Cuba's Struggle
Against Spain
WITH THE
Causes for American Intervention and a Full Accounl
of the Spanish-American War, including
Final Peace Negotiations
. By F1TZHUGH LEE,
MAJ. GEN. U. S. V. ; LATE CONSUL GENERAL TO CUBA, and
JOSEPH WHEELER, MAJ. GEN. U. S. V.
With a Story ot Santiago
BY GOVERNOR THEODORE ROOSEVELT, OF NEW YORK,
LATE COLONEL OF THE ROUGH RIDERS
A Description of the Destruction of the "Maine," '
BY COMMANDER RICHARD WAINWRIGHT, U. S. N.,
EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE " MAINE " AND COMMANDER OF THE " GLOUCESTER "
NEW YORK
THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PRESS
1890
COPYRIGHTED, 1899,
BY
THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PRESS,
All rights reserved.
ILLUSTRATIONS.
PAGE.
GENERAL FITZHUGH LEE, 15
MORRO CASTLE, 25
HAVANA HARBOR, 26
QUEEN REGENT CHRISTINA AND HER SON, KING ALFONSO XIII, . . -35
AMERICAN CONSULATE, HAVANA, " . .36
THE PRADO — PRINCIPAL STREET IN HAVANA, 45
THE CHURCH WHERE COLUMBUS WAS BURIED, 46
SHOOTING CAPTURED INSURGENTS, 55
THE FAMOUS FILIBUSTER " DAUNTLESS," 56
PRISON OF EVANGELINA ClSNEROS, . 65
ENTRANCE TO HARBOR OF HAVANA — PUNTA PARK, . . ... .66
A BULLFIGHT, 75
A COCKFIGHT, . 76
GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S HOUSE, HAVANA, 85
MAXIMO GOMEZ — GENERAL-IN-CHIEF OF THE CUBAN ARMY OF LIB
ERATION, 86
GENERAL VALO. WEYLER, 95
MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH WHEELER, 96
GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S PALACE, HAVANA, . . . . . . . 105
HAVANA MARKET, 106
CUBAN FORCES SUSTAINING AN ATTACK, . . . . . . . .115
CHURCH CONVERTED INTO SPANISH HOSPITAL, 116
ON THE TROCHA, 125
BUILDING A TROCHA, . 126
4 ILLUSTRATIONS.
PAGE.
THE UNITED STATES BATTLESHIP " MAINE," 135
CAPTAIN C. D. SIGSBEE, 136
INSURGENT HOSPITAL 145
SPANISH HOSPITAL 146
INSURGENTS IN CAVE REGION IN CAIGUANABO COUNTY, .... 155
PAYING THE PENALTY OF REBELLION AGAINST SPANISH MISRULE, . . 156
COLONEL JOAOUIN Ruiz (IN FIREMAN'S UNIFORM), 165
COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE THE Ruiz MURDER, . . . 166
CUBAN SCENE, . ...*......... 175
A SPANISH VICTIM RESCUED TOO LATE, 176
CUBAN INSURGENTS FIGHTING THE SPANIARDS IN THE OPEN, . . .185
SPANISH GUERRILLAS, 186
THE MARINE GUARDS OF THE " MAINE " AT DRILL, 195
REVOLVER PRACTICE ON THE " MAINE," 196
GROUP PHOTOGRAPHED AFTER BREAKFAST OF OFFICERS OF THE " MAINE,"
AT HAVANA YACHT CLUB, JANUARY 30, 1898, ...... 205
THE CREW OF THE " MAINE," MOST OF WHOM WERE LOST, .... 206
CUBAN WOUNDED EN ROUTE TO THE HOSPITAL, 215
DE-SMAYS, THE CUBAN BALAKLAVA, ......... 216
" MAINE " COAL PASSERS, WHOSE QUARTERS WERE BLOWN UP, . . . 225
SINGLE-STICK EXERCISE ON THE " MAINE," 226
ADMIRAL DEWEY, 243
BATTLE OF MANILA, 244
AFTER THE ACTION 261
BlRDSEYE VIEW OF MANILA AND ENVIRONS, . 262
CAPTAIN-GENERAL BLANCO, 279
CLOSING IN ON HAVANA, 280
ADMIRAL SAMPSON, 297
THE SPANISH FLEET, 298
CAPT. " BOB " EVANS, . . . . . . . ' . . . . 315
VIEW OF MORRO CASTLE, SANTIAGO DE CUBA, AS SEEN ON ENTERING TL.E
HARBOR, • . . . . 316
ON THE FIRING LINE, 333
CAPTAIN CIIADWICK, 334
SANTIAGO REFUGEES AT EL CANEY, 351
ILLUSTRATIONS. 5
PAGE.
WHERE THE TROOPS LANDED, 352
MACEO, 369
SPANISH COLUMN AT PARADE REST, 370
AN INSURGENT CAMP, . . . . 387
/ ?AVORITE HAVANA CAFE, . ' 388
A JROUP OF RED CROSS SISTERS, . 405
A SPANISH OFFICER, 406
A SCENE IN EASTERN CUBA, 423
Los Fosos, 424
MAP OF THE PORT OF GUANTANAMO ON THE SOUTH COAST OF CUBA, . . 441
SPANISH FORT AND SIGNAL TOWER, . . . 442
COMPANY OF SPANISH SOLDIERS FIRING, . . . . . . . 459
VIEW OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA FROM THE HARBOR, 460
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY LONG, 477
A PART OF THE RED CROSS CORPS, 478
A TYPICAL CUBAN CAMP, 495
A SOLDIER FUNERAL, 496
THE PIER AT BAQUIRI, 513
MORTAR BATTERIES FOR HARBOR DEFENSE, . . . . . . . 514
A HAVANA VEGETABLE SELLER, . 531
TRANSPORTING SUGAR CANE, 532
MAJOR-GENERAL N. B. MILES, 549
PREPARED TO RAM THE ENEMY 567
CITIZENS OF JARUCO PRESENTING A MEMORIAL FOR THE VICTIMS OF THE
' MAT- J* 568
SECR^IARY ALGER, 585
CONVOY CROSSING HILLY COUNTRY — CUBA, 603
LITTLE CONVALESCENTS IN HOSPITAL, 604
LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER RICF^RD WAINWRIGHT, 621
DESTRUCTION OF THE BATTLESHIP " MAINE," 622
COLON^ THEODORE ROOSEVELT, 639
WRECK OF THE BATTLESHIP " MAINE," HAVANA HARBOR, .... 640
HANDLING THE DISAPPEARING GUNS, 657
IN THE TRENCHES BEFORE SANTIAGO JUST BEFORE SURRENDER, . . . 658
ONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT.
Columbus in America — The Most Beautiful Land Ever Seen — A Dream
of the Land of Gold — Character of the Natives — Seeking the Great
Kahn — Tobacco — Colonizing the Island — Founding Havana —
Naming the Island — Slavery and Slaughter — Las Casas and, His
Work — Negro Slavery Introduced — Final Extermination of the
Natives .- J7^
CHAPTER II.
THE CUBA OF TO-DAY.
Size, Shape and Situation of the Island — Its Rivers and Harbors — Vege
tation and Climate — Agricultural Products — Mineral Resources —
Something about the People — The Negro Population — Religion and
Education — The Spanish Government a Military Despotism — Re
volting Tyranny 67
CHAPTER III.
"BA, I492-I8OO.
The " Queen of the Antilles " - Velasquez Explores the Island — De
generacy of the Whites — Incursions of Privateers — Havana Captured
by the English — The Golden Age of Cuba 94
•
CHAPTER IV.
CUBA, I8OO-I868.
Cuba's Loyalty to Spanish Throne — A Liberal Constitution Granted in
1812 — Ferdinand VII Destroys Cuban Hopes — Constitution of 18.36
— Cuban Deputies in the Spanish Cortes — Captain-General Tacon's
High-Handed Despotism — Treatment of Negro Slaves — Administra
tion of General Valdez — Filibustering Expedition cf General Lopez, 107
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER V.
THE TEN YEARS' WAR.
PAGE.
Commencement of the Revolution of 1868 — Inhumanity of Captain-Gen
eral Valmaseda — The " Virginius " Affair — Treaty of Zanjon — The
" Little War " — Financial Depression of 1889-1892 — Reform Bill of
1894 113
CHAPTER VI.
THE REBELLION OF 1895.
Manuel Garcia — Cuban Autonomists on Side of Spain — Antonio and
Jose Maceo — Landing of Gomez and Marti — Death of Marti —
Gomez Invades Puerto Principe — Marquis of Santa Lucia Elected
President — Recall of Campos — Arrival of General Weyler — An
End of Civilized Warfare — Reform Decrees — Extreme Cruelty of
General Weyler — Marshal Blanco Succeeds Weyler — Colonel Ruiz «
Shot as a Spy — The " Maine " Arrives at Havana — The Explosion, 122
CHAPTER VII.
RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE PAST.
v.uba the "Guardian of the Gates of the American Mediterranean " — Ef
forts of American Administrations to Preserve Neutrality — Seizure
of the Black Warrior — The " Ostend Manifesto" — President Bu
chanan's Message — Official Correspondence on " Virginius " Affair
— President Cleveland's Messages — American Charity Relieves Suf
fering — President McKinley's Message 139
CHAPTER VIII.
JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1898.
.\nti-American Feeling in Havana — Congress Appropriates $50,000,000 for
National Defense — American Fleet at Key West — Official Report
of Court of Inquiry Concerning the "Maine" Disaster — Relieving
the " Reconcentrados "— President's Message of April 11, 1898 —
Why America Should Intervene to Stop the War — General Lee
Leaves Havana — Congress Directs the President to Intervene — Span
ish Minister at Washington Receives His Passports — Fleet Blockades
Havana — Call for 125,000 Volunteers — European and South Ameri
can Powers Declare Neutrality — Organization of the Army 189
CONTENTS. 9
CHAPTER IX.
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY.
PAGE
ewey at Manila — Official Reports of Battle of Manila Bay — Spanish
Reports — Admiral Cervera Sails from Cape Verde — Sampson At
tacks San Juan in Porto Rico — Cutting Cables — Cervera Reaches
Santiago — Hobson and the "' Merrimac " — Landing of Invading
Force — Destruction of Cervera's Fleet — Bombardment of Santiago
— Spanish Ships in Manzanillo Harbor Destroyed — Official Reports —
A Spanish Account of the Battle of Santiago — Sortie of the Fleet —
Causes of the Spanish Loss — A German View of the Situation 236
CHAPTER X.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
] Embarkation — Official Correspondence — Plans of General Miles — •
Las Guasimas — Officers who Participated in the Battle — Forces En
gaged — El Caney — San Juan — Officers of the Cavalry Division
Killed and Wounded in the Battle of San Juan — List of Officers
Taking Part in the Battle of Santiago de Cuba, July i, 2 and 3, 1898 —
Name of Regimental Commanders and Roster of Regiments and
Other Organizations Composing Fifth Army Corps in Battle of
Santiago de Cuba — Officers Distinguished in the Santiago Campaign, 338
CHAPTER XI.
PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN.
ral Miles Embarks — Landing of Troops at Arroyo — March towards
^ayey — General Schwan's Movements — Attack on Spanish Position
t Asomanti — Suspension of Hostilities — Description of Porto
Uco 556
CHAPTER XII.
THE CAMP AT MONTAUK POINT.
option of the Plan of the Camp — Sailing of the Transports — Donors
t Supplies — General Wheeler's Report 564
CHAPTER XIII.
THE TREATY OF PEACE.
Drench Minister Presents a Letter from the Spanish Government —
eply of the Secretary of State — The Protocol — The Commissioners
rrange for the Evacuation of Cuba and Porto Rico — The Peace
Dmmissioners — Meeting in Paris — The Treaty 583
IO CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XIV.
CUBA AS IT IS TO-DAY.
PAGE.
Its Extent — Fertility — Its Harbors and Water Courses — Its Mineral
Wealth — Its Flora — The Black Cubans — Importance of its Sugar
and Tobacco Products 608
CHAPTER XV.
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE.
Arrival in Havana — The Officers — Official Visits — The Explosion —
Rescue of Survivors — Description of the Wreck — Diving Opera
tions — The Decision of the Court of Inquiry 623
CHAPTER XVI.
THE FIFTH CORPS AT SANTIAGO.
Unpreparedness of the Army — The Responsibility — The Hurried De
parture from Tampa — Overcrowded Transports — Poor Food —
Landing at Daiquiri — Advance on Las Guasimas — El Caney — San
Juan 636
JOHN D. LONG,
SECRETARY.
NAVY DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON.
The American sailor is worthy of the name. He has maintained
the high prestige of the men who, during the Revolution and the War
of 1812 and the Civil war, won for the American navy historic renown.
He is intelligent, patriotic, and animated by the spirit of the Republic.
It is the universal testimony of naval officers that there were never
better crews. The Navy is proud of the American seaman and marine.
Nothing could be finer than the tribute with which Captain Evans
closes his report of the part taken by the navy in the naval battle off
Santiago :
" I cannot express my admiration for my magnificent crew. So
long as the enemy showed its flag, they fought like American seamen;
but when the flag came down they were as gentle and tender as
American women."
Secretary of Navy.
10
Its
Arr
Unp
WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON.
The American Soldier needs no tribute from me. Nothing that
I might say would add to the glory of his name. The campaign of
Santiago adds a new and illustrious page to the history of his match
less valor and indomitable spirit, for that was achieved by irresistible
courage.
In spite of hardships never before experienced by our army,, and
notwithstanding that the American forces were confronted by an
enemy of great courage and of greater numbers, intrenched in a posi
tion that seemed madness to assault, the American army — the
American soldier — by individual bravery won a victory equal to any
in the history of battles.
Manilla and Porto Rico would have witnessed like deeds of daring
had opportunities been given.
The American soldier is a patriot — and in the broadest sense —
a man.
Secretary of War.
MAJOR-GENERAL FITZHUGH LEE.
CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
By FITZHUGH LEE, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V.
CHAPTER I.
DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT.
Columbus in Cuba— The Most Beautiful Land Ever Seen — A Dream of the
Land of Gold — Character of the Natives — Seeking the Great Kahn —
Tobacco— A Heathen's Exhortation — Colonizing the Island — Founding
Havana — Naming the Island — Slavery and Slaughter — Las Casas and His
Work — Negro Slavery Introduced — Final Extermination of the Natives.
IT has been well said that Spain has been ruined by her colonies.
Up to the reign of Charles V. the Spanish were distinguished for
energy and audacity. The confines of the sea, and the great chain of
the Pyrenees, which had given it strength and individuality before the
struggle with the Moors, could confine no longer Spanish ambition.
Spain started out, therefore, to plant her banners, upon which was
inscribed the fierce motto " Conquer or die! " upon new worlds; and,
had she governed wisely and well the territories annexed to the home
government by her seamen and soldiers, she would to-day have been
in the front line of the great Powers of the globe. Consultation, or
compromise with, or affection for her new subjects never had place in
a colonial policy which resembled the Bourbon Government's, that
Gladstone characterized as " The negation of God erected into a
system." Had the Spanish pioneers who first seized and occupied the
many countries which originally they took possession of organized a
progressive, humane, and enlightened government, allowing the
natives to regulate their own domestic affairs, so that her colonial
possessions would have occupied in reference to the home govern
ment a position similar to the American States to their central gov
ernment, or had they been given a liberal and enlightened form of
government, — such as we find possessed by the colonies of the first-
class Powers, — what a magnificent position Spain would have occu
pied in the history of the world, and what a splendid record the Spanish
people would have made for themselves! They have done just the
17
18 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
reverse. Spain has always considered that she owned the countries of
which her sailors and soldiers had taken possession, just as if they were
purchased estates, and that it was her duty to get as much as possible
out of them with as little return. Very soon she began to depend
upon the metals, mines, and resources of her allied possessions, rather
than the development of her own resources at home, and to-day her
statesmen, as a result of such policy, are witnessing the golden stream
of her colonial gleanings running dry, but ready to burst forth again
to cheer the hearts of a foreign people and fill the coffers of new
governments.
The people who have for so long contributed to the profits of
Spain have at last resented the loss of economic strength and
have insisted upon using their revenues for their own advan-
tagCo The inhabitants, whether direct or colonial descendants of the
Spanish or Indians, negroes, Creoles, or half-castes, have always been
regarded not only as inferiors, but with a certain degree of hate, which '
has alienated them from Spain, until they are ready in every case to
take, if necessary, a complete revenge and be driven to fight for inde
pendence or a change of Flag, that they might have some voice in
shaping their own destinies, and be permitted to organize a govern
ment which would be under no obligation to pay a tribute to the
purse of Spain, and whose people could hold profitable appointments
in their midst, and not have all offices filled by appointments from
the Madrid Government.
So far as the United States is concerned, it can be safely asserted
that had Spain given a just, legal, peaceful, and humane government
to her colonies lying near the borders of the American Republic, so as
to insure the lives and property of American citizens who had found
homes in her rich possessions, and which would have preserved unin
terruptedly life, liberty, and property, and proper exchange of com
mercial relations, there would have been no desire on her part to see
the Spanish flag replaced either by the independent flag of Cuba or
the " Star-Spangled Banner," but, on the contrary, she would have
continued her policy of assisting Spain, if necessary, to resist any
attempt upon the part of other Powers to seize and hold her colonial
territory.
The continent of which Spain of the fifteenth century was capable
of grasping is dissolving because Spain of the nineteenth century is
incapable of retaining it, and we can almost see the spirit of Columbus
and hear the clanking of his handcuffs in the forefront of the most
DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 19
dramatic picture in all history. The flag which has floated unchal
lenged over thousands of square miles for three centuries, before the
print of the white man's foot was ever placed upon them, and com
pared to which the British Empire of to-day, and the Roman Empire
at the height of its glory, was far inferior, is about to be lowered before
the march of modern civilization.
The colonization of the North American continent and its re
sults, contrasted with the colonization of new lands by Spanish ex
plorers, is a most striking and impressive lesson. In one case, though
wars took place between the early North American settlers and the
Indians found in possession of the lands, it must be remembered that
the latter were the aggressors and that every effort was made by the
forefathers of the people of the United States to preserve peace, to be
friends with the natives, and, if possible, avoid armed conflicts. Had
these early Spanish settlers pursued the same tactics, at this hour
Spain would have probably been abreast with that great Republic in all
that constitutes the glory of a nation, and been living in peace and
amity with her own colonies and with the United States. No colonial
revolutions would have marked her triumphal progress, no smoking
villages and bloody paths would have been a part of her record, and
no blush would have crimsoned the face of her National Glory.
Christopher Columbus as a discoverer was a great success. He
gave more than any man who ever lived to a country of which he
was not a native. The world is familiar with his history and his
voyages. In his diary, under date of October 28, 1492, he wrote,
" This is the most beautiful land ever beheld by human eyes." On
that day he had discovered the island of Cuba. It is true that sixteen
days before he had landed upon another and smaller island, and had
been sailing for a number of days among a group of such islands, ad
miring their semi-tropical luxuriousness and their strange new beauty.
" I know not," he said, " where first to go! Never could my eyes
weary of gazing upon the beautiful verdure. The song of the birds
is so sweet that one might desire never to go hence. There are trees
of a thousand species, each having its particular fruit, and all of exqui
site flavor." But Columbus was not looking for islands; he was in
quest of the Asiatic continent, the fabled Cipango, the East Indian
land of gold where Kublai Khan ruled, and of which Marco Polo had
written. After leaving the lesser islands he thought the goal of his
ambition had been reached, when he came to a place surpassing all
others in beauty, and apparently a continent in size. The natives
20 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
told him it was rich in gold and sparkling with gems, and when he
saw its blue mountains, green plains, and the beautiful tropical sky,
he was convinced the object of his voyage had been accomplished. It
was then an earthly paradise; to-day, after more than four hundred
years, cruelty, oppression, bloodshed, famine, and war are encamped
throughout " this most beautiful land."
Cuba is the largest and the westernmost of the four islands known
as the " Great Antilles," which differ from most other tropical lands
in possessing unique features so as to belong to a class to themselves,
and is due to certain peculiarities of configuration and soil formations
possessing unusual productiveness.
Columbus first landed at the north coast, at or near what is now
known as Nuevitas del Principe in the province of Del Principe. This
town of seven thousand people is the seaport now of Puerto Principe,
the largest inland city in Cuba, with which it is connected by a rail
road forty-five miles long, and with other Cuban ports by steamship
lines. Its splendid harbor, nearly circular and the second in size in
Cuba, must have presented a most inviting appearance to Columbus
on that October day 406 years ago. He became more and more en
chanted with the charming outlook, and with the people, who seemed
to be gentle, hospitable, and intelligent, and who, being interested in
him, gave him information and aid.
Among other things he noticed that the natives had a habit of roll
ing up the leaves of a certain plant, setting fire to them, and inhaling
the smoke. The natives called it tobacco. Several of his men tried
it, found it grateful, and adopted the practice; and in this way, it is said,
the smoking of tobacco was first made known to the civilized world.
Columbus still thought he had found a continent, and on his second
voyage reached wrhat is now called Cape Maisi, the most eastern ex
tremity of the island. He then sailed along the southern coast for
some distance, in consequence of the natives telling him that a land
of gold lay further on — they probably meant South America. On
this voyage he found the island of Jamaica. If he had sailed west
along the Cuban southern coast three or four days longer he would
have reached the western end of the island, and then have learned that
he had not discovered a continent, but an island. This great dis
coverer made a third and last visit to Cuba at the end of May, 1503,
but he never knew the real nature of the land he had found, and
always supposed it to be the mainland of a continent.
The first attempt at colonization in Cuba was made by his son
DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 21
Diego, in 1511. 'He sent an expedition there of 300 men, led by
Diego Velasquez, who had been with his father on his second voyage.
A landing was made, and a town was commenced at Baracoa, and
two or three years later Trinidad and Santiago de Cuba were founded.
Batabano, as it is called, now directly opposite Havana on the south
ern coast, was next settled, and called San Cristobal de la Habana.
In 1519 the name of the settlement was transferred to the loca
tion now known as Havana, which was then founded and afterward
became the capital of the island, the original name being Puerto de
Cabanas. At Batabano Cortez prepared his expedition for the con
quest of Mexico, sailing for that place in February, 1519. After
ward those who remained at Batabano removed to Cabanas, giving
it the name of Havana. Upon their arrival they celebrated a Mass
under a great ceiba tree, the site of which is to this day marked with
a large stone column and a small temple at the east side of the Plaza de
Armas. The island was first called Juana, in honor of Prince Juan,
the son of Ferdinand and Isabella. After the death of Ferdinand it
was renamed Fernandmo, and later called Santiago after the patron
saint of Spain; later still it was called Ave Maria, in honor of the Holy
Virgin. The natives had, however, from time immemorial called it
Cuba, and Cuba it remains to this day.
Valesquez began the settlement of the island in characteristic
fashion. Instead of making friends of the natives he treated them as
enemies marked for destruction. Those who gave themselves up as
his slaves he spared from death, and used them as beasts of burden;
ail those who resisted he massacred, frequently with tortures.
Hatuey, who had been a celebrated chief in San Domingo, but fled
from that island to escape the Spanish, organized an army, and for a
time led his men against his enemies, even at fearful odds. After
ward he was captured, doomed to be burned at the stake, and bravely
met his fate. Before the fire was kindled he was approached by a
priest, who began to exhort him to believe in Christ in order that his
soul might be taken to heaven. Hatuey interrupted him with the
inquiry, " Where do the souls of the Spanish go? " The priest replied,
" To heaven." " Then," said Hatuey, " I prefer to go to hell."
Bartholomew Las Casas, the famous apostle of the Indies, accom
panied Velasquez. He first tried to mitigate the horrors of the Span
ish conquest, but ultimately acquiesced in the brutalities of the
conquerors.
It would have been well indeed for Cuba to have remained in the
22 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
hands of the English after the capture of Havana in 1762. The res
toration to Spain under the treaty of 1763 was simply a reversement
to Spanish control, which meant a reversion to the old state of things.
Cuban ports were closed to foreign ships and the commerce of the
island limited to Spain, and within these legislative Chinese walls
people were born who grew up in dense ignorance.
Eighty-five years ago Spain practically awakened to the fact that
she had not been exercising a wise and liberal government over her
dominions outside of her own borders, for the spirit of revolution had
become so frequent in Spanish America that a more generous policy
was at last determined upon for Cuba; so the ports of the island were
thrown wider open to general commerce, and a decree was issued
doing away with the monopoly on tobacco, which had a very mar
velous effect on its growth. Sugar, too, experienced prosperity from
this policy, so that four times as much was exported of these products
as before. If the same liberality had been shown in the political gov
ernment of Cuba, to-day's history of that island might have been very
different, and the breach promptly healed between those citizens who
were born in Spain, and who were called in Cuba " Peninsulars," and
those who were born in Cuba, termed "Insulars"; and there would
have been no record on the pages of history of the many attempts at
rebellion in the island.
There was no attempt evei made to give it its own government, but
the Captain Generals were sent from Madrid, who exercised despotic
power. And to increase the antagonism springing up between these
two classes, smoldering political fires were ever present, and at stated
intervals broke out into rebellious flames.
Havana, the principal city of " The Ever-faithful Isle " (as it will
no longer be called), has many interesting incidents in its early history.
Away back in 1538 French pirates burned the town and destroyed
the inhabitants. Santiago de Cuba, which has lately become so promi
nent to the public mind, was then the capital.
In 1555 we find Havana was again destroyed, this time by a French
corsair, De Sores, who landed at San Laraza and destroyed the city by
fire, killing many of its inhabitants. It was in consequence of these
hostile raids that the idea obtained a footing to give to the city per
manent fortifications, so as to make it more secure from attacks by sea.
The construction of Morro Castle was commenced as far back as 1589,
the work on which occupied eight years. It did not, however, prevent
the siege and capture of Havana by the English in 1762.
DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 23
An expedition under Lord Albemarle sailed from Spithead, Eng
land, March 5th of that year. The expeditionary forces were rendez
voused in Martinique, and sailed from that point on the 2/th of May
through the old Bahama passage on the north side of Cuba.
There were 200 vessels of all classes which passed the bay of Ma-
tanzas on the 5th of June, and the next day began to debark fifteen
miles east of Havana.
While the troops were landing, the admiral, with 13 ships of the line,
2 frigates, and 36 small boats made a feint attack at the mouth of Ha
vana harbor. At that time 12 Spanish ships of the line were laying
inside of the harbor, besides a number of smaller vessels. The Span
iards were taken by surprise at the unexpected appearance of the Eng
lish, who had 9000 seamen and marines, 1400 militia of all colors, 3500
infantry, 300 artillery, 810 cavalry, making a force of 27,610 men.
These troops were finally landed about six miles east of Morro
Castle. Most of the Spanish force was stationed in Guanabacoa, on
the bay opposite Havana, for the purpose of resisting any attempt of
the English to march around the city and take it from the south
side.
Albemarle went straight at the Cabanas Fortress, carried it, and
drove the Spaniards into the Morro, a feint being made by the English
admiral at the same time west of the mouth of Havana harbor. The
naval and military forces, which seem to have been in complete har
mony, co-operated with each other.
Batteries were then planted by the English on this neck of land for
the purpose of reducing the Morro, as it was easily seen that after the
capture of that stragetic point the city would be at the mercy of the
English land guns as well as the guns of the fleet. The English had
thirty-four guns including the mortars and howitzers, and the Span
iards even a greater number; but the firing of the English was more
effective.
On the ist of July, twenty-three days after landing, the English guns
opened on the Morro; at the same time three of their ships of the line
cannonaded it on the sea front. There had been no rain falling for two
weeks, and the troops were suffering much from extreme heat. The
English army was reduced to one-half of its effective force, but on the
I2th of July re-enforcements were received from Jamaica. The Span
iards made a brave defense, in spite of the fact that sapping and min
ing operations were gradually bringing the English close to their walls.
At one time the Spanish troops were carried across the harbor, and
24 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
the attempt made to assault the English near the Morro, but they were
repulsed and beaten back.
About this time a ship arrived from New York with the first division
of troops from the English-American colonies. On the 29th of June
the British mine was exploded, and a breach made large enough for
the assaulting party to march into, which they did with great dash and
courage.
The Spanish commander of the Morro was a naval officer named
Don Luis de Valesco. A desperate resistance was made, Valesco
falling mortally wounded. He was shown every mark of respect on
the part of his British captors during the short time that he lived.
After his death his son was made commander of the Morro by His
Spanish Majesty, and it was ordered that there should always be a ship
named Valesco.
The Spanish lost about 130 killed; 400 laid down their arms; and
the remainder, it is said, were drowned in attempting to escape the
city.
The Marquis de Gonzales, second in command of the Morro, was
also killed. The English only lost 2 officers and 30 men.
There is no question of the bravery of the Spanish defenders of the
Morro. When Valesco was requested by Albemarle to surrender the
fortress, he declined, deciding to abide the fate of arms.
The capture of the Morro was the beginning of the end, and on the
loth of August Albemarle sent a demand to the Governor of the city
of Havana to capitulate. The bearer of his flag of truce was kept from
sunrise to four in the afternoon, and then sent back without an answer.
The next day forty-five English guns opened upon the city. The
Spanish batteries at the Punta were soon silenced, and at two that
afternoon the Spaniards sent a committee to propose a capitulation to
Albemarle, and arrangements were made, and by the I4th the Eng
lish had entered and hoisted the British flag over the city of Havana.
The total loss by the English amounted in all to 1799. These facts
are interesting, as recent operations by the American Army at Santiago
de Cuba show similar soldierly traits in the Spaniards of to-day. The
idea then and now seemed to prevail that it is necessary, however grave
the situation and certainty of results, to fight desperately for a time for
what they are always calling " The honor of Spain."
It will be remembered that France, Austria, and Russia were at
war against Great Britain and Prussia; Spain added her arms to
those of the former, and, as a result, the English captured Havana.
DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 27
It was restored to Spain by the treaty of 1763, in exchange for
Florida, which, in another treaty ten years later, was restored to Spain.
Had the island remained in England's possession the interests of civili
zation and good government in Cuba would have made of that island a
very different country.
As soon as the British left, the construction of the present Cabanas
fortress began, and the defenses of the harbor were thus greatly
strengthened. This work was completed in 1841, at a cost of fourteen
million dollars. Fort Atares and the Castillo del Principe were also
constructed about the same time. Hundreds of slaves and convicts
were brought to Havana to work on these forts; and, being brought
over in foul ships, packed closely with no regard to health or cleanli
ness, a terrible pestilence broke out among them never before known.
It proved most contagious, and soon became a permanent epidemic at
Havana and other coast towns, and gave to the world, it is said, the
dreadful scourge now called yellow fever.
In the latter part of the eighteenth century many handsome public
buildings were erected in Havana, including the Palace, which has
been occupied ever since by the Captain Generals. Fine parks and
boulevards were also constructed, and the whole place greatly im
proved and adorned.
Las Casas, so well known in the early history of Cuba, first began
to work for the abolition of native slavery. He returned to Spain and
appealed to his Government, with the result that a commission was
sent from Spain to investigate the condition of the natives, and effect
such a reform as might be desirable, with Las Casas at the head of the
Commission with the title of " Protector of the Indians."
His associates on the commission, it seems, were indifferent at that
day, just as the Spaniards of the present day have been, to reform, so
nothing practically was accomplished. Las Casas then conceived the
idea of abolishing slavery of the Indians by substituting negro slavery,
and proposed a system of emigration from Spain under which each
Spanish settler in Cuba should have the privilege of taking there twelve
negro slaves from Africa; but it was a hopeless failure, because the
Spaniards demanded that the Indians should purchase their freedom
with gold-dust, which was impossible because the Indians did not have
the gold-dust.
The slight physique of these Indians rapidly succumbed to ill treat
ment, and those who sought to escape from slavery were hunted down
with bloodhounds and were worried, and torn to death in some in-
28 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
stances, by the dogs. In about half a century the population was
exterminated.
Early testimony, including that of Columbus, will show that these
natives were affectionate, tractable, and peaceable. " The Discov
erer " says of those he found in Hayti, who were of the same race and
habits as the natives of Cuba, that there was not a better race of men
in the world. " They love their neighbors as themselves, their conver
sation is the sweetest and mildest in the world, and always accom
panied with a smile. And although it is true that they go naked, yet
Your Highnesses may be assured that they have commendable cus
toms; the king is served with great state, and his behavior is so decent
that it is pleasant to see him, as it is likewise the wonderful memory
which these people have, and their desire of knowing everything, which
leads them to inquire into its causes and effects."
As long as Isabella lived it is said the Indians found a protector, but
" her death," says the venerable Las Casas, " was the signal for their'
destruction." So much so that it has also been said that " Every step
of the white man's progress in the New World may be said to have
been on the corpse of a native." It will thus be seen that the Span
iards did not begin their early settlements in Cuba in the true Christian
spirit. A writer has said that " Their behavior to the Indians, and, in
deed, to those who afterward became in their term ' The Natives,'
brought down the retribution of Heaven, which has seen fit to turn this
fountain of inexaustible wealth and prosperity to the nation into the
waters of bitterness."
Irving, in his history of Columbus, gives a weird picture of Span
ish treatment of slaves, in which is pictured the suffering of these poor
people under their conquerors.
Much labor and little food was given them; and if they fled from in
cessant toil and insufficient nourishment, and took refuge in the moun
tains, they were hunted out and scourged, and laden with chains to
prevent a second escape. Las Casas says he found many dead in the
road, and others, gasping under the trees in the pangs of death, faintly
crying "Hunger! Hunger!" "The toils and sufferings," says Las
Casas, " of this weak and unoffending race dissolved them, as it were,
from the face of the earth. Even mothers forgot the powerful instincts
of nature, and destroyed the infants at their breasts to spare them a life
of wretchedness." This history has repeated itself in many cases
among that portion of the present natives of Cuba styled " Reconcen-
trados."
DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 29
MacKenzie charges ten million victims to inhumanity, against the
Spanish conquerors. Vasco Nunez wrote that on one expedition he
had hanged thirty chiefs, and would hang as many as he could seize,
because, he says, the Spaniards were so few in proportion to the
natives that there was no other means of securing their safety. " The
native orphans," wrote a merciful Spaniard, " are as numerous as the
stars of the heavens and the sands of the sea." And yet the conquer
ors often slew the children and parents together.
When Columbus first beheld the splendid beauty and luxuriant land
scape and received the hospitality of the gentle and docile inhabitants
of Cuba, that island contained a population of one million souls; about
fifteen years afterward the number of inhabitants did not amount to
over sixty thousand. It is doubtful whether human history has ever
recorded more blood causelessly and wantonly shed than in the de
struction of the native population of Cuba by the Spaniards. The
genial climate and rich soil of Cuba naturally attracted many colo
nists from Spain, and rapid advance was made in settlement and pros
perity. Towns were founded, and the island became the center of
commerce for the Western Hemisphere. In spite of this fact, the
adventurous newcomers were actuated by a desire for new conquest
and the attainment of wealth by quicker methods than those of agri
culture and grazing.
It was Diego Velasquez who conceived and proposed the conquest
of Mexico and Florida, although the work was done and the fame
enjoyed by Cortez and De Soto. The expeditions led by these two
adventurers took from Cuba many of its most enterprising settlers.
Then came the conquest of Peru by Pizarro, and many were attracted
there because there was no gold or silver in Cuba; indeed, a Cuban
official declared that, with the news from Peru, Cuba was threatened
with depopulation. So the island fell into a state of lethargy and
neglect, and became a sort of way-station between Spain and Mexico;
and for a century and a half it had little history of any kind. The
colonists merely devoted themselves to fruit-growing and cattle-
raising.
There being no gold or silver on the island prevented raids from
buccaneers, so that it escaped the attacks which were made upon
Hayti and the cities of the Spanish Main, and seemed almost forgotten
alike by friends and foes.
In the early part of the eighteenth century Cuba contained scarcely
one hundred thousand inhabitants, and twenty or thirty thousand
negro slaves, for the original natives had all been exterminated.
3O CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
The British siege and capture of Havana in 1762, and its possess
ion by the English for nine months, brought most important results.
Pezuela, the Spanish historian, says: "During the nine months the
British held the capital of Cuba they introduced nearly one thousand
loaded vessels in a port which up to that time had received only ten or
twelve a year. They also imported several thousand negroes, began
the establishment of extensive agricultural operations, and augmented
the productions and exports of the island." " After the restitution of
Havana," says this historian, " the Government then secured its pos
sessions, with the superb fortifications which now defend it, and slowly
and jealously began the concessions of commercial privileges."
The revolution in Hayti in 1796, under the famous Toussaint
L'Ouverture, drove a large number of white people from that island,
and a multitude of families and individuals. Some with considerable
fortunes took refuge in Cuba. The concurrence of this unexpected
prosperity was most fortunate, inasmuch as, in 1818, the freedom of
commerce had been decreed for Cuba. This measure was the true be
ginning of the prosperity of the island. From the time of its cession,
excepting a short period during the constitutional agitation of Spain
from 1820 to 1823, there has been to a certain extent some progress
made in Cuba in wealth and population.
To this record we may add that a second Las Casas became Gov
ernor General of Cuba in 1790, and that under his administration
many great public works were executed, and fine progress was made
in the island in arts and industry, which should have proved a fountain
of blessing, because the ports of Cuba were opened to foreign com
merce and the Spanish monopoly of the tobacco trade was revoked;
but unfortunately for Cuba, Spain, having lost all of her colonial posses
sions in the Western Hemisphere except Cuba and Porto Rico, en
deavored to make these two supply her with the revenue which had
been previously obtained from a continent, and acts of oppression and
injustice soon began to counteract the promise of prosperity and
happiness.
The island was managed as a conquered province for the selfish
profits of the conquerors. Even the national constitution adopted in
Spain in 1812, in which Cuba was to be represented in the Cortes on
equal terms with other parts of Spain, was abrogated by the des
potic Spanish king Ferdinand VIII. , and not restored until three years
after his death in 1863.
The appeal to the President of the United States in 1817 by the
DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 31
fourteen Americans who were captured by the Spaniards on the charge
of being privateers furnishes a striking proof of the manner and
methods of those days. They said that they were " cut and mangled
to pieces with cutlasses, bound back to back until blood ran from under
their finger-nails, and were at present in a Cuban jail on an allowance
of Spanish ration of one pint of rice and beans, half cooked, for twenty-
four hours, and without clothing."
;< The Ever-faithful Isle," as it was called because it refused allegi
ance to Napoleon Bonaparte in 1808, when he drove the Spanish king
from his throne, began to attract about this time the close scrutiny and
attention of the United States; and that Government took the position
that Cuba must do one of three things, become independent, remain
Spanish, or join the United States. The American Republic was
scarcely then able to interfere, in case some European Power should
take the island, so practically declared that she would not interfere
with affairs upon the island, except to prevent the overthrow of Span
ish authority. The ardor of the Cuban people for liberty began to
display itself more and more. In 1819 there was an insurrection in
which a number of Americans took part, and no less than twenty-two
American citizens were arrested and thrown into prison at Havana for
complicity in the revolt.
It is true that Cuban deputies were permitted at last to sit in the
Cortes at Madrid, and in 1821 they made a vigorous protest against
the burdensome and oppressive tariff which the Spanish Government
proposed to place on the islands. Commercial freedom, they said,
should be of the greatest interest to Spain as well as to Cuba; that the
island had not the twelfth part of the population it was capable of
maintaining; and urged such measures as would attract more settlers.
Indeed, they told Spain frankly that, if she persisted in her present
policy, she would lose Cuba altogether. Oppressive measures con
tinued to be adopted, and the spirit of discontent and disaffection
steadily grew. The Spanish Government repelled instead of welcomed
the settlers.
At the beginning of 1822 the Captain General decreed that every
newcomer must, before landing, present a memorial to the Government
setting forth the object of his visit to the island, which memorial had to
be indorsed by some responsible person, who would be answerable for
his conduct while he was in the island. Soldiers enforced all rules
of the Captain General, and frequently took the law into their own
hands and became a mob. For example, in 1822 a paper in Havana
32 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
printed temperately what was thought by many to be a well-deserved
criticism upon some features of the policy of the Captain General.
The next day soldiers took the office of the paper, destroyed the press
and type, and personally abused the editor and staff. The Captain
General approved, if he did not incite this outrage; and the people of
the city were made to feel that they were at the mercy of a violent and
lawless soldiery.
In a written remonstrance over three thousand of the best citizens
of Havana warned the Government that if such practices prevailed
there must be sooner or later a revolution, but the only effect of this
paper was increased tyranny. Then, for the first time, two political
parties were formed, one being composed of native Cubans, and one
of Spanish officers; the Cuban party being committed to the principle
of home rule, and independence — if necessary to secure it.
Anyone familiar with the history of the Spanish Government on the
island of Cuba up to the present day will recognize that there has
been no material change in the policy of the Spanish rulers from that
time to this. The Governor, or Captain General, of Cuba is appointed
by the Crown, and the office is considered a most desirable one from a
financial standpoint. His power under the decree of the Spanish Gov
ernment issued May 28, 1825, is absolute; and practically he holds in
the hollow of his hand the life and liberty of all the citizens of the
island.
" His Majesty the King, our Lord, desiring to obviate the incon
veniences that might in extraordinary cases result from a division of
command, and from the interferences and prerogatives of the respect
ive officers: for the important end of preserving in that precious island
his legitimate sovereign authority, and the public tranquillity, through
proper means, has resolved, in accordance with the opinion of his
council of ministers, to give to your Excellency the fullest authority,
bestowing upon you all the powers which by the royal ordinances are
granted to Governors of besieged cities. In consequence of this his
Majesty gives to your Excellency the most ample and unbounded
power, not only to send away from the island any person in office,
whatever their occupation, rank, class, or condition, whose continu
ance therein your Excellency may deem injurious, or whose conduct,
public or private, may alarm you; replacing them with persons faith
ful to his Majesty, and deserving of all the confidence of your Excel
lency; and also to suspend the execution of any order whatsoever, or
any general provision made concerning any branch of the administra-
DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 33
tion, as your Excellency may think most suitable to the Royal
service."
This decree, placing in office a despotic ruler clothed with full
authority, did not have the effect intended, but, on the contrary, was
another step toward setting in motion a series of insurrections which
have at last culminated in the present war, and which at last has ended
in the displacement of the Spanish flag from the island.
We find that the first real insurrection occurred in 1823, being
organized by a secret association called the " Soles de Bolivar," and
was inspired to some extent by the example of the " Great South
American Liberator." The attempt, it is true, was frustrated by the
authorities before it reached maturity, and all of the leaders and par
ticipants who did not escape from the island were punished, but it did
not prevent other revolutions from breaking out in 1826, 1828, 1830,
1848, 1850, 1851, 1855, l868, 1879, and finally in 1895.
Secret organizations were prohibited by law after 1823, especially
Freemasons, and those who persisted in belonging to such organiza
tions were judged guilty of high treason and put to death ; and many
innocent men were garroted therefor.
A military commission was established for the purpose of ferreting
out and punishing suspected cases of treason, a sort of Holy Inquisi
tion applied to politics. The king himself suggested this commission,
in order, as he said, the more effectually to> preserve his dominions in
America from the horror of ruin with which they were threatened by
the spirit of reform, for all spirits of reform were regarded as disloyal
to Spain.
Even at that day Spain had become uneasy about the fate of the
island. The Bishop of Havana had been compelled to flee to New
Orleans for safety, as he was suspected by the Governor General of
being liberal in his political opinions, and an English paper in 1825
declared that Cuba was the " Turkey of transatlantic politics, tottering
to its fall, and kept from falling only by the struggles of those who
contend for the right to catch her in her descent."
The revolution in 1826 was planned in 1826 by Cuban refugees in
Mexico and Colombia, and it was led by no less person than Simon
Bolivar himself. It failed to receive the expected encouragement from
the United States, and came to naught.
Two years later a more serious attempt was made by the same
parties by organizing a secret league called " The Black Eagle," with
headquarters in Mexico and branches in the United States. A con-
34 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
siderable army was recruited, but the United States opposed this
scheme, and many of the soldiers of the plot were captured by the
Spanish and put to death.
In 1844 we find another outbreak — not to be classed, however,
among attempts at independence. It was an uprising of the negro
slaves in and about Matanzas. A general revolt was planned, but
resulted in thousands of slaves being arrested and put to the torture
of the thumbscrew and rack to make them testify, and on the
strength of evidence thus obtained some 1346 persons were convicted,
of whom 78 were put to death.
In 1848 the famous Narciso Lopez of Venezuela appeared on the
scene, the base of his operations being in the United States, where
was organized a band of 600 well-drilled soldiers who were to serve
as the nucleus of his army in Cuba. He evaded the neutrality laws
and made a landing in Cuba with this force, and was joined by a con
siderable number of Cubans, both black and white; but his army was
too small to hold its own against the Spaniards, and a precipitate
flight from the island was necessary. It is said that the offer by this
Government, made directly after the return of Lopez from Cuba, to
buy the island for one hundred million dollars in cash was due largely
to Lopez's representations and work.
This adventurous spirit attempted to organize another expedition
in 1849, but was not successful, as the United States Government pre
vented the sailing of his men; but in the following year Lopez got off
with some 600 men, which he landed safely at Cardenas. There he
was attacked by an overwhelming Spanish force and compelled to
flee back to his ships, and upon reaching Key West disbanded his
party.
In 1851 this indomitable revolutionist went from New Orleans to
Cuba with Colonel Crittenden of Kentucky and 450 men, landing near
Havana, where they were attacked by a superior force. Lopez was
put to death, but a portion of his men were released, and a detach
ment of 150 men under Crittenden fought until they were reduced to
50 men and out of ammunition, when they were captured and all put
to death.
Colonel Logan Crittenden was a nephew of the Hon. John J. Crit
tenden, so long a distinguished United States Senator from Kentucky,
and was a brother of ex-Governor Thomas T. Crittenden of Missouri.
He behaved most courageously. His hands, and the hands of his men,
were tightly bound with cords, and they were kept in this condition
Ji
I
QUEEN REGENT CHRISTINA AND HER SON, KING ALPHONSO XIII.
DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 37
for eighteen hours, when on the morning of the i6th of August 1851,
they were taken out and shot in platoons of six at a time, after having
been made to kneel with their backs to the firing squad. Crittenden,
who was reserved to be executed last, when ordered to kneel declined
to do so, and with a curl of scorn upon his lips, said, " An American
kneels only to his God, and always faces his enemy! " They shot him
down, but with his face to his foe.
In 1855 there was another insurrection led by a Spaniard named
Pinto and two comrades, Estambes and Aguero. They were cap
tured and put to death.
Proclamations of the Governor and Captain Generals have been
curious productions from time immemorial in giving flattering pic
tures of " The Ever-faithful Isle," calling it an abode of peace and
plenty and loyalty, because it had always enjoyed the mild government
of a king and the blessings which spring from security of property
and the uninterrupted progress of arts and sciences. " All men of
sense," one of them said, " in this isle are faithful to the king, our
master, from affection and a conviction that loyalty to the parent state
was the only guarantee for their well-being, and that the day which
severs these sacred bonds will be the last day of the happiness of Cuba,
and even of her existence; and that the heart of the king only throbbed
with pleasure when it contemplated the people of Cuba as contented
and happy."
These oft-repeated revolutions produced more and more friction
between the United States and Spain, and the feeling between these
two countries was intensified in 1850 by the " Black Warrior "
incident.
The " Black Warrior " was a steamship regularly plying between
American ports and Havana. Under strict interpretation of the Span
ish law, a steamer touching at a Cuban port was required to exhibit
a manifest of her cargo, but this provision had been passed over in the
case of regular liners.
The " Black Warrior " had thirty-six times in succession entered
and left Havana without making a manifest, but calling herself " in
ballast." All of this was done with the full knowledge and at the sug
gestion, it is said, of the Spanish authorities, who wished to save them
selves needless work. On this occasion the ship entered the port
with a cargo of cotton from Mobile for New York. As before, she was
reported " in ballast " ; then the authorities seized her, confiscated the
cargo and took it ashore, and levied a fine against her for twice the.
38 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
value of her cargo. The captain refused to pay it and protested
against the whole performance as illegal. He finally pulled down his
flag and abandoned the ship, and reported to the United States that
the Spanish had forcibly seized her. After five years the United
States succeeded in making Spain pay an indemnity of three hundred
thousand dollars.
Hon. J. P. Benjamin of Louisiana, in a speech in the United States
Senate in 1859, speaking about the grievance of the island of Cuba,
said :
" That with arms General Tacon despoiled the island of Cuba of
the Constitution of Spain, proclaimed by the powers of the monarchy,
and which these powers had ordered to be sworn to, as the funda
mental law of the entire monarchy.
''' That the Cortes deprived the Cubans of the rights which all Span
iards enjoy, and which are naturally conceded to persons the least
civilized.
''' That the decree was issued which deprived the sons of Cuba of
all right of being chosen to occupy public offices or of employment in
the state.
" That military commissions existed which, in other countries, the
law permits only in extraordinary cases, during the time of war, and
then only for offenses against the state.
' That the continual increase of the army and the creation of the
new mercenary bodies, under the pretext of public security, are put
upon the natives for the purpose of augmenting the burdens that lie
upon Cuba, and of exercising with greater vexation the system of sub
ordination and espionage over its inhabitants.
" That obstacles and difficulties are placed in the way of each indi
vidual for exercising any industry, nobody being sure that he will not
be seized and fined, by reason of some defect of authorization or want
of license at every step that he makes in the island.
:< That exactions of all kinds are imposed upon its inhabitants by
inferior officers with the greatest disregard to the opinion of mankind.
" I return now, sir," he said, " to the year 1836, when the Cuban
deputies were convoked to a meeting of the constituent Cortes at
Madrid. The Cortes assembled in 1837, but the Cuban deputies were
not admitted to their seats. Cuba was deprived of her representation,
nor was this the only outrage inflicted on her rights. It was decided
that she should be governed in the future by exceptional laws, and not
DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 39
by the laws common to the rest of the monarchy. These special laws
were never passed, but the royal ordinance has continued in force until
the present hour, maintaining martial law, and Cuba has thus re
mained ever since a helpless victim, subject to the despotic control of
a single man, the extent of whose powers can only be described by the
word invented to express them — omni-modas (of all kinds).
" Ever since this monstrous system has been adopted, Cuba has not
been blessed with one year of peace. Constantly attempts have been
made to shake off the Spanish yoke, but all in vain. Twenty thou
sand bayonets on the land, and a powerful fleet off Cuba's coasts keep
the dread watch of the tyrant and suppress the first symptoms of revolt.
The whites have been disarmed, and four companies of colored men
have been added to each of the sixteen regiments of peninsular troops
stationed on the island, thus holding before the unfortunate inhabi
tants the constant threat of a war of races, a renewal of the horrors of
San Domingo. Their pride of race has been shocked by a Governor's
decree authorizing marriages between the two races, except when one
of the parties is a noble.
" The army is maintained faithful solely by a rigorous isolation,
all communication between the inhabitants and troops being inter
dicted. No security for life, person, or liberty against the caprice of a
despot, no arms of self-defense; the size of a walking stick being
limited to dimensions small enough to pass through a ring furnished
the policeman.
;' The Cubans have not even the idea of a trial by jury. Cases are
tried before the judges of royal appointment, the venal favorites of the
Spanish court, who are speedily removed to make room for more
hungry aspirants.
" The Captain General, himself a mere soldier, presides by law
over the supreme court of justice. All offices, with the exception of a
few of the lowest order, are in the hands of Spaniards. The penalty
for carrying weapons of any description is six years' hard labor in the
chain-gangs of the penal colonies of Africa.
;< The Cuban cannot have company at home without a permit, for
which he must pay $2.50, and he must be provided with a license at
the same cost if he is to absent himself from town or from his home in
the country. Neither can he change his domicile without notifying
the police, obtaining a permit, and paying for the same.
" He cannot lodge any person, whether foreigner or native, stran
ger, friend, or relative, in his house without previous notice to the
police.
40 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
" Mayors of cities are not elected by the people, but by the alder
men of the common councils and under the dictation of the Spanish
Governors. These aldermen serve for life, and their offices are either
inherited or purchased from the Crown at public auction for prices
varying according to the perquisites thereof.
" Thus it happens that even they who should be the immediate
guardians of the people often become speculators, who, far from ex
tending them protection, extort the full interest of the capital invested
in the purchases of their offices.
" No affidavit is required in Cuba; but a suspicion, or a secret
denunciation, is sufficient to tear a man from the bosom of his family
at any hour of the day or night, throw him into a dungeon, there to
linger for days or months, if it so please the authorities, and then to
set him free with the mere acknowledgment of his innocence, or send
him to transatlantic exile, if, though innocent, he still remains
suspicious.
" Such is the sad, the dreadful condition of the unfortunate
islanders."
So it will seem that the condition of Cuba and its future history
was receiving already the scrutiny of some of our leading statesmen.
John Quincy Adams, while he was Secretary of State, in 1823, wrote
to the United States Minister at Madrid that, " It will be taken for
granted that the dominion of Spain upon the American Continents,
North and South, is irrevocably gone. But the islands of Cuba and
Porto Rico still remain nominally, and so far really, dependent upon
her that she yet possesses the power of transferring her own dominion
over them, together with the possession of them, to others."
It was inevitable that from an early date the United States should
take a deep interest in the affairs of Cuba. The nearness of the island
to our southern coast made it naturally a part of our domain. At any
rate, it was seen that commercial intercourse between the two coun
tries must be very close and that the possession of Cuba by a hostile
power would be a dangerous menace to the peace and welfare of this
country. The great question to be solved was the duration of the
Cuban conditions, and how long a time should elapse before the United
States should interfere in the interest of humanity, law, order, and
peace. The state of affairs described by Senator Benjamin, with but
few changes, still existed from year to year — a repetition of the past,
without a change of Spanish policy. There must be sooner or later
DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 41
outside interference. No foreign Power shall interfere, said the
United States. So the responsibility rested alone with our Govern
ment, and at last has been taken.
" Cuba and Porto Rico, from their local position [writes Mr. J. Q.
Adams, when Secretary of State in 1823], are natural appendages to
the North American Continent, and one of them, almost in sight of
our shores, from a multitude of considerations has become an object
of transcendent importance to the commercial and political interests
of our Union. Its commanding position, with reference to the Gulf
of Mexico and the West Indian seas; the character of its population;
its situation midway between our southern coasts and the island of
San Domingo; its safe and capacious harbor of Havana, fronting a
long line of our shores destitute of the same advantages; the nature
of its productions and of its wants, furnishing the supplies and needing
the returns of a commerce immensely profitable and mutually bene
ficial, give it an importance in the sum of our national interests with
which that of no other foreign territory can be compared, and little
inferior to that which binds the different members of this Union
together. Such indeed are, between the interests of that island and
this country, the geographical, commercial, moral, and political re
lations formed by nature, gathering, in the process of time, and even
now verging to maturity, that, in looking forward to the probable
course of events for the short period of half a century, it is scarcely
possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our
Federal Republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity
of the Union itself. There are laws of political, as well as physical,
gravitation. And if an apple, severed by the tempest from its native
tree, cannot choose but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined
from its own unnatural connection with Spain, and incapable of self-
support, can gravitate only toward the North American Union, which,
by the same law of nature, cannot cast her off from her bosom."
To this Mr. Adams added that the transfer of Cuba to any other
power would be an event unpropitious to the interest of this Union,
which we should prevent, if necessary, by force.
Thomas Jefferson, a few weeks later, expressed almost exactly the
same ideas in a letter to President Monroe, saying that the addition
of Cuba to this Union " is exactly what is wanted to round out our
power as a Nation to the point of its utmost interest."
42 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Henry Clay also put himself on record, in 1825, to the same effect.
He was then Secretary of State, and in an official letter to the various
American ministers in Europe, he said: " We could not consent to the
occupation of those islands [Cuba and Porto Rico] by any other Euro
pean Power than Spain under any contingency whatever."
Mr. Van Buren, in one of his state papers, said, on this same
subject:
" The Government has always looked with the deepest interest upon
the fate of those islands, but particularly of Cuba. Its geographical
position, which places it almost in sight of our southern shores, and,
as it were, gives it the command of the Gulf of Mexico and the West
Indian seas, its safe and capacious harbors, its rich productions, the
exchange of which for our surplus agricultural products and manu
factures constitute one of the most extensive and valuable branches
of our foreign trade, render it of the utmost importance to the United
States that no change should take place in its condition which might
injuriously affect our political and commercial standing in that
quarter. Other considerations connected with a certain class of our
population make it to the interest of the southern section of the Union
that no attempt should be made in that island to throw off the yoke of
Spanish dependence, the first effect of which would be the sudden
emancipation of a numerous slave population, which result could not
but be very sensibly felt upon the adjacent shores of the United
States."
The United States Government also played the part of Spain's
friend and protector. On more than one occasion other European
Powers were at the point of seizing Cuba from Spain by force. They
were restrained simply by the warning that such a proceeding would
be regarded by the United States as an unfriendly act. The American
Secretary of State wote to the American minister at Madrid, in 1840,
as follows:
" You are authorized to assure the Spanish Government that in
case of any attempt, from whatever quarter, to wrest from her this
portion of her territory, she may securely depend upon the military
and naval resources of the United States to aid her either in preserving
or recovering it."
Again Mr. Buchanan, when Secretary of State in 1847, wrote:
DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 43
" The United States will not tolerate any invasion of Cuba by citizens
of neutral states."
OFFERS TO PURCHASE.
The question of acquiring Cuba by purchase had long been con
sidered by the United States, and in 1848 it was put into concrete
form. In that year the Secretary of State, Mr. Buchanan, wrote to the
American minister at Madrid on the subject, as follows:
" With these considerations in view, the President believes that the
crisis has arrived when an effort should be made to purchase the island
of Cuba from Spain, and he has determined to intrust you with the
performance of this most delicate and important duty. The attempt
should be made, in the first instance, in a confidential conversation
with the Spanish minister for foreign affairs; a written offer might pro
duce an absolute refusal in writing, which would embarrass us here
after in the acquisition of the island. Besides, from the incessant
changes in the Spanish cabinet and policy, our desire to make the pur
chase might thus be made known in an official form to foreign gov
ernments and arouse their jealousy and active opposition. Indeed,
even if the present cabinet should think favorably of the proposition,
they might be greatly embarrassed by having it placed on record, for
in that event it would almost certainly, through some channel, reach
the opposition and become the subject of discussion in the Cortes.
Such delicate negotiations, at least in their incipient stages, ought
always to be conducted in confidential conversation, and with the
utmost secrecy and dispatch.
" At your interview with the minister for foreign affairs you might
introduce the subject by referring to the present distracted condition
of Cuba and the danger which exists that the population will make an
attempt to accomplish a revolution. This must be well known to the
Spanish Government. In order to convince him of the good faith
and friendship toward Spain with which this Government has acted,
you might read to him the first part of my dispatch to General Camp
bell and the order issued by the Secretary of War to the commanding
general in Mexico and to the officer having charge of the embarkation
of our troops at Vera Cruz. You may then touch delicately upon the
danger that Spain may lose Cuba by a revolution in the island, or that
it may be wrested from her by Great Britain, should a rupture take
44 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
place between the two countries, arising out of the dismissal of Sir
Henry Bulwer, and be retained to pay the Spanish debt due to the
British bondholders. You might assure him that while this Govern
ment is entirely satisfied that Cuba shall remain under the dominion
of Spain, we should in any event resist its acquisition by any other
nation. And, finally, you might inform him that, under all these cir
cumstances, the President had arrived at the conclusion that Spain
might be willing to transfer the island to the United States for a fair
and full consideration. You might cite as a precedent the cession of
Louisiana to this country by Napoleon, under somewhat similar cir
cumstances, when he was at the zenith of his power and glory. I have
merely presented these topics in their natural order, and you can fill
up the outline from the information communicated in this dispatch,
as well as from your own knowledge of the subject. Should the
minister for foreign affairs lend a favorable ear to your proposition, then
the question of the consideration to be paid would arise, and you have
been furnished with information in this dispatch which will enable you
to discuss that question.
" The President would be willing to stipulate for the payment of
one hundred million dollars. This, however, is the maximum price;
and if Spain should be willing to sell, you will use your best efforts to
purchase it at a rate as much below that sum as practicable. In case
you should be able to conclude a treaty, you may adopt as your model,
so far as the same may be applicable, the two conventions of April 30,
1803, between France and the United States, for the sale and purchase
of Louisiana. The seventh and eighth articles of the first of these
conventions ought, if possible, to be omitted; still, if this should be
indispensable to the accomplishment of the object, articles similar to
them may be retained."
The offer was declined by the Spanish Government, with an air of
being offended at the very making of it.
THE OSTEND MANIFESTO.
But the matter was not permitted to rest there. In the summer of
1854 the American ministers at London, Paris, and Madrid, Mr.
Buchanan, Mr. Mason, and Mr. Soule, met together at Ostend, and
from that fashionable watering-place issued the famous " Ostend
Manifesto." This was a letter signed by them and addressed to the
THE CHURCH WHERE COLUMBUS WAS BURIED.
DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 47
Secretary of State, urging that immediate steps be taken for the acqui
sition of Cuba. Their plan was first to offer to purchase the island
for one hundred and twenty million dollars. If Spain declined to sell
it, the United States should seize it by force. They said:
" Our past history forbids that we should acquire the island of
Cuba without the consent of Spain unless justified by the great law of
self-preservation. We must, in any event, preserve our own conscious
rectitude and our self-respect. Whilst pursuing this course, we can
afford to disregard the censures of the world, to which we have been
so often and so unjustly exposed. After we shall have offered Spain
a price for Cuba, far beyond its present value, and this shall have been
refused, it will then be time to consider the question, ' Does Cuba,
in the possession of Spain, seriously endanger our internal peace and
the existence of our cherished Union?' Should this question be an
swered in the affirmative, then by every law, human and divine, we
shall be justified in wresting it from Spain, if we possess the power;
and this upon the very same principle that would justify an individual
in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor if there were no
other means of preventing the flames from destroying his own home.
Under such circumstances we ought neither to count the cost nor re
gard the odds which Spain might enlist against us."
This advice was not followed by the Government. But a few years
later, when he became President, Mr. Buchanan in his messages more
than once recurred to the subject and urged the desirability of Ameri
can ownership of Cuba. Indeed, in every one of his annual messages
he strongly recommended the purchase of the island.
LATER UTTERANCES.
Then the Civil War in the United States came on, and attention was
drawn away from Cuba for a time. But soon after the restoration of
peace here the Ten- Years' War broke out there, and the subject of
Cuba was forced upon us again in a very direct manner. What the
feeling of the Government then was may be judged by some of the
utterances of Mr. Fish, the Secretary of State under President Grant.
He wrote in 1874 to the American Minister at Madrid that
" Cuba ought to belong to the great family of American Republics.
The desire of independence on the part of the Cubans is a natural and
48 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
legitimate aspiration of theirs, because they are Americans. That the
ultimate issue of events in Cuba will be its independence, however that
issue may be produced, whether by means of negotiation, or as the
result of military operations, or of one of those unexpected incidents
which so frequently determine the fate of nations, it is impossible to
doubt. It is one of those conclusions which have been aptly termed
the inexorable logic of events. Entertaining these views, the Presi
dent at an early day tendered to the Spanish Government the good
offices of the United States for the purpose of effecting, by negotiation,
the peaceful separation of Cuba from Spain, and thus putting a stop
to the further effusion of blood in the island, and relieving both Cuba
and Spain from the calamities and charges of a protracted civil war,
and of delivering the United States from the constant hazard of incon
venient complications on the side either of Spain or of Cuba. But the
well-intended proffers of the United States on that occasion were un
wisely rejected by Spain, and, as it was then already foreseen, the
struggle has continued in Cuba, with incidents of desperate tenacity
on the part of the Cubans, and of angry fierceness on the part of the
Spaniards, unparalleled in the annals of modern warfare.
" Meanwhile this condition of things grows, day by day, more and
more insupportable to the United States. The Government is com
pelled to exert constantly the utmost vigilance to prevent infringement
of our law on the part of Cubans purchasing munitions or materials
of war, or laboring to fit out military expeditions in our ports ; we are
constrained to maintain a large naval force to prevent violations of our
sovereignty, either by the Cubans or the Spaniards; our people are
horrified and agitated by the spectacle, at our very doors, of war, not
only with all its ordinary attendance of devastation and carnage, but
with accompaniments of barbarous shooting of prisoners of war, or
their summary execution by military commissions, to the scandal and
disgrace of the age; we are under the necessity of interposing continu
ally for the protection of our citizens against wrongful acts of the
local authorities of Spain in Cuba; and the public peace is every mo
ment subject to be interrupted by some unforeseen event, to drive us
at once to the brink of war with Spain. In short, the state of Cuba
is the one great cause of perpetual solicitude in the foreign relations of
the United States."
The Cuban patriots sought and thought they had found their
opportunity in the distress of Spain. In September, 1868, the long-
DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMEMT. 49
standing" disgust of the Spanish people with the corrupt govern
ment of Queen Isabella came to a culmination in open revolution. A
few weeks afterward the Cubans also rose in revolution for their own
independence. It was on October 10, 1868, that Carlos M. de Ces-
pedes, a lawyer of Bayamo, Cuba, with 128 poorly armed men at his
back, raised the standard of revolt and of Cuban freedom. He issued
a formal proclamation of his intentions and of the reasons therefor, as
follows :
" The laborers, animated by the love of their native land, aspire to
the hope of seeing Cuba happy and prosperous by virtue of its own
power, and demand the inviolability of individuals, their homes, their
families, and the fruits of their labor, which it will have guaranteed by
the liberty of conscience, of speech, of the press, by peaceful meetings;
in fact, they demand a government of the country for and by the
country, free from an army of parasites and soldiers that only serve
to consume it and oppress it. And, as nothing of that kind can be
obtained from Spain, they intend to fight it with all available means,
and drive and uproot its dominion on the face of Cuba. Respecting
above all and before all the dignity of man, the association declares
that it will not accept slavery as a forced inheritance of the past; how
ever, instead of abolishing it as an arm by which to sink the island
into barbarity, as threatened by the Government of Spain, they view
abolition as a means of improving the moral and material condition of
the workingman, and thereby to place property and wealth in a more
just and safe position.
" Sons of their times, baptized in the vivid stream of civilization
and therefore above preoccupation of nationality, the laborers will re
spect the neutrality of Spaniards, but among Cubans will distinguish
only friends and foes, those that are with them or against them. To
the former they offer peace, fraternity, and concord; to the latter hos
tility and war — war and hostility that will be more implacable to the
traitors in Cuba where they first saw the day, who turn their arms
against them, or offer any asylum or refuge to their tyrants. We, the
laborers, do not ignore the value of nationality, but at the present mo
ment consider it of secondary moment. Before nationality stands liberty,
the indisputable condition of existence. We must be a people before
becoming a nation. When the Cubans constitute a free people they
will receive the nationality that becomes them. Now they have
none."
50 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
PROGRESS OF THE INSURGENTS.
A week after this proclamation was issued the insurgents were
sufficiently increased in number to capture the town of Bayamo. Ten
days after that the entire district of Holguin was in revolt against
Spain, and by the end of the month Cespedes was at the head of an
army of 15,000 men, poorly armed and drilled, but resolute. Among
those who joined him were the Marquis of Santa Lucia, General Que-
sada, Maximo Gomez, Calixto Garcia, Antonio Maceo, and many
others who have been identified with Cuba's latest fight for freedom.
The patriots were quickly recognized by most of the South American
republics as belligerents, and by April 10, 1869, they were able to
organize a regular government, with an elected legislature, and to
promulgate a national constitution. Cespedes was elected President
of the republic.
The Spanish Captain General at Havana was seriously alarmed,
as he had cause to be. He at first tried to check the movement by
appealing to the people of Cuba to remain loyal to Spain, promising
them all possible reforms and frvors if they would do so. " I will,"
he said, <k brave every danger, accept every responsibility for your wel
fare." He congratulated them on the fact that the revolution in Spain
had swept away the Bourbon dynasty, " tearing up by the roots a
plant so poisonous that it putrefied the air we breathed." He told
them they should receive all the reforms which they required and that
Cubans and Spaniards should henceforth be brothers; Cuba would be
considered a province of Spain; freedom of the press, the right of pub
lic meeting, and equal representation in the Spanish Cortes should be
granted to them. The only effect of this proclamation was to arouse
the contempt and derision of the Cuban people and to strengthen their
determination to free their country once for all from the Spanish yoke.
Then, finding that soft words produced no good effect, the Captain
General sent to Spain for troops in large numbers. The freedom of
the press was abolished throughout the island and martial law was
proclaimed everywhere. The citizens of Havana were compelled at
the point of the bayonet to contribute the sum of twenty-five million
dollars for the use of the Government.
Serious fighting began in February, 1869, and for several months
continued, the rebels being almost uniformly successful. Their first
important victory was at San Cristobal, about 65 miles west of Havana.
The second took place at Guanajay, not far from Havana, on the
DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 5 1
coast. Santiago de Cuba narrowly escaped capture, General Valma-
seda arriving with re-enforcements just in time to save the city. In a
few weeks Havana was threatened.
The insurgents pursued very much the same plan that has proved
so troublesome to Spain in the last war. When they found the Span
ish army too strong for them to meet in the open field, they resorted to
guerrilla warfare, moving swiftly from point to point, baffling pur
suit and striking heavy blows wherever they could. The Spanish Gov
ernment hurried tens of thousands of troops to the island and began
a campaign of savagery. This policy appeared to be that no quarter
should be granted; that all prisoners should be immediately killed, and
even sick and wounded men captured in hospitals should be put to the
sword. The Spanish garrisons managed to keep possession of the
cities, large towns, and fortified camps, but the vast bulk of the open
country and small towns had soon to be abandoned to the rebels.
In March, 1869, the Insurgent Government issued a formal decree
absolutely abolishing slavery. It arranged that the patriots should
receive pay for the loss of their slaves, and that the liberated slaves
might become farmers or enter the army, according to their pleasure.
A great many of them did enter the army and made good soldiers.
The Cuban President then sent an address to the President of the
United States explaining the object of the insurrection and the causes
that provoked it, and arguing strongly in favor of recognition of the
insurgents as belligerents and as an independent power. It was an
eloquent document and strong in logic. Its appeal to the American
President and to the American people was effective, yet the stability
of the Insurgent Government did not seem at that time sufficient to
\varrant the recognition that was asked. Mexico, however, recog
nized the Cubans as belligerents, and Peru recognized their govern
ment as an independent sovereignty, on June 13, 1869.
Three brief addresses are worthy of record here, as indications of
the spirit in which the war was waged on both sides. The first is an
inaugural address of President Cespedes. He said:
" Compatriots: The establishment of a free Government in Cuba,
on the basis of democratic principles, was the most fervent wish of my
heart. The effective realization of this wish was, therefore, enough to
satisfy my aspirations and amply repay the services which, jointly with
you, I may have been able to devote to the cause of Cuban independ
ence. But the will of my compatriots has gone far beyond this, by
52 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
investing me with the most honored of all duties, the supreme magis
tracy of the republic.
" I am not blind to the great labors required in the exercise of the
high functions which you have placed in my charge in these critical
moments, notwithstanding the aid that may be derived from the other
powers of the State. I am not ignorant of the grave responsibility
which I assume in accepting the Presidency of our new-born repub
lic. I know that my weak powers would be far from being equal to the
demand if left to themselves alone. But this will not occur, and that
conviction fills me with faith in the future."
Address to the Army.
The second is the proclamation issued to the Cuban army by Gen
eral Queseda, who was appointed its commander-in-chief. He said:
" In the act of beginning the struggle with the oppressors, Cuba
has assumed the solemn duty to consummate her independence or
perish in the attempt; and, in giving herself a democratic government,
she obligates herself to become a republic. This double obligation,
contracted in the presence of free America, before the liberal world,
and, what is more, before our own conscience, signifies our determina
tion to be heroic and to be virtuous. On your heroism I rely for the
consummation of our independence, and on your virtue I count to
consolidate the republic.
" I implore you, sons of Cuba, to recollect at all hours the proclama
tion of Valmaseda. That document will shorten the time necessary
for the triumph of our cause. That document is an additional proof
of the character of our enemies. Those beings appear deprived even
of those gifts which nature has conceded to the irrational — the instinct
of foresight and of warning. We have to< struggle with tyrants, always
such — the very same ones of the Inquisition, of the Conquest, and of
Spanish domination in America. We have to combat with the assas
sins of women and children, with the mutilators of the dead, with the
idolaters of gold. If you would save your honor and that of your
families, if you would conquer forever your liberty, be soldiers."
Valmaseda 's Bloody Order.
The third is the hideous proclamation of Valmaseda, the Spanish
Captain General, who has ever since been known as " The Butcher."
He said:
DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 53
" Inhabitants of the country! The re-enforcements of troops that
I have been waiting for have arrived; with them I shall give protection
to the good, and punish promptly those that still remain in rebellion
against the government of the metropolis.
" You know that I have pardoned those who have fought us with
arms; that your wives, mothers, and sisters have found in me the un
expected protection that you have refused them. You know, also,
that many of those we have pardoned have turned against us
again.
" Before such ingratitude, such villainy, it is not possible for me
to be the man that I have been ; there is no longer a place for a falsi
fied neutrality: Pie that is not for me is against me', and that my soldiers
may know how to distinguish, you hear the order they carry."
It was thereafter war to the knife, and the knife to the hilt.
Throughout 1869 the Cubans were generally successful. Many out
rages were perpetrated by the Spaniards, and a large part of the island
was laid desolate. In the fall of that year a Cuban junta was organized
in New York and thereafter did excellent work for the patriot cause in
enlisting American sympathy and securing and forwarding supplies
of arms and ammunition. By the summer of 1870 it was evident that
war would be a long and bitter one. The insurgents then had more
than 50,000 men in the field. These were chiefly in small parties,
poorly armed and carrying on a irregular system of warfare, which was,
however, most effective in annoying and injuring the Spanish Gov
ernment.
The first serious blow to the insurrection occurred in the spring of
1871, when a considerable number of their troops operating in the
district of Camaguey, in the central part of the island, surrendered to
the Spanish Government on the condition that their lives should be
spared. Their Commander, General Agramonte, would not surrender,
but organized another force and maintained the conflict for two years
longer, when he was killed in battle.
* The year 1873 was perhaps the most bloody of the whole war.
Fighting was almost incessant, and, though the engagements were in
dividually small, in the aggregate they meant a vast amount of blood
shed. In the fall of that year President Cespedes was removed from
his office by the Cuban Congress and retired to private life. Some
time afterward he was found by the Spaniards, living in peace and
quiet and taking no part in the war, and was brutally put to death.
54 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
The Marquis of Santa Lucia was elected President in his place. His
estates had already been confiscated by the Spanish Government and
he now renounced his title and became known thereafter simply as
Seiior Cisneros.
The war was conducted on the Spanish side with all the severity
and cruelty hinted at in Valmaseda's order, and deliberate attempt was
made to exterminate the entire population of the island. No excep
tion was made in behalf of sex or age — helpless women, infants in the
cradle, and infirm old men were alike put to death, often with every
possible insult and torture. One of the officers of the Spanish army
wrote in the fall of 1869 concerning a certain engagement:
"We captured seventeen, thirteen of whom were shot outright;
on dying they shouted: ' Hurrah for free Cuba! hurrah for independ
ence! ' A mulatto said, 'Hurrah for Cespedes!' On the following
day we killed a Cuban officer and another man. Among the thirteen
that we shot the first day were found three sons and their father; the
father witnessed the execution of his sons without even changing color,
and when his turn came he said he died for the independence of his
country. On coming back we brought along with us three carts filled
with women and children, the families of those we had shot; and they
asked us to shoot them, because they would rather die than live among
Spaniards."
Another wrote a few days later: " Not a single Cuban will remain
in this island. We shoot all those we find in the fields, on the farms,
and in every house. We do not leave a creature alive where we pass,
be it man or animal."
In these statements there was no exaggeration. The acts de
scribed were repeated a thousand times throughout the island during
that dreadful war.
" It could not," says one of the most trustworthy observers of the
war, " be expected that the insurgents on their own side should ab
stain from taking a fearful revenge." The practice with them when
a prisoner, especially an officer, fell into their hands, was to hang
him by his feet to the branch of a tree and build a fire beneath his
head.
" Indeed, it would not be easy to ascertain on which side the atroci
ties first began, or are carried to greater lengths. The rule is that all
prisoners be shot without discrimination. Nay, the conquerors even
DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 57
grudge their powder and shot, and the victims are usually dispatched
with machetes, a kind of long chopping-knife or cutlass peculiar to a
cane-growing country, and to be almost invariably seen at the side
of every combatant as well as in every laborer's hand. Some of the
soldiers and volunteers have acquired such skill in the use of this
weapon that they cut off a man's head with all the mastery of a pro
fessional executioner. These men march in the rear of their detach
ments; and upon any suspected person being apprehended, the officer
in command, after a brief examination, orders the prisoner to the rear,
where he is immediately hacked to pieces by the inexorable macheteros.
As a rule also, the bodies of the slain are left unburied on the spot
where they fall. The turkey buzzards swarming everywhere in the
island, and whose life is protected by law on account of their use
fulness as public scavengers, fatten on the rotting human carcasses;
and it is not without a shudder that one sees these foul birds hovering
everywhere in the air, and poising themselves on their wings above
the forests where the remnants of their hideous feasts in every stage of
decomposition still attract them."
Throughout the war the insurgents received much aid from the
United States. That is to say, their friends and sympathizers here
sent them arms and ammunition whenever possible. Under the neu
trality laws of the United States it was perfectly legitimate to do this,
but of course there was much danger of the vessels carrying such sup
plies being seized by the Spaniards upon their arrival in Cuban waters.
Some were thus seized, but many more succeeded in eluding the
Spaniards and landing their supplies upon the Cuban coast.
Case of the " Virginius"
About twenty-six years ago the civilized world in general, and the
United States especially, were greatly shocked and stirred up by the
capture of the " Virginius," and the murder of a portion of her crew.
The " Virginius " was said to be an English-built, side-wheel steamer
originally called the " Virgin," and was distinguished as a daring
blockade runner during the war between the States. In 1870, it is
said, she was sold in Washington to an agent of the Cuban junta, and
her name was changed to the " Virginius." For three years there
after she made a number of successful and daring expeditions to the
Cuban coast, carrying clothing, food, ammunition, and arms to the
insurgents. On the 23d of October, 1873, the " Virginius " cleared
58 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
from the U. S. Consulate in Kingston, Jamaica, as a United States
vessel bound for Port Limon, Costa Rica. On board were a number
of Cuban insurgents, and the crew was composed of Americans,
Cubans, and some others. On board, too were a number of enlisted
men to join the insurgent army. The commander oi the " Virginius "
was named Captain Joseph Fry, a citizen of the United States. A
Spanish gunboat, " Tornado " — constructed, it is said, by the same
English firm that built the " Virginius " — discovered the latter on the
3 ist day of October, as she was approaching the Cuban coast, and
chased her for eight hours, capturing her about ten o'clock that night,
and taking her to Santiago de Cuba; Captain Fry claiming that his
boat flew American colors, had an American crew, and was an Ameri
can ship. The 155 men captured were taken ashore, placed in close
confinement, and court-martialed, and the most of them sentenced to
be shot.
The whole proceedings were very summary and rapid. Fodr
days thereafter the first four were shot, Brigadier General Ryan being
one, though he claimed to be a Canadian, and therefore a British
citizen. These men, according to the usual Spanish style, were shot
in the back, and afterward their heads were cut off and displayed on
spikes, while their bodies were trampled by horses. After an inter
val of twelve days, twelve more of them were shot, and five days later
thirty-seven were executed, these last being the officers and crew of
the " Virginius " and some of them American citizens. It is said that
the American flag was not flying from its staff and that the American
consul was directed to keep in his office. Captain Fry was among the
first ten who were shot; and some of the men, it is reported, were not
killed by the firing, but were shot afterward through their mouths by
the Spanish soldiers. Burriel, the Spanish general, seemed to have
been a regular butcher. He promptly refused all protests of the
American and British vice consuls, and would not allow them to use
the telegraph to communicate with their governments. It is said the
American vice consul, Schmidt, wrote repeated communications to
General Burriel, but failed to get replies, except in one instance when
this blood-thirsty Spaniard told him that he should have known that
the day previous was religious festival, during which he and all of his
officers were engaged in meditation on the divine mysteries, and could
not consider temporal affairs. Fortunately news of what was going
on reached Jamaica, and the British gunboat " Niobe," Captain Sir
Lambton Lorraine, left for the scene of massacre. The captain was on
DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 59
shore at Santiago almost before his ship had dropped anchor, and
declared that he would bombard the city if there was another man ex
ecuted. Ninety-three men were still alive, and their execution he
demanded should be suspended.
These acts at Santiago were in keeping with much else which had
been done of similar nature, but perhaps on not so large a scale, and
aroused the public indignation of the United States, and mass meetings
were held demanding vengeance on Spain. Admiral Polo de Bernabe,
the father of the last Spanish minister who succeeded De Lome,
wanted to submit the matter to arbitration, but Hamilton Fish, then
Secretary of State, very properly replied to him that the capture on the
high seas in a time of peace of a vessel bearing the register and papers
of an American ship was not deemed referable to other powers to de
termine. The nation must be the judge and custodian of its own
honor. And on November 4 Fish cabled to Sickles, then American
minister to Madrid, that, " In case of refusal of satisfactory reparation
within twelve days from this date, close your legation and leave
Madrid. If Spain cannot redress these outrages the United States
will." The matter was finally settled by Spain agreeing to surrender
to an American ship the " Virginius " and the survivors of those who
had been captured with her, and that on the 25th of September the
United States flag should be saluted by the " Tornado." Of course
these terms contemplated that the " Virginius " should be surrendered
in Santiago, or taken to Havana for that purpose, but the Spanish took
the vessel to an obscure harbor, Bahia Honda, and there delivered her
to Captain W. D. Whiting, chief of staff of the North Atlantic Squad
ron. Lieutenant Marix was his flag lieutenant, the same officer who
was recently judge advocate on the court of inquiry on the " Maine "
disaster. The salute to the flag never took place, and no indemnity
was ever paid for the lives of the American citizens who had been
executed. Right then and there the United States should have de
clared war on Spain; but, in lieu thereof, she allowed the incident to
be closed and the vessel to be surrendered in a little obscure place in
order to avoid the publicity of the "Virginius " being returned; and
this publicity was one of the principal subjects the United States was
supposed to have in mind when she arranged the terms. Spain came
out of the affair with flying colors. The " Virginius " was of no use
to her, or, indeed, to anybody else, because she was not seaworthy, and
a little later sank on her way to New York. The United States went
through the form of exacting certain conditions in order to appease
60 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
some of her people, but at the same time was very careful not to insist
upon conditions which Spain might refuse, and thus leave her the
alternative of declaring war. An eye-witness of this transfer of the
" Virginius " writes:
" While the Spanish officer was courtesy itself, we were all im
pressed with the fact that the ceremony was lacking in dignity and that
the Spaniards had purposely n.ade that lack as conspicuous as they
dared. It appeared that the ' Virginius ' was towed from Havana by
the first-class man-of-war ' Isabella la Catolica,' the commander of
which retired immediately and left the surrender to be made by the
'commander of the ' Favorita,' which had been in the vicinity of Bahia
Honda for several months engaged in surveying duty. The surrender
should have taken place either at Santiago de Cuba or at Havana, and
a Spanish officer of like rank with Captain Whiting should have dis
charged the duty. A quick survey by our officers showed the ' Vir
ginius ' to be in a most filthy condition. She was stripped of almost
everything movable save a few vermin, which haunted the mattresses
and cushions in cabin and staterooms, and half a dozen casks of water.
The decks were caked with dirt, and nuisances recently committed,
combined with mold and decomposition, caused a foul stench in the
forecastle and below the hatches. In the cabin, however, the odor of
carbolic acid gave evidence that an attempt had been made to make
that part of the vessel habitable for the temporary custodians of the
ship. Our officers were reluctant to put the men into the dirty fore
castle and stowed them away into hardly more agreeable quarters
afforded by the staterooms of Ryan and his butchered companions.
Some attempt seemed to have been made, as shown by the engineering
survey, to repair the machinery, but a few hours' work put the engines
in workable order. The ship was leaking considerably and the pumps
had to be kept going constantly to keep the water down. After a few
hours of hard work we got under way, but had only gone two hundred
yards when the engine suddenly refused to do duty, and it became
necessary for the ' Dispatch ' to take us in tow. As we passed the
fort at the entrance to the harbor the Spanish flag was rather defiantly
displayed by that antiquated apology for a fortification, and there was
no salute for the American flag, either from the fort or the surrender
ing sloop of war.
" We had a hard time that night, those of us who were aboard the
' Virginius/ It seemed hardly possible that we could keep afloat until
DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 6l
morning. During the night the navy tug ' Fortune ' from Key West
met us and remained with the convoy. At noon the next day, when
we were about thirty miles south-southeast of Dry Tortugas, the ves
sels separated, the ' Virginius ' and ' Dispatch ' going to Tortugas and
the ' Fortune ' returning, with me as a solitary passenger, to Key
West, whence I had the honor of reporting the news to the admiral
and of sending an exclusive report of the surrender.
A Scurvy Spanish Trick.
" It was the general opinion among the naval officers that Spain
had endeavored to belittle the whole proceeding ordering the smug
gling of the ' Virginius ' out of Havana, by selecting an obscure harbor
not a port of entry as the place of surrender, and by turning the duty
of surrender over to a surveying sloop, while the ' Tornado/ which
made the capture, lay in the harbor of Havana and the ' Isabella la
Catolica,' which had been selected as convoy, steamed back to
Havana under cover of the night. The American officers and Ameri
can residents in Cuba and Key West agreed that our government
ought to have required that the 4 Virginius ' should be surrendered
with all the released prisoners on board either at Santiago de Cuba,
where the ' Tornado ' brought her ill-gotten prey and where the in
human butcheries were committed, or in Havana, where she was after
ward taken in triumph and greeted with the cheers of the excited
Spaniards over the humiliation of the Americans.
" An attempt was made to take the ' Virginius ' to some Northern
port, but the old hulk was not equal to the journey. On the way no
pumping or calking could stop her leaks, and she foundered in mid-
ocean. The Government had been puzzled to know what disposition
to make of her, and there was great relief in official circles to know
that she was out of the way.
' The surrender of the surviving prisoners of the massacre took
place in course of time at Santiago, owing more to British insistence
than to our feeble representations. As to the fifty-three who were
killed, the Madrid Government unblushingly denied that there had
been any killing, and when forced to acknowledge the fact they put us
off with preposterous excuses. ' Butcher Burriel,' by whose -orders
the outrage was perpetrated, was considered at Madrid to have been
justified by circumstances. It was pretended that orders to suspend
the execution of Ryan and his associates were ' unfortunately ' received
62 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
too late, owing to interruption of telegraph lines by the insurgents, to
whose broad and bleeding shoulders an attempt was thus made to shift
the responsibility. There was a normal repudiation of Burriel's act,
and a promise was made to inflict punishment upon those who have
offended, but no punishment was inflicted upon anybody. The Span
ish Government, with characteristic double-dealing, resorted to pro
crastination, prevarication, and trickery, and thus gained time until
new issues effaced in the American mind the memory of old wrongs
unavenged. Instead of being degraded, Burriel was promoted.
Never to this day has there been any adequate atonement by
Spain."
This war dragged on for ten years, and was finally ended by nego
tiations conducted by General Martinez de Campos, who was sent to
Cuba as Captain General for the express purpose of ending the war.
How he did his work has been told by himself at great length. The
simple fact is that he prevailed upon the leaders of the insurgents to
lay down their arms, partly through bribery and partly through
promises of reforms in the government of the island. The final bar
gain was made at a place called Zanjon, and has since been known
as the " Treaty of Zanjon."
General Campos was undoubtedly sincere in his promises to the
Cubans. He urged upon the Spanish Government the desirability of
fulfilling them to the letter. In his report to the Government he said:
Campos' Wise Words.
" I do not wish to make a momentary peace. I desire that this
peace be the beginning of a bond of common interests between Spain
and her Cuban provinces, and that this bond be drawn continually
closer by the identity of aspirations and the good faith of both.
" Let not the Cubans be considered as pariahs or minors, but put
on an equality with other Spaniards in everything not inconsistent with
their present condition.
" It was on the other hand impossible, according to my judgment
and conscience, not to grant the first condition; not to do it was to
postpone indefinitely the fulfillment of a promise made in our pres
ent constitution. It was not possible that this island, richer, more
populous, and more advanced morally and materially than her sister,
Porto Rico, should remain without the advantages and liberties long
ago planted in the latter with good results; and the spirit of the age, and
DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 63
the decision of the country gradually to assimilate the colonies to the
Peninsula, made it necessary to grant the promised reforms, which
would have been already established, and surely more amply, if the
abnormal state of things had not concentrated all the attention of gov
ernment on the extirpation of the evil which was devouring this rich
province.
" I did not make the last constitution; I had no part in the discus
sion of it. It is now the law, and as such I respect it, and as such en
deavor to apply it. But there was in it something conditional, which
I think a danger, a motive of distrust, and I have wished that it might
disappear. Nothing assures me that the present ministry will con
tinue in power, and I do not know whether that which replaces it
would believe the fit moment to have arrived for fulfilling the precept
of the constitution.
" I desire the peace of Spain, and this will not be firm while there is
war or disturbance in the richest jewel of her crown. Perhaps the in
surgents would have accepted promises less liberal and more vague
than those set forth in this condition; but even had this been done, it
would have been but a brief postponement, because those liberties are
destined to come for the reasons already given, with the difference that
Spain now shows herself generous and magnanimous, satisfying just
aspirations which she might deny, and a little later, probably very
soon, would have been obliged to grant them, compelled by the force
of ideas and of the age.
" Moreover, she has promised over and over again to enter on the
path of assimilation, and if the promise were more vague, even though
the fulfillment of this promise were begun, these people would have
the right to doubt our good faith and to show a distrust unfortunately
warranted by the failings of human nature itself.
:' The not adding another 100,000 to the 100,000 families that
mourn their sons slain in this pitiless war, and the cry of peace that
will resound in the hearts of the 80,000 mothers who have sons in
Cuba, or liable to conscription, would be a full equivalent for the oay-
ment of a debt of justice."
Results of the War.
It remains to be said that the Spanish Government quickly re
pudiated almost every promise that had been made by General Cam
pos, and that the state of the island soon became as bad as it had
been before the war.
64 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
What the war cost Cuba and cost Spain can never be exactly told.
According to official Spanish statements, 145,000 soldiers were sent
from Spain to the island. It is known that the losses of the patriots,
in killed, were more than 45,000. The majority of these were mur
dered in cold blood in prison after they had surrendered or been cap
tured. Some 13,000 estates belonging to Cubans were confiscated.
The cost of the war in money has been estimated at about one billion
dollars. It is believed that the Spanish losses, in killed and from dis
ease, amounted to fully 85,000. During the war a university professor
at Havana kept a careful record of the number of Cubans the Span
iards officially reported as killed, wounded, or captured. He found
at the end of the war that the totals amounted to considerable more
than the entire population of the island. This was a fair illustration of
the truthfulness of Spanish reports.
After the end of this Ten-Years' War, as it is called, Spanish mis-
government was continued as badly and in many respects worse than
before. All the cost of the war was charged against Cuba as a public
debt. Dishonesty and corruption became more flagrant than ever be
fore. This was recognized by Spanish leaders at Madrid themselves.
Senor Romero Robledo said in the Cortes in 1890 that certain defalca
tions by the public officers at Havana amounted to nearly
twenty-three million dollars. The Government knew of it, but
did nothing. General Pando at about the same time said in the
Cortes: " How can anyone doubt that corruption exists in the island
of Cuba?" General Prendergrast has furnished a list of 350 persons
employed in the customhouse and the administration, against whom
proceedings have been taken for fraud, and not one of whom has been
punished.
Another member of the Cortes, in 1895 asserted that since 1878
customhouse frauds in Cuba had amounted to more than one hundred
million dollars.
In this manner the Government at Madrid repudiated its own
solemn pledges and drove the people of Cuba to despair. Thus the
way was cleared for the latest and last rebellion in the " Ever-faithful
Isle."
PRISON OF EVANGELINA CISNEROS.
THE CUBA OF TO-DAY.
CHAPTER II.
Size, Shape, and Situation of the Island— Its Rivers and Harbors — The Vege
tation and Climate— Agricultural Products— Mineral Resources— Something
about the People — The Negro Population — Religion and Education — The
Spanish Government a Military Despotism — Revolting Tyranny.
THE island of Cuba is by far the largest and most important of all the
West Indies. Its area is much larger than that of any other; its natu
ral resources are more varied and valuable; and its population, in spite
of the ravages of war and the discouragements of bad government, is
more numerous than that of any of its neighbors. Its position,
whether from the point of view of commerce or of war, lends it especial
importance. It is less than 100 miles from the southern extremity of
the United States and 130 from Mexico. It commands three impor
tant maritime gateways — viz., the Straits of Florida, leading from the
Atlantic Ocean into the Gulf of Mexico; the Windward Passage, which
leads from the Atlantic into the Caribbean Sea, and the Yucatan Chan
nel, which connects the Caribbean Sea with the Gulf of Mexico.
The general outline of the island has been compared by the Span
ish with that of a bird's tongue. It also resembles that of a hammer-
headed shark, the head of which forms the straight south coast of the
east end of the island, while the body extends to the westward in a
great curve. This analogy is made still more striking by two long,
fin-like strings of small islands which extend along the opposite coasts,
parallel with the main body of the island. The island extends through
1 1 degrees of longitude, from the 74th to the 85th meridian, and
through nearly 4 degrees of latitude, from 19° 40' to 23° 33'. Its
length is 730 miles, and its width varies from 90 miles at the eastern
end to less than 20 miles at Havana. Cape Maysi, the eastern ex
tremity, lies directly south of New York, and Cape San Antonio, at
the extreme west, is exactly south of Cincinnati. The area of the main
island is nearly 43,000 square miles, and that of the smaller adjacent
islands about 2600 square miles.
The total area, therefore, is about equal to that of the State of New
York.
67
68 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
On this area are to be found almost all kinds of land, including
swamps, level plains, plateaus, hills, and high mountains. About one-
fourth of the total area is mountainous, while three-fifths are plains,
valleys, and low hills. The remainder is swampy. The coast line,
with its many curves and indentations, measures nearly 2200 miles.
In some parts it is high and steep and at others low and marshy.
Along the north coast, between the cities of Havana and Matanzas, are
ranges of hills which Humboldt declared to contain some of the most
beautiful scenery in the world. In the central part of the island these
hills change into extensive plateaus, and at the south side become
mountainous and reach a high altitude.
RIVERS AND HARBORS.
The rivers of Cuba are necessarily short, but are numerous and
afford excellent drainage to the entire island. The heavy rainfall give%
them a copious volume, despite the limited area of watershed. No
island in the world of comparable size has anything like so many
good harbors as Cuba. Indeed, no equal stretch of coast line in the
world is blessed with so many. They are not only numerous, but
capacious, deep, and safe. Most of them are pouch-shaped, entrance
to them being gained through a comparatively narrow gateway, with
high headlands on each side and the interior harbor almost entirely
landlocked, expanding into a large open bay. Chief among these
harbor's are Havana, Matanzas, Nuevitas, Gibara, Nipe, and Baracoa
on the north coast, and Guantanamo, Santiago de Cuba, Manzanillo,
Trinidad, and Cienfuegos on the south. The last-named is said to be
one of the very finest harbors in the world.
THE FLORA.
The surface of the island, as described by Professor Robert T. Hill
of the United States Geological Survey (from whom this chapter is
largely quoted), is clad in a voluptuous floral mantle which, from its
abundance and beauty, first caused Cuba to be designated as the Pearl
of the Antilles. In addition to those introduced from abroad, over
3350 native plants have been catalogued. Humboldt said: " We might
believe the entire island was originally a forest of palms, wild limes,
and orange trees." The flora includes nearly all the characteristic
forms of the other West Indies, the southern part of Florida, and the
Central American seaboard. Nearly all the large trees of the Mexican
THE CUBA OF TO-DAY. 69
Tierra Calientc, so remarkable for their size, foliage, and fragrance,
reappear in western Cuba. Over 30 species of palm, including the
famous royal palm (Oreodoxa regia), occur, while the pine tree, else
where characteristic of the temperate zone and the high altitudes of the
tropics, is found associated with palms and mahoganies in the province
of Pinar del Rio and the Isle of Pines, both of which take their names
from this tree.
Among other woods are the lignum vitae, granadilla, the cocoa
wood, out of which reed instruments are made, mahogany, and
Cedrela odorata, which is used for cigar boxes and linings of cabinet
work.
Although three hundred years of cultivation have exterminated the
forests from the sugar lands of the center and west, it is estimated that
in the hills of those districts and the mountains of the east nearly
thirteen million acres of uncleared forest remain.
Rich and nutritious grasses are found throughout the island, afford
ing excellent forage for stock. The pineapple, manioc, sweet potato,
and Indian corn are indigenous to the island. When the flora of Cuba
is studied geographically, it will doubtless be divided into several sub
divisions.
THE CLIMATE.
Climatologic records are not available, except for Havana,
and these are not applicable to the whole island, where it is
but natural to suppose that the altitudes and positions of the high
mountains produce great variations in precipitation and humidity, such
as are observable in adjacent islands. The Sierra Maestra probably
presents conditions of temperature very nearly the same as the Blue
Mountains of Jamaica, where the thermometer at times falls almost
to the freezing point.
Everywhere the rains are most abundant in summer, from May to
October — the rainy season. As a rule, the rains, brought by the trade
winds, are heavier and more frequent on the slopes of the eastern end.
At Havana the annual rainfall is 40 inches, of which 28 inches fall in
the wet season. This rainfall is not excessive, being no greater than
that of our Eastern States. The air at this place is usually charged with
85 per cent, of moisture, which under the tropical sun largely induces
the rich mantle of vegetation. The average number of rainy days in
the year is 102. There is but one record of snow having fallen in
Cuba, namely, in 1856.
70 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
At Havana, in July and August, the warmest months, the mean
temperature is 82° F., fluctuating between a maximum of 88° and a
minimum of 76°; in the cooler months of December and January the
thermometer averages 72°, the maximum being 78°, the minimum 58°;
the mean temperature of the year at Havana, on a mean of seven years,
is 77°; but in the interior, at elevations of over 300 feet above the sea,
the thermometer occasionally falls to the freezing point in winter, hoar
frost is not uncommon, and during north winds thin ice may form.
The prevailing wind is the easterly trade breeze, but from November
to February cool north winds (los nortes, or " northers ") — the south
ern attenuation of our own cold waves — rarely lasting more than forty-
eight hours, are ^xperienced in the western portion of the island, to
which they add a third seasonal change. From 10 to 12 o'clock are
the hottest hours of the day; after noon a refreshing breeze (la lirazoii)
sets in from the sea. In Santiago de Cuba the average is 80°; that of
the hottest month is 84° and that of the coldest 73°.
The whole island is more or less subject to hurricanes, often of
great ferocity. The hurricane of 1846 leveled nearly 2000 houses in
Havana and sank or wrecked over 300 vessels. In 1896 the banana
plantations of the east were similarly destroyed. Earthquakes are sel
dom felt in the western districts, but are frequent in the eastern.
All in all, the climate of Cuba is much more salubrious than it has
been painted. The winter months are delightful — in fact, ideal — while
the summer months are more endurable than in most of our own terri
tory. The current impressions of insalubrity have arisen from an erro
neous confusion of bad sanitation with the weather. While it is true
that sickness follows the seasons, the former would be greatly allayed
— almost abated — if public hygiene received proper official con
sideration.
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS.
Cuba is almost exclusively an agricultural country. Its chief
products are sugar from the sugar-cane, tobacco, coffee, bananas, corn,
oranges, and pineapples, which are of importance in the order named.
The production of cane-sugar is incomparably the most important of
all, and heretofore has been the mainstay of the island. This industry
had its origin as long ago> as 1523, when the king of Spain gave a
bounty to everyone who engaged in it. In times of peace the whole
vast central plain of the island has been practically one continuous
field of sugar-cane. In the year 1892-93 it yielded more than one
THE CUBA OF TO-DAY. Jt
million tons, valtied at eighty million dollars. The Cuban sugar lands;
are all on upland soils, far different from the swamps of Louisiana, and
excel in fertility all others in the world, It is necessary to replant the
cane only once in seven years, instead of every year or two as else
where. The plantations vary in extent from one hundred to one thou
sand acres each, and employ an average of one man to every two acres.
Before the plantations were ravaged by the revolution, they were
equipped with the most perfect manufacturing machinery in the world.
Tobacco stands next to sugar in importance, and far exceeds it in
the profit per acre. It grows well in all parts of the island, but is
chiefly cultivated in the extreme western end, which produces the finest
tobacco in the world. In addition to plantations for growing leaf
tobacco, there are numerous cigar factories in Havana, giving employ
ment to thousands of people. In 1893 more than six million pounds
of tobacco and one hundred and thirty-five million cigars were ex
ported.
Coffee growing has declined in importance in recent years. The
coffee plantations have all given way to sugar. Bananas and oranges
of the finest quality grow wild in all parts of the island. Pineapples
are extensively cultivated. Mahogany and logwood have also been
among the exports, and at one time indigo formed a considerable
article of commerce.
In the eastern provinces of the island, the cattle industry, owing to
the fertile grazing lands, reaches large proportions. Horses, goats,
and sheep are also bred, though the latter do not do well. Poultry
flourishes everywhere, and was, before the wrar, abundant in all mar
kets. In 1895 the island contained more than one hundred thousand
farms and plantations, valued at more than twenty million dollars.
MINERAL RESOURCES.
The mineral resources of the island are iron ores, asphaltum, man
ganese, copper, and salt. A little gold and silver were mined in past
centuries, but never in large quantities. The silver mines of Santa
Clara yielded in 1827 140 ounces to the ton, but were soon worked
out. The iron mines situated in the mountains a few miles east of
Santiago de Cuba are of importance. The production of the Juragua
Iron Company in 1890 was 362,068 tons, and constituted one-fourth
of the total importation of iron ores into the United States for the same
period. These mines were owned by an American company, which
72 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
had invested extensive capital in them, but the production has been
almost destroyed by the present revolution. The ores are mineralog-
ically peculiar, being the result of replacement in limestone. They
are mixed brown and red hematite (turgite).
Asphaltum (chapatote) of unusual richness occurs in several parts
of the island, in the beds of late Cretaceous and early Eocene age. At
Villa Clara occurs an unusually large deposit of this material, which
for forty years has supplied the material for making the illuminating
gas of the city. American investors bought these mines the year pre
ceding the revolution, and their investment up to date, which would
otherwise have been profitable, has proved a total loss.
Copper of extraordinary richness has been worked on the leeward
side of the Sierra Maestra range, twelve miles from Santiago de Cuba.
In former years these mines yielded as high as fifty tons per day. Cur
rent report asserts that they are still very valuable, but are awaiting
the return of peace and development. Salt of great purity is found in
the cays adjacent to the north coast.
No manufacturing industries except those of tobacco and sugar
have been encouraged, the persistent policy of Spain having been to
promote the importation of manufactured articles from the mother
country. In the writer's travels over the island only a single indus
trial establishment was seen, namely, a mill at Baracoa for extracting
oil from cocoanuts and making soap.
COMMERCE.
The shipping trade of Cuba, both foreign and coastwise, has been
very extensive, the American tonnage alone amounting to 1,000,000
tons a year. About 1200 ocean-going vessels annually clear from the
Port of Havana. In 1894 the tonnage of the largest nine ports of the
island amounted to more than 3,500,000 tons, carried by 31,181 vessels.
The island is not well supplied with roads. There are less than
looo miles of railroad — none of it first-class. Wagon roads are poor.
Telegraph lines in 1895 measured something more than 2800 miles,
including nearly 1000 miles of cables along the coast.
THE CHIEF CITIES.
The capital city, Havana, which boasts of the title of Key of the New
World, lies on the west and south side of a splendid harbor, which,
THE CUBA OF TO-DAY. 73
however, has been sadly neglected. It is a picturesque and beautiful
city, presenting a brilliant appearance of a European capital. Its com
merce is ordinarily enormous, and its extensive parks, drives, and
numerous clubs and public institutions give it picturesque variety. It
comprises extensive wharfs, fortifications, hospitals, university, a
botanical garden, government palaces, and several churches — includ
ing a cathedral, which contains the tomb of Columbus, although his
dust is not certainly known to repose therein.
West of Havana are several small ports of secondary importance,
such as Mariel, Cabanas, and Bahia Honda. Seventy-five miles east
is the second city and seaport of northern Cuba, Matanzas. This is
the chief outlet for an extensive sugar region. Nature endowed it
with a superb harbor, but Spanish neglect has allowed it to become
filled up with silt and rubbish, until it is no longer able to receive the
largest steamships.
Cardenas is one of the few towns in Cuba founded as late as the
present century. It dates back only to 1828.
Cienfuegos, on the southern coast, has a superb harbor, which was
first visited in 1508. It is second in commercial importance only to
Havana. Trinidad, east of Cienfuegos, has three harbors and is of
much importance, dating back to the earliest years of the Spanish con
quests.
The great port of the eastern end of the island is Santiago de
Cuba. It lies at the inner extremity of one of the largest and finest
of the pouch-shaped harbors and commands one of the most mag
nificent. views of land and water to be had in the whole world. There
are also numerous inland cities of importance — such as Santa Clara,
Esperanza, Puerto Principe, Holguin, and Bayamo.
Upon few subjects connected with Cuba is the world at large so ill-
informed as that of its population. No trustworthy census has been
taken by the Government for half a century. One was taken in 1887,
but is probably filled with errors. It showed the total population to
be something more than 1,600,000, of whom more than two-thirds were
white and only thirty-two per cent, of the negro race.
Of the total population of Cuba about 30,000 are Chinese male
laborers. The Spanish-born, not counting the present army of in
vasion, probably do not exceed 30,000, while counting all others there
are not over 50,000 Caucasian foreigners. This foreign population,
except the Chinese, is engaged in office-holding, trade, and shipping,
and is largely confined by residence to the cities, which contain fully
74 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
one-third of the total population. These foreigners, having no other
interest in the welfare of the country than gain of wealth, and possess-
jng no intention of permanent residence, should not be considered in
any manner as representative of the Cuban people, although, alas! their
voice has, in recent political events, almost drowned that of the true
inhabitants.
To the Cubans the foreign Spaniards are known as Intransigentes,
and between the two classes, the governors and the governed, owing
to the despotism of the former, a bitter hatred has existed since 1812,
and has been more strongly accentuated since the surrender of Zan-
jon, in 1876, when the rebellious Cubans laid down their arms under
unfulfilled promises of autonomy and local self-government similar to
schemes lately presented.
THE CUBANS.
Seventy-five per cent, of the native population of the islands Is
found outside of the Spanish capital of Havana, which, being the seat
of an unwelcome foreign despotism, is no more representative of Cuban
life or character than is the English city of Hong-Kong of the rural
Chinese. While the Havanese have had the freest communication
with the United States during the last three years of the revolution,
Americans have had little opportunity to hear from the true white
Cuban population. The Cubans are mostly found in the provinces
and provincial cities, especially in Pinar del Rio and the eastern prov
inces of Santa Clara, Puerto Principe, and Santiago. Although of
Spanish blood, the Cubans, through adaptation to environment, have
become a different class from the people of the mother country, just
as the American stock has differentiated from the English. Under the
influence of their surroundings, they have developed into a gentle, in
dustrious, and normally peaceable race, not to be judged by the com-
bativeness which they have developed under a tyranny such as has
never been imposed upon any other people. The better class of
Camagueynos, as the natives are fond of calling themselves, are cer
tainly the finest, the most valiant, and the most independent men of
the island, while the women have the highest type of beauty. It is
their boast that no Cuban woman has ever become a prostitute, and
crime is certainly almost unknown among them.
While these people may not possess our local customs and habits,
they have strong traits of civilized character, including honesty, family
attachment, hospitality, politeness of address, and a respect for the
THE CUBA OF TO-DAY. 77
Golden Rule. While numerically inferior to the annual migration of
Poles, Jews, and Italians into the eastern United States, against which
no official voice is raised, they are far too superior to these people to
justify the abuse that has been heaped upon them by those who have
allowed their judgment to be prejudiced by fears that they might by
some means be absorbed into our future population.
Notwithstanding the disadvantages under which the Cubans have
labored, they have contributed many members to the learned profes
sions. To educate their sons and daughters in the institutions of the
United States, England, and France has always been the highest am
bition of the Creoles of Cuba and Porto Rico. The influence of their
educated men is felt in many countries: the most distinguished pro
fessor of civil engineering, two leading civil engineers of our navy,
and the most eminent authority on yellow fever in our country be
long to this class. Thousands of these people, driven from their
beloved island, have settled in Paris, London, New York, Mexico,
and the West Indies, where they hold honorable positions in society,
and even the exiles of the lower classes, with their superior agricul
tural arts, have been eagerly welcomed in countries like Jamaica, Mex
ico, and Florida, which hope to share with Cuba the benefits of its
tobacco culture.
The negro population of Cuba, both pure black and mulatto, are
much more independent and manly in their bearing than their kins
men in the United States. Their social privileges are also much
greater, and, indeed they are largely treated almost as the equals of the
white race. They belong to several distinct classes. Most of them are
descendants of slaves imported during the present century. Many of
them, however, are descendants from slaves brought into the island by
the earliest Spanish settlers. There are also a few who have migrated
hither from the United States. As there are no mo-re than half as many
negroes as whites in Cuba, and the proportion of negroes is steadily
growing smaller and will continue to do so at an increasingly rapid
rate, all fear of " negro domination " in the island may be dismissed
as idle.
RELIGION AND EDUCATION.
The Roman Catholic religion prevails throughout Cuba. The
island is divided into two dioceses. One, under the Archbishop of San
tiago de Cuba, contains 55 parishes; the other, under the Bishop of
Havana, contains 144 parishes. In the whole island there are prob-
78 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
ably not a dozen priests of Cuban birth; the ecclesiastical, as well as the
political, functionaries of the island, being imported from Spain.
Education is much neglected. There is not a parish on the whole
island that supports an endowed school. At Havana there is a uni
versity and four or five professional schools, and, of course, a number
of private and public schools of common grade, but for the mass of the
people educational facilities are most meager, while all who are able
to do so send their children away from the island to the United States
or to Europe for instruction.
Since its first settlement Cuba has been treated as a subordinate
crown colony. The central and absolute authority of the Crown has
been exercised by a Captain General, who has generally wielded the
arbitrary power of a czar. He has had the right even to set aside, at
will, any judgment of the courts. His authority has been backed, even
in times of peace, by a Spanish army much larger than the army of the
United States, and with police powers unknown in this country. 'In
addition to the army, there have been thousands of office-holders, high
and low, attending to all the public business of the island and draw
ing all the salaries, and of these ninety-nine per cent, have been mere
" carpet-baggers " from Spain.
The lower classes of the Havana male population — porters, dray
men, and clerks — are organized into a dangerous and oftentimes un
controllable military force, known as the Volunteers, who, while never
having been known to take the field, are a serious menace to the peace
of the city, being feared equally by the authorities, over whose heads
they wave the threat of mutiny, especially upon any indication of grant
ing reforms, and by the resident and unarmed Cubans, over whom they
hold the threat of massacre. Up to date the record of this organized
mob has been a series of horrible crimes, such as shooting down a
crowd of peaceable citizens as they emerged from the theater, firing
into the office and dining room of a hotel, assaulting the residences of
Cuban gentlemen, and in 1871 forcing the authorities to execute forty-
three medical students, all boys under twenty, because one of them
had been accused of scratching the glass plate on a vault containing
the remains of a volunteer. Fifteen thousand volunteers witnessed
with exultation this ignoble execution.
While the primary functions of the Government have been to
attend to the prerogatives of the Crown and the collection of revenues,
its attention has been largely devoted to the personal enrichment of the
officials through misfeasance and the prevention of the secession of
THE CUBA OF TO-DAY. 79
the island. It has practically ignored the other functions of govern
ment, such as the collection of statistics, the promotion of education,
and the establishment of public works and proper public sanitation.
Few, if any, educational institutions have been erected at public ex
pense; no public highways have been constructed, nor have any
improvements of a public character been made outside of the city of
Havana. Even when the Cubans have undertaken such improve
ments, they have been heavily taxed for the benefit of the Spanish
officials. The administration of Cuba is and has been since the set
tlement of the island an absolute military despotism on the part of the
mother country. At periods, dependent upon the personality of the
Captain General, there have been epochs of peace and prosperity, but
since the middle of the present century the island has been in a state
of insurrection, dormant or eruptive, accompanied by a growing hatred
between the governing and the governed classes, with constantly in
creasing restrictions upon the latter. At times the revolting people
were reduced to subjection by promises of local self-government, which
have invariably been broken.
MILITARY DESPOTISM.
During the present century the Spanish Crown has made various
pretenses of giving to the inhabitants of the island greater political
privileges, but all of these, down to the latest and present autonomy
scheme, have been the merest subterfuges, void of the true essence of
local self-government, with a string attachment by which absolute and
despotic power remained in the hands of the Spanish Governor Gen
eral. Thus it was that in February, 1878, the ten-years' revolution was
ended by General Campos. Under the stipulations of the treaty the
island was allowed to be represented in the Spanish Cortes by 16
senators and 30 deputies; but restrictions were so thrown around their
selection that Cubans were practically debarred from participating in
the choice of these members, notwithstanding that these so-called rep
resentatives were utterly powerless to press any Cuban measure in the
Cortes of over 900 members or to put it to a vote.
This military despotism has been accompanied by a system of ex
orbitant taxation, such as has never been known elsewhere in the
world. This has included at times an average of 40 per cent, on all
imports, in addition to taxes upon real estate, the industries, arts, pro
fessions, the slaughtering of meats, and an odious system of stamp
8o CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
taxes, which even included in its far-reaching application the affixing
of an impost stamp upon every arrival at a hotel. The processes of
possible direct taxation being exhausted, the Government even resorted
to the establishment of a most nefarious and contaminating lottery sys
tem, which yielded a profit of $4,000,000 annually.
In 1879 the total revenue collected was about $35,000,000, or $25
per capita, all of which, except $98,000, was spent — mostly in the pay
ment of the parasitic horde of intransigente soldiers and office-holders
and the Spanish debt. In addition to the legal taxation, the com
merce is burdened by a system of illegal taxation in the form of bribes,
which are necessary to the securing of any legal action. Little or none
of this money was devoted to education, science, public construction,
harbor improvements, highways, sanitation, or other benevolent pur
poses, such as those to which our free government devotes its per
capita tax of $13.65. It is also a remarkable fact, notwithstanding the
extravagant taxation, that only about $100,000,000 have been remitted
to the mother country during the past century, most of the revenue
having been diverted to maintain the official classes. It is a common
assertion that, with the exception of Martinez Campos, no captain
general has ever returned to Spain after a four years' intendency except
as a millionaire.
REVOLTING TYRANNY.
The right of free speech on the part of the individual citizen has not
only been restricted, but the rigorous press law of 1881 requires every
editor or manager of a paper to send, duly signed by him, two copies
of each issue to government headquarters and two other copies to the
district attorney as soon as printed, that it may be seen whether any
objectionable remarks are contained therein. Nearly every publica
tion in Cuba has been suspended at some time or other, and its editor
fined, imprisoned, or deported to the penal colonies.
The American who' undertakes to investigate the history of the
Spanish Government in Cuba inevitably finds he has undertaken an
unpleasant task. Greed, injustice, bribery, and cruelty have been prac
ticed with such frequency that volumes could be filled with details.
Beyond and above all this, however, prominently stands the fact that
Spain has thrice endeavored to extinguish the entire native population.
The first of these attempts, practiced in former centuries upon the
aborigines, was successful. The second attempt was made during the
Ten- Years' War by Valmaseda, who wrote:
THE CUBA OF TO-DAY. 8 1
" Not a single Cuban will remain on this island, because we shoot
all those we find in the fields, on their farms, and in every hovel. . .
We do not leave a creature alive where we pass, be it man or animal.
If we find cows, we kill them; if horses, ditto; if hogs, ditto; men,
women, or children, ditto. As to the houses, we burn them. So
everyone receives what he deserves — the men with bullets, the animals
with the bayonet. The island will remain a desert."
The intentions of this officer were only foiled by the arousal of
foreign public sentiment against him, and his replacement by the
humane General Campos, who tried to restore peace. The third
attempt at extermination, a matter of present history, was made by
Weyler, who expressed sentiments as ferocious 'as those of Val-
maseda.
How successful Weyler's policy has been, partially carried out, can
be answered by the graves of a fourth of the population, which have
been recently filled with victims. The sole remnant of the Cuban peo
ple wrould at this time have consisted of the soldiers of Gomez if
Weyler's policy had been continued.
Martinez Campos, who has the reputation of being the best Span
iard ever placed in high authority in Cuba, was sincere when he nego
tiated the treaty of Zanjon, and thought the Spanish Government was
sincere in the liberal plan of reforms, which were generally expected
in good faith by a large majority of the people, but as the years went
on it became manifest that the whole plan was an illusion and a
mockery.
The few deputies Cuba was allowed to send to the Cortes had no
weight or position there, and any protests that they made were either
ignored or derided. The government of the island became worse and
worse. Taxes increased, public works were more neglected, and job
bery and corruption prevailed in all parts of the government. The
peninsula stood first — the island last.
Spain, however, recognized the fact that her hold on this colonial
possession was gradually weakening, and that something would have
to be done to prevent the sword being unsheathed there. Impelled by
these considerations, and hearing the first growl of a new " dog of
war," she determined to go through certain forms which would give
her colonies some faith in her assertions that a more just and liberal
government should be meted out to them. So she concocted a farci
cal home rule for Cuba, put forward in all apparent seriousness, but
82 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
only to be a grim joke. Under the name of " home rule," as it was
called, it would have fastened the Spanish yoke more firmly than ever
upon the island. It must have taken considerable labor and work to
get it up, for it was diffuse and extensive. Many rumors reached Cuba
of this great and generous act on the part of Spain, and many reports
came also that it would soon be put into operation. At last it was
acknowledged that a huge document labled " Home Rule " had been
received in the palace by General Valeriano Weyler, then Governor
and Captain General, which this officer had been instructed in due
time to put into operation by properly starting its cumbersome
machinery.
Weyler, being bitterly opposed to any and every thing that savored
of local Cuban government, found no difficulty in letting this first
bundle of " Home Rule " sleep quietly in his official desk. Indeed
the time had passed for Spain to make any proposal of this sort. It
was too late, and the memory of recent broken pledges too fresh.
The Cubans regarded this proposal as a mockery and an insult, and
began to see that they would have to fight again before they ever ex
pected to get freedom and justice. Then Spain began to find out that
it would be necessary to grant fuller reforms than she had ever granted
before. Indeed the idea was conceived in the brain of a statesman at
Madrid that the Cubans must have an autonomistic government, pur
porting to be a real liberal, general, local self-government controlled
by a majority of the voters. This autonomistic government was a
very curious mechanical contrivance. It looked just and fair, but, on
examination, the close observer could see a string attached to almost
all of its most important features, one end of the string being in Madrid
after passing through the hands of the Spanish Captain General at
Havana.
But at that time the storm had gathered; heavy clouds, dark with
discontent and rebellion against the Spanish authorities, were ready to
burst, and war was an accomplished fact. " We have not counted the
number of our enemies," said one of the Cuban leaders, " but we have
cast up an account of our grievances, we have weighed the mass of
injustice which crushes us." " We may find ruin and death a few steps
ahead; so be it, we do our duty." " The people of Cuba require liberty
and independence to become a factor in the community of civilized
nations." " The field lies entirely with Spain." " Cuba is the de
fender of its rights."
The first " Home Rule " bill was finally published on the 24th of
THE CUBA OF TO-DAY. 83
February, 1895, and a few weeks thereafter the new Cuban Republic
was proclaimed.
Jose Marti was the chief organizer of this movement. He had
been in New York City for many years, gaining knowledge in literary
and artistic pursuits. After making an attempt to get up an expe
dition, which was stopped by the United States authorities at Fernan-
dina, Fla., he went to San Domingo to see Maximo Gomez, who had
been one of the leaders in the Ten- Years' War, and with him landed
in the month of May, and raised the flag of the Cuban Republic at
Cubitas, a small town among the mountains of the province of Puerto
Principe, near the eastern end of the island. At that time there were
some 19,000 Spanish troops on the island in addition to 50,000 volun
teers. It was not until Marti, Gomez, and other leaders arrived in
Cuba that the magnitude of the movement was appreciated. As soon
as the Madrid authorities were informed that another revolution was in
progress they sent over 7000 additional troops at once, making on the
island about 76,000 men.
Marti, at the outbreak of the Ten- Years' War, was only thirteen
years old, but seemed to be considered a dangerous person, because
he was sent to Spain for conspiring against the Government, and was
kept him in an unwholesome prison until his life was in danger, and
was then released under the condition that he would remain in Spain
the rest of his life.
While in Spain he went to the University of Saragossa, where he
graduated with much honor; after that he went to France, and then
came to the United States. The Ten-Years' War was then nearly at
its end, but he immediately joined it.
An expedition which he organized and brought from Mexico
proved a failure, but Marti escaped and went to Central America,
where he became a university professor.
As is known, he came to Cuba afterward and lost his life in defense
of her cause.
During the summer or rainy season practically a truce prevailed.
The prevalence of yellow fever and other diseases, the intense heat and
daily thunderstorms, forced to a great extent the suspension of active
operations, though the Cubans were affected less by these climatic
changes than were the Spaniards. The Spanish army was largely in
creased before the opening of the fall campaign, for the purpose of
promptly suppressing this insurrection. The Cubans upon their side
had been recruiting and drilling, and thus were made more effective.
84 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
On the I Qth of September at Anton, in the province of Puerto Prin
cipe, a formal proclamation of the independence of Cuba was made,
and a form of republican government was organized, and the Consti
tution promulgated. The officers of state were the following :
President, Salvador Cisneros Betancourt of Puerto Principe; Vice
President, Bartolome Maso of Manzanillo; Secretary of War, Carlos
Roloff of Santa Clara; Vice Secretary of War, Mario Menocal of
Matanzas; Secretary of Foreign Relations, Rafael Portuondo y Ta-
mayo of Santiago de Cuba; Vice Secretary of Foreign Relations,
Fermin Valdis Dominguez of Havana; Secretary of Finance, Joaquin
Castillo Duany of Santiago de Cuba; Secretary of the Interior, Santi
ago Canizares of Remedios; Vice Secretary of the Interior, Carlos du
Bois of Baracoa; General in Chief, Maximo Gomez; Lieutenant General,
Antonio Maceo. Jose Maceo, Maso, Capote, Serafin Sanchez, and
Rodrigues were appointed Major Generals: Jose Maceo to lead tjie
operations in Baracoa, Guantanamo, Mayari, and Santiago de Cuba;
Maso in Manzanillo, Bayamo, and Holguin; Sanchez in the Villas; and
Rodrigues in Camaguey.
Betancourt, the President, was also the President during the Ten-
Years' War, and was known a£ the Marquis of Santa Lucia. Maso,
the Vice President, has been noticed before. Roloff, the War Secre
tary, was born in Poland, but came to Cuba at an early age. He was
also in the Ten-Years' War, and afterward became a leading citizen of
Cienfuegos. Menocal came of a well-known family, one of whose
members has long been in the United States service, and has been
much heard of in connection with the Nicaragua Canal.
A battle was fought in the later part of August midway between
Santiago de Cuba and Guantanamo, where the Spanish Colonel,
Canellas, attacked the camp of Jose Maceo, the Spaniards being vic
torious. After this another battle was fought at Peralejo, Marshal
Campos commanding the Spanish troops, and Antonio Maceo the
Cubans. In this encounter the Spaniards were routed with heavy
loss, Campos himself narrowly escaping capture.
The town of Baire was next taken by the Cubans, and another vic
tory was won at Decanso del Muerto. Gomez then desired to march
west in the direction of Havana, declaring he would eat his Christmas
dinner between Havana and Matanzas.
An order was issued by him to the sugar planters in the provinces
of Havana, Matanzas, and Santa Clara, forbidding them to grind cane
or to manufacture sugar. This was done in order to deprive the Span-
•
COPYRIGHT, 1898, BY THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY.
MAXIMO GOMEZ — GENERAL-IN-CHIEF OF THE CUBAN ARMY
OF LIBERATION.
THE CUBA OF TO-DAY. 8/
ish Government of the revenue received from the sugar trade. The
order was as follows:
" In accordance with orders of the Provisional Government, and to
the end that no one may allege ignorance, I hereby make known to the
sugar manufacturers, cane planters (Colonos) and proprietors of the
zone under my command:
" First. The building and cane fields of all plantations will be con
sidered and respected, provided no work is given to any able-bodied
laborer, nor the operations of grinding begun.
" Second. When there are no fortifications nor forces located in the
same for their protection.
" Third. A term of ten days is hereby granted for the suspension
of all work, the destruction of the fortifications, and the withdrawal of
the troops.
" Fourth. Those who contravene this order will be severely pun
ished and their buildings and cane fields reduced to ashes."
Campos met this with a counter proclamation, ordering the plant
ers to go on with their usual work, and promising them full protection.
The richest parts of the island were desolated, and they were filled day
and night with the smoke of burning plantations along Gomez's line
of march. The planters obeyed Gomez and stopped grinding, where
upon he issued the following proclamation :
" HEADQUARTERS OF THE LIBERATING AR&IY OF CUBA,
" Sugar estate, ' Mirosa,' January 10, 1896.
" In consideration that the crop has been suspended in the western
districts, and, whereas, it is not necessary that the burning of the cane
fields should continue, I dispose the following:
" Article I. The burning of the cane fields is now prohibited.
" Article 2. Those who contravene this disposition, whatsoever be
their category or rank in the army, will be treated with the utmost
severity of military discipline in behalf of the moral order of the revo
lution.
" Article 3. The buildings and machinery of the sugar estates will
be destroyed, if in spite of this disposition they should intend to renew
their works.
" Article 4. The pacific inhabitants of the island of Cuba, what-
CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
soever be their nationality, will be respected, and agricultural laborers
will not be interfered with.
" The General in Chief,
" M. GOMEZ."
To prevent the insurrectionists from continuing their march to the
western end of the island, and invading the rich tobacco plantations of
Pinar del Rio, the Spaniards constructed clear across the island a
trocha or ditch with a barb-wire fence on one side of it, and block
houses at intervals. It did not seem, however, to answer the purpose,
because Antonio Maceo finally reached the province of Pinar del Rio,
and upon this march proved that he was an excellent soldier and pos
sessed daring and dashing qualities.
Marshal Campos was too conscientious and honest a man to deal
with the questions now rapidly coming up for solution as Spain would
like to have them dealt with, or to carry out the instructions his Gov
ernment thought necessary to give to meet the situation, and was too
humane to please the Spanish official ring.
Valeriano Weyler, who had been one of Valmaseda's lieutenants
in the Ten- Years' War, was then made Governor and Captain Gen
eral. It is reported that Campos said of him at the time that if he ever
returned to Cuba the very dead would rise to fight against him, and a
Spanish soldier also said of him in the Saturday Review:
" When Don Valeriano Weyler came out to command us he got
together the greatest rascals in the country under the name of Volun
teers, and if the regular soldiers under Weyler were cruel to the coun
try folk, the Volunteers were far worse. They perpetrated every crime
on the defenseless country folk, and the women and children suffered
every outrage at their hands.
" Weyler believed in killing people wholesale to strike terror into
the insurgents, but it did very little good. The insurgents played the
same game. They killed all of our men whom they took prisoners.
When Gomez broke through the ' trocha ' between Jucaro and Moron
a couple of years ago, he shot all of his prisoners. We had been doing
the same by Weyler's orders, and indeed he forced us to shoot down
defenseless non-combatants.
" It was enough to be discovered to be a distant relation of an
insurgent to receive sentence of death. Boys and women were shot,
sick and wounded in Cuban hospitals were bayoneted, and when once
THE CUBA OF TO-DAY. 89
or twice a lad in the ranks, fresh from Spain, refused to obey the order
to kill, he was promptly shot by his own officer.
" We soldiers, however, generally got into the habit of killing, and
did not think much of it, but we were never such savages as the Volun
teers. Who were the Volunteers? They were the fellows enlisted
from the Spaniards of the towns, and were ten times as bitter as we
soldiers against the Cubans, and the Cubans hated them worse than
they hated us.
"He was certainly a strong man, Weyler, and a great deal harder
and crueler than Martinez Campos; but he was just like the others;
he filled his pockets while he was in office, and they say he came home
with a big fortune."
Weyler reached Havana on the loth of February, 1896, on the
steamer " Alfonso XIII.," and was received with great enthusiasm by
the Spaniards.
In landing he made a short speech to the soldiers, " You know my
record; well, I intend to live up to it." The next day he issued a for
mal address to the army in which he said:
:< The address which I made yesterday will give you an idea of the
spirit and policy of your new Governor General, and similarly the di
rection of the general opinion in Spain favoring the bringing of all
necessary means to bear upon the suppression of the insurrection.
Knowing these and knowing my character, I would add nothing else
to direct the line of conduct which you may follow. But I think it
convenient to add some instructions at present, and to state that the
insurrection and the recent march of the principal leaders thereof with
out its being possible for the Spanish columns to prevent it, indicates
indifference on the part of the inhabitants, and also fear and dis
couragement. I cannot understand their inactivity while their prop
erty is being destroyed. Spaniards cannot sympathize with insur
gents. It is necessary, at any cost, to oppose this state of things, and
reanimate the spirit of the inhabitants.
" I have come disposed to help all loyal citizens. I am at the same
time disposed to make use of all the rigor of the law against those who
in any form help the enemy, speak well of them, or discredit the pres
tige of Spain, of its army, or volunteers. All who are with our side
must demonstrate the fact with acts, and leave in their attitude no
place for doubt in proving that they are Spaniards.
" Because the defense of the country demands sacrifices, it is neces-
QO CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
sary that towns should establish their own defenses. They should not
fail to provide guides for the army, and to give news of the enemy when
they are in the vicinity. The case should not be repeated that the
enemy be better informed than ourselves. The enemy and the vigor
which they employ should serve as an example to show us the line of
conduct which we must follow in all circumstances.
:i You will detain and put at my disposal, or submit to the tribunals,
those who, in any way I have described, show help or sympathize with
the rebels. I promise myself that you, by fulfilling these instructions,
will give valuable help to the good of the Spanish cause."
He also issued an address to the people of Cuba, in which he
said :
" I take charge with the confidence which never abandons the
cause of preserving the island for Spain. I shall be always generous
with those who surrender, but will have the decision and energy to
punish rigorously those wrho in any way help the enemy.
" Without having in mind any political mission, I would not oppose
the government of his Majesty when in its wisdom, having peace in
Cuba, it should think it convenient to give this country reforms with
the same spirit of love in which a mother gives all things to her chil
dren. People of Cuba, lend me your help! So you will defend your
own interests, which are the interests of the country."
We are told General Weyler promised to end the war in thirty
days. He told the delegation of sugar planters who called upon him
on the 1 5th of February that by the I5th of March he would have peace
and order established throughout the island so that they could go to
work everywhere without fear of molestation. Twenty per cent, of the
crop had already been destroyed, but if he could keep his promise it
meant the saving of forty-five million dollars' worth of sugar, but the
difficulty of these planters commencing grinding lay in the fact that
they did not have Weyler's promise indorsed by Gomez and Maceo.
The new Captain and Governor General issued at this time the follow
ing proclamation; defining those who were to be subject to trial by
court-martial :
" First. Those who invent or circulate by any means whatever
news or information directly or indirectly favorable to the rebellion
THE CUBA OF TO-DAY. 91
will be considered guilty of acts against the security of the country,
as defined by Article 223 of the military code, as they thereby facilitate
the operations of the enemy.
" Second. Those who destroy or damage railroads, telegraphs or
telephones, or interrupt the operation of the same.
" Third. Those who are guilty of arson.
" Fourth. Those who sell, carry, or deliver arms or ammunition to
the enemy or in any other way facilitate their introduction through the
customhouses. Parties failing to cause the seizure of such arms or
ammunition will incur criminal responsibility.
" Fifth. Telegraph operators delivering war messages to other per
sons than the proper officials.
" Sixth. Those who by word of mouth, through the medium of the
press, or in any manner, shall belittle the prestige of Spain, the army,
Volunteers, firemen, or other forces operating with the army.
" Seventh. Those who by the same means shall praise the enemy.
" Eighth. Those who shall furnish the enemy with horses or other
resources of warfare.
" Ninth. Those who act as spies will be punished to the fullest
extent of the law.
" Tenth. Those who shall act as guides to the enemy and fail to
surrender themselves immediately, and give proof of their loyalty and
report the strength of the force employed by the enemy.
" Eleventh. Those who shall adulterate the food of the army or
alter the prices of provisions.
" Twelfth. Those using explosives in violation of the decree of
October 17, 1895.
" Thirteenth. Those who shall use pigeons, rockets, or signals to
convey news to the enemy.
" Fourteenth. The offenses above mentioned are punishable by
the penalty of death or life imprisonment, the judges to take summary
proceedings."
In another proclamation he commanded all the inhabitants of the
provinces of Santiago and Puerto Principe to present themselves at
army headquarters and obtain passports. To go about the country
it would be necessary to have these passes. All stores in the country
were to be closed and their contents given up. And all persons not
obeying these orders were to be arrested and sent to Havana for mili
tary trial as traitors. The result of these orders was that thousands
92 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
of innocent non-combatants were arrested and many of them put to
death.
Still another proclamation followed :
" The authorities of the villages who will show themselves friendly
within a term of ten days, and those of the vicinity of the same, and all
those within it's limits that are engaged in the insurrection, are warned
to surrender themselves within the space of fifteen days from the publi
cation of this proclamation, otherwise they will be subject to arrest; and
well-disposed persons will be held to their civil responsibilities, and to
effect this it will be proposed to the Governor General to nominate a
body which will see to carrying this out. If in the case of insurgent par
ties who have sacked, robbed, burned, or committed other outrages dur
ing the rebellion, anyone will give information as to the participation
that such persons may have had in them, not only those who may have
been in the rebel ranks, but also those who have succored them, or who
have not remained in their homes, they will be fittingly punished; and,
moreover, if any town or other place where robberies have been
effected is known to them, they will be required to make identification
that proper responsibility may be fixed."
Weyler's policy was quickly put into execution. On February 22
occurred the hideous massacre of Guatao, the first of a series of such
affairs which shocked the world. A small body of insurgents fell in
with a large Spanish force and took to flight after a little firing. Near
Guatao they scattered and took to the woods. The Spanish troops,
enraged at not being able to capture them, went on to the village
of Guatao, which the rebels had not even entered, and wreaked their
wrath upon it. They deliberately massacred all the inhabitants they
could find, men, women, and children. A milkman who was making
his rounds was the first victim. They then came to a cottage where
a man lay sick. His wife came to the door to see what was wanted.
They clubbed her to death with musket butts, and then went in and
bayoneted the sick man in his bed. This was only a few miles from
Havana. A report of the case was made to Weyler, praising the sol
diers for their bloody crimes, and saying, " they have done to-day what
your Excellency did so gloriously thirty years ago."
Nor was this the only massacre, but, as we have said, merely the
first of many. Weyler gave his officers the power of life or death over
all the people they came in contact with. A large portion of these
THE CUBA OF TO-DAY.
93
commanders believed Weyler to be a man who would quickly approve
any extreme on their part. They looked for no punishment for
summary executions of Cubans who sympathized with the insurgents.
They expected praise and promotion for shooting prisoners, and for
any and every act of brutality, committed under the guise of sup
pressing the insurrection.
" NEW YORK " AND " PORTER " INTERRUPTING ITALIAN MAN-OF-WAR OFF
HAVANA.
CUBA, 1492-1800.
By JOSEPH WHEELER, Major-General, U. S. V.
CHAPTER III.
Cuba, the " Queen of the Antilles," the key of the Gulf of Mexico,
was for centuries the fairest gem in the crown of Spain. Fair and
luxuriant as the fabled isles of olden mythology, it burst upon the
admiring gaze of the Spanish explorers; for its discovery was coin
cident with the first voyage of Columbus to the New World. Sailing
southwesterly from Guanahani, on the 28th of October, 1492, the
mariners sighted the rocky shores of Cuba, and after coasting west-
wardly for three days, entered the harbor of Maternillos. The length*
of the coast line and the appearance of the land confirmed the belief
of Columbus that he had reached the eastern extremity of India, and
that he stood upon the shores of the continent which was the object
of his search. Finding that the country was inhabited, he sent a
number of officers to visit the Cacique and open friendly negotiations
with him. The chieftain was found in a village consisting of about
fifty houses, with 1,000 inhabitants. These people are described as
gentle, friendly and hospitable, indolent and fond of ease, with little
industry, and expert only as hunters and fishers. They regaled their
visitors with abundance of native fruits, yams, and Indian corn.
They slept in hammocks and made an immoderate use of tobacco.
They were not acquainted with the use of iron, but used implements
of wood, stone or shell. They had no domestic animals; in fact the
only indigenous quadruped found on the island was the hutia, an
arboreal creature, about fifteen inches long, black in color and re
sembling a rat.
It was discovered later that the government of these islands was
portioned among nine tribes, each having its own ruler, and all living
in harmony. Their religious belief was a very simple one, and
included but one supreme Deity; indeed they received the Spaniards
with open arms as messengers from God, and would have been
ready and willing converts to Christianity, had their friendly docility
later met with adequate response from the white invaders, who
allowed their greed for gold and conquest to crush every sentiment
of justice and humanity.
MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH WHEELER.
CUBA, 1492-1800. 97
Columbus continued his explorations of the Cuban coast and
returned to Spain fully convinced that he had discovered the eastern
shore of Asia. He again visited the island, sailing thither April
4, 1494, from San Domingo. During this visit he discovered the
Isle of Pines, and visited Guantanamo, sighting Cape Cruz and nam
ing the ocean reefs in that vicinity " Jardines de la Reyna," (The
Queen's Gardens). He first named the country Juana, in honor of
Prince John. It was consecutively named Ferdinandina, Santiago,
and Ave Maria; and it finally became known under its original Indian
name, Cuba. It was also known by some of the old geographers
as La Lengua de Pajaro, the Sparrow's Tongue, from a fancied re
semblance in form to the shape of a bird's tongue.
Although Columbus and his officers had signed a statement de
claring this land to be a continent, in a few years it was deemed
necessary to prove this, and Sebastian Ocampa was sent to make fur
ther explorations. He circumnavigated the island in 1508, and
strongly recommended its colonization, praising the fertility of
its soil and its excellent harbors, especially that of Havana. The
northern and western part was, however, for a long time neglected,
all the earlier settlements being along the southeastern coast as more
convenient and accessible from the islands already colonized by
Spain, as well as from the mainland of South America.
In 1511, Diego Columbus, governor of San Domingo, sent Diego
Velasques to explore and colonize the Island of Cuba. Landing near
Cape Maysi he found himself opposed by the natives under the leader
ship of the Cacique Hatuei, who, having learned by bitter experience
in San Domingo the real character of the white man, had fled to the
Cubans and endeavored to arouse these gentle and peaceful people
against the designs of the invaders. They were, however, easily sub
jugated and soon found that resistance was hopeless. They were
either enslaved or exterminated, and in spite of the efforts of Queen
Isabella, the many laws passed in favor of these unfortunate natives,
and the protests of the zealous missionaries, in the course of a few
years many thousands of these unfortunate people became victims
of the rapacious greed and inhumanity of their conquerors. In beau
tiful contrast to the barbarous conduct of the Spanish cavaliers, stands
out the noble character of Bartholomew Las Casas, the first priest
ordained in the New World, the "Apostle to the Indians," whose
long life of ninety-two years was a saintly protest against the iniquity
of his fellow-countrymen. He made twelve voyages across the ocean
98 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
in the service of his Indian proteges. In 1522 he wrote his celebrated
book on " The Destruction of the Indians." Twenty years later, fifty
years after the discovery of the West Indies, he wrote his history of
the rule of the Spaniards in these islands, and while the numbers of
the natives given by him are greatly exaggerated, still he is held to
be a trustworthy historian in other respects. In his celebrated thirty
" Propositions " as to the duties of the Spanish sovereigns towards
their heathen subjects, he says:
" The kings of Spain have from the first given and reiterated their
orders against war and the ill-treatment of the Indians."
Las Casas has been criticised for having countenanced the impor
tation of negro slaves into Cuba. He afterwards acknowledged that
this was a mistake, and that he acted under a delusion. His impres
sion at the time was that the negro slaves brought to America were
to be only those born in servitude, and that by using these stronger
and hardier laborers, the weak and delicate aborigines might be saved
from total destruction. He survived Columbus sixty years, and his
life and writings present a sad commentary upon the customs of the
age and nation in which he lived. The wholesale slaughter of natives
was checked by selfish motives only after there were a mere handful
of these " gentle savages " left.
Las Casas was not the only one to lift his voice in behalf of the
oppressed. Even before him the Dominicans, as early as 1501, in
formed Ferdinand of the abuse of the natives by the system of reparti-
miento, or dividing them among the white landholders; and long after
his time there were repeated appeals made to the monarch, notably
one by Mendosa, in 1650. But as we have seen, the royal decrees
and the protests of the good were defied by these barbarous colonists ;
and such has been the case in the Spanish colonies, with a few shining
exceptions, to the present day.
In considering these events we must not lose sight of the fact that
the conditions of the age were so very different from those under
which we live as to be difficult for us to realize. It is little more than
a century since the first regular mail, and that only one of " once in
three months " was established between Spain and her colonies. The
sixteenth century was in many respects a wild and lawless age; the
statute books of every country were disgraced by laws which at this
day would be looked upon as barbarous and inhuman; voyages which
are now accomplished in a few days then occupied as many months;
there was no rapid nor reliable means of communication even be-
CUBA, 1492-1800. 99
tween countries upon the same continent; land and sea swarmed with
reckless and daring brigands and freebooters, ready to waylay and
murder an inoffensive and defenseless traveler; and human rights
were held of small consequence by those who had the power to
trample upon them. Centuries of war against an encroaching, in
vidious foe in the fastnesses of Spain had developed in the Spanish
people an overmastering passion for war and conquest and tyrannical
oppression of the conquered, with a species of contempt for those
heroic and gentle men and women who appealed to the higher and
nobler attributes of man or threatened him with a retribution affecting
only his spiritual and eternal destiny.
Another cause of the degeneracy of the settlers in the West Indies
is found in the fact that the worst element of the Spanish population
swarmed with the adventurers to the New World, drawn hither by
the greed of gold and conquest and the prospect of unrestrained law
lessness. The very advantages of the country were against the moral
uplifting of the colonists. Abundance of gold could be wrung from
the timid, defenseless natives; the rich soil gave forth an exhaustless
supply of fruit; the luxurious, enervating climate invited indolence.
There was nothing in their surroundings to stimulate the austere vir
tues cultivated by the Puritans of New England, who had sought a
retreat in the wilds of North America, and who were early trained to
patient endurance of hardships, industry, rigid economy and self-
reliance, and were checked by the very nature of their surroundings
in the intolerance which would have ruined their free institutions.
Spain was not at this time behind the other nations of Europe; in
fact she was at the zenith of her glory and excelled in diplomacy,
in arms and in letters. A brilliant galaxy of scholars and writers sur
rounded the throne of Philip II. For centuries of mediaeval history
Spain had been the stronghold of civil liberty in Europe, and had
held out stubbornly against the encroachments of feudalism; but
the centuries of wars with the Moors had brought a change; and the
narrow policy which confined the elevating and humanizing influ
ences of intellectual culture to the privileged few, left the masses in
a state of ignorance. The magnificence of the king and his court
had to be maintained by gold and silver from the mines of the West.
Extravagant waste of treasures, neglect of agriculture and commerce,
made a constant demand for revenue which could be supplied only
by grinding out the lives of the hapless Americans. The offices in
the colonies were portioned out among the most reckless and worth-
100 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
less of the court favorites, and the governor who made the highest
record at home was he who wrung from the wretched Cubans the
greatest amount of gold. Another cause of the decadence of Spain
in material wealth is found in the expulsion of the Moors by
Philip III. These conquered people had almost monopolized the
trades and commerce of Spain, pursuits scorned by the cavaliers, who
cared only for military renown, and their sudden and violent expul
sion caused the destruction of the main source of home wealth.
These reflections explain, while they do not palliate, much less
excuse, the excesses of the men, who, while boasting of their faith
and chivalry, made of them but a cloak for the most sordid and de
grading passions, and set at naught the labors of the virtuous, self-
sacrificing and devoted to be found in every nationality.
The capital of Cuba was established first at Baracoa in 1518. The
seat of government was transferred in 1522 to Santiago de Cuba,
which for a long time was the most important city. Early in th'e
century, a town named San Cristobal de la Habana, in honor of the
great discoverer, was founded in the southern part of the island, but
the name was transferred in 1519 to the place where the city of
Havana now stands. This city was destroyed by a French privateer
in 1538, was rebuilt and fortified, and in 1549 became the residence of
the governor; but the seat of government remained long in the South.
In 1538, Hernando de Soto was governor, and during his absence on
the continent the province was ruled by a lady, Dona Isabel de
Bobadilla.
The incursions of the French privateers became more alarming
every year. In 1555 Jacques Sorie surprised Havana, plundered and
pillaged it; in 1559 Megander pillaged Port Rico, and John de la
Roche plundered the ships and battlements near Carthagena.
In 1578, under the governor, Don Francesco Carreno, vast quan
tities of timber, we are told, were shipped from Cuba to the mother
country to contribute towards the construction of the convent and
palace of the Escurial. About this time the Church of San Cristobal
was built in Havana on the spot now occupied by the residence of the
Captain-General. In 1589, Havana was formally made the seat of
government, and Don Juan de Tejida was appointed Captain-General.
During his administration the construction of the Morro and the
Punta was commenced, the place received the title of Ciudad, and a
coat of arms was granted consisting of three castles argent — alluding
to the Fuerza, Morro and Punta — and a golden key, the whole
CUBA, 1492-1800.
surmounted by a crown. Cuba has been known since the time of its
first Governor, Velasques, as " The Key of the New World."
In 1607, the island was divided into two separate provinces. Pirati
cal incursions increased to such an alarming extent that the seaboard
was continually menaced. Santiago was strongly fortified in 1630,
the defenses consisting of the fortresses Morro, on a rocky eminence
overlooking the harbor, and La Estrella, a fortification on the same
side of the bay, but much less elevated, being erected near the level
of the water.
In 1655, the attitude of the English commonwealth, and the
squadron sent to America by Cromwell, gave rise to apprehensions
for the safety of the Spanish possessions, and these fears were realized
when Jamaica was attacked, the Spanish defenders dispersed, the gov
ernor killed, and the Spanish inhabitants compelled to flee to Cuba.
About this time, the pirates became more and more formidable;
the French by gradual encroachments got possession of San Do
mingo, assisted by the English in Jamaica. Up to 1697 San Domingo,
where the first permanent Spanish settlements were planted, was a
Spanish colony; but in that year the western portion was ceded to
France; in 1785 that country obtained possession of the whole island;
in 1801 it was abandoned by Spain; and with the exception of a fleet
ing sovereignty there, from 1806 to 1821, she never recovered posses
sion of it.
In 1658 Puerto Principe and Santiago were sacked by pirates, and
Puerto Principe a second time, shortly after. During the whole of
this century piracy reigned supreme; and it was not for many years
that, by erecting stronger fortifications and adopting the most forcible
measures, the governors of the island began to get control of and
finally exterminated piracy on their borders. In 1675 the city of San
tiago was destroyed by an earthquake.
In the eighteenth century, riots broke out in the island, caused by
some oppressive measures of the royal governors.
In 1716 the government of Havana was so arranged by royal de
cree that in case of the absence, illness or death of the Captain-
General, the chief authority should devolve successively upon the
Triente Rev, the castellano of the Morro, the sergeant-major of the
garrison, the senior captain of infantry. By this arrangement the
clashing of authority in time of disaster was effectually prevented.
In 1741 Admiral Vernon, with an English fleet, attempted the
seizure of Santiago, but was repulsed. American colonists took part
Jib2 ^CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
in this expedition. It is thought that Lawrence Washington accom
panied some Virginia troops thus engaged. Admiral Vernon was
the officer in whose honor Mt. Vernon was named.
In 1755 the English made a landing and attempted to take Havana
by storm; but, as the Spanish story goes, the noise made by the land-
crabs and the lights of the fireflies impressed them with the idea that
an immense army of defense was opposing them, and the invaders
retreated precipitately to their ships. This was called by the Cubans
" The miracle of the crabs." Those who have heard the march of
the land-crabs and seen the display of the phosphorescent insects of
Cuba will not find this story incredible.
June 6, 1762, Havana was attacked by the English under Admiral
Pocoke and Lord Albemarle. The city was at that time protected by
a mediaeval wall, flanked by the three fortresses already mentioned.
Dense forests, which have since been cleared away, grew in the
vicinity. The Spanish troops were hastily massed at Guanabacoa,
but were driven back into the city, which was besieged for more than
two months. In the course of the siege the Spaniards caused three
large warships to be sunk in the mouth of the harbor to prevent the
entrance of the English vessels, which anchored outside, thinking the
channel was completely obstructed. After the fall of the city, they
entered without difficulty, proving the uselessness of the sacrifice,
which had not been made without loss of life on the part of the
Spanish seamen.
The efforts of the English to overcome the fire from the forts by
their naval guns was unsuccessful and resulted in great destruction
to their vessels; but by feints at points where the noncombatants of
the city had taken refuge, they so diverted the attention of the be
sieged as to gain a secure footing on shore, and gradually surrounded
the city. They gained possession of an eminence which commanded
the guns of the Morro; and the opportune arrival of a convoy from
Jamaica enabled them to reduce the Spanish guns so effectually that
by July i6th they were silenced altogether.
July 27th the spirits of the besiegers were raised by the arrival
of long-expected reinforcements from North America, Colonial
troops from New York, New Jersey and Connecticut, under General
Phineas Lyman and Colonel Israel Putnam. On the 2Qth the in
vestment of the city being completed and the Captain-General having
positively refused to surrender, a breach was made in the walls and
the victorious English troops swarmed in. The gallant Captain-
CUBA, 1492-1800. IO3
General Velasco and the Marquis Gonzales, next in command, fell
mortally wounded, and Morro Castle was taken after a siege of forty-
four days; but the capitulation of the city was not accomplished until
the 1 3th of August, and included the territory surrounding the city,
nine ships of war, more than a thousand prisoners and property
amounting to about three million pounds sterling. The Spaniards
had lost besides about one thousand killed and wounded, and five
battle ships destroyed. The loss of the English was 1,790 killed,
wounded and dead from exposure to the diseases incident to a sum
mer campaign in the tropics. The brave Velasco was mourned and
honored by both friend and foe; and it was ordered that to com
memorate his heroism, there should always be a ship in the Royal
Armada bearing the name of Velasco. His son was afterwards made
Visconde del Morro, by the king of Spain.
The terms of the capitulation were very favorable to the van
quished, but they were not strictly complied with. Some of the
church property was seized by the English governor, onerous taxes
were imposed, and those who protested against these measures were
expelled from the province as seditious characters, and were otherwise
maltreated; but the foreign occupation came to an end with the
declaration of peace in 1763, and the English garrison returned to
Europe. The forts, hospitals and other institutions were rebuilt,
and customs duties were established in 1764. About 1768 the Jesuits
were expelled by Governor Bucarly, and their church became the
cathedral.
In 1790, San Domingo was racked by a bloody revolution, but the
Island . of Cuba enjoyed profound peace, and welcomed with open
arms many of the refugees from her sister isle. This is known as the
golden age of Cuba, owing to the wise and beneficent rule of the
Captain-General Don Luis de las Casas. The city was paved, schools
were established, the administration of justice was improved, public
roads were constructed, the first public library and the first news
papers were founded and the Casa de Beneficiencia, a noted charitable
institution, was built. This is one of the most remarkable institu
tions, and it is said that similar ones exist in the other Spanish colo
nial possessions. Many hundreds of young people are educated and
provided for, the young women being allowed to remain there as long-
as they wish, and if they marry from the institution being provided
with dowries as daughters of the house. A description of Cuba,
written about the year 1830, speaks of 230 young inmates at this
home.
104
CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Another circumstance very beneficial to Cuba about the opening
of the century was the influx of Spanish population of the better class
from the possessions alienated from the mother country. Many of
the judges who had continued to reside in San Domingo after the
cession of that island to the French, thus greatly obstructing the
administration of justice in Cuba, removed in 1797 to Puerto Prin
cipe. About this time the French made a descent upon the island,
but were persuaded by diplomatic measures to depart without doing
much damage. It was about this time that the cultivation of the
coffee plant, which soon became the source of a most profitable
revenue, was introduced into Cuba. Bees from Europe were intro
duced, and in 1772 the exportation of wax was commenced. The
most important industrial pursuits were the manufacture of sugar,
coffee, tobacco and wax. Rice and maize were also raised in
abundance.
FIRING ON BATTERY AT SANTIAGO BY SEARCH-LIGHT.
CUBA, 1800-1868.
CHAPTER IV.
The wise and humane administration of Captain-General Las Casas
confirmed the loyalty of the Cubans to the throne of Spain, a loy
alty boldly attested and stoutly maintained throughout the stormy
days of revolution, when almost every country in Europe seemed
rocked by the waves of popular uprisings or foreign invasion. When
the news of the overthrow of the Spanish dynasty by Napoleon
reached Cuba in 1808, the municipal corporations of the island unani
mously declared war against the French emperor; and Jose Aleman,
an emissary in the interest of King Joseph, was captured and executed
in Cuba July 13, 1810. The loyalty of the island at the time merited
the title of " Ever Faithful Isle."
Between the years 1810 and 1830 Spain lost one after another of
her American colonial possessions, not so much through the action
of a united people, inspired by the lofty motives of patriotism and a
love of liberty, as through European hostilities and political intrigues,
turned to advantage by more or less unscrupulous adventurers.
Venezuela, Buenos Ayres, Chili, Peru, Mexico and the states of
Central America followed one another in rapid succession, and with
rare exceptions have groaned ever since in the throes of alternate
anarchy and despotism.
Had Spain been as wise as England, and profited as the latter did
by experience, she could have retained with little difficulty the fairest
of her American possessions, the Pearl of the Antilles. But her
policy has never advanced an iota towards the ideal of colonial govern
ment, where the laws are in favor of the governed and the advantages
are on their side rather than on the side of the mother country. Cuba
has been always governed by foreigners; to be a native of the island
was in itself a mark of inferiority and a cause of being deprived of any
share in the government. Arbitrary governors and swarms of officials,
military and political, were always quartered upon the people with
the uniform hope of returning to Spain rich on the spoils of office.
Up to the second decade of the present century Cuba, while sub
ject to many hardships, was governed well or ill according to the
CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
personal character of those who were in authority, and not as a con
sequence of laws bad and oppressive in themselves. She was not
treated as a colonial province to be ground down and plundered. But
as Spain gradually lost her power, and was racked by intestine strug
gles, and harassed by outside foes, until one by one her colonies
slipped from her grasp, her government of Cuba became more selfish
and oppressive in proportion to her troubles at home.
In 1812, a liberal constitution was granted to the island, but it was
cast aside by Ferdinand VII in 1814 as soon as he regained power.
Had the constitution of 1812 been honestly administered, it would have
lifted Cuba at once into an enviable position; and prosperity and
contentment would have riveted the bonds of loyalty which bound
her to the mother country. She would have been recognized as an
integral part of Spanish territory, as important and as independent
as any of the provinces of the peninsula, which have from time
immemorial so jealously guarded their provincial rights. But the
brutal selfishness of Ferdinand VII caused him to overthrow the
fairest hopes of the Cubans at the most favorable and promising
period in the history of the island.
In 1836, after Ferdinand's death, a new constitution was granted
to Spain, and Cuba was included in its provisions.
September 27, 1836, the barkentine " Guadaloupe " brought to
Santiago the good news of the promulgation of the liberal constitu
tion, adopted by the Queen Regent, mother of Isabella. This was
immediately published by General Lorenzo, Governor of the Santiago
province and leader of the liberal party, amid the acclamations of the
delighted Cubans; but his action was instantly condemned by Captain-
General Tagon, who brought the whole military and naval force
against Santiago and drove General Lorenzo from the island. Tagon
was armed with a commission enabling him to exercise supreme
authority over all subordinates and to suspend at his own discretion the
execution of any order concerning the general administration of the
government. Even a royal decree was but a dead letter in Cuba if
it conflicted with the judgment of the Captain-General, who was
really the supreme arbiter of the fate of the Cubans. Tagon knew
Spain well enough to appreciate that the action of the Queen Regent
was merely a temporary ebullition of liberal sentiment, and that her
majesty would be better served by a non-observance of the royal
decree. He knew that to attempt to show impartial justice to the
Cubans meant the loss of a princely revenue to the mother country;
\
\
CUBA, I800-I868. 109
and although outsiders could see that to continue her oppressive reigii
of plunder was sooner or later to " kill the goose that laid the golden
egg/' yet Spain could not understand this and could never be led to
appreciate moral power as superior to brute force.
The three deputies who had been elected in spite of Tagon's prompt
protest, presented their credentials in Madrid the following January.
They were received with coldness and silence, and after waiting several
months they were finally denied the right of admission to the Cortes.
This action forever alienated the extreme party in Cuba, though
there has always been a conservative party working and hoping
to secure prosperity for their island without a forcible separation from
the mother country. The incessant warring between the Carlists
and the Queen Regent led to constant demands for money which
was extorted in every manner from the landholders, the real pro
ducers of all the wealth of the island.
The captains-general were armed with despotic and almost unlim
ited power, and by laws little less odious than the infamous penal
laws against Ireland, the natives were deprived of all rights and
excluded from all offices.
There is great diversity of opinion in regard to the real character
of the renowned Tac,on. His name is associated with some of the
most famous buildings of Havana, and history records numberless
instances of an impartial administration of justice, correction of abuses
and appreciation of true heroism. By his efforts, persons guilty of
shameful misdemeanors were condemned to work on paving the
streets, and in this manner the vicious and degraded classes were com
pelled to contribute to the comfort of the whole community. Assassin
ation, which had become a very common crime, was so severely
dealt with, that it became rare, and extortion and venality in high
places were unmasked and punished. Yet, in spite of the benefits
accruing from his stern administration of justice, the fact that he
was the tool of a grinding despotism, and that he represented a
policy which entirely excluded the Cubans from advancing towards
their ideal of self-government has caused his memory to be held in
execration.
Volumes are written detailing his acts of high-handed despotism,
but it must be confessed that in many cases it was the guilty who
suffered. It is further charged that he grew so rich on the spoils
of the office, that he was recalled to Spain because the government
" feared that he would leave nothing on the island for any one else."
no CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
The statutes in regard to the treatment of the negro slaves were
lenient, but that they were not enforced is shown not only by the
mortality among them being so great that the only increase in the
slave population was from constant new importations of negroes and
coolies, but also by the frequent uprisings among the blacks them
selves. And although the law of 1820 forbade the importation of
African slaves, we know that its violation was constantly tolerated —
for a consideration — by the captains-general, and also that for many
years of the present century the slave trade was the chief source of
Cuban revenue. Another effort was made in 1853 to abolish the
slave traffic, but slavery was not abolished until 1878, after the ten
years' war, and then emancipation was gradual.
A pleasant picture is presented in the character of the Captain-
General, appointed in 1841, — Valdez, who appears to have been liberal
and conscientious; but he was soon recalled and he returned to Spain
poor, a shining exception in the long list of Governors. He was
succeeded by O'Donnell, who is described as rapacious, tyrannical
and unscrupulous, one of the charges against him being the sup
pression of infant schools, and the general discouragement of educa
tion. Thus, Cuba was* tossed to and fro like a shuttlecock from good
to bad, from one extreme to the other, her governors seeming to
come and go at the caprice of whichever party happened to be in
power at the Spanish capital, without the slightest regard for the weal
of the hapless natives.
Meanwhile one uprising succeeded another. An insurrection of
the blacks occurred in 1826, followed by the conspiracies of the Black
Eagle and kindred organizations, and a dangerous insurrection of
the blacks, said to have been instigated by Turnbull, the British Con
sul at Havana, in the early forties.
In May, 1850, General Lopez organized an expedition, recruited to
some extent from the United States. The first detachment, two hun
dred and fifty men, embarked at New Orleans April 25th on the
"Georgiana," under the command of Major Theodore O'Hara, a brave
soldier and a talented man, whose name is immortalized as the author
of the beautiful poem, " The Bivouac of the Dead." The second
detachment, under Lopez, reached the rendezvous, the island of
Contoy, off the coast of Yucatan, in Mexican territory, a few weeks
later, and all together set sail in the " Creole" for Cardenas. Fifty men
under Major T. Pickett were the first to land. The railroad station
was captured and the garrison were nearly taken by surprise, had
CUBA, 1800-1868. Ill
they not been awakened by the sudden discharge of a gun by a
sleepy sentry. The citizens did not respond to the appeal of the
liberating invaders, and the approach of the Spanish troops in large
numbers forced them to take flight. The filibusters were pursued,
but reached Key West and from there dispersed to their homes, having
lost of their number fourteen killed and fifteen wounded. The
Spaniards lost one hundred killed and nearly as many wounded.
Lopez made preparations to return the following year.
In 1852 he sailed from New Orleans in the steamer "Pampero," with
three hundred men. The second in command was W. S. Crittenden,
a graduate of West Point, who, although only twenty-eight years of
age, had already won renown as a hero of the Mexican war. The
purpose of the expedition was well known in the Southern States, and
the Spanish authorities in Cuba were informed. Letters were sent
to Lopez, purporting to come from Cuban patriots, persuading him
to land in the western province, where it was promised an uprising
of patriots would be ready to support him. Deceived by these forger
ies he changed his course, landed at Bahia, and marched into the
interior, leaving a number of men with Crittenden at the seaside.
Finding they were betrayed, these men attempted to escape, but were
captured by the Spanish Admiral Brestillo. Crittenden and fifty men
were shot August 15 under the walls of Fort Atares. Lopez, after
two skirmishes, was captured and was executed as a malefactor, with
the garrote, at Havana, September i, forty-nine more of his men
being shot. About this time General Houston organized a band of
Cuban sympathizers, but the fate of Lopez and his men threw a
damper upon their enterprise, and they failed to set out.
Lopez had a remarkable career. He was born in Venezuela in 1798
when that country was still a Spanish colony. Early in life he became
embroiled in the strife which raged in the South American countries
and generally fought on the side of liberty; but becoming disgusted
with the conduct of some of the adventurers in these civil wars,, he
entered the Spanish army. His services in securing a favorable
settlement of the war induced the Venezuelans to offer him the com
mission of colonel in the patriot army, the same rank he held in the
Spanish army. He, however, refused this and went to Cuba, where
he married and settled. During the administration of Tacjon, he
was accused of favoring the independence of Cuba, was tried and ac
quitted. Being in Spain at the time of a Carlist uprising, he fought
on the side of the Queen Regent and rose to the rank of General. He
112 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
filled several offices in Spain; was Governor of Madrid, Chief of the
National Guard, and Senator. He retained his affection for Cuba,
but for some time was not allowed to return there, as his influence
was feared; but finally he obtained permission to return in 1839. He
became ambitious to lead a revolution to free Cuba, and for more
than ten years was silently making his preparations. He had many
friends and sympathizers in the United States, among them Crit-
tenden, shot by the Spaniards at Fort Atares, and General John A.
Quitman, Governor of Mississippi, Hon. John Henderson, Governor
of Louisiana, and others, who were indicted and restrained by the
United States authorities. The character of a man like Lopez must be
judged according to the point from which it is viewed; by some he
is considered a restless, visionary adventurer; by others a martyr to
the cause of freedom; but all agree in the opinion that his expedition
was ill-advised, not being supported by the Cubans themselves, and
was an unnecessary sacrifice of life.
During an uprising in 1854, the Cuban junta in New York had made
extensive preparations to assist the insurgents, but the prompt and
energetic measures of Captain-General Concha prevented a general up
rising. He organized and drilled a large number of blacks, armed the
Spaniards and disarmed the natives. Ramon Pinto, the leader of the
Cubans, was captured and executed and many leading citizens were
banished. Concha was rewarded for his services by being created
Marquis of Havana. He advised the home government to conciliate
the Cubans, as the revolution was not confined to the negroes, but was
supported by the Creole planters; but the only means taken to con
ciliate the Cubans was to tighten the shackles of the slaves, while the
slave-holders themselves were becoming every day more and more
burdened with excessive taxation. In 1868 the revenue of the country
was about $26,000,000, $6,000,000 of which was sent to Spain, and
a very small portion of the remainder was expended for the benefit of
the island. This state of affairs was calculated to increase still
further the dissatisfaction of the Cubans and to foment the spirit of
rebellion against the mother country.
THE TEN YEARS' WAR.
CHAPTER V.
Meanwhile the revolutionary flame, which was temporarily smoth
ered by the prompt and energetic policy of Concha, was not quenched,
but was smouldering, ready to break out at any moment. In the
summer of 1867, at a meeting in Bayamo, an organization was
effected preparatory to the inauguration of a fierce and stubborn
rebellion throughout the island of Cuba. The leading spirits in this
movement were Francesco Maceo Osorio and the brothers Aguilera.
The armed conflict was deferred for more than a year, to give time
for a more perfect organization of the forces and arrangement of the
plan of campaign.
The revolution, under the command of Carlos Emanuel Cespedes,
commenced October 10, 1868, after the dethronement of Isabella, and
held out ten years. Cespedes was a graduate of the Diversity of
Havana and the School of Law in the University of Barcelona. In
1852, he had been imprisoned for five months in Morro Castle on a
charge of favoring the liberation of Cuba. In proclaiming the inde
pendence of Cuba, he granted absolute, unconditional liberty to his
own slaves. Many other Cuban leaders did the same. The flag of
independence was unfurled on the field of Yara, and this outbreak
was followed by simultaneous attacks upon various small towns.
On October 18, Bayamo was captured by the insurgents and the
Spanish force sent to its relief was totally defeated. A republican
form of government was organized with Salvador Cisneros, Marquis
of Santa Lucia, and Ignacio and Eduardo Agramonte at its head.
Other native leaders were Manuel Quesada, Acosta, Maximo Gomez,
Sanguilly, Garcia and Maceo.
Captain-General Lersundi refused to treat with a committee of
Spaniards and Cubans who came interceding with him to inaugurate
a policy of reform. He continued to organize the volunteers, who,
being aliens and drawn from the lowest classes of the people, became
more obnoxious than ever to the Insulars, as the landholders called
themselves. Lersundi was replaced by Dulce, who was inclined to a
more liberal policy, but was hampered in his movements, and was
replaced in 1870 by De Rodas.
H4 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Captain-General Valmaseda, who was in command for a time,
carried on the war with great inhumanity, shooting down every male.
Cuban over fifteen years old found away from home without a pass,
and removing the women and children by force from their country
homes to the cities. This was the beginning of the horrible recon-
centrado measures, afterwards employed by Weyler, in his efforts to
depopulate the island. Under Valmaseda the volunteers committed
great atrocities upon the helpless people, and it is estimated that
during The Ten Years' War, not less than 50,000 prisoners and
non-combatants were murdered. But this massacre of the helpless
was not unavenged; for in addition to those killed in battle, many
thousands of Spanish soldiers perished from diseases incident to
campaigns in a tropical climate.
Thomas Jordan, an ex-confederate soldier and a graduate of West
Point, was for a time in command of the insurgents, having landed
at Mazari with a force of 175 men, ten pieces of artillery and amunition
for 2,500 men In 1873 the Cuban cause was considerably helped
by the battle of La Sacra, won by the insurgents, in addition to ad
vantages gained by Gomez. Cespedes was betrayed and killed in
1874. In that year Captain-General Jovellar was sent out, and he
was relieved by Captain-General Martinez Campos in 1876. Both
these commanders carried on the war vigorously, and in 1877 the
fortunes of the insurgents rapidly declined. The diplomacy of General
Campos, not less than his military superiority, assisted in bringing
this disastrous rebellion to a close; but the promises made by him
were shamefully disregarded by the government of Spain, and the
pacification was only temporary. Even had .these measures been
strictly carried out, it is doubtful whether the affection of the insur
gents could ever have been regained after the cruel and bloody meas
ures which had been enforced against them during the war.
There were several filibustering expeditions from the United States
about this time, but one of the most tragic and lamentable occurrences
of the period was the unfortunate " Virginius " affair, under the
leadership of Captain Fry, an ardent sympathizer with the Cuban
cause. Captain Joseph Fry was born at Tampa Bay, June 14, 1826.'
He was the son of Major Fry, who was killed in the Florida war
with the Indians, and was himself a graduate of Annapolis and a
gallant officer in the Confederate service. He left Port au Prince
October 7, 1/83, on the "Virginius," a wooden side-wheel steamer,
with a crew of fifty-two men and carrying 113 passengers and a cargo
THE TEN YEARS' WAR. 117
of war material for the Cuban insurgents. While on the open sea
the " Virginius " was sighted by the " Tornado," a Spanish gunboat,
and attempted to run back to Jamaica, meanwhile throwing overboard
the contraband goods; but she was overtaken and captured, still re
taining unmistakable signs of her mission. The captain claimed that
the " Virginius " was " an American ship, carrying American colors
and papers, with an American captain and crew," and that the pas
sengers were going to Costa Rica; but the Spaniards protested
that the ship was a "pirate," the American colors were torn down
and replaced by the Spanish flag, and the prize towed into Santiago.
Four Cuban generals arrested on board, Bambetta, Cespedes, Del
Sol and Ryan, were immediately shot; their heads were cut off and
displayed on spikes, while their bodies were trampled by horses. The
American Consul, who attempted to protest against this outrage, was
restrained in his house by a guard. After this barbarous exhibition,
Captain Fry and his crew were put through the form of a trial by
court-martial and were condemned to be shot. They were executed
in the afternoon of November 7, 1873 Fifty-three men in all were
killed, and there were ninety-three passengers under sentence of death
when the proceedings were arrested by the arrival of the British
steamer " Niobe," under the command of Captain Sir Lampton Lor
raine, who indignantly demanded that the wholesale massacre be
stopped. The timely arrival of the American warship " Wyoming,"
and later on the Juanita," added to the moral effect of this demand,
and the Spaniards desisted from their purpose. The surviving pas
sengers were restored to the custody of the United States December
I, 1873. The vessel was given up to the United States, being de
livered to Captain Whiting, commanding the " Dispatch " at Bahia
Honda, and she was taken north, but being unseaworthy, she
foundered in a storm and was sunk off Cape Fear.
At this time General Grant was President of the United States,
General Sickles was Minister to Spain, and Castelar was President
of Spain. It was claimed that the authorities at Madrid ordered the
execution not to take place, but, if so, the order did not reach
Santiago in time, and General Burriel, who superintended the trial,
was never reprimanded nor censured for his action.
Before his execution, Captain Fry wrote a most beautiful and touch
ing letter to his wife, in which he spoke of the fearful sacrifice of life
on the " Virginius." The beautiful character of the chief victim and
II& CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
the heroic manner in which he met his fate increased the sympathy
felt for him and his companions by the people of the United States;
and they loudly demanded the punishment of the government permit
ting such atrocities. There was an animated exchange of letters and
protests, and a serious straining in the diplomatic relations between
the United States and Spain; but the latter government insisted that
the vessel was piratical and that the American papers were fraud
ulently obtained; and, as usual, Spanish diplomacy scored another
triumph, and no atonement save the payment of $80,000 to the heirs
of the victims was ever made. The undeniable fact that the expedition
was an unlawful one made it impossible for the United States to se
cure the satisfaction demanded by many of the American people.
While in Santiago, after the capitulation of that city in the summer
of 1898, I visited the place made famous by the execution of Captain
Fry and his comrades, and had the guides point out to me the spot
where these brave men fell. They were made to kneel with their faces
to the wall of a large butcher pen, and the place is known as " the
slaughter-house." Captain Fry was allowed to walk along and tell
the men goodbye before taking his own station in the line. It will be
remembered that one of the last things he did, besides writing the letter
to his wife alluded to above, was to write to General Grant, his old
friend, asking him to secure for his wife some pay which was due him
when he resigned from the United States Navy.
In the insurrection of 1868, bands of roving insurgents roamed
throughout the wooded sections of the eastern part of the island, burn
ing cane-fields and destroying the outlying farms. The Spanish
government sent more than 150,000 men to Cuba and spent about
$700,000,000 in efforts to suppress this rebellion.
The treaty of Zanjon, secured in 1878 by Captain-General Martinez
Campos, called the Pacificator, guaranteed the abolition of slavery
and promised constitutional reforms. The title of Captain-General
was changed to that of Governor-General, but the power of the in
dividual remained unchanged. Provincial reforms were inaugurated
and privileges promised, but the grinding taxation continued even
worse than ever, augmented as it was by an enormous war debt.
The tariff system, ruinous to Cuba, but profitable to Spain, continued
without any change, its effect being to exhaust every industry and
paralyze every enterprise; and while the Cubans were daily growing
poorer, the Spanish officials were increasing their private fortunes.
THE TEN YEARS' WAR. 119-
The poll-tax was very large and the voting age was twenty-five years.
The island was divided into two parties, the Conservatives and the
Liberal Autonomists, but the whole power of the government was
thrown on the side of the rulers and against the ruled.
No doubt Governor-General Campos, who is described as a humane
and generous man, was sincere in his desire to fulfill the stipulations
of the treaty whereby he had secured the cessation of hostilities, but
the government of Spain acted with despicable falseness in the matter.
Thousands of laws were enacted, but they were mere empty words.
The government offices in a short time became the property of the
highest bidder and the Cubans were gradually forced out of any
opportunity to contend in a lawful way for self-government. Re
strictions of all kinds were placed upon education and business enter
prises, and the country people were deprived of all liberty of action.
A short rebellion, called " the little war," took place in 1879, but was
quickly suppressed. In 1885 a revolt broke out in Santa Clara and
Santiago provinces while Blanco was Governor-General. It was put
down with great cruelty, many of the Cubans being executed or
assassinated without the slightest formality of a trial. General Seyti
Vidal, a Cuban leader, was murdered when about to embark for
Kingston under agreement with the authorities.
An economical crisis arose in 1889-92, owing to the depression of
the sugar market. Sugar is the staple production of Cuba. The
manufacture of beet sugar in Europe and the McKinley tariff in
America, caused the complete stagnation of this industry and great
distress prevailed. It was a question interesting to both Cubans and
Spaniards, and promised to make a new bond of union between the
contending lactions, but the government discountenanced this policy
and little relief could be obtained. The people lost heart and the
elections proving only a farce, they ceased to trouble themselves to
go to the polls. The abolition of slavery had made matters worse
in an economical way, and the reckless extravagance of the govern
ment piled up the debt upon the people of Cuba until it became
unbearable. The heavy poll-tax disfranchised the greater number
of the natives, so that the right of suffrage was restricted to 53,000
out of a population of 1,600,000; and while there was a pretense of
representation, the number of native Cubans in the Cortes has never
exceeded six and seldom been more than three. The offices were
distributed among the Spaniards; there was no personal safety, no
freedom of speech nor of the press. Such was the corruption in the
120 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
collection of duties that in 1887 the Havana custom-house was cleared
at the point of the bayonet by order of Captain-General Marin. Span
ish products paid no duties, while foreign articles were heavily taxed
and the Cubans paid enormous duties in Spain. Before 1895 Cuba
groaned under a debt of $295,707,264, most of which was incurred
by Spain in foreign wars or the Carlist insurrections. This debt
included " the expense of Spain's occupation of San Domingo, the
invasion of Mexico, expedition against Peru, money advanced during
Carlist wars, all that Spain had spent to uphold domination in Cuba
and to cover lavish expenses since 1868," including the enormous
military force sent to the island. The debt absorbed nearly 41 per
cent.; after deducting other expenses, there was less than 3 per cent,
left for internal development and improvement. While a subsidy of
$471,836.68 was paid to one company alone, the Spanish Trans-
Atlantic Company, the island was allowed less than $200,000 for
education.
In 1894 a bill of reforms acceptable to the majority of the Cubans
was introduced into the Cortes, but being discouraged by Sagasta
failed to pass, and a very unsatisfactory one was substituted and be
came a law in January. The very terms of this bill, showing the
reforms that were demanded, prove the utter falsity of the claims
put forth by the government of Spain in vindication of her policy
towards the Cubans.
Provision was made for a council of administration to consist of the
Governor-General and fifteen councillors appointed by royal decree.
The members of the council were to be selected from men having
been for four years resident in the country, and having been one
among the fifty largest taxpayers in the island, whether on real estate
or for the exercise of a profession. In addition they must have occu
pied certain high positions enumerated in the bill. There were also
to be fifteen councillors elected according to the same census as are
the provincial deputies. Public works, telegraphic and postal com
munications, agriculture, industry and commerce, immigration, pub
lic instruction, beneficence and health, all were to come under the
decrees of this administrative council, which was also to make up and
approve the annual budget.
The law provides that —
" It shall be incumbent on the Governor-General, as the supreme
head of the government of the island, to execute all the decrees of
the council."
THE TEN YEARS WAR. 121
But it continues:
" Whenever the Governor-General shall judge any decision of the
council to be contrary to the laws, or to the general interest of the
nation, he shall suspend its execution, etc."
And, for certain reasons, the Governor-General may suspend the
council of administration. He may also suspend the publication and
fulfillment of royal decrees, suspend the guarantees granted in the
interests of the people, and apply the riot act.
It will be seen that the authority of the Governor-General was not
at all abridged, and his power remained as arbitrary as ever; for in
addition to the privileges enumerated, he was given supreme com
mand of all the armed forces on land and sea stationed in the island;
and he was the acknowledged delegate of the minister of the colonies,
of state, of war and marine; and all the other authorities of the island
were made subordinate to him.
If the reforms allowed by the bill were any improvement on the
existing state of affairs, it is not surprising that the Cubans found
their condition unbearable. The law of January, 1895, precipitated
the brewing storm and the banner of Cuban liberty was again un
furled February 24, 1895.
The law, when received in Cuba, was loudly applauded by the
Autonomist party, which issued, April, 1895, a circular praising its
provisions and stigmatizing the revolutionists, and affirming " faith
in the means afforded by the Constitution, in the effectual agency of
work, in the indisputable force of ideas." After enumerating the
evils already caused in the islands by the threatened rebellion, such
as the suspension of the constitutional guarantees, preventing free
use of rights already secured, the circular describes the insurgents
as " men who belong to the most ignorant and miserable classes,
victims of the lamentable want of advancement in which they were
left to live in that fine section of Cuba (the eastern province), as an
easy prey for agitators, having no cohesion or discipline, for which
reason it is expected they will have to disband or surrender." The
people are exhorted to unite in assisting the " pacifier " of 1878, " who
has come once more to solve the present problems in the same spirit
of noble, righteous and generous confidence in the people."
THE REBELLION OF 1895.
CHAPTER VI.
After the close of the Ten Years' War, many of the chiefs of the
rebellion left Cuba and continued their plans for the liberation of
the island. The failure of Spain to keep the terms of the treaty of
Zanjon still further embittered the partisans of free Cuba, and it was
not difficult to organize revolutionary clubs. By 1890 there were
150 such clubs organized in the United States, Mexico, Cuba, Central
and South America, with a war fund of $1,000,000, and arms for
8,000 men.
The outbreak of the rebellion of 1895 was signalized by the simul
taneous uprising of nrmerous small bands of insurgents in various
parts of the island. Manuel Garcia, a chieftain of the previous war,
gave the signal for revolt in Matanzas; he was betrayed and killed.
A planter named Brooks, subsequently killed, led a large band in
Santiago province. The governors of Matanzas and Santiago hav
ing reported these outbreaks to the Governor-General, Calleja, martial
law was declared on the 28th of February, and free pardon offered
to all who should surrender within eight days. Other bands of rebels
under the command of Antonio Lopez Coloma, Dr. Martin Marrero
and Joaquin Pedrosa did not make much headway, many of the
leaders being captured and their men dispersed; but it was soon
found that the organizations in Santiago were of a more formidable
nature, especially that under the leadership of Bartolome Masso, one
of the most influential chiefs of the Ten Years' War. Nearly all the
insurgents in the initial uprising were dispersed and fled to the
mountains or swamps to perfect their organization and gather re
cruits, which were daily pouring in from the country homes and
from the ranks of the militia.
The Cuban autonomists or home rulers threw their whole strength
and influence on the side of the government, and used every means
possible to prevent the spread of the revolution. They sought an
interview with Masso, who requested ten days' time for consultation
THE REBELLION OF 1895. 123
with other Cuban leaders, but General Lachambre, the military com
mander of the province, demanded immediate surrender. A com
mittee went to Havana to ask the Captain-General to stop hostilities,
but he upheld the action of Lachambre, and all the efforts of the
peace party were useless to stay the progress of the civil war.
The number of the insurgents was insignificant, and they were
poorly armed, their principal weapon being the machete, a long-
bladed sword-knife, which they used with great strength and dex
terity. They relied for firearms upon what they could capture from
the Spaniards, or could secure from friends abroad. They were
generally mounted, being fine riders, and in small bands scoured the
country, attacking outposts or blockhouses where weak garrisons
were stationed, and raiding plantations, where they levied contribu
tions of food, stock and ammunition. The formation of the country
was favorable to this style of guerilla warfare and immense damage
could be done with impunity by very small forces.
Meanwhile, Governor-General Calleja was recalled, and Marshal
Martinez Campos was sent over to replace him, April 10. He
landed at Guantanamo April 16, and visited the southeastern cities
before proceeding to Havana he gave the most elaborate instruc
tions in regard to every subject — the diet and medical attendance for
his own soldiers, the protection of noncombatants, and the treatment
of prisoners Fie placed the troops in the eastern district under
Generals Salcedo, Lachambre and Valdez, with headquarters, re
spectively, at Santiago, Bayamo and Gibaro. General J. Garrich
was made military and civil governor of Santiago In August, the
same year, General J. J. Morena succeeded Salcedo, and General A.
G. Munoz succeeded Lachambre. Campos had control not only of
the military forces, but the men-of-war were at his disposal. He
was very active, constantly moving from place to place, sometimes
by special train, but generally by water.
Almost simultaneously with his appointment, two formidable
enemies appeared on the southeastern coast. Antonio and Jose
Maceo, Frank Agramonte and Flor Crombert, with a small body
of insurgents, arrived from Costa Rico, landed near Baracoa March
31, and joined Perez near Guantanamo, after losing several of their
number on the way. Jose Marti and Maximo Gomez, from San
Domingo, landed at Cabonico April 14, and after perilous adven
tures reached the main body of insurgents, where Gomez was re
ceived and recognized as commander-in-chief. The revolt was at
124 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
this time centered in Santiago province. The insurgents numbered
over 6,000 men, scattered in small bands over the country, while the
standing colonial army of 20,000 soldiers and something like 50,000
volunteers or militia, was already reinforced by more than 25,000
fresh troops. There was heavy fighting in the southeast during the
latter part of the spring. Flor Crombert, commanding about 300
of Maceo's men, was ambushed by a large force of Spaniards near
Palmerito, early in April, and was killed by one of his own men,
He was an able and enthusiastic leader and his loss was greatly
deplored. Maceo attacked and nearly annihilated 400 Spaniards
near Guantanamo, May 14; and, on the following day, the Spanish
escort to a provision train to Bayamo was dispersed by a body of
800 insurgents. Gomez and Jose Marti rode into Carmaguez, while
Maceo was diverting the attention of the Spaniards by terrorizing
Holquin. Marti was killed in a skirmish at Dos Rios, May 19,
and Gomez was wounded, but escaped capture. The corpse of Marti
was embalmed and taken to Santiago, where it was identified and
honorably buried. Marti was not a soldier, but he was a devoted,
successful and enthusiastic organizer and civil leader. He had in
tended to leave Cuba and work for her from abroad after seeing the
revolution well launched. Henri Rochefort speaks of him as " the
Antillian Mazzini," and he is commonly known as the father of
the Cuban rebellion. His death was a severe blow to the cause for
which he gave his life. His place as organizer was filled by T. E.
Palma, of New York.
Early in June, Gomez invaded the province of Puerto Principe
and in a few days there was a general uprising throughout the
province. The Marquis of Santa Lucia, an ex-Cuban president,
joined the insurgents, whose ranks were daily increasing, and active
hostilities were carried on, a regular plan of campaign on each side
being commenced. The orders of Gomez to his followers were to
attack all small Spanish posts and secure arms, to destroy railroads
and telegraph lines, Spanish forts or buildings where resistance was
made, to destroy all crops or mills whose owners refused to con
tribute to the Cuban war fund, and to keep on the defensive unless
they could fight at great advantage.
Campos' orders were to protect sugar estates and railroads; to
attack unless the enemy's forces were three to one, to release all
rebels who surrendered unless they held rank as officers, and to keep
the towns supplied with provisions.
THE REBELLION OF 1895.
The rainy season did not put an end to the conflict, although the
Spanish troops suffered severely from the tropical climate. The first
serious check given to the royal troops was at the battle of Bayaiuo,
July 12, where General Santocildes was killed. The fight was long
and bloody; the insurgent forces were skillfully managed by Maceo,
and they claimed to have killed and disabled 300 Spaniards. The
immediate presence and good generalship of Campos alone saved the
army from a disastrous rout. In August, the revolt had spread to
the Santa Clara province, a rich, level district where many Americans
own property, and Gomez was preparing to invade the western prov
inces. Late in this month, the expedition of Rolof and Rodriquez
from Key West, Florida, landed on the shores of Santa Clara prov
ince; and before long the insurgents were traversing the provinces
of Matanzas, Havana, and Pinar del Rio, a portion of the island here
tofore regarded as sacred from the torch of insurrection. The revo
lutionary government elected the Marquis of Santa Lucia, president,
and Bartolome Masso, vice-president; Maximo Gomez was confirmed
as general-in-chief of the liberating army, and Antonio Maceo, gen-
eral-in-chief of the invading army, with the rank of lieutenant-general.
After the defeat of General Suarez Valdez by Gomez, General Pando
was sent over from Spain with 30,000 men.
The favorite method of repressing the Cubans seems to have been
the construction of the trocha, a kind of fortified wall which the
Spaniards seemed to regard as impregnable, but to their surprise it
was broken through, and by the end of the rainy season, the rebel
a>rmy was swarming over the western provinces. November 17,
Maceo, with a force of 1,900 men, defeated General Navarro near the
city of Santa Clara, and Gomez won another victory in the same
neighborhood November 19 and 20. General Campos made a
stand at Coliseo, in Matanzas province, and met with a severe check.
Gomez attacked him with 7,000 men, and being reinforced by 1,500
insurgents, he made a bold charge, at the same time firing a cane-
tleld in which the Spaniards attempted to make a flank movement,
and thus driving them back to Havana province. This victory
enabled the insurgents to carry the war to the very gates of Havana,
for the burning fields fired by them could be seen from the city, and
before the end of the year 1895, Maceo had a large force massed in
the Province of Pinar del Rio^ west of Havana.
The extent and consequences of the insurrection became so alarm
ing that Campos was recalled January 17, 1896, and General Weyler,
a man with a reputation for great sterness and severity, was sent
128 . CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
to take his place. This was to prove the end of civilized warfare in
the island. General Campos had acted with humanity, and the
Cubans, in the beginning of the conflict, had treated their prisoners
in the same way; but after Weyler took command, February 10, 1896,
such a carnival of blood was commenced that the cruelty exhibited
on both sides was fiendish in its malignity.
At this time the Cubans claimed, in the various provinces, a total
of 60,722 men, sixty per cent, of whom were white, and forty per
cent, colored. Of their officers above the rank of captain, fifty were
white, ten black, three mulatto, and one Indian. The sugar-cane
plantations all over the island were laid waste by the insurgents; the
country homes and stores were pillaged and destroyed, first by one
side and then by the other, until the beautiful island became one vast
scene of ruin and desolation; laborers were arrested in the fields and
executed on the charge of being insurgents; women and children and
aged men were killed or driven into the cities and corraled there
to starve, not being allowed to go beyond a certain line under pain
of death. The press was so restricted, and the accounts of all that
took place in the island from the opening of the year 1896 are so
garbled and contradictory that it is impossible to form a correct idea
of the campaign.
The insurrection was at first very much underestimated, both at
home and abroad, while public interest in this country was for a
time greatly excited over the Venezuelan controversy, and the dis
covery of gold in the Klondike. But gradually the rebellion began
to assume larger proportions, and attracted the attention of the nations
of Europe as well as of the people of the United States. The humane
and conciliatory policy of Campos was unsuccessful, and it was evi
dent that nothing but absolute independence or the extermination
of the Cubans would end the conflict.
The great difficulty of the insurgents was to get recognition as
belligerents, but owing to the peculiar nature of the conflict, they
found it hard to prove the existence of a local government. On this
subject the greatest diversity of opinion prevailed. The Spaniards
invariably characterized them as an unorganized mob of negroes, and
yet within one year, in the face of more than 100,000 Spanish soldiers,
the insurgents had traversed the whole length of the island and made
more headway than they had been able to do in the whole Ten Years'
War. They had almost undisputed possession of the eastern half of
the island. Before the beginning of 1897, they had a civil admin-
THE REBELLION OF 1895. I29
istration organized for the provinces of Santiago, Puerto Principe
and part of Santa Clara. These provinces were divided into districts,
with regular officials, known as prefects. Salvador Cisneros was
president, and Bartolome Masso, vice-president. Sundry laws had
been enacted dealing- with marriages and collection of taxes, a mail
service was established and set in operation, four newspapers were
printed, and primary schools were opened.
The seacoast was patrolled and a large part of it used by the
insurgents, more than thirty shipments of arms and ammunition hav
ing been safely landed; still, on account of want of artillery, they
could not hold a single seaport against Spanish men-of-war. The
Spanish garrisons had to be withdrawn from the interior towns as
soon as the insurgents received a few pieces of light artillery. Yet,
in spite of these facts, it seemed impossible to prove that the Cuban
rebels had an organized form of government and a capital city.
Cubitas, the capital, was inaccessible to the outside world.
Captain-General Marin was in command for a few weeks before
the arrival of the new governor. Captain-General Weyler reached
Cuba February 10, 1896. The reputation he bore as a stern and
relentless character had produced such consternation among the non-
ccmbatants that thousands of Cuban citizens in sympathy writh the
rebellion left the island before he arrived. On the day after reach
ing Cuba, he made a proclamation urging all the citizens to uphold
the cause of Spain. March 8, another proclamation was issued in
which he gave the insurgents fifteen days to surrender, offering pardon
to those who would prove they were forced into the ranks of the in
surgents and who would take the oath of allegiance to Spain.
March n, Monteguelo was burned by the insurgents. In April,
Maceo broke through the trocha line between Havana and Pinar
del Rio and gained an important victory at the battle of Cacarajicara,
which was given out as the usual Spanish victory. Maceo, however,
remained undisturbed in his mountain fastness, while it required
30,000 men to keep the vicinity of Havana itself safe from the in
cursions of the rebels. About this time, General Garcia, who had
been intercepted and detained in the United States in February, suc
ceeded in reaching Cuba and was put in command in the extreme
southeast, while General Gomez commanded in the center. On April
21, at a fight near Manzanillo, the Spaniards received a severe
check. Generals Pando and Bernal, about this time, returned to
Spain, not being in accord with the new regime introduced by Wey-
I3O CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Icr. In May the exportation of leaf-tobacco from Havana and Pinar
del Rio was prohibited. Early in May, the " Bermuda " landed two
Catling guns, 1,000 rifles, 500,000 rounds of ammunition and 1,000
pounds of dynamite for the insurgents. The " Competitor " was not
so successful, but was captured on a similar mission and carried to
Cuba by a Spanish gunboat. In June the Spanish government
made strenuous efforts to raise funds with which to carry on the
expenses of the war, which were enormous. With the setting in
of the rainy season, the campaign was for a time suspended, the
insurgents holding their own, while the king's soldiers were being
mowed down by thousands before the resistless advances of disease.
When Weyler reached Cuba, he sent back a demand for more
troops, and they continued to pour into Cuba until there was an
army of Spanish soldiers there exceeding 200,000. He began by
scattering 150,000 of these in fortifications in the cities and in the*
numberless small forts along the trochas.
These defenses are so often mentioned in the course of a history
of the Cuban War that a more detailed description of them will assist
in understanding the situation. The trocha resembles a fortified wall.
It is a cleared space between one and two hundred yards wide, stretch
ing through an impassable jungle. The felled trees are piled up in
rows about as wide as an ordinary street and some six feet high.
Between these barriers runs a road and in some cases a single track of
military railway protected by a line of forts and blockhouses; beyond
them a maze of barbed wire and another barrier of felled trees and
jungle. Ditches are generally dug parallel to the trocha. The princi
pal trochas cross the island in its narrowest parts, one of fifty miles
across the western part of the province of Puerto Principe, the other
of twenty-five miles across the eastern part of the province of Pinar
del Rio, hardly twenty miles from the city of Havana. The fortifi
cations on the trochas are unique. Every half mile there is a large
stone fort, painted white, so as to be easily seen from a great distance.
Half way between these forts are blockhouses, and between the block
houses and forts are what might be compared to large, fortified sentry
boxes, very strongly built and skillfully protected by entanglements
of barbed wire. It is evident that such obstructions as the trochas
would prove very formidable to opponents without artillery, while
of little value against the use of artillery. In point of fact, they were
frequently crossed by spies and couriers, and several times by large
bodies of insurgents.
THE REBELLION OF 1895. 131
In the fall, after the rainy season, Weyler himself took the field
and there were continual bulletins announcing the pacification of the
province or the fact that the insurgents were surrounded, and prom
ising that the sugar plantations should be protected and that the
grinding of the cane should be recommenced; but as soon as the
rebels disappeared from one side they sprang up on the other.
In December the insurgents sustained a severe loss in the death
c? Maceo. It has been impossible to verify the accounts of his death,
as the circumstances are represented so very differently. The Span
iards charge that he was killed in open fight; the insurgents that
he was lured into ambush and treacherously murdered. The news
of his death was received with great delight at Havana, was cele
brated by illuminations and processions, and Don Francisco Cirujeda,
who led the troops that killed the Cuban leader, was honored and
promoted. Maceo was succeeded in command by General Juan Ruiz
Rivera. Weyler's campaign in Pinar del Rio was continued with
great ostentation and parade, accompanied by continual proclama
tions of pacification, while in fact the rebels were daily increasing in
strength. January 19, Weyler started east with 19,000 men, in
creased from the garrisons to 25,000. He reached Santa Clara Feb
ruary I, and issued concentration orders February 9, and marched
to Placitas, thence to Sancti Spiritus. The concentration orders
required all the noncombatants to go to certain towns within a limited
period, or be considered as rebels and shot at sight. Indeed, the
chief fury of the Spaniards seemed to be directed against these un
armed and helpless pacificos, who were herded like cattle in the most
unhealthy locations, where they died by hundreds from contagious
diseases and starvation. Frequently, unarmed laborers were shot in
the fields or brought to the towns and executed as rebels, while every
dwelling in the open country was burned to the ground and not a
living creature was left in the devastated region.
Meanwhile Gomez and Cisneros crossed the central trocha in Janu
ary and attacked Arroyo Blanco, whose garrison was relieved Febru
ary 3. Gomez then sent Rodriguez in Weyler's rear to threaten the
provinces of Havana and Matanzas., while he established himself at
Arroyo; and, although the Spaniards reported three battles as vic
tories, they failed to dislodge him. Gomez was so expert in mis
leading his adversaries that he acquired the name of " the wily fox."
He seldom came to an open fight, but led his pursuers a roundabout
chase, until fear of being ambushed obliged them to give, up the
pursuit, and he would return in safety to his headquarters..
132 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
In February the Queen Regent signed reform decrees, and in
March Weyler was ordered to negotiate with the rebels. March 28,
reaching Cienfuegos, he sent three Cuban leaders of the Ten Years'
War to negotiate with Gomez, but the latter refused to receive them.
In April, Weyler returned to Havana, declaring the province of
Santa Clara pacified. The rainy season was again approaching and
the insurgents were prepared to recuperate in the well-guarded fast
ness, while the Spanish numbers dwindled daily from the effects of
disease. The insurgents of Santiago province, under the leadership
of General Garcia, were living on supplies captured from the Spanish
columns. In the case of Bayamo, about twenty or thirty miles from
Manzanillo, it is estimated that the Spaniards must have lost at least
5.000 men in the effort to keep the garrison supplied with provisions,
and, after the insurgents secured artillery, many of these interior
towns had to be abandoned.
July 31, General Weyler announced amnesty to the exiled Cubans.
There was great opposition to his course and demands were made
for his recall. In August, Canovas was assassinated and was suc
ceeded by General Azcarraga. The Spanish policy remained for
some time unchanged and Weyler was not recalled until October 9.
General Blanco, his successor, arrived in Havana October 30. In
November, Spain extended the suffrage and offered concessions to
Cuba. The starving condition of the Cuban reconcentrados could
no longer be denied and the authorities were compelled to accept the
help of charitable Americans in caring for these destitute creatures.
This was galling to the Spaniards in Cuba, and riots occurred in
Havana early in the year 1898, when the American consulate had to
be protected by a large body of troops. General Lee informed the
authorities of the critical situation of Americans in Cuba, and the
White Squadron, under the command of Admiral Sicard, was ordered
to rendezvous in the neighborhood of Key West. Excitement all
over the country ran high and urgent measures were taken to improve
the navy and protect our seaboard in case of hostility.
Meanwhile, Marshal Blanco had proceeded to carry out the re
forms suggested by the Sagasta cabinet, and the promised plan of
autonomy was inaugurated. Cabinet officers were selected to assist
the Governor-General in the home government. Jose Maria Galvez
was president of the cabinet; Antonio Govin, minister of the interior;
the Marquis of Montoro, leader of the autonomist party in Cuba,
minister of finance; Laureano Rodiguez, minister of commerce;
THE REBELLION OF 1895. 133
Francesco of Zayas, minister of education, and Kduardo Dolz, min
ister of posts and telegraphs. In addition to the establishment of
the new form of government, commissioners, or more properly speak
ing, emissaries were sent to the various rebel headquarters to endeavor
to persuade or bribe the leaders into accepting the new regime. The
messengers were badly received; in fact, they failed to return, and it
was soon made known that one of them, Col. D. Joachin Ruiz, aide-
de-camp to General Blanco, and sent by him to the camp of the
insurgent chief, Rodriguez, had been court-martialed and shot as a
spy. The sacrifice of this brave and popular young officer was deeply
deplored and aroused great indignation; but it was justified by the
Cubans on the ground that he came as an emissary to corrupt the
loyalty of a subordinate commander; that the' Spaniards had already
published false reports as to the defection and desertion of various
rebel leaders, and that the only way to offset this treachery was by
dealing summarily with any agent attempting to treat with them, or
offering to make any concessions short of the absolute independence
they had proclaimed.
On January 25, by order of the Navy Department, the battleship
" Maine " took leave of the rest of the fleet at Key West, and pro
ceeded to the harbor of Havana. There had been serious riots in
Havana and it was considered that the presence of an American man-
of-war would be a safeguard to American interests there. The plan
was acquiesced in by the Spanish Government and arrangements
we're made that the courtesy should be returned by the visit of the
" Vizcaya," a large, heavily-armed Spanish cruiser, to the port of New
York. The unfortunate De Lome matter fanned the flame of dis
cord and the relations between Spain and the United States were
strained to a degree which needed not such a terrible catastrophe
as the destruction of the " Maine " to produce an irreparable breach.
The officers of the "Maine" were: Captain, Charles D. Sigsbee;
executive officer, Lieutenant-Commander Richard Wainwright; navi
gator, Lieutenant George F. W. Holman; lieutenants, John Hood
and Carl W. Jungen; lieutenants, junior grade, George P. Blow,
John J. Blandin and Friend W. Jenkins; naval cadets, Jonas H.
Holden, Watt T. Cluverius, Amon Bronson and David T. Boyd, Jr.;
surgeon, Lucien G. Heneberger; paymaster, Charles M. Ray; chief
engineer, Charles P. Howell; passed assistant engineer, Frederick C.
Bowers; assistant engineers, John R. Morris and Darwin R. Merritt;
naval cadets (engineer division), Pope Washington and Arthur Cren-
134 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
shaw; chaplain, John P. Chidwick; first lieutenant of marines, Al-
bertus W. Catlin; boatswain, Francis E. Larkin; gunner, Joseph Hill;
carpenter, George Helms; pay clerk, Brent McCarthy. The crew
numbered 328.
The night of the explosion was overcast, hot and sultry. The
" Maine," lying peacefully at the buoy where she was moored by the
Spanish pilot on her entrance into the port, had swung around into
an unusual position;' in fact, she was in exactly the position she would
have had to take to open fire on the shore fortifications. Nearly astern
of the " Maine " was the American steamer "City of Washington; " on
the starboard side were the " Alfonso XII " and the " Legazpi."
Suddenly, at forty minutes past nine, an awful explosion shook the
vessel, which caught on fire and instantly commenced to sink. The
electric lights went out and the quarters were left in intense darkness
and smoke. All the crew were on board, and, except those on duty^
had turned in. Only four of the officers were absent — • Assistant
Engineer Bowers, Cadet Washington, Paymaster's Clerk McCarthy
and Gunner Joseph Hill. Some of the officers were in their state
rooms or the messrooms below, in the officers' smoking quarters, or
on the main deck. The captain was in his cabin writing. The force
of the explosion being on the side occupied by the men's sleeping
quarters, made the escape of the majority of the crew impossible.
Those of the officers and crew who were able hurried to the deck,
and, without confusion or disorder, reported for duty and did all that
could be done to save the vessel and the crew.
Only three of the fifteen boats were found available; three manned
and went to the work of rescuing the men who were floating in the
water and crying for help. Boats from the American and Spanish
ships also aided in the work of rescue. Meanwhile, the vessel was
burning and was sinking rapidly. It was supposed that the maga
zines were flooded, but there was momentary danger of explosion of
ammunition, which had become mingled with the wreckage; and
1he group of officers who had remained on deck until the last moment,
having done all that was possible, sadly and reluctantly left the wreck'
and took refuge on the " City of Washington," a Ward Line steamer,
commanded by Captain Stevens, who did good service in behalf of
his unfortunate countrymen. The injured men were cared for on this
vessel and the Spanish men-of-war in the neighborhood, and were
afterwards sent to the Spanish hospitals in Havana, where they were
nursed with great kindness and consideration..
CAPTAIN C. D. SIGSBEE.
THE REBELLION OF 1895. 137
A few moments after reaching safe quarters, Captain Sigsbee sent
the following dispatch:
"SECRETARY NAVY, Washington, D. C.:
" ' Maine ' blown up in Havana harbor at nine forty to-night and
destroyed. Many wounded and doubtless more killed or drowned.
Wounded and others on board Spanish man-of-war and Ward Line
steamer. Send lighthouse tenders from Key West for crew and the
few pieces of equipment above water. No one has clothing other
than that upon him. Public opinion should be suspended until fur
ther report. All officers believed to be saved. Jenkins and Merritt
not yet accounted for. Many Spanish officers, including representa
tive of General Blanco, now with me to express sympathy.
" SIGSBEE."
Consul-General Lee, upon hearing of the disaster, immediately
hastened on board to offer sympathy and assistance. Several Span
ish officers, including General Salano, chief of staff to General Blanco,
also called upon Captain Sigsbee immediately after he boarded the
'l City of Washington," expressed their great sympathy, and asserted
that the authorities in Havana were entirely ignorant of the cause
of the explosion.
Two hundred and fifty-four were lost that night, seven of the
wounded afterwards died, and many were crippled for life. Only two
of the officers were lost — Lieutenant Jenkins and Assistant Engineer
Merritt. The Spanish authorities offered to give public burial to the
dead whose bodies had been recovered; the offer was accepted, and,
on the afternoon of February 17, the funeral of nineteen of the victims
took place amid demonstrations of profound sympathy and respect.
The funeral cortege was very imposing; thousands of all ranks took
part in the vast procession which followed the dead, who were laid
to rest in the beautiful Colon cemetery just outside the city of Havana.
Most of the remaining bodies, as they were recovered, were buried
there, Chaplain Chidwick identifying them and conducting the funeral
services. After it became possible to forward the bodies to Key
West, they were buried there, and the wounded were also sent back
to the United States, as soon as they were able to travel, with the
surviving officers and men, except seven officers and two men, who
remained in Havana with the captain.
The divers arrived on the igth, and among the first articles recov
ered from the captain's cabin were the keys of all the magazines and
138 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
shellrooms, showing that these keys had been safely turned in upon
the night of the accident. The work of diving for the bodies may
be better imagined than described, and conspicuous among the many
brave deeds of officers and men was the heroic fortitude of the gentle
chaplain in personally inspecting and identifying the remains of these
unfortunate men, who in life had found in him a warm and sympa
thetic friend. He also answered fully and kindly the hundreds of
sad and terrible letters received from sorrowing relatives of the dead.
By the 2ist of February 143 bodies had been recovered, and several
more were brought up later. The remains of the two officers who
were lost were among the last recovered.
The life of Captain Sigsbee, during the days succeeding the disaster,
was full of the most harrowing details and distressing scenes, but
through it all he had the consolation of knowing that he was upheld
by the entire confidence of the American people, who exonerated
him from all charges of carelessness long before the court of inquiry
met. He remained in Havana until March 26, when he returned to
Washington, where he was received by the Secretary and the Presi
dent with every mark of respect and sympathy, and some weeks after
was assigned to another command.
It was uncertain at first whether the accident was due to an internal
explosion, caused by the firing of the magazines, or to some external
cause. A board of inquiry was immediately appointed by the United
States authorities to investigate the matter, and it seemed decided
beyond question, based upon evidence that the hull was bent in
wardly, that the destroying agency was an external one, probably
a submarine mine in the harbor. This construction was always de
nied by Spain, excepting a short and perfunctory examination, but
no serious efforts were made by that government to investigate the
matter or to place the guilt. This was natural. If they did not
admit the findings of the American board as correct, but persisted in
maintaining that the explosion was from some internal cause, it was
hardly to be expected that they would seek to throw blame, which
they did not admit to exist, upon one of their own officials in the city
of Havana. The indignation felt in the United States, on account of
this terrible affair, was little less than that felt in Spain over what
the Spanish people considered an unjust and unproven charge; and
feelings of intense bitterness were engendered between the two nations.
The destruction of the " Maine " was not the alleged reason for
war, but it was the most important factor in precipitating the inevi
table conflict.
RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED
STATES IN THE PAST.
CHAPTER VII.
The geographical situation of Cuba is remarkable, commanding as
it does the two most important approaches to the Gulf of Mexico.
With an area of about the same as that of Alabama, its configuration
is peculiar and almost crescent-shaped. It is 790 miles long, 117 miles
wide in its broadest part and 22 in its narrowest. It is 50 miles from
Hayti, 95 miles from Jamaica, 124 miles from the extremity of Florida
and about an equal distance from Yucatan. Early in its history, the
strategic value of the island was recognized, and it was the base of
the most important expeditions to the Gulf Coast, those of Cortez and
De Soto, and, at a later date, the expedition of the Prince de Joinville
against Mexico. It was here also that General Packenham's forces
stopped on their way home after his disastrous encounter with the
Americans at New Orleans.
"The position of Cuba, the Key to the Gulf of Mexico, or, as it is
called by Mr. Murat Halstead the " Guardian of the gates of the
American Mediterranean," renders the island an object of intense in
terest to the citizens of the United States, and while there has never
been any question as to Spain's right of possession, the cession of
Cuba to a foreign power has always been considered a " purely Ameri
can question." In the same degree the secession of Cuba from the
mother country and the securing of her absolute independence, has
always been a question more interesting to Americans than to any
others. The paramount importance of its commanding position has
always been acknowledged, although, our statesmen have been divided
in their views with regard to the advisability of annexation, particu
larly during ante-bellum days before the abolition of slavery, when the
economic conditions of our country were vastly different from those
since existing. / But even in those early days,fjefferson thus expressed
himself (Jefferson's Works, Vol. 7, p. 316):
I candidly confess that I have ever looked upon Cuba as the most inter
esting addition that can be made to our system of States, the possession of \
140 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
which (with Florida Point), would give us control over the Gulf of Mexico
and the countries and isthmus bordering upon it, and would fill up the measure
of our political well-being.
April 27, 1809 (Ibid, Vol. V, p. 444), Jefferson wrote as follows:
He (Napoleon) will with difficulty consent to our receiving Cuba into our
Union, to prevent our aid to Mexico and other provinces. That would be a
price, and I would immediately erect a column on the southernmost limit of
Cuba, and inscribe on it a ne plus ultra as to us in that direction. We should
then have only to include the North in our confederacy, which would be, of
course, in the first war, and we should have such an empire for liberty as she
has never surveyed since the creation; and I am persuaded no Constitution was
ever so well calculated as ours for extensive empire and self-government.
* * * It will be objected to our receiving Cuba, that no limit can then be
drawn to our future acquisitions. Cuba can be defended by us without a Navy,
and this develops the principle which ought to limit our views. Nothing
should ever be accepted which would require a Navy to defend it.
June n, 1823 (Ibid, Vol. 7, p. 288), he wrote to the President:
Cuba alone seems at present to hold up a speck of war to us. Its possession
by Great Britain would, indeed, be a great calamity to us. Could we induce
her to join us in guaranteeing its independence against all the world, except
Spain, it would be nearly as valuable to us as if it were our own. But should
she take it, I would not immediately go to war for it; because the first war on
other accounts will give it to us; or the island will give itself to us, when able
to do so.
And again, on June 23d, the same year (Ibid, Vol. 7, p. 300), he
wrote, speaking of Cuba:
It is better then to lie still in readiness to receive that interesting incorpora
tion when solicited by herself. For, certainly, her addition to our confederacy
is exactly what is wanting to round out our power as a nation to the point of
its utmost interest.
r
Our Secretaries of State since the time of Jefferson have always
watched with jealous care the development of foreign interests upon
this continent and have always insisted that Cuba should never be
suffered to pass into the hands of any other European power, if re
leased from the dominion of Spaing I
John Quincy Adams, Monroe's Secretary of State from 1817 to
1825, said:
RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. 14!
* * * Looking forward to the probable course of events for the short
period of half a century, it is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the
annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be indispensable to the con
tinuance and integrity of the Union itself. * * * Cuba, forcibly disjointed
from its own unnatural connection with Spain and incapable of self-support,
can gravitate only toward the North American Union, which by the same law
of nature can not cast her off from its bosom.
•This letter was written to the United States Minister in Spain and
shows plainly how naturally the inference was drawn that Cuba no
longer dependent on Spain would seek alliance with or entrance into
the American Union. Spain was at this time losing her American
possessions, and that she would retain Cuba for a very long period
was considered highly improbable. I
The celebrated Monroe Doctrine about which there has been so
much controversy, was announced about this time, and showed plainly
that any attempt at interference by European powers on the American
continent, or any attempt to recover lost dominion over states which
had achieved their independence, would be regarded by the United
States as unfriendly.
Henry Clay, while Secretary of State during the administration of
John Quincy Adams, 1824-1829, writing to the United States Minister
in Spain, said:
If the war should continue between Spain and the new Republics, and those
islands (Cuba and Porto Rico) should become the theatre of it, their fortunes
have such a connection with the prosperity of the United States that they
could not be indifferent spectators, and the possible contingencies of such a
protracted war might bring upon the Government of the United States duties
and obligations, the performance of which, however painful it should be, they
might not be at liberty to decline.
In 1825, Spain endeavored to secure a treaty with the United States
offering commercial advantages in exchange for a guarantee to Spain
of perpetual possession of Cuba. The effort coupled with an attempt
to recover her lost colonies, was unsuccessful, the utmost concessions
made being an expression from the President that all our efforts
should be to preserve the -existing state of things. At the same time
the United States discountenanced attempts made by the Spanish-
American Republics to carry their war with Spain into Cuba.
In 1826, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was instructed that the
United States would not countenance the passage of Cuba to any other
/
i/
142 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
European power. \Thus it seems there has always been a mutual dis-
trust in regard to Cuba, and the attitude of the United States seems to
have been tolerance of Spain's claims so long as the mother country
was able to enforce therrTTl It seems to have gone much further dur
ing the last thirty years, for the condition of Cuba has been a serious
menace to the commerce and welfare of the United States; at the
same time it must be admitted that while the Government did its full
duty in keeping faith with Spain, the people of the United States did
much to foment and encourage the uprisings upon the island, and
without the moral support and material assistance derived from . imeri-
can sympathizers, Cuba could never have successfully defied Spain,
because a vast number of the better class of Cubans were not dis
affected, but clung with unshaken loyalty to the mother country.
In 1852, Mr. Everett, Secretary of State, protested against Euro
pean interference in Cuba, and in 1853, Governor Marcy, then Secre
tary of State, said that Cuba " must be to the United States no cause
of annoyance in itself, nor must it be used by others as an instrument
of annoyance." He wrote July 23, 1853, that it was very difficult
for Spain to retain Cuba or to sustain without assistance her connec
tion with the island, but he declared that while Spain remained in fact
as well as in name the sovereign of Cuba, she could depend on us
" maintaining our duty as a neutral nation towards her, however dif
ficult it might be." It was contended that neutrality laws could not
be made more restrictive without violating the constitutional rights
of our citizens. Reference was also made by Governor Marcy to the
idea of purchase, and it was stated that there had been no intention
of purchase " unless the inhabitants were very generally disposed to
concur in the transfer."
The seizure of the steamer " Black Warrior," packet ship of the
New York and Alabama line, in February, 1854, on some technical
charge of irregularity, aroused great indignation, and Soule, United
States Minister to Spain, presented this claim in terms which the
Spanish Minister of State considered " harsh and imperious." Soule
then referred to the great carelessness of the Spanish Government in
making redress for former claims of the same character. A bitter
correspondence ensued. The Secretary of State advised a conference
between the ministers to Madrid, Paris and London, and this took
place at Ostend in October of the same year and resulted in the
famous document known as the Ostend Manifesto.
RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. 143
THE OSTEND MANIFESTO.
AIX-LA-CHAPELLE, October 18, 1854.
SIR. — The undersigned, in compliance with the wish expressed by the
President in the several confidential dispatches you have addressed to us
respectively, to that effect, we have met in conference, first at Ostend, in
Belgium, on the Qth, loth, and nth instant, and then at Aix-la-Chapelle, in
Prussia, on the days next following, up to the date hereof.
There has been a full and unreserved interchange of views and sentiments
between us, which we are most happy to inform you has resulted in a cordial
coincidence of opinion on the grave and important subjects submitted to our
consideration.
We have arrived at the conclusion, and are thoroughly convinced that an
immediate and earnest effort ought to be made by the Government of the
United States to purchase Cuba from Spain at any price for which it can be
obtained, not exceeding the sum of $
The proposal should, in our opinion, be made in such a manner as to be
presented through the necessary diplomatic forms to the Supreme Constituent
Cortes about to assemble. On this momentous question, in which the people,
both of Spain and the United States, are so deeply interested, all our pro
ceedings ought to be open, frank, and public. They should be of such a
character as to challenge the approbation of the world.
We firmly believe that, in the progress of human events, the time has
arrived when the vital interests of Spain are as seriously involved in the sale,
as those of the United States in the purchase of the island, and that the
transaction will prove equally honorable to both nations.
Under these circumstances we can not anticipate a failure, unless possibly
through the malign influence of foreign powers who possess no right whatever
to interfere in the matter.
We proceed to state some of the reasons which have brought us to this
conclusion, and for the sake of clearness, we shall specify them under two
distinct heads:
1. The United States ought, if practicable, to purchase Cuba with as little
delay as possible.
2. The probability is great that the Government and Cortes of Spain will
prove willing to sell it, because this would essentially promote the highest
and best interests of the Spanish people.
Then, first. It must be clear to every reflecting mind that, from the peculiarity
of its geographical position, and the considerations attendant on it, Cuba is as
necessary to the North American Republic as any of its present members, and
144 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
that it belongs naturally to that great family of States of which the Union is
the providential nursery.
From its locality it commands the mouth of the Mississippi and the immense
and annually increasing trade which must seek this avenue to the ocean.
On the numerous navigable streams, measuring an aggregate course of some
30,000 miles, which disembogue themselves through this magnificent river into
the Gulf of Mexico, the increase of the population within the last ten years
amounts to more than that of the entire Union at the time Louisiana was
annexed to it.
The natural and main outlet to the products of this entire population, the
highway of their direct intercourse with the Atlantic and Pacific States, can
never be secure, but must ever be endangered whilst Cuba is a dependency of
a distant power in .whose possession it has proved to be a source of constant
annoyance and embarrassment to their interests.
Indeed, the Union can never enjoy repose, nor possess reliable security, «as
long as Cuba is not embraced within its boundaries.
Its immediate acquisition by the Government is of paramount importance,
and we can not doubt but that it is a consummation devoutly wished for by
its inhabitants.
The intercourse which its proximity to our coast begets and encourages
between them and the citizens of the United States, has, in the progress of
time, so united their interests and blended their fortunes that they now look
upon each other as if they were one people and had but one destiny.
Considerations exist which render delay in the acquisition of this island
exceedingly dangerous to the United States.
The system of immigration and labor lately organized within its limits, and
the tyranny and oppression which characterize its immediate rulers, threaten
an insurrection at every moment which may result in direful consequences to
the American people.
Cuba has thus become to us an unceasing danger, and a permanent cause of
anxiety and alarm.
But we need not enlarge on these topics. It can scarcely be apprehended that
foreign powers, in violation of international law, would interpose their in
fluence with Spain to prevent our acquisition of the island. Its inhabitants are
now suffering under the worst of all possible governments, that of absolute
despotism, delegated by a distant power to irresponsible agents, who are
changed at short intervals, and who are tempted to improve the brief oppor
tunity thus afforded to accumulate fortunes by the basest means.
As long as this system shall endure, humanity may in vain demand the
suppression of the African slave trade in the island. This is rendered im-
RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. 147
possible whilst that infamous traffic remains an irresistible temptation and a
source of immense profit to needy and avaricious officials, who, to attain their
ends, scruple not to trample the most sacred principles under foot.
The Spanish Government at home may be well disposed, but experience has
proved that it can not control these remote depositaries of its power.
Besides, the commercial nations of the world can not fail to perceive and
appreciate the great advantages which would result to their people from a
dissolution of the forced and unnatural connection between Spain and Cuba,
and the annexation of the latter to the United States. The trade of England
and France with Cuba would, in that event, assume at once an important and
profitable character, and rapidly extend with the increasing population and
prosperity of the island.
2. But if the United States and every commercial nation would be benefited
by this transfer, the interests of Spain would also be greatly and essentially
promoted.
She can not but see what such a sum of money as we are willing to pay for
the island would effect in the development of her vast natural resources.
Two-thirds of this sum, if employed in the construction of a system of
railroads, would ultimately prove a source of greater wealth to the Spanish
people than that opened to their vision by Cortes. Their prosperity would
date from the ratification of the treaty of cession.
France has already constructed continuous lines of railways from Havre,
Marseilles, Valenciennes, and Strasburg, via Paris, to the Spanish frontier, and
anxiously awaits the day when Spain shall find herself in a condition to extend
these roads through her northern provinces to Madrid, Seville, Cadiz, Malaga,
and the frontiers of Portugal.
This object once accomplished, Spain would become a centre of attraction
for the traveling world, and secure a permanent and profitable market for her
various productions. Her fields, under the stimulus given to industry by re
munerative prices, would teem with cereal grain, and her vineyard would bring
forth a vastly increased quantity of choice wines. Spain would speedily become
what a bountiful Providence intended she should be, one of the first nations
of continental Europe — rich, powerful, and contented.
Whilst two-thirds of the price of the island would be ample for che com
pletion of her most important public improvements, she might with the re
maining 40,000,000 satisfy the demands now pressing so heavily upon her
credit, and create a sinking fund which would gradually relieve her from the
overwhelming debt now paralyzing her energies.
Such is her present wretched financial condition, that her best bonds are
sold upon her own bourse at about one-third of their par value; whilst another
148 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
class, on which she pays no interest, have but a nominal value, and are quoted
at about one-sixth of the amount for which they were issued. Besides, these
latter are held principally by British creditors, who may, from day to day,
obtain the effective interposition of their own Government for the purpose of
coercing payment. Intimations to that effect have been already thrown out
from high quarters, and unless some new sources of revenue shall enable
Spain to provide for such exigencies, it is not improbable that they will be
realized.
Should Spain reject the present golden opportunity for developing her
resources and removing her financial embarrassments, it may never again
return.
Cuba, in her palmiest days, never yielded her exchequer, after deducting the
expense of its government, a clear annual income of more than a million and
a half of dollars. These expenses have increased to such a degree as to leave
a deficit, chargeable to the treasury of Spain, to the amount of $600,000. «
In a pecuniary point of view, therefore, the island is an incumbrance instead
of a source of profit to the mother country.
Under no probable circumstances can Cuba ever yield to Spain one per cent,
on the large amount which the United States are willing to pay for its
acquisition. But Spain is in imminent danger of losing Cuba without
remuneration.
Extreme oppression, it is now universally admitted, justifies any people in
endeavoring to relieve themselves from the yoke of their oppressors. The
sufferings which the corrupt, arbitrary, and unrelenting local administration
necessarily entails upon the inhabitants of Cuba can not fail to stimulate and
keep alive the spirit of resistance and revolution against Spain which has of
late years been so often manifested. In this condition of affairs it is vain to
expect that the sympathies of the people of the United States will not be
warmly enlisted in favor of their oppressed neighbors.
We know that the President is justly inflexible in his determination to
execute the neutrality laws; but should the Cubans themselves rise in revolt
against the oppression which they suffer, no human power could prevent
citizens of the United States and liberal-minded men of other countries from
rushing to their assistance. Besides," the present is an age of adventure in
which restless and daring spirits abound in every portion of the world.
It is not improbable, therefore, that Cuba may be wrested from Spain by a
successful revolution; and in that event she will lose both the island and the
price which we are now willing to pay for it — a price far beyond what was ever
paid by one people to another for any province.
It may also be remarked that the settlement of this vexed question, by the
RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. 149
cession of Cuba to the United States, would forever prevent the dangerous
complications between nations to which it may otherwise give birth.
It is certain that, should the Cubans themselves organize an insurrection
against the Spanish Government, and should other independent nations come
to the aid of Spain in the contest, no human power could, in our opinion,
prevent the people and Government of the United States from taking part in
such a civil war in support of their neighbors and friends.
But if Spain, dead to the voice of her own interest, and actuated by stubborn
pride and a false sense of honor, should refuse to sell Cuba to the United
States, then the question will arise, What ought to be the course of the
American Government under such circumstances?
Self-preservation is the first law of nature with States as well as with indi
viduals. All nations have, at different periods, acted upon this maxim.
Although it has been made the pretext for committing flagrant injustice, as in
the partition of Poland and other similar cases which history records, yet the
principle itself, though often abused, has always been recognized.
The United States has never acquired a foot of territory except by fair pur
chase, or, as in the case of Texas, upon the free and voluntary application of
the people of that independent State, who desired to blend their destinies with
our own.
Even our acquisitions from Mexico are no exception to this rule because,
although we might have claimed them by the right of conquest in a just war,
yet we purchased them for what was then considered by both parties a full
and ample equivalent.
Our past history forbids that we should acquire the island of Cuba without
the consent of Spain, unless justified by the great law of self-preservation. We
must, in any event, preserve our conscious rectitude and our own self-respect.
Whilst pursuing this course we can afford to disregard the censures of the
world, to which we have been so often and so unjustly exposed.
After we have offered Spain a price for Cuba far beyond its present value,
and this shall have been refused, it will then be time to consider the questions,
Does Cuba, in the possession of Spain, seriously endanger our internal peace
and the existence of our cherished Union?
Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then, by every law,
human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain, if we
possess the power; and this upon the very same principle that would justify
an individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor if there were
no other means of preventing the flames from destroying his own home.
Under such circumstances we ought neither to count the cost nor regard the
odds which Spain might enlist against us. We forbear to enter into the
I5O CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
question, whether the present condition of the island would justify such a
measure. We should, however, be recreant to our duty, be unworthy of our
gallant forefathers, and commit base treason against our posterity, should we
permit Cuba to be Africanized and become a second San Domingo, with all its
attendant horrors to the white race, and suffer the flames to extend to our
own neighboring shores, seriously to endanger, or actually to consume, the
fair fabric of our Union.
We fear that the course and current of events are rapidly tending toward
such a catastrophe. We, however, hope for the best, though we ought certainly
to be prepared for the worst.
We also forbear to investigate the present condition of the questions at issue
between the United States and Spain. A long series of injuries to our people
have been committed in Cuba by Spanish officials, and are unredressed. But
recently a most flagrant outrage on the rights of American citizens, ami on the
flag of the United States, was perpetrated in the harbor of Havana under
circumstances which, without immediate redress, would have justified a resort
to measures of war in vindication of national honor. That outrage is not only
unatoned, but the Spanish Government had deliberately sanctioned the acts of
its subordinates, and assumed the responsibility attaching to them.
Nothing could more impressivly teach us the danger to which those peaceful
relations it has ever been the policy of the United States to cherish with foreign
nations, are constantly exposed, than the circumstances of that case. Situated
as Spain and the United States are, the latter have forborne to resort to
extreme measures.
But this course can not, with due regard to their own dignity as an inde
pendent nation, continue; and our recommendations, now submitted, are
dictated by the firm belief that the cession of Cuba to the United States, with
stipulations as beneficial to Spain as those suggested, is the only effective
mode of settling all past differences, and of securing the two countries against
future collisions.
We have already witnessed the happy results for both countries which
followed a similar arrangement in regard to Florida.
Yours, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN,
J. Y. MASON,
PIERRE SOULE.
Hon. WM. L. MARCY, Secretary of State.
It was contended bv many that the hostile tone of this document
was owing to the feeling of Soule toward Spain. It was also con-
RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. 15!
tended that the move was in the interest of the slave-holding States,
and, although not acted upon by the American Government, did
much towards shaping the results of the next election which found
Buchanan, one of its signers, the successful candidate for the
Presidency. Soule, who had be.come obnoxious to the Spanish
Government, sent in his resignation as soon as he found that the
Manifesto was repudiated by the administration; no redress was
obtained for the outrages complained of, and thus the diplomacy
of Spain was again triumphant. !This was not long after the Lopez s
expedition; and the execution of Crittenden and his companions had /
caused intense feeling throughout this country and came near pro
ducing war with Spahir/
President Buchanan in his annual message to Congress at the
opening of the Thirty-sixth Congress, December 6, 1858, says:
The island of Cuba, from its geographical position, commands the mouth of
the Mississippi and the immense and annually increasing trade, foreign and
coastwise, from the valley of that noble river, now embracing half the sovereign
States of the Union. With that island under the dominion of a distant foreign
power, this trade, of vital importance to these States, is exposed to the danger \XX'
of being destroyed in time of war, and it has hitherto been subjected to
perpetual injury and annoyance in time of peace. Our relations with Spain,
which ought to be of the most friendly character, must always be placed in
jeopardy while the existing colonial government over the island shall remain
in its present condition*."!
Whilst the possession of the island would be of vast importance to the
United States, its value to Spain is comparatively unimportant. Such was the
relative situation of the parties when the great Napoleon transferred Louisiana
to the United States. Jealous as he ever was of the national honor and in
terests of France, no person throughout the world has imputed blame to him
for accepting a pecuniary equivalent for this cession. |
The publicity which has been given to our former negotiations upon this
subject and the large appropriation which may be required to effect the pur
pose render it expedient before making another attempt to renew the negotia
tion that I should lay the whole subject before Congress. This is especially
necessary, as it may become indispensable to success that I should be en
trusted with the means of making an advance to the Spanish Government
immediately after the signing of the treaty, without awaiting the ratification of
it by the Senate. I am encouraged to make this suggestion by the examole of
Mr. Jefferson previous to the purchase of Louisiana from France and by that
152 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
of Mr. Polk in view of the acquisition of territory from Mexico. I refer the
whole subject to Congress and commend it to their careful consideration. —
Messages and Papers of the Presidents; James Buchanan (page 511). ,
The following extracts refer to an offer of $100,000,000 which was
indignantly refused by Spain:
WASHINGTON CITY, January 22, 1854.
To the Senate of the United States:
I transmit herewith a report from the Secretary of State in answer to the
resolution of the Senate of the i8th instant, requesting the President, if not
incompatible with the public interest, " to communicate to the Senate any and
all correspondence between the Government of the United States and the
Government of Her Catholic Majesty relating to any proposition for the
purchase of the island of Cuba, which correspondence has not been furnished
to either house of Congress." From this it appears that no such correspond
ence has taken place which has not already been communicated to Congress.
In my late annual message I stated in reference to the purchase of Cuba that
"the publicity which has been given to our former negotiations on this subject
and the large appropriation which may be required to effect the purpose
render it expedient, before making another atempt to renew the negotiations,
that I shall lay the who1« subject before Congress." I still entertain the same
opinion, deeming it highly important, if not indispensable to the success of
any negotiation which I might institute for this purpose, that the measure
should receive the previous sanction of Congress. — Messages and Papers of
the Presidents; James Buchanan (pages 535-537).
In his annual Message of December 19, 1859, the President again
refers to the matter of purchase of Cuba. He says:
' I need not repeat the arguments which I urged in my last annual message
in favor of the acquisition of Cuba by fair purchase. My opinions on that
measure remain unchanged. I, therefore, again invite the serious attention of
Congress to this important subject. Without a recognition .of this policy on
their part it will be almost impossible to institute negotiations with any reason
able prospect of success. — Messages and Papers of the Presidents; James
Buchanan (page 561). )
And in his message of December 3, 1860, he says!
r*
1 I reiterate the recommendation contained in my annual message of Decem
ber, 1858, ancJ repeated in that of December, 1859, in favor of the acquisition
RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. 1 53
of Cuba from Spain by fair purchase. / 1 firmly believe that such an acquisition
would contribute essentially to the well-being and prosperity of both countries
in all future time, as well as prove the certain means of immediately abolishing
the African slave trade throughout the world. I would not repeat this recom
mendation upon the present occasion if I believed that the transfer of Cuba
to the United States upon conditions highly favorable to Spain could justly
tarnish the national honor of the proud and ancient Spanish monarchy. Surely
no person ever attributed to the first Napoleon a disregard of the natic
honor of France for transferring Louisiana to the United States for a fair
equivalent, both in money and commercial advantages. — Messages and Papers
of the Presidents; James Buchanan (page 642).
During the Ten Years' War, the United States offered to guarantee
the debt of the island, if Spain would grant its independence. At this
time General Grant was President of the United States and Spain
was a Republic, but she was not an iota less tyrannical and grasping
in one form than another^ The proposition was promptly declined
by General Prim who was temporarily in power; and General Grant,
throughout his administration, scrupulously adhered to the policy of
non-intervention. During the stormy days following the terrible
affair of the " Virginius," General Sickles was our Minister to Spain.
His efforts to obtain an honorable settlement of the difficulty not
having been successful, he resigned. Copies of some of the letters
exchanged at this time will doubtless be of interest in this connection.
It will be seen there was a conflict between the expressions made to
our Minister at Madrid, and those made to the State Department by
Spanish diplomats in Washington.
UNITED STATES LEGATION IN SPAIN.
MADRID, November 14, 1873.
SIR. — I have the honor to forward herewith a copy of a note this day passed
to the minister of State, in which, in obedience to your instruction of the I2th
inst., by cable, I have protested against the summary execution of the captain
and thirty-six of the crew of the " Virginius " and sixteen others, by order of
the Spanish authorities at Santiago de Cuba. You were advised in my telegram
of last evening that Mr. Carvajal, in our interview of yesterday, confirmed
the report published in the Havana papers.
I am, etc.,
SICKLES.
(Received December nth.)
154 CUBAS STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
MADRID, November 15, 1873.
Received an ill-tempered note to-day from the minister of State, rejecting
protest, and saying Spain would, nevertheless, consider and decide questions
according to law and her dignity.
SICKLES.
MADRID, November 18, 1873.
Minister of State informs me, in note of this date, that the reports mentioned
in your cable of I5th are not confirmed, and that, on the contrary, as soon as
the captain-general could submit to Santiago the orders sent by this Govern
ment on the 6th, the executions were suspended.
SICKLES.
MADRID, November 19, 1873.
Popular feeling runs high here against United States and this legation.
Press violent and abusive, advising Government to order me out of Spaifi.
Last night a mob was collected to attack and sack the legation. The author
ities interfered and preserved the peace.
SICKLES.
WASHINGTON, November 20, 1873.
Instructions sent yesterday by cable authorize you to defer closing legation
in order to allow a reasonable time to Spanish Government to ascertain facts
in response to their request through minister here, presented on the i8th inst.
No other postponement has been agreed to, and minister was informed that a
satisfactory settlement would be expected by the 26th.
FISH.
MADRID, November 20, 1873.
Have received rejoinder of minister to my reply to his note in answer to our
protest. Neither this nor either of the three communications in writing so far
received, contains any expression of regret or disapproval of the capture or the
slaughter at Santiago. The press approves the whole business, and denies that
any censure or regret has been expressed by this Government. The ministerial
journals acquiesce.
SICKLES.
MADRID, November 21, 1873.
Constant efforts are made by this Cabinet to conciliate England. Castelar
is every day at British legation. The press has received an official hint to
RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. I5/
contrast the moderation of England with our impatience. I suspect overtures
have also been made to Germany for her good offices.
SICKLES.
WASHINGTON, November 23, 1873.
Have telegraphed to Rome for authority to Italian minister to take custody
of library and property. Spanish Government, through minister here, proposed
arbitration, which has been declined, on the ground that the question is not one
for arbitration, the subject being one of national honor, of which the nation
must be the judge and custodian.
FISH.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, November 25, 1873.
If upon the close of to-morrow no accommodation shall have been reached
in the case of the " Virginius," you will address to the foreign office a note
expressing regret at the delay of the reparation asked for, and stating that, in
conformity with instructions from your Government, you were under the
necessity of withdrawing from Madrid, for which purpose you request the
usual passport for yourself, your family and suite. If, however, the accom
modation desired should be brought about in the course of to-morrow, either
here or in Madrid, you will, until otherwise directed, abstain from addressing
the note adverted to. Should a proposition be submitted to you to-morrow,
you will refer it here, and defer action until it be decided upon. A telegram
has just now been read to me by Admiral Polo, which gives reason to hope
for a satisfactory accommodation. You will, therefore, allow the whole of
to-morrow to pass before addressing your note.
FISH.
MADRID, November 25, 1873.
Layard says Granville has expressed his sense of the justice and moderation
of the reparation we have demanded, and this has been communicated to
Castelar. England reserves her reclamation for the present, and endeavors
to promote a settlement of the question pending between the United States
and Spain.
SICKLES.
MADRID, November 26, 1873.
At half-past two this afternoon, half an hour after I had asked for my pass
ports, I received a note, dated to-day, from minister of State, in which he says:
First. If it appear, on or before the 25th of December next, that the
" Virginius " rightfully carried the American flag, and that her documents
158 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
were regular, Spain will declare the seizure illegal, salute the flag as requested,
and return the ship with the surviving passengers and crew.
Second. If it be proved that the authorities of Santiago de Cuba, in their
proceedings and sentences pronounced against foreigners, have essentially
infringed Spanish legislation or treaties, this Government will arraign those
authorities before competent tribunals.
Third. Any other reclamations growing out of the affair, which either of the
respective governments may have to present, will be considered diplomatically,
and, if no agreement be reached, they will be submitted to the arbitration of a
third power, named by mutual consent.
Fourth. If the 25th day of December shall have expired without the Spanish
Government having resolved, in so far as comes within its province, the
questions arising out of the demand for reparation, it will hold itself bound to
accord such reparation the same as if the right of the United States to receive
it were recognized, and such reparation will be given in the form specified hi
the first and second paragraphs.
SICKLES.
MADRID, November 28, 1873.
Last night it was agreed here informally that, accepting my declaration of
the nationality of the " Virginius," reparation would be made in accordance
with our demand of the 15th inst. This was ratified by the council of ministers
at 3 this morning, and I was promised an official communication in that sense
to-day. I am now informed in a note from minister of State that yesterday
you authorized the Spanish minister at Washington to convey to this Govern
ment a different proposition on the part of the United States, and that it has
been accepted, of which you have been notified through Admiral Polo. Please
let me know whether this statement is true. The only instruction I have had
from you since my four telegrams of the 26th, is a copy of the Senate resolu
tions passed in fifty-six.
SICKLES.
WASHINGTON, November 29, 1873.
Remain at post. Further instructions soon. Settlement being effected here.
FISH.
MADRID, December 15, 1873, 4:30 P. M.
President Castelar called at the legation this afternoon and informed me
that the " Virginius " and survivors had been surrendered to those authorized
to receive them on the part of the United States.
SICKLES.
(Received 3:20 P. M.)
RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. 159
MADRID, December 20, 1873, 12:30 A. M.
It is stated here by authority that in consequence of a communication this
Government has received from that of the United States, in which it appears
the " Virginius " is not an American ship, a reclamation will be made by Spain
for the restoration of the vessel and passengers.
SICKLES.
(Received December 20, 10:20 A. M.)
WASHINGTON, December 20, 1873, 11:20 A. M.
Official advices received of surrender of survivors from " Virginius."
FISH.
MADRID, December 26, 1873.
My resignation having been accepted, I now respectfully renew my request
for the publication of the correspondence relating thereto, comprising my
telegrams of the 6th, i6th and 20th inst, and your replies of the 6th, I7th and
2oth. I beg that this request may be submitted to the President.
SICKLES.
(Received December 26th, p. M.)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, December 31, 1873.
SIR. — On the 26th ult, General Sickles' No. 893 arrived at this Department
during my absence for the holidays. In it he states that it was informally
agreed, on the night of the 27th of November last, that on a declaration made
by him of the American nationality of the " Virginius," the vessel and sur
viving passengers and crew would be delivered up, the flag saluted, and the
other measures of reparation accorded in conformity with our demands of the
I5th inst. It is greatly to be regretted that General Sickles did not state
with whom this informal agreement was made.
The note of Mr. Carvajal, minister of foreign affairs, which accompanies
General Sickles' dispatch, does not convey the idea that he had been a party to
that agreement, but does intimate that he would have discussed some of the
points raised in General Sickles' note but for the arrangement which was
made here.
General Sickles further says, that at noon on the 28th of November, Mr.
Carvajal sent him a copy of a telegram from Admiral Polo, containing what
purported to be a fresh proposal from me respecting the " Virginius," which
i6o
General Sickles appears to have supposed was in conflict with the informal
arrangement of the previous evening.
Without more accurate information concerning the person with whom the
informal arrangement was made, I can not permit myself to think that the
Spanish Government receded from any undertaking which it had once assumed.
So far, however, as General Sickles' statement may be supposed to affect
this Government, it is proper to say that the changes from the original demands
of the United States, which were agreed to in the protocol of the 29th of
November, were adopted on the suggestion of the Spanish Government, under
the belief that they did not affect the principles upoi. which our demands were
founded, and were calculated to promote a peaceful settlement of the un
fortunate differences which had arisen between the two powers.
Spain having admitted (as could not be seriously questioned), that a regu
larly documented vessel of the United States is subject on the high seas, in
time of peace, only to the police jurisdiction of the power from which it
receives its papers, it seemed to the President that the United States should not
refuse to concede to her the right to adduce proof to show that the " Virginius "
was not rightfully carrying our flag. When the question of national honor
was adjusted, it also seemed that there was a peculiar propriety in our con
senting to an arbitration on a question of pecuniary damages.
This happy adjustment of the difference between two sister Republics on a
basis honorable to both, fortunately makes the matters referred to by General
Sickles of little importance. I have thought it right, however, to correct the
misapprehensions under which his dispatch seems to have been written.
I am, sir, etc.,
HAMILTON FISH.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, November 14, 1877.
The Secretary of State, to whom was referred the resolution of the House of
Representatives of the i2th inst, requesting him to " inform the House, if not
incompatible with public interests, what amount of indemnity has been paid to
this Government by the Government of Spain on account of the execution of
General Ryan and others, at Santiago de Cuba, November 4, 1873, and what
disposition has been made of such funds as may have been received," has the
honor to report to the President that the amount of indemnity paid by the
Government of Spain on that account was 80,000 Spanish dollars, yielding, less
exchange, the sum of $77,794.44 in coin; that claims thereon have been settled
and paid to the amount of $38,102; that a claim for $2,500 has been settled, but
i& not yet -paid; and that the unexpended balance of the "Virginius" in-
RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. l6l
demnity is invested at 5 per cent, registered bonds of the United States. The
Secretary of State has also to state that, as the heirs of General Ryan failed to
prove that he was a citizen of the United States, nothing has been paid to
them from said indemnity funds.
Respectfully submitted,
WM. M. EVARTS.
To the President.
It will be seen that in the report of Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State
in 1877, in regard to the matter, he states that the indemnity paid
by Spain on account of the execution of General Ryan and others at
Santiago, November 4, 1873, was $77,794.44; that claims thereon
amounting to $38,102 had been settled and paid, and that the unex
pended balance was invested in 5 per cent, registered United States
bends. The vessel and the surviving passengers were given up to
the authorities of the United States. Spanish diplomacy had the
better chance in this disastrous matter from the fact that the President
was fully conscious of the illegality of the proceedings of the " Vir-
ginius," and this knowledge formed an element of weakness in the
negotiations.
In the general instructions to General Sickles' successor, Mr.
Gushing, before his departure to Madrid, he was informed by the
Secretary of State that " The President can not but regard independ
ence and emancipation, of course, as the only certain and even neces
sary solution of the question of Cuba."
In 1875 the American Government addressed strong protests to the
Spanish Government and to the European powers asking intervention
in the interest of terminating the war in Cuba. The foreign powers
refused to interfere, but Spain promised reforms and the immediate
suppression of the rebellion. It required more than two years longer
to accomplish this, but General Grant adhered strictly to the estab
lished policy of nonintervention.
Those who wonder that Spain should have stubbornly and indig
nantly refused to entertain the idea of parting with Cuba, little ap
preciate the tie connecting the countries. To the great bulk of the
Spanish people, Cuba was as much a part of Spain as any one of
the provinces of the Peninsula itself. Its separation from Spain was
looked upon as a national dismemberment. It was as impossible
for Spain to make of Cuba a matter of bargainings as it would be for
the United States to entertain the idea of selling one of the States
1 62 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
whose star shines in the constellation gracing our national banner.
In addition to this, Spain felt very bitterly the loss of her other Ameri
can possessions. The South American colonies were lost to her
one after another, owing in a great measure to her own bad manage
ment and complications with foreign powers. Louisiana, ceded to
France with the understanding it was not to be alienated, almost im
mediately passed to the United States. Florida was sold by Fer
dinand VII, and this action on his part produced a revolution in Spain.
In addition to this, the unconcealed sympathy of the American people
for the insurgents in every Cuban rebellion greatly increased the
obstinate attachment of Spain to the fairest and last of her American
possessions.
In President Cleveland's message to Congress in December, 1895,
he thus refers to the war in Cuba:
Cuba is again gravely disturbed. An insurrection, in some respects more
active than the last preceding revolt, which continued from 1868 to 1878, now
exists in a large part of the eastern interior of the island, menacing even some
populations on the coast.' Besides deranging the commercial exchanges of the
island, of which our country takes the predominant share, this flagrant con
dition of hostilities, by arousing sentimental sympathy and inciting adventurous
support among our people, has entailed earnest effort on the part of this
Government to enforce obedience to our neutrality laws and to prevent the
territory of the United States from being abused as a vantage ground from
which to aid those in arms against Spanish sovereignty.
Whatever may be the traditional sympathy of our countrymen as individuals
with a people who seem to be struggling for larger autonomy and greater
freedom, deepened as such sympathy naturally must be in behalf of our neigh
bors, yet the plain duty of their Government is to observe in good faith the
recognized obligations of international relationship. The performance of this
duty should not be made more difficult by a disregard on the part of our
citizens of the obligations growing out of their allegiance to their country,
which should restrain them from violating as individuals the neutrality which
the nation of which they are members is bound to observe in its relations to
friendly sovereign States. [Though neither the warmth of our people's
sympathy with the Cuban insurgents, nor our loss and material damage con
sequent upon the futile endeavors thus far made to restore peace and order,
nor any shock our humane sensibilities may have received from the cruelties
which appear to especially characterize this sanguinary and fiercely conducted
war, have in the least shaken the determination of the Government to honestly
, RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. 163
fulfill every "international obligation, yet it is to be earnestly hoped, on every
ground, that the devastation of armed conflict may speedily be stayed and
order and quiet restored to the distracted island, bringing in their train the
activity and thrift of peaceful pursuits"?"}
it will be seen that President Cleveland counseled good faith, neu
trality and non-intervention. In the following February, resolutions
recognizing the belligerency of the Cubans were introduced into the
Senate and they were adopted February 28th, by a vote of 64 to 6.
These resolutions, favored by Senators Sherman, Morgan, ^Davis,
Lodge and others, were opposed by Senators Hale and Hoar./ Dif
ferent resolutions on the same subject were passed by the House, the
matter went to conference, was discussed again to a considerable ex
tent in the House and Senate, and finally the Conference Committee
adopted the original Senate resolutions and they were finally passed
by the House by a vote of 245 to 27, April 6th.
WAR IN CUBA.
54th Congress, SENATE. Con. Res. 19,
1st Session. Part 5.
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION:
Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring therein}, That,
in the opinion of Congress, a condition of public war exists between the
Government of Spain and the government proclaimed and for some time
maintained by force of arms by the people of Cuba; and that the United States
of America should maintain a strict neutrality between the contending powers,
according to each all the rights of belligerents in the ports and territory of the
United States.
Resolved further, That the friendly offices of the United States should be
offered by the President to the Spanish Government for the recognition of the
independence of Cuba.
Passed the Senate, February 28, 1896.
Passed the House of Representatives, April 6, 1896.
I These resolutions were not in a form which made action by the
President necessary, and they amounted to nothing further than to
show the drift of public sentiment! The long and violent discussion
of the matter aroused a very bitter feeling in Spain, and riotous dem
onstrations took place in Valencia, Madrid, Barcelona, Cadiz and
164 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Bilboa. These outbreaks were, disavowed by the Spanish Govern
ment and some of the colleges whose students had been engaged in
them were closed on that account. Spain endeavored in every way
to avoid diplomatic entanglements.
Meanwhile, the international obligations of the United States were
strictly complied with, and much money was expended in guarding the
coast to intercept the departure of filibustering expeditions. One
of these was captured about to leave New York, February 25th, and
General Garcia and others were detained in this country. But in
spite of these precautions, Cuban sympathizers were constantly elud
ing the authorities, and Garcia himself reached Cuba safely in the
spring. April 8th, Senator Turpie boldly urged intervention by the
United States. There had been some dissatisfaction with the course
of Consul-General Williams in Cuba, owing to his alleged inactivity
in behalf of Americans arrested or ill-treated in Havana, and on April
1 3th, he was replaced by General Fitzhugh Lee. April i6th, the
Diaz Brothers, American citizens, were arrested and imprisoned.
April 24th, Dygert, an American prisoner in Havana, was released
upon the intervention of the Consul-General. April 27th, the " Ber
muda," with arms and ammunition for the Cubans, sailed from Jack
sonville, Fla., and safely accomplished her mission; but the schooner
" Competitor," on the same business, was captured by a Spanish gun
boat. American citizens on board were tried by court-martial and
sentenced to be shot, and a repetition of the " Virginius " affair was
feared; but at the solicitation of the United States, Spain agreed to
postpone the execution, and after a delay of more than a year, they
were finally released from prison, November 18, 1897. On July 4,
1896, a filibustering expedition under Captain Colby, an American,
was safely landed in Cuba and contributed greatly to the Cuban cause.
1 President Cleveland's last annual message to Congress, December,
, x icV)6, was conservative and not aggressive; still it hinted that inter
vention might soon become necessary, and the idea of purchasing
Cuba was again suggested. 1 The following extracts contain the gist
of his remarks on the subject:
The insurrection in Cuba still continues with all its perplexities. It is diffi
cult to perceive that any progress his thus far been made toward the pacifica
tion of the island or that the situation of affairs, as depicted in my last annual
message, has in the least improved. If Spain still holds Havana and the seaports
and all the considerable towns, the insurgents still roam at will over at least
COPYRIGHT, 1898, BY THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY.
COLONEL JOAQUIN RUIZ (IN FIREMAN'S UNIFORM).
Killed by Insurgent Chief Aranguren.
RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. l6/
two-thirds of the inland country. If the determination of Spain to put down
the insurrection seems but to strengthen with the lapse of time, and is evinced
by her unhesitating devotion of largely increased military and naval forces to
the task, there is much reason to believe that the insurgents have gained in
point of numbers, and character, and resources, and are none the less inflexible
in their resolve not to succumb, without practically securing the great objects
for which they took up arms. If Spain has not yet re-established her authority,
neither have the insurgents yet made good their title to be regarded as an
independent State. Indeed, as the contest has gone on, the pretense that civil
government exists on the island, except so far as Spain is able to maintain it,
has been practically abandoned. Spain does keep on foot such a government,
more or less imperfectly, in the large towns and their immediate suburbs. But,
that exception being made, the entire country is either given over to anarchy
or is subject to the military occupation of one or the other party. It is re
ported, indeed, on reliable authority that, at the demand of the commander-in-
chief of the insurgent army, the putative Cuban Government has now given up
all attempt to exercise its functions, leaving that Government confessedly
(what there is the best reason for supposing it always to have been in fact), a
government merely on paper.
* * ^* * .* . * . * . * ;,* *
The spectacle of the utter ruin of an adjoining country, by nature one of the
most fertile and charming on the globe, would engage the serious attention
of the Government and people of the United States in any circumstances. In
point of fact, they have a concern with it which is by no means of a wholly
sentimental or philanthropic character. It lies so near to us as to be hardly
separated from our territory. Our actual pecuniary interest in it is second
only to that of the people and Government of Spain. It is reasonably
estimated that at least from $30,000,000 to $50,000,000 of American capital are
invested in plantations and in railroad, mining, and other business enterprises
on the island.
The insurgents are undoubtedly encouraged and supported by the wide
spread sympathy the people of this country always and instinctively feel for
every struggle for better and freer government, and which, in the case of the
more adventurous and restless elements of our population, leads in only too
many instances to active and personal participation in the contest. The
result is that this Government is constantly called upon to protect American
citizens, to claim damages for injuries to persons and property, now estimated
at many millions of dollars, and to ask explanations and apologies for the acts
1(58 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
of Spanish officials, whose zeal for the repression of rebellion sometimes blinds
them to the immunities belonging to the unoffending citizens of a friendly
power. It follows from the same causes that the United States is compelled- to
actively police a long line of seacoast against unlawful expeditions, the escape
of which the utmost vigilance will not always suffice to prevent.
**********
It is now also suggested th&.t the United States should buy the island — a
suggestion possibly worthy of consideration if there were any evidence of a
desire or willingness on the part of Spain to entertain such a proposal. It is
urged, finally, that, all other methods failing, the existing internecine strife in
Cuba should be terminated by our intervention, even at the cost of a war
between the United States and Spain — a war which its advocates confidently
prophesy could be neither large in its proportions nor doubtful in its issue.
The correctness of this forecast need be neither affirmed nor denied. The
United States has, nevertheless, a character to maintain as a nation, which
plainly dictates that right and not might should be the rule of its conduct. *
Referring to the conduct of the United States toward Spain during
the existing rebellion and during the Ten Years' War, President
Cleveland continues:
No other great power, it may safely be said, under circumstances of similar
perplexity, .would have :manifested the same restraint and the same patient
endurance. It may also be said that this persistent attitude of the United
States toward Spain in connection with Cuba, unquestionably evinces no
slight respect and regard for Spain on the part of the American people. They
in truth do not forget her connection with the discovery of the Western
Hemisphere, nor do they underestimate the great qualities of the Spanish
people, nor fail to fully recognize their splendid patriotism and their chivalrous
devotion to the national honor.
**********
And yet neither the Government nor the people of the United States have
shut their eyes to the course of events in Cuba, or have failed to realize the
existence of conceded grievances, which have led to the present revolt from
the authority of Spain — grievances recognized by the Queen Regent and by
the Cortes, voiced by the most patriotic and enlightened of Spanish statesmen,
without regard to party, and demonstrated by reforms proposed by the exec
utive and approved by the legislative branch of the Spanish Government. It
is in the assumed temper and disposition of the Spanish Government to remedy
RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. 169
these grievances, fortified by indications of influential public opinion in Spain,
that this Government has hoped to discover the most promising and effective
means of composing the present strife, with honor and advantage to Spain
and with the achievement of all the reasonable objects of the insurrection.
**********
It was intimated by this Government to the Government of Spain some
months ago that, if a satisfactory measure of home rule were tendered the
Cuban insurgents, and would be accepted by them upon a guaranty of its
execution, the United States would endeavor to find a way not objectionable
to Spain to furnishing such guaranty. While no definite response to this
intimation has yet been received from the Spanish Government, it is believed
to be not altogether unwelcome, while, as already suggested, no reason is
perceived why it should not be approved by the insurgents. Neither party can
fail to see the importance of early action, and both must realize that to prolong
the present state of things for even a short period will add enormously to the
time and labor and expenditure necessary to bring about the industrial
recuperation of the island. It is, therefore, fervently hoped on all grounds that
earnest efforts for healing the breach between Spain and the insurgent Cubans,
upon the lines above indicated, may be at once inaugurated and pushed to an
immediate and successful issue. The friendly offices of the United States,
either in the manner above outlined or in any other way consistent with OUT
Constitution and laws, will always be at the disposal of either party.
Whatever circumstances may arise, our policy and our interests would con
strain us to object to the acquisition of the island or an interference with its
control by any other power.
It should be added that it can not be reasonably assumed that the hitherto
expectant attitude of the United States will be indefinitely maintained.
**********
When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the insurrection has
become manifest, and it is demonstrated that her sovereignty is extinct in
Cuba for all purposes of its rightful existence, and when a hopeless struggle
for its re-establishment has degenerated into a strife which means nothing
more than the useless sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction of the
very subject-matter of the conflict, a situation will be presented in which our
obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher obliga
tions, which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge.
* # ********
Until we face the contingencies suggested, or the situation is by other
incidents imperatively changed, we should continue in the line of conduct here
tofore pursued, thus in all circumstances exhibiting our obedience to the
i7o CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
requirements of public law and our regard for the duty enjoined upon us by
the position we occupy in the family of nations.
A contemplation of emergencies that may arise should plainly lead us to
avoid their creation, either through a careless disregard of present duty or even
an undue stimulation and ill-timed expression of feeling. But I have deemed
it not amiss to remind the Congress that a time may arrive when a correct
policy and care for our interests, as well as a regard for the interests of other
nations and their citizens, joined by considerations of humanity and a desire
to see a rich and fertile country, intimately related to us, saved from complete
devastation, will constrain our Government to such action as will subserve the
interests thus involved and at the same time promise to Cuba and its in
habitants an opportunity to enjoy the blessings of peace.
The message was adversely criticised in Spain where it aroused
great bitterness. From the beginning of the session of Congress the
debates on Cuban matters were the all-absorbing topic. Early in
December, the country was greatly agitated by the accounts received
of the assassination of Maceo by the Spanish troops. He was suc
ceeded in command by General Juan Ruis Rivera.
In February, 1897, the Queen Regent signed a decree granting re
forms to the Cubans. In the same month, two American prisoners,
Scott and Sanguilly were released. A list of American citizens, either
native or naturalized, who had been arrested in Cuba, was presented
to Congress by President Celeveland and comprised seventy-four per
sons, seven of whom were newspaper correspondents. One of the
most affecting cases, which created widespread indignation, was that
of Dr. Ricardo Ruiz who was imprisoned and died before his release
could be secured, presumably from the effects of ill-treatment. In
February, Secretary Olney demanded a full investigation. Later on,
in April, President McKinley appointed William J. Calhoun as special
commissioner to investigate the case. While there was strong pre
sumption that death was due to ill-treatment, there was no direct
evidence to prove this, and the report gave the cause of death as
congestion of the brain.
The agitation of the Cuban question was continued all during the
winter and it was confidently expected by many that President McKin-
ley's first move would be a stron.e war measure; but this hope was
quickly dissipated by the conservative tone of his inaugural messa.ee
which reiterated the policy of nonintervention adhered to by his
predecessor.
RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. I /I
The selection of Senator Sherman, as Secretary of State, again
raised the hopes of the Cuban sympathizers for he had been a strong
advocate of Cuban interests when in the Senate; but as soon as he
entered the cabinet, he announced his policy to be the preservation of
peace in every direction.
March 28th, General Rivera was captured by the Spanish troops
and would have been summarily dealt with had it not been for the
interference of the United States. On April 1st, Senator Allen intro
duced a resolution protesting against the purpose of the Spanish
Government to court-martial him. Secretary Sherman accordingly
made a protest, and the Spanish Government replied that General
Rivera would be treated as a prisoner of war.
During the month of May, 1897, while Congress was in extra
session, Cuban matters were extensively discussed, and as there was
no further possibility of concealing the suffering existing in Cuba,
at the suggestion of the President $50,000 was appropriated for the
relief of the Americans who were starving in that island.
Among the many speeches made at this time in Congress in regard
to affairs in Cuba, I copy the following from the Congressional Record
of May 20, 1897, Vol. 30, part II, pp. 1196 and 1197:
Mr. WHEELER of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, the highest parliamentary body
of the greatest government on earth is called upon to determine from the
evidence before it whether war does or does not exist on the island of Cuba.
That is the only question, Mr. Speaker.
Only on yesterday, at the very time prominent Republican statesmen were
asserting that war did not exist on that island, the distinguished Spanish
senator and ex-premier, Senor Sagasta, was making a speech in Madrid, in
which he asserted in tl^e most positive terms that war did exist; that Spain
had 200,000 troops in Cuba, but he painfully admitted that Spain was not master
even of the territory trodden by her soldiers. I read his exact words as they
appear in the cablegram from Madrid in the Post of this morning:
" MADRID, May 19.
"At a meeting of Liberal senators and deputies to-day Senor Sagasta,
former premier, made an important speech, in the course of which he said:
' We have 200,000 troops in Cuba, but we are not even masters of the
territory trodden by our soldiers. At the same moment Carlism is organizing
itself in the peninsula and menaces us with a new war, thanks to the impunity
it enjoys, while the seeds of separatism are germinating in some of the
provinces.
172 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
*' ' The picture could not be gloomier. We have war in Cuba and in the
Philippines, and we have attempts at civil war at home.' "
Two hundred thousand Spanish soldiers in arms and in line of battle in the
island of Cuba, and an official report before us stating that 800 American
citizens are driven from their homes, deprived of their property, despoiled of
their estates, impounded and corralled and starving in the towns and villages
of Cuba, and yet men who have forgotten that honor and chivalry are the
priceless heritage of the American people would make us believe that the island
of Cuba is blessed with profound peace.
For three years the Spanish bulletins have been reporting frequent engage
ments with superior bodies of insurgents. They have told us of the slaughter
of the insurgents in battle, and the sound of musketry shooting down helpless
prisoners, including combatants and noncombatants, including Cubans and
Americans, has been heard every day of the reign of the Nero of the nineteenth
century: "King Weyler the First;" and yet, after all this slaughter, the dis
tinguished Spanish senator and ex-premier proclaims in Madrid, the Spanish
capital:
" We have 200,000 troops in Cuba, but we are not even masters of the terri
tory trodden by our soldiers."
This is an important statement from a Spanish senator and ex-premier, and
the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hitt] who has just taken his seat informs
us that Senor Sagasta will in a few days again become the premier of that
Gcvernment, and this fact gives even more significance to his words. He tells
the people of Spain that because of an insurgent army of superior numbers the
200,000 Spanish troops are not even masters of the territory they st^nd upon,
and the gentleman from Pennsylvania who spoke half an hour ago told us that
the warfare carried on by these 200,000 soldiers was brutal, cruel, and atrocious.
The statement by Senor Sagasta that " Spain is not even master of the
territory trodden by her 200,000 soldiers," is an admission that the Cubans have
practically the control of the entire island. This alone entitles the struggling
patriots to the rights of belligerents.
All works on international law assert that actual possession of the territory
is sufficient.
Wildman, quoted approvingly by Halleck, page 68, says:
" When, in the result of a civil war, a state changes its government, or a
province, or colony, that before had no separate existence, is in the possession
of the rights of sovereignty, the possession of sovereignty de facto is taken to
be possession de jure ; and any foreign power is at liberty to recognize such
sovereignty by treating with the possessor of it as an independent State. In
international transactions possession is sufficient."
RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES.
Davis in international law, page 200, says:
" The parties to a war are called belligerents. The recognition of such rights
by foreign governments in no way involves the recognition of the rebellious
government as a separate political recognition. It only implies that the laws
of war are to prevail in the military operations."
Lorimer, Vol. i, page 142, says:
" By recognizing belligerent rights neutral powers pronounce no judgment
whatever, either on the merits of the claim or the probability of its ultimate
vindication. Belligerent recognition is a mere declaration of impartiality. To
withhold from the claimant for recognition the rights of belligerency, whilst we
extend them to the parent State, would plainly be to take part against it in
the war."
Notwithstanding all this, the money changers and owners of Spanish bonds
tell the people that there is no war in Cuba, and that we must not recognize
Cubans as entitled to belligerent rights.
From 1776 to 1781 the average enrolled force of our continental soldiers
was 38,263, while the average force of British troops in America during that
time, which I take from eleven different official reports, was 32,208, to which
force should be added their American adherents, which at one time numbered
8,954 men, making the average British force somewhat in excess of 40,000
soldiers; yet all historical works, including our school histories, tell us that
the period from Lexington and Concord, April 19, 1775, to Yorktown, October
19, 1781, was a condition of bloody, cruel, and desolating war.
Our losses during that seven-years conflict was but 2,200 killed and 6,500
wounded, a less number than the Spaniards claim are killed each month, either
killed in battle or shot down in Weyler's slaughter pens. In the war of 1812
we had 1,877 killed and died of wounds, and 3,737 were wounded and recovered;
and in the war with Mexico 1,049 were killed and died from wounds, and 3,928
were wounded and recovered.
The greatest force commanded by General Taylor, with which he won the
victories of Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, and Monterey, was 6,650, and his
great victory at Buena Vista was accomplished with a force of 4,733 men, and
Santa Anna's entire army at that battle was reported on paper as 19,993 men.
General Scott carried the Stars and Stripes from Vera Cruz to the halls of
Montezuma with an army whose maximum strength was 12,776 men, and the
entire force brought against him by Santa Anna was estimated to be 30,000
strong [applause] ; and yet American history has dignified these occurrences
as real, actual, bloody warfare. Mr. Speaker, we have to either stop Fourth
of July celebrations and undo the elections of Old Hickory in 1848 and Pierce
in 1852, whom the people elected because they were told that old Zach Taylor
174 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
and Franklin Pierce were both heroes in actual war, or else we have got to
admit that the array of hostile armies five times as formidable as those which
fought the campaign in Mexico or the battles of the Revolution have created a
condition of actual war in Cuba.
Stonewall Jackson in his campaign in the Valley had less than 17,000 men,
and even less than that number in his engagements at Kernstown with General
Shields, at McDowell with General Milroy, at Front Royal and Winchester
with General Banks, and at Cross Keys and Port Republic with Generals
Fremont and Shields, and yet all these gallant soldiers, driven from these fields
by the sagacity, skill, and courage of the superb Jackson, hastened forward
couriers, dispatches, and telegrams assuring the Government that the once
peaceful valley of the Shenandoah had become a theater of actual war.
If we are to vote that war does not exist in Cuba, we must also vote that
there was no war in the Shenandoah Valley.
Again, Mr. Speaker, the War Record Reports tell us that in 1863 the total
effective of all the Confederate force east of the Mississippi river was only
I53'?8o men. If we now decide that there are not a sufficient number of
Spanish troops in Cuba to create a condition of war, we must also decide that
war did not exist in this country from 1861 to 1865, and we must follow up
that by repealing all the pension laws, bringing the dead to life, making the
lame to walk, revising history, and teaching the children that there are no such
persons as Lincoln, McClellan, Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Hancock, Schofield,
or Lee, Jackson, and Jefferson Davis. We must do one of these things, Mr.
Speaker, or else admit that the same facts which created a condition of war in
one country did not create it in another.
The SPEAKER. The time of the gentleman from Alabama has expired.
Mr. WHEELER of Alabama. I ask two minutes more.
Mr. BAILEY. I have yielded all the time under my control.
Mr. WHEELER of Alabama. I ask unanimous consent for an extension of
two minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. WHEELER of Alabama. I thank the House for this courtesy.
The trouble is, Mr. Speaker, that the country has changed. From 1776 to
1865 the dominant spirit which controlled in this Republic was one of honor,
glory, chivalry, and patriotism. The dominant spirit of to-day is the pride of
gold, of palaces, of marriage alliances with dukes, and princes, and counts.
I do not know what others may say or how others may vote, but I for one
proclaim on this floor that war, cruel, brutal, murderous war, does exist in
that " gem of the ocean " — that beautiful " Queen of the Antilles " — and I
RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. 177
here assert that it is our duty as the greatest people upon earth to so declare
in the highest councils that exist under the canopy of heaven.
If this declaration will aid our brethren struggling for liberty, we are only
doing what we promised to do when God vouchsafed victory and liberty to us.
If we fail to do this, we are recreant to our pledges, to Christianity, to civiliza
tion, to humanity, and to God. [Loud applause.]
It was not until later that the Spanish Government allowed Ameri
can charity to be applied to the few surviving reconcentrados who could
be saved.
Early in June, 1897, there was a crisis in the Spanish Cabinet and
Canovas resigned, but was persuaded to withdraw his resignation.
He was assassinated August 8th, and his place as Premier was filled
by General Azcarraga, who in turn gave way to Sagasta. Hon.
Hannis Taylor of Alabama was replaced as Minister to Spain by Gen
eral Stewart L. Woodford, who was appointed June i6th, and pre-
cented his credentials to the Queen Regent September 13, 1897.
He was authorized to attempt to adjust matters, but it was impossible
tu make any arrangement satisfactory to either side. The feeling of
hostility between Spain and the United States was every day increas
ing in intensity and the inevitable outbreak was only a question of
time.
On December 6th, President McKinley sent to Congress a message
in which he ably reviewed the condition of affairs in Cuba in the
following words:
The most important problem with which this Government is now called
upon to deal pertaining to its foreign relations concerns its duty toward Spain
and the Cuban insurrection. Problems and conditions more or less in com
mon with those now existing have confronted this Government at various
times in the past. The story of Cuba for many years has been one of unrest;
growing discontent; an effort toward a larger enjoyment of liberty and self-
control; of organized resistance to the mother country; of depression after
distress and warfare and of ineffectual settlement to be followed by renewed
revolt. For no enduring period since the enfranchisement of the continental
possessions of Spain in the Western continent has the condition of Cuba or
the policy of Spain toward Cuba not caused concern to the United States.
The prospect from time to time that the weakness of Spain's hold upon tne
island and the political vicissitudes and embarrassments of the home govern
ment might lead to the transfer of Cuba to a continental power called forth.
178 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
between 1823 and 1860, various emphatic declarations of the policy of the
United States to permit no disturbance of Cuba's connection with Spain unless
in the direction of independence or acquisition by us through purchase; nor
has there been any change of this declared policy since upon the part of the
Government.
The revolution which began in 1868 lasted for ten years despite the strenuous
efforts of the successive peninsular governments to suppress it. Then as now
the Government of the United States testified its grave concern and offered
its aid to put an end to bloodshed in Cuba. The overtures made by General
Grant were refused and the war dragged on, entailing great loss of life and
treasure and increased injury to American interests, besides throwing enhanced
burdens of neutrality upon this Government. In 1878 peace was brought about
by the Truce of Zanjon, obtained by negotiations between the Spanish com
mander, Martinez de Campos, and the insurgent leaders.
The present insurrection broke out in February, 1895. It is not my purpose
at this time to recall its remarkable increase or to characterize its tenacious
resistance against the enormous forces massed against it by Spain. The revolt
and the efforts to subdue it carried destruction to every quarter of the island,
developing wide proportions and defying the efforts of Spain for its suppres
sion. The civilized cede of war has been disregarded, ro less so by the
Spaniards than by the Cubans.
Th3 existing conditions can not but fill this Government and the American
people with the gravest apprehension. There is no desire on the part of our
people to profit by the misfortunes of Spain. We have only the desire to see
the Cubans prosperous and contented, enjoying that measure of self-control
which is the inalienable right of man, protected in their right to reap the
benefit of the exhaustless treasures of their country.
The offer made by my predecessor in April, 1896, tendering the friendly
offices of this Government failed. Any mediation on our part was not accepted.
In brief the answer read: "There is no effectual way to pacify Cuba unless
it begins with the actual submission of the rebels to the mother country."
Then only could Spain act in the promised direction, of her own motion and
after her own plans.
The cruel policy of concentration was initiated February 16, 1896. The
productive districts controlled by the Spanish armies were depopulated. The
agricultural inhabitants were herded in and about the garrison towns, their
lands laid waste and their dwellings destroyed. This policy the late Cabinet
of Spain justified as a necessary measure of war and as a means of cutting off
supplies from the insurgents. It has utterly failed as a war measure. It was
not civilized warfare. It was extermination.
RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES.
Against this abuse of the rights of war I have felt constrained on repeated
occasions to enter the firm and earnest protest of this Government. There was'
much of public condemnation of the treatment of American citizens by alleged
illegal arrests and long imprisonment awaiting trial or pending protracted
judicial proceedings. I felt it my first duty to make instant demand for the
release or speedy trial of all American citizens under arrest. Before the
change of the Spanish Cabinet in October last twenty-two prisoners, citizens
of the United States, had been given their freedom.
For the relief of our own citizens suffering because of the conflict the aid
of Congress was sought in a special message, and under the appropriation of
April 4, 1897, effective aid has been given to American citizens in Cuba, many
of them at their own request having been returned to the United States.
The instructions given to our new minister to Spain before his departure for
his post directed him to impress upon that Government the sincere wish of the
United States to lend its aid toward the ending of the war in Cuba by reaching
a peaceful and lasting result, just and honorable alike to Spain and to the
Cuban people. These instructions recited the character and duration of the
contest, the widespread losses it entails, the burdens and restraints it imposes
upon us, with constant disturbance of national interests, and the injury result
ing from an indefinite continuance of this state of things. It was stated that
at this juncture our Government was constrained to seriously inquire if the
time was not ripe when Spain of her own volition, moved by her own interests
ancl every sentiment of humanity, should put a stop to this destructive war and
make proposals of settlement honorable to herself and just to her Cuban
colony. It was urged that as a neighboring nation, with large interests in
Cuba, we could be required to wait only a reasonable time for the mother
country to establish its authority and restore peace and order within the
borders of the island; that we could not contemplate an indefinite period for
the accomplishment of this result.
No solution was proposed to which the slightest idea of humiliation to
Spain could attach, and indeed precise proposals were withheld to avoid
embarrassment to that Government. All that was asked or expected was that
some safe way might be speedily provided and permanent peace restored. It
so chanced that the consideration of this offer, addressed to the same Spanish
Administration which had declined the tenders of my predecessor and which
for more than two years had poured men and treasure into Cuba in the
fruitless effort to suppress the revolt, fell to others. Between the departure
of General Woodford, the new envoy, and his arrival in Spain the statesman
who had shaped the policy of his country fell by the hand of an assassin, and
although the Cabinet of the late Premier still held office and received from our
180 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
envoy the proposals he bore, that Cabinet gave place within a few days there-
after to a new Administration, under the leadership of Sagasta.
The reply to our note was received on the 23d day of October. It is in the
direction of a better understanding. It appreciates the friendly purposes of
this Government. It admits that our country is deeply affected by the war in
Cuba and that its desires for peace are just. It declares that the present
Spanish Government is bound by every consideration to a change of policy
that should satisfy the United States and pacify Cuba within a reasonable time.
To this end Spain has decided to put into effect the political reforms heretofore
advocated by the present Premier, without halting for any consideration in the
path which in its judgment leads to peace. The military operations, it is said,
will continue but will be humane and conducted with all regard for private
rights, being accompanied by political action leading to the autonomy of Cuba
while guarding Spanish sovereignty. This, it is claimed, will result in in
vesting Cuba with a distinct personality; the island to be governed by an
executive and by a local council or chambers, reserving to Spain the control
of the foreign relations, the Army and Navy and the judicial administration.
To accomplish this the present Government proposes to modify existing legis
lation by decree, leaving the Spanish Cortes, with the aid of Cuban senators
and deputies, to solve the economic problem and properly distribute the
existing debt.
In the absence of a declaration of the measures that this Government pro
poses to take in carrying out its proffer of good offices it suggests that Spain
be left free to conduct military operations and grant political reforms, while
the United States for its part shall enforce its neutral obligations and cut off
the assistance which it is asserted the insurgents receive from this country.
The supposition of an indefinite prolongation of the war is denied. It is
asserted that the western provinces are already well nigh reclaimed; that the
planting of cane and tobacco therein has been resumed, and that by force of
arms and new and ample reforms very early and complete pacification is hoped
for.
The immediate amelioration of existing conditions under the new administra
tion of Cuban affairs is predicted, and therewithal the disturbance and all occa
sion for any change of attitude on the part of the United States. Discussion
of the question of the international duties and responsibilities of the United
States as Spain understands them is presented, with an apparent disposition
to charge us with failure in this regard. This charge is without any basis in
fact. It could not have been made if Spain had been cognizant of the constant
efforts this Government has made at the cost of millions and by the employ
ment of the administrative machinery of the nation at command to perform
RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. l8l
its full duty according to the law of nations. That it has successfully prevented
the departure of a single military expedition or armed vessel from our shores
in violation of our laws would seem to be a sufficient answer. But of this
aspect of the Spanish note it is not necessary to speak further now. Firm in
the conviction of a wholly performed obligation, due response to this charge
has been made in diplomatic course.
Throughout all these horrors and dangers to our own peace this Government
has never in any way abrogated its sovereign prerogative of reserving to it?elf
the determination of its policy and course according to its own high sense of
right and in consonance with the dearest interests and convictions of our own
people should the prolongation of the strife so demand.
Of the untried measures there remain only: Recognition of the insurgents
as belligerents; recognition of the independence of Cuba; neutral intervention
to end the war by imposing a rational compromise between the contestants,
and intervention in favor of one or the other party. I speak not of forcible
annexation, for that can not be thought of. That by our code of morality
wculd be criminal aggression.
Recognition of the belligerency of the Cuban insurgents has often been
canvassed as a possible if not inevitable step both in regard to the previous ten
years' struggle and during the present war. I am not unmindful that the
two Houses of Congress in the spring of 1896 expressed the opinion by con
current resolution that a condition of public war existed requiring or justifying
the recognition of a state of belligerency in Cuba, and during the extra session
the Senate voted a joint resolution of like import, which, however, was not
brought to a vote in the House of Representatives. In the presence of these
significant expressions of the sentiment of the legislative branch it behooves
the Executive to soberly consider the conditions under which so important a
measure must needs rest for justification. It is to be seriously considered
whether the Cuban insurrection possesses beyond dispute the attributes of
Statehood which alone can demand the recognition of belligerency in its
favor. Possession, in short, of the essential qualifications of sovereignty by
the insurgents and the conduct of the war by them according to the received
code of war are no less important factors toward the determination of the
problem of belligerency than are the influences and consequences of the strug
gle upon the internal polity of the recognizing State.
The wise utterances of President Grant in his memorable message of Decem
ber 7, 1875, are signally relevant to the present situation in Cuba, and it may
be wholesome now to recall them. At that time a ruinous conflict had for
seven years wasted the neighboring island. During all those years an utter
disregard of the laws of civilized warfare and of the just demands of humanity,
1 82 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
which called forth expressions of condemnation from the nations of Christen
dom, continued unaoated. Desolation and ruin pervaded that productive
region, enormously affecting the commerce of all commercial nations, but
that of the United States more than any other by reason of proximity and
larger trade and intercourse. At that juncture General Grant uttered these
words, which now as then sum up the elements of the problem:
" A recognition of the independence of Cuba being, in my opinion, im
practicable, and indefensible, the question which next presents itself is that
of the recognition of belligerent rights in the parties to the contest. In a
former message to Congress I had occasion to consider this question, and
reached the conclusion that the conflict in Cuba, dreadful and devastating as
were its incidents, did not rise to the fearful dignity of war. * * * It is
possible that the acts of foreign powers, and even acts of Spain herself, of
this very nature, might be pointed to in defense of such recognition. But
now, as in its past history, the United States should carefully avoid the fals£
lights which might lead it into the mazes of doubtful law and of questionable
propriety, and adhere rigidly and sternly to the rule, which has been its guide,
of doing only that which is right and honest and of good report. The ques
tion of according or of withholding rights of belligerency must be judged in
every case, in view of the particular attending facts. Unless justified by
necessity, it is always, and justly, regarded as an unfriendly act and a
gratuitous demonstration of moral support to the rebellion. It is necessary,
and it is required, when the interests and rights of another government or of its
people are so far affected by a pending civil conflict as to require a definition
of its relations to the parties thereto. But this conflict must be one which will
be recognized in the sense of international law as war.
" Belligerence, too, is a fact. The mere existence of contending armed
bodies, and their occasional conflicts, do not constitute war in the sense re
ferred to. Applying to the existing condition of affairs in Cuba the tests recog
nized by publicists and writers on international law, and which have been
observed by nations of dignity, honesty and power, when free from sensitive
or selfish and unworthy motives, I fail to find in the insurrection the existence
of such a substantial political organization, real, palpable and manifest to the
world, having the forms and capable of the ordinary functions of government
toward its own people and to other states, with courts for the administration
of justice, with a local habitation, possessing such organization of force, such
material, such occupation of territory as to take the contest out of the category
of a mere rebellious insurrection, or occasional skirmishes, and place it on
the terrible footing of war, to which a recognition of belligerency would aim
to elevate it.
RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. 183
" The contest, moreover, is solely on land; the insurrection has not pos
sessed itself of a single seaport whence it may send forth its flag, nor has it
any means of communication with foreign powers except through the mili
tary lines of its adversaries. No apprehension of any of those sudden and
difficult complications which a war upon the ocean is apt to precipitate upon
the vessels, both commercial and national, and upon the consular officers of
other powers, calls for th^ definition of their relations to the parties to the
contest. Considered as a question of expediency, I regard the accordance of
belligerent rights still to be as unwise and premature, as I regard it to be, at
present, indefensible as a measure of right.
" Such recognition entails upon the country according the rights which
flow from it difficult and complicated duties, and requires the exaction from the
contending parties of the strict observance of their rights and obligations. It
confers the right of search upon the high seas by vessels of both parties; it
would subject the carrying of arms and munitions of war, which now may
be transported freely and without interruption, in vessels of the United States,
to detention and to possible seizure; it would give rise to countless vex
atious questions, would release the parent government from responsibility for
acts done by the insurgents, and would invest Spain with the right to exercise
the supervision recognized by our treaty of 1795 over our commerce on the
high seas, a very large part of which, in its traffic between the Atlantic and
the Gulf States, and between all of them and the States on the Pacific, passes
through the waters which wash the shores of Cuba. The exercise of this su
pervision could scarce fail to lead, if not to abuses, certainly to collisions
perilous to the peaceful relations of the two States. There can be little doubt
as to what result such supervision would before long draw this nation. It
would be unworthy of the United States to inaugurate the possibilities of such
result, by measures of questionable right or expediency, or by any indirection."
Turning to the practical aspects of a recognition of belligerency and review
ing its inconveniences and positive dangers, still further pertinent considera
tions appear. In the code of nations there is no such thing as a naked recog
nition of belligerency unaccompanied by the assumption of international neu
trality. Such recognition without more will not confer upon either party to a
domestic conflict a status not theretofore actually possessed or affect the re
lation of either party to other States. The act of recognition usually takes
the form of a solemn proclamation of neutrality which recites the de facto
condition of belligerency as its motive. It announces a domestic law rf
neutrality in the declaring State. It assumes the international obligations of a
neutral in the presence of a public state of war. It warns all citizens and
others within the jurisdiction of the proclaimant that they violate those rigor-
184 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
ous obligations at their own peril and can not expect to be shielded from the
consequences. The right of visit and search on the seas and seizure of ves
sels and cargoes and contraband of war and good prize under admiralty law
must under international law be admitted as a legitimate consequence of a
proclamation of belligerency. While according the equal belligerent rights
defined by public law to each party in our ports disfavors would be imposed
on both, which while nominally equal would weigh heavily in behalf of Spain
herself. Possessing a navy and controlling the ports of Cuba her maritime
rights could be asserted not only for the military investment of the island, but
up to the margin of our own territorial waters, and a condition of things
would exist for which the Cubans within their own domain could not hope
to create a parallel; while its creation through aid or sympathy from within
our domain would be even more impossible than now, with the additional
obligations of international neutrality we would perforce assume.
The enforcement of this enlarged and onerous code of neutrality would
only be influential within our own jurisdiction by land and sea and applicable
b> our own instrumentalities. It could impart to the United States no juris
diction between Spain and the insurgents. It would give the United States
no right of intervention to enforce the conduct of the strife within the para
mount authority of Spain according to the international code of war.
For these reasons I regard the recognition of the belligerency of the
Cuban insurgents as now unwise and therefore inadmissible. Should that
step hereafter be deemed wise as a measure of right and duty the Executive
will take it.
Intervention upon humanitarian grounds has been frequently suggested and
has not failed to receive my most anxious and earnest consideration. But
should such a step be now taken when it is apparent that a hopeful change has
supervened in the policy of Spain toward Cuba? A new government has taken
office in the mother country. It is pledged in advance to the declaration that
all the effort in the world can not suffice to maintain peace in Cuba by the
bayonet; that vague promises of reform after subjugation afford no solution
of the insular problem; that with a substitution of commanders must come a
change of the past system of warfare for one in harmony with a new policy
which shall no longer aim to drive the Cubans to the " horrible alternative of
taking to the thicket or succumbing in misery; " that reforms must be in
stituted in accordance with the needs and circumstances of the time, and that
these reforms, while designed to give full autonomy to the colony and to create
a virtual entity and self-controlled administration, shall yet conserve and
affirm the sovereignty of Spain by a just distribution of powers and burdens
upon a basis of mutual interest untainted by methods of selfish expediency.
I 3
u PL,
. O
a
S
f,
RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES.
The first acts of the new government lie in these honorable paths. The
policy of cruel rapine and extermination that so long shocked the universal
sentiment of humanity has been reversed. Under the new military com
mander a broad clemency is proffered. Measures have already been set on foot
to relieve the horrors of starvation. The power of the Spanish armies it is
asserted is to be used not to spread ruin and desolation but to protect the
resumption of peaceful agricultural pursuits and productive industries. That
past methods are futile to force a peace by subjugation is freely admitted, and
that ruin without conciliation must inevitably fail to win for Spain the fidelity
of a contented dependency.
Decrees in application of the foreshadowed reforms have already been
promulgated. The full text of these decrees has not been received, but as
furnished in a telegraphic summary from our minister are: All civil and
electoral rights of Peninsular Spaniards are, in virtue of existing constitutional
authority, forthwith extended to Colonial Spaniards. A scheme of autonomy
has been proclaimed by decree, to become effective upon ratification by the
Cortes. It creates a Cuban parliament which, with the insular executive, can
consider and vote upon all subjects affecting local order and interests, pos
sessing unlimited powers save as to matters of State, war and the navy as to
which the governor-general acts by his own authority as the delegate of the
central government. This parliament receives the oath of the governor-general
to preserve faithfully the liberties and privileges of the colony, and to it the
colonial secretaries are responsible. It has the right to propose to the central
government, through the governor-general, modifications of the national
charter and to invite new projects of law or executive measures in the interest
of the colony.
Besides its local powers it is competent, first, to regulate electoral registra
tion and procedure and prescribe the qualifications of electors and the manner
of exercising suffrage; second, to organize courts of justice with native judges
from members of the local bar; third, to frame the insular budget both as to
expenditures and revenues, without limitation of any kind, and to set apart
the revenues to meet the Cuban share of the national budget, which latter
will be voted by the national Cortes with the assistance of Cuban senators and
deputies; fourth, to initiate or take part in the negotiations of the national
government for commercial treaties which may affect Cuban interests; fifth, to
accept or reject commercial treaties which the national government may have
concluded without the participation of the Cuban government; sixth, to frame
the colonial tariff, acting in accord with the peninsular government in
scheduling articles of mutual commerce between the mother country and the
colonies. Before introducing or voting upon a bill, the Cuban government or
i88 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
the chambers will lay the project before the central government and hear its
opinion thereon, all the correspondence in such regard being made public.
Finally, all conflicts of jurisdiction arising between the different municipal,
provincial and insular assemblies, or between the latter and the insular exec
utive power, and which from their nature may not be referable to the central
government for decision, shall be submitted to the courts.
That the Government of Sagasta has entered upon a course from which
recession with honor is impossible can hardly be questioned; that in the fevv
weeks it has existed it has made earnest of the sincerity of its professions is
undeniable. I shall not impugn its sincerity, nor should impatience be suffered
to embarrass it in the task it has undertaken. It is honestly due to Spain and
to our friendly relations with Spain that she should be given a reasonable
chance to realize her expectations and to prove the asserted efficacy of the'new
order of things to which she stands irrevocably committed. She has recalled
the commander whose brutal orders inflamed the American mind and shocked
the civilized world. She has modified the horrible order of concentration and
has undertaken to care for the helpless and permit those who desire to resume
the cultivation of their fields to do so and assures them of the protection of the
Spanish Government in their lawful occupations. She has just released the
" Competitor " prisoners heretofore sentenced to death and who have been the
subject of repeated diplomatic correspondence during both this and the
preceding Administration.
Not a single American citizen is now in arrest or confinement in Cuba of
whom this Government has any knowledge. The near future will demonstrate
whether the indispensable condition of a righteous peace, just alike to the
Cubans and to Spain as well as equitable to all our interests so intimately
involved in the welfare of Cuba, is likely to be attained. If not, the exigency
of further and other action by the United States will remain to be taken.
When that time comes that action will be determined in the line of indisputable
right and duty. It will be faced, without misgiving or hesitancy in the light
of the obligation this Government owes to itself, to the people who have
confided to it the protection of their interests and honor, and to humanity.
Sure of the right, keeping free from all offense ourselves, actuated only by
upright and patriotic considerations, moved neither by passion nor selfishness,
the Government will continue its watchful care over the rights and property of
American citizens and will abate none of its efforts to bring about by peaceful
agencies a peace which shall be honorable and enduring. If it shall hereafter
appear to be a duty imposed by our obligations to ourselves, to civilization
and humanity to intervene with force, it shall be without fault on our part and
only because the necessity for such action will be so clear as to command the
support and approval of the civilized world.
JANUARY i TO MAY i, 1898.
CHAPTER VIII.
With the beginning of the year 1898, a provisional government, in
accord with the reforms promised by the Sagasta cabinet, was inau
gurated in Havana. Although there was very little chance of any
measure of autonomy proving satisfactory to the Cubans, the Ameri
can people were advised to give the Spanish Government a chance of
testing the value of the attempted reforms. Thoughtful persons feared
that the policy of Spain was simply to keep the United States in a con
dition of inaction until so late in the season that a campaign would
have to be made in the rainy season or deferred until the following
year. Meanwhile the country was fully awakened to the necessity of
increasing the navy and strengthening the coast defenses.
The White Squadron, under the command of Admiral Sicard, was
ordered to rendezvous at Key West. Riotous demonstrations against
the Americans in Cuba being reported by the consul-general, it was
deemed best to send a war vessel to the port of Havana, and on January
25th, the " Maine," under command of Captain Sigsbee, was ordered to
that place. This was ostensibly a visit of courtesy, but was also a pre
cautionary measure in behalf of Americans and American property in
Cuba. The hostility of the Spaniards was scarcely veiled, but in time
of peace they dared not object to the presence of an American war
vessel before Havana, and they immediately prepared to return the
courtesy by sending the " Vizcaya " to the port of New York. The
vessel was in fact present in New York harbor during the days of ex
citement following the destruction of the " Maine; " and the fact that it
was protected from violence at the hands of irresponsible and excited
persons argued well for the self-control of the American people and
the administrative ability of those in authority at the port. Mean
while both Consul-General Lee and Captain Sigsbee were aware of
the anti-American spirit existing in Havana, not on account of any
lack of courtesy on the part of the Spanish officials, but from the
indifference and apathy with which they were received by the Spanish
soldiers and the trades-people in the city. Several threatening pla
cards were printed and distributed and rumors of ill-feeling were rife;
IQO CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
consequently the officers of the " Maine," were constantly on the alert
for a popular outbreak; and the crew of the vessel were not allowed
to go ashore.
February 8th, it was learned that De Lome, the Spanish Minister at
Washington, had sent to a friend in Havana, Senor Coneljas, a Spanish
politician of high rank, a letter containing abusive and insulting lan
guage about President McKinley. The publication of this letter
caused great indignation throughout the United States; and as De
Lome was unable to deny the authorship of the objectionable ex
pressions, Spain was immediately requested to recall him, but he
promptly resigned and received his passports before action could be
taken at Madrid.
De Lome had not left New York when the co mtry was horrified by
the news of the blowing up of the " Maine." The telegram from Captain
Sigsbee announcing the disaster, requested that judgment be sus
pended until an investigation could be made; and everything possible
was done by the American authorities to allay the excitement naturally
aroused. A naval court of inquiry to investigate the matter was ap
pointed by Admiral Sicard. The members of the court were Cap
tain Sampson of the " Iowa," Captain Chadwick of the " New York "
Lieutenant-Commander William P. Potter, United States Navy, and
Lieutenant-Commander Adolph Marix also of the " New York, "
The last-named was appointed judge-advocate; he had at one time
been executive officer of the " Maine " and was thoroughly familiar
with the construction of the vessel and the disposition of her stores
and ammunition. The order appointing the court of inquiry reads
as follows:
U. S. FLAGSHIP "NEW YORK" (first rate).
KEY WEST, FLA., February 19, 1898.
Capt. WILLIAM T. SAMPSON, U. S. N., Commanding U. S. S. Iowa, Key West,
Fla.:
SIR. — A court of inquiry, consisting of yourself as president, and of Capt.
French E. Chadwick, and Lieut. -Commander William P. Potter, United
States Navy, as additional members, and of Lieut. -Commander Adolph
Marix, United States Navy, as judge-advocate, is hereby ordered to convene at
noon on Monday, February 21, 1898, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for
the purpose of inquiring into the circumstances connected with the loss, by
explosion, of the United States battle ship " Maine," in the harbor of Havana,
Cuba, on the night of Tuesday, February 15, 1898.
JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1898.
The court is authorized to hold its sessions on board any ship of the North
Atlantic Squadron, or in the city of Key West, Florida, or in the harbor of the
city of Havana, Cuba.
The attention of the court is invited to the instructions, concerning the
particulars to be investigated in the case of the loss or grounding of a ship of
the Navy, contained in the United States Navy Regulations.
The following-described papers relating to the loss of the United States ship
" Maine " on the occasion referred to are attached to and made part of this
precept:
1. The copy of ? telegram sent by Capt. C. D. Sigsbee, United Stares
Navy, at Havana, Cuba, to Commander James M. Forsyth, United States
Navy, at Key West, Florida, without date, but, probably, sent on the night of
February I5th, as it was received at Key West, Florida, by Lieut. -Commander
William S. Cowles, United States Navy, at i A. M. of February 16, 1898, and
by the commander-in-chief at 5:30 A. M. of February 16, at Dry Tortugas,
Florida.
2. A telegram sent by Capt. C. D. Sigsbee, United States Navy, 10 the
commander-in-chief at Key West, Florida, dated Havana, Cuba, February
1 6, 1898.
The court will diligently and thorougniy inquire into all the circumstances
attending the loss of said vessel on the date named, and upon the conclusion
of the investigation will report to the commander-in-chief its proceedings, all
the testimony taken, and the facts which it may deem established by the evi
dence adduced, together with its opinion as to what further proceedings, if
any, should be had in the matter.
The court will also report whether or not the loss of said vessel was, on the
occasion named, in any respect due to fault or negligence on the part of any
of the officers or members of the crew of said vessel, and if so, the names of
such officers or members of the crew, and in what respect and to what extent
any or either of them were so at fault or negligent.
If the court shall be of opinion that further proceedings should be had in
the matter, it will include in its report a -succinct statement as to the person or
persons against whom, and the specific matter upon which, such proceedings
should be had.
The court will also report its opinion as to the cause or causes of the ex
plosion, or other incidents that bore directly or indirectly upon the loss of the
" Maine."
It will also record any information that it may be able to obtain by testimony
and evidence, as to any person or persons not connected with the Navy of the
IQ2 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
United States, who are, in its opinion, responsible, in part or wholly, directly
or indirectly, for the explosion and loss of the " Maine," and will include their
names, in its opinion, together v/ith the degree of responsibility in each case.
M. SICARD,
Rear-Admiral, Commander -in-Chief,
United States Naval Force on North Atlantic Station.
I certify the above to be a true copy.
A. MARIX,
Lieut.-Com., U. S. N., fudge-Advocate.
The court commenced its sittings at Havana, February 2ist, and
continued some time at that place, later moving to Key West where
many of the witnesses were located and it continued in session for a
month. The inquiry was thorough and exhaustive, and was made
with great fairness and deliberation; and the further it progressed,
the less doubt there seemed to be that the " Maine " was destroyed by
some external agency.
February I9th, the United States had declined the request of Spain
for a joint investigation of the disaster. The officials in Havana held
a short court of inquiry and transmitted the findings to Madrid; but
it was regarded in this country as a mere perfunctory affair, and not
of serious weight as to the investigation or the result announced.
The following resolution was passed by Congress to defray the ex
penses of the submarine work necessary on the wreck of the " Maine."
Joint Resolution To provide for recovering the remains of officers and men
and property from the wrecked United States ship " Maine," and making an
appropriation therefor.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Navy be, and he is
hereby, authorized to engage the services of a wrecking company or com
panies, having proper facilities for the prompt and efficient performance of
submarine work, for the purpose of recovering the remains of the officers
and men lost on the United States ship " Maine," and of saving the vessel or
such parts thereof, and so much of her stores, guns, material, equipment,
fittings, and appurtenances as may be practicable; and for this purpose the
sum of two hundred thousand dollars, or as much thereof as may be necessary,
is hereby appropriated and made immediately available.
Approved, February 23, 1898.
JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1898.
Meanwhile the Red Cross had begun effective work among the
starving Cubans. Spain having objected to the transporting of char
itable supplies by Government cruisers, it was agreed to have them
carried on light-house tenders. Feeling having been aroused in Cuba
against Consul-General Lee, it was intimated by Spain that his with
drawal w^as desirable, but the United States refused to recall him.
Senor Polo y Bernabe was appointed Spanish Minister to succeed De
Lome, and he arrived in Washington and presented his credentials to
the President, March I2th, being received with the utmost courtesy
and consideration.
On March 8th, a bill appropriating $50,000,000 to be expended by
the President for national defense, was reported to the House by
Hon. Joseph G. Cannon, Chairman of the Committee on Appropria
tions. From among the short speeches delivered on this occasion, I
reproduce the following from the Congressional Record of that date.
(Con. Record, Vol. 31, part 3, page 2607.)
The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Alabama is recognized. [Loud and
prolonged applause.]
The Chair must inform the House that the time taken up with applause
comes out of the gentleman's time.
Mr. WHEELER of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, 20,000,000 brave and true hearts
that dwell in that beautiful land south of yon river join me in most earnest
support of this resolution, [Loud and prolonged applause.]
To those who insist that the diplomats of this Government should regard
the maintenance of peace as the paramount purpose, I beg to say that the
history of all nations shows that the best way to preserve peace is to Le
always thoroughly prepared for war. Certainly it is the only way for a
nation to preserve peace and at the same time uphold its honor and retain the
respect of other nations.
I respectfully submit that it is time for the American people to halt for a
moment and stop the worship of Mammon and Mammon's kings, to cast a
glance backward and reflect upon that which formed the foundation of this
Great Republic. It, Mr. Speaker, was the teachings of the mothers who fled
from the oppressions of caste and class, braved an unfathomed ocean, and
landed upon these shores, confronted by wild beasts and savage Indians.
They taught their sons that the highest possible honor and greatest possible
privilege was to fight for country, its safety, and its honor. It was this spirit
which enabled our forefathers to successfully cope with the brave and wild
Indians. It was this that crowned our arms with glory and victory in the
194 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
war of the Revolution, the war of 1812, and the war with Mexico. It was thii
that caused a million brave men to fly to arms in 1861.
For a century American mothers had taught their sons that an ounce of
glory earned in battle was worth more than a million pounds of gold. LLoud
applause.] This is the teaching which we must continue to impress upon our
children, and it is the best heritage we can give to tho.;e who are to follow after
us. This and this alone will cause the flag of our country to continue to soar
higher and higher and the prestige of this Great Republic to extend its power
for good in the farthest corners of the earth. [Applause.]
After twenty years of war and turmoil in Europe, which terminated in 1815,
Napier, in his closing words of the history of those events, showed how
thoroughly the English people appreciated that their greatness and power were
due to the glory achieved by the arms of Britain's chivalrous sons. This great
writer said:
" "Wellington was victorious; the great conqueror (Napoleon) was over
thrown; England stood the most triumphant nation of the world, but with
an enormous debt, a dissatisfied people, gaining peace without tranquillity,
greatness without intrinsic strength, the present time uneasy, the future dark
and threatening. Yet she rejoices in the glory of her arms, and it is a stirring
sound." [Applause.]
And in illustration of the virtue developed and exercised in the pursuit of
martial glory, General Napier said:
" War is the condition of this world. From men to the smallest insect all
are at strife, and the glory of arms, which can not be obtained without the
exercise of honor, fortitude, courage, obedience, modesty, and temperance,
excites the brave man's patriotism and is a chastening corrective for the rich
man's pride."
And with striking truth this great historian continues:
<; It is yet no security for power. Napoleon, the greatest man of whom
history makes mention — Napoleon, the most wonderful commander, the most
sagacious politician, the most profound statesman, lost by arms, Poland,
Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and France. Fortune, that name for the
unknown combination of infinite power, was wanting to him; and without her
aid the designs of man are as bubbles on a troubled ocean."
Change one word, and we in America will indorse this expression. For
"fortune'* write "patriotism;" interpret that word to mean the exercise of
this great virtue in the spirit inspired by the teaching and example of Wash
ington, Lincoln, Lee, and Stonewall Jackson — a patriotism which holds love
of country as dearer and sweeter than life, and as far above personal ambition
as the heavens are above the earth — I repeat, substitute that dearest of words
GROUP PHOTOGRAPHED AFTER THE BREAKFAST TO OFFICERS
OF THE " MAINE," HAVANA YACHT- CLUB, JAN. 30, 1858.
JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1898. 197
and give it this interpretation, and then this sentiment which Napier applied
to monarchy and imperialism would express the emotion uppermost in the
hearts of the patriots of this the greatest country of the world. [Loud
applause.]
[Here the hammer fell.]
-I
The bill passed the Senate without debate, and was signed by the
President March 9th. ' All the southern members of Congress were
warm in their advocacy of the measure, and the unanimity of the
action and the implicit confidence placed in the President had a good
moral effect, not only in the United States, but especially abroad
where it was hoped that a spirit of disunion might become manifest
in case of the declaration of war. ,;
The administration took immediate measures to put the country
into a good state of defense; vessels were bought and transformed into
armored cruisers, monitors were refitted, and steps were taken to get
the army into a thoroughly good condition. The military depart
ments were rearranged and the troops in the west were on marching
orders in a short time.
Spain remonstrated against the presence of the American fleet at
Key West, but took immediate steps to increase her own navy and
prepare a hostile fleet for American waters. The " Massachusetts "
and the " Texas " were ordered to Hampton Roads, and the sea-coast
was thoroughly patrolled by armed vessels. At this time the papers
were filled with descriptions of the preparation of two formidable
Spanish fleets, and their probable destination could only be con
jectured. Every city on the Atlantic coast was more or less appre
hensive of possible attack; the Engineer's Department devoted much
of its energy to strengthening the defenses of the sea-board, and our
navy-yards were kept busy day and night with the unusual demands
upon them.
March I7th, Senator Proctor spoke in the Senate on the Cuban
question, giving full descriptions of the condition of the people there,
as learned from his own personal observation. Senator Proctor had
been Secretary of War during President Harrison's administration,
and was highly respected for intelligence, integrity and good judg
ment. He had just returned from Cuba whither he had gone during
the last week of February on a tour of investigation to satisfy himself
as to the actual condition of affairs in the island. He presented the
facts in a cool, deliberate, unimpassioned manner, showing that the
198 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
estimated mortality among the noncombatants from starvation and ill-
treatment was about 200,000, and that thousands more were at that
moment in the throes of starvation and disease. He declared that the
issue was between 1,400,000 Cubans and 200,000 Spanish soldiers.
Senator Thurston had also visited Cuba with a party in a private
yacht, reaching there a few days after Senator Proctor. He was ac
companied by Senator Money, Representatives Cummings and W. A.
Smith, Mrs. Thurston and several other ladies. Mrs. Thurston was
deeply impressed with the sad scenes witnessed in the course of their
visit and her sympathy was strongly aroused in favor of these suffer
ing people. She died suddenly on board the yacht in Matanzas harbor
and the circumstances under which she died gave additional weight to
Senator Thurston's advocacy of the Cuban cause. Public indignation
was inflamed by his recital of the terrible state of affairs in Cuba as
given in his speech in the Senate about a week after Senator Proctor
had spoken on the same subject.
March 2ist, the House of Representatives passed a bill for the re
lief of the survivors of the " Maine " disaster, and this bill was passed
by the Senate two days later. The Spanish report of the destruc
tion of the " Maine " was received at Madrid, March 25th, and the
American report was transmitted to Madrid on the following day and
was sent to Congress, March 28th, the summing up of the case being
as follows:
U. S. S. "!OWA" (ist rate),
KEY WEST, FLA., Monday, March 21, 1898 — 10 A. M.
The court met pursuant to the adjournment of yesterday.
Present — All the members and the judge-advocate.
The record of last day's proceedings was read over and approved.
The court was then cleared for deliberation.
After full and mature consideration of all the testimony before it, the court
finds as follows:
1. That the United States battle ship "Maine" arrived in the harbor of
Havana, Cuba, on the 25th day of January, 1898, and was taken to buoy No. 4,
in from five and one-half to six fathoms of water by the regular Government
pilot.
The United States consul-general at Havana had notified the authorities at
that place, the previous evening, of the intended arrival of the " Maine."
2. The state of discipline on board the " Maine " was excellent, and all orders
and regulations in regard to the care and safety of the ship were strictly
carried out.
JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1898. 1 99
All ammunition was stowed in accordance with prescribed instructions, and
proper care was taken whenever ammunition was handled.
Nothing was stowed in any one of the magazines or shellrooms which was
not permitted to be stowed there.
The magazines and shellrooms were always locked after having been opened,
and after the destruction of the " Maine " the keys were found in their proper
place in the captain's cabin, everything having been reported secure that
evening at 8 P. M.
The temperatures of the magazines and shellrooms were taken daily and
reported. The only magazine which had an undue amount of heat was the
after ten-inch magazine, and that did not explode at the time the " Maine "
was destroyed.
The torpedo war-heads were all stowed in the after part of the ship, under
the wardroom, and neither caused nor participated in the destruction of the
" Maine."
The dry gun-cotton primers and detonators were stowed in the cabin aft. and
remote from the scene of the explosion.
Waste was carefully looked after on board the " Maine " to obviate danger.
Special orders in regard to this had been given by the commanding officer.
Varnishes, driers, alcohol, and other combustibles of this nature were stowed
on or above the main deck and could not have had anything to do with the
destruction of the " Maine."
The medical stores were stowed aft, under the wardroom, and remote from
the scene of the explosion.
No dangerous stores of any kind were stowed below in any of the other
storerooms.
The coal bunkers were inspected daily. Of those bunkers adjacent to the
forward magazines and shellrooms four were empty, namely: 63, B4, BS, B6.
Ai5 had been in use that day, and Ai6 was full of New River coal. This coal
had been carefully inspected before receiving it on board. The bunker in
which it was stowed was accessible on three sides at all times, and the fourth
side at this time on account of bunkers 64 and B6 being empty. This bunker,
Ai6, had been inspected that day by the engineer officer on duty.
The fire alarms in the bunkers were in working order, and there had never
been a case of spontaneous combustion of coal on board the " Maine."
The two after boilers of the ship were in use at the time of the disaster, but
for auxiliary purposes only, with a comparatively low pressure of steam, and
being tended by a reliable watch.
These boilers could not have caused the explosion of the ship. The four
forward boilers have since been found by the divers, and are in a fair
condition.
2OO CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
On the night of the destruction of the " Maine," everything had been reported
secure for the night at 8 P. M. by reliable persons, through the proper author
ities, to the commanding officer. At the time the " Maine " was destroyed
the ship was quiet, and, therefore, least liable to accident caused by move
ments from those on board.
EXPLOSIONS.
3. The destruction of the " Maine" occurred at 9:40 P. M. on the I5th day
of February, 1898, in the harbor of Havana, Cuba, she being at the time moored
to the same buoy to which she had been taken upon her arrival. There were
two explosions of a distinctly different character, with a very short but distinct
interval between them, and the forward part of the ship was lifted to a marked
degree at the time of the first explosion. The first explosion was more in the
nature of a report like that of a gun, while the second explosion was more
open, prolonged, and of greater volume. This second explosion was, in the
opinion of the court, caused by the partial explosion of two or more of the*
forward magazines of the " Maine."
CONDITION OF THE WRECK.
4. The evidence bearing upon this, being principally obtained from divers,
did not enable the court to form a definite conclusion as to the condition of the
wreck, although it was established that the after part of the ship was practically
intact, and sank in that condition a very few minutes after the destruction of
the forward part.
The following facts in regard to the forward part of the ship are, however,
established by the testimony:
A portion of the port side of the protective deck, which extends from about
frame 30 to about frame 41, was blown up, aft, and over to port. The main
deck, from about frame 30 to about frame 41, was blown up, aft, and slightly
over to starboard, folding the forward part of the middle superstructure over
and on top of the after part.
This was, in the opinion of the court, caused by the partial explosion of
two or more of the forward magazines of the " Maine."
5. At frame 17 the outer shell of the ship, from a point eleven and one-half
feet from the middle line of the ship, and six feet above the keel when in its
normal position, has been forced up so as to be now about four feet above
the surface of the water, therefore about thirty-four feet above where it would
be had the ship sunk uninjured.
The outside bottom plating is bent into a reversed V-shape (A), the after
wing of which, about fifteen feet broad and thirty-two feet in length (from
JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1898. 2OI
frame 17 to frame 25), is doubled back upon itself against the continuation of
the same plating, extending forward.
At frame 1,8 the vertical keel is broken in two, and the flat keel bent into an
angle similar to the angle formed by the outside bottom plating. This break
is now about six feet below the surface of the water, and about thirty feet
above its normal position.
In the opinion of the court this effect could have been produced only by the
explosion of a mine situated under the bottom of the ship at about frame 18
and somewhat on the port side of the ship.
6. The court finds that the loss of the " Maine " on the occasion named was
not in any respect due to fault or negligence on the part of any of the officers
or members of the crew of said vessel.
7. In the opinion of the court the " Maine " was destroyed by the explosion
of a submarine mine, which caused the partial explosion of two or more of
the forward magazines.
8. The court has been unable to obtain evidence fixing the responsibility for
the destruction of the " Maine " upon any person or persons.
W. T. SAMPSON,
Captain, U. S. N., President.
A. MARIX,
Lieut.-Com., U. S. N., Judge-Advocate.
The court having finished the inquiry it was ordered to make, adjourned at
ii A. M., to await the action of the convening authority.
W. T. SAMPSON,
Captain, U. S. N., President.
A. MARIX,
Lieut. -Com., U. S. N., Judge- Advocate.
U. S. FLAGSHIP " NEW YORK,"
Off Key West, Fla., March 22, 1898.
The proceedings and findings of the court of inquiry in the above case are
approved.
M. SICARD,
Rear- Admiral, Commander -in-Chief of the
United States Naval Force on the North Atlantic Station.
Minister Woodford, at Madrid, held a special conference with
Sagasta and used every possible measure to obtain a peaceful settle
ment of the Cuban question, but the time for diplomacy had passed.
Spain had no intention of yielding any of her claims over the Cubans,
and the only possible result of diplomatic measures at this time was
2O2 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
to defer the outbreak of hostilities until the rainy and unhealthy
season. It was incredible to any European power, especially to a
people so slow and procrastinating as the Spaniards habitually are,
that the United States in her unprepared condition could muster, arm
and mobilize a formidable army in the course of a few weeks. Mean
while the Blanco administration endeavored to soften the condition of
affairs in Cuba. Money was donated to relieve the suffering, and the
reconcentrado edicts were abrogated; while the Red Cross agents in
co-operation with the American consuls were allowed to carry on their
humane work in the island. But it was impossible for the Spanish
authorities to give the relief they were evidently sincere in attempting
to give. Most of the reconcentrados had lost everything. Their
homes were destroyed, their live-stock scattered or killed; weak with
starvation, and penniless, it was impossible for them to return to the
places they once called home. Those who sought employment on the
plantations near the city, were not secure; for the Government was
unable to prevent the burning of the fields and machinery by the in
surgents, who were driven to desperation and refused to accept or
even to listen to any other terms save absolute independence.
The following letter from Consul-General Lee, partly describes the
situation and gives little hope of relief for the unfortunate condition of
affairs :
UNITED STATES CONSULATE-GENERAL,
HAVANA, January 8, 1898.
SECRETARY OF STATE:
SIR. — I have the honor to state, as a matter of public interest, that the
" reconcentrado order " of General Weyler, formerly Governor-General of this
island, transferred about 400,000 self-supporting people, principally women and
children, into a multitude, to be sustained by the contributions of others or die
of starvation or of fevers, resulting from a low physical condition, and being
massed in large bodies, without change of clothing and without food.
Their houses were burned, their fields and plant beds destroyed, and their
live stock drive-n away or killed.
I estimate that probably aoo,ooo of the rural population in the provinces of
Pinar del Rio, Havana, Matanzas, and Santa Clara, have died of starvation or
from resultant causes, and the deaths of whole families almost simultaneously
or within a few days of each other, and of mothers praying for their children
to be relieved of their horrible sufferings by death, are not the least of the
many pitiable scenes which were ever present. In the provinces of Puerto
JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1898. 2O3
Principe and Santiago de Cuba, where the " reconcentrado order " could not
be enforced, the great mass of the people are self-sustaining.
**********
A daily average of ten cents' worth of food to 200,000 people would be an
expenditure of $20,000 per day, and, of course, the most humane efforts upon
the part of our citizens can not hope to accomplish such a gigantic relief, and
a great portion of these people will have to be abandoned to their fate.
**********
I am, etc.,
FITZHUGH LEE.
Similar letters from consuls in the various provinces were being
daily received; and mention was made in some of the letters of organ
ized bodies of charitable women who went from door to door carrying
relief, some families contributing hundreds of dollars each month to
feed the poor. Some of the letters and reports gave harrowing de
tails of the suffering witnessed, and the following letters describe
the crowds coming to the consulates to receive the rations and med
icines sent by the United States for distribution:
CONSULATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
SANTIAGO DE CUBA, February 26, 1898.
SECRETARY OF STATE:
SIR. — I have the honor to herewith inclose for your information a copy of a
letter sent yesterday by me to the New York Central Cuban Relief Committee,
showing the results of four days' work in distributing rations to the starving
poor.
Rations are issued in a court attached to the consulate, the people being
admitted by the police through a carriage driveway.
As I write the street is blocked by the hungry throng for nearly a square
above and below the entrance.
I have requested the police to admit the most delicate and feeble subjects
first, as many of them are unable to stand very long in such a crowd.
I shall, if possible, get a photographic view of the scene and forward it to
the President through your honorable Department.
I am, etc.,
PULASKI F. HYATT,
United States Consul.
Since writing this dispatch (No. 437), I have been informed that the ladies'
relief committee have estimated that in this city alone the number who need
help is at least 18,000. HYATT,
Consul.
2O4 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
CONSULATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
SAGUA LA GRANDE, March 12, 1898.
SECRETARY OF STATE:
SIR. — With reference to the distribution to and requirement for the con-
centrados in my consular district, I beg to submit the following for the in
formation of the Department:
From the I5th of last month, through cash donations made to this consulate,
direct, through personal appeal, I cared for 1,200 persons. By the ist instant
these contributions increased so as to enable the committee to increase the
relief list to 2,000. This has been maintained until now; but as the " Fern,"
with thirty-five tons, should arrive to-morrow, the Sagua relief can be
continued.
About a week since I received the first shipment of supplies, about twenty
tons being sent from Havana under direction of the Red Cross branch in that
city. All this I distributed among ten of the twenty-two towns I had managed
to investigate, using none for Sagua; there being five others not yet looked
into out of the twenty-seven cities and towns in my zone. I believe that with
the assistance of a very able local committee, that I have this relief reduced to
a kind of system so as to avoid as little abuse as possible, and at the same
time care for the most deserving.
For instance, about sixty days ago, the mayors of these towns furnished, by
request, this office with the number they claimed as actually destitute in their
several municipal districts, which footed up over 50,000 persons. Estimating a
decrease from death of 10,000, would leave, say, 40,000.
From the investigation so far made, I estimate if provision can be made to
care for 25,000, whatever may be left will manage to survive.
Upon this estimate I beg to say that to keep this number alive will require
eighty tons per month.
With the supplies reported in transit we can carry them through until the
I2th of the coming month (April).
While, as stated in a very recent dispatch to the Department, the military
have thrown every conceivable obstacle in the way of carrying out this humane
work, I have, when convinced of their sincerity, acted in conjunction with the
civil authorities.
Of the 5,000 utterly destitute in this city, the mayor, by popular subscription,
has made an effort to issue a scant ration of rice and beans to about one-third
of this number. Yesterday he called to say that he had a telegram from the
acting Spanish minister in Washington, suggesting that he offer to aid m
the distribution of the supplies bein,^ sent from the United States; that he had
no funds with which to do anything.
JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1898.
Being a good, active man, I gladly accepted the offer of his services.
It is with pleasure that I say to the Department that Senor Leonardo Chia,
" administrador " of the Sagua, as also the " administradores " of the Santa
Clara and Cienfuegos railroads, have not only transported free the supplies kr
the reconcentrados, but have used extra effort to have them reach destination
in due time.
I am, etc., WALTER B. BARKER,
Consul.
[Telegram.]
SAGUA LA GRANDE, March 24, 1898.
DAY, Washington:
Closer investigation disclose larger number destitute than estimates sent.
Fifty tons needful now. Distress far greater than my reports show.
BARKER,
Consul.
On February i4th, the Senate had passed a resolution calling for
the diplomatic correspondence on this subject, and it was transmitted
to the Senate in April. The paper from which above extracts are
made was consolidated with the message of President McKinley,
Senate Document No. 405, Fifty-fifth Congress.
On April ist the House passed an appropriation of $39,000,000
for the building of three war ships, six torpedo boats, six torpedo-boat
destroyers and a smokeless powder factory. On the 4th speeches
were made in both Houses of Congress favoring intervention in Cuba.
On the same day messages were received from Pope Leo XIII offer
ing to mediate between the two countries, and he did in fact send
conciliatory messages to Spain in an effort to prevent the outbreak
of hostilities, but his efforts were fruitless. On the 5th, five Sen
ators declared themselves in favor of war, and on the same day Consul-
General Lee was recalled. April 7th, representatives of six great
powers presented a joint note to the President in favor of peace.
They were courteously and kindly received, but the President de
clared firmly that war in Cuba must cease.
At last, after great and trying delay in futile schemes of diplomacy,
the President sent a message to Congress April nth in favor of im
mediate intervention.
208 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
PRESIDENTS MESSAGE ON THE CONDITION OF AFFAIRS IN
CUBA.
To the Congress of the United States:
Obedient to that precept of the Constitution which commands the President
to give, from time to time, to the Congress information of the state of the
Union and to recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall
judge necessary and expedient, it becomes my duty now to address your body
with regard to the grave crisis that has arisen in the relations of the United
States to Spain by reason of the warfare that for more than three years has
raged in the neighboring island of Cuba.
I do so because of the intimate connection of the Cuban question with the
state of our own Union and the grave relation the course which it is now
incumbent upon the Nation to adopt must needs bear to the traditional policy
of our Government if it is to accord with the precepts laid down by tjie
founders of the Republic and religiously observed by succeeding Administra
tions to the present day.
The present revolution is but the successor of other similar insurrections
which have occurred in Cuba against the dominion of Spain, extending over a
period of nearly half a century, each of which, during its progress, has sub
jected the United States to great effort and expense in enforcing its neutrality
laws, caused enormous losses to American trade and commerce, caused irrita
tion, annoyance, and disturbance among our citizens, and, by the exercise of
cruel, barbarous, and uncivilized practices of warfare, shocked the sensibilities
and offended the humane sympathies of our people.
Since the present revolution began, in February, 1895, this country has seen
the fertile domain at our threshold ravaged by fire and sword in the course of a
struggle unequaled in the history of the island and rarely paralleled as to the
numbers of the combatants and the bitterness of the contest by any revolution
of modern times where a dependent people striving to be free have been
opposed by the power of the sovereign State.
\Our people have beheld a once prosperous community reduced to com
parative want, its lucrative commerce virtually paralyzed, its exceptional
productiveness diminished, its fields laid waste, its mills in ruins, and its people
perishing by tens of thousands from hunger and destitution.* We have found
ourselves constrained, in the observance of that strict neutrality which our
laws enjoin, and which the law of Nations commands, to police our own
waters and watch our own seaports in prevention of any unlawful act in aid
of the Cubans.
Our trade has suffered; the capital invested by our citizens in Cuba has been
largely lost, and the temper and forbearance of our people have been so sorely
JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1695. 2OQ
tried as to beget a perilous unrest among our own citizens *which has inevitably
found its expression from time to time in the National legislature, so that
issues wholly external to our own body politic engross attention and stand in
the way of that close devotion to domestic advancement that becomes a self-
contained commonwealth whose primal maxim has been the avoidance of all
foreign entanglements. All this must needs awaken, and has, indeed, aroused
the utmost concern on the part of this Government, as well during my
predecessor's term as in my own. ]
In April, 1896, the evils from which our country suffered through the Cuban
war became so onerous that my predecessor made an effort to bring about a
peace through the mediation of this Government in any way that might tend
to an honorable adjustment of the contest between Spain and her revolted
colony, on the basis of some effective scheme of self-government for Cuba
under the flag and sovereignty of Spain. It failed through the refusal of the
Spanish Government then in power to consider any form of mediation or,
indeed, any plan of settlement which did not begin with the actual submission
of the insurgents to the mother country, and then only on such terms as Spain
herself might see fit to grant. The war continued unabated: The resistance of
the insurgents was in nowise diminished.
The efforts of Spain were increased, both by the dispatch of fresh levies to
Cuba and by the addition to the horrors of the strife of a new and inhuman
phase happily unprecedented in the modern history of civilized Christian
peoples. The policy of devastation and concentration, inaugurated by the
captain-general's bando of October 21, 1896, in the Province of Pinar del Rio
was thence extended to embrace all of the island to which the power of ths
Spanish arms was able to reach by occupation or by military operations. The
peasantry, including all dwelling in the open agricultural interior, were driven
into the garrison towns or isolated places held by the troops.
The raising and movement of provisions of all kinds were interdicted. The
fields were laid waste, dwellings unroofed and fired, mills destroyed, and, in
short, everything that could desolate the land and render it unfit for human
habitation or support was commanded by one or the other of the contending
parties and executed by all the powers at their disposal.
By the time the present Administration took office a year ago, reconcentra-
tion — so called — had been made effective over the better part of the four
central and western provinces, Santa Clara, Matanzas, Havana, and Pinar
del Rio.
The agricultural population to the estimated number of 300,000 or more was
herded within the towns and their immediate vicinage, deprived of the means
of support, rendered destitute of shelter, left poorly clad, and exposed to the
210 CUBANS STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
most unsanitary conditions. As the scarcity of food increased with the devasta
tion of the depopulated areas of production, destitution and want became
misery and starvation. Month by month the death rate increased in an alarm
ing ratio. By March, 1897, according to conservative estimates from official
Spanish sources, the mortality among the reconcentrados, from starvation and
the diseases thereto incident, exceeded 50 per centum of their total number.
No practical relief was accorded to the destitute. The overburdened towns,
already suffering from the general dearth, could give no aid. So-called " zones
of cultivation " established within the immediate areas of effective military
control about the cities and fortified camps proved illusory as a remedy for the
suffering. The unfortunates, being for the most part women and children,
with aged and helpless men, enfeebled by disease and hunger, could not have
tilled the soil without tools, seed, or shelter for their own support or for the
supply of the cities. Reconcentration, adopted avowedly as a war measure in
order to cut off the resources of the insurgents, worked its predestined result.
As I said in my message of last December, it was not civilized warfare; it was
extermination. The only peace it could beget was that of the wilderness and
the grave.
Meanwhile the military situation in the island had undergone a noticeable
change. The extraordinary activity that characterized the second year of the
war, when the insurgents invaded even the hitherto unharmed fields of Pinar
del Rio and carried havoc and destruction up to the walls of the city of Havana
itself, had relapsed into a dogged struggle in the central and eastern provinces.
The Spanish arms regained a measure of control in Pinar del Rio and parts of
Havana, but, under the existing conditions of the rural country, without imme
diate improvement of their productive situation. Even thus partially restricted,
the revolutionists held their own, and their conquest and submission, put for
ward by Spain as the essential and sole basis of peace, seemed as far distant as
at the outset.
In this state of affairs my Administration found itself confronted with the
grave problem of its duty. My message of last December reviewed the situa
tion and narrated the steps taken with a view to relieving its acuteness and
opening the way to some form of honorable settlement. The assassination of
the prime minister, Canovas, led to a change of government in Spain. The
former Administration, pledged to subjugation without concession, gave place
to that of a more liberal party, committed long in advance to a policy of
reform involving the wider principle of home rule for Cuba and Puerto Rico.
The overtures of this Government, made through its new envoy General
Woodford, and looking to an immediate and effective amelioration of the con
dition of the island, although not accepted to the extent of admitted mediation
JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1898. 211
in any shape, were met by assurances that home rule, in an advanced phase,
would be forthwith offered to Cuba, without waiting for the war to end, and
that more humane methods should thenceforth prevail in the conduct of
hostilities. Coincidcntally with these declarations, the new Government of
Spain continued and completed the policy already begun by its predecessor, of
testifying friendly regard for this Nation by releasing American citizens held
under one charge or another connected with the insurrection, so that, by the
end of November, not a single person entitled in any way to our National
protection, remained in a Spanish prison.
While these negotiations were in progress the increasing destitution of the
unfortunate reconcentrados and the alarming mortality among them claimed
earnest attention. The success which had attended the limited measure of
relief extended to the suffering American citizens among them by the judicious
expenditure through the consular agencies of the money appropriated ex
pressly for their succor by the joint resolution approved May 24, 1897,
prompted the humane extension of a similar scheme of aid to the great body
of sufferers. A suggestion to this end was acquiesced in by the Spanish
authorities. On the 24th of December last, I caused to be issued an appeal to
the American people, inviting contributions in money or in kind for the
succor of the starving sufferers in Cuba, following this on the 8th of January
by a similar public announcement of the formation of a central Cuban relief
committee, with headquarters in New York city, composed of three members
representing the American National Red Cross and the religious and business
elements of the community.
The efforts of that committee have been untiring and have accomplished
much. Arrangements for free transportation to Cuba have greatly aided the
charitable work. The president of the American Red Cross and representatives
of other contributory organizations have generously visited Cuba and co
operated with the consul-general and the local authorities to make effective
distribution of the relief collected through the efforts of the central committee.
Nearly $200,000 in money and supplies has already reached the sufferers and
more is forthcoming. The supplies are admitted duty free, and transportation
to the interior has been arranged, so that the relief, at first necessarily con
fined to Havana and the larger cities, is now extended through most, if not all,
of the towns where suffering exists.
Thousands of lives have already been saved. The necessity for a change in
the condition of the reconcentrados is recognized by the Spanish Government.
Within a few days past the orders of General Weyler have been revoked; the
reconcentrados, it is said, are to be permitted to return to their homes, and
aided to resume the self-supporting pursuits of peace. Public works have been
212 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
ordered to give them employment, and a sum of $600,000 has been appropriated
for their relief.
The war in Cuba is of such a nature that short of subjugation or extermina
tion a final military victory for either side seems impracticable. The alternative
lies in the physical exhaustion of the one or the other party, or perhaps of
both — a condition which in effect ended the ten years' war by the truce of
Zanjon. The prospect of such a protraction and conclusion of the present
strife is a contingency hardly to be contemplated with equanimity by the
civilized world, and least of all by the United States, affected and injured as
we are, deeply and intimately, by its very existence.
Realizing this, it appeared to be my duty, in a spirit of true friendliness, no
less to Spain than to the Cubans who have so much to lose by the prolongation
of the struggle, to seek to bring about an immediate termination of the war.
To this end I submitted, on the 27th ultimo, as a result of much representation
and correspondence, through the United States minister at Madrid, propo
sitions to the Spanish Government looking to an armistice until October ist for
the negotiation of peace with the good offices of the President
In addition, I asked the immediate revocation of the order of reconcentra-
tion, so as to permit the people to return to their farms and the needy to be
relieved with provisions and supplies from the United States, co-operating with
the Spanish authorities, so as to afford full relief.
The reply of the Spanish Cabinet was received on the night of the 3ist
ultimo. It offered, as the means to bring about peace in Cuba, to confide the
preparation thereof to the Insular Parliament, inasmuch as the concurrence of
that body would be necessary to reach a final result, it being, however, under
stood that the powers reserved by the Constitution to the Central Government
are not lessened or diminished. As the Cuban Parliament does not meet until
the 4th of May next, the Spanish Government would not object, for its part,
to accept at once a suspension of hostilities if asked for by the insurgents from
the general-in-chief, to whom it would pertain, in such case, to determine the
duration and conditions of the armistice.
The propositions submitted by General Woodford and the reply of the
Spanish Government were both in the form of brief memoranda, the texts of
which are before me, and are substantially in the language above given. The
function of the Cuban Parliament in the matter of " preparing " peace and the
manner of its doing so are not expressed in the Spanish memorandum; but
from General Woodford's explanatory reports of preliminary discussions pre
ceding the final conference it is understood that the Spanish Government
stands ready to give the Insular Congress full powers to settle the terms of
peace with the insurgents — whether by direct negotiation or indirectly by
means of legislation does not appear.
JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1898. 213
With this last overture in the direction of immediate peace, and its dis
appointing reception by Spain, the Executive is brought to the end of his
effort.
In my annual message of December last I said:
" Of the untried measures there remain only: Recognition of the insurgents
as belligerents; recognition of the independence of Cuba; neutral intervention
to end the war by imposing a rational compromise between the contestants,
and intervention in favor of one or the other party. I speak not of forcible
annexation, for that can not be thought of. That, by our code of morality,
would be criminal aggression."
Thereupon I reviewed these alternatives, in the light of President Grant's
measured words, uttered in 1875, when after seven years of sanguinary, de
structive, and cruel hostilities in Cuba he reached the conclusion that the
recognition of the independence of Cuba was impracticable and indefensible;
and that the recognition of belligerence was not warranted by the facts accord
ing to the tests of public law. I commented especially upon the latter aspect
of the question, pointing out the inconveniences and positive dangers of a
recognition of belligerence which, while adding to the already onerous burdens
of neutrality within our own jurisdiction, could not in any way extend our
influence or effective offices in the territory of hostilities.
Nothing has since occurred to change my view in this regard; and I recog
nize as fully now as then that the issuance of a proclamation of neutrality, by
which process the so-called recognition of belligerents is published, could, of
itself and unattended by other action, accomplish nothing toward the one end
for which we labor — the instant pacification of Cuba and the cessation of the
misery that afflicts the island.
Turning to the question of recognizing at this time the independence of the
present insurgent government in Cuba, we find safe precedents in our history
from an early day. They are well summed up in President Jackson's message
to Congress, December 21, 1836, on the subject of the recognition of the
independence of Texas. He said:
" In all the contests that have arisen out of the revolutions of France, out of
the disputes relating to the Crowns of Portugal and Spain, out of the separa
tion of the American possessions of both from the European Governments,
and out of the numerous and constantly occurring struggles for dominion in
Spanish America, so wisely consistent with our just principles has been the
action of our Government, that we have, under the most critical circumstances,
avoided all censure, and encountered no other evil than that produced by a
transient estrangement of good-will in those against whom we have been by
force of evidence compelled to decide.
214 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
" It has thus made known to the world that the uniform policy and practice
of the United States is to avoid all interference in disputes which merely relate
to the internal government of other Nations, and eventually to recognize the
authority of the prevailing party without reference to our particular interests
and views or to the merits of the original controversy.
* * * But on this, as on every other trying occasion, safety is to be found
in a rigid adherence to principle.
" In the contest between Spain and the revolted colonies we stood aloof, atH
waited not only until the ability of the new States to protect themselves wan
fully established, but until the danger of their being again subjugated had
entirely passed away. Then, and not until then, were they recognized.
" Such was our course in regard to Mexico herself." * * * " It is true
that with regard to Texas the civil authority of Mexico has been expelled, its
invading army defeated, the chief of the Republic himself captured, and all
present power to control the newly-organized government of Texas annihilated
within its confines; but, on the other hand, there is, in appearance at least, an
immense disparity of physical force on the side of Texas. The Mexican
Republic, under another Executive, is rallying its forces under a new leader
and menacing a fresh invasion to recover its lost dominion.
" Upon the issue of this threatened invasion the independence of Texas may
be considered as suspended; and were there nothing peculiar in the relative
situation of the United States and Texas, our acknowledgment of its inde
pendence at such a crisis could scarcely be regarded as consistent with that
prudent reserve with which we have hitherto held ourselves bound to treat all
similar questions."
Thereupon Andrew Jackson proceeded to consider the risk that there might
be imputed to the United States motives of selfish interest in view of the
former claim on our part to the territory of Texas, and of the avowed purpose
of the Texans in seeking recognition of independence as an incident to the
incorporation of Texas in the Union, concluding thus:
" Prudence, therefore, seems to dictate that we should still stand aloof and
maintain our present attitude, if not until Mexico itself, or one of the great
foreign powers shall recognize the independence of the new government, at
least until the lapse of time or the course of events shall have proved beyond
cavil or dispute the ability of the people of that country to maintain their
separate sovereignty and to uphold the government constituted by them.
Neither of the contending parties can justly complain of this course. By
pursuing it we are but carrying out the long-established policy of our Govern
ment, a policy which has secured to us respect and influence abroad and
inspired confidence at home."
JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1898. 21 7
These are the words of the resolute and patriotic Jackson. They are evi
dence that the United States, in addition to the test imposed by public law as
the condition of the recognition of independence by a neutral State (to-wit,
that the revolted State shall " constitute in fact a body politic, having a govern
ment in substance as well as in name, possessed of the elements of stability,"
and forming de facto, " if left to itself, a State among the Nations, reasonably
capable of discharging the duties of a State "), has imposed for its own
governance in dealing with cases like these the further condition that recog
nition of independent statehood is not due to a revolted dependency until the
danger of its being again subjugated by the parent State has entirely passed
away.
This extreme test was, in fact, applied in the case of Texas. The Congress
to whom President Jackson referred the question as one " probably leading to
war," and, therefore, a proper subject for " a previous understanding with that
body by whom war can alone be declared and by whom all the provisions for
sustaining its perils must be furnished," left the matter of the recognition of
Texas to the discretion of the Executive, providing merely for the sending of
a diplomatic agent when the President should be satisfied that the Republic
of Texas had become " an independent State." It was so recognized by
President Van Buren, who commissioned a charge d'affaires March 7, 1837,
after Mexico had abandoned an attempt to reconquer the Texan territory, and
when there was at the time no bona fide contest going on between the.
insurgent province and its former sovereign.
I said in my message of December last, " It is to be seriously considered
whether the Cuban insurrection possesses beyond dispute the attributes of
statehood which alone can demand the recognition of belligerency in its favor."
The same requirement must certainly be no less seriously considered when the
graver issue of recognizing independence is in question, for no less positive
test can be applied to the greater act than to the lesser; while, on the other
hand, the influences and consequences of the struggle upon the internal policy
of the recognizing State, which form important factors when the recognition of
"belligerency is concerned, are secondary, if not rightly eliminable, factors
when the real question is whether the community claiming recognition is or is
not independent beyond peradventure.
Nor from the standpoint of expediency do I think it would be wise or
prudent for this Government to recognize at the present time the independence
of the so-called Cuban Republic. Such recognition is not necessary in order
to enable the United States to intervene and pacify the island. To commit
this country now to the recognition of any particular government in Cuba
might subject us to embarrassing conditions of international obligation toward
218 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
the organization so recognized. In case of intervention our conduct would be
subject to the approval or disapproval of such government. We would be
required to submit to its direction and to assume to it the mere relation of a
friendly ally.
When it shall appear hereafter that there is within the island a government
capable of performing the duties and discharging the functions of a separate
nation, and having, as a matter of fact, the proper forms and attributes of
nationality, such government can be promptly and readily recognized and the
relations and interests of the United States with such nation adjusted.
There remain the alternative forms of intervention to end the war, either
as an impartial neutral by imposing a rational compromise between the con
testants, or as the active ally of the one party or the other.
As to the first, it is not to be forgotten that during the last few months the
relation of the United States has virtually been one of friendly intervention in
many ways, each not of itself conclusive, but all tending to the exertion of a
potential influence toward an ultimate pacific result, just and honorable to all
interests concerned. The spirit of all our acts hitherto has been an earnest,
unselfish desire for peace and prosperity in Cuba, untarnished by differences
between us and Spain, and unstained by the blood of American citizens.
The forcible intervention of the United States as a neutral to stop the war,
according to the large dictates of humanity and following many historical
precedents where neighboring States have interfered to check the hopeless
sacrifices of life by internecine conflicts beyond their borders, is justifiable on
rational grounds. It involves, however, hostile constraint upon both the
parties to the contest as well to enforce a truce as to guide the eventual
settlement.
The grounds for such intervention may be briefly summarized as follows:
First. In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities, blood
shed, starvation, and horrible miseries now existing there, and which the
parties to the conflict are either unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It
is no answer to say this is all in another country, belonging to another nation,
and is, therefore, none of our business. It is specially our duty, for it is right
at our door.
Second. We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford them that protection and
indemnity for life and property which no government there can or will afford,
and to that end to terminate the conditions that deprive them of legal
protection.
Third. The right to intervene may be justified by the very serious injury to
the commerce, trade, and business of our people, and by the wanton destruc
tion of property and devastation of the island.
JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1898. 2IQ
Fourth, and which is of the utmost importance. The present condition of
affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace, and entails upon this
Government an enormous expense. With such a conflict waged for years in
an island so near us and with which our people have such trade and business
relations — • when the lives and liberty of our citizens are in constant danger
and their property destroyed and themselves ruined — where our trading
vessels are liable to seizure and are seized at our very door by war ships of a
foreign nation, the expeditions of filibustering that we are powerless to prevent
altogether, and the irritating questions and entanglements thus arising — all
these and others that I need not mention, with the resulting strained relations,
are a constant menace to our peace, and compel us to keep on a semi-war
footing with a nation with which we are at peace.
These elements of danger and disorder already pointed out have been strik
ingly illustrated by a tragic event which has deeply and justly moved the
American people. I have already transmitted to Congress the report of the
naval court of inquiry on the destruction of the battle ship " Maine " in the
harbor of Havana during the night of the I5th of February. The destruction
of that noble vessel has filled the national heart with inexpressible horror.
Two hundred and fifty-eight brave sailors and marines and two officers of our
Navy, reposing in the fancied security of a friendly harbor, have been hurled to
<ieath, grief and want brought to their homes and sorrow to the nation.
The naval court of inquiry, which, it is needless to say, commands the un
qualified confidence of the Government, was unanimous in its conclusion that
the destruction of the " Maine " was caused by an exterior explosion, that of
a submarine mine. It did not assume to place the responsibility. That
remains to be fixed.
i In any event the destruction of the " Maine," by whatever exterior cause,
is a patent and impressive proof of a state of things in Cuba that is intolerable.
That condition is thus shown to be such that the Spanish Government can not
assure safety and security to a vessel of the American Navy in the harbor of
Havana on a mission of peace, and rightfully there. )
Further referring in this connection to recent diplomatic correspondence, a
dispatch from our minister to Spain, of the 26th ultimo, contained the state
ment that the Spanish minister for foreign affairs assured him positively that
Spain will do all that the highest honor and justice require in the matter of
the " Maine." The reply above referred to of the 3ist ultimo also contained
an expression of the readiness of Spain to submit to an arbitration all the
differences which can arise in this matter, which is subsequently explained by
. the note of the Spanish minister at Washington of the loth instant, as follows:
"As to the question of fact which springs from the diversity of views be-
22O CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
tween the reports of the American and Spanish boards, Spain proposes that the
facts be ascertained by an impartial investigation by experts, whose decision
Spain accepts in advance."
To this I have made no reply.
President Grant, in 1875, after discussing the phases of the contest as it thert
appeared, and its hopeless and apparent indefinite prolongation, said:
" In such event, I am of opinion that other nations will be compelled to
assume the responsibility which devolves upon them, and to seriously consider
the only remaining measures possible — mediation and intervention. Owing,
perhaps, to the large expanse of water separating the island from the peninsula,.
* * * the contending parties appear to have within themselves no de
pository of common confidence, to suggest wisdom when passion and excite
ment have their sway, and to assume the part of peacemaker.
" In this view in the earlier days of the contest the good offices of the
United States as a mediator were tendered in good faith, without any selfish
purpose, in the interest of humanity and in sincere friendship for both parties,
but were at the time declined by Spain, with the declaration, nevertheless, that
at a future time they would be indispensable. No intimation has been received
that in the opinion of Spain that time has been reached. And yet the strife
continues with all its dread horrors and all its injuries to the interests of the
United States and of other nations.
" Each party seems quite capable of working great injury and damage to the
other, as well as to all the relations and interests dependent on the existence
of peace in the island; but they seem incapable of reaching any adjustment, and
both have thus far failed of achieving any success whereby one party shall
possess and control the island to the exclusion of the other. Under these
circumstances, the agency of others, either by medium or by intervention,
seems to be the only alternative which must sooner or later be invoked for the
termination of the strife."
In the last annual message of my immediate predecessor during the pending-
struggle, it was said:
" When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the insurrection has
become manifest, and it is demonstrated that her sovereignty is extinct in
Cuba for all purposes of its rightful existence, and when a hopeless struggle
for its re-establishment has degenerated into a strife which means nothing
more than the useless sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction of the
very subject-matter of the conflict, a situation will be presented in which our
obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher obliga
tions, which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge."
JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1898. 221
In my annual message to Congress, December last, speaking to this ques
tion, I said:
" The near future will demonstrate whether the indispensable condition of a
righteous peace, just alike to the Cubans and to Spain, as well as equitable to
all our interests so intimately involved in the welfare of Cuba, is likely to be
attained. If not, the exigency of further and other action by the United States
will remain to be taken. When that time comes that action will be determined
in the line of indisputable right and duty. It will be faced, without misgiving
or hesitancy, in the light of the obligation this Government owes to itself, to
the people who have confided to it the protection of their interests and honor,
and to humanity.
" Sure of the right, keeping free from all offense ourselves, actuated only by
upright and patriotic considerations, moved neither by passion nor selfishness,
the Government will continue its watchful care over the rights and property
of American citizens and will abate none of its efforts to bring about by
peaceful agencies a peace which shall be honorable and enduring. If it shall
hereafter appear to be a duty imposed by our obligations to ourselves, to
civilization and humanity to intervene with force, it shall be without fault on
our part and only because the necessity for such action will be so clear as to
command the support and approval of the civilized world."
The long trial has proved that the object for which Spain has waged the
war can not be attained. The fire of insurrection may flame or may smolder
with varying seasons, but it has not been and it is plain that it can not be
extinguished by present methods. The only hope of relief and repose from a
condition which can no longer be endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba.
In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered
American interests which give us the right and the duty to speak and to act,
the war in Cuba must stop.
In view of these facts and of these considerations, I ask the Congress to
authorize and empower the President to take measures to secure a full and
final termination of hostilities between the Government of Spain and the people
of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable government,
capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, in
suring peace and tranquillity and the security of its citizens as well as our own,
and to use the military and naval forces of the United States as may be
necessary for these purposes.
And in the interest of humanity and to aid in preserving the lives of the
starving people of the island I recommend that the distribution of food and
supplies be continued, and that an appropriation be made out of the public
Treasury to supplement the charity of our citizens.
222 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
The issue is now with the Congress. It is a solemn responsibility. I have
exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at
our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the
Constitution and the law, I await your action.
Yesterday, and since the preparation of the foregoing message, official in
formation was received by me that the latest decree of the Queen Regent of
Spain directs General Blanco, in order to prepare and facilitate peace, to
proclaim a suspension of hostilities, the duration and details of which have
not yet been communicated to me.
This fact with every other pertinent consideration will, I am sure, have
your just and careful attention in the solemn deliberations upon which you are
about to enter. If this measure attains a successful result, then our aspirations
as a Christian, peace-loving people will be realized. If it fails, it will be only
another justification for our contemplated action.
WILLIAM McKINLEYv
EXECUTIVE MANSION, April n, 1898.
Consul-General Lee and other Americans arrived about this time
from Havana. General Lee expressed himself as positive that the
secret of the " Maine " disaster was known to some of the Spanish
officials at Cuba. His disclosures added somewhat to the excitement
already aroused. On the I3th, amid a scene of wild disorder, the
House passed a resolution recognizing the independence of Cuba
and directing the President to intervene. It was debated for two
days by the Senate and passed with amendments; went to a confer
ence committee, where the amendment recognizing the existing Re
publican government of Cuba was stricken out, was thus accepted by
the Senate, passed on April i9th and was signed by the President on
the 2Oth. The bill, as it finally became law, reads as follows:
[PUBLIC RESOLUTION — No. 21.]
Joint Resolution For the recognition of the independence of the people of
Cuba, demanding that the Government of Spain relinquish its authority and
government in the island of Cuba, and to withdraw its land and naval forces
from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United States
to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry these resolutions
into effect.
Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three
years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral
sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian
JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1898. 223
civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States
battle ship, with two hundred and sixty-six of its officers and crew, while on a
friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and can not longer be endured, as has
been set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress
of April eleventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, upon which the action
of Congress was invited: Therefore,
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, First. That the people of the island of Cuba are.
and of right ought to be, free and independent.
Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Govern
ment of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain
at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba and
withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.
Third. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed
and empowered to use the entire land and naval force of the United States, and
to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several
States, to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.
Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention
to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the
pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished,
to leave the government and control of the island to its people.
Approved, April 20, 1898.
On the same day the Spanish Minister at Washington received his
passports. In Madrid at a meeting of the Cortes, the Queen Regent
from the throne, read a speech appealing to the loyalty and devotion
of the people of Spain, and speaking of the injustice of the American
Government. She was received with the wildest enthusiasm. On
the following day, before Minister Woodford could deliver the ulti
matum of the United States, he was informed by the Spanish Govern
ment that diplomatic relations with the United States were at an end.
He left Madrid for Paris, being followed to the frontiers of Spain
by crowds of rioters from whom he was protected by a strong Spanish
guard; American affairs in Madrid were entrusted to the British
embassy.
The fleet at Key West, under command of Admiral Sampson, was
ordered to blockade Havana. The Asiatic squadron, under Commo
dore Dewey, was ordered to blockade the Philippine Islands. Ad
miral Sicard was detained at Washington as adviser to the Secretary of
the Navy. Captain Sigsbee, late in command of the " Maine," was
224 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
given command of the " St. Paul," an auxiliary cruiser. Commodore
Schley was in command of the fleet at Hampton Roads; and a squad
ron for the protection of the American coast was placed under the
command of Admiral Howard. Meanwhile the Army was rapidly
mobilizing. Chickamauga Park was made a general rendezvous for
troops, which were also being hurried to New Orleans, Key West,
Tampa and other points. The Twenty-fifth United States Infantry
reached Chickamauga and camped there April I5th.
At this time, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Hon. Theodore
Roosevelt, resigned to accept active service in the Army and enlisted
as an officer of the First Volunteer Cavalry, generally known of as
" Roosevelt's Rough Riders " under the command of Colonel Leonard
Wood.
April 22d, a bill was passed by both Houses, authorizing the call
for volunteers, and on the following day, the President issued a call tor
125,000 men from the different States. The call was promptly re
sponded to and recruits came pouring in from the different States.
The act authorizing this call is as follows:
[PUBLIC — No. 67.]
An Act To provide for temporarily increasing the military establishment of
the United States in time of war, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That all able-bodied male citizens of the United
States, and persons of foreign birth who shall have declared their intention
to become citizens of the United States under and in pursuance of the laws
thereof, between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years, are hereby declared
to constitute the national forces, and, with such exceptions and under such
conditions as may be prescribed by law, shall be liable to perform military duty
in the service of the United States.
§ 2. That the organized and active land forces of the United States shall
consist of the Army of the United States and of the militia of the several
States when called into the service of the United States: Provided, That in
time of war the Army shall consist of two branches which shall be designated,
respectively, as the Regular Army and the Volunteer Army of the United
States.
§ 3. That the Regular Army is the permanent military establishment, which
is maintained both in peace and war according to law.
§ 4. That the Volunteer Army shall be maintained only during the existence
of war, or while war is imminent, and shall be raised and organized, as in this
JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1898. 22/
act provided, only after Congress has or shall have authorized the President
to raise such a force or to call into the actual service of the United States the
militia of the several States: Provided, That all enlistments for the Volunteer
Army shall be for a term of two years, unless sooner terminated, and that all
officers and men composing said army shall be discharged from the service of
the United States when the purposes for which they were called into service
shall have been accomplished, or on the conclusion of hostilities.
§ 5. That when it becomes necessary to raise a volunteer army the President
shall issue his proclamation stating the number of men desired, within such
limits as may be fixed by law, and the Secretary of War shall prescribe such
rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the terms of this act, as may in
his judgment be necessary for the purpose of examining, organizing, and
receiving into service the men called for: Provided, That all men received into
service in the Volunteer Army shall, as far as practicable, be taken from the
several States and Territories and the District of Columbia and the Indian
Territory in proportion to their population. And any company, troop,
battalion or regiment from the Indian Territory shall be formed and organized
under such rules and regulations as shall be prescribed by the Secretary of
War.
§ 6. That the Volunteer Army and the militia of the States when called into
the service of the United States shall be organized under, and shall be subject
to, the laws, orders, and regulations governing the Regular Army: Provided,
That each regiment of the Volunteer Army shall have one surgeon, two
assistant surgeons, and one chaplain, and that all the regimental and company
officers shall be appointed by the governors of the States in which their
respective organizations are raised: Provided further, That when the members
of any company, troop, battery, battalion or regiment of the organized militia
of any State shall enlist in the Volunteer Army in a body, as such company,
troop, battery, battalion or regiment, the regimental, company, troop, battery
and battalion officers in service with the militia organization thus enlisting may
be appointed by the governors of the States and Territories, and shall, when
so appointed, be officers of corresponding grades in the same organization
when it shall have been received into the service of the United States as a part
of the Volunteer Army: Provided further, That the President may .authorize
the Secretary of War to organize companies, troops, battalions, or regiments,
possessing special qualifications, from the nation at large not to exceed three
thousand men, under such rules and regulations, including the appointment of
the officers thereof, as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War.
§ 7. That all organizations of the Volunteer Army shall be so recruited from
time to time as to maintain them as near to their maximum strength as the
228 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
President may deem necessary, and no new organization shall be accepted into
service from any State unless the organizations already in service from such
State are as near to their maximum strength of officers and enlisted men as the
President may deem necessary.
§ 8. That all returns and muster-rolls of organizations of the Volunteer
Army and of militia organizations while in the service of the United States
shall be rendered to the adjutant-general of the Army, and upon the disband-
ment of such organizations the records pertaining to them shall be trans
ferred to and filed in the record and pension office of the War Department.
And regimental and other medical officers serving with volunteer troops in the
field or elsewhere shall keep a daily record of all soldiers reported sick, or
waunded as shown by the morning calls or reports, and shall deposit such
reports with other reports provided for in this section with the record and
pension office as provided herein, for other reports, returns and muster-rolls.
§ 9. That in time of war, or when war is imminent, the troops in the service
of the United States, whether belonging to the Regular or Volunteer Army
or to the militia, shall be organized, as far as practicable, into divisions of
three brigades, each brigade to be composed of three or more regiments; and
whenever three or more divisions are assembled in the same army the President
is authorized to organize them into army corps, each corps to consist of not
more than three divisions.
§ 10. That the staff of the commander of an army corps shall consist of one
assistant adjutant-general, one chief engineer, one inspector-general, one chief
quartermaster, one chief commissary of subsistence, one judge-advocate, and
one chief surgeon, who shall have, respectively, the rank of lieutenant-colonel;
one assistant adjutant-general, who shall have the rank of captain, and the
aids-de-camp authorized by law. The staff of the commander of a division
shall consist of one assistant adjutant-general, one engineer officer, one in
spector-general, one chief quartermaster, one chief commissary of subsistence,
and one chief surgeon, who shall have, respectively, the rank of major, and the
aids-de-camp authorized by law. The staff of the commander of a brigade
shall consist of one assistant adjutant-general, one assistant quartermaster, and
one commissary of subsistence, each with the rank of captain, one surgeon, and
the aids-de-camp authorized by law. The staff officers herein authorized for
the corps, division, and brigade commanders may be appointed by the Presi
dent, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, as officers of the
Volunteer Army, or may be assigned by him, in his discretion, from officers
of the Regular Army or the Volunteer Army, or of the militia in the service of
the United States: Provided, That when relieved from such staff service said
appointments or assignments shall terminate.
JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1898. 22Q
§ ii. That the President is hereby authorized to appoint in the Volunteer
Army, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, not exceeding one
major-general for each organized army corps and division, and one brigadier-
general for each brigade, and any officer so selected and appointed from the
Regular Army shaii be entitled to retain his rank therein: Provided, That
each general officer of the Volunteer Army shall be entitled to the number of
aids-de-camp authorized for an officer of like grade in the Regular Army.
§ 12. That all officers and enlisted men of the Volunteer Army, and of the
militia of the States when in the service of the United States, shall be in all
respects on the same footing as to pay, allowances, and pensions as that of
officers and enlisted men of corresponding grades in the Regular Army.
§ 13. That the governor of any State or Territory may, with the consent of
the President, appoint officers of the Regular Army in the grades of field
officers in organizations of the Volunteer Army, and officers thus appointed
shall be entitled to retain their rank in the Regular Army: Provided, That
not more than one officer of the Regular Army shall hold a commission in any
one regiment of the Volunteer Army at the same time.
§ 14. That the general commanding a separate department or a detached
army is authorized to appoint from time to time military boards of not less
than three nor more than five volunteer officers of the Volunteer Army to
examine into the capacity, qualifications, conduct, and efficiency of any com
missioned officer of said army within his command: Provided, That each mem
ber of the board shall be superior in rank to the officer whose qualifications
are to be inquired into: And provided further, That if the report of such a
board is adverse to the continuance of any officer, and the report be approved
by the President, such officer shall be discharged from service in the Volunteer
Army, at the discretion of the President, with one month's pay and allowances.
§ 15. That all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions hereof
be, and the same are hereby, repealed.
Approved, April 22, 1898.
On the same day Congress passed a
Joint Resolution To prohibit the export of coal or other material used in
war from any seaport of the United States.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That the President is hereby authorized, in his
discretion, and with such limitations and exceptions as shall seem to him
expedient, to prohibit the export of coal or other material used in war from
any seaport of the United States until otherwise ordered by the President or
by Congress.
Approved, April 22, 1898.
230 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
This was followed by action upon the part of Great Britain de
claring coal contraband of war.
The following is the important paragraph in the Proclamation of
Neutrality published by Great Britain, on April 26, 1898, making coal
contraband of war:
Rule 3. — No ship of war of either belligerent shall hereafter be permitted,
while in any such port, roadstead, or waters subject to the territorial jurisdiction
of Her Majesty, to take in any supplies, except provisions and such other
things as may be requisite for the subsistence of her crew, and except so much
coal only as may be sufficient to carry such vessel to the nearest port of her
own country, or to some nearer destination, and no coal shall again be supplied
to any such ship of war in the same or any other port, roadstead, or waters
subject to the territorial jurisdiction of Her Majesty, without special permis
sion, until after the expiration of three months from the time when such coal
may have been last supplied to her within British waters as aforesaid. «
War was declared by Spain April 24th,
PROCLAMATION OF WAR BY SPAIN.
FOREIGN OFFICE, May 3, 1898.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has received, through Her
Majesty's embassy at Madrid, the following translation of a decree issued by
the Spanish Government on the 23d of April, 1898:
ROYAL DECREE.
In accordance with the advice of my Council of Ministers; in the name of
my son, King Alfonso XIII, and as Queen-Regent of the Kingdom, I decree
as follows:
ARTICLE I. The state of war existing between Spain and the United States
terminates the treaty of peace and friendship of the 27th October, 1795, the
protocol of the I2th January, 1877, and all other agreements, compacts, and
conventions that have been in force up to the present between the two countries.
ART. II. A term of five days from the date of the publication of the present
royal decree in the Madrid Gazette is allowed to all United States ships
anchored in Spanish ports, during which they are at liberty to depart.
ART. III. Notwithstanding that Spain is not bound by the declaration signed
in Paris on the i6th April, 1856, as she expressly stated her wish not to adhere
to it, my Government, guided by the principles of international law, intends
JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1895. 23!
to observe and hereby orders that the following regulations for maritime law
be observed:
(a) A neutral flag covers the enemy's goods, except contraband of war.
(6) Neutral goods, except contraband of war, are not liable to confiscation
under the enemy's flag.
(c) A blockade to be binding must be effective; that is to say, maintained
with a sufficient force to actually prevent access to the enemy's ccast.
ART. IV. The Spanish Government, while maintaining their right to issue
letters of marque, which they expressly reserved in their note of the i6th May,
1857, in reply to the request of France for the adhesion of Spain to the
declaration of Paris relative to maritime law, will organize for the present a
service of " auxiliary cruisers of the navy," composed of ships of the Spanish
mercantile navy, which will co-operate with the latter for the purposes of
cruising, and which will be subject to the statutes and jurisdiction of the navy.
ART. V. In order to capture the enemy's ships, to confiscate the enemy's
merchandise under their own flag, and contraband of war under any flag, the
royal navy, auxiliary cruisers, and privateers, if and when the latter are author
ized, will exercise the right of visit on the high seas and in the territorial
waters of the enemy, in accordance with international law and any regulations
which may be published for the purpose.
ART. VI. Under the denomination contraband of war, the following articles
are included:
Cannons, machine guns, mortars, guns, all kinds of arms and firearms, bul
lets, bombs, grenades, fuses, cartridges, matches, powder, sulphur, saltpeter,
dynamite and every kind of explosive, articles of equipment like uniforms,
straps, saddles and artillery and cavalry harness, engines for ships and their
accessories, shafts, screws, boilers and other articles used in the construction,
repair, and arming of war ships, and in general all warlike instruments, utensils,
tools, and other articles, and whatever may hereafter be determined to be
contraband.
ART. VII. Captains, commanders, and officers of non-American vessels or of
vessels manned as to one-third by other than American citizens, captured while
committing acts of war against Spain, will be treated as pirates, with all the
rigor of the law, although provided with a license issued by the Republic of
the United States.
ART. VIII. The Minister of State and the Minister of Marine are charged 1o
see the fulfillment of the present royal decree and to give the orders necessary
for its execution.
MARIA CRISTINA.
MADRID, April 23, 1898.
232 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
The United States declared war on the 25th, in the following words:
An Act Declaring that war exists between the United States of America and
the Kingdom of Spain.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, First. That war be, and the same is hereby,
declared to exist, and that war has existed since the twenty-first day of April,
anno Domini eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, including said day, between
the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain.
Second. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, di
rected and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United
States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the
several States, to such extent as may be necessary to carry this act into effect.
Approved, April 2$, 1898.
The European and South American powers proclaimed neutrality.
The Spanish squadron sailed from Cape Verde Islands; its destina
tion was unknown, and caused much anxiety, but it was finally con
jectured that it had sailed directly west to the Caribbean Sea.
April 25th, the same day that war was declared, Secretary Sher
man resigned and was succeeded by William R. Day, as Secretary
of State. The following day, the President declared that he would
adhere to the anti-privateering agreement of the Declaration of Paris.
The Postmaster-General ordered no more mails sent to Spain.
The following act of Congress approved April 26th, authorized
an increase in the enlisted strength of the army to 62,597, more than
doubling its strength upon the peace basis :
[PUBLIC — No. 70.]
An Act For the better organization of the line of the Army of the United
States.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That hereafter the peace organization of each
regiment of infantry now in service shall embrace one colonel, one lieutenant-
colonel, two majors, ten captains, twelve first lieutenants, ten second lieu
tenants, one sergeant-major, one quartermaster-sergeant, one chief musician,
two principal musicians, two battalions of four companies each, and two
skeleton or unmanned companies; the organized companies to be constituted
as now authorized by law: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be
JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1898. 233
construed as abolishing the office of chaplain in each regiment of colored
troops: And provided further, That the vacancies in the grade of major created
by this section shall be filled by promotion according to seniority in the
infantry arm.
§ 2. That upon a declaration of war by Congress, or a declaration by Congress
that war exists, the President, in his discretion, may establish a third battalion
for each infantry regiment, consisting of four companies, to- be supplied by
manning the two skeleton companies and by organizing two additional com
panies. The vacancies of commissioned officers in the additional companies
shall be filled by promotions by seniority in the infantry arm, and by appoint
ments in accordance with existing law; and hereafter all vacancies occurring
in the cavalry, artillery, and infantry above the grade of second lieutenant shall,
subject to the examination now required by law, be filled by promotion
according to seniority from the next lower grade in each arm.
§ 3. That upon a declaration of war by Congress, or a declaration of Con
gress that war exists, the enlisted strength of a company, troop, and battery,
respectively, may, in the discretion of the President, be increased to comprise
not exceeding:
For each company of infantry: One first sergeant, one quartermaster-
sergeant, four sergeants, twelve corporals, two musicians, one artificer, one
wagoner, and eighty-four privates; total enlisted, one hundred and six:
Provided, That in the event of a call by the President for either volunteers or
the militia of the country the President is authorized to accept the quotas of
troops of the various States and Territories, including the District of Columbia
and Indian Territory, as organized under the laws of the States and Territories,
including the District of Columbia, in companies, troops, and batteries, each to
contain so far as practicable the number of enlisted men authorized in this
act for each arm of the service, and battalions of not less than three such
companies and regiments of not less than ten nor more than twelve such
companies. But this proviso shall apply to companies, troops, batteries, bat
talions, and regimental organizations and none other: Provided further, That
in volunteer organizations received into the service under this act and existing
laws, one hospital steward shall be authorized for each battalion.
For each troop of cavalry: One first sergeant, one quartermaster-sergeant,
six sergeants, eight corporals, two farriers and blacksmiths, two trumpeters,
one saddler, one wagoner, seventy-eight privates; total enlisted, one hundred.
For each battery of heavy artillery: One first sergeant, twenty-two sergeants,
ten corporals, two musicians, two artificers, one wagoner, one hundred and
sixty-two privates; total enlisted, two hundred.
For each battery of field artillery: One first sergeant, one quartermaster-
234 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
sergeant, one veterinary sergeant, six sergeants, fifteen corporals, two farriers,
two artificers, one saddler, two musicians, one wagoner, one hundred and
forty-one privates; total enlisted, one hundred and seventy-three.
For each company of engineers: One first sergeant, ten sergeants, ten
corporals, two musicians, sixty-four first-class privates, sixty-three second-
class privates; total enlisted, one hundred and fifty. In time of war there shall
be added to the Signal Corps of the Army ten corporals, one hundred first-
class privates, and forty second-class privates, who shall have the pay and
allowances of engineer troops of the same grade.
The quartermaster and veterinary sergeants provided for in this section shall
have the pay and allowances of sergeants of their respective arms.
§ 4. That when recruited to their war strength the President may add one
second lieutenant to each battery of artillery; such offices to be filled by
appointments, as prescribed by existing law.
§ 5. That in time of war the President shall cause the batteries of artillery
authorized by law to be organized as heavy or field artillery, as in his judg
ment the exigencies of the service may require.
§ 6. That in time of war the pay proper of enlisted men shall be increased
twenty per centum over and above the rates of pay as fixed by law: Provided,
That in war time no additional increased compensation shall be aHowed to
soldiers performing what is known as extra or special duty: Provided further,
That any soldier who deserts shall, besides incurring the penalties now attach
ing to the crime of desertion, forfeit all right to pension which he might other
wise have acquired.
§ 7. That in time of war every officer serving with troops operating against
an enemy who shall exercise, under assignment in orders issued by competent
authority, a command above that pertaining to his grade, shall be entitled to
receive the pay and allowances of the grade appropriate to the command so
exercised: Provided, That a rate of pay exceeding that of a brigadier-general
shall not be paid in any case by reason of such assignment: Provided further,
That at the end of any war in which the United States may become involved
the Army shall be reduced to a peace basis by the transfer in the same arm of
the service or absorption by promotion or honorable discharge under such
regulations as the Secretary of War may establish of supernumerary commis
sioned officers and the honorable discharge or transfer of supernumerary
enlisted men; and nothing contained in this act shall be construed as author
izing a permanent increase of the commissioned or enlisted force of the
Regular Army beyond that now provided by the law in force prior to the
passage of this act, except as to the increase of twenty-five majors provided
for in section one hereof.
Approved, April 26, 1898.
JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1898.
235
On the 27th, Admiral Sampson's blockading squadron silenced the
works at Matanzas, Cuba; and Commodore Dewey's squadron sailed
from Mirs' Bay to Manila. The steamer " Paris," to be employed
as an auxiliary cruiser, reached New York safely, and the United
States battle ship " Oregon," which had been hastily recalled from
the Pacific coast, was reported at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on the 3<Dth of
April.
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY.
CHAPTER IX.
On the ist day of May, the whole country was electrified by the
glorious news of Dewey's victory at Manila. The "Asiatic " squadron,
under the command of Admiral, then Commodore, Dewey, consisted
of the cruisers " Olympia," " Raleigh," " Boston," " Charleston," and
"Baltimore;" gunboats "Concord," " Monocacy," and "Petrel;"
the supply vessel "Zafiro;" colliers "Brutus," " Nashan," and
"Nero;" monitors " Monadnock " and "Monterey;" transports
" City of Pekin " and " Sydney," and the revenue cutter " McCul-
lough." With these vessels he entered Manila Bay and engaged a
Spanish fleet stationed there, destroying or capturing the entire
squadron under Admiral Montojo, consisting of the cruisers " Reina
Christina/' " Castillo," " Don Antonio," " Ulloa," " Isla de Cuba,"
" Isla de Luzon," the gunboats " General Lezo," " Duero," " Correo,"
" Velasco," " Mindano," and one transport, with a loss to the American
fleet of seven wounded. The loss on the side of the Spaniards was
300 killed and more than twice that number wounded.
Commodore Dewey was at Hong Kong when war was declared.
Forced to leave British waters, with no coaling station nearer than
Honolulu, there was but one course for him to pursue, that is to say,
to make himself master of Manila by the defeat of the Spanish
squadron. Having a good insight into Spanish character, and a
thorough knowledge of the disposition of the enemy's forces, he left
Mirs Bay with his program fully prepared, and he carried it through
successfully.
The bay of Manila is one of the largest and deepest harbors in the
world, having an area of 125 miles, with an entrance twelve miles
wide, defended by the fortified islands Corregidor and Caballos.
Passing these fortifications during the night of Saturday, April 3oth,
Dewey's fleet coolly sailed into the bay and at 5 o'clock Sunday
morning, the flagship " Olympia " was five miles from Manila, and as
soon as she was discovered, the shore batteries and the long-range
guns of the ships opened on the Americans and continued to bombard
the fleet for two hours, but without effect. The flagship, followed by
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 237
the " Baltimore," the " Raleigh," the " Petrel," the " Concord," and
the " Boston," steamed directly for Cavite, and when about three
miles from that fortress, opened fire on the " Reina Christina," the
flagship of the Spanish Admiral Montojo. Filing past the enemy five
times and countermarching in a circle with gradually decreasing
range, Dewey practically annihilated the Spanish fleet and fortifica
tions in about two hours. Retiring to give his men a little needed
rest and food, he promptly returned to the attack and finished his
work.
The Spaniards fought with desperate bravery. When his flagship
was destroyed, the Spanish admiral, taking his flag in an open boat,
was transferred to the " Isla de Cuba." Cadarso, captain of the vessel,
was mortally wounded and, refusing to leave, remained with his men
and went down with his ship. Their desperate valor availed nothing,
for their tactics and marksmanship were bad, while those of the
Americans were superb.
The temporary withdrawal of the American fleet was construed by
the Spaniards as a retreat. They could not imagine that a battle could
be waged with such enormous loss on one side and so few casualties
on the other. The news first cabled to Spain was that the American
fleet had been successfully repulsed.
Before a definite account of the action was received in this country,
Commodore Dewey had cut the cable to prevent communication with
Spain; but a few days later, full reports were received from the
despatch boat " McCulloch," by way of Hong Kong.
The two brief messages sent by Dewey form the most concise and
comprehensive report that could well be made of an achievement
which has never been equalled in daring conception and magnificent
execution.
The first message, dated Manila, May 1st, but sent only when the
second was forwarded, was as follows:
Squadron arrived at Manila at daybreak this morning. Immediately engaged
the enemy and destroyed the following Spanish vessels: " Reina Christina,"
" Castilla," " Don Antonio," "Isla de Ulloa," "Isla de Luzon," " Isla de Cuba,"
" General Lezo," " Marquis del Duero," " Correo," " Velasco," " Isla de Min
danao," a transport and a water battery at Cavite. The squadron is uninjured;
and only a few men. are slightly wounded. Only means of telegraphing is the
American consul at Hong Kong. I shall communicate with him.
238 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
The second, dated at Cavite, May 4th, completed his record of the
action :
I have taken possession of the naval station at Cavite and destroyed its
fortifications. Have destroyed fortifications at the bay entrance, paroling the
garrison. I control the bay completely, and can take the city at any time.
The squadron is in excellent health and spirits. The Spanish loss not fully
known, but very heavy; 150 killed, including the captain of the " Reina
Christina." I am assisting in protecting the Spanish sick and wounded; 250
sick and wounded in hospital within our lines. Much excitement at Manila.
Will protect foreign residents.
Lieutenant L. J. Stickney, a former naval officer who was on the
bridge of the " Olympia," as a volunteer aide to Commodore Dewey,
in writing of the battle, thus describes the combat after the first fire
of the Americans:
The Spaniards seemed encouraged to fire faster, knowing exactly our
distance, while we had to guess theirs. Their ships and shore guns were
making things hot for us. The piercing scream of shot was varied often by
the bursting of time fuse shells, fragments of which would lash the water like
shrapnel or cut our hull and rigging. One large shell that was coming
straight at the " Olympia's " forward bridge fortunately fell within less than
100 feet. One fragment cut the rigging; another struck the bridge gratings in
line with it; a third passed under Commodore Dewey and gouged a hole in
the deck. Incidents like these were plentiful.
Our men naturally chafed at being exposed without returning fire from all
our guns, but laughed at danger and chatted good-humoredly. A few nervous
fellows could not help dodging, mechanically, when shells would burs' right
over them, or close aboard, or would strike the water, or pass overhead with
the peculiar spluttering roar made by a tumbling rifled projectile.
Still the flagship steered for the center of the Spanish line, and, as our
other ships were astern, the " Olympia " received most of the Spaniards'
attention.
Owing to our deep draught, Commodore Dewey felt constrained to change
his course at a distance of 4,000 yards and run parallel to the Spanish column.
' Open with all guns,' he ordered, and the ship brought her port broadside
bearing. The roar of all the flagship's five-inch rapid-firers was followed by
the deep diapason of her turret eight-inchers. Soon our other vessels were
equally hard at work, and we could see that our shells were making Cavite
harbor hotter for the Spaniards than they had made the approach for us.
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 239
Protected by their shore batteries and made safe from close attack by
shallow water, the Spaniards were in a strong position. They put up a
gallant fight.
One shot struck the " Baltimore " and passed clean through her, fortunately
hitting no one. Another ripped the upper main deck, disabled a six-inch gun.
and exploded a box of three-pounder ammunition, wounding eight men. The
" Olympia " was struck abreast the gun in the wardroom by a shell, which
burst outside, doing little damage. The signal halyards were cut from the
officer's hand on the after bridge. A sailor climbed up in the rain of shot and
mended the line.
A shell entered the " Boston's " port quarter and burst in Ensign Dodridge's
stateroom, starting a hot fire, and fire was also caused by a shell which burst in
the port hammock netting. Both these fires were quickly put out. Another
shell passed through the " Boston's " foremast just in front of Captain Wildes,
on the bridge.
After having made four runs along the Spanish line, finding the chart in
correct, Lieutenant Calkins, the " Olympia's " navigator, told the commodore
he believed he could take the ship nearer the enemy, with lead going to watch
the depth of water. The flagship started over the course for the fifth time,
running within 2,000 yards of the enemy, followed by all the American vessels,
and, as even the six-pounder guns were effective at such short range, the
storm of shot and shell launched against the Spaniard was destructive beyond
description.
Following are the official reports of the captains of the various
American warships which took part in the battle of Manila bay, and
also an English translation of the report of Admiral Montojo, the
Spanish commander-in-chief of the station and squadron of the
Philippines:
U. S. FLAGSHIP " OLYMPIA,"
Off MANILA, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, May 3, 1898.
SIR. — I have the honor to make the following report of this ship's engage
ment with the enemy on May ist:
On April 3oth we stood down for the entrance to Manila bay. At 9:42 p. M.
the crew were called to general quarters (the ship having been previously
cleared for action) and remained by their guns, ready to return the fire of the
batteries if called upon.
At about 11:30 P. M. we passed through Boca Grande entrance of Manila
bay. The lights on Corregidor and Caballo islands and on San Nicolas banks
Vyere extinguished.
240 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
After this ship had passed in, the battery on the southern shore of entrance
opened fire at the ships astern, and the " McCulloch " and the) " Boston "
returned the fire.
At 4 A. M. of May 1st coffee was served out to officers and men. At day
break sighted shipping at Manila. Shifted course to southward and stood for
Cavite. At 5:06 two submarine mines were exploded near, Cavite bearing
south-southeast, distant four miles. At 5:15 battery on Shangly Point opened
fire, but the shell fell short. Other shells passed over us, ranging seven miles.
At 5:41 A. M. we opened fire on Spanish ships with forward eight-inch guns,
which were soon followed by the five-inch battery. A rapid fire was kept up
until the close of the action.
The range varied from 5,600 to 2,000 yards.
A torpedo boat ran out and headed for this ship, but was finally driven back
by our secondary battery. She came out a second time and was again re
pulsed. This time she had to be beached, as several shots had hit her.
Batteries from Manila fired occasional shots at the ships during the action,
but did no damage.
At 6:20 turned to starboard and headed back in front of the Spanish line.
The " Olympia " led the column three times to the westward and twice to the
eastward in front of the Spanish ships and shore batteries. On one occasion
the Spanish flagship " Reina Cristina " was hit by an eight-inch shell from
our forward turret and raked fore and aft. At 7:35 ceased firing and stood
out into Manila bay.
The men went to breakfast.
Many of the Spanish ships were seen to be on fire, and when we returned
at 11:16 to complete the destruction of the Spanish fleet only one, the "Don
Antonio de Ulloa," and the shore batteries, returned our fire. The former was
sunk and the latter were silenced.
At 12:40 P. M. stood back to Manila bay and anchored.
Besides making the ordinary preparations of clearing ship for action, the
heavy sheet chains were faked up and down over a buffer of awnings against
the sides in wake of the five-inch ammunition hoists and afforded a stanch
protection, while iron and canvas barricades were placed in various places to
cover gun's crews and strengthen moderate defenses.
The vessel was struck or slightly hulled as follows:
(1) Plate indented one and one-half inches starboard side of superstructure
just forward of second five-inch sponson.
(2) Three planks torn up slightly in wake of forward turret on starboard
side of forecastle.
(3) Port after shrouds of fore and main rigging.
(4) Strongback of gig's davits hit and slightly damaged.
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 24!
(5) Hole in frame of ship between frames 65 and 66 on starboard side below
maindeck rail; made by a six-pounder.
(6) Lashing of port whaleboat davit carried away by shot.
(7) One of the rail stanchions carried away outside of port gangway.
(8) Hull of ship indented on starboard side one foot below main-deck rail
and three feet abaft No. 4 coal port.
The forward eight-inch guns fired twenty-three shells. The ammunition hoist
was temporarily out of commission on account of the blowing of the fuse.
The right gun worked well with the electrical batteries. Battery of left gun
failed to explode the primer after the first shot; also resistance lamp in dynamo
circuit broken. Used percussion primers in this gun with good results after
the first shot.
The after turret fired thirteen shells. Had three misfires with battery of
right gun and two with dynamo circuit, as fuses blew out. In renewing fuses
they were immediately blown out; so shifted to percussion primers with good
results. In left gun one shell jammed, after which used half-full and half-
reduced charge, which fired it. Battery of this gun gave good results. One
primer failed to check gas.
The smoke from the five-inch battery and from the forward eight-inch guns
gave considerable trouble, and in both turrets the object glass of the telescopic
sights became covered with a deposit from the powder and had to be wiped
off frequently. These are, nevertheless, considered good sights for heavy guns;
but it is recommended that bar sights be installed in case of emergency, as
there is no provision for sighting other than with the telescopes.
The batteries for the five-inch guns found to be unreliable. Used dynamo
circuit on three guns with good results. Ammunition poor. Many shell be
came detached from the cases on loading and had to be rammed out from the
muzzle. Several cases jammed in loading and in extracting. Guns and gun
mounts worked well. Fired about 281 five-inch shell.
The six-pounder battery worked to perfection, firing 1,000 rounds. Fired
360 rounds of one-pounder and 1,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition.
From 9:42 P. M. of April 30th till 12:40 p. M., May ist, two divisions of the
engineer's force worked the boilers and engines, keeping up steam and working
well, notwithstanding the heat of the fire and engine rooms. The third division
worked at their stations in the powder division.
The ship needs no immediate repairs and is in excellent condition to engage
the enemy at any time.
There were no casualties nor wounded on this ship.
Where every officer and man did his whole duty there is only room for
general praise. Pay Inspector D. A. Smith, Fleet Pay Clerk Wm. J. Right-
mire, and Pay Clerk W. M. Long, all volunteered for and performed active
242 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
service not required by their stations. Ensign H. H. Caldwell, secretary to
the commander-in-chief, volunteered for fighting duty and was assigned to
the command of a subdivision of the five-inch battery. Mr. J. L. Stickney,
correspondent of the New York Herald (and formerly a naval officer of ex
ceptional ability), served as a volunteer aid to the commander-in-chief and
rendered invaluable assistance in carrying messages and in keeping an accu
rate account of the battle. One six-pounder was manned by a crew of marines,
and two relief crews for the five-inch guns and two for the six-pounders acted
as sharpshooters under Capt. W. Biddle, U. S. M. C.
The range was obtained by cross bearings from the standard compass and
the distance taken from the chart.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
CH. V. GRIDLEY,
Captain U. S. N., Commanding U. S. Flagship " Olympia."
The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, Asiatic Station.
U. S. " RALEIGH,"
Off MANILA, LUZON, May 4, 1898.
SIR. — I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of
this vessel of your squadron during the engagement with the Spanish squadron
and shore batteries at Cavite, near Manila, on the morning of May i, 1898:
At about 12:10 A. M. of May ist, when passing in column, natural order, abreast
of El Fraile island, at the entrance to the bay, I observed a flash, as of a signal
thereon, and at about 12:15 A. M. a shot was fired from El Fraile, passing, as
I think, diagonally between the " Petrel " and this vessel. A shot was fired
in return, but without effect, by the starboard after five-inch gun of this vessel.
At 5 A. M., when the squadron was nearly abreast the city of Manila and the
flagship was turning to pass down toward Cavite, the Lunetta battery, of
apparently heavy guns, at Manila, opened fire and continued so long as the
squadron was in action. This vessel shifted position from starboard to port
(inside) quarter of the " Baltimore," and held that position until retired at
7:35 A. M. At a few minutes after 5 A. M. this vessel, so soon as the Spanish
vessels at Cavite bore on the port bow, opened fire with the six-inch gun, and
then with the five-inch guns in succession, as fast as they would bear. The
secondary battery guns did not seem to reach the enemy, and their fire was
soon stopped and not again used until the distance was considerably lessened.
At 11:20 A. M., when signal was made to re>-engage, this vessel started ahead
full speed (using reserve speed) to keep up with the flagship, but it was found
ADMIRAL DEWEY.
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 245
to be impossible, and falling behind all the time, I cut across to gain line
abreast of Cavite battery just as the flagship passed the " Baltimore " at that
port, at which time we opened fire with all guns. At 12, in obedience to
signal, this vessel attempted to get into the inner harbor to destroy enemy's
vessels, but getting into shoal water — twenty feet — was obliged to withdraw,
and so reported. While attempting to get inside, the battery was used, on an
enemy's vessel at anchor (supposed to be the " Don Antonio de Ulloa ") until
she sank. Not being able to find a channel farther inside, and everything in
sight having been destroyed, this vessel, at 1 130 P. M., withdrew and later an
chored near the flagship. I inclose a statement of the ammunition expended
during the engagement.
I am very pleased to report that the officers and crew behaved splendidly.
Each and every one seemed anxious to do his whole duty, and, so far as I
can learn, did it. Their whole conduct was beyond praise.
This vessel was struck but once, and then by a six-pounder shell, which
passed through both sides of the whaleboat (above her water line), and then
glanced along the chase of the starboard six-pounder on our poop. The gun
was not injured, and the whaleboat but slightly, and she is again ready for
service.
I am happy to report that there were no casualties of any kind.
This vessel at the cl©se of the engagement was in as good condition as when
it began, and without any preparation could have fought it over again.
In conclusion, permit me to congratulate you upon the very brilliant victory
you achieved over a naval force nearly equal to your own and backed by
extensive shore batteries of very heavy guns, and this without the loss of a
single life. History points to no greater achievement.
Very respectfully,
J. B. COGHLAN,
Captain, U. S. N., Commanding.
Commodore GEORGE DEWEY, U. S. N., Commander -in-Chief U. S. Naval
Force, Asiatic Station.
U. S. S. " CONCORD,"
MANILA, May 2, 1898.
SIR. — In compliance with article 275, United States Navy Regulations, I
have to submit the following report of the late action so far as this vessel
was concerned:
In obedience to your orders I took position in line. In passing the city a
big gun opened on the fleet, to which I replied with, two shots. The " Con
cord " held her position in the line until your order to withdraw from action.
246 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Later in the day I was ordered by you to burn a transport. To arrive at
the position of the transport my course lay so as to open the dockyard and
vessels therein, at which I took a few shots with the six-inch battery. I suc
ceeded in firing the transport, which is still in flames.
Each and every one of my subordinates did his whole duty with an enthu
siasm and zeal beyond all praise. I am particularly indebted to the executive
officer, Lieut-Commander George P. Colvocoresses, for the cool, deliberate,
and efficient manner with which he met each phase of the action, and for his
hearty co-operation in my plans. Lieut. T. B. Howard, the navigator, proved
that, like his father, he was ready to offer his life to his country and flag.
The officers of divisions — Lieut. P. W. Hourigan, powder; Lieut, (j. g.) C.
M. McCormick, third gun; Ensign L. A. Kaiser, second gun; and Ensign
W. C. Davidson, first gun — • performed every duty with zeal and alacrity.
Ensign O. S. Knepper, in charge of signals, performed the duty as though he
were in the daily habit of being under fire. P. A. Paymaster E. D. Ryan
volunteered to take charge of the after powder division, and was most useful
therein. The steam department, under Chief Engineer G. B. Ransom and P.
A. Engineer H. W. Jones, was in a perfect condition, working as though on
parade. Pay Clerk F. K. Hunt volunteered to assist the surgeon. The crew,
one and all, worked with enthusiasm. I have nothing but praise for each and
every man.
I am happy to report that there were no casualties. The " Concord " was
not hit.
The following is a list of the ammunition expended: One hundred and fif
teen six-inch full charges, 67 six-inch reduced charges, 6 shrapnel, 176 six-inch
common shell, 220 six-pounder cartridges, 120 three-pounder cartridges, and
60 one-pounder cartridges.
I inclose a list of the ammunition remaining on board; also the report of
the executive officer and of the chief engineer.
Very respectfully,
ASA WALKER,
Captain, U. S. N., Commanding.
The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. NAVAL FORCE, Asiatic Station.
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 247
U. S. S. " BALTIMORE,"
MANILA, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, May 4, 1898.
SIR. — I have the honor to make the following report, as required by article
437, Navy Regulations, of the engagement of this ship with the Spanish fleet
and shore batteries at Sangley Point, Cavite bay, on the ist instant.
At early daylight the fleet had reached a point close up to the shipping off
the city of Manila, when the signal was made, " Prepare for general action."
Spanish batteries near Old Manila opened fire at long range at about the same
time. Flagship leading, with port helm, bore down on the right of Spanish
line of vessels, formed in a somewhat irregular crescent at anchor, extending
from off Sangley Point to the northeast, and in readiness to receive us, their
left supported by the batteries on Sangley Point.
Following your lead in close order, our fire commenced with the port battery
at about 5:40 A. M., at a distance of about 6,000 yards.
Our column passed down the enemy's line, turning with port helm as their
left was reached, engaging them with starboard battery on the return. This
maneuver was performed three times at distances from the enemy's ships vary
ing from 2,600 to 5,000 yards, when you signaled to " withdraw from action "
at 7:35.
Upon reaching a convenient distance in the bay, you signaled, " Let the
people go to breakfast; " and at 8:40, " Commanding officers repair on board
the flagship."
While on board the flagship I received an order to intercept a steamer
coming up the bay, reported to be flying Spanish colors.
Soon after starting on this duty I discovered the colors of the stranger to
be British, and so reported by signal, you having in the meantime made gen
eral signal to get under way and follow your motions, this ship being at the
time some two miles to the south-southwest of the flagship on her way to
intercept the supposed Spanish steamer.
At 10:55 you mar''* general signal, " Designated vessel will lead," with
" Baltimore's " distinguishing pennant, and in a few minutes signal to " attack
the enemy's batteries or earthworks " and for fleet to " close up; " in obedience
to which order this ship led in, with starboard helm, to a position off the
Cafiacoa and Sangley Point batteries and opened fire with starboard battery
at a distance of about 2,800 yards, closing in to 2,200, between which and
2,700 yards our best work was done, slowing the ship dead slow, stopping the
engines as range was obtained, delivering a rapid and accurate fire upon the
shore batteries and a gunboat just inside of Sangley Point, since proven to
have been the " Don Antonio de Ulloa," pr-actically silencing the batteries in
248 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
question before the fire of another ship became effective, owing to the lead
we had obtained in our start for the supposed Spanish steamer.
The fire of ships and batteries having been silenced and the white flag dis
played on the arsenal buildings at Cavite, you signaled, at 1:20, to "prepare
to anchor," and at i'-3O, "Anchor at discretion."
The victory was complete.
The wind was light and variable during the first engagement and from the
northeast; force, 2 to 3 during the second.
The firing devices gave considerable trouble, extractors, sear springs, and
firing pins bending and breaking, and wedge blocks jamming. Electric firing
attachments gave trouble by the grease and dirt incident to firing insulating
the connections, so much so that shortly after the engagement commenced
they were abandoned for percussion, but coolness and steadiness replaced de
fective parts in the shortest possible time.
The ammunition supply was ample, and the test was conclusive so long as
electric hoists are uninjured.
The behavior of officers and men was beyond all praise. The accuracy and
rapidity of their fire you were an eye-witness of. The steadiness and cool
bearing of all on board who came under my observation was that of veterans.
The fact that the ship was so rarely hit gave few opportunities for conspicu
ous acts of heroism or daring, but the enthusiasm and cool steadiness of the
men gave promise that they would have been equal to any emergency.
I shall report later such detail of individual merit as has been mentioned
by officers of divisions or that came under my own observation.
I inclose (a) report of executive officer; (b) surgeon's report of casualties;
(c) carpenter's report of damages; (d) report of ammunition expended.
Very respectfully,
N. M. DYER,
Captain, U. S. N., Commanding.
The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. NAVAL FORCE, Asiatic Station.
U. S. S. " PETREL,"
MANILA BAY, May 4, 1898.
SIR. — I respectfully report as follows concerning my share in the action
fought by the fleet under your command in Manila bay, off Cavite, on the
morning of May I, 1898:
The ship had been partly cleared for action at Hong Kong and on the run
to Manila. Went to quarters for action at 9:45 P. M. of April 3oth, and all
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 249
preparations were completed. Hammocks were not piped down, but men were
allowed to sleep at their guns.
The position of " Petrel " was fourth from head of column, astern of
" Raleigh " and ahead of " Concord." We passed in through Boco Grande,
about one mile from El Fraile. All lights were masked and only stern
lights showing. At 11:10 a rocket and light were shown from Corregidor
Island and just as the " Raleigh " and " Petrel " came abreast El Fraile three
shots were fired from a shore battery on the rock, these being promptly
replied to by the :' Raleigh," " Concord " and " Boston." We steamed slowly
up the bay, and just as day was breaking, about 5 o'clock, the shore bat
teries below Manila began firing. It was scarcely light enough to distin
guish vessels from this vessel when flagship made signal to " prepare for ac
tion," so signal was repeated from the " Baltimore." During time column was
forming and closing up, the batteries from below Manila were firing. As
flagship stood to southward the ships and batteries at Cavite began their
firing, and gradually, as we approached, we could make out ships under
way in harbor and three guns on shore firing. The battery of this vessel
began firing at 5:22 by the deck clock at a range of 5,000 yards.
The column circled three times from east to west in front of shore, stand
ing in a little nearer each time, the first time being 3,000 yards and the
third time 1,800 yards. During these three rounds this vessel expended
92 six-inch common shells, 82 six-inch full charges, 10 reduced charges,
and 253 three-pounders. Several times during rounds had to cease firing
on account of smoke and in order to economize ammunition. The greater
part of our great-gun fire was at the " Reina Cristina " and " Castilla," the
former steaming around the harbor and the latter anchored about 500 yards
off Sangley Point; but the other and smaller vessels were fired at when
opportunity offered. Especially was the fire of the rapid-fire guns aimed at
a yellow launch, which was apparently a torpedo boat trying to turn our flank.
The navigator, Lieutenant B. A. Fiske, was stationed in the top with a stadi-
meter to determine the distance and report upon the efficiency of the fire.
At 7:30 we ceased firing and withdrew from action in obedience to a signal
from flagship to fleet to that effect. The men were given their breakfast.
While withdrawing, the enemy continued firing until we were well out of range,
and the batteries below Manila were firing at intervals during breakfast. At
11, when the signal was made to get under way, the "Petrel" followed the
" Olympia " and stood well in. While steaming across the fire the signal was
hoisted for the " Petrel " to pass inside.
This vessel left her station, passed outside of " Baltimore," and rounded
Sangley Point about 500 yards outside of where " Castilla " was burning.
250 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
The fire was then directed at the " Don Antonio de Ulloa," and when it
was found that she was sinking and deserted, the ship passed farther inside
and opened fire upon the ships behind inner breakwater and whose masts
were seen above government buildings. During the firing on the " Ulloa "
a white flag with a Geneva cross was discovered in range with her, and I
stood in further so as to get it out of range. After the first two or three
shots fired through the public building at ships behind the mole, the Spanish
flag was, at 12:30 P. M., hauled down and a white flag run up. The surrender
was immediately signaled to fleet and firing ceased.
In obedience to a signal from flagship to destroy all shipping in the harbor,
Lieutenant Hughes was sent with a whaleboat's crew of seven men, this
whaleboat being the only one on the ship which would float, and set fire
to the " Don Juan de Austria," " Isla de Cuba," " Isla de Luzon," " General
Lezo " and " Marques del Duero." Afterward Ensign Fermier was sent
to set fire to the " Velasco " and " El Correo." The " Isla de Cuba," " lala
de Luzon " and " Don Juan de Austria " were aground and full of water
when they were fired. Their outboard valves were opened and the ships
allowed to fill. The breech plugs of four-inch guns had been taken off and
could not be found. During the night the magazines of the " Don Juan de
Austria " blew up. The " Manila " was not burned because the Spanish
officers begged that she be not destroyed because she was unarmed and a
coast-survey vessel. Lieutenant Fiske and Passed Assistant Engineer Hall
raised steam on the ship this morning, the 4th instant, and brought her out.
At the time she was aground. The " Don Antonio de Ulloa " was sunk and
the " Reina Cristina " and " Castilla " were burning in outer harbor.
Lieutenant Fiske was sent ashore and brought off two tugboats, the
" Rapido " and " Hercules," and three steam launches.
I was anchored in Cavite harbor from 12:50 to 5:20 p. M., when I got under
way and returned to the fleet.
There were no casualties or accidents of any kind, the ship having been
struck only once just beneath hawse pipe by a piece of shell which burst just
as it sank, and threw a column of water over the forecastle.
After the white flag was displayed, there was apparently the greatest con
fusion in the arsenal. Parts of the crews of the various ships were there,
and all were armed and were constantly falling in and moving about; yet
there was no evidence of any desire to continue the fighting, and instead of
any resistance being offered to the destruction of the ships, they were rather
inclined to assist with their advice and evinced a desire to surrender to the
first officer they met.
The action of ammunition was exceedingly good. There was expended
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY.
during action, 113 six-inch common shells, 3 six inch armor-piercing shells,
82 six-inch full charges, 34 six-inch reduced charges, and 313 three-pounder
ammunition. Owing to the heat due to firing, the pads swelled and made it
very difficult to lock the breech plug. Nothing would remedy this save shift
ing plugs, replacing hot plug by the one from the other gun which was cool.
The wedge of firing lock jammed frequently, due to hot parts. This was
remedied by shifting locks.
The percussion primers worked very unsatisfactorily; sometimes four
primers would be expended before one would act. Primers leaked badly,
causing excessive deposit in primer seat, hard extraction, and delay in prim
ing of gun and requiring frequent boring of vent.
The action of no one can be censured, the conduct of each and every
officer and man being excellent. There was no confusion; I should say less
than at ordinary target practice.
The loading was rapidly done and the firing was deliberate. Due to your
caution to commanding officers that no ammunition should be wasted, Lieu
tenant Plunkett fired the forward six-inch guns and Ensign Fermier the after
ones, and the work was thoroughly done. Lieutenant Hughes stationed
himself on the poop, as it was deemed essential that he should not be with
the commanding officer on the bridge. He materially assisted Ensign Fermier
by observing fall of shot and tendering advice regarding pointing. I wish
particularly to call to your attention Lieutenant Hughes, his gallantry in
taking a boat's crew of seven men and in the face of a large armed force
on shore setting fire to the five ships before mentioned. He was aware that
he had the only boat in the ship which would float, until the steam whaleboat
could be prepared.
Lieutenant Fiske stationed himself on the fore cross trees with stadimeter
to measure the range and report on the fall of shots. He also took charge
of the steam whaleboat to cover Lieutenant Hughes in his operations in
burning the ships.
Lieutenant Wood had charge of the powder division, assisted in the after
part by Assistant Paymaster Siebels. There was at no time a halt in the
firing due to failure of the powder division.
Ensign Montgomery was in charge of the signals, and materially assisted
me on the bridge. He also directed the fire of the forward three-pounder
when it was allowed to be fired. He also afforded assistance to Lieutenant
Plunkett by observing the fall of shots from the forward six-inch guns.
I desire also to mention the efficient service of the engines. In order to
maintain our position and to take advantage of every oppurtunity, the engine
telegraph was in constant use from full speed to stop, and the engine never
252 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
failed to respond in the quickest time possible. This I consider to be due
to the high state of efficiency of that department, and the whole credit is due
to Passed Assistant Engineer Hall.
I can make no statement regarding the services of Passed Assistant Surgeon
Brownell, as the " Petrel " was most fortunate in having no casualties.
I inclose the report of the executive officer.
Very respectfully,
E. P. WOOD,
Commander, U. S. N., Commanding.
The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. NAVAL FORCE, Asiatic Station.
U. S. S. " BOSTON," 20 RATE,
PORT CAVITE, MANILA BAY, May 3, 1898.
SIR. — I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken
by this vesssel in the late action with the Spanish fleet on the morning of
May i st.
At daylight the merchant ships off Manila were seen, and soon after the
Spanish fleet, close into Cavite. This vessel was the sixth in the column and
brought up the rear. Several shots were fired by the batteries in Manila,
and two shots were given in reply. At 5:35 A. M. action with the enemy com
menced and was continued at varying distances, steaming in a circle until
7:35 A. M., firing with a fair degree of deliberation and accuracy. At times
the smoke was dense, interfering very materially with maneuvering and firing.
The Spanish fleet and shore batteries replied vigorously, and an attempt
was made with an improvised torpedo boat, but our fire was overpowering
and the enemy received heavy damage and loss.
In obedience to signal I withdrew from action at 7:35 and gave the crew
breakfast and rest.
At 11:10 the action was renewed and continued until the enemy ceased
firing and his ships were all burned, sunk or withdrawn behind the arsenal
of Cavite.
This vessel was struck four times by enemy's shot, doing no material damage.
Our own 'fire destroyed three of our own boats and badly damaged three
others.
No casualties occurred.
The conduct of officers and men on this trying occasion was of the very
highest quality, and they bore themselves with courage and spirit and entirely
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 253
to my satisfaction. It also gives me pleasure to bear witness to the courage
and resolution of the Spanish fleet and to say that they defended themselves
creditably.
Very respectfully,
FRANK WILDES,
Captain, U. S. N., Commanding.
The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF COMMANDING U. S. NAVAL FORCE, Asiatic Station.
CONSULATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
BAY OF MANILA, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, May 4, 1898.
SIR. — I have the honor to briefly report to you concerning the battle of
Manila Bay, fought on May i, 1898.
Heeding your mandate, and by repeated request of Commodore George
Dewey, of the United States Asiatic Squadron, I left Manila on Saturday,
April 23d, and on Wednesday, April 27th, at about I o'clock, p. M., boarded the
flagship " Olympia," in Mirs Bay, in Hong Kong. After meeting the Com
modore and his captains and commanders in council, the Commodore at once
ordered his fleet to start at 2 p. M. for Manila Bay.
On Saturday, April 3Oth, Subig Bay was reconnoitered because of reported
hiding of Spanish fleet in its inner harbor, but no fleet being there found, the
Commodore proceeded at once to the south channel entrance to Manila Bay,
and while by many reports mines, torpedoes and land defenses obstructed
entrance, yet the flagship led the van, and between 10 P. M., April 3Oth, and 2
A. M., May ist, our fleet of six war ships, one dispatch boat and two coal-
laden transports passed all channel dangers unharmed, despite shots from forts,
and at 2 A. M. were all safe on the broad expanse of Manila Bay.
After my departure, April 23d, and by drawing fire, to save Manila if possible,
all Spanish war ships went to their strongly fortified naval station at Cavite,
where the inner harbor gave refuge, and where potential support could be
had from several forts and well-equipped batteries, which extended several
miles right and left from Port Cavite.
At about 5:30 A. M., Sunday, May ist, the Spanish guns opened fire at both
the Manila breakwater battery and at Cavite, from fleet and forts.
With magnificent coolness and order, but with the greatest promptness, our
fleet, in battle array, headed by the flagship, answered the Spanish attack, and
for about two and a half hours a most terrific fire ensued.
254 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
The method of our operations could not have shown greater system, our
guns greater effectiveness, or our officers and crews greater bravery; and
while Spanish resistance was stubborn and the bravery of Spanish forces such
as to challenge admiration, yet they were outclassed, weighed in the balance
of war against the methods, training, aim and bravery shown on our decks, and
after less than three hours' perilous and intense combat one of Spain's war
ships was sinking, two others were burning, and all others, with land de
fenses, had severely suffered, when our squadron, with no harm done its
ships, retired for breakfast.
At about 10 o'clock, A. M., Commodore Dewey renewed the battle, and with
effects most fatal with each evolution.
No better evidence of Spanish bravery need be sought than that, after the
castigation of our first engagement, her ships and forts should again answer
our fire. But Spanish efforts were futile. Ship after ship and battery after
battery went to destruction before the onslaught of American energy and
training, and an hour and a half of our second engagement wrought the*
annihilation of the Spanish fleet and forts, with several hundred Spaniards
killed and wounded and millions in value of their Government's property
destroyed. While amazing, almost unbelievable, as it seems, not a ship or
gun of our fleet had been disabled, and, except on the " Baltimore," not a
man had been hurt.
One of the crew of the " Baltimore " had a leg fractured by slipping and
another hurt in the ankle in a similar manner, while four received slight flesh
wounds from splinters thrown by a six-inch projectile, which pierced the
starboard side of the cruiser.
But in the battle of Manila Bay the United States squadron of six war
ships totally destroyed the Spanish fleet of eight war ships, many forts and
batteries, and accomplished this work without the loss of a man!
History has only contrasts. There is no couplet to form a comparison. The
only finish fight between the modern war ships of civilized nations has proven
the prowess of American naval men and methods, and the glory is a legacy
for the whole people. Our crews are all hoarse from cheering, and while we
suffer for cough drops and throat doctors, we have no use for liniment or
surgeons.
To every ship, officer and crew, all praise be given. As Victoria was an
swered years ago, " Your Majesty, there is no second," so may I report to
your department as to our war ships conquering the Spanish fleet in the battle
of Manila Bay — there is no first — " there is no second." The cool bravery
and efficiency of the Commodore was echoed by every captain and commander
and down through the lines by every officer and man, and naval history of the
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 255
dawning century will be rich if it furnishes to the world so glorious a display
of intelligent command and successful service as must be placed to the credit
of the United States Asiatic Squadron under date of May i, 1898.
It was my lot to stand on the bridge of the " Baltimore " by ths side of
Captain Dyer during the first engagement, and to be called to the flagship
" Olympia " by the Commodore, at whose side, on the bridge, I stood during
the second engagement, and when the clouds roll by and I have again a set
tled habitation, it will be my honor and pleasure to transmit a report show
ing service somewhat in detail and for which commanders promise data.
Meanwhile our Commodore will officially inform you of events which will
rival in American history the exploits of Paul Jones.
I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,
OSCAR F. WILLIAMS,
U. S. Consul, Manila, Philippine Islands.
(Not acting.)
Hon. JUDGE DAY, Assistant Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.
SPANISH OFFICIAL REPORT.
DEPARTURE FOR SUBIC.
On the 25th of April, at n p. M., says Senor Montojo, I left the bay of
Manila for Subic with a squadron composed of the cruisers " Reina Cristina,"
" Don Juan de Austria," " Isla de Cuba," " Isla de Luzon," dispatch boat
" Marques del Duero," and the wooden cruiser " Castilla." This last could
merely be considered as a floating battery, incapable of maneuvering, on
account of the bad condition of her hull. The following morning, being at
Subic, I had a conference with Captain Del Rio, who, though he did not relieve
my anxiety respecting the completion of the defensive works, assured me that
they would soon be finished.
In the meanwhile the cruiser " Castilla," even on this short cruise, was mak
ing much water through the bearings of the propeller and the opening astern.
They worked day and night to stop these leaks with cement, finally making
the vessel nearly water-tight, but absolutely impossible to use her engines.
On the morning of the 27th I sailed with the vessels to cover the entrance
to the port of Subic. The " Castilla " was taken to the northeast point of
256 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
the island of Grande to defend the western entrance, since the eastern entrance
had already been closed with the hulls of the " San Quintin " and two old
merchant vessels which were sunk there.
With much disgust, I found that the guns which should have been mounted
on that island were delayed a month and a half. This surprised me, as the
shore batteries that the navy had installed (with very little difficulty) at the en
trance of the bay of Manila, under the intelligent direction of colonel of naval
artillery, Sefior Garces, and Lieutenant Beneavente, were ready to fight twenty-
four days after the commencement of the work.
I was also no less disgusted that they confided in the efficacy of the few
torpedoes which they had found feasible to put there.
The entrance was not defended by torpedoes nor by the batteries of the
island, so that the squadron would have had to bear the attack of the Ameri
cans with its own resources, in forty meters of water and with little security.
Our vessels could not only be destroyed, but they could not save their crews.
1 still held a hope that the Americans would not go to Subic, and give us
time for more preparations, but the following day I received from the Spanish
consul at Hong Kong a telegram which said: " Enemy's squadron sailed at
2 P. M. for the bay of Mirs, and according to reliable accounts they sailed
for Subic to destroy our squadron, and then will go to Manila."
This telegram demonstrated that the enemy knew where they could find
my squadron and that the port of Subic had no defenses.
The same day, the 28th of April, I convened a council of the captains, and
all, with the exception of Del Rio, chief of the new arsenal, thought that the
situation was insupportable and that we should go to the bay of Manila in
order to accept there the battle under less unfavorable conditions.
THE RETURN TO MANILA.
I refused to have our ships near the city of Manila, because, far from de
fending it, this would provoke the enemy to bombard the plaza, which doubt
less would have been demolished on account of its few defenses. It was
unanimously decided that we should take position in the bay of Canacao,
in the least water possible, in order to combine our fire with that of the
batteries of Point Sangley and Ulloa.
I immediately ordered Del Rio to concentrate his forces in the most strat
egic point of the arsenal, taking every disposition to burn the coal and stores
before allowing them to fall into the power of the enemy. I sent the " Don
Juan de Austria " to Manila to get a large number of lighters filled with sand
to defend the water line of the " Castilla " (which could not move) against the
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 257
enemy's shells and torpedoes. At 10 A. M. on the 2Qth I left Subic with the
vessels of my squadron, towing the " Castilla " by the transport " Manila."
In the afternoon of the same day we anchored in the Gulf of Canacao in
eight meters of water. On the following morning we anchored in line of
battle, the " Cristina," " Castilla," " Don Juan de Austria," " Don Juan
de Ullo," " Luzon," " Cuba " and " Marques del Duero," while the transport
" Manila " was sent to the Roads of Bacoor, where the " Velasco " and
" Lezo " were undergoing repairs.
At 7 P. M. I received a telegram from Subic announcing that the enemy's
squadron had entered the port at 3, reconnoitering, doubtless seeking our
ships, and from there they sailed with course for Manila.
The mail steamer " Isla Mindanao " arrived in the bay. I advised her cap
tain to save his vessel by going to Singapore, as the enemy could not get
into the entrance probably before midnight, as he was not authorized from the
trans-Atlantic he did not do so, and then I told him that he could anchor in
shallow water as near as possible to Bacoor.
At midnight gun fire was heard off Corregidor, and at 2 on the morning
of the 1st of May I received telegraphic advices that the American vessels
were throwing their search lights at the batteries of the entrance, with which
they had exchanged several shots. I notified the commanding general of the
arsenal, Senor Sostoa, and the general-governor of the plaza, Capt. Senor
Garcia Pana, that they should prepare themselves. I directed all the artillery
to be loaded, and all the sailors and soldiers to go to their stations for battle,
soon to receive the enemy.
This is all that occurred since I sailed to Subic until the entrance of the
American squadron in the bay of Manila.
TPIE ARRIVAL OF THE ENEMY.
The squadron being disposed for action, adds Senor Montojo, fires spread,
and everything in proper place, we waited for the enemy's arrival.
All the vessels, having been painted dark-grey color, had taken down their
masts and yards and boats to avoid the effects of projectiles and the splinters,
had their anchors buoyed and cables ready to slip instantly.
At 4 A. M. I made signal to prepare for action, and at 4:45 the "Austria"
signaled the enemy's squadron, a few minutes after which they were recog
nized, with some confusion, in a column parallel with ours, at about 6,000
meters distant; the flagship " Olympia " ahead, followed by the "Baltimore,"
" Raleigh," " Boston," " Concord," " Helena," " Petrel " and " McCulloch,"
and the two transports " Zafiro " and " Nanshan,"
258 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
The force of these vessels, excepting transports that were, noncorabatant,
amounted to 21,410 tons, 49,290 horse-power, 163 guns (many of which were
rapid-fire) 1,750 men in their crews, and of an average velocity of about
seventeen miles. The power of our only five effective ships for battle was
represented by 10,111 tons, 11,200 horse-power, seventy-six guns (very short of
rapid-fire), 1,875 crew, and a maximum speed of twelve miles.
THE FIRE FROM SHORE.
At 5 the batteries on Point Sangley opened fire. The two first shots fell
short and to the left of the leading vessel. These shots were not answered
by the enemy, whose principal object was the squadron.
This battery only had two Ordonez guns of fifteen centimeters mounted, and
but one of these could fire in the direction of the opposing fleet.
In a few minutes one of the batteries of Manila opened fire, and at 5:15 I
made signal that our squadron open fire. The enemy answered immediately..
The battle became general. We slipped the springs and the cables and started
ahead with the engines, so as not to be involved by the enemy.
THE BATTLE.
The Americans fired most rapidly. There came upon us numberless pro
jectiles, as the three cruisers at the head of the line devoted themselves
almost entirely to fight the " Cristina," my flagship. A short time after the
action commenced one shell exploded in the forecastle and put out of action
all those who served the four rapid-fire cannon, making splinters of the for
ward mast, which wounded the helmsman on the bridge, when Lieutenant Jose
Nunez took the wheel with a coolness worthy of the greatest commendation,
steering until the end of the fight. In the meanwhile another shell exploded
in the orlop, setting fire to the crews' bags, which they were fortunately able
to control.
The enemy shortened the distance between us, and, rectifying his aim,
covered us with a rain of rapid-fire projectiles. At 7:30 one shell destroyed
completely the steering gear. I ordered to steer by hand while the rudder was
out of action. In the meanwhile another shell exploded on the poop and put
out of action nine men. Another destroyed the mizzen masthead, bringing
down the flag and my ensign, which was replaced immediately. A fresh
shell exploded in the officers' cabin, covering the hospital with blood, de
stroying the wounded who were being treated there. Another exploded in
the ammunition room astern, filling the quarters with smoke and preventing the
working of the hand steering gear. As it was impossible to control the
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 259
fire, I had to flood the magazine when the cartridges were beginning to
explode.
Amidships several shells of smaller calibre went through the smokestack
and one of the large ones penetrated the fire room, putting out of action one
master gunner and twelve men serving the guns. Another rendered useless
the starboard bow gun; while the fire astern increased, fire was started for
ward by another shell, which went through the hull and exploded on the deck.
The broadside guns, being undamaged, continued firing until there were
only one gunner and one seaman remaining unhurt for firing them, as the
guns' crews had been frequently called upon to substitute those charged with
steering, all of whom were out of action.
THE DESTRUCTION OF OUR SHIPS.
The ship being out of control, the hull, smoke pipe and mast riddled with
shot or confused with the cries of the wounded; half of her crew out of action,
among whom were seven officers, I gave the order to sink and abandon the ship
before the magazines should explode, making signal at the same time to the
" Cuba " and " Luzon " to assist in saving the rest of the crew, which they
did, aided by others from the " Duero " and the arsenal.
I abandoned the " Cristina," directing beforehand to secure her flag, and ac
companied by my staff, and with great sorrow, I hoisted my flag on the
cruiser " Isla de Cuba."
After having saved many men from the unfortunate vessel, one shell de
stroyed her heroic commander, Don Luis Cadarso, who was directing the
rescue.
The " Ulloa," which also defended herself firmly, using the only two guns
which were available, was sunk by a shell which entered the water line, put
ting out of action her commander and half of her remaining crew, those which
were left only remaining for the service of the two guns stated.
The " Castilla," which fought heroically, remained with her artillery useless,
except one stern gun, with which they fought spiritedly, was riddled with shot
and set on fire by the enemy's shells, then sunk, and was abandoned by her
crew in good order, which was directed by her commander, Don Alonzo
Algado. The casualties on this ship were 23 killed and 80 wounded.
The " Austria," very much damaged and on fire, went to the aid of the
" Castilla." The " Luzon " had three guns dismounted, and was slightly
damaged in the hull. The " Duero " remained with one of her engines useless,
the bow gun of twelve centimeters and one of the redoubts.
At 8 o'clock in the morning, the enemy's squadron having suspended its
2DO CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
fire, I ordered the ships that remained to us to take positions in the bottom
of the Roads at Bacoor, and there to resist to the last moment, and that they
should be sunk before they surrendered.
THE SINKING.
At 10:30 the enemy returned, forming a circle to destroy the arsenal and
the ships which remained to me, opening upon them a horrible fire, which we
answered as far as we could with the few cannon which we still had mounted.
There remained the last recourse to sink our vessels, and we accomplished
this operation, taking care to save the flag, the distinguishing pennant, the
money in the safe, the portable arms, the breech plugs of the guns and the
signal codes.
After which I went with my staff to the Convent of Santo Domingo de
Cavite, to be cured of a wound received in the left leg, and to telegraph a
brief report of the action, with preliminaries and results.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE ADMIRAL.
It remains only to say that all the chiefs, officers, engineers, quartermasters,
gunners, sailors and soldiers rivaled one another in sustaining with honor
the good name of the navy on this sad day.
The inefficiency of the vessels which composed my little squadron, the
lack of all classes of the personnel, especially master gunners and seamen
gunners; the inaptitude of some of the provisional machinists, the scarcity of
rapid-fire cannon, the strong crews of the enemy, and the unprotected character
of the greater part of our vessels all contributed to make more decided the
sacrifice which we made for our country, and to prevent the possibility of
the horrors of the bombardment of the city of Manila, with the conviction
that with the scarcity of our force against the superior enemy we were going
to certain death and could expect a loss of all our ships.
Our casualties, including those of the arsenal, amounted to 381 men killed
and wounded.
OFFICE OF THE STAFF OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE
STATION AND SQUADRON OF THE PHILIPPINES,
MANILA, April 24, 1898.
It having been resolved to go out with the squadron for the port of Subic,
not only for the defense of that important port but also as a strategic harbor
' s* U >M w^ KMU¥: «?'.'• • ?»,;
I i^?KM^
^
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 263
for operations which may occur, the staff is placed in charge of the necessary
orders from these headquarters.
As commandant of the Cavite arsenal I have nothing to say to your excel
lency concerning its defense, as the chief commander and officers will know
how to defend the interests of the nation, trusting the valor, zeal and intelli
gence of all those who, with the slight and feeble resources upon which we
can count, will do everthing possible to guard the honor of the flag and the
navy.
Go on, sir, in the ordering and equipping as much as you think necessary
for the common purposes which concern our interests.
You will use the telegraph to report to me all that you think important
for your affairs in all departments, as well as the cable to communicate with the
Government.
As long as possible communicate by way of Paranaque and Malate, and
also with the batteries of the coast by signals as well as by boats.
If you need merchant vessels to equip with torpedo tubes, which may be
effective in such vessels, you will also equip them, etc.
MONTOJO.
The COMMANDANT OF THE CAVITE ARSENAL.
April 25. — Copy. SIGUILLY,
Secretary.
Commodore Dewey had already reported that it would be useless for
him to capture Manila without sufficient land forces to occupy the
place, and preparations were being made to send troops to the
Philippines to co-operate with the squadron; but three weeks elapsed
after his victory, before the first troops were embarked. Major-Gen
eral Wesley Merritt, United States Army, was appointed military
governor of the Philippines. A force of 158 officers and 3,428 men
sailed to Dewey's assistance, May 25th. Others followed soon after,
and General Merritt went out himself on June 27th. It was a strange
and unlooked-for circumstance that the war declared for the purpose
of assisting the starving Cubans should have commenced in the far
East. The continuation of the Manila campaign, and its far-reaching
results, belong to the historians of the future. The immediate results
of Dewey's victory were to cripple the Spanish Navy so seriously as to
make our Pacific coast reasonably secure against attacks from that
source; while it established, or rather maintained, the prestige of the
American Navy and showed the superb training of our officers and
264 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
seamen. Meanwhile the naval officers on this side of the world had
their hands full.
At the opening of hostilities, the Atlantic fleet, then cruising at
Key West, under the command of Admiral Sampson, was ordered
to blockade Havana, and to keep the coast of Cuba, as near as possible,
in a state of blockade. Admiral Sampson's squadron at first consisted
of three battle ships, two armored cruisers, four double-turreted
monitors, ten torpedo boats and more than eighty cruisers, tugs,
colliers, gunboats, auxiliary transports, scouts, supply, hospital, re
frigerator, repair, and other boats. It was later reinforced by the
Flying Squadron under Schley.
After the Flying Squadron was merged into Sampson's, another
squadron called the Eastern was organized under Commodore J. C.
Watson, with a view to a possible European cruise. It consisted of
the cruiser " Newark," auxiliaries " Yankee," " Yosemite," and
" Dixie," collier "Abaranda," and after July 5th, the " Oregon " and
" Iowa; " these vessels did good service in assisting the transportation
of troops, and the naval operations in the West Indies.
The enterprise intrusted to Sampson was of vast importance, his
squadron being required to blockade nearly 2,000 miles of coast.
Communication between the principal cities of Havana depended in
the main upon transportation by sea, on account of the limited railroad
facilities in the island.
April 29th, Admiral Cervera sailed from the Cape Verde islands
with the warships " Maria Teresa," "Almirante Oquendo," " Vizcaya,"
" Cristobal Colon," and the torpedo-boat destroyers " Terror,"
" Furore," and " Pluton." The course taken by this fleet was very
uncertain, and there were various suggestions as to the intentions of
Admiral Cervera. There was great reason to suppose that he would
stop at Porto Rico and coal his vessels before sailing to Cuba. It was
also supposed that he might go to Martinique, as at that time there
was a suspicion of friendship for Spain among the French, and it was
feared that the Spanish fleet might be permitted to coal at that island.
There was also great fear that Cervera's squadron might attempt to
intercept the " Oregon," which was on the way from the Pacific
coast to the West Indies.
The sailing of this gallant vessel from San Francisco to Key West,
was one of the most extraordinary feats recorded during the war.
Leaving San Francisco on hurried orders, she steamed down the
Chilean coast, around the Horn, and proceeded up the Atlantic coast
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 265
into the harbor of Buenos Ayres, which was reported to be mined
against her entrance. Without any encounter, she sailed out again
and reached Key West safely, a voyage of over 14,000 miles in less
than six weeks, through waters in which the enemy's cruisers were
supposed to be swarming.
Four converted Atlantic liners, the " Harvard," " Yale," " St.
Louis," and " St. Paul," besides the fast commerce destroyers
"Columbia" and "Minneapolis," did magnificent -service as scouts;
these vessels were constantly on the lookout to catch a glimpse of the
Spanish fleet, but it was very difficult for them to obtain any reliable
information. As the indications seemed to point out that Cervera
would stop at San Juan, Porto Rico, Admiral Sampson determined to
attack that port.
On the 4th of May, having provided for the blockade of Havana,
he left Nicholas Channel with the battle ships " New York," " Iowa,"
and "Indiana;" the monitors "Amphitrite " and "Terror;" the
lighter vessels " Detroit " and " Montgomery," and the torpedo boat
" Porter," and steamed for San Juan, being much delayed on the way
by the slowness of the monitors. He reached San Juan on the I2th of
May and bombarded that place to reduce the means of defense should
the Spanish ships arrive. His loss was one man killed and four
wounded on board the " New York," three wounded on the " Iowa,"
and one death from heat on the "Amphitrite," the other ships escaping
without casualties.
U. S. FLAGSHIP " NEW YORK," IST RATE.
KEY WEST. FLA., May 18, 1898,
SIR. — • Supplementary to my telegram No. 73, of the 12th instant, I have
the honor to submit the following report, more in detail, of the attack on
the defenses of Porto Rico, made by a portion of this squadron on the I2th
instant
Upon approaching San Juan it was seen that none of the Spanish vessels-
were in the harbor. I was, therefore, considerably in doubt whether tfyeyliad
reached San Juan and again departed for some unknown destination,- 'or whether
they had not arrived. As their capture was the object of the expedition, and
as it was essential that they should not pass to the westward, I determined
to attack the batteries defending the port, in order to develop their positions
and strength, and then, without, waiting to reduce the city or subject it to a
regular bombardment — which would require due notice — turn to the west
ward.
266 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Our progress had been so much slower than I had reason to anticipate,
from Key West to Porto Rico, owing to the frequent breakdowns of the two
monitors, which made it necessary to tow them both the whole distance, and
also to the disabled condition of the " Indiana," that eight days had been
consumed instead of five, as I had estimated.
I commenced the attack as soon as it was good daylight. This lasted about
three hours, when the signal was made to discontinue the firing, and the
squadron stood to the northeast until out of sight of San Juan, when the course
was laid for the westward, with the view of communicating with the Depart
ment at Port Plata and learn if the Department had obtained information as
to the movements of the Spanish vessels.
At Cape Haytien I received word from the Department that the Spanish
vessels had been sighted off Curagao on the I4th instant and directed me to
return with all dispatch to Key West.
As stated in my telegram, no serious injury was done any of the ships,
and only one man was killed and seven wounded slightly.
The following notes were taken during the attack:
Weather, fair; very light breeze; long swell from northward and westward.
3:30. — Breakfast.
4. — Call " All hands " complete clearing for action. Squadron standing in
for San Juan, the lights of the town being plainly visible, " Detroit " leading;
" Wompatuck " on starboard bow to anchor boat for turning stake as pro
vided in my "Order of battle " — second plan of action; the other ships in
column as follows: "Iowa," "Indiana," "New York," " Amphitrite," "Ter
ror," and " Montgomery." Speed, four knots.
4:58. — " Detroit " inshore, standing across harbor entrance. In this passage
across the front of the harbor, and very close to rhe town, the " Detroit "
received no fire at all. No Spanish flag was flying on the Morro or elsewhere.
No Spanish vessels could be seen in the harbor. There was one merchant
steamer in the inner harbor.
5. — Sounded " General quarters."
5:16. — "Iowa" began firing on the Morro with forward six-pounder, and
then with all starboard battery. Smoke hanging over the ship made firing slow.
5:24. — First return shot from the shore batteries.
5:30. — "Iowa" turned from the batteries, circling to the westward.
5:59- — Made signal, "Form column."
6:09. — Made telegraphic signal, "Use only large guns." The smoke from
the smaller guns had been interfering with the fire of the heavier guns. The
column was headed in for the batteries in the same line of attack as in 'the
first round.
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 267
6:15.— " Detroit" seen standing away from Morro, with the " Montgomery"
not far off her port beam. From the time when the shore batteries began
firing (5:24) until this time (6:15) the " Detroit" had been lying close inshore,
between the line followed by the squadron and the Morro, and she had been
subjected to what seemed a concentrated fire of all the shore batteries for all
this time, she in the meanwhile pouring in broadsides from her own rapid-fire
battery.
6:30.— Made signal to "Detroit" and "Montgomery" not to follow battle
ships. By this time all the shore batteries had been developed, and they were
more numerous than the information received had led me to suspect.
6:35.— "Iowa" began firing at Morro on the second round; range, 1,500
yards.
6:40. — "Iowa" ceased firing. Almost calm; smoke hanging over the shore
fortifications, pretty effectually screening them.
7:12. — " Amphitrite " signaled, "After turret disabled for to-day."
7:16. — • " Iowa " began firing on the third round.
7:38.— Signaled to "Detroit" and "Montgomery," "Report casualties."
Received replies as follows: "Detroit," " o; " "Montgomery," " o."
7:45. — " Iowa " sounded, " Secure."
7:45. — Made signal, "Form column, course northwest," and hauled down
the signal at 8:01.
8:12. — Made signal, " Report casualties."
8:15. — The "Terror," which had been lying close inshore engaged with the
fortifications, ceased firing.
8:47. — "New York" reports "i killed, 4 wounded." All other ships re
ported no casualties, except the " Amphitrite," which reported the death of
one gunner's mate from the effects of heat.
I inclose copies of the reports of the commanding officers on the incidents
of the bombardment, including ammunition expended, and behavior of the
guns and ordnance material, etc.
Very respectfully,
W. T. SAMPSON,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander -in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
Meanwhile, other vessels of Sampson's squadron were busily
engaged cutting the cable around the coast of Cuba. On May nth,
the " Marblehead " and " Nashville " cut two cables at Cienfuegos
268 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
under a galling fire, which resulted in a loss to the Americans of one
killed and eleven wounded. Several hundred of the Spanish soldiers
defending the coast at this place, were reported killed. On the same
day a fatal encounter took place at Cardenas where the " Winslow ''
was disabled and almost destroyed by fire from the forts, with a loss of
five killed and three wounded. Among the lost was Ensign Worth
Bagley, the first officer killed during the war.
CONVENT HOSPITAL,
KEY WEST, FLA., May 16, 1898.
SIR. — I respectfully submit the following report of the action off Cardenas,
Cuba, as participated in by the U. S. torpedo boat " Winslow," to supplement
the summarized statement submitted by me on the nth instant, the day of ^he
fight.
The " Winslow" arrived off Cardenas from Matanzas at 9 A. M. on the ntft,
having left her station on the blockade to obtain an additional supply of coal,
the amount of fuel in her bunkers being reduced to five tons. The U. S. S.
" Machias " and " Wilmington " were found at Piedras Cay. Upon making
application to Captain Merry, the senior officer present, I was directed to
apply to Captain Todd, commanding U. S. S. " Wilmington," for necessary
supplies.
On boarding the U. S. S. " Wilmington " I was informed by her command
ing officer of his intention to enter Cardenas harbor on the afternoon of that
day. Of the three channels leading through the cays two were believed to
be mined. There remained unexplored a third channel, between Romero and
Blanco cays, over which the minimum depth of water, as shown by the chart,
was one and three-fourths fathoms. As the rise of tide at this place was
about one and one-half feet, and the " Wilmington " drew scant ten feet, I
was directed to receive on board a Cuban pilot, Santos, to take with me the
revenue cutter " Hudson " to sound this channel, and, in company with the
" Hudson," to sweep the channel for torpedoes. This work I completed by
noon, except the sweeping of the channel, which could not be done on account
of the grounding of the " Hudson." That vessel touched lightly, but managed
to work off without injury. The " Winslow," therefore, dragged the channel
with grapnels and returned to the " Wilmington," reporting to Captain Todd
upon the practicability of the entrance.
The entrance was begun at 12:30, high tide, the " Hudson " on the starboard
side and the " Winslow " on the port side of the " Wilmington " assisting in
marking out shoal water. No vessels were in sight on entering Cardenas bay
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 269
save two square-rigged merchantmen with sails unbent, anchored directly off
the town. As it was thought possible that gunboats might attempt to escape,
the " Hudson " was sent along the western side and the " Winslow " along
the eastern side of the bay to intercept them in event of such movement; not
finding them the throe vessels met off the town at a distance o.f about 3,500
yards. When in this position the " Winslow " was signaled to approach the
" Wilmington " within hail and I was directed by Captain Todd to go in and
investigate a small gunboat then observed for the first time, painted gray with
black smokestack, apparently not under steam and moored to a wharf, to the
left of which arose a compact mass of buildings close to the water front.
Torpedoes were set for surface runs, the fans upon the war-noses were run
up so as to provide for explosion at short range for use alongside of the
gunboat, and all preparations were made for immediate action.
At a distance of about 1,500 yards, at which time the " Winslow " was ad
vancing at about twelve knots, which seems her maximum speed in quite shoal
water, the first gun of the engagement was fired from the bow of the Spanish
gunboat, marked by a clear puff of white smoke. This shot, which passed over
the " Winslow," was at once replied to by that ship and was the signal for the
commencement from the beach of a rapidly sustained fire, characterized, pri
marily, by a total absence of smoke. At the commencement of this firing I
received a flesh wound in the left thigh. As the action advanced a cloud of
haze collected on shore at the location of this battery and when closed I
detected one or two gun flashes from among the buildings, but at no time
could I detect the exact position of the guns. My uncertainty as to the posi
tion of the enemy was attested to by the commanding officer of the " Hudson "
and by officers commanding gun divisions on the " Wilmington," who inquired
of me shortly after the action what I made out to be the enemy's exact position.
At this time the wind was blowing from the ships toward the shore. The
first shot that pierced the " Winslow " rendered her steam and hand-steering
gear inoperative and damaged them beyond repair. Efforts to work the hand-
steering gear from aft were frustrated by the wrecking of that mechanism and
the rupture of both wheel ropes; relieving tackles failed to operate the rudder.
For a short time the vessel was held in her bows on position by use of her
propellers. She then swung broadside to the enemy. A shot now pierced her
engine-room rendering one engine inoperative. 1 directed my attention to
maintaining fire from her one-pounder guns, to keeping the vessel constantly
in movement, so as to reduce the chances of her being hit, to endeavoring
to withdraw from close range, and to keeping clear of the line of fire of the
" Wilmington " and " Hudson." The use of the remaining engine, however,
had the effect of throwing her stern toward the enemy upon backing, while
270 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
going ahead threw her bow in the same direction. Under the heavy fire of
the " Wilmington " the fire of the enemy slackened. The Spanish gunboat
was silenced and put out of action early in the engagement.
The " Winslow " now being practically disabled, I signaled to the " Hudson "
to tow us out of action. She very gallantly approached us, and we succeeded
in getting a line to her. Previous to this, the alternate rapid backing and
steaming ahead of the " Winslow " had had the effect of working her out
from under the enemy's batteries, and in this way a distance of about 300 yards
was gained. Finding that we were working out in this manner, I directed
Ensign Bagley to concentrate his attention upon the movement of the ship,
watching the vessel so as to keep her out of the " Wilmington's " way, and to
direct the movements of the man at the reversing gear, mechanical communi
cation from deck to engine-room being impracticable. This necessitated Mr.
Bagley making repeated short trips from the deck to the foot of the engine-
room ladder while directing the vessel's course, and at the moment of being
on deck he stood abreast the starboard gun close to a group of men who had
been stationed below, but who had been sent on deck from the disabled ma
chinery. A shell hitting, I believe, a hose-reel, exploded instantly, killing
Ensign Bagley and two others and mortally wounding two. This accident,
which occurred at the close of the action, was virtually its end; the enemy fired
a few more shots, but was soon completely silenced by the heavy fire of the
" Wilmington." The conduct of Ensign Bagley and the men with him, as
well as that of the crew who survived the fight, is beyond commendation.
After seeing the dead and wounded removed from the " Winslow " and con
veyed on board the " Wilmington," I turned over the command of the ship
to Gunner's Mate G. P. Brady, my own injury preventing me from performing
active duty for the time being.
I have the honor to remain, sir, your obedient servant,
JOHN B. BERNADOU,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.
On May i8th, the " St. Louis " and " Wompatuck " cut a cable near
Santiago, and on the following day made an unsuccessful attempt to
cut the cable at Guantanamo. A more successful attempt was made
at the latter place on June 7th, by the " St. Louis " and the " Marble-
head."
On the 1 5th of May, news was brought to Admiral Sampson that
the Spanish destroyer " Terror " had reached Martinique, and that
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY.
Cervera's fleet had been seen off Curasao on the day before. It was
evident that his destination was either Santiago or San Juan, and the
admiral hastened back to Key West to coal, so as to be able to inter
cept the Spanish squadron before it could reach the Windward
passage.
A Cuban pilot informed the Americans that there was probably
not more than 1,000 tons of coal at Santiago. About this time, May
25th, the " St. Paul " captured the Spanish collier " Restormal," hav
ing on board 2,400 tons of coal; this must have been a severe blow
to the Spanish squadron.
Meanwhile, Commodore Schley had been ordered to the West
Indies with the Flying Squadron and arrived at Key West on the
morning of the i8th; he was dispatched in haste next day by way
of the Yucatan passage, to Cienfuegos, as it was the very natural
surmise that Cervera was bringing munitions of war to that port, the
most important place on the coast having direct communication by
rail with Havana. Schley's squadron consisted of the " Brooklyn,"
" Massachusetts," " Texas," and " Scorpion," to which were added
the " Iowa," " Castine," " Dupont," the collier " Merrimac," and later
the " Marblehead," " Eagle," and " Vixen." Commodore Schley im
mediately proceeded to blockade Cienfuegos to prevent the entrance
of Cervera's squadron. It was not until sometime later he learned
that the Spanish admiral had reached Santiago on the day the Flying
Squadron left Key West. The American fleet arrived within block
ading distance of Santiago on the evening of the 28th, and on the next
day Schley reported in the following dispatch that four of Cervera's
vessels had been sighted inside the harbor.
MOLE ST. NICHOLAS, via HAYTI.
SECRETARY OF NAVY, Washington:
Off Santiago de Cuba, May 2Qth, 10 A. M. Enemy in port. Recognized
" Cristobal Colon," " Infanta Maria Teresa," and two torpedo-boat destroyers
moored inside Morro, behind point. Doubtless the others are here. I have
not sufficient coal. Making every effort to get coal in. " Vixen " has blown
out manhole gasket. I have sent boiler makers on board to repair. Collier
repaired, machinery being put together. Have about 3,000 tons of coal in
collier, but not easy to get aboard here. If there is no engagement in next
two or three days, Sampson's squadron could relieve this one to coal at
Gonaives or Port au Prince. Hasten me dispatch vessels for picket work.
272 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
The " Brooklyn," " Iowa," " Texas," " Massachusetts," " Marblehead,"
" Vixen," and collier compose squadron here. I am sending " St. Paul " to
communicate with Sampson.
SCHLEY.
Early during the blockade it was determined to obstruct the channel
to prevent any attempt at the escape of Cervera's squadron, and it
was suggested that the collier " Merrimac " would answer the purpose.
Lieutenant Hobson, assistant naval constructor, who had been on
duty on the flagship, was intrusted by Admiral Sampson, May 29th,
with the formation of a plan for obstructing the channel. This plan he
submitted to the admiral on May 3Oth, every point, even to the
smallest detail, having been thoroughly studied in regard to the
navigation and manoeuvering of the vessel as well as the method of
sinking her. It was decided to sink the collier by exploding a series
of torpedoes advantageously placed on the outside, these torpedoes to*
be fired simultaneously from the bridge of the vessel by means of
electric cables. It was arranged with a view to additional ease in
sinking that all the ports and apertures should be opened at the same
time, and that the lashings holding the anchors should be instantly
cut so as to catch and hold the vessel in the desired position. The
crew was to be composed of picked men, strong, alert, experienced,
and positively reliable, for the slightest deviation from the program
would be fatal to success. Arrangements were to be made for the
crew to escape in a boat prepared for the purpose.
The preparation of the torpedoes was instantly begun under the
direction of Gunner Morgan of the " New York." The flagship,
accompanied by the " Oregon," the " Mayflower," and the " Porter,"
reached Santiago early on June 1st with the preparations — torpedoes,
fuses, etc. — completed, except as to the plan for adapting them to the
collier, which they then saw for the first time. The " Merrimac " was
immediately stripped, the torpedoes attached and all arrangements
made to have her taken into the entrance of the channel. Lieutenant
Hobson, having prepared the plan, and being thoroughly familiar with
every detail, was intrusted with its performance, Captain Miller of the
" Merrimac " having most reluctantly given way to the younger man
in the command of his vessel which was selected for the perilous
enterprise. When volunteers were called for, practically the whole
fleet responded, every man seeming to consider it a priceless privilege
to take part. The crew finally selected was as follows: Naval Con-
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 273
structor R. P. Hobson; D. Montague, chief master at arms, " New
York;" George Charette, gunner's mate, third class, ''New York;"
R. Clausen, coxswain, " New York; " G. F. Phillips, machinist, first
class, "Merrimac;" F. Kelly, water tender, "Merrimac;"' O. Deig-
nan, coxswain, "Merrimac;" and J. E. Murphy, coxswain, "Iowa."
In order to secure sufficient light to enter the harbor, it was de
termined to go in just before the setting of the moon, which would
occur a short time before daylight.
On the morning of June 2(1, the first attempt to approach the
harbor was made, but to the great disappointment of Lieutenant Hob-
son and his gallant crew, the vessel was recalled, as the morning was
too far advanced, and they were obliged to wait until the next day.
The final start was made shortly before daybreak on June 3d, the
pilot remaining on board to take her as far as possible, and the former
assistant engineer, Mr. Crank, volunteered to look after the engines
and leave them in a condition to complete the trip without further care.
He and the pilot were taken off by a steam launch sent in near the
entrance of the channel, under the command of Naval Cadet Powell,
who was also directed to wait near the entrance of the harbor to pick
up any of the crew who might escape. The roar of the guns soon
gave the signal that she had been attacked by the enemy, and those
outside waited with great anxiety to learn the fate of the crew and
the ship.
Meanwhile a small boat by which the men expected to escape be
came disabled, and when the vessel was abandoned, they were obliged
to keep themselves afloat by clinging to a raft. They remained in this
condition in the water until overtaken by the steam launch of the
Spanish admiral, when they surrendered as prisoners and were taken
aboard. The same day a tugboat from Santiago, bearing a flag of
truce, brought out a letter from Admiral Cervera to Admiral Sampson
assuring him of the safety of Hobson and his men, and returned to
Santiago with clothing and necessaries for the heroes who had escaped
from the sinking " Merrimac." Efforts to exchange these men proved
unsuccessful, as the " Merrimac " prisoners had been delivered to the
custody of the army, and the matter was referred to Captain-General
Blanco. The Spanish officials were afraid the prisoners had acquired
too much valuable information in regard to the defenses of the harbor
of Santiago, and they were not exchanged until July 6th, after nego
tiations with General Shatter.
On Monday, June 6th, Santiago was bombarded by the American
274 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
fleet, orders being given to avoid Morro Castle where the " Merrimac "
prisoners were confined; but several shots struck there, severely
wounding a number of the garrison. Lieutenant Hobson and his men
were uninjured. They were removed to quarters in the city the next
day.
June loth, the American vessels took possession of the landing at
Guantanamo, making it possible for the marines to establish a camp
there.
The first United States forces to land upon Cuban soil were 650
men of the First Marine Battalion Volunteers of New York, under
the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Robert W. Huntington. These
men had been aboard the transport " Panther " since May 22d, and
hailed with delight the prospect of stretching themselves on shore.
On the afternoon of Friday, June loth, they landed and marched up a
steep hillside east of Fisherman's Point, Guantanamo Bay, and hoisted
the Stars and Stripes on a plateau at the summit of the hill. The
camp was laid out, tents set up, and the marines, proud of having the
honor of making the first landing, and with a sense of security in hav
ing been able to establish themselves without opposition, christened
their camp after the commander of the gunboat " Marblehead," Cap
tain McCalla, and gave themselves up to the enjoyment of a night's
rest. Before the landing, the coast and the neighborhood had been
bombarded by the American vessels outside, and the Spaniards had
been dispersed for a short time. About 4 o'clock in the afternoon of
the next day, while some of the men were resting, and about 150 were
bathing in the surf, they were suddenly surprised by an attack from
the jungles beyond the camp, where a large body of Spaniards had
collected and were pouring a deadly rain of Mauser bullets upon the
startled marines.
Then ensued the first land fight of the war, in which four of our men
were killed and a number wounded. The first to fall was Dr. John
Blair Gibbs, surgeon of the battalion. The attack continued at inter
vals all night long, the smokeless powder used by the Spaniards
giving them great advantage, and making it almost impossible for
the marines to pick off their skulking foes. Twenty-four hours longer
the fight was maintained, but the arrival of sixty Cuban scouts,
familiar with the tactics of the enemy and able to serve as guides,
assisted the marines, who formed themselves into scouting parties, and
in three or four days succeeded in driving the Spaniards back to
Caimanera and holding their camp unmolested. This heroic en-
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 275
counter proved the great superiority of the United States forces, their
courage, endurance and determination to conquer, while it developed
the fact that the Cubans, although brave and enthusiastic, were of
little value as disciplined fighters, and were utterly unskilled as
marksmen. The landing, thus severely contested, remained in the
possession of the Navy and was used by Admiral Sampson as a
coaling and repair station.
On June 22d, Captain Sigsbee of the " St. Paul," disabled the
Spanish destroyer " Terror," which had been left at Martinique for
repairs, and which, coming up with the cruiser near San Juan, fool
ishly attempted to torpedo her.
On the 2Oth of June, word was brought to the admiral's flagship of
the approach of the transports bringing the Army of Santiago under
the command of General Shatter. After a consultation between the
two commanders, naval and military, a conference was held with the
Cuban chieftains at the headquarters of General Rabi at Aserraderos,
about eighteen miles west of Santiago, and the final plans for landing
the troops were decided upon. On the 22d, the steam launches and
other boats of the blockading fleet which could be spared, were col
lected at the flagship, each in charge of a young naval officer, and all
under command of Captain Goodrich of the " St. Louis," ready to
assist in landing the troops. The ships began to shell the coast as
soon as the troops were ready to land at Daiquiri, while a feint was
made on a large scale at Canabas on a little bay west of the harbor.
During this action a shell hit and seriously damaged the-*' Texas,"
killing one and wounding nine men. A few days later some of the
troops were landed at Siboney, 3,000 Cubans under Garcia were
brought there from Aserraderos, and on the I7th, 1,300 of General
Outfield's brigade arrived on the " Yale," making about 21,000 men
in all who had been landed at that time.
One of the most important features of the blockade was the search
light thrown into the harbor at night, making it impossible for the
enemy to attempt to send out even the smallest vessel. The search
light service was maintained by the " Iowa," " Oregon," and " Massa
chusetts," whose crews took up the watch for two hours at a time,
while the guns of the adjacent vessel were trained on the entrance.
The ships, of the blockading squadron were arranged in a semi-circle,
drawing up at night closer to the shore and at daylight moving out to
a line about six and a half miles from the land batteries.
By June 3Oth, the preparations for attacking the city were com-
276 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
pleted, and arrangements were made tor a joint attack by the land
and sea forces. Early on the morning of July 1st, an assault was
commenced on Aguadores by General Duffield's brigade, supported
by the " New York," the " Suwanee," and the " Gloucester." The
attack was a feint to draw off the Spanish forces from the land side of
the city. While the firing was in progress the " Yale," " Newark," and
" Vulcan " arrived crowded with soldiers who cheered wildly at every
shot and begged permission to land, but the day was too far advanced
for them to be put on shore. The shelling, which lasted all the fore
noon, ruined the fortifications of Aguadores.
Next day a bombardment commenced on the forts and batteries
defending the harbor and on the ships within. The line of warships
was formed as follows: "Gloucester," "New York," "Newark,"
" Indiana," " Oregon," " Iowa," " Massachusetts," " Texas," " Brook
lyn," and " Vixen," and the firing commenced at 6 o'clock continuing
two hours, when signals were received that the shells thrown toward
the Spanish position might endanger our own troops. The firing
ceased after having done much damage to the fortifications, and in
cidentally to the buildings in the city. The marksmanship displayed
by the American gunners was again shown to be unsurpassed.
Meanwhile, Admiral Cervera, who had found it impossible to
elevate his guns sufficiently to assist in the defenses of the city, re
ceived orders from the Spanish government and from Captain-Gen
eral Blanco to leave the harbor, and, if possible, sail to the rescue of
Havana. It was hoped that with his swift cruisers, Cervera would be
able to make a dash and get past the American ships before they could
recover from their surprise. The admiral did not share this belief, but
while he protested the impossibility of executing the manoeuver with
success, he obeyed orders and prepared with his magnificent ships to
rush into certain and awful destruction.
Sunday morning, the 3d of July, dawned clear and beautiful over
Santiago bay. The American ships of war, swinging in the semi
circle outside the entrance of the harbor, gave little token of the
terrible work in which they were so soon to take part. The men
were in their " Sunday clothes," and the ordinary routine of the holy
day was in progress. Admiral Sampson on the flagship " New York,"
was steaming seven miles off to Siboney to hold a consultation with
General Shafter and form plans for a simultaneous attack of the land
and sea forces upon the beleaguered city of Santiago.
About half past 9 o'clock, at an opening in the cliffs surrounding
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 277
the harbor, appeared the fighting masts of a warship, her funnels
throwing out dense clouds of smoke, indicating that she was coming
out with great speed. Suddenly the signal " Enemy's ships are coming
out," appeared on the masthead of the " Iowa," and almost at the
same moment from the other vessels; while the "Brooklyn," Com
modore Schley's flagship, instantly displayed the signal, " Close in
and engage the enemy." The " Maria Teresa," Admiral Cervera's
flagship, was followed by the " Vizcaya," the " Cristobal Colon," and
the "Almirante Oquendo," only a few minutes elapsing between the
appearance of the different vessels.
It was evidently the intention of the " Vizcaya " to immediately
ram the " Brooklyn," but the splendid manoeuvering of the American
vessels, which instantly responded to the commodore's orders, com
pelled the Spaniards to change their tactics, and they immediately
commenced a running fight, while firing wildly and ineffectively, their
only hope being to disable some of the American vessels and escape
to the open sea.
In a few moments the Spanish flagship was undone; the first shell
that struck her shattered her main water-supply pipe; the second went
into the admiral's cabin, exploding and set the stern afire, while an
other tore through a gunroom and killed sixty men. In twenty
minutes the " Teresa " was beached six miles from the harbor entrance,
her captain and many of her crew killed, and the survivors, among
them Admiral Cervera and his son, were compelled to leap into the
water and swim ashore. The "Almirante Oquendo," the last of the
cruisers to leave the bay, was wrecked and beached half a mile be
yond the " Maria Teresa." The " Vizcaya " and " Colon " were speed
ing to the west, pursued by the " Brooklyn," " Oregon," " Iowa," and
" Indiana."
Meanwhile the little torpedo-boat destroyers " Pluton " and
" Furor," came rushing out of the harbor entrance and were met by
the " Gloucester," under the command of Lieutenant Richard Wain-
wright. Shots from the " New York," which had now reached the
scene, and the " Texas," assisted the " Gloucester " in destroying these
two vessels. The " Furor " was sunk and the " Pluton " ran ashore
hauling down her colors. The " Vizcaya " went ashore at Aserraderos,
fifteen miles west of Santiago. On flew the " Cristobal Colon," fol
lowed by the " Brooklyn," the " Oregon," the plucky little " Vixen,"
the " Texas," and the " New York." The Americans had ceased
firing, intent only on winning the race; the "Oregon," "Brooklyn,"
278 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
and "Texas" were making great speed and closing in upon the doomed
vessels. In answer to a signal from Captain Clark of the " Oregon,"
Commodore Schley gave the orders to try one of the thirteen-inch
projectiles. The first struck the water close astern the " Colon," the
second reached the mark. The magnificent " Colon," the pride and
glory of the Spanish Navy, and considered one of the fleetest vessels in
the world, hauled down her colors and ran aground at Rio Darquino,
seventy-five miles west of Santiago, at 1:15 P. M., after a chase of three
hours and a quarter. Captain Cook of the " Brooklyn " went on board
to receive the surrender of the " Colon," conveying from Commodore
Schley most considerate orders as to the terms to be granted the
prisoners. The crew of 525 men were transferred to the " Resolute,"
while Commodore Paredes and his aide and Captain Moreu were taken
on board the " New York." The sea-valves of the vessel were opened
by the Spaniards, and she sank so rapidly that it was impossible tp
save her.
The survivors of the " Vizcaya," consisting of Captain Eulate and
twenty-five officers, together with 250 petty officers and men, thirty-
two of whom were wounded, were rescued by the " Iowa," while the
" Indiana," the " Gloucester," and other vessels were busy with the
work of rescuing the crews of the " Maria Teresa," the " Oquendo "
and the torpedo boats. Four hundred and eighty prisoners were taken
from the " Maria Teresa," and about forty from the " Oquendo,"
twenty-two from the " Pluton " and seventeen from the " Furor."
Admiral Cervera and his son were taken aboard the " Gloucester,"
and afterward transferred to the " Iowa."
In the noble work of rescue the kindness, tenderness and chivalry
of the American seaman were not less conspicuous than his matchless
courage and devotion in the hour of conflict.
The American officers and seamen bore testimony to the bravery
displayed by the Spaniards, as well as to the patience and fortitude
of the wounded prisoners, and their appreciation of the kindness with
which they were treated by their captors. The Spaniards had fought
against overwhelming odds, but they could have done immense dam
age to the blockading fleet had it not been for their incompetency
with machinery, and their poor marksmanship. Another thing against
the Spaniards was the fact that the seamen at the outset of this
desperate enterprise was stimulated by liquor, while the American
seamen were all sober. The Spaniards expected no quarter from the
Americans, and so astonished were they at the treatment received
CAPTAIN-GENERAL BLANCO.
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY.
28l
that Admiral Cervera cabled to General Blanco: " The crews are very
grateful for the noble generosity with which they were treated." The
prisoners were taken to healthy quarters in the United States, sup
plied with good clothing and food, while the officers were conveyed to
Annapolis and released on parole; and these men, so kindly treated by
the Americans, had been rescued by them at the risk of their own
lives.
In this action the Americans lost one killed and two wounded. The
man killed was George H. Ellis, yeoman of the " Brooklyn," who was
instantly killed by a shell from the " Vizcaya," as he was stepping
forward to find the range of that ship. None of the American vessels
were disabled, although the " Iowa " was struck five times, two shells
piercing her, one starting a fire that was quickly extinguished.
The following dispatch in regard to the action was sent by Com
modore Watson:
PLAYA DEL ESTE, July 3.
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, Washington:
July 3d, at 9:30 A. M. To-day Spanish squadron, seven in all, including one
gunboat, came out of Santiago in column and was totally destroyed within an
hour, excepting " Cristobal Colon," which was chased forty-five miles to west
ward by the commander-in-chief, " Brooklyn," " Oregon," and " Texas," sur
rendering to " Brooklyn," but was beached to prevent sinking. None of our
officers or men were injured, except on board " Brooklyn," the chief yeoman,
Ellis, was killed and one man wounded. Admiral Cervera, all commanding
officers excepting of " Oquendo," about seventy other officers, and 1,600 men
are prisoners. About 350 killed or drowned and 160 wounded; latter cared for
on " Solace " and " Olivette." Have just arrived off Santiago in " Marble-
head " to take charge while commander-in-chief is looking out for " Cristobal
Colon."
WATSON.
On the afternoon of the 3d, Admiral Sampson sent the following
cable dispatch to Washington:
SIBONEY, July $d, via HAYTI, July 4th.
The fleet under my command offers the nation, as a Fourth of July present,
the whole of Cervera's fleet. It attempted to escape at 9:30 this morning. At
2 the last ship, the " Cristobal Colon," had run ashore seventy-five miles west
of Santiago and had let down her colors. The " Infanta Maria Teresa,"
282
" Oquendo," and " Vizcaya," were forced ashore, burned and blown up wjthin
twenty miles of Santiago. The " Furor " and " Pluton " were destroyed
within four miles of the port.
SAMPSON
This message, which reached the President at noon on Monday
the 4th, .filled the country with joy and exultation, arousing the
national spirit from the depression caused by the heavy losses at San
Juan and El Caney on July ist.
Immediately on the receipt of Admiral Sampson's message, the
President sent the following:
EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, D. C, July 4th.
ADMIRAL SAMPSON, Playa del Este:
You have the gratitude and congratulations of the whole American people.
Convey to your noble officers and crews, through whose valor new honors have
been added to the American Navy, the grateful thanks and appreciation of the
nation.
WILLIAM McKINLEY.
Secretary Long sent the following:
To ADMIRAL SAMPSON, Playa del Este:
The Secretary of the Navy sends you and every officer and man of your
fleet, remembering affectionately your dead comrade, grateful acknowledg
ment of your heroism and skill. All honor to the brave. You have main
tained the glory of the American Navy.
JOHN D. LONG.
The following is a translation of Admiral Cervera's telegram de
scribing the battle:
CERVERA'S TELEGRAM.
PLAYA DEL ESTE (SANTIAGO).
I went out with the ships at 9:30 and sustained a very hot battle with the
enemy. The defense was brilliant, but it was impossible to fight against the
hostile forces, which were three times as large as ours. The " Maria Teresa,"
" Oquendo," and " Vizcaya," all with fire on board, ran ashore, and were then
blown up. The destroyers " Pluton " and " Furor " were sunk by shots from
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 283
the hostile guns. The " Colon," the Americans say, surrendered after running
aground. I estimate our losses at 600 killed and wounded. The rest of the
crews have been taken prisoners. Villaamil was killed in battle; I believe also
Lazaga. Among the wounded are Concas and Eulate. The Americans have
allowed the latter to retain his sword because of his brilliant conduct. I must
state that the American sailors are treating us with all possible consideration.
CERVERA.
Six days later, the admiral wrote as follows to the captain of the
U. S. S. " St. Louis," the vessel in which the officers of the Spanish
ships were transported to the United States:
Captain CASPER F. GOODRICH, U. S. M. S. " St. Louis: "
MY DEAR SIR. — I have the greatest pleasure in acknowledging by the pres
ent, in my own name and also in that of all captains and officers actually on
board this ship, that we consider ourselves under the greatest obligation to
you for the many kindness and excellent treatment which you and all the
officers under your command have shown to us during this passage. I must
also mention the careful and most valuable medical assistance which has been
given to our wounded and sick men; your kind feelings are gone as far in
this respect as to order them to be put in one of the saloons of the ship, in
order to provide more effectually to their comfort.
I know nothing which does not agree with what I have just written. * * *
I thank you again for the delicate and manifold acts of kindness through
which you have endeavored to alleviate the sore burden of our great misfor
tune. I assure you that I shall never forget them, and I am, sir,
Your most obedient servant,
PASCUAL CERVERA.
AT SEA, July 9, 1898.
The battles of Santiago and Manila, though reversed in circum
stances and movements, were perfect parallels as to results. The
losses to the Spaniards in these two engagements amounted to twenty
ships in all, valued at about $25,000,000. The Spanish loss in men in
both engagements was about 1,100 killed, 2,400 captured, and several
hundred wounded and missing. The American loss in the two battles
was one killed and sixteen wounded, while the injuries sustained by
our vessels were comparatively of the most trivial character. The
284 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
commanders engaged on the American side in the battle of Santiago
were Sampson, Schley, Clark, Philip, Cook, Evans, Taylor, and Wain-
wright, all of whom were eminent and conspicuous for bravery and
good conduct, and all of whom were advanced in the order of their
rank in recognition of their good service in this engagement.
On July 4th, the Spaniards made an attempt to imitate Hobson's
exploit by towing the dismantled cruiser " Reina Mercedes " into the
entrance to sink her across that part of the channel not closed by the
wreck of the " Merrimac." The movement was observed by the
battle ship " Texas," which opened fire with such good effect that the
" Mercedes " was driven out of her course to the north side of the
channel, where a thirteen-inch shell struck her in the hull, exploded
and sank her in shoal water, far out of the channel. The Spanish
cruiser "Alphonso XII " left Havana harbor and endeavored to reach
" Mariel," but was pursued and destroyed; the crew and part of her
cargo were rescued by detachments of Spanish infantry and artillery
which reached the shore where she was stranded.
On July loth, Santiago was bombarded by the " Brooklyn,"
" Texas," and " Indiana," and on the following day by the " New
York," " Brooklyn," and " Indiana," this demonstration being in
tended to support the attack of the army on the land side of the city.
On the I /th, Santiago having capitulated and the mines in the harbor
being removed under the terms of capitulation, the blockading fleet
entered the bay, and the gunners were able to observe for the first
time the effect of the projectiles fired by them during the various
bombardments.
On July 1 8th, all the Spanish ships in Manzanillo harbor were de
stroyed by the " Wilmington," " Helena," " Scorpion," " Hist,"
" Hornet," " Wompatuck," and " Osceola," without any casualties to
our own vessels. On the I2th of August the city was bombarded, but
on the next day news was brought of the agreement for a treaty of
peace, and hostilities ceased.
The most important facts demonstrated by the naval battles during
the war were the advantage of the use of smokeless powder, and the
great superiority of land fortifications over armed vessels; also the
great importance of thorough drilling in the care and use of machinery
and in marksmanship. So great have been the improvements in the
manufacture of artillery, that success in modern warfare depends in a
great measure upon the efficiency of the men handling the machinery.
Another fact demonstrated to the satisfaction of the members of the
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 285
" Maine " board of inquiry, as well as to the country at large, was
that the destruction of the " Maine " could not possibly have been due
to an internal cause, the wrecked vessels of Cervera's fleet having been
injured in such a manner as to cause their magazines to explode
leaving the wrecks in a condition totally different from that of the
" Maine."
The following are the official reports of officers engaged in the
battle with Cervera's squadron:
SAMPSON'S REPORT OF BATTLE WITH SPANISH FLEET.
U. S. FLAGSHIP " NEW YORK," IST RATE,
Off SANTIAGO DE CUBA, CUBA, July 15, 1898.
SIR. — I have the honor to make the following report upon the battle with
and the destruction of the Spanish squadron commanded by Admiral Cervera,
off Santiago de Cuba, on Sunday, July 3, 1898:
The enemy's vessels came out of the harbor between 9:35 and 10 A. M., the
head of the column appearing around Cay Smith at 9:31 and emerging from
the channel five or six minutes later.
The positions of the vessels of my command off Santiago at that moment
were as follows: The flagship " New York" was four miles east of her block
ading station and about seven miles from the harbor entrance. She had
started for Siboney, where I intended to land, accompanied by several of my
staff, and go to the front to consult with General Shafter. A discussion of the
situation and a more definite understanding between us of the operations pro
posed had been rendered necessary by the unexpectedly strong resistance of
the Spanish garrison of Santiago. I had sent my chief of staff on shore the
day before to arrange an interview with General Shafter, who had been suffer
ing from heat prostration. I made arrangements to go to his headquarters,
and my flagship was in the position mentioned above when the Spanish squad
ron appeared in the channel. The remaining vessels were in or near their
usual blockading positions, distributed in a semi-circle about the harbor en
trance, counting from the eastward to the westward, in the following order:
The "Indiana" about a mile and a half from shcre, the '"Oregon" — the
" New York's" place being between these two — the " Iowa," " Texas," and
" Brooklyn," the latter two miles from the shore west of Santiago. The dis
tance of the vessels from the harbor entrance was from two and one-half to
286 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
four miles, the latter being the limit of day blockading distance. The length
of the arc formed by the ships was about eight miles. The " Massachusetts "
had left at 4 A. M. for Guantanamo for coal. Her station was between the
" Iowa " and " Texas." The auxiliaries " Gloucester " and " Vixen " lay close
to the land and nearer the harbor entrance than the large vessels, the
" Gloucester " to the eastward and the " Vixen " to the westward. The tor
pedo boat " Ericsson " was in company with the flagship and remained with
her during the chase until ordered to discontinue, when she rendered very
efficient service in rescuing prisoners from the burning " Vizcaya." I inclose
a diagram showing approximately the positions of the vessels as described
above.
The Spanish vessels came rapidly out of the harbor, at a speed estimated at
from eight to ten knots, and in the following order: " Infanta Maria Teresa"
(flagship), "Vizcaya," "Cristobal Colon," and the " Almirante Oquendo."
The distance between these ships was about 800 yards, which means that from
4
the time the first one became visible in the upper reach of the channel until
the last one was out of the harbor, an interval of only about twelve minutes
elapsed. Following the " Oquendo," at a distance of about 1,200 yards, came
the torpedo-boat destroyer " Pluton," and after her the " Furor." The armored
cruisers, as rapidly as they could bring their guns to bear, opened a vigorous
fire upon the blockading vessels, and emerged from the channel shrouded in
the smoke from their guns.
The men of our ships in front of the port were at Sunday " quarters for
inspection." The signal was made simultaneously from several vessels,
" Enemy ships escaping," and general quarters were sounded. The men
cheered as they sprang to their guns, and fire was opened probably within
eight minutes by the vessels whose guns commanded the entrance. The
" New York " turned about and steamed for the escaping fleet, flying the
signal, " Close in towards harbor entrance and attack vessels," and gradually
increasing speed, until toward the end of the chase she was making sixteen
and one-half knots, and was rapidly closing on the " Cristobal Colon." She
was not, at any time, within the range of the heavy Spanish ships, and her
only part in the firing was to receive the undivided fire from the forts in
passing the harbor entrance, and to fire a few shots at one of the destroyers,
thought at the moment to be attempting to escape from the " Gloucester."
The Spanish vessels, upon clearing the harbor, turned to the westward in
column, increasing their speed to the full power of their engines. The heavy
blockading vessels, which had closed in toward the Morro at the instant of
the enemy's appearance, and at their best speed, delivered a rapid fire, well
sustained and destructive, which speedily overwhelmed and silenced the Spanish
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 287
fire. The initial speed of the Spaniards carried them rapidly past the blockad
ing vessels, and the battle developed into a chase in which the " Brooklyn "
and " Texas " had, at the start, the advantage of position. The " Brooklyn "
maintained this lead. The " Oregon," steaming with amazing speed from the
commencement of the action, took first place. The " Iowa " and the " Indi
ana " having done good work, and not having the speed of the other ships,
were directed by me, in succession, at about the time the " Vi/.caya " was
beached, to drop out of the chase and resume blockading stations. These ves
sels rescued many prisoners. The " Vixen,0 finding that the rush of the
Spanish ships would put her between two fires, ran outside of our own column
and remained there during the battle and chase.
The skillful handling and gallant fighting of the " Gloucester " excited the
admiration of everyone who witnessed it, and merits the commendation of
the Navy Department. She is a fast and entirely unprotected auxiliary vessel
— the yacht " Corsair " — and has a good battery of light rapid-fire guns.
She was lying about two miles from the harbor entrance, to the southward
and eastward, and immediately steamed in, opening fire upon the large ships.
Anticipating the appearance of the " Pluton " and " Furor," the " Gloucester "
was slowed, thereby gaining more rapidly a high pressure ©f steam, and when
the destroyers came out she steamed for them at full speed, and was able to
close to short range, while her fire was accurate, deadly, and of great volume.
During this fight the " Gloucester " was under the fire of the Socapa battery.
Within twenty minutes from the time they emerged from Santiago harbor the
careers of the " Furor " and the " Pluton " were ended, and two-thirds of their
people killed. The " Furor " was beached and sunk in the surf; the " Pluton "
sank in deep water a few minutes later. The destroyers probably suffered
much injury from the fire of the secondary batteries of the battle ships " Iowa,"
" Indiana," and the " Texas," yet I think a very considerable factor in their
speedy destruction was the fire, at close range, of the " Gloucester's " battery.
After rescuing the survivors of the destroyers, the " Gloucester " did excellent
service in landing and securing the crew of the " Infanta Maria Teresa."
The method of escape attempted by the Spaniards, all steering in the same
direction, and in formation, removed all tactical doubts or difficulties, and
made plain the duty of every United States vessel to close in, immediately
engage, and pursue. This was promptly and effectively done. As already
stated, the first rush of the Spanish squadron carried it past a number of the
blockading ships which could not immediately work up to their best speed;
but they suffered heavily in passing, and the " Infanta Maria Teresa " and the
" Oquendo " were probably set on fire by shells fired during the first fifteen
minutes of the engagement. It was afterward learned that the " Infanta Maria
288 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Teresa's " fire main had been cut by one of our first shots, and that she was
unable to extinguish fire. With large volumes of smoke rising from their
lower decks aft, these vessels gave up both fight and flight, and ran in on the
beach — the "Infanta Maria Teresa" at about 10:15 A. M. at Nima Nima, six
and a half miles from Santiago harbor entrance, and the " Almirante Oquendo "
at about 10:30 A. M. at Juan Gonzales, seven miles from the port.
The " Vizcaya " was still under the fire of the leading vessels; the c< Cristobal
Colon " had drawn ahead, leading the chase, and soon passed beyond the range
of the guns of the leading American ships. The " Vizcaya " was soon set on
fire, and, at 11:15, she turned inshore and was beached at Aserraderos, fifteen
miles from Santiago, burning fiercely and with her reserves of ammunition on
deck already beginning to explode. When about ten miles west of Santiago
the " Indiana " had been signaled to go back to the harbor entrance, and at
Aserraderos the " Iowa " was signaled to " Resume blockading station." The
" Iowa," assisted by the " Ericsson " and the " Hist," took off the crew of the
" Vizcaya," while the " Harvard " and the " Gloucester " rescued those *of
the " Infanta Maria Teresa " and the " Almirante Oquendo." This rescue of
prisoners, including the wounded, from the burning Spanish vessels was the
occasion of some of the most daring and gallant conduct of the day. The ships
were burning fore and aft, their guns and reserve ammunition were exploding
and it was not known at what moment the fire would reach the main maga
zines. In addition to this a heavy surf was running just inside the Spanish
ships. But no risk deterred our officers and men until their work of humanity
was complete.
There remained now of the Spanish ships only the " Cristobal Colon " — but
she was their best and fastest vessel. Forced by the situation to hug the
Cuban coast, her only chance of escape was by superior and sustained speed.
When the " Vizcaya " went ashore, the " Colon " wras about six miles ahead
of the "Brooklyn" and the "Oregon;" but her spurt was finished and the
American ships were now gaining upon her. Behind the " Brooklyn " and the
" Oregon " came the " Texas," " Vixen " and " New York." -It was evi
dent from the bridge of the " New York " that all the American ships were
gradually overhauling the chase, and that she had no chance of escape. At
12:50 the "Brooklyn" and the "Oregon" opened fire and got her range —
the " Oregon's " heavy shell striking beyond her — and at i :2O she gave up
without firing another shot, hauled down her colors and ran ashore at Rio
Torquino, forty-eight miles from Santiago. Captain Cook, of the " Brooklyn,"
went on board to receive the surrender. While his boat was alongside I came
up in the " New York." received his report and placed the " Oregon " in charge
of the wreck to save her, if possible, and directed the prisoners to be transferred
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 289
to the " Resolute," which had followed the chase. Commodore Schley, whose
chief of staff had gone on board to receive the surrender, had directed that
all her personal effects should be retained by the officers. This order I did
not modify. The " Cristobal Colon " was not injured by our firing, and
probably is not much injured by beaching, though she ran ashore at high
speed. The beach was so steep that she came off by the working of the sea.
But her sea valves were opened and broken, treacherously, I am sure, after her
surrender, and despite all efforts she sank. When it became evident that she
could not be kept afloat, she was pushed by the " New York " bodily upon
the beach, the " New York's " stem being placed against her for this purpose —
the ship being handled by Captain Chadwick with admirable judgment — and
sank in shoal water and may be saved. Had this not been done she would
have gone down in deep water and would have been, to a certainty, a total
loss.
I regard this complete and important victory over the Spanish forces as the
successful finish of several weeks of arduous and close blockade, so stringent
and effective during the night that the enemy was deterred from making the
attempt to escape at night, and deliberately elected to make the attempt in day
light. That this was the case I was informed by the commanding officer
of the " Cristobal Colon."
It seems proper to briefly describe here the manner in which this was ac
complished. The harbor of Santiago is naturally easy to blockade, there being
but one entrance and that a narrow one, and the deep water extending close
up to the shore line presenting no difficulties of navigation outside of the
entrance. At the time of my arrival before the port — June ist — the moon was
at its full, and there was sufficient light during the night to enable any move
ment outside of the entrance to be detected; but with the waning of the moon
and the coming of dark nights there was opportunity for the enemy to escape,
or for his torpedo boats to make an attack upon the blockading vessels. It
was ascertained with fair conclusiveness that the " Merrimac," so gallantly
taken into the channel on June 3d, did not obstruct it. I, therefore, maintained
the blockade as follows: To the battle ships was assigned the duty, in turn,
of lighting the channel. Moving up to the port, at a distance of from one to
two miles from the Morro — dependent upon the condition of the atmosphere
— they threw a search-light beam directly up the channel, and held it steadily
there. This lighted up the entire breadth of the channel for a half a mile inside
of the entrance so brilliantly that the movement of small boats could be de
tected. Why the batteries never opened fire upon the search-light ship was
always a matter of surprise to me; but they never did. Stationed close to the
entrance of the port were three picket launches and a little distance farther out
CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
three small picket vessels — usually converted yachts — and, when they were
available, one or two of our torpedo boats. With this arrangement there was
at least a certainty that nothing could get out of the harbor undetected. After
the arrival of the army, wher the situation forced upon the Spanish admiral a
decision, our vigilance increased. The night blockading distance was reduced
to two miles for all vessels, and a battle ship was placed alongside the search
light ship, with her broadside trained upon the channel in readiness to fire the
instant a Spanish ship should appear. The commanding officers merit the
greatest praise for the perfect manner in which they entered into this plan and
put it into execution. The " Massachusetts," which, according to routine, was
sent that morning to coal at Guantanamo, like the others had spent weary
nights upon this work, and deserved a better fate than to be absent that
morning.
I inclose for the information of the Department, copies of orders and mem
orandums issued from time to time, relating to the manner of maintaining the
blockade.
When all the work was done so well it is difficult to discriminate in praise.
The object of the blockade of Cervera's squadron was fully accomplished, and
each individual bore well his part in it — the commodore in command on the
second division, the captains of ships, their officers and men. The fire of the
battle ships was powerful and destructive, and the resistance of the Spanish
squadron was, in great purt, broken almost before they had got beyond the
range of their own forts. The fine speed of the " Oregon " enabled her to
take a front position in the chase, and the " Cristobal Colon " did not give up
until the " Oregon " had thrown a thirteen-inch shell beyond her. This per
formance adds to the already brilliant record of this fine battle ship, and speaks
highly of the skill and care with which her admirable efficiency has been main
tained during a service unprecedented in the history of vessels of her class.
The " Brooklyn's " westerly blockading position gave her an advantage in
the chase which she maintained to the end, and she employed her fine battery
with telling effect. The " Texas " and the " New York " were gaining on
the chase during the last hour, and had any accident befallen the " Brooklyn "
or the " Oregon," would have speedily overhauled the " Cristobal Colon."
From the moment the Spanish vessel exhausted her first burst of speed the re
sult was never in doubt. She fell, in fact, far below what might reasonably have
been expected of her. Careful measurements of time and distance give her an
average speed, from the time she cleared the harbor mouth until the time she
was run on shore at Rio Tarquino, of thirteen and seven-tenths knots. Neither
the " New York " nor the " Brooklyn " stopped to couple up their forward
engines, but ran out the chase with one pair, getting steam, of course, as
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 2QI
rapidly as possible on all boilers. To stop to couple up the forward engines
would have meant a delay of fifteen minutes, or four miles in the chase.
Several of the ships were struck — the "Brooklyn" more often than the
others — but very slight material injury was done, the greatest being aboard
the " Iowa." Our loss was one man killed and one wounded, both on the
" Brooklyn." It is difficult to explain this immunity from loss of life or injury
to ships in a combat with modern vessels of the best type, but Spanish gun
nery is poor at the best, and the superior weight and accuracy of our fire
speedily drove the men from their guns and silenced their fire. This is borne
out by the statements of prisoners and by observation. The Spanish vessels,
as they dashed out of the harbor, were covered with the smoke from their
own guns, but this speedily diminished in volume and soon almost disappeared.
The fire from the rapid-fire batteries of the battle ships appears to have been
remarkably destructive. An examination of the stranded vessels shows that
the " Almirante Oquendo " especially had suffered terribly from this fire.
Her sides are everywhere pierced and her decks were strewn with the charred
remains of those who had fallen.
The reports of Commodore W. S. Schley and of the. commanding officers
are inclosed.
A board, appointed by me several days ago, has made a critical examination
of the stranded vessels, both with a view of reporting upon the result of our
fire and the military features involved and of reporting upon the chance of
saving any of them and of wrecking the remainder. The report of the board
will be speedily forwarded.
Very respectfully,
W. T. SAMPSON,
Rear Admiral United States Navy.
Commander-in- Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
SCHLEY'S REPORT OF ENGAGEMENT WITH SPANISH
SQUADRON.
NORTH ATLANTIC FLEET, SECOND SQUADRON, U. S. FLAGSHIP " BROOKLYN,"
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, July 6, 1898.
SIR. — • I have the honor to make the following report of that part of the
squadron under your command which came under my observation during
the engagement with the Spanish fleet on July 3, 1898.
2Q2 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
At 9:35 A. M. Admiral Cervera, with the " Infanta Maria Teresa," " Vizcaya,"
" Oquendo," " Cristobal Colon " and two torpedo boat destroyers, came out
of the harbor of Santiago de Cuba in column at distance and attempted to
escape to the westward. Signal was made from the " Iowa " that the enemy
was coming out, but his movements had been discovered from this ship at the
same moment. This vessel was the farthest west, except the " Vixen," in the
blockading line. Signal was made to the western division, as prescribed in
your general orders, and there was immediate and rapid movements inward
by your squadron and a general engagement at ranges beginning at 1,100
yards and varying to 3.000 yards, until the " Vizcaya " was destroyed, about
10:50 A. M. The concentration of the fire of the squadron upon the ships com
ing out was most furious and terrific, and great damage was done them.
About twenty or twenty-five minutes after the engagement began two ves
sels, thought to be the " Teresa " and " Oquendo," and since verified as such,
took fire from the effective shell fire of the squadron and were forced to r\m
on the beach some six or seven miles west of the harbor entrance, where they
burned and blew up later. The torpedo boat destroyers were destroyed early
in the action, but the smoke was so dense in their direction that I cannot say
to which vessel or vessels the credit belongs. This, doubtless, was better seen
from your flagship.
The " Vizcaya " and " Colon," perceiving the disaster to their consorts, con
tinued at full speed to the westward to escape and were followed and en
gaged in a running fight with the " Brooklyn," " Texas," " Iowa " and
" Oregon " until 10:50, when the " Vizcaya " took fire from our shells. She
put her helm to port and, with a heavy list to port, stood in shore and ran
aground at Aserraderos, about twenty-one miles west of Santiago,, on fire
fore and aft, and where she blew up during the night. Observing that she
had struck her colors, and that several vessels were nearing her to capture
and save her crew, signal was made to cease firing. The " Oregon " having
proved vastly faster than the other battleships, she and the " Brooklyn," to
gether with the " Texas " and another vessel which proved to be your flagship
continued westward in pursuit of the " Colon," which had run close in shore,
evidently seeking some good spot to beach if she should fail to elude her
pursuers.
This pursuit continued with increasing speed in the " Brooklyn," " Oregon "
and other ships, and soon the " Brooklyn " and " Oregon " were within long
range of the " Colon," when the " Oregon " opened fire with her thirteen'
inch guns, landing a shell close to the " Colon." A moment afterwards the
" Brooklyn " opened fire with her eight-inch guns, landing a shell just ahead of
her. Several other shells were fired at the " Colon," now in range of the
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 2Q3
" Brooklyn's " and " Oregon's " guns. Her commander, seeing all chances of
escape cut off, and destruction awaiting his ship, fired a lee gun and struck
her flag at 1:15 P. M., and ran ashore at a point some fifty miles west of
Santiago harbor. Your flagship was coming up rapidly at the time, as was
also the " Texas " and " Vixen." A little later, after your arrival, the " Cristo
bal Colon," which had struck to the " Brooklyn " and the " Oregon," was
turned over to you as one of the trophies of this great victory of the squadron
under your command.
During my official visit, a little later, Commander Eaton, of the " Resolute,"
appeared and reported to you the presence of a Spanish battleship near Altares.
Your orders to me were to take the " Oregon " and go eastward to meet her,
and this was done by the " Brooklyn," with the result that the vessel reported
as an enemy was discovered to be the Austrian cruiser " Infanta Maria Teresa,"
seeking the commander-in-chief.
I would mention, for your consideration, that the " Brooklyn " occupied the
most westward blockading position, with the " Vixen," and, being more di
rectly in the route taken by the Spanish squadron, was exposed for some
minutes, possibly ten, to the gun fire of three of the Spanish ships and the
west battery, at a range of 1,500 yards from the ships and about 3,000 yards
from the batteries, but the vessels of the entire squadron, closing in rapidly,
soon diverted this fire and did magnificent work at close range. I have never
before witnessed such deadly and fatally accurate shooting as was done by the
ships of your command as they closed in on the Spanish squadron, and I deem
it a high privilege to commend to you, for such action as you may deem
proper, the gallantry and dashing courage, the prompt decision and the skillful
handling of their respective vessels of Captain Philip, Captain Evans, Captain
Clark, and especially my chief of staff, Captain Cook, who was directly under
my personal observation and whose coolness, promptness and courage were of
the highest order. The dense smoke of the combat shut out from my view
the " Indiana " and the " Gloucester," but, as these vessels were closer to your
flagship, no doubt their part in the conflict was under your immediate obser
vation.
Lieutenant Sharp, commanding the " Vixen," acted with conspicuous
courage; although unable to engage the heavier ships of the enemy with his
light guns, nevertheless was close in to the battle line under heavy fire, and
many of the enemy's shot passed beyond his vessel.
1 beg to invite special attention to the conduct of my flag lieutenant, James
H. Sears, and Ensign Edward McCauley, Jr., aid, who were constantly at my
side during the engagement and who exposed themselves fearlessly in dis
charging their duties; and also the splendid behavior of my secretary, Lietu-
294 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
tenant B. W. Wells, Jr., who commanded and directed the fighting of the
fourth division with splendid effect.
I would commend the highly meritorious conduct and courage in the en
gagement of Lieutenant Commander N. E. Mason, the executive officer, whose
presence everywhere over the ship during its continuance did much to secure
the good result of this ship's part in the victory.
The navigator, Lieutenant A. C. Hodgson, and the division officers, Lieu
tenant T. D. Griffin, Lieutenant W. R. Rush, Lieutenant Edward Simpson,
Lieutenant J. G. Doyle, Ensign Charles Webster and the junior divisional offi
cers were most steady and conspicuous in every detail of duty contributing
to the accurate firing of this ship in her part of the great victory of your forces.
The officers of the Medical, Pay, Engineer and Marine Corps responded to
every demand of the occasion, and were fearless in exposing themselves. The
warrant officers, Boatswain William L. Hill, Carpenter G. H. Warford and
Gunner F. T. Applcgate, were everywhere exposed, in watching for damage,
reports of which were promptly conveyed to me.
I have never in my life served with a braver, better, or worthier crew than
that of the " Brooklyn." During the combat, lasting from 9:35 until 1:15 P. M.,
much of the time under fire, they never flagged for a moment, and were appar
ently undisturbed by the storm of projectiles passing ahead, astern and over the
ship.
The result of the engagement was the destruction of the Spanish squadron
and the capture of the Admiral and some thirteen to fifteen hundred prisoners,
with the loss of several hundred killed, estimated by Admiral Cervera at 600
men.
The casualties on board this ship were: G. H. Ellis, chief yeoman, killed;
J. Burns, fireman, first class, severely wounded. The marks and scars show
that the ship was struck about twenty-five times, and she bears in all forty-one
scars as the result of her participation in the great victory of your force on
July 3, 1898. The speed-cone halyards were shot away and nearly all the
signal halyards. The ensign at the main was so shattered that in hauling it
down at the close of action it fell in pieces.
I congratulate you most sincerely upon this great victory to the squadron
under your command, and I am glad that I had an opportunity to contribute
in the least to a victory that seems big enough for all of us.
I have the honor to transmit herewith the report of the commanding officer
and a drawing, in profile, of the ship, showing the location of hits and scars,
also a memorandum of the ammunition expended and the amount to fill her
allowance.
Since reaching this place and holding conversation with several of the cap-
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. . 2Q5
tains, viz., Captain Etilate, of the Vizcaya, and the second in command of the
" Colon," Commander Contreias, I have learned that the Spanish admiral's
scheme was to concentrate all fire for awhile on the " Brooklyn," and the
" Vizcaya " to ram her, in the hopes that if they could destroy her the chance
of escape would be increased, as it was supposed she was the swiftest ship of
your squadron. This explains the heavy fire mentioned and the " Vizcaya's "
action in the earlier moments of the engagement. The execution of this purpose
was promptly defeated by the fact that all the ships of the squadron advanced
into close range and opened an irresistibly furious and terrific fire upon the
enemy's squadron as it was coming out of the harbor.
I am glad to say that the injury supposed to be below the water line was
due to a water valve being opened from seme unknown cause and flooding
the compartment. The injury to the belt is found to be only slight and the
leak small.
I beg to inclose a list of the officers and crew who participated in the combat
of July 3, 1898.
I cannot close this report without mentioning in high terms of praise the
splendid conduct and support of Captain C. E. Clark of the " Oregon." Her
speed was wonderful and her accurate fire splendidly destructive.
Very respectfully,
W. S. SCHLEY,
Commodore United States Navy.
Commanding Second Squadron North Atlantic Fleet.
The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. NAVAL FORCE, North Atlantic Station.
U. S. FLAGSHIP " NEW YORK," IST RATE,
PLAYA DEL ESTE, July 4, 1898.
SIR.— I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by
this ship in the action of yesterday during and following sortie of Admiral
Cervera's squadron.
The ship had started at 8:50 for the army landing at Siboney, the comrnander-
in-chief having an appointment with the general commander of the army. A
few minutes after the crew had been called to quarters for Sunday inspection,
firing was heard and a ship was seen leaving the harbor entrance; the helm was
2Q6 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
at once put over, the crew called to general quarters, signal " Close in toward
harbor entrance and attack vessels " made, orders given to spread all fires
and the ship headed back for the enemy, whose ships were seen successively
coming out at a high speed. The flagship " Infanta Maria Teresa " was first,
then another armored cruiser of the same class (which turned out to be the
" Vizcaya "), followed by the " Cristobal Colon," and armored cruiser
(" Oquendo "), and the torpedo-boat destroyers "Furor" and " Pluton."
The nearer ships had immediately engaged and by the time we were off the
entrance, one, the flagship, was already afire and was soon ashore. The
" Indiana " and " Gloucester" were actively engaged with the torpedo boats.
This ship fired some four-inch shell at the one nearer the port toward which
she was headed and seemed attempting to return, but she was already practi
cally out of the fight. The boiler of the more advanced one had blown up,
showing a vast column of condensed steam. During this time the batteries,
whose line of fire we had crossed close to, repeatedly fired upon us, without
effect. No return was made to this fire. A shell from the west battery fell
within 200 yards of the ship when we were over four miles to the westward
and we had thought ourselves entirely out of range. This ship stood on, leav
ing the " Gloucester," which had shown herself so capable, to look after the
survivors in the torpedo boats. By this time a second cruiser was ashore and
burning (the " Almirante Oquendo "), while the third, the " Vizcaya," and the
" Cristobal Colon " were still steaming rapidly westward. The " Indiana " was
now signaled (11:26 A. M.) to return to the blockading position to look after
snylhing which might be there. Very shortly the " Vizcaya " turned shoreward,
smoke began to issue from her afterpart, and by the time that she was ashore
on the reef at Aserraderos (fifteen miles west of Santiago) she was ablaze. The
" Iowa " had signaled a little before that she had surrendered, and stopped
off this place, where she gave much assistance in the rescue of the " Vizcaya's "
people.
This ship stood on in the chase of the " Cristobal Colon," with ahead of
us the " Brooklyn," " Oregon," " Texas " and " Vixen," the " Oregon " being
much nearer inshore of the two headmost ships, but not in gunshot. We were
rapidly increasing our speed.
It was evident, however, that the " Colon " would give us a lengthy chase,
and at noon the crew left quarters and went to dinner.
About 12:50 the "Oregon" opened fire, and some of her shells were ob
served to strike beyond the " Colon." This made her capture a foregone
conclusion, and shortly after i o'clock she turned in toward shore and soon
struck her colors. She had been beached at a small inlet known as Rio
Tarquino. By the time we arrived a boat was alongside her from the " Brook-
ADMIRAL SAMPSON.
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY.
lyn," and Captain Cook, the boarding officer, came alongside this and re
ported. This ship then sent a boat to take possession, the commanding
officer going in the boat. I was received by the commodore of the squadron,
the captain, Captain de Navio Don Emilio Moreu and Captain de Navio,
of the first class, Don Jose de Paredes y Chacon (which latter had been
civil governor of Santiago and had only just been attached to the squadron).
I arranged for the transfer of the crew and officers, a division to each ship
present and the engineer force to be left aboard. While aboard, however,
the " Resolute " arrived and it was arranged to transfer the whole number to
her.
I had taken with me the fleet surgeon, an engineer officer and the carpenter
to examine and make secure everything necessary. The engineer officer rey-
ported to me that she was making water aft. I had previously had soundings
taken and found eight feet at the bow and seventy at the stern, so that but a
small portion of the ship was ashore. I returned as quickly as possible to
the flagship to report the situation. The " Oregon " was signaled to take
charge and the men were hastened on board, a number being sent also from
this ship. Our work of closing water-tight doors, etc., was of no avail. A
large number of sea valves had been treacherously opened and the valves so
broken as to make it impossible to close them. The ship thus slowly settled.
At 7:30 she came afloat and came out into deeper water. The officer in charge
(Lieutenant-Commander Cogswell) had let go an anchor, but as it was clear
that if she went down in water of the depth in which she was she could never
be recovered, this ship's stem was placed against her quarter, and later, a
line being taken from our own bow to hers, the " Colon " was forced inshore.
It was by this time dark, but using a searchlight we were enabled gradually
to force the ship in on the beach, the chain being paid out at the same time.
She thus sank in a very moderate depth of water, and it is very probable she
may be saved.
At ii P. M. the flagship returned to Santiago, leaving the "Texas" and
" Oregon " in charge of the prize.
Though the ship was not able to come to action with any of the larger
ships on account of her distance to the eastward, every nerve was strained
to do so, and all was done that could be done. Our speed had rapidly in
creased so that we were going sixteen knots at the end. We were imme
diately astern while all others were considerably to seaward. We were thus in
a position to prevent a possible doubling to the rear and escape to the south
east.
The officers and crew, as they always have done, acted in the most enthu
siastic and commendable manner. They have worked into so complete a
300 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
system that the ship is practically instantaneously ready for action, and while
all are deserving of commendation and credit, I think it no derogation from
the deserts of others to particularly name Lieutenant-Commander Potter, to
whom, as executive officer, so much of the ship's efficiency is due, and Chief
Engineer McConnell, who has kept the machinery in the admirable order
which has enabled us at all times to develop the ship's full speed.
Very respectfully,
F. E. CHADWICK,
Captain, U. S. N., Commanding.
The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. NAVAL FORCE, North Atlantic Station.
U. S. FLAGSHIP "NEW YORK," 'IST RATE,
GUANTANAMO BAY, July 2Q, 1898.
SIR. — As supplementary to my report, dated July 4th, of the action of the
3d, I beg to state that at the close of the chase of the " Colon " our speed had
increased to not less than seventeen knots, instead of sixteen, as mentioned
in my ninth paragraph.
We were making at the close from 104 to 108 turns. One hundred and four
turns with a clean bottom would give seventeen and a third knots. One hun
dred and eight turns with a clean bottom would give eighteen knots. An
allowance of one knot off for foul bottom is more than ample, as the ship was
flying light, having in but a moderate amount of coal and very few stores.
Under such circumstances there can be no question that this ship would have
quickly overhauled the " Colon " had she continued her flight, and would have
insured her capture had there been an accident of any sort to the other ships
in pursuit.
Very respectfully,
F. E. CHADWICK,
Captain, U. S. N., Commanding.
The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 30 1
CAPTAIN CLARK'S REPORT OF BATTLE AT SANTIAGO, JULY 3,
1898.
U. S. S. " OREGON," IST RATE,
Off SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 4, 1898.
SIR.— I have the honor to report that at 9:30 A. M., yesterday, the Spanish
fleet was discovered standing out of the harbor of Santiago de Cuba. They
turned to the westward and opened fire, to which our ships replied vigorously.
For a short time there was an almost continuous flight of projectiles over this
ship, but when our line was fairly engaged, and the " Iowa " had made a swift
advance as if to ram or close, the enemy's fire became defective in train as
well as range. The ship was only struck three times, and at least two of them
were by fragments of shells. We had no casualties.
As soon as it was evident that the enemy's ships were trying to break through
and escape to the westward we went ahead at full speed, with the determination
of carrying out to the utmost your order: " If the enemy tries to escape, the ships
must close and engage as soon as possible and endeavor to sink his vessels
or force them to run ashore." We soon passed all of our ships except the
" Brooklyn," bearing the broad pennant of Commodore Schley. At first we
only used our main battery, but when it was discovered that the enemy's tor
pedo boats were following their ships we used our rapid-fire guns, as well as
the six-inch, upon them with telling effect. As we ranged up near the stern-
most of their ships she headed for the beach, evidently on fire. We raked her
as we passed, pushing on for the next ahead, using our starboard guns as they
were brought to bear, and before we had her fairly abeam she too was making
for the beach. The two remaining vessels were now some distance ahead, but
our speed had increased to sixteen knots and our fire, added to that of the
" Brooklyn," soon sent another, the " Vizcaya," to the shore in flames. The
" Brooklyn " signaled " Oregon, well done." Only the " Cristobal Colon "
was left, and for a time it seemed as if she might escape; but when we opened
with our forward turret guns and the " Brooklyn " followed, she began to
edge in toward the coast and her capture or destruction was assured. As she
struck the beach her flag came down and the " Brooklyn " signaled, " Cease
firing," following it with " Congratulations for the grand victory, thanks for
your splendid assistance."
The " Brooklyn " sent a boat to her, and when the admiral came up with
the " New York," " Texas," and " Vixen," she was taken possession of. A
prize crew was put on board from this ship under Lieutenant-Commander
Cogswell, the executive officer, but before 11 P. M. the ship, which had been
302 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
filling in spite of all efforts to stop leaks, was abandoned, and just as the
crew left she went over on her side.
I can not speak in too high terms of the bearing and conduct of all on board
this ship. When they found the " Oregon " had pushed to the front, and was
hurrying to a succession of conflicts with the enemy's vessels if they could be
overtaken, and would engage, the enthusiasm was intense.
As these vessels were so much more heavily armored than the " Brooklyn "
they might have concentrated upon and overpowered her, and consequently I
am persuaded that, but for the way the officers and men of the " Oregon "
steamed and steered the ship and fought and supplied her batteries, the
" Colon " and perhaps the " Vizcaya " would have escaped. Therefore, I feel
that they rendered meritorious service to the country; and while I can not
mention the name of each officer and man individually, I am going to append
a list of the officers, with the stations that they occupied, hoping that it may
be of service to them should the claims of others for advancement above thejn
ever be considered.
J. K. Cogswell, lieutenant-commander; had general charge of the batteries.
R. F. Nicholson, lieutenant; handled the ship, placing her as I directed
W. H. Allen, lieutenant; in charge of ammunition supply.
A. A. Ackerman, lieutenant; in charge of after thirteen-inch turret.
E. W. Eberle, lieutenant, junior grade; in charge of forward thirteen-inch
turret.
C. M. Stone, lieutenant, junior grade; in charge of six-inch battery.
L. A. Bostwick, ensign; aloft giving ranges till we closed, then in charge
of torpedoes.
C. L. Hussey, ensign; in charge of ten six-pounder H. R. F. guns.
R. Z. Johnston, ensign; in charge of signals and aid to captain.
R. Dickins, captain, U. S. M. C.; in charge of marines and four six-pounder
H. R. F.
A. R. Davis, second lieutenant, U. S. M. C. ; in charge of four six-pounder
H. R. F. and two one-pounder.
H. E. Yarnell, naval cadet; in charge port after eight-inch turret.
L. M. Overstreet, naval cadet; in charge of starboard forward eight-inch
turret.
C. R. Miller, naval cadet; in charge of port forward eight-inch turret.
S. G. Magill, naval cadet; in charge of six-inch gun.
C. S. Kempff, naval cadet; in charge of starboard eight-inch turret aft.
P. B. Dungan, naval cadet; in forward thirteen-inch turret.
E. J. Sadler, naval cadet; in forward chain of supplies.
E. £, Kalbfus, naval cadet; in after thirteen-inch turret.
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 303
H. L. Brinser, naval cadet; in after chain of supplies.
C. B. Hatch, naval cadet; at secondary battery.
C. Shackford, naval cadet; in torpedo division.
R. W. Milligan, chief engineer; in charge of machinery.
C. N. Offley, passed assistant engineer; in starboard engine-room.
J. M. Reeves, assistant engineer; in port engine-room.
F. Lyon, assistant engineer; in charge of firerooms.
H. N. Jenson, naval cadet; in after hydraulic pumproom.
W. D. Leahy, naval cadet; in forward hydraulic pumproom.
T. C. Dunlap, (acting) assistant engineer; in starboard engine-room.
P. A. Lovering, surgeon; in charge of hospital.
W. B. Grove, assistant surgeon; transportation of wounded.
S. R. Colhoun, paymaster; with surgeon, aid to wounded.
J. P. Mclntyre, chaplain; with surgeon, aid to wounded.
J. A. Murphy, pay clerk; aid to wounded in six-inch compartment.
John Costello, boatswain; in central station.
A. S. Williams, gunner; in powder division.
M. F. Roberts, carpenter; in powder division.
Very respectfully,
C. E. CLARK,
Captain, U. S. N., Commanding.
The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. NAVAL FORCE, North Atlantic Station.
CAPTAIN PHILIP'S REPORT OF THE BATTLE JULY 3, 1898.
U. S. S. " TEXAS,"
Off SANTIAGO, July 4, 1898.
SIR. — In accordance with the requirements of article 437, Navy Regulations,
I respectfully submit the following statement in regard to the part the " Texas "
took in the engagement with the enemy yesterday.
At daylight on the morning of the 3d the " Texas " stood out from entrance
to harbor, taking day blockading position, about three miles from the Morro
(the Morro bearing north-northeast).
At 9:35, the Morro bearing N. by E. % E., distant 5,100 yards, the enemy's
ships were sighted standing out of the harbor. Immediately general signal
250 was made; this signal was followed by the "Iowa's" almost at the same
time.
304 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
The ship, as per order, was heading in toward the entrance; went ahead
full speed, putting helm hard astarboard, and ordering forced draft on. all
boilers. The officer of the deck, Lieut. M. L. Bristol, having given the general
alarm and beat to quarters for action at the same time.
As the leader, bearing the admiral's flag, appeared in the entrance she
opened fire, which was, at 9:40, returned by the "Texas" at range of 4,200
yards while closing in. The ship leading was of the " Vizcaya " class and
the flagship.
Four ships came out, evidently the " Vizcaya," the " Oquendo," " Maria
Teresa," and " Colon," followed by two torpedo-boat destroyers. Upon seeing
these two we immediately opened fire upon them with our secondary battery,
the main battery at the time being engaged with the second and third ships
in line. Owing to our secondary battery, together with the " Iowa " and
" Gloucester," these two destroyers were forced to beach and sink.
Whilst warmly engaged with the third in line, which wyas abreast and engag
ing the " Texas," our fire was blanketed for a short time by the " Oregon "
forging ahead and engaging the second ship. This third ship, after a spirited
fire, sheered inshore, and in 10:35 ran up a white flag. We then ceased fire on
the third and opened fire with our forward guns at long range (6,600 yards)
on the second ship (which was then engaged with the " Oregon ") until 11:05,
when she (enemy's second ship) sheered in to the beach, on fire.
At 11:10 she struck her colors. We ceased fire and gave chase, with
" Brooklyn " and " Oregon," for the leading ship until 1:20, when the " Colon "
sheered in to beach and hauled down her colors, leaving them on deck at foot
of her flagstaff. We shut off forced draft and proceeded at moderate speed
to close up.
I would state that during this chase the " Texas " was holding her own with
the " Colon," she leading us about four miles at the start.
The reports of the executive order and the surgeon are transmitted.
I have the pleasure of stating that the entire battery of the " Texas " is in
a most excellent condition and ready for any service required by the com-
mander-in-chief, especially calling attention to the efficiency of the two turret
guns, due to the alterations recently made by Lieut. F. J. Haeseler, of this ship.
The bearing and performance of duty of all officers met with my entire
approval.
Very respectfully submitted,
J. W. PHILIP,
Captain, U. S. N., Commanding.
The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, North Atlantic Station.
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 305
CAPTAIN TAYLOR'S REPORT OF ENGAGEMENT WITH SPANISH
FLEET.
U. S. S. " INDIANA," IST RATE,
Off SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 4, 1898.
SIR. — I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of
the " Indiana " in the action of July 3d with the Spanish squadron off Santiago
de Cuba:
At 9:37 A. M., while the crew were at quarters preliminary to general muster,
noted two guns fired from the " Iowa " and general signal " Enemy's ships
escaping " flying. At once cleared ship for action and the crew were at the
guns in a remarkably short time, all officers and men showing an alacrity that
indicated clearly their pleasure at the opportunity offered them.
The Spanish squadron was seen emerging from the harbor, and in a few
moments a general action ensued. The leading ship, which proved to be the
" Infanta Maria Teresa," flying the flag of Vice-Admiral Cervera, was followed
by the other vessels of the squadron, as follows: " Vizcaya," " Cristobal
Colon," " Oquendo," and the torpedo-boat destroyers " Furor " and " Pluton."
The enemy's vessels headed to the westward and our ships headed in the same
direction, keeping as nearly abreast of them as possible.
This ship fired on all of them as they came out one by one, and continued
the action later by firing principally on the " Maria Teresa," " Oquendo,"
" Furor," and " Pluton." Several of our shells were seen to take effect on
these vessels. Our secondary-battery guns were directed principally on the
destroyers, as were the six-inch guns. The destroyers were sunk through
the agency of our guns and those of the " Gloucester," which vessel had come
up and engaged them close aboard.
The initial fire of the last two ships was directed at this vessel, and, although
falling very close, only striking the ship twice, without any injury to ship or
crew.
Our ranges were obtained by stadimeter angles on Morro as the ships
emerged, and then by angles on the tops of the rear ships. The ranges were
from 4.500 to 2,000 yards, observed from the top. From the bridge I could
see that our shooting was excellent and showed its effect. One of our thirteen-
inch shells was seen to enter the " Maria Teresa " under the quarter-deck and
explode, and that ship was observed on fire very shortly afterward.
About 10:15 A- M- observed the " Maria Teresa " and " Oquendo " on fire
and heading for the beach, the fire from their guns having ceased. We then
3o6
devoted our special attention to prevent the escape of the destroyers, which
appeared more than a match for the " Gloucester," she being the only small
vessel near to engage them. They were soon seen to blow up, apparently
struck by our six-inch and six-pounders. We now fired our large guns at
the " Vizcaya," which was at long range. She made for the shore soon after,
on fire and battery silenced. These ships hauled down their colors as they
made for the beach. The Spanish flagship hoisted the white flag as she
grounded.
We now ceased firing. The " Colon " was observed well over the western
horizon, closely pursued by the " Brooklyn," " Oregon," and " Texas," offshore
of her. The flagship " New York," steaming full speed to the westward, as
soon as the " Vizcaya " surrendered signaled us, " Go back and guard entrance
of harbor." Several explosions were observed on board the burning ships.
At noon turned and stood to the eastward for our station, in obedience to the
above signal. Observed the " Harvard " and several transports standing tp
the westward.
About 12:30 the "Resolute" came within hail and informed us by mega
phone that a Spanish battle ship was sighted to the eastward, standing toward
us. Later the " Harvard " passed, confirming the information, and adding
that the ship was painted white. We made out the vessel ahead and stood
for her with our guns bearing. She proved to be the Austrian armored cruiser
" Kaiserin Maria Teresa." She sent an officer on board and requested per
mission to enter the harbor. I referred him to the commander-in-chief. She
then stood on to the westward and we resumed our station.
During this action we used no armor-piercing shell except the smokeless
powder six-pounders, and the good effect of the common shell is shown by
the fires on the enemy's ships and the short time taken to disable them without
piercing their armor, and with almost no injury to our ships.
The guns and mounts worked well; only two failures of electric primers
noted.
During the afternoon sent boats with surgeon on shore to the burning ves
sels to assist in caring for the wounded. The boats returned, bringing one
wounded officer and seventeen men as prisoners.
Received also during the afternoon and night prisoners from the '' Glouces
ter " and " Hist," in all 7 officers and 217 men, which were to-day transferred
to the " St. Louis."
The conduct of the officers and crew was in every respect commendable;
coolness and good discipline prevailed, coupled with a marked enthusiasm.
This desirable condition of affairs is largely due to the efforts of the officers,
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 307
and I desire to commend to the commander-in-chief the executive officer,
Lieut-Commander John A. Rodgers, and all the officers of the ship, for the
part taken by the " Indiana " in bringing about this great victory and the
complete destruction of the enemy's squadron.
Very respectfully,
H. C. TAYLOR,
Captain, Commanding.
The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. NAVAL FORCE, North Atlantic Station.
U. S. S. " INDIANA," IST RATE,
Off SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 14, 1898.
SIR. — Fearing that some mistake might occur as to the position of the
" Indiana " when the Spanish squadron came out, owing to my having omitted
it in my report, I have the honor to inclose a sketch showing our correct
position at the time.
There are circumstances that identify clearly this position of the " Tndiana "
on the sketch. One of these is that by my order the officer of the deck
steamed out when the flagship turned to the eastward and took a position upon
the line parallel to shore formed by the other ships and closed in the interval
on that line. The bearing of Morro at that time was between NNW. % W.
and NW. by N. The distance is fixed by the fact that the first range given
by the officer in the top, as obtained by vertical angle of Morro, measured by
sextant and stadimeter, was 4,200 yards, and at this time we had only begun
to close in on the entrance, according to your instructions, and had barely
gathered way.
Our distance was, therefore, about 4,300 yards, with Morro bearing between
NNW. V2 W. and NW. by N., the ship at the time heading west-northwest
and stationary.
Very respectfully,
H. C. TAYLOR,
Captain, Commanding.
THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. NAVAL FORCE, North Atlantic Station.
308 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
CAPTAIN EVANS' REPORT OF ENGAGEMENT WITH SPANISH
SQUADRON, JULY 3, 1898.
U. S. S. " IOWA," IST RATE,
Off SANTIAGO DE CUBA, CUBA, July 4, 1898.
SIR. — I have the honor to make the following report of the engagement
with the Spanish squadron off Santiago de Cuba on the 3d of July:
On the morning of the 3d, while the crew was at quarters for Sunday
inspection, the leading vessel of the Spanish squadron was sighted at 9:31
coming out of the harbor at Santiago de Cuba. Signal, " Enemy's ships
coming out," was immediately hoisted and a gun fired to attract attention.
The call to general quarters was sounded immediately, the battery made ready
for firing, and the engines rung full speed ahead.
The position of the vessel at the time of sighting the squadron was the usuaj
blockading station off the entrance of the harbor, Morro Castle bearing about
north and distant about three to four miles. The steam at this time in the
boilers was sufficient for a speed of five knots.
After sighting the leading vessel, the " Infanta Maria Teresa " (Admiral
Cervera's flagship), it was observed that she was followed in succession by
the remaining three vessels of the Spanish squadron, the " Vizcaya," " Cristo
bal Colon," and " Almirante Oquendo." The Spanish ships moved at a speed
of about eight to ten knots, which was speedily increased as they cleared the
harbor entrance and stood to the westward. They maintained a distance of
about 8co yards between vessels. The squadron moved with precision and
stations were well kept.
Immediately upon sighting the leading vessel fires were spread, and the
" Iowa " headed toward the leading Spanish ship. About 9:40 the first shot
was fired from this ship, at a distance of about 6,000 yards.
The course of this vessel was so laid that the range speedily diminished.
A number of shots were fired at ranges varying between 6,000 and 4,000 yards.
The range was rapidlv reduced to 2,500 yards, and subsequently to 2,000 and
to 1,200 yards.
When it was certain that the " Maria Teresa " would pass ahead of us, the
helm was put to starboard, and the starboard broadside delivered at a range
of 2,500 yards. The helm was then put to port and the ship headed across
the bow of the second ship, and as she drew ahead the helm was again put to
starboard and she received in turn the full weight of our starboard broadside at
a range of about 1,800 yards. The " Iowa " was again headed off with port
helm for the third ship, and as she approached the helm was put to starboard
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 309
until our course was approximately that of the Spanish ship. In this position
at a range of 1,400 yards the fire of the entire battery, including rapid-fire guns,
was poured into the enemy's ships.
About 10 o'clock the enemy's torpedo-boat destroyers " Furor " and '* Plu-
ton " were observed to have left the harbor and to be following the Spanish
squadron. At the time that they were observed, and in fact most of the time
that they were under fire, they were at a distance varying from 4,500 to 4,000
yards. As soon as they were discovered the secondary battery of this ship
was turned upon them, while the main battery continued to engage the " Viz-
caya," " Oquendo," and " Maria Teresa."
The fire of the main battery of this ship, when the range was below 2,500
yards, was most effective and destructive, and after a continuance of this fire
for perhaps twenty minutes it was noticed that the " Maria Teresa " and
" Oquendo " were in flames and were being headed for the beach. Their colors
were struck about 10:20, and they were beached about eight miles west of
Santiago.
About the same time (about 10:25) the fire of this vessel, together with that
of the " Gloucester " and another smaller vessel, proved so destructive that
one of the torpedo-boat destroyers (" Pluton ") was sunk and the " Furor "
was so much damaged that she was run upon the rocks.
After having passed, at 10:35, the " Oquendo " and Maria Teresa," on fire
and ashore, this vessel continued to chase and fire upon the " Vizcaya " until
10:36, when signal to cease firing was sounded on board, it having been dis
covered that the " Vizcaya " had struck her colors.
At ii the " Iowa" arrived in the vicinity of the " Vizcaya," whi<,h had been
run ashore, and, as it was evident that she could not catch the " Cristobal
Colon," and that the " Oregon," " Brooklyn," and " New York " would, two
steam cutters and three cutters were immediately hoisted out and sent to the
" Vizcaya " to rescue her crew. Our boats succeeded in bringing off a large
number of officers and men of that ship's company, and in placing many of
them on board the torpedo boat " Ericsson " and the auxiliary dispatch vessel
" Hist."
About 11:30 the "New York" passed in chase of the "Cristobal Colon,"
which was endeavoring to escape from the " Oregon," " Brooklyn," and
" Texas."
We received on board this vessel from the " Vizcaya," Captain Eulate, the
commanding officer, and twenty-two officers, together with about 248 petty
officers and men, of whom thirty-two were wounded. There were also re
ceived on board five dead bodies, which were immediately buried with; the
honors due to their grade.
The battery behaved well in all respects.
310 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
The dashpot of the forward twelve-inch gun, damaged in the engagement
of the 2d, had been replaced the same day by one of the old dashpots, which
gave no trouble during this engagement.
The following is an approximate statement of the ammunition expended
during the engagement. A more exact statement cannot be given at this time:
Twelve-inch semi-armor-piercing shell, with full charges 31
Eight-inch common shell, with full charges 35
Four-inch cartridges, common shell 251
Six-pounder cartridges, common shell 1,056
One-pounder cartridges, common shell 100
This ship was struck in the hull, on the starboard side, during the early
part of the engagement by two projectiles of about six-inch caliber, one strik
ing the hull two or three feet above the actual water line and almost directly
on the line of the berth deck, piercing the ship's side between frames 9 and 10,
arid the other piercing the side and the cofferdam between frames 18 and 19.
The first projectile did not pass beyond the inner bulkhead of the cofferdam
A 4I~43- The hole made by it was large and ragged, being about sixteen inches
in a longitudinal direction and about seven inches in a vertical direction. It
struck with a slight inclination aft, and perforated the cofferdam partition bulk
head (A 41-43 to 4S~47)- It did not explode, and remained in the cofferdam.
The second projectile pierced the side of the ship and the cofferdam A 105,
the upper edge of the hole being immediately below the top of the cofferdam
on the berth deck in compartment A 104. The projectile broke off the hatch
plate and the coaming of the water-tank compartment, exploded, and perforated
the walls of the chain locker. The explosion created a small fire, which was
promptly extinguished. The hole in the side made by this projectile was
about five feet above the water line, and about two or three feet above the
berth deck. One fragment of this shell struck a link of the sheet chain wound
around the six-pounder ammunition hoist, cutting the link in two. Another
perforated the cofferdam on the port side and slightly dished the outside
plating. »
These two wounds, fortunately, were not of serious importance.
Two or three other projectiles of small caliber struck about the upper bridge
and smokestacks, inflicting trifling damage, and four other small projectiles
struck the hammock nettings and the side aft.
There are no casualties among the ship's company to report. No officer
nor man was injured during the engagement.
After having received on board the rescued crew of the " Vizcaya," this
vessel proceeded to the eastward and resumed the blockading station in obe
dience to the signal made by the commander-in-chief about 11:30.
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 311
Upon arriving on the blockading station, the " Gloucester " transferred to
this vessel Rear Admiral Cervera, his flag lieutenant, and the commanding
officers of the torpedo-boat destroyers " Furor " and " Pluton," and also one
man of the " Oquendo's " crew, rescued by the " Gloucester."
Naval Cadets Frank Taylor Evans and John E. Lewis, and five men belong
ing to the " Massachusetts," were on board the " Iowa " when the enemy's
ships came out. They were stationed at different points and rendered efficient
service.
The officers and men of this ship behaved admirably. No set of men could
have done more gallant service.
I take pleasure in stating to you, sir, that the coolness and judgment of the
executive officer, Lieutenant-Commander Raymond P. Rodgers, deserves, and
will, I hope, receive a proper reward at the hands of the Government. The test
of the executive officer's work is the conduct of the ship and crew in battle.
In this case it was simply superb.
The coolness of the navigator, Lieutenant W. H. Schuetze, and of Lieutenant
F. K. Hill, in charge of the rapid-fire guns on the upper deck, are worthy of the
greatest commendation.
Other officers of the ship did not come under my personal observation, but
the result of the action shows how well they did their duty.
I cannot express my admiration for my magnificent crew. So long as
the enemy showed his flag they fought like American seamen; but when the
flag came down they were as gentle and tender as American women.
In conclusion, sir, allow me to congratulate you on the complete victory
achieved by your fleet.
Very respectfully,
R. D. EVANS,
Captain, U. S. N., Commanding.
The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. NAVAL FORCE, North Atlantic Station.
COMMANDER WAINWRIGHT'S REPORT OF BATTLE AT
SANTIAGO.
U. S. S. " GLOUCESTER,"
Off SANTIAGO DE CUBA, Cuba, July 6, 1898.
Sir..— I have the honor to report that at the battle of Santiago on July 3d,
the officers and crew of. the " Gloucester " were uninjured and the vessel was
312 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
not injured in hull or machinery, the battery only requiring some slight over
hauling. It is now in excellent condition.
I inclose herewith a copy of the report of the executive officer made in
compliance with paragraph 525, page no, Naval Regulations, which report, I
believe, to be correct in all particulars. I also inclose copies of the reports
of the several officers, which may prove valuable for future reference.
It was the plain duty of the " Gloucester " to look after the destroyers, and
she was held back, gaining steam, until they appeared at the entrance. The
" Indiana " poured in a hot fire from all her secondary battery upon the
destroyers; but Captain Taylor's signal, " Gunboats close in," gave security
that we would not be fired upon by our own ships. Until the leading destroyer
was injured our course was converging, necessarily; but as soon as she slack
ened her speed, we headed directly for both vessels, firing both port and star
board batteries as the occasion offered.
All the officers and nearly all the men deserve my highest praise during the
action. The escape of the " Gloucester " was due mainly to the accuracy and
rapidity of the fire. The efficiency of this fire, as well as that of the ship
generally, was largely due to the intelligent and unremitting efforts of the
executive officer, Lieutenant Harry P. Huse. The result is more to his credit
when it is remembered that a large proportion of the officers and men were
untrained when the " Gloucester " was commissioned. Throughout the action
he was on the bridge and carried out my orders with great coolness. That we
were able to close in with the destroyers — and until we did so they were not
seriously injured — was largely due to the skill and constant attention of P. A.
Engineer George W. McElroy. The blowers were put on and the speed in
creased to seventeen knots without causing a tube to leak or a brass to heat.
Lieutenant Thomas C. Wood, Lieutenant George H. Norman, Jr., and Ensign
John T. Edson not only controlled the fire of the guns in their divisions and
prevented waste of ammunition, but they also did some excellent shooting
themselves. Acting Assistant Surgeon J. F. Bransford took charge of one of
the guns and fired it himself occasionally. Acting Assistant Paymaster Alex
ander Brown had charge of the two Colt guns, firing one himself, and they did
excellent work. Assistant Engineer A. M. Proctor carried my orders from
the bridge and occasion?lly fired a gun when I found it was not being served
quite satisfactorily. All were cool and active at a time when they could have
had but little hope of escaping uninjured.
Lieutenants Wood and Norman, Ensign Edson, and Assistant Engineer Proc
tor were in charge of the boats engaged in saving life. They all risked their
lives repeatedly in boarding and remaining near the two destroyers and the
two armed cruisers when their guns were being discharged by the heat and
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 313
their magazines and boilers were exploding. They also showed great skill
in landing and taking off the prisoners through the surf.
Of the men mentioned in the several reports, I would call special attention
to John Bond, chief boatswain's mate. He would have been recommended
to the Department for promotion prior to his gallant conduct during the
action of July 3d. I would also recommend to your attention Robert P.
Jennings, chief machinist, mentioned in the report of Mr. McElroy. I believe
it would have a good effect to recognize the skill of the men and the danger
incurred by the engineer's force. I would also recommend that the acting
appointments of those men mentioned by the officers in their reports be made
permanent.
The wounded ana exhausted prisoners were well and skillfully tended by
Assistant Surgeon Bransford, assisted by Ensign Edson, who is also a surgeon.
The admiral, his officers and men were treated with all consideration and
care possible. They were fed and clothed as far as our limited means would
permit.
Very re> pectfully,
RICHARD WAINWRIGHT,
Lieutenant-Commander, U. S. N., Commanding.
The COMMANDER-IN- CHIEF U. S. NAVAL FORCES, North Atlantic Station.
LIEUTENANT SHARP'S REPORT OF ENGAGEMENT OF "VIXEN"
WITH SPANISH FLEET JULY 3, 1898.
U. S. S. " VIXEN,"
GUANTANAMO, Cuba, July 7, 1898.
SIR. — I have the honor to make the following report as to the part taken
by the U. S. S. " Vixen " in the engagement with the Spanish fleet under the
command of Admiral Cervera during the morning and afternoon of Sunday,
July 3, 1898.
Between 9:35 and 9:45 A. M. the "Vixen" was at a point about four miles
to the westward of Morro, and at a distance of about one and ones-half miles
south of the shore line. At about 9:40 it was reported to me that an explosion
had taken place in the entrance of Santiago Harbor. I went on deck and
almost immediately sighted the leading vessel of the Spanish fleet standing out
of the entrance. Some of the vessels of our fleet were closing in toward Morro
and firing.
314 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
The " Vixen " was heading toward the Morro. The engines were ordered
ahead at full speed and the helm put hard aport, the object being to cross ahead
of the leading Spanish vessel, and thus not obstruct the gun fire of our own
fleet, the shells from which soon began to fall about the position we had just
left.
The leading Spanish vessel opened fire on this vessel with her starboard
bow guns the projectiles from which passed over us, all being aimed too high.
I estimate the number of shots fired at us at this time to have been between
five and ten
As the " Vixen " gathered headway her head came to about south by east,
opening the <; Brooklyn " up about two points on our port bow; steadied her
and steamed on about this course until we had reached a position about a mile
to the southward and westward of the " Brooklyn," which was now turning with
port helm and firing her guns as they bore on the enemy's vessels. At 9:50
hoisted signal No. 252. The course was then ordered changed to west-south
west, the intention being to steer a parallel course to that of the Spanish fleet.
By some mistake the quartermaster steadied the helm on southwest by south,
which was soon discovered, but not until the " Vixen " had increased her dis
tance off-shore by perhaps another half mile. The course west-southwest was
again ordered, and when steadied on it we were an estimated distance of about
five miles from the shore. From about 10:15 the courses and times of changing
were as follows: At 10:15 changed course to W. % S., at 10:56 to NW. by N.,
at 11:00 WNW., at 11:05 W. by N., at 11:10 NW. by W., at 11:15 W. by N.,
at 11:30 W. by S., at 1:50 W. by N. All these courses were by the steering
compass, and the speed was estimated from twelve to thirteen and one-half
knots per hour. Times noted are by deck clock, which was five minutes fast
of watch time used in the notes inclosed.
Seeing that the Spanish vessels were out of range of our guns while we
were well within range of theirs, we reserved our fire.
About 11:06, having approached within range of the " Vizcaya, we opened
fire with our starboard battery at an elevation of 5,000 yards for the six-pounder
guns and extreme elevation for the one-pounders; continued the fire for six
minutes, when, seeing that the ensign of the " Vizcaya " was not flying, at
11:12 ordered cease firing. Expended 27 six-pounder armor-piercing shells and
18 one-pounder common shells.
After passing Aserraderos the course was held at from west by north to west
by south, heading for the point on the western horizon. Average speed, about
twelve to thirteen and one-half knots; average number of revolutions, 105 per
minute; average steam pressure, 122% pounds.
The " Brooklyn " and " Oregon " bore on the port and starboard bows, re-
CAPT. "BOB " EVANS.
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 317
spectively, and were gradually dropping the " Vixen " astern, as was the
" Cristobal Colon," which was running closer inshore. About 12:25 the " Ore
gon " opened fire on the " Colon, as did also the " Brooklyn," feeling their
way up to the range, which was apparently obtained after the fourth or fifth
shot. About i :2o the " Oregon " and " Brooklyn " headed inshore about four
points. About i :28 the " Texas " hoisted signal, " Enemy has surrendered."
This signal was repeated to the "New York" by the "Vixen." At 2:30
'' Vixen " stopped off Rio Tarquino, in the vicinity of the " Oregon " and
'' Brooklyn." The " Cristobal Colon " was close inshore, bows on the beach,
her colors down, lying on the deck at the foot of her staff.
I have the honor to inclose a copy of notes taken during the chase by my
orders upon the suggestion of Lieutenant Harlow. These notes were written
by Assistant Paymaster Doherty. The incidents and times were given by
Lieutenant Harlow, whose watch was five minutes slow of deck-clock time.
The times taken after 10:30 are accurate; those taken before that time were
estimated and may be in error a few minutes.
Inclosed is a sketch showing positions of vessels at various times. It is
taken from a chart taken from the ." Cristobal Colon " after the surrender and
is enlarged four times. All courses are true.
In conclusion, I wish to call to your attention the coolness and strict atten
tion to duty of both officers and men.
Very respectfully,
ALEX. SHARP, JR.,
Lieutenant, Commanding.
The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. NAVAL FORCES, North Atlantic Station.
In connection with the defeat of Cervera's squadron on the 3d of
July, the following pages from the report of the Spanish Lieutenant
Jose Muller y Tejeiro, will be found interesting.
XXVI.
SORTIE OF THE FLEET.
If I were to live a thousand years and a thousand centuries, never should I
forget that 3d day of July, 1898, nor do I believe that Spain will ever forget it.
The day dawned beautifully. One of those summer days when not the slightest
breath of air stirs the leaves of the trees, when not the smallest cloud is visible
in the skies; when not the slightest vapor fills the atmosphere, which was won
derfully transparent, so that the horizon could be observed at a great distance.
318 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Nothing special was to be noticed among the ships of our fleet; motionless
on the quiet waters of the bay, that reflected their hulls, though inverted, with
wonderful accuracy, they looked as though they ought not to leave an anchor
ing place where they could remain in such perfect safety.
It was 8:30. Feeling sure that the ships would not go out, and taking advan
tage of the chance of getting a horse, for the distance was great, I went to the
military hospital to see Mr. Joaquin Bustamente, whom I found a different man,
as the saying is. His voice was strong, his eyes bright, and his cheeks flushed.
He moved with ease and did not appear to experience any difficulty in doing so.
I was agreeably surprised.
Why does one remember things that are really not of great importance? Is
it perhaps because they are connected with others that are? I cannot explain it.
I only know that I remember, word for word, the conversation that took place
between us. It was as follows:
" Is the fleet not going out? " he asked, without giving me a chance to say
anything.
" Not just now, I believe, though it is ready to go out. Is it known when
the other fleet will arrive? " I said.
"What other fleet?"
" The one that is supposed to come from Spain; they probably know at about
what time it may be expected at the mouth of the harbor."
" Don't be simple." (I don't remember whether he called me simple, or
innocent, or a fool.) " There is no other fleet; the ships are going out and that
is all there is to it. I have a letter from Don Pascual (Admiral Cervera) in
which he tells me so."
I remained thunderstruck. I could doubt no longer. I know Admiral Cer
vera sufficiently well, as does everybody else, to know that he does not say, and
still less write, what he does not intend to do.
" Do you think he will go out to-day? " I said.
" I thought he was going even now."
I could not answer. A gunshot which, judging from the direction, could
only be from one of the two fleets, left me motionless.
Two or three minutes later a terrific cannonade commenced, such as I have
never heard, nor will probably ever hear again, a cannonade more intense than
that of June 6th, a thing which I believed impossible, shaking the building,
thundering through the air. I could not think coherently. I kept looking
at Mr. Bustamente like an imbecile, and he looked at me and didn't say a word.
I felt something that commenced at my feet and went up to my head, and my
hair must have stood on end. Then suddenly, without taking leave. T went out,
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 319
got on my horse and rode down the hill at breakneck speed, and I hardly under
stand how it was that I did not break my neck. I arrived at the captaincy of
the port, where I found them all, from the commander of marine to the last
clerk, with emotion painted on every face, and all looking in the direction of
the mouth of the harbor, the mountains of which, that had been such a protection
to us, and which now prevented us from seeing what was going on outside, we
should have liked to grind to powder.
The noise caused by the gunshots which the mountains and valleys echoed
was truly infernal and comparable to nothing. An idea may be gained of what
it was when it is remembered that over 250 guns, most of them of large
caliber and all breach-loading, were firing incessantly. The earth trembled,
and very soon Punta Gorda, the Morro and the Socapa took part in the fright
ful concert, adding the thunder of their guns to the noise of those of the two
fleets.
But the firing continued and that is what puzzled me. I thought, taking
into account the number and class of hostile ships and of our own, that the
catastrophe of the latter must necessarily take place in the very channel of the
harbor, which is such a difficult one, even for ships of less length and draft than
those which formed our fleet, under normal conditions; how much more, then,
when sustaining a battle. A deviation, a change of course ahead of time, an
injury to the rudder or the engine, even though slight and momentary, the least
carelessness, in a word, might run a ship aground, and such a disaster would
cause also the destruction of the other ships that were coming after and which
would have collided with the first; the hostile ships might sink the first right
there and then; for the same reasons, the disaster of the others becomes
inevitable.
To my mind, the going out from Santiago harbor under the circumstances
Admiral Cervera did, and as confirmed by the commanders of the ships of the
fleet, constitutes the greatest act of valor imaginable, for it meant to go out to
certain death, not only with fearlessness, but with a clear head, for a man must
be completely master of himself in order to command a ship without becoming
excited nor losing his head. One may form an idea of it from the horror which
I experienced, who was not in any of the ships, but I knew perfectly well the
dangers of the enterprise, which, in my opinion, was impossible.
The day, as I said, was most beautiful and the calm perfect. Therefore, the
smoke, far from vanishing, rose up in a straight line. When the first moments
of excitement were over and we had somewhat cooled down, we could see per
fectly that the smoke from the firing formed four groups more or less distant
from each other, but what group did our fleet form? If the one farthest to the
west, then no doubt it was not surrounded and had the open sea before it, and
32O CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
this was a great advantage. If, on the contrary, it formed the second or third,
then it was between two fires.
Later on it was noticed that the firing was at a greater distance and decreased
in intensity, and that the columns of smoke were moving farther to the west.
Had they succeeded in escaping and outwitting the hostile fleet? For the pres
ent one thing was certain: Our ships had not gone down in the entrance of
the harbor, nor even close to it, and that was of great importance, for the great
est danger was in the channel. Imagine our joy when the Morro advised us
by telephone that our fleet was fighting in wing formation and that the enemy
did not have the range. Evidently the age of miracles is not over. I will not
try to describe what we felt that day — we, at Santiago, who have the honor of
belonging to the navy.
I still had the horse at my disposal, and as I remembered the anxiety in which
I had left Mr. Bustamente and his delicate state of health, I hastened to bring
him the news, which I thought would do him a great deal of good. Wliea I
arrived, he knew it already, as everyone else did in Santiago. He had been all
over the city. I found him radiant with satisfaction.
I may safely say that the 3d of July was a day of true rejoicing, for, as will
be seen later when I relate the events of that day, it was believed that our ships
had accomplished their object, although at the cost of the destroyers, the loss of
which was already known. And although we felt very sad over the victims
there must have been, the result, on the whole, was so brilliant that it surpassed
all reasonable expectations.
How great were my consternation and sorrow when, at 6 o'clock in the even
ing, I saw the pilot Miguel Lopez arrive, his appearance changed and his cloth
ing and shoes wet from the drizzling rain, with the news that he had at his house
at Cinco Reales five shipwrecked from the " Maria Teresa " and " Oquendo,"
worn out and weak; that both ships, on fire, had run aground on the coast close
to each other west of Punta Cabrera and about eight miles from the harbor
of Santiago, and that a great many more, some wounded and all tired, were on
the road.
The " Teresa " and " Oquendo " lost, besides the " Pluton " and " Furor! "
What a horrible contrast and what a sad awakening! In the morning I had
believed the ships safe and was already thinking of a telegram from Plavana
announcing their arrival at that port. At night the news of the catastrophe,
the full extent of which I did not know even then!
But as my comments and lamentations do not explain what had happened,
I will give the news as it was received in the course of the day at the captaincy
of the port. It will explain why, for eight hours, we believed at Santiago de
Cuba that the Spanish fleet was in safety.
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 321
NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA.
July 3d.— The hostile fleet in sight, about five miles distant.
At 9:45 the Spanish fleet went out. Shortly after, a violent bombardment
was heard.
At 10:40 the Morro said: "The Spanish fleet is fighting in wing formation
at Punta Cabrera; the enemy does not have the range and it seems as though
they would succeed in escaping. The American fleet is composed of the
' Brooklyn/ ' Indiana,' ' Iowa,' ' Texas,' ' Massachusetts,' ' Oregon,' and one
yacht. The ships from Aguadores have come to assist in the battle."
At 11:15 no more firing was heard.
At 12:30 the Morro said: " When the fleet went out it did so slowly. After
the four large ships had gone out the destroyers went, and all of the American
ships fell upon them. Our fleet opposed the attack and the destroyers hurried
to join them, but near Punta Cabrera one of them took fire and ran ashore.
The other continued to fire and when she saw herself lost she lowered two
boats filled with men; one reached the coast, the other was captured. On
leaving the destroyer they set it afire and she ran aground burning."
So they are both lost. When our fleet passed Punta Cabrera one of the
ships, apparently the " Teresa," went close to the shore and a great deal of
smoke was seen. The " Iowa " and " New York " were pursuing her and
the others followed them. By this time the hostile ships from Aguadores were
already taking part in the fight.
At 2 an English warship was signaled to the south.
At 3 the Morro said that the ships which pursued our fleet were twenty-four
in all; fifteen warships, armored and unarmored; the others merchant vessels
equipped for war.
At 6:30 the pilot, Miguel Lopez, said that at his house at Cinco Reales, he
had five shipwrecked from the " Teresa " and " Oquendo," and they said there
must be others at Cabaiiitas.
The tug " Esmeralda," with the second commander of marine and Ensign
Nardiz, with the pilot, Lopez, and ten armed sailors, went out to gather them
up. Forces of the army also went out in the steamer " Colon " to protect
those who might be returning by roads and paths along the coast.
At nightfall Colonel Escario's column arrived from Manzanillo.
My friend, Mr. Robert Mason, Chinese consul, who is interested in naval
matters, and has a good understanding of everything concerning them, wit
nessed the battle from the Vigia del Medio, which is the highest mountain in
the bay, and overlooks a great part of it. But we must take into account that,
322
as it is quite distant from the coast, the ships that pass close to it cannot be
seen. As soon as he arrived he told me what had happened as he had seen it,
and I put it down as he dictated it to me. The following is what I heard from
his own lips, word for word, without changing anything in this interesting
account:
"The 'Teresa' went out first, then the ' Vizcaya ' and 'Colon;' after a
somewhat longer interval, the ' Oquendo,' then the destroyers. The Admiral
passed the Morro at 9:45. A little to windward of the Mcrro (west) was the
' Brooklyn.' Opposite the Morro another ship, apparently the ' Massachusetts,'
and I could distinguish no other war ships from the Vigia. When the Admiral
passed the Morro the hostile ships and the Morro and Socapa opened a violent
fire simultaneously; the hostile ships that could not be seen and that were
at Aguadores also opened fire at the same time. After passing the Morro, the
Admiral went west and was lost from sight on account of the Socapa. Tl}e
' Vizcaya ' followed, and then the other two. In the meantime the destroyers
remained in the bay. The Spanish ships were now visible again, the ' Vizcaya '
in the lead, the ' Colon,' ' Oquendo,' and ' Maria Teresa,' in line ahead at a
certain distance from the American fleet. The Spanish fleet was firing slowly,
the American ships lively, so that I did not lose sight again of the Spanish
ships, but often of the American ships on account of the smoke. In the mean
time the American warships and two yachts were gathered opposite the Socapa,
and when the destroyers came out it seemed impossible that they should be
able to escape. The fire was horrible from the large guns, as well as from the
rapid-fire guns. Nevertheless, the destroyers were lost from sight, but they
appeared again, firing from their stern guns. As long as the ships could be
distinguished it could not be estimated whether they had received injuries of
any kind. When they disappeared from sight, at 10:30, we could see no in
juries in the masts or smokestacks, or anything special. At this time we saw
all the American ships firing in a westerly direction, and at that hour the ' New
York,' which had not yet entered the fight, passed the bay headed westward.
When I left the battle I had not seen any ship run aground nor on fire, either
Spanish or American."
Before I continue, in order to give a better understanding, I will recall the
fact that the coast between Santiago and Punta Cabrera, a stretch of about
six miles, forms a kind of bay on which are situated Cabanas and Guaicabon;
that Punta Cabrera projects south and is very high land, consequently the
ships which are west of it and close to the coast cannot be seen. It is abso
lutely necessary to remember this in order to understand why it was that the
final result of the battle was not seen.
At 9:30 the Spanish fleet started up; first the " Maria Teresa," Admiral Cer-
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 323
vera's flagship, the " Vizcaya," then the " Cristobal Colon," and " Oquendo."
Behind these the " Pluton " and " Furor." This was the order of sortie as
I learned from the pilots Lopez and Nunez.
The " Brooklyn," " Iowa," " Indiana," " Texas," " Massachusetts," " Ore
gon," and one yacht were waiting at the mouth of the harbor. The others
arrived soon from Aguadores, where they had been, with their engines going
and under steam. One of the last ones to arrive was the " New York," which,
the same as the " Brooklyn," has a twenty-mile speed.
The Spanish ships, which necessarily had to go out in line-ahead, received,
as each went out, the fire of all the American ships, which they could not
answer until they had passed the bank of Diamante, because they could not
present the broadside, consequently their guns, to the enemy. Therefore, as
long as they were inside of the harbor, they all sustained a terrible fire.
Nevertheless, they came out without serious injuries and reached the open sea.
The " Vizcaya," which was the fastest ship, but had not had her bottom
cleaned, was making only thirteen miles, and the other ships had to regulate
their speed by hers in order to preserve the line.
I suppose, from what happened, and taking into account the order of the
sortie, that Admiral Cervera intended to protect the retreat of the " Vizcaya,"
accompanied by the " Colon " (which did not have her turret guns mounted),
with the " Oquendo " and " Maria Teresa," and then have the latter, by putting
on forced draft, rejoin the former, but both were set on fire by the stern, which
they presented to the hostile fire, and they were soon converted into one im
mense blaze and went aground on the coast, the " Teresa " about seven miles
from Santiago harbor, west of Punta Cabrera, then close to her the " Oquendo."
These events I learned at nightfall from the shipwrecked who had arrived.
The fate of the " Vizcaya " and " Cristobal Colon " I will anticipate, in order
to complete the account of what happened to the whole fleet as it was told me
by an officer of the Austrian cruiser " Maria Teresa " (same name as ours) the
next day.
When the " Oquendo " and " Teresa " had been lost, two or three American
ships remained there to consummate the surrender and gather up the ship
wrecked and wounded and take the others prisoners. The other ships con
tinued to pursue the " Vizcaya " and the " Colon." The first of the two also
took fire at the stern and stranded at a distance of about twenty miles (toward
Aserraderos) ; the second did not take fire. Probably her engine was damaged
and she ran up on the coast about sixty miles distant (off Tarquino).
Such was the hecatomb (for there is no other name for it) of our ill-fated
fleet, and I do not believe that history records another like it. Not a single
ship was saved from the catastrophe. The commanders and officers of all the
324 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
ships knew well what was going to happen, when, calm and serene in spite
of everything and ready to do their duty fully, they took leave of each other
and of their comrades who remained on shore, as they did not belong to the
fleet.
A person who has witnessed and seen with his own eyes an event like the
one which I have in vain tried to describe, must necessarily be of interest, even
though of little prominence and education. For that reason I have had the
pilots Miguel Lopez and Apolonio Nunez, who took out the " Teresa " and
" Oquendo," respectively, repeat to me a hundred times what they had seen.
I shall not copy everything they said; that would be too much of a task, but
only what relates to the battle and which gives an idea of that veritable hell,
for that is what the mouth of Santiago harbor was for fifteen minutes.
Miguel Lopez, who is cool-headed and daring on land as well as on the sea,
said to me about as follows:
" I was in the forward tower by the side of Admiral Cervera, who was tas
calm as though he had been at anchor in his own cabin, and was observing
the channel and the hostile ships and only said these words:
1 ' Pilot, when can we shift the helm? ' He had reference to turning to
starboard, which could only be done after we had passed Diamante bank.
After a few seconds he said.
" ' Pilot, advise me when we can shift the helm.'
' I will advise you, Admiral,' I answered.
" A few moments later I said: ' Admiral, the helm may be shifted now.'
" In a moment the Admiral, without shouting, without becoming excited,
as calm as usual, said: 'To starboard,' and the next minute, ' Fire! ' At the
same moment, simultaneously, the two guns of the turret and those of the port
battery fired on a ship which seemed to me to be the ' Indiana.' I thought the
ship was sinking. I cannot tell you, Don Jose, all that passed. By this time
there were already many dead and wounded in the battery, because they had
been firing on us for some time, and I believe that in spite of the water that
was in the ship she was already on fire then. The Admiral said to me:
' ' Good-by, pilot; go now; go, and be sure you let them pay you, because
you have earned it well.' And he continued to give orders."
These were, more or less, the words that Miguel Lopez spoke to me, and
which he repeats to anyone who wishes to hear them.
Apolonio Nunez, who took out the " Oquendo," is very different from
Lopez, not daring, but rather easily frightened. These were his impressions:
" When we arrived at Santa Catalina battery, they were already firing.
There was a hail of bullets on board which cannot be compared to anything.
I was in the tower looking after the course of the ship. The commander, who
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 325
is very kind, and who knew me because I had taken the ship in on the ipth,
said to me:
" ' You can go, pilot; we can get along now, and later on perhaps you will
not be able to go.' I thanked him and should have gone gladly enough, I
can tell you, but I was afraid they might shift the helm before they passed
Diamante, and you can imagine Don Jose, what would have happened. I
remained on board, and when we had passed the bank I said to him: ' Com
mander, you can shift the helm.'
" ' Go, pilot, go,' he said, and then he commanded to put to starboard and
shouted, ' Fire! ' The noise caused by the big forward gun and the shaking
of the ship made more impression on me than the fire of the Yankees. I
thought the ' Oquendo ' had been cut in two. I do not even want to remember
it. I was lowered in a boat and then I thought I was a dead man. The bullets
were falling all around me. Finally I reached Estrella Cove, where Miguel
Lopez had already arrived. I did not even dare look at the battle, which was
now outside of the harbor."
These two accounts, which, perhaps, do not inspire the interest which no
doubt they possess, because I have not been able to remember the exact words
of the men, although in substance they are the same, may give an idea of that
never-to-be-forgotten sortie which had such fatal consequences.
I supposed that the American fleet would await the Spanish fleet at the
mouth of the harbor and absolutely prevent it from going out, under penalty
of having the ships attacked. But that requires a great deal of courage and
presence of mind. Nevertheless, it would have been the safest means for ac
complishing it. By not doing so they exposed themselves to being outwitted
and this is proved by the fact that our ships succeeded in getting out of the
harbor and as far as Punta Cabrera (about six miles), so that they really ac
complished the most difficult part, and there is no doubt that if they had not
been set on fire and if they had had a speed of even eighteen miles they would
have run the blockade.
It will also have been noticed that the three ships built in Spain all had the
same fate; they were burned. The one built in Italy, although not having the
turret guns, and which had suffered from the hostile fire much longer, because
she " died " later than the others, was not burned; she had a different fate,
but not that. I believe I am not bold in affirming that if the four ships had
been protected like the " Colon," they would have outwitted the enemy's pur
suit. In that event they might have reached Havana, for as the whole, or
nearly the whole, American fleet was in front of Santiago, they would have
met no one to prevent them and the situation would have been very different.
326 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
A few of the shipwrecked arrived in the tug " Colon," and were embarked by
our commander of marine in the cruiser " Reina Mercedes."
The tug " Esmeralda," with Ensign Nardiz, ten armed sailors, and the pilot
Lopez, went to Cabanitas Cove to gather up shipwrecked; but, although they
made a careful search, they found none.
At night Colonel Escario's column, whose forces have already been men
tioned, arrived from Manzanillo. The next day General Escario told me that
when he heard the fire of the battle in the morning, he proceeded with a small
vanguard to the heights of the harbor of Bayamo, and that the detachment
there told him the same thing, viz., that they saw our ships run the blockade
and disappear past Punta Cabrera.
To my mind there is nothing so interesting and eloquent as the account of
a naval battle by persons who have taken part in it. Lieutenants Bustamente
and Caballero, second in command of the destroyers " Furor " and " Pluton,"
respectively, who escaped by a miracle from the horrible hecatomb, in wljich
the greater part of their crews perished, told me two days after the catastrophe,
still sick and tired, of the battle which their ships sustained. Their accounts
follow:
Mr. Caballero. — " The last ships were already outside of the harbor when
the destroyers, which had stopped between the Socapa and Cay Smith for the
purpose of getting up steam, proceeded and passed through the channel as
far as Punta Morrillo, where the ' Furor,' which was in the lead, put to port
as though trying to go east, but when she discovered the ' Gloucester ' and
other ships which were near Aguadores, she put to starboard, following the
lead of our fleet, which was already at some distance, opening fire on the
' Gloucester ' which we (the two destroyers) had left astern. And the ' Indi
ana,' ' Oregon,' ' Iowa,' and ' Texas,' which we had passed in the order named
on the port hand, continued to fire very rapidly, which made it extremely diffi
cult for us to serve the guns. After we had passed Cabanas we commenced
to gain on the ' Furor,' and when we came up with her and were about fifty
meters to starboard, she listed rapidly on that side, her rudder having been
disabled, and passed astern of us at a distance of one meter, and sank by the
stern, standing up almost vertically, and was buried in the sea a moment later,
before reaching Punta Cabrera.
" As we (the ' Pluton ') were making a great deal of water we continued
close to the shore to reach Punta Cabrera, and when we were close to the
headland which it forms, we received a thirty-two centimeter projectile, which
exploded the forward group of boilers, blowing up the whole deck and cutting
off communication between the two ends. She then veered to starboard and
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 327
struck on the headland, tearing off a great pait of the bow. The shock threw
her back some distance, then she struck again. I jumped into the water and
reached the shore.
" I climbed up on the headland of Punta Cabrera and lay there for about
fifteen minutes, during which the fire continued. When it was at an end I
went into the mountains and gathered up such personnel of the ship as I met —
about twenty or twenty-five — and with them I went around a small hill for the
purpose of hiding from the coast and took the road to Santiago de Cuba,
avoiding the roads and seeking the densest thickets and woods. The pilot,
on pretext that the road which I was following was not a good one, left us
and did not again put in an appearance. We continued walking in an easterly
direction — some clothed, others naked, and the rest half clothed — for
two hours, resting now and then and trying to keep close to the coast.
When we reached the beach we met Lieutenant Bustamente with a group of
shipwrecked from the ' Furor ' (his ship) and some from the ' Maria Teresa.'
We saw a yacht with the English flag close to the coast maneuvering back of
Punta Cabrera, as though trying to gather up the shipwrecked there. We
made signals to her with a shirt, and seeing that she paid no attention to us
we walked on, avoiding the formation of large groups and hiding ourselves as
much as possible.
"About 3:30 we reached the harbor of Cabanas, which we had to cross
swimming, and on the opposite shore, about 9 o'clock at night, we reached
the trenches of the Socapa, where at last we could rest for the night, with the
assistance of some guerrillas, who supplied us with what they could."
Mr. Bustamente. — " When we (the ' Furor ') reached the mouth of the
harbor and saw the Spanish fleet we thought that by shaping our course west
ward we could seek the protection of the Spanish fleet, which was already at
some distance, and we maneuvered accordingly. One of the projectiles struck
one of the hatches of the boiler ventilators, thereby reducing the pressure and
consequently the speed of the ship. By this time the projectiles were falling
on board in large numbers. One of the shells struck Botswain Dueiias, cut
ting him in two; one part fell between the tiller-ropes, interrupting them mo
mentarily, and it was necessary to take it out in pieces. Another projectile
destroyed the engine and the servo-motor, so that the ship could neither pro
ceed nor maneuver. Another had struck the after shellroom, exploding and
destroying it.
Our torpedoes had their warheads on and were ready to be used, but we
did not launch them because we were never at a convenient distance from the
enemy. Under these circumstances, the commander of the destroyers, Captain
328 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Fernando Villamil, gave orders to abandon the ship, and I, with part of the
crew, jumped into the water, about three miles from the coast. In the water,
one of the men near me, I believe the first boatswain, was struck by a bullet
in the head and was buried in the water forever. The ship, in the meantime,
after a horrible series of explosions, went down. When we reached the land
we went in an easterly direction toward Santiago. Shortly after we met Lieur
tenant Caballero and with him and his men we reached Santiago, and following
thr same road and the same fortunes; as they are identical, I will not here
relate them."
To what has been said it is useless to add another word. .
CAUSES OF THE LOSS OF THE NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTIAGO
DE CUBA.
Words fail me to describe the painful impression produced upon me by jhe
disaster of the four cruisers and two destroyers under Admiral Cervera's com
mand, and by what I may call the hecatomb of their crews, which was not
complete for the only reason that the battle had taken place so near the shore,
where the ships, all on fire, could run aground, rather than surrender to the
enemy. In less than two hours the ships were destroyed, and yet, this is not
strange. I am surprised, on the contrary, that they were not sunk in the
channel.
The loss of the fleet had been foretold by all its commanders, with whom
I have talked more than once, and was prophesied, so to speak, as soon as
the order was received at the Cape Verde Islands to start for Cuba, and the
Admiral, who was in command, advised the Government to that effect several
times; these official communications are still in existence. But it seems that
public opinion in the island of Cuba, especially at Havana, required the pres
ence of the fleet in those waters, and between that and the very sensible and
logical reasons advanced by the Admiral, the Government decided in favor of
the former, and the fleet departed, shaping its course to the west. From that
moment the loss of the fleet became inevitable, and it was only a question of
time, as will be easily understood from what follows.
The fleet left the Cape Verde Islands with no more coal than was in the
bunkers, the greater part of which must necessarily be used up during the
voyage across the Atlantic ocean. The three destroyers, " Pluton," " kuror,''
and " Terror," accompanied it and had to be convoyed and supplied with coal,
which involved difficulties and delays.
At Martinique (where the " Terror " was left, being no longer able to follow
the fleet) the ships could not coal; and at Curasao, in spite of the Govern-
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 329
ment's promise that they were to find a ship there with fuel, which did not put
in an appearance, only two of the ships could get a small number of tons.
The order to proceed to the island of Cuba was there; what could they do
under such circumstances? The only natural and logical thing: go to the
harbor that was nearest and for that reason offered the least dangers, go to
Santiago de Cuba, which Admiral Cervera believed well defended, as the harbor
is suited for that purpose, and supplied with provisions. How great was his
surprise when he found that only two guns worthy of the name defended its
entrance, and that provisions were lacking in the city, as well as ammunition
and everything else.
I have already stated, and will here repeat it, that during those days of May,
before the hostile fleet appeared with forces superior to ours (that is, from
the 2Oth to the 27th) the ships could not go out, not only because they did not
have coal enough, but also because there was considerable swell in the sea,
which prevented them from going out, as was stated by the pilots of the
locality, who said that the ships were almost sure to touch bottom, especially
the " Colon," which drew more water than the others.
We must take into account, for it means everything for a fleet, that they
had not cleaned their bottoms for a long time and their speed was, therefore,
far from what it should have been; the " Vizcaya," above all, was not able to
n:ake thirteen miles, and later, after being in Santiago harbor for forty-six
days, her speed was reduced to even less.
But even if there had been no swell in the sea to the south and the ships
could have gone out, where would they have gone? To Havana by the short
est route? They would have met Sampson's fleet, as Admiral Cervera knew
only too well, and that was just what he wished to avoid. Perhaps, he might
have succeeded by taking a course which he would have been least expected
to take, through Providence channel, for instance; and this did occur to Ad
miral Cervera, but it was impossible, for the simple reason that he did not
have fuel enough for so many days of navigation.
Moreover, when the fleet reached Santiago harbor, everybody there, as well
as in the peninsula, believed it safe and congratulated its commander on his
success and his clever maneuver; and when I say "everybody" I do not
mean the common people only, but the official element. Could there be a
better proof that Admiral Cervera complied with the wishes of the Govern
ment?
The fleet received definite order from the Captain-General of the island of
Cuba to leave the harbor of Santiago, which he reiterated, in spite of Admiral
Cervera' s remonstrances. After that, what was to be done? Only one thing;
go out, as, indeed, they did, resigned, but calm and serene, those heroes; for
330 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
all those who went out with the fleet to certain death, as every one knew,
deserve that name. And I say that they went out calm and serene, and shall
say it a thousand times, for only thus can ships be maneuvered in so narrow
and dangerous a channel, without any of them running aground, which can
happen so easily even under ordinary circumstances, when it is not necessary
to oppose the fire of a hostile fleet, and with ships of less draught and length.
The sortie from that harbor, under the circumstances under which those ships
effected it, I do not hesitate in calling the greatest act of valor, fearlessness,
skill, intelligence and practical experience in seamanship that can be conceived.
This was stated repeatedly and with great admiration by the commanders and
officers of the English corvette " Alert " and the Austrian cruiser " Maria
Teresa," who, it may be said, witnessed the battle.
The number of ships that were awaiting ours at the mouth of the harbor,
and with which the latter had to fight, as well as their nature and the kind of
armament they mounted, was given in one of the first chapters, from statistics
of the American Navy. This alone is more than sufficient to demonstrate that,
in view of the inferiority of ours in quantity and quality, it was impossible to
sustain the battle.
But there is more, much more, to be added in order to explain what hap
pened in the naval battle of Santiago de Cuba, the greater part of which is not
known by the people in Spain.
I have already stated that the " Colon," the only really protected ship of
the four that composed the fleet, did not have her turret guns. Of the 14-cm.
guns of the " Teresa," " Oquendo," and " Vizcaya," which are the ones that
do most of the firing in a battle, six had been declared useless; and while the
" Teresa " could change hers, the " Oquendo " and " Vizcaya " could not do
so, and had to fight, the former with one, the latter with two, useless guns, as
I have stated.
Moreover, the supply of ammunition for all of the ships was inadequate,
and the " Teresa " had seventy useless charges. The greater part of !the
primers were no good, and consequently the guns did not go off. The breech-
plugs were imperfect, so that after the second or third shot they no longer
closed. The firing-pins blew out, and from many of the survivors of the
" Oquendo " and " Teresa " I have learned that a number of the men serving
the guns were wounded by their own pieces. Therefore, if the whole thing
were not so sad and serious, it might be said that the guns of our ships were
like the " carbine of Ambrosius," which went off at the breech; that is, that
far from injuring the enemy, they were a danger to those who had charge of
firing them.
The majority of the cartridge cases did not have the required diameter, and
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 331
on the " Maria Teresa " it happened that seven had to be discarded before one
good one could be found. Under these conditions, it will be readily understood
that the armament, which was intended to be converted into rapid-fire artillery,
was instead converted into artillery — I do not know what to call it, but it
was certainly entirely useless.
After what has been stated, can the result of the battle of Santiago be
wondered at? Certainly not. The only thing that may appear strange is that,
under such conditions, a fleet should have been sent to the scene of war.
It was under these circumstances that the sortie was made from the difficult
harbor of Santiago by those commanders and officers who, convinced that they
would all perish, contented themselves with saying farewell to the comrades
who remained on shore ar d whom they never expected to see again.
We Spanish are very proud of the disaster of Trafalgar on account of the
heroism which our navy showed on that occasion, when they placed honor
above everything else, though our ships were buried in the sea. The battle
of Santiago de Cuba is much more glorious even than that of 1805. In this
latter battle, thirty-two allied ships of 64, 80, and 120 guns fought with twenty-
eight English ships, also of 120, 80, and 64 guns; the forces, therefore, were
almost equal; and if the battle was lost, while it might very well have been
won, it was because our fleet was commanded by Villeneuve, and the hostile
fleet by Nelson. In the battle of Santiago, six ships (if the " Pluton " and
" Furor " may be called such), had to fight against twenty-four that were
better protected and armed. After these figures, anything else that might be
added would appear to be useless.
I have never been able to understand the reason why there was sent to the
island of Cuba a fleet that was in no manner able to cope with that of the
United States, and which, therefore, could in nowise prevent the ships of the
latter from blockading our ports and controlling the sea; but since it was sent,
without its arrival being able to prevent the loss of the island, which was lost,
as experience has shown, from the very moment when war was accepted, owing
to the conditions prevailing there, then it should have been prevented from
being destroyed, as it was, without resulting in any advantage whatever.
The only way of gaining any advantage would have been, in my opinion,
taking advantage of the fact that all the hostile ships were in Cuba, to send a
few ships of great speed, more or less well armed, to the commercial ports of
the United States and bombard them, even though not very effectively. It is
probable that public opinion, especially of those who did not participate in
the war, would have exacted the return of the ships, and then the Spanish fleet
could have left Santiago in perfect safety, and a catastrophe would have been
avoided which has brought us no advantage. At the same time, the ports of
332 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
the island, freed from the blockade, could have supplied themselves with pro
visions; and although the final result would probably have been the same, it
would not have been so immediate.
The following, taken from a German report of the naval battle at
Santiago, explains in some measure the defeat of the Spanish fleet:
In order to be able to realize the complete defeat of the Spanish fleet it is
necessary to call clearly to mind its situation in Santiago harbor. Cervera
had entered the harbor on May iQth. As early as May 27th five hostile cruisers
with several gunboats and auxiliary cruisers were observed in front of the
harbor, and there was no longer any doubt that the whole American battle
fleet was blockading the harbor. Then followed the bombardments of Morro
Castle and the Socapa, several shells falling into the bay, and the Spanish ships
retreated closer to the city. On June 3d the " Merrimac " was sunk, but the
entrance remained unobstructed. On June 22d occurred the landing of the
American troops, who on July 1st attacked the fortifications of the city. Five
hundred men of the landing corps of the Spanish ships took part in the defense
and are said to have fought very valiantly.
The Government authorities at Havana were very anxious to have the fleet
leave the harbor, in order to remove the main object of the attack upon San
tiago; for the ships had been the cause of the blockade and of the attack on
the unprepared city. Hence it was imperative that the ships should leave.
It is probable that ever since the middle of June this had been suggested to
Admiral Cervera by the authorities at Havana; but the Admiral appears to
have declared that it was impossible to make an attempt to run the blockade
at night. Whether direct orders were finally given to leave the harbor under
all circumstances I have not been able to ascertain.
Admiral Cervera was in a very difficult position. He was expected to act
in some manner. He did not dare make the attempt at night, and so he de
cided to go out with his fleet in broad daylight. The whole crew fell a victim
to this fatal decision. Instructions for the order of the sortie and the taking
of the western course had been previously issued by the chief of the fleet.
According to the Revista General de Marina, Vol. XI, No. 3, August, 1898,
the Admiral was entirely convinced of the impossibility of defeating the enemy
or of reaching another Cuban harbor, even if he should succeed in steaming
right through the hostile fleet. It is to this feeling of helplessness and im
potence as against the American naval forces more than to anything else that I
attribute the defeat. The Spanish ships had spent a month and a half in the
harbor without even attempting to attack the blockading fleet when a favorable
CAPTAIN CHADWICK.
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 335
opportunity presented itself, or even of harassing it. The two torpedo-boat
destroyers were not used for the purpose for which they were intended. This
inactivity and lack of initiative must have had a very demoralizing effect on
the officers and men. If we add to this the certain knowledge that the oppos
ing forces were much stronger, it will be readily understood that the idea of
general flight after coming out of the harbor entrance was the only acceptable
one, especially in view of the possibility of beaching the ships, thereby rendering
them unserviceable, and eventually rescuing the crews. From the very moment
that this feeling of impotence took possession of the Spanish and led to the
above reflections, their fate psychologically speaking, was sealed. We do not
mean to disparage their valor and tenacity in the midst of the hostile fire; but,
on the other hand, it is quite natural that the Admiral, seeing that everything
was happening as he had foreseen, was the one who set the example of running
his ship ashore. All the other commanders followed this example.
On the American side the situation was just the reverse. Admiral Samp-
sun's fleet was fully conscious of its power. The blockade was being con
ducted in accordance with carefully prepared plans, as were also the arrange
ments in case of the enemy's attempt to escape. Frequent engagements with
the Spanish forts had given commanders and crews that calm and assurance in
the handling of their weapons which guarantees success. The long blockade
service, exhausting and monotonous, hardly interrupted by any action on the
part of the Spanish, had strung the nerves to the highest pitch, and everybody
was anxious for the end to come. Suddenly the enemy attempts to escape.
All the passions that had been smoldering under the ashes break forth. The
welcome opportunity for settling accounts with the enemy had come at last,
and with a wild rush the American ships fell upon their victims. At the be
ginning the American fire, owing to the excitement of the personnel and the
great distances, was probably not very effective; but when the Spanish Admiral
turned to westward and the other ships followed him the moral superiority of
the Americans reasserted itself. The commanders, calm and cool-headed, had
their ships follow the same course, and the Americans, having every advantage
on their side, recommenced the fire on the fleeing ships, which soon resulted in
their total annihilation.
I have already spoken of the lack of training of the Spanish crews, the
neglect of gun and torpedo target practice, the inadequate education of the
commanders of the ships and torpedo-boat destroyers. It is mainly due to
these deficiencies that the defeat was hastened and that the American ships
sustained so few losses. Furthermore, there can be no excuse for having
allowed the cruiser " Cristobal Colon to leave Spain without her heavy arma
ment. It has also been stated that the rapid-fire guns of this cruiser were
CUBAS STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
unserviceable, so that she was really completely defenseless. The training of
the engine personnel also was totally unreliable, which is not surprising in
view of the fact that the Spanish ships, as a rule, are not sent out on extensive
cruises. The bottoms of the Spanish ships had not been cleaned for a long
time, and as they had been lying in Santiago harbor for a month and a half
they were considerably fouled. Thus the cruisers " Maria Teresa," " Oquendo,"
and " Vizcaya," which in all official books are credited with eighteen and a half
knots speed, went into the battle with a speed of from ten to twelve knots at
most, and the " Cristobal Colon," which is the latest ship and was to run
twenty knots, hardly attained a speed of thirteen and a half. Under these cir
cumstances, in every way unfavorable to the Spanish, whose crews were in
sufficiently trained and physically and morally enervated by long inactivity,
whose ships were inferior in number, speed, and fighting efficiency, it is no
wonder that the victory of the Americans was easy and paid for with insignifi
cant sacrifices.
There was only one chance for the success of the sortie. It should have
been made at night in scattered formation. After a personal investigation of
the locality, it is my opinion that it is entirely practicable for a fleet to leave
Santiago harbor at night. The wreck of the " Merrimac " did not constitute
an obstruction. It is true that Admiral Sampson's report on the night of the
blockade states that the light-ships were lying from one to two miles from
Morro Castle, according to the state of the atmosphere, and that they lighted
up the channel for half a mile inside. Even the best search light, however,
does not reach farther than one mile. Therefore, the illumination could not
have been very effective. Moreover, the shore batteries, by opening fire upon the
light-ships, could have compelled them to change their positions; but, strange
to say, this was never done. The dark nights at the time of the new moon,
about the middle of June, would have been best suited for the enterprise. Be
sides, the four vessels of the fleet, two large Spanish merchant vessels lying in
Santiago harbor might have been taken out in order to deceive the enemy.
The six vessels, with lights darkened, should have followed each other out
of the harbor entrance, in predetermined order, as fast as possible. They
should then have steered different courses, previously determined, with orders
not to fight except when compelled to do so by the immediate vicinity of the
hostile ship or when there was no possibility of escaping the enemy in the
darkness. A rendezvous should have been fixed for the next day, where the
ships that succeeded in escaping were to assemble.
If the fleet did not dare attempt a night sortie and was nevertheless com
pelled to leave the harbor in obedience to orders, then the ships should have
been headed straight at the enemy. All weapons, including the torpedo and
THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 337
the ram, should have been used. A bold attack in close formation was the
only chance of success against the superior hostile fighting forces, who would
hardly have found time to form their lines.
I shall not attempt to discuss at length all the lessons which may be derived
from the battle, because this would lead too far. I will only enumerate them,
and confine myself to dwelling a little more fully on those which are of the
greatest importance for practical service.
(a) Abolition of all woodwork.
(b) No unprotected torpedo tubes.
(c) Protection for all gtm crews against shell fire.
(d) Protection of the fire-extinguishing apparatus against shell fire.
(e) Smokeless powder; greatest possible simplicity in the service of the guns
and the greatest possible rapidity of fire.
(f) Good speed of the ships under normal conditions.
(g) Thorough training of the crews in all branches of the service.
The last two are the most important. A ship may show very brilliant re
sults at the trial trip and be credited with the greatest speed in the different
books on the navies of all nations; but for the officer who is to command the
ship in battle this is not a criterion from which to judge of her efficiency.
Frequent trial trips under full steam, making it possible to discover and cure
defects of the machinery in time of peace, and familiarizing the personnel with
the functioning of the vessel in all its details, can alone give the commander
an idea of what he may expect of his ship in battle. Extensive cruises at war
speed should also be made, in order that the personnel may get an idea of
how much more will be required in time of war. This is especially important
in the tropics, where the great heat materially affects the physical endurance
and efficiency of the boiler and engine personnel.
The most perfect training of the crews in all branches of the service, espe
cially by all kinds of torpedo and gun practice, as nearly as possible under
war conditions, is the foundation of success. As I said in Part IV of this
work, nothing should be left undone to attain the greatest perfection possible
in time of peace. No expense should be spared to enable those who bear the
responsibility of the battle — the chiefs of fleets and squadrons, as well as all
commanders — thoroughly to test the actual degree of efficiency of their crews
by practical exercises, resembling as nearly as possible the operations of actual
warfare.
Such exercises will also demonstrate whether the weapons, from a technical
standpoint, are equal to all the exigencies of war.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
CHAPTER X.
EMBARKATION.
At the approach of hostilities, I had volunteered my services in case
of war, and on May 4th, my nomination as major-general was sent
to the Senate and was immediately confirmed by that body ; I promptly
reported for duty, and, on the Qth, I was ordered to report to General
Brooke at Chickamauga.
I left Washington on the first through train, and reached General
Brooke's headquarters early on the morning of May nth. This officer
had earned a very fine reputation. He is one of the three major-
generals in the regular army, and as Governor-General of Cuba has
become quite distinguished. He is a large, soldierly-looking man, and
impresses those who meet him very favorably.
The next day at 2 o'clock I received the following telegram:
WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, D. C., May 12, 1898— 1:38 P. M.
Major- General JOSEPH WHEELER, Chickamauga Battlefield, Ga., care of General
Brooke :
With approval of Secretary of War, major-general commanding directs you
to report at Tampa, Fla., to command the cavalry in the expedition now leaving.
General Miles leaves here to-night. You should meet him at Tampa soon as
possible after his arrival.
H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.
I hastened to the depot in time to take the 2 107 train, and reached
Tampa on the evening of the I3th, pitched my tent with the cavalry,
and devoted myself to inspection and other duties which would enable
me to become thoroughly familiar with the officers and men, and I
soon learned that the division was a body of men of whom any com
mander might be justly proud.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 339
The concentration of these troops at Tampa was for the purpose of
a movement upon Havana, it being believed that the city could be as
saulted and captured before the rainy season commenced. The inten
tion was to land the army at Mariel, a point about twenty-six miles
west of Havana.
The . following dispatches are interesting to show more correctly
the military plans at that time:
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, D. C, May 9, 1898.
The major-general commanding directs that the following orders be sent by
telegraph to General Wade, at Tampa:
Direct Major-General Shafter to move his command, under protection of
Navy, and seize and hold Mariel, or most important point on north coast of
Cuba and where territory is ample to land and deploy army. Follow up his
command with all the force sent to you. Troops will be sent you as rapidly
as possible from Chickamauga and other points. Have troops fully equipped;
send abundance of ammunition and ship with them food for men and animals
for sixty days, to be followed by four months' supplies.
J. C. GILMORE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, May 9, 1898 — 6:7 P. M.
General WADE, Commanding Troops at Tampa, Fla.:
With the approval of the Secretary of War, the major-general commanding
directs that General Shafter move his command under protection of Navy and
seize and hold Mariel, or most important point on north coast of Cuba, and
where territory is ample to land and deploy army. Follow up his command
with all the forces sent to you. Troops will be sent you as rapidly as possible
from Chickamauga and other points. Have troops fully equipped, send
abundance of ammunition, and ship with them food for men and animals for
sixty days, to be followed by four months' supplies. Acknowledge receipt.
H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.
34O CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
General Shafter's dispatches at this time show that he anticipated
difficulty in concentrating a force at Key West on account of the fresh
water at that place. These dispatches are as follows :
TAMPA BAY HOTEL, TAMPA, Fla., May 7, 1898 — 3:44 p. M.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY, Washington, D. C.:
Am crowding work of watering and coal transport and put in pen and stall
for sortie (stock?). Will have it completed Wednesday sure. Many obstacles
to .
SHAFTER,
Brigadier-General.
TAMPA BAY HOTEL, TAMPA, Fla., May 7, 1898 — 6:50 p. M.
ADJUTANT- GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY, War Department, Washington, D. t.:
Colonel Lawton just returned from Key West. Brings message from Com
modore Watson that water is absolutely necessary; that supply on all ships is
very short, and that if I can assist him in getting supply it will be a great favor
to him. A barge, capacity one hundred thousand gallons, can start in morning
for Key West, towed by one of ships under charter. Cost of water two cents
per gallon. No tug here for hire. Shall I send it?
SHAFTER,
Brigadier-General.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, May 8, 1898.
General SHAFTER, Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla.:
Your telegram concerning water supply for Commodore Watson received,
and Secretary of War directs you to make every possible effort to furnish any
thing and everything to help him along. In this and other cases Secretary of
War approves any action you take, but desires every such order of yours
reported for his information.
H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, D. C., May 10, 1898.
The major-general commanding directs that the following orders be tele-
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 341
graphed General Wade, Tampa, Fla.: That the movement of troops to Cuba
is delayed until Monday, May 16, 1898. In the meantime he will send the
infantry in the ships, with an abundant supply of water and whatever else is
required with them, to Key West, there to disembark. The ships are to return
to Tampa to carry more infantry to Key West until there are about 12,000 men
there. These will move from Key West to Dry Tortugas and Cuba on ships
coming from New York. Also, that General Brooke has been directed to send
to Tampa from Chickamauga the Second, Seventh, Eighth, Twelfth, and Six
teenth Infantry. These can be forwarded to Key West by any means available.
J. C. GILMORE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, May 10, 1898 — 6:35 p. M.
General WADE, Commanding Troops at Tampa, Fla.:
Movement of troops to Cuba is delayed until Monday, May i6th. In the
meantime you will send infantry in the ships, with an abundant supply of water
and whatever else is required with them, to Key West, there to disembark.
The ships are to return to Tampa to carry more infantry to Key West until
there are about 12,000 men there. These will move from Key West to Dry
Tortugas and Cuba on ships coming from New York. General Brooke has
been directed to send to Tampa from Chickamauga the Second, Seventh,
Eighth, Twelfth, and Sixteenth Infantry. These can be forwarded to Key
West by any means available.
By command General Miles.
H. C. CORBIN,
A djutant-General.
TAMPA BAY HOTEL, TAMPA, Fla., May n, 1898.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY, FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, War
Department, Washington, D. C.:
Water for large body of troops at Key West is serious question. Absolutely
no water there. Only water barge from this port, capacity 130,000 gallons,
should reach Key West to-morrow with water for Navy, and be back Friday.
Transports carry considerable water, but have no way of distillation. Is im
perative that water be placed in Key West before troops begin to arrive.
Quartermaster-general has been asked to charter, clean, loan, and start
1,000,000 gallons tank steamer with light-draft barge for unloading. Dry
342 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Tortugas reported to have brackish water in cisterns. Am now trying to
ascertain quantity and quality. Expect information.
J. F. WADE,
Brigadier-General.
(Received, Washington, 8:12, p. M.)
TAMPA BAY HOTEL, TAMPA, Fla., May 21, 1898 — 11:21 A. M.
Gen. N. A. MILES, Washington, D. C.:
On account of difficulty in finding suitable camp ground, with abundant
water supply, I have temporarily stopped part of the volunteer regiments at
Jacksonville, and placed them under command of General Lawton. The
Government will not be subjected to extra expense on account of transporta
tion, nor for supply depots or officer. They will be brought closer to Tampa
as soon as possible. The principal difficulty here is water, which must be
drawn from wells; surface water can not be used.
SHAFTER,
Major-General
Measures were promptly taken to remedy the deficiency of water, but
by this time it had become evident that Admiral Cervera's fleet was
in the harbor of Santiago, the movement against Havana was aban
doned, and it was determined to send a force of some 5,000 men to the
southern coast of Cuba, but further information of the enemy made a
further change necessary, and it was determined to direct the efforts
of the Government against the Spanish fleet and army at Santiago, it
being believed that our Army and Navy combined could capture the
Spanish fleet as well as the forces in that part of Cuba.
The following letter from General Miles to the Secretary of War
explains the views of the Government at that time:
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, D. C, May 27, 1898.
The Honorable the SECRETARY OF WAR:
SIR. — Referring to my letter of yesterday, and to our consultation since, I
desire to submit the following:
As we are now about to inaugurate active military operations in conjunction
with the Navy, I think it would be advisable to load the transports at Tampa
with a strong force of infantry and artillery, move them to Key West, and
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 343
thence along the northern coast of Cuba, where they would have the full
protection of Admiral Sampson's fleet until they reach Admiral Schley's fleet
at Santiago de Cuba, and then, by a combined effort of the Army and Navy,
capture the harbor, garrison, and possibly the Spanish fleet at that point.
If before reaching Admiral Schley's fleet it shall be found that he has already
accomplished the above object, or that the Spanish fleet shall have escaped, I
then urge the importance of a combined attack of the Army and Navy upon
Porto Rico. We will be able to land a superior force, and I believe that a com
bined effort will result in capturing the island, with its garrison, provided it is
done before it can be re-enforced from Spain. The distance from Key West to
Porto Rico is 1,040 miles, and from Cadiz, Spain, to Porto Rico is about
4,000 miles. The possession of Porto Rico would be of very great advantage to
the military, as it would cripple the forces of Spain, giving us several thousand
prisoners. It could be well fortified, the harbor mined, and would be a most
excellent port for our Navy, which could be speedily relieved from any re
sponsibility in the charge of that port, as we could leave a sufficient garrison
to hold it against any force that might be sent against it.
Then we should commence, in my judgment, a movement toward the west
by capturing the ports along the northern coast of Cuba, at the eastern end,
supplying the insurgents with abundance of arms and munitions of war, and as
speedily as possible land our cavalry and sufficient light artillery to enable them
to move from the harbor of Pto de Nuevitas along the line of railroad to
Puerto Principe. From that base our cavalry and light artillery, in con
junction with the forces of Lieutenant-General Garcia and General Gomez,
should move west to near Santa Clara. These movements, in my judgment,
can all be accomplished during the rainy season, through a country com
paratively free from yellow fever, well stocked with cattle, and having grass
sufficient for our animals. While this is being accomplished our Volunteer
Army will be prepared to land in the vicinity of Mariel, Havana, or Matanzas
in sufficient force to complete the capture or destruction of the Spanish forces
upon the Kiand of Cuba. The advantage of this movement will be that the
Army and Navy will act in concert and close unison; that it does not divide
our Navy, and that it will utilize our most available military force in the best
way during the time of the year when military operations are most difficult.
I believe that the entrance to the port of Cienfuegos can be obstructed or
blockaded by one or two monitors to better advantage than to send the Army
there, where it would have to meet a strong garrison, which is already there,
and also of the forces that can be quickly sent there by rail directly from
Havana and Matanzas.
If the above plan is approved, troops could be ordered to embark on the
344 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
transports immediately, and the purpose would be the occupation of Spanish
territory, first, by moving our troops as speedily as possible to Santiago de
Cuba and Porto Rico, and later to the north coast of Cuba, especially our
cavalry. This military occupation to continue until hostilities cease.
Very respectfully,
NELSON A. MILES,
Major-General Commanding.
With great energy the Government had secured thirty-six trans
ports, all of which arrived at Port Tampa about May ist; and with
great rapidity they were arranged for transportation of troops, horses
and munitions of war. Major-General Shafter was selected to com
mand the expedition. His instructions were contained in the follow
ing letter, dated May 31:
WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, May 31, 1898 — 2:30 A. M.
Major-General WILLIAM R. SHAFTER, Tampa, Fla.:
With the approval of the Secretary of War, you are directed to take your
command on transports, proceed under convoy of the Navy to the vicinity of
Santiago de Cuba, land your force at such place east or west of that point as
your judgment may dictate, under the protection of the Navy, and move it onto
the high ground and bluffs overlooking the harbor or into the interior, as shall
best enable you to capture or destroy the garrison there, and cover the Navy
as it sends its men in small boats to remove torpedoes, or, with the aid of the
Navy, capture or destroy the Spanish fleet now reported to be in Santiago
harbor. You will use the utmost energy to accomplish this enterprise, and the
Government relies upon your good judgment as to the most judicious use of
your command, but desires to impress upon you the importance of accom
plishing this object with the least possible delay. You can call to your
assistance any of the insurgent forces in that vicinity and make use of such of
them as you think advisable to assist you, especially as scouts, guides, et cetera.
You are cautioned against putting too much confidence in any persons outside
of your own troops. You will take every precaution against ambuscade or
surprises or positions that may have been mined or are commanded by the
Spanish forces. You will co-operate most earnestly with the naval forces in
every way, agreeing beforehand upon a code of signals. Communicate your
instructions to Admiral Sampson and Commodore Schley. On completion
of this enterprise, unless you receive other orders or deem it advisable to remain
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 345
in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, re-embark your troops and proceed to the
harbor of Fto de Banes, reporting by the most favorable means for further
orders and future important service — this with the understanding that your
command has not sustained serious loss and that the above harbor is safe for
your transports and convoy. When will you sail?
By command of Major-General Miles:
H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General
On June ist General Miles arrived at Tampa to assist in the prompt
dispatch of this expedition. The following was sent General Shafter
on June 4th:
ADJUTANT- GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, June 4, 1898 — 6:15 P. M.
Major-General SHAFTER, Tampa, Fla.:
Admiral Sampson cables to-day: ( ' Merrimac ' in channel. Cervera, with
four ships and two torpedo boats, in harbor safely bottled up. He urges
immediate aid from your troops. He reports 7,000 men intrenched in Juraqua-
cito and Daiquiri; 5,000 at Morron de Cuba; 4,000 at other points; in bay 500,
with small Hotchkiss gun. Cervera sent flag of truce opprobriously to exchange
prisoners for Naval Constructor Hobson and seven men who unharmed with
him on ' Merrimac,' were taken prisoners, in recognition of their bravery.
We are sure Cervera is there."
ALGER,
Secretary of War.
To this dispatch General Shafter replied as follows:
TAMPA, Fla., June 4-5, 1898 — 6:32 A. M.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY, Washington, D. C.:
Replying to your dispatch that President wishes report of the situation, I
have to say that everything possible is being done to get away, but delays
occur that can not be prevented or foreseen. Siege guns have only been
assembled late this evening. They will be loaded on cars to-night and sent to
transports early in the morning and the loading rushed. Will begin putting
men on to-morrow, p. M., if possible, and be ready to start Monday night or
Tuesday morning. The last of the troops from Chickamauga are expected
to-night. Officers engaged in loading transports have worked night and day.
The main cause for delay has been the fact that great quantities of stores have
346 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
been rushed in promiscuously, and with no facilities to handle or store them.
The last ten miles before reaching the wharf is a single track and very narrow
place in which to work. The capacity of this place has been greatly exceeded.
Could have put the troops on and rushed them off, but not properly equipped,
as I know the President wishes them. I will not delay a minute longer than is
absolutely necessary to get my command in condition, and start the earliest
moment possible.
SHAFTER,
Major-General.
The following telegrams are given to show the progress of events
during this campaign :
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, June 5, 1898 — 12 NOON. '
Major-General SHAFTER, Tampa, Fla.:
Your telegram of 6:45 this morning shown to the President, with which he
expressed his satisfaction, with every confidence that you are doing everything
for the best. I would like to have a telegram at 6 o'clock this evening of the
situation.
H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.
TAMPA, Fla., June 5, 1898 — 12:24 p. M.
The SECRETARY OF WAR, Washington, D. C.:
This expedition has been delayed through no fault of anyone connected with
it. It contains the principal part of the Army, which for intelligence and effi
ciency is not exceeded by any body of troops on earth. It contains fourteen
of the best conditioned regiments of volunteers, the last of which arrived this
morning. Yet these have never been under fire. Between 30 and 40 per cent.
are undrilled, and in one regiment over 300 men have never fired a gun. I re
quest ample protection at all times for this command from the Navy- This en
terprise is so important that I desire to go with this army corps or to immedi
ately organize another and go with it to join this and capture position number
2. Now that the military is about to be used, I believe it should be continued
with every energy, making the most judicious disposition of it to accomplish the
desired result
MILES,
Major-General Commanding Army.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 347
TAMPA, Fla., June 6, 1898 — 2:37 P. M.
SECRETARY OF WAR, Washington, D. C.:
In telegram sent to you yesterday morning please substitute words " while on
sea" for "at all times " after word "protection."
MILES,
Major-General Commanding.
NAVY DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, June 6, 1898.
SIR. — This Department has received from Admiral Sampson, off Santiago
de Cuba, a telegram from which the following is an extract: " Very important
we should know immediately whether the army expedition has sailed for
Santiago and its number of vessels." You are respectfully requested to give
information on the above points as soon as practicable, in order that it may be
communicated to the Admiral. It is respectfully urged that the expedition
should get off as soon as possible. The naval force is all ready to convoy it.
Very respectfully, CHAS. H. ALLEN,
The Honorable the SECRETARY OF WAR. Acting Secretary.
TAMPA, Fla., June 6, 1898 — 11:40 P. M.
Hon. R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:
Troops have been marching on board to-day and will continue all night.
General Shafter hopes to sail to-morrow night or next day. There is siege
artillery here and more will arrive before No. 2 can be ready. There should
be a few regiments well equipped at Camp Alger.
MILES,
Major-General.
NAVY DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, June 7, 1898.
To Major-General SHAFTER or Major-General MILES, Tampa, Fla.:
Secretary of Navy has received this dispatch from Sampson to-day: " Bom
barded forts at Santiago 7:30 to-day, June 6. Have silenced works quickly
without injury of any kind, though stationed within 3,000 yards. If 10,000
men were here, city and fleet would be ours within forty-eight hours. Every
34$ CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
consideration demands immediate army movement. If delayed, city will be
defended more strongly by guns taken from the fleet."
R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.
WASHINGTON, June 7, 1898.
Major-General SHAFTER, Port Tampa, Fla.:
Since telegraphing you, an hour since, the President directs you to sail at
once with what force you have ready.
R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.
TAMPA, Fla., June 7, 1898 — 9 p. M. *
SECRETARY OF WAR, Washington:
I will sail to-morrow morning. Steam can not be gotten up earlier. There
is loaded to-night one division of . infantry (9 regiments), 16 companies of
dismounted cavalry, 4 light batteries, 2 siege batteries artillery, 2 companies
of engineers, and the troops from Mobile. I will try and get on the rest of
the cavalry and another division of regular infantry by morning. I will sail
then with whatever I have on board.
SHAFTER,
Major-General.
EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, June 7, 1898.
General SHAFTER, Tampa, Fla.:
About how many men will you have ready by morning?
CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.
PORT TAMPA, Fla. (direct), June 7, 1898 — 10:15 P. M.
Adjutant-General CORBIN:
I expect to have 834 officers, 16,154 men on transports by daylight and will
sail at that hour. Will wire particulars before starting,
SHAFTER.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 349
TAMPA, Fla., June 7, 1898 — 9:34 P. M.
The PRESIDENT. Washington:
From the Commanding General down to the drummer boys, everyone is im
patient to go, and annoyed at the delay. The last of the troops from Chick-
amauga arrived this morning and have been equipped and hurried to the
steamers. Feel confident they will all do their best to carry out the wishes
and directions of the President.
MILES,
Major-General Commanding.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, D. C, June 8, 1898.
Major-General SHAFTER, Tampa, Fla.:
Wait until you get further orders before you sail. Answer quick.
R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, D. C., June 8, 1898.
Major-General MILES, Port Tampa, Fla.:
I have sent the following telegram to Major-General Shafter: " Wait until
you get further orders before you sail. Answer quick."
R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.
TAMPA, Fla., June 8, 1898 — 4:3^ P. M.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL U. S. ARMY, Washington:
Your dispatch of to-day received.
MILES,
Major-General Commanding Army.
PORT TAMPA, Fla., June 8, 1898 — 4:06 P. M.
R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:
Message received. Vessels are in the stream, but will be able to stop them
before reaching the Gulf.
SHAFTER,
Major-General.
350 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, June 8, 1898.
Major-General MILES, Tampa, Fla.:
The reason for countermanding order you will find in the following. The
order was given at the request of the Navy Department by direction of the
President:
KEY WEST, June 8.
" Spanish armor cruiser, second class, and Spanish torpedo-boat destroyer
seen by " Eagle," Nicholas Channel, Cuba. Destroy convoy. Detail follow.
" REMEY."
" KEY WEST, June 8.
" Last cipher just came by 'Resolute,' just arrived; was pursued by twcf
vessels, Nicholas Channel, Cuba, last night. Shall I order ' Indiana " and all
available cruisers to coast of Cuba? More detail to follow. — REMEY."
R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.
TAMPA, Fla., June 8, 1898 — 11:42 p. M.
Hon. SECRETARY OF WAR, Washington, D. C.:
If that report is true, those Spanish vessels could be within six hours of the
loaded transports now, and there to-morrow. Have ample measures been
taken by the Navy to insure their safety?
MILES,
Commanding.
PORT TAMPA, Fla., June 8, 1898 — 5:03 P. M.
Hon. SECRETARY OF WAR, Washington, D. C.:
Ships commenced moving at 4 o'clock yesterday. They have been moving
out during night and morning as loaded. Your dispatch just received. Ships
can be recalled and await orders.
MILES,
Commanding.
m
i
W
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 353
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
TAMPA, Fla., June 9, 1898 — 6:50 P. M.
SECRETARY OF WAR, Washington, D. C.:
Think it would be well to announce that the Army got on board trans
ports and started, as they did yesterday. Say nothing about its being recalled,
but let our naval vessels go over the course that our transports would have
gone over, with the hope of finding those Spanish ships. Does not the pres
ence of Spanish war vessels in Cuban waters render it extremely hazardous
to send troops on transports until they are captured, destroyed, or driven away?
And, under the circumstances, is it expected that I shall organize expedition
number 2? Arrangements had been partly made before the presence of the
Spanish ships was announced.
MILES,
Major-General Commanding Army.
WAR DEPARTMENT, June 9, 1898.
Major-General MILES, Tampa, Fla.:
The President directs me to say that no change of plan will be -made; that
Expedition "No. 2 must be organized as rapidly as possible. We are looking
for transports and are satisfied the Navy will take care of that problem. Give
nothing out.
R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.
TAMPA, Fla., June 9, 1898 — 2:45 p. M.
SECRETARY OF WAR, Washington, D. C.:
It seems that it is a naval problem yet unsolved, and it might be advisable for
the command now on board transports to have the protection of the entire
Navy to convoy it to number I, number 2, or Nuevitas, or, if this is considered
too hazardous, then keep the troops in healthful camps, as they are now, and
assist the Navy to destroy the Spanish fleet. There are here 25 good steam
ers that could be used to carry water, coal and supplies, guns, revolving
cannon and mortars, etc., and they could be added to the force of the Navy.
It seems strange to be suggesting that the Army assist the Navy in this way,
but I am sure we would receive most loyal support when the waters are safe
for crossing with the Army.
MILES,
Major-General Commanding Army.
354 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, June 9, 1898.
Major-General SHAFTER, Tampa, Fla.:
Should you not sail until Monday, Secretary War desires to know whether
you will keep your troops on board or disembark them.
H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.
PORT TAMPA, Fla., June 9, 1898 — 9:32 p. M.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY, Washington, D. C.:
As the ships are lying it is impracticable to disembark the men. The gen
eral officers in command are all unanimous in this opinion. They will be tal^n
off, however, in detachments for exercise. There is no place in the vicinity
where they can be camped with any degree of comfort.
SHAFTER,
Major-General U. S. Volunteers.
The following communication was received from Navy Depart
ment on date named:
NAVY DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, June 9, 1898.
The Honorable the SECRETARY OF WAR:
SIR. — Referring to the expedition destined to Santiago de Cuba, I have the
honor to inform you that it is expected that the convoy of men-of-war, re-
enforced by two armored ships from Admiral Sampson's fleec, will be coaled
and ready to start for Santiago de Cuba by the evening of Monday, the I3th
instant, or by the morning of the following day, without regard to the
Spanish ships.
The board is of opinion that the army transports should not move from the
vicinity of Tampa until about twenty hours before the naval convoy will be
coaled and ready to start. This latter time, though estimated as above, can not
be closely fixed to-day, but probably can be by to-morrow evening.
Very respectfully,
CHAS. H. ALLEN,
Acting Secretary.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 355
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, June g, 1898 — 9:30 P. M.
Major-General MILES, Tampa, Fla.:
Following from the Acting Secretary Navy sent you for your information
and you will transmit it to General Shafter:
" Referring to the expedition destined to Santiago de Cuba, I have the honor
to inform you that it is expected that the convoy of men-of-war, re-enforced
by two armored ships from Admiral Sampson's fleet, will be coaled and ready
to start for Santiago by the evening of Monday, the I3th instant, or by the
morning of the following day, without regard to the Spanish ships. The
board is of opinion that army transports should not move from the vicinity of
Tampa until about twenty hours before the naval convoy will be coaled and
ready to start. This latter time, though estimated as above, can not be closely
fixed to-day, but probably can be by to-morrow evening."
Any further information concerning the movement of vessels for convoy
will be sent you the moment it is received.
By order Secretary of War:
H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, June 12, 1898 — 11 A. M.
Maj.-Gen. W. R. SHAFTER, Port Tampa, Fla.:
The following is sent you for your information and guidance: Commodore
Remey, commandant of the naval base at Key West, has been directed to
reassemble and coal as soon as possible the naval force which was recently
designated to convoy the army transports in which is embarked the military
expedition for Santiago de Cuba. As soon as Commodore Remey reports
when the convoy will be coaled and ready, his instructions are to send it to
meet the army transports in the passage or strait between Rebecca Shoal and
the Dry Tortugas, and considerable time would be saved if the army transports
could leave Tampa about eighteen hours before the Key West division of the
convoy reaches the neighborhood of Rebecca Shoal. The date and hour at
which the Key West division of the convoy will reach the vicinity of Rebecca
Shoal can not be exactly fixed, but you will be informed of it as soon as
practicable.
CUBAS STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
You will place yourself in communication with Commodore Remey and ar
range to meet convoy as herein suggested, making close connection. Ac
knowledge receipt.
By order of Secretary of War.
H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, June 12, 1898.
Major-General SHAFTER, Port Tampa, Fla.:
Having reference to telegram of this morning, the Secretary of War now di
rects me to inform you that the " Indiana " and other ships forming the con
voy will meet the transports at Rebecca Shoal and proceed together to desti
nation. You should reach the shoal not later than to-morrow afternoon.
Confer freely with Commodore Remey.
H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.
TAMPA, Fla., June 12, 1898 — 7:18 P. M.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL U. S. ARMY, Washington, D. C.:
4:30 p. m. Your dispatch in reference to starting delivered at 3 p. m. to-day.
Have consulted with senior naval officer present, who says we must have day
light to get down the lower bay. Will start the transports at daylight to
morrow, and with good luck will meet convoy from Key West before
Wednesday noon.
SHAFTER,
Major-Gcncral U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.
PORT TAMPA, Fla., June 13, 1898 — 1:10 P. M.
SECRETARY OF WAR, Washington, D. C.:
Steamers are moving out to sea and should be away at I o'clock.
MILES,
Major- General.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 357
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, D. C, June 14, 1898 — 11:40 p. M.
Major-General MILES, Tampa, Fla.:
Secretary of War desires the names of the general officers accompanying
General Shatter's expedition.
H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.
TAMPA, Fla., June 15, 1898 — 1:41 p. M.
Gen. H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.:
In reply to your telegram of yesterday the Major-General Commanding
directs me to inform you that the following general officers accompanied
General Shafter:
Maj.-Gen. Joseph Wheeler, Brig.-Gens. J. F. Kent, H. S. Hawkins, S. S.
Sumner, J. C. Bates, S. B. M. Young, H. W. Lawton, and A. R. Chaffee.
Also Major-General Breckinridge and Brig.-Gen. William Ludlow went as
inspecting officer and engineer officer from Headquarters Army, respectively.
MICHLER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
KEY WEST, Fla., June 15, 1898.
Captain MONTGOMERY, Executive Mansion, Washington, D. C.:
Twenty-one transports and eight convoys off Tortugas 10 this morning, and
at same place at sundown.
SAWYER,
Censor.
(Received at Washington 10:55 P. M-;
PLAYA DEL ESTE, via HAITI.
SECRETARY OF WAR, Washington, D. C.:
Off Daiquiri, Cuba, June 22, 1898. — Landing at Daiquiri this morning suc
cessful. Very little, if any, resistance.
SHAFTER.
(Received, Washington June, 22, 1898, 6:22 p. M.)
358 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, June 21, 1898.
Major-General SHAFTER, Santiago de Cuba:
Secretary War directs that the transports that went with you be returned to
Tampa for re-enforcements under same convoy that conducted you to your
present station, unless you think it unsafe to send it. Also report as to your
needs. Proposed to send you auxiliary cruisers " Yale " and " Harvard "
sailing from Newport News with re-enforcements.
H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, June 21, 1898."
The Honorable the SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:
SIR. — I have the honor to inclose herewith copy of a telegram just sent to
Major-General Shafter, Santiago de Cuba.
Very respectfully,
R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.
By H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, June 23, 1898.
Major-General SHAFTER, Santiago de Cuba:
Secretary of War directs such of the transports as can be spared be returned
to Tampa soon as convenient under convoy of the Navy. Please cable number
and names that can be returned and time of departure. Should it be deemed
best to not unload all supplies not perishable on ships, the same can be left in
them until next voyage.
By command Major-General Miles.
H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 359
PLAYA DEL ESTE, via HAITI.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Washington:
Siboney, i. — Cable received. Colonel Humphrey has been ordered to re
turn as many transports as possible at once.
W. R. SHAFTER,
Major-General, U. S. Volunteers, Fifth Corps.
(Received at Washington, July 2, 1898 — 1:21 A. M.)
On June 24th General Miles proposed the following for the plan of
the campaign:
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, D. C, June 24, 1898.
SIR. — I have the honor to submit the following:
With the capture of Santiago de Cuba it is expected we will have several
thousand Spanish prisoners, and with the capture of the second objective
position, now under consideration, it is expected we will add to the number,
making, it is hoped, in the aggregate at least 30,000 prisoners.
After the capture of the position next after Santiago de Cuba it would be, in
my judgment, advisable to take some deep-water harbors on the northern
coast of Cuba, which would be advisable, not only for our Army, but also for
the Navy, as safe ports for our transports, supply ships, and naval vessels
between Key West and Porto Rico. It is also important that we should select
some point at which to disembark our mounted troops and light artillery, with
which our Government is well supplied. We will have, in a few weeks, upward
of 15,000 cavalry. This force, with the light artillery and a small body of
infantry, will make a most formidable army corps with which to conduct a
campaign in the interior of Cuba.
The most available point, it appears to me, would be thei harbor of Neuvitas,
which has twenty-eight and one-half feet of water. From there the command
could move to Puerto Principe, one of the principal cities of the Island of Cuba.
Using that as a base, it could move through the rolling country, which is
reported to be free from yellow fever, to Moron and Taguayabon, and thence
to the Villa Clara, or, by a more southern route, from Puerto Principe to
Ciego de Avila, thence to Spiritus, and thence to Villa Clara. A road could be
built at the rate of five miles per day as that army corps marches; also, we
would find two railroad bases between Puerto Principe and Villa Clara.
CUBAS STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
To move the mounted troops over from Florida to Cuba and make this march
would undoubtedly consume the time up to nearly the 3Oth of September.
This army corps would also have the assistance of all the available forces of
Garcia and Gomez, and would by that time be occupying practically two-thirds
of the Island of Cuba.
If no serious force was encountered, this army corps could continue its march
to the south side of Havana. If a large force of Spanish troops, sufficient to
check its march, was moved to the vicinity of Villa Clara, then the entire army
with which we propose to invade Cuba could be moved between the forces at
Villa Clara and Havana, dividing the Spanish forces and defeating them in
detail.
I make this suggestion as having three advantages: First, we could employ
at reasonable compensation such prisoners as desired occupation in road
building; second, we could move into the interior of Cuba our large cavalry
command without serious molestation; third, wre would be operating during the
rainy or sickly season in the most healthful parts of Cuba, practically free
from yellow fever, and at the same time be occupying a large portion of the
enemy's territory.
If this proposition does not meet with favor, then, after the capture of
Santiago de Cuba and other places to the east, we could move the entire force
to the west of Havana and conduct the campaign from the deep harbors on
that coast. My judgment, however, is decidedly in favor of the first plan of
campaign.
Before reaching Villa Clara we would undoubtedly have upward of 50,000
prisoners, and if we could, by judicious, humane treatment, use them in a way
that would be advantageous to themselves as well as to our interests, I think
it would be advisable. There would be one great danger in moving them to
our own territory and establishing a large camp of prisoners, and that is that
they would bring the germs of disease with them and spread them among our
own people, as many Americans would have to be employed on the ships and
railroads, together with the guards necessary to control them.
Very respectfully,
NELSON A. MILES,
Major-General Commanding.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
When General Miles reached my headquarters in front of Santiago
on July 1 3th, he informed me of this proposition to organize a
mounted force of 15,000 men, with full artillery equipment, and he
also informed me that I was to be in command.
The plan was for me to move westerly to Havana, and capture all
the positions occupied by the enemy between Santiago and Havana.
But to return from this digression and to resume the thread of our
narrative, on June 7th orders were received from Washington for the
immediate embarkation of our troops. That night will long be remem
bered at Tampa. The hotel was made bright and beautiful by the
presence of fair ladies daintily attired in filmy muslins and laces; while
the brilliant uniforms of our infantry, cavalry and artillery officers, with
their white, yellow or red trimmings, and the additional novelty of the
uniforms of the foreign attaches moving about amid the ever-changing
throng added to the general interest and gayety of the scene. The
band was sending inspiring strains of martial music through the
foyer of the hotel and over the moonlit grounds. Many of the guests
were out on the front porch and steps watching the Rough Riders who
had come in from camp to be paid off for the first time, their kaki
uniforms making a long brown line as they sat on the ground in the
dim light waiting their turn.
About 9 o'clock there was a decided and very perceptible wave of
excitement and mystery sweeping over the concourse of visitors.
Orderlies were coming in saluting and giving dispatches to officers,
after reading which the latter would hastily excuse themselves and call
ing other officers aside would disappear for a consultation. It was
evident from the indications that the long waiting was over and that
important orders had come.
Out in the camps great excitement reigned. Orders rang out clear
and distinct in the still night air, dark figures were seen hurrying to
and fro, while orderlies darted about holding candles by whose meagre
light the hurried packing was done. Soon the tents were struck and
huge white piles of tentage and baggage were heaped up beside
the railroad, awaiting the train which was expected to leave at n
o'clock. Groups of officers sat around discussing the situation and ex
pressing their belief at the prospect of immediate active service. The
train did not arrive until daylight when it was eargely boarded by the
weary soldiers. After reaching Port Tampa, a distance of nine miles,
the troops were hurriedly embarked on the transports.
362
The following official table shows approximately the order of nav
ships, transports and cruisers:
ORDER OF CRUISING.
International Signal, T. C. F.
Vesuvius. O 1600 yds. O Scorpion.
1600 yds. 1600 yds.
Annapolis. Castinc. Helena. Indiana.
O 800 yds. O 800 yds. O 1600 yds. O
400 yds.
400 yds.
<u
O i
0 9
<> 17 Alleg/iany.
S
O 2
O 10
O 18 ist Div.
0
n
1600 yds. <> 3
0 ii
O 19 1600 yds.
o
^
0 4
Panther.
<> 12
O 20
Yosemite.
O 1600 yds. <C> 5
<0 25
0 3° 0
8co yds.
800 yds.
Bancroft.
Detroit.
O O 8co yds. O
800 yds.
O O
400 yds.
400 yds
O 26
O 28
O 22
-
0 7
o '5
O 23 2d Div.
0 8
O 16
O 24 1600 yds.
0 27
Wompatock.
O 29
O
Eagle.
O 1600 yds. O 6
O 14
0 21 O
1600 yds.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 363
The cavalry division were on board the steamships " Alleghany,"
" Rio Grande," " Miami " and " Yucatan." It was understood that
the hurried orders for immediate embarkation were due to the dispatch
from Admiral Sampson to the effect that with the aid of 10,000 troops
the city of Santiago and Cervera's fleet could be captured. This fired
the men who knew of it with the wildest anxiety to be on the spot
without a moment's delay; those who did not know of it felt there was
some urgent need at the front and every man was intensely anxious to
be off. Bitter disappointment was felt when the dispatch came order
ing a delay. It was reported that a Spanish fleet was lying in wait in
Nicholas Channel to attack the transports, which had not sufficient
convoys to protect them Finally on Monday, the I3th, orders came
to sail, and on Tuesday morning, June Hth, we succeeded in pushing
down Tampa Bay. The channel is a difficult one, the ships drawing
eighteen feet, and the narrow channel being only twenty-three feet at
its deepest part. There were only four pilots for this large number of
vessels, which caused some delay.
The last glimpse the soldiers had of faces from home was when a
number of ladies went down on the steamer " Margaret," which took
water and mail to the fleet anchored off Egmont Keys, twenty miles
from Port Tampa. When the ship sailed majestically out of Tampa
Bay, cheer after cheer from the men on the decks and crowded in the
rigging proved how glad they were to go forth and face the hardships
and dangers in store for them; everyone exulted in the joyous con
sciousness that he was to have the privilege of striking a blow at one
and the same time for humanity and for the honor of his country.
On Wednesday, June I5th, the transports passed Tortugas light,
leaving it to the right, and at daylight on June i6th they found them
selves under the escort of the warships. They moved in triple columns.
My own quarters were on the " Alleghany," the leading vessel in the
right-hand column of transports, some thousand yards behind the
warship " Indiana."
Only a few horses and mules were carried, these being for the use
of general and staff officers, and the absolute necessities of trans
portation, making in all about 2,000 animals. The troopers, to their
great disappointment, had to go dismounted on account of the im
possibility of transporting a large number of horses, which necessitated
leaving in Tampa a detachment of each regiment to care for the
horses there. The entire cavalry division which entered this expedi
tion numbered 158 officers and 2,822 men, and the strength of the
364 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
entire army which sailed from Tampa to Cuba was 815 officers and
16,072 enlisted men.
Fortunately the weather was calm and the voyage was accomplished
safely, with no unlooked-for incidents. Sailing around the northern
coast of Cuba, we caught sight of the mainland on Friday morning,
June I7th, about opposite the west end of Puerto Principe; on Sunday
morning we turned southward into the Windward Channel ; that nighi
we rounded Cape Maysi, and at daylight, Monday, June 2oth, were
within thirty miles of Santiago. As we rounded the Cape, the waiting
tugs which had been impatiently looking out for the appearance of the
American armada, catching sight of the " Indiana " and the foremost
of the transports, scurried back in haste to the waiting fleet; and when
we came near Guantanamo, the " Detroit " shot forward in a race
with the tugs to carry the news. The flagship fired a salute and sent
the Admiral's launch to welcome General Shatter. The hurrahs ex
changed between the soldiers and the sailors at this great distance, the
salutes and cheering on both sides, were awe-inspiring to a high degree
and must have reached the ears of the Spaniards in and around the
city of Santiago.
After a meeting with Admiral Sampson, General Shafter with his
staff went ashore and had a consultation with the Cuban generals.
It was decided that the landing should be effected at Daiquiri, while
feints were to be made at other points in order to confuse the
Spaniards.
A general bombardment of the shore took place on the morning of
the 22d, immediately after which the disembarkation commenced.
The men went ashore, joyous and jubilant, generosity and good
nature prevailed, and with few exceptions — for in every large body
of men the chronic grumbler may be found — not a complaint or
criticism was to be heard. Officers of all grades cheerfully packed
their blankets and rations, and by the following day the advance
troops of the corps were marching forward.
Much has been said as to the correctness of judgment which
directed the landing at Daiquiri, and it has been contended by some
that a landing at some point west of the bay would have been better.
There would certainly have been advantages in such a course, but also,
objections and difficulties. The coast was by no means favorable and
the scarcity of water was also urged; but all things being considered,
with the facts before General Shafter, it was certainly good judgment
to land troops at Daiquiri, which could be pushed forward, drive the
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 365
enemy from Siboney and thus open that locality as an additional place
of landing.
On the 22d I went ashore at the earliest possible moment to pre
pare for my troops and directed Colonel Wood to have his regimental
flag hoisted upon the flagstaff of a Spanish blockhouse, on an emi
nence near the shore. The flag was instantly saluted by shrill whistles
from the entire fleet. I rode forward into the country about three
miles and a half, returning late at night, and was ordered next morning
to proceed with such of my troops as had already disembarked, to
Juragua, and to throw forward pickets to Juraguacito, commonly
called " Siboney," which place, we were informed, was occupied by
General Linares with a considerable force of Spainards, the defenses of
the place being blockhouses and other temporary works.
LAS GUASIMAS.
Directing General Young and Colonel Wood with two squadrons
of the First Volunteers, known as the " Rough Riders," and one squad
ron each of the First and Tenth Regulars, amounting in all to 964 men,
and the commanders of three Hotchkiss guns and one dynamite gun
to follow me, I rode forward accompanied by my staff officers,
Major Beach and Lieutenant Steele, my interpreter, Mr. Mestre,
and one orderly and a guide. Approaching Siboney I found that the
Spaniards had evacuated that place and had started at daylight in the
direction of Sevilla, followed by 200 Cubans.
General Lawton, with his fine division, had been given the privilege
of bein-g the first to land. He had reached Siboney with the advance
of his command soon after the Spaniards had evacuated that place.
Two of his brigades were encamped upon the Daiquiri and Siboney
road, about half a mile from the latter place. I proceeded rapidly
to the front and found that the enemy had halted in a strong position
three miles from Siboney, and that the Cubans had engaged their rear
with a loss of two killed and seven wounded. After examining the
position and consultation with General Castillo and other Cuban offi
cers and learning the features of the country, I returned to Siboney,
reaching that place after dark, leaving the Cubans encamped on the
road about one-third of the distance between Siboney and the Spanish
position. This body of Cubans knew the country, and their officers
seemed to be enthused to learn that the Americans were to move upon
the Spaniards, and they were delighted with the idea that at daylight
they were to march to battle side by side with the army which had
366 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
come for their deliverance. I expected several hundred, and these,
together with my 900 men, would, I thought, be able to make a very
formidable attack; and I was much impressed with the advantage it
would give us for the Spaniards to be promptly and forcibly con
vinced that their American foes were bold, brave, aggressive and
determined.
I resolved to attack as early as possible. The disposition of the
troops and the plan of attack were as follows:
General Young with the Hotchkiss guns, the dynamite gun, the
two squadrons of regular cavalry, and the Cubans, were to march by
the main Santiago road, while Colonel Wood with his two squadrons
of volunteers was to march by a road running to the left of and nearly
parallel with the main road. At a designated point, where the two
columns would be about seven or eight hundred yards apart, Colonel
Wood was to file to the right, causing his right flank to connect with
the left flank of the regulars, which, together with the Cubans, would
file to the left; this would bring our troops directly in position for
attack.
I was up before daylight and together with Major Beach and Mr.
Mestre hastened to get the columns in march. After my own troops
had been started, I sought General Castillo and the Cuban officers who
had come into the town the night before, to make certain of prompt
movement on their part. Being assured that the Cubans would cer
tainly be with us if not in our advance, I rode rapidly, soon overtaking
the column of regulars. I was disappointed in finding but few Cubans
and could hear nothing of the main body of these troops.
On emerging from a dense wood, the Spaniards were discovered
on a hill at a distance of about 800 yards.. Preparations for action
were promptly made. A Cuban guide was dispatched to Colonel
Wood, who deployed the troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Roose
velt, a squadron as a reserve being under Major Brodie. General
Young put Bell's squadron of the First Regular Cavalry in line, Major
Norvill being at first held in reserve and the Hotchkiss guns were
put in position upon and near the road. All this was done in full
view of the enemy, not more than 800 yards distant, but to our
surprise not a shot was fired by them. This, together with our
inability to find or hear of the main body of the Cuban force, and
the further fact that the Cuban officers had stated that Spaniards
would certainly retreat during the night, made me uncertain whether
the troops we saw were really Spaniards or our Cuban allies, who, we
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 367
had been assured, would start for the front at the earliest dawn. I
had a very powerful glass and Major Beach and I rode out on an
elevation and spent some twenty-five minutes in examining the line
which confronted us. They were stationed on a ridge, their breast
works were very clearly visible, and our glasses soon made it evident
that they were without doubt Spaniards.
I went back to the Hotchkiss guns, told General Young and Cap
tain Watson of my observations and directed that a well-aimed shot
be fired from the Hotchkiss guns. We could see the missile strike
the works, and instantly a volley from a line many hundred yards in
length was showered upon us. Unfortunately the dynamite gun, on
which we very much depended, had not been heard from, but the three
Hotchkiss guns and Bell's squadron of regulars returned the fire with
promptitude and precision. Then troops of Norvill's squadron were
put in line and one troop under the gallant Captain Ayers was held in
reserve. I moved forward in person with a squadron of the First Regu
lar Cavalry under Major Bell and was particularly struck with the ad
mirable conduct of both officers and men. The fire upon the squadron
seemed to come from the breastworks a little to the left of our front
and also from a portion of the Spanish line screened by a wood
directly in front of us. The first man to fall in this part of the line,
and I think he was the first of this regiment who was struck, was
private Emil Bjork. I glanced at him as he lay partly on his side
gasping, and I told the next soldier to unbuckle his belt, under which
I saw a red spot showing he had been shot directly through the
stomach. The Mauser bullets are so small — only twenty-seven cali
bre — that although I looked directly at his belt I could not see where
he had been struck until his belt was removed. Major Bell, the
squadron commander, Captain Knox, Lieutenant Byram and a num
ber of noncommissioned officers and privates were badly wounded
during the advance. It was very pleasing to see the perfect discipline
displayed by these regular troops; as men fell, those nearest them
would call in a loud voice for the hospital corps, but without for a
moment turning from their duty. Most of the wounded officers and
men lay in the grass where they fell, but some tried to crawl or roll
back to a less exposed position.
On approaching the wood I turned off to the left so I could see that
portion of the line which was advancing through the open grass-cov
ered fields. Meanwhile Colonel Wood had deployed his regiment,
his right nearly reaching the left of the regulars.
It now being evident that the Cubans were still in our rear, I went
CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
to General Young, who was in position about fifty yards to the left
of the battery, and told him I would send an officer back to find the
Cubans, or get any other available troops to come up. During all
this time our men were advancing and under the direction of the offi
cers, stopping to fire when it could be done to advantage. After some
thing over an hour's warm fighting and when our troops were within
some 300 yards of the Spanish intrenchments, the enemy com
menced retreating. Upon reaching the enemy's position we found
it lined with empty shells of the Mauser rifles, showing their
lavish use of ammunition. Our men fired a few well-directed volleys
at the flying enemy, but were too exhausted to pursue.
The character of the roads over which our columns had moved was
such as to render progress very difficult. The masses of under
growth, obstructed here and there by a tangle of briers and occasional
wire fencing and a succession of rocky heights and deep gullies, made
the regular formation of flanking lines almost impossible, besides the
extreme heat of the climate told severely on our men; but in spite of
these obstacles they responded to every command with readiness of
seasoned veterans and pushed steadily on with a valor so heroic and
irresistible as to strike terror into the hearts of their opponents.
Our losses were 16 killed and 52 wounded, the number of killed
being exactly the same in each column, but the number of wounded
being much higher among the volunteers. Among the killed
were Captain Allyn K. Capron, Jr., an officer in the regular army,
but a captain in the First Volunteer Cavalry, Sergeant Hamilton
Fish, of the distinguished family of that name, Sergeant Marvyn
Russell of New York, a gentleman of education and culture. The
others killed were Corporal Dougherty, Privates Leggett, Irvine,
Hefner and Dawson, of the First Volunteer Cavalry, Corporal White,
of the Tenth Cavalry, and Corporal Slemmer, Privates Stark, Krupp,
Bjork, Kolb, Dix and Berlin, of the First Regular Cavalry. Major,
afterward Colonel, Brodie, who commanded a squadron of the First
Volunteer Cavalry, was badly wounded and disabled.
This battle, though not great either in point of numbers engaged or
in casualties, was far-reaching in results, especially in the esprit de
corps and enthusiasm with which the victory inspired our troops.
Nine hundred and sixty-four dismounted cavalry in less than two days
after reaching the shores of Cuba had marched fourteen miles and at
tacked and defeated the Spanish forces under Lieutenant-General
Linares in a position which this distinguished general had selected
as very favorable to defense. The Spaniards had thrown up some tern-
MACEO.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 371
porary defenses which still further strengthened their position. The
Spanish force was variously estimated at from 1,400 to more than
double that number.
The following is an extract from my official report:
On June 2ist, I was ordered to report to General Shafter on board the
" Seguranca," and orders were given for the Arrny to disembark the next day,
General Lawton's division to land first, Bates' Independent Brigade second,
and the dismounted cavalry division, which I had the honor to command,
third. In conversation with General Shafter at this and at other times, I
specially dwelt upon the historic fact that the tactics of Spanish armies had
been to fight in defenses around cities, and that the information we had gave
strong indications that the same plan would be followed by the Spanish gen
erals in Cuba, and I emphasized the importance of our using every effort and
device to overtake and attack the enemy's detachments before they could con
centrate at Santiago behind their strong breastworks, which we knew were
made still stronger by wire entanglements in their front. General Shafter and
all the officers to whom the suggestion was made fully concurred in this.
On the morning of the 22d a fleet of boats towed by steam or naphtha
launches belonging to the Navy was placed at General Lawton's disposal, and
his division was quickly landed. Appreciating the importance of getting the
Army ashore as soon as possible, and knowing that it was General Shafter's
desire that this should be done, I, so far as practicable, urged the landing of
my troops by means of the ships' boats, and seeing these efforts on our part,
some of the young naval officers, not being able to find the ships occupied by
Bates' brigade, and my ships being near the shore, landed some of my troops
on the afternoon of the 22d and on the morning of the 23d. I went ashore
myself on the 22d, rode out to the front about four miles to reconnoiter the
country, and returned that night. The next morning General Shafter sent for
me and expressed great anxiety at not having heard from Lawton. He told
me that there was a Spanish force in blockhouses and other fortifications at
Siboney, and directed me to proceed to its immediate vicinity with the dis
mounted cavalry then on shore and throw out my pickets to that place, General
Shafter's exact language being to " proceed to Juragua and throw forward
pickets to Juraguacito." The latter place was also called Siboney, and after
wards was almost always designated by that name.
I appreciated the importance of getting Siboney into our possession, as it
had a good harbor and was some nine miles nearer to Santiago than our then
landing place at Daiquiri. General Shafter's anxiety for me to move rapidly
was such that he gave orders for his quartermaster, Major Jacobs, to furnish
me all the horses I needed for my Hotchkiss guns, dynamite gun, and for
372
myself and staff. The sea was so high that the captain of my transport stated
that it was not safe for his boats to be lowered at that time, but I insisted upon
his doing so, reached the shore, procured the horses, directed the Hotchkiss
guns and the dynamite gun to move forward as soon as possible, gave the same
directions to Colonel Wood and General Young, and then, accompanied by
Major Beach, Lieutenant Steele, and Mr. Mestre of my staff, and one orderly,
T rode rapidly to Siboney. This is a small village close to the shore, while the
place which was designated Juragua was on a slight elevation overlooking
Siboney and but a short distance from it.
I found General Lawton's division had been halted before reaching Siboney
and was camped on the Daiquiri and Siboney road. I also found that the
enemy had left Siboney that morning and was fighting with some Cubans on
the Siboney and Santiago road. I rode rapidly to the front, reconnoitered the
ground, and was forcibly impressed that it would be a great military advantage
to attack and defeat the enemy in their position. At dark I rode back* to
Siboney and sent for General Young and Color ',1 Wood. The First Volunteer
Cavalry, about 500 strong, reached Siboney between 7 and 8 o'clock that night,
and the two squadrons of regular cavalry, numbering about 464 men, had been
halted by General Young and put in bivouac before reaching Siboney. Many
of the Cubans insisted that the enemy would leave that night. I gave directions
for the command to take breakfast before daylight, and to start to the front at
the first dawn of day. I explained to General Young and Colonel Wood the
position and strength of the enemy.
Fully an hour before day I was up and seeking to hasten preparations for
the march. The regular cavalry had arisen long before daybreak, finished
their breakfast, marched quite a distance, and reached Siboney very shortly
after daylight. There were two roads leading up to the point occupied by the
Spaniards. The First Volunteer Cavalry, accompanied by Capt. Lloyd S.
McCormick, Seventh Regular Cavalry; First Lieutenant Tyree R. Rivers, Third
Regular Cavalry, and Second Lieutenant William R. Smedberg, Jr., Fourth
Regular Cavalry, were, on the recommendation of General Castillo, sent by
the less frequented and most difficult road, while the regular troops and the
artillery were ordered upon the main Siboney and Santiago road. General
Castillo had promised to take a Cuban regiment with us, and after starting the
American troops I went to General Castillo and urged him to push his troops
forward, which he promised to do. The Spaniards were found in the same
position they occupied the .previous night, about three miles from Siboney.
The squadron of the First Cavalry, commanded by Major James M. Bell, was
promptly put in line and the three Hotchkiss guns in position on the road, and
Major Norvell's squadron of the Tenth Cavalry was at first held in reserve.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 373
The dynamite gun, upon which we placed great dependence, failed to
reach us.
A man was sent across to Colonel Wood to let him know that we were in
position and that the enemy was directly in our front. What appeared to be the
right of the enemy's line was in full view. The space intervening between this
portion of the enemy's line and our position wras quite open, but the enemy's
left was hidden by heavy timber and undergrowth. As we were not fired
upon, and as I had been unable to find the bulk of the Cuban force, I feared
for a moment that the men we saw might be Cubans. I, therefore, together
with Major Beach, rode to a little elevation in front and carefully examined
them with a powerful glass, and being satisfied that they were Spaniards, I
\vent back and ordered a shot to be fired from one of the Hotchkiss guns.
This was replied to by a long line of infantry, and the fight commenced.
Shortly afterward we heard shots to our left, which told us that Wood was
also in action. Bell's dismounted squadron of the First Cavalry \vas imme
diately advanced, and Major Norvell, leaving Captain Ayres' troop with the
battery, deployed his other three troops into line, and the seven troops
advanced together. Officers and men fought with great gallantry, continuing
to advance, and in an hour the fight was won. The enemy's retreat was pre
cipitate, and our men being exhausted, and all the men and regimental officers
being on foot, pursuit was impossible. Our losses were 16 killed and
52 wounded, and after giving directions in regard to the care, of the wounded
and the burial of the dead, I rode rapidly to Sevilla, which was in full
view of Santiago, and then rode on to a point about seven miles from Santiago.
Immediately after the fight was over I wrote to General Shafter and received
from him complimentary replies.
That afternoon I received instructions to take command of all the troops on
shore, and in the evening received the following from General Shafter's
adjutant-general :
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
S. S. " SEGURANCA," June 24, 1898 — i p. M.
SIR. — The commanding general directs me to say that he is glad to hear
such good news, and that you are occupying the enemy's ground. A battery
will be sent you as soon as it can be unloaded and horses are off. Will also
send you some saddle horses from the artillery. The mounted cavalry will be
dispatched as fast as possible.
********* *
McCLERNAND,
A. A. G.
Major-General WHEELER, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding Cavalry Division.
374 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Later I also received the following:
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD S. S. " SEGURANCA," OFF DAIQUIRI,
CUBA, June 25, 1898 — 5:50 A. M.
SIR. — Dispatch of 5 P. M. just received. Your news is excellent. Have
ordered Bates to repair road to Sevilla at once. One battery of artillery is on
way to you, and will have another battery before night. Four troops Second
Cavalry will be gotten to you just as early as possible.
###**##**#
Very respectfully,
WM. R. SHAFTER,
Major-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.
Major-General J. WHEELER, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding Cavalry Division,
4
near Sevilla, Cuba.
General Shafter, in his official report dated September 13, 1898,
in referring to this battle says:
The engagement had an inspiriting effect upon our men and, doubtless, corre
spondingly depressed the enemy, as it was now plainly demonstrated to them
that they had a foe to meet who would advance upon them under heavy fire
delivered from intrenchments.
The day after the Las Guasimas fight General Shafter received the
following telegrams from Washington:
WASHINGTON, D. C, June 25.
General SHAFTER, Daiquiri, Cuba:
The President directs me to send his thanks to you and your Army for the
gallant action of yesterday, which I gladly do.
R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.
WASHINGTON, D. C., June 25.
General SHAFTER, Daiquiri, Cuba:
Congratulations on success attained thus far. Regret most deeply to hear
of the loss of your heroic men.
MILES,
Major -General.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 375
General Shafter replied:
Major-General MILES, Commanding Army, Washington:
Thanks for congratulations. Nine hundred and sixty-four men only engaged
on our side. But it was very decisive in our favor, and the enemy retreated
precipitately. Lack of cavalry only prevented their capture. Reports from
Spanish sources from Santiago say we were beaten, but persisted in righting,
and they were obliged to fall back. Deeply regret the loss of so many brave
men' SHAFTER.
The following is General Young's report of this engagement:
HEADQUARTERS SECOND CAVALRY BRIGADE,
CAMP NEAR SANTIAGO DE CUBA, CUBA, June 29, 1898.
The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Cavalry Division:
SIR. — By direction of the major-general commanding the cavalry division,
I have the honor to submit the following report of the engagement of a part of
this brigade with the enemy at Guasimas, Cuba, on the 24th instant, accom
panied by detailed reports from the regimental and other commanders engaged,
and a list of the killed and wounded:
After debarking at Daiquiri on the afternoon of the 23d instant, I received
from Major-General Wheeler, the division commander, verbal orders to move
out with three days' rations in haversacks, to a good camping place between
Juraguacito and Siboney, on the road leading to Santiago de Cuba.
In obedience thereto, at 4:30 P. M., I moved from my bivouac near the land
ing, with brigade headquarters, the First Volunteer Cavalry (Wood's), one
squadron of the First United States Cavalry (Bell's), one squadron of the
Tenth United States Cavalry (Norvell's), and the Hotchkiss mountain-gun
battery (four guns, Captain Watson, Tenth Cavalry, temporarily commanding),
all dismounted. The remainder of the brigade was ordered to follow early
the following morning on receiving its rations.
I arrived at Siboney with the head of the column at about 7 P. M., where I
bivouacked for the night with the First Volunteer Cavalry, the two squadrons
of the First and Tenth United States Cavalry and the battery being delayed by
the crowded condition of the trail and the difficulty of following through the
jungle after night.
I reported to General WTheeler and from him learned of an engagement be
tween Cubans and Spaniards in that vicinity during the day, resulting in the
repulse of the former with some loss. Later I met General Castillo, the com
mander of the Cuban forces, who gave me a full description of the topography
376 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
of the country and much information regarding the Spanish troops, their man
ner of fighting, etc. General Castillo expressed the belief that although the
Spaniards had successfully resisted his attack, they would fall back to Santiago
during the night; but he also stated that he had received information they were
being re-enforced.
Deeming it essential that positive information should be obtained as to the
position and movements of the enemy in our front, I asked and obtained from
General Wheeler authority to make a reconnoissance in force for this purpose,
General Castillo having promised to assist and co-operate with me with a force
of 800 effective Cubans.
Leading from Siboney there are two roads, or more properly trails, one to
the eastward, the other to the westward of the little town, which unite about
one mile before reaching Sevilla and a little in advance of the scene of the
Cuban-Spanish engagement. The trails are at no point more than one and
one-half miles apart.
I concluded to move by the two trails, General Castillo having informed me
his outposts covered both. I consequently directed Colonel Wood to move
with his regiment by the western route, cautioning him to keep a careful look
out and to attack any Spaniards he might encounter, connecting in the latter
event by his right flank with the other column while trying to gain the enemy's
right flank. Colonel Wood marched about 6 A. M. the 24th instant, and I sent
my personal aids, First Lieutenant T. R. Rivers, Third Cavalry, and Second
Lieutenant W. R. Smedberg, Fourth Cavalry, to accompany his column.
The other, the right column, marched at 5:45 A. M. I moved with it, accom
panied by Captain A. L. Mills, assistant adjutant-general. I proposed to
attack the enemy in front and on his left if I found him in position.
At 7:20 A. M., the right column being masked in an open glade, Captain
Mills with a patrol of two men advanced and discovered the enemy located, as
described by General Castillo, in a locality called Guasimas, from trees of that
name in the vicinity. After having carefully examined the enemy's position I
prepared to develop his strength. Canteens were ordered filled; the Hotchkiss
battery was placed in position in concealment at about 900 yards, and Bell's
squadron was deployed and Norvell's in support.
On discovering the enemy I had sent a Cuban guide to warn Colonel Wood,
and knowing that his column had a more difficult route, and would require a
longer time to reach the position, I delayed the attack some time in order
that the development on both flanks should begin simultaneously. During this
delay General Wheeler arrived and was informed of my dispositions, plan of
attack, and intentions. After an examination of the position by him, and his
approval of my action, I ordered the attack, and. it was executed in a manner
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 377
winning the admiration of the division commander and all present who
witnessed it.
The Spanish forces occupied a range of high hills in the form of an obtuse
angle, with the salient toward Siboney and with an advance party on the trail
on which I had been moving. The attack of both wings was simultaneous, and
the junction of the two lines occurred near the apex of the angle on the ridge,
which had been fortified with stone breastworks flanked by blockhouses.
The Spaniards were driven from their position and fled precipitately toward
Santiago. The attacking force numbered 950 men, while that of the enemy, at
first estimated at 2,000, has since been learned from Spanish sources to have
been 2,500. The Cuban military authorities claim the Spanish strength was
4,000. It has also been reported that Lieutenant-General Linares, commanding
the Spanish forces in eastern Cuba, and two other general officers were present
and witnessed the action. The fire of the enemy was almost entirely by
volleys, executed with the precision of parade. For an account of the opera
tions of the left column, attention is invited to the inclosed report of Colonel
Wood, marked "A."
The ground over which the right column advanced was a mass of jungle
growth, with wire fences, not to be seen until encountered, and precipitous
heights as the ridge was approached. It was impossible for the troops to keep
touch along the front, and they could only judge of the enemy from the sound
and direction of his fire. However, had it not been for this dense jungle, the
attack would not have been made against an overwhelming force in such a
position. Headway was so difficult that advance and support became merged and
moved forward under a continuous volley firing, supplemented by that of two
rapid-fire guns. Return firing by my force was only made as here and there a
small clear spot gave a sight of the enemy. The fire discipline of these par
ticular troops was almost perfect. The ammunition expended by the two
squadrons engaged in an incessant advance for one hour and fifteen minutes
averaged less than ten rounds per man. The fine quality of these troops is also
shown by the fact that there was not a single straggler, and in not one instance
was an attempt made by any soldier to fall out in the advance to assist the
wounded or carry back the dead. The fighting on the left flank was equally
creditable and was remarkable, and I believe unprecedented in volunteer troops
so quickly raised, armed, and equipped.
Our total losses were I officer and 15 men killed; 6 officers and 46 men
wounded. Forty-two dead Spanish soldiers were found, the bodies of nearly all
of whom had been thrown into the jungle for concealment. Spanish news
papers of Santiago the day after the battle gave their loss as 77 killed. It is
known that many wounded were carried to the city.
CUBAS STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Every possible attention was given to the wounded, and the medical officers
were unremitting in their efforts to alleviate their sufferings. Circumstances
necessarily limited their appliances to the first aid order. The wounded were
carried on improvised litters to Siboney, and the dead were carefully buried on
the battlefield, a proper record of their burial being kept.
Finding, when the ridge was carried, that many of my men had become ex
hausted by the excessive heat and exertion, I ordered a halt and occupation of
the captured position. Had I had at hand at the time of the assault a force of
mounted cavalry, the fruits of our victory would have been more apparent.
General Castillo did not appear on the field, nor did any of his troops come to
the front until the firing had ceased. No other troops than those mentioned
were engaged in the action. Three troops of the Ninth United States Cavalry
arrived on the left after the firing had stopped and were posted as pickets until
relieved by General Chaffee's brigade of General Lawton's division, which then
took the advance.
The action of all officers and men, so far as my personal observation ex
tended, was superb, and I can only at this time mention the names of those
whose conduct was personally observed by me as being highly conspicuous in
gallantry and daring, and evidencing a firm intention to do everything within
the power and endurance of humanity and the scope of duty. Captain Knox,
after being shot through the abdomen, and seeing his lieutenant and first
sergeant wounded, gave necessary orders to his troops and refused to allow a
man in the firing line to assist him to the rear; Lieutenant Byram, after having
his scalp wound dressed, and knowing his captain (Knox) to be wounded, as
sumed command of his trcop, but fell fainting while pushing to the front;
Captain Mills, the only member of my staff present with me on this part of
the field, was most conspicuous for his daring and unflagging energy in his
efforts to keep troops in touch on the line and in keeping me informed of the
progress made in advancing through the jungle.
In connection with the conduct of the officers, attention is called to Colonel
Wood's report on the conduct of Captain Capron, Major Brodie, Captain
McClintock, Lieutenant Thomas, Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt, Captain Mc-
Cormick (Seventh United States Cavalry), and my personal aids, Lieutenants
T. R. Rivers and Smedberg. I can not speak too highly of the efficient man
ner in which Colonel Wood handled his regiment, and of his magnificent
behavior on the field. The conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt, as re
ported to me by my two aids, deserves my highest commendation. Both
Colonel Wood and Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt disdained to take advantage
of shelter or cover from the enemy's fire while any of their men remained
exposed to it — an error of judgment, but happily on the heroic side, I beg
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 379
leave to report that the behavior of all men of the regular and volunteer
forces engaged in this action was simply superb, and I feel highly honored in
the command of such troops.
I desire to express my admiration of the fine soldierly qualities and conduct
on the march and after meeting the enemy, of Major Norvell, Tenth Cavalry,
and Major Bell, First Cavalry, commanding squadrons. Their quick and rapid
execution of orders and instructions were admirable and gratifying. Major
Bell received a serious wound in the early part of the engagement and was
succeeded in the command of his squadron by Captain Wainwright, whose
management of the right wing of the advance firing line was all that I could
desire or hope for, and more than I could, under such opposing conditions,
confidently expect. Captains Beck and Galbraith and Lieutenants Wright and
Fleming also deserve equal praise for the manner in which they maneuvered
and controlled their troops in attacking the precipitous heights before them.
Captain Ayres' performance of the duties assigned his troop was highly com
mendable, as was Captain Watson's fine work with his battery. Attention is
invited to the inclosed reports of troop commanders regarding the conduct of
their subordinates and their men. Assistant Surgeon Fuller and Acting
Assistant Surgeon Delgardo, also Assistant Surgeon J. R. Church, First
Volunteer Cavalry, deserve special mention for their gallant action in person
ally carrying and assisting in carrying wounded men from the field under
heavy fire.
The chief results following from this action with the Spaniards are a test of
the valor of the opposing forces; the spirit of superiority I believe it has fixed
in our own; the opening of the road to the gates of Santiago de Cuba, and the
gaining of a beautiful camping ground for our Army on the heights over
looking that city, which can now easily be taken at our leisure.
Very respectfully,
S. B. M. YOUNG,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.
The following is a list of the officers who participated in this
battle:
Major-General Joseph Wheeler, commanding.
Major William D. Beach, chief engineer.
Aurelius E. Mestre, volunteer aid.
Brigadier-General S. B. M. Young, U. S. Volunteers.
Captain A. L. Mills, A. A. G., U. S. Volunteers.
First Lieutenant T. R. Rivers, Third Cavalry, aid.
380 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Second Lieutenant W. R. Smedberg, Jr., Fourth Cavalry, aid.
First Lieutenant L. A. Fuller, assistant surgeon.
First United States Regular Cavalry:
Major James M. Bell, commanding squadron, wounded, Las Guasimas,
June 24th.
Captain Thomas T. Knox, commanding Troop K, wounded, Las Guasimas,
June 24th.
Captain R. P. Page Wainwright, commanding Troop G.
Captain Jacob G. Galbraith, commanding Troop B.
First Lieutenant George L. Byram, squadron adjutant, wounded, Las
Guasimas, June 24th.
First Lieutenant Peter E. Traub, duty with Troop G.
First Lieutenant Edmund S. Wright, commanding Troop A.
Second Lieutenant Walter M. Whitman, duty with Troop G.
Second Lieutenant Charles McK. Saltzman, duty with Troop B.
Second Lieutenant Henry C. Smither, duty with Troop A.
Tenth United States Regular Cavalry:
Major S. T. Norvell.
Captain W. H. Beck.
Captain C. G. Ayres.
Captain J. B. Watson.
Lieutenant R. L. Livermore.
Lieutenant R. J. Fleming.
Lieutenant G. Vidmer.
Lieutenant A. M. Miller, Jr.
Lieutenant H. O. Williard.
Lieutenant F. R. McCoy.
First United States Volunteer Cavalry:
Colonel Leonard Wood.
Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt.
Major Alexander O. Brodie, wounded, Las Guasimas, June 24th.
Major and Assistant Surgeon Henry La Motte.
Captain L. S. McCormick, Seventh United States Cavalry.
Captain Allyn K. Capron, killed, Las Guasimas, June 24th.
Captain Micah J. Jenkins.
Captain Frederick Muller.
Captain Maximilian Luna.
Captain R. B. Huston.
Captain W. H. H. Llewellyn.
Captain William O. O'Neill.
Captain J. C. McClintock.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 381
First United States Volunteer Cavalry — (Continued):
First Lieutenant Woodbury Kane.
First Lieutenant Frank Frantz.
First Lieutenant J. A. Carr.
First Lieutenant J. B. Wilcox.
First Lieutenant J. R. Thomas, Jr., wounded, Las Guasimas, June 24th.
First Lieutenant and Surgeon J. R. Church.
Second Lieutenant R. C. Day.
Second Lieutenant Maxwell Keyes.
Second Lieutenant J. C. Greenway.
Second Lieutenant J. C. Goodrich.
Second Lieutenant Thomas Rhyning.
Second Lieutenant J. D. Carter.
Second Lieutenant D. J. Leahey.
Second Lieutenant H. K. Devereux.
U. S. Military Cadet Ernest Haskell.
Edward Marshall, wounded, Las Guasimas, June 24th.
Richard Harding Davis.
Caspar Whitney.
Robert C. Cramer.
All these officers were distinguished, but at the time I made special
mention of General Young, Colonel Wood and Colonel Roosevelt, and
these officers and myself made special mention of Majors Bell and
Brodie, Captains McClintock, Wainwright, McCormick, Capron,
Knox, Miller, Beck, Galbraith, Ayres, Watson; Surgeons Fuller,
Delgardo and Church, and Lieutenants Mills, Byram, Rivers, Smed-
berg, Wright, Fleming and Thomas. Mr. Marshall (who was badly
wounded), Richard Harding Davis, Mr. Whitney and Mr. Cramer
were also favorably mentioned. Major Beach and Mr. Mestre, my
aid, were also highly distinguished and commended.
Colonel Leonard Wood made the following report of the part taken
by the First U. S. Volunteer Cavalry (Rough Riders) in this battle:
HEADQUARTERS FIRST U. S. VOLUNTEER CAVALRY,
IN CAMP AT GUASIMAS, Cuba, June 25, 1898.
Brigadier-General YOUNG, Commanding Second Brigade, Cavalry Division:
SIR. — I have the honor to submit the following report of the action at
Guasimas. about nine (9) miles from Santiago, on the morning of June 24,
1898:
32 CUBAS STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
I left camp at the sea coast at 5:40, proceeding by trail in the direction of
the town of Caverita. On reaching the top of the mesa, an advance guard
was thrown out, and every precaution taken against surprise, as we had
positive information that the enemy was ahead of us in force. The character
of the country was such that reconnoitering was extremely difficult, as the
dense growth of underbrush rendered the rapid movement of flanking parties
practically impossible. At 7:10 our advanced point discovered what they
believed to be signs of the immediate presence of the enemy. The command
was halted and the troops deployed to the right and left, in open skirmish
order, and the command ordered to advance carefully. The firing began
almost immediately, and the extent of firing on each flank indicated that we
had encountered a very heavy force. Two additional troops were deployed on
the right and left, thus leaving only three (3) troops in reserve. It was soon
apparent that their lines were overlapping us on both flanks. Two (2) other
troops were rapidly deployed, one on the right and one on the left, which gave
our line a length about equal to their own. The firing about this time was
exceedingly heavy, much of it at very short range, but on account of the
heavy undergrowth comparatively few men were injured at this time. It was
about this time that Captain Capron was mortally wounded. The firing on
his immediate front was terrific.
The remaining troop was sent to the front, and the order given to advance
very slowly. Men and officers behaved splendidly, and advanced slowly,
forcing back the enemy on the right flank. We captured a small blockhouse
and drove the enemy out of a very strong position in the rocks. We were now
able to distinguish their line, which had taken a new position about 800 or
1,000 yards in length and about 300 yards in front of us. The firing was
exceedingly heavy here again, and it was here that we had a good many
men wounded and several officers. Our men continued to advance in very
good order, and steadily forced the Spanish line back. We now began to
get a heavy fire from a ridge on our right, which enfiladed our line (this
ridge was the position which was being attacked by two squadrons of the
regular cavalry), and was held in very strong force by the Spanish in small
rock forts along its entire length, supported by two machine-guns.
Having cleared our right flank, we were able to pay some attention to the
Spanish on the above-mentioned ridge, and centered upon it the fire of two
troops. This fire, with the attacking force on the other side, soon completed
the evacuation of this end of the ridge, and the regular assault completed
the evacuation along the entire length of the ridge. Of the Spaniards who
retreated from the ridge some few fell into line, but apparently remained
there only a moment when large masses of them were seen to retreat rapidly,
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 383
and we were able to distinguish parties carrying litters of wounded men. At
this time my detached troops had moved out to the left to take the right end
of the Spanish line in flank. This was successfully accomplished; and as soon
as this troop gained its position, " Cease firing and advance " was ordered,
our men advanced within 300 yards of the enemy, when we again opened heavy
fire. The Spanish broke under this fire and retreated rapidly. We advanced
to the last position held by them and halted, having established before this a
connection on the right with the regular troops, who had successfully carried
the ridge before mentioned. This left us in complete possession of the entire
Spanish position. Our troops were too much exhausted and overcome with
heat and hard work of the two preceding days to continue the pursuit. Had
we had many mounted men or even fresh foot troops I think we could have
captured a large portion of their forces, as they seemed completely dis
heartened and dispirited. About thirty minutes after the firing had ceased,
three troops of the Ninth U. S. Cavalry under Captain Dimmock reported
to me and I advanced them, forming a heavy line of outposts covering our
entire front at a distance of about 800 yards from our line.
About two hours after the fight was over, a number of Cubans came up
and made a short reconnoissance as far as Cevitas, and reported that the
Spanish had apparently fled into Santiago, as they found no evidence of them.
They reported a quantity of blood along the trail and a quantity of abandoned
equipments, and every evidence of a complete rout from the point of their
break in our front to above-named town (Cevitas).
In regard to the conduct of the officers and men, I can only say that one
and all of them behaved splendidly. Captain Capron died shortly after the
termination of the fight. I cannot say enough in commendation of the gal
lant conduct of this officer. His troop was in advance and met the enemy in
very heavy force, and resisted them and drove them back, and it was in the
performance of his duty that the captain was mortally wounded. The service
he performed prior to his death, and the work of his troop subsequently to
it, were of the very greatest value in contributing to the success of this en
gagement. Captain Capron's loss is an irreparable one to this regiment.
Major Brodie was shot through the arm while on the firing-line. Captain
McClintock had both bones of his leg broken, also on the firing-line. Lieu-
tenan Thomas, Captain Capron's first lieutenant, was shot shortly after the
fall of Captain Capron. We found no wounded Spaniards, but all along the
line we found their abandoned equipments; and there is every evidence of
a large number of wounded. To the best of my knowledge we discovered
in the neighborhood of 40 dead Spaniards. There may be some mistake in
the figures owing to the jungle character of the country, and it is probable
384 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
that a careful search will reveal many more. Mr. Marshall, of the New York
" Journal," was shot through the spine while on the firing-line witnessing the
action. His conduct was extremely courageous.
The First Squadron was under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Theo
dore Roosevelt, and the Second under Major Alex. O. Brodie; both of these
officers deserve great credit for the intelligence and courage with which they
handled their men. In this particular it is only fair to say that this remark
would apply to all officers.
I desire to express my appreciation of the gallant and effective services of
Captain McCormick, Seventh Cavalry, attached to my regiment for any duty
to which I might assign him; also of Captain Rivc:s and Lieutenant Smedberg
of your staff, whose services were of the greatest value and performed under
heavy fire.
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
LEONARD WOOD,
Comdg. ist U. S. Vol. Cav., of 2d Brig., Cav. Div.
The victory cleared the road for our army, and gave us possession
of a beautiful and well-water camping ground, with a full view of
Santiago and the surrounding country. The Spanish forces at Las
Guasimas have been variously stated. The civil governor of the
province told me that Linares had on the 24th of June 4,000 men.
This was corrected by General Toral, who estimated the number at
2,000 or a little less, and the losses about 250. Lieutenant-General
Linares told me the Spanish soldiers engaged numbered 1,400, and
General Escario put the losses at 200.
I fear, however, that these statements put the Spanish force and
losses rather too large. Probably the most conservative estimate is
that of Colonel Roosevelt, to which I shall refer later on.
Mr. Richard Harding Davis was present on the night of June 23d
while we were arranging these details for the operations for the next
morning. I then laid down on my blankets near both Mr. Davis and
Mr. Whitney. In the former gentleman's book, called the " Cuban
and Porto Rican Campaign," he has this to say about the conference
between General Young, Colonel Wood and myself. I quote from
page 132 of his book:
The first accounts of the fight of the Rough Riders at Guasimas came from
correspondents three miles away at Siboney, who received their information
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 385
from the wounded when they were carried to the rear, and from an officer
who stampeded before the fight had fairly begun. These men declared they
had been entrapped in an ambush, that Colonel Wood was dead, and that their
comrades were being shot to pieces. When the newspapers reached the front,
it was evident that the version these wounded men gave of the fight had been
generally accepted in the States as the true account of what had occurred,
and Colonel Wood and Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt, while praised for their
courage, were condemned editorially for having advanced into the enemy's
country without proper military precautions, for rushing blindly into an am
buscade, and through their " recklessness " and " foolhardiness " sacrificing the
lives of their men.
Indeed, one Congressman, who from the marble rotunda of the Capitol was
able to master a military problem in a Cuban swamp 2,000 miles away, de
clared that Roosevelt ought to be court-martialed.
It is quite true that the fight was a fight against an enemy in ambush; in
a country with such advantages for ambush as this, the Spaniards would be
fools to fight us in any other way, but there is a vast difference between
blundering into an ambuscade and setting out with a full knowledge that you
will find the enemy in ambush, and finding him there, and then driving him
out of his ambush and before you for a mile and a half in a full retreat. This
is what Major-General Joseph Wheeler planned that General Young and
Colonel Wood should do; so if the conduct of these officers was reckless, it
was recklessness due to their following out the carefully-prepared orders of a
veteran general.
At the time of this fight General Wheeler was in command of all troops on
shore, and so continued as long as General Shafter remained on board the
flagship. What orders he gave then were in consequence final.
On the afternoon of June 23d, a Cuban officer informed General Wheeler
that the enemy were intrenched at Guasimas, blocking the way to Santiago.
Guasimas is not a village, nor even a collection of houses; it is the meeting
place of two trails which join at the apex of a V, three miles from the seaport
town of Siboney, and continue merged in a single trail to Santiago. General
Wheeler, accompanied by Cubans, reconnoitered this trial on the afternoon
of the 23d, and with the position of the enemy fully explained to him, returned
to Siboney and informed General Young and Colonel Wood that he would
attack the place on the following morning. The plan was discussed while I
was present, so I know that so far from any one's running into an ambush
unaware, every one of the officers concerned had a full knowledge of where
he was to go to find the enemy and what he was to do when he got there.
No one slept that night, for until 2 o'clock in the morning troops were still
386 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
being disembarked in the surf, and two ships of war had their searchlights
turned on the landing-place, and made Siboney as light as a ballroom. Back
of the searchlights was an ocean white with moonlight and on the shore red
campfires, at which the half-drowned troops were drying their uniforms, and
the Rough Riders, who had just marched in from Daiquiri, were cooking their
coffee and bacon. Below the former home of the Spanish commandante, which
General Wheeler had made his headquarters, lay the camp of the Rough
Riders, and through it Cuban officers were riding their half-starved ponies
scattering the ashes of the campfires, and galloping over the tired bodies of
the men with that courtly grace and consideration for Americans which in
variably marks the Cuban gentleman. Below them was the beach and the
roaring surf in which a thousand or so naked men were assisting and impeding
the progress shoreward of their comrades, in pontoons and shore boats, which
were being hurled at the beach like sleds down a water chute.
4
" The Fall of Santiago," by Vivian, page 102, says:
Juragua was reached at night without the faintest opposition from the
Spaniards, the Cuban scouts bringing in information that the enemy which
had been in some force at Siboney had fallen back on Sevilla road and had
halted and intrenched themselves at a small settlement named La Guasima,
some three or four miles beyond Siboney. Many of the men had fallen from
exhaustion, and the detachment of Rough Riders, which had been in charge
of the dynamite gun, with which it was expected to do great things, had in
sisted on bringing this weapon with them, so that it was long after dusk when
the last stragglers were brought in by the rear guard. General Castillo, who
was in command of the Cuban scouts, made out a rough map of La Guasima
for General Wheeler and it was decided to continue the march beyond Siboney
at daybreak of the 24th and attack the Spanish position.
There were two roads leading to La Guasima, and it was decided to divide
the American forces so as to attack the Spaniards from two quarters. Colonel
Wood's regiment was sent to approach the enemy on the left-hand or mountain
road, while Wheeler and Young, with the First and Tenth, and three Hotch-
kiss mountain guns, were to attack the enemy on the main or valley roa-d.
Young's command had somewhat the shorter road and they started by throw
ing out a strong scouting line in order to give Wood's men a chance to work
around to the left. Troopers, as they lay at Juragua, had heard the Spaniards
felling the trees before daybreak and judged that they were throwing up barri
cades, but on account of the echoing hills could not exactly locate the spot
from which the sounds came. With the general locality of the Spaniards and
•
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
the character of their position and their strength, General Wheeler was, how
ever, measurably well informed, as his plan of battle indicated.
Governor Roosevelt, in his book called " The Rough Riders,"
pages 101-104, gives a summary of the forces and losses in this fight.
This is valuable because it was written after he had ample time to
examine all the accounts, both Spanish and American. He says:
The Spaniards were under General Rubin, with, as second in command, Col
onel Alcarez. They had two guns and eleven companies of about a hundred men
each; three belonging to the Porto Rico regiment, three to the San Fernandino,
two to the Talavero, two being so-called mobilized companies from the mineral
districts, and one a company of engineers; over 1,200 men in all, together
with two guns.
General Rubin reported that he had repulsed the American attack, and
Lieutenant Tejeiro states in his book that General Rubin forced the Americans
to retreat, and enumerates the attacking force as consisting of three regular
regiments of infantry, the Second Massachusetts and the Seventy-first New
York (not one of which fired a gun or were anywhere near the battle), in
addition to the sixteen dismounted troops of cavalry. In other words, as the
five infantry regiments each included twelve companies, he makes the attacking
force consist of just five times the actual amount. As for the " repulse " our line
never went back ten yards in any place, and the advance was practically steady;
while an hour and a half after the fight began, we were in complete possession
of the entire Spanish position and their troops were fleeing in masses down the
road, our men being too exhausted to follow them.
General Rubin ?.lso reports that he lost but seven men killed. This is cer
tainly incorrect, for Captain O'Neill and I went over the ground very carefully
and counted eleven dead Spaniards, all of whom were actually buried by our
burying squads. There were probably two or three men whom we missed,
but I think that our official reports are incorrect in stating that forty-two dead
Spaniards were found, this being based upon reports in which I think some
of the Spanish dead were counted two or three times. Indeed, I should doubt
whether their loss was as heavy as ours, for they were under cover, while we
advanced, often in the open, and their main lines fled long before we could
get to close quarters. It was a very difficult country, and a force of good
soldiers, resolutely handled, could have held the pass with ease against two or
three times their number. As it was, with a force, half of regulars, and half
of volunteers, we drove out a superior number of Spanish regular troops,
strongly posted, without suffering a very heavy loss. Although the Spanish
390 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
fire was very heavy, it does not seem to me it was very well directed; and
though they fired with great spirit while we merely stood at a distance and
fired at them, they did not show much resolution, and when we advanced,
always went back long before there was any chance of our coming into contact
with them. Our men behaved very well indeed — white regulars, colored
regulars, and Rough Riders alike. The newspaper press failed to do full jus
tice to the white regulars, in my opinion, from the simple reason that every
body knew that they would fight, whereas, there had been a good deal of
question as to how the Rough Riders, who were volunteer troops, and the
Tenth Cavalry, who were colored, would behave; so there was a tendency to
exalt our deeds at the expense of those of the first regulars, whose courage
and good conduct were taken for granted. It was a trying fight beyond what
the losses show, for it is hard upon raw soldiers to be pitted against an un
seen foe and to advance steadily when their comrades are falling around them
and when they can only occasionally see a chance to retaliate.
Governor Roosevelt also refers to a Spanish work entitled
" Combates y Capitulacion de Santiago de Cuba/' by Lieutenant
Muller y Tejeiro. Concerning certain statements of this Spanish
officer, Governor Roosevelt says:
On page 136 the lieutenant speaks as if only one echelon, of seven companies
and two guns, was engaged on the 24th. The official report says distinctly,
" General Rubin's column," which consisted of the companies detailed above.
By turning to page 146, where Lieutenant Tejeiro enumerates the strength of
the various comapnies, it will be seen that they averaged over no men apiece;
this probably does not include officers and is probably an under-statement any
how. On page 261, he makes the Spanish loss at Las Guasimas, which he calls
Sevilla, nine killed and twenty-seven wounded. Very possibly he includes only
the Spanish regulars; two of the Spaniards we slew, over on the left, were in
brcwn instead of the light blue of the regulars, and were doubtless guerrillas.
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge gives an interesting account in
" Harper's Monthly," of May, 1899, with regard to the Guasimas
fight; he says, pages 835-838:
The next morniog General Wheeler, commanding the division of dis
mounted cavalry, under direct orders from General Shafter, rode forward, fol
lowed by two squadrons of the First Volunteer Cavalry, and one each of the
First and Tenth Regular Cavalry. When General Wheeler reached Juraguacito,
or Siboney, he found that the Spaniards had abandoned the blockhouse at that
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
point, retreated some three miles toward Servilla, and there taken up a strong
position, their rear having been engaged by some 200 Cubans with little effect.
By 8 o'clock that night, the cavalry division had reached Siboney, and General
Wheeler, after consultation with General Castillo, determined to advance and
dislodge the enemy, lying between the Americans and Santiago. The next
morning before daylight the movement began. The troops marched along two
roads, which were really nothing more than mountain trails. The First and
Tenth Regular Cavalry, under the immediate command of General Wheeler,
and General Young, with Hotchkiss guns, marched by the main or easterly road
to Sevilla. Along the westerly road went the First Volunteer Cavalry nearly
500 strong. This regiment, enlisted, officered, disciplined and equipped in fifty
days, may well be considered for a moment as it moves forward to action only
two days after its landing. It is a very typical American regiment, most of the
men come from Arizona, New Mexico and Oklahoma, where the troops were
chiefly raised. There are many cowboys, many men of the plains, hunters and
pioneers and ranchmen, to whom the perils and exposure of frontier life are
a twice-told tale. Among them can be found more than two score civilized, but
full-blooded, Indians — Americans by older lineage than any of those who were
fighting for the domination of the new world. Then there are boys from the
farms and towns of the far western territories. Then, again, strangest mingling
of all, there are a hundred or more troopers from the east — graduates of Yale
and Harvard, members of the New York and Boston clubs, men of wealth and
leisure, and large opportunities. They are men who have loved the chase of
big game, fox-hunting, and football and all the sports which require courage and
strength and are spiced with danger. Some have been idlers, many more are
workers, all have the spirit of adventure strong within them, and they are there
in the Cuban chaparral because they seek perils, because they are patriotic,
because, as some think, every gentleman owes a debt to his country, and this
is the time to pay it. And all these men, drawn from so many sources, all so
American, all so nearly soldiers in their life and habit, have been roughly,
quickly and effectively molded and formed into a fighting regiment by the
skillful discipline of Leonard Wood, their colonel, a surgeon of the line, who
wears a medal of honor, won in campaigns against the Apaches; and by the
inspiration of Theodore Roosevelt, their lieutenant-colonel, who has laid down
a high place in the Administration at Washington and come hither to Cuba
because thus only can he live up to his ideal of conduct by offering his life to
his country when war comes.
These Rough Riders, as they have been popularly called, marched along
the westerly trail, so shut in by the dense undergrowth that it was almost im
possible to throw out flankers or deploy the Jine, and quite impossible to see.
392 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
And then suddenly there were hostile volleys pouring through the brush, and
a sound like the ringing of wires over head. No enemy was to be seen. The
smokeless powder gave no sign. The dense chaparral screened everything.
Under the intense heat men had already given way. Now they began to drop,
some wounded, some dead. The Rough Riders fire and advance steadily, led
onward by Colonel Wood, and Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt. A very trying
place it was for perfectly new troops with the burning tropical heat, the unseen
enemy, the air filled with the thin noise of the Mauser bullet. But there was
no flinching and the march forward went on.
Along the eastern road the regulars advanced with equal steadiness and
perfect coolness. They do not draw the public attention as do the volunteers,
for they act just as every one expected, and they are not new, but highly-trained
troops. But their work is done with great perfection, to be noted in history
later, and at the time, by all who admire men who perform their allotted task
in the simple line of daily duty, bravely and efficiently. Thus the two lines
moved forward constantly, along the trails and through the undergrov/th, con
verging to the point at which they aimed, and Colonel Wood's right flank finds
the anticipated support from the advancing regulars The fire began to sweep
the ridges and the strong rock forts on the ridge. Spaniards were seen at last,
apparently without much desire to remain in view; the two columns pressed for
ward, the ridge was carried, the cross-road reached, and the fight of Las Guasi-
mas had been won.
There was no ambush or surprise about it, as was said by some people in the
first confusion, and by others later without any excuse for the mis-statement.
The whole movement was arranged and carried out just as it was planned by
the commanding general of the division. It had been a hot skirmish and the
victory had come to the steady American advance, unchecked by the burning
heat, the dense stifling undergrowth and the volleys of an unseen enemy. That
night the Spanish soldiers said in Santiago:
" Instead of retreating when we fired, the Americans came on. The more we
fired, the more they advanced. They tried to catch us with their hands."
The Spanish official report stated that they had repulsed the Americans and
won, but as they had only 4,000 men, and the Americans 10,000, they had re
treated, which was, perhaps, to the Spanish mind, dwelling these many centuries
among mendacities, and thereby much confused, a satisfying explanation.
The plain truth was, that the entire American force amounted to 964 officers
and men. The Rough Riders suffered most severely, having eight killed and
thirty-four wounded. The regulars lost eight killed and eighteen wounded.
The Spanish accounts gave their own force in various figures from 4,000 down
to 1,400, the last statement being made long after the battle, when the number
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 393
of Americans who had defeated them could no longer be concealed. A com
parison of their varying statements and all the best evidence make the Spanish
troops engaged not less than 2,800.
The firing at Las Guasimas was heard distinctly at the rear, and
General Lawton hurried forward, his leading brigade under General
Chaffee, but the head of the column did not reach us until some time
after the engagement was over, and they were so exhausted by their
rapid march that they were unable to proceed further. General
Shafter sent congratulations and offers of reinforcements, directing me
to take command of all the troops on shore and put them in camp in
favorable positions, but not to become engaged with the enemy until
we were ready to advance with the entire force. I had, therefore,
several days which I devoted to reconnoitering the country, selecting
the most convenient camps for the various divisions, and repairing the
roads so they could be used by artillery, wagons and ambulances.
On June 3Oth, the strength of the American Army in Cuba was as
follows :
Wheeler's cavalry division, 127 officers, 2,522 men.
Kent's infantry division, 233 officers, 4,869 men.
Lawton's infantry division, 235 officers, 5,179 men.
Bates' independent infantry brigade, 49 officers, 1,037 men.
There were also four batteries of artillery.
Duffield's brigade, with an aggregate strength of 2,486 officers and
men, was in the rear, near Siboney and Aguadores.
EL CANEY.
During the week following the battle of Las Guasimas, I recon-
noitered San Juan and El Caney and learned the extent and nature
of the defenses, and especially that there were no cannon at
El Caney. On the 25th, General Shafter had sent me one battery and
written that two more batteries would soon be forwarded to me. I
felt confident that by placing these batteries upon an elevation beyond
the range of the small arms at El Caney, and concentrating the fire
of some twelve guns at a time upon one of their forts or blockhouses,
they would soon be made untenable, and that by placing troops on the
road from El Caney to Santiago, we would catch the Spaniards in
their attempt to retreat to that place. When General Shafter came
ashore on the 28th, I visited him and urged that I be permitted to
take the guns and reduce El Caney as above indicated, He came
394 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
ashore again on the 29th, and I repeated my recommendation and
request, as I felt convinced of the feasibility and advisability of the
project. The General fully agreed with me as to the advisability of
the movement, but said he had determined to entrust it to General
Lawton. I could not demur, as I knew that General Shafter had a
long acquaintance with and a very high regard for General Lawton,
and I was myself very favorably impressed with that officer.
El Caney was regarded by General Shafter as a place of considerable
importance to the Spanish, because it commanded the Guantanamo
road and could be used as an outpost from which the enemy could
attack the right flank and rear of our forces that were to assail San
Juan hill. He, therefore, determined to capture it before commencing
the attack upon San Juan.
General Lawton's division, supported by Capron's light battery, was
accordingly, on the afternoon of June 3Oth, ordered to proceed toward
El Caney so as to be ready the following day to commence the attack.
It was expected that the place would be captured within an hour and
the division was then to proceed on the Caney road toward Santiago
and take positions on the right of the line.
July ist found General Lawton in position around El Caney with
Chaffee's brigade on its right across the Guantanamo road, Miles's
brigade in the center and Ludlow's on the left. At 6:15 that morning
the sound of artillery, Capron's battery, 2,400 yards from El Caney,
announced that the battle had begun, but no one imagined that it
would be so hotly contested or that it would continue so long. The
battle was opened by the artillery firing on a column of Spanish
cavalry at about two miles' range. It was afterward learned that
sixteen of the enemy were killed in this preliminary engagement.
The battery fired shell and shrapnel till 11:30; recommenced at 12:30
and changed its position about 2 :3o from where it was moved to about
1,000 yards from the blockhouses in the town.
During the battle General J. C. Bates was ordered by General
Shafter to proceed with two regiments of his brigade, the Third and
Twentieth Infantry, and relieve the Second Brigade which was holding
the main road from El Caney to Santiago, to permit the latter brigade
to join in the attack. Bates moved on to within about a mile and a
half of El Caney where he halted for a short time and then moved
down the road toward El Caney, crossing the San Juan river, and,
taking a position to the right of Miles's brigade, rendered valuable
assistance in the assault of the forts.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 395
Early in the morning General Chaffee led a company of the Seventh
Infantry to a point where it could seize a ridge at daylight while a
company of the Twelfth Infantry was placed in a position half a mile
distant, for the same purpose. This ridge was the point on which
the brigade was to rest its left flank. The Twelfth Regiment was
ordered to march to this ridge and attack in the direction of El
Caney, the Seventh and Seventeenth Regiments, led by about fifty
Cubans, marched by the El Caney road to the Guantanamo road in
the direction of the town. The head of the column joined the right of
the Twelfth at 7:30 A. M., about three-fourths of a mile east of Caney.
At this point the enemy's skirmish line delivered a brisk fire from the
town and from the ridge. The Seventh Infantry was deployed on the
right of the road and the Twelfth on the left, forming a line of battle
facing El Caney. The Seventeenth was placed on the right of the
Seventh and the Cubans were ordered to attack the blockhouse on the
right.
The artillery opened fire on the stone building before which
Chaffee's line was extended. Chaffee now pressed forward; the firing
was very severe and a number of our men were killed and wounded.
The battle lasted until late in the afternoon. About 4:30 P. M. Captain
Haskell's battalion, composed of Companies A, D, E and F, of the
Twelfth Infantry, under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Comba,
assaulted the stone blockhouse in a gallant manner, capturing it and
driving the few surviving Spaniards from the fort to the town. This
fort was a rough stone structure of considerable strength, with loop
holes for rifle fire and surrounded on three sides by deep trenches for
rifle men. The artillery made the breach through which our men
entered the fort which was taken and held, thus practically ending the
battle, although the firing was continued for some time longer.
Haskell's battalion was joined by other companies of the Twelfth and
companies from other regiments.
Miles's brigade consisting of the Twenty-fifth and Fourth Regi
ments of infantry having been detached to support Capron's battery,
came into action about 12:30 P. M., and was continually under fire until
late in the afternoon. The attack of this brigade was begun by two
companies in each regiment on the firing line, strengthened by sup
ports and reserves from the remaining companies. As the brigade
advanced across a ploughed field in front of the enemy's position, the
Spanish sharpshooters in the houses in El Caney enfiladed the left of
the line with a terrific fire. A battalion of the Fourth Infantry, under
command of Major Baker, turned its fire upon the town, thus assisting
396 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
the brigade to advance upon the stone fort. The battalion lost heavily
in rendering this important service. The tactics of the brigade were
well shown by forming a line from close order at a distance of about
1,000 yards which advanced through dense underbrush and three
wire fences for about 6,000 yards under a heavy fire from an enemy
that could not be seen. The courage of the men is highly commended
by the officers.
The First Brigade, commanded by General Ludlow, was aroused at
4 A. M., July ist, and a half hour later took the Caney-Duquereau road
toward El Caney. It was halted about 1,000 yards from that town and
was greeted by the enemy with a raking fire, which swept the road,
cutting the leaves from the trees. The brigade was immediately de
ployed, the Eighth Infantry on the left, First Battalion of Twenty-
second Infantry in the center and the Second Massachusetts on the
right. The brigade moved steadily forward under a deadly fire whic.h
resulted in a heavy loss, and continued until 12 o'clock. There was a
lull for about an hour when the action again became violent; at 3
o'clock the brigade captured a stone fort and hoisted the American
flag. The battle still continued between the brigade and the enemy in
the town until 4:30 P. M.
After the battle of El Caney had terminated in our favor the division
assembled at the Duquereau House, as directed by the division com
mander, arriving there at about u o'clock, p. M., the officers and men
so exhausted they were hardly able to walk. After a short rest they
resumed their march to San Juan via El Poso, and during the morn
ing of the 2d, General Lawton's troops were placed in position on
San Juan ridge to the right of the cavalry division. General Bates's
brigade left El Caney on the evening of July ist, after the fighting
had practically ceased; the general reached my headquarters about
midnight and was directed to place his force on the left of the line as
soon as they came up.
The casualties at El Caney on July ist were 4 officers and 84 en
listed men killed, 24 officers and 232 enlisted men wounded. The
following reports of Generals Lawton, Bates and Chaffee give a good
description of this engagement:
HEADQUARTERS INDEPENDENT BRIGADE,
In front of SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 8, 1898.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIFTH ARMY CORPS:
SIR. — I have the honor to report that my brigade left Sihoncy, Cuba, on
the evening of June 3Oth, at 8:30, and marched up over the hill trail. We fol-
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 397
lowed this trail to where it joins the main road and proceeded along the main
road in the dark to the place just vacated by Wheeler's ca\alry division as a
camp. Here we found General Wheeler's headquarter tents still standing, and
went into camp in the rear of them about midnight. We struck camp at 6:30
A. M., July ist, and marched to a point adjacent to General Shafter's head
quarters, where I reported in person to General Shatter. At 10:05 A- M- I moved
my brigade from this location to within about a mile and a half of El Caney,
and met General Lawton upon the road at this point. After a consultation with
him, lasting some minutes, I halted my brigade upon the road in order to give
an opportunity for the placing of a battery that General Lawton expected to
put in position between Colonel Miles's right and General Chaffee's left. I
waited some time for this to be done, but the battery not putting in an appear
ance, I moved my brigade down the road in the direction of El Caney, crossed
the San Juan river, and taking the first crossroads moved to the right to a
position upon this crossroad to the right of the brigade commanded by Colonel
Miles, and pushed rapidly to the front. After my brigade remained in this road
for some time, under a heavy fire, we moved to the right to the assault of a
small hill, occupied upon the top by a stone fort and well protected by rifle pits.
General Chaffee's brigade charged them from the right and the two brigades
joining upon the crest, opened fire from this point of vantage, lately occupied
by the Spanish, upon the village of El Caney. From this advantageous position
the Spanish were easily driven from place to place in the village proper, and as
fast as they sought shelter in one building were driven out to seek shelter else
where; the sharpshooters of my command were enabled to do effective work at
this point. The town proper was soon pretty thoroughly cleaned out of Spanish,
though a couple of blockhouses upon the hill to the right of the town offered
shelter to a few, and some could be seen retreating along the mountain road lead
ing to the northwest. A part of these made a stand in a field among some
bowlders. I desire to say at this point that the Third United States Infantry,
under command of Colonel John H. Page, and the Twentieth United States In
fantry, under command of Major William S. McCaskey, performed most efficient
and meritorious services in the engagement before the village of El Caney.
At about 4:30 P. M. the firing from the village had practically ceased, and as
General Ludlow's brigade was then moving up the valley from the left upon the
village it was deemed unwise to charge El Caney, as our troops would have been
subjected to the fire from this brigade. After consultation with General Chaffee,
I withdrew my brigade, hoping there was yet time to aid in the attack more to
the left. My command, having had a long, hard march, the withdrawal took
more time than anticipated; darkness was coming on. I, therefore, halted the
command at the first water at which we arrived and proceeded in person to
398 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
report to the corps commander; was then ordered to the extreme left. I im
mediately moved the command and reached this position at midnight. My com
mand had been then continuously marching or fighting for twenty-seven and
one-half hours, with the exception of six and one-half hours spent near Gen
eral Wheeler's headquarters. On the morning of July 2d I placed tile-Twentieth
Infantry on the left of the Second Infantry and in continuation of their line,
and held the Third Infantry in reserve near the brigade of Colonel Pearson,
of General Kent's division, as that part of the line seemed to need to be strength
ened. The loss in action at El Caney suffered by this brigade was three killed
and ten wounded; on the 2d of July, was one killed and eighteen wounded.
The wounded include Captains Rodman and Moon, of the Twentieth Infantry.
I desire to mention the following members of my staff for efficient and gal
lant service in the action before El Caney and in front of Santiago: Major
Logan, Major Wilkins, Captain Wright, and Lieutenant Smiley. I wish also
to add that Major Ives, my chief surgeon, was on the firing line and did efficient
services during the progress of the fight and behaved in most gallant manner.
I invite attention to the inclosed sketch, which gives the itinerary of march of
this brigade during the two days.
Very respectfully,
J. C. BATES,
Brigadier-General of Volunteers, Commanding Brigade.
HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
Camp near SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 3, 1898.
THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIFTH ARMY CORPS, near Santiago de Cuba:
SIR. — I have the honor to report the following operations of the Second
Division in the capture of El Caney on July i, 1898: The town of El Caney
is situated at an important point about four miles northeast of Santiago de
Cuba, on the main road from Guantanamo to that city, where reinforcements
for the Spanish garrison of Santiago de Cuba would probably concentrate.
The town was strongly fortified with numerous blockhouses within its limits
and on the roads leading thence. On a prominent hill of the town was a stone
fort surrounded, as is now known, by intrenchments cut in solid rock. The
reduction of El Caney being determined upon, and being on the right flank
of the general advance on Santiago de Cuba, the duty devolved on the Second
Division, to which was attached Light Battery E, First Artillery, commanded
by Captain Allyn Capron, First Artillery. After due reconnaissance by the
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 399
division and brigade commanders, the movement began about 3 P. M. on June
30th, from the division camp about four miles east of Santiago on the main
road from Siboney through Sevilla. The position of the brigades and the
details of operations on July ist are quite fully set forth in the accompanying
reports of regimental and brigade commanders and in the sketch herewith sub
mitted. The light battery first opened on a column of Spanish troops which
appeared to be cavalry moving westward from El Caney and about two miles
range, resulting, as was afterward learned, in killing sixteen in the column.
The battery remained during the action at its first position until about 2:30
p. M., when it was moved to a new position south of and about 1,000 yards
from certain blockhouses in the town where a few shots, all taking effect, were
fired. This firing terminated the action, as the Spanish garrison was attempt
ing to escape. General J. C. Bates, United States Volunteers, with two regi
ments of his independent brigade — the Third and Twentieth Infantry — having
been sent by the major-general commanding the forces of the United States in
Cuba to relieve the Second Brigade of this division, which was holding the
main road from El Caney to Santiago, so as to permit it to join in the attack,
also came forward, joined in the attack, taking position between the Second
and Third Brigades, and rendered material assistance, especially in the assault
of the stone fort.
I heartily approve the special mention of individuals and recommendations
made in the reports of the regimental and brigade commanders, and regret that
others who deserve mention have not received it, through circumstances. Dur
ing the action I was accompanied most of the time by Major-General J. C.
Breckenridge, inspector-general United States Army, as a spectator, and had
the advantage of his valuable suggestions and advice during the day, for which
I desire to express my sincere appreciation. His horse was shot under him
on the advance upon Santiago the morning of the 2d instant.
To General Adna R. Chaffee I am indebted for a thorough and intelligent
reconnaissance of the town of El Caney and vicinity prior to the battle, and
the submission of a plan of attack which was adopted. I consider General
Chaffee one of the best practical soldiers in the army and recommend him
for special distinction for successfully charging the stone fort mentioned in
this report, the capture of which practically closed the battle. I desire to invite
special attention to General William Ludlow, commanding the First Brigade.
General Ludlow's professional accomplishments are well known, and his assign
ment to command a brigade in my division I consider a high compliment to
myself. In this battle General Ludlow proved himself a capable and able
commander. His coolness, good judgment, and prompt action in difficult situ
ations were remarkable. To this and his personal example on the firing line
4OO CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
was due the decisive success of the attack on his part of the line. I recommend
General Ludlow for substantial recognition.
To Captain H. C. Carbaugh, assistant adjutant-general, adjutant-general of
the division, I desire to express my thanks and appreciation for untiring energy
and faithful work in dangerous positions on this occasion, and I desire par
ticularly to mention him for gallantry in volunteering to carry and carrying
to General Chaffee, while he was most hotly engaged on the firing line, in
structions concerning the assault upon the stone fort mentioned in these re
ports, and to recommend Captain Carbaugh for promotion to the rank of
major and assistant adjutant-general and for brevet of lieutenant-colonel for
this act. I desire also to commend to favorable consideration Major G.
Creighton Webb, inspector-general on my staff, for persistently riding his horse
along the firing line of the First Brigade in search of the brigade commander
to deliver important instructions when men of his escort demurred at going
with him, and recommend that he receive the brevet of lieutenant-colonel *of
volunteers. I am particularly pleased that this battle gives me a suitable oppor
tunity to call to the notice of my superiors Mr. R. G. Mendoza, a volunteer
aid on my staff. Mr. Mendoza is a Cuban by birth, an American citizen, a
young man of prepossessing appearance, of education and refinement. He
joined me at Tampa, Florida, with the consent and authority of the general
commanding the forces, as a volunteer aid. Since that time he has become
one of my most competent and reliable assistants, and has been untiring in
his labors, both night and day. In the battle he was active, energetic, and
courageous. He has my hearty thanks for his invaluable assistance, and I
strongly recommend and urge that he be offered the appointment of captain
and assistant adjutant-general of volunteers, and that he be left on duty with
me. I desire also to commend for gallantry and courageous conduct in this
battle, and for faithful and valuable services generally, Mr. E. L. D. Brecken-
ridge, a son of Major-General J. C. Breckenridge, inspector-general of the
army, who has also been on duty on my staff during the campaign as volunteer
aid. Mr. Breckenridge is educated and refined, a gentleman in every respect,
and has proven in battle his courage and coolness. I earnestly recommend
that he be appointed a second lieutenant in the army in consideration of the
services rendered in this battle. To Lieutenant H. H. Warren, Second Massa-
chusetss, aid-de-camp, I desire to tender my thanks for courageous and efficient
performance of duty in this battle, and to recommend that he receive a brevet
of captain of volunteers. To Surgeon H. S. Kilbourne, chief surgeon, is due
the thanks, not only of myself, but of the whole division, for faithful and un
remitting attention to the wounded on the field and under fire.
It may not be out of place for me to mention the fact that Captain J. C. Gil-
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 4O1
more, Jr., of the staff of the general commanding the forces, joined me with
important instructions and that he might see for himself the situation, the
better to inform the commanding general, he rode the firing line with me
exhibiting a coolness under severe fire worthy a veteran.
Very respectfully,
H. W. LAWTON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding Division.
HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, FIFTH CORPS,
In Field near SANTIAGO, Cuba, July 4, 1898.
THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL, SECOND DIVISION, FIFTH CORPS:
SIR. — In connection with the operations of the Third Brigade of July ist,
I have the honor to report that the road traversed by the army from Siboney
toward Santiago de Cuba forks to the right about five miles from the latter
place. The right-hand road runs a little west of north to a place called Caney,
the distance in an air line being about four miles. The main road leads gen
erally west to the city. Santiago and Caney are connected by a broad, well-
marked road, and are about six miles apart. This road also is a main thor
oughfare to - Guantanamo. Thus the point first mentioned (the fork of the
road), Santiago, and Caney form a sort of triangle inclosing a vast thicket of
brush and vines, the interior of which is only traversed by paths, although
called roads. About three miles from the fork, toward Caney, a road branches
to the left to the northwest, and intersects the Santiago-Caney road at about
a mile west of the latter place. Further on toward Caney, about 600 yards,
a trail branches to Caney, passes around on the south side of a ridge over
looking Caney. This ridge, which is short, is about 800 yards from the south
east corner of the town, where was located on a round and prominent knoll a
stone building, used by the Spanish troops as a place of defense. Outside the
building was sunk a trench about three feet deep and covering the east, south,
and westerly face of the building.
South of the town, on lower ground, perhaps 100 yards from the houses,
was located a small blockhouse, the structure being of wood, banked with
earth on the outside about four feet high. On the northwest corner of the
town was a similar and larger blockhouse. On the northeast face was a line
of intrenchments close into the town. The buildings and streets were also
used by the Spanish troops for protection. About one mile northeast of the
town, on the side of the mountain, was located a blockhouse, its capacity being
4O2 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
fifteen to twenty men. This blockhouse was to the right of the line of march
of the Seventh and Seventeenth Infantry, to be explained.
On the 26th of June I examined this place from the ridge explained as being
about 800 yards southeast of Caney, and reported the fact to the division com
mander. The main road to Caney continues on from the trail, passing around
to the eastward of a sugar-loaf mountain, and intersects the Caney-Guantanamo
road about two miles east of the former place. This section of the Caney road,
a mere trail, is extremely difficult for troops in single file to march over.
Being authorized by the division commander, I cleared the road for the passage
of artillery for about three miles, also a position for a battery to the left of the
road, this at the place where the first road branched to the left and intersects
the main road (Caney-Santiago). The position for the battery was about 2,000
yards from the town.
On the afternoon of June 30th I received verbal orders from the division
commander to march on the Caney road and attack the Spanish position from
the eastward. I marched at about 5 o'clock and assembled my brigade at the
sugar-loaf mountain after dark, passing on the way Capron's battery, supported
by the First Infantry of the Second Brigade. We camped without fires.
I led forward on the Caney road Young's company of the Seventh Infantry
about one mile, up to a point where it could seize a ridge at daylight. I also
took forward by the trail a company of the Twelfth Infantry about half a mile
and directed it to seize the ridge at daylight overlooking the town from the
southeast. This ridge was the point on which the brigade was to base its left
flank. Colonel Comba, commanding the Twelfth Infantry, was given orders
to march by this trail, base on this ridge, and deploy to his right and attack
in the direction of the town. I led the Seventh and Seventeenth, preceded by
about fifty Cubans, by the Caney road to the Guantanamo road, following the
latter toward the town. The head of the column came into connection with
the right of the. Twelfth at 7:50 A. M. and about three-fourths mile east of
Caney. At this point we received the enemy's skirmish fire, both from the
town and from the blockhouse on the right before referred to.
The Seventh Infantry was deployed on the right of the road in an irregular
way because of the difficult nature of the terrane. Practically, the Seventh
was on the right of the road and the Twelfth on the left, and formed a line
of battle facing the town. The Seventeenth Infantry was directed to proceed
to the right of the Seventh, the Cubans to attack the blockhouse to the right.
The artillery, Capron's battery, opened fire on the stone building some minutes
before my line was extended. As we pressed forward the enemy's fire became
very severe, and in the course of the action the Seventh Infantry, particularly,
met with heavy and severe loss in killed and wounded. The Twelfth also had
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 4°3
losses, the Seventeenth but few, owing to the fact that only the head of the
column became exposed to the fire of the enemy.
The action lasted nearly throughout the day, terminating at about 4:30 P. M.,
at which time the stone blockhouse was assaulted by Captain Haskell's bat
talion of the Twelfth Infantry under the personal direction of Lieutenant-
Colonel Comba, commanding the regiment The resistance at this, point had
been greatly affected by the fire of Capron's battery. A few moments after the
seizure of this point — the key to the situation — my left was joined by General
Bates with a portion of his command. He soon after withdrew. This action
was continuous throughout the day, with brief lulls for the purpose of quieting
and resting the men, who were fatigued from their difficult march and broken
sleep of the night previous. They marched to the field of battle without break
fast, except a cracker and a drink of cold water. The conduct of all officers
observed by me, and I saw the most of them, is deserving of unlimited praise.
The same may be said of the enlisted men, with some few exceptions. All of
the men were without battle experience, but the great majority went forward
into action in a very soldierly and gallant manner.
The reports of regimental commanders are herewith inclosed. These reports
are unsatisfactory to these officers themselves because of the limited time that
has elapsed since the engagement, nearly all of which has been expended in
fatiguing march or in the preparation of trenches for defense. They are also
without proper means to render their reports in form to insure durability. I
very cordially and heartily concur now and for the future in any special men
tion of distinguished conduct on the part of officer or enlisted man which
commanding officers of regiments have now or may hereafter submit. The
brigade is greatly indebted in its successful operation for the assistance ren
dered to it by Capron's battery of artillery. Its fire on the stone blockhouse
was accurate and very effective. The brigade is also indebted for assistance
rendered by the command of General Bates, whose movements from the south
on the town necessarily drew from me a portion of the enemy's fire.
Immediately after the action ceased I directed a thorough search of the field
we had fought over for our wounded and dead. These, I think, were all col
lected before dark. After this I permitted the men to make coffee, detailed
one company (Howell's Seventh Infantry) to remain with the wounded and
bury the dead, and at 7:30 to 8 o'clock marched for the Ducourcaud House, a
point of assembly of the division, previously directed by the division commander.
We arrived at about u o'clock p. M., officers and men exhausted of strength
to the extent they were hardly able to walk. The brigade lay down in the
road and rested until 3 A. M. At the Ducourcaud House I joined the division
commander, who informed me he had sent me an order to leave a regiment at
404 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Caney. The courier had failed to find me before marching. The division
commander concurred with my opinion that the return of a battalion would
be sufficient strength. It was so ordered, Coolidge's battalion of the Seventh
Infantry being sent back. This, in addition to Howell's company of the same
regiment left behind, made five companies of this regiment on guard at Caney.
Through a misunderstanding of my order, or the noncompliance therewith
on the part of Captain Howell, one company of the Seventeenth Infantry was
left at Caney and is still absent at that place.
At 3 A. M., July 2d, the brigade resumed its march on El Poso, thence on
San Juan, and took position on the right of the cavalry division, commanded
by General Sumner, arriving on the ground at 7:20 A. M.
The losses of the brigade in battle from daylight July ist to 7:30 A. M., July
2d, are as follows:
Seventh Infantry: Killed, officer, I (Second Lieutenant Wansboro) ; en
listed men, 32; wounded, officers, 4 (Major Corliss, Captain Jackson, First
Lieutenant Grisard, adjutant, Second Lieutenant Lafferty) ; enlisted men, 91;
missing, enlisted men, 3.
Twelfth Infantry: Killed, enlisted men, 7; wounded, officers, 2 (Second
Lieutenants Dove and Churchman; the latter has since died of his wound);
enlisted men, 29.
Seventeenth Infantry: Killed, enlisted men, 4; wounded, officers, 2 (Lieu
tenant-Colonel Haskell and First Lieutenant Dickinson, regimental quarter
master; the latter has since died of his wounds); enlisted men, 21; missing,
enlisted men, 2.
Total loss: Killed, officers, 3 (including the 2 died since of wounds); en
listed men, 45 (including 2 died of wounds since the battle) ; wounded, officers,
6; enlisted men, 139; missing, enlisted men, 5; total loss, 198.
A map indicating the roads and some of the places herein mentioned is
inclosed.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
ADNA R. CHAFFEE,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.
SAN JUAN.
After a night of alternate halting and marching, the cavalry division,
followed by Kent's First Infantry Division, reached El Poso. The
enemy on San Juan ridge could be seen from an elevation near El
Poso house; and from this point Grimes' battery opened upon them
early on the morning of July ist. Ihe enemy replied with both
Copyright, 1898, by Clara Barton.
A GROUP OF RED CROSS SISTERS
The four sisters of the New York Red Cross Hospital of Dr. and Mrs. A.
Monae Lesser, who nursed sick reconcentrados and their orphans in Havana, and
afterward assisted the surgeons on the ships and in the hospitals of Siboney in
dressing the wounds of Cuban, Spanish and American soldiers and sailors, until
they fell victims of the fever and went into hospital themselves.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 4O/
small arms and artillery, keeping up a severe, pelting fire upon our
dismounted cavalry and infantry who were then marching toward
San Juan ford.
The conformation of the country between El Poso and the San
Juan river was such that the enemy could not be seen by our troops;
besides being heavily timbered, the ground was covered with a pro
fusion of thickets, jungles and bushes. The cavalry and a portion of
the leading brigade of Kent's division, under General Hawkins, con
tinued on the regular Santiago road; and these troops, General Kent
and I, crossed at the main ford. The remainder of Kent's divi
sion was turned to a trail which led to a ford a short distance down
the river.
While riding from El Poso to the ford, I readily saw the im
portance of hastening the troops forward. It was very clear that the
Spaniards had a thorough knowledge of the location of the roads upon
which we were advancing, and they were, therefore, enabled to con
centrate their fire upon our troops. With as little delay as possible,
and by the use of the two fords, San Juan river was crossed, and line
formed, the left of the cavalry division resting on the Santiago road,
and Kent's division being formed to the left of the cavalry.
To understand the situation at this stage of the day's operations,
requires a brief description of the ground involved in the field of
operations. After crossing the river, Wheeler's and Kent's divisions
were in line near and parallel to its banks, facing nearly westward to
ward Santiago. Directly in front of this line of battle was San Juan
ridge, about 500 yards distant and upon which were the enemy's in-
trenchments strengthened by Fort San Juan, which was to the left of
the main Santiago road, and a blockhouse to the right, both of these
fortifications being on the intrenched line upon the crest of the ridge.
About 600 or 700 yards beyond or behind San Juan ridge and between
that place and Santiago, was another line of Spanish fortifications.
Between San Juan ridge and the cavalry division was an elevation,
upon which was a large building called San Juan House, and upon
this hill was a large body of Spaniards.
While the forces of Wheeler and Kent were approaching San Juan,
General Lawton with the second division of infantry, numbering
5,280 men, Bates' brigade numbering 1,064 men, one battery of
artillery, two troops of cavalry, and some 400 Cubans, making the
entire force 6,889, appeared before El Caney about five miles north
west of Santiago.
408 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
The above strength is taken from the official reports of June 3Oth.
It is probable that the actual number under General Lawton's com
mand on July ist, was less than these figures.
The defense at this place consisted of a fort, partly of rock and
wood, and three blockhouses, the force defending these num
bering 520 men. The plan of operations for July ist was that
General Duffield should move against Aguadores, that General
Lawton would promptly take El Caney and then march down the
main road to Santiago, the head of his column to unite with the
right of the cavalry division; and the entire force was then to attack
the main Spanish position. The plan contemplated that Wheeler and
Kent, after crossing the river, would remain in position and await the
approach of Lawton, but the difficulty of carrying out this soon became
apparent. Kent's division was subjected to a severe fire from San
Juan ridge only about 500 yards distant, while the cavalry division in
addition to this fire was being pelted by the fire of a considerable force
of Spaniards who occupied the elevation called Kettle hill, upon which
San Juan house was situated, and to increase our discomfiture, both
divisions were subjected to a heavy fire from the Spanish intrench-
ments beyond San Juan ridge, from which came a continuous fire
passing over that ridge and plunging upon our troops.
After crossing the San Juan river and forming line we had finally
reached a position from which we could direct our fire upon the
enemy in the intrenchments on San Juan ridge, the heads and
shoulders of the men being frequently exposed; and the officers with
swords in hand could also be seen, directing and encouraging the
men. In the reconnoissance made after the fight at Las Guasimas, I
had become thoroughly familiar with the topography of San Juan
ridge and the plain in front of it, all of which I had described to
General Shatter, both verbally and in writing. It is true that our men
could now return the enemy's fire, which was not the case before they
crossed the river; but as the enemy continually dodged down behind,
their works it was evident our fire could not be effective. It was
also true that some of our men were protected by inequalities of the
ground, and some of the officers had put their men back into the river
so as to secure the protection of its banks; but notwithstanding this,
the great bulk of our troops were still under severe fire, and as the
enemy knew our range with great accuracy, the Spanish fire was
generally well directed. There was no question in my mind but that
it was all important our troops should promptly advance from their
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 4OQ
position and attack the ridge. It was clear that the moment we com
menced advancing the enemy would be disconcerted and their fire would
be less accurate as they would be compelled to continually change their
range, and the formation of the ground was such that when we had
crossed the plain and come within twenty or thirty yards of the ridge,
the whole line would be within a dead space entirely screened from the
enemy's fire.
Again, the road upon which Lawton was expected to approach
from El Caney was located several hundred yards in front of our line
and behind that occupied by the enemy, and it was evident that if we
remained where we were until he reached the vicinity of Santiago he
would be without any assistance from us, and might be confronted
by a very large force of the enemy.
On the 3Oth, General Shafter had given directions to his other
division commanders; but, although I was not on the sick report, it
seems that he was informed that I was ill ; and I was not invited to, and
knew nothing of this conference. My information as to the plans was
obtained after I reached the field, on the morning of July 1st, the two
brigades of my division having been moved forward during the night
of the 3oth by direct instructions from General Shafter.
It is true that I was sick, but had carefully abstained from being
put on the sick report, and continued to perform all my duties.
On the 28th, 29th, and 3Oth I suffered with fever caused by ex
posure to the hot suns by day and, being without a tent, to the heavy
dews by night, but nevertheless I continued my duties and was not
put on the sick report. On the 28th and 2Qth General Shafter came
ashore and I visited him on both days. On the 3Oth General Shafter
ordered the generals before him, but no notification was sent to me,
and I was entirely ignorant of this meeting. In explanation of this
General Shafter afterward told me that he understood I was sick, and
his staff officer, Colonel Miley, in his book (page 103), states:
He (Wheeler) was sick with fever and whose attending physician advised
against informing him of the proposed battle next day.
Notwithstanding this, I learned that preparations were being made
for active operations, and early on the morning of the 1st I rode to the
front. I learned from General Sumner, General Kent, and others of
the proposed plan of battle, viz., that Lawton and Bates were to take
El Caney, while General Kent's division and my division were to cross
San Juan river and form line, the left of my division to be on the main
4io CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
road, while Kent's division was to be formed on my left, and that these
troops were to remain in that position until Lawton had taken El
Caney, and, by a march of five miles, joined the head of his column to
the right of my division, when all were to advance upon the fortifica
tions of San Juan.
At ii o'clock on July ist the cavalry division and Kent's division
were forming line on San Juan river, confronting the Spanish forces
upon Kettle hill and San Juan ridge. General Lawton and General
Bates, together with a body of Cubans were at El Caney, about three
miles to the north, or rather to the northeast of this point. General
Shafter's official report in speaking of himself, says:
My own health was impaired by overexertion in the sun and intense heat
of the day before, which prevented me from participating as actively in the battle
as I desired, but from a high hill near my headquarters I had a general view
of the battlefield, extending from El Caney on the right to the left of our lines
on San Juan hill.
This point referred to by General Shafter was on the Santiago and
Siboney road about equi-distant from each of the two points, El Caney
and San Juan. General Shafter was, therefore, at an apex of a tri
angle, the other two apices being San Juan and El Caney.
General Shafter, of course, exercised authority over both these
forces, but my distance and that of Lawton from the commander
being so great, each of us was responsible for the troops under his
immediate command; and the general custom of the service, and my
former instructions from General Shafter, made this responsibility in
regard to myself more unquestioned. Colonel McClernand, adjutant-
general of General Shafter's staff, a most gallant officer, was near El
Poso and I hastened to him and after a short conference found that
he agreed, and I received his full sanction to order the entire line
forward, and he directed me to give the orders to General Kent. I
rode rapidly to General Kent, explained the orders to him, and this
gallant officer started his division forward in magnificent style. I
also personally gave similar orders to General Sumner and, through
my staff officers, to the "brigade commanders, Colonel Leonard Wood
and Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Carroll. The First Brigade was com
posed of the Third, Sixth and Ninth Regular Cavalry; the Second
comprised the First and Tenth Regular and the First Volunteer
Cavalry. These regiments were far below their full quota, details
having been left at Tampa, and on duty at various points. The
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 411
cavalry division made a bold charge, carrying the San Juan House hill
in a handsome manner, and driving the Spaniards from their position
on its crest. This charge put the cavalry in line with Kent's division,
the two divisions then being confronted by what is called San Juan
ridge, on the crest of which, as before stated, was a line of breast
works and quite a formidable work called Fort San Juan, and further
to the north or to our right was a strong blockhouse. The entire line
advanced steadily across the valley, the fire upon them from the
Spanish becoming less steady and less deadly as they advanced, and
upon reaching the foot of the hill, the conformation of the ground was
such that they were almost entirely screened from the Spanish bullets.
With but little hesitation they ascended the hill and on reaching the
crest were met by a heavy fire from the enemy's works, some 600
yards beyond, the casualties for a few moments being very severe.
It would be hard to picture or adequately describe the valor of these
men. The superb training of the regulars had given them an
advantage in drill and marksmanship, which highly enhanced their
endurance and effectiveness; while many of the volunteers exhibited
most commendable and enthusiastic valor, courage and determination,
and this in a great degree compensated for their want of experience.
The officers of foreign armies who accompanied the army as military
experts, expressed their admiration of the bravery, inflexible determi
nation and patient endurance exhibited by the American soldiers.
That the enemy's retreat from the fort and ridge was precipitate was
quite apparent; cooking utensils, rice, other foods, wines and various
articles were found in abundance. Although our troops had gained
the day by determined and heroic valor, the situation was far from
satisfactory. Nothing had been heard from Lawton or Bates, and our
troops were thoroughly broken down and exhausted. They had been
up marching most of the night previous, had forded San Juan river, be
coming soaked up to their waists, they had been under a fire more or
less severe during the entire day. Of the 6,900 men in Wheeler's and
Kent's divisions at daylight, 147 had been killed and about 1,000
wounded, most of whom had to be removed in improvised litters, each
being carried by two men. A considerable number were engaged in
burying the dead, which the warm climate required should be done
without delay. I sent to the rear for intrenching tools and a large
force was put to work with the determination to intrench sufficiently
to protect our men from the fire which we felt certain would open
warmly at daylight. All this left a very thin firing line which was
412 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
further weakened by the absence of many who had fallen from ex
haustion and become separated from their commands.
In front of this thin line appeared a numerically strong enemy,
whom many of the officers and men seemed to regard as firm and
determined; and some of the bravest and best officers were earnest in
their assertions that if the Spanish forces in our front should attack,
the ridge could not be held. And it was insisted that should such a
disaster befall our army, it would be virtually destroyed before it could
reach the eastern bank of the San Juan river. Hearing that appre
hensions had also been conveyed to General Shafter, I wrote to him at
8:30 as follows:
HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
" SAN JUAN, July i, 1898, 8:20 P. M.
General SHAFTER:
SIR. — I examined the line in front of Wood's brigade and gave the men
shovels and picks and insisted on their going right to work. 1 also sent word
to General Kent to come and get intrenching tools, and saw General Hawkins
in person and told him the same thing. They all promised to do their best,
but say the earth is very difficult, as a great part of it is rocky. The positions
our men carried were very strong and the intrenchments were very strong.
A number of officers have appealed to me to have the line withdrawn and
take up a strong position farther back, and I expect they will appeal to you.
I have positively discountenanced this as it would cost us much prestige.
The lines are now very thin, as so many men have gone to the rear with
wounded, and so many are exhausted; but I hope these men can be got up to
night, and with our lines intrenched and Lawton on our right we ought to
hold to-morrow, but I fear it will be a severe day. If we can get through to
morrow all right, we can make our breastworks very strong the next night.
You can hardly realize the exhausted condition of the troops. The Third
and Sixth Cavalry and other troops were up marching and halted on the road,
all last night, and have fought for twelve hours to-day, and those that are not
on the line will be digging trenches to-night.
I was on the extreme front line. The men were lying down and reported
the Spaniards not more than 300 yards in their front.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOS. WHEELER,
Major-General Volunteers.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 413
" The Fight for Santiago," by Stephen Bonsai, page 124, says:
The advancing columns followed the line of the stream until they came to
the place, later known as the " Bloody Angle," where the road to Santiago
crossed the Aguadores stream for the last time.
At this juncture our losses began to be very heavy indeed, in spite of every
effort that was made to keep the troops under cover. The men were not over
600 yards from the advanced position of the Spaniards, and the Spanish artillery
as well as the Mausers had their range well. A great many men were falling,
and here the heaviest losses of the day were experienced. This was especially
the case with the cavalry division, who later on, in closer quarters and at
shorter range, did not lose so heavily. General Kent, who commanded the
First Infantry Division, was at this moment, and not unnaturally, very much
at a loss to know what to do. His orders had been from McClernand, adju
tant-general at El Poso, to advance two miles toward Santiago, and there to
bivouac and await orders and the result of the movements of Lawton's division
and of Stunner's division.
Page 131, says:
There was, it is true, in addition to the devotion to duty which characterized
our men, a material incentive to spur on the charge. The nearer we came to
San Juan, the fewer men fell under the deadly fire. In depressing their rifles,
as the Spaniards had to do, firing as they did down from a great height, the
danger or killing space of each bullet became considerably shortened as the
men advanced and drew nearer to the heights.
* * * * # * * * #
Throughout the advance the losses were very heavy, especially when they
came to the San Juan river, which at this point was very deep, though not
broad. Many of the men had narrow escapes from drowning, and were com
pelled to take refuge on the banks from which they had sprung and look for
a shallower passage.
Page 135, says:
When they reached the foothills of the heights, they secured some protection
and a better footing, and crept up the heights in little bunches, availing them
selves of what shelter the inner qualities of the ground offered, while Hawkins,
by his presence and his voice, spurred them on.
414 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Page 163, says:
The Spaniards were well posted upon the line of march our advancing col
umns were compelled by the nature of the ground to take, and their sharp
shooters, by the practice of the morning — if not by the previous exact meas
urement, as some think — had obtained the range at the more open places
which our men had to pass over, and where there was not even the false,
deceptive cover of the guinea-grass and the low jungle shrubbery. Our men
were dropping every instant under this exasperating fire, which came in upon
them from every side.
* * *******
Page 164, says:
There is no doubt that, on the whole, more of the brave fellows of these
devoted brigades fell in the jungle labyrinth and under the bullets of the
unseen foe than when, later, they swung out into the open and charged up
the hillside, bare of all protecting cover, to the Spanish works. And that
march through the jungle, and the fire that could not be ambushed from an
enemy that could not be seen, filled me with greater admiration than even
the wild, heroic burst up the bullet-swept hill. There were few men, and
certainly no one worthy of the name, who could have held back or stood aside
when this tidaJ wave of high-beating hearts surged through the valley and
swept up the hillside, and certainly no one wearing the blue coat did. But it
seemed to me, as I saw the haggard and hard-drawn features of our men, as
they stumbled and staggered on through the dense jungle which shut out the
light and air, but not the death-dealing bullets, that the less spectacular part
of this performance upon this glorious day required a less common order of
courage. And I have always thought that the unwavering and unquestioning
advance of our men through the wilderness, which led they knew not where,
was the triumph of the day, and presented the highest exhibition of soldierly
qualities of the many which were illustrated upon this field of battle conse
crated by so many glorious memories.
* # *******
Page 165, says:
To nine-tenths, and perhaps to a larger proportion still, of the five brigades
which made the gallant advance through the jungle and up to the heights of
San Juan, under such untoward circumstances and under such a withering and
unrelenting fire, the trying experience was also a novel one. Only a few of
the gray-haired colonels surviving from the Civil War could remember from
their subaltern days to have confronted such a fire as this.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 415
At midnight of July ist, General Bates reported in person announc
ing the advance of his brigade. Meanwhile the gallant Lawton found
the defenses at El Caney so strong and the resistance so determined
that the action which it was expected would occupy some thirty or
forty minutes occupied most of the day, and he did not reach us until
the next day. General Bates's brigade arrived about daylight and was
placed on the left of Kent's division. General Lawton's division
reached us later in the morning and was placed in position on the
right of the cavalry division. Before daylight on the morning of July
2d, I placed Best's, Parkhurst's and Grimes's batteries, under Major
Dillenbach, on the ridge near the main Santiago road, where they did
good service until they were withdrawn and placed in position near
El Poso. The righting continued during the 2d and 3d, including a
night attack by the Spaniards, but as both sides were well protected
by intrenchments, the losses were comparatively slight. About dark
on the evening of July 2d, a meeting was held at General Shatter's
headquarters, Generals Shatter, Kent, Lawton, Bates and myself being
present, and the question of maintaining or abandoning our position
on the ridge was seriously discussed. It resulted in a determination to
encourage the troops, strengthen the breastworks, perfect the system
of transportation and endeavor to secure the surrender of Santiago
by surrounding the city and cutting off supplies.
The entire losses of the troops engaged in the battle of San Juan,
which consisted of the cavalry division, Kent's division and the
batteries just mentioned, were: Twenty officers and 127 men killed
and 68 officers and 862 men wounded. Total killed and wounded, 88
officers and 989 men.
HEADQUARTERS FISST DIVISION, FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
IN THE FIELD, FORT SAN JUAN, NEAR SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 7, 1898.
THE ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIFTH ARMY CORPS:
SIR. — I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of
my command in the battle of July ist:
On the afternoon of June 3oth, pursuant to orders given to me verbally by
the corps commander at his headquarters, I moved my Second and Third
Brigades (Pearson and Wikoff) forward about two miles to a point on the
Santiago road, near Corps Headquarters. Here the troops bivouacked, the
First Brigade (Hawkins) remaining in its camp of the two preceding days,
slightly in rear of Corps Headquarters.
416
On the following morning (July ist) at 7 o'clock I rode forward to the hill
where Captain Grimes's battery was in position. I here met Lieutenant-Colonel
McClernand, assistant adjutant-general Fifth Corps, who pointed out to me
a green hill in the distance which was to be my objective on my left, and either
he or Lieutenant Miley, of Major-General Shafter's staff, gave me directions
to keep my right on the main road leading to the city of Santiago. I had pre
viously given the necessary orders for Hawkins's brigade to move early, to be
followed in turn by Wikoff and Pearson. Shortly after Grimes's battery opened
fire I rode down to the stream and there found General Hawkins at the head
of his brigade at a point about 250 yards from the El Poso sugar house. Here
I gave him his orders.
The enemy's artillery was now replying to Grimes's battery. I rode forward
with Hawkins about 150 yards, closely followed by the Sixth Infantry, which
was leading the First Brigade. At this point I received instructions to allow
the cavalry the right of way, but for some unknown reason they moved up vtry
slowly, thus causing a delay in my advance of full forty minutes. Lieutenant
Miley, of General Shafter's staff, was at this point and understood how the
division was delayed, and reported several times that he understood I was mak
ing all the progress possible. General Hawkins went forward, and word came
back in a few minutes that it would be possible to observe the enemy's position
from the front. I immediately rode forward with my staff. The fire of the
enemy's sharpshooters was being distinctly felt at this time. I crossed the main
ford of the San Juan river, joined General Hawkins, and with him observed
the enemy's position from a point some distance in advance of the ford. Gen
eral Hawkins deemed it possible to turn the enemv's right at Fort San Juan,
but later, under the heavy fire, this was found impracticable for the First
Brigade, but was accomplished by the Third Brigade coming up later on Gen
eral Hawrkins's left. Having completed the observation, with my staff I pro
ceeded to join the head of my division, just coming under heavy fire. Ap
proaching the First Brigade, I directed them to move alongside the cavalry
(which was halted). We were already suffering losses caused by the balloon
near by attracting fire and disclosing our position.
The enemy's infantry fire, steadily increasing in intensity, now came from all
directions, not only from the front and the dense tropical thickets on our flanks,
but from sharpshooters thickly posted in trees in our rear, and from shrapnel
apparently aimed at the balloon. Lieutenant-Colonel Derby, of General Shaf
ter's staff, met me about this time and informed me that a trail or narrow way
had been discovered from the balloon a short distance back leading to the left
to a ford lower down the stream. I hastened to the forks made by this road,
and soon after the Seventy-first New York Regiment, of Hawkins's brigade,
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 41?
came up. I turned them into the by-path indicated by Lieutenant-Colonel
Derby, leading to the lower ford, sending word to General Hawkins of this
movement. This would have speedily delivered them in their proper place on
the left of their brigade, but under the galling fire of the enemy the leading
battalion of this regiment was thrown into confusion and recoiled in disorder
on the troops in rear. At this critical moment the officers of my staff practically
formed a cordon behind the panics-stricken men and urged them to again go
forward. I finally ordered them to lie down in the thicket and clear the way
for others of their own regiment who were coming up behind. This many of
them did, and the second and third battalions came forward in better order and
moved along the road toward the ford. One of my staff officers ran back,
waving his hat, to hurry forward the Third Brigade, who, upon approaching the
forks, found the way blocked by men of the Seventy-first New York. There
were other men of this regiment crouching in the bushes, many of whom were
encouraged by the advance of the approaching column to rise and go forward.
As already stated, I had received orders some time before to keep in rear of the
cavalry division Their advance was much delayed, resulting in frequent halts,
presumably to drop their blanket rolls and due to the natural delay in fording
a stream. These delays under such a hot fire grew exceedingly irksome, and
I therefore pushed the head of my division as quickly as I could toward the
river, in column of files or twos, parallel in the narrow way by the cavalry.
This quickened the forward movement and enabled me to get into position as
speedily as possible for the attack. Owing to the congested condition of the
road the progress of the narrow columns was, however, painfully slow. I again
sent a staff officer at a gallop to urge forward the troops in rear. The head of
Wikoff's brigade reached the forks at 12:20 p. M., and hurried on the left, step
ping over prostrate forms of men of the Seventy-first. This heroic brigade,
consisting of the Thirteenth, Ninth and Twenty-fourth U. S. Infantry, speedily
crossed the stream and were quickly deployed to the left of the lower ford.
While personally superintending this movement, Colonel Wikoff was killed,
the command of the brigade then devolving upon Lieutenant-Colonel Worth,
Thirteenth Infantry, who immediately fell seriously wounded, and then upon
Lieutenant-Colonel Liscum, Twenty-fourth Infantry, who, five minutes later,
also fell under the withering fire of the enemy. The command of the brigade
then devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel E. P. Ewers, Ninth Infantry. Mean
while, I had again sent a staff officer to hurry forward the Second Brigade,
which was bringing up the rear. The Tenth and Second Infantry, soon arriv
ing at the forks, were deflected to the left, to follow the Third Brigade, while
the Twenty-first was directed along the main road to support Hawkins.
Crossing the lower ford a few minutes later, the Tenth and Second moved
418 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
forward in column in good order toward the green knoll already referred to
as my objective on the left. Approaching the knoll the regiments deployed,
passed over the knoll and ascended the high ridge beyond, driving back the
enemy in the direction of his trenches. I observed this movement from the
Fort San Juan hill. Colonel E. P. Pearson, Tenth Infantry, commanding the
Second Brigade, and the officers and troops under his command, deserve great
credit for the soldierly manner in which this movement was executed. I
earnestly recommend Colonel Pearson for promotion. Prior to this advance
of the Second Brigade, the Third, connecting with Hawkins's gallant troops
on the right, had moved toward Fort San Juan, sweeping through a zone of
most destructive fire, scaling a steep and difficult hill and assisting in capturing
the enemy's strong position (Fort San Juan) at 1:30 p. M. This crest was
about 125 feet above the general level and was defended by deep trenches and
a loop-holed brick fort, surrounded by barbed wire entanglements. General
Hawkins, some time after I reached the crest, reported that the Sixth and
Sixteenth Infantry had captured the hill, which I now consider incorrect;
credit is almost equally due the Sixth, Ninth, Thirteenth, Sixteenth, and
Twenty-fourth Regiments of Infantry. Owing to General Hawkins's repre
sentations, I forwarded the report sent to Corps Headquarters about 3 P. M.
that the Sixth and Sixteenth Infantry regiments had captured the hill. The
Thirteenth Infantry captured the enemy's colors waving over the fort, but un
fortunately destroyed them, distributing the fragments among the men, because,
as was asserted, " It was a bad omen," two or three men having been shot
while assisting Private Arthur Agnew, Company H, Thirteenth Infantry, the
captor. All fragments which could be recovered are submitted with this report.
The greatest credit is due to the officers of my command, whether company,
battalion, regimental, or brigade commanders, who so admirably directed the
formation of their troops, unavoidably intermixed in the dense thicket, and made
the desperate rush for the distant and strongly defended crest. I have already
mentioned the circumstances of my Third Brigade's advance across the ford
where, in the brief space of ten minutes, it lost its brave commander (killed)
and the next two ranking officers by disabling wounds, yet, in spite of these
confusing conditions, the formations were effected without hesitation, although
under a stinging fire, companies acting singly in some instances, and by bat
talion and regiments in others, rushing through the jungle across the stream,
waist deep, and over the wide bottom thickly set with barbed wire entanglements.
In this connection I desire to particularly mention First Lieutenant Wendell
L. Simpson, adjutant, Ninth Infantry, acting assistant adjutant-general Third
Brigade, who was noticeably active and efficient in carrying out orders which
I had given him to transmit to his brigade commander, who no longer existed.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
The enemy having retired to a second line of rifle pits, I directed my line to
hold their positions and intrench. At ten minutes past 3 P. M. I received almost
simultaneously two requests — one from Colonel Wood, commanding a cav
alry brigade, and one from General Stunner, asking for assistance for the
cavalry on my right, " as they were hard pressed." I immediately sent to
their aid the Thirteenth Infantry, who promptly went on this further mission,
despite the heavy losses they had already sustained.
Great credit is due to the gallant officer and gentleman. Brigadier-General
H. S. Hawkins, who, placing himself between the two regiments, leading his
brigade, the Sixth and Sixteenth Infantry, urged and led them by voice and
bugle calls to the attack so successfully accomplished. My earnest thanks are
due to my staff officers present at my side and under my personal observation
on the field, especially to Major A. C. Sharpe, assistant adjutant-general; Major
Philip Reade, inspector-general; Captain U. G. McAlexander, chief quarter
master, and my aids. First Lieutenant George S. Cartwright, Twenty-fourth
Infantry, and First Lieutenant William P. Jackson, Second Infantry; also to
Mr. Adolpho Carlos Munoz, the latter a volunteer aid, subsequently wounded
in the fight of the 2d instant, who richly merits a commission for his able
assistance, given without pay.
The officers enumerated should at least be brevetted for gallantry under fire.
I also personally noticed the conduct of First Lieutenant F. J. Kirkpatrick,
assistant surgeon, United States Army, on duty with the Twenty-fourth In
fantry, giving most efficient aid to the wounded under fire. I observed several
times First Lieutenant J. D. Miley, Fifth Artillery, aid to General Shafter,
who was conspicuous throughout the day for his coolness under fire, delivering
instructions with apparent unconcern. The bloody fighting of my brave com
mand cannot be adequately described in words. The following list of killed
wounded, and missing, tells the story of their valor:
Report or killed, wounded, and missing July i, 1898, First Division, Fifth
Army Corps:
Killed. Wounded. Missing.
Organization. , • , . • v
Officers Men. Officers. Men
First Brigade:
Sixteenth Infantry I 13 5 82 6
Sixth Infantry 4 13 7 92
Seventy-first N. Y. Vol. Infantry.. 4 12 i 47 43
Total 9 38 13 221 49
420 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Killed. Wounded. Missing.
Organization. , • « , • ,
Officers. Men. Officers. Men,
Second Brigade:
Tenth Infantry I 4 5 21
Twenty-first Infantry 5 I 25
Second Infantry i 4 16
Total i 10 10
Third Brigade:
Brigade commander i
Ninth Infantry i 3 2,3 i
Thirteenth Infantry 2 16 5 Si i
Twenty-fourth Infantry 2 10 4 73 7
Total 6 29 9 177 « 9
Grand total 16 77 32 460 58
At daylight on the morning of July 2d, the enemy resumed the battle, and
firing continued throughout the day, part of the time in a drenching rain. At
nightfall the firing ceased, but at 9 P. M. a vigorous assault was made all along
our lines. This was completely repulsed, the enemy again retiring to his
trenches. The following morning firing was resumed and continued until near
noon, when a white flag was displayed by the enemy and firing was ordered
to cease. The casualties of these two days (July 2d and 3d) were as follows:
Report of killed, wounded, and missing, July 21, 1898, First Division, Fifth
Army Corps:
Killed. Wounded.
Organization.
Officers. Men. Officers. Men. Missing.
Division Staff:
First Brigade i
General officers i
Field and staff:
Sixth Infantry 2
Sixteenth Infantry i 21 I
Seventy-first N. Y. Vol. Infantry i ..,.., 7
Total 2 i 30
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 421
Killed. Wounded. Missing.
Organization. / • > , ' >
Officers. Men. Officers. Men.
Second Brigade:
Field and staff
Tenth Infantry I 14 3
Twenty-first Infantry i 7
Second Infantry 4 31
Total 6 52 3
Third Brigade:
Field and staff
Ninth Infantry 4
Thirteenth Infantry 3
Twenty-fourth Infantry i 2 i
Total . 128
Grand total 9 4 90 4
Mr. A. C. Munoz, volunteer aid to division commander.
Report of killed, wounded, and missing, July 3, 1898, First Division, Fifth
Army Corps:
Killed. Wounded. Missing.
Organization. , • - — > , • ,
Officers. Men. Officers. Men.
First Brigade:
Field and staff
Sixth Infantry 2
Sixteenth Infantry i
Seventy-first N. Y. Vol. Infantry 4
Total i
Second Brigade:
Field and staff
Tenth Infantry
Twenty-first Infantry
Second Infantry i
Total . i
422 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Officers. Men. Officers. Men. Missing.
Organization. , > v , > ,
Killed. Wounded.
Third Brigade:
Field and staff
Ninth Infantry
Thirteenth Infantry
Twenty-fourth Infantry . .
Total
Grand total .
Grand total, July i, 2 and 3,
1898 12 87 36 561 62
One hospital corps man killed, attached to Tenth Infantry, not included in
above total.
I desire, in conclusion, to express my gratitude to Major-General Joseph
Wheeler for his courteous conduct to me, and, through me, to my division,
under the trying circumstances enumerated.
Though ill and suffering, General Wheeler was so perfectly at home under
fire that he inspired all of us with assurance.
Attention is invited in this connection to the reports of brigade and sub
ordinate commanders herewith. I cordially indorse their commendations.
Very respectfully,
J. FORD KENT,
Brigadier-General, Ignited States Volunteers, Commanding.
HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
Before SANTIAGO, Cuba, July 7, 1898.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIFTH ARMY CORPS:
SIR. — After the engagement of June 24th I pushed forward my command
through Sevilla into the valley, Lawton's and Kent's commands occupying
the hills in the vicinity of that place. After two days' rest Lawton was ordered
forward, and on the night of the 30th instructions were given by Major-General
Shafter to this officer to attack Caney while the cavalry division and Kent's
division were ordered to move forward on the regular Santiago road. The
movement commenced on the morning of July 1st. The cavalry division
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 425
advanced, and formed its line with its left near the Santiago road; while Kent's
division formed its line with the right joining the left of the cavalry division.
Colonel McClernand, of General Shafter's staff, directed me to give instruc
tions to General Kent, which I complied with in person, at the same time
personally directing General Sumner to move forward. The men were all
compelled to wade the San Juan river to get into line. This was done under
very heavy fire of both infantry and artillery. Our balloon, having been sent
up right by the main road, was made a mark of by the enemy. It was evident
that we were as much under fire in forming the line as we would be by an
advance, and I, therefore, pressed the command forward from the covering
under which it was formed. It merged into open space in full view of the
enemy, who occupied breastworks and batteries on the crest of the hill which
overlooks Santiago, — • officers and men falling at every step. The troops ad
vanced gallantly, soon reached the foot of the hill, and ascended, driving the
enemy from their works and occupying them on the crest of the hill. To
accomplish this required courage and determination, on the part of the officers
and men, of a high order, and the losses were very severe.
Too much credit cannot be given to General Sumner and General Kent,
and their gallant brigade commanders — Colonel Wood and Colonel Carroll
of the cavalry. General Hamilton S. Hawkins, commanding First Brigade,
Kent's division, and Colonel Pearson, commanding Second Brigade. Colonel
Carroll and Major Wessells were both wounded during the charge; but Major
Wessells was enabled to return and resume command. General Wyckoff, com
manding Kent's Third Brigade, was killed at 12:10. Lieutenant-Colonel Worth
took command, and was wounded at 12:15. Lieutenant-Colonel Liscum then
took command, and was wounded at 12:20; and the command then devolved
upon Lieutenant-Colonel Ewers, Ninth Infantry.
Upon reaching the crest, I ordered breastworks to be constructed, and sent
to the rear for shovels, picks, spades and axes. The enemy's retreat from the
ridge was precipitate, but our men were so thoroughly exhausted that it was
impossible for them to follow. Their shoes were soaked with water by wading
the San Juan river, they had become drenched with rain, and when they reached
the crest they were absolutely unable to proceed further. Notwithstanding this
condition, these exhausted men labored during the night to erect breastworks,
and furnished details to bury the dead and carry the wounded back in improvised
litters.
I sent word along the line that reinforcements would soon reach us, and that
Lawton would join our right, and that General Bates would come up and
strengthen our left. After reaching the crest of the ridge General Kent sent the
Thirteenth Regulars to assist in strengthening our right. At midnight General
Bates reported, and I placed him in a strong position on the left of our line.
CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
General Lawton had attempted to join us from Caney; but when very near our
lines he was fired upon by the Spaniards and turned back, but joined us next
day at noon by a circuitous route.
During all the day, on July 2d, the cavalry division, Kent's division and
Bates's brigade were engaged with the enemy, being subjected to a severe fire
and incurring many casualties; and later in the day Lawton's division also
became engaged.
During the entire engagement my staff performed their duties with courage,
judgment and ability. Special credit is due to Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Dorst,
Major William D. Beach, Captain Joseph E. Dickman, and Lieutenant M. F.
Steele. I desire also to say that Lieutenants James H. Reeves and Joseph
Wheeler, Jr., Captain Wm. Astor Chanler, Major E. A. Garlington, Mr. Au-
relius E. Mestre and Corporal John Lundmark also deserve high commendation
for courage and good conduct. Major West, my quartermaster, deserves special
commendation for his energy and good conduct during the campaign; and
Major Valery Havard and Mr. Leonard Wilson have also done their full duty.
Captain Hardie and First Lieutenant F. J. Koester, with Troop 6, Third Cavalry,
were detailed with headquarters, and conducted themselves handsomely under
fire. The superb courage displayed by the officers and men will be specially
mentioned in the reports of subordinate commanders.
Our aggregate strength, and our losses, were as follows:
Killed. Wounded. Strength.
Organization. , • , , • , Aggregate. , ' >
Officers. Men. Officers. Men. Officers. Men.
First Brigade:
Third Cavalry
Sixth Cavalry
Ninth Cavalry
Totals 2 9 12 114 137 50 1,054
Second Brigade:
Attached 3 3
First Cavalry i 13 i 47 62 21 501
Tenth Cavalry 2 6 9 66 83 22 450
First Volunteer Cav
alry i 12 5 72 90 25 517
•3
6
47
56
22
420
4
4
qo
58
16
427
. . . . 2
2
2
17
23
12
207
Totals 4 31 18 185 238 77 1,468
Grand totals, 6 40 30 299 375 127 2,522
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 427
OFFICERS OF THE CAVALRY DIVISION KILLED AND WOUNDED
IN THE BATTLE OF SAN JUAN, CUBA.
OFFICERS KILLED.
Lieutenant-Colonel John M. Hamilton, Ninth Cavalry.
Major Albert G. Forse, First Cavalry.
Captain W. O. O'Neil, First U. S. Volunteer Cavalry.
First Lieutenant William E. Shipp, Tenth Cavalry.
First Lieutenant William H. Smith, Tenth Cavalry.
Acting Assistant Surgeon H. W. Danforth, Attached Ninth Cavalry.
OFFICERS WOUNDED.
Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Carroll, Sixth Cavalry.
Major Henry W. Wessells, Jr., Third Cavalry.
Major T. J. Wint, Tenth Cavalry.
Major and Assistant Surgeon H. La Motte, First U. S. Volunteer Cavalry.
Major W. C. Hayes, First Ohio Volunteer Cavalry.
Captain J. B. Kerr, Sixth Cavalry.
Captain George A. Dodd, Third Cavalry.
Captain George K. Hunter, Third Cavalry.
Captain C. W. Taylor, Ninth Cavalry.
Captain A. P. Blocksom, Sixth Cavalry.
Captain John Bigelow, Jr., Tenth Cavalry.
Captain M. T. Henry, commanding First U. S. Volunteer Cavalry.
First Lieutenant A. Mills, First Cavalry, captain and acting adjutant-general,
Volunteers.
First Lieutenant M. H. Barnum, Tenth Cavalry.
First Lieutenant Arthur Thayer, Third Cavalry.
First Lieutenant O. B. Meyer, Third Cavalry.
First Lieutenant W. S. Wood, Ninth Cavalry.
First Lieutenant A. C'. Murrillat, Third Cavalry.
First Lieutenant E. D. Anderson, Tenth Cavalry.
First Lieutenant R. C. Livermore, Tenth Cavalry.
First Lieutenant Carr, First U. S. Volunteer Cavalry
First Lieutenant David J. Leahey, First U. S. Volunteer Cavalry.
First Lieutenant R. C. Day, First U. S. Volunteer Cavalry.
Second Leutenant Harry O. Williard, Tenth Cavalry.
Second Lieutenant Walter C, Short, Sixth Cavalry.
428 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Second Lieutenant F. R. McCoy, Tenth Cavalry.
Second Lieutenant T. A. Roberts, Tenth Cavalry.
Second Lieutenant H. K. Devereaux, First U. S. Volunteer Cavalry.
Second Lieutenant H. C Whitehead, Tenth Cavalry.
Cadet L. K. Haswell, First U. S. Volunteer Cavalry.
General Kent's report of casualties of officers has been forwarded.
The strength given in tabulated statements above, is the aggregate strength
of the command; but as there were many details, above figures are about 15
per cent, greater than the forces actually engaged in battle.
The command has been active in strengthening their position, and com
manders and their staffs have thoroughly informed themselves as to the topo
graphical features of the country and the situation of the enemy.
Very respectfully,
4
JOS. WHEELER,
Major-General Volunteers, Commanding.
LIST OF OFFICERS TAKING PART IN THE BATTLE OF
SANTIAGO DE CUBA, JULY i, 2 AND 3, 1898.
FIFTH ARMY CORPS.
Major-General WILLIAM R. SHAFTER, Commanding.
Personal Staff.
Major Robert H. Noble, A. A. G. U. S. V On duty at headquarters.
Major John D. Miley. A. A. G. U. S. V On duty at headquarters.
Captain William H. McKittrick, A. A. G. U. S. V Aid.
Captain Stewart M. Brice, C. S. U. S. N Aid.
Doctor George Goodfellow Volunteer Aid.
Mr. G. F. Hawkins Volunteer Aid.
Mr. James T. Ord Interpreter.
Corps Staff.
Lieutenant-Colonel E. J. McClernand, A. A. G. U. S. V.... Adjutant-General.
Captain J. C. Gilmore, Jr., A. A. G. U. S. V Assistant Adjutant-General.
Major S. W. Groesbeck, Judge- Advocate, U. S. A Judge- Advocate.
Captain Charles G. Starr, First Infantry Acting Inspector-General.
Lieutenant-Colonel J. J. Astor Inspector-General, U. S. V.
Lt.-Col. Chas. G. Humphrey, A. Qr.-Mr.-G. . Chief Qr.-Mr. of the Expedition.
Major J. W. Jacobs, Quartermaster Chief Quartermaster,
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 429
Lieutenant-Colonel B. F. Pope, Chief Surgeon, U. S. V....... Chief Surgeon.
Col. J. F. Weston, Asst. Com. -Gen. of Subs. .. . Chief Com. of the Expedition.
Lieut-Colonel Geo. McC. Derby, Chief Engineer, U. S. V.... Chief Engineer.
Lieutenant William Brooke, Fourth Infantry Ordnance Officer.
Major Frank Greene, U. S. V. Signal Corps Signal Officer.
Major Hugh J. Gallagher Depot Commissary,
Lieutenant Frank DeW. Ramsy Assistant to Depot Commissary.
Captain E. H. Plummer, Tenth Infantry In charge of transportation.
CAVALRY DIVISION.
Major-General JOSEPH WHEELER, U. S. V., Commanding.
Personal Staff.
First Lieutenant M. F. Steele, Eighth Cavalry Aid.
Second Lieutenant James H. Reeves, Sixth Cavalry Aid.
Second Lieutenant Joseph Wheeler, Jr., Fourth Artillery Aid.
Mr. Aurelius E. Mestre Interpreter and Volunteer Aid.
Mr. Leonard Wilson Secretary and Volunteer Aid.
Division Staff.
Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Dorst, A. A. G., U. S. V Adjutant-General.
Major Valery Havard, Surgeon, U. S. A Chief Surgeon.
Major E. A. Garlington, Inspector-General, U. S. A Inspector-General.
Major Win. Beach, Chief Engineer, U. S. V Acting Engineer Officer.
Captain P. W. West, Sixth Cavalry Acting Chief Quartermaster.
Captain Wm. A. Chandler, U. S. V Acting Ordnance Officer.
FIRST DIVISION.
Brigadier-General J. FORD KENT, U. S. V., Commanding.
Personal Staff.
First Lieutenant George S. Cartwright, Twenty-fourth Infantry Aid.
First Lieutenant W. P. Jackson, Second Infantry Aid.
Division Staff.
Major A. C. Sharpe, U. S. V Adjutant-General.
Major Phillip Reade, Inspector-General, U. S. V Inspector-General.
43° CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Major James, I. G. U. S. V Assistant to Inspector-General.
Major Morris C. Hutchins, Q. M. U. S. V Chief Quartermaster.
Captain U. G. McAlexander, A. Q. M. U. S. V.... Assistant to Chief Qr.-Mr.
Major M. W. Wood, Surgeon, U. S. A Chief Surgeon.
Captain F. G. Lord, C. S., U. S. V Assistant to the Chief Commissary.
First Lieutenant E. F. Taggart, Sixth Infantry Acting Chief Commissary.
Mr. A. C. Munez Volunteer Aid.
SECOND DIVISION.
Brigadier-General HENRY W. LAWTON, U. S. V., Commanding,
Personal Staff.
Second Lieutenant H. H. Warren, Second Massachusetts Vol. Inf Aid.
Second Lieutenant William Brooke, Fourth Infantry Aid.
Division Staff.
Captain H. C. Carbaugh, A. A. G., U. S. V Adjutant-General.
Major C. Creighton Webb, Inspector-General, U. S. V.... Inspector-General.
First Lieutenant D. E. Holley, Fourth Infantry. . . Acting Chief Commissary
and Mustering Officer.
First Lieutenant C. S. Farnsworth, Seventeenth Inf.... Acting Chief Qr.-Mr.
Major H. J. Kilbourne, Surgeon, U. S. A Chief Surgeon.
Major H. C. Daniels, U. S. V A. A. G.
Mr. R. C. Mendoza Volunteer Aid.
Mr. E. L. D. Breckinridge Volunteer Aid.
PROVISIONAL DIVISION.
Brigadier-General J. C. BATES, U. S. V., Commanding.
Personal Staff.
First Lieutenant S. E. Smiley, Fifteenth Infantry.. Aid and Ordnance Officer.
Second Lieutenant M. F. Smith, Twentieth Infantry Aid
Division Staff.
Major John A. Logan, A. A. G., U. S. V Adjutant-General.
Major H. E. Wilkins, C. S., U. S. V Chief Commissary.
Major Thomas M. Woodruff, I. G., U. S. V Inspector-General.
Major F. J. Ives, Surgeon, U. S. V Chief Surgeon.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 431
Captain W. M. Wright, A. A. G., U. S. V Assistant Adjutant-General.
First Lieutenant F. R. Day, Twentieth Infantry Chief Quartermaster.
First Lieutenant H. H. Reeve, Third Infantry Engineer Officer.
Major James A. Irons, U. S. V Engineer Officer.
NAMES OF REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS AND ROSTER
OF REGIMENTS AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS COM
POSING FIFTH ARMY CORPS IN BATTLE OF SAN
TIAGO DE CUBA.
CAVALRY DIVISION.
Major- General WHEELER, Commanding.
First Brigade.
General Sumner, Commanding.
Third Cavalry Major H. Wessells, Jr., Commanding.
Sixth Cavalry Major Thomas C. Lebo, Commanding.
Ninth Cavalry Major W. C. Forbush, Commanding.
Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Carroll commanded the Sixth Cavalry until as
signed to the command of the brigade; he was wounded during the advance
on San Juan.
Lieutenant-Colonel John M. Hamilton commanded the Ninth Cavalry; he
was killed during the advance on San Juan, Major Forbush succeeding in
command.
Second Brigade.
Brigadier-General Leonard Wood, Commanding.
First Cavalry Lieutenant-Colonel C. D. Viele, Commanding.
Tenth Cavalry Lieutenant-Colonel T. A. Baldwin, Commanding.
First U. S. Volunteer Cavalry Lieut. -Colonel T. Roosevelt, Commanding.
FIRST DIVISION.
Brigadier-General J. F. KENT, Commanding.
First Brigade.
Colonel H. A. Theaker, Sixteenth Infantry, Commanding.
Sixth United States Infantry Major Charles Miner, Commanding.
Sixteenth United States Infantry. . Major Wm. B. McLaughlin, Commanding.
Seventy-first N. Y. Volunteer Infantry. , Colonel W. A. Downs, Commanding.
432
Second Brigade.
Colonel E. P. Pearson, Tenth Infantry, Commanding.
Tenth Infantry Lieutenant-Colonel E. R. Kellogg, Commanding.
Second Infantry Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. M. Wherry, Commanding.
Twenty-first Infantry Captain F. H. E. Ebstein, Commanding.
Third Brigade.
Brigadier-General Adelbert Ames, Commanding.
Ninth Infantry Lieutenant-Colonel E. P. Ewers, Commanding.
Thirteenth Infantry Major Wm. Auman, Commanding.
Twenty-fourth Infantry.... Major A. C. Markley, Eleventh Inf., Commanding,
SECOND DIVISION.
Major-General H. W. LAWTON, Commanding.
4
First Brigade.
Brigadier-General Wm. Ludlow, Commanding.
Eighth Infantry Major C. H. Conrad, Commanding.
Twenty-second Infantry Major Wm. M. Van Home, Commanding.
Second Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry Colonel Clark, Commanding.
Second Brigade.
Brigadier-General Chambers McKibbin, Commanding.
Fourth Infantry Major Stephen Baker, Commanding.
First Infantry Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. H. Bisbee, Commanding.
Twenty-fifth Infantry Lieutenant-Colonel A. S. Daggett, Commanding,
Third Brigade.
Brigadier-General A. R. Chaffee, Commanding.
Seventh Infantry Lieutenant-Colonel G. S. Carpenter, Commanding.
Twelfth Infantry Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Comba, Commanding.
Seventeenth Infantry Major L. W. O'Brien, Commanding.
PROVISIONAL DIVISION.
Major-General BATES, Commanding.
First Brigade.
Colonel John H. Page, Third Infantry, Commanding.
Third Infantry Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Harbach, Commandim*;.
Twentieth Infantry Major Wm. S. McCaskey, Commanding.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 433
Second Brigade.
Colonel Henry L. Turner, Commanding.
First Illinois Volunteer Infantry. . Lieutenant-Colonel Lauman, Commanding.
First District Col. Volunteer Infantry Colonel Harries, Commanding.
(Attached) Ninth Mass. Volunteer Inf Lieut. -Col. Logan, Commanding.
Battalion of Engineers. .. Capt. Ed. Burr, Commanding (Companies C and E^
Signal Corps, Company No. 15 Captain Smead, U. S. V., Commanding.
Mounted Squadron (Troops A, C, D and F), Second Cavalry,
Major Wm. Rafferty, Commanding.
Light Artillery Brigade (General Randolph) Commanding Light Batteries:
"E" (Capron's); "K" (Best's) First Artillery; "A" (Grimes) and "F"
(Vose), Second Artillery; "F" (Taylor), Fourth Artillery, and "F"
(Reilly), Fifth Artillery.
BATTALION SIEGE ARTILLERY.
Fourth Artillery, Battalion " G " and " H," Capt. Wm. Enniss, Commanding.
Catling Gun Detachment. .. Second Lieut. John H. Parker, i3th Inf., ComdV,
Thirty-third Michigan Volunteer Infantry.... Colonel Boynton, Commanding.
Thirty-fourth Michigan Volunteer Infantry. . Colonel Peterson, Commanding.
Eighth Ohio Volunteer Infantry Colonel Hard, Commanding.
The plan of campaign must always, in a measure, be controlled by
the disposition of the opposing forces. Lieutenant-General Linares,
who commanded at Santiago, had in his immediate command and
within two days' march of our point of disembarkation, at least 24,000
regular Spanish soldiers. It was certainly to be presumed that he
would concentrate these forces against us, and our plans in the first
instance were of necessity based upon the probability of such action
upon his part. After landing and finding that the Spaniards were not
concentrating their forces, it was plain that our best plan was to move
with all rapidity upon the defenses of Santiago. It was hoped that
such a movement would enable the Americans to fight the forces at
Santiago before the arrival of reinforcements, and we also reduced to
a minimum the chance of the army being depleted by sickness before
the final conflict with the enemy.
Immediately after the fight of July ist and 2d, I made a careful
and exhaustive investigation of the defenses of the city and was con
vinced that to take the city by assault would cost us at least 3,000
men. This was 'fully confirmed by a closer inspection of the works
434 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
after the city was captured. The plan of extending our lines around
the city was adopted, and this was done by continually spreading them
to the right and lengthening the line by placing new troops in position
as the reinforcements reached us.
The following communications describe the positions of the troops
as they reached San Juan and were placed in line surrounding the
city:
HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
July 2, 1898.
General SHAFTER:
General Lawton's division is now taking position on the right of our cavalry.
I had to let the artillery withdraw to take a better position. They were ex
posed to so hot infantry fire that they were unable to fire where they were.
Major Dillenback is sure of being able to effectively bomboard Santiago from
the position he had withdrawn to.
Very respectfully,
JOS. WHEELER,
Major-General Vohintcers.
HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
July 2, 1898.
General SHAFTER:
General Chaffee's Brigade of General Lawton's division is now in line on
the right of cavalry. General Lawton's other two are on the road coming up.
The Cubans, under Colonel Gonzales, have come up and General Lawton is
holding them to decide where to put them in. The batteries have been de
layed by bad ford and have caused General Lawton's two brigades some delay,
but the}r are pushing on and hope they will be here soon.
General Ludlow's brigade is now arriving and General Lawton is putting it
in position. The men are firing as little as they can and we are trying to let
them rest as much as possible, in order that they may be in condition to work
on the intrenchments to-night.
Very respectfully,
JOS. WHEELER,
Major-General Volunteers.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 435
HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
SAN JUAN, July 2, 1898— n A. M.
Major-General SHAFTER, Fifth Corps:
The situation is the same as it has been all day.
I have reinforced Kent'? left with one of Duffield's regiments.
The Duftield regiment to remain only until I can give Kent back the Thir
teenth Infantry.
I regret that we are having some killed and wounded.
The Cubans are still at this point.
Very respectfully,
JOS. WHEELER,
Major-General Volunteers.
HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION.
Jvly 2, 1898 — 12:15 P. M.
General W. R. SHAFTER, Commanding, Etc.:
SIR. — General Bates is now on our extreme left with his left flank refused
or thrown back so as to face southwest and also to face batteries that we
feared would enfilade us. Kent's division is on Bates's right; the cavalry
division is on the right of Kent; Lawton is formed on the right of cavalry
division. One regiment of Duffield sent over to strengthen Kent's left, to
remain until I could lend him the Thirteenth Infantry, which in the hurry of
movement got mixed in with cavalry yesterday. I asked General Lawton to
put one platoon in the San Juan building to northeast of us for purpose of
observation.
The men have made some breastworks and they are endeavoring to keep as
quiet to-day as possible so as to secure rest and peace, which they need very
much.
We are losing a few killed and wounded, but are righting as little as possible.
I suppose Lawton will throw his right forward so as to somewhat encircle the
city, but I presume he will await instructions from you on that point and that
he has already received such instructions. One regiment of General Duffield
is in reserve near my headquarters.
The Cubans have moved over to our right. We have distributed ammuni
tion and rations so far as I learn there is any need for them.
Very respectfully,
JOS. WHEELER,
Major-General, Commanding Cavalry Division.
436 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
The following is a letter from General Shafter:
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
July 2, 1898.
My Dear General WHEELER:
What do you think of the idea of sending a division in rear of the left
division to clear out the forts along the entrance to the bay so as to let the
navy in and have the business over. Can it be done~J
Very respectfully,
WM. R. SHAFTER.
To which I sent the following reply:
HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
July 2, 1898*.
Major-General SHAFTER, Commanding U. S. Forces:
DEAR GENERAL. — I regret to say that I do not think infantry can take the
forts along the entrance of the bay. I would like to do it, but the effort would
be attended with terrible loss. We can procure artillery ammunition without
limit. It seems to me it would be a good plan to place our siege guns and
other artillery in position and hammer at Santiago and at all the batteries that
interfere with us. Our artillerymen should be studying positions to do this
work and I can have no doubt as to the final result. If we hammer at the
enemy's batteries they will fire back upon ours, and we all know that there
are so few men connected with batteries and they learn to take such care of
themselves that losses are comparatively small. Again, if there is a heavy lire
at the batteries which can enfilade our line they \vill be apt to neglect our line
and devote themselves to our batteries.
Very respectfully,
JOS. WHEELER,
Major-General Commanding.
P. S. — What I mean by infantry not being able to take forts along entrance
of bay is that it would take a large force and an enormous loss would
sustained.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 437
Early on June 3d, General Shafter sent in a demand for the imme
diate surrender of Santiago. It was in the following words :
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES,
Near SAN JUAN RIVER, Cuba, July 3, 1898 — 8:30 A. M.
To the COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE SPANISH FORCES, Santiago de Cuba:
SIR. — I shall be obliged, unless you surrender, to shell Santiago de Cuba.
Please inform the citizens of foreign countries and all women and children
that they should leave the city before ic o'clock to-morrow morning.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. R. SHAFTER,
Major-General, U. S. A.
The following is the Spanish reply:
SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 3, 1898 — 3 p. M.
His EXCELLENCY, the General Commanding Forces of United States, near San
Juan River:
SIR. — I have the honor to reply to your communication of to-day, written
at 8:30 A. M. and received at i P. M., demanding the surrender of this city; on
the contrary case announcing to me that you will bombard this city and that
I advise the foreign women and children that they must leave the city before
10 o'clock to-morrow morning. It is my duty to say to you that this city will
not surrender and that I will inform the foreign consuls and inhabitants of the
contents of your message.
Very respectfully,
JOSE TORAL,
Commander -in-Chief, Fourth Corps.
Colonel Dorst, who was the bearer of these letters, brought with
him from the city a number of foreign consuls begging protection for
noncombatants, as shown by the following:
HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION.
July 3, 1898
General SHAFTER:
Colonel Dorst has just returned bringing the British, Portuguese, Chinese,
Norwegian pro-consuls, representing the Consular Corps. They wish to know
CUBAS STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
if the old men and all noncombatants may come out and occupy Caney and
places on the railway line. They also want a postponement till 10 A. M., the
5th instant. Please answer at once, as these gentlemen desire to return before
dark.
Very respectfully,
JOS. WHEELER,
Major-General Volunteers.
P. S. — They received notice only at 3 o'clock.
There are 15,000 to 20,000 women and children in the city.
Consuls who called under flag of truce, July 3, 1898:
Frederick W. Ramsden, H. B. M. Consul, Santiago de Cuba.
Isidoro P. Augustini, Swedish and Norwegian Vice-Consul.
Modesto Ras, Portuguese Consul.
Robert Mason, British Pro-Consul and Chinese Consul.
Frederick Wm. Ramsden (fils).
To which General Shafter made the following reply:
My 3, 1898.
THE COMMANDING GENERAL SPANISH FORCES, Santiago dc Cuba:
In consideration of the request of the consular officers in your city awarded
the delay in carrying out my intention to fire on the city and in the interest
of the poor women and children who will suffer very greatly by their hasty and
in forced [enforced] departure from the city, I have the honor to announce
that I will delay such action solely in their interest until noon on the 5th, pro
viding during the interval your forces make no demonstration whatever upon
those of my own.
I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,
W. R. SHAFTER,
Major-General, United States Volunteers.
Late in the evening he received a communication from General
Toral, as follows:
ARMY OF THE ISLAND OF CUBA, FOURTH ARMY CORPS,
SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 3, 1898, at 9 o'clock.
To His EXCELLENCY, the General of the Cavalry Division of the Forces of the
United States:
YOUR EXCELLENCY. — I am receiving at 9 at night, through the English
consul, your esteemed communication dated this afternoon at 6:45, and refer-
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 439
ring to the withdrawal, from danger of the bombardment, of foreign subjects
and women and children in the city. I do not hesitate to order my troops to
remain quiet during that time, if they be not attacked by the Americans; this
in aid of the proposals of your excellency, and believing that the commissioners
of the foreign governments will go to-morrow, the 4th, and have a conference
with your excellency, in accordance with a communication presented by the
dean of the consuls.
I remain, your excellency, your most obedient servant,
J. TORAL,
Commander-in-Chief, in the Interim, Fourth Army Corps,
and Military Governor of Santiago de Cuba.
This occasioned a cessation of hostilities to give the noncombatants
a chance to escape from the beleaguered city. During the following
days a mournful procession streamed through the lines toward the
neighboring villages; old men and helpless women and children, many
of them in a starving condition. Our soldiers in many places shared
their scanty rations with these poor people, whose condition excited
our deepest sympathy.
On the 3d of June, we received the glorious news of the defeat and
destruction of Cervera's fleet, as told in the following dispatches :
HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
July 3, 1898.
To Colonel MCCLERNAND, in Field:
The Spanish fleet ran out of Santiago harbor about 9 A. M. to-day. Terrific
naval battle outside. Three Spanish gunboats and one torpedo boat destroyed.
Run on beach and burned up. One Spanish gunboat still at large going west
ward and greater portion of fleet in pursuit.
I saw the three gunboats and one torpedo boat. Signal fires on hill west
of Morro Castle last night. The torpedo boat on beach about three miles,
two gunboats about six miles, and third gunboat about twenty miles west of
Morro Castle.
FRED. A. SMITH,
A. A. A. G.
44° CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
EL Pozo, July 3, 1898 — • i P. M.
Colonel MCCLERNAND. — Lieutenant Allen, Second Cavalry, from our ex
treme right, where he overlooked the bay, states that Admiral Cervera's fleet
steamed out this morning and engaged our fleet. French consul, who came
into our lines yesterday, informed General Garcia, Admiral Cervera said yester
day, it was better to die fighting than to sink his ships. Rush this notification
all around our lines to the front.
SHAFTER,
Commanding.
The 4th of July was quietly observed in camp; no salutes could be
fired on account of the truce, but the bands played at noon and the
following general orders were published :
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES,
SAN JUAN RIVER, July 4, 1898.
GENERAL ORDERS, •)
No. 21. \
I. The general commanding congratulates the army on the results of its
first general engagement with the enemy. The strongly-fortified outpost and
village of Caney was captured after a most stubborn resistance, nearly its
entire garrison being killed, wounded, or captured, by the Second Division,
Fifth Corps, Brigadier-General Lawton commanding. The heroic valor dis
played by those troops adds another brilliant page to the history of American
warfare. To Major-General Wheeler of the cavalry division was probably
given the most difficult task, that of crossing a stream under fire, and deploying
under the enemy's rifle-pits. These he almost immediately charged, and carried
in the most gallant manner, driving the enemy from his strong positions to
the shelter of the stronger works in rear. This was only accomplished by the
most persevering and arduous efforts, officers and men exposing themselves
to the deadly fire of the Spanish troops. In these efforts he was ably seconded
by Brigadier-General Kent with the First Division on the extreme left, who
also captured the works on his front.
Numerous distinguished acts have been reported, and in due time will be
made known to the proper authorities.
By command of Major-General Shatter,
E. J. McCLERNAND,
Assistant Adjulant-GeneraL
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SPANISH FORT AND SIGNAL TOWER.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 443
And the following telegram was read to the troops:
WASHINGTON, D. C, July 3, 1898.
General SHAFTER, Siboney:
Accept my hearty congratulations on the record made of magnificent forti
tude, gallantry and sacrifice displayed in the desperate fighting of the troops
before Santiago.
I realize the hardships, difficulties and suffering, and am proud that amidst
it all the troops illustrated such fearless and patriotic devotion to the welfare
of our common country and flag. Whatever the result to follow, their unsur
passed deeds of valor is already a gratifying chapter of history. Expect to be
with you within one week with strong reinforcements.
MILES,
Major-General Commanding.
General Shatter had replied to General Miles's telegram in the fol
lowing words:
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
Near SANTIAGO, July 3, 1898.
Major-General NELSON A. MILES, Commanding the Army of the United States,
Washington:
I thank you in the name of the gallant men I have the honor to command
for splendid tribute of praise which you have accorded them. Your telegram
will be published at the head of the regiments, and this morning I feel that I
am master of the situation and can hold the enemy for any length of time.
I am delighted to know that you are coming, that you may see for yourself
the obstacles which this army had to overcome. My only regret is the great
number of gallant souls who have given their lives for our country's cause.
SHAFTER.
General Garcia with 400 Cubans was sent around the city to guard
the Cobre road, but his forces were attacked and driven back by
General Pando, who with 5,000 men entered the city to reinforce the
garrison there.
The following letter was received informing me of Pando's arrival,
and at the same time imparting the welcome news of the approach of
reinforcements for ourselves:
444 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
July 4, 1898 — 10:20 A. M.
To General WHEELER:
Just received letter from General Garcia that 5,000 men entered the city last
night over the Cobre road. I understood from Lavvton that this road was
securely covered by Garcia's men, nearly 4,000 in number, since the day before
yesterday. Garcia must have withdrawn and given them free entrance. If this
was the case there will probably be an attack made at any minute. Our lines
must be made as strong as possible. I am expecting 6,000 men every hour
and 3,000 from Camp Alger hourly. Telegram from General Miles last night
says that he will be here with strong reinforcements within a week. Have just
wired above information. Acknowledge receipt.
SHAFTER.
The following dispatch, passed along the whole line, greatly en
couraged the troops:
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
July 5, 1898.
General WHEELER:
Please communicate the following dispatches, just received, along the whole
line:
" WASHINGTON, D. C, July 5, 1898.
' General SHAFTER, Siboney:
" Reinforcements are being hurried to you. Randolph leaves Key West to
night with fast convoy; he has about 3,500 men, including the six light batteries
from Tampa. The ' St. Paul ' will leave New York Wednesday evening with
the Eighth Ohio Volunteers. The ' Yale ' and ' Harvard ' will take all the
troops they can carry, sailing from Charleston; the day and hour of their de
parture will be communicated to you as soon as known, probably the 6th.
" By command of Major-General Miles,
" H. C. CORBIN,
" Adjutant-General."
On July 4th, 5th and 6th, the following telegrams were exchanged,
showing clearly the condition of affairs at Santiago:
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, July 4, 1898.
Major-General SHAFTER, Playa del Este, Cuba.
After conference with the President and the Secretary of War, I am directed
to say your continued illness brings sorrow and anxiety. In case you are
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 445
disabled General Wheeler would, of course, succeed to command. His illness,
which we also regret, is feared to be so serious as to prevent his assuming
command. You must determine whether your condition is such as to require
you to relinquish command. If so, and General Wheeler is disabled, you will
order the next general officer in rank for duty to succeed you and to take up
the work in hand. It is not expected that our forces will make assault until
they are ready.
H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.
PLAYA DEL ESTE, via HAITI, July 6, 1898 — 5 140 A. M.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Washington:
Camp near Santiago, 5. I am not at present so much ill as exhausted from
the intense strain that has been on me for the last two months. I am also
suffering from an attack of gout, which prevents me from moving about. I
have, however, the whole business in my hand and am mansging it through
able staff officers. When I do have to give up I will, of course, follow your
order, but I hope to be better soon.
SHAFTER,
Major-General, Commanding.
• ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, July 4, 1898 — 3:50 P. M.
Major-General SHAFTER, Playa del Este, Cuba:
Being on the ground and knowing all the conditions, the Secretary of War
directs you will use your own judgment as to how and when you will take
the city of Santiago, but, for manifest reasons, it should be accomplished as
speedily as possible.
By command of Major-General Miles,
H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.
PLAYA DEL ESTE, via HAITI, July 4, 1898 — 10:10 P. M.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A., Washington:
Camp near Santiago, Cuba, 4. When am I to expect troops from Tampa?
Report just received; Pando entered city last night by Cobre road with 5,000
from Holguin, Garcia was especially charged with blockading that road.
SHAFTER,
Commanding.
446 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, July 4, 1898.
General SHAFTER, Playa del Estc, Cuba:
Reinforcements are being hurried to you. Randolph leave? Key West to
night with fast convoy. He has about 3,500 men, including the six light batter
ies from Tampa. The " St. Paul " will leave New York Wednesday evening
with the Eighth Ohio Volunteers. The "Yale" and " Harvard" will lake all
the troops they can carry, sailing from Charleston. The day and hour of their
departure will be communicated to you as soon as known, probably the 6th.
By command of Major^General Miles,
H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.
PLAYA DEL ESTE, via HAITI, July 4, 1898 — 11:50 i'- M.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A., Washington:
Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, in camp near Santiago de Cuba, 4. There
appears to be no reasonable doubt that General Pando succeeded in entering
Santiago last night with his force, said to be about 5.000 men. This puts a
different aspect upon affairs, and while we can probably maintain ourselves, it
would be at the cost of very considerable fighting and loss. General Lawton
reports that General Garcia, who was to block entrance of Pando, informed
him at 10 o'clock last night that Pando had passed in on Cobre road. Lawton
says cannot compel General Garcia to obey my instructions, and that if they in
tend to place themselves in any position where they will have to fight, and that
if they intend to reduce Santiago, we will have to depend alone upon our own
troops, and that we will require twice the number we now have. I sent mes
sage to Admiral Sampson, asking if he proposed entering the harbor so as
to give us his assistance. Commodore Watson replies that he does not know
Admiral Sampson's intentions since the destruction of the Spanish squadron,
but does not himself think fleet should try to go into harbor of Santiago.
This, under the circumstances, is not very encouraging. Have been expecting
a division from Tampa and Duffield's Second Brigade from Camp Alger, but
only a small number of recruits have appeared so far. We have got to try
and reduce the town, now that the fleet is destroyed, which was stated to be
the chief object of the expedition; there must be no delay in getting large
bodies of troops here. The town is in a terrible condition as to food, and
people are starving, as stated by foreign consuls this morning, but the troops
can fight and have large quantities of rice, but no other supplies. There will
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 447
be nothing done here until noon of the 5th, and I suppose I can put them off
a little longer to enable people to get out. Country here is destitute of food or
growing crops, except mangoes. Men are in good spirits and so far in good
health, though it is hard to tell how long the latter will continue. I am sorry
to say I am no better, and, in addition to my weakness, cannot be out on
account of slight attack of gout, but hope to be better soon. Lieutenant Miley
had interview with consuls this morning, and his report will be telegraphed
immediately. I do not send this in cipher, as time is precious.
SHAFTER,
Major-General.
PLAYA DEL ESTE, via HAITI, Juiy 5, 1898— 12:53 A. M.
ADJUTANT- GENERAL, Washington :
In the field near San Juan river, 4. I regard it as necessary that the navy
force an entrance into the harbor of Santiago not later than the 6th instant
and assist in the capture of that place. If they do, I believe the place will
surrender without further sacrifice of life.
SHAFTER,
Ma jor -General.
Please acknowledge receipt to me.
ALLEN.
PLAYA DEL ESTE, via HAITI, July 5, 1898 — 1:10 A. M.
ADJUTANT- GENERAL, Washington :
Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, camp near San Juan river, 5. If Sampson
will force an entrance with all his fleet to the upper bay of Santiago, we can
take the city within a few hours. Under these conditions I believe the town
will surrender. If the army is to take the place, I want 15,000 troops speedily,
and it is not certain that they can be landed, as it is getting stormy. Sure and
speedy way is through the bay. Am now in position to do my part.
SHAFTER,
Major-General.
Please acknowledge receipt to me.
ALLEN.
448 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, July 5, 1898 — 11:20 A. M.
Major-General SHAFTER, Playa del Este, Cuba:
Secretary of War instructs me to say that the President directs that you
confer with Admiral Sampson at once for co-operation in taking Santiago.
After the fullest exchange of views you will agree upon the time and manner of
attack.
By command of Major-General Miles,
H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.
PLAYA, July 5, 1898 — 1 137 p. M.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Washington :
Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, near Santiago de Cuba. Navy should g*o
into Santiago harbor at any cost. If they do, I believe they will take the city
and all the troops that are there. If they do not, the country should be pre
pared for heavy losses among our troops. After talking with the French consul
myself, and Lieutenant Miley with several others, I do not believe I will
bombard the town until I get more troops, but will keep up fire on trenches.
If it was simply a going out of the women, and to outside places where they
could be cared for, it would not matter much, but now it means their going
out to starve to death or be furnished with food by us, and the latter is not
possible now. I should very much like the Secretary's views.
SHAFTER,
Major-General.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, July 5, 1898 — 3:10 P. M.
Major-General SHAFTER, Playa del Este, Cuba:
Your telegram this date has been submitted to the President. After con
sideration, the Secretary of War directs me to say that it is evident from your
several reports that you do not consider your force strong enough to make a
successful assault upon the Spanish army intrenched in Santiago. This being
the case, it is the part of wisdom to await reinforcements, the embarkation of
which you have already been advised. As you have already been advised, you
must be judge of the time and manner of assault. The President has directed
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 449
that you and Admiral Sampson have a conference and determine a course of
co-operation best calculated to secure desirable results, with least sacrifice.
By command of Major-General Miles,
H. C. CORB1N,
Adjutant-General.
PLAY A DEL ESTE, July 5, 1898 — 3:45 P. M.
General RUSSELL A. ALGER, Secretary of War, Washington:
Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, near San Juan river, Cuba, 4th, 6 P. M. In
accordance with your order I send a dispatch showing the situation at this time:
No firing on lines since n A. M. yesterday, and there will be none to-morrow;
certainly not before 12 o'clock, noon. I have quite a number of seriously
wounded Spanish officers and I have proposed to send them in, which the
Spanish general has apparently gladly accepted. Only the severely wounded
will be sent This will probably occupy to-morrow. I am told troop ships
are in sight; if so, I will get the men up to-morrow. Lieutenant Miley, of
my staff, had an interview this morning with several of the consular officers.
His report is telegraphed, so you may know all the circumstances, and is as
follows;
Memorandum of an interview between Mr. Robert Mason, British pro-consul;
M. Isidore Augustine, Swedish and Norwegian consul; Mr. Modesmo
Ross, Portuguese consul; Mr. Angel Navarro, secretary to Cuban gov
ernor of the Province of Santiago; and first lieutenant of the Second
Artillery, near Santiago de Cuba, July 4, 1898, at 9:45 A. M.
Lieutenant Miley met General Wheeler and Colonel Dorst on the American
lines and proceeded with them, bearing a flag of truce, to a point from 500 to
600 yards in front of the lines, where they met the four first above-named
gentlemen. It was explained to the consuls that Caney had been badly shelled
in the last few days and that many wounded were still in the houses at that
place, and also some of the dead unburied, but that any person leaving Santiago
could go there if he wished to a limited few — 3,ooo or 4,000. General Shatter
could furnish the rougher components of the ration, namely, bread, sugar,
coffee, and bacon. Left impossible at present to render assistance to a greater
number. He did not expect there would be such a great number to leave the
city. He also stated that General Shafter had submitted the question of bom
bardment to his home Government and expected a reply to-day. The alterna
tive being a very close investment and starving the garrison out, which could
45° CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
be easily done, as the Americans had a force several times stronger than the
enemy. In the latter case the people who could get something to eat would
probably stay in the city and come out gradually, as their provisions failed.
By this time the general would undoubtedly be in a position to assist them,
but not now, if all were forced out at once. The general, therefore, advised a
short wait until he received orders from his home Government, relying on the
fact that he will not throw shells into the city.
The British proconsul, speaking for the others, then explained the dreadful
condition now existing among the inhabitants of Santiago. The condition has
been gradually growing worse for the last three years. For the past two years
no crops of any consequence have been raised. It would entail a dreadful
hardship upon everyone if forced to leave the city, and day before yesterday the
scenes in the streets and around the consulates were very distressing. It was
then expected that the American fleet would attempt to enter the harbor and
bombard the city. Mr. Mason and the other consuls insisted upon the im
portance of the use of the broad term noncombatants when designating the
persons who could leave Santiago. They said that many inhabitants of Spanish
birth and sympathies now engaged in civil pursuits would be glad to leave the
city if given an opportunity by General Shafter and General Toral. He says
there are about 15,000 or 20,000 women and children and foreigners and about
30,000 noncombatants. The secretary to the civil governor was also very
anxious that the term noncombatants be used. The British consul submitted
for the consideration of General Shafter the following propositions: First,
whether the old and infirm and the sick could not be taken on board the
Spanish merchant vessels now in and moored at a point not under fire; second,
whether trains filled with noncombatants could be run from Santiago through
American lines and the empty trains returned; third, whether some guaranty of
disposition of American troops could not be given for the safety of noncombat
ants who might leave the city for territory now occupied by the Cuban forces.
The first and second propositions were accepted, the third General Shafter could
not agree to, as he could not afford to expose his troops in isolated places,
where they will be forsaken by the Cuban forces when attacked.
E. J. McCLERNAND.
A. A. G.
PLAYA, via HAITI, July 5, 1898 — 6:50 P. M.
Secretary ALGER, Washington:
In camp near Santiago, 5. Large number of women and children coming out
of Santiago this morning. With assistance of Miss Barton will try and feed
them. Do not believe there will be any firing to-day on account of all the
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 45 l
people not being able to get out. Have also the enemy receiving some of his
wounded which I am sending him. Heavy firing about midnight, which con
tinued an hour, at entrance to bay. Don't know cause. Hope it was Sampson
clearing the entrance of torpedoes. Appearance of fleet in harbor will settle
Santiago. The land side is securely held.
SHAFTER,
Commanding.
It is evident from these communications that there was an intense
desire upon the part of the army officers to end the siege as speedily
as possible, to lessen the hardships of our own men and to prevent the
ravages of sickness. The truce, commencing on the 3d, was frequently
renewed on account of the deplorable condition of the noncombatants
in the city and the delay in the arrival of our own reinforcements.
The news of the destruction of Admiral Cervera's fleet had a very
depressing effect upon the Spaniards and created a corresponding
enthusiasm among our troops, who were also encouraged by the
arrival of reinforcements. As we have seen, the surrender of
the city was demanded, and time was given to allow the non-
combatants to leave Santiago; and for several days the constant
interchange of letters between the commanding generals, under the
flag of truce, caused the cessation of hostilities. On the 5th about
22,000 refugees from Santiago passed through our lines to El Caney,
Siboney and other localities. These days of inaction in the trenches
were, probably, more trying to the men than the time of active
hostilities. They suffered from the burning sun of the morning, the
drenching afternoon rains, the heavy dews of the night, and most of
all from the suspense of uncertainty.
The abject fear exhibited by our prisoners when they were first
brought in was pitiful to witness, as was their relief and gratitude
when they found that they were to be treated with kindness and
humanity. Those of the wounded officers who were able to bear the
fatigue of transportation were sent back to Santiago, and the effect of
this upon the sentiments of the besieged enemy was very beneficial
to our cause. This was made apparent when on the 5th General
Toral agreed to exchange Hobson and his men, who had been cap
tured after the sinking of the " Merrimac " and had been for a month
detained as prisoners in Santiago, for an equal number of Spanish
prisoners. The exchange took place on the 6th, in full view of the
army and amid the greatest delight and enthusiasm on part of the
American troops.
452 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
July 5, 1898, 6:25 P. M.
General SHAFTER:
General Toral sends word by a flag that the wounded have arrived safely
and he expresses his thanks for the kindness shown them.
JOS. WHEELER.
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
July 5, 1898.
General WHEELER:
General Toral has just acceded to my proposition to exchange Hobson
and his men, and it will be done to-morrow A. M.
SHAFTER.
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
Camp near SANTIAGO, July 5, 1898.
ADJUTANT- GENERAL, Washington :
I am just in receipt of a letter from General Toral, agreeing to exchange
Hobson and men here. To make exchange in the morning. Yesterday he
refused my proposition of exchange.
SHAFTER,
Major-General.
The good effects of our kind treatment of the Spanish prisoners
has already been alluded to, and is more fully described in the follow
ing letter from General Shafter:
PLAY A DEL ESTE, via HAITI, July 6, 1898 — 7:58 P. M.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A., Washington:
Siboney, 5, 7:29 A. M. I yesterday offered to return to the commanding officer
of the Spanish forces a number of wounded officers and men left lying on the
battlefield at Caney, the officers to give their paroles and the senior officer for
the men. Did this, first, to get rid of the care of them ; and, second, to show the
Spanish troops they were not to be killed by us, as they had been told by their
officers would be the case. This morning I sent Lieutenant Brooke and Dr.
Goodfellow with some ambulances to Caney for the wounded, and from there
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 453
conducted them as far as they were to go. Four officers and twenty-four men
were loaded and driven into the inner line of defenses, near the city. Large
numbers of officers and soldiers gathered about the ambulances and assisted in
removing the men. Two companies of troops were drawn up on either side of
the road and arms were presented to the officers and their mounted escort. All
of the officers gave their individual parole and desired to return. The men did
not wish to go back, but were required to do so. I have just received a letter
through a flag of truce from the general of the lines thanking me courteously
for giving them their wounded. I am satisfied that it will tend more to create
dissatisfaction in the ranks of the enemy than anything I could have done, as the
soldiers said we were fighting the church and were going to kill them. There
has not been a shot fired on the line to-day. I am simply making my lines
stronger and hanging on. I shall expect many deserters, as a number of officers
came out with the refugees last night, one of them a colonel, and two captains,
who fought us on the 1st.
SHAFTER,
Major-General.
I sent the following communications to General Toral:
HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
SAN JUAN, Cuba, July 6, 1898.
To His EXCELLENCY, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL TORAL, Commanding Spanish Forces,
Santiago, Cuba:
GENERAL. — I am directed by the Commanding General, U. S. Forces, to
inform you that Second Lieutenant C. F. Emilio Valez, Twenty-ninth Regi
ment, and seven men have arrived at my headquarters for exchange for Lieuten
ant Hobson and men. Through an error Second Lieutenant Constanzio Ger
main, Twenty-ninth Regiment, and First Lieutenant Adolfo Arioz, Provisional
Battalion, of Porto Rico, were not sent. The Commanding General, however,
states that within the next four hours these officers will be here, so that you can
make your selection of officers for exchange. Lieutenant Hobson should be
sent on the San Juan road. Your officers will be sent on this road.
With great respect,
JOSEPH WHEELER,
Major-General, Commanding Advance Line.
454 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
Near SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 6, 1898.
To His EXCELLENCY, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL TORAL, Commanding Spanish Forces
at Santiago de Cuba:
SIR. — There has been delay in getting the Spanish prisoners up to this point.
They are now en route and we will follow them on immediately to effect their
exchange for Lieutenant Hobson and his seven sailors.
With respect,
JOSEPH WHEELER,
Major-General, Commanding Advance Line.
The prisoners, escorted by Major Irles and a guard of Spanish
soldiers, were met by Lieutenants Miley and Noble, aides to General
Shatter, on neutral ground, under a magnificent ceiba tree, afterward
to become famous as the " Surrender Tree," under whose wide-
spreading branches the commission which arranged for the surrender
of the city held its meetings. The exchange of prisoners took place
about 4 o'clock, and it was expected the truce would end in about an
hour, as shown by the following dispatches:
[Circular.]
HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
July 6, 1898.
The exchange of prisoners will be over in an hour, and we may expect an
attack at any moment.
Have your men prepared for it.
By command of Major-General Wheeler,
J. H. DORST,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
[Circular.]
HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
Before SANTIAGO, Cuba, July 6, 1898.
The Major-General Commanding directs me to inform you that the truce will
cease at 5 o'clock, p. M., this date.
By command of Major-Geneial Wheeler,
J. H. DORST,
Lieutenant-Colonel U. S. Vols., Assistant Adjutant-General.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 455
PLAYA DEL ESTE, via HAITI, July 7, 1898 — 7 A. M.
SECRETARY OF WAR, Washington:
Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, Cuba, 6. Lieutenant Hobson and all his
men have just been received safely in exchange for Spanish officer and prisoners
taken by us. All are in good health except two seamen convalescent from
remittent fever.
SHAFTER,
Major-General Commanding.
About this time General Shatter received a dispatch irom the Secre
tary of War in regard to reports of alleged cruelty of Cubans. The
telegram and General Shatter's answer are as follows:
EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, D. C, July 6, 1898 — n P. M.
Major-General SHAFTER, Playa del Este, Cuba:
The New York Journal reports that fifty Spanish prisoners were turned over
to the Cubans and by them killed. Is there any truth in the report? We can
not believe it. Did you receive my dispatch of Saturday conveying the Presi
dent's congratulations to you and your army?
R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.
PLAYA DEL ESTE, July 7, 1898 — 10:30 A. M.
Hen. SECRETARY OF WAR, Washington:
Dispatch as to killing prisoners by Cubans absolutely false. None have been
turned over to them, and they show no disposition to injure anyone coming
into their hands.
SHAFTER,
Major-General.
General Shatter continued his efforts to have the navy force an
entrance into the bay, and finally came to an agreement that a joint
attack should be made upon the city by the army and navy.
July 7, 1898 — 4:50?. M.
ADJUTANT- GENEKAL, U. S. A., Washington:
Had consultation with Sampson. Navy disinclined to force entrance except
as a last resource. They will bombard the city, which is within easy range of
456 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
their big guns, beginning at noon of the gth, and if that is not effective, after
twenty-four hours, will then force entrance with some of the smallest ships. I
still have hopes they will surrender. Made a second demand on them yesterday,
calling attention to the changed conditions because of the loss of the Spanish
fleet, and offering to give them time to consult their home Government, which
General Toral has accepted, asking that the British consul return to the city
with employes of the cable company to permit him to do so. Meanwhile, I
hope my reinforcements will arrive. Not one in sight yet except the 200 re
cruits for the Second Infantry, who came a week ago. As a last resource I will
try running in transports. I do net consider my force sufficient to warrant an
assault on the city, though I believe it would be successful, but at a fearful loss.
Of course, it would be criminal to hope for the end to be gained, which is
merely the capture of a few thousand men and when we see we are getting them
by siege. Nothing has yet been seen of tugs, lighters and launches promised
ten days ago.
SHAFTER,
Major-General Commanding.
On the Qth of July, General Toral proposed in reply to another
demand for surrender, to withdraw his forces to the city of Holguin,
provided he should not be molested before he reached that place.
General Shafter had telegraphed to Washington as follows, on the
8th and the morning of the Qth:
PLAYA DEL ESTE, via HAYTI, July 8, 1898 — 8:35 A. M.
lion. R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War, Washington:
Camp near Santiago, 7. Perfect quiet to-day. At request of Spanish gen
eral employees of English cable company were sent in to him to telegraph
his Government as to surrendering. Men in good spirits and are making
themselves more secure every hour. Five days' subsistence on hand. Wounds
are much less dangerous than similar ones made by caliber .45. Among the
large number of wounded, very few amputations; perhaps ten will cover it.
Am looking anxiously for reinforcements; they seem to be delayed. Garret-
son's brigade expected ten days ago. Do not expect much results from long-
range firing, but do from course promised for second day. General health of
the command is good. One hundred and fifty cases of fever, which runs its
course in four or five days and is not serious. I am feeling much better.
SHAFTER,
Major-General.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 457
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, July 9, 1898 — 11:15 P. M.
Major- General SHAFTER, Playa del Este, Cuba:
In reply to your telegram recommending terms of evacuation as proposed
by the Spanish commander, after careful consideration by the President and
Secretary of War, I am directed to say that you have repeatedly been advised
that you would not be expected to make an assault upon the enemy at San
tiago until you were prepared to do the work thoroughly. When you are
ready, this will be done. Your telegram of this morning said your position
was impregnable and that you believed the enemy would yet surrender uncon
ditionally. You have also assured us that you could force their surrender by
cutting off the supplies. Under these circumstances your message, recommend
ing that Spanish troops be permitted to evacuate and proceed without molesta
tion to Holguin, is a great surprise and is not approved. The responsibility of
destruction and distress to the inhabitants rests entirely with the Spanish com
mander. The Secretary of War orders that when you are strong enough to
destroy the enemy and take Santiago that you do it. If you have not force
enough, it will be dispatched to you at the earliest moment practicable. Re
inforcements are on the way, of which you have already been advised. In the
meantime nothing is lost by holding the position you now have and which
you regard as impregnable. Acknowledge receipt.
By order of the Secretary of War,
H. C. CORBIN,
A d jut ant- General.
The following communications show the offer of the commander
of the Spanish forces, and the firm stand taken by the Administration
against allowing the escape of the Spanish garrison from Santiago:
PLAYA, July 9, 1898 — i p. M.
R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War, Washington:
Camp near Santiago, Cuba, July 8. I am just in receipt of a letter from the
commandant of Santiago de Cuba, who proposes to march out of the city with
arms and baggage and not to be molested until he reaches Holguin, surrender
ing to the American forces the territory now occupied by him. I have replied
that while I have submitted the matter to my home Government I did not think
his terms would be accepted. He makes this proposition to avoid danger to
the city and useless shedding of blood. This will give me another day to get up
CUBAS STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
troops from Siboney, the first transports of reinforcements having just arrived.
. In my opinion they will have to surrender unconditionally very soon after I
open fire upon them.
W. R. SHAFTER,
Major -General, United States Volunteers.
ARMY OF THE ISLAND OF CUBA, FOURTH ARMY CORPS,
SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 9, 1898.
YOUR EXCELLENCY. — In acknowledging to your Excellency the receipt of
your communication of this day, stating that you had notified Washington of
my proposition of evacuation of the territory of Division of Santiago de Cuba,
I have the honor to inform your Excellency that I repeat the orders for my
troops to preserve the same attitude as the American troops.
By " arms " is to be understood portable weapons, that is, those that soldiers
carry and the field artillery that is transported on mule back; there being ex
cluded field guns and fixed siege and coast defense guns, which cannot be con
sidered as forming an integral part of the units of the army. I make this
explanation in reply to your note, and beg your Excellency to consider me
Your obedient servant,
JOSE TORAL,
Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Corps of the Army of the Island of Cuba.
To His EXCELLENCY, the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Forces, in
camp at SAN JUAN RIVER.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, July 9, 1898 — 1:50 p. M.
Major-General SHAFTER, Playa del Este, Cuba:
Your telegram setting forth terms on which the enemy will evacuate Santiago
has been submitted to the President by the Secretary of War, who instructs me
to say that you will accept nothing but an unconditional surrender, and should
take extra precautions to prevent the enemy's escape.
By order Secretary of War,
H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.
I >-^N* '**
*^p
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
46l
PLAYA DEL ESTE, via HAITI, July 9, 1898 — 9 P. M.
SECRETARY OF WAR, Washington:
Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, near Santiago. I forwarded General
Toral's proposition to evacuate the town this morning without consulting any
one. Since then I have seen the general officers commanding divisions, who
agree with me that it should be accepted. First, it releases at once the harbor;
second, it permits the return of thousands of women, children and old men,
who have left the town fearing bombardment and who are now suffering where
they are, though I am doing my best to supply them with food; third, it saves
the great destruction of property which a bombardment would entail, most of
which belongs to Cubans and foreign residents; fourth, it at once relieves the
command, while it is in good health, for operations elsewhere. There are now
three cases of yellow fever at Siboney, in Michigan regiment; and if it gets
started, no one knows where it will stop. We lose by this simply some prison
ers we do not want and the arms they carry. I believe many of them will desert
and return to our lines. I was told by sentinel, who deserted last night, that
200 men want to come but were afraid our men would fire upon them.
W. R. SHAFTER,
General.
PLAYA DEL ESTE, via HAITI, July 10, 1898 — 2:50 P. M.
ADJUTANT- GENERAL. Washington:
Headquarters near Santiago, Cuba, 10. Telegram of 9th regards to evacua
tion of Spanish troops received. My position is impregnable against any
attack the enemy can bring against us, but I have not yet enough troops to
entirely surround the town. The Cuban forces are not to be depended upon
for severe fighting. Instructions of the War Department will be carried out
to the letter.
SHAFTER,
Major-General.
PLAYA DEL ESTE, via HAITI, July 10, 1898 — 5:55 p. M.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A., Washington:
Siboney, Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, 10. I have just received letter
from General Toral, declining unconditional surrender. Bombardment by the
army and navy will begin at as near 4 p. M. to-day as oossible.
SHAFTER,
Major-GeneraL
4^2 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
It will be seen by the above correspondence that in advising the
acceptance of General Toral's proposition, General Shafter was influ
enced by the knowledge that our lines did not surround the city, and
that there were no American troops in position to prevent General
Toral's marching his army out of Santiago on the Cobre road. Offi
cers upon the line in front could not comprehend why Toral should
make such a proposition when it was so easy for him to march out
practically without molestation.
The opinion was also expressed that this would give us the harbor,
and that if Toral took his troops toward Holguin, it would finally
result nearly as much to the advantage of the United States as if they
were in our hands as prisoners, and it was clear that other Spanish
troops to the east of Santiago would fall into our hands. This being
accomplished, the army would be free to enter upon a campaign in
Porto Rico, which was understood to be the wish of the Government.
Toral's proposition was, probably, due to the Spanish predilection for
old ways — the old habit of fighting within walled towns, perhaps
suggesting that any style of evacuation, save the one proposed, would
be a reflection upon the honor of the mother country and the courage
of the Spanish soldiers.
On the morning of July loth, General Shafter made a demand for an
unconditional surrender. He had received that day a dispatch from
the Secretary of War stating that should the Spaniards surrender un
conditionally and wish to return to Spain, they would be sent back
direct at the expense of the United States Government.
General Toral refused to surrender and hostilities were resumed at
4 P. M. on the loth.
The following letter was sent to me by Colonel McClernand:
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
Camp near SANTIAGO, Cuba, July 10, 1898:
COMMANDING GENERAL, CAVALRY DIVISION:
SIR. — The Commanding General directs me to say a demand has been made
this morning for the unconditional surrender of Santiago, with notification that
unless favorable reply is received by 3 p. M., hostilities will be resumed at 4 P. M.
In resuming hostilities, it is the intention of the general commanding to drive
the enemy out of his works and into the town by means of artillery and rifle
fire. To do this the volume of fire is of importance, but its accuracy is of the
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
utmost importance. The greatest care, therefore, should be exercised to direct
your fire wherever men can be seen, firing deliberately and taking good aim
and keeping your own men well covered. An advance upon the city is not ex
pected to be made until after the bombardment and until ordered. A shot from
the battery with General Lawton's division will be the signal to authorize firing
to be commenced.
Very respectfully,
E. J. McCLERNAND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
At midnight General Shafter dispatched, as follows, to Washington :
PLAYA DEL ESTE, via HAITI, July n, 1898 — 12:01 A. M.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Washington :
Headquarters Fifth Corps, 10. Enemy opened fire a few minutes past 4
with light guns, which were soon silenced by ours. Very little musket firing
and the enemy kept entirely in their trenches. Three men slightly wounded.
Will have considerable addition to force to-morrow, enough to completely block
all the roads on the northwest. I am quite well. General Garcia reports enemy
evacuated little town called Doscaminos, about three miles from Santiago and
near the bay. Garcia's force now occupies it. Everything is looking well and
men feeling well. Navy fired few shots from the sea near Aguadores. Effect
was not perceptible.
SHAFTER,
Major-General.
The transports " City of Macon," " Hudson," " Gate City," " Com-
manche," " Neuces," and " Specialist " arrived at Siboney on July
Qth bearing reinforcements of infantry and artillery. General Henry
on the " St. Paul," with his command and stores arrived on the loth;
and about the same time the First District of Columbia Volunteers on
board the " Catania," reached Siboney. All these reinforcements were
hurried up to the front as rapidly as possible. Early on the morning
of the nth, General Shafter telegraphed as follows:
PLAYA DEL ESTE, via HAITI, July n, 1898 — 1:30 A. M.
Hon. R. A. ALGER, Secretary War, Washington:
Headquarters Fifth Corps, camp near Santiago, 10. After twenty-four hours'
bombardment navy promised to try and get in close the harbor with some
464 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
of her large draft boats. If to-morrow bombardment is not satisfactory I shall
ask them to make the attempt. I will not sacrifice any lives. As soon as Henry
reaches me the town will be surrounded and we can knock it to pieces with our
light guns. The obtaining of launches from the navy was not satisfactory,
and I prefer calling on them as little as possible. So Captain Goodrich assiste
very ably in disembarking troops, but means were all kept in their control.
SHAFTER,
Major-General.
PLAYA DEL ESTE, via HAITI, July n, 1898 — 1:53 A. M.
Hon. R. A. ALGER, Secretary War, Washington:
Headquarters Fifth Corps, near Santiago, 10. My plans for to-morrow are
to keep a bombardment of the trenches and city and to complete the investment
on the northwest by the troops that have just arrived at Siboney, one regiment
of which, First Illinois, has now reached me. Should the operation be light at
any point will push line nearer city, but will not assault.
SHAFTER,
Major-General.
As Congress was about to adjourn, the Secretary of War sent the
following telegram to General Shafter:
EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, D. C. July 6, 1898 — 10:41 p. M.
Major-General SHAFTER, Playa del Este, Cuba"
As the Senate may soon adjourn, the President requests that if you have any
recommendations to make for promotions of officers in your command for dis
tinguished services, you do so by telegram at the earliest possible date.
R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.
To which he received the following reply:
PLAYA DEL ESTE, July 7, 1898.
Hon. R. A. ALGER, Secretary War, Washington:
In absence of full reports I cannot at this time make all recommendations
for promotion I would like to; but the following officers were so conspicuous
for bravery and handled their troops so well I desire to recommend them for
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 465
promotion; Brigadier-Generals Hawkins, Lawton, Chaffee anu Bates to be
major-generals; Colonel Wood and Lieutenant-Colonel McKibbin to be briga
dier-generals.
W. R. SHAFTER,
Major-General Commanding.
PLAYA DEL ESTE, via HAITI, July 8, 1898 — 12 MIDNIGHT.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A., Washington:
Camp near Santiago, 8. Omitted names of Young and Kent from lack of
information I have just received to-day. Earnestly recommend both for pro
motion to major-general, also Lieutenant-Colonel Carroll, of the cavalry, for
promotion to brigadier-general.
SHAFTER,
Major- General.
On July Qth, Generals Kent, Young, Bates, Chaffee, Lawton and
Hawkins were promoted to the rank of major-general, and Colonels
Wood, McKibbin and Carroll were made brigadier-generals, as seen
by the following telegram:
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, July 9, 1898 — 2:10 P. M.
Major-General SHAFTER, Playa del Este, Cuba:
I am instructed by the Secretary of War to inform you that the following
promotions have been made among the officers serving with you, to date from
yesterday: Kent, Young, Bates, Chaffee, Lawton, Hawkins, to be major-
generals; Wood, McKibbin and Carroll, to be brigadier-generals. Inform
them, and extend to each the congratulations of the Secretary of War and
myself.
H. C. CORBIN,
A d jut ant-General.
Allusion has already been made to the assistance given us by the
navy on the nth, when they bombarded the city in conjunction with
our attack by land. The presence of reinforcements who were hastily
brought forward and placed in line to complete the investment of the
city, enabled General Shafter to make a new demand on General
Toral for unconditional surrender. His demand and the reply of the
Spanish commander were as follows:
466 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
Camp near SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July IT, 1898.
To His EXCELLENCY, Commander in Chief of the Spanish Forces, Santiago de
Cuba :
SIR. — With the largely-increased forces which have come to me, and the
fact that I have your line of retreat securely in my hands, the time seems
fitting that I should again demand of your excellency the surrender of Santiago
and of your excellency's army. I am authorized to state that should your
excellency so desire, the Government of the United States will transport the
entire command of your excellency to Spain.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WM. R. SHAFTER,
Major-General Commanding.
SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July n, 1898.
To His EXCELLENCY, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army, in Camp
at the San Juan:
SIR. — I have the honor to advise your eminence that your communication
of this date is received, and in reply desire to confirm that which I said in my
former communication; also to advise you that I have communicated your
proposition to the general-in-chief.
Reiterating my sentiments, I am, very respectfully,
JOSE TORAL,
Commander-in-Chief Fourth Corps and Military Governor of Santiago.
July 1 2th was very quiet and little fighting was done on that day.
A flag of truce was up during the consideration of proposals for sur
render. General Shafter reported to the War Department that the
city was surrounded on the evening before, lines being completed by
General Ludlow all the way to the bay; that these lines would be
strengthened in the morning by the arrival of General Henry with his
command, and also that two of the new batteries would be placed in
position on that day. Meantime there was great suffering among the
refugees from the city and the Americans were doing their best to
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
relieve the starving people about them. Yellow fever broke out and
it was found necessary to destroy Siboney, which had become a pest
hole. Increase of sickness among our own troops made the situation
alarming in the extreme and all were anxious for a speedy settlement.
On the 1 3th the following letters were exchanged between General
Shafter and the War Department:
PLAYA DEL ESTE, via HAYTI, July 13, 1898 — 2 A. M.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Washington:
The following communication has just been received from the Spanish com
mander in Santiago:
" SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 12.
" ESTEEMED GENERAL OF THE AMERICAN FORCES:
" SIR. — I have the honor to insist upon my proposition to evacuate the
Plaza and the territory of the division of Cuba under conditions hereinafter
stated, for the Spanish arms, trusting that your chivalry and sentiment as a
soldier will make you appreciate exactly the situation, and, therefore, must a
solution be found that leaves the honor of my troops intact; otherwise you
will comprehend that I shall see myself obliged to now make defense as far
as my strength will permit. I call the attention of your eminence to the ad
vance of your troops by railroad, the movement of which I suppose you are
ignorant, and I take that you will kindly order their return to their position
during the time that the armistice is in existence.
" Very respectfully,
"JOSE TORAL,
" Commander -in-Chief, Etc.1'
Will any modification of the recent order be permitted? I have been per
fectly satisfied that he can be taken, but if he fights, as we have reason to
believe he may, it will be at fearful cost of life; and to stay here with disease
threatening may be as great loss from that cause. The suffering of the people
who left the town is intense. I can only supply food enough to keep them
from starvation, and if the rains continue I do not know how long I can do
that.
SHAFTER,
Major-General.
468 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
WASHINGTON, D. C, July 13, 1898 — 2:14 A. M.
Major-General SHAFTER, Before Santiago, Cuba, Playa del Este:
Telegram just received. No modification of former order permitting the
Spanish Army evacuating Santiago under such conditions as proposed by Toral
will be made. The Secretary of the Navy will be consulted at once concerning
the ordering of Sampson in to assist you.
R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War,
The following letter was, in fact, sent that day to the Secretary of
the Navy, but before it could be acted upon negotiations for the sur
render of the city were on the way:
WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, July 13, 1898. «
SIR. — I have the honor to request that you order the fleet off Santiago to
at once force its way into the bay, if possible, to aid the army in the capture
of Santiago and the Spanish Army defending it.
The special reasons for immediate action are: First, the very heavy rains
that are falling almost continuously have made the roads nearly impassable
and threaten to^cut off our supply of provisions for the army in the trenches
altogether; second, the rains are making the holding of our lines almost im
possible, as the trenches are filled with water; third, the lives of our men are
in great danger from yellow fever, which has broken out among our troops
and is spreading rapidly; and, fourth, the character of the works of the enemy
is such that to take them by assault would be a terrible sacrifice of life.
These conditions, it is believed by the major-general commanding, would
be changed were the navy in the bay to co-operate with the army, and the
capture of the city and the Spanish Army thus made comparatively easy matter.
Very respectfully,
R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.
The Honorable the SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.
The breaking out of the yellow fever among the troops caused
great alarm and anxiety throughout the United States and rendered
it necessary to make some changes in the original orders concerning
the disposition of General Shafters troops. On July I4th. while the
negotiations for the capitulation of the city were in progress, the
following telegrams were exchanged between General Shafter and the
War Department:
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 469
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, July 13, 1898 — 3 P. M.
Major- General SHAFTER, Playa del Este, Cuba:
Secretary of War directs that as soon as the military situation admits of such
action, that troops should be withdrawn from proximity to the infected towns
and encamped on high ground near the coast and within easy reach of their
base of supplies. The camps should be well separated, and any regiment which
remains in such fresh camp for five days without having any cases of yellow
fever among the troops could be put on a transport, if desired, to return home
or to go to some other point of active preparations. If cases of yellow fever
occur in any regiment camped by itself, they should at once be sent to the
hospital established for the reception of such cases and the regiment should
not be put upon a transport until at least five days have elapsed since the last
case of yellow fever. In general, no cases of yellow fever and no suspicious
cases of yellow fever should go upon the transports, as it is extremely import
ant that these should not become infected. Major John Guiteras, surgeon,
United States Volunteers, who is at Santiago, is an expert with reference to
the management of yellow-fever epidemics, and his advice should be carefully
followed.
By order Secretary of War,
H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.
WASHINGTON, D. C., July 14, 1898.
Major-General MILES, Cuba:
The conditions are such on account of yellow fever that I have ordered all
further shipment of troops to Santiago to cease. We are now arranging trans
portation for 25.000 men for Porto Rico. As soon as matters are settled at
Santiago, I think you had better return and go direct with this expedition.
Yellow fever breaking out in camps at Santiago will, I fear, deprive you of
the use of all forces there. That, however, can be determined later. As soon
as Santiago falls the troops must all be put into camps as comfortable as they
can be made, and remain, I suppose, until the fever has had its run. It is a
most difficult problem to solve, but we are sure you and General Shafter, with
the aid of the surgeon in charge, will do all that can be done. Have ordered
two immune regiments to Santiago, and they, with the colored regulars, it
seems to me, will answer to garrison the places as long as our forces have to
remain.
R. A. ALGER.
Secretary of War.
47° CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
PLAYA DEL ESTE, July 14, 1898 — 9:56 A. M.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A., Washington:
Am I to understand from your telegram about yellow fever that Fifth Army
Corps has to remain here through an epidemic of that disease?
SHAFTER,
Major-General Commanding.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, July 14, 1898 — IP. M.
General SHAFTER, Playa del Este, Cuba:
Telegram of yesterday meant that as soon as the surrender was accomplished
the Fifth Army Corps was to be put in camp on ground near by and above the
fever belt. Experts here say this can be done. This is the first set to fight
the fever. If later it is found advisable to bring your troops away, it will be
done. After careful consideration of the question, your views and recom
mendations are desired. Every possible aid in the power of the Government
will be given you.
By order Secretary War,
H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.
It will be remembered that the original orders issued to General
Shatter, contemplated his troops being taken after the fall of Santiago,
directly to Porto Rico ; but the prevalence of disease among the troops
in front of Santiago rendered them unfit for further immediate active
service, and the reinforcements which had been hurrying to the front
were detained, and many of them sent to Porto Rico instead of to
Cuba where the capture of Santiago rendered their presence no longer
necessary.
On tlie 1 2th of July, the archbishop of Santiago came out between
the lines to meet the officers who had gone out with the flag of truce,
and stated that he had come out without consulting the commander-
in-chief, to get permission for himself and the priests and nuns in
Santiago to leave the city and seek a place of safety before the bom
bardment should recommence. His request was transmitted to Gen
eral Shafter who declined to grant it, knowing that the influence of the
archbishop, if used upon the commander-in-chief, in favor of sur
rendering the city, would be very useful to our cause. The following
letters describe the situation in this respect:
.THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 47 J
HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
Before SANTIAGO, Cuba, July 12, 1898.
Major General WILLIAM R. SHAFTER, Commanding United States Forces:
SIR. — The archbishop of Santiago met the officer who went out with the
flag of truce to receive the last message, and said he had come out to speak
to this officer without consulting the commander-in-chief of the town. He
wishes to get permission for himself and all his priests — about thirty in num
ber — and for the nuns — some twenty-eight in all — to leave the city and
come within our lines before the bombardment recommences. He said that
he made this request without letting the military authorities know that he was
going to make it. He would like to get the answer in duplicate in two en
velopes left unsealed, one addressed to him and one addressed to the com
mander-in-chief, so that there will be no delay in the permission getting to
him. He stated that about a dozen houses were blown down by the shells
yesterday, but no one was killed.
Respectfully,
JOSEPH WHEELER,
Major-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.
PLAYA DEL ESTE, via HAITI, July 13, 1898 — 2:50 A. M.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Washington :
Camp Santiago, 12. I have just received a letter from the archbishop of
Santiago, asking that he be freed; that his nuns be permitted to come in our
lines before bombardment recommences. He reports that the shells destroyed
several houses, but killed no one. I have declined to grant his request for the
present, and advised him to urge the surrender.
WM. R. SHAFTER,
Major-General.
General Miles, on the " Yale," accompanied by the " Columbia,"
both transports bearing reinforcements, arrived off Siboney July nth,
and proceeded to General Shafter's headquarters on the following day.
After an interview with General Shafter, he sent the following state
ment to the Secretary of War:
PLAYA DEL ESTE, via HAITI, July 13, 1898 — 2:40 A. M.
SECRETARY OF WAR, Washington:
Camp near Santiago, 12. The Spanish general to-day asked that some con
clusion be reached that shall save his honor. Offers to surrender Santiago
4/2 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
province, force, batteries, munitions of war, etc., all except the men and small
arms. Under ordinary circumstances would not advise acceptance, but this is
a great concession, and would avoid assaulting intrenching lines with every
device for protecting his men and inflicting heavy loss on assaulting lines.
The siege may last many weeks, and they have the provisions for two months.
There are 20,000 starving people who have fled the city and were not allowed
to take any food. The fortitude and heroism of the army has been unsur
passed, and, under the circumstances, I concur with General Shafter and the
major-general, and would request that discretion be granted as to terms, in
view of the importance of other immediate operations in which both this part
of the army and navy will participate. The very serious part of this situation
is that there are 100 cases of yellow fever in this command and the opinion
of the surgeon that it will spread rapidly.
MILES,
Major-General, Commanding.
To which he received the following reply:
WASHINGTON, D. C, July 13, 1898.
Major-General MILES, Camp near Santiago, Playa del Este, Cuba:
You may accept surrender by granting parole to officers and men, the offi
cers retaining their side arms, the officers and men after parole to be per
mitted to return to Spain, the United States assisting. If not accepted, then
assault, unless in your judgment an assault would fail. Consult with Sampson,
and pursue such course as to the assault as you jointly agree upon. Matter
should now be settled promptly.
R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.
Later, on the morning of the I3th, he came to the front, and to
gether with General Shafter and myself went out and had a long
interview with General Toral between the lines. Upon General
Miles's return to my camp, he sent the following dispatch to the
Secretary of War:
GENERAL WHEELER'S HEADQUARTERS,
Before SANTIAGO, Cuba, July 13, 1898.
To Hon. SECRETARY OF WAR, Washington, D. C.:
At a meeting between the lines, at which Generals Shafter and Wheeler and
Spanish General Toral were present, the latter claims that he is unable to act
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 473
without authority of his Government, but has received authority to withdraw
and surrender harbor, forts, munitions of war, and eastern portion of Cuba.
He urgently requests until to-morrow noon to receive answer from his Gov
ernment regarding offer of our Government to send his forces to Spain, which
was granted.
NELSON A. MILES,
Major-General, Commanding the Army.
To which the Secretary of War replied:
WASHINGTON, D. C, July 13, 1898.
Major-General MILES, Camp near Santiago, Playa del Este, Cuba:
I telegraphed you an hour since in regard to the action of the army. Since
then your dispatch has been received conveying the result of the meeting
between the lines, at which conference Toral requested until to-morrow noon
to hear from his Government regarding our offer, which you granted. Your
action is approved. This Government v/ill send the Spanish prisoners who
surrender home if they wish.
R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.
General Shafter thus describes the situation on July I3th:
PLAYA, July 13, 1898 — 2:12 p. M.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Washington:
Headquarters near Santiago, 13. Your telegram saying no modifications
of orders allowed just received. Have had an interview of an hour and a half
with General Toral and have extended truce until noon to-morrow. Told him
that his surrender only will be considered, and that he was without hope of
escape and had no right to continue the fight. I think it made a strong im
pression on him, and hope for his surrender. If he refuses I will open on him
at 12, noon, to-morrow, with every gun I have, and have the assistance of the
navy. Am ready to bombard the city with thirteen-inch shells. There is a
good deal of nervousness throughout the army on account of yellow fever,
which is among us certainly. Twenty-nine new cases yesterday and probably
150 all told. Whatever happens, one or two immune regiments should be
sent here to act as hospital guards and garrison for the town.
W. R. SHAFTER.
474 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
WAR DEPARTMENT, July 13, 1898 — 4:30 P. M.
Major-General SHAFTER, Play a del Estc, Cuba:
Your message announcing that unless your terms are accepted before noon
to-morrow you will make an assault all along the line is received and approved.
God bless you and your heroic army.
R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.
On the next day, the I4th, the same officers had a much more
extended interview, during which the question of surrender was dis
cussed. Previous to that time, General Toral had repeatedly stated
that under the laws of Spain, a general could not surrender without
the authority of the home, or Madrid, government. He stated, how
ever, that he had authority from General Blanco to arrange terms to
capitulate on the basis of the Spanish troops being transported to
Spain, and that these terms would become effectual upon the reception
of authority from the Madrid government. He also stated with
great emphasis that the Spanish government would accede to the
terms because it was the custom to comply with the recommendations
of their captains-general.
It seems, however, that owing to some misunderstanding or care
lessness on the part of the interpreters, General Miles and General
Shafter were led to understand that General Toral had consented to
an absolute capitulation; that they were under this impression when we
returned from the conference to my headquarters is evident from a
careful perusal of the following dispatches:
PLAYA, July 14, 1898 — 11:05 A. M.
ADJUTANT- GENERAL U. S. ARMY, Washington:
Camp near Santiago, 14. Fifth Army Corps have at this moment received
communication from General Toral asking that commissioners be appointed
to arrange terms of the surrender on basis of returning to Spain. Has ap
pointed his commissioners. Has not surrendered, however. How soon can
the Spanish Army be sent back?
W. R. SHAFTER,
Major-General.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 475
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, July 14, 1898 — 12 NOON.
General SHAFTER, Playa del Este, Cuba:
Your message referring to General Toral's last communication is received.
The assistance of the United States to return the Spanish prisoners to Spain
is a matter of detail which will require time, but will be done promptly and with
the least possible delay. That can be arranged after surrender, which should
be immediate on lines of instruction already given you.
By order of the Secretary of War:
H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.
PLAYA, July 14, 1898 — 2:04 P. M.
ADJUTANT- GENERAL, Washington:
Have just returned from interview with General Toral. He agrees to sur
render upon the basis of being returned to Spain. This proposition embraces
all of eastern Cuba, from Aserraderos, on the South, to Sagua, on the north,
via Palma, with practically the Fourth Army Corps. Commissioners meet
this afternoon at 2:30 to definitely arrange terms.
W. R. SHAFTER,
Major-General.
The letter of July I4th, in which General Toral transmitted the
telegraph from General Blanco in regard to the capitulation, was for
warded by General Miles on the i6th. It will be seen the terms are
very ambiguous and add to the misunderstanding which arose during
the conference of July I4th:
PLAYA, July 16, 1898— 10:38 A. M.
Hon. R. A. ALGER, Washington:
Siboney, 16. The letter of July 14 instant is as follows (translation dated
Santiago de Cuba, July 14, 1898) :
" GENERAL-IN-CHIEF AMERICAN FORCES:
" HONORED SIR. — His excellency, the general-in-chief of the army of the
island of Cuba, telegraphs from Havana yesterday at 7 p. M. the following:
' Believing that business of such importance as the capitulation of that place
should be known and decided upon by the government of His Majesty, I give
you notice that I have sent the conditions of your telegram, asking an immediate
476 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
answer, and enabling you also to show this to the general of the American
Army to see if he will agree to await the answer of the government, which
cannot be as soon as the time which he has decided, as communication by
way of Bermuda is more slow than by Key West. In the meanwhile your
honor and the general of the American Army may agree upon capitulation
on the basis of repatriation, returning to Spain.' I have the honor to transmit
this to you that in case you may think the foregoing satisfactory he may desig
nate persons in representation of himself, who, with those in my name, may
agree to clauses of the capitulation upon the basis of return to Spain, accepted
already in the beginning by the general-in-chief of this army. Awaiting a
reply, I am, very respectfully,
Your servant,
"JOSE TORAL, ETC."
The positive statement of General Toral and the claims of the capitulation
are such, and have been signed by both Spanish and American commissioners,
that I think there can be no possible failure. It was a positive and gratifying
surrender of a brave people on generous terms.
MILES.
It having been agreed that commissioners on the part of the United
States and Spain should be appointed to negotiate the terms of
capitulation, the commission to meet between the lines at 2 o'clock on
the I4th, directions on the subject were given by General Miles as
follows :
GENERAL WHEELER'S CAMP,
Before SANTIAGO, Cuba, July 14, 1898.
To Major-General WILLIAM R. SHAFTER, Commanding U. S. Forces:
SIR. — You are authorized to appoint commissioners to draw up articles
of capitulation on the terms upon which the Spanish division have been sur
rendered, namely, the return of the Spanish troops to Spain at the expense
of the United States. The Spanish troops will be supplied at the expense of
the United States and assembled at such a place as may be available for their
embarkation on the arrival of the necessary transportation.
The attention of the commissioners should be called to the importance of the
return of the people that have fled from the city of Santiago and the supplying
them with food.
2. The sending of supplies into the harbor on the Red Cross ship and other
vessels.
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY LONG.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 479
3. The removal of all obstructions to the entrance of the harbor or notifi
cation to the fleet that no obstacle will be placed in the way of their removing
such obstructions.
Respectfully,
NELSON A. MILES,
Maj 'or '-General Commanding the Army.
In accordance with these instructions, General Lawton, Lieutenant
Miley and I were appointed commissioners to represent General
Shatter at the conferences which were to arrange for the surrender of
Santiago, and we immediately commenced to prepare the preliminary
articles of capitulation. While I was dictating this document, Mr.
Mestre, my own interpreter (who has since died from the effects
of his arduous labors during the campaign) told me that he thought
General Toral did not mean to convey the idea that he was
agreeing to an absolute and immediate capitulation; but as many
who were present at the conference had taken the contrary view,
the United States commissioners decided to complete the paper
contemplating an absolute surrender. We proceeded to the
neutral ground at the hour appointed, where w^ were met by
the Spanish commissioners appointed by General Toral — General
Escario, Lieutenant-Colonel Frontan and Mr. Robert Mason of
Santiago. Our negotiations took place on the spot before referred
to as the scene of the exchange of Lieutenant Hobson and his men.
On reaching there we soon found that there was a misunderstanding,
as suggested to me by Mr. Mestre during the preparation of the pre
liminary article; and at 4 o'clock the Spanish commissioners returned
to the city for further instructions. They met us again at 6 o'clock,
stating that it would be necessary to postpone the negotiation until the
next day, but I made such serious objection to this that they finally
consented to return with General Toral at half-past 9 that night.
The third meeting took place at this hour, General Toral himself
being present; and he was very positive in the assertion that he had
no power to capitulate, but was acting under authority received from
General Blanco, the extent of which was that he might open negotia
tion for the basis of a capitulation, awaiting the action of Spain upon
a cablegram which had been sent to Madrid.
This complicated the situation to some extent, but upon my sug
gestion it was agreed by the commissioners that we discuss separately
4§o CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
each paragraph of the paper prepared, modifying it in such a manner
that the Spanish commissioners would be willing to submit it as a
proposition on their part. With this view, we took up each paragraph
separately, writing it out in English and also in Spanish, and after
making a few changes in the document, the Spanish commissioners
consented to submit it to us as their proposition, and we adiourned at
twenty minutes after midnight, agreeing to meet again the next morn
ing at 9 o'clock.
I have already mentioned that on the afternoon of the I4th, the
Spanish officers urged that all matters be postponed until the next
day, while we insisted that they should return that night, and if pos
sible complete the negotiations. We had become so accustomed to
the Spanish peculiarity of procrastination in deferring everything until
the manana, and we were so very anxious for a prompt settlement ,of
the affair that it did not occur to me at the time that the Spaniards
might regard this insistance as a singular and unwarranted action on
our part. However, when we passed our outposts to go to the ap
pointed place at 9:30 that night, the sentinels informed us that they
had heard a large body of men not far from the place of rendezvous.
When we reached the place we found no one in the vicinity, but after
a little delay the Spanish officers came up accompanied by a larger
escort than before and armed as they had not been at the previous
meeting. I was so interested in the negotiations that I did not ob
serve this at the time, and we proceeded with our consultation which
occupied some three hours when, after the customary salutations,
we parted and returned to our respective lines.
This conference is thus referred to in a work entitled " The Fall
of Santiago," by Vivian, where, on page 240, he says :
At length when midnight was past and a crystallization of result seemed
as far off as ever, General Wheeler insisted on a test of bona fide and articles
were taken up seriatim and each was dealt with until it was accepted. When
all had thus been declared satisfactory, Wheeler further insisted that the Span
ish commissioners should affix their signatures to the articles and this, much
against their will, they did, in the early morning hours of July I5th. But sat
isfactory as this was, back of it all remained the unpleasant facts that nothing
was completed. Toral had insisted that everything was preliminary and sub
ject to orders from Madrid, and Toral carried the day. There was no appre
hension, however, on the American side as to the outcome, and the concession
to Toral's dignity was not regarded as calculated to jeopardize the result.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 481
Next day the atmosphere was cleared up by the receipt of a dispatch from
Toral saying that his government had " authorized him to capitulate." This
one phrase was intelligible both in its original Spanish and in the (unique
translation which lies in the archives of the War Department, but the rest of
it was a mystery.
The Commission met at the hour agreed upon and was in session
the greater part of the I5th. Meanwhile, owing to the dispatches
received at Washington on the I4th, it seemed difficult for the ad
ministration to comprehend the cause of delay in the negotiations and
the following communications were exchanged between General
Shafter and the War Department:
PLAYA, July 15, 1898 — 4:10 P. M.
ADJUTANT- GENERAL, Washington :
Headquarters near Santiago, 15. Sent you several telegrams yesterday, as
did General Miles, in regard to surrender. General Toral agreed yesterday
positively to surrender all the forces under his command in eastern Cuba
upon a distinct understanding that they were to be sent to Spain by the
United States; that this surrender was authorized by General Blanco, and that
its submission to-morrow was merely formal. Commissioners to arrange
details were appointed; Wheeler, Lawton and Miley on part of United
States. Points were immediately raised by Spanish commissioners. The dis
cussion lasted until 10 last night. At last my commissioners think the matter
will be settled to-day, and meet at 9:30 o'clock this A. M. The great point with
Spanish is that they may be allowed to carry their arms with them to Spain,
marching out here and depositing them in my charge, but having them shipped
with them to Spain. There are about 12,000 troops in the city and about as
many more in the surrounding district; 25,000 in all, will be transported. Gen
eral Miles was present, and said the surrender was as absolute and as complete
as possible. It cannot be possible that there will be a failure in completing
arrangements. Water famine in city imminent. Have supply cut. This was
to Lieutenant Miley by English commissioners. Will wire frequently when
negotiations are progressing.
SHAFTER.
Major-General, Commanding.
482 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
WASHINGTON, D. C, July 15, 1898 — 12:35 p. M.
Major- General SHAFTER, Camp before Santiago, Cuba:
Have you received the absolute surrender of the enemy? We are awaiting
the conditions with impatience.
R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.
WASHINGTON, D. C., July 15, 1898 — 5:59 P. M.
Major-General SIIAFTER, Camp near Santiago, Playa:
It is not possible that you are entertaining the proposition of permitting the
Spanish to carry away their arms. Such a suggestion should be rejected in
stantly. You have been instructed the terms of surrender acceptable to the
President, and they must be concluded on those lines.
R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, July 15, 1898 — 4:45 P. M.
Major-General SHAFTER, Playa del Este:
Secretary War suggests is it not possible that Toral is gaining time to get
reinforcements that may be on the way to assist him?
H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.
PLAYA DEL ESTE, July 15, 1898 — 9 P. M.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY, Washington:
Headquarters near Santiago, Cuba, 15. I do not believe that Toral is trying
to gain time in hopes of getting reinforcements. Cubans have forces in
vicinity of all Spanish troops. Toral asked to send messages to Guantanamo
and to Palmas to notify Spanish troops of condition. Wheeler, Lawton and
Miley are thorougly convinced that they are earnest, and they have been in
consultation with the Spaniards twenty-four hours. Am told by reliable per
sons of Santiago that the Spanish officers are greatly pleased at the thought
of going home, but generals are afraid of the consequences with themselves
unless terms of surrender are sanctioned by the Madrid Government.
SHAFTER,
Major-General,
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 483
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, July 15, 1898 — 9:20 P.. M.
Major-General SIIAFTER, Playa del Este:
The President and Secretary of War are becoming impatient with parley.
Any arrangement that allows the enemy to take their arms had as well be
abandoned once for all, as it will not be approved. The way to surrender is
to surrender, and this should be fully impressed on General Toral. I send
this as your friend and comrade, and not by authority, but you can be guided
by it with entire safety. Forwarded your telegram last night as requested.
H. C.'CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.
PLAYA DEL ESTE, via HAITI, July 15, 1898 — 11:20 P. M.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY, Washington:
Headquarters near Santiago, 15. I do not entertain the proposition for the
Spanish to retain their arms. They are to surrender them absolutely, im
mediately after articles of capitulation are signed, but they beg, as an act of
consideration to them, that I will intercede with my Government that they be
shipped with them to Spain. I regard this as a small matter that in no way
binds the Government, but is one I would not let stand between clearing
20,000 Spanish soldiers out of Cuba or leaving them there to be captured later,
and probably with much loss to ourselves.
SHAFTER,
Major-General.
PLAYA DEL ESTE, July 16, 1898 — 2:20 A. M.
ADJUTANT- GENERAL, Washington :
Headquarters near Santiago, 15. Surrender was made by Toral yesterday
afternoon absolutely on conditions of returning troops to Spain. Delay was
caused by the commissioners on his part insisting on approval of Madrid. I
think they fear death when they get home. We may have to fight them yet.
SHAFTER.
WASHINGTON, D. C., July 16, 1898 — 1:18 A. M.
Major-General SITAFTER, Playa del Este, Cuba, Camp near Santiago:
Our understanding from your message is that you have agreed with the
commander of the Spanish forces in eastern Cuba for their complete surrender,
484 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
with a single condition granted on your part that the United States would
transport them to Spain, officers and soldiers to give their paroles and the
former to retain their side-arms. The demand of General Toral that the arms
belonging to his command shall be shipped with him to Spain has been
rightly declined by you.
R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.
Early on the morning- of the i6th, General Toral informed Genera!
Shafter that he had received the authorization of his Government to
make the final capitulation on the terms and conditions agreed upon.
The letter was as follows:
SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 16.
To His EXCELLENCY, Commander-in-Chief American Forces:
4
EXCELLENT SIR. — I am now authorized by my Government to capitulate.
I havo the honor to so apprise you, and request that you designate hour
and place where my representatives shall appear to compare with those of
your excellency to effect the articles of capitulation on the basis of what has
been agreed upon to this date, in due time. I wish to manifest my desire to
know the decision of the United States Government respecting the return
of the army, so as to note on the capitulations; also the great courtesy of your
commissioners in return for their great generosity and kindness for the Spanish
soldiers, in desiring to allow them to return to the peninsula with the arms the
American Army does them the honor to acknowledge, as dutifully defended.
JOSE TORAL,
Commanding General Fourth Army Corps.
The final meeting took place on the i6th in order to settle final
details and sign the final document. Typewritten copies of the article
were prepared both in Spanish and English and were duly signed
in duplicate by the Spanish and American commissioners at 4 o'clock.
General Shafter having come forward during this meeting- of the com
mission discussed with General Toral and the commissioners the de
tails of the ceremony to be observed the following day in carrying out
the terms of the final capitulation; and that evening arrangements
were completed as to the method of surrender which it was agreed
to take place at 9 the next morning.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 485
Pending the negotiations for surrender the following dispatches
were sent to the War Department by General Miles and General
Shafter:
GENERAL WHEELER'S CAMP,
Before SANTIAGO, Cuba, July 14, 1898.
To the Honorable SECRETARY OF WAR, Washington, D. C.:
General Toral formally surrendered the troops of his army corps and di
vision of Santiago on the terms and understanding that his troops would be
returned to Spain.
General Shafter will appoint commissioners to draw up conditions of arrange
ment for carrying out the terms of surrender. This is very gratifying, and
General Shafter and the officers and men of this command are entitled to
great credit for their tenacity, fortitude and the almost insurmountable
obstacles which have been overcome. A portion of the army has been in
fected with yellow fever, and efforts will be made to separate those who are
infected and those free from it and keep those that are still on board ship
separated from those on shore. Arrangements will be immediately made for
carrying out the further instructions of the President and yourself.
NELSON A. MILES,
Major-General Commanding the Army.
GENERAL WHEELER'S CAMP,
Before SANTIAGO, Cuba, July 14, 1898.
To Major-General WM. R. SHAFTER, Commanding U. S. Forces:
SIR. — The Spanish Army having surrendered, the terms of capitulation
will be carried into effect with as little delay as practicable on the understand
ing that their troops will be returned to Spain at the expense of the United
States.
You will, with as little delay as practicable, place such troops as are not in
fected with yellow fever in separate camps and as soon as practicable report the
number that will be available for service with another expedition. Those
organizations which have been infected with yellow fever, every effort will
be made to improve their sanitary condition and to check the spread of the
disease by placing them in as healthy camps as possible.
Respectfully,
NELSON A. MILES,
Major-Gencral Commanding the Army.
486 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
DAIQUIRI, July 15.
SECRETARY OF WAR, Washington:
Commission on behalf of the United States was appointed, consisting of
Generals Wheeler and Lawton and Lieutenant Miley, with Spanish com
mission, to arrange details for carrying into effect the capitulation. I will
reach Siboney to-morrow.
MILES.
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
July 15, 1898.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Washington:
Sent you several telegrams yesterday, as did General Miles, in regard to the
surrender. General Toral agreed yesterday positively to surrender all tl\e
forces under his command in eastern Cuba upon a distinct understanding that
they were to be sent to Spain by the United States; that this surrender was
authorized by General Blanco, and that its submission to-morrow was merely
formal. The commissioners to arrange details were appointed — Wheeler,
Lawton and Miley on the part of the United States. Points were immediately
raised by Spanish commissioners. The discussion lasted until 10 o'clock
last night. My commissioners think the matter will be settled to day, and
met at 9:30 o'clock this morning. There are about 12,000 troops in the city,
and about as many more in the surrounding district; 25,000 in all will be trans
ported. General Miles was present, and said the surrender was as absolute and
complete as possible. It cannot be possible that there will be a failure in
completing arrangements. Water famine in city imminent. Have supply
cut; this was told Lieutenant Miley by English commissioners. Will wire
frequently when negotiations are progressing.
SHAFTER.
The document surrendering the division of Santiago de Cuba as
finally signed, is as follows:
Terms of the military convention for the capitulation of the Spanish forces
occupying the territory which constitutes the division of Santiago de Cuba,
and described as follows: All that portion of the island of Cuba east of a
line passing through Aserraderos, Dos Palmas, Cauto Abajo, Escondida,
Tanamo and Aguilera, said troops being in command of General Jose Toral;
agreed upon by the undersigned commissioners — Brigadier-General Don Fed-
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
erico Escario, Lieutenant-Colonel of Staff, Don Ventura Frontan, and as
interpreter, Mr. Robert Mason, of the city of Santiago de Cuba, appointed by
General Toral, commanding the Spanish forces, on behalf of the Kingdom
of Spain; and Major-General Joseph Wheeler, U. S. V., Major-General H.
W. Lawton, U. S. V., and First Lieutenant J. D. Miley, Second Artillery,
A. D. C, appointed by General Shafter, commanding the American forces,
on behalf of the United States.
1. That all hostilities between American and Spanish forces in this district
shall absolutely and unequivocally cease.
2. That this capitulation includes all the forces and war material in said
territory.
3. That the United States agrees, with as little delay as possible, to transport
all the Spanish troops in said district to the Kingdom of Spain, the troops being
embarked, as far as possible, at the port nearest the garrison they now occupy.
4. That the officers of the Spanish Army be permitted to retain their side
arms, and both officers and private soldiers their personal property.
5. That the Spanish authorities agree to remove, or assist the American
Navy in removing, all mines or other obstructions to navigation now in the
harbor of Santiago and its mouth.
6. That the commander of the Spanish forces deliver, without delay, a com
plete inventory of all arms and munitions of war of the Spanish forces in
above described district to the commander of the American forces; also a
roster of said forces now in said district.
7. That the commander of the Spanish forces, in leaving said district, is
authorized to carry with him all military archives and records pertaining to
the Spanish Army now in said district.
8. That all of that portion of the Spanish forces known as volunteers, mo-
vilizadoes and guerrillas who wish to remain in the island of Cuba are per
mitted to do so upon condition of delivering up their arms, and taking a parole
not to bear arms against the LInited States during the continuance of the
present war between Spain and the United States.
9. That the Spanish forces will march out of Santiago de Cuba with honors
of war; depositing their arms thereafter at a point mutually agreed upon, to
await their disposition by the United States Government; it being understood
that the United States commissioners will Recommend that the Spanish soldier
return to Spain with the arms he so bravely defended.
10. That the provisions of the foregoing instrument become operative im
mediately upon its being signed.
Entered into this sixteenth day of July, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight,
488 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
by the undersigned commissioners, acting under instructions from their re
spective commanding generals and with the approbation of their respective
governments:
JOSEPH WHEELER, FEDERICO ESCARIO.
Major -General U. S. Volunteers.
H. W. LAWTON, VENTURA FRONTAN.
Major-General U. S. Volunteers.
J. D. MILEY, ROBERT MASON.
First Lieutenant, Second Artillery, A. D. C.
General Shafter had the pleasure and honor of sending the following
dispatches :
Camp near SANTIAGO, July 16.
Adjutant-General CORBIN:
The surrender has been definitely settled; and the arms will be turned over
to-morrow morning, and the troops will be marched out as prisoners of war.
The Spanish colors will be hauled down a" 9 o'clock, and the American flag
hoisted.
SHAFTER,
Major-Gcncral.
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
Near SANTIAGO, July 16, 1898.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Washington :
The conditions of capitulation include all forces and war material in de
scribed territory. The United States agrees with as little delay as possible to
transport all Spanish troops in the district to the Kingdom of Spain, the
troops, so far as possible, to embark near the garrison they now occupy.
Officers to retain their side-arms, and officers and men to retain their personal
property. Spanish commander authorized to take military archives belonging
to surrendered district. All Spanish forces known as volunteers, movilizadoes
and guerrillas who wish to remain in Cuba may do so under parole during the
present war, giving up their arms. Spanish forces march out of Santiago with
honors of war, depositing their arms at a point mutually agreed upon, to await
the disposition of the United States Government, it being understood the United
States commissioners will recommend that the Spanish soldiers return to Spain
with arms so bravely defended. This leaves the question of return of arms
entirely in the hands of the Government. I invite attention to the fact that
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 4^9
several thousand surrendered — said by General Toral to be about 12,000 —
against whom a shot has not been fired. The return to Spain of the troops in
this district amounts to about 24,000 according to General Toral.
W. R. SHAFTER.
To which he received the following reply from the President:
General SHAFTER, Commanding Front, near Santiago:
The President of the United States sends to you and your brave army the
profound thanks of the American people for the brilliant achievements at San
tiago, resulting in the surrender of the city and all of the Spanish troops and
territory under General Toral.
Your splendid command has endured not only the hardships and sacrifices
incident to campaign and battle, but in stress of heat and weather has tri
umphed over obstacles which would have overcome men less brave and
determined. One and all have displayed the most conspicuous gallantry and
earned the gratitude of the nation. The hearts of the people turn with tender
sympathy to the sick and wounded. May the Father of Mercies protect and
comfort them.
WILLIAM McKINLEY.
From the beginning of the negotiation it was evident to me that
the great desire on the part of General Toral was to maintain his
honor and prestige as a soldier. It was explained to me, by one of
the commissioners, that, as general commander of the Spanish forces
he would be held accountable for the surrender and that he would pos
sibly have to answer for the same before a court-martial at Madrid.
This was doubtless his main reason for insisting so strongly on al
lusions to the bravery of the Spanish soldiers, and desiring to eliminate
from the document everything that might possibly reflect upon his
courage or give ground for any charges against him. I also saw that
he was a man of keen pride and sensitive temper; every effort was made
by myself and the other commissioners to avoid anything that would
in any way wound the feelings of the Spanish officer. We readily con
sented to change words and phrases which seemed to us immaterial
but appeared to have great weight with the Spanish commissioners
whose entire conduct at this time was such as to elicit our regard and
sympathy.
4QO CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
The request drawn up by the American commissioners in reference
to the return of the arms captured from the Spanish soldiers, was not
granted by the United States. It reads as follows :
Neutral Camp near SANTIAGO DE CUBA,
Under the Flag of Truce, July 14, 1898.
Recognizing the nobleness, valor and bravery of Generals Linares and Toral
and of the Spanish troops who took part in the actions that have recently
occurred in the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba, as shown in said battles, we, the
undersigned officers of the United States Army, who had the honor of taking
part in the actions referred to, and who now constitute a committee, duly
authorized, treating with a similar committee of officers of the Spanish Army
for the capitulation of Santiago de Cuba, unanimously join in asking the
proper authorities that these brave and gallant soldiers may be granted the
privilege of returning to their country carrying the arms which they have l5o
nobly defended.
(Signed.) JOSEPH WHEELER,
Major-General, U. S. V .
H. W. LAWTON,
Major -General, U. S. V.
J. D. MILEY,
First Lieutenant, Second Artillery Aid.
The army was promptly apprised of the surrender of Santiago, and
the soldiers went to rest that night happy in the consciousness of a
triumphant termination of their efforts, trials and sufferings.
Sunday, July I7th, was a bright and beautiful day. General Shafter,
with his generals and their staffs, accompanied by a troop of cavalry,
rode to a large field in front of Santiago, where he was met by Gen
eral Toral and the other Spanish generals and their staff officers,
and a detail of 100 men from the different Spanish regiments. Gen
eral Shafter presented General Toral with the sword and spurs of
the Spanish General Vara del Rey who was killed at El Caney. The
Spanish officers retained their side arms. The Spaniards filed to the
left and returned to the city, where they, together with the entire
Spanish Army, were marched to the arsenal and their arms turned
over to the American officials. The American generals rode into the
city in columns of two, General Shafter and the next senior general in
front, the other generals following in order of rank, then the staff
officers, the whole being followed by the cavalry troops. When we
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
reached the palace we were met by all the officials, the civil governor,
the archbishop, consuls, etc. At about 1 1 o'clock we were entertained
at lunch and then marched out to the plaza, where thousands of the
populace, Spaniards and Cubans, had congregated to witness the
hoisting of the American flag.
The governor's palace faces the plaza opposite the cathedral. As
the clock commenced to strike the hour of noon, the United States
flag (it was my headquarters flag) was hauled to the masthead by
Lieutenant Miley, Captain McKittrick and Lieutenant Joseph
Wheeler, Jr., who had previously mounted the roof of the palace to
accomplish this object, and the Stars and Stripes triumphantly floated
in the place of the Spanish flag, which for 382 years had waved over
the city. A national salute was fired by Capron's battery, and the band
of the Sixth Cavalry played " Hail Columbia " and other national
airs. The Ninth Infantry, which was drawn up in the plaza, presented
arms to the American colors; and the eastern province of Santiago,
with 23,000 Spanish soldiers, and its forts, batteries, guns, and ammu
nition, was surrendered to the United States.
The arms captured at Santiago were as follows:
Mauser rifles 16,902
Argent rifles 872
Remington rifles 6,118
Mauser carbines 833
Argent carbines 84
Remington carbines 330
Revolvers 75
Rifled cannon:
Bronze 30
Cast-iron I0
Steel 3
Smooth bore and obsolete 44
Mortars 5
Projectiles:
Solid shot ... 3,551
Shrapnel *-,j
Shells 2 577
Small-arm ammunition:
Mauser, rounds 1,471,200
Argent, rounds 1,500.000
Others 1,680,000
492 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
The following description of the terms of capitulation were sent by
General Shafter:
PLAYA, July 16, 1898 — 3:52 p. M.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A., Washington:
Headquarters, near Santiago, 16. The conditions of capitulation include all
forces and \var material in described territory. The United States agrees with
as little delay as possible to transport all Spanish troops in district to Kingdom
of Spain, the troops, as far as possible, to embark near the garrison they now
occupy. Officers retain their side arms, and officers and men retain their per
sonal property. Spanish commander authorized to take military archives be
longing to surrendered district. All Spanish forces known as volunteers,
moirilizadves, and guerrillas, who wish to remain in Cuba may do so under
parole during present war, giving up their arms. Spanish forces march out of
Santiago with honors of war, depositing their arms at a point mutually agreed
upon to await disposition of United States Government, it being understood
the United States commissioners will recommend that the Spanish soldiers re
turn to Spain with the arms they so bravely defended. This leaves the question
of return entirely in the hands of the Government. I invite attention to the
fact that several thousand surrendered, said by General Toral to be about 12,000,
against whom a shot has not been fired. The return to Spain of the troops
in this district — about 24,000, according to General Toral — in my opinion
closes the war in Cuba. Not a word has been said about the parole of Spanish
officers and men, as it did not seem possible to me that we should fight them
in Spain, and once there it does not seem possible that they can ever return.
W. R. SHAFTER,
United States Volunteers.
As we rode for the first time into Santiago, we were struck by the
excellent manner in which the Spanish lines were intrenched, and by
the formidable defenses barricading the roads. The road by which
we entered the city was barricaded in four different places ; quantities
of barbed wire lines crossing one another in every direction, were
stretched across the entire width of the road, with an .enormous mass
in the center. Behind these were immense barrels filled with sand
stone and concrete, above which were placed sand bags so arranged
as to leave small holes through which the Spaniards could sight their
guns. Nothing short of artillery could have swept such obstructions
out of the way, and even then they would have been difficult to get
rid of on account of the narrowness of the road, which was inclosed
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 493
by high banks on either side. The streets of the city were defended
in a similar manner and the Spaniards had evidently expected that
the siege would finally come to a hand-to-hand fight. To have made
an assault upon the city would have cost an enormous sacrifice of life.
Shortly after the surrender, with my staff and various other officers,
I made a tour of inspection of the wrecks of the Spanish fleet. Passing
down the bay, the first wreck we approached was that of the " Reina
Mercedes," which was sunk in some thirty feet of water, just inside of
the bay near Morro Castle. I have already alluded to her unsuccessful
effort to block the channel, which was defeated by our brave seamen.
The gaping holes which were visible, part of the decks and smoke
stacks being out of the water, spoke eloquently of the skill and
marksmanship of American gunners.
Some six miles up the coast we found the wrecks " Maria Teresa "
and " Oquendo," which we were not allowed to board, it being con
sidered unsafe; we saw enough, however, to show the terrible havoc
made by American shells on these once fine battle ships. Later on,
I boarded and examined the " Maria Teresa," which was probably the
least injured of all these ships, and which was afterward raised and
unfortunately lost on her journey north. Continuing our trip some
ten miles farther up, we came upon the remains of the proud and
beautiful " Vizcaya," which we boarded. Here we found a scene of
utter and complete ruin; not a vestige of woodwork remained, and the
massive iron beams were twisted into the most fantastic shapes, the
large guns on board being the only things which retained a semblance
of their original form. The " Colon," having been grounded at such
a great distance up the coast, was not induded in our tour, and we
returned to Santiago after a brief visit to examine the defenses of
Morro Castle. I afterward visited and examined the fortifications of
the Punta Gorda and Socopa batteries.
It must have been with feelings of pride and satisfaction that Gen
eral Shafter turned from the scene of his brilliant triumph on the
afternoon of the ifth and dictated the following dispatch:
SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 17, 1898.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A., Washington:
I have the honor to annourrce that the American flag has been this instant,
12 o'clock, noon, hoisted over the house of the civil government in the city
of Santiago. An immense concourse of people present, a squadron of cavalry
and a regiment of infantiy presenting arms, and band playing national airs.
494 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Light battery fired salute twenty-one guns. Perfect order is being maintained
by municipal government. Distress is very great, but little sickness in town.
Scarcely any yellow fever. A small gunboat and about 200 seamen, left by
Cervera, have surrendered to me. Obstructions are being removed from mouth
of harbor. Upon coming into the city I discovered a perfect entanglement
of defenses. Fighting as the Spaniards did the first day, it would have cost
5,000 lives to have taken it. Battalions of Spanish troops have been depositing
arms since daylight in armory, over which I have guard. General Toral
formally surrendered the plaza and all stores at 9 A. M.
W. R. SHAFTER,
Ma jor -General.
On the day after the entry of the American Army into Santiago, the
following instructions were received from the President, as to the
conduct to be observed during the military occupation:
EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, July 18, 1898.
THE SECRETARY OF WAR:
SIR. — The capitulation of Spanish forces in Santiago de Cuba and in the
eastern part of the province of Santiago and the occupation of the territory
by the forces of the United States render it necessary to instiuct the military
commander of the United States as to the conduct which he is to observe
during the military occupation.
One of the important and most practical problems with which it will be
necessary for him to deal is that of the collection and administration of the
revenues. You will, therefore, at once arrange to collect customs duties and
port charges on goods and ships entering Santiago or other ports or places
coming under our control. For customs dues you will adopt the Spanish
schedules as here-tofore applied to Spanish products, whether the goods are
shipped from the United States or other country.
You will abolish, also, $i tax per ton on cargoes imported or exported;
require every vessel entering to pay twenty cents per registered ton as port
dues; collect present tax of five cents per gross ton on iron ore exported;
collect charges as per export tariff schedule.
This order is subject to modification at a later date.
WILLIAM McKINLEY.
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THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 497
OFFICERS DISTINGUISHED IN THE SANTIAGO
CAMPAIGN.
I wish to say a few words in regard to the officers serving in Cuba
during our late war with Spain.
The commander-in-chief of the American forces of invasion, Major-
General William R. Shafter, has a brilliant and enviable army record.
He did exceptionally good and honorable service during the trying
days of the civil war, from the date of his appointment as a first
lieutenant in the Seventh Michigan Infantry on August 22, 1861, to
the time when he was brevetted a brigadier of volunteers for marked
gallantry in the field in March. 1865. Early in the month of May,
1898, he was made a major-general of volunteers and assigned to the
command of the Fifth Army Corps, which conducted the operations in
front of Santiago de Cuba, and caused the surrender of the Spanish
forces of that city and province.
One of General Shatter's most marked characteristics is his
thorough grasp of detail which was of special value in the conduct of
the expedition and which helped not a little in effecting the brilliant
results of the campaign. The difficulties attending the transportation
of ammunition and rations to the front were successfully overcome,
and mismanagement in connection with such important details would
have been attended with very great suffering, and might seriously have
affected the entire situation. With his ships lying off a hostile shore,
and without a harbor, he was compelled to unload his ships into
small boats and run them through the waves and surf on to the open
coast. The difficulties were increased also by the condition of the
roads which, especially after the frequent and heavy rains, became
well-nigh impassable. It is worthy of special remark that notwith
standing these disadvantages and drawbacks, General Shafter re
mained master of the situation, and if any portion of the American
troops failed to procure sufficient rations and ammunition for all its
requirements it was owing to lc.ck of initiative on the part of sub
ordinate officers.
General Shatter's plan of the battle to be undertaken by the
Americans on July ist, was for General Lawton and his division,
strengthened by General Bates's independent brigade, to take at day
break the town of El Caney, which was defended by 520 Spaniards.
498
It was anticipated that the town would capitulate within an hour, and
that the American troops would then march on Santiago by the most
direct road, there to take their place on the right of the cavalry.
The persistency of the defense of El Caney by the Spaniards was
such, however, as to occupy the assailants until about 4 o'clock
in the afternoon, when the town was taken. Leaving some of his
troops to occupy El Caney, General Lawton then marched to join the
rest of the army on the heights of San Juan, but being met by some
Spanish soldiery during the darkness of the night, he changed the
direction of his march, and reached his destination the next morning.
General Bates, who had started in advance of General Lawton,
reached the foot of San Juan hill at midnight, and at daylight on the
morning of the 2d, placed his brigade on the ridge on the left of
Kent's division.
To General Lawton and to his brigade commanders, is due great
credit for the victory achieved at El Caney. Both General Lawton
and General Chaffee, commander of his First Brigade, are superb
soldiers, and conducted their operations in a very praiseworthy man
ner. General Ludlow, who commanded a brigade under General
Lawton, is an officer of marked ability; although, being younger, he
has had less experience than either Generals Lawton or Chaffee.
Colonel Evan Miles, commanding the Second Brigade, was an officer
of distinction and had a creditable service of thirty-seven years; he
was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general. General Bates, too,
rendered valuable services; he is a military man of high attainments,
and during his career in the army has established for himself an
enviable reputation.
Major-General Joseph Breckenridge was with the army at San Juan
as the representative of the commanding general of the army. Before
he was of age, he was appointed first lieutenant and aid-de-camp, and
afterward a lieutenant of the Second Artillery. He served creditably
during the entire war and was a graduate of the Artillery School in
1871 ; was promoted through all the grades, reaching the high office of
inspector-general of the army in January, 1889. He was among the
first appointed major-generals of volunteers. At the battle of El
Caney, he assisted General Lawton and was highly commended by that
distinguished officer. He was again with General Lawton in the
advance upon San Juan on July 2d. At this time the enemy in front
of San Juan were firing very freely upon our troops at San Juan, many
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 499
of the shots passing over their heads and falling along the road from
San Juan to El Poso. One of these shots struck General Brecken-
ridge's horse as he was crossing San Juan river at what was called the
" Bloody Ford." Soon after this General Breckenridge was placed in
command of the troops of the Second Corps at Chattanooga, Ten
nessee, and later he was in command of the same corps at Lexington,
Ky. Had the war continued, it is more than probable this officer
would have earned great distinction.
I must say a special word concerning Major-General J. Ford Kent,
with whom my acquaintance dates back to the classes at West Point.
He has always been considered as an officer possessing the most ex
cellent qualities. His command, which consisted of the first division
of infantry, joined forces with the cavalry division in the attack on
San Juan. Having been directed to issue orders to this gallant officer
as well as to those of my own division, his conduct was necessarily to
a great extent under my own personal observation.
As the troops of General Kent and those of my own division were
alone in their attack on San Juan on July ist, and as I was the senior
officer on the firing line, it was deemed advisable that I should issue
instructions to General Kent as well as to the officers of my own
division General Shafter had very properly chosen an elevated posi
tion from which he could overlook the movements of the troops both
at El Caney and at San Juan, as, being responsible for the entire
army, he was thus enabled to control the two battles which it became
his duty to direct.
As has already been stated, the orders given me on June 24th, had
placed me in command of all the troops on shore. And although, of
course, I no longer occupied that position after General Shafter came
ashore and assumed command in person, yet this character of dele
gated control was to a certain degree extended to me for some time
afterward. Although General Kent's good military record was well
known to me, and although I had always had a high opinion of his
qualifications, yet the intelligent and courageous manner in which
he handled his troops during the engagements at San Juan still more
increased my admiration for him.
General Hamilton S. Hawkins was very greatly distinguished in the
battle and exhibited courage and determination. He was also at
West Point with me, and commanded the First Brigade of the First
Infantry Division of the Fifth Army Corps at this time. He was un-
5OO CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
fortunately wounded in the foot on the evening of July 2d, which
temporarily incapacitated him from retaining his place on the firing
line, and it was very gratifying to us all to know that he, together
with Generals Kent, Bates, Lawton, and Chaffee, and eventually Gen
erals Sumner and Ludlow, were all of them promoted to the rank of
major-general of volunteers.
General Samuel S. Sumner, mentioned in my report, commanded
the First Brigade of Cavalry. He was the son of Major-General
Edwin B. Sumner, a distinguished corps commander of the war of
1861-1865. He was appointed lieutenant of cavalry in June, 1861,
serving on his father's staff; he also served as commander of a com
pany of cavalry ; he was promoted through all the grades, and became
colonel of the Sixth Cavalry, May, 1896. His record shows a most
creditable career as a soldier; he is now serving as military attaahe
with the American legation in London.
General S. B. M. Young, who, as has already been seen, was quite
distinguished at the battle of Las Guasimas, was absent at this time,
sick. I joined very strongly in recommending him also to the Gov
ernment for promotion, which was, we were pleased to see, favorably
acted upon. His experience as an officer in the army has been very
large, and his qualifications, which are of the very highest order, are
well known. General Ludlow, who had received his military training
as an officer of engineers, although being in command for a very
short period, showed marked ability in the handling of his men, and
although brief, his management as a commander of soldiers was very
creditable.
General Ed. D. Pearson entered the army April 18, 1861. He
served continuously with great distinction, passing through all grades
up to and including colonel in the regular army and brigadier-general
of volunteers. His service was always creditable, particularly at San
Juan.
General Wallace F. Randolph, commander of the artillery, did not
reach Cuba until after the battle of San Juan. He was distinguished
during the civil war and had a very excellent record as an artillery
officer.
Colonel Charles A. Wikofr* entered the army April 20, 1861. He
passed through all the grades of the regular army to colonel, and was
killed while gallantly commanding his brigade at San Juan.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 5OI
Colonel William S. Worth entered the army in April, 1861. He
passed through all the grades to colonel; was made brigadier-general
for gallantry at San Juan, where he was wounded.
Colonel Emerson H. Liscum entered the army in May, 1861. He
served through all grades to the rank of colonel; he was badly
wounded while gallantly fighting at San Juan, and was promoted to
the rank of brigadier-general of volunteers.
Lieutenant-Colonel Ezra P. Ewers entered the army in 1862. He
served up to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and was made brigadier-
general of volunteers for gallant conduct in battle.
Colonel Leonard Wood reported for duty at Tampa in May, 1898,
as colonel of the First Volunteer Cavalry. He showed great energy
and determination. He was distinguished at Las Guasimas and San
Juan and was afterward made brigadier-general and appointed mili
tary governor of Santiago, being finally promoted major-general of
volunteers.
Colonel Charles D. Viele commanded the First Regiment of
United States Cavalry. He was distinguished at San Juan and was
promoted to the rank of brigadier-general of volunteers for gallantry.
Colonel Henry Carroll entered the army in 1859. He commanded
the Sixth Cavalry at San Juan; a portion of the time he commanded
the First Cavalry Brigade; was distinguished and wounded in that
battle, and was promoted brigadier-general of volunteers.
Lieutenant-Colonel Norvell entered the army in 1858; was dis
tinguished at the battles of Las Guasimas and San Tuan, and was
recommended for promotion to colonel by brevet.
Colonel T. A. Baldwin commanded the Tenth United States
Cavalry in the battle of San Juan; was promoted brigadier-general of
volunteers for distinguished gallantry.
Major James M. Bell served in the regular army for thirty-three
years; was distinguished at the battle of Las Guasimas where he was
badly wounded; he was recommended for promotion for gallantry.
Major Henry W. Wessells, Jr., was very distinguished in the battle
of San Juan; was recommended for promotion by brevet for good
conduct.
Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt volunteered for the war
and served with great distinction at Las Guasimas and San Juan, for
which he was nominated for the brevets of colonel and brigadier-
general.
502 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Major T. J. Wint has spent his life in the army; was wounded and
distinguished for gallantry in the battle of San Juan
Colonel Derby of the Engineer Corps, Colonel E. J. McClernand,
General Shafter's adjutant-general, and Lieutenant J. D. Miley, aid-
de-camp, were all very gallant officers. They rendered exceptionally
good service throughout the campaign, and contributed not a little
to its ultimate success. It was very pleasing to me to know that all
three of these officers were recommended and promoted for gallantry.
Colonel Harry C. Egbert commanded the Sixth Infantry, First
Brigade of Kent's division; was very distinguished and was wounded
in the battle of San Juan, and was promoted to the rank of brigadier-
general of volunteers for good conduct on that field. He became
colonel of the Twenty-second Infantry and was ordered to join that
regiment at Manila, where he was afterward killed while gallantly
leading in battle.
Colonel Richard Comba was very distinguished at El Caney, and
was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general of volunteers in recog
nition of his gallantry.
Major William H. Boyle was distinguished at San Juan. He served
during the civil war and has spent his life in the army.
There are very many others whose services I would like to mention
in detail; their names are among those commended by their superior
officers and among those recommended by the President for brevet
promotion, full lists of which will be found further on.
On July 23d, I wrote a letter consolidating some recommendations
previously made by me of officers who served with distinction in the
battles of Las Guasimas and San Juan. It was as follows:
HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
Near SANTIAGO BE CUBA, July 23, 1898.
To Colonel E. J. MCCLERNAND, Adjutant-General, Fifth Army Corps:
SIR. — I received your letter instructing me to consolidate all the recom
mendations commending officers for good conduct in the battle of Las
Guasimas on June 24th, in the battle of San Juan on July ist, and in subsequent
operations. I therefore transmit herewith the recommendations referred to.
I also respectfully recommend, for the consideration of the Government, the
following officers who served upon my staff:
Major William D. Beach did distinguished service in the battle of Las
Guasimas on June 24th and in operation before San Juan.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 503
Lieutenant-Colonel Dorst, adjutant-general of the cavalry division, Major
E. A. Garlington, Captain Joseph P. Dickman, First Lieutenant Matthew W.
Steele, Second Lieutenant James H. Reeves and Second Lieutenant Joseph
Wheeler, Jr., were all distinguished in the battle of July ist and in subsequent
operations. I recommend them for the consideration of the Government.
In forwarding these recommendations I respectfully request a favorable
indorsement from the commanding general of the forces in Cuba.
I also desire to commend the good conduct of Captain William Astor Chanler
of the volunteers and of Mr. Aurelius Mestre, volunteer aid, in the battle
of July ist and in the operations around San Juan.
I also desire to commend Captain P. W. West, who although not actually
in the engagements, has been efficient in the highest degree in performing the
duties of quartermaster of the division and in assisting materially as quarter
master of the Army.'
Respectfully,
JOS. WHEELER,
Major-General U. S. Volunteers, Commanding Cavalry Division.
My association with General Jose Toral who, in the illness of Gen
eral Linares, commanded the Spanish forces at Santiago, and with
General Federico Escario, was quite extensive. I saw both of these
officers several times, and many communications passed between us.
They both stand high in the army of Spain, and I was very favorably
impressed with both of them. The rapid and skilful march made by
General Escario with his troops from Manzanillo to Santiago, where
he reinforced General Linares, won him promotion to the rank of
brigadier-general in the Spanish army. He commanded on this march
some 2,500 men, rapidly marched with them a distance of more than a
hundred miles, and, although his approach to the city was opposed by
General Garcia, yet he easily forced a passage and reached the city
without difficulty. General Linares, the Spanish commander-in-chief
of the Santiago district, commanded his forces in person at the action
of Las Guasimas on June 24th, and also at the San Juan battle, where
he was quite severely wounded. I called on him one morning after
the surrender and found him in bed with his arm bandaged and lying
upon a pillow. The wound had much weakened him, given him much
pain, and caused him to have almost constant attacks of fever. This
officer is evidently highly regarded by his fellow countrymen. He is
lieutenant-general by rank, and impressed me very favorably.
504 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
When the formal ceremonies of the surrender took place on July
i6th, the American generals and their staffs repaired to the governor's
palace in Santiago, and I met at this time a large number of public
functionaries, among them the archbishop, civil governor and the
judges. My impressions of them were, of course, based upon a very
short interview with them, but they did not impress me at all as well
as does the average American official.
One of the causes which rendered the army of Santiago a unique
.one, and which had attracted considerable public attention, was the
number of people of wealth and distinction who enlisted in the army
of the United States as privates at the outbreak of the war, or who
went through the campaign with subordinate commissions. Among
these was one very prominent gentleman, Colonel John Jacob Astor,
whose wealth is said to be certainly not less than $100,000,000, but
who voluntarily suffered the hardships and incurred the risks of his
brother officers throughout the whole campaign. Two of his cousins,
too, did valuable service, both gentlemen of means, Captain William
Astor Chanler and Lieutenant Woodbury Kane. When the position
of these three gentlemen is considered, I think due credit should be
given them for the disinterested services rendered. Colonel Astor, I
think, supplies the only instance on record of a man of his wealth
voluntarily neglecting his large interests and sacrificing his comfort
in time of war in a tropical and unhealthy district in the service
of his country. Many other gentlemen also are entitled to the
fullest credit for the same self-sacrifice. Among them might be men
tioned Major G. Creighton Webb, Henry Bull, Craig Wadsworth,
Joseph Stephen, Captain Brice, son of Senator Brice, and last but not
least, Lieutenant Tiffany, who died in Boston soon after landing, from
the effects of fever contracted during the campaign, and Sergeant
Hamilton Fish of the First Volunteer Cavalry, who fell while bravely
fighting at Las Guasimas, the first battle of the American army on
Cuban soil.
On Sunday, August ist, the command and officers of the various
brigades and divisions which participated in the campaign, together
with some members of their staff, met in the building which had
formerly been occupied by the Spanish governor of .Santiago, where
General Shatter's headquarters were then established. A meeting was
held which was called to order by General Lawton, who explained
that its purpose was to establish the Society of the Army of Santiago.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 505
General Lawton moved that General Wheeler be elected chairman,
which was unanimously carried. Upon taking the chair .General
Wheeler addressed his fellow-officers as follows:
GENTLEMEN. — I thank you for the honor of being called as the temporary
chairman of this gathering of my fellow officers, who have met to consider the
advisability of organizing a society of the Army of Santiago.
The rapidly occurring events of the campaign of the past five or six weeks
have been of a character which will ever bring together the hearts of those
who have participated.
This army, by its endurance and courage, has already won the admiration
of the civilized world, and it is most natural and appropriate that men who have
stood shoulder to shoulder in such a struggle, crowned as it has been with
glorious victory, should desire to cherish and perpetuate such memories.
General Wheeler adverted to the historic character and value of
similar societies, which had been organized at the close of the several
wars in which our country had been engaged; enumerating the Order
of the Cincinnati, organized by Washington's officers at the close of
the American Revolution, the Society of the War of 1812, the Aztec
Society, which grew out of the war with Mexico, and the various
societies growing out of the war of 1861-5.
It was eventually carried upon the motion of General Ludlow, that
the following officers be appointed to draw up the constitution and
by-laws of the whole society : Generals Ludlow, Lawton, Kent, Bates,
Captain Woodbury Kane, Lieutenant J. D. Miley.
The meeting then adjourned on the understanding that a further
meeting was to be held at the same place on the following Sunday,
August 7th. At this adjourned meeting, however, the only business
that was transacted was the election of a president, vice-president and
secretary. After requesting General Lawton to take the chair, General
Wheeler spoke in complimentary terms of General Shafter, and
nominated him to be the permanent president of the new-founded
society. This motion was unanimously adopted, General Wheeler
being elected vice-president and Major Alfred C. Sharpe, secretary.
After the chair had appointed a committee to notify General Shafter of
his unanimous election as president of the society, the meeting ad
journed to meet at the call of the president.
506 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIK.
The following nominations for brevet appointments were sent by the
President to the Senate in January, 1899:
APPOINTMENTS BY BREVET, TO RANK FROM JULY i, 1898.
To BE MAJOR-GENERAL BY BREVET.
Brigadier-General William R. Shafter, United States Army, for distinguished
service in the conduct of the Santiago campaign, June 22, 1898, to July 17, 1898.
To BE BRIGADIER-GENERAL BY BREVET.
Colonel Hugh A. Theaker, Sixteenth Infantry (since retired), for gallantry
in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July I, 1898.
To BE COLONELS BY BREVET.
Lieutenant-Colonel Charles W. Miner, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob H. Smith, Twelfth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Lieutenant-Colonel Abram A. Harbach, Third Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Lieutenant-Colonel John M. Hamilton, Ninth Cavalry (killed in action July
i, 1898), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Lieutenant-Colonel Stevens T. Norvell, Ninth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur L. Wagner, assistant adjutant-general, United
States Army, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
To BE LIEUTENANT-COLONELS BY BREVET.
Major Stephen W. Groesbeck, judge-advocate, United States Army, for
gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Major Samuel Q. Robinson, surgeon, United States Army, for meritorious
service in attending wounded under fire, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Major Henry S. Kilbourne, surgeon, United States Army, for meritorious
service in attending wounded under fire, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Major Ernest A. Garlington, inspector-general, United States Army, for
gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Major Charles A. Dempsey, Second Infantry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Major Sumner H. Lincoln, Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 5°7
Major Richard I. Eskridge, Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Major Augustus W. Corliss, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El
Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Major Charles A. Coolidge, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El
Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Major James Miller, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago
de Cuba, July I, 1898.
Major William Auman Thirteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago
de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Major Alfred C. Markley, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Major William M. Van Home, Twenty-second Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Major Stephen Baker, Fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney,
Cuba, July I, 1898.
Major Lyster M. O'Brien, Seventeenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El
Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Major Henry W. Wessells, Jr., Third Cavalry, for most distinguished gal
lantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Major Henry Jackson, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de
Cuba, July i, 1898.
Major Thomas C. Let>o, Sixth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de
Cuba, July i, 1898.
Major George McCreery, surgeon, United States Army (since deceased),
for meritorious service in attending wounded under fire, Santiago de Cuba,
July i, 1898.
Major Albert G. Forse, First Cavalry (killed in action July i, 1898), for
gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Jacob G. Galbraith, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago
de Cuba, July i, 1898. (Nominated for brevet major, to rank 'from June 24,
1898.)
Captain Robert P. P. Wainwright, First Cavalry, for gallantry in» battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898. (Nominated for brevet major, to rank from
June 24, 1898.)
Major Theodore J. Wint, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago
de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain William H. Berk, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de
Cuba, July i, 1898. (Nominated for brevet major, to rank from June 24, 1898.)
508 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Captain Charles G. Ayres, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de
Cuba, July i, 1898. (Nominated for brevet major, to rank from June 24, 1898.)
Captain James W. Watson, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de
Cuba, July I, 1898. (Nominated for brevet major, to rank from June 24, 1898.)
Captain Lloyd S. McCormick, Seventh Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898. (Nominated for brevet major, to rank from June
24, 1898.)
Major William S. McCaskey, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
To BE MAJORS BY BREVET.
Captain Lloyd M. Brett, Second Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney,
Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Henry C. Fisher, assistant surgeon, United States Army, for meri
torious service in attending wounded under fire, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain William B. Banister, assistant surgeon, United States Army, for
meritorious service in attending wounded under fire, Santiago de Cuba, July
i. 1898.
Captain Harry M. Hallock, assistant surgeon. United States Army, for
meritorious service attending wounded under fire, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Madison M. Brewer, assistant surgeon, LTnited States Army (since
deceased), for meritorious service attending wounded under fire, El Caney,
Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Alexander M. Wetherill, Sixth Infantry (killed in action), for gal
lantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Charles Byrne, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de
Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain layman W. V. Kermon, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain George B. Walker, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago
de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Zerah W. Torrey, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago
de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Charles H. Noble, Sixteenth Infantry (now major, Twenty-fifth
Infantry), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain George H. Palmer, Sixteenth Infantry (now major, Fourth Infantry),
for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain William C. McFarland, Sixteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 5°9
Captain William Lassitcr, Sixteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July I, 1898.
Captain Leven C. Allen, Sixteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago
de Cuba, July I, 1898.
Captain Theophilus W. Morrison, Sixteenth Infantry (killed in action, July
i, 1898), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Richard R. Steedman, Eleventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Harry L. Haskcll, Twelfth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney,
Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Wallis O. Clark, Twelfth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney,
Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Palmer G. Wood, Twelfth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El
Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Robert K. Evans, Twelfth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El
Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Millard F. Waltz, Twelfth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney,
Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain William J. Turner, Second Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago
de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Charles W. Rowell, Second Infantry (killed in action, July 10, 1898),
for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain John K. Waring, Second Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago
de Cuba, July I, 1898.
Captain Abner Pickering, Second Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago
de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Frederick T. Van Liew, Second Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Joel T. Kirkman, Tenth Infantry (now major, Sixteenth Infantry),
for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Gregory Barrett, Tenth Infantry (since deceased), for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain John F. Stretch, Tenth Infantry (now major, Eighth Infantry), for
gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Walter T. Duggan, Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago
de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain William Paulding, Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago
de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Robert C Van Vliet, Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago
de Cuba, July i, 1898.
5 io CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Captain Charles J. T. Clarke, Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago
de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Frederick M. H. Kendrick, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain John T. Van Orsdale, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El
Caney, Cuba, July T, 1898.
Captain Charles A. Booth, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Ei Caney,
Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Charles A. Worden, Seventh Infantry (since deceased), for gallantry
in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain George S. Young, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El
Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain James B. Jackson, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El
Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Daniel L. Howell, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El
Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain George W. Mclver, Seventh Infant^, for gallantry in battle, El
Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Daniel A. Frederick, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El
Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Frederick H. E. Ebstein, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Daniel Cornman, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Joseph W. Duncan, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Willis Wittich, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Charles A. Williams, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Francis E. Eltonhead, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Charles H. Bonesteel, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Harry L. Bailey, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Lawrence J. Hearn, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain John S. Parke, Jr., Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 511
Captain Morris C. Foote, Ninth Infantry (now major, Ninth Infantry), for
gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain James Regan, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de
Cuba, July I, 1898.
Captain Edgar B. Robertson, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July I, 1898.
Captain Thomas S. McCaleb, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Charles R. Noyes, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago
clc Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain John B. Rodman, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El
Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Joseph F. Huston, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El
Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Alfred Reynolds, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El
Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Herbert S. Foster, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle. El
Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain James S. Rogers, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El
Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Henry B. Moon, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle. El
Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain James A. Irons, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El
Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain John C. Dent, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney,
Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain John F. Morrison, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantly in battle, El
Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Henry A. Greene, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle. El
Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Marion B. Saffold, Thirteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain William N. Hughes, Thirteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Ammon A. Augur, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Charles Dodge, Twenty-fourth Infantry (since deceased), for gal
lantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain John J. Brereton, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
512 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Captain Arthur C. Ducat, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 189.8.
Captain James E. Brett, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Henry Wygant, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Benjamin W. Leavell, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Benjamin C. Lockwood, Twenty-second Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain John J. Crittenden, Twenty-second Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Robert N. Getty, Twenty-second Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain William H. Kell, Twenty-second Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Richard H. Wilson, Eighth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El
Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Colville P. Terrett, Eighth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney,
Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Butler D. Price, Fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney,
Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Henry E. Robinson, Fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El
Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Edward H. Browne, Fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El
Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Leonard A. Lovering, Fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El
Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Frank B. Andrus, Fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle. El Cnney,
Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Henry Seton, Fouith Infantry (now major, Twelfth Infantry), for
gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain George O. Webster, Fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El
Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Charles W. Mason, Fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El
Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Carver Howland, Fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney,
Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Charles L. Hodges, Twenty-fifth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
a
<
PQ
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 5:5
Captain Robert H. R. Loughborough, Twenty-fifth Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Eaton A. Edwards, Twenty-fifth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El
Caney, Cuba, July I, 1898.
Captain Robert W. Dowd, United States Army, retired (when serving as
first lieutenant, Seventeenth Infantry), for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba,
July i, 1898.
Captain Daniel H. Brush, Seventeenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El
Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain George H. Roach, Seventeenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El
Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Edward Chynoweth, Seventeenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El
Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Charles St. J. Chubb, Seventeenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain James T. Kerr, Seventeenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El
Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Jown W. Hannay, Third Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney,
Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Omar Bundy, Sixth Infantry (then serving as first lieutenant, Third
Infantry), for gallantry in battle. El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Arthur Williams, Third Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney,
Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain George Bell, Jr., First Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney,
Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Chase W. Kennedy, Eighth Infantry, for gallantry in battle. El
Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Joseph Hale, Third Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney,
Cuba, July i, 1898 (since deceased).
Captain Charles Morton, Third Cavalry (now major, Fourth Cavalry), for
gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain George A. Dodd, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago
de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain George K. Hunter, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Henry L. Ripley, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain George H. Morgan, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
CUBAS STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Captain Daniel H. Boughton, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Francis H. Hardie, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Franklin O. Johnson, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain John B. Kerr, Sixth Cavalry (now major, Tenth Cavalry), for gal
lantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain William Stanton, Sixth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago
de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Henry P. Kingsbary, Sixth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Frank West, Sixth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de
Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Augustus P. Blocksom, Sixth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain John F. R. Landis, Sixth Cavalry (now captain, First Cavalry),
for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Clarence A. Stedman, Ninth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Charles W. Taylor, Ninth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain John F. McBlain, Ninth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain George J. Newgarden, assistant surgeon, United States Army, for
meritorious service in attending wounder under fire, Santiago de Cuba, July
i. 1898.
Captain Charles J. Stevens, Second Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Herbert E. Tutherly, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain William C. Brown, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Peter E. Traub, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898. (Nominated for brevet captain, to rank from
June 24, 1898.)
First Lieutenant Edmund S. Wright, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898. (Nominated for brevet captain, to rank from
June 24, 1898.)
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 5J7
Captain Thaddeus W. Jones, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain John Bigelow, Jr., Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Robert J. Fleming, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898. (Nominated for brevet captain, to rank from
June 24, 1898.)
Captain Allyn Capron, First Artillery (since deceased), for gallantry in
in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Clermont L. Best, First Artillery, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain George S. Grimes, Second Artillery, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Charles D. Parkhurst, Second Artillery, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Thomas H. Wilson, Second Infantry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Joseph T. Dickman, Eighth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Albert B. Scott, Thirteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Eugene D. Dimmick, Ninth Cavalry (now major, Fifth Cavalry),
for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
To BE CAPTAINS BY BREVET.
First Lieutenant Thomas L. Smith, Seventeenth Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Benjamin F. Hardaway, Seventeenth Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant John D. Miley, Second Artillery, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Samuel E. Smiley, Fifteenth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Matthew W. Steele, Eighth Cavalry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Edward R. Chrisman, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant William H. Simons, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
518 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
First Lieutenant Stephen M. Foote, Fourth Artillery, for gallant and
meritorious service in presence of the enemy, Santiago cle Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Benjamin W. Atkinson, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant William C. Bennett, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Edwin T. Cole, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Willard E. Gleason, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant S. J. Bayard Schindel, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry i,n
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Jules G. Ord, Sixth Infantry (killed in action), for gallantry
in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant William K. Jones Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Guy G. Palmer, Sixteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Edward C. Carey, Sixteenth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Lewis S. Sorley, Sixteenth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant John F. Preston, Jr., Sixteenth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Isaac Erwin, Sixteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Charles P. George, Sixteenth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Samuel P. Lyon, Sixteenth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Frank L. Winn, Twelfth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Willis Uline, Twelfth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant William J. Lutz, Second Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Charles H. Muir, Second Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant William P. Jackson-, Second Infantry (now first lieutenant,
Twenty-fourth Infantry), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i,
1898.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. S19
First Lieutenant John L. Hines, Second Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July I, 1898.
First Lieutenant Carl Koops, Tenth Infantry (since deceased), for gallantry
in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant James Baylies, Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July I, 1898.
First Lieutenant Eli A. Helmick, Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Samuel Burkhardt, Jr., Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Truman O. Murphy, Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Mathew E. Saville, Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Robert S. Offley, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant John S. Grisard, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle.
El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Harry H. Bandholtz, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant William Wallace, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Willi?m C. Rogers, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant George H. Jamerson, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in
battle. El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Otho B. Rosenbaum, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Almon T. Parmcrter, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Edward W. McCaskey, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Charles Crawford, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Peter Murray, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant William M. Morrow, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, Santiago dc Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant John J. O'Connell, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
520 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
First Lieutenant William H. Mullay, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Frank K. Lawton, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 189.8.
First Lieutenant David G. Spurgin, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Wendell L. Simpson, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
F'irst Lieutenant Edgar F. Koehler, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Andre W. Brewster, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant John M. Sigworth, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Edwin V. Bookmiller, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry «in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Francis H. Schoeffel, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Louis B. Lawton, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Thomas W. Connell, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Hugh D. Wise, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant John H. Parker, Thirteenth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, while commanding Gatling-gun detachment, Santiago de Cuba, July
i, 1898.
First Lieutenant William H. H. Chapman, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Robert W. Mearns, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Morton F. Smith, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898
First Lieutenant Ulysses G. Worrilow, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Charles C. Smith, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July I, 1898.
First Lieutenant Lorrain T. Richardson, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 521
First Lieutenant George H. Estes, Jr., Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Edward M. Lewis, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Frederick R. Day, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Thomas W. Darrah, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July I, 1898.
First Lieutenant Hansford L. Threlkeld, Thirteenth Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Frederick W. Fuger, Thirteenth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Frank D. Ely, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Charles E. Tayman, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Albert Laws, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Henry G. Lyon, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Henry C. Keene, Jr., Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Joseph D. Leitch, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Isaac C. Jenks, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Hunter B. Nelson, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant William P. Jackson, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant John A. Gurney, Nineteenth Infantry (killed in action),
for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July I, 1898.
First Lieutenant Walter L. Taylor, Twenty-second Infantry (since deceased),
for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant William H. Wassell, Twenty-second Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant George J. Godfrey, Twenty-second Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant William C. Neary, Fourth Infantry (since deceased), for
gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
522 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
First Lieutenant Charles McQuiston, Fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Austin H. Brown, Fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Vernon A. Caldwell, Twenty-fifth Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Marcus D. Cronin, Twenty-fifth Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Ross L. Bush, Twenty-fifth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Dennis M. Michie, Seventeenth Infantry (killed in action),
for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Hollis C. Clark, Twenty-fifth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Henry L. Kinnison, Twenty-fifth Infantry, for gallantry"
in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant William T. Schenck, Twenty-fifth Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant James A. Moss, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, .Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Charles D. Clay, Seventeenth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Verling K. Hart, Seventeenth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Arthur Johnson, Seventeenth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant James H. McRae, Third Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant James W. McAndrew, Third Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant, Harry Freeland, Third Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Horace M. Reeve, Third Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant James T. Moore, Third Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant George E. Houle, Third Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Hamilton A. Smith, Third Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 523
First Lieutenant John W. Barker, Third Infantry, for gal-lantry in battle,
El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant John C. McArthur, Third Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July I, 1898.
First Lieutenant Alexander L. Dade, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Thomas B. Dugan, Third Cavalry (now captain, Seventh
Cavalry), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Arthur Thayer, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Francis J. Koester, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Alfred C. Merillat, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Oren B. Meyer, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant John A. Harman, Sixth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant James A. Cole, Sixth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Richard B. Paddock, Sixth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Edward C. Brooks, Sixth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Winthrop S. Wood, Ninth Cavalry (now captain and as
sistant quartermaster. United States Army), for gallantry in battle, Santiago
de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Henry A. Barber, Ninth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Wilbur E. Dove, Twelfth Infantry, ,for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Michael M. McNamce, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant John D. L. Hartman, First Cavalry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Milton F. Davis, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Clough Overton, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
524 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
First Lieutenant William H. Osborne, First Cavalry (since deceased), for
gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant George W. Goode, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant William E. Shipp, Tenth Cavalry (killed in action), for
gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant William H. Smith, Tenth Cavalry (killed in action), for
gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant John J. Pershing, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant James B. Hughes, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Malvern-Hill Barnum, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battlt,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Richard L. Livermore, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry* in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Edward D. Anderson, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant George Vidmer, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898. (Nominated for brevet first lieutenant, to
rank from June 24, 1898.)
Second Lieutenant Dennis E. Nolan, First Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898. (Nominated for brevet first lieutenant, to
rank from May 12, 1898.)
Second Lieutenant Alexander M. Miller, Jr., Tenth Cavalry, for gaHantry
in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898. (Nominated for brevet first lieutenant,
to rank from June 24, 1898.)
First Lieutenant William Lassitcr, First Artillery, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant William L. Kenly, First Artillery, for gallantry in battle,
El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant John Conklin, Jr., Second Artillery, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant William W. Quinton, assistant surgeon, United States Army,
for distinguished public service in presence of the enemy, Santiago de Cuba,
July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Briant H. Wells, Eighteenth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 525
To BE FIRST LIEUTENANTS BY BREVET.
Second Lieutenant Edmund M. Leary, Second Cavalry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1.898.
Second Lieutenant James H. Reeves, Sixth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Joseph Wheeler, Jr., Fourth Artillery, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Dwight W. Ryther, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Clarence N. Purdy, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle. Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Louis H. Gross, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant William F. Nesbitt, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant James V. Heidt, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant John Robertson, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Reuben S. Turman, Sixth Infantry (since deceased),
for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Edmund N. Benchley, Sixth Infantry (killed in action),
for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Benjamin T. Simmons, Sixteenth Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant William F. Creary, Second Infantry, for gallantry, in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Alexander E. Williams, Second Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Franklin S. Hutton, Second Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Oscar J. Charles, Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Alga P. Berry, Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle.
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Romulus F. Walton, Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Thomas A. Pearce, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
526 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Second Lieutenant Charles E. Russell, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Henry M. Dichmann, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Curtis W. Otwell, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Herbert A. Lafferty, Seventh Infantry (since deceased),
for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Thomas A. Wansboro, Seventh Infantry (killed in action),
for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Anton Springer, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant William M. Fassett, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Edgar T. Conley, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Francis K. Meade, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Louis -M. Nuttman, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Arthur R. Kerwin, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Claude H. Miller, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Isaac Newell, Twenty-second Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Charles S. Lincoln, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant William L. Murphy, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gal
lantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Joseph N. Augustin, Jr., Twenty-fourth Infantry (since
deceased), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Halstead Dorey, Fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle.
El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant John H. Hughes, Fourth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant John J. Bernard, Fourth Infantry (killed in action),
for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Howard W. French, Twenty-fifth Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. $2?
Second Lieutenant John E. Hunt, Twenty-fifth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Berkeley Enochs, Twenty-fifth Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July I, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Paul Giddings, Third Infantry, for gallantry in battle.
El Caney, Cuba, July I, 1898.
Second Lieutenant George L. Byroade, Third Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Thomas T. Frissell, Third Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Ira C. Welborn, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle.
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Ira L. Reeves, Seventeenth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Thomas F. Dwyer, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Harry F. Rethers, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Warren S. Barlow, Fifteenth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Charles W. Exton, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Lucian Stacy, Twentieth Infantry (since deceased), for
gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant G. Maury Cralle, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Lyman M. Welch, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Thomas M. Anderson, Jr., Thirteenth Infantry, for gal
lantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Alvan C. Read, Thirteenth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Lincoln C. Andrews, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Julius T. Conrad, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Andrew E. Williams, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Harry H. Pattison, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
528 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Second Lieutenant John Morrison, Jr., Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant William D. Chitty, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Edgar A. Sirmyer, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July T, 1898.
Sf-cond Lieutenant George C. Earnhardt, Sixth Cavalry (now first lieuten
ant, Fourth Cavalry), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Harry H. Stout, Sixth Cavalry (now first lieutenant,
Ordnance Department), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Nathan K. Averill, Seventh Cavalry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant August C. Nissen, Sixth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Alvord Van P. Anderson, Sixth Cavalry, for gallantry
in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant John C. Raymond, Sixth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Kenzie W. Walker, Ninth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Edward E. Hartwick, Ninth Cavalry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Walter M. Whitman, First Cavalry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Henry C. Smither, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Charles McK. Saltzman, First Cavalry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Robert C. Williams, First Cavalry (now first lieutenant,
First Cavalry), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Hugh D. Berkeley, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Newton D. Kirkpatrick (since deceased), First Cavalry,
for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Harry O. Williard, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Henry C. Whitehead, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Frank R. McCoy, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 529
Second Lieutenant Thomas A. Roberts, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago, de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Alfred E. Kennington, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July I, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Alston Hamilton, First Artillery, for gallantry in battle,
El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Otho W. B. Farr, Second Artillery, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Charles D. Roberts, Seventeenth Infantry, for gallantry
in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
To BE MAJOR-GENERAL BY BREVET.
Brigadier-General Henry M. Duffield, United States Volunteers, for gallant
and meritorious service in the presence of the enemy, Aguadores, Cuba, July
i, 1898.
To BE BRIGADIER-GENERALS BY BREVET.
Colonel Embury P. Clark, Second Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, for
gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gal
lantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898. (Nominated for brevet col
onel, to rank from June 24, 1898.)
To BE COLONELS BY BREVET.
Lieutenant-Colonel Edward J. McClernand, assistant adjutant-general,
United States Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i,
1898.
Lieutenant-Colonel George McC. Derby, United States Volunteer Engineers,
for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Lieutenant-Colonel John Jacob Astor, inspector-general, United States Vol
unteers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898. '
Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph H. Dorst, assistant adjutant-general, United
States Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Major William D. Beach, United States Volunteer Engineers, for gallantry
in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898. (Nominated for brevet lieutenant-
colonel, to rank from June 24, 1898.)
Lieutenant-Colonel Edwin R. Shumway, Second Massachusetts Volunteer
Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
53° CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
To BE LIEUTENANT-COLONELS BY BREVET.
Major Robert H. Noble, assistant adjutant-general, United States Volun
teers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Major Charles G. Starr, inspector-general, United States Volunteers, for
gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Major Henry S. T. Harris, brigade surgeon, United States Volunteers, for
meritorious service attending wounded under fire, Santiago de Cuba, July i,
1898.
Major Henry T. Allen, assistant adjutant-general. United States Volunteers,
for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Major Alfred C. Sharpe, assistant adjutant-general. United States Volunteers,
for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Major C. Creighton Webb, inspector-general, United States Volunteers, for
gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Major John A. Logan, assistant adjutant-general, United States Volunteers,
for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Major Francis J. Ives, brigade surgeon, United States Volunteers, for meri
torious service attending wounded under fire, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Major Harry E. Wilkins, chief commissary of subsistence, United States
Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Major Reuben A. Whipple, Second Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, for
gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Major George H. Sands, United States Volunteer Engineers, for gallantry
in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Albert L. Mills, assistant adjutant-general, United States Volunteers,
for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898. (Nominated for brevet
major, to rank from June 24, 1898.)
Major Webb Hayes, First Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Major Philip Reade, inspector-general, United States Volunteers, for gal
lantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Major Victor C. Vaughn, surgeon, Thirty-third Michigan Volunteer In
fantry, for meritorious service in attending wounded under fire, Aguadores,
Cuba, July i, 1898.
Major Charles B. Nancrede, surgeon, United States Volunteers, for meri
torious service in attending wounded under fire, Aguadores, Cuba, July i, 1898.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 533
To BE MAJORS BY BREVET.
Captain Stewart M. Bricc, commissary of subsistence, United States Volun
teers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July I, 1898.
Captain John C. Gilmore, assistant adjutant-general, United States Volun
teers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain William A. Chandler, assistant adjutant-general, United States Vol
unteers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July I, 1898.
Captain William H. McKittrick, assistant adjutant-general, United States
Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July I, 1898.
Captain Cornelis De W. Willcox, assistant adjutant-general, United States
Volunteers, for gallant and meritorious services in presence of the enemy,
Aguadores, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain James H. McMillan, assistant quartermaster, United States Volun
teers, for gallant and meritorious services in presence of the enemy, Agua
dores, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Frederick M. Alger, assistant adjutant-general, United States Vol
unteers, for gallant and meritorious services in presence of the enemy, Agua
dores, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Charles D. Rhodes, assistant adjutant-general, United States Vol
unteers, for gallant and meritorious services in presence of the enemy, San
tiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Ulysses G. McAlexander, quartermaster, United States Volunteers,
for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain William E. Horton, assistant adjutant-general, United States Vol
unteers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Harvey C. Carbaugh, assistant adjutant-general, United States Vol
unteers, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July I, 1898.
Captain William H. Wright, assistant adjutant-general, United States Vol
unteers, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Robert L. Howze, assistant adjutant-general, United States Volun
teers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Robert H. Beckham, commissary of subsistence, United States Vol
unteers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Morton J. Henry, assistant adjutant-general, United States Volun
teers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Edward Anderson, assistant adjutant-general, United States Vol
unteers, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain William R. Sample, assistant adjutant-general, United States Vol
unteers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
534 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Captain Micah J. Jenkins, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain William H. H. Llewellyn, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Frederick Muller, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain Maximilian Luna, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Captain William O'Neill, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
To BE CAPTAINS BY BREVET.
First Lieutenant Joseph A. Carr, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry in
battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.
First Lieutenant Herbert H. Warren, Second Massachusetts Volunteer In
fantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Woodbury Kane, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Frank Franz, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant James H. Pound, Thirty-third Michigan Volunteer Infantry,
for gallant and meritorious service in presence r»f the enemy, Aguadores, Cuba,
July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant George H. Brown, Thirty-third Michigan Volunteer In
fantry, for gallant and meritorious service in presence of the enemy, Agua
dores, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant George L. Harvey, Thirty-third Michigan Volunteer In
fantry, for gallant and meritorious service in presence of the enemy, Agua
dores, Cuba, July i, 1898.
First Lieutenant Guy G. Bailey, assistant surgeon, Thirty-third Michigan
Volunteer Infantry, for meritorious service in attending wounded under fire.
Aguadores, Cuba, July i, 1898.
To BE FIRST LIEUTENANTS BY BREVET.
Second Lieutenant David J. Leahy, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry
in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Horace K. Devereux, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gal
lantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 535
Second Lieutenant David M. Goodrich, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gal
lantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July I, 1898.
Second Lieutenant John C. Green way, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gal
lantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
To BE COLONEL BY BREVET.
Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gal
lantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.
To BE LIEUTENANT-COLONELS BY BREVET.
Major Alexander O. Brodie, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.
Major William D. Beach, engineer officer, United States Volunteers, for
gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.
To BE MAJORS BY BREVET.
Captain Albert L. Mills, assistant adjutant-general, United States Volun
teers, for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.
Captain Allyn Capron, First Volunteer Cavalry (killed in action), for gal
lantry in action, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.
Captain James H. McClintock, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry in
battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.
To BE CAPTAINS BY BREVET.
First Lieutenant James R. Thomas, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry
in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.
First Lieutenant James R. Church, assistant surgeon, First Volunteer Cav
alry, for meritorious service in attending wounded under fire, La Guasima,
Cuba, June 24, 1898.
Appointment by brevet in the Army of the United States, to rank from
June 24, 1898, namely:
To BE A COLONEL BY BREVET.
A'lajor James M. Bell, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La Guasima,
Cuba, June 24, 1898. (Brevet lieutenant-colonel, to rank from February 27,
1890.)
53$ CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
To BE LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BY BREVET.
Major Stevens T. Norvell, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La
Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.
To BE MAJORS BY BREVET.
Captain Thomas T. Knox, First Cavalry (now major and inspector-general),
for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.
Captain Robert P. P. Wainwright, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La
Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.
Captain Jacob G. Galbraith, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La
Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.
Captain William H. Beck, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La
Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.
Captain Charles G. Ayres, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in batttle, La
Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.
Captain James W. Watson, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La
Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.
Captain Lloyd S. McCormick, Seventh Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La
Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.
To BE CAPTAINS BY BREVET.
First Lieutenant George L. Byram, First Cavalry, for gallantry in oi'.ttle,
La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.
First Lieutenant Peter E. Traub, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.
First Lieutenant Edmund S. Wright, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.
First Lieutenant Robert J. Fleming, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.
First Lieutenant Tyree R. Rivers, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.
First Lieutenant Leigh A. Fuller, assistant surgeon, United States Army,
for meritorious service attending wounded under fire, La Guasima, Cuba,
June 24, 1898.
To BE FIRST LIEUTENANTS BY BREVET.
Second Lieutenant Robert C. Williams, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Henry C. Smither, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle.
La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 537
Second Lieutenant George Vidmer, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Alexander M. Miller, Jr., Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry
in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.
Second Lieutenant William R. Smedberg, Fourth Cavalry, for gallantry
in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Harry O. Williard, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle.
La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Frank R. McCoy, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Walter M. Whitman, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle,
La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.
Appointments by brevet in the Army of the United States, to rank from
July 2, 1898, namely:
To BE MAJORS BY BREVET.
Captain Edward H. Plummer, Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago dc Cuba, July 2, 1898.
Captain Daniel A. Frederick, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July 2, 1898.
Captain Clermont L. Best, First Artillery, for gallantry in battle, Santiago
de Cuba, July 2, 1898.
To BE CAPTAIN BY BREVET.
First Lieutenant Ernest Hinds, Second Artillery, for gallantry in battle, San
tiago de Cuba, July 2, 1898.
To BE FIRST LIEUTENANTS BY BREVET.
Second Lieutenant Robert McCleave, Second Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 2, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Harry H. Tebbetts, Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 2, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Benjamin M. Hartshorne, Jr., Tenth Infantry, for gal
lantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 2, 1898.
Second Lieutenant James W. Clinton, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in
battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 2, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Ira C. Welborn, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July 2, 1898.
Second Lieutenant Harry E. Smith, First Artillery, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July 2, 1898.
538
Appointment by brevet in the Army of the United States, to rank from
July 10, 1898, namely:
To BE CAPTAIN BY BREVET.
First Lieutenant Alfred M. Hunter, Fourth Artillery, for gallantry in battle,
Santiago de Cuba, July 10, 1898.
Appointment by brevet in the Volunteer Army of the United States, to rank
from July 2, 1898, namely:
To BE CAPTAIN BY BREVET.
First Lieutenant Guy E. Manning, Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry, for gal-
lantr- while delivering orders in battle near Santiago de Cuba, July i, 1898.
Following is a list of officers and men in the several divisions of the
Fifth Army Corps who were mentioned in the various official reports
as deserving commendation for their gallantry and valuable services
in the battles of Las Guasimas, June 24th, El Caney, July ist, and San
Juan, July i, 2 and 3, 1898:
By Major-General William R. Shafter:
Major-General Joseph Wheeler.
Brigadier-General J. Ford Kent.
Brigadier-General Hamilton S. Hawkins, wounded, July 2d, San Juan.
Brigadier-General S. S. Sumner.
Brigadier-General John C. Bates.
Brigadier-General S. B. M. Young.
Brigadier-General Henry W. Lawton.
Brigadier-General Adna R. Chaffee.
Colonel Leonard Wood,
Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt.
Colonel John F. Western.
Colonel Charles A. Wykoff, killed, July ist, San Juan.
Lieutenant-Colonel G. McC. Derby.
Lieutenant-Colonel William A. Rafferty, Second Cavalry.
Lieutenant-Colonel E. J. McClernand.
Lieutenant-Colonel Charles F. Humphrey.
Lieutenant-Colonel J. J. Astor.
Lieutenant-Colonel B. F. Pope.
Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Miley.
Major R. H. Noble.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 539
Major S. W. Groesbeck.
Major C. G. Starr.
Major Leon Roudiez.
Major Hugh J. Gallagher.
Captain Lloyd M. Brett, Second Cavalry.
Captain Thomas J. Lewis, Second Cavalry.
Captain S. M. Brice.
Captain W. H. McKittrick.
Captain J. C. Gilmore, Jr.
Captain E. H. Plummer.
Lieutenant John H. Parker, Thirteenth Infantry.
Lieutenant Henry T. Allen, Second Cavalry.
Lieutenant William F. Clark, Second Cavalry.
Dr. G. Goodfellow, volunteer aid.
Mr. G. F. Hawkins, volunteer aid.
By Major-General Joseph Wheeler:
Brigadier-General J. Ford Kent.
Brigadier-General S. S. Sumner.
Brigadier-General Hamilton S. Hawkins, wounded, July 2d, San Juan.
Colonel Leonard Wood.
Colonel Henry Carroll, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
Colonel Edward P. Pearson.
Lieutenant-Colonel John M. Hamilton, Ninth Cavalry, killed, July ist, San
Juan.
Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt.
Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Dorst.
Major Theodore J. Wint, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
Major Albert G. Forse, First Cavalry, killed, July ist, San Juan.
Major W. D. Beach.
Major James M. Bell, wounded, June 24th, Las Guasimas.
Major Henry W. Wessels, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
Major Thomas C. Sebo, Sixth Cavalry.
Major E. A. Garlington.
Major Valery Havard.
Captain Eugene D. Dimmick, Ninth Cavalry.
Captain W. H. Beck.
Captain Robert P. P. Wainwright
Captain Jacob G. Galbraith.
Captain Thomas T. Knox, wounded, June 2ist, Las Guasimas.
Captain Charles D. Parkhurst, wounded, July 2d, San Juan.
54° CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Captain Theophilus W. Morrison, killed, July ist, San Juan.
Captain Joseph T. Dickman.
Captain William Astor Chanler.
Captain P. W. West.
Captain Francis H. Hardie.
Captain Charles W. Taylor, Ninth Cavalry, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
Captain John F. McBlain, Ninth Cavalry.
Captain Robert L. Howze, Sixth Cavalry.
Captain Robert H. Beckham, commissary 01 subsistence, volunteers.
First Lieutenant Charles J. Stevens, Ninth Cavalry.
First Lieutenant Henry A. Barber, Ninth Cavalry.
First Lieutenant Michael McNamee, Ninth Cavalry.
First Lieutenant Winthrop S. Wood, Ninth Cavalry.
Lieutenant Albert L. Mills, First Cavalry, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
First Lieutenant William E. Shipp, Tenth Cavalry, killed, July ist, San Juan.
First Lieutenant William II. Smith, Tenth Cavalry, killed, July ist, San Juan.
Lieutenant John A. Harmon, Sixth Cavalry. ,
Lieutenant George L. Byram, wounded, June 24th, Las Guasimas.
Lieutenant M. F. Steele.
Lieutenant James H. Reeves.
Lieutenant Lincoln C. Andrews, Third Cavalry.
Lieutenant Joseph Wheeler, Jr.
Lieutenant F. J. Koester.
Second Lieutenant Kinzie W. Walker, Ninth Cavalry.
Second Lieutenant Edward E. Hartwick, Ninth Cavalry.
Corporal John Lundmark.
Mr. E. A. Mestre, volunteer aid.
Mr. Leonard Wilson, secretary and volunteer aid.
Mr. Adolfo Carlos Munoz, volunteer aid.
By Brigadier-General J. Ford Kent:
General H. S. Hawkins, wounded, July 2d, San Juan.
Colonel Charles A. Wikoff, killed, July ist, San Juan.
Colonel E. P. Pearson.
Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. S. Worth, Thirteenth Infantry, wounded, July 1st,
San Juan.
Lieutenant-Colonel Emerson H. Liscum, Twenty-fourth Infantry, wounded,
July ist, San Juan.
Lieutenant-Colonel Ezra P. Ewers, Ninth Infantry.
Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Smith, Twelfth Infantry.
Major H. C. Sharpe.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 541
Major Philip Reade.
Captain U. G. McAlexander.
First Lieutenant Wendell L. Simpson, Ninth Infantry.
First Lieutenant George S. Cartwright, Twenty-fourth Infantry.
First Lieutenant William P. Jackson, Second Infantry.
First Lieutenant F. J. Kirkpatrick.
First Lieutenant J. D. Miley, aid to General Shafter.
Mr. Adolfo Carles Munoz, volunteer aid, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
By Brigadier-General H. S. Hawkins:
Colonel H. A. Theaker.
Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Egbert, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
Captain W. E. Horton.
Lieutenant Dennis M. Michie, killed, July ist, San Juan.
Lieutenant J. D. Ord, killed, July ist, San Juan.
Corporal Megill.
Trumpeter Shrocdcr, Sixteenth Infantry.
Trumpeter Dorris, Sixteenth Infantry.
By Brigadier-General John C. Bates:
Colonel John H. Page.
Major William S. McCaskey.
Major John A. Logan.
Major Harry E. Wilkins.
Major Francis J. Ives, surgeon.
Captain Wright.
Lieutenant Samuel E. Smiley.
Lieutenant Horace M. Reeves.
Lieutenant Smith.
By Brigadier-General Henry W. Lawton:
Major-General J. C. Breckinridge.
Brigadier-General A. R. Chaffee.
Brigadier-General William Ludlow.
Colonel George H. Harries, First District of Columbia.
Lieutenant-Colonel Aaron S. Daggett.
Lieutenant-Colonel A. S. Wagner.
Major C. D. Hine.
Major H. S. Kilbourne, surgeon.
Major D. Creighton Webb. '
Captain H. C. Carbatigh.
Captain J. C. Gilmore, Jr.
542 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Lieutenant H. H. Warren, Second Massachusetts.
Mr. E. L. D. Breckinridge, volunteer aid.
Mr. R. D. Mendoza, volunteer aid.
By Brigadier-General William Ludlow:
Captain R. N. Getty, Twenty-second Infantry.
By Colonel Leonard Wood:
Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt.
Lieutenant-Colonel C. D. Viele.
Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore A. Baldwin.
Major Theodore I. Wint, Tenth Cavalry, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
Major Webb Hayes, First Ohio, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
Captain M. J. Heney.
Captain A. L. Mills, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
Captain William O. O'Neill, killed, July ist, San Juan.
Captain Loyd S. McCormick, Seventh Cavalry.
Lieutenant J. H. Parker, Thirteenth Infantry.
Lieutenant W. E. Shipp, killed, July ist, San Juan.
Cadet Ernest Haskell, United States Military Academy, wounded, July ist,
San Juan.
Lieutenant J. B. Hughes, Tenth Cavalry.
Sergeant William Brittain, Troop G, First Cavalry.
Sergeant Hallett A. Burrowe.
By Colonel E. P. Pearson, Tenth Infantry:
First Lieutenant C. J. T. Clarke, Tenth Infantry.
First Lieutenant E. H. Plummer, Tenth Infantry.
First Lieutenant J. S. Parke, Jr., Tenth Infantry.
Second Lieutenant O. J. Charles, Tenth Infantry.
Second Lieutenant L. M. Nuttman, Twenty-first Infantry.
By Colonel G. H. Harries, First District of Columbia:
Major C. D. Hine, First District of Columbia.
Captain Charles S. Domer, First District of Columbia.
Captain Harry Walsh, First District of Columbia.
First Lieutenant W. E. Crist, First District of Columbia.
By Colonel C. L. Boynton, Thirty-third Michigan,
George L. Harvey, adjutant, Thirty-third Michigan.
By Colonel E. Miles, Twenty-second Infantry:
Captain Jose Vergas.
Captain Aveleus Brago.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 543
Lieutenant Nicolas Franco, killed, July ist, San Juan.
Lieutenant Tomas Repelo.
Second Lieutenant Dennis E. Nolan, First Infantry.
Lieutenant Paul A. Wolf, Fourth Infantry.
Private Henry Downey, Company H, First Infantry.
By Colonel E. P. Clark, Second Infantry:
Captain W. S. Warriner, Second Infantry, wounded, July ist, El Carey.
First Lieutenant Charles H. Field, Company E, Second Infantry, killed, July
ist, El Caney.
Second Lieutenant D. J. Moynihan, Second Infantry, wounded, July ist, El
Caney.
Second Lieutenant O. D. Hapgood, Second Infantry, wounded, July ist, El
Caney.
Private Arthur H. Packard, Second Infantry, killed, July ist, El Caney.
Private George A. Richmond, Company G, Second Infantry, killed, July ist,
El Caney.
Private Frank E. Moody, Company K, Second Infantry, killed, July ist,
El Caney.
Private George A. Brooks, Company E, Second Infantry, killed, July ist,
El Caney.
By Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Egbert, Sixth Infantry:
Captain Alexander M. Wetherill, Sixth Infantry, killed, July ist, San Juan.
Captain Charles Byrne, Sixth Infantry.
Captain Lyman W. V. Kennon, Sixth Infantry.
Captain George B. Walker, Sixth Infantry.
Captain Zerah W. Torrey, Sixth Infantry.
Captain Samuel R. Whitall, Sixteenth Infantry.
First Lieutenant Clarence N. Purdy, Sixth Infantry.
First Lieutenant Jules G. Ord, Sixth Infantry, killed, July ist, San Juan.
Lieutenant William C. Bennett, Sixth Infantry.
Lieutenant Benjamin W. Atkinson, Sixth Infantry.
Lieutenant John Robertson, Sixth Infantry.
Lieutenant Edmond D. Benchley, Sixth Infantry, killed, July ist, San Juan.
Lieutenant John H. Parker, Thirteenth Infantry,
.ieutenant Dennis M. Michie, Seventeenth Infantry, killed.
Second Lieutenant Reuben S. Turman, Sixth Infantry, killed, July 4th, San
Juan.
Second Lieutenant William H. Simons, Sixth Infantry.
Second Lieutenant Louis H. Gros, Sixth Infantry.
544 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
First Sergeant Thomas Farrell, Sixth Infantry, Company B.
First Sergeant Harold M. Hallman, Sixth Infantry, Company A.
First Sergeant James Bennett, Sixth Infantry, Company B.
First Sergeant Dick Carter, Sixth Infantry, Company F.
First Sergeant William Wiley, 'Sixth Infantry, Company D.
First Sergeant John Murray, Sixth Infantry, Company C.
First Sergeant William J. Brown, Sixth Infantry, Company H.
Private James Mullen, Sixth Infantry, Company F.
By Lieutenant-Colonel F. Greene, Signal Corps:
Major Joseph E. Maxfield.
Lieutenant-Colonel George McC. Derby, Engineers.
By Lieutenant-Colonel E. R. Kellogg, Tenth Infantry:
Major Richard I. Eskridge, Tenth Infantry.
Captain Sumner H. Lincoln, Tenth Infantry.
Captain Joel T. Kirkman, Tenth Infantry.
Captain Gregory Barrett, Tenth Infantry.
Captain John Drum, Tenth Infantry, killed, July ist, San Juan.
Captain John F. Stretch, Tenth Infantry.
Captain Walter T. Duggan, Tenth Infantry.
Captain William Paulding, Tenth Infantry.
Captain Robert C. Van Vliet, Tenth Infantry.
First Lieutenant Carl Koops, Tenth Infantry.
First Lieutenant James Baylies, Tenth Infantry.
First Lieutenant Eli Helmick, Tenth Infantry.
First Lieutenant Samuel Burkhardt, Jr., Tenth Infantry.
First Lieutenant Truman O. Murphy, Tenth Infantry.
Second Lieutenant Matthew E. Saville, Tenth Infantry.
Second Lieutenant Robert S. Offley, Tenth Infantry.
Second Lieutenant William T. Schenck, Tenth Infantry.
Second Lieutenant Alger P. Berry, Tenth Infantry.
Second Lieutenant Harry H. Tebbetts, Tenth Infantry.
Second Lieutenant Benjamin M. Hartsorne, Jr., Tenth Infantry.
Second Lieutenant Romulus F. Walton, Tenth Infantry.
By Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt:
Captain William O. O'Neill, killed, July ist, San Juan.
Captain John H. Parker, Thirteenth United States Infantry.
Captain Micah Jenkins.
Captain W. H. H. Lewellen.
Captain Maximilian Luna.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 545
Captain Frederich Muller.
Lieutenant Michael J. Leahy, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
Lieutenant H. K. Devereux, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
Lieutenant Woodbury Kane.
Lieutenant William W. Greenwood, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
Lieutenant J. A. Carr, wounded, July 2d. San Juan.
Lieutenant D. M. Goodrich.
Lieutenant John C. Greenway.
Lieutenant Frank Frantz.
Acting Second Lieutenant Ernest Haskell, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
Sergeant David L. Hughes, Troop B, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
Sergeant John E. Campbell, Troop B.
Sergeant Robert M. Ferguson, Troop K.
Sergeant William E. Dame, Troop E.
Corporal Waller, Troop E, wounded, June 24th, Las Guasimas.
Corporal Fortesque, Troop E, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
Corporal John D. Roades, Troop D, wounded, June 24th, Las Guasimas.
Corporal Joseph J. Lee, Troop K.
Trooper George Roland, Troop G, wounded. June 24th, Las Guasimas.
Trooper Lewis Cevers, Troop G, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
Trooper Winslow Clark, Troop G, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
Trooper Charles E. McKinley, Troop E, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
Trooper Edward J. Albertson, Troop F, wounded, June 24th, Las Guasimas.
Trooper John G. Winter, Troop F, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
Trooper Herbert P. McGregor, Troop F, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
Trooper Ray V. Clark, Troop F, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
Trooper Fred. W. Bugbee, Troop A, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
Trooper Charles B. Jackson, Troop A, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
Trooper John H. Waller, Troop A, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
Trooper Oliver B. Norton, Troop B, killed, July ist, San Juan.
Trooper Sherman Bell, Troop K.
Trooper John F. Carroll, Troop K.
Trooper G. Campbell, Troop B.
Trooper Dudley Dean, Troop D.
Trooper Samuel Greenwald, Troop A.
Trooper H. Bardshar, Troop A.
Trumpeter Frank R. McDonald, Troop L, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
Trumpeter John Foster, Troop B.
Saddler Richard E. Goodwin, Troop B.
546 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
By Lieutenant-Colonel Charles D. Viele, First Cavalry:
Major Albert G. Forse, killed, July ist, San Juan.
Captain J. G. Galbraith, Troop B.
Captain R. P. P. Wainwright, Troop G.
Capt. H. E. Tutherly, commanding squadron.
Captain W. C. Brown, Troop C.
First Lieutenant E. S. Wright, Troop A.
First Lieutenant J. D. L. Hartman, Troop K.
First Lieutenant Milton F. Davis, Troop C.
First Lieutenant C. Overton, Troop D.
First Lieutenant W. H. Osborne, Troop E.
First Lieutenant G. W. Goode, Troop I.
First Lieutenant P. E. Traub, adjutant.
Second Lieutenant H. G. Smither, Troop A.
Second Lieutenant Charles Saltzman, Troop G.
Second Lieutenant W. M. Whitman, Troop G.
Second Lieutenant R. C. Williams, Troop C.
Second Lieutenant H. D. Berkley, Troop D.
Second Lieutenant M. D. Kirkpatrick, Troop I.
Lieutenant J. F. R. Landis, regimental quartermaster.
By Lieutenant-Colonel W. M. Wherry, Second Infantry:
Captain William B. Banister, surgeon.
Post Chaplain Charles S. Walkley.
By Lieutenant-Colonel A. S. Daggett, Twenty-fifth Infantry:
Captain W. S. Scott.
First Lieutenant V. A. Caldwell.
Second Lieutenant J. A. Moss.
Second Lieutenant J. E. Hunt.
Second Lieutenant H. W. French.
By Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Comba, Twelfth Infantry:
Captain Millard F. Waltz.
Captain Henry L. Haskell.
Captain Palmer G. Wood.
Captain Wallace O. Clark.
First Lieutenant Fred. S. Wild.
Second Lieutenant Wilber E. Dove, wounded, July ist, El Caney.
Second Lieutenant William M. Wood.
Second Lieutenant A. T. Smith.
Corporal Joseph E. Able.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 547
By Major Henry H. Humphreys, Twelfth Infantry:
Captain Millard F. Waltz.
First Lieutenant Mark L. Hersey, Twelfth Infantry.
Sergeant Major John S. E. Young.
Quartermaster Sergeant John W. Blair, Twelfth Infantry.
First Sergeant John B. Murphy, Company H.
First Sergeant Daniel Arundell, Company H.
Corporal Edward Meyers, Company E, Twelfth Infantry.
Corporal Joseph E. Able, Company E, Twelfth Infantry.
Private James W. Smith, Company H, Twelfth Infantry.
Private James McMillen, Company H, Twelfth Infantry.
Hamilton J. Carroll, Company C.
By Major S. Baker, Fourth Infantry:
Captain Henry Seton.
Captain Frank B. Andrus.
Captain Henry E. Robinson.
First Lieutenant W. C. Neary, Fourth Infantry, killed, July ist, El Caney.
Second Lieutenant J. J. Bernard, Fourth Infantry, killed, July ist, El Caney.
Lieutenant Halstead Dorey.
By Major William S. McCaskey, Twentieth Infantry.
Lieutenant Ed. M. Lewis.
Lieutenant Fred R. Day.
Acting Assistant Surgeon Thomas Y. Aby.
By Major J. A. Smith, Second Infantry:
First Sergeant Meyer, Company A.
Surgeon Banister.
By Captain Charles Byrne, Sixth Infantry:
Lieutenant William K. Jones, Company G.
Second Lieutenant Reuben S. Turman, killed, July 4th, San Juan.
Second Lieutenant William F. Nesbitt.
By Captain G. S. Grimes, Second Artillery:
First Lieutenant W. W. Quinton, assistant surgeon.
First Lieutenant John Conklin, Jr.
Second Lieutenant Otho W. B. Farr.
Corporal Herbert D. Keene.
Private Michael J. Gresham, Hospital Corps.
By Captain P. W. Jones, Tenth Cavalry:
First Lieutenant Edward D. Anderson, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
Second Lieutenant Henry C. Whitehead, wounded, July ist, San 7 lan.
54$ CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
By Captain L. W. V. Kennon, Sixth Infantry:
First Lieutenant William H. Simons.
Second Lieutenant Edward D. Benchley, killed, July 1st, San Juan.
By Captain William Lassiter, Sixteenth Infantry:
First Sergeant Frank Stevens.
Sergeant R. N. Davidson.
.Private Samuel J. Shay.
Private Robert Colling.
Private W. F. Gilhooly.
Private Percy Foster.
By Captain Benjamin W. Leavell, Twenty-fourth Infantry:
Lieutenant Arthur R. Kerwin.
By Captain H. L. Haskell, Twelfth Infantry:
Captain Robert K. Evans.
Captain Wallace Clark.
Captain Palmer G. Wood.
First Lieutenant David J. Baker, Jr.
First Lieutenant Willis Uline.
First Lieutenant William Morton Wood, killed, July ist, El Caney.
First Lieutenant Fred S. Wild.
Lieutenant F. L. Winn.
Lieutenant Clark Churchman, killed, July ist, El Caney.
Lieutenant Glen H. Davis.
Lieutenant F. Wilson Smith.
Lieutenant A. T. Smith.
First Sergeant John B. Murphy, Company H.
Sergeant Feldcamp.
Corporal Meyers.
Corporal Estabueau.
Private James W. Smith, Company H.
Private James L. McMillen, Company H.
By Captain W. C. McFarland, Sixteenth Infantry:
Captain Leven C. Allen, Company C.
Captain Sumter, Company G.
Lieutenant Guy S. Palmer, Company C.
Lieutenant Lewis S. Sorley, Company G.
Private Boone, Company E.
Private Edward Stewart, Company E.
Private Goud, Company E.
MAJOR-GENERAL N. B. MILES.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 551
Private Spears, Company B.
Private Harris, Company A.
Private Fleming, Company A.
By Captain George H. Palmer, Sixteenth Infantry:
Corporal Clifton M. Spears.
Corporal McGiffin.
Corporal Theodore Kokocinski.
Private Thure A. Strand.
Private Andrew J. Connors.
Private Frederick J. Liesman.
Private George W. Miller.
By Captain L. C. Allen, Sixteenth Infantry:
Musician Emmanuel Sammet.
Corporal John Hanavan.
Corporal Edward Berg.
Corporal Daniel P. Meadows.
Private William Morrow.
Private John D. Hess.
Private Robert Borchart.
By Captain H. L. Bailey, Twenty-first Infantry:
Lieutenant F. H. Lawton.
Sergeant Charles R. Burr.
Sergeant Charles F. Pearson.
Sergeant P. Rosat.
Private Kerigan.
Private Hogan.
Private B. F. Bowling.
Private Hafer Mauz.
Private Oscar Moody.
Private Thomas McDonald.
By Captain William H. Beck, Tenth Cavalry:
First Lieutenant R. L. Livermore, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
Second Lieutenant F. R. McCoy, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
By Captain Madison M. Brewer, assistant surgeon:
Captain Fuller, assistant surgeon.
By Captain A. W. Brewster, Ninth Infantry:
Lieutenant L. B. Lawton.
By Captain James W. Watson, Tenth Cavalry:
Corporal W. F. Johnson, Troop B.
55- CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
By Captain S. R. Whitall, Sixteenth Infantry:
First Lieutenant John F. Preston, Jr.
Lieutenant Isaac Irwin.
Sergeant Deihl, Sixteenth Infantry.
Acting First Sergeant John Dudley.
Sergeant Alvah T. Kase.
Corporal Charles E. Morgan.
Corporal Fredrick Harfas.
Private Robert M. McCrory.
Private G. Moseley.
Private William Litinger.
Private John Allen.
Private William Stone.
Private Fred G. Schroeder.
Private Otto Hasenfuss.
Private Henry Iddings.
Private 'Walter T. Noyes.
By Captain C. A. Williams, Twenty-first Infantry:
Lieutenant W. H. Mulloy.
Private John C. Barnard.
By Captain Willis Wittich, Twenty-first Infantry:
Lieutenant Edgar C. Conley.
Corporal Loomis.
Private Mulford.
Private Flynn.
Private Glenning.
Private Depew.
By Captain E. B. Robertson, Ninth Infantry:
Lieutenant H. D. Wise.
By Captain S. E. Sparrow, Twenty-first Infantry:
Sergeant Prefer.
By Captain R. K. Evans, Twelfth Infantry:
Corporal Meyers.
Private Abele.
By Captain Millard F. Waltz, Twelfth Infantry:
Second Lieutenant Wilber E. Dove, wounded, July 1st, El Caney.
First Sergeant Carroll.
Sergeant Van- Horn.
Sergeant Eckert.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN, 553
Corporal Perry, wounded, July ist. El Caney.
Private Lehr, killed, July ist, El Caney.
Private James, wounded, July ist, El Caney.
Private Johnson, wounded, July ist, El Caney.
Private Trimmer, wounded, July ist, El Caney.
Private Hatch, wounded, July ist, El Caney.
Private Little, wounded, July ist, El Caney.
Private Grothe, wounded, July ist, El Caney
Private Wilmer, wounded, July ist, El Caney
By Captain E. D. Dimmick, Ninth Cavalry:
Lieutenant-Colonel T. M. Hamilton, killed, July ist, San Juan.
Captain C. A. Stedman.
Captain C. W. Taylor, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
Captain J. F. McBlain.
First Lieutenant W. S. Wood, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
First Lieutenant C. W. Stevens.
First Lieutenant M. M. McNamee.
First Lieutenant A. A. Barber.
Second Lieutenant K. W. Walker.
Second Lieutenant E. E. Hartwick.
By Captain Robert N. Getty, Twenty-second Infantry:
First Lieutenant W. L. Taylor.
Third Lieutenant W. H. Wassell.
First Sergeant John P. Byrne.
Sergeant William Parnell, wounded, July ist, El Caney.
Sergeant Cornelius Cullman.
Private Martin P. Broberg.
Private Belton Johnson.
By Captain L. M. O'Brien, Seventeenth Infantry:
Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph T. Haskell, killed, July ist, El Caney.
Lieutenant Walter M. Dickenson, killed, July ist, El Caney.
By Captain J. B. Kerr, Sixth Cavalry:
Captain George H. Sands, Sixth Cavalry.
Lieutenant R. B. Paddock.
Lieutenant A. V. P. Anderson.
Lieutenant N. K. Averill.
Sergeant Blarney.
Corporal Douglas McCaskey.
Trumpeter Joseph Wilson, Troop K.
554 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
By Captain John Bigelow, Jr., Tenth Cavalry.
Lieutenant J. G. Ord, Sixth Infantry.
First Sergeant William H. Gevens.
Sergeant George Dyals, Troop D, killed. July ist, San Juan.
Sergeant James Elliott, Troop D.
Corporal John Walker.
Private Luchius Smith.
By Captain C. H. Noble, Sixteenth Infantry:
Captain Woodbury, wounded, July ist, El Caney.
Captain G. H. Palmer.
Captain L. C. Allen.
Captain W. C. McFarland, wounded, July ist, El Caney.
Captain W. Lassiter.
Captain S. R. Whitall.
First Lieutenant R. R. Steedman.
First Lieutenant S. W. Dunning, wounded, July ist, El Caney.
Second Lieutenant G. G. Palmer.
Second Lieutenant B. L. Simmons.
Second Lieutenant E. C.' Carey.
Second Lieutenant L. S. Sorley.
Second Lieutenant Ridenour.
Second Lieutenant Isaac Erwin.
By Captain Henry Wygant, Twenty-fourth Infantry:
Captain Charles Dodge, Jr.
Captain Arthur C. Ducat, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
Captain A. A. Auger.
First Lieutenant J. D. Leitch.
First Lieutenant Albert Laws.
Second Lieutenant A. R. Curwin.
Corporal Richard Williams, Company B.
By First Lieutenant M. M. McNamee, Ninth Cavalry:
Second Lieutenant Ed. E. Hartwick.
Sergeant Elisha Jackson, Tenth Volunteers.
Sergeant John Mason, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
Private Bates.
Private Pumphrey.
Private Nelson, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
Private Ed. Davis, wounded, July ist, San Juan.
By First Lieutenant William G. Elliott, Twelfth Cavalry:
Private John Taylor, wounded, July ist, El Caney.
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 555
By First Lieutenant Fred S. Wild, Twelfth Infantry:
First Sergeant Daniel Arundell, wounded, July ist, El Caney.
By First Lieutenant Willis Uline, Twelfth Infantry:
Private McMillen.
Private Smith.
By First Lieutenant Henry T. Ferguson, Thirteenth Infantry:
Private John Davis.
Private Frederick Anthony.
By First Lieutenant R. J. Fleming:
Second Lieutenant A. M. Miller.
Farrier Sherman Harris.
Wagoner John Boland.
Private Elsie Jones.
By First Lieutenant Ernest Hinds, Second Artillery:
Lieutenant D. E. Altman.
First Sergeant Hidlund.
By First Lieutenant James B. Hughes, Tenth Cavalry:
First Sergeant Arthur Watson, Troop B.
Private Peter Saunders.
Private Daniels, Troop F.
Sergeant Bivins, Troop G.
By Lieutenant A. E. Kennington, Tenth Cavalry:
Corporal J. Walker.
By First Lieutenant John M. Sigworth, Ninth Infantry:
Second Lieutenant Warren S. Barlow.
First Sergeant Bailey.
By First Lieutenant Wendell L. Simpson, Ninth Infantry:
Lieutenant Edgar F. Koehler, Ninth Infantry
Lieutenant Paul V. Malone, Thirteenth Infantry.
Lieutenant Charles E. Tayman, Twenty-fourth Infantry.
By Second Lieutenant Arthur R. Kerwin, Twenty-fourth Infantry:
Second Lieutenant John A. Gurney, killed, July ist, San Juan.
By Second Lieutenant Dwight E. Aultman, Second Artillery:
First Sergeant John O. Brien.
Corporal William Underwood.
Lance — Corporal William R. Logan.
By Second Lieutenant Louis H. Bash, Thirteenth Infantry:
Artificer Samuel W. Milliard.
Private Samuel W. Crouter. Company E.
THE PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN.
CHAPTER XL
General Miles left Guantanamo on July 2ist, with 3,415 infantry
and artillery, two companies of engineers and one company of the
signal corps on nine transports convoyed by Captain Higginson's
fleet, the flagship " Massachusetts " and two smaller vessels. The
" Yale " and " Columbia," although armed vessels, were used as
transports, being crowded with troops. About 100 of the soldiers
were sick, leaving 3,300 effectives. The Spanish troops at Porto Rico
numbered 8,233 regulars and 9,107 volunteers.
The American forces arrived at Guanico, July 25th, and entered the
harbor without opposition, the " Gloucester " firing a few shots at
the Spanish troops on shore. After a' short skirmish the Americans
took possession of the landing and the United States flag was raised
on the island. General Miles was accompanied by Captain Whitney,
whose knowledge of the country, gained during his perilous journey
in the spring, was of great assistance in the Porto Rico campaign.
The navy was active in assisting at the landing. Ten lighters were
captured from the Spaniards here and seventy at Ponce.
On July 26th, with six companies of the Sixth Massachusetts, and
one company of the Sixth Illinois, General Garretson attacked the
Spanish near Yauco, drove them back and took possession of the
railroad and highway. On the 27th, Commander Davis of the
" Dixie " examined the harbor of Ponce and found it free of mines.
General Wilson entered the next day and took possession of the city,
General Henry following with his troops. Finding there was great
disaffection toward the Spanish cause among the citizens and the
volunteers, General • Miles issued the following proclamation, at the
same time giving detailed instruction as to the protection to be
afforded by our troops to the inhabitants of Porto Rico. The effect of
these measures was very beneficial:
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY.
PONCE, Puerto Rico, July 28, 1898.
To THE INHABITANTS OF PUERTO Rico:
In the prosecution of the war against the Kingdom of Spain by the people
of the United States in the cause of liberty, justice, and humanity, its military
THE PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN. 557
forces have come to occupy the island of Puerto Rico. They come bearing
the banner of freedom, inspired by a noble purpose to seek the enemies of our
country and yours, and to destroy or capture all who are in armed resistance.
They bring you the fostering arm of a nation of free people, whose greatest
power is in its justice and humanity to all those living within its fold. Hence,
the first effect of this occupation will be the immediate release from your former
political relations, and it is hoped a cheerful acceptance of the Government of
the United States. The chief object of the American military forces will be
to overthrow the armed authority of Spain and to give to the people of your
beautiful island the largest measure of liberty consistent with this military occu
pation. We have not come to make war upon the people-of a country that for
centuries has been oppressed, but, on the contrary, to bring you protection,
not only to yourselves but to your property, to promote your prosperity, and
bestow upon you the immunities and blessings of the liberal institutions of
our Government. It is not our purpose to interfere with any existing laws
and customs that are wholesome and beneficial to your people so long as they
conform to the rules of military administration of order and justice. This is
not a war of devastation, but one to give to all within the control of its military
and naval forces the advantages and blessings of enlightened civilization.
NELSON A. MILES,
Major-General, Commanding United States Army.
General Brooke, commanding the First Army Corps, arrived on
July 3 ist, and disembarked at Arroyo. On August 5th, there was an
engagement at Guayama in which a few of our men were wounded.
This was followed by a second engagement on the 8th. Preparations
to attack Cayey were about completed when hostilities ceased in com
pliance with the following order:
PORT PONCE, August 13, 1898.
Major-General BROOKE, Arroyo:
By direction of the President all military operations against the enemy are
suspended. Negotiations are nearing completion, a protocol having just been
signed by representatives of the two countries. All commanders will be gov
erned accordingly.
By command of Major-General Miles,
GILMORE,
Brigadier-General.
558 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
The troops engaged at this place were the Third Illinois, Fourth
Pennsylvania, Fourth Ohio, Troop " H " of the Sixth Cavalry, the
Pennsylvania city troops, Pennsylvania Battery " B," " Missouri "A,"
Illinois "A," and the Twenty-seventh Indiana Battery. General
Brooke reported the action of these troops as follows:
HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMY CORPS,
GUAYAMA, Porto Rico, August 20, 1898.
General JOHN C. GILMORE, Adjutant-General, Headquarters of the Army, Ponce,
Porto Rico:
SIR. — • Complying with telegraphic instructions of this date, I have the honor
to report that, accompanied by my staff, I embarked with the Second Brigade,
First Division, of my corps (Hains) at Newport News, Va., on Thursday,
the 28th of July, 1898, for Porto Rico on the steamer " St. Louis," arriving off
the port of Guanica, Sunday, July 3ist, at 2 o'clock, p. M., where information
was received that General Miles was at Ponce, and I directed the " St. Louis "
to that point and found General Miles at Playa, the port of Ponce, about three
miles south of it, reporting to the major-general commanding about 4 P. M.
On Monday night, August ist, I proceeded, in the steamship " St. Louis," with
the Third Illinois Volunteer Infantry, along the coast in an easterly direction
to Arroyo, where, on Tuesday, the 2d instant, I disembarked this regiment and
established my headquarters, making arrangements at once to land the remain
ing regiments of Hains's brigade and four batteries of artillery, with quarter
master and commissary supplies. There being no wharf and the landing being
difficult, I went with Captain Chester and Lieutenant Wainwright, of the navy,
on the U. S. S. " Gloucester " along the coast in search of a more accessible
landing. Failing to find one, I directed my engineer officer to construct a
wharf on which I could land the transportation and artillery. Owing to a lack
of lighters and launches, the work of disembarkation was very slow and seri
ously impeded my intended movements.
The steamer " St. Paul," with General Hains, his staff, and the Fourth Ohio
Volunteer Infantry, arrived August 3d; also the transports "Seneca" and
" City of Washington," with the Fourth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry. The
transports " Roumania " and " Massachusetts," on which were the artillery,
cavalry, officers' horses and rations, went aground at Ponce, and a further
delay was thereby occasioned. On August 5th the transport " Roumania " ar
rived, and the artillery was disembarked at once. On this day I directed an
advance on the town of Guayama, and at i o'clock, P. M., the Fourth Ohio,
Colonel Coit commanding, supported by the Third Illinois, Colonel Bennitt
THB PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN. 559
commanding, and dynamite guns, commanded by Captain Potter, Fourth Ohio
Volunteer Infantry, all under immediate command of General Hains, entered
and took possession of Guayama. A special report of this movement has been
made to your headquarters.
The enemy made slight resistance about one mile from town. We had four
men wounded slightly.
On Wednesday, August 8th, a reconnoissance for the purpose of developing
the enemy's position and to clear the way for the engineers to correctly map
the country was made by order of General Hains during my absence at Ponce,
where I had been summoned by the commanding general. It was found that
the enemy had taken position on a crest commanding the road, from six to
eight miles from Guayama. A special report of this reconnoissance has been
made and forwarded to army headquarters. Our loss was five enlisted men
wounded, none seriously.
On Saturday, August I3th, I determined to move forward in force and proceed
against Cayey. The movement was well under way when hostilities were sus
pended by receipt of telegram from headquarters of the army, publishing the
President's order to that effect. A special report of this movement was also
made to your headquarters.
Withdrawing the troops from their advanced position, I placed them in as
healthful camps as I could find; established outposts and moved my own head
quarters to Guayama. On August I4th I sent to the commanding officer Span
ish troops in my front, and to Governor-General Macias, under flag of truce,
copies of the President's orders as communicated to me by you, and on August
I5th, General Macias, under flag of truce, acknowledged receipt. Since that
date nothing of importance has occurred in my front.
Very respectfully,
JOHN R. BROOKE,
Major-General Commanding.
On August Qth, General Schwan left Yatico with the Eleventh
Infantry, Light Batteries " C," Third Artillery, and " D," Fifth
Artillery, and Troop "A," Fifth Cavalry, with orders to drive out or
capture all the Spanish troops in western Porto Rico. He successively
occupied the towns of Sabana Grande, San German, Lajas, Cabo
Rojo, Hormigueros and finally captured the city of Mayaguez, after
an engagement on August loth; the Spaniards were routed with severe
loss, the American loss being one killed and sixteen wounded. The
pursuit of the Spaniards continued until the order to suspend
560 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
hostilities was received. From August 7th to I5th, General Schwan's
forces had marched ninety-two miles, captured nine towns, taking
162 prisoners, paroled 200 volunteers and captured valuable material.
The commanding officer thus describes the condition and spirit of his
men when the order to suspend hostilities was received :
MAYAGUEZ, Porto Rico, August 16, 1898.
My Dear GILMORE:
Availing myself of the first breathing spell I have had for some time, I wish
in this informal way and in advance of my regular report to say a few words
to the general and yourself regarding our last Saturday's work. As soon as the
result of the Hormiguero fight became known in Mayaguez — about 9 o'clock —
Colonel Soto, the commander, "pulled up stakes." That the Spanish troops
left in the greatest hurry the condition of their barracks abundantly evidenced.
Our advance guard found the city entirely clear of the Spanish, and I ordered
my cavalry to keep in touch with them; but the cavalry took the right-hand
(the easterly) of the two roads leading to Lares, on which some of the Spanish
troops had actually gone, and in the evening the troop commander reported
that they were some seven or ten miles off and still retreating. My command
was thoroughly tired. No one not witnessing it can conceive of the distress
an infantry soldier suffers while marching in this hot climate in a deep column,
weighted down as he is, even without his pack, and some rest seemed actually
imperative. But the next day I found that the main body of the Spanish had
taken the westerly road to Lares, and early on Friday — there being many
other things to engage the attention of myself and troops — I started Burke
out in pursuit with about 700 men all told. I overtook him Saturday morning
about three and one-half miles north of Los Marias. His infantry had pulled
his guns over roads that were almost perpendicular. His troops were exchang
ing shots at long range across a deep valley with the retreating Spaniards, most
of whom had gotten across (losing a lot of men, who were drowned) a deep
and rapid river, known in that country as the Rio Grande. Our fire had
thoroughly demoralized the already disheartened and half-famished Spanish
soldiers, and their rear guard at least was also disorganized and hiding in the
hills. A company of infantry I had sent out brought in, about 10 o'clock in
the evening, forty-odd prisoners, a number of pack animals, etc. Our men
were thoroughly worn out from the day's work. Early the next morning I
had four companies of infantry, the cavalry and two guns ready to resume the
pursuit. And there cannot be a shadow of a doubt that had I had five more
hours I should have taken Lares, for that the flying Spaniards had prepared to
THE PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN. 561
abandon it at once I have the most reliable information. But at this particular
juncture the notice that hostilities would be suspended came to me. No troops
ever " suspended " with a worse grace. We had given the Spanish no peace,
and had taken all the starch out of them. The colonel and the lieutenant-
colonel had surrendered, and their troops were thoroughly demoralized and
disintegrated. It seemed a pity to deprive us of the full fruits of a victory
for which we had labored so hard; but of course we had to bow to the in
evitable. Please let the general read this.
Faithfully, your friend,
THEO. SCHWAN.
While General Schwan was proceeding to Western Porto Rico,
General Henry moved over the new road constructed by General
Stone, through the interior, his advance reaching Arecibo by the I4th
of August.
At Coamo, General Wilson's troops, under the personal direction
of General Ernst, had a serious engagement with the Spanish forces.
The main feature of this fight was the skillful flank movement made
by the Sixteenth Pennsylvania Volunteers under Colonel Hulings.
This regiment made a detour over an almost impassable mountain
trail, cutting off the Spanish retreat on the military road to San Juan.
The Spanish commander and the second in command were killed and
167 prisoners taken. This victory cleared the road to Aibonito. The
Spanish loss was six killed and about thirty wounded; American loss,
seven wounded. The troops engaged were the Second and Third
Wisconsin Infantry, Sixteenth Pennsylvania, Battery " F," Third
United States Artillery, and Battery " B," Fourth United States
Artillery. The town was defended by about 400 Spanish troops well
intrenched, and a strong blockhouse was occupied by an infantry out
post. General Ernst says, the satisfactory result of this action was due
(i) To the excellent plan of the division commander; (2) to the daring and
skillful reconnoitering of Lieutenant-Colonel Biddle and Lieutenant Pierce,
frequently under fire; (3) to the fortitude on the march and steadiness under
fire of the Sixteenth Pennsylvania, and (4) to the impressive advance of the
main body of the brigade in front. Every portion of the brigade behaved in
a highly satisfactory manner, though the brunt of the affair fell upon the
Sixteenth Pennsylvania.
The report of Colonel Hulings, of the Sixteenth Pennsylvania, is herewith
562 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
transmitted. I invite attention to the names especially mentioned by him,
and in addition thereto I beg leave to name Colonel Hidings* himself. As an
example and inspiration to his men, he dismounted from his horse and made the
long mountain march on foot, and conducted himself with great coolness
under fire.
On August 1 2th, General Wilson began shelling the Spanish posi
tion at Asomante and General Ernst was preparing to attack in the
rear the following day when hostilities were suspended. In the nine
teen days of the Porto Rican campaign, the Spanish were defeated in
six engagements and driven from one position to another, the deser
tion of the volunteers and demoralization of the army assisting in their
defeat. Our loss was three killed and forty wounded. The Spanish
loss was, probably, five times as great. The success of the enterprise
and the comparatively small loss to the Americans was largely due
to the skill and good generalship of the officers in command, and the
efficient use of artillery.
The island of Porto Rico, which has since become a part of the
United States, comprises nearly 3,700 square miles, with a population
a little less than a million.
It is 1,000 miles from Havana and is described as " one of the most
lovely of all the regions of loveliness which are washed by the
Caribbean sea; even in that archipelago it is distinguished by the
luxuriance of its vegetation and the soft variety of its scenery." It
has only one-twelfth the area of Cuba and scarcely equals in dimensions
the smallest province of that island. Although the smallest of the
great Antilles, it is the most productive in proportion to its size, and
the most densely settled. The majority of its inhabitants are of the
white race, and it produces sufficient food to supply its inhabitants
and has a surplus which is shipped to the adjacent islands.
Porto Rico is ninety-five miles long and thirty-five miles wide, with
a coast line of nearly 300 miles. Its general aspect is that of a hilly
landscape, a low range of mountains extending through its length,
with low and broken slopes. It has beautiful fertile plains, a mild
climate and luxurious vegetation and is well supplied with water.
Among the minerals found in Porto Rico are magnetic pyrite,
agate, manganite, limonite, crystal quartz and garnet; gold was
formerly mined but its quantity or location is not now definitely
known. The climate, though warm, is said to be more healthful than
THE PORTO RTCO CAMPAIGN.
any of the other Antilles. A number of medicinal plants are found,
some of which are used as condiments, and a number for dyeing and
tanning. It has many large trees bearing edible fruits, such as pines,
cocoas, oranges, lemons and mangoes. There is a deficiency of native
animals and the island is said to be free from noxious reptiles and
insects.
The hottest months are June, July, August and September. The
coldest, December, January and February. The mean monthly
temperature scarcely varies six degrees throughout the year, the
extreme limits being within forty degrees of each other. The average
rain fall of the past twenty years has been 59.5 inches, about the same
as that of New Orleans. It rains very hard and abundantly during
the hottest months. The rain comes in heavy gusts with strong
winds, as a rule between 9 and 4 o'clock; it seldom rains at night.
The island of Porto Rico was discovered November 16, 1493, by
Columbus, who took possession of it on the igth of the same month.
It was conquered by Ponce De Leon in 1508 from the aborigines, and
the first town was founded in 1509, near the present capitol and was
called Caparra. Its early history, with the exception of a few attacks
by buccaneers, offers but few incidents of interest. For three centuries
it served as a penal colony only. In 1870, it was made a province of
Spain instead of a colony, and acquired the same right and govern
ment which existed in the mother country, with representation in the
Cortes elected by universal suffrage. In 1897, the system of autonomy,
which was offered to Cuba, was granted to Porto Rico, and under it
the island has a premier, and a house of representatives. In 1894
Porto Rico had thirty-five newspapers and periodicals, seventeen of
which were published in San Juan, seven in Ponce and eight in
Mayaguez.
The chief cities of Porto Rico are San Juan, Ponce and Mayaguez.
There are fifty smaller towns. San Juan, the capital, was built over
250 years ago. It is a walled town with moats, gates and battlements.
It had a population in 1887 of 27,000; Ponce, founded in 1872, has
about 15,000 inhabitants, and Mayaguez, founded in the same year, has
a population of 20,000. Playa, which has about 5,000 population,
contains the custom-house and the consular offices. Its port will hold
vessels of twenty-five feet draft. Aguadilla, founded in 1770, has a
population of 5,000. Among other towns are Arecibo, Arroyo, San
German, Caya and Aibonito.
THE CAMP AT MONTAUK POINT.
CHAPTER XII.
The many hardships and protracted exposures to which our troops
had been subjected had very seriously affected the health of the entire
command; so much so, indeed, that the chief surgeons of the various
divisions unanimously reported that a change in locality and a move to
a more healthy country was absolutely essential to restore the troops
to health. The sick list was not so very large until after the surrender,
when the men settled down to more comfortable quarters, and where
their only duty was to guard unarmed Spanish prisoners. The result
of exposure to the sickly climate of Cuba in the rainy season can be
well understood when the composition of the army in Cuba is borne
in mind. Two of the regiments serving in the field came from
Massachusetts, one from New York, two from Michigan, one from
Ohio, one from Illinois, one from the District of Columbia, and the
regiment of " Rough Riders," about one-half of which came from the
north, and most of the rest from the healthy plains of New Mexico
and Texas. The regiments of the regular army which, together with
the volunteers, composed the Fifth Army Corps, had nearly all been
stationed in the extreme north, and consequently it would have been
difficult to find a body of men so little adapted to retain its health
and vigor during such a campaign.
As the army had been disembarked so quickly, and it was necessary
to rush them to the front with all speed, it had not been practicable
for the men to take their tents, and as a consequence, they were ex
posed to the torrid suns of the days and the heavy dews of the night,
without even a canvas protection. They had slept upon the ground,
when sleep was possible, for more than three consecutive weeks. To
this might be added the forced marches over rough roads, and on the
morning of the battle of San Juan, the soldiers became soaked to the
waist by wading through the San Juan river, and as they were with
out a change of clothing or shoes, they were more or less wet for
several days. All these things together had reduced this army of
THE CAMP AT MONTAUK POINT. 565
physically strong men to a deplorable condition, and the majority of
them were so weak from the fevers of which they were continually the
victims, that an extended march would have been very difficult if not
impossible. Instead of becoming better this condition of things had
grown steadily worse, until by August ist, when the immune regiments
arrived in Santiago, orders were received for the embarkation of
General Shafter's army.
The following communications describe the condition of affairs at
this time, and the gradual evolution of a plan which resulted in the
encampment at Montauk Point:
SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 23, 1898. (3:14 A. M., July 24, 1898.)
ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE ARMY, Washington:
Referring to the question of more immune regiments, I have to say I think
there should be at least four to make this place secure against attack if the Hol-
guin troops remain at that place. Should they go west the two regiments will
be sufficient, but there should be all the time one and I think better if two
small ships of the navy could remain here. This upon the supposition that
the Fifth Corps is all removed. I fully appreciate the fact that everything that
can be done for the comfort of the troops will be. The greatest need now
is for hospital tents. I think at as early a day as possible the Fifth Army Corps
should be rapidly moved to some point in the north. It can be done so
quickly that but few would die in making the change, and once landed recovery
would be speedy. Up to this time but comparatively few deaths.
SHAFTER,
Major -General.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, July 23, 1898.
General SHAFTER, Santiago, Cuba:
Of the transports with you, including those reported having left yesterday,
we need room for 6,000 from Tampa, having no transportation for that number.
You will then order all others to repair to New York as speedily as possible.
We can handle the quarantine question better there than at southern ports, and
land troops there quite readily.
The Secretary of War asks for report on fever conditions to-day, and what
progress is being made in getting troops to the high grounds, and how
effective this is going to be. Would you advise sending more than two im-
566 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
mune regiments now on the way to you? The desire is to help you in every
way possible. As soon as it can be done with safety, etc., it is the intention
to bring the entire Fifth Corps north for rest and recuperation.
H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.
WAR DEPARTMENT, July 28, 1898.
General SHAFTER, Cuba:
Would it not be well to encourage your command by telling them they will
be moved north as soon as the fever cases subside? It would stimulate them,
it seems to me, and that frequently is a tonic. We have selected Montauk
Point, Long Island, for your command when it can be moved. How many
troops should be sent to take the places of your command? How many
Spaniards have surrendered to date?
R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.
SANTIAGO DE CUBA, VIA HAITI, July 30, 1898 — 10:45 A. M.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A., Washington:
Made known Secretary's telegram that troops would go to Long Island as
soon as fever subsided, and it had a very good effect on the men. Two regi
ments of immunes in addition to the two already sent will be sufficient to
garrison this place and the surrounding towns, where insurgents are already
behaving badly and where there is great and well-grounded fear of molestation.
This force will be sufficient to defend the town, even if the Spanish troops at
Holguin do not leave there or surrender. The count of prisoners has not yet
been accurately made, but so far about 21,500 have surrendered and there
should be 3,000 or 4,000 at Sagua and Baragoa. Will send transport around
there to receive their surrender as soon as immunes arrive.
SHAFTER,
Major-General
WASHINGTON, August 2, 1898.
Major-General SHAFTER, Santiago:
After full consideration with Surgeon-General it is deemed best to have you
move your command up to end of railroad where yellow fever is impossible.
PREPARED TO RAM THE ENEMY.
THE CAMP AT MONTAUK POINT. 569
Then we will move them north as rapidly as possible. What do you advise?
It is going to be a long job at best to get so many troops away.
R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.
SANTIAGO DE CUBA, VIA HAITI August 3, 1898.
ADJUTANT- GENERAL, U. S. A., Washington:
In reply to telegram this date, stating that it is deemed best that my command
be moved to end of railroad, where yellow fever is impossible, I have to say that
under the circumstances this move is practically impossible. The railroad is
not yet repaired, although it will be in about a week. Its capacity is not to
exceed i,coo men a day at the best, and it will take until the end of August
to make this move, even if the sick list should not increase. An officer of
my staff. Lieutenant Miley, who has looked over the ground, says that it is
not a good camping ground. The country is covered with grass as high as
a man's head when riding a horse, and up in the hills there is no water and
it will be required to pump water two miles. He also states that rainfall is
twice as great as it is here and the soil is a black loam that is not suitable for
camping. Troops that have been sent to that locality have been housed in
barracks. In my opinion there is but one course to take, amd that is imme
diately to transport the Fifth Corps and the detached regiments that came
with it to the United States. If it is not done, I believe the death rate will
be appalling. I am sustained in this view by every medical officer present.
I called together to-day the general officers and the senior medical officers
and telegraph you their views. There is more or less yellow fever in almost
every regiment throughout the command. As soon as it develops they are
sent to hospital, but new cases arise, not very many, it is true, and it is of a
mild type, but nevertheless it is here. All men taken with it will, o*f course,
have to be left and have to take their chances. Some will undoubtedly be
taken sick on the ships and die, but the loss will be much less than if an attempt
is made to move this army to the interior, which is now really an army of
convalescents; at least 75 per cent, of the men having had malarial fever, and
all so much weakened by the exposure and hardships which they have*under-
gone that they are capable now of very little exertion. They should be
put at once on all the transports in the harbor and not crowded at all, and
this movement should begin to-morrow and be completed before the I5th. All
here believe the loss of life by doing this will be much less than if more time
is taken. If the plan is adopted of waiting until the fever is stamped out,
57° CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
there will be no troops moved from here until the fever season is passed, and
I believe there will then be very few to move. There are other diseases which
are prevailing — typhoid fever, dysentery, etc., and severe types of malarial
fever which are quite as fatal as yellow fever. The matter of moving this
army has been placed before you, and you have the opinions of all command
ing officers and chief surgeons, who fully agree with me as to the only course
left open for the preservation of this army. There can be no danger to the
people at home, as it seems to me that infected ships is a matter of small
moment.
SHAFTER,
Major-General.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, August 4, 1898.
General SHAFTER, Santiago, Cuba:
You can load all ships in harbor that can be properly supplied with medicine
and medical attendance for Montauk Point. Will hurry other ships forward
as rapidly as possible. The ships on the way from Spain should take at least
IS,OOO prisoners. We arc doing everything possible to relieve your gallant
command.
R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.
It was a matter of great regret to the officers and men of the.
cavalry division that they were not permitted to take part in the Porto
Rican campaign. I had myself strongly urged that my division be
sent to Porto Rico, as I felt assured that the sea voyage to that healthy
island, together with a change of diet would put them in. good
campaigning condition, and it is still my belief that such a movement
would have had the favorable result I anticipated.
I give below two letters addressed by me to General Miles on this
subject:
HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 21, 1898.
Major-General NELSON A. MILES, Commanding the Army:
SIR. — My command is now on high ground and is improving. They were
simply worn out by constant service and the rest they are now getting will
THE CAMP AT MONTAUK POINT. 571
soon restore them. There is not a particle of infection of yellow fever in the
command, and has not been. I think the cavalry division would be of great
service in Porto Rico.
With great respect,
Your obedient servant,
JOSEPH WHEELER,
Major-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.
HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 24, 1898.
Major-General NELSON A. MILES, Commanding the Army:
DEAR GENERAL. — I am very glad to hear that you have started with the
Porto Rican expedition, and that you are to command it. We still have some
sickness, but it is a fever which is by no means of the character of yellow fever
and not contagious at all. Our total sick list was 340 cases yesterday. Our
command is isolated on the hills nearly five miles from Santiago, and there
has been but one case sent from the whole division that was regarded even
with suspicion as yellow fever. We could move to Porto Rico with 2,200
or 2,300 men entirely free from disease or contagion of any kind, and they
would be very valuable to you. If you do not want to move the cavalry
division immediately, I am certain that I could be very valuable to you with
my staff, and should be very glad to serve you in any capacity whatever.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOSEPH WHEELER.
As it was eventually decided by the authorities that none of the
troops which took part in the Santiago campaign were to be sent to
Porto Rico, my repeated applications for my troops to be sent there
were not acted upon, and on August 6th, orders were given me to
embark my command upon three ships to be sent to the United
States. General Sumner embarked with the advance portion of the
command on the " Gate City," other of my troops went on the
" Matteawan-/1 and in compliance with orders, Colonel Roosevelt, my
self and some 700 of our men boarded the " Miami " and sailed from
Santiago on Monday, August 8th.
Our voyage home was uneventful. On the night of the 8th we
572 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
sailed through the " Windward channel " and passed Cape Maisa
about 3 o'clock on Tuesday morning. Castle Island lighthouse was
passed at 5 o'clock that afternoon, and Wattlings island the following
day about the same time. It is said that it was upon this island that
Columbus landed 407 years ago. There appears to be nothing of
interest on it and but few houses could be seen. The chief occupation
of the inhabitants is, I am informed, that of fishing.
As our ship took a direct line for Montauk Point, our destination,
this threw us some 400 miles east of the Florida coast, and we were
quite out of the range of the usual line of travel. The sanitary con
dition of our ship was excellent, and the continued efforts of the
officers and men were directed to taking care of the sick. We lost
by death but one man during the voyage, Sergeant George Walsh of
Troop "A," First United States Volunteer Cavalry, who was buried
at sea on the morning of Friday, August I2th, with the usual soldierly
and Christian services.
On the afternoon of Sunday, August I5th, we sailed into the harbor
at Montauk Point. We remained anchored in the bay that night, and
after a rigid inspection by the quarantine officers, we were allowed to
disembark next day. After reporting my arrival to Washington by
telegram I was at once summoned by the President to proceed to that
city. After an interview with the Chief Executive and the Secretary
of War, I was directed to return to Montauk Point, and to take com
mand of the troops at that place.
My duties here comprised the supervision of the disembarkation of
the troops as they arrived from Cuba, locating the various camps for
their reception, seeing that the necessary tent accommodation had
been erected, and above all, caring for the sick who arrived on the
various vessels in large numbers.
Within the space of less than three weeks, the necessary hospitals,
storehouses and tents for more than 25,000 soldiers, besides accom
modations for the attendant nurses and physicians, were erected on
the barren fields of Montauk Point. About half the soldiers brought
from Cuba were invalids and were installed in the various wards of the
mammoth hospitals. By September 5th, so well were these arrange
ments completed, that Dr. Sands, the eminent Chicago physician,
stated that the fever patients at the camp at Montauk Point were
better taken care of than in any other hospital he had ever seen ; that
in fact the convalescents were living luxuriously. The Pennsylvania
and New York Central Railroad companies, issued half-rate tickets
THE CAMP AT MONTAUK POINT. 573
to officers and men of the various commands going home on furlough
and paying their own transportation, these tickets being freely issued
to any one wearing the uniform of a soldier.
No sooner had the camp been established than the most liberal
offers of money, help and supplies came in from all parts of the
United States. One gentleman, who has forbidden his name to be
mentioned, telegraphed me that he had placed to my personal credit
the sum of $5,000 to be expended by me in such way as I thought
best, for the comfort of the soldiers. I preferred, however, not to
expend this money myself, and so notified him; he afterward spent it
in sending a barge of ice to Montauk Point for the use of the com
mand. It would be impossible to give a full list of the generous-
hearted people who gave freely of their substance for t.he benefit of
the soldiers, but I cannot refrain from mentioning the names of a
few of these benefactors.
Hon. Sherman Hoar, on behalf of the Massachusetts Volunteer
Aid Association, donated cargoes of very valuable supplies. This
distinguished man twice visited the camps occupied by the Massa
chusetts volunteers and worked very hard in helping to provide for
their comfort. He died at his home in Concord, Massachusetts, Octo
ber 7, 1898, of typhoid pneumonia, brought on from overwork in this
noble cause. Cargoes of supplies were also furnished by the
Merchants' Association of New York; the War Relief Committee of
Philadelphia; Hon. George F. Hoar, of Worcester, Mass.; Hon. Mel
ville Bull; Mrs. S. E. Winthrop, and Mr. C. Dorcher, and others, of
Newport, R. I.
We were similarly indebted to Mr. D. W. Lord and a committee
from Illinois; to Commander Gerry, who in person donated stores for
the sick, bringing them to Montauk Point in his own yacht; to
Commissioner Powers of the United States Fish Commission, who
sent i ,000 pounds of fresh fish for distribution to the soldiers; to Mrs.
K. M. Bostwick of the Woman's Veteran Auxiliary Corps of Brook
lyn, Mrs. R. B. Cooley of the Soldiers' Relief Committee, Pough-
keepsie, N. Y., and to R. S. Howland, Esq., editor of the Providence
" Journal."
The Murray Hill Hotel, New York, gratuitously furnished our
hospital with forty quarts of consomme daily; and Mr. George H. Cas-
sidy, New York, offered to receive into his home, furnishing medical
attendance and nurses free of charge, a number of our soldiers who
needed such care.
574 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Mr. Charles Palmer, of Watch Hill, R. I., and his colleagues did
most excellent work in donating supplies and superintending their
distribution at the detention hospital; while the kindly interest mani
fested in the welfare of the soldiers by Mrs. S. M. McMaster, then
staying at Watch Hill, and by my numerous other correspondents in
all parts of the United States, was much appreciated.
The Messrs. Kane, Van Cortland & Co., of New York, offered also
a large sum of money; and Mrs. Ireland sent her steamboat " Kelpie,"
loaded with delicacies.
Mr. Stuyvesant Fish, president of the Illinois Central Railroad,
telegraphed me, offering $1,000. Mention cannot be omitted of the
help given by the officials of the " Red Cross " and other kindred
societies; or of the liberality of Miss Helen M. Gould, whose dona
tions probably far exceeded any like gifts ever made before for such a
purpose, and who personally devoted her time and efforts to relieve
the sufferings of the soldiers.
The example given to humanity by the gentle and generous acts
and bounteous charity of this lady has made a deep impression upon
the world, and has marked her as one whom posterity will honor and
whose name will be pre-eminent in the history of this century for her
good and noble works.
When the pleasing duty of commanding the soldiers at Montauk
Point was intrusted to me, I was instructed by the President to spare
no expense in providing for the comfort of the soldiers and in
endeavoring to restore the sick to health. In consequence of this we
were soon able to supply them with the most nourishing articles of
food and permission was obtained for expenditure of money by the
surgeons in the purchase of unusual and extra supplies for the sick
under their care. Trained nurses were brought to the camp and
extra physicians and hospital stewards were employed. Some un
easiness being felt as to the purity of the water supply, an immense
filtering plant was purchased and erected at a cost of some $7,000;
a steam laundry was erected for the express purpose of laundering
clothes and linen for the sick, and all the clothes and linen used in the
hospitals were thoroughly disinfected. In every possible way the
solicitude of the Government was shown for the safety and comfort
of the soldiers who had been in Santiago, and provisions were made
for their comfortable transportation to their homes when they left the
camp. Not only officials appointed for the purpose, but committees
THE CAMP AT MONTAUK POINT. 575
of citizens waited at the different railroad stations to care for the
returned soldiers. The Red Cross Society joined nobly in this work.
Perhaps the most trying part of our work at Montauk was
endeavoring to relieve the anxiety of anxious relatives in regard to
their loved ones who had been in the war. Every effort wa^ made to
investigate promptly and telegraph immediate answers to inquiries as
to the safety or whereabouts of the soldiers.
On August 24th, the Secretary of War visited Montauk Point and
made a thorough investigation of all parts of the camp, remaining
two days, during which he made many valuable suggestions and gave
directions regarding the administration of the command.
On September 3d, the President and party arrived and made a
visit of inspection; and the occasion was much enjoyed by the soldiers
at Montauk.
On the 6th of September, Surgeon-General Sternberg made a visit
to the camp, and after a rigid inspection of all its departments, ex
pressed himself as highly gratified at the result of his investigation.
In speaking of the camp, he says:
It is the finest place in the United States, and the water is all right. Lieu
tenant-Colonel Smart's present investigation is the second on his part. The
first analysis of the water was made before the camp was opened, and we
are having another analysis made, largely to reassure the public.
The commands who were with me were mustered out at different
dates, commencing with the Seventy-first New York Volunteers,
which, on August 27th, were ordered to be sent on furlough, at the
expiration of which time they were to be mustered out. Following this
command in order came the Thirty-third and Thirty-fourth Michigan
Volunteers, the Eighth Ohio, First District of Columbia and the
First Volunteer Cavalry.
I give below the farewell letters addressed to these different com
mands respectively upon their departure:
HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES,
CAMP WIKOFF, L. I., August 27, 1898.
To THE OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS OF THE SEVENTY-FIRST REGIMENT, NEV
YORK VOLUNTEER INFANTRY:
Pursuant to the directions of the President, you will proceed to your homes
and friends to receive the welcome which Americans love to accord return-
576 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
ing heroes who have fought, endured, and suffered for the sake of country,
its honor and its prestige.
This short but severe campaign has made ours the leading among the great
countries of the earth, and you have done your full part in this great accom
plishment. Your comrades who fell in battle, and those who became victims
of disease in a tropical clime, will be revered and honored, not only by the
people of your Empire State, but by the 70,000,000 of this great Republic.
In bidding you adieu, I shall always remember each and all of you as
honored comrades of the Santiago Campaign, the effect of which, in import
ance and far-reaching benefits to our Republic, can hardly be estimated.
JOS. WHEELER,
Major -General Commanding.
HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES,
CAMP WIKOFF, L. I., September i, 1898.
To THE OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS OF THE THIRTY-THIRD AND THIRTY-FOURTH
MICHIGAN VOLUNTEER INFANTRY:
When your country called upon the brave men of the west to rally to the
standard which waves as the emblem of American liberty, you were among
the first to respond. You made no request but to. be given the post of
danger and honor. You gladly faced the torrid sun and the disease of a
tropical climate. You bravely hastened to the firing line in front of Santiago,
and nobly did your duty as heroic soldiers.
During this short but sharp campaign, in which you well performed your
part, our country was elevated to a leading position among the greatest nations
of the earth. Your work having been accomplished, the Secretary of War
directs that you proceed to your homes, where the people of your great
commonwealth await your coming, eager to shower plaudits and honors upon
you.
To those of your comrades whose lives became a sacrifice to the cause you
so bravely upheld, we reverently bow our heads; and it will be the delight of
a grateful country to cherish and perpetuate their memories.
• You take with you to your homes my best wishes for your prosperity and
happiness, and in bidding you adieu, with my whole heart I say, may God
give you His best blessing!
JOSEPH WHEELER,
Major-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.
THE CAMP AT MONTAUK POINT. 577
To THE OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS OF THE EIGHTH Omo VOLUNTEER INFANTRY:
By direction of the Secretary of War you are to proceed to your homes,
where you will receive the heartfelt welcome and generous plaudits of the
people of the great State of Ohio.
You were prompt to answer the call of your country. You eagerly sought
to meet your country's foes upon far distant foreign soil. You braved deadly
disease in a tropical land. You did your full duty in a war which has won for
us the highest place among the nations of the earth.
In bidding you adieu, I wish you Godspeed, and may health, prosperity
and honor be showered upon you.
JOSEPH WHEELER,
Major-General Commanding.
HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES,
CAMP WIKOFF, L. I., September 6, 1898.
To THE FIRST DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA VOLUNTEER INFANTRY:
The purpose for which you so promptly gave your services to your country
has been accomplished. You were among the first to respond to the nation's
call co arms. In the face of tropical suns you hastened to the scene of con
flict, and with eager steps marched to the front of our line of battle at San
tiago, and, together with your brave comrades, engaged your country's foes
until you saw them surrender their strongholds and lay down their arms at the
feet of the valorous American army.
The results of this campaign, in which you did your full duty, have been
so momentous and beneficial as to win for you and your fellow soldiers the
applause and gratitude of your countrymen.
In bidding you adieu, I beg to express my personal admiration for the forti
tude, endurance, and soldierly qualities which you displayed, and to wish for
you every possible blessing and the best prosperity and happiness.
JOS. WHEELER,
Major- General, U, S. Volunteers.
578 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
CAMP WIKOFF, L. I., September 7, 1898.
To THE OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS OF THE CAVALRY DIVISION, ARMY OF SAN
TIAGO:
The duties for which the troops comprising the cavalry division were brought
together have been accomplished.
On June I4th we sailed from Tampa, Florida, to encounter in the sickly
season the diseases of the tropical island of Cuba, and to face and attack the
historic legions of Spain in positions chosen by them and which for years
they had been strengthening by every contrivance and art known to the skill
ful military engineers of Europe.
On the 23d one squadron each of the First and Tenth Regular Cavalry, and
two squadrons of the First Volunteer Cavalry, in all 964 officers and men,
landed on Cuban soil. These troops marched on foot fourteen miles, and,
early in the morning of the 24th, attacked and defeated double their number
of regular Spanish soldiers under the command of Lieutenant-General Linares.
Eagerly and cheerfully you pushed onward, and on July ist the entire division,
consisting of the First, Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Cavalry and First
Volunteer Cavalry, forded San Juan river, and gallantly swept over San Juan
hill, driving the enemy from its crest. Without a moment's halt you formed,
aligning the division upon the First Infantry Division under General Kent,
and, together with these troops, you bravely charged and carried the formid
able intrenchments of Fort San Juan. The entire force which fought and
won this great victory was less than 7,000 men.
The astonished enemy, though still protected by the strong works to which
he had made his retreat, was so stunned by your determined valor that his
only thought was to devise the quickest means of saving himself from further
battle. The great Spanish fleet hastily sought escape from the harbor and
was destroyed by our matchless navy.
After seizing the fortifications of San Juan ridge, you, in the darkness of
night, strongly intrenched the position your valor had won. Reinforced by
Bates's brigade on your left and Lawton's division on your right, you con
tinued the combat until the Spanish Army of Santiago province succumbed to
the superb prowess and courage of American arms. Peace promptly followed,
and you return to receive the plaudits of 70,000,000 of people.
The valor displayed by you was not without sacrifice. Eighteen per cent.,
or nearly one in five, of the cavalry division fell on the field either killed or
wounded. We mourn the loss of these heroic dead, and a grateful country
will always revere their memory.
THE CAMP AT MONTAUK POINT. 579
Whatever may be my fate, wherever my steps may lead, my heart will always
burn with increasing admiration for your courage in action, your fortitude
under privation, and your constant devotion to duty in its highest sense,
whether in battle, in bivouac, or upon the march.
JOSEPH WHEELER,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.
The cavalry division lost in the Santiago campaign 18 per cent., or
nearly one in five; Kent's division lost 13} per cent., or nearly one in
seven; while Lawton's division lost 7 per cent., or one in fourteen.
In the cavalry division the proportionate losses were twice as great
as those in many great battles of Europe. At Waterloo the English
lost but about 10 per cent., and the average loss in Napoleon's great
battles did not exceed 8 per cent.
My report for the months of August and September shows the
number of troops which arrived at Montauk Point between August
1 3th and September I3th; the. number sick on date of arrival, the
number of deaths on the voyage and the condition of the vessel on
the date of arrival. It also shows the quantity and description of the
extra prices of food and lumber supplied for the various buildings
and many other interesting facts in connection with the camp,
especially the number of deaths at the hospital :
REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL WHEELER, COMMANDING CAV
ALRY DIVISION, U. S. VOLUNTEERS.
HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES,
CAMP WIKOFF, Montauk Point, L. I., September 26, 1898.
THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL U. S. ARMY:
SIR. — In compliance with General Orders, No. 108, dated War Department,
Adjutant-General's Office, July 28, 1898, I have the honor to submit the fol-
" lowing report for the months of August and September, " specifying the nature
of my duties during that period, the dates of my assignments, and the authority
by which I \vas assigned."
During the first week in August, the cavalry division under my command
was encamped near El Caney, about five miles north of Santiago. Pursuant
to the instructions from the commanding general, these troops were em
barked upon transports " Gate City," " Matteawan," and " Miami," to be
transported to Montauk Point. I embarked on the last-named steamer and
sailed on August 8th, reaching Montauk Point August
580
CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
I proceeded to Washington, pursuant to orders from the Secretary of War,
which were in these words:
* * *******
On the 1 7th I received verbal instructions from the Secretary of War and
the President to return to Montauk Point, and take command of the troops
at that place and those that were to arrive from Santiago. Before the arrival
of any troops Montauk Point was a barren pasturage, with no buildings what
ever in which troops could be quartered or stores sheltered.
I give below a statement of the number of troops which arrived at this
place from Santiago:
TABLE shoiuing the number of troops which arrived at Montauk Point during the
thirty days from August 13 to September 13, 1898 ; also the number sick on date
of arrival, number of deaths on voyage, and condition of the vessel on tlie
date of arrival.
NAME OF VESSEL.
Date of
arrival.
Troops on
board .
Number
sick
Deaths on
voyage.
Condition of
vessel.
Au
Se
g'?4
14
14
15
15
15
18
18
18
20
20
21
21
21
2-2
23
23
23
23
21
25
26
26
26
26
"26
26
23
30
30
30
31
31
pt. 1
1
2
2
551
G99
872
680
1.113
1 , 143
527
416
488
1,600
636
345
275
462
312
528
688
186
185
1,069
1,199
670
376
486
511
401
489
214
816
118
397
836
106
480
62
4
848
24
385
86
600
249
312
224
~"Hws&
41
21
24
84
89
224
70
73
114
300
30
50
192
92
20
104
61
82
27
178
130
33
20
110
9.5
50
124
99
49
20
5
150
15
145
3
0
3
0
28
0
100
249
28
70
3,252
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
10
1
1
8
2
0
1
0
0
0
1
2
1
0
4
1
9
2
0
1
0
0
1
1
14
0
0
0
0
0
0
•7
13
2
2
87
Not
Inf<
Not
Infe
Not
infected.
;cted .
infected.
jcted .
infected.
St Louis ...•
St Paul
Comanclie
Mobile
Unionist
4
4
10
11
13
THE CAMP AT MONTAUK POINT. 51
In addition to the soldiers arriving from Santiago, some 8,000 were brought
to this point from Tampa, Fort McPherson barracks, and other recruiting-
stations, making the total number of soldiers brought here in thirty days
about 30,000 men.
Tents were erected and hospitals were constructed from plank and canvas
sufficient to care for between 3,000 and 4,000 sick.
While only 3,252 were reported sick when the ships landed, the great bulk
of the troops that were at Santiago were by no means well, and many of
them, fully 5,000 or 6,000, developed sickness after their arrival.
The physicians recommended a change of diet for the entire command as
essential to their prompt restoration to health, and with their aid I prepared
a list of articles such as they recommended to be furnished the soldiers in
addition to their regular rations. I immediately ordered these articles by tele
graph, and after some delay they were received, the first invoice reaching
Montauk Point on August 22d.
The quantity and description of the extra articles of food is as follows:
Halibut, 2,100 pounds; lima beans, 47,947 pounds; ice, 379,350 pounds; evapo
rated apples, 21,000 pounds; cans apples, 6,120; evaporated apricots, 15,000
pounds; butter, 20,964 pounds; green corn, 14,400 cans; cocoa, 1,080 pounds;
crackers, 3,990 pounds; sugar-cured hams, 21,000 pounds; evaporated crearn,
28,800 cans; oatmeal, 23,040 pounds; cans peaches, 14,856; evaporated peaches,
18,125 pounds; cans pears, 12,000; cans peas, 14,400; prunes, 10,500 pounds;
soups, 19,104 cans: pickles, 5,296 gallons; lemons, 150 boxes; oranges, 300
boxes; eggs, 53,070 dozen; tea, 250 pounds; fresh milk, 28,630 gallons.
For building frames for hospitals' and floors to tents, etc., we hauled 1,494
loads of lumber, each containing about 1,000 feet. The total amount of lumber
accounted for as delivered to the depot up to September loth was 1,446,326
feet.
In order to supply the camp with water, wells were dug, and 62,545 feet, or
12 miles, of pipe were laid. On these lines there were 178 faucets.
Late in August fears were entertained that the purity of the water would
not be maintained, and to obviate this difficulty a filtering plant was erected
at the cost of $7,000.
The entire number of deaths up to this date, including those who died on
shipboard and were brought ashore for burial, was 263. This is a very low
death rate when we consider that it is the rate for some 30,000 men, nearly all
of whom had been subjected to the malarial climate of Cuba.
It must be borne in mind that all of these soldiers had come from a yellow-
fever country, and most of them either directly from yellow-fever camps or
their immediate vicinity. When we consider the apprehension which was felt
5^2 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
and expressed throughout the country at the announcement that this large
body of soldiers who had been exposed to yellow fever were to land in this
country, and when we consider that there was not a spread of one single case
outside of the ships or camps, we should feel very grateful for so fortunate an
outcome. This was accomplished by the exercise of the greatest care on the
part of the officials. Every ship was carefully inspected immediately upon its
arrival, and all the passengers were placed in detention camps and hospitals
under strict quarantine. As a further prevention, disinfecting plants were es
tablished at the pier and also in connection with the hospital where the sick
were entered in the first instance, and, to keep everything isolated which was
in any way connected with the sick, a steam laundry plant was erected suffi
cient to do laundry work for hospitals containing 5,000 patients.
Last, but by no means least, I desire to express the gratitude which every
officer and soldier of this camp feels for the most bounteous generosity of the
people. Steamboat loads and carloads of luxuries of every kind were donated
with a lavish hand. The hospitals of our leading cities were thrown open and
shelter, medical care, and nursing freely offered to our sick soldiers, and very
many ladies left their luxurious homes and hastened to our camps, tendering
their services to nurse the sick. This beautiful exhibiliori of sympathy and
devotion on the part of the people most strikingly supplemented the exhibition
of fortitude and courage which was displayed by our soldiers in their campaign
under the torrid suns in the fever-stricken land of Cuba.
All of which is respectfully submitted.
Very respectfully,
JOS. WHEELER,
Major-General, U. S. Volunteers.
THE TREATY OF PEACE.
CHAPTER XIII.
When diplomatic relations between the United States and Spain
were broken off in April, 1898, the Spanish minister, Senor Polo y
Bernabe, by direction of his Government, confided to the French
ambassador, M. Jules Cambon, and the minister of Austria-Hungary,
Mr. Hengelmuller, the protection of Spanish subjects and interests
in the United States.
These two gentlemen had a meeting in which they agreed upon
their action in regard to all affairs of interest to Spain. The following
letter addressed by the Secretary of State to the French ambassador,
and a similar one to the Austro-Hungarian minister, contain a full
description of the plans of these two diplomats as communicated to
the United States Government:
THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, April 25, 1898.
EXCELLENCY. — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of
the 22d instant, whereby you inform me that Mr. Polo de Bernabe, before leav
ing Washington and in fulfillment of the instructions of his Government, in
trusted to you, and at the same time to. the Austro-Hungarian minister, the
protection of Spanish subjects and interests in the United States. To the end
of simplifying in practice the accomplishment of this commission, which your
respective governments have accepted, you and the Austro-Hungarian minister
have agreed upon certain convenient arrangements, which you are pleased to
communicate to me, as follows:
" First. The archives of the Spanish legation in Washington will remain
stored in the legation of Austro-Hungary.
" Second. The care of the consular archives and the protection of Spanish
interests will be confided to the consulates-general of Austria-Hungary in New
York and Chicago, and to the consulates of France in New Orleans, San
Francisco and Philadelphia.
5§4 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
" Third. In those localities where only one of the two countries has a rep
resentative, he will assume the protection of Spanish interests; in those places
where the two countries are only represented by consular agents, such pro
tection will be exercised by the French agent.
" Fourth. Questions, the adjustment of which may necessitate representations
to the Department of State, will be dealt with either by the minister of Austria-
Hungary or by me [the French ambassador], accordingly as the Austrian or
the French consul shall have had the initiative therein.
" Fifth. In all other cases I shall charge myself [the French ambassador]
alone with the steps to be taken with respect to the Government of the United
States."
In reply, I beg to inform you that the Government of the United States admits
your friendly action in assuming charge of the protection of Spanish subjects
and interests in the United States, and that the scheme which you and the
Austro-Hungarian minister have devised for the practical division of the charge
you have simultaneously assumed is provisionally accepted so long as experi
ence shall show its convenience in practice. It is, of course, understood, in
conformity with the international usage which obtains in circumstances like
the present, that the arrangement contemplates only the friendly offices of
yourself or of your esteemed colleague, as. well as of the consular representa
tives of your respective nations, should occasion therefor arise, with regard
to Spanish subjects and their interests actually within the jurisdiction of the
United States, and embraces no representative office by either of you on behalf
of the Government of Spain, between which and the Government of the United
States a condition of war unhappily exists.
I shall communicate to the competent authorities copies of the notes thus
addressed to me by yourself and the Austro-Hungarian minister, to the end
that they may give all due heed to such representations as the agents of either
country may feel called upon to make in behalf of Spanish subjects and in
terests in fulfillment of the friendly office of protection thus assumed and ad
mitted. In order, however, that no confusion may exist as to the distribution
of protective functions among the respective consulates, I beg that you will
favor me with a list of the French consular officers who have been designated
to act in the manner stated in your note.
Be pleased to accept, etc.,
JOHN SHERMAN.
M. Cambon transacted with great discretion and good judgment
the duties thus devolved upon him in the interests of Spanish citizens
and also prisoners taken by the United States during the war,
SECRETARY ALGER.
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 587
After the fall of Santiago it became evident that Spain had de
termined to make proposals looking forward to a cessation of
hostilities, and the following information, given out from the White
House, July 25th, was gladly received by thousands in the United
States, who anxiously awaited the return of peace:
The French ambassador, on behalf of the Government of Spain, and by
direction of the Spanish minister for foreign affairs, presented to the President
this afternoon at the White House a message from the Spanish Government,
looking to the termination of the war and a settlement of terms of peace.
The letter addressed by Her Majesty's Government to the President
of the United States, was as follows:
MADRID, July 22, 1898.
Mr. PRESIDENT:
Since three months the American people and the Spanish nation are at war
because Spain did not consent to grant independence to Cuba and to withdraw
her troops therefrom.
Spain faced with resignation such uneven strife, and only endeavored to de
fend her possessions with no other hope than to oppose, in the measure of her
strength, the undertaking of the United States, and to protect her honor.
Neither the trials which adversity has made us endure nor the realization
that but faint hope is left us could deter us from struggling till the exhaustion
of our very last resources. This stout purpose, however, does not blind us,
and we are fully aware of the responsibilities which would weigh upon both
nations in the eyes of the civilized world were this war to be continued.
This war not only inflicts upon the two peoples who wage it the hardships
inseparable from all armed conflict, but also dooms to useless suffering and
unjust sacrifices the inhabitants of a territory to which Spain is bound by secular
ties that can be forgotten by no nation either of the old or of the new world.
To end calamities already so great and to avert evils still greater, our coun
tries might mutually endeavor to find upon which conditions the present
struggle could be terminated otherwise than by force of arms.
Spain believes this understanding possible, and hopes that this view is also
harbored by the Government of the United States. All true friends of both
rations share, no doubt, the same hope.
Spain wishes to show again that in this war, as well as in the one she car
ried on against the Cuban insurgents, she had but one object: the vindication
of her prestige, her honor, her name. During the war of insurrection it was
her desire to spare the great island from the dangers of premature independ-
CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
ence; in the present war she has been actuated by sentiments inspired rather
by ties of blood than by her interests and by the rights belonging to her as
mother country.
Spain is prepared to spare Cuba from the continuation of the horrors of war
if the United States are, on their part, likewise disposed.
The President of the United States and the American people may now learn
from this message the true thought, desire and intention of the Spanish nation.
And so do we wish to learn from the President of the United States upon
which basis might be established a political status in Cuba and might be ter
minated a strife which would continue without reason should both Govern
ments agree upon the means of pacifying the island.
In the name of the Government of H. M. the Queen Regent I have the
honor to address this message to your excellency, with the expression of my
highest consideration.
DUC D'ALMODOVAR DEL RIO.
Miuistre d'Etat.
To this letter the Secretary of State replied:
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, July 30, 1898.
EXCELLENCY. — The President received on the afternoon of Tuesday, the 26th
instant, from the hand of his excellency, the ambassador of France, represent
ing for this purpose the Government of Spain, the message signed by your
excellency as minister of state in behalf of the Government of Her Majesty, the
Queen Regent of Spain, and dated the 22d instant, as to the possibility of ter
minating the war now existing between the United States and Spain.
The President received with satisfaction the suggestion that the two countries
might mutually endeavor to ascertain the conditions on which the pending
struggle may be brought to an end, as well as the expression of Spain's belief
that an understanding on the subject is possible.
During the protracted negotiations that preceded the outbreak of hostilities
the President earnestly labored to avert a conflict, in the hope that Spain, in
consideration of her own interests, as well as those of the Spanish Antilles and
the United States, would find a way of removing the conditions which had,
for half a century, constantly disturbed the peace of the Western Hemisphere
and on numerous occasions brought the two nations to the verge of war.
The President witnessed with profound disappointment the frustration of
his peaceful efforts by events which forced upon the people of the United States
the unalterable conviction that nothing short of the relinquishment by Spain
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 589
of a claim of sovereignty over Cuba which she was unable to enforce would
relieve a situation that had become unendurable.
For years the Government of the United States, out of regard for the sus
ceptibilities of Spain, had by the exercise of its power and the expenditure of
its treasure preserved the obligations of neutrality. But a point was at length
reached at which, as Spain had often been forewarned, this attitude could no
longer be maintained. The spectacle at our very doors of a fertile territory
wasted by fire and sword, and given over to desolation and famine, was one to
which our people could not be indifferent. Yielding, therefore, to the demands
of humanity, they determined to remove the causes in the effects of which they
had become so deeply involved.
To this end the President, with the authority of Congress, presented to Spain
a demand for the withdrawal of her land and naval forces from Cuba, in order
that the people of the island might be enabled to foim a government of their
own. To this demand Spain replied by severing diplomatic relations with the
United States, and by declaring that she considered the action of this Govern
ment as creating a state of war between the two countries.
The President could not but feel sincere regret that the local question as to
the peace and good government of Cuba should thus have been transferred and
enlarged into a general conflict of arms between two great peoples. Neverthe
less, having accepted the issue with all the hazards which it involved, he has,
in the exercise of his duty, and of the rights which the state of war confers,
prosecuted hostilities by land and sea, in order to secure at the earliest possible
moment an honorable peace. In so doing he has been compelled to avail him
self unsparingly of the lives and fortunes which his countrymen have placed at
his command; and untold burdens and sacrifices far transcending any material
estimation, have been imposed upon them.
That as the result of the patriotic exertions of the people of the United States
the strife has, as your excellency observes, proved unequal, inclines the Presi
dent to offer a brave adversary generous terms of peace.
The President, therefore, responding to your excellency's request, will state
the terms of peace which will be accepted by him at the present time, subject
to the approval of the Senate of the United States hereafter.
Your excellency in discussing the question of Cuba intimates that Spain
has desired to spare the island the dangers of premature independence. The
Government of the United States has not shared the apprehensions of Spain
in this regard, but it recognizes the fact that in the distracted and prostrate
condition of the island, aid and guidance will be necessary, and these it is
prepared to give.
59° CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
The United States will require.
First. The relinquishment by Spain of all claim of sovereignty over or title
to Cuba and her immediate evacuation of the island.
Second. The President, desirous of exhibiting signal generosity, will not
now put forward any demand for pecuniary indemnity. Nevertheless he cannot
be insensible to the losses and expenses of the United States incident to the
war or to the claims of our citizens for injuries to their persons and property
during the late insurrection in Cuba. He must, therefore, require the cession
to the United States and the immediate evacuation by Spain of the island of
Porto Rico and other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain in the West
Indies, and also the cession of an island in the Ladrones, to be selected by the
United States.
Third. On similar grounds the United States is entitled to occupy and will
hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty
of peace which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the
Philippines.
If the terms hereby offered are accepted in their entirety commissioners will
be named by the United States, to meet similarly authorized commissioners
on the part of Spain for the purpose of settling the details of the treaty of
peace and signing and delivering it under the terms above indicated.
I avail myself of this occasion to offer to your excellency the assurances of
my highest consideration.
WILLIAM R. DAY.
To his Excellency DUKE OF ALMODOVAR DEL Rio, Minister of State, etc.
The Spanish minister of state and foreign affairs replied to this,
reluctantly agreeing to the terms proposed, but differing somewhat
from the deductions drawn by Mr. Day as to the order of events
leading to the war. Mr. Day finding the letter of the Duke of Almo-
dovar not entirely explicit, replied, inclosing a draft of the proposed
agreement. The text of these two letters is here given :
MADRID, August 7, 1898.
Mr. SECRETARY OF STATE:
The French ambassador at Washington, whose good offices have enabled the
Spanish Government to address a message to the President of the United States,
has forwarded by cable your excellency's reply to this document.
In examining the arguments used as a preamble to the specification of the
terms upon which peace may be restored between Spain and the United States,
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 59 J
it behooves the Spanish Government to deduce from the order of events that
the severance of diplomatic lelations with the United States had no other pur
pose than to decline the acceptance of an ultimatum which Spain could only
consider as an attempt against her rightful sovereignty over Cuba.
Spain did not declare war; she met it because it was the only means of de
fending her right in the Greater Antilles. Thus did the Queen and the United
States see fit to transform and enlarge the purely local question of Cuba.
From this fact your excellency draws the conclusion that the question at
stake is no longer only the one which relates to the territory of Cuba, but also
that the losses of American lives and fortunes incident to the war should in
some manner be compensated.
As to the first condition, relating to the future of Cuba, the two Governments
reach similar conclusions in regard to the natural inability of the people to
establish an independent government; be it by reason of inadequate develop
ment, as we believe, or on account of the present distracted and prostrate
condition of the island, as your excellency states, the fact remains that Cuba
needs guidance. The American people are willing to assume the responsibility
of giving this guidance by substituting themselves to the Spanish nation, whose
right to keep the island is indisputable; to this intimation we have nothing to
oppose. The necessity of withdrawing from the territory of Cuba being im
perative, the nation assuming Spain's place must, as long as this territory shall
not have fully reached the conditions required to take rank among other
sovereign powers, provide for rules which will insure order and protect against
all risks the Spanish residents, as well as the Cuban natives still loyal to the
mother country.
In the name of the nation the Spanish Government hereby relinquishes
all claim of sovereignty over or title to Cuba, and engages to the irremeable
evacuation of the island, subject to the approval of the Cortes — a reserve which
we likewise make with regard to the other proffered terms — just as these terms
will have to be ultimately approved by the Senate of the United States.
The United States require, as an indemnity for or an equivalent to the sacri
fices they have borne during this short war, the cession of Porto Rico and of the
other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain in the West Indies, and also
the cession of an island in the Ladrones, to be selected by the Federal Gov
ernment.
This demand strips us of the very last memory of a glorious past, and expels
us at once from the prosperous island of Porto Rico and from the Western
Hemisphere, which became peopled and civilized through the proud deeds of
our ancestors. It might, perhaps, have been possible to compensate by some
other cession for the injuries sustained by the United States. However, the
592 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
inflexibility of the demand obliges us to cede, and we shall cede, the island
of Porto Rico and the other islands belonging to the Crown of Spain in the
West Indies, together with one of the islands of the archipelago of the La-
drones, to be selected by the American Government.
The terms relating to the Philippines seem, to our understanding, to be
quite indefinite. On the one hand, the ground on which the United States
believe themselves entitled to occupy the bay, the harbor, and the city of
Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, cannot be that of con
quest, since in spite of the blockade maintained on sea by the American
fleet, in spite of the siege established on land by a native supported and pro
vided for by the American Admiral, Manila still holds its own, and the Spanish
standard still waves over the city. On the other hand, the whole archipelago
of the Philippines is in the power and under the sovereignty of Spain. There
fore the Government of Spain thinks that the temporary occupation of Manila
should constitute a guaranty. It is stated that the treaty of peace shall de
termine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines; but as the
intentions of the Federal Government by regression remain veiled, therefore
the Spanish Government must declare that, while accepting the third condi
tion, they do not a priori renounce the sovereignty of Spain over the archi
pelago, leaving it to the negotiators to agree as to such reforms which the
condition of these possessions and the level of culture of their natives may
render desirable.
The Government of Her Majesty accepts the third condition, with the above-
mentioned declarations.
Such are the statements and observations which the Spanish Government
has the honor to submit in reply to your excellency's communication. They
accept the proffered terms, subject to the approval of the Cortes of the King>
dom, as required by their constitutional duties.
The agreement between the two Governments implies the irremeable sus
pension of hostilities and the designation of commissioners for the purpose
of settling the details of the treaty of peace and of signing it, under the terms
above indicated.
I avail myself of this occasion to offer to your excellency the assurances of
my highest consideration.
ALMODOVAR DEL RIO.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, August 10. 1898.
EXCELLENCY. — Although it is your understanding that the note of the Duke
of Almodovar, which you left with the President on yesterday afternoon, is
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 593
intended to convey an acceptance by the Spanish Government of the terms set
forth in my note of the 3Oth ultimo as the basis on which the President would
appoint commissioners to negotiate and conclude with commissioners on the
part of Spain a treaty of peace, I understand that we concur in the opinion
that the Duke's note, doubtless owing to the various transformations which
it has undergone in the course of its circuitous transmission by telegraph and
in cipher, is not, in the form in which it has reached the hands of the Presi
dent, entirely explicit.
Under these circumstances it is thought that the most direct and certain
way of avoiding misunderstanding is to embody in a protocol, to be signed
by us as the representatives, respectively, of the United States and Spain, the
terms on which the negotiations for peace are to be undertaken.
I, therefore, inclose herewith a draft of such a protocol, in which you will
find that I have embodied the precise terms tendered to Spain in my note of
the 30th ultimo, together with appropriate stipulations for the appointment
of commissioners to arrange the details of the immediate evacuation of Cuba,
Porto Rico, and other islands under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies,
as well as for the appointment of commissioners to treat of peace.
Accept, excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
WILLIAM R. DAY.
His Excellency M. JULES CAMBON, etc.
PROTOCOL.
William R. Day, Secretary of State of the United States, and His Excellency
Jules Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic
of France at Washington, respectively possessing for this purpose full authority
from the Government of the United States and the Government of Spain, have
concluded and signed the following articles, embodying the terms on which
the two Governments have agreed in respect to the matters hereinafter set
forth, having in view the establishment of peace between the two countries,
that is to say:
ARTICLE i. Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over or title to
Cuba.
ARTICLE 2. Spain will cede to the United States the island of Porto Rico
and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also
an island in the Ladrones, to be selected by the United States.
ARTICLE 3. The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor
of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, which shall determine
the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines.
ARTICLE 4. Spain will immediately evacuate Cubn, Porto Rico, and other
594 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
islands under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies; and to this end each
Government will, within ten days after the signing of this protocol, appoint
commissioners, and the commissioners so appointed shall, within thirty days
after the signing of this protocol, meet at Havana for the purpose of arrang
ing and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Cuba and the
adjacent Spanish islands; and each Government will, within ten days after the
signing of this protocol, also appoint other commissioners, who shall, within
thirty days after the signing of this protocol, meet at San Juan, in Porto Rico,
for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid
evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands under Spanish sovereignty in the
West Indies.
ARTICLE 5. The United States and Spain will each appoint not more than
five commissioners to treat of peace, and the commissioners so appointed shall
meet at Paris not later than October i, 1898, and proceed to the negotiation
and conclusion of a treaty of peace, which treaty shall be subject to ratification
according to the respective constitutional forms of the two countries.
ARTICLE 6. Upon the conclusion and signing of this protocol hostilities
between the two countries shall be suspended, and notice to that effect shall
be given as soon as possible by each Government to the commanders of its
military and naval forces.
It having been agreed upon what terms the United States and Spain
should treat for peace, the preliminary protocol was signed on the
1 2th of August by the American Secretary of State, William R. Day,
and M. Cambon, French ambassador, on the part of Spain. M.
Cambon received by cable his powers to sign the protocol, but the
document conferring the authority, received later by mail, read as
follows :
[Translation.]
DON ALFONSO XIII
BY THE GRACE OF GOD AND THE CONSTITUTION, KING OF SPAIN, AND IN HIS
NAME AND DURING HIS MINORITY,
DONA MARIA CRISTINA,
QUEEN REGENT OF THE KINGDOM.
Whereas it has become necessary to negotiate and sign at Washington a
protocol in which the preliminaries of peace between Spain and the United
States of America shall be settled, and as it is necessary for me to empower
for that purpose a person possessing the requisite qualifications: Therefore,
I have decided to select, after procuring the consent of His Excellency the
THE TREATY OF PEACE.
595
President of the French Republic, you, Don Julio Cambon, ambassador ex
traordinary and plenipotentiary of the French Republic in the United States
of America, as I do, by these presents, select and appoint you to proceed,
invested with the character of my plenipotentiary to negotiate and sign with
the plenipotentiary whom His Excellency the President of the United States
of America may designate for that purpose the aforesaid protocol. And I
declare, from the present moment, all that you may agree upon, negotiate,
and sign in the execution of this commission acceptable and valid, and I will
observe it and execute it, and will cause it to be observed and executed as
if it had been done by myself, for which I give you my whole full powers in
the most ample form required by law. In witness whereof I have caused
these presents to be issued, signed by my hand, duly sealed and countersigned
by the undersigned, my minister of state. Given in the palace at Madrid,
August n, 1898.
[L. s.l MARIA CRISTINA.
JUAN MANUEL SANCHEZ Y GUTIERREZ DE CASTRO,
Minister of State.
The protocol of agreement between the United States ana Spain,
signed at Washington, August 12, 1898, was as follows:
PROTOCOL.
William R. Day, Secretary of State
of the United States, and His Ex
cellency Jules Cambon, Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of
the Republic of France at Washing
ton, respectively possessing for this
purpose full authority from the Gov
ernment of the United States and the
Government of Spain, have concluded
and signed the following articles, em
bodying the terms on which the two
Governments have agreed in respect
to the matters hereinafter set forth,
having in view the establishment of
peace between the two countries, that
is to say:
ARTICLE I.
Spain will relinquish all claim of
sovereignty over and title to Cuba.
PROTOCOLE.
William R. Day, Secretaire d'Etat
des Etats-Unis, et Son Excellence
M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur Ex
traordinaire et Plenipotentiaire de la
Republique Franchise a Washington,
ayant respectivement regu a cet effet
pleine autorisation du Gouvernement
des Etats-Unis et du Gouvernement
d'Espagne, out conclu et signe
les articles suivants qui precisent les
termes stir lesquels les deux Gouv-
ernements se sont mis d'accord en
ce qui concerne les questions ci-apres
designees et ayant pour objet 1'etab-
lissement de la paix entre les deux
pays, savoir:
ARTICLE I.
L'Espagne renoncera a toute pre-
tention a sa souverainete et a tout
droit sur Cuba.
596
CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
ARTICLE II.
Spain will cede to the United States
the island of Porto Rico and other
islands now under Spanish sover
eignty in the West Indies, and also
an island in the Ladrones to be se
lected by the United States.
ARTICLE III.
The United States will occupy and
hold the city, bay and harbor of
Manila, pending the conclusion of a
treaty of peace which shall determine
the control, disposition and govern
ment of the Philippines.
ARTICLE II.
L'Espagne cedera aux Etats-Unis
Tile de Porto-Rico et les autres iles
actuellement sous la souverainete
Espagnole dans les Indes Occident-
ales, ainsi qu'une ile dans les La-
drones qui sera choisie par les Etats-
Unis.
ARTICLE III.
Les Etats-Unis occuperont ct
tiendront la ville, la baie et le port
de Manille en attendant la conclusion
d'un traite de paix qui devra deter
miner le controle, la disposition et
le Gouvernement des Philippines.
ARTICLE IV.
Spain will immediately evacuate
Cuba, Porto Rico and other islands
now under Spanish sovereignty in
the West Indies; and to this end
each Government will, within ten
days after the signing of this pro
tocol, appoint commissioners, and
the commissioners so appointed shall,
within thirty days after the signing
of this protocol, meet at Havana for
the purpose of arranging and carry
ing out the details of the aforesaid
evacuation of Cuba and the adjacent
Spanish islands; and each Govern
ment will, within ten days after the
signing of this protocol, also appoint
other commissioners, who shall,
within thirty days after the signing
of this protocol, meet at San Juan,
in Porto Rico, for the purpose of ar
ranging and carrying out the details
of the aforesaid evacuation of Porto
Rico and other islands now under
Spanish sovereignty in the West
Indies.
ARTICLE IV.
L'Espagne evacuera immediate-
ment Cuba, Porto Rico et les autres
iles actuellement sous la souverainete
Espagnole dans les Indes Occident-
ales; a cet effet chacun des deux
Gouvernements nommera, dans les
dix jours qui suivront la signature
de ce protocole, des commissaires, et
les commissaires ainsi nommes dev-
ront, dans les trente jours qui suiv
ront la signature de ce protocole, se
rencontrer a la Havane afin d'ar-
ranger et d'executer les details de
1'evacuation sus-mentionee de Cuba
et des iles Espagnoles adjacentes;
et chacun des deux Gouvernements
nommera egalement, dans les dix
jours qui suivront la signature de
ce protocole, d'autres commissaires
qui devront, dans les trente jours
de la signature de ce protocole, se
rencontrer a San Juan de Porto-Rico
afin d'arranger et d'executer les de
tails de 1'evacuation sus-mentionnee
de Porto-Rico et des autres iles ac
tuellement sous les Indes Occident-
ales.
THE TREATY OF PEACE.
597
ARTICLE V.
The United States and Spain will
each appoint not more than five com
missioners to treat of peace, and the
commissioners so appointed shall
meet at Paris not later than October
i, 1898, and proceed to the negotia
tion and conclusion of a treaty of
peace, which treaty shall be subject
to ratification according to the re
spective constitutional forms of the
two countries.
ARTICLE VI.
Upon the conclusion and signing
of this protocol, hostilities between
the two countries shall be sus
pended, and notice to that effect
shall be given as soon as possible
by each Government to the com
manders of its military and naval
forces.
Done at Washington in duplicate,
in English and in French, by the
undersigned, who have hereunto set
their hands and seals, the I2th day
of August, 1898.
[SEAL.] WILLIAM R. DAY.
[SEAL.] JULES CAMBON.
ARTICLE V.
Les Etats-Unis et 1'Espagne nom-
meront, pour traiter de la paix, cinq
commissaires au plus pour chaque
pays; les commissaires ainsi nom-
mes devront se rencontrer a Paris,
le ier Octobre, 1898, au plus tard, ei
proceder a la negociation et a la con
clusion d'un traite de paix; ce traite
sera sujet a ratification, selon les
formes constitutionnelles de chacun
des deux pays.
ARTICLE VI.
A la conclusion et a la signature
de ce protocole, les hostilites entre
les deux pays devront etre suspend-
ues, et des ordres a cet effet devront
etre donnes aussitot que possible par
chacun des deux Gouvernements aux
commandants de ses forces de terre
et de mer.
Fait a Washington, en double ex-
emplaire, anglais et frangais, par les
Soussignes qui y out appose leur sig
nature et leur sceau, le 12 Aout, 1898.
[SEAL.] WILLIAM R. DAY.
[SEAL.] JULES CAMBON.
The American commissioners appointed to arrange for the evacua
tion of Cuba were Major-General Wade, Admiral Sampson and
Major-General Butler; those for Porto Rico, Major-General Brooke,
Admiral Schley and Brigadier-General Gordon. These gentlemen
immediately proceeded to the Islands of Cuba and Porto Rico and
superintended the arrangements made for the evacuation of these
islands and the substitution of American authority in the place of
Spanish authority which had been paramount there for nearly four
centuries.
In accordance with the stipulation of Article V of the protocol, the
two governments proceeded to appoint commissioners for the nego
tiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace, the commissioners im
mediately preparing to meet at Paris at the specified time.
59$ CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
On October i, 1898, the peace conference met at Paris, America
being represented by Messrs. William R. Day, Cushman K. Davis,
William P. Frye, George Gray and Whitelaw Reid; the Spanish com
missioners being Eugenio Montero Rios, B. de Abarzuza, J. de
Garnica, W. R. de Villa-Urrutia and Rafael Cerero, the secretary of
the American board of commissioners, Mr. Moore, and the interpreter,
Mr. Ferguson. The Spanish secretary, Senor Ojeda, not being preseru,
Senor Villa-Urrutia acted in his stead. The commissions and full
powers of the commissioners were exchanged.
The commissioners gave many weeks to the completion of the
task set before them, during which every phase of the questions
arising was fully considered. The Spanish debts in Cuba and Porto
Rico, and the status of the Philippines, were the most difficult sub
jects to agree upon, but the diplomatic skill of the Spanish com
missioners was fairly met by the determined attitude of the Ameri
cans, and in the end they were forced to grant the American
proposals. The last conference was held on December 8th, arid
the final meeting took place on December loth, when the treaty of
peace was read, approved and signed in duplicate by the pleni
potentiaries of the two high contracting parties. We give the docu
ment as it was finally signed in English.
A TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
SPAIN, SIGNED AT THE CITY OF PARIS, ON DECEMBER 10,
1898.
The United States of America and Her Majesty, the Queen Regent of
Spain, in the name of her august son Don Alfonso XIII, desiring to end
the state of war now existing between the two countries, have for that purpose
appointed as plenipotentiaries:
The President of the United States — •
William R. Day, Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, George Gray and
Whitelaw Reid, citizens of the United States.
And Her Majesty, the Queen Regent of Spain —
Don Eugenio Montero Rios, president of the Senate, Don Buenaventura
de Abarzuza, senator of the Kingdom and ex-minister of the Crown; Don
Jose de Garnica, deputy to the Cortes and associate justice of the Supreme
Court; Don Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa-Urrutia, envoy extraordinary and
minister plenipotentiary at Brussels, and Don Rafael Cerero, general of
division;
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 599
Who having assembled in Paris, and having exchanged their full powers,
which were found to be in due and proper form, have, after discussion of
the matters before them, agreed upon the following articles:
ARTICLE I.
Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.
And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the
United States, the United States will, so long as such occupation shall last,
assume and discharge the obligations that may under international law result
from the fact of its occupation; for the protection of life and property.
ARTICLE II.
Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands
now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and the island of Guam
in the Marianas or Ladrones.
ARTICLE III.
Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine
islands, and comprehending the islands lying within the following line:
A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth parallel of
north latitude, and through the middle of the navigable channel of Bachi,.
from the one hundred and eighteenth (n8th) to the one hundred and twenty-
seventh (i27th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence
along the one hundred and twenty-seventh (i27th) degree meridian of longi
tude east of Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees and forty-five minutes
(4° 45') north latitude, thence along the parallel of four degrees and forty-
five minutes (4° 45') north latitude to its intersection with the meridian of
longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty-five minutes (119° 35')
east of Greenwich, thence along the meridian of longitude one hundred and
nineteen degrees and thirty-five minutes (119° 35') east of Greenwich to the
parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes (7° 40') north, thence
along the parallel of latitude of seven degrees and forty minutes (7° 40')
north to the intersection with the one hundred and sixteenth (n6th) degree
meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the inter
section of the tenth (loth) degree parallel of north latitude with the one
hundred and eighteenth (n8th) degree meridian of longitude east of Green
wich, and hence along the one hundred and eighteenth (n8th) degree meridian
of longitude east of Greenwich to the point of beginning.
The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars
($20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of the ratifications
of the present treaty.
6oo CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
ARTICLE IV.
The United States will, for the term of ten years from the date of the ex
change of the ratifications of the present treaty, admit Spanish ships and
merchandise to the ports of the Philippine islands on the same terms as ships
and merchandise of the United States.
ARTICLE V.
The United States will, upon the signature of the present treaty, send back
to Spain, at its own cost, the Spanish soldiers taken as prisoners of war on the
capture of Manila by the American forces. The arms of the soldiers in question
shall be restored to them.
Spain will, upon the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, pro
ceed to evacuate the Philippines, as well as the island of Guam, ion terms
similar to those agreed upon by the commissioners appointed to arrange
for the evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands in the West Indies, under
the protocol of August 12, 1898, which is to continue in force till its pro
visions are completely executed.
The time within which the evacuation of the Philippine islands and Guam
shall be completed shall be fixed by the two governments. Stands of colors,
uncaptured war vessels, small arms, guns of all calibres, with their carriages
and accessories, powder, ammunition, live stock and materials and supplies
of all kinds, belonging to the land and naval forces of Spain in the Philippines
and Guam, remain the property of Spain. Pieces of heavy ordnance, exclusive
of field artillery, in the fortifications and coast defenses, shall remain in their
emplacements for the term of six months, to be reckoned from the exchange
of ratifications of the treaty; and the United States may, in the meantime,
purchase such material from Spain, if a satisfactory agreement between the
two governments on the subject shall be reached.
ARTICLE VI.
Spain will, upon the signature of the present treaty, release all prisoners
of war, and all persons detailed or imprisoned for political offenses, in con
nection with the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines and the war with
the United States.
Reciprocally, the United States will release all persons made prisoners of
war by the American forces, and will undertake to obtain the release of all
Spanish prisoners in the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and the Philippines.
The Government of the United States will at its own cost return to Spain
and the Government of Spain will at its own cost return to the United States,
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 6oi
Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines, according to the situation of their re
spective homes, prisoners, released or caused to be released, by them, respect
ively, under this article.
ARTICLE VII.
The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all claims for indemnity,
national and individual, of every kind, of either Government, or of its citizens
or subjects, against the other Government, that may have arisen since the be
ginning of the late insurrection in Cuba and prior to the exchange of rati
fications of the present treaty, including all claims for indemnity for the cost
of the war.
The United States will adjudicate and settle the claims of its citizens against
Spain relinquished in this article.
ARTICLE VIII.
In conformity with the provisions of articles I, II, and III of this treaty,
Spain relinquishes in Cuba and cedes in Porto Rico and other islands in the
West Indies, in the island of Guam, and in the Philippine archipelago, all the
buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways and other
immovable property which, in conformity with law, belong to the public
domain, and as such belong to the Crown of Spain.
And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case
may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers, cannot in any respect impair
the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of prop
erty of all kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or private establishments,
ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having legal capacity
to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded,
or of private individuals, of whatsoever nationality such individuals may be.
The aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, includes
all documents exclusively referring to the sovereignty relinquished or ceded
that may exist in the archives of the peninsula. Where any document in such
archives only in part relates to said sovereignty, a copy of such part will be
furnished whenever it shall be requested. Like rules shall be reciprocally
observed in favor of Spain in respect of documents in the archives of the
island above referred to.
In the aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, are also in
cluded such rights as the Crown of Spain and its authorities possess in respect
of the official archives and records, executive as well as judicial, in the islands
above referred to, which relate to said islands or the rights and property of
their inhabitants. Such archives and records shall be carefully preserved,
6o2 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
and private persons shall without distinction have the right to require, in
accordance with law, authenticated copies of the contracts, wills and other
instruments forming part of notarial protocols or files, or which may be con
tained in the executive or judicial archives, be the latter in Spain or in the
islands aforesaid.
ARTICLE IX.
Spanish subjects, natives of the peninsula, residing in the territory over
which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, may
remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all
their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property
or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry,
commerce and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are
applicable to other foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of
record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this
treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default
of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted
the nationality of the territory in which they may reside.
The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories
hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress.
ARTICLE X.
The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her
sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of their religion.
ARTICLE XL
The Spaniards residing in the territories over which Spain by this treaty
cedes or relinquishes her sovereignty shall be subject in matters civil as
well as criminal to the jurisdiction of the courts of the country wherein they
reside, pursuant to the ordinary laws governing the same; and they shall
have the right to appear before such courts, and to pursue the same course
as citizens of the country to which the courts belong.
ARTICLE XII.
Judicial proceedings pending at the time of the exchange of ratifications
of this treaty in the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her
sovereignty shall be determined according to the following rules:
i. Judgments rendered either in civil suits between private individuals, or in
criminal matters, before the date mentioned, and with respect to which there
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 605
is no recourse or right of review under the Spanish law, shall be deemed to be
final, and shall be executed in due form by competent authority in the territory
within which such judgments should be carried out.
2. Civil suits between private individuals which may on the date mentioned
be undetermined shall be prosecuted to judgment before the court in which
they may then be pending or in the court that may be substituted therefor.
3. Criminal actions pending on the date mentioned before the Supreme
Court of Spain against citizens of the territory which by this treaty ceases
to be Spanish shall continue under its jurisdiction until final judgment;
but, such judgment having been rendered, the execution thereof shall be com
mitted to the competent authority of the place in which the case arose.
ARTICLE XIII.
The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents acquired by
Spaniards in the island of Cuba and in Porto Rico, the Philippines and other
ceded territories, at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty,
shall continue to be respected. Spanish scientific, literary and artistic works,
not subversive of public order in the territories in question, shall continue to be
admitted free of duty into such territories, for the period of ten years, to be
reckoned from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty.
ARTICLE XIV.
Spain will have the power to establish consular officers in the ports and
places of the territories, the sovereignty over which has been either relin
quished or ceded by the present treaty.
ARTICLE XV.
The Government of each country will, for the term of ten years, accord to the
merchant vessels of the other country the same treatment in respect of all
port charges, including entrance and clearance dues, light dues, and tonnage
duties, as it accords to its own merchant vessels, not engaged in the coastwise
trade.
This article may at any time be terminated on six months' notice given by
either Government to the other.
ARTICLE XVI.
It is understood that any obligations assumed in this treaty by the United
States with respect to Cuba are limited to the time of its occupancy thereof;
but it will, upon the termination of such occupancy, advise any Government
established in the island to assume the same obligations.
606 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
ARTICLE XVII.
The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United States,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by Her Majesty
the Queen Regent of Spain; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at
Washington within six months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible.
In faith whereof, we, the respective plenipotentiaries, have signed this treaty
and have hereunto affixed our seals.
Done in duplicate at Paris, the tenth day of December, in the year of Our
Lord, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight.
[SEAL.] WILLIAM R. DAY. [SEAL.] EUGENIC MONTERO RIOS.
[SEAL.] CUSHMAN K. DAVIS. [SEAL.] B. DE ABARZUZA.
[SEAL.] WILLIAM P. FRYE. [SEAL.] J. DE GARNICA.
[SEAL.] GEO. GRAY. [SEAL.] W. R. DE VILLA-URRUTIA.
[SEAL.] WHITELAW REID. [SEAL.] RAFAEL CERERO.
On January 4, 1899, it was transmitted by the President to the
Senate and discussed in executive session until the nth, when me
injunction of secrecy was removed, and on the I3th, it was ordered to
be printed. The treaty of peace was ratified by the United States
Senate at 3 o'clock on the afternoon of February 6, 1899; and was also
ratified by the Queen Regent of Spain, March 19, 1899.
Diplomatic relations between Spain and the United States were
formally resumed at Washington on June 3d, when the Duke of Arcos,
the new Spanish minister, was received by President McKinley at the
White House. The ceremony was very simple, and the speeches
exchanged were short but cordial and to the point. After the intro
ductions the Spanish minister handed his credentials to the President
and addressed him as follows:
Mr. PRESIDENT. — I have the honor to place in youT excellency's hands the
royal letter by which Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, in the name
of her august son, King Don Alfonso XIII, accredits me near this Govern
ment in the capacity of envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary.
I have come to renew the relations of friendship which have existed from
of old between Spain and the United States, and which were interrupted by
the war of last year. The treaty of peace which Spain has signed put an end
to that war, and now, looking only to the future, Spain desires that her rela
tions with this Republic may be as friendly as they were in times past, and
from the days in which this country was struggling to gain its independence.
It is my task to contribute to the renewal of these relations, to strengthen
them and to draw them closer; and. in the discharge of it, I hope to be aided
by the kindness and co-operation of your excellency and of your Government.
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 607
*
The President responded as follows:
Mr. MINISTER.— I receive with the greatest gratification the letter by which
Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, in the name of her august son, King
Alfonso XIII, has accredited you near this Government as envoy extraordinary
and minister plenipotentiary.
You will find, Mr. Minister, a cordial welcome in this country, not only
from those whose friendship you acquired during your former residence, but
from all our people, who rejoice as I do, at the renewal of the ancient bonds
of amity, which with a brief interruption have united our nations for more
than one hundred years. That these friendly relations may be confirmed and
strengthened to the advantage of both peoples is my earnest wish, and I can
assure you that every member of this Government will heartily co-operate
with you to that desirable end.
The speeches were briefer than usual, and, while purely formal, may
be accepted as models in their way.
At the conclusion of the address, the President stepped forward and
shook hands cordially with the new minister, and they engaged in
conversation in a low tone for a few moments. The President in
quired gracefully after the health of the Queen Regent and the King.
He referred courteously to the Duke's former residence in this country,
and repeated the assurances in his formal greeting that all wQtild
unite in making the minister's stay in this country pleasant and
satisfactory.
The French ambassador, M. Cambon, on the same day called upon
the Secretary of State and formally surrendered the representation of
Spanish affairs, which at the mutual wish of the two Governments he
had conducted during the interruption of our friendly relations with
Spain.
A few days later, Hon. Bellamy Storer, the newly appointed
American minister to Spain, was kindly received at Madrid by the
Queen Regent.
Thus closed the brief chapter, which in a few short months had
changed the map of the world, and added an empire of domain to the
territory under the control of the United States.
608
CUBA AS IT IS TO-DAY.
CHAPTER XIV.
Cuba is not only the largest, fairest and most fertile, but it is the
most important of the tropical islands of the Western world, owing to
its geographical position, the great fertility of its soil and its wealth
in timber and minerals. Lying at the mouth of the Gulf of Mexico,
ninety-six and one half miles from Key West, 130 miles from Yucatan,
fifty-four miles from Haiti and eighty-five miles from Jamaica, it com
mands three great gateways — Florida Strait, connecting the Gulf
of Mexico with the Atlantic ocean, the Windward passage, connecting
the ocean with the Caribbean sea and the Channel of Yucatan, cqn-
necting the gulf with the Caribbean sea.
The importance of its geographical position is mainly political,
its commanding station making it something like a sentinel at the
entrance of the Gulf of Mexico, or in the hands of an enemy, a power
ful menace to the peace and prosperity of the gulf States and their
neighbors. The political importance thus acquired by the island has
already been dwelt upon in the course of this narrative.
Cuba comprises a very small proportion of untillable land, is thor
oughly watered and drained, with no sandy, arid or sterile plains; it is
covered with rich, fertile loams, capable of producing in abundance
every form of useful vegetation known to tropical or temperate climes.
Including the numberless islands which depend upon it, the area of
Cuba exceeds 45,000 square miles, of which about one-tenth is culti
vated, a small part is forest land, and the greater part unreclaimed
wilderness.
From Cape Maysi, on the extreme east, to Cape San Antonio on the
west, it measures 730 miles in length, its width varying from 117 to
22 miles. Its longitude is between 74° and 85° west, Cape Maysi
being on a line directly south of New York and Cape San Antonio
south of Cincinnati, and its latitude is from 19° 40' to 23° 33' north,
lying within the extreme northern edge of the torrid zone.
The three provinces into which Cuba is divided — eastern, western
and central — are not merely political divisions, but are the natural
CUBA AS IT IS TO-DAY. 609
result of the great diversity of topography, climate and productions.
The eastern end is rugged and mountainous, containing the well-
defined range of the Sierra Maestra with several small mountains,
of which the most formidable is the Pico del Turquino, rising abruptly
to a height of about 8,600 feet. La Gran Piedra, near Santiago, is
5,200 feet high and its peak is surmounted by a gigantic rock which
appears poised on the summit ready to topple over. A small range
of mountains called Sierra de Los Organos runs northeast and south
west through the province of Pinar del Rio, between Mariel and Cape
San Antonio, sloping down on the south to the celebrated Vuelto
Abajo, where the finest tobacco in the world is raised.
South of Havana, and along the northern coast are low wooded hills
which have long formed strongholds for the insurgents. The greater
part of the Santa Clara province consists of long extensive plateaus,
considerably elevated above the sea level, ending in the Sierras Zati-
borico and Cubitas, the latter being the rebel stronghold and seat of
government during the rebellion of 1895. One of the most remark
able things about Cuba is the peculiar terrace formation extending
throughout the southeastern part; this is especially noticeable in the
vicinity of Santiago, and gives a most singular appearance to the
island as approached from the sea.
The Cuban mountains are not composed of barren and rocky soils,
but consist mainly of rich clays and are densely wooded, sloping down
into plains covered with verdure. The central province is well ele
vated above the sea level and affords vast rolling and gently sloping
plains for the culture of the sugar cane or for any branch of agricul
ture. The western province consists of a series of low mountains with
fertile slopes and valleys of less rugged contour than the general for
mation of the eastern extremity; it is, in fact, more temperate in
every respect. Over the whole island is a fadeless mantle of tender
vegetation, kept green by copious showers and the humidity of the
atmosphere.
The coast of Cuba is the most remarkable in the world. With a
shore line of 2,000 miles, it has, including its indentations, a coast
of 6,800 miles ; a hundred pouch-like harbors indent its sides, and most
of these are good harbors. About half the coast is bordered by keys
aggregating an area of 1,350 square miles. They are small islands, for
the most part formations of coral, built upon the shallow submerged
edge of the island, sometimes presenting serious obstruction to navi
gation, at other times affording safe and quiet coves for shelter or
610 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
forming the outside arm of a beautiful harbor. Some of these islands
are quite large, the Cayo Ramano, for instance, having an area of
140 square miles.
The Isle of Pines, off the southern coast, was ceded direct to the
United States by the treaty of peace with Spain. It is directly south
of the city of Havana, and is nearly one-third the size of Porto Rico,
having an area of about 1,200 miles. The greater part of the island
is extremely fertile, and the air is so pure and bracing that it is dest'—xl
to become quite important as a health resort, although, under the
Spanish rule, it was used principally as a penal settlement. Its prin
cipal products are marble, rock-crystal, tortoise shells, pine, cedar,
mahogany and other valuable woods. There are also deposits of mer
cury and iron. It is probable that this island will prove of great value
as a naval station, as it will be our nearest outpost to the Nicaragua
canal.
The rivers of Cuba are quite numerous, but not of any great length
owing to the topography of the country; few of them are navigable
for vessels of light draft. The Cauto, which flows westward through
the province of Santiago, is the largest in the island, being 150 miles
long and is navigable for fifty miles; but its mouth is obstructed by
a treacherous sand-bar deposited there by a heavy flood in 1661, when
many large vessels, including a Spanish man-of-war, were imprisoned
and abandoned there.
The little river of Yumuri winds its way through one of the finest
bits of scenery in the world, so beautiful that the land through which
it flows is known as the <k Happy Valley."
Several of the streams of Cuba have no visible outlet, but appear
to lose themselves in the ground. Among these is the Rio San
Antonio in the province of Havana, which drains the wonderful lake
of Ariguanabo, about twenty miles southwest of the city, passes
through the town of San Antonio de los Banos and disappears beneath
a large tree. There is another short stream called the Moa, having a
remarkable cataract with a fall of 300 feet and also a cave into which
it plunges to appear again farther down. The San Diego river in its
course passes under some beautiful natural arches and bridges.
There are many resorts of great beauty in Cuba, the principal of
these being known as the " Caves of Bellamar," about two and a half
miles southeast of the city of Matanzas. This cave, while it does not
equal in size the famous mammoth cave of Kentucky, or the Luray
caverns of Virginia, excels them in the richness and splendor of its
CUBA AS IT IS TO-DAY. 6l I
crystal formations, the most remarkable of which are the " Fountain
of Snow," the " Cloak of the Virgin," " Columbus' Mantle," " The
Altar," and " The Guardian Spirit," while on every side in this vast
apartment known as the " Gothic Temple," are formations in which
the visitor can find representations of fairies and shadowy spirits.
Besides the " Caves of Bellamar " are those of San Jose de los
Remedios together with the caverns of Cubitas, Jibara, Yumuri,
Holguin, and Bayamo, also the noted Monte Libano caverns.
In Cuba, the year is divided into two seasons, the wet and the dry;
though there is really no excessively dry weather, the air being always
humid. The wet season corresponds to our summer and the rain
fall is heavier in the eastern part. The average rainfall for the year
is not excessive, being similar to that of our eastern States, but differ
ently distributed. Frost is sometimes, but rarely seen, and a slight
skim of ice has been known to form; but the only record of snow
having fallen in Cuba was in the year 1856.
The temperature is not excessively high, the average at Havana
being 82° Fahrenheit, during July and August, the warmest months,
and 72° during December and January. It is probably warmer at
Santiago on the extreme southeast coast; and that section is more
liable to be visited by earthquakes; though the whole island is more
or less subject to storms of great violence.
The climate of Cuba is more salubrious than we would be led to
suppose from some recent accounts. The sickness which prevails at
some seasons, and is supposed to be inseparable from the climate, is
due, to a great extent, to the neglect of sanitary precautions and to
indiscretion in diet.
Localities having an altitude of more than 700 feet are free from the
ravages of yellow fever, and there are some portions of the island
where the yellow fever and certain malarial fevers are unknown.
Surgeon-General Sternberg, who has made an exhaustive study of
this subject, believes that it is possible to put the city of Havana in
such a good sanitary condition as to make it exempt from yellow
fever; and Surgeon-General Wyman, marine hospital service, is of the
same opinion. This is confirmed by the experience of England in
Jamaica and other West India islands, and the general experience of
our own people in the control of diseases resulting from a want of
proper sanitary regulations. Could Cuban cities be reclaimed from
the unhealthy conditions which create and foster disease, the island
would be a delightful place of residence.
6i2 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
The flora of Cuba is abundant and magnificent, embracing nearly all
the forms of vegetation found in the other West Indies, southern
Florida and the central American seaboard. More than 3,350 native
plants have been catalogued, besides many which have been introduced
from abroad.
Trees, remarkable for their size, foliage and fragrance, abound, and
woods of the most valuable kind are found here. Twenty-six .different
varieties of palms, including the famous royal palm, are found in
great abundance. Mahogany, logwood, lignum-vitae, granadilla, the
coca-wood, out of which reed instruments are made, the ccdrcla odor at o
used for making cigar boxes and lining cabinet-work, ebony, orange
and lime trees, and others too numerous to mention, are found in
great abundance, those used in cabinet-making, shipbuilding and the
arts furnishing the material of most lucrative industries.
The palm tree, which has been called the queen of the Cuban forest,
furnishes the Cuban peasant with numerous useful articles. The bud
in the center of the green leaves is a palatable food; the wood is usad
for lumber; fans, hats and other articles are made from the leaves;
basins, buckets and kettles are made from the stems of the long leaves,
and the stems, when boiled, even furnish salt to the natives.
The most important cities of Cuba are Havana, Matanzas, Pinar del
Rio, Cardenas, Puerto Principe, Cienfuegos, Santo Espiritu, Trinidad,
Santiago, Holguin, Santa Clara, and Manzanillo. The undue pro
portion of city population in an agricultural country like Cuba, and
the crowded condition of the poorer classes are due partly to the
sociable disposition of the natives and to the expense of building,
stone houses being used almost exclusively; besides this, a great
number of country homes have been destroyed in the various
rebellions.
Havana, called by its founder " Llave del Nuevo Mundo," was
founded in 1519, a hundred years before the Pilgrim Fathers landed in
New England. It is a beautiful picturesque city, eminently Spanish in
its architecture and the habits and characteristics of its citizens. It
presents a fine appearance as approached from the sea. The deep blue
of the open sea is fringed by a narrow belt of pearl-green shallow
water washing the shores of the bay. To the east high wooded land
stretches toward Matanzas. The harbor is a quadrangle with the
city of Havana on the right, and Regla, its chief suburb, on the left.
To the right is the fortification of La Punta, across from the light
house and fortification of Morro Castle, which commands the entrance
CUBA AS IT IS TO-DAY. 613
to the harbor. The cliffs on the east side are surmounted by fortifica
tions called Cabanas, built of white stone. At the south end of the
harbor is a hill called "Atares," surmounted by antique battlements;
it was here that Crittendon and his men were shot in 1851. South
and west of the city are low hills, the western-most being crowned by
the Castillo del Principe; others filled with handsome suburban
dwellings.
The beautiful bay of Havana is alive with shipping, sailing vessels,
steamers and war ships, ferry boats and yachts. A sea wall built of
stone borders the Havana side of the harbor, and the handsome street
runs parallel with the water's edge. The houses are built of light-
colored stone, and are kalsomined in various colors, giving a massive
and gorgeous effect. The windows are protected by gratings; very
little glass is seen, but heavy curtains are sometimes used inside the
window casings. The streets are very lively in the evening, filled
with equipages, horsemen, promenaders, gaily uniformed soldiers and
bands of music. The city contains fine theatres and clubhouses,
market-houses, cigar factories, hospitals, churches, many charitable
and benevolent institutions, the University of Havana, and a vast
number of mercantile establishments where wholesale business is done
on a large scale; the jewelers and goldsmiths of the city were at one
time famous, but their trade has been ruined by the wars. The chief
buildings in the city are the captain-general's palace and the old
cathedral formerly claiming to contain the tomb of Columbus, to
which many pilgrimages have been made. The honor of possessing
the remains of the celebrated navigator has been disputed by San
Domingo, where the alleged tomb of Columbus is preserved with great
care and constantly guarded. It is impossible to prove whether the
relics preserved in Havana were those of Columbus or of some mem
ber of his family, but the Spaniards have long considered his casket
as one of their most precious possessions.
Among the many charitable and benevolent institutions of Havana
are the Casa de Beneficiencia, for poor children, a hospital for lepers
and one for the insane. There are also asylums for the care of all
classes of needy and afflicted persons. The Jesuit College de Belen
possesses a very fine observatory and library, probably the finest in
the West Indies.
The poorer quarters of Havana are densely populated, with no
regard to sanitary regulations. The street-car service and carriage
service are very good. The city is well supplied with water, but the
614 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
sewerage is bad. The people are devoted to amusement and pleasure,
and before the island was devastated by such ruinous wars Havana
was one of the gayest and handsomest cities of America.
In the western province of Pinar del Rio, there are many pretty
towns; Cabanas, Mariel, Bahia Honda, on the northern coast, are
small reproductions of Havana. In the interior are Guanajay, Pinar
del Rio and San Cristobal; San Antonio de los Banos is a summer
resort, possessing fine mineral springs. This province was much
damaged in the late war with the insurgents.
Matanzas, sixty miles east of Havana, is a comparatively modern
city, founded in 1693. It has a population of 27,000 and rejoices in
the most beautiful scenery in the world. The rivers Yumuri and San
Juan have their outlet in the vicinity. The Caves of Bellamar are a
few miles from the city and handsome suburban towns surround it.
The climate is fine and the city extremely healthy. It has handsome
clubhouses, theatres and churches, an administration building and a
fine boulevard. The principal business carried on here is exportation
of sugar and molasses, chiefly to the United States, the value of
this exportation in 1895 being $59,988,497. There are also railroad -
car machine-shops, warehouses, distilleries and refineries, and the rail
road connections with Havana and other cities are convenient.
Cardenas is also comparatively new, dating only from 1828. It has a
population of 23,680 and is a thriving shipping place for sugar and
molasses. Many Americans are engaged in business there.
Sagua la Grande, 200 miles from Havana, is the eastern terminus
of the Havana railroad system, and is important as a sugar depot.
The railroad crosses Cuba from here to Cienfuegos on the southern
coast. This latter is a modern place of 27,430 inhabitants. It was
founded by refugees from San Domingo and emigrants from Louisiana
in 1819. It is entered through the bay of Jagua which was visited by
Columbus and is described by Father Las Casas as the most
magnificent port in the world- It is the second seaport in importance
and the metropolis of central Cuba, some of the largest and finest
sugar estates in the world being located in this neighborhood. The
city is well built. It is lighted by gas and electricity, has good water
works and many fine buildings.
Trinidad, east of Cienfuegos, was settled by Diego Velasquez in
1513 and is a fine specimen of an old fortified city. It was the scene
of many piratical adventures in the days when the buccaneer reigned
supreme in West India waters. It is convenient to three good harbors
CUBA AS IT IS TO-DAY. 615
and has a fine road. It is built on the slope of Vigia (Lookout)
Mountain and is surrounded by pleasant drives and rides where the
mountain heights command magnificent views. It has a population
of 27,640 and is very gay in the winter, being the resort of many
prosperous planters.
Santa Clara, now called Villa Clara, was founded in 1689. It
formerly possessed a very wealthy community and the women were
renowned for their beauty, but the surrounding country has been
devastated by war. It is connected by railroad with Havana and
Cienfuegos.
Camaguey, or Puerto Principe, is the chief interior city. It has a
population of more than 46,000 and claims to be the most purely
Cuban of all the towns.
Bayamo, in the valley of the Cautb, is a very old town. It was the
cradle of the revolution of 1868, and was a stronghold during the war
of 1895, costing the Spaniards many hundreds of lives in efforts to keep
its garrison supplied with provisions. Holguin is also an important
city.
Manzanillo, on the southern coast between Santiago and Trinidad,
has a population of 23,300 and is the principal outlet of the Cauto
valley, shipping annually large quantities of tobacco, sugar, wax,
honey and other products. It is low and unhealthy, but has im
portance as a commercial port.
Santiago, the capital of eastern Cuba, is next to Havana in political
and strategic importance. It was the seat of government in 1514
under Velasquez. It lies 100 miles west of the eastern extremity of
Cuba on a beautiful land-locked bay six miles long. The entrance to
the harbor is scarcely visible, appearing like a narrow rent in a
mountainous coast line. It is 180 feet wide and of ^ood depth.
Santiago bay is one of the finest harbors in the world. On the east is
Morro Castle built by Pedro cle la Rocca about 1640. It forms a
perfect picture from an artistic point of view, and half a century ago
would have been regarded as a formidable defense. To the east of
Morro Castle there is a modern fortification facing the ocean.
Further up the bay was another fortification called La Punta Gorda
Battery, its armament consisting of two modern breech-loading, six
teen centimeter guns and two smaller guns of the same character. On
the other side of the bay, directly west of Morro Castle, is Socapa
battery; all of the Spanish batteries being arranged with commendable
engineering skill. To the north, east and west, tall mountains rear
616 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
their heads, forming a vast amphitheatre back of the bay. The city
lies on the northeast indentation of the bay six miles from the sea on a
sloping hillside. The city is quaint and peculiar with old Moorish
architecture. The modest houses are surmounted by red tile roofs.
There are few imposing buildings, the largest being the government
house, the San Carlos club, the military barracks and hospital. There
is a dilapidated theatre where it is claimed that Adalina Patti made
her debut at the age of fourteen under the direction of Gottschalk.
The cathedral occupies a central position back of a plaza, or large
public square. The first cathedral of Santiago, built in 1522, was
destroyed by fire. Its successor, proving defective in architecture, was
abandoned in 1672; the present structure was erected in 1790. Un
fortunately this venerable building was slightly damaged by shells
from the ships during the bombardment of the city. Opposite the
cathedral stands the governor's palace facing the plaza. It was over
this building that the Spanish flag which had floated for 382 years was
furled forever on Sunday, July I7th, and the American flag was
hoisted in its place.
Santiago is the center of the mineral district of Cuba, several short
railroads running from the city to various mines worked by American
companies — the Juragua, the Spanish- American and the Sigua. The
city will always be of importance owing to its commanding position
near the Windward Passage. The mountains in its vicinity offer good
sites for coffee culture and fruit growing, but the locality is very
unhealthy. It does a large trade in exporting raw materials and im
porting manufactures and provisions. The population in 1895 was
nearly 60,000.
Guantanamo, fifty miles east of Santiago, is a charming little city,
formerly a famous resort of wealthy planters. In this neighborhood
are many cafetals or coffee plantations where long rows of coffee
bushes are cultivated in the shade of lemon and lime trees which are
not only very beautiful but of great commercial value. Many hand
some estates owned by rich Cuban and American planters are found
here.
Baragoa, the most eastern city on the northern coast, was founded
by Diego Columbus in 1514, and was originally the seat of govern
ment and the site of the first cathedral of the new world. It has a
population of 7,000 and is the center for the shipment of fruits and
manufactures of cocoanut oil. It has a limited communication with
other parts of the island but possesses a beautiful harbor. Here
CUBA AS IT IS TO-DAY. 617
Maceo and his companions landed at the beginning of the rebellion in
1895. This is one of the oldest cities of the island and the inhabitants
still point out the ruins of the house of Diego Columbus and the spot
where the first cross was erected.
There has been much misapprehension and misunderstanding in
regard to the population of Cuba. It is divided into five classes: the
white Cubans, the black Cubans, colored Cubans, Spaniards and
foreigners. The white Cubans are the owners of the soil. They are as
a class educated and refined and are skilled agriculturalists. They have
contributed scholars, scientists and writers to enrich with their learn
ing the countries to which they have been forced to flee. While
naturally a gentle and peace-loving people, their circumstances have
developed a brave, independent spirit. They are simple-hearted and
hospitable, with strong family affection, but lack the energy of more
northern nations. The women are of a peculiar style of beauty,
elegant and graceful, with fine hair, eyes and teeth, and in character
they are loyal, affectionate and virtuous.
The black Cubans, who are laborers, and formed part of the Cuban
army, although quite illiterate, are not of so low a class as many
imagine. Before the abolition of slavery, they had the rights of free
marriage, choice of masters, purchase of freedom, and the right to
acquire property, and were in many respects treated better by the
Spanish laws than were their masters. The colored Cubans are a
mixed race, some of them descended from African slaves and some of
them from the negroes who came with the first Spaniards to Cuba.
The men are better laborers than the same class of natives in the other
West India islands. The black and colored Cubans are not numerous
enough or strong enough morally or physically to cause them to
preponderate to such an extent as to Africanize the island. There is
no danger that Cuba will ever pass from the control of the white race.
The Spanish governing class in Cuba has lost its occupation, and the
civilian class will either return to Spain or become amalgamated with
the native Cubans; and the same can be said as to other foreigners
who cast their fortunes upon the island.
The soil of Cuba excels in fertility that of all the other West Indies
and the greater part of the gulf States, and heretofore agricultural
pursuits have been the mainstay of the island, the principal products
consisting of sugar cane, tobacco, coffee, bananas, corn, oranges and
pine apples.
First in importance comes the culture of the sugar cane, and so great
618 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
is the fertility of the soil that the cane requires to be planted only once
in seven years. On many of the sugar estates, the finest and most
modern machinery in the world is used, and many hundreds of miles
of private railway have been constructed on these estates for the pur
pose of conveying the grain to the mills in the grinding season. In
1892 and 1893, the yield of sugar from Cuban plantations amounted
to 1,054,214 tons, valued at $80,000,000, besides giving employment
to an enormous number of men and women and building up large
commercial interests. The sugar plantations, which vary in extent
from 100 to 1,000 acres and employ about one man to two acres, are
models in every respect. The houses and quarters are neatly built
and provision is made for the comfort and care of the employes. The
great centrals or grinding plants are enormous establishments which
in the grinding seasons are busy centers of industry. The superior
systems of handling the cane and extracting the juice have made it
possible to continue the profitable cultivation of this crop in Cuba in
spite of the great competition of European beet sugar which ha»s
proved so disastrous to American sugar manufacturers in many other
places. The climate and soil are admirably adapted to the culture of
the cane which yields a larger percentage of sugar than in any
American country with the exception of Mexico; and the Spaniards
and the Cubans combined have been wise enough to equip their plants
with modern machinery. This industry builds up many others, loco
motives and cars being necessary to haul the cane, and large herds of
cattle required to supply provisions for those employed on the estates
and at the grinding centrals.
Next in importance to the culture of the sugar cane is the raising
of tobacco which is more profitable in proportion to acreage. This
plant grows well in all parts of the island; but the chief seat of its
cultivation is the famous Vuelta'Abajo region on the southern slope
of the Organos mountains in the province of Pinar del Rio. Here
the finest tobacco in the world is produced. The best tobacco farms
are known as vegas averaging thirty-three acres in size and are
generally located on the river bank. These vegas employ from twenty
to thirty hands. The usual buildings are a dwelling-house, a drying-
house, laborers' huts and a few sheds for cattle. The residence is
generally a roomy house, surrounded by porches and beautiful gardens,
usually fenced with deep stone walls, having handsome gateways from
which avenues of royal palms lead up to the residence.
The Cuban tobacco planters have a wonderful knowledge of the
CUBA AS IT IS TO-DAY. 6lQ
processes necessary to produce the plant in its greatest perfection, and
the high grade of Havana cigars is in a large measure due to the
remarkable care with which the different leaves of the plant are
graded, every plant producing four different grades of tobacco. The
leaves when dyed are packed in bales of 100 pounds, averaging in value
according to grade, from $20 to as much as $300 per bale. In 1893,
6,160,000 pounds of leaf tobacco and 134,210,000 cigars were exported.
Coffee culture was introduced into Cuba in 1727 and was for a long
time very profitable. This industry has greatly declined, very little
coffee being grown except what is consumed locally. The mountain
sides and the hill lands are expressly favorable for this product, which
may again become a large and flourishing source of revenue.
The culture of tropical fruits is quite profitable in Cuba, which will
undoubtedly become one of the greatest fruit-growing centers in the
world.
In the eastern province the cattle industry has already reached large
proportions owing to the extensive and fertile grazing lands, rich in
natural grasses which are luxuriant all the year around. The Cuban
horse is not large, but is a stout pony, very hardy and with a peculiar
pacing gait which renders it very easy to ride. Sheep are not success
fully raised in Cuba, the wool losing its soft texture and changing to
stiff hair like that of the goat. Poultry flourishes and is cheap and
abundant.
In consequence of the fertility of the soil and mildness of the
climate, Cuba offers great inducement to small farmers, fruits and
vegetables of all kinds being easily raised and being greatly in demand.
The mineral resources of the island consist principally of iron ores,
asphaltum, manganese, copper and salt. Gold and silver have been
mined in limited quantities; but iron ore has thus far proved the chief
mineral resource of the island. Important iron mines are located a few
miles east of Santiago. They are owned and worked by American
companies and the ore brought from these mines is largely used in
this country in the manufacture of steel armor-plate. There is also an
American mining company employed in mining and shipping manga
nese from the province of Santiago to manufacturers in this country.
These mines were closed by the insurgents on account of the large
tonnage royalty they yielded to the mother country.
Asphaltum of superior quality has long been mined for exportation
in the vicinity of Cardenas, the average quantity obtained being from
one to one and a half tons daily, bringing from $86 to $125 per ton.
620 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
The deposits lie beneath the waters of Cardenas bay and appear to be
inexhaustible. Some of the cities in Cuba use illuminating gas made
from this mineral.
Copper occurs in many places in Cuba, having been mined at the
village of Cobre north of Santiago from 1524 to 1857; but the mines
are now filled with water and have been abandoned. It is believed,
however, that a large deposit of copper still remains in the same
locality.
Salt occurs abundantly along the northern keys of the island, large
natural salt pans having been formed along the margins of these
islands, where in depressions from twelve to sixteen inches deep the
accumulated sea waters are evaporated leaving perfect crystallized beds
of salt far more than sufficient for the consumption of the Cuban
population.
The railroad facilities of Cuba are quite limited, the public railways
aggregating only about 1,000 miles. The length of the island from
northwest to southeast is very nearly the distance from New York tq
Chicago. There is no system of railway connecting Havana with
Santiago, the principal lines running north and south across the island
and connecting Havana with neighboring cities.
Cuba is so rich in fine harbors that the greater part of the trans
portation is by sea. Highways for even wheel vehicles hardly exist
except in the vicinity of the largest cities; even where these roads
exist they are often rendered impassable by the heavy rains, and,
although the streams are not large, the necessity for bridges is great.
It will thus be seen that outside of the enormous wealth of agri
cultural resources possessed by Cuba, the internal improvements which
will become necessary under the new regime and the untrammeled
outlay of capital in Cuba offer great inducements to the ambitious
and enterprising; and it is hoped that the introduction of modern
sanitary laws and appliances will greatly decrease the unhealthiness
of the island, which is due to a large extent to the over-crowded con
dition of the cities and the neglect of the simplest hygienic laws.
LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER RICHARD
WAINWRFGIIT
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE "MAINE."
By LiEUT.-CoMDR. RICHARD WAINWRIGIIT, U. S. N.
CHAPTER XV.
N Monday evening, January 24, 1898, the " Maine " received
orders to proceed to Havana. She arrived there the following
morning, and was moored to a buoy in that harbor without any unusual
incident.
The " Maine" was 324 feet in length; beam, 57 feet; displace
ment, 6,682 tons; horse power, 9,295; speed between seventeen and
eighteen knots. She was rated as a second-class battleship and carried
four lo-inch guns, two in the forward and two in the after turret; six
6-inch guns, and a number of six and one pounders.
Her officers were as follows: Captain, C. D. Sigsbee; executive
officer, Lieutenant-Commander R. Wainwright; navigator, Lieutenant
G. F. W. Holman; watch officers, Lieutenants John Hood
and Carl W. Jungen; lieutenants (junior grade), G. P. Blow,
J. J. Blandin, and F. W. Jenkins; naval cadets, J. H.
Holden (captain's clerk), W. T. Cluverius, Amon Bronson, Jr., and
D. F. Boyd, Jr.; surgeon, L. G. Heneberger; paymaster, C. M. Ray;
chief engineer, C. P. Howell; passed assistant engineer, F. C. Bowers;
assistant engineers, J. R. Morris and D. P. Merritt; naval cadets (en
gineers), Pope Washington and A. Crenshaw; chaplain, J. P. Chidwick;
first lieutenant, A. W. Catlin, U..S. M. C.; boatswain, F. E. Larkin;
gunner, J. Hill; carpenter, G. Helms, and pay clerk, Brent McCarthy,
She carried on her rolls at the time of the disaster, 328 men.
When the orders were received on Monday evening, preparations
were made to reply in case of attack. As the mission was a friendly
one, the ship had to appear in perfect order from the outside, but the
officers and men were at their stations and the ammunition and tor
pedoes were handy for immediate use. From the commencement we
were prepared for treachery and every precaution was taken consistent
with a peaceful appearance from the outside. Special sentries, with
rigid orders, were stationed about the ship. Crews were kept on deck
at night ready to man the rapid-fire guns, and ammunition was placed
623
624 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
near at hand. The closing of all water-tight doors was rigidly carried
out; and lines were run under the ship (hogging lines), so that the col
lision mats could be used in a minute's notice to cover a hole in the
side. Steam was carried in two boilers, to insure the turrets turning
readily. In fact, we were ready at all times to repel an attack or to
repair an injury. While treachery was not expected, it was deemed
wise by the captain to take all possible precautions.
On the day of our arrival the usual salutes were fired, viz.: The
national salute to the Spanish flag and the salute to the flag of the
Spanish admiral, Admiral Manterola.
The customary official visits were made by the captain, com
mencing with Consul-General Fitzhugh Lee; and they were duly
returned. Captain-General Blanco being absent, his representative,
General Parado, returned the captain's visit. There was nothing to
indicate at this time that we were not anchored in a friendly port. At
first the officers and men were not permitted to visit the shore, unless
on duty; but after a few days this restriction was removed from the
officers. The men were not allowed to go on shore, so as to prevent
any slight unpleasantness that might arise should there be any friction
between them and the police.
Visitors were permitted to visit the ship, and the inhabitants
availed themselves of this privilege quite freely. Care was taken not
to allow too many on board at one time. Everyone that went below
decks was accompanied by a guide, who was also a guard, and
watched that no explosives or bombs could be left behind by some
treacherous visitor. The officers had many visitors and the captain
entertained many guests. The larger portion of these were Cubans,
and only once did any Spanish army officer come on board except
during the official visits.
The Spanish were trying, or pretending to try, a new experiment
in governing Cuba, and the Autonomistic Council came into power
shortly before we reached Havana. The removal of General Weyler
and the inauguration of this so-called reform were ascribed to the
pressure of the United States. The Spanish party in Cuba believed in
General Weyler and in his methods. They hated the idea of autonomy
and despised the members of that party. Their long-cherished hatred
of America was augmented by the removal of Weyler and by the
arrival of the " Maine," as they chose to translate her appearance as a
menace. This feeling was greatly increased after ,a visit made by
Captain Sigsbee to the Autonomistic Council and its return visit.
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE " MAINE." 625
During the latter visits some speeches were made, and the few words of
the captain were tortured in the party papers into a support by our
government of the council's policy.
There was little outward show of unfriendly feeling. Once in
the early part of February a ferry-boat crowded with passengers re
turning from a bull fight passed near our stern, and there were some
jeering remarks made by the crowd. The absence of Spanish army
officers from our entertainments was rather significant. Consul-
General Lee, who was held in the highest esteem by all Americans and
respected by the Cubans and better class of Spaniards, was threatened
frequently; but he was not the man to bother about threats.
On the afternoon of February I5th, the " City of Washington/'
Captain Stevens, one of the Ward line, came in the harbor and an
chored off our quarter. We were then headed out of the harbor The
usual routine had been carried out during the day, and at eight o'clock
in the evening the chief engineer reported his department and the
various petty officers reported their storerooms secure. Eight o'clock
lights and galley fires were reported out, and as required by regulation,
I reported to the captain that everything was secure. Only four
officers wrere absent from the ship. It has been falsely asserted that
most of the officers were on shore or that a large number of the officers
were on board the " City of Washington " taking part in an orgy.
These reports were spread by the Spanish papers to throw discredit
upon the discipline of the ship. They also said that the officers and
men were lazy and that we seldom drilled the men. The various
exercises and drills were carried out on the " Maine " with more than
ordinary care and regularity.
At nine I heard the officer of the deck after he had the watch
mustered questioning them as to their stations at the guns. There
were occasional changes in the watch and he was careful to see that the
men knew what to do in case of an alarm. At half-past nine I finished
writing some letters in my office and passed across to the captain's
office for some mucilage as my stamps would not stick on the envelopes.
As I went along the passage between the offices, I noticed Captain
Sigsbee sitting in his cabin at a desk. While I was standing in the
office talking to Mr. Holden, I felt a very heavy shock, and heard the
noise made by objects falling on deck. I was so much shaken up that
it took an appreciable time to find the handle of the door, the door
having been closed by the shock, and pull it open. I was under the
impression at the time that we had been blown up by a mine and that
626 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
the "Alfonso XII " was firing on us. The nature of the shock felt by
the survivors was carefully inquired into by the Court and some sepa
rated the sensation into two shocks. Mr. Hood was very clear on this
point before the Court. He said: " I was sitting on the port side of
the deck with my feet on the rail, and I both heard and felt — felt more
than I heard — a big explosion, that sounded and felt like an under
water explosion. I was under the impression that it came from for
ward starboard, at the time. I instantly turned my head, and the
instant I turned my head there was a second explosion." Hood who
was always cool was remarkably so during the excitement attending
the disaster, and he could not have been mistaken. Blandin who was
officer of the deck said, " I am under the impression that there were
two explosions, though I cannot be sure of it." I believe that the
difference was due to the position. That those furthest forward on
the berth deck, like Jungen, felt the overhead crash the more keenly.
Those on the open deck felt the greater blow from the under-water
explosion, and where Holden and I were, the two explosions were
nearly or quite run into one. The first shock being the blow on the
underbody of the ship, and the second the bursting of gases into the
open air.
I rushed out of the office, followed by Mr. Holden, with the inten
tion of getting our battery ready to return the "Alfonso's " fire. I
reached the main deck through the starboard door and passed up on
the after superstructure by means of the starboard ladder. On reaching
the deck I heard the captain's voice and went towards him to get his
directions. He ordered me to flood the magazines, but some one
pointed down the hatch near by and I saw the water had risen so high
as to make the flooding of the magazines useless.
The cries of the wounded, mostly rising from the water, m?.de mani
fest the necessity of lowering our boats. The captain told me to see
the boats ready for lowering, and I gave the order to clear away and
man them. I saw very few men moving to obey the order, so I went
from davit to davit, to see some one was there ready to cast off the falls.
I then began to realize the extent of the disaster, as I found the boats
were largely manned by officers. Only a few men had been able to
reach the poop. The boats were lowered promptly and did good
service in saving life.
About this time I noticed that we were on fire forward, and called
for aid to endeavor to put it out. Hood and Boyd started forward with
me. We were unable to get further than what was apparently the
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE " MAINE." 627
break of the central superstructure, the after part of the deck just for
ward of the after turret. As soon as I got there it was evident to me
from the burning mass that there was no chance of fighting the fire.
The smoke was very unpleasant — I think it was from burning
cellulose — and for many a day, when I had time to think, I could smell
and choke over the pungent odor. Boyd climbed from the awning to
the top of the superstructure and passed down to me two men, who
were crying out loudly — one, I think, had his arm broken — and we
got them both into the gig.
When I reached the poop again, we were surrounded by boats from
the " City of Washington " and from the "Alfonso XII." They weie
aiding our boats in rescuing the wounded. When I felt confident that
there were no more to be rescued, either on board ship or in the water,
I suggested to the captain that there might be more explosions from
the burning mass forward, and that it would be well to get the crowd
of boats out of danger. Our boats shoved off and the gig backed in.
The captain was loath to go until I pointed out to him that the only
means of getting the other boats out of the way was to shove off our
selves. When at last he followed me into the gig, we pushed in among
the boats and induced them to leave, taking the wounded to different
vessels. Sigsbee was very determined to be the last man to leave the
ship, and when he did, the water was nearly level with the poop.
The gig made for the " City of Washington." We found our
wounded being well cared for, the officers, crew, and passengers as
sisting as nurses. The discipline on this ship was greatly to the credit
of Captain Stevens. The promptness with which boats were lowered
saved many lives that would have been lost otherwise, and the rapidity
with which the saloon was cleared and turned into a hospital greatly
reduced the suffering of the wounded.
Blandin was sent in the gig to pull around the ship, but not having
sufficient men to continue the patrol, he was ordered back. Holman
was sent over to the "Alfonso " to get the survivors and to take a list
of the wounded and an immediate muster was held to ascertain the list
of killed and wounded. That night we ascertained that there were
eighty-five survivors of the disaster and of these only nineteen or
twenty were uninjured. Two officers were missing, Jenkins and
Merritt, the former's body was found by the divers many days after
wards, but Merritt's was never seen although searched for with great
care by the divers. Fifteen more were afterwards added to the list of
the saved. Besides the wounded on the " City of Washington," some
628 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
were taken to the two hospitals, the " San Ambrosio " and the
"Alfonso XIII," and some were cared for by the fire organization of
the city.
General Lee, the principal Spanish officials, and many American
citizens and reporters came on board the " City of Washington " to
offer assistance and to express their sympathy. It was at this time that
Captain Sigsbee wrote his cable dispatch to the navy department.
Within a few minutes of the great disaster and while pressed on all
sides by visitors, he composed his celebrated telegram that induced a
portion of the American people to suspend their judgment until the
decision of the Court of Inquiry was made public.
At daylight the next morning, I took the gig with Lieutenant
Hood and a few of the men and attempted to board the wreck, but I was
warned off by an armed boat's crew from the "Alfonso XII." I then
pulled around the wreck. It was evident that she was blown to pieces
forward, but it was too dark to estimate the damages aft. There were
still some fragments of wood and cellulose burning and the " Maine "
appeared to be a total wreck.
The Spanish authorities made claim to have jurisdiction over the
wreck, but this question was soon settled in our favor; although the
Spaniards kept an armed patrol about the " Maine " during all the
subsequent diving operations.
Later, on the morning of the sixteenth, I made a careful examina
tion of all of the wreck that was visible above water. The after
part of the ship appeared to be intact from the forward crane for the
steam launch aft, with a heavy list to port, the port turret being about
two feet under water. The main deck was folded back, carrying the
central superstructure with it at a line between the two forward cranes
and about the line between the two firerooms. It was folded in a
direction from port to starboard, so that the port 6-inch gun was lying
nearly on top of the starboard 6-inch. They were both mounted on the
central superstructure, and the conning tower was pointing downward
about where the armory was — that is, at the starboard after corner
of the superstructure. The forward smokestack was lying abreast and
partly over where the first whaleboat hung, on the starboard side aft;
the siren was on the starboard side of the superstructure. The after
smokestack was lying on the port side abreast the fore-and-aft bridge,
between the after and central superstructure. At the lowest tide we
had, I stood on the port waterways, and could see nothing that I could
recognize as any part of the ship forward of the crane on the port side
629
of the main deck. That is, there was nothing of the ship visible above
the water forward of the after fireroom, except that part of the main
deck that was turned over and some scattering pieces sticking out of
the water.
There were small portions of the wreck on the starboard side for
ward of this line. By looking in underneath it I saw the torpedo port
of the forward torpedo. Near this I recognized a portion of the fire
men's washroom, that was situated just abaft the starboard turret.
There was a small scupper, with a hold-down valve and a half-round
bulkhead, used to separate a portion of the washroom into stalls. For
ward again, sticking out of the water, was a piece of bottom plating.
This was an important find, for from it the position of the broken keel
was traced. Forward of all, one of the foreyard arms was sticking up.
As far as I could tell at that time, from an above-water view, there was an
angle between the after body of the ship and the forward, with the
apex of the angle to starboard — as a stick would show a break if held
fast at both ends and pushed from left to right until broken.
During this examination of the wreck, I was impressed with the
fact that the force of the explosion was in a direction from port for
ward to starboard aft. The main deck and superstructure were thrown
in that direction, also the forward smokestack and siren. The crane
was bent in that direction. There was no wreckage above water on
the port side forward and the ship itself appeared to be bent by a force
moving in that direction.
The day after the disaster, the Plant Line steamer " Olivette/* the
lighthouse steamer " Mangrove," and the United States ship " Fern,"
Lieutenant-Commander W. S. Cowles commanding, entered the har
bor. All the survivors who were well enough to be moved were sent
to Key West on the " Olivette " except some of the officers and two
men retained by the captain to aid him in his work in connection with
the wreck. The " Mangrove " brought over some seamen divers from
the fleet and a day or two later took back some of the injured who had
recovered sufficiently to be moved from the hospital. With the excep
tion of a few days, when she was used to transport provisions to Sagua
la Grande, the " Fern " remained in the harbor of Havana until
Consul-General Lee left for the United States. Captain Cowles and
his officers and men lent us willing assistance in wrecking the " Maine."
It was to Ensign Powelson's exertions, that we were indebted for the
complete manner in which the facts connected with the work of the
divers was placed before the Court of Inquiry.
630 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
By direction of the Department, Rear-Admiral Sicard imme
diately appointed a Court of Inquiry and the members arrived in
Havana on the lighthouse steamer " Mangrove," on February 2ist.
The Court consisted of Captain W. T. Sampson, Captain F. E.
Chadwick, Lieutenant-Commander W. P. Potter, members, and Lieu
tenant-Commander Adolph Marix, judge advocate.
The decision of such a Court was sure to carry conviction abroad
as well as at home. The senior two had international reputation and
the juniors stood high in the United States. Marix was peculiarly well
fitted for his position both from his legal experience and from his
knowledge of the structure of the " Maine," he having been her
executive officer for over two years.
The Court proceeded to take testimony at once, and after calling
all the witnesses in Havana, sailed to Key West. Here 'they heard all
the survivors and then returned to Havana, remaining there until they
had reached their decision.
The most important evidence produced before this Court was that
of the divers, as from them was gained the knowledge of the condition
of the wreck under water, which proved conclusively that the " Maine "
was blown up from the outside.
Captain Sigsbee placed me in charge of the wreck and of the diving
operation. When the contract was made with the Merritt & Chap
man Wrecking Company and the Boston Towboat Company, I was
made the representative of the Department, Captain Sharp, of the
Merritt & Chapman Company, being the representative of the con
tractors.
Diving operations commenced on the seventeenth with naval
divers, and our first endeavor was to secure certain important books
and papers. The question of preventing their falling into unauthor
ized hands was more important than their recovery. In fact, nearly
all that were secured by the divers were burnt up. On the twenty-
second, more naval divers arrived and two parties were then kept at
work, one aft, searching for papers, bodies, and valuables, and the
other forward, examining the vicinity of the explosion. All but one
of the naval divers were seamen gunners. Men trained in diving at the
torpedo station and trained in the service from the time they became
apprentices. They were intelligent men, as only the brightest appren
tices are sent to the torpedo station, and they had some experience.
Their operations were carried on under great difficulties. How well
they overcame these is known to all who are familiar with the
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE " MAINE." 63!
proceedings of the Court of Inquiry. Ensign Brumby and Gunner
Morgan were sent with the divers. The latter was an expert diver
himself, and his services were valuable in superintending their work.
Ensign Powelson and Naval Cadet Cluverius were also detailed to
assist me. The former was given charge of the work for the Court.
The tug " Right Arm " was the first wrecking boat to put in an
appearance. She arrived on the twenty-third and commenced work on
the following day. This party did some little wrecking about the hull,
taking on board some articles of value, but their most important work
was searching the wreck for bodies. She left soon after the arrival of
the other wrecking boats.
The next boats to come were the tug " Merritt," and the barge
" Sharp," and later the tug " Underwriter " towed down the derrick
" Chief " and the barge " Lone Star."
From this time on until the contract was closed, the work of the
wrecking company was continuous. Guns, anchors, chains and various
kinds of ammunition were recovered, also many bodies. The search
for the latter was most thorough and careful. A barge was anchored
near the wreck with coffins, the undertaker and his men. Father Chid-
wick was in constant attention and under his immediate superintend
ence, every effort was made to identify the dead.
The wreckers made a careful examination of the wreck and it was
evident from their report that while it might be possible to raise the after
body of the ship that it would be a most expensive operation, and that
even sentimental grounds would hardly justify the undertaking. We
hoped to save the lo-inch guns, but the only way that was practicable
was by breaking off the top of the turret with dynamite. It was de
cided not to use high explosives, so after the Court left, it only re
mained for the wreckers to remove guns, torpedoes and such equip
ments as were of value. A board composed of Captain Chadwick,
Lieutenant-Commander Cowles and myself, after considering the re
ports of the divers, recommended that all wrecking operations be
abandoned. This board met on March 27th and remained in session
two or three days. Upon the receipt of its report, the Department
closed the contract with the wreckers and they withdrew their plant.
Then the flag that had been hoisted at half mast over the wreck day
and night was hauled down.
The work that the divers did to inform the Court of the condition
of affairs about the wreck under water was slow and difficult. It took
several days' steady work to gain any idea of how the mass was situated
632 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
and to recognize the various portions. The danger was great from
the ragged portions of plates and frames cutting air-hose or life line.
The region of the lo-inch magazine was carefully explored and powder
tanks and shell hoisted to the surface. A start was made from the
bottom plate found above water forward. From this point careful
measurements were made in all directions. The distance between
frames and intercostals was measured, and the keel being found the
locations of sea valves and man-holes were determined. All important
measurements were verified by sending down a second diver. Powel-
son would check off the measurements on the drawings and make notes
of the divers' reports. All divers would signal up the feet and inches
by jerking on the guide rope and often they would in this way give
most valuable information without being able to see its importance.
The water was very filthy, and except when the sun was in a favor
able position the diver could see very little. An attempt was made
to use electric lights under water, but it failed of success. The cour
age of these men was perfect. Rondquist, finding that his life line
was too short to permit his examining a certain portion of the wreck,
anchored it with a lump of coal and went ahead. Had he failed to
find this line, on his return, and there was a good chance of his miss
ing it, he would hardly have reached the surface alive. Olsen once
found his air-hose caught below him and his life line above. Had he
not kept cool he must have been lost. When he reached the surface,
he was fairly exhausted and did not want to go down again that day.
The only time on any day when he did not wish to continue to do
more work than was thought good for his health. Olsen and Smith
took the breech plugs out of the lo-inch guns in the after turret. A
good job for two men under ordinary circumstances, above water.
This prevented the Spanish from making use of the guns provided they
were able to raise them. Olsen and Smith entered the after lo-inch
magazine by way of the turret, the hatch on the other side being
blocked by debris. One of them tended the other from the gun
platform, being tended in turn by a man on top the turret.
The work of the naval divers ceased when the Court of Inquiry
had reached a decision, and as they filled important billets on board
ship and their services might be needed shortly, they were sent back
to the fleet.
The decision of the Court is dated March 2ist. To all of us who
survived the disaster, the most important portion of this was para
graph 6, " The Court finds that the loss of the " Maine " on the oc-
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE.
633
casion named was not in any respect due to fault or negligence on
the part of any of the officers or members of the crew of said vessel."
This, after a most searching inquiry into every detail connected with
the disaster and after asking such questions, that, had any possible
precaution been neglected, it must have appeared in the evidence.
To me the next most important point in the findings was para
graph 5, " At frame seventeen the outer shell of the ship, from a point
eleven and one-half feet from the middle line of the ship, and six feet
above the keel when in its normal position, has been forced up so
as to be now about four feet above the surface of the water, there
fore, about thirty-four feet above where it would be had the ship sunk
634 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
uninjured." This piece of plating was readily recognized as
bottom plating, as it was covered on the outside by Mclnms
paint, a green paint only used on the under-water portions
of ships. This paragraph continues: "The outside bottom plating
is bent in a reversed V-shape (A), the after wing of which, about
fifteen feet broad and thirty-two feet in length (from frame seventeen
to frame twenty-five), is doubled back upon itself against the con
tinuation of the same plating extending forward.
"At frame eighteen the vertical keel is broken in two, and the
flat keel bent into an angle similar to the angle formed by the outside
bottom plating. This break is now about six feet below the surface
of the water, and about thirty feet above its normal position.
" In the opinion of the Court, this effect could have been pro
duced only by the explosion of a mine situated under the bottom of
the ship at about frame eighteen and somewhat on the port side of
the ship."
These facts were established by the divers, aided and guided ^y
the intelligence of Powelson. They were determined by actual
measurements referred to the ship's drawings. There have- been
some, who, while admitting the facts as to the condition of the hull,
still maintained that this condition was produced by an inside ex
plosion. It is hard to imagine how an explosion from inside could
throw or draw the bottom of the vessel to the surface of the water.
It would be natural to suppose that the force of the explosion would
follow the lines of least resistance and that it would blow up the
protective deck above it, and perhaps force out the sides at and near
the surface of the water, where the pressure from the water was slight.
As there was little in previous experience to guide us so far as actual
explosions of great magnitude were concerned, it might have left
those who preferred the flights -of a vivid imagination to the dictates
of common sense to believe that the " Maine " was blown up by her
cwn magazine. But since the crime was committed, we have had
actual experience in the destructive effect of exploding magazines
on board the Spanish ships that were destroyed off Santiago on July
3d. The decision of the Court was fully upheld by the knowledge
gained from these explosions.
There were many facts discovered by the divers that served to
corroborate this evidence. They could not find any coal on the port
side forwsrd and they found quantities on the starboard side. There
was a coal bunker to port of the lo-inch magazine. Many of the
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE " MAINE." 635
lo-inch shells remained in about their original position on the port
side of the magazine. A quantity of 6-inch powder tanks were found
on top the lo-inch. Many powder tanks were found that had not been
exploded, some with the powder still in them; and the mud near the
magazines was full of powder. Quantities of this mud was brought
up by the divers, dried and burnt. It undoubtedly contained a large
proportion of brown powder.
Can any one fail to believe that the " Maine " was blown up by
a powerful mine ? Those who have seen the horrors surrounding
the wreck will not readily forget the wholesale murder.
The dead have been buried or lie quietly with the wreck at the
bottom of Havana harbor. The commissioners of the United States
are sitting in that city, and before the anniversary of the " Maine "
disaster the troops of the United States were maintaining order in
Cuba.
THE FIFTH CORPS AT SANTIAGO.
By COLONEL THEODORE ROOSEVELT, U. S. V.
CHAPTER XVI.
H HE two striking facts in the war with Spain were the preparedness
of the navy and the unpreparedness of the array. Both facts
were mainly due to causes that had been in operation for years, for
no attempt had been made since the Civil War to put the army on
a really effective fighting basis; while after 1883 under Secretaries
Chandler, Whitney, Tracy, Herbert and Long, the navy had been
steadily built up. The difference was partly due also to the fact that
for months before the outbreak of war, preparations had been going
on in the navy in anticipation of the event, while the War Depart
ment had done nothing until the war was upon us. It was then
entirely too late to make up for lost time. The ships of the Navy
had been gathered from the distant seas and assembled in three
fleets long before the scattered battalions and companies of the army
were even put in motion towards the camps of assemblage. Battle
ships and cruisers had been trained for months in squadron evolutions
under commodores and admirals, while not a general in the United
States army was exercising so much as a major's command. The
auxiliary ships of the navy had been practically all purchased and
fitted up before the effort to purchase similar ships as transports for
the army began. The ordnance bureau of the army was fossilized;
that of the navy was doing splendid work. The quartermaster's and
commissary bureaus of the army were unfortunately under the con
trol of officers who were entirely separated from the line, and both
bureaus broke down when the strain came. The medical de
partment was in a similar plight. There was no good organization,
no general staff; and no proper subordination, there being no
proper division of the duties of the secretary, the adjutant-general
and the major-general, who was in nominal command of all the
forces. The field artillery were equipped with black powder and
slow-firing guns. The men had but little practical training, and the
THE FIFTH CORPS AT SANTIAGO. 637
battery commanders were for the most part old. The engineers were
a highly-trained body of men, able to do admirable work in civil
engineering, but they were not used to rough field work of the kind
to be encountered in war. Against all the defects there was one
offset, namely: the splendid fighting capacity of the officers and en
listed men of the cavalry and infantry. The cavalry and infantry were
well armed with good, modern military carbines and rifles, which they
knew how to use, and they had been well drilled -in field work, al
though only in small bodies. The elder officers were relatively much
less good than the younger ones, for, although some of them had
kept their vigor and force, others had completely rusted; but the
junior captains, the lieutenants, the noncommissioned officers and
the rank and file formed as splendid a body of fighting men as could
be found in the world.
The real responsibility for the shortcomings lies with the men —
and especially the legislators — who refused throughout long years
(as some even yet refuse) to provide an adequate army. Every sena
tor or congressman who refused to vote for a fair-sized army, who
refused to vote the means to properly exercise that army, and every
newspaper that upheld such a cause, must share the guilt of all that
befell in the way of evil during the war, just as all who interfered, as
in the present year, with our having the army raised to the proper size,
will stand as the real authors of any disasters that may hereafter befall
our army in the field, as the real cause of any national dishonor or
disaster. The votes of these men, recorded in the journals of the
two houses at Washington, will stand as a roll of dishonor.
No effective plan for the use of the army had been made in ad
vance, and in the actual event whatever it did, merely followed .the
action of the navy. When Dewey destroyed the Spanish fleet at
Manila, an army corps was sent to the Philippines, and when Cervera
shut himself in Santiago harbor, another army corps was sent there,
so as to ensure the fleet falling into Sampson's hands. The larger
part of the small Regular army of the United States, or at least the
larger part of the cavalry and infantry, was gathered at Tampa,
Florida, together with a number of volunteer regiments, to be ready
for descent upon Cuba. Tampa was a poor choice in some ways, the
climate in summer being almost as trying as that of Cuba, while the
facilities for gathering troops and stores were bad in the extreme. It
was the terminus of a single track railway which speedily became
638
CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
choked to the point of congestion with men and material of war. it
would be difficult to overstate the weltering chaos of the Tampa yards.
General Miles was in command at Tampa, but General Shatter
was put in command of the expedition. When it was definitely known
that Cervera's fleet was in Santiago harbor, blockaded by Sampson's
fleet, the proper objective for our army was at once clear. The
BAY OF SANTIAGO.
Bay of Santiago is completely land-locked and is entered by a narrow,
winding channel, running between high precipitous shores. There
were Spanish batteries on the shores. There were Spanish mines in
the channel. Only dire need would have justified an attempt by the
warships to force an entrance where the chance of disaster was so
great. This dire need could never arise if a good and well-handled
army was sent against the city itself; and accordingly the War De
partment decided, quite properly, to send an army thither. It could
not make up its mind quite when the army was to go, until, misled
COLONEL THEODORE ROOSEVELT.
THE FIFTH CORPS AT SANTIAGO. 64!
by a report that the city was already practically battered into submis
sion by the fleet, it suddenly decided to hurry forward our forces in
order to take possession. I doubt if anyone realized the serious fight
ing that was ahead, although the effects of disease were more or less
anticipated, but not provided against. In view of the presence of the
Spanish fleet in Santiago harbor, it would, of course, have been folly
to defer operations until cool weather. It would have been much to
our military advantage had War been declared the preceding fall, but
as things were, the need of bringing matters to a conclusion out
weighed the danger of disease.
The decision to sail immediately was reached in a great hurry and
word cabled to the Generals at Tampa that they must embark next
morning. It was late in the evening when, the order was received,
and a night of utter confusion followed getting the troops down to
the quay, which was nine miles away. The expedition included about
sixteen thousand men, chiefly regulars. There was also the First
United States volunteer cavalry, eight troops strong; and the Sixth
Massachusetts and the Seventy-first New York infantry. Two Wash
ington regiments, an Illinois regiment, a District of Columbia regi
ment and another Massachusetts regiment with some other corps
joined later. There were several regular regiments of cavalry along,
each of eight troops, the First, Third and Sixth being white, and the
Ninth and Tenth colored. These were all dismounted, but some of
the Second cavalry were mounted to act as orderlies. There were
some eighteen regiments of regular infantry and a few field batteries.
The supply of mules and wagons was utterly inadequate for a serious
campaign. The men were unsuitably clothed, having exactly the
same garments that they would have worn in the Klondike, and the
food was also unsuited for a tropic climate. The loading of the
transports was accomplished in utter confusion, without any system
whatever.
The transports were overcrowded. It was expected, .however,
that they would get under way at once, thus minimizing the length of
time the troops would be aboard, and, therefore, their discomfort.
As we were on the eve of starting, however, word was brought by
the naval commander of one of our small scout boats that a Spanish
squadron had been seen off the Florida coast. This information
naturally produced consternation at Washington. Nobody was posi
tive of the whereabouts of all the Spanish ships. It was certain that
642
CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
most of Cervera's squadron was in Santiago harbor, and most of the
remaining Spanish ships of the Atlantic fleet in the Spanish ports;
SPANISH FLEET IN SANTIAGO HARBOR.
but there was a bare chance that there were some ships unaccounted
for, and if this was the case, the convoy would be in great danger.
Accordingly word was wired to hold the transports where they were
while our war vessels scouted for the supposed enemy. It took some
five days of this before it was developed that the alarmist report was
not warranted by facts, the officer having mistaken our own ships for
those of the enemy. Meanwhile the transports swung idly at their
anchors in shallow Tampa Bay, the pitch bubbling in the seams under
the intense sun rays. The travel rations were good, except in two
important particulars. The meat issued consisted of what was called
" canned roast beef." This was unsalted and at the best insipid, while
at the worst it was positively nauseating. The men could eat but little
of it. Moreover, there was not a sufficiency of vegetables, while the
water was poor and there was no ice for the men. No provisions
had been made for cooking. With few exceptions the men were clad
in the ordinary blue uniform with heavy shirts and underclothes, a
costume much better suited for Manitoba than for an expedition in
the tropics.
I have commented very strongly upon the general superiority of
the management of our naval as compared with our land forces. Tt
is but fair to say that in the Santiago campaign the navy was partly
THE FIFTH CORPS AT SANTIAGO. 643
responsible for some of the hurry and unpreparedness at one time,
and for some of the delay at another. The report of the scouting
officer above mentioned had its share to do with the latter. As for
the former, one cause of the hurried embarkation of the troops was
the receipt of a telegram from the American admiral off Santiago
stating that he had silenced the works and continuing as follows:
" If ten thousand men were here, city and fleet would be ours within
forty-eight hours. Every consideration demands immediate move
ment." It is true that the admiral, who both before and after this ren
dered service second only to Dewey's, had a plan of campaign, which
included for the work of the army the taking of the forts at the
mouth of the harbor. It is possible that this might have been done
within a comparatively short space of time, and as in this case the
army would have been close to the sea coast, there would have been
less difficulty about transportation and less need of a greater number
of troops. As it turned out ultimately, the course actually followed
made the victory far more complete, as it resulted not only in the cap
ture of the fleet and the city, but in the capture of the hostile army also,
as the city was surrounded and attacked from the landward side. In
any event, the sending of such a despatch was assuming a grave re
sponsibility, for it could not but convey what was, as events proved,
an entirely erroneous idea of the magnitude of the task and the de
fensive power of the Spanish garrison. Moreover, the ship captains
had themselves been misled by the ease and impunity with which they
silenced the forts, into the belief that they had crippled them. As a
matter of fact, they hardly did any real damage, and the defenses
were in practically as good shape as ever. The troops actually sent
were, of course, abundantly fitted with everything necessary for a
forty-eight hours' campaign, or even for one twice as long, and they
had boats enough with them, taken in conjunction with those of the
fleet, to permit the speedy landing of these men, with provisions
enough to carry on their backs for three days. They did not, how
ever, have boats sufficient to land all the stores aboard, in any reason
able time, and they had no transportation adequate to taking these
stores to the front, when once the army was encamped at any distance
from the coast.
It was June gth that we received the order to embark. It was
June 1 4th when we finally weighed anchor and started clown Tampa
Bay. Next day the convoy put to sea and sailed southeastward be
tween the Tortugas and the Florida coast. There were about thirty
644 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
transports and some sixteen warships, ranging from the great battle
ship " Indiana " through cruisers and gunboats to the swift, delicate
little torpedo boats. The transports were drawn up in three columns,
and, of course, the speed of the whole was regulated by that of the
slowest; so that it was very slow indeed. It was an impressive sight,
especially at night, when the long rows of lights gleamed ahead and
behind for miles and the warships kept signalling to one another. We
were favored by fine weather and pushed steadily eastward while the
trade-wind blew in our faces. The sky was a bright blue overhead
and the waters beneath were a wonderful indigo.
The transports should have been under the control of the navy.
Trouble arose now and then with their commanders, who were, of
course, responsible to the shipowners for the safety of their vessels
and who had nothing to gain by taking risks. Moreover the military
men in command had no idea of what was or was not needed to ensure
the safety of the convoy. Thus when one of the transports, which
was towing a schooner, dropped behind, another transport was,
actually sent back to accompany it; the only effect being to give the
rearmost war vessel twro ships to protect instead of one. The warships
kept a most vigilant lookout, and neither by night nor by day did they
permit any stranger to come within danger distance. I think, how
ever, that most of us who were aboard realized that after nightfall a
swift and daring hostile warship, willing to take chances, could, in
all probability, have slipped into the middle of the fleet unobserved,
and have wrought great havoc among the clumsy, helpless troop-ships,
swarming with men.
It was June iQth before we reached Inagua Island. Up to this
time only the generals had known whither we were bound, and there
had been a good deal of speculation among* the regimental officers
whether it was for Porto Rico or Santiago; but after sighting the
light-house on Inagua, the fleet turned sharply toward the southwest
and steamed steadily through the rolling seas, with the trade-wind
aft, and the southern coast of eastern-most Cuba on the right hand.
All the following day we coasted along not far from shore, high
barren-looking mountains rising almost from the water's edge, while
the low country was broken and covered with thick jungle. It was
a very difficult-looking country for an offensive campaign. About a
hundred and fifty years before an English fleet and Army had at
tempted what we were about to attempt, but had failed signally, the
fleet being unable to force an entrance into Santiago harbor, while
THE FIFTH CORPS AT SANTIAGO. 645
the army, after disembarking (not far from where we intended to dis
embark), was unable to advance through the jungle-covered country,
and finally re-embarked. However, nobody had any foreboding of
failure or indeed of special difficulty. The Spaniards had shown such
lack of enterprise, and their gunners had been so completely unar'e
to do any damage to our ships, that, unmindful of the lessons of
Spanish history, especially in the Peninsular War, we did not antici
pate much hard fighting with the Spanish troops on shore.
On the twenty-first the fleet lay off Santiago harbor, while Gen
eral Shafter and staff landed to meet the Cuban General Castillo. It
was decided to make the landing east of Santiago, and the so-called
Cuban army was largely taken there in our ships, although some of
it straggled around by land. The Cuban soldiers were almost all
blacks and mulattoes and were clothed in rags and armed with every
kind of old rifle. They wrere utterly unable to make a serious fight,
or to stand against even a very inferior number of Spanish troops,
but we hoped they might be of use as scouts and skirmishers. For
various reasons this proved not to be the case, and so far as the
Santiago campaign was concerned, we should have been better off if
there had not been a single Cuban with the army. They accom
plished literally nothing, while they were a source of trouble and
embarrassment, and consumed much provisions.
The landing place selected was at the little ruined hamlet of
Daiquiri, some fifteen or twenty miles from the city of Santiago; very
long miles, however, when following a tortuous trail up and down hill
through the jungle. It was an open roadstead, but as it was a ship
ping point for iron ore, and as the sea was comparatively calm, it was
possible to land the army by the use of the small boats belonging to
the warships and transports. There was a strongly-built iron pier
extending out some distance from the shore, but too high above the
water for use. The surf was sufficiently severe to prevent landing on
the beach, which was flanked by projecting rocky promontories. The
boats, therefore, were obliged to land at the end of a small dock, which
extended some thirty yards out into the water. This dock had been
partially burned by the Spaniards and the connecting walk between
the end of it and the shore consisted of one or two loose boards on
charred but heavy cross-ties. Naturally such a landing place offered
but few facilities for easy disembarkation, and even to get the first two
or three brigades ashore on the twenty-second taxed the capacity of
the dock. Extraordinarily to relate, the engineers never repaired it,
646
CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
and it remained as it was throughout the time of siege. Their work
in bridge building and road building was not much better, whether
through their own fault or because they could not procure enough
laborers, I do not know.
HARBOR OF PONCE, LANDING PLACE.
Before landing, the ships made feints along the coast to distract
the attention of the Spaniards, and briskly shelled the woods and
heights in our immediate front to dislodge any lurking enemy. A
small force of the latter had held the place, but they left without
striving to interfere with our landing. This was very foolish on their
part, for the country offered absolutely unlimited opportunities for
defensive work, and was the most difficult imaginable for
offensive operations. The steep, jungle-covered hills made a hun
dred natural fortresses, and a very few hundred men, resolutely com
manded, could have put a complete stop to the disembarkation, while
even a few score could have inflicted severe loss with practical im
punity. However, nothing of this kind was done, and when we landed,
we found that the Spaniards had fled, and that a swarm of practically
naked Cubans had come in.
THE FIFTH CORPS AT SANTIAGO. 647
General Lawton was the first to disembark part of his division.
There was very little order in the disembarkation, however — the
different regiments getting ashore partly in accordance with the gen-
eral plan and partly in accordance with the individual initiative of
their commanders. General Lawton at once moved some of his
troops to the front and established outposts, pickets and scouting
parties, well in advance. Several of the regular infantry regiments
and the Second Massachusetts disembarked, and General Young's
brigade of Wheeler's cavalry division, including the First and Tenth
regular cavalry and the First volunteer cavalry. Camp was made
wherever each regiment could find room, the men putting up their
dog tents, or, more generally, sleeping out in the open — the officers
all sleeping out in the open, as practically none of the officers' bag
gage was landed. The generals, Wheeler, Lawton, Young and
Chaffee, fared no better than the privates. General Wheeler having
landed, was in command until General Shatter should come ashore,
and as General Shatter was obliged to take very many of the trans
ports with troops and stores farther to the west to the little town of
Siboney to land, General Wheeler had the immediate direction of the
movements for some days.
Landing the mules and the few horses proved difficult. The
transports could not go near shore and the animals had to be flung
overboard to make their way to the beach as best they could. Some
were drowned. Enough were gradually gathered to make a few
small mule trains.
Next day, the twenty-third, the advance was begun. At this time
the generals believed that the Cubans could be used, not merely as
scouts, but in bush fighting in the front, and they were accordingly
sent forward to find where the Spaniards were. They served the pur
pose of scouts well enough on this occasion, the Spaniards being found
at a place called Las Guasimas, just at the hither side of the ruined
hamlet, on the road to Santiago.
LTnder the direction of General Shafter, General Wheeler led the
army towards Siboney, he himself going first. There he found that
the Spaniards had left the block houses, followed by the Cubans, who
had engaged their rear guard and been repulsed. General Wheeler
rode out in person towards the scene of the engagement, and, having
satisfied himself where the Spaniards were, and determined that there
should be an attack upon them the next morning, he returned to
Siboney.
648 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
Meanwhile by his orders the head of the army had taken up its
march. General Lawton had brought forward the regiments of
General Chaffee's brigade; and General Young's brigade, so far as it
was landed, consisting of the two squadrons of the First volunteer
cavalry and of one squadron each of the First and Tenth regular
cavalry, was marched to the extreme front. The march \vas not long,
but it was a trying one. The men had been cooped up for a fortnight
aboard ship where it was impossible to take any exercise whatever.
The road was a mere jungle trail and the heat intense. There were
not a few stragglers. Naturally these were especially numerous in
the Second Massachusetts, a regiment of gallant men, who were
unaccustomed to field work; but there were a number in the regular
regiments. A noteworthy fact was that the cavalry walked quite as
well as the infantry. It was after eight o'clock at night when the
cavalry brigade reached Siboney'and camped ahead of the infantry
regiments. Each general was anxious to be the first to strike the
Spaniards. General Wheeler being in command, allotted the task to
General Young's brigade, the foremost of his own cavalry division.
General Castillo and a number of Cubans were at or near Siboney.
General Wheeler consulted with him and General Young, and di
rected the latter to strike the Spaniards at Las Guasimas early the
following morning, General Castillo promising his aid. General
Young then sent for Colonel Wood, of the First volunteer cavalry,
and arranged the plan of battle with him. From Siboney the main
road to Santiago runs up through a valley and at its head crosses a
spur of the great mountain chains towards the interior, and thence
runs down hill to the city. Just where it crosses this spur it is joined
by another trail from Siboney which runs along the hill-crest to the
left of it, that is, between it and the sea. General Young directed
Colonel Wood to lead the two squadrons of the First volunteer cavalry
along this hill trail to the left, while he himself with a squadron of
the First and a squadron of the Tenth regular cavalry, took the
valley road.
Next morning the two small columns started before daybreak
and after marching1 a couple of hours they struck the Spaniards. A
sharp little fight followed and the Spaniards were driven from their
position, although they were superior in numbers. At the sound of
the firing, the infantry regiments who were nearest, started forward
in great haste, as did one squadron of the Ninth cavalry, the foremost
of Summer's brigade. The fight was over before they got to the
THE FIFTH CORPS AT SANTIAGO. 649
front, however. This little brush put the men in good spirits and
cleared the way to Santiago, the Spaniards not making another stand.
Some seventy Americans and about fifty Spaniards were killed and
wounded.
The next week was spent in getting the army within striking
distance of Santiago, the camps of the regiments being strung out
along the road from Savilla to within three miles or so of the city.
There were available for the attack somewhat over twelve thousand
men all told, of whom ten thousand were regulars. The Spaniards
in Santiago at this time numbered six thousand troops, one thousand
of whom were sailors and marines from the ships. There were in the
province of Santiago, all told, twenty-three thousand, and although
great supineness had been shown by the Spanish general in gathering
his forces, there was a body of four thousand troops from the outside
actually in motion towards Santiago.
Gangs of men were employed to repair the road from Siboney
and make it passable for the army wagons which had now been
landed and were in constant use bringing provisions to the front. The
amount of transportation was utterly insufficient and the number of
boats on the transports was also insufficient, although not to the same
extent. In consequence, though there was plenty of food on the
transports, the Army was on salt pork and hardtack, generally with
out the full amount of coffee and sugar. In the afternoon there were
usually heavy downpours of rain, such as are only seen in the tropics,
which turned the road into a furious torrent and the camp grounds
into morasses. The time was too short to permit of extensive de
velopment of fever, but cases began to crop out here and there. Gal
lant General Young was one of the victims and was obliged to go
home.
There was very hard work for everybody during this week, the
most efficient portion of it being done by the line officers and men of
the infantry and cavalry. The fact that these showed to such ad
vantage in this campaign when compared with the engineers and
artillerymen ought to be enough to show to even the blindest, what,
of course, really needs no proof, viz.: That it is the system which
makes the difference between efficiency and inefficiency when men are
equally good to start with. The officers of the engineers and artillery
were certainly at the outset, at least as good as those of the cavalry
and infantry. In theory they were supposed to be better. But the
cavalry and infantry were armed and drilled according to the most
650 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
modern methods, and had seen actual practice in the field. The en
gineers had not been trained in the field. The artillerymen were also
without field training, and in addition they had slow-firing guns and
black powder, the last making them hopelessly inferior to the Span
iards. The commissary department was under the immediate charge
of Colonel Weston, and his energy, good sense and willingness to
cut through red tape and take responsibilities, enabled those who came
into immediate contact with him to do pretty well; but the quarter
master's department did badly. Too much cannot be said for the
men, and indeed, for the beasts of the mule trains. The packers and
the mules worked all the time in getting up provisions and ammuni
tion. They were ravaged by fever, their ranks being so depleted that
at one time a draft was made on the Rough Riders for twenty-four
of their number to supply the packers' places. But all the efforts of
the pack trains would not alter the fact that their numbers were too
few. Nothing like enough transportation was brought along. The
commanding general in his official report stated that there was ample
transportation. This cannot be so, for if it were, the responsibility
for the failure to bring up sufficient food to the front would rest with
the general. No regiment had anything like the proper amount of
transportation for its needs. Whether this was because the War De
partment failed to send enough, or because the commander of the
army failed to use aright what he had, whether the shortage was
inevitable or whether it was due to a faulty system, does not alter the
fact that the shortage existed. The line officers had to work un
ceasingly to bring forward the necessary rations and to get transporta
tion. They also had to mend roads, to reconnoiter the country ahead
so far as they were allowed (for there \vas little reconnoissance) and to
make rough maps.
The Signal corps was unfortunately partly diverted from efficient
work by the presence of an experimental toy — a balloon. This bal
loon accomplished nothing. There was little it could do in such a
country as that in which we operated, for from hills it was always
possible to see as far as a man in the balloon could see. In any event,
even if the reverse had been the case, if half of the energy expended
in getting the balloon at work had been expended in proper recon
noissance, we would have gained literally a hundred-fold the knowl
edge of the enemy's positions that was gained. Several wagons were
employed in dragging to the front all the clumsy apparatus for send
ing up the balloon. If, instead of this, they had been employed in
THE FIFTH CORPS AT SANTIAGO. 651
bringing beans to the front for the soldiers, the result would have been
in every way infinitely better.
During this week all the troops which were intended for the
actual assault on Santiago were brought to the front. General Law-
ton was encamped nearest Santiago with his infantry division of nine
regiments, all of them regulars, excepting the Second Massachusetts.
Generals Chaffee, Ludtow and Miles were under him; General Bates
having an independent brigade. Following Lawton was General
Sumner with his cavalry division of six regiments, all regulars except
the First United States volunteer cavalry. Then came General Kent's
infantry division of nine regiments, all regulars excepting the Seventy-
first New York, his three brigades being under Generals Hawkins
and Wyckoff and Colonel Pearson.
Young's fight at Guasimas had been won so easily, the Spaniards
had shown so little obstinacy, that all the army had become un
fortunately confirmed in the belief that the task before us was light.
This feeling of over-confidence was increased by the utter failure of
the Spanish fleet to do anything, and by the want of aggressiveness
on the part of their land forces. It was the old story of over-confi
dence, complicated with refusal to learn from the course of history.
Ninety years before the Spaniards had been pitted in succession against
the two greatest military powers of the day — England and France.
At sea their navy had been the helpless prey of the English fleets;
on land their armies had been scattered like chaff by Napoleon's
marshals when they fought in the open; and yet their guerrilla war
fare and their extraordinary defense of intrenched and fortified places
(as at Sargossa and Gerona), had won the admiration of the civilized
world. The fact that the Spanish ships were not effective fighting
machines, and that their armies lacked aggressiveness and even firm
ness in the open, should not have been held to indicate that the
Spaniards would not fight as desperately as they always had fought
behind intrenchments. Moreover, we had been misled by the re
ports of those observers who had been in Cuba before the war. The
best of them had not only underestimated the power of the Spanish
garrisons to hold out when the Cuban coast was blockaded, but had
wholly failed to understand the military value of the Spanish trochas,
forts and block houses. A generation had passed since the Civil War
and most men had forgotten how formidable intrenchments were, and
did not realize the immense resisting power of even small block houses
when attacked by infantry, unsupported or not properly supported
652 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
by artillery. Accordingly the whole expedition was managed in the
most happy-go-lucky manner. There was little evidence of foresight,
forethought, or careful planning or of preparation in advance. The
campaign itself was fought by the army on the every-man-for-his-
own-hand principle. Even the numerical weakness of the Spaniards
in the city of Santiago and their failure to concentrate the superior
numbers which they had in the province, could not have prevented
disaster, had it not been for the wonderful fighting qualities developed
by the line officers and enlisted men- of the infantry and cavalry.
On June 3oth the advance was ordered. As we faced Santiago,
the outlying town of El Caney, some four miles distant from the city,
was on the right. This was held by the Spaniards in considerable
force, and until it was captured, we could not interfere with their
water supply, or with the districts from which they drew food. Ac
cordingly it was resolved that General Lawton should attack and take
this town, while the rest of the troops made a demonstration against
the city to prevent reinforcements being sent out. The plan was not
worked out well in advance and as no proper reconnoissance had been
made, and as the resistance of the Spanish garrison of El Caney was
utterly underestimated, the result was a fight along the whole line,
in the shape of an assault by our army upon 'that portion of the
Spanish defenses which was the strongest.
Chaffee's brigade, which was to do the heaviest fighting at El
Caney, had bivouacked over night about a mile southeast of the town,
the men preserving strict silence and lighting no fires; the chief anxiety
felt among all concerned was lest the Spanish might leave the town
before there was a chance to attack and bag them. As a matter of
fact, the Spaniards had not the slighest intention of leaving, and were
preparing to put up as gallant and desperate a fight as the like num
ber of men ever did put up. Captain Capron's four-gun battery of
light artillery went with Chaffee's brigade. Miles' brigade was to
the left, and Ludlow's close to the battery, in advance of Miles' brigade.
The brigades of Chaffee and Ludlow advanced shortly after five
on the morning of July 1st, Chaffee landing. The fight was to be
opened by Capron's artillery.
The town was small, with a church and plaza, as in most Spanish-
American towns, the houses having high sloped roofs of thatch. It
was surrounded by trenches and by various block houses. At the
southeast corner, on a round knoll, was a loop-holed stone fort with
deep trenches outside. South of the town was a small block house of
THE FIFTH CORPS AT SANTIAGO. 653
wood, the lower portion, however, being banked with earth to the
height of four feet. On the northwest corner of the town was a
similar but larger block house. On the northeast face was a line of
intrenchments close to the town. There were intrenchments in the
streets, and the heavier buildings were also used by the Spanish
troops. A mile from the town on the side of the mountain was a
very small block house which on the day in question was attacked
by the Cubans, who were repulsed. The next day some of the soldiers
took it.
As the troops approached on the morning of July 1st, the Span
iards could be seen lounging outside their lines. Above the little
stone fort floated the red and yellow banner of Spain. The pro
ceedings opened in a rather leisurely way, giving no promise of the
desperate fight that was to follow. The Spanish soldiers, in their
light blue-and-white striped uniforms and, red-cockaded straw hats,
looked with interest at Capron's battery as it was being wheeled into
position, while the American troops, in their slouch hats, blue shirts,
blue trousers and brown leggings, marched forward into position.
Neither officers nor men wore jackets, and all were dusty, sun-burned,
and, for the most part, unshaven. The Spanish soldiers had been for
three years on the Island and had seen much fighting against the
Insurgents. Half the American troops were raw recruits ; of the re
mainder, few indeed had been under fire. But they behaved most
admirably.
The action began at about seven. Capron's battery opened fire.
The Spaniards at once sought cover and a quarter of an hour later
Chaffee's brigade worked up close enough to begin exchanging shots
with the trenches at about a thousand yards.
Fortified places and indeed intrenchments of all kinds should be
reduced by artillery fire, either by itself or in combination with an
infantry assault delivered when the big guns have prepared the way.
Small stone forts and wooden block houses are peculiarly vulnerable
to modern artillery. But unfortunately the American artillery could
not properly be called modern. The black powder was a great dis
qualification, and partly through inferiority of design, and partly
through lack of proper training among the officers and men, the fire
was very slow and not very accurate; light guns can do little unless
hnndled with exceptional vigor ?nd skill, and but little vi.^or or skill
was shown. The Spaniards should have been smothered by a very
654 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
rapid and accurate fire. As a matter of fact, the shooting was slow,
there were frequent pauses, and for quite a time the aim was very bad.
Meantime the infantry fight became murderous, especially as
regarded the Seventh and Twelfth regiments. This continued for
about three or four hours, the artillery accomplishing nothing during
this time. The American troops were pressed in to about six hundred
yards distance from the village and were then brought to a stop,
though the skirmish line was edged cautiously forward. The fire was
exceedingly heavy, but, whereas the Americans could fire at nothing
but the white hats which marked the heads of the Spaniards in the
trenches, the Spaniards, who knew the ground accurately, and some of
whose sharpshooters shot very well, were continually able to take ad
vantage of the advance of their foes and to fire at them when they
were practically unprotected. Every move by a squad of men towards
the Spanish line was greeted with a drove of Mauser bullets. The
fullest possible credit must be awarded the Spaniards for their defense.
They were outnumbered five to one but they fought most gallantly
and effectively. On the other hand too much credit cannot be
awarded the Americans for their courage in the attack.
To the Seventh infantry fell the hardest task. They were de
ployed behind a low ridge fronting the stone fort, and were then ad
vanced up to the crest. Immediately they were subjected to a ter
rible fire from their front and from the block houses, which were
enabled to shoot at them from an angle. For hour after hour they lay
flat on their stomachs under the intense heat of the sun, firing as
occasion offered itself. Whenever one of them so much as raised
himself on his elbows, be became a target for the Spanish rifles. The
grim, gaunt old Indian fighter, General Chaffee, realizing now the
serious task before him, and entirely careless of his own life, walked
up and down along and behind the lines, encouraging and steadying
his men. One of his buttons was shot away and also his shoulder
strap, yet he himself was not scratched, and continued to stroll to and
fro, gripping his half-smoked cigar between his teeth. Three or four
of the recruits becoming unsteady began to fall back from the firing
line towards a sunken road in the rear but only to be pounced upon
by Chaffee in person and driven back to the front under the flail of
his bitter words. Most of the men, however, showed no symptom
whatever of retreating. They lay stretched out at full length, their
rifles at the ready, gazing eagerly towards the trenches for the chance
to get a fair shot. At last a Spaniard would show himself, and in-
THE FIFTH CORPS AT SANTIAGO. 655
stantly the soldiers who saw him would rise on their elbows or perhaps
to their knees, fire, and once more stretch themselves at full length.
It would be difficult to single out men for special gallantry where
all showed so much, but perhaps the bravest of the brave was Lieu
tenant Wansboro. He kept crawling on hands and knees along the
extreme front of the firing line, cheering the men, and whenever a
soldier was hit, he would jump up, help take him to the rear, and
then again return to the front. At last as he started up to go to the
assistance of a man who had just been hit, a bullet struck him through
the heart and he fell dead. He was taken to the rear by some of
his own men, aided by Captain Arthur H. Lee, the British military
attache, a man who on that day showed as much gallantry and as
little fear of death as any man in the American army. As they laid
him under the shade beside a sunken road, a noncommissioned officer
quietly drew a handkerchief over the boyish face of the dead man and
said: " Good-bye, lieutenant! You were a brave officer and you
died like a true soldier."
This sunken road in the rear was the point to which the wounded
were brought from the firing line beyond them. Captain Lee had
come over to the line held by the Seventh infantry about midday and
when he reached this road and saw it full of men lying down, he
remarked to an officer whom he met that he supposed these were the
reserves. The officer replied: " No, by God, they are the casual
ties! " There were over a hundred of them, who lay in silence without
a whimper or a groan, the Spanish bullets clipping the leaves of the
jungle trees close above their heads. The slightly wounded were
attending those who had been less fortunate, with great tenderness,
and each man seemed to show the most thoughtful consideration for
his fellow, as they lay in the sweltering heat without a breath of air.
Gorged vultures sat on the trees around them, seemingly undisturbed
by the bullets, and when the firing lulled, one could hear the buzzing
of the carrion flies and the uncanny rustling of the land crabs as they
scuttled to and fro in the bushes. Each soldier had a first-aid-to-the-
injured dressing, and in some cases these had been applied, but hour
after hour went by and no doctors could come up. They were sta
tioned about three-quarters of a mile to the rear and were there kept
so busy that they could not get to the front. Unfortunately, how
ever, this meant that they were busy with the lightest cases, for the
slightly wounded could walk to the rear, while the others could not
656 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
The Twelfth regiment was also suffering very heavily. Two of
its men during the forenoon performed an act of singular gallantry.
They crept forward alone, armed only with wire cutters, and, taking
skillful advantage of the cover, passed along the whole east front of
the village not two hundred yards from the Spanish lines, clipping the
barb wire fencing, which would otherwise have impeded the assault.
They returned in safety from their dangerous task.
Colonel Haskell had led the Seventeenth infantry forward to de
ploy, .but was himself hit three times and the regiment checked. Iti
was withdrawn in good order and deployed to the right, where it
rendered gallant service.
Meanwhile Ludlow's brigade was closing in on the south and
west sides of the village. He had with him two regular regiments,
the Eight and Twenty-second infantry, and one volunteer regiment,
the Second Massachusetts. The volunteers were gallant fellows, b-Mt
they were armed with the black-powder Springfields. Very early in
the day they were struck by some long range volleys from El Caney,
and halted and began to fire. Their cartridges, of course, sent out
dense clouds of smoke, and as there was not a particle of smoke any
where else on the firing lines, either of the Spanish or American in
fantry, this, of course, meant that they were immediately singled out
as a target by every Spanish rifle. In a minute or two they were
under such a heavy fire and were suffering so considerably that they
were withdrawn from the fight, not having been able to render the
slightest assistance. The fate of this regiment was a very severe com
mentary upon the folly of the nation, and the supineness of the ord
nance bureau of the War Department, in failing to provide the best
kind of modern arms for all our soldiers. The Eighth and Twenty-
second, however, like their fellow regulars, had the Krag-Jorgensen,
and Ludlow, an excellent officer, pushed these forward until they
were hotly engaged; but, of course, at a great disadvantage, in spite
of their numerical superiority, for they were in the open, while their
opponents were in trenches or behind loop-holed walls.
General Miles also brought up his reserve brigade from its head
quarters at the great red-topped Darcoureaud house, and two of his
regiments, the Fourth and Twenty-fifth regulars, were sent in to sup
port Ludlow.
At one o'clock no perceptible advance had been made. Hitherto
the Americans had lost far more heavily than the Spaniards, and the
latter were holding out as stubbornly as ever, while the expenditure
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THE FIFTH CORPS AT SANTIAGO. 659
of ammunition by the Americans had been prodigious. Just at this
time an order was brought from General Shafter's headquarters to
General Lawton to cease assaulting El Caney and move over to the
help of Generals Kent and Wheeler at San Juan. To have carried
out this order would have been disastrous in the extreme. It would
have meant a demoralizing retreat in the very face of the enemy.
Accordingly it was disregarded and the attack was pressed home, for
Lawton was made of stern stuff. The battery was firing with renewed
vigor and better aim and it began to make some impression on the
little stone fort. Fiercer and more uninterruptedly rose the rattle of]
Krags and Mausers. The Twelfth regiment had been pushed for
ward close to the outworks and General Chaffee gave them the order
to charge. At the word they rushed forward towards the stone fort,
swarmed through and over the wire fences, over the trenches where
the Spanish soldiers lay in heaps, their brains oozing out of the little
bullet holes in their foreheads, and then into the fort, while the on-
looking soldiers cheered frantically.
Two newspaper men were among the foremost in this charge,
James Creelman and Caspar Whitney, the former being shot in the
shoulder.
Inside the fort the shattered walls were splashed with blood. A
dozen dead and wounded Spaniards were lying on the floor, and about
as many more, including a lieutenant, who were unhurt, had been
taken prisoners. The prisoners, like almost all the Spaniards, firmly
believed they were going to be killed. As a matter of fact, they were
promptly offered water and hardtack by the victors ; but still regarded
the advances with profound distrust. The lieutenant, a handsome,
well-dressed young fellow, looked both anxious and dignified until
General Chaffee strode through the breach into the fort, shook hands
with him, and then listened impassively to the excitable, brave little
Spaniard, who, under the touch of kindness, promptly lost every
appearance of reserve and chattered away about what had happened,
constantly making reference to the " fortune of war."
The fight was not yet over, for, with desperate courage, the
Spaniards still defended the town and the wooden block houses, and
the men of the victorious Twelfth had to begin firing on them. Not
withstanding, the end could not now be long averted. The other
regiments of the three brigades were closing in, and as they reached
the outer works the Spaniards retreated and the Americans at last got
66o
CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
a chance to shoot at their foes in the open and to repay the losses
they themselves had suffered.
The Spaniards had fought as bravely and as efficiently as any
troops possibly could have fought. No men of any nationality could
have done better. Now that their opponents were on even terms
with them, it was- a simple impossibility for them longer to resist, and
they streamed out of the northwest end of the village. This was
about four o'clock in the afternoon.
Considering the greatly superior numbers of the Americans (for
Bates had just reinforced Lawton), it would certainly seem that troops
might have been interposed to cut off the Spanish retreat; but as it
was, the survivors were allowed to retire .unmolested, returning fire
for fire while they were in sight. One hundred and fifty of them
were captured unhurt, and in addition to these between three and
four hundred were killed and wounded. The Americans lost about
four hundred.
THE 25TH (COL'D) INFANTRY FIRING ON EL CANEY AFTER TAKING BLOCK HOUSE.
About three thousand five hundred men were engaged on the
American side all told, though the brunt of the fight was borne
by only about a third of this number. About six hundred
Spaniards were engaged. The lesson taught is the very trite
one, that earthworks and intrenchments, sheltering unbroken in-
THE FIFTH CORPS AT SANTIAGO. 66l
fantry armed with high-power repeating rifles, can be held against
very superior numbers of even the best troops, if the effort is
made to carry them by assault. The Spaniards fought well and
it would probably have been impossible to carry the village in
less time or with less loss in the manner which was actually adopted,
but a sufficiency of the right kind of artillery, properly handled, could
have reduced it with very little loss indeed.
Soon after the fight was over the division which had taken El
Caney was ordered to move up to the right of the dismounted cavalry
at San Juan. The march was begun on the straight road from El
Caney to Santiago. Both officers and men were utterly tired out
and no precautions of the proper kind were taken either to scout in
advance or to find out how serious any resistance that might be
encountered was. After advancing nearly to their proper place in
the line, the advance guard was fired on. As a matter of fact, there
were no Spanish troops at the place where this fire was encountered
save a few guerrillas, and it is even doubtful whether the bullets did
not come from within the Santiago lines, whence at this time they
were firing at Kent's and Wheeler's troops. But after the experience
at El Caney there was a good deal of natural reluctance to make an
attack against a foe of unknown strength, and there was a failure
to try to develop the hostile strength by a proper reconnoissance. In
stead of this the division was withdrawn and marched around all night
by a circuitous route, so that it did not come into its proper position
until the morning of the next day.
Over on the left wing the cavalry and Kent's infantry had been
engaged in an even more desperate and bloody struggle. General
Wheeler being sick the two brigades of dismounted cavalry were
under General Sumner. General Kent led the three brigades of his
own infantry. All of them were regulars except the Seventy-first
New York volunteers. The original plan was that these divisions
should leave their bivouac early in the morning, and, while the artillery
fired on the Spanish lines, the infantry and dismounted cavalry should
march to the right and connect with Lawton's division. No proper
reconnoissance of the ground in front had been made, prior to Kent's
taking matters in hand himself on the morning of the fight. The
proposed bivouac of the foremost of Kent's brigades, Hawkins', was
on ground which was actually well within range of the Spanish rifles,
and the proposed line of march by which the troops were to connect
with the infantry of Lawton led parallel to and within half rifle shot of
662 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
the Spanish trenches. In the actua. event, the battle was left to fight
itself, the division, brigade, regimental and company commanders
acting each according to his lights.
The cavalry, which was to take the advance, was encamped in the
neighborhood of El Po?o where we had placed a battery of light artil
lery. Early on the morning of the first this battery was in position
on the crest of the hill behind which the cavalry brigades were
gathering together with some Cubans. When the sound of Lawton's
guns announced the beginning of the fight at El Caney, the El Poso
battery opened on the Spaniards. The black smoke hung thick and
low, telling the exact spot to the Spaniards, and when they began to
reply with their artillery, the shrapnel which missed the American
battery, did considerable damage to the troops in the rear. Soon
after this General Sumner marched his two brigades to the front. The
balloon had been sent up with the idea of making a reconnoissance.
What trifling information it thereby gained was more than offset by
the fact that it was eventually anchored in front of the road by which
Kent and Sumner's troops debouched for the attack on San Juan, and
acted as a mark which enabled the Spaniards to locate their exact
position.
This roaa was a mere muddy track through the jungle which
lormed a wall on either hand. Through this jungle it was quite
impossible for troops to advance. The movement had to be by the
road. The position of the road was, of course, well known to the
Spaniards, and for at least a mile of its length it was within good range
of the Mauser rifles carried by the soldiers who held the block houses
and trenches we were about to assault. In consequence our troops,
as they marched along, before they had a chance to deploy, were
under a heavy fire and suffered a demoralizing loss.
General Wheeler was with the advance, but owing to his sick
ness, was not able to take command of the cavalry division until
about the middle of the afternoon when the heavy fighting was over
and the advance had almost ceased. Up to this time Sumner was in
command of the dismounted cavalry. Kent exercised a command
practically as independent as that of Lawton although two of General
Shafter's staff officers were with him. Lieutenant Miley, who was
Shafter's personal aide, was at the extreme front all day. General
Sumner himself led his division, the first brigade in front. General
Kent received orders to follow the cavalry, and his first brigade, under
General Hawkins, had to wait to let the cavalry pass and get in
THE FIFTH CORPS AT SANTIAGO. 663
front. As is always the case when a long column marches down a
narrow and rather difficult track, there was much delay. In places
the road was broad enough to render column of fours, the natural
formation. Elsewhere it would narrow so as to make it most easy to
go forward in columns of twos. This, of course, doubled the length
of the column, and taken together with the occasional halts for getting
rid of the packs, resulted in long delays for the troops in the rear, who
fretted and fumed and were naturally unable to understand what
was the reason for the halts. General Kent had his division drawn
up with Hawkins' brigade in front, Wyckoff's brigade second, and
Pearson's third.
Sumner, having brought his brigades across the San Juan
into a comparatively open reach of tree-dotted grass jungle, turned
to the right to march towards El Caney. Meanwhile General
Hawkins had pushed forward opposite the cavalry column and made
a reconnoissance in front. He was speedily joined by General Kent
himself. They saw that the strongest position in their front was that
occupied by the San Juan block house. The Spaniards also occu
pied the slopes which, from where the general stood, lay on the left
of the block house. The left of this part of the Spanish line, oppo
site the right of the American, was on another hill where there were
some large ranch buildings and a huge iron kettle, because of which
the soldiers afterwards christened it " Kettle Hill."
General Kent rode back after his reconnoissance, and, becoming
impatient, pushed his infantry forward beside the two rearmost regi
ments of the cavalry division, the Tenth and First. General Hawkins
himself led the advance composed of the Sixteenth and Sixth infantry.
His third regiment, the Seventy-first New York volunteers, was handi
capped by its black-powder rifles, and moreover, was not well com
manded. It accordingly hung back; but many of the officers and
men behaved well and came forward in companies and squads, joining
the regulars.
General Summer's first brigade as it marched to the right in
front of the Spanish position, naturally attracted their fire and was
finally forced to stop and return it. Meanwhile General Hawkins
brought forward his two regiments of regulars and led them in person
towards the San Juan block-house hill. The advance was through
thick jungle — great patches of densely intertwined tropical bushes,
vines and trees, alternating with glades of the tall, rank guinea-grass.
The still, stifling heat made it terrible work for the advancing troops,
664 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
and in such a country it was utterly impossible to preserve the regi
mental or even the company formations with anything like accuracy.
No man could see more than a short distance, save from some un
usually good point of observation, and in the advances no officer
could personally direct men more than a few yards to one side or the
other. In consequence the advance soon became broken up, less into
companies than into squads, each captain or lieutenant and each
natural leader among the noncommissioned officers bringing forward
the little group of men he himself could rally. All movements in this
jungle had been made in line or in single file. Only the simplest
commands could be given or could be obeyed. But each officer and
the enlisted men knew that what was demanded was an advance upon
the Spanish works.
As the men went forward the officers directed volley firing upon
the Spaniards upon the hills. Not only did the jungle offer great
obstructions, but there were barbed wire fences scattered along the
foot of the hills. Meanwhile some of the American artillery had
opened upon the crest held by the Spaniards in order to help the*
American infantry, and still more effective assistance was given by
Lieutenant Parker and his battery of four Catlings, which he fought
almost ahead of the infantry.
The foremost companies struggled through the thick jungle,,
reached the steep open slopes of the hills proper and started upward,
but in their first attempt were driven down again. By this time
Sumner's whole cavalry division had been drawn fairly into the fight
and had begun to advance, taking Kettle Hill with a rush. Once on
top of Kettle Hill, they first of all turned their attention towards the
San Juan block house, firing volleys at the block house and trenches
so as to assist the infantry.
General WyckofFs brigade was not able to get into action until
some time after Hawkins had begun his advance. No sooner was
it across the San Juan river than it suffered under a heavy fire. Gen
eral Wyckoff was killed and the command then fell on Lieutenant-
Colonel Worth, who soon fell severely wounded. The next in com
mand was Lieutenant-Colonel Liscum, who was also wounded not five
minutes later; the brigade thus losing three commanders in a quarter
of an hour. Lieutenant-Colonel Ewers then took command of it. The
brigade struggled forward, and as it came up, Hawkins' regiments
again charged the hill. This time they went to the top, two of
Wyckoff s regiments accompanying, and the Spaniards were driveny
THE FIFTH CORPS AT SANTIAGO.
665
and ran from their positions. Soon after the charge took place,
Pearson's brigade charged and took possession of the hills to the
left. Hawkins' brigade had suffered most and Pearson's least.
Hawkins himself was wounded not long afterwards. The Thirteenth
infantry of Wyckoff's brigade had the honor of capturing a Spanish
flag.
ON SAN JUAN HILL — SECOND DAY.
FIRST DAY.
As soon as the infantry took the San Juan block house, the
cavalry on Kettle Hill started forward at a run against the second line
666 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
of intrenchments on the hills in their front. The Spaniards fired on
them for some moments, but did not wait the charge, most of them
fleeing long before the Americans were at close range. A few fought
to the last. From here the troops swung to the left until they reached
the ridge crest overlooking Santiago, where they were halted. The
cavalry were to the right and nearest the Spanish lines. As their
flank was exposed, the Thirteenth regiment of infantry was later sent
over to hold the extreme right. An effort was made to fight the Ameri
can artillery on the front line with the infantry, but the black powder
rendered this effort futile. Every gun that attempted it was sooner
or later driven off.
The battle had been largely fought by the captains, lieutenants
and first sergeants. Few colonels were able to exercise command
over much more than a company. Generals Kent and Sumner did
splendid work, the one in command of the infantry and the other of the
cavalry. But from the very nature of the case, where an unplanned
battle was fought on unknown jungle-covered ground, very much had
to be left to the individual initiative of the troops themselves. There*
were three brigades of infantry and two of cavalry, and of their com
manders, one, General Wyckoff, was killed, and two, General Hawkins
and Colonel Carroll, wounded. Kent and Sumner out of six thou
sand five hundred men had lost over a thousand killed and wounded.
Lawton and Bates had at El Caney over five thousand men, although
Bates' brigade and two or three of Lawton's regiments were
not seriously engaged. The American loss of four hundred at
El Caney represented nearly as heavy a proportion of those en
gaged as was the case at San Juan. Lawton, a gallant and
accomplished soldier, had won his fight as well and expeditiously as
circumstances permitted. The individual acts of heroism were very
numerous. Most of the loss at San Juan occurred before the advance
was fairly begun, while the men 'lay in the stifling jungle grass, and
the Mauser bullets seemed to go in sheets, rustling through the air
and ripping up the ground. The hospital stewards took the wounded
as fast as they rolled over and, drew them back to the San Juan river,
where they laid them in long rows under the bank. The generals
and their aides were almost the only mounted men. The conduct of
the wounded was extraordinary. They showed no selfishness and no
brutality, never complaining and hardly ever grumbling, but waiting
patiently for the few surgeons. As for these surgeons they worked all
day and far into the night, until they literally fell asleep at their tasks.
THE FIFTH CORPS AT SANTIAGO. 667
The American advance when it did take place was so quick that a
number of Spanish sharpshooters were left in the trees. The foliage of
these trees was very thick. The Spaniards were carefully concealed
and used smokeless powder. The result was that it was exceedingly
difficult to place them. They were under the impression that no
quarter would be given them, and, consequently, they stayed in their
leafy ambush, shooting down every man who came within range whom
they thought they could with safety fire at. As Richard Harding
Davis, one of the correspondents, was going to the rear carrying a
wounded captain with the help of one of the Rough Riders, the latter
was shot from a tree almost overhead. Several of the hospital
stewards were shot in spite of the Red Cross brassards on their arms,
and more than once the same fate befell men who were carrying the
wounded to the rear.
Many of the newspaper correspondents showed marked gallantry.
James Creelman and Caspar Whitney at El Caney and Davis and
John Fox at San Juan, like Edward Marshall who had be^n terribly
wounded at Las Guasimas, behaved as bravely as any of the veteran
fighters in the army.
In the afternoon General Wheeler assumed command of the forces
at San Juan. No further advance was attempted. The Spaniards had
brought up all of their available reserves and at one time made an at
tempt at a forward movement, which was instantly repelled. During
the rest of the time they kept up an exceedingly hot fire from both
great guns and rifles. When dark came, General Wheeler gave the
orders to intrench. The weary men had been all day long without food
and had fought from early morning until dark. However, they set
to work with pick and shovel and soon after midnight had completed a
broken line of trenches across their position. Meanwhile there had
been something very like a panic in the rear. As must always be the
case in an army which has fought a hard fight, things at the rear looked
very bad. There were wounded and stragglers and men who could
not find their regiments and other men who did not want to find them.
The resistance of the Spaniards had been long and determined.
General Bates had marched hard all day without being able to take
any heavy part in the fighting. General Lawton after nearly reaching*
the lines had been fired on and h?.d made a long circle before coming
up to the right of the forces on the San Juan hills. Under these cir
cumstances there was some gloomy talk of retiring. This would have
been a fatal mistake. General Wheeler, however, put a stop to it. He
668
CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
was a veteran of the Civil War who had seen fights compared to which
this was little more than child's play. He knew that the Spaniards,
who had been driven back, must be in a far more shaky condition than
the Americans, who had steadily advanced, and he had no intention of
yielding a foot of ground to the rear. Nor did the proposal to go to
the rear take more than a rather vague and tentative form. I wish to
state with all possible emphasis that the men at the front, the men on
the firing line were never affected in the slightest degree by this talk of
retiring, and, indeed, were for the most part ignorant of it. So far as
I know not a single officer at the front so much as dreamed of the
possibility of retiring, and those who heard the rumor were equally
angered and amazed.
There were two or three night alarms of Spanish attacks, due to
the enterprising nature of the Spanish pickets and sharpshooters whoj
came up close to our lines. Soon after dawn, on July second, the
fight opened again and all day long the musketry crackled and the big
guns boomed at intervals3. As on the day before, the black powder
used by the American artillery put it at a hopeless disadvantage. Many*
of the Spanish guns were old muzzle loaders, but they used smokeless
powder and in consequence it was very difficult to find their where
abouts. But there was one kind of wheeled gun which was fought
right on the firing line with great success. This was the Catling.
Four of these machine guns had been in the battle under Lieutenant
John H. Parker of the Thirteenth infantry. Parker had taken his
battery into action on the day preceding. He had hammered the earth
works at San Juan while the infantry assaulted them, and had put the
Catlings on the extreme front with the cavalry division late in the
IN THE RIFLE PITS.
afternoon. Two Colt's automatic guns and a dynamite gun belonging
to the First United States volunteer cavalry were now put under his
THE FIFTH CORPS AT SANTIAGO. 669
charge, and he used his motly battery with great effect throughout the
rest of the siege.
During the main fight on July 1st, the Thirty-third Michigan
had been detached to attack Aguadores on the coast as a diversion.
The attack was not pushed home and nothing was accomplished.
The fighting on the second was nothing but an exchange of firing
between the trenches, nothing of consequence being accomplished by
either side, except that the American artillery with its black powder
again showed that it could not remain within range of the Spanish
rifles and had to be withdrawn to a commanding position well in the
rear. Four thousand Spanish troops marched into Santiago. A
couple of volunteer regiments were sent up to join the American lines
at the front. Deducting losses this left about nine thousand Spanish
troops inside the city and about eleven thousand Americans outside, at
this time.
As is generally the case, each side exaggerated the strength of the
other. The American commanders thought the Spaniards out
numbered their troops. One or two of the reports speak of the fact
that there was " little apprehension " of the Spaniards being able to
make a successful attack upon our lines. In the light of our after
knowledge this reads rather funnily. The men on the firing line never
felt the slightest anxiety about the Spaniards taking the initiative, and
indeed hoped for nothing so much as that the Spaniards would make an
attack, for this would have meant the immediate downfall of the city.
Any attempt of the Spaniards to push home such an attack against
superior numbers of men, intrenched, especially when these men were
better individual soldiers, would have resulted in disaster so great,
that the slightest energy in taking advantage of it would have meant
the fall of the city.
Each side was wholly ignorant of the designs of the other, and
inclined to attribute to it plans of which it knew nothing. There was
also a tendency to speak of every outburst of firing from the trenches
as an attack. These two tendencies are responsible for the accounts of
the alleged Spanish " night attack " late in evening of July 2d. The
insurgents had been burning block houses on the mountains.
The Spaniards believed that these were signals between the insurgents
and ourselves. We believed that they were signals between the
Spanish garrison and Spanish reinforcements. Each side was on the
outlook for developments, and when the Spanish pickets happened to
come in contact with our outposts, a lively fire ensued, which quickly
670 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
spread to the trenches. At night it was far easier to tell the position of
the Spaniards than by day, when the smokeless powder gave no sign of
their whereabouts; for in the darkness the little spurts of flame were
visible. The Spaniards did have an unusually large force of skirmish
ers out in the jungle between the lines, but their main body was in or
right beside the trenches and never moved from them. A tremendous
fire was kept up for some minutes after it became general, but it was
very ill-directed, it being impossible to aim well at night, and what
casualties there were, happened in the rear, the fire for the most part
going high. The best officers on the American side speedily realized
the futility of wasting ammunition, and running up and down the lines
gradually stopped the firing on our side. The Spaniards continued
for some time longer, doing practically no damage; then their fire also
died away.
Again this afternoon there was talk of retiring, and again General
Wheeler took the lead in putting a stop to it, thereby rendering prob
ably the greatest single service rendered by any man in the campaign.
The following morning, the third, the firing went on much as usual;
but by this time the American trenches had been perfected, and the men
had grown used to the work, the casualties being very few. The
Spanish sharpshooters, between the lines, displayed much boldness, and
the guerrillas in the rear were still doing much damage, so details of
sharpshooters were organized to hunt them down. A goodly number
were killed that morning and several after the truce in the afternoon,
for the guerrillas knew nothing of the truce and continued to shoot at
our men. The truce took place about noon, a summons to surrender
being sent in at that time. For a week the negotiations went on. It
was not a truce all the time, however, for sometimes negotiations would
be broken off, and the American troops would be notified not to make
an attack. During these intervals we would strengthen our lines and
extend them by the right flank until we gradually completely invested
the city. At the same time a mortar battery and additional artillery
under General Randolph were brought to the front. No siege guns,
however, were brought up, and the transportation was so utterly in
sufficient that never more than a day's food in advance was provided at
the front. The rest was at the sea coast.
Inside the city of Santiago there was abundance of ammunition
and food for the immediate necessities of the garrison, but there was no
hope of ultimate success against the Americans. Disease might ravage
the American ranks and bad weather cause great suffering by the inter-
THE FIFTH CORPS AT SANTIAGO. 6/1
rr.ption to the supply of provisions, but there was not the slightest
chance of breaking up the siege operations. The resources of the
United States were almost literally unlimited, and enough troops
could be continually sent to the front to repair any losses, while
there was no hope of the garrison breaking out or of rein
forcements driving away the invaders. Sooner or later the
food of the garrison would give out, and meanwhile, when
the bombardment began in serious earnest, the time of unavailing
suffering was sure to set in. The Spaniards had fought bravely; their
cause was now hopeless, and they wished merely an honorable excuse
for surrendering. General Linares, the commander-in-chief in the
city, had been wounded, and General Toral had taken his place. On
July 3d, Cervera's fleet, which was in the harbor, and was the ob
jective of the army, made a sortie and was destroyed. This put a
final end to all hope of successful resistance, not merely at Santiago,
but in the war. General Blanco, at Havana, and the Spanish home
government, wished to avoid the responsibility for the surrender and
cast it upon Toral. Toral was equally reluctant to accept it. On the
other hand, the Americans were anxious to get the city surrendered
before a serious epidemic of disease should break out. But after eight
days the parties were still unable to come to an agreement, whereupon
negotiations were broken off, and on the afternoon of the tenth and
morning of the eleventh, the bombardment reopened. The Spanish
reply was very feeble, General Randolph with his artillery completely
silenced the Spanish batteries and the fire from the Spanish trenches
was readily quelled. Another truce was declared and this time the
Spaniards came to terms. It was agreed that they should surrender the
city and be transported without their arms to Spain. On the seven
teenth, the American flag was hoisted on the works.
Throughout these days of peace and war in the trenches the troops
showed excellent soldierly qualities. It was essentially a campaign of
the regular army. Of the volunteer organizations along with them,
some did very well and some ill. But the great bulk of the work was
done, and the great bulk of the loss was suffered, by the regulars.
The officers and men alike shared the hardship and fatigue, and the
officers, as shown by their losses, and as was quite proper, took even
greater risks than did the men under them. The lines were from time
to time strengthened by traverses, and bomb proofs were put up under
the hills. At night the trenches were pushed forward, here and there.
There was need for great watchfulness, as in places the hostile lines
672 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
were not more than four hundred yards apart. Zig-zag approaches to
the trenches were made so that the troops in them could be relieved
every few hours of the day. At night pickets and Cossack posts were
established in a cordon through the jungle and the most vigilant watch
was kept in the trenches. Dog tents were brought up and put under
the protection of the hills on the side farthest away from the Spanish
fire. Rough field hospitals were established.
Fortunately, from the first of July to the eleventh, when the last
shot had been fired, the weather was good. During this period every
effort should have been made to establish a depot of provisions at the
front, but, as a matter of fact, nothing of the kind was done. The
transports were still standing on and off in front of Siboney. There
was a good deal of food on the beach there. The narrow jungle trail
which led from there for eight or ten miles over the hills and across
streams to the army received scant attention The insufficient number
of mules and wagons had all they could do to bring up ammunition and
enough food to meet the needs of the army from day to day. In
consequence there was always imminent danger of partial disaster. In
good weather there was no trouble, but a single storm would render the
road temporarily impassable, and a long spell of bad weather would
have closed communications between the army and its base on the
seaboard. Just after the last firing occurred there were two days of
stormy weather. The road became an impassa"ble quagmire and the
streams torrents across which no wagons could be taken. Food at
the front was short, — one or two of the volunteer regiments being
literally without any whatever. Fortunately the weather cleared and
by great exertion matters were restored to their normal condition ; but
if instead of two days' bad weather, there had been three, the damage
to the road would have been such as to mean actual suffering from
hunger of a marked kind on the part of the troops.
The condition of the hospitals was very bad indeed. There were
not nearly enough doctors and the number of ambulances was utterly
insufficient. A good deal of the trouble came from the fact that the
stubborn and effective fight made by the Spaniards was a complete
surprise. Before the battle of July 1st, the general in command of the
corps was reported to have told the surgeons to prepare to take care
of forty wounded men. As a matter of fact there were twelve hundred.
There were only two ambulances for them and very few litters. There
were but few surgeons, few hospital attendants and entirely insufficient
supplies. Many of the wounded went two or three days without any
THE FIFTH CORPS AT SANTIAGO. 673
attention whatsoever. Some walked down to Siboney and got aboard
the boats before they were cared for. Others were put into the hospitals
and their wounds dressed, but were left without food or drink for
forty-eight hours. The surgeons in charge did what they could, work
ing until their eyes closed from utter weariness. The hospital attend
ants for the most part did well too, but they were all so overworked as
to become peevish and irritable, and the immense amount of suffering
they saw tended to make them a little calloused — at least in some in-
stances. There were no cots, few blankets, and insufficient tentage.
When a wounded man came to the rear he laid in the mud on his
blanket, if he had one. If he did not have one, then he lay in the mud
without it. In the most crowded hospitals many of the wounded were
taken away from the operating table and put down in the high grass
with no cover whatever, there to wait for perhaps twenty-four hours
before they were found again. The astounding fact remains that from
the wounds proper there was a very small death rate. The steel
jacketed bullet, of minute size and high velocity, is anything but a lethal
projectile. If shot through the heart, brain or spine death was in
stantaneous; but if shot anywhere else the man usually recovered.
Scores of cases of abdominal wounds which would have meant certain
and painful death if inflicted by the old style rifle or by a shotgun, were
cured completely. One result of this was that a very large number
of men who were wounded never left the firing lines, save for an hour
or two to get their wounds dressed.
Far more trouble resulted from sickness. The army should have
been moved north just as soon as the city surrendered. The exposure,
the insufficient tentage and the improper food had severely shaken the
constitutions of all the men. Half of them were more or less sick after
they had been three weeks ashore and most of the remainder had lost
a good deal of their snap and buoyancy. They suffered somewhat from
dysentery and kindred complaints, but the arch-foe was a persistent
malarial fever of an acute and recurrent kind. This was not infectious,
but unfortunately a few sporadic cases of yellow fever appeared and
cast the home authorities into a panic. Various so-called experts ex
amined the cases and speedily reported that nearly every man had
yellow fever. The commanders at the front found that when a man
was stricken down with fever, if he was kept in his tent or in a regi
mental hospital, he was able to return to duty in a few days, having
merely suffered from severe malaria, but if he was sent to the rear,
then his case was reported as yellow fever and he was clapped into a
674 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
yellow fever hospital. With this terror before their eyes the home
authorities, misled by some of the reports they received, declined to take
any steps to bring the army back to the United States, and as they were
familiar neither with the country nor with the conditions and needs of
the troops, they directed various plans to be carried out, not one of
which was possible of fulfillment. The troops kept sickening and the
percentage of men who were attacked by malarial fever kept increasing,
while when once attacked, though a man might temporarily recover
he was sure to be stricken down again and again and to grow continu
ally weaker. Under these circumstances the corps commander sum
moned a meeting of the division and brigade commanders, and it was
unanimously agreed to make the most emphatic protest possible to the
Secretary of War against the army being longer kept where it was, for
no good end and to its certain ultimate ruin. The division and brigade
commanders memorialized the corps commander to this effect and their
protest was made public. The immediate result was to bring the army
home, and about August 5th the embarkation began. ,
The voyage home was accomplished with little incident. There was
no longer the slightest danger from Spanish cruisers so the ships went
separately and without convoy, each making its way as best it could.
The conditions on the first transports which had gone north were
terrible, owing to their crowded condition, and insufficient accommoda
tions and lack of proper food, good water and medicines. The most
crying evils were to some extent remedied afterwards, but the transport
service in the main was bad. The men were all much weakened, and
in consequence the sick list on many of the vessels was appalling.
Some of the ships were mere floating pest houses. The water on some
of them was bad, and on almost all the food was improper, chiefly owing
to the fact that the meat ration, consisting generally of the canned roast
beef, so-called, was at the best tasteless and at the worst nauseating;
so that only a small part of it was consumed, even when the soldiers
were very hungry. In healthy troops this merely meant a certain loss
of strength; in sick troops it meant weakening them nearly to the
danger point.
The returning army was gathered into a great camp near Montauk
Point on Long Island. No thorough preparations were made in ad
vance for this camp, in spite of the limitless resources of the country
being available; but it was so near New York, and the chance for
volunteer aid was so great, that the most crying defects were speedily
remedied. The hard work and good sense of the officers did the rest,
THE FIFTH CORPS AT SANTIAGO. 675
and the camp was made as healthy as could possibly be desired. The
fever had a firm hold on the men, and the malarial poison was so acute
that the attacks occurred again and again. One of the sad features of
the war was the number of men who died from disease after their re
turn to their own country and even to their homes. Some weeks
went by before any notable improvement in the health and strength of
the troops became apparent.
One feature of the campaign, that is, the attitude of a section of the
newspaper press, should be mentioned. A perfect shoal of war corre
spondents started with the army. Many of them did admirable work.
Many of them represented papers of dignified tone, which only desired
to know the truth and to tell it so far as it did not interfere with the
success of the military operations. But there were some who repre
sented papers which showed a very unwholesome inclination towards
sensationalism, and an indifference to finding out the facts pure and
simple, or to upholding the best interests of the country. The majority
of the papers sought to find out the facts as they actually were; a few
observed throughout an attitude of irrational optimism or irrational
pessimism ; but quite a number passed from one extreme to the other.
During the early weeks of the campaign, that is, until after the heavy
fighting had ended, the representatives of the last class apparently con
sidered it to be almost treacherous to so much as hint that the troops
were not always well led and volunteers not always in good shape to
fight, or that the management of the various bureaus of the War De^
partment was not always what it should be. Every volunteer regi
ment was given hysterical praise whether it did well or ill; every
general called a hero bold, without regard to his acts; and every step
in the matter of embarkation, transportation and the like was chronicled
as of inconceivable wisdom. After this period, the very patent faults in
organization and administration, and to some extent in leadership and
conduct, were recognized, and soon the same papers took the opposite
extreme, using quite as exaggerated language on the one side as they
had previously employed on the other. The army was described as
" starving to death at Camp Wyckoff " at a time when in reality there
was a positive plethora not only of food, but of delicacies. t
A wise and patriotic historian must, of course, try to state the
facts as they are; not only for the s?Ve of the truth of history, but
because of the need, from the standpoint of the nation, of learning
aright the lessons history teaches. Americans need to have brought
pvhome to them, the high quality of our Regular army, and the indis-
676 CUBA5S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.
pensaWe nature of its services at the outbreak of any serious war.
Volunteer regiments differ wonderfully in efficiency at the outset, and
even more in the rapidity with which they learn their trade. The aver
age American volunteer is brave, intelligent and patriotic. I con
scientiously believe that he can learn the trade of war more quickly
than a similar soldier of any other country; but, he has got to learn it.
Moreover, the nation needs to be taught that even the Regular army
can never show at its best unless it is sometimes exercised as a unit, and
not as a jumble of small fractions. It should be sometimes drilled and
manoeuvered in mass; and sometimes the quartermaster and commis
sary, not to speak of the ordnance and medical departments, should
be trained by actual experience in provisioning and supplying large
bodies of men in the march and in the field. In short, the War
Department must be managed on an altogether different basis from
that on which it has been managed since the Civil War, if it is ade
quately to serve the nation's needs in times of crisis. But when all
these disagreeable lessons have been learned from the experience of
Santiago, there will remain the pleasanter lesson of successful heroism.
There was a good deal of blundering and some inexcusable misman
agement, but as a whole, the fighting edge of the officers and men was
of the keenest and truest temper. The Fifth corps at Santiago won a
great victory in a marvellously short time and added a striking page to
the honor roll of American history.
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