108-1 Hearing: Current and Futu
S. Hrg. 108-303
CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS
TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED
STATES
Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG. 108-303
HEAKING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
FEBRUARY 12, 2003
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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108-1 Hearing: Current and Futu
S. Hrg. 108-303
CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS
TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED
STATES
Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG. 108-303 ,
HEAEING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON AKMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
FEBRUARY 12, 2003
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS
DEPOSITORY
MAR 1 B 2004^
BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS DEPT
91-721 PDF
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2004
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN WARNER,
JOHN McCain, Arizona
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South CaroUna
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
JOHN CORNYN, Texas
Virginia, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
JACK REED, Rhode Island
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
BILL NELSON, Florida
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
EVAN BAYH, Indiana
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director
(II)
CONTENTS
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the
United States
february 12, 2003
Page
Tenet, Hon. George J., Director of Central Intelligence 6
Jacoby, Vice Adm. Lowell E., USN, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency 21
(III)
CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE
THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF
THE UNITED STATES
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:43 a.m., in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner (chair-
man) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, Inhofe, Roberts,
Allard, ColHns, Ensign, Talent, Graham, Cornyn, Levin, Kennedy,
Byrd, Reed, Akaka, Ben Nelson, Dayton, Bayh, Clinton, and Pryor.
Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff direc-
tor; and Cindy Pearson, assistant chief clerk and security manager.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup, professional
staff member; Brian R. Green, professional staff member; Mary
Alice A. Hayward, professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock,
professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff
member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member; Lynn
F. Rusten, professional staff member; and Scott W. Stucky, general
counsel.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic
staff director; Madelyn R. Creedon, minority counsel; Kenneth M.
Crosswait, professional staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, profes-
sional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff
member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Maren R.
Leed, professional staff member; Christina D. Still, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger, Leah C. Brewer, An-
drew Kent, Jennifer Key, Sara R. Mareno, and Nicholas W. West.
Committee members' assistants present: Cord Sterling, assistant
to Senator Warner; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe;
James Beauchamp, assistant to Senator Roberts; Jayson Roehl, as-
sistant to Senator Allard; James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant to Sen-
ator Collins; Sara Grisier, assistant to Senator Ensign; Lindsey R.
Neas, assistant to Senator Talent; James W. Irwin, assistant to
Senator Chambliss; Aleix Jarvis and Stephen Flippin, assistants to
Senator Graham; Henry J. Steenstra, assistant to Senator Dole;
Sharon L. Waxman and Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistants to Senator
Kennedy; Terrence E. Sauvain and Erik Raven, assistants to Sen-
ator Byrd; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davel}^!
Noelani Kalipi and Richard Kessler, assistants to Senator Akaka;
(1)
Douglas Bush, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assist-
ant to Senator Ben Nelson; Rashid Hallaway, assistant to Senator
Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; Terri Glaze,
assistant to Senator Pryor.
OPENmG STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAT ROBERTS
Senator Roberts [presiding]. The committee will come to order.
Senator Warner, our distinguished chairman, is temporarily de-
tained. The committee meets today to receive testimony from
George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), and Vice
Admiral Jacoby, who is the Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA), on current and future worldwide threats to the
United States and national security. On behalf of Senator Warner,
I want to welcome our two distinguished witnesses. Their testi-
mony is the foundation for the committee's actions about the types
of military forces and military capabilities our Nation needs to de-
tect and deter and, if necessary, defeat those threats.
The chairman, in his statement, said he wanted to take a mo-
ment to acknowledge Vice Admiral Jacoby on what is his first ap-
pearance before our committee in his new capacity as the Director
of the DIA. The Admiral is no stranger to the committee, having
provided many briefings and updates to the committee while he
served as the J-2 on the Joint Staff for the past 3 years. Admiral,
you did a great job in that position. We congratulate you as you
fleet up, I think that is the word to this new challenge during these
very challenging times. As chairman of the Intelligence Committee,
I can say we really appreciated your testimony yesterday and I ap-
preciated your courtesy when Senator DeWine and I visited the
DIA and received your briefing several weeks ago.
The circumstances of this hearing are quite compelling. Our
country was brutally attacked by terrorists 17 months ago. Our
military is engaged in an all-out global war to defeat terrorism.
The threat of war looms in Iraq. Nuclear tensions are on the rise
as testified yesterday by Mr. Tenet, also on the Korean peninsula;
and the threat of another catastrophic attack against our Nation
and our interests has recently increased.
I am going to simply put the rest of the chairman's statement in
the record without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
The committee meets today to receive testimony from George Tenet, Director of
Central Intelligence, and Vice Admiral Jacoby, Director, Defense Intelligence Agen-
cy, on current and future worldwide threats to U.S. national security.
I welcome our two distinguished witnesses. Their testimony on the wide range of
threats facing our Nation is the foundation for the committee's deliberations about
the types of military forces and military capabilities our Nation needs to detect,
deter and — if necessary — defeat those who threaten us.
I want to take a moment to acknowledge Vice Admiral Jake Jacoby in what is
his first appearance before our committee in his new capacity as the Director of
DIA. Admiral Jacoby is no stranger to the committee, having provided many brief-
ings and updates to the committee while he served as the J2 on the Joint Staff for
the past 3 years. You did a great job in that position and we congratulate you as
you "fleet up" to this new challenge, during very challenging times.
The circumstances of this hearing are quite compelling. Our country was brutally
attacked by terrorists 17 months ago; our military is engaged in an all-out global
war to defeat terrorism; the threat of war looms in Iraq; nuclear tensions are on
the rise on the Korean peninsula; and, the threat of another catastrophic attack
against our Nation and our interests has recently increased.
For the past several years, Director Tenet has been quite prophetic in warning
us of "greater risk" and "vulnerability to surprise attack, even at home." Your recent
assessments that al Qaeda remains a significant risk and is planning imminent at-
tacks on the United States and its interests is quite sobering.
As U.S. forces pour into the Persian Gulf region, we look to both of you for your
assessments of the dangers facing these brave men and women if conflict cannot be
avoided, as well as the dangers facing the world if the international community fails
to act to disarm Saddam Hussein.
In addition, although much progress has been made, Afghanistan remains a dan-
gerous place. We are anxious to hear your assessment of the situation there and
the prospects for the future.
The global war on terrorism is not just confined to Afghanistan and the Middle
East. Your assessment of the overall magnitude of this threat and the progress that
has been made thus far to defeat this danger will greatly assist our understanding
of the scope of this problem.
Even though we are focused on current and potential military conflicts, we must
not lose sight of the other, non-traditional threats that abound in this uncertain
world — the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies, in-
formation warfare, ethnic conflict, and overall global trends. Our security demands
vigilance in these areas, as well. We look forward to your fi-ank assessments of the
many wide ranging threats to our national security.
There has been much discussion about what went wrong on September 11. Clear-
ly, changes need to be made in the way we process, analyze, and disseminate intel-
ligence to ensure the right people have the right information at the right time. We
are anxious to hear from Doth of you on structural, technological, and cultural
changes you believe are required to better posture our intelligence services for fu-
ture success. We look forward to your insights and will rely greatly on your judg-
ment.
We depend on you, gentlemen, to guide us as we make critical decisions in the
weeks and months ahead about the capabilities, resources, and policies our Nation
needs to defend itself. Success in your respective missions is essential to our na-
tional security — both at home and abroad — and the future readiness of our Armed
Forces.
Thank you for your service to our country. We welcome your testimony.
Senator Roberts. I yield at this time to the distinguished vice
chairman, ranking member, shotgun writer, and defender of free-
dom in Michigan, Senator Levin, for any comments he may wish
to make.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As we
meet today to receive testimony from the United States intelHgence
community on worldwide threats to our national security, it is no
exaggeration to say that the current threats to the United States
are serious and some of them are imminent. Osama bin Laden is
still at large and the al Qaeda network, though weakened and de-
prived of its safe haven in Afghanistan, has just over the last sev-
eral months attacked innocent civilians in Bali and Tunisia and
U.S. Service members and civilians in Kuwait and Jordan. Late
last month, U.S. Coalition Forces fought the biggest battle in Af-
ghanistan since Operation Anaconda last spring.
Our intelligence and law enforcement agencies are working with
allied countries to thwart further attacks in the United States and
abroad, but the fact is that we remain vulnerable to al Qaeda and
other terrorists. Indeed, the United States is at alert "orange"
today, the second-highest level of alert in our system. Our military
forces are also at heightened force protection levels worldwide. We
remain vulnerable to attack using conventional explosives, to say
nothing of weapons of mass destruction. Earlier this week. Federal
officials even suggested that the pubHc should make preparations
for a terrorist attack involving chemical, biological, or radiological
weapons.
Meanwhile, North Korea, a country that possesses weapons of
mass destruction and has rejected the international nuclear inspec-
tors, has declared it has resumed operations at its plutonium facili-
ties. North Korea is on the brink of becoming an undisputed nu-
clear power. By refusing to open a direct dialogue with North
Korea, even though South Korea wants us to do just that, we are
stoking North Korea's paranoia and that could lead to additional
provocative and possibly irreversible action on their part.
Iran's admission that it has been mining uranium underscores
our concern that its nuclear energy program is intended for nuclear
weapons. Iraq continues to flout the international community, not
assisting the U.N. weapons inspectors to find and/or account for
chemical and biological weapons programs. Disagreement over how
to address the Iraqi threat has divided the U.N. Security Council.
Moreover, an Islamist extremist terrorist group operating in north-
east Iraq beyond the control of Saddam Hussein has set up a poi-
son producing factory. Surely there can be little doubt that Osama
bin Laden would like to see the United States and Britain attack
Iraq. Keeping the world community together through the U.N. Se-
curity Council is exactly what Osama bin Laden doesn't want to
see.
All of us want Saddam Hussein to be disarmed. The best way to
accomplish the goal of disarming Saddam Hussein without war is
if the United Nations speaks with one voice relative to Iraq. I also
believe that if military force is used, the best way of reducing both
short-term risks, including the risks to the United States and Coa-
lition Forces, and the long-term risks, including the risk of terrorist
attacks on our interests throughout the world, is if the United Na-
tions specifically authorizes the use of military force.
That is the bottom line for me. The best way of increasing any
chance of disarming Saddam Hussein without war and of minimiz-
ing casualties in future attacks on the United States if war does
ensue is if the United Nations acts together in the Security Council
relative to Iraq. Supporting U.N. inspections is an essential step if
we are going to keep the Security Council together. We can support
those U.N. inspections by sharing the balance of our information
about suspect sites, by quickly getting U-2 aircraft in the air over
Iraq, with or without Saddam Hussein's approval, and by giving
the inspectors the time they need to do their work as long as the
inspections are unimpeded.
I disagree with those, including high officials in our Government,
who say that U.N. inspections are useless. We heard that before
the inspections began. We heard it from Dr. Rice at the White
House last week. I am astounded that some of those high officials
have gone so far as to refer in a derogatory way to the "so-called"
U.N. inspectors. If these inspections are useless unless they have
Iraqi assistance in pointing out where Iraq has hidden or destroyed
weapons of mass destruction, why are we sharing any intelligence
at all with the inspectors? Why are we apparently finally imple-
menting U-2 flights to support the inspectors? It is one thing to be
realistic about the limitations of the U.N. inspections and not have
too high hopes about what they can produce. It is another thing to
denigrate or prejudge their value, be dismissive and disdainful
about the beliefs of others on the U.N. Security Council about their
value, and to be cavalier about the facts relative to those inspec-
tions.
Referring to being cavalier about facts brings me to my next
point, the sharing of intelligence information in our possession with
the U.N. inspectors. This is an issue that I have followed very
closely. In the last several weeks at my request, the CIA has been
providing me with classified details of how much information we
have been sharing with the U.N. inspectors in Iraq. We just began
sharing specific information in early January, according to Sec-
retary Powell, as quoted in The Washington Post on January 9.
While I can't go into those classified details in an open hearing, I
can say that the information the CIA has provided me made it very
clear that we had shared information only on a small percentage
of the suspect sites in Iraq, that we had not shared information on
the majority of the suspect sites which were confirmed by CIA
staff. At yesterday's hearing of the Intelligence Committee, I was
astounded when Director Tenet repeatedly and firmly told us that
we have now shared with U.N. inspectors information about every
site where we have credible intelligence. Then last night, in Direc-
tor Tenet's presence and in the presence of Senator Warner, his
staff acknowledged that we still have useful information that we
have not shared with the inspectors, which is the opposite of what
Director Tenet told the Intelligence Committee yesterday in open
session. If we have not shared yet all the useful information that
we have with the U.N. inspectors, that would run counter to the
administration's position that the time for inspections is over.
When President Bush addressed the U.N. General Assembly on
September 12 of last year, he said, "We want the United Nations
to be effective and respected and successful." Well, we have some
responsibility to help the United Nations achieve that. Saying to
other countries, including allies, if you do not see it our way you
must have some ulterior motive, doesn't help. While a number of
heads of state and governments have called for the U.N. Security
Council to take the necessary and appropriate action in response
to Iraq's continuing threat to international peace and security, and
some have pledged to contribute military forces to that effort, oth-
ers believe that we should give the inspections the strength and
the time they need to finish the job.
All groups agree on the necessity of disarming Iraq. Rather than
following a course that divides the United Nations and separates
us from some of our closest allies, we should at least fairly consider
courses of action that would unite the world community against
Iraq.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing more today about the
capabilities that al Qaeda, North Korea, and Iraq possess. I hope
we also hear about the risks that we might face to our homeland
and our military and the Middle East, Afghanistan, and worldwide
in taking action without U.N. authority in Iraq, in not engaging
North Korea in serious dialogue and in not fighting al Qaeda with
all our assets whenever and wherever we find them. Thank you.
Senator Roberts. The procedure recommended by Chairman
Warner is to make available 6 minutes that will be provided to
each Senator. Each Senator can then make an opening statement
at this particular time. In the interest of time, however, we do
want to get to Director Tenet and to the Admiral. Mr. Tenet, would
you proceed, please.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE J. TENET, DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Tenet. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Last year, in the
wake of the September 1 1 attack on our country, I focused my re-
marks on the clear and present danger posed by terrorists who
seek to destroy who we are and what we stand for. The national
security environment that exists today is significantly more com-
plex than that of a year ago. I can tell you that the threat from
al Qaeda remains, even though we have made important strides in
the war against terrorism. Secretary of State Powell clearly out-
lined last week the continuing threats posed by Iraq's weapons of
mass destruction, its efforts to deceive U.N. inspectors, and the
safe haven that Baghdad has allowed for terrorists in Iraq. North
Korea's recent admission that it has a highly-enriched uranium
program, intends to end the freeze on its plutonium production fa-
cilities, and intends to withdraw from the nonproliferation treaty
raised serious new challenges for the region and the world.
At the same time, we cannot lose sight of those national security
challenges that, while not occupying space on the front pages, de-
mand a constant level of scrutiny. Challenges such as the world's
vast stretches of ungoverned areas, lawless zones, veritable no
man's lands, like some areas along the Afghan-Pakistani border
where extremist movements find shelter and can win breathing
space to grow. Challenges such as the numbers of societies and
peoples excluded from the benefits of an expanding global economy,
where the daily lot is hunger, disease, and displacement, and that
produce large populations of disaffected youth who are prime re-
cruits for our extremist foes.
As you have talked about, Mr. Chairman, yesterday and today,
the United States Government last week raised the terrorist threat
level. We did so because of threat reporting from multiple sources
with strong al Qaeda ties. The information we have points to plots
aimed at targets on two fronts — in the United States and on the
Arabian Peninsula. It points to plots timed to occur as early as the
end of the Hajj, which occurs late this week, and it points to plots
that could include the use of a radiological dispersion device as well
as poisons and chemicals. The intelligence, as I said yesterday, is
not idle chatter on the part of terrorists and their associates. It is
the most specific we have seen and it is consistent with both our
knowledge of al Qaeda doctrine and our knowledge of the plots this
network, and particularly its senior leadership, has been working
on for years.
The intelligence community is working directly and in real time
with friendly services overseas and with our law enforcement col-
leagues here at home to disrupt and capture specific individuals
who may be part of this plot. Our information and knowledge is the
result of important strides we have made since September 11 to en-
hance our counterterrorism capabilities and to share with our law
enforcement colleagues, and they with us, the results of disciplined
operations, collection, and analysis of events inside the United
States and overseas.
Raising the threat level is important to our being as disruptive
as possible. The enhanced security that results from a higher level
of threat can buy us more time to operate against the individuals
who are plotting to do us harm. Heightened vigilance generates ad-
ditional information and leads.
This latest reporting underscores the threat that al Qaeda con-
tinues to pose to the United States. The network is extensive and
adaptable. It will take years of determined effort to unravel this
and other terrorist networks and stamp them out.
Mr. Chairman, my statement goes on to note what I believe are
formidable successes that we have had with our law enforcement
partners over the last 14 or 15 months in disrupting this organiza-
tion. It notes the important role Muslim counties continue to play
in the war on terrorism, from Pakistan to Jordan and Egjrpt, to the
Saudis, to the Indonesians, to the Malaysians. We cannot forget Af-
ghanistan where the support of the leadership is absolutely essen-
tial.
Mr. Chairman, al Qaeda will try to adapt to changing cir-
cumstances as it regroups. It will seek a more secure base so they
can pause from flight and resume planning. We place no limita-
tions on our expectations of what the organization may do to sur-
vive. We see disturbing signs that al Qaeda has established a pres-
ence in both Iran and Iraq. In addition, we are also concerned that
al Qaeda continues to find refuge in the hinterlands of Pakistan
and Afghanistan. Al Qaeda is also developing or refining relatively
new means of attack including the use of surface-to-air missiles,
poisons, and air and surface and underwater methods to attack
maritime targets.
We know from the events of September 11 that we can never
again ignore a specific type of country. A country unable to control
its own borders and internal territory, lacking capacity to govern,
educate its people or provide fundamental social services. Such
countries can offer extremists a place to congregate in relative safe-
ty.
I told you last year, Mr. Chairman, that bin Laden has a sophis-
ticated capability in biological weapons. In Afghanistan, al Qaeda
succeeded in acquiring both the expertise and equipment needed to
grow biological agents, including a dedicated laboratory in an iso-
lated compound in Kandahar. Last year, I also discussed al Qaeda's
efforts to obtain nuclear and radiological materials as part of an
ambitious nuclear agenda. One year later, we continue to follow
every lead in tracking terrorists' efforts to obtain nuclear materials.
Mr. Chairman, with regard to Iraq, let me quickly summarize.
Last week. Secretary Powell carefully reviewed for the U.N. Secu-
rity Council the intelligence that we have on Iraqi efforts to deceive
U.N. inspectors, its programs to develop weapons of mass destruc-
tion, and its support for terrorism.
I don't plan to go into these matters in detail, but let me summa-
rize some key points. Iraq has in place an active effort to deceive
U.N. inspectors and deny them access. This effort is directed by the
8
highest levels of the Iraqi regime. Baghdad has given clear instruc-
tions to its operational forces to hide banned materials in their pos-
session. Iraq's biological weapons program includes mobile search
and production facilities that will be difficult, if not impossible, for
the inspectors to find. Baghdad began this program in the mid-
1990s, during a time when U.N. inspectors were in the country.
Iraq has established a pattern of clandestine procurements de-
signed to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program. These procure-
ments include and also go well beyond the aluminum tubes that
you have heard so much about. Iraq has tested unmanned aerial
vehicles to ranges that far exceed what it declared to the U.N. We
are concerned that Iraq's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) can dis-
pense chemical and biological weapons and they can deliver such
weapons to Iraq's neighbors or even transport them to other coun-
tries, including the United States. Iraq is harboring senior mem-
bers of a terrorist network led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a close
associate of Osama bin Laden. We know Zarqawi's network was be-
hind the poison plots in Europe that I discussed earlier as well as
the assassination of a U.S. State Department employee in Jordan.
Iraq has, in the past, provided training in document forgery and
bomb making to al Qaeda. It has also provided training in poisons
and gases to two al Qaeda associates. One of these associates char-
acterized the relationship he forged with Iraqi officials as success-
ful. Mr. Chairman, this information is based on a solid foundation
of intelligence. It comes to us from credible and reliable sources.
Much of it is corroborated by multiple sources and it is consistent
with the pattern of denial and deception exhibited by Saddam Hus-
sein over the past 12 years.
With regard to proliferation, sir, I will quickly summarize by say-
ing we have entered a new world of proliferation. The vanguards
of this world are knowledgeable nonstate purveyors of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) materials and technology. Such nonstate
outlets are increasingly capable of providing technology and equip-
ment that previously could only be supplied by countries with es-
tablished capabilities.
Demand creates the market. The desire for nuclear weapons is
on the upsurge. Additional countries may seek to obtain nuclear
weapons as it becomes clear that their neighbors and regional ri-
vals are already doing so. The domino theory of the 21st century
may well be nuclear.
With regard to North Korea, its recent behavior regarding its
longstanding nuclear weapons program makes apparent to all the
dangers Pyongyang poses to its region and to the world. This in-
cludes developing the capability to enrich uranium, ending the
freeze on its plutonium production facilities, and withdrawing from
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). If, as it seems likely,
Pyongyang moves to reprocess spent fuel at the facilities where it
recently abrogated the 1994 International Atomic Energy Agency
(lAEA)-monitored freeze, we assess it could recover sufficient pluto-
nium for several additional weapons.
North Korea also continues to export complete ballistic missiles
and production capabilities with related raw materials, compo-
nents, and expertise. Profits from these sales help Pyongyang to
support its missile and other weapons of mass destruction develop-
ment programs, and in turn generate new products to offer its cus-
tomers.
Indeed, Mr. Chairman, Kim Jong Il's attempt this past year to
parlay the North's nuclear weapons program into political leverage
suggests he is trying to negotiate a fundamentally different rela-
tionship with us, one that implicitly tolerates North Korea's nu-
clear weapons program. Although Kim Jong II presumably cal-
culates the North's aid, trade, and investment climate will never
improve in the face of U.S. sanctions and perceived hostility. He is
equally committed to retaining and enlarging his nuclear weapons
stockpile.
Mr. Chairman, I want to talk about China. We did not talk about
that yesterday. China's chosen path to long-term regional and glob-
al interest runs through economic growth and Chinese integration
into the global economy. Beijing calculates that as China's eco-
nomic mass increases, so too will the pull of its political gravity.
To date China's successes have been dramatic and disconcerting to
some of its neighbors. Despite China's rapid growth, it remains vul-
nerable to economic fluctuations that could threaten political and
social stability. China is increasingly dependent on its external sec-
tor to generate rapid growth and, without rapid growth, China will
fall even further behind in job creation.
The recent Congress of the Communist Party marked a leader-
ship transition to a younger political generation but also created a
potential division of authority at the top; and, in light of China's
profound policy challenges, an additional leadership challenge. The
former party chief, Jiang Zemin, who was also scheduled to hand
over the presidency to his successor in both positions, Hu Jintao,
is determined to remain in charge. He retains the chairmanship of
the party's Central Military Commission. The next generation of
leaders offer policy continuity but the current set-up probably guar-
antees tensions among leaders uncertain of their own standing and
anxious to secure their positions.
Such tensions may well play out on the issue of Taiwan, the mat-
ter of greatest volatility in U.S. -China relations. For now, the situa-
tion appears relatively placid, but recent history shows this can
change quickly, given the shifting perceptions and calculations on
both sides. Chinese leaders seem convinced that all trends are mov-
ing in their favor. Taiwan is heavily invested in the mainland, and
Chinese military might is growing.
From its perspective, Beijing remains wary of nationalist popular
sentiment on Taiwan and of our arms sales to and military co-
operation with Taipei. As for Taiwan's President Chen, he may feel
constrained by internal political and economic problems and by
Beijing's charm offensive. As he approaches his re-election bid next
year, Chen may react by reasserting Taiwan's separate identity
and expanding its international diplomacy.
In this regard, our greatest concern is China's military buildup.
Last year marked new high points for unit training and weapons
integration, all sharply focused on the Taiwan mission, and on in-
creasing the costs for any who might intervene in a regional Chi-
nese operation. We anticipate no slowdown to this trend in the
coming year.
10
Mr. Chairman, my statement goes on to talk about Russia and
Iran. I will enter those into the record.
I want to talk for a minute about South Asia, where I think our
attention must remain focused. On the Pakistan-India border the
underlying cause of tension is unchanged, even though India's re-
cent military redeployment away from the border reduces the dan-
ger of imminent war. The cycles of tension between India and Paki-
stan are growing shorter. Pakistan continues to support groups
that resist India's presence in Kashmir in an effort to bring Indians
to the negotiating table. Indian frustration with the continuing ter-
rorist attacks, most of which it attributes to Pakistan, causes New
Delhi to reject any suggestion that it can resume a dialogue with
Islamabad. Any dramatic provocation like the 2001 terrorist attack
on Indian parliament by Kashmir militants runs a very high risk
of sparking another major military deployment.
Mr. Chairman, my statement goes through a number of other hot
spots and transnational issues that I will enter into the record with
your permission.
I would note that with regard to Africa, this is a place where we
do not often pay a lot of attention or enough attention to. Sub-Sa-
haran Africa's chronic instability will demand our attention. Afri-
ca's lack of democratic institutionalization combined with pervasive
ethnic rifts and corruption render most of the 48 countries vulner-
able to crisis that can be costly in human lives and lost economic
growth. The Cote d'lvoire is collapsing, and its collapse will be felt
throughout the region, where neighboring economies are at risk
from the fall-off in trade and from refugees fleeing violence.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tenet follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. George J. Tenet
DCI'S worldwide threat briefing — THE WORLDWIDE THREAT IN 2003: EVOLVING
DANGERS IN A COMPLEX WORLD
Mr. Chairman, last year — in the wake of the September 11 attack on our coun-
try— I focused my remarks on the clear and present danger posed by terrorists who
seek to destroy who we are and what we stand for. The national security environ-
ment that exists today is significantly more complex than that of a year ago.
• I can tell you that the threat from al Qaeda remains, even though we
have made important strides in the war against terrorism.
• Secretary of State Powell clearly outlined last week the continuing
threats posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, its efforts to deceive
U.N. inspectors, and the safehaven that Baghdad has allowed for terrorists
in Iraq.
• North Korea's recent admission that it has a highly-enriched uranium
program, intends to end the freeze on its plutonium production facilities,
and has stated its intention to withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty
raised serious new challenges for the region and the world.
At the same time we cannot lose sight of those national security challenges that,
while not occupj'ing space on the front pages, demand a constant level of scrutiny.
• Challenges such as the world's vast stretches of ungovemed areas — law-
less zones, veritable "no man's lands" like some areas along the Afghan-
Pakistani border — where extremist movements find shelter and can win the
breathing space to grow.
• Challenges such as the numbers of societies and peoples excluded from
the benefits of an expanding global economy, where the daily lot is hunger,
disease, and displacement — and that produce large populations of dis-
affected youth who are prime recruits for our extremist foes.
11
Terrorism
Mr. Chairman, the United States Government last week raised the terrorist
threat level. We did so because of threat reporting from multiple sources with strong
al Qaeda ties.
The information we have points to plots aimed at targets on two fronts — in the
United States and on the Arabian Peninsula. It points to plots timed to occur as
early as the end of the Hajj, which occurs late this week. It points to plots that
could include the use of a radiological dispersion device as well as poisons and
chemicals.
The intelligence is not idle chatter on the part of terrorists and their associates.
It is the most specific we have seen, and it is consistent with both our knowledge
of al Qaeda doctrine and our knowledge of plots this network — and particularly its
senior leadership — has been working on for years.
The intelligence community is working directly, and in real time, with friendly
services overseas and with our law enforcement colleagues here at home to disrupt
and capture specific individuals who may be part of this plot.
Our information and knowledge is the resvilt of important strides we have made
since September 11 to enhance our counterterrorism capabilities and to share with
our law enforcement colleagues — and they with us — the results of disciplined oper-
ations, collection, and analysis of events inside the United States and overseas.
Raising the threat level is important to our being as disruptive as possible. The
enhanced security that results from a higher threat level can buy us more time to
operate against the individuals who are plotting to do us harm. Heightened vigi-
lance generates additional information and leads.
This latest reporting underscores the threat that the al Qaeda network continues
to pose to the United States. The network is extensive and adaptable. It will take
years of determined effort to unravel this and other terrorist networks and stamp
them out.
Mr. Chairman, the intelligence and law enforcement communities aggressively
continue to prosecute the war on terrorism, and we are having success on many
fronts. More than one third of the top al Qaeda leadership identified before the war
has been killed or captured, including:
• The operations chief for the Persian Gulf area, who planned the bombing
of the U.S.S. Cole.
• A key planner who was a Muhammad Atta confidant and a conspirator
in the September 11 attacks.
• A major al Qaeda leader in Yemen and other key operatives and
facilitators in the Gulf area and other regions, including South Asia and
Southeast Asia.
The number of rounded-up al Qaeda detainees has now grown to over 3,000-up
from 1,000 or so when I testified last year — and the number of countries involved
in these captures has almost doubled to more than 100.
• Not everyone arrested was a terrorist. Some have been released. But the
worldwide rousting of al Qaeda has definitely disrupted its operations.
We've obtained a trove of information we're using to prosecute the hunt still
further.
The coalition against international terrorism is stronger, and we are reaping the
benefits of unprecedented international cooperation. In particular, Muslim govern-
ments today better understand the threat al Qaeda poses to them and day by day
have been increasing their support.
• Ever since Pakistan's decision to sever ties with the Taliban — so critical
to the success of Operation Enduring Freedom — Islamabad's close coopera-
tion in the war on terrorism has resulted in the capture of key al Qaeda
lieutenants and significant disruption of its regional network.
• Jordan and Egypt have been courageous leaders in the war on terrorism.
• A number of Gulf states like the United Arab Emirates are denying ter-
rorists financial safehaven, making it harder for al Qaeda to funnel funding
for operations. Others in the Gulf are beginning to tackle the problem of
charities that front for, or fund, terrorism.
• The Saudis are providing increasingly important support to our counter-
terrorism efforts — from arrests to sharing debriefing results.
• Southeast Asian countries like Malaysia and Indonesia, with majority
Muslim populations, have been active in arresting and detaining terror sus-
pects.
• We mustn't forget Afghanistan, where the support of the new leadership
is essential.
12
Al Qaeda's loss of Afghanistan, the death and capture of key personnel, and its
year spent mostly on the run have impaired its capability, complicated its command
and control, and disrupted its logistics.
That said, Mr. Chairman, the continuing threat remains clear. Al Qaeda is still
dedicated to striking the U.S. homeland, and much of the information we've received
in the past year revolves around that goal.
Even without an attack on the U.S. homeland, more than 600 people were killed
in acts of terror last year — and 200 in al Qaeda-related attacks alone. Nineteen
were United States citizens.
• Al Qaeda or associated groups carried out a successful attack in Tunisia
and — since October 2002 — attacks in Mombasa, Bali, and Kuwait, and off
Yemen against the French oil tanker Limburg. Most of these attacks bore
such al Qaeda trademarks as intense surveillance, simultaneous strikes,
and suicide-delivered bombs.
Combined U.S. and allied efforts thwarted a number of al Qaeda-related attacks
in the past year, including the European poison plots. We identified, monitored, and
arrested Jose Padilla, an al Qaeda operative who was allegedly planning operations
in the United States and was seeking to develop a so-called "dirty bomb." Along
with Moroccan partners we disrupted al Qaeda attacks against U.S. and British
warships in the straits of Gibraltar.
Until al Qaeda finds an opportunity for the big attack, it will try to maintain its
operational tempo by striking "softer" targets. What I mean by "softer," Mr. Chair-
man, are simply those targets al Qaeda planners may view as less well protected.
• Al Qaeda has also sharpened its focus on our Allies in Europe and on op-
erations against Israeli and Jewish targets.
Al Qaeda will try to adapt to changing circumstances as it regroups. It will seek
a more secure base area so that it can pause from flight and resume planning. We
place no limitations on our expectations of what al Qaeda might do to survive.
We see disturbing signs that al Qaeda has established a presence in both Iran
and Iraq. In addition, we are also concerned that al Qaeda continues to find refuge
in the hinterlands of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Al Qaeda is also developing or refining new means of attack, including use of sur-
face-to-air missiles, poisons, and air, surface, and underwater methods to attack
maritime targets.
• If given the choice, al Qaeda terrorists will choose attacks that achieve
objectives — striking prominent landmarks, inflicting mass casualties, caus-
ing economic disruption, rallying support through shows of strength.
The bottom line here, Mr. Chairman, is that al Qaeda is living in the expectation
of resuming the offensive.
We know from the events of September 1 1 that we can never again ignore a spe-
cific type of country: a country unable to control its own borders and internal terri-
tory, lacking the capacity to govern, educate its people, or provide fundamental so-
cial services. Such countries can, however, offer extremists a place to congregate in
relative safety.
Al Qaeda is already a presence in several regions that arouse our concern. The
Bali attack brought the threat home to Southeast Asia, where the emergence of
Jemaah Islamiya in Indonesia and elsewhere in the region is particularly worri-
some.
• The Mombasa attack in East Africa highlights the continued vulner-
ability of western interests and the growing terrorist threat there.
Although state sponsors of terrorism assume a lower profile today than a decade
ago, they remain a concern. Iran and Syria continue to support the most active Pal-
estinian terrorist groups, HAMAS and the Palestine Islamic Jihad. Iran also spon-
sors Lebanese Hizballah. I'll talk about Iraq's support to terrorism in a moment.
Terrorism directed at U.S. interests goes beyond Middle Eastern or religious ex-
tremist groups. In our own hemisphere, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colom-
bia (FARC) has shown a new willingness to inflict casualties on U.S. nationals.
Mr. Chairman, let me briefly turn to a grave concern: the determination of terror-
ists to obtain and deploy weapons of massive destructive capability, including nu-
clear, radiological, chemical, and biological devices.
The overwhelming disparity between U.S. forces and those of any potential rival
drives terrorist adversaries to the extremes of warfare — toward "the suicide bomber
or the nuclear device" as the best ways to confront the United States. Our adversar-
ies see us as lacking will and determination when confronted with the prospect of
massive losses.
13
• Terrorists count on the threat of demoraUzing blows to instill massive
fear and rally shadowy constituencies to their side.
We continue to receive information indicating that al Qaeda still seeks chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. Trie recently disrupted poison plots in
the U.K., France, and Spain reflect a broad, orchestrated effort by al Qaeda and as-
sociated groups to attack several targets using toxins and explosives.
• These planned attacks involved similar materials, and the implicated
operatives had links to one another.
I told you last year, Mr. Chairman, that bin Laden has a sophisticated biological
weapons capability. In Afghanistan, al Qaeda succeeded in acquiring both the exper-
tise and the equipment needed to grow biological agents, including a dedicated lab-
oratory in an isolated compound outside of Kandahar.
Last year, I also discussed al Qaeda's efforts to obtain nuclear and radiological
materials as part of an ambitious nuclear agenda. One year later, we continue to
follow every lead in tracking terrorist efforts to obtain nuclear materials.
• In particular, we continue to follow up on information that al Qaeda
seeks to produce or purchase a radiological dispersal device. Construction
of such a device is well within al Qaeda capabilities — if it can obtain the
radiological material.
Iraq
Before I move on to the broader world of proliferation, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to
comment on Iraq. Last week Secretary Powell carefully reviewed for the U.N. Secu-
rity Council the intelligence we have on Iraqi efforts to deceive U.N. inspectors, its
programs to develop weapons of mass destruction, and its support for terrorism. I
do not plan to go into these matters in detail, but I would like to summarize some
of the key points.
• Iraq has in place an active effort to deceive U.N. inspectors and deny
them access. This effort is directed by the highest levels of the Iraqi regime.
Baghdad has given clear directions to its operational forces to hide banned
materials in their possession.
• Iraq's biological weapons program includes mobile research and produc-
tion facilities that will be difficult, if not impossible, for the inspectors to
find. Baghdad began this program in the mid-1990s — during a time when
U.N. inspectors were in the country.
• Iraq has established a pattern of clandestiiie procurements designed to
reconstitute its nuclear weapons program. These procurements include — but
also go well beyond — the aluminum tubes that you have heard so much
about.
• Iraq has recently flight tested missiles that violate the U.N. range limit
of 150 kilometers. It is developing missiles with ranges beyond 1,000 kilo-
meters. It retains — in violation of U.N. resolutions — a small number of
SCUD missiles that it produced before the Gulf War.
• Iraq has tested unmanned aerial vehicles to ranges that far exceed both
what it declared to the United Nations and what it is permitted under U.N.
resolutions. We are concerned that Iraq's UAVs can dispense chemical and
biological weapons and that they can deliver such weapons to Iraq's neigh-
bors or, if transported, to other countries, including the United States.
• Iraq is harboring senior members of a terrorist network led by Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi, a close associate of Osama bin Laden. We know
Zarqawi's network was behind the poison plots in Europe that I discussed
earlier as well as the assassination of a U.S. State Department employee
in Jordan.
• Iraq has in the past provided training in document forgery and bomb-
making to al Qaeda. It also provided training in poisons and gasses to two
al Qaeda associates; one of these associates characterized the relationship
he forged with Iraqi officials as successful.
Mr. Chairman, this information is based on a solid foundation of intelligence. It
comes to us fi-om credible and reliable sources. Much of it is corroborated by mul-
tiple sources. It is consistent with the pattern of denial and deception exhibited by
Saddam Hussein over the past 12 years.
Proliferation
Mr. Chairman, what I just summarized for you on Iraq's WMD programs under-
scores our broader concerns about proliferation. More has changed on nuclear pro-
liferation over the past year than on any other issue. For 60 years, weapon-design
information and technologies for producing fissile material — the key hurdles for nu-
14
clear weapons production — have been the domain of only a few states. These states,
though a variety of self-regulating and treaty based regimes, generally limited the
spread of these data and technologies.
In my view, we have entered a new world of proliferation. In the vanguard of this
new world are knowledgeable non-state purveyors of WMD materials and tech-
nology. Such non-state outlets are increasingly capable of providing technology and
equipment that previously could only be supplied by countries with established ca-
pabilities.
This is taking place side by side with the continued weakening of the inter-
national nonproliferation consensus. Control regimes like the Non-Proliferation
Treaty are being battered by developments such as North Korea's withdrawal from
the NPT and its open repudiation of other agreements.
• The example of new nuclear states that seem able to deter threats from
more powerful states, simply by brandishing nuclear weaponry, will reso-
nate deeply among other countries that want to enter the nuclear weapons
club.
Demand creates the market. The desire for nuclear weapons is on the upsurge.
Additional countries may decide to seek nuclear weapons as it becomes clear their
neighbors and regional rivals are already doing so. The "domino theory" of the 21st
century may well be nuclear.
• With the assistance of proliferators, a potentially wider range of countries
may be able to develop nuclear weapons by "leapfrogging" the incremental
pace of weapons programs in other countries.
Let me now briefly review, sector by sector, the range on non-nuclear proliferation
threats.
In biological warfare (BW) and chemical warfare (CW), maturing programs in
countries of concern are becoming less reliant on foreign suppliers — which com-
plicates our ability to monitor programs via their acquisition activities. BW pro-
grams have become more technically sophisticated as a result of rapid growth in the
field of biotechnology research and the wide dissemination of this knowledge. Almost
anyone with limited skills can create BW agents. The rise of such capabilities also
means we now have to be concerned about a myriad of new agents.
• Countries are more and more tightly integrating both their BW and CW
production capabilities into apparently legitimate commercial infrastruc-
tures, further concealing them from scrutiny.
The United States and its interests remain at risk from increasingly advanced
and lethal ballistic and cruise missiles and UAVs. In addition to the longstanding
threats from Russian and Chinese missile forces, the United States faces a near-
term Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) threat from North Korea. Over the
next several years, we could face a similar threat from Iran and possibly Iraq.
• Short- and medium-range missiles already pose a significant threat to
U.S. interests, military forces, and allies as emerging missile states in-
crease the range, reliability, and accuracy of the missile systems in their
inventories.
Several countries of concern remain interested in acquiring a land-attack cruise
missile (LACM) capability. By the end of the decade, LACMs could pose a serious
threat to not only our deployed forces, but possibly even the U.S. mainland.
Mr. Chairman, I turn now to countries of particular concern, beginning, as you
might expect, with North Korea.
The recent behavior of North Korea regarding its longstanding nuclear weapons
program makes apparent to all the dangers Pyongyang poses to its region and to
the world. This includes developing the capability to enrich uranium, ending the
freeze on its plutonium production facilities, and withdrawing from the Non-Pro-
liferation Treaty. If, as seems likely, Pyongyang moves to reprocess spent fuel at the
facilities where it recently abrogated the 1994 IAEA-monitored freeze, we assess it
could recover sufficient plutonium for several additional weapons.
• North Korea also continues to export complete ballistic missiles and pro-
duction capabilities along with related raw materials, components, and ex-
pertise. Profits from these sales help Pyongyang to support its missile and
other WMD development programs, and in turn generate new products to
offer to its customers.
Indeed, Mr. Chairman, Kim Jong Il's attempts this past year to parlay the North's
nuclear weapons program into political leverage suggest he is trying to negotiate a
ftmdamentally different relationship with Washington — one that implicitly tolerates
the North's nuclear weapons program.
15
• Although Kim presumably calculates the North's aid, trade, and invest-
ment climate will never improve in the face of U.S. sanctions and perceived
hostility, he is equally committed to retaining and enlarging his nuclear
weapons stockpile.
Mr. Chairman, I want to mention our renewed concern over Libya's interest in
WMD. Since the suspension of sanctions against Libya in 1999, Tripoli has been
able to increase its access to dual-use nuclear technologies. Qadhafi stated in an
Aljazeera interview last year that Arabs have "the right" to possess weapons of
mass destruction because, he alleges, Israel has them.
• Libya clearly intends to reestablish its offensive chemical weapons capa-
bility and has produced at least 100 tons of chemical agents at its Rabta
facility, which ostensibly reopened as a pharmaceutical plemt in 1995.
China vowed in November 2000 to refrain from assisting countries seeking to de-
velop nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, and last August Beijing promulgated new
missile-related export controls. Despite such steps, Mr. Chairman, Chinese firms re-
main key suppliers of ballistic- and cruise missile-related technologies to Pakistan,
Iran, and several other countries.
• Chinese firms may be backing away from Beijing's 1997 bilateral commit-
ment to forego any new nuclear cooperation with Iran. We are monitoring
this closely.
We are also monitoring Russian transfers of technology and expertise. Russian en-
tities have cooperated on projects — many of them dual-use — that we assess can con-
tribute to BW, CW, nuclear, or ballistic- and cruise-missile programs in several
countries of concern, including Iran. Moscow has, however, reexamined at least
some aspects of military-technical cooperation with some countries and has cut back
its sensitive nuclear fuel-cycle assistance to Iran.
• We remain alert to the vulnerability of Russian WMD materials and tech-
nology to theft or diversion. Russia has the largest inventory of nuclear ma-
terials that — unless stored securely — might be fashioned into weapons that
threaten U.S. persons, facilities, or interests.
Iran is continuing to pursue development of a nuclear fuel cycle for civil and nu-
clear weapons purposes. The loss of some Russian assistance has impeded this ef-
fort. It is also moving toward self-sufficiency in its biological and chemical weapons
programs.
• Tehran is seeking to enlist foreign assistance in building entire produc-
tion plants for commercial chemicals that would also be capable of produc-
ing nerve agents and their precursors.
• As a supplier, Iran in 2002 pursued new missile-related deals with sev-
eral countries and publicly advertises its artillery rockets, ballistic missiles,
and related technologies.
I should also note, Mr. Chairman, that India and Pakistan continue to develop
and produce nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them.
China
I'd like to turn now from the transnational issues of terrorism and proliferation
to countries and regions of the world where the United States has important inter-
ests, beginning with China. I have commented for the past several years on China's
great power aspirations and in particular Beijing's efforts to maximize its influence
within East Asia relative to the U.S. This is both despite and because global strate-
gic shifts unfolding since September 11 have impressed upon the Chinese the limits
of their international influence.
Despite Beijing's continuing skepticism of U.S. intentions in Central and South
Asia and its concern that the United States is gaining regional influence at China's
expense, Beijing is emphasizing developing a "constructive relationship" with us.
Both before and since President Jiang's visit to Crawford last fall, Chinese leaders
have been actively seeking a degree of engagement in areas of mutual interest, such
as counterterrorism and regional security issues like North Korea.
China's chosen path to long-term regional and global influence runs through eco-
nomic growth and Chinese integration into the global economy. Beijing calculates
that, as China's economic mass increases, so too will the pull of its political gravity.
To date, China's successes have been dramatic — and disconcerting to its neighbors.
Despite China's rapid growth, it remains vulnerable to economic fluctuations that
could threaten political and social stability. China is increasingly dependent on its
external sector to generate GDP growth. Without rapid growth, China will fall even
further behind in job creation.
16
The recent Congress of the Chinese Communist Party marked a leadership transi-
tion to a younger poUtical generation but also created a potential division of author-
ity at the top — and, in light of China's profound policy challenges, an additional
leadership challenge.
• The former party chief, Jiang Zemin, who is also scheduled to hand over
the presidency to his successor in both positions, Hu Jintao, is determined
to remain in charge. He retains the chairmanship of the party's Central
Military Commission. The new leadership contains many Jiang loyalists
and proteges.
• The "next generation" leaders offers policy continuity, but the current
setup probably guarantees tensions among leaders uncertain of their own
standing and anxious to secure their positions.
Such tensions may well play out on the issue of Taiwan, the matter of greatest
volatility in U.S. -China relations. For now the situation appears relatively placid,
but recent history shows this can change quickly, given the shifting perceptions and
calculations on both sides.
• Chinese leaders seem convinced that all trends are moving in their
favor — Taiwan is heavily invested in the mainland and Chinese military
might is growing.
• From its perspective, Beijing remains wary of nationalist popular senti-
ment on Taiwan and of our arms sales to and military cooperation with Tai-
pei.
As for Taiwan President Chen's part, he may feel constrained by internal political
and economic problems and by Beijing's charm offensive. As he approaches his re-
election bid next year, Chen may react by reasserting Taiwan's separate identity
and expanding its international diplomacy.
In this regard, our greatest concern is China's military buildup. Last year marked
new high points for unit training and weapons integration — all sharply focused on
the Taiwan mission and on increasing the costs for any who might intervene in a
regional Chinese operation. We anticipate no slowdown in the coming year.
Russia
Moving on to Russia, Mr. Chairman, I noted last year that well before September
11, President Putin had moved toward deeper engagement with the United States.
I also observed that the depth of domestic support for his foreign policy was unclear
and that issues such as NATO enlargement and U.S. missile defense policies would
test his resolve. Since then, Putin has reacted pragmatically to foreign policy chal-
lenges and has shown leadership in seeking common ground with the United States
while still asserting Russia's national interests.
• This was apparent in Russia's low-key reaction to the decision to invite
the Baltics into NATO and in its serious attitude toward the new NATO-
... Russia Council, and in reconsidering some of it military-technical coopera-
tion with proliferation states of concern.
• Moscow eventually supported U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441 on
Iraq and has been a reliable partner in the war on terrorism.
International terrorist groups' presence and activities in and around Russia are
influencing Russia's policies, sometimes in ways that cornplicate Moscow's relations
with neighboring states. For example, the presence in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge of
Chechen fighters and some of their foreign Mujahideen backers have generated new
tensions in Russian-Georgian relations. These tensions were highlighted on the 1-
year anniversary of the September 11 attacks, when Putin threatened unilateral
force against Georgia because he was not satisfied Tbilisi had, in his words, taken
action to prevent Georgian-based terrorists from entering Russia.
Similarly, the war in Chechnya is complicated by the continued influence of radi-
cal Chechen and foreign Islamists — some of whom have ties to al Qaeda. The take-
over of the Moscow theater in October proved counterproductive to the terrorists'
aim of forcing Russia to withdraw from Chechnya. Indeed, the Kremlin has turned
this to its advantage by tying the Chechen opposition to international terrorism.
• Meanwhile, over the past year the war in Chechnya entered a new, bru-
tal phase. Russian security service units have targeted suspected guerrillas
and their supporters and punished their families. Chechen guennllas, for
their part, continued to kill pro-Moscow officials and their families.
Putin has no clear domestic rivals for power as he enters an election season that
culminates in parliamentary elections in December and presidential elections in
March 2004.
17
Putin has sought to recentraHze power in Moscow. He exercises considerable in-
fluence over both houses of parhament and the national electronic news media.
• While Putin has reined in some powerful political figures — a few of the
governors and so-called "oligarchs" — in many cases he has negotiated a bal-
ance of interests.
Putin still hopes to transform Russia over the long term into a power of global
prominence, but his comments since late 2001 have contained more emphasis on
raising the country's economic competitiveness. To this end, his government has set
out a goal of narrowing the huge gap in living standards between Russians and Eu-
ropeans and seeks to advance an ambitious structural reform program.
• Over the past 3 years, the Russian Government has made real progress
on reform objectives by cutting tax and tariff rates, legalizing land sales,
and strengthening efforts to fight money laundering.
• Moscow has used its largely oil-driven revenue growth to pay down the
country's external public sector debt to a moderate level of 40 percent of
GDP, half the level of only a few years ago.
Such reforms are promising, but success ultimately hinges upon the sustained im-
plementation of reform legislation. A risk exists that the government will delay criti-
cal reforms of state-owned monopolies and the bloated, corrupt bureaucracy — which
Putin himself has highlighted as a major impediment — to avoid clashes with key in-
terest groups before the March 2004 Presidential election. Moreover, Russia's econ-
omy remains heavily dependent on commodity exports, which account for 80 percent
of all Russian exports and leaves future growth vulnerable to external price shocks.
Iran
We watch unfolding events in Iran with considerable interest, Mr. Chairman, be-
cause despite its antagonism to the United States, developments there hold some
promise as well. Iranian reformers seeking to implement change have become in-
creasingly frustrated by conservatives' efforts to block all innovation. We see the
dueling factions as heading for a showdown that seems likely to determine the pace
and direction of political change in Iran. Within the next several weeks a key test
will come as reformers try to advance two pieces of legislation — bills that would re-
form the electoral process and significantly expand presidential powers — they claim
will benchmark their ability to achieve evolutionary change within the system.
• Some reformist legislators have threatened to resign from government if
conservatives block the legislation. Others have argued for holding a ref-
erendum on reform if opponents kill the bills.
• Comments from the hardline camp show little flexibility — and indeed
some opponents of reform are pressing hard to dismantle the parties that
advocate political change.
As feuding among political elites continues, demographic and societal pressures
continue to mount. Iran's overwhelmingly young population — 65 percent of Iran's
population is under 30 years old — is coming of age and facing bleak economic pros-
pects and limited social and political fi-eedoms. Strikes and other peaceful labor un-
rest are increasingly common. These problems — and the establishment's inflexibility
in responding to them — drive widespread fi-ustration with the regime.
• Weary of strife and cowed by the security forces, Iranians show little ea-
gerness to take to the streets in support of change. The student protests
last fall drew only 5,000 students out of a student population of more than
1 million.
• But more and more courageous voices in Iran are publicly challenging the
right of the political clergy to suppress the popular will — and they are gain-
ing an audience.
Given these developments, we take the prospect of sudden, regime threatening
unrest seriously and continue to watch events in Iran with that in mind. For now,
our bottom line analysis is that the Iranian regime is secure, but increasingly fi-ag-
ile. The reluctance of reformist leaders to take their demands for change to the
street, coupled with the willingness of conservatives to repress dissent, keeps the
population disengaged and maintains stability.
• We are currently unable to identify a leader, organization, or issue capa-
ble of uniting the widespread desire for change into a coherent political
movement that could challenge the regime.
• In addition, we see little indication of a loss of nerve among the oppo-
nents of reform, who have publicly argued in favor of using deadly force if
necessary to crush the popular demand for greater fi"eedom.
18
Although a crisis for the regime might come about if reformers were to abandon
the government or hardhners were to initiate a broad suppression on leading advo-
cates of change, the resulting disorder would do little to alleviate U.S. concern over
Iran's international behavior. Conservatives already control the more aggressive as-
pects of Iranian foreign policy, such as sponsoring violent opposition to Middle East
peace.
• No Iranian Government, regardless of its ideological leanings, is likely to
willingly abandon WMD programs that are seen as guaranteeing Iran's se-
curity.
South Asia
On the Pakistan-India border, the underlying cause of tension is unchanged, even
though India's recent military redeployment away from the border reduced the dan-
ger of imminent war. The cycles of tension between India and Pakistan are growing
shorter. Pakistan continues to support groups that resist India's presence in Kash-
mir in an effort to bring India to the negotiating table. Indian frustration with con-
tinued terrorist attacks — most of which it attributes to Pakistan — causes New Delhi
to reject any suggestion that it resume a dialogue with Islamabad.
• Without progress on resolving Indian-Pakistani differences, any dramatic
provocation — like 200 1's terrorist attack on the Indian parliament by Kash-
mir militants — runs a high risk of sparking another major military deploy-
ment.
I also told you last year, Mr. Chairman, that the military campaign in Afghani-
stan had made great progress but that the road ahead was full of challenges. This
is no less true today. Given what Afghanistan was up against at this time last year,
its advances are noteworthy, with impressive gains on the security, political, and
reconstruction fronts.
• Milestones include establishing the Afghan Interim Authority, holding
the Emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002 to elect a President and decide on
the composition of the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA), and establish-
ing judicial, constitutional, and human rights commissions.
• The country is relatively stable, and Kabul is a safer place today than
a year ago. The presence of Coalition Forces has provided security sufficient
for aid organizations and non-governmental organization's (NGO) to oper-
ate. Six battalions of what will be the Afghan National Army have been
trained by the U.S. and coalition partners to date.
• The Afghan Government also has made great strides in the reconstruc-
tion of the beleaguered economy. More than $1 billion in foreign aid has
helped repatriate Afghan refugees, re-opened schools, and repaired roads.
The ATA introduced a new currency, and instituted trade and investment
protocols.
That said, daunting, complex challenges lie ahead that include building institu-
tional barriers against sliding back into anarchy. Opposition elements, such as
Taliban remnants and Hezbi-Islami and al Qaeda fighters, remain a threat to the
Afghan Government and to Coalition Forces in the eastern provinces. At the same
time, criminal activity, such as banditry and periodic factional fighting continue to
undermine security. Sustained U.S. and international focus is essential to continue
the progress we and the Afghans have made.
• The Afghans will also have to decide politically contentious issues such
as how the new constitution will address the role of Islam, the role sharia
law will play in the legal system, and the structure of the next Afghan Gov-
ernment. Other major hurdles include bringing local and regional tribal
leaders into the national power structure.
• Several Bonn Agreement deadlines are looming, including the concerning
of a constitutional Loya Jirga by December 2003 (within 18 months of the
establishment of the ATA) and holding free and fair elections of a rep-
resentative national government no later than June 2004.
• Much effort is needed to improve the living standards of Afghan families,
many of whom have no steady source of income and lack access to clean
drinking water, health care facilities, and schools.
What must be avoided at all costs is allowing Afghanistan to return to the inter-
necine fighting and lawlessness of the early 1990s, which would recreate conditions
for the rise of another fanatical movement.
19
Transnational Threats
Mr. Chairman, I'd like to address now a range of key transnational issues that
have an immediate bearing on America's national security and material well-being.
They are complex, evolving, and have far-reaching consequences.
Globalization— while a net plus for the global economy— is a profoundly disruptive
force for governments to manage. China and India, for example, have substantially
embraced it and retooled sectors to harness it to national ends, although in other
countries it is an unsought reality that simply imposes itself on society. For exam-
ple, many of the politically and economically rigid Arab countries are feeling many
of globalization's stresses — especially on the cultural front — without reaping the eco-
nomic benefits.
• Latin America's rising populism exemplifies the growing backlash against
globalization in countries that are falling behind. Last year Brazil's Presi-
dent, "Lula" da Silva, campaigned and won on an expressly anti-global-
ization populist platform.
• U.N. figures point out that unemplojmient is particularly problematic in
the Middle East and Africa, where 50 to 80 percent of those unemployed
are younger than 25. Some of the world's poorest and often most poHtically
unstable countries — including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Haiti, Iraq, Yemen,
and several nations in Sub-Saharan Africa — are among the countries with
the youngest populations in the world through 2020.
Among the most unfortunate worldwide are those infected with HIV. The HIV/
AIDS pandemic continues unabated, and last year more than 3 million people died
of AIDS-related causes. More than 40 million people are infected now, and Southern
Africa has the greatest concentration of cases.
• That said, the intelligence community recently projected that by 2010, we
may see as many as 100 million HIV-infected people outside Airica. China
will have about 15 million cases and India will have 20 to 25 million — high-
er than estimated for any country in the world.
• The national security dimension of the virus is plain: it can undermine
economic growth, exacerbate social tensions, diminish military prepared-
ness, create huge social welfare costs, and fiirther weaken already belea-
guered states. The virus respects no border.
But the global threat of infectious disease is broader than AIDS. In Sub-Saharan
Afi-ica the leading cause of death among the HIV-positive is tuberculosis. One-third
of the globe has the tuberculosis bacillus. At least 300 million cases of malaria occur
each year, with more than a million deaths. About 90 percent of these are in Sub-
Saharan Airica — and include an annual 5 percent of African children under the age
of 5.
Mr. Chairman, the world community is at risk in a number of other ways.
• The 35 million refugees and internally displaced persons in need of hu-
manitarian assistance are straining limited resources. Substantial aid re-
quirements in southern Airica, the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, and North
Korea, plus expected needs this year in Iraq, Cote d'lvoire, and elsewhere
in Afi-ica will add up to an unprecedented demand for food and other hu-
manitarian assistance. Worldwide emergency assistance needs are likely to
surpass the record $8 to $10 billion donors provided last year for humani-
tarian emergencies.
• Food aid requirements this year will rise more sharply than other cat-
egories of humanitarian assistance, particvilarly in Sub-Saharan Africa, be-
cause of drought, instability, HIV/AIDS, and poor governance. Prelimineiry
estimates put the total food aid needed to meet emergency appeals and
long-term food aid commitments at about 12 million metric tons, 4 million
tons greater than estimated aid supplies.
Other Hotspots
Mr. Chairman, Sub-Saharan Afi-ica's chronic instability will demand U.S. atten-
tion. Africa's lack of democratic institutionalization combined with its pervasive eth-
nic rifts and deep corruption render most of the 48 countries vulnerable to crises
that can be costly in human lives and lost economic growth. In particular, the poten-
tial is high for Nigeria and Kenya to suffer setbacks in the next year.
• Growing ethnic and religious strife, rampant corruption, and a weak
economy will test Nigeria's democracy before and after the April 2003 elec-
tion. Its offshore oil areas provide 9 percent of U.S. crude oil imports and
are insulated ft-om most unrest, but relations with Washington could rup-
20
ture if yet another military regime assumes power in Nigeria during a do-
mestic upheaval.
• After 24 years of President Moi's rule, the new president and ruling coali-
tion in Kenya face many challenges, including preserving their shaky alli-
ance while overhauling the constitution. Kenyans' severe economic woes
and sky-high expectations for change do not bode well for the coalition's sta-
bility this year.
In addition, other failed or failing African states may lead to calls for the United
States and other major aid donors to stabilize a range of desperate situations. In
Zimbabwe, President Mugabe's mismanagement of the economy and clampdown on
all political opposition may touch off serious unrest and refugee flows in coming
months.
• Cote d'lvoire is collapsing, and its crash will be felt throughout the re-
gion, where neighboring economies are at risk from the fall-off in trade and
from refugees fleeing violence.
Regarding Latin America, Mr. Chairman, Colombian President Uribe is off to a
good start but will need to show continued improvements in security to maintain
public support and attract investment. He is implementing his broad national secu-
rity strategy and moving aggressively on the counterdrug front — with increased aer-
ial eradication and close cooperation on extradition. The Armed Forces are gradually
performing better against the FARC. Meanwhile, the legislature approved nearly all
Uribe's measures to modernize the government and stabilize its finances.
• Although Uribe's public support is strong, satisfying high popular expec-
tations for peace and prosperity will be challenging. Security and socio-
economic improvements are complex and expensive. The drug trade will
continue to thrive until Bogota can exert control over its vast countryside.
• FARC insurgents are well-financed by drugs and kidnappings, and they
are increasingly using terrorism against civilians and economic targets — as
they demonstrated last weekend in a lethal urban attack — to wear away
the new national will to fight back.
Venezuela — the third largest supplier of petroleum to the United States — remains
in mid-crisis. The standoff between Hugo Chavez and the political opposition ap-
pears headed toward increased political violence despite the end of the general
strike, which is still being honored by oil workers.
• Because many oil workers have returned to work, the government is
gradually bringing some of the oil sector back on line. Nevertheless, a re-
turn to full pre-strike production levels remains months. Oil production
through March will probably average less than 2 million barrels per day —
1 million barrels per day below pre-strike levels.
• Meanwhile, Chavez, focused on crippling longtime enemies in the opposi-
tion, states he will never resign and has balked at requests for early elec-
tions.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, after several years of modest progress toward normaliza-
tion in the Balkans, the situation is beginning to deteriorate. Although we are un-
likely to see a revival of large-scale fighting or ethnic cleansing, the development
of democratic government and market economies in the region has slowed. More-
over, crime and corruption remain as major problems that are holding back
progress.
• International peacekeeping forces led by NATO exert a stabilizing influ-
ence, but the levels of support provided by the international community are
declining.
• The real danger, Mr. Chairman, is that the international community will
lose interest in the Balkans. If so, the situation will deteriorate even fur-
ther.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome any questions you and the members of the
committee may have for me.
Mr. Tenet. Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude and respond
to Senator Levin's comments about data and inspectors. I'd like to
be quite formal about this.
Chairman WARNER. I want you to have that opportunity and
what I'd like to do is give it to you immediately following the Admi-
ral's statement. You will be given time to reply and I will comment
myself.
21
STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. LOWELL E. JACOBY, USN,
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Admiral Jacoby. Defense intelligence today is at war on a global
scale. We are committed in support of our military forces fighting
in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan. We provide warning and
intelligence support for force protection of our military deployed
worldwide, even as they increasingly are targeted by terrorists. De-
tailed intelligence is essential long before forces are deployed. This
detailed effort, termed intelligence preparation of the battlespace,
has been ongoing for many months to support potential force de-
ployment in Iraq.
Other defense intelligence resources are committed to careful as-
sessment of the dangerous situation on the Korean peninsula. De-
fense intelligence is also providing global awareness, meaning we
are watching for developments that might require U.S. military
employment. These situations range from internal instability and
threats of coups that could require evacuation of American citizens
to interdiction of shipments of materials associated with WMD. We
recognize that we are expected to know something about every-
thing and it is a daunting task for those already at war on a global
scale.
Beginning with global terrorists, despite our significant successes
to date, terrorism remains the most immediate threat to U.S. inter-
ests at home and abroad. A number of terrorists groups, including
the FARC in Colombia, various Palestinian organizations and Leb-
anese Hizbollah, have the capability to do us harm. I am most con-
cerned about the al Qaeda network. It has a considerable amount
of seasoned operatives and draws support from an array of legiti-
mate and illegitimate entities. The network is adaptable, flexible,
and extremely agile.
At this point, sir, I defer to Director Tenet's comments about the
al Qaeda network. We are certainly in agreement with his conclu-
sions. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein seems determined to retain his
WMD programs and become the dominant regional power. He rec-
ognizes the seriousness of the current situation but may think that
he can outwit the international community by feigning cooperation
with U.N. weapons inspectors, hiding proscribed weapons and ac-
tivities, playing on regional and global anti-American sentiments,
and aligning himself with the Palestinian cause. Saddam's pench-
ant for brinksmanship and miscalculation increases the likelihood
that he will continue to defy international will and relinquish his
WMD and related programs.
In North Korea, Pyongyang's open pursuit of additional nuclear
weapons is the most serious challenge to the U.S. and Northeast
Asia in a generation. The outcome of this situation will shape rela-
tions in that region for years to come. While North Korea's new
hard-line approach is designed to drawn concessions from the
United States, Pyongyang's desire for nuclear weapons reflects a
long-term strategic goal that will not be easily abandoned.
In the global situational awareness arena, while terrorism and
Iraq have our immediate attention, we also must assess global de-
velopments to provide strategic warning on a wide spectrum of
global threats. We continue to generate requisite intelligence to
22
give our leaders opportunity to preclude, dissuade, deter or defeat
dissuade emerging threats.
Mr. Chairman, there are a number of other of issues that include
weapons of mass destruction, international crime, instability in
several key states and regions, and assessments with respect to
Russia, China, South Korea, parts of Europe, Latin America, and
the Middle East. These are all important. They are all included in
my written testimony. But in the interest of time, I end my open-
ing remarks here and defer these issues to the question and an-
swer session. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Jacoby follows:!
Prepared Statement by Vice Adm. Lowell E. Jacoby, USN
Defense Intelligence today is at war on a global scale. We are committed in sup-
port of military forces fighting the war on terrorism in Afghanistan and other loca-
tions where war might take us. We provide warning and intelligence for force pro-
tection of our military deployed worldwide even as they increasingly are targeted
by terrorists. Detailed intelligence is essential long before forces are deployed. This
detailed effort, termed Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, has been ongoing
for many months to support potential force employment in Iraq. Other Defense In-
telligence resources are committed to careful assessment of the dangerous situation
on the Korean Peninsula. Defense Intelligence is also providing global awareness,
meaning we're watching for developments that might require U.S. militaiy employ-
ment. These situations range from internal instability and threat of coups that could
require evacuation of American citizens, to interdiction of shipments of materials as-
sociated with weapons of mass destruction. We recognize that we're called upon to
"know something about everything" and it's a daunting task for those already at
war on a global scale. Our sustained level of crisis and operational commitment is
straining personnel, equipment, and resources, and reducing time for "sustaining"
activities such as training, education, data base maintenance, and longer-term re-
search and analysis. I am increasingly concerned that our Defense Intelligence capa-
bility is being stretched too thin and that we are being forced to sacrifice longer-
term capabilities in order to respond to today's requirements.
near term priorities
Within the broader global context, my most important current priorities are sup-
porting the global war on terrorism, retaining our readiness to support any military
missions that may be assigned, Iraq, monitoring the North Korea situation, and
maintaining the global situational awareness required to warn decision-makers of
emerging crises.
Global Terrorism
Despite our significant successes to date, terrorism remains the most immediate
threat to U.S. interests at home and abroad. A number of terrorist groups — includ-
ing the FARC in Colombia, various Palestinian organizations, and Lebanese
Hizballah — have the capability to do us harm. But I am most concerned about the
al Qaeda network.
Al Qaeda retains a presence on six continents, with key senior leaders still at
large. It has a corps of seasoned operatives and draws support from an array of le-
gitimate and illegitimate entities. The network is adaptive, flexible, and arguably,
more agile than we are. Eager to prove its capabilities in the wake of significant
network losses, al Qaeda had its most active year in 2002 — killing hundreds in Bali,
striking a French oil tanker off the coast of Yemen, attacking marines and civilians
in Kuwait, murdering a U.S. diplomat in Jordan, bombing a hotel popular with for-
eign tourists in Mombassa, attacking a synagogue in Tunisia, and attempting to
down an Israeli airliner.
Al Qaeda remains focused on attacking the U.S., but I expect increasing attacks
against our allies — particularly in Europe — as the group attempts to widen its cam-
paign of violence and undermine coalition resolve. I'm also very concerned about the
potential for more attacks using portable surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) with civilian
airliners as the key target. Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups are seeking to ac-
quire chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities, and we are working
to prevent their use of WMD. Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD) or "dirty
bombs," pose a particular problem. An RDD is simple to make, consisting of conven-
23
tional explosives and radiological materials widely available from legitimate medi-
cal, academic, and industrial activities.
Iraq
Saddam Hussein appears determined to retain his WMD and missile programs,
reassert his authority over all of Iraq, and become the dominant regional power. He
recognizes the seriousness of the current situation, but may think he can "outwit"
the international community by feigning cooperation with U.N. weapons inspectors,
hiding proscribed weapons and activities, pla5ang on regional and global "anti-Amer-
ican" sentiments, and aligning himself with the "Palestinian cause." Saddam's
penchant for brinksmanship and miscalculation increases the likelihood that he will
continue to defy international will and refuse to relinquish his WMD and related
programs. Should military action become necessary to disarm Saddam, he will likely
employ a host of desperate measures.
• Saddam's conventional military options and capabilities are limited, but
I expect him to preemptively attack the Kurds in the north and conduct
missile and terrorist attacks against Israel and U.S. regional or worldwide
interests — perhaps using WMD and the regime's links with al Qaeda.
• He will certainly attempt to energize "the Arab street," calling for attacks
against U.S. and allied targets and encouraging actions against Arab gov-
ernments that support us.
• If hostilities begin, Saddam is likely to employ a "scorched-earth" strat-
egy, destroying food, transportation, energy, and other infrastructures, at-
tempting to create a humanitarian disaster significant enough to stop a
military advance. We should expect him to use WMD on his own people,
to exacerbate humanitarian conditions, complicate allied operations, and
shift world opinion away from his own transgressions by blaming us.
North Korea
Pyongyang's open pursuit of additional nuclear weapons is the most serious chal-
lenge to U.S. regional interests in a generation. The outcome of this current crisis
will shape relations in Northeast Asia for years to come. While the North's "new"
hard-line approach is designed to draw concessions from the United States,
Pyongyang's desire for nuclear weapons reflects a long term strategic goal that will
not be easily abandoned. Three factors complicate the issue.
• North Korea's chronic proliferation activities are troubling in their own
right today, and an indication that the North would be willing to market
nuclear weapons in the future.
• Development of the Taepo Dong 2 (TD-2) missile, which could target
parts of the U.S. with a nuclear weapon-sized payload in the two-stage con-
figuration, and has the range to target all of North America if a third stage
were used.
• Pyongyang's significant military capabilities, composed of large, forward
deployed infantry, armor, and artillery forces, a full range of WMD (includ-
ing perhaps two nuclear weapons), and hundreds of short- and medium-
range missiles, capable of striking all of South Korea and Japan. War on
the peninsula would be violent, destructive, and could occur with very little
warning.
Pyongyang will continue its hard-line rhetoric, while moving forward with "start-
up" and reprocessing activities at the Yongbyon nuclear facility. Kim Jong II has
a number of options for ratcheting-up the pressure, to include: increasing efforts to
drive a wedge between the U.S. and other regional states; provocative actions along
the Demilitarized Zone; increasing military training and readiness; and conducting
large-scale military exercises or demonstrations, including a missile launch or nu-
clear weapons test.
Global Situational Awareness
While terrorism, Iraq, and North Korea have our immediate attention, they are
not the only challenges we face. We must assess global developments to provide
strategic warning on a wide spectrum of potential threats. We continue to generate
the requisite intelligence to give our leaders the opportunity to preclude, dissuade,
deter, or defeat emerging threats.
ENDURING GLOBAL REALITIES
The situations outlined above, and others we have to contend with, have their
basis in a number of "fundamental realities" at work in the world. These are endur-
ing— no power, circumstance, or condition is likely to emerge in the next decade ca-
24
pable of overcoming them and creating a less turbulent global environment. Collec-
tively, they create the conditions from which threats and challenges emerge, and
they define the context in which U.S. strategy, interests, and forces operate.
Reactions to U.S. Dominance
Much of the world is increasingly apprehensive about U.S. power and influence.
Many are concerned about the expansion, consolidation, and dominance of American
values, ideals, culture, and institutions. Reactions to this sensitivity to growing
"Americanization" can range from mild 'chafing* on the part of our friends and al-
lies, to fear and violent rejection on the part of our adversaries. We should consider
that these perceptions, mixed with angst over perceived "U.S. unilateralism" will
give rise to significant anti-American behavior.
Globalization
The increasing global flow of money, goods, services, people, information, tech-
nology, and ideas remains an important influence. Under the right conditions,
globalization can be a very positive force, providing the political, economic, and so-
cial context for sustained progress. But in those areas unable to exploit these advan-
tages, it can leave large numbers of people seemingly worse off, exacerbate local and
regional tensions, increase the prospects and capabilities for conflict, and empower
those who would do us harm. Our greatest challenge may be encouraging and con-
solidating the positive aspects of globalization, while managing and containing its
"downsides."
Uneven Economic and Demographic Growth
The world will add another billion people over the next 10 to 15 years, with 95
percent of that increase occurring in developing nations. Rapid urbanization contin-
ues— some 20-30 million of the world's poorest people migrate to urban areas each
year. Economic progress in many parts of Asia, Afinca, the Middle East, and Latin
America will not keep pace with population increases. These conditions strain the
leadership, resources, and infrastructures of developing states. Corrupt and ineffec-
tive governments particularly are unable to cope. Their actions marginalize large
numbers of people, foster instability, spawn ethnic, religious, and cultural conflict,
create lawless safe-havens, and increase the power of dangerous non-state entities.
In some areas, particularly in the Middle East, rising unemployment among expand-
ing youth populations, stagnant or falling living standards, ineffective governments,
and decaying infrastructures create environments conducive to extremist messages.
General Technology Proliferation
Advances in information processing, biotechnology, communications, materials,
micro-manufacturing, and weapons development are having a significant impact on
the way people live, think, work, organize, and fight. New vmnerabilities, inter-
dependencies, and capabilities are being created in both advanced and less devel-
oped states. The globalization of "R&D intensive" technologies is according smaller
countries, groups, and individuals access to capabilities previously limited to major
powers. The integration of various advancements, and unanticipated applications of
emerging technologies, makes it extremely difficult to predict the technological fu-
ture. Surprises will result. Some aspects of our technological advantage are likely
to erode.
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Proliferation
The long-term trends with respect to WMD and missile proliferation are bleak.
States seek these capabilities for regional purposes, or to provide a hedge to deter
or offset U.S. military superiority. Terrorists seek greater physical and psychological
impacts. The perceived "need to acquire" is intense and, unfortunately, globalization
provides a more amenable proliferation environment. Much of the technology and
many of the raw materials are readily available. New alliances have formed, pooling
resources for developing these capabilities, while technological advances and global
economic conditions make it easier to transfer materiel and expertise. The basic
sciences are widely understood, although the complex engineering tasks required to
produce an effective weapons capability are not achieved easily.
Some 25 countries possess or are actively pursuing WMD or missile programs.
The threat to U.S. and allied interests will grow during the next decade.
• Chemical and biological weapons. These are generally easier to develop,
hide, and deploy than nuclear weapons and are more readily available.
Over a dozen states have biological or chemical warfare programs, including
stockpiles of lethal agents. The associated technologies are relatively inex-
pensive, and have "legitimate" uses in the medical, pharmaceutical, and ag-
ricultural industries. Detection and counter proliferation are very difficult.
25
I expect these weapons will be used in a regional conflict and by a terrorist
group.
• Nuclear weapons. Iran and Iraq have active nuclear programs and could
have nuclear weapons within the decade. North Korea is seeking additional
fissile material to increase its nuclear stockpile and its withdrawal from the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty — the first state ever to do so — may
prompt other nations to rethink their positions on nuclear weapons. India
and Pakistan will increase their inventories and seek to improve associated
delivery systems.
• Ballistic and cruise missiles. In addition to existing Russian and Chinese
capabilities, by 2015 the U.S. will likely face new ICBM threats from North
Korea, Iran, and possibly Iraq. Meanwhile, the proliferation of theater-
range ballistic and cruise missiles, and associated technologies, is a growing
challenge. The numbers, ranges, accuracies, mobility, and destructive power
of these systems will increase significantly, providing many states capabili-
ties to strike targets within and beyond their region.
• Proliferation. Russia, China, and North Korea are the suppliers of pri-
mary concern, but I expect an increase in Pakistani and Iranian prolifera-
tion. Russia remains involved in ballistic missile and nuclear programs in
Iran. China has provided missile assistance to Iran and Pakistan, and may
be connected to nuclear efforts in both states. North Korea is the world's
primary source of ballistic missiles and related components and materials.
Finally, I worry about the prospect of secondary proliferation — today's tech-
nology importers becoming tomorrow's exporters. Iran is beginning to pro-
vide missile production technologies to Syria. Over time, Iran, like North
Korea today, may have the capability to export complete missile systems.
It is also critical for governments that are not involved in proliferation to
strengthen export control laws and enforcement to prevent entities ft-om
proliferating sensitive technologies.
• Declining global defense spending. Global defense spending has dropped
50 percent during the past decade and, with the exception of some parts
of Asia, is likely to remain limited. This trend will have multiple impacts.
First, both adversaries and allies will not keep pace with the U.S. military.
This drives foes toward "asymmetric options," widens the capability gap be-
tween U.S. and allied forces, and increases the demand on unique U.S.
force capabilities. Additional, longer-term impacts on global defense tech-
nology development and on U.S. -allied defense industrial cooperation and
technological competitiveness are likely. Finally, defense resource con-
straints, declining arms markets, and globalization are leading to a more
competitive global armaments industry. In this environment, technology
transfer restrictions and arms embargoes will be more difficult to maintain,
monitor, and enforce.
• International crime. Criminal groups in Western Europe, China, Colom-
bia, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, and Russia are broadening their global
activities and are increasingly involved in narcotics trafficking, alien smug-
gling, and illicit transfers of arms and other military technologies. My
major concern is over the growing link between terrorism and organized
crime, especially the prospect that organized criminal groups will use their
established networks to traffic in nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons,
and to facilitate movement of terrorist operatives.
• Increasing numbers of people in need. A host of factors — some outlined
above — have combined to increase the numbers of people facing deepening
economic stagnation, political instability, and cultural alienation. These
conditions provide fertile ground for extremism. Their frustration is increas-
ingly directed at the U.S. and the west.
Other Regional Issues
There are a number of other regional situations we must monitor because of their
potential to develop into more serious challenges.
Israeli-Palestinian Violence
The prolonged Israeli-Palestinian conflict is furthering anti-American sentiment,
increasing the likelihood of terrorism directed at U.S. interests, increasing the pres-
sure on moderate Middle East regimes, and carries with it the potential for wider
regional conflict. With each side determined to break the other's will, I see no end
to the current violence.
26
Tension Between India and Pakistan
After last year's military standoff along the Line-of-Control (LOG), both
Islamabad and Delhi took steps to defuse tensions. But with the Kashmir situation
still unresolved and with continued cross border infiltration from Pakistan, the po-
tential for miscalculation remains high, especially in the wake of some violent 'trig-
gering' event such as another spectacular terrorist attack or political assassination.
Both sides retain large forces close to the tense LOG and continue to develop their
WMD and missile programs. Recent elections have hardened India's resolve and
constrain Musharraf's ability to offer additional concessions.
Pressures in the Muslim World
The Islamic would is sorting through competing visions of what it means to be
a Muslim state in the modem era. Unfavorable demographic and economic condi-
tions and efforts to strike a balance between modernization and respect for tradi-
tional values are exacerbated by the global war on terrorism, continued Israeli-Pal-
estinian violence, and the Iraqi situation. This fosters resentment toward the west
and makes it difficult to define the vision of a modem Islamic state. These pressures
will be most acute in states important to the U.S., including Pakistan, Afghanistan,
Indonesia, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Even in countries where Muslim popu-
lations are a minority, such as the Philippines, there are threats from the extremist
fringe bent on the violent overthrow of democratic rule.
• Pakistan. While Pakistan is making progress in its return to a function-
ing democracy. President Musharraf faces significant political and economic
challenges and continued opposition. Musharraf claims little influence over
the Kashmiri militants and other religious extremists, and Pakistan does
not completely control areas in the northwest where concentrations of al
Qaeda and Taliban remain. Populeu" hostility to the United States is grow-
ing, driven in part by cooperation between Washington and Islamabad
against terrorism. Islamist opponents of the current government, or reli-
gious extremists, could try to instigate a political crisis through violent
means. Goup or assassination could result in an extremist Pakistan.
• Afghanistan. President Karzai is making progress in stabilizing the poUt-
ical situation, but continues to face challenges from some local and regional
leaders, criminals, and remnant al Qaeda and Taliban elements. Assassina-
tion of President Karzai would fundamentally undermine Afghan stability.
• Indonesia. President Megaw/ati is attempting to deal with serious social
and economic problems and to confront Islamic extremists, without under-
mining her support from moderate Muslims. Her failure would increase the
popular appeal of radical elements.
• Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia. The leadership in all three countries is sub-
ject to increased pressure, but each probably has the capacity to contain se-
rious unrest. However, in a worst-case scenario of mass protests that
threatened regime control, their support for U.S. basing, overflights, and
the war on terrorism would likely be withdrawn.
OTHER MAJOR REGIONAL ACTORS
Iran
As the recent protests in Tehran attest, Iran is a country with growing internal
tensions. Most Iranians want an end to the clerical rule of the AyatoUahs. Moham-
med Khatami, Iran's president, received the bulk of his now-waning support from
minorities, youths, and women when he first won the elections. He is also vulner-
able to being forced aside by the religious conservatives who have held power since
1979. Iran's conservatives remain in control and continue to view the U.S. with hos-
tility. Iran remains the leading state-sponsor of terrorism. For instance, it has pro-
vided safe-haven to al Qaeda and remains the principal source of military supplies
and financial support for Hizballah. For these reasons, I remain concerned with
Tehran's deliberate military buildup.
• Iran is pursuing the fissile material and technology required to develop
nuclear weapons. It uses its contract with Russia for the civilian Bushehr
nuclear reactor to obtain sensitive dual-use technologies that directly sup-
port its weapons program. If successful, Tehran will have a nuclear weapon
within the decade.
• Iran has a biological warfare program and continues to pursue dual-use
biotechnology equipment and expertise from Russian and other sources. It
maintains a stockpile of chemical warfare agents and may have weaponized
some of them into artillery shells, mortars, rockets, and aerial bombs.
27
• Teheran has a relatively large ballistic missile force — hundreds of Chi-
nese CSS-8s, SCUD Bs and SCUD Cs— and is likely assembling additional
SCUDs in country. It is also developing longer-range missiles and continues
to test the Shahab-3 (1,300 km range). Iran is pursing the technology to de-
velop an ICBM/space launch vehicle and could flight test that capability be-
fore the end of the decade. Cooperation w^ith Russian, North Korean, and
Chinese entities is critical to Tehran's ultimate success.
• Iran's navy is the most capable in the region and could stem the flow of
oil from the Gulf for brief periods by emplojdng a layered force of diesel-
powered KILO submarines, missile patrol boats, naval mines, and sea and
shore-based anti-ship cruise missiles. Aided by China, Iran is developing
potent anti-ship cruise missile capabilities and is working to acquire more
sophisticated naval capabilities.
Russia
Moscow's muted reaction to NATO enlargement and the U.S. withdrawal from the
ABM Treaty, its cooperation in the war on terrorism, and its acceptance of a U.S.
military presence in Central Asia emphasize President Putin's commitment to closer
integration with the west. I am hopeful the current cooperative atmosphere can be
built upon to form a more positive and lasting security relationship. That said, there
are no easy solutions to the tremendous challenges confronting Russia. I remain
concerned about Russian proliferation of advanced military and WMD technologies,
the security of its nuclear materials and weapons, the expanding global impact of
Russian criminal syndicates, and unfavorable demographic trends.
Meanwhile, the Russian Armed Forces continue in crisis. Moscow's defense ex-
penditures are inadequate to overcome the problems associated with a decade of
military neglect, much less fund Russia's plans for military reform, restructuring,
and modernization. Even priority strategic systems have not been immune to the
problems affecting the Russian military. The deployment of the SS-27 ICBM is now
several years behind schedule. Overall system aging, chronic underfunding, and
arms control agreements ensure that Russian strategic warhead totals will continue
to decline — from approximately 4,500 operational today to a level near 1,500 by
2010. For at least the next several years, the military will continue to experience
shortfalls in pay, housing, procurement, and training. These factors, the war in
Chechnya, and inconsistent leadership, will undermine morale and readiness.
China
In November 2002, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held its 16th Congress.
Vice President Hu Jintao was selected as CCP General Secretary and Jiang Zemin
was re-appointed Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Beijing is stressing
stability during this period of transition and I expect few changes to China's na-
tional priorities, including military modernization.
• China's total military spending will continue growing at about the same
rate as the economy. Beijing spent between $40 and $65 billion on defense
last year (about 5 percent of GDP) and is content with that rate of invest-
ment.
• Strategic force modernization is a continuing priority. China is becoming
less reliant on the vulnerable, silo-based CSS--4 ICBM by transitioning to
a mix of more survivable, mobile, and solid propellant ICBMs. Three new
strategic missiles will likely be fielded: the road-mobile DF-31, an extended
range DF-31 variant, and a new submarine launched ballistic missile,
which will deploy on a new ballistic missile submarine.
• The People's Liberation Army (PLA) will sustain its focus on acquiring
high-technology arms — especially air, air defense, anti-submarine, anti-sur-
face ship, reconnaissance, and battle management capabilities — and will
continue to emphasize the professionalization of the officer corps. These ele-
ments are essential to Beijing's force design concept — pursing the capability
to operate against a 'high-technology' opponent employing long-range preci-
sion strike capabilities — in other words, the United States. China also is
rapidly expanding its conventionally-armed theater missile force, some of
which can target U.S. bases in the region, to provide increased leverage
against Taiwan and, to a lesser extent, other U.S. Asian allies.
COPING WITH U.S. POWER
Our opponents understand they cannot match our political, economic, and mili-
tary power. Accordingly, they seek to avoid decisive engagements and act indirectly,
hoping to extract a price we are unwilling to pay, or to present us with capabilities
28
and situations we cannot react to in a timely manner. They want to fundamentally
change the way others view the United States. This could include: undermining our
political, economic, and social infrastructures, thwarting U.S. global leadership, un-
dermining our will to remain globally engaged, and curtailing the global appeal of
our ideas, institutions, and culture.
Threats to the Homeland
Many adversaries believe the best way to avoid, deter, or offset U.S. power is to
develop a capability to threaten the U.S. homeland. In addition to the traditional
threat from strategic nuclear missiles, our national infrastructure is vulnerable to
physical and computer attack. The interdependent nature of the infrastructure cre-
ates more vulnerability, because attacks against one sector — the electric power grid
for instance — would impact other sectors as well. Many defense-related critical in-
frastructures are vulnerable to a wide range of attacks, especially those that rely
on commercial sector elements with multiple, single points of failure. Foreign states
have the greatest attack potential (in terms of resources and capabilities), but the
most immediate and serious threat today is from terrorists canying out well-coordi-
nated strikes against selected critical nodes. Al Qaeda has spoken openly of target-
ing the U.S. economy as a way of undermining our global power and uses publicly
available Internet web sites to reconnoiter American infrastructure, utilities, and
critical facilities.
The Intelligence Threat
We continue to face extensive intelligence threats targeted against our national
security policy-making apparatus, national infrastructure, military, and critical
technologies. The open nature of our society, and the ease with which monev, tech-
nology, information, and people move around the globe, make counterintelligence
and security difficult. Sensitive business information and advanced technologies are
increasingly at risk as both adversaries and allies conduct espionage against the pri-
vate sector. They seek technological, financial, and commercial information that will
provide a competitive edge in the global economy. Several coxintries continue to pose
a serious challenge, prioritizing collection against U.S. military and technological
developments, and diplomatic initiatives. The threat from these countries is sophis-
ticated and increasing. They target our political, economic, military, and scientific
information, and their intelligence services have demonstrated exceptional patience
and persistence in pursuing priority targets.
Information Operations
Adversaries recognize our reliance on advanced information systems and under-
stand that information superiority provides the U.S. unique advantages. Accord-
ingly, numerous potential foes are pursuing information operations capabilities as
a means to undermine domestic and international support for U.S. actions, attack
key parts of the U.S. national infrastructure, and preclude our information superi-
ority. Information operations can involve psychological operations, physical attacks
against key information nodes, and computer network attacks. These methods are
relatively inexpensive, can have a disproportionate impact on a target, and offer
some degree of anonymity. I expect this tnreat to grow significantly over the next
several years.
Counter-Transformational Challenges
For at least the next decade, adversaries who contemplate engaging the U.S. mili-
tary will struggle to find ways to deal with overwhelming U.S. force advantages.
They will take the time to understand how we operate, will attempt to identify our
strengths and vulnerabilities, and will pursue operational and technological initia-
tives to counter key aspects of the "American Way of War." They will focus exten-
sively on the transformation goals that will drive U.S. military developments, and
will purs&e programs that promise affordable "counter-transformational" capabili-
ties. Accordingly, I expect our potential enemies will continue to emphasize the fol-
lowing:
• WMD and precision weapons delivery capabilities that allow effective tar-
geting of critical theater bases of operation, personnel concentrations, and
key logistics facilities and nodes, from the earliest stages of a campaign. My
expectation is that during the next decade, a number of states will develop
precision attack capabilities roughly equivalent to what the U.S. fielded in
the mid-1990s. These will increasingly put our regional bases and facilities
at risk.
• Counter-access capabilities designed to deny access to key theaters, ports,
bases, and facilities, and critical air, land, and sea approaches. I am espe-
cially concerned about the global availability of affordable and effective
29
anti-surface ship systems (cruise missiles, submarines, torpedoes, naval
mines), and a number of other long-range interdiction and area denial tech-
nologies. Our adversaries will attempt to exploit political, social, and mili-
tary conditions in a number of host-nations to complicate the future over-
seas basing environment for the U.S.
• Counter-precision engagement capabilities focused on defeating our preci-
sion intelligence and attack systems. This includes the growing availability
of global positioning system jammers, the increased use of denial and de-
ception (including decoys, camouflage, and underground facilities), the pro-
liferation of advanced air defense systems, more mobile and survivable ad-
versary strike platforms (especially missiles), and improved efforts to com-
plicate our targeting process by using "human shields," or by locating other
high-value assets in "no-strike areas" (urban centers, or near hospitals,
schools, religious facilities, etc.).
• Space and space-denial capabilities. Adversaries recognize the importance
of space and will attempt to improve their access to space platforms, either
indigenous or commercial. Worldwide, the availability of space products and
services is accelerating, fueled by the proliferation of advanced satellite
technologies and increased cooperation among states. While generally posi-
tive, these developments provide unprecedented communications, reconnais-
sance, and targeting capabilities to our adversaries.
A number of potential foes are also developing capabilities to threaten U.S. space
assets. Some countries already have systems, such as satellite laser range-finding
devices and nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, with inherent anti-satellite capabilities.
A few countries have programs that could result in improved space object tracking,
electronic warfare or jamming, and kinetic or directed energy weapons. But these
techniques are expensive and won't be widely available in the next 10 years. Other
states and non-state entities are pursuing more limited, though potentially effective,
approaches that don't require large resources or a high-tech industrial base. These
tactics include denial and deception, signal jamming, and ground segment attack.
CLOSING THOUGHTS
As I have noted above, a wide array of threats exists today and others are devel-
oping over time. Collectively, these challenges present a formidable barrier to our
vision of a secure and prosperous international order.
Against this backdrop, the old defense intelligence threat paradigm, which focused
primarily on the military capabilities of a small set of potential adversary states,
no longer addresses the entire threat spectrum. More importantly, the emerging
threats cannot be dismissed as "lesser included cases." In this environment, tradi-
tional concepts of security, threat, deterrence, intelligence, warning, and military su-
periority are not adequate. We must adapt and respond to these new conditions just
as our enemies pursue new ways to diminish our overwhelming power.
While the challenges facing us are daunting, I am enthusiastic about the unique
opportunity we have to transform our capabilities, personnel, and processes to better
address the changing security environment. The intelligence transformation proc-
ess— intended to improve our capability to provide strategic warning, better facili-
tate effects-based campaigns, provide greater insights into adversaries' intentions,
improve preparation of the intelligence and operational battlespace, and more effec-
tively support homeland defense — will be the centerpiece of my tenure as Director,
Defense Intelligence Agency.
The Defense Intelligence community — composed of DIA, the Service Intelligence
Centers, and the Combatant Command Intelligence Centers — is working hard to de-
velop the processes, techniques, and capabilities necessary to handle the current
threat as well as new and emerging security challenges. As I said at the outset, we
are at war on a global scale and the task is daunting. With your continued support,
I am confident we will be able to provide our decisionmakers with the intelligence
they need.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much. I want to discuss my
perspective on the observations made by my colleague this morn-
ing, the ranking member. Then Director Tenet, we will listen to
you further.
The meeting that we had with the President last Wednesday, the
senior members of the House and Senate, was followed by a brief
30
meeting with Condoleeza Rice, myself, Senator Levin, and possibly
one other, at which time Senator Levin raised these concerns that
he has expressed this morning. It was my clear impression, listen-
ing to the National Security Advisor to the President, that all of
the material that we deemed helpful to the inspectors had been or
was in the process of being given to Hans Blix and to the Security
Council.
Yesterday we had the opportunity to resume that conversation
with the director, Mr. Foley, Senator Levin, and myself. The four
of us had a meeting for about a half hour, at which time the discus-
sion resumed. Now, I do not wish to get into the questions of num-
bers and so forth, but again, it is clear to this Senator that while
there have been comments by members of the administration as to
their concern about the likelihood of the inspection process succeed-
ing, Hans Blix himself has clearly said that Iraq has not been coop-
erative. It is that lack of cooperation that has been the basic predi-
cate that the administration has expressed concern about, and that
has been made eminently clear publicly.
Now, I find two things. One, I am satisfied that this administra-
tion has in a conscientious way, in a timely way, transmitted this
important information to the inspectors in the hopes that their task
could have been more fruitful. Second, I find absolutely no evidence
to indicate that any member of this administration would have
used this process of submitting evidence to Blix in any other man-
ner than to help and foster success by the inspectors. So at this
time. Director Tenet, I think it is opportune for you to reply to me.
Mr. Tenet. I think Senator Levin has raised a very important
question, and we have spent a great deal of time assembling all the
facts; and let me walk you through where we are. We, the Amer-
ican intelligence community, have had intelligence exchanged with
the United Nations on Iraq and WMD in sensitive sites for over 10
years. That is an important point to make. There is therefore a
very strong common understanding of sites of potential interest to
inspectors, whether they were U.N. Special Commission
(UNSCOM) inspectors or U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspec-
tion Commission (UNMOVIC) inspectors or IAEA inspectors.
When the inspections began, we drew up a list of suspect sites
which we believe may have a continuing association with Iraq's
WMD programs. The list is dynamic. It changes according to avail-
able intelligence or other information we receive. Of this set num-
ber of suspect sites, we identified a specific number as being high-
est interest, highest value or moderate value, because of recent ac-
tivities suggesting ongoing WMD association or other intelligence
information that we received.
As I said yesterday, we have briefed all of these high value and
moderate value sites to UNMOVIC and the IAEA. Of the remain-
ing sites, of lower interest on this suspect site list, I had my ana-
lysts review all of them last night to see what we have shared with
UNSCOM, with UNMOVIC, and with L^JEA. We identified a hand-
ful, one handful of sites which may not have been known to the
UNSCOM inspectors that we will pass to them.
Now, the important thing to also note is that in addition we con-
tinue to provide additional site information to UNSCOM either in
response to their questions on a daily basis, because they have
31
their own site lists, they receive data from other countries, or as
we continue to receive new information.
It is important to note that our support to UNMOVIC and the
IAEA goes well beyond the provision of information on just sites.
We have briefed them on the Iraqi declaration. We have briefed
them on missiles. We have briefed them on the nuclear program.
We briefed them on biological weapons, on mobile biological weap-
ons, on a whole range of subjects. Our analysts are in daily contact
with their analysts. We take this seriously and professionally and
that is the record as we put it together, sir, to try to put this in
some context. Questions may remain.
Chairman Warner. Fine. Do you agree with my observation,
having listened and carefully observed and participated in these
meetings, that we as a Nation have conscientiously given them ev-
erything as we have received it — as you say, it is continuing to
come in — in such a way as to foster the ability of the inspectors to
do their work?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, my direction to our community and our people
was to "flood the zone," to work with these people on a daily basis
to do everything that we can to assist their inspection process, and
that is what we are tr3dng to do each and every day.
Chairman WARNER. I find no basis by your agency or anyone else
in this administration to impede that flow in such a way as to con-
tribute to their inability to discover the evidence that we know as
a Nation is somewhere hidden in that country. Am I correct in
that?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I can tell you, I can just repeat my statement
about what we are doing each and every day. I will just tell you
what our motivation is, what we are trjdng to do, and that the men
and women that work for us are trying to do it each and every day.
Chairman WARNER. Now the question is going to be forthcoming
here with regard to whether or not in the Security Council there
will be some suggestions to the effect that we double, quadruple,
whatever number may be put down on the table, the number of in-
spectors in the hopes that they can have a greater degree of suc-
cess. Do you see any evidence that this would lead to a more fruit-
ful process of inspections?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, let me say that the burden here is not on the
inspectors. The burden here is on Iraq. Everything that Iraq has
done since its initial date of declaration, which was wholly inad-
equate, everjiihing that they have done to clean up sites before the
inspectors arrive, to have Iraqi intelligence officers pose as sci-
entists at sites that would be visited, to provide incomplete lists of
scientists to be interviewed — you heard Secretary Powell's speech.
They have done nothing here to live up to their obligations to facili-
tate an inspection process. The burden on the Iraqi side is as yet,
to my professional judgment, unmet, so that is all I can say at this
moment, sir. I haven't seen specific proposals about numbers of
people, how long it will go, but you take the history, you take the
fact that this is a country that essentially built a WMD capability
while inspections were going on inside this country, and you take
behavior that we have seen. It is frustrating, but the burden has
to be placed where the burden belongs, on him, to do what he is
required to do.
32
Chairman Warner. If this option is pursued by which you quad-
ruple the inspectors, and indeed perhaps get some U-2 surveillance
and other things, what are the risks associated with added time
being given, and I mean significant added time, to the inspection
process?
Mr. Tenet. Well sir, it is my judgment that if you have a process
perceived under the circumstances that I have just talked to you
about, with no compliance with what is expected, the expectation
on our part is his capabilities will continue to grow. His clandestine
procurement networks will continue to operate. He will continue to
hide and deceive. So I am not very sanguine about where we are,
in terms of how he has calculated he can wait us out and the
games that he has been playing in this regard. So that would be
my judgment today.
Chairman Warner. There is also the option for Iraq to allow
quantities of the weapons of mass destruction with biological and
chemical weapons to find their way to the international terrorists,
am I not correct, and transported elsewhere in the world?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, those are always possibilities. We have been very
careful about the case we have made and what we have talked
about, this poisonous network that may be operating out of no
man's land. Certainly an individual who has been in Baghdad, who
is supported by a group of individuals who remain in Baghdad and
facilitate not only this network, of which there has been a large
number of arrests in European countries, but also these individuals
in Baghdad have their own that they may be pursuing, so I want
to be religious and careful about the evidence that we have and
what our concerns are. Certainly how chemical and biological
weapons may find their way into other people's hands, to terrorist
groups is an ongoing concern that we are watching very carefully.
Chairman Warner. Yesterday the Intelligence Committee met,
and as a member of that committee, I put a question to you and
you gave me an answer, but I think it is important that that same
question and answer be put in today's record. There have been alle-
gations by some world leaders that they do not think Iraq pos-
sesses weapons of mass destruction. In the event, and there is no
decision yet, that force must be used by this Nation and other na-
tions willing to work with us, and in the aftermath of the battle
when the world press can go in and examine the sites and so forth,
is it your professional judgment that there will be clearly found
caches of weapons of mass destruction to establish beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that he had them?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I believe that we will. I think that when you lis-
ten to Secretary Powell's statement at the United Nations, he
noted a specific intercept that told operational units to ensure that
the word nerve agents never appeared in any communications. So
we know that weapons have been subordinated to units and I be-
lieve that we will find research and development (R&D). We will
find stockpiles of things he has not declared and weapons he has
not declared.
Chairman Warner. Those pictures that showed trucks moving,
presumably, that material to other sites, those sites could be lo-
cated?
33
Mr. Tenet. Well, that is a part of this, sir, of course. It is a big
country and the advantage is always to the hider but we will do
everything we can if that is where we are to find these things.
Chairman Warner. Admiral Jacoby, in the event that force is
used, what do we know now about the risk of Saddam Hussein de-
ploying weapons of mass destruction against forces trying to re-
move that regime?
Admiral Jacoby. Mr. Chairman, we do not know Saddam Hus-
sein's doctrine for WMD usage. We assess, however, based on his
past patterns and availability of weapons in his inventory, is that
he will employ them when he makes a decision that the regime is
in jeopardy. Now, the real hard part about that is to identify when
he might make that judgment and of course, that resides with one
individual, his perceptions, the information available to him to
make such a call.
Chairman WARNER. Those risks have been made known not only
to the general public but most specifically to the men and women
of the Armed Forces in our Nation and such other nations that are
courageous enough to undertake the risk, should force be nec-
essary. Senator Levin?
Senator LE\aN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You agree, Mr. Tenet,
with what Admiral Jacoby just said?
Mr. Tenet. Yes.
Senator Levin. I think that is a critically important intelligence
finding as to what we expect, and your intelligence estimate is. Ad-
miral, that when Saddam determines that his regime is in jeop-
ardy, that is the point when he would utilize the weapons of mass
destruction many people believe he still has. I want to go back to
inspections, Mr. Tenet.
You have read the letters which your agency sent me indicating
the number of significant sites that had not yet been shared in
terms of information with the United Nations inspection inspectors,
is that correct?
Mr. Tenet. Probably not all of them, sir.
Senator Levin. The key ones?
Mr. Tenet. I read the key one last night, I believe.
Senator LEVIN. What you are indicating this morning is that that
was in error?
Mr. Tenet. I do not know if it was in error. I could look at the
language.
Senator Levin. The numbers were dramatically different than a
handful. Will you agree to that?
Mr. Tenet. Yes, sir. I went back last night and reviewed all of
these numbers, reviewed all of our data, and potentially we made
some mistakes in some of our transmissions. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. What is very important, it seems to me, is that
we give full cooperation to the U.N. inspectors. Would you agree
with that?
Mr. Tenet. I agree, sir.
Senator Levin. Even though you agree they are not useful unless
Saddam cooperates, is that correct? Is it still useful to cooperate
with the inspectors?
34
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I think we have to do everything we can do to
support them, even though they are getting no support from the
person who is supposed to provide support.
Senator Levin. Because even though the burden is on Saddam,
they still might prove useful, is that correct?
Mr. Tenet. Potentially, sir.
Senator Levin. I just want to put that on the record, because of
your testimony today which I welcome, and your testimony yester-
day which was so astounding to me. I would want to put Mr. Te-
net's testimony from yesterday in the record.
Mr. Tenet. Sir, can I just make one comment? My assertion yes-
terday about the high value site was absolutely right and I make
the same
Senator Levin. High-moderate value, yes, sir.
Mr. Tenet. My knowledge yesterday was incomplete with regard
to the rest of these sites. We took advantage of the line of question-
ing in our meeting to go back and get our people to go do all the
work so I can complete that statement. But what I said yesterday
was absolutely accurate with regard to high value and moderate
value targets.
Senator Levin. Without pressing this any further because you
have acknowledged that the data which was submitted to me was
incorrect, and we will go into that in classified session as to wheth-
er or not it was indeed incorrect, but nonetheless, I want yester-
day's testimony to be put in the record.
Chairman Warner. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:!
35
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Jacoby has made the following statement in
his written presentation. Director Tenet, and I am wondering if you agree, that Pyongyang's
open pursuit of additional nuclear weapons is the most serious challenge the U.S. regional
interests in a generation. The outcome of this current crisis will shape relations In Northeast
Asia for years to come." Do you agree with that statement?
MR. JACOBY: Sir, it's very serious.
SEN. LEVIN: I think It's really useful that at least our Intelligence community is willing to
describe the problem with North Korea as a crisis. The administration has avoided that
word. They've said it's not a crisis. And the fact that our Intelligence community describes it
accurately as a crisis it seems to me is at least a beginning of a fair assessment of how
serious that is. Dirertor Tenet, in early January we started sharing with U.N. Inspectors
Intelligence on sites in Iraq that we have suspicions about. I assume that we are sharing
Information with all the limitations of Inspections, because our intelligence community
believes that U.N. inspections have value — at least there's a possibility that those
inspections would provide evidence of the presence of weapons of mass destruction or of
Iraqi deception, or of violations of the resolutions of the United Nations. Do you agree that
there Is some value to those inspections?
MR. TENET: Sir, there's value in these Inspections so long as the partner In these
inspections, Saddam Hussein, complies with U.N. resolutions. And thus far he has been
singularly uncooperative In every phase of this Inspection process.
SEN. LEVIN: What you are saying is they have no value then unless he cooperates? That
there's no chance that they will find evidence of weapons of mass destruction, even without
his cooperation?
MR. TENET: Sir, unless he provides the data to build on, provides the access, provides the
unfettered access that he's supposed to, provides us with surveillance capability, there's
little chance you are going to find weapons of mass destruction under the rubric he's
created inside the country. The burden is on him to comply and us to do everything we can
to help the inspectors. But the inspectors have been put in a very difficult position by his
behavior.
SEN. LEVIN: Have they been given unfettered access?
MR. TENET: By Saddam Hussein?
SEN. LEVIN: Yes.
MR. TENET: Sir, I don't know In real-time. Everything that happens on every Inspection —
SEN. LEVIN: As far as you know, were they given unfettered access?
MR. TENET: I don't believe so, sir.
SEN. LEVIN: All right. Now, we have only shared a small percentage of the sites so far that
we have suspicions about. I am going to use the word "small percentage," because I am not
allowed to use the actual numbers of sites that you have suspicions about. I am not allowed
to use the actual number of sites that we have shared with the U.N. inspectors. All I'm
allowed to say Is that there has t>een a "small percentage" of sites that we have shared the
information with the inspectors. My question to you is: When will be completing the sharing
of information with the U.N. inspectors?
MR. TENET: Sir, we have given the U.N. inspectors and UNMOVIC every site that we have
that is of high or moderate value, where there is proven intelligence to lead to a potential
outcome — every site we have.
36
SEN. LEVIN: Would you say what percentage of the sites that we have on our suspect list
that you have put out In that estimate we have —
MR. TENET: Sir, the -- the collect — I'm sorry, sir. I apologize.
SEN. LEVIN: Would you give us the approximate percentage of the sites that we have in
your classified National Intelligence Estimate that we have shared information on with the
U.N. inspectors, just an approximate percentage?
MR. TENET: I don't remember the number.
SEN. LEVIN: Just give me an approximation.
MR. TENET: I don't know, but let me just — can I just comment on what you said, sir?
SEN. LEVIN: Would you agree it's a small percentage?
MR. TENET: Well, sir, there is a collection priority list that you are aware of, and there Is a
number that you l<now. And this collection priority list Is a list of sites that we have held
over many, many years. The vast majority of these sites are low priority and against which
we found little data to direct these inspectors. All I can tell you Is we have given them
everything we have and provided every site at our disposal, and we cooperate with our
foreign colleagues to give them — we have held nothing back from sites that we believe
based on credible Intelligence could be fruitful for these inspections.
SEN. LEVIN: I just must tell you that Is news. That Is a very different statement than we
have received before.
MR. TENET: Sir, I was briefed last night, and I think that we owe you an apology. I don't
know that you have gotten the full flavor of this. But in going through this last night, I can
tell you with confidence that we had given them every site.
SEN. LEVIN: Now, Mr. Tenet, another question relative to al Qaeda's presence In Iraq. Does
al Qaeda have bases in Iraq?
MR. TENET: Sir, you know that there is — there's two things that I would say —
SEN. LEVIN: And would you summarize it by saying al Qaeda has bases in Iraq?
MR. TENET: Sir --
SEN. LEVIN: That is the part of Iraq that is controlled by Saddam?
MR. TENET: Sir, as you know — first of all, as you know by secretary — well, we won't get
into northern Iraq, but I can tell you this — bases — it's hard for me to deal with, but I know
that part of this — and part of this Zarqawi network in Baghdad are two dozen Egyptian
Islamic jihad which is indistinguishable from al Qaeda — operatives who are aiding the
Zarqawi network, and two senior planners who have been In Baghdad since last May. Now,
whether there is a base or whether there is not a base, they are operating freely, supporting
the Zarqawi network that is supporting the poisons network In Europe and around the
world. So these people have been operating there. And, as you know — I don't want to
recount everything that Secretary Powell said, but as you know a foreign service went to
the Iraqis twice to talk to them about Zarqawi and were rebuffed. So there is a presence in
Baghdad that is beyond Zarqawi.
SEN. ROBERTS: The senator's time has expired.
Senator Levin. I ask for that testimony because of the clear dif-
ference between what was stated yesterday and what has been ac-
knowledged today.
I want to talk to you about the value of U-2 flights. Do we sup-
port giving the inspectors what they have asked for in terms of U-
2 flights?
Mr. Tenet. Yes, sir, I believe we do.
Senator Levin. Even though Saddam isn't cooperating?
Mr. Tenet. Yes, sir.
37
Senator Levin. He has not agreed to those U-2 flights at least
until a couple of days ago and we have acquiesced in that. The
United Nations, including us, has never adopted the resolution that
Senator Clinton and I have suggested to Mr. Powell that the U.N.
tell Saddam, it is not up to you whether we have useful U-2
flights. That is up to us, the United Nations. We are flying. You
attack those U-2s and you are attacking the United Nations. Why
shouldn't we do that?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I think there is an important question here
about whether you are going to fly a U-2 and put a pilot at risk
in an environment that is not permissive and that he has not
agreed to and I don't think that is an insignificant consideration.
Senator Levin. It is a very significant issue. The underl)ring
issue is much more significant. We are going to put hundreds of
thousands of U.S. troops at risk if we attack Saddam with some
huge long-term consequences as well as the short term ones that
Admiral Jacoby has outlined. That would be done, according to the
administration, even without a U.N. authorized use of force. What
we are suggesting is that the U-2 flights be authorized by the U.N.
When you talk to Mr. Blix, as I have done, he believes the chance
that Saddam Hussein will attack a U-2 if he knows that by doing
so he is attacking the United Nations is so slim, compared to the
risks involved in war. For us to focus on the risk of a U-2 flight
without Saddam's agreement rather than the importance of impos-
ing the U.N.'s will on Saddam Hussein — it is incredible to me that
we have acquiesced in Saddam Hussein's veto of U-2 flights, which
you acknowledge will be helpful or could be helpful to the inspec-
tors, based on the risk of a U-2 flight. I find that incredible.
In any event. Senator Clinton and I wrote a long letter to Sec-
retary Powell about this issue. It may not be necessary anymore to
have a U.N. resolution, but if so, I would hope that this adminis-
tration will introduce and support a U.N. resolution imposing the
U-2 flights which will provide critical information, particularly
about vehicles which move around on the ground.
Secretary Powell pointed out that there are suspect vehicles on
the ground. The way to track those suspect vehicles is with U-2
flights. You cannot do it with satellites and yet this administration
is saying there is risk to U-2 pilots. As a reason not to impose the
will of the world as requested by its inspectors on Saddam Hussein,
I find that incredible. I find it to be a lack of support for the inspec-
tors who have asked for the U-2 flights. I will give you a chance —
my time is up, but you should have a chance to respond.
Mr. Tenet. Sir, we are out of my realm a bit, but let me just say
the following. When we passed Resolution 1441 there were a series
of stipulations and obligations that dealt with surveillance and in-
formation flow and all these other kinds of things. Again, I find it
from my perspective interesting that the burden shifts in the other
direction constantly.
Senator Levin. You misunderstand my point. I am not saying the
burden shifts. I want to impose our will on Saddam.
Mr. Tenet. All I am saying to you, sir, is that this is something
that should have been acquiesced to immediately when we passed
the resolution. It never was. I understand your point.
38
Senator Levin. I must finish this. Of course, the resolution says
that he is supposed to comply and he is not supposed to interfere
with overflights, but we have specifically suggested a resolution
identifying the consequences. That is not in 1441. U.N. Resolution
1441 says he may not interfere with inspections and with over-
flights, but what 1441 doesn't do, which the resolution we have
proposed would do, is to say the consequence specifically of attack-
ing a U-2 would be that you are attacking the United Nations.
That is the addition to what 1441 specifically provides.
Mr. Tenet. I understand, sir.
Chairman Wakner. I think at this point we should put in the
record exactly what 1441 says and I quote it: "UNMOVIC and the
IAEA shall have free, unrestricted use and landing of fixed and ro-
tary wing aircraft, including manned and unmanned reconnais-
sance vehicles." Now what could be more explicit? That is just one
of a series of enumerations of what 1441 says Iraq must do, and
it is but one of a series that he has steadfastly refused to do.
Senator Levin. We have not done what we should do, which is
to tell him: Attack a U-2, attack the world. It is important that we
not let him veto and that we keep the world together. The world
will be together on the U-2s. The world will be together. Why are
we not working to keep the world together against Saddam Hus-
sein?
Chairman WARNER. I think efforts are being made by this Presi-
dent and the Prime Minister of Great Britain and others to keep
the world together but this is just one of a long litany of things
that he is not doing, and what is the consequence? Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. I got so caught up in listening to this talk of
putting the tail U.N. insignia on a U-2, what would happen in
terms of the safety of the pilot, that I am not quite ready here. If
I may, let me see if I can get organized.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We had a very productive hearing
yesterday in the Intelligence Committee. I thank the witnesses for
returning today to appear before the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices. I am also the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities and I look forward to any guidance that
you can continue to provide us on the appropriate Department of
Defense (DOD) policy and planning response to the threats Amer-
ica faces.
Yesterday I listened very carefully to these two very dedicated
witnesses describe a world in which, and I am quoting, "economic
and political instability and proliferation and extremism combine to
produce new and difficult requirements for America's military."
Now, some would say that that is certainly not a very good situa-
tion, but I would like to stress this. It is good news in regards to
the threat warning analysis and the better analj^ical ability that
we have in all of the 13 agencies that represent the intelligence
community, in my personal opinion, and I have visited 6 and I will
visit the remaining 7 along with Vice Chairman Rockefeller. I
think through the tremendous, unequalled assets that we have and
the dedicated work by those in these agencies, the structural re-
forms that are taking place — and we will have hearings in the In-
telligence Committee to make sure that those happen and to mon-
itor those — we have right now better real-time analysis to produce
39
a better threat warning procedure to safeguard the American peo-
ple. Now, that doesn't mean, of course, that the threat goes away
or that we have other things that we cannot do.
I would Uke to ask you. Director Tenet, to assess the tape yester-
day played for all America and the world by Osama bin Laden,
more particularly, in regards to his relationship with Iraq. The one
thing that I would like to point out is that he closed that tape with
a prayer which is really a lament indicating that his challenges are
much more difficult because two-thirds of his operation has either
been destroyed or captured. In some ways I think that is good, but
could you assess that tape in regards to the situation between al
Qaeda and Osama bin Laden?
Mr. Tenet. Senator, our linguists and experts are going through
all the Arabic. They were working on it last night. I want to be pre-
cise when I come back and talk to you about that. Obviously he
talked about the crusaders. He tried to work around the Iraqi as-
pect. Let me take this for the record and when we go through the
Arabic and allusions and symbols he may raise I will come back to
the committee with a very precise answer in that regard.
Senator Roberts. I have another one you can come back to. We
are hearing a lot from the Security Council, including France, Rus-
sia, and China, how they claim to have not been persuaded by Sec-
retary Powell's presentation. They want to refrain from attacking
Iraq and, as has been indicated, try to let the inspectors continue
about their business, and I am not opposed to inspectors with the
exception that inspectors are not finders, they are inspectors, and
what they are allowed to find in regards to Saddam Hussein I
think is important. I'd like for you to get back to us, I am not sure
that you can say so in a public setting, but please tell us how many
of the countries that are currently on the U.N. Security Council
have at one point provided or permitted nationals to provide arms
or nuclear or biological technology to Saddam Hussein's govern-
ment in Iraq. I'd like to know how many of the members of the Se-
curity Council supported easing the economics sanctions against
Saddam Hussein since 1998. I'd like to know how many of them
also participated in sanctions busting activities such as the com-
mercial airline flights to Baghdad. I'd like to know how many of
the governments that currently insist we engage in bilateral nego-
tiations in North Korea were also the governments that insisted
the only way to deal with the U.S. and Iraq was also through the
United Nations. If you could give me that information in writing,
I would appreciate it.
Mr. Tenet. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Tenet did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be re-
tained in committee files.
Senator ROBERTS. Finally, Pyongyang. The chance that there
could be an uprising on the part of the poor people is between slim
and none, and slim left town. I asked yesterday in the public set-
ting what pressure point we could put on North Korea in regards
to direct engagement to make Kim Jong II change his mind about
cooperation with China, Japan, and South Korea. It has ominous
portents in regards to Japan getting back into the business of re-
militarizing. That goes back to 1952 and the days of Ike.
40
It has ominous portents for our relations with China, so I talked
with the Chinese ambassador. He said he will be a good, strong
global partner. I have yet to see much evidence of that, and I am
very worried about South Korea and the generation of people who
have forgotten the aggression by North Korea. What pressure
points could you suggest with negotiations with Kim Jong II? He
has to play the nuclear card, in my assessment. Any assessment
there?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I will have to come back to you. We are sitting
down with our policymakers and reviewing that. Let me come back
to you, in fairness.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Tenet did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be re-
tained in committee files.
Senator Roberts. If he has another test, sends another mission,
he gets attention and this is the only attention getter he can play,
similar to Pakistan or in relation to Pakistan, but would you think
that is mainly his purpose?
Mr. Tenet. It is one of his purposes, sir, and I indicated in my
testimony that he is trying to draw attention in any way he can.
He has a number of routes at his disposal to try and draw atten-
tion.
Senator Roberts. My time has expired.
Chairman Warner. Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I would
ask that my opening statement be made a part of the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Kennedy follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
Last February, CIA Director Tenet told Congress that al Qaeda is "the most im-
mediate and serious threat" to our country, "despite the progress we have made in
Afghanistan." Yet, this year, the CIA Director tells us only that "the threat from
al Qaeda remains."
Then, as now, Osama bin Laden was still at large and al Qaeda is determined
to strike America again. There have been deadly new al Qaeda attacks worldwide.
A French tanker was attacked in Yemen, a nightclub was bombed in Indonesia, a
hotel was destroyed in Kenya, and missionaries murdered in Yemen. Of more than
600 people killed in acts of terrorism last year, 200 were in al Qaeda-related at-
tacks, including 19 U.S. citizens. Our Nation has just gone on new and higher alert
because of the increased overall threat from al Qaeda. A new tape from Osama bin
Laden has been aired. We are told that a terrorist attack could come very soon.
The administration maintains that there are links between al Qaeda and Iraq
that justify war. But al Qaeda activists are present in more than 60 countries, in-
cluding Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Even within the administration, there are
skeptics about the links with Iraq. Intelligence analysts are concerned that intel-
ligence is being politicized to justify war.
The administration refuses to call the situation on the Korean Peninsxila what it
is — a genuine crisis. It refuses to directly engage the North Koreans in talks to per-
suade North Korea to end its nuclear program. By ignoring the North Korean crisis
in order to keep the focus on Iraq, many of us are deeply concerned that the admin-
istration has kept its eye on the wrong place.
North Korea can quickly produce a significant amount of nuclear materials and
even nuclear weapons for its own use or for terrorists to attack America and our
allies. North Korea is only months away from producing weapons-grade plutonium
and nuclear weapons. Desperate and strapped for cash, North Korea is the country
most likely to use weapons-grade plutonium as its "cash cow." It has already pro-
vided missile to nations like Iran, Syria, and Libya that support terrorists. Pluto-
nium could be sold in small amounts and traded among terrorist groups. In the fu-
ture, it could be used in nuclear weapons against us. If that is not a crisis, I don't
41
know what is. Clearly, the administration owes us a more convincing explanation
of its priorities.
Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Tenet, we have seen Americans called to
great concern over these past days. They are being urged to collect
3 days' worth of water, 3 days of food, plastic sheeting, and duct
tape. That is happening all over the country.
Now, let us be cold and frank about it. Is that because of the
danger of Iraq or is that because of the danger of al Qaeda?
Mr. Tenet. This threat is directly related to al Qaeda and
Osama bin Laden at this moment. That is what the predicate of
raising the threat level was, specific intelligence.
Senator Kennedy. That is the threat, I think, at least for Ameri-
cans today. Now, when Americans ask me, given that al Qaeda is
the threat they are being called to action for, why isn't the admin-
istration giving a fi'action of the attention to the dangers that al
Qaeda is presenting here at home that is giving to organizing a
war against Iraq? How do we answer that?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I would not agree with that at all. I think that
we
Senator Kennedy. You think the American people — let me just
ask you the question, then. Do you think the average American be-
lieves that this government is as focused on what the danger is
here at home as it is on the efforts that it is making to mobilize
the international community and the military in order to engage in
a war in Iraq?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I can only answer that from where I sit and
what I see and do every day. I can tell you that there is on our
part and the people we support an enormous amount of attention
being paid to al Qaeda and this threat, every day, in a very consid-
ered and considerable manner.
Senator Kennedy. Yesterday Mr. Muller reported that the al
Qaeda network will remain for the foreseeable ftiture the most im-
minent and serious threat facing this country. The organization
maintains the intent to inflict significant casualties in the United
States with little warning. Al Qaeda has developed a support infra-
structure inside the United States that will allow it to mount an-
other terrorist attack on U.S. soil, multiple-scale attacks against
sofl targets, banks, shopping centers, supermarkets, apartment
buildings, schools, universities, poisoning water and water supplies.
Then al Qaeda will probably continue to favor spectacular facts
that meet several criteria, high sjnnbolic value, mass casualties, se-
vere damage to the U.S. economy, the maximum psychological
trauma. Then it finally gets into Baghdad's capability and will to
use biological, chemical, and radiological weapons against U.S. do-
mestic targets in the event of a U.S. invasion. In the event of a
U.S. invasion.
Then it continues along: Our particular concern — this is the head
of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) — is that Saddam
Hussein may supply al Qaeda with biological, chemical, or radio-
logical material before or during a war with the U.S. to avenge the
fall of his regime.
The best testimony that we have from the head of the FBI says
that the greatest risk to American servicemen will come either be-
fore or during a war with Iraq or the fall of the regime, and Bagh-
42
dad has the capabihty to provide biological and chemical weapons
for use against U.S. domestic targets in the event of a U.S. inva-
sion.
Let me get back to you. You were very clear about what you
thought was the most imminent threat to the United States. The
President said the biggest threat is Iraq in the State of Union a
year ago. I think most Americans believe, particularly after what
they have heard in the very recent times, that this is where the
administration is focused. Your reaction?
Mr. Tenet. Senator, let me just take a few minutes because you
raised a number of important points. Let me put this poisons and
gas thing in some context. There are 116 people in jail in France,
in Spain, in Italy, and in Great Britain who received training and
guidance out of a network run by an individual who is sitting in
Baghdad today and supported by two dozen of his associates. Now,
that is something important for the American people to under-
stand. Iraq has provided a safe haven and a permissive environ-
ment for these people to operate in.
The other thing that is very telling to us, sir, just so I can close
the loop on this issue, is we also know from very reliable informa-
tion that there has been some transfer of training in chemical and
biologicals from the Iraqis to al Qaeda. So we are already in this
mix in a way that is very important for us to worry about. How
far it goes, how deep it is is a subject that we will continue to en-
tertain.
Senator Kennedy. Just on that point, here we have North Korea
that has provided technology and weapons to countries that are di-
rectly supporting terrorism. North Korea has provided items to
Iran, Syria, and other countries. They may very well have two nu-
clear weapons. We do not have to get into that, but there is no
question that they are going to be producing weapons-grade pluto-
nium which can be made into nuclear weapons within the next few
weeks.
They have provided the weapons to nations which have sup-
ported terrorism. We do not need another review. We do not need
another study. We know that they have done that. Why is that not
a crisis? You refuse to call it a crisis. Why is that not a crisis? Can
you give the assurance to the American people that it is getting as
much focus and attention as the mobilization in terms of the mili-
tary for
Mr. Tenet. Sir, if I can answer. It is a very serious problem. Ad-
miral Jacoby yesterday called it a crisis. I called it a serious prob-
lem. Let us split the difference. North Korean behavior, their pro-
liferation activities, their ballistic missile capabilities are all very
serious issues. They also must be dealt with. Policymakers are try-
ing to figure out an approach that deals with the Russians, Chi-
nese, Japanese, and South Koreans. This is a very important issue.
We are unfortunately in an environment where we have three or
four tough things to do simultaneously. Each approach, each sub-
ject will be different for the policymakers. You yourself highlighted
something that must be dealt with and that we are paying atten-
tion to and have to move on because it has serious consequences
as well, sir.
43
Chairman WARNER. Did you have adequate time to reply to that
in your judgment?
Mr. Tenet. Yes, I beheve I did.
Chairman Warner. Senator CoUins.
Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Tenet,
your testimony was that more than a third of the top al Qaeda
leadership identified before the war has been either captured or
killed. Obviously and unfortunately, that does not include Osama
bin Laden. But do you believe that Osama bin Laden is still in ac-
tive command of the al Qaeda network, or have we been suffi-
ciently successful that we have disrupted his ability to control the
network?
Mr. Tenet. Ma'am, I'd like to talk about all of that in closed ses-
sion with you.
Senator Collins. You had mentioned that your analysts are just
beginning their study of the tape that was relayed yesterday. Are
there any preliminary indications that the tape was intended as a
trigger or a signal to cells to attack?
Mr. Tenet. Ma'am, I think I would say the following to you. You
noted the previous two instances when he made tapes. On October
6, I said remarks were made shortly before the French oil tanker
was attacked, Limburg, the murder of the U.S. marine in Kuwait
and the Bali bombing. His 12 November statement was 11 days be-
fore the bombing in the hotel in Kenya, so one of the things we are
looking at is that he is obviously raising the confidence of his peo-
ple. He is obviously exhorting them to do more. Whether this is a
signal of impending attack or not is something we are looking at.
I can only tell you what the history is. What he has said has
often been followed by attacks which I think corroborates every-
thing that we are seeing while raising the threat warning in terms
of the specific information that we had at our disposal last week.
Senator Collins. Yesterday there were media reports that our
intelligence has detected the movement of Iraqi SCUD launcher
equipment next to mosques, that Saddam Hussein has moved ex-
plosives to Southern Iraq near the oilfields, and that he has posi-
tioned some of his military forces among civilian areas. Do those
developments suggest that if war comes that Saddam is going to
pursue a scorched earth strategy? Do you believe that those devel-
opments are substantiated? If the Vice Admiral would like to re-
spond, that would be fine, too.
Admiral Jacoby. Senator, there is a pattern over a considerable
number of years and it is being played out today. Saddam inter-
mingles combatants and civilian population. It is part of the strat-
egy to blend and to use the term human shields as part of his ap-
proaches, and that continues.
The parts of the question having to do with current disposition
of forces, I'd like to take on in closed session if I could. That way
I can give you some specifics about where he is on some of the
issues that are being presented.
Senator Collins. That would be fine. Director Tenet, I am also
troubled by press reports this week that the Iranian government
intends to develop uranium mines in the southern part of its coun-
try. While Iranian officials have contended that this step has been
undertaken to address civilian energy needs, I am concerned about
44
the implications for Iran's nuclear arms program. Could you please
comment on that?
Mr. Tenet. Yes, ma'am. We are concerned as well. We are going
to follow up on all of that reporting. We have some very specific
data for the classified session about specifically where the uranium
nuclear program is today. People who were supplying it may not
be supplying it, due to some improvements in Russian behavior in
this regard, but all of this is a piece and it comes back to my seri-
ous concern about how many countries are pursuing nuclear weap-
ons, how many countries are developing an indigenous capability to
do so, and the amount of foreign assistance that is available from
foreign states and networks that really make this a formidable
challenge when you lash it up to ballistic missile proliferation,
whether medium- or long-range.
Senator Collins. Has Iran been the impediment to the establish-
ment of the new government in Afghanistan?
Mr. Tenet. Well, I think you know that in the diplomatic part
of this when they went to Bonn and set this government up, I
think the record is the Iranians were helpful diplomatically in cre-
ating this government. I think every country on the border of Af-
ghanistan naturally has its own agenda. We initially, in the con-
flict, were concerned about Iranian assistance for safe haven or
conflict with the Taliban and al Qaeda remnants. So remember,
you have two governments, you are really dealing with two faces
in a country like Iran — spiritual leader and President Hatami — in
control of different services. This also creates different pictures of
this government's activity inside Afghanistan. But regarding your
specific question, they were very cooperative in Bonn as far as I
can tell.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. The Senator from West Virginia.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Director, a tran-
script of the Osama bin Laden tape has been available for at least
24 hours. Secretary of State Powell mentioned it yesterday morn-
ing. This Nation is at a heightened level of terrorist threat. We do
not have the luxury of time to analyze the Osama bin Laden tape
to death. Surely, you have completed at least a preliminary analy-
sis of the tape. What conclusions have you drawn thus far? Please
be as brief as you can because my time is short.
Mr. Tenet. Sir, as I said, I believe the tape represents an exhor-
tation to his followers. I believe he is trjdng to raise their con-
fidence, and we know that previous tapes occurred roughly prior to
attacks that have recently occurred. So the surface is very concern-
ing to us, and whether there is any other operational signal in this
tape or something we can glean from it, we will work on and get
back to you, sir.
Senator Byrd. Are the reports that the tape is evidence of a con-
nection between Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein — let me
repeat that. Are the reports that the tape is evidence of a present
and/or past connection between Osama bin Laden and Saddam
Hussein credible?
Mr. Tenet. Well, sir, what he says in the tape is unprecedented
in terms of the way he expresses solidarity with Baghdad. He talks
about fighting alongside Iraqi socialists, who he has generally con-
45
sidered un-Islamic, to defeat the crusaders. The IsraeHs would be
the crusaders, so I am trying to get underneath all of that to un-
derstand what the allusion and sjmibolism is. But on the surface,
and that is why I want to be precise when I come back to you, on
the surface he appears to be making some kind of a linkage, per-
haps for his own purposes. Whether he is aligning himself with the
Iraqi government or he is speaking to the Iraqi people, I just want
to be very precise when I comment on this. But it is a bit alarming
that he did it this way.
Senator Byrd. How do you feel about the reference to the word
Infidel applied to the Iraqis?
Mr. Tenet. Well, it goes back, I think, sir to historical allusions
that he has made about who's pure and who's not pure. Iraq has
been a secular society. It is a distinction that people have tried to
make, particularly in the terrorism world, which I don't make
much of. I think these distinctions get blurred easily. Again I need
a little bit more time to do work on that.
Senator Byrd. How much more time do you need?
Mr. Tenet. A day or two, sir.
Senator Byrd. Who is the greatest threat in your judgment, Mr.
Director, to the United States today? Who is the greatest threat
looking at the situation, if you can, 2 years from now, 3 years from
now, 5 years from now? Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden, or
Kim Jong II?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I hope that 2 or 5 years from now al Qaeda is
a diminished threat for this country. Obviously today we are worry-
ing deeply about al Qaeda and what threat it poses to this country.
In 2 to 5 years' time, someone like a Saddam Hussein may have
acquired a nuclear weapon and all of his capabilities would be en-
hanced and his relationship with these terrorist networks would
continue to develop, so they cause us concern.
Kim Jong II is a present threat with his ballistic missile and
weapons capability and weapons potential. So how you rack them
and stack them is difficult. How you deal with them in terms of
emerging layers is difficult and of great concern to the intelligence
community.
Senator Byrd. Does this concern with respect to al Qaeda per-
meate the highest echelons of the current administration in your
judgment?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, it does.
Senator Byrd. I wonder then out loud why this administration
did not support amendments that I offered with respect to the om-
nibus appropriation bill that was recently passed by the Senate,
amendments that would increase by on the order of $5 billion ap-
propriations to deal with al Qaeda and homeland defense. I am
wondering out loud. Do you have anything you might wonder out
loud with me about why the administration did not support that
$5 billion?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I rarely wonder but I really do not know.
Senator Byrd. Now it came back to $3 billion. I got the same
support from this administration with respect to homeland secu-
rity. $3 billion. The administration did not support those amend-
ments.
46
Mr. Tenet. Sir, can I give you my observation? The administra-
tion has been supportive as has the Appropriations Committee on
what we are doing in providing dollars for the overseas intelligence
community and the FBI. I do not know about the domestic side, sir.
Senator Byrd. I did not ask you about the other.
Mr. Tenet. Yes, sir, I understand that.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Director, in regard to Kim Jong II, it seems
to me that he is a threat that is as imminent, or perhaps more so,
directly to the United States than is Iraq. So if we say to our
friends in this world, if you are not with us, you are against us,
I wonder if we are not sowing dragon seeds as we look down the
road past the immediacy of Iraq. When we think about the nuclear
threat that is posed by North Korea, we say to our friends in the
United Nations, if you are not with us, you are against us. I won-
der as we get down the road how we are going to bring about bet-
ter cooperation and better union with respect to efforts in the
United Nations as we face a more determined and more imminent
and more powerful aggressor in the form of North Korea.
I wonder if we might look at France and those others who are
posing opposition to us today with respect to what we are trying
to do in Iraq, if we are not going to need them down the road. So
how can we say you are not with us, you are against us? It seems
to me we are being somewhat careless and self-righteous as we
look ahead.
Mr. Chairman, my time is up. To be limited to 6 minutes, that
is not necessarily your fault, but it is not like the old days when
we were able to follow a thread of thought to the end. Thank you,
Mr. Director.
Mr. Tenet. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Warner. I say to Mr. Byrd, I take note that we almost
have 100 percent attendance here this morning. Now that will con-
clude the first round here and at the completion of all recognitions
we will go into the closed session. I share your views, Senator, but
we are doing the very best we can.
Senator Byrd. I know you are doing that.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. The Senator from Texas.
Senator Cornyn. In the interest of time, I will reserve any ques-
tions I have for the closed session.
Chairman Warner. All right.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Director Tenet and Admiral Jacoby. I just returned last weekend
from Munich and talked to the Grerman officials and other NATO
officials, and one of the stumbling blocks for a more concerted effort
with respect to confronting Iran is a dispute about whether or not
there would be substantial links between Baghdad and terror
groups. Yesterday, in your testimony, Mr. Director, you cited
Zarqawi's presence in Baghdad, but also the press said he is not
under their control, words to that effect, is he an independent
envoy?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, he is a senior al Qaeda associate who has met
with Osama bin Laden, who has received money from al Qaeda
leadership, and is on my list of the top 30 individuals that are re-
quired to decapitate and denigrate this organization. Mr. Zarqawi
47
is on that list. The fact is that he is a contractor, he does things
on his own, but he has an intimate relationship with Osama bin
Laden and we have classified him as a senior al Qaeda associate.
Senator Reed. The issue is — and I want to be clear. I understand
your response. The issue is his relationship to Saddam Hussein, to
Baghdad, if he is operating in concert explicitly with Saddam Hus-
sein or is there for his own convenience and safety
Mr. Tenet. The argument, the specific line in evidence and argu-
ment we have made is they are providing safe haven to him, and
we know this because a foreign government approached the Iraqis
twice about Zarqawi's presence in Baghdad and he disappeared.
The second troubling piece of this, sir, is, as I mentioned yesterday,
the two dozen other associates and two senior Egyptian Islamic
Jihad associates are indistinguishable from al Qaeda because they
merged. The third piece I would say to you is Baghdad is not Gene-
va. It is inconceivable that these people are sitting there without
the Iraqi intelligence service's knowledge of the fact that there is
a safe haven being provided by people, to people who believe it is
fairly comfortable to operate there. That is as far as I can take the
story today.
Senator Reed. Following up, the presence of all of these individ-
uals you have cited are in Baghdad based on your information?
Mr. Tenet. Yes.
Senator Reed. Do you have any information, beyond providing
the safe haven, as you see it, clear evidence that the Iraqi regime
is facilitating their operations?
Mr. Tenet. That is what we are trying to understand more of,
sir. I will talk about this in closed session.
Senator Reed. With respect to Osama bin Laden's statement yes-
terday, and I know you have responded to Senator Bjrrd in terms
of your desire to look at it more closely, but some of the language
I think deserves to be enclosed here with respect to the supposed
collaboration and affiliation between al Qaeda and Baghdad. This
is the text I have: "On the threshold of this war, the war on the
infidels and disbelievers which is led by America and its agents
. . . First, the sincerity of the intent for the fight should be for the
sake of Allah only, not for the victory of national minorities or for
aid of the infidel regimes in all Arab countries, including Iraq,"
which seems to be a statement not of unconditional support for
Baghdad by Saddam Hussein for his regime. In fact, he is lumped
into the same category as we are, as an infidel.
Mr. Tenet. Sir, you are talking about an individual who is a
master at deception, an individual that understands all linkages
being made all over the world about this. Let us be careful about
placing a lot of credence on distinctions that he is making here. I'd
like the opportunity to just be careful about it and look at it, but
the kind of language and solidarity he talks about with Baghdad
is something we want to look at more carefully inside the text.
Senator Reed. I encourage you to do that but I think you have
to confront this language and put it in a logical context. I urge you
to do that. Admiral Jacoby, you are in an interesting position
where you have access to collaboration with the Central Intel-
ligence Agency and yet you provide specific support to the war
fighters in examining targets in Iraq. This whole issue of how
48
much information and what tj^De of information has been disclosed
to the defectors, and I asked you to generally comment. If we put
the target list between developing attack issues, weapons of mass
destruction sites, and we laid next to that the information that we
are providing to the inspectors, would that be essentially the same
list?
Admiral Jacoby. Senator, I haven't tried to do a side by side
comparison, but we are working from the same shared information
on trjdng to develop that list so I would expect commonality.
Senator Reed. Has anybody done that side by side comparison to
essentially check the judgment of the intelligence authority and
judgment of the military authorities for planning this operation?
Admiral Jacoby. I am not sure whether it has been laid down
that way or not, sir.
Senator Reed. Mr. Tenet, are you aware of anybody doing that
side by side?
Mr. Tenet. No, sir.
Senator Reed. Turning to North Korea, it seems increasingly
clear that if we do nothing during the next several weeks or
months, they will have sufficient plutonium, marketable quantities,
and that is a shuddering concept. Are we reasonably confident we
are beginning to identify the possible links to terror groups that
might attempt to acquire this material, Mr. Tenet?
Mr. Tenet. I do not have any specific links that I have developed
to terror groups out of the North Korean context at this moment.
Senator Reed. Are we looking hard?
Mr. Tenet. We always do worry. We have this kind of capability.
Senator Reed. I agree with you that the frightening potential of
nuclear power is emerging. You mentioned they were nonstate ac-
tors in many cases. You are identifying those and is the presump-
tion that our policy will be preemption of nonstate actors?
Mr. Tenet. I am not making a policy prescription but we are
working hard to identify companies, people, things that do not look
like states. We see a number of these popping up around the world.
That causes us concern. The policy towards Baghdad would be not
ours, but our job first and foremost is to gather as much informa-
tion as possible to lay down before the policymakers so they can
make determinations.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much. The Senator from
Colorado.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to start out
by asking Vice Admiral Jacoby about conventional forces in North
Korea, artillery, tanks, as well as missiles. What is your assess-
ment of their capability to sustain that force in combat?
Admiral JACOBY. Senator, they have the capability to sustain for
a considerable period of time what is basically a very large but also
not a high-tech kind of force in being. So armaments, weapons, am-
munition, and so forth have been stored for considerable periods of
time and they have had that kind of force capability for many dec-
ades.
Senator Allard. I am going to change the questioning to Russia
and their intercontinental ballistic missile force. Vice Admiral, we
are aware that that force continues to age and in your prepared
testimony, you mentioned that the SS-27 is several years behind
49
schedule. Do you see a decline in the size of Russia's missile force
in the next 10 years? Then also could you elaborate on how the
Moscow Treaty affects the tough decisions that Russia may have to
make in the future?
Admiral Jacoby. Sir, our assessment is that their force level will
decline, and the SS-27 fielding is a problem they are having. Sir,
I need to take the treaty question for the record and get back to
you. I am not specific on the details and the applications against
our assessment.
Senator Allard. If you would provide a response to me, I'd ap-
preciate that.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Moscow Treaty gives both parties the flexibiUty to structure their strategic
offensive forces as they see fit, and leaves each side to carry out reductions — or to
modernize its forces — essentially under its own terms, within the treaty's stated lim-
its (1,700-2,200 operationally deployed strategic warheads).
Prior to the Moscow Treaty, Russia had begun to move away fi"om its traditional
emphasis on land-based missiles (ICBMs) and shift resources to the naval leg of its
strategic triad, which under START II could have continued to deploy MIRVed
sealaunched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). However, since START II — which would
have banned land-based MIRVs — did not go into effect, the Russians may now hold
on to older MIRVed ICBMs, such as the SS-18s and SS-19s. As a result, Russia
has reemphasized the role of land-based systems within the triad. However, we be-
lieve that over the next decade, the retention of aging land-based systems will likely
come at the expense of modernization, constraining the production and deployment
of new ICBMs such as the SS-27. In fact, the commander of Russia's ICBM force
has publicly noted the negative impact that the retention of older systems will have
on modernization efforts.
We believe that for practical reasons the Russian strategic nuclear forces will de-
cline over the next decade regardless of whether there were arms control constraints
or not to a level probably below the treaty's warhead limits. Therefore, it is more
likely that Russia is looking to the Moscow Treaty as a means of constraining U.S.
strategic forces, rather than as a planning tool for its own force development.
Mr. Tenet, a number of weeks back, Condoleezza Rice said we
are expecting compliance with eliminating weapons of mass de-
struction. I think she cited three countries. Most frequently, it says
South Africa opened their country up for inspection. Ukraine and
Kazakhstan are also mentioned. I got the impression from her com-
ments that all three of those countries were markedly different
than what we are facing in Iraq.
I was wondering if you could lay out for the committee the dif-
ferences between what you saw happening in those three countries
and what has happened in Iraq in some fairly explicit terms?
Mr. Tenet. I apologize, Senator, but I do not have the explicit
details of those places right on the tip of my tongue. I will come
back with a piece of paper.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Tenet did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be re-
tained in committee files.
Senator Allard. I did not mean to broadside you on that.
Mr. Tenet. That is all right.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I have questions for closed ses-
sion so I will yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Warner. Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Tenet, in your written testimony, you men-
tioned that Libya is developing weapons of mass destruction and
that since 1999, Libya has increased, and I quote, "its access to
50
dual-use nuclear technologies." My question to you is do you have
any assessment about how long it will be before Libya has a nu-
clear weapon, and can you share that assessment with us now?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, we can do that in closed session.
Senator Akaka. Director Tenet, I have heard about recent public
diplomatic differences with European allies. Have these differences
with European allies had an effect on their cooperation with us or
us with them in efforts to fight terrorism? Specifically, are we with-
holding useful intelligence from them or vice versa, or other types
of cooperation?
Mr. Tenet. No, sir. In fact, in the war on terror, our European
allies have been extremely supportive of what we are doing. We
work hand in glove with them. This whole network that I alluded
to is something that we have worked very closely on with them, so
the level of intelligence services, military services, law enforcement
relationships, they are all very good. I know there are other issues,
but it has not impacted our work on terrorism with them one bit.
In fact, all of that is quite enhanced.
Senator Akaka. Admiral Jacoby stated, Director Tenet, that he
expects an increase in Pakistani and Iranian proliferation. Do you
share that concern and can you indicate at all in public session the
direction of Pakistani and Iranian proliferation efforts?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I apologize but we should talk about this in
closed session. I apologize for that answer. It is more appropriate
there.
Senator Akaka. Admiral Jacoby, yesterday the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee held an open hearing on the post-war situa-
tion in Iraq. I have pursued a post-war Iraqi plan that I feel we
should have. My question to you is what is your assessment con-
cerning the attitude the post-war Iraqi military would have to-
wards Israel?
Admiral Jacoby. Sir, I think what we are going to find, and now
I mean particularly in the assessment, I think what we are going
to find is that the Iraqi military is separated fi-om the regime's po-
sitions and policies. We might find that they feel very differently
about the situations in the region than the present regime. But sir,
that is something to be discovered down the road, I think.
Senator Akaka. Do you envision that the United States would be
able to construct an Iraqi military capable of meeting Iraq's legiti-
mate defense needs, which will not still harbor anti-Israeli feel-
ings?
Admiral Jacoby. Our assessment is that we will be able to work
to construct an Iraqi military sufficient to meet their defensive
needs. On the political orientation, sir, I think that is still some-
thing to be determined as we work through this.
Senator Akaka. In reading your statement, I share your concern
about general technology proliferation and I want to commend the
work done by DIA's futures division. I know that getting ahead of
the curve is becoming harder and yet more critical. As you men-
tioned in your testimony, our technological advantage is going to
erode and the long-term trends concerning WMD and missile pro-
liferation are bleak. It is important that senior policymakers, espe-
cially those involved in formulating our strategies for military
transformation, utilize assessments by groups like DIA's futures di-
51
vision. Is there a process to ensure that this takes place? Has Sec-
retary Rumsfeld been briefed by the futures division?
Admiral Jacoby. Yes, sir. Our futures division work gets to him
regularly. My promise to you, sir, is even in this period of chal-
lenges between the stresses of the current situations and the need
for predictive assessments in the future, we have fenced off the fu-
tures divisions and I am making every effort to strengthen that ef-
fort, which is predictive. It is future threat, warning, avoidance of
surprise is an area where we need to increase investment. We are
very aware of that, sir, and it is a focused area for me.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your response.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Talent.
Senator TALE^rT. I think I am going to reserve for the closed ses-
sion.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
thank the directors for being here today. My first question for Di-
rector Tenet is one that perhaps you will want to address during
the closed and classified session. I understand that the IAEA will
issue a report later this month on the nuclear program for Iran. Do
you have an opinion based on the information that is available now
on how long it would take Iran to develop a nuclear program on
a par with, let us say, North Korea's nuclear program? I ask you
first if you have an opinion on that. If you do, you probably want
to express it in the closed session.
Mr. Tenet. Yes, sir. It is incorporated into my classified state-
ment.
Senator Ben Nelson. Inspectors from the IAEA were expelled
from North Korea last fall as we all know and shortly thereafter.
North Korea withdrew from the NPT. Assuming that these inspec-
tors are not expelled from Iran, for example, we would still have
some international monitoring of Iran's nuclear program as a sig-
natory of the NPT, but as we have learned from the North Korean
case, monitoring requires a permissive environment. In North Ko-
rea's case they did not want to fully reveal the extent of their nu-
clear program. This committee, of course, as well as the Intel-
ligence Committee, has discussed with you and others in the ad-
ministration the importance of human intelligence but also the im-
portance of proper funding for satellite and other technological in-
telligence capabilities.
With the proliferation of nuclear technology and the number of
nuclear powers or would-be powers and want-to-be powers growing
every day, it is important that decision makers have reliable intel-
ligence. Are you satisfied with the level of funding provided in the
fiscal year 2004 budget for this purpose?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, going back to last year when the President sub-
mitted the 5-year defense program and the intelligence fund, we
have experienced very important growth to sustain our collection
capabilities. I think Admiral Jacoby and I would tell you we are
carefully discussing how to enhance these capabilities with the Sec-
retary of Defense. We talked about this a bit yesterday in the Intel-
ligence Committee, the issue of global coverage and the coverage of
52
all the things people would expect us to have knowledge about or
information about is a daunting challenge for us. But nevertheless,
the Secretary and I are working through this very carefully, and
we are very pleased with the level of resources we have been pro-
vided going forward.
We may come back for more, but we want to do that in a consid-
ered way so that when we talk to you about this there is some pro-
grammatic content to it.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you. Vice Admiral Jacoby, I met
yesterday with Defense Minister Ramirez from Colombia to discuss
the war on terrorism and other transnational threats, specifically
drug trafficking, that we are continuing to encounter. You mention
in your written testimony that terrorism in general and principally
the threat posed by al Qaeda is the most important priority of the
DIA.
My question concerns the FARC and Colombia. The Colombian
government maintains that the Irish Republican Army and the
Basque separatist groups from Spain have ties to the FARC and
argues therefore that their internal conflict has wider ramifications
for the war on terrorism. What intelligence do you have through
the DIA that would link these terrorist groups together, if you can
speak about it in open session?
Admiral Jacoby. I can speak to it in closed session, sir. I would
add that the concern with the FARC is a very real one for us with
the official U.S. presence in Colombia. Obviously we have a respon-
sibility for information flow to the State Department and our Ma-
rine guards and so forth as part of the diplomatic presence, too.
The worrisome part for us was that for many years, the FARC ex-
cluded the U.S. from their target list. Recently they have changed
their statements, although they have not yet executed attacks spe-
cifically directed against U.S. official presence here. That is a con-
cern for us.
So we are worried about a changing situation in Colombia and
it is getting attention from us at the appropriate level.
Senator Ben Nelson. Do you have the access to the kind of in-
formation you need to help us be informed on the basis of intel-
ligence that is reliable, credible, and helpful?
Admiral Jacoby. We have insights. Do we have access that
makes me comfortable that we have the situation well assessed in
the land? No, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. That is probably not because of any reluc-
tance to share, it is because of the ability to access it.
Admiral Jacoby. It is certainly not a problem with sharing it. It
is the level of detailed specificity, time and place kind of threat in-
formation for a country that is as large as Colombia that is a major
issue for them.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Da5d;on.
Senator Dayton. I want to thank both of you for your extraor-
dinary service to our country at this critical time. Director Tenet,
I would agree with your testimony that the burden of proof is en-
tirely on Saddam Hussein and I believe as you said that we would
find if we were able to make a complete inspection that those
caches of chemical and biological materials the President outlined
53
in his State of the Union Address are largely still there; and those
constitute violations of the U.N. sanctions, as the Secretary of
State evidenced last week with what has been detected to date.
The United States has confronted dangerous dictators with weap-
ons of mass destruction for 55 years since World War II and the
essence of the critique you made today against Saddam Hussein
could be applied to Nikita Khrushchev and other leaders of the
former Soviet Union in years past, making linkages with anti-U.S.
and anti-west operatives around the world, and to Chinese leaders
in decades past and even North Korea today. Vice Admiral, you
have stated the most serious threat to the U.S. regional interests
in a generation but the United States has not launched preemptive
strikes to eliminate those threats. Those threats remain serious
and ongoing, even increasing.
Those countries have leaders which we distrusted, yet no demo-
cratic President acted to remove them or disarm them, and the pri-
mary reason I believe was that doctrine of mutually-assured de-
struction, that an attack by the United States would result in an
assured destruction of our cities, our countryside, our social net-
works, and civilian casualties that would be unforeseeable in num-
ber.
So when I read reports of the last week that our threat level has
been increased and read what Director MuUer predicted yesterday,
that a U.S. attack would result in retaliatory attacks against the
United States within our borders, I ask myself why would we ex-
pect otherwise? Why wouldn't we expect that Saddam Hussein
would retaliate, as we would if we were attacked those years past
by the Soviet Union or some other enemy, and with as much de-
struction in this country, within our borders as possible?
To what extent do you assess that as an ongoing threat and is
it factored in to the decision to proceed militarily against Iraq?
Why is Iraq different? If we do proceed with military action against
Iraq, why is Iraq different from North Korea today, from all the
threats in the years past?
Mr. Tenet. You are asking intelligence and policy questions. I
will give you my view in any event. The interesting thing about
Iraq, of course, is that Iraq, even though its army is a third of the
size it was 10 or 11 years ago, it is still larger than all the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and Arab nations combined.
The difference with Iraq, one difference you have to remember is
that in the last 15 years he has crossed two borders twice. Of con-
cern to us just from an intelligence persuasion
Senator Dayton. When did those occur?
Mr. Tenet. You had Kuwait, the Iran-Iraq war
Senator Dayton. In the last 12 years?
Mr. Tenet. 15 years.
Senator Dayton. In the last 12 years?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I will provide it for the record. I had 15 years
in my mind.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Tenet did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be re-
tained in committee files.
The other thing is that he is going to get a nuclear weapon soon-
er or later. Our estimate is that with fissile material he could have
54
it within a year or 2. He will enhance his ballistic missile capabil-
ity with that material; and his biological weapons capability is far
bigger than it was at the time of the Gulf War and he has chemical
weapons capability that he hasn't declared. So you put that in the
context of a region that is a little bit different from what you look
at in North Korea, because you go to South Korea with a large dip-
lomatic presence and the Chinese and South Korea that are dif-
ferent in terms of their strength and overall stature than the coun-
tries he faces in this region.
At the end of the day, you have to make a determination about
how to best deal with this problem. At the end of the day, you have
to ask yourself whether, after 10 or 12 years of dealing with proc-
ess, he has fundamentally complied with it. Whether you wake up
in 3 or 4 years and face the prospect of the issues that I walked
through. Those are valid and important issues for people to debate.
All we can do is lay down the facts of what the concerns are.
Senator Dayton. My time is limited so let me just go on. Today's
Washington Post reported on your remarks yesterday, your testi-
mony as "signaling that the Bush administration has concluded
that without enforcement the era in which countries were encour-
aged by treaties and self-regulation to avoid developing nuclear
weapons may be coming to an end. Such a conclusion would but-
tress the new national security doctrine which suggests strikes
against nuclear powers and nuclear defenses." Is that, in your
view, the policy we are entering into, preemptive strikes against
potential nuclear powers?
Mr. Tenet. When I wrote the statement, I had no policy in mind
other than to attempt to say to you — I did not talk about policies
yesterday. I basically said that my concern was that the Non-
proliferation Treaty regime was being battered in a way that con-
tinues to undermine a foundation that we have used for many
years. Given my concern that proliferation will loom larger, do we
have the right regime in place? What should it be replaced with?
How active should we become?
Those are policy questions I would have to answer but I was re-
flecting on my look at the world and the concerns I have.
Senator Dayton. One last question, please. Regarding the Iraq-
al Qaeda connection. I would agree with what I understood your
assertion being, that the evidence of a linkage you have presented
here has increased, but it seems to have increased since the admin-
istration announced that it intended to go to war. Prior to last Oc-
tober, the reports I have received — and I have sat in quite a num-
ber of briefings — those connections were far more tenuous than the
one that you presented today, that the enemy of my enemy is my
friend. It doesn't surprise me that Saddam Hussein has been reach-
ing out in the last months to as many prospective allies as he could
possibly find in the face of possible U.S. invasion, and it is not sur-
prising that Osama bin Laden would seize on this crisis to exploit
it to advance his anti-U.S. and anti-Israel agenda.
That is the reality we have today based on your reports, whether
we like it or not. It seems to increase the specter or likelihood that
an attack is going to be portrayed as an attack against Arab na-
tions, and as you said, that we are going to see the kind of retalia-
55
tions that we saw on September 11, as part of their effort to foment
this rebelUon against what they view as the infidel.
Mr. Tenet. Let me just comment on one of your points. This is
an iterative business and very dynamic from the way it changes.
If you go back and look at my testimony to this committee, I think
in October, when we talked about WMD, when you look at the clas-
sified terrorism section, it mentioned Zarqawi, it mentioned Egyp-
tian Islamic Jihad operatives. What has happened is an explosion
in our knowledge and understanding and depth, additional sources,
people we have at our disposal working with our European allies.
This thing moves every day. It is very dynamic. But you said
something that I have to push back on, because we do not cook the
case for anybody to make a policy. We never do that. We would
never do that. We would never allow it. I would never allow it.
Senator Dayton. I wasn't implying that, sir. What I understood
it to be was the amount of contacts, the degree of connection be-
tween those two entities, it has increased in the last few months
compared to what they were prior to, say, October of last year.
Mr. Tenet. We have provided some interesting papers to the
committee about contacts that go back to the Sudanese time period
in the mid-1990s and an extensive paper on all of this. It is a tough
issue that you are constantly trying to connect the dots on, and in
the terrorism environment remember, everybody can connect the
dots. There are lots of dots here that people have to be careful to
connect in the right way and be quite dispassionate about how you
portray it. But this is a serious issue and we have to be very mind-
ful of it.
Senator Dayton. I credit you, in both these appearances and
those classified briefings, for being as forthright, candid, and giving
up the information and knowledge you say that is a constantly
shifting set of information.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you Senator.
Senator Bayh.
Senator Bayh. Gentlemen, I have 6 minutes and six questions so
I am going to move expeditiously. If I could ask you to do the same,
I would appreciate it. Admiral, I hope you won't take it personally
that most of my inquiries are for the Director. My first question.
Director, is I know we have finite resources and there is debate
today about how many crises we can handle well simultaneously.
My direct question to you is, is there anything that we could do to
combat al Qaeda or to apprehend or kill Osama bin Laden that we
are not doing because of the current focus on Iraq?
Mr. Tenet. No, sir.
Senator Bayh. I want to follow up on a question that was asked,
I think by Senator Akaka, with regard to cooperation from Ger-
many, France, Belgium, or some of the countries that we have a
difference of opinion with Iraq. I understood your answer to be that
there has been no undermining of the intelligence cooperation with
those countries and that that has not undermined our efforts to
combat terrorism. Is that correct?
Mr. Tenet. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Bayh. With regard to Iraq and the potential action,
there have been concerns expressed that this action will lead to ad-
ditional recruits for al Qaeda or other potential terrorist organiza-
56
tions. Obviously that is a concern. You never want to do anything
to create a more fertile field for the creation of extremists who
might turn against the United States. My understanding has been
that a lack of manpower has not been their problem, that there has
been no shortage of operatives to carry out attacks. There have
been other things that have constrained their attacks on the
United States. Is that a correct view?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, they train thousands of people in their camps in
Afghanistan. Manpower isn't the issue. Brain power, money, lots of
foot soldiers willing to volunteer, tens of thousands of people who
are trained in those camps. So it is not a manpower question as
much as the other issues.
Senator Bayh. That is not an element that leads to few or poten-
tial attacks to the country, the lack of manpower?
Mr. Tenet. No, sir.
Senator Bayh. With regard to Iraq and al Qaeda — you might not
be able to answer this in open session. There have been press re-
ports to the effect that there have been al Qaeda sympathizers in
our country. There have been press reports to the effect that there
have been Iraqi operatives in our country. I won't ask you about
all that. I am just curious, as Senator Byrd and others have men-
tioned, about the alarm in the country today. What level of assur-
ance do we have? Have you identified all these folks? What is the
probability that there are some out there, we just do not know they
are here?
Mr. Tenet. In terms of terrorists?
Senator Bayh. Iraqi agents or al Qaeda operatives.
Mr. Tenet. I can't give you a guarantee that Bob Muller and I
have identified everybody in this country who may be affiliated
with a terrorist organization. All I can give you is my certain
knowledge that over the last 14 months we are better off than we
were in terms of our knowledge and operations and sharing of
data. So I can't give you that assurance, sir.
Senator Bayh. I appreciate your giving it the best shot that you
can.
Chairman Warner. Senator, we will provide the transcript for
you of yesterday's intelligence hearing, at which time the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigations addressed that question.
Senator Bayh. Two final questions. Again, this one I understand
might be more appropriate for the closed hearing, but there have
been a lot of public reports to the effect that North Korea probably
has a nuclear device already. What kind of probability do you think
exists that they currently have a nuclear device?
Mr. Tenet. I think we have unclassified the fact that they prob-
ably have one or two plutonium-based devices today.
Senator Bayh. Probably. Between 50 and 100? Where would you
put that?
Mr. Tenet. I think one or two is a very good judgment.
Senator Bayh. How about if they fired missiles over Japan?
What is the likelihood they have a missile currently capable of hit-
ting the United States?
Mr. Tenet. I think the declassified answer is yes, they could do
that.
57
Senator Bayh. They have the abiUty to deUver nuclear warheads
to the west coast of the United States. Obviously that is very trou-
bhng.
My final question is an attempt to look beyond the horizon a lit-
tle bit at other threats. It was raised by Senator Nelson. That is
the issue of the FARC.
There have been troubling things recently — the bombing in
downtown Bogota. Our increased involvement there is not just
against the war on drugs. It is to battle the insurgency. People
move from Colombia into and out of the United States very fre-
quently. I was at a conference on Colombia in December where an
individual indicated he had met with FARC officials who had U.S.
passports. So you combine urban bombings, the fact that they are
beginning to focus on us as a direct adversary, and a significant
flow back and forth between the United States and FARC
operatives in this country. Am I justified in being worried about
this threat, thinking that looking down the road this is something
that could come home here to the heartland in a very direct way?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I actually asked that question this morning be-
cause we had a discussion about Colombia. There is an excellent
question about whether you extend that to here. The question was
regarding specific targeting at specific facilities. The FARC is tak-
ing it to the urban environment. Obviously you see the health club,
that they really touched a vulnerable point.
Senator Bayh. I am concerned about what could happen down
the road, if you game this out this could come home.
Mr. Tenet. Let me come back to you with an answer.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Tenet did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be re-
tained in committee files.
Chairman Warner. Director Tenet, do you wish to refine your
reply to that very important question regarding the North Korean
delivery system and probability of a warhead, whether those sys-
tems are capable? I think it is an important statement for the
record.
Mr. Tenet. Sir, let me let it stand where it is until we — yes, sir.
Let me leave it stand where it is. I do not want to give classified
information.
Chairman WARNER. Senator Clinton.
Senator CLINTON. Thank you. I want to thank you for the hard
work that your teams are doing. I just have several questions that
have not been addressed yet. In his State of the Union, President
Bush proposed a Terrorist Threat Integration Center, a central lo-
cation, as I understand it, where all foreign and domestically gen-
erated terrorist threat information and intelligence would be gath-
ered, assessed, and coordinated. As I further understand it, it
would include elements from the CIA, the FBI, the new Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense, but
that the director would report to the Director of Central Intel-
ligence. So far, is that a correct description?
Mr. Tenet. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Clinton. One of the difficulties that I still see us strug-
gling with is the coordination between national agencies and
sources of information with State and local law enforcement offi-
58
cials. I am particularly concerned not only about what goes down
but what comes up. The fact is that our front line defenders with
respect to any terrorist attacks here on our own shores are local
law enforcement personnel. What steps are being taken as you de-
sign this department to ensure first that our local law enforcement
officials will receive the information they need in a both timely and
thorough enough manner; and second, that you will be receiving in-
formation?
As I just think about it, this is an overwhelming task, and I have
to say clearly here in this committee that we are focused on the
external and international emerging threats and their connections
with what goes on here at home, but I really do believe we have
not given adequate support to our local law enforcement first re-
sponders. We must have an intelligence and information gathering
system that works far better than it ever used to in the past.
Frankly, there were lots of conflicts as to what information would
or would not be shared. So where are we in planning that, Mr.
Tenet?
Mr. Tenet. It would be good if Director Muller were here but I
will tell you what I know.
Senator Clinton. You will be the overall director?
Mr. Tenet. This is an anal3rtical component and essentially what
we want to do is get all the threat information together, much as
we did this morning, that has law enforcement and intelligence
feeds so it is all seamless to make sure we have the right terrorist
tracking database in one place that is available to State and local
governments, to police forces. What we collect overseas, what we
can hand over. The other thing that we think we have to do a heck
of a lot more, if you put your finger on something, is give State and
local police departments texture and understanding of what they
look for, how they use their intelligence divisions, how they use the
officer on the beat.
This is a daunting challenge. This is something that the Director
of the FBI is taking on because of his rather direct relationship to
what we are trjdng to do in creating this kind of integrated analyt-
ical center. There are lots of things that we can pass. For example,
we have an excellent relationship with the New York City Police
Department and the Washington police. Obviously New York and
Washington are special places, but we need to be able to pass to
Milwaukee and Seattle and every place else in this country texture,
understanding, context. You do not have to give up sources and
methods for this human operator, but you need to give those men
and women the opportunity to find out what we are looking for
when we go to orange.
There is an enormous amount of data we have started to push
out the door about chemical and biological attacks, what to look for
and how to protect Americans from them. One of our objectives is
to have a place where we can push this out to law enforcement.
The FBI can be at the proper front end, where we can have officials
understand what the threat is without developing very much.
Senator Clinton. This is an issue that concerns me greatly and
I look forward to continuing to receive updates on how this is oc-
curring. Second, last month the British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC) reported that British officials believe al Qaeda successfully
59
built a crude radiological device, commonly referred to as a dirty
bomb, in Afghanistan. What intelligence do we have regarding the
veracity of this report from British intelligence? Admiral Jacoby, if
you have additional insight into this I would appreciate hearing it.
Mr. Tenet. I would say that BBC and British intelligence may
be two separate entities. We know they had a keen interest in de-
veloping a radiological device, and our whole thought process ana-
lytically and operationally is to prove the negative, that you did not
get one or you did not get a nuclear weapon. I have never seen any
reporting that suggests they successfully tested a radiological de-
vice from any source, our own, or British, I have never seen our
reporting. I can check but I have never seen it. Senator.
Senator Clinton. You agree with that. Admiral Jacoby?
Admiral Jacoby. Yes. We have found nothing in our investiga-
tions of Afghanistan.
Senator Clinton. The leader of Hamas, who has carried out nu-
merous bombings in Israel, released an open letter that said Mus-
lims should threaten western interests and strike them anywhere.
This is a very new development as I understand the history of
Hamas, which has primarily been focused on fighting the Israeli
government and the Israeli people. To what extent does Hamas
pose a direct threat now to Americans both here and abroad?
Mr. Tenet. Well, you are quite correct about where their target-
ing has been focused on but I would have to go back and talk to
Bob Muller about what he perceives this threat to be here. The way
you are isolating it is exactly right. All of these groups, a group like
Hamas in particular operates in a constrained geographic region
where they have comparative advantages but obviously the concern
would be how they migrate those here. I will come back to that.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Tenet did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be re-
tained in committee files.
Chairman WARNER. Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. I have just a couple of quick questions about al
Qaeda and Director Tenet, I would like to direct those to you if pos-
sible. My first is a follow-up on Senator Bayh's very good question-
ing about al Qaeda and their capabilities and the manpower that
they have. You mentioned that there were two facts. One is that
we have disabled, if I could use that term, a lot of their leadership,
and also, second, that they trained potentially thousands of troops,
if you can call them that, or thousands of foot soldiers or believers,
whatever you want to say, in Afghanistan and other places around
the world.
Is al Qaeda at the present time growing?
Mr. Tenet. Well, I think that the most important point I would
make is because you have taken the sanctuary away and the abil-
ity to train an unlimited capability and unlimited resource for im-
punity, you hurt the ability of the organization to grow. There is
no doubt about that, to train and deploy people. Whether people
are motivated by the message and are comfortable with them or —
is a different category, but I would say once we took the sanctuary
away and we put them on the run and put them at greater risk,
we jeopardized their ability to grow with trained operatives.
Senator Pryor. Do they have a new sanctuary?
60
Mr. Tenet. Nothing that rivals what we once saw in Afghani-
stan. None. What we are trying to do is find where they may mi-
grate to in the same kind of mass and scope.
Senator Pryor. Is it your perception that as some leadership is
removed from the picture, other leadership is developing?
Mr. Tenet. Well, that is — I'd like to talk about that in closed ses-
sion. Senator.
Senator Pryor. The last thing I have on al Qaeda is we hear a
lot about it. For years, really, but certainly after September 11,
there is not an American today that doesn't know a little some-
thing about it, and I assume that in your view, it would be cat-
egorized as the most dangerous terrorist organization with regard
to America's national security.
Mr. Tenet. It is the most dangerous terrorist organization that
has attacked the United States but I will tell you that Hezbollah
is an organization of capability, of worldwide presence, that is an
equal if not far more capable organization, if you can believe that.
It is a very capable organization.
Senator Pryor. That was my question. What is number two?
Mr. Tenet. I would say Hezbollah. I actually think they are a
notch above in terms of the relationship with the Iranians. The
training they received puts them in a state-sponsor supported cat-
egory with a potential for lethality that is quite great.
Senator Pryor. I assume they are organized a little differently
than al Qaeda but it sounds like they are also kind of a loose-knit
organization out there. Do they have a safe haven?
Admiral Jacoby. Actually, Hezbollah is much tighter, much more
structured, much more organized in sort of a traditional sense,
whereas al Qaeda is a loose network and I might add that one of
the things, in your first question about numbers, we certainly
learned in the U.S.S. Cole attack was that there were a few al
Qaeda operatives that ran the operation but they drew fi-om this
larger group of Mujaheddin who they had fought with previously,
who are not sworn to al Qaeda, who did not have allegiance. So
when we get into discussions about relative numbers, the training
camps are gone but the people who would share beliefs and join up
for a specific operation are yet another aspect of this whole prob-
lem.
Senator Pryor. Does Hezbollah have a primary training facility,
or training region, or safe haven, as we talked about it before?
Mr. Tenet. Southern Lebanon is a place of great concern obvi-
ously.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. Senator.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, Senator Pryor has a little of his
6 minutes left.
Chairman Warner. Senator, if you ask for a minute or 2, Sen-
ator Levin and I are prepared to grant that.
Senator Byrd. I'd like to reserve on that. He is asking about
training of al Qaeda.
Chairman Warner. If you wish to follow up.
Senator Byrd. I wonder if al Qaeda has any training camp or
camps in this country? I seem to remember — and I do not have to-
days newspaper report in fi-ont of me — something that is attrib-
61
uted to you to the extent that there are al Qaeda training camps
in this country. Am I right or wrong?
Mr. Tenet. No, sir. I don't beheve you are correct. Not attributed
to me. No, sir. I don't beUeve the Director of the FBI would say we
have ever found an3dhing Hke that in this country.
Senator Byrd. So there is nothing that you know about?
Mr. Tenet. Nothing that I know about, sir.
Chairman Warner. Senator Byrd, do you wish to conclude? Then
we will go to our executive session in SH-219.
Senator Byrd. I take this opportunity to align myself with a
high-ranking member in his remarks. I think I subscribe to those
remarks 100 percent. The Director has said more than once that
the burden is upon Iraq and not on the inspectors. This response
has come in answer to a question as to the efficacy of having more
inspectors in Iraq. There are some nations that are advocating that
we increase the number of inspectors and I believe I heard the Di-
rector say that in response to that proposal that the burden is not
on the inspectors but on Iraq. Am I correct in having heard you say
that?
Mr. Tenet. Yes, sir, I believe I said that.
Senator Byrd. Is it not true, Mr. Director, that if the inspectors
are increased this would increase the problems for Saddam Hus-
sein in his attempts to deceive the inspectors and deceive the
United Nations? Would it not also provide additional information
to the people of the world and to the people of this country who
are about to send their sons and daughters into Iraq? Would it not
serve some good purposes, even though somewhat of the burden
may be, if we use a political answer and a rhetorical answer, yes
the burden is on Saddam Hussein, not on the inspectors? But
would it not provide some additional information to the people?
Would it not make it more difficult for Saddam Hussein to continue
in his course of deception?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I doubt it. I would respectfully disagree. I think
that his practices and the way he has organized himself, the very
elaborate regime that he has in place, I am doubtful that it would
make much of a difference.
Senator Byrd. It seems to me that common sense reasoning, and
I don't claim to have all of the common sense on my side, but it
seems to me that common sense reasoning would indicate that the
more inspectors that are put in, it is going to increase the burden
upon Saddam Hussein.
But aside from that, I think we also have a burden. I think there
is not only a burden on the inspectors and on Saddam Hussein, but
I think this country has a burden, a burden to attempt to do what-
ever it possibly can do, particularly at this junction, to avoid war.
Wars kill people. It seems to me we have a burden. This country
has a burden to bend over backwards and it has done some of that
already, but it seems to me more so, I think when we talk about
the burden being not on the inspector but on Iraq, we should see
our own burden that we bear before the country and the judgment
of history. We need to do everything we possibly can to avoid war.
Now, having said that, let me congratulate you, Mr. Director, on
your work. I read the book Bush at War by Bob Woodward, and
62
as I read that book, I came to believe that you were virtually the
central hero.
Mr. Tenet. Do not believe everj^hing you read, Senator.
Senator Byrd. I don't, not everything I hear either in response
to questioning. But you performed admirably in that book, if I may
say. With respect to the defeat of the Taliban, and whatever is true
about that book, I want to compliment you on.
I only have one other question, Mr. Chairman. Let me just ask
it this way. The Director has on more than one occasion this morn-
ing said that he has not had time to analyze the recent information
that has come to light on Osama bin Laden and he has indicated
he might need another day or so. Might we have another hearing
when the Director has had time to analyze this information? Might
we have another hearing? I think the American people are entitled
to know what his responses to those questions are.
Chairman Warner. Our colleague makes another point. May I
suggest we take the interim step of analyzing the submissions from
the Director of Intelligence and then in consultation with our rank-
ing member and yourself and others, we will take that into consid-
eration.
Senator Byrd. Fair enough. I thank my chairman. He is so ac-
commodating and responsive. I think we have a burden to inform
the American people and it is not any fault of the chairman or the
ranking member, but I think we have been delinquent in our duty
as a Congress to ask questions and to inform the American people
as we are about to take this very critical step we see looming just
ahead. I think this committee has a responsibility to do everything
that it can. So does our Appropriations Committee.
I do not think we as a Congress have fully fulfilled our respon-
sibility to the American people.
Chairman Warner. I think our distinguished colleague would
recognize just in the past few days a number of hearings have been
held one at the Foreign Relations Committee yesterday, and Sen-
ator Levin and I participated with members of the Intelligence
Committee today. I think the consultation between the administra-
tion and Congress, and I have urged to reach the highest obtain-
able highwater mark of any President; I believe we are reaching
that.
Senator Levin, you had a comment that you wished to make.
Senator Levin. A very quick question and comment. It relates to
this issue of where the Director said we are not worried about the
number of foot soldiers out there in the terrorist movement. Let me
tell you, I am and Admiral Jacoby apparently is.
Mr. Tenet. I did not mean to imply it. Senator. Let me correct
the record then.
Senator Levin. I want to read you what Admiral Jacoby said and
let me see if you agree with that. This is in today's written testi-
mony, and it says so much. I wish you would have time to read this
paragraph. "Much of the world is increasingly apprehensive about
U.S. power and influence. Many are concerned about the expan-
sion, consolidation, and dominance of American values, ideals, cul-
ture, and institutions. Reactions to this sensitivity to growing
'Americanization' can range from mild 'chafing' on the part of our
friends and allies to fear and violent rejection on the part of our
63
adversaries. We should consider that these perceptions, mixed with
angst over perceived U.S. unilateraHsm, will give rise to significant
anti-American behavior." Do you agree with the Admiral?
Mr. Tenet. I'd like to think about it.
Senator Levin. I would like to put in the record, Mr. Chairman,
an article from The Washington Post of Friday, February 7. There
are two quotes in particular. One, "Senior U.S. officials said that,
although the Iraqi government is aware of Zarqawi's group's activ-
ity it does not operate, control, or sponsor it." Second, the para-
graph which says, "Senior administration officials said that, al-
though Zarqawi has ties to Osama bin Laden's group, he is not
under al Qaeda control or direction. 'They have common goals,' one
intelligence analyst said, but he [Zarqawi] is outside Osama bin
Laden's circle. He is not sworn al Qaeda."
Because the time has run today and because the Director did
comment on both of those yesterday at the Intelligence Committee,
I would ask that in addition to these quotes from this article being
made part of the record, that the testimony of the Director com-
menting on those quotes from yesterday's Intelligence Committee
hearing also be made part of the record.
Chairman Warner. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
64
The Washington Post
February 07, 2003, Friday, Final Edition
SECTION: A SECTION; Pg. A21
LENGTH: 823 words
HEADLINE; Alleged Al Qaeda Ties Questioned; Experts Scrutinize Details of Accusations
Against Iraqi Government
BYLINE: Walter Pincus, Washington Post Staff Writer
BODY:
Foreign government officials, experts In terrorism and a few members of Congress raised
questions yesterday about the Bush administration's description of the connections between
the Iraqi leadership and the al Qaeda terrorist network.
One of the most powerful disclosures made by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell in his
presentation to the U.N. Security Council Wednesday concerned a terrorist organization run
by Abu Musab Zarqawi, 36, a Jordanian-born Palestinian. Powell described Zarqawl as an
"associate" and "collaborator" of al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.
Several experts described Powell's presentation as very strong in public relations terms, but
they questioned the details of his description of the Zarqawi group and its relationship with
Baghdad. A Washington terrorism expert who asked not to be Identified said President
Bush's depiction of Zarqawi yesterday as "a senior al Qaeda terrorist planner" raised similar
questions. Senior administration officials said that, although Zarqawi has ties to bin Laden's
group, he is not under al Qaeda control or direction. 'They have common goals," one
intelligence analyst said, "but he (Zarqawi] is outside bin Laden's circle. He is not sworn al
Qaeda."
Another senior administration official said Zarqawi started out as a Palestinian terrorist
whose first known operation was carried out with Jordanians who had come together during
the fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The operation was an
attempt in late 1999 to blow up the Radlsson SAS Hotel in Amman, Jordan, which was
frequented by Israeli and American tourists.
In his U.N. address, Powell said Zarqawi's network represents a potentially "more sinister
nexus between Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network" than the connections Baghdad
previously had with terrorist groups such as the Palestine Liberation Front, which It had
supplied with money, small arms and explosives. Powell said Zarqawi has a "cell" in
Baghdad from which associates "coordinate the movement of people, money and supplies
Into and throughout Iraq for his network."
Senior U.S. officials, contacted by telephone yesterday, said that, although the Iraqi
government Is aware of the group's activity. It does not operate, control or sponsor It.
65
Zarqawl's network, Powell said, maintains a camp in northeastern Kurdish Iraq -- territory
not controlled by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein -- that is within a small enclave ruled by
an Islamic fundamentalist group called Ansar al-Islam. Powell said Baghdad has an "agent"
in "the most senior levels" of Ansar, implying a special relationship with the Hussein
government.
A senior government official said U.S. Intelligence has no direct knowledge of what the
"agent" does. "He may be spying on the Ansar group. He may be a liaison with Baghdad,"
the official said. "Saddam Hussein likes to keep an eye on such groups."
Ansar is at war with the Kurdish groups in northern Iraq that are protected by the United
States. "We used to say there was no connection [between Hussein and the Zarqawi
group]," said a senior foreign official supportive of the administration's Iraq policy. "You've
got this camp of nutters up there in Kurdistan. Now there are some more indications of
more connections, but what they mean and where they lead" are not clear.
The exiled former head of Ansar, Mullah Krekar, told the Guardian newspaper of London
yesterday that he has no links with Iraqi leaders. "I am against Saddam Hussein," he said
from his home in Oslo. "I want [Iraq] to change into an Islamic regime."
At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing yesterday. Sen. Joseph R. Biden 3r.
(D-Del.) asked Powell why no military action has been taken against the Ansar camp since
U.S. officials became aware of it in August. Noting that he was in Kurdistan last summer,
Biden said there were reports at the time that an attack against the camp was planned.
Powell responded that there had been intelligence monitoring of the camp. "It's been
occupied and unoccupied since last summer," he said. As for why no military action has
been taken, Powell told Biden that he could not talk about "specific military contingency
plans."
Powell said the United States has beeu "tracing individuals who have gone in there and
come out of there," a surveillance effort that enabled him "to make the presentation that I
made yesterday." The tracing of those individuals and the testimony of one detainee helped
Powell connect Zarqawl's network to plotted terrorist attacks in Europe during his U.N.
presentation.
In his remarks at the White House after meeting with Powell yesterday. Bush said Zarqawl's
network "was caught producing poisons In London."
However, senior administration officials said a connection with Zarqawi "is still being
investigated," a statement echoed by London law enforcement officials quoted In British
newspapers.
66
SEN. LEVIN: In the February 7th Washington Post, senior U.S. officials contacted by
telephone by the reporter said that although the Iraqi government is aware of the group's
activity, It does not operate, control, or sponsor. Do you disagree with that?
MR. TENET: I'nn sorry, sir; it's - on the basis of what I know today, I can't say "control" in
any way, shape or form, but I will tell you, there's more data coming in here. So what you
just read, I will stand by today, maybe not tomorrow, but we'll see where the data takes us.
SEN. LEVIN: All right.
Next. Is Zarqawi himself a senior al Qaeda terrorist planner? Is he -
MR. TENET: He's a senior al Qaeda terrorist associate, yes, sir.
SEN. LEVIN: No, is he a planner?
MR. TENET: Yes, sir. He's met with bin Laden. He's --
SEN. LEVIN; So he works for al Qaeda?
MR. TENET: He's been provided money by them. He conceives of himself as being quite
Independent, but he's someone who's well known to them, has been used by them, has
been contracted by them. And —
SEN. LEVIN: Is he under their control or direction?
MR. TENET: He thinks of himself as independent, sir, but he draws sustenance from them.
SEN. LEVIN: All right. Do you disagree, then, with the senior administration officials In The
Washington Post quoted on February 7th who say that although Zarqawi has ties to bin
Laden, he is not under al Qaeda's control or direction?
MR. TENET: Sir, I don't agree with that statement. I believe they're witting about what he's
doing. I believe they provide him sustenance, and I believe they use him effectively for their
purposes and they know precisely what he's up to.
SEN. LEVIN: And therefore you do not agree with the senior officials who said this?
MR. TENET: No, sir. I think the relationship with him Is more Intimate than that.
SEN. LEVIN: Unnamed. These are unnamed ofTiclals, of course. But it's —
MR. TENET: (Off mike) -- are.
SEN. LEVIN: But even when they come from the CIA, they're unnamed.
MR. TENET: Yes, sir.
SEN. LEVIN: Yeah.
The reason 1 ask you about the statement whether or not they have bases — al Qaeda has
bases m Iraq is because of the statement this morning of Mr. Ford. He said you couldn't say
that they have bases one way or the other. But I just want to let you know, on page 3 of
Mr. Ford's testimony, he says that Saddam has allowed al Qaeda increasingly to secure
bases from which to plan terrorist attacks.
MR. TENET: Well, sir, you said to me (the main are at ?) -- you told me not about the -
67
well, of course, in regard to this Kurdish -- these —
SEN. LEVIN: No, no. He's allowed. Saddam has allowed. That's not the Kurdish area.
MR. TENET: Yeah. Well, he's allowing them to operate in Baghdad. Whether It's a base or
not, I --
SEN. LEVIN: But tell Mr. Ford you don't know whether their base -- so his next testimony
will reflect some consistency with the CIA.
MR. TENET: It would be a base of operation, sir, Is the way I'd characterize it.
MR. FORD: We've never had an agreement that we had to be consistent with the CIA. We
give our own view.
SEN. LEVIN: That sounds good. That — that's -- there's not unanimity about these issues In
the intelligence community. That's a useful bit of information.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman WARNER. We will now reconvene in SH-219 in execu-
tive session.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
scott speicher
1. Senator Bill Nelson. Director Tenet, Captain Scott Speicher's status is of
great concern to me. I want to ensure that as events unfold in Iraq that he is not
forgotten and that the U.S. intelhgence community is doing all it can to find out
more information about his location and his condition. I appreciate your past assist-
ance on this matter and look forward to continuing to work with you in the future.
Is there new information on the status of Captain Scott Speicher?
Director Tenet. We defer to DIA on the status of the investigation of Captain
Speicher.
2. Senator Bill Nelson. Director Tenet, are regional intelligence agencies in the
Middle East cooperating with U.S. efforts to resolve Captain Speicher's status?
Director Tenet. We defer to DIA on the status of the investigation of Captain
Speicher.
AL QAEDA elements in PAKISTAN
3. Senator Bill Nelson. Director Tenet, I am greatly concerned with escalating
combat operations in Afghanistan by U.S. troops. I am especially concerned with the
fact that al Qaeda and Taliban elements may be using Western Pakistan as a stag-
ing area or safe haven for operations against U.S. forces and the Karzai govern-
ment. Are elements of Pakistan's security or defense forces allowing (or tolerating)
al Qaeda or the Taliban to use Western Pakistan as a "safe haven" from which to
launch operations against American forces in Afghanistan?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
al qaeda ELEMENTS IN IRAQ
4. Senator Bill Nelson. Director Tenet, a portion of Secretary Powell's presen-
tation to the U.N. dealt with the ties between Iraq and al Qaeda. One particular
training camp was identified in northeastern Iraq. In addition, officials of the Patri-
otic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) say that they informed U.S. officials of an al Qaeda
presence in September 2001. Where exactly is this camp located, Saddam-controlled
territory, Kurd-controlled territory, or perhaps some other ambiguous location like
a no-fly zone?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
5. Senator Bill Nelson. Director Tenet, how many such camps exist in the re-
gion? Do they not pose a threat to U.S. security?
68
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
6. Senator Bill Nelson. Director Tenet, how long has the administration been
aware of this presence in northeastern Iraq? Why haven't we taken direct military
action against that group?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
CHINESE MILITARY MODERNIZATION
7. Senator Bill Nelson. Vice Admiral Jacoby, press reports indicate that China
has increased its defense budget significantly in the last 2 years. They are on a glide
path to significant modernization that may threaten U.S. military superiority in the
not too distant future. How would you assess the impact of Chinese military mod-
ernization, especially their naval, air defense, and anti-ship missile modernization,
on regional stability and future U.S. relations?
Admiral Jacoby. China has underway an ambitious military modernization pro-
gram aimed at improving key elements of both its conventional and its strategic
Forces. Its primary focus is on improving the ability of the People's Liberation Army
(PLA) to fight short-duration, high-intensity conflicts along or near China's periph-
ery. This modernization program also is aimed at deterring or countering U.S. mili-
tary intervention in the Asia-Pacific region. To this end, the PLA is acquiring mod-
em surface combatants and submarines, surface-to-air missile systems, fourth-gen-
eration fighters, supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles and naval air defense systems,
and a new generation of ground force equipment. As a result, within the decade,
China's overall capacity to threaten other countries in the region, as well as U.S.
military forces in the region, will increase. For example:
• China has begun to deploy indigenous SONG and Russian-built KILO
diesel attack submarines and is developing a new nuclear-powered sub-
marine class.
• China is improving significantly its passive air and missile defenses.
• China is procuring and developing cruise missiles capable of being
laimched fi-om aircran, and land, as well as submarines and surface ships.
These programs and other enhancements to the PLA's overall fighting capability
potentially could contribute to instability in the Asia-Pacific region and challenge
Sino-Americans relations, should Beijing opt to use military force to resolve its nu-
merous disputed territorial claims or to achieve regional preeminence, one of Chi-
na's strategic objectives.
COLOMBIA
8. Senator Bill Nelson. Director Tenet, I am concerned with the growing level
of violence in Colombia and the potential for instability there to spread to other na-
tions in the region. What are the threats to stability and democratization posed by
the spread of both narcotics production and insurgency in the South America?
Director TENET. [Deleted.]
9. Senator Bill Nelson. Director Tenet, specifically, how is the threat of terror-
ism evolving in Colombia in light of the recent Bogota nightclub bombing?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
10. Senator Bill Nelson. Director Tenet, do you expect the FARC or other groups
to begin directly targeting American citizens in Colombia or elsewhere in South
America?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
[Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
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