. Williams, 43
Conn. 409; Nat 'I Bank v. Smith,
43 Conn. 327 ; In re Sturdevant's
Estate (1892) (Conn.), 23 Atl.Rep.
826. Though a married woman
cannot make a contract that will
bind her personally, her separate
estate will be liable for debts con-
tracted by her on the credit of such
estate. Shelton v. Hadlock (1893),
62 Conn. 143; S. c, 25 Atl.Rep.
4S3. District of Columbia. Har-
mon v. Garland, 1 Mackey, 1 ; Mc-
Dermott v. Garland, 1 Mackey, 496.
Delaware. State v. Gorman, 4 Houst.
624; Ross v. Singleton, 1 Del.
Ch. 149; s. C, 12 Am. Dec. 86;
Nelson v. Vinson, 9 Houst. 27; s. c,
32 Atl.Rep. 225. Florida. Schna-
bel v. Betts, 23 Fla. 178 ; Thrasher
v. Doig, 18 Fla. 809 ; Caulk v. Fox,
13 Fla. 147 ; Sanderson v. Jones, 6
Fla. 430; s. c, 63 Am. Dec. 217;
Maiben v. Bobe, 6 Fla. 3S1 ; Lewis
v.Yale, 4 Fla. 418; Smith v. Poy-
thress, 2 Fla. 92; Staley v. Hamil-
ton, 19 Fla. 275; Tison v. Mattair,
45
8 Fla. 107 ; Halle v. Einstein (1895) ,
34 Fla. 589; s. c, 16 So. Rep. 554;
Seedhouse v. Broward (1895), 34
Fla. 509; s. c, 16 So. Rep. 425;
Nutt v. Codington (1894), 34 Fla.
77; s. c, 15 So. Rep. 667; Garvin
v. Watkins (1892), 29 Fla. 51; s.c.,
10 So. Rep. 818. Georgia. Dallas
v. Heard, 32 Ga. 604; Kent v.
Plumb, 57 Ga. 207 ; Humphrey t.
Copeland, 54 Ga. 543; Clark v.
Valentino, 41 Ga. 143; Huff v.
Wright, 39 Ga. 41 ; Roberts v. West,
15 Ga. 123; Cherokee Lodge v.
White, 63 Ga. 742; Howard v.
Simpkins, 70 Ga. 322; Wingfield,
v. Rhea, 73 Ga. 477 ; .ffitna Ins. Co.
v. Brodinax, 48 Fed. Rep. 892 ; Villa
Rica Lumber Co. v. Paratain (1893) ,
92 Ga. 370; s. c, 17 S. E. Rep.
340; McCroy v. Grandy (1893), 92
Ga. 319; s. c, 18 S. E. Rep. 65;
Dobbins v. Blanchard (1895), 94
Ga. 500; s. C, 21 S. E. Rep. 215.
ldado. Bassett v. Beam (1894)
(Idaho), 36 Pac. Rep. 501. Illinois.
Patterson v. Lawrence, 90 111. 174;
s. c, 32 Am. Rep. 22; Thompson
v.Scott, 1 111. App. 641; McCul-
lough v. Ford, 96 111. 439 ; Robin-
son v. Brems, 90 111. 351; Emmert
v. Hays, 89 111. 11 ; Elder v. Jones,
85 111. 384; Whitford v. Doggett, 84
111. 144 ; Yazel v. Palmer, 81 111. 82 ;
Husband v. Epling, 81 111. 172;
S. C, 25 Am. Rep. 273; Harrer v.
Wallner, 20 111. 197; Doyle v.
Kelly, 75 111. 574; McDavid v. Ad-
ams, 77 111. 155 ; Kase v. Painter,
77 111. 543 ; Indianapolis, etc. Ry.
v. McLaughlin, 77 111. 275; Bau-
man v. Street, 76 111. 526 ; Patten v.
Patten, 75 111. 446 ; Williams v. Hu-
gunin, 69111. 214; S.C, 18 Am. Rep.
607; Halley v. Ball, 66 111. 250;
Haight v. McVeigh, 69 111. 624;
Cookson v. Toole, 59 111. 515; Post
v. First Nat'l Bank (1891), 138 III.
559; S. C, 28 N. E. Rep.978;Pom-
eroy v. Manhattan Ins. Co. 40 111.
706
MARRIED "WOMEN.
[5 30;
398 ; Husband v. Epling, 81 111. 172 ;
Brown & Manzanares Co. v. Samp-
son, 44 111. App. 308. Indiana.
Harris v. Harrell, 117 Ind. 94;
Smith v. Howe, 31 Ind. 233; Will-
iams v. Wilbur, 67 Ind. 42 ; Patton
v. Rankin, 68 Ind. 245; s. C, 94
Am. Rep. 254; Jackman v. fow-
ling, 69 Ind. 188; Woodman v.
Wampler, 69 Ind. 88; Smith v.
Smith, 80 Ind. 267; Vaill v. Meyer,
71 Ind. 159; Miller v. Albertson, 73
Ind. 343 ; Morningstar v. Hard wick
(1892), 3 Ind. App. 431; s. c.,29N.
E. Rep. 929 ; Potter v. Sheets (1892),
5 Ind. App. 506 ;s. C, 32N. E. Rep.
811; State v. Frazier (1894), 134
Ind. 648; s. C, 34 N". E. Rep. 636;
Bowles v. Trapp (1894), 139 Ind.
55; s. C, 38 N. E.Rep. 406; Welch
v. Fisk (1892), 139 Ind. 637; s. C,
38 N". E. Rep. 403. The following
cases hold that the wife's separate
property is liable for her contracts
made directly for its improvement,
but is not liable for her general en-
gagements, although made for her
own benefit and on the credit of
her separate estate, when they are
not expressly, in very terms,
charged upon it: Kantrowitz v.
Prather, 31 Ind. 92; s. C, 99 Am.
Dec. 587 ; Putman v. Tennyson, 50
Ind. 456 ; Bellows v. Rosenthal, 31
Ind. 116 ; O'Daily v. Morris, 31 Ind.
Ill ; Montgomery v. Sprankle, 31
Ind. 113; Lindley v. Cross, 31 Ind.
106; s. C, 99 Am. Dec. 610. Iowa.
Mitchell v. Smith, 32 Iowa, 484,
487 ; First JSTat'l Bank v. Haire, 36
Iowa, 443 ; Miller v. Hollingsvvorth,
36 Iowa, 163 ; Spafford v. Warren,
47 Iowa, 47 ; Sweazy v. Kamner, 51
Iowa, 642; Wasson v. Millsap, 77
Iowa, 762; Price v.Seydel, 46 Iowa,
696; Hendershott v. Henry, 63
Iowa, 744; Patton v. Kinsman, 17
Iowa, 428. Kansas. Minerv. Pear-
son, 16 Kan. 27; Deering v. Boyle,
8 Kan. 528; s. c, 12 Am. Rep. 480;
Tallman v. Jones, 13 Kan. 438;
Furrow v. Chapin, 13 Kan. 107;
Larimer v. Kelly, 10 Kan. 298 ; Fad-
dis v. Woollomes, 10 Kan. 56;
Knaggs v. Mastin, 9 Kan. 532 ; Mon-
roe v. May, 9 Kan. 466; Going v.
Orns, 8 Kan. 85 ; Wicks v. Mitchell,
9 Kan, 80. Kentucky. Young v.
Smith, 9 Bush, 421 ; Penn v. Young,
10 Bush, 626 ; Hannon v. Madden,
10 Bush, 664 ; Moreland v. Myall,
14 Bush, 474 ; Uhrig v. Horstman,
8 Bush, 172; Lillard v. Turner, 16
B. Mon. 482; s. C, 63 Am. Dec.
553; Cardwell v. Perry, 82 Ky. 129;
Sweeney v. Smith, 15 B. Mon. 325;
S. c, 61 Am. Dec. 188; Bell v. Kel-
lar, 13 B. Mon. 381; Coleman v.
Wooley, 10 B. Mon. 320; Jarmanv.
Wilkerson, 7 B. Mon. 293; Hackett
v. Metcalfe, 6 Bush, 352; Huss v.
Rice (1891) (Ky.), 17 S. W. Rep.
869; Parsons v. Spencer, 83 Ky.
305; Marsh v. Alford, 5 Bush, 392;
Aultman & Taylor Co. v. Frasure
(1894), 95 Ky. 429; s. c, 26 S. W.
Rep . 5 ; B ullock v. G-rimstead (1894) ,
85 Ky. 261; s. C, 24 S. W. Rep. 867.
Maine. Mayo v. Hutchinson, 57 Me.
546; Sampson v. Alexander, 66 Me.
182; Bean v. Boothby, 57 Me. 295;
Hanson v. Millett, 55 Me. 184;
Duren v. Getohell, 55 Me. 241;
Beals v. Cobb, 51 Me."31S; Winslow
v. Gilbreath, 50 Me. 90 ; Brookings
v. White, 49 Me, 479; Springer v.
Berry, 47 Me. 330 ; Eaton v. Nason,
47 Me. 132 ; Beale v. Knowles, 45
Me. 479 ; Hancock Bank v. Joy, 41
Me. 568 ; Merrill v. Smith, 37 Me.
394; Southard v. Piper, 36 Me. 84;
Johnson v. Stillings, 35 Me. 427;
Howe v. Wildes, 34 Me. 566; Mot-
ley v. Sawyer, 34 Me. 540 ; Eldridge
v. Preble, 34 Me. 148; Clark v.
Viles, 32 Me. 32 ; McLellan v. Nel-
son, 27 Me, 129. Maryland. It must
be affirmatively shown that the
contract was made by the married
woman with direct reference to her
§ 303.]
MARRIED WOMEN.
707
separate estate, and that it washer
intention to charge the same. Wil-
son v. Jones, 46 Md. 349 ; G-irault v.
Adams, 64 Md. 1 ; Jackson v. West,
22 Md. 71 ; Koontz v. Nabb, 16 Md.
549; Kerchner v. Kempton, 47 Md.
568; Oswald v. Hoover, 43 Md. 360;
Eice v. Hoffman, 35 Md. 344; War-
ner v. Dove, 33 Md. 579; Kuhn v.
Stansfield, 28 Md. 210 ; s. C.,92Am.
Dec. 681 ; Smith v. McAtee, 27 Md.
420; s. c, 92 Am. Dec. 641; Miller
V.Johnson, 27 Md. 6; Six v. Shaner,
26 Md. 415 ; Fowler v. Jacob, 62 Md.
326; Wingert v. Gordon, 66 Md.
106. Massachusetts. The contract
must be made with reference to the
separate estate. Nourse v. Hen-
shaw, 123 Mass. 96; Allen v. Fuller,
118 Mass. 402 ; Wilder v. Richie,
117 Mass. 382; Tracy v. Keith, 11
Allen, 214; Eogers v. Ward, 8
Allen, 387; s. c, 85 Am. Dec. 710;
Willard v. Bastham, 15 Gray, 328;
s. C, 77 Am. Dec. 366; Wright v.
Dresser, 110 Mass. 51 ; Athol Ma-
chine Co. v. Fuller, 107 Mass. 437 ;
Heburn v. Warner, 112 Mass. 271 ;
s. C, 17 Am. Rep. 86; Williams v.
Hayward, 117 Mass. 532 ; Merriam
v. Boston, etc. R. R., 117 Mass.
241; Faucett'v. Currier, 109 Mass.
79; Labaree v. Colby, 99 Mass. 559;
Estabrook v. Earle, 97 Mass. 302;
Fowle v. Toney, 13 Mass. 90; Por-
ter v. Wakefield, 146 Mass. 25.
Michigan. Glover v. Alcott, 11 Mich.
470; Burdeno v. Amperse, 14 Mich.
91; s. c, 90 Am. Dec. 225; Watson
v. Thurber, 11 Mich. 457; Farr v.
Sherman, 11 Mich. 33; Stark-
weather v. Smith, 6 Mich. 377;
Durfee v. McClurg, 6 Mich. 223;
Insurance Co. v. Wayne Co. Bank,
68 Mich. 116; Russell v. People's
Savings Bank, 39 Mich. 671 ; s. c,
33 Am. Rep. 444; Kenton Ins. Co.
v. McClellan, 43 Mich. 564; Powers
v. Russell, 26 Mich. 179 ; Jenne v.
Marble, 37 Mich. 318; Rankin v.
West, 25 Mich. 195; Denison v.
Gibson, 24 Mich. 1S7; Fisk v. Mills
(1895) , 1 04 Mich. 433 ; s . C . , 62 N . W.
Rep. 559; Mosher v. Kittle (1894),
101 Mich. 345; s. c, 59 N. W. Rep.
497 ; Chamberlain v. Murrin (1892),
92 Mich. 361 ; s. c, 52 ST. W. Rep.
640; Schmidt v. Spencer (1891), 87
Mich. 121; s. c, 49 N. W. Rep. 479.
Minnesota. Pond v. Carpenter, 12
Minn. 430 ; Tuttle v. Howe, 14 Minn.
145; s. C, 100 Am. Dec. 205; Car-
penter v. Leonard, 5 Minn. 155;
Flynn v. Messenger, 28 Minn. 208 ;
s. c, 41 Am. Rep. 279; Northwest-
ern Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Allis, 23
Minn. 337 ; Holley v. Huntington,
21 Minn. 325; Leighton v. Sheldon,
16 Minn. 243 ; Williams v. McGrade,
13 Minn. 46 ; Rich v. Rich, 12 Minn.
468; Wilder v. Brooks, 10 Minn. 50;
s. c, 88 Am. Dec. 49. Mississippi.
Musson v. Trigg, 51 Miss. 172 ; Mor-
rison v. Knistra, 55 Miss. 71 ; Ogden
v. Guice, 56 Miss. 330; McDougalv.
People's Savings Bank, 62 Miss.
663; Shacklett v. Polk, 51 Miss.
378 ; Davis v. Wilkerson, 48 Miss.
585; Armstrong v. Stovall, 26 Miss.
275; Robertson v. Bruner, 24 Miss.
242; Boarman v. Graves, 23 Miss.
283. Wife's separate property may
be subjected to the payment of a
judgment, even though acquired
after its rendition. Taggart v.
Muse, 60 Miss. 870. The plaintiff , in
order to charge the separate estate,
must set out in his pleadings, under
the Revised Code of Mississippi, the
special circumstances which gave
validity to the contract. Dunbarv.
Meyer, 43 Miss. 679. Where a hus-
band carries on his wife's planta-
tion, and such fact is known to a
person who furnishes the husband
and his tenants supplies to carry it
on, the wife is not liable for th«
supplies. Lea v. Clarksdale Bank
& Trust Co. (1894), 72 Miss. 317;
S. C, 16 So. Rep. 431. Missouri-
70S
MARRIED WOMEN.
[§ 303.
The English doctrine seems to be
accepted in Missouri. Even as to
the married woman's verbal agree-
ments, the intent to charge will be
presumed, unless it can be shown
that credit was not given to it.
Metropolitan Bank v. Taylor, 62
Mo. 338 ; Rosenheim v. Hartsock,
90 Mo. 357; Hooton v. Ransom, 6
Mo. App. 19; De Bann v. Van
"Wagoner, 56 Mo. 347, 349 ; Davis
v. Smith, 75 Mo. 219 ; Boatmen's
Savings Bank v. Collins, 75 Mo.
280; Whiteley v. Steward, 63 Mo.
363; Gage v. Gates, 62 Mo. 417;
Sharpe v. McPike, 62 Mo. 307;
Lincoln v. Rowe, 51 Mo. 571;
Kimm v. Weipert, 46 Mo. 532;
Schafroth v. Ambs, 46 Mo. 114;
Miller v. Brown, 47 Mo. 504; s. c,
4 Am. Rep. 345 ; Whiteside v. Can-
non, 23 Mo. 457 ; Morrison v. This-
tle, 67 Mo. 596 ; Tucker v. Gest, 46
Mo. 339; Boeckler v. McGowan, 9
Mo. App. 373; Klenke v. Koeltze,
75 Mo. 239 ; Staley v. Howard, 7
Mo. App. 377; Clark v. National
Bank, 47 Mo. 17 ; Eystra v. Capelle,
61 Mo. 578 ; Kern v. Pfaff, 44 Mo.
App. 29 ; Mendenhall v. Leivy, 45
Mo. App. 20; Ferguson v. Soden
(1892), 111 Mo. 208; S. C, 19 S. W.
Rep. 727; D. M. Osborne & Co. v.
Graham, 46 Mo. App. 28. When a
married woman makes a contract
for herself and on her own credit,
it will be charged on her separate
property, though the other party
to the contract at the time
the contract was made did
not know of the existence of
such property. Lee v. Cohick, 49
Mo. App. 188. Nebraska. Webb
v. Hoselton, 4 Neb. 308; s. C, 19
Am. Rep. 638; MoCormick v. Law-
ton, 3 Neb. 449; Davis v. First
NaflBank, 5 Neb. 242; s. C, 25
Am. Rep. 4S4; Aultman v. Ober-
myer, 6 Neb. 200; Hall v. Christy,
8 Neb . 264 ; Savings Bank v. Scott,
10 Neb. 83; Barnum v. Young, 10
Neb. 309; Watts v. Gantt (1894),
42 Neb. 869; s. c, 61 N. W. Rep.
104; Buffalo County, etc. Bank v.
Sharpe (1894), 40 Neb. 123; s. c,
58 N. W. Rep. 734; Godfrey v.
Megahan (1894), 38 Neb. 748; s. c,
57 N. W.Rep. 284. Nevada. Seethe
following cases under the statutes :
Darrenberger v. Haupt, 10 Nev.
43; Cartan v. David, 18 Nev. 310;
Beckman v. Stanley, 8 Nev. 257.
New Hampshire. Bailey v. Pearson,
29 N. H. 77; Blake v. Hall, 57 N.
H. 373; Muzzy v. Reardon, 57 X.
H. 378; Whipple v. Giles, 55 N. H.
139 ; Hammond v. Corbett, 51 N. H.
312; Patterson v. Patterson, 45 N.
H. 164; Shannon v. Canney, 44 N.
H. 592; Ames v. Foster, 42 N. H.
381 ; Woodward v. Seaver, 38 N. H.
29; Alvin v. Lord, 39 N. H. 196;
Cooper v. Alger, 51 N H. 172;
Batchelder v. Sargent, 47 N. H.
262 ; George v. Cutting, 46 N. H.
130; Hill v. Pine River Bank, 45
N. H. 300; Vogt v. Tichener, 48
N. H. 242; Nims v. Bigelow, 45
N. H. 343; Parsons v. McLane,
64 N. H. 478; Parsons v. Rolfe
(1894), 66 N. H. 620; s. c, 27
Atl.Rep. 172. New Jersey. Home-
opathic Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Marshall, 32 N. J. Eq. 103; Huyler
v. Atwood, 26 N. J. Eq. 504;
Pierson v. Lum, 25 N. J. Eq. 390;
Perkins v. Elliott, 23 N. J. Eq. 526;
Merchant v.Thompson, 34N. J. Eq.
73; Porch v. Fries, 18 N. J. Eq.
204 ; Dilts v. Stevenson, 17 N. J. Eq.
407; Beal's Exr. v. Storm, 26 N. J.
Eq. 372 ; Vreeland v. Vreeland, 16
N. J. Eq. 512; Belford v. Crane, 16
N. J. Eq. 265; s. c, 84 Am. Dec.
155; Vreeland v. Ryno, 26 N. J.
Eq. 160 ; Armstrong v. Ross, 20 N.
J. Eq. 109 ; Compton v. Pierson, 28
N. J. Eq. 229; Johnston v. Vaill, 4
N. J. Eq. 423; Johnson v. Cum-
mings, 16 N. J. Eq. 97; S. C, 84
§ 303. J MAKKIED WOMEN. 709
Am. Dec. 142; Farmer v. Farmer, s. c, 15 Am. St. Rep. 524; Dicker -
39 N. J. Eq. 211; Wood v. Chet- son v. Rogers, 114 N. Y. 406 ; Cole-
wood, 44 N. Eq. 66; Warwick v. man v. Burr, 93 N. Y. 17; s. c,
Lawrence, 43 N. J. Eq. 179; s. c, 45 Am. Rep. 160; Com. Ex. Ins.
3 Am. St. Rep. 299; Walter v. Co. v. Babcock, 42 N. Y.613; s. c,
Dixon Crucible Co., 47 N. J. Eq. 1 Am. Rep. 601. North Carolina.
342; Condon v. Barr, 49 X. J. L. Hall v.- Short, 81 N. Car. 273 ; Pip-
53; Hinkson v. Williams, 41 N.J. pen v. Wesson, 74 N. Car. 437;
L. 35; Wilson v. Herbert, 41 N.J. Webb v. Gay, 74 N. Car. 447;
L. 454; s. 0., 32 Am. Rep. 243. Manning v. Manning, 79 N. Car.
New York. Yale v. Dederer, 18 X. 300; s. c, 28 Am. Rep. 354; Kirk-
Y. 265; s. c.,72Am. Dec. 503; 22 man v. Bank of Greensboro, 77 N.
N. Y. 450; 78 Am. Dec. 216; 68 Car. 394; Knox v. Jordan, 5 Jones
N. Y. 329 ; 21 Barb. 286 ; 31 Barb. Eq. 175 ; Harris v. Harris, 7 Ired.
525; 17 How. Pr. 165; 19 How. Pr. Eq. Ill; s. c, 53 Am. Dec. 393;
146; 20 How. Pr. 242; Jaques v. Frazier v. Brownlow, 3 Ired. Eq.
M. E. Church, 17 Johns. Ch. 548; 237; s. c, 42 Am. Dec. 165;
s. c, 8 Am. Dec. 447; Saratoga Co. Dougherty v. Sprinkle, 88 N. Car.
Bank v. Pruyn, 90 ST. Y. 250; 300; Flaum v. Wallace, 103 N. Car.
Eisenlord v. Snyder, 71 1ST. Y. 45 ; 296 ; Thurber v. La Rogue, 105 ST.
McVey v. Cantrell, 70 N. Y. 295; Car. 310; Farthing v. Shields, 106
s. c, 26 Am. Rep. 605; Gosman v. N. Car. 295; Thompson v. Smith,
Cruger, 69 N. Y. 87 ; s. c, 25 Am. 106 JST. Car. 357 ; Wood v. Wheeler,
Rep. 141; Conlin v. Cantrell, 64 N. 106 N. Car. 513; Witz v. Gray
Y. 217; Second Nat'l Bank v. Mil- (1895), 116 N. Car. 48; s. c, 20 S.
ler, 63 N. Y. 639 ; Manhattan Brass, E . Rep. 1019 ; Bray v. Carter (1894) ,
etc. Co. v. Thompson, 56 N. Y. 80; 115 1ST. Car. 16; s. c, 20 S. E. Rep.
Maxon v. Scott, 55 N. Y.247; Com. 164; Jones v. Craigmiles, 114 N.
Exchange Ins. Co. v. Babcock, 42 Car. 613; s. c, 19 S. E. Rep. 638;
N. Y. 613; Johnston v. Penguet, Ullman v. Mace, 115 N. Car. 24;
17 Hun, 540; Baker v. Harden, 4 s. c, 20 S. E. Rep. 166. Ohio.
Hun, 272; White v. McNett, 33 N. Elliot & Lawhead, 43 Ohio St. 171;
Y. 271; Scott v.Otis, 25 Hun, 33; Rice v. Columbus, etc. R. Co., 32
Speck v. Gurnee, 25 Hun, 644; Ohio St. 380; Herzshizer v. Flor-
Travis v. Lee, 58 Hun, 605; Coon ence, 39 Ohio St. 516; Avery v.
v. Brook, 21 Barb. 546; Knowlesv. Vansickle,35 0hioSt. 270; Phillips
McCamly, 10 Paige, 343 ; Gardner v. v. Graves, 20 Ohio St. 371 ; s. c, 5
Gardner, 7 Paige, 112; Shorter v. Am. Rep. 675; Williams v. Urmis-
Nelson,4Lans.ll4; Todd v.' Ames, ton, 38 Ohio St. 296; Levi v. Earl,
60 ST. Y. 454; Nash v. Mitchell, 71 30 Ohio St. 147; Patrick v. Littell,
N. Y. 200; s. c, 27 Am. Rep. 38; 36 Ohio St. 79; s. C, 38 Am. Rep.
Boyntonv. Squires (1S94), 85 Hun, 552; Fallis v. Keys, 35 Ohio St.
128; S. C, 32 N. Y. Supl. 467. 265; Swasey v. Antram, 24 Ohio St.
The following are a few of the de- 87 ; Jenz v. Gugel, 26 Ohio St. 527;
cisions under the statute: Third Meiley v. Butler, 26 Ohio St. 535;
Nat'l Bank v. Guenther, 123 N. Y. Westerman v. Westerman, 25 Ohio
568; s. c, 20 Am. St. Rep. 780; St. 500; Logan v. Thrift, 20 Ohio
Manchester v. Tibbetts, 121 N. Y. St. 62; Clark v. Clark, 20 Ohio St.
219; s. c, 18 Am. St. Rep. 816; 12S; Alison v. Porter, 29 Ohio St.
Hendricks v. Isaacs, 117 N. Y. 411 ; 130 ; Machir v. Burroughs, 14 Ohio
710
MARRIED WOMEN.
[§ 303.
St. 519; Ankeney v. Hannon, 147
U. S. 118; s. c, 13 S. Ct. Eep. 206.
Oregon. Kennard v. Sax, 3 Ore.
263 ; Brumnmet v. "Weaver, 2 Ore.
168; Starr v. Hamilton, 1 Deady,
265; Dick v. Hamilton, 1 Deady,
322 ; Orange Nat'l Bank v. Traver,
7 Sawy. 210; Moore v. Fuller, 6
Ore. 274; Gray v. Holland, 9 Ore.
513; Cross v. Allen (1891), 141 IT.
S. 528; s. C, 12 S. Ct. Kep. Penn-
sylvania. Bowers' Appeal, 68 Pa.
St. 126; Speakman's Appeal, 71 Pa.
St. 25; Silvens v. Porter, 74 Pa. St.
448; Berger v. Clark, 79 Pa. St.
340; Lippincottv. Leeds, 77 Pa. St.
420; Wright v. Brown, 44 Pa. St.
223. Bear v. Bear, 33 Pa. St. 525;
Walker v. Keamy, 36 Pa. St. 410;
Trimble v. Reis, 37 Pa. St. 448;
Thorndell v. Morrison, 25 Pa. St.
326; Peck v. Ward, 18 Pa. St. 506;
Snyder v. Noble, 94 Pa. St. 286;
App. of Germania Savings Bank,
95 Pa. St. 329; Innis v. Templeton,
95 Pa. St. 262; s. C, 40 Am. Kep.
643; McConnellv. Lindsay, 131 Pa.
St. 476; Mullin v. Beatty, 56 Pa.
St. 389; Steinman v. Ewing, 43 Pa.
St. 63; Donmce v. Scott, 3 Whart.
306; s. C, 31 Am. Dec. 509; Moore
v. Copeley (1894), 165 Pa. St. 294;
S. C, 35 W.-ST. C. 563; 30Atl.Kep.
829; Mitchell v. Richmond (1895),
164 Pa. St. 566; s. C, 30 Atl. Kep.
48G; McNeal v. MdSTeal (1894), 161
Pa. St. 109; s. C, 34 W. N. C. 259;
28 Atl. Kep. 997; In re Spotts' Es-
tate (1894), 156 Pa. St. 2S1 ; s. C,
27 Atl. Kep. 132; Latrobe, etc.
Assn. v. Fritz (1892), 152 Pa. St.
224; s. C, 34 W. N". C.330; 25 Atl.
Kep. 558 ; Milligan v. Phipps (1893) ,
153 Pa. St. 208; s. c, 31 W. 1ST. C.
561 ; 21 Atl. Rep. 1121 ; Appeal of
Koechling (1891), 144 Pa. St. 215;
s. c, 22 Atl. Rep. 808. Rhode Is-
land. Elliott v. Gower, 12R. 1.79;
Angell v. McCullough, 12 R. I. 47;
Petition of O'Brien, 11 R. I. 419;
Berry v. Teel, 12 R. I. 267 ; War-
ner v. Peck, 11 R. I. 431 ; Fallon v.
McAlonen, 15 R. I. 223. South
Carolina. Adams v. Mackey, 6
Rich. Eq. 75 ; Magwood v. John-
ston, 1 Hill Eq. 228; Cater v. Eve-
leigh, 4 Desaus. Eq. 19; s. c, 6
Am. Dec. 596 ; James v. Mayrant,
4 Desaus. Eq. 591; s. c, 6 Am.
Dec. 630. The following are a few
of the cases under the statute:
Griffin v. Earle (1892), 34 S. Car.
246; s. C, 13 S. E. Rep. 473; Ellis
v. Am. Mortgage Co. (1892), 36 S.
Car. 45; S. c, 15 S. E. Rep. 267;
Carrigan v. Drake (1892) , 36 S. Car.
354; s. C, 15 S. E. Rep. 339; Reid
v. Stevens (1893), 38 S. Car. 519; s.
C, 17 S. E. Kep. 358 ; Witt v. Carroll
(1892), 37 S. Car. 388; s. c, 16 S.
E. Rep. 130; Pelzer v. Campbell,
15 S. Car. 5S1; Conor v. Edwards
(1893), 36 S. Car. 563; s. c.,15S.E.
Rep. 706; Brattonv. Lowery(1893),
39 S. Car. 383; s. C, 17 S.E. Rep.
832 ; Gibson v. Hutchins (1895) , 43 S.
Car. 287; S. C, 21 S. E. Rep. 250;
Kuker v. Mclntire (1895), 43 S. Car.
117; s. c, 20 S. E. Rep. 976; Early
v. Law (1895), 42 S. Car. 330; s. c,
20 S. E. Rep. 136; Dunbarv. Fore-
man (1894), 40 S. Car. 490; s. C,
19 S.E. Rep. 186. Tennessee. Owens
v. Johnson, 8 Baxt. 265; Myers v.
James, 2 Lea, 159; Robertson v.
Wilburn, 1 Lea, 633 ; Davis v. Jen-
nings, 3 Tenn. Ch. 241 ; Eckerly v.
McGhee, 85 Tenn. 661 ; Warren v.
Freeman, 85 Tenn. 513; Menees v.
Johnson, 12 Lea, 561 ; Bedford v.
Burton, 106 U. S. 341; Sherman v.
Turpin, 7 Cold. 382; Young v.-
Young, 7 Cold. 461; Hughes v.
Peters, 1 Cold. 67; Head v. Temple,
4 Heisk. 34 ; Moseby v. Partee, 5
Heisk. 26; Chatterton v. Young, 2
Tenn. Ch. 768; Arrington v. Roper,
3 Tenn. Ch. 572 ; Bank of Shelby v.
James (1895) , 95 Tenn. 8 ; s. c, 30 S.
W. Rep. 1038. The separate estate
§ 304.]
MARRIED WOMEN.
711
§ 304. Gifts from Husband. — -At law, gifts or grants
of property by a husband to his wife are ordinarily void ;
but in equity, subject to certain equitable limitations, such
in Tennessee being equitable, a wile
owning an estate devised to her
sole and separate use without re-
striction of her power to alienate,
may, on becoming surety for an-
other's debt, by express words
charge the estate with such debt.
Webster v. Helin (1894), 93 Tenn.
322; s. c, 24 S, W. Bep. 488.
Texas. Hutchinson v. Underwood,
27 Tex. 255 ; Hamilton v. Brooks,
51 Tex. 142 ; Hall v. Dotson, 55 Tex.
520 ; Bradford v. Johnson, 44 Tex.
381; Wallace v. Finberg, 46 Tex.
35; Bhodes v. Gibbs, 39 Tex. 432;
Ferguson v. Beed, 45 Tex. 574;
Gregory v. Van Vleck, 21 Tex. 40 ;
Cartwright v. Hollis, 5 Tex. 152;
Hollis v. Francois, 5 Tex. 195;
S. C, 51 Am. Dec. 760; Shelby v.
Burtis, 18 Tex. 644; Sorell v. Clay-
ton, 42 Tex. 188 ; Harris v. Will-
iams, 44 Tex. 124; Grant v. Whit-
tlesey, 42 Tex. 320 ; Smith v. Powell,
5 Tex. Civ. App. 373; s. C, 23 S.
W. Bep. 1109; Bing v. Campbell
(1894), 6 Tex^ Civ. App. 714; s. c,
26 S. W. Eep. 295; McCormick v.
Blum (1893), 4 Tex. Civ. App. 9;
S. C, 22 S. W. Bep. 1054, 1120.
Vermont. Sargent v. French, 54
Vt. 384; Dale v. Bobinson, 51 Vt.
20; s. c, 31 Am. Bep. 669; Priest
v. Cone, 51 Vt. 499; S. C, 31 Am.
Bep. 695; Partridge v. Stacker, 36
Vt. 108; s. c, 84 Am. Dec. 664;
Southworth v. Kimball, 58 Vt.337;
Kelsey v. Kelley, 63 Vt. 41 ; Howe
v. Chesly, 56 Vt. 727 ; Webster v.
Hildreth, 33 Vt. 457; s. c, 78 Am.
Dec. 632; White v. Hildreth, 32
Vt. 265 ; Peck v. Walton, 26 Vt. 82.
Virginia. Crockett v. Doriot, 85
Va. 240 ; Jones v. Degge, 84 Va.
685; French v. Waterman, 79 Va.
617 ; Triplett v. Bomine, 33 Gratt.
651 ; Finch v. Marks, 76 Va. 207 ;
Bain v. Buff, 76 Va. 371 ; Greens-
boro Bank v. Chambers, 30 Gratt.
202; s. c.,32 Am. Dec. 661; Justis
v. English, 30 Gratt. 565; Mullerv.
Bay ley, 21 Gratt. 521 ; Leake v. Ben-
son, 27 Gratt. 157 ; Darnall v. Smith,
26 Gratt. 878 ; Penn v. Whitehead,
17 Gratt. 503; s. C, 94 Am. Dec.
478 ; Woodson v. Perkins, 5 Gratt.
345; Burnett v. Hawpe, 25 Gratt.
481 ; Garland v. Pamplin, 32 Gratt.
305; Filler v. Tyler (1895), 91 Va.
458; s. C, 22 S. E. Bep. 235; Tay-
lor v. Cussen (1893), 90 Va. 40;
S. c, 17 S. E. Bep. 721. West Vir-
ginia. Dages v. Lee, 20 W. Va.
584; Eadford v. Carwile, 13 W. Va.
573; Hughes v. Hamilton, 19 W.
Va. 366; Weimberg v. Bempe,
15 W. Va. 829; Hogg v. Dower
(1892), 36W.Va.200;S. c, 14 S. E.
Bep. 995; Camden v. Hiteshaw, 23
W. Va. 236; Howe v. Stortz, 27 W.
Va. 555; Tufts v. Copen (1892), 37
W. Va. 623; S. C, 16 S. E. Eep.
793; Williamson v. Cline (1895),
40 W. Va. 194; s. c, 20 S. E. Eep.
917; Gill v. State (1894), 39 W. Va.
479; s. C. 20 S. E. Eep. 568. Wis-
consin. Todd v. Lee, 15 Wis. 365;
Krouskopf v. Shontz, 51 Wis. 204;
s. c, 37 Am. Eep. 817; Kavanaugh
v. O'Neill, 53 Wis. 101 ; McKesson
v. Stanton, 50 Wis. 297; s. c, 36
Am. Eep. 850; Meyers v. Eahte,
46 Wis. 655; Conway v. Smith, 13
Wis. 125; Beard v. Eedolph, 29
Wis. 130; Nelson v. McDonald, 80
Wis. 605; s. C, 50 N. W. Eep. 893.
United States. Bank of America v.
Bank, 101 IT. S. 240. Cheever v.
Wilson, 9 Wall. 108, 119.
712 MARRIED WOMEN. [§ 304.
gifts and conveyances are sustained. A husband may con-
vey property to a trustee for the separate estate of his wife,
he may declare himself a trustee for her to the extent of
the gift which he proposes to make, or he may make a di-
rect conveyance of the property to her.1 But in whatever
manner the property may be conveyed, the intention of the
donor must be clearly and unequivocally expressed. It
must not depend upon the testimony of the wife, and the
declaration of trust, or other conveyance, must not be in-
definite or equivocal.2 Such conveyance is valid only where
the husband is free from debt at the time of convey-
ance, and the act is not open to the charge of an intention
to defraud or to delay creditors. In a recent case before
the United States Circuit Court for the District of Ken-
tucky, the late Judge Ballard, in his opinion, said : ' 'Nor is it
at all material whether the settlement is made by a stranger
or by the husband himself. In either case the trust will
attach upon him and will be enforced in equity. It is now
universally held that a settlement made by a husband on
his wife, by direct conveyance to her, will be enforced in
the same manner and under the same circumstances that it
will be when made by a stranger, or where made to a trus-
tee for her exclusive use. All voluntary conveyances,
whether made wholly without consideration or upon the
meritorious consideration of love and affection, are scrutin-
ized and regarded with some suspicion in courts of equity
where they are sought to be impeached by creditors ; but I
have been referred to no case, and I have found none,
which hints that a reasonable settlement, made by a hus-
band free from a debt on his wife, by direct conveyance to
her, is any more impeachable than where it is made through
1 Bank of Louisville v. Gray, 84 by James M. Kerr, 5 Atl. Rep.
Ky. 5G5; Parker v. Lechmere, L. R. 183.
12 Ch. D. 256; Ashworth v. Out- 2 Grant v. Grant, 34 Beav. 623;
ram, L. R. 5 Ch. D. 423; Ex parte In re Whittaker, L.R. 21 Ch. D.657;
Whitehead, L. E. 14 Q.B. Div. 419; In re Finch, L. R. 23 Ch. T>. 657;
Mews v. Mews, 15 Beav. 529; Lloyd v. Pughe, L. R. 8 Ch. App.
"Gifts from Husband to "Wife," 71 88; McLean v. Longlands, 5 Ves.71;
L. T. 260; 7 Mo. Law Mag. 109; Rich v. Cockrell, 9 Ves. 369; Hayes
"Xote given wife by husband,'' v. Kindersley, 2 Sm. & Gif. 197.
§ 304.]
MARRIED WOMEN.
713
the intervention of trustees. Settlements made in either
mode, when uncontaminated by actual fraud, are unim-
peachable by subsequent creditors. It may be admitted
that a power of revocation, inserted in an assignment made
by a debtor for the benefit of his creditors, would render
such assignment constructively fraudulent, and therefore
void. But such power of revocation has never been held
to affect a family settlement. On the contrary, in the case
of Riggs v. Murray, 2 Johns. Ch. 576; s. c, 15 Johns.
571, Chancellor Kent expressly declares that 'family settle-
ment may often require such powers of revocation to meet
the ever-varying interests of family connections.' More-
over, it is the well settled practice in England to insert
such powers in such settlements, unless, indeed, the sole
object of the settlement is to guard against the extraya-
gance and imprudence of the settlor. Indeed, ever since
Lord Hardwicke's time, the failure of the conveyancer to
insert a power of revocation in a deed of family settlement
has been regarded as a strong: badge of fraud."1 The ob-
ligation of the husband to provide for a wife and her chil-
dren constitutes a meritorious consideration, and, as such,
renders a voluntary conveyance to her valid as against all
persons, except creditors whose equities have been violated
by the conveyance.2 Where the husband is free to convey
his property, a conveyance of an estate of any kind to his
wife may be secured to her, as against her husband's heirs
or subsequent creditors, and it may be secured to her by a
parol agreement between the parties.3 Where an estate is
1 Jones v. Clifton, 2 Flip. 191
S. C, 11 Otto, 225 ; See also Shep
ard v. Shepard, 7 Johns. Ch. 56
Jones v. Obenchain, 10 Gratt. 259
Sims v. Kieketts, 35 Ind. 192
Thompson v. Mills, 30 Ind. 532
Putnam v. Bicknell, 18 Wis. 335
Burden v. Amperse, 14 Mich. 91
Barron v. Barron, 24 Vt. 398; Mara
man v. Maraman, 4 Met. (Ky.) 84
WaUingford v. Allen, 10 ret. 594
Biggs v. Murray, 2 Johns. Ch. 57G
S. C.,15 Johns. 571; Tarbackv. Mar-
bury, 2 Ver. 510 ; Huguenin v. Base-
ley, 14 Ves. 273.
2 Hunt v. Johnson, 44 N. Y. 27;
Wallingford v. Allen, 10 Pet. 583 ;
Garlick v. Strong, 3 Paige, 440;
Jackson v. G-urnsey, 16 Johns.
189.
3 Wallingford v. Allen, 10 Pet.
583;Milner v. Edwards, 7 Bush,
394; Child v. Pearl, 43 Vt. 224.
714
MARRIED WOMEN.
[§ 305.
conveyed by a husband to a wife it will be presumed that
it is a voluntary settlement, or provision for her support or
benefit, and unless some fraudulent intention is established
it will be sustained in equity.1 Where the wife has a legal
claim against the husband and he conveys land to her in
liquidation of the debt, the transaction will be held valid.2
§ 305. The Rights of the Wife in Her Savings. —
Where a married woman holds a separate estate her savings
from it are subject to the same rule as the estate itself.
She has the same right to the interest, or other accumula-
1 Corcoran v. Corcoran, 119 Ind.
138; s. c, 12 Am. St. Rep. 390;
Majors v. Everton, 89 111. 56 ; Hunt
v. Johnson, 44 N. Y. 27 ; City ^at'l
Bank v. Hamilton, 34 N. J. Eq.
158; Loomis v. Brush, 36 Mich.
557.
2 Thurber, Wyland & Co. v. De la
Roque, 105 N. C. 301; Savage v.
O'Xeil, 44 5T. Y. 29S; Jaycox T.
Caldwell, 51 ST. Y. 395; Dyer v.
Keeper, 51 111. 525 ; Enyeart v. Kep-
ler, 118 Ind. 37 ; Kelso v. Robertson,
51 Ark. 397 ; Medeker v. Bonebrake,
108 U. S. C6. In an action to quiet
title it appeared that a husband
purchased property with commu-
nity funds, and then conveyed the
premises as a gift; that subse-
quently he wished to sell the land,
but the wife refused to join in a
deed unless he paid her one-half
the proceeds of the sale; that they
conveyed the premises by joint
deed, and one- half the proceeds
were paid to the wife by the hus-
band's consent; that out of this
money the wife purchased the
premises in controversy. It was
held that the proceeds paid to the
wife, and the premises purchased
with them, became her separate
property. Oaks v. Oaks (1892), 94
Cal.66;s.c.,29Pac.Rep.330. A gift
may be made by a husband to his
wife which, though bad at law, will
be supported in equity. Though
the property does not pass at law,
yet, in equity, a husband, being the
legal owner, may become a trustee
for his wife, and if by clear and ir-
revocable acts he has made him-
self a trustee, the gift to his wife
will be conclusive. To constitute
a gift between husband and wife
there must either be a clear irrevo-
cable gift to a trustee for the wife,
or some clear and distinct act of
the husband, by which he divested
himself of his property, and en-
gaged to hold it as a trustee for the
separate use of his wife. If a man
were to deposif money with bank-
ers, directing them to hold it for
his wife, that would probably be
sufficient. A former wife, with
his knowledge and sanction, depos-
ited the produce of the surplus,
butter, eggs and poultry, with a firm
in her own name, and he called it
"her money." On his deathbed
he gave his executor directions to
remove the money, and do the best
he could with it for his wife. It
was held that the evidence was not
sufficient to establish a gift be-
tween them, and that the husband
had neither made the firm nor
himself trustees for his • wife.
Mews v. Mews. 15 Beav. 529.
§ 305.] MAKKIED WOMEN. 715
tions, that she has to her separate property.1 But
money given by a husband to a wife for the expenses of
the household, or for her own ordinary current expenses,
belongs to the husband. Any investment which she may
make of such money will be for his benefit.2 Money
saved by a wife during separation will be subject to the
same rule. The doctrine is that such money is given her
for her necessary expenses, and that anything remaining,
after such expenses are met, belongs to the husband. Un-
doubtedly she may devote to this object all the money that
the husband engages to pay her, or that he does, as a mat-
ter of fact, pay her. But her right in it is simply a right
to use it for this purpose, and any part of her allowance
not devoted to this purpose remains the property of the
husband. In a leading case where a husband and wife
separated by agreement, — not under seal, — and at that time
he agreed to allow her a certain sum weekly for her sup-
port, which was paid; and she saved a certain portion of
her allowance and invested it in stock ; but a few days be-
fore her death she sold out the stock and disposed of the
proceeds by way of gift. In an action against the person
1 Mallory v. Kennedy, 19 Sim. with her paraphernal funds, and if
254; G-ore v. Knight, 2 Vern. 535; the income from her paraphernal
Humphrey y. Eiohards, 2 Jur. property is not sufficient to meet the
(X. S.) 432; Barron v. Barron, 24 accruing payments, may buy on
Vt. 375 ; Merritt v. Lyon, 3 Barb, credit, and the property thus
110; Hoot v. Sorrell, 11 Ala. 386; bought is paraphernal. For fur-
Kee v. Vasser, 2 Ired. Eq. 553; ther decisions illustrating the pe-
Gentry v. McReynolds, 12 Mo. 533 ; culiar character of paraphernal
Rogers v. Fales, 5 Barr, 104; Yard- property under the laws of Louis-
ley v. Raub, 5 Whart. 123; Towers iana, see the following decisions:
v. Hagner, 3 Whart. 57 ; Young v. Miller v. Handy, 33 La. Ann. 160 ;
Jones, 9 Humph. 551; Bush v. Jaffa v. Myers, 33 La. Ann. 406;
Vought, 55 Pa. St. 437; Miller v. Morrow v. Goodchaux, 41 La. Ann.
Williams, 5 Md. 226, 236 ; Churchill 711 ; Putnam v. New York L. Ins.
v. Dibben, 9 Sim, 447 n.; Messen- Co., 42 La. Ann. 739. The wearing
ger v. Clark, 5 Exch. 392. apparel purchased by a married
2 Barrack v. McCulloch, 3 Kay & woman after her marriage with
J. 114; Mews v. Mews, 15 Beav. her husband's money or upon his
529; Richardson v. Louisville, etc. credit, belongs to him as against
R. Co., 85 Ala. 559. In Louisana, her creditors. Smith v. Obear, 87
a wife may buy property for cash Mich. G2.
71G
MARRIED WOMEN.
[§ 306.
who received it for money lent, it was held that the hus-
band was entitled to receive back the. money so given.1 In
another case, where money was saved by a wife from a
yearly allowance, and not invested, but deposited in a
bank, it was held that the money was to be treated as her
separate estate as against her husband, and that she was
entitled to save any part of it that she pleased. In this
case it was not shown, nor even alleged in the bill, that the
allowance was larger than was required for her proper sup-
port and maintenance, and the payment of her debts.2
§ 306. Bight of Wife in Her Pin Money. — In marriage
" settlements, especially in England, the husband frequently
binds himself to make to the wife a definite annual allowance
for her personal use, which is designated as pin money. This
money is not for the ordinary and necessary purposes of
the household, but for her apparel and adornment, and for
other personal expenses. As has been said, this provis-
ion is "in order to avoid the necessity of a perpetual re-
1 Messenger v. Clarke, 5 Exch.
388. Alderson, B., in the case cited,
states the views of the court as fol-
lows : "I am of opinion that there
ought to be no rule. The cases
cited are authorities to show, that
in equity, where the wife has a sep-
arate estate, settled to her use, and
she effects savings out of that sep-
arate estate, she has the same
power and control over those sav-
ings as she had over the separate
estate itself. That principle holds
good in courts of equity, hut has
no application to the present case.
'A separate maintenance,' and 'a
maintenance upon separation,' are
distinct matters, and are not to be
considered as synonymous. In the
case of a maintenance on separa-
tion, the husband allows money to
his wife, from whom he has sep-
arated, to the end that she may
supply herself with necessaries
through the medium of it. The
very next passage in Mr. Roper's
work to that which has been relied
upon runs thus : 'The intent of the
provision made for the wife upon
separation, being to enable her to
procure necessaries, it follows that
the application of it to those pur-
poses, however it may be settled, is
a, legitimate appropriation of the
property.' The real truth is, that
the only authority which the hus-
band gave the wife in the present
case, upon their separation, with
respect to the allowance made to
her by him, was, that she should
supply herself with necessaries out
of it. If she chooses to save some
of it, the money so saved becomes
his, and not hers. In the present
case, therefore, the money so saved
and appropriated was the hus-
band's as he gave her no authority
so to save and appropriate it."
2 Brooke v. Brooke, 25 Beav. 342,
347.
§ 306.]
MARRIED WOMEN.
717
currence by the wife to the husband that a sum of money
is settled at the marriage, which is to be set apart to the
use of the wife for the purpose of bearing those per-
sonal expenses."1 Gifts made to the wife for this purpose
1 Howard v. Digby, 2 CI. & F.
634,675; s. C., 8 Bligh (N. S.), 224,
245, 265, 269. See also Jodrell v.
Jodrell, 9 Beav. 45; Slanning v.
Style, 3 P. Wm. 337; Acton v.
Acton, 1 Ves. 267; Peacook v.
Monk, 2 Ves. 190 ; Fowler v. Fow-
ler, 3 P. Wm. 355; Ball v. Coutts,
1 V. & B. 305; Stanway v. Styles,
2 Eq. Abr. 246 ; Mangey v. Hun-
gerford, 2 Eq. Abr. 156 ; Bidout v.
Lewis, 1 Atk. 269; Foss v. Foss, 15
Ir. Ch. 215; Edgeworth v. Edge-
worth, 16 Ir. Ch. 348; Lord Town-
shend v. Windham, 3 Ves. 290;
Ashtonv. Ashton, 1 Ves. 264, 267.
In the leading case of Howard v.
Digby, supra, 654, the lord chan-
cellor thus defines pin money:
"This leads me to consider what
pin money is; for what purpose
and with what view it is set apart
and provided; in what right the
wife enjoys it, and by what obliga-
tion the husband pays it. It is not
an ordinary debt ; it is not a gift
from the husband to the wife out
and out ; it is not to be considered
like money set apart for the sole
and separate use of the wife, dur-
ing the coverture, excluding the
jus mariti; but it is a sum set apart
for a specific purpose, due to the
wife in virtue of a particular ar-
rangement, payable by the hus-
band by force of that arrange-
ment and for that specific
purpose, I am subject to be cor-
rected upon this as upon all other
subjects, and to be better informed,
but I have not in this case received
any such correction, I have not had
the benefit of any light better than
I possess myself; I have heard
nothing whatever to shake my
opinion that pin money is, with
respect to the personal expense of
the wife, for the dress and the
pocket money of the wife, its very
name implies a connection with
the person; it means that which
goes to deck the person of the wife,
and, as I should say, upon a some-
what larger construction, to pay
her ordinary expenses. A person
in a humble station of life pays
his wife's bills as he pays his own ;
a person in a station a little higher
is accustomed to make, for common
convenience, an allowance to his
wife of so much for housekeeping
expenses, and so much over for her
own dress and the dress of her
children; a person in a higher
station still makes a general ar-
rangement, which probably ex-
tends over years, if not over the
whole coverture ; and a person in
a higher station — in the highest,
— makes the arrangement of pin
money by the marriage settlement;
which is as much as to say, 'you,
the wife, shall not be reduced to
the somewhat humiliating neces-
sity of disclosing to me every want
of a pound to keep in your pocket;
or of taking my pleasure and ob-
taining my consent every time you
want to go to the milliner's shop
to order your dress ; but you will
have so much, consistent with my
estate and my income, which you
shall retain apart from me and ex-
empt from my control.' It is a re-
finement which the law has intro-
duced, peculiar to the bargain or
arrangement previous to and upon
the marriage. The husband ex-
718 MAEEIED WOMEN. [§ 307.
after marriage are treated as pin money, and are subject
to the same equitable rules. Money to which this charac-
ter attaches is held by the wife for her personal use, and it
is subject to her own disposal. Her right in it is not an
absolute right, but a power to dispose of it for the object
for which it is given, according to her pleasure. She holds
it to be used for this purpose, subject to the marital right
of her husband, and if she uses it for any other purpose,
or fails to use it for the object for which it is provided, he
may reduce it into possession. Where a provision of this
character is a part of a marriage settlement, and the hus-
band fails to meet his obligation, the wife may enforce her
claim against his estate. But where her wants have been
met by the husband without the payment of the pin
money, she will have no claim on him for, the payment of
arrears. In any event, the rule is that her claim shall be
limited to one year and a fraction of a year.1
§ 307. Voluntary Separation of Husband and "Wife. —
A state of voluntary separation between husband and wife
is a condition in which, in pursuance of a mutual agree-
ment, they live apart while their matrimonial obligations
are not legally dissolved.2 Formerly the courts were very
reluctant to sanction contracts of this character. It was
held that public policy required that husbands and wives
should be released from the obligation to live together
only for the very few reasons known to the law.3 But even
empting it from his control may § 215. See on this topic generally
be supposed to say, 'there shall be "Separation Deeds," 45 L. T. 274;
your dress money, your pocket "Separations a Mensa et Thoro"
money, your fund for separate per- 2 Scot. L.J. 65; "Separation Deeds
sonal expenses set apart for you and Divorce," 56 L. T. 176; "(Jon-
during the coverture.' " tracts between Husband and Wife
'Howard v. Digby, 2 CI. & F. Regarding Custody of Children," 2
654. See also Miller v.Williamson, Bench and Bar, 58; 51 L. T. 391;
5 Md. 219, 236. The English doc- 6 L. Rep. 236.
trine of pin money does not obtain 3 Evans v. Evans, 1 Haggard,
in North Carolina. McKinnon v. Consistory Rep. 36. When people
McDonald, 4 Jones Eq. 1 ; s. c, 72 understand that they must live to-
Am. Dec. 574. gether, except for a very few rea-
2 Schouler's Domestic Relations, sons known to the law, they learn
§ 307. J MARRIED WOMEN. 719
in England this view has been materially modified. In
the leading case of Besant v. Wood, Sir George Jessel,
M. R., in discussing this question, in his opinion, said;
"For a great number of years both ecclesiastical judges
and lay judges thought it was something very horrible, and
against public policy, that the husband and wife should agree
to live separate, and it was supposed that a civilized country
could no longer exist if such agreements were enforced
by courts of law, whether ecclesiastical or not. But a
change came over judicial opinion as to public policy;
other considerations arose, and people began to think that
after all it might be better and more beneficial for mar-
ried people to avoid in many cases the expense and scan-
dal of suits of divorce by settling their differences quietly
by the aid of friends out of court, although the conse-
quence might be that they would live separately, and that
was the view carried out by the courts where it* became
once decided that separation deeds per se were not against
public policy."1 But whatever doubt may have been en-
tertained at any former time, it is now well settled that a
deed of separation between husband and wife, where the
separation has already occurred, or is to occur at the
time of the closing of the contract, and where the con-
sideration is positive and a reasonable provision is made
for the maintenance of the wife, the husband being in
fault, will be sustained in equity.2 The objections urged
to soften by mutual accommoda- ciety, might have been at Ihis mo-
tion that yoke which they know ment living in a state of mutual
they cannot shake off ; they become unkindness — in a state of estrange-
good husbands and good wives, ment from their common offspring
from the necessity of remaining — and in a state of the most licen-
husbands and wives, for necessity tious and unreserved immoralty.
is a powerful master in teaching In this case, as in many others, the
the duties which it imposes. If it happiness of some individuals must
were once understood that upon be sacrificed to the greater and
mutual disgust married persons more general good. Ibid. 36.
might be legally separated, many J Besant v. Wood, L. E. 12 'Ch.
couples, who now pass through the D. G05, 620.
world with mutual comfort, with 2 Walker v. Walker, 9 Wall. 743,
attention to their common offspring 751. See also Nicol v. Nicol, L. E.
and to the moral order of civil so- 31 Ch. D. 524; Gandy v. Gandy,L.
720 MARRIED WOMEN. [§ 307.
by the early English courts are still felt by judicious and
conscientious jurists. In the leading case of Walker v.
"Walker, before the Supreme Court of the United States,
Mr. Justice Davis, in his opinion, said: "It is true that
different judges, in discussing the question, have strug-
gled against maintaining the principle ; but while doing so
they have not felt themselves at liberty to disregard it on
account of the great weight of authority with which it
was supported, and have, therefore, uniformly adhered to
it. It is unnecessary to consider whether the extent to
which the doctrine has been carried meets our approbation,
nor are we required to discuss the subject in any aspect
which this case does not present. It is enough for the
purposes of this suit to say that a covenant by the husband
for the maintenance of the wife, contained in a deed of
separation between them, through the medium of trustees,
where the consideration is apparent, is valid, and will be
enforced in equity if it appears that the deed was not
made in contemplation of a future possible separation, but
in respect to one which was to occur immediately, or for
the continuance of one that had already taken place. And
this is especially true if the separation was occasioned by
the misconduct of the husband, and the provision for the
wife's support was reasonable under the circumstances,
and no more than a court, before which she was entitled to
carry her grievances, would have decreed to her as ali-
mony."1
E. 30 Ch. D. 57; Fearon v. Ayles- E. 10 Ch. App. 297; Marshall v.
ford, L. R. 14 Q.B.Div. 792; Moore Marshall, 27 W. R. 399; Hunt v.
v. Moore, 57 L. T. 568. Hunt, 4 De G., F. & J. 221, 235;
1 Walker v. Walker, 9 Wall. 743. Besant v. Wood, L. K. 12 Ch. D.
See also Compton y. Collinson, 2 605,620,624; Gibbs v. Harding, L.
Bro. Ch. 377; Worrall v. Jacob, 3 E. 8 Eq. 490; Wellesley v. Welles-
Meriv. 266 ; Jee v. Thurlow, 2 Bam. ley, 4 Myl. & Cr. 561 ; Stephens v.
& Ores. 546; Webster v. Webster, 1 Olive, 2 Bro. Ch. 90; Durant v.
Sm. & Giff. 489; s. c, 23 Eng. L. Titley, 7 Price, 577; St. John v. St.
& Eq. 216; 17 Id. 278; Eandle v. John, 11 Ves. 256; Guth v. Guth,
Gould, 8 Ell. & Bl. 457; Hunt v. 3 Bro. Ch. 614; Logan v. Birkett,
Hunt, 5 L. T. Eep. 778; Saunders 1 Myl. & K. 220 ; Elworthy v. Bird,
v. Eodway, 22 L. J. Ch. (N. S.) 2 S. & S. 372; Earl of Westmeath
230; Fisher v. Appolinaris Co., L. v. Countess of Westmeath, Jacob,
§ 308.]
MARRIED "WOMEN.
721
§ 308. The Consideration Required. — An agreement
between a husband and wife to live apart in itself has no
bearing upon the legal obligations of either party. In law
they are no less husband and wife than they were before
the separation. In consequence, the husband is still bound
for the support of the wife, unless the covenant of separa-
tion provides for her support and is fulfilled by the hus-
band. To meet this difficulty the covenant of separation
usually provides for the appointment of a trustee, who, as
the representative of the wife, engages to indemnify him
against this claim. This is a valuable consideration, and
renders the contract binding. Without this or some other
valuable consideration, the engagement of the husband re-
lating to the maintenance of the wife would be nudum
pactum, and not enforceable. And on the other hand, the
husband's obligation to pay the wife a stipulated sum for
her maintenance is a valuable consideration for her release
of him from his obligation to supDort her.1 Where a trust
126, 141; Jones v. Wait, 4 M. &
G. 1107; Wilson v. Wilson, 1 H. L.
Cas. 538; Clifford v. Clifford, SOL.
T. 650; Moore v. Moore, 57 L. T.
568; Fearon v. Aylesford, L. R. 14
Q. B. Div. 792; Gandy v. Gandy,
L. R. 30 Ch. D. 57; Nicol v.Nicol,
31 Ch. D. 524; Byrne v. Lord
Carew, 13 Ir. Eq. 1; Carson v.
Murray, 3 Paige, 483 ; Xichols v.
Palmer, 5 Day, 47 ; Hutton v. Duey,
3 Barr, 100; Bettle v. Wilson, 14
Ohio, 257; Chapman v. Gray, 8Ga.
341 ; Reed v. Beazley, 1 Blackf . 97 ;
Wells v. Stout, 9 Cal. 494; Dillin-
ger"s Appeal, 35 Penn. 357 ; Gaines
T. Poor, 3 Met. 503 ; Hunt v. Hunt,
5L. T. 778; Clark v. Fosdiok, 118
N. Y. 7; S. C, 6 Lawy. Rep. 132;
Galusha v. Galusha, 116 X. Y. 635 ;
Tallinger v. Mandeville , 113 X. Y.
427; s. c, 28 Am. L. Reg. 471;
Petit v. Petit, 107 X.Y. 677 ; Winn v.
Sanford, 148 Mass. 39 ; s.c.,lLawy.
Rep. 512; Fay v. Davis, 113 Mass.
4G
255; Commonwealth v. Richards,
131 Pa. St. 209 ; Appeal of Agnew
(18SS) (Penn.), 12 Atl. Rep. 160;
Carey v. Mackey, 82 Me. 516;
S. C, 9 Lawy. Rep. 512; Barnes v.
Barnes, 104 X. Car. 613; Fosdiok v.
Fosdick. 15R. 1. 130 ;Daniels v. Dan-
iels, 9 Colo. 133; Brown v. Miller,
63 Mich. 413 ; House v. Harden, 52
Miss. 874; Loud v. Loud, 4 Bush,
461 ; Phillips v. Meyers, 82 111. 67 ;
Garbut v. Bowling, 81 Mo. 214;
McKee v. Reynolds, 26 Iowa, 5S9 ;
Gould v. Gould, 29 How. 458;
Commonwealth v. Richards, 131
Pa. St. 209 ; Westmeath v. West-
meath, Jac. 120; Durant v. Titley,
7 Price, 577 ; Hobbs v. Hall, 1 Cott.
445. But see Duryea v. Bliven, 47
Hun, 638; Friedman v. Bierman,
43 Hun. 387.
1 Hindley v. Marquis of West-
meath, 6 B. & C. 200, 215; Wal-
rond v. Walrond, Johns. IS ; Caux
v.Foster,! J. & H. 30; Petit v.
722
MARRIED WOMEN.
[§ 308.
is actually created and carried into effect, it is not necessary
that there should be any formal execution of the deed.1
But where no trustees are appointed, or there is no cov-
enant on the part of trustees to indemnify the husband
against the claims or the debts of the wife, the contract
will be good against the husband, though void with regard
to his creditors.2 Formerly it was held that the appoint-
ment of trustees was essential to the validity of agreements
for separation as deeds. The earlier English decisions
were to this effect, and they were followed by some of the
Petit, 107 K. Y. 677; Watson's
Compendium of Equity (2d ed.),
401 ; "Contract by Wife Separated
from Husband for Necessaries," by
Irving Browne, 23 Alb. L. J. 284;
'•From the incapacity of a married
woman to contract, or to possess
personal property which may be
the subject of contract, men and
their wives desirous of living sepa-
rate have found it necessary to
have recourse to the intervention
of trustees, in whom the property
of which it is intended she shall
have the disposition, may vest un-
controlled, by the rights of her
husband, and with whom he may
contract for her benefit; but in
such property the woman herself
acquires no legal interest whatso-
ever. Of such trusts courts of equity
alone can take notice." Marshall
v. Button, 8 T. R. 845. See also
Mills v. Richards, 34 Miss. 77; Du-
pre v. Rein, 50 How. Pr. 228 ; Wor-
rall v. Jacobs, 3 Meriv. 256. The
trustee is not indispensable now,
though proper and customary.
Garver v. Miller, 10 Ohio St. 527;
Wilson v. Wilson, 1 H. L. Cas.
538; Dillenger's Appeal, 35 Pa. St.
357; Bradish v. Gibbs. 3 Johns. Ch.
523. But see Cropsy v. McKinney,
30 Barb. 47 ; Beach \ . Beach, 2
Hill, 260; s. c, 38 Am. Dec. 584;
Legard v. Johnson, 3 Ves. 352.
The husband's duty to support his
wife a sufficient consideration.
Jones v. Clifton, 101 U. S. 225;
Phillips v. Meyers, 82 111. 67; s. c,
25 Am. Rep. 295; Horder v.
Horder, 24 Kan. 392; s. c,
33 Am. Rep. 167; Griffin v. Banks,
37 X. Y. 621. Release of marriage
rights may be a valid considera-
tion (Hobbs v. Hull, 1 Cox, 445) , or
claim for alimony. Bratton v. Mas-
sey, 15 S. Car. 277. For other ex-
amples of sufficient consideration
see Wells v. Stout, 9 Cal. 479;
Fitzer v. Fitzer, 2 Atk. 511 ; Clough
v. Lambert, 10 Sim. 174; McDon-
nel v. Murphy, Fox &S. 279; Ran-
dall v. Randall, 37 Mich. 573 ; An-
gier v. Angier. Gilb. Eq. 152; Kehr
v. Smith, 20 Wall. 33; Stevens v.
Olive, 2 Bro. Ch. 90; Hargoves v.
Meray, 2 Hill (S. Car.), 222.
iElworthy v. Bird, 2 S. & S.
371 ; Wilson v. Wilson, 14 Sim.
405; s. C, 1 H. L. Cas. 538; Angier
v. Angier, Pr. Ch. 496; Head v.
Head, 3 Atk. 54.
2 Fitzer v. Fitzer, 2 Atk. 511;
Westmeath v. Westmeath, Jacob,
126; Frampton v. Frampton, 4
Beav. 287; Reed v. Beazley, 1
Blackf . 98 ; Bowers v. Clark, Phil.
Rep. 501
§ 309. J MARRIED WOMEN. 723
courts of this country.1 But in the recent cases it has been
held that the contract will be enforced without the ap-
pointment of trustees. Where a contract for separation is
made and carried into effect by the parties without the in-
terposition of trustees, equity will enforce the provisions of
the engagement by treating the husband as a trustee, and
by compelling him to execute the trust.2
§ 309. The Subject Continued. — The enforcement of
a contract for separation without the intervention of a
trustee is based on the same principle as that upon which
it is held that an equitable separate estate may be conveyed
directly to the wife. In either case the husband is charged
with the duties of a trustee and made responsible as such.3
But while equity makes the husband a trustee wherever that
may be required, even that is rendered wholly unnecessary
in that class of States in which the wife is empowered by
statute to make contracts in regard to her separate prop-
erty as if she were a -feme sole. This right, of course, in-
cludes the right to acquire property by a contract with her
husband.4 Where a trust is created for the benefit of the
1 Legard v. Johnson, 3 Ves. 359 ; contract between them that does
Elworthy v. Bird, 2 Sim. & St. not spring from fraud or coercion,
372; Switzer v. Switzer, 12 Gratt. and contemplates a suitable pro-
580 ; Rogers v. Rogers, 4 Paige, vision for the wife and children by
516, 518 ; Corson v. Murray, 3 Paige, an equitable division of the prop-
483, 501; Champlin v. Champlin, erty, is maintainable. In an action
1 HofE. 578; Stephenson v. Osborn, between a husband and wife on a
41 Miss. 126; Carter v. Carter, 22 contract between them, equity will,
Miss. 61 : Simpson v. Simpson, 4 whenever needful, give effect to
Dana, 140 ; Smith v. Knowles, 2 provisions, in behalf of the wife, by
Gratt. 413; Nichols v. Palmer, 5 adjudging the husband to be her
Day, 57; 2 Story, Equity Jurispru- trustee and requiring him to ac-
dence, § 1428. See Dixon v. Dixon, count accordingly. Ibid. The
23 N. J. Eq. 316. validity of such a covenant is not
2 More v. Ellis, Bunb. 205; Guth impaired by the fact that the deed
v. Guth, 3 Bro. Ch. 614; Frampton contains a provision that if the
Frampton, 4 Beav. 294 ; Hutton v. parties should afterwards come
Duey, 3 Barr, 100; Barron v. Bar- together, the trust should remain,
ron, 24 Vt. 375 ; Picket v. Johns, 1 and be executed in like manner as
Dev. Eq. 123. if they should remain separate.
3 Randall v. Randall, 37 Mich. Walker v. "Walker, 9 Wall. 743.
563, 572. When a husband and wife 4 Tillman v. Shackelton, 15 Mich,
have fully decided to separate a 447; Metcalf v. Shaw, 3Campb.22;
724 MAREIED WOMEN. [§§ 310-311.
wife under a deed of separation, and the parties are subse-
quently reconciled and resume cohabitation, it will be held
that the property was settled to the separate use of the
wife, and that her right in this regard is not lost by the
reconciliation.1
§ 310. Illegal Executory Agreements. — Any stipulation
in an executory contract for separation which is essentially
illegal, or contrary to public policy, will render the entire
instrument void. In this regard the executory agreement
differs from the deed of separation. In a deed one illegal
provision would not necessarily invalidate all the others.2
Where it is a part of the contract that the wife shall lend
her aid to the husband in an effort to secure a divorce, no
part of the agreement will be held binding.3 It has been
held that unchastity in either party will not render the con-
tract void ; but if it appears that it was the intention of the
contract that one or both of the parties should be at liberty
to commit adultery, the deed would be illegal and void.4
§ 311. Property Rights of Wife under Separation. —
The estate of the wife under a deed of separation is not a
Bently v. Griffin, 5 Taunt. 356; 3 Cliff. 155; Slatter v. Slatter, 1 Y.
Leggett v. Reed, 1 Car. & P. 16; & C. 28.
Stammers v. Macomb, 2 Wend. 454; 2 Ratcltff v. Huntley, 5 Ired. 545;
Shelton v. Pendleton, 18 Conn. 417. Huntley v. Huntley, 6 Ired. Eq.
1 Huntley v. Huntley, 6 Ired. Eq. 514.
514; Ratoliffe v. Huntley, 5 Ired. 3 Seagrave v. Seagrave, 13 Ves.
Eq. 545. For cases where a re- 439; Cook v. Wiggins, 10 Ves.*191.
sumption of cohabitation, thus re- A Cranston v. Plumb, 54 Barb. 59.
storing the former relations, will In Jones v. Waite, 5 Bing. N. Cas.
avoid the deed, see Mcrcier v. 341; s. c, 35 E. C. L. 130, the court
People, 25 Wend. 97; S. C, 35 Am. said: "That the husband himself
Dec. 653; Wells v. Stout, 9 Cal. may derive protection against
498; Garland v. Garland, 50 Miss, debts incurred by his wife while
694 ; Bateman v. Ross, 1 Dow. 235 ; living apart from him, by showing
Zimmer v. Settle, 124 N". Y. 37; that he had agreed with a trustee
s.C, 21 Am. St. Rep. 638; James to provide adequate funds for her
v. James, 81 Tex. 373. A casual maintenance, and had in fact pro-
intercourse of three days may not vided for them is clearly established
be proof of permanent reconcilia- by several cases." See Nurse v.
tion. Heyer v. Burger, Hoffm. Craig, 2 X. R. 148; s. C, 5 B. & P.
Ch. 1. See also Walker v. Beal, 153.
§ 312. J
MARRIED WOMEN.
725
legal or an equitable separate estate, in the sense that she
would hold it had no separation occurred. To a great ex-
tent her rights are determined by the instrument of sepa-
ration.1 Where the deed makes provision for the benefit
of the wife the trustees may be compelled to execute their
trust.2 Where the right is not otherwise enforced, the
husband may bring an action against the trustees to enforce
the performance of their obligations for the benefit of the
wife.3
§ 312. Termination of Contract. — The instrument of
separation may provide that the trust shall be absolute and
irrevocable, even though the separation may be determined.4
But without some provision to this effect it will be pre-
sumed that reconciliation and the resuming of cohabitation
will terminate the separation and the obligations involved..5
1 Vansiltart v. Vansiltart, 2 De
G. & J. 249; s. c, Watson's Comp.
Eq. (2d ed.) 402.
2 Hope v. Hope, 8 De G. , M. & G.
731. In England by the Acts 36
Vict. ch. 12, § 2, agreements in sep-
aration deeds are not to be void
merely" because they provide for
the mother having the custody and
control of the infant children, but
the court is not to enforce the agree-
ment if not for the benefit of the
children. Hart v. Hart, L. R. 18
Ch. D. 670, 681. The children have
no equity to sue on the deed unless
they can show that they have ben-
eficial rights cestuis que trust. L . R.
30 Ch. D. 57. Formerly the agree-
ment would not be enforced where
there was a stipulation that the
children should be delivered to and
remain under the care of the
mother. Hope v. Hope, 8 De G.,
M. & G. 731 ; Vansiltart v. Vansil-
tart, 2 «De G. & J. 249. See also
Swift v. Swift, 34 Beav. 266; s. C,
11 Jur. (N. S.) 458.
3 Besant v. Wood, L. R. 12 Ch.
D. 605 ; Fearon v. Earl of Ayles-
ford, L. R. 14 Q. B. Div. 792. But
semble, adultery by the wife followed
by the birth of a spurious child
whom she puts forward as the child
of her husband, especially if this is
done with intent to claim a title or
property to which the legitimate
offspring of her husband would be
entitled, is evidence of a breach of
a covenant against molestation of
her. Fearon v. Earl of Aylesford,
L. R. 14 Q. B. Div. 792. But if the
intent was that the wife might be
at liberty to commit adultery, the
deed would be void. Ibid. See also
Gandy v. Gandy, L. R. 7 Probate
D. 168; s. C.,30Ch. D. 57.
4 Wilson v. Mushett, 3 B. & Ad.
743 ; Webster v. Webster, 4 De G.,
M. & G. 437.
s Nicol v. Nicol, L. R. 31 Ch. D.
524; Bateman v. Ross, 1 Dow. 235;
Westmeath v. Westmeath, 1 Dow.
& CI. 519; Webster v. Webster, 4
De G., M. & G. 437 ; s. c, Watson's
Comp. Eq. 404; Keyes v. Keyes,
11 Heisk. 425; Mercein v. People,
25 Wend. 97; s. c, 35 Am. Dec.
653; Wells v. Stout, 9 Cal. 498;
726
MARRIED WOMEN.
[§ 312.
But reconciliation without the resuming of cohabitation,
even though the parties may reside under the same roof,
will not terminate the contract.1 Where the contract con-
tains provisions relating to property in excess of what is
necessary for the support of the wife, it appears that rec-
onciliation with cohabitation will not necessarily terminate
the deed.2 Where the deed of separation contains no pro-
vision that either of the parties shall not sue for a divorce,
it will not constitute a bar to divorcement proceedings. A
deed of separation is not abrogated by a subsequent divorce,
especially where the divorce makes no provision for alimony
or for any substitute for the provisions of the contract of
separation.3
Garland v. Garland, 50 Miss. 694 :
Zimmer v. Settle, 124 N. Y. 37;
S. c, 21 Am. St. Rep. 638; James
v. James, 81 Tex. 373; Keller v.
Phillips, 39 X- Y. 351 ; Carson v.
Murray, 3 Paige, 483; Stephenson
v. Osborne, 41 Miss. 119; s. 0., 90
Am. Dec. 358 ; Hitner's Appeal, 54
Pa. St. 110; Garland v. Garland, 50
Miss. 694; Calkins v. Long, 22
Barb. 97 ; Walker v. Beal, 3 Cliff.
155. An intercourse of three days
may not be proof of permanent
reconciliation. Heyer v. Burger,
Hoff. Ch. 1.
1 Frampton v. Frampton, 4 Beav
287 ; Bateman v. Boss, 1 Dow. 245
Carson v. Murray, 3 Paige, 483
Wells v. Stout, 9 Cal. 479; "Sepa-
ration Deeds and Reconciliation, "
21 L. J. 352.
2 Watson's Compendium of
Equity (2d ed.), 404. In Rupp-
ler v. Alston, L. R. 19 Eq. 539, a
lady was entitled at the time
of her marriage to a sum of money
secured by the promissory note of
her brother, a deed of separation
between her and her husband was
afterwards executed, in which the
brother covenanted that he would
hold the money upon trust
for the wife and husband suc-
cessively for life and then for the
child of the marriage. The hus-
band and wife after separation re-
turned to cohabitation, and the hus-
band became bankrupt. It was
held that, as the deed contained
provisions beyond the purview of a
mere separation deed, it could be
supported as a, valid settlement.
See also Nicol v. Nlcol, L. R. 30
Ch. D. 143.
3 Clark v. Fosdick, 118 N. Y. 7;
Pettit v. Pettit, 107 N". Y. 677;
Carey v. Mackey, 82 Me. 517, 521 ;
s. c, 9 Lawy Rep. 112; Moore v.
Moore, 57 L. T. 568; Kremelburg
v. Kremelburg, 52 Md. 563. The
wife's covenant not to disturb the
husband is not broken by her in-
stituting suit for judicial separa-
tion. Thomas v. Everhard, 6 Hurl.
& N". 448 ; Williams v. Bailey, L. R.
2 Eq, 731. See also Brown v.
Brown, L. R, 3 P. & M. 202.
CHAPTER XVI.
TRUSTS FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
313. The Charitable Trust De-
fined.
314. Trusts for Religious Pur-
poses.
315. Trusts for Purposes of Edu-
cation.
316. Trustsfor Purposes of Gen-
eral Benevolence.
317. Trusts for the Benefit of
the Public.
318. Origin of Charitable Trusts.
319. Jurisdiction of Equity.
320. The Doctrine in the United
States.
321. The Subject Continued.
322. Characteristics of the Trust
for Charitable Purposes.
323. The Subject Continued.
324. The Cy Pres Doctrine.
325. The Subject Continued.
326. The Same Subject.
327. The Same.
328. The Disposition of Charita-
ble Corporations.
329. The Subject Continued.
330. Power of the Court to
Change a Charitable
Scheme.
331. The Cy Pres Doctrine in
America.
332. Cy Pres under the Royal
Prerogative.
333. The Legislature as Parens
Patrice.
§ 334. Corporations as Trustees
for Charitable Gifts.
335. Gifts to Charitable Cor-
porations.
336. The Subject Continued.
337. Charitable Gifts to Non-
existing Corporations.
338. Abuse of Charitable Trusts.
339. Breach of Ecclesiastical
Trust.
340. The Subject Continued.
341. The Same Subject.
342. The Same.
343. The English Doctrine.
344. The Marshalling of Testa-
tor's Assets.
345. Gifts in Contravention of
Law or Public Policy.
346. The Subject Continued.
347. Charitable Trusts to be
Administered in a For-
eign Country.
348. Barred by Statutes of Mort-
main.
349. Objects not Subject to
Change.
350. Personal Distinguished
from Official Trust.
351. Perpetuities and Accumu-
lations.
352. The Subject Continued.
353. The Statute of Limita-
tions.
§ 313. The Charitable Trust Defined. — The English
statute and the decisions of the courts, both in England
and in this country, have given to charitable or public
trusts a very broad and comprehensive definition. The
728 CHARITABLE PURPOSES. [§ 313.
statute enumerates the objects in the following quaint and
expressive language : "Whereas lands, tenements, rents,
annuities, profits, hereditaments, goods, chattels, money,
and stocks of money, have been heretofore given, limited,
appointed and assigned, as well by the Queen's most excellent
majesty, and her most noble progenitors, as by sundry
other well disposed persons ; some for relief of aged, im-
potent and poor people, some for maintenance of sick and
maimed soldiers and mariners, schools of learning, free
schools, and scholars in universities, some for repair of
bridges, ports havens, causeways, churches, sea banks and
highways, some for education and preferment of orphans,
some for or towards relief, stock or maintenance for houses
of correction, some for marriages of poor maids, some for
supportation, aid and help of young tradesmen, handicrafts-
men and persons decayed, and others for relief or redemp-
tion of prisoners or captives, and for aid or ease of any
poor inhabitants concerning payments of fifteens, setting
out of soldiers and other taxes ; which lands, tenements,
rents, annuities, profits, hereditaments, goods, chattels,
money, and stocks of money, nevertheless have not been
employed according to the charitable intent of the givers
and founders thereof, by reason of frauds, breaches of
trust and negligence in those that should pay, deliver and
employ the same."1 This enumeration has not been ac-
1 Stat. 43, Eliz. ch. IV. "Be- charity of the era of hospitals,
fore entering upon the subject, we Before the matter becomes the sub-
should give our views of the mean- ject of legal cognizance as a char-
ing of 'charitable uses.' Undoubt- ity, there must be a gift to a gen-
edly, in one sense, charity may be eral public use. This may in some
defined to be all the good affections cases embrace the rich as well
which men ought to bear to each as the poor. (Amb. 651.) These
other. In still another sense, it ideas seem to be necessary to
signifies relief to the poor; such the notion of a charitable use.
charity as this is a mere moral duty, It must concern property, which
not capable of being enforced by may be either real or personal
law. The distinction, for legal estate; this property must be de-
purposes, must be drawn between voted by the owner to a charitable
mere charitable gifts and organized purpose, in such a, way that a trust
charities — the distinction between is fastened upon it, and the donor
the charity of St. Paul and the cannot recall it; an authority is to
§ 313.;
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
729
cepted as exhaustive. Singularly enough, it omits some
of the objects which awaken the deepest and most general
interest of the benevolent at least in Christian England
and America. The decisions of the courts have regard, not
preside over the charity, having a
permanent character, so that its
benefits shall not exhaust them-
selves with a single effort, but
shall be continuous and reproduct-
ive ; the beneficiaries, successively,
are to be derived from a class of
persons who have no claim upon
the fund, except by selection or
ascertainment in some proper fund,
so that there is a succession of con-
tingent uses • and, finally, the char-
ity must be public, productive of
some kind of public advantage.
There may be other charities be-
sides these above described, but
they do not come within the scope
of the law of charitable uses. They
are private or intermittent; or the
beneficiaries are not contingent.
They either lie outside of the pale
of the law altogether, or else they
are not subject to special rules ap-
plicable to charitable trusts."
Prof. Dwight in "Argument in
Rose Will Case," page 92. The
definition given by Mr. Binney in
his argument in the G-irard Will
Case has been adopted by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in
Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. St. 23, and
cited with approval by Gray, Jus-
tice, in Jackson v. Phillips, 14
Allen, 556. He says: "I say the
legal doctrine of pious uses comes
from the Bible. I do not say that
the principle and duty of charity,
are not derived from natural re-
ligion also. Individuals may have
taken it from this source. The law
has taken it in all cases from the
revealed will of God. What is a
charitable or pious gift, according
to that religion? It is whatever is
given for the love of God, or for
the love of your neighbor, in the
Catholic and universal sense, —
given from these motives and to
these ends, — free from the stain or
taint of every consideration that is
personal, private or selfish. * *
Here are the two great principles
upon which charitable or pious
uses depend. The love of God is
the basis of all that are bestowed
for this honor, the building up of
His church, the support of His min-
isters, the religious instruction of
mankind. The love of his neighbor,
is the principle that prompts and
consecrates all the rest. The cur-
rents of these two great affections
finally run together, and they are
at all times so near that they can
hardly be said to be separated."
Girard Will Case, page 41. "A
charity in the legal sense may be
more fully defined as a gift, to be
applied consistently with existing
laws, for the benefit of an indefinite
number of persons, either by bring-
ing their minds or hearts under the
influence of education or religion,
by relieving their bodies from dis-
ease, suffering or constraint, by as-
sisting them to establish themselves
in life, or by erecting or maintain-
ing public buildings or works or
otherwise lessening the burdens of
government. It is immaterial
whether the purpose is called
charitable in the gift in itself, if it
is so described as to show that it is
charitable in its nature." Jackson
v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 539, 556. "A
gift to a general public use, which
730 CHARITABLE PURPOSES. [§ 314.
to the particular enumeration of the statute, but to the
obvious spirit and intention of its provisions. It is now
well established that the doctrine will be applied to trusts
for all objects that may be considered as charitable, in a
general sense, unless they are clearly in contravention of
public policy, or in violation of some statutory provision.
In general, the purposes which are held by the courts to
be charitable, and, as such, proper objects of a public
trust, may be included under the following designations,
viz. : Religious, educational, general benevolence, and for
the benefit of the public.
§ 314. Trusts for Religious Purposes. — In that class
of trusts for objects designated as religious may be included
provision for the support or propagation of any and all
forms of religious doctrine. Such provision may include
gifts for the erection, care or renovation of church edifices,
for the maintenance of public worship, including the sala-
ries of ministers and other current expenses, for the print-
ing and circulation of the Bible, for the sending out and
support of missionaries, and for the support of missionary
operations in Pagan lands, for the support of religious
societies for the promotion of any truly religious ends,
and, in general, for any work designed to aid in the sup-
port and spread of the Gospel. In England an exception
was made in the case of what were termed "superstitious
uses," that is, masses for the repose of the souls of the
dead and the like, in the Roman Catholic Church. But in
this country this exception has not been sustained. In a
leading case before the New York Court of Appeals, which
extends to the poor as well as the usage of English-speaking people,
rich." Jones v. Williams, Ambl. The moment the word is used in
652; Coggeshall v. Pelton, 7 Johns, connection with the present sub-
Ch. 294; Mitford v. Reynolds, 1 ject-matter of charitable gifts, or
Phil. Ch. 191, 192; Perin v. Carey, charitable institutions, the popular
24 How. 506. "The commonest as well as legal mind takes in at
and most familiar meaning of char- once its wider scope of goodwill,
ity is alms-giving; but that narrow benevolence, desire to add to the
definition is not the primary or happiness or improvement of our
most important one given in the fellow-beings." Donough's Ap-
dictionaries or sanctioned by the peal, 83 Pa. St. 306, 312.
§ 314. J
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
731
received very full and careful consideration, Mr. Justice
Rapallo, in his opinion, said: "The efficacy of prayers
for the dead is one of the doctrines of the Roman Catholic
Church, of which the testator was a member ; and those
professing that belief are entitled in law to the same re-
spect and protection in their religious observances thereof
as those of any other denomination. These observances
cannot be condemned by any court, as matter of law, as
superstitious, and the English statutes against superstitious
uses can have no effect here."1 In this country, as well as
1 Holland v. Alcock, 108 N. Y.
312, 323; s. c, 2 Am. St. Rep. 420.
See also Attorney-General v. Fish-
mongers' Co., 5 Myl. & Cr. 11;
West v. Shuttleworth, 2 Myl. & K.
684; In re Blundell, 30 Beav. 360;
Heath v. Chapman, 2 Drew. 417 ;
Carey v. Abbott, 7 Ves. 490, 495;
Gass v. Wilhite, 2 Dana, 170; s. c,
26 Am. Dec. 440; Methodist Church
v. Remington, 1 Watts, 218; s. c,
26 Am. Dec. 61; In re Schouler,
134 Mass. 426; Seda v. Huble, 75
Iowa, 429; s. C, 9 Am. St. Rep.
495; In re Backes' Will (1895), 9
Misc. Rep. 504; s. C.,30N.Y. Supl.
394. The following are a few of
the objects sanctioned by the
authorities as being trusts for re-
ligious purposes in the United
States; for missionary purposes:
Board of Foreign Missions, United
Presbyterian Church v. Culp (1893) ,
151 Pa. St. 467; s. c, 25 Atl. Rep.
117 ; 31 W. N.C. 135 ;Tallman v.Tall-
man (1893), 3 Misc. Rep. 465; s. c,
23 N". Y. Supl. 374; Chappell v.
Missionary Soc. of Churches of
Christ (1892), 3 Ind. App. 356;
S. c, 29 N. E. Rep. 924; McAllister
v. Burgess (1894), 161 Mass. 269;
s. c, 37 N. E. Rep. 173; Goodell v.
Union Assn., etc., 29 N. J. Eq. 32;
De Lamp v. Dobbins, 29 N. J. 36;
Fairbanks v. Lamson, 99 Mass. 533 ;
Maine Baptist Miss. Con. v. Port-
land, 65 Me. 92; Morville v. Fowle,
144 Mass. 109; Kinney v. Kinney,
86 Ky. 610; Andrews v. Andrews,
110 111. 223 ; for a parsonage, Long-
heed v. Dykeman's Baptist Church
(1892), 129 ST. Y. 211; S. C, 29 ST.
E. Rep. 249; building and sup-
porting churches, maintaining di-
vine worship, De Camp v. Dob-
bins, 29 5T. J. Eq. 36; Old South
Soc. v. Crocker, 119 Mass. 1 ; s. c,
20 Am. Rep. 299; Meeting St. Bap-
tist Soc. v. Hail, 8 R. I. 234; Jones
v. Haversham, 3 Woods, 443; s. c,
107 U. S. 174; New York Bible
Soc. v. Budlong(1893), 30 Abb. ST.
C. 139; s. c, 25 N". Y. Supl.
6S; support of clergyman, Bullard
v. Town of Shirley. 153 Mass. 559;
Sunday Schools, Conkling v. Davis
(1893), 63 Conn. 377; s. c, 28 Atl.
Rep. 537; Fairbanks v. Lamson, 99
Mass. 533. Contra: Goodell v. Union
Assn., etc., 29 1ST. J. Eq. 32. See
also Field v. Drew Theological
Seminary, 41 Fed. Rep. 371 ; Simp-
son v. Welcome, 72 Me. 496; s. C,
39 Am. Rep. 349. The following
English authorities are to the same
effect : For promotion of religious
doctrines by distribution of publi-
cations, Atty.-Gen. v. Stephney,
10 Ves. 22; Wilkinson v. Lindgren,
L. R. 5 Ch. 570; White v. White
(1893), 2 Ch. 41; building and re-
pairing churches, Hoare v. Os-
732 CHARITABLE PURPOSES. [§ 314.
in England, a gift will not be sustained as a trust for char-
itable purposes where the avowed object is to oppose religion,
or where its influence and tendency are plainly irreligious.
In Pennsylvania it has been held that a devise to the "In-
fidel Society in Philadelphia for the purpose of building a
hall for the free discussion of religion, politics, etc.,"
cannot be sustained as a charitable trust. In his opinion
in this case Mr. Justice Sharswood said: "It is in entire
consistency with this sacred guarantee of the rights of
conscience and religious liberty to hold that, even if Chris-
tianity is no part of the law of the land, it is the popular
religion of the country, an insult to which would be indict-
able as directly tending to disturb the public peace. The
laws and institutions of this State are built on the founda-
tion of reverence for Christianity. To this extent, at
least, it must certainly be considered as well settled that
the religion revealed in the Bible is not to be openly re-
viled, ridiculed or blasphemed to the annoyance of sincere
believers who compose the great mass of the good people of
the commonwealth."1
borne, L. R. 1 Eq. 585; Booth The church had been built and
v. Carter, L. R. 3 Eq. 757; Cress- licensed, and an incumbent ap-
well v. Cresswell, L. R. 6 Eq. 69; pointed. It had not yet been con-
Turner v. Ogden, 1 Cox, 316; secrated, and the money was not to
Adnam v. Cole, 6 Beav. 353; for be paid until it was consecrated,
support of pastor and worship, Held, that the condition was a con-
Atty.-Gen. v. Laws, 8 Hare. 32; tinuingone; that it was not illegal ;
Thornber v. Wilson, 3 Drew. 245; and that the fund was to be carried
s.c.,4Drew. 350; In re Maguire, over to a separate account, and upon
L. R. 9 Eq. 632; In re Clergy Soc, the church being consecrated the
2 Kay & J. _ 615 ; In re Kilvert's income to be paid to the incumbent
Trusts, L. R. 12 Eq. 183; s. c, 7 so long as he appeared to fulfill the
Ch. D. 170; Atty. -Gen. v. Pearson, condition. In re Robinson, 61 Law
3 Meriv. 353, 409; Atty.-Gen. v. J. Ch. 17.
Bunce, L. R. 20 Eq. 483; to repair J Zeisweiss v. James, 63 Pa. St.
church yard, Vaughan v. Thomas, 465, 471. "I can conceive of noth-
L. R. 33 Ch. D. 187. Testatrix be- ing so likely — so sure, indeed to
queathed a sum of money towards produce these consequences; as a
the endowment of a certain church hall desecrated in perpetuity for
on condition "that the black gown the free discussion of religion, pol-
shall be worn in the pulpit, unless itics, etc., under the direction and
there shall be any alteration administration of a society of infi-
in the law rendering it illegal." dels. Indeed, I would go further
§ 315.]
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
733
§ 315. Trusts for Purposes of Education. — All devises,
bequests, or other gifts, for the support of educational in-
stitutions of a general character, have been held to be valid
as included in the spirit of the statute. This class includes
all donations designed for the advancement of learning, for
the promotion of any form of education, for the increase
of knowledge in a general sense, or for the cultivation of
intelligence. It may include a foundation for the support
of a particular science, or for the encouragement of art. It
may embrace a provision for the founding or for the en-
dowment of a college, a seminary, or other institutions of
learning, for the erection of buildings for such institutions,
for the establishment of a particular professorship, or for
the special training of a designated class, as the indigent
youth of a particular town or district. But all gifts of this
character must constitute a public trust. Charitable trusts
for strictly, or essentially, private purposes will not be
upheld.1
and adopt the sentiment and lan-
guage of Mr. Justice Duncan in the
case just referred to : 'It would
prove a nursery of vice, a school
of preparation to qualify young
men for the gallows and young
women for the brothel, and there
is not a skeptic of decent manners
and good morals, who would not
consider such a debating club as a
common nuisance and disgrace to
the city.' " Ibid. SeeUpdegraff v.
The Commonwealth, 11 Serg.& K.
394; Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2
How.(U. S.) 198. The "Friendship
Liberal League" was incorporated
for the improvement of its mem-
bers, by the dissemination of
"scientific truth"1 by means of
music, literature, lectures and de-
bates; held'meetings on Sundays;
and was wholly dependent for funds
on gifts and contributions. There
was evidence that it "opposed all
isms," that Christian and infidel
were alike eligible to membership,
and that a Sunday evening lecture
against Christianity was followed
by a debate in the same spirit.
Held, that a bequest to such league
was "for religious uses," and void
under Act April 26, 1855, when
made less than one calendar month
before testator's death. In re
Knight's Estate (1893), 159 Pa. St.
500; s. C, 28 Atl. Rep. 303; 34 W.
N. C.6.
1 Burke v.Koper, 79 Ala. 142 Hol-
land v. Alcock, 108 X. Y. 312, 330;
Blandford v. Fackerel, 4 Bro. Ch.
394; Attorney-General v. Hewer,
2 Vern. 387; Magistrates of Dun-
dee v. Morris, 3 Macq. 134 ; In re
Latymer's Charity, L. R. 7 Eq. 353 ;
In re Hedgman, L. R. 8 Ch. D. 156;
New v. Bonaker, L. R. 4 Eq. 655;
Rex v. Xewman, 1 Lev. 284; Attor-
ney-General v. Margaret Prof essors,
1 Vern. 55; Attorney-General v.
Tancred, 1 Eden, 10; Whicker
734
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
[§ 316.
§ 316. Trusts for Purposes of General Benevolence.
— Donations, the object of which is to constitute a pro-
vision for any suffering or needy class, are sustained as
v. Hume, 7 H. L. Cas. 124;
s. C, 1 De G., M. . & G. 506;
Beaumont v. Oliveira, L. R. 6 Eq.
534; s. c.,4Ch. D.309; Trustees of
British Museums v. White, 2 Sim.
& St. 594; Townley v. Bedell, 6
Ves. 104; Kussell v. Allen, 5 Dill.
235; Boxford, etc. Soc. v. Harri-
man, 125 Mass. 321; Stevens v.
Snippen, 28 N. J. Eq. 487; Piper
v. Moulton, 72 Me. 155; Taylor v.
Trustees, 34 N. J. Eq. 101;
Attorney-General v. Soule, 28
Mich. 153; Attorney-General v.
Parker, 126 Mass. 216; Dodge
v. Williams, 46 Wis. 70; De
Camp v. Dobbins, 29 N. J. Eq.
36; Clement v. Hyde. 50 Vt. 716;
S. C, 28 Am. Rep. 522; Craig v.
Secrist, 54 Ind. 419; Mason v. M.
E. Church, 27 X. J. Eq.47; Birch-
ard v. Scott, 39 Conn. 63; Jones v.
Habersham, 107 U. S. 174, 189;
Kussell v. Allen, 107 U. S. 172;
Missouri Hist. Soc. v. Academy of
Sciences, 94 Mo. 459; Webster v.
Morris, 66 Wis. 366; s. c, 57 Am.
Rep. 278; Dascomb v. Marston, 80
Me. 223; Brown v. Pancoast, 34
X. J. Eq. 324; George v. Braddock,
45 X. J. Eq. 757; S. C, 14 Am. St.
Bep. 754; Tidal v. Girard's Exrs.,
2 How. 127, 192; American Acad-
emy v. Harvard College, 12 Gray,
582; Chapin v. School Dist., 35
1ST. H. 445. A devise to a school
under the auspices and control of a
religious denomination or sect and
confined to the youth of its mem-
bers, both rich and poor, and in
which the peculiar views of Chris-
tianity, as entertained by that de-
nomination, constituted a part of
the instruction imparted in the
school, is a charitable use. Price
v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. St. 23. A be-
quest of money in trust to testa-
tor's executors and their successors,
the income to be paid semi-an-
nually to a public lyceum and free
library, is valid. In re Bartlett
(1895), 163 Mass. 50; s. c, 40 N.
E. Rep. 899. A devise of land to
"The Protestant Episcopal Church
of the Diocese of Maryland, a body
corporate, and its successors for-
ever, to be held as a place for a
church school for boys, to be under
the control and supervision of said
corporation," and to be called the
"Warfield College," constitutes a
trust for charitable and religious
purposes which the court of chan-
cery had jurisdiction, independent
of Stat. 43 Eliz. to enforce; as the
corporate body to which the de-
vise was made was capable, under
its charter, of taking and holding
the property so devised, and as the
object and character of the trust
were definite and certain. Halsey
v. Convention of Protestant Epis-
copal Church (1892), 75 Md. 275;
s. c, 23 Atl. Rep. 781. A bequest
to an institution of learning to be
applied to the education and tuition
of worthy, indigent females is not
void for the uncertainty of the ben-
eficiaries. Dodge v. Williams, 46
Wis. 70; s. C, 50 X. W. Rep. 1103.
See also Brewer v. University of
North Carolina (1892), 110 N. Car.
26; s. C, 14 S. E. Rep. 644; City
of Bangor v. Beal (1894) , 85 Me.
129; s. c, 26 Atl. Rep. 1112; Shel-
don v. Town of Stockbridge (1895),
67 Vt. 299; s. c, 31 Atl. Rep. 414;
Woodruff v. Marsh (1893) , 63 Conn.
125; S. C, 26 Atl. Rep. 846.
§ 316.]
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
735
charitable trusts. In this class of trusts may be included
the endowment of hospitals, asylums, or retreats of any
description, infirmaries, or houses of refuge for the correc-
tion of juvenile offenders, homes for the benefit of aged
and indigent persons, and, in general, trusts designed as a
provision for the relief of any class that may stand in need
of benevolent aid. It has been held that even trusts for
the benefit of the "poor relations" of the donor, if the
provision is not for certain individuals named, but for the
poor relations of the donor as a class, are trusts for char-
itable purposes. As in other cases, trusts of this character
must be a provision for the class designated.1
1 Gillam v. Taylor, L. R. 16 Eq.
581, 5S4; Attorney - General v.
Price, 17 Ves. 371 ; Isaac v. Defriez,
Arab. 595; s. C, 17 Ves. 373; White
v.White, 7 Ves. 423; Bernal v. Ber-
nal, 3 Myl. & Cr. 559; Attorney-
General v. Duke of Northumber-
land^. R. 7 Ch. D. 745; Powell v.
Attorney-General, 3 Meriv. 48;
Attorney-General v. Comber, 2
Sim. & St. 93; Attorney-General v.
Clarke, Amb. 422; Bishop of
Hereford v- Adams, 7 Ves. 324;
Russell v. Kellett, 3 Sm. & G. 264;
Thompson v. Corby, 27 Beav. 649;
Fisk y. Attorney-General, L. R. 4
Eq. 521; Dawson v. Small, L. R.
18 Eq. 114; In re Williams, L. R.
5 Ch. D. 735; In re Birkett, L. R.
9Ch. D. 576; Webster v. Sonthey,
L. R. 36 Ch. D. 9. For hospitals,
Pelham v. Anderson, 2 Eden, 296;
Magistrates of Dundee v. Morris,
3 Macq. 134, 157 ; Perring v. Traill,
L. R. 18 Eq. 88; University of
London v. Garrow, 1 De G. & J.
72; Ould v. Washington Hospital,
95 TJ. S. 303; McDonald v. Mass.
Gen. Hospital, 120 Ma-s. 432;
s. c, 21 Am. Rep. 529; Ilay-
den v. Connecticut Hospital for
Insane (1894), 64 Conn. 320; S. C,
30 Atl. Rep. 50; Phillips v. Har-
row (1894) (Iowa), 61 1ST. W. Rep.
434. See generally Creswell v.
Creswell, L. R. 6 Eq. 69; Mogg-
ridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. 36 ; Po-
cock v. Attorney-General, L. R. 3
Ch. D.342; Lewis v. Allenby, L.
R. 10Eq.668; Wilkinson v. Barber,
L. R. 14 Eq. 96 ; Sohier v. Burr, 127
Mass. 221 ; Fellows v. Miner, 119
Mass. 541 ; Cruse v. Axtell, 50 Ind.
49; Swift v. Beneficial Society, 73
Pa. St. 362; Suter v. Hilliard, 132
Mass. 412; s. C, 42 Am. Rep.
444; Goodale v. Mooney, 60 K. H.
528; s. c, 49 Am. Rep. 334; Pell
v. Mercer, 14 R. I. 412. Hesketh
v. Murphy, 35 N. J. Eq. 23; Das-
comb v. Marston, 80 Me. 223 ; Hunt
v. Fowler, 121 111. 269; Gafney v.
Kennison, 64 N. H. 354. A bequest
for founding and supporting an
animal sanitary institution for in-
vestigating and curing maladies,
distempers and injuries of quadra-
peds or birds useful to man is a
good charitable bequest. Univer-
sity of London v. Garrow, 1 De G.
& J. 72. See also Marsh v. Marsh,
3 Jur. (N". S.) 790. A bequest to an
institution in Philadelphia that
will give shelter to homeless peo-
ple at night, irrespective of creed,
color or condition, will be sus-
736
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
[§ 317.
§ 317. Trusts for the Benefit of the Puhlie. — The
creation of trusts for any object designed to promote the
public welfare will be upheld in equity as trusts for char-
itable purposes. Though not charitable or benevolent in
the strict sense of that term, there is a benevolent intention
that is in accord with the spirit of the statute. Of trusts
of this class may be named trusts for the erection of public
buildings, for the endowment of public libraries, museums,
or art galleries, the providing of water for a town, as the
opening of a fountain, the improvement of streets, the
opening of a public park, or any other work designed and
adapted to benefit the public. Provisions of this character
tained in favor of a society shown
to have been organized and in
operation a number of years, to be
engaged in maintaining shelters on
the terms mentioned in the will,
and to be the only institution in
the city so engaged. Inre Croxall's
Estate (1894), 102 Pa. St. 579; S. C,
29 Atl. Rep. 790. A bequest in
trust for the purpose of giving
premiums, for treatises on sub-
jects conducive to the advancement
of medical science, and for printing
and distributing treatises to which
premiums shall have been avvarded,
is a valid charitable bequest. Pal-
mer v. President, etc. of Union
Bank (1892). 17 R. I. 627; s. C, 24
Atl. Rep. 109. For maintenance of
a burial lot a valid charitable trust.
In re Tierney's Estate, 2 Pa. Dist.
Rep. 524. A direction to executors
to pay money "for the benefit of
disabled soldiers and seamen who
served in the Union Army in the
late War of Rebellion in the
United States, their widows and
orphans," is good as a public
charitable bequest. Holmes v.
Coates (1S93), 152 Mass. 226; s. c,
34 N. E. Rep. 190. A devise to the
town council of Coventry, R. I., in
trust for the support of the poor of
said town, is not void for uncer-
tainty as to the beneficiaries.
Wood v. Paine, 66 Fed. Rep. 807.
See also Sheldon v. Town of Stock-
bridge (1895), 67 Vt. 299; s. c, 31
Atl. Rep. 414; Trim v. Bright-
man (1894), 168 Pa. St. 395;
s. c, 31 Atl. Rep. 1071; Phil-
lips v. Harrow (1894) (Iowa), 61 N.
W. Rep. 434; In re Geek, 69 Law
T. (N. S.) 819. A gift to a cor-
poration organized for the purpose,
with which to purchase land and
build residences thereon for the
laboring classes, to be controlled
so as to "improve the moral, phys-
ical and intellectual condition of
the youth of this city," and to be
let to laborers for rent, and not
gratuitously, is a charitable trust,
which may be sustained by an-
alogy under Stat. 43 Eliz., ch.
IV.; Webster v. Wiggin (1895)
(R. I.), 31 Atl. Rep. 824. Ahoi-pital
maintained by a railroad company
for the free treatment of its
employes, supported partly by the
monthly contributions of all its em-
ployes, and partly by the company,
and not maintained for profit, is a
charitable institution. Union Pac.
Ry. Co. v. Artist, 60 Fed. Rep.
365: s. c, 9C.C.A. 14.
§ 317.]
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
737
are adapted, in a general sense, to promote the well-being
of the public, or of a class, and are open to the use of as
many as are able to avail themselves of the benefit which
the donor seeks to confer.1
1 The following are a few exam-
ples: For opening public parks,
In re Bartlett (1895), 163 Mass. 503;
s. c, 40 N. E. Rep. 899; for sup-
plying water to a town, Jones v.
Williams, Amb. 651 ; for the im-
provement of a town, Attorney-
General v. Bushby, 24 Beav. 299 ;
Mitford v. Reynolds, 1 Phil. Ch.
185; Attorney-General v.Lonsdale,
1 Sim. 105; Howse v. Chapman, 4
Ves. 542; Jones v. Williams, Amb.
651 ; Attorney-General v. Heelis, 2
S. & S. 67; for the reduction of the
national debt, Ashton v. Langdale,
4Eng. L.& Eq. 139; Newland v.
Attorney-General, 3 Meriv. 684;
Dickson v. United States, 125 Mass.
311; United States v. Fox, 94 IT. 8.
315; for benefit of the community
in general, Nightingale v. Gold-
bourn, 2 Phil. Ch. 594; Attorney-
General v. Eastlake, 11 Hare, 205,
215, 216; Attorney- General v.
Brown, 1 Swanst. 265, 301, 302; to
the British Museum, British Mu-
seum v. White, 2 S. & S. 594; to
the Koyal Geographical Society,
Beaumont v. Oliveira, L. K. 6 Eq.
534; s. C, L. B. 4 Ch. App. 309;
for the suppression of manufacture
and sale of intoxicating liquors,
Haines v. Allen, 78 Ind. 100; for
municipal purposes, Vidal v. Gir-
ard's Exrs., 2 How. (U. S.) 124;
Town of Hampden v. Rice, 24
Conn. 357; for a town house,
Coggeshall v. Pelton, 7 Johns. Ch.
492; books for public schools,
Davis v. Inhabitants of Barnstable,
154 Mass. 224; for public libraries,
New Haven Young Men's Institute
v. City of New Haven (1892), 60
47
Conn. 32; s. c, 22 Atl. Rep. 447 ;
Crerar v. Williams (1893), 145 111.
625; s. C, 34 N. E. Rep. 467. A
gift of the part of an entire fund
and its accumulations at the end
of two hundred years, to be di-
vided between the inhabitants of
the city of Philadelphia and the
government of Pennsylvania, is a.
charitable trust. Franklin's Admx.
v. City of Philadelphia, 13 Pa. Co.
Ct. Rep. 241; s. c, 2 Pa. Dist.Rep.
435. A gift to the Philadelphia
Fire Department Relief Associa-
tion, the constitution of which
provides for the raising of a per-
manent fund to insure stability to
the association, and the by-laws of
which declare all admission fees
and all ■•legacies," etc., shall con-
stitute such fund, and that on a
member's death his widow, or-
phans, or next of kin, shall receive
as much as shall be collected from
the surviving members for that
purpose, is a charitable gift. In re
Jeane's Estate (1894), 34 W. N. C.
190; s. c, 3 Pa. Dist. Rep. 314. A
board of county commissioners is
a corporation capable of taking a
devise for the establishment of a
home for the benefit of worthy
homeless people and orphans.
Board of Commissioners of Rush
County v. Dinwiddie (1894), 139
Ind. 128; s. c, 37 N. E. Rep. 795.
A provision in a will that, when
a fund amounts to $500,000, one-
half of the income shall be de-
voted to the payment of the sala-
ries of additional teachers in the
public schools, or if the city re-
fuses to co-operate in that design,
738 CHARITABLE PURPOSES. [§ 318.
§ 318. Origin of Charitable Trusts The origin and
source of charitable trusts, as a system or doctrine of
equity, is involved in some obscurity. It has generally
been supposed that the Court of Chancery derived it from
the civil law of England, as it had there grown out of the
Eonian law, or Codex Justinianus. Lord Thurlow held
that view, and he was followed in it by Lord Eldon.1 Not-
withstanding, however, the support of this high authority,
the doctrine of charitable uses, if not in its modern form,
at least in its essential features, must be assigned a much
earlier origin. It is certain that what has been termed
"pious uses" had the sanction of the Emperor Constantine.
It is also well known that such gifts were subsequently re-
strained by Valentinian in his opposition to Christianity,
and that at a still later date the privilege was restored to
the Christians of the Roman Empire by Justinian, and that
under his authority such uses were fully and permanently
established. "But where did the Roman law get them?
We might infer the source from the fact that Constantine
was the first Christian emperor ; that Valentinian was an
Arian, a sagacious, bold and cruel soldier, but the tolerant
the trustees may devote it to the tion are for public welfare and
establishment of schools for the charitable, though it was organized
education of children residing in as a private corporation, when it
certain tenements controlled by was not organized for pecuniary
the trustees under a previous pro- profit, and never was conducted
vision of the will, creates a char- for that purpose, and all moneys
itable trust. Webster v. Wig- obtained by it are used to maintain
gins (1895) (E. I.), 31 Atl. the library and purchase books,
Eep. 824. A bequest of a sum of and all are entitled to the use of the
money to a town to use the income books in the library room, though
in improving a certain cemetery, one may take a book therefrom
is not void because of a condition only by becoming a subscriber for
that the town shall keep the amount a fixed time and paying a pre-
intact for all future time under E. scribed fee, or by paying a certain
L. § 3192, empowering towns to amount for each book without be-
raise money to keep burial grounds coming a subscriber. Phillips v.
in repair, and giving the selectmen Harrow (1895) (Iowa), 61 N. W.
authority to make all necessary Eep. 434.
regulations therefor. Sheldon v. 1 White v. White, 1 Bro. Ch. 12;
Town of Stockbridge (1895), 67 Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. 36,
Vt. 299; s. C, 31 Atl. Eep. 414. 69; S. c. 1 Meriv. 55, 94, 95.
The objects of a library associa-
§ 318. J CHARITABLE PURPOSES. 739
friend of Jews and Pagans, and a persecutor of the Chris-
tians; and that Justinian, 'the vain titles of whose victo-
ries are crumbled into dust, while the name of the legis-
lator is inscribed on a fair and everlasting monument,' ob-
tains, with this praise from the Historian of the Decline
and Fall, the more enviable sneer of being at all times the
'pious,' and, at least in his youth, the 'orthodox Justinian.'
We might infer it still better from that section of the
code which, after liberating gifts to orphan houses and
other religious and charitable institutions, a lucrativorum
inscriptionibus, and confirming the effect of these charges
to other persons, concludes with the inquiries : ' Cur enim non
faciamus discrimen inter res divinas et humanas? Et quare
non competens prerogativa celesti favori conservetur?' 'n
But whatever may have been true of the time and circum-
stances under which the doctrine of trusts for charitable
purposes assumed its permanent form as a method of equity
jurisprudence, it must be traced, not only in its origin, but
as well in the development under which it has reached its
present completeness and perfection, to the efficacy of
the Gospel of Jesus Christ. It was born of the benign in-
fluence of the precepts and example of Him who lived on
earth to go about doing good, to heal the sick, to feed the
hungry and to relieve the distressed, and who finally gave
his life as a ransom for sinners. Neither Paganism nor
Mohammedanism knows anything of eleemosynary institu-
tions. The great Pagan nations of antiquity were strangers
alike to the thing and to the idea. They knew nothing
either of "pious uses," or of the spirit in which the doc-
trine has its springs. Even ancient Greece, with all of its
boasted civilization, and with its unparallelled attainments
in literature and art, had no place for charity. The word
even, in its original Greek form, agape, is wanting to the
language of Pagan Greece.2 It is not found in the vocabu-
1 Girard "Will Case, Argument of which it is derived — agapao — is
Horace Binney, p. 40. classic Greek, but the substantive
2 The original word agape is a agape is not found in the works of
purely Hellenistic, or Biblical and any classical Greek writer. So far
ecclesiastical word. The root from as is known it was first used by the
740
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
[§ 318.
lary of Solon, or of Lycurgus, of Homer or of Plato, of
Herodotus or of Demosthenes. The word, like the idea, to
which it gives expression, is a product of the religion of
the Son of God. To draw farther from the learned and
eloquent argument above cited: The "pious uses" of Jus-
tinian "came then from that religion to which Constantine
was converted, which Valentinian persecuted, and which Jus-
tinian more completely established ; and from the same re-
ligion they would have come to England and to these
States, though the Pandects had still slumbered at Amalfi,
or Eome had remained forever trodden down by the bar-
barians of Scythia and Germany. 1 say the legal doctrine
of pious uses comes from the Bible. I do not say that the
principle and duty of charity are not derived from natural
religion also. Individuals may have taken it from this
source. The law has taken it in all cases from the revealed
will of God."1 The first trust for charitable purposes of
Jews of Alexandria, in Egypt, in
their translation of the Old Testa-
ment Scriptures into Greek, in what
is known as the Septuagint. From
its use in this version it was
adopted by the New Testament
writers. It is the word which they
employ to designate the love which
men cherish toward God, and
which they cherish toward their
fellow-men as the fruit of their
love to God. In other words, it
means love in the Christian sense.
The Greek word for "love," philia,
used by the Pagan Greek writers,
from Homer down, means friend-
ship and love in a sensuous and
emotional sense. For the charity
of the Gospel, which finds expres-
sion in the charitable trust, Pagan
Greece had no conception.
1 Girard Will Case, Argument of
Horace Binney, p. 40. The argu-
ment of Mr. Binney for the defend-
ants in the Girard Will Case
continues to be freely consulted by
students of the subject of char-
itable uses. It is specially rich in
its historical treatment of the sub-
ject. The Supreme Court of the
United States and some of the
States have been greatly aided in
this class of cases by reason of Mr.
Binney's exhaustive treatment of
the subject. In the course of his
argument, in speaking of the great
antiquity of charitable trust, he
uses this language : "Here are the
two great principles upon which
charitable or pious uses depend.
The love of God is the basis of all
that are bestowed for His honor,
the building up of His church, the
support of His ministers, the relig-
ious instructions of mankind. Tlie
love of his neighbor is the principle
that prompts and consecrates all
the rest. The currents of these
two great affections finally run to-
gether, and they are at all times so
near that they can hardly be said
to be separated. * * * But who
is my neighbor? * * * Even
the disciples of the Great Teacher,
§ 319.]
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
741
which we have any record was created by the Church at
Antioch. The amount of the trust estate is not now known,
but the trustees were Barnabas and Saul, and the bene-
ficiaries were the disciples of -Judaea.1 The second charitable
trust of which we have any account was created by the dis-
ciples of Macedonia and Achaia for the benefit of the poor
of the Church at Jerusalem. Of this trust Paul was the
trustee. He has left us a brief notice of his administra-
tion of the trust and of its determination.2
§ 319. .Jurisdiction of Equity — At one time it appears
to have been generally accepted that the jurisdiction of
equity in cases of trusts for charitable purposes was derived
from the statute of Elizabeth.3 This statute determines
the powers of courts of equity in regard to charitable
trusts, and regulates proceedings in equity for their en-
the fishermen from the strand of
Genesareth, who, from their sta-
tion and the vicissitudes of their
calling, would seem to have been
more than others in sympathy with
the unprotected and unprovided of
the earth, were not quick to learn
this great lesson. * * * Lesson
after lesson was designed to lead
the Jew from the prejudices of his
narrow family to 'all the kindreds
upon the earth,' and to open his
heart to even theproscribed Gentile,
instead of suffering none to enter
but those who held to him the per-
sonal relations, by which his own
infirmities wei-e cherished and con-
firmed— to lead him to imitate that
celestial mercy which sends the
rain upon the unjust, and 'is kind
to the unthankful and the evil' — to
impel him, in fine, to love his ene-
mies and to do good unto all men,
as his brethren of one descent from
the same Father in heaven. * * *
The great final illustration of the
principle of charity is given as al-
most the last act of the ministry of
Christ, when he prefigured the
gathering of all nations, and the
separation of one from another as
the shepherd divides the sheep
from the goats. To those on his
right hand the king shall say: "I
w"as an hungered, and ye gave me
meat ; I was thirsty, and ye gave me
drink; I was a stranger, and ye
took me in ; naked, and ye clothed
me ; sick, and ye visited me ; I was
in prison, and ye came unto me.'
And when the righteous, uncon-
scious of this personal ministration
to His wants, say: 'Lord, when?'
the answer consummates the les-
son, and leaves it for the instruc-
tion of the living upon earth, as it
is to be pronounced for their beati-
tude in heaven : 'Inasmuch as ye
have done it to one of the least of
these, my brethren, ye have done
it unto me.' "
1 Acts, xi, 27-30.
2 2 Cor. viii, 1-4; Bom. xv, 25-
28; Acts, xxiv, 17.
3 Stat. 43, Eliz. ch. IV.
742 CHARITABLE PURPOSES. [§ 319.
forcement. But it has been maintained and is now well
established that the jurisdiction of the courts in cases of
charitable trusts had been recognized, previously to the en-
actment of the statute, as arising from its general powers,
and that the only effect of the statute, so far as relates to
equity, was to define the objects of charitable trusts, and to
regulate the exercise of powers already recognized by the
chancery courts.1 In a leading case before the House of
Lords, Lord Redesdale, in his opinion, said: "We are re-
ferred to the statute of Elizabeth, with respect to charita-
ble uses, as creating a new law upon the subject of charita-
ble uses. That statute only created a new jurisdiction, it
created no new law ; it created a new and ancillary juris-
diction ; a jurisdiction borrowed from the elements which I
have mentioned; a jurisdiction created by a commission
to be issued out of the Court of Chancery to inquire
whether the funds given for charitable purposes had
or had not been misapplied, and to see to their proper
application ; but the proceedings of that commission
were made subject to appeal to the Lord Chancel-
lor, and he might reverse or affirm what they had
done, or make such order as he might think fit for reserv-
ing the controlling jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery
as it existed before the passing of that statute, and there
can be no doubt that, by information by the Attorney-
General, the same thing might be done."2 In a leading
1 Vidal v. Girard's Exr., 2 How. 2 Attorney-General v. Mayor of
(U. S.) 127. See schedule of cases Dublin, 1 Bligh (K. S.), 312,347.
from chancery proceedings in the "The opinion prevailed extensively
time of Elizabeth in notes to that in this country for a considerable
case, pp. 155-167; Burford v. Len- period that the validity of charita-
thal, 2 Atk. 551; Attorney-General ble endowments and the jurisdic-
v. Middleton, 2 Ves. 327; Attorney- tion of courts of equity in such
General v. Tancred, Amb. 351 ; cases depend upon that statute,
s. c, 1 W. Black. 90; 1 Eden, 10; * * The former idea was ex-
Attorney-General v. Skinner Co., ploded and has since nearly dis-
2 Russ. 407,420; Attorney-General appeared from the jurisprudence of
v. Mayor of Dublin, 1 Bligh. (N. S.), the country. Upon reading the
312,347,348; Incorporated Soc. v. statute carefully, one cannot but
Richards, 1 Conn. & L. 58; s. C, feel surprised that the doubts thus
1 Dr. & War. 258. indicated ever existed. The statute
§319.;
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
743
case before the Irish High Court of Chancery, Lord Sug-
den, in his opinion, referring to the words of Lord Redes-
dale above cited, said: "It is impossible to read these ob-
servations without coming to the conclusion that Lord
Redesdale meant generally to state that a general juris-
diction existed independently of and before the statute,
and that charitable gifts might be enforced ; that the statute
introduced a new machinery, but no new jurisdiction, and no
new law."1 Lord Sugden cites the words of Lord Lough-
borough in the case of Attorney-General v. Bowyer, as
bearing in the opposite direction, as follows: "It does not
appear that this court at that period had cognizance upon
information for the establishment of charities. Prior to
the time of Lord Ellesmere, as far as the tradition in times
immediately following goes, there were no such informa-
tions as this upon which I am now sitting ; but they made
out the case as well as they could by law."2 To this cita-
is purely remedial and auxiliary.
It provided for a commission to ex-
amine into the abuses of charities
already existing, and to correct
such abuses. An appeal lay to the
lord chancellor. The statute was
silent as to the creation or inhibi-
tion of any new charity, and it
neither increased nor diminished
the pre-existing jurisdiction in
equity touching the subject. The
object of the statute was to create
a cheaper and a speedier remedy
for existing abuses. Hynshaw v.
Morpeth Corp., Duke, Charitable
Uses, 242. In the course of time
the new remedy fell into entire
disuse and the control of the chan-
cellor became again practically
sole and exclusive. The power of
the king was parens patriae, act-
ing through the chancellor, and
the powers of the latter independ-
ently of the king are subjects that
need not here be considered. Fon-
taine v. Kavenel, 17 How. (U. S.)
379. The learning developed in
the three cases mentioned, shows
clearly that the law as to such uses,
and the jurisdiction of the chan-
cellor, and the extent to which it
was exercised, before and after the
enactment of the statute, were just
the same." Swayne, J., in Ould v.
Washington Hospital for Found-
lings, 95 U. S. 309.
1 Incorporated Society v. Rich-
ards, 1 Connor & Law. 107.
2 Incorporated Society v. Rich-
ards, 1 Connor & Law. 58, 107.
"Trusts for charitable uses are not
dependent for their support on that
statute. Before its enactment
they had been sustained by the
English chancellors in virtue of
their general equity powers in
numerous cases, and generally, in
this country, it has been settled
that courts of equity have an orig-
inal and inherent jurisdiction over
charities, though the English
statute is not in force and inde-
pendently of it. It is believed that
such is the accepted doctrine in all
744 CHARITABLE PURPOSES. [§ 319.
tion the Lord Chancellor adds: "Certainly, so far as it
goes, this is an authority the other way, but it is opposed
to all the authorities which I have referred to ; and I must
say that, looking to the early authorities, I find them very
much mixed up with law, because in early times there was
no case of importance in which the judges were not called
in to assist the Lord Chancellor; and, therefore, it was that
equity was said to follow the law."1 But whatever there
may have been of confusion in the earlier decisions, it is
now accepted that courts of equity will enforce charitable
trusts by virtue of their general powers and independently
of the statute of Elizabeth. The filing of an information
by the Attorney-General is by virtue of a power peculiar
to the English courts. "The right which the Attorney-
General has to file an information is a right of prerogative;
the King, as parens patriae, has a right, by his proper
officer, to call upon the several courts of justice, according
to the nature of their several jurisdictions, to see that right
is done to his subjects who are incompetent to act for them-
selves, as in the case of charities and other cases; the case
of lunatics, where he has also a special prerogative to take
care of the property of a lunatic ; and where he may grant
the custody to a person who, as a committee, may proceed
on behalf of the lunatic ; or where there is no such grant,
the Attorney-General may proceed by his information."2
the States of the Union except Vir- Eyre v. Countess of Shafteshnry, 2
gin ia, Maryland and North Caro- P. Wms. 119. '-It has now become
lina." Strong, J., in Kain v. Gib- an established principle of Amer-
boney, 101 U. S. 362, 366. See also ican law that courts of chancery
Vidal v. Girard's Exrs., 2 How. will sustain and protect such a gift,
127; Carter v. Balfour, 19 Ala. 814; devise or bequest or dedication of
Wright v. Trustees M. E. Church, property to public charitable uses,
1 Hoffm. Cb. 202; Dutch Church provided the same is consistent
v. Mott, 7 Paige, 77; Wittman v. with local laws and public policy,
Lex, 17Serg.&R. 88; Burrv. Smith, where the object of the gift is a
7 Vt. 241. See Attorney-General dedication specific and capable of
v. Bowyer, 3 Ves. 726; Russell v. being carried into effect according
Allen, 107 U. S. 163. to the intention of the donor."
i Ibid. Perin v. Carey, 24 How. (U. S.)
2 Attorney-General v. Mayor of 465. According to the uniform
Dublin,! Bligh (X. S.), 312, 347; course of the decisions of this court,
§ 320.]
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
745
§ 320. The Doctrine in the United States. — The de-
cisions of the English courts relating to trusts for charitable
purposes have not been generally accepted in this country.
Wherever the system of charitable trusts is in force, it is
held, as a rule, that courts of equity have jurisdiction in
cases of this class by virtue of their ordinary or general
powers. A few of the States, only, have adopted the En-
glish doctrine as a whole.1 In most of the States the stat-
the validity of these devises, as
against the heirs-at-law, depends
upon the law of the State in which
the lands lie, and the validity of the
bequests as against the next of kin,
upon the law of the State in which
the testatrix had her domicile.
Yidal v.Girard, 2 How. 127 ;Wheeler
v. Smith, 9 How. 55; McDonogh
v. Madock, 15 How. 367; Fontaine
v. Kavenel, 17 How. 369, 384, 394;
Perm v. Carey, 24 How. 465 : Lor-
ingsv. Marsh, 6 Wall. 337; United
States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315; Kain v.
Gibboney, 101 U. S. 362; Russell
v. Allen, 107 U. S. 163." Gray, J.,
in Jones v. Habersham, 107 U. S.
174, 179. "But a very strong addi-
tional light was thrown upon this
subject, by the recent publications
of the commissioners on the Public
Records in England, which con-
tains a very curious and interesting
collection of the chancery records
in the reign of Queen Elizabeth,
and in the earlier reigns. Among
these are found many cases in
which the court of chancery
entertained jurisdiction over char-
ities long before the statute of 43
Elizabeth; and some fifty of these
cases, extracted from the printed
calendars, have been laid before us.
They establish in the most saiis-
factory and conclusive manner,
that cases of charities, when there
were trustees appointed for gen-
eral and indefinite charities, as well
as for specific charities, were famil-
iarly known to and acted upon and
enforced in the court of chancery.
In some of these cases, the charities
were not only of an uncertain and
indefinite nature, but as far as we
can gather from the imperfect state-
ment in the printed records, they
were also cases where there were
either no trustees appointed, or the
trustees were not competent to
take. These records, therefore, do
in a remarkable manner confirm
the opinion of Sir Joseph Jekyll,
Lord JSTorthington, Lord Chief
Justice Wilmot, Lord Redesdale
and Lord Chancellor Sugden.
Whatever doubts, therefore, might
properly be entertained upon the
subject, when the case of The Trus-
tees of the Philadelphia Baptist
Association v. Hart's Exrs., 4
Wheat. 1, was before this court,
1819, those doubts were entirely
removed by the later and more
satisfactory sources of information
to which we have alluded." Vidal
v. Girard's Exrs., supra.
1 In Massachusetts, Kentucky and
Rhode Island the English doctrine
in its essential feature is in force.
Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 539;
Earle v. Wood, 8 Cush. 437; Attor-
ney-General v. Parker, 12G Mass.
216; Sohier v. Burr, 127 Mass. 221;
Boxford, etc. Soc. v. Harriman,
125 Mass. 321 ; McDonald v. Mass.
Gen. Hospital, 120 Mass. 432; s. C,
746 CHARITABLE PURPOSES. [§ 320.
ute of Elizabeth has not been adopted by legislative enact-
ment, and it is held that such legislation is not necessary to
the jurisdiction of equity. This docti'ine has been fully
and unequivocally upheld by the Supreme Court of the
United States. In a recent leading case, it was held that
the statute of 43 Elizabeth, ch. IV., was never in force in
Maryland, and that the validity of charitable endowments,
and the jurisdiction of a court of equity, in such cases, do
not depend upon that statute.1 In the legislation of the
different States, and in the decisions of the State courts
relating to trusts for charitable purposes, there is a wide
diversity. In a recent case, before the Supreme Court of
the United States, the law in relation to charitable trusts
is stated in general by Mr. Justice Gray, as follows : "By
the law of England, from before the statute of 43 Elizabeth,
ch. IV., and by the law of this country at the present day
(except in those States in which it is restricted by statute
or judicial decision, as in Virginia, Maryland, and more re-
cently in New York), trusts for public charitable purposes
are upheld under circumstances under which private trusts
would fail. Being for objects of permanent interest and
benefit to the public, they may be perpetual in their dura-
tion and are not within the rule against perpetuities ; and
the instruments creating them should be so construed as to
give them effect if possible, and to carry out the general
intention of the donor, when clearly manifested, even if
the particular form or manner pointed out by him cannot
be followed. They may, and indeed must, be for the ben-
efit of an indefinite number of persons ; for if all the bene-
ficiaries are personally designated, the trust lacks the es-
sential element of indefiniteness, which is one character-
istic of a legal charity. If the founder describes the gen-
eral nature of the charitable trust, he may leave the details
21 Am. Rep. 529; Nichols v. Allen, nado, 82 Ky. 5; Kinney v. Kinney,
130 Mass. 211; S. c, 39 Am. Rep. 86 Ky. 610; Rhode Island Hosp.
445; Darcy v. Kelley, 153 Mass. Trust Co. v. Olney, 14 R. I. 449;
433; Church v. Church, 18 B. Mon. Peckham v. Newton, 15 R. I. 321.
635 ; Attorney-General v. Wallace, ' Ould v. "Washington Hospital,
7 B. Mon. 611 ; Peynado v. Pey- 95 U. S. 303.
§ 320. J
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
747
of its administration to be settled by trustees under the
superintendence of a court of chancery ; and an omission to
name trustees, or the death or declination of the trustees
named, will not defeat the trust, but the court will appoint
new trustees in their stead."1 Without attempting any ex-
haustive analysis, or making any definite and positive state-
ment of the law in each State, the division will be suffi-
ciently accurate if the States, with one or two exceptions,
are marshalled under four classes : In the first class,
either the statute of Elizabeth has been adopted, or
some doctrine which embodies, the essential spirit or
the main features of the statute is in force. The
following States are included in this class, viz. : Con-
necticut,2 Georgia,3 Illinois,4 Indiana,5 Kentucky,6
1 Bussell v. Allen, 107 U. S. 163,
166. See also Kain v. Gibbony, 101
U. S. 362; Wheeler v. Smith, 9
How. 55; Fontaine v. Bavenel, 17
How. 369; Mormon Church v.
United States, 136 U. S. 1.
2 American Bible Society v. "Wet-
more, 12 Conn. 181; Bull v. Bull,
8 Conn. 47; S. c, 20 Am. Dec. 86
Birchard v. Scott, 39 Conn. 63
Treat's Appeal, 30 Conn. 113
White v. Fisk, 22 Conn. 31 ; Hamp-
don v. Bice, 24 Conn. 350; Brew-
ster v. McCall, 15 Conn. 274; Fair-
field v. Lawson. 50 Conn. 501 ;
S. C, 47 Am. Bep. 669; Coil v.
Comstock, 51 Conn. 352; s. C, 50
Am. Bep. 29; Tappan's Appeal, 52
Conn. 412; Bristol v. Bristol, 53
Conn. 242; Beardsley v. Selectmen
of Bridgeport, 53 Conn. 489; S. C,
55 Am. Rep. 152; Camp v. Crock-
er's Admr., 54 Conn. 21; New
Haven Y. M. I. v. City of New
Haven, 60 Conn. 32; s. c, 22 Atl.
Bep. 447; Conklin v. Davis (.1894),
63 Conn. 377; s. c, 28 Atl. Bep.
537; Hay den v. Conn. Hosp. for
Insane (1395), 64 Conn. 320; S. C,
30 Ail. Bep. 50.
3 Beall v. Fox, 4 Ga. 404; "Walker
v. "Walker, 25 Ga. 420; Jones v.
Habersham, 107 U. S. 177; Beck-
with v. St. Phillip's Parish, 69 Ga.
564.
4 Heuser v. Harris, 42 111. 425;
Starkweather v. Am. Bible Soc, 72
111. 50; s. C, 22 Am. Bep. 133;
Gilman v. Hamilton, 16 111. 225;
Andrews v. Andrews, 110 111. 223;
Mills v. Newberry, 112 111. 123;
S. C, 54 Am. Bep. 213; Hunt v.
Fowler, 121 111. 269 ; Crerar v. Will-
iams (1893), 145 111. 625; s. c, 34
N. E. Bep. 467.
5 McCord v. Ochiltree, 8 Blackf .
15; Com. of Lagrange Co. v. Sog-
ers, 55 Ind. 299; Craig v. Secrist,
54 Ind. 419; Cruse v. Axtell, 50
Ind. 49; Grimes' Exrs. v. Harmon,
•35 Ind. 198; s. c, 9 Am. Bep. 690;
Ex parte Lindley, 32 Ind. 3;i7;
Sweeney v. Sampson, 5 Ind. 465;
Common Council of Bichmond v.
State, 5 Ind. 334; Board Coin. Bush
Co. v. Dinwiddie (1894), 139 Ind.
128; s. c, 37 N. E. Bap. 795.
6 Cromies v. Louisville, etc. Soc,
3 Bush, 365; Baptist Churrh v.
Presbyterian Church, 18 B. lion.
748
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
[I 320.
Maine,1 Massachusetts,2 Missouri,3 New Hampshire,4 New
Gray, 171 ; Am. Acad. v. Harvard
College, 12 Gray, 582; Tucker v.
Seamans' Aid Soc, 7 Met. 188;
Bartlett v. Nye, 4 Met. 378; Bur-
bank v. Whitney, 24 Pick. 146;
s. C, 35 Am. Dec. 312; Sanderson,
v. White, 18 Pick. 328; s. C, 29
Am. Dec. 591; Going v. Emery, 16
Pick. 107; s. c, 26 Am. Dec. 645;
Hadley v. Hopkins' Acad., 14 Pick.
240; Barker v. Wood, 9 Mass. 419;
Suter v. Hilliard, 132 Mass. 412;
s. c, 42 Am. Kep. 444; Bates v.
Bates, 134 Mass. 110; s. c, 45 Am.
Kep. 305; In reSchouler, 134 Mass.
426; Darcey v. Kelly, 153 Mass.
433; Burbank v. Burbank, 152
Mass. 254; Bullard v. Chandler,
149 Mass. 532; s. C, 14 Am. St.
Rep. 442; Weeks v. Hobson, 150
Mass. 377 ; Stratton v. Physio Med-
ical Coll., 149 Mass. 508; Minot v.
Baker, 147 Mass. 348; Morville v.
Fowle, 144 Mass. 109; Kent v.
Dunham, 142 Mass. 216; s. C, 56
Am. Kep. 667; White v. Ditson,
134 Mass. 351 ; Faulkner v. Nat'l
Sailors' Home (1891), 155 Mass.
458; s. C, 29 N. E. Rep. 645;
Holmes v. Coates (1893), 152 Mass.
226; s. C, 34N.E. Rep. 190; Mc-
Allister v. Burgess (1894) , 163 Mass.
269; s. C, 37 N. E. Kep. 173;
Wardens, etc. St. Paul Church v.
Attorney-General (1895), 164 Mass.
188; s. C, 41 N. E. Rep. 231.
3 Chambers v. St. Louis, 29 Mo.
543; State v. Prewitt, 20 Mo. 165;
Russell v. Allen, 5 Dill. 235; Acad-
emy of Visitation v. Clemens, 50
Mo. 167; Howe v. Wilson, 91 Mo.
45; s. c, 60 Am. Rep. 226; Mis-
souri Hist. Soc. v. Academy of Sci-
ence, 94 Mo. 459; Barkley v. Don-
nelly (1892), 112 Mo. 561; s. c, 19
S. W. Rep. 305.
4 Goodale v. Mooney, 60 X. H.
52S; Gafney v. Kenison, 64 N. H.
635; Hadden v. Chorn, 8 B. Mon.
70; Attorney-General v. Wallace,
7 B. Mon. 611; Moore v. Moore, 4
Dana, 354; s. c, 29 Am. Dec. 417;
Gass v. Wilhite, 2 Dana, 170; s. C,
26 Am. Dec. 446; Peynado v. Pey-
nado, 82 Ky. 5 ; Kinney v. Kinney,
86 Ky. 610.
1 Tappan v. Deblois, 45 Me. 122;
Howard v. Am. Peace Soc, 49 Me.
288; Swasey v. Am. Bible Soc, 57
Me. 526; Maine Bapt., etc. Con. v.
Portland, 65 Me. 92; Shapleighv.
Pillsbury, 1 Me. 271; Piper v.
Moulton, 72 Me. 155; Simpson v.
Welcome, 72 Me. 496; s. c.,39 Am.
Rep. 349; Bangor v. Masonic
Lodge, 73 Me. 428; s. c.,40Am.
Rep. 369; Dascomb v. Marston, 80
Me. 223; City of Bangor v. Beal
(1894), 85 Me. 129; s. c, 26 Atl.
Rep. 1112; Fox v. Gibbs (1895), 86
Me. 87 ; s. C, 29 Atl. Kep. 940.
2 Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen,
539; Sohier v. Burr, 127 Mass. 221 ;
McDonald v. Mass. Gen. Hospital,
120 Mass. 432; s. C, 21 Am. Rep.
529 ; Old South Soc. v. Crocker, 119
Mass. 1; S. C, 20 Am. Rep. 299;
Fellows v. Miner, 119 Mass. 541;
Gooch v. Assn. for Relief, etc., 109
Mass. 558; Olliffe v. Wells, 130
Mass. 221 ; Attorney-General v.
Garrison, 101 Mass. 223; Nichols
v. Allen, 130 Mass. 211; Harvard
College v. Society, etc., 3 Gray,
280; North Adams, etc. Soc. v.
Fitch, 8 Gray, 421; Fairbanks v.
Lamson, 99 Mass. 533; Hosea v.
Jacobs, 98 Mass. 65; Saltonstall v.
Sanders, 11 Allen, 446; Odell v.
Odell, 10 Allen, 1; Drury v.
Natick, 10 Allen, 169; Attorney-
General v. Trinity Church, 9 Allen,
422; Dexter v. Gardner, 7 Allen,
243; Tainter v. Clark, 5 Allen, 66;
Bliss v. Am. Bible Soc, 2 Allen,
334; Esterbrook v. Tillinghast, 5
§ 320. J
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
749
Jersey,1 Pennsylvania,2 Khode Island,3 Texas4 and Ar-
kansas.5 In the second class, the English doctrine of
charitable trusts, as belonging to the jurisdiction of
equity independent of the provisions of the statute,
is in force, at least in its essential features. To
this class belong the following States, viz. : Alabama,6
354; Academy v. Adams, 65 N. H.
225; Dublin Case, 38 N. H.
459; Chapin v. School Dist., 35 N".
H. 445; Duke v. Fuller, 9 N. H.
536; s. c, 32 Am. Dee. 392; Sec-
ond Cong. Soc. v. First Cong. Soc.,
14 ST. H. 315 ; Brown v. Concord,
33 N. H. 285.
1 Non-is v. Thompson, 4 C. E.
Green, 307; Attorney-General v.
Moore, 4 C. E. Green, 445; Taylor
v. Trustees, 34 N. J. Eq. 101;
Brown v. Pancoast, 34 N. J. Eq.
324; Hesketh v. Murphy, 35 1ST. J.
Eq. 23; s. C, 36 N. J. Eq. 384;
Union M. E. Church v. Wilkinson,
36 N. J. Eq. 141 ; Detwiler v. Hart-
man, 37 N. J.Eq. 348; Hutchins v.
George, 44 N. J. Eq. 126; George
v. Braddock, 45 N. J. Eq. 757;
S. C, 14 Am. St. Kep. 754; Goodell
v. Union Assn., 29 N. J. Eq. 32;
De Camp v. Dobbins, 29 N. J. Eq.
36 ; Trustees, etc. v. Beatty, 28 N.
J.Eq. 570; Stephens v. Shippen,
28 N. J. Eq. 487 ; Mason's Exrs. v.
M. E. Church, 27 ST. J. Eq. 47.
2 Witman v. Lex, 17 serg. & R.
88; Zimmerman v. Anders, 6 W. &
S. 218; Wright v. Linn, 9 Pa. St.
433 ; Vidal v. Girard's Exrs., 2 How.
127 ; Jones v. Renshaw, 130 Pa. St.
327; Manners v. Phila. Library Co.,
93 Pa. St. 165; S. C, 39 Am. Kep.
741; Philadelphia v. Elliott, 3
Kawle, 170; Morrison v. Beirer, 2
W. & P. 81; Humane Fire Com-
pany's Appeal, 88 Pa. St. 389;
Swift's Exrs. v. Eaton Beneficial
Soc, 73 Pa. St. 362; Zeissweiss v.
James, 63 Pa. St. 465; s. c, 3 Am.
Rep. 558; McLean v. Wade, 41 Pa.
St. 266; Miller v. Porter, 53 Pa. St.
292; Henderson v. Hunter, 59 Pa.
St. 335; Philadelphia v. Fox, 64
Pa. St. 169; Soohan v. Philadel-
phia, 33 Pa. St. 9; Price v. Mas-
well, 28 Pa. St. 23; Griffitts v.
Cope, 17 Pa. St. 96; McLain v.
School Directors, 51 Pa. St. 196 ;
Evangelical Association's Appeal,
35 Pa. St. 316 ; Cresson's Appeal, 30
Pa. St. 437; Barr v. Weld, 24 Pa.
St. 84; Brendel v. German Kef.
Cong., 33 Pa. St. 415; Gregg v.
Irish, 6 Pa. St. 211 ; Pickering v.
Shotwell, 10 Pa. St. 23; Hillyard
v. Miller, 10 Pa. St. 326; Martin v.
McCord,5Watts,493; s. a, 30 Am.
Dec. 342; Board of Foreign Mis-
sion, etc. v. Culp (1892), 151 Pa. St.
467; s. c, 25 Atl. Kep. 117; 31 W.
1ST. C. 135; In re Kinike's Estate
(lS92),155Pa. St. 101; S. C.,25Atl.
Kep. 1016.
3 Derby v. Derby, 4 K. I. 414;
Meeting St. Baptist Soc. v. Hail. 8
K. I. 234; hotter v. Thornton, 7R.
I. 252; Pell V. Mercer, 14 R.I. 412;
Peekham v. Newton, 15 R. I. 321 ;
Webster v. Wiggin (1895) (R. I.),
31 Atl. Rep. 824.
4 Paschal v. Acklin, 27 Tex. 173;
Ryan v. Porter, 61 Tex. 106 ; Pierce
v. Weaver, 65 Tex. 44 ; Hopkins v.
Upshur, 20 Tex. 89; s. c, 70 Am.
Dec. 375; Laird v. Bass, 50 Tex.
412; Bell Co. v. Alexander, 22 Tex.
350; s. c, 73 Am. Dec. 268.
5 Grisson v. Hill, 17 Ark. 483.
6 Burke v. Roper, 79 Ala. 138;
Johnson v. Holilield, 79 Ala. 423;
750
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
[§ 320.
California,1 Delaware,2 Iowa,3 Mississippi,4 Ohio,5
South Carolina,6 Tennessee,7 Vermont.8 In another
class, consisting of the States of New York,9 Michi-
s. c, 58 Am. Eep. 596; Johnson's
Admr. v. Longmire, 39 Ala. 143;
Williams v. Pearson, 38 Ala. 299;
Carter v. Balfour's Admr., 19 Ala.
814; Antones v. Eslava, 9 Port.
527.
1 Hickley's Estate, 58 Cal. 457.
2 Griffith v. State, 2 Del. Ch. 421 ;
State v. Griffith, 2 Del. Ch. 392;
Doughter v. Vandever, 5 Del. Ch.
51; Field v. Drew Theol. Sem., 41
Fed. Rep. 371.
3 Byers v. McCartney, 62 Iowa,
339 ; Seda v. Huble, 75 Iowa, 429 ;
S. C, 9 Am. St. Rep. 495; Miller v.
Chittenden, 2 Iowa, 315, 352 ; John-
son v. Mayne, 4 Iowa, 180; Lepage
v. McNamara, 5 Iowa, 124, 146;
Phillips v. Harrow (1895) (Iowa),
61 N". W. Rep. 434.
4 Wade v. Am. Colon. Soc., 7Sm.
& M. 663; s. c, 45 Am. Deo. 324;
State v. Prewitt, 20 Miss. 165.
5Perin v. Carey, 24How.465; Am.
Bible Soc. v. Marshall, 15 Ohio St.
537 ; Mannix v. Purcell, 46 Ohio St.
102; s. C, 15 Am. St. Rep. 562;
Mclntire's School v. Zanesville, 9
Ohio, 203; Urmey'sExr. v. Wooden,
1 Ohio St. 160; s. c, 59 Am. Dec.
615; Hullman v. Honcomp, 5 Ohio
St. 237.
6 Attorney-General v. Jolly, 1
Rich. Eq. 99; s. C, 2 Strobh. Eq.
379; Attorney-General v. Clergy
Soc, 8 Rich. Eq. 190; Gibson v.
McCall, 1 Rich. 174; Combe v.
Brazier, 2 Desaus. Eq. 431; Bren-
nan v. Winkler (1892), 37 S. Car.
457; S. C, 16 S. E. Rap. 190.
?Fite v. Beasley, 12 Lea, 328;
Green v. Allen, 5 Humph. 170;
Dickson v. Montgomery, 1 Swan,
348; White v. Hale, 2 Cold. 77;
Gass v. Ross, 3 Sneed. 211 ; Frank-
lin v. Armfield, 2 Sneed, 305 ; Nance
Busby (1892), 91 Tenn. 303; s. c,
18 S. W. Rep. 874 ; Johnson v. John-
son (1894), 92 Tenn. 559; s. C,
23 S. W. Rep. 114.
8 Burr's Exrs. v. Smith, 7 Vt. 241 ;
Clement v. Hyde, 50 Vt. 716 ; s. C,
28 Am. Rep. 522; Stone v. Griffin,
3 Vt. 400; Penfield v. Skinner, 11
Vt. 296; Sheldon v. Town of Stock-
bridge (1895), 67 Vt. 299; s. C, 31
Atl. Rep. 414.
9 Bascomb v. Albertson, 34 N. Y.
584; Levy v. Levy, 33 ]5T. Y. 97;
Holmes v. Mead, 52 N. Y. 332;
Beekman v. Bonsor, 23 N. Y. 298;
s. c, 80 Am. Dec. 269; Dodge v.
Pond, 23N.Y. 69; Burrill v. Board-
man, 43 2ST. Y. 254, 263; S.C.,3Am.
Rep. 694; Adams v. Perry, 43 ST.
Y. 487; Rose v. Rose, 4 Abb. App.
108 ; Hollis v. Drew Theolog. Sem.,
95 1ST. Y. 166; Stephenson v. Short,
92 N. Y. 433 ; Pritchard v. Thomp-
son, 95 NY. 76; s. c, 47 Am. Rep.
9 ; Fosdick v. Town of Hempstead,
125 N. Y. 581 ; 8. c, 21 Am. St. Rep.
753. "The law has been simplified
and that is all. Instead of the huge
and complex system of England,
for many generations the fruitful
source of litigation, we have sub-
stituted a policy which offers the
widest field for enlightened benev-
olence. The proof of this is in the
great number of charitable institu-
tions scattered throughout the
State. It is not certain that any
political State or society in the
world offers a better system of law
for the encouragement of property
limitations in favor of religion and
learning, for the relief of the poor,
the care of the insane, the sick and
the maimed, and the relief of the
§ 321.] CHARITABLE PURPOSES. 751
gan,1 Wisconsin2 and' Minnesota,3 all express trusts, pri-
vate as well as public, have been abolished by statute.
The statute provides for some exceptions, but aside from
these exceptions no express trust will be upheld in these
States.
§ 321. The Subject Continued. — The States of the
third class, following the lead of New York, have a special
statutory enactment for carrying out the provisions of a
devise, or other gift for charitable purposes. The decision
of a leading case before the New York Court of Appeals
contains the following statement of the policy of the States
of this class in regard to trusts for charitable purposes :
"It has been the settled policy of this State to encourage
donations and endowments for religious and charitable pur-
poses by providing for the administration of such funds
through organized and responsible agencies, sanctioned by
legislative authority, and subject to legislative regulation
and control. Such gifts, if otherwise valid, are upheld in
our courts, when made to institutions or societies having
authority by charter or by law to receive them, and when
the purposes contemplated by the donors are within the
range of the objects of such societies and the scope of their
destitute, than our system of ereat- Y. 29; s. C, 28 N". E. Rep. 880; 29
ing organized bodies by the legis- ST. E. Rep. 1033.
lative power, and endowing them x Methodist Church v. Clark, 41
with the legal capacity to hold Mich. 730; Hathaway v. New Bal-
property which a private person or timore, 48 Mich. 251; Attorney -
a private corporation has to receive General v. Soule, 28 Mich. 153.
and hold transfers of property. 2 Dodge v. Williams, 46 Wis. 70 ;
Under this system many doubtful Ruth v. Oberbrunner, 40 Wis. 23S ;
and obscure questions disappear Heiss v. Murphy, 40 Wis. 276;
and give place to the more simple Gould v. Taylor Orphan Asylum,
inquiry, whether the grantor or de- 46 Wis. 106; Webster v. Morris, 66
visor of a fund designed for charity Wis. 366; s. c, 57 Am. Rep. 278;
is competent to give; and whether Estate of Hoffen, 70 Wis. 522;
the organized body is endowed by Fadness v. Branenborg, 73 Wis.
law with capacity to receive and 257.
hold and administer the gift." Ra- 3 Little v. Wilford, 31 Minn. 173;
pallo, J., in Holland v. Alcock, 108 Society of the Most Precious Blood
N. Y. 312. See also Riker v. Leo, v. Moll (1892) , 51 Minn. 277 ; s. c,
133 N.Y. 519; s. a, 30 N". E. Rep. 53 1ST. W. Rep. 648.
59S; Tilden v. Green ( 1891), 130 1ST.
752
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
[§ 321.
general powers. The English system of indefinite charita-
ble uses has no existence in this State, and no place in our
system of jurisprudence."1 In a fourth class of States, con'
1 Bascomb v. Albertson, 34 X. Y.
684. See also Levy v. Levy, 33 X.
Y. 97; Holmes v. Mead, 52 X. Y.
332; Eose v. Eose, Abb. App. 108;
Adams v. Perry, 43 X. Y. 487:
Burrill v. Boardman, 43 X. Y. 254,
263; S.C., 3 Am. Eep. 694; Dodge
v. Pond, 23 X. Y. 69; Beekman v.
Bonsor, 23 X. Y. 298; s. C.,80 Am.
Dec. 269; Stephenson v. Short, 92
N. Y. 433; Williams v. "Williams,
8 X. Y. 525; Hollis v. Drew Theo-
logical Seminary, 95 X. Y. 166;
Pritchard v. Thomson, 95 X. Y. 76;
S. C, 47 Am. Eep. 7 ; Bead v. Will-
iams, 125 X. Y. 560; s. c, 21 Am.
St. Eep. 748; Posdick v. Town of
Hempstead, 125 1ST. Y. 581; s. C,
21 Am. St. Eep. 753; Holland v.
Alcoek, 108 X. Y. 581; Tilden v.
Green, 130 X. Y. 29; s. c, 29 X.
E. Eep. 1033; Adams v. Perry, 43
X. E. Eep. 487, 500; Owens v. Mis-
sionary Soc, 14 X. Y. 380. "He
(Wright, J., in Levy v. Levy,
supra,) calls attention to the fact
that in 1788 the legislature of this
State repealed the statute of 43
Elizabeth, the statute against su-
perstitious uses, and the mortmain
acts; that at that time it was sup-
posed that the law for the enforce-
ment of charitable trusts had its
origin only in the statute of Eliza-
beth, and argues that the legisla-
ture of 1788, in thus sweeping away
all the great and distinctive land-
marks of the English system, must
have intended that the effect of
the repeal should be to abrogate
the entire system of indefinite
trusts, which were understood to
be supported by that statute alone,
and that the whole course of leg-
islation in this case indicates a
policy not to introduce any system
of public charities except through
the medium of corporate bodies;
that in 1784 the general law for the
incorporation of religious societies
had been enacted, and that before,
and contemporaneously with, the
repeal of the statute of Elizabeth
and the statute of mortmain,
special acts incorporating such
societies were passed, and other
acts have been passed, creating
or authorizing corporations for
various religious and charitable
purposes, in all of which are to be
found limitations upon the amount
of property to be held by such so-
cieties, thus indicating a policy to
confine within certain limits the
accumulation of property perpetu-
ally appropriated, even to chari-
table and religious objects; that
the absolute repeal of the statute
of Elizabeth and the mortmain
acts was wholly inconsistent with
the policy thus indicated, unless it
was intended to abrogate the whole
law of charitable uses, as under-
stood and enforced in England.
The opinion, then, refers to the
course of legislation in this State,
following the repeal of the English
statutes authorizing corporations
for charitable, religious, literary
and benevolent purposes, and in
all cases limiting the amount of
property to be enjoyed by them.
This legislation is claimed to dis-
close a policy differing from the
English system, and absolutely in-
consistent with the supposition
that uses for public or indefinite
objects, and of unlimited duration,
can be created and sustained with-
out legislative sanction. * * *
§ 322.J
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
753
sisting of Maryland, North Carolina and Virginia, the stat-
ute has either been repealed by legislative enactment, or is
held to have been repealed in equity by recent or modern
decisions.1 Louisiana constitutes an exception. It does not
belong in any class, but has a rule peculiar to itself. The
jurisdiction of the courts is wholly derived from the civil
code, but they place a liberal construction upon its provis-
ions in cases of charitable trusts.2
§ 322. Characteristics of the Trust for Charitable
Purposes. — In distinction from an express private trust,
which, by the definition, is designed for the benefit of one
or more individuals, the trust for charitable purposes is a
public trust, and from the nature of the case the beneficia-
ries are, to a greater or less extent, unknown or indefinite.
Ordinarily the trust is designed for the benefit of a class,
But charity, as a great interest of
civilization and Christianity, has
suffered no loss or diminution in
the change which has been made.
The law has been simplified, and
that is all." Eapallo, J., in Hoi-
land v. Alcock, 108 N. Y. 312, 334,
335, 336.
1 Barnum v. Mayor, etc. of Bal-
timore, 62 Md. 275; s. C, 50 Am.
Rep. 219; Henry Watson, etc. Soc.
v. Johnson, 58 Md. 139; Dasbiels
v. Attorney-General, 5 Har. & J.
392, 400; S. C, 6 Har. & J. 1 ; 9
Am. Dec. 572; "Wilderman v. Bal-
timore, 8 Md. 551 ; Methodist
Church v. Warren, 28 Md. 338, 353;
Needles v. Martin, 33 Md. 609;
Murphy v. Dallam, 1 Bland, 529;
Church Extension, etc. v. Smith,
50 Md. 362; Kizer v. Perry, 58 Md.
112; Isaac v. Emory, 64 Md. 333;
Crisp v. Crisp, 65 Md. 422; Maught
v. Getzendanner, 65 Md. 527; S. C,
57 Am. Kep. 352; Eutaw Place
Baptist Church v. Shively, 67 Md.
493; S. C, 1 Am. St. Kep. 412;
Protestant Episcopal, etc. Soc. v.
Gaither (1895), 62 Fed. Rep. 422;
48
Gamble v. Tripp (1892), 75 Md.
252; s. c, 23 Atl.Kep.461; Halsey
v. Convention, etc., 75 Md. 275;
S. C, 23 Atl. Rep. 781 ; Lingling v.
Miller (1893), 77 Md. 104; s. c, 26
Atl. Rep. 491 ; Miller v. Atkinson,
63 N. Car. 537; White v. Attorney-
General. 4 Ired. Eq. 19; s. c, 44
Am. Dec. 92; Holland v. Peck, 2
Ired. Eq. 235; Trustees v. Cham-
bers' Exrs , 3 Jones Eq. 253; Mc-
Auley v. Wilson, 1 Dev. Eq. 276;
s. c, 18 Am. Dec. 587; Griffin v.
Graham, 1 Hawks, 96; Brewer v.
University, 110 N. Car. 26; s. c,
14 S. E. Rep. 644 ; Carter v. Wolf,
13 Gratt. 301; Kain v. Gibbony,
101 U. S. 362; Gallego's Exrs. v.
Attorney-General, 3 Leigh, 450;
s. C, 24 Am. Dec. 650; Seaburn's
Exrs. v. Seaburn, 15 Gratt. 423.
But see Protestant, etc. Soc. v.
Churchman's Reps., 80 Va. 718.
2 Fink v. Exr. of Fink, .12, La.
Ann. 301 ; New Orleans v. McDon-
ogh, 12 La. Ann. 240; Society of
Orphan Boys v. New Orleans, 12
La. Ann. 62.
754 CHARITABLE PURPOSES. [§ 322.
the individuals of which can be designated only in general
terms. In a private trust, if the beneficiary or beneficiaries
are not definitely and positively named, the trust fails on
the ground of indefiniteness. But in a charitable trust the
beneficiaries need not be definitely named, and even where
there is no adequate designation of a cestui que trust, the
trust will be enforced in equity if the intention of the
settlor can be ascertained beyond a reasonable doubt.
Trusts for charitable purposes are regarded by courts of
equity with special favor, and a much more liberal con-
struction will be put upon an instrument creating such a
trust than upon one creating a trust for individuals. A
will creating a trust for a charitable purpose will receive,
where there is occasion for it, a construction differing very
widely from that which would be applied to a trust for an
individual. Where a testator leaves his property to such
person as he shall subsequently name as his executor
and no executor is appointed, or if an executor is appointed
and dies during the lifetime of the testator and no other
person is appointed to take his place, the testator will be
held to have died intestate, and his property will descend
to his heirs subject to the legal rules of the jurisdiction.
But if property is left to an executor in trust for a charity,
and no executor is named, or if he dies before the testator,
a court of equity will appoint an executor and provide for
the execution of the trust.1 Where an estate is devised to
1 Moggridge v. Thackwell,7 Ves. important distinction between
37; Mills v. Farmer, 1 Heriv. 55, charities and other trusts is in the
94; Attorney-General v. Jackson, time of duration allowed and the
11 Ves. 365, 367. "By the law of degree of deflniteness required.
this commonwealth, as by the law The law does not allow property
of England, gifts to charitable uses to be made inalienable, by means
are highly favored, and will be of a private trust, beyond the
most liberally construed in order period prescribed by the rule
to accomplish the intent and pur- against perpetuities, being a life
pose of the donor; and trusts or lives in being and twenty-one
which cannot be upheld in ordi- years afterwards; and if the per-
nary cases, for various reasons, sons to be benefited are uncertain
will be established and carried into and cannot be ascertained within
effect when created to support a that period, the gift will be ad-
gift to a charitable use. The most judged void, and a resulting trust
§ 322. J CHARITABLE PURPOSES. 755
such persons as may be named by an executor thereafter
to be appointed, and no such executor is appointed, or
where an executor has been appointed and dies before the
testator and no successor has been named, the trust fails
for lack of an executor. But if, in a case of this kind, the
estate is left to a charitable object, the court will appoint
an executor and carry into effect the provisions of the will.1
Where money is left to trustees for a charitable object, and
the trustees die during the life of the testator and no suc-
cessors are appointed, the same rule of equity will be
applied. Other trustees will be appointed by the court,
and the trust will be executed.2
declared for the heirs-at-law or Mass. 221 ; Russell v. Allen, 107 U.
distributees. But a public or chari- S. 167; In re Sehouler, 134 Mass.
table trust may be perpetual in its 426; Brown v. Pancoast, 34 ST. J.
duration, and may leave the mode Eq. 324.
of application and the selection of 2 Attorney-General v. Hickman,
particular objects to the discretion 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 193; Attorney-
of trustees." Gray, J., in Jackson General v. Jackson, 11 Ves. 365,
v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 539, 550. See 367; Moggridge v. Thackwell, 3
also Sanderson v. White, 18 Pick. Bro. Ch. 517. In White v. White,
333; Odell v. Odell, 10 Allen, 5, 6; 1 Bro. Ch. 12, a testator gives
Saltonstall t. Sanders, 11 Allen, a moiety of the residue to such
446; In re Rickard, 31 Beav. 244; lying-in hospital as his executor
Fowler v. Fowler, 33 Beav. 616; should appoint. He afterwards
Hoare v. Osborne, L. B. 1 Eq. 585; strikes out the executor's name, and
Vaughan v. Thomas, 33 Ch. Div. dies without appointing any other
187; Piper v. Moulton, 72 Me. 155; executor. This is not a revocation,
Bates v. Bates, 134 Mass. 110; s. c, but the court will appoint. In
45 Am. Bep. 305; Detwiller v. the opinion the lord chancellor
Hartman, 37 1ST. J. Eq. 34S; John- says: "The cases have proceeded
son v. Holifleld, 79 Ala. 423; s. c, upon notions adopted from the
58 Am. Rep. 596; Fite v, Beasley, Roman and civil law, which are
12 Lea, 328. very favorable to charities, that
1 Mills v. Farmer, 1 Meriv. 55, legacies given to public uses not
94; Moggridge v. Thackwell, 3 ascertained shall be applied to
Bro. Ch. 517; S. C, 1 Ves. 4G4; 7 some proper object. From Svvin-
Ves. 36, 69; Attorney-General v. burn, down to Lord Hardwicke's
Jackson, 11 Ves. 365, 367; White time, that would be the effect
v. White, 1 Bro. Ch. 12 ; Attorney- where the object is disappointed ;
General v. Hickman, 2 Eq. Cas. but the present case is different.
Abr. 193; Brown v. Kelsey,3Cush. Here the testator, giving a legacy
243; Winslowv. Cummings,2Cush. to the next of kin, and to the ex -
358, 305 ; McCord v. Ochiltree, 8 editor names a particular charity
Blackf . 15, 22 ; Sohier v. Burr, 127 a residuary legatee ; the question
756
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
[§ 323.
§ 323. The Subject Continued. — -In putting into ex-
ecution a devise to an individual, a court of equity will have
supreme regard to the provisions of the will relating to the
manner in which the trust is to he administered. The vital
point relates to the question whether a valid private trust
has been created. But where the devise is to a charitable
object, the material point will be whether the testator really
intended to leave the property for this purpose. If it is
clear that he did, and the manner of creating the trust is
defective, the court will correct his mistake, or supply
what was omitted through ignorance or oversight, and give
effect to the intentions expressed in the will.1 In a leading
is, only, how the trust shall be car-
ried into execution. I remember
to have read a ease somewhere
(Attorney-General v. Hickman, 2
Eq. Cas. Abr. 193) where a legacy
is given to B for the benefit of non-
conforming ministers, with the ad-
vice of C and D ; at the testator's
death B, C and D were all dead,
yet the court sustained the legacy.
It must be referred to the master
to see unto which of the lying-in
hospitals it is fit it shall be paid."
' Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves.
36; Mills v. Farmer, 1 Meriv. 55,
100; Attorney-General v. Berry-
man, 1 Dick. 168; Attorney-Gen-
eral v. Ironmongers' Co., 1 Cr. &P.
208, 222, 225; S. C, 2 Beav. 313;
Attorney-General v. Stewart, L.E.
14 Eq. 17; Attorney-General v.
Coopers' Co., 3 Beav. 29; Attor-
ney-General v. Drapers' Co., 2
Beav. 508; Denyer v. Druce, 1
Taml. 32; Heuser v. Harris, 42 111.
425; Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen,
539. See also Hunt v. Fowler, 121
111. 269; Estate of Hinckley, 58
Cal.457; Academy of Visitation v.
Clemens, 50 Mo. 167; Kain v. Gib-
boney, 101 U. S. 362; Heiss v.
Murphy, 40 "Wis. 276; Stevens v.
Shippen, 28 X. J. Eq. 487; Phila-
delphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St. 169;
Zeissweiss v. James, 63 Pa. St. 465;
S. C, 3 Am. Kep. 558; State v.
Warren, 28 Md. 338; Needles v.
Martin, 33 Md. 609; Miller v. At-
kinson, 63 N. C. 537; Mclntyre v.
Zanesville, 17 Ohio St. 352'; Board
of Ed. v. Edson, 18 Ohio St. 221;
s. C, 98 Am. Dec. 114; Ex parte
Lindley, 32 Ind. 367; Attorney-
General v. Soule, 28 Mich. 133;
Methodist Church v. Clark, 41
Mich. 730 ; Preachers' Aid Soc. v.
Kich, 45 Me. 552 ; Tappan v. De-
blois, 45 Me. 122; Swasey v. Am.
Bible Soc, 57 Me. 523; Tucker v.
Seaman's Aid; Soc, 7 Mete 188,
195; Bliss v. Am. Bible Soc, 2
Allsn, 334; Meeting St. Baptist
Soc. v. Hail, 8 R. I. 234; Birchard
v.Scott, 39 Conn. 63; Goodell v.
Union Assn., 29 N. J. Eq. 487;
Dascomb v. Marston, 80 Me. 223;
Byers v. McCartney, 62 Iowa, 339;
Ould v. Washington Hosp., 95 U.
S. 303; Trustees, etc. v. Beatty, 28
X.J. Eq. 570; Coit- v. Comstock,
51 Conn. 352; s. C., 50 Am. Kep.
29; Jones v. Habersham, 107 U. S.
174, 191. In a case where a testa-
tor left a fund to two town?, in
trust, to apply the income to the
education of poor children and the
§ 323.] CHARITABLE PURPOSES. 757
case, where the testator directed the residue of his personal
estate "to be divided" for certain charitable purposes,
which he mentioned, "and other charitable purposes as I
do intend to name hereafter," and afterwards added a codi-
cil, but made no mention of any charitable bequests, it was
held that there should be a disposition of the residue in
favor of some charitable object, and it was decreed that the
court would cany out the intention of the testator, having
regard to the charitable objects named in the will.1 It has
been held, also, that where a testator leaves by his will a
sum of money for charitable purposes, and provides that
the objects shall be named in a codicil, or by a note accom-
panying the will, but fails to leave either the codicil or the
note, the court will name the objects and provide for the
enforcement of the trust.2 In England it has been held
that where it was the intention of the testator to leave
property for a charitable purpose, and the object named
was illegal or in contravention of public policy, the court
will carry out the intention of the testator by devoting the
property to some other object in accord with the law.3 In
a leading case before the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts, it was held that a charitable bequest which,
consistently with the intention of the testator as manifested
relief of poor widows, it was held may take effect. Heuser v. Harris,
that the town was not a proper 42 111. 425.
trustee, but the charity would not ' Mills v. Farmer, 1 Meriv. 55,
fail on that account, for the court 95; "White v. White, 1 Bro. Ch. 12;
would appoint a new trustee. Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves.
Mason v. Methodist Church, 27 N. 36.
J. Eq. 47. Charitable bequests are 2 Attorney-General v. Syderfin,
favored in the law, and will receive lVern. 224; s. c, 2 Freem. 261;
a more liberal construction than Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves.
will 'be allowed in gifts made to 36, 70.
individuals, as in the latter case, 3 Da Costa v. De Pas, 1 Vern.
the mode in which the legacy is to 251; Attorney-General v. Power,
take effect is deemed to be of the IB. & B. 145; De Themmines v.
substance of the legacy; but when De Bonneval, 5 Euss. 2S8, 292;
the legacy is to charity, the court Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. 36,
will consider charity as the sub- 75; Attorney-General v. Guise, 2
stance, and in such cases, if the Vern. 266 ; Cary v. Abbot, 7 Ves.
mode pointed out fails, it will pro- 490.
vide another by which the charity
758
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
[§ 323.
in the will, can be applied in a lawful manner, will be up-
held ; but if the words are broad enough to cover an illegal
as well as a legal application, and the trustees to whom it
is given are not a corporation established by law, this court,
upon a bill in equity by the executor for instructions as to
the disposition of the bequest, will refer the case to a Mas-
ter in chancery to frame a scheme for its application in a
lawful manner, according to the intent of the testator, be-
fore ordering it to be paid to the trustees.1
1 Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen,
539. "But the case most like that
before us is that of Lady Mico's
charity. Lady Mico, hy her will
made in 1670, gave a thousand
pounds 'to redeem poor slaves in
what manner the executors should
think most convenient.' This
charity was established by decree
in chancery in 1C86. Upon an in-
formation filed in 1827, after the
fund had accumulated a hundred
fold, it was referred to a master to
approve of a scheme for the appli-
cation of the income according to
the will of the testatrix, or, if he
should find that it could not be
executed according to her will,
then as near the intent of the will
as could be, regard being had to
the existing circumstances and to
the amount of the fund. The mas-
ter by his general report in 1835
stated that the relators had laid
before him a scheme for applying
the fund to the enfranchisement of
slaves in the British colonies who
were too poor to purchase their
own freedom ; which] application,
in consequence of the St. of 3 & 4,
Wins. IV., ch. 73, abolishing
slavery (which took effect in 1834),
had become impracticable; that he
was of opinion that the testatrix,
by her will, contemplated the re-
demption of poor slaves in the
Barbary States, but that intention
could not be carried into effect;
and he approved a scheme to ap-
ply the capital and income in pur-
chasing and building school houses
for the education of the emanci-
pated apprentices and their issue,
qualifying teachers, paying the
salaries of masters and other ex-
penses, and to apply the surplus
rents to the support of any other
schools, and generally in promot-
ing education in the British col-
onies. Sir Christopher Pepys, M.
B., confirmed this scheme by a de-
cree; and, after he had become
lord chancellor, stated the reasons
to have been that 'in this there
was no restriction as to the de-
scription of slaves, or the countries
in which the slaves were to be
looked for;' that upon the refer-
ence to the master 'it appeared
that there were not within any
part of the British dominions any
poor slaves to be redeemed, but
that there were in the colonies
many thousands of human beings
from whom the odious appellation
of slaves had been removed, but
whose state was very far short of
that of freemen, from whose bodies
the chains of slavery had been
struck, but whose minds and
morals were still in that state of
degradation, which is inseparable
from the unfortunate situation
from which they had recently been
§324/
CHARITABLE PUBPOSES.
759
§ 324. The Cy Pres Doctrine. — It is well established
as a doctrine of equity that where a valid devise or bequest
is made to trustees for a charitable purpose, and the pur-
pose indicated in the will cannot, for any reason, be carried
out in accordance with the directions of the will, a court of
equity has power to order the execution of the trust as
nearly as possible according to the intention of the tes-
tator.1 So far as relates to the enforcement of the trust
in equity, it is altogether immaterial whether there is un-
certainty in regard to the object, whether the persons
designated are in esse, whether the executor or trustee is a
corporation capable in law of administering a trust, or
whether the trust admits of a literal or exact execution.
In cases of this character the court will carry out, as far as
practicable, the intention of the donor. Where the pro-
visions of the will, or of the gift, cannot be carried out to
the letter, they will be enforced in accordance with the
spirit of the instrument.2 In the leading case of Jackson v.
in part rescued ; it was proposed to
the master to apply and he ap-
proved of a scheme for the com-
pletion of that holy work by as-
sisting in the education of these
poor beings.'" Ibid. p. 587. "If
the words of a charitable bequest
are ambiguous or contradictory,
they are to be so construed as to
support the charity if possible.
It is an established maxim of inter-
pretation, that the court is bound
to carry the will into effect if it
can see a general intention con-
sistent with the rules of law, even
if the particular mode pointed out
by the testator is illegal." Ibid.
p. 556. See also Bartlett v. King,
12 Mass. 543; Inglis v. Sailors'
Snug Harbor, 3 Pet. 117, 118.
1 Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen,
539; Academy v. Clemens, 50 Mo.
167; Gilman v. Hamilton, 16 111.
231; Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7
Ves. G9; '-Doctrine of Cy Pres," 3
Prop. Law, 249; "Cy Pres Con-
struction of Charitable Trusts," 70
L. T. 455.
2 Cower v. Mainwaring, 2 Ves.
87, 89 ; Attorney-General v. Oglan-
der, 3 Bro. Ch. 166 ; Attorney-Gen-
eral v. Green, 2 Bro. Ch. 492; At-
torney-General v. Boultbee, 2 Ves.
Jr. 380; Frier v. Peacock, Kep.
temp. Finch, 245; Baptist Associa-
tion v. Hart's Bxr., 4 Wheat. 1;
s. C, 3 Peters' Appendix, 481; At-
torney-General v. "Wansay, 15 Ves.
232; Preachers' Aid Soc. v. Rich,
45 Me. 552; Bliss v. Am. Bible Soc,
2 Allen, 334; Philadelphia v. Fox,
64 Pa. St. 169; Meeting St. Baptist
Soc. v. Hail, 8 K. I. 234 ; Heuser v.
Harris, 42 111. 425; Mclntire v.
Zanesville, 17 Ohio St. 352. A sum
of money was given by a testatrix
in 1643, to be laid out in the pur-
chase of lands of the annual value
of £10, one-hulf to be applied to-
wards the better relief of the most
7G0
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
[§ 324.
Phillips, the court said: "It is accordingly well settled by
decisions of the highest authority that where a gift is made
to trustees for a charitable purpose, the general nature of
which is pointed out, and which is lawful and valid at the
time of the death of the testator, and no intention is ex-
pressed to limit it to a particular institution or mode of
application, and afterwards, either by change of circum-
stances the scheme of the testator becomes impracticable,
poor and needy people of good
life and conversation in the parish
of K, to be paid to them half yearly
in the church, or the porch thereof ;
and the other half to apprentice
one poor boy or more of the parish.
At that time K was a small village,
but it had now increased to a large
and wealthy town, and the income
of the charity estate had increased
to more than £2.000. The charity
commissioners settled a scheme by
which they appropriated the in-
come to following objects: («)
The relief of poor, deserving; ob-
jects of the parish in case of sud-
den accident, sickness or distress ;
(6) subscriptions to dispensaries
and hospitals in the parish; (o)
annuities for deserving and neces-
sitous persons who had resided
seven years in the parish ; (d) the
advancement of the education of
children attending elementary
schools; (e) premiums for appren-
ticeship, and outfits for poor boys
of the parish; (/) payments to
encourage the continuance of
scholars at public elementary
schools above the age of eleven
years; (g~) exhibitions at higher
places of education; (h) providing
lectures and evening classes. Some
of the parishioners objected to the
application of the income to edu-
cational purposes. Held (revers-
ing the decision of Hall, V. C),
that considering the enormous in-
crease of the income of the charity,
and the population of the parish,
and the change of the circum-
stances and habits of the people,
the application of the income of
the charity cy pres to educational
and other charitable purposes was
justifiable, and the scheme of the
charity commissioners ought to be
confirmed. In re Hampden's Chari-
ties, L. R. 18 Ch. Div. 310. When
a bequest is made to charity, it
matters not howuncertain the per-
sons or ■ the objects may be, or
whether the persons who are to
take are in esse or not, or whether
the legatee be a corporation capa-
ble by law of taking, or whether
the bequest can be carried into ex-
act execution or not; in all such
cases the court will sustain the
legacy, and when a literal execu-
tion becomes inexpedient, the court
will execute cy pres, or as nearly
as possible. Heuser v. Harris, 42
111. 425. A testator by his will gave
the residue of his estate to his ex-
ecutor "to be disposed of by him
for such charitable purposes as he
shall think proper;" and the ex-
ecutor died, having disposed of
only a small portion thereof for
such purposes. It was held that
the will created j. valid trust for
charitable purposes, and that the
court would frame a scheme to
carry out the trust. Minot v. Baker,
147 Mass. 348.
§ 324. J CHARITABLE PURPOSES. 7G1
or bv change of law becomes illegal, the fund having once
vested in the charity, does not go to the heirs-at-law as a
resulting trust, but is to be applied by the Court of Chancery,
in the exercise of its jurisdiction in equity, as near the tes-
tator's particular directions as possible to carry out his gen-
eral charitable intent. In all the cases of charities which
have been administered in the English Courts of Chancery
without the aid of the sign manual, the prerogative of the
King, acting through the Chancellor, has not been alluded
to, except for the purpose of distinguishing it from the
power exercised by the court in its inherent equitable juris-
diction with the assistance of its master in chancery."1
The doctrine, essentially as it is here stated, is held in
other States. It would appear that in all the States in
which the statute of Elizabeth is in force, either by legis-
lative enactment or by the decisions of the courts of equity,
the doctrine of cy pres, as ordinarily held in this country,
should be recognized. In a leading case in Pennsylvania,
the doctrine is stated by Mr. Chief Justice Lowrie, as fol-
lows : "Possibly some of the directions given for the man-
agement of this charity are very unreasonable and even
impracticable ; but this does not annul the gift. The rule
of equity on this subject seems to be clear that where a
definite charity is created, the failure of the particular mode
in which it is to be effectuated does not destroy the charity,
for equity will substitute another mode, so that the sub-
stantial intention shall not depend on the insufficiency of
the formal intention. And this is the doctrine of cy pres,
so far as it has been expressly adopted by us ; not the doc-
trine 'grossly revolting to the public sense of justice' and
'carried to the extravagant length that it was formerly' in
England, by which an unlawful or entirely indefinite charity
was transformed by the court, or the Crown, into one that
was lawful and definite, though not at all intended by the
donor or testator. But a reasonable doctrine by which a
well defined charity, or one where the means of definition
are given, may be enforced in favor of the general intent,
1 Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 539, 580.
762 CHARITABLE PURPOSES. [§ 325.
even where the mode or means provided for by the donor
fail by reason of their inadequacy or unlawfulness. Our
jurisprudence furnishes illustrations of the doctrine thus
restricted. The meaning of the doctrine of cy pres, as re-
ceived by us, is that where a definite function or duty is to
be performed, and it cannot be done in exact conformity
with the scheme of the person or persons who have pro-
vided for it, it must be performed with as close approxima-
tion to that scheme as reasonably practicable; and so, of
course, it must be enforced. It is the doctrine of approx-
imation, and it is not at all confined to the administration of
charities, but is equally applicable to all devises and con-
tracts wherein the future is provided for, and it is an essen-
tial element of equity jurisprudence."1
§ 325. The Subject Continued. — In Massachusetts,
where a testator, having made a bequest to "The Marine
Bible Society," and there being no society of that name in
existence, but it appearing in answer to a bill in equity,
brought to obtain the direction of the court as to the dis-
position of the bequest, that, at or shortly before the time
of the making of the will, there was a voluntary associa-
tion in being, known by the name of "The Boston Young
Men's Marine Bible Society," the object of which was "to
circulate Bibles among destitute seamen," but which, at
the time of the testator's death, had been dissolved, or be-
come extinct ; it was held that the latter was the society in-
tended by the testator, and the court thereupon appointed
a trustee to receive and dispose of the legacy by appropria-
ting the avails thereof to the purchase of Bibles to be dis-
tributed among destitute seamen, and distributing the
same, as near as may be in conformity with the constitu-
tion and by-laws of the Boston Young Men's Marine Bible
Society, as it formerly existed.2 In an English case, a leg-
1 City of Philadelphia v. Girard's Methodist Church v. Remington,
Heirs, 45 Pa. St. 9, 27. See also 1 Watts, 226; Morrison v. Beirer, 2
Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. 69 ; W. & S. 81 ; Pickering v. Shotwell,
Thelluson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. 329 ; 10 Barr, 26.
Martin v. Maugham, 14 Sim. 232; 2 AVinslow v. Cummings, 3 Cush.
Witman v. Lex, 17 Serg. & R. 91; 358. See also Burr v. Smith, 7 Vt.
§ 325. j
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
763
acy left for the purpose or providing for the support of a
bishop in America was sustained, though at the time no
bishop had been appointed.1 A devise of lands to a body of
nuns, not incorporated, as the church wardens, or other
officers of a church or parish, and which, in consequence,
is not capable of holding real estate, will be sustained in
equity, although at law it is void.2 Where a testator made
a mistake in the name of a corporation to which he devised
property, and, in consequence, the devise was void at law,
it was sustained in equity.3 Where a bequest was made
"to the Jews' Poor, Mile Und," and at that place there
were two charitable institutions for Jews, so that it was
uncertain which was intended, the court applied the cy
pres doctrine and divided the bequest between the two in-
stitutions.4
241; Howard v. Am. Peace Soc,
49 Me. 302 ; Manners v. Philadel-
phia Library Co., 93 Pa. St. 165;
Philadelphia v. Girard's Heirs, 45
Pa. 9 ; Moore v. Moore, 4 Dana,
354; Gilman v. Hamilton, 16 111.
225; Kiefer v. German- Am. Semi-
nary, 46 Mich. 636; Academy v.
Clemens, 50 Mo. 167; Jackson v.
Phillips, 14 Allen, 539 ; Am. Acad,
v. Harvard Col., 12 Gray, 582;
Bliss v. Am. Bible Soc, 2 Allen,
334; Derby v. Derby, 4 R. I. 439;
Hunt v. Fowler, 121 111. 269, 276;
Kinney v. Kinney's Exr., 86 Ky.
610; Vidal v. Girard's Exrs., 2
How. 128; Mills v. Newberry, 112
111. 123 ; Minot v. Baker, 147 Mass.
348; Hunt v. Fowler, 121 111. 269;
Brown v. Kelsey, 2 Cush. 243;
Washburn v. Sewall, 9 Mete. 280;
Beardsley v. Selectmen of Bridge-
port, 53 Conn. 489; Hesketh v.
Murphy, 35 N". J. Eq. 23.
1 Attorney -General v. Bishop of
Chester, 1 Bro. Ch. 444.
2 Attorney-General v. Combe, 2
Ch. Cas. 13; Rivett's Case, Moore,
890; Attorney-General v. Bowyer,
3 Ves. 714; West v. Knight, 1 Ch.
Cas. 135 ; Highmore on Mortmain,
204; Mills v. Farmer, 1 Meriv. 55.
3 Minot v. Boston Asylum, 7 Mete.
417; Tucker v. Seaman's Aid Soc,
7 Mete. 188; Winslow v. Cum-
mings, 3 Cush. 359; Attorney-
General v. Piatt, Kep. temp. Finch,
221; Anon., 1 Ch. Cas. 267; Bode-
man v. Am. Tract Soc, 9 Allen,
447 ; In re Maguire, L. K. 9 Eq. 632 ;
Hosea v. Jacobs, 98 Mass. 65.
4 Bennet v. Hayter, 2Beav. 81 ; In
re Kilvert's Trusts, L. R. 12 Eq.
183. "It is clear where there are
two societies, and it is uncertain
on the face of the will which of
them is entitled to a gift, evidence
is admissible to show which of
them was intended. Then there
"being no evidence that the testa-
trix knew of the restriction of the
operations of the society to the
archdeaconry, and the subscrip-
tions of thefamily having continued
through the period when the society
operated for the benefit of all the
diocese, can I attribute to her an
intention to exclude a clergyman
764
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
[§ 326*.
§ 326. The Same Subject. — In an English case it was
held that where a charity is so given that there can be no
objects, the court will order a different scheme; but if the
objects are not now in being, but may be at some future
time, the court will retain the fund to be applied in due
time to the original scheme.1 Where property was devised
for the advancement of Christianity among infidels in Amer-
ica, and it was found that there were no infidels within the
territorial limits designated, it was held that a new scheme
must be devised for the administration of the charity.2 In
from the benefits of her bounty
who happens to die within the
diocese, but not within the arch-
deaconry? I collect from the words
of the will an intention to make a
gift to the "Worcester Society, but
only in the belief that it extended
its operations to the whole diocese,
and I find no warrant for exclud-
ing any part of it. There is no so-
ciety at present completely answer-
ing her description, and I am bound
to bold that she intended to make
her gift for the benefit of the whole
diocese; and I am, therefore, of
the opinion that I must treat the
legacy as being given, not to a
charitable society, but for a chari-
table object, to which I can only
give effect by dividing the money
between thetwo societies."' Halins,
V. C, in Kilvert's Trusts, L. R. 12
Ch. 186. On appeal (7 Ch. App.
170) the court held that the gift
was to a particular society, with a
slight inaccuracy of expression,
and that the Worcester Society was
solely entitled.
1 Attorney-General v. Oglander,
3Bro. Ch. 166; Attorney-General
v. Stewart, L. R. 14 Eq. 17.
2 Attorney-General v. The City
of London, 3 Bro. Ch. 171; s. C,
1 Ves. Jr. 243. But see Fisk v.
Attorney-General, L. R. 4 Eq. 521 ;
Attorney-General v. St. John's
Hospital, L. R. 1 Ch. 92. "In
another case Queen Elizabeth, by
letters patent, established a hospi-
talfor forty lepers, and made thein-
mates a corporation. After leprosy
had become extinct in England,
and the members of the corpora-
tion reduced to three, an informa-
tion was filed, alleging that the
corporation was dissolved, and
praying for a, new application of
the revenues agreeably to the let-
ters patent and the donor's inten-
tion, or as near thereto as circum-
stances would permit and the court
should direct. Lord Elden held
that neither the donor's heirs at
law nor the crown took the land
discharged of the charity; ref erred
the case to a master to report a
scheme; and confirmed the report
of the master, approving a scheme
for the application of the revenues
to a general infirmary, reserving a
preference to all lepers who might
offer themselves. [Attorney-Gen-
eral v. Hicks, 3 Bro. Ch. 1G6, note.]
Sir John Romilly, M. R., after-
wards made a like decision, hold-
ing tbat a gift made in 1687 of land
(for which in 1774 other land had
been substituted by leave of parlia-
ment) in trust out of the income to
keep it ready for a hospital and
burial place for patients sick of
the plague, was a present gift for
§ 326. ] CHARITABLE PURPOSES. 765
a leading English case, where a testator gave the residue of
his estate to trustees, positively forbidding them to dimin-
ish the capital thereof , or that the interest and profit arising
be applied to any other use or uses than thereinafter di-
rected ; and he proceeded to direct one moiety of the in-
come to be applied to a charitable purpose which failed;
and tke other moiety to be applied to other specified char-
itable purposes, it was held upon appeal that the court
had jurisdiction to apply cy pres the income of the moiety
devoted to the charitable purpose which failed.1 In his
opinion in this case, the Lord Chancellor said: "So in the
case of a charity, where I bequeath £100 to one object and
£50 each to two other objects of bounty, my trustees vio-
late their duty if they give less than £100 to the one and
more than £50 to each of the other two ; and that, whether
I use words of exclusion, such as 'no otherwise,' 'no other
charities,' etc., or omit to use them. But where the one
object fails, the doctrine of cy pres becomes applicable, al-
though it has no place in legacies to individuals ; and the
intention to which the court is to approximate will be gath-
ered from the other gifts, and from the gift itself. Should
words be used which positively exclude such an approxima-
tion, as, for instance, if there be an express direction that
charitable purposes, and valid, al- Attorney-General v. Green, 2 Bro.
though the plague had not reap- Ch. 492; Attorney-General v.
peared in England for more than Bishop of London, 3 Bro. Ch. 171;
one hundred and eighty years ; and Moggridge v. Thackwell, 3 Bro.
after alluding to a class of cases, Ch. 517; s. c, 1 Ves. Jr. 464; At-
cited for the heirs-at-law in that torney- General v. Glyn, 12 Sim.
case, as they have been in this, in 84; Attorney-General v. Lawes, 8
which the charitable bequest could Hare, 32; Attorney-General v.
never have taken effect, added: Vint, 3 De G. &Sm. 705; Attorney-
'But who can say, when this deed General v. Boultbee, 2 Yes. Jr.
was executed or the act passed, 387, 3S8; Attorney-General v.
that this was not a charitable trust, Whitchurch, 3 Ves. 143, 144 ; At-
capable of being performed;' 'and torney-General v. Jlinshull, 4 Ves.
if it were ever wholly devoted to 14; Mills v. Farmer, 1 Meriv. 55;
charity, those cases do not apply.' " s. c, 19 Ves. 4S3.
Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 539, 1 Attorney-General vf Ironmong-
583. See also Attorney-General v. ers' Co., 2 Beav. 313; S. C, 2 Myl.
Craven, 21 Beav. 392, 408; Attor- & K. 576; 1 Cr. & P. 220.
ney-General v. Pyle, 1 Atk. 435;
766 CHARITABLE PURPOSES. T§ 327.
each of the charities named shall have so much, and neither
more nor less, and one shall not be extended in case the
objects of another fail, then, clearly, the doctrine can have
no place ; but that is because the will of the testator has
expressly said so ; and by acting against his clear intent,
the court would not be executing cy pres (as near as possi-
ble), but departing as far as possible from that intent."1
§ 327. The Same. — In England the cy pres doctrine
appears to have been applied to any case in which there
was evidence of a purpose to establish a trust for charitable
purposes, unless there was some obstacle of a legal char-
acter. In the absence of any circumstance positively for-
bidding such an application of the doctrine, the theory was
that where a man intended to leave money for a charitable
purpose, but, in consequence of an error in the execution
of his will, or of indefiniteness in the language employed,
had either failed to comply with the requirements of the
law, or had failed to indicate the object with distinctness,
the court would not suffer the charity to fail. The prop-
erty would not be allowed to result to the heirs, but would
be disposed of in accordance with the intention of the
donor, if that was known, and, if not, cy pres to some
other charity. But the cy pres doctrine will be applied
only where the intention of the donor cannot be liberally
executed. Where the mode indicated by the instrument
cannot be followed, the court will adopt another mode that
appears consistent with the intention of the donor. Where
the mode cannot be followed, the court will execute the
1 Attorney-General v. Ironmong- where there are other charitable
ers' Co.,2Myl. &K. 576, 588; s. C, purposes mentioned in the testa-
lCr. &P.220; 2 Beav. 313. "Where tor's will itself, and in which a
a fund is to be disposed of cy pres, comparison may be instituted, be-
the court, for the sake of making a tween the probability of the testa-
disposition, is bound to act upon tor resorting to something very
the suggestions which are before remote from his original intention,
it however remote, and it is rather and something far less remote from
astute in ascertaining some appli- the other objects which are
cation in conformity, more or less, specifically mentioned in the will."
with the intention of the testator. Ibid.
The case, however, is different
§ 327.J
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
767
trust in the spirit in which it was created. Where the mode
is possible at the time a devise is made for a charity, but
subsequently becomes impossible, the court will not suffer
the general object to fail if there is any other method of
accomplishing it.1 In an English case, where the testator
1 Attorney-General v. Boultbee,
2 Ves. 380. Under wills dated be-
tween 1716 and 1803, various sums
were bequeathed for the ministers
and otherwise for the benefit of
Protestant Dissenters called "Pres-
byterians" at D. It appeared that
there had exis-ted a Presbyterian
chapel at D since 1662; that some
Baptists had associated with them,
and that the Baptist element had
in course of time so much increased
that in 1S63 only a few of the mem-
bers were Presbyterian, and since
1803 the ministers of the chapel
had been Baptist. An information
was filed in 1863, raising the ques-
tion who were entitled to these
funds which were proved to have
been enjoyed by the minister and
congregation of the chapel for the
last seventy years, and in 1865 a
congregation was formed by per-
sons claiming to be strict Presby-
terians who now claimed the fund
as such. Held, that the use of the
term "Presbyterian" did not
amount to a requisition that any
particular religious doctrine or
mode of worship should be taught
or observed; and that under the
Dissenters' chapel act (7 & 8 Vict,
ch. 45), the usage for the last
twenty-five years must be held
conclusive, and the congregation
who had enjoyed the funds must
be declared entitled. Held also,
that upon the evidence there had
been no strictly Presbyterian con-
gregation at D for the last century,
and that the funds would, if nec-
essary, be applied cy pres in favor
of the congregation in possession.
Attorney-General v. Bund, L. R.
6 Eq. 563. In 1862, on the occasion
of an accident at the Hartley Col-
liery, in Northumberland, a fund
was raised by voluntary subscrip-
tions and vested in trustees for the
relief of the sufferers and their
families. There being an ultimate
surplus, the managers of the fund
proposed to apportion it among
several mining districts, including
South Durham, for the relief of
suffering occasioned by colliery
accidents in those districts, and in
aid of relief funds already in oper-
ation there. By the rules of a
miners1 relief fund friendly society
established in 1862 for certain
counties, including the county of
Durham, provision was made for
raising funds by voluntary sub-
scriptions among the members
(required to be persons employed
in coal or other mines), and by
donations, for defraying the funeral
expenses of members, supporting
their families, assisting members
disabled by accident, old age or
infirmity, and for payment of a
sum at the death of a member.
Held, in an action by the surviving
trustee of the Hartley Colliery
Fund, that the friendly society
was a "charity," and that that
portion of the fund intended for
the South Durham district might
be applied cy pres by payment to
four of the trustees of the friendly
society, td be applied by them, ac-
cording to the rules of the society,
for the relief of suffering occa-
768
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
[§ 327.
directed funds to be provided for certain charity schools
by accumulating his property, but fixed no time for the
continuance of the accumulation, which must necessarily
have exceeded the legal period, the court held the di-
rection to accumulate to be void, and, consequently, the
sioned by colliery accidents in the
South Durham district, and lor no
other purpose. Held, also, that the
Hartley Colliery fund, being a
fund arising wholly from "volun-
tary contributions," was exempted
by section 62, of the Charitable
Trust Act, 1853, from the operation
of the act, and that, therefore, the
consent of the charity commission-
ers to the action, under section 17,
was unnecessary. Pease v. Pat-
tison, L. R. 32 Ch. D. 154. A
charitable bequest to an institution
which comes to an end after the
death of the testator, but before
the legacy is paid, does not fail for
the benefit of the residuary legatee,
as in the ordinary case of a lapse
through failure of the object in the
testator's ; the property in the leg-
acy falls to be administered by the
crown and will ordinarily be ap-
plied for charitable purposes. A
testator gave a number of legacies
to various persons, using the intro-
ductory words, '-I bequeath the
pecuniary legacies following." He
then gave a number of legacies to
various institutions, churches and
bodies, using the introductory
words, "I bequeath the following
charitable legacies;" and amongst
such last mentioned legacies was
one to an orphanage voluntarily
maintained by a lady at her own
expense, which was in existence
at the testator's death, but was
discontinued shortly afterwards,
and before his assets were admin-
istered. Held (reversing Stirling,
J.), that on the death of the testa-
tor the legacy became the property
of the orphanage ; and that on the
orphanage ceasing to exist, the
property in the legacy became ap-
plicable by the crown for charita-
ble purposes. In re Slevin [1891],
2 Ch. 236. A testator directed his
trustees to set apart a sum of
money out of such part of his per-
sonal estate as might by law be
applied for charitable purposes,
and to apply it in the establish-
ment of a soup kitchen and cottage
hospital for the parish of S, in
such a manner as not to violate the
mortmain acts. A suit having been
instituted to administer the trusts
of the will, the chief clerk reported
that it was impossible to apply the
fund in accordance with the direc-
tions in the will. Held, that the
will showed a general charitable
intention to benefit the poor of the
parish of S, and although the par-
ticular purpose of the bequest had
failed, the court would execute the
trust cy pres; and a scheme was
directed accordingly. Biscoe v.
Jackson, L. K. 35 Ch. D. 460. The
following are a few recent English
decisions on the cy pres doctrine :
In re Maguire, L. K. 9 Eq. 632; Ex
parte Earl Romney, L. K. 14 Eq.
230; Chamberlaine v. Brockett, L.
R. 8 Ch. 206; New v. Bonaker, L.
R. 4 Eq. 655; Attorney-General v.
Hankey, L. R. 16 Eq. 140, n.; Inf.
Clarke's Charities, L. R. 1 Ch. E.
497 ; Broadbent v. Barrow, L. R.
29 Ch. D. 560; In re White's Trusts,
L. R. 33 Ch. D. 449; Fisk v. Attor-
ney-General, L. R. 4 Eq. 521.
§ 328. J CHARITABLE PURPOSES. 769
ulterior dispositions of the will to fail ; but as the testator
had shown an intention to devote his property to charitable
purposes, it directed his intention to be carried into effect
cy pres, by means of a scheme settled by the Master.1 In
his opinion in the case, the Vice Chancellor said: "Al-
though the particular mode in which the testator meant
the benefits to be doled out to the objects of his bounty
cannot take effect, yet as there is confessedly a devotion of
his personal estate to charitable purposes, my opinion is
that his next of kin have no claim at all to his property. I
conceive that, if a testator has expressed his intention that
his personal estate shall be in substance applied for char-
itable purposes, the particular mode which he may have
pointed out for effecting these purposes has nothing to do
with the question whether the devotion for charitable pur-
poses shall take place or not ; and that whatever the diffi-
culty may be, the court, if it is compelled to yield to cir-
cumstances, will carry the charitable intention into effect
through the medium of some other scheme."2
§ 328. The Disposition of Charitable Corporations. —
Where a charitable corporation has revenues of which no
objects remain as beneficiaries, the court will dispose of the
revenue by providing a new scheme cy pres, in harmony
with the design of the original gifts. But if the institution
is permanent, as a college or other educational institution,
and the object of the testator was to benefit the institution
through the administration of the charity, a new scheme
will not be ordered, though the particular individuals named
as trustees may have died during the life of the testator.
In such a case the court will order the money to be paid to
the institution through the proper officer. In Walsh v.
Gladstone, where a legacy was given by a will to A B, "to
be applied to the use of" a certain Catholic college, and A
B died in the testator's lifetime, the court, on being satis-
fied of the respectability and permanent character of the
institution, ordered the legacy to be paid to the president
1 Martin v. Maugham, 14 Sim. 2 Martin v. Maugham, 14 Sim.
230. 230, 232.
49
770
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
[§ 328.
of the college, who was the officer intrusted with the man-
agement of its pecuniary affairs, without requiring any
scheme to be settled, although the Attorney-General asked
for one.1 Where property is devised to a corporation for
any charitable purpose, with the understanding on the part
of the donor that it is a permanent institution, the property
will not, in any case, revert to his heirs. But if it becomes
impracticable to administer the charity in accordance with
the intention of the donor, the court will substitute some
object of a similar character, as long as the corporation
continues to exist.2 In The Attorney-General v. Wilson,
the Master of the Eolls said: "Whether the increased
1 Walsh v. Gladstone, 1 Phill.
290. See also Inglis v. Sailors'
Snug Harbor, 3 Pet. 99 ; Reeve v.
Attorney-General, 3 Hare, 191;
Hayter v. Trego, 5 Russ. 113;
Denyer v. Druce, Taml. 32; So-
ciety, etc. Gospel v. Attorney-
General, 3 Russ. 142 ; Lorings v.
Marsh, 6 Wall. 337; Attorney-
General v. Gladstone, 13 Sim. 7
Pountaine v. Ravenel, 17 How. 382
Green v. Allen, 5 Humph. 170
Griffin v. Graham, 1 Hawks, 96
Down v. Worrall, 1 Myl. & K. 561.
In Walsh v. Gladstone, supra, the
lord chancellor uses this language:
"Whether a scheme should be di-
rected or not will depend upon the
information I may have as to the
nature of the institution and the
situation of the officer. If there
are already existing funds belong-
ing to the institution, and if the
president, who has the manage-
ment of those funds, is appointed
for life, so as to give him a perma-
nent character, the legacy may
perhaps be paid to him without
referring it to the master to settle
a scheme. But suppose the presi-
dent held his office by « precari-
ous tenure, by appointment from
year to year, for instance, and that
the institution was supported by
voluntary contributions, then it
might be right that a scheme should
be settled. If there is a character
of permanence in the institution,
and in the situation of the officer,
the court will hand it over to him
without a scheme, as was done
lately in the ease of the Venice
charity. Where a testator, who is
a Roman Catholic, leaves money
for the use of a Roman Catholic es-
tablishment, all I have to do is to see
that it is applied to the use of that
establishment, and that it is paid
into hands in which it will be safe.
I have nothing to do with the in-i
ternal management, discipline and
mode of education in such an in-
stitution. I should wish, however,
before I dispose of this petition, to
have some more precise informa-
tion than the present affidavits af-
ford, respecting the nature of this
institution, and the situation and
character of the president." See
also Birchard v. Scott, 39 Conn. 63.
2 Attorney-General v. Wilson, 3
Myl. & K. 362; Goode v. McPher-
son, 51 Mo. 126 ; Attorney-General
v. Hankey, L. R. 16 Eq, 140, n.; In
re Prison Charities, L. R. 16 Eq.
129.
§ 329.] CHARITABLE PURPOSES. 771
rent of an estate devised to a charity is to be applied to
charitable purposes, or results to the heir, depends upon
the expressed intention of a testator. If, in direct terms,
the whole profits of the estate are devised to charitable
uses, the heir is, of course, excluded from any resulting
trust in the increased rent. If the charitable purposes
mentioned in the will exhaust the whole actual rent of the
estate at the time of the devise, the plain implied intention
of the testator necessarily excludes the heir."1 If the
charitable fund continues in possession, but the corporation
ceases to exist, or there is a failure of the trustees, the
court will assume control of the property and administer
the charity.2
§ 329. The Subject Continued. — It is an established
rule of equity that where an estate is devoted to a charita-
ble purpose, and the income of the estate subsequently in-
creases, so that it is in excess of the requirements of the
charity, there will be no resulting trust in favor of the
heirs-at-law of the donor, but the entire revenue will be de-
voted to the object of the charity. In the case of The
Merchant Tailors' Company v. The Attorney-General,
Lord Eomilly, Master of the Rolls, in his opinion, said:
1 Attorney-General v. Wilson, 3 years the trustees delayed so long
Myl. & K. 362, 372. in approving a vicar that the chan-
2 Attorney-General v. Hicks, 3 cellor appointed without their ap-
Bro. Ch. 166, n.; s. c, Highrnore probation. They attempted then
on Mortmain, 336, 353, etc. ; In re to deprive the incumbent of his
St. John's Church, 3 Ir. Eq. 335; emoluments, because he was not in
Attorney- General v. Glyn, 12 Sim. according to the trust. The court
84; Attorney-General v. London, 3 laid down the principle that a
Bro. Ch. 171; s. c, 1 Ves. 243; charity is not be executed in a
Attorney-General v. Craven, 21 mode different from that directed,
Beav. 392; Attorney-General v. unless a literal performance be-
Boultbee, 2 Ves. Jr. 380; s.c. 3 come impossible; if that mode be-
Ves. 220. Property was conveyed come impossible, then the sub-
to seven trustees to permit and en- stance is to be fulfilled, and the
able the vicar of P forever to main- general object not to be defeated
tain certain charities, and have if it can be attained. Attorney-
emoluments to himself, if he General v. Boultbee, 2 Ves. Jr. 380,
should be in by approbation of the 388. See also Attorney- General v.
trustees. After a hundred and fifty Andrew, 3 Ves. 633.
772 CHARITABLE PURPOSES. [§ 330,
"It is proper to observe that, if a person gives, in any will,
certain property to a company in trust, to apply the rents
of that property (which means all the rents of that prop-
erty), to a certain charity, and if that charity does not
exhaust the whole of it, the property is given to charitable
purposes, and the remainder must be applied to charitable
purposes, either cy pres for the extension of that charity
itself, or, if that fails, and it cannot be so applied, then, it
being all given to a charity, it must be assigned by the sign
manual, or the like, to certain charitable purposes."1 In
a leading case, Lord Chancellor Heatherly quoted with
approval the words of Lord St. Leonards, in Mayor v. The
Attorney-General, as follows: "If there is a dedication
of the estate to a charity by a clear intention, expressed or
implied, from what is stated in the will, then the whole es-
tate must go to the charity, although the entire rents are
not disposed of specifically."2
§ 330. Power of the Court to Change a Charitable
Scheme. — In the exercise of the same power by which a
court of equity creates a new scheme for a charity, where
the circumstances render it necessary, it will also amend
or change an existing scheme where it appears that it is
1 Merchant Tailors' Co. v. Attor- & K. 362, 372 ; Attorney-General v.
ney-General, L. R. 11 Eq. 35, 42, Wax Chandlers' Company, L. B. 8
43. Eq. 452; s. c, 5 Ch.503; Merchant
2 Mayor of Southmolton v. At- Tailors' Company v. Attorney -
torney-General, 5H. L. Cas. 1. See General, L. R. 11 Eq. 35; s. c, 6
also Attorney-General v. Earl of Ch.512; Attorney -General v. Mer-
Winchelsea, 3 Bro. Ch. 373; Ex chant, L. R. 3 Eq. 424; /nj-eLati-
parte Jortin, 7 Ves. 340; Attorney- mer, L. R. 7 Eq. 353; Attorney-
General v. Mayor of Bristol, 2 General v. Trinity Church, 9 Allen,
Jac. & W. 321; Attorney-General 422; Attorney-General v. Tonna,
v. Dixie, 2 Myl. & IC. 342 ; Attorney- 4 Bro. Ch. 103 ; Attorney-General
General v. Hurst, 2 Cox, 364; At- v. Tonner, 2 Ves. Jr. 1; Attorney-
torney- General v. The Coopers' General v. Haberdashers' Com-
Company, 3 Beav. 29; Attorney- pany, 1 Ves. Jr. 295; Attorney-
General v. The Drapers' Company, General v. Wansay, 13 Ves. 234;
2 Beav. 508; Attorney-General v. Attorney-General v. Whiteley, 11
The Ironmongers' Company, 2 Ves. 251 ; Mercers' Company v.
Myl. & K. 576, 586, 588; s. C, 2 Attorney-General, 2 Bligh (N. SO,
Beav. 313; 1 Craig & P. 220, 227; 165.
Attorney -General v. Wilson, 3 Myl.
$ 330.] CHARITABLE PURPOSES. 773
required. In a recent English case, it was held that the
court has power to alter, from time to time, the scheme of
charity which has been settled by a previous decree of the
court, if the circumstances require it. The court refused
to permit the renewal of leases of the lands of a charity on
fines, although the practice had been sanctioned by a scheme
settled by the award and decree of the court, and had been
acted on since, under the direction of the court. The cus-
tom of an ancient charity had been that the lessees of the
charity lands should have renewals of leases on easy and
beneficial terms. The court, nevertheless, in settling a
scheme, refused to permit leases to be granted, except at
rack rent, but directed that in granting fresh leases regard
should be had to the claims of any lessees who had ex-
pended money on the faith of renewals.1 In his opinion in
this case, Lord Justice Turner said: "It is as I have said,
no more than a scheme for the administration of the charity,
and I know no authority and no principle which can war-
rant us in holding that a scheme settled by this court for
the administration of a charity cannot be altered, if the
lapse of time and the change of circumstances render it for
the interest of the charity that the alterations should be
made. It is the duty of the Crown to protect the interests
of charities, and to take the necessary proceedings for rem-
edying any defect arising in the administration of them ;
and I can see no distinction between defects arising in the
ordinary administration of charities and those which may
arise in the administration of them under schemes settled
1 Attorney-General v. St. John's of the demised premises. The at-
Hospital,L.K. 1 Ch. 92. A scheme torney-general applied to have
settled in 1856 for the administra- this scheme amended by striking
tion of a charity, •authorized the out the clause as to granting leases,
granting of building leases, with Held, by the Court of Appeals, af-
the sanction of charity commis- firming the decision of Chitty, J.,
sioners for ninety-nine years abso- that the clause ought to be struck
lute, or for twenty-one years with out, leaving the granting of leases
a covenant for perpetual renewal to be governed by the charitable
at the expiration of every twenty- trusts acts. In re Smith's Charity,
one years, on payment of a fine of L. K. 20 Ch. D. 516.
one-half of the then annual value
774
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
[§ 330.
by this court, except that in the cases in which discretion
has been already exercised more care and caution ought
perhaps to be exercised before alterations are made."1 But
while the power of the court to change an existing scheme
is well established, it will proceed in a case of this character
with extreme caution, and will act only where it is plain
that a change is indicated by all the circumstances, and there
is good reason to believe that a new scheme will operate to
the promotion of the end for which the charity was estab-
lished, and that the change can be effected without any
violence to the original idea of the charity.2
1 Attorney-General v. St. John's
Hospital, L. E. 1 Ch. 92, 106.
2 Attorney-General v. Stewart,
L. K. 14 Eq. 17. Where a chari-
table fund has, on the object for
which it was provided becoming
incapable of being carried out,
been applied cy pres to an object in
itself beneficial, the court will not
subsequently change the applica-
tion, even to a purpose identical
with its original object, unless sat-
isfied that the proposed application
will be as beneficial as the existing
one, — semble, that when a scheme
has been once settled for the appli-
cation of a charitable fund, an
alteration in it can only be made
on the application of the attorney-
general, or, at all events, with his
consent. A fund was subscribed
for the purpose of providing a
place of public worship in Lon-
don, for persons coming from the
Highlands of Scotland who could
not speak English, where divine
service should be performed in the
Gaelic language. Held, that per-
sons who could not speak the En-
glish language in such manner as
to enable them to attend with
advantage a place of public wor-
ship where the English language
was spoken were objects of charity.
But the fund having been applied
cy pres to the purposes of the Cale-
donian asylum, under a scheme
settled in an information in conse-
quence of the impossibility of find-
ing a minister to conduct the service
in the Gaelic language, or a suffi-
cient number of persons to attend
such services, although it now ap-
peared on a petition by some
natives of the Highlands of Scot-
land, who alleged that they desired
to attend a service in the Gaelic
language, that a duly qualified
Scotch clergyman could be found
to conduct the service, the court
not being satisfied upon the evi-
dence that there were persons in
London who were properly objects
of the charity, or would attend the
service if established, refused to
alter the existing scheme. Attor-
ney-General v. Stewart, L. K. 14
Eq. 17. "But, although it is thus,
in my opinion, competent to the
attorney-general to apply to the
court for alterations in schemes
which have been settled under its
directions, it is obvious, I think,
that the court must proceed upon
such applications with the utmost
possible caution; that what has
been done by the court must not
be disturbed, except upon the most
§ 331. j
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
775
§ 331. The Cy Pres Doctrine in America. — As a rule,
the English doctrine has not been accepted in its full extent
by the American courts. In some of the States it has been
accepted in its general features, and in others it has been
altogether rejected. The United States courts, in their de-
cisions, follow, of course, the rule established in the State
from which the case comes. The rule that governs in that
class of States in which the English doctrine has been
adopted is expressed by Mr. Justice Gray in Jackson v.
Phillips, as follows: "The instruments creating them,"
— that is, charitable trusts, — "should be so construed as to
give them effect if possible, and to carry out the general
intention of the donor, where clearly manifested, even if
the particular form or manner pointed out by him cannot
be followed."1 A similar view has been held in Pennsyl-
substantial grounds, and upon the
clearest evidence, not only that
the scheme does not operate bene-
ficially, but that it can by altera-
tion be made to do so consistently
with the object of the foundation.
Incalculable mischief will ensue to
all the charities in the kingdom if
this rule be not strictly observed,
and if the court ventures in such
cases to interfere upon speculative
views as to the result of alterations,
or in matters of discretion or regu-
lation— matters on which the opin-
ion of each succeeding attorney-
general, and of each succeeding
judge, may well be permitted to
differ, I consider this case as cast-
ing upon me the duty of most
carefully guarding myself against
being led into adopting, in oppo-
sition to what has been already
settled by the court, any mere
opinions wlNiih I may entertain as
to what m> $ht be more or less
beneficial for this charity." At-
torney-General v. Bishop of Wor-
cester, 9 Hare, 328.
1 Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen,
580. Massachusetts adopts the
doctrine without qualification.
See Weeks v. Hobson, 150 Mass.
37"; Sears v. Chapman, 158 Mass.
400; Winslow v. Cummings, 3
Cush. 358; Bliss v. Am. Bible Soc,
2 Allen, 334; Am. Acad. v. Har-
vard College, 12 Gray, 582. "The
question arises whether the chanty
must altogether fail, or whether it
is a case for the application of the
doctrine of cy pres, whereby the
general purpose of the testator may
be carried out in a way differing
from that which he contemplated.
He meant to have the money used
in the support of a school in School
District No. 19, for the benefit of
that part of the public who might
from time to time reside within
the district, or so near it as to use
the school established. But we
should undoubtedly do him injus-
tice if we should interpret his pur-
pose so narrowly as to make the
continuance of the charity depend
upon the maintenance of a school
within the limits of the district,
the entire area of which was only
776
CHARITABLE PUKPOSES.
[§
vania and some of the other States. There is no obvious
reason why the cy pres doctrine should not be accepted in
those States in which the statute of Elizabeth has been
adopted by legislative enactment, or where the principle of
about twenty-five acres. When he
made his will he thought the con-
tinuance of a school there was the
best way of promoting education
in that vicinity. The promotion
of education in that neighborhood
was his object, and the charity is
of such a kind that his general
purpose must be carried out as
nearly as possible in accordance
with his design, even though the
result reached differs in minor par-
ticulars from that intended. * * *
It is contended in behalf of the
residuary legatees, that inasmuch
as the bequest cannot be used ex-
actly as provided by the will, and
as the residue is given to a charity,
it should be held that this bequest
has failed, and that the fund should
go to them for the charitable uses
mentioned in the residuary clause.
But the fact that the residue is
given to a charity does not defeat
the application of the doctrine of
cy pres to another charitable be-
quest which it becomes impracti-
cable to administer precisely ac-
cording to the terms of the will.
This rule is established by the
highest authority in England, and
it is founded upon the same prin-
ciples of interpretation as the gen-
eral doctrine of cy pres itself. The
residuary clause is to be considered
only as other parts of the will are
considered, to aid in ascertaining
the general purpose of the testator
in regard to the gift in question."
Attorney-General v. Briggs (1895) ,
164 Mass. 561, 568; s. C, 42 N. E.
Kep. 118. See also for cases fa-
vorable to cy pres in the United
States: Burr v. Smith, 7 Vt. 241;
Manners v. Philadelphia Library
Co., 93 Pa. St. 165; Philadelphia
v. Girard's Heirs, 45 Pa. St. 9;
Gilman v. Hamilton, 16 111. 225;
Derby v. Derby, 4 K. I. 439; How-
ard v. Am. Peace Soc, 49 Me. 302;
Academy v. Clemens, 50 Mo. 167;
Kiefer v. Ger. Am. Seminary, 46
Mich. 636; Moore v. Moore, 4Dana
(Ky.), 354. The Eastport fire fund
having been contributed to relieve
the suffering caused by the fire in
that town, and that purpose hav-
ing been accomplished, and it be-
ing impracticable to restore the
unexpended balance to the donors,'
since they are unknown, the sur-
plus should be used to repair the
losses occasioned by the fire, and
could not be employed by the town
to the support of the poor. Doyle
v. Whalen (1895), 87 Me. 414; S.C.,
32 Atl. Kep. 1022. Where property
is given to the trustees of a church
for the Sabbath school of the
church, on consolidation of such
church with another after testator's
death, the legacy does not lapse,
but should be paid to the consoli-
dated church, under Act May 9,
1889 (P. L. 173), providing that no
disposition of property for a relig-
ious use shall fail by reason of the
object ceasing, but an equity court
shall appoint a trustee to carry
into effect the intent of the testator.
In re Cowan's Estate, 4 Pa. Dist.
Rep. 435. The doctrine has been
criticised or repudiated in the fol-
lowing cases : Pringle v. Dorsey,
3S. Car. (X. S.) 509; Bascom v.
Albertson, 34 X. Y. 584; Beekman
4 332. J CHARITABLE PURPOSES. 777
the statute has been adopted by the courts.1 In Russell v.
Allen, the Supreme Court of the United States fully sus-
tained the doctrine as set forth in Jackson v. Phillips.2
§ 332. Cy Pres Under the Royal Prerogative In
England there are two forms under which the cy pres rule
is put into execution by a court of chancery. Under the
first method the Lord Chancellor acts without the decree of
the court, on the authority with which he is delegated as
the representative of the Crown. His official acts in this
class of cases are the acts of the sovereign through his in-
strumentality. The doctrine is that the King, as parens
jpatrice, and by virtue of his general authority over all mat-
ters pertaining to the public interest, has the power to en-
force all charities where no other person has been specific-
ally intrusted with such authority. In this act the Lord
Chancellor exercises a prerogative of the King and dis-
charges a duty which belongs to him. In the second class
of cases a court of equity, acting in the exercise of its ordi-
nary chancery powers, directs the carrying out of the char-
ity.3 The distinction between the two classes of cases is
t. Bonsor, 23 1ST. Y. 298; Fontaine 2 Russell v. Allen, 107 U. S. 166,
v. Eavenel, 17 How. 369; Carter v. 167.
Balfour, 19 Ala. 814; White v. 3 Moggridge v. Thackwell,7Ves.
risk, 22 Conn. 31 ; Grimes v. Har- 83,86. "The principal, if not the
mon, 35 Ind. 198; Le Page v. Mo- only, cases in which the disposi-
ISTamara, 5 Clarke (Iowa), 124; tion of a charity is held to be in
McAuley v. Wilson, 1 Dev. Eq. the crown by sign manual, are of
276 ; Venable v. Coffman, 2 W. Va. two classes : the first, of bequests
310; Thompson's Bxr. v. Norris, to particular uses charitable in
20 N". J. Eq. 522. their nature, but illegal, as for a
1 Vidal v. Girard, 2 How. 128 ; form of religion not tolerated by
Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 519; law; and second, gifts of property
Perin v. Carey, 24 How. 465; to charity generally, without any
Treat's Appeal, 30 Conn. 113; Witt- trust interposed, and in which
man v. Lex, 17 Serg. & E. 88 ; Zane's either no appointment is provided
Will, Brightley, 350; Williams v. for, or the power of appointment
Pearson, 38 Ala. 305; Potter v. is delegated to persons who die
Thornton, 7 B. I. 252; Church v. without exercising it, is by the
Church, 18 B. Mon. 635; Pasehal sign manual and in cases of the*,
v. Acklin, 27 Tex. 173; Walker v. first class, that the arbitrary dispo-
Walker, 25 Ga. 420 ; Going v. Em- sitions have been made, which
«ry, 16 Pick. 107; Hadley v. Hop- were so justly condemned by Lord
kins' Acad., 14 Pick. 240. Thurlow, in Moggridge v. Thaek-
778
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
[§ 333.
drawn by Lord Eldon, as follows: "The general principle
thought most reconcilable to the cases is that, where there
is a general indefinite purpose, not fixing itself upon any
object, the disposition is in the King by sign manual; but
Where the execution is to be by a trustee, with general or
some objects pointed out, then the court will take the ad-
ministration of the trust."1
§ 333. The Legislature as Parens Patriae. — Under
our form of government the prerogatives of the sovereign,
as well as the power of parliament, belong to the people.
In Fontaine v. Raven el, Mr. Justice McLean, delivering the
opinion of the court, said: "When this country achieved
its independence, the prerogatives of the Crown devolved
upon the people of the States, and this power still remains
with them, except so far as they have delegated a portion
of it to the Federal Government. The sovereign will is
made known to us by legislative enactment. The State, as
a sovereign, is the parens patrice."2 The doctrine, as held
well, 1 Ves. Jr. 469, and Sir Wm.
Grant in Carey v. Abbot, 7 Ves.
494, 495, and which, through want
of due discrimination, have brought
so much discredit upon the whole
doctrine of cypres. Such was the
case of Attorney-General v. Bax-
ter, in which a bequest to Mr.
Baxter to be distributed by him
among sixty pious ejected minis-
ters (not as the testator declared,
for the sake of their non-conform-
ity, but because he knew many of
them to be pious and good men
and in great want), was held to be
void, and given under the sign
manual to Chelsea College; but
the decree was afterwards reversed,
upon the ground that this was
really a legacy to sixty individuals
to be named. * * * The second
class of bequests which are dis-
posed of by the king's sign manual
is of gifts to charity generally,
with no uses specified, no trust in-
terposed, and either no provision
made for an appointment, or the
power of appointment delegated to-
particular persons who die without
exercising it. This, too, is not
a judicial power of expounding
and carrying out the testator's in-
tention, but a prerogative power
of ordaining what the testator has
failed to express. No instance is
reported or has been discovered in
the thorough investigations of the
subject, of an exercise of this power
in England before the reign of
Charles II." Jackson v. Phillips,
14 Allen, 574. See also Kex v.
Portington, 1 Salk. 162 ; Attorney-
General v. Syderf en, 1 Vern. 224;
S. c, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 96; Attor-
ney-General v. Fletcher, 5 L. J.
(X. S.) Ch. 75.
1 Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves.
36, 86.
2 Fontaine v. Ravenel, 17 How.
369, 384. "The courts of the United
§ 333.J
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
779
in those States in which the English theory of cy pres has
been adopted, is stated by Mr. Justice Bradley in the lead-
ing case of The Mormon Church v. The United States, as
follows: "The true ground is that the property given to
a charity becomes in a measure public property, only ap-
plicable as far as may be, it is true, to the specific purpose
to which it is devoted, but within those limits consecrated
to the public use, and becomes part of the public resources
for promoting the happiness and well being of the people
of the State. Hence, where such property ceases to have
any other owner, by failure of the trustees, by forfeiture
for illegal application, or for any other cause, the owner-
ship naturally and necessarily falls upon the sovereign
power of the State ; and, thereupon, the Court of Chancery,
in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction, will appoint a
new trustee to take the places of the trustees that have
failed, or that have been set aside, and will give direction
States cannot exercise any equity
powers, except those conferred by
acts of congress, and those judicial
powers which the high court of
chancery in England, acting under
its judicial capacity as a court of
equity, possessed and exercised, at
the time of the formation of the
constitution of the United States.
Powers not judicial, exercised by
the chancellor merely as the rep-
resentative of the sovereign, and by
virtue of the king's prerogative as
parens patriae, are not possessed by
the circuit courts." Ibid. 384. "In
this country, the legislature or
government of the State, as parens
patriae, has the right to enforce all
charities of a public nature, by
virtue of its general superintending
authority over the public interests,
where no other person is intrusted
with it." 4 Kent, Com. 508, note.
"The manner in which the due ad-
ministration and application of
charitable estate is secured, de-
pends upon the judicial institutions
and machinery of the particular
government to which they are sub-
ject. In England the court of
chancery is the ordinary tribunal
to which this class of cases is dele-
gated, and there are comparatively
few which it is not competent to
administer. Where there is a fail-
ure of trustees, it can appoint new
ones ; and when a modification of
uses is necessary in order to avoid
a violation of the laws, it has power
to make the change. There are
some cases, however, which are
beyond its jurisdiction, as where,
by statute, a. gift to certain uses is
declared void and the property
goes to the king; and in some
other cases of failure of the charity.
In such cases the king as parens
patriae, under his sign manual, dis-
poses of the fund to such uses,
analogous to those intended as
seems to him expedient and wise."
Mormon Church v. United States,
136 U. S. 1, 51.
780
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
[§ 333.
for the further management and administration of the
property ; or if the case is beyond the ordinary jurisdiction
of the court, the legislature may interpose and make such
disposition of the matter as will accord with the purposes
of justice and right. The funds are not lost to the public
as charity funds ; they are not lost to the general objects
or class of objects which they were intended to subserve
or effect. The State, by its legislature, or its judiciary,
interposes to preserve them from dissipation and destruc-
tion, and to set them up on a new basis of usefulness, di-
rected to lawful ends, coincident, as far as may be, with
the objects originally proposed."1
1 Mormon Church v. United
States, 136 U. S. 1, 59. "The in-
terposition of the legislature in
such cases is exemplified by the
case of Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch,
292, which arose in Vermont. In
the town charter, granted in the
name of the king in 1761, one en-
tire share of the town lands was
granted 'as a glebe for the church
of England as by law established.'
There was no Episcopal church in
the town until 1802. In that year
one was organized, and its parson
laid claim to the glebe lands and
leased them to Clark and others.
Of course, this church had never
been connected with the 'Church of
England as by law established;"'
and the institution of such a church
in 1802 was impossible, and would
have been contrary to the public
policy of the State. Meantime, in
1794, the legislature had granted
the glebe lands to the several
towns to be rented by the select-
men for the sole use and support
of public worship without restric-
tion as to sect or denomination.
This law was subsequently re-
pealed, and in 1805 the legislature
passed another act granting the
glebe lands to the respective towns
to apply the rents to the use of
schools therein. This was held to
be a valid disposition. Mr. Story,
in the course of an elaborate opin-
ion, amongst other things, showed
that a mere voluntary society of
Episcopalians within a town could
no more entitle themselves, on ac-
count of their religious tenets, to
the glebe than any other society
worshiping therein. 'The glebe,'
he said, 'remained hmreditasjacens,
and the State, which succeeded to
the rights of the crown, might,
with the assent of the town, alien
or incumber it or might erect an
Episcopal church therein,' etc. p.
335. 'By the revolution the State
of Vermont succeeded to all the
rights of the crown as to the unap-
propriated as well as the appro-
priated glebes,' p. 335. Again,
'without the authority of the State,
however, they [the towns] could
not apply the lands to other uses
than public worship; and in this
respect the statute of 1805 conferred
a new right which the towns might
or might not exercise at their own
pleasure.' p. 336." Ibid. 59. See
the note of Justice Bradley to this
case.
§ 334. J CHARITABLE PURPOSES. 781
§ 334. Corporations as Trustees for Charitable Gifts.
— There is a class of corporations designated as charitable
corporations, the distinguishing feature of which is that
they are organized for the administration of charitable
trusts, and not for the personal benefit of the incorpora-
tors. Such a corporation is not an association of stock-
holders, like a joint-stock company organized for business
purposes, but simply an agency for the administration of
trust funds. The beneficiaries of a charitable corporation
are the donees of the charity, not the incorporators or
members of the corporation. Gifts for charitable pur-
poses may be left to existing corporations of this character,
or they may be left to trustees with instructions to secure
an act of incorporation, and to convey the property to such
corporation for the administration of the trust. These as-
sociations are invested with such rights and privileges by
the act of the donor, and by the act of incorporation, that
the trust cannot be affected by subsequent legislation.1
Where the circumstances subsequently require a change in
the corporation, it may be made without in any way affect-
ing the administration of the charity, and where the prop-
erty was left to an existing corporation, subsequent changes
in the corporation will not divest it of its power to admin-
ister the trust.2 The establishment of a charity in this
form subjects its management and control to a visitatorial
jurisdiction on the part of the donor and his heirs, or of
the persons whom the donor has substituted for himself
and his heirs.3 The visitors have a general superintendence
of the operations of the body, and it is their duty to see
that the rules and regulations of the corporation are duly ob-
served. They are to be guided by the instructions and regu-
lations of the founder of the charity, and within their sphere,
or so far as they act in accordance with their authority,
'Brown v. Hummel, 6 Pa. St. Wall. 1; Mclntire v. Zanesville, 17
86; State v. Adams, 4 Mo. 570; St. Ohio St. 352.
John's College v. State, 15 Md. 3 Attorney-General v. Gaunt, 3
330 ; Dartmouth College v. Wood- Swanst. 148 ; Eden v. Foster, 2 P.
ward, 4 Wheat. 518. Wms. 326.
2 Girard, etc. v. Philadelphia, 7
782 CHARITABLE PURPOSES. [§ 335.
their decisions are not to be called in question by appeal. In
The Attorney-General v. Smythies an information alleging
an abuse in the internal regulations of a charity was dis-
missed by the court on the ground that they were the
proper subject for the interference of the special visitor.1
But while the court will not interfere with the power of
the visitors, it has jurisdiction so far as relates to the ad-
ministration of the corporate property.2 Where it is in
evidence that there has been a perversion of the corporate
funds, equity will interpose and correct the abuse in the
same manner that it would act against unincorporated
trustees.3
§ 335. Gifts to Charitable Corporations. — Devises,
bequests and convej^ances inter vivos to charitable corpora-
tions are of very frequent occurrence, and in their charac-
teristics, and in the equitable rules to which they are
subject, they present very numerous phases. While courts
of equity will weigh with great care any objection that may
be urged against any charitable bequests, and especially
- Attorney-General v. Smythies, torney-General v. Master of Cath-
2 Myl. & Cr. 135. See also Attor- arine Hall, Jac. 392; Attorney-
ney-General v. Dulwich College, General v. Moore, 4 Green Ch.
4 Beav. 255 ; Dangars v. Rivaz, 28 503.
Beav. 233; In re Christ's Church, 2 Attorney-General v. Clarendon,
L. K. 1 Ch. 126; Attorney-General 17 Ves. 498; Whiston v. Rochester,
v. Foundling Hospital, 2 Ves. Jr. 7 Hare, 532; In re Bedford Charity,
47; In re Chertsey Market, 6 Price, 5 Sim. 578; Attorney-General v.
272; Attorney-General v. Locke, 3 Bedford, 10 Beav. 505; Attorney-
Atk. 165 ; Ex parte Berkhampstead General v. Dixie, 13 Ves. 519 ; At-
School, 2 Ves. & B. 138; Poor of torney-General v. Mtddleton, 2
Chelmsford v. Mildmay, Duke, 83; Ves. 327; Attorney -General v.
Attorney-General v. Clarendon, 17 Dulwich College, 10 Beav. 255;
Ves. 499; Eden v. Foster, 2 P. Attorney-General v. Magdalen
Wms. 326; Attorney-General v. College, 10 Beav. 402.
Dixie, 13 Ves. 533; Attorney-Gen- 3 Brunnenmyer v. Buhre, 32 111.
eral v. Bedford, 2 Ves. 505; s. c, 183; Van Houten v. First Reformed
5 Sim. 578; Attorney-General v. Dutch Church, 2 Green Ch. 137;
Browne's Hospital, 17 Sim. 137; At- Attorney-General v. Clarendon, 17
torney-General v. Dedham School, Ves. 499; Attorney-General v.
23 Beav. 350; St. John's College v. Foundling Hospital, 2 Ves. p. 48;
Toddington, 1 Burr. 200; Attorney- Attorney-General v. St. Cross'
General v. Locke, 3 Atk. 165; At- Hosp. 17 Beav. 435.
§ 335. J CHARITABLE PURPOSES. 783
against bequests to charitable corporations, they will uni-
formly uphold such bequests where it can be done without
the violation of any statutory provision or principle of law.
As the court will always regard the intention of the donor,
it will construe the language of a conveyance, not in a
strictly legal or scientific sense, but with reference to the
general tenor of the instrument. In a case relating to a
bequest for the benefit of several colleges, it was held that
the terms "institution" and "incorporated" contemplated
an incorporated college, and that the court was bound to
give the language that construction to support the charita-
ble use. In the same case it was also held that a charitable
bequest to an "institution" of learning of a character and
organization commonly called and known as a "female sem-
inary," to be "organized" by the end of five years, con-
templates that the institution is to be incorporated.1 Be-
quests to religious institutions, whether incorporated or
unincorporated, will be liberally construed by courts of
equity. In Massachusetts it has been held that a bequest
to a denominational home mission society "for the benefit
of poor churches of the city of Boston and vicinity' ' is not
void for uncertainty in designating the beneficiaries.2 In
1 Dodge v. "Williams, 46 Wis. 70; poration is not empowered, under
S. c, 50 N. W. Rep. 1103. its charter, to accept and adminis-
2 McAllister v. Burgess (1894), ter this charity. But it is a novel
161 Mass. 509; s. c, 37 X. E. Kep. proposition, as inconsistent with
173. A bequest to a church to pur- the rules of law, as it is with the
chase clothing "for the poor chil- dictates of religion, that a Chris-
dren, to enable them to attend the tian church or religious society
Sabbath school at such church," cannot receive and distribute
is void for want of an ascertained money to poor churches of its own
beneficiary. Simmons v. Burrell denomination, so as to promote the
(1894), 8 Misc. Eep. 388; s. c, 28 cause of religion in the State in
N. Y. Supl. 625. A bequest to cer- which it is established." Jones v.
tain churches "to buy coal for the Habersham, 107 U. S. 174, 182. A
poor of said churches," is not an direction to executors to pay money
absolute gift to such churches, but for the benefit of disabled soldiers
is in trust, and is, therefore, void and seamen who served in the
as lacking an ascertained and defi- Union army in the late War of the
nite beneficiary. Schell v. Merklee, Rebellion in the United States, their
75 Hun, 74; s. c, 26 ST. Y. Supl. widows and orphans," is good as a
1021. "It is objected that this cor- public charitable bequest. Holmes
784
CHARITABLE PDEPOSES.
[§ 335.
another case before the same court it was held that, if the
officers of a religious society intermingle funds held by
them upon distinct trusts, one of which is charitable, and
another, although not strictly charitable, is in the nature of
religious uses, and there is evidence by which the amount
of each fund can be approximately ascertained, the charity
will not for that reason be entitled to the whole amount ;
but the court will determine, with as much accuracy as
possible, the amount now justly belonging to each fund.1
In a recent English case it was held that a bequest to a re-
ligious institution, or for a religious purpose, is prima facie
a bequest for a "charitable" purpose, and the law appli-
cable to "charitable" bequests, as distinguished from the
law applicable to ordinary bequests, ought to be applied to
a bequest to a religious institution, or for a religious
purpose.2
v. Coates (1893), 152 Mass. 226;
s. c, 34 X. E. Rep. 190. The fact
tbat patients of a charitable corpo-
ration who are able to pay, are re-
quired to do so, does not deprive
the corporation of its eleemosynary
character, so as to render it liable
to them for injuries resulting from
the negligence of the trustees on
account of contract relations.
Downs v. Harper Hospital, 101
Mich. 555; S. C, 60 N. W. Kep. 42.
A conveyance of property to a re-
ligious corporation, in trust, to in-
vest the rents thereof to form a
permanent fund, and to pay one-
half the income thereof to the
grantor, or any heir of the grantor
of the same name who may demand
the same, and, in case no demand
therefor is made, to invest said in-
come so as to increase and accu-
mulate the fund, and providing
that the remaining half of said in-
come should be either invested in
order to increase and accumulate
the fund or expended on charitable
objects, is, as to one-half the fund,
a valid charitable trust, subject to
an illegal discretion as to the ac-
cumulation for the benefit of the
grantor, or his descendants, which
will be rejected; as to the other
half an invalid trust was created,
the beneficial interest therein re-
sulting to the owner. Wardens,
etc. v. Attorney-General (1895),
164 Mass. 188; s. c, 41 N. E. Eep.
231.
1 Attorney-General v. Old South
Soc, 13 Allen, 474. "This is not
the case of an individual mingling
his own private moneys indistin-
guishably with funds held by him
in trust; but of the officers of a re-
ligious society intermingling funds
held by them upon distinct trusts,
some of which are charitable, and
others, although not strictly chari-
table, are in the nature of religious
uses, the property belonging to
which is not to be forfeited by the
neglect of the trustees to keep it sep-
arate from other trust funds." Ibid.
2 White v. White, 2 Eep. 380;
S. C. (1893), L.K.2Ch. 41.
§ 336.]
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
785
§ 336. The Subject Continued. — Where property is
given to a charitable corporation already in existence it will
be presumed, in the absence of any special provisions in
the conveyance, that it will be devoted to the general pur-
poses of the corporation, and that it will be subject to the
general rules by which the corporation is governed.1 But
where a special provision attaches to a bequest to a char-
itable corporation, it will not carry with it the visitatorial
power, but the court will treat the corporation as a simple
trustee of the fund, or as an individual intrusted with it for
a special purpose.3 In England it has been held that where
a charity is founded by a private individual, and no visitor
is appointed, and it is incorporated by Royal Charter, the
court will interfere if the rules of the corporation do not
carry into effect the views and wishes of the founder, and
if altered circumstances and the progress of civilization
render it necessary, it will direct a scheme in furtherance
of the founder's intention.3
1 Attorney-General v. Clare Hall,
3Atk. 675; Hadley v. Hopkins, 14
Pick. 240 ; Green v. Rutherforth, 1
Ves. 472; Corp. of Sons of Clergy
v. Mose, 9 Sim. 610; Phillips v.
Bury, 1 Ld. Raym. 5; s. c, Comb.
265; Holt, 715; 2 Show. 360; 4
Mod. 106; Skin. 447. A person
who endows a close fellowship in
a college comprising other fellow-
ships of an older foundation, will
he presumed to be generally con-
versant of the statutes and rules
of the college, and to mean that
his fellow shall be subject to the
same provisions with respect to
election and admission as the other
fellows, except in so far as those
provisions are controlled by the
express terms of the endowment.
When, therefore, out of several
candidates for a close fellowship,
only one fulfilled all the conditions
required by the endowment, that
circumstance was held not to ex-
50
empt him from the necessity of
undergoing the usual college ex-
aminations to prove his fitness for
the fellowship. But the standard
of merit set up on the examination
of such a candidate should not be
relative, but positive; merely as-
certaining that he is duly qualified,
and having no regard as to the
comparative qualifications of his
competitors. Ex parte Inge, 2 Kuss.
& Myl. 590.
2 Green v. Kutherforth, 1 Ves.
462; Corp. Sons of Clergy v. Mose,
9 Sim. 610.
3 Attorney- General v. Dedham
School, 23 Beav. 350; In re Univer-
sity College, 2 Phill. 521 ; In re
Queen's College, 5 Buss. 64; King
v. St. Catharine's Hall, 4 T. R. 233,
244; Ex parte Wrangham, 2 Ves.
Jr. 609 ; Attorney-General v. Black,
11 Ves. 191; Case of Queen's Col-
lege, Jac. 1 ; Attorney- General v.
Clarendon, 17 Ves. 498.
786
CHARITABLE PUEPOSJSS.
[§ 337.
§ 337. Charitable Gifts to Non-Existing Corporations.
— Property may be left to trustees, either to found a char-
itable corporation, or to be conveyed to an institution already
in existence for a charitable purpose. In a leading case
which came before the Supreme Court of the United
States on appeal from the Circuit Court of the United
States for the Southern District of Georgia, it was held
that a devise and bequest in trust for the building, endow-
ment and maintenance of "a hospital for females within
the city of Savannah, on a permanent basis, into which
sick and indigent females are to be admitted and cared for
in such manner and on such terms as may be defined and
and prescribed by" certain directresses named and their
associates, who are to obtain an act of incorporation for
the purpose, is a valid charitable devise and bequest, al-
though no time is limited for the erection of the building,
or the obtaining of the charter.1 In a recent case a testa-
1 Jones v. Habersham, 107 U. S.
175. A charitable bequest to an
institution of learning, to be or-
ganized and incorporated by the
end of five years, is not void.
Dodge v. Williams, 46 "Wis. 70;
s. c, 50 N. W. Kep. 1103. A will
giving testator's wife the use of
land for life, and devising it to a
religious society by the words, "at
the death of my wife I give and
devise," etc., provided that the
land should be used as a parsonage
by the society, and that, when the
society should cease to use it as
such, it should revert to testa-
tor's heirs. Held, that the devise
did not vest until the death of tes-
tator's wife, and that the society,
having been incorporated during
her life, was competent to take
under it, though not incorporated
at the time of testator's death.
Lougheed v. Dykeman's Baptist
Church (1892), 129 N. Y. 211; S. C,
29 N". E. Kep. 249. A bequest to
the trustees of such free library as
may be established within certain
limits, contemplates the creation
of a new library in the future, and
is not a bequest to an existing li-
brary. In re Pepper's Estate, 154
Pa. St. 331 ; s. c, 25 Atl. Pep. 1058.
A trust is not void because the
trustees are authorized to form and
charter a charitable corporation
under the laws of Pennsylvania, to
carry out the objects of the trust,
since a devise for charitable uses is
valid, though in favor of a corpo-
ration not existing at testator's
death. In re Lewis' Estate, 11 Pa.
Co. Ct. Rep. 561. That a church
to which real property was con-
veyed in trust to maintain a par-
ticular religious faith, was unin-
corporated at the time of the grant,
does not defeat such trust, since
Code, § 1598, empowers "any re-
ligious denomination, whether in-
corporated or not, to take by deed or
otherwise, and hold, not exceed-
ing five acres of land at one place,
for purposes of public worship."
§ 338. J CHARITABLE PURPOSES. 787
tor provided in his will that all the residue of his property,
after paying legacies and debts, should be used "for the
purpose of founding and supporting, or uniting in the sup-
port of, any institution that may be then founded, to fur-
nish a retreat and a home for disabled or aged and infirm
and deserving American mechanics," it was held that the
validity of the trust was undoubted*, notwithstanding that
the trustees might appropriate the fund to an institution
established after testator's death.1
§ 338. Abuse of Charitable Trusts. — In all cases of
charitable trusts, where there is mismanagement, misappli-
cation of funds, or other breach of trust, a court of equity
has power to correct the abuse. In such cases the remedy
is, not in an action to secure the forfeiture of the funds in
the interests of the grantor, or of his heirs, but to secure
the proper enforcement of the trust. This will be done,
unless the instrument by which the trust is created con-
tains a provision that the estate shall revert in case of any
perversion of the charity.2 No resulting trust will arise to
Nancev. Busby (1892), 91 Tenn. 303; that this estate is not upon a con-
s. c, 18 S. W. Rep. 874. dition which will entitle the heirs
1 Hayes v. Pratt, 147 U. S. 557; of the grantor to re-enter for its
s. c, 13 S. Ct. Rep. 503. See also alienation, and of course the alien-
Jones v. Habersham, 107 U. S. 174, ation, if made under the sanc-
191; Curran's Appeal, 4 Penn. 331; tion of the court, will not be re-
Taylor v. Bryn Mawr College, 34 . garded as a violation of the trust.
N. J. Eq. 101. * * * Indeed, the cases seem to
2 Brown v. Meeting Street Bap- rest upon the idea somewhat like
tist Society, 9 K. I. 177. "The that which obtains in cy pres ap-
grant is upon a trust for certain plications of charity estates, that
charitable uses, and if the estate be the primary purpose of the donor
misapplied, the fitting remedy is being the promotion of the charity,
not its forfeiture to the grantor or his incidental purpose that the
his heirs, but a proceeding upon particular property given shall be
the equity side of the court to en- used for its promotion may be dis-
force the trust. We do not mean regarded, and the property sold or
that such a trust may not be exchanged, if thereby the charity
coupled with a condition that the will be greatly benefited." Ibid.
estate shall revert if misapplied, 186. See also Barr v. "Weld, 24 Pa.
but that the court will not infer St. 84; Stanley v. Colt, 5 Wall. 119.
such a condition, where none such An individual vested a fund in the
is expressed or necessarily implied, trustees of a church, to appropriate
Agreeably to these views, we find one-half the income to the support
788
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
[§ 339.
the donor, or to his heirs, from any mismanagement, or
other abuse of the trust, on the part of trustees, or of a
corporation ; and no beneficial interest will arise to them
from any non-execution of the trust.1 In case of any gross
abuse of trust on the part of trustees, whether indviduals
or a corporation, the court may devest them of their trust,
and commit the administration of the charity to other
trustees.2 It may be observed that this rule applies to
private as well as to charitable trusts.
§ 339. Breach of Ecclesiastical Trust. — A local church
or ecclesiastical organization, holding property for the use
of the congregation, whether it is an incorporated or unin-
corporated body, holds the property, not in fee, but as the
trustee of a charity. As a trustee, it will be held ac-
countable in equity for a faithful administration of the
trust. But this is the extent to which the individual
of the church, and the other half
to a designated college, for the
purpose of educating poor, young
men for the ministry ; the church
trustees to select the benefieiaries.
After said fund had vested, the col-
lege, through lack of money, sus-
pended. Held, that this did not
cause a reverter of one-half the
fund to the grantor's heirs, or
authorize the appropriation of the
income thereof to the support of
the church, hut that equity would
cause it to he applied through
another college, to effectuate the
original purpose, and in case the
original college resumed its func-
tions, would then require the trust
to be executed through it. Bar-
nard v. Adams, 58 Fed. Kep. 313.
See also Commonwealth v. Pauline
Home, 141 Pa. St. 537; Danville
Seminary v. Mott, 136 111. 289.
1 Sanderson v. White, 18 Pick.
328; Good v. McPherson, 5 Mo.
126; Reformed Dutch Church v.
Mott, 7 Paige, 77; Chapin v. School
District, 35 N. H. 445 ; Hadley v.
Hopkins, 14 Pick. 241; Dublin
Case, 38 N. H. 459; Attorney-
General v. Wax Chandlers' Co., L.
R. 6 H. L. Cas. 1; Heriot's Hospi-
tal v. Ross, 12 CI. & Fin. 507 ; S. C,
5 Bell, App. Cas. 37 ; Pierson v.
Thompson, 1 Bdw. Ch. 212; Ben-
nett v. Wyndham, 4 De G., F. & J.
259; Duncan v. Findlater, 6 CI. &
Fin. 894; Mersey Docks, etc. v.
Gibbs, 11 H. L. Cas. 686; s. c, L.
R. 1 H. L. Cas. 93. Attorney-
General v. Middleton, 2 Ves. 328;
Cook v. Duckenfield, 2 Atk. 567,
569; Attorney-General v. Found-
ling Hosp., 4 Bro. Ch. 165; s. c,
2 Ves. Jr. 42; Attorney-General
v. Boucherett, 25 Beav. 116; At-
torney-General v. Moore,, 19 N". J.
Eq. 503.
2 Attorney-General v. Mayor of
Coventry, 7 Bro. P. C. 236; Attor-
ney-General v. Earl of Clarendon,
17 Ves. 491, 499; In re Chertsey
Market, 6 Price, 261; Attorney-
General v. Utica Insurance Co., 2
Johns. Ch. 389; Attorney-General
v. South Sea Co., 4 Beav. 453.
§ 339. J CHARITABLE PURPOSES. 789
church, or the ecclesiastical organization with which it is
connected, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts.
Conflicting claims to church property, or in regard to the
administration of the trust, are subject to the rules by
which other charitable trusts are governed. In their rights
of property churches, and other religious organizations,
are under the protection of the law, and all officers and
members of such organizations are subject to the restraints
imposed by the law. From the circumstance that such or-
ganizations are religious and not business corporations, the
courts will investigate these proceedings with indulgence
and consideration, but the legal and equitable rights of all
parties concerned will be sustained without favor. The
right of any and of all persons, whatever may be their re-
ligious views, to dedicate property in trust to the purpose
of sustaining the form of doctrine to which they adhere,
will have the amplest legal protection. The courts will not
permit property, set apart to a religious use, to be diverted
from the objects of the trust. A majority of the mem-
bers of an individual church, or other ecclesiastical body,
cannot subvert the trust by transferring the property to
another organization, or to the support of a different form
of doctrine.1 Any act of this character is a breach of
1 Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679 ; Church v. Wood, 5 Ohio, 284;
Mason v. Muncaster, 9 Wheat. 445 ; Happy v. Morton, 33 111. 398;
Kniskern v. Lutheran Church, 1 Koshi's Appeal, 69 Pa. St. 462;
Sandf. Ch. 439; First Constitu- Kottmann v. Bartling, 22 Neb. 375;
tional Presbyterian Church v. Con- Mt. Zion Baptist Church v. Whit-
gregational Soc, 23 Iowa, 567; more, 83 Iowa, 138; Venable v.
Fadness v. Braunborg, 73 Wis. 257 ; Coffman, 2 W. Va. 320 ; McRob-
Baker v. Fales, 16 Mass. 487 ; Steb- erts v. Moudy, 19 Mo. App. 26
bins v. Jennings, 10 Pick. 172; Finley v. Brent, 87 Va. 103
Hale v. Everett, 53 N. H. 9; Dub- Schnorr's Appeal, 67 Pa. St. 138
lin Case, 38 N. H. 459; Lawson v. Kinkead v. McKee, 9 Bush, 535
Kolbenson, 61 111. 407; Lawyer v. Ferrara v. Vasconelles, 23 111. 456
Cipperly, 7 Paige, 281; Hartford Bouldin v. Alexander, 15 Wall. 131
First Baptist Church v. Witherell, Winebrenner v. Colder, 43 Pa. St
3 Paige, 296; Harrison v. Hoyle, 244; Grimes v. Harmon, 35 Ind
24 Ohio St. 254; Field v. Field, 9 198; Feizel v. First German Soc
Wend. 401; Gable v. Miller, 10 of M. E. Church, 9 Kan. 592; Chase
Paige, 627; s. C, 4 L. Ed. 1118; 2 v. Cheney, 58 111. 509; Lucas v.
Denio, 492; Cincinnati M. E. Case, 9 Bush, 297; Henderson v.
790
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
[§ 339.
trust and will be restrained by a court of equity. Conflict-
ing claims in regard to church property involve the consid-
eration of one or another of three questions: 1. Was the
property in question, by the express terms of the instru-
ment by which it was conveyed, devoted to the support and
promulgation of some definite form of Christian doctrine?
2. Is the property in question held by a church, or congre-
gation, which, by the terms of its organization, is strictly
independent of any other ecclesiastical body, or association,
and which in its government is altogether free from any
subordination to a higher authority. 3. Is the church, or
other ecclesiastical body holding the property, connected
with and subordinate to a general denominational organ-
ization in which there are higher courts, which are invested
with authority over the congregations of a district, or over
Hunter, 59 Pa. St. 335. In the case
of Koshi's Appeal, 69 Pa. St. 462,
the court held that a religious so-
iety, incorporated or not, is but a
trustee of a charity, and a court of
equity will prevent the diversion
of property held in trust. A church
endowed in connection with an ec-
clesiastical organization, or in sub-
ordination to it, cannot unite with
another organization or become in-
dependent. The title to the church
property of a divided congregation
is with that part acting accord-
ing to its own laws; and the right
is to he determined by the ecclesi-
astical laws, etc., which were ac-
cepted among them before the suit
began, those not conforming to
their laws may form another con-
nection or become independent,
but must abandon all claim to the
property. A portion of a church
declared independence of their ec-
clesiastical judicatory^ The judi-
catory declared the offices of their
elders and deacons vacant, and
ordered the election of others for
the church. Having thrown off
the jurisdiction of the judicatory,
they were not entitled to notice of
the election. The court closes its
opinion as follows : "The whole
case is then reduced to this one
simple question, whether, being an
independent body as they declare
themselves to be, they have any
right or title to the lot, with the
buildings thereon erected, which,
as we have seen, was conveyed 'in
trust for the German Reformed
Church,' and can withhold the
possession and enjoyment of it
from those who, under the orders
of. the proper judicatory, have been
chosen to represent that portion of
the congregation who adhere to
the faith, order, government and
discipline of their church. To
this question there can be but one
answer in law, equity, good con-
science, justice as well to the living
as the dead, and according to the
precepts of that divine Master who
has taught us to do unto others as
we would that others should do
unto us."
§ 340.] CHARITABLE PURPOSES. 791
the entire body?1 The answer to the questions involved
will determine the decree of the court.
§ 340. The Subject Continued. — In all cases falling
into the first class, as designated in the preceding section,
the court will uphold the claim of that part of the congre-
gation which adheres to the form of faith for the support
of which the trust was created. It will not permit any
part of the property to be diverted to the support of another
system of doctrine, or to any other purpose than that to
which it was originally devoted. In the leading case of
Schnorr's Appeal, before the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania, in which the whole subject received a most careful
and exhaustive consideration, Mr. Justice Sharswood de-
livering the opinion, it was held that property vested in a
religious society, incorporated or not, is a charitable use,
whether the donors be one or many. The society are
trustees, and cannot divert the property from the use to
which it was dedicated more than other trustees. If they
undertake to divert the fund, equity will raise another
trustee to administer it according to the intention of the
donor or subscribers. Where the founders have expressed
their intention that particular doctrines shall be taught, or
a particular form of worship and government maintained,
those having the management of the institution cannot alter
the purpose for which it was founded. A church organ-
1 Watson v. Jones, 13 "Wall. 679, dependent order of the congrega-
722. In the first class of cases the tion, this is to be determined by
court will, "when necessary to pro- the majority of the society, or by
tect the trust to which the prop- such organization of the society,
erty has been devoted, inquire into as by its own rules constitute its
the religious faith or practice of government. Acquiescence in and
the parties claiming its use or con- use of a constitution by a religious
trol, and will see that it shall not society for fifty years makes it
be diverted from that trust. If the valid and binding on the society.
property was acquired in the ordi- Schlichter v. Keiter, 156 Fa. St.
nary way of purchase or gift, for 119 ; s. c. , 27 Atl. Kep. 45. A con-
trie use of a religious society, the stitution acquiesced in and recog-
court will inquire who constitute nized by the society for nearly fifty
that society, or its legitimate sue- years is valid and binding thereon,
cessors, and award to them the use Bear v. Heasley, 98 Mich. 279;
of the property. In case of the in- s. c, 57 1ST. W. Kep. 270.
792 CHARITABLE PURPOSES. T§ 340.
ized and endowed as belonging to any particular sect, or in
subordination to any particular form of church govern-
ment, cannot break from that connection or government.
If the church be not described in the original donation or
subscription as under any particular ecclesiastical jurisdic-
tion, it may change its relation, provided there be no radical
departure from the original faith or doctrine. In churches,
those who adhere and submit to the regular order of the
church, though a minority, are the true congregation. The
title to the property of a divided congregation is in that
part which is acting in harmony with its own law, and the
ecclesiastical laws, usages, etc., which were accepted before
the dispute, are the standard to determine which is right.
The guaranty of religious freedom has nothing to do with
the property. The majority of a congregation, organized
under a particular ecclesiastical jurisdiction, resolved that
they would not continue under that jurisdiction, elected
church officers as an independent body, and took possession
of the church property. Theys afterwards rescinded their
resolutions and resolved to return ; this did not restore them
to their former church relations, or to any rights in the
property.1 The later decisions of this court are in full ac-
1 Schnorr's Appeal, 67 Pa. St. maintenance of a particular relig-
138. Where members, alter the ious faith, and it is ascertained that
church building had been wrested a minority of the church alone
from the custody and control of adheres to the original faith, a:
the rightful trustees, and after very court of equity will, on applica-
many of them had been excommu- tion of such minority to prevent a
nicated in mass by a small minor- diversion of the property to un-
ity, held their religious services at authorized uses by the majority,
another place, but formed no new decree that the minority constitute
organization, and still had the the beneficiaries, and are entitled
same trustees, the same deacons, to the exclusive control of the
and claimed to be the original property. Nance v. Busby, 91
church, and as such were recog- Tenn. 303; s. c, 18 S. W. Kep. 874.
nlzed by councils of the "Baptist Where land was granted in trust
church, they lost no right in the for the use and benefit of a congre-
church property, or to its control, gation of one's religious denomi-
by reason of not attending its nation, the members of that con-
services. Bouldinv. Alexander, 15 gregation cannot carry the trust
Wall. 131. Where real property property with them when they
has been conveyed in trust for the join another denomination. Fin-
§ 340. J
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
793
cord with the doctrine as above stated. In a recent case it
was held that the title to the church property of a congre-
gation that is divided is in that part of the congregation
that is in harmony with its own laws, usages and customs,
as accepted by the body before the division took place, and
who adhere to the regular organization. In such a case it
does not matter that a majority of any given congregation,
or annual conference, is with those who dissent. The
power of the majority, as well as that of the minority, is
bound by the discipline, and so are all the tribunals of the
ley v. Brent, 87 Va. 103. Where
property is conveyed to trustees
for the use of a church, having
a well-known and established doc-
trine, faith and practice, a majority
of the members has not the power,
by reason of a change of religious
views, to carry the property thus
dedicated to a new and different
doctrine. Smith v. Pedigo (1S93)
(Ind.), 33 N. E. Rep. 77. In the
ascertainment of rights of prop-
erty devoted to church purposes,
the court will give effect to the
usages and regulations of the
church itself, if not inconsistent
with the constitution and laws of
the State. Prickett v. Wells (1893) ,
117 Mo. 502; s. c, 24 S. W. Kep.
52. As between two opposing fac-
tions of a religious association,
land acquired by the association
before any schisms arose will be
adjudged the property of that fac-
tion which abides by the doctrines,
principles and rules of church
government which the united body
professed when the property was
acquired. Reorganized Church of
Jesus Christ, etc. v. Church of
Christ, 60 Fed. Kep. 937. "It is
the duty of the court to decide in
favor of those, whether a minority
or a majority of the congregation,
who are adhering to the doctrine
professed by the congregation, and
the form of worship in practice, as
also in favor of the government of
the church in operation, with
which it was connected at the time
the trust was declared." App v.
Lutheran Congregation, 66 Pa. St.
201. See also McGinnis v. Watson,
41 Pa. St. 9; Sutter v. First Eef.
Dutch Church, 42 Pa. St. 503;
Shannon v. Frost, 3 B. Mon. 253;
Smith v. Nelson, 18 Vt. 511. The
title to the property of a divided
religious sect is in that part follow-
ing the laws, usages, customs and
principles which were accepted
before the division. Philomath
College v. Wyatt (1894), 27 Ore.
390; s. C.,37Pac.Kep. 1022. In de-
termining the question of legiti-
mate succession of a religious so-
ciety, where a separation has taken
place, a court will adopt the rules
of such society and enforce its
polity in the spirit, and to the ef-
fect for which it was designed.
Eottman v. Bartling, 22 Neb. 375.
Civil courts in determining the
question of legitimate succession
of an unincorporated religious so-
ciety, where a separation has taken
place, will adopt its rules and en-
force its polity in the spirit and to
the effect for which it was designed.
Harrison v. Hoyle, 24 Ohio St.
254.
794
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
[§ 341.
church, from the lowest to the highest. Upon the questions
arising under the discipline, as upon those arising under
the articles of faith, the decisions of the ecclesiastical body
are ordinarily final, and they will be respected and enforced
by the courts of law ; but if such decisions violate the law
they profess to administer, or are in conflict with the laws
of the land, they will not be followed.1 In a recent case,
before the Supreme Court of Michigan, it was held that the
members of a church, who adhere to the old constitution and
confession of faith, although constituting a small minority,
are entitled to the church property, where the majority, by
revolutionary action, have adopted a new constitution and re-
fused longer to submit to the organic law of the association.2
§ 341. The Same Subject Where a church, by its or-
ganization, is strictly congregational and independent, and
'Krecker v. Shirey (1894), 163
Pa. St. 534; s. c, 30 Atl. Rep. 447.
See also AVinebrenner v. Calder, 43
Pa. St. 244 ; Kerr v. Trego, 47 Pa.
St. 292 ; Eoshi's Appeal, 69 Pa. St.
462 ; McGinnis v. Watson, 41 Pa. St.
9; McAuley's Appeal, 77 Pa. St.
397; Landis' Appeal, 102 Pa. St.
467; Sutter v. Reformed Dutch
Church, 42 Pa. St. 503; Stack v.
O'Hara, 90 Pa. St. 477; Schlichter
v. Keiter, 156 Pa. St. 119; Tuigg v.
Treacy, 104 Pa. St. 493; Ehren-
feldt's Appeal, 101 Pa. St. 186;
Fernstler v. Seibert, 114 Pa. St.
196; Commonwealth v. Cornish, 13
Pa. St. 288.
2 Bear v. Heasley, 98 Mich. 279.
"Cases sometimes arise in civil
courts in which it becomes neces-
sary to determine which part of a
divided church is entitled to the
church property. * * * Courts
of law will inquire which party
or which division adheres to the
form of church government, or
acknowledges the church connec-
tion designated in the conveyance,
and adjudge the right to that party.
* * * That property the civil
courts will adjudge to the members,
however few in numbers they may
be. This rule * * * necessi-
tates an inquiry into the constitu-
tion and discipline of the church.
When property is held charged
with a trust for the use of a church
receiving and maintaining certain
religious doctrines, it occasionally
happens that its members depart
from the faith and embrace other
and contrary doctrines, while still
claiming to hold the church prop-
erty. In such a case, if the prop-
erty can be retained by them, it is
diverted from the use to which it
was first settled. * * * Courts
of law will institute all inquiries
necessary to determine who were
the real beneficiaries intended, and
prevent the diversion of the prop-
erty to any other uses, and in so
doing they will, if necessary, in-
vestigate the doctrines held, or the
religious belief of the members."
Justice Strong on Relation of Civil
Law to Church Polity, pp. 45-59.
§341.]
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
795
as such not in subordination to any other ecclesiastical or-
ganization, it holds its property, not as a trust, but in fee.
The property rights of a church of this character are simply
the rights of any voluntary association, and are governed
by the rules to which the property of such associations are
subject.1 Secus, in Iowa, it has been held that the ma-
jority of the members of a Baptist church, although it is
independent in government, have no power to divert the
church property to the propagation of doctrines contrary
to Baptist articles of faith and church covenants, and, on
attempting to do so, maybe enjoined from interfering with
the proper use and control of the property by the minority.2
1 Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679.
"In such cases where there is a
schism which leads to a separation
into distinct and conflicting bodies,
the rights of such bodies to use
the property must be determined by
the ordinary principles which gov-
ern voluntary associations. If the
principle of government in such
cases is that the majority rules,
then the numerical majority of
members must control the right to
the use of the property. If there
be within the congregation officers
in whom are vested the powers of
such control, then those who ad-
here to the acknowledged organism
by which the body is governed are
entitled to the use of the property.
The minority, in choosing to sepa-
rate themselves into a distinct
body, and refusing to recognize
the authority of the governing
body, can claim no right in the
property from the fact that they
had once been members of the
church or congregation. This rul-
ing admits of no inquiry into the
existing religious opinions of those
who comprise the legal or regular
organization; for, if such was per-
mitted, a very small minority,
without any officers of the church
among them, might be found to be
the only faithful supporters of the
religious dogmas of the founders
of the church. There being no
such trust imposed upon the prop-
erty when purchased, or given,
the court will not imply one for
the purpose of expelling from its
use those who, by regular success
sion and order, constitute the
church, because they may have
changed in some respects their
views of religious truth." Ibid.
725. See also Shannon v. Frost, 3
B. Mon. 253; Smith v. Nelson, 18
Vt. 511 ; Lamb v. Cain, 129 Ind.
4S6; S. C, 14 L. R. A. 518.
2 Mount Zion Baptist Church v.
Whitmore, 83 Iowa, 138. liIf, per-
chance a bare majority of some
Baptist church should determine,
on Scriptural authority, their right
to a plurality of wives, and,
against the protest of a minority,
devote the property of the church
to the advocacy and practice of
such doctrine, under the claim of
appellees that the church 'owes
no allegiance to any man or body
of men, civil or ecclesiastical, ex-
cept a majority of its members,'
the only redress of the minority
would be to retire from the church
796 CHARITABLE PURPOSES. [§ 342.
But in this case the individual church, though independent
in its church government, is directly connected with and is
understood to be connected with the Baptist denomination.
Those who contribute to the funds of an individual church
of that name and order understand that they are contribu-
ting to the support and promulgation of the doctrines of
the Baptist branch of the church . It was farther held, in this
case, that the decision of aBaptist council, on the joint call of
both factions of a Baptist church (which agree to accept the
decision as final), that the doctrines taught by the majority
faction are not in harmony with the teachings of the de-
nomination, is conclusive, and may be adopted by a court
as a basis of its action in giving the control of the property
to the other faction.1
§ 342. The Same. — In cases falling into the third class
above noticed, where the local church is connected with and
subject to the government of a general organization, or re-
ligious denomination, the decisions of the supreme judica-
tory of such organization are binding upon the individual
church, and such decisions will be upheld as final by courts
of equity. In the leading case above cited, from the Su-
and leave the property to the ma- Penick, 5Bush, 110; S. c.,9Am.L.
jority for such a purpose. Such a Reg. (N. S.) 210; Miller v. Gable,
surrender of civil rights is without 2 Denio, 492; Craigdaillie v. Aik-
support on any principle of natural man, 1 Dow. P.C.I; White Lick
justice, and, we believe, without Quarterly Meeting v. "White Lick,
the sanction of any judicial tribu- etc., 89 Ind. 153; Chase v. Cheney,
nal. We, of course, treat and un- 58 111. 538; s. C, 11 Am. Rep. 104;
derstand the arguments and claims Gibson v. Armstrong, 7 B. Mon.
of parties as to the law to be ap- 481 ; Bonldin v. Alexander, 15
plicable to the property interest of Wall. 131 ; Watson v. Garvin, 54
a church, for it is the only question Mo. 353; Connitt v. Keformed,
in this suit." Ibid. etc. Church of New Prospect, 54
1 Mount Zion Baptist Church v. N. Y. 551 ; Reformed, etc. Church
Whitmore, 83 Iowa, 138. See also v. Bradford, 8 Cow. 457; Dieffen-
First Const. Presby. Church v. dorf v. Canajoharie, etc. Church,
Congregational Soc, 23 Iowa, 567; 20 Johns. 12; Brunnenmeyer v.
Fadness v. Braunborg, 73 Wis. 257; Buhre, 32 111. 183; Gaff v. Greer,
Hale v. Everett, 53 N. H. 71; Peo- 88 Ind. 122; Field v. Field, 9
pie v. Steele, 2 Barb. 397; Grimes Wend. 394; Happy v. Morton, 33
v.Harmon, 35 Ind. 213; Ferraris 111.398.
v.Vasconvellos, 31 111.46; Gartinv.
§ 342.J
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
797
preme Court of the United States, it was held that in
the class of cases in which property has been acquired
by a society which constitutes a subordinate part of a gen-
eral religious organization, with established tribunals for
ecclesiastical government, those tribunals must decide all
questions of faith, discipline, rule, custom, or ecclesiastical
government.1 In Massachusetts it has been held that
' Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679.
See also Buettner v. Frazer (1894),
100 Mich. 179 ; s. c, 58 N". W. Rep.
834; Schweiker v. Husser, 146 111.
399; S. C, 34 N. E. Eep. 1022;
Bear v. Heasley, 98 Mich. 279;
s. C, 57 N. W. Rep. 270; Kike v.
Floyd, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. Kep. 80. The
general conference of a church ap-
pointed a commission to amend the
church constitution, and to revise
the confession of faith, and directed
that the report of such commission
be submitted to the people of the
church, and if the result showed
that two-thirds of the number of
votes cast were given for the
approval of the proposed consti-
tution and revision, that the bishop
publish such result in the official
organs of the church ; whereupon
the constitution and confession of
faith so adopted should become
the organic law and fundamental
belief of the church. These di-
rections were followed, and the
amended constitution and revised
confession were declared adopted
by the next general conference, as
having received the necessary two-
thirds vote. Held, that the ques-
tion was for the church authorities
alone, whether such action con-
flicted with those provisions of the
former constitution, forbidding
any change whatever in the con-
fession of faith, and permitting
alterations of the constitution only
on request of two-thirds of the
whole church, but giving no di-
rections as to the time and manner
of making such requests ; and the
civil courts, having no ecclesiastical
jurisdiction, cannot question the
decision of the general conference.
Lamb v. Cain (1891), 129 Ind. 486;
s.c, 29 ]ST. E. Rep. 13. The laws
of an ecclesiastical body will be
recognized and enforced by the
civil courts, if not in conflict with
the laws of the State. Krecker v.
Shirley, 163 Pa. St. 534; s.c, 30
Atl. Rep. 440; 35 W. N. C. 165.
Courts having no ecclesiastical
jurisdiction cannot revise or ques-
tion ordinary acts of church dis-
cipline. Their only jurisdictional
power arises from the conflicting
claims of the parties to the church
property and the use of it. Christ
Church v. Phillips, 5 Del. Ch. 429.
See also Grimes v. Harmon, 35 Ind.
213 ; Ferraria v.Vasconvellos, 31 111.
46; Dieffendorf v. Canajoharie
Ref. Cal. Church, 20 Johns. 12;
German Ref. Church v. Seibert, 3
Pa. St. 291; Shannon v. Frost, 3
B. Mon. 258; Gartin v. Penick, 5
Bush, 110; s. c. 9 Am.L. Keg. OS.
S.) 210; Forbes v. Eden, L. R. 1
H. L. Sc. App. 568; Hale v. Ever-
ett, 53 N. H. 71; People v. Steele,
2 Barb. 397 ; Robertson v. Bullions,
9 Barb. 126 ; Mason v. Muncaster, 9
Wheat. 445 ; Rotmann v. Bartling,22
Neb. 375 ; EastNorway, etc. Church
v. Halvorson, 42 Minn. 503 ; Smith
v.Pedigo (Ind.), 33 N.E. Rep. 777;
Rector, etc. St. James Church v.
Huntington, 82 Hun, 125; s. C, 31
798
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
[§ 342.
where a legacy is left to a church and society, to be held
"so long as they maintain their present essential doctrines
and principles of faith and practice," which at the time
that the legacy was left were Unitarian, is forfeited by a
change to a Trinitarian system of faith and practice.1 In
N. Y. Supl. 9; Pounder v. Ash
(1895), 44 Neb. 672; s. c, 63 N. W.
Rep. 48; Russie v. Brazzell (1895),
128 Mo. 93; s. c, 30 S. W. Rep.
526; Powers v. Budy (1895), 45
Neb. 208; s. C, G3 X. W. Rep. 476.
The discussion of a religious judi-
catory, as to what is consistent
with a peculiar doctrine, is conclu-
sive on civil courts. East Norway,
etc. Church v. Halvorson, 42 Minn.
503. The decision of the highest
tribunal of a church on a purely
ecclesiastical matter is binding on
the civil courts. Kruss v. Robert-
son (1894), 154 111. 394; s. C, 40N.
E. Kep. 343. See Pounder v. Ash
(1895), 44 Neb. 672; s. c.,63N.W.
Rep. 48. Courts will not review
proceedings of church tribunals
on questions involving discipline.
Powers v. Budy, 45 Neb. 20; s. c,
63 N. W. Rep. 476. "It is of the
essence of these religious unions,
and of their right to establish tri-
bunals, for the decision of questions
arising among themselves, that
those decisions should be binding
in all cases of ecclesiastical cogni-
zance, subject to only such appeals
as the organism itself provides for.
Nor do we see that justice would
be likely to be promoted by sub-
mitting those decisions to review
in the ordinary judicial tribunals.
Each of these large and influential
bodies (to mention no others, let
reference be had to the Protestant
Episcopal, the Methodist Episco-
pal, and the Presbyterian
churches;, has a body of constitu-
tional and ecclesiastical .law of its
own, to be found in their books of
discipline, in their collection of
precedents, in their usage and cus-
toms, which as to each constitute
a system of ecclesiastical law and
religious faith that tasks the ablest
minds to become familiar with. It
is not to be supposed that the
judges of the civil courts can be
as competent in the ecclesiastical
law and religious faith of all these
bodies as the ablest men in each
are in reference to their own. It
would, therefore, be an appeal
from the more learned tribunal in
the law, which should decide the
case, to one which is less so."
Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 729.
The decisions of the supreme ju-
dicatory of a religious denomination
of the associated class, having a
constitution and governed by local,
district, State and national bodies,
are not conclusive upon the courts,
when they are in open and avowed
defiance, and in express violation,
of the constitution of such body.
Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, dis-
tinguished ; Brundage v. Deardorf,
55 Fed. Rep. 839.
1 Princeton v. Adams, 10 Cush.
129. See also Attorney-General v.
Pearson, 3 Meriv. 353; s. C, 7 Sim.
290; Shore v. Wilson, 9 CI. & Fin.
355; Attorney-General v. Shore, 11
Sim. 592; s. c, 16 Sim. 210; Attor-
ney-General v. Drummond, 1 Con.
& L. 210; s. C, 1 Dr. & W. 353;
Attorney-General v. Hutton, 7 Ir.
Eq. Rep. 612, 614; Miller v. Gable,
2 Denio, 492, 548; Kniskern v.
Lutheran Church, 1 Sandf . Ch. 439.
§ 342.] , CHARITABLE PURPOSES. 799
the leading case before the New York Court of Chancery,
it was held that where a trust is created by deed for the
use of a congregation of Christians, designating such con-
gregation by the name of a sect or denomination, without
any other specification of the religious worship intended,
the intent of the donors or founders, in that respect, may
be implied from their own religious tenets, from the prior
and contemporary usages and doctrines of the congregation,
and from the usages, tenets and doctrines of the congrega-
tion or denomination to which such congregation belongs.
In ascertaining the early and contemporary usage and doc-
trines of such sect, resort may be had to history, and to
standard works of theology of an era prior to the existence
of the dispute or controversy. Where it is shown what
such prior usage and doctrines were, it is incumbent on
those who allege a departure therefrom in the founders of
the particular congregation, or the donors of its temporali-
ties, to prove such departure. Where a church is endowed
with property for the support of a particular faith, and is
subsequently incorporated, it is not competent for a ma-
jority of each combined to appropriate such property for
the maintenance of a different faith. The question of the
particular religious faith, or belief, is not material in such
cases, except so far as the court is called upon to execute
the trust, and to that end it merely inquires what was the
faith or belief to maintain which the fund was bestowed.
The court does not animadvert upon the religious belief of
either party, or assume to determine that either is in itself
right or wrong.1 In his learned and exhaustive opinion in
this case, Vice Chancellor Sandford, referring to the de-
nominational names and creeds of which he had previously
spoken, said: "From their designation and their distinc-
tive character, we learn what are their peculiar faith and
tenets. The belief in which the founders grew up, and
which they professed, becomes the belief of the church of
their institution. It is co-existent with the church itself.
The name of their sect announces to the world what is that
1 Kniskern v. Lutheran Church, 1 Sandf. Ch. 439.
800
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
[§ 343.
belief, and it is as much the faith of the church so founded
as if it were formally adopted in a public meeting and then
engraved on its walls. So, when new sects spring up, pro-
fessing, as they invariably do, to look to the Bible alone as
their standard of faith and doctrine, the moment that they
attempt to show wherein other sects depart from that
standard they are driven to set forth their own peculiar
interpretation of the Bible, their doctrines and belief.
These, whether so-called or not, constitute their creed,
which the world is to understand that they maintain."1
§ 343. The English Doctrine. — In their decisions of
cases of this class, the courts of this country, as a rule,
have accepted the doctrine which has been held in England
from an early day. In a leading case, where a meeting-
house was founded by certain Protestant Dissenters for the
worship and service of God, it was held that no doctrines
ought to be taught in it which are opposed to the opinions
of the founders; and, in ascertaining those opinions, the
1 Kniskern v. Lutheran Church, 1
Sandf. Ch. 439, 528. See Lutheran
Eyan. Church v. Gristgan, 34 Wis.
337. "It must be a plain and
palpable abuse of trust which will
induce a court of equity to interfere,
respecting a controversy growing
out of a difference in religious and
sectarian tenets. Between that ex-
treme which confers all power
upon the congregation or the trus-
tees, and the doctrine which sub-
jects the property to forfeiture for
departures from doctrine or forms
of government, in matters not in-
dispensable to the great ends to be
obtained by religious organization,
there is a wide interval, where we
may take our stand, sustained by
the law and by a sober and en-
lightened public sentiment. * *
If any class of our citizens are of
opinion that spiritual blessings can
only flow in a particular channel ;
if the church or a creed in their
minds usurps the place of the rev-
elation upon which they suppose
them to be founded, and if such
persons found churches, they must
declare their opinions explicitly to
have them respected. Such was not
the belief of the plain men who es-
tablished this church. They have
left enough on record to show that
they were anxious that the essen-
tial truths of Christianity, which
were recognized by the great body
of the reformers of that day, should
be preached to them and to their
children. This has been done.
If we go farther and bind this
church to a particular creed, and
compel a reluctant submission to a
judicatory whose authority they
have renounced, it will, in my
opinion, be the act of this court,
and not that of the founders of the
charity." Gardiner, P., in Miller
v. Gable, 2 Denio, 492, 548.
§ 343.]
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
801
state of the law, when the meeting-house was founded, is
to be regarded, as the court will intend that the founders
did not mean any doctrines to be taught which were then
illegal.1 For a very clear and comprehensive statement of
the English doctrine see the opinion of Lord Lyndhurst in
this case in note below.1
1 Attorney-General v. Pearson,
7 Sim. 290; s. c, 3 Meriv. 409.
The case of Attorney-General v.
Shore, appears in a note to the
case just cited. In the opinion in
this case, which was afterwards
sustained in the House of Lords on
another point, Lord Lyndhurst
stated the grounds of the doctrine
as follows: "I agree in the prin-
ciple, stated hy the learned judges,
upon which this case must be de-
cided. In every case of charity,
whether the object of the charity
he directed to religious purposes
or to purposes purely civil, it is
the duty of the court to give effect
to the intent of the founder, pro-
vided this can be done without in-
fringing any known rule of law. It
is a pi inciple that is uniformly
acted upon in courts of equity. If,
as they have stated the terms of
the deed of foundation be clear
and precise in the language, and
clear and precise in the applica-
tion, the course of the court is free
from difficulty. If, on the other
hand, the terms which are made
use of are obscure, doubiful or
equivocal, either in themselves or
in the application of them, it then
becomes the duty of the court to
ascertain by evidence, as well as it
is able, what was the intent of the
founder of the charity, in what
sense the particular expressions
were used. It is a question of
evidence, and that evidence will
vary with the circumstances of
51
each particular case ; it is a ques-
tion of fact to be determined, and
the moment the fact is known and
ascertained, then the application
of the principle is clear and easy.
It can scarcely be necessary to cite
authorities in support of these
principles. They are founded in
common sense and common jus-
tice; but if it were necessary to
refer to any authority, I might re-
fer to the case which has been al-
ready mentioned, the case of the
Attorney-General v. Pearson, and
to another case which was cited
at the bar, the case in the House
of Lords. Throughout those judg-
ments the principles which have
been stated were acknowledged
and acted upon by a noble and
learned judge, of more experience
in courts of equity, and more ex-
perience in questions of this nature,
than any other living person. I
look upon it, then, that those prin-
ciples are clear and established,
that they admit of no doubt what-
ever." See also Cragdallie v.
Aikman, 1 DavN, P. C.l; Foley
v. Wontner, 2 Jac. & W. 245;
Leslie v. Birnie, 2 Kuss.114; Davis
v. Jenkins, 3 Ves. & B. 156; Mulli-
gan v. Mitchell, 3 Myl. & Cr. 72;
s. C, 1 Myl. & K. 446; Attorney-
General v. Hutton, 7 Ir. Eq. 612,
S14; Attorney- General v. Drum-
mond, 1 Con. & L. 210; s. C, 1
Dru. & W. 353; Attorney-General
v. Wilson, 16 Sim. 210.
802 CHARITABLE PURPOSES. [§ 344.
§ 344. The Marshalling of Testator's Assets. -'-In En-
gland the marshalling of assets in favor of charities was
formerly allowed. Where there were charities and general
legacies, and the testator had charged the estate with the
payment of all his legacies, and the personalty was insuffi-
cient for the payment of the whole, the court would order
the charity to be paid out of the real estate, so as to effectu-
ate all the provisions of the will.1 But more recently the
courts have been disinclined to marshal the testator's assets
in favor of uny charitable bequest to be paid out of a mixed
fund of real and personal estate. Where the will has made
no distinction whether the real estate were freehold or
leasehold estate, or from personal estate or mixed person-
alty, and whether the bequests have been particular or re-
siduary, the court will refuse to direct the debts and other
legacies to be paid out of the real estate and to reserve the
personal to fulfill the charity. In a case where there were
particular charitable legacies, and a gift of the residue for
such benevolent, charitable and religious purposes as the
testator's trustees should, in their discretion, think fit; and
it was contended that the particular charitable legacies
ought to be made good out of so much of the residue as
consisted of pure personally, Lord Chancellor Cottenham
said: "This would be marshalling the assets at least
against the next of kin, and Avould be contrary to the rule
of the court adopted in all such cases, which is to appro-
priate the fund as if no legal objection existed as to apply-
ing any part of it to the charity legacies, then holding so
much of the charity legacies to fail as would in that way
be to be paid out of the prohibited fund."2 In the more
1 Attorney-General v. Tyndal, 2 ready money, money at the bank-
Eden, 211; Attorney-General v. ers, and money in the public stocks
Tompkins, Amb. 217; Attorney- or funds of Great Britain, and also
General v. Graves, Amb. 158; all other of her pergonal estate
Arnold v. Chapman, 1 Ves. 108. and effects which she could by
2 Williams v. Kershaw, 1 Keen, law bequeath to such an institu-
274, note. A testatrix bequeathed tion, and she appointed executors,
to an hospital all her household but made no further disposition of
furniture and other things in her her property, real or personal,
dwelling house, and also all her Held, that the charitable bequest
§ 344.]
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
803
recent decisions in England the courts have held that where
there is a fund of pure and mixed personalty, and both
classes of property may be applied to the payment of debts
and legacies, and the charitable legacies are made a charge
on the pure personalty, and the debts and other legacies
are charged on the remainder of the fund, if the assets are
not sufficient to pay the debts and all the legacies, the lega-
cies for charity will be held to have failed in the proportion
of the mixed personalty to the pure personalty. In a case
where a testatrix bequeathed legacies to charities and to
individuals, and she directed her charity legacies to be paid
"out of her ready money and the proceeds of the sale of
was a specific bequest, and that
the debts, funeral and testamentary-
expenses and costs, must be paid
first out of the undisposed of per-
sonal estate, next out of the real
estate, and lastly out of the specific
bequest; but that the specific be-
quest must exonerate the real estate
from probate duty. The testatrix,
long before her death, had granted
a lease of a house for thirty-one
years at a low rent, with a pre-
mium of £600, which had not been
paid. Held, that the unpaid pre-
mium, being in the nature of pur-
chase money, for which there was
a lien on the land, could not be
bequeathed to a charity. Shep-
heard v. Beetham. L. E. 6 Ch. D.
597. A testatrix gave all her real
and personal estate to trustees
upon trust to convert, and out of
the proceeds pay her debts, funeral
and testamentary expenses, and
certain legacies bequeathed to
private individuals, and directed
that all such legacies should in the
first instance be payable out of the
proceeds of sale of her '-real and
leasehold estate, if any." She di-
rected her trustees to divide the
residue of her estate into three
parts and pay the same to certain
charities. She then directed that
"the forgoing charitable legacies"
should be paid "exclusively" out
of such part of her pure personal
estate as was legally applicable for
that purpose. The testatrix had
no real or leasehold estates in this
country, but was possessed of land
in the colony of the Cape of Good
Hope (the value of which was less
than the amount of the general
legacies) and of pure and impure
personalty. Held, that the direc-
tion as to payment of the charita-
ble legacies was in effect equiva-
lent to a direction that the residue
should consist exclusively of pure
personalty, and therefore operated
as a direction to marshal for the
benefit of the charities; that the
general legacies were primarily
payable out of the proceeds of sale
of the land in the colony ; and that
the debts and funeral expenses, and
costs of action, and the unpaid
portion of the general legacies,
must be paid in the first instance
out of the impure personalty, so as
to leave the pure personalty, so far
as possible, to constitute the ulti-
mate residue. In re Arnold, L. E.
37 Ch. D. 637.
804 CHARITABLE PURPOSES. [§ 345.
her funded property, personal chattels and effects, and not
from the proceeds or by sale of her leaseholds or real es-
tate," and she charged her leasehold estates, in addition,
with the payment of her debts, funeral and testamentary
expenses, and legacies not given to charities, the pure
personalty was insufficient to pay the debts, etc., and all
the legacies, and it was held that the charity legacies failed
in the proportion of the mixed personalty to the pure per-
sonalty.1
§ 345. G-ifts in Contravention of Law, or of Public
Policy A trust created for a purpose professedly charita-
ble that is in conflict with any provision of the law, or that
is contrary to public policy, will not be sustained. In a
recent case, where there was a bequest for purchasing the
discharge of poachers committed to prison for non-paj^ment
of fines, fees or expenses under the game laws of England,
it was held that the bequest was void on the ground that it
was adapted to encourage the violation of law, and that as
such it was opposed to public policy.2 In his opinion in
this case, Sir John Romilly, M. R., said: "I cannot sup-
port this bequest. It is impossible not to see that the effect
of it would be to give immunity and protect persons in the
commission of acts which are treated by the legislature as
1 Philanthropic Society v. Kemp, gave his residuary real estate, and
4 Beav. 581. See Goskin v. Rog- all the residue of his personal estate,
ers, L. R. 2 Eq. 284; Wigg v. which should not be applicable to
Nicholl, L. R. 14 Eq. 92. A testa- and applied in trusts and purposes
tor directed all the rest, residue aforesaid unto the Middlesex Hos-
and remainder of his personal es- pital, that institution being empow-
tate, which might be legally ap- ered by law to receive the same,
plied for such purposes, to be paid Held, that the bequest to the six
unto and equally between six hos- hospitals included impure person-
pitals therein named (two of which alty, and that such impure person-
had power by law to take and hold alty must be applied as far as
land, notwithstanding 9 Geo. II., possible in payment of the shares
eh. 36, while the other four had of thee of the six hospitals which
not) ; and he directed that his had power to take and hold the
estate should be so marshalled and land. Wigg v. Nicholl, L. R. 14
administered as to give the fullest Eq. 92.
possible effect to the bequests in 2 Thrupp v. Collett, 20 Beav.
favor of charitable institutions 125.
thereinbefore contained ; and he
§ 345.] CHARITABLE PURPOSES. 805
offenses, and for which penalties by fine are imposed. This
court could not support a charity which M'ould protect per-
sons from the consequences of this offense, any more than
of others of a different nature which might even amount to
felony."1 In cases of this character the bequest will not
be applied cy pres, or under the King's sign manual, to
some other charitable purpose, on the ground that it was
the intention of the donor to make a bequest for charity,
but the property will revert to his representatives. In a
leading English case, where a sum of 3 per cent, stock
having been transferred by A into the name of himself and
three trustees, a deed was executed in England by him and
them, declaring they were to hold the stock upon trust to
pay the dividends to A during his life, and, after his death,
to apply them in printing and promoting the circulation of
a treatise, written in French and Latin, which inculcated
the doctrine of the absolute and inalienable supremacy of
the Pope in ecclesiastical matters ; and the deed contained
a proviso that, if any court of law or equity should declare
any of the trusts to be void, the trustees should stand pos-
sessed of the stock in trust for A's executors or administra-
1 Thrupp v. Collett, 26 Beav. cannot be accomplished without
125, 127. "Looking at these be- changing the constitution also,
quests in a plain common sense Whether such an alteration of the
view, it is obviously calculated to existing laws and frame of gov-
encourage offenses prohibited by ernment would be wise and desir-
the legislature. This is against able is a question upon which we
public policy, and the court cannot cannot, sittinginajudicialcapacity,
carry such an object into effect." properly express an opinion. Our
Ibid. See Kussell v. Jackson, 10 duty is limited to expounding the
Hare, 204. "It is quite clear that laws as they stand. And those
the bequest in trust to be expended laws do not recognize the purpose
"to secure the passage of laws of overthrowing or changing them,
granting women, whether married in whole or in part, as a charitable
or unmarried, the right to vote, to use. This bequest, therefore, not
hold office, to hold, manage and being for a charitable purpose, nor
devise property, and all other civil for the benefit of any particular
rights enjoyed by men,' cannot be persons, and being unrestricted in
sustained as a charity. " * This point of time, is inoperative and
bequest differs from the others in void." Jackson v. Phillips, 14
aiming directly and exclusively to Allen, 539, 571.
change the laws; and its object
80(5
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
[§ 345.
tors, it was held that the trusts, after A's life interest, were
void, as being contrary to the policy of the law, and in the
nature of a superstitious use ; that the fund was not subject
to a general trust for charity, so as to be applicable to any
other charitable purpose, according to the pleasure of the
Crown suggested under the sign manual, and that A was
entitled to have the fund retransferred to him.1 For ob-
1 De Tbemmines v. De Bonneval,
5Russ. 289. 'I have penned the
pleadings in this cause and looked
into the book to which they refer.
The book is not a treatise inculcat-
ing the general doctrines of the
Roman Catholic Chnrch; it is
written with a different object;
and that object is to show that,
according to the admitted doctrines
of the Roman Catholic Church,
the Pope has. in all ecelesiastie.il
matters, a supremacy which he is
not at liberty to alienate, or to
subject to the temporal sovereign,
and that I'ius VII., by his concord-
ant with the government of
France, did alienate it in opposition
to all the principles which that
church holds most sacred. Such
is the nature of the work; the
circulation of which, and the pro-
mulgation of the doctrines con-
tained in it, are the purposes for
which this charity is established.
It is against the policy of the
country to encourage, by the es-
tablishment of a charity, the pub-
lication of any work which asserts
the absolute supremacy of the
Pope in ecclesiastical matters over
the sovereignty of the State; and,
although the words of the deed are
so large that it may be argued that
the purposes of the charity may be
effectually carried on in other parts
of the world without infringing in
any manner on the policy of the
kingdom, still I incline strongly to
the opinion that this charitable
trust is to be deemed a superstitious
use and against public policy."
Ibid. But spe Shrewsbury v.
Hornby, 5 Hare, 406; Miller v.
Gable, 2Denio,492; Scott v. Curie,
9 B. Mon. 17. '-It is distinctly
stated in the pleadings and findings
of fact that the property of the
said corporation was held for the
purpose of religious and charitable
uses. But it is also stated in the
findings of fact, and is a matter of
public notoriety, that the religious
and charitable uses intended to be
subserved and promoted are the
inculcation and spread of the
doctrines and usages of the
Mormon Church, or Church of
Latter Day Saints, one of the dis-
tinguishing features of which is
the practice of polygamy — a crime
against the laws, and abhorrent to
the sentiments and feelings of the
civilized world. Notwithstanding
the stringent laws which have
been passed by congress — notwith-
standing all the efforts made to
suppress this barbarous practice —
the sect or community composing
the Church of Jesus Christ of Lat-
ter Day Saints perseveres in de-
fiance of law, in preaching, up-
holding, promoting and defending
it. It is a matter of public noto-
riety thatits emissaries are engaged
in many countries in propagating
this nefarious doctrine, and urging
its converts to join the community
in Utah. The existence of such a
propaganda is a blot on our civili-
§ 345.] CHARITABLE PURPOSES. 807
vious reasons the English doctrine is not sustained in this
country. As we have no State religion, or religious organ-
ization with a constitutional or recognized head, the supreme
authority of the Pope in matters ecclesiastical would not,
necessarily, be subversive of the order of the State. We
have no ecclesiastical establishment for which the supremacy
of the Pope would be a substitute. In this country bequests
for denominational objects, for the support of any denom-
inational tenet, or for the payment of any religious service
or act of a denominational character, will be upheld. In a
leading case, before the New York Court of Appeals, where
money was left to be devoted to the payment of priests for
celebrating masses for the souls of the dead, the trust was
sustained. In the opinion in this case, the court said:
"The efficacy of prayers for the dead is one of the doctrines
of the Roman Catholic Church, of which the testator
was a member, and those professing that belief are en-
titled in law to the same respect and protection in their
religious observances thereof, as those of any other denom-
ination. These observances cannot be condemned by any
court, as matter of law, as superstitious, and the English
statutes against superstitious uses can have no effect here."1
zation. * * * The question, 170; Gilman v. MoArdle. 99 N. Y.
therefore, is' whether the promotion 451; Rhymer's Appeal, 93 Pa. St.
of suehanefarioussystemandprac- 142; Dougherty's Estate, 5 W.N.
tice, so repugnant to our laws and C. 556; Manners v. Public Library,
to the principles of our civilization, 93 Pa. St. 165; In re Backe's Will,
is to be allowed to continue by the 9 Misc. Rep. 504; s. c, 30 N. Y.
sanction of the government itself ; Supl. 394. In Alabama a different
and whether the funds accumulated view is taken of the subject of
for that purpose shall be restored bequests for masses. InFestorazzi
to the same unlawful uses as here- v. St. Joseph's Church, 104 Ala. 327;
tofore, to the detriment of the true s. c, 18 So. Rep. 394, Head, J.,
interests of civil society." Justice says: "Charitable uses, whether
Bradley, in Mormon Church v. arising out of the English statute
United States, 136 U. S. 1, 48. of charitable uses, in force in a
1 Holland v. Alcock, 108 IS. Y. qualified sense, in Alabama, or
312. 329. See also Kehoe v. Kehoe, sustained upon the general princi-
22 Am. L. Reg. 656; M. E. Church pies of equity, do not include
v. Remington, 1 Watts, 218, 224; dispositions of the kind in question.
Macill v. Brown, 1 Bright. 346, To constitute a charitable use it
373B?i.; Gass v. Wilhite, 2 Dana, must confer a public benefit, open to
808 CHARITABLE PURPOSES. [§ 346.
§ 346. The Subject Continued.— In England the idea
of a trust for charitable purposes, especially as it was put
into execution by the earlier courts, was that of a provision
for the carrying out of some plan of Christian benevolence.
The donor was supposed to have acted in obedience to the
precepts of the Gospel, or to have been animated by some
essentially Christian motive. Trusts for a religious pur-
pose were sustained only as they were devoted to the sup-
port of some form of faith which recognized the Holy
Scriptures as a Divine revelation and prof essed to be founded
upon its teachings. In this country the English doctrine
is not accepted to its full extent. The American courts do
not discriminate in favor of one form of religious teaching
as against another, but a religious charity is upheld only as
it is, in reality, in some proper sense religious, as opposed
to what is irreligious and, as such, palpably unfriendly to
religion and morality. In a general sense, the religion of
the Bible is favored by the courts, and whatever is essen-
tially opposed to common morality will not be upheld. In
a well known case, before the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania, Mr. Justice Sharswood, in his opinion, said: "It is
in entire consistency with this sacred guarantee of the rights
of conscience and religious liberty to hold that, even if
Christianity is no part of the law of the land, it is the pop-
ular religion of the country, an insult to which would be
indictable as tending to disturb the public peace. The laws
and institutions of this State are built on the foundation of
reverence for Christianity. To this extent, at least, it
must certainly be considered as well settled that the religion
revealed in the Bible is not to be openly reviled, ridiculed
or blasphemed, to the annoyance of sincere believers, who
compose the great mass of the good people of the common-
an Indefinite number of persons. * * law by which such charities are
The bequest in the present case is, supported. It is not valid as a
according to the religious belief private trust, for the want of a liv-
of the testator, for the benefit ing beneficiary." See also Dashiell
alone of his own soul, and cannot v. Attorney-General, 5 Har. & J.
be upheld as a public charity with- 392; s. C, 9 Am. Dec. 577; Will-
out offending every principle of iams v. Pearson, 38 Ala. 307.
§ 346. J CHARITABLE PURPOSES. 809
wealth. I can conceive of nothing so likely, so sure, in-
deed, to produce these consequences, as a hall dedicated
in perpetuity for the free discussion of religion, politics,
et cetera, under the direction and administration of a society
of infidels. Indeed, I would go further, and adopt the
sentiment and language of Mr. Justice Duncan in the case
referred to : 'It would prove a nursery of vice, a school of
preparation to qualify young men for the gallows and young
women for the brothel, and there is not a skeptic of decent
manners and good morals who would not consider such a
debating club as a common nuisance and disgrace to the
city.' "1 In a recent case, before the same court, Mr. Jus-
tice Paxson, in delivering the opinion, said: "It may be
regarded as settled in Pennsylvania that a court of equity
will not enforce a trust where its object is the propagation
of Atheism, infidelity, immorality, or hostility to the ex-
isting form of government. A man may do many things
while living which the law will not do for him after he is
dead. He may deny the existence of a God, and employ
his fortune in the dissemination of infidel views, but should
he leave his fortune in trust for such purposes, the law will
strike down the trust as contra bonos mores."2 In an earlier
1 Zeisweiss v. James, 63 Pa. St. merits of the law, and agitating
465, 471. See also Updegraff v. the question whether such law has
Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & E. 394; or has not any better foundation
Vidal v. Girard"s Exrs., 2 How. than wrong and injustice. A devise
128; In re Knight's Estate, 159 Pa. of property to be used in distribu-
St. 500; s. C., 28 Atl. Rep. 303. ting over the land the publications
But see Thornton v. Howe, 31 of Henry George on the land
Beav. 14. The only restriction question, and cognate subjects,
which has been imposed on de- will be sustained and enforced,
vises for the better distribution of though all such publications teach
specified writings or books is, that doclrines antagonistic to the law,
the writings to be circulated must in this, in teaching that the earth
not have, when considered with belongs to all mankind, and is an
respect to their purpose, a general inalienable heritage, and that no
tendency of hostility to religion, private ownership can rightfully
law or morals. The courts will exist therein. George v. Brad dock,
permit the enforcement of a testa- 45 N. J. Eq. 757; s. c, 14 Am. St.
mentary use which is designed to Rep. 757.
circulate works calling in question 3 Manners v. Library Company,
fundamental rules and establish- 93 Pa. St. 165, 172.
810
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
[§ 347.
decision of this court it was held that it is the equitable
powers of a court which can compel the execution of a
trust which has not the benefit of any principle of legisla-
tive recognition, but those equitable powers will not be ex-
ercised to enforce a trust which is against the policy of the
State, as expressed by the legislature in its acts in parallel
cases.1
§ 347. Charitable Trusts to be Administered in a
Foreign Country. — A charitable trust in favor of an asso-
ciation in another State is valid, and where no person is
named who is capable of taking the legal title the court will
appoint a trustee to take the title and execute the trust.2
1 Methodist Church v. Reming-
ton, 1 Watts, 218. See also Da
Costa v. De Pas, Amb. 228; s. C,
2 Swanst. 487 n.; 1 Dick. 258;
Gass v. Wilhite, 2 Dana, 170; Ma-
gill v. Brown, Bright. 373; Finley
v. Hunter, 2 Stroh. Eq. 218; Eusk
v. Lewis, 32 Miss. 297; Johnson v.
Clarkson, 3 Rich. Eq. 305. The
perplexities in the way of a court
in defining these offenses against
public policy are neatly summed
up in Davies v. Davies, L. R. 36
Ch. D. 364. Kekewich, J., said:
"All authorities, from first to last,
concur in one thing, viz., that the
doctrine on this subject is founded
on 'public policy ;' and I cannot
hut regard the jarring opinions as
exemplifying the well-known dic-
tum of Mr. Justice Burrough, in
Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing.
229; s. C, 9 E. C. L. 252, that
public policy 'is a very unruly
horse, and when once you get
astride it you never know where it
will carry you.' Public policy
does not admit of definition, and
it is not easily explained. If that
statement requires aathority, turn
to Egerton v. Earl Brownlow, 4 H.
L. Cas. 1, and consult the argu-
ments of counsel and opinions of
judges covering the whole subject,
including, in some passages to
which I will presently call atten-
tion, that part of it which con-
cerns restraint of trade. One
thing I take to be clear, and it is
this, that public policy is » vari-
able quantity; that it must vary,
and does vary with the habits,
capacities and opportunities of the
public, that it cannot have been
the same when Chief Justice Tin-
dal decided Horner v. Graves, 7
Bing. 754; s. c, 20 E. C. L. 310,
in 1831, as it was when Chief
Justice Parker decided Mitchell v.
Reynolds, 1 P. Wins. 181, in 1711 ;
that it must have changed, and
did change, between 1831 and
1869, when Vice Chancellor James
decided Leather Cloth Co. v. Lor-
sont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345; and if there
had not been further change before
Lord Justice Fry decided Rousillon
v. Rousillon, L. R. 14 Ch. D. 351,
in 1880, it must have occurred ere
now."
2 Washburn v. Bewail, 9 Mete.
(Mass.) 280; Provost of Edinburgh
v. Aubery, Amb. 336; Mackintosh
v. Townshend, 16 Ves. 330; Curtis
v. Hutton, 14 Ves. 537; Attorney-
General v. Chester, 1 Bro. Ch.444;
§ 347. j
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
811
In :m English case, where a testator gave a sum of money
to be laid out in heritable securities in Scotland for charita-
ble purposes, Lord Thurlow decided that the legacy was
good, and Lord Chancellor Eldon, in deciding another case,
referred to this in saying: "This is a direct decision upon
the point, and if I had more doubt upon it that authority
binds me to determine that this is a good bequest."1 In the
case of the legacy for the founding of the Smithsonian
Institution at Washington, D. C, the suit of the President
of the United States v. Drummond, Executor, was sus-
tained.2 In England it has been held that where it is re-
quired or rendered important, either by the terms of the
instrument creating the trust, or by any other considera-
tion, the court may order the fund to be invested within its
jurisdiction and order the income only to be paid to the
foreign trustees.3 But if a bequest to be paid to trustees
Campbell v. Radnor, 1 Bro. Ch.
171 ; Society for Prop. Gospel v.
Attorney-General, 3 Kuss. 142;
Oliphant v. Hendrie, 1 Bro. Ch.
571 io.; Collyer v. Burnett, Tatnl.
79; Attorney -General v. Lepine, 2
Swanst. 181; s. c, 19 Ves. 309;
Chamberlain v.. Chamberlain, 43
N. Y. 424; Mitford v. Reynolds, 1
Phil. 185; Emery v. Hill, 1 Kuss.
112; Mayor of Lyons v. East India
Co., 1 Moore P. C. 273; Minet v.
Vulliamy, lRuss. 113n.; Attorney-
General v. London, 3 Bro. Ch. 171;
S. c, 1 Ves. Jr. 243; Silcox v. Har-
per, 32 Ga. 639; Chamberlain v.
Chamberlain, 43 N. Y. 437. "The
existence of a foreign corporation,
organized under the laws of the
State where the charity is to be
administered, will be recognized
by this court, and the fund com-
mitted to it if, by the law of its
creation, such corporation has the
requisite powers and competency
in the premises. But it is obvi-
ously due to the proper adminis-
tration of justice that this court
should, before ordering the pay-
ment, be fully satisfied as to the
qualifications of the corporation.
In the case in hand the testator
intended that the trustees whom
he named should become incorpo-
rated under the laws of Pennsyl-
vania, and that the trust should be
wholly administered by means of
the corporation." Taylor v. Trus-
tees of Bryn Mawr College, 34
:sT. J. Eq. 101, 105. See also Inglis
v. Sailors' Snug Harbor, 3 Pet. 99;
Trustees, etc. v. Beatty, 1 Stew.
Eq. 570; Stevens v. Shippen, 1
Stew. Eq. 487; Goodell v. Union
Assn., 2 Stew. Eq. 32. But see De
Garcia v. Lamson, 4 Ves. 433 n.;
De Themmines v. De Bonneval, 5
Kuss. 292.
1 Mackintosh v. Townshend, 16
Ves. 337.
2 Cited in Whicker v. Hume, 7 H.
L. Cas. 124.
3 Attorney-General v. Lepine, 2
Swanst. 181 ; Attorney-General v.
Sturge, 19 Beav. 597.
812 CHARITABLE PURPOSES. [§ 348.
under a foreign jurisdiction is illegal in the State in which
it is made, or is clearly contrary to public policy as under-
stood in that State, the court will not order it to be paid to
the trustees named.1 Where a charitable trust is so created
as to be void in the State in which the gift is made, it will
not be put into execution, even though it may be legal in
the State in which it was to be administered.2 If the for-
eign trustees named by the testator refuse to accept the
trust it will fail, and the trust estate will pass to the heirs
of the testator.3
§ 348. Barred by Statute of Mortmain. — In England
very numerous cases of charitable gifts fail from their con-
travention of the statute of mortmain. This statute, — 9
George II., chap. 36, — provides that after the 24th of June,
1736, no manors, lands, tenements, or other hereditaments,
etc., or any sums of money or other property to be con-
verted into such estates, shall be given to any charitable
use, unless it shall be conveyed by deed, indented and ex-
ecuted before two witnesses, at least twelve months before
the death of the donor, and that all gifts in contravention
of this statute shall be null and void.* This chapter of the
statute is materially modified by the mortmain and charita-
1 De Garcia v. Lamson, 4 Ves. instruction of youth in the State of
433)1.; DeThemmines v. De Bon- Pennsylvania, and directed that
neval, 5 Buss. 292. moral philosophy should be taught
2 Bascomb v. Albertson, 34 N. Y. therein, and a professor should be
584. See also Baptist Association engaged to inculcate and advocate
v. Hart, 4 Wheat. 1 ; Gallego's the natural rights of the black
Exrs. v. Attorney-General, 3 Leigh, people, of every clime and country,
474; Yates v. Yates, 9 Barb. 345
Fontaine v. Ravenel, 17 How. 3G9
Burbank v. Whitney, 24 Pick. 154
Andrews v. Harriott, 4 Cow. 517
until they be restored to an equality
of rights with their white brethren
throughout the Union. The trus-
tees disclaimed the gift. Held, that
Parsons v. Lyman, 20 N. Y, 103. the court having no power to en-
s New v. Bonaker, L. B. 4 Eq. force the trust, nor to settle a trust
654; Levy v. Levy, 33 N. Y. 97. for the administration of the charity
A testator gave certain funds to cy pres, the object had failed, and
the President and Vice-President the funds fell into the residue. New
of the United States, and the Gov- v. Bonaker, L. R. 4 Eq. 655.
ernorof Pennsylvania, upon trust to 4 9 Geo. II., eh. 3G.
build and endow a college for the
§ 348.]
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
813
ble uses Act of 1888. J But this act provides that, "if the
assurance is of land, or of personal estate, not being stock
in the public funds, then, unless it is made in good faith
for full and valuable consideration, it must be made at least
twelve months before the death of the assuror, including in
those twelve months the days of the making of the as-
surance and of the death."2 The English statute has not
been adopted or recognized in this country, but a number
of the States have statutory provisions of this general
character. The word "mortmain," Latin mortua manu,
French mort main, that is, dead hand, was originally em-
ployed to designate a purchase of land by a corporation,
whether ecclesiastical or temporal. But as purchases of
this nature were made chiefly by religious bodies, the term
came to be applied exclusively to such alienations, the mem-
bers of such bodies being reckoned as "dead" in law. But
at the present time the word is used to designate any enact-
'51 & 52 Victoria.
2 51 & 52 Victoria, ch. 42, § 4.
See the following for recent de-
cisions under English statute of
mortmain : Booth v. Carter, 3 Eq.
757; In re Watmough's Trusts, L.
B. 8 Eq. 272 ; In re Lynall's Trusts,
L. K. 12 Ch. D. 211 ; Pratt v. Har-
vey, L. E. 12 Eq. 544; Sinnett v.
Herbert, L. K. 12 Eq. 201; S. C, 7
Ch. 23; Champney v. Davy, L. K.
llCh.D.949; Wilkinson v. Barber,
L. E. 14 Eq. 96; In re Cox, L. B.
7 Ch. D. 204; Hawkins v. Allen,
L. E. 10 Eq. 246; Sewell v. Crewe-
Eead, L. E. 3 Eq. 60; Creswell v.
Creswell, L. B. 6 Eq. 69; Morley
v. Croxon, L. R. 8 Ch. D. 156; In
re Hill's Trusts, L. E. 16 Ch. D.
173; In re Thompson, L. E.45 Ch.
D. 161 ; Holdsworth v. Davenport,
L. E. 3Ch. D. 185; In re Mitchell's
Estate, L. E. 6 Ch. D. 655; Atlee
v. Hawe, L. E. 9 Ch. D. 337;
Emley v. Davidson, L. E. 19 Ch.
D. 156; Martin v. Lacon, L. E. 30
Ch. D. 544; s. c, L. E. 33 Ch. D.
332; Buckley v. Eoyal Nat'l Life-
boat Institution, L. R. 41 Ch. D.
168; s. C, L. E. 43 Ch. D. 27;
Entwistle v. Davis, L. E. 4 Eq.
272; Cluff v. Cluff, L. R. 2 Ch. D.
222; Brook v. Bradly, L. R. 4 Eq.
106 ; Lucas v. Jones, L. R. 4 Eq. 73 ;
Cornford v. Elliott, L. R. 27 Ch.D.
318; s. c, L. R. 29 Ch. D. 947;
Shepheard v. Beetham, L. R. 6 Ch.
D. 597; Jervis v. Lawrence, L. R.
22 Ch. D. 202; In re Harris, L. R.
15 Ch. D. 561; Thomas v. Howell,
L. R. 18 Eq. 198; Perring v. Trail,
L. R. 18 Eq. 88; Luckraft v. Prid-
ham, L. R. 6 Ch. D. 205; Nether-
sole v. Indigent Blind School, L.
E. 11 Eq. 1; Chester v. Chester, L.
R. 12 Eq. 444; Springett v. Jen-
nings, L. R. 10 Eq. 48S ; O'Brien v.
Tysen, L. R. 28 Ch. D. 272; Bunt-
ing v. Sargent, L. R. 13 Ch. D. 330 ;
Webster v. Soulhey, L. R. 36 Ch.
D. 9; Churcher v. Martin, L. E. 42
Ch. D. 312; Wickham v. Marquis
of Bath, L. E. 1 Eq. 17; Fox v.
Lowndes, L. E. 19 Eq. 453.
814
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
[§ 348.
ment in restraint of gifts to charitable purposes. It is ap-
plied to all laws by which devises, bequests, or other con-
veyances of lands, or other corporeal hereditaments, are
limited, or are rendered void.1 In Pennsylvania it has been
held that the statutes of mortmain are extended to this
State only so far as they prohibit dedications of property
to superstitious uses and grants to corporations without a
statutory license.2 In several of the States there have been
legislative enactments designating the length of time that
must elapse between the devise or grant and the death of
the donor, and also the proportion of the estate which may
legally be devoted to charitable objects.3
1 Anderson's Law Dictionary, tit.
Mortmain; 2 Blackstone's Com-
mentaries, 268. "The term mort-
main, as its derivation signifies, is
not necessarily confined to the
landed possessions of corporations;
it equally applies to all property
that, from the nature of the pur-
poses to which it was devoted, or
the character of the ownership to
which it is subjected, is for every
practical purpose in a dead or
unserviceable hand. This, it is
obvious, is the characteristic of
alienations to charitable uses; it is
the very nature of such dispositions
to withdraw the subject of them
from every kind of circulation,
since a contrary course defeats their
manifest object.'' Lewis on Per-
petuities. See Yates v. Yates, 9
Barb. 324.
* Miller v. Porter, 53 Pa. St.
29:>.
' In California a bequest or devise
must be made at least thirty days
prior to donor's decease, and must
noiexceed one-third of his estate.
Code, § 1313. Even if religious
societies are not charitable or
benevolent societies, within the
meaning of Civil Code, § 1313,
prohibiting bequests or devises to
any ''charitable or benevolent soci-
ety, or corporation, or to any
person or persons in trust for
charitable uses," of more than
one- third of the estate, where the
testator leaves legal heirs, a bequest
to the boards of trustees of several
churches of more than one-third
of the estate, to be used by the
trustees for missionary purposes,
is a bequest ia trust for charitable
uses within the prohibition of said
section. In re Hewitt's Estate, 94
Cal. 376; s. c, 29 Pac. Rep. 775.
In Kentucky no church or society
of Christians can acquire more
than fifty acres of land. In Mis-
souri gifts, sales or devises for
religious purposes are liraiied to
one acre of ground. Constitution,
art. 1, § 13. Where more than an
acre of ground was devised in trust
for the erection of a church and
religious school, and the title to
so much of the land as exceeded
an acre failed, the devise was valid
as to the remainder. Const., art.
1, §§ 12, 13, making void every
devise, for such purposes, of land
exceeding an acre in extent.
Barkley v. Donnelly (1892), 112
Mo. 561; s. c.,19 S. W. Rep. 305.
In Georgia the Code, § 2419, pro-
§ 349. J
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
815
§ 349. Objects not Subject to Change Where a char-
itable trust has been created, and the object of the trust is
unequivocally designated in the conveyance, it cannot be
changed as a matter of convenience, or with a view to in-
vides : "S"o person leaving a wife
or child shall, by will, devise more
than one-third of his estate to any
charitable, religious, educational,
or civil institution, to the exclu-
sion of such wife or child; and, in
all cases, the will containing such
devise shall be executed at least
niuety days before the death of
the testator, or such devise shall
be void." This does not invalidate
a charitable devise contained in a
will, executed within ninety days
before the testator's death, unless he
leaves a wife or child, or descend-
ants of a child. Jones v. Haber-
sham, 107 U. S. 174. See White v.
McKeon (1893), 92 Ga. 343; s. c,
17 S. E. Rep. 2S3. In Wisconsin,
Rev. St. 1S78, § 2039, providing
that the power of alienation should
not be suspended beyond two lives
in being, and twenty-one years
thereafter, except where the land
is given to literary or charitable
corporations, was amended by laws
1891, ch. 359, by adding that relig-
ious corporations should be held
charitable corporations, within
these provisions, but that "no
gift, grant or devise of real estate
to any such literary or charitable
corporations shall be valid unless
made at least three months before
the death of the person making
the same." Held, that a devise of
land to a charitable corporation
within three months of testator's
death was void, the prohibition of
the statute not being limited to
devises to religious corporations.
Milwaukee Protestant Home for
Aged v. Bechcr (1S94), 87 Wis.
409; s. c, 58 N. W. Rep. 774. In
New York there is a general pro-
vision, by the Act of 1860, ch. 360,
that no person having a husband,
wife, child or parent shall, by Lis
or her last will or testament, de-
vise or bequeath to any benevolent,
charitable, literary, scientific, re-
ligious or missionary society, as-
sociation or corporation, in trust
or otherwise, more than one- half
part of his or her estate, after the
payment of his or her debts. Cor-
porations created under the Act of
1S4S, ch. 319, are entitled to $10,-
000 yearly income, and all gifts to
be valid must have been made or
devised two months before the
donor's death. See Stephenson v.
Short, 92 X. Y. 433; s. c, 1 Am. &
Eng. Corp. Cas. 007. A devUe of
lands in Xew York to the United
States for the national debt is void.
United States v. Fox. 94 U. S. 315;
s. c, 52 X. Y. 530. See also
Fairchild v. Edson, 77 Hun, 298;
S. C, 28 1ST. Y. Supl. 401; Simmons
v. Burrell, 8 Misc. Rep. 388; s. C,
28 2v". Y. Supl. 625; People's Trust
Go. v. Smiih, 82 Hun, 494; s. C,
31 X. Y. Supl. 519; In re Walker's
Will, 63 Hun, 627; s. c, 17 N. Y.
Supl. 666; Hemmje v. Meinen, 20
N. Y- Supl. 619; Kerr v. Dough-
erty, 79 N. Y. 327; Hollis v.
Seminary, 95 N. Y. 166. In Ver-
mont the statutes of mortmain
have never been adopted, so that
the common law right to take an
estate in fee incident to a corpora-
tion is unlimited, except by its
charter and by statute. Page v.
Heineberg, 40 Yt. 81. In Ohio
816
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
[§ 349.
creasing the value or usefulness of the charity, even by the
consent of all the parties in being. In a case relating to
the establishment of a divinity school in connection with
Harvard, and where relief was sought by the corporation
of the college, it was held that this court cannot, in the ex-
ercise of its chancery jurisdiction, withdraw funds given by
individuals to the corporation of Harvard College, in trust
for the promotion of theological education at the college,
or for the benefit of a divinity school attached to the col-
lege, and intrust them to an independent board of trustees,
to be applied to the support of a divinity school not con-
nected with the college, merely on the ground of inconven-
ience and embarrassment in continuing the connection be-
tween the college and the divinity school, and of the ben-
efit which would result to both from a separation, and
without proof of incapacity or unfaithfulness on the part
of the corporation, or failure of the objects of the char-
a devise or bequest to a charitable,
religious or educational purpose
by a testator leaving issue or
adopted children, 'is void, unless
made at least one year before the
testator's death. Rev. St., § 5915.
See Folsom v. Haas, 9 Ohio Cir.
Ct. Rep. 473. In Pennsylvania a
devise, bequest or conveyance for
religious or charitable uses is void,
unless done by deed or will attested
by two credible and, at the time,
disinterested witnesses, at least one
calendar month before the decease
of the testator or alienor. Act of
1855; Purdon's Digest, 252. See
Hamilton's Estate, 74 Pa. St. 69;
McGlade's Appeal, 99 Pa. St. 338;
In re Knight's Estate, 159 Pa. St.
509; s. c, 34 W. N". C. 6; 28 Atl.
Rep. 303; In re Carlisle's Estate,
34 "W. jST. C. 62. In Maryland, Act
1888, ch. 249, § 305a, which declares
that no devise for any charitable
uses shall be void by reason of any
uncertainty with respect to the
donees thereof, provided the will
or codicil making the same shall
also contain directions for the for-
mation of a corporation to take
the same, and within the period of
twelve calendar months from the
probate of such will or codicil, a
corporation . shall be formed in
correspondence with such direc-
tions! capable and willing to re-
ceive and administer such devise
does not make an uncertain be-
quest valid where the will makes
no provision for the formation of
a corporation, although the church
in question was incorporated be-
fore the testator's death. Yingling
v. Miller (1893), 77 Md. 104; s. C,
26 Atl. Rep. 491. The English
statutes of mortmain were never
in force in the English colonies,
and if they were ever considered
to be so in the State of Ohio, it
must have been from that resolu-
tion by the governor and judges
in her territorial condition; and if
so, they were repealed by the Act
of 1806.
§ 349.]
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
817
ity.1 If the trustees decline to administer the trust, or if they
are known to hold such opinions in regard to the objects of
the trust as to disqualify them for their duty as trustees, or
materially to interfere with their efficiency as such, they
will be removed by the court and other persons appointed
in their place.2 Where trustees remove, or for any cause
cease to be subject to the jurisdiction of the court having
jurisdiction of the trust, they may be removed and others
substituted.3 But it has been held that persons who have
been elected as objects of a charity upon an erroneous con-
struction of the scheme for the regulation of the trust, but
where the election was made bona fide and without fraud or
corruption, will not be removed by the court.4
1 Harvard College v. Society, 3
Gray, 280. See also Attorney-Gen-
eral v. Garrison, 101 Mass. 223;
Attorney-General v. Hartley, 2 J.
& "W. 382; Attorney-General v.
Mansfield, 2 Russ. 520; Attorney-
General v. City of London, 1 Ves.
Jr. 243; Provost of Edinburgh
v. Aubery, Amb. 236; Stone v.
Framingham, 109 Muss. 303; Re
Storie's Un.versity Gift, 2 De G.,
F. & J. 529, 531, 540.
2 Attorney-General v. Garrison,
101 Mass. 223. '-We cannot go be-
hind the decree, and the trust must
be executed according to its terms;
and if we were at liberty to modify
tthe decree, we could not sanction
the proposed appropriation, be-
cause it would be for a purpose of
a political nature, and not within
any proper definition of a charit-
able trust. These trustees are so
unwilling to execute the trust in
conformity with the decree thus
interpreted, that they prefer to be
removed rather than be the agents
of its execution. As the trust has
been entirely unexecuted for a long
time, and the society has been con-
stantly in pressing need of the
money, and there is no reason to
believe that these trustees will
change their opinions, it becomes
necessary to remove them. Of the
power to do this there can be no
doubt." Ibid. 239.
3 Attorney-General v. City of
London, 1 Ves. Jr. 243. See Pro-
Tost of Edinburgh v. Aubery,
Amb. 236.
* Bf, Storie's Gift, 2 De G., F. &
J. 529. '-All considerations be-
longing to a case of unfair dealing,
or of artifice, or of partiality, seem
to be out of place here. If error
there was, it seems to have been
honest and excusable error. * *
His conduct seems to have been
unimpeaehed; his advancement in
learning sufficient, and, attending
to the length of time which elapsed
between his election and the pre-
sentation of the petitioner's origi-
nal petition, and all the circum-
stances in evidence, I am of opinion
that in the proper exercise of a
judicial discretion, Mr. W ought
not now to be displaced or inter-
fered with. The interval of time
that I have just mentioned was
more than eleven months, and was
of considerable importance to him
at his period of life. * And now
818 CHARITABLE PURPOSES. [§ 350.
§ 350. Personal Distinguished from Official Trust. —
The alienation of the legal title of a charitable trust estate
by the trustee will be regarded as per se a breach of his
trust. It is his business as a trustee to care for the trust
estate, and, in all that he does relating to it, to promote
the interests of beneficiaries. If he alienates the legal
title, the burden of showing that the transaction was for the
benefit of the charity will be upon him, and if he fails to
establish that point he will stand convicted of a breach of
trust.1 In the case cited, it was held that charitable trusts
are not within the statute of uses (27 Henry VIII.), so as
to merge the legal title into the equitable estate. Such
trusts are by their very nature continuing executory trusts.
Therefore, where the title to a certain lot was vested in the
bishop of a diocese for the use of the church in a certain
division, and the title to other lots was vested in him for
the benefit of a parish in his diocese, upon the incorpora-
tion of such diocese and parish the title was not divested
from the bishop and vested in them. Where the title was
conveyed to E "of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the
Division of Georgia, to have and to hold to him, the said
E, bishop as aforesaid, for the use of the Protestant Epis-
copal Church in said Division of Georgia, in fee-simple."
such trust did not attach to the person of E, but to the
office of bishop, and passed to his successor in office.2
to take it from trim without any the office of bishop, and that the
fault on his part, would, in my trust did not pass to his successors
opinion, be an act of unnecessary in office? In Georgia the courts
har.-hness.'' Ibid. 531. apply liberal rules of construction
1 Beckwithv. St. Phillip's Parish, to carry out the intention of the
69 Ga. 504. See Calkins v.Cheney, donor. Beall v. Fox, 4 Ga. 404;
72 111. 402. Walker v. Walker, 25 Ga. 420. A
2 Beckwith v. St. Phillip's Parish, bond payable to Gilmer, governor,
69 Ga. 564. "Was there error in and his successors in office, is pay -
the courts holding as complained able to the officer and not to the
of in the fifth assignment of error, individual. Howard v. Crawford,
that the lot conveyed to Stephen 15 Ga. 423. So if only payable to
Elliott, Jr., bishop, in trust for the the governor. Stephens v. Craw-
Protestant Episcopal Church in ford. 1 Ga. 574. So by the terms
the Division of Georgia, was a trust of or a close anology with § 2343 of
attaching to the pi rson and not to the code, this trust would vest in
§ 351.]
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
<S19
§ 351. Perpetuities and Accumulations. — Not only by
the law of England, but also by that of this country, trusts
for charitable purposes are upheld where private trusts
would be void. In Russell v. Allen, Mr. Justice Gray said
of public trusts : "Being for objects of permanent interest
and benefit to the public, they may be perpetual in their
duration, and are not within the rule against perpetuities ;
and the instruments creating them should be so construed
as to give them effect, if possible, and to carry out the gen-
eral intention of the donor, where clearly manifested, even
if the particular form or manner pointed out by him cannot
be followed."1 In New York it has been held that the pro-
the present complainant as the
successor. This was evidently the
intention of the donor. The trust
was lodged for the benefit of a
diocese in its bishop, its highest
officer, and who, by the rules of
his church government, was the
regular successor of a long line of
officials preceding him. No other
provision was made by the deed
for any other succession, and the
conclusion is reasonable, he in-
tended this trust to pass to the suc-
cessors in office of the first trustee.''
Beekwith v. St. Phillip's Parish,
69 Ga. 564, 575.
1 Russell v. Allen, 107 U. S. 167
Andrews v. Andrews. 110 111. 230
Richmond v. Davis, 103 Ind. 449
Webster v. Morris, 66 Wis. 366
Church in Brattle St. v. Grant, 3
Gray, 143; Attorney-General v.
Downing, Wilrnot, 1 ; s. C, Dick.
14; Arab. 550; Attorney-General v.
Bowyer, 3 Ves. 714; S. C, 5 Yes.
300; 8 Yes. 256; Attorney-General
v. Chester, 1 Bro. Ch. 464; Inglis
v. Sailors' Snug Harbor, 3 Pet. 99;
Sanderson v. White, IS Pick. 336;
Company of Pewterers v. Christ's
Hosp., 1 Vern. 161 ; Attorney-Gen-
eral v. Gill, 2 P. Wms. 369; Attor-
ney-General v. Hall, W. Kel. 13;
Comr's of Donations v. De Clif-
ford, 1 Dr. & W. 254; Wells v.
Heath, 10 Gray, 25; McDonough
v. Murdock, 15 How. 367; Potter
v. Thornton, 7 E. I. 252; Ould v.
Hospital, 95 U. S. 303; Perin v.
Carey, 24 How. 465; Christ's Hos-
pital v. Grainger, 16 Sm. 84, 100;
Jones v. Habersham, 107 U. S. 174;
Franklin's Admx. v. City of Phila-
delphia, 13 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep.
241; In re Strickland's Estate, 63
Hun, 625; s. C, 17 X. Y. Supl.
304; Trustees v. Whitney (Conn.),
3 X. E. Rep. 513. The con-
veyance of property in trust with
direction that the income should
accumulate to form a fund, the in-
come of which, should be paid over
annually to charitable purposes, is
not such an unreasonable accumu-
lation as to require a court of
equity to terminate it. St. Paul's
Churchy. Attorney-General (1S95),
164 Mass. 18S8; s. c, 41 X. E. Rep.
231. A devise of a life estate to the
testator's sons on condition, and,
in case of breach thereof, to the
inmates of a charitable institution
is not within the statute of perpe-
tuities. Pendleton v. Kinney, 65
Conn. 222; s. C, 32 Atl. Rep. 331.
The fact that a will gives a dis-
<S20
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
[§ :«l.
visions of the Revised Statutes, "of accumulations of per-
sonal property and of expectant estates in such property,"
do not affect property given in perpetuity to religious or
charitable institutions.1 The same court has also held that
a corporation created for charity may take by bequest and
hold personal property limited by the testator to any of the
corporate uses of the legatee, and a direction of the testator
that the principal shall be kept inviolate, and the income
only be expended, will not invalidate the bequest, provided
it is fixed and certain and gives an immediate and vested
interest.2
cretion to use the funds to purchase
books for any public library does
not make it void, as conflicting
with the statute of perpetuities
although no time is fixed in which
the beneficiary shall be selected.
New Haven Young Men's Institute
v. City of Xew Haven, 00 Conn. 32;
s. c, 22 Atl. Kep. 447. A bequest
was made to a charitable institu-
tion, subject to a condition that
they should keep the testator's
tomb in repair, with a gift over to
another charitable institution on
failure to comply with the condi-
tion. Held, that the rule against
perpetuities had no application,
and that the condition was valid.
In re Tyler, L. Ii. (1891), 3 Ch.
252. Testator devised the residue
of bis estate in trust for the estab-
lishment of a public school, and
directed that, in case the school
buildings were not erected in his
lifetime, the necessary amount for
their erection should be taken from
the residue, and that the balance
should be invested, $10,000 of the
income added yearly to the princi-
pal for 100 years, or longer in the
trustee's discretion, and the bal-
ance used in maintaining the
school. Held, that the devise was
not void as tending to create a per-
petuity. Woodruff v. Marsh (1893),
63 Conn. 125; s. c, 26 Atl. Rep.
S46. See exceptions in Wetmore v.
Parker, 52 N". Y. 450; Phelps v.
Pond, 23 M".Y. 69; Jocelyn v. Nott,
44 Conn. 55; De Wolf v. Lawson,
61 Wis. 469.
1 Williams v. Williams, 8 N. Y.
525.
2 Wetmore v. Parker, 52 N. Y.
450. See Martin v. Maugham, 14
Sim. 230; Kilpatrick v. Johnson,
15 N. Y. 322; Hooper v. Hooper,
9 Cush. 122; Southampton v. Hert-
ford, 2 V. & B. 54; Brown v.
Stoughton, 14 Sim. 309; Matthews
v. Keble, L. R. 1 Eq. 467; S. c, L.
R. 3 Ch. 691 ; Franklin's Admx. v.
City of Philadelphia, 13 Pa. Co. Ct.
Rep. 241. A devise and bequest to
an institution that has no existence
at the time of testator's death, with
a direction to the executors to pro-
cure from the legislature an act for
the incorporation of such institu-
tion as soon as practicable, is void,
as attempting to hold the title to
the land and the ownership of the
personal property in abeyance for
a period not measured by a life or
lives in being. Booth v. Baptist
Church, 126 N. Y. 215; s. c, 28
N. E. Rep. 238.
i
§ 352. J CHARITABLE PURPOSES. 821
§ 352. The Subject Continued. — The rule against ac-
cumulations is not rigidly enforced in the case of charitable
trusts. But in those States in which there are statutes
limiting the time of accumulations, charities will be gov-
erned by the statute, unless they are especially excepted
from its operation.1 The decisions in the different States,
and to some extent in the same State, are not by any means
in harmony. In New York it was held that there is nothing
to withdraw gifts to mere private trustees for indefinite
charitable uses from the operation of the provisions of the
Revised Statutes in relation to uses and trusts, perpetuities
and the limitation of future estates ; and the prohibitions
contained in these statutes are in direct contravention of
the English law on this subject as it existed at the time of
the Revolution, when our first constitution was adopted.2
In Pennsylvania it has been held that trusts for accumula-
tion beyond the period allowed for the vesting of an execu-
tory limitation are absolutely void, although the fund thus
to be created is directed to be ultimately applied to the
formation and support of a charity.3 In Martin v. Maugham,
1 Kilpatrick v. Johnson, 15 X. Y. draw into its vortex all the property
322. in the State. For proof of it, take
2 Bascorn v. Albertson, 34 X1 . Y. the trust before us in connection
584. "We think the English sy»- with the principal charity, so to
tern of indefinite charitable uses, speak, but disconnected from the
if it ever existed in this State, fell other, which may never be called
with the repeal of the statute of into active existence, we would
Elizabeth and the mortmain acts; then have a gift of real and per-
and we are also of the opinion that sonal estate, in trust, to lend the
. gifts of this nature are within the income and increase the capital to
scope and meaning, as well as the infinitude by investing the interest
terms, of our statutes, forbidding of it, toties quoties, in other loans
perpetuities unauthorized by law." secured by bonds and mortgages,
Ibid. 620. the produce falling into the gen-
3Hillyard v. Miller, 10 Pa. St. eral mass, and being applicable to
326. "But a trust for perpetual all the primary uses of the trust.
accumulation of a part of the in- It is easy to see what that would
come, though a consequence not lead to. As nothing would he dis-
intended, and though the founding bursed except for agency and re-
of a charity were the exclusive pairs, loans would be multiplied
motive, would be a perpetuity pro- while farms remained to be bought,
ductive of all the evils which the and mechanics to be assisted; for,
law ahhors, for it would ultimately so long as a propensity to run in
#22 CHARITABLE PURPOSES. [§ 353.
the English doctrine is set forth, as follows: "The testa-
tor directed funds to be provided for certain charity schools,
by accumulating his property, but fixed no time for the
continuance of the accumulation, which must necessarily
have exceeded the legal period. The court held the direc-
tion to accumulate to be void, and consequently the ulterior
dispositions of the will to fail ; but as the testator had
shown an intention to devote his property to charitable
purposes, it directed his intention to be carried into effect
cy pres, by means of a scheme to be settled by the master. 'n
§ 353. The Statute of Limitations It is well estab-
lished that charitable trusts are not subject to the statute of
limitations, and that the rights of beneficiaries are not
barred by the lapse of time. The rule applies to private
express trusts. The claims of the cestui* que trust will be
enforced, where they can be clearly established, after any
length of time.2 As the equitable claim is not diminished
by the lapse of time, so the equitable right is not lost. In
an English case it was held that between cestui que trust
and trustee, no lapse of time will preclude the account from
the commencement of the trust in a case in which the rela-
tion of trustee and cestui que trust continues, the transac-
tions between them are not closed, and the delay of the
claim is attributable to the trustee not having given to his
debt is an instinct of our nature other aims — for no sane man would
borrowers would be found. The be so silly as to meditate such a
consequence of this compounding thing; but when a trust is declared
of capital would be the gradual which is effectively such, though -
absorption of nearly all the prop- the objact were ever so meritorious,
ertyin the country, which would ought it to be tolerated?"' Ibid.
thenceforth be locked up — a conse- 235, 236.
quence more prejudicial to the gen- 'Martin v. Maugham, 14 Sim.
eral weal than that which followed 230.
the trusts in Mr. Thelluson's will, 2 Attorney-General v. Coventry,
which produced little inconven- 2 Vera. 300; Attorney-General v.
ience except to the persons ulti- Brewers' Co., lMeriv. 40S; Incorp.
mately entitled, though they were Soc. v. Richards, 1 Con. & Law.
left to expire by their own limita- 58; s. c, 1 Dru. &War. 25S; Attor-
tiou. The records of judicial de- ney-General v. Exeter, Jac. 448;
cisions afford no case of a trust for Attorney-General v. Bristol. 2 J.
perpetual accumulation without & TV. 321.
§ 353.]
CHAEITABLF, PURPOSES.
823
cestui que trust that information to which he was entitled,
and accounted with him in such manner as he ought.1 The
circumstances may be of such a nature that after a long time
a court of equity will not interpose in a private trust.2 But
no length of time has been fixed beyond which a charitable
trust will not be enforced. In an English case it was held that
where the court sees clearly the intention of the founder of
a charity, no argument founded on lapse of time can prevail
against it.3 In Massachusetts it has been held that trustees
of a charity may be required by a court of chancery to ac-
count for income which has been misapplied, for any length
of time, without regard to the statute of limitations ; but
an application of such income, made in good faith, and con-
tinued for man)'' years, will not be lightly disturbed, espe-
cially after the lapse of a considerable time.4 But the
1 Wedderburn v. Wedderburn, 4
Myl. & Or. 41. See Michoud v.
Girod, 4 How. 561; 1'revost v.
Gratz, 6 Wheat. 4S1 ; Boone v.
Gliiles, 10 Pet. 177; Portl>ek v.
Gardner, 1 Hare, 5114; Bridginan
v. Gill, 24 Beav. 312; Attorney -
General v. Fishmongers' Co., 5
Myl. & Cv. IS; A torney-General v.
Bristol, 2 J. & IV. 321; s. c, Shel-
ford, 49S; Watson v. Saul, 5 Jnr.
(X. S.) 404; Knight v. Bowyer, 2
De G. & J. 421, 442 ; Ward v. Arch,
12 Sim. <#72; Young v. Waterpark,
13 Sim. 199; Cox v. Dolman. 2 De
G., 31. & G. 592; Garrard v. Tuck,
8C. B. 231.
2 Attorney-General v. Payne, 27
Beav. 168; Attorney-General v.
Migdalen College, 6 H. L. Cas.
1S9; Portlock v. Gardner, 1 Hare,
594. Where upwards of twenty
years bad elapsed after an executor
had settled the accounts of his tes-
tator's estate with the residuary
legatee, and had given up all inter-
ference in the trust, it was held
that the emus was on the residuary
legatee to prove that the conduct
of the executor, which might have
been a breach of trust, was so in
fact; and that the onus was not
shifted by an admission that- the
account was settled on a misunder-
standing of the rights of the parties,
by which the residuary legatee was
prejudiced. Portlock v. Gardner,
1 Hare, 594. In cases of ex-
press trust the statute of limitations
is no bar to the demand of a cestui
que trust, though the other cestui
que trusts have for more than twenty
years received from the trustee the
whole of the rents to the exclusion
of the claimant. Knight v. Bow-
yer, 2De G. &.J. 421.
3 Attorney-General v. Beverly,
GDeG.,11. & G. 256; Attorney-
General v. Christ's Hospital. 3 Myl.
& K. 344; Attorney-General v.
Rochester, 5 De G., M. & G. S22;
In re Chertsey Market, 6 Price, 231,
285; s.C., G H. L. Cas. 189; Attor-
ney-General v. Bristol, 2 J. & W.
321.
4 Attorney-General v. Old South
Soc, 13 Allen, 474. See Tudor on
Charitable Trusts 341, 342; Man
824 CHARITABLE PURPOSES. [§ 353.
courts have taken the ground that there ought to be some
end to the opportunity for litigation in cases of this char-
acter. In an English case it was held that although a
charit}' is not barred by the statute of limitations, an ad-
verse enjoyment for a long time is a very material consid-
eration in construing an instrument under which it claims.1
In New York it has been held that a trust which has been
administered for more than one hundred years without
question as to the right or the manner of its administration,
ought not to be disturbed without clear and unequivocal
evidence that the true terms of the trust have been disre-
garded, and that the just and legal rights of the party com-
plaining have been infringed.2
v. Ballet, 1 Yern. 44; Attorney- acquiescence of twenty years. See
General v. Mayor of Stratford, Attorney-General v. Payne, 27
Barnard Ch. 36; Attorney-General Beav. 108.
v. Mayor of Newbury, 3 Myl. & K. - Attorney-General v. Ref. Prot.
647; Attorney-General v. Roches- Dutch Church, 33 Barb. 303. Pos-
ter, 5 De G., M. & G. 822; Attor- session for forty years by a relig-
ney-General v.St. John's Hosp., 11 ions society, under an act incor-
Jur. (X. S.) 629; Attorney- General porating them as a congregational
v. Ref. Prot. Dutch Church, 33 society, of a meeting house pre-
Barb. 303. viously conveyed to their pruden-
1 Attorney- General v. Mayor of tial cominitlee in trust for the sup-
Bristol, 2 J. & W. 294, 321. In port of Presbyterianism, will bar a
England, Statute 3 and 4, William suit in equity to enforce the trust.
IV., ch. 27, now bars the attorney- Attorney General v. Meeting
general from interfering, after an House, 2 Gray, 1.
CHAPTER XVII.
TRUSTS FOE LXFAXTS.
§ 354. Introductory.
355. Equitable Conversion of
Infants' Estates.
356. The Maintenance of Infants
357. The Subject Continued.
358. When Maintenance will
not be Directed.
§ 359. Order for Maintenance
Without Suit.
360. Order in Restraint of Re-
moval.
361. Order for Maintenance Be-
yond the Jurisdiction.
§ 354. Introductory — By the simple act of the filing
of a bill in behalf of an infant in a court of equity, the in-
fant becomes a ward of the court. The jurisdiction of the
court extends to all that appertains to his interests, both in
his person and property. This guardianship of equity is
exercised with vigilant and jealous care. In everything by
which the person, property or condition of an infant is
affected, executors, trustees, or other legal guardians, in-
cluding even a parent, are subject to the authority and di-
rection of the court. In every act of this nature they are
ever under either the express or implied direction of the
court, and any act in opposition to such direction, or in dis-
regard of it, will be treated as a violation of authority. The
offending party will be subject to arrest under the usual
process for contempt of court ; they will be compelled to
execute the orders of the court, and they will be subject to
such penalties as are inflicted in other cases of contempt.1
1 Williamson v. Berry, 8 How.
555; Aymar v. Roff, 3 Johns. Ch.
49; In re Whittaker, 4 Johns. Ch.
378; G-arr v. Drake, 2 Johns. Ch.
542; Putnam v. Ritchie, 6 Paige,
391; De Mannville v. DeMannville,
lOVes. 52; In re Andrews, 1 Johns.
Ch. 99; Monell v. Monell, 5 Johns.
Ch. 283; Ex parte Crumb, 2 Johns.
Ch. 489; Disbrow v. Henshaw, 8
Cow. 351 ; In re Dyer, 5 Paige, 534;
Wood v. -Wood, 5 Paige, 605; Peo-
ple v. Wilson, 22 Barb. 117; West-
brook v. Comstock, Walker
(Mich.), 314; Lynch v. Rotan, 39
111. 14; Grattan Y. Qrattan, 18 111.
826
INFANTS.
[§ M4.
It has been held that to conceal the person of an infant, or
in any manner to resist the authority of the court in the
guidance and control of its ward, or to refuse to obey the
orders of the court in regard to its education or msiin-
171 ; McCord v. Ochiltree, 8 Blackf.
15; Townsend v. Kendall, 4 Minn.
412; Wood v. Wood, 3 Ala. 756;
Chambers v. Perry, 17 Ala. 726;
Van Duzer v. Van Dnzer, 6 Paige,
366 ; Hope v. Hope, 4 De G., M. &
G. 328; Dawson v. Jay, 3 De G.,
M. & G. 764; Stuart v. Bute, 9 H.
L. Cas. 440; Nugent v. Vetzera,
L. R. 2 Eq. 704; Spring v. Wood-
worth, 4 Allen, 326; Anderson v.
Mather, 44 N. Y. 229; Smith v.
Smith, 3 Atk. 304; Goodallv. Har-
ris, 2 P. Wins. 560, 562; Butler v.
Freeman, Amb. 302, 303; Hughes
v. Science, Amb. 302, n. The
chancery court here, as in England,
is the general guardian of all in-
fants within its territorial juris-
diction, and has original, inherent
jurisdiction to appoint guardians
for them and to remove their
guardians, no matter how or by
whom appointed, whenever the in-
terest of the infant requires such
removal; and this jurisdiction is
not affected by the statutory juris-
diction which has been conferred
on the probate courts. In the ex-
ercise of this jurisdiction, the court
proceeds upon the theory that
guardianship is a trust, and inter-
venes to protect the interests of the
infant, by way of preventive, as
well as remedial justice, where a
loss or injury is threatened, as well
as where it has been consummated.
Lee v. Lee, 55 Ala. 590. "It is
proper that I should state, that
according to the uniform course of
the court of chancery. — which I
understand to be the law of that
court, which has always been the
law of that court,— upon the insti-
tution of a suit of this description,
the plaintiff, the infant, became a
ward of the court, — became such
ward by the very fact of the insti-
tution of the suit ; and, being a ward
of the court, it was the duty of the
court to provide for the care and
protection of the infant, it appoints
a guardian, who is an officer of the
court, for the purpose of doing that
on behalf of the court, which the
court cannot do itself personally.
If there be a parent living wilhin
the jurisdiction of the court, or if
there be a testamentary guardian
within the jurisdiction of the court,
the court in that C-ise does not in-
terfere for the purpose of appoint-
ing a person to discharge thatduty,
which is imposed upon the court
itself, of taking care of the per-on
of the infant, but l lie parent or the
testamentary guardian is subject to
the orders and control of the court,
precisely in the same way as an
officer appointed by the authority
of the court, for the purpose of
discharging the duties to which
I have referred. I apprehend that
is clearly the law of the court of
chancery; and tt has always been
so, as far as I have been able to
understand and comprehend. The
manner in which this appointment
(of guardian) is made, is not with-
out previous inquiry and consider-
ation. The court directs the mas-
ter to inquire who are the proper
persons to be intrusted with the
care of the infant; and as that cus-
tody and care may endure for some
time, it is necessary that some in-
§ 355. J INFANTS. 8i7
tenance, will be treated as a contempt of court. In an En-
glish case it was held that a solicitor is bound to give to the
court any information which may lead to the discovery of
the residence of a ward of the court whose residence is be-
ing concealed from the court, although such information
may have been communicated to him by his client in the
course of his professional employment. Therefore, where
the mother of wards of the court had absconded with the
wards, her solicitor was ordered to produce the envelopes
of letters which he had received from her as her solicitor,
with the object of discovering her residence from the post-
mark.1 It has been held, also, that it is contempt of court-
to marry a ward without the consent of the court, even
though the father of the infant be living.2
§ 355. Equitable Conversion of Infant's Estate. — In
England it is a well established rule of equity that a guardian
has no general or unqualified permission to convert the es-
tate of his ward. Since such an act might affect the rights,
not only of the infant himself, but also the rights of his
representatives, should he die under age, guardians are not,
ordinarily, permitted to change his personal property into
real estate, or his real estate into personalty.3 Where the
quiry should be made for the pur- ■* Inwood v. Twyne, Arab. 417;
pose of determining how that care s. c, 2 Eden, 148, and note; Cam-
should be exercised." Lord Lynd- den v. Murray, L. R. 16 Ch. D. 161 ;
hurst in Johnstone v. Beattie, 10 In re Jackson, L. K. 21 Ch. D. 780;
CI. & Fin. 42, 84, 85. See also Ex parte Phillips, 19 Ves. 122;
Wallace v. Holmes, 9 Blatchf, 65; Ware v. Polhill, 11 Ves. 278. See
Atkinson v. Atkinson, 8 Allen, 15; also Horton v. McCoy, 47 N. Y. 21 ;
Chandlerv. Simmons, 97 Mass. 508; Attridge v. Billings, 57 111. 489;
Hicks v. Chapman, 10 Allen, 463. Matthews v. Heyward, 2 S. Car.
iRainsbotham v. Senior, L. R. 8 239; Shelton v. Ordinary, 32 Ga.
Eq. 575. 266; Collins v. Dixon, 72 Ga. 475;
2 Butler v. Freeman, Amb. 301; Kann's Estate, 69 Pa. St. 219;
Eyrev. Countess of Shaftesbury, 2 White v. Parker, 8 Barb. 48; Ex
P. Wms. Ill, 112, 115; Edes v. parte Crutchfield, 3 Yerg. 336;
Brereton, West, 348; More v. More, Wood v. Boots, 60 Mo. 546; Paul v.
2 Atk. 157; Hughes v. Science, York, 1 Tenn. Ch. 547; West v.
Ambl. 302, n.; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. Wesfs Admr., 75 Mo. 204; Hol-
277; Nicholson v. Squire, 16 Ves. brook v. Brooks, 33 Conn. 347;
259; Herbert's Case, 3 P.Wms. 116. Robinson v. Pebworth, 71 Ala. 240;
828
INFANTS.
[§ 355.
guardian has purchased lands with the infant's personal es-
tate, or with the rents and profits of his real estate, or has
converted his real estate into personalty, the property will
retain its original character.1 But while the guardian has
no general permission to convert the infant's estate, if the
circumstances are such that it is plain that the interests of
the infant will be promoted by a change, it may be made.
Under such circumstances the court will order the change,
Roger's Appeal, 11 Pa. St. 36;
Dorr, Pet. Walk. Eq. (Mich.), 145;
Boisseau v. Boisseau, 79 Va. 73;
McReynolds v. Anderson, 69 Iowa,
208; Moore v. Moore, 12 B. Mon.
651,662; Davis' Appeal, 60 Fa. St.
118; Rockwell v. Morgan, 2 Beasl.
(X. J.) 3S4. See also Walter v.
Walter, 10Neb.l23; Taylor v. Hite,
61 Mo. 142; Bowman's Appeal, 3
Watts, 869; Harding v. Larned, 4
Allen, 426; Hoyt v. Sprague, 103
U. S. 613; Bonsall's Case,l Rawle,
266; Elliott v. Howell, 78 Va. 297;
2 Kent's Commentaries, 228, 230,
and note.
1 Forman v. Marsh, 11 1ST. Y. 544;
Sweezy v. Thayer, 1 Duer, 286;
In re Finch, Clarke, 538; Stiles v.
Stiles, 1 Lans. 90; In re Thomas,
1 Hun, 473; Genet v. Tallmadge,
1 Johns. Ch. 564 ; Snowhill v. Snow-
hill, 2 Green's Ch. 20; Lloyd v.
Hart, 2 Pa. St. 473 ; Marsh v. Ber-
rier, 6 Ired. Eq. 524; Shumway v.
Cooper, 16 Barb. 556; Fidler v.
Higgins, 21 N. J. Eq. 138; Ex parte
Phillips, 19 Ves. 124; Rook v.
Worth, 1 Ves. 461; Ex parte Brom-
fleld, 1 Bro Ch. 516 ; Dyer v. Dyer,
34 Beav. 504; Seys v. Price, 9 Mod.
220; Dowling v. Belton, 1 Flan. &
Kel. 462; s. C, 2 Freem. 114,126.
Where real estate owned by tenants
in common, of whom an infant is
one, is sold under and in pursuance
of a judgment in partition suit, in-
stituted by others of the tenants, in
common, the portion of the pro-
ceeds belonging to the infant re-
mains impressed with the character
of real estate, and as such does not
pass under the infant's will. Horton
v. McCoy, 47 N. Y. 21. In his
opinion in this case, Church, C. J.,
uses this language: ''Infants are
not regarded capable of managing
their property, or of determining
whether a change from one kind of
property to another is for their in-
terest. The general rule both in
England and in this country has
been in dealing with the property
of infants, to impress it during
minority with its original charac-
ter, whatever change may have
actually occurred. Whether this
rule is based upon the old idea of
the inviolability of legal titles, or
to prevent the injustice to heirs
and next of kin, of changing the
power of disposition, or to protect
the property from conversion by
improper influences on the part of
either class, it is not important to
inquire." See Story's Equity Ju-
risprudence, § 1357. When the real
estate of an infant is converted into
money by order of court, and the
infant dies before attaining its
majority, the fund will be treated
as real estate, and as such descend
to the heirs-at-law of the infant.
Wetherell v. Hough (1894), 52 N.
J. Eq. 683; S. c, 29 Atl. Rep.
592.
§ 355.]
INFANTS.
•S29
and where the court would order it, the change may be
made by the guardian without the order.1 The court has
jurisdiction to order the raising of money for strictly neces-
sary repairs and improvements. In an English case, where
an infant was absolutely entitled, subject to certain trusts,
to the beneficial interest in real estate, the legal estate being
in the trustees, it was ' held that the court had jurisdiction
to direct the raising of money by means of «a mortgage of
the estate for the purpose of paying the cost of repairs cer-
tified by the chief clerk to be absolutely necessary.2 Inas-
1 Invvood v. Twyne, Amb. 418,
and note; s. c, 2 Eden, 148, and
note; 1 Madd. Cb. 269; Mason v.
Day, Pr. Ch., 319; Tullitt v.Tullitt,
Amb. 370; Ex parte Grimstone,
Amb. 706; Crawford v. Oesswell,
55 Ala. 497; Ex parte Jewett, 16
Ala. 409; In re Jackson, L. R. 21
Ch. D.786.
2 In re Jackson, L. R. 21 Ch. D.
786. "In some jurisdictions the
rule is adhered to that the guardian,
to justify expenditure of the prin-
cipal and claim reimbursement,
must obtain the proper order in
advance; denying him indemnity,
although the conditions were such
as that the necessary order would
have been granted if applied for in
advance. But this court long since
adopted the less rigid rule of rati-
fying in such oases that which
would clearly have been previously
authorized, at least to the extent of
allowing credit to the guardian,
upon the settlement of his ac-
counts, for sums paid out for
maintenance and education from
the principal of the estate, or
beyond the income realized by
him." Bellamy v. Thornton
(1894), 103 Ala. 404; S. c, 15
So. Rep. 831. See also Stewart v.
Lewis, 16 Ala. 734; Montgomery v.
Givhan, 24 Ala. 568 ; Calhoun v. Cal-
houn, 41 Ala. 369; Waldrom v.
Waldrom, 76 Ala. 285. Where a
guardian without leave of court,
made a payment from the income
and profits of his ward's estate for
taxes, interest and payment on the
mortgage debt, such payments, be-
ing for the benefit of the ward,
will be allowed against his estate.
Wright v. Comley, 14 111. App. 551.
In Virginia it is held that such
authority must be given before,
and not after, such expenditures
are made; and therefore when a
guardian without first obtaining an
order for that purpose, makes such
expenditures, the court has no
authority afterwards to ratify the
same. Whitehead v. Bradley (1891),
87 Va. 676 ; s. c, 13 S. E. Eep. 195.
See also Bicker v. Streit, 33 Gratt.
663; Johnston v. Haynes, CS X.
Car. 514; McDowell v. Caldwell,
2 McCord's Ch. 43; s. c, 16 Am.
Dec. 635; Villard v. Robert, 2
Strob. Eq. 40; S. C, 49 Am. Dec.
654. For decisions further in sup-
port of the text, see Walker v.
Wetherell, 6 Ves. 474 ; Maberly v.
Wetherell, 14 Ves. 499; Wilkes v.
Rogers, 6 Johns. 566; Jairett v.
Andrews, 7 Bush, 311; Bond v.
Lockwood,33IIl. 212; Gott v.Culp,
45 Mich. 265; Calhoun v. Calhoun,
41 Ala. 369; Eoseboro v. Roseboro,
59 Tenia. 314; Smith's Appeal, 30
Pa. St. 397 ; Maupin v. Delaney, 5
830 INFANTS. [§ 356.
much as some risk is incurred by the guardian in acting on
his own responsibility, it is the usage, and an eminently fit
and proper usage, to ask the sanction of the court in any
contemplated change of this character, and where such con-
version is ordered by the court, the new investment is in
trust for the benefit of such persons as would have been en-
titled to it if there had been no conversion.1
§ 356. The Maintenance of Infants. — It is well estab-
lished in this country, as well as in England, that the in-
herent jurisdiction of equity extends to the control of
infants in all that appertains to the care of their persons,
so far as relates to their protection and to their education,
and also to the care and management of their property, and
to its proper application in providing for their maintenance.
These powers of the court relate to the personal property
of infants and to the income of their real estate, but equity
has no inherent jurisdiction to order a sale of their real es-
tate for their education or maintenance. That power be-
longs exclusively to the legislature. But in most, if not all, of
the States this power has been conferred upon the court by
legislative enactment.2 Wherever the infant has become a
Dana (Ky.), 5S9; s. C, 30 Am. Baker v. Lorillard, 4 N. Y. 257:
Dec. 699; Hobbs v. Harlan, 10 Lea, In re Turner, 10 Barb. 552 ; Horton
26S; s. c, 43 Am. Kep. 309. v. McCoy, 47 X. Y. 21; Forman v.
1 Ashburton v. Ashburton, 6 Ves. Marsh, 11 X. Y. 544. Rule other-
0; Sergeson v. Sealey, 2 Atk. 413; wise in case of infant's equitable
Webb v. Shaftesbury. 6 Madd. 100; estate. V\'ood v. Mather, 38 Barb.
Tullitt v. Tullitt, Ambl. 370; Ex 475; s. c, 44 N, Y. 249. The
parte Phillips, 19 Ves. 122, 123; statutory requirements must be
Oxendon v. Compton, 2 Ves. Jr. followed strictly in order to make
69, 70, 78; Ex parte Degge, 4 Bro. ,a valid sale of infant's real estate.
Ch. 235, 11. As to power to bind The burden is upon one who ac-
ward's estate by guardian, see quires title at such sale to establish.
Wood v. Truax, 39 JXich. (128. affirmatively that every require-
2 Williamson v. Berry, 8 How. ment neces-ary to give jurisdiction
555. 556. The court has no inner- have been complied with. In the
ent jurisdiction to direct a sale of absence of proof, there is no pre-
infant's real estate. Its jurisdic- sumption of compliance. Elwood
tion is statutory. And a sale not v. Northrup, 106 X. Y. 172. In
authorized by statute is void, general, no right to sell except
Rogers \.Dill, 6 Hill, 415; On- with court's permission. See
derdonk v. Mott, 34 Barb. 10G; Washabaugh v. Hall (.1893), 4 S.
356. J
INFANTS.
831
ward of the court from the filing of a bill in equity, upon a
proper petition, the court, will, of course, direct a suita-
ble maintenance for the infant. In this the court will have
regard to the amount of his property, to his social rank
and station, and to the profession or employment that he
has in view.1 But where the guardian was not appointed
by the court, and there was no suit pending touching either
the infant or his property, by virtue of which he might be
treated as a ward of the court, a difficulty was formerly en-
countered in regard to the jurisdiction of the court. In
consequence, the infant was sometimes permitted to assume
Dak. 16S; s. C. 56 X. W. Rep. S2;
Belding v. Willard, 56 Fed. Kep.
699; Mnmma v. Brinton (1893), 77
Md. 197; S. C., 26 Atl. Rep. 184;
Oman v. Bowles (1S93), 18 Colo.
463; s. c, 33 Pac. Rep. 109; Scarf
v. Aldrieh (1895), 97 Cal. 360;
s. C, 32 Pac. Rep. 324; In re
Dickinson, 111 X. Car. 108; s. c,
15S.E. Rep. 1025; Perin v. Me-
gibben,53 Fed. Rep. 86; Matthews
v. Matthews (1894), 104 Ala. 303;
S. c, 16 So. Rep. 91; Wallace v.
Jones, 93 Ga. 419; s. C, 21 S. E.
Rep. 89; Northwestern Guaranty-
Co. v. Smith (1894), 15 Mont. 101 ;
s. c, 38 Pac. Rep. 224; Weems v.
Masterson (1891), 80 Tex. 45; s. <5.,
15 S. W. Rep. 590; Howbert v.
Heyl (1894), 47 Kan. 58; s. c. 27
Pac. Rep. 116; Martin v. McCau-
less, 68 Miss. 810; s. c, 10 So. Rep.
72; Whitehead v. Bradley, 87 Va.
676; Richardson v. Farwell (1892),
49 Minn. 210; s. C., 51 N. W. Rep.
915; Meikel v. Borders, 129 Ind.
529; S. C, 29 X. E. Rep. 29. Sale
and conveyance of minors' land
by guardian, under license of court,
is not void because the wards re-
sided in another State and guard-
ian was appointed in third State,
where wards once resided. Myers
v. McGavock (1894), 39 Neb. 843;
S. C-, 58 X. W. Rep. 522. An ap-
plication by a guardian for license
to sell real estate of his wards for
their maintenance . and education,
is a proceeding for their benefit,
and notice to them of such appli-
cation is not essential to the juris-
diction of the court to grant the
license. Myers v. McGavock (1894) ,
39 Neb. 843; s. c, 58 X. W. Rep.
522. See also Mohr v. Mamierre,
101 U.S. 417; Scarf v. Aldrich(1895),
97 Cal. 360 ; s. c. 32 Pac. Rep. 324 ;
Mohr v. Porter. 51 Wis. 487; s. C,
8 X. W. Rep. 364; Howard v. Sin-
gleton (1S93), 94 Ky. 336; s. C, 22
S. W. Rep. 337; Southern Marble
Co. v. Stegall (1892), 90 Ga. 236;
s. C.,13 S. E.Rep. 806. Underthe
statute the sale of real estate de-
vised to minors may be decreed,
although the will directs that no
sale take place until the.youngest
one arrives at age, where it is
impossible to carry out the will.
Southern Marble Co. v. Stegall
(1892), 90 Ga. 236; s. c, 15 S. E.
Rep. 800.
1 Wellesley v. Wellesley, 2 Bligh
(X. S.), 135,137; JrereHowarth, L.
R. 8 Ch. 415; Brophy v. Bellamy,
L. R. 8 Ch. 798; Dewitt v. Polin,
L. B. 14 Eq. 251; Ex parte Burke,
4 Sandf . Ch . 617 ; Owens v. Walker,
2 Strobh. En- 289.
832 INFANTS. [§ 357.
a degree of responsibility which was not for his best inter-
ests. But at present, in ordinary cases, especially where
the estate is limited, the court, upon petition, will settle a
proper maintenance, without requiring formal proceedings
by bill.1 This method has an appearance of an arbitrary
exercise of authority, but is defended by Lord Hardwicke,
as follows: "There may be a great convenience in appli-
cations of this kind, because it may be a sort of check upon
infants with regard to their behavior; and it may be an in-
ducement to persons of worth to accept of the guardianship,
where they have the sanction of this court for anything
they do on account of maintenance, and likewise of use in
saving the expense of a suit to an infant's estate." To
this may be added the remark of Air. Justice Story, that
"these are considerations which certainly ought never to be
lost sight of in regulating the practice of the court, for it
seems not to be a question as to the jurisdiction of the
court."2
§ 357. The Subject Continued It is not to be under-
stood that, in all cases, a court of equity will direct the
maintenance of an infant out of his own estate, as a matter
of course. A careful investigation will be made, and if it
appears that the father is well able to provide for the in-
fant from his own property or income, the court will not
make an order of maintenance from the infant's estate.3
1 Ex parte, Whitfield, 2 Atk. 315; insufficient, Newport v. Cook, 2
Ex parte Thomas, Ambl. 146; Ex Ashm. 332; Roseborough v. Rose-
parte Kent, 3 Bro. Ch. SS; Ex parte borough, 3 Baxt. 314; Withers v.
Salter, 2 Dick. 709; s. c, 3 Bro. Hickman, 0 B. Mon. 204; In re
Ch. 500; Ex parte Mountfort, 15 Clark, 17 Eng. L. & Eq. 599; Far-
Ves. 445; Ex parte Myerscough, 1 ranee v. Viley, 9 Eng. L. & Eq.
J. & W. 152; Corbet V.Tottenham, 219; or where special necessity is
1 B. & B. 59, 60; Ex parte Green, 1 shown. Campbell v. Golden, 79
J. & W. 253; Bridge v. Brown, 2 Ky. 544; Johnson v. Coleman, 3
Y. & C. 181; Clay v. Pennington, Jones Eq. 290; Long v. JSTorcom, 2
8 Sim. 359; Ex parte Molesworth, 4 Ired. Eq. 354; Browne v. Bedford,
Russ. 308 /..; Ex parte Lakin, 4 4 Dem. (X. Y.) 304.
Russ. 307; Ex parte Starkie, 3 Sim. 22 Story, Equity Jurisprudence,
339. Expenditures beyond the in- § 1354.
come will be permitted where the 3 Thompson v. Griffin, 1 Cr. &
principal is small, and the income Ph. 317, 320. In the case cited,
§ 357.]
INFANTS.
833
But where the father is not able to maintain the children
from his own resources, the court will order maintenance
from their own estate. It is not a condition of this order
that the father shall be in a state of insolvency, or of ex-
Lord Oottenham says: '-If the
property had been derived from
the bounty of a stranger, there
could be no doubt but that the
father, being of ability to main-
tain his children, could not be
entitled to any allowance out of the
income of their property for that
purpose; but the claim of the
father rests upon the distinction
which has been taken between the
cases in which the property of the
children is derived from the bounty
of a stranger, and those in which
they are entitled to it under the
marriage settlement of their par-
ents, such as Mundy v. Lord Howe
(4 Bro. Ch. 223) , Stocken v. Stocken
(4 Sim. 152; s. c, 2 Myl. & K.
489; 4 Myl. & Cr. 95), Meacher v.
Young (2 Myl. & K. 490). It ap-
pears to me that the distinction
between these two classes of cases
has been carried quite as far as can
be justified on principle. In some of
them it has been said that, in the
case of marriage settlements, the
father is a purchaser, and, there-
fore, entitled to an allowance for
the maintenance of his children,
and thereby to be relieved from the
burden which the law throws upon
him of maintaining them himself.
2n"o doubt he is so, if the contract
contained in the settlement gives
him such a benefit; but, before he
can be entitled to it, he must show
that such was his contract. So, in
the case of a legacy from a stranger,
if the intention to be found in the
construction of the will appears to
have been that the father should
have such a benefit, the court is
53
bound to give it to him. In both
cases the question is one of con-
struction and intention. In all the
cases referred to, there were dis-
tinct and positive trusts to apply
the income to the maintenance of
the children, applicable, according
to the construction put upon the
whole of the provision, to the
case of a surviving father. If, in
these cases, the construction was
correct, the order for maintenance
must have been so; for, if the set-
tlement had expressed in terms
what the court thought it suffi-
ciently expressed upon the con-
struction of the whole of the
provisions, there could be no
doubt but that such a trust would
be carried into effect. In the
present case I find no such trust;
I find, indeed, a power; and, in
the case of freehold property
which is vested in the infant, a
mere power, at the discretion of
the trustees to apply part of that
income, which would otherwise
belong to the infants for the pur-
poses of their maintenance and
education. If they do not exercise
that power, the whole income
belongs to the children. The
father contends that he, by the
authority of the court, can compel
them to exercise that power, for
the purpose of giving the whole
or part of this income to him.
This would be going far beyond
any of the other cases. I cannot,
upon this settlement, find any trust
for the benefit of the father, or
any contract that he should be
relieved out of the settled prop-
834
INFANTS.
[§ 357.
treme poverty. If his means are limited, so that he is un-
able to maintain and educate the children in such a manner
as is suitable to their fortune, either as possessed or antici-
pated, the decree will be issued.1 And in cases of this
character, where the father has contracted debts for the
maintenance or education of the children, the court will
order a reimbursement from the children's estate. In a
erty from the burden of supporting
his children." A petition was pre-
sented by an infant, who had for
some years been entitled to prop-
erty amounting to £290 per annum.
The petitioner had been main-
tained by his father, who had
incurred a large debt for the pur-
pose, and was unable any longer
to maintain his son. The petition
stated that the father had been
resident for many years in India,
and it asked for a sum of £300 for
part maintenance. It was held
that the father, having resided out
of the country, and being unable
to apply to the court before, was a
special circumstance which would
enable the court to grant the sum
required for past maintenance.
Carmichael v. Hughes, 6 Eng. L.
& Eq. 71. See also Stopford v.
Canterbury, 11 Sim. 82; Bruin v.
Knott, 1 Phill. 572; Kansome v.
Burgess, L. R. 3 Eq. 773; Stephens
v. Howard, 32 N. J. Eq. 244 ; Tom-
kins v. Tomkins, 18 If. J. Eq.
303; Sparhawk v. Buell, 9 Vt. 41;
Griffith v. Bird, 22 Gratt. 73 ; Welch
v. Burris, 29 Iowa, 186; McKnight
v. Walsh, 23 X. J. Eq. 136; Beas-
ley v. Watson, 41 Ala, 234 ; Mulhern
v. McDavitt, 16 Gray, 404. A
father, guardian of his two chil-
dren, aged four and six, respect-
ively, having for the support of
his family only $20 per month,
which he earned as a laborer, was
obliged to spend about $170 which
he received of his wards' estate,
in providing for them food, eloth-
ing and necessary medical atten-
tion. Held, that the wards cannot
recover the money thus expended
from the sureties on the guardian's
bond. Overfleld v. Overfield (1895)
(Ky.), 30 S. W. Rep. 994. An
infant's relative cannot recover for
its support from its guardian,
though its father refused to sup-
port it, and though the guardian
had estate of the ward which he
failed to use for its support, unless
the father's failure to support it
was brought to the notice of the
guardian. Turner v. Plagg (1893),
6Ind. App. 563; s. C, 33 N. E.
Rep. 1104.
1 Buckworth v. Buckworth, 1
Cox, 80; Jervoise v. Silk, Coop.
52. The allowance will be made,
although the devise or settlement
under which the property is held
contains no direction for mainte-
nance, but even directs the income
to accumulate. See Greenwell v.
Greenwell, 5 Ves. 194 ; Fairman v.
Green, 10 Ves. 45; Locke v. Foote,
4 Sim. 132. Where the guardian
was a stepfather, and the ward's
estate was small, and he and the
mother resided with the stepfather,
and the mother was able to support
him, and the ward was able to earn
something toward his support, the
court refused to allow the guardian
anything for his support. Brad-
ford v. Bodfish,39 Iowa, 681.
§ 357. J INFANTS. 835
case in England, where, by a marriage settlement, the
trustees were to stand possessed of £2,000 (coming from
the wife's father), upon trust after the decease of the wife
for the children of the marriage equally, their shares to be
vested at twenty-one or marriage, with a proviso that,
until the principal should become payable to the children,
the trustees should apply the whole, or so much of the div-
idends as they should think fit, for the education and main-
tenance of such children. The wife died leaving one child,
and it was held that this was a discretionary trust for main-
tenance, and not simply a power, and that the father Avas
entitled to have an allowance for past and future mainte-
nance of his child without reference to his ability to provide
such maintenance, and an inquiry was directed as to the
quantum to be so applied.1 In his opinion in this case,
Vice Chancellor Kindersley said: "The result of these
four cases seems to be this : That where the trust property
is derived from the bounty of a stranger, the father, if of
sufficient ability, is not entitled to have the income applied
to the maintenance of his children, but that if the trust
property is the subject of a marriage settlement, and there-
fore the creation of the trust is matter of contract, then, if
the language of the settlement is so framed as to express a
trust to apply the income, or any part of the income, in
maintaining the children, although the quantum of income
to be so applied is left to the discretion of trustees, the
father is entitled to have whatever is proper and necessary
for the maintenance of his children applied for that pur-
pose, without reference to his ability to maintain them;
but if the language of the settlement expresses merely a
power so to apply the income, or any part thereof, to the
maintenance of the children, then the father is not so en-
titled."2 Such allowance will be made, not only where the
devise or settlement contains no direction for maintenance,
1 Ransome v. Burgess, L. E. 3 Young, 2 Myl. & K. 490; Stocken
Eq. 773. v. Stocken, 4 Sim. 152; Thompson
2Eansome v. Burgess, L. E. 3 v. Griffin, Cr. &P.317; InreBydei,
Eq. 773. See also Mundy v. Lord 11 Paige, 185.
Howe, 4 Bro. Ch. 223; Meacber v.
836 INFANTS. [§ 357.
but also where there is a direction that the income shall
accumulate. But even this is not the extent to which a
court of equity may go in this class of cases. Where it
appears that, for any reason, it would be beneficial to in-
fant legatees that maintenance should be allowed, even
where the will not only does not authorize it, but directs an
accumulation to be paid over at maturity, with survivorship
in case of the death of any before the age of twenty-one,
the court will direct the maintenance.1 But if there is a
gift over, maintenance will not be directed without the con-
sent of the ultimate devisee.2 It has been held, also, that
where the income is insufficient for the maintenance and
education of an infant, the court will order an appropria-
tion from the principal, and this may include a debt already
incurred, as well as a provision for the future.3 In Massa-
chusetts it has been held that a husband who receives into
his family the children of his wife by a former marriage
stands to them in loco parentis, and in the absence of an ex-
press contract, or of circumstances showing a different ar-
rangement, has a right to their services, and is liable for
their support and education. A husband, who for seven
years has lived in a house belonging to his wife and her
1 Ex parte Kebble, 11 Ves. 606 ; ians in expending more than
Greenwell v. Greenwell, 5 Ves. 195, the income of the estate on their
n.; Errington v. Chapman, 12 wards where the income is insuf-
Ves. 20; Marshall v. Hollo way, 2 ficient. See Davis v. Harkness, 1
Swanst. 436; Errat v. Barlow, 14 Gilm. 173 : Beeler v. Dunn,3Head,
Ves. 202; MoPherson's Infants, pp. 87; Phillips v. Anderson, 2 Sneed,
232, 233, 234; "Ward on Legacies, 520; Cohen v. Shyer, 1 Tenn. Ch.
303. 195; Gilbert v. McEachem, 38 Miss.
2 Errat v. Barlow, 14 Ves. 20; 460; Frelick v. Turner, 26 Miss.
Greenwell v. Greenwell, 5 Ves. 195, 393 ; Brown v. Mullins, 24 Miss.
n.; Ward on Legacies, 303. 204; Dalton v. Jones, 51 Miss. 585;
sLevet v. Medham. 2 Vern. 137; Calhoun v. Calhoun, 41 Ala. 369;
Harvey v. Harvy, 2 P. Wms. 21; Spear v. Tinsley, 55 Ga. 89; John-
Ex parte Green, 1 Jac. & W. 253; son v. Haynes, 68 1ST. Car. 511;
Ex parte Swift, 1 Kuss. & Myl. 575; Jackson v. Jackson, 1 Gratt. 143;
Boach v. Garvan, 1 Ves. 160; Hill McDowell v. Caldwell, 2 McCord's
v. Chapman, 2 Bro. Ch. 231 ; Allen Ch. 58; Bybee v. Tharp, 4 B. Mon.
v. Coster, 1 Beav. 202 ; Heysham v. 313; Caffrey v. McMichael, 64 N.
Heysham, 1 Cox, 179. The courts Car. 507.
sometimes ratify acts of guard-
§ 358.] INFANTS. 837
three children by a former marriage, has been appended
guardian of the children and kept them in the house with
himself and their mother, has no property of his own, has
only earned enough during the time to support the united
family, and has sold the real estate of his wards by leave
of court, is not to be charged in his guardian's account with
any previous rent thereof, or credited with taxes paid
thereon, or for the board and clothing of his wards, but
may be allowed a reasonable amount paid for the expenses
of one of the wards at a boarding-school.1
§ 358. Where Maintenance Will not be Directed. —
Touching the claims for the maintenance of an infant, the
court will make a distinction between property derived from
a parent and an estate left in trust by a stranger. In the
case of property left by a parent, or by one standing in
loco parentis, maintenance will be directed where the sub-
ject of the trust is residuary personal estate, or a contingent
interest only, although no power is conferred by the will,
and there is an express direction to accumulate, and even
where there is a gift over to other children, if the chances
of survivorship are equal. But if the chances of survivor-
ship are not equal, maintenance will not be directed.2 It
1 Mulhern v. McDavitt, 16 Gray, Lamhert v. Parker, Coop. 143;
404. See Stone v. Carr, 3 Esp. 1; Brown v. Temperly, 3 Euss. 263;
Cooper v. Martin, 4 East, 76; Will- Mole v. Mole. 1 Dick. 310; Green-
iams v. Hutchinson, 3 Comst. 312, well v. Greenwell, 5 Ves. 194
and cases cited; '-Maintenance of Cavendish v. Mercer, 5 Ves. 195
Infants," 20 Sol. J. & K. 432; Collis v. Blackburn, 9 Ves. 470
19 Irish Law Times, 216; "Sale of McDerinot v. Kealy, 3 Russ. 264
Infant's Real Estate for its Support Stretch v. Watkins, 1 Madd. 253
and Maintenance,'' 8 Wash. L. Rep. Ex pane Kebble, 11 Ves. 604; Tur-
371; "Allowances for Maintenance ner v. Turner, 4 Sim. 434; Errat
of Infants," 11 Alb. L. J. 205. v. Barlow, 14 Ves. 202; Krine v.
2Lomaxv. Lomax, 11 Ves. 48; Welpitt, 3 Sim. 533; Turner v.
Fairman v. Green, 10 Ves. 45; Turner, 4 Sim. 430; Carmings v.
Boddy v. Dawes, 1 Keen, 362; Ex Flower, 7 Sim. 523; Rhoades v.
parte Chambers, 1 Russ. & Myl. 577
Mills v. Robarts. 1 Russ. & Myl. 555
Acherley v. Vernon, 1 P. Wms. 783
Rogers v. Soutten, 2 Keen, 598
Incledon v. Northcote, 3 Atk. 433
Harvey v. Harvey, 2 P. Wms. 22
Rhoades, 43 111. 239; Seibert's
Appeal, 19 Pa. St. 49; Corbin v.
Wilson, 2 Ashm. 208; Newport v.
Cook, 2 Ashm. 342 ; In re Ryder, 11
Paige, 185.
838 INFANTS. [§ 358.
will not be directed where the interest is real estate, and
either contingent or residuary.1 In an English case the
rule is stated, as follows : "Residue bequeathed to infants,
with survivorship among them in the event of death under
the age of twenty-one. Maintenance not being directed by
the will, was not ordered by the court; there being a lim-
itation over upon the death of all under twenty-one to their
sister, having no other interest in'that fund, though a dis-
tinct legatee by the same will. The case, in which the
court has given maintenance, has been where the fund, be-
ing given to the children with survivorship among them,
their interests, and the chance of taking the whole as sur-
vivor, were equal ; and no other person interested."2 In
Marshall v. Hollowav, Lord Chancellor Eldon said: "The
court has never gone farther than this, that though the
words of the will do not authorize the application of inter-
est to the maintenance of the infants, yet, if it can collect
before it all the individuals who may be entitled to the
fund, so as to make to each a compensation for taking from
him part, it will grant an allowance for maintenance; but
if the will contains successive limitations under which per-
sons not in being may become entitled, it is not sufficient
that all the parties then living, presumptively entitled, are
before the court, for none of the living may be the parties
eventually entitled to the enjoyment of the property. In
such a case, the order would be, in effect, to give for the
maintenance of one person the property of another."3 In
another English case, maintenance was not allowed upon
1 Green v. Ekins, 2 Atk. 476; surviving the eldest, in the event of
Leake v. Kobinson, 2 Meriv. 384; his death under twenty-one, with-
Bullock v. Stones, 2 Ves. 521. out issue. The court refused to
2 Ex parte Kebble, 11 Ves. 604. make the order on petition, and
Maintenance allowed in the case directed a bill to be filed. Main-
of children and grandchildren, tenance not allowed out of legacies
though the interests were contin- to children, given over in case of
gent, with reference to the case of their deaths under twenty-one,
survivorship ; accumulation di- without consent of the legatee over,
rected; and no express authority Fairman v. Green, 10 Ves. 45.
for any application during minority s Marshall v. Halloway, 2 Swanst.
except for the younger children, 432, 436.
•J
INFANTS.
839
legacies by a grandfather to his grandchildren at twenty-
one with interest, though ■ the father was not of ability to
maintain them, the legacies with the interest being given
over in the event of death under twenty-one.1 Interest
1 Errington v. Chapman, 12 Ves.
20. In this country the following
oases hold that where the father's
means are small, an allowance out
of the ward's estate will be made
for maintenance and education
Clark v. Montgomery, 23 Barb. 464
Beasley v. Watson, 41 Ala. 234
Welch v. Bums, 29 Iowa, 186
Newport v. Cook, 2 Ashm. 332
Patton's Admr. v. Patton, 3 B.
Mon. 161; Corbaley v. State, 81
Ind. 62; State v. Roche, 94 Ind.
372; Chapline v. Moore, 7 T. B.
Mon. 150; Myers v. Wade, 6 Hand.
444; Walker v. Crowder, 2 Ired.
-Eq. 478; Voessing v. Voessing, 4
4Redf. 360; Latham v. Myers, 57
Jowa, 519; Kinsey v. State, 71 Ind.
32; Waldron v. Waldron, 76 Ala.
245; Morris v. Morris, 2 McCart.
239; State v. Martin, 18 Mo. App.
468. Where a guardian standing in
loco parentis expressly agrees not to
charge anything for the support
and education of his ward he will
acquire a father's liability therefor.
See Manning v. Baker, 8 Md. 44;
Bradford v. Bodfish, 39 Iowa, 681 ;
Hooper v. Royster, I Munf. 119;
Dowell v. Caldwell, 2 McCord's
Ch. 43. See also Lowndes v. Lown-
des, 15 Ves. 301; Greenwell v.
Green well, 5 Ves. 194; Chisholm
v. Chisholm, 4 Rich. Eq. 226;
Corbin v. Wilson, 2 Ashm. 208;
Miles v. Wistar, 5 Binn. 477;
Magoffin v. Patton, 4 Rawle, 119;
Infledon v. Nortbcote, 3 Atk. 433.
"Where the legacy is to a child, let
the testator give it how he will,
either at twenty-one, or at mar-
riage, or payable at twenty-one, or
payable at marriage, and the child
has no other provision, the court
will give interest, by way of main-
tenance; for they will not presume
the father inofficious or so unnat-
ural as to leave a child destitute."
Lord Hardwicke in Heath v. Perry,
3 Atk. 101. See also Harvey v.
Harvey, 2 P. Wms. 21; Green v.
Belchier, 1 Atk. 505; Hearle v.
Greenbank, 3 Atk. 716; Coleman v.
Seymour, 1 Ves. 210; Beckford v.
Tobin, 1 Ves. Jr. 300; Carey v.
Askew, 2 Bro. Ch. 5S; Phillips v.
Annesley, 2 Atk. 58; s. C, 1 Bro.
Ch. 105; Cricket v. Dolby, 3 Ves.
10. Likewise where a legacy was
given by a party who puts himself
in loco parentis, the doctrine is the
same. Acherley v. Vernon, 1 P.
Wms. 753; Beckford v. Tobin, 1
Ves. 308; Hill v. Hill, 3 Ves. &. B.
183 ; Ritzer v. Haber, 14 Serg. & R.
237 ; Corbin v. Wilson, 2 Atk. 207.
"Fortunately for the consistent
and humane administrations of jus-
tice, the courts of this country are
no longer influenced by the feudal
policy which favored the eldest son
to the exclusion of other claims;
and are not restrained, as Lord
Eldon was, from contradicting a
decision of the English House of
Lords, if founded upon a principle
which has no existence in this
country, and the decision be op-
posed to reason and justice, and to
the opinions of enlightened jurists,
in that country as well as in this.
It was well urged by Mansfield and
Fonblanquef or theplaintiff in Perry
v. Whitehead, that 'the ground
that a grandfather is not bound to
840
INFANTS.
[§ 358.
upon a legacy to a wife, or to a natural child, will not be
allowed as maintenance from testator's death, as it is in the
case of a legitimate child.1 It may be stated, in general,
that it is a condition precedent to the entertaining of a pe-
tition for maintenance that the infant, in whose behalf the
application is made, shall have such a right and title to the
estate, or to the income thereof, that the granting of the
provide for his grandchild, as a
father is for a child, and the
former, therefore, is not under the
same moral obligation, would sound
extraordinary out of a court of judi-
cature, and certainly affords no
reason. The statute of Elizabeth
imposes the same obligations upon
a grandfather and grandmother
as upon the parents; which is the
sense of the legislature and man-
kind.' In Pennsylvania the grand-
father is required by the Act of
13th June, 1836, § 28, to relieve and
maintain his grandchildren when
their necessities require it. This
statute is in accordance with the
moral sense of mankind. Those
who suppose that infant grand-
children do not upon the death of
their parents take the place of the
latter in the affections of their
grandfather, are strangers to the
most ordinary manifestations of the
best feelings of the human heart.
* * If there is anything in the
argument in favor of awarding in-
terest on a legacy to a, child, rest-
ing upon the presumption that a
parent did not intend that his
children should starve, the pre-
sumption holds, with equal strength
where the parent is dead, and the
grandchildren are in the will sub-
stituted to the legacy previously
given to the parent for life. If the
testator by benevolent manifesta-
tions may put himself in loco par-
entis so as to entitle a stranger to
maintenance, much slighter cir-
cumstances will bring the case of a
grandchild within that rule. In-
deed, this may always be presumed,
where, as in the case under con-
sideration, the legacy is given to
the child only for life, and upon
its death the grandchildren are
substituted, under the express di-
rection in the will, to receive the
legacy, the income of which had
been previously given to their par-
ent." Lewis, J., in Seibert's Ap-
peal, 19 Pa. St. 49, 56.
1 Lowndes v. Lowndes, 15 Ves.
301; Cricket v. Dolby, 3 Ves. 10
Kogers v. Soutten, 2 Keen, 598
Sullivan v. Winthrop, 1 Sumn. 14
Lupton v. Lupton, 2 Johns. Ch.
614. See following cases of interest
on legacies : • Ingraham v. Postell,
1 McCordCh. 98; Codgell v. Cod-
gell, 3Desaus. 387; Gillonv. Turn-
hull, 1 McCord Ch. 148; Bitzer v.
Hahn, 14Serg. &R. 238 ;Van Bramer
v. Hoffman, 2 Johns. Ch. 200 ; Mills
v. Wister, 5 Binn. 477; Glen v.
Fisher, 6 Johns. Ch. 33 ; Knight v.
Knight, 2 Sim. & Stu. 490: Quarles
v. Quarles, 2 Munf. 321; Stephen-
son v. Axson, 1 Bail. Eq. 274;
Smith v. Field, 6 Dana, 364. Where
a legacy is given to a natural child,
with directions to apply the inter -
terest for his maintenance, the in-
terest is payable from the death of
the testator. Dowling v. Tyrell, 2
Buss. & M. 343.
§ 359.]
INFANTS.
841
petition will not conflict with the right of any other person.
The decree of allowance must not contravene any provision
of the will under which the trust was created. Under all
circumstances the court will be very careful not to make a
will for the testator.1
§ 359. Order for Maintenance without Suit. — Where
there is no question in regard to the absolute right or title
to the estate, or to the income, the court will order main-
tenance on petition without suit.2 But while the court will
direct maintenance on an ex parte petition, it will not ap-
point a guardian unless a suit is pending.3 But it appears
that on the filing of a bill a receiver may be appointed be-
1 Ex parte Kebble, 11 Ves. 603.
Testator devised his real and per-
sonal estate to trustees, in trust to
pay certain annual sums for the
maintenance of his grandchildren
till they attained 25, and to accu-
mulate the surplus income of his es-
tates, which was to form part of
his residuary personal estate ; and
to divide the income of his estates
amongst his grandchildren when
they attained 25, with the benefit
of survivorship on any of them dy-
ing under 21, without leaving a
child that should attain 21 ; and,
on the death of each of them leav-
ing such child, to convey the par-
ent's share to such child; and he
empowered his trustees, after the
death of the father of his grand-
children, to convey, to his grand-
sons, absolutely, the shares of his
estates, to which, under the pre-
vious trusts, they would be entitled
for their lives. A petition by one
of the grandsons, for an increase
of the maintenance provided by the
testator, was dismissed, the dis-
position of the property not being
such as that the grandchildren
must of necessity take the whole
fund. Turner v. Turner, 4 Sim. 430.
2 Ex parte Salter, 3 Bro. Ch. 500
Rice v. Tonnele, 4 Sand. Ch. 571
Ex parte Mountfort, 15 Ves. 445
In re Bostwick, 4 Johns. Ch. 100
Fairman v. Green, 10 Tes. 45.
3 Ex parte Whitfield, 2 Atk. 330;
Ex parte Mountfort, 15 Ves. 445;
Ex parte Thomas, Ainbl. 146; Ex
parte Kent, 3 Bro. Ch. 500; Ex parte
Myerscough, 1 Jac. & W. 152;
Corbet v. Tottenham, 1 B. & B.
59, 60; Ex parte Green, 1 Jac. &
W. 253; Ex parte Starkie, 3 Sim.
339; Ex parte Lakin, 4 Buss. 307;
Ex parte Molesworth, 4 Kuss. 308,
n.; Clay v. Pennington, 8 Sim.
359; Bridge v. Brown, 2 Y. & C.
181. ''There may be a great con-
venience in applications of this
kind, because it may be a sort of
check upon infants with regard to
their behavior, and it may be an
inducement to persons of worth to
accept of the guardianship, when
they have the sanction of this court
for anything they do on account
of maintenance, and likewise of
use in saving the expense of a suit
to an infant's estate." LordHard-
wicke in Ex parte Whitfield, 2 Atk.
316.
842 INFANTS. [§ 360.
fore an answer has been made, and where it is warranted by
the circumstances, even before a subpcena has been served.1
The modern rule is that wherever it is clear from the affi-
davits offered that it is demanded by justice, and by a due
regard for the interests of the petitioner, a receiver will be
appointed before answer.2 Where a defendant is keeping
out of the way to avoid the service of a process, a receiver
may be appointed against him upon the plaintiff's affidavit.3
§ 360. Order in Restraint of Removal. — In England
it is well established that wherever there is occasion for it,
a court of equity will exercise its authority in restraining a
parent from removing a ward of the court out of its juris-
diction. In the case of Mountstuart v. Mountstuart, Lord
Eldon refused to issue an order permitting a guardian, who
was a grandfather, to take his wards, at proper times, to
Dumfries House, in Scotland. The granting of the petition
was opposed on various grounds, but the Lord Chancellor
refused to consider the arguments of the defendant's
counsel, preferring to rest his refusal to grant the petition
on the general ground that the court never made an order
for taking of an infant out of its jurisdiction.4 English
lJervis v. White, 6 Ves. 73S; Ves. 70; Jervis v. White, 6 Ves.
S. c, 7 Ves. 413; 8 Ves. 313. See 739.
also Vann v. Barnett, 2 Bro. Ch. s Maguire v. Allen, 1 Ball & B.
158; Pitcher v. Helliar, 2 Dick. 75. See also Andrews v. Powis, 2
580; Compton v. Bearcroft, 2 Bro. Bro. P. C. 504; Montgomery v.
Ch. 158. n.; Duckworth v. Traf- Clarke, 2 Atk. 37S; Mordaunt v.
ford, 18 Ves. 283; Berney v. Sew- Hooper, Ambl. 311; Middleton v.
ell, 1 Jac. & W. 649 ; Lloyd v. Dodswell, 13 Ves. 286 ; In re G-ra-
Passingham, 16 Ves. 70; Huguenin ham, L. E. 10 Eq. 530; De Pereda
v. Baseley, 13 Ves. 107; Stilwell v. v. De Mancha, L. R. 19 Ch. D. 451.
Wilkins, Jacobs, 283 ; Maguire v. 4 Mountstuart v. Mountstuart, 6
Allen, 1 Ball & B. 75; Anon., 12 Ves. 363. See also Hunter v.
Ves. 5 ; Middleton v. Dodswell, 13 Macray, Cas. temp. Talbot, 196;
Ves. 269; Brodie v. Barrie, 3 Bernal v. Marquis of Donegal, 11
Meriv. 696; Buxton v. Monkhouse, Ves. 46; Wilson v. Boswell, 2
Coop. 42; Metcalfe v. Pulvertoft, Dick. 535; Anon., Jacob, 265, n.;
1 Ves. & B. 184. De Carrier v. De Caloune, 4 Ves.
2 Duckworth v. Trafford, IS Ves. 577 ; Flack v. Hohne, 1 Jac. & W.
283; Ex parte Myerscough, 1 Jac. 416; Whitehead v. Murat, Bunb.
& W. 152; Mole v. Smith, 1 Jac. & 183; Howden v. Rogers, 1 V. & B.
W. 645 ; Lloyd v. Passingham, 16 133. A resident in Jamaica died
360.]
INFANTS.
843
cases of this character are numerous. This order will be
issued on petition without affidavit. But the power to re-
fuse permission to take a ward beyond the jurisdiction of
the court seems to involve the right to grant such a request,
and the language of some of the decisions seems to imply
that under certain circumstances such a permission would
be granted. In De Manneville V. De Manneville, Lord
Eldon said: "If the child, a ward of court, would not be
safe, I would not even let it go to Scotland."1 The En-
leaving two children, who were
born there, and resided there with
their mother till 1875, when the
elder, a daughter, was sent to En-
gland to be educated. The mother
came to England in 1876 to place
her son at school, and returned to
Jamaica in 1878. In 18S0 she
came to see her children, and had
remained there, the daughter upon
leaving school, living with her.
With the above exceptions the
mother had always lived in Ja-
maica, and regarded it as her
home. She now wished to return
thither permanently, and to take
with her the daughter, aged
twenty years and three months,
the son, who was apprenticed to
an engineer, remaining in England.
The children were wards of court,
and the mother had been ap-
pointed by the court sole guardian.
Held, by Kay, J., that the court
would not allow a ward of court to
be taken out of the jurisdiction ex-
cept under very special circum-
stances, and that there were not
in the present case any such special
circumstances as would justify
giving the permission. Held, on
appeal, that leave may be given to
take a ward out of the jurisdiction
without a case of necessity being
shown, the court only having to
be satisfied that the step is for the
benefit of the ward, and that there
is sufficient security that future
orders will be obeyed. Leave was
accordingly given upon a relative
resident in England being ap-
pointed guardian along with the
mother. In re Callaghan, L. R.
28 Ch. D. 186.
1 De Manneville v. De Manne-
ville, lOVes. 52, 56. ''Some method
must be taken to secure to the
court, that the person of the child
shall remain in this country. As
to specific means, I do not recol-
lect that the court has directly
gone farther than an order, re-
straining a person from removing
the child out of its jurisdiction.
But the court may, according to
its habits and principles, find
means indirectly of securing that
object. It must be considered
what the eourt is to do, if the
father will; and, if he will not,
give security not to remove the
child; and, if security can be
given, whether the child, regard
being had to both claims, is to re-
main in the custody of the father,
or, on account of its very tender
age, in that of the mother, or
some friend, or, whether the mas-
ter shall say, in what manner it
should be disposed of. It is clear
that the father must be restrained
from taking the child out of the
country. I must either give the
child to the father; when I know
844 INFANTS. [§ 361.
glish doctrine, in its essential features, is accepted in this
country. It is stated by Mr. Chancellor Kent, as follows:
"The principle recognized and enforced by the cases is,
that the Court of Chancery will not permit an infant too
young to choose for itself, and being a natural bom citizen,
to be taken from its mother against her consent, to be deliv-
ered to an alien father to be carried abroad, out of the
country, whatever may be the merits of the difficulties
causing a separation between husband and wife, and not-
withstanding the domicile of the wife be that of her hus-
band. The child born in the United States owes natural
allegiance and has independent rights, and one is to reside
where he was born, when the mother, born here also, and
lawfully and actually a resident here, will not consent to
his removal, and he is too young to choose for himself."1
§ 361. Order for Maintenance of Infants Beyond
the Jurisdiction. — Where, for any good reason, an infant
is under a foreign jurisdiction, the court has power to direct
the income of his estate to be applied to his maintenance
or education. In such cases the court, under ordinary cir-
cumstances, will require a guardian or an attorney to be
what he proposes to do, if it re- the ground of his inability to com-
mains with him ; or to the mother, ply with it, and his right to the
to which, upon some principles, custody of his child, the lord
there is great objection; or I must chancellor expressed the opinion,
take some middle course; and I that the order was not sufficiently
shall take care that the intercourse extensive; and ordered that the
of both father and mother with defendant should neither remove
the child, as far as is consistent the child, nor do any act towards,
with its happiness, shall be unre- or for the purpose of, removing it
strained. An order was immedi- out of the jurisdiction." Ibid. 65,
ately pronounced, that the defend- 66. See also The Kingv. Johnson,
ant and all other persons should be 8 Mod. 214; The King v. Delaval,
restrained from taking the child 3 Burr. 1436; s. c, 1 W. Black. 412;
out of the kingdom; and on the People v. Mercien, 8 Paige, 47;
2d of August the defendant was s. c, 3 Hill, 399; Mercien v. The
ordered to go before the master and People, 25 Wend. 64, 83.
give security — not to take the child ]2 Kents' Commentaries (13th
out of the kingdom. Upon the 19th ed.), * 220, note $. See also Creuze
of February, 1805, upon an appli- v. Hunter, 2 Cox, 242; De Mann-
cation by the defendant to dis- ville v. De Mannville, 10 Ves. 52;
charge the order for security, on Kex v. De Mannville, 5 East, 221.
§ 361. ] INFANTS. 845
appointed within the jurisdiction, to receive and transmit
the fund.1 If a guardian has been appointed under the
same jurisdiction as the infant, the court may appoint such
person guardian.2 In a case before an English court a
female infant residing in the United States had no guardian
in England, but had a guardian appointed by an American
court, with whom she resided. On the hearing of a peti-
tion the Vice Chancellor ordered the dividends of a fund
held by the court, to which she was entitled, to be paid to
VT, who was a solicitor of the court, and also her solicitor,
to be remitted by him to her guardian in America.3 In an
English case guardians were appointed in Ireland to infants
brought up and educated and domiciled there. Their for-
tunes were in court in England. The court adopted the
proceedings in Ireland, appointed the same persons guard-
ians, notwithstanding they resided out of the jurisdiction,
and ordered payment to them of the maintenance money.4
Where the circumstances are such as to warrant it, the
court will direct not only the income, but where the amount
is small, the entire estate, to be paid over for the mainte-
nance of an infant, to parents under a foreign jurisdiction,
or who are about to emigrate.5 In a leading case in Massa-
chusetts where, under a will creating a trust fund, with di-
rections to pay the income yearly to the testator's son "for
the support of himself and his family and the educa-
tion of his children," the income, when received by
the son, is taken in trust, and his wife and children can
enforce its due appropriation, in part for their benefit, in
equity, and if the will was made by a resident of
this commonwealth, and was proved in this commonwealth,
and the trustee who, by the terms of the will, holds the
principal trust fund, lives in this commonwealth, this court
1 Logan v. Fairlee, Jacobs, 193; 2 Daniel v. ISTewton, 8 Beav. 485.
De Weever v. Rockport, 6 Beav. s In re Morrison, 16 Sim. 42.
391, and notes; In re Morrison, 16 4 Daniel v. Newton, 8 Beav. 485.
Sim. 42 ; Hart v. Tribe, 19 Beav. 5 Volans v. Carr, 2 De G. & Sm.
149. For rule as to commission of 242; "Walsh v. Walsh. 1 Drew. 04;
lunacy see Ex parte Ord, Jacobs, Exparte Hays , 3 De G. & Sm. 485.
846
INFANTS.
[§ 361.
has jurisdiction to regulate the proper administration ©f the
trust, although the testator's son, and his wife and children,
all live in another State.1 In an English case, the infant's
1 Chase v. Chase, 2 Allen, 101.
"The objection to the jurisdiction
of the court cannot prevail. The
residence of the trustee and cestuis
que trust out of the commonwealth
does not take away the power of
this court to regulate and control
the proper administration of- trust
estates which are created by wills
made by citizens of this State, and
which have been proved and es-
tablished in the courts of this com-
monwealth. The legal existence
of the trust takes effect and validity
from the proof of the will, and the
right of the trustee to receive the
trust fund is derived from the de-
cree of the probate court. If the
trustee is unfaithful or abuses his
trust, that court has jurisdiction to
remove him, in concurrence with
this court, on the application of
those beneficially interested in the
estate." Ibid. "The tutor has no
right to send the minor's property
beyond the State, except for the
collection of money due on obli-
gations. He has no right or au-
thority to invest these funds be-
yond the limits of the State, and
out of the jurisdiction of the court
having jurisdiction of the tutorship.
This fact alone, stated in the testi-
mony of the undertutor, requires
prompt investigation. The under-
tutor should be directed at once to
institute against the tutor the
proper proceedings to insure the
safety of the minor's estate." Welch
v. Baxter, 45 La. Ann. 1062, 1005.
Where the English Court of Chan-
cery, when refusing to award the
custody of the minor to the Amer-
ican guardian, decreed that the
guardian should transmit the in-
come of the minor's property to
England to be disposed of under
the direction of that court. Held,
that under the circumstances, there
was no good reason for deferring
ex comitate to , the decision of the
foreign tribunal, and permission
was therefore refused to the guard-
ian to transmit the funds abroad.
In re Dawson, 3 Bradf . 130. A for-
eign guardian seeking permission
from a Virginia court, to remove
his ward's property to his own
State, is subject to the Virginia
laws, and may be compelled to re-
turn the money which he has been
improperly allowed to remove
from Virginia. Clendening v.
Conrad (1895), 91 Va. 410;
S. C, 21 S. E. Rep. 818.
In the absence of evidence that
property in Iowa, of a non-resi-
dent infant, can be invested better
there than in the State of his domi-
cile, a guardian of his property in
Iowa will be directed to deliver it
to the duly appointed foreign
guardian of the infant's person and
property on his compliance with
Code, §§ 2269, 2271. In re Benton,
92 Iowa. 202; s. C, 60 ST. W. Rep.
614. See also Watts v. Wilson, 93
Ky. 495. It may be stated as the
recognized rule that the guardian's
rights and powers being local can-
not be exercised in other States.
A guardian being recognized as a
civil officer of the court which ap-
points him, and all his authority
coming from the court can for this
reason have no authority beyond
the limits of the territory from the
laws of which he derives his ap-
pointment. See Morell v. Dickey,
1 Johns. Ch. 153; Williams v.
§ 361. j
INFANTS.
847
father was dead, and his mother, who was living apart from
her second husband, was, with the infant, whose age was
fourteen, in indigent circumstance at New York, and refused
to allow him to be brought to that country. The uncle, by
petition, asked to be appointed guardian, with an allowance
for maintenance, to commence on the infant's arrival in
England. The court appointed the mother and uncle the
guardians, and after the consideration of the circumstances
at chambers, refused to make any allowance for main-
tenance.1 ,
Stoers, 6 Johns. Ch. 353 ; Townsend
v. Kendall, 4 Minn. 412; Leonard
v. Putnam, 51 N. H. 247; Saline v.
Gilman, 1 1ST. H. 193; McLoskey v.
Keid, 4 Bradf. 334; Biolley's
Estate, 1 Tuck. 422; Maxwell v.
Campbell, 45 Ind. 361 ; Ross v.
Southwestern R. K. Co., 53 Ga.
514; Earl v. Dresser, 30 Ind. 11. A
non-resident, on obtaining ancil-
lary letters, may obtain authority
from the court to break into the
principal of the estate of the infants
for their benefit, where the estate,
•whether consisting of realty or per-
sonalty, is placed under the control
of the court, although the guardian
and wards are non-residents of the
State, and the latter made defend-
ants by publication. Hart v. Czap-
ski, 11 Lea, 151. The appointment
of a foreign guardian will not be
recognized in Louisiana. In order
for him to sue in that State he must
first qualify as tutor according to
the laws of the State. Succession
of Stephen, 19 La. Ann. 499. See
also where, as a matter of comity, a
foreign guardian will be permitted
to sue and be otherwise recognized.
Earl v. Dresser, 30 Ind. 11 ; Hoyt v.
Sprague, 103 U. S. 613; Marts v.
Brown, 56 Ind. 386; Sims v. Ren-
wick, 25 Ga. 58; Townsend v.
Kendall, 4 Minn. 315; Wood worth
v. Spring, 4 Allen, 321 ; Nugent v.
Vetzera, L. R. 2 Eq. 704; Wells v.
Andrews, 60 Miss. 373 ; Goods of
Countess of Da Cunha, 1 Hag. 237;
Rice's Case, 42 Mich. 528; Taney's
Appeal, 97 Pa. St. 74. In some
States statutory regulations must
be complied with before commenc-
ing suit. Grist v. Forehand, 36
Miss. 69; Hines v. State, 10 Sm. &
M. 529 ; Carlisle v. Tuttle, 30 Ala.
613; Warren v. Hofer, 13 Ind. 167;
McClelland v. McClelland, 7 Baxt.
310; McCleary v. Menke, 109 111.
294; Cochran v. Fillans, 20 S. Car.
237. In other States he must first
obtain ancillary letters of guardian-
ship. Morell v. Dickey, 1 Johns
Ch. 153; Wellerv.Suggett,3Redf.
249; In re Gunther, 3 Dem. 3S6
Beattie v. Johnston, 1 Phil. 17
Curtis v. Smith, 6 Blatch. 537
In re Fitch, 3 Redf. 457; Rogers v,
McLean, 31 Barb. 304.
1 Lockwood v. Fenton, 1 Sm. &
G. 73.
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